Volume XX - Annexes 764-775

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME XX OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 764 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June
2014)
Annex 765 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16
September 2014)
Annex 766 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 November
2014)
Annex 767 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (1 December
2014 to 15 February 2015)
Annex 768 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February–
15 May 2015)
Annex 769 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15
August 2015)
Annex 770 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August–
15 November 2015)
Annex 771 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February
to 15 May 2016)
Annex 772 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15
August 2016)
Annex 773 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August –
15 November 2016)
Annex 774 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February
to 15 May 2017)
Annex 775 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15
August 2017)

Annex 764
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014)

1
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
15 June 2014
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
II. METHODOLOGY 6
III. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 7
A. Investigations into human rights violations related to the Maidan protests 7
B. Investigations into human rights violations related to the violence in Odesa
on 2 May
9
C. Investigations into other human rights violations 17
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES 18
A. Rule of law 18
B. Freedom of peaceful assembly 22
C. Freedom of expression 23
D. Minority rights 23
E. Political rights 24
F. Internally displaced persons 25
V. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN THE EAST 27
A. Impact of the security situation on human rights 27
B. Right to life, liberty and security 32
C. Freedom of expression 37
D. Freedom of religion or belief 41
E. Economic, social and cultural rights 41
VI. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN CRIMEA 48
A. Civil and political rights of Crimean residents 48
B. Economic, social and cultural rights 53
C. Rights of indigenous peoples 55
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 55
3
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The present report is based on findings of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) covering the period of 7 May – 7 June
2014. It follows two reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine released by the
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on 15 April and 16
May 2014.
2. During the reporting period, the human rights situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions has continued to deteriorate. The 11 March “referendum” on “self-rule” held by
the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic”,1
albeit without effect under international law, was seen by their representatives as the
first step to the creation of a “Novorossia”. In addition, armed groups have continued to
physically occupy most of the key public and administrative buildings in many cities
and towns of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and have declared virtual
“independence”, however, the provision of administrative services to the local
population remains with the State.
3. The presence of armed people and weapons in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk has
increased. Representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” have recognised the
presence within their armed groups of citizens of the Russian Federation, including
from Chechnya and other republics of the North Caucasus. In the period following the
elections, the HRMMU observed armed men on trucks and armoured vehicles moving
around downtown Donetsk in daylight.
4. The escalation in criminal activity resulting in human rights abuses is no longer limited
to targeting journalists, elected representatives, local politicians, civil servants and civil
society activists. Abductions, detentions, acts of ill-treatment and torture, and killings
by armed groups are now affecting the broader population of the two eastern regions,
which are now marked by an atmosphere of intimidation and consequent fear. Armed
groups must be urged to stop their illegal activities and lay down their arms.
5. There has also been more regular and intense fighting as the Government has been
trying to restore peace and security over the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
through security operations involving its armed forces. Local residents of areas affected
by the fighting are increasingly being caught in the cross-fire between the Ukrainian
military and armed groups, with a growing number of residents killed and wounded,
and damage to property. The HRMMU is concerned at the increasing number of reports
of enforced disappearances as a result of the security operations. The Government must
further use restraint of force, and ensure that its security operations are at all times in
line with international standards.2
6. As a result of these developments, residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions live in
a very insecure environment, coupled with social and economic hardships. Daily life is
more and more of a challenge. The HRMMU is gravely concerned that the combination
of the increased number of illegal acts by the armed groups, and the intensification of
fighting between armed groups and Ukrainian forces is raising serious human rights
1 Hereafter referred to as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic”.
2 Human Rights Watch Letter to former Acting President Turchynov and President-Elect Poroshenko dated 6
June 2014, on the conduct of security operations in south-eastern Ukraine in light of the growing number of
credible reports regarding Ukrainian forces’ use of mortars and other weapons in and around populated areas,
and the recent intensifying of hostilities between Ukrainian forces and armed groups.
4
concerns, including but not limited to, the fate of the general population, especially
women and children, in the areas under the control of armed groups.
7. As of 6 June, the departments of social protection in Ukraine’s regions had identified
over 12,700 internally displaced persons (IDPs)3. However, the actual number of
people who have fled the violence and fighting in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
is believed to be higher and increasing daily.
8. Freedom of expression continues to be threatened, particularly in the eastern regions,
where journalists face ongoing intimidation and threats to their physical security. Hate
speech, particularly through social media, continue to fuel tensions and to deepen
division between communities.
9. In Crimea, the introduction of Russian Federation legislation, in contradiction with the
United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/262 and applicable bodies of
international law, hampers the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It
has created a legislative limbo as, while Ukrainian legislation was supposed to remain
in force until 1 January 2015, the legal institutions and framework are already required
to comply with the provisions of legislation of the Russian Federation.
10. Residents in Crimea known for their “Pro-Ukrainian” position are intimidated. The
HRMMU is concerned that many may face increasing discrimination, particularly in
the areas of education and employment. Leaders and activists of the indigenous
Crimean Tatar people face prosecution and limitations on the enjoyment of their
cultural rights. During the reporting period, the situation of all residents of Crimea has
deteriorated with regard to their right to freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly,
association, religion or belief.
11. From 14 to 19 May, Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Human Rights Ivan
Šimonović travelled to Ukraine. During his visits to Kyiv, Donetsk and Odesa, he
discussed the 16 May report with the Government, regional and local officials, the
Ombudsperson and representatives of civil society, and the international community.
The ASG highlighted the importance of prompt follow-up to the recommendations
made in the OHCHR report as a means to de-escalate tensions, in particular ahead of
the Presidential elections.
12. The investigations under the Office of the Prosecutor General into the Maidan events
continued. On 28 May, a Kyiv court sentenced two police officers who subjected a
Maidan demonstrator to ill-treatment. On 15 May, relatives of those killed on Maidan,
dissatisfied with the perceived slowness of the official investigation, created an
initiative group to conduct their own investigation. The HRMMU remains in regular
contact with the Office of the Prosecutor General and emphasizes the need for the
investigation to be transparent, comprehensive and timely.
13. With respect to the incidents that took place in Odesa on 2 May, it should be noted that
six official investigations have been established. The main bodies undertaking such
investigations are the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the State Security Service in
Ukraine (SBU). It is with regret that the HRMMU reports a lack of cooperation from
both governmental bodies, particularly at the central level with the HRMMU, which
has been preventing the HRMMU from conducting a proper assessment of the progress
3 As of 16 June, UNHCR estimate there to be 34,336 IDPs in Ukraine.
According to the Russian Federation Federal Migration Service, as of 6 June, 2014, 837 persons had applied
and were granted refugee status; and 3,750 persons had applied and were granted Temporary Asylum.
Approximately 15% were minors under the age of 18. These figures do not include people from Crimea.
5
made. The HRMMU reiterates the need for prompt and thorough investigations into the
violent incidents on 2 May in Odesa. Some key questions must be addressed to ensure
confidence in the investigation and to guarantee accountability, due process and to
enable the communities to accept fully the results of such an investigation. Among
those questions are the conduct of the police on 2 May: why it, and the fire brigade,
either did not react, or were slow to react; what caused the fire in the Trade Union
building; who are the perpetrators of the killings in the afternoon and the fire in the
evening; and what measures are being taken to guarantee justice for the victims, and
due process for the people detained in connection with these events. Furthermore, the
Government must pay particular attention to ensure social media is not used for hate
speech or incitement to hatred.
14. A key development during the reporting period was the Presidential election held on 25
May 2014. There were 21 candidates officially on the ballot. On 3 June, the Central
Election Commission (CEC) confirmed that Mr. Petro Poroshenko had won with 54.7%
of the vote. In the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, attacks had taken place every day
during the week preceding the elections and multiplied on election day, with violent
obstruction of polling stations. The pattern of such attacks consisted of representatives
of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” and armed
men entering the premises of the district election commissions, threatening staff and
sometimes beating and/or abducting them, often taking away voters’ lists, computers
and official documents. In some cases, the premises of these commissions were seized
and blocked; others had to close either because they became inoperative, or for security
reasons the staff were frightened to come back. Several attacks against district election
commissions and polling stations were reported just prior to, and on, the election day,
with armed men entering polling stations, forcing them to close and/or destroying or
stealing ballot boxes. These illegal acts prevented many people living in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions to exercise their right to vote.
15. Residents of Crimea had to go to mainland Ukraine to vote. The HRMMU monitored
the situation in the Kherson region, where most of the Crimean voters had registered,
and spoke to representatives of the Crimean Tatars. As they crossed the administrative
border by car to go to vote, representatives of “self-defence forces” reportedly recorded
various personal details, including car license plates and passport numbers. The
HRMMU was informed that many Crimean Tatars did not go to vote due to the cost of
travelling, concerns about crossing the administrative border, and fear of reprisals by
the authorities in Crimea.
16. During the reporting period, the Government of Ukraine continued to implement the
Geneva Statement.4 National roundtables on constitutional reform, decentralization,
minority rights and the rule of law were held in Kyiv on 14 May, in Kharkiv on 17
May, and in Mykolaiv on 21 May. These meetings brought together former Presidents
Kravchuk and Kuchma, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, political party leaders, members of
the business community and other civil society organizations. In Kharkiv, Prime
4 The Geneva Statement on Ukraine was issued on 17 April 2014 by representatives of the European Union,
United States, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. It sets out the agreed initial concrete steps to de-escalate
tensions and restore security for all: (1) All sides must refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative
actions; (2) All illegal armed groups must be disarmed; all illegally seized buildings must be returned to
legitimate owners; all illegally occupied public offices must be vacated; (3) Amnesty should be granted to the
protestors who left seized buildings and surrendered weapons, with the exception of those found guilty of
capital crimes; and (4) The announced constitutional process will be inclusive, transparent and accountable
carried out through a broad national dialogue.
6
Minister Yatsenyuk declared that the Constitution should be amended in order to
provide a special status for the Russian language and national minority languages.
17. On 13 May, the Parliament adopted the Law “On amending some legislative acts in the
area of state anti-corruption policy in connection with the implementation of the
European Union (EU) Action Plan on the liberalisation of the visa regime for Ukraine”.
The Law provides for more stringent penalties for corruption offences committed by
individuals or legal entities.
18. On 20 May, Parliament adopted by resolution № 4904 the Memorandum of Concord
and Peace, which was drafted during the roundtable on national unity in Kharkiv on 17
May, and discussed on 21 May in Mykolaiv. Supported by 252 votes (all deputies
except the Communist Party of Ukraine and Svoboda), the document foresees that the
adoption of a constitutional reform package, including the decentralization of power
and a special status for the Russian language; judicial and police reform, and the
adoption of an amnesty law for anti-government protesters in the east who would
accept giving up weapons, except for those who have committed serious crimes against
life and physical integrity. The Parliament called on all to work together to protect,
promote and build a democratic Ukraine, and the peaceful coexistence of all
nationalities, religions and political convictions.
II. METHODOLOGY
19. The present report was prepared by the HRMMU on the basis of information collected
during the period of 7 May to 7 June 2014. During this period, the HRMMU continued
to operate pursuant to the objectives as set out at the time of its deployment in March
2014, and in accordance with the same methodology as outlined in its second monthly
report on the situation of human rights in Ukraine issued by OHCHR on 16 May.5 The
present report does not intend to present an exhaustive account of all human rights
concerns in Ukraine that have been followed by HRMMU during the reporting period.
It rather focuses on those violations and developments which represent particular
human rights challenges at the current juncture or demonstrate trends for potentially
longer-term human rights concerns in the country.
20. The HRMMU continued to work closely with the United Nations entities in Ukraine. It
is grateful for the support and contributions received for the report from the Office of
the United Nations Resident Coordinator, the Department for Political Affairs (DPA),
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health
Organisation (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United
Nations Development Fund (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Organisation
for Migration (IOM), and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA).
21. The HRMMU appreciates the close cooperation with international and national
partners, including among others, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).
5 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf
7
III. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. Investigations into human rights violations related to Maidan protests
22. Five separate initiatives are ongoing in connection with the investigations into human
rights violations committed during the Maidan events: (1) the official State
investigation is undertaken by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine in
cooperation with the MoI; (2) a temporary “commission on the investigation of illegal
actions of the law enforcement bodies and individual officials and attacks on the rights
and freedoms, lives and health of citizens during the events connected with the mass
actions of political and civil protests that have been taking place in Ukraine since 21
November 2013” was established by Parliament on 26 December 2013; (3) the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe initiated, in December 2013, a threemember
International Advisory Panel to oversee that the investigations of the violent
incidents which have taken place in Ukraine from November 2013 onwards meet the
requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights; (4) a Public Commission on the investigation and
prevention of human rights violations in Ukraine was created on 27 January 2014,
initiated by a group of Ukrainian legal academics; and (5) an initiative group
comprising family members of people who died on Maidan.
23. The Ukrainian Ombudsperson issued a special report on “Infringement of Human
Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine - The Events of November 2013 – February 2014’.6
Forceful dispersal of Maidan protesters on 30 November 2013
24. As noted in the previous reports, the violent dispersal of protesters on 30 November
was the first instance of the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators, and
triggered further protests.
25. On 14 May, the Kyiv Pechersky Court postponed a hearing of Oleksandr Popov, former
Head of the Kyiv City administration, and of Volodymyr Sivkovych, former Deputy
Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, who are under suspicion of
being responsible for the forced dispersal of Maidan protesters on the night of 30
November 2013. The hearing was scheduled after the Kyiv city Court of Appeal
cancelled the decision of the Kyiv Pechersky Court of 31 January 2014 to amnesty
persons responsible for ordering the crackdown of demonstrators by the “Berkut” riot
police under the law of 19 December, which has since then been rescinded.
26. The hearing planned for 14 May eventually took place on 26 May but was followed by
an incident. About 15 members of the “Maidan self-defence” attacked Oleksandr Popov
after he left the court room. He was doused with water, alcohol and iodine, and
insulted. Members of the police, who were standing by, did not intervene.
27. During the following hearing, on 5 June, the plaintiffs (representing Maidan victims)
submitted a petition for the revocation of the judge considering the case. The petition
was accepted by the court, leading to the postponement of the hearings until a decision
on the revocation.
6 Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Report on ‘Infringement of Human Rights and
Freedoms in Ukraine - The events of November 2013 – February 2014’, issued on 28 February, 2014.
8
Criminal proceedings into the killings of 19-21 January and 18-20 February 2014
28. During 19-21 January 2014, fierce clashes broke out in central Kyiv between the police
and protesters, resulting in the first three casualties among demonstrators. The death
toll rose significantly between 18-20 February, with confrontations taking the lives of
dozens of persons, mostly protesters.
29. Different figures continue being reported regarding the number of deaths during the
protests in January and February. According to information from the Office of the
Prosecutor General communicated to the HRMMU on 27 May, 76 protesters were
killed as a result of firearm wounds on Hrushevskoho and Institutska streets due to
armed confrontations. On 21 May, the Ministry of Health announced that 106
demonstrators had died during the protests. Information from the NGO “Euromaidan
SOS”, dated 3 June, refers to 113 casualties among protesters (109 in Kyiv and 4 in the
regions).
30. There are also discrepancies concerning casualties among law enforcement officers: 14
according to the Office of the Prosecutor General; 17 according to the Investigation
Commission of the Parliament of Ukraine on the Maidan events; and 20 according to
the NGO “Euromaidan SOS”.
31. For investigation purposes, all the killings of protesters by firearms were merged by the
Office of the General Prosecutor into one criminal proceeding. As of 24 April, three
“Berkut” officers had been arrested and officially charged with Article 115 (Murder) of
the Criminal Code. The situation has not changed over the past month and a half. The
killing of law enforcement officers is being investigated by a separate team within the
Office of the Prosecutor General. As of 6 June, no suspects had been identified.
32. On 20 May, the deputy head of the Kyiv Department of the MoI, Sergiy Boyko,
declared that all documentation related to the activities of the special police unit
“Berkut” during Maidan had been destroyed upon the order of the unit commander in
the last days of February 2014.
33. On 5 June, the HRMMU met with a representative of an initiative group claiming to
represent about 320 relatives of people killed on Maidan. The group held its first
meeting on 15-16 May, and is planning to initiate an independent investigation into the
events, with the involvement of lawyers and journalists. They consider their initiative
as necessary as they are not satisfied with the ongoing investigations. The group, which
plans to register an NGO entitled “Family Maidan” also intends to support families of
Maidan victims.
34. On 21 May, the Head of the Parliamentary Investigation Commission on the Maidan
events reported that two persons who had participated in the protests were still missing.
Eleven persons suspected in the killing of demonstrators have been identified, of whom
three were arrested and eight remain at large, allegedly in the Russian Federation. The
Commission is seeking to obtain full and reliable information on violations during
Maidan and will forward evidence to the General Prosecutor’s Office. It has a one-year
mandate and must issue a report to Parliament no later than six months after its
establishment that is by 26 June 2014.
35. The International Advisory Panel (IAP) of the Council of Europe overseeing the
Maidan investigations held two working sessions in Strasbourg on 9-11 April and 5-7
May 2014. On 16 May, it issued guidelines for NGO submissions and requested input
by 11 June 2014. It also decided to request ‘certain authorities’ to submit information
9
mainly concerning the Maidan investigations. The first meetings of the IAP in Kyiv
will take place at the end of June 2014.
Torture and ill-treatment
36. On 28 May, the Kyiv Pechersky Court sentenced two police officers for abuse of power
and violence against a demonstrator, Mykhailo Havrylyuk, during the Maidan protests.
Mr. Havrylyuk had been stripped naked in the street by the police in freezing
conditions and forced to stand in the snow while being mocked, assaulted and filmed
with a mobile phone. During the hearings, the defendants pleaded guilty. One of them
was sentenced to three years of imprisonment with a probation period of one year, and
the other to two years, including a one-year probation period.
B. Investigations into human rights violations related to 2 May Odesa violence
Summary of events
37. The most serious single incident of significant loss of life in Ukraine since the killings
on Maidan occurred in Odesa on 2 May 2014.7 The events occurred on the same day
that a football match was due to take place between the Kharkiv football team
“Metallist” and the Odesa football team “Chernomorets”. On 1 May, the police
authorities issued an official statement announcing that due to possible disorder
because of the football game, an additional 2,000 police officers would patrol the
streets of Odesa.
38. Early in the morning of 2 May, at least 600 football fans arrived from Kharkiv. Football
fans from both teams are known to have strong “Pro-Unity”8 sympathies. A pre-match
rally for “United Ukraine” had been planned for 3.00 p.m. on Sobornaya square and
gathered, at least, 2,000 people, including supporters of the two football teams, Right
Sector activists, members of so-called self-defence units, and other “Pro-Unity”
supporters. Right Sector and “self-defence” unit supporters were observed by the
HRMMU wearing helmets and masks, and armed with shields, axes, wooden/metallic
sticks and some with firearms. By 3:00 p.m. the HRMMU had observed 15 police
officers on Sobornaya square and two buses of riot police officers parked nearby.
39. Meanwhile, the HRMMU observed that about 450 metres away from Sobornaya street,
“Pro-Federalism” activists, comprising approximately 300 activists from “Odesskaya
Druzhina” (radical “Pro-Federalism” movement), had also gathered one hour earlier.
They reportedly intended to prevent the “Pro-Unity” rally; and were wearing helmets,
shields, masks, axes, wooden/metal sticks and some of them with firearms.
40. The HRMMU observed an insufficient and inadequate police presence to manage and
ensure security, and crowd control of the “United Ukraine” march towards the football
stadium. The HRMMU noted that additional police officers arrived at the scene, but
were unable to stop the violent confrontation.
41. At 3.15 p.m., the “Pro-Federalism Odesskaya Drujina”, “Narodnaya Drujina” and other
activists approached the Sobornaya square and started to provoke the participants of the
“United Ukraine” rally. Clashes arose and quickly turned into mass disorder, which
7 See also OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 15 May 2014
(http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf)
8 The terms “Pro-Unity” and “Pro-Federalism” are used in the context as describing the motivations and
orientation of the supporters / activists.
10
lasted for several hours until 6.30 p.m. Police officers and supporters from both sides
were injured during the afternoon. Six men were killed by gunshots fired by activists.
42. The HRMMU observed that following the clashes in the city centre, some “Pro-
Federalism” activists ran from the area chased by “Pro-Unity” supporters.
Approximately 60 “Pro-Federalism” activists took refuge in the “Afina” shopping
centre, which had been closed during the day. The “Afina” shopping centre was then
surrounded by “Pro-Unity” activists. Riot police (Special Forces “SOKOL”) arrived on
the scene, and reportedly took away 47 “Pro-Federalism” activists, while letting women
out of the complex. Other “Pro-Federalism” supporters ran from the clashes to the tent
camp at the Kulikovo Pole square, where approximately 200 supporters had gathered
(including all the “Pro-Federalism” leaders) during the afternoon.
43. Some “Pro-Unity” politicians called upon their supporters to march towards the
Kulikovo Pole square. At 7.00 p.m., the “Pro-Unity” supporters marched in that
direction, accompanied behind them by approximately 60 riot police.
44. The “Pro-Federalism” leaders were informed that “Pro-Unity” supporters were heading
towards the tent camp, and between 6.00 – 6.30 p.m., they decided to take refuge in the
nearby Trade Union Building.
45. At 7.30 p.m., when the “Pro-Unity” supporters reached Kulikovo Pole square, they
burned all the “Pro-Federalism” tents. The “Pro-Federalism” activists, who had hidden
in the Trade Union Building, and the “Pro-Unity” activists, then reportedly started
throwing Molotov cocktails at each other. Gunshots could reportedly be heard coming
from both sides. At around 8.00 p.m., the “Pro-Unity” activists entered the Trade Union
Building where the “Pro-Federalism” supporters had sought refuge.
46. During the evening a fire broke out in the Trade Union Building. At 7.43 p.m., the
HRMMU called the fire brigade, which has its base located 650 metres from the Trade
Union Building. Reportedly, the fire brigade only arrived 40 minutes after receiving the
first phone call about the fire. According to fire brigade officials, this was due to the
fact that the police did not create a safe and secure perimeter allowing the fire brigade
to easily access the Trade Union Building. The cause of the fire remains unclear at this
stage.
47. As a result of the fire, officially 42 people died: 32 (including 6 females) were trapped
and unable to leave the building and 10 (including one female and one minor) died
jumping from windows.
48. The HRMMU has received information from credible resources that some “Pro-Unity”
protesters were beating up “Pro-Federalism” supporters as they were trying to escape
the Trade Union Building, while others were trying to help them.
49. 247 other people were brought from the scene requiring medical assistance: 27 people
with gunshot wounds, 31 with stab wounds, 26 with burns and intoxication caused by
combustible products and 163 with injuries by blunt objects. Of these, 99 people were
hospitalised, including 22 policemen, with 35 in serious condition. According to
various sources, all those who died were Ukrainian citizens. There are no more official
reports of people missing in relation to 2 May events. Seven of those injured remain in
hospital. The HRMMU received allegations that many who were treated in hospitals
did not give their real names and addresses. Moreover, some people who were heavily
injured from the violence did not go to hospital for fear of retaliation.
11
50. During the evening, it was reported to the HRMMU that a bare minimum police force
was present at the Kulikovo Pole square. Even when the special riot police force
arrived at the scene, the officers did not intervene in the violence that took place on the
Kulikovo Pole square. The HRMMU was told by high ranking police officers that the
reason for this is that they did not receive any formal order to intervene.
Detentions
51. The HRMMU has noted slight discrepancies regarding the number of people
arrested/detained/transferred during, and in the aftermath of, the 2 May violence. The
Regional Prosecution Office and the Regional Ministry of Interior present different
figures relating to these events. For example, figures for those arrested in the centre of
town vary from 42 to 47 people, and figures for those arrested at the Trade Union
Building from 63 to 67 people.
52. Criminal investigations have been launched under the following articles of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine: Article 115/1 (Intentional homicide); Article 194/2 (Intentional
destruction or damage of property); Article 294/2 (Mass riots/unrest); Article 296
(Hooliganism); Article 341/2 (Capturing of the state or public buildings or
constructions); Article 345 (Threat or violence against a law enforcement officer),
Article 365 (Excess of authority or official powers) and Article 367 (Neglect of official
duty).
53. The 47 “Pro-Federalism” activists who took refuge in the “Afina” shopping centre were
taken away (for so-called protection reasons) by Police Special Forces “SOKOL” and
transferred to two police stations outside Odesa (Ovidiopol and Bilhorod-Dnistrovkyi)
where they were detained for two days.
54. During this 48 hour period in police custody, detainees were not given food or water on
a regular basis, nor were they provided a one-hour walk per day, as per internal MoI
regulations9.
55. On 4 May, all 47 detainees were transferred to Vinnitsa (424 km from Odesa).
According to information provided to the HRMMU by credible sources, during the
transfer, which lasted for 12 hours, they received neither food nor water, nor were they
allowed to use toilet facilities (they had to urinate in the detainees van). According to
Ukrainian internal regulations, detainees during transfer should receive food and water.
56. On 6 May, video court hearings of the “Pro-Federalism” activists were organised with
the Primorsky District Court of Odesa. All were charged with Article 294 (Mass riots)
and/or Article 115 (Intentional homicide) of the Criminal Code; and during the
following days some were given additional criminal charges of either: Article 194/2
(Intentional destruction or damage of property); Article 296 (Hooliganism); Article
341/2 (Capturing of the state or public buildings or constructions); or Article 345
(Threat or violence against a law enforcement officer). According to the court
decisions of the 47 arrested, 14 were placed in the Vinnitsa pre-trial detention centre.
Four of these, after appealing the court decision, were placed under house arrest and
have since reportedly returned to Odesa. 33 of the 47 individuals originally arrested
were placed under house arrest as of 10 June 2014. Late in the evening of 2 May, 67
people were arrested at the Trade Union Building and transferred to the Odesa City
Police Station, where they were detained for two days. On 2 and 3 May, all were
9 Ministry of Interior regulation Number 60 dated 20/01/2001: warm food three times per day, and one hour
walk per day.
12
charged with either Articles 115 (Intentional homicide) or Article 294 (Mass riots) of
the Criminal Code. On 4 May at 5.00 p.m., the Odesa City Police Station was stormed
by relatives and friends of the “Pro-Federalism” movement. Under unclear
circumstances all of the 67 detainees were “released” by the police.
57. In addition to those arrested on 2 May, the MoI arrested at least four other people. On 6
May, one of the leaders of the “Pro-Federalism” movement was arrested and charged
under Article 294 of the Criminal Code. He is currently detained in a pre-trial detention
centre. On 18 May, a “Pro-Unity” activist was arrested, accused of firing at, and
injuring several people in the city centre on 2 May, including police officers, “Pro-
Federalism” activists and journalists. He was first transferred to the Investigation
Department of Odesa Regional Police Office, before being transferred to Kyiv. He is
accused under Article 115 (Murder) and Article 294-2 (Mass riots) of the Criminal
Code and on 21 May, he was placed under house arrest in Odesa by the Kyiv Pechersky
District Court.
58. Of the arrests conducted between 2 May and 3 June, in connection with the
investigations into the 2 May violence, 13 persons remain in pre-trial detention centres
under the Penitentiary Services (either in Vinnitsa, Odesa or Kyiv) charged with one or
more of the following six articles of the Criminal Code: Article 115/1 (Intentional
homicide); Article 194/2 (Intentional destruction or damage of property); Article 294/2
(Mass riots/unrest); Article 296 (Hooliganism); Article 341/2 (Capturing of the state or
public buildings or constructions); and Article 345 (Threat or violence against law
enforcement officer).
59. In addition, reportedly 40 people were placed under house arrest in Odesa charged with
the following articles of the Criminal Code: Article 115/1 (Intentional homicide);
Article 194/2 (Intentional destruction or damage of property; Article 294/2 (Mass
riots/unrest); Article 296 (Hooliganism); Article 341/2 (Capturing of the state or public
buildings or constructions); and Article 345 (Threat or violence against law
enforcement officer).
60. Two cases concerning “Pro-Unity” activists suspected of shooting and killing persons
during the 2 May violence, were heard by the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv,
following the arrest of two suspects on 18 and 26 May. Both were given house arrest;
both are charged under Article 294 (Mass riots), and one has been additionally charged
under Article 115 (Murder) of the Criminal Code.
Due process rights during, and after, the 2 May violence
61. The HRMMU visited detainees held in the pre-trial detention centre in Odesa. The
Penitentiary Services administration fully cooperated with the HRMMU and granted
access to several detainees (including one female) with whom private interviews were
carried out. The detainees did not complain about their conditions of detention or
physical treatment in the pre-trial detention centre in Odesa. They confirmed they were
able to meet privately with their lawyers.
62. The HRMMU also met with lawyers, victims, witnesses, detainees and relatives with
regard to the 2 May violence. It also held numerous meetings with the
Ombudsperson’s team, as well as representatives of law enforcement agencies, mass
media, local politicians and officials, activists and local officials. Through its
monitoring, the HRMMU has identified various human rights concerns with regard to
the on-going criminal investigations, which include some of the following.
13
Timely notification of reasons for arrest and charges within short period of time
63. On 15 May, the SBU apprehended five additional people. Although this took place at
9.00 a.m., the official arrest time has been recorded as 11.50 p.m. – over 12 hours later.
According to Article 208/4 of the Criminal Procedure Code ‘a competent official who
apprehended the person, shall be required to immediately inform the apprehended
person, in a language known to him, of the grounds for the apprehension and of the
commission of what crime he is suspected’. Furthermore, the procedure applied for the
arrest was not in line with Articles 9.2 and 9.3 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).
64. Similarly eight people apprehended by the SBU on 27 May at the Odesa railway station
did not receive prompt notification of the reasons for their arrest.
Right to a fair trial
65. Law enforcement agencies resorted to an illegal practice in order to prevent prompt
access to legal counsel. Indeed, during criminal interrogation procedures, police and
SBU officers summoned individuals as “witness” and later then substituted their status
as “suspect” and/or substituted their interrogation by interviewing. This resulted in
violating the persons’ right to see and consult a legal counsel (as provided for in Article
208/4 of the Criminal Procedural Code) and gave an opportunity to “delay” the official
time of apprehension.
66. For instance, the eight people who were arrested by the SBU at the Odesa railway
station were transferred to the SBU for an alleged “interview”. They were not informed
about their rights with regard to apprehension, nor were they provided with legal
counsel, nor could they contact their lawyers before and during interrogation.
67. The HRMMU observed, based on interviews with detainees and their relatives, that the
governmental Free Legal Aid scheme (established in connection with the new Criminal
Procedural Code of November 2012) encountered gaps in its system. For the legal
defence of detainees arrested during and after 2 May violence, the Free Legal Aid
system could not provide enough lawyers.
68. As of 4 June, the legal status of the 67 “detainees” released on 4 May from Odesa city
Police Station remained unclear. Due to procedural gaps following their alleged illegal
release (i.e. without a court decision), they remain suspects. The measure of restraint
was not applied to them as required in accordance with the Criminal Procedural Code.
Right to medical care
69. In Ovidiopol and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Police Stations medical care was not provided
to those among the 47 detainees who required such assistance due to illness. The
relatives of detainees placed in custody in the Vinnitsa pre-trial detention centre also
reported about the lack of medical care provided to their kin.
Personal data
70. Concerns have been raised with the HRMMU that on 19 May, the presumption of
innocence may have been violated during an official press conference of the MoI, by
the Deputy Minister of Interior/Head of Main Investigation Unit by disclosing personal
data of 12 detainees. The HRMMU reminds the authorities of the importance of
respecting international standards concerning the presumption of innocence and the
prohibition of arbitrary interference with one’s privacy or attacks upon his/her honour
and reputation.
14
71. Also on 3 May, the SBU published the names and passports of three citizens from the
Russian Federation allegedly involved in the 2 May violence.
Legality of arrest
72. On 15 May, the SBU conducted an illegal search of an apartment from 8.00 p.m. to
3.00 a.m., without a search warrant and without preparing a report/protocol on the
search. During the search, they broke the door, forced the family, including a girl to lie
down on the floor. A woman (wife/mother) was subsequently arrested and taken to the
SBU Office. The next day she was transferred to the Odesa Police Station. On 17 May,
the Primorsky District Court placed her in custody under Articles 294 (Mass riots) and
110 (Trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine) of the Criminal
Code. She is currently detained in Odesa pre-trial detention centre.
Accountability: Update on investigations into the Odesa incidents
73. Six official investigations have been initiated to look into the incidents of 2 May in
Odesa and are ongoing: 1) a criminal investigation by the MoI; 2) an investigation of
the General Prosecution Investigation Unit into police conduct; 3) a criminal
investigation by the SBU into alleged state level crimes (including actions aimed at
forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order); 4) an investigation by the
Ombudsperson; 5) an investigation by the Parliamentary Commission; and 6) an
investigation by a commission comprising civil society representatives under the
auspices of the Governor. During his visit in May, ASG Šimonović met with
interlocutors involved in these various investigations.
74. These parallel investigations by different bodies present a high risk of
miscommunication between the various law enforcement agencies’ commissions,
which may impact the integrity of the criminal investigations. Furthermore, there
appear to be widespread concerns among citizens regarding the ability of local law
enforcement agencies to conduct independent and thorough investigations due to the
politicisation of the 2 May events. The day after the violence, the former acting
President dismissed several local high-ranking officials on the grounds of Article 365
(Excess of authority or official powers) and Article 367 (Neglect of official duty) of the
Criminal Code). An interim government and new officials were appointed at the local
level: the Governor of Odesa, the Head of the Regional MoI, the Head of the Odesa
City Police, and the Head of the Regional Prosecution Office.
Governmental Commission on the issues of numerous deaths of people during
“Pro-Ukrainian” protests and fire in the Trade Union Building in Odesa City
75. During the late evening of 2 May, Vice-Prime Minister Vitalii Yarema was appointed
Head of the Governmental Commission on the issues of numerous deaths of people
during “Pro-Ukrainian” protests and the fire in the Trade Union Building in Odesa City,
which is responsible for overseeing the investigation carried out by the law
enforcement agencies at the Odesa regional and city level. The HRMMU has officially
requested to meet with this Commission, but had not received a response as of 7 June
2014.
Criminal investigation by the Ministry of Interior Investigation Unit
76. On 2 May, a criminal investigation was launched by the Odesa Regional Police
Investigation Department. On 6 May, the responsibility for the investigation was
transferred to the Main Investigation Department of the MoI in Kyiv (under the lead of
Deputy Minister of Interior). According to the law, the investigation process should be
15
completed in 60 days. Investigators from Kyiv, Odesa and other regions are
cooperating on this investigation, which has been launched under the following articles
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine: Article 115/1 (Intentional homicide); Article 194/2
(Intentional destruction or damage of property; Article 294/2 (Mass riots/unrest);
Article 296 (Hooliganism); Article 341/2 (Capturing of the state or public buildings or
constructions); and Article 345 (Threat or violence against law enforcement officer).
General Prosecution Investigation Unit regarding police duty performance
77. On 3 May, the Odesa Regional Prosecutor Office launched a criminal case against four
police officials under Article 365 (Excess of authority or official powers) and Article
367 (Neglect of official duty) of the Criminal code. On 6 May, this investigation was
transferred to the Investigation Unit of the General Prosecutor.
78. According to information provided to the HRMMU by credible sources, the regional
MoI did not enforce the special police tactical plan called “Wave” (“Khvylia”), which
would have allowed the use of special police means and forces, and ensured
coordination of all official emergency units (e.g. health, and the department of
emergency situations).
79. Furthermore, there are credible reports that during the 2 May violence, all high ranking
officials from the Regional MoI and Regional Prosecutor’s Office were holding a
meeting and were unavailable.
80. Since then, several criminal proceedings have been initiated against high-ranking police
officials and policemen. The Deputy Head of the Regional MoI was placed under house
arrest in relation with the 2 May violence and the “release” of the 67 detainees held in
the Odesa Police Station on 4 May. His current whereabouts remain unknown but he is
thought to be outside Ukraine. On 8 May, the Head of the Odesa City Police, the Head
of the Odesa Police Detention Centre and the duty officer were apprehended and
transferred to Kyiv. On 9 May, the Head of the Odesa City Police was released on bail.
Both The Head of the Odesa Police Detention Centre and the duty officer were also
released under obligations to make a personal commitment not to leave Ukraine.
Criminal investigation under the State Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)
81. In mid-March, the SBU initiated a criminal investigation throughout the country under
Articles 109 (Actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order
or take-over of government) and 110 (Trespass against territorial integrity and
inviolability of Ukraine) of the Criminal Code in relation to threats to national security
and national integrity. As of 15 May, the SBU arrested several people in Odesa region.
According to the HRMMU informal sources, 18 people were placed under investigation
by the SBU and detained in the Odesa pre-trial detention centre between 2 May and 3
June.
82. On 15 May, the SBU arrested five people (four male and one female) who were
allegedly leaving the Odesa region to join armed groups in eastern Ukraine. The
woman was placed under house arrest. Later that day another female “Pro-Federalism”
supporter, allegedly the organiser of the expedition, was arrested and placed in pre-trial
detention in Odesa. One more person was arrested the following day in connection with
the same case. As of 7 June, the HRMMU had no information on his whereabouts.
83. On 27 May, eight men were arrested at the Odesa railway station from a train about to
depart for Moscow. The SBU stated that these people were planning to attend a
“paramilitary training” in Moscow before joining the armed groups in eastern Ukraine.
16
On 29 May, the Primorsky District Court charged all of them under Articles 109
(Actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order or take-over
of government) and 110 (Trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of
Ukraine) of the Criminal Code. They have been placed in custody in the pre-trial
detention centre in Odesa. One more person was arrested the following day in
connection with the same case. As of 7 June, the HRMMU had no updated information
on his whereabouts.
84. On 28 May, three men, members of the NGO "Orthodox Cossacks", were arrested in
Odesa and on 31 May, they were charged by the Primorsky District Court under
Articles 109 and 110 of the Criminal Code, and placed in custody at the pre-trial
detention centre in Odesa.
Parliamentary Interim Commission of inquiry into the investigation of the death of
citizens in the cities of Odesa, Mariupol and other cities of the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions of Ukraine.
85. On 13 May, the Parliament adopted decision 4852 establishing an” Interim Inquiry
Parliamentary Commission on the investigation of the death of citizens in the cities of
Odesa, Mariupol and other cities of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine”,
further to a proposal by parliamentarians representing the Odesa region. The mandate
of this Commission expires on 15 June, by which date it is to submit its report to
Parliament.
86. The Commission informed the HRMMU that it had already gathered a lot of
information on the violence of 2 May in Odesa, which should be properly analysed and
processed. According to the Head of the Parliamentary Commission, its members met
with officials from Odesa, including the regional SBU divisions, MoI, Prosecutor’s
Office, independent experts, NGOs and suspects under house arrest. He believes many
people are still frightened by the events with some afraid to share important
information. Moreover, he highlighted that the situation in Odesa is not stable yet, and
it is important to optimise the activities of law enforcement bodies in the investigation.
According to him, the criminal investigation by the MoI had only conducted
approximately 7% of the necessary work. The perpetrators of the Odesa events have
still not been identified, with some suspects detained for a few days and then released
by courts. From information gathered by the Commission, there is much questioning
within local communities as to why this happened. There is also a fear that the local
population will use reprisals against suspected persons for the restoration of justice.
Thus, according to the Head of the Commission, the Special Interim Parliamentary
Commission has intensified its contacts with the local community representatives.
Investigation by the Ombudsperson’s Office
87. The Ombudsperson’s Office initiated an evaluation on human rights violations by law
enforcement agencies during the 2 May violence in Odesa. The Ombudsperson and her
team visited Odesa on several occasions and were provided with official documents
from all law enforcement agencies.10
10 The Ombudsperson submitted a report of her findings to the Prosecutor General on 10 June 2014. It is not a
public document.
17
Commission investigating the 2 May violence
88. A commission was established under the auspices of the Head of the Odesa Regional
State Administration (Governor). This commission, which includes civil society
activists, journalists and experts, is conducting its own investigation and intends to play
a public oversight role concerning the official investigation.
89. The commission members are undertaking their work through open sources, without
interfering with the official investigation. It is foreseen that their conclusions will be
published only if all members agree on its content. A first official briefing took place
on 30 May.
Specialised Headquarters providing assistance in the aftermath of 2 May
90. In the aftermath of the 2 May events, the former acting Mayor of Odesa established an
emergency headquarters (HQ) encompassing various departments of the City Council
Executive Committee. It provided assistance to victims and their relatives, such
healthcare, information, social services. It also ran an emergency hotline in the
aftermath of 2 May incidents. The HRMMU has been in daily contact with the staff on
follow-up required, and to enquire about the situation of the victims, particularly
medical care and the list of those declared missing. As of 7 June, the Social Welfare
Department remained the only operational part of this emergency HQ.
91. After the 2 May violence the HRMMU has been monitoring the criminal proceedings
launched by the Office of the General Prosecutor, the MoI and the SBU.
92. As the investigations continue, some key questions must be addressed to ensure
confidence in the investigation and to guarantee accountability, due process and to
enable the communities to fully accept the results of such an investigation. Issues to be
clarified include:
a. the identification of the perpetrators who were shooting at protesters during
the afternoon;
b. the conduct of the police on 2 May - why the police and the fire brigade either
did not react, or were slow to react and who ordered what action;
c. what happened in the Trade Union Building and what caused the fire there;
d. what was the cause of the deaths in the Trade Union Building;
e. the identification of the perpetrators of the incidents and violence surrounding
the fire in the Trade Union Building;
f. the need to guarantee justice for the victims and due process for the detainees.
92. The HRMMU regretfully reports the lack of cooperation from the MoI and the SBU at
the central level.
93. The HRMMU reiterates the need for prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into
the events so as to ensure accountability of all those concerned and to provide redress
and reparations for victims and their families. This process is critical to restore people’s
confidence in the authorities.
C. Investigation into other human rights violations
94. The HRMMU continues to follow closely the investigation into the human rights
violations that occurred in March in 2014 in Kharkiv, including into the “Rymarska
case”, a clash between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian organizations “Oplot” and
“Patriots of Ukraine” on 13 March. On 7 May, it was confirmed that the case had been
transferred from the police to the SBU. Investigations were opened in connection with
18
the role of the police in this case, as well as during the attack by protesters against the
ATN TV station on 7 April. On 5 June, the Deputy Head of the regional SBU informed
the HRMMU that the investigation into “Rymarska case” was ongoing - there were two
suspects, who still had to be detained. The challenging aspect of the investigation is that
many minors participated in the incident, which requires additional measures to ensure
due process.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES
A. Rule of law
95. During the reporting period, the HRMMU monitored legal and policy developments
affecting human rights and the rule of law. These include the adoption of a
“Memorandum on Concord and Peace” resulting from national roundtable discussions;
legislative amendments to combat discrimination, corruption, and on the situation of
refugees; developments relating to amnesty, lustration of judges, language rights,
internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Crimea, ethnic policy, torture and illtreatment,
the media and the reform of law enforcement agencies.
Constitutional reform
96. Pursuant to an Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of 17 April 2014, debates were
organized on constitutional amendments proposing the decentralization of power to
regions. In accordance with the Geneva Statement of 17 April, roundtables on national
unity, co-organized by the Government of Ukraine and the OSCE, were held on 14, 17
and 21 May. At the first roundtable in Kyiv, the eastern regions of the country were
largely under-represented, with the only official being the Mayor of Donetsk, Mr.
Lukyanchenko (Party of Regions). During the roundtable in Kharkiv, acting Prime
Minister Yatsenyuk declared that the constitution should be amended in order to
provide a special status for the Russian language and national minority languages. With
more representatives present from the east, including local parliamentarians, various
perspectives were raised; at the same time, this brought to the fore an array of diverging
views on the way forward. The roundtable also prepared a Memorandum containing
provisions for a unified society, changes to the Constitution, increasing the local
authorities’ role, and decentralisation of state power.
97. On 20 May, through resolution 4904, Parliament adopted the “Memorandum of
Concord and Peace”, which was drafted during the second roundtable discussion in
Kharkiv. This document foresees the adoption by Parliament of a constitutional reform
package, including the decentralization of power, a special status for the Russian
language, judicial and police reform, and an amnesty law for anti-government
protesters in the east who accept to give up their weapons (except for the perpetrators
of serious crimes against life and physical integrity). The Parliament called on all to
work together to protect, promote and build a democratic Ukraine, and the peaceful
coexistence of all nationalities, religions and political convictions.
International Criminal Court
98. On 23 May, former acting President Oleksandr Turchynov requested the Constitutional
Court to assess whether the Constitution of Ukraine would preclude the ratification of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The document was signed
on 20 January 2000. On 25 February 2014, the Parliament recognised the jurisdiction of
the ICC for acts committed in Ukraine from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014.
19
On 9 April, Ukraine informed the Registrar of the Court about this decision. On 25
April, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC announced a preliminary examination on
the situation in Ukraine to establish whether all the statutory requirements for the
opening of an investigation are met.
99. A Member of the Parliament of Ukraine from Odesa, Sergey Kivalov, registered on 15
May a draft resolution which aims to create the legal and institutional conditions for
those responsible for the deaths of dozens of people in Odesa, on 2 May, to be tried by
the ICC. As of 7 June, the draft resolution11 had not been considered by Parliament.
Crimea
100. On 5 June, Parliament adopted, on first reading, amendments to the Law of Ukraine
“On Securing Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms and the Legal Regime on the Temporary
Occupied Territory of Ukraine”. These amendments aim at making the registration
procedure for those displaced from Crimea easier and faster, especially for those who
wish to re-register their business. Thus, IDPs from Crimea in mainland Ukraine will no
longer need other documents than the national passport.
Amnesty
101. During the reporting period, no actual progress was made in adopting an amnesty law
in relation to the events in the east of the country. On 18 April 2014, the Cabinet of
Ministers prepared a draft law “On the prevention of harassment and punishment of
persons in relation to the events that took place during mass actions of civil resistance
which began on 22 February 2014". The text would exempt from criminal liability all
those who attempted to overthrow the legal government; took part in riots; seized
administrative and public buildings; and violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine,
provided they agreed to voluntarily cease all illegal actions and were not guilty of
“particularly serious crimes”. Four other so-called “amnesty laws” were registered in
Parliament by different political parties between 9 and 23 April. On 6 May, a draft
resolution was registered, calling on Parliament to make the draft law submitted by the
Cabinet of Minister the basis for the adoption of an amnesty law. During his
inauguration speech, on 7 June, President Poroshenko offered to amnesty protesters
who did not have “blood on their hands”.
Discrimination
102. On 13 May, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law “On preventing and
countering discrimination”. The amendments bring the definitions of direct and indirect
discrimination in line with Ukraine’s obligations under the ICCPR and other
international human rights instruments. They include, in particular, the prohibited
grounds listed in Article 2(1) of the Covenant (except “birth”). It should be noted,
however, that the amendments do not integrate the jurisprudence of the UN Human
Rights Committee on the prevention of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. The amendments also provide for criminal, civil and administrative liability
in case of discrimination. While these are positive changes, other legal texts, notably
the Criminal Code, must be brought in line with the anti-discrimination amendments in
11 Draft resolution “On the recognition by Ukraine of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
concerning crimes against humanity having led to very serious consequences, deliberate and planned of mass
killing of citizens in a particularly brutal and cynical way during the peaceful protests on 2 May 2014 in Odesa,
and concerning all perpetrators of these crimes, and on the request to the International Criminal Court to bring
the perpetrators to justice”.
20
order to ensure effective remedies for victims and contribute to enhanced prevention of
discrimination.
Anti-corruption
103. On 13 May, Parliament adopted the Law "On amending some legislative acts Ukraine
in the area of state anti-corruption policy in connection with the implementation of the
EU Action Plan on the liberalisation of the visa regime for Ukraine”. The Law provides
for more stringent penalties for corruption offences committed by individuals or legal
entities. In particular, the liability for providing knowingly false data in the declaration
of assets, income and expenses is introduced to the Code on Administrative Offences.
The Law also strengthens the protection of persons reporting on corruption, for
instance, providing for anonymous phone lines for reporting corruption. An external
control of declarations of assets, income, expenses and financial obligations is also to
be introduced. While the amendments are welcome, the key to combatting corruption
lies in the readiness of all government institutions to effectively tackle this phenomenon
and to implement anti-corruption norms in place. In this regard, the HRMMU recalls
that in its concluding observations adopted in May 2014, the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights called on Ukraine to “make politicians, members
of parliament and national and local government officials aware of the economic and
social costs of corruption, and make judges, prosecutors and the police aware of the
need for strict enforcement of the law”.
Torture and ill-treatment
101. On 3 June, the Minister of Justice announced at a press-conference the establishment of
a Special Committee to carry out random inspections of penitentiary institutions, with
broad powers to check violations of human rights and the detention conditions of
prisoners. The Committee will be a permanent body and is to produce monthly reports.
It will comprise representatives of the Ministry of Justice and representatives of civil
society.
102. While welcoming this step, the HRMMU notes that the Ombudsperson was designated
by law as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) against torture, in line with the
Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Torture. As such, it is
entrusted to conduct visits to places of deprivation of liberty, with the involvement of
civil society, and with a view to preventing human rights violations affecting detainees
or contributing to their elimination. Due to the obvious similarities between mandates
of the Special Committee and the NPM, proper coordination and consultations between
these bodies will be required to ensure the effectiveness of efforts to combat torture and
ill-treatment.
Lustration
103. The Interim Special Commission on the vetting of judges was established on 4 June,
pursuant to Article 3 of the Law "On the restoration of trust in the judiciary in
Ukraine”, which entered into force on 10 May. The Commission consists of five
representatives from the Supreme Court, the Parliament and the Governmental
Commissioner on the Issues of the Anti-Corruption Policy. Legal entities and
individuals will have six months from the date of advertisement of the establishment of
the Commission in the newspaper "Voice of Ukraine" to request examination (vetting)
of judges. Public information about the activities of the Interim Special Commission
will be published on the official website of the High Council of Justice of Ukraine. The
HRMMU reiterates its concern that the immediate dismissal of judges by the Special
21
Commission may put in jeopardy the administration of justice. Any lustration initiatives
should be pursued in full compliance with the fundamental human rights of the people
concerned, including the right to individual review and the right of appeal.
Ethnic and national policy
104. The Minister of Culture stated on 4 June that the Cabinet of Ministers decided to
establish a ‘Council of interethnic consensus’ and to create the position of a
Government commissioner for ethnic and national policy. This official, who has not
been appointed yet, will reportedly be responsible for the implementation of the ethnic
and national policy developed by the Government.
Language
105. On 4 June, a draft law was submitted to Parliament “On the official status of the
Russian language in Ukraine”. The draft law proposes to give “official status” to the
Russian language without compromising the position of Ukrainian as the state
language. The bill proposes to introduce the wide usage of Russian language in state
institutions, courts, educational institutions, mass media, official publications of
legislation and by-laws, pre-trial investigation, advertising and labelling of goods.
Media
106. On 4 June, the Cabinet of Ministers instructed the State Committee on television and
radio broadcasting to prepare a draft law "On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of
Ukraine regarding resisting informational aggression of foreign states". Other
ministries and agencies that will participate in the drafting of the bill will include the
Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, MoI, State Security Service, the National Council on Television and
Radio Broadcasting, and the State Committee on Entrepreneurship of Ukraine. This
development comes after a Ukrainian court banned, in March 2014, broadcasting by
four Russian TV channels in Ukraine, and armed groups in the east having disrupted
broadcasting of Ukrainian channels.
107. The HRMMU is of the view that professional journalism and critical thinking, not
prohibition, are the proper answers to the attempts to distort or manipulate facts.
Everyone, in accordance with article 19 of the ICCPR, should have the right to hold
opinions without interference and to freedom of expression, which includes freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.
Refugees
108. On 13 May, Parliament adopted amendments to the refugee Law extending the
definition of complementary protection to include persons fleeing armed conflict and
other serious human rights violations. This brings the definition of complementary
protection into line with international and European standards.
109. The HRMMU notes, that certain legal gaps remain, affecting particularly the quality of
due process in the asylum procedure and the reception conditions for asylum-seekers.
The quality of decision-making on asylum applications also remains of concern, as well
as the fact that State funding for asylum matters is inadequate.
Martial law
110. On 3 June, former acting President Oleksandr Turchynov signed decree № 936/2014
“About considering the question of the introduction of martial law in certain areas of
Ukraine”. The decree requests the Secretary of the Council of the National Security and
22
Defence of Ukraine to “immediately cooperate with the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine,
the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Administration
of the State Border Service of Ukraine to consider the question about the need to
impose martial law in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, where the security operation
is taking place, to prevent further development and ensure the ending of the armed
conflict on the territory of Ukraine, to prevent mass deaths of civilians, military
personnel and members of law enforcement agencies, to stabilize the situation and
restore normal life in these regions”.
Law enforcement sector reform
111. On 4 June, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to set
up a working group that will prepare legislation to reform the law enforcement system
by 1 August 2014. The working group will be headed by First Vice-Prime Minister,
Vitaliy Yarema, who stressed the need to develop draft laws on the police, the security
service and the prosecutor’s office. Experts from the European Commission and Poland
will assist the working group.
112. On 5 June, Parliament adopted the Law "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine on
combating terrorism". The law provides a definition of a Counter-Terrorist Operation
(CTO), the authority of the CTO participants and other innovations. It also prescribes
the possibility of "physical elimination of the terrorists" in case of resistance. Speaking
at a press conference, the former acting Head of the Presidential Administration gave
his support to the introduction of martial law in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as
well as in the border areas of seven other regions of Ukraine.
B. Freedom of peaceful assembly
113. After the 2 May events in Odesa, a police presence has been highly visible during
peaceful assemblies in all major cities of Ukraine. However, the real or perceived
inaction of law enforcement is a further challenge to ensuring accountability at such
events such as demonstrations, rallies and pickets.
114. Ahead of 9 May (Victory Day), for instance, security was heightened with numerous
checkpoints on roads in several cities the programme of celebrations was changed in
order to avoid situations that could provoke unrests, for example by cancelling parades.
Public commemorations and rallies took place in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv and in many
cities in western and central Ukraine. In Donetsk, a rally gathering 2,000 persons went
peacefully.
115. However, legislation is required to regulate the conduct of assemblies in line with
international standards, as previously recommended by the HRMMU.12
116. A trend of local administration requesting courts to take measures to prevent peaceful
assemblies illustrates the need for relevant legislation. For instance, on 4 June, the
Mykolaiv District Administrative court decided to ban until 30 June all rallies planned
in the city centre further to a request from the City Council. The Mykolaiv City Council
had requested such a prohibition after 2 June when the police intervened to prevent
clashes between participants of two rallies running in parallel. The court justified the
ban, arguing that the right to life and health was more important than the right to
peaceful assembly.
12 The OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine report, 15 April 2014, paras. 52-54.
23
C. Freedom of expression
117. The HRMMU remains concerned about the curtailment of freedom of expression,
including harassment and threats to targeting journalists working in Ukraine, mostly in
eastern regions (see section C, in Chapter V).
118. During the reporting period, a few isolated cases of obstruction to media work and
attacks on journalists were registered across Ukraine.
119. On 23 May, two journalists of “Russia Today”, who were travelling to Ukraine to cover
the elections, were denied entry at Odesa airport. The border officers reportedly forced
them to buy return tickets to Moscow and fly back, without providing any reason.
120. On 25 May and shortly after, journalists were prevented from filming the vote
counting. The HRMMU is aware of such cases having occurred in Sumy,
Dnipropetrovsk, Kremenchuk (Poltava region), Lviv, Mykolaiv, Uzhgorod and Kyiv.
To the knowledge of the HRMMU, none of these instances resulted in physical
violence or damage to equipment.
121. On 23 May, the holding “Multimedia invest group”, based in Kyiv, reported that the
accounts of the company were blocked and its building was searched by tax police.
The management sees this as pressure against its media outlets (newspaper and website
“Vesti”, TV Channel UBR and Radio Vesti) which are critical of the Government.
122. In general, the developments in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine and the large
number of casualties have generated an escalation of hate speech and tension between
the two rival sides. This is particularly obvious in social media.
D. Minority rights
123. The HRMMU regularly meets representatives of various minorities in Ukraine. In the
reporting period no major incidents and human rights violations were reported in that
regard.
National and Ethnic minorities
124. Ethnic minorities generally speak of positive relations and atmosphere conducive to
exercising their human rights, including cultural rights. Some communities, particularly
Russian, expressed concerns with the lack of financial allocations for the needs of
ethnic minorities or bureaucratic obstructions by local authorities, for example, in
establishing additional schools, churches, newspapers, etc.
125. On 20 May, during a press-conference, Josyf Zisels, the Head of the Association of the
Jewish Organisations and Communities of Ukraine, underlined that there was no
increase in anti-Semitism in Ukraine. He noted that the number of anti-Semitic
incidents is declining since 2007. While pointing out that in the first half of 2014 more
Ukrainian Jews had migrated to Israel compared to the previous year, he attributed this
to the social-economic impact of the situation in Crimea and in the eastern regions.
Linguistic rights
126. The guarantees of using one’s mother tongue freely in private and public life without
discrimination remain high on the public agenda. The Law “On the Basics of State
Language Policy” currently in force (provides for the introduction of a “regional
language” based on ethnic composition). However, the Government has recognised
that a new language law was needed, reflecting broad consensus as well as the
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expectations of the Russian-speaking population. There have been attempts to amend
legislation and a draft law has been developed. The latest draft law was submitted on 4
June, which proposes to provide Russian language with “official status” through
extensive usage in State institutions and public documents (see section D, Chapter IV).
127. On 30 May, the Ministry of Education amended the framework curriculum and study
plans for secondary school students of grades 5-9 for the learning of minority
languages, such as Armenian, Bulgarian, Crimean Tatar, Gagauz, Greek, German,
Hebrew, Hungarian, Korean, Moldovan, Polish, Romanian, Russian and Slovak. The
Ministry also increased significantly the number of hours prescribed for learning of a
minority language in schools where the relevant language is the working one (it is now
equal to the hours of learning Ukrainian language).
Sexual minorities
128. The HRMMU continues to receive reports from the LGBT community regarding lack
of tolerance and daily discrimination based on their sexual orientation and gender
identity, mainly bullying at school/university, difficulties in finding and/or preserving
employment especially when persons disclose their sexual orientation and gender
identity; access to health services, particularly for transgender people; and physical
attacks.
129. On 7 May, the High Specialized Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases issued a
letter (N 10-644/0/4-14) to appellate courts, explicitly prohibiting discrimination in
employment on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court stressed that, when
considering cases of labour discrimination, it is important to take into consideration the
existing anti-discrimination law, which prohibits discrimination on any basis.
E. Political rights
Human rights in the electoral process
130. On 25 May, the population of Ukraine voted to elect a new President among 21
candidates. On 3 June, the Central Election Commission (CEC) confirmed that Mr.
Petro Poroshenko had won with 54.7% of the vote.
131. The elections took place in a challenging political, economic and, in particular, security
environment, due to continued unrest and violence in the east of Ukraine, where armed
groups control some areas, and the Government has been conducting security
operations. This situation affected the general human rights situation and seriously
impacted the election environment, also obstructing meaningful observation.
132. Notwithstanding, elections were characterised by a 60% voter turnout and the clear
resolve of the authorities to hold elections in line with international commitments and
with a respect for fundamental freedoms in the vast majority of the country. The voting
and counting process were transparent, despite large queues of voters at polling stations
in some parts of the country.
133. Despite efforts of the election administration to ensure voting throughout the country,
polling did not take place in 10 of the 12 election districts in Luhansk region and 14 of
the 22 election districts in Donetsk region. This was due to illegal activities by armed
groups before, and on, the election day, including death threats and intimidation of
election officials, seizure and destruction of polling materials, as well as the
impossibility to distribute ballots to polling stations due to the general insecurity caused
25
by these groups (see Chapter V). The majority of Ukrainian citizens resident in these
regions were thus deprived of the right to vote. Elsewhere, a few isolated attempts to
disrupt voting were reported.
134. The HRMMU followed the participation of Crimean residents in the Presidential
elections. Simplified registration procedures were put in place to ensure that residents
of Crimea and persons who resettled from Crimea to other regions could take part in
the elections. According to the CEC, 6,000 Crimean residents voted on 25 May.
Political parties/ Freedom of association
135. On 7 May, several political parties were allegedly banned in Luhansk region by a
decision of the “people’s council”, including Batkivchyna, Udar, Svoboda and Oleg
Lyashko’s Radical Party, as well as Right Sector. It also inferred “extended powers” on
Valeriy Bolotov, the self-proclaimed “people’s governor”.
136. On 13 May, the Kyiv District Administrative Court banned the party Russian Bloc
based on the fact that the party leaders had called for the overthrow of the constitutional
order and violations of the territorial integrity of the country.13
137. It appears that the Communist Party of Ukraine is coming under increasing pressure.
On 7 May, the Communist faction of the Parliament was expelled from a closed-door
parliamentary hearing, which was denounced by the Party of Regions faction,
allegedly, because of the “separatist” statements by its head, Petro Symonenko. The
hearing was reportedly about the security operations in the east. Party of the Regions
pointed out that information on these security operations should be made public.
138. On 18 May, former acting President Turchynov called on the Ministry of Justice to
review documents gathered by the law enforcement bodies relating to the alleged illegal
and unconstitutional activities of the Communist Party of Ukraine aimed at violating
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, undermining State security and
illegal seizure of State power. On 19 May, the Ministry of Justice sent a request to the
General Prosecutor’s Office and the SBU to investigate possible crimes by the
leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine.
F. Internally displaced persons
139. As of 6 June, the departments of social protection in the Ukrainian regions had
identified over 12,70014 internally displaced persons (IDPs)15. However, the actual
number of people who have fled the violence and fighting in the regions of Donetsk
and Luhansk is believed to be higher and increasing daily. According to various
estimates, around 64% are women; many are with children, including infants. The IDPs
live dispersed across the entire territory, with significant concentrations in Kyiv and
Lviv.
13 On 15 April, the Ministry of Justice filed a lawsuit to prohibit the activities of the political parties Russian
Bloc and Russian Unity in Ukraine. The activity of Russian Unity was banned on 30 April. According to
Ukrainian law, a court can ban the activities of a political party upon a request filed by the Ministry of Justice.
14 UNHCR estimated that, as of 16 June, there were 34,336 IDPs in Ukraine, with 15,200 located in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions.
15 According to the Russian Federation Federal Migration Service, as of 6 June 2014, 837 persons had applied
and were granted refugee status; and 3,750 persons had applied and were granted Temporary Asylum.
Approximately 15% were minors under the age of 18. These figures do not include people from Crimea.
26
140. People have left Crimea for different reasons. The majority have economic,
professional or family ties within Ukraine and do not wish to acquire Russian
citizenship, which many feel compelled to do in order to continue a normal life in
Crimea. Some Crimean Tatars fear limitations to their religious and cultural expression.
Activists and journalists have been exposed to, or fear, harassment.
141. The main difficulties the IDPs from Crimea continue to face are: lack of temporary and
permanent housing; access to social allocations, medical and educational services;
access to bank accounts / deposits; possibility to continue entrepreneurship activity, and
employment opportunities.
142. Despite efforts made, some of these issues, particularly housing, are very difficult to
resolve without systemic changes and involvement of the Government. The HRMMU
has been made aware of some instances when IDPs had to return to Crimea, since their
basic needs could not be met in Ukraine.
143. Displacement from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions started in the days leading up to
the “referendum” held in both regions on 11 May. People have been trying to leave the
violence affected areas, particularly Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, after witnessing
violence on the streets. Armed groups and increasing criminality have generated fear.
144. The HRMMU interviewed several IDPs from the eastern regions, who reported that
apart from random violence, there were targeted attacks and intimidation of activists
and increasingly of “ordinary” residents, known for their “Pro-Ukrainian” stance. Local
NGOs confirmed that while seizing administrative buildings, armed groups obtained
access to personal data of activists who participated in rallies. The latter and their
families were reportedly being threatened and harassed.
145. One of the few interviewed activists reported being threatened and having to stay in a
friend’s house for nine days without food, as her own apartment was under
surveillance. Then other activists helped her escape and settle in another town. She has
no information about her family and suffers from insomnia and anxiety attacks.
146. Political activists and journalists began to feel pressure from the armed groups who
were consolidating their position in the region. After the “referendum” and with the
intensification of violence, other residents of the region have started leaving their
homes in areas affected by violence due to the illegal activities of armed groups and the
security operations, particularly in the areas of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Many
remain within the eastern regions in rural areas, as IDPs have been reporting
harassment at checkpoints if they were perceived to be leaving the region to seek
protection.
147. The majority of international humanitarian actors, due to security reasons, are unable to
access persons displaced within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and thus only some
very limited assistance has been provided. IDPs, who leave the eastern regions, have
generally maintained a low profile, fearing retribution against their relatives who have
remained at home.
148. There are considerable gaps in the State’s ability to protect IDPs. The central
authorities have not issued formal instructions regarding how to register and assist
persons displaced from Donetsk and Luhansk regions, leading to different practices
across the country. The system for registering the IDPs is rudimentary, so the number
and profile of IDPs and their needs remain largely invisible. As a result, the actual
number of displaced persons is difficult to estimate.
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149. Regional authorities are waiting for instructions on funding allocations for IDPs from
the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Temporary accommodation, while theoretically
available, cannot be paid for and is thus rationed in many regions. Several
administrative matters remain unresolved, hindering IDPs’ ability to resume a normal
life: many cannot obtain temporary residence registration; register business activities;
or in the case of IDPs from Crimea, who have not registered on the mainland, they may
find that they cannot access their personal savings in bank accounts in Crimea.
150. IDPs from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions describe leaving the region with few
personal belongings in order to disguise the purpose of their departure. Many report
having witnessed violence and experiencing feelings of fear. In dozens of interviews
with UNHCR, IDPs have reported significant deterioration of the humanitarian
situation in the areas affected by violence and the security operations. They are mostly
concerned about security: people report staying in cellars to keep away from the
fighting, facing harassment at checkpoints and fearing the increasingly common
abductions, threats and extortion. They have been reporting to UNHCR and the
HRMMU about the serious social and economic impact of the conflict. Families have
run out of money since jobs are lost, banks closed and pensions unpaid. Public utilities
like electricity and water work only intermittently. Thus, the IDPs from the eastern
regions are particularly vulnerable. There are multiple reports that thousands of people
are eager to escape the areas affected by violence and the security operations as soon as
they can safely move.
151. Many IDPs have exhausted their resources. Having originally been hosted by friends,
family or even generous strangers identified through social networks, they find
themselves under pressure to move out of these temporary housing arrangements, as
conditions are overcrowded and hospitality reaches its limits. Without sufficient
support to find jobs and housing, IDPs report increasing levels of frustration and
humanitarian needs. Increasingly, IDPs are trying to self-organise into NGOs to help
each other, as illustrated by Crimea SOS, Vostok SOS, the Unified Coordination Centre
of Donbas. On 23 May, the HRMMU attended the first all-Ukrainian meeting
organized by an initiative group of IDPs from Crimea to bring the problems faced by
IDPs to the attention of the Government and local authorities so as to develop joint
solutions.
V. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN THE EAST
A. Impact of the security situation on human rights
Deterioration of the security situation
152. The reporting period was marked by a significant deterioration in the security situation
in eastern Ukraine. The HRMMU received credible reports illustrating an escalation of
abductions, arbitrary detentions, ill-treatment, looting, as well as the occupation of
public and administration buildings (with certain fluctuations, as some buildings are
recovered by the Ukrainian military and law enforcement bodies, and some then again
re-seized by armed groups). The period since the Presidential elections can be
characterized by an increase of fighting in eastern Ukraine, with fluctuations in
intensity.
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153. The regularity and intensification of fighting between the armed groups and Ukrainian
armed forces raises serious human rights concerns, including but not limited to: the fate
of persons not involved in the fighting, especially children; the necessity and
proportionality of the use of force; and the large-scale destructions, which only add to
the social and economic hardship and a general lack of respect for international
humanitarian law, when and where applicable to the fighting.
154. Violence and lawlessness have spread in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Having
gained access to deposits of weapons, including from the SBU building, the armed
groups increasingly started spreading violence. Abductions of persons not involved in
any fighting and related acts of arbitrary detentions, looting, and killings of persons not
involved in any fighting and other activities in violation of international law have been
carried out by the armed groups. Moreover there are reports of victims being subjected
to degrading treatment, random shooting and provocations, particularly near the
Ukrainian-Russian border. Increasingly, attacks target ordinary people, who take no
part in the fighting.
155. The security operations by the Government, with military and National Guard forces
particularly concentrated around the town of Slovyansk, are present in the regions of
Donetsk and Luhansk. With their superior manpower and military hardware, the
Ukrainian armed forces have controlled access to the cities through multiple layers of
check-points.
156. Skirmishes between armed groups and the Ukrainian military also saw the inclusion of
various territorial defence battalions under the command of the MoI.
157. The HRMMU observed an increasing presence of armed men on trucks and armoured
vehicles moving around the city of Donetsk during daylight. For the first time, the
HRMMU team members were stopped as they drove in their vehicle through Donetsk
by armed persons who demanded to see their identity.
158. In the two regions, the situation has been made complex as some of the armed groups
operating in the regions have reportedly slipped out of the control and influence of the
self-proclaimed republics and their leaders. Examples of this can reportedly be found
with the armed groups in the area surrounding the town of Horlivka16 in the Donetsk
region, and the armed groups operating in the border area of the Luhansk region near
the border with the Russian Federation. Moreover, on the “official” “Donetsk People’s
Republic” media outlet “Anna Info News”, the Slovyansk commander “Strelkov” Igor
Girkin referred to “criminal groups” operating in the regions and that the “Donetsk
People’s Republic” was lacking volunteers.
159. Regardless of the veracity of this information, the proliferation of armed groups has
clearly exacerbated threats to the security of the population, posing a further challenge
in ensuring the rule of law and accountability for the numerous illegal acts committed.
The “Donetsk People’s Republic” has reported the presence among them of citizens of
the Russian Federation, including from Chechnya and other republics in the North
Caucasus. A particular call for women to join the armed groups was made on 17 May
through a video released with Igor Girkin “Strelkov”, urging women of the Donetsk
region to enlist in combat units.
16 Now reportedly under the control of an armed group led by Igor Bezler.
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“Referendum” on “self-rule” held in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on 11 May
160. On 11 May, a “referendum” on “self-rule” that was neither in accordance with the
Constitution of Ukraine nor with effect under international law, took place in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions. The following question was asked: “Do you support the act of selfrule
of the People’s Republic of Donetsk / People’s Republic of Luhansk?” The
Government of Ukraine deemed the “referendum” illegal.
161. Reports suggest that there were a limited number of polling stations for the two regions.
The official voter registration of the Central Election Commission was not used as a basis
for the vote. Media outlets and journalists observing the “referendum” reported a number
of violations (e.g. one person filling out several ballots; multiple voting; voting without
documentation).
162. In the aftermath of the “referendum” of 11 May, the level of violence by armed groups
intensified. At the same time, a new “government” was formed, and Alexander Borodai, a
Russian citizen, nominated as “prime minister” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. A call
was made for Ukrainian troops to leave the region.
Casualties due to the escalation in intensity of fighting as Government aims to gain
control of the territory
165. Reports illustrate that over the past month, attacks and fighting have been intensifying
with an increased number of casualties. Fighting remained concentrated in the northern
part of the Donetsk region and the border areas and south of the Luhansk region. In the
Kharkiv region, one Ukrainian serviceman was killed in an ambush, near the city of
Izyum, on the border with the Donetsk region, which serves as a basis for the security
operations of the Ukrainian forces.
166. On 3 June, the Prosecutor General Oleg Mahnіtsky announced that 181 people had been
killed since the start of the Government’s security operations on 14 April to regain control
of the eastern regions. Of those killed, 59 were Ukrainian soldiers; the others were
reported to be residents. 293 were wounded as a result of these security operations in the
Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. This is a considerable increase since 14 May, when the
Prosecutor General had announced 68 killed (servicemen and residents).
167. The HRMMU is trying to verify these allegations and to obtain disaggregated data on the
victims and perpetrators. This is, however, difficult to obtain due to either a lack of, or
contradictory, information.
168. On 13 May, a Ukrainian military unit was ambushed near Kramatorsk, killing seven
Ukrainian soldiers. On 22 May, 17 Ukrainian servicemen were killed and 31 injured near
Volnovakha (south of Donetsk); that same day another soldier was killed and two others
injured in an attack by armed men on a convoy of military vehicles near Rubizhne in the
Luhansk region. On 23 May, the territorial defence battalion “Donbas” was ambushed and
attacked by an armed group, reportedly controlled by Igor Bezler, near the town of
Horlivka close to Donetsk. Nine soldiers were wounded and detained by Bezler’s group;
one was reportedly killed. On 29 May, a Ukrainian military helicopter was shot down near
Slovyansk, which killed 12 service personnel who were on board, including a General.
169. On 26 May, fighting broke out for control of the Donetsk airport between the armed
groups and the Ukrainian military. Ukrainian military planes and helicopters were used
against the armed groups who eventually conceded control. The airport terminal and the
runway were damaged as a result of aerial bombing. According to the Interior Minister,
there were no losses within the Ukrainian military but according to various sources, the
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armed groups suffered over 50 casualties, of these at least 31 volunteers were reportedly
from the Russian Federation, including from Chechnya and other republics in the Northern
Caucasus. Out of these casualties, 30 bodies of those fighting with the armed groups have
not been recovered.
170. During the fighting around Donetsk airport on 26 May, the Mayor called on the population
not to leave their apartments unless absolutely necessary. Notwithstanding, residents did
become victims. A woman was killed by a shell at a bus stop. A man was killed as a result
of an incoming explosion near the Children's Hospital, with a further six people wounded,
including a seven-year-old boy who was at home. A criminal case was opened under
Article 258, Part 3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“Terrorist act that led to the death of
a person”).
171. On 2 June, an explosion of an unknown nature took place at the occupied building of
Luhansk Regional State Administration. According to various accounts, it was either a
failed attempt by the local armed groups to hit a Ukrainian fighter plane, or the
bombardment of the occupied building by a Ukrainian plane. Seven people in, and around,
the occupied building were reported killed as a result of the shelling, including the
“minister of health” of the “Luhansk People’s Republic”, Nataliya Arkhipova.
172. The Ukrainian National Guard took control of the town of Krasnyi Liman (20 km North-
West of Slovyansk) after fierce fighting on 3 June. The town hospital was badly damaged
reportedly by shelling and most patients were evacuated to the basement of the hospital.
Two civilians were killed. The chief surgeon of the hospital was gravely wounded, and
died on 4 June.
173. IDPs from Slovyansk have described to the HRMMU the situation they have faced for the
past weeks. They claim that the Ukrainian air force was shelling the city and bombed a
kindergarten. They also said that for two months they did not receive any social benefits.
Some of them left male members behind, and/or their parents or grandparents. A hotline at
the disposal of IDPs or people who are considering leaving the areas affected by fighting
is run by a few Red Cross activists. Transport of people who come to the check points is
mostly organized by “Auto-Maidan” activists. Reception centres for arriving IDPs
organised the initial assistance they received, including psycho-social.
Widening protection gap and erosion of the rule of law
174. With the presence of armed groups in seized and occupied government buildings, and
checkpoints, which shift hands as they are taken over by armed groups or the Ukrainian
security and law enforcement units involved in the security operations, the human rights of
the residents of the northern part of Donetsk region and parts of the Luhansk region are
threatened.
175. With the demise of security, the rule of law and governance, the protection gap is
widening. Armed groups physically occupy key public and administrative buildings in
many cities and towns of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and have declared virtual
“independence”. However, they are not undertaking any governing responsibilities. In
addition, the atmosphere of fear and intimidation, particularly following the abductions
and killing of town councillors and public civil servants, prevent many local officials from
going to work.
176. Of particular concern is the continued erosion of the rule of law and the limited capacity of
the Government to protect residents from the ever increasing acts of violence. Many of the
attacks and abductions by armed groups target journalists, elected representatives and civil
31
society activists. The number of armed robberies and shootings of residents has also been
increasing.
177. The difficulty of providing public services impacts the daily life of residents of the
regions, including the disruption of public transport (airports remain closed and rail
services are disrupted); numerous checkpoints on the roads; lack of access to cash through
banks; and earlier reports of schools and kindergartens being repeatedly closed before the
summer holidays began in early June. Regional governments have endeavoured to make
the necessary arrangements so that local residents are able to carry on with their daily
lives. While this remains possible in the larger cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, and the less
affected southern part of the Donetsk region, this is a challenge in the northern part of the
Donetsk region. As a consequence, there are reportedly increased numbers of people
leaving the area, in particular in the areas of Slovyansk; primarily women with children
(see section B, Chapter V).
178. In the main cities, there were a few rallies supporting or opposing the self-proclaimed
republics. On 13 May, hundreds of local residents of the Luhansk region addressed a
petition to the Government of Ukraine, stating that they did not recognise the results of the
“referendum", and demanding more proactive and effective action to free the region from
“terrorists who do not allow us to live in peace” and to pay more attention to the concerns
of the population.
179. According to NGOs, the week preceding the “referendum” of 11 May, over 500
apartments were reportedly put up for sale in Donetsk in just a few days as people were
seeking means to leave. Since then, an average of 20 families leave the region every day.
Presidential elections
180. After the “referendum”, representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” openly
declared their intention to obstruct the 25 May Presidential election. Physical attempts to
disrupt the election in these two regions were stepped up, with reports of attacks against
electoral commissions. As a result, the CEC stated that in 24 districts of the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions the election was obstructed due to illegal acts by armed groups and
supporters of the self-proclaimed “People’s Republics”. According to official CEC
figures, 82 % of the voters in the Donetsk region, and 88 % of voters in Luhansk region
were thus deprived of their right to vote. Elections of Mayors due to take place in
Antratsyt, Lisichansk and Severodonetsk in the Luhansk region also had to be cancelled
due to such illegal activities.
181. There was a similar pattern of attacks on District Election Commissions (DEC) and
Precinct Election Commissions (PEC). An armed group of between five to fifteen people
representing the “Donetsk People’s Republic” would come to a Commission or polling
station. Claiming that the Presidential election was illegal, they would seize office
equipment and DEC/PEC protocols and stamps. Generally, they would detain the head of
the commission for several hours or, in some cases for several days, subjecting individuals
to interrogation and reportedly at times ill-treatment and torture.
182. On 13 May, representatives of the “Donetsk People's Republic” reportedly entered a DEC
in Horlivka, demanding documents and office equipment and requesting that the staff
leave the premises. The electoral staff refused to obey this. Two hours later the men
returned, armed with baseball bats. The staff left, grabbing the most important documents
and official stamps. A similar incident occurred in a DEC in Starobeshevo (Luhansk
region) on 14 May. The DEC members were ordered to leave the building with threats to
their families, should they return.
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183. On 7 May, unknown groups of people broke into a DEC in Kuybyshevskiy district, seizing
equipment containing electoral information. Upon arrival at the scene, the police did not
intervene. Other examples of attacks by armed groups on DECs and TECs include
incidents in Artemivsk, Donetsk and Metalist (near Amrosiyivka) on 20, 21 and 25 May.
184. Election commission members also faced attacks, with many abducted and detained. On 9
May, an armed group abducted a member of the DEC in Kramatorsk. He was taken to the
occupied City Council and released after being interrogated. On 20 May, a member of the
PEC in Mariupol was detained by armed persons, beaten up and then released.
185. Skirmishes around the electoral process included an incident on 25 May, when a group of
armed people of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” reportedly attacked and stole the ballots
from the PEC in Novoaydarsk in the Luhansk region. Ukrainian soldiers pursued the
armed group. A violent confrontation took place, during which two members of the armed
group were reportedly killed and three Ukrainian army servicemen were allegedly
wounded. 14 people were subsequently detained by the Ukrainian army. Other accounts
claim that three people were injured and one person was killed.
186. On the election day, five election commission members from Donetsk were detained by
armed persons and taken to the SBU building. Following an intervention by the HRMMU
with representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” at the occupied SBU building,
they were released the next day.
187. Such attacks prevented DECs and PECs to continue their preparations for the Presidential
election, which led to widespread limitations to exercise of the right to vote in eastern
Ukraine, notably in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.
188. On 26 May, the “speaker” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”, Denis Pushylin,
announced that a visit of the newly-elected President Petro Poroshenko to the Donbas
would “heat up” the situation in the Donetsk region, and that dialogue was possible only
through mediation by the Russian Federation. According to him, the “Donetsk People’s
Republic” had proclaimed “martial law” on “its” territory and that a curfew might be
imposed in certain areas.
B. Right to life, liberty and security
189. On 9 May, as reported by the MoI, some 60 men armed with automatic weapons stormed
and seized the Mariupol Department of the MoI. The security operations which involved
the National Guard, the special unit “Azov”, the special unit “Dnepr” and the armed forces
of Ukraine, tried to take back the building. As a result, nine people were killed and many
were wounded, primarily residents.
190. Unidentified armed persons reportedly started firing from the second floor of the building,
and the Ukrainian forces fired back. Reportedly, the National Guard servicemen who were
outside started firing at the building with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades. As
a result, a fire started in the building. The fire brigade arrived. Those who were inside
started running out the building and dispersing in the city.
191. In the early afternoon, while retreating, the special unit “Azov” came across local “Pro-
Russian” demonstrators who reportedly tried to stop them. Members of the special unit
“Azov” reportedly fired warning shots, first into the air, and then at people’s legs. The
HRMMU is verifying this information.
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192. After the armed forces left the military base in Mariupol, it was looted by “Pro-Russian”
activists, who reportedly took an unknown number of weapons, ammunitions and two
armoured vehicles. The Ukrainian security and law enforcement forces were relocated
outside the city in an effort to decrease tensions, and for the safety of residents.
193. According to the MoI, 20 armed persons were killed and four captured; while the Public
Health Department of the Donetsk Regional State Administration asserts that three
persons were killed. The Chief of the Traffic Police was confirmed killed; and the Chief of
Police was abducted and illegally detained. On his release on 11 May, confirmed by the
MoI, he was found to have multiple injuries. The HRMMU is trying to verify this
information.
194. Human rights activists from the NGO Memorial who visited Mariupol on 11 May reported
finding 15 wounded men at Mariupol City Clinic Hospital № 1. Six police officers were
hospitalised and the first civilian victims were brought later to the hospital. The Mariupol
Emergency Hospital received 10 wounded persons, of whom one (a police officer) died.
15 wounded people were brought to Mariupol City Clinic Hospital № 2. As reported to
the HRMMU by the human rights defenders, the majority of those wounded were not
involved in the fighting.
195. The HRMMU continues to highlight the need for a prompt and comprehensive
investigation into these events.
Abduction and detentions
196. In the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, a reported escalation of violence and violations of
international law (abductions and acts of arbitrary detention targeting persons not involved
in the fighting, intimidation and harassment, torture and killings) by armed groups
illustrated the growing erosion of law and order. The HRMMU is increasingly concerned
about guarantees for the protection of human rights of the general population. According
to the MoI, from April to 7 June 2014, armed groups in the eastern regions abducted 387
people, among them 39 journalists.
197. Below are some of the many cases reported to the HRMMU during the period covered by
the present report. The HRMMU is keeping track of reports of abductions and acts of
arbitrary detention targeting persons not involved in the fighting, intimidation and
harassment, torture and killings in eastern Ukraine. It is trying to verify such reports
through direct contacts with the victims and/or relatives or through other reliable sources.
From its own records, the HRMMU is aware of 222 cases of abductions and detentions by
armed groups since 13 April. Of these, 4 were killed; 137 released; and 81 remained
detained as of 7 June.
198. The pattern of abductions consists of groups of armed men taking people away and
detaining them in one of the buildings they occupy on the grounds that they are members
of the Right Sector and “spies”. Some are released after a few hours, some after a few
days, and there are numerous accounts of allegations of ill-treatment and torture.
199. According to local activists from Kramatorsk, on 9 May, about 40 residents of the city
were abducted by the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. On 10 May, three “Pro-Ukrainian”
female activists not involved in any fighting were abducted and detained by armed persons
in Kramatorsk. One of them was released the next day after being reportedly subjected to
torture during interrogation. She was subsequently hospitalised in Slovyansk, suffering
from broken ribs, a pierced liver, a head injury and multiple bruises. The other two women
were released on 13 May and placed under so-called “house arrest”, reportedly prohibited
from leaving Kramatorsk.
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200. On 8 May, a woman went to Slovyansk to try to secure the release of her son detained by
the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and was reportedly abducted by the same armed persons.
She has cancer and was undergoing chemotherapy. The whereabouts of a female
interpreter was unknown from 4 to 18 May. Upon her release, she reported having been
detained by armed groups in Donetsk and to having being subjected to ill-treatment and
sexual assault.
201. On 26 May, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) lost contact in the town of
Antrazyt, with one of its Donetsk-based teams, consisting of four persons. On 29 May,
contact was lost with another team of four in the Luhansk region. As of 7 June, the eight
remained detained and their whereabouts unknown. 11 other OSCE SMM members were
stopped on 28 May for a few hours at a checkpoint in Mariynka (Donetsk region) before
being able to return safely to Donetsk.
202. On 25 May, two officers of the SBU were reportedly detained by the “Luhansk People’s
Republic” while attempting to negotiate the release of their colleagues who were being
detained. Their current location remains unknown. On 2 June, three police officers of the
Amvrosievka District Department of the MoI were reportedly abducted; their whereabouts
remain unknown although there are reports they might be detained by armed groups in
Horlivka. Two senior police officers went to Horlivka to negotiate their release. They have
not returned and their whereabouts is also unknown.
203. The HRMMU was involved in efforts to negotiate the release of individuals detained by
the armed groups under the control of the “Donetsk People’s Republic and the “Luhansk
People’s Republic”. Following repeated interventions, several civic activists and members
of district election commissions were released from the SBU building in Donetsk on 27
May. During the night of 29-30 May, 20 civilians detained in the SBU building were
released following discussions between the HRMMU and representatives of the “Donetsk
People’s Republic”.
204. The HRMMU appealed to the leadership of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” on 26 May
for the release of two detained journalists at the occupied building of the SBU in Luhansk.
A similar release took place of a third journalist. They were all detained by armed groups
for having covered the elections in the Donetsk region. While in detention, two of the
journalists were badly beaten, and were hospitalised upon their release.
205. The emergence of ransom demands is a worrisome trend, following abductions of people
from their homes and in some cases accompanied by looting and stealing of valuables,
including cars. For example, on 9-10 May, an armed group together with police officers
allegedly abducted the parents of a local activist from “Svoboda”, from their home in the
village Khanzhenkovo (near Makyivka, Donetsk region). On 10 May, the home of an
activist from Kramatorsk was allegedly attacked and items stolen by armed persons.
Applicable international law prohibits the taking of hostages for purposes of demanding
ransom or political concessions, regardless of whether the victims are of the general
population or involved in the fighting.
206. On 26 May, three deputy prosecutors were abducted by armed men, but two were
immediately released. The third was subsequently exchanged for three supporters of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic” who were being detained in the Lukyanovskoe pre-trial
detention centre in Kyiv. That same day, a traffic police officer was taken hostage by an
armed group of “Cossacks” in Antratsyt in Luhansk region. The family was asked for a
ransom of one million UAH (approximately 80,000 USD).
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207. Although most of the persons detained are activists, journalists, and town councillors,
NGOs in Donetsk have highlighted to the HRMMU a growing pattern of the systematic
persecution against civil society. According to them, fear is spreading in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, with an increasing number of acts of intimidation and violence by armed
groups, targeting “ordinary” people who support Ukrainian unity or who openly oppose
the either of the two “people’s republics”.
208. Among cases brought to the attention of the HRMMU, on 14 May, four armed men in
camouflage reportedly abducted the principal of a school in Luhansk from the school
premises. Allegedly, she had opposed holding the “referendum” on the school premises.
She was released a few hours later, but refused to speak about the incident. The same day
in Kramatorsk, armed men came to the apartment of an employee and reportedly abducted
him. Reportedly they were looking for his 16-year old son, allegedly because of his active
“Pro-Ukrainian” position, including in the social media. Since the son was not to be found,
they took the father to the occupied building of the Kramatorsk City Council where he was
beaten. Allegedly, they eventually found the son and took him to the city council. Both
were released a few hours later, and the whole family left the region the same day.
Killings
209. Increasingly residents have been killed by armed groups. On 8 May, the burned body of
Valeriy Salo, a farmer and head of a local cultural organization known as a “Pro-Maidan”
activist, was found a day after he had been abducted by armed persons from his village.
There have also been several reports of killings at checkpoints held by armed groups. That
same day, an Orthodox priest was shot dead at a checkpoint near his hometown of
Druzhivka, and a couple was also shot dead in their car at a checkpoint in the Luhansk
region. Their daughter survived with head injuries. In the same region, on 23 May, a
woman who allegedly did not stop at a checkpoint died when heavy gun fire was opened
at her car.
210. The HRMMU is also concerned about reports of “summary executions” by representatives
of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. On 18 May, in a village near Slovyansk an elderly
farmer was accused of bringing food to the Ukrainian forces, taken out of his house into
the yard, where according to witnesses a “sentence” was read in the name of the “Donetsk
People’s Republic” and shot dead, in front of his family and neighbours. Reportedly, on
26 May, by order of Igor Strelkov, Dmytro Slavov (“commander of a company of the
people’s militia”) and Mykola Lukyanov (“commander of a platoon of the militia of
”Donetsk People’s Republic”) were “executed” in Slovyansk, after they were “sentenced”
for “looting, armed robbery, kidnapping and abandoning the battle field”. The order,
which was circulated widely and posted in the streets in Slovyansk, referred to a decree of
the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR of 22 June 1941 as the basis for the
execution.
Torture
211. The HRMMU has been following cases of individuals who have been abducted and
detained by armed groups in eastern Ukraine. Several interviews conducted with persons
who were abducted provide vivid accounts of human rights abuses committed by
representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic”,
including beatings, psychological torture and mock executions. There are instances of
relatives of detained persons, including women and children, having been threatened and
terrorised. Witnesses also mention having seen supporters of the “Donetsk People’s
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Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” being detained and subjected to harsh
punishment for looting or insubordination.
212. Among the numerous cases reported to the HRMMU, a journalist from Lutsk who was
abducted by armed groups in Donetsk on 25 April, stated that during 23 days of his
detention, he suffered from permanent lack of drinking water. He was reportedly tortured
with electric shocks, beaten repeatedly over the head with a heavy book, and his captors
reportedly tried to cut off one of his fingers.
213. An activist of “Batkivschyna”, abducted on 22 May and detained by supporters of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic” in Donetsk, reported being subjected to torture and forced
labour while in detention. He stated that he only received food twice in the five days he
was detained. He was interrogated about affiliation with the “Right Sector”, with
“Euromaidan”, and trips to Kyiv. During one of the interrogations he was reportedly
subjected to a mock execution.
214. Three activists of a local human rights NGO were detained in Donetsk on 27 May and
released on 1 June. They were taken to the occupied building of the Makiyivka
Department of Organized Crime Control, and interrogated on a daily basis, accused of
being affiliated to the “Right Sector” and the Ukrainian military. Both of them allege
having been tortured.
Enforced disappearances
215. The HRMMU has received credible reports of individuals being detained in conditions
that amount to enforced disappearance, and has a list of 11 such cases.
216. On 10 May, units of the Ukrainian armed forces allegedly detained a streamer, who was
covering the activities of armed groups, in particular, the attacks on the government
buildings in Donetsk region. The HRMMU filed a request to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA), asking about the current location of the individual. On 15 May, the
HRMMU was informed by the MFA that a criminal case was opened by the MoI underhe
Article 115 (Murder) of the Criminal Code.
217. In an earlier case of concern, working with the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM),
the HRMMU was able to identify the location of an individual whose whereabouts had
been unknown for nine days. The location of an activist of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic” was identified on 26 May, after he had been allegedly detained by the National
Guard on 17 April in the area of Amvrosiyivka. After enquiries made by the NPM, the
activist was located in the pre-trial detention centre in Dnipropetrovsk. It remains
unknown who exactly arrested the activist and why access was not granted to him for nine
days. The NPM confirmed that he had no health complaints, besides having "a few minor
bruises" on his body. It is checking on access to legal counsel for him. It is also unclear
whether the activist has been officially charged.
218. This has put in motion a good practice for partnership with the NPM on such cases, which
was key in drawing attention to the case of the enforced disappearance for six days of two
LifeNews journalists, Oleg Sidyakin and Marat Saychenko. Both were detained on 18
May near Kramatorsk during a raid by Ukrainian forces against armed groups. The
whereabouts of the two journalists was unknown until their release on the evening of 24
May, when they were flown to Moscow via Grozny. All attempts by their lawyers to be in
contact with them, and gain some access to the two individuals, had failed. The HRMMU
worked with the lawyers of the two journalists, and with others including the
Ombudsperson, the NPM and the MFA. Through these institutions, requests were made on
the case to the General Prosecutor, MoI and SBU. Upon their release, the journalists
37
asserted that they were beaten in the first two days of their detention, initially held in a
hole, blindfolded with hands tied, and then transferred to Kyiv. For the period from 18
May to 24 May, the journalists were effectively held in conditions that amounted to
enforced disappearance.
219. The HRMMU was also looking into the detention conditions of supporters of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” detained by the Ukrainian
forces during the security operations. Regular visits to places of detention take place,
including in Kyiv when persons arrested have been transferred to detention facilities in the
capital. The HRMMU actively cooperates with the Ombudsperson and the NPM to make
sure the human rights of detained persons are upheld, including from the point of view of
access to medication and to the services of a lawyer.
Children
220. The HRMMU is particularly concerned about the impact of the situation in eastern
Ukraine - especially in the area between Donetsk and Slovyansk - on the human rights of
women, and the most vulnerable persons - children and persons with disabilities, including
those in institutional care, older persons, and those needing medical assistance.
221. According to a rapid psychological assessment of 204 children conducted by the
UNICEF17 in four cities of the region of Donetsk from 15 to 22 May, nearly every second
child experienced fear, anger, sadness or problems with sleep. Other behavioural changes
were also observed in a number of children.
222. According to Donetsk Regional State Administration, in the period between 9 – 30 May,
seven children had been wounded as a result of the illegal activities of the armed groups.
According to credible reports received by the HRMMU, 14 children from the children’s
institution in Slovyansk have been evacuated from the city. An NGO in Kharkiv expressed
concern that there were no evacuation plans for persons with disabilities living in closed
institutions. On 7 June, the Ministry of Social Policy informed the HRMMU that out of
1,494 children who are in closed institutions (children’s institutions, shelters, and so forth)
in Donetsk region, 663 have been evacuated; in Luhansk region out of 760 children, 464
have been evacuated.
223. As fighting intensifies and with the end of the school year on 30 May, parents are
reportedly increasingly looking for ways to evacuate their children to safety. There is
information that a group of children from Slovyansk has arrived in Crimea and most
recently on 6 June to Odesa. On 30 May, various media outlets informed that a group of
148 children from Slovyansk was taken to a summer camp in Crimea. There were also
reports that on 31 May, a group of 21 children crossed into the Russian Federation on foot,
after having to disembark from their bus at the border. This information cannot be verified
by the HRMMU.
C. Freedom of expression
224. Journalists’ safety continues to be a serious issue in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions due
to fighting between the Government’s security forces and armed groups. On 24 May, an
Italian photojournalist, Andrea Rocchelli, and his interpreter, Andrey Mironov, Russian
citizen, were killed under mortar fire, while covering fighting between government forces
and armed groups in Andreyevka near Slovyansk, Donetsk region. On 9 May, it was
17 UNICEF, Rapid Psychosocial Assessment of Children in Donetsk Oblast, 2014.
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reported that a freelance cameraman of the video agency RUPTLY, which is part of the
TV channel Russia Today, was wounded while filming events in Mariupol. Reportedly, he
received necessary medical treatment and is in satisfactory condition.
225. The working environment for journalists has become increasingly dangerous, with the
threat of abduction and illegal detention by armed groups. On 7 May, it was reported that
armed groups in Luhansk offered a reward of USD 2,000-10,000 for each detained
journalist. The HRMMU continues to closely monitor cases of detentions of journalists in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Although all but one of the journalists abducted and known
to the HRMMU before 6 May (cut-off date of the previous report) have been released, the
HRMMU is aware of new cases abducted after that date. The HRMMU interviewed many
of the released journalists, who reported ill-treatment, beatings, and sexual harassment (of
women). They also confirmed the fact that other detainees were being kept in the seized
administrative buildings; but the exact number and their identities remain unknown.
226. Also, journalists and editorial offices continue to be threatened and intimidated by armed
groups. For instance, on 14 May, the HRMMU received credible reports that those
journalists who work in the region but refuse to comply with the orders of the “Donetsk
People’s Republic” are threatened and harassed. Reportedly, the state regional television is
in a particularly difficult situation; its office has been practically blocked by
approximately 100 heavily armed men. On 21 May, an unidentified man called the
editorial office of the Public television of Donetsk region and threatened its journalists.
227. Local journalists have reported having to flee Donetsk and Luhansk regions due to such
threats and intimidation. On 8 May, two journalists from Donetsk had to move to Lviv out
of fear of persecution and threats. On 13 May, an internet resource in Severodonetsk
(Luhansk region) announced the forced suspension of activities and advised its journalists
to leave the town because of growing pressure and threats against their lives from the
armed groups. On 27 May, the editorial office of another local web-based outlet was
forced to relocate to a different town, reportedly, due to threats from the self-proclaimed
“Army of the South-East”. On 26 May, it was reported that the publisher and editor in
chief of one of the local newspapers in Kramatorsk was forced to flee the region with his
family due to threats they were receiving after he had refused to publish materials armed
representatives of “Donetsk People’s Republic” demanded him to publish.
Arbitrary arrests of journalists
228. In the reporting period, Ukrainian and Russian journalists have been arbitrarily arrested;
this raises concerns about the possibility for journalists to conduct their professional
activities safely.
· On 10 May, a journalist of Russian TV channel Kuibishev 61, was allegedly
detained by the Ukrainian security forces at a checkpoint on the road between
Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. His whereabouts remain unknown to the family. On
22 May, the HRMMU sent an official inquiry to the MoI (via the MFA) about the
case. On 5 June, the HRMMU was informed that as of 15 May a criminal
investigation had been opened under Article 115 (Murder) of the Criminal Code.
The HRMMU has requested more information on this case.
· On 15 May, a journalist and cameraman of the ICTV Ukrainian channel were
arrested on the border (Kharkiv / Belhorod) while performing editorial tasks by
the Border Service and Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation,.
Reportedly, after more than 15 hours of questioning without water and food and
deleting all photo and video materials, the journalists were released.
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· Two LifeNews journalists, Oleg Sidyakin and Marat Saychenko, were detained on
18 May near Kramatorsk during a raid by Ukrainian forces against the armed
groups. They were released on 24 May (see section B, chapter V).
· The HRMMU also followed closely the case of a British journalist working for
Russia Today detained by the National Guard in Mariupol on 20 May for
allegedly filming military objects. He was released on 21 May and transferred to
the Consulate of the United Kingdom in Kyiv. After his release he tweeted details
of his detention, including that he had been treated fairly.
· On the night of 6 June, two journalists of the Russian TV station “Zvezda” were
detained by the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) at a checkpoint near
Slovyansk. According to their driver, who was also initially detained and later
released, the journalists were cuffed, balaclavas were put on their heads, and they
were forced to kneel down in a ditch (allegedly, to protect them from possible
shooting). On 7 June, the NGU issued a statement saying that journalists were
suspected of monitoring and collecting information. The MFA of the Russian
Federation reportedly filed a note of protest to the MFA of Ukraine. On 8 June
2014, the TV station “Zvezda” received information from the SBU that the two
journalists were in good health. They were released on 9 June and transferred to
the Russian Federation.
Obstruction to lawful professional journalist activities
229. On 11 May, it was reported that Ukrainian journalists were not allowed to photograph or
film the voting process during the “referenda” in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
230. The same instances were reported prior and during the election day on 25 May. For
instance, the journalists of the Voice of America were warned not to film the seizure of
one of the polling stations in Donetsk.
Attacks on editorial offices and TV towers
231. In the reporting period, there has been a growing number of armed attacks on the editorial
offices of the local media outlets by armed men. Some of the examples are provided
below.
· On 7 May, the office of the local newspaper “Hornyak” in Torez (Donetsk Region)
was reportedly attacked and its equipment was broken and damaged.
· On 8 May, the independent newspaper “Provintsiya” in Kostyantynivka was
attacked by armed, masked men, allegedly members of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic”. The editors were told the paper was “closed” and taken to the “city
commander’s office” situated in the occupied building of the City Council, where
they were threatened and suggested to leave the town. The police was called, but
did not interfere or arrested the attackers. The editors did not file a complaint
because they do not trust the police will act and because they feel threatened and
fear for their lives.
· On 11, 13, 19 and 20 May, armed groups shelled the TV tower in Slovyansk,
which led to interruptions in broadcasting. On 14 May, in Kramatorsk, the armed
groups blocked the TV tower, which transmits the channels not only for
Kramatorsk, but also Slovyansk, Horlivka and Makiivka.
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Censorship / access to information
232. According to NGOs, freedom of media in the Donetsk region is severely curtailed, with
Ukrainian TV channels switched off by the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and replaced by
the its own media programmes and Russian TV. Some of the examples include the
following:
· On 8 and 25 May, armed group stormed the office of the local TV Channel
“Union” with demands to report about the activity of “Donetsk People’s Republic”
and declared their intent to control the activity of journalists. The target audience
of the channel is about 3 million people in nine towns of Donetsk region.
· On 8 May, under threat of physical violence from the armed groups, the company
“Vokar Holding” was forced to stop retransmission of Ukrainian TV Channels:
“Inter”, “Ukraine”, “1+1”, ICTV, STB, “New Channel”, “5th Channel”, “112
Ukraine”, and “TVI” in Severodonetsk, Luhansk region. Instead the Russian
channels were broadcasted. The same incidents occurred throughout May in
Luhansk and its region (Krasnyi Luch, Alchevsk).
· On 2 June, armed members of the so-called “Donbas People’s Militia” arrived at
the office of the newspapers “Donbas” and “Vecherniy Donetsk” and blocked all
entrances and exits. They abducted the editor-in-chief of the “Donbas” and his
deputy and the editor-in-chief of “Vecherniy Donetsk”. The armed men reportedly
used psychological pressure and death threats to change the editorial policy of the
newspapers and ensure more positive coverage of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic”. The three editors were eventually released on 3 June after which all the
“Donbas” employees were sent on leave and the newspaper stopped its publication.
Also, the HRMMU has noted specific hate speech on the “official” media outlet of
the “Donetsk People’s Republic” “Anna Info News”. On 20 May Oleksandr
Mozhayev, known as "Babai" (a fighter participating in the armed groups) referred
to the on-going operations as a “Holy War” and spoke of exterminating America.
· On 5 June, a local cable TV and Internet network provider in Donetsk terminated
the broadcast of Ukrainian channels: “1+1”, “Donbas”, “UBR” and “News24” at
the demand of “Donetsk People’s Republic” representatives.
Propaganda
233. The HRMMU reiterates the importance to counter misinformation, incitement to hatred,
discrimination, and violence. As an example, the “Donetsk People’s Republic” denied all
responsibility for the attack near Volnovakha, claiming that it was the National Guard
“paid by Kolomoiskiy” which perpetrated this attack on the Ukrainian military. On 27
May, LifeNews posted a photo of a wounded child stating he was shot in the Donetsk
International Airport; however the StopFake.org experts discovered that the photo was
from the Syrian city of Aleppo in April 2013. Although the original publication in twitter
was deleted, the photo was widely used for similar posts on alleged shootings of children.
A different photo with a dead boy's body in a coffin was used for similar messages of
alleged shooting of children in eastern Ukraine. The photo, however, was made in 2010, in
the Crimean city Dzhankoy, of a boy killed by a local criminal.
234. Similarly, various videos became viral, allegedly showing either atrocities by the
Ukrainian army, seizing of "Grad" complexes by armed groups, or of the use UN symbols
on Ukrainian helicopters used in the security operations. It was also demonstrated that
originals of such videos were also filmed earlier in the Russian Federation or in other
countries, and had nothing to do with the current events in Ukraine.
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235. Misinformation adds to the instability and fear which affect the lives of people in the
region, and all sides should refrain from using it, especially to the extent that it amounts to
advocacy to national hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence, which is prohibited under Article 20 of the ICCPR.
D. Freedom of religion or belief
236. On 15 May, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchy (UOC-KP)
condemned the violence and threats to the life and health of the clergy and the faithful of
eastern Ukraine by armed groups. The statement by the Holy Synod of the UOC-KP calls
for the Moscow Patriarchate to condemn collaboration with the supporters of the selfproclaimed
“people’s republics” and distance itself from it. The UOC-KP requested the
Government of Ukraine to protect the clergy and congregation of the Kyiv Patriarchy in
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions from the attacks and threats of the “criminals”.
237. In the statement, the Church also appeals to the international community and interreligious
social human right organizations to pay attention to the infringement of rights of
the believers of UOC-KP in the eastern parts of Ukraine and in Crimea.
238. In Donetsk, numerous attacks against the inter-religious Prayer Marathon (attended by all
major denominations except the Moscow Patriarchy) took place almost on a daily basis in
May, including heavy beatings of participants, the destruction of property, and threats to
organisers and volunteers. On 23 May, after a repeated attack by 15 representatives of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic”, in an attempt to discuss security arrangements for the
Prayer Marathon, its coordinator allegedly went to the occupied building of the Donetsk
Regional State Administration. While there he was allegedly heavily beaten and had to
seek medical assistance. The Prayer Marathon has continued gathering in June. No
incidents have been reported.
239. Reports have also been received of other denominations being attacked, for example,
Protestants.
E. Economic and social rights – impact of the violence
240. As background to the situation in the eastern regions and the current impact on economic
and social rights being faced by the local population, the HRMMU recalls that Ukraine is
a middle-income country, ranked 78 in the Human Development Index in 2013.
241. The recent evaluation of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ESCR) published on 23 May 2014, highlighted the positive steps of the Government in
ratification of, or accession to, various human rights instruments. At the same time the
Committee identified major problems that have an adverse impact on the enjoyment of all
human rights, including the large extent of corruption, discrimination against Roma and
Crimean Tatars, a low level of social standards, unemployment among youth, around 30%
gender pay gap, employment in the informal economy, a stable poverty rate of 24.7%,
absence of a health insurance system, and low expenditure on health care.
242. The Committee made related recommendations to address the root causes of the
aforementioned challenges.
243. The violence and security operations in the eastern regions has had a direct impact on the
existing level of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, and has also influenced
42
the State capacity to progressively realize the rights and comply with the Committee´s
recommendations in the areas struck by the conflict.
Right to education
244. Despite the efforts of the Donetsk Department of education and science, as well as school
administrations, studies had to be suspended in several towns of the Donetsk region in
May. In Slovyansk, Krasnyi Lyman and Krasnoarmiysk, 62 schools and 46 kindergartens
were not functioning, which affected 21,700 students and 5,600 children, respectively. On
28 May, it was reported that during the fights in Slovyansk two school buildings have
been damaged; no one was injured.
245. In other towns in the Donetsk region schools remained open, but attendance varied from
25% in Slovyansk district to 98% in Makiivka district.
246. Most schools in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions managed to complete the academic
year, which finished on 30 May. The main concern had been the organisation of the
“External Independent Assessment18” for the students of these eastern regions. On 29
May, the Ministry of Education announced that testing in these regions would be
postponed until 11 July to 27 July, and if necessary could be postponed again.
247. Following instructions issued by the Ministry of Education and Science, all universities in
the eastern regions had to ensure that foreign students finished their studies earlier, by 20
May, so that they could leave the country.19
248. Reportedly, school administrations have faced various forms of pressure from
representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” including in the preparation and
holding of the “referendum” of 11 May, as well as establishing temporary “hideouts” in
school premises.
Right to health
249. Due to the growing number of wounded, hospitals are overcrowded and understaffed. As
of 28 May, in order to minimize the risk to life and security of patients, the Regional
Hospital of occupational diseases in Donetsk partially discharged patients whose medical
condition did not require in-ward treatment. A sanatorium for children with cerebral palsy
was closed in Donetsk due to its proximity to the occupied Security Service of Ukraine
building. On 26 May, Children’s Hospital Nr 1 and city hospital Nr 18 had to close due to
the proximity to Donetsk airport20.
250. Access to medical services, treatment and supplies for residents in areas most affected by
the fighting is becoming more and more challenging. This is of particular concern as more
residents are caught in the crossfire between the armed groups and Ukrainian forces. The
18 A final test for the high school students to enter universities in Ukraine.
19 On 29 and 30 April, The Ministry of Education and Science issued two letters Nr 1/9 - 228 and Nr 08.01-
47/12033 instructing all universities of Ukraine, particularly in the East, to terminate the studies of all foreign
students by 20 May, which is much earlier than usually. Reportedly, the decision was made upon request of the
embassies of foreign countries so that foreign students could complete exams and leave the country if they
wish so due to the security situation. Allegedly, at the end of April there were two attacks in eastern regions on
foreign students; however the HRMMU could not verify these facts.
20 On 26 May 2014, approximately 20-30 armed representatives of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” reportedly
arrived at Donetsk International Airport. According to the Press-Secretary of the Donetsk International Airport
Dmytro Kosinov, they demanded the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which were guarding the airport, to withdraw.
Fighting broke out at 7.00 a.m. and at that time the airport was closed. It was reported that it will stay out of
service till 30 June. According to some reports the main terminal was partially destroyed and some fighting is
still on-going there.
43
situation is most difficult in Slovyansk. The overcrowded, understaffed and under
resourced hospitals are only admitting those who are severely injured. Primary Health
Care services are overloaded and at times called to provide treatments and care that are
within their capacity. Patients from the Mental Health Hospital (229 persons) were
evacuated from Slovyansk. All emergency services have been relocated to the nearby
village of Mykolayivka, with a number of medical number units set up in Svyatohirsk
(location of a large Russian Orthodox monastery - the Lavra). Some patients were
transferred to Poltava region. Pharmacies are open only a few hours per day.
251. The delivery of supplies, particularly medicines, becomes more complicated every day;
especially with the Donetsk airport being out of service. Reports and requests sent to the
UN agencies indicate the lack of specific medications, including some antibiotics, painkillers,
vaccines and consumables. In Donetsk, insulin was distributed to various locations;
however, such deliveries are becoming more difficult. Supplies of food in hospitals are
running low.
252. There have been reported difficulties to ensure uninterrupted provision of opioid
substitution therapy (OST)21. This directly affects 759 persons (56% of whom are HIV
positive) in Donetsk region and 609 (13% are HIV positive) in Luhansk region. According
to the HIV/AIDS Alliance and the Wold Health Organisation, in a number of cities, such
as Slovyansk, the healthcare facilities providing OST are completely controlled by armed
groups. The fact that pharmaceuticals in the healthcare facilities in the districts have fallen
beyond the legitimate authorities’ control, is in its essence a certain risk factor for medical
staff and patients. On 30 May, OST treatment was stopped for more than 100 patients in
Mariupol, due to drugs not being delivered because of the security situation. As of 2 June,
HIV service organisations reported that for some patients such an interruption in treatment
had resulted in people using illegal drugs. In the long run, this may lead to an increase in
cases of HIV and hepatitis infections due to intravenous drug use. Due to the numerous
check-points and blocked roads, as well as interruptions in public transport, the specialized
hospital for HIV/AIDS patients in Yasynovata, Donetsk region, is practically inaccessible.
Conditions for treatment of patients
253. The conditions for the treatment of patients, including those who have been wounded in
fighting and violence, are precarious As the security situation deteriorates, so does the
access to hospital care and the quality that can be provided by medical professionals. For
example, in Slovyansk, medical personnel were already highlighting the problems with the
delivery of medical supplies to the city. In the regions affected by violence and the
ongoing security operations, hospitals are trying to allocate what funds they have to
purchase the medical supplies they require. In early June, some hospitals in Donetsk
discharged patients, except those in critical condition or those who were immobile, leaving
the hospitals almost empty.
254. Due to the lack of trust regarding law enforcement, both the medical personnel and
patients try to conceal the facts and nature of wounds (the standard protocol is that
medical institutions have to report any gunshot and/ stab wounds to the police). The
HRMMU has received credible reports that doctors are at times trying to ensure the
security of the wounded.
21 This has been an integral part of the widespread implementation of harm reduction programmes. These
programmes are an essential element in controlling HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases among injecting
drug users in Ukraine, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
44
255. Cooperation with local civil society and community volunteers is an important part of
treatment of those who suffered in the recent months. The volunteers, local NGOs,
political parties and priests donated money, clothes, food, and medical drugs and provided
psychological support. In some cases, when expensive purchases were necessary – such as
plates for head surgery – they were purchased by charitable organizations, which also
provided financial support to the victims after they were discharged from the medical
institutions – to receive rehabilitation treatment in sanatoria. In the local hospitals where
the wounded were brought – such as after the shooting on 22 May near Volnovakha in the
Donetsk region – there were instances when the local community cared and protected the
wounded, bringing them medical drugs, food and clothes.
256. Security in hospitals has been reported to the HRMMU as a concern with patients having
to be protected from potential abductions by armed groups. The officials from the Donetsk
Regional State Administration confirmed that such kidnappings of the wounded had taken
place, however there is no official record of such cases, thus no exact figure could be
provided. There is also an increased risk for healthcare professionals themselves,
particularly if it involves moving around in the case of ambulance medical teams.
Right to an adequate standard of living
257. Since 17 May, prices for basic commodities (including bread) have been rising by a
minimum 0.73 Hryvnia (UAH) and 1-2 UAH on average due to higher risks of production
and delivery of goods into the occupied towns through numerous checkpoints. Seasonal
vegetables and fruits are 4-5 UAH more expensive than usual.
258. Also, due to increased cases of looting, private businesses and retailers prefer to close
down, which creates scarcity of supply. Consequently, while the minimum set of products
is always available, the variety is much less. Often times there are interruptions in delivery
of dairy products, fruits and vegetables, and non-alcohol drinks.
Housing
259. The HRMMU is concerned when security operations take place in residential areas of
towns and villages of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. As of 30 May, there had been
reports of ruined residential buildings in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk and Donetsk.
Additionally, on 7 June, it was reported that nine houses were damaged by the Ukrainian
army shelling in Semyonovka near Slovyansk.
260. The HRMMU will raise this and other similar issues with the Ukrainian Government,
including advocating for monetary compensation to be awarded to the victims for damages
to their property in the course of these security operations.
Electricity and water supply
261. As of 18 May, in the Slovyansk region, 22 electrical sub-stations stopped functioning. As
a result, more than 2,000 households were left without access to electricity. According to
the Press-service of the company “Donetskoblenergo”, the company has all the necessary
material and human resources for reconstruction. However, repair crews are unable to
access the site due to the ongoing security operations.
262. In the northern part of the Donetsk region, the supply of water supply is increasingly under
threat, with regular interruptions. Moreover, as of 3 June, residents of Slovyansk,
Konstyantynivka, Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk (cities in Donetsk region) had no access to
running water, due to damage to the water supply reportedly as a result of the security
operations.
45
Social security (services and benefits)
263. Due to the deteriorating security situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, it is a
growing challenge to ensure continuous work of State institutions. On 14 May, the
Pension Fund department resumed its work (after the seizure of its building on 5 May) in
Slovyansk, but the department’s office hours were cut. On 15 May, it was reported that the
National Bank of Ukraine suspended22 the operations of its office in Donetsk region due to
the threats by the representatives of the "Donetsk People's Republic”. On 15 May, the
Ministry of Revenue and Duties of Ukraine also evacuated the staff of its directorate and
tax inspections in the region.
264. On 7 June, the Ministry of Social Policy informed the HRMMU that all social payments
had been made to the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. However, there were major
challenges in delivering cash to Antratsyt in Luhansk region and Slovyansk and
Kramatorsk in Donetsk region. The Ministry has already addressed the MoI and SBU to
develop a mechanism of the safe delivery of cash to these regions if the situation remains
the same or aggravates.
265. On 30 May, the head of Department of Marketing Communications of the
Novokramatorskiy Machine-Building Plant Volodymyr Zhuliy spoke of the imminent
“humanitarian catastrophe” in Kramatorsk, due to the termination of the work of the city
department of the State Treasury of Ukraine since 20 May. In particular, Mr Zhuliy
mentioned that thousands of the city’s pensioners, local governance workers, educators
and public health workers were deprived of the means for existence. Reportedly, the
Treasury’s debt to the workers and pensioners in Kramatorsk for the payments due in May
already amounted to UAH 61.4 million.
Increased lawlessness resulting in loss of individual property
266. On 15 May, the Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights informed the HRMMU that
there are numerous incidents in Donetsk and Luhansk regions when the armed groups’
members seize personal phones and especially cars from ordinary citizens. The police
rarely intervene or take any action, as they are usually unarmed and thus unable to perform
their functions in the current situation. Consequently, although criminality is increasing,
there is nobody to apply to in case of an alleged crime, and no effective means to intervene
for police. It also becomes dangerous for persons to report about such crimes, so in most
cases they chose to leave the region. The increase in criminality is, in the view of some,
returning the regions to the “lawlessness of the 1990s”:
· For example, on 8 May, the private residence of a local activist was allegedly shot
at from a car; the attackers broke into the house and looted everything of value.
The police called by the neighbours, allegedly made several photos of the
location, but did not even walk into the building. Reportedly, the activist left the
region to Kharkiv with his family, due to previous threats to his life, including
attempted arson of his home with Molotov cocktails on 4 May.
· On 15 May, owners of car-dealerships in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions formed rapid response groups to protect their businesses against attacks
aimed at robbery that have multiplied since the beginning of May.
· On 28 May, the HRMMU spoke to one of the local political leaders in the
Donetsk region. He reported that his legal firm’s office was ruined when attackers
took his computers, documentation on the legal cases and stole the firm’s car. He
22 The staff of the Bank was evacuated, and online banking in the region was reportedly suspended.
46
was also detained for 7-8 hours and subjected to life threats, inhumane treatment
and beating. After his release he fled the region together with his family.
Labour rights
267. There are growing concerns about the ability of enterprises in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions to continue functioning due to the on-going fighting, targeted attacks and
intimidations by the armed groups.
268. The presence of uncontrolled armed groups and rise of criminality obstruct the business
activity of entrepreneurs, which first of all affects small companies in the sphere of
services and retail (banks, logistic companies, stores, petrol stations, and bakeries).
269. On 20 May, the Mayor of Donetsk, Oleksandr Lukyanchenko, stated that a wide range of
enterprises do not work in full capacity and some of them suspend production, in
particular, “Donetsk Metallurgical Plant” employing approximately 2,100 persons.
270. On 29 May, the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Parliamentary Committee,
Sergey Kaplin, stated that due to the current events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
approximately 60 % industrial enterprises of companies were forced to suspend their
work, leaving thousands of employees without regular income.
271. There also have been armed attacks on mining companies, which constitute the main share
of the regions’ economy. On 9 May, it was reported that local miners repelled an attack by
the pro-Russian supporters of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”, who attempted to take
down the Ukrainian flag and threatened the miners that they would throw explosives into
the mine’s shafts for their disobedience. Allegedly, the miners decided to organize their
own “self-defence” to protect themselves. On 19 May, there were armed attacks on the
operational and closed coal mines in Horlivka, Donetsk region. On 22 May, a group of
unidentified armed individuals allegedly captured four operating mines of the JSC
"Lysychanskvuhillya" in Luhansk region. All of the four attacked mines temporarily
suspended production activities. Reportedly the armed men pointed guns at the mines’
workers, demanding to supply them with explosives. The Ministry of Energy of Ukraine
appealed to the SBU demanding that necessary steps be taken to protect the mines.
Previously, on 26-27 May, due to pressure by the armed representatives of the “Donetsk
People’s Republic” on the “Donetsk Coal-Mining Company”, coal production was
suspended at several mines, including “Octyabrskiy Rudnik”, “E. Abakumov”, “A.
Skochinskogo” and “Trudovskaya”.
272. On 20 May, Denys Pushylin, “speaker” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”, announced
the launch of the nationalization campaign in the region. According to their official
sources, Mr. Pushylin blamed the local oligarchs` unwillingness to pay taxes to the
“republic’s” budget, and their opposition to the interests of Donbas as the reason for the
adopted decision to start the nationalization. In particular, Mr Pushylin blamed Renat
Akhmetov, owner of the company System Capital Management.
The broader impact of the crisis in the eastern regions of Ukraine
273. Recent developments in the country have already negatively affected the financial and
banking system. In the first quarter of 2014, the national currency depreciated by 27%,
dramatically reducing incomes and salaries. Whereas the average monthly wage in
December stood at $453, by March it had dropped to $343. This also puts significant
pressure on those who have loans in foreign currencies.
47
274. After remaining quiescent for more than two years, inflation rates have shot up with a
6.8% increase in consumer prices reported for the beginning of May being the highest
year-on-year inflation rate recorded since 2011.
275. Food prices have increased by 8.2% above 2013 levels, bringing the socio-economic crisis
to many households in Ukraine. Large price hikes were reported for sugar (59%),
vegetables (33%), and dairy products and eggs (10%).
276. Other inflationary pressures are now gathering, for example in the form of increases in
communal service tariffs. Household gas prices shot up 56% on average in May; a 40%
increase in heating tariffs is scheduled for July. These higher tariffs are projected to
increase the numbers of low-income households from 1.4 to 4 million during this time.
277. Should these tariff increases be accompanied by a further weakening of the UAH,
Ukraine’s inflation rates could dramatically accelerate. Even in the best case scenario,
consumer and food price inflation rates seem likely to remain in double figures for the rest
of 2014, and going into 2015. These developments will place increased pressure, and
need, for Ukraine’s social welfare system to cushion the impact, particularly for the most
vulnerable.
278. The 63 billion UAH deficit recorded on the consolidated government budget in 2013
(some 9% of GDP) is regarded as unsustainable by both the Government and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Fiscal austerity in 2014 is therefore required.
Although a justified measure, it may do little to boost the country’s long term
competitiveness or development prospects. Already in the first quarter of 2014
Government expenditure23 in the health sector declined by 5%, and in the education sector
by 8%, compared to the budget allocations in 2013. At the same time, the Government has
been able to increase spending on social protection by 2% (which includes expenditures
on both social assistance and social insurance) for 2014, which may lessen the hardships
and pressures that many Ukrainian households are now facing.
279. The economy of the eastern region has already been in decline since April 2014, and it is
likely to deteriorate further in any protracted situation of violence and fighting. Business is
in decline in the region; personal income is decreasing; investments are dwindling.
Compared to 2013, in the first quarter of 2014 investments in the eastern regions had
significantly declined. In the annual rating Donetsk region moved from third place in 2013
to twenty-second place in 2014, and the Luhansk region from ninth to twenty-third.
280. Any exacerbation of the violence will lead to the further decline of industrial production in
the region and Ukraine as a whole. The industries of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
account for 18.5% and 6.1% of all production in the country respectively. Such a decline
would therefore increase the imbalance between the income of the state budget from the
Donbas and expenditure provided to the region. This will augment the budget deficit. One
result could be that it would jeopardise compliance with the agreed parameters of the IMF
loan.
281. Official statistics released in May indicate that Ukraine’s GDP dropped 1% in the first
quarter of 2014. The recession is expected to worsen over the course of the year: IMF and
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade forecast a 3% decline in GDP, while
other, more pessimistic forecasts point to 5-10% declines in output and income. The
largest decline in exports (70-85%—relative to the fourth quarter of 2013) has already
23 Changes are given in real terms: changes in nominal expenditure amounts divided by changes in the consumer
price index.
48
been recorded in the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Cherkasy, and Khmelnitskyi, as well in
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Any collapse in exports could trigger a decline in
industrial output, and subsequently in household incomes and livelihoods. These trends
should be closely monitored.
282. There are concerns that if these macro-economic tendencies continue, the State will no
longer be able to guarantee existing social standards, which could lead to the social unrest
spreading throughout the country.
VI. PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN CRIMEA
A. Civil and political rights of Crimean residents
283. Crimean residents faced difficulties in exercising their civil and political rights. A very
small number participated in the Presidential elections of 25 May. Simplified registration
procedures had been put in place to ensure that residents of Crimea and persons who
resettled from Crimea to other regions can take part in the vote. Ukrainian citizens living
in Crimea had to register in person at any polling station on the mainland no later than five
days prior to the elections. The HRMMU monitored the situation near Kherson, where
most of the Crimean voters had registered. Some 20 cars had left Crimea and were
welcomed by local authorities. They drove to the polling station in a column with Crimean
and Ukrainian flags. Prior to the election they had been summoned by the Crimean police
for “conversations" and issued ‘warnings’ about the unacceptability of ‘extremist
activities’. While the cars were crossing the administrative border, representatives of the
Crimean ‘self-defence’ reportedly wrote down license plates, passport numbers and
driving licenses' details. Among those who intended to vote, many allegedly did not do so
because of the cost of travelling, the uncertainty linked to having to cross the
administrative border and the fear of reprisals by the authorities in Crimea.
284. During its month-long monitoring of events in Crimea, the HRMMU noted a continuation
of worrying trends, including instances of enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions,
violence and ill-treatment committed by the so-called ‘Crimean self-defence’, often
targeting journalists, human rights defenders and political opponents, and impunity for
human rights violations. Furthermore the enforcement of the Russian Federation law on
the territory of Crimea, at variance with UN General Assembly resolution 68/262 and
applicable bodies of international law, is creating difficulties for Crimean residents to
enjoy their human rights, as there are many differences with Ukrainian laws.
Rule of law and the judiciary
285. The judicial system remains practically paralyzed. Ukrainian laws will be in effect in
Crimea until 31 December 201424. Nevertheless, the judicial system is already being
transformed to use Russian laws: restriction measures are implemented pursuant to the
Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, and judicial decisions are adopted in
the name of the Russian Federation. Pending cases that have not been decided by 18
March 2014 must be tried in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation. This
poses numerous problems in practice, especially in administrative and criminal cases,
when Russian and Ukrainian legislation differs on the existence, nature and scope of rights
24 Paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the Federal Constitutional Law of 21 March 2014 N 6-FCL “On Acceptance of
the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Creation of the New Constituent Entity within the
Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol”.
49
and obligations; and remedies and sanctions available. The outcome of court decisions that
are currently being appealed is unclear.
286. There are reports that, at least, 15,000 judicial cases are in legal limbo between Ukrainian
and Russian laws. The Ukrainian “Law on the occupied territories” allows the transfer of
judicial cases from the peninsula to Kyiv. However, in practice, this is unlikely to happen.
The HRMMU notes that the current situation has detrimental consequences affecting
access to justice, the right to fair trial and due process for Crimean residents.
Right to life, liberty and security
287. The Russian Security Service (FSB) confirmed on 30 May, the detention of four Ukrainian
citizens in Simferopol (Crimea), including film-maker Oleg Sentsov. The other three are
Aleksandr Kolchenko, Gennady Afanasiev and Aleksei Chyrnyi. The HRMMU spoke to
Mr. Sentsov’s lawyer who stated that while his client had been arrested on 11 May, he
managed to speak to him for the first time on 27 May. He also claims his client has been
tortured while in detention to confess to criminal intentions he did not have. According to
the FSB press release, the people detained are members of the Ukrainian ‘Right Sector’
party and were planning acts of sabotage and terrorism in Simferopol, Yalta and
Sevastopol. On 6 June, Sentsov was, according to his lawyer, officially charged with
terrorism and arms trafficking under Article 205, Part 2; Article 205.4, Part 2; and Article
222, Part 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
288. On 26 May, Timur Shaimardanov (born in 1980) left his home in Simferopol and did not
return. He had participated in campaigns against Crimea becoming a part of the Russian
Federation. The day before he went missing, he allegedly said that the whereabouts of one
of his friends, Leonid Korzh, (born in 1990) had not been known for 3-4 days. On 30 May,
Seiran Zinedinov, who had been coordinating the efforts to find Korzk and Shaimardanov
also went missing.
289. Mr. Mustafa Dzhemilev, former head of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis (Assembly) who was
banned from the authorities in Crimea to enter the peninsula on 3 May, informed the
HRMMU that the “Crimean police” had brought to his Crimean house a summons for an
interrogation related to illegal possession of weapons. Dzhemilev assumes that this could
be an attempt to initiate a criminal case against him. Ms. Ella Panfilova, Ombudsperson of
the Russian Federation, announced that her office has requested from the relevant
Governmental bodies an explanation of the actions undertaken by officials towards
Mustafa Dzhemilev, particularly regarding his ban on entering Crimea.
290. The Head of the Kurultai (Congress) of the Crimean Tatars, Zayr Smedlyaev, informed
HRMMU that he had received a written “warning” from the Crimean police about the
"inadmissibility of extremist activities and unlawful assemblies", in line with Russian
legislation. The notice says that on 3 May, the leaders of the Mejlis publicly spoke in
support of ‘extremist statements’ by Mustafa Dzhemilev and provoked extremist
manifestations from people.
291. On 15 May, three houses of Crimean Tatars in Simferopol were searched by FSB officials.
Two houses belong to the head of the External Relations Department of the Mejlis, Ali
Khamzin. The searches were performed at his actual place of residence (Bakhchysarai)
and his place of registration (Strogonovka village, Simferopol region). FSB officials
explained that these persons were suspected of preparing terrorist attacks.
292. On 15 May, the “Chairman” of the Council of Ministers of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov,
announced that the so-called “Crimean self-defence” would become regular and receive
budgetary support to ensure public security. The HRMMU underlines that such an
50
intention raises concern as the “Crimean self-defence” has reportedly been involved in
numerous human rights violations.
Accountability
293. The HRMMU is concerned that after more than two months of investigation of the murder
of 39year-old Reshat Ametov, the Crimean law-enforcement authorities have not yet
established the identities of perpetrators, although a video of the attackers is available that
would allow their identification. Crimean Tatar Reshat Ametov was abducted by
unidentified persons wearing military uniform in the centre of Simferopol in early March
during a picket near the Council of Ministers of Crimea. On 17 March, his corpse was
found with traces of torture in the Zemlyanichnoye village of the Belogorsk district.
294. The acting Prosecutor General of Ukraine reported on 27 May that an interagency
‘working group for legal issues relating to the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea’
had been established. The working group will coordinate the activities of the Ukrainian
authorities on a wide range of legal issues connected with the violations that took place
after the March “referendum”.
Citizenship
295. The HRMMU received worrisome information that, in some cases, Crimean residents
were forced to give up their Ukrainian citizenship, which may amount to arbitrary
deprivation of nationality. Judges of the Crimean Commercial Court in Simferopol and the
administrative staff, who were granted Russian citizenship on a priority basis, were
reportedly compelled to complete application forms renouncing Ukrainian citizenship. In
general, the procedure of issuing Russian passports is slow. According to different
calculations, providing passports to the whole population of Crimea will take up to 15
months while Russian laws allocated only three months for this procedure. Besides, it is
unclear how citizenship issues, applications for social benefits and payments and other
rights and entitlements are organised for persons in closed institutions: orphanages,
geriatric institutions, psycho-neurological hospitals, penitentiaries, and others.
296. The status of refugees and asylum seekers has not been regulated. Prior to the
“referendum” there were 18 refugees on the territory of Crimea. It is unclear how their
situation will be affected by the changed legal regime.
297. On 4 June, the President of the Russian Federation signed amendments to the law “On
citizenship of the Russian Federation”, introducing criminal responsibility for concealment
of dual citizenship. According to the amended law, those concealing their second
citizenship will be fined up to 200,000 Rubles ($5,700) or subjected to compulsory
community service of up to 400 hours in case of a failure to notify the Federal Migration
Service within two months from the date of the acquisition of the second citizenship. The
new provisions will become effective on 1 January 2016.
Freedom of expression
298. The HRMMU is alarmed by excessive limitations placed on freedom of information and
expression in Crimea. Journalists, human rights defenders and other individuals must be
able to freely exercise their right to freedom of expression, in accordance with article 19 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Any restrictions should comply
with the strict requirements of article 19, paragraph 3 of the Covenant.
299. On 15 May, a photojournalist of the "Crimean telegraph" newspaper Maksim Vasilenko
was briefly detained and ill-treated by members of the "self-defence of Crimea" in
Simferopol while preparing a report about the training of the special police forces before
51
the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Crimean Tatar Deportation. A
cameraman of the "FM" television channel was also attacked; his phone was taken and his
equipment was broken.
300. On 18 May, Osman Pashayev, Chief Editor of "Open Crimean Channel" internet project,
and his crew (correspondent, cameraman and driver) were detained by members of the
“Crimean self-defence” during the mourning events related to the anniversary of the
Crimean Tatar Deportation. They were deprived of their equipment, phones and personal
belongings, and subjected to physical and psychological pressure for four hours. No
reasons were given for the detention. After being brought to the central district police
station of Simferopol, they saw their lawyers and were released. Their money and personal
belongings were not returned. Russian Human Rights Ombudsperson Ella Pamfilova
condemned the incident, saying that the detention and interrogation of Pashayev and his
crew without the presence of a lawyer for several hours constituted a human rights
violation.
301. On 19 May, the “Crimean self-defence" detained for a short period of time Petr Ruzavin, a
correspondent of Russian television company "Dozhd", subjected him to violence and
damaged his equipment. According to Ruzavin, camouflaged people approached him
when he was filming the central square of Simferopol and they were filmed as well. They
requested him to delete his records, which he did. Ruzavin said he was beaten and his
equipment was damaged. After being interrogated he was released.
302. On 2 June, the “Acting Prosecutor” of Simferopol summoned the Chief Editor of the
Crimean Tatar newspaper “Avdet” Shevket Kaybullayev for questioning over possible
“extremist activity”. According to the notice, Kaybullayev had to appear on summons to
the Prosecutor’s Office. As written in the summons, the Prosecutor is investigating
violation of the Russian law “On counteraction to extremist activity”. The ‘Avdet’
newspaper is a press organ of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, published since 15
June 1990.
303. On 2 June, the Editor of the “Crimean Centre for Investigative Journalism”, Sergey
Mokrushyn, and his cameraman Vladlen Melnikov were attacked by members of the
“Crimean self-defence” in Simferopol, taken to their headquarters (on Kirova 26) and
beaten. They were eventually transferred to the police station for questioning, and released
without any explanation being given for their detention and or any protocol of detention
having been drawn up by the police.
304. The HRMMU recalls that acts of aggression, threats and intimidation against journalists
must be investigated, prosecuted and punished and victims provided with appropriate
remedies.
305. In the period of 12-25 May, the Russian Ministry of Communication and Mass Media and
the Federal Service for Supervision of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass
Communications held seminars for Crimean journalists to explain requirements of Russian
legislation with respect to the media. The HRMMU is concerned that the imposition of
Russian media legislation is already negatively impacting the conditions for journalists to
freely perform their functions. There is also concern that media representatives can be
subjected to criminal prosecution pursuant to Article 280 (Public calls for extremism),
Article 282 (Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation) and Article 319
(Insult of a public servant) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which are too
broad and can be used to criminalize conduct that is protected under international human
rights law.
52
Freedom of movement
306. While air connections between other parts of Ukraine and Crimea were suspended in
March 2014, it still remains possible to travel by train and car. However, freedom of
movement is affected by a number of factors related to the status of Crimea and different
regulations - Russian Federation and Ukraine’s - being applied. This creates difficulties to
maintain personal and professional ties.
307. Pursuant to the Law of “On guaranteeing citizens’ rights and freedoms and legal regime in
the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”, which entered into force on 10 May,
foreigners and stateless persons may enter and leave Crimea through security check-points
only subject to special permission. The procedure for obtaining such permission remains
unclear. On 16 May, the Press Secretary of the Chairman of the State Border Service of
Ukraine, Sergey Astakhov, confirmed that Ukrainian border guards around the Melitopol
checkpoint (in the Kherson region bordering Crimea) obliged persons going from Crimea
to continental Ukraine with Russian passports and Crimean residence permits to get off
trains. He reported that the Crimean residents with Russian passports are considered as
foreign citizens and, consequently, shall entry into Ukraine and leave it only through
special border points. According to him, the administrative border of Kherson and
established control line is not a border of Ukraine. Therefore, the foreign citizens,
including Russian citizens, may not be allowed via this line. He also noted that the
Crimean residents with Russian passports who wish to enter Ukraine shall go to the
Russian Federation first, for example, to Rostov-on-Don, and cross the borders there.
308. The Russian Federation illegally established its State border at the northern entrance to
Crimea on 25 April. Citizens of Ukraine who are not registered in Crimea are regarded as
foreigners and obliged to fill out an immigration card. Such a category also comprises the
people who permanently reside in Crimea, own real estate or are employed there, but
whose place of registration is mainland Ukraine. The Federal Immigration Service issued
warnings that foreign nationals must promptly (within 90 days) leave the territory of
Crimea and re-enter it pursuant to Russian laws applicable to foreign nationals. Inter alia,
such regulations will create inconveniences for students who study in other regions of
Ukraine and are temporarily registered there. While returning home to the territory of
Crimea during summer vacations, they will be regarded as foreigners with an admitted
stay of up to 90 days.
Freedom of association
309. Since the “referendum” on 16 March, many NGOs and human rights activists left Crimea
out of fear of being prosecuted, detained and subjected to ill-treatment. Legislation of the
Russian Federation - the so-called “foreign agents” law – has discouraged the activities
and development of NGOs. Besides, Crimea does not yet have an institution to register
civil society organisations; consequently, those that have not been registered before the
Crimean “referendum” are deprived of such a possibility.
Freedom of peaceful assembly
310. Dozens of Crimean Tatars have been summoned to courts for participating in protest
actions against the prohibition imposed on 3 May by the Crimean authorities on their
leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev, to enter the peninsula. As of 8 May, the courts of Crimea had
examined 55 cases related to those events. In 52 cases, the activists were fined on the basis
of Article 20.2.2 (Public disorder) of the Code on Administrative offences of the Russian
Federation.
53
311. On 16 May, the authorities in Crimea issued a decree prohibiting all mass events until 6
June. A similar prohibition was issued in Sevastopol. The degrees were motivated by
security developments in south-eastern Ukraine and the need to prevent "possible
provocations of extremists which can penetrate into the Republic of Crimea". The
HRMMU recalls that under Article 4 of the ICCPR, a derogation from the right to freedom
of assembly and association is only permissible “in time of public emergency” and “to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” and would require immediate
notification to the other State Parties to the ICCPR through the UN Secretary-General.
Freedom of religion or belief
312. The HRMMU is concerned about reports of violations of freedom of religion and belief on
the territory of Crimea.
313. On 8 May, the League of Muslim Women “Insaf” informed the HRMMU that some 150
persons from Kirovskoye and Stary Krym, including women, were being called in for
interrogations. Reportedly, they were being invited to the local police stations for “a
conversation”. They were reportedly fingerprinted and photographed.
314. On 20 May, the Head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church made a statement
expressing concern for the safety of the Greek Catholic priests remaining in Crimea. He
reported that all five Crimean parishes had experienced pressure, allegedly from the
representatives of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
315. On 1 June, men in Russian Cossack uniforms reportedly broke into the local Orthodox
church of the Kyiv Patriarchate in the village of Perevalnoe (Crimea), shouting and
terrorizing churchgoers. The car of the priest was allegedly damaged. The “Cossacks” said
they were seizing the building for the Moscow Patriarchate. After three hours, the
“Crimean self-defence” arrived with assault rifles and sided with the attackers. The police
were called but reportedly did not show readiness to properly investigate the incident. On
2 June, the local authorities of the city of Evpatoriya conducted a check of the church
documentation and called it an “illegal building”. In addition, the authorities in Crimea
significantly raised the rent for the main Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral in Simferopol. The
rent increase has not affected Crimean Tatar mosques or Russian Orthodox churches.
Mosques and Russian churches on the peninsula either belong to the religious
communities (mosques) or to the Moscow Patriarchate (Russian churches) or are rented
for a token fee.
B. Economic, social and cultural rights
316. Crimean residents face serious challenges in realizing their rights under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR). This can be attributed, in
part, to the complicated transition between two different legal systems, but also to the
absence of appropriate reactions of the authorities in Crimea to human rights violations
affecting certain communities. This concerns, in particular, the Ukrainian and Crimean
Tatar communities who are being harassed, assaulted and prosecuted for speaking
Ukrainian or Tatar languages in public places or using national symbols. Such conditions
are also reflected in the diminishing possibilities to receive education in another language
than Russian, particularly in Ukrainian.
Language and education
317. There are only two Ukrainian schools in Crimea: in Yalta and Simferopol. According to
the head of the Department of Education in Simferopol, three out of four classes in the
54
Simferopol gymnasium will now use the Russian language. The decision is motivated by
the decision of 86 % of the parents who reportedly decided to switch to Russian-language
studies. The director of the gymnasium was allegedly forced to resign. There is
information that the local authorities in Sevastopol are planning to close the only
Ukrainian boarding school/orphanage.
318. On 14 May, the press service of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian
Federation reported that teachers of the Ukrainian language and literature of general
educational institutions could be re-trained to become teachers of the Russian language
and literature. The Presidential Council for Civil Society Development and Human Rights
of the Russian Federation recommended to keep the study in the Simferopol Ukrainian
gymnasium in Ukrainian language and to resume the work of the Faculty of Ukrainian and
Crimean-Tatar Philology in the Tavrida National University.
319. In light of Article 27 of the ICCPR, the HRMMU recalls that all the national communities
in Crimea must be supported to preserve, develop and promote their identity, language and
culture, and to use their mother tongue in education and daily life.
Property rights
320. In early March, public notaries stopped documentation of property acquisition and sale
deals in Crimea, when Ukraine blocked access to the peninsula for the State Register of
Real Estate and Land Plots. Crimean residents face serious difficulties in exercising their
right to property due to the pending court decisions, transactions, and the privatisation
process. On 10 May, the Russian Minister of Crimean Affairs stated at a press conference
that the Russian authorities would deal with cases of unauthorized acquisition of land in
Crimea "with full responsibility and caution". On 28 May, a draft law “On the special
procedure for real estate registration in Crimea” was introduced in the Russian Parliament.
The text proposes to delegate to the local authorities, during a two-year transitional period,
the right to resolve land issues.
321. The HRMMU stresses that decisions concerning such important issues as land and
property must be taken through an inclusive, transparent and fair process that will
eliminate the risk of corruption and tensions.
Right to an adequate standard of living
322. On 13 May, the Ukrainian State Water Resources Agency stated that Ukraine shut off
water supplies to Crimea via the North-Crimean Canal, which accounts for 85% of all
fresh water on the peninsula. The Canal water is mostly used for irrigation purposes, and
its closure could severely impact agricultural land and the upcoming harvest. This
situation has reportedly had no negative implications for drinking water, according to the
‘First Deputy Chairman’ of the Council of Ministers of Crimea, Rustam Temirgaliyev.
Having no access to Crimea, the HRMMU does not have additional information about the
impact of the shut-off of water supplies on the economic and social rights of the Crimean
residents.
Banking
323. Access to banking services remains complicated for Crimean residents. On 7 May, the
National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) decided to suspend operations of Ukrainian banks in
Crimea until 6 June. However the activities of Ukrainian banks were terminated on 2 June,
by decision of the Central Bank of Russia motivated by the need to protect the interests of
depositors and customers. Compensation payments will reportedly be made by a nonprofit
organization, the “Depositor Protection Fund”, which acquired the rights to deposits.
55
C. The rights of indigenous peoples
324. The 18 May marked the 70th anniversary of the massive deportation of Crimean Tatars and
other minorities by the Soviet authorities. A Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation, in force on 21 April, had instructed the authorities in Crimea and Sevastopol to
support events commemorating the deportation. However, referring to security
considerations linked to the events in south-eastern Ukraine, the authorities in Crimea
issued on 16 May a decree prohibiting all mass events until 6 June. Eventually, the
“Council of Ministers” of Crimea decided on 17 May that the commemoration could go
ahead, although not in the centre of the capital of Crimea, Simferopol. The
commemorations passed without incidents, albeit with significant and sometimes
intimidating police presence.
325. On 29 May, the State archive of the SBU handed over the documents on Crimean Tatar
deportation from Crimea in 1944 to the representatives of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis. The
head of the SBU, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, and the former head of the Crimean Tatar
Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev, participated in this event.
326. On 4 June, the Crimean Parliament adopted a Decree providing for social guarantees to
the people who were deported on an ethnic basis in 1941-1944 from the Crimean
Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic. The Decree will provide social benefits in the
form of one-time payments to the Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and
Germans, along with their families and children who were born in exile. This document
was adopted pursuant to a Decree signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 21 April
2014, rehabilitating formerly deported people from Crimea.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
327. During the reporting period, the HRMMU identified acute human rights concerns
particularly in the eastern regions, Crimea and in the aftermath of the Odesa 2 May
violence. They are symptomatic of the particular local contexts, not least involving the
presence of armed groups, the breakdown in law and order and on-going security
operations. As highlighted in the report issued on 15 April 2014 by OHCHR, short-term
human rights concerns should be addressed within the broader and longer term framework
that will see institutional reform and enable change that will impact on the enjoyment of
all rights – civil, cultural, economic, political, and social. The root causes of the current
crisis were initially due to the systematic and structural curtailment of human rights and
widespread corruption. The way out of the current crisis, to ensure reconciliation of
communities through peaceful and democratic means, will be through the accountability
for violations and the full respect and guarantee of all human rights for all.
328. With the election of President Poroshenko, there is the opportunity for the Government of
Ukraine to prioritise addressing these systemic and structural concerns through
institutional reform focusing on human rights challenges in the short-term, and
progressively paving the way for the establishment of a system that promotes and protects
human rights for all, ensures justice, good governance and the rule of law through
inclusive, non-discriminatory and participatory means. A comprehensive national human
rights action plan reflecting all recommendations from the international and regional
mechanisms is highly recommended, as well as the creation by the Government of a senior
level coordination mechanism of implementation open to state institutions, civil society
56
and having the combined support of the UN, regional organisations and the international
community.
329. Recommendations have been made below on Crimea to both the authorities in Crimea and
the Russian Federation, which exercises de facto control over the peninsula. With the
negative impact of the current situation, including the legal uncertainty, on the full
enjoyment of human rights by the residents of Crimea, the HRMMU is advocating for the
legal framework of Ukraine to remain in force, considering the adverse human rights
impact of legislative changes imposed and also bearing in mind UN General Assembly
resolution 68/262.
330. The recommendations should be read in conjunction with - and seen as complimentary to
– those outlined in the OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine, issued on
15 April and 16 May 2014, which have not yet been fully implemented.
331. The HRMMU takes note of the joint report by the OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities
issued on 12 May 2014, and calls upon all relevant parties to implement its
recommendations.
To the Government of Ukraine and other stakeholders
a) There should be constitutional inclusive and meaningful consultations with all political
parties, regardless of their ideology, as well as representatives of civil society and
minority (national and ethnic, linguistic, religious and other) groups and indigenous
peoples in order to embrace all components of society, including women in the
dialogue for the new constitution, which will reflect the new reality of the country with
a full-fledged system of checks and balances. The peaceful population of the east
should participate in these consultations.
b) As a representative body of the country, the Parliament should reflect the new political
and social reality of the country; therefore there is a need for new parliamentary
elections.
c) All armed groups must immediately put an end to their violent activities and lay down
their arms.
d) The Government must ensure that its armed forces refrain from using excessive force,
and ensure that its ongoing security operations are at all times in line with the relevant
international standards applicable to different types of operations. In all circumstances,
it must ensure the protection of those who are not involved in the fighting.
e) All people detained in the context of the security operations should be treated in line
with international norms and standards and guaranteed their human rights under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other applicable bodies of
international law. In order to protect its security personnel and persons not involved in
the fighting, the Government should consider providing assurances that acts of
abduction and detention by armed groups will not be prosecuted provided that they do
not target people not involved in the fighting and the victims are treated humanely at all
times.
f) The role and position of the Ombudsperson and National Preventive Mechanism, as the
main bodies / institutions working towards the strengthening of the national human
rights system and the protection and guarantee of human rights for all, should be
enhanced.
57
g) All gaps of legislation should be brought in line with the recommendations of the
international human rights mechanisms (treaty bodies, universal periodic review and
special procedures); the Judiciary, Office of the Prosecutor General and the Bar
Association should operate in line with relevant international norms and standards in
order to ensure fair trial without which it is impossible to tackle corruption.
h) The Constitutional Court should be enhanced – legal, social and all other guarantees
need to be elaborated in order to ensure the genuine independence of the Constitutional
Court.
i) The State Migration Service should propose amendments to bring the refugee law in
line with international standards, and to allocate sufficient funds to ensure due process
in the asylum procedure, as well as reception conditions meeting humanitarian needs.
j) A language law should be adopted in line with international standards that enables the
promotion of the official national language as well as other languages.
k) A central authority should be established to respond to the humanitarian needs of IDPs,
including by establishing a comprehensive registration system, formulation of
legislative and regulatory acts to ease access to important social and economic rights,
establishing public assistance programmes, mobilization and coordination of civil
society-initiated relief efforts, and cooperation with international donors and technical
assistance.
l) All stakeholders should refrain from using messages of intolerance or expressions,
which may incite hatred, violence, hostility, discrimination or radicalisation.
m) Access for international organisations to the areas affected in eastern Ukraine by the
security operations (urban areas in the epicentre of the fighting) should be facilitated so
that the real needs of the population can be assessed and addressed.
n) Normative acts to ensure freedom of movement for residents of Crimea should be
enacted as soon as possible.
To the authorities in Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the Russian
Federation
o) Reaffirming UN General Assembly resolution 68/262, entitled “Territorial integrity of
Ukraine”, measures must be taken to protect the rights of persons affected by the
changing institutional and legal framework, including on issues related to citizenship,
right of residence, labour rights, property and land rights, access to health and
education.
p) Journalists, human rights defenders and individuals must be able to fully exercise their
right to freedom of expression, in accordance with Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
q) Ukrainian legislation should remain in force, considering the adverse human rights
impact of legislative changes imposed and also bearing in mind UN General Assembly
resolution 68/262.
r) Intimidation, harassment and abductions of residents must stop, with guarantees
ensured for the respect for the right to life, liberty and security
s) Criminal and administrative liability should not be used as a mechanism of intimidation
against Crimean Tatars and other residents of Crimea, but used in line with
international law.
58
t) Human rights violations should be independently, promptly and comprehensively
investigated and perpetrators brought to justice.
u) All forms of intimidation and harassment of religious communities must be put to an
end and all incidents, including those where there have been attacks on Ukrainian
Orthodox Church, Greek Catholic Church and the Muslim community must be properly
investigated, thus enabling the effective promotion and protection of the freedom of
religion or belief.
v) The promotion and protection of the rights of national minorities, including the
Crimean Tatars and other indigenous peoples must be ensured, enabling them to
participate fully and inclusively in public and political life.
w) The deployment of independent and impartial human rights monitors, including by the
HRMMU, should be agreed upon.
Annex 765
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 September 2014)

1
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
16 September 2014
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY 7
A. Casualties 7
B. Summary, extrajudicial or arbitrary executions 9
C. Missing persons, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detentions 9
III. FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY 12
A. Freedom of expression 12
B. Freedom of peaceful assembly 14
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 15
A. Accountability for human rights violations in the east 15
B. Investigations into the 2 May violence in Odesa 16
C. Investigations into human rights violations committed during the Maidan protests 18
D. Administration of justice 18
V. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 19
A. Changes to the legislative framework 19
B. Judicial and governance reform 21
VI. POLITICAL RIGHTS 22
VII. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 23
A. Right to an adequate standard of living 23
B. Right to work 24
C. Social rights 25
D. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 25
E. Right to education 26
VIII. SITUATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 27
IX. WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 29
X. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA 30
A. Rule of law 31
B. Freedoms of peaceful assembly, expression, religion and movement 32
C. Rights of indigenous peoples 33
D. Economic and social rights 33
E. Situation of internally displaced persons and other groups in a position of
vulnerability 34
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35
3
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This is the sixth monthly report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, based on the work of the United
Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU). It covers the period from 18
August to 16 September 2014.
2. By 18 August, the Government of Ukraine regained control of some areas in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions that had earlier been seized by the armed groups, and had restored law and
order. Residents of these areas, who had fled the fighting, started returning home as of early
August. Government ministries and volunteer groups began restoring essential services, clearing
away rubble and unexploded ordinance, and rebuilding damaged areas. In Slovyansk, basic
services were restored and residents started receiving social welfare benefits and pensions that
had not been paid since April when the city first fell under the control of the armed groups. As
the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk remained under the control of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’,1 the Ukrainian armed forces tightened the
blockade around both of these cities in an effort to take them back.
3. Between 24 August and 5 September, fighting escalated in the east. Armed groups of the
self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ were bolstered by
an increasing number of foreign fighters, including citizens of the Russian Federation2. On 27
August, the so-called ‘prime minister’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, Alexander
Zakharchenko, stated on Russian State television that 3,000-4,000 Russians were fighting
alongside the armed groups, including former or serving Russian soldiers, on leave from their
posts. Incursions were made by the armed groups into areas that the Government forces had
recently regained particularly in the Donetsk region. In a number of areas, Ukrainian armed
forces reported being bombarded by the armed groups with advanced weaponry. Ukrainian
forces were pushed back from their positions in other areas of the southeast, including the border
town of Novoazovsk, captured from Ukrainian armed forces on 27 August.
4. The escalation of hostilities led to a sharp increase in casualties among civilians,
members of the armed groups and Ukrainian servicemen. From mid-April to 16 September, at
least 3,517 people had been killed (including the casualties of the Malaysian airlines MH17
crash) and at least 8,198 wounded.3 While the HRMMU has not been able to obtain
disaggregated data on casualties among civilians and armed elements, it appears that the
majority of civilian victims were killed due to indiscriminate shelling in residential areas and the
use of heavy weaponry. There were continued reports of armed groups positioning, and
intermingling, within urban communities, endangering civilians. Some of the reported cases of
indiscriminate shelling in residential areas can be attributed to the Ukrainian armed forces. The
unknown number of military casualties has increased anxiety within communities, and is
fuelling protests.
1 Henceforth referred to as either the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ or the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
2 On 7 September, Amnesty International stated that it believed the Russian Federation to be fuelling the conflict
through direct and indirect interference. It reported that it had compelling evidence that the fighting had burgeoned
into what it considered to be an international armed conflict. It also accused both the ‘Ukrainian militia and
separatist forces’ of being responsible for war crimes.
3 These are very conservative estimates by the UN HRMMU and World Health Organization based on the official
data, where available. These totals include: casualties of the Ukrainian armed forces as reported by the Ukrainian
authorities; the 298 people killed in the crash of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 on 17 July; and casualties
reported by civil medical establishments and local administrations in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The
casualties reported by medical establishments include civilians and some members of the armed groups (without
distinguishing them). Only a fraction of them have been reported by medical establishments. OHCHR and WHO
estimate that the actual numbers of fatalities may be much higher.
4
5. During the reporting period, international humanitarian law, including the principles of
military necessity, distinction, proportionality and precaution continued to be violated by armed
groups and some units and volunteer battalions4 under the control of the Ukrainian armed forces.
It is critical for all those involved in the conflict to comply with international humanitarian and
human rights law, and to be fully aware of the consequences of their actions, and the concept of
command responsibility.
6. In late August, the Trilateral Contact Group comprising senior representatives of
Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, established to facilitate a
diplomatic resolution to the fighting and introduced into their talks the political representatives
of the ‘Donetsk and Luhansk peoples’ republics’. After the first face to face meeting on 1
September, a consultation process began, during which the Presidents of Ukraine and the
Russian Federation discussed and tabled elements of a peace plan. On 5 September, at a meeting
in Minsk the representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the ‘Donetsk and Luhansk
peoples’ republics’ signed a 12-point Protocol5, and declared a ceasefire, to be implemented on
the same day.
7. This ceasefire is increasingly fragile, with daily reports of skirmishes, shelling and
fighting. Although there have been fewer casualties, civilians and military personnel continue to
be killed on a daily basis. Some areas in the conflict zone report calm, such as Luhansk city,
while others have been the scene of increasing fighting and hostilities, such as Donetsk airport,
which has seen a surge in fighting as of 13 September. Since the ceasefire, there are reports that
the Ukrainian military has been shelled by the armed groups many times. Reportedly, 49
servicemen have been killed and 242 wounded.
8. Two key human rights priorities emerged from the 12-point-Protocol: the immediate
release of all hostages and detainees6 and an amnesty7 in connection with the conflict in parts of
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Both elements have been included in a draft law on ‘the
prevention of persecution and punishment of participants of events on the territory of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions’ adopted on 16 September pursuant to the Minsk Protocol. The law
excludes amnesty for crimes, including genocide, terrorism, murder and infliction of serious
bodily injuries, sexual crime, hostage-taking and human trafficking. Also on 16 September,
Parliament adopted a law offering special status to parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
thereby fulfilling another requirement of the Minsk Protocol aimed at strengthening the ceasefire
and advancing peaceful solutions. The two Bills need to be signed by the President to enter into
force. While both have the potential to play a critical role in reconciliation and creating an
environment for sustainable peace, strategies for their implementation need to be developed with
the participation of victims and civil society more broadly. These should be designed to enable
implementation of the legislation to be in accordance with international norms and standards,
including UN General Assembly resolution 68/262, through the assistance and guidance of
4 This is a generic term applied to type of ‘military’ battalions recently created, which are currently fighting in the
conflict in the east. They have been formed on the basis of the voluntary participation of individuals. These
battalions comprise those placed under the command of the Ministry of Defence (known as territorial battalions),
and those under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (known as special police battalions).
5 Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group with respect to the joint steps aimed at the
implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko and the initiatives of the President
of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. It was signed by the Swiss diplomat and OSCE representative Heidi
Tagliavini, Former president of Ukraine and Ukrainian representative Leonid Kuchma, Russian Ambassador to
Ukraine and Russian Federation representative Mikhail Zurabov, ‘Donetsk peoples’ republic and Luhansk peoples’
republic’ leaders Aleksandr Zakharchenko and Ihor Plotnytskiy respectively.
6 Point 5, of the above-mentioned protocol ‘Release immediately all hostages and illegally detained persons’.
7 Point 6, of the above-mentioned protocol ‘Adopt the law on non-prosecution of persons in connection with events
that took place in some parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine’.
5
relevant international organisations, and with a view to guaranteeing due process. The President
publicly advocated for the two draft laws during their passage, both before the Government and
Parliament. The response of the leaders of the so-called 'Donetsk and Luhansk peoples’
republics’ has been mixed, with the former stating that he found that the document contained
‘certain points to start a dialogue’, but he still challenged any measure to remain with Ukraine,
while the latter stated that the draft law gave a ‘peaceful settlement its first chance’8.
9. Armed groups continued to terrorise the population in areas under their control, pursuing
killings, abductions, torture, ill-treatment and other serious human rights abuses, including
destruction of housing and seizure of property. They abducted people for ransom and forced
labour and to use them in exchange for their fighters held by the Ukrainian authorities. They also
continued to practice forced mobilisation of civilians and threatened the local population with
executions. Reports also continued of parallel governing structures being set up in the ‘Donetsk
and Luhansk peoples’ republics’. An unlawful ‘criminal code’ was adopted by the so-called
‘presidium of the council of ministers’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’; and entered ‘into
force’ on 18 August. Modelled on the criminal code of the Russian Federation, its provisions
include the establishment of military tribunals to implement death sentences to be applied in
cases of aggravated murder.
10. There have also been continued allegations of human rights violations committed by
some volunteer battalions under Government control, which have been undertaking police
functions in many of the liberated towns and villages. The Government needs to exercise more
control over all of its forces, including the volunteer battalions, and to ensure accountability for
any violations and crimes committed by their members.
11. With the increasing number of reports of grave violations of international humanitarian
and human rights law committed in the conflict area, it is crucial to establish accountability. The
humanitarian situation in the areas controlled by the armed groups remained precarious, even
after the ceasefire, especially in the Luhansk region. Humanitarian assistance largely depends on
volunteers and a few international organisations, namely the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Despite the ceasefire, many people in the
conflict area remained for a second month deprived of water and electricity, with limited access
to healthcare and educational services. On 22 August and 13 September, the Russian Federation
authorities sent white-truck convoys to eastern Ukraine, without the consent of the Government
of Ukraine. Such humanitarian convoys must be undertaken in full compliance with international
standards, and the procedures of relevant international organisations, including proper
inspections, before entering the territory of Ukraine.
12. The ceasefire encouraged many internally displaced persons (IDPs) to go back to their
homes in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Some went back to their homes just to collect
belongings, others have remained. Those who have returned face serious difficulties besides the
volatile security situation, private property has been destroyed or damaged, and employment is
limited as many business or industries have now closed down.
13. At the same time, more than 275,489 registered IDPs9 remained partly without the
commensurate assistance and care. Most IDPs still live from their savings and the generosity of
family and friends willing to host them. The conflict in the east has triggered a wave of solidarity
among Ukrainians, but the capacity of absorption within host communities has been weakening.
There have been some reports of increased tensions between residents and IDPs mostly due to a
growing distrust vis-à-vis persons coming from the areas controlled by the armed groups, and
8 According to the ‘prime minister’ of the ‘Luhansk People’s republic’, the law is "largely in line with our
negotiating position … Therefore, although there is still much uncertainty, it can be said that a peaceful settlement
has its first chance".
9 State Emergency Service, 18 September, 2014.
6
suspicions of potential connections with such groups. It is crucial for the authorities to defuse
such tensions. It is also important that the draft IDP law under review by Parliament be adopted
promptly so as to allow the provision of basic services, including the possibility for IDPs to
access health care, education and employment, in line with the UN Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement.
14. Some protests against mobilization have been reported and the lack of rotation for
soldiers at the front is allegedly leading some servicemen, on ‘leave’, not to return.
15. Authorities and residents throughout Ukraine are particularly concerned about the
coming winter months, especially because of the expected gas shortages. This is a particular
issue for those living in temporary shelters and camp sites that are ill-equipped, and for those
who have returned to areas affected by the conflict, where properties have been damaged.
16. On 27 August, a presidential decree announced the holding of extraordinary
parliamentary elections on 26 October 2014. It is critical for these elections to be held
transparently, freely and fairly in an environment which allows the participation of the electorate
throughout the country. Ensuring the protection of freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly
and association will be particularly crucial. Elections are an opportunity to encourage greater
participation of women in political life, as they only constitute 10 per cent of all
parliamentarians. How people will be able to exercise their right to vote in the eastern regions
under the control of the armed groups is unclear. The precedent of the Presidential election raises
serious grounds, as well as with the ongoing curtailment on the freedoms of expressions and
peaceful assembly in these areas, which are an essential element for a free and fair electoral
process.
17. The investigations into the unlawful killing of protesters and the Maidan violence of
November 2013 – February 2014 continued. On 5 September, an ‘Interim Parliamentary
Commission’ report, including on the 2 May Odesa violence, was published and is now under
consideration in Parliament. It has highlighted some new elements, such as the use of chloroform
in the Trade Union Building. Other investigations into the 2 May violence continue, including
by the Office of the General Prosecutor and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA). It remains
critical to ensure the impartiality of all ongoing judicial processes in order to guarantee
accountability and justice for the victims.
18. In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the human rights situation continued to be
marked by multiple and ongoing violations. As previously reported, the introduction of Russian
Federation legislation, in contravention with General Assembly resolution 68/262, continued to
curtail freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association, religion or belief. Property
rights have been violated through ‘nationalisation’ and the illegal seizure of property by decision
of the de facto authorities and actions by the so-called ‘Crimean self-defence’. Law enforcement
personnel continued to conduct searches, particularly among the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
population, claiming to look for ‘extremist’ material. The number of IDPs from Crimea on
mainland Ukraine has further increased to 17,794.10 The HRMMU continued to seek access to
Crimea, and reiterated a request to establish a sub-office there.
19. On 16 September, the Parliaments of Ukraine and the European Union ratified the EU
Association Agreement in simultaneous sessions, moving towards the establishment of political
association and a free-trade area between the two parties. The key provisions on free trade will
not be implemented until December 2015 at the earliest.
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
20. Intense hostilities in the Donbas region continued during the reporting period, and
intensified between 24 August and 5 September, causing numerous military and civilian
10 Ibid.
7
casualties, and damage to infrastructure. Following the 5 September ceasefire, the scale and
intensity of hostilities dramatically decreased, although not completely. The civilian population
in Debaltseve, Donetsk, Horlivka, Ilovaisk, Luhansk, Pervomaisk, Shchastya and a number of
other settlements continued to be caught in the crossfire and cross-shelling.
21. The intensification of hostilities between 24 August and 5 September led to an increase
in casualties largely due to the use of heavy weaponry and indiscriminate shelling of densely
populated areas. An increasing number of foreign fighters were reported to be participating in
the fighting, including citizens of the Russian Federation, allegedly “former servicemen” or
active duty personnel “on leave”.
22. One emblematic case of such casualties was around the town of Ilovaisk (Donetsk
region). As a result of an offensive that started on 19 August, part of the town came under the
control of the Ukrainian armed forces. By 27 August, the Ukrainian troops in Ilovaisk were
completely surrounded by the reinforced armed groups. The same day, a safe corridor was
allegedly negotiated with the parties involved in the fighting. However, at least one column of
Ukrainian troops was heavily shelled while leaving Ilovaisk. Many Ukrainian units and
individual servicemen managed to break out from the encirclement. According to various
official reports, between 107 and more than 200 Ukrainian servicemen were killed, hundreds
were wounded, several hundreds have been detained by the armed groups, and many remain
reportedly missing.
23. On 22 August and 13 September, the Russian Federation authorities sent separate large
white-truck convoys to eastern Ukraine. Both entered Ukraine at the Izvaryne crossing point,
located in armed group controlled territory. This was without the full consent or inspection of
Ukraine, and the exact destination and content of the convoy could not be verified. The first
convoy reached the border under an agreement whereby a visiting Ukrainian team of border and
customs officials would check the vehicles, along with Russian counterparts. This broke down
however, after only 34 vehicles of the 227 assorted vehicles that made up the convoy were
inspected. The remaining vehicles proceeded to just drive across the border without the
Ukrainian officials having any way to enforce their control. The crossings were monitored by
OSCE. The convoy on 13 September consisted of 216 assorted vehicles.
Indiscriminate shelling
24. Indiscriminate shelling of populated areas, both by armed groups and the Ukrainian
armed forces continued to be reported. This, combined with the continued intermingling of
armed groups in civilian areas, endangered the local population. In the reporting period, the
Department of Internal Affairs of the Donetsk region started investigations into several cases of
shelling which resulted in at least 12 civilian deaths and 44 wounded. Shelling of civilians trying
to leave the conflict areas was reported to the HRMMU. On 18 August, a column of vehicles
with civilians evacuating from Luhansk was allegedly targeted and shelled by the armed groups,
between the settlements of Novosvitlivka and Khryashchuvate. As a result, at least 17 people
were killed and six were wounded. Prison facilities were also targeted. On 20 August, two
artillery shells hit Makiivka Penitentiary Colony No. 32 (Donetsk region) killing two inmates
and wounding six.
A. Casualties
25. The number of reported casualties caused by the conflict in eastern Ukraine increased by
almost one and a half times since the cut-off date of the last HRMMU report issued on 17
August. Prior to the ceasefire, from 18 August to 5 September, at least 42 people were killed on
average every day. Since mid-April, and as of 16 September, at least 3,517 people (including at
least 36 children) were killed, and at least 8,198 (including at least 82 children) wounded. This is
8
a conservative estimate by the HRMMU and the World Health Organization based on the
official data, where available.
26. These totals include: Ukrainian armed forces (at least 1,078 killed and 3,277 wounded)
as reported by the National Security and Defence Council and the Prosecutor-General; the 298
people killed in the crash of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 on 17 July; and casualties
reported by civil medical establishments and local administrations (at least 1,299 killed and
2,245 wounded in the Donetsk region, and at least 842 killed and 2,676 wounded in the Luhansk
region).
27. The casualties reported by medical establishments include civilians and some members
of the armed groups (without distinguishing among them). The HRMMU and WHO deem that
casualties among Ukrainian armed forces, civilians and of the armed groups (including foreign
servicemen and volunteer fighters) have been under reported during the whole period of the
security operation.
28. The reporting of Ukrainian military casualties remained imprecise and contradictory.
By 4 September, according to the National Security and Defence Council, 837 servicemen were
killed and 3,044 wounded during the whole period of the security operation. On 5 September,
the National Security and Defence Council reported that the previous day seven servicemen
were killed and 59 wounded and indicated that total of 846 servicemen were killed and 3,072
wounded since April 2014 (while arithmetic would imply 844 killed and 3,103 wounded). The
National Security and Defence Council reported an increase of 151 Ukrainian servicemen killed
from 24 August to 12 September, while, according to the Minister of Defence only in Ilovaisk
and some other locations of most intense hostilities, 181 persons were killed during that period.
While the Minister reported being aware of 107 servicemen killed in Ilovaisk, the Prosecutor-
General indicated that at least 200 servicemen had perished there. On 29 August, the National
Security and Defence Council spokesperson reported 11 Ukrainian servicemen missing in action,
while first-hand reports from Ukrainian soldiers suggest that tens, if not hundreds, of Ukrainian
servicemen remained missing.
29. The level of under reporting of military casualties by the Government can be grasped by
comparing the figures on wounded provided by the National Security Defence Council (3,277)
with the number of servicemen treated in major military and civilian hospitals closest to the
fighting – Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and in Zaporizhzhya region. They amounted to at least 4,800
in these three locations by earlier reporting dates (until 3 September, 26 August and 13 August
respectively). Further, some lightly wounded who are treated in the field with their units, are
probably not accounted for in these totals. Estimates for the number of wounded, therefore,
could be two times higher than the figure reported by the National Security and Defence
Council.
30. As during previous reporting periods, insecurity prevented people from seeking medical
aid. Many of those killed were buried without being taken to morgues or offices with forensic
expertise. The armed groups increasingly buried their members in separate burial sites in fields.
Reportedly, many bodies were taken to the Russian Federation.11 Therefore reports of medical
establishments only partially covered casualties among civilians and armed groups. In the
Donetsk region, women comprised 15 per cent of those killed and 15 per cent of those wounded
as reported by medical establishments by 16 September (11 per cent and 13 per cent respectively
as of 11 August).12 At the same time, the indiscriminate use of weapons accounted for the
11 According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers in the Stavropol region of the Russian Federation, about 400
servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces were killed and wounded in Ukraine as of 28 August.
12 The breakdown of statistics is not available for the Luhansk region as not reported to the WHO by medical
establishments from region.
9
majority of civilian deaths, which affected men and women equally.13 Although women and
children comprised the majority of those who have fled the security operation area, the
proportion of one killed woman to six-seven killed men suggest that members of the armed
groups (who are predominantly men) constitute a considerable part of casualties (up to 50 per
cent) reported by medical establishments. From this, it can be considered that the majority of
those killed and wounded in hostilities comprised servicemen of the Ukrainian armed forces and
members of the armed groups.
B. Summary, extrajudicial or arbitrary executions
31. During the reporting period, alleged torture and executions of detainees by the armed
groups and the volunteer battalions continued to be reported. These reports require thorough
verification.
32. On 22 August, Lithuania’s Honorary Consul in Luhansk was abducted and killed. On 9
September, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported on the detention, in Kramatorsk
(Donetsk region), of a Ukrainian citizen who admitted that he had voluntarily “become part of
the firing squad No.1 of the NKVD [‘Donetsk people’s republic’s secret service] at the
Druzhkivka commandant’s office”. Local people reportedly have named at least five people
executed by that squad in the nearby forest.
C. Missing persons, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention14
Detainees
33. The escalation of hostilities between 24 August and 5 September resulted in a sharp
increase in detentions by the armed groups. According to the SBU15, the law enforcement
agencies registered 30 to 50 submissions on missing or abducted persons per day, both military
personnel and civilians. Between 5 and 10 September, an inter-departmental centre at the SBU
created to assist citizens regarding detainees, hostages, and missing persons received 1,290
submissions. By 11 September, its database included about 700 names.
34. Point 5 of the Minsk Protocol agreed upon on 5 September foresees that ‘all hostages and
illegally detained people shall be released without delay’. On 6 September, the National Security
and Defence Centre reported that at least 200 Ukrainian servicemen were kept by the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’. According to the ‘acting minister of state security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ about 1,000 people were being detained by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ as of 7
September. On 8 September, the Press Secretary of the President of Ukraine, referring to the
Army Chief of Staff, reported that 648 people were released by the armed groups during the
whole period of the security operation, while more than 500 remained to be released. On 11
September, the HRMMU shared with Ukrainian authorities a list of more than 400 people
(mainly civilians) alleged to be held by the armed groups.
35. Between 6 and 16 September, at least three exchanges took place, during which at least
130 people were released by the armed groups. The exact number of people released by the
Ukrainian side is unknown, though it is believed to be comparable with the number of detainees
released by the armed groups. On 12 September, the HRMMU was informed by some families
that three detainees were released from the Odesa pre-trial detention centre and driven by the
13 This is supported by figures provided to Human Rights Watch by a senior figure in the Luhansk medical system
in early September; the city morgue had received more than 300 bodies of civilians, about half of them female,
since the shelling started.
14 The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention regards as detention all forms of deprivation of
liberty.
15 In a meeting with the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights on 29 August in Kyiv.
10
SBU to Kharkiv in order to be exchanged, despite the alleged refusal of two of them to be
exchanged. The HRMMU was granted access to them and held private talks with each detainee.
They were released the following day by the Ukrainian authorities.
36. A number of exchanges and unilateral releases occurred before the signature of the
Minsk agreements. Reportedly, more than 200 Ukrainian servicemen were unilaterally released
by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ during the night of 30 to 31 August. On 5 September, hours
before the ceasefire was announced, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ released 10 detainees. On 7
September, 15 people were unilaterally released by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ but this was
allegedly not related to the Minsk Protocol.
Detentions by armed groups
37. On 21 August, the HRMMU talked to relatives of two people who went missing on 7
August near Makiivka, Donetsk region. Reportedly, three armed men came to the victims’
residence and abducted them. On 21 August, in an interview, the son of a Donetsk businessman
described the abduction of his father from his office. On 24 August, a pastor and a parishioner
from a town in the Donetsk region were abducted by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ supporters
– one for his allegedly ‘anti-Donetsk people’s republic’ views and the other for having relatives
in the United States. On 25 August, a member of a Protestant church who delivered
humanitarian assistance to elderly residents of Donetsk, and had been vocal about his pro-
Ukrainian views, went missing. On 5 September, a Druzhkivka resident was detained by
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ supporters on his way home from Komsomolskoe. His wife was told
that “there were reasons” for his detention, and that “he would be released after circumstances
are clarified”. As of 16 September, the whereabouts of all these people remained unknown.
38. In early September, three local administration officials of the town of Kirovsk (Luhansk
region) were abducted by the armed ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ supporters, allegedly because
of their refusal to provide a school building for the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ needs. On 11
and 16 September, two senior officials of the Luhansk National University were abducted by the
armed groups. At the same time, the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ leadership had ordered earlier
that the university lecturers return to work or they would otherwise be fired.
39. A number of people released by the armed groups reported being transferred to the
Russian Federation for interrogation, and then returned to Ukraine. Ukrainian servicewoman
Nadiya Savchenko, allegedly captured in the Luhansk region in July, remains in a detention
facility in the Russian Federation. Ms. Savchenko is charged with killing Russian journalists in
Ukraine, while on duty. On 27 August, the Voronezh Court decided that she would remain in
custody until the end of October 2014, and refuted the motion of her defence to initiate an
investigation concerning her abduction from Ukraine. The court ordered, at the same time, that
the Ukrainian lieutenant undergo a so-called compulsory psychiatric examination in Moscow.
The referral to a psychiatric examination means that she will be deprived of contact with the
outside world – including her lawyers and the consular services of Ukraine. For two other
Ukrainian citizens detained in Crimea in May, please see section X on human rights issues in
Crimea.
Torture and ill-treatment of detainees by armed groups
40. The HRMMU continued to document cases of torture and ill-treatment in the custody of
the armed groups in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. A woman suspected of acting as an
artillery spotter for the Ukrainian armed forces was abducted at the end of August. She was
subjected to beatings (including with rifle butts) and shooting near her ears. She was forced to
stretch her arm in a Nazi salute and shout “Sieg Heil”, threatened with rape and handcuffed to a
radiator for several days. Two civil society volunteers were abducted while transporting
humanitarian aid. They spent 22 days in detention in late August. They were reportedly beaten,
including with truncheons and rifle butts, whilst cigarettes were crushed on their noses and their
11
nails were broken. Two other civil society volunteers (in detention from 28 July to 27 August)
experienced mock execution with guns placed to their heads and knives pointed at their eyes.
They were also reportedly beaten (including with baseball bats), poorly fed, and received no
medical assistance. Another volunteer was abducted, and taken to a nearby forest where he was
ordered to dig his own grave. After refusing to do so, he was hit several times on the head, and
his nose was broken. All these people were later released.
Detention and enforced disappearances by Ukrainian armed forces and police
41. According to the SBU, from mid-April to 25 August, at least 1,000 individuals have been
detained on suspicion of being ‘militants and subversives’. Most of these detainees have been
accused of violating territorial integrity or constitutional order, terrorism, espionage, diversions
and State treason. After 25 August, at least 52 other people were detained throughout the country
on suspicion of such crimes. The HRMMU remains concerned over the situation of these
individuals. On 12 September, a number of people released by the Ukrainian forces reported illtreatment
in custody, such as beatings, poor nutrition and lack of medical assistance.
42. The HRMMU has also remained concerned over the enforced disappearances, arbitrary
detention and ill-treatment allegedly perpetrated by members of the volunteer battalions, in
particular by ‘Aydar’, ‘Dnipro-1’, ‘Kyiv-1’ and ‘Kyiv-2’. This includes the enforced
disappearance of a man detained at a checkpoint, whose whereabouts remained unknown,
despite the battalion commanders maintaining that he was released after several days; the
enforced disappearance and ill-treatment of a man who was suspected of being a ‘separatist’
because of his mobile phone records of calls around the Donetsk region; the killing of a driver
who was passing by a column of Ukrainian military vehicles; the extortion of large sums of
money from businessmen at checkpoints; and the enforced disappearance of relatives of
suspected supporters of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, as well as demands of ransom for their
release.
43. On 13 September, the HRMMU interviewed a Donetsk resident who had been detained on
29 July in Starobesheve (Donetsk region) while passing a checkpoint manned by the National
Guard. During the search a St. George’s ribbon, an ID of a Communist Party member and a
Communist Party newspaper were found in his car. For the first three to four days he was
reportedly held in a pit in or near Starobesheve, and then transferred to a base allegedly shared
by the ‘Dnipro’ and ‘Donbas’ battalions and the ‘Right Sector’ unit in Pokrovske district
(Dnipropetrovsk region). He was reportedly held in a basement cell together with 19 persons,
including three women. The detainees were urinated on; forced to carry each other naked,
covered in foam; boiling water was poured over their legs; and logs were thrown at them, while
his hands were cut with a knife. According to the victim, a superior officer noticed what his
subordinates were doing and ordered them to stop the torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment. At some point, the detainee interviewed received medical aid, allegedly ahead of the
visit of a ‘Right Sector’ leader. The latter was reportedly appalled by the treatment of the
detainees and ordered that the perpetrators be sent to the front. On 5 September, the victim was
released. According to him, many other detainees were left on the base.
III. FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
12
A. Freedom of expression
44. Foreign and domestic journalists continued to face threats and abductions, with an
obvious impact on their work and freedom of expression. Journalists have an important role to
play when reporting from conflict zones, as they disseminate information to which the general
public would otherwise not have access. However, some unprofessional and biased media fuel
the conflict, contributing to the division of society and exacerbating tensions.
Safety of journalists
45. Media professionals continued to risk their safety while working in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions. On 3 September, ‘Russia Today’ photographer Andrei Stenin, who went
missing on 5 August near Snizhne, was confirmed dead16. He was allegedly traveling in a
convoy of civilians fleeing the conflict zone when it came under heavy fire. The police opened a
criminal investigation into his death. On 21 August, a Ukrainian photographer was wounded
during the fighting in Ilovaisk. To limit casualties among media professionals, some NGOs
continued to hold security training sessions for journalists17.
46. As in previous months, journalists were detained by armed groups and the ‘volunteer’
battalions. A journalist and a cameraman from TV channel ‘112 Ukraine’ were detained on 21
August by armed men of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ while reporting on the exchange of
hostages. Both were released two and a half weeks later, following an intervention by Russian
journalists. A journalist of the media outlet ‘Road control’ and a cameraman of ‘Espreso TV’,
upon their release on 2 September, reported that they were abducted by Russian servicemen on
25 August near Ilovaisk. Some media professionals have yet to be released, such as two Kharkiv
journalists, who have been detained by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ armed groups on 17
August and a journalist of ‘Espreso TV’ detained by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ armed
groups on 25 August18.
47. On 25 August, the ‘Aydar’ territorial defence battalion detained a female editor-in-chief
of a Luhansk-based newspaper near Shchastya, allegedly for “supporting terrorists, inciting war
and serving the interests of the Party of the Regions”. Her whereabouts remained unknown as of
16 September. That same day, two journalists (a man and a woman) of the weekly Crimean
Telegraph went missing near Donetsk after being allegedly removed from a bus by
representatives of the ‘Right Sector’. At the time, one of them called her editorial office, but
since then there has been no contact with either of the two. On 1 September, two Russian
correspondents from TV ‘Dozhd’ and Forbes were abducted at a checkpoint by the ‘Azov’
battalion. They were held for several hours. After their release they reported being taken to a
basement with bags on their heads, whilst their documents and accreditations were checked.
Disinformation / media regulation
48. As fighting intensified in August, the instances of media disinformation significantly
increased. On 21 August, the Russian TV channel ‘Zvezda’ aired a report alleging shelling of
Makiivka by the Ukrainian forces in order to liberate it by Independence Day on 24 August. The
video was later removed from the channel’s website. The same day, the National Security and
Defence Council Information and Analysis Centre and the public initiative StopFake tracked
16 This is the seventh registered death of a journalist since the beginning of 2014.
17 Media professionals working in the security operation area often do not use personal safety equipment. Of
concern are a number of instances where reporters are seen in their own recordings wearing camouflage and
elements of military attire, beyond just protective helmets and body armour.
18 According to the study of the NGO ‘Institute of Mass Information’ presented on 16 September, in the period from
beginning of March to end of August 2014, 70 media professionals have been detained by ‘self-defence’ units and
armed groups in Crimea and eastern regions of Ukraine respectively.
13
down the actual footage of the supposed rocket blast and established that it was filmed on 2 July
2013 in Baikonur (Kazakhstan).
49. On 28 August, the press services of the ‘Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics’
claimed that Osypenko settlement near Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Region, was seized by their
armed units. However, Ukrainian journalists found out that the town was under the control of the
Government. The mayor of Berdyansk stated that ‘pro-Russian’ supporters are reporting nonexistent
victories in order to sow panic among the population.
50. The Ukrainian authorities continued to take measures to regulate and, in some cases, to
censor the media. On 19 August, an adviser to the MoIA confirmed that the police would
monitor whether cable TV providers complied with an earlier ban on 12 Russian channels19. On
28 August, the National Council on TV and Radio Broadcasting stated that it had transmitted to
the SBU a list of 49 Russian media professionals, who should be banned from entering Ukraine,
allegedly for inciting hatred, violence and war propaganda. As of 11 September, 35 persons on
the lists had been denied entry to Ukraine for three to five years. While such measures may be
required, it is necessary to ensure that such steps are not arbitrary and in accordance with article
20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
51. On 11 September, the SBU searched the offices of Vesti newspaper, in Kyiv, and
confiscated equipment, materials and journalists’ personal belongings20. The SBU reportedly
conducted the search as part of a criminal investigation into Vesti publications, which allegedly
contained information infringing Ukraine's territorial integrity. After the search, the newspaper
published pictures of the consequent damage to its property. On 11 September, the SBU
searched the Mega-Polygraph printing house, where Vesti is printed. According to the printing
house, the search resulted in delays in the printing of Vesti and other media publications.21
52. On 12 September, the leadership of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ reportedly obliged
all media outlets in the Donetsk region, including branch offices of all-Ukrainian channels, to
register at the so-called ‘ministry of information’, threatening that their editorial offices would
otherwise be forced to stop working.
53. The ongoing conflict continued to be accompanied by propaganda, disinformation, lack
of objective, unbiased reporting, and use of charged terminology (‘junta’, ‘fascist’, ‘terrorists’)
by all sides to the conflict. This has contributed to exacerbating tensions, fuelling a dual
narrative of ‘us versus them’ which has led to polarising society and spreading intolerance
among some communities.
Manifestation of intolerance
54. Two instances of humiliation and manifestation of intolerance through symbols occurred
in Donetsk at the end of August, causing particular outrage. On Independence Day, armed group
members forced some 50 of their detainees, believed to be Ukrainian servicemen, to march
through the centre of Donetsk, exposing them to crowds who threw items at them and shouting
insults. Afterwards, public road-cleaning vehicles washed the road behind the detainees while
driving over Ukrainian flags22.
55. On 26 August, armed supporters of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ subjected a
Ukrainian female activist from Yasynuvata, Donetsk region, to public humiliation. She was held
19 See paragraph 68 of the OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 17 August 2014.
20 This is not the first time Vesti has been searched. These offices were previously threatened by an MP and his
supporters, demanding that it change its editorial policy. It was later vandalised by masked and armed
demonstrators. In the past, ‘Vesti’s’ management expressed to the HRMMU its concern that political pressure was
being applied to prevent its criticism of Government policies.
21 Following the incident, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media called on the Ukrainian authorities to
respect media. The full text is available at: http://www.osce.org/fom/12352.
22 Such a practice was applied in the Soviet Union to German prisoners of war.
14
in captivity for a day, beaten and threatened with rape and death. After that she was forced onto
the street, draped in a Ukrainian flag and with a sign reading ‘she is killing our children’. The
passers-by spat in her face, kicked and beat her with sticks, took pictures of her and verbally
abused her. A Russian and foreign journalist witnessed and recorded this incident23.
56. Such incidents, as well as a growing number of videos of torture of Ukrainian
servicemen by armed groups, provoke anger. In this climate, those questioning or not
supporting the security operation or a military solution are often viewed as supporting the
‘Donetsk or Luhansk people’s republics’. At the same time, there is a shrinking public space for
people to express their dissatisfaction, frustration and views that may be different. Generally,
incidents of intolerance have become more frequent.
57. The HRMMU noticed an increased use of hate speech and incitement to violence in
social networks by ‘pro-Unity’ supporters in Odesa, particularly targeting high ranking officials
and parliamentarians connected to the Party of Regions24. There has also been an increased use
of hate speech during ‘pro-Federalism’ assemblies, with some participants calling for the death
of active ‘pro-Unity’ supporters, and labelling them as ‘fascists’ and ‘Nazis’. In general, the use
of hate speech has fostered an antagonistic and aggressive environment, limiting space for
dialogue and reconciliation.
B. Freedom of peaceful assembly
58. During the reporting period, the right to peaceful assembly was generally exercised
without restrictions in most of Ukraine, with the exception of eastern Ukraine and the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The number of peaceful protests increased, while the number
of police officials who attend such events declined compared to previous months. However,
there was an increase of prohibitions of protests by courts or local authorities in the name of
public order and safety, In particular, rallies were prohibited in Kyiv and Odesa on the grounds
of preventing rival protests that could potentially turn violent,25 on Independence Day.
59. Public calls for lustration gained momentum throughout Ukraine. In Kyiv, people
gathered near the Parliament buildings to demand the adoption of the lustration law. A number
of rallies took place in western Ukraine expressing dissatisfaction with local institutions or
regional state officials and demanding lustration and the dismissal of heads of local institutions.
In most cases, local authorities demonstrated openness to dialogue with protesters and no violent
incidents were reported. In some cases, protesters blocked major roads.
60. Protests over the reporting period generally pertained to issues connected to the conflict,
particularly demanding peace or protesting against the deployment of military units to the east,
or the conditions of deployment, or rallies demanding that IDPs residing in western Ukraine do
not evade mobilisation. Many also related to social and economic concerns, and support to either
‘pro-Unity’ or ‘pro-Federalism’ positions.
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
23 The Russian journalist contacted the local brigade commander who expressed outrage at the incident and ordered
the activists to be released. He guaranteed her free passage and she has since reached Ukrainian controlled territory.
24 For example, on 9 August, a Facebook group posted the following – ‘Lustration may start by itself, it is enough
just to shoot Efremov, cut the throat of Lena Bondarenko, chop off Chechetov’s hands, hang Kivalov, announce a
hunt for Liovochkin, publicly hang three brothers Litvinov, burn alive Shufrych and I assure you, they will run, they
will leave Ukraine the next day’.
25 This increase for now may be viewed in the context of the larger numbers of public manifestations marking
Independence Day, which fell in the reporting period.
15
A. Accountability for human rights violations in the east
Command responsibility
61. With the increasing number of reports of grave violations of international humanitarian
and human rights law committed in the conflict area it is crucial to establish accountability,
including command responsibility. Command responsibility is applicable to both the military
and political leadership. No matter who the perpetrators or the victims are, efforts must be made
to ensure that anyone who has committed any serious violation of international law is brought to
justice, and appropriate remedies provided for victims.
Reprisals
62. With the shift in control of territory during the reporting period between Government
forces and the armed groups the risks of reprisals against individuals for collaborating with ‘the
enemy’ or for such perceived collaboration has increased.
63. The escalation of hostilities after 24 August resulted in armed groups recapturing some
territories they had previously lost to Ukrainian forces. People with expressly ‘pro-Ukrainian’
views are thus at risk of reprisals. On 7 September, the HRMMU learned that several officials of
the Telmanove district administration (Donetsk region) were abducted by armed supporters of
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ on 3 September.
64. There have been allegations of reprisals against people who collaborated with the armed
groups of the ‘Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics’ who now find themselves in territory
under the control of the Ukrainian armed forces. On 4 September, 33 legislators of the
Artemivsk city council and three members of the Donetsk regional council signed an appeal to
the President, the Prosecutor-General and the MoIA, asking for a legal assessment of the actions
of the ‘Artemivsk’ battalion. Concerns remained regarding the continued detention of the former
mayor of Slovyansk, Ms. Nelya Shtepa. On 9 September, the HRMMU observed the court
hearing in Chervonozavodsky, Kharkiv, on the prolongation of the measure of restraint imposed
on Ms. Shtepa. The court extended this measure for a further 60 days, until 12 November. The
defence announced that they would appeal the decision of the court.
Accountability for human rights abuses and violations
65. Point 6 of the Minsk Tripartite Protocol requires adoption of a “law on prevention of
persecution and punishment of individuals in connection with events which took place in certain
select areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions”. It will be critical that such legislation does not
result in impunity from prosecution, including for grave crimes and most severe human rights
violations (see section V on legislative developments and institutional reforms).
66. On 2 September, the Chief Military Prosecutor of Ukraine26 announced that the overall
number of criminal proceedings opened by the military prosecutors had reached 1,700 for the
entire period of the security operation. The Office of the Military Prosecutor may only conduct
investigations into crimes committed by servicemen of the armed forces, as well as voluntary
battalions of territorial defence under the Ministry of Defence, but not those committed by the
voluntary battalions subordinated to the MoIA. Most of the criminal proceedings opened
concern disobedience and insubordination. The office of the military prosecutors initiated
investigations into 82 crimes committed by 881 servicemen under article 402 of the Criminal
Code (insubordination), 350 crimes committed by 514 servicemen under article 407 of the
Criminal Code (absence without leave from a military unit or place of service), and 109 crimes
committed by 2,605 servicemen under article 408 of the Criminal Code (desertion). So far more
26 The Office of the Military Prosecutor was introduced into the system of the Office of the Prosecutor General by a
new law amending ‘the Law on the Office of the Prosecutor general’, which came into force on 23 September 2014.
16
than 380 indictments were submitted to courts, and some 30 individuals have already been
subjected to sanction.
67. The SBU, which is the competent body to conduct investigations into crimes aimed at
State security, reported that up until 25 August, it was investigating more than 1,000 criminal
proceedings into trespass against the territorial integrity of Ukraine, actions aimed at forceful
change or overthrow of the constitutional order or take-over of Government, acts of terrorism,
high treason, and other unnamed crimes. SBU investigators have submitted 49 indictments
against 52 people, and 10 individuals have so far been sentenced to different terms of
deprivation of liberty.
68. At the same time, the HRMMU has been receiving complaints from people who were
abducted by the armed groups both in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In a number of cases
people submitted applications with the SBU or MoIA, which were not duly considered but were
transferred to the local MoIA departments where the abductions took place (see section II on
rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity).
69. Three people who were allegedly abducted and tortured by the armed groups in the
Luhansk and Donetsk regions, filed applications with the MoIA but were denied the opening of
criminal proceeding due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. The case was forwarded to the
respective local MoIA where the alleged crimes occurred, irrespective of the fact that these
crimes were committed with either the direct involvement of, or with failure of local police
officers to prevent the crime.
Introduction of the death penalty in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
70. A ‘criminal code’ adopted by the ‘presidium of the council of ministers of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ entered into force on 18 August. It is modelled after the Russian Federation
criminal code, and includes the establishment of military tribunals to implement the death
penalty. According to the ‘Prosecutor General’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, the ‘death
sentences’ would be applied to cases of aggravated murder; such as the murder of two or more
persons, with particular cruelty; of a minor, or a pregnant woman; and to a number of other
crimes; as well as for certain military offences committed in time of war or in a combat situation,
such as the transfer of technology or means of warfare to the enemy, desertion, and other crimes,
such as those related to violations of the laws or customs of war. The current ‘prime minister’ of
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ claimed that death sentences would be an exceptional measure.
The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ would make its legislation “more humane", once the war would
be over. The HRMMU has no confirmed information on the implementation of ‘death sentences’
implemented after 17 August.
B. Investigation into the 2 May violence in Odesa
71. The MoIA and the Office of the General Prosecutor continued their investigations into
the 2 May violence in Odesa. No new official elements have been presented. The measures of
restraint (custody or house arrest) have been prolonged for an additional 60 days for all suspects
in connection with 2 May violence. Until now there is no will among the law enforcement
agencies (MoIA, Office of the General Prosecutor and SBU) to cooperate with each other.
Furthermore, the HRMMU received direct evidence that the judicial system and law
enforcement agencies have been facing great political pressure to not cooperate regarding the
investigation. The incident continues to divide the Odesa, with each political side accusing the
other of initiating the mass disorder.
72. On 12 September, the deputies of the Odesa Regional Council dissolved the “Temporary
Oversight Commission of the Odesa Regional Council” upon an initiative by members of this
Commission due to lack of authority and competence to oversee the official investigation
17
process. All the materials gathered by the ‘Temporary Oversight Commission’ have since been
transmitted to the ‘Interim Parliamentary Commission investigating the facts of citizens’ deaths
in Odesa, Mariupol and other cities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.
73. The ‘Interim Parliamentary Commission’ registered its final report on 5 September.
However, the secretary of the Commission withdrew her signature from the report due to
discrepancies in the text submitted to the members of the Commission and the final version.
These differences were confirmed by the head of the ‘Interim Parliamentary Commission’.
Indeed, it appears that some of the Commission members altered the final draft by removing
names of Kyiv and Odesa high ranking officials (including ‘pro-Unity’ leaders), reducing their
level of responsibility in the 2 May violence. Furthermore, the work of the ‘Interim
Parliamentary Commission’ was impeded by the limited cooperation from the MoIA, the SBU
and the Prosecution Office, allegedly due to the confidentiality of the official investigation.
74. The ‘Interim Parliamentary Commission’ final report highlights some new elements: the
use of chloroform in the Trade Union Building; the delay in putting out the fire due to the
interference of protesters; the visit of the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council
to Odesa a few days before the 2 May, and his alleged involvement in the violence.
75. As of 16 September, the report was under consideration in the Parliament. The ‘Interim
Parliamentary Commission’ members recommended that the Parliament widely distribute the
report and invite all relevant law enforcement agencies for hearings on it. They also
recommended that all law enforcement agencies present their comments on the report to the
Parliament within two weeks.
76. The MoIA Special Investigation Unit (based in Odesa) also continued its investigation. It
underlined having little experience in investigating mass riots involving various political groups,
and large numbers of suspects (114). The ‘pro-Unity’ movement has reportedly attempted on
several occasions to interfere in the investigation, for example by proposing to assist in arresting
people. There is evidence that changes of measures of restraint (from custody to house arrest)
were introduced following pressure on judges by ‘pro-Unity’ activists. So far, only one person
has been arrested under article 115 of the Criminal Code (murder) and placed under house arrest.
The Head of the Investigation Unit, however, has reasserted that all perpetrators, regardless of
their political affiliation, would be brought to justice.
77. On 12 September, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights submitted
an updated report to the Office of the General Prosecutor, highlighting human rights violations
by law enforcement agencies during the 2 May violence.
78. The Office of the General Prosecutor has not yet transmitted the criminal investigation
materials to the court concerning the four police officers accused of the illegal “release” of
detainees on 4 May27.
79. The SBU has so far, appeared reluctant to share any information regarding 2 May
violence with other law enforcement agencies and the Parliamentary Commission.
80. On 16 September, the Independent Commission held a press-conference on the 2 May
violence in Odesa. It noted reliable information that there might be four additional deaths during
the 2 May violence: two people were allegedly shot at the Trade Union Building (one in and one
near); and two died from heavy burns at the Odesa Military Hospital. The MoIA is examining
these allegations. The Independent Commission continued to underline that the authorities have
been reluctant to conduct an objective and impartial investigation. It stressed that most of the
evidence was destroyed very soon after the 2 May violence. Finally, it noted that following the
27 On 4 May, pro-federalism protesters massively gathered in front of the Odesa Police Station in order to claim the
release of those arrested on 2 May. They stormed the police station and, following the decision of the Deputy Head
of the Regional MoIA, together with other high ranking MoIA officials, 63 detainees were illegally released.
18
leak of personal data, some witnesses and activists had been intimidated by opponents, and some
had to leave the region or the country.
C. Investigations into human rights violations committed during the Maidan protests
Investigations into mass killings of protesters (January and February 2014)
81. The Office of the Prosecutor General continued its criminal investigations into the
killings of four protesters on 19 and 21 January, and of at least 98 people between 18 and 20
February. These are combined into a single proceeding under which three former servicemen of
the ‘Berkut’ special police unit, out of 26 suspects, are currently being held in custody since 4
April.
82. According to the Office of the General Prosecutor, the pre-trial investigation into the
mass killings of peaceful protesters has been completed, and files of the proceedings were
disclosed to the three former ‘Berkut’ officers. This marks a shift in the criminal proceedings to
the trial stage. This is the first time all case files will be disclosed for familiarization, not just to
the three suspects, but to all parties. This should clarify whether all required procedural inquiries
were made and if this was in accordance with the law. Some lawyers consider that certain
inquiries are yet to be done and that the case will not go to trial soon.
Investigations into killings of law enforcement officers on 18 and 20 February
83. Investigations into the killings of police officers between 18 and 20 February have not
significantly progressed. The latest official development was the release of the report of the
Provisional Investigating Commission of the Ukrainian Parliament on Maidan events (PIC
Report), on 7 July 2014. This document reports that 196 officers and servicemen of the MoIA
received gunshot wounds from 18 to 20 February, and that 17 of them (10 police officers and 7
servicemen of MoIA interior troops) died. Reportedly, none of them were carrying service
weapons.
84. According to the PIC Report, for unknown reasons, the initial investigative group did not
visit the hospitals where the wounded police officers were brought, as required by standard
procedure. Bullets removed from the victims were not preserved according to regular procedure,
but were stored in a single container, which made it impossible to identify which bullet hit which
particular victim.
85. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine transferred all materials relating to
gunshot wounds suffered by the MoIA staff to the MoIA. The PIC report found the MoIA
negligent in undertaking any investigation into the killings, and furthermore the Commission has
distanced itself from such an investigation.
D. Administration of justice
86. On 2 September, the High Specialized Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases
pursuant to the law passed a regulation changing the venue for cases to be heard, in cases where
a court was located on the territory controlled by the armed groups. According to the regulation,
all civil, administrative and criminal cases subject to trial in the Luhansk Regional Court of
Appeals are to be considered in the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeals, and cases of the
Donetsk Regional Court of Appeals, are to be considered in the Zaporizhzhia Regional Court of
Appeals28. The regulation also changes the venue for cases considered in the first instance courts
located in territory controlled by the armed groups. Cases are now heard in other courts located
within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which are under control of the Government.
28 Except for those previous criminal cases at the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeals that remained with this court
when it was temporarily relocated to Mariupol.
19
87. Activists who mostly support a ‘pro-Unity’ position have been placing significant
pressure on judges during the trial of a ‘pro-Unity’ activist who was detained in Odesa on 20
August for beating people who had jumped from the windows of the burning Trade Union
building on 2 May. He was then transferred to Kherson (in order to avoid mass protests during
the court trial) where the court placed him into custody for two months. On 29 August, during
the trial at the Court of Appeals of Kherson Region, a rally took place protesting against his pretrial
detention.
V. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
88. During the reporting period, draft legislation on IDP rights and corruption was submitted
to Parliament. In addition, before the Tripartite Contact Group talks, which led to a ceasefire,
draft laws were registered or adopted in the context of the security operation. Policy areas for
reform were also outlined by the authorities. There have been no new developments in the
sphere of constitutional reform.
A. Changes to the legislative framework
Draft legislation in follow up to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September
89. On 16 September, Parliament passed two draft laws pursuant to the Minsk protocol of 5
September. The draft law on the ‘special status’ of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions was submitted by the President of Ukraine by 16 September. The status is envisaged for
a period of three years. The document provides for local authorities to facilitate the use of
Russian and other languages in public life. It rules out criminal or administrative responsibility
for those who took part in the events on the territory of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, where
the law applies. The law provides that local elections would take place on 7 December 2014.
90. The powers of the local authorities will be greater than those enjoyed by other local
authorities in Ukraine. In particular, they will have the right to take part in the appointment of
heads of courts and of prosecution offices. The special status allows for the creation of voluntary
people’s police, accountable to the local authorities. The draft law provides for specific
financing to be allocated to these areas, without the possibility to diminish this financing, even in
case of amendments to the State budget. The territory enjoying special status will be able to
establish closer cooperation with the Russian Federation. The law will enter into force once
signed by the President and published in the ‘Official Gazette’.
91. The implementation of this law requires one legal clarification. In particular, the
competencies of the new local authorities would have to be defined, as well as the areas where
those competencies would be shared with the central Government, and those that would be
exclusively attributed to the local authorities.
92. The draft law on ‘the prevention or punishment of participants in events on the territory
of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’ cancels criminal and administrative liability for people who
took part in the activities of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
from 22 February until the moment the law enters into force. However, certain conditions must
be met for the cancellation to take place: all hostages must be released within a month and
weapons and ammunition must be surrendered. Responsibility, however, will not be waived in a
wide range of cases. These include: “crimes against life and health (murders and infliction of
serious bodily harm); sexual crimes; hostage taking; human trafficking; banditry; smuggling;
acts of terrorism; violation of graves, burial places, or corpses; attacks against the life of a law
enforcement officer, a judge, an official or a citizen performing his/her public duty, a defence
attorney, or a foreign State representative; threats or violence against a public official or a citizen
20
who performs his/her public duty, internationally protected persons and institutions in
connection with their activity related to the administration of justice; genocide; and persons who
committed a crime connected with the crash of the ‘Malaysia Airlines’ flight MH17”.
93. All newly adopted legislation needs to be undertaken in accordance with international
norms and standards and be implemented in consultation with civil society and local
communities; guarantees for due process must also be ensured, including through the
involvement of relevant organisations. Strategies for their implementation need to be developed
with the participation of victims and civil society more broadly. These should be designed to
enable implementation of the legislation to be in accordance with international norms and
standards, including UN General Assembly resolution 68/262, through the assistance and
guidance of relevant international organisations, and with a view to guaranteeing due process.
Draft law on ensuring rights and freedoms of internally displaced persons
94. On 28 August, Parliament registered a draft law regarding IDPs. The draft was
elaborated in cooperation with the United Nations, the OSCE, the State Migration Service and
representatives of NGOs on the basis of a draft by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union,
following amendment by the Ministry of Justice. The document simplifies the procedure of
temporary registration of IDPs; reduces the deadlines for registration; prolongs social benefits
for IDPs; and guarantees their access to social and medical services. It also aims at establishing
legal grounds to develop special government programmes for IDPs; a unified register and
database; information on available accommodation and employment opportunities in the regions;
and provide for the application of the state system on social security, pensions and financing of
expenses connected with temporary settlement of IDP families in State and municipal
institutions. On 2 September, the Human Rights Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament voted to
recommend that Parliament adopt the draft with an accelerated procedure of seven days between
the first and second readings. The first preliminary reading of the draft law was scheduled for 16
September, but was postponed to 16 October.
Draft law countering corruption29
95. On 4 September, President Poroshenko submitted a draft law to Parliament on the
establishment of a national anti-corruption bureau30. The bureau would have the status of a law
enforcement body and would carry out pre-trial investigations, and conduct operative and search
measures. With an envisaged staff of up to 700 employees, it would cover cases of alleged
corruption crimes involving UAH 500,000 (USD 37,000-38,000) or more, and implicating highlevel
officials, at presidential and cabinet level, including judges and senior officials within the
MoIA, the Army, and the customs. The anti-corruption bureau would be competent to
investigate new cases, as well as relevant crimes committed under the mandate of former
President Yanukovych.
96. A special commission for the selection of the bureau director and employees will be
established, as well as a procedure envisaging ‘monitoring of lifestyle’ and ‘virtuousness checks’
of State authorities and the bureau itself, which is not line with international norms and
standards. The draft law provides for the use of controversial methods, including polygraph
examination and ‘provocation of bribe’, which should be applied to the employees of the bureau.
Registering of the draft and its adoption by the end of October was one of the conditions set by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of the reform process in Ukraine. On 16 September,
Parliament did not adopt the draft law.
29 Law on the system of special authorised bodies in the field of countering corruption.
30 The draft was submitted as part of a package of anti-corruption measures adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on
2 July 2014.
21
97. On 16 September, Parliament passed an amended version of the draft law ‘on cleaning up
the State authorities’, which had been adopted on its first reading on 14 August. The law seeks to
create the legal framework for a comprehensive lustration or vetting of State officials of all
levels who held office during the period of the administration under former President
Yanukovych, including parliamentarians, ministers and judges of the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine, as well as officials of other state agencies and local self-government. The first draft
adopted in August had been criticized by civil society groups as opening the way to arbitrary
dismissals31. A parliamentary working group prepared a new draft with civil society, which
includes approximately 400 amendments. According to a parliamentarian who co-authored the
new draft, the latest version excludes lustration for certain elected positions (members of
Parliament, the ombudsman, and constitutional court judges). At the time of writing, the text of
the law was not available. The HRMMU will be able to properly assess it once it is published32.
Legislation in the context of the security operation
98. On 19 August, Parliament registered a draft law aimed at ensuring the equal mobilization
of citizens from all regions in the context of the security operation, including those areas
formerly under the control of armed groups. The law aims at meeting concerns about the lack of
mobilization of IDPs and others from the east.
99. On 2 September, Parliament adopted in a first reading a draft law on ‘amendments to
certain legislative acts regarding ensuring mobilisation and guarantees to citizens who serve in
the army during mobilisation’. The draft law proposes to set up criminal liability (imprisonment
for two-five years) for company directors who do not provide company vehicles if requested by
the military commissariats. It envisages the preservation of jobs and an average salary for
employees who are mobilised, as well as exemption from taxes and fees for entrepreneurs who
are also mobilised. Such measures come after strong public requests.
B. Judicial and governance reform
100. On 10 September, the interim special commission, established on 4 June 2014 according
to the Law on the Restoration of Confidence in the Judiciary in Ukraine, published its second
monthly report. This body is mandated to assess the decisions and conduct of general court
judges who considered civil, administrative or criminal cases related to the ‘Maidan’ mass
protests held throughout Ukraine from November 2013 and until the law entered into force on 11
April 2014. The Commission had reviewed 579 complaints, of which 504 were dismissed and 75
were declared admissible. The commission can also review the decisions and conduct of judges
who ruled on cases which were assessed by the European Court of Human Rights as having
violated the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Any person or legal entity can request a judge to be assessed by the Commission. The
HRMMU will attend the first public hearing of judges against whom complaints were accepted,
tentatively scheduled for 24 September 2014.
101. Another initiative to strengthen public confidence in the courts was a countrywide
campaign launched in September by the Ukrainian Council of Judges, the State Judicial
31 In the 5th monthly report, the HRMMU had highlighted a number of shortcomings: the draft law did not create a
single independent lustration body; responsibility for carrying out lustration was given to the heads of each body
concerned. It proposed to dismiss virtually all state officials occupying leading posts in previous years, thus
entailing wholesale dismissal within certain departments. There was no mechanism for ensuring that those removed
would be replaced by qualitatively different persons.
32 It is believed to contain an ‘improved’ formulation of the provision regarding lustration of the ex-President of
Ukraine, the President’s administration, the Prime-Minister and his deputies, heads and deputy heads of the state
regional administrations, officials connected with the Maidan events as well as judges and prosecutors who adopted
illegal decisions in regard of Maidan activists.
22
Administration and the Centre of Judicial Studies. Visitors to each court will be asked to
complete an anonymous form, containing questions on the organizational and procedural activity
of the court. Simultaneously, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, scientists, representatives of NGOs
and the mass media will be questioned on the level of judicial independence in Ukraine.
Effective State administration
102. The Government of Ukraine has started to reduce the number of State institutions as part
of an institutional reform package aimed at decreasing the cost and size of State administration,
under reforms required by the IMF. On 2 September, President Poroshenko thus issued a decree
terminating the functions of 22 state bodies in an advisory or supporting role33. These bodies
were largely ineffective or duplicating other existing functions. Besides, they did not have a
clear role and impact on the protection of human rights.
103. On 10 September, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a decree ‘On the Optimisation of the
System of Central Executive Bodies’ that reduces supervisory State authorities by approximately
50 per cent, either by completely terminating them or by merging their functions and reducing
the number of control functions performed by these bodies by 34 per cent.
VI. POLITICAL RIGHTS
Right to vote and to be elected
104. On 27 August, a Presidential Decree34 dissolving Parliament and announcing
extraordinary elections for 26 October entered into force. The current Parliament is to function
until the new members of Parliament take oath.
105. According to current legislation, voters cast ballots both for a member of parliament
(MP) elected under the majority system, and for one elected under the proportional system35.
Voting under the majority system is dependent on a voter having a permanent or temporary
residence. Due to this, some groups of people may face difficulties in realizing their right to
vote. For example, IDPs registered at their places of temporary residence will be able to vote for
candidates under both systems; however those who are not registered at their temporary
residence can vote only for the candidates on the party lists under the proportional system36.
106. According to the Law on Temporary Occupied Territory37, elections cannot be
administered on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Thus, those who currently
reside in Crimea and who wish to vote, will only be able to do so if they travel to mainland
Ukraine. However, they will not be able to vote for candidates under the majority system, as
explained above. The May Presidential elections showed that many people hesitated or did not
33 It affects the committee of economic reforms, the committee on reforming state enforcement bodies, the
interagency working group on the analysis of observance of legislation on freedom of expression and protection of
freedom of the media, the council of regions, the expert council on questions of Ukrainian and Russian relations, the
working group on implementing the concept of criminal justice for under 16-s in Ukraine and the working group on
criminal justice reform.
34 Decree of the President № 690/2014, as of 27 August, on Dissolving Parliament and announcing early
Parliamentary elections.
35 On 12 August, three draft laws related to the electoral process were proposed, but none were adopted. One aimed
at establishing a proportional system with open lists of candidates, another proposed to introduce a proportional
system and a third one with partial modernization of current mixed electoral system.
36 The Human Rights Committee stated in its General Comment No. 25 on article 25 that ‘Where registration of
voters is required, it should be facilitated and obstacles to such registration should not be imposed. If residence
requirements apply to registration, they must be reasonable […]’ (para 11).
37 Law on Ensuring Rights and Freedoms of Citizens on the Temporary Occupied Territory of Ukraine No. 1207-
VII, dated 15 April 2014.
23
have the possibility to travel to electoral districts on the mainland. Thus, under the current legal
framework, theoretically only 438 of 450 national parliamentarians can be elected, considering
that 12 electoral districts are located in Crimea.
107. In case the ceasefire is maintained and a peace agreement is reached, a procedure would
be required to ensure the security of residents in the eastern regions occupied by the armed
groups so that they can safely and freely exercise their right to vote. This would be important to
avoid situations as witnessed in the context of the Presidential elections.
108. Court hearings to ban the Communist Party of Ukraine based on a lawsuit from the
Government are pending, as the scheduled hearings were postponed. If the court has to adopt a
decision banning the Communist Party before the elections, this will prevent its candidates’
participation in elections. This comes alongside State officials continuing to accuse Communist
Party representatives of supporting ‘Crimean annexation’ and the ‘Luhansk and Donetsk
people’s republics’.
109. Regarding ethnic minorities, the Hungarian community in the Zakarpattia region has
concerns over the limited feasibility to elect its own ethnic representatives. According to article
18(2) of the Law on the Elections, boundaries of single-mandate election districts are established
taking into account, inter alia, the interests of national minorities. Thus, bordering administrative
entities, where ethnic minorities reside shall be included in the same electoral district; whereas in
the Zakarpattia region, the Central Election Committee has so far divided the territory of the
compact residence of Hungarians between separate electoral districts.38 The Hungarian
community addressed the administrative court of appeal in Kyiv with a request for the decision
of the Central Election Committee to be reviewed.
110. Within civil society, concern has been raised about the need for women to be properly
represented in the new parliament, as the gender quota legislation was not passed39 and no
systematic efforts have been made to encourage women’s participation in political life.
VII. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
111. The security situation in the east seriously affects the right of over five million residents
in those areas directly affected by violence40. More, generally budget resources across the whole
country are being depleted, which is impacting on various groups in other regions of Ukraine.
A. Right to an adequate standard of living (including food, clothing and housing)
112. In spite of the ceasefire declared on 5 September, local administrations continued to
report about the further destruction of houses and infrastructure caused by shelling. According to
preliminary estimates from the Ministry of Regional Development, 4,501 residential buildings
and 4,733 energy and water systems facilities and structures have been damaged as a result of
fighting or destroyed deliberately by armed groups. Despite efforts made to restore damaged
infrastructure, as of 12 September, there was still no running water in at least 22 settlements of
the Donetsk region, nor electricity in 93 settlements. The HRMMU has received first-hand
reports about the illegal seizure of movable and immovable property in the eastern regions. The
majority of reports suggest that the property (apartments, businesses and cars) was expropriated
38 As stated by the Human Right Committee, the “drawing of electoral boundaries and the method of allocating
votes should not distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any group and should not exclude or
restrict unreasonably the right of citizens to choose their representatives freely.”
39 The draft law to establish a 35 per cent quota for women was registered in Parliament in October 2013, but never
adopted. Currently women hold approximately 9.8 per cent of the 450 seats in Parliament.
40 Estimate provided by OCHA, situation report No.11, as of 12 September 2014.
24
by armed groups. In some cases, when residents refused to give their property away, they were
reportedly immediately shot or detained. On 12 September, it was reported that the leadership of
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ planned to nationalize the property of those who had fled the area,
based on lists received of those who had requested refugee status in the Russian Federation. On
16 September, the National Security and Defence of Ukraine reported that ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ created a special commission to keep record of all abandoned apartments, which
further would be nationalized for the needs of the ‘republic’.
113. On 9 September, the HRMMU received a complaint that on 4 August, Ukrainian soldiers
evicted inhabitants from a number of houses in Mariinka (Donetsk region) near a Ukrainian
controlled checkpoint. A complaint about this was recently filed with the Office of the Military
Prosecutor.41 All incidents of illegal seizure of property must be promptly investigated; clear
procedures should be developed to return the property to the lawful owners.
114. Uninterrupted food supply and access to potable water remained priorities. Local
administrations in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk reported that the delivery of basic
commodities was complicated due to fighting; but a minimum choice of products was available
thanks to the efforts of the Government, private entrepreneurs and volunteers, as well as
humanitarian aid, which reached the region in August. The situation slightly improved in these
areas following the ceasefire. At the same time, on 15 September, the HRMMU was informed
that there had been no food delivery to Yenakievo prison No.52 in Olenivka, Donetsk region, for
almost two months, leaving 450 inmates at the point of starvation.
B. Right to work
115. The Government estimates that 39,985 small and medium businesses in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions have ceased activity due to fighting. This has directly affected 54 per cent of
entrepreneurs in these regions, leaving many of their employees without income. Due to the
destruction of industrial companies and mines42, more than 30,000 residents of Donbas are
currently without jobs. Even if the fighting stops, many will not be able to immediately return to
work, as the re-launch of many technological processes in some of these companies requires
significant time and resources.
116. Many of those who have left the region may not receive unemployment benefits, as their
work contracts have not been officially terminated, which is a main requirement for registering
as unemployed. Also, according to existing legislation, those who terminated their contracts
unilaterally (even due to personal safety concerns) may not apply for benefits for three months.
Additionally, some may lack motivation to search for new work, especially in areas such as Kyiv
where newly received unemployment benefits are higher than the minimum wage being offered
to most IDPs. The influx of IDPs has been increasing the rate of unemployment in host
communities. In some regions the unemployment rate has increased by 1 per cent monthly and
has led to tensions.
117. The Prosecutor’s Offices in Ternopil reported about the case of the unlawful dismissal of
a mobilized soldier from his workplace. The man was mobilized in March and due to his
absence from the work place, was unlawfully fired as a manager of a local store. The Prosecutor
filed a request to the employer to reinstate him in his position and pay his wage arrears starting
from the time of his dismissal. The Military South Region Prosecution Office has reported
41 Other allegations of theft and expropriation of property by members of the ‘volunteer’ Aydar battalion, from
earlier in the summer, have become more prominent recently, following the 8 September release of an Amnesty
International report into range of alleged human rights violations by members of this battalion.
42 On 12 September, the Donetsk State Regional Administration stated that at least 14 state-owned mines have
completely ceased working, with coal production now reduced by almost 50 per cent.
25
similar violations of labour rights in Kherson region. Measures were taken to reinstate the
servicemen in their posts.
C. Social rights
118. On 23 August, the State Treasury in Luhansk region resumed its work, enabling 232
regional state institutions covering healthcare, education, culture and social protection to fund
salaries and expenditures, along with the payment of social benefits, budget allocations and
subsidies from the state budget. As of 11 September, funds were transferred for social benefit
payments for the months of July and August. These are for families in poverty, families with
children, adults and children with disabilities living in Donetsk city. Pensions are being paid in
21 and 13 districts/towns of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
119. As the number of wounded and killed soldiers increased, the regional authorities have
had to allocate more resources to respond to the needs of service personnel and their families.
For example, over the reporting period, regional councils in Lviv, Volyn, Chernivtsi, Ternopil,
and Ivano-Frankivsk regions have developed special social programmes for these groups. These
foresee one-time social benefits, provision of land, social and rehabilitation services and
exemption from certain utility payments, etc.
120. In Mykolaiv, officers’ wives have established an NGO aimed at protecting servicemen’s
rights. In particular, it will help soldiers to overcome the bureaucratic procedures required to
receive social benefits, land and housing; and for the adjustment of housing for the special needs
of wounded soldiers.
D. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
121. Lack of security and safety affected access to, and the provision of, health services in
part of Donbas controlled by the armed groups. Health care in Donetsk, Horlivka, Makiivka,
Torez and Luhansk was reported to be limited. According to NGOs, in some of these areas,
ambulances refuse to respond, as they lack fuel. At least, 32 hospitals are no longer functioning,
whilst 45 medical buildings have been damaged or destroyed. It is estimated that the restoration
of these would require UAH 467 million43 (USD 36 million).
122. People with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and drug users have faced interrupted treatment. In
Luhansk region, the delivery of required treatment has been relocated from Luhansk to
Siverodonetsk, from where it is distributed to towns controlled by the Ukrainian authorities.
Antiretroviral therapy (ART) treatment has not been delivered to penitentiary institutions on the
territory controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. Overall, in the two regions there is a
critical deficit of children’s ART formulas and test systems for virus load, including for pregnant
women. This poses a serious risk for the life and health of people who are living with HIV/AIDS
and those infected with TB. In addition, this increases the risk of an uncontrolled spread of
infection, especially considering the reported rapid growth of the heroin market in these regions
since the spring.
123. In addition, the Government delayed44 the launching of tenders for procurement of ART
and other live-saving medicines. Some tuberculosis treatments and vaccines have not been
available since the end of spring 2014. Besides, due to the national currency’s devaluation, the
Ministry of Health may not be able to procure sufficient amounts of the required medicines.
43 Preliminary estimates of the Ministry of Regional Development.
44 These tenders are normally announced in April. This year, the proposal was opened only in August. Only three
tenders for ART have been accepted, the other 20 were denied due to high prices. The tenders were re-opened and
will be considered by the Ministry on 19 September.
26
124. As the number of servicemen wounded in the east has been increasing, hospitals across
Ukraine have found growing difficulties in providing quality healthcare. In many regions, the
military hospitals are understaffed and do not have sufficient experience and resources, often
relying on volunteer help. NGOs have reported a lack of psychological services, needed mostly
for non-professional servicemen. There have been reports of doctors refusing to document
serious wounds properly, to reduce future state benefit payments45.
125. The situation of people in institutional care is very difficult in all regions of Ukraine. On
25 August, the Civil Commission on Human Rights published the results of an assessment of
one psycho-neurological nursing home, which revealed a range of human rights violations46:
lack of proper treatment, usage of punitive measures and punishment, forced labour for 9-12
hours a day, and unjustified usage of strong psychotropic drugs, which often cause physical
suffering. It was also established that many patients who did not appear to have any pathology
had been placed in the institution without their consent or with gross violations of their
procedural rights. Consequently they had been recognised as incapable by the court and cannot
appeal their ‘treatment’. Such conditions do not only violate the right to health, but also raise
concerns for protection against inhuman and degrading treatment. Following the findings, a
special medical commission was established by the Regional State Administration to further
study the conditions in the nursing home. The examination of all patients showed that 80 per
cent should not have been placed in this nursing home, but rather treated without any isolation.
Similar conditions are believed to be observable in most psycho-neurological homes under the
Ministry of Social Policy. This illustrates the need for an in depth reform of the institutional care
system in Ukraine.
E. Right to education
126. According to the Ministry of Education, on 1 September, only 547 (out of 1,091) schools
in the Donetsk region and 250 (out of 690) in the Luhansk region were opened, allowing
196,300 children47 to resume their studies at the start of the school year. The remaining 984
schools in both regions could not be opened either due to substantial damage as a result of
fighting or due to the security situation. This prevented access to education for approximately
270,000 children, mainly on the territory controlled by the armed groups.
127. A preliminary assessment of the Ministry of Regional Development48 suggests that at
least 217 educational buildings have been damaged, reconstruction of which requires at least
UAH 103 million (approximately USD 8 million). In settlements which are controlled by armed
groups, the Ministry of Education tentatively postponed the commencement of the school year
until 1 October or until the situation stabilizes so as to ensure the safety of children.
Alternatively, distance-learning courses have been offered for children in grades 5-11 in these
regions. The security situation also limited the right to education for school graduates. Only
20,000 of 36,000 graduates could pass the ‘external independent assessment’ which is required
to enter university.
128. On 1 September, the ‘ministry of education’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ issued an
order on the re-subordination of the educational institutions located on the territory of the
45 The Decree of the Cabinet Ministers N413, adopted on 20 August 2014, foresees the procedure of obtaining the
status ‘of a military action participant’, which also enables application for certain social benefits.
46 The results of the study of the Velykobrulskyi Psycho-neurological Nursing Home, initiated by Odesa State
Administration, are available at: http://cchr.org.ua/
47 According to the State Statistics Service, in 2013/2014 school year, there were 509,100 school children in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
48 Information provided by UNDP, on 4 September, during the meeting of the UN Sector Group on Early Recovery
and Livelihood.
27
‘Donetsk people’s republic’. The teachers were forced to sign a statement about being ‘aware of
the order’ and were threatened to be otherwise fired. Additionally, teachers were asked to
provide their personal data in order to allow the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ to pay out wages.
The Ministry of Education of Ukraine made a public statement on 1 September stressing that
‘the participation of teaching staff in such provocative actions (coming to work, giving classes,
educational activities and others) is unacceptable and will have legal consequences.’ This is
potentially putting local educators in an impossible position of facing either sanction from the
leadership of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ or from the Ukrainian authorities, whilst all the
time having balance their duty of care to their pupils.
129. On 10 September, the representatives of armed groups seized the building of the Donetsk
National University, fired the rector for his “unconstructive position” and appointed a new one.
They also reminded the staff about the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’s decrees on re-subordination
of educational institutions.
130. Schoolchildren of some rural parts of Kherson, Mykolaiv, Volyn and Rivne regions have
limited access to schools, as their school busses were transferred to the army according to
mobilization plans. The distance between some villages and the nearest school is significant and
requires such transport. The regional authorities are trying to resolve h this by hiring private
carriers.
VIII. SITUATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
131. The number of IDPs increased in the last month to 275,48949, reflecting a rise in
displacement, including from new regions like Novoazovsk in the south of Donetsk region, and
an increase in registration of previously displaced persons, possibly due to the need to enrol
children into schools and State support. Nevertheless, the absence of a uniform, State-wide
registration procedure and of a clear system of benefits associated with registration, many IDPs
have still not registered.
132. According to the State Emergency Service, as of 8 September, 32 per cent of IDPs were
children and 14 per cent were elderly persons or persons with disabilities. The average family
consists of three persons; and two-thirds of adult IDPs were women. Such a composition implies
specific needs, as most IDP families include elderly and unaccompanied women with children.
133. The protracted crisis is taking an increasing psychological toll on IDPs. Many had hoped
to return to their homes by the end of the summer, but since early September have realized that
they need to make plans for a longer period of displacement.
Right to education
134. Despite concerns as described in paragraph 135, the process of enrolment of IDP children
in schools went smoothly, with education authorities showing flexibility regarding the
procedures. According to the Ministry of Education, the number of IDP children attending
school and pre-school facilities in all regions is approximately 49,195 (as of 8 September). Local
authorities and civil society groups are aware of families who have not yet enrolled their
children in school, hoping to return home in the near future, especially after the ceasefire was
declared. The actual number of out-of-school children is not yet available. There have also been
reports that IDP children are traumatised and have difficulties adapting to new schools; while
pupils coming from host communities also reportedly hesitate to engage actively with children
from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. On 4 September, the Ministry of Education issued a
49 State Emergency Service, 18 September 2014.
28
special instruction to remind school administration and teachers to be particularly sensitive and
tolerant towards IDP children.
Separated children
135. Some IDP children from the Donbas region are unaccompanied and separated from their
families. Many of them were sent by their families for “summer” retreats to avoid danger and
violence in the affected regions. Initial plans were that children would return after the holidays,
but with escalating violence, the situation changed. Ministries, international and local
organisations are trying to join their efforts to locate such children and ensure that they are
united with their families.
Returnees
136. Returns to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions started taking place during July, mainly to
areas that are under the control of the Ukrainian Government. Returns to the areas controlled by
the armed groups started in August, and significantly increased after the 5 September ceasefire.
UNHCR witnessed long lines of cars passing a checkpoint entering Slovyansk on the weekend
preceding the start of the school year. With winter approaching and recent reports about seizures
of property by armed groups, some people are returning for short periods, even to areas where
the conflict is ongoing, in order to get warm clothing, blankets or other possessions and to check
on their property.
Social benefits
137. Many IDPs have experienced significant delays in receiving benefits, thus having been
deprived of any money for weeks or months. It will continue to be difficult for IDPs to receive
back-pay for missed payments, since there is no electronic registry of past payments and the
records must be checked manually. The Ministry of Social Policy is adapting procedures that
would allow for prompt solutions. The issue of social benefits is critical, considering the
proportion of women, children, elderly and persons without disabilities, and lack of employment
opportunities.
138. Access to Government services is particularly difficult for Roma IDPs. A legal aid
organization in Dnipropetrovsk reports that over 60 per cent of Roma that it assists lack identity
documentation, and therefore cannot register and receive support.
Accommodation
139. The State Emergency Services reported that 20 per cent of IDPs were living in statesponsored
collective centres, while the rest were hosted in private apartments or centres.
Financing of the state-run centres remains problematic, since the central authorities have not yet
allocated resources for payment of utilities at collective centres hosting IDPs from Donetsk and
Luhansk. According to Government data as of 12 September, at least 25,500 IDPs were living in
State-supported collective centres that are not suitable for residence in winter.
140. Several NGOs reported instances of violence among IDPs living in collective centres,
attributing such behaviour to post-traumatic stress disorder, poor living conditions and
uncertainty about the future. Healthcare professionals are concerned that where population
density is high, there is a heightened risk of epidemics of tuberculosis or infectious diseases.
Civil society response
141. In the absence of a predictable State assistance programme, most IDPs have been seeking
assistance from grassroots civic or religious groups. The response from these groups has been
tremendous, supported by private donations, active use of social media and civic spirit.
However, many of the volunteers were students and teachers who are no longer available since
the start of the school year; the remaining appear to be at the edge of exhaustion, squeezed
between the increasing number of IDPs and the dwindling levels of support.
29
IX. WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
142. Although women constitute 53.8 per cent of the population, inequalities between women
and men in Ukraine have generally been significant. It has been manifested through their low
participation and representation in political life, in particular at high-level positions, salary
discrepancies, and disproportionate levels of poverty suffered by women50. Prevalent societal
stereotypes about female roles within the family and in society foster to a large extent these
manifestations of discrimination and gender inequality against women.
143. The Maidan protests showcased women as equal, active participants, able to coordinate
and lead in fighting for their rights. Many civil society representatives believed that it created a
momentum to address pre-existing power imbalances based on gender and review the gender
policies, promote the effective participation of women in public and political life and to
empower them. However, the five months of the conflict have led to a major set-back in this
regard. As the HRMMU pointed out in s previous reports, the budget cuts have disproportionally
affected women and two-thirds of IDPs are women with children, living in precarious
conditions.
Sexual and gender-based violence
144. The HRMMU has received allegations of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence
in the east. An NGO reported that women who remained in the area are forced to clean, cook and
wash clothes for the members of armed groups. Groups of volunteers helping to evacuate people
received first-hand reports of rape or detention of women at check-points. There have also been
incidents of abductions of women, by armed groups, whose whereabouts remain unknown.
145. During a filmed interrogation, the member of an armed group detained by the Security
Service of Ukraine mentioned that at the checkpoint where he served, local women were
subjected to gang rape and then killed. The NGO La Strada has received several calls on its
hotline from victims of rape or their relatives and provided psychological help to them. On 15
September, one of the regional NGOs working with IDPs informed the HRMMU about two
reported cases of rape by members of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ armed groups, allegedly
from the Caucasus. Credible allegations of rape by members of the territorial defence battalions
were also reported.
146. Details about such incidents are limited and difficult to verify. The lack of reports can be
attributed to the difficulties of speaking about rape and other forms of sexual abuse, fear of
reprisals and the stigma attached to rape. The Ukrainian Foundation for Public Health and NGO
Health Right International, which voluntarily provides services to IDPs, reported that women
were often reluctant to request any psychological support until their basic needs (shelter,
clothing, and food) were met, while work with victims of sexual violence requires at least
several psychological consultations before women can ‘open up’. There are also difficulties in
gathering information in the context of the ongoing conflict in the east, where police presence is
limited and experienced civil society organisations have either been forced to leave or have been
unable to effectively carry out their tasks. Considering the situation, La Strada runs a campaign
to prevent sexual exploitation and trafficking in human beings. Information materials were sent
to Slovyansk for further distribution in the eastern region.
Domestic violence
50 Please see the fourth and fifth OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine. Available at:
http://un.org.ua/en/information-centre/news/1870.
30
147. According to NGOs, women coming from eastern regions mentioned that conflicts
regularly occurred in their families due to ‘ideological’ differences. La Strada received calls
from women complaining that their husbands, active supporters of ‘Donetsk or Luhansk
people’s republics’, tried to prevent them from fleeing the region, including in cases when they
had young children.
148. Women are at heightened risk of domestic violence due to the return of soldiers from the
security operation area. Doctors treating wounded Ukrainian servicemen reported that many
have resorted to alcohol to cope with psychological trauma. Volunteers in hospitals also reported
about the need for professional and experienced psychologists. NGOs providing social and
psychological services for women mentioned that some have requested assistance due to the acts
of violence committed against them by their husbands, who were fighting in the east and have
now returned; at the same time these women generally justify the behaviour of their partners, on
the grounds of post-traumatic stress. Ukrainian Foundation for Public Health and Health Right
International noted that women themselves do not always perceive violence as such; battering
and psychological pressure are considered ‘normal’.
149. In addition, the constant exposure of violence in the media appears to be raising the
threshold for tolerating cruelty and aggressiveness. Women’s NGOs expect a rise of domestic
violence across Ukraine. This requires the Government to ensure that necessary mechanisms are
in place to prevent domestic violence, raise awareness about the problem and provide support
and assistance to victims. Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) represents
an important step to be taken in this regard.
X. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
150. On 14 September, ‘local elections’ were held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
the City of Sevastopol, reportedly without incident. These were carried out as part of local
elections held across 14 areas of the Russian Federation. Ukraine declared that those elections
were unlawful and the results would not have any legal impact on the status of the Autonomous
Republic. The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation published preliminary
results showing a turnout of 52.69 per cent in Crimea and 48.03 per cent, in the city of
Sevastopol. The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People had called for a boycott of these elections.
On 9 September, the press service of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine qualified
the conduct of the election as an attempt to form illegal government authorities, and stated that
criminal proceedings would be opened against its organizers.
151. In the lead up to the elections, an all-Crimean conference ‘On the status of the Crimean
Tatar people in the modern period’ was held in Simferopol on 6 September, attended by the
leadership of the Crimean de facto authorities. The conference created a working group to
“neutralize political confrontation, interethnic and interreligious tensions”. According to the
head of the working group one of the main objectives of the conference was to encourage
Crimean Tatars to participate in the elections. Crimean ‘prime minister’ Sergey Aksyonov
stressed that the conference should mark a new stage in the relations between Crimean Tatars
and the de facto authorities. The ‘Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in
Crimea’, at the conference, informed that Crimean Tatars would be offered posts in his office.
The Crimean Tatar community, however, ignored the event. According to the leadership of the
Crimean Tatars, this conference was organised to split the Tatar community. The head of the
Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, issued a statement criticizing the conference at which his
deputy head was not allowed to speak at the conference. He also highlighted that among the
31
Crimean Tatars who attended this event were Tatar state officials who had been reportedly
forced to do so.
152. During the reporting period, there have been numerous human rights violations
committed in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by representatives of the de facto authorities.
A. Rule of law
153. Crimean law enforcement bodies continued and intensified their searches, particularly for
so-called ‘extremist’ literature and activity, mainly among the Crimean Tatar population. On 19
August, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) conducted a house search of a Crimean
Tatar family (practising Muslims) in Bakhchisaray. ‘Extremist literature’ and a gun were
allegedly found. On 26 August, the director of the Dzhankoi madrassa was fined 2,000 RUB
(approximately 50 USD) under the Code on Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation
for alleged storage and distribution of extremist literature. On 28 August, several policemen as
well as people in camouflage and in civilian clothes entered the house of a Crimean Tatar family
in Bakhchisaray. Upon showing a court decision, they searched the house illegally for drugs and
weapons, but instead confiscated books listed under the so-called ‘list of extremist literature’,
prohibited under Russian anti-extremism legislation.
154. A group of Crimean human rights activists and the local media confirmed that, on 9
September, the Crimean gymnasium in Tankove (Bakhchysarai district) was searched by people
in civilian clothes. They searched the library and classes, looking for ‘extremist literature’. Two
Turkish language teachers were taken for questioning after ‘prohibited literature’ was found.
Other teachers alleged such books had never been in the library and were planted as fake
evidence by the FSB. Similarly, on 11 September, five officers of Crimean Prosecutor’s office
searched the library of Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University (CEPU) for banned
literature.
155. On 10 September, the houses of two Crimean Tatars were searched in the village
Kamenka (Leninskiy district). As in earlier cases, armed men broke into the houses in the early
morning, showed a warrant, but refused to invite independent witnesses. The men searched for
weapons, drugs and ‘extremist literature’. Two notebooks, a mobile phone and two religious
books from a list of ‘extremist literature’ were confiscated. The home-owners were taken to
Simferopol for interrogation and later released after 18 hours. They were forced to sign a
statement stating that ‘there was no moral or physical harm’; however their notebooks were not
returned.
156. On 4 and 5 September, at least 10 Crimean Tatar houses were searched by police officers
and FSB officials in Simferopol, Nizhnegorsk, Krasnoperekopsk and Bakhchisaray. The homes
searched belonged both to ordinary people and to Mejlis (the Crimean Tatar Assembly)
members, including regional Mejlis heads. The police, who had warrants, found no weapons and
drugs, but confiscated religious literature. On 16 September, FSB officers and the police
searched the building of the Mejlis in Simferopol and seized documents, religious books,
computers, hard discs, and some personal belongings of Mustafa Jemiliev, the former head of
the Mejlis, including money and a ‘non-lethal pistol’. The editorial office of the Crimean Tatar
Avdet newspaper was also searched. The same day, FSB officers searched two houses of
Crimean Tatars, including the head of the Belohorsk office of the Mejlis.
157. On 8 September, the house of a well-known ethnic Ukrainian activist was searched by
law enforcement officers. Electronic items were confiscated for further examination, whilst she
was detained at the Department for Countering Extremism for six hours before being released.
She was questioned about her involvement in protests during May, against the entry-ban
imposed on Mustafa Jemiliev. She was also questioned about her ‘anti-Russian’ publications on
32
the Internet, which were suggested to be “extremism and inciting people to inter-ethnic enmity”.
She has since left Crimea, fearing the fabrication of terrorism charges that may lead to her arrest
as an ‘extremist’. There are also reports of Crimean Tatars having been summoned to police
stations and interrogated for their reported involvement in the May protests.
158. On 1 September, the Ukrainian Ombudsperson received information from the Office of
the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation regarding the detention conditions and the
alleged use of torture against Ukrainian citizens Oleg Sentsov, a Crimean filmmaker, and A.
Kolchenko. Both, along with two others, were previously detained in Crimea on terrorism
charges and transferred to an FSB detention facility in Moscow. According to the Prosecutor of
the Russian Federation, the detention conditions of A. Kolchenko meet the standards under
Russian legislation, and there is no basis for the torture allegations. The reports of torture against
Oleg Sentsov are still to be investigated.
B. Freedoms of peaceful assembly, expression, religion and movement
Freedom of peaceful assembly
159. Limitations to the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly continued to be observed.
The authorities in Simferopol refused to grant permission for a Crimean Tatar assembly planned
by the NGO Kardashlyk for 23 August near the memorial complex for the victims of the World
War Two Crimean Tatar deportation. The official reason for this refusal was that the extremely
high temperatures could negatively affect the health of participants. Other outdoor events went
ahead as planned. On 24 and 25 August, Crimean local authorities, law enforcement agencies
and the FSB took actions to prevent or limit participation in the Ukrainian Flag and
Independence Day events in Sevastopol and Simferopol. This included banning rallies, and
detentions and summons for ‘preventive talks’. On 26 August, the police in Sevastopol
prohibited the conduct of an anti-corruption meeting in the main square.
Freedom of expression
160. On 10 September, the Institute of Mass Information released its August monthly analysis
of freedom of expression by the de facto authorities in Crimea, finding that violations to freedom
of expression had increased from one case in July to nine cases in August.
161. On 12 September, the ‘Broadcasting Centre of Crimea’ refused to return the equipment
of Chornomorska TV Company, which it had previously confiscated despite the decision of the
Commercial Court of Crimea. The confiscation of equipment had disabled the work of the
channel. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović, stated that this
was “an attempt to pressure independent media in Crimea, which provides space for critical
voices and this was a “clear sign of censorship”.
Freedom of religion or belief
162. On 12 September, in an interview with Hrmodaske.TV, Metropolitan Kliment of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate stated that the FSB was exerting moral
coercion against its priests who remained in Crimea. They were reportedly forced to sign papers
on cooperation with the FSB and asked to report about various anti-Russian actions, as well as
everything connected with Metropolitan Kliment himself. The HRMMU earlier reported about
acts of violence and intimidation targeting priests, believers and the property of the Orthodox
Church of Kyiv Patriarchate. Since the March ‘referendum’ in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, six out of 15 priests of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate have left the
peninsula and four out of 12 churches have closed.
163. Religious communities faced challenges related to the de facto application of Russian
law in Crimea. It is not clear whether religious communities' previous registration under
Ukrainian law remains valid in the eyes of the de facto authorities. The Russian authorities are
33
requiring all religious communities which register under Russian law. In August, all but five of
23 Turkish imams and religious teachers invited by the Crimean Muftiyat, under a 20-year-old
programme, were forced to leave Crimea as Russia's Federal Migration Service refused to
extend their residence permits. The residence permits of the remaining five are to expire in the
next three months.51 According to sources in the Russian Migration Service, lack of registration
of the Muftiyat implies that they cannot invite foreign guests. On 22 August, an Islamic group in
Crimea supported by the Religious Administration of Muslims in Russia established a Tavrida
Muftiyat religious leadership body. Its leader, Ruslan Saitvaliev, said in an interview to a
Russian newspaper, that the majority of mosques in Crimea were led by supporters of “nontraditional
Islam”, specifically ‘wahhabites’ or members of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir group, which is
banned in Russia. The establishment of the Tavrida Muftiyat is viewed by the leadership of the
Crimean Tatar Mejlis as an attempt by Russian authorities to weaken the Crimean Muftiyat,
which is supported by the Mejlis, who had opposed the March 2014 ‘referendum’. Already, the
Khan-Cami mosque in Evpatoria, previously subordinated to Crimea’s Muftiyat, has been
included in the new Tavrida Muftiyat.
C. Rights of indigenous peoples
164. On 20 August, an institute of the President's Commissioner on Crimean Tatars was
established in Kyiv with the aim of preserving and developing the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and
religious identity of the Crimean Tatar people within Ukraine. This is a new body with an
advisory function. Ukraine has no law on indigenous peoples. Mr. Mustafa Jemilev was
appointed to the position. He has since urged Crimean Tatars to report human rights violations to
Ukrainian state bodies and to apply to local Mejlis offices in Crimea for legal aid. He also called
on victims to collect evidence, including official correspondence and witness reports. According
to the Head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, Refat Chubarov, FSB officers are
examining Crimean bookshops and removing books about Crimean Tatars, including the book of
Crimean historian Gulnara Bekirova Mustafa Jemilev: Crimean Tatar voice was not heard for
decades.
D. Economic and social rights
165. The process of ‘nationalization’ and illegal seizure of property has been ongoing for
several months. On 24 August, the ‘people’s militia’ entered Zaliv shipbuilders in Crimea and
prevented the company management entering its working places. Then a new administration was
introduced to the firm, from Zelenodolsk (Tatarstan), one of the biggest Russian shipbuilders.
On 27 August, members of the ‘people’s militia’ entered the headquarters of Ukrainian gas
company Krymgas and expropriated all documents and stamps. The entrances were blocked and
the employees were advised either to quit or to sign applications for transfer of their jobs to a
newly created gas company. On 3 September, the ‘state council’ of Crimea passed a decree
nationalising 82 (mainly PrivatBank) objects owned by Ihor Kolomoiskyi and 28 Crimean
markets owned by others. Mr. Kolomoiskyi is the current governor of Dnipropetrovsk region
who actively finances some battalions of the security operation. Instances of illegal seizure and
transfer of property were also reported before the adoption of the decree.
Right to an adequate standard of living
51 There is also uncertainty about the ability of the priest of the Catholic parish in Simferopol to stay. His residence
permit expires on 25 October 2014. In the second half of August, he lodged an application to the Crimean branch of
Russia's Federal Migration Service in Simferopol in order to extend his residence permit. In a reply obtained on 3
September, the priest was recommended to apply later. Under Ukrainian law, residence permits were often
automatically renewed. Under Russian law, there is no automatic renewal.
34
166. The Ukrainian National energy company officially informed Crimean and Sevastopol
authorities about the restriction of energy supplies (with new quotas) for the Crimean peninsula
starting on the week of 1 September. It threatened to cut power altogether if these quotas were
breached by consumers. 80 per cent of the electric power in Crimea comes from the mainland.
The same preventive cuts are expected across the rest of Ukraine. Fighting in the east, however,
has disrupted supplies to thermal power plants, which provide around 40 per cent of Ukraine's
electricity. The looming winter and energy crisis are increasingly coming to the fore in domestic
political social discourse.
Right to education
167. The HRMMU is in the process of collecting information on the new school year in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. According to preliminary information obtained in Yalta,
Russian is the only language of instruction in that city. This is also true of the ‘Ukrainian
gymnasium’ in Yalta, which used Ukrainian as the language of instruction before the March
‘referendum’. Ukrainian language can still be taught as an option twice a week, although such
optional teaching still violates the right of Ukrainians to study in their native language. The
director of this school was dismissed from her post on 9 September.
168. On 9 September, students of the Crimean State Medical University (CSMU), among
them foreigners, protested against their institute joining the Crimean Federal University,
following a decree of Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev issued on 13 August. There is
concern that if this occurs CSMU’s international status will be lost52 and graduates will no
longer receive an international certificate admissible for employment opportunities in other
countries. Reportedly, more than 300 national students have transferred to medical schools in
mainland Ukraine.
E. Situation of internally displaced persons and other groups in a position of
vulnerability
IDPs
169. The number of registered IDPs from Crimea continued to grow with officially 17,794
Crimean IDPs registered on mainland Ukraine53. This constitutes an increase of almost 7 per
cent in less than a month. According to sources in the Ukrainian Government, this could be
partly attributed to unregistered IDPs on the mainland having registered; to some Crimean
entrepreneurs leaving the peninsula after having sold their property; and to the arrival of families
who object to their children attending school under the education system of the Russian
Federation.
170. According to the so-called Crimean authorities, there were more than 7,000 “refugees”
from eastern Ukraine in special temporary accommodation facilities throughout the peninsula.
These facilities were closed on 1 September and the “refugees” were to be resettled in Russia’s
central and eastern regions. The HRMMU is verifying claims that some were resettled against
their wishes.
LGBTI
171. On 2 September, during a meeting of the de facto authorities in Crimea, while discussing
the demographic development of Crimea, the Crimean ‘prime minister’ Sergey Aksyonov
stressed that representatives of the LGBTI community will not receive support from authorities.
Moreover, according to him, if they try to conduct any street actions, they will be prosecuted.
52 According to the Ukrainian Health Ministry, the transformation of the CSMU as a structural subdivision of the
Crimean Federal University will ruin its educational process and technical base.
53 State Emergency Services, 18 September 2014.
35
Domestic violence
172. On 10 September, the NGO La Strada informed the HRMMU that in the first six months
of this year, 3.1 per cent of phone calls received on domestic violence and gender discrimination
issues came from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. While the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation foresees liability for intentional crimes against the life, health and sexual integrity of
citizens, Russia, unlike Ukraine, has no domestic violence law. In view of the general reluctance
of the police to react to complaints of domestic violence, the absence of a specific law makes it
even more difficult for family members to secure an intervention from law enforcement officials.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
173. The sharp increase in civilian casualties towards the end of August is largely due to the
intensified fighting, including the use of heavy weaponry and indiscriminate shelling in densely
populated areas, as a result of the influx of an increasing number of foreign fighters, including
citizens of the Russian Federation, as well as former or current servicemen ‘on leave’, in support
of the armed groups of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic. In this context, the principles of international humanitarian law on the conduct of
hostilities should be recalled and respected, including the principles of military necessity,
distinction, proportionality and precaution in order to ensure the protection of civilians. There
needs to be accountability for crimes committed. No matter who the perpetrators or the victims
are, efforts must be made to ensure that anyone who has committed a serious violation of
international law is brought to justice. This is essential to overcome divisions and pave the way
for national reconciliation.
174. The situation remains fragile and while all efforts should be made to support a ceasefire
that will have a direct positive effect on the human rights situation, it is equally important to
support the Government in preparing for the social effects of a possible escalation in the
hostilities. Legislation adopted on 16 September pursuant to the Minsk Protocol furthering the
points on the immediate release of all hostages and detainee and an amnesty, as well as with
regard to an offer of the special status to parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions is to be
welcomed. Respect for human rights, good governance and the rule of law are key to peace and
security, and economic and social development. An environment conducive to the promotion
and protection of human rights in Ukraine depends on respect for General Assembly resolution
68/262 on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the absence of armed conflict, and
the effective control of the State borders between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
175. As OHCHR has consistently highlighted in its reports, the Government of Ukraine
should prioritise addressing systemic and structural issues affecting human rights through
institutional reform, with the aim of establishing governance and justice systems that are
effective and accountable, promote and protect human rights for all in line with international
standards.
176. OHCHR continued to appreciate the good cooperation extended by the Government of
Ukraine to the HRMMU, and welcomed the some initial steps taken to implement some
previously issued recommendations. The HRMMU will continue to monitor and report on the
evolving situation, with a view to contributing towards the establishment of an objective
assessment of the human rights situation and a stronger and more effective national human rights
protection system.
177. All recommendations contained in the OHCHR reports issued since 15 April remain
valid. In addition, OHCHR calls upon all those involved in the situation in Ukraine to implement
the following recommendations:
36
a) Maintain the ceasefire and ultimately seek a sustainable peaceful solution for the Donbas
region, to end the loss of life and avoid a large scale humanitarian disaster.
b) Ensure that all those involved in the situation in Ukraine adhere to norms and principles
of international humanitarian law and provide free and safe passage for civilians and
humanitarian relief in strict compliance with existing international standards, and in any
situation refrain from indiscriminate shelling of populated areas or positioning in areas
that put civilians in danger.
c) All violations of international law, including war crimes, must be fully investigated and
accountability guaranteed, including for command responsibility; perpetrators must be
promptly brought to justice and victims provided with remedies and reparations.
d) Adopt effective prosecutorial strategies to bring to justice the perpetrators of violations
of human rights and humanitarian law. All allegations of sexual violence, which under
some circumstances constitute international crimes (war crimes, crimes against
humanity), must be fully investigated, with regard to the needs of victims and specific
methodologies (e.g. the International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of
Sexual Violence in Conflict).
e) All incidents of illegal seizure of property must be promptly investigated; clear
procedures should be developed to return the property to the lawful owners.
f) Treat all detainees humanely and in accordance with international human rights
standards and international humanitarian law to ensure their rights, including access to
legal aid.
g) Ensure informed consent of detainees who are to be exchanged as a result of the Minsk
protocol of 5 September and ensure that these exchanges are monitored and are in
accordance with international norms and standards.
h) Establish a transparent and accessible mechanism for families seeking to find missing
persons, including military personnel.
i) Ensure that all those living in Ukraine are provided with basic assistance, services and
shelter/heating needs in accordance with international norms and standards and that the
necessary legal institutional framework to support this is enacted.
j) Ensure the equal provision of services and utilities, as well as humanitarian and social
assistance where needed, for both those who have remained and returnees.
k) Collect and make publicly available comprehensive and reliable gender-disaggregated
statistics concerning IDPs and other people affected by the conflict (including those
killed and wounded).
l) Conduct national consultations, with the involvement of civil society, to develop a
national action plan in accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 to promote
women’s equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of
conflicts, peace-building and peacekeeping, as well as incorporate gender perspective in
all areas of peace building.
m) Encourage adoption of temporary measures to ensure greater participation of women in
public life, including in Parliament.
n) Ensure freedom of the media and regulatory monitoring of media professionalism,
disinformation, and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.
37
o) Take immediate action to facilitate access to, and the provision of, treatment for
HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis, as well as of essential medicines, particularly in conflictaffected
areas, in order to prevent the interruption of treatment.
178. With regard to the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, OHCHR notes with
concern the continued human rights violations that are generated by the introduction of Russian
Federation legislation, in contravention of General Assembly resolution 68/262.
Recommendations from previous report remain unimplemented. To the authorities in Crimea
and the de facto governing authority of the Russian Federation, OHCHR makes the following
recommendations:
p) End pressure and intimidation against the Crimean Tatars linked to the Mejlis,
including the multiplication of searches of private property under the pretext of
combatting extremism.
q) Strengthen the security of Crimean residents by acting to curb human rights violations
committed by the “Crimean self-defence” groups.
r) Guarantee all fundamental rights to all persons in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
including freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, expression, religion and
movement, as well as right to education and guarantees of economic and social rights.
Investigate the cases of alleged killing and enforced disappearances of Crimean civil
activists (Reshat Ametov, Timur Shaimardanov, Seiran Zinedin, Leonid Korzh, Vasyl
Chernysh) and hold accountable the perpetrators.
s) Ensure that citizens of Ukraine who fled the conflict in the east of the country and go to
Crimea are not forcefully resettled in the Russian Federation.
t) Ensure monitoring of the human rights situation in Crimea by the UN HRMMU.

Annex 766
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 November 2014)

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
15 November 2014
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY 7
A. Missing persons and the identification of their remains 8
B. Deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance 10
C. Torture and ill-treatment 12
III. FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY,
RELIGION OR BELIEF 14
A. Freedom of expression 14
B. Freedom of peaceful assembly 16
C. Freedom of religion or belief 17
IV. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 17
A. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 17
B. Right to an adequate standard of living (including food, clothing,
housing, water and sanitation) 19
C. Right to property 19
D. Right to work and favourable working conditions 19
E. Right to social security 20
F. Right to education 21
G. Groups facing discrimination 21
V. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 23
VI. SITUATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 24
VII. WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 25
A. Women affected by the hostilities in the east 25
B. Participation and representation of women 27
VIII. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AND ABUSES 27
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east 27
B. Investigation into the 2 May violence in Odesa 29
C. Investigations into crimes committed during the Maidan protests 30
D. Administration of justice 31
IX. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 32
A. Constitutional reform 32
B. Lustration 33
C. Corruption 36
D. Reform of the judiciary 37
E. Office of the Prosecutor 37
F. Criminal proceedings in absentia 38
G. Legislation in follow up to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 39
H. Law on Internally Displaced Persons 39
I. Human rights strategy 40
J. Police reform 40
X. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA 41
A. Civil and political rights 41
B. Economic and social rights 46
C. The rights of indigenous peoples 47
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47
4
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This is the seventh report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, based on the work of the United
Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU). It covers the period from 17
September to 31 October 2014.
2. There were major developments during the reporting period that significantly impacted
on the human rights situation.
3. Despite the ceasefire, which entered into force on 5 September, hostilities in the east and
related human rights violations and abuses continued. On 19 September, in Minsk, the Trilateral
Contact Group1, with political representatives of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’2, and the self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk people’s republic’3 agreed on a Memorandum to
implement ‘the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine and the initiatives of the President of the
Russian Federation’. Despite the announcement of ‘silent regimes’4 by the Ukrainian
Government (on 5 and 7 October) and by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ (on 11 October),
violations of the ceasefire were reported by the Ukrainian security forces and the armed groups.
Fighting was particularly severe around the Donetsk airport, Debaltseve and Mariupol (Donetsk
region), and Shchastia (Luhansk region), causing casualties among civilians, military servicemen
and members of the armed groups. On average 13 people were killed every day between 6
September and 31 October. Since the beginning of the hostilities in mid-April until 31 October,
at least 4,042 people were killed and 9,350 were wounded in the conflict affected area of eastern
Ukraine5.
4. There are credible reports from different sources, including the OSCE Observer Mission,
that hundreds of people in military-style clothing have been observed crossing the two border
crossing points of Gukovo and Donetsk in both directions6. The Ukrainian Government and
some civic groups report the delivery of weapons from the Russian Federation to the eastern
regions. On 19 September and 31 October, two further convoys were sent by the Russian
Federation to territory under the control of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’. As on the previous occasions, the convoys crossed at the Izvaryne border
crossing point without the authorisation of Ukraine, and were not inspected.
5. In the territories under the control of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ there continues to be a total breakdown in law and order, and a lack of any
human rights protection for the population under their control. In addition, parallel governance
structures are being set up, with so-called ‘ministries’, as well as legislative and administrative
procedures being established. Both ‘republics’ announced plans to hold ‘presidential and
parliamentary elections’ on 2 November, outside the legal framework of Ukraine7. There were
strong objections to these initiatives from the Government of Ukraine, some Member States and
international organisations, including the United Nations.
1 The Group is composed of senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and of the OSCE
Chairperson-in-Office.
2 Hereafter referred to as ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
3 Hereafter referred to as the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
4 During which armed hostilities and shelling should cease in the conflict zone.
5 This is a very conservative estimate by the HRMMU and WHO based on available official data. Both believe that
the casualties have been under reported, and that their actual numbers are considerably higher.
6 From 24 September to 31 October 2014, the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk
has reported 2,751 persons in military-style clothing crossing the border in both directions at the two
aforementioned border crossing points.
7 Further observations on these ‘elections’ will be documented in the eighth HRMMU report.
5
6. In territories under the control of both ‘republics’8, cases of serious human rights abuses
by the armed groups continued to be reported, including torture, arbitrary and incommunicado
detention, summary executions, forced labour, sexual violence, as well as the destruction and
illegal seizure of property. These violations are of a systematic nature and may amount to crimes
against humanity.
7. On 23 September, reports of the discovery of alleged mass graves near the village of
Nyzhnia Krynka not far from Donetsk city (Donetsk region) received much attention. One grave
contained five bodies; two further graves found on the territory ‘Komunarska’ No. 22 mine
contained two bodies each. The bodies in the first grave were identified as members of the
armed groups, killed in action. With regard to the four bodies found in the two graves, there are
allegations of forensic evidence of a summary execution, according to the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. The Ukrainian Government has denied the involvement of its security forces in the
allegations of summary executions. On 26 September, the National Security and Defence
Council announced the continuation of investigations into the alleged ‘mass crimes’ committed
against civilians by the armed groups in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, including an
investigation into the three ‘mass graves’ found in July in the town of Sloviansk (Donetsk
region).
8. The reports on the use of cluster munitions in the hostilities in both urban and rural areas
are a matter of concern. Due to their wide radius and indiscriminate impact, their use in areas
with a civilian presence would constitute a violation of international humanitarian law and may
amount to a war crime. The Government has denied the use of cluster munitions. Reports on the
use of cluster munitions, as well as those of indiscriminate shelling, need to be investigated
promptly and thoroughly.
9. The exchange of persons deprived of their liberty, as foreseen by the Minsk Protocol,
was largely non-transparent. The Government of Ukraine claimed that by 20 October, 1,509
people had been released by the armed groups. Priority was given to military personnel, while an
unknown number of civilians continued to remain in the captivity of the armed groups. There
were worrying reports of individuals being included in the exchange process by the Ukrainian
authorities who had not been involved in the conflict: some were already in detention facilities;
others were deprived of their liberty for the purpose of exchange.
10. There have also been allegations by victims and their relatives, as well as civil society
representatives of secret and illegal places of detention being operated by the armed groups, as
well as some being maintained by some volunteer battalions outside of judicial oversight. The
HRMMU continued to receive credible reports of persons deprived of their liberty being
subjected to torture and ill-treatment while being illegally held or detained by either the armed
groups or by Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and some volunteer battalions.
11. Procedural rights of detainees are of concern. Some volunteer battalions continued to
arrest people and detain them incommunicado, with many cases amounting to ‘enforced
disappearance’. For those who appear before the judiciary there have been many due process
concerns from the moment of their arrest, with systematic violations of the relevant national
legislation and fair trial guarantees, provided in international norms and standards.
12. The overall number of IDPs increased from 275,489 as of 18 September to 436,444 on
29 October according to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. Of these 417,410 people have
come from the conflict affected areas, including 62,306 and 29,727 people who are now in the
8 The territory under the control of the two ‘republics’ is approximately 16,400 square km, about one-third of the
territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the two major cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. It is estimated
that approximately 3.1 million people live on this territory. Some armed groups operating on the territory do not see
themselves as being under the control of either the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ or the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’,
such as the self-proclaimed ‘Stakhanov Republic’ in the Luhansk region.
6
Government controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions respectively; as well as
19,034 IDPs from Crimea. IDPs who were living in summer camps or sanatoria have had to
move to warmer shelters. In the absence of a countrywide assistance programme, relocation
efforts have depended on local resources and approaches. Given that they are mainly dependent
on unsustainable assistance from civil society, IDPs are faced with legal barriers to access
employment and social welfare benefits. Some families have returned home to conflict-affected
areas, encouraged by the ceasefire but also due to scarce resources in their host communities.
While some remain, others just visit.
13. The situation in Crimea, the status of which is prescribed by General Assembly
resolution 68/262, is marked by reports of increasing human rights violations and protection
challenges, especially for minority and indigenous groups and those in a position of
vulnerability, for example the growing number of enforced disappearances of Crimean Tatars.
14. The so-called authorities in Crimea continued to conduct raids actively searching for
weapons and religious literature, with a focus on literature considered to be of an extremist
nature. These overwhelmingly target Crimean Tatar properties.
15. The space for freedom of expression in Crimea has further shrunk due to the activities of
the so-called authorities, in particular with the disruption to the work of more media outlets,
including that of Avdet (the weekly Mejlis newspaper), and the Crimean Tatar ATR television
channel.
16. There has been no significant progress in the investigations of crimes committed during
the Maidan protests, except for limited progress in the investigation into mass killing of
protesters by officers of the former Berkut police unit, with three former officers having been
accused of killing 39 protesters on 20 February 2014. On 25 September, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MoIA) announced the completion of the pre-trial investigation into the 2 May violence
in the centre of Odesa. Twenty-four suspects have been named as either organising or
participating in the disorder; and nine people are on a wanted list. The investigation into the
violence and fire in, and around, the Trade Union building is reportedly in its final stage.
17. The parliamentary elections of 26 October resulted in political parties with pro-reform
and pro-European agendas (Petro Poroshenko Block, the People’s Front and the Self-Reliance
Party) gaining the majority of votes. These parties are in discussions over forming a coalition
Government. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ denied, as for
the May 2014 Presidential elections, all those living in these eastern territories under their
control their right to vote by preventing the elections from being held.9 In order to vote, residents
of Crimea had to cross to mainland Ukraine, which limited their participation in the election due
to the distance, cost and difficulties in crossing the administrative boundary line, as well as due
to fears of possible repercussions.
18. The armed conflict in the eastern regions continued to negatively affect the economic
situation in Ukraine and access to, and the quality provision of, basic services. GDP dropped by
4.6 per cent compared to the previous year. Inflation reached 102.9 per cent in the first nine
months of 2014. Unemployment increased to a level of 8.4% as of 1 October, 2014. Growing
numbers of IDPs and wounded decreased the accessibility to healthcare services not only in the
conflict areas, but also in adjacent regions. Overall in the country, one of the most pressing
concerns relates to the threat of the interrupted treatment as of 1 January 2015 of more than
59,448 HIV-positive and approximately 11,600 multi-drug resistant tuberculosis patients in all
9 It is estimated that between 50-60 per cent of registered voters in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were not able
to participate in the 26 October parliamentary elections, either because their residence was in areas controlled by the
armed groups, or because they were displaced or refugees, and so if they voted, it was not in their domiciled
location. From Crimea, only 2,800 residents voted, which is 0.2 per cent of the pre-March 2014 total of registered
voters in the peninsula.
7
regions, due to the non-completed tenders for the purchase of needed live-saving medication.
19. On a positive note, parliament adopted legislation that should introduce reform in the rule
of law area and for the protection of human rights. This includes reform of the Office of the
Prosecutor and the introduction of an anti-corruption package.
20. On 20 October, the law on IDPs was adopted by parliament and is to be signed by the
President. It should guarantee specific rights, provide access to low-cost housing loans, and
simplify the procedures for access to various economic and social rights. On 1 October, the
Cabinet of Ministers adopted two resolutions establishing regulations for the registration and
assistance of internally displaced persons. Parliament adopted a law providing special status to
certain territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including more powers to local
authorities as foreseen in the Minsk Protocol.
21. More laws were adopted or came into force, including the law on lustration, which seek
to ban from public office some State employees who had worked under the administration of the
former President Yanukovych, which could affect up to one million people.
22. On 15 October, President Poroshenko signed a Decree tasking the Government to
elaborate a national human rights strategy for Ukraine by 1 January 2015. At the end of October
the Government tasked the Ministry of Justice, with the support of the Ombudsman’s Office, to
elaborate a draft strategy by 1 December. The HRMMU is working with the UN Country Team
and the Council of Europe to support the Government and the Ombudsperson towards the
elaboration of the strategy.
23. In addition, on 25 September, President Poroshenko presented his ‘Strategy 2020’,
promising that Ukraine would apply for European Union membership by 2020. The strategy
foresees more than 60 reforms in that context, prioritising the fight against corruption,
decentralization and energy independence, as well as the modernisation of the judiciary and the
defence system.
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
Hostilities
24. Following the 5 September ceasefire agreement, fighting between the Ukrainian armed
forces and various armed groups continued almost on a daily basis due to breaches of the
ceasefire. The main flashpoints were: the Donetsk airport and the surrounding northwest suburbs
of the city; the Ukrainian-controlled Debaltseve salient (Donetsk region) which intersects the
main road and rail links between the Donetsk and Luhansk; the town of Shchastia (Luhansk
region); and the area around Smile (Luhansk region) along the south bank of the river Siverskyi
Donets, which the armed groups captured on 28 October after the Ukrainian military withdrew.
After the announcement of a so-called ‘silence regime’ (for example, “cease of armed hostilities
and shelling”) by the Ukrainian Government, on 5 and 7 October, and by the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ on 11 October, the intensity of hostilities somewhat decreased, especially by the time
of the parliamentary elections. According to the Ukrainian Government, since 5 September, its
armed forces were shelled and attacked more than 2,000 times by the armed groups.
Use of explosive weapons in populated areas - Indiscriminate shelling
25. Before, as well as after, the announcement of a ‘silence regime’, residential areas
continued to be indiscriminately shelled by various artillery and multiple launch rocket systems
(MLRS) throughout the whole reporting period. This led to military and civilian casualties
Targeting of military positions occurred in the immediate vicinity of residential areas, but areas
which were not located near military positions were also shelled, particularly in the city of
8
Donetsk.
26. The reported use of cluster munitions in fighting between Ukrainian forces and the armed
groups in more than 12 urban and rural locations in early October is of concern10. The use of
cluster munitions in populated areas violates the laws of war due to the indiscriminate nature of
the weapon and may amount to war crimes. It is imperative that such reports be investigated
promptly and thoroughly, as well as the reports of indiscriminate shelling of residential areas by
conventional weapons.
27. The Government of Ukraine continued to blame the armed groups for the use of heavy
weapons in populated areas, notably for the following incidents: the 29 September shelling of
the town of Popasna (Donetsk region), which killed four civilians; the 1 October rocketing of the
centre of Donetsk, which hit a bus and a bus stop, killing six civilians and wounding 25; the
rocketing of a school, on the same day, which killed two civilians and wounded five; and the 2
October shelling near the ICRC office in Donetsk, which killed an ICRC administrator. On 14
October, the village of Sartana (north-east of Mariupol in the Donetsk region) was reportedly
shelled with mortars and a MLRS ‘Grad’. According to the Mariupol city council, shells hit a
funeral procession, killing seven civilians and wounding 18. According to the Ukrainian army, a
Ukrainian checkpoint 1 km away from the village was the supposed target. On 10 October, the
Government of Ukraine accused armed groups of targeting an ambulance near the village of
Shyroke (Donetsk region) which killed two medical personnel and a patient11. The Government
of Ukraine attributed some attacks on the populated areas to armed groups that report neither to
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ nor to the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
28. The armed groups have declined any responsibility for the aforementioned incidents and
other instances where residential areas were shelled, blaming the Ukrainian armed forces. For
instance, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ claims that the Ukrainian army killed four civilians in
Kuibyshevskyi and Kyivskyi districts of Donetsk city by shelling.
29. Since the start of the ceasefire, between 6 September and 31 October, at least 718 deaths
were reported12. Among them, at least 84 women were killed by indiscriminate shelling in
Donetsk region13. The share of women among casualties reported by medical establishments of
Donetsk region remained at the same level as during the peak of hostilities in August
(approximately 15%). Between 9 September and 28 October, the number of children killed in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions increased by 28%, from 28 to 36 deaths, whilst the number of
wounded increased by 82%, from 56 to 102 cases.
A. Missing persons and the identification of their remains
30. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that between 5 September and 1
10 Ukraine: widespread use of cluster munitions, Human Rights Watch, 20 October 2014.
11 The ambulance was to deliver a wounded civilian from a territory controlled by the Ukrainian Government to a
hospital in Donetsk.
12 Some of the individuals may have been killed prior to the period under review with data recorded at a later stage.
Thus, between mid-April and 31 October, a total of at least 4,042 people have been killed and 9,350 wounded in the
conflict area of eastern Ukraine. This is a conservative estimate by the HRMMU and the World Health Organization
(WHO) based on the available official data and the actual numbers of fatalities may be much higher. These numbers
include casualties within the Ukrainian armed forces (at least 1,167 killed and 3,808 wounded) as reported by the
National Security and Defence Council, the Prosecutor-General, the Chief Military Prosecutor and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs; civilians and elements of the armed groups reported without distinction by civil medical
establishments and local administrations: at least 1,719 killed (including 22 children) and 2,797 wounded (including
64 children) in the Donetsk region, and at least 858 killed (including 14 children) and 2,745 wounded (including 38
children) in the Luhansk region; the 298 passengers of flight MH17.
13 The breakdown of statistics is not available for the Luhansk region as there have been no reports to the WHO by
medical establishments from the region.
9
October its Inter-agency Centre for Assistance in Release of Captives, Hostages and Search of
Missing Persons had received 2,600 requests for the search of military personnel and civilians
from individuals and families. On 3 October, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ head of the
‘commission on issues of prisoners of war and refugees’ reported that at least 1,300 people
(members of the armed groups and civilians) were recorded as missing.
31. There may be some duplications in the lists of missing persons maintained by the
Government of Ukraine and by the armed groups as relatives of some missing people may have
filed applications both to the Inter-agency Centre at the SBU and to the ‘commission on issues of
prisoners of war and refugees’. The Government of Ukraine, the armed groups, NGOs and local
communities have intensified their efforts to search and collect the unburied remains of those
killed in hostilities. Additionally, there have been exhumations of ad hoc graves so as to
establish the identities of those found and to hand over their bodies to relatives.
32. Between 3 September and 11 October, members of an NGO, the People’s Memory
Union, reported finding and exhuming the remains of over 150 Ukrainian servicemen and two
civilians in Donetsk region (the bodies were subsequently taken to the territory controlled by the
Government of Ukraine). Of 31 ad hoc graves exhumed by the Union in Donetsk region, 11
contained two or more bodies with the largest one containing 12 bodies.
On 1 October, the first deputy head of the Main Investigative Department of the MoIA stated
that more than 1,000 bodies had been found in the territory of Donbas, with the identity of more
than 200 determined. On 29 September, the ‘deputy prime minister’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ reported that about 400 unidentified bodies were awaiting forensic examination in
Donetsk and other towns of the region. In this regard, more systematic efforts have been initiated
by the Government of Ukraine and the armed groups to identify the bodies delivered to the
forensic offices, including through proper documentation and DNA sampling, before burial.
33. On 25 September, an adviser to the SBU Head stated that “on the territories freed from
terrorists, law enforcement officials continue to find newer and newer burials of those who were
tortured to death by the punitive organs of the so called ‘people’s republics’. Thanks to local
residents, we establish locations of these burials and carry out exhumation of bodies”.
34. On 26 September, the National Security and Defence Council announced that law
enforcement agencies “continued to investigate mass crimes against civilians perpetrated by the
armed groups in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions”. It claimed that three “mass graves” had
been found in the town of Sloviansk, and that bodies had been exhumed and were awaiting
official forensic examination. Twelve people had reportedly been identified. According to the
Council, these people perished in the first half of June, when the town was controlled by the
armed groups. On 2 October, a grave with three bodies (one female and two male) was found in
the town of Mykolaivka (Sloviansk district). According to the acting press secretary of Sloviansk
police department, “efforts to identify illegal graves on the territory of local cemeteries
continue”.
Allegations of mass graves
35. On 23 September, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ announced the discovery of graves in
the vicinity of the village Nyzhnia Krynka, 35 km north east of Donetsk. These graves were
initially described by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ as graves or ‘fraternal graves’, but later
referred to as ‘mass graves’14.
36. One of these graves (located near the entrance to the village) contained five bodies. Two
14 There is no internationally agreed definition of ‘mass grave’. The former United Nations Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary execution, Bacre Ndiaye, defined mass graves as locations where three or more
victims of extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions were buried, not having died in combat or armed
confrontations (1991). This definition was used by the UN tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia.
10
further graves discovered on the territory of the ‘Komunarska’ No 22’ mine contained two
bodies each. People whose bodies were found in the first grave were identified as members of
the armed groups, reportedly killed in action. Currently to the knowledge of the HRMMU, there
are no allegations that they were summarily executed. As regards to the four people from the two
graves near the mine, according to the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, there allegedly exists
forensic evidence that they could have faced a summary execution. On 15 October, an HRMMU
team visited the three grave locations, and interviewed relatives of two people whose bodies
were reportedly identified, having been exhumed from one of the two graves where those buried
could have faced a summary execution. Their testimonies indicate that these people may have
previously been detained by Ukrainian forces. This has been denied by the Ukrainian
Government. The alleged summary execution of four people found in the graves near
‘Komunarska No 22’ mine needs to be investigated, and all measures should be taken for the
preservation of evidence.
37. On 3 October, an adviser to the SBU Head presented a map marking the location of
“concentration camps, torture sites of punitive bodies of terrorist organisations, places of torture
and executions of local population”. According to him, the map is based on the testimonies of
witnesses received through an SBU hotline, and the locations were “verified by satellite photos,
intercepted telephone calls between members of the armed groups, SBU intelligence data, and
by testimonies of detained and arrested perpetrators”.
38. The map lists five places where ‘local residents were tortured, killed and buried’ by the
armed groups: ‘five bodies in a pit in Nyzhnia Krynka’ (it is not clear whether this is the same
grave as the one mentioned below; ‘mass graves’ in Sloviansk (described above); ‘numerous
hastily made graves close to fighters’ camp near the Izium-Sloviansk highway’; and ‘the burial
of 30 civilians in Telmanivskyi district’.
39. The requests of the HRMMU to the SBU to provide additional details concerning these
cases have so far not been met. The HRMMU was only informed that criminal cases had been
initiated and an investigation was being carried out.
B. Deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance15
By the armed groups
40. On 8 October, the head of the ‘commission on issues of prisoners of war and refugees’ of
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ publicly declared that “about 600 Ukrainians” were held by the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’. The number of people held by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ and
by other armed groups is not known.
41. According to the SBU, as of 30 September, there were at least 21 new ad hoc places of
detention set up since the conflict started in the areas controlled by the armed groups (in the
cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as Horlivka, Makiivka and Shakhtarsk). In addition, the
‘minister of internal affairs’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’16, claims that it controls all penal
colonies, pre-trial detention centres and temporary detention facilities which existed before the
hostilities started in its territory. However, there are also places of detention managed by the
‘military police’ subordinated to the ‘ministry of defence’, and some managed by the ‘ministry
of state security’. There are also numerous detention facilities, which are reportedly maintained
15 The arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law (Article 2 of the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance).
16 The information was given to HRMMU in a meeting on 12 October in Donetsk.
11
by various armed groups operating under the auspices of either the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
or the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, as well as ad hoc detention facilities that are operated by
armed groups not under the control of either of the aforementioned ‘republics’.
42. On 6 October, an unknown group of people reportedly abducted the warden of Penal
Colony № 82, in Selidove (Donetsk region), from his home in Donetsk. On 11 October, it
became known that, on 29 September, a civil activist and deputy of Novoazovsk district council
(Donetsk region) who provided assistance and accommodation to IDPs, was taken by armed
men. He had previously also been deprived of his liberty on 29-30 August by the armed groups,
and taken to a forest where he was forced to dig his own grave, but later released. His current
whereabouts are unknown.
43. On 8 October, the HRMMU was informed about the deprivation of liberty of the head of
the Independent Miners’ Trade Union of the Kalinin mine, and of his two sons. Allegedly, on 6
October, his private apartment was stormed by eight armed men who introduced themselves as
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ police. They reportedly claimed having received a complaint
that an “enemy of the republic” was living in the apartment, and that they had to detain him to
“clarify circumstances”. When contacted by his wife, neither the local ‘police department’ where
he and his sons were supposedly taken, nor the ‘state security committee’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ had any information about the individual.
By the Government of Ukraine
44. The Ukrainian law enforcement agencies continued to detain people in relation to the
hostilities in the east, particularly on the grounds of terrorism and separatism. The number of
those detained is constantly in flux due to detainees being released and new detentions, including
in the context of the exchanges as foreseen under the Minsk Agreement. The SBU declared that
as of 17 October, it was carrying out about 1,500 investigations cases with the aforementioned
allegations although the number of people in detention is unknown. On 7 October, an adviser to
the Minister of Internal Affairs reported that MoIA servicemen in the Luhansk region had put 99
persons under arrest or home arrest for suspicion of ‘crimes related to terrorism and separatism’.
45. There continue to be allegations that the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and
volunteer battalions maintain secret and illegal detention facilities outside of judicial oversight
with reports of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances. An illustrative example is the
case of a man who was suspected of organizing riots which led to the seizure of the Kharkiv
Regional State Administration in March. On 26 April, he was arrested and kept in a pre-trial
detention facility in Poltava. He was to be released on 12 September, upon a decision of the
Kyivskyi District Court but according to his lawyer, he was immediately detained by the SBU
without any order. The next day, the MoIA posted on his Facebook page that the man was
placed in an “SBU isolation facility”. On 17 September, his lawyer filed a complaint to the
investigative judge in the Kyivskyi District Court17. In an official answer to the court, the SBU
denied that the man was in its custody. However, the HRMMU was informed by a credible
source received on 18 September that the man was being held in a secret SBU facility in
Kharkiv. The HRMMU inquiries to the SBU and the prosecutor’s office have not produced any
results.
46. The HRMMU has also been following the case of a professor in Kharkiv – a well-known
opponent to Ukraine’s association with the European Union – who was arrested by the SBU
during the night of 29 to 30 June. After spending two and a half months in pre-trial detention in
Poltava, he was supposed to be released on bail, but his whereabouts have remained unknown
17 In accordance with article 206 of the Criminal Procedure Code: ‘Each investigating judge of the Court within the
territorial jurisdiction of which a person o is held in custody has the right to pass a resolution which obliges any
organ of State power or service person to ensure observance of the rights of such persons’.
12
since 18 September.
47. On 2 October, a deputy of the Luhansk Regional Council18 was reportedly taken by
soldiers of the 24th Voluntary Territorial Defence Battalion Aidar in Sievierodonetsk (Luhansk
region). The MoIA reported that two battalion members transferred the man to Kyiv reportedly
in accordance with an earlier agreement with the Luhansk regional department of the SBU. On 3
October, following a report of the deprivation of his liberty made by his wife to law enforcement
agencies, the Aidar soldiers were apprehended by the police in Kyiv. The office of the Military
Prosecutor initiated a criminal investigation under article 146 (Illegal deprivation of liberty) of
the Criminal Code. The whereabouts of this individual remain unknown.
Exchanges of persons deprived of their liberty
48. Between 5 September and 31 October, about 20 exchanges of persons deprived of their
liberty, as part of the Minsk Protocols, were reported by various Ukrainian officials and/or civil
initiatives, with 400 to 420 people (predominantly members of the Ukrainian military) released
by the armed groups. There are no official figures as to how many have been released by the
Government of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the SBU reports that from 5 September to 20 October,
1,509 people have been released by the armed groups. The SBU reported having secured the
release of 822 people, including 628 soldiers or police officers of various formations and 194
civilians, including five journalists. The number of people released by the Government of
Ukraine is not known.
49. Some credible reports question the voluntary nature of the exchanges, which has not
always been observed, with some detainees following their exchange reporting that they were
forced to participate in the process. For example, the HRMMU received information that on 25
September, some ‘pro-federalism’ detainees held in the pre-trial detention facility in Odesa were
forced by the SBU to participate in detainee exchanges. At that time they were notified that the
criminal charges against them were dropped. Although they were warned unofficially by the
SBU that if they did return to Odesa they would again face prosecution. On 16 October, the
HRMMU was informed by the relatives and lawyers of the detainees, that having been
exchanged, criminal proceedings had indeed been reopened against them.
C. Torture and ill-treatment
50. During the reporting period, the HRMMU continued to receive reports of torture and illtreatment
by the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and volunteer battalions and by the armed
groups, including beating, death threats, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and lack of
access to medical assistance. Some detainees who had been selected by the Government of
Ukraine to be released, under the Minsk agreements, reported spending several days in detention
without food and water.
By the armed groups
51. A serviceman of the 24th Voluntary Territorial Defence Battalion Aidar, released by
armed groups on 27 September, after being wounded and detained in an ambush on 26
September, reported being beaten and that his right arm marked with a tattoo of the Ukrainian
coat of arms and ‘Glory to Ukraine’, was cut off with an axe.
52. On 24 October, the HRMMU interviewed a man who had been detained for 48 days by
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ for ‘espionage’, and was released on 27 September. At a
detention facility managed by the ‘ministry of state security’ (a former plant of isolation
materials), the man reported seeing several dozens of people, most of whom were beaten. He
reported that there was no separation between men and women; that detainees were poorly fed;
18 He had recently been the ‘deputy minister of health’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
13
with limited or no access to water; humiliating sanitation arrangements; extremely limited access
to medical care; and no opportunity to communicate with relatives. A further HRMMU
interview with a Donetsk resident how had been detained on 6 August by an armed group
because of his ‘anti-governmental propaganda subversive activities’, revealed that he was taken
to the former Donetsk regional SBU building. There he was heavily beaten, for two days, with
wooden bats and rubber sticks, and threatened to be shot. His abductors allegedly started cutting
off his ear. He was reportedly kept in a very small cell with three Ukrainian servicemen, and
then transferred to another place where he was beaten again and then imprisoned in an iron box
already containing one man, with little capacity to even hold one person. They were left there for
a day under the sun, which caused him to lose consciousness. After the detainees began banging
the box, they were eventually let out for a short while, received pain killing injections and given
some water, but were later put back in the box again. They were subsequently taken to a garage,
handcuffed and beaten for 10 days.
By the Ukrainian forces
53. On 6 October, the HRMMU contacted the Head of the National Preventive Mechanism
(NPM) with regard to the allegations of ill-treatment of detainees by the Ukrainian authorities in
the pre-trial detention facility (SIZO) №18, located in Starobilsk (Luhansk region). Further to an
inspection, the NPM reported on 10 October that it could not confirm the allegations but it had
found that some detainees bore signs of physical abuse on the arrival to the SIZO, as recorded by
SIZO officials.
54. On 13 October, the HRMMU interviewed a resident of Debaltseve (Donetsk region) who
claimed that when with the armed groups, he was involved in building and guarding checkpoints
and roadblocks. On 16 September, he was allegedly detained at home by Ukrainian servicemen
of the 25th Territorial Defence Battalion ‘Kyivska Rus’ and was reportedly kicked repeatedly. He
was then taken to the Debaltseve department of the MoIA, where he was allegedly interrogated
and beaten for three days, and urged to tell where weapons, ammunition and supporters of the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ were located. He was suffocated with a plastic bag; he was hanged
from an opened door and pulled by a rope tied to his hands on his back; he was also beaten on
the head with a rubber hammer. He was threatened to be taken back to the Kyivska Rus battalion
to be shot dead. After two weeks, he was transferred to the Izium department of MoIA, where he
was again beaten on his back with wooden sticks for a couple of hours. At the end of September,
he was the subject of a detainee exchange.
55. On 14 October, the HRMMU interviewed a resident of Krasnoarmiisk (Donetsk region)
who claimed that he never participated in armed hostilities and only manned an unarmed anti-
Maidan checkpoint. On 5 August, some military servicemen pulled him out of his car and took
him to a location in Krasnoarmiisk, where he was y kept in a basement. He was accused of
operating checkpoints with weapons, and of ‘engagement in terrorism’. He was beaten, and
death threats towards his family were made. The servicemen reportedly wore balaclavas,
camouflage, with Ukrainian flags and the inscription Donbas on their chevrons. He was later
transferred to an official detention facility after his detention was sanctioned by a court. On 17
September, he was put in a cell where 15-25 persons were detained. They were allegedly ordered
to crawl to another cell, while on each side of the corridor guards and operatives were standing
and beating them with clubs. On 28 September, the detainee was the subject of a detainee
exchange.
14
III. FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY, RELIGION OR
BELIEF
A. Freedom of expression
56. In the period covered in this report, violations of freedom of expression continued. The
number of reported incidents involving media workers in conflict affected area has decreased
compared to previous months; nevertheless the working conditions of media professionals in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain dire due to security concerns. Instances of intimidation of
journalists became more frequent in other regions of Ukraine during the Parliamentary elections
campaign.
Safety of journalists and media workers in the conflict affected area
57. As of 31 October, the HRMMU was aware of at least six more journalists and media
workers that remain held by armed groups of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’: a local journalist
and a public relations specialist of the Stakhanov town council, captured on 31 July; a journalist
of the Kharkiv-based magazine Ukrainian Space and his aide, captured at a check point on 15
August; an editor-in-chief of internet-based outlet Politics 2.0, captured on 28 July, in Luhansk
region; and a journalist of a pro-Russian newspaper Donetskii Kriazh who went missing on 1
August and was last seen in the office of the Commandant of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ in
Horlivka.
58. During the period covered by this report, five journalists who had been held by armed
groups were released. On 25 September, a blogger of Ukrainian Truth was released after 48 days
of being held by an armed group of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. On 30 September, a
freelance journalist of the Vesti newspaper and the Reporter magazine, together with a free-lance
photojournalist, who had been held by the armed groups since 22 September, were released in
Sverdlovsk, Luhansk region. On 6 October, a journalist of Espreso TV was released after 38
days of detention by an armed group in Makiivka, Donetsk region. He was reportedly ill-treated
and forced to give a false testimony on camera about the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He was later
forced to make video reports as a pre-condition for his release, under the supervision of members
of the Don Cossack unit that was holding him. On 11 October, a freelance journalist from the
Lviv-based agency ZIK had been released after he had been held by armed groups in Luhansk
region since 23 July, along with a group of priests with whom he was travelling to report on their
missionary work in the conflict area. All were held in the basement of the Luhansk State
Administration for more than two months and severely beaten. On 27 October, a local civic
activist and blogger captured on 22 September by armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’, was released during a detainee exchange.
59. There have been cases of detention of journalists by Ukrainian forces. On 12 October, the
HRMMU interviewed a Russian photographer of the New York Times, who was reportedly
beaten up by servicemen of the Ukrainian army or of the National Guard on 4 October. He and a
journalist for Deutsche Presse-Agentur were detained at a Ukrainian checkpoint in Mariynka
(Donetsk Region) for taking a picture of a Ukrainian tank. Both journalists were ordered to get
out of the car and forced to lie on the ground for half an hour, while their documents were
checked. Both were beaten. They were then escorted to a camp, where their documents were
checked again. After the arrival of SBU officials, the New York Times journalist was allowed to
pass through the checkpoint, but was asked to sign a paper that he had no complaints. The other
journalist did not have proper accreditation and was escorted by the SBU to a hotel. He
reportedly managed to reach Donetsk on 6 October.
60. On 26 September, during a meeting with the OSCE Representative on freedom of the
media in Vienna, representatives of media organisations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation
15
released a joint statement, condemning incidents of killing, beating and detention of journalists
in the conflict-affected areas. They also agreed to ‘continue … cooperation and to undertake the
necessary efforts regarding matters such as the safety of journalists, the development of
professional media and de-escalation of the conflict in Ukraine’. Such efforts are welcome as
disinformation presented in the media has contributed to deepen tensions within society
61. In addition to international human rights law, in the context of armed conflict also
international humanitarian law provides protection for journalists. In armed conflict, journalists
are entitled to all the protections afforded to all other civilians. Journalists will lose this
protection if they directly participate in hostilities for as long as they take direct part. It is
therefore prohibited to target journalists who carry out their lawful professional activities.
Attacks, harassment and intimidation of journalists
62. During the Parliamentary election campaign, some journalists, mainly those dealing with
authorities and political issues, were attacked, harassed and threatened in some parts of the
country. Some incidents seemed to be an attempt to restrict freedom of expression, particularly
regarding corruption issues or what is perceived as a pro-Russian stance – with arbitrary judicial
and administrative measures targeting individual journalists, editors and heads of media
companies. Others were individual acts of violence against journalists and media workers.
63. On 23 September, a Kyiv-based journalist for the programme Our Money and her family
were threatened by a man who demanded the non-airing of a video report about one of the
deputies of the Office of the General Prosecutor, suspected of embezzlement. The police have
opened an investigation into the incident.
64. On 1 October, the general director of the Odesa-based TV Channel Seven reported being
threatened by two unknown young men demanding a change to the editorial policy. The general
director noted that over the last couple of months the channel had been preparing and
broadcasting programmes aimed at combatting corruption, extortion, and bribery. It was also the
only local channel that refused to broadcast any political advertisements, but which provided
free-of-charge space for interviews and debates involving authorities at all levels.
65. On 21 October, the editor of the Odesa website ‘INFO-centre’ – and member of the
Journalists Union of Ukraine – was arrested by the SBU on the street. Immediately after, his
house was searched, and he was brought to the SBU on the grounds that files related to the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ were found in his home. His
lawyer was informed about the arrest the following day. On 23 October, he was placed in
custody for two months as a measure of restraint, accused of complicity with terrorist
organizations and concealment of a crime, based on electronic files related to his journalist
activities. On 31 October, the court prolonged the journalist’s custody until 23 December.
66. On 24 October, the MoIA Main Investigation Department searched the offices of three
media companies in the context of an investigation into “funding actions aimed at overthrowing
the constitutional order or seizing State power). The MoIA stated that it had established that the
companies had violated the decision of the District Administrative Court, which banned
broadcasting of Russian TV channels in Ukraine, and that they had “used the funds received
from the sale of advertising time on the specified channels to fund terrorist groups in Ukraine”.
Based on a court decision, the accounts of the companies were blocked, whilst the financial
documents and some technical equipment were seized.
67. On 23 September, unknown persons in camouflage attacked the editor of the magazine
Political Critique and severely beat him in the centre of Kyiv, accusing him of separatism.
68. On 6 October, five men wearing uniforms of the Territorial Defence Battalion Donbas
came to the office of the Internet and TV provider LLC Matrix in Krasnoarmiisk. They
reportedly instructed everybody to kneel, whilst one of them struck the senior office manager
16
with a rifle, accusing him of collaboration with pro-Russian armed groups by broadcasting
Russian TV channels. All office equipment and documentation was seized and taken away.
According to the Press Office of the Krasnoarmiisk City Police Department, an investigation
was opened into the incident. On 8 October, the deputy commander of the Donbas Battalion
stated that all equipment and documentation had been returned, and that the serviceman who had
acted aggressively was “punished”.
69. On Parliamentary Election Day, 26 October, the NGO Institute of Mass Information
registered nine instances of obstruction of journalists’ professional activity, mainly in southern
regions of Ukraine. They included physical threats and intimidation of journalists and their
crews, as well as preventing their access to, and filming of, polling stations.
B. Freedom of peaceful assembly
70. On 26 September, the Kharkiv State Administration and a local court banned a ‘peace
march’ planned by the Communist party on the following day, arguing that this measure sought
to ‘ensure safety ‘due to notifications about alleged provocations of conflict’. Despite this ban,
the rally took place and activists were detained.
71. On 28 September, a large crowd of ‘pro-unity’ protestors was able to gather in Freedom
Square in Kharkiv and tore down the statue of Lenin. Several clashes occurred on 29 September
between rival groups of activists but the police did not appear at the scene.
72. As a general rule, neither a perceived or potential risk of public disorder, nor the
presence of a hostile audience should justify the banning of peaceful assembly.19 It is preferable
to detain and prosecute people later for any outbreak of violence, rather than impose prior
restraints on an assembly based upon the possibility of violence. At the end of September, in a
new development, protests emerged in parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions controlled by the
armed groups. Citizens of Stahanov, Antratsyt, and Rovenky (Luhansk region) on 14 September,
22 September, and 27 September respectively, demanded that the Government of Ukraine
address the issue of pensions as armed groups were not able to provide such payments. On 12
October, in Donetsk, activists protested against the upcoming elections of self-proclaimed ‘top
officials’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
73. The armed groups responded to some of these movements with acts of intimidation. For
example, on 5 October, in Sverdlovsk (Luhansk region) during a protest to demand payments of
salaries and other social payment by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, armed supporters of the
‘republic’ tried to prevent the gathering by shooting at people, injuring three citizens. Similarly,
on 22 October in Brianka (Luhansk region), armed supporters of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
prevented pensioners who had not received pensions for four months from rallying by shooting
in the air.
74. The protest in Kyiv on 13 October of uniformed National Guard conscripts demanding
their demobilisation (they had been mobilised beyond their terms of initial conscription or had
later been remobilised). In case this demand could not be met, they asked to be paid their due
cash benefits and to be provided with winter clothing. The demands of the conscripts were
transmitted to the President. The Office of the General Prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings
against the organisers of the protest for absence without leave. Servicemen in 10 other locations
supported the protest.
19 See the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Makhmudov v. Russia. See also Report of the Special
Report of the Special Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association, Maina Kiai, A/HRC/20/27, para.25.
17
C. Freedom of religion or belief
75. There have been increasing reports of violations of freedom of religion or belief in the
areas controlled by the armed groups. All faith traditions, except for the Orthodox Church of the
Moscow Patriarchate, appear to be targeted by the armed groups through the persecution and
detention of clergy members and believers, as well as the seizure of church property.
76. Thus, on 27 September, armed men abducted a Protestant pastor of the Seventh-day
Adventist church in Horlivka, Donetsk region, reportedly stating that “this is Orthodox land and
there is no place for various sects”. The pastor was released on 16 October.
77. On 23 September, the Evangelical Christian Baptist Church announced on its website
that from the beginning of April until September, seven Baptist church buildings had been seized
by the armed supporters of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
78. On 4 October, armed Don Cossacks seized the Holy Trinity Cathedral (Orthodox Church
of Kyiv Patriarchate) in Luhansk and gave the clergy one hour to “get out”, declaring that the
Church would be used as their dormitory.
79. On 18 September, the Metropolitan of Luhansk and Alchevsk, Mytrofan, issued an
official statement claiming that the local Orthodox clergy had nothing to do with the forcible
seizure of religious buildings, which was exclusively the initiative of the armed groups. He
stated that diocese bishops disapproved of such actions and would not accept any buildings
belonging to Baptists or any other confessions that had been seized by the armed groups and
offered to his denomination for use.
IV. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
80. The hostilities continue to severely affect the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights. In the first nine months of 2014 prices increased by 16.2 per cent, utility rates by 24.3 per
cent on average, whilst the average salary increased by 4.9 per cent20. The situation of the
approximately 5.221 million people living in the conflict and post conflict affected areas is
particularly difficult due to the considerable breakdown and disruption of the economic
infrastructure and social services. The availability of healthcare in those areas is increasingly
limited, with particularly serious consequences for the most vulnerable people.
A. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
81. The hostilities have exposed some more systemic problems in the healthcare system
affecting patients across the country. One of the most pressing concerns relates to the threat of
interrupted treatment of HIV-positive and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis patients in all regions
as of 1 January 2015, due to the non-completed tenders for the purchase of the live-saving
medication22. As of 31 October, only 25 per cent of the required amount of medication had been
purchased. Now even if the tenders are finalised shortly, the medications may be delivered only
in April 2015. The National Council on Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS prevention has already
requested the Global Fund to provide treatment for the first three months of 2015; however civil
society service providers are greatly concerned that the life-saving medication will not be
delivered in time. The absence of treatment will directly affect 59,448 HIV-positive patients and
20 According to the data of the State Statistics service released on 31 October.
21 As of 31 October according to the Situation Report No.18, of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs.
22 This year the Ministry of Health of Ukraine has not completed tenders for procuring life-saving medications for
more than five months. For this, the Minister has been suspended from his position in September.
18
approximately 11,600 multidrug resistant tuberculosis patients. Ukraine is a country with high
HIV as well as multi-drug resistant tuberculosis burden23. Thus discontinuation of treatment is
life-threatening for more than 70,000 patients and may lead to the uncontrolled spread of
epidemics. Provision of essential medicines is one of the core obligations of the State to ensure
the satisfaction of the minimum essential level of the right to health24. While some disruption
may be unavoidable, the conflict may not be used to justify long delays or large scale disruption
in the provision of essential drugs.
Access to healthcare in the conflict affected area
82. Access to healthcare services in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, especially in areas
controlled by armed groups, remained limited. At least 45 hospitals out of 601 medical
establishments in Donetsk and Luhansk regions are destroyed or damaged and many other are
partially functioning or not operational. Access to specialized care, including for noncommunicable
diseases, diabetes, cancer, palliative care, maternal and new-born care and safe
blood transfusion, is significantly limited due to a lack of staff and medications. Specialized care
is concentrated in Luhansk and Donetsk cities, which are now controlled by armed groups, and
hence not at present accessible for residents in the two regions, particularly those in towns
controlled by Ukrainian Government. Shifting the provision of such care to other hospitals is
complicated and resources-consuming. Whilst local antiretroviral therapy-sites25 and the regional
tuberculosis (TB) dispensary in Luhansk are non-operational, the Donetsk and Luhansk regional
AIDS centres are providing limited services. However, the provision of tests for timely diagnosis
of HIV is critical, for those who are entitled to this service free of charge: pregnant women,
blood donors, individuals with positive results of first tests, and children under 18 months born
from HIV positive mothers. In addition, residents of the conflict-affected areas report on the lack
of medications available for purchase in pharmacies, especially for heart diseases and high blood
pressure, sedatives, and antiviral treatment.
83. Although many medical professionals have left the conflict affected area, most hospitals
still seem staffed by some doctors and nurses. In the areas controlled by armed groups, a
shortage of paramedics26 is reported. This is likely to have an impact on the quality of services
provided as such personnel play an important role in the post-surgery recovery of patients. As
reported by local doctors to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and WHO, one of the main
concerns in the conflict affected area is the increasing lack of medical supplies including
anaesthetic, vaccination, insulin, consumables, solutions, surgical instruments and equipment,
TB, HIV and cancer drugs, and reagents for haemodialysis.
84. The growing numbers of IDPs, wounded and disabled, are also putting additional
pressure on hospitals across Ukraine, leading to limited access and low quality of healthcare,
including rehabilitation. On 29 October, the HRMMU has received reports that, in several
instances, ambulances refused to drive to collective accommodation for IDPs due to the lack of
fuel. Also, many have access to doctors, some cannot obtain specialized care, and many are
unable to buy the medicines prescribed27. There are also constraints in accessing dental care,
which is mainly provided by private dental clinics and are paid out-of-pocket. This has a
particularly negative effect on groups in a position of vulnerability, such as people living in
poverty, older persons, and some IDPs.
23 WHO Tuberculosis profile, Ukraine (http://www.who.int/gho/countries/ukr/country_profiles/en/).
24 CESCR General Comment on the right to health, paragraph 43.
25 Located in Krasnyi Liman, Shakhtarsk, Snizhne in Donetsk region.
26 According to the regular surveys of WHO in the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ there are only 30 cent of nonprofessional
medical staff available.
27 Due to the absence of the system of medical insurance and limited financing of hospitals, most medications, even
prescribed, are not available free of charge.
19
B. Right to an adequate standard of living (including food, clothing, housing, water
and sanitation)
85. As of 31 October, 36 settlements in Donetsk region remained without electricity as a
result of the continued fighting. Electricity was only partially available in Mariinka, Avdiivka,
Donetsk and Horlivka. Information about the situation in Luhansk region was not available. In
the last days of October, there were reports of more frequent shelling of electric power stations
in Schastia, Luhansk and Donetsk cities, which depending on the circumstances may constitute a
violation of International Humanitarian Law.
86. Access to water in Donetsk and Luhansk regions has been improving, although water
utility companies continued to face difficulties in inspecting and repairing pipelines due to
insecurity in many places. The majority of the regions still had only a partial flow of water and,
in some areas people were digging shallow wells to cope with the shortage. As of 31 October, 29
settlements in the Donetsk region had limited access to water supply.
87. Humanitarian aid delivery in September slightly improved in the conflict-affected area.
Due to an ongoing shortage of cash, residents in the areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
under the control of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ have
continuing fears of being unable to buy the limited food and commodities that are available.
Residents of five towns (Kirovske, Pervomaisk, Avdiivka, Stanytsia Luhanska and Stakhanov)
reported a shortage of food, especially cereals, dairy, meat and fish products. Hygiene items
were reported to be lacking in Novotoshkivske, Stanytsia Luhanska, Pervomaisk, Avdiivka and
Yunokomunarivsk.
C. Right to property
88. The HRMMU continued to receive reports about illegal seizure of property in the areas
controlled by armed groups. On 30 September, the spokesman of the Information Centre stated
that the armed groups of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ organised the sale of about 100 cars stolen
from local residents or dealerships and had been forcing local residents of Lutugino to sell their
homes for as little as USD 100 to USD 1,000.
89. On 28 October, the HRMMU learned that private entrepreneurs and those trading on
local food markets had to ‘urgently’ re-register with the so-called ‘ministry of revenues and
duties’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and pay taxes in order to further carry out their
activities. Earlier in October, it was reported that entrepreneurs in Rovenky and Antratsyt towns
(Luhansk region), were required respectively, to either pay a specific sum, or pay a 20 % tax on
profits to support the armed groups. On 28 October, the self-proclaimed ‘Ataman of Antratsyt
District of the Great Don Cossacks Army Major-General’ stated that entrepreneurs should now
maintain at their own expense the Cossack units, which reportedly took control of the Krasnyi
Luch (Luhansk region). Due to the absence of law-enforcement in the areas controlled by the
armed groups, the residents are left without any real means to protect their rights. All of these
demands amount to extortion.
D. Right to work and favourable working conditions
90. Unemployment is growing in Ukraine. As of 27 October, there were 1.7 million
20
unemployed28 (8.4 per cent of economically active population) including 1,147,425 who were
officially registered as such. The largest number of unemployed was registered in the Donetsk
region29 (87,097 persons) and in the regions with the highest influx of IDPs, namely
Dnipropetrovsk (81,875 persons), Kharkiv (70,752), Lviv (62,547) and Zaporizhzhia (62,179).
Women accounted for 57.6 per cent of registered unemployed.
91. As of 29 October, wage arrears amounted to UAH 1.9 billion (approximately USD 148
million)30 across Ukraine. The highest rates of unpaid salaries were registered in Donetsk,
Luhansk, Kyiv and Kharkiv regions. In some regions, particularly in the south, the illegal
practice of sending teachers on unpaid leave was identified by respective authorities. For
example, in Kherson region, the teachers were proposed to go on unpaid leave for 5 or 10
working days due to the lack of funding for wages. The non-payment of salaries is an acute issue
in those areas controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’,
especially for teachers and doctors. Until August, the Government of Ukraine attempted to
transfer money to those areas. In some medical establishments, workers received payments for
August and September, while in others, for example in Shakhtarsk and Torez, employees have
not received their salaries since July. In September, the ‘leadership’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ made attempts to pay salaries, however there is no specific data as to how many people
received the payments.
92. The HRMMU continued to receive worrying reports about abuses of the right to work
and favourable working conditions in the east. The medical and educational institutions
continued to be subordinated to the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
in areas under their control, leading to numerous violations. Medical employees and teachers in
several towns controlled by armed groups were dismissed without being duly informed about the
reasons: the employees of the Luhansk City Hospital № 9 were forced to write letters of
resignation and sign papers pledging their loyalty to the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ should they
wish to continue working at the hospital.
93. The HRMMU was informed that in September and October, armed groups forced
medical personnel of medical institutions to terminate their labour contracts and to sign new
ones with ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. Those unwilling to do
so were threatened with dismissal.
Reprisals
94. On 17 October, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs stated that 17,000 police officers
had been dismissed in Luhansk and Donetsk regions for ‘failure to comply with the oath,
obeying the enemy, or merely for being supported [sic i.e. paid] while waiting to see what would
happen’. A number of dismissed officers interviewed by the HRMMU consider this decision to
be a punishment for not abandoning their posts and continuing to fulfil their law enforcement
duties in the absence of direction from the central authorities, when they found themselves in
areas controlled by the armed groups.
E. Right to social security
95. Due to the suspended work of the State Treasury and the breakdown of banking system
in the areas controlled by armed groups, the delivery of social benefits remained limited in the
settlements controlled by armed groups. The payment arrears to citizens in these areas amounted
to UAH 6.6 billion (approx. USD 508 million)31. As of 31 October, most residents had not
28 According to the data released by the State Statistics Service on 27 and 31 October.
29 In the 6th OHCHR report, the HRMMU noted that enterprises and business had to close due to security situation.
30 According to the data of the State Statistics Service, released on 29 October.
31 According to the Ministry of Social Policy, as of 24 October.
21
received benefits for more than three months, which is particularly difficult for older persons and
persons with disabilities.
96. The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine has developed simplified procedures to enable
residents of Donetsk and Luhansk regions under the control of armed groups to access their
benefits, but according to the regulations, social benefits can only be received by in the areas
under control of the Government. The HRMMU learned that some social workers in the
territories controlled by armed groups have organized schemes, unlawfully charging retirees
money (UAH 300 per person) for processing their applications to receive pensions from Ukraine
on a bank card, and to organize trips for retirees to the Government-controlled towns to submit
such applications in person.
97. Reportedly, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ has commenced disbursing social benefits in
the territory it controls. But people have to submit application forms to claim their benefits and
must present a passport, and a photo. Such social benefits have been disbursed reportedly
varying between UAH 900 and 1800 (approximately USD 69 and 138). But they have not been
systematic and have not reached all those who are entitled to social benefits.
F. Right to education
98. The Administration of big cities continues facing difficulties to accommodate children in
pre-school facilities; for example, in Kyiv 8,000 children were left without a place in
kindergarten, in Odesa 10,000 are waiting for placement32. The Ministry of Education and
Science reported that no problems occurred with accommodation of children in the schools, even
in the areas with the highest influx of IDPs. However funding to cover the salaries of additional
staff was lacking dramatically.
99. Across Ukraine, access to education facilities in remote areas remained complicated, as
many school buses remained mobilized for the military operation in the east33. This especially
affects children in rural areas. In the territories controlled by the armed groups, schooling is
limited, mainly due to the destruction of buildings and insecurity. On 10 October, the ‘minister
of education’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ stated that on the territory controlled by the
‘republic’, 85 educational buildings, 26 kindergartens and 51 schools had been damaged or
destroyed. In Donetsk city, 48 out of 150 secondary schools and 54 out of 185 kindergartens
were reportedly damaged. As of 13 October, in Luhansk city, 5 out of 60 schools had been
destroyed completely and 43 had been damaged. Out of 63 kindergartens, 38 had been damaged.
The overall number of children, who still had no access to secondary education in both regions,
remained unknown34.
100. In these areas, the curricula have been altered to exclude the teaching of Ukrainian
language and history, which makes it problematic to obtain State school diplomas. This also
violates the cultural rights of Ukrainian speaking children.
G. Groups facing discrimination
Roma
101. Roma NGOs continued to report about difficulties faced by members of their community
face seeking to access social services or employment. The main underlying reason seems to be a
32 Lack of places in the kindergartens will also have a negative impact on women’s economic situation and their
right to work.
33 In paragraph 130 of the 6th OHCHR report, the HRMMU stated about such problems in Kherson, Mykolaiv,
Volyn and Rivne regions.
34 As of 16 September, the number of children who were not able to resume their studies on 1 September was
260,000 children; primarily in the territories controlled by armed groups.
22
lack of education and absence of identity documents. It is particularly the case for Roma IDPs.
Insufficient outreach activities, lack of coordination among volunteer initiatives, limited
awareness among the Roma concerning available assistance and lack of documents, exacerbates
their vulnerability.
People living with HIV/AIDS
102. On 14 October, UNAIDS and UNODC raised concerns about reckless disclosure of the
status of people with HIV/AIDS in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as medical records have often
become available to non-medical staff while hospitals are being seized by armed groups.
103. On 10 October, the NGO All-Ukrainian Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS
confirmed to the HRMMU that most people living with HIV and former drug users had left the
region due to fear of persecution, as well as the lack of available services.
Persons deprived of their liberty
104. The HRMMU regularly receives reports from civil society organisations regarding the
situation of people deprived of their liberty in areas controlled by armed groups. As of 31
October, approximately 15,000 people reportedly remained in detention facilities in the conflict
affected area. Most of them are reportedly at the point of starvation, as humanitarian aid rarely
reaches them due to the insecurity.
LGBTI
105. The prevalence of negative stereotypes vis-à-vis LGBTI remains quite high. For
example, on 22 September, an NGO from Lviv informed the HRMMU that it had recently
exposed a social network that requested users to share information about LGBTI members, sex
workers and drug dealers in the town and to vote as to whether such people should be attacked
and beaten. The NGO also reported a case of police officers collecting information about LGBTI
persons and extorting UAH 3,000 (approx. USD 230) from each, threatening to otherwise reveal
their sexual orientation to their family and friends. The LGBTI community is often reluctant to
report threats and violations of their rights.
106. The HRMMU is particularly concerned about the safety of the LGBTI community in the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ a law35 was passed, which
criminalizes homosexuality with a prison term of two to five years.
Trafficking in persons
107. The armed hostilities, the deterioration of the economic situation, including growing
unemployment, significant wage arrears, and the large numbers of IDPs create an environment
that is propitious to increased trafficking in human beings. The International Organization for
Migration (IOM) in Ukraine reported about the identification of 642 victims of trafficking (282
women and 360 men) in January-September 2014 throughout Ukraine, which is fewer than the
number reported by IOM in the respective period of last year. This, however, may indicate gaps
in the identification mechanism of victims, as the responsible ministries, as well as key NGOs,
have concentrated their efforts on addressing other immediate and acute issues arising from the
conflict.
108. The HRMMU welcomes the steps undertaken by the Government of Ukraine to prevent
trafficking in human beings from the conflict affected area. For example, the creation of a
working group under the Ministry of Social Policy to draft a new national action plan aimed to
protect civilians, including against the risks of trafficking; as well as the strengthened control
over the movement of children out of the country, given the numerous attempts of illegal
movement of orphans and children deprived of parental care who have not reached the age of 16
35 ‘Law on the protection of Christian values of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ from the negative influence of the
customs of hostile states such as Ukraine, the European Union, Canada and the USA’.
23
abroad, especially to the territory of the Russian Federation.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
109. According to legislation36, voters can directly vote both for one national deputy under the
majority system and for a party list of candidates under the proportional system. However,
voting under the majority system requires a permanent residence in Ukraine. Some IDPs from
Crimea and those who left their electoral districts due to the hostilities in the eastern regions, and
conscripts or soldiers and volunteers located out of their home areas, faced difficulties in
exercising their right to vote, particularly under the majority system. The Central Electoral
Commission (CEC) facilitated a special procedure to allow IDPs to vote at least for the party
lists under the proportional system, IDPs from Donetsk and Luhansk regions37 and from
Crimea38 could apply to any office of the State Register of Voters to change their place of voting
with their valid internal passports.
110. The Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea informed Crimean residents wishing to vote at the parliamentary elections that they
needed to register at a local polling station no later than 20 October. Crimean residents were to
produce an internal passport showing that they came from Crimea. According to the CEC 2,864
IDPs from Crimea, 21,704 IDPs from Donetsk region and 11,119 IDPs from Luhansk region
changed their voting places before the parliamentary elections. Approximately 80 per cent of
servicemen were able to vote on Election Day according to the National Security and Defence
Council (NCSD).
111. On 25 September, the CEC closed the deadline for applications of candidates wishing to
stand in the parliamentary elections. Twenty-nine political parties contested 225 seats in
proportional voting for party lists and 3,321 candidates contested 198 out of the 225 remaining
seats, under the majority electoral system. Fifteen seats from the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions controlled by the armed groups and the 12 seats for Crimea remain vacant according to
the law39. It was possible to hold elections in 12 out of 21 single-mandate electoral districts in
Donetsk region and in 5 out of 11 single-mandate electoral districts in Luhansk region. On 10
October, the Chairman of parliament announced the possibility of holding by-elections within
those single-mandate electoral districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions under the control of
armed groups as well as in Crimea. As the election campaign became more active, the public
lustration campaign (see Chapter on Administration of Justice) against allegedly corrupt officials
became more aggressive, with some actions targeting some parliamentary candidates. The
HRMMU received at least 20 reports of attacks (not lustration-related) against candidates or
parliamentary deputies, which resulted in injuries. Violence was also reported against political
party campaign workers, their relatives, and electoral workers and monitors, as well as
destruction of or damage to party offices, and of promotional material in public places.
112. On 23 October, a law aimed at strengthening penalties for violations of electoral rights,
36 Law as of 17 November 2011 ‘On elections of national deputies in Ukraine’.
37 Resolution as of 7 October No. 1529 ‘On questions of temporary change of voting place by voters whose address
belongs to the territory of Donetsk or Luhansk regions for the period of holding of early parliamentary elections in
Ukraine on 26 October 2014’.
38 On 29 April, the CEC adopted Resolution No. 415 that allows changing an address of voting without changing
the place of registration for residents of the Crimea and the city of Sevastopol where SRVs are not functioning.
39 The Law of 15 April 2014 No. 1207-VII On Ensuring Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and Legal Regime on the
Temporary Occupied Territory of Ukraine’.
24
including for bribery of voters entered into force40. On 30 October, the MoIA stated that 300
criminal cases had been registered for breaching the electoral process, including 71 (until 21
October) for bribery of voters41.
On Election Day incidents were few and isolated. According to the MoIA, there were 19 cases of
temporary disruption of voting with bomb and mine threats at polling stations, including seven
incidents in the Mykolaiv Region; voting was resumed after the police conducted security
checks. Incidents reported on Election Day included cases of: bribery of votes42; attacks in
Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk region) or threats to members of the election commissions in
Rubizhne and Sieverodonetsk (Luhansk region); abduction of a member of an election
commission in Volnovakha (Donetsk region); provocation of violence at polling stations; and
interference in the vote counting. The OSCE/ODIHR led International Election Observation
Mission, in its preliminary findings, stated that “in most of the country Election Day proceeded
calmly, with few disturbances. Voting and counting were transparent and assessed positively
overall.”
VI. SITUATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
113. Despite the proclaimed ceasefire an average of more than 2,000 new IDPs registered
each day during the reporting period as people continued to flee the hostilities. The overall
number of IDPs increased thus from 275,489 as of 18 September to 436,444 on 29 October,
according to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. This includes 417,410 people coming
from the east, and 19,034 IDPs from Crimea.
114. According to UNHCR, as of 24 October, the overall number of people who had fled the
conflict affected areas to other states since April reached 454,339 people 387,355 of them went
to the Russian Federation.
Returnees
115. On 24 October, the OSCE SMM has observed that at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo
and Donetsk [sic] (in the Rostov Region of the Russian Federation) there has been a clear
reverse flow of people back to the eastern regions of Ukraine for the last two months since the
ceasefire agreement.
116. According to the Minister of Social Policy, as of 26 October, approximately 135,000
people had returned to their homes on territories back under the control of the Government of
Ukraine.
117. IDPs have been also returning to the territories controlled by the armed groups. Some go
back temporarily to visit relatives, inspect property or take items. Others return because they
have been unable to find a job or shelter, or for fear that their property will be confiscated by
either the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ or ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
Accommodation
118. With the onset of autumn, IDPs who were living in summer camps or sanatoria have had
to move to warmer shelter. According to statistics from the Government of Ukraine, fewer than
1,500 IDPs remained in non-winterized shelters as of the middle of October; but this number
40 The law ‘on amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine regarding strengthening of penalties for violations of
electoral rights of citizens’.
41 The largest numbers of such cases was reported in Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Zhytomyr, Donetsk
regions and Kyiv city.
42 The cases of bribery or attempted bribery of voters mostly occurred in Kyiv city and region, Kharkiv and Odesa
regions.
25
only includes IDPs who have registered and not others who may be living in various forms of
private shelters like those run by religious organizations, some of which may not be suitable for
winter conditions.
119. On 1 October, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted Resolutions No 505 and No 509
establishing regulations for the registration of, and financial assistance to, IDPs. According to
resolution No 509, the Ministry of Social Policy will be responsible for the registration of IDPs,
and will maintain a centralized database on the profile and specific needs of the IDPs. This
should help better identify needs for IDPs, and plan and coordinate the response.
120. According to resolution No 505 IDPs will be eligible for monthly financial assistance as
long as they fulfil certain conditions, including the requirement for adults to actively seek
employment. The assistance will be UAH 884 (approximately 68 USD) per month for
individuals not able to work (for example, children, elderly, disabled persons), and UAH 442
(approximately 34 USD) per month for working-age adults. The assistance is limited to six
months and is intended to help families pay for housing.
121. The registration process started on 15 October and according to the Ministry of Social
Policy, as of 26 October more than 70,000 IDPs were registered, more than 35,000 families had
applied for financial assistance and 19,000 started receiving it.
Employment
122. Despite significant attempts undertaken by the State Employment Bureau (SEB)43 IDPs
continued to face barriers to finding employment and receiving unemployment benefits. In order
to receive unemployment benefits, IDPs need to provide the SEB with their employment record
books (a system inherited from the Soviet Union). However, these are normally retained by the
employer. IDPs, having fled the conflict-affected areas, have often not taken their employment
record books, and are consequently not eligible to obtain unemployment benefits. The SEB
accepts letters of resignation as formal evidence of unemployment for IDPs, which allows them
to receive the benefits.
123. In addition, some IDPs have complained of facing discrimination, with claims that they
are usually offered worse working conditions than normal, and expected to work for a lower
salary due to the lack of other options.
Financial assistance to IDPs
124. Many IDPs owe loans for cars or homes, which they are not in a position to reimburse.
Parliament partially sought to address this issue through the adoption of legislation to excuse
interest payments on outstanding loans44. This law would decrease the risks of IDPs losing their
homes due to foreclosure.
VII. WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Women affected by the hostilities in the east
125. Women may be particularly affected by the short and long-term effects of the hostilities
in the eastern regions. This is due to a number of factors including: gender inequality, their status
in society, and the lack of structures to protect them.
Displaced women
126. Women comprise two thirds of the IDPs in Ukraine. Women continue fleeing with
43 The SEB is under the Ministry of Social Policy, which keeps a record of all job vacancies in Ukraine.
44 Law of Ukraine on Temporary Measures for a Period of Anti-Terrorist Operation as entered into force on 15
October 2014.
26
children, elderly or relatives with disabilities, without male relatives. Thus, they often carry a
heavy burden of caring for others and trying to make decisions about the future. Many women
report45 feeling overwhelmed by the magnitude of their daily tasks. Their general problem is a
lack of support from the State or local authorities and unemployment. Some of them managed to
find a job but none of those who are registered in Donetsk and Luhansk regions could obtain
legal employment.
Sexual and gender-based violence
127. The HRMMU continued to receive allegations of sexual and gender-based violence in
the eastern regions.
128. On 13 October, the HRMMU interviewed a woman from Donetsk, who was “arrested” in
May for violating a curfew by the ‘Vostok Battalion’. She was intimidated, forced into a car and
brought to a place, which, she thought, was a police department seized by the armed groups. She
was beaten with metal sticks for three hours, suspected of being a Ukrainian sniper because of
callosities on her fingers, and released the next day. The woman referred to being raped by
several men from the ‘Vostok Battalion’.
129. The HRMMU spoke with other women who were detained by armed groups or
Ukrainian forces and who stated that while not physically abused, they were often threatened
with rape and in some cases forced to undress. For example, on 14 October, the HRMMU
interviewed an activist of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ activist and medical volunteer, who
was detained by Ukrainian forces in July along with four other persons. She reported that she
and another female detainee were regularly threatened with rape, and were once ordered to
undress and interrogated while standing naked and blindfolded. They were later transported to
the Kharkiv SBU, and one of the women reported being slapped on the back of her head several
times during interrogation. On 2 August she was subject of a detainee exchange, after being
asked to sign an undated protocol of detention.
130. On 14 October, an NGO informed the HRMMU that a couple was detained by armed
groups at an opioid-replacement-therapy site on the grounds of being former drug users. While
the man was forced to dig trenches, the woman was reportedly forced to cook meals for
members of a ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ unit and provide sexual services to them. Both were
later released.
131. On 15 October, the ‘authorities’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ informed the
HRMMU of two cases of alleged rape. In Torez, a member of an armed group reportedly
kidnapped a local female resident, raped her and at the same time placed a grenade in her mouth.
Members of the local armed group reportedly caught and detained the perpetrator; the ‘General
Prosecutor’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ has opened a criminal case. The second case of
rape reportedly took place in Dokuchaivsk (Donetsk Region) while it was under the control of
Ukrainian armed forces. Ukrainian policemen reportedly detained the suspect, and placed him in
a pre-trial detention, but he was released when the Ukrainian troops retreated from Dokuchaivsk.
The ‘police’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ claimed its ‘officers’ have detained the
perpetrator, and have opened a criminal case after the victims’ relatives filed a complaint.
132. On 23 September, it was reported that a member of a ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ armed
group raped a 22-year old girl. He was later subjected to public humiliation by his commanders
as punishment. On 25 October, in Alchevsk (Luhansk region) the ‘Phantom Brigade’ organised
‘the first people’s trial’, which considered two cases of sexual violence. In the first case, a 37-
year old man, also a member of an armed group was accused of raping a 15-year old girl on 12
September. In the second case, a man was accused of raping a 20-year old girl on 27
45 Such reports are received by the UNHCR and NGOs and volunteer initiatives that provide services to IDPs.
27
September46. The ‘trial’ was filmed and clearly did not meet any fair trial standards. The death
penalty was pronounced in both cases. Following a vote of the 340 residents who had gathered,
the first perpetrator was allowed to “go to the front-line to pay his guilt with blood”. While the
second was sentenced to death. It is not known whether the death penalty has been implemented.
During this ‘trial’, the commander of the ‘Phantom Brigade’, presiding over the proceedings,
made some derogatory comments regarding women and stated that ‘from now on any woman
seen in a cafe or bar will be immediately detained’, adding that women should sit at home (see
Chapter VIII, section D Administration of Justice).
B. Participation and representation of women
133. The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees equal rights between men and women, including
in public and political life. This is further protected by the Law on Ensuring Equal Rights and
Opportunities of Women and Men. However, the level of women’s representation in political
and public life remains low.
134. The Ministry of Social Policy reported that due to austerity measures, in 2014 only 10
per cent of the required state contribution was allocated for the implementation of the two State
programmes On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men until 2016 and
Support of the Family until 2016.
135. The demand of civil society to introduce gender quotas was only partially implemented
in the amendments to the Law on Political Parties in Ukraine. Article 8 of the Law, since 1
February 2014, obliged all political parties to amend their statutes to ensure that at least 30 per
cent of their candidates on their election lists are women; though the majority of political parties
have not complied with this requirement47.
136. Women comprised around a quarter of the candidates on party lists. Women are
represented the least in the following political parties: Svoboda (14 per cent), Civic Position (12
per cent), Right Sector (9 per cent), Vidrodzhennia (8 per cent) and Congress of Ukrainian
nationalists (0 per cent). Among majoritarian candidates, women accounted for only 13 per cent.
A key reason for this, according to the IEOM observers, was the difficulty women candidates
faced in securing funding for their campaigns. Women were well-represented at the District
election committees, where they accounted for 54 per cent of all members and held many senior
positions48. In the Central Election Commission, five of the 15 members, including one of the
two deputy chairpersons and the secretary, were women. Issues of equal participation of men
and women in elections and the country’s political life more broadly, were generally not part of
the campaign and did not feature prominently in most candidate or party programmes.
VIII. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east
Command responsibility
137. As of 28 October, the Office of the Military Prosecutor had opened three criminal
investigations into inaction of the military authorities concerning the failure of the command of
the Voluntary Territorial Defence Battalion ‘Aidar’ to prevent and stop the crimes committed by
46 See the administration of justice section of this report for more details on this trial.
47 The data was presented on 7 October during the press-conference in frames of the USAID-supported project
Gender monitoring of the 2014 elections, which is implemented by the NGO Women’s Consortium of Ukraine.
48 These included 99 committees chaired by women, with 107 female deputy chairpersons and 144 secretaries.
28
its subordinates, and to notify law enforcement regarding such crimes.
138. On 15 October, the SBU announced that a criminal investigation had been opened
against both the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ for ‘crimes
against peace and security of mankind’.49 The SBU is to investigate cases of inhuman treatment
of civilians and captured military servicemen, notably torture, forced labour and looting of
national treasures in the captured territories.
Military prosecutions
139. Only three criminal proceedings for violence against the population in the areas of
hostilities50 were opened by the Office of the Military Prosecutor as of 18 September. The
current status of these proceedings is unclear, as according to the Office of the Military
Prosecutor, it has not conducted investigations into these crimes as of 27 October.
140. In response to reports of violations committed by Ukrainian volunteer battalions, the
Minister of Internal Affairs announced on 16 October that the Voluntary Special Police Patrol
Battalion ‘Shakhtarsk’ had been disbanded due to multiple cases of looting committed by 50 out
of its 300 members.
141. On 21 October, servicemen of the Voluntary Special Police Patrol Battalion
‘Slobozhanshchina’ filed an open submission to the head of Kharkiv Regional Department of the
MoIA and to the Prosecutor’s Office in relation to violence, looting, intimidation of servicemen,
and other acts allegedly committed by their commander.
Investigations into the use of explosive weapons in populated areas
142. According to the MoIA, from 1 August to 26 October, more than 300 criminal
proceedings were opened into indiscriminate shelling of residential areas in Donetsk region. The
Ministry claims that all necessary investigative actions have been taken, but that has been
hampered by the hostilities and lack of access to the territories controlled by the armed groups.
143. On 4 October, the HRMMU was informed that the Office of the Military Prosecutor of
the Southern Region had initiated a criminal investigation under terrorism charges into the
shelling of residential areas in Debaltseve (Donetsk region).
Investigations into detention by the armed groups
144. As more people have been released by the armed groups, the HRMMU is concerned that
some of these people have not been interviewed by the law enforcement agencies, which may
lead to a failure to collect all necessary information and evidence to ensure accountability for
crimes committed.
Case of Nadiia Savchenko
145. The HRMMU is following the case of Nadiia Savchenko, a Ukrainian servicewoman and
newly elected member of Parliament, who was reportedly captured on 17 June and moved to
Voronezh in the Russian Federation,. She was then moved to pre-trial detention centre in
Moscow. Ms Savchenko is charged with killing two Russian journalists in Ukraine, while on
duty. On 27 October, Basmannyi District Court of Moscow ruled in a closed hearing to hold Ms
Savchenko in custody until 13 February 2015. On 30 October, on the basis of an allegedly
compulsory psychiatric examination, Ms Savchenko was declared sane. The investigation into
her case will therefore proceed.
146. On 29 October, Ms Savchenko’s lawyer informed that she had recognized Ihor
Plotnitskyi, the head of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ as one of those involved in her
abduction. Mr Plotnitskiy is a former commander of the ‘Zaria Battalion’ and a ‘minister of
49 Chapter 20 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
50 It was not clear which particular charges they faced apart from violence. Article 433 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine, also encompasses illegal destruction and taking of property as well as robbery against local population.
29
defence’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ whom Ms Savchenko mentioned in her 17 July appeal
to the Consul General of Ukraine, after she was moved to the Russian Federation51. As a result,
on 30 October, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine has notified Ihor Plotnitskyi and
Aleksandr Popov (a Russian Federation citizen who was allegedly involved in the attack on the
‘Aidar’ battalion that resulted in Ms Savchenko’s detention) of being suspects in committing
crimes under article 146, part 3 (illegal deprivation of liberty), article 258, part 2 (terrorist act),
and article 332, part 3 (illegal conveying of persons through the state border of Ukraine) of the
Criminal Code.
Case of Nelia Shtepa
147. The HRMMU is also concerned over new developments in the case of the former mayor
of Sloviansk, Nelia Shtepa, who was previously found in pre-trial investigation to be an
accessory to the trespassing of the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine, resulting in
death of people. On 8 October, Ms Shtepa was presented an amended notice of suspicion, saying
that she was also suspected of membership in a terrorist organisation – the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. Ms Shtepa had also been held in detention for more than two months by that same
‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
148. On 31 October, the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's office submitted an indictment to the
court, accusing Ms Shtepa of calls to change the boundaries of Ukraine, assisting in the conduct
of a so-called 'referendum’ on the separation of the Donetsk region from Ukraine, and setting the
stage for activities of terrorist groups and organisations. The maximum sanction for such crimes
is life sentence.
149. Ms Shtepa has informed the HRMMU that she was attacked and beaten while in the
bathroom of the Office of the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor. She immediately complained of the
assault but was threatened with a lawsuit for slander. She was examined by the doctor at the pretrial
detention facility she is being held in, who observed and documented a number of bruises
on her thighs and forearms. The HRMMU visited Ms Shtepa in detention and observed and
documented the bruises on her body as a result of the alleged ill-treatment.
150. According to the Office of the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor, the pre-trial investigation is
completed and it is expected that the case materials will be submitted to court for consideration
in the near future.
B. Investigation into the 2 May violence in Odesa
151. The MoIA investigation into the 2 May violence in Odesa has been split into several
criminal proceedings: on mass disorder in the city centre, on the mass disorder at the Trade
Unions building (the Kulikovo Pole square), and against the single ‘pro-unity’ activist charged
with murder.
152. While the investigations into the second and third criminal proceeding are on-going, the
investigation into the mass disorder in the city centre was completed on 24 September. 24 ‘profederalism’
supporters were charged with mass disorder, and 9 suspects were put on a wanted
list. The MoIA expects the court trial to commence in early November.
153. Further, the SBU has started its own investigation on five criminal cases, in relation to
the 2 May violence, but due to the secrecy of investigation, it is reluctant to provide any
information.
51 Yet in her appeal to the Consul General of Ukraine in the Russian Federation of 17 July, Ms. Nadiia Savchenko
stated that she was taken prisoner by the armed groups of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ on 17 June and was
attended by inter alia a man who introduced himself as a commander of the 'Zaria Battalion' and ‘minister of
defence’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
30
154. On 17 October, the local media disclosed phone transcripts from the Odesa fire brigade
registered on 2 May, which may constitute evidence of negligent behaviour on the part of the
firemen. Numerous emergency phone calls reporting the fire at Kulikovo Pole, including from
police officers, appeared not to have been fully addressed. However, there has so far been no
investigation of this element. The Independent Commission investigating the 2 May violence
reiterated that the results of the official investigation process cannot be deemed reliable. In
particular, it objects to the fact that the forensic examinations were conducted by the municipal
forensic bureau, which is not a governmental institution as required by Ukrainian legislation. It
also noted that according to experts who received copies of the autopsies, the post mortem
examinations had not been properly conducted in terms of quantitative and qualitative samples
of the deceased people. This concern is all the more serious as all bodies have been buried or
incinerated.
155. Following research, some members of the Independent Commission consider that the 2
May violence was planned by all parties for political purposes: the Regional State
Administration – to disperse the ‘pro-federalism’ tent camp; the MoIA – to disperse the camp
with the help of football fans in order to avoid responsibility; the ‘pro-unity’ movement – to
disperse the ‘pro-federalism’ tent camp and show the strength and unity of local ‘pro-unity’
forces; and the ‘pro-federalism’ movement - to obtain evidence of the impartial attitude of the
local authorities by exposing the intimidation of the ‘pro-unity’ movement and the violation of
their rights (freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of speech). However, those in the
Independent Commission who hold this opinion believe that the plan to disperse the ‘profederalism’
tent camp at Kulikovo Pole square went out of control, with none of the parties
expecting such grave consequences.
156. On 29 October, the Main Investigations Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the
Russian Federation opened a criminal case against members of ‘the Right Sector, Maidan Selfdefence,
as well as Ukrainian football fans and some officials of the Ukrainian MoIA, as well as
the SBU’ for attempts to commit, murder and torture under the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, against a Russian citizen.
157. According to the Directorate’s statement, a Russian citizen was apprehended on 2 May
by the Odesa city department of the MoIA near the Trade Union Building. He was later
interrogated by the SBU, notified of suspicion in participating in mass disorder and placed in
custody as a measure of restraint. It reported serious violations by Ukrainian law enforcement
officials, including ill-treatment, failure to provide a translator (being a Russian-speaker he did
not understand the contents of the procedural documents drafted in Ukrainian), and refusal to
grant him official victim status (having been exposed to carbon monoxide in the Trade Unions
building instead of being treated as a victim he was perceived as a suspect). The lawyer stressed
that the law enforcement agencies and the court had shown a negative and biased attitude
towards his client based on his Russian citizenship.
C. Investigations into crimes committed during the Maidan protests
158. The HRMMU is particularly concerned about a lack of significant progress into
investigations of crimes committed during the Maidan protests. Three major criminal
proceedings have resulted from these events: an investigation into forceful dispersal of protesters
on 30 November 2013; investigations into mass killings of protesters on 19-21 January and 18-
20 February; and an investigation into the killings of police officers on 18-20 February.
However, so far the only result in these high profile cases was the outcome of the investigation
into mass killing of protesters by members of the Berkut officers. The Office of the Prosecutor
General found grounds to believe that three former members of the unit committed killings of 39
protesters on 20 February 2014 and noted that the main obstacle to the effective investigation
31
was the impossibility of locating most of the suspects, many of whom had fled Ukraine. In such
a case, the Criminal Procedure Code provides that criminal proceedings be suspended until the
suspects are tracked down.
Investigations into mass killings of protesters (January and February 2014)
159. There is a risk that very few individuals will be brought to justice for their role in the
mass killings of demonstrators in January and February 2014, especially among those in
positions of command. This probability has been strengthened with the news of the apparent
escape of the former Berkut commander.
160. The commander, one of only three suspects identified and detained for the killing of 39
demonstrators at Instytutska Street on 20 February, was placed under house arrest on 19
September. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General this allowed him to escape and to
presumably flee Ukraine52. The decision of the Pecherskyi District Court (in Kyiv) to change the
commander’s measure of restraint from custodial detention to house arrest is now under scrutiny.
According to the Criminal Procedure Code, an investigating judge enjoys great discretion in
deciding on this issue. However, according to the Office of the Prosecutor General, this is not
the usual practice and judges are normally extremely cautious when it comes to such grave
crimes. The judge has been notified that she is now under suspicion of rendering a knowingly
unjust decision. Results of a pre-trial investigation into this will be soon submitted to the court.
A further high-profile case from the night of 18 to 19 February may also reveal shortcomings in
the Kyiv courts to adequately handle the Maidan cases. This involves the killing of a journalist
by a group of Titushky (thugs hired by the then authorities to disperse demonstrators) and the
infliction of bodily harm to two other people. On 15 October, the Shevchenkivskyi District Court
of Kyiv in a closed judicial session released from detention the only suspect located so far. The
six other suspects have been put on an international wanted list. The victims and activists believe
that the accused is now free to escape following the example of the Berkut commander, thus
creating another example of impunity.
161. In the meantime, the Office of the Prosecutor General has been conducting investigations
into other crimes committed by the law enforcement officers during Maidan protests. On 17
October, a high-profile case of bodily harm and humiliation inflicted to a Maidan demonstrator
was sent to the Pecherskyi District Court (of Kyiv) with an indictment against an officer of the
MoIA internal troops. He is accused of not stopping the attack against the demonstrator. This is
already the fourth law enforcement officer brought to account for committing this act.
Investigations into killings of law enforcement officers on 18 and 20 February 2014
162. An investigation into the murder of 13 police officers and MoIA interior troops, and
injuries to some 600 law enforcement officers on 18 - 20 February in Kyiv is on-going. The
HRMMU is concerned that the Law on Prevention of Persecution and Punishment of Individuals
in Respect of Events which have Taken Place during Peaceful Assemblies53, passed immediately
after former President Yanukovych fled, may block this investigation. According to Article 3 of
this Law “all criminal proceedings, opened in respect of crimes, envisaged in Article 1 of this
Law, in which no person was notified of suspicion, shall be closed” and “all individuals who
have committed a large number of crimes, including murder and attempted murder of police
officers due to their activities, shall be exempted from criminal responsibility”.
D. Administration of justice
52 Although, according to the MoIA, there is no data that he has legally crossed the border of Ukraine.
53 Law of Ukraine on prevention of persecution and punishment of individuals in respect of events which have taken
place during peaceful assemblies, and recognising the repeal of certain laws of Ukraine, as adopted by the
Parliament on 21 February 2014.
32
Establishment of parallel structures
163. In the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ various armed groups
have performed quasi-judicial functions: issuing arbitrary sentences, deciding on the detentions
of civilians and members of the armed groups on charges of looting, desertion, drinking, and
other alleged acts. Detention by the armed groups is often accompanied by ‘correctional labour’,
and physical punishment. Armed groups have also established ad hoc martial tribunals as was
the case in Sloviansk in May-June, rendering death sentences against their own members and
civilians suspected of activities directed against the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. A ‘resolution
on field courts’ apparently adopted on 17 August by the ‘supreme council’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ provided for the establishment of field and martial courts. So far, the
HRMMU has received no information on the existence of such bodies.
164. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ is also reportedly in the process of establishing its own
‘judiciary system’, with two key officials already appointed. On 23 September, the former
‘prosecutor general’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ was appointed as ‘head’ of the ‘supreme
court’ and a ‘minister of justice’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ was also appointed. On 10
October, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ invited all eligible candidates with a background in law
to apply for the vacant positions in its ‘supreme court’.
165. In areas controlled by the Government of Ukraine, the HRMMU was presented with
numerous due process violations, both in civil and administrative cases. Public authorities and
courts sometimes justified non-compliance with international human rights standards by the
“actual state of war” in the country. The HRMMU is also concerned with the neglect of
procedural rights of detainees. In the Odesa region in particular, the HRMMU collected evidence
of systematic violations of the Criminal Procedure Code, which should lead to the immediate
release of the detainee (for example, the late presentation of a written notice of suspicion and/or
violation of the terms of detention, apprehension and house search without the order of an
investigating judge or a court). However, during the court hearings judges have tended to
systematically ignore these violations, which in turn constitute a violation of fair trial standards.
IX. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
166. On 25 September, President Poroshenko presented his ’Strategy for the Sustainable
Development of Ukraine - 2020’, a roadmap enabling the country to apply for EU membership
by that date. The strategy foresees over 60 legislative and institutional reforms, prioritising
fighting corruption, decentralizing government and energy independence, and modernising the
judiciary and defence system. Legislative developments during the reporting period touched
upon some key reform aspects of this Strategy, notably the fight against corruption and the
powers of the Office of the Prosecutor General. In addition, the President also created a Council
for Judicial Reform and tasked the government to elaborate a national human rights strategy.
167. The popular demand for lustration voiced during the Maidan protests resulted in a law
that would ban public office primarily for some State employees who worked within the
administration of the former President Yanukovych. A separate lustration procedure applies to
judges. Parliament also passed a law allowing absentee trials, which could be applied to former
President Yanukovych and government officials who fled the country. While the issue of
decentralization has not been addressed by parliament, the Venice Commission published an
opinion on draft constitutional amendments dealing partly with it.
A. Constitutional reform
168. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has reviewed the draft law amending
33
the Constitution of Ukraine, as submitted by President Poroshenko to Parliament on 2 July 2014.
It delivered an Opinion on 27 October. One of the positive aspects noted by the Commission is
that the draft eliminates the power of the Prosecutor’s Office to supervise respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms and observance of laws by the authorities. These powers are,
according to the Commission, a ‘reminiscence of the old system of the Soviet prokuratura’.
169. Advances, according to the Venice Commission, also concern decentralization of powers
towards more local self-governance. The draft proposed that regional and district councils
independently elect their own executive bodies and that State administration at the regional and
district level be removed. New levels of territorial units are defined; the principle of subsidiarity
is introduced; planning powers and taxes go to the community. A new provision empowers
villages, settlements, cities, districts and regional councils to provide a special status for the
Russian language and other languages of national minorities.
170. The Venice Commission also recommended improvements. It found that some
competencies under the draft law gave the President significant power or overlapped with
governmental functions and could be a source of conflict. The President would be able to
appoint and dismiss certain key state officials without the involvement of any other State organs.
In addition, his representatives in the regions and districts would be able not only to supervise
compliance by local self-government bodies with the law and constitutional principles but also
to ensure coordination of the inter-action between the central government authorities. Further,
the principle of financial support by the State for local self-government is not given clear
constitutional entrenchment and the amendments do not address reform of the judiciary. In
respect of the new provision on the special status of Russian and other minority languages, the
Venice Commission notes that it ‘raises issues of harmonization’ with relevant international
norms and standards and statutory guarantees for the use of languages ‘irrespective of the
support of more than 50% of the local government council’. Finally, the Commission notes that
Ukrainian civil society has neither been informed nor consulted on the amendments, which
should be prepared in an inclusive manner and submitted to public discussion.
B. Lustration54
Lustration of government
171. A law ‘On the Purification of Government’ aimed at subjecting officials who performed
State or local self-government functions to a screening procedure entered into force on 16
October. The intention behind the law was to revive people's trust in the authorities and respond
to demands expressed during the Maidan protests to address past human rights violations and
curb corruption in various levels of power.
172. Article 1.1 of the law states that ‘Purification of government (lustration) shall be the
prohibition set by the Law or by court decision for some individuals to hold certain positions in
state authorities and local self-government bodies’. It is to be applied to people who
implemented or contributed to measures aimed at “usurpation of power” by former President
Yanukovych, undermining national security or violating human rights and freedoms.
173. The law provides for ex-officio prohibition of holding office for a period of 10 years after
the law comes into force for people who occupied for at least one year between 25 February
54 Lustration (from Latin lustration - ‘purification by sacrifice’) is an evaluation and examination process used in
order to eliminate abusive and corruptive officials through due procedure. To define lustration very broadly, it is a
measure barring officials of a former regime from positions of public influence in a country after a change of
government.
34
2010 and 22 February 2014, a number of high level positions enumerated in the law55. It also
provides for a five year ex-officio prohibition from holding office for those who occupied
positions during the same period in the judiciary and law enforcement spheres and who, through
their actions or omissions, enabled human rights violations or threatened national security56.
174. In addition, several categories of public officials will be subjected to screening regarding
the reliability of data on their property and its value as indicated in the declaration of assets, and
income submitted for the tax year obtained from legal sources.
175. The vetting envisioned under one of the forms indicated above could apply to tens of
thousands of people who held certain positions or executed decisions in various official
capacities at central, regional and local levels.
176. According to the law, the Ministry of Justice shall be the body authorized to carry out the
vetting procedure. It shall elaborate and submit for approval to the Cabinet of Ministers a list of
bodies and the procedure and plans of vetting for each state authority and local self-government
body where those to be inspected currently work. The body conducting the vetting sends the
vetting opinion to the head of the institution, whose terms of reference include dismissal for the
person subject to vetting from the position. The vetting opinion can be appealed to court. In case
the unreliability of the data reviewed on property and income is traced during the inspection, the
vetting body sends a copy of the vetting opinion to the Ministry of Justice for official publication
on the web-site of the Ministry of Justice and for recording of the person in the Unified State
Register. The official who fails to pass the screening or did not agree to it shall be dismissed by
the inspection body and prohibited to hold the post for 10 years after dismissal. An advisory
body of the Ministry of Justice for lustration issues, including representatives of the mass media
and the public, will also be established in order to guarantee independent monitoring and control
over the process.
177. On the same day the law entered into force, the Government started applying it. The first
decisions applied to 39 individuals who will have to leave high level civil servant positions. The
President's administration and the Ministry of Defence also announced that they had started
vetting their employees under the new law.
178. Since the start of implementation of the law there have been a number of complaints
about its application, particularly regarding the dismissal of those who are pregnant or are on
paternity leave.
179. Several provisions of the law are questionable from the point of view of their compliance
55 The list of prohibitions covers several hundred positions in the State, as well as regional and local administrations.
They include the President, Prime Minister, first Vice Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minister, Ministers, heads of
central bodies of executive authority who are not members of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Governor of the National
Bank of Ukraine, chairs of all state committees, commissions, directorates and funds, the Prosecutor General of
Ukraine and agencies related to the prosecutor’s office, the heads of all law enforcement agencies and military
institutions, tax and customs institutions, members of judicial institutions, heads and deputy heads of regional,
district and city administrations. The prohibition also applies to persons who were elected and worked in
supervisory functions in the Communist Party of the USSR, of Ukraine and other republics of the former USSR, or
were staff members or secret agents of the KGB.
56 The five year prohibition to hold office for positions to which lustration applies concerns judges, public
prosecution and law enforcement officials who permitted detention, passed guilty verdicts, or implemented
measures aimed at prosecution of persons to whom amnesty has been applied under the amendments to the Law ‘On
Amnesty in Ukraine Concerning Full Rehabilitation of Political Prisoner’ of 27 February 2014. It also includes all
public officials who implemented measures aimed at power usurpation, undermining national security and
infringing human rights, as established by a court decision as well as any official concerning whom it has been
established by court decision that he collaborated with the secret services of other countries, implemented measures
undermining national security, defence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, or called for violation thereof, and led to
the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms as determined by a decision of the European Court of
Human Rights.
35
with international standards. The vetting grounds are overly broad in scope and establish a
principle of collective responsibility, which is contrary to international human rights law and
Recommendation 7568 of the Council of Europe57. This recommendation contains Guidelines to
ensure that lustration laws and similar administrative measures comply with the requirements of
a State based on the rule of law.
180. The Guidelines also indicate that lustration should be administered by ‘a specifically
created independent commission of distinguished citizens nominated by the head of State and
approved by parliament’58. However, the law gives responsibility for carrying out lustration to a
multiplicity of public government bodies under the control of the Ministry of Justice. The law
also prohibits the possibility to maintain or obtain positions for those whose past work has
violated the right to peaceful assembly or curtailed the right to life, as proven by court. Return to
government service would, in some cases, be banned for 10 years while the Guidelines state that
disqualification based on lustration should not exceed five years. Finally, prohibition from
holding office on the sole basis of having occupied certain functions, rather than as a
consequence of a proven violation or abuse can be viewed as contravening the presumption of
innocence59.
Lustration of judges
181. On 24 September and 24 October, the temporary special commission on the Inspection of
Judges, which was established according to the Law on Restoration of Trust in the Judicial
System, conducted its first public hearings. Pursuant to its mandate, it examined cases involving
12 judges60 who considered civil, administrative or criminal cases regarding defendants who had
participated in the Maidan protests. Several plaintiffs or lawyers representing them were in
attendance. All were given the opportunity to make statements. The commission found that eight
judges were guilty of a ‘violation of oath’ due to their decisions which the commission viewed
as: politically motivated, in violation of procedural rules, or made on the basis of falsified
materials. Two judges were found to have taken decisions which, while not constituting
violations of oath, were considered as deserving disciplinary sanctions. One judge was acquitted
and consideration of one case was postponed upon the request of the plaintiff. In its decisions61
the commission mentioned violations of national and international legal acts and the practice of
the European Court of Human Rights.
182. The commission is not competent to decide on sanctions and its decisions are advisory in
nature. Thus, cases involving findings about violations of oath were submitted to the High
Council of Justice and those where disciplinary measures are recommended were addressed to
the High Qualification Commission of Judges. However, none of these institutions currently
function, as their members were dismissed by the same law that established the temporary
special commission on the inspection of judges. The HRMMU will continue following the work
of the Commission.
So-called ‘public lustration’
183. The HRMMU is concerned about an increased number of acts of ‘public lustration’62,
57 See also PACE Res. 1096 (1996), paras. 11-12.
58 See also Rule of Law Tool for Post Conflict States, ‘Vetting: An operational Framework’ also requesting a
specially created mechanism in the form of a commission.
59 See PACE Res. 1096 (1996), para. 12; ECtHR decision of 30 May 2006, Matyjek v. Poland, app. No. 38184/03,
paras. 48 et sec; decision of 24 October 2006, Bobek v. Poland, app. No. 68761/01, para.2.
60 The cases regarded ten judges in Kyiv and two in Dnipropetrovsk.
61 Most cases involved decisions limiting the right to take part in protests or applying measures of restraint in the
form of pre-trial detention.
62 Public lustration or the ‘rubbish container challenge’ came to the fore during the month. Under the slogan “that
‘rubbish’ should be in rubbish containers” it aims to publicly lustrate (i.e. purify) state and regional authorities of
corrupt officials and politicians, or those who served under the former President Yanukovych. This has usually
36
and other actions by groups of people deciding to take justice into their own hands63, which
circumvents the law, placing public officials perceived to be involved in corrupt activities in
rubbish containers, and at times forcing them to resign from their positions.
C. Corruption
Anti-corruption legislation
184. On 14 October, the Parliament passed a package of laws aimed at uprooting the country’s
deeply embedded corruption. The legislation was drafted in cooperation with anti-corruption
organizations, including Transparency International, which in 2013 ranked Ukraine among the
30 world’s most corrupt nations (144 out of 177). The laws, signed by the President, have
different dates of entry into force.
185. The package foresees the creation of a State anti-corruption bureau64, competent to
conduct investigations of crimes believed to have been committed by high level public officials,
including judges and prosecutors. After an investigation, the bureau will be able to file cases in
court through specially trained prosecutors to be appointed by the Office of the Prosecutor
General and responsible to the head of the anti-corruption bureau. The law creating the anticorruption
bureau will enter into force on 25 January 2015.
186. Another law65 aims at revealing company ownership by requiring disclosure of all
information about the actual owners of commercial entities and real estate registered in Ukraine,
and creates a public register of assets. A mandatory e-declaration of income and expenditures of
all public officials is introduced66 and a National commission on preventing corruption is
created, with responsibilities that include, in particular, checks on the lifestyle and declarations
of officials. The law creating the national commission on the prevention of corruption will
become applicable on 26 April 2015.
187. Further a law67 creates conditions for implementing international recommendations on
combatting money laundering and the financing of terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and another law provides for a three-year National Anti-corruption Strategy68,
defining Ukraine’s objectives, policy and tools in the fight against corruption until 2017. The
law containing the new anti-corruption strategy came into force on 26 October.
188. The adoption of the anti-corruption package should improve Ukraine’s ability to fight
corruption. It provides new instruments to identify and investigate corruption practices. It
enables enhanced transparency and public information about the owners or beneficiaries of
assets and properties. It creates specialized anti-corruption bodies, such as the anti-corruption
bureau and the commission for prevention of corruption. Civil society will be able to exercise
‘civil control’ of the new anti-corruption agencies by monitoring their work and assessing their
involved a mob forcing a particular civil servant into a rubbish container. The actions appear to be led by the Right
Sector political party and the ‘Automaidan’ activist group, but other parties and groups have also since conducted
their own public lustration events. In certain cases where victim refused to be ‘dumped’, they were beaten. The most
emblematic cases are beating of members of the parliament Yurii Miroshnychenko on 17 September in Kyiv and
Nestor Shufrych in Odesa on 30 September. There have been numerous events of public lustration in Odesa.
63 Within the reporting period the ‘Right Sector’ of Odesa and Kherson also attacked up to ten private shops
allegedly involved in drug trafficking. In most cases, the sales assistants were publicly humiliated and tied to trees.
64 Law No. 1698-VII‘on national anti-corruption bureau’.
65 Law 1701-VII ‘on amendments to several legislative acts of Ukraine on determining ultimate beneficiaries of
legal persons and public figures’.
66 Law No. 1700-VII ‘on preventing corruption’.
67 Law No. 50671702-VII ‘on prevention and fighting legalization (laundering) of incomes received illegally,
financing of terrorism and financing the spread of weapons of mass destruction’.
68 Law No. 1699-VII ‘on the principles of state anti-corruption policy in Ukraine (anti-corruption strategy) for 2014-
2017’.
37
performance. The new three year anti-corruption strategy contains, for the first time, a clear set
of success indicators and performance measurements.
189. While all these novelties constitute clear advances, they are not a panacea. The new legal
framework will have to be accompanied by a genuine political commitment to implement it.
Corruption investigations of high-level officials conducted by the anti-corruption bureau may
turn out to be effective, but the decision on their outcomes remains with the courts, which at
times in the past have lacked independence and integrity. The police and the prosecutor’s office
continue to be responsible for investigating corruption cases involving non-senior public
officials, despite very limited success in the past. Eradicating corruption is also inextricably
linked to improving the functioning of other institutions. This includes amendments to the legal
framework governing public procurement procedures and reforming the public administration
and civil service. In all these areas, progress still remains to be made.
National Council on Anti-Corruption Policy
190. On the same day that Parliament adopted the anti-corruption legislation, President
Poroshenko signed a Decree ‘On the National Council on Anti-Corruption Policy’ (NCACP).
This new body placed under the authority of the President replaces the National Anti-Corruption
Committee, which was established in 2010 but never became operational. The role of the
NCACP will be to analyse the situation of corruption in Ukraine, as well as to coordinate and
monitor state anti-corruption policy, including the implementation of the national anti-corruption
strategy and Ukraine’s international anti-corruption obligations. The NCACP will consist of 17
members, 9 of whom will be from civil society.
191. The creation of an independent anti-corruption body with monitoring functions was a
long-standing requirement of international anti-corruption institutions (such as the Council of
Europe’s anti-corruption monitoring body: the GRECO). Ukraine had been urged to establish a
body distinct from the law enforcement bodies, with the responsibility of overseeing the
implementation of national anti-corruption strategies and related action plans, as well as
proposing new strategies and measures against corruption. Such a body should be given the
necessary level of independence to perform an effective monitoring function. While the 2010
anti-corruption committee had been given appropriate functions, its composition reflected a very
low representation of civil society, which cast doubt about the level of independence of the
commission. The composition of the NCACP appears to have addressed this concern.
D. Reform of the judiciary
192. On 16 October, President Poroshenko issued a decree establishing the Council for
Judicial Reforms pursuant to his Strategy for Sustainable Development ‘Ukraine – 2020’. The
task of this consultative body is to prepare and submit to the President a draft strategy on
reforming the judiciary, the administration of justice and legal institutions. This is to be done by
the President-appointed Coordinator of the Council within three months, following the
appointment of the other Council members who include the heads of appropriate central
government bodies and judicial institutions, the Prosecutor General, representatives of legal and
scientific institutions, NGOs and international organizations. The Decree abolishes the Working
Group on Judicial Reforms established in 2010.
E. Office of the Prosecutor
193. On 14 October, the Parliament adopted a Law on the Office of the Prosecutor General.
The law eliminates prosecutorial functions with regard to the supervision of the observance and
application of the laws, the so-called nadzor (‘general supervision’). It contains amendments in
respect to the recruitment of prosecutors, their appointment for administrative positions and
38
hierarchical and disciplinary measures and procedures. The main body of the prosecutorial
authorities is the National Conference of Prosecutors. It is to address issues related to the internal
activities of the Prosecution Service and to appoint members of its qualification and disciplinary
commissions, which, in turn, will carry out the functions of selecting candidates for vacant posts
and disciplinary proceedings. This law will enter into force on 25 April 2015. However, a few
provisions, including those eliminating the ‘general supervision’ function of the Prosecution
became effective on 26 October.
194. While in previous amendments Parliament had considerably limited the overly broad
powers of the Prosecution Service not related to the criminal justice process, this new law
appears to take into account most of the remaining international recommendations regarding the
attributes, internal organization and guarantees for an independent functioning of Office of the
Prosecutor General. In particular, a key concern addressed regards the general supervisory
powers (nadzor) of the Office of the Prosecutor General related to the observance and
application of laws. This function used to give the Office extensive ability to interfere with the
interests and activities of private individuals and organizations. This capacity was compounded
by the entitlement of the Prosecutor General and other public prosecutors to participate in the
proceedings of the Parliament, boards of ministries, central executive agencies, local councils
and other administrative bodies. These powers and rights ran counter to the separation of powers
and posed a threat to rights and freedoms.
195. The new law, however, maintains a function relating to the representation of the interests
of the individual and the State in court that go beyond the criminal justice sphere. This ability to
represent the interests of citizens is problematic because it confers the right to participate in any
legal proceedings where such interests are seen to arise regardless of the wishes of the
individual. Furthermore, the Prosecutor General is also mandated to act in pursuit of the State
interest, which does not necessarily coincide with the interests of the individual being
represented.
F. Criminal proceedings in absentia
196. On 7 October, the Parliament adopted a draft law on criminal proceedings in absentia69
for persons who are accused of crimes and have fled the country. The law entered into force on
31 October. The intention behind this law was to create the legal conditions to try the former
President of Ukraine and other high level officials who left the country, and to recover the vast
assets they are accused of having usurped. The law allows for proceedings in absentia to be
opened for defendants who seek to avoid court hearings, but with the presence of their lawyer
for the following crimes: overthrow of the constitutional order, violation of the territorial
integrity or its financing, high treason, attempt against the life of a statesman, sabotage,
espionage, murder, murder committed as a crime of passion, murder in excess of necessary
defence, and a list of corruption crimes.
197. In its General Comment № 32, the United Nations Human Rights Committee declared
that proceedings in the absence of the accused ‘may in some circumstances be permissible in the
interest of the proper administration of justice’, and added that these circumstances emerge when
the accused persons, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, decline to
exercise their right to be present. In international judicial practice, trial in absentia is usually
avoided. Article 63 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides that
such trials are permitted only where the defendant is removed from the proceedings on the
69 The draft law ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Code and Criminal Code of Procedure of Ukraine regarding
Inevitability of Punishment for Certain Crimes against the Fundamentals of National and Public Security and
Corruption-Related Crimes’.
39
grounds that he has repeatedly and continually disrupted them. In the current document the
grounds for prosecution in the absence of the accused are very wide, making the frequent use of
this procedure a real possibility. The provisions stipulated to inform the accused in a timely
manner of a court hearing, as well as to request attendance, are not in line with international
norms and standards, as they do not provided adequate procedures to inform the accused in a
timely manner of the date and place of the trial.
G. Legislation in follow up to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014
198. On 16 September, Parliament passed two laws pursuant to the Minsk Protocol of 5
September.
The Amnesty Law
199. The draft law on ‘the prevention or punishment of participants in events on the territory
of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’ cancels criminal and administrative liability for acts committed
by ‘armed formations’ from 22 February 2014 until when the law enters into force, although it
lists a number of crimes to which amnesty will not be extended70. It should be noted, however,
that the law does not explicitly include torture and other ill-treatment in the list of exceptions,
which means that such acts could be amnestied. This must be avoided as it would contravene
the prohibition under international law of amnesties for international crimes and other gross
violations of human rights. The acts of all those suspected of having committed or ordered these
acts must be investigated, perpetrators must be brought to justice, and victims should be given
full reparation. The law is to be signed by the President.
The Law on Special Status
200. The other law passed on 16 September and which entered into force on 18 October is the
Law ‘On the Special Procedure of Local Self-Government in Some Districts of Donetsk and
Luhansk Regions’, which is to be in force for three years. The law provides for local authorities
to facilitate the use of Russian and other languages in public life and for local elections to take
place on 7 December 2014. The law provides for powers for the local authorities greater than
those enjoyed by other local authorities in Ukraine. In particular, they will have the right to take
part in the appointment of heads of courts and prosecution offices at local level. The special
status allows for the creation of voluntary people’s police, accountable to the local authorities.
The law provides for specific financing to be allocated to these areas, without the possibility to
diminish this financing, even in case of amendments to the State budget. The territory enjoying
special status will be able to establish closer cooperation with administrative and territorial units
of the Russian Federation on the basis of treaties on trans-border cooperation.
H. Law on Internally Displaced Persons
201. On 20 October, the Parliament passed a law “On ensuring the rights and freedoms of
internally displaced persons”. It has yet to be signed by the President. The law establishes a
unified IDP database, simplifies residence registration and voting rights, prohibits
discrimination, protects the rights of IDPs with disabilities and obliges the state to provide free
temporary accommodation for 6 months (although the IDPs need to pay for utility fees). It also
70 These include: ‘crimes against life and health (murders and infliction of serious bodily harm); sexual crimes;
hostage taking; human trafficking; banditry; smuggling; acts of terrorism; violation of graves, burial places, or
corpses; attacks against the life of a law enforcement officer, a judge, an official or a citizen performing his/her
public duty, a defence attorney, or a foreign state representative; threats or violence against a public official or a
citizen who performs his/her public duty, internationally protected persons and institutions in connection with their
activity related to the administration of justice; genocide; and persons who committed a crime connected with the
crash of the ‘Malaysia Airlines’ flight MH17”.
40
makes provisions to return home voluntarily and access to social housing or home loans on
favourable terms for those who wish to settle elsewhere. Another positive initiative concerning
IDPs was the adoption of amendments71 to the Tax Code of Ukraine exempting IDPs of income
tax payment for charitable aid received for the purchase of drug costs, medical items and
supplies, and technical and other means of rehabilitation, among others.
202. The new legislation generally conforms to international legal standards, in particular the
United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. It should be noted, however, that
the law does not provide for an on-line registration system for IDPs, which makes the process
unnecessarily burdensome and time-consuming. In addition, internally displaced stateless
persons as well as foreigners legally residing in Ukraine who have been displaced are not
covered by the provisions of this law. This contravenes earlier resolutions of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine on registration of IDPs and on monthly targeted financial support to IDPs,
both of which apply to stateless and foreign IDPs legally residing in the country. This
contradiction will need to be clarified. Another aspect of these resolutions is that they apply to
people coming from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as well as the 'anti-terrorist operation
area’. On 30 October, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine defined a list of territories that are
comprised in the ‘anti-terrorist operation area’. The list encompasses territories of the Luhansk
and Donetsk regions, but also some districts, towns and villages in the neighbouring Kharkiv
region. Thus, it would appear that people from territories that have not been directly affected by
the fighting in the east could be eligible to be recognized as IDPs. Finally, considering that two
thirds of the IDP population are women, specific attention should be devoted to ensure their
specific needs and fundamental rights, including access to quality healthcare, the provision,
where required, of social security, food, water and sanitation, as well as access to justice.
I. Human rights strategy
203. On 15 October, President Poroshenko signed a Decree tasking the Government to
elaborate a draft national human rights strategy for Ukraine by 1 January 2015. The document is
to be prepared with the participation of state and local authorities, civil society and international
experts on the basis of international experience.
204. The elaboration of a national human rights strategy could ensure greater prominence and
attention to the promotion and protection of human rights in the country.
J. Police reform
205. On 22 October, the Minister of Internal Affairs organized a conference to inform about
his proposals for police reform. They include: renaming the militia (the current name) as the
police; reducing the number of police officers according to United Nations defined standards
(from 376 officers to 222 officers per 100,000 people); authorising the MoIA to only conduct
the functions of law enforcement, protection of territorial integrity, civil protection, fire and
rescue, migration control and protection of the state border; merging of certain departments;
terminating separate special police units and instead setting up unified rapid response units;
establishing a municipal police accountable to local self-government bodies and the MoIA;
demilitarisating the police by keeping ‘officers in uniform’ only for practical law enforcement
functions; and re-assessing of staff through the use of the lustration law.
206. Following the conference, the Cabinet of Ministers held a meeting where several
provisions of the police reform concept were adopted as decrees72. The next steps are to
71 In force since 26 September 2014.
72 The first decree concerns termination of several departments of the police, such as the General Department on
Combating Organized Crimes, the veterinary police and the transport police. The second decree concerns
41
implement the adopted decrees and to draft an act on the general structure and quantity of staff
in the MoIA.
X. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
207. The situation in Crimea was marked by the continued implementation of the policy
aimed at integrating the peninsula into the legal and political system of the Russian Federation
and by persistent acts of intimidation targeting the Crimean Tatars, as well as those who opposed
the March ‘referendum’ or were critical of the de facto ‘authorities’. As a result, the number of
people leaving Crimea is constantly increasing.
208. On 23 September, the ‘Crimean prosecutor general’ posted a statement mentioning that
all actions aimed at the non-recognition of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation will be
prosecuted. The position of the United Nations on the status of Crimea and Sevastopol is guided
by General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 on the Territorial Integrity of
Ukraine, which calls on all states and international organizations “not to recognize any alteration
of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol”.
209. Key developments in the period included a new wave of disappearances of Crimean
Tatars. Vivid disquiet over this led to the establishment by the de facto ‘authorities’ of a ‘contact
group’ to tackle the issue of missing people and other instances of human rights violations
against Crimean Tatars. Furthermore, following months of intrusive searches (supposedly to
fight extremism) affecting dozens of properties and other facilities owned mostly by Crimean
Tatars, a ‘moratorium’ on police raids, was announced by the de facto ‘authorities’.
Nevertheless, the Mejlis73 continued to be seen as an illegal organization and had to leave its
premises in Simferopol. In general, freedom of expression in Crimea remains stifled as a result
of actions seeking to influence media content.
210. On 27 October the report by Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights, was made public following his mission to Kyiv, Moscow and Crimea from 7 to
12 September 2014. This was the first in situ assessment by an international organisation of the
human rights situation in Crimea since March 2014. Mr. Muižnieks noted that more resolve is
needed in investigating all cases of serious violations of human rights that have occurred in
Crimea since February 2014, including recent abductions. The Commissioner expressed concern
about groups rendered vulnerable by events unfolding in the region, including Crimean Tatars,
ethnic Ukrainians and all those who have refused Russian citizenship. He also stressed the
urgent need to ensure “free and unconditional access of international humanitarian and human
rights organizations to Crimea” as well as “unimpeded international monitoring”.
A. Civil and political rights
Rule of law
211. On 29 September, a Moscow city Court extended the detention until 11 January 2015 of
the Ukrainian citizen and film maker Oleg Sentsov, arrested in Simferopol (Crimea) in May
2014 and accused by the FSB under terrorism charges. On 13 October, the same Court upheld
the ban on Mr Sentsov’s lawyer from commenting on his criminal case. Mr Sentsov’s defence
considers these actions to be a violation of his rights. He also informed that his client’s name has
recently been placed on a list of suspected terrorists and extremists on the web-site of the
identification of police officers by placing special badges on uniform, and the last decree concerns ceasing certain
administrative functions for the traffic police, for example the issuance of driver’s license, and so forth.
73 Crimean Tatar Assembly.
42
Russian Federal Financial Monitoring Service, under number 2,460 in the section ‘Private
persons – Russian citizens’. The prosecution asserts that Mr Sentsov ‘automatically’ became a
Russian national as he did not formally and in person indicate his wish to retain Ukrainian
citizenship.
Impunity for human rights violations
212. Between 27 September and 31 October, five Crimean Tatars disappeared in unclear
circumstances. One of them, Edem Asanov, who went missing on 29 September, was later found
hanged in a deserted sanatorium in the city of Evpatoria. Other disappearances include two
Crimean Tatars cousins, Islyam Dzhepparov and Dzhevdet Islyamov, who are relatives of a
former Mejlis member and were abducted on 27 September by unknown men in military
uniform in the town of Belogorsk. In October, two more Crimean Tatars from Simferopol went
missing on 3 and 23 October respectively.
213. On 1 October, the so-called ‘prime minister’ of Crimea, Sergei Aksionov, met with
relatives of the two cousins abducted on 27 September and pledged to create a ‘contact group’ to
investigate cases of abduction as well as other incidents involving Crimean Tatars.
214. On 14 October, the first meeting of the ‘contact group’ was chaired by Mr. Aksionov and
the deputy head of the Crimean branch of the Russian Federation Investigation Department for
especially serious crimes. Five relatives of victims attended. Information was provided on
actions undertaken in relation to both recent and earlier disappearances, including the cases of
two other Crimean Tatars, Timur Shaimardanov and Seiran Zinedinov, who disappeared in late
May. Both were members of a pro-Ukrainian group – ‘Ukrainian House’ and went missing a few
days after another group member, Leonid Korzh, also disappeared. Regarding Shaimardanov and
Zinedinov, where no witnesses were found, the Crimean police opened criminal proceedings
under article 105 (murder) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In the cases of
Dzhepparov and Islyamov, where some witnesses claim to have seen the two being pushed into a
car, criminal proceedings were initiated under article 126 (abduction). The investigations,
initially conducted by the Crimean police, were subsequently transferred to the Russian
Federation Investigation Department. During the meeting, it was decided that this Department
would similarly take over the investigation concerning the case of enforced disappearance of 3
October. The ‘prime minister’ stated he was interested in an objective investigation of all
criminal acts and invited the contact group to closely cooperate with the investigation bodies.
215. The establishment of the contact group, coupled with the direct involvement of Russian
Federation investigative organs and the presence of relatives of the disappeared, are important
developments. Investigating all disappearances both before and after the March ‘referendum’ is
a duty of the de facto authorities. The HRMMU is aware of nine cases of disappearances and
two deaths74 since early March 2014. It would appear that some investigations have not taken
place while others were inconclusive, a situation which supports impunity and creates tensions.
The HRMMU sent a letter urging the de facto authorities to provide information on the state of
the investigations regarding all disappearances and deaths in Crimea since March 2014,
including those that have not been reviewed during the first meeting of the contact group.
216. Civil society groups and some witnesses claim that the so-called ‘Crimean self-defence’
was directly involved in most cases of abductions, deaths and other human rights abuses in the
past six months. Its members supported the takeover of public buildings in the peninsula in late
February and early March 2014 and are said to have been responsible for multiple human rights
abuses during and after that period, including torture and ill-treatment. However, the de facto
74 In addition to Edem Asanov who was found hanged on 6 October, another Crimean Tatar, Reshat Ametov, had
been found dead, on 16 March, in the village of Zemlyanichne apparently with signs of torture. See HRMMU report
of 15 April, pp. 20-21
43
authorities have always treated these groups with respect due to their active opposition to the
Ukrainian authorities and support to the March ‘referendum’.
217. Further, on 11 June, the so-called ‘parliament of Crimea’ passed a law which resulted in
the integration of the ‘self-defence’ into a ‘people’s militia’, with powers to assist the police in
keeping law and order. More recently, on 2 October, a draft law was submitted by the de facto
authorities of Crimea to the Parliament of the Russian Federation proposing to amnesty
‘militants’ and members of the ‘self-defence forces’ in Crimea. According to the draft, the
actions of the ‘self-defence forces’ and ‘militants’ committed between 27 February 2014 and 1
January 2015, including those which caused physical and moral damage, should be
acknowledged as having been ‘of extreme necessity’. The amnesty should also cover suspects,
defendants and those convicted in criminal cases. Excluded from the amnesty would be actions
committed for financial gain, as well as other self-serving motives75. It should be noted that it
contravenes the prohibition under international law of amnesties for international crimes and
other gross violations of human rights. The acts of all those suspected of having committed or
who ordered such crimes or violations must be investigated, perpetrators must be brought to
justice, and victims should be enabled full reparation.
Actions targeting Crimean Tatar institutions and their supporters
218. On 16 September, FSB officers and the police searched the houses of two Mejlis
officials, seizing notebooks, computers and hard drives. Later that day, they conducted an 11-
hour search of the Mejlis building in Simferopol. Mejlis session protocols were seized, as well as
religious books, computers, hard discs, and some personal belongings of Mustafa Jemiliev, the
former head of the Mejlis. On 17 September, a court writ was served on the charitable
organization Crimea Fund which owns the Mejlis building, giving it 24 hours to evacuate the
building. The document prohibits the charity from carrying out its powers as owner of the
building and six other premises. On 19 September, the Mejlis members left the building. On 29
September, the Central District Court of Simferopol upheld a request of the Crimean
‘Prosecutor’s Office’ to exclude Mustafa Jemiliev from the founders of the Crimea Fund.
219. The Mejlis opposed the March ‘referendum’ and has repeatedly criticized human rights
violations committed in Crimea since that time. Its supporters consider the actions of the
Crimean de facto authorities to be part of a concerted effort to undermine the authority and
influence of this institution among the Crimean Tatar community. On 22 September, in an
interview to a Russian media, ‘prime minister’ Aksionov stated that the Mejlis had no legal
existence as it was not properly registered under Russian law.
220. On 22 October, the Crimean ‘police’ arrested Tair Smedlyaev, brother of Zair
Smedlyaev, the head of the Kurultai’s election committee. The Kurultai is the parliament of the
Crimean Tatars. Tair Smedlyaev was accused of violating article 318 (violence against police
officer) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation during the 3 May action in Armyansk,
when Crimean Tatars gathered in support of Mr Jemilev’s attempts to enter the Crimea76. On 24
October, a Simferopol Court in a closed session ordered the two month pre-trial detention for Mr
Smedlyaev as a measure of restraint.
Actions targeting possession and dissemination of ‘extremist’ literature
221. The Crimean authorities continued actively searching for weapons, guns and religious
literature. Dozens of raids reportedly took place since August, focusing on literature considered
75 On 16 October, during a press conference in Moscow, the so-called Crimean ‘prime minister’ Sergei Aksionov
said that if the amnesty bill was not passed over 100,000 members of the ‘Crimean Self-Defence’ could be judged
and sentenced on the basis of the current legislation.
76 The protest involved thousands of Crimean Tatars gathering at the Crimean administrative border with the
mainland, to meet Crimean Tartar leader Mustafa Jemilev, who earlier had been banned by the Crimean
‘authorities’ from entry to Crimea because of his alleged ‘extremist activity’.
44
to be of an extremist nature, as listed on a federal list of extremist materials. While the searches
have overwhelmingly concentrated on Crimean Tatar properties - mosques, madrassas (Islamic
religious school), schools, libraries and private homes - there have also been reports of raids on
Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Halls.
222. Possession or distribution of ‘extremist material’ is punishable under article 20.29 of the
Administrative Code of the Russian Federation77 with a fine or imprisonment of up to 15 days
and confiscation of banned literature. For example, on 26 August, the Dzhankoi District Court
fined with RUB 2,000 (approximately USD 50) one of the deputy heads of the Crimean Muftiyat
in charge of education issues after the police raided a madrassa he oversaw in the settlement of
Azovskoe and seized religious literature. On 7 October, a librarian of a boarding school in the
village of Tankovoe (Bakhchisaray district) was fined RUB 1,000 (approximately USD 25)
because the school library contained three books from a collection of sermons by a Turkish
Muslim theologian, and one Jehovah’s Witnesses booklet. About a dozen other cases have been
opened under article 20.29 between August and October 2014 and most have led to fines being
imposed.
223. The Crimea ‘ministry of education, science and youth’ is participating in the campaign to
remove extremist religious literature and other banned books. In a letter dated 12 September, the
ministry ‘orders the administrations of educational organizations to conduct […] an analysis and
audit of literature present in libraries and educational premises on the subject of the presence of
materials on the Federal List, with the aim of its removal and destruction’.
224. Confronted with mounting criticism from the Crimean Tatar community78, the de facto
‘authorities’ have attempted to lower tensions. On 13 October, whilst meeting 150 Crimean
Tatars, including the head of the Muftiyat, who returned from the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca,
‘prime minister’ Sergei Aksionov announced a three month moratorium indicating that no
punishments for possessing such literature would be imposed during that time. Furthermore, in
an interview given to a Russian news agency on the following day, ‘prime minister’ Aksionov
stated that the de facto authorities would conduct “educational work” among Muslims in
cooperation with the Mufiyat during the moratorium and that the media would publish a list of
materials whose possession was prohibited.
225. The HRMMU is not aware of instructions having been issued to law enforcement organs
to halt raids and prosecutions until January 2015. However, the moratorium appears to be
respected. Furthermore, on 21 October, in one case involving a schoolteacher from Belogorsk,
the ‘supreme court’ of Crimea cancelled a District Court decision of 16 September, which had
found the schoolteacher guilty under article 20.29 of the Administrative Code of the Russian
Federation. She allegedly ‘repented’ and, instead of a fine, was given a ‘verbal warning’.
Freedom of expression
226. The space for free media in Crimea continued to shrink. The latest media outlet whose
activities were disrupted by actions of the de facto ‘authorities’ was the weekly Mejlis
newspaper, Avdet. On 17 September, Avdet editor was given an official warning by the FSB for
‘actions that might incite extremist activities’. A day earlier, the paper’s offices in Simferopol
were searched and on 18 September the FSB forced all tenants, including Avdet's staff, to vacate
the premises. In June and July, the editor had received written and oral ‘warnings’ related to the
newspaper’s reporting. Avdet continues to regularly publish but from different premises. The
77 This article punishes the "mass distribution" of items on the Federal List, as well as their "production or
possession for the purposes of mass distribution".
78 The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights visited Crimea on 10-11 September and heard
complaints from many Muslims about raids. He reported to local officials that he regarded these raids as
“disproportionate and excessive”.
45
editor in chief of the Crimean Tatar ATR television channel informed the HRMMU that a letter
from a Russian Federation media supervisory body to the Russian MoIA claimed that ATR was
disseminating false rumours about repression on an ethnic and religious basis and promoting
extremism. ATR was subsequently instructed by the police to show all documentation and a list
of employees. Like Avdet, ATR continues operating, but with the understanding that the channel
could be subject to legal or administrative actions should the content of its programmes be
deemed by the de facto ‘authorities’ to question that Crimea is part of the Russian Federation.
227. In an apparent attempt to limit freedom of expression, Nadir Bekirov, the head of the
Fund for Research and Support of the Indigenous Peoples of Crimea, was attacked in Crimea on
19 September. He was travelling to New York to take part in the UN General Assembly World
Conference on Indigenous Peoples. On his way to catch a train to Kyiv, a minivan blocked the
road and four masked men pulled him out of the car. He was beaten up and his passport and
mobile phone stolen. The Crimean police are investigating the incident.
228. On 30 September, the Crimean ‘vice-minister of internal policy, information and
communications’ informed that starting from 1 January 2015, the Russian Federation Service for
Supervision in the Sphere of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media will
apply sanctions to any of the Crimean mass media which conducts a ‘provocative policy’. An
example given was the Crimean on-line news agency Crimean Events, which publishes pro-
Ukrainian articles.
229. On 1 October, six editors and journalists of Crimean Tatar programmes on the Crimean
State TV and Radio Company Krym were dismissed from their posts due to ‘restructuring’.
According to the former chief editor, the authorities in Crimea appointed a new editor, who
announced the enrolment of new staff in order to change the content of the Crimean Tatar
programs.
Freedom of movement
230. The HRMMU travelled to Chongar, a crossing point on the administrative boundary line
between the region of Kherson and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and spoke to
representatives of the State Border Service of Ukraine. According to the information obtained on
the rules governing the entry of vehicles and passengers from Crimea into mainland Ukraine,
holders of Russian passports issued in Crimea and cars with Crimea-issued Russian license
plates are not allowed to cross the boundary line. Additionally a foreigner will not be allowed to
enter mainland Ukraine from Crimea because access to Ukraine can only be from a recognized
State border crossing.
231. An average of 300 vehicles circulate daily between Crimea and mainland Ukraine on
both sides and about three to five persons per day are denied entry into mainland Ukraine due to
one of the reasons cited above. However, the HRMMU learned from reliable sources that there
were also instances of Ukrainian nationals prevented from entering mainland Ukraine from
Crimea. This is in violation of the law “On Guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens and
on the legal regime on the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”, which provides that
‘Citizens of Ukraine have the right to free and unimpeded access to the temporarily occupied
territory and exit from it through the control points of entry and exit upon presentation of a
document confirming the identity and citizenship of Ukraine’79. This may also constitute a
violation of the right to enter one’s own country, as provided for in article 12(4) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
IDPs
232. According to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, 19,056 IDPs (including 5328
children) from Crimea and Sevastopol were registered in mainland Ukraine on 31 October.
79 See Article 10 of the law.
46
233. The HRMMU met with Natalia Popovych, the Permanent Representative of the President
of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Her office informs IDPs and Crimean
residents about their rights and entitlements and provides advice and support in legal, civil or
administrative matters as required. As of 1 October, Ms. Popovych’s office had received 312
requests, mostly on employment issues and the issuing of identification documents, including
passports. Other claims include education, property, pensions, banking deposits, and various
social benefits and entitlements. The Permanent Representative initiated the establishment of a
consultative council, made up of representatives of 13 civil society organizations, mainly from
Kherson region to discuss IDP issues and agree on joint solutions.
Persons deprived of their liberty
234. As of 10 September there were 2,671 inmates from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
serving sentences in various institutions throughout Ukraine. Of that number, 287 have
expressed the wish to return to Crimea after having served their prison term, but 56 did not have
identification documents enabling them to travel. A penitentiary institution in Kherson claims it
assists inmates with obtaining Ukrainian passports. However, an NGO in the region which
assists former prisoners maintained that they often leave prison with nothing but a document
confirming their discharge. They have no place to go to and, for those wishing to return to
Crimea, no possibility to travel. In this situation, they often become homeless.
B. Economic and social rights
Property rights
235. Using various pretexts, the self-proclaimed local authorities in Crimea and Sevastopol
continued to conduct actions amounting to forcible seizure of private property from individuals
or companies maintaining links to Ukraine. On 25 September, the public company Ukrtelecom
JSC informed that unknown persons had seized its premises and equipment. Employees’ access
was restricted, while the director was handed over a decree from the Sevastopol authorities
announcing that he was discharged from office.
236. Between 18 September and 9 October, the ‘state council’ of Crimea nationalized over 20
facilities, including health resorts, pensions and hotels, owned by the entrepreneur and Governor
of Dnipropetrovsk, Ihor Kolomoiskyi.
237. On 23 October, the Minister of Justice of Ukraine announced that Ukrainian
investigatory authorities had initiated criminal cases against judges, law enforcements officials
and Crimean executive service employees who had violated Ukrainian citizens’ rights in Crimea
and were involved in expropriations. A law adopted by the Crimean ‘Parliament’ on 31 July
2014 regulating property and land relations bans Ukrainian citizens, including those Crimean
residents who rejected Russian citizenship from using agricultural land which they own. They
are required to sell their land plots to Russian citizens only or to Russian legal entities.
According to Russian legislation, agricultural land includes horticultural, market-gardening and
dacha (cottage) cooperatives, as well as lands of former collective farms which were divided
between village residents and former workers of the collective farms.
Right to education
238. According to information obtained on 21 October from Ms. Natalya Popovich, the
Permanent Representative of the Ukrainian President in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
out of the 600 secondary schools in the peninsula, only 20 teach Ukrainian language and
literature three hours per week. Teachers of Ukrainian language and literature have been forced
either to retrain on their own account or to resign. In the last six months, the number of high
schools teaching Ukrainian has dropped from 96 to 12. According to Ms. Popovich, this would
be explained by a cessation of funding to schools that refused to join the newly created Crimean
47
Federal University.
C. The rights of indigenous peoples
239. The HRMMU travelled to Novooleksiivka (Kherson region), a town of 10,000
inhabitants of whom almost 4,000 are ethnic Crimean Tatars. The head of the regional Mejlis in
Kherson, Asan Aliev, explained that the greatest danger faced by the Crimean Tatar community
on the mainland was assimilation. Over 90% of the Crimean Tatars allegedly do not speak their
native language and communicate in Russian. There are two schools where the Crimean Tatar
language is taught, but only for two hours per week.
240. Several Crimean Tatars mentioned to the HRMMU that they considered themselves to be
an indigenous nation, entitled to recognition by law and to specific rights, such as the right to
have its own self-government institutions. They noted that the law on national minorities
adopted in 1992 did not provide for such recognition and that Ukraine did not have a law on
indigenous peoples. They expressed the hope that the new parliament elected on 26 October
would be more open to the adoption of legal measures confirming the status of the Crimean
Tatars as an indigenous people, which is a category recognized by the Constitution of Ukraine.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
241. A peaceful solution must be found to end the fighting and violence in the eastern regions,
to save lives and to prevent further hardship for those people living in the conflict affected area
and in the neighbouring regions. With the tenuous respect for the ceasefire and the Minsk
Protocols, people continue to be killed, and violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law persist. The situation in the conflict affected area is becoming
increasingly entrenched, with the total breakdown of law and order and the emergence of
parallel governance systems in the territories under the control of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. The continuing presence of a large amount of
sophisticated weaponry, as well as foreign fighters that include servicemen from the Russian
Federation, directly affects the human rights situation in the east of Ukraine. Guaranteeing the
protection of those who live within the conflict affected area must be of the highest priority, so
too the control and respect of the Ukrainian borders with the Russian Federation.
242. The impact of the hostilities on the whole of Ukraine, the economic downturn and the
potential energy crisis require timely and dedicated attention, to heal divisions within families
and communities, and to ensure that all human rights concerns are addressed. Accountability and
an end to impunity are at the core of ensuring peace, reconciliation and long term recovery.
Violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international
humanitarian law must be investigated and, where there is evidence of crimes, the perpetrators
brought to justice.
243. The situation for those living in Crimea, the status of which is prescribed by General
Assembly resolution 68/262, remains of particular concern with increasing violations occurring
for vulnerable and minority groups, including intrusive searches of mainly Crimean Tatar
properties. New cases of enforced disappearances are a matter of great concern and could further
fuel mistrust and increase tensions.
244. The root causes of the Maidan protests were the systematic and structural curtailment of
human rights and widespread corruption. As peace is pursued, Ukraine should be commended
for the steps already undertaken as outlined in this report, yet it must continue to meaningfully
48
reform its governance and legislative system to effectively enable the change that will promote
and guarantee human rights protection.
245. Recommendations made in the OHCHR reports published since April 2014 that have not
yet been acted upon or implemented remain valid and are reiterated. In addition, OHCHR calls
upon all parties to implement the following recommendations:
To all parties involved in the hostilities in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
a) Immediately release all persons illegally or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.
b) Guarantee transparency regarding the release of detainees, and prevention of
abductions, enforced disappearances, trafficking in persons and other human rights
violations and abuses.
c) Ensure the treatment with due respect and dignity of the bodies and remains of people
killed as a result of hostilities. Free and safe access to the areas where such bodies and
remains can be found must be provided to collect them and ensure their identification
and a dignified and decent burial, and return them to their families.
d) Increase efforts to search for missing people, ensure unfettered access by independent
experts and preserve evidence of possible mass graves.
To the Government of Ukraine
e) Investigate promptly and systematically allegations of summary, extra-judicial or
arbitrary executions in the conflict zone, and take all measures to ensure the
preservation of evidence.
f) All allegations of sexual and gender-based violence must be promptly investigated,
perpetrators held accountable and victims provided with an effective remedy, as well as
the required help and support.
g) Close all secret and ad hoc detention facilities and ensure that detainees are kept only in
officially recognised and supervised places of detention, and that all their rights are
fully respected.
h) Guarantee that all detainees can communicate with and be visited by their families,
have access to doctors and legal counsels. Lawyers must have access to the information
concerning: 1) the authority that ordered the detention; 2) the date, time and place
where the person was arrested and admitted to the detention place; 3) the authority
responsible for supervising the detention place; 4) the whereabouts of the detainee,
including, in the event of a transfer to another detention place, the destination and the
authority responsible for the transfer; 5) the date, time and place of release; and 6)
elements relating to the state of health of the detainee.
i) Urge the expedient signature and implementation of the law on IDPs.
j) Initiate wide public consultations to ensure that the law on lustration fully complies
with the relevant international norms and standards and provides adequate guarantees
against human rights violations affecting those concerned by this procedure.
k) Urge that the draft law ‘on the prevention or punishment of participants in events on the
territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’ is further amended in line with international
norms and standards, and to clearly prevent acts of torture and ill-treatment committed
by armed groups from being subject to amnesty, before being signed into law.
l) Call on all the authorities to support the drafting of a national human rights strategy for
Ukraine by 1 January 2015.
49
To the self-proclaimed authorities of Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the
Russian Federation
m) Urge the ‘contact group’ to make progress on investigations of cases of disappearances
and deaths and ensure that perpetrators of crimes are held to account.
n) Reconsider the legislative initiative to grant amnesty to the ‘Crimean self-defence’
group and reiterate that all allegations of gross human rights violations and abuses must
be investigated, their perpetrators identified and punished and their victims duly
compensated.
o) Put an end to selective searches of facilities and the confiscation of property belonging
mostly to Crimean Tatars.
p) Promote inter-ethnic harmony, and put an end to intimidation and persecution.
q) Promote and protect freedom of expression, guaranteeing full and non-discriminatory
access to information for all.

Annex 767
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (1 December 2014 to 15 February
2015)

􀀁
􀀁
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015
􀀁
􀀁 􀀄
CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL􀀁
INTEGRITY 7
A. Casualties 8
B. Evacuation of civilians 8
C. Alleged summary, extrajudicial or arbitrary executions 9
D. Illegal and arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture 􀀁
and ill-treatment 9
E. Measures limiting movement in and out of the conflict area 11
III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 12
A. Social welfare, food, health, education 12
B. The situation of internally displaced persons 14
IV. OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 15
A. Right to peaceful assembly 15
B. Freedom of expression 15
C. Women’s rights and gender issues 16
D. Rights of minorities and groups facing discrimination 17
V. ACCOUNTABILITY 17
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 20
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA 23
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25
􀀁
􀀁 􀀅
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This is the ninth report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation of human rights in Ukraine based on the work of
the Human Rights Mission in Ukraine (HRMU)1. The report covers the period from
1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015. The report presents the outstanding and emerging
human rights challenges in the eastern regions of Ukraine and in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea2 (hereafter Crimea) as well as other parts of the country. It considers the human rights
situation of all population groups affected by the ongoing current conflict and political
developments, including internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups.
2. The impact of the conflict on the human rights of those living in areas affected by the
fighting in the eastern regions is dramatic and frequently life threatening in areas where
fighting and indiscriminate shelling take place. OHCHR calls for intensified efforts by all
parties to the conflict to achieve a peaceful solution and to comply fully with the Minsk
agreement, and allow civilians remaining in areas affected by fighting to be evacuated on a
voluntary basis. Statements by representatives of armed groups rejecting any ceasefire
agreement and to scale-up offensives have been deeply worrying3. It is imperative that
indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas and targeting of civilians and civilian property and
infrastructure must cease immediately.
3. Non-implementation of all the provisions of the Minsk agreement concluded in
September 2014 has had a serious impact on the human rights situation, especially the number
of civilians killed and wounded and persons displaced. The situation in numerous localities
affected by fighting has been characterized by the increasing use of heavy and sophisticated
weaponry, including multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), new offensives in several areas
and indiscriminate shelling. Credible reports indicate a continuing flow of heavy weaponry
and foreign fighters throughout the reporting period, including from the Russian Federation,
into areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by armed groups. This has sustained
and enhanced the capacity of armed groups of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’4 to resist Government armed forces and to launch
new offensives in some areas, including around the Donetsk airport, Mariupol and
Debaltseve.
4. The peace talks on 11-12 February 2015 in Minsk resulted in agreement, inter alia, to
a new ceasefire starting from 15 February; the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the
contact line; the establishment of 50-140 km security zone; and the withdrawal of foreign
armed formations, mercenaries and weapons from the territory of Ukraine. OHCHR
welcomes the provision regarding an ‘all for all’ release of hostages and unlawfully detained
persons. OHCHR has advocated for this at the highest levels with representatives of the
armed groups, Government and the facilitators. Regarding the provision on amnesty for those
involved in the conflict, OHCHR reiterates the long-standing position of the United Nations
that amnesty must not be granted for international crimes, including gross violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law.
5. Following a relative lull in the hostilities in December under the ‘silence regime’, the
security and human rights situation in the east dramatically deteriorated in January and early
February 2015. 􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
1 The Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has evolved into the Human Rights Mission in Ukraine due
to its enhanced work, which includes technical cooperation.
2 The United Nations’ position on the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is guided by General
Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine.
3 The ‘prime minister’ of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, Aleksandr Zakharchenko, stated in
January that they would continue to push back government forces to the limits of the eastern Donetsk region.
“Attempts to talk about a ceasefire will no longer be undertaken by our side,” he said.
4 Hereafter ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
g y y y
. In areas of hostilities, there is continuing and indiscriminate shelling of highly
􀀁
􀀁 􀀆
populated civilian areas by all parties and an escalating toll of civilian casualties killed and
injured on a daily basis, including women, children and elderly people.
From mid-April 2014
until 15 February 2015, at least 5,665 people were killed (including 298 from MH-17 flight)
and 13,961 were wounded in the east of Ukraine5.
6. Heavy civilian tolls of dead and wounded have resulted from indiscriminate shelling
of residential areas in both Government-controlled areas, such as in Avdiivka, Debaltseve,
Popasna, Shchastia and Stanychno Luhanske, as well as cities controlled by the armed groups,
including Donetsk, Luhansk and Horlivka. On 13 January, 13 civilians were killed and 18
wounded, when a bus was hit by an MLRS GRAD rocket at a Ukrainian checkpoint near the
Government controlled town of Volnovakha. At least 31 people were killed, including 2
children, and 112 wounded in the Government controlled city of Mariupol, following deadly
attacks on 24 January by multiple launch rocket systems. An intensification of hostilities was
evident immediately prior to the February peace talks. On 10 February seven civilians were
killed and 26 injured in attacks on Kramatorsk, the headquarters of Ukraine’s ‘anti-terrorism
operation’.
7. The fighting and indiscriminate shelling have caused heavy damage to civilian
property and vital infrastructure, leaving civilians in highly precarious situations and often
without electricity, gas, heating, water or food. Hospitals, schools and kindergartens were hit
by shelling of residential areas, including in Avdiivka, Donetsk city, Horlivka, Luhansk,
Mariupol and other settlements, raising suspicion that civilian objects have been targeted or at
the minimum indiscriminate shelling of such areas had been conducted in the knowledge of
and with stark disregard for international humanitarian law and civilian lives.
8. Despite welcome steps by the Government of Ukraine to continue to supply gas and
electricity to some of the areas held by the armed groups, the impact of the destruction in
these areas is severe in freezing winter temperatures, particular affecting older persons,
persons with disabilities and others with limited mobility. Many civilians have remained
trapped in conflict zones. Locally agreed ceasefires and evacuation efforts have been
inconsistent and reports suggest inadequate evacuation modalities, including provision of
transport and other assistance, have been made available by the Government or by armed
groups in areas under their control. Civil society volunteers continued to play a vital role in
the evacuation of civilians. Many persons remaining in areas controlled by armed groups lack
the capacity, resources or assistance to leave such areas voluntarily.
9. Evacuees interviewed by the HRMU highlighted the lack of information on
evacuation opportunities and further steps. Some said that they had to arrange their own travel
out of the conflict zone, although there was an organized evacuation from some towns. As of
12 February, the Ministry of Social Policy reported that since 24 January, 1,898 children had
been evacuated from the immediate vicinity of fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Many of these children were unaccompanied and the HRMU emphasizes the importance of
keeping families together wherever possible.
10. Guaranteeing the protection of those who live within the conflict-affected area must be
the highest priority. Thousands of civilians remain trapped in locations including Debaltseve,
sheltering in basements and lacking drinking water, food, heating, electricity and basic
medical supplies. Evacuations have been hampered by lack of information and consistent
shelling. A ceasefire agreement on 6 and 7 February allowed many hundreds to leave
Debaltseve and adjacent villages. However, according to some of the evacuees, approximately
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
5 This is a very conservative estimate by the HRMU and the World Health Organization based on available data.
These totals include casualties within the Ukrainian armed forces as reported by the Ukrainian authorities and
casualties reported by civil medical establishments of Donetsk and Luhansk regions: civilians and some
members of the armed groups (without distinguishing them). The actual number of casualties is likely to be far
higher since military and civilian casualties remain under-reported.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀇
20 per cent of the original 26,000 residents have remained in the area, mostly older persons,
but also some families with children. Electricity, water and telephone connections are
disrupted and people have little food. Some underground shelters are reportedly now flooded
and unusable.
11. On 11 January 2015, the State Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) announced the
introduction of a temporary order to regulate travel in and out of the conflict area, which
became effective on 21 January6. This requires that movement into and out of the areas
controlled by armed groups must be through seven government-designated transport
corridors. Furthermore, special passes are required based on the necessity to travel and may
be refused, including on grounds related to national security or public order. IDPs reported
inconsistent practice and corruption in securing the vitally needed passes to leave the area of
armed conflict. This temporary order is particularly concerning in light of the Government
decision in November 2014 to discontinue providing State services in the territories controlled
by armed groups, which has had a severe effect on the most vulnerable groups, such as older
people, mothers with young children and persons with disabilities, who depend heavily on
social benefits. For humanitarian reasons the Government continues to supply gas and
electricity to the areas under the control of armed groups. On 26 January, the Government
introduced an ‘emergency situation’ regime in Donetsk and Luhansk and a state of ‘high alert’
throughout the rest of Ukraine. OHCHR notes that this does not diminish the human rights
obligations of the State.
12. Ensuring the safety and security of persons, as well as access to humanitarian aid for
vulnerable persons, and non-discriminatory delivery of humanitarian aid are therefore critical
concerns. The United Nations and other humanitarian organizations continue to seek
assurances of free and unimpeded access to all areas to perform their essential humanitarian
functions.
13. In many locations, reception centres for internally displaced persons (IDPs) are
overwhelmed, under-resourced and unprepared for potentially high levels of expected new
arrivals. Since the beginning of hostilities in April 2014 there has been massive displacement.
On 13 February, the Ministry of Social Policy reported that the number of registered IDPs had
exceeded one million people. According to UNHCR, 60 per cent of IDPs are pensioners7.
Those internally displaced by recent fighting commonly flee their homes with very few
possessions, inadequate warm clothing and with few financial resources. They are
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, the United Nations,
14. Allegations of violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law have persisted over the reporting period. Credible reports of arbitrary
detentions of civilians, torture and enforced disappearance have been alleged against the
armed groups and the Government.
The HRMU interviewed victims and verified numerous
accounts of acts that may amount to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. The arbitrary detention of civilians regrettably remains a feature of the hostilities,
including for the purpose of prisoner exchanges. In areas controlled by the armed groups,
‘parallel structures’ have been established and the break down in law and order in these areas
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
6 Temporary Order on the control of movement of people, transport vehicles and cargoes along the contact line
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
7 Many reportedly continue to live on the territories controlled by the armed groups and register as IDPs in
Government-controlled areas for the sole purpose of receiving social payments. The Cabinet of Ministers issued
an unofficial instruction to regional offices of social protection to check actual places of residence, but the local
authorities informed the HRMU that they lack capacity to conduct such checks.
y
p , q g consequently entirely reliant on assistance provided by the Government, the self-proclaimed
international and national humanitarian actors and volunteers.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀈
accommodates persistent violations of the rights of civilians, including abductions, arbitrary
detention, beatings and alleged torture.
15. Following a Presidential decree on the fourth wave of mobilization on 19 January
2015, there were public appeals against mobilization. Local groups organized rallies and tried
to block conscription offices in several towns. Subsequently a wave of anti-mobilization
protests took place in numerous Government controlled areas, particular in Severodonetsk,
Kramatorsk, Mariupol, several villages in Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Volyn and Ivano-Frankivsk
regions. In some cases people were prevented from protesting, facing opposition from other
groups and rival activists. In most cases no violence was reported. Criminal charges have
been brought against some individuals who openly oppose mobilization. Conscientious
objection to military service should be respected by the authorities, with opportunities
provided for non-armed service.
16. Little progress has been made in achieving accountability for violations of human
rights committed in the context of the continuing conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine.
While recognizing challenges due to the ongoing conflict, the HRMU urges that all possible
steps be taken to pursue investigations and prosecutions as appropriate, including into
possible international crimes and gross violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law.
17. Measures to achieve accountability for grave human rights violations committed
during the Maidan protests, in which at least 104 demonstrators and 13 law enforcement
officers were killed, and in 2 May violence in Odesa when 48 persons were killed, remain
inadequate with poor progress over the reporting period. According to the Prosecutor General,
the main obstacle impeding investigations into the Maidan violence remains the impossibility
to locate suspects who fled Ukraine and the lack of expertise in investigating this type of
cases. Regarding the 2 May violence in Odesa similar obstacles prevail and there is no
measurable result into the investigation of police and fire brigade negligence.
18. During the reporting period the Government continued to develop the human rights
strategy for Ukraine; a working group was established to amend the law on lustration of
public officials; and a national anti-corruption bureau was established. On 29 January,
Parliament registered a draft law establishing criminal responsibility for public calls to avoid
mobilization, which, if adopted, may contravene the rights to freedom of opinion and
expression and freedom of peaceful association.
19. The United Nations’ position on the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is
guided by General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 on the Territorial Integrity
of Ukraine. The situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea8 continues to be
characterized by systematic human rights violations affecting mostly Crimean Tatars and
those who opposed the March ‘referendum’. The application of Russian Federation laws,
which contravene resolution 68/262, also has human rights implications. Arrests and
detention of Crimean Tatar activists on charges related to demonstrations and disruption of
the activities of their civil society organizations and media outlets on the grounds of
prevention of ‘extremist activities’ have been evident. Arrests, prosecution and deportation of
Crimean Tatar leaders, including leaders of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis and the Committee on
the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatars, have been criticized by Crimean Tatar
leaders and those affected as politically motivated.
20. The exercise of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and of peaceful
assembly continued to be curtailed, particularly for Crimean Tatars. Limitations are imposed
on the freedom of religion or belief in Crimea due to restrictive registration requirements.
This situation, and instances of police raids on places of worship, has created anxiety among
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
8 Hereafter referred to as Crimea.
, y p ,
A
q p p g p g p g ,
p g g p y
􀀁
􀀁 􀀉
the religious groups and questioned the commitment of the de facto authorities in Crimea to
the protection of religious freedoms. In addition, on 26 December 2014 the Government of
Ukraine stopped train and bus connections from mainland Ukraine into Crimea, which
particularly affects older persons and persons with disabilities, on the grounds of ensuring the
safety of passengers and to prevent the penetration of ‘subversive groups’ from the peninsula.
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
Armed hostilities
21. The ‘silence regime’ between Ukrainian armed forces and armed groups declared on 9
December 2014, resulted in several weeks of relative calm. In January 2015, usage of tanks,
heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) resumed and spread to populated
areas along or near the line of contact. From mid-January, armed hostilities escalated to a
degree unseen since the 5 September Minsk agreement. Major flashpoints were the Donetsk
airport, the nearby village of Pisky and the town of Avdiivka; areas around the town of
Debaltseve and cities of Horlivka and Mariupol (Donetsk region); and the town of Shchastia
and the village of Stanychno Luhanske (Luhansk region). On 10 February, the Ukrainian
forces launched an offensive east of Mariupol, seizing control of several settlements. By 15
February, a number of Ukrainian units in Debaltseve ‘pocket’ (including the town and
surrounding areas) were cut-off from the main Government-controlled territories.
22. The peace talks held on 11 and 12 February in Minsk resulted in agreement, inter alia,
to a ceasefire to enter into force from 15 February; the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from
the contact line; the establishment of a 50-140km security zone; and withdrawal of foreign
armed formations, mercenaries and weapons from the territory of Ukraine. OHCHR
welcomes the provision regarding an ‘all for all’ release of hostages and unlawfully detained
persons. OHCHR has advocated for this at the highest levels. Regarding the provision on
amnesty for those involved in the conflict, OHCHR reiterates the long-standing position of
the United Nations that amnesty must not be granted for international crimes, including gross
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
23. Indiscriminate shelling of populated areas, both Government-controlled and those
controlled by the armed groups continued to be widespread. Although, in some cases,
imprecise targeting of military positions occurred in the immediate vicinity of built-up areas
(especially in Debaltseve area), there were also numerous cases of shelling of residential areas
not located near military positions.
24. On 13 January, 13 civilians were killed and 18 wounded, when a bus was hit at a
checkpoint near the Government-controlled town of Volnovakha (Donetsk region). The bus
was hit by a MLRS ‘Grad’ rocket launched from territory controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. On 24 January, at least 31 people were killed and 112 wounded following MLRS
attacks on the city of Mariupol (Donetsk region). The rockets were allegedly fired from the
territory controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. On 4 February, a hospital in the city of
Donetsk held by the armed groups, was hit with six people killed and wounding 25. The
MLRS rockets reportedly came from areas controlled by the armed groups.
25. On 22 January, at least 13 civilians were killed and 12 wounded in Donetsk, most of
them after a trolleybus and public transport stop were hit by mortars. On 29 January, eight
civilians were killed and 19 wounded amidst heavy shelling in city of Horlivka held by the
armed groups. The armed groups attributed responsibility for these and other cases of shelling
of residential areas to the Ukrainian armed forces. In January and February 2015, several
cases of usage of cluster munitions were reported. It is imperative that reports of shelling of
residential areas (either by conventional or prohibited weapons) be investigated promptly. In
calm
.
y g p , p p
􀀁
􀀁 􀀊
all cases, verification of the origin of the attacks remains required. All possible measures must
be undertaken to prevent civilian casualties and the targeting of civilians.
A. Casualties
26. Between 1 December 2014 and 15 February 2015, at least 1,012 people were killed
and at least 3,793 were wounded in the conflict area of eastern Ukraine. Due to the dramatic
escalation of hostilities (13 January – 15 February), at least 842 deaths were reported,
including at least 359 civilians. Of at least 3,410 reported wounded during this period, at least
916 were civilians. From mid-April 2014 to 15 February 2015, at least 5,665 people
(including at least 375 women9 and 63 children) were killed and at least 13,961 (including at
least 630 women10 and 159 children) were wounded. These totals include Ukrainian armed
forces (at least 1,756 killed and 5,505 wounded); 298 from flight MH-17; and casualties
reported by medical establishments: at least 2,420 killed and 4,919 wounded in the Donetsk
region, and at least 1,185 killed and 3,573 wounded in the Luhansk region. Casualties
reported by medical establishments include civilians and some members of the armed
groups11.
27. Many of those killed (especially members of armed groups) have been buried without
being taken to morgues, and insecurity prevented many wounded people from accessing
medical establishments. Hundreds are considered missing with numerous bodies pending
recovery and identification. Through interviews conducted in the Lviv region, HRMU noted
the lack of an effective system to inform relatives of deceased Ukrainian servicemen about
their rights and entitlements prescribed by the law. Moreover, family members of the missing
and captured servicemen also report lack of information from and contact with the relevant
authorities.
B. Evacuation of civilians
28. Since the upsurge in hostilities in late January, the State Emergency Service of
Ukraine has reported evacuations of civilians from residential areas in the vicinity of the
armed conflict, including Avdiivka, Debaltseve and Svitlodarsk in Donetsk region and
Chornukhyne, Popasna and Shchastia in the Luhansk region. According to Government
figures, the overall number of evacuated civilians from 28 January until 13 February was
8,429 people, including 1,923 children and 265 persons with disabilities. The armed groups
have also reported evacuations, including of some 1,100 civilians, mainly older persons and
children, from Vuhlehirsk (Donetsk region) and 272 people from the village of Chornukhyne
and nearby areas (Luhansk region) to safe locations in territories under their control.
29. Evacuations were hampered by constant shelling of Government controlled territories
and evacuation routes. Reports suggest that some incidents of shelling coincided with the
evacuation of civilians and may have been targeted to prevent it. In view of the temporary
order regulating transit across the line of contact and the requirement for individuals to have
an official pass, the State Emergency Service indicated to the HRMU that evacuations were
conducted with a simplified procedure that did not require passes. Individuals making their
own way out of territories controlled by armed groups continue to require the official passes,
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
9 Breakdown of casualties by sex is not available for the Luhansk region and is not reported by medical
establishments.
􀀄􀀃􀀁􀀁As in footnote 9.
11 As in previous reports, these are conservative estimates by the HRMU and the World Health Organization
(WHO) based on the available official data. Actual fatalities are probably much higher. Military casualties
remain under reported by the Ukrainian Government and by the armed groups and there is evidence that some
killed and wounded members of the armed groups have been taken to the Russian Federation.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀋
although some people described inconsistent enforcement of requirements and incidents of
the payment of bribes at border crossings.
30. The HRMU monitored reception and transit points for evacuees in Kharkiv,
Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv. Evacuees informed about problems they had encountered,
including a lack of information about evacuation opportunities, especially for those living in
the suburbs of towns where organized evacuations were conducted. Due to the constant
shelling, people were frequently hiding in basements with no electricity or communication
with the outside world. Some were not aware of organized evacuations and had to find ways
to leave by their own means. The HRMU is aware of some cases when civilians had to walk
to adjacent villages and cities in order to be evacuated, because neither volunteers nor
authorities could reach their settlements due to intensive fighting. Civil society volunteers
continued to play a vital role in the evacuation of civilians and many have relied heavily on
their assistance provided at great personal risk to themselves.
31. Evacuation from social care institutions is particularly difficult as many patients,
mostly older persons, have not consented to evacuation. High numbers of bedridden persons
who require special assistance or transportation also remain in conflict-affected areas.
Members of armed groups have on several occasions stated that they will not allow the
evacuation of people from such institutions to Government controlled areas. They have also
demanded the return to Donetsk of 260 orphans who were evacuated in the summer of 2014.
In addition, no steps have been taken for the evacuation of inmates of the penitentiary system.
C. Alleged summary, extrajudicial or arbitrary executions
32. A number of media reports and social media postings of videos have raised concern
over possible incidents of summary, extrajudicial or arbitrary executions. On 24 January,
armed groups claimed control over the settlement of Krasnyi Partyzan (30 km north of
Donetsk), which had been previously controlled by the Ukrainian armed forces. The video
footage made by the armed groups soon after the fight for the settlement and disseminated
through social media gives grounds to allege the execution of up to three Ukrainian
servicemen taken captive in Krasnyi Partyzan. Following fighting for Donetsk airport in
January and the subsequent taking of the airport by armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’, media reports suggested that the bodies of Ukrainian military personnel were found
in the airport with “their hands tied with white electrical cable.”12 OHCHR underlines that all
evidence of summary, extrajudicial or arbitrary executions must be fully investigated and
perpetrators prosecuted without the possibility of amnesty.
D. Illegal and arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture and illtreatment
By the armed groups
33. Estimates of the number of people held by armed groups vary continuously and reflect
the constantly evolving pattern of detentions and releases. Several hundred were thought to be
detained at any given time between December 2014 and mid-February 2015. On 9 December,
the Head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Main Investigative Department stated that
684 people were held by armed groups. On 11 December, the non-governmental organization,
The Centre for Release of Captives estimated the number of people held by the armed groups
to be 632. In addition to Ukrainian servicemen (as of 25 January, the Ukrainian Government
estimated the number still held as 184), people held by the armed groups include those
suspected of ‘subversive’ activities. On 22 January, the ‘head’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ declared that up to five Ukrainian ‘subversives’ aged between 18 and 35 were
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
12 See http://blogs.channel4.com/alex-thomsons-view/bodies-shells-snow-ruins-donetsk-airport/8993
􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀂
detained every day. On 22 January, a dozen Ukrainian servicemen captured at Donetsk airport
were forced to march through the streets of Donetsk. Several were physically assaulted by an
armed group commander and by onlookers.
34. As of 4 February, civilians held by armed groups are estimated by the Government of
Ukraine to number over 400. Some are held for minor offences and substance abuse.
However, civil society activists, journalists and staff of international NGOs continue to be
illegally detained. A Donetsk-based journalist was abducted on 8 January while observing a
‘humanitarian convoy’ from the Russian Federation and released on 7 February. On
31 January, a freelance journalist was abducted in Donetsk. His whereabouts were unknown
as of 15 February.
35. On 30 December, according to the ‘prosecutor general’s office’ of the ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’, a ‘criminal case’ was initiated against armed group commander Aleksandr
Biednov (call sign ‘Batman’) and his subordinates for illegal detention and torture resulting in
the death of a detainee. On 2 January, videos were released showing members of Biednov’s
group who confessed to running a facility in the basement of a university library in Luhansk
and taking part in the ill-treatment of captives. The ‘head’ of the facility (call sign ‘Maniac’)
allegedly used a hammer to torture prisoners and surgery kit to scare and extract confessions
from prisoners.
36. The Ukrainian female pilot, Nadiia Savchenko, Member of the Parliament of Ukraine
(since November 2014) and Ukrainian delegate to Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (since December 2014), has been in detention in the Russian Federation since July
2014 after being reportedly captured by armed groups in June. She is awaiting trial on charges
of involvement in the deaths of two Russian journalists killed during the conflict in eastern
Ukraine. On 10 February 2015, the Basmanny court in Moscow extended her pretrial
detention until 13 May. A motion to have her released on bail was rejected. She has now been
on hunger strike since 13 December and reportedly is being kept in solitary confinement in
the Matrosskaya Tishina detention centre in Moscow. On 9 February, EU foreign ministers
launched a plea for the Russian Federation to release her.
By the Ukrainian Government
37. Ukrainian law enforcement agencies continued to report on the detention of people
suspected of separatism and terrorism. On 10 December, the SBU announced that since
March 2014, it was carrying out over 3,000 criminal proceedings related to crimes against
national and public security. In the context of these proceedings, 1,043 people had reportedly
been notified of being officially
suspected; of them, 703 people had been arrested and 198
indictments (in relation to 254 people) had been submitted to the courts13. Information
received by the HRMU from the detainees, their relatives and lawyers reveals a pattern of
enforced disappearances, secret detention and ill-treatment by Ukrainian law enforcement
agencies in the security operation area and adjacent territories.
38. In December 2014, the HRMU interviewed a man who was unofficially detained by
unidentified Ukrainian servicemen and allegedly severely beaten for several days. Another
detainee claimed to have been beaten by SBU officers and kept in incommunicado detention
where he met detainees who had been beaten and subjected to mock executions. A freelance
journalist claimed that during his detention and SBU interrogation, masked men forcefully
raised his handcuffed arms behind his back and hung him in that position urging him to
confess to working for the Russian secret services. Several other detainees interviewed by the
HRMU alleged incommunicado detention and ill-treatment that may amount to torture.
39. As of 15 January, a joint database of the civil society initiatives included 37 cases of
people who had disappeared on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian armed forces. These
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
13 It shall be noted that exactly the same figures were released by the SBU on 22 January 2015.
g
􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀃
cases had been filed by relatives, some of whom reportedly saw missing persons being
detained by people in military uniform.
40. On 17 December, the pro-federalism activist Ignat ‘Topaz’ Kromskoi was reported by
the SBU to have been detained at the Ukrainian/Russian Federation border. He had previously
been detained and formally released from custody by a Kharkiv court on 12 September,
however he was taken away from the court room by the same guards who brought him there
and no one saw him free afterwards. His location was officially unknown and he was put on a
wanted list14. On 18 December 2014, during a court hearing to decide on his measure of
restraint (he was detained for two months), Mr Kromskoi stated that from 12 September until
17 December he had been held incommunicado in cell No. 5 of an SBU building in Kharkiv
(the SBU denies the existence of this facility). He claimed that he had taken a hidden video of
the cell, and had left notes on the walls, as well as hair and other traces to confirm his
presence there. According to him, on 17 December, the SBU took him from his cell, put him
on a bus and, as it approached the border, he was officially arrested. On 22 January, he
informed the HRMU of his alleged secret detention. He said he saw up to 90 other people
kept there. The HRMU also received other testimonies alleging the existence of this illegal
detention facility in Kharkiv. Regarding this issue, the SBU has denied the allegations of a
secret detention facility in Kharkiv.
Exchanges of detainees and captives
41. Exchanges of detainees and captives have continued over the reporting period. On 26
December, an exchange took place of 222 persons released by the Ukrainian Government in
exchange for 145 persons (members of voluntary battalions, National Guard, civilian
volunteers and civilians; all men) released by the armed groups. The exchange included
persons whose cases were followed by the HRMU and who allege secret and incommunicado
detention and ill-treatment while in custody. On 27 December and 2 and 5 January, at least
ten people were released by the Ukrainian Government and 16 captives were released by the
armed groups. On 6 January, there was reportedly the exchange of new lists of people for a
future exchange in the coming weeks. According to ‘the ombudsperson’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’, the armed groups requested to release 168 members of the armed groups
and 380 ‘political prisoners’. Detention of persons not associated with the conflict for the
purpose of exchanges has been reported. In February, representatives of the armed groups
reiterated their intention to conduct exchanges based on ‘serviceman to serviceman’. The
HRMU received information that some exchanged detainees were not given back their ID
documents. On 11-12 February, it was agreed in Minsk to “ensure the release and exchange of
all hostages and illegally detained persons based on ‘all for all’ principle”.
E. Measures limiting movement in and out of the conflict area
42. On 21 January 2015, a temporary order regulating travel into and out of the conflict
area came into effect15.
With reference to national security concerns, it limited the movement
four district police departments. Those wishing to travel are required to provide their itinerary
and duration of stay in the area – whether it be in Government-controlled territory or territory
a valid passport; and a copy of a document justifying the
necessity to travel (e.g. proof of residence; proof of illness of a relative; certificate of
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
14 Mr Kromskoi is suspected of committing crimes under articles 28 and 294 (participation in mass disorders
accompanied by pogroms, arson and destruction of property), article 110 (encroachment on the territorial
integrity of Ukraine) and articles 28 and 289 (illegal seizure of the vehicle) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
15 Temporary order on control of the movement of people, transport vehicles and cargos along the contact line in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
, p y g g
of civilians, passenger and cargo vehicles to seven corridors in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions. The order also introduced special passes issued at ‘coordination centres’ located in
under the control of armed groups;
􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀄
employment, etc.). The HRMU was informed of various problems in implementing the order:
hotlines providing information on the procedures could not be reached or did not work; passes
were not provided to offices authorized to issue them; coordination centres were
overwhelmed with up to 3,000 applications in each in the first days of their operation. Lack of
a specific provision for civilians wishing to move solely due to security concerns largely left
such crossing at the discretion of local security officers, frequently leading to the payment of
bribes. No legal procedure has been established to appeal against the refusal to issue a pass.
43. Civilians living in and wishing to leave territories controlled by armed groups have to
travel to the checkpoints at least twice: to submit documents and to receive a pass. They have
faced constant danger as shelling and attacks on Ukrainian checkpoints intensified. On 26
January, at a checkpoint near Mariinka, an explosive device in a car went off killing the driver
and one Ukrainian soldier. Mortar shelling began simultaneously. The discontinuation of
State services16, including postal service, in areas controlled by armed groups added to the
difficulty of providing required documents. No alternative provisions were envisaged for
people whose identification documents were lost or taken away, which is a widespread
problem. Interviews conducted indicate that some people who experienced problems
obtaining passes to leave via the line of contact are leaving the conflict zones through the
Russian Federation territories and then having to bribe Ukrainian border officials to re-enter
Ukraine (some paying 10 times the official fine of UAH 170). On 27 January, the
Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Children's Rights announced that families with
children may leave the territories without a special pass and reports received by the HRMU
indicate that this has been the case.
III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
44. The impact of the conflict on the enjoyment of economic and social rights has been
devastating for those living in conflict-affected areas and internally displaced persons, in
particular women, children, older persons and persons with disabilities. An escalation in the
hostilities since January 2015, including heavy and indiscriminate shelling, has caused, in
addition to the increased numbers of casualties, significant additional displacement,
destruction of infrastructure and housing, leading to the almost total economic and
infrastructure breakdown in some of the worst affected localities. Since 10 January, at least 27
schools, kindergartens and hospitals have been damaged, in some cases leading to casualties,
both in towns controlled by both the Government and armed groups. In the towns regularly
shelled, at least 50 residential buildings are damaged on a weekly basis. As of 15 February, 77
settlements in the conflict affected area with approximately 202,000 residents remained
completely without electric power supply and heating. Due to the shelling of water facilities,
461,350 people in Donetsk region and 86,862 people in Luhansk region do not have access to
safe drinking water.
A. Social welfare, food, health, education
45. The payment of salaries, pensions and social benefits for those living in territories
controlled by the armed groups stopped in November 2014, making it difficult for local
residents to purchase essential goods. At the very least, 600,000 pensioners17 in Luhansk and
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
16 Pursuant to the Presidential Decree ‘On Immediate Measures aimed at the Stabilization of the Socio-Economic
Situation in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions’ as of 14 November 2014 enacting an earlier decision of the National
Security and Defence Council of Ukraine.
17 The estimates are very conservative and the actual number affected is likely to be higher. In Ukraine
‘pensioners’ include not only the elderly but also other categories, for example persons with disabilities.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀅
Donetsk regions have been left without regular income due to the cessation of the allocations
from the State budget. Often the only income, its termination makes these persons extremely
vulnerable. As described below, many pensioners had to register as IDPs in order to receive
pensions while still living in areas controlled by the armed groups.
46. Access to food is increasingly challenging in conflict-affected areas and humanitarian
actors have expressed their concern about their impeded access to the conflict area.
Humanitarian actors reported that they have supplies in warehouses, while access to areas of
need is hampered by roads being closed, due to shelling and restrictions imposed on the
Government side of the line of contact. In December 2014, some battalions of the Ukrainian
armed forces - ‘Dnipro-1’, ‘Donbas’ and ‘Kryvbas’ - blocked access of a humanitarian
organization to the areas controlled by armed groups, demanding the release of prisoners held
by armed groups. On 29 January, the volunteer initiative, ‘Humanitarian Mission of Aid to the
Civilians from Conflict Area’, noted that due to the new rules, it has become more difficult
for Ukrainian volunteers to deliver aid. It is reportedly difficult to provide the package of
documents required by customs services. In Artemivsk, a control point for cargo transport,
trucks are reportedly held up for several days. It is also difficult to pass through other control
points: Stanychno Luhanske, Shchastia, Avdiivka; the latter has been regularly shelled.
47. On 30 January, the Cabinet of Ministers issued Decree No. 2118, regulating the
provision of humanitarian aid to residents of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. However, it does
not provide clear guidance on how to deliver aid to conflict affected areas and does not
facilitate the efforts of humanitarian actors, as was its intention. Child and infant nutrition is a
constant need in all conflict-affected areas as well as in IDP centres. The November 2014
Presidential Decree ending Government financing of State institutions, such as hospitals, in
territories controlled by armed groups has potentially serious implications for a wide range of
economic and social rights. It is recalled that Ukraine has continuing obligations to the
realization of such rights as a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
48. In January, most hospitals in conflict affected territory remained open but reported
severe shortages of various drugs, particularly painkillers, antibiotics and other essential
medical supplies. Patients suffering from chronic conditions, including HIV/AIDS, TB and
drug dependency are likely to run out of essential medicines upon which their lives depend.
49. Penitentiary institutions, nursing homes, psycho-neurological and other facilities
continue to function albeit without State financing and depend entirely on humanitarian aid.
Humanitarian actors report a constant shortage of medicine and hygiene kits. The situation is
particularly dire in the psycho-neurological facilities due to a severe shortage of drugs crucial
for its patients. On 30 January, the HRMU learned that 2,332 persons remain in the
institutional care of such facilities in territories controlled by the self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’. According to Ukrainian ministries, 577 children remain in orphanages and
some 5,000 children in family foster care in territories controlled by armed groups. 􀀁
50. Access to education in conflict-affected areas has been severely curtailed. School
buildings have been damaged and heating and power cut-off, forcing schools in many towns
to close. As of 15 February, all schools in Donetsk city were closed. In Horlivka 16 schools
and four kindergartens were reported to have been damaged by shelling. Numerous education
sector workers have left the eastern regions. As of 13 February, in ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ all schools and kindergartens were reported to be closed. Evacuees interviewed by
the HRMU reported that schools have not been functioning for over three weeks in towns
controlled by the Ukrainian Government in the conflict area due to shelling.
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
18 This resolution was adopted according to the Presidential decree as of 14 November (on urgent measures for
the east and relocation of state institutions) by which the President instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to adopt
the procedure on provision of the humanitarian aid and its marking with state symbols.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀆
51. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine made provisions to facilitate access
to education for students living in the areas controlled by armed groups. The enrollment of
IDP children into schools is done based on the written application from their parents with no
other documentation required. As of 15 February, 71,632 IDP children were registered in
schools of Donetsk (territories under Government contrtol), Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk regions
and Kyiv city. To enable children who remain in territories controlled by the armed groups as
well as Crimea to continue their education and sit exams, the registration deadline for the
independent assessment (exams required to enter universities) has been prolonged to 20 April
for school graduates from these areas.
B. The situation of internally displaced persons
52. As of 13 February the Ministry of Social Policy reported that the number of registered
IDPs in Ukraine had exceeded one million people, more than a twofold increase in their
number since the beginning of December 2014. Approximately 60 per cent of the IDPs are
reported to be pensioners. At the same time, the State Emergency Service, responsible for
accommodation of IDPs reported that the number of people displaced from the east had
reached 731,422 people as of 15 February (711,209 from Donetsk and Luhansk regions and
20,213 from Crimea), This figure includes 133,178 children and 328,770 persons with
disabilities. The discrepancy in the IDP numbers provided by the different Government
bodies may be partly explained by so called ‘pension tourism’. Government Resolution
No. 637 states that pensions are to be paid only to those who are registered IDPs residing in
the Government controlled territory. Some pensioners who still live in territories controlled
by the armed groups register with the Ministry of Social Policy to continue receiving their
pensions.
53. The accommodation capacities in regions neighbouring the conflict area are almost
exhausted. New IDPs from conflict-affected regions who arrive at locations such as Sloviansk
or Kharkiv have been encouraged by the State Emergency Service to travel to western and
southern regions of Ukraine. Authorities provide IDPs with free onward train tickets. New
arrivals have little choice but to accept them. The HRMU recalls that under international
standards, all authorities should ensure the voluntariness of the displacement process,
including respecting decisions of IDPs to travel to locations of their choice. In view of new
and potential future displacement flows, new winterized accommodation options may be
required in eastern regions and information should be provided to IDPs to assist their
decisions and ensure, to the extent possible, their right to freely decide upon the location of
their temporary resettlement.
54. In October 2014, Parliament adopted the law on IDPs, however many concerns remain
regarding their rights and welfare. While many desire an early return to their homes when
conditions allow it, recognition of the likely protracted nature of the displacement for many
IDPs is essential. The elaboration of a programme to ensure durable solutions for IDPs is
essential. IDPs unable to return to their homes must be properly integrated into other regions
of Ukraine on a voluntary basis and in full consultation with them. Article 2 of the law on
IDPs guarantees the right of a displaced person to return and to reintegration, however, it sets
no guarantees for integration in other parts of Ukraine as required by international standards,
including the Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons.
55. Despite the efforts of regional authorities, IDP reception centres in many locations are
overwhelmed, under-resourced and under-prepared for possible high levels of expected new
arrivals following the upsurge in fighting in some areas and essential evacuations. IDPs and
those supporting them continue to stress their urgent needs, which include winter clothes,
hygiene kits, diapers, food and non-food items, and medicines (including for chronic
conditions). There is a lack of disease monitoring and control at IDP reception and transit
􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀇
points for contagious diseases such as tuberculosis. Reports indicate that there is a lack of
shelter to accommodate people, particularly those with special needs or limited mobility, who
cannot be sent to other regions.
􀀁
􀀁
IV. OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
A. Right to peaceful assembly
56. During the reporting period, the right to peaceful assembly was generally exercised in
most of the country, with the exception of territories controlled by the armed groups and
Crimea. Nevertheless a number of prohibitions of protests by courts in Kharkiv and Odesa
regions in the name of public order and safety were reported. Public appeals for peace and
protests against mobilization gained momentum throughout Ukraine in the reporting period.
57. After the fourth wave of mobilization was announced on 14 January, there were
attempts to oppose mobilization and initiate a dialogue with State authorities in some cities,
which were then followed by anti-mobilization protests in cities including Ivano-Frankivsk,
Kyiv, Kherson, Mariupol, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, and parts of Donetsk controlled by the
Government. In some cases protestors were opposed by rival activists, as noted in
Kramatorsk, Mariupol and in Zaporizhzhia region. A recent initiative, ‘People of Peace’,
calling for the reconciliation of two sides to the conflict, received criticism in social media
and its public events were prevented from being held on several occasions. It has also been
noted that those who oppose mobilization and the conflict report increasing antagonism
towards them. In January, the HRMU followed the cases of prosecutions of people who
publically opposed mobilization. On 29 January, Parliament registered a draft law
establishing criminal responsibility for public calls to avoid mobilization19. On 8 February, a
man who recorded a public video appeal to the President of Ukraine ‘I refuse mobilization’
Criminal proceedings have been initiated against him under article 111 (high treason) and 114
(espionage) of the Criminal Code. The video was widely disseminated by several Russian TV
channels, which also invited him to participate in programmes on the situation in Ukraine,
classified by the prosecution as ‘propaganda’. The HRMU is concerned about these measures,
which can be considered as criminalization of dissenting political views.
B. Freedom of expression
58. The HRMU is concerned about continuing attacks on journalists in Ukraine,
particularly in eastern areas controlled by armed groups and in Crimea (see below). On 11
February, the State Committee on TV and Radio Broadcasting addressed the issue of freedom
of expression and protection of the rights of Ukrainian and foreign journalists in Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. It was stated that since
March 2014, at least 78 journalists have been held by armed groups and at least 60 attacks on
media offices have been documented. Many journalists were forced to leave Crimea, and the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions due to constant threats. In addition the State Committee stated
59. In other regions of Ukraine some journalists or media offices were attacked due to
their alleged ‘separatist’ views. On 10 January, the editorial office of Slavianka newspaper in
Kharkiv, was attacked by unknown masked men who broke windows and threw Molotov
cocktails into the office. On 22 January, a journalist of a local ‘pro-federalism’ website,
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
19 Draft law ‘On Introduction of Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine (regarding liability for public
appeals to avoid mobilisation)’ No. 1886 as of 29 January.
g p y p and published it on ‘Youtube’ was sentenced to a 60-day detention as a preventive measure.
g , p that “there is also a large-scale and aggressive Russian propaganda campaign.”
􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀈
covering the preparatory trial hearing on the 2 May violence in Odesa, was beaten outside the
Malynovskiy city court in Odesa.
60. In other cases, journalists
were attacked for criticizing local authorities or law
enforcement officials. On 26 January, a journalist of the Internet outlet Traffic Control from
Chernihiv reported an attempt on his life, which he assumed, was related to his work on the
lustration of police serving under the Yanukovych government. On 11 February a Ukrainian
journalist from Dnipropetrovsk region working for the Russian Federal news agency and St.
Petersburg-based news agency Nevskiie Novosti was detained in Mykolaiv region for
allegedly gathering data about the defence industry of Ukraine. 0n 12 February, the central
district court of Mykolaiv ordered his detention for pre-trial investigation until 11 April under
article 111 (high treason) of the Criminal Code.
C. Women’s rights and gender issues
61. With the prolongation of the conflict and displacement, women are increasingly
vulnerable to various human rights violations and abuses both in Government and armed
group controlled areas. The economic consequences of the conflict also acutely affect women.
Those trapped in areas of fighting are at a heightened threat of sexual violence. Information
from NGOs and IDPs that young women and men are being taken off buses leaving the
conflict zone require further investigation. The HRMU is concerned that cases of violence
against women may go unreported. The NGO La Strada, which operates a national hotline,
reported only few calls related to sexual violence. Yet cases continue to emerge: one IDP
woman reported sexual violence against her by members of the armed groups and members of
an unidentified Ukrainian battalion, and remains severely traumatized.
62. Women may be at increased risk of domestic violence, as servicemen return from the
conflict area without receiving proper social and psychological services. La Strada registered
an increase in calls relating to domestic violence over the reporting period (72.2 per cent of
total calls). It reported that incidents of psychological violence are increasing in families of
IDPs, as well as within those remaining in the conflict area.
63. Women, including those internally displaced, may be at heightened risk of being
exposed to trafficking, sexual violence and resorting to prostitution as a means of survival. In
the reporting period, the HRMU became aware of cases of trafficking involving IDPs. On 19
January a man in Lviv was arrested on suspicion of allegedly recruiting four women, one Lviv
resident and three IDPs, for sex work in Israel. One of the IDPs stated that she was desperate
for any income, as it was impossible to find employment and she had to provide for her two
children. The case highlights the need for all actors working with IDPs to be alert to the threat
of trafficking facing displaced women. The International Organization for Migration was
providing services for two IDP women from Luhansk region who were allegedly in the
process of being trafficked to Turkey for sex work.
64. Some incidents of discrimination continued against the LGBTI community, especially
in the territories under the control of the armed groups. On 19 December, the HRMU
succeeded in evacuating a transgender man from the areas controlled by armed groups who
was in fear of persecution and isolated at home without access to either food or medicine. As
a transgender man, he was believed to be at risk of detention and violence if attempting to
leave the area himself, as his identification documents did not reflect his gender identity. The
HRMU negotiated with officials from the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the Ukrainian
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ukrainian military to escort him to safety.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀉
D. Rights of minorities and groups facing discrimination
65. The HRMU continues to monitor the human rights situation of minority groups and
incidents of discrimination throughout Ukraine and to identify trends in this regard. As noted
by the Special Rapporteur on minority issues following her visit in April 2014, Ukraine has a
legislative, policy and social environment that is generally conducive to the protection of
minority rights, including linguistic and cultural rights20. Nevertheless the Special Rapporteur
recommended the further strengthening of Ukraine’s legislative and institutional frameworks
for minority rights protection. The HRMU continued receiving reports of alleged
discrimination against Roma
who frequently face additional challenges including lack of
documents. On 11 December in Sverdlovsk (under control of the ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’), a group of armed men reportedly broke into Roma homes, robbed them and took
their passports. On 15 December, a Roma NGO reported that two police officers, in civilian
clothes, came to the collective centre and harassed and threatened Roma IDPs and demanded
money from them.
66. The HRMU received reports of targeting of religious minorities in the areas controlled
by armed groups. On 10 January, in Horlivka, five Jehovah’s Witnesses ministers were taken
to the office of a ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ commander and accused of betraying the
Orthodox religion.
They were allegedly punched and kicked and subjected to mock execution.
After several hours, they were released while threatened with being shot if they continued
their religious activities. On 22 January, in Donetsk city, a Jehovah’s Witnesses minister was
abducted at his workplace by members of the Oplot battalion, a military unit of ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’. He was blindfolded and interrogated several times before being released
on 23 January. On 5, 11 and 20 December 2014, Kingdom Halls (prayer houses of Jehovah’s
Witnesses) were seized by armed groups in Krasnyi Luch, Telmanove and Zuhres.
67. On 15 January a synagogue was vandalised in Ivano-Frankivsk with offensive
inscriptions.
The HRMU spoke with the local Jewish community representatives, who
informed them that similar incidents had occurred previously, but never received appropriate
attention by the law enforcement officials, and that such cases have always been categorized
by police as hooliganism and the persons responsible have never been found. The written
complaints and applications of representatives of the community concerning similar incidents
were left without response. At the same time, the community does not perceive such instances
as posing any threat or having some wider anti-Semitic context.
68. On 15 January, residents of Mykolaiv originally from Azerbaijan and Armenia filed a
complaint to the Office of the Prosecutor General for racial discrimination, as they were
refused to be served in a local restaurant and were told that “Caucasians were not welcome”.
A criminal investigation was launched under article 161 of the Criminal Code (violation of
equality of citizens based on their race, national origin and religion).
V. ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability for human rights violations in the east
69. The Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as the SBU conducted investigations into
cases of indiscriminate shelling of residential areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The
Ministry collected all available evidence relating to major incidents, but emphasized that a
core obstacle barring the investigation remained the lack of access to the territories shelled.
The HRMU also noted that a further obstacle to accountability is that many witnesses/victims
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
20 A/HRC/28/64/Add.1 available online in English and Russian and all UN languages at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session28/Pages/ListReports.aspx
p g g g
y g p y g p
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􀀁 􀀃􀀊
are reluctant to file complaints to the police for fear of reprisals and in the absence of
trustworthy protection schemes.
70. While a significant percentage of criminal proceedings in regard to human rights
violations in the east were opened under charges of terrorist acts, the Government reported
On 13 January the district court of
Sloviansk delivered the first judgment against a member of the armed groups of the selfproclaimed
‘Donetsk people’s republic’, recognising the latter as a ‘terrorist organization’ and
sentencing him to eight years imprisonment for membership of such a group under article
258-3 of the Criminal Code (membership of a terrorist organisation) and related charges. This
judgment may set a precedent for subsequent judgements against those suspected of affiliation
with the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ identifying them as terrorists.
71. The HRMU has been following the case of the former mayor of Sloviansk, Nelia
Shtepa, who remains in custody charged under articles 110 (trespassing the territorial integrity
of Ukraine) and 258 (creation of a terrorist organization) of the Criminal Code21. In a
concerning development, Ms Shtepa’s deputy, who was one of the main witnesses for the
defence, was abducted on 30 January and subsequently found dead along with his driver. The
HRMU learnt from the lawyers that other defence witnesses - around 40 persons - have since
become reluctant to appear as witness in the proceedings.
72. As of 4 February, offices of the military prosecution conducted 49 criminal
proceedings against servicemen of the National Guard and Armed Forces of Ukraine and 26
criminal proceedings into human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions and illegal
deprivation of liberty committed by the ‘Aidar’ and ‘Donbas’ battalions in the conflict area.
On 11 February, the Office of the Military Prosecutor reported the completion of pre-trial
investigations against four servicemen of the ‘Aidar’ battalion accused of killing a civilian
who refused to stop his car at a checkpoint on 19 November.
The HRMU repeatedly come
across instances where the military prosecutor's office investigators refused to pursue a case,
arguing that civil prosecutor’s office investigators had to prove first that servicemen had been
involved in these crimes. Since not all combatants are provided with chevrons or other
identification marks, investigations can be significantly impeded.
73. The ‘ombudsperson’ of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ reported on 3
February (having collected evidence in the ‘White Book’ project) of military crimes
committed by Ukrainian armed forces. The ‘White Book’ reportedly includes almost 3,000
documents, victim and witness reports and video footage. According to the ‘ombudsperson’
almost 2,000 individual applications have been received which will be submitted to the
European Court of Human Rights in a case against Ukraine.
74. The Office of the Prosecutor General, which is responsible for observation of
compliance with the law by law enforcement bodies, reported that its investigations into
allegations that the Kharkiv Regional Office of the SBU was used as a place of illegal
detention, had not led to the identification of cases of illegal detention at that location, despite
witness testimonies received by the HRMU.
Accountability for human rights violations committed in the context of Maidan protests
75. Progress in accountability for serious human rights violations committed during the
Maidan protests in which at least 104 demonstrators and 13 law enforcement officers were
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
21 In addition to this case, the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine have reported prosecution of at least six high
level national and local politicians. These include former Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration,
Mykhailo Dobkin, Kharkiv City Mayor, Hennadii Kernes, Mayors of Stakhanov – Yurii Borysov, of Debaltseve
– Volodymyr Protsenko, and of Kurakhove – Serhii Sazhko, and former head of the faction of the Party of
Regions in the Parliament – Oleksandr Yefriemov. All of them were suspected of trespass on the territorial
integrity of Ukraine under Article 110 of the Criminal Code, however, no case has yet been brought to court.
p
g p g
p g
only one case where a person was convicted of such act. O
􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀋
killed and 1,200 people were injured (including 1000 who sustained gunshot wounds),
remains inadequate with poor progress over the reporting period. According to the Prosecutor
General of Ukraine, the main obstacle to investigations remained the difficulty in locating
suspects who fled Ukraine as well as the lack of expertise in investigating this type of cases.
An investigation into the forceful dispersal of Maidan protestors on the night of 30 November
2013, when 84 people were injured, has established that the former head of the Kyiv City
State Administration, Oleksandr Popov, was responsible for the violent actions of the police.
He is charged under the Criminal Code with illegal impediment of public meetings and
collusion with the purpose of abuse of power. Four ‘Berkut’ officers were suspended and
placed under house arrest for their alleged role in the 30 November events.
76. On 6 February, the Prosecutor General reported that approximately 1,000 criminal
proceedings were ongoing into human rights violations and abuses committed during Maidan
protests. Eight indictments in cases related to killing of protestors were submitted to the court.
On 20 January, the Prosecutor-General informed the HRMU of submission of the indictment
on the case of killing of 39 protestors by a group of law enforcement officials (including three
Berkut servicemen) on 20 February 2014. On 23 January two servicemen remanded in
custody had their detention extended until 23 March 2015. The Berkut commander was
released from custody and placed under house arrest by the court in September 2014, however
he subsequently escaped, raising serious questions regarding the appropriateness of his house
arrest for such serious charges. The suspects are charged under the Criminal Code articles 115
(murder), 262 (theft of firearms) and 365 (abuse of power by the law enforcement). On 2
February the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that its investigations into the killing of
protestors in February 2014, had established that firearms used by the tytushky22 against
protestors in Kyiv were obtained from the Ministry.
77. On 20 January, the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed the HRMU of the
completion of pre-trial investigations in relation to a former senior official of the Kharkiv
Regional Department of Internal Affairs who allegedly ordered the dispersal of pro-Maidan
protestors in Kharkiv on 19 February 2014, in which protestors were injured as a result of
violent police action.
Accountability for the 2 May violence in Odesa
78. No essential progress has been reported in investigations into the killing of 48 persons
burning of the Trade Union Building in Odesa on 2 May 2014. During preliminary court
hearings by the Malynovskyi District Court of Odesa from 16 January, lawyers for the
defendants (mostly ‘pro-federalism’ activists) drew attention to human rights violations and
procedural omissions contained in the indictment: failure to provide Russian Federation
citizens with Russian translation of indictment; failure to specify the action of each accused
during mass disorder; failure to indicate information on conducted investigative actions, and
incorrect personal data of participants of the trial. On 2 February 2015, the panel of judges
ruled that the indictment regarding organising mass disorder in the city centre violated the
right to fair trial and did not comply with the Criminal Procedure Code, and should be
trial hearings were held in a tense atmosphere with threats by ‘pro-unity’ supporters. There is
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
22 Organized groups of young men used to attack peaceful rallies or stage provocations.
and inflicting bodily harm to
p g g p
247 people ( including 22 police officers) during the clashes and
g y p p g p ) g
D
g g y g p y
g y y y y, y
returned to the Office of the Prosecutor General for revision and correction. The preparatory
no measurable result into the investigation of police and fire brigade negligence on 2 May,
which is chaired by the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀄􀀂
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Legislative developments related to the situation in the east
79. Confronted with a surge in hostilities from January 2015 the authorities introduced
measures designed to prevent the further destabilization of the security situation, including the
temporary order regulating travel in and out of the security operation area,23 which became
effective on 21 January 2015. The temporary order may contravene elements of international
standards for freedom of movement, restrictions to which must be based on clear legal
grounds and meet the test of strict necessity and proportionality. Whereas it is acceptable to
restrict access into the security operation area, making it hard or impossible for civilians to
leave the area of conflict is not in compliance with article 12 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights24. The Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (articles
14 and 15) also establish that IDPs are free to move anywhere within a country. As the
shelling and fighting has intensified, impeding movement of civilians out of the conflict areas
contravenes the international humanitarian law customary norm regarding removal of
civilians from the vicinity of military objectives. The temporary order has also created
difficulties for the delivery of humanitarian aid, contrary to international humanitarian law,
which obliges the parties to a conflict to allow rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian
relief for civilians25.
80. Another legislative development related to the situation in the east is the elaboration of
a draft law that would empower the High Administrative Court of Ukraine to decide whether
an organization should be considered as ‘terrorist’26. Requests for recognition can be
submitted by the Office of the Prosecutor General or prosecution offices in the regions based
on documentary evidence. The decision of the High Administrative Court cannot be appealed
and would enter into force immediately. The draft law provides that in a crisis situation the
decision to recognize an organization as terrorist may be taken by the National Security and
Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC). This draft law raises serious questions as it enables a
non-judiciary body with links to the executive branch to make a legally binding determination
of an organization as terrorist and lacks internationally recognized fair trial guarantees,
including due process and the right to appeal. The draft should be significantly amended in
order to comply with international standards.
81. On 26 January, the Government introduced an ‘emergency situation’ regime in the
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk under Government control, and a state of ‘high alert’
throughout the rest of Ukraine27. The purpose of this measure was reportedly to ensure proper
identification of the needs of the population in the conflict affected areas and efficient
coordination of State assistance, and to strengthen the protection of civilians. On the basis of
this regime, local authorities in government-controlled areas will have enhanced powers to
use State funds, notably to rebuild infrastructure destroyed during the fighting. The
emergency situation regime is regulated by the Code of Civil Protection of Ukraine, which
deals with the tasks, role and responsibilities of the State in connection with the protection of
the population in emergency situations. OHCHR reiterates that this ‘emergency situation’
regime must neither diminish the human rights obligations of the State nor must it affect the
enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms.
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
23 Temporary Order on the control of movement of people, transport vehicles and cargos along the contact line in
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
24 General Comment 27 of the Human Rights Committee (paragraph 16).
25 See Rule 55 on Access for Humanitarian Relief to Civilians in Need.
26 Draft Law No. 1840 ‘On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on the Recognition
of Organizations as Terrorist ones’, registered in parliament on 26 January 2015.
27 Order No. 47-r ‘On the establishment of regimes of high alert and emergency’.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀄􀀃
82. A State commission was created to streamline civilian protection efforts,28 including
to draw up an inventory of State facilities that can be used for the protection of civilians and a
registry for the delivery of equipment as well as humanitarian and other supplies. Regional
emergency commissions will support and complement the civilian protection measures that
already form part of the legal obligations of the State,29 namely activities necessary for
evacuation, safety and health. In a resolution of 30 January, a procedure for rendering
humanitarian assistance to the population was elaborated which provides for assistance to be
distributed through the State administrations of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in areas
controlled by the Government and in areas controlled by armed groups’. While the intention
to provide and ensure access to humanitarian assistance without discrimination is a positive
signal, no procedures for coordination and delivery to areas controlled by armed groups are
elaborated.􀀁
83. On 3 February, Parliament adopted a law ‘On military-civilian administrations’ aimed
at ensuring the functioning of local administrations in the conflict area. The law allows the
State-appointed regional administrations in Donetsk and Luhansk to nominate civilian and
military personnel to run local self-government bodies. This measure applies to territories
under the control of the Ukrainian armed forces. It appears to be aimed at making up for the
absence of local people to fill local government positions as a result of the ongoing conflict.
Other legislative and institutional developments
84. On 9 February, the Kyiv District Court of appeal partially cancelled the Government
decision adopted in November 2014 that discontinued pension and social security payments
for residents in the areas controlled by armed groups. The court declared illegal the provisions
of paragraph 2 which state that “in cities of Donetsk and Luhansk regions where State
authorities temporarily cannot exercise or cannot exercise at all their functions, payments
from the State budget, budget of the Pension Fund of Ukraine and other budgets of funds of
social insurance will be conducted only after the Government regains control over these
territories”. If after 10 days no appeal is received, the Government will become liable to
resume payments and retroactively pay pensions and other social payments suspended since
November 2014 when the decision entered into force.
85. On 12 January, President Poroshenko signed a decree ‘On the Strategy of sustainable
development – Ukraine 2020’. The strategy foresees 62 reforms including on the fight against
corruption, decentralization, energy independence, and modernising the judiciary, the public
administration and the defence system. A national council on reforms, involving civil society
representatives, was established and tasked to submit strategies and other draft documents
concerning the administration of justice and legal institutions. Several anti-corruption laws
were adopted30 and the powers of the prosecution were reduced.
86. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Justice, the Government continued working on
the development of the national human rights strategy. Upon the request of civil society, the
deadline of 1 January 2015 for its adoption was extended until 31 March 2015 to provide
additional time for consultations. The elaboration of the strategy has been based on a
consultative process involving representatives of the Government, civil society, the
Ombudsman’s Office, UN agencies and regional organizations. Over a dozen meetings in
plenary sessions and sub-working groups were held in December, January and February.
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
28 Resolution No. 18 ‘On the State Commission on technogenic and environmental security and emergencies’.
29 See Resolution No. 11 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ‘On approval of the Regulation on the unified
state system of civil protection’ (9 January 2014).
30 See the HRMMU report of 31 October 2014.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀄􀀄
Lustration law and anti-corruption measures
87. A government-led working group was established on 12 January 2015 to prepare
amendments to the law ‘On the purification of Government’ (lustration law) adopted on 16
September 201431. The ‘lustration’ of public officials was demanded during the Maidan
protests to address corruption and human rights violations by officials under the Yanukovych
government. Assessment of the law by the Venice Commission revealed several
shortcomings, including: an overly broad timeframe for its application; collective guilt by
virtue of belonging to a category of public officials; and a lack of fair trial guarantees. By 12
February 2015, 395 high-ranking State officials had been dismissed, including heads and
deputies of ministries, government agencies and State bodies at central, regional and local
levels. More than 200 decisions have been appealed in court. Eight decisions were confirmed,
while three were overturned, leading to reinstatements. The remaining cases are on hold
pending a Constitutional Court ruling on the constitutionality of the law32.
88. A law ‘On fair trial’ adopted on 12 February aims to improve the impartiality and
professionalism of judges. It provides for a complete re-attestation of judges; elaborates in
detail procedures for membership of the bodies in charge of appointing, dismissing and
initiating disciplinary proceedings against judges; enhances the powers of the Supreme Court
as the ultimate cassation authority; and widens the scope of disciplinary proceedings that can
be initiated against judges. The provisions are conducive to improving the functioning and
independence of the judiciary, however, constitutional changes have been recommended33 to
ensure that judges are elected by their peers rather than by parliament; and to make the lifting
of judicial immunity the prerogative of an independent authority rather than parliament.
89. On 31 January, amendments to the lustration law34 came into force enabling the
selective exemption of high ranking military and security officers from the lustration
procedure due to the ongoing conflict. At least one case resulted in the reinstatement of a
general previously dismissed under the lustration law. The amendment may be abused and
carries the risk of exemptions being obtained through corruption or other illicit means.
90. The law establishing a National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NACB) entered into force
on 25 January 2015 while legal acts are being adopted for its functioning. The NACB is a
specialized law enforcement agency to fight corruption among senior officials, including
ministers, judges and heads of public administrations. It can conduct investigations and open
criminal proceedings for corruption cases involving more than UAH 600,000. Its creation
constitutes a positive development but should be combined with other necessary reforms,
including of the courts, which have lacked independence and integrity. The police and the
prosecutor’s office remain responsible for investigating corruption cases involving non-senior
officials and smaller amounts, despite very limited success in the past.
Law on criminal proceedings in absentia
91. Amendments to the law on criminal proceedings in absentia35 became effective on 31
January. Trials in the absence of the defendant will be possible when a suspect has left the
country and for individuals known to be in the area of the security operation or in Crimea.
Amendments widen the scope of the law to include parts of Ukraine which the authorities
neither have access to nor control. The HRMU notes that the grounds for prosecution in the
absence of the accused, as provided for in the law on criminal proceedings in absentia, are
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
31 For a description and analysis of the law, see the HRMMU report of 31 October 2014.
32 Requests to assess the constitutionality of the law was made by the External Intelligence Service of Ukraine
(18 October 2014), the Supreme Court of Ukraine (20 November 2014) and 47 deputies (20 January 2015).
33 See Opinion No. 639/2011 of the Venice Commission of 18 October 2011.
34 Law No. 132-VIII ‘Оn Introducing Amendments to the Law of Ukraine on the Purification of Government’
Regarding Additional Measures to Secure the Defense Capabilities of the State’.
35 The law was analysed in the HRMMU report of 31 October 2014.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀄􀀅
very wide36, making possible a frequent resort to this procedure. International law recognizes
the right of the accused to be present in person at trial37.
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
92. Political pressure and intimidation continued against Crimean residents opposing the
de facto authorities in Crimea and in particular Crimean Tatars and human rights activists. In
addition, for the first time, the de facto authorities in Crimea have opened legal proceedings in
relation to incidents that occurred prior to the March ‘referendum’ in application of Russian
laws in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, contrary to General Assembly resolution 68/262
on the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The exercise of the rights to freedom of opinion and
expression and of peaceful assembly continued to be curtailed while registration requirements
imposed limitations on the exercise of freedom of religion or belief.
93. The de facto authorities in Crimea started legal actions in relation to the events of 26
February 2014 when supporters of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, mostly Crimean Tatars, and
pro-Russia demonstrators, clashed in front of Crimea's parliament building. Two individuals
died in the scuffles and about 30 were injured.
On the following day, armed men took over
Crimea’s parliament. On 29 January 2015, the Crimean police arrested the
Deputy Chairman
of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Akhtem Chiigoz, who took part in the demonstrations.
A
Simferopol court ordered his detention until 19 February and later extended it until 19 May.
Mr Chiigoz is accused under article 212 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
(Organization and participation in mass disturbances), which carries a maximum prison
sentence of 10 years. On 7 February another Crimean Tatar, Eskender Kantemirov, was
detained and accused under the same charges. On 8 February, a court placed him in pre-trial
detention for two months.
94. On 26 January 2015, armed masked men raided the premises of the Crimean Tatar TV
channel ATR. Equipment was confiscated and some staff members were detained for several
hours. According to Crimea’s prosecution office, the channel had been warned against
violating the Russian Federation law on extremist activities. Sources within ATR stated that
the searches involved video materials related to the events of 26 February 2014.
95. The de facto authorities in Crimea started legal proceedings in relation to Crimean
participants of the Maidan events. On 8 February, Oleksandr Kostenko was remanded in
custody for two months accused under article 115 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation38 of having injured a Berkut special police officer during demonstrations in Kyiv.
In this case, as well as the case involving the deputy chairman of the Mejlis, legal proceedings
relate to events preceding the March ‘referendum’ and the de facto application of Russian
legislation in Crimea. This seems to be against article 15(1) of the ICCPR, which states that
“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which
did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed.”
96. A Crimean Tatar activist, Edem Osmanov, was arrested by the Crimean police on 19
January 2015 in connection with the events of 3 May 2014 when thousands of Crimean Tatars
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
􀀅􀀆􀀁The law allows trial in absentia for: overthrow of the constitutional order; violation of territorial integrity or its
financing; high treason; attempt against the life of a statesman; sabotage; espionage; murder and corruption.􀀁
37 Proceedings in absentia are in some circumstances (for instance, when the accused person, although informed
of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, declines to exercise their right to be present) permissible in the
interest of the proper administration of justice (See Daniel Monguya Mbenge v. Zaire, Communication No.
16/1977, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 76 (1990)
38 Article 115 concerns “deliberate infliction of mild damage to health for motives of political, ideological,
racial, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity, or hatred or enmity in relation to a social group”.
j g y,
p y , p . p y
j , g , p
p y y
􀀁
􀀁 􀀄􀀆
came to the administrative border with Ukraine to greet the former head of the Crimean Tatar
Mejlis, Mustafa Jemilev, who had been banned from entering Crimea by the de facto
authorities on 22 April 2014. A tense standoff with the Crimean police ensued, with the
Crimean Tatars briefly blocking a few roads. A court placed Mr Osmanov in pre-trial
detention for two months. He is the fifth Crimean Tatar activist detained in relation to these
events since October 2014 on charges of using force against a police officer39 despite
eyewitness reports that the action was largely peaceful.
97. On 25 December 2014, Gennady Afanasiev was sentenced to seven years
imprisonment by a Moscow city court. Together with Ukrainian film director Oleh Sentsov
and pro-Ukrainian activists Oleksandr Kolchenko and Oleksii Chornyi, he was arrested in
May 2014 in Simferopol, accused of a ‘terrorist plot’, and later transferred to a pre-trial
detention centre in Moscow. Mr Afanasiev had confessed to the charges while in police
custody in Simferopol without access to family or a lawyer. On 28 January, a court in
Simferopol refused Oleksandr Kolchenko’s request to keep his Ukrainian citizenship. It stated
that he had applied for Russian citizenship, a claim denied by his lawyer. On 3 February, in
addition to the accusation that he organized a ‘terrorist plot’, Oleh Sentsov was also charged
with illegal possession of weapons under article 222-3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation (unlawfully obtaining, selling, possessing weapons, explosive substances and
devices).
98. Intimidation of civil society activists has continued over the reporting period. On 23
January 2015, Sinaver Kadyrov, Eskender Bariiev and Abmedzhit Suleimanov, three
coordinators of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar people, a
Crimea-based NGO, were stopped by Russian border guards as they were crossing the
administrative boundary line with mainland Ukraine. After being interrogated by FSB
officials, two were released but Mr Kadyrov was detained and taken to a court, which fined
him and ordered his deportation from Crimea for “violating migration legislation and the
passport regime”. On 17 January 2015, the three had organized a conference in Simferopol
that adopted a resolution calling on the Ukrainian authorities and the international community
to protect the Crimean Tatar people. In December 2014, they had tried unsuccessfully to hold
a public event on Human Rights Day.
99. On 23 January, officials of the Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested three Crimean
Tatars near Simferopol on suspicion of belonging to Hizb ut-Tahrir, a religious organization
banned in the Russian Federation for extremism.
Their arrest followed searches of their
houses. They were placed in pre-trial detention for two months in accordance with article
205-5 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (planning and participation in the
activities of a terrorist organization). These are the first cases known to the HRMU of charges
for belonging to a banned religious organization since the March ‘referendum’.
100. On 30 January, the Crimean ‘head’ adopted a decree enacting a ‘Comprehensive Plan
to counter the terrorist ideology in the Republic of Crimea for the period 2015 to 2018’
developed on the basis of an analogous document of the Russian Federation. The plan aims to
‘effectively decrease the threat of terrorism’ through measures designed to prevent the
radicalization of various population groups, ‘in particular the youth’. The measures include
identifying people who participated in the armed conflicts in the northern Caucasus of the
Russian Federation and other states, including Syria and Ukraine; disseminated terrorist and
extremist ideology and information discrediting the Russian Federation; or are members of
non-traditional religious organizations and sects. Other measures include terrorism prevention
programmes in the media and educational spheres, and activities to promote tolerance, interethnic
and religious harmony.
􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀁
39 The other four were remanded in custody for two months in October 2014 and released in December but are
still facing charges of using force against a police officer.
􀀁
􀀁 􀀄􀀇
101. Freedom of peaceful assembly continued to be restricted by actions of the de facto
authorities in Crimea. The Committee on the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatars, a
Crimean NGO, was prohibited by the de facto authorities of the city of Simferopol from
holding an event to mark Human Rights Day (10 December) on the grounds that it could
block public transportation and access to public buildings as well as “constitute a real threat to
the life and health of the population”. An appeal against the ban was rejected and the
organizers notified the Simferopol city administration about a planned protest rally instead,
also on 10 December. This notification was also rejected and the protest could not go ahead
due to a strong police presence. At a press conference later that day, members of the
Committee were doused in green paint by a group of young men. The police did not
investigate the incident.
102. The Ukrainian authorities restricted the movement of people to and from Crimea. On
26 December 2014 train and bus connections from mainland Ukraine into Crimea were
stopped. The decisions of the Railway Transport of Ukraine (‘Ukrzaliznytsia’) and the State
Inspection on Safety of Overland Transport mentioned the need ‘to ensure the safety of
passengers’ and to prevent the penetration of ‘subversive groups’ from the peninsula.
Passenger cars and trucks are still allowed to move in and out of Crimea. However, this
situation has created very long lines of vehicles. There are reports of people needing to walk
through the two custom services and border guard check-points, which are separated by a five
kilometre-long ‘security area’, by foot. Suspension of bus and train connections particularly
affects older persons and those with disabilities, who used to travel by train to the mainland.
103. Religious communities in Crimea currently operate based on Ukrainian registration,
which the de facto authorities in Crimea have neither recognized nor formally denounced.
Russian Federation law requires religious communities and civil society organizations to
register by 1 March 2015. Registration is essential to open a bank account or rent premises
and is a pre-condition for inviting foreign citizens. Non-registration of the Roman Catholic
Church in Crimea has led to the departure of a Polish priest and nuns of the Roman Catholic
parish in Simferopol after their Ukrainian resident permits expired in late 2014. Similarly, 23
Turkish imams residing in Crimea under a 20-year-old programme with the Crimean Tatar
Mejlis had to leave due to non-registration of the Mejlis under Russian law. This situation,
and instances of police raids on places of worship, has created anxiety among religious
communities and questions the commitment of the de facto authorities in Crimea to the
protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
104. In view of the serious escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine since January and
its devastating impact on civilians caught in indiscriminate shelling and other hostilities, it is
essential that the fighting be brought to an end without further delay. Credible reports indicate
a continuing influx of heavy and sophisticated weaponry to armed groups in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, as well as foreign fighters, including from the Russian Federation. This has
fuelled the escalation of the conflict and new offensives by armed groups, undermining the
potential for peace as armed groups extend their areas of control. This has resulted in further
and significant increases in civilian and military casualties. All parties to the conflict must
implement fully the provisions established under the Minsk agreement including: a new
ceasefire to have entered into force from 15 February; the withdrawal of heavy weaponry by
both sides to create a 50-140km security zone; the withdrawal of foreign armed formations,
mercenaries and weapons from the territory of Ukraine; and the reinstatement of full control
of the state border by the Government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area.
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105. Travel restrictions imposed by the Government of Ukraine on movement across the
line of contact have created new threats to civilians in affected areas already in extremely
precarious situations, adding to their vulnerability. Assumptions that those who remain on
territory controlled by armed groups have made their choice to remain, are worrying and
misguided. Many of those who remain do so in fear for their lives due to indiscriminate
shelling of homes and evacuation routes, to protect children or other family members, or lack
the physical means to leave, including elderly persons, those with disabilities and others. All
of those who remain have a right to protection according to international human rights and
humanitarian law, which must be respected for all, by all relevant authorities, everywhere.
106. Despite previous warnings that continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine could
potentially result in new waves of internally displaced persons, national responses to new
displacement over the reporting period remained inadequate, unprepared and largely in the
hands of volunteers and humanitarian organizations. The Government must do more to meet
the needs of internally displaced persons, in conformity with their rights under international
standards, including to ensure winterized accommodation in locations preferred by IDPs,
provision of social benefits, and ensuring all their basic needs are met. It is essential to
recognize that for many, displacement is likely to be protracted and that durable solutions
with regard to housing, employment and integration must be promptly put in place.
107. The impact of the conflict on the economic and social rights of civilians is massive
and long-term. All parties to the conflict should strive to guarantee economic and social rights
as required by international human rights law and to minimize the restriction of access to
basic social services, including health, education, social security as well as access to housing.
Interruption of access to such services could have life-threatening or life-long impact on a
large portion of the population and would hinder post-conflict recovery of the society. In
times of resource constraint, it is essential to mobilize maximum available resources and
avoid retrogressive measures.
108. OHCHR continues to appreciate the cooperation extended by the Government of
Ukraine to the HRMU during the reporting period. The HRMU will continue to monitor and
report on the evolving situation with a view to contributing to an unbiased and accurate
assessment of the human rights situation throughout Ukraine. It will work closely with the
Government and other national, regional and international actors, including the United
Nations system, and will endeavour to assist all actors to fulfil their commitments with
respect to international human rights and humanitarian law.
109. While all previous recommendations contained in OHCHR reports issued since 15
April 2014 remain valid, OHCHR calls upon all those involved in the conflict in Ukraine to
implement the following recommendations:
a) Guarantee efforts to abide by and implement the Minsk agreement to end the conflict
in the Donbas region and urgently bring an end to the fighting and violence in all
localities.
b) Ensure the protection of civilians in conflict affected regions in full conformity with
international human rights and humanitarian law, including an immediate end to
indiscriminate shelling of populated areas that puts civilians at risk.
c) Ensure free and unimpeded access for humanitarian actors to all necessary areas as
well as the rapid and non-discriminatory delivery of humanitarian assistance, while
adhering to international norms and ensuring the protection of humanitarian actors.
d) Lift restrictions on free movement across the line of contact on the grounds of security
to ensure that civilians wishing to leave conflict affected areas can do so promptly and
safely without undue restrictions or delays that may put them at risk due to
indiscriminate shelling and attacks at checkpoints.
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e) Enhance evacuation measures, including for those in institutional facilities, to ensure
that all individuals wishing to leave conflict affected areas have access to information,
transport and essential needs. Respect ceasefire agreements to ensure the safe and
voluntary evacuation of civilians.
f) Provide all necessary assistance to internally displaced persons according to
international standards such as the Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons,
including with regard to their freedom of movement and the need for durable
solutions.
g) Release all those unlawfully or arbitrarily detained without delay and in conditions of
safety. Treat all detainees, civilian or military humanely and according to international
human rights and humanitarian law and standards, including those regarding women
in detention.
h) Investigate and prosecute according to law any person found to be responsible for
serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, degrading or
inhumane treatment or punishment of detainees, summary or arbitrary execution, or
enforced or involuntary disappearance, including those with command responsibility.
i) Mechanism for the reporting of violence against women should be established and
referral and support systems put in place to ensure the protection of women and girls
who may be highly vulnerable to sexually-based or other forms of violence, trafficking
and prostitution as a means of survival and ensure prompt investigation of all cases.
j) Ensure the protection of family unity and that wherever possible children are not
separated from their parents, including in the context of evacuation of civilians.
k) Implement measures in the field of education to ensure to the fullest extent possible
that students, including those living in areas controlled by armed groups, who wish to
do so, may continue their education, sit exams and obtain Ukrainian diplomas and
certificates.
l) Ensure freedom of the media and the liberty, security and rights of journalists to freely
conduct their legitimate professional activities.
m) Guarantee the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of opinion and
expression and freedom of association for those legitimately protesting, including for
those who object to military mobilization.
n) Law-enforcement agencies should ensure prompt and effective investigation of crimes
motivated by ethnic or religious hatred, including desecration of property and places
of worship and acts of violence.
110. With regard to the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, OHCHR notes a
continuing deterioration of the human rights situation for some persons belonging to the
Crimean Tatar indigenous group, in particular political and human rights activists and
community leaders. Measures have been implemented that undermine the legitimate rights of
this and other communities, including freedom of religion or belief and freedom of
association and peaceful assembly, and the rights of minorities. To the de facto authorities in
Crimea and to the Russian Federation, OHCHR makes the following recommendations:
o) Review of the judicial legitimacy of criminal cases brought against Crimean Tatar
leaders and activists and deportations of some leaders should be conducted to answer
challenges that cases are politically motivated.
p) Freedom of religion or belief should be fully respected and protected, including the
right of religious communities to freely function without undue administrative or
legislative hindrance, harassment or other restrictions, including by law enforcement
bodies.
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q) The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association should be fully restored and
measures should be taken to protect that right in practice and to ensure that
organizations may hold events including commemorations and demonstrations freely
and without hindrance.
Annex 768
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February–15 May 2015)

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
16 February to 15 May 2015
2
CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY 6
A. Armed hostilities 6
B. Casualties 7
C. Alleged summary, extrajudicial or arbitrary executions 8
D. Illegal and arbitrary detention, and torture and ill-treatment 9
E. Trafficking in persons 13
III. FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 14
A. Freedom of movement 14
B. Freedom of expression 15
C. Freedom of peaceful assembly 17
IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 18
A. Right to an adequate standard of living 18
B. Right to social protection 19
C. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 21
V. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 21
A. Accountability for human rights violations in the east 22
B. Accountability for human rights violations committed during
the Maidan protests 23
C. Accountability for the 2 May violence in Odesa 25
D. Investigation into Rymarska case 26
E. Administration of justice 27
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 29
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA 33
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 36
3
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This is the tenth report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, based on the work of
the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)1. It covers the
period from 16 February to 15 May 2015.
2. The reporting period covers the time span that marked one year since the events which
had dramatic impact on the human rights situation in Ukraine and which have triggered its
subsequent deterioration: February 2014 events at Maidan; the so-called ‘referendum’ in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea of 16 March; the start of the Government’s security operation
in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk on 14 April to re-gain control of territory and
buildings seized by the armed groups in March and April 2014, which was met with resistance
and reportedly bolstered by the influx of foreign fighters and weapons from the Russian
Federation; the violence on 2 May in Odesa; and the so-called ‘referendums’ on self-rule in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions on 11 May, which contravened the Constitution of Ukraine and
international norms and standards.2
3. For more than a year, the lack of protection and justice for victims and the impunity of
perpetrators have prevailed in Ukraine. Accountability for gross human rights violations
committed during the Maidan protests, in which at least 104 demonstrators and 13 law
enforcement officers were killed, and in the 2 May violence in Odesa, when 48 persons died,
is pending. No perpetrators have been brought to justice, and the investigation into these
cases remains slow. Though the Office of the Prosecutor General claimed that it had identified
all senior Government officials involved in decision making during Maidan events, no one is
informed that they are a suspect in the case. Only seven people suspected of killing protestors
on 18-20 February 2014 have been detained so far with two of them being tried. Investigations
in Odesa by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Office of the Prosecutor General are
widely believed to be unreliable, particularly because of the inability or unwillingness of law
enforcement bodies to bring to justice those responsible for the violence. The prosecution of
perpetrators is also reportedly hampered by the fact that some of them have fled Ukraine.
4. Collapse of law and order on the territories controlled by the self-proclaimed
‘Donetsk people’s republic’3 and the self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk people’s republic’4 continued to
be aggravated by on-going armed hostilities between the Ukrainian armed forces and armed
groups. The hostilities continue to be accompanied by violations of international humanitarian
law and have had a devastating impact on the overall enjoyment of human rights by an
estimated five million people living in the area. In places directly affected by the fighting, such
as Debaltseve, Donetsk and Horlivka, people pleaded to the HRMMU: “we just want peace”.
5. The current ceasefire in eastern Ukraine is not fully respected. Agreed upon on 12
February 2015 as part of a Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk
Agreements with participation of representatives of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the
‘Luhansk people’s republic’, it entered into force on 15 February. The Package also foresees
the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the contact line; the establishment of a 50-140 km
security zone; the withdrawal of illegal and foreign armed formations from the territory of
1 The HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout
Ukraine and to propose recommendations to the Government and other actors to address emerging human rights
issues. For more details, see paragraphs 7-8 of the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
situation of human rights in Ukraine of 19 September 2014 (A/HRC/27/75).
2 For more details on these events, see paragraphs 3-6 and 9-10 of the abovementioned report.
3 Henceforth referred to as the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
4 Henceforth referred to as the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
4
Ukraine; and an ‘all for all’ release of “hostages and unlawfully detained persons”. On
17 February, by resolution 2202 (2015), the Security Council called on all parties to the
conflict to fully implement the Package. On 17 March, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted a
resolution approving the application to the Security Council and the Council of the European
Union about deployment of the international peacekeeping and security operation in Ukraine.
6. In the days following the abovementioned agreement on a ceasefire, attacks by the
armed groups against Ukrainian troops continued around the town of Debaltseve (Donetsk
region) until 19 February causing new casualties among the remaining civilian population
which had already spent several weeks in basements. Between 19 February and 10 April, the
ceasefire was generally upheld, though isolated skirmishes and clashes were reported daily.
While some areas in the conflict zone have remained calm, such as the city of Luhansk,
others have become the scenes of escalating hostilities since 11 April5. The vicinity of
Donetsk airport and the contested village of Shyrokyne (Donetsk region) remained the major
flashpoints where heavy weapons were intensively used. Reports of sophisticated heavy
weaponry and fighters being supplied from the Russian Federation persisted.
7. The overall decrease in indiscriminate shelling of populated areas after 15 February
resulted in a decrease in civilian casualties. Casualties of Ukrainian armed forces and armed
groups continued to grow. In total, since the beginning of the hostilities in mid-April 2014
until 15 May 2015, at least 6,362 people (including at least 625 women and girls) were
documented as killed and 15,775 as wounded in the conflict area of eastern Ukraine6. Many
people remain missing; bodies continue to be recovered.
8. Serious human rights abuses, intimidation and harassment of the local population
perpetrated by the armed groups continued to be reported. The HRMMU received new
allegations of killings, torture and ill-treatment, as well as cases of illegal deprivation of
liberty, forced labour, looting, ransom demands and extortion of money on the territories
controlled by the armed groups. Persecution and intimidation of people suspected of
supporting the Ukrainian armed forces or being pro-Ukrainian remained widespread. At times,
the armed groups did not permit the HRMMU to access areas where violations of human rights
have reportedly been taking place, or it was not possible for security reasons.
9. The armed groups and the so-called ‘governance structures’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ are accountable for human rights abuses
committed on territories under their control. Steps taken by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ to establish their own ‘legislative’ frameworks and systems
of ‘administration of justice’ (‘police’, ‘prosecutors’ and ‘courts’) are contrary to the
Constitution of Ukraine and international law, and jeopardize the Minsk Agreements.
10. Residents of the territories controlled by the armed groups continued to be
increasingly isolated from the rest of Ukraine since the so-called 2 November ‘elections’ held
by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ at variance with
provisions of the Minsk Agreements and the Constitution of Ukraine due to the subsequent
decisions of the Government of Ukraine to temporarily relocate all State institutions and
organisations from these territories and to stop allocations and disbursements (including
social payments) to the institutions and individuals located there7. On 17 April, the
5 Such as Avdiivka, Dokuchaivsk, Donetsk, Horlivka, Hranitne, Krasnohorivka, Krymske, Luhanske, Olenivka,
Opytne, Pisky, Popasna, Shchastia, Shyrokyne, Slovianoserbsk, Spartak, Stanychno Luhanske, Svitlodarsk,
Vesele, Vodiane, Volnovakha, Yasynuvata and Zolote.
6 This is a conservative estimate by the HRMMU and WHO, based on available official data. It is believed that
casualties have been under reported and that the actual number is higher.
7 For more details, see paragraph 12 of 8th HRMMU report.
5
Parliament of Ukraine recognized these territories as “temporarily occupied”. The situation of
the most vulnerable, particularly older persons, persons with disabilities, families with
children and people in institutional care, remains dire with many of them having no source of
income or being deprived of access to basic social services. In early April, reports emerged of
some pensions and salaries being paid in Russian roubles by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
11. The permit system introduced through a Temporary Order on 21 January by the
Security Service of Ukraine continued to significantly limit the freedom of movement across
the contact line. It was even the case during the height of hostilities in February as many tried
to leave the conflict zone. Those seeking to obtain permits face corrupt practices and delays
of up to three months. International and national organizations have advocated for the
revision of the permit system with no avail to date.
12. The safety and security of journalists remained precarious in the conflict zone with
several of them killed during the reporting period. The armed groups continued to limit
freedom of expression and impede the work of media professionals on the territories they
control. The Government of Ukraine identified over 100 media outlets (including TV
channels, information agencies, newspapers and Internet resources) from the Russian
Federation that are not allowed anymore to attend press events of the state bodies until the
end of the security operation.
13. The HRMMU is concerned that the efforts of the Government to safeguard territorial
integrity of Ukraine and to restore law and order in the conflict zone continue to be
accompanied by persistent allegations of arbitrary and secret detentions and enforced
disappearances of people suspected of separatism or terrorism. The HRMMU continued to
receive allegations of ill-treatment and torture of people detained by the Ukrainian armed
forces and law enforcement agencies. It is also concerned that investigations into allegations
of gross human rights violations by the Ukrainian military and law enforcement personnel
have yet to be carried out.
14. More than 1.2 million people internally displaced since the beginning of the conflict
suffer from impeded access to healthcare, housing and employment. The proliferation of
arms, the lack of job opportunities, limited access to medical care and psycho-social services
for demobilised soldiers and a deep anxiety that the ceasefire may not hold have a serious
impact on the population and the prospects for reconciliation. Further deterioration of the
overall economic and financial situation is affecting the whole population of Ukraine.
15. On 3 March, the President established a Constitutional Commission to elaborate
amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine on the basis of broad public consultations. Three
working groups started their work in April to outline proposals related to the functioning of
the State and its institutions, decentralization, self-government, fundamental freedoms and
human rights. On 26 April, amendments to the laws on the judiciary were adopted, inter alia,
to strengthen the role of the Supreme Court as the guarantor of the unity of the jurisprudence.
16. On 15 May, the President of Ukraine signed a package of four laws which denounce
Communist and Nazi regimes as “criminal under the law”, ban propaganda in their favour and
all public display of their symbols. They also require replacing communist-inspired names for
cities, streets, squares and other places and providing for public recognition to all those who
“fought for Ukrainian independence in the twentieth century”. The HRMMU notes that there is
a serious risk that some provisions of the package could limit the freedom of expression and
deepen divisions in society.
17. Despite the many challenges that the Government of Ukraine faces, there has been
some progress in reforms concerning business deregulation, state procurement, education and
anti-corruption. On 18 March, a National Agency on the Prevention of Corruption was
6
created to conduct the mandatory e-declaration of incomes and expenditures of all public
officials. On 16 April, the Director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, a body which
will conduct investigation into crimes committed by high level public officials, including
judges and prosecutors, was appointed by the President.
18. The situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea8, the status of which is prescribed
by General Assembly resolution 68/262, continued to be characterized by human rights
violations committed by the de facto authorities applying the laws of the Russian Federation.
The HRMMU was informed about the ill-treatment and torture of a detained former Maidan
activist by or with the acquiescence of Crimean ‘law enforcement’. Harassment and arrests of
Crimean Tatars and other ‘pro-unity’ supporters continued. A ‘court’ ordered corrective labour
for three Crimean activists after they unfurled a Ukrainian flag with the inscription “Crimea is
Ukraine” during an authorized rally to commemorate the anniversary of the national poet Taras
Shevchenko.
19. Control of the media in Crimea was tightened. At least seven media outlets using
Crimean Tatar language, including a TV station and a newspaper, which are most popular
among the Crimean Tatar community, were denied re-registration under the law of the
Russian Federation and have ceased operating. Freedom of religion has been jeopardized by
limitations resulting from re-registration requirements. Only 51 religious communities
currently have a legal status under the law of the Russian Federation compared to over 1,400
under the law of Ukraine before the March 2014 ‘referendum’. The situation of some
vulnerable groups, such as people with drug addiction, is dramatic. About 800 of them are
currently without life-saving opioid-substitution therapy and up to 30 have died since March
2014. Treatment provided is inadequate as it involves simple detoxification and,
occasionally, a follow-up rehabilitation.
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
A. Armed hostilities
20. The entry into force of a ceasefire as of 15 February 2015 which was part of the
Package of Measures for the Implementation of Minsk Agreements of 12 February led to a
considerable decrease in the intensity and geographic scope of hostilities in eastern Ukraine,
except for the vicinity of the town of Debaltseve (Donetsk region), where several thousand
Ukrainian armed forces remained under sustained attack by the armed groups. On 18
February, Ukrainian units were ordered to withdraw from the Debaltseve area. On 17 March,
the Parliament of Ukraine adopted a resolution on the approval of an application to the
United Nations Security Council and the Council of the European Union about deployment of
the international peacekeeping and security operation to Ukraine.
21. Between 19 February and 10 April, the ceasefire was generally upheld, although
isolated clashes were reported, mainly through the use of small arms, grenade launchers and
mortars9. This was to a considerable extent due to the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the
contact line, which the Government of Ukraine and the armed groups claimed to have
completed by beginning of March, but which the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM)
8 Henceforth referred to as Crimea.
9 The locations where ceasefire violations were reported most frequently: Avdiivka, Dokuchaivsk, Donetsk,
Horlivka, Hranitne, Krasnohorivka, Krymske, Luhanske, Olenivka, Opytne, Pisky, Popasna, Shchastia,
Shyrokyne, Stanychno Luhanske, Slovianoserbsk, Spartak, Svitlodarsk, Vesele, Vodiane, Volnovakha,
Yasynuvata, Zolote and the area of Donetsk airport.
7
was unable to fully verify due to the lack of access to certain locations. Reports of sophisticated
heavy weaponry and fighters being supplied from the Russian Federation persisted.
22. Between 11 and 15 April, fighting considerably escalated in the vicinity of the Donetsk
airport and near the contested village of Shyrokyne (Donetsk region), where the use of heavy
weapons, including mortars, artillery and tanks, resumed. On 13 April alone, the Ukrainian
armed forces reported six soldiers killed and 12 wounded, while the armed groups of
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ claimed four of their members
killed and 17 wounded. Further escalation occurred from 3 to 8 May. On 3 May, two
Ukrainian soldiers were reported killed and three wounded, while the armed groups claimed
three of their members killed and six wounded.
23. On 25 March, the Head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said that members
of armed formations “which do not want to join the Armed Forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs,
National Guard or SBU shall forfeit arms and choose another mode of operation – to leave
the security operation zone and, moreover, not create or participate in any illegal military or
paramilitary formations”. On 30 March, the ‘heads’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ issued ‘decrees’, which obliged all persons not belonging to
‘official’ military or law enforcement units to forfeit all their weaponry by 4 April,
announcing that those who would not comply would be considered as “members of illegal
gangs”, “forcefully disarmed” and “brought to criminal responsibility”.
24. In other areas of Ukraine, security continued to be challenged by explosions. On 22
February, an explosive device killed three people and wounded 15 in the city Kharkiv during
a rally. The SBU reported the arrest of possible perpetrators. On the night of 12 March, an
explosion near the office of the political party Samopomich occurred in Odesa. No casualties
were reported. The Ministry of Internal Affairs qualified both incidents as terrorist acts. On 30
and 31 March, two explosions occurred at railway stations near the city of Kharkiv (with no
casualties), bringing the total number of such incidents in the region to more than 45 since July
2014.
B. Casualties
25. Since the beginning of the hostilities in mid-April 2014 until 15 May 2015, at least
6,362 people (including at least 625 women and girls) were documented as killed and at least
15,775 as wounded in the conflict area of eastern Ukraine10.
26. Even with the decrease in hostilities, civilians continued to be killed and wounded. On
22 February, an artillery shell killed three civilians in the Government-controlled town of
Avdiivka (Donetsk region). On 4 March, a woman was killed when her apartment was hit by
a shell during a mortar attack on Avdiivka. During the night from 28 to 29 April, a man was
reported killed and a woman wounded by shelling of the city of Horlivka controlled by the
armed groups (Donetsk region). On 22 February, three civil volunteers were reportedly killed
by a mine blast on the route between the town of Debaltseve controlled by the armed groups
(Donetsk region) and the Government-controlled town of Artemivsk (Donetsk region). On 29
April, a civilian was wounded after stepping on a booby trap near the Government-controlled
village of Zolote (Luhansk region). On 31 March, the Ministry of Health stated that “starting
from March 2014, at least 109 children were heavily wounded and 42 killed as a result of
10 As in previous reports, these are conservative estimates by the HRMMU and the World Health Organization
based on the available official data. The number includes casualties among the Ukrainian armed forces as
reported by the Ukrainian authorities; casualties reported by civil medical establishments of the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions (civilians and some members of the armed groups, without distinguishing among them), and
the 298 casualties from flight MH-17. The actual number of fatalities is probably higher.
8
tripping landmines and explosive objects, which remained from the armed hostilities in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (referring to Government-controlled territories11).
27. On 8 May, President Poroshenko stated that 1,675 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed
since the beginning of the conflict; meanwhile according to Knyga Pamyati (Book of
Memory), a civil initiative, which cooperates with the Ministry of Defence, 1,926 soldiers
had been killed prior to 12 February 2015. As of 18 April, 222 unidentified bodies (presumed
to be mainly those of soldiers) were reported to be held in morgues of Dnipropetrovsk region.
Also, 170 bodies of Ukrainian soldiers had been buried, of which only 47 were identified.
28. Recovery of the bodies of those killed (both military and civilian) continued on the
conflict-affected territories. Between January and March 2015, the NGO Soyuz ‘Narodnaya
Pamiat’ (People’s Memory Union) reported recovering 340 bodies, mainly of Ukrainian
soldiers, from the conflict area. By 7 May, the total number of bodies recovered by the Union
since 5 September 2014 had reached 560, mainly from those areas of the Donetsk region,
which are controlled by the armed groups. The search for bodies in former areas of hostilities in
the Luhansk region, which are currently under the control of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, is
still pending.
Missing persons
29. The absence of a unified database of missing persons in the east of Ukraine since mid-
April 2014 makes it difficult to estimate their number. By 10 May, the open database of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs contained the names of 1,331 people (1,218 men and 113
women) who went missing on the “territory of the anti-terrorist operation”12. On 6 May, the
representative of Ukraine in the Trilateral Contact Group stated that 1,460 people were
considered to be missing. As of 8 May, the database of the NGO Mirnyi Bereg included data
on 378 missing Ukrainian soldiers and 216 missing civilians. The HRMMU notes that
Governmental bodies do not effectively coordinate their activities related to the search of
missing persons, both among themselves and with various civil initiatives.
C. Alleged summary, extrajudicial or arbitrary executions
By the armed groups
30. During the reporting period, the HRMMU became aware of new allegations of summary
executions of people in the captivity of the armed groups. Some of these allegations have been
supported by testimonies of witnesses and by forensic examinations and photographic materials.
31. The HRMMU interviewed a number of witnesses and relatives in the case of
Ukrainian soldier Ihor Branovytskyi, who was allegedly summarily executed on 21 January
while in captivity of the armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. According to them,
when the Ukrainian military retreated from the Donetsk airport, a group of 12 soldiers,
including Mr. Branovytskyi, was captured by the armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. En route to the former SBU premises in Donetsk, members of the armed groups took
the captives to the former military base currently used by the so-called ‘Sparta battalion’.
They were reportedly beaten and subjected to interrogation under torture and ill-treatment.
All captives were allegedly lined up along a wall and beaten one after the other for a few
hours by some 20 people with metal pipes, wooden batons and butts of rifles. Perpetrators
were reportedly looking for a machine gunner and when Mr. Branovytskyi said that he was
the one they were looking for, he was separated from the other captives, beaten with a blunt
11 There is no available numbers of civilians killed or wounded by mines and unexploded ordnance on the
territories controlled by the armed groups.
12 Whereabouts of some of these people have been already established, but their names have not been removed
from the list.
9
hard object and sustained shot wounds with a traumatic gun, according to a forensic
examination received by the HRMMU13. After Mr. Branovytskyi collapsed and fainted, the
commander of ‘Sparta battalion’14 reportedly refused to call an ambulance and fired two
shots in the head of the victim. In addition to physical torture and ill-treatment, the other
captives were also subjected to mock executions with members of the ‘Sparta battalion’ firing
shots above their heads.
32. On 8 May, the HRMMU interviewed a Ukrainian soldier, who was released by the
armed groups of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ the previous day. He was one from the group of
seven captured soldiers, two of whom were wounded. Five of them, including the
interlocutor, were kept in one dug-out shelter, while one wounded soldier was in the other
dug-out shelter and the other wounded – in a trench. The interlocutor heard a number of shots
fired by the members of the armed groups. When passing by those places, he saw these two
soldiers lying on the ground showing no sign of life. The remaining soldiers were forced into
a hole, which was allegedly a shell crater, where they remained for some time, until members
of the so-called ‘international Piatnashki battalion’ took one of them out. The interlocutor
heard a shot accompanied with scream and a second shot shortly thereafter. When four
captives were leaving the hole, the interlocutor saw the soldier lying on the ground with blood
on his back. The HRMMU is examining this case.
33. In February and March, nine Ukrainian soldiers captured by the armed groups in the
village of Krasnyi Partyzan (Donetsk region) on 22 January were released. Some of them
confirmed earlier allegations of the summary execution of four of their fellow soldiers15. In
April, the HRMMU was provided with photographs of a Ukrainian soldier whose body was
delivered to Dnipropetrovsk morgue on either 20 or 21 February. The body had visible signs
of torture and execution (two bullet marks on the face shot from a very close range and a cut
throat). The HRMMU is examining these cases.
By the Government forces
34. In April, the HRMMU received information about bodies of two members of the
armed groups exhumed in autumn 2014 near the former checkpoint of Ukrainian armed
forces (on the territory then controlled by the armed groups) with their hands tied behind their
back and gunshots to the heads. Another case confidentially reported to the HRMMU was that
of a member of the armed groups who was beaten to death while detained at a Ukrainian
army checkpoint in autumn 2014. The HRMMU works to verify these allegations.
D. Illegal and arbitrary detention, and torture and ill-treatment
By the armed groups
35. Estimates of the number of people held by armed groups vary continuously, notably
due to the evolving pattern of continued abductions and releases. People held by armed
groups are mostly Ukrainian soldiers, civilians suspected of ‘espionage’ or ‘pro-unity’
sympathies, civilians suspected of criminal activities16 and members of the armed groups
13 According to the forensic examination, he had multiple bone fractures and bruises all over his body.
14 Arsenii Pavlov (call sign Motorola).
15 As previously reported by the HRMMU (paragraph 3 of the 9th report), on 24 January 2015, the armed groups
claimed control over the settlement of Krasnyi Partyzan (30 km north of Donetsk). The video footage made by
the armed groups soon after the fight for the settlement was disseminated through social media and gave
grounds to allege the execution of several Ukrainian soldiers taken captive in the village.
16 According to the ‘head of investigation department of the ministry of internal affairs’ of the ’Luhansk
people’s republic’ (interviewed by the HRMMU on 1 May), in February and March, 325 people were “arrested”
in the city of Luhansk on criminal charges: 249 were reportedly sanctioned by a ‘prosecutor’ to be placed in
‘custody’, and 64 were placed under ‘house arrest’.
10
themselves (for various disciplinary and criminal misdeeds). On 8 May, the Ukrainian
representative on humanitarian issues in the Trilateral Contact Group claimed that 399 people
(both civilian and military) were in captivity of the armed groups and in the Russian
Federation. As of 8 May, database of the NGO Mirnyi Bereg contained data on 260 soldiers
and 71 civilians allegedly in captivity of the armed groups. All figures mentioned above
concern people whose identity the Government of Ukraine and/or civil initiatives have
managed to determine. On 5 May, a Ukrainian civil volunteer, who is engaged in the process,
estimated the total number of people held by the armed groups at up to 1,000.
36. On 23 April, the HRMMU interviewed a Ukrainian soldier who was taken captive
near the contested town of Vuhlehirsk (Donetsk region) and held by the armed groups from
29 January until 6 April. On 30 January, he was reportedly transferred to the city of Horlivka
and placed in the basement of the so-called ‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’, in a cell two by three metres, together with three other Ukrainian soldiers.
While being there, the man had a bandage on his eyes because of burns. He heard a detainee
being taken out of the cell where he was, and brought back approximately two hours later that
evening. He could hear him breathing heavily, and the next morning he was reportedly dead.
He claims he was heavily beaten, including with rifle butts. Within two weeks, he was
transferred to Donetsk to the former premises of SBU regional department, where he was
hospitalized and reportedly “treated properly”.
37. On 5 May, the HRMMU interviewed a woman, who had been abducted on 22 May
2014 and illegally deprived of liberty for five days by the ‘traffic police’ and members of the
armed groups of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ for assisting the Ukrainian armed forces. She
reported having been blindfolded and beaten every two hours on the head and the legs,
including with a blunt object which she could not identify. During her interrogation, she was
reportedly tied to a chair, with her arms twisted behind the back of the chair. She claims that
her captors beat another detainee to death in her presence. They also reportedly subjected her
to a mock execution twice: once she was shot with a blank cartridge; another time, shots were
fired above her head while she stood against a wall; and she was forced to play ‘Russian
roulette’. She also reported an attempted rape by a group of men.
38. On 6 May, the HRMMU interviewed a man who had been illegally deprived of liberty
in a “base” of a “Cossack” armed group in Donetsk from 1 to 28 February. He reportedly
witnessed other captives being beaten, including with rifle butts. His cellmate told him he had
been tortured with electric current and had his ears cut. Some captives reportedly told him
that another detainee (with whom he shared the cell) was taken for interrogation and was
probably tortured to death. The victim also spent 10 days in an isolated cell with a
temperature of approximately 5 C°. The HRMMU is examining the case.
39. On 8 May, the ‘head’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ stated that 200 “looters,
rapists and kidnappers” had been “arrested” through a massive “law enforcement campaign
against crime and corruption”, which reportedly resulted in “finding 13 civilian hostages and
eight Ukrainian servicemen”. The HRMMU was informed that up to 300 people may have
been captured. There are allegations that these people have been subjected to torture and illtreatment.
By the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies
40. Between 17 February and 18 April, the number of people under SBU whose arrest
was sanctioned by courts since the beginning of the conflict increased from 720 to 753, and
the number of people officially in SBU custody rose from 118 to 134.
41. On 14 March, the SBU Head reported that during the whole conflict, the Government
had released 1,553 “detained traitors, spies and subversives” so as to secure the release of
people held by the armed groups. As a court decision is required by law to detain a person
11
beyond 72 hours, and since the Office of the Prosecutor General claims that the so-called
‘preventive detention’ of 30 days without a court order (introduced in August 2014) has
never been applied, these figures suggest that a considerable number of people apprehended
by SBU have been kept in arbitrary (and often secret, as former detainees testify) detention
prior to being released in the context of ‘simultaneous release’ arrangements with the armed
groups.
42. In March 2015, a resident of the Government-controlled town of Sloviansk (Donetsk
region) approached the Ombudsperson’s Office in relation to the abduction of her husband on
28 February by a group of unidentified people. On the same day, she filed a complaint with
the police. A criminal investigation was opened under Article 146 (illegal confinement or
abduction of a person) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. On 26 March, she received a
response from the SBU, saying that her husband was detained by Dnipropetrovsk Regional
Department of the SBU. The detainee informed the Ombudsperson’s Office that after
abduction, he was taken to a bomb shelter in Sloviansk, and kept in a room of approximately
1.2x1.5 metres for 26 days. During this period he was held incommunicado and
systematically tortured to confess to illegal activities in support of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. This case reflects a continued pattern of cases of enforced disappearance. The man
remains in pre-trial detention.
43. On 10 March, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ reportedly transmitted three lists of
“prisoners of war” to the Ukrainian authorities of people they believe are held by the
Ukrainian law enforcement bodies. The lists include 220 members of the armed groups,
800 “political prisoners” and 900 “civilians”. On 6 April, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
claimed that 1,378 of its ‘supporters’ remained in detention under the Government of Ukraine.
44. During the reporting period, the HRMMU continued to receive allegations concerning
violations of the rights of people in custody or detention of the Government of Ukraine. The
HRMMU is verifying them.
45. From 10 to 16 April, the HRMMU interviewed lawyers and relatives of ‘pro-federalism’
activists detained by SBU in Odesa in April. In April and May, the HRMMU visited the
Odesa pre-trial detention centre (SIZO) and privately interviewed detainees arrested on
suspicion of terrorism. They informed the HRMMU that searches of their homes were carried
out without warrants and with excessive use of force; they were not informed of their rights
and access to legal aid was provided with delays of up to 70 hours; SBU was bringing their
own witnesses and did not record all seized belongings. They were officially notified about
their detention only the next day after the apprehension or even later with no possibility to
inform relatives and without access to legal aid. In addition, the HRMMU received
allegations that during interrogation, some detainees were subjected to ill-treatment and
torture (beatings, suffocation with bag on the head, electric shocks and deprivation of sleep,
food and water for more than 24 hours). The people arrested were not provided with a defense
lawyer and were mocked at when requesting one. The Government of Ukraine claimed that all
allegations of torture and ill-treatment would be duly investigated.
46. On 9 April, the HRMMU interviewed a resident of a Government-controlled town in
Donetsk region who claimed to have been kidnapped in October 2014 by a man in civilian
clothes who put a bag over his head, handcuffed him and placed him in a vehicle. Then he
was held in detention in a basement. For three days, he was reportedly beaten and
electrocuted by masked assailants. He was forced under torture to sign a confession stating he
had been “transferring intelligence information” to the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. Then the
man was taken to another basement, which he later discovered as located in Poltava. There,
an SBU investigator, in the presence of witnesses, compiled a protocol about his detention
“as a person who was caught while committing the crime”. Two days after, a Poltava court
12
decided to place him under house arrest. In February, the investigator tried to force him to
enter a plea bargain, which he refused to do. In the beginning of April, while meeting with
the investigator, he was given a mobile phone and recognized the voice of one of the
individuals who had tortured him in October. The man said that if he would not sign a plea
bargain, they would meet again. Later, the interlocutor informed the HRMMU that he had
signed the plea agreement.
47. On 10 April, the HRMMU was informed by the Kharkiv Military Prosecutor that it
had investigated allegations on the existence of a secret detention facility in the premises of
Kharkiv SBU Department. The Prosecutor, having visited the premises in March, announced
he had found the cells empty. As reported earlier, the HRMMU interviewed a number of
people who claim to have been kept in this facility, and who described how, prior to the visit
of the Military Prosecutor, they had been removed by SBU officers from their cells and
placed in the basement or other places within the building.
48. On 24 March, the HRMMU interviewed a ‘pro-unity’ activist from Donetsk region
who referred to human rights violations committed by elements of the Ukrainian armed
forces (especially former volunteer battalions, such as Dnipro-1) on the Governmentcontrolled
territories, such as abductions for ransom and arbitrary detentions, particularly in
the towns of Krasnyi Liman and Selidove (both in Donetsk region). On 24 March, the Head
of Luhansk Regional State Administration accused soldiers of Aidar battalion of abducting
and torturing the deputy head of Novoaidar district state administration. He was reportedly
abducted on 25 November 2014, held in captivity (together with some other people) for five
days. He was threatened and accused of separatism, and then delivered to the district hospital,
where his numerous injuries, including a firearm wound, were documented.
49. In mid-March, the NGOs Foundation for the Study of Democracy, the Russian Public
Council for International Cooperation and Public Diplomacy and the Russian Peace Foundation
issued a report entitled “War Crimes of the Armed Forces and Security Forces of Ukraine:
Torture and Inhumane Treatment: Second Report”. The report is claimed to be based on
“interviews with over 200 prisoners released by the Ukrainian side”, reportedly conducted
between 25 August 2014 and 20 January 2015. In April, Chief Military Prosecutor of Ukraine
initiated eight criminal proceedings to investigate allegations contained in the report. The
HRMMU is also verifying the allegations contained in this report.
Releases of detainees and captives
50. During the reporting period, a piecemeal approach in the release of “hostages and
unlawfully detained persons” was continued under the auspices of the implementation of the
‘all for all’ scheme foreseen in the Minsk Agreements.
51. On 21 February, the armed groups released 139 Ukrainian soldiers while the
Government of Ukraine released 52 people. On 24 February, four Ukrainian soldiers were
released. On 28 February, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine announced the release of two
Ukrainian soldiers and eight civilian volunteers. On 7 March, five Ukrainian soldiers were
reportedly released from the captivity of the armed groups.
52. On 14 March, the SBU Head reported that since mid-April 2014, the release of 2,483
people from the captivity of the armed groups had been secured. By 23 April, the SBU was
reporting that 2,586 people had been released. On 5 May, the Head of the United Centre for
the Release of Captives at the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine reported the total of 2,667
people being released. The claim of an additional 184 people being released between 14
March and 5 May does not correspond to the public announcements during the same
timeframe on releases of detainees and captives. This suggests either discrepancies in the
official data, or the non-transparent character of ‘simultaneous releases’ in which many actors
are involved.
13
53. On 26 March, the HRMMU met with the ‘deputy head’ of the ‘commission on
prisoner’s exchange’ and with the ‘ombudsperson’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
According to them, people released by the Government of Ukraine were often in poor health
and bearing signs of ill-treatment. Approximately 70 per cent of all people proposed by the
Government of Ukraine for ‘simultaneous releases’ were “civilians”, while only 30 per cent
are “military” or “political activists”. Interlocutors claimed that the Government of Ukraine
continues to detain and then release random civilians to inflate the number of releases. A
person from the Government-controlled town of Sloviansk (Donetsk region) was reported to
have been ‘exchanged’ three times. According to interlocutors, many people released by the
Government had not been given back their passports, and the criminal cases against them
reportedly have not been closed or have been re-opened. A group of at least 22 individuals
released by the Government in January 2015 continued to be trapped in the city of Donetsk
during the reporting period, with their passports reportedly held by the SBU. The HRMMU
interviewed several of them.
54. The Ukrainian pilot, Nadiia Savchenko, member of the Parliament of Ukraine (since
November 2014) and Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (since December 2014) has remained in detention in the Russian Federation since
July 2014 after being captured by armed groups in June. She is awaiting trial on charges of
involvement in the deaths of two Russian journalists killed during the conflict in eastern
Ukraine. On 24 April, Ms. Savchenko was additionally charged with the illegal crossing of
the border. Having been on hunger strike (with a few suspensions) since 13 December 2014,
she was transferred from the Moscow pre-trial detention facility to a civilian hospital on 28
April. On 6 May, Basmannyi court of Moscow extended her pre-trial detention until 30 June.
55. On 2 May, the Head of the United Centre for the Release of Captives at the Ministry
of Defence of Ukraine stated that “several dozens” of Ukrainian soldiers continued to be kept
in captivity on the territory of the Russian Federation since August 2014.
E. Trafficking in persons
56. In the difficult economic conditions there is an increased risk of trafficking in persons.
In 2015, the hotline of NGO La Strada registered an increased number of calls related to
trafficking. Compared to 2014, more people, predominantly women, sought consultation
regarding employment, studies, and going abroad to marry. An Odesa-based women’s NGO
informed the HRMMU that it had documented nearly 60 cases of trafficking in 2014.
Meanwhile in 2015, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has already
identified 230 victims of trafficking.
57. The main destinations are the Russian Federation and Poland. Victims are most often
from rural areas and low income groups, either young women crimped for sexual exploitation
or older persons, mostly women, forced to become street beggars. In some IDP collective
centres and in settlements in the conflict affected areas, recruiters have been known to offer
to adult men and women services for asylum claims and ‘employment’ abroad,
predominantly in the Russian Federation, without any guarantees, which may lead to labour
exploitation. Cases are poorly investigated as victims rarely report for various reasons,
including lack of legal knowledge, stigma and fear, perpetuated by harmful gender stereotypes.
In 2015, 75 have been registered by the police.
14
III. FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
A. Freedom of movement
58. Although criticized by international and national organizations, the system of permits,
introduced on 21 January 2015 by the Temporary Order17, remained operational and continued
to limit the freedom of movement of civilians across the contact line, isolate residents of the
areas controlled by the armed groups, generate corruption and impede humanitarian aid. On 6
April, the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court rejected a lawsuit that was brought by two
individuals from Luhansk region, ruling that the Temporary Order was adopted legally.
According to the ICCPR and the Constitution of Ukraine, however, freedom of movement may
be limited only by law.
59. According to the SBU, from 21 January to 6 May, 349,496 people applied for permits
and 274,755 received them. Despite the fact that the President and the Ombudsperson of
Ukraine18 declared the need to simplify the procedure for civilians to obtain permits, the
process remained arduous and inconsistent. On 20 March, the SBU allowed the electronic
submission of documents to apply for permits and receive them electronically. The majority
of people, however, continued to apply in person, due to lack of information on the electronic
system (especially in the areas controlled by the armed groups), low computer literacy,
interrupted Internet access, and a distrust towards online applications. Also, the coordination
centres issuing permits have been overwhelmed with applications due to limited capacity:
lack of computer equipment, problems with connectivity, and of trained staff. Some
applicants reportedly had to stay in the street near to a coordination centre for up to four days
before being able to submit their documents. During this time some people approached them
with offers to issue a permit faster for a price varying from UAH 600 to 1,500 (US$ 29 to 71).
60. The HRMMU interviewed people, mostly older persons, who had applied for permits
at the end of January and still had not received them by mid-May. Prisoners in penitentiary
institutions in the cities of Horlivka and Yenakieve controlled by the armed groups and older
persons from two geriatric facilities in Luhansk (visited by the HRMMU in March and April)
reported that their relatives could not visit them any longer as they could not obtain permits.
61. Irregular application of rules at check-points has caused confusion and frustration
among residents. To cross the contact line, vehicles and passenger buses have, at times, to
spend up to 11 hours at check points, without access to water and sanitation facilities. Reports
suggest that exceptions are made more often for women with children than for a man. On
25 April, the HRMMU learned from a bus driver who regularly drives across the contact line
that at some Ukrainian checkpoints people with Donetsk license plates were not allowed to
pass although they had permits. Consequently, people often circumvent the checkpoints,
which may be dangerous, as shown in the case of a bus travelling from the Governmentcontrolled
town of Artemivsk to the city of Horlivka controlled by the armed groups, which
hit a land mine, resulting in the death of three passengers. On 28 April, the head of the
Luhansk Regional Military-Civil Administration stated that since 1 May, only passenger
vehicles and pedestrians were allowed to pass through the check point in Luhansk region.
17 The Order was developed and approved by the joint entity ‘the Operational Headquarters of Management of
the Anti-Terrorist Operation’ composed of various structures, including the SBU, Ministry of Defence, Ministry
of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, Migration, Emergency and Fiscal Services of Ukraine. For more
information, please see previous HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period
from 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015, paragraphs 42-43.
18 On 4 March, during the meeting of the National Security and Defence Council, the President of Ukraine
stressed the need to simplify the procedure of obtaining passes for civilians. On 3 April, the Ombudsperson of
Ukraine stated that the current system of special passes “inhumane”, and urged the SBU to simplify the system.
15
The movement of buses and cargo was stopped until the Government of Ukraine fully
regulates the permit system. The exceptions were made for humanitarian aid and specialised
transport, including medical and that of companies restoring infrastructure and utilities (gas,
water, electricity).
62. On 12 May, the head of the Luhansk Regional Military-Civil Administration, issued
an order further limiting the movement of civilians from the territories controlled by armed
groups. It instructed that only people holding a Ukrainian passport would be allowed to pass
across the contact line; no provisions were made for people who have lost their documents.
63. On 5 May, the SBU established a working group that included NGOs to improve the
permit system and prevent human rights violations.
64. The HRMMU is concerned that no arrangements have been made so far to allow
civilians to flee the conflict area in accordance with international law. Those seeking safety
and security must be allowed to do so without having to apply for a permit in advance, and
without going through pre-designated check-points, which exposes them to risks and
arbitrary decisions. The permit system severely limits civilians’ access to safe areas and lifesaving
assistance.
B. Freedom of expression
Safety of journalists
65. Safety of media professionals remains a serious issue in the conflict area due to
fighting. On 28 February, a photographer of the Ukrainian newspaper Segodnia (Today) was
killed during the mortar shelling attack by armed groups near the village of Pisky (Donetsk
region). He was the eighth journalist killed in the east of Ukraine since the beginning of the
conflict. On 12 April, two local media professionals were wounded near Donetsk airport
when their car was hit by a shell. On 14 April, a local Donetsk journalist working for the
Russian TV channel Zvezda was seriously wounded when he tripped a mine trap in the
contested village of Shyrokyne (Donetsk region).
66. The HRMMU continued to receive reports of media professionals held by armed
groups. On 11 March, a journalist from the city of Makiivka (Donetsk region), controlled by
the armed groups, was reportedly abducted by armed groups. After his 80-year-old mother
filed a complaint to ‘local police’, the armed groups conducted a search of her house and
intimidated her. The journalist was released on 10 May.
67. On 16 April, Oles Buzyna, a Ukrainian journalist, writer and former editor of the
newspaper Segodnia, was killed close to his home in Kyiv by two unknown masked men. He
was known for his criticism of the Government, in particular in relation to the Maidan events
and the conflict in the east. The President of Ukraine called the murder of Mr. Buzyna “a
provocation”, aimed at destabilization of the situation in Ukraine. He also called for prompt
investigation into two killings and regular reporting on its progress. The police initiated
investigation into the incident under Article 115 (intentional homicide) of the Criminal Code
of Ukraine.
68. On 14 May, the Parliament passed a law19 amending the Criminal Code of Ukraine,
strengthening accountability for the threats to or violence against journalists. In addition to
existing provision of Article 171 (preclusion of legal professional activities of journalists),
which was rarely applied in practice, due to its ambiguity, four additional articles were added.
They envisage criminal liability for threats and infliction of injuries to journalists or their
19 The Law On Amending Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine to Increase Guarantees of Legal Professional
Activity of Journalists.
16
families, intentional damage of property of a journalist, trespass against life and hostage
taking of a journalist. The HRMMU notes that the law may positively contribute to the
protection of media workers and promote freedom of expression in Ukraine.
Access to information / media regulation
69. The armed groups continued to limit freedom of expression and impede the work of
media professionals on the territories they control. On 10 March, the so-called ‘council of
ministers’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ issued an order demanding telecommunications
operators to remove 23 Ukrainian TV channels and the Russian TV channel Dozhd from the
broadcasting network on the grounds that they “pose threat to ‘state’ security”. The ‘ministry
of infrastructure, transport and communication’ was assigned to control the implementation
of the decision.
70. Residents in the territories controlled by the armed groups often reported to the
HRMMU that available media outlets presented only biased information. As many people did
not have access to the Internet for technical reasons, access to any alternative sources of
information was difficult. Journalists informed the HRMMU that during interviews with the
so-called local ‘authorities’ only pre-cleared questions are allowed. Reportedly, journalists
are sometimes demanded not to include parts of the interviews in their reports. On 1 May,
two journalists from the Russian Federation were reportedly abducted by the armed groups in
Donetsk and forced to delete some photos from a public rally. They were then released.
71. The Government of Ukraine also attempted to impose restrictions on some media
outlets. Following the resolution by the Parliament, adopted on 19 February20, the SBU
identified over 100 media outlets (including TV channels, information agencies, newspapers
and Internet resources) from the Russian Federation that are not allowed anymore to attend
press events of the State bodies until the end of the security operation. The resolution
instructed the State bodies to implement the decision by 21 February. While no suspension
has reportedly occurred, a number of reporters from the Russian Federation have not been
allowed to enter Ukraine and banned from entry for the next five years21. Also, the resolution
ordered the Government to develop the procedure of accreditation of all foreign media
professionals in Ukraine; however as of 15 May this has not yet been done.
Criminal proceedings against journalists
72. The HRMMU continued to follow the case of the journalist, Ruslan Kotsaba22
charged with high treason for publishing an anti-mobilisation video on 17 January. On 6
April, the Ivano-Frankivsk city court extended his detention for another 60 days (until 6
June). Hearings on the merits started on 16 April. During the last hearing on 29 April, seven
20 Parliamentary Resolution No. 1853 of 12 February 2015 ordered the temporary suspension of the
accreditation of journalists and representatives of some media outlets of the Russian Federation until the end of
the security operation.
21 For example, on 25 February, the SBU confirmed that three Russian media professionals (a journalist from
the NTV Channel and a journalist and a cameraperson from the Lifenews Channel) have not been allowed to
enter the territory of Ukraine and banned from entry for the next five years, On 3 May, a journalist of the
Russian media agency RBC was taken off the train Moscow-Odesa by the State Border Service of Ukraine and
sent back to the Russian Federation.
22 On 29 January, the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office announced the opening of criminal investigations into
obstruction of the lawful activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations. The
investigations are based on the results of media monitoring and identification of public appeals to avoid
mobilisation. On 5 February, Ivano-Frankivsk SBU Regional Department arrested Mr. Kotsaba for charges
under Article 111-1 (high treason) and 114-1 (preclusion of lawful activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine for his public statements against mobilisation. The Ombudsperson of Ukraine
expressed her concerns regarding the case of Mr. Kotsaba.
17
of the 30 witnesses in the case were questioned, but none could provide specific facts to
support the prosecution. The court hearing was also attended by the members of some of the
Ukrainian battalions, which may have created pressure on judges.
73. On 14 May, the SBU Department of Odesa region conducted searches in apartments
of six journalists of the website Timer, known for its ‘pro-federalism’ views, and ceased several
of their computers and documents23. The journalists were then taken to the SBU, questioned
there and released in the evening. The Timer website faced connection problems on 1–3 May
and on 8–10 May, and since 14 May has stopped functioning.
Incitement to hatred and violence
74. The HRMMU is concerned about the recurring increase of hate speech and incitement
to violence on social media and the Internet. On 6 March, supporters of armed groups in the
city of Horlivka controlled by the armed groups announced on their social networks the
“beginning of cleansing of ‘ukrops’ [an offensive word used for Ukrainians]”, including
those who allegedly acted as artillery fire spotters during hostilities. The call, initially
published by the social media group with 88,000 subscribers, was widely disseminated,
calling supporters to make lists of all those sympathetic to Ukraine and Ukrainians, and
asking residents “to report on their neighbours, friends, and strangers”. A website Tribunal
lists over 1,300 individuals – allegedly Ukrainian soldiers, police staff and civilian volunteers
– who are labelled as “punishers” and “accomplices”.
75. Similarly, the HRMMU is concerned about the activities of the website Myrotvorets
(Peacemaker), on which various contributors created a list of people (with their personal
data) who are allegedly related to the armed groups and labelled as “terrorists”. Such a list
violates the presumption of innocence, right to privacy and personal data protection.
C. Freedom of peaceful assembly
76. During the reporting period, in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’, an atmosphere of intimidation imposed by the armed groups continued to prevent
people from demonstrating publicly. On 6 April, the rally of miners of the Kirov mine in the
city of Makiivka controlled by the armed groups (Donetsk region), who protested against the
increase of the working hours from six to eight, was reportedly dispersed.
77. On the territory controlled by the Government, freedom of peaceful assembly was
generally respected although the authorities imposed some restrictions in some instances,
invoking security concerns. In some cases, law enforcement officials did not prevent ‘prounity’
supporters from disturbing gatherings of people supporting other political views, and
in a few instances, police even took part in such disruptions.
78. On 16 April, the NGO Police of Odesa, which officially notified the authorities of a
rally in advance, was prevented by the police and ‘pro-unity¨’ supporters from gathering in
front of the Odesa City Council to protest against the increase in utility payments. The
HRMMU observed the detention of 50 protestors, including 17 minors; some were handed to
the police by ‘pro-unity’ activists. Adult activists (all male)24, minors and their parents25 were
later charged for administrative offences.
23 On 3 January, the SBU initiated criminal investigation under Article 110 (trespass against territorial integrity
and inviolability of Ukraine) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. A court decision on the search stated that the
media outlet has had “negative informational influence… In particular, in 2014, the media outlet has posted
informational materials, which substantiated the historical roots of the term ‘Novorossia’, its right to existence
and the historic need to implement the ‘Russian World’ project”.
24 Under Article 185-1 (breach of order on the organization and conduct of assembly, meetings, street
campaigns and demonstrations) of the Code of Administrative Offences of Ukraine
18
79. On 16 April, a group of approximately 20 people who identified themselves as
activists of Narodna Rada Besarabii (National Council of Bessarabia) rallied in Odesa. Soon
after the beginning of the rally, police appeared at the scene and arrested about 20 activists.
According to the police, the activists had not notified the authorities in advance about the
rally, and they stopped the event. These twenty people were charged under Article 185-1
(breach of the order of the organization and conduct of assembly, meetings, street campaigns
and demonstrations) of the Code of Administrative Offences of Ukraine. The procedure of
notification concerning upcoming rallies foresees the submission of an application prior to a
rally but their prohibition can only be declared by a court. Yet the police had not presented
the activists with a court decision when stopping the rally.
80. On 6 May, Kharkiv Administrative Court decided to ban a traditional procession in
Kharkiv, which was scheduled to be held on 9 May by the NGO Soyuz Sovetskikh Ofitserov
(Union of Soviet Officers). A lawsuit was filed by the Kharkiv City Council because of the
“security situation and terrorist threats”.
IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
81. The impact of the conflict on the enjoyment of economic and social rights continued
to be devastating for about five million people living in the conflict-affected area and for
more than 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Older persons, persons with
disabilities, families with children and people in institutional care have faced particular
difficulties. Discrimination against IDPs, especially Roma, has often impeded their access to
healthcare, housing and employment. More than 25,000 demobilised soldiers experience
difficulties in accessing medical care and psycho-social services.
82. The overall deterioration in the economic situation affects a large proportion of the
population of Ukraine. Compared to December 2014, the real income of the population has
dropped by 8.4 per cent, prices have grown by 20.3 per cent, wage arrears have increased by
2.7 per cent, and the unemployment rate reached 9.7 per cent26.
A. Right to an adequate standard of living
83. Heavy, indiscriminate shelling of populated areas in January and February led to
significant destructions in the affected localities. In some towns, like Debaltseve and
Vuhlehirsk (Donetsk region) controlled by the armed groups, visited by the HRMMU on 20
March, up to 80 per cent of residential buildings and public facilities were destroyed. A
compensation mechanism for civilians whose property has been destroyed has yet to be
developed.
84. Despite the ceasefire, the humanitarian situation remains grim. Lack of food, clean
water, hygiene items, and children’s clothes is reported in most settlements controlled by
armed groups. Residents remaining in towns and villages divided by the contact line (such as
Dzerzhynsk, Mykolaivka, Novohnativka, Pisky and Shyrokyne) are in the most precarious
position, as they are rarely reached by humanitarian actors due to the security situation.
85. On the territories controlled by the armed groups, the so-called ‘authorities’ and many
national humanitarian NGOs distribute aid based on ‘social cards’27 for people below 18 and
25 Under Article 184 (for default by parents or persons who substitute them, of duties regarding child guidance)
of the Code of Administrative Offences
26 According to the information of the Statistical Service of Ukraine released on 30 April.
27 The ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ and ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ began to issue so-called ‘social cards’ in
November 2014, which reportedly entitle people to humanitarian aid, social benefits and access to free medical
care.
19
over 60 years, and for those who do not receive salaries, but work voluntarily. Adults who
have lost their jobs and have grown-up children, are not entitled to aid, and are becoming
increasingly vulnerable. The conflict has had a detrimental impact on isolated bed-ridden
older persons in small towns and villages; with the collapse of social services, many have not
been identified and thus have not or may not have had access to any kind of assistance for
long periods. For instance, in mid-March, the HRMMU was informed of at least 30 older
persons found dead in their homes a month after the ceasefire in Debaltseve, Donetsk city,
Krasnyi Luch, Luhansk and some other populated areas.
86. The situation of approximately 10,000 people in institutional care facilities remains of
concern. On 29 and 30 April, the HRMMU visited two geriatric facilities in Luhansk: one
with 242 residents and the second with 174 (in both there were more women than men). The
management of the institutions stated that the Government of Ukraine had not facilitated the
evacuation of the centres during the shelling, although it was requested. The staff also
reported an increasing death rate attributed to stress and malnutrition.
87. Civilians continued to suffer from the lawlessness and impunity of the armed groups.
For example, on 18 and 26 March, the HRMMU interviewed residents of Kuibyshevskyi
district of Donetsk city, who reported that an armed group (allegedly part of the so-called
‘Vostok battalion’) occupied a local kindergarten and a chemical factory on 17 January. On
18 March, members of this armed group prevented the HRMMU from visiting this part of the
district. They also reportedly prevented people from returning to their own homes even to
take their own belongings. A local resident reported that on 22 March, a couple went to the
home of their 82-year-old grandmother to collect some belongings. Although they had all
documents proving their ownership of the property, they were detained by members of the
armed group for looting and taken to the basement of the seized chemical factory, where they
were kept for several hours. Afterwards, they visited the building and found that most of the
apartments were looted.
88. Reportedly, the armed groups, regularly detained civilians, particularly young men
and women spotted with alcohol. Allegations of sexual violence, which were also reported to
the HRMMU, have to be verified.
89. Reports of looting of abandoned property are commonplace in many other towns
located in the conflict area, both those controlled by the armed groups and by the Ukrainian
armed forces (such as Azov regiment). As of 1 May, the HRMMU learned that the so-called
‘ministry of internal affairs’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ has been investigating 700
cases of looting on the territory it controls.
90. The HRMMU also received reports28 of armed groups seizing property of religious
communities. On 3 March, in the town of Yenakieve controlled by the armed groups
(Donetsk region), three armed men ordered the community of Jehovah’s Witnesses to hand
over the keys to the Kingdom Hall (place of worship) so that they could use them as barracks.
On 26 March, armed men broke in to the Kingdom Hall in the town of Brianka controlled by
the armed groups (Luhansk region) and took away all the furniture from the building. They
reportedly removed the sign ‘Kingdom Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ and put up a new one –
“The All-Great Don Army”.
B. Right to social protection
91. Following the so-called ‘elections’ held on 2 November 2014 in the areas controlled
by armed groups, which violated the Minsk Agreements and the Constitution of Ukraine, the
28 For more cases, please see paragraph 66 in the OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
covering the period from 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015.
20
Government of Ukraine adopted two resolutions29 suspending allocations and disbursements
from the State budget (including social payments) to the territories controlled by armed
groups30. This has seriously affected at least 400,000 pensioners (predominantly women),
depriving them of vital resources – sometimes the only financial means of existence.
92. On 2 April, the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the decision31 of the first
instance court, which acknowledged that resolution No. 595 of the Cabinet of Ministers
(which stopped payment of pensions) was illegal and had thus to be cancelled. It also obliged
the Cabinet to resume the payments. Nevertheless, the court decision has not been
implemented yet32. Many pensioners, while continuing to live in the territories controlled by
the armed groups, travelled to the Government-controlled areas to collect their pensions, but
this has been made difficult due to the system of permits. On 24 April, the HRMMU
interviewed an employee of a ‘pension fund’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ who alleged
an increase in mortality rates among pensioners (due to shelling, stress and malnutrition).
93. Since early April, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
started paying pensions from unknown resources. In April, 200,000 people living in the areas
controlled by armed groups reportedly received some pensions in Russian roubles.
Reportedly, postal workers delivered payments home for pensioners over 70 years old; all
others could collect their pensions at ‘local banks’ and ‘postal service departments’. Many
local residents indicated having to queue for seven days and not managing to receive their
pensions, because of a lack of cash. Reportedly, on 16 April in the town of Stakhanov,
pensioners started protesting near the post office, demanding the so-called ‘authorities’ pay
their pensions. The demonstration was dispersed by the so-called ‘people’s police’. On 30
April, the HRMMU learned that older persons in the institutional care facility of Luhansk had
received only 25 per cent of their pensions. Earlier, there were also reports that the armed
groups had paid salaries on an irregular basis to medical staff, teachers, employees of social
care institutions and penitentiary services. None had received salaries from the Government
of Ukraine since July 2014.
94. As of 13 May, the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine registered 1,283,735
internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the conflict-affected areas of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions and from Crimea. Out of 361,895 IDP families who applied for financial assistance to
cover accommodation and utilities, 302, 581 families have already started receiving it. The
precondition for obtaining financial assistance is registration with the Ministry; available
reports suggest that some IDPs still face problems with obtaining registration. In particular,
this relates to people moving within the Government-controlled areas of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions to safer location away from the contact line. In such cases, the Ministry
applies the geographical criteria to accept or deny IDP registration based on Government
Resolution No. 1085 of 7 November 2014, which contains a list of settlements that are fully
or partially not controlled by the Government. Therefore, IDPs fleeing settlements not
included in the list have faced problems with obtaining registration.
95. Another category of IDPs deprived of access to social security is unaccompanied or
separated children, who travel to the territory controlled by the Government. According to
29 Presidential Decree No. 875 and Resolution No. 595 of the Cabinet of Ministers.
30 The Government reports of allocating 100 percent of pensions to the residents living in the territories
controlled by armed groups, with should be paid after the Government regains control over these territories.
31 On 9 February, the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court found in favour of a lawsuit of 16 pensioners from the
city of Donetsk against the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, who had demanded the cancellation of
governmental resolution No. 595 of 7 November 2014.
32 According to the Government the decision of the court may not be implemented due to the security situation
in the areas controlled by armed groups.
21
Government Resolution No. 509 on registration of IDPs, children can only be registered with
a legal guardian or a parent. Legal guardianship can only be established with a special
document certified by a notary. This is nearly impossible to obtain on behalf of a child
travelling from the territories controlled by the armed groups, as notaries on these
territories have been suspended by the Government.
96. On 18 February, the Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights, National Minorities
and Interethnic Relations registered a draft law33 amending the current legislation on IDPs.
The draft broadens the list of authorities responsible for registration of IDPs and simplifies
the procedure. Particularly, it allows using other documents, including employment record
book, educational or medical certificates, to prove that an IDP resided in conflict area, in case
a passport is unavailable or does not have registration stamp. It also obliges the state to create
conditions for voluntary integration into host communities as well as voluntary return. The
HRMMU notes that the draft law would positively contribute to the protection of IDPs.
C. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
97. As reported by local health and penitentiary institutions, humanitarian actors and local
residents, the lack of medication remained the major constraint to healthcare in the areas
controlled by armed groups. Medication for patients with diabetes, cancer, genetic diseases,
and those in need of haemodialysis, were purchased by the Ministry of Health of Ukraine on
24 November 2014. However, as of 15 May, it was still stocked in the Government-controlled
town of Sieverodonetsk (Luhansk region) and not transported to the areas controlled by armed
groups. To date, there are no systematic and sustainable mechanisms to deliver psychotropic
drugs for psychiatric institutions, as well as to guarantee consistent treatment of HIV/AIDS
and tuberculosis in the areas controlled by armed groups.
98. Lack of vaccines continued to be a major problem, leading to the risk of an outbreak
of measles, diphtheria or polio. Given the low quality of water there is a constant danger of
outbreak of infectious diseases, including hepatitis A and rabies due to the high number of
stray animals. Luhansk, which even before the conflict had been one of the regions with the
highest spread of tuberculosis, lacks BCG vaccine for children. It has also been impossible to
diagnose tuberculosis in penitentiary institutions for more than six months.
99. As of 15 May, there were more than 25,000 demobilised Ukrainian soldiers. They return
traumatized, display signs of depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, resorting to
alcohol, drug abuse and the use of violence as coping mechanism. In interviews with the
HRMMU, many of them reported experiencing difficulties in obtaining an official status as a
‘participant of security operation’ and thus accessing psycho-social assistance, medical and
rehabilitation services free of charge.
100. The rehabilitation of former soldiers is important, including for the prevention of
domestic violence. The NGO La Strada notes that as demobilisation is ongoing, cases of
domestic violence have been increasingly reported. More instances of physical and sexual
domestic violence have been reported compared to 2014, including from the territories
controlled by the armed groups.
V. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
101. The reporting period covers the anniversaries of three events which most negatively
impacted the human rights situation in Ukraine: Maidan killings of 18–20 February 2014, the
33 The draft law No. 2166 On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine in Relation to Strengthening Guarantee of
Compliance with the Rights and Freedoms of the Internally Displaced Persons of 18 February 2015.
22
beginning of the security operation in the east on 14 April 2014 and the violence in Odesa on
2 May 2014. Although some results in the investigations into Maidan events and the 2 May
violence have been reported by the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine, only a few of the
alleged perpetrators have been brought to account34. Also, investigations into human rights
violations committed in the conflict zone have also not produced tangible results.
A. Accountability for human rights violations committed in the east
102. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine has opened a number of criminal
proceedings into the killings of servicemen of Ukrainian armed forces and civilians in the
security operation area under Article 115 (intentional homicide) of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine. Investigations into deaths that were caused by the hostilities are hampered by the
difficulty to identify perpetrators and weapons. The Ministry also explains the lack of
progress in these investigations by the lack of access to the crime scenes and to victims. The
HRMMU believes that releases of members of the armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ (within implementation of Minsk Agreements) by
the Ukrainian Government have complicated the investigations further. So far, the HRMMU
is unaware of any investigations that have been completed.
103. The SBU is carrying out investigations into the alleged extrajudicial killing of a
Ukrainian soldier, Ihor Branovytskyi, on 21 January, and into other alleged aggravated
human rights violations by the members of the armed groups.
104. On 30 April, following the adoption of the resolution of the Parliament on admission
of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court35, the Office of the Prosecutor General of
Ukraine reported that the analytical summary of the crimes which fall under Articles 7 and 8
of the Rome Statute has been completed and sent to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for
review and deciding of whether it should be submitted to the ICC.
Investigations into human rights violations allegedly committed by Ukrainian armed forces
and law enforcement personnel
105. On 17 April, the Chief Military Prosecutor of Ukraine, who is responsible for
investigating crimes committed by the Ukrainian armed forces, has reported opening 7,560
criminal investigations into crimes committed by the Ukrainian soldiers since the beginning
of the year. These include 1,964 criminal proceedings under Article 407 (absence without
leave from a military unit or place of service), 948 – under Article 408 (desertion), 107 –
under Article 409 (evasion from military service) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. However,
the HRMMU is unaware of any criminal investigations conducted by the Office of the
Military Prosecutor into human rights violations against civilians and violations of
international humanitarian law in the east.
34 These include five police officers who were found guilty in ill-treatment of Maidan protestor Mykhailo
Havryliuk on 22 January 2014 in Kyiv, and a number people found guilty by the courts under Articles 110
(trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine), 258-3 (creation of a terrorist group or terrorist
organization), 260 (creation of unlawful paramilitary or armed formations) and 263 (unlawful handling of
weapons, ammunition or explosives) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine for membership in the armed groups of
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. The HRMMU is unaware of the exact number of
convictions under the above charges to date.
35 Resolution of the Parliament No. 145-VIII of 4 February 2015, on the admission of the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court over crimes against humanity and military crimes committed by senior officials of
the Russian Federation and heads of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, which
resulted in grave consequences and mass killing of Ukrainian citizens.
23
106. An illustrative case of impunity of perpetrators is the death of Oleksandr Agafonov on
14 November36. On 10 April, the Kharkiv Regional Military Prosecutor informed the
HRMMU that there had been suspects in the case, but that no one has been prosecuted yet.
The only person whose identity was established (an SBU officer) is not a suspect in the
allegations of torture of Mr. Agafonov.
107. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ have claimed that
their members and people suspected of being affiliated with them have been subjected to
torture and ill-treatment by the Ukrainian armed forces and law enforcement agencies
(especially SBU) while in custody (some of these cases have been described in the report
mentioned in paragraph 50 above). The HRMMU is verifying these allegations. As of 15
May, the HRMMU is unaware of investigations into such allegations by the Ukrainian
authorities. Alleged victims are unlikely to seek justice under the Ukrainian legal
framework37 for fear of possible detention38 or reprisals and lack of trust in it.
B. Accountability for human rights violations committed during the Maidan protests
108. Over a year after Maidan protests, during which at least 117 people died and more than
2,29539 were wounded, no significant progress has been achieved to bring perpetrators to account.
Lack of progress in investigation
109. On 1 April, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine stated that all senior Government
officials involved in decision making during the Maidan events had been identified.
However, the HRMMU is concerned about the lack of cooperation between the SBU,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Office of the Prosecutor General, which are involved in
the investigation, as well as about loss of evidence and the impossibility to locate some of the
suspects who have fled Ukraine.
110. On 29 April, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine reported the initiation of criminal
proceeding under Article 365 (abuse of powers or official misconduct) of the Criminal Code
of Ukraine in relation to interference of the law enforcement agencies into investigation of
crimes committed against Maidan protestors. According to the Prosecutor General, certain
36 In the morning of 14 November, Oleksandr Agafonov was stopped at the Izium check-point in Kharkiv region
while going by car with his wife and an infant to Donetsk. They were asked to go to the police station for an
interview. Mr Agafonov was not formally detained, but from that time was under control of the police. At 5 pm,
a so-called ‘filtering group’ composed of two uniformed masked men and an SBU officer entered the police
station and took Mr. Agafonov away. At 9 pm masked people and the SBU officer brought him back.
Mr. Agafonov was still alive, even able to sit on a bench, but complained about feeling bad. An hour later the
ambulance called by the policemen declared his death of shock and a closed blunt injury of the chest. On 2
December, the Kharkiv Military Prosecutor confirmed to the HRMMU that the identity of the SBU agent had
been determined, but that it was established that he had not taken part in torture. The other suspects in the
investigation were not yet identified “because the men who committed the crime wore masks”. As not a suspect,
the SBU officer was not suspended.
37 According to Ukrainian legislation and internal regulations of the law enforcement agencies, formal
complaints can only be filed: (i) personally; (ii) through a trustee empowered with a power of attorney certified
by the notary; and (iii) via postal mail. Residents of the territories controlled by the armed groups cannot resort
to the latter two means as notaries’ powers as well postal communications have been suspended by the
Government.
38 Prior to ‘simultaneous releases’ the law enforcement agencies change a measure of restraint for the suspects,
but do not terminate cases and keep them on wanted lists, so that they will be detained should they come to the
territory controlled by the Government. ID documents of the released remain with the investigation as the cases
are not closed.
39 According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, 185 protestors sustained gunshot wounds and more than
1,000 had other types of injuries, 210 policemen and servicemen of internal troops sustained gunshot wounds,
and more than 900 suffered other types of injuries.
24
officials of the Office of the Prosecutor General, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SBU
had intentionally interfered with the investigations and destroyed evidence.
111. On 31 March, the International Advisory Panel on Ukraine, constituted by the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, issued the report on its review of the Maidan
investigations. The Panel stated that no substantial progress had been made and described the
same impediments barring the investigation, in violation of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights. The Panel also found that information delivered by the authorities to
the public on the investigations was insufficient, as were the steps taken to involve victims
and next-of-kin in criminal investigations. In February 2015, a coalition of civic
organisations and initiatives published a report entitled Price of Freedom ‘on crimes against
humanity’ committed during Maidan protests based on materials the coalition submitted for
examination to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.
112. Similarly, no progress in the investigation into the killing of 13 police officers and
servicemen of internal troops during the Maidan protests has been reported.
On-going trial of two Berkut servicemen
113. On 24 February, the Kyiv City Court of Appeals issued a ruling to refer the case of
two Berkut servicemen charged with the killing 39 protestors at Instytutska Street on 20
February 2014 for trial to the Sviatoshynskyi District Court of Kyiv. The accused have been
in custody since 5 April 2014 and will remain there until 26 June. The next court hearing has
only been scheduled for 3 June due to the inability to form the panel with two people’s
assessors40 as requested by the accused. Media reporting on the case has not been always
compliant with the presumption of innocence, and the HRMMU is concerned that it may
impact on the objectivity and impartiality of the people’s assessors participating in the trial.
114. The HRMMU obtained a copy of the indictment in the case of one of the accused.
According to the document, the pre-trial investigation established that both of the accused
were firing shots towards the crowd of protestors going up Instytutska Street, as a result of
which 39 protestors were killed. The HRMMU is concerned that the prosecution has not yet
established individual responsibility and is leaning towards an approach that would aim at
establishing collective responsibility. The HRMMU will continue monitoring the trial and
report on this issue.
115. The whereabouts of the third suspect, a Berkut commander, who was detained on 5
April 2014 and escaped from house arrest on 3 October 2014, has not yet been established.
The Office of the Prosecutor General claimed on 29 April that it had enough evidence that he
had fled to the Russian Federation, but his extradition cannot be invoked as he is not on an
international wanted list41.
Detention and charges to five Berkut officers and servicemen
116. As the Maidan investigations are on-going during the reporting period, the Office of
the Prosecutor General reported the detention of five Berkut servicemen under the charges of
killing and injuring of protestors in February 2014. On 23 February, the Office of the
40 Form of participation of society in the administration of justice inherited by some countries of the former
USSR in a limited number of cases, including criminal cases where accused may face lifetime sentence. The
panel consists of three judges and two people’s assessors.
41 On 29 April, the Head of the Special Investigation Department with the Office of the Prosecutor General
Serhii Horbatiuk reported that Interpol had refused to put the suspect on a wanted list, although there was
enough evidence that he fled Ukraine.
25
Prosecutor General reported that all 23 Berkut servicemen (including those mentioned in
paragraphs 110-112 above), involved in killing of 39 protestors at Instytutska Street on 20
February 2014, have been identified. The same day two former Berkut servicemen were
detained, and following a ruling of Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv of 24 February, they
were placed in custodial detention, where they currently remain. The other 19 servicemen
were put on a wanted list as they have been hiding from justice.
117. On 23 April, Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv detained three other former Berkut
servicemen on charges under Articles 365 (abuse of powers) and 115 (intentional homicide)
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. As it was alleged by the pre-trial investigation, the detained
servicemen were involved in the killing of five protestors, the infliction of gunshot wounds to
62 protestors as well as other types of injuries to more than 400 people on 18 February 2014
at Hrushevskoho Street in Kyiv.
C. Accountability for the 2 May violence in Odesa
118. Two official investigations have been initiated to look into the 2 May violence in
Odesa, when 48 persons died (six killed in the city centre and 42 – from the effects of the fire
at the Trade Union Building), one by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the other by the
Office of the Prosecutor General. However, these investigations are widely believed to be
unreliable, particularly because of the inability or unwillingness of law enforcement bodies to
bring to justice those responsible for the violence. The HRMMU believes that with no
obstacles in the investigation of the 2 May violence, the prosecution of perpetrators is only
hampered by the fact that some suspects have reportedly fled Ukraine, including the former
Deputy Head of Odesa Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs42.
Investigation led by Prosecutor General Office on police and fire brigade negligence
119. On 30 April 2015, the Office of the Prosecutor General notified the former Head of
the Odesa Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs about suspicions of
official negligence, by failing to ensure public security which resulted in clashes between
‘pro-federalism’ and ‘pro-unity’ supporters during the march ‘For United Ukraine’. On 13
May, the Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv placed the former Head of the Odesa Regional
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs under house arrest.
120. No progress has been achieved in a criminal investigation into the negligence of the
fire department, which having received numerous phone calls about the fire, took 40 minutes
to arrive at the scene – the Trade Unions Building, where 42 people died of suffocation, burns
and as a result of jumping out of the windows – despite being located in its immediate vicinity.
Investigation led by the Ministry of Internal Affairs
121. The investigation headed by the Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
on mass disorder in the city centre and at the Trade Union Building continues to raise grave
concerns. In September 2014, the investigation was split into several criminal proceedings,
including three major ones: on the mass disorder at the Trade Union Building (Kulykove Pole
Square), on mass disorder in the city centre and against a ‘pro-unity’ activist charged with
murder.
Investigation regarding the mass disorder at the Trade Union building
122. The investigation led by the Ministry of Internal Affairs into mass disorder at the
Trade Union Building is still on-going. By 15 May, no substantive progress has been
observed in the investigation into the death of 42 people, and no suspect had been identified.
42 He is charged under Articles 365 (excess of authority or official powers) and 367 (neglect of official duty) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine for unlawful release of 63 perpetrators on 4 May detained the day before.
26
At the same time, on 9 February, the Office of the Prosecutor General closed the criminal
investigation for lack of evidence against a ‘pro-unity’ activist, accused of beating ‘profederalism’
supporters, jumping out of the burning Trade Union Building. On 19 August, he
was arrested and transferred to the SIZO in Kherson. On 26 August, the District Court of
Kherson ruled on placing him in custodial detention. However, on 30 August, due to the
pressure from ‘pro-unity’ activists, the Court of Appeal of Kherson Region changed the
measure of restraint to an obligation not to leave Odesa without the investigator’s permission.
On 17 February, victims appealed this decision as being groundless and politically motivated
with no result to date as the trial on the matter is on-going.
Investigation into mass disorder in the city centre
123. On 25 March, the Office of the Prosecutor General submitted a revised indictment
against 20 ‘pro-federalism’ supporters charged under Article 294 (mass disorder) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine (one of whom had reportedly fled to Crimea) to the Malynovskyi
District Court of Odesa. The defence lawyers maintain that in addition to previously
mentioned numerous omissions, including violation of the principle of fair trial, the revised
indictment contained new procedural mistakes and referred rather to the political views of the
accused, than to evidence of their participation in the mass disorder. The court ruled to return
the indictment to the Office of the Prosecutor General for the second time.
124. Consideration of the motion of the ‘pro-federalism’ suspects regarding the returned
indictment was carried out in the absence of some of defence lawyers (due to failure of the
court to properly notify the parties of the hearing in advance). The Court of Appeals of Odesa
region also disregarded a request from defendants for legal aid which was hampered by the
absence of their lawyers. On 26 March, a judge of the Malynovskyi District Court of Odesa
extended the detention of 10 ‘pro-federalism’ detainees without a full panel of judges as
prescribed by law when considering grave crimes. Furthermore, the court session was not
public and transparent since none of the defenders and their lawyers were notified of the
court date and, they were thus unable to participate.
125. On 27 April, the Malynovskyi District Court of Odesa ruled once again to return the
indictment to the Office of the Prosecutor General due to numerous omissions and procedural
mistakes. On 15 May, the Court of Appeals of Odesa Region considered the appeal of the
prosecution against the decision of the Malynovskyi District Court. The HRMMU observed
numerous procedural violations during the hearing which was held in the absence of several
defence lawyers. Appeals for legal aid of the defendants, including minor, were ignored by
the court. The panel of judges seemed prejudiced against the defence and decided to submit
the indictment to the Malynovskyi District Court of Odesa for a new consideration.
Investigation regarding the ‘pro-unity’ activist charged with murder
126. On 22 April, almost one year after the opening of the criminal investigation, the
indictment against the single ‘pro-unity’ activist, charged with participation in mass disorder,
murder and injuring a law enforcement officer in the city centre, was submitted to the
Prymorskyi District Court of Odesa.
D. Investigation into the Rymarska case
127. The investigation into the shooting at Rymarska street in Kharkiv on 14 March 2014
due to a conflict between activists of the ‘pro-federalism’ group Oplot and activists of the
‘pro-unity’ group Patriots of Ukraine which resulted in two people killed and several
wounded including a police officer, has shown little progress. More than a year after the
event, no perpetrators have been identified.
128. In 2014, the SBU informed the HRMMU that there would be no indictments in the
case, as according to the pre-trial investigation, the shooting was a case of self-defence. At
27
the same time, the HRMMU is not aware that the case has been officially closed. Information
from the SBU, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office
suggests that the majority of the members of the Patriots of Ukraine, allegedly involved in
shooting, are now serving with the Azov Regiment in the conflict zone, and therefore cannot
be reached.
E. Administration of justice
Parallel ‘administration of justice’ systems on the territories controlled by the armed groups
129. The armed groups and the so-called ‘governance structures’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ are accountable for human rights violations
committed on territories under their control. Steps taken by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ to establish their own ‘legislative’ frameworks43 and
systems of ‘administration of justice’ (‘police’, ‘prosecutors’44 and ‘courts’45) are contrary to
the Constitution of Ukraine and international law, and jeopardize the Minsk Agreements.
130. Although there is no legal framework for the activity of ‘lawyers’ in the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’, on 19 March, the ‘supreme court’ and the ‘prosecutor general’ issued a
joint instruction to ensure the right to a public defender in criminal ‘proceedings’ initiated
since December 2014. Meanwhile, the Law On Advocacy of Ukraine is still in force in the
‘Luhansk people’s republic’, but is still not applied due to lack of established ‘judiciary’.
131. A ‘court system’ started functioning in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ as of 9
January with the appointment of 42 ‘judges’, including 12 assigned to the ‘supreme court’
and its ‘head’, and two ‘arbitrators’. Majority of cases are those which remained pending
from Ukrainian courts46 and cases filed by the ‘penitentiary service’ for revision of the term
of detention of those remaining there since 2005. The ‘supreme court’ has already made
‘decisions’ in 20 ‘criminal cases’. ‘Courts of general jurisdiction’ are ‘hearing’ 61 civil cases;
and issued ‘decisions’ in eight cases.
132. The ‘court system’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ has not started functioning
yet47. There have been, however, ‘cases’ awaiting ‘trial’. They include the ‘case’ of Maria
Varfolomieieva who was captured in January for allegedly taking pictures of the buildings
that were allegedly subsequently shelled, accused of ‘espionage’ and is expected to be ‘tried’
in a ‘court’ as soon as the ’court system’ starts functioning. The HRMMU is concerned that a
‘trial’ over Ms. Varfolomieieva would ‘legitimize’ her unlawful deprivation of liberty and
urged the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ to release her – as well as other captives.
43 ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ apply a Criminal Procedural Code of the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of 1960.
44 ‘Prosecutor’s offices’ in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ have been vested with broad powers, including the right to
decide on a measure of restraint (including ‘detention’ of up to two months which can be extended to 20 months).
45 While the ‘court system’ has not yet started functioning in the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, the same has been
introduced in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ based on the Soviet Union model. The ‘supreme court’ started
functioning on 23 September 2014 with the primary aim of development of a ‘legislation framework’ for
‘administration of justice’. ‘Courts of first instance’ started working on 9 January, with the appointment of 42
‘judges’ based on the interview; this includes 12 ‘judges’ of the ‘supreme court’ and its ‘head’, 2 ‘arbitrators’.
46 Currently the archive of ‘supreme court’ (previously Court of Appeal of Donetsk region) has 498
unconsidered criminal ‘cases’ and 1,837 civil ‘cases’. ‘Courts of the first instance’ have 1,602 unconsidered
criminal ‘cases’ and more than 1,000 civil ‘cases’. Some of the ‘cases’ have already been heard.
47 Member of ‘people’s council’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ informed the HRMMU that on 30 April,
several ‘laws’ on the ‘judiciary’ had been ‘adopted’ in the ‘second reading’. These included ‘laws’ ‘on the court
system’, ‘on the creation of courts’, which set up ‘courts’ at the ‘republican’ level: ‘supreme court’, ‘court of
appeals’, ‘martial court’, four ‘district courts’ in Luhansk, eight ‘city courts’, two ‘city/county courts’, and three
‘district (county) courts’.
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Law enforcement tolerating illegal action by ‘pro-unity’ supporters
133. The HRMMU is concerned that illegal activities of ‘pro-unity’ activists have been
tolerated by Ukrainian law enforcement agencies. On 26 March, the HRMMU witnessed the
abduction by ‘pro-unity’ activists of two lawyers representing ‘pro-federalism’ activists. This
occurred during a protest organised by the lawyers as they attempted to enter the Odesa
SIZO, where their clients were held48. The police at the scene made no attempt to intervene.
Moreover, as observed by the HRMMU, while the perpetrators were clearly identified on the
spot, no investigation was open. The abduction appeared to have been stopped due to the
intervention of the HRMMU which immediately reported on the incident to a police officer
prompting him to eventually take action.
134. Several ‘rubbish container lustration’ incidents took place during the reporting period.
On 11 April, members of the Right Sector, Self-Defence and other local civil activists who
claim poor implementation of the Lustration Law forcefully put the head of Ivano-Frankivsk
Regional Department of Justice into a rubbish container. The police initiated criminal
investigation under Article 296 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. On 24 April,
Right Sector activists took the deputy of the city council of Dniprodzerzhynsk from his office
and pushed him in a rubbish container. He was also hit, including with a five litre bottle filled
with water.
Alleged intimidation of judges
135. The HRMMU is highly concerned about the lack of independence of the judiciary.
Due to direct intimidation and threats against judges, the judiciary fails to ensure impartial
and fair trial. On 27 February, the Odesa Court of Appeal held a general meeting with all
judges of Odesa region to discuss the increased pressure on the judiciary system by ‘prounity’
activists. The pressure reportedly includes death threats, physical attacks and forcefully
putting judges into trash containers. In addition to the pressure from ‘pro-unity’ activists, the
judges referred to pressure from the SBU to take ‘right’ decisions during hearings involving
‘pro-federalism’ activists suspected of terrorism and committing crimes against national security.
High profile cases
136. The HRMMU continued to follow up on the prosecutions of former senior and
Government officials, with no progress to date. These include the cases of Yurii Borisov,
Nelia Shtepa and Oleksandr Yefremov. On 3 March, the Chervonozavodskyi Court of Kharkiv
started hearings on the case of Ms. Shtepa and has since held several sessions where
witnesses were questioned. While Ms. Shtepa insisted that many possible defence witnesses
refused to testify after the abduction and killing of her deputy in January 2015, the prosecutor’s
witnesses stated that she was not abducted and forcefully detained by the armed groups as she
had claimed, but that she collaborated with them. The HRMMU reiterates the necessity to
ensure impartiality and objectivity of the process against current and former officials.
137. The HRMMU is concerned with the deaths over the reporting period of several
politicians at various levels connected to the previous regime. These include the former
Mayor of Melitopol Serhii Valter, who committed suicide on 25 February, former deputies of
the Parliament Mykhailo Chechetov49 and Stanislav Melnyk, who committed suicide on 28
48 On 26 March, Malynovskyi District Court of Odesa extended detention for 10 ‘pro-federalism’ detainees,
accused in the mass disorder on 2 May 2014 in the city centre whose term of detention expired at 5 am that day.
A single judge instead of a panel of three judges considered the issue on detention without holding a court
hearing and without notifying the defence team.
49 On 20 February, the Office of the Prosecutor General notified Mykhailo Chechetov of suspicion in
committing a crime under Article 364 (abuse of power) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine during voting for the
laws aimed at limitation of civil rights and freedoms on 16 January 2014. On 21 February, Pecherskyi District
29
February and 9 March respectively, the former Head of Zaporizhzhia Regional State
Administration Oleksandr Peklushenko, who committed suicide on 12 March, and the killing
of former deputy of the Parliament Oleh Kalashnikov on 15 April.
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Constitutional reform
138. On 3 March, the President of Ukraine established a Constitutional Commission to
prepare a draft law on constitutional reform that would result from wide public consultations.
The Commission is chaired by the Chairperson of the Parliament and made up of 73
members, both women and men, including the Minister of Justice, former presidents of
Ukraine, parliamentarians, academics, judges and other members of the legal profession,
representatives of the civil society, and 13 foreign legal experts and representatives of
international organizations, including the Council of Europe, European Union, OSCE and the
HRMMU representing the United Nations.
139. The first meeting of the Commission was held on 6 April and several meetings were
held in May. Three working groups have been set up to review issues related to: human rights
and freedoms; the judiciary, legal institutions and law enforcement; and constitutional
principles of state governance, local self-government, administrative and territorial
organization and decentralization.
140. While no deadline for the work of the Commission is mentioned in the decree
establishing it, this process would need to be completed before the country-wide local
elections of October 2015 as amendments regarding decentralization and local selfgovernance
bodies would be required. In addition, the Package of Measures for the
Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of 12 February 2015 states that a new constitution
must enter into force “by the end of 2015” and that it should provide for “decentralization as
a key element”.
Reform of the judiciary
141. On 26 February, the Law on Ensuring the Right to a Fair Trial, which amends the
laws on the Judicial System and the Status of Judges, on the High Council of Justice, the
Code on Administrative Offences and different procedure codes, entered into force.
142. The HRMMU considers that this law brings some positive elements. In particular, it
strengthens the role of the Supreme Court as the guarantor of the unity of the jurisprudence.
At the same time, the HRMMU notes that the legislator was limited in the nature and scope
of amendments it could introduce due to constitutional provisions preventing fundamental
changes in the judicial system. Therefore, as highlighted by the Venice Commission50, the
HRMMU recommends that the Constitution of Ukraine should be amended to achieve
effective judicial reform. The HRMMU is of the view that amendments should eliminate or at
least limit the influence of non-judiciary institutions on judicial matters. This applies to the
powers of the Parliament to appoint judges to permanent posts, dismiss them and lift their
immunities. It also includes the exclusive power of the President to establish and liquidate
courts. Furthermore, the composition of the High Council of Justice should be modified to
ensure that a substantial part or a majority of its members are judges elected by their peers,
which is currently not the case.
Court of Kyiv ruled on a measure of restraint in the form of custodial detention with a right to bail. On 23
February, upon settling the bail, he was released.
50 See Opinion No 801/2015 of 23 March 2015.
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Reform of the law enforcement
143. On 13 May, the Government submitted to the Parliament a draft Law On the National
Police after the deputies had withdrawn an earlier draft prepared with the civil society. The
HRMMU notes that the new text has not been discussed and that it contains some
questionable provisions presented as measures of a preventive character. In particular, it
gives wide discretion to the police to enter private premises without a court decision. This
can be done “in urgent cases” to track suspects, neutralize a threat to the life of occupants and
verify the presence of a person under home arrest. Another provision would authorize the
police in the area of the security operation to shoot at a person without a warning. The
HRMMU also recalls that the UN Basic Principles on the use of force and firearms by law
enforcement officials stipulate that intentional use of firearms may only be made when
strictly unavoidable in order to protect life and that in such cases, officials shall identify
themselves as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms.
International human rights commitments
144. On 30 April, the Parliament of Ukraine registered a draft resolution51 requesting the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice to notify the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe about the derogation by
Ukraine from certain obligations enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. The derogation is proposed in response to the “military aggression of
the Russian Federation” and will be in place until the “complete termination” of the
“aggression”. The proposed derogation from State obligations is envisaged in relation to the
right to liberty and security, fair trial, effective remedy, respect for private and family life and
freedom of movement, including the right to choose one’s residence. It is proposed to be
applied to certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions determined by the Anti-
Terrorist Centre of the Security Service of Ukraine. In accordance with Article 4 of the
ICCPR, a State may take measures to derogate from their obligations under the Covenant in
time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is
officially proclaimed. The State then shall notify the UN Secretary-General. The HRMMU is
concerned that such a derogation could further complicate the protection of human rights for
those living in the conflict area.
Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of 12 February
145. On 17 March, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Law On the Temporary
Procedure of Local Self-Government in Certain Parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk Regions,
which was passed on 16 September 2014 pursuant to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September
2014. The March amendments provide that temporary self-rule provisions under the
September law would be enacted only after local elections are held in certain parts of the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution and legislation.
The amendments also mention the need for free, fair and internationally supervised elections
meeting OSCE standards; enabling IDPs to vote; equal access to the media, including a
resumption of the work of the Ukrainian media; and withdrawal of foreign weapons, military
and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine. The representatives of the self-proclaimed
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ condemned the amendments,
insisting that self-rule provisions should be implemented without pre-conditions.
51 The Resolution On the Approval of the Notification of Ukraine about the Derogation from Certain
Obligations Determined by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the Parliament on 21 May.
31
146. On 17 March, the Parliament adopted two resolutions. One resolution (No. 252)
identifies the area of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to be provided with temporary special
status. The other resolution (No. 254) recognizes that the districts, cities, settlements and
villages located inside the area enjoying temporary special status are considered to be
“temporarily occupied”52.
147. It should be noted that, during the reporting period, no significant progress has been
made in implementing the provisions of the Package directly affecting human rights. They
include: releasing all “hostages and unlawfully detained persons”, based on the ‘all for all’
principle; ensuring pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and
punishment of persons in connections with the events that took place in the east; ensuring
safe access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need; and
defining modalities for a full resumption of socio-economic ties, including banking services,
payment of pensions and various social allocations.
Humanitarian aid
148. As of 15 May, the working group of a parliamentary Committee on Issues of Veterans,
Participants of Combat Operations, Participants of the Anti-Terrorist Operation and Persons
with Disabilities was finalising a concept the for a law on humanitarian aid. The concept
proceeds from the recognition that the existing legal framework is inadequate and needs to be
brought in compliance with international standards. The concept envisages delivery of and
access to humanitarian supplies to all civilians affected by conflict, including but not limited
to IDPs, no matter where they are geographically. The concept also stipulates the creation of
an inter-ministerial Agency for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid and measures to
facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid, notably through tax exemptions and simplification
of administrative procedures.
Martial law
149. On 12 May, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Law On the Legal Regime of
Martial Law articulating in greater detail the legal mechanisms to introduce and cancel
martial law and the organs in charge of enacting it. They also increase the number of
restrictive measures that may be taken under martial law. One new measure includes
“interning (forcibly expelling) nationals of a foreign state which threatens to attack or carries
out aggression against Ukraine”. In light of the resolution of the Parliament of 27 January
2015 recognizing the Russian Federation as an “aggressor state”, the HRMMU is of view that
this provision could apply in particular to nationals of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. It
also appears to provide a legal basis to detain and expel foreign citizens legally staying in
Ukraine who have not committed any crime.
Law on Civil-Military Administrations
150. One regional and five local military-civil administrations have been established in the
Donetsk region and one regional and seven local ones in the region of Luhansk during the
reporting period. These administrations are temporary State bodies functioning within the
Anti-Terrorist Centre of the SBU. They can be established in localities where selfgovernment
bodies are unable or fail to carry out their functions pursuant to the Law On
Civil-Military Administrations, which entered into force on 28 February.
151. Civil-military administrations cumulate the executive and legislative powers of local
self-government organs. They are vested with powers to limit freedom of movement; prohibit
52 According to the document, the qualification will remain valid “until the withdrawal of all illegal armed
formations, military hardware, militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine and the restoration of full
control over the state border of Ukraine”.
32
the activities of political parties and public organizations; control the work of enterprises and
media outlets; terminate the functions of local bodies and cancel their decisions.
152. The HRMMU notes that some safeguards have been introduced to counter-balance
these wide powers and the risks of abuse they carry. The decisions of civil-military
administrations must be published and can be appealed in court. In addition, communal
property cannot be disposed of (privatized), which implies that property transactions
frequently giving rise to corruption schemes at the local level are prohibited. On the other
hand, the establishment of such administrations is left at the discretion of the President and
does not seem to result from a clear set of criteria. Furthermore, the head of a military-civil
administration in a locality is appointed and dismissed by a central body, the National
Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. This means that in addition to being unelected, this
official is not accountable to the local community where her or his functions are exercised.
De-communization laws
153. On 15 May, the President of Ukraine signed a package of four laws53 relating to
Ukraine’s history. They denounce the Communist and Nazi regimes as “criminal under the
law”, ban propaganda in their favour and all public display of their symbols. They also require
replacing communist-inspired names for cities, streets, squares and other places. The package
of laws include provisions for opening all archives of Soviet-era security organs and provides
public recognition to all those who fought for Ukrainian independence. Thus, in addition to
Soviet war veterans, the State and local governments are to provide social benefits to members
of very diverse groups enumerated in the law, ranging from human rights activists to members
of ultra-nationalist movements which committed mass atrocities during World War II, such as
the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).
154. The HRMMU notes that there is serious risk that some legal provisions could
discourage debate about Ukraine’s past and limit the freedom of expression in a way that
could deepen divisions. For example, the Law On the Legal Status and Honouring of Fighters
for Ukraine’s Independence in the Twentieth Century’ states that “publicly expressing
disrespect” for any mentioned group that fought for Ukraine’s independence and the
legitimacy of this struggle is “illegal” and will result in “liability” under Ukrainian
legislation. The Law On Condemning Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian
Regimes in Ukraine and Prohibiting Propaganda of their Symbols is even more explicit in
imposing sentences in the form of restriction of liberty or imprisonment for up to five years
for the preparation, circulation and public use of Communist or Nazi symbols. It should be
noted that similar provisions adopted in other countries were found by the European Court of
Human Rights54 to violate the right to freedom of expression. According to Article 20 of the
ICCPR, States parties are only required to prohibit by law “propaganda for war” and
“advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence”.
Anti-corruption
155. On 18 March, the Cabinet of Ministers created a National Agency on Prevention of
Corruption, as foreseen under the legal anti-corruption package adopted in October 2014. The
Agency is to conduct mandatory e-declaration of incomes and expenditures of all public
53 See the laws On Condemning Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and
Prohibiting Propaganda of their Symbols; On the Legal Status and Honouring of Fighters for Ukraine’s
Independence in the Twentieth Century; On Perpetuating the Victory over Nazism in World War II 1939 –
1945; On Access to the Archives of the Repressive Bodies of the Totalitarian Communist Regime 1917-1991.
54 See, for example, Vajnai v. Hungary (2008), where the Court found that fining a demonstrator for wearing a
red star was in breach of his right to freedom of expression.
33
officials. A public council was created within the agency to monitor its work. On 16 April,
President Poroshenko appointed Artem Sytnyk, a former prosecutor, as Director of the
National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NACB), a body which will conduct investigation into
crimes committed by high level public officials, including judges and prosecutors. The
Bureau will be able to file cases in court through specially trained prosecutors to be appointed
by the Office of the Prosecutor General and responsible to the Bureau Director.
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
156. The situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea continued to be characterized by
human rights violations targeting mostly those who opposed the unlawful ‘referendum’ in
March 2014 and the arrival of ‘authorities’ applying the laws of the Russian Federation.
157. During the reporting period, the HRMMU was informed about ill-treatment and
torture perpetrated by or with the acquiescence of the Crimean ‘law enforcement’.
Harassment and arrests of Mejlis members or supporters and civic activists continued.
Control of the media was tightened after a number of media outlets, particular Crimean Tatar
ones, were forced to cease operating. The freedom to practice’s one’s religion has been
jeopardized by limitations resulting from re-registration requirements.
Torture and ill-treatment
158. During the reporting period, the HRMMU obtained new information, including
medical and court records, concerning the case of Oleksandr Kostenko. As previously
reported55, Mr. Kostenko was arrested by the ‘police’ on 8 February 2015 on suspicion of
wounding a Berkut police officer on 18 February 2014 during the Maidan protests in Kyiv.
New information suggests that on 5 February 2015 he was abducted by two men, possibly
affiliated to the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation, blindfolded, hit
and tortured, including through electric shocks, to extort a confession of guilt he made after
being delivered to the ‘police’ on 8 February. The HRMMU has a copy of Mr Kostenko’s
medical examination revealing multiple fractures, a dislocated shoulder and a broken elbow.
159. On 9 February 2015, Mr. Kostenko was provided with a lawyer and placed by a
‘court’ in pre-trial detention56 for two months. This term has later been prolonged until 3
June. According to his lawyer, he was beaten up by other detainees. His lawyer requested the
‘court’ to exempt from the case file all the evidence obtained under duress. On 3 April, the
‘court’ rejected the request as unfounded, stating that the evidence obtained and the
allegations made, including torture claims, should be examined together in future court
proceedings, in order not to compromise the establishment of facts and responsibility. On 15
May, Mr. Kostenko was found guilty of inflicting deliberate injury and possession of firearms
by a ‘court’ in Simferopol and sentenced to four years and two months of imprisonment. His
lawyer said he would appeal the decision. The HRMMU considers that in addition to
evidence of confessions obtained under torture, the case points to an absence of conditions
for a fair trial and legal safeguards for the accused.
55 See paragraph 95 of the 9th HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine.
56 He is charged under Article 115 (deliberate infliction of mild damage to health for motives of political,
ideological, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity, or hatred or enmity in relation to a social group) of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
34
160. On 20 April, FSB officers detained Emir-Usein Kuku, a member of the ‘human rights
contact group’57, and informed him that he was suspected under Article 282 (incitement of
hatred or enmity) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. He claims that he was
repeatedly hit while being convoyed to the FSB department in Yalta. His house was also
searched. On 21 April, a medical examination found that Mr. Kuku suffered injuries to the
head and one kidney.
Persecution of Crimean Tatars and ‘pro-Ukraine’ supporters
161. Pressure and intimidation against all those who oppose the de facto authorities or
officially sanctioned views about events in Crimea continued. They usually take the form of
arbitrary arrests, house searches, abusive questioning as suspects or witnesses, the imposition
of fines and job dismissals. They also frequently involve the vague and unsubstantiated
accusation of promoting extremism and intolerance.
162. During the reporting period, another four Crimean Tatars58 were arrested and placed in
pre-trial detention in connection with the events of 26 February 201459. All four Crimean Tatars
were charged with participation in mass riots and risk prison terms of three to eight years. On 23
March, several other Crimean Tatars, including two senior Mejlis officials60 and a businessperson
were also summoned for questioning as witnesses in relation to the February 2014 events, and the
‘police’ searched their houses. These actions followed the arrest of the deputy head of the Mejlis,
Ahtem Chiygoz, on 29 January 2015, who was placed in detention until 19 May on suspicion of
organising mass riots, a charge which carries a prison sentence of four to 10 years.
163. On 11 March, a ‘court’ in Simferopol ordered 40 hours of corrective labour for three
Crimean activists and 20 hours for another one after they unfurled a Ukrainian flag with the
inscription “Crimea is Ukraine” during a rally, which had been authorized by the Simferopol
‘city administration’, to commemorate the 201st anniversary of the national poet of Ukraine Taras
Shevchenko on 9 March. The ‘court’ found that, by failing to mention the use of Ukrainian
symbols in the request form for the event, the activists had violated “legal provisions
regulating the conduct of mass events”. On 11 March, the organizer of the event, Leonid
Kuzmin, was dismissed from his job as teacher of history for behaviour “inconsistent with his
position”. On 17 April, he was attacked by a group of young men, including one of his
former students, who allegedly accused him of being a Right Sector member and hit him with
a bottle. Mr. Kuzmin reported the case to the Crimean ‘police’.
164. On 21 April, Oleksii Chornyi, one of four Ukrainian citizens arrested in Crimea and
transferred to the Russian Federation in May 2014, was found guilty of planning terrorist
acts and smuggling weapons by a Russian court and sentenced to seven years imprisonment
Mr. Chornyi, who risked up to 12 years of imprisonment, entered a plea agreement. In
December 2014, another co-accused, Hennadii Afanasiev, did the same and received an
identical prison sentence. The two other people arrested include a ‘pro-Ukrainian’ activist,
Oleksandr Kolchenko and film-maker Oleh Sentsov, who are currently awaiting trials on
charges under Article 222-3 (unlawfully obtaining, selling, possessing weapons, explosive
substances and devices) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
57 The group is a coordination body established in October 2014 by de facto authorities of Crimea to contribute
to the search for several Crimean Tatars who went missing in 2014. It is composed of ‘police officers’, officials
of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation and relatives of those who went missing.
58 Eskender Emirgaliyev was arrested on 18 February, Talyat Yunusov on 11 March, Ali Asanov on 15 April
and Eskender Nebiev on 22 April.
59 For more details see paragraph 93 of the HRMMU report of 1 December 2014 -15 February 2015.
60 Nariman Dzhelal and Ilmy Umerov.
35
Freedom of expression
165. On 1 April, the deadline for re-registration of all Crimean media outlets under the law
of the Russian Federation expired. Roskomnadzor, the Russian Federation media registration
agency, registered 232 media. The HRMMU has analysed the situation of the Crimean Tatar
media and identified at least seven media outlets which were denied registration. They
include the television channels ATR and Lale, radio stations Meydan and Lider, news agency
QHA, the newspaper Avdet and the Internet site 15minut. Roskomnadzor cited procedural
violations as the main reasons for rejection. Some media were unsuccessful despite
submitting several requests. On 30 and 31 March, dozens of people gathered outside the ATR
studio and several were briefly detained for trying to make a video clip in support of the
channel. A Simferopol ‘court’ imposed a fine on one of the protesters for “infringing the
rules for holding mass protests” and “resisting arrest”. On 14 May, Roskomnadzor published
a list of 30 media outlets using Crimean Tatar language, which were registered. They include
nine newspapers, eight journals, five TV and eight radio stations where Crimean Tatar is used
as the sole language or one of the languages of communication.
166. The HRMMU notes that although some media outlets arguably continue operating in
Crimean Tatar language, the TV channel mostly watched by the Crimean Tatar community
(ATR) and the mostly read newspaper (Avdet) were denied licenses to continue their work.
The HRMMU recalls that undue restrictions on the right to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds gravely undermine media pluralism and violate freedom of
expression, which is protected under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and Article 19 of the ICCPR.
167. The Crimean ‘law enforcement’ also acted to discourage critical reporting on Crimea
from media that left the peninsula for mainland Ukraine. On 2 April, the HRMMU interviewed
Anna Andrievska, a journalist from the Crimean Centre for Investigative Journalism who now
lives in Kyiv. She informed that on 13 March, the Crimean ‘police’ opened a criminal case
against her for an article she wrote in December 2014 on a Crimea volunteer battalion of the
Ukrainian armed forces. They also searched the house of her parents in Crimea, seized some
personal notes and questioned former colleagues of hers. Ms. Andrievska is accused under
Article 280-1 (public calls for the infringement of the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which carries a prison sentence of
up to five years.
Freedom of religion
168. Public organizations, including religious communities also had to re-register under
Russian Federation law to obtain legal status. The deadline for re-registration was extended
twice61 and is now 1 January 2016. Religious communities requesting re-registration need to
submit the statutes of the organization, two records of community meetings, a list of all the
community members, and information on the “basis of the religious belief”.
169. Almost 200 religious communities applied for re-registration so far and many requests
are still being processed. As of 8 May, 51 communities have been re-registered, including
two with the largest number of Christian Orthodox and Muslim believers on the peninsula,
the Russian Orthodox Diocese for Simferopol and Crimea and the Spiritual Administration of
Muslims of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (i.e. the Mufiyat). Other
registered organizations include Protestant and Jewish communities. The Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate did not lodge an application for registration, while the
61 The first deadline was 1 January 2015 and the second one – 1 March 2015.
36
Roman Catholic Church had to re-submit applications after the initial ones were rejected due
to some documents being in Ukrainian.
170. The HRMMU notes with concern that the obligation of religious communities to reregister
under Russian Federation law, the strict requirements of the procedure, and the
lengthy verifications it entails, have adversely affected the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion of hundreds of thousands of Crimean residents. Without registration,
religious communities can congregate but cannot enter into contracts to rent state owned
property, employ people or invite foreigners62.
Vulnerable groups
171. The situation of some vulnerable groups, such as people with drug addiction, is
dramatic. About 800 of them are currently without life-saving opioid-substitution therapy in
Crimea. Under Ukrainian legislation, Crimean doctors provide intravenous drug users with
methadone, an opioid substitute, and buprenorphine, a drug used to ease dependence.
According to Russian legislation substitution therapy is not a legal option for treatment of
drug dependence and needle-exchange programs are not supported. The HRMMU has
information that patients who have stayed in Crimea have been offered treatment in Russian
hospitals, but that usually includes simple detoxification and, occasionally, a follow-up
rehabilitation. By May 2015, up to 30 people have died in Crimea due to complications
related to drug overdose or chronic illness since March 2014. Dozens have fled to mainland
Ukraine mostly with the help of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance, an NGO network.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
172. All measures need to be taken to end the fighting and violence in the eastern regions
of Ukraine to save lives and to prevent further hardship for those people living in the conflict
affected area. With the tenuous respect for the 15 February ceasefire, people continue to be
killed, and violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law
persist. The situation in the conflict-affected areas is becoming increasingly entrenched, with
the local population more and more isolated, without any rule of law, meaningful protection
for dissenting views or access by vulnerable groups to effective remedies. OHCHR believes
that the full implementation of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk
Agreements of 12 February is the only viable strategy for achieving a peaceful solution in
Donbas, which would pave the way for fuller respect of the rights of people both in the conflict
area and elsewhere in Ukraine. As noted in previous reports, the control of the borders between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the withdrawal of foreign fighters and the cessation of the
flow of weapons from the Russian Federation would have a significant impact on law and order
and the implementation of other provisions of the Minsk Agreements.
173. The impact of the conflict on the economic and social rights of civilians continues to
be dramatic. Guarantees of economic and social rights have progressively weakened,
especially on the territories controlled by the armed groups. The interruption of access to
62 See the thematic report of the Independent Expert on minority issues, Rita Izsák, concerning the protection
and promotion of the rights of religious minorities (A/68/268, paragraph 61: “It is essential to ensure that all
procedures for registration are accessible, inclusive, non-discriminatory and not unduly burdensome.
Registration procedures designed to limit beneficiaries due to political or social intolerance run afoul of human
rights standards”). See also the thematic report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief,
Heiner Bielefeldt (A/HRC/22/51, paragraph 42: “failure to register, or re-register periodically, could lead to
legal vulnerability that also exposes the religious minorities to political, economic and social insecurity”).
37
basic services is life-threatening and can have a life-long impact on a large portion of the
population, hindering the post-conflict recovery of the society.
174. The situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea remains very
concerning. Arrests, ill-treatment, torture and intimidation continue being perpetrated against
political opponents, primarily in the Crimean Tatar community, with the knowledge or
participation of the ‘law enforcement’ or affiliated groups. Legal safeguards for detained
persons are all but inexistent. The exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, assembly
and religion is mostly limited to groups or individuals being loyal to the de facto authorities.
Administrative measures, including registration requirements, are used as control mechanisms
and tools to prevent the spread of dissenting views.
175. Accountability and an end to impunity are at the core of ensuring peace, reconciliation
and long term recovery in Ukraine. Violations of human rights must be investigated and,
where there is evidence of crimes, the perpetrators brought to justice.
176. OHCHR appreciates the good cooperation extended by the Government of Ukraine to
the HRMMU. The HRMMU will continue to monitor and report on the evolving situation,
with a view to contributing to an unbiased and accurate assessment of the human rights
situation and a stronger and effective national human rights protection system.
177. OHCHR notes the progress made by the Government of Ukraine in the implementation
of some recommendations contained in previous HRMMU reports, in particular, the adoption
of the legislation on Judiciary and the Office of the Prosecutor General, some progress on the
law-enforcement reform, anti-corruption and development of the National Human Rights
Strategy. OHCHR also welcomes the development, under the leadership of the Ministry of
Social Policy, of the National Action Plan on implementation of the UN Security Council
Resolution 1325, which promotes role of women in conflict resolution and peace-building.
178. Recommendations made in the HRMMU reports published since April 2014, that
have not yet been acted upon or implemented, remain valid and are reiterated. In addition,
OHCHR calls upon all parties to implement the following recommendations:
To all parties involved in the hostilities in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
a) Seek common ground, through a sustained dialogue, in order to fully implement the
Package of Measures for the Implementation of Minsk Agreements of 12 February. In
particular, work in good faith towards the implementation of the provisions of the
Package directly affecting human rights.
b) Prioritise demining activities, in particular, in places of expected returns of IDPs and
conduct mine risk awareness outreach to children and communities.
c) Allow full and unhindered access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian
agencies in the conflict area.
d) Provide additional security guarantees for humanitarians accessing settlements
divided by the contact line.
To the Government of Ukraine
e) Investigate all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
committed in the east, including by the Government forces.
f) Guarantee independence and impartiality of judges within their mandate, especially
with regard to Maidan events and the 2 May violence in Odesa.
g) Conduct impartial and objective investigations into the recent killings of the former
members of parliament and a journalist and regularly report on its progress.
h) Revoke the Temporary Order of 21 January. Limitations on freedom of movement must
be based on clear legal grounds and meet the tests of necessity and proportionality.
38
Those seeking safety and security must be allowed to do so without having to apply for
a permit in advance or go through only pre-designated check-points.
i) Develop mechanisms to ensure that people on the territories controlled by armed
groups have access to justice.
j) Develop compensation mechanisms for people whose property has been damaged in
the conflict.
k) Take measures for securing assemblies rather than prohibiting them; facilitating
assemblies, including spontaneous assemblies, as long as these are peaceful in nature.
l) Ensure that the process of development of a new constitution of Ukraine is
transparent, open and inclusive, with the full participation of the civil society
including women, minorities and indigenous peoples.
m) Speed up the process of the adoption of the National Human Rights Strategy and start
the development of the National Human Rights Action Plan.
n) Re-engage in a dialogue with the civil society in order to ensure wide grass-root
support for the reform of the law enforcement.
o) Amend the provisions of the de-communization laws so that they fully comply with
international standards related to freedom of expression.
p) Develop special procedures for early identification, registration and documentation of
unaccompanied or separated internally displaced children and ensure their access to
assistance and services.
q) Develop state programme to support social adaptation of IDPs and envisage durable
solutions for them, as prescribed by the paragraph 3 of Article 10 of the law on IDPs.
To the de facto authorities of Crimea and to the Russian Federation
r) Put an end to arbitrary arrests and detentions of political opponents in Crimea and
investigate all claims of human rights violations by the ‘law enforcement’,
particularly ill-treatment and torture.
s) Cancel, in particular, the decision to deny licenses to Crimean Tatars media outlets,
which disproportionately affects this community and may additionally amount to
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity.
t) End the practice of imposing cumbersome re-registration requirements in Crimea,
which have been applied mainly to the media and religious organizations and limited
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, thought, conscience and religion.
Annex 769
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2015)



Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
16 May to 15 August 2015


CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL
INTEGRITY 7
A. Casualties 7
B. Civilian casualties 8
C. Total casualties (civilian and military) from mid-April 2014
to 15 August 2015 12
D. Unlawful and arbitrary detention, summary executions, and torture
and ill-treatment 13
III. FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 18
A. Freedom of movement 18
B. Freedom of expression 19
C. Freedom of peaceful assembly 20
D. Freedom of association 21
E. Freedom of religion or belief 22
IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 22
A. Right to an adequate standard of living 23
B. Right to social security and protection 24
C. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 26
V. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 27
A. Accountability for human rights violations committed in the east of Ukraine 27
B. Accountability for human rights violations committed during the
Maidan protests 30
C. Accountability for the 2 May violence in Odesa 30
D. Administration of justice 32
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 34
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA 38
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 42
3
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This is the eleventh report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, based on the work of
the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)1. It covers the
period from 16 May to 15 August 20152.
2. During the reporting period, the situation in Ukraine continued to be marred by
ongoing armed hostilities in some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions reportedly fuelled
by the presence and continuing influx of foreign fighters and sophisticated weapons and
ammunition from the Russian Federation. These hostilities continued to result in violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Lack of accountability for
such acts persisted, particularly in areas affected by the conflict, including territories controlled
by the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’3 and self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’4, and other parts of Ukraine under the control of the Government.
3. Despite the absence of large-scale offensives since mid-February 2015, locallycontained
escalations of fighting occurred in various places, notably in the Governmentcontrolled
town of Mariinka (Donetsk region) on 3 June, and near the Government-controlled
village of Starohnativka and the village of Novolaspa controlled by the armed groups (both in
Donetsk region), on 9 and 10 August. The withdrawal of heavy weapons from the contact
line as foreseen in the Minsk Agreements remained partial with the armed groups and the
Ukrainian military using mortars, canons, howitzers, tanks and multiple launch rocket
systems in daily clashes and exchanges of fire along the contact line.
4. Shelling of populated areas on both sides of the contact line, especially of the cities of
Donetsk and Horlivka (controlled by the armed groups) and of the Government-controlled
towns of Avdiivka and Mariinka – all in Donetsk region – persisted and, together with explosive
remnants of war (ERW) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continued to claim civilian
lives. In total, since mid-April 2014 until 15 August 2015, at least 7,883 people (Ukrainian
armed forces, civilians and members of the armed groups) have been killed, and 17,610 injured
in the conflict area in the east of Ukraine5. HRMMU noted an increase in civilian casualties in
this three month reporting period with 105 civilians killed and 308 injured compared to the
previous three month reporting period when 60 civilians were killed and 102 civilians were
injured. In the post-ceasefire period of 16 February to 15 August 2015, HRMMU recorded
165 civilian deaths and 410 civilians injured.
5. More centralized civilian ‘administrative structures’ and ‘procedures’ continued to
develop in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. These include the
‘legislature’, ‘judiciary system’, ‘ministries’ and ‘law enforcement’. ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ reportedly began issuing passports to residents of the territories under its control.
Among other ‘laws’, ‘legislative bodies’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ have adopted a number of ‘legislative acts’ governing criminal prosecution6
in the territories under their control. The HRMMU notes that all these ‘structures’ and
‘procedures’ in neither way conform to international law and national legislation of Ukraine.
 1 HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout
Ukraine and to propose recommendations to the Government and other actors to address emerging human rights
issues. For more details, see paragraphs 7-8 of the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
situation of human rights in Ukraine of 19 September 2014 (A/HRC/27/75).
2 The report also updates with recent developments included on cases reported in previous reporting periods.
3 Henceforth referred to as the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
4 Henceforth referred to as the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
5 This is a conservative estimate of HRMMU based on available data.
6 See paragraphs 129-132 of the 10th HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period
16 February – 15 May 2015.
4
6. HRMMU continued to receive and verify allegations of killings, abductions, torture
and ill-treatment, sexual violence, forced labour, ransom demands and extortion of money on
the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. It
also received reports of isolated incidents where armed groups disrupted religious services
and intimidated several religious communities. An estimated three million people continue to
reside in the territories under control of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ without protection from the human rights violations and abuses of the armed groups
and their supporters. The estimated hundreds of people held by the armed groups are at
particular risk of being tortured, ill-treated or otherwise abused.
7. Very limited progress has been achieved so far into investigations of human rights
violations committed by the armed groups in the east. Ukrainian law enforcement entities
claim that investigations are impeded by the lack of due access to the sites and the difficulty
in identifying suspects and weapons. Available court decisions sanctioning members of the
armed groups are mainly linked to charges of trespassing and violating the territorial integrity
of Ukraine as well as the illegal handling of weapons; most defendants have pleaded guilty
and been handed down a prison sentence with a probation period. HRMMU has received
testimonies of plea bargains being made by individuals under torture or duress.
8. HRMMU continued to observe a persistent pattern of arbitrary and incommunicado
detention by Ukrainian law enforcement officials (mainly by the Security Service of Ukraine)
and military and paramilitary units (primarily by former volunteer battalions now formally
incorporated into the Ukrainian armed forces, National Guard and police), which is often
accompanied by torture and ill-treatment of detainees, and violations of their procedural
rights. HRMMU continues to advocate for proper and prompt investigation of every single
reported case, and for prosecution of perpetrators.
9. Accountability continued to be sought for the killing and other human rights
violations committed during the Maidan protests in Kyiv, and for the deaths which occurred
on 2 May 2014 in Odesa. With regard to Maidan, the jury trial7 in the case of the two Berkut
(special riot police) officers accused of killing 39 protestors in Kyiv on 20 February 2014
during the Maidan protests, started on 6 July 2015. Seven other Berkut officers have been in
pre-trial detention charged with killing of protestors on 18 and 20 February. Investigations
into the involvement of other identified Berkut officers and former senior Government
officials in the killing of protestors have been protracted. Likewise, limited progress has been
observed in accountability into the 2 May 2014 violence in Odesa. OHCHR is concerned
with the protracted investigation into the negligence of the police and fire brigade
surrounding the violence in the city centre and fire at the Trade Unions building, which
resulted in 48 deaths that day. To date, only ‘pro-federalism’ supporters have been charged
with mass disorder in the city centre, which resulted in six deaths.
10. On 16 June, the Temporary Order8 issued by the Government of Ukraine on
21 January 2015 to impose movement limitations for individuals and cargo between the
Government-controlled territories and territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, was revised further following advocacy by
national and international organizations. On 7 July, the Government launched a web-portal to
 7 In the courts of first instance criminal proceedings into crimes for which a person can be sentenced to life
imprisonment, upon request of accused, are tried by a bench of three juries and two professional judges, who
take procedural decisions unanimously.
8 The Temporary Order on control of the movement of people, transport vehicles and cargos along the contact
line in Donetsk and Luhansk region was developed and approved by the ‘Operational Headquarters of the Anti-
Terrorist Operation’, a joint entity of the Security Service, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and
the State Migration, Emergency and Fiscal Services. It required special permits for civilians to be able to cross
the contact line in either direction.
5
obtain electronic permits required for crossing the contact line. The full enjoyment of the
freedom of movement, however, has remained problematic. Civilians still spend hours, and
even overnight, at check points located along one of the three transport corridors. With the
cessation of bus services between the Government-controlled territories and territories under
the control of the armed groups, those without private means of transport have to walk
several kilometres. While waiting at check points over long periods of time, civilians are
exposed to shelling as well as ERW and IEDs along the roads.
11. The regulations of the revised Temporary Order, particularly the prohibition of
commercial cargo of food and medicine, taxation of humanitarian aid, and the availability of
only one transport corridor for cargo, have complicated the delivery of food and medicine to
the territories controlled by the armed groups. Furthermore, the process of ‘registration’ of
humanitarian organisations introduced by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ in June 2015, has complicated the operation of external or externally
supported humanitarian actors in the areas controlled by armed groups. Since mid-July, such
humanitarian assistance has been severely curtailed as the armed groups consider registration
as a pre-condition to operate. This lack of access and delivery of humanitarian assistance is of
particular concern with the approach of winter. It is also of concern that the Russian
Federation has continued to send white-truck convoys without the full consent or inspection
of Ukraine, and their exact destination and content could not be verified.
12. People living in the territories controlled by armed groups continued to face obstacles
in exercising any type of rights: civil, political or economic, social and cultural. They
experience particular problems in accessing quality medical services and social benefits. In
order to receive their benefits, people have to either move or regularly travel across the contact
line to the Government-controlled areas. Adults aged from 21 to 60 years old and families with
one or two children in the territories controlled by the armed groups are becoming increasingly
vulnerable due to their limited access and entitlement to social and humanitarian assistance.
The quality of food and water available to the population affected by the conflict is also
deteriorating, leading to a decreasing standard of living.
13. The situation for those residing on both sides of the contact line is especially dire, as their
access to humanitarian and medical aid is impeded due to security reasons and the prohibition
of the transportation of cargo. This has resulted in an increase in prices on the available goods.
HRMMU notes that the National Human Rights Strategy9 stresses the necessity of “ensuring
the rights of persons living in the settlements of Donetsk and Luhansk regions where state
authorities temporarily do not perform or partially perform their duties”.
14. The conflict aggravates the overall economic deterioration in the country causing
further hardship for the population. Since the beginning of the year, real income dropped by
23.5 per cent, wage arrears reached UAH 1.9 billion (approximately USD 87 million), while
prices for basic commodities have increased by 40.7 per cent. Deterioration of the economic
situation makes it more difficult for the Government to progressively realize economic and
social rights.
15. The growing number of internally displaced persons (over 1.4 million)10 and of
wounded civilians and soldiers, have created new challenges for the Government of Ukraine
to ensure proper access to quality medical care. So far, Ukrainian and international
volunteers, private donors and charity foundations have provided most of the rehabilitation
services and necessary equipment.
 9 Adopted on 25 August 2015.
10 Ministry of Social Policy figures on registered IDPs.
6
16. In July and August, HRMMU observed two transfers11 to the Government-controlled
areas of convicts and pre-trial detainees, who due to the conflict had fallen within the
‘penitentiary system’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. Initiated by the Ombudsperson of
Ukraine, the transfers resulted from her negotiations with the ‘ministry of justice’ and the
‘penitentiary administration’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. HRMMU facilitated the
process, using its good offices to act as an initial intermediary between the parties, which
enabled a group of foreign prisoners and detainees to be transferred to the Ukrainian
penitentiary system and thus returned to the judicial system under which they were sentenced
or were facing trial.
17. As reported previously12, on 5 June, the Government of Ukraine notified the United
Nations and the Council of Europe about its decision to derogate from certain obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The derogation
will have a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights in certain areas of the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions. A positive development was the signing on 6 July by President
Poroshenko of a law enabling Ukraine to join the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance13.
18. On 31 July, the Constitutional Court approved a package of constitutional amendments
on decentralization developed by the Constitutional Commission14, which is expected to be
adopted by the Parliament before the local elections on 25 October 2015. Another package of
constitutional amendments concerns the judiciary and is aimed, inter alia, at increasing its
independence from the President and the Parliament. The package incorporates comments
from the European Commission for Democracy through Law and is pending final approval
by the Constitutional Commission. A package on human rights, which is to increase
conformity of the Constitution with the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union and UN human rights instruments is under development.
19. On 14 July, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted a law on local elections which will
govern nation-wide local elections scheduled for 25 October 2015 (except for the “territory of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” and “certain territories15 of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions” where elections will not be held “because of temporary occupation and armed
aggression of the Russian Federation and impossibility to ensure the observance of OSCE
standards regarding elections”). The ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ announced its ‘local
elections’ would be held on 1 November, while the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ is still to
determine a date; should these ‘elections’ be held, they would contravene the Constitution of
Ukraine and the Minsk Agreements.
20. The situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea16, the status of which is
prescribed by General Assembly resolution 68/262, continued to be characterized by human
rights violations committed by the de facto authorities. Former Maidan activists resident in
Crimea continued to be under scrutiny of the ‘investigative’ bodies. Dissenting voices
continued to be effectively silenced and denied any public space, especially as regards to
 11 They concerned nine and twenty people, accordingly.
12 See paragraph 144 of the 10th HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period
16 February – 15 May 2015.
13 The Convention will enter in force for Ukraine on 13 September 2015.
14 The package of constitutional amendments on decentralization stipulates, inter alia, that “special order of
self-governance of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions shall be set forth in a separate law”.
HRMMU participated in the work of the commission as an observer.
15 These territories are enlisted in the Resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine of 17 April 2015.
16 Henceforth referred to as Crimea.
7
those Crimean Tatars organizations which the de facto authorities consider non-loyal or claim
to be extremist. HRMMU notes with concern that the increasingly restrictive conditions
placed by the de facto authorities applying legislation of the Russian Federation on the
activities of civil society organizations could lead to the impossibility for them to re-register
and operate in Crimea, and, as a result, significantly infringe full enjoyment of freedoms of
expression, peaceful assembly and association by local population. The right to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health continues to be
affected by problems in obtaining medical treatment and delays in assisting patients.
21. OHCHR positively notes the efforts of the Government of Ukraine in bringing
together the Ministries of Defence, Justice, Social Policy and Office of the Prosecutor
General under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss and respond to the
findings of the tenth OHCHR report. A number of actions are to be welcomed; in particular,
OHCHR notes the decision to strengthen the human rights training of members of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
A. Casualties
22. While within the reporting period there have been no large-scale offensives since
mid-February 2015, a number of local escalations of armed hostilities occurred. The most
notable incidents took place in the Government-controlled town of Mariinka (Donetsk
region), on 3 June, and near the Government-controlled village of Starohnativka and the
village of Novolaspa controlled by the armed groups (both in Donetsk region) on 9 and
10 August. Clashes and exchanges of fire along the contact line between the armed groups
and the Ukrainian armed forces were reported daily. The major flashpoints were the cities of
Donetsk and Horlivka, controlled by the armed groups, and the nearby Governmentcontrolled
towns of Avdiivka and Mariinka, the contested villages of Pisky and Shyrokyne
(all in Donetsk region), as well as the Government-controlled towns of Shchastia and
Stanychno Luhanske (Luhansk region).
23. The withdrawal of heavy weapons from the contact line stipulated by the Minsk
Agreements remained partial with the armed groups and the Ukrainian military continuing to
use mortars, canons, howitzers, tanks and multiple launch rocket systems17. They routinely did
not comply with the international humanitarian law principles of distinction, proportionality
and precautions, with numerous incidents of indiscriminate shelling of residential areas
causing civilian casualties observed. Explosive remnants of war (ERW)18 and improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) continued to claim numerous civilian lives in Government-controlled
areas and in territories controlled by the armed groups.
 17 Such weapons may be classified as explosive weapons which are not explicitly defined by international law.
Explosive weapons generally consist of a casing with a high explosive filling and whose destructive effects result
mainly from the blast wave and fragmentation produced by detonation. The use of heavy weapons in and around
residential and urban areas generally violates the international humanitarian law principles of distinction,
proportionality and precautions and reduces civilian protection.
18 Explosive remnants of war refer to unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO).
8
B. Civilian casualties19
Current reporting period: 16 May – 15 August
24. During the current three-month reporting period, HRMMU recorded 413 civilian
casualties in the conflict zone of eastern Ukraine with 105 civilians killed (30 women and two
girls, 52 men and three boys), and 308 civilians injured (99 women and eight girls, 141 men
and nine boys)20.
25. Of the 413 civilian casualties recorded, 156 (37 deaths and 119 injured) occurred in the
Government-controlled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Two hundred and fiftyseven
(257) civilian casualties (68 deaths and 189 injured) were recorded on territories
controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.21
26. The majority of these 413 casualties were caused by shelling with 342 casualties (81
deaths and 261 injuries) recorded. Fifty-two (52) casualties (16 killed and 36 injured) resulted
from ERW and IEDs22. Compared to the previous reporting period of 16 February to 15 May, the
number of civilians killed by shelling more than doubled (from 29 to 81) with a huge increase in
injuries (from 38 to 261).
Post-ceasefire reporting period: 16 February – 15 August 2015
27. During the post-ceasefire six-month period of 16 February to 15 August, HRMMU
recorded 575 civilian casualties in the conflict zone of eastern Ukraine: 165 civilians killed
(37 women and four girls, 85 men and nine boys; three children whose gender is unknown)23,
and 410 injured (127 women and nine girls, 195 men and 17 boys).
 19 For this report, HRMMU investigated reports of civilian casualties by consulting a broad range of sources and
types of information that are evaluated for their credibility and reliability. In undertaking documentation and
analysis of each incident, HRMMU exercises due diligence to corroborate and cross-check information on
casualties from as wide range of sources as possible including OSCE SMM public reports, accounts of witnesses,
victims and directly affected persons, military actors, community leaders, medical professionals and other
interlocutors. Where HRMMU is not satisfied with information concerning an incident, it is not reported. In some
instances, investigations may take weeks or months before conclusions can be drawn. This may mean that
conclusions on civilian casualties may be revised as more information becomes available. Where information is
unclear, conclusions are not drawn until more satisfactory evidence is obtained. The increases in the numbers of
casualties between different reporting dates do not necessarily mean that these casualties happened between these
dates: they could have happened earlier, but were recorded by a certain reporting date. HRMMU does not claim
that the statistics presented in this report are complete and may be under-reporting civilian casualties given
limitations inherent in the operating environment including gaps in coverage of certain geographic areas and time
periods.
20 The gender and age of 18 civilians killed and 51 civilians injured are unknown but it is believed they are
adults as practice to date has shown that the Ukrainian authorities and the armed groups single out civilian
casualties that are children.
21 HRMMU is not in a position at this time to attribute specific civilian casualties recorded to the armed groups,
Ukrainian armed forces or other parties. It is worth noting however that in the post ceasefire period of 16
February to 15 August, 71 percent of civilian casualties were caused by shelling from mortars, canons,
howitzers, tanks and MLRS with the majority of these civilian casualties recorded in the territories controlled by
the armed groups.
22 In addition, four people were killed and seven were injured from small arms fire; three people were killed in a
road incident with an armoured military vehicle; and the causes of death of one person and of injuries of four are
unknown.
23 The gender and age of 27 civilians killed and 62 injured are not known.
9






     














 
    
    
        
    
        
Total civilian casualties,
16 February - 15 August 2015

    

 



 










    

    

    

    

    



 
      

Total civilian deaths by territory,
16 February – 15 August 2015













    


    

    





    




    
       
  



Total civilian casualties, gender- and agedisaggregated,
16 February – 15 August 2015

    

 
    
    
              
    
            
 !!         
    
         
 !"    #
!        
    
$!
         %     &
Total civilian casualties by type of incident
(weapon), 16 February – 15 August 2015
10
Government-controlled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
28. Of the 575 civilian casualties, HRMMU documented 261 civilian deaths and injuries
in the Government-controlled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions during this period.
Seventy-one (71) civilians were killed (14 women and one girl, 49 men and three boys), and
190 injured (65 women and three girls, 117 men and 10 boys)24.







    





     

Civilian casualties in the Government-controlled
territories, by reporting period
      

     

29. These 261 civilian casualties were caused mainly by shelling and ERW and IEDs with
165 civilian casualties (41 killed, 124 injured) from shelling, and 87 (28 killed, 59 injured)25
from ERW and IEDs.
    
    
              
    
            
          
    
         
 !    "
         
    
# 
        $
%     
Civilian casualties in the Government-controlled
territories, by type of incident (weapon)
30. Of the 261 civilian deaths and injuries recorded in the Government-controlled areas of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions, 221 (61 killed and 160 injured) occurred in the Donetsk
region. Forty (40) civilian casualties (10 killed and 30 injured) were documented in the
Luhansk region. The locations most affected by shelling26 were the towns of Avdiivka (13
 24 The gender and age of four civilians killed and four injured are unknown.
25 In addition, five men were injured from small arms fire; one girl was killed and one woman and one girl were
injured in a road incident with an armoured military vehicle; and the cause of death of one person is unknown.
26 Casualties from ERW and IEDs in these locations are not included.
11
civilians killed and 28 injured), Mariinka (four killed and 15 injured) and Dzerzhynsk (four
killed and 10 injured), all in the Donetsk region.
Territories controlled by the armed groups
31. HRMMU recorded 314 civilian casualties between 16 February and 15 August in
these areas: 94 civilians were killed (23 women and three girls, 36 men and six boys), and
220 civilians were injured (62 women and six girls, 87 men and seven boys).
 



    

    

     

Civilian casualties in territories controlled
by armed groups, by reporting period


 

    


    
32. These 314 civilian casualties resulted mainly from shelling, ERW and IEDs, and
small arms fire.27 Shelling caused 244 civilian casualties (69 killed and 175 injured); ERW
and IEDs caused 49 civilian deaths and injuries (16 killed and 33 injured) with 14 civilian
casualties (six killed and eight injured) from small arms fire.
33. In the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, 286 civilian casualties
(84 killed and 202 injured) were recorded. Twenty-eight (28) civilian casualties (10 killed
and 18 injured) were documented in territories controlled by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
The locations most affected by shelling28 were the cities of Horlivka (25 killed and 43
injured) and Donetsk (22 killed and 84 injured).
 27 In addition, three women were killed in a road incident with an armoured military vehicle and the cause of
injuries of four civilians is not known.
28 Casualties from ERW and IEDs in these locations are not included.
12
C. Total casualties (civilian and military) from mid-April 2014 to 15 August 2015
34. In total, from mid-April 2014 to 15 August 2015, HRMMU recorded at least 25,493
casualties (Ukrainian armed forces, civilians and members of the armed groups) that include at
least 7,883 people killed and at least 17,610 injured in the conflict area of eastern Ukraine29.
Missing persons
35. According to the representative of Ukraine to the Trilateral Contact Group, the
Government estimated that as of 8 June 1,200 people were missing in the conflict zone. In
her most recent regular update on missing persons, the ‘ombudsperson’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’, estimated that as of 11 August, more than 400 people were missing on
both Government-controlled territories and on territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’.
36. HRMMU believes that many of those who are reported as missing are dead, with their
bodies either not found or unidentified30. They are victims of the armed hostilities or of
summary executions or of criminal killings. HRMMU is also confident that some people
recorded as missing are alive31, either in the territories controlled by the armed groups – in
their ‘official places of detention’ or in other places, or in detention (often secret or
incommunicado) of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), or Ukrainian military or
paramilitary units, especially in the security operation zone32.
37. A male pensioner was reported as missing by his wife on 14 August 2014, having
been last seen leaving his house in the city of Horlivka (controlled by the armed groups;
Donetsk region), with two armed men in camouflage who were pointing their rifle at him33.
Another woman claimed that her husband went missing in May 2015 while driving his
expensive car in the town of Debaltseve (controlled by the armed groups in Donetsk region).
She informed all the ‘law enforcement institutions’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ about
her husband’s disappearance and a ‘criminal case’ was initiated with no results so far. His
whereabouts remain unknown34.
38. In the Government-controlled village of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk region), several
armed men dressed in camouflage and masked reportedly entered a house on 4 June, beat the
male resident in front of his wife, and detained him. No further information was provided to
his wife despite numerous requests filed to different law enforcement agencies. Following
 29 This is a conservative estimate of HRMMU based on available data. These totals include: casualties of the
Ukrainian forces as reported by the Ukrainian authorities; 298 people from flight MH-17; civilian casualties on
the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine as reported by local authorities and regional
departments of internal affairs of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; and casualties among civilians and members of
the armed groups on the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ as reported by the armed groups, so-called ‘local authorities’ and local medical establishments. This
data is incomplete because of lacunas in coverage of certain geographic areas and time periods and because of
overall under reporting, especially of military casualties. The increases in the numbers of casualties between the
different reporting dates do not necessarily mean that these casualties happened between these dates: they could
have happened earlier, but were recorded by a certain reporting date.
30 Hundreds of unidentified bodies remain in morgues or have been buried in either Government-controlled
territories or in territories controlled by the armed groups.
31 This HRMMU has observed a number of cases when people who went missing reappeared later either in
detention of the Government, or in detention of the armed groups.
32 This territory has not been defined by the Government in public documents; according to an internal regulation
of the ‘Anti-Terrorist Operation’ Headquarters of 7 October 2014, it covers territories of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions (those which are Government-controlled and those which are controlled by the armed groups).
33 HRMMU interview, 2 June 2015.
34 HRMMU interview, 1 June 2015.
13
HRMMU intervention, his whereabouts were established on 25 June, in Dnipropetrovsk pretrial
detention centre (SIZO), reportedly under SBU investigation35.
D. Unlawful and arbitrary detention, summary executions, and torture and illtreatment36
By the armed groups
39. HRMMU continued to document cases of killings, abductions, torture and illtreatment,
sexual violence, forced labour, ransom demands and extortion of money,
committed by the armed groups.
40. Estimates of the number of people held by the armed groups vary continuously,
notably due to the fluctuating pattern of continued abductions, detentions and releases.
According to SBU, as of 15 August, 172 people were held by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. This figure, however, concerns those whose whereabouts
have been established by the Government of Ukraine, and whose release has been sought.
41. A number of simultaneous releases (so-called ‘exchanges’) took place during the
reporting period. This process lacked transparency and has not led to a tangible number of
releases. OHCHR continues to advocate for the ‘all for all’ release of “hostages and
unlawfully detained persons” as stipulated by the Package of Measures for the
Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of 12 February 2015.
42. During the reporting period, HRMMU learned about two incidents of summary
execution of civilians in the village of Peremozhne (controlled by the armed groups; Luhansk
region) reportedly committed by members of the so-called separate special brigade Odessa
operating in the area under the control of the ‘Luhansk people's republic’. On 10 August
2014, eight armed men in camouflage without any signs of distinction stormed the house of
local volunteers who were providing food to Ukrainian soldiers37. After searching and looting
the house, the armed men took away a man and a woman. Over the following ten days the
armed men returned three times to the house and looted it, holding the 75-year-old father of
one of the abducted at gun point. The family had no information of the whereabouts of those
who were abducted until January when their bodies were found near the village of
Piatyhorivka; confirmed by forensic examinations only in June 2015. The forensic expertise
showed that cause of death of the two victims to have been two to three fire gun shots to the
head, with head injuries sustained by beating. In the same village, on 22 August 2014, four
members of a family were executed outside their house for their alleged assistance to the
Ukrainian armed forces, and their property then looted38.
43. There have been allegations of summary executions documented by HRMMU during
the reporting period. An IDP from Luhansk region claimed that he witnessed the killing of a
family of four and the torture of another civilian by the armed groups in August 201439. A
resident of Odesa region informed HRMMU that in September 2014, while he was a member
of an armed group, he witnessed the execution of three captured Ukrainian soldiers40. A
resident of the city of Cherkasy, who had spent more than three months in the captivity of the
armed groups in the Luhansk region, claimed that on 20 September 2014, while being kept in
 35 HRMMU interviews 5 June, 25 June and 1 July 2015.
36 During the reporting period, a number of victims and witnesses reported allegations of human rights
violations and abuses that had taken place in 2014 and beginning of 2015. These highlight how the human rights
situation deteriorated in Ukraine, particularly in the eastern territories.
37 HRMMU interview, 18 August 2015.
38 HRMMU interview, 27 May 2015.
39 HRMMU interview, 2 June 2015.
40 HRMMU interview, 20 July 2015.
14
a basement in the town of Rovenky (Luhansk region), he witnessed the death of a detainee
who had been beaten by the members of the armed groups41.
44. A former Ukrainian soldier reported about his detention in the conflict zone, in
August 2014, allegedly by fighters from the Russian Federation who then handed him over to
the armed groups42. He reportedly spent six months held by the armed groups on the territory
of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ where he was subjected to beatings and forced labour.
Another man claimed that he was deprived of his liberty for more than four months by the
armed groups of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ after being stopped at a check point in July
2014, near the city of Luhansk, on suspicion of ‘subversive activities’. During interrogations,
armed men beat him with rifle butts and a rod, and employed electric shock. Between the
‘interrogations’, he was made to hang from parallel bars, to which he was tied with
handcuffs. Four days later, he was transferred to the ‘military commandant’s office’, where
he was kept in a 16 square metres room in a basement, with up to 40 other individuals. All
were forced to work at the training ground and in various localities where they discharged
munitions and dug trenches43.
45. In February 2015, an Orthodox priest who was delivering food to Ukrainian soldiers
and civilians in the Government-controlled town of Artemivsk (Donetsk region), mistakenly
drove to a check point controlled by armed groups. He was forced to lie on the ground, and
several fighters started jumping on his body. They also shot at the asphalt near his head. He
was then transferred to a nearby village for interrogation which lasted several hours and
during which he was beaten. He was detained for 50 days in various places, along with
approximately 70 other detainees44.
46. A young woman with a disability was taken from her home in Donetsk city, in June
2015 by three armed men in civilian clothes from the ‘ministry of state security’ of the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’. She was accused of being a “sniper of the Right Sector” and
kept incommunicado for over a month in the former premises of a cultural centre in Donetsk.
The woman, who was three months pregnant, claimed she was subjected to beatings. She was
also forced to give a press conference issuing false statements to the media, and to testify
against ‘pro-unity’ activists45. Following HRMMU advocacy with the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’, she was released in July 2015. HRMMU also facilitated her evacuation to the
Government-controlled territory. Another Donetsk resident detained by the armed groups in
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ in May 2015 claimed that she was kept for four days in a
one-by-two metres cell. She reported that male detainees kept in adjacent cells were forced to
work. She was transferred after four days to an ‘official’ detention facility and released a
month and a half later46.
47. A woman from the town of Debaltseve (Donetsk region) informed HRMMU that on
2 June 2014, several masked men stormed her house and abducted her son-in-law who has a
disability status due to impaired vision. In August 2015, his whereabouts still remained
unknown. Allegedly, on the same day, seven other young men were kidnapped from the same
residential building. She also claimed that on 5 September 2014, her husband (a police
officer) was executed (shot dead) by members of the armed groups in front of the police
station, allegedly for his ‘pro-unity’ position47.
 41 HRMMU interview, 4 August 2015.
42 HRMMU interview, 26 June 2015.
43 HRMMU interview, 11 August 2015
44 HRMMU interview, 10 July 2015.
45 HRMMU interview, 13 July 2015.
46 HRMMU interview, 11 August 2015.
47 HRMMU interview, 2 July 2015.
15
48. HRMMU also interviewed a woman who had been held twice by the armed groups of
the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, from July to October 2014 and from February to July 2015.
In July 2014, she was detained with three men at a check point manned by the ‘Cossacks’
Union’ of the ‘All-Great Don Army’. During her first two weeks of detention, she and others
were interrogated and tortured. The woman was severely beaten with rifle butts and bullet
proof vests until she lost consciousness. As a result, four ribs were fractured, and her nose
and most of her teeth were broken. During interrogation, perpetrators were reportedly
extinguishing cigarette butts against her wrist, and threatening the life of her child and
mother. She also reportedly survived an attempted gang rape. She witnessed the summary
execution of two Ukrainian soldiers – one was shot, a second was beaten to death on the
head. During the first two weeks of captivity, she and other detainees received no food and
almost no water. She received medical care and food after being transferred to the ‘military
commandant’s office’ in Luhansk city. There, she was not ill-treated but witnessed the
beatings of male detainees48.
By Ukrainian law enforcement and security entities
49. HRMMU continued to observe a persistent pattern of arbitrary and incommunicado
detention by the Ukrainian law enforcement (mainly by the Security Service of Ukraine) and
by military and paramilitary units (first and foremost by the former volunteer battalions now
formally incorporated into the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and the police).
These cases were often accompanied by torture and ill-treatment, and violations of procedural
rights. HRMMU continues to advocate for proper and prompt investigation of every single
reported case, and for prosecution of perpetrators. HRMMU also urges the Security Service
of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence to put an end to such
practices, and to strengthen human rights training of their staff.
50. HRMMU interviewed a woman reportedly working for the newspaper of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ Novorossiia. She claimed to have been detained following her arrest at a
check point of the Ukrainian armed forces on 24 August 2014, until her exchange on
21 September. She was subjected to torture, ill-treatment, a mock execution and an attempted
rape.49 A former member of the armed groups detained by Ukrainian armed forces in August
2014 claimed that he had been tortured and ill-treated while in official custody on charges of
terrorism. After being convicted to five years of imprisonment, with a suspended sentence of
three years, he was reportedly kept in the SBU premises in Kharkiv50 for over two months,
and released (as part of an ‘exchange’) in May 201551.
51. A man, who had been detained by the Ukrainian military in November 2014, in the
Government-controlled village of Soloviove (Donetsk region), claimed to have been brought
to the village of Pisky, where he was kept in a basement for two days. Four masked men
kicked him and beat him with a wooden board, cut with electro shocks and pointed a gun to
his head. He was also allegedly threatened with sexual violence52. A man, who had been
arrested by unidentified Ukrainian servicemen in the Government-controlled city of Mariupol
on 24 November 2014, claimed that for 11 days, he was subjected to torture and mock
executions at Mariupol airport. He was later charged with terrorism and illegal possession of
weapons, and detained in the Mariupol SIZO. In March 2014, he signed a plea bargain and
 48 HRMMU interview, 10 August 2015.
49 HRMMU interview, 1 June 2015.
50 HRMMU has regularly attempted to check the information on detainees kept in SBU premises in Kharkiv.
Various SBU officials repeatedly denied presence of detainees in this building, though HRMMU has credible
information from people who had been previously kept in this unofficial detention facility for periods of time
varying from several days to several months.
51 HRMMU interview, 3 June 2015.
52 HRMMU interview, 4 June 2015.
16
was kept in SBU premises in Kharkiv from 13 March until released as part of an ‘exchange’ on
27 May 201553. A man, who had been arrested in September 2014 in the city of Ternopil,
informed the HRMMU that he was kept incommunicado for a day, severely beaten and
forced to confess that he belonged to a “separatist and terrorist organization”. He was then
formally detained by SBU and released within an ‘exchange’ in November 201454.
52. A man interviewed by HRMMU claimed that in October 2014, 10 to 12 masked men
entered his house in the Government-controlled town of Avdiivka (Donetsk region), threw
him to the table and stepped on his spine, ordering him to be quiet if he did not want his
children to see his brain all over the table. For approximately a week he was kept in a place
that he could not identify, apparently in a very confined place, with a bag on his head, and
most of the time hung up, handcuffed, and beaten randomly by those passing by. He was
interrogated and videotaped. During interrogation, the masked men would be sitting in front
of him or behind him, forcing him to confess that he had killed and tortured civilians, looted
their homes, and burnt a column of Ukrainian soldiers. He was reportedly beaten, subjected
to electroshocks (with wires put to his fingers and genitals), and twice to a mock execution.
Then he was taken to Mariupol and afterwards transferred to Kharkiv, where he was kept in
SBU premises for about three months. In May, he was released within an ‘exchange’ with the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’55.
53. A woman, who had been arrested by SBU in Kyiv in December 2014 for allegedly
carrying an explosive, claimed that after the apprehension, she was held incommunicado for
24 hours, beaten, dragged by the hair on her knees across a corridor and threatened with
sexual violence. She was also forced to read a ‘confession’ on camera. In the evening of 18
December, over 24 hours after her arrest, she was notified as a suspect under article 258-2
(attempt to commit a terrorist act by a group of persons upon prior conspiracy) of the
Criminal Code. On 27 February 2015, the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case
was sent to court56.
54. Seven people held in the Odesa SIZO on charges under article 258 (terrorism) of the
Criminal Code informed HRMMU that they were arrested on 7 July 2015 with excessive use
of force by SBU special unit Alpha57. Four of them claimed that they were tortured and illtreated
while in custody: handcuffed, with a bag on the head, forced to stand against a wall,
beaten with sticks and subjected to verbal assaults and threats. The detainees were not
informed about their rights and were not provided with legal aid during the first day of
detention. One of the detainees was forced to sign a confession dictated to him (regarding his
involvement in possible explosions in the city of Mykolaiv), as well as a document stating
that he had not been ill-treated or threatened at SBU. Another detainee was forced into
confessing that he had placed explosions at Odesa railway station. HRMMU has been
informed that since the beginning of 2015, the Prosecutor’s Office of Odesa region has
received 68 reports from the Odesa SIZO regarding detected traces of bodily injuries on
detainees58. 56 criminal investigations were initiated in this regard.
55. A woman residing in the Government-controlled Krasnoarmiisk district (Donetsk
region) claimed that on 23 December 2014, unidentified armed people burst into her house
and took her to the Government-controlled city of Kramatorsk (Donetsk region) where she was
 53 HRMMU interview, 5 June 2015.
54 HRMMU interview, 22 June 2015.
55 HRMMU interview, 22 June 2015.
56 HRMMU interview, 17 July 2015.
57 HRMMU interview, 20 July 2015.
58 According to the order of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Health of Ukraine No 239/5/104 of 10
February 2012, “within 24 hours the management of the SIZO shall inform in writing the public prosecutor
about the detected bodily injuries of a person taken into custody”.
17
kept for two days in a basement. She was allegedly threatened with sexual violence and forced
to sign a confession, which was video-recorded, stating that her sons were members of the armed
groups and that she had transmitted information to them about Ukrainian military vehicles.
She then was transferred to the Kharkiv SBU where she spent almost two months, without going
outdoors and unable to contact any relatives. No official charges were ever brought against her
and she was never presented in court. In February 2015, she was released as part of an
‘exchange’59.
56. A resident of a village located near the town of Debaltseve (Donetsk region) claimed
that on 20 November 2014, while the area was still under the Government’s control, she was
taken to the police station in Debaltseve where she was interrogated, threatened and beaten,
allegedly by SBU officers from Kyiv. She was accused of cooperating with the armed groups
and manning a check point. She was officially charged only eight days after her apprehension.
Soon after, the court decided to place her in pre-trial detention in Kharkiv for two months. It
is only at that stage that her relatives were able to find out about her whereabouts. A week
after the court decision, the detention was extended by another 30 days. She was taken to the
investigator in the town of Izium and informed that the criminal case against her had been
closed and that she would be released. The investigators offered to take her to Kharkiv to
collect her belongings but she was taken to a basement in Izium where she was kept
incommunicado for 15 days before being released within an ‘exchange’ in February 201560.
Arbitrary detention in the context of mobilization
57. HRMMU documented several cases of arbitrary detention in relation to continuing
mobilization into the Ukrainian armed forces (in particular, in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Odesa).
For instance, on 24 June, it interviewed a man who had been apprehended by people in
military uniform in Derhachi, a suburb of Kharkiv. They took him to the Kharkiv military
collecting point and requested his passport and other documents they needed to draft him.
The man was forbidden to leave. Officers later forced him to sign a document stating that he
had volunteered to serve in the army. According to the witness, there were then more than a
hundred young men at the point. His relatives reported to the police that he had been
kidnapped. The case was filed but no action was taken. Having spent two days in detention,
the man managed to escape and has since been hiding.
Other cases
58. On 22 May 2015, the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv sanctioned pre-trial
detention of two servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on suspicion
under article 258-3 (creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization) of the Criminal
Code (in July, their pre-trial detention was extended until September). They had been
detained by the Ukrainian military in a skirmish near the town of Shchastia (Luhansk region),
in which one Ukrainian serviceman was killed. Both of them were wounded and have been
undergoing medical treatment in Kyiv.
59. On 29 July, SBU announced the arrest, on charges under article 258 (terrorism) of the
Criminal Code, of an officer of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation who was
apprehended in Donetsk region on 25 July. According to the State Border Guard Service of
Ukraine, he holds the rank of major. He was arrested together with a member of the armed
groups as they were approaching the check point in Berezove, in the direction of the territory
controlled by the armed groups. Reportedly, the truck in which they were travelling was
carrying 192 boxes of grenades, cartridges and rocket-propelled grenades.
 59 HRMMU interview, 22 July 2015.
60 HRMMU interview, 26 July 2015.
18
60. Following the announcement of the completion of the investigation into the case of
Nadiia Savchenko on 28 May, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation
reported on 7 July that it had amended the charges against her from involvement in the
killing, to the killing of two Russian journalists on 17 June 2014, in the village of Metalist in
Luhansk region. On 25 July, she was transferred to the Novocherkassk SIZO (Rostov region
of the Russian Federation), where she was visited by the Ombudsperson of the region who
stated that she had reported of no complaints regarding her conditions of detention. On
10 June, the Basmannyi District Court of Moscow extended her detention until 10 September.
III. FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
A. Freedom of movement
61. The restrictions on freedom of movement imposed by the Temporary Order of
21 January 201561 continued to separate people living in the areas controlled by armed
groups from the Government-controlled territories, and to impede the delivery of
humanitarian aid62.
62. With the de-escalation of armed hostilities, civilians have shown an increased intent
to move back and forth across the contact line, including to check on their property and to
visit relatives in the areas controlled by armed groups. Many travel regularly to the
Government-controlled territory to collect their social benefits, withdraw cash, to seek
medical care and purchase food and medicine.
63. Further to advocacy by national and international organisations, a revised version of
the Temporary Order entered into force on 16 June. Although it waived the requirement to
obtain a permit for emergency situations, crossing the contact line in such situations
essentially remained at the discretion of officers at checkpoints, while international human
rights law requires using precise criteria63. In all other cases civilians still need to apply for
permits in advance. The web-portal for applying and receiving permits online, launched by
the Government of Ukraine on 7 July, has significantly simplified this procedure for civilians.
64. The revised Temporary Order facilitated movement of children from the areas
controlled by armed groups who still have not obtained their identification documents.
However, for a child to cross the contact line from the Government-controlled area, a
notarized power of attorney issued by both parents is required, and it is impossible to obtain
one if one parent lives in the areas controlled by armed groups64. Crossing to the Government
controlled areas was also simplified for people having completed their prison sentence65.
65. Overall, the crossing of the contact line remained arduous. As of 15 August, three out
of the six transport corridors were operational – all in Donetsk region66. In Luhansk region,
 61 For more information, see OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering 1 December
2014 to 15 February 2015 (paragraphs 42-43) and 16 February to 15 May 2015 (paragraphs 58-64).
62 For the effects of the Temporary Order on the humanitarian situation, See chapter IV of this report.
63 General Comment 27 to article 12 of the Human Rights Committee, paragraph 13, states: “the laws
authorizing restrictions should use precise criteria and may not confer unfettered discretion on those charged
with their execution”.
64 Order Nr.1351/5 of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine issued on 28 July completely blocked access to the
notary registries for citizens of Ukraine living in the areas controlled by armed groups.
65 On 14 July, further to the revised Temporary Order, and with the facilitation of the National Preventive
Mechanism, a special Inter-Agency Order No 53okv\1539\310\185\20\62 was issued regulating the crossing of
the contact line by people who served their prison sentence and were released from the penitentiary institutions
controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
66 Two corridors in Luhansk region closed down in March 2015 as the main bridges were destroyed. The Cargo
and passenger corridor of Kurakhove (Donetsk region) was closed in early June. Despite advocacy by international
organizations and lengthy negotiations with the Government, no alternative routes have been proposed to date.
19
residents have no other choice but to use the destroyed bridge in the town of Stanychno
Luhanske to cross the contact line by foot, or if travelling by vehicle, to go through the
Donetsk region, which takes more time and resources.
66. On 16 June, the Government of Ukraine prohibited the movement of all public
transport across the contact line. Since then, civilians who do not possess a private vehicle
have had to walk for up to 15 kilometres between the public transport stops on both sides of
the contact line. People generally spent several hours in the heat, with no drinking water and
no sanitation facilities. On 5 August, obligatory checks of ID documents and vehicles were
also introduced at checkpoints controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ – this has further
slowed down the crossing of the contact line. Lines of between 200 to 1,000 personal
vehicles have been observed at all checkpoints, often in both directions. With such queues,
civilians are exposed civilians to the risk of shelling, as the checkpoints are often targeted.
Therefore, the idea of the Government of Ukraine to establish logistical centres/markets near
the contact line raises grave protection concerns. On 13 August, the head of the civil-military
administration of Luhansk region stated that the construction sites of the prospective logistic
centres had been actively shelled over the last days.
67. Due to the long queues, people often seek by-pass roads, which may not be cleared
from mines and explosive remnants. For instance, on 22 July, a woman was wounded by a
mine while trying to by-pass the checkpoint near the town of Volnovakha (Donetsk region).
68. The situation of people living in the so-called ‘grey area’67 is particularly difficult.
Due to the location of roads and checkpoints, residents of such Government-controlled
settlements as Kominternove, Lebedynske and Vodiane can only reach other Governmentcontrolled
settlements via the territory controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, and
crossing the contact line. There is no special simplified crossing procedure for local residents.
B. Freedom of expression
In the territories controlled by armed groups
69. The safety and conditions of work of media professionals in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions remain difficult due to the overall security situation and continuing human rights
abuses by the armed groups. On 14 June, a local reporter working for Agence France-Presse,
covering the conflict in eastern Ukraine, was injured in the leg by shrapnel during shelling in
Donetsk. On 16 June, a journalist of the Russian newspaper Novaia Gazieta was captured in
Donetsk by the ‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. He was
interrogated, beaten and then released at the border with the Russian Federation. A Ukrainian
freelance journalist, Mariia Varfolomieieva, is being held by the armed groups of the
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ since 9 January 201568.
70. On 9 June, the company Donetsk Cable Television confirmed that it had blocked
access to 39 Internet-based media outlets, upon an ‘order’ from the ‘ministry of information’
of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ issued on 3 June 2015.
In the territories controlled by the Government
71. HRMMU continued to follow the case of journalist Ruslan Kotsaba, charged with
high treason for publishing an anti-mobilisation video on 17 January69. The Ivano-Frankivsk
General City Court authorized the prolongation of his detention until 28 August. During the
 67 Areas along the contact line where no local authorities are present although nominally controlled by the
Government of Ukraine.
68 For more information, see OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering 16 February to
15 May 2015 (paragraph 132).
69 For more information, see OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering 16 February to
15 May 2015 (paragraph 72).
20
reporting period, four court hearings took place. On 3 and 4 June, activists of the Right Sector
party present in the court room brandished posters “No getting away with separatism”,
“Kotsaba to jail, Montian [one of his lawyers] as well”, which may amount to pressure on
judges. During a hearing on 17 July, one witness threatened to shoot Kotsaba for being a
“traitor to the country”.
C. Freedom of peaceful assembly
In the territories controlled by the armed groups
72. On 15 and 16 June, hundreds of residents of Donetsk gathered in the city centre
demanding that the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ pay pensions and stop its armed groups from
placing their weapons in residential areas so as to prevent counter fire from the Ukrainian
military. On 16 June, a rally was dispersed by the ‘police’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
who urged the protestors “not to violate public order”.
In other parts of Ukraine
73. During the reporting period, a number of rallies were held throughout Ukraine with
participants demanding to lower utility prices and to increase salaries. The ‘Finance Maidan’
movement held rallies in Kyiv, urging the Parliament to adopt a law allowing payment of
loans taken in foreign currencies in UAH at lower exchange rates.
74. A number of rallies were organized by the Right Sector party to express distrust to the
Government, demanding to “stop persecution of members of volunteer battalions”, to put an
end to corruption and to call for the introduction of martial law. The biggest rally of 3 July
(over a thousand of participants) called for the annulment of the Minsk Agreements,
cessation of all relations with the Russian Federation and “punishment of all the criminals of
Yanukovych’s regime”. A series of Right Sector rallies also took place across the country (in
Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kramatorsk, Kyiv,
Lviv, Mariupol, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil and Zaporizhzhia) following an incident
in Mukacheve70. Participants of these rallies demanded to stop “persecution of patriots”.
75. On the night of 7 June, several dozens of persons joined Rustam Tashbaiev who,
since mid-May, had been protesting at Maidan square in Kyiv against the lack of
investigation into the 2014 Maidan events. They also demanded the indexation of social
payments and a decrease of utility payments. In the night, the tents of the protestors were
forcefully dismantled by a group of unidentified persons in masks. The police arrived to the
scene and detained Tashbaiev, claiming that the protestors had not informed the local
authorities about the rally. He was released the next day and claimed that he had been illtreated
and tortured by SBU.
76. Several local councils have adopted regulations limiting freedom of assembly, in
contradiction with the Constitution of Ukraine and ICCPR which allow limitations of rights
and freedoms only by law. As of mid-June, such regulations were put in place in 33 cities and
towns of Ukraine, according to a research by the Ukrainian Independent Centre for Political
Studies. During the reporting period, this NGO managed to obtain the annulation of such
regulations through court litigation in the towns of Krasnohrad (Kharkiv region) and Novi
Petrivtsi (Kyiv region). It also filed four other cases in Bucha (Kyiv region), Kharkiv,
Korosten (Zhytomyr region) and Poltava.
 70 On 11 July, 20 armed members of the Right Sector shot a man on the premises of ‘Antares’ sport complex, in
the town of Mukacheve (Zakarpattia region). They destroyed three police cars with machine guns and grenade
launchers, blocked the Kyiv-Chop highway. The Governor of the region reported that 11 people were wounded,
including six police officers and two members of the Right Sector. Two members of the Right Sector
surrendered to the police and remain under investigation, while location of the others remains unknown. Right
Sector claims that the confrontation occurred as they were attempting to stop illicit trafficking in the region that
allegedly involves a deputy and ‘Antares’ owner, whom they demanded to detain.
21
77. On 6 June, the March of Equality in Kyiv which brought together representatives of
the LGBTI community and civil society activists was attacked by a group of people who
threw firecrackers and smoke grenades filled with shrapnel. Ten participants and nine police
officers were injured. Seven attackers were charged under article 296 (hooliganism) of the
Criminal Code. On 13 August, the Odesa Circuit Administrative Court prohibited an Equality
March, which was planned by the local LGBTI community within the Equality Festival,
motivating its decision by security concerns and the inability of the police to ensure the
security of participants. On 15 August, activists of the political party Svoboda wearing masks
attacked a local LGBTI community center with fire crackers. The police intervened and
detained ten activists who were charged under article 173 (minor hooliganism) of the Code of
Administrative Offences.
78. On 22 July, a peaceful rally organised by the NGO Syla Natsii demanded the
resignation of the Prosecutor of Zaporizhzhia region for failure to perform his duties and
corruption. The gathering was forcefully dispersed by a group of men, some of whom wore
camouflage and balaclavas. Police did not interfere and the Prosecutor of Zaporizhzhia region
later stated that the attackers were “patriots”. Some attackers bore insignia of the right-wing
UNA-UNSO and Right Sector parties; the head of the local branch of the latter, however,
denied the party’s involvement in the incident. HRMMU notes that the State should protect
the exercise of freedom of assembly even if attacks come from private individuals.
79. In Odesa, ‘pro-federalism’ supporters continued to be prevented from conducting their
weekly rallies near the Trade Unions building (where 42 people died on 2 May 2014). The
police claimed either that the square was under a bomb threat, or that drill training was taking
place at the exact day and time of the announced rally. The rallies were thus conducted at the
bus stop near the square, with participants being routinely confronted by ‘pro-unity’ activists.
On 2 August, following a ‘pro-unity’ attack, one ‘pro-federalism’ activist used tear gas and was
apprehended by the police, whereas actions of ‘pro-unity’ supporters remained unchallenged.
80. On 3 August, clashes were reported in Kharkiv, where some 100 people (mostly
women) demanded that local authorities register the local branch of the political party
Opposition Bloc (whose members are associated with the former President’s regime) for the
local elections scheduled for 25 October. ‘Pro-unity’ activists, including members of the
Right Sector party, attacked the rally using batons and gas guns. The police did not interfere.
As some protestors hid in the office of the Opposition Bloc party, the attackers threw stones
and smoke grenades into the office. The police then cordoned off the building and arranged for
the safe exit of the people from the premises. One Opposition Bloc supporter was reportedly
abducted on his way to the rally by men wearing masks and uniforms who drove a military
vehicle with the inscription “Azov”71. He was allegedly beaten at the city cemetery and left
there. The police initiated criminal investigations under articles 294 (riots), 296 (hooliganism)
and 146 (illegal confinement or abduction of a person) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
D. Freedom of association
81. On 14 August, the Opposition Bloc succeeded to challenge in District Administrative
Court a decision adopted by the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Council in mid-April, prohibiting
the activities of the Opposition Bloc, Development of Ukraine political parties and the
Ukrainian Choice organizations on the territory of the region and instructing the regional
Ministry of Justice to de-register it72. The Court ruled that the suit should be satisfied in the
part that relates only to the plaintiff (the Opposition Bloc). A political party can be lawfully
prohibited only when it or any of its candidates uses violence or advocates for violence or
 71 Name of the regiment of the National Guard of Ukraine.
72 According to article 5 of the law ‘On Political Parties’, only a court may take decision on prohibition the
political party.
22
national, racial or religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility, or when
it carries out activities or acts aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms enshrined in
international human rights73.
82. The head of the Odesa branch of the Communist Party informed HRMMU that on 13
June, representatives of the Right Sector and of the Odesa AutoMaidan, Self-Defence and
Council of Public Security groups raided the party’s office. Representatives of the Right
Sector reportedly stole technical equipment and some party materials, and occupied the
premises until 26 July. The police initiated investigation into the case under article 356
(unauthorized action) of the Criminal Code, despite the court decision to open a criminal case
under article 170 (preclusion of legal activities of labour unions, political parties, and nongovernmental
organizations).
E. Freedom of religion or belief
In the territories controlled by armed groups
83. In a statement issued on 20 May, the head of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ threatened
to “brutally fight sects” and stated it did not recognize any religions apart from Orthodoxy,
Roman Catholicism, Islam and Judaism. HRMMU was informed by the clergy of minority
Christian denominations in Donetsk city that, overall, they have been able to operate and
practice. Nevertheless, HRMMU continued to receive reports about isolated incidents of armed
groups attacking community members and places of worship, and disrupting religious services.
84. The Jehovah’s Witnesses community appears to have been particularly targeted. Since
the beginning of the conflict, the armed groups have abducted and ill-treated 26 elders and
members of community. On 17 May, armed men detained four Jehovah’s Witnesses members
in Novoazovsk, blindfolded them and delivered them to their ‘local headquarters’. For two
hours, they beat them and conducted a mock execution, persuading the detainees to
“acknowledge Orthodoxy as the only true religion” and to join the armed groups. All four
were released the following day. On 21 May, the ‘police’ detained two Jehovah’s Witnesses
while they were engaged in their religious ministry (having Bible-based conversations with
local residents) in the town of Stakhanov, controlled by the ‘Luhansk people's republic’.
They were accused of disturbing peace by forcing their religious convictions on others, and
were illegally detained for 15 days. On 21 June, in the town of Torez, controlled by the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’, two armed men entered the Kingdom hall during a prayer,
attacked the preacher and verbally abused the audience, including women and children. The
community elders reported the incident to the local ‘police’ but no follow-up action was taken.
85. As of 15 August, 12 prayer houses of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community had been
taken over by armed groups. Representatives of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ in the towns
of Yenakiieve and Zhdanivka (Donetsk region) stated that these would never be returned to
the religious community and would be turned into “more important things, such as gyms”.
IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
86. As of 15 August, approximately five million people remained in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions (on Government-controlled territories and those controlled by the armed groups).
Over 1.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) throughout Ukraine continued to face
obstacles in exercising economic and social rights. Also, the conflict impacts negatively on
the overall economic situation affecting population across the country. Compared to
December 2014, real income has dropped by 23.5 per cent while prices for basic
commodities have increased by 40.7 per cent. The unemployment rate has reached 10 per
 73 Paragraph 38, Report of Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association (A/68/299).
23
cent, while wage arrears amounted to UAH 1.9 billion (approximately USD 87 million)74. The
situation in the areas controlled by armed groups is even worse.
87. According to a survey by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) released
on 30 July 2015, Ukrainians (both men and women) are increasingly vulnerable to the risk of
trafficking. The results of the survey suggest that approximately three million residents of
Ukraine intend to seek work abroad. Due to the deteriorating economic situation and the
conflict, they tend to disregard terms of contracts75.
A. Right to an adequate standard of living
Right to food and access to humanitarian assistance
88. The regulations of the Temporary Order severely restricted the delivery of food and
medicine to the areas controlled by armed groups – particularly the prohibition of commercial
cargo of food and medicine, the tedious registration procedures for humanitarian assistance
providers, and the taxation of humanitarian aid. Only one transport corridor remained open for
cargo. In the absence of simplified procedures for the delivery of humanitarian aid, humanitarian
convoys are blocked for up to 24 hours at checkpoints while documents are checked.
89. The process of ‘accreditation’ of humanitarian organisations introduced by the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ on 29 June 2015, coupled with an increased animosity and
pressure, complicates the operation of external or externally supported humanitarian actors in
the areas controlled by armed groups. For instance, on 16 July, a World Food Programme
convoy was stopped at a checkpoint and obliged to turn back because the organisation had
not been “accredited” for delivering humanitarian assistance.
90. The restrictions by the Government of Ukraine and accreditation procedures by the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ may amount to violations of the obligation to allow and facilitate
rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief.
91. In the urban areas controlled by armed groups, basic commodities generally of rather
low quality have been available in the shops, but the purchasing power of the average person
has been steadily decreasing. Categories of people traditionally not entitled to social or
humanitarian assistance (i.e. adults aged 21-60, and families with one or two children) have
become vulnerable.
92. As reported to HRMMU, in the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, young men (sometimes
under 18) joined the armed groups or ‘militia’ because it is one of the very few means to
receive income. Observations by various organizations suggest that women may see
themselves obliged to resort to harmful survival strategies, including engaging in sexual
relationships with soldiers in exchange of material support or money. This may lead to a rise
in sexual and gender-based violence. HRMMU has received secondary reports of a number
of such incidents; however survivors refused to be interviewed for the fear of reliving the
trauma again, especially in the absence of specialised services in the areas controlled by the
armed groups.
Right to clean water
93. According to UNICEF, up to 1.3 million children and adults are facing a serious
water crisis, due to damaged or destroyed water lines and acute water shortages, in the
conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine. In particular, over 470,00076 people, including
118,000 children, are facing serious problems in accessing safe water in the territories of
Luhansk region controlled by the armed groups. Since main water pipes and filtration
 74 According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
75 http://www.iom.org.ua/en/ukrainians-are-increasingly-vulnerable-threats-human-trafficking-iom-commissionedsurvey-
reveals
76 Affected population number is an estimate, as it varies daily as damages are recurrent and repairs are ongoing.
24
systems, as well as electricity infrastructure, are located along the contact line, they are
frequently damaged by shelling and it is difficult to carry out timely repairs due to the lack of
security on the ground and diminishing resources77. The situation has been especially dire in
the south west of Luhansk region (Brianka, Kirovsk, Pervomaisk and Stakhanov). In
addition, from 3 to 10 June and from 23 June to 3 July, for no technical reasons, water supply
was cut off at the filter and pumping stations located in the Government-controlled areas of
Luhansk region, affecting approximately 165,000 people in the areas controlled by armed
groups78. They either relied on water trucking (if available), or had to travel to neighbouring
villages, which posed additional risks to their security, especially for women. People also
revert to alternative water sources which may not be fit for human consumption and hence
put public health at risk.
Right to adequate housing
94. As of 15 August, 1,437,967 IDPs were registered by the Ministry of Social Policy in
Ukraine. For those who continue to be displaced, the issue goes beyond humanitarian
assistance, with long term solutions needed, including related to housing, employment and
social protection. This trend underlines again the importance of long-term solutions,
particularly regarding shelter. HRMMU is concerned that in the regions with the highest
influx of IDPs (such as Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia) specialised
settlements, particularly for persons with disabilities, are discussed as a viable alternative for
accommodation. Such a strategy may prevent the integration of IDPs into society and their
meaningful participation in political and public life. This would be in contravention with
international human rights law, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities.
95. IDPs staying in collective centres often have poor living conditions – no running
water, and lack heating or cooking facilities. On 24 June, HRMMU visited a sanatorium in
Serhiivka village, Odesa region, which hosts 198 IDPs with disabilities from the conflict
area, including 38 children. Volunteers working in this centre reported dire humanitarian
conditions, poor nutrition, lack of medication and medical services, and a shortage of nonfood
items. The centre had not received any State budget allocation since October 2014,
whereas according to the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the competent
authorities are responsible to ensure access of IDPs to essential food and medical services.
B. Right to social security and protection
96. The civil registration system has not been functioning in the areas controlled by
armed groups. Therefore people who have lost their identification or other administrative
documents or wish to obtain them, they have to travel to Government controlled areas, often
detouring checkpoints, in order to apply for documents. IDPs with disabilities face particular
difficulties in accessing and obtaining social and medical services, especially when they do
not have the necessary documents confirming their disability, or if their documents are
certified by a stamp of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ or ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. They
have to undergo lengthy examinations to confirm their disability and await a decision by a
special commission.
97. HRMMU interviewed civilians who had been detained in the Government-controlled
areas for being perceived as “separatists” or holding “pro-Russian views” and transferred to
the areas controlled by armed groups after their identification documents were confiscated.
 77 International Humanitarian Law particularly instructs for the special protection of water sanitation and
distribution installations.
78 UNICEF data.
25
They have since remained trapped in the areas controlled by armed groups, often without
relatives or friends, and unable to find legal employment or to apply for social assistance.
98. Following the 2014 decisions of the Government of Ukraine79, there have been no
allocations from the State budget for social benefits, including pensions, as well as for the
social care institutions which continued to operate in the areas controlled by the armed groups.
99. Lawyers of the Donetsk-based NGO Spravedlyvist (Justice) prepared 6,812 applications
from people in the areas controlled by armed groups who have had no access to their social
benefits. 3,312 of these cases have been transferred to courts, with no action taken to date.
100. The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No 595 of 7 November 2014, which
required people to register and live in the Government controlled areas to receive their social
benefits, was effectively challenged in court. The decision of the Kyiv Administrative Court
of Appeal in April 2015 acknowledged the resolution as illegal and obliged the Government
to resume payments to people regardless of their registration and residence80. The court
decisions remained unimplemented81 and the Government has filed a cassation appeal. In
order to receive their benefits, people have to either move or regularly travel across the
contact line to the Government controlled areas. As of July 2015, pensions for 233,900
people have been suspended as they were not identified at their place of residence in the
Government-controlled areas. The deprivation of pensions to people based on their place of
residence is unconstitutional and violates international law. The Government should take
proactive measures to ensure equal access to social security regardless of the place of
residence, particularly in a situation of armed conflict82.
101. According to available data, approximately 523,000 pensioners living in territory
under the control of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ received a pension payment for July
2015 in roubles83. Allegedly, persons with disabilities in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ have
not received any social benefits. It is reported that payment of pensions started in the
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ but the number of beneficiaries has not been made available.
102. As of 15 August, out of 1,126,508 registered IDP families, 455,566 were receiving
financial support from the Government of Ukraine84. HRMMU received reports of isolated
cases of people who were denied registration as IDPs. Due to inconsistencies in the
legislation85, people coming from the Government controlled areas, even those close to the
contact line, have difficulties in obtaining the IDP status.
 79 The Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of 4 November On Immediate Measures Aimed
at the Stabilization of Socio-Economic Situation in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, enacted by the Decree of the
President of Ukraine No. 875/2014 on 14 November 2014, and the consequent resolution of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine No.595 as of 7 November 2014, On the Issues of Financing of State Institutions, Payment
of Social Benefits to Citizens and Provision of Financial Support for Some enterprises and Organizations of
Donetsk and Luhansk region. See OHCHR report on the situation of human rights in Ukraine covering 1 to 30
November 2014, paragraphs 47-50.
80 For more information, see paragraph 92 of the OHCHR Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine
covering the period from 16 February to 15 May 2015.
81 In its reply to the plaintiff as of 30 April 2015, the Ministry of Finance stated its readiness to implement the
court decision.
82 General Comment No19 regarding article 9 (the right to social security) of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.
83 According to the ‘pension fund’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
84 Ministry of Social Policy.
85 Government Resolution No 509 On Registration of Persons who are moving from the Temporarily Occupied
Territories, districts of antiterrorist operation and localities which are situated at the contact line foresees that,
among other reasons, people may be registered as IDPs if they come not only from the areas controlled by
armed groups, but also districts of the ‘anti-terrorist operation’, localities situated at the contact line or where
state bodies temporarily do not exercise their powers (grey zone), while the Government Order No 1085-p,
26
103. Soldiers that served in the so-called ‘volunteer battalions’86 and the families of
deceased soldiers continued to face difficulties in obtaining the official status of security
operation participants, precluding them from accessing social and medical services.
On 11 June, HRMMU interviewed a widow who had not received any support for almost a
year, although at the time of her husband’s death, his battalion had been included into the
structure of the Ministry of Defence.
C. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
Access to medical services in the areas along the contact line
104. HRMMU is concerned about the continued damage caused by the ongoing armed
hostilities to medical facilities, often in violation of international humanitarian law. This also
constitutes one of six grave violations against children during armed conflict. According to
information available, more than 150 healthcare facilities have been partly or completely
destroyed in the conflict area as a result of indiscriminate shelling87. On 22 July, HRMMU
visited Donetsk hospital No 23, which was shelled for the third time since the beginning of
the armed conflict. Despite damages to the building, patients continued to be treated. On 4
August, the Government-controlled towns of Krymske (Luhansk region) and Avdiivka
(Donetsk region) were shelled, damaging the tuberculosis and general city hospitals.
Individuals interviewed by HRMMU reported that since the beginning of the conflict,
medical facilities and ambulances continued to come under fire, although clearly marked and
easily identifiable.
105. Access to healthcare is particularly dire along the contact line. Due to the small
numbers of inhabitants, professional medical care was already limited before the conflict.
Regular shelling impedes access for ambulances and the delivery of humanitarian aid to this
area. Furthermore, due to the location of the checkpoints, some of the villages are cut off
from the nearest hospitals. The pharmacies have not received necessary stocks of medication.
Access to healthcare in the areas controlled by armed groups
106. Compared to previous months, a variety of basic medicines can be found in the
pharmacies of Donetsk, but treatment for chronic diseases remains largely limited, as well as
surgeries, reproductive health and paediatrics. The situation in rural areas is much more
difficult, especially in Luhansk region –already the case before the conflict.
107. The administration of local health care facilities, and social and penitentiary
institutions controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ reported to HRMMU about the
constant shortage of consumables, reagents, testing systems, maintenance and spare parts for
medical equipment, and that they were increasingly dependent on humanitarian aid. Social
care institutions, particularly for older people, reported not having the most basic medicines.
108. Pursuant to Decree No 875 of the President of Ukraine of 14 November 2014,
ordering the relocation of all State institutions to territories under Government control, almost
all hospitals located in areas controlled by the armed groups have changed their legal address
and formally registered in Government-controlled territories, although they remain in the
areas controlled by armed groups. Specialised treatment (anti-retroviral, tuberculosis, insulin
and haemodialysis) purchased by the Government has remained in store houses in

which approves the exact list of localities from which IDPs may be registered includes only those that are
controlled by armed groups.
86 These battalions were integrated into the official structures under the MoIA or the Ministry of Defence by the
end of 2014.
87 This is a rough estimate of HRMMU based on data provided by the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, city and
regional administrations of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Government-controlled areas and areas under the
control of the armed groups, as well as the statements made by the representatives of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
27
Government-controlled areas and has not been delivered to the medical facilities which
continue to operate in the territories controlled by armed groups88. This particularly affects
the approximately 8,000 people living with HIV, including children and prisoners. To prevent
therapy interruption, since July 2014 some people have been transporting antiretroviral
treatment into areas controlled by armed groups via checkpoints and non-official roads,
risking their life including due to the increased presence of ERW and IEDs.
Access to healthcare in other parts of Ukraine
109. The growing number of IDPs, wounded civilians and demobilised soldiers has created
new challenges for the Government to ensure access to quality medical care. So far, most of
the rehabilitation services and necessary equipment have been provided by volunteers,
private donors and charity foundations. HRMMU received a number of individual complaints
from IDPs in Odesa region regarding denial of access to medical care. For example,
ambulances refused to go the IDP collective centre, as well as discriminating against and
avoiding visits to Roma communities. Also, hospitals have refused to admit IDPs. Some
cases were addressed following HRMMU interventions with the regional authorities.
110. On 21 July, the Ombudsperson of Ukraine presented the results of monitoring of
places of deprivation of liberty in Ukraine. According to the report, approximately one
million people are deprived of their liberty, with limited access to healthcare, which is due to
poor staffing, lack of medication, and inaccessibility of professional medical services. The
Ombudsperson stressed that in many cases, this may amount to ill-treatment.
Mental health
111. Mental health services are lacking on both sides of the contact line – including a
growing need for individual psycho-social support for children, detainees, and combatants who
have been traumatised. The psychological and physical rehabilitation of at least 40,000
demobilized soldiers in the Government-controlled areas is still largely provided by
volunteers. Services for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence are not available in the
areas controlled by the armed groups and are insufficient in the Government-controlled areas.
112. In the areas controlled by armed groups, psychiatric and psycho-neurological facilities
are still in need of specialised medication, particularly sedatives and neuroleptics.
113. During the reporting period, HRMMU received alarming information about inhumane
conditions in psychiatric institutions across Ukraine. Apart from appalling accommodation
and poor nutrition, there were reports of cases of ill-treatment, forced labour,
misappropriation of pensions, and access to medical services being denied. As most of the
people in these institutions have been acknowledged by court as legally incapable, they
cannot even file a complaint or access legal remedies.
V. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
A. Accountability for human rights violations committed in the east of Ukraine
For violations and abuses committed by the armed groups
114. Since the launch of the security operation by the Government on 14 April 2014, the
MoIA opened 6,006 criminal investigations into the killing and injuring of civilians and
Ukrainian military personnel in the conflict-affected areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
under article 115 (intentional homicide) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
115. The MoIA and SBU have initiated investigations into cases of indiscriminate shelling
of residential areas by the armed groups under article 258 (act of terrorism) of the Criminal
 88 Insulin and haemodialysis are purchased from the budget of the regional administrations of Ukraine, whereas
MDR-TB and ARVs are approximately 50% Government supplied and 50% are Global Fund supplied.
28
Code. They have also continued to investigate crimes related to the unlawful deprivation of
liberty and ill-treatment of civilian and military detainees by the armed groups. To date, the
law enforcement agencies have collected testimonies of victims upon their release and any
available evidence. No further progress is reported in these cases with perpetrators still to be
brought to account for these crimes. The main impediments to investigation, as reported by
law enforcement entities, are the lack of access to crime scenes due to the ongoing hostilities,
and the impossibility to identify and locate suspects and weapons. HRMMU learnt that some
of the civilians released by the armed groups intentionally have not reported their cases
because of a lack of trust in the law enforcement.
116. Access to crime scenes may be at times problematic. Over the past year, however, the
Government has regained control over certain territories previously held by the armed
groups, and investigations into crimes they had committed in these areas should be possible.
The town of Sloviansk, where grave human rights violations and abuses reportedly took place
from April to June 2014, is particularly emblematic in this regard. As of 5 July 2014, it came
back under the control of the Government. HRMMU is concerned, as are human rights
activists and lawyers of victims, about the lack of progress in investigations by MoIA and
SBU into alleged human rights violations and abuses committed in the city while it was under
the control of the armed groups.
For violations committed by Ukrainian armed forces and law enforcement entities
117. HRMMU noted little progress in the investigations of human rights violations
committed by the Ukrainian armed forces and law enforcement entities. Although the
Criminal Procedure Code provides for two grounds for opening a criminal case, notification
of a crime; and discovery of the fact by the law enforcement – the latter is mostly used in
high profile cases, which gain resonance among the public and therefore cannot be ignored.
Most criminal cases are opened following the notification of a crime. Victims of human
rights violations alleged to have been committed by members of the Ukrainian military or
law enforcement have been reluctant to file complaints fearing persecution if they are to
remain in Government-controlled territory; or have been simply unable to file a complaint
from the territories controlled by the armed groups, in the absence of functioning postal
service between areas under Government control and those under the armed groups89.
118. In the absence of any formal notification of a crime, law enforcement officers are
reluctant to open an investigation. The case of the Mariupol airport is illustrative. It is
allegedly used as a military base, where numerous human rights violations have been
reported, including illegal detention, and ill-treatment amounting to torture committed by the
Ukrainian military against alleged members of the armed groups. HRMMU submitted a letter
to the Office of the Military Prosecutor of the Southern Region to examine the place in
relation to these allegations. On 10 July, HRMMU received an official response stating that
the Office of the Military Prosecutor had not received any complaints or notifications
regarding human rights violations committed at the airport and that no investigative actions
had therefore been conducted. According to the Military Prosecutor for the Southern Region,
criminal prosecution is highly dependent on submissions from victims, as a basis on which
investigations may be launched. In the course of the reform of the Office of the Prosecutor
General in 2014, its general supervision powers were removed, precluding prosecutors from
verifying allegations of human rights violations without opening criminal cases.
119. As of 1 June, the Office of the Military Prosecutor had opened 31 criminal
proceedings under article 365 (excess of authority or official powers) of the Criminal Code of
 89 According to Ukrainian legislation and internal regulations of the law enforcement agencies, formal
complaints can only be filed: (i) personally; (ii) via postal mail; and (iii) through a trustee empowered with a
power of attorney certified by a notary.
29
Ukraine for use of physical force by the Ukrainian military and law enforcement against
people detained in the course of the armed conflict in the east. By the beginning of June, the
Office submitted nine cases to courts with indictments, while the investigation of the other 22
cases was ongoing.
120. On 22 April, HRMMU submitted to the Prosecutor General of Ukraine a list of 34
detainees who were allegedly exposed to ill-treatment. Following examination of the facts,
the Office reported opening criminal investigations under article 365 (excess of authority or
official powers) of the Criminal Code into the use of force against four persons by SBU and
Ukrainian military, and one by members of the Right Sector under article 129 (threat to kill)
of the Criminal Code. HRMMU is concerned that the said cases of physical abuses against
detainees are investigated under article 365 instead of article 127 (torture) of the Criminal
Code90.
121. HRMMU is concerned about the slow progress in the investigation into torture by
Ukrainian servicemen and the consequent death of a man in the town of Izium (Kharkiv
region) in November 201491. On 7 August, the Military Prosecutor for the Kharkiv Garrison
informed HRMMU that two identified suspects would be interrogated as soon as they were
located as they were currently serving in the security operation area. In the meantime,
notifications of suspicion were sent to their commanders.
122. On 25 June, the Head of the Military Police of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported
that approximately 110 criminal proceedings had been opened into crimes committed by the
battalion Aidar in 2014-2015. These include the abduction and ill-treatment of people
allegedly affiliated with the armed groups and engaged in separatism-related activities. The
former commander of Aidar battalion is being investigated under article 426 (inaction by
military authorities) of the Criminal Code for failing to prevent crimes committed by his
subordinates. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, he is also suspected under
articles 146 (illegal confinement or abduction of a person), 345 (threats or violence against a
law enforcement officer) and 382 (failure to comply with a judgment) of the Criminal Code
for organising the abduction of the director of the State enterprise Ukrspyrt, on 19 December
2014. On 28 June, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine informed that the pre-trial investigation
into the incident was completed.
123. On 16 June, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine reported that his Office was
investigating a number of crimes committed by other former voluntary battalions which were
operational in the east of Ukraine. On 17 June, the MoIA department for internal security
jointly with the Office of the Military Prosecutor detained the commander and seven
servicemen of the special police patrol battalion Tornado, which incorporated personnel of the
Shakhtarsk police battalion disbanded for looting in October 2014. The same day, the Chief
Military Prosecutor stated that a “criminal gang” of servicemen of the battalion Tornado used
the basement of a school in the town of Pryvillia (Luhansk region) to unlawfully detain local
 90 In its concluding observations to the sixth periodic report of Ukraine (November 2014), the Committee
against Torture expressed its concern that “while article 127 of the Criminal Code relates to torture, acts
amounting to torture are often prosecuted under articles 364 (abuse of authority or office), 365 (excess of
authority or official powers) and 373 (compelling to testify) of the Criminal Code, which do not provide for the
criminal liability of all individuals who inflict torture. It is also concerned that torture is punishable by two to
five years of imprisonment and at the low number of persons convicted for having committed acts of torture
(arts. 2 and 4). The State party should amend its legislation to ensure that persons who are alleged to have
committed acts of torture are prosecuted under article 127 of the Criminal Code and that appropriate penalties
for acts of torture are applied that are commensurate with the gravity of the crime, as set out in article 4,
paragraph 2, of the Convention” (CAT/C/UKR/CO/6).
91 For more details, please see paragraph 106 of the OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
covering the period 16 February – 15 May 2015.
30
residents. Servicemen of the battalion allegedly tortured and ill-treated people unlawfully
deprived of their liberty, and raped some men, recording these acts on video. The crimes are
investigated under articles 146 (illegal confinement or abduction of a person), 255 (creation of
a criminal organisation) and 365 (excess of authority or official powers) of the Criminal Code.
On 10 July, the Office of the Military Prosecutor reported that a number of Tornado
servicemen were suspected of debauchery of minors. On 18 June, the Minister of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine ordered to disband the battalion. On 23 July, the battalion was withdrawn
from the security operation area but was not effectively disbanded. As of the date of this report
investigations were ongoing.
B. Accountability for human rights violations committed during the Maidan protests
124. Limited progress has been achieved in the investigation into the incidents of excessive
use of force during the dispersal of protestors at Maidan on 30 November 2013 and the killing
of protestors in Kyiv between 18 and 20 February 2014, when special police units used firearms.
Forceful dispersal of Maidan protestors on 30 November 2013
125. On 26 June, the Office of the Prosecutor General submitted the indictment in the case
of forceful dispersal of Maidan protestors, on 30 November 2013, according to which four
Berkut officers are charged under articles 340 (illegal interference with the organization or
holding of assemblies, rallies, marches and demonstrations) and 365 (excess of authority or
official powers) of the Criminal Code. The preliminary hearing in the case was scheduled by
the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv on 17 August.
126. On 27 February, the Shevchenkivskyi District Court resumed consideration of the
case of the former head of the Kyiv City State Administration, accused of the same crimes,
for ordering the forceful dispersal of the peaceful protest. The court is still collecting witness
testimonies and its next hearing is scheduled for 17 September.
Prosecution of Berkut servicemen accused of killing of protestors
127. The two Berkut servicemen accused of killing 39 protestors on 20 February 2014, in
Kyiv, remain in custody since 4 April 2014 when they were detained along with their
commander. Whereabouts of the latter have been unknown since he fled from house arrest on
3 October 2014. Although preliminary hearings in the case began on 20 February 2015, the
Sviatoshynskyi District Court of Kyiv only finalized the appointment of the jury on 6 July.
The process was protracted due to the failure of the Kyiv city council to submit a list of jury
candidates and procedural flaws that, according to the lawyers, could have eventually
affected legitimacy of the court decision. On 6 July, the court started the trial on the merits,
hearing testimonies of relatives of the killed protestors.
128. On 26 June, the Office of the Prosecutor General reported the detention of the acting
Berkut Lieutenant Colonel who is also suspected in the killing of the 39 protestors. Two other
Berkut servicemen facing the same charges have been in detention since 23 February 2015. In
total 25 Berkut servicemen are suspected in the killing of the 39 protestors; 20 of whom were
put on a wanted list. To date the prosecution did not determine the individual responsibility
of each of them. HRMMU is concerned that the approach taken by the Office of the
Prosecutor General may result in establishing collective responsibility.
129. The investigation into the killing of three and injuring of 69 Maidan protestors on 18
February 2014 in Kyiv is ongoing. Three suspected Berkut servicemen have been in detention
since 22 April 2015.
C. Accountability for the 2 May violence in Odesa
130. More than 15 months after the events of 2 May 2014 in Odesa, which resulted in the
death of 48 people due to clashes of supporters of federalisation of Ukraine (‘pro-federalism’
31
supporters), supporters of unitary Ukraine (‘pro-unity’ supporters)92 and football fans, only
limited progress has been observed in the investigations. None of the officials then responsible
for maintaining public order in the city have been brought to account.
131. As of 15 August, 22 ‘pro-federalism’ supporters have been accused of mass disorder
in Odesa city centre; 11 of them93 have spent 15 months in the Odesa SIZO. One ‘pro-unity’
activist was accused of murder in the city centre, and another ‘pro-unity’ activist is suspected
of mass disorder near the Trade Unions building. Currently they are not under any measure of
restraint due to the expiration of the maximum terms of the application of the measure of
restraint under the Code of Criminal Procedure; one of them is awaiting trial and the second
one is still under investigation.
132. On 18 May, a draft law was registered in Parliament suggesting that all those accused
of the mass disorder on 2 May 2014 in Odesa should be exempted from criminal
responsibility, whereas those suspected or accused of grave crimes should be prosecuted.
Investigations by the Office of the Prosecutor General
133. Although a criminal case had been opened against the former head of the Odesa
Regional Department of the MoIA94, no particular progress in the investigation has been
reported. In addition, only a few relatives of the deceased or injured have been granted the
status of victims in the case.
Investigations by the Ministry of Internal Affairs
134. No suspects have been identified in the criminal case opened by the MoIA into the
slow response and inaction of the fire brigade, which took 45 minutes to arrive at the scene
despite the numerous emergency calls. The MoIA investigative unit claims to be still waiting
for the results of the forensic examination of the Trade Unions building.
135. In September 2014, the investigation into the 2 May events in Odesa carried out by
the MoIA was split into three major criminal proceedings: mass disorder at the Trade Unions
building (Kulykove Pole square), mass disorder in the city centre, and a case of homicide
opened against a ‘pro-unity’ activist for shooting dead a protestor in the city centre.
Investigation regarding the mass disorder at the Trade Unions building
136. In June 2015, the MoIA identified the last body discovered after the fire of the Trade
Unions building. All 48 people who died during the 2 May violence have thus been
identified.
137. On 3 July, following the appeal filed on 17 February 2015 by the victims, the
Prymorskyi District Court in Odesa overturned the decision of the Office of the Prosecutor
General to cease criminal proceedings against a ‘pro-unity’ activist, accused of beating ‘profederalism’
supporters, jumping out of the burning Trade Unions Building. The judge
decided that the necessary investigative measure had not been taken and ruled to resume the
pre-trial investigation against the activist.
Investigation into mass disorder in the city centre
138. As of 15 August 2015, the criminal case into the mass disorder on 2 May 2014 in
Odesa had been in court for eight months. Numerous procedural violations have been
 92 Six people were killed in mass disorder in the city centre of Odesa and 42 people died at the Trade Unions
building.
93 In November 2014, 21 ‘pro-federalism’ supporters were accused of participating in mass disorder during the 2
May violence. In July 2015, the Prosecutor General Office brought charges against one more ‘pro-federalism’
activist for participating in mass disorder and illegal possession of weapons.
94 On 13 May 2015, the former Head of the Odesa Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was
placed under house arrest for official negligence, by failing to ensure public security which resulted in clashes
between ‘pro-federalism’ and ‘pro-unity’ supporters during the march For United Ukraine.
32
reported, as well as the non-appearance of lawyers and the poor quality of case materials – all
of which have significantly delayed the process. Consideration on the merits started on
2 July. At this stage the trial remains protracted due to failure of the Office of the Prosecutor
General to provide a simultaneous interpreter for two citizens of the Russian Federation,
accused of mass disorder in the city centre.
Investigation regarding the ‘pro-unity’ activist charged with homicide
139. A court hearing in the case of the only ‘pro-unity’ activist accused of shooting dead a
protestor and injuring a police officer in Odesa city centre on 2 May, which started on
23 June, was disrupted by other ‘pro-unity’ activists (mostly men, many in paramilitary
uniform). The ‘pro-federalism’ supporters and relatives of the victims (mostly women and
elderly people) have been violently prevented by ‘pro unity’ from entering the court room.
140. On 3 August, HRMMU observed how prior to the beginning of the hearing, a member
of Parliament supported by a group of some 40 ‘pro-unity’ activists verbally threatened two
judges from the panel, accusing them of lack of impartiality and objectivity and forcing them
to recuse themselves from the case.
141. It was the third court hearing adjourned because of the disqualification of judges,
which resulted in transferring the case to another court. HRMMU is concerned about the
inaction of the police and has intervened with the Odesa Regional Department of the MoIA to
take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of trial participants in compliance with
national and international human rights standards.
D. Administration of justice
142. HRMMU analysed a number of court decisions related to acts committed by members
of the armed groups of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ or
people affiliated thereto. Most of the perpetrators are prosecuted under articles 110 (trespass
against territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine) or 263 (unlawful handling of
weapons, ammunition or explosives) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. In the vast majority of
these cases, the accused agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence with a probation
period, which along with numerous reports of ill-treatment of detainees, some of which have
been interviewed by HRMMU during the reporting period, may indicate that they could have
been forced to confess95.
143. Moreover, HRMMU has noted a lack of uniformity in the qualification of similar
crimes. While in certain cases members of the armed groups were accused under article
258-3 (participation in a terrorist group or terrorist organisation), in other cases courts found
them guilty under article 260 (participation in the illegal paramilitary or armed formations) of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine, emphasising that neither ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ nor
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ were recognised as terrorist organisations under Ukrainian
legislation. Although in both types of cases perpetrators were sentenced for the same crime,
i.e. participation in the armed groups, those found guilty under article 258-3 were sentenced
to longer terms of imprisonment than those accused under article 260 of the Criminal Code.
144. For example, on 10 August, the Prosecutor of the Donetsk region reported sentencing
a member of the armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ to four years of
imprisonment under article 260 of the Criminal Code for participation in the unlawful activity
of paramilitary armed formation Oplot. The next day, the Slovianskyi District Court in Donetsk
region sentenced another member of the armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ to
nine years of imprisonment under article 258-3 of the Criminal Code for setting up check
points, trench shelters and other fortification installations and keeping the armed watch there.
 95 See paragraphs 46 and 164 of OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering 16 February
to 15 May 2015.
33
145. The HRMMU noted the development of more centralized civilian ‘administrative
structures’ and ‘procedures’ continued to develop in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic” and
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ These include the ‘legislature’, ‘judiciary system’, ‘ministries’
and ‘law enforcement’. ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ reportedly began issuing passports to
residents of the territories under its control. Among other ‘laws’, ‘legislative bodies’ of
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ have adopted a number of
‘legislative acts’ governing criminal prosecution96 in the territories under their control.
Prosecution of Ukrainian citizens under these ‘laws’ by these ‘courts’ would constitute
violation of their right to fair trial. In general, all these ‘structures’ and ‘procedures’ do not
conform to international law and the Constitution of Ukraine.
High profile cases
146. On 28 July, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine reported the opening of an in absentia
trial against former senior officials for corruption – the former President Yanukovych, former
Head of the National Bank Arbuzov, former Minister of Revenues and Duties Klymenko and
his former deputy Ihnatov, former Minister of Health Bohatyriova and her former deputy
Stashchenko. Most of them have fled Ukraine and are allegedly in the Russian Federation.
All of them were put on an international wanted list, which is the main prerequisite for
launching a trial in absentia. According to the procedure, the suspects are to be officially
notified through a summons published in the official Gazette and on the website of the Office
of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, inviting them to the interrogation and notifying them
that the investigation and trial shall otherwise take place in their absence. This is the first time
a trial in absentia procedure has been applied in Ukraine since October 2014, when
amendments were introduced to the Criminal Procedural Code.
147. In its General Comment No 32, the Human Rights Committee declared that
proceedings in the absence of the accused ‘may in some circumstances be permissible in the
interest of the proper administration of justice’, and added that these circumstances emerge
when the accused persons, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance,
decline to exercise their right to be present.
148. On 18 June, the Minister of Internal Affairs reported that the case of the killing of the
editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper Siegodnia Oles Buzyna (shot dead in Kyiv on 16 April
2015) was “solved”. According to the Minister, two suspects were identified and detained in
the course of the investigation. On 18 June, the Shevchenkivskyi District Court in Kyiv ruled
to hold one of them – a member of police battalion Kyiv-2 who participated in the armed
conflict in the east – in custodial detention until 18 August. The other was released on bail for
UAH 5 million (approximately USD 235,000). The pre-trial investigation of the case is ongoing.
149. HRMMU continued to monitor the case of Nelia Shtepa, the former mayor of the
town of Sloviansk (Donetsk region), who is charged under articles 110 (trespass against
territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine) and 258-3 (creation of a terrorist group or
terrorist organization) of the Criminal Code for cooperation with and rendering support to the
“separatists”; and failure to secure the city police department, where 479 units of firearms
were stored in April 2014. According to the indictment, these actions led to the takeover of
the town and the subsequent killing of 117 people and injuring of 198. Ms Shtepa has been in
custody since 11 July 2014, after the Ukrainian armed forces regained control over the town
of Sloviansk on 7 July (she had previously spent nearly three months as a detainee of the
armed groups). The trial is moving slowly, with approximately one hearing per month, and is
at the stage of collection of testimonies from prosecution witnesses.
 96 See paragraphs 129-132 of the 10th HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period
16 February – 15 May 2015.
34
150. Another high-profile case monitored by HRMMU is that of the mayor of Kharkiv,
Hennadii Kernes, who is charged under articles 127 (torture), 129 (threat to kill) and 146
(illegal confinement or abduction of a person) of the Criminal Code for abduction and illtreatment
of pro-Maidan activists in Kharkiv which he allegedly conducted along with two of
his bodyguards, in March 2014. Although the indictment was submitted to the court on 26
March 2015, the hearing on the merits has not yet commenced. Preliminary hearings in the
case are closely followed by activists, with all sittings accompanied by their demonstrations,
demanding that the defendant be imprisoned. In some cases, activists attempted to enter the
court room, and clashed with the police.
Transfer of prisoners
151. Approximately 9,300 prisoners sentenced before the conflict remain in penitentiary
institutions located on the territory controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. This
includes over 760 prisoners from different regions of Ukraine and foreign citizens. In March
2015, the Ombudsperson’s Office of Ukraine initiated a discussion on the transfer of such
pre-conflict prisoners to Government-controlled territories. At this time, HRMMU acted as
an intermediary between the ‘penitentiary administration’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and the Office of the Ombudsperson in this operation. This enabled a group of foreign
prisoners, and a group of detainees who had been in the process of being transferred prior to
the start of the armed conflict to return to the judicial system under which they were
sentenced or had been facing trial97.
152. As of 15 August, two transfers had taken place. On 8 July, nine male prisoners (seven
citizens of the Russian Federation, one citizen of the Republic of Moldova, and one citizen of
Georgia) were transferred from the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ to the Government-controlled
territories (three of them await further transfer to the states of their nationality). On 5 August, a
group of 20 (19 men and one woman) were transferred from the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ to
Government-controlled territory. HRMMU presence during both transfers fostered trust
between the parties.
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Constitution of Ukraine
Decentralization
153. On 31 July, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine published its opinion on a draft law
on constitutional amendments relating to decentralization, finding it in line with the
Constitution and international human rights standards. The European Commission for
Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) found the amendments “largely
compatible with the European Charter of Local Self-Government”98.
154. The amendments enshrine the principle of subsidiarity and the duty of the State to
ensure adequate financial resources for the local self-government units. It clearly separates
and defines the functions of the State and local self-government. Prefects are to assume the
oversight functions of the State at local level. The President and the Prefect can suspend the
powers of local government bodies if they believe their decisions are illegal, and the
Constitutional Court is to rule on the issue of such decisions.
155. It should be noted that the draft amendments do not address the territories controlled
by the armed groups and foresee that “special order of self-governance of certain districts of
 97 This concerned nine (in July) and 20 (in August) people respectively.
98 See Paragraph 38 of the Preliminary Opinion on the Proposed Constitutional Amendments Regarding the
Territorial Structure and Local Administration of Ukraine, the Venice Commission, 24 June 2015.
35
Donetsk and Luhansk regions shall be set forth in a separate law”. Commenting on the draft
amendments, President Poroshenko said that they “do not envision and cannot envision any
special status for the Donbas”. The Venice Commission regretted that the amendments “do
not provide a constitutional basis for proposals aimed at settling the present conflict in
Ukraine. The Commission considers that the authorities should add a provision to the effect
that “some categories of administrative/territorial units or special arrangements for or within
administrative/territorial units may (only) be created by law”. This formula, albeit neutral,
would nonetheless enable future legal developments in line with the Minsk agreements”99.
Judiciary
156. Amendments aimed at reforming the judicial system and the status of judges were
developed by a working group of the Constitutional Commission and foresee the removal of
long-standing constitutional obstacles to the independence of the legal system. In particular,
judges will no longer be elected and dismissed by Parliament but appointed by the President
upon the submission of the High Council of Justice, which will also be empowered to decide
on the termination of their term. The High Council of Justice is to be composed of a majority
of judges (10 out of 19). Probationary periods for judges, which made them vulnerable to
political pressure, are abolished. The broad supervisory powers of the Public Prosecutor not
related to his prosecutorial functions have been cancelled and the competence of the
Parliament to declare no confidence in the Prosecutor General has been removed. The
amendments also mention that “Ukraine may recognize the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court as provided by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”. The
amendments largely reflect the recommendations of the Venice Commission and of United
Nations human rights mechanisms100 to improve strengthening the independence of the
judiciary, to fight corruption and to improve access to justice. To date, these amendments
have not yet been approved by the Constitutional Commission.
157. The working group of the Constitutional Commission dealing with human rights
issues is in the process of developing draft amendments to the Constitution in this area based
on the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and UN human rights instruments.
Accession to international conventions
158. HRMMU welcomes the adoption, on 17 June, of a law signed by the President of
Ukraine on 6 July, enabling Ukraine to join the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. On 14 August, Ukraine transmitted to the UN
Secretary-General the Instrument of Accession to the Convention which will enter into force
for Ukraine on 13 September 2015. While acceding to the Convention, Ukraine made a
declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances under
articles 31 and 32 of the Convention.
Derogation from certain human rights obligations
159. On 5 June 2015, the Government of Ukraine informed the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe101 that it would derogate
from certain State obligations under the ICCPR and the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. According to the text of the
 99 Ibid, paragraph 27.
100 See, in particular, paragraph 17 of the Concluding Observations of the Human Right Committee
(CCPR/C/UKR/CO/7) of 22 August 2013, and paragraphs 7-13, 14, 15, 88, 90-92, 95 and 96 of the Report of
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (A/HRC/22/7).
101 See paragraph 144 of HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine for 16 February – 15 May 2015.
36
resolution of the Ukrainian Parliament of 21 May 2015102, it was adopted in connection with
“annexation and temporary occupation by the Russian Federation” of Crimea and “military
aggression of the Russian Federation” “on the territory of certain districts of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions”.
160. The derogation is envisaged in relation to the right to liberty and security, fair trial,
effective remedy, respect for private and family life and freedom of movement, including the
right to choose one’s residence, which should be applied in certain districts of the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions determined by the Anti-Terrorism Centre of the Security Service of
Ukraine. In addition, the Resolution does not define clearly the territory to which the
derogation applies but states that Ukraine shall inform the Secretary-General of the United
Nations and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe about “the alteration of the
territory” to which the derogation shall apply. The resolution envisages derogations from
some rights which have been interpreted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee as
being non-derogable. They include the right to an effective remedy and procedural rights,
such as the supervision by a judicial body of the lawfulness of detention.
161. The derogation will have a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights in
certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The derogation in regard of ICCPR is
effective since 16 July. According to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, “the
derogation does not mean that Ukraine is no longer bound by the European Convention on
Human Rights, that it is no longer a member of the Council of Europe, or that our cooperation
is being put on hold. The European Court of Human Rights will assess in each case
whether the derogation is justified”. HRMMU notes that the armed groups and the so-called
‘governance structures’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
are accountable for human rights abuses committed on territories under their control.
National Human Rights Strategy
162. During the reporting period, the Government and the Presidential Administration, in
cooperation with Ombudsperson office and civil society, finalized the draft of the National
Human Rights Strategy. The draft was analysed by OHCHR, the Council of Europe and other
organizations, and was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in the end of March 2015. The
draft was further amended following comments made by civil society organizations and the
Ombudsperson office and submitted to the Presidential Administration for approval103.
Freedom of movement
Movement of people
163. On 4 June 2015, the Government adopted Regulation No 367 which organizes the
movement of foreigners and stateless persons to and from Crimea. The adoption of this
regulation was a legal requirement deriving from the law ‘On Securing the Rights and
Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of

 The Resolution On the Approval of the Notification of Ukraine about the Derogation from Certain
Obligations Determined by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 103 On 25 August, the President of Ukraine approved the Strategy and tasked the Government to develop a
relevant Action Plan within three months. The Strategy was developed through collaborative efforts that have
involved, since November 2014, the Government, civil society groups, the Ombudsperson and international
organizations. It provides a five-year roadmap to address both systemic human rights challenges and more
recent conflict-related issues that have followed Maidan events. The Strategy outlines 24 strategic areas,
including torture and ill-treatment, impunity, fair trial rights, fighting discrimination, national minorities, gender
equality, fundamental freedoms, right to health, rights of IDPs and those living in the territories controlled by the
armed groups.
37
Ukraine’ of 15 April 2014104. It provides that foreigners and stateless persons shall enter or
leave Crimea through designated checkpoints and in possession of passports as well as
special permits issued by the State Migration Service of Ukraine. The delivery of a special
permit requires the submission of a number of documents and mention of the purpose of the
visit. The Regulation contains a limited list of grounds for entering Crimea for foreigners and
persons without citizenship which may negatively impact freedom of movement for this
category and be assessed as discriminatory as no grounds for the restriction is being provided.
The refusal to deliver a permit must be motivated and in writing. HRMMU interviewed one
foreign citizen who was refused a permit without any justification and is aware of another
case of permits delivered to some but not all members of a family traveling together, without
providing arguments for this difference in treatment.
Movement of goods
164. On 8 August, law No 649-VIII105 was published, instructing the Government of
Ukraine to adopt a legal act (to be developed by SBU) regulating the movement of goods to
and from the area of the “anti-terrorist operation” until 22 August. The Temporary Order
already includes such a procedure and the adoption of a new legal act would duplicate it and
further tighten the control of movement across the contact line. Additionally, the law
introduces administrative responsibility for violating the procedure of cargo movement in the
form of fines ranging from UAH 121,800 (approximately USD 5,800) to UAH 243,600
(approximately USD 11,380), as well as the confiscation of goods. HRMMU emphasizes that
restrictions to the movement of goods should not lead to violations of the right to an adequate
standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, housing and the right to health106.
HRMMU also recalls that the parties to the conflict, in line with international humanitarian
law, must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for
civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse
distinction, subject to their control107.
Police reform
165. On 4 August, the President of Ukraine signed the law on the national police, defining
the legal and organizational framework for the activities of the police. It states that the
national police shall be headed by a chief of police appointed and dismissed by the Cabinet of
Ministers. The law regulates the use of physical force, firearms, special equipment, as well
the procedures for arrest, questioning and document check. It also requires for police
measures to be necessary and proportionate. The law also provides that police officers having
committing illegal acts shall be brought to criminal, administrative, civil and disciplinary
liability.
166. The law clearly defines the powers, status and obligations of police officers, covering
a wide range of police activities. In addition, it regulates the application of measures of
restraint and the use of force, while such aspects were previously covered by Government
regulations. On the negative side, the law provides that firearms can be used without warning
 104 Article 10-2 of this law states that the movement of foreigners and stateless persons to and from Crimea
should take place in accordance with a “regime” applicable to those categories and only through “special
permission” established by the Government of Ukraine.
105 Law on Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding Order of Movement of Goods to and
from the Territory of Anti-Terrorist Operation Area.
106 See articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
107 Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy
remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such
as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations
and supplies and irrigation works.
38
in the area of the “anti-terrorist operation”108. Moreover, it does not foresee independent
complaints and oversight mechanisms of police activities, which would strengthen
accountability and public trust109.
Law on local elections
167. On 14 July, the Parliament adopted a law on local elections which will be first applied
to the nation-wide local elections scheduled for 25 October 2015110. The elections will take
place under a proportional system, with open party lists, except for city mayors and village
councils which will be chosen under the majoritarian system. A person will only be able to
vote in his or her place of registration. This means that IDPs will not be able to vote in their
place of displacement, which will de facto prevent many of them from taking part in the
process. According to Principle 22 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
IDPs have the “right to vote and to participate in government and public affairs, including the
right to have access to the means necessary to exercise this right”. To be noted, the law
determines a 30 per cent quota on the proportional system lists for candidates “of either
gender”111. In practical terms, this will apply to women. The law does not provide for any
sanctions for political parties that fail to comply with this rule. The critical issue is the gap
between the de jure and de facto, or the right as against the reality of women’s participation
in politics and public life generally. Research demonstrates that if women’s participation
reaches 30 to 35 per cent (generally termed a “critical mass”), there is a real impact on
political style and the content of decisions, and political life is revitalized112.
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA113
Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity
168. On 29 May, ‘the prosecutor of Crimea’ announced identification of at least 50 leaders
and participants in the Maidan protest movement, alleging that they were involved in attacks
against Berkut servicemen in 2014 in Kyiv. She stated that information on these people
would be submitted to the investigative authorities for further actions. As of 15 August, some
people from the list have been already summoned to the Investigative Committee of the
Russian Federation. HRMMU is concerned in this regard that in Crimea conditions for a fair
trial and proper legal safeguards are often absent, and recalls in this regard sentencing by a
Crimean ‘court’, on 15 May 2015, of the Crimean ‘pro-unity’ activist Oleksandr Kostenko114.
 108 See UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (principles 9 and 10).
109 See United Nations Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of
Ukraine (CAT/C/UKR/CO/6), 12 December 2014, p. 4.
110 The elections will not be held in the “territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” and in “certain
territories110 of Donetsk and Luhansk regions” “because of temporary occupation and armed aggression of the
Russian Federation and impossibility to ensure the observance of OSCE standards regarding elections”.
111 The attainment of a minimum ratio of 30 per cent of leadership positions for both genders was first
recommended in a 1990 resolution of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The role of women in
democratic processes was also emphasized in the 2011 United Nations General Assembly resolution on Women’s
Political Participation (A/RES/66/130).
112 CEDAW General Recommendations No. 23: Political and Public Life, XVI Session of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 1997, A/52/38.
113 The de facto authorities of Crimea rejected HRMMU request to establish a sub-office in the peninsula.
HRMMU maintains direct contacts with residents of Crimea as well as with IDPs from Crimea on the mainland
Ukraine. HRMMU obtains first-hand information from ‘pro-unity’ activists, Crimean Tatars, leaders of Mejlis
and Qurultay of Crimean Tatars people, lawyers of those who had been detained in Crimea as well as from local
teachers, doctors and private entrepreneurs. HRMMU continued to seek access to Crimea.
114 For more details, see paragraphs 158-159 of 10th HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
covering period 16 February – 15 May 2015.
39
169. On 11 June, the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation approved the
indictment of Crimean residents Oleh Sentsov and Oleksandr Kolchenko115. On 17 June, the
North Caucasian Military District Court started to consider the case on the merits. Between
21 July and 15 August, ten court hearings were held116. During one of them, the main
prosecution witness, Hennadii Afanasiev, revoked his earlier testimony as forced under
torture. Mr Afanasiev also informed the court of threats from the Federal Security Service
(FSS) of the Russian Federation against himself and his mother. He was taken back to prison
on 6 August and, according to his lawyer, was beaten by an FSS officer. HRMMU is deeply
concerned about possible further reprisals against Mr Afanasiev and risks to his personal safety.
170. The pre-trial detention of the Deputy Head of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars Akhtem
Chiigoz117, who was arrested on 29 January 2015 on suspicion of organizing mass riots on
26 February 2014118, was extended until 19 November 2015.
171. The HRMMU is concerned about the lack of accountability in the case of two ‘prounity’
Crimean Tatars, Timur Shaimardanov and Seiran Zinedinov, who disappeared in May
2014 in Crimea119. On 9 June 2015, the Main Investigative Department of the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for Crimea suspended the preliminary investigation into
the case, opened on 24 July 2014, because the perpetrator of the crime had not been
identified.
Freedom of movement
172. On 4 June, the Government of Ukraine adopted Regulation No 367120, introducing
additional requirements for children below 16 years of age to cross the administrative
boundary line (ABL) between mainland Ukraine and Crimea. According to the new
Regulation, children must be in possession of an international passport and, in case he or she
is accompanied by only one of his parents, must have the consent of the other parent certified
by a notary. Prior to the adoption of the Regulation, the only requirement for Ukrainian
children under 16 years to cross the ABL was to have a birth certificate, which was not
deemed by the Ukrainian authorities as a proof of citizenship.
173. The absence of information about the new rule has caused long queues at crossing
points, with people waiting for hours and many with children being turned away by
Ukrainian Border Guards. Crossing points on the Ukrainian side of the ABL are particularly
ill-suited to handle the transit of people as there are no toilets, no facilities for children, older
persons or persons with disabilities to rest, and no shelter in case of bad weather conditions.
 115 Four Crimean residents, including film-maker Oleh Sentsov and a ‘pro-unity’ activist Oleksandr Kolchenko,
were arrested in Crimea on suspicion of planning terrorist acts and transferred to the Russian Federation in May
2014. Two other detainees related to the case, Hennadii Afanasiev and Oleksii Chyrnii, entered a plea
agreement and were sentenced to seven years of imprisonment.
116 On 25 August, Oleh Sentsov was sentenced to 20 years of prison for setting up a terrorist group and being
involved in two attempted arson attacks in Crimea. The HRMMU notes that the process was marred by
violations of fair trial rights and the presumption of innocence. The court dismissed credible allegations of
torture and ill-treatment of Sentsov during pre-trial detention and passed the guilty verdict notwithstanding the
fact that the main prosecution witness recanted in the courtroom, saying his testimony had been extorted under
torture. Oleksandr Kolchenko, who was being tried with Sentsov and also denied the charges, received a 10-year
prison sentence for his participation in the ‘terrorist plot’ organized by Sentsov.
117 For more details, see paragraph 162 of the 10th HRMMU report covering period of 16 February to 15 May
2015.
118 For more details, see paragraph 93 of the 9th HRMMU report covering period of 1 December 2014 – 15
February 2015.
119 For more details, see paragraph 218 of the 7th HRMMU report covering period of 17 September to
31 October 2014.
120 On Entry/Exit to/from the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine.
40
Freedom of expression121
174. The imam of a mosque in the Bakhchysaraiskyi district was sentenced to two years of
probation for stating his views in a private conversation at his workplace. The imam allegedly
told three people that Crimea will be returned to Ukraine, after which “a war will start in
which the Russians will be massacred and many Muslims will be killed”. The Imam denied
using these words. The ‘court’ found him guilty of “inciting inter-ethnic animosity” after
criminal proceedings were opened by the ‘centre for combating extremism’ of the Crimean
‘ministry of interior’ based on a complaint made by the three individuals. The court decision
also prohibits the imam, during the period of his sentence, “to conduct activities related to the
dissemination of any information”.
Freedom of peaceful assembly122
175. On 18 May, commemorative events were held throughout Ukraine to mark the 71st
anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars123. In Crimea, the de facto authorities
organized official ceremonies and visited the construction site of a future memorial complex
dedicated to the victims of the deportation. However, they prohibited all rallies planned by
the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, invoking the necessity to avoid political manipulation of the
commemoration. In addition, about 60 Crimean Tatars taking part in an unauthorized
motorcade in Simferopol were arrested by the Crimean ‘police’, interrogated for several
hours, and released after being fined. Restrictions were also applied to the commemoration of
the Crimean Tatar Flag Day on 26 June. While Crimean Tatar organizations loyal to de facto
authorities were able to organize a car rally and deploy a huge Crimean Tatar flag, ‘prounity’
activists and members of the Mejlis were formally warned by the Crimean
‘prosecutor’s office’ not to organize any events dedicated to the celebration.
Freedom of association
176. HRMMU notes with concern that the increasing restrictive conditions placed by the
legislation of the Russian Federation on the activities of civil society organizations could lead
to the impossibility to re-register and operate in Crimea, and, as a result, infringe enjoyment
of freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association by local population.
177. For instance, the Crimean association Ecology and the World managed to re-register
and obtain legal status as required by the de facto authorities applying the law of the Russian
Federation, while its Feodosia branch was denied registration due to its reported failure to
comply with “administrative requirements”. Some NGOs operating with funding from abroad
decided to suspend their activities. This is the case, for instance, of the Association
Gurzuf-97, Centre for the Animals and Crimean Association of Support to Animals which
were reluctant to register as a “foreign agents”, as required by the de facto authorities
 121 On 31 March 2015, in its concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation,
the Human Rights Committee expressed concern about reported violations of the Covenant in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol that are under effective control of the Russian Federation
including “(b) Alleged violations of freedom of expression and information, including harassment of media,
blockage of Ukrainian internet sites and forced relocation of local internet sites, threats and intimidation against
journalists” (CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7, paragraph 23).
122 On 31 March 2015, the Human Rights Committee, in its concluding observations on the seventh periodic
report of the Russian Federation, expressed concern about “(e) Allegations of discrimination and harassment of
members of minorities and indigenous peoples, in particular Crimean Tatars, including a ban on entry into the
territory of Crimea for five years of some of their leaders, Mustafa Dzhemiliev, Ismet Yuksel and Refat Chubarov”
(CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7, paragraph 23).
123 A concert-requiem, attended by the President and the Prime Minister of Ukraine was organized in the
National Opera and a nationwide mourning rally was held in Kyiv; a collective “Prayer of memory and unity”
also took place, gathering representatives of various religious faiths; and the Ministry of Education and Science
recommended all schools to read a lecture dedicated to the commemoration of the deportation.
41
applying the 2012 amendments to the law on non-profit organizations of the Russian
Federation.
Freedom of religion124
178. As of 23 July, 55 religious organizations from Crimea were listed on the website of
the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation as having obtained State registration,
including Christian Orthodox, Muslim, Protestant and Jewish communities. HRMMU is
aware of at least 30 more communities, including 22 Jehovah’s Witnesses denominations,
which gained registration but have yet to be listed on the Ministry’s website.
179. Registration, however, does not grant an automatic right to conduct pastoral activities
under the law of the Russian Federation. HRMMU has been informed of a number of
incidents, including the case when eight Baptists from the Council of Churches from the town
of Saki were detained in May by the Crimean ‘police’. They had travelled to the village of
Marianivka (Krasnohvardiiskyi district) on the occasion of the Easter celebrations. A ‘court’
found that they had violated “the established procedure for organizing or conducting a
gathering, meeting, demonstration, procession or picket” and fined them. On 2 July, in the city
of Simferopol, eight Jehovah’s Witnesses, who erected tents and disseminated religious
literature, were brought to administrative responsibility (fines) for unsanctioned pickets.
180. HRMMU stresses that the use of such repressive measures contravenes the obligation
to respect freedom of religion, which may be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
Civil registration
181. HRMMU observes that residents of the peninsula cannot organize their lives without
interacting with the institutions that function in Crimea. The Ukrainian legal framework
applying to Crimea penalizes those who wish to maintain a continued bond to the mainland
and can lead to the development of fraudulent practices.
182. In July 2015, a civil registration office in Kharkiv refused to issue a Ukrainian birth
certificate to a child born in Crimea in May 2014, although the mother had a copy of the birth
registration statement issued by the Crimean maternity using a Ukrainian form and stamp.
The Kharkiv officials argued that after the March 2014 ‘referendum’, the Government of
Ukraine stopped recognizing civil registration documents issued on the peninsula and closed
the Crimean branch of the Single Registry of Civil Acts. They also stressed that the April
2014 Law ‘On Securing the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime on the
Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine’ proclaims that all documents and decisions
issued by de facto authorities or bodies are deemed null and void.
Right to an adequate standard of living
183. As of 1 July, the price of commodities rose in Crimea. The increase amounted to
15 per cent for water and 14.4 per cent for electricity. For consumers who opted for
wholesale payment of gas consumption amounting to less than 6,000 cubic meters per year,
tariffs rose by 10 per cent.
184. Crimea is dependent on supplies from mainland Ukraine for electricity (85 per cent)
and water for agricultural and industrial products (80 per cent). In addition, due to the
difficult economic situation prevailing in Crimea, many private businesses and retailers have
 124 On 31 March 2015, the Human Rights Committee, in its concluding observations on the seventh periodic
report of the Russian Federation, expressed concern about “(f) Reports of violations of freedom of religion and
belief on the territory of Crimea, such as intimidation and harassment of religious communities, including
attacks on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the Greek Catholic Church and the Muslim community”
(CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7, para.23).
42
closed, contributing to a scarcity of supply and higher prices, including for seasonal
vegetables and fruits. Basic products are available but their variety is reduced. There are also
interruptions in the delivery of dairy products and other products of necessity.
185. The substantial dependence of Crimea on Ukraine is aggravated by other factors,
including diminished trade between the peninsula and continental Ukraine, and threatens the
right to an adequate standard of living of the most vulnerable, particularly the unemployed
and people with scarce economic resources.
Right to health
186. Long delays are reported in obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment in free-ofcharge
public health care institutions on the peninsula. There are also reports that some
medicines in public hospitals are lacking. According to the ‘human rights commissioner’ of
Crimea, Crimean penitentiary institutions lack medical personnel and are short of necessary
medicines, including for people with tuberculosis or HIV. Specific problems of access to
medicines were reported in the city of Kerch. According to its residents and medical workers,
city hospitals do not have painkillers for patients suffering from cancer.
Cultural rights
187. On 21 May, four Crimean activists and three Ukrainian journalists of the Ukrainian
TV channel Inter were arrested in relation to a flash mob on Ukrainian Embroidery Day, in
the city of Armiansk, close to the ABL. The activists intended to take pictures of themselves
clad in traditional Ukrainian clothes and post them on social networks. The Ukrainian TV
crew arrived to film them in a separate car. The Crimean ‘police’ started searching the
vehicles for “prohibited items”. They did not find anything but took the journalists and
Ukrainian activists to the police station where they were held for five hours, photographed and
released after having their fingerprints taken. The protocol drawn up stated they had been
detained “to establish their identity”. This incident illustrates the difficulties that some groups
in Crimea, particularly ethnic Ukrainians, face to maintain their culture and identity.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
188. An environment conducive to the promotion and protection of human rights in
Ukraine dramatically depends on putting an end to the armed conflict and achieving a
peaceful solution in the east, and on respect for General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Continuing presence of foreign fighters, with
some identified by the Government of Ukraine as servicemen from the Russian Federation, as
well as the reported influx of heavy and sophisticated weaponry from the Russian Federation
and the lack of effective control by the Government of Ukraine of the state border with the
Russian Federation remain the major impediments to this solution. In this regard, more has to
be done to ensure that the Minsk Agreements are faithfully implemented by all parties. The
protection of human rights and accountability must be at the core of efforts towards long term
justice for all, genuine reconciliation within the population, and the recovery of Ukraine.
189. The daily lives of citizens who live on both sides of the contact line remain one of
hardship. Despite efforts to ease freedom of movement, the practicalities at checkpoints
continue to hamper the daily lives of citizens of Ukraine as they try to access social welfare
payments and medical healthcare, and maintain family ties and contact. The unresolved
armed conflict coupled with the continued economic crisis in the country only leads to further
insecurity in the lives of those who live in Ukraine – leading to more hardship and making
the population more vulnerable to human rights violations in all spheres of their lives.
190. Despite certain improvements made by the Government of Ukraine, the delivery of
humanitarian aid to the areas controlled by armed groups is still complicated. Access and
43
unimpeded activities of the humanitarian organisations are pre-conditions for addressing the
urgent needs of the target population. Additional efforts must be undertaken to facilitate the
work of international and national humanitarian organisations in the conflict area.
191. OHCHR appreciates the continued cooperation extended by the Government of
Ukraine to HRMMU during the reporting period. OHCHR positively notes the efforts of the
Government to discuss the findings of the tenth OHCHR report and to address
recommendations made by HRMMU. In particular, OHCHR welcomes the Government’s
decision to strengthen human rights training for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs.
192. The OHCHR also notes the progress made by the Government of Ukraine in the
implementation of the law-enforcement reform and the adoption of the National Human
Rights Strategy and the development of the National Action Plan on implementation of the
Security Council Resolution 1325 to promote women’s equal and full participation as active
agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace-building and peacekeeping. The
proposed Constitutional changes, in general, are positive from the human rights perspective
and are welcomed by OHCHR.
193. Recommendations made in HRMMU reports published since April 2014, that have not
yet been acted upon or implemented, remain valid. OHCHR calls upon all parties to implement
the following recommendations:
To all parties involved in the hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions:
a) Put an end to any form of fighting and violence in Donetsk and Luhansk regions in
compliance with provisions of the Package of Measures for Implementation of the
Minsk Agreements of 12 February 2015.
b) Respect international humanitarian law, particularly by complying with the principles
of distinction, proportionality and precaution and, in any situation, refraining from
indiscriminate shelling of populated areas, and refraining from locating military
objectives within or near densely populated areas and damaging objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population (i.e. water facilities), as well as protect
medical personnel, ambulances and facilities.
c) Promptly and effectively investigate all allegations of violations and abuses of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law, with perpetrators
held accountable and victims provided with access to effective remedies and justice.
d) Ensure treatment with due respect and dignity of the bodies and remains of persons
killed as a result of hostilities, provide free and safe access to the areas where bodies
and remains can be found, ensure their identification, a dignified and decent burial,
and return to their family, and preserve evidence of possible summary executions.
e) Ensure and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief, in
particular by facilitating delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian aid to the
affected population, particularly in the settlements along the contact line, as well as
the safe passage for civilians in strict compliance with international norms and
standards.
f) Ease freedom of movement across the contact line for civilians.
To the Government of Ukraine
g) Ensure consistency of charges against members of the armed groups and proportionality
of sanctions to them to ensure their right to equal treatment before the law.
h) Proactively investigate violations of the international humanitarian law and
international human rights law committed by the Ukrainian armed forces and law
44
enforcement agencies based on own identification of such cases in addition to complaints
of the victims.
i) Ensure access of victims of human rights violations to medical services and social
protection.
j) Develop special simplified procedures for people who have been deprived of their
identification documents due to the conflict to obtain temporary travel documents.
k) Develop procedures for delivering specialised medicines which have been purchased
by the Government to medical institutions in the territories controlled by armed
groups.
l) Ensure the presence of law enforcement officials and medical personnel to secure the
protection of participants in peaceful demonstrations.
To the de facto authorities of Crimea and to the Russian Federation
m) Implement recommendations of the Human Rights Committee, in particular on issues
related to nationality, right of residence, labour rights, property and land rights, access
to health care and education, as well as the rights to freedoms of expression,
association, religion, and peaceful assembly.
n) Stop all acts of discrimination and harassment of representatives of minorities and
indigenous peoples, in particular Crimean Tatars, and other Crimean residents who
did not support the ‘referendum’ of March 2014.
o) Investigate the killing of Crimean Tatar Reshat Ametov and enforced disappearances
of Crimean civil society and human rights activists Timur Shaimardanov, Seiran
Zinedinov, Leonid Korzh125 and Vasyl Chernysh126, and bring perpetrators to justice.
p) Ensure full observance of and compliance with fair trial and due process rights in criminal
proceedings against the Deputy Head of Mejlis Akhtem Chiigoz and ‘pro-unity’ activists
Oleh Sentsov and Oleksandr Kolchenko.
q) Provide HRMMU and other international human rights missions with full access to
the territory of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.
 125 See paragraph 214 of the 7th HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period 17
September – 31 October 2014.
126 See paragraph 80 of the 8th HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period 1–30
November 2014.
Annex 770
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2015)

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
16 August to 15 November 2015
CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY 5
A. Alleged violations of international humanitarian law 5
B. Summary executions, enforced disappearances, unlawful and arbitrary detention,
and torture and ill-treatment 8
III. FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 12
A. Freedom of movement 12
B. Freedom of expression 13
C. Freedom of peaceful assembly 14
D. Freedom of association 15
E. Freedom of religion or belief 15
IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 16
A. Right to an adequate standard of living 17
B. Right to social security and protection 18
C. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 20
V. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 21
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east 21
B. Accountability for human rights violations committed during
the Maidan protests 23
C. Accountability for the violence of 2 May 2014 in Odesa 25
D. Administration of justice 26
VI. RIGHTS TO VOTE AND TO BE ELECTED 28
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA 29
A. The blockade of Crimea 29
B. Citizenship 30
C. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity 30
D. Due process and fair trial rights 30
E. Freedom of expression 31
F. Right to education in native language 31
G. Access to services 32
VIII. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 32
A. Constitutional reform 32
B. Adoption of a National Human Rights Strategy 33
C. Cooperation with the International Criminal Court 33
D. Viza liberalization package 33
E. Labour Code 34
F. Criminal justice reform 34
G. Protection of internally displaced persons 34
H. Civil documents 35
I. Freedom of movement 36
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 36
2
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This is the twelfth report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, based on the work of
the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)1. It covers the
period from 16 August to 15 November 20152.
2. During the reporting period, despite a reduction in hostilities, the armed conflict in
eastern Ukraine continued to significantly affect people residing in the conflict zone and all
their human rights. The absence of effective control3 of the Government of Ukraine over
considerable parts of the border with the Russian Federation (in certain areas of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions) continued to facilitate an inflow of ammunition, weaponry and fighters
from the Russian Federation to the territories controlled by the armed groups, which carries
latent risks of a resurgence of hostilities.
3. The ‘ceasefire within the ceasefire’4 agreed upon in Minsk on 26 August 2015 led to a
considerable decrease in the hostilities, especially in September and October. The withdrawal
of certain heavy weapons by the Ukrainian military and the armed groups contributed to a
significant reduction of civilian casualties. In the first half of November, however, increasing
skirmishes occurred along the contact line, including with the use of artillery systems.
Alarming reports of the gradual re-escalation of hostilities in some particular flashpoints,
especially around the city of Donetsk, have raised fears that there could be a resumption of
indiscriminate shelling of populated areas, which previously plagued the conflict zone.
4. The number of civilian casualties recorded by HRMMU between 16 August and 15
November was 178 (47 deaths and 131 injured). This is a 232 per cent decrease compared to
the previous reporting period (16 May – 15 August) when 413 civilian casualties (105 killed
and 308 injured) were recorded. Explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices
caused 52 per cent of all civilian casualties during the reporting period, underscoring the
urgent need for extensive mine clearance and mine awareness actions on both sides of the
contact line. In total, from mid-April 2014 to 15 November 2015, HRMMU recorded at least
29,830 casualties (Ukrainian armed forces, civilians and members of the armed groups) in the
armed conflict area of eastern Ukraine, including at least 9,098 killed and at least 20,732 injured5.
5. Serious human rights abuses against the population residing in the territories
controlled by the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’6 and the self-proclaimed
‘Luhansk people’s republic’7 continued to be reported, with new allegations of killings,
torture and ill-treatment, illegal detention and forced labour received by HRMMU. Local
residents continued to remain without any effective protection of their rights. Places of
detention maintained by the armed groups remained virtually inaccessible for independent
oversight, and international organizations, including HRMMU, did not have access to detainees.
1 HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout
Ukraine and to propose recommendations to the Government and other actors to address human rights concerns.
For more details, see paragraphs 7–8 of the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation
of human rights in Ukraine of 19 September 2014 (A/HRC/27/75).
2 The report also provides an update of recent developments on cases that occurred during previous reporting periods.
3 The Russian Federation has continued to send white-truck convoys without the full consent or inspection of
Ukraine, and their exact destination and content could not be verified.
4 For the first time, the ceasefire was agreed upon on 5 September 2014; in December 2014, because of
continued hostilities, the agreement on a ‘silence regime’ was reached; and after the new escalation of hostilities
in January-February 2015, a new ceasefire was agreed upon on 12 February 2015. The agreement of 29 August
was also preceded by the escalating hostilities in June – August 2015.
5 An HRMMU conservative estimate based on available data. For more details, see footnote 32.
6 Henceforth referred to as the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
7 Henceforth referred to as the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
3
At times, it was not possible for HRMMU to access areas, where violations or abuses of
human rights have reportedly been taking place, for security reasons.
6. HRMMU observed the further strengthening of parallel ‘governance structures’ of the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, with their own legislative
frameworks, including parallel systems of law enforcement and administration of justice
(‘police’, ‘prosecutors’ and ‘courts’), in violation of the Constitution of Ukraine and in
contravention of the spirit of the Minsk Agreements. HRMMU reiterates that the ‘officials’
of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ are responsible and
shall be held accountable for human rights abuses committed on territories under their
control. This particularly applies to people bearing direct command responsibility for the
actions of perpetrators.
7. Efforts of the Government of Ukraine to safeguard the territorial integrity of Ukraine
and restore law and order in the conflict zone continued to be accompanied by allegations of
enforced disappearances, arbitrary and incommunicado detention as well as torture and illtreatment
of people suspected of trespassing against territorial integrity or terrorism or believed
to be supporters of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. Elements
of the Security Service of Ukraine appear to enjoy a high degree of impunity, with rare
investigations into allegations involving them.
8. HRMMU reiterates that a proper and prompt investigation of every single reported
case of a violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by
Ukrainian military and law enforcement elements should be carried out, perpetrators brought
to justice, and victims receive compensation. Without this, impunity will remain widespread.
The independence of the judiciary in the face of such cases is often challenged by pressures
and threats of political activists who consider those indicted as patriots.
9. Imposed in January 2015, restrictions on movement across the contact line remained
one of the major challenges for people living in the conflict area, leading to their isolation,
impeding their access to medical care and social benefits, and disrupting family links, with no
clear benefits in terms of security. With only four transport corridors being operational in the
Donetsk region, and just one recently opened corridor for pedestrians in Luhansk region,
movement back and forth and around the contact line has been very limited, congested and
time-consuming. People often spend hours and even nights waiting in queues to pass
checkpoints, with limited access to water and sanitation facilities. The presence of mines
alongside the official transport corridors is a security risk, and constitutes a particular threat
along other roads crossing the contact line. Approaching winter poses additional hardship to
people waiting to cross the contact line.
10. An estimated 2.9 million people living in the conflict area8 continued to face
difficulties in exercising their economic and social rights, in particular access to quality
medical care, accommodation, social services and benefits, as well as compensatory
mechanisms for damaged, seized or looted property. Many people continued to rely on
humanitarian assistance, which has been further restricted. An earlier prohibition of cargo
travelling from Government-controlled territory to the territories controlled by the armed
groups initially affected the flow of goods. The more recent registration requirement introduced
by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ for organizations
delivering humanitarian assistance has resulted in a decrease in the number of humanitarian
organisations operating in the territories under the control of the armed groups. The hardship
already faced by many residents, including those in state institutions, is further aggravated
8 2.7 million living in the territories controlled by the armed groups, including 600,000 along the contact line, and
200,000 residents of the Government-controlled territories along the contact line (Humanitarian Country Team).
4
with the onset of winter and a shrinking humanitarian space. The situation for an estimated
800,000 people living along both sides of the contact line has been particularly difficult.
11. Media professionals working in the territories controlled by the armed groups have
reported that self-censorship for personal security reasons was widespread among local
journalists. The procedure for accreditation of foreign journalists by the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ has become more complicated, with some being
refused accreditation on the grounds that they were “propagandists”. At the same time, the
list of foreigners, including media professionals, banned by the Government from entering
Ukraine for alleged promotion of terrorist activities or undermining territorial integrity,
continued to expand.
12. Rallies to challenge the policies of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ or ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ have been extremely rare because people are afraid to assemble and speak
out. In the Government-controlled territories, the conduct of police during ‘pro-unity’ counterdemonstrations
has been of concern, as illustrated on 2 November 2015 in Odesa, when no
action was taken to prevent ‘pro-unity’ activists from attacking ‘pro-federalism’ supporters
commemorating victims of the 2 May 2014 violence.
13. Accountability has yet to be achieved for the killing of protestors and other human
rights violations committed during the Maidan events in Kyiv, from November 2013 to
February 2014. Although the involvement of senior officials in the killing of protestors has
been confirmed, no one has been brought to justice so far. Similarly, there has been no
progress in ensuring accountability for the death of 48 people (six women and 42 men)
during the violence of 2 May 2014 in Odesa.
14. A decision by the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine, in October, ordering the
Government of Ukraine to resume the payment of pensions and benefits for people living in
the areas controlled by the armed groups, has remained unimplemented.
15. In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,9 the status of which is determined by General
Assembly resolution 68/26210, residents of the peninsula continued to be affected by broad
curtailment of their rights due to the application of a restrictive legal framework imposed
upon them by the Russian Federation. Their right to citizenship has been violated. Although
they may keep their Ukrainian passports and will not be sanctioned for not disclosing this
fact, Crimean residents were granted Russian Federation citizenship by default and given no
choice but to take up Russian Federation passports or lose their employment and social
entitlements. HRMMU documented new cases reflecting the lack of fair trial guarantees,
effective investigations into human rights violations and human rights protection for persons
in detention. These cases concern mostly Crimean Tatars and people supporting Crimea as an
integral part of Ukrainian State.
16. On 20 September, upon the initiative of the Crimean Tatar leadership, a trade
blockade of Crimea from mainland Ukraine started, to call international attention to human
rights violations in Crimea and to request an international monitoring presence in the
peninsula. From its observations at the three checkpoints on the administrative boundary line
in mid-November, HRMMU noted actions to enforce the blockade by Ukrainian activists in
uniforms illegally performing law enforcement functions. The activists reportedly have an
unofficial list of “traitors”, which serve as a basis to illegally arrest and detain people. The
law enforcement officers present at the checkpoints were often or generally passive, merely
observing the situation.
9 Henceforth referred to as Crimea.
10 http://www.un.org/ru/documents/ods.asp?m=A/RES/68/262.
5
17. On 25 August, the President of Ukraine adopted the first National Human Rights
Strategy of Ukraine. In order to move ahead with its implementation, work has been underway
to develop a Human Rights Action Plan. Since November 2014, the Government, civil society
groups, the Ombudsperson and international organizations have been cooperating to design a
five-year roadmap to address systemic human rights challenges and conflict-related issues.
18. On 8 September, Ukraine accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
with respect to alleged crimes committed on its territory after 20 February 2014. This was the
second declaration lodged by Ukraine following its acceptance, in April 2014, of the Court’s
jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed on its territory from 21 November 2013 to 22
February 2014, during the Maidan events.
19. The Parliament adopted several laws required under the European Union visa
liberalization action plan, including anti-corruption laws and the explicit prohibition of
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in employment
relations. It also adopted a law establishing a State Bureau of Investigations tasked to investigate
serious crimes and human rights violations committed by law enforcement, military and
Government officials. There was also some progress in reforming the Constitution after the
adoption by Parliament on the first reading of the constitutional amendments on decentralization.
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
A. Alleged violations of international humanitarian law
20. The reporting period was marked by a sharp de-escalation of hostilities in the conflict
zone of eastern Ukraine, following the revamped agreement on the ceasefire agreed upon in
Minsk, which started to be implemented on 1 September11. While frequent in August,
exchanges of fire from artillery and light weapons almost ceased in September and October.
21. The withdrawal of heavy weapons by the Ukrainian military and armed groups from the
contact line, which took place before the reporting period, as well as the removal of weapons
with calibre below 100mm, which began in September under the oversight by the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), contributed to a considerable decrease in civilian
casualties. Indeed, during the previous reporting periods, most casualties were caused by shelling.
22. The absence of effective control of the Government of Ukraine over considerable parts
of the border with the Russian Federation (in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions)
continued to facilitate an inflow of ammunition, weaponry and fighters to the territories
controlled by the armed groups. Robust military presence on both sides of the contact line
carried persistent risks of resurgence of hostilities. Despite the general observance of the
ceasefire, the presence of military equipment near civilian facilities continued to threaten the
security of the local population.
23. During the first half of November, increasing skirmishes occurred along the contact
line, including with the use of artillery systems. Alarming reports about the gradual re-escalation
of hostilities, especially around the city of Donetsk, raised fears of a resumption of largescale
indiscriminate shelling of populated areas.
24. There is an urgent need to raise people’s awareness to the dangers posed by explosive
remnants of war (ERW) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the conflict zone. Mapping
of the minefields is so far incomplete and inaccurate, and signs posting is urgently required to
warn the population about their presence. Rapid interventions are also required as the snow will
11 For the first time, the ceasefire was agreed upon on 5 September 2014; in December 2014, because of
continued hostilities, the agreement on a ‘silence regime’ was reached; and after the new escalation of hostilities
in January-February 2015, a new ceasefire was agreed upon on 12 February 2015. The agreement of 26 August
was also preceded by the escalating hostilities in June – August 2015.
6
cover and displace booby-traps. There is a lack of equipment for mine clearance on both sides of
the contact line, as well as insufficient safety trainings for the staff of emergency services.
25. Ukraine is party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, which
categorically prohibits the use of anti-personnel mines “under any circumstances”. It is
therefore important that the Government fulfils its obligations under the Convention.
Civilian casualties12
26. Between 16 August and 15 November 2015, HRMMU recorded at least 178 civilian
casualties in the armed conflict zone of eastern Ukraine: 47 killed13 and 131 injured14. This
represents a 232 per cent decrease in the total number of casualties (223 per cent decrease in
killed and 235 per cent decrease in injured), compared to the previous reporting period of 16
May – 15 August 2015 with 413 civilian casualties recorded (105 killed and 308 injured).
17 24
9
28
41
27
43
10 10 3
17
37
22
57
125
72
137
38 31
7
34
61
31
85
166
99
180
48 41
10
0
50
100
150
200
16-28
February
March April May June July August September October 1-15
November
Total civilian casualties, 16 February - 15 November 2015
Killed Injured Total
27. On the Government-controlled territories, 87 civilian casualties (24 deaths and 63
injured) were recorded. The 24 fatalities included 22 adults15 and two children16. Of 63
injured: 57 were adults17 and six were children18.
28. In the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’, 91 civilian casualties (23 deaths and 68 injured) were recorded. Of 23 killed: 22
were adults19 and one was a child20. Of 68 injured: 64 were adults21 and four were children22.
12 For this report, HRMMU investigated reports of civilian casualties by consulting a broad range of sources and
types of information that are evaluated for their credibility and reliability. In undertaking documentation and
analysis of each incident, HRMMU exercises due diligence to corroborate information on casualties from as
wide range of sources as possible, including OSCE public reports, accounts of witnesses, victims and other
directly affected persons, military actors, community leaders, medical professionals, and other interlocutors. In
some instances, investigations may take weeks or months before conclusions can be drawn. This may mean that
conclusions on civilian casualties may be revised as more information becomes available. HRMMU does not
claim that the statistics presented in this report are complete. It may be under-reporting civilian casualties given
limitations inherent in the operating environment, including gaps in coverage of certain geographic areas and
time periods. HRMMU is not in a position at this time to attribute specific civilian casualties recorded to the
armed groups, Ukrainian armed forces or other parties.
13 44 adults (14 women, 27 men and three adults whose gender is unknown) and three children (two girls and a boy).
14 121 adults (25 women, 60 men and 36 adults whose gender is unknown) and ten children (a girl, eight boys
and a child whose gender is unknown).
15 Seven women, 14 men and an adult whose gender is unknown.
16 A girl and a boy.
17 15 women, 38 men and four adults whose gender is unknown.
18 A girl, four boys and a child whose gender is unknown.
19 Seven women, 13 men and two adults whose gender is unknown.
20 A girl.
7
9
6 6
3
15
4 4
0
0
5
10
15
20
1-15 August September October 1-15
November
Total civilian deaths by territory,
16 August - 15 November 2015
Government-controlled territories
Territories controlled by the armed groups
24
21
12
6
34
17 19
1
0
10
20
30
40
1-15 August September October 1-15
November
Total civilian injuries by territory,
16 August - 15 November 2015
Government-controlled territories
Territories controlled by the armed groups
29. The majority of civilian casualties on 16 August – 15 November were caused by
ERW and IEDs: 93 (17 deaths and 76 injuries). Of 17 killed: 15 were adults23 and two were
children24. Of 76 injured: 68 were adults25 and eight were children26.
30. During the reporting period, 70 casualties (22 killed and 48 injured) resulted from
shelling27. Of 22 killed: 21 were adults28 and one was a child29. Of 48 injured: 47 were
adults30 and one was a child31.
31. Besides, six people were killed and two were injured from small arms in the conflict
zone. Other conflict-related casualties included two people killed and two injured in road
incidents with military vehicles in the conflict zone; and the exact causes of conflict-related
injuries of three people are unknown.
Mortars,
canons,
howitzers,
tanks and
MLRS
21%
ERW and
IEDs
67%
Small arms
6%
Road
incidents
with military
vehicles in
the conflict
zone
4%
Unknown
2%
Total civilian casualties by type of
incident (weapon) in the Governmentcontrolled
territories,
16 August - 15 November 2015
ERW and
IEDs
39%
Mortars,
canons,
howitzers,
tanks and
MLRS
57%
Small arms
3%
Unknown
1%
Total civilian casualties by type of
incident (weapon) in the territories
controlled by the armed groups,
16 August - 15 November 2015
21 Ten women, 22 men and 32 adults whose gender is unknown.
22 All boys.
23 Six women and nine men.
24 A girl and a boy.
25 19 women, 40 men and nine adults whose gender is unknown.
26 All boys.
27 From mortars, canons, howitzers, tanks and multiple launch rocket systems.
28 Six women, 12 men and three adults whose gender is not known.
29 A girl.
30 Four were women, 16 were men and 27 adults whose gender is unknown.
31 A girl.
8
32. During his visit to Ukraine from 20 to 25 September, the United Nations Assistant
Secretary-General for Human Rights urged the Government and the armed groups to
investigate incidents, which have led to civilian casualties, in particular those from an
exchange of fire. He also encouraged the Government and the armed groups to establish
civilian casualty mitigation cells within their competent bodies to prevent violations of
international humanitarian law leading to civilian casualties.
Total casualties
33. In total, from mid-April 2014 to 15 November 2015, HRMMU recorded at least
29,830 casualties (Ukrainian armed forces, civilians and members of the armed groups) that
include at least 9,098 people killed and at least 20,732 injured in the conflict area of eastern
Ukraine32. HRMMU estimated the total number of civilians killed during the conflict period
to be up to 2,00033, with an additional 298 passengers killed as a result of the MH-17 plane crash.
B. Summary executions, enforced disappearances, unlawful and arbitrary detention, and
torture and ill-treatment34
By the armed groups
34. During reporting period, HRMMU received new allegations of killings, torture and
ill-treatment, illegal detention and forced labour perpetrated by members of the armed groups.
35. HRMMU received information concerning the alleged killings or attempted killings
of captured Ukrainian soldiers. In one case dating back to the beginning of the conflict (May
2014), an injured Ukrainian soldier was stabbed to death after surrendering, despite a pledge
that his safety would be guaranteed35. In another case, in May 2015, a Ukrainian soldier was
stabbed after being captured and survived thanks to the medical personnel of a hospital,
having been taken to its morgue36. On 20 October, HRMMU received additional details
concerning the alleged summary execution of three members of Ukrainian volunteer
battalions in the yard of the former premises of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in
Donetsk, in mid-September 201437.
36. Some allegations received by HRMMU concern beatings to death or the execution of
armed group members by other armed group members. A former detainee at the SBU
premises in Donetsk alleged that in mid-September 2014, a detained member of the armed
groups was beaten to death by guards for not fulfilling their orders38. Another allegation
32 This is a conservative estimate of HRMMU based on available data. These totals include: casualties among the
Ukrainian forces, as reported by the Ukrainian authorities; 298 people from flight MH-17; civilian casualties on the
territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine, as reported by local authorities and the regional departments
of internal affairs of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; and casualties among civilians and members of the armed
groups on the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, as
reported by the armed groups, the so-called ‘local authorities’ and local medical establishments. This data is
incomplete due to gaps in coverage of certain geographic areas and time periods, and due to overall under
reporting, especially of military casualties. The increase in the number of casualties between the different reporting
dates does not necessarily mean that these casualties happened between these dates: they could have happened
earlier, but were recorded by a certain reporting date.
33 This estimate is based on the number of civilian casualties recorded by HRMMU during the period of 16
February – 15 November 2015, and on the estimated share of civilian casualties among the casualties reported
by medical establishments of Donetsk and Luhansk regions between mid-April 2014 and 15 February 2015
(their reports did not distinguish between military and civilian casualties). HRMMU continues to work to
produce a more exact estimate of civilian casualties caused by the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
34 During the reporting period, a number of victims and witnesses reported allegations of human rights violations
and abuses that had taken place in 2014 and during the first half of 2015. These highlight how the human rights
situation deteriorated in Ukraine, particularly in the eastern territories.
35 HRMMU interview, 23 October 2015.
36 HRMMU interview, 12 November 2015.
37 HRMMU interview, 20 October 2015.
38 HRMMU interview, 15 October 2015.
9
received by HRMMU concerns the execution of members of Cossack units who were kept in
the premises of the former ‘Izolyatsia’ art centre in Donetsk, in April and May 201439.
37. HRMMU also received allegations of enforced disappearances on the territories
controlled by the armed groups. One case concerns a former member of the ‘Vostok’ battalion
who disappeared in May 2015, allegedly after witnessing the killing of three Ukrainian
soldiers in January 2015. Threatened by his commander that he would be accused of the
killings if he spoke, he deserted in January 2015 and went into hiding in Donetsk. After his
disappearance, his mother learnt he was detained by the ‘Vostok’ battalion, but she was never
formally informed of his whereabouts40. Another case concerns the disappearance of a
member of an armed group who was last seen on 5 December 2014 being taken away from a
party by an armed group commander from Horlivka (Donetsk region). In spring 2015, his
mother was informed that the commander had been detained by the ‘general prosecutor’s
office’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and charged with enforced disappearances,
kidnapping and killings, and that her son’s disappearance was included in charges against
him41. One more case concerns two men who travelled from Donetsk to the Governmentcontrolled
territories and went missing on 8 September 2015. According to relatives, they
have not crossed the contact line, and their last known whereabouts were in the Telmanivskyi
district (Donetsk region, controlled by the armed groups)42.
38. Places of detention maintained by the armed groups remained virtually inaccessible
for independent oversight, and international organizations, including HRMMU, did not have
access to detainees. During the reporting period, HRMMU was only able to visit the Donetsk
pre-trial detention centre (SIZO) but did not have access to detainees. Given the considerable
number of cases of torture and ill-treatment of detainees documented by HRMMU since the
beginning of the conflict, including in 2015, and poor detention conditions, there is an urgent
need for independent monitoring of detention facilities in the territories controlled by the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
39. A man, who spent a year in the armed groups’ captivity, described in detail the
conditions in the former SBU premises in Donetsk – namely overcrowding, insufficient
nutrition and lack of adequate medical treatment – as well as ill-treatment, torture and forced
labour. He described the conditions as particularly bad in 2014 and noted some improvement in
2015. He also reported numerous incidents when he and other detainees, including women,
were tortured: mock executions, beatings and electrocution43. Another former detainee reported
poor nutrition and lack of medical aid in a detention facility of one of the ‘military units’ in
Donetsk in the summer of 201544. A man released from penal colony No 97 in Makiivka
(Donetsk region) reported about a room called by inmates the “tram” because it looks like a
very small and narrow metal tram carriage, with a metal tube in it. When an inmate was
considered to have misbehaved, he would be hung to the tube, wrapped in a sticky tape,
sometimes for three to five hours, but often for a whole night. The witness also described cases
of repeated negligence in providing medical assistance to inmates, and reported that in January
2015, one inmate died as a result of not receiving timely medical assistance45.
40. On 25 September, HRMMU interviewed the mother of a man with mental disability
who had been in detention since 26 February 2015. Before being placed in the Donetsk SIZO,
he had spent some time in a temporary detention centre where he was reportedly beaten for
39 HRMMU interview, 16 October 2015.
40 HRMMU interview, 30 September 2015.
41 HRMMU interview, 5 October 2015.
42 HRMMU interview, 26 September 2015.
43 HRMMU interview, 15 October 2015,
44 HRMMU interview, 6 October 2015.
45 HRMMU interview, 18 September 2015.
10
three days. He was allegedly forced to sign a paper stating he had hit himself against the wall.
His parents reported that in SIZO, while his health deteriorated, he did not receive any
adequate medical treatment46.
41. On 19 October, HRMMU interviewed the mother of a man who was abducted on 12
July 2014 near his home, in the city of Donetsk. On 16 July 2014, he was found in another
district of the city, handcuffed, with gunshot wounds and blunt force trauma wounds on his
head. His mother first saw him at the hospital on 16 July. The victim stated that armed men in
camouflage had stopped him on the road, forced him into their car and then held him in a
dark space where he was beaten and accused of being a spy due to his skin colour (he is half-
Congolese). After three days, during the night, he was taken outside to a cornfield where he
was fired at. In July 2014, police refused to record his statement and closed the investigation
into the earlier case that had been opened on his disappearance. On 16 April 2015, his mother
received a notice from the Leninskyi district ‘police department’ of the city of Donetsk which
stated that the investigation was focusing on perpetrators from a “Ukrainian subversive
armed group”47.
By Ukrainian law enforcement and security entities
42. HRMMU remains concerned that the Government’s efforts to safeguard the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and restore law and order in the conflict zone continued to be
undermined by allegations of enforced disappearances, arbitrary and incommunicado
detention and torture and ill-treatment of people suspected of trespassing against territorial
integrity or terrorism or believed to be supporters of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and
‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
43. HRMMU consistently documents reports throughout the country of recurrent
allegations of ill-treatment during arrest and the first hour interrogations that are led by SBU.
A man, detained by SBU on suspicion of preparing a terrorist act in Zaporizhzhia, claimed to
have been repeatedly and heavily beaten, including in the SBU building48. A woman who
was detained by SBU on suspicion of preparing a terrorist act claims that during her
interrogation, she was hung by her hands handcuffed in the back until her elbow joints were
torn apart. About 20 times, a gas mask was reportedly put on her head, with the inhaler closed49.
44. A man who, as of 15 November was tried under articles 113 (sabotage), 258-3 (creation
of a terrorist group) and 263 (illegal possession of weapons) of the Criminal Code, claimed that
after his apprehension on 9 July 2014, he was delivered to the Zaporizhzhia SBU Regional
Department. There, he was reportedly beaten with sticks on his heels, subjected to
waterboarding and tortured with electric shocks by two electric wires connected to his genitals
and to his mouth. As a result, one of his teeth was knocked out, and his ribs and a little finger
were broken. He was coerced into confessing to committing the crimes for which he was
charged. He was constantly threatened by the SBU officers that if he did not plead guilty in
court, he would be killed. He was so frightened by these threats, that for one year he feared
complaining of the torture and ill-treatment he had been subjected to, including to his lawyer. It
was only on 1 July 2015 that he reported to a judge about the torture and ill-treatment he was
subjected to50.
45. HRMMU notes that SBU officers appear to enjoy a high degree of impunity,
systematically escaping from investigations into alleged violations. In one case, dating from
September 2014, a man was apprehended by armed men in the city of Mariupol in the
46 HRMMU interview, 25 September 2015.
47 HRMMU interview, 19 October 2015.
48 HRMMU interview, 3 September 2015.
49 HRMMU interview, 3 September 2015.
50 HRMMU interview, 11 November 2015.
11
presence of witnesses. The following day, his body, bearing signs of violence, was found
dead on the outskirts of the city. According to witnesses, one of the armed men had
introduced himself to the victim as an SBU officer, showing his ID. During the investigation
into this case the police requested SBU whether they had a staff member with such a name or
a similar one serving in Donetsk region, and whether SBU had detained the victim. SBU
responded that they had neither detained the victim nor initiated any investigation regarding
the victim, and refused to answer any questions concerning the name of the alleged
perpetrator. The investigation was reportedly transferred to the Military Prosecutor of the
Southern region, with no progress as of November 2015.
46. The conduct of those elements of Ukrainian law enforcement which are under the
Ministry of Internal Affairs is also of concern. Three men detained by police in Donetsk
region claimed that for more than eight hours after their detention they were subjected to
beatings, death threats, and mock executions during which they were forced to dig their own
graves. In a city police department they were tortured with a gas mask (so-called ‘elephant
torture’) and forced to sign a confession to incriminate themselves. Two of them claimed that
they had been electrocuted with an electric wire connected to their genitals51. A man detained
by Azov regiment (then battalion) of the National Guard, claimed that his legs were pierced
with a bayonet knife, he was hit in the face and his ribs were broken. He also reported being
threatened with rape and subjected to a mock execution52.
47. During his visit to Ukraine in September 2015, the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions recommended that a system of independent
overview of the conduct of all those who perform law enforcement functions be established.
He added that it should have a particular focus on allegations of ill-treatment by SBU, and
that it should be “empowered to conduct investigations into suspected informal detention
facilities, including comprehensive power of search within military or SBU facilities”53.
48. Continued reports of detainees being held in unofficial places of detention remain of
high concern, with more acute risks of torture and ill-treatment, and no indication that this
practice has been decreasing. These places are clearly not accessible to Ukraine’s National
Preventive Mechanism and international organizations. HRMMU received reports that in
November 2015, 27 detainees were being kept in the SBU premises in Kharkiv, with allegations
that some were subjected to torture and ill-treatment54. One of the detainees was allegedly
repeatedly detained after having been sentenced to a conditional sentence55 by a court in
Pavlohrad. HRMMU interviewed a member of an armed group who, as he was seeking to leave
Mariupol in June 2014, was arrested at a checkpoint operated by the Azov battalion. He
reported having been taken to the Mariupol airport, where he was allegedly tortured and illtreated
for a month and a half56. In September, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
summary executions was denied access to the military base in Mariupol airport where, according
to reports received by HRMMU, detainees have been kept and ill-treated since summer 2014.
49. HRMMU continued to receive reports of incommunicado detention. For instance, in
Lysychansk (Luhansk region), on 19 July 2014, the Ukrainian army detained a man. On 20
July 2014, photographs of his identification documents (passport and military documents)
were published on non-governmental websites supporting the security operation, with a
51 HRMMU interview, 25 September 2015.
52 HRMMU interview, 28 August 2015.
53 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16460&LangID=E#sthash.OIrAXYnl.dpuf
54 HRMMU interview, 2 November 2015.
55 Conditional sentence implies the release from custody.
56 HRMMU interview, 22 October 2015.
12
caption stating that he had been captured and was being detained as a terrorist. Inquiries by
his family as to his whereabouts with various law enforcement bodies produced no results57.
50. A former member of a Ukrainian volunteer battalion was detained by police in
Dnipropetrovsk and transferred to Mariupol. According to his former spouse, the victim
witnessed a deal involving illegal property confiscations in the Government-controlled
territories of Donetsk region, after which he was subjected to persecution for refusing to be
involved. He was reportedly beaten, forced to lie and was not granted access to a lawyer for
two weeks. Although he suffers from an ulcer and other health problems, he was allegedly
denied medical assistance. Defense witnesses in his case have reportedly received anonymous
threats and have therefore been afraid to testify58.
51. HRMMU also continued to receive alarming reports of poor detention conditions and
ill-treatment of pre-trial detainees. For instance, on 5 October 2015, a man died in the Mariupol
SIZO. He had been detained since February 2015 on suspicion of spying for the armed groups.
During his nine months in custody, he was allegedly sent several times to an isolation cell and
was repeatedly beaten. His health condition dramatically deteriorated several days before his
death, and he was transferred to the hospital. According to the official report, he died of
pancreatic cancer. His daughter was not allowed into the morgue to see his body; when the body
was returned to the family for burial, his relatives saw his ears bruised and stitches on his head59.
III. FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
A. Freedom of movement
52. Although revised, the Temporary Order of 21 January 201560 continued to limit the
freedom of movement of civilians across the contact line. Originally introduced with reference
to national security concerns, the Temporary Order and its implementation through a permit
system to cross the contact line and pass through the Government controlled check points,
has been one of the major challenges for people living in the conflict-affected areas of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions, leading to an increased sense of isolation for many people,
impeding their access to medical care and social benefits, as well as disrupting family and
communal links. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognises that in
exceptional circumstances, the necessity to protect national security and public order may
justify some restrictions of freedom of movement. However, as stated by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, such restrictions may be authorized only by law using precise
criteria, be limited in time, consistent with other human rights and fundamental principles of
equality and non-discrimination, meet the test of necessity and the requirements of
proportionality61.
53. With the ceasefire and approaching winter, the movement of civilians across the
contact line increased as people travelled to areas controlled by armed groups to visit
relatives, check on their property or collect warm clothes. Those living in the areas controlled
57 HRMMU interview, 23 October 2015.
58 HRMMU interviews, 25 August and 10 September 2015.
59 HRMMU interview, 15 October 2015.
60 The Temporary Order on the control of movement of people, transport vehicles and cargoes along the contact
line in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions was developed and approved by the joint entity ‘the Operational
Headquarters of Management of the Anti-Terrorist Operation’. For more information, see OHCHR reports on
the human rights situation in Ukraine covering periods from 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015 (paragraphs
42-43), from 16 February to 15 May 2015 (paragraphs 58-64), and from 16 May to 15 August 2015 (paragraphs
61-68)For more information, see OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering periods
from 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015 (paragraphs 42-43), from 16 February to 15 May 2015 (paragraphs
58-64), and from 16 May to 15 August 2015 (paragraphs 61-68).
61 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 27, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999).
13
by armed groups regularly travelled to the Government-controlled territories to purchase
food, medicine, withdraw cash, obtain documents or renew lost ones, access social benefits,
and receive medical care.
54. Compared to the previous reporting period, in addition to three operational transport
corridors in Donetsk region, two more were reopened; including one in Luhansk region
(Stanychno Luhanske), allowing only pedestrians and no private or public vehicles.
Nevertheless, with increased movement, the capacity of the checkpoints remained insufficient
especially as working hours were reduced due to the shortened daylight period. Long queues
of up to three kilometres at the contact line, in both directions, were registered at all
checkpoints. In October, reports of people having to spend nights in cars became more
frequent. With the temperature below zero at night, lack of water and sanitation facilities in
between the checkpoints and the absence of medical services, the waiting time was
particularly difficult for people with disabilities, the elderly, pregnant women and children.
55. Upon the President’s instruction62, authorities of Donetsk and Luhansk regions opened
three “logistic centres” near the contact line where civilians living in the areas controlled by
armed groups can buy food, medicine and withdraw cash. However, civilians still could not
reach them easily, as the requirement to have a permit to reach the centres was not waived.
Furthermore, the centres are located between the contact line and the first Governmentcontrolled
checkpoint, in the area where shelling used to be the heaviest, and where the risk
for exposure to ERW and IED is the highest. While visiting two logistical centres in Donetsk
region, HRMMU noted lack of appropriate protection for civilians in case of shelling.
56. The situation of people residing in the area between the contact line and the first
checkpoints in the area controlled by the Government remains unduly complicated. They
have to apply for permits required to cross the contact line, or prove that their village belongs
to the areas controlled by the Government. Entry/exit through checkpoints often depends on
the familiarity of the soldiers with the area; for example, whether they know which side of
the contact line a particular village belongs to, sometimes even whether the street of the
official registration belongs to the area controlled by the Government63. Rotation of personnel
at checkpoints has often resulted in increased delays. Due to the lack of infrastructure in these
localities, such as stores, pharmacies or health facilities, people have to cross Ukrainian
checkpoints on a regular basis and spend long periods in queues. This was further aggravated
by the absence of public transport in these areas.
B. Freedom of expression
Territories controlled by the armed groups
57. Media professionals interviewed by HRMMU continued to report restrictions on their
work. A Donetsk-based media professional stated to HRMMU that there was no freedom of
speech in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, as “no one from local media would even think to
express a critical opinion”64. To ensure their safety, journalists working in the areas
controlled by armed groups reportedly have increasingly resorted to self-censorship.
58. Foreign journalists must be accredited at the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ press centre.
According to them, the procedure became more complicated over the summer of 2015 with
the creation of the ‘special analytical department’, responsible for monitoring all the
reporting of journalists working in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. For example, in
September, two foreign journalists were refused accreditation and invited for an ‘interview’ at
the analytical department. One of the reporters was accused of being ‘a propagandist’ and
62 The decision was announced on 6 August.
63 Some settlements are spilt by the contact line.
64 HRMMU interview, 21 October 2015.
14
ordered to leave Donetsk city. Other nine media outlets informed HRMMU of having
difficulties with ‘accreditation’.
59. Ukrainian freelance journalist Maria Varfolomieieva has been held by armed groups of
the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ since 9 January 2015, accused of ‘espionage’ for taking pictures
of the administrative buildings in Luhansk city, which were allegedly subsequently shelled.
60. Overall, reports indicate that people trying to express alternative views are facing a
non-conducive environment. Preclusion of professional activities of independent media
professionals was followed by the suspension of the operations of most international
humanitarian organizations.
Territories controlled by the Government
61. On 16 September, the President of Ukraine signed an order enacting a decision of the
National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) of 2 September 2015, which added 41
foreign journalists and bloggers (mainly Russian) to a list65 of 388 other persons (media
professionals, artists, politicians) banned from entering Ukraine for one year. The authorities
claimed that “their activity or public statements promoted terrorist manifestations on the
territory of Ukraine and misinformed the international community about the situation at the
occupied territory, or who illegally crossed the Ukrainian border to access the occupied
territory”. On 17 September, NSDC removed six foreign journalists from BBC and European
media outlets from the list, following statements made by the media outlets and public opinion.
62. While recognizing the Government’s right to protect national security, HRMMU is
concerned that such unjustified broad restrictions are applied without clear procedures and
criteria.
63. HRMMU continued to follow the case of blogger Ruslan Kotsaba, charged by SBU
with high treason for publishing an anti-mobilisation video on 17 January66. On 1 October,
Ivano-Frankivsk City Court prolonged the term of his custodial detention, which was to end
on 16 October, until 29 November. The defence lawyers noted an unreasonable protraction of
the court hearings. For example, on 27 October, the Court adjourned the planned hearing to
13 November, stating that law enforcement officials could not transport the defendant to the
court, as all of them were busy ensuring public order during the local elections.
C. Freedom of peaceful assembly
Territories controlled by the armed groups
64. Freedom of peaceful assembly continued to be significantly infringed in the territories
controlled by the armed groups. Rallies to challenge the policies of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ or ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ were extremely rare because people have been
reportedly afraid to assemble for fear of reprisals. On 5 September, approximately 70 people
(including media representatives) gathered in Donetsk to protest against the dismissal of the
‘speaker of the parliament’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. When the protestors tried to
block the road, the rally was dispersed by men in camouflage.
Territories controlled by the Government
65. HRMMU continued to follow up the case related to the prohibition of the LGBT
Equality March in Odesa, in August. As of 15 November, the LGBT Community Centre was
still waiting for the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine on the
complaint challenging the legality of the prohibition. The Odesa Regional Prosecutor’s
65 See paragraph 50 of the 6th OHCHR report on the human rights situation covering the period from 18 August
to 16 September 2014.
66 See paragraph 71 of the 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 16
May to 15 August 2015.
15
Office informed HRMMU that eight ‘Svoboda’ activists were fined for attacking the Centre on
15 August 2015.
66. On 31 August, while the Parliament was voting on the draft constitutional
amendments related to decentralization, a crowd of an estimated 3,000 people gathered
outside the Parliament. They objected to a constitutional provision foreseeing that “special
order of self-governance for certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions” would be
determined by law, arguing this would provide “special status” to the areas controlled by the
armed groups and constitute a betrayal of national interests. After the amendments were
adopted, protestors started to burn tires and wood in front of the main entrance of the
Parliament and to confront the police cordons. One of the protestors launched a combat
grenade which killed four police officers. In total, 187 people (mostly policemen) were
injured during the clashes. Police forces failed to adequately protect demonstrators and
themselves. The incident illustrates the challenges in securing the physical security and right
to life or participants of mass gatherings, which is of particular concern given the unregulated
outflow of small arms and explosive weapons from the conflict area.
67. HRMMU also witnessed cases of police failure to ensure public order and safety
during counter-demonstrations. For instance, on 2 November, in Odesa, ‘pro-unity’ activists
conducted a non-notified counter-demonstration at the same time and place as the 2 May
notified commemoration organized by ‘pro-federalism’ supporters and victims’ families.
Despite previous provocations from ‘pro-unity’ supporters, police intervened and formed a
cordon between the two groups only after ‘pro-unity’ activists attacked their opponents and
burned a banner with the names and photos of victims of the 2 May violence. No one was
arrested during or following the incident.
D. Freedom of association
Conflict-affected area
68. In the areas controlled by armed groups, key civil society actors, especially human
rights organizations, had been targeted at the onset of the conflict and forced to leave. Those
few local NGOs which remained have been carrying out predominantly humanitarian
activities as human rights protection and promotion may put them at risk.
69. In addition to restrictions imposed by armed groups, local staff and activists of the
NGOs operating in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ also
faced persecution from Ukrainian authorities and groups affiliated with them. During the
reporting period, HRMMU learnt that the names and personal data of at least 34 civil society
activists operating in the areas controlled by armed groups were publicized on the
‘Myrotvorets’ (‘Peace-maker’) website, allegedly due to the fact that they have been
collaborating and communicating with the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’. Some of these NGOs had been founded before the conflict to provide
services to HIV positive people, orphans and other vulnerable groups. Officially, the website
is presented as a centre to track signs of crimes against the national security of Ukraine,
peace, humanity, and the international law. However, the website is known in the public as a
database of alleged ‘separatists’ and ‘terrorists’67. In the absence of a court decision, such
labels have a defamatory character, violate the presumption of innocence, and expose people
listed to threats. In addition, people included into the list cannot cross the contact line, and are
detained under charges of terrorism.
E. Freedom of religion or belief
70. During the reporting period, HRMMU documented a number of violations of freedom
of religion or belief. In territories controlled by armed groups, minority Christian denominations
67 In April 2015, the Ombudsperson of Ukraine demanded to close the website. However, no reaction followed.
16
continued to be targeted. In other parts of Ukraine, a series of violations against the Jewish
community were committed, with a failure of police to investigate the majority of cases.
Territories controlled by the armed groups
71. HRMMU continued to receive reports about the persecution of Jehovah Witnesses in
the territories controlled by armed groups. On 25 August, in the city of Luhansk, four local
members of the community (all men) were interrogated for six hours at the office of the
“ministry of state security”, and forced to state that they were connected to foreign
intelligence services. The interrogators forbade them to distribute religious literature and to
publicly practice their religion. On 21 September, in the town of Vuhlehirsk (Donetsk
region), two representatives of the local ‘military police’ ordered the community of Jehovah’s
Witnesses in the region to stop religious services and distribution of religious literature until a
law on religion was passed, threatening that members would otherwise be sanctioned by arrests
or high fines. On 29 September, in the town of Shakhtarsk (Donetsk region) a group of
people came to the Kingdom Hall to protest against the activity of the religious community
and put up signs on the facade that read: “Away with the Sect!” and “No place for sects!”
The local ‘police chief’ was present during the protest, but did not intervene.
Territories controlled by the Government
72. HRMMU is concerned about the incidents across Ukraine which targeted the Jewish
community. On 5 September, approximately 30 men attacked a camp of Hassidic Jews in
Uman (Cherkasy region), a few days before the beginning of the Rosh Hashannah
pilgrimage. The attack took place on Shabbat, when the Jewish community could not defend
themselves. The police reportedly observed the attackers dismantling the fence around the
camp but did not intervene. On 6 September, investigation into the incident was initiated
under article 356 (unauthorized action) of the Criminal Code with no progress achieved as of
15 November 2015.
73. Also, the HRMMU became aware of five other attacks on Jewish cemeteries or
Holocaust memorials, occurring across Ukraine in the period from 27 August to 19
September 2015. In all of the incidents the criminal investigation was launched; however
with no progress as of 15 November.
IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
74. The situation of estimated 2.9 million people living in the conflict area68 remained
particularly difficult. Absence of the rule of law and legitimate civil authorities, coupled with
intense military presence, continued to create tension and uncertainty for the population.
Despite the ceasefire, civilians still largely relied on humanitarian assistance while their
needs remain very high. Housing, land and property issues, including damaged and looted
houses, were one of the most often reported problems.
75. Humanitarian assistance for those people who have been directly affected by the
armed conflict in territories under the control of the armed groups remains limited. The
prohibition of cargo travelling from the Government-controlled territory to the territories
controlled by the armed groups impedes the general movement flow. The registration
requirement introduced in June by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ for organizations delivering humanitarian assistance on the territories controlled by
the armed groups has limited the number of humanitarian organizations providing assistance
– medicine, food, shelter and other items. The impact of such restrictive access to healthcare
and daily needs for many living in both the urban and rural areas should not be under
68 2.7 million living in the territories controlled by the armed groups, including 600,000 along the contact line, and
200,000 residents of the Government-controlled territories along the contact line (Humanitarian Country Team).
17
estimated, particularly with the onset of winter. HRMMU considers that both the
Government and the armed groups need to ensure the critical needs of the most affected
population are met to prevent any decline in their health and welfare69.
76. As of 15 November, the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine had registered
1,578,925 internally displaced persons (IDPs) throughout Ukraine. A number of registered
IDPs permanently live in the Government-controlled areas, others regularly move across the
contact line; however many of them continue to face precarious economic and social
conditions, with particularly limited access to quality medical care, social services and benefits
and long-term accommodation.
77. Demobilized soldiers still faced difficulties in obtaining official status as security
operating participants allowed to access social aid, medical and psychological services free of
charge. This particularly affects those requiring expensive treatment and rehabilitation. For
example, on 13 November, HRMMU interviewed the mother of a mobilized soldier who had
been in hospital in critical condition for five months after sustaining multiple injuries,
including while being in captivity of armed groups. Although all necessary documents had
been submitted in August, they had not yet been processed as of 15 November. Thus, the
family had so far received no State social support and required medications have been
purchased by volunteers.
78. HRMMU is concerned that no attention and support have been given so far to the
needs of victims of torture, especially civilians, due to the absence of relevant legislative
provisions, and lack of knowledge and skills in dealing with the survivors. HRMMU
interviewed victims of torture who could not undergo proper forensic examination, receive
medical care, rehabilitation, psychological and social services in State institutions. While
soldiers may receive treatment and some rehabilitation services at military hospitals, civilian
victims rely on the help from NGOs and private donors.
A. Right to an adequate standard of living
79. On the Government-controlled side, as of 15 November, an estimated 200,000 people
were living along the contact line70, mostly in rural settlements. In many of these areas, local
authorities have not returned and public services remained unavailable. Local residents had to
manage on their own to restore the supply of water, gas and electricity.
80. In addition, access to these areas remained a major challenge, including due to the
presence of IEDs and ERWs, and continued limitations of freedom of movement imposed by
the Temporary Order. Public transport was also limited or unavailable, complicating access
to medical, social and educational services. For example, before the conflict, residents of
Lopaskyne settlement were receiving such services in Slovianoserbsk (now controlled by
armed groups), which was only two kilometres away, while they now have to travel for at
least 15 kilometres to access basic services.
81. Compared to previous months, the choice and quality of available basic commodities
and food improved in the areas controlled by armed groups. However, the prices on average
were 40 per cent higher than at the national level, and unaffordable to many. Furthermore, the
suspension of the operations of organizations delivering humanitarian aid in the areas
controlled by armed groups for more than four months significantly affected the estimated
2.7 million people residing in these territories, including 600,000 living along the contact
line. Residents of Donetsk city whose houses were damaged or destroyed, as well as IDPs
from other towns and villages, suffer from poverty, lack of warm clothes and heating, and
from limited access to humanitarian aid.
69 Rule 55 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law invokes the obligations to the parties to the
conflict to allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access, subject to their right of control.
18
Rights to housing, land and property
82. Damaged, seized or looted property and lack of any justice and compensation
mechanisms remained one of the major concerns for civilians living in the conflict area and for
IDPs wishing to return.
83. On 12 October, HRMMU interviewed three residents of the Pisky village, whose
property had been allegedly looted and used for military purposes. Although the owners
reported their case to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the Military Prosecutor’s office and
the Prime Minister of Ukraine, there has been no follow-up. In addition, the Ukrainian armed
forces did not allow people to go to Pisky to visit their property and take their belongings,
presumably because the settlement was still on the contact line.
84. The absence of housing programmes and job opportunities necessary for the
sustainable integration of IDPs in the host communities remained a major concern in the
Government-controlled territories.
85. HRMMU also noted a general absence of accessibility for persons with disability in
collective centres. For example, in the Sergiivka and Kuyalnik sanatoria of the Odesa region,
living conditions were not suitable due to the lack of access ramps for people in wheelchairs,
and no access to toilets and bathrooms. In addition, the Odesa Regional Administration has not
secured budget funds to cover accommodation fees, and IDPs could consequently be evicted
in January 2016.
B. Right to social security and protection
For people from the territories controlled by armed groups
86. Payment of pensions to people living in the areas controlled by armed groups
remained suspended despite a decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine, on
16 October, repealing Resolution No 595 of the Cabinet of Ministers, and obliging the
Government to resume the payments71. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights requires States to ensure progressive realization of all envisaged rights.
Retrogressive measures cannot be justified solely on the basis of the existence of an armed
conflict or other emergency72. The States must ensure that their policies and actions are not
discriminatory73 and do not reduce access to social security benefits74, including based on the
place of residence or origin of its citizens.
87. In order to receive their social benefits, people still had to be registered and reside in
the Government-controlled areas, which has been especially difficult for the elderly and
people with disabilities. Furthermore, the Migration Service of Ukraine continued conducting
unannounced checks to verify IDPs’ places of residence. Those not found at their registration
addresses were notified of the need to confirm residence to the State Migration Service
within 10 days. The names of those who did not meet the requirement were submitted to a
social security department for discontinuation of social payments, which was the sole source
of income for some. During the reporting period, HRMMU learnt that such checks had led to
suspension of financial assistance to 3,247 registered IDPs in Dnipropetrovsk region.
71 The Court heard the cassation appeal filed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to the April 2015 court
decision, which acknowledged the suspension of pensions illegal and ordered the Cabinet of Ministers to
resume the payments. See paragraph 100 of the 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
covering period of 16 May to 15 August 2015.
72 See paragraph 26 of the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic
and Social Council, E/2015/59.
73 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 20, 2 July 2009.
74 See paragraph 41 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and Social
Council, E/2013/82.
19
Previously, HRMMU reported of more than the pensions of 230,000 people had been
suspended on the same grounds75.
88. Civil registration documents issued on the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ – birth, death, marriage, divorce and
medical certificates – are considered invalid by Ukrainian authorities. This precludes people
from accessing basic social and medical services. For example, on 3 November, HRMMU
interviewed a woman who was refused to be paid for maternity leave, because she had given
birth in a hospital in the town of Sverdlovsk (Luhansk region, controlled by armed groups) –
although she worked for a company registered on Government-controlled territory.
89. IDPs continued to face difficulties in proving their work experience, affecting their
possibility to receive special pension or unemployment benefits and to find new employment.
An official electronic database of employment records has been functioning in Ukraine only
since 2002, and any prior employment records exist only in hard copy. Many IDPs did not
take such documents with them while fleeing the conflict area. Documents bearing the ‘stamps’
of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ or ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ are considered invalid.
90. The Presidential Decree of 14 November 2014 ordering State institutions and enterprises
to relocate to the Government-controlled area continued to affect economic and social rights.
Due to the impossibility of implementing the Decree, enterprises re-registered in the
Government-controlled territories, but continued to function in the areas controlled by armed
groups, hindering their employees’ rights to social guarantees and favourable conditions of
work, especially in case of work-related injury.
91. For example, 16 injured coalminers and the relatives of 34 coalminers who died during
an explosion which occurred on 4 March 2015 in Zasiadko mine, Donetsk, reported to
HRMMU that they could not receive any social benefits or compensation. They were informed
that no payments will be made by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, as the company was not
‘registered’ there and did not pay ‘taxes’ or contribute to the ‘republican social security fund’.
The Ukrainian Fund of Social Insurance covering accidents at work informed the Zasiadko
mine management that the conclusions about the accident made by the commission of the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ would not be recognized by Ukraine and that compensation would
therefore not be made. They also stated that, the injured coalminers were not eligible for the
status of persons with disabilities and would not receive benefits linked to this status.
Situation in social care institutions
92. HRMMU visits to social care institutions in Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled
by armed groups revealed that a number of their patients had not been able to receive their
social entitlements since June 2014. Due to their physical condition, some of the elderly
patients or persons with disabilities simply could not travel to the Government-controlled
territories to re-register and receive their benefits. Guardians or custodians of legally incapacitated
patients or minors could not perform actions on their behalf and obtain social benefits as the
notarial services have been discontinued in the areas controlled by armed groups.
93. It was also brought to the attention of HRMMU that under the Ukrainian social
welfare system, 25 per cent of financial allocations spent by the Government to support an
individual in a social care institution was transferred to their individual bank accounts and
could be used for personal needs. In addition to the fact that social care institutions in the
areas controlled by armed groups have not received any financial support from the
Government of Ukraine since November 2014, its patients also have had no access to their
personal savings.
75 See paragraph 100 of the 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period
from 16 May to 15 August 2015.
20
C. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
Territories controlled by the armed groups
94. The suspension of the operation of organizations delivering humanitarian aid in the
areas controlled by the armed groups, as well as continuous restrictions of the Temporary
Order to move cargo across the contact line, has had a negative impact on access to
medicines, consumables, expert medical services, including psycho-social support.
95. On 25 September and 12 October, Médecins Sans Frontièrs (MSF) was ordered to
stop all its activities in the territories controlled by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ and
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ respectively. These decisions threaten the lives of many residents
who face chronic and serious health problems. In the territory controlled by the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’, MSF was providing 77 per cent of the insulin needed for adult living with
diabetes and 90 per cent of supplies required for haemodialysis treatment vital for patients
suffering from kidney failure. 146 patients with drug-resistant tuberculosis in penitentiary
institutions will no longer receive treatment provided to these institutions since 2011.
Coupled with the lack of food and poor detention conditions, this could lead to an eventual
deterioration of their health. Interruption of TB treatment is particularly worrying in Donetsk
region, which had one of the highest rates of TB prevalence countrywide before the conflict,
and raises a broader public health concern. The physician of one of the detention facilities
stated to HRMMU that local NGOs had less experience and could not make up for the
capacities of international relief agencies. Finally, since the termination of MSF activities,
more than a hundred medical facilities no longer receive supplied from MSF for treating
emergencies resulting from the conflict, chronic conditions, and mental illnesses.
96. In the areas controlled by armed groups, 7,665 people living with HIV, including 209
children, were on anti-retroviral therapy. As of 15 November, required medicines were
included in humanitarian deliveries, coordinated by the World Health Organisation, but the
supplies are low and given the difficulties to operate, the risk of interrupted treatment is high.
97. The situation in social care and specialized medical institutions remained critical,
especially in the areas controlled by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. HRMMU visited
several institutions, including one in Rovenky (Luhansk region; controlled by the armed
groups) hosting 192 persons with disabilities, including 23 children. The institution was in
urgent need of psychotropic medicine, particularly for 39 patients suffering from epilepsy.
HRMMU has referred the needs to international organizations whose operations were then
stopped for an undetermined period of time.
98. HRMMU interlocutors in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ claimed hospitals and medical staff faced frequent harassment and threats by
fighters, who openly carry weapons in medical facilities. Although reportedly ‘the ministry of
defence’ took some steps to address this situation, during one of its recent visits to a hospital,
HRMMU witnessed a car with four armed group members at the hospital entrance, heavily
armed, harassing female medical staff. Such a conduct endangers medical personnel and patients.
Territories controlled by the Government
99. Lack of financial allocations from the State budget to cover healthcare expenses for
IDPs remained one of the biggest challenges in ensuring their access to healthcare. Regions
with a high influx of IDPs could not meet the existing needs, especially for vaccination or
specialised medical care.
100. There are still few possibilities for IDPs, especially persons with disabilities, to
receive psychological support, and they are at high risk of psychological distress due to poor
living conditions, disability, destroyed family links, and lack of funds to cover basic needs.
One NGO reported that alcohol addiction among IDPs was high, especially those staying in
21
collective centres. There was also reportedly a high rate of domestic violence among IDPs, as
well as families of demobilised soldiers due to psychological stress and lack of social support.
101. In addition, IDPs with mental impairments who require special care in psychiatric or
social care institutions, are sometimes placed in sanatoria, where staff was not capable or
addressing their special needs. Reportedly, funds for their treatment are often insufficient,
which leads to a deterioration of their condition.
V. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
102. The lack of protection and justice for victims and the impunity of perpetrators
continued to prevail. Accountability for human rights violations committed during the
Maidan protests of November 2013 – February 2014 and during the violence of 2 May 2014
in Odesa was pending at the end of November 2015. No perpetrators had been brought to
justice, and investigations remained slow. Accountability for human rights violations and
abuses in the conflict zone has been progressing with a number of perpetrators being tried or
sentenced. However, impunity overall remains widespread, as mentioned in various sections
of the present report.
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east
Investigations into human rights abuses committed by the armed groups
103. As previously articulated by the Ukrainian law enforcement76, the lack of access to the
territories controlled by the armed groups remained the major impediment to investigate human
rights abuses committed there. It has been challenging for the Ukrainian authorities to
identify and locate perpetrators and weapons given lack of access to the crime scene, and
limited opportunity to question witnesses and victims in the course of an investigation.
104. Members of the armed groups who have been detained by Ukrainian law enforcement
(SBU or the national police) are usually charged under articles 258-3 (participation in a
terrorist group or terrorist organization)77 or 260 (creation of or participation in unlawful
paramilitary or armed formations) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. It is largely at the
discretion of prosecution to decide which of these two categories of charges applies. Recent
court decisions suggest that those who resorted to plea bargain were charged under article
260 and sentenced to deprivation of liberty with a probation period78, while those who did
not79 were sentenced to imprisonment under article 258-3 of the Criminal Code. The court
decisions in such matters so far are largely based on confessions of the accused. HRMMU is not
aware of any progress in cases of killings, torture, ill-treatment or other crimes against liberty
and physical integrity of a person committed by the armed groups.
105. Many detained members of the armed groups are charged under article 263 (unlawful
handling of weapons, ammunition or explosives) of the Criminal Code. In one case, a person
was accused of illegal storage of up to 30 cartridges for Kalashnikov assault rifle80. In the other
76 See paragraphs 115 and 116 of the 11th OHCHR report on human rights situation in Ukraine covering period
from 15 May to 15 August 2015.
77 The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ are publicly referred to by Ukrainian law
enforcement as terrorist organizations, despite the fact that no court or administrative decision has formally
recognized them as such, as there is no clear procedure for doing so. The security situation in the east has been
officially called “anti-terrorist operation”.
78 See the decision of Dzerzhynskyi District Court of Donetsk region of 21 October 2015 and decision of
Slovianskyi District Court of Donetsk region of 21 October 2015.
79 See the decision of the Kramatorsk City Court of Donetsk region of 12 October 2015 and decision of
Volnovaskyi District Court of Donetsk region of 13 October.
80 See the decision of Slovianskyi District Court of Donetsk region dated 30 October 2015 and decision of
Druzhkivskyi District Court of Donetsk region of 15 October 2015.
22
two cases, the suspects’ bags were seized and only after found containing a hand grenade and
an IED. HRMMU is concerned that cartridges or hand grenades can easily be planted and used
as a tool to secure ‘confessions’ of persons on their affiliation with the armed groups.
106. HRMMU also notes limited efforts of investigative bodies to establish command
responsibility for crimes committed by the armed groups. ‘Senior officials’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ have rarely been mentioned in the
investigations into grave human rights abuses, although in some cases there appeared to be
enough evidence to initiate an investigation81. On 11 November, MoIA reported putting on a
wanted list a former commander of an armed group which controlled the city of Horlivka
(Donetsk region) in 2014. On suspicion of killing a serviceman of ‘Artemivsk’ special police
patrol battalion on 14 July 2014, he has been charged under article 115 (intentional homicide
in collusion by a group of people) in addition to previous charges under article 258 (act of
terrorism) of the Criminal Code. The victim’s father collected testimonies of witnesses as MoIA
had appeared reluctant to open an investigation into the incident. Along with the case of Ihor
Branovytskyi82, this is one of few cases in which the alleged perpetrator has been identified.
107. Investigations into human rights abuses committed by the armed groups have
particular significance in the context of renewed discussions of the Trilateral Contact Group
on the ‘all for all’ mutual release of detainees. The armed groups insist that this issue will be
discussed only after the Government of Ukraine honours its obligation to “provide pardon
and amnesty by way of enacting a law that forbids prosecution and punishment of persons in
relation to events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of
Ukraine”83. HRMMU reiterates that amnesty cannot be provided for individuals responsible
for war crimes, crimes against humanity and grave human rights violations, including summary
executions, torture or similar cruel inhuman or degrading treatment, and enforced disappearances.
Investigations into human rights violations by the Ukrainian military and law enforcement
108. According to MoIA, 1,448 claims for violations of rights, including 298 for bodily
injuries due to excessive use of force and ill-treatment of detained individuals, were
submitted to the MoIA departments of internal security between early January and late
August 2015. MoIA reported that 80 criminal investigations had been opened into these
allegations. In general, as of 28 September, MoIA had opened 141 criminal proceedings into
human rights violations by police officers, including 98 for infliction of bodily injuries, 13
concerning arbitrary detention and seizure of property, and six for torture. 29 police officers
were notified of being suspected of involvement in human rights violations.
109. On 22 October, the Military Prosecutor for the Southern region (covering, inter alia,
Donetsk and Luhansk regions) reported to HRMMU that 460 criminal proceedings had been
opened since early 2015 into crimes committed by the Ukrainian military. 300 cases
concerned desertion and 63 cases relate to crimes against civilians. Only 14 of these cases
have been completed and submitted to courts.
81 For instance, according to a witness, in January 2015, a high level ‘official’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
“pointed out to three Ukrainian captives – …, … and Ihor Branovytskyi, and said, to put it mildly, that he will
make them ‘girls’. Then he ordered to take them to the cemetery to dig graves for themselves”. According to
other witness, “three of us (Branovytskyi, myself and …) were pointed out by [the name of the high level
‘official’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’] and ordered to take us on a long circuit. We three were taken in a
bus with our faces down on the floor to the cemetery to be shot, to dig graves for ourselves. At the cemetery we
were lined up and fired shots by or above our heads”.
82 See paragraph 31 of the 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 16
February to 15 May 2015.
83 Paragraph 5 of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of 12 February 2015.
23
110. HRMMU is concerned that despite the concluding observations of the Committee
against Torture (Ukraine, December 2014)84, many cases of alleged ill-treatment or torture
continue to be qualified as mere “abuse of power”.
111. HRMMU takes note of the establishment of two units within the structure of the
Office of the Prosecutor General in mid-August: the Office of the Military Prosecutor for the
ATO Forces and the Department on investigation of crimes against, peace, security and
humanity. With the focus of investigation of crimes committed in the security operation area
committed by the Ukrainian military and of the “military invasion of the Russian Federation on
the territory of Ukraine and facilitation of activities of the armed groups”, it is expected that
more efforts will be dedicated to documenting grave human rights violations abuses on both
sides of the contact line. HRMMU also believes that re-enabling of the Office of the Military
Prosecutor to exercise general oversight over the military and law enforcement would further
strengthen accountability mechanisms85.
112. On 30 September, the Office of the Military Prosecutor reported the completion of
pre-trial investigation into crimes committed by members of the special police patrol
battalion “Tornado”. Eight of them are accused of creating a criminal gang, abuse of power,
abduction and illegal confinement of a person, torture, violent unnatural gratification of
sexual desire, resistance to law enforcement officers and unlawful appropriation of a
vehicle86. The case is to be submitted to court once all suspects have reviewed the case files.
113. HRMMU is concerned over the approach taken by the prosecution in some cases of
killings allegedly committed by the Ukrainian military, with investigations appearing to focus
on more minor offences. The case of Volodymyr Kulmatytskyi, former deputy mayor of
Sloviansk, illustrates this pattern. He and his driver were abducted by armed men in the
Government-controlled town of Sloviansk (Donetsk region) on 28 January 2015. On
31 January, they were found dead in Kharkiv region with gunshot wounds on their heads. On
21 September, after a one-day court hearing, three out of the four alleged participants in the
murder (all servicemen of Dnipro-1 battalion) were sentenced for kidnapping and illegal
handling of weapons to four years of imprisonment, with a three-year probation period, and
were released from custody. The fourth suspect – the only suspect in the murder – was killed (or
killed himself) during the attempt of the police to apprehend him.
114. Very limited progress was achieved in the investigation into death of Oleksandr
Agafonov who was beaten to death in November 201487. The lawyer of the victim’s family’s
informed HRMMU that two officers of the Central SBU Office in Kyiv had been notified of
suspicion under articles 146 (kidnapping) and 365 (abuse of authority) of the Criminal Code.
On 28 October, Dzerzhynskyi District court of Kharkiv released both of them on a bail of
UAH 91,000 (approximately USD 3,800) for each. Allegedly, the suspects have not been
suspended from their work. HRMMU notes that it took almost a year for the investigation to
establish the identity of the suspects. An additional concern is that the suspects face charges
that may not lead to the accountability for the death of the victim.
B. Accountability for human rights violations committed during the Maidan protests
115. While most of the human rights violations committed during the Maidan protests have
been investigated and alleged perpetrators identified, accountability continued to be sought
84 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=1&DocTypeID=5.
85 See paragraphs 117 and 118 of 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period
from 16 May to 15 August 2015.
86 See paragraph 123 of 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 16
May to 15 August 2015.
87 See paragraph 121 of 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 16
May to 15 August 2015.
24
for the killing of protestors on 18-20 February 2014. Indeed, only few perpetrators located
and are being prosecuted as the majority have fled Ukraine. None of the former senior
officials found responsible have been brought to account for organizing the killing of protestors
in January-February 2014.
General overview of Maidan investigations
116. On 17 October, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine reported that his office had
established the chronology of all events that had taken place during the Maidan protests, and
identified all individuals involved in the organization of unlawful counteraction to protests
that resulted in the death of protestors88. However, none of these individuals has been brought
to account as they all allegedly fled Ukraine on 20 February 2014 or shortly afterwards.
Moreover, most of the material evidence has been destroyed, especially in central Kyiv.
117. On 10 November, the Chief Military Prosecutor reported that 20 Berkut servicemen
had fled Ukraine immediately before the launch of a special operation to arrest them at the
beginning of August 2014, assuming that they had either received an order or were warned.
No progress has been observed to locate Berkut commander Dmytro Sadovnyk who fled
Ukraine after the authorities changed the measure of restraint against him from custodial
detention to house arrest on 6 October 2014. It would be important to investigate the
destruction of evidence of killings around the Maidan events, as well as the escape of people
involved in these incidents.
118. The Office of the Prosecutor General investigated 14 different episodes of the crimes
committed during the Maidan protests89. HRMMU is concerned that the dispersal of
investigative efforts among various criminal proceedings may undermine the investigation as
all the incidents and individuals involved were closely linked.
Ongoing trial of Berkut servicemen (killing of protestors)
119. The investigation into the killing of 39 protestors (all men) on 20 February 2014, at
Instytutska Street, Kyiv, has not progressed since the previous HRMMU report90. Zinchenko
and Abroskin remained the only two Berkut servicemen whose case had been submitted to
court. Two other servicemen have remained in detention since 23 February 2015, when they
were detained under the same charges (killing of 39 protestors). 18 other Berkut servicemen
have been put on a wanted list for killing the 39 protestors. Investigations were ongoing into
the alleged involvement of three Berkut servicemen in killing three protestors and injuring 69
on 18 February, in Kyiv91. Two former SBU officials have been detained in February and
88 The following individuals were reportedly notified by the office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine: the
former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, former Prosecutor General Viktor Pshonka, former Prime
Minister Mykola Azarov, former Minister of Internal Affairs Vitalii Zakharchenko, former SBU Head
Oleksandr Yakymenko, former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Ratushniak, former Commander of
the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Stanislav Shuliak, former First Deputy Head of the SBU
Volodymyr Totskyi, former Head of Public Security Militia in Kyiv Petro Fedchuk and former commander of
special police unit ‘Berkut’ Serhii Kusiuk. The Prosecutor General deemed them suspects for organizing
unlawful counteraction to the protest actions.
89 Dispersal of Maidan protest on 30 November 2013; confrontation on 1 December 2013 at Bankova street;
dispersal of Maidan protest into the night of 11 December 2013; mass killings of protestors in January-February
2014; counteraction to protest actions of ‘tityshky’; adoption of ‘dictatorship’ laws on 16 January 2014; supplies
and enhanced use of riot control weapons; persecution for participation in the protests; travesty of justice;
upholding unjust court decisions; non-enforcement of court decisions; prosecution of members of the
‘AutoMaidan’ movement; killings and infliction of bodily injuries to law enforcement during the protests;
illegal resistance to the investigation of crimes committed during the Maidan protests.
90 See paragraph 127 of 11th OHCHR report on human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 15 May
to 15 August 2015.
91 See paragraph 129 of 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 16
May to 15 August 2015.
25
April 2015 under suspicion of running an anti-terrorist operation on 18 February in Kyiv,
which led to the death of protestors.
120. The legality of the composition of the jury panel hearing the case of Zinchenko and
Abroskin has been challenged before court. Claiming that Zinchenko and Abroskin have not
committed the crimes they are accused of, their lawyers stated to HRMMU that in the course
of the investigation, the Office of the Prosecutor General had not examined the legality of the
use of force by the Berkut servicemen should it be established that they had killed any of the
39 victims. The lawyers maintained that as three law enforcement were shot dead or injured
in the morning of 20 February 2014, the use of force by Berkut’ may have been justified.
121. HRMMU also reiterates earlier concerns92 about the lack of progress in the investigations
into the killing of 13 law enforcement officers on 18-20 February 2014, with no alleged
perpetrators identified thus far.
C. Accountability for the violence of 2 May 2014 in Odesa
122. More than 18 months after the violence of 2 May 2014 in Odesa, which resulted in the
death of 48 people (including six women who died during the fire at the House of Trade
Unions) due to clashes between supporters of federalisation of Ukraine (‘pro-federalism’) and
supporters of unitary Ukraine (‘pro-unity’), no progress has been observed in the investigations.
Only ‘pro-federalism’ supporters were accused of mass disorder, and one ‘pro-unity’ activist
was accused of a murder in the city centre (in total, six people were killed there). The
investigation into the gravest episode – the fire at the House of Trade Unions which claimed
lives of 42 people – is ongoing.
123. On 4 November, the Council of Europe International Advisory Panel on Ukraine93
presented its report on the investigations of the events of 2 May 2014 in Odesa. The Panel
noted a worrying decrease in the staffing of the investigating teams, underlining the detrimental
effect on the progress, quality and effectiveness of investigations. It also expressed serious
concern about the decisions to terminate the proceedings against two suspects for lack of
evidence. The Panel concluded that “[t]he challenges confronting those responsible for the
investigations into the events in Odesa on 2 May 2014 have been significant and their impact
on the investigations cannot be under-estimated. However, these challenges cannot excuse any
failings which did not inevitably flow from them”94. HRMMU fully shares these concerns.
124. The investigation into the 2 May violence has been dispersed between the Office of
the Prosecutor General and MoIA, raising concerns of protracted investigation due to lack of
communication among these entities. The MoIA Investigation Unit on the 2 May events,
created on 6 May 2014, and comprising a dozen high-ranking investigators from Kyiv and
other cities, has practically stopped functioning.
Investigations by the Office of the Prosecutor General
125. No progress has been reported concerning the investigation into the case of the former
head of Odesa Regional Department of Internal Affairs95 charged with neglect of official duty
for failure to ensure public order in the city.
92 See paragraphs 83-85 of 6th OHCHR report on human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 18
August to 16 September 2014, and paragraph 162 of 7th OHCHR report on human rights situation in Ukraine
covering period from 17 September to 31 October 2014.
93 The Panel was established in April 2014, to oversee that the investigations of the violent incidents which had
taken place in Ukraine from 30 November 2013 onwards met all the requirements of the European Convention
on Human Rights and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.
94 https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168048851
95 On 13 May 2015, the Pecherskyi district Court of Kyiv placed the former head of the Odesa Regional
Department of MoIA under house arrest for 60 days. On 28 August, the investigative judge of the Pecherskyi
district Court of Kyiv refused to extend the duration of the house arrest. Currently, the former head of the Odesa
Regional Department of MoIA is under no measure of restraint.
26
Investigations by the Ministry of Internal Affairs
126. No suspects have been identified in the criminal case opened by MoIA into the slow
response and inaction of the fire brigade, which contributed to cause the death of 42 people.
Allegedly, the former head of the Odesa Region Fire Brigade Department left Ukraine in
February 2015.
127. 23 ‘pro-federalism’ supporters have been accused for mass disorder in the city centre
in a trial that has been ongoing for 11 months. Numerous procedural violations observed in
this case, non-attendance of lawyers, poor quality of case files, failure to provide interpreter,
have significantly delayed the process. While consideration on the merits started on 2 July
2015, as of 15 November, the court continued announcing the indictment.
128. The only ‘pro-unity’ activist accused of killing of a protestor and injuring a police
officer and a journalist has not been subjected to any sanction since his indictment in
November 2014. HRMMU notes essential pressure that ‘pro-unity’ supporters exert on the
court. Due to their obstructive behaviour, the court hearings in this case, which started on 23
June 2015, were several times disrupted. This resulted in the transfer of the case to another
court in Odesa, in August 2015, but hearings have not yet started. Following threats by ‘prounity’
activists and a member of Parliament96, a judge (relocated from Donetsk to Odesa in
2014) decided to return to Donetsk, fearing for his life.
D. Administration of justice
Parallel ‘administration of justice’ systems in the territories controlled by the armed groups
129. During the reporting period, HRMMU observed the further strengthening of parallel
‘governance structures’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’, with their own legislative frameworks, including parallel systems of law
enforcement and administration of justice (‘police’, ‘prosecutors’ and ‘courts’), in violation
of the Constitution of Ukraine, and in contravention with the spirit of the Minsk Agreements.
HRMMU reiterates that the ‘officials’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ are responsible and shall be held accountable for human rights abuses
committed on territories under their control. This particularly applies to people bearing direct
command responsibility for the actions of perpetrators.
Pre-trial detainees in the territories controlled by the armed groups
130. Pre-trial detainees who find themselves trapped in the territories controlled by the
armed groups since the outbreak of the armed conflict in April 2014 remain in legal limbo,
without recourse to justice and with their right to a trial within a reasonable time or release
being violated, resulting in their arbitrary detention.
Deprivation of documents of detainees released by the Government
131. HRMMU is concerned about the situation of 22 former detainees from
Dnipropetrovsk who were handed over to the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ in the context of
‘simultaneous releases’ in December 2014, and whose passports remain with SBU. In
October 2015, HRMMU received an official reply from SBU stating that their passports were
held by SBU investigators (except for one individual whose mother applied to obtain the
passport) pending investigations.
Investigation into 31 August violence near the Parliament
132. MoIA identified 27 people suspected of being involved in violent actions on 31
August 2015, in front of the Parliament, in Kyiv, including one person suspected of throwing
a combat grenade at the police. All suspects are charged under articles 258 (act of terrorism),
263 (unlawful handling of weapons, ammunitions or explosives), 293 (group violation of
96 See paragraph 140 of 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 16
May to 15 August 2015
27
public order), 294 (riots) and 345 (violence against a law enforcement officer) of the
Criminal Code. Lawyers representing 10 of the suspects informed HRMMU that their clients
were still held in the temporary holding facility of MoIA, while they should have been
relocated to the SIZO under the Penitentiary Service. They also claimed lack of access of
their clients to legal and medical aid and ill-treatment. The Ombudsperson’s Office visited
the suspects and sent an official letter to MoIA concerning the alleged violations of their rights.
Case of Nelia Shtepa
133. HRMMU continued to follow the case of former mayor of Sloviansk (Donetsk
region) Nelia Shtepa, who has remained in detention since 9 July 2014, charged under
articles 110 (trespass against territorial integrity) and 258-3 (creation of a terrorist group or
terrorist organisation) of the Criminal Code97. As of 15 November, the court was crossexamining
witnesses in the case.
134. HRMMU is concerned that following the killing of Shtepa’s former deputy
Kulmatytskyi – who was the main defence witness – and the release of three men involved in
his and his driver’s murder, witnesses would be reluctant to testify. On 22 September, the
victim’s lawyer informed HRMMU that Kulmatytskyi had been questioned by the
prosecutors, who told them at length about Shtepa’s attempts to draw the attention of the then
head of Donetsk Regional State Administration about the need to prevent capture of the city
by the armed groups, as well as about her abduction.
135. On 6 October, the High Council of Justice (HCJ) of Ukraine found that the presiding
judge in the case of Shtepa had violated the oath when he ruled on the arrest of Maidan
activists in Kharkiv in February 2014. HCJ approved a petition for the dismissal of the judge.
Should the President of Ukraine dismiss the judge, trial in the case will start from the beginning.
Case of Hennadii Korban
136. On 31 October, the leader of ‘UKROP’ party, and former candidate for mayor of
Kyiv Hennadii Korban was apprehended by SBU at his home in Dnipropetrovsk, and taken to
the Office of the Prosecutor General in Kyiv for interrogation, facing charges of
misappropriation of property, creation of a criminal organization, unlawful appropriation of a
vehicle and hostage taking of a representative of public authorities. On 3 November, upon
elapse of the maximum term of detention (72 hours), he was released and immediately taken
by SBU to the Office of the Prosecutor General for interrogation under new charge of
preclusion of the right to vote. HRMMU notes that the practice of “repeated arrest”98
constitutes a violation of article 5(4) of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms99. Korban’s lawyers allege violations of “the right
to lawful arrest”100, failure to inform the relatives about his arrest, absence of timely
information on charges, delayed access to a lawyer. On 3 November, after visiting Korban at
the SBU pre-trial detention centre, the Ombudsperson stated that the violations alleged in the
case reflected systemic violations of human rights in criminal proceedings in Ukraine.
Prosecution of Ukrainian citizens in the Russian Federation
137. HRMMU continued to follow the cases of 11 Ukrainian citizens101 who are held in
detention and prosecuted in the Russian Federation, including the case of Nadiia Savchenko,
97 See paragraph 149 of 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 1
May to 15 August 2015.
98 Particularly, when a person has been detained immediately after the court ruled on his release.
99 See Feldman v. Ukraine (application 42921/09) judgment 14 April 2012.
100 According to his lawyers, Korban was arrested without any court order, which is only permissible for
individuals arrested at the crime scene immediately after committing a crime or in the course of a hot pursuit.
101 Nadiia Savchenko, Oleh Sientsov, Oleksandr Kolchenko, Oleksii Chyrnii, Hennadii Afanasiev, Yurii
Yatsenko, Serhii Lytvynov, Mykola Karpiuk, Stanislav Klykh, Yurii Soloshenko and Valentyn Vyhovskyi.
28
who has been in detention in the Russian Federation since July 2014, facing charges of
killing two Russian journalists102. On 22 September, the Donetsk District Court of Rostov
region (the Russian Federation) commenced hearing the case on the merits and extended
Savchenko’s pre-trial detention until January 2016.
VI. RIGHTS TO VOTE AND TO BE ELECTED
138. On 25 October, local elections were held in most of the territory of Ukraine. Over
350,000 candidates competed for 168,450 positions of mayors of cities, villages and
settlements and for councillors of villages, settlements, cities, city districts, districts (rayon)
and regional councils. According to the Central Election Commission of Ukraine (CEC), the
turnout was 46.62 per cent. A second round took place on 15 November to elect the mayors
of cities of more than 90,000 voters where no candidate obtained more than 50 per cent of the
votes in the first round.
139. The election law established three electoral systems and introduced a requirement of
at least 30 per cent representation of each gender on a party list, without providing for any
sanction for failure to comply. According to CEC, women comprised about 35 per cent of all
registered candidates for the proportional races and 13 per cent in mayoral races. Based on
these figures, and while the final election results were not yet known when this report was
being finalized, they are likely to confirm a significant under-representation of women.
140. The electoral process was monitored by local and international observation missions,
including the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), which assessed the
elections as competitive, well organized and respectful of the democratic process. However,
it noted the influence of powerful economic groups over the electoral process, the fact that
the legal framework fell short of international commitments and standards, and some
problems with the printing and distribution of ballots which prevented or led to the cancelling
of elections in several Government-controlled districts of eastern Ukraine103.
141. HRMMU is also concerned that millions of Ukrainian citizens could not exercise their
right to vote. Indeed, local elections were not conducted in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and in certain areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions
controlled by the armed groups. CEC declared that for security reasons, holding elections was
not possible in some territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by the
Government104. In addition, the law on local elections of 14 July 2015 did not foresee the
possibility for IDPs105 to vote106.
142. The ‘Opposition Bloc’ branch in Kharkiv was prevented from registering for the local
elections. HRMMU learned from the leadership of the party and their lawyer that the
Regional Department of the Ministry of Justice had actively obstructed and prevented the
members of the party to hand over registration documents. The Regional Department of
Ministry of Justice also refused to implement a decision of the Regional Administrative Court
102 For more information, see paragraph 60 of 11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
covering period from 16 May to 15 August 2015, and paragraph 54 of the 10th OHCHR report on the human
rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 16 February to 15 May 2015.
103 See Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission
(IEOM), Ukraine – Local Elections, 25 October 2015.
104 CEC resolutions 207 and 208 declared that it was not possible to organize elections in 91 local councils in
the Donetsk region and 31 local councils in the Luhansk region. These decisions were based on the information
provided by the military/civil administrations and affected 525,588 voters.
105 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement105 and Recommendation Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member states on internally displaced persons
106 See paragraph 167 of the 11th HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period
from 16 May to 15 August 2015.
29
in Kyiv. The ‘Opposition Bloc’ was prevented from conducting its electoral campaign and its
candidates were only partially able to take part in the local elections.
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA107
143. A trade blockade of Crimea, initiated by the Crimean Tatar leadership and enforced
by ‘pro-unity’ activists, including Crimean Tatars and former member of voluntary
battalions, has been in place since 20 September. HRMMU is concerned about the legality of
this action and human rights abuses that have accompanied it, including illegal identity
checks, vehicle searches, confiscation of goods, and arrests. Other important developments
related to Crimea have included the sentencing of Ukrainian film-maker Oleh Sientsov by a
Russian Federation military court, the issuing of the first verdict by a court in Crimea in
relation to the violent protests on 26 February 2014 involving pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian
groups, and the Ukrainian parliament resolution of 12 November recognizing the 1944
deportation of the Crimean Tatars as an act of genocide.
A. The blockade of Crimea
144. Since 20 September, hundreds of Ukrainian activists, including Crimean Tatars and
members of nationalist battalions, have been blocking the flow of goods between mainland
Ukraine and Crimea in both directions. The trade blockade was initiated by the former and
current heads of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemiliev and Refat Chubarov, and has
been conducted simultaneously at all three crossing points on the Ukrainian-controlled side
of the administrative boundary line (ABL): in Chaplynka, Chongar and Kalanchak. The
objective of this action was to call international attention to human rights violations in
Crimea – including the alleged persecution of Crimean Tatars – and to request an
international monitoring presence in the peninsula. The organizers also demand that the
Ukrainian authorities repeal an August 2014 law108 which regulates trade between Ukraine
and the peninsula, and demanded that the next step should be to halt energy supplies to
Crimea.
145. HRMMU travelled to the area of the blockade on 12-13 November. It noted that the
blockade was designed to prevent the movement of commercial cargo transported by trucks
without hindering the movement of people and private vehicles. However, the volunteers
enforcing the blockade – uniformed men sometimes wearing masks and balaclavas – have
been systematically stopping private vehicles. They reportedly have lists of people considered
to be ‘traitors’ due to their alleged support to the de facto authorities in Crimea or to the
armed groups in the east. In one case, two people were arrested for allegedly carrying drugs
and explosives and kept in illegal detention for hours before being handed over to the police.
In another incident, a Crimean resident with a Russian passport issued in Crimea was beaten
up. The activists have also established improvised roadblocks at the crossing points. Their
behavior has in some cases been threatening when drivers refuse to show their identification
documents or allow their vehicles to be searched. HRMMU is aware of the case of a driver
who had his windows smashed for refusing to unload vegetables.
107 HRMMU has not been granted access to Crimea and has no in situ presence. However, it has been able to
monitor the human rights situation by establishing and maintaining contacts with Crimean residents on the
peninsula and mainland Ukraine and relying on a variety of interlocutors of different ages and genders including
representatives of political, religious, civil society organizations, victims, relatives and witnesses of alleged
human rights violations, members of the legal profession, journalists, entrepreneurs, teachers, doctors, social
workers, human rights activists and other categories, including individuals with no specific affiliations.
HRMMU continues to seek access to Crimea.
108 The law “On the Establishment of the Free Economic Zone ‘Crimea’ and Peculiarities of Providing
Economic Activity on the Temporary Occupied Territory of Ukraine” (12 August 2014).
30
146. The activists have been enforcing the blockade in the presence of the police and
border guards who observed the situation without intervening. HRMMU is concerned about
instances of human rights abuses near the ABL. It is also worried that activists enforcing the
blockade have been illegally performing law enforcement functions, such as identity checks
and vehicle searches, with the apparent acquiescence of the Ukrainian authorities.
B. Citizenship
147. On 30 October, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of the Russian Federation issued
a statement indicating that the legal requirement to inform FMS about a second citizenship, in
addition to Russian citizenship, did not apply to Crimean residents. This requirement derived
from amendments to the law “On citizenship of the Russian Federation”109, which obliged
Crimean residents to disclose a second citizenship before 1 January 2016.
148. HRMMU notes that FMS did not refer to any legal act or official policy supporting its
statement. This development would be welcome as it would mean that Crimean residents
who chose note to disclose their Ukrainian citizenship will not be sanctioned.110 However,
HRMMU also recalls that Russian citizenship has been imposed upon all Crimean residents
following the unrecognized ‘referendum’ of March 2014, and that such automatic attribution
has led to human rights violations, including claims that people were dismissed or threatened
to be dismissed from their posts for refusing to take up Russian Federation passports111.
C. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity
149. Another case, involving a Crimean Tatar disappearing in circumstances reminiscent
of abduction, has been reported. On 27 August, a witness claimed he saw two men in uniform
forcing Muhtar Arislanov into a minivan, after which he went missing. On 3 September, the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation in Crimea opened a criminal case under
the qualification of murder. HRMMU notes that other Crimea Tatars, including Islyam
Dzhepparov and Dzhevdet Islyamov112, were also seen by witnesses to be kidnapped by
uniformed men and that none of them has been found to this day.
D. Due process and fair trial rights
150. Crimean residents continued to be subjected to Russian Federation laws and in some
cases they were transferred to the Russian Federation to undergo trial. This was the case with
Ukrainian film-maker Oleh Sientsov who on 25 August, was sentenced by a Russian
Federation military court in the city of Rostov-on-Don to 20 years of prison for setting up a
terrorist group and involvement in two attempted arson attacks in Crimea. HRMMU notes
that the process was marred by violations of fair trial standards and of the presumption of
innocence. The court dismissed allegations of torture and ill-treatment which Sientsov
experienced during pre-trial detention, and delivered a guilty verdict despite the fact that the
main prosecution witness recanted in the courtroom, stating his testimony had been extorted
under torture. Oleksandr Kolchenko, who was being tried with Sientsov and also denied the
charges against him, received a 10-year prison sentence for participation in the ‘terrorist plot’
organized by Sientsov. Both verdicts were appealed and will be examined by the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation on 24 November 2015.
109 See Federal Law of the Russian Federation No 142-FZ “On Amendments to Articles 6 and 30 of the Federal
Law ‘On Citizenship of the Russian Federation’ and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation” (4 June
2014, entered into force 4 August 2014).
110 In all other cases, concealing a second citizenship will expose to a fine of up to RUB 200,000 (USD 5,700)
or compulsory community service of up to 400 hours.
111 For more information, see paragraph 295 of the 3rd OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
covering period from 7 May to 7 June 2014.
112 For more information, see paragraph 216 of the 7th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
covering period from 17 September to 31 October 2014.
31
151. On 12 October, a ‘court’ in Simferopol sentenced Eskender Nebiyev, a cameraman of
the Crimean Tatar TV channel ‘ATR,’ to two years and six months of prison for
“participation in mass riots” The sentence was immediately commuted by court to a
suspended sentence as Nebiyev had allegedly cooperated with the investigation and admitted
his guilt. Nebiyev was arrested by the Crimean “police” on 22 April 2015, and accused of
participating in a violent demonstration organized by the Crimean Tatar Mejlis in front of the
Crimean parliament building, on 26 February 2014. This was the first verdict issued in
relation to these events, during which two ethnic Russians died and over 40 people were
injured. Five other Crimean Tatars, including the deputy head of the Mejlis, Akhtem Chiigoz,
were arrested in 2015113 for organizing or participating in the February 2014 clashes between
supporters and opponents of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and await trial. HRMMU notes
that the arrests have only concerned ethnic Crimean Tatars, which raises questions about the
impartiality of the criminal proceedings under way.
E. Freedom of expression
152. Crimean residents continued to be pressured, intimidated and sanctioned for
expressing views challenging Crimea’s status as a part of the Russian Federation or
expressing attachment to Ukraine publicly or via social media networks.
153. On 23 September, a ‘court’ in Crimea prolonged for two months the pre-trial
detention of a pro-Ukrainian activist, Yurii Ilchenko, for having published on a social
network an article condemning the “annexation” of Crimea and calling for an “end to the war
allegedly waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine”. Ilchenko was arrested on 2 July
2015 in Sevastopol, and accused of “inciting national, racial or religious enmity”.
154. On 14 October, the ‘police’ in Crimea prevented the head of the unregistered
Ukrainian cultural centre in Simferopol and two other residents from paying tribute to
Bogdan Khmelnitsky, a 17th century ruler of Ukraine. Before the men could lay flowers at the
monument in Simferopol, they were approached by ‘police officers’ and men in civilian
clothes who asked to check their documents and took them to the ‘police centre for
countering extremism’. They were questioned for two hours, allegedly for holding an
unauthorized rally, told that the Ukrainian cultural centre was considered to be an extremist
organization, and released without being charged with any offense. HRMMU observes that
the actions of the ‘police’ seemed to be designed to intimidate and discourage what amounted
to a peaceful public display of attachment to a national identity.
155. On 29 October, the head of the Mejlis and Ukrainian deputy Refat Chubarov, received
a notification from a court in Simferopol informing him that the court had granted a request
of the ‘prosecutor’ of Crimea to remand him in custody. The notification mentions that
Chubarov was charged for “public calls for action aimed at violating the territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation”, and applies to any statements made on the Internet. The
‘prosecutor’ of Crimea stated that Chubarov had been placed on a wanted list and could be
immediately arrested should he appear on the territory of Crimea. He also declared that a
five-year entry ban that applied to Chubarov since 5 July 2014 had been lifted, without
providing further information.
F. Right to education in native language
156. 1 September marked the beginning of the new school year in Crimea where the
education curriculum of the Russian Federation has continued to be applied. Information
from the Crimean ‘ministry of education’ concerning the language of education confirms the
113 Akhtem Chiigoz was arrested on 29 January 2015, Eskender Kantemirov on 7 February 2015, Eskender
Emirgaliyev on 18 February 2015, Talyat Yunusov on 11 March 2015, and Ali Asanov – on 15 April 2015.
32
trend already noticed last year that the overwhelming majority of children (96.4 per cent) use
Russian language in their school curriculum.
157. Education in Ukrainian language dropped significantly in the past two years. In 2013,
when the curriculum of Ukraine was last used, the number of children educated in Ukrainian
was 12,694; in 2014, it was 2,154; and in 2015, it is 949. Twenty-two schools across the
peninsula are currently providing teaching in Ukrainian but only two schools – in Alushta
and Feodosiya – offer full primary and secondary education (grades 1 to 9) in that language.
The number of children educated in Crimean Tatar language has remained relatively stable.
In 2015, Crimean Tatar is the language of education of 5,334 children. In 2014 the figure was
5,146, and in 2013, it was 5,551. Currently, teaching is done exclusively in Crimean Tatar
language in 15 Crimean schools.
158. Some Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar parents told HRMMU that the de facto authorities
were discouraging the use of minority languages, notably by preventing the grouping of
children by language preference and placing them in classes with Russian language
education. This claim is disputed by the de facto authorities. The ‘minister of education,
science and youth’ of Crimea stated in September that separate classes were opened for
minority language education if at least seven parents would request it.
G. Access to services
159. On 1 September, the Kyiv administrative court of appeal revoked Item 1 of
Resolution No 699 adopted by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) on 3 November 2014,
which identified Crimeans as “non-residents” from the point of view of Ukrainian law. A
practical implication of the non-resident status was that Crimeans could not open foreign
currency accounts and purchase foreign currency.
160. On 18 December 2014, following criticism by civil society, NBU issued another
Resolution (No 810) allowing Crimeans registered as IDPs to retain resident status. However,
this resolution did not change the situation of Crimeans not registered as IDPs. A September
2015 decision of the Kyiv administrative court of appeal remedied this by recognizing the
right of all Crimean residents, without distinction, to equal treatment in accessing banking
services. Despite this decision, many banks continued in September and October to deny
Crimean residents not having the IDP status the right to purchase foreign currency and open
foreign currency accounts. On 30 October, NBU sent an official note to all banks informing
them that all prior restrictions applying to Crimean residents were lifted. HRMMU will
monitor whether access to banking services is afforded to Crimean residents without
discrimination.
VIII. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
A. Constitutional reform
161. Constitutional amendments on decentralization were adopted on first reading by the
Parliament on 31 August 2015. They enshrine the principle of subsidiarity, simplify the
territorial structure of the State and separate the functions of the State and those of local selfgovernments,
which are all positive aspects. They also refer to a law, which was adopted in
2014 but never implemented, providing for the transfer of some competencies to the
territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by the armed groups. This specific
aspect triggered a violent reaction from supporters of far right groups who clashed with the
police outside the parliament building, leading to the death of four members of the National
Guards and over 100 people being injured. The final adoption of the law requires a
constitutional majority of deputies (at least 300).
33
162. As of 15 November, constitutional amendments related to the judiciary had not been
registered at the Parliament of Ukraine. The current version of the amendments removes
some constitutional obstacles to an independent judiciary, notably by requiring that the
institution in charge of appointing and removing judges be made up of a majority of
representatives of the judicial branch. The amendments also remove the broad powers of the
public prosecutor, which have often been abused, to oversee the implementation of the law.
163. In November 2015, the amendments to the human rights chapter of the Constitution
were still under development by a working group of the constitutional commission in charge
of constitutional reform. One of the major novelties envisaged in the current draft is to enable
citizens to initiate a constitutional review of laws.
B. Adoption of a National Human Rights Strategy
164. On 25 August, President Poroshenko approved the first National Human Rights
Strategy of Ukraine. This document was developed through collaborative efforts that have
involved, since November 2014, the Government, civil society groups, the institution of the
Ombudsperson and international organizations, including HRMMU. The document describes
24 priority areas114 and provides a five-year roadmap to address systemic human rights
challenges and more recent issues related to the conflict. The Government was tasked by the
President to elaborate an Action Plan to implement it. HRMMU supports the development of
the Action Plan.
C. Cooperation with the International Criminal Court
165. On 8 September 2015, the Registrar of the International Criminal Court received a
declaration lodged by Ukraine accepting the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to alleged
crimes committed in its territory since 20 February 2014. The declaration was lodged under
article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, which enables a State not party to the Statute to accept the
exercise of jurisdiction of the Court. This is Ukraine’s second declaration under article 12(3)
of the Statute. On 17 April 2014, it accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes
committed on its territory from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014. Based on the latest
declaration, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over crimes that were committed after the
Maidan events, on the entire territory of Ukraine. HRMMU views this development as a
significant contribution towards the establishment of accountability for human rights
violations and justice for victims and their relatives.
D. Visa liberalization package
166. From 10 to 12 November, the parliament of Ukraine adopted several laws and
measures bringing positive changes, and which were requested under the European Union
visa-liberalization Action Plan. They include anti-corruption measures, such as the
establishment of a national Asset Recovery Office and guarantees against corruption risks
when property is seized or confiscated. Legislative amendments were passed to limit the pretrial
investigative functions of SBU to crimes against national security. In the area of
migration management, amendments adopted on first reading provide for an immediate
judicial review of decisions to expel or detain foreigners and stateless persons. The issue of
the reintegration of migrant workers was regulated by a law on external labour migration.
167. The most divisive topic was the requirement under the visa liberalization action plan
to explicitly prohibit discrimination on the grounds of gender identity and sexual orientation
in labour relations. It took several rounds of votes for deputies to adopt this amendment to the
labour legislation.
114 The 24 priority areas include, among other issues, torture and ill-treatment, impunity, fair trial rights, fighting
discrimination, national minority rights, gender equality, fundamental freedoms, the right to health, IDP rights
and those of the population living in the territories not controlled by Ukraine.
34
E. Labour Code
168. Amendments to the Labour Code were passed on first reading on 5 November.
Guarantees were introduced to strengthen the protection of workers, such as the obligation to
conclude an employment contract in writing, the prohibition to change working conditions
unilaterally, a higher salary for night work, a two-month notice and a higher compensation
package in case of dismissal.
169. Nonetheless, some provisions seem to contravene the principle of equality before the
law. For example, the transitional provisions foresee the right for legal entities in the area of
the security operation to regulate employment issues pertaining to working hours, resting
time and salaries, without taking into consideration the provisions of the Labour Code.
HRMMU recalls that, pursuant to article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, State Parties must “recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
just and favorable conditions of work”. HRMMU also notes that the adoption, on 12
November, of labour legislation prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation needs to be reflected in the Labour Code.
F. Criminal justice reform
170. On 12 November, the Parliament adopted a law115 creating a State Bureau of
Investigation (SBI) defined as a central executive body with special status and law
enforcement functions. SBI is mentioned in the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine as an
instrument to improve the independence and effectiveness of pre-trial criminal investigations.
It is mandated to investigate organized crime, excess of authority, torture, inhuman,
degrading or other cruel treatment or punishment committed by members of the law
enforcement and the military; crimes which may give rise to a life imprisonment sentence;
war crimes; crimes committed by high-ranking officials, prosecutors and judges116, members
of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Special Anti-Corruption Office of the
General Prosecution117. The law stipulates that SBI will have seven regional offices118. SBI
will issue annual activity reports which will be subjected to review by a public oversight
council consisting of 15 members of the public. HRMMU views the adoption of the law as an
important step in the creation of an independent criminal justice system. However, it notes
with concern that the law gives the executive authority the main prerogative in the selection
of the Bureau director and the two deputies119.
G. Protection of internally displaced persons
171. Two Government resolutions (Nos 615 and 636) adopted in August 2015 could affect
IDPs’ rights and limit their ability to obtain IDP status. A new rule obliges people seeking to
be recognized as IDPs to sign a declaration of non-participation in the commission of
criminal activity. Another one provides that IDP registration may be denied if the
circumstances that led to the displacement “are absent” or have significantly changed.
HRMMU is of the view that the unclear meaning and consequences of such provisions
increase the risk of arbitrary decisions regarding the attribution or removal of IDP status.
Another provision, subject to different interpretations, specifies that unaccompanied children
may be registered as IDPs in case of non-performance of parental obligations. In addition to
creating legal uncertainty, this may lead to the deprivation of parental rights.
115 Draft Law No 2114 ‘On the State Bureau of Investigation’.
116 Except for cases falling under the jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau.
117 Except for cases falling under the jurisdiction of an internal oversight mechanism of the National Anti-
Corruption Bureau.
118 In Lviv, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Melitopol, Kramatorsk and Kyiv.
119 The law provides that the Government appoints the Director of the Bureau and its two Deputies upon a
submission of the Prime Minister based on the proposal of a Selection Commission consisting of nine persons:
three persons chosen by the government, three by the president and three by the parliament.
35
172. Progress was made to ensure the legal protection of IDPs. HRMMU observes that the
amendments to the law on IDPs120, adopted on 3 November, reflect key provisions of the
United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Accordingly, the amendments
extend the scope of the law to heretofore excluded categories, such as internally displaced
foreign nationals and stateless persons who legally reside on the territory of Ukraine and are
eligible for permanent residence in Ukraine. The amendments also stipulate that the
Government should support the integration of IDPs in new communities, as well as their
voluntary return to their previous place of residence. They also recognize the rights of IDPs
to family reunification and to information about the fate and whereabouts of missing
relatives. Furthermore, the amendments simplify the procedures for IDP registration and
revocation of labour relations prior to displacement.
H. Civil documents
173. On 5 November, the Parliament adopted on first reading Draft Law No 3171121, which
is to regulate the recognition by Ukraine of facts of birth and death occurring on the
territories controlled by the armed groups in the east, as well as in Crimea, by amending the
Civil Procedure Code. Indeed, under the current legislation, all acts issued by de facto
authorities are considered to be invalid by Ukrainian authorities122. This situation has prevented
people from the territories concerned from enjoying the same rights as other citizens of Ukraine.
174. The draft law creates a simplified procedure of court review pertaining to the
registration of civil acts. In particular, it waives the principle of territorial jurisdiction by
allowing any Ukrainian court to examine a request for recognition. Birth and death
certificates will be issued by the civil registration body upon receipt of a copy of the
judgment authorizing it.
175. HRMMU notes that the draft law covers some but not all civil documents.
Furthermore, in the absence of postal services between the territories controlled by the armed
groups (and Crimea) and the rest of Ukraine, a claimant would need to be physically present
on Government-controlled territory to file for recognition or to empower a representative to do so.
176. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Namibia Advisory Opinion123 provided
that while official acts performed by de facto authorities “are illegal and invalid, this
invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births,
deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the
inhabitants of the [t]erritory”. This exception was upheld by the European Court of Human
Rights in its case law regarding the “TRNC”124 and “MRT”125. Thus, it would appear that the
solution proposed by the draft law falls short of the standards supported by international
120 Law of Ukraine ‘On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons’, No 1706-VII of 20
October 2014.
121 Law of Ukraine ‘On amendments to the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine concerning the establishment of
the fact of birth or death on the temporary occupied territory’, No. 3171 of 22 September 2015.
122 On 16 October 2015, Ukraine informed the United Nations Secretary-General as the depository of
international treaties that “documents or requests made or issued by the occupying authorities of the Russian
Federation, its officials at any level in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and by
the illegal authorities in certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, which are temporarily
not under control of Ukraine, are null and void and have no legal effect regardless of whether they are presented
directly or indirectly through the authorities of the Russian Federation”. See note of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine №72/22-612-2486 of 12 October 2015).
123 ICJ Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 – Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), paragraph 125.
124 Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), Judgement of 18 December 1996, ECHR (1996), para. 45; Cyprus v. Turkey
(Merits), Judgment of 10 May 2001, ECHR (2001), para. 90.
125 Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russian Federation, Application n. 48787/59, Judgment of 8 July 2004, para.
458-461.
36
jurisprudence, which imply direct recognition by Ukraine’s institutions of the registration of
births, deaths and marriages performed by de facto authorities.
I. Freedom of movement
177. On 16 September, the Government of Ukraine amended126 decree No 367 of 4 June
2015 concerning the procedure of entry into and exit from Crimea for foreigners and stateless
persons. The amended decree widens the category of people who can move across the ABL if
they are in possession of special permits. In addition to the categories mentioned under the
previous decree127, the new one includes journalists, human rights defenders, representatives
of international NGOs, religious officials and persons taking part in the activities of the Mejlis.
178. The procedure, however, to obtain a permit remains cumbersome and requires the
approval of a relevant Ukrainian Ministry. In addition, the request for a permit cannot be filed
from abroad but only on the Ukrainian territory. It should be noted that the amended decree
maintains provisions regarding restrictions of freedom of movement for Ukrainian children
below 16, who are required to travel with an international passport and to obtain the notarized
authorization of the second parent when traveling with only one.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
179. All measures need to be taken to prevent the resumption of hostilities in the eastern
regions of Ukraine, to save lives and to prevent further hardship for those people living in the
conflict-affected area. With the tenuous respect for the ceasefire agreed upon on 29 August,
people still continue to be killed and injured.
180. OHCHR reiterates that the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements remains the
only viable strategy for achieving a peaceful solution in Donbas, which would pave the way for
fuller respect of the rights of people, both in the conflict area and elsewhere in Ukraine.
Continuing presence of foreign fighters, with some having been established by a Ukrainian
court or identified by the Government of Ukraine as servicemen from the Russian Federation,
as well as the reported influx of heavy and sophisticated weaponry from the Russian
Federation and the lack of effective control by the Government of Ukraine of the state border
with the Russian Federation remain the major impediments to this solution128.
181. The impact of the conflict on economic and social rights for people residing in the
conflict areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions remains significant. The interruption of access
to basic services is life-threatening and can have a life-long impact on the affected
population, hindering the post-conflict recovery. It is especially worrying with the onset of
winter. In this regard, unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance for those people who have
been directly affected by the armed conflict in territories controlled by the armed groups
remains vital. HRMMU considers that both the Government and the armed groups have the
obligation to ensure the critical needs of the affected population are met to prevent the decline
126 Decree No 722.
127 People who could obtain a permit included those with relatives living or buried in Crimea, having property
on the peninsula, participating “in the defence of national interests of Ukraine”, performing diplomatic or
consular functions and railway system employees.
128 On 25 September, Dzerzhynskyi District Court of Donetsk region sentenced a citizen of the Russian
Federation, who confessed to being an acting officer of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, to 14 years
of imprisonment, under article 437 (planning, preparation and waging of an aggressive war) of the Criminal
Code. The man was apprehended by the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine on 25 July 2015, as the truck he
was driving approached the check-point of ‘Berezove’ (Donetsk region) carrying boxes with grenades,
cartridges and rocket-propelled grenades. For more information on his case and on the case of two other citizens
of the Russian Federation alleged to be acting servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, see
paragraphs 58-59 and 188 of the 11th HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the
period from 16 May to 15 August 2015.
37
in their health and welfare, including through the provision of humanitarian assistance, in line
with obligations under international humanitarian law.
182. Accountability and an end to impunity should remain at the core of efforts to ensuring
peace, reconciliation and long-term recovery throughout Ukraine. All violations and abuses
of human rights must be investigated and the perpetrators, whoever they are, should be
brought to justice. This concerns events dating back to 2014 and the first half of 2015, and
the new cases. Investigations into allegations of killings, summary executions, torture and illtreatment,
and enforced disappearance and illegal detention shall become a priority.
183. The human rights situation in Crimea continues to be of great concern due to persistent
allegations of violations of the rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity, and nonrespect
of due process, fair trial rights and the rights to freedoms of expression and peaceful
assembly. The trade blockade of Crimea has human rights implications and affects more
acutely some vulnerable groups. The lack of HRMMU access to Crimea continues to be an
impediment for OHCHR to effectively fulfil its mandate in Ukraine. OHCHR also reiterates
that an environment conducive to the promotion and protection of human rights in Ukraine
depends on respect for General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine.
184. OHCHR has noted progress made by the Government of Ukraine in the
implementation of some recommendations contained in previous HRMMU reports, including
their declaration to extend the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court beyond the
Maidan events, the adoption of the country’s first human rights strategy, and of various laws,
including legislation mentioning gender identity and sexual orientation as prohibited grounds
of discrimination in employment relations.
185. Recommendations made in OHCHR previous reports on the human rights situation in
Ukraine published since April 2014, that have not yet been acted upon or implemented, remain
valid. OHCHR calls upon all parties to implement the following recommendations:
To all parties involved in the hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions:
a) Guarantee efforts to abide by and implement the Minsk Agreements to end the
conflict in the Donbas region and bring an end to the fighting in all localities.
b) Ensure the protection of civilians in conflict affected areas in full conformity with
international human rights and humanitarian law, including complete avoidance of
indiscriminate shelling of populated areas.
c) Report on, and investigate all cases and incidents of civilian casualties caused by
military action.
d) Establish civilian casualty mitigation cells within their competent bodies to prevent
violations of international humanitarian law leading to civilian casualties.
e) Prioritize demining activities and conduct mine risk awareness outreach to children
and communities.
f) Release all those unlawfully or arbitrarily detained without delay and in conditions of
safety.
g) Treat all detainees, civilian or military, humanely and according to international
human rights and humanitarian law standards.
h) Investigate and prosecute any person found to be responsible for serious human rights
violations or abuses, including torture and other cruel, degrading or inhumane
treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, or enforced or involuntary
disappearances, including those with command responsibility.
i) Ensure freedom of the media and the liberty, security and rights of journalists to
freely conduct their legitimate professional activities.
38
j) Facilitate the work of humanitarian actors, both individuals and institutions, to ensure
that the population has access to relief aid, particularly those delivering medication,
providing medical care and basic services.
k) Provide additional security guarantees for humanitarians, both individuals and
institutions, accessing settlements divided by the contact line.
To the Government of Ukraine
a) Enable the Office of the Military Prosecutor to exercise general oversight over the
military and law enforcement.
b) Ensure prompt and effective investigations of all crimes motivated by ethnic or
religious hatred.
c) Reconsider restrictions of freedom of movement imposed by the Temporary Order
vis-à-vis ICCPR provisions, particularly legality and proportionality of the
restrictions. Meanwhile, facilitate the movement of civilians across the contact line by
increasing the number of transport corridors, especially in Luhansk region, restore
public transportation between the checkpoints and nearest towns, equip all
checkpoints with medical services, water, sanitation and heating facilities to create
favorable conditions for crossing, including during winter.
d) Facilitate and ensure access of the victims of torture, especially civilians, to medical,
rehabilitation, social and employment services.
e) Develop legal mechanism for civilians whose property has been damaged, looted or
seized for military purposes to seek and receive compensation.
f) Seek ways to ensure progressive realization of economic and social rights, especially
right to social security and protection for the people living in the conflict areas,
including by ensuring continuity in public social services.
g) Exclude from the draft Labour Code discriminatory provisions allowing waiving in the
security operation area the application of certain rules regulating employment relations.
h) In line with the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights, recognize civil registration documents (birth, death and
marriage certificates) issued in territories controlled by the armed groups.
i) Ensure the rule of law on the territory of the Kherson region adjacent to the three
crossing points between mainland Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula.
j) Take steps to remove the illegal roadblocks, guarantee the safety of passengers and
pedestrians, and prevent unauthorized people from carrying out law enforcement
functions in the areas adjacent to the crossing points between mainland Ukraine and
the Crimean peninsula.
To the de facto authorities of Crimea and to the Russian Federation
k) Permit HRMMU to access Crimea in order to ensure effective fulfilment of its mandate;
l) Stop using law enforcement bodies and the justice system as instruments of political
pressure, blackmail and intimidation of opponents.
m) Guarantee impartial investigations and fair trial conditions for Crimean Tatars
undergoing criminal proceedings in relation to the protests of 26 February 2014.
n) Investigate the killing of Crimean Tatar Reshat Ametov and enforced disappearances
of Crimean civil society and human rights activists Timur Shaimardanov and Seiran
Zinedinov129 and Vasyl Chernysh130, and bring perpetrators to justice.
129 See paragraph 214 of the 7th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from
17 September to 31 October 2014.
130 See paragraph 80 of the 8th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 1
to 30 November 2014.
39
o) Release Ukrainian citizens Oleh Sientsov and Oleksandr Kolchenko who were sentenced
by a Russian Federation court in denial of due process and fair trial proceedings.
p) Allow unimpeded exercise of the freedoms of peaceful assembly, expression and religion
by all Crimean residents and to accept and protect all non-violent forms of expression.
q) Ensure the continued availability of education in the Ukrainian language.
Annex 771
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2016)

1
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in
Ukraine 16 February to 15 May 2016
2
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Executive Summary ................................................................................................ 1–10 6
II. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity ............................................. 11–52 9
A. Violations of international humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities ..... 13–22 9
B. Casualties ........................................................................................................ 23–25 12
C. Missing persons and the recovery and identification of mortal remains ......... 26–28 13
D. Summary executions, enforced disappearances, unlawful and arbitrary
detention, and torture and ill-treatment ........................................................... 29–44 13
E. Sexual and gender-based violence .................................................................. 45–52 17
III. Accountability and administration of justice ........................................................... 53–70 19
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east ................. 55–64 19
B. Parallel structures of administration of justice ................................................ 65–67 21
C. Individual cases .............................................................................................. 68–70 22
Nadiia Savchenko ................................................................................... 68 22
Nelia Shtepa ........................................................................................... 69 22
Oleh Kalashnikov and Oles Buzyna ....................................................... 70 23
D. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public disturbances .......... 71–80 23
November 2013 – February 2014 demonstrations at Maidan, Kyiv ...... 71–75 23
2 May 2014 demonstrations in Odesa .................................................... 76–80 24
IV. Fundamental freedoms ............................................................................................ 81–126 25
A. Violations of the right to freedom of movement............................................. 84–90 26
B. Violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief ................................... 91–96 27
C. Violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly ................................ 97–105 28
D. Violations of the right to freedom of association ............................................ 106–111 30
E. Violations of the right to freedom of opinion and expression ........................ 112–126 31
V. Economic and social rights ..................................................................................... 127–167 34
A. Right to social security and protection............................................................ 133–143 35
B. Civil registration and access to public services .............................................. 144–148 37
C. Housing, land and property rights................................................................... 149–156 38
D. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health .......... 157–167 39
VI. Legal developments and institutional reforms ........................................................ 168–177 41
A. Ratification of United Nations treaties ........................................................... 169 41
B. Implementation of the Human Rights Action Plan ......................................... 170–171 42
C. Criminal justice............................................................................................... 172–173 42
D. Civil registration ............................................................................................. 174–175 43
E. Reform of the civil service ............................................................................. 176–177 43
VII. Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol 178–202 44
A. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity ..................................... 180–185 44
3
B. Minority and indigenous peoples’ rights ........................................................ 186–188 45
C. Due process and fair trial rights ...................................................................... 189–190 46
D. Violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly ................................ 191–193 46
E. Violations of the right to freedom of opinion and expression ........................ 194–196 47
F. Violation of the right to freedom of movement .............................................. 197 47
G. Transfers of persons deprived of their liberty outside of Crimea ................... 198–200 47
H. Conscription into military service................................................................... 201 48
I. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health .......... 202 48
VIII. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................... 203–214 48
4
Ukraine
5
6
I. Executive Summary
1. The fourteenth report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, based on
the work of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
(HRMMU)1 covers the period from 16 February to 15 May 20162. This report also
marks two years since the start of the human rights crisis in Ukraine.
2. When the conflict broke out in spring 2014 with the influx3 of foreign fighters,
including citizens of the Russian Federation, ammunition and heavy weaponry into
east Ukraine from across the border with the Russian Federation and the
Government of Ukraine's security 'anti-terrorism operation' response, OHCHR
witnessed major violations and abuses of human rights. The lack of security and at
times intense military hostilities contributed to a total breakdown in the rule of law,
leading to lack of any real protection for those opposing the presence of armed
groups and a worsening human rights situation in certain areas of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions. Since mid-2014, OHCHR has, recorded some 1,500 accounts
from victims, witnesses and relatives. These accounts show that all parties are
responsible for human rights violations and abuses and violations of international
humanitarian law. Above all, these testimonies – and the civilian casualty data
collected – demonstrate that civilians have paid the greatest price for this conflict.
3. From mid-April 2014 to 15 May 2016, OHCHR recorded 30,903 casualties in
the conflict area in eastern Ukraine, among Ukrainian armed forces, civilians and
members of the armed groups. This includes 9,371 people killed and 21,532
injured4. After two years, the situation in the east of Ukraine remains volatile and
may develop into a ‘frozen conflict’, creating a protracted environment of insecurity
and instability; escalate, with dire consequences for civilians living in the conflictaffected
area; or move towards sustainable peace through the meaningful
implementation of the Minsk Package of Measures. The stakes are high, and it is
essential that human rights abuses and violations are addressed to prevent further
abuses and to build confidence toward a durable solution to the crisis.
4. Since the start of the security operation, hundreds of people accused of
involvement in or affiliation with the armed groups have been detained and charged
1 OHCHR was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout
Ukraine and to propose recommendations to the Government and other actors to address human rights
concerns. For more details, see paragraphs 7–8 of the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine of 19 September 2014 (A/HRC/27/75).
2 The report also provides an update of recent developments on cases that occurred during previous reporting
periods.
3 'The declaration of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ have not only precipitated the escalation of armed conflict in certain districts of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but also brought in an influx of fighters from abroad that have had
significant influence on human rights in Ukraine. .... The Working Group was informed that foreigners
joined combat to support all parties to the conflict. These foreigners came from various countries, mostly
in Europe, and joined volunteer battalions on the side of the Government and the armed groups of the selfproclaimed
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. References
to the use of mercenaries by all parties to the conflict, and these require further analysis by the delegation,
in light of the specified definition of mercenary in international law.' Preliminary findings by the UN
Working Group on the use mercenaries on its Mission to Ukraine, 18 March 2016, Kyiv, Ukraine
4 This is a conservative estimate of OHCHR based on available data. These totals include: casualties among the
Ukrainian forces, as reported by the Ukrainian authorities; 298 people from flight MH-17; civilian casualties
on the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine, as reported by local authorities and the regional
departments of internal affairs of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; and casualties among civilians and members
of the armed groups on the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’, as reported by the armed groups, the so-called ‘local authorities’ and local medical establishments.
This data is incomplete due to gaps in coverage of certain geographic areas and time periods, and due to
overall under -reporting, especially of military casualties. The increase in the number of casualties between
the different reporting dates does not necessarily mean that these casualties happened between these dates:
they could have happened earlier, but were recorded by a certain reporting date.
7
under existing counter-terrorism provisions. Individuals detained by Ukrainian
authorities in connection with the armed conflict have been tortured and ill-treated,
and continue to face systematic violations of their due process and fair trial rights.
In many cases, criminal proceedings against individuals charged with terrorism
offenses have brought the lack of independence and impartiality of the judiciary and
legal profession into harsh relief. Further, in conducting the security operation and
armed conflict, Ukrainian authorities have often run afoul of the principle of nondiscrimination
through adopting policies that distinguish, exclude, and restrict
access to fundamental freedoms and socio-economic rights to persons living in the
conflict-affected area5. The Government has applied special measures to the conflict
zone, lowering human rights protection guarantees and derogating from a number of
international treaty obligations.
5. Maintaining a presence in Donetsk has allowed OHCHR to monitor the human
rights situation under armed group control and to advocate for human rights
protection. The self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and self-proclaimed
‘Luhansk people’s republic’6 have undermined the human rights of the estimated
2.7 million people residing under their control. They have imposed an arbitrary
system of rules, established a network of places of deprivation of liberty where
detainees are tortured and ill-treated, and cracked down on dissent. The ‘ministry of
state security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ has emerged as the main entity
responsible for carrying out repressive house searches, arrests, and detentions. In a
worrying pattern of behaviour, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ continued to deny international organizations and external
observers unfettered access to places of deprivation of liberty. Subjected to
unaccountable rule and excluded from the legal system applying to the rest of
Ukraine, the population living in the territories controlled by the armed groups has
been effectively denied basic protection and deprived of basic human rights and
freedoms.
6. The conflict has severely impacted economic and social rights on either side of
the contact line. Many depend on humanitarian assistance, which has been severely
curtailed following decisions by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic to deny the majority of humanitarian actors access to territories
under their control, particularly those conducting protection activities. A large
number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continue to meet daily obstacles in
exercising their economic and social rights due to discrimination, barriers to
receiving payments and entitlements, and finding appropriate housing. The number
of cases where civilian housing and property have been damaged, looted or
occupied has increased, demonstrating an urgent need for a mechanism to address
the needs of those affected for remedy, including reparation. Victims of torture,
especially civilians, and families of missing continue to struggle in accessing State
medical and social services.
7. The conflict has also led to widely felt restrictions on fundamental rights to
freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly and religion across Ukraine.
There have been concerning developments related to fundamental freedoms in the
territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine, including the use of counterterrorism
legislation to curtail the activities of those that may express views
differing from the authorities’. In armed group-controlled areas, the lack of freedom
of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly leads OHCHR to
have serious concerns about the ability to implement free and fair elections in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions as prescribed in the Package of Measures for the
Implementation of the Minsk Agreements.
5 The Temporary Order on the control of movement of people, transport vehicles and cargoes along the
contact line in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions was developed and approved by ‘the Operational
Headquarters of Management of the Anti-Terrorist Operation’, and entered into force as of 21 January
2015. After consultations with civil society it was amended on 12 June 2015.
6 Hereinafter ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
8
8. Following the extension of Russian Federation control over the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol7 on 16 March 2014, OHCHR was
denied access but has continued to monitor the human rights situation on the
peninsula from Kyiv through a wide network of contacts and monitoring visits
along the administrative border, guided by United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine. In the two years after the
Russian Federation extended its jurisdiction over Crimea, the human rights situation
in the peninsula has sharply deteriorated. Russian Federation laws and citizenship
have been compulsorily imposed on the population of the peninsula. Those who
have refused to accept this state of affairs have faced harassment and discrimination
in their daily life, including through the denial of access to free health care and
other social services. Treatment of people living with HIV and drug-users has
become inadequate. Fundamental freedoms of assembly, speech, association,
conscience and religion have been significantly curtailed. Anti-extremism and antiterrorism
laws have been used to criminalize non-violent behaviour and stifle
dissenting opinion, while the judicial and law enforcement systems have been
instrumentalized to clamp down on opposition voices. The majority of victims have
been Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians who publicly opposed Crimea’s unrecognized
‘accession’ to the Russian Federation. On the other hand, human rights abuses
committed by paramilitary groups, such as the Crimean self-defense, remain
unpunished. The expression of Ukrainian culture and identity and the use of
Ukrainian language are viewed with suspicion, discouraged and sometimes banned
by the de facto authorities.
9. There has no meaningful progress in the investigation into the Maidan events in
Kyiv and ensuing violence8. High-level officials that bear responsibility for ordering
and overseeing the violence have to date eluded justice. While there has been some
progress in the investigation into the 2 May 2014 violence in Odesa and the
resulting death of 48 individuals, serious concerns remain. These cases represent a
barometer in how Ukraine is able to bring perpetrators to account and ensure justice
for victims and their families.
10. Throughout the last two years, OHCHR has constructively engaged with the
Government of Ukraine and its various organs. OHCHR has supported their efforts
to fulfil their international human rights obligations, through sharing information
regarding documented human rights violations, advising on the incorporation of
international human rights standards into draft legislation and policies,
strengthening national institutions that promote and protect human rights under the
rule of law, and counselling on the National Human Rights Action Plan and
Strategy. OHCHR has issued concrete recommendations and engaged with relevant
authorities on the status and progress of their implementation. OHCHR has also
engaged with the armed groups in Donetsk and Luhansk regions in advocating for
the protection of and respect for the rights of people under their control and in their
custody, as well as raising awareness of international human rights standards and
humanitarian law. The abuses and violations documented in this report indicate that
at this juncture, despite the lower intensity and frequency of hostilities, the full
cessation of hostilities and meaningful implementation of the Minsk Agreements is
critical to improving the overall human rights situation in Ukraine.
7 Hereinafter ‘Crimea’
8 The International Advisory Panel constituted by the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
commended the “genuine efforts, especially on the part of the representatives of the prosecuting authorities
to address more closely the international requirements which should govern the investigations.” Among the
encouraging changes, the panel cited the creation of the Special Investigation Division in the Prosecutor
General’s Office and more active position adopted by the parliament to improve the quality of the
investigations into the Maidan events.
9
II. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity
11. Since mid-April 2014, up to 2,000 civilians have been killed in armed
hostilities, mostly as a result of indiscriminate shelling of populated areas from
various artillery systems. Dozens of individuals were subjected to summary
executions and killings, or died of torture and ill-treatment in custody. Hundreds of
people remain missing – either in secret detention or, most likely, killed – with their
bodies pending recovery or identification.
12. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty has reached an unprecedented scale in the
territories controlled by the armed groups, with a broad network of unrecognized
detention facilities. Thousands of people have gone through these places of
deprivation of liberty, subjected to inhuman conditions of detention combined with
the absence of access by external observers, torture and ill-treatment. In
Government-controlled territories, OHCHR continues to receive allegations about
unofficial places of detention in the conflict zone where conflict-related detainees
are kept incommunicado and subjected to torture and ill-treatment, which the
authorities systematically deny.
A. Violations of international humanitarian law in the conduct of
hostilities
13. Since 16 February 2016, the ceasefire in the east of Ukraine has slowly
unravelled. The skirmishes in Avdiivka and Yasynuvata (both in Donetsk region)
that erupted in the beginning of March 2016 are ongoing, affecting both towns on
either side of the contact line, with populations of 35,000 each. Since mid-April, an
increase in heavy weaponry use has been observed by monitors of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) near the contact line. The presence
of tanks and anti-aircraft missiles in residential areas9 endangers civilians and
indicates that the risk of a re-escalation in hostilities remains high. A renewed
“cessation of fire” reached in late April (ahead of the Orthodox Easter) stymied the
spike in hostilities, but remains precarious. The armed conflict between the
Government of Ukraine and the armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ continues to be fought without due regard for
civilian protection.
14. Ukrainian armed forces and armed groups continue to lay landmines, including
anti-personnel mines, despite Ukraine’s obligations as a State party to the 1997
Mine Ban Treaty10. Credible estimates indicate that mines contaminate large areas
of agricultural land in east Ukraine, often in areas which are poorly marked, near
roads and surrounding civilian areas. This has resulted in civilians being killed and
maimed, often while walking to their homes and fields. These risks are particularly
acute for people living in towns and settlements near the contact line, as well as the
23,000 people who cross the contact line every day.
15. Water filtration stations and other essential infrastructure have been damaged in
hostilities in the shelling of densely-populated civilian areas, as the parties to the
9 Daily Report, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information
received as of 19:30hrs, 15 May 2016; Daily Report, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission
(SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 1 May 2016; Daily Report, Latest from
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 27
April 2016
10 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997
“When evening starts, I cower and sit in the corridor. There’s rustle, and a
rocket is flying. I pray, God, please, let it miss the house, let it miss the house.”
- Female resident of Makiivka
10
conflict have failed to take all feasible precautions in attacks to protect and prevent
the destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population11.
In Krasnohorivka, a village under Government control, there has been no heating
and no hot water for two years following the shelling of a gas pipeline in 2014. The
pipeline cannot be repaired due to ongoing hostilities in that area. In early May
2016, it was reported that in parts of Debaltseve and nearby Vuhlehirsk, residents
have no access to water due to damaged pipelines. As of April 2016, residents of
Mariinka, who relied on the Petrovskyi district water station in Donetsk, have
sporadic access to potable water. It is alleged that armed groups are deliberately
limiting access to water for residents of Government-controlled areas. Depriving
people of access to safe water denies them a fundamental human right.
16. Ukrainian armed forces and armed groups have appropriated residential
property of local residents for military use (See: Housing, land, and property rights).
In many cases, this has forced the owners or residents to leave their homes and in
some cases, their communities. On 22 April 2016, OHCHR witnessed Ukrainian
armed forces members occupying residential houses in Luhanske. Residents
complained that they were forced to leave their homes, which had been damaged
and looted by soldiers. In response to OHCHR advocacy, soldiers vacated the
houses, reportedly moving closer to the contact line. People living in contested
areas close to the contact line are most exposed to military forces and armed groups
and are most vulnerable to coercion. Female-headed households are at particular
risk of losing their homes to military use, especially in areas close to the contact line
where there is little rule of law or law enforcement presence. OHCHR recalls the
general protection afforded to the civilian population and individual civilians
against the dangers arising from military operations12.
17. Hostilities have also endangered medical personnel evacuating the wounded,
medical facilities, and journalists, with disregard to their special protection under
international humanitarian law13. On 16 March 2016, a female medical first
responder with the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ was injured in Kalynove, when a
shell hit her unmarked vehicle. According to the ‘ombudsperson’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’, 67 medical facilities in the areas controlled by armed groups
remain damaged as the result of hostilities. In addition, OHCHR continued to
receive reports about the military occupation of medical facilities. The sole
polyclinic in Trudovskiie neighbourhood in Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city
continued to be used by armed groups14. Such conduct violates binding international
humanitarian law15.
18. OHCHR is concerned about the application of counter-terrorism laws and the
security regulatory framework to the provision of medical assistance to the sick and
wounded in armed group-controlled areas. The Temporary Order has for a year
caused delays in the delivery of humanitarian aid and basic medical necessities,
resulting in continued shortages of supplies for civilians living in armed groupcontrolled
areas, particularly affecting among children. Judicial decisions have also
recast medical care as impermissible support to the armed group-controlled areas16.
11 Article 15, Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventions; Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary
international humanitarian law, Volume I, Rule 54
12 Article 13(1), Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventions; Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck,
Customary international humanitarian law, Volume I, Rule 22.
13 Article 9, Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventions; Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary
international humanitarian law, Volume I, Rule 28.
14 HRMMU interview, 30 March 2016.
15 Article 11, Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventions; Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary
international humanitarian law, Volume I, Rule 22.
16 In January 2015, a court in Lysychansk, Luhansk region, rules that the provision of medicine by an owner
of a pharmacy to a hospital in armed group-controlled areas amounted to the crime of providing “assistance
to members of a criminal organization” through “creating conditions for medical treatment of members of
11
19. Due to ongoing heavy shelling in the western outskirts of Donetsk near the
contact line, some residents still use bomb shelters on a regular basis, sleeping in
damp, damaged basements on a nightly basis. Over the reporting period, OHCHR
recorded civilian casualties caused by artillery shelling and the use of small arms
and light weapons in the Government-controlled towns Avdiivka and Mariinka, and
the villages of Novooleksandrivka, Pisky and Vodiane (all in Donetsk region).
Civilian casualties were also recorded in the contested village of Zaitseve (Donetsk
region), as well as in the cities of Donetsk, Horlivka and Makiivka, and the villages
of Kominternove, Mykolaivka, Olenivka and Yakovlivka (all controlled by the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’).
20. On 27 April 2016, civilians waiting to cross a checkpoint in Olenivka village,
on the road between Mariupol and Donetsk city, were hit by shelling at night. Four
civilians were killed and eight others injured. According to OSCE crater analysis,
the mortar rounds were fired from the west-south-westerly direction17. This
indicates the responsibility of the Ukrainian armed forces. The checkpoint is
routinely – both during day and night time – surrounded by passenger vehicles
waiting to cross the contact line due to the restrictions imposed by the Temporary
Order18. This is a stark illustration of the impact of the limitations on freedom of
movement, which have compelled civilians to spend prolonged periods exposed to
the violence and risks of ongoing hostilities near the contact line.
21. Humanitarian assistance rarely reaches the villages and towns in the “grey” and
“buffer” zone. According to the World Food Programme (WFP)19, the two-year
long conflict in eastern Ukraine has left 300,000 people severely food insecure and
in need of immediate food assistance. It added that people living in the armed
group-controlled territories of Luhansk region and near the conflict line were most
affected by food insecurity with over half of the population, in both the
Government-controlled and non-Government controlled areas, having experienced a
complete loss or a significant reduction of income. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ denial of access to humanitarian actors and
resulting lack of protection activities, at a time when the civilian population in
armed group-controlled territories is experiencing undue hardship, further violates
norms of international human rights and humanitarian law20.
22. OHCHR positively notes the efforts of the Government of Ukraine to include in
the training of its armed forces personnel humanitarian law, including by holding
some 25 training workshops with the support of the International Committee of the
Red Cross.
a criminal organization”. Lysychansk city court, 19 January 2015, № 415/4328/14-к (accessible at:
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/42468935)
17 Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Shelling in Olenivka, 28 April
2016
18 HRMMU interview, 27 April 2016.
19 World Food Programme, Conflict In Eastern Ukraine Leaves 1.5 Million People Hungry, 4 April 2016
(accessible at: https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/conflict-eastern-ukraine-leaves-15-million-peoplehungry)
20 Article 18, Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventions; Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary
international humanitarian law, Volume I, Rule 55
12







 
     







    











 




    



        





 
















    


















    



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B. Casualties
23. In total, from mid-April 2014 to 15 May 2016, OHCHR recorded 30,903
casualties in the conflict area in eastern Ukraine, among Ukrainian armed forces,
civilians and members of the armed groups. This includes 9,371 people killed and
21,532 injured21.
24. The overall trend of relatively low levels of civilian casualties, observed since
the ceasefire of 1 September 2015, continued. During the reporting period, average
monthly civilian casualties remained to be among the lowest since the beginning of
the conflict in mid-April 2014. Between 16 February and 15 May 2016, OHCHR
recorded 113 conflict-related civilian casualties in eastern Ukraine: 14 killed (three
women, ten man and one adult whose sex is unknown) and 99 injured (24 women,
57 men, and seven adults whose sex is unknown; six girls, four boys and one child
whose sex is unknown).
25. Compared to the previous reporting period, the share of casualties resulted from
shelling increased: five killed (three women and two men) and 41 injured (14
women, 19 men and five adults whose sex is unknown; two boys and a child whose
sex is unknown). Explosive remnants of war (ERW) and improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) continued to account for the majority of civilian casualties: eight
deaths (a woman, six men and an adult whose sex is unknown) and 47 injuries
(seven women, 30 men and two adults whose sex is unknown; six girls and two
boys). Small arms and light weapons accounted for ten casualties: a man was killed
and three women and six men were injured. Two adults were injured from
unspecified firearms.
21 This is a conservative estimate of OHCHR based on available data. These totals include: casualties among the
Ukrainian forces, as reported by the Ukrainian authorities; 298 people from flight MH-17; civilian casualties
on the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine, as reported by local authorities and the regional
departments of internal affairs of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; and casualties among civilians and members
of the armed groups on the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’, as reported by the armed groups, the so-called ‘local authorities’ and local medical establishments.
This data is incomplete due to gaps in coverage of certain geographic areas and time periods, and due to
overall under-reporting, especially of military casualties. The increase in the number of casualties between the
different reporting dates does not necessarily mean that these casualties happened between these dates: they
could have happened earlier, but were recorded by a certain reporting date.
13
C. Missing persons and the recovery and identification of mortal
remains
26. As of 1 April 2016, 3,687 criminal cases had been initiated by the National
Police of Ukraine into cases of missing people in Donetsk and Luhansk regions
since the beginning of the security operation. Besides, 2,755 criminal investigations
into abductions or kidnappings had been initiated. The whereabouts of the majority
of the missing or abducted persons have been established; hundreds of people,
however, remain missing or believed to be in detention (recognized or secret) by the
armed groups or Ukrainian authorities.
27. Since 1 April 2014, 1,351 unidentified bodies have been recovered in
Government-controlled territories of the conflict zone. As of 1 April 2016, 523 of
these bodies have been identified while 828 were pending identification. The armed
groups have also publicly reported on a number of unidentified bodies in morgues
or buried in unmarked graves on the territories they control. In early April 2016, a
dozen of bodies of Ukrainian servicemen and members of armed groups were
recovered in the Government-controlled territories and in the territories controlled
by the armed groups. There are still many bodies of fallen soldiers and members of
armed groups that have not yet been recovered. In the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’,
at least 430 families are looking for their missing relatives.
28. A draft law ‘On prevention of disappearance of people and facilitation in tracing
the missing persons’ has been developed under the auspices of the Ministry of
Justice of Ukraine. This marks an important step toward streamlining relevant
national procedures and the implementation of international human rights and
humanitarian law obligations22. However, it requires further development, such as the
establishment of a centralized entity or institution dealing with missing persons.
D. Summary executions, enforced disappearances, unlawful and
arbitrary detention, and torture and ill-treatment
29. Enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment remain
deeply entrenched practices. Though new cases documented by OHCHR mostly fall
outside of this reporting period, OHCHR believes that this demonstrates the hidden
character of the phenomenon and delayed reporting by victims and witnesses, rather
than a genuine improvement in the conduct of relevant actors. Enforced
22 Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary international humanitarian law, Volume I, Rule 117.
    

    
     
        


        

          
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14
disappearances are continuing offences, as long as the perpetrators continue to
conceal the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared persons23.
Ukrainian law enforcement, armed and security forces
30. OHCHR received allegations of enforced disappearances, arbitrary and
incommunicado detention, torture and ill-treatment committed by Ukrainian law
enforcement. Among these were over 20 cases of arbitrary detention and illtreatment24.
OHCHR communicates well-founded information to the relevant
Ukrainian authorities and requests investigations into the allegations. Many of the
victims of these cases approach OHCHR demanding justice for the violations they
suffered. Until there is genuine investigation and prosecution of those responsible,
these victims continue to have their rights to access to justice and redress
mechanisms violated.
31. The majority of cases documented during the reporting period concerned
incidents in the conflict zone. While the cases from 2014 and early 2015 suggest
that volunteer battalions (often in conjunction with the Security Service of Ukraine
(SBU)) were frequent perpetrators, information from the late 2015 and early 2016
mostly implicate SBU. Many of these cases concern incommunicado detention in
unofficial detention facilities where torture and ill-treatment are persistently used as
means to extract confessions or information, or to intimidate or punish the victim.
SBU continued to deny practicing secret or incommunicado detention, the mere
existence of unofficial detention facilities, and the whereabouts and fate of
individuals who were forcibly disappeared. SBU officials continue to maintain that
allegations documented by OHCHR are “unfounded insinuations” made by
criminals trying to portray themselves as victims.
32. On 20 February 2016, a Mariupol resident was transferred to Donetsk as part of
a simultaneous release of detainees. Since March 2015, he had been held
incommunicado at the Kharkiv SBU. He was apprehended in Mariupol on 28
January 2015 and kept in an illegal detention facility. There, he was reportedly
severely tortured and electrocuted by three men who wanted him to identify
supporters of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ in Mariupol. On 8 February 2015, he
was charged under article 258 (terrorism) of the Criminal Code. The following day,
the court placed him in Mariupol SIZO. On 12 March 2015, he was released from
custody under house arrest and, while leaving the courthouse, was apprehended by
SBU and transferred to Kharkiv SBU. At the time of his arrival, 72 individuals were
held there; 17 when he was released on 20 February 2016.
33. As of March 2016, OHCHR was aware of the names of 15 men and one woman
disappeared in Kharkiv SBU. On 20 April, the Ombudsperson’s Office of Ukraine
conducted an unannounced inspection visit and found that there were no detainees
held at the Kharkiv SBU. A few days later, OHCHR learned from a reliable source
that on 20 April, detainees were told to pack their belongings and were taken to a
different location for 24 hours.
34. On 18 February 2016, a woman disappeared in the village of Zhovanka
(Donetsk region), located in the so-called grey zone, after she went to check on her
house. Local Ukrainian armed forces told her neighbours she had been taken to
hospital for medical treatment. On 22 February, a video was released of her
confessing to being an informant for the armed groups,25 suggesting she had been
apprehended and detained, while local forces concealed her fate and whereabouts
for four days.
23 Article 17(1) of the United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
24 HRMMU interview, 24 March 2016; HRMMU interview, 25 February 2016; HRMMU interview, 24
March 2016; HRMMU interview, 18 March 2016; HRMMU interview, 18 March 2016.
25 HRMMU interview, 25 February 2016.
15
Armed groups
35. OHCHR recorded new allegations of killings, abductions, arbitrary detention,
torture and ill-treatment perpetrated by members of the armed groups. The accounts
most often referred to incidents that took place outside the reporting period. Some
victims delayed reporting until they left the areas under the control of the armed
groups. In other cases, the relatives of those deprived of their liberty or otherwise
abused by the armed groups requested that their cases remain confidential for fear
of retribution.
36. Despite repeated requests to the ‘authorities’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ to grant OHCHR access to places of deprivation of
liberty on the territories they control, such access was not provided. All these
factors considerably limit OHCHR’s ability to report on human rights abuses
perpetrated on the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and
‘Luhansk people’s republic’. Due to the absence of due process, redress
mechanisms, and denial of access to external observers, OHCHR remains
particularly concerned about the situation of individuals deprived of their liberty by
armed groups. The information that has been obtained by OHCHR indicates poor
conditions of detention, arbitrary and incommunicado detention, torture and illtreatment.
37. A woman informed OHCHR that on 16 July 2014, her son was deprived of his
liberty at the ‘Staryi Most’ checkpoint, in the town of Stanychno Luhanske
(Luhansk region), controlled by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. She was later
informed that he and another man were deprived of their liberty by a ‘mobile group’
of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. On 17 July, she received a phone call from a
man who informed her he had been kept with her son in a house located
approximately a 10 minute drive from the ‘Staryi Most’ checkpoint. The
whereabouts of the man remains unknown26.
38. A serviceman of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was captured on 10 August 2015
by four members of the so-called ‘Vostok’ battalion of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’, near the village of Verkhnioteretske (Donetsk region). They put a plastic
bag on his head, handcuffed him, and drove him to a private house. He was then
tied to a tree with wristbands, severely beaten, threatened, and tortured with
electrical shocks at 220 volts. He lost consciousness on several occasions. After
three hours of torture inflicted by some 10 men wearing masks and camouflage with
the insignia of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, he was interrogated. No medical aid
was provided to him. He was then transferred to a military base in the centre of
Makiivka. In October 2015, he was taken to a sports hall, apparently in a school, not
far from the military base in Makiivka and placed in a cell with two local civilians
and two members of the armed groups. Within a month, he was taken to a basement
of an office centre in Makiivka where he was held until his transfer to Government
territory as part of a simultaneous release of detainees on 20 February 201627.
OHCHR documented a number of cases when people were deprived of their liberty
by armed groups while crossing the contact line. For instance, on 14 February 2016,
while crossing the contact line in Stanychno Luhanske, a man was deprived of his
liberty at a check point of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. As of 12 May, his relatives
were not informed about reasons of his deprivation of liberty, and the place where he
is kept.
39. On 5 March 2016, while travelling to Donetsk through the Zaitseve/Maiorsk
checkpoints, a man went missing after passing Government checkpoints. Reports
indicate that he was deprived of his liberty at the checkpoint of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ and would have been transferred to the department of the
‘ministry of state security’ in the city of Makiivka. To date, his whereabouts remain
26 HRMMU interview, 2 March 2016.
27 HRMMU interview, 4 March 2016.
16
unknown. Before the conflict, the man was working in the Donetsk State University
of Management. He was known for his strong pro-Ukrainian views, which he
expressed at the beginning of 2014. He moved to Kyiv in 2014 as the security
situation was deteriorating, and started working in the National University28.
40. OHCHR continues to receive reports of human rights abuses committed in penal
colonies in the territory controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. For instance,
OHCHR interviewed a man sentenced to life imprisonment prior to the conflict,
who was formerly held in penal colony No. 52, in the city of Yenakiieve (Donetsk
region) under the control of the armed groups. In February 2015, several such
prisoners in Yenakiieve were reportedly subjected to mock execution for their
alleged pro-unity Ukrainian views. The first deputy of the head of the colony
allegedly carried out the mock execution. Several detainees were forced to kneel in
the ‘square’ near the administration building. After a short speech on “proper
political views”, the first deputy reportedly fired shots above the heads of the
detainees29. Four former detainees from penal colony No. 52 informed OHCHR
about an incident involving two prisoners in May 2015, where they were severely
beaten for three days with the involvement of local ‘police’ to “teach them a
lesson.”30
41. Another man sentenced to life imprisonment prior to the conflict, who was
formerly held in penal colony No. 52 and then transferred to Government-controlled
territory, informed OHCHR that in January-February 2015, he witnessed how one
detainee died. His cellmate had kidney problems, was denied treatment, and was
transferred to a cell with tuberculosis patients. One day before his death, his legs
were severely swollen. The head of medical staff at the facility ignored his
deteriorating health condition31.
42. OHCHR welcomes the efforts by the Ombudsperson’s Office to facilitate the
transfer of such pre-conflict prisoners to the territory controlled by Ukraine, to
allow prisoners better access to and communication with their families.
Release of persons deprived of their liberty
43. During the reporting period, there has been no progress regarding the release of
“hostages and illegally-held persons” under the ‘all for all’ principle foreseen by the
Minsk Agreements, although a number of simultaneous releases took place, such as a
three to six release on 20 February 2016. OHCHR continues to advocate for the ‘all
for all’ release of detainees with representatives of the armed groups, Government and
facilitators.
44. According to OHCHR’s Government interlocutors, the absence of a legal
framework for simultaneous releases of detainees contributes to human rights
violations. The release process takes place outside the protection of the law and is
directly linked to incommunicado detention and enforced disappearance, contributes
to conduct that is tantamount to hostage-taking. Moreover, the role of the SBU in
coordinating the simultaneous releases compromises judicial independence.
28 HRMMU interview, 11 March 2016.
29 HRMMU interview, 20 February 2016.
30 HRMMU interview, 20 February 2016.
31 HRMMU interview, 7 March 2016.
17
E. Sexual and gender-based violence
45. Details about incidents of sexual and gender-based violence are limited and
often difficult to verify. Due to the collapse of law and order in conflict-affected
areas, as well as a lack of capacity of law enforcement and service providers to deal
with such cases, victims rarely appeal for help. Forensic examinations have not
been conducted in any of the cases documented by OHCHR. As a result, survivors
may feel deterred from seeking recourse to police protection in a context where
victims of sexual and gender-based violence are often confronted with inaction
from state authorities or armed groups who exercise control over certain areas. The
lack of services for survivors on both sides of the contact line is of particular
concern, and international humanitarian actors specialized in the provision of such
services are not allowed to operate in the territories controlled by armed groups.
46. Moreover, underreporting of sexual and gender-based violence can be attributed
to the difficulty many women and men feel to speak about rape and other forms of
sexual abuse, fear of reprisals and the stigma attached to rape. The cases
documented below have been recorded in the reporting period, while the actual
incidents may have taken place in 2014 and 2015. As the conflict reaches its twoyear
mark, it seems that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence are
increasingly able to speak about their experiences in detention during the early
stages of the conflict.
47. During the reporting period OHCHR continued to document cases of conflictrelated
sexual and gender-based violence32. While certain cases may be attributed to
general lawlessness, the majority of allegations suggest that threats of rape and
other forms of sexual violence are used as a method of ill-treatment and torture in
the context of arbitrary or illegal detention, both towards men and women. It was
also noted that threats of sexual violence, injury or death towards female relatives,
or their detention, are often used as a means to compel male detainees to confess,
relinquish their property, or perform other actions demanded by the perpetrators, as
an explicit condition for their safety or release.
Ukrainian law enforcement, armed and security forces
48. In the majority of cases documented by OHCHR, law enforcement employed
threats of sexual violence against individuals detained under charges of terrorism,
32 ‘Conflict-related sexual violence’ refers to incidents or patterns of sexual violence, that is rape, sexual
slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence
of comparable gravity, against women, men, girls or boys, including as a tactic of war or tool of political
intimidation. Such incidents or patterns occur in conflict or post-conflict settings or other situations of
concern (e.g., political strife). They also have a direct or indirect nexus with the conflict or political strife
itself, i.e. a temporal, geographical and/or causal link. Broader acts of gender-based violence that are not
related to a situation of conflict are generally beyond the scope of the present document.
“They invited a notary to the building. I was offered to sign papers to surrender
all my real estate. At first I refused, but then the terrorists’ chief “Vasilevich”
told me that he will bring my wife and my daughter here; Chechen fighters will
rape them both in front of me. Then of course I said that they can take everything
they want – just don’t harm my girls.”
- A man detained by armed groups in Donetsk region in 2014
“They asked me if I had given birth. When I replied 'yes, three times' they said
that it meant I was able to endure pain. So they started hitting me on the top and
on the side of my head. They didn't beat me in the face. They also hit me on the
chest, legs. They beat me with their fists and with a heavy flat object.”
- A woman detained by police in Government-controlled Donetsk region
in 2015
18
along with other forms of torture and ill-treatment during interrogation. Two of the
documented cases took place in or around Avdiivka in April and May 2015. A male
detainee who was subjected to torture and forced to confess to his involvement in
the armed groups on camera, was subsequently threatened with sexual violence,
told that he would be handcuffed and raped by a homosexual man33. Two women
from the same family, aged 18 and 41, were tortured and repeatedly threatened with
sexual violence.
49. Other documented cases appear to be linked to the military presence in densely
populated civilian areas, such as towns near the contact line, and general impunity.
A man with a mental disability was subject to cruel treatment, rape and other forms
of sexual violence by eight to 10 members of the ‘Azov’ and ‘Donbas’ battalions in
August-September 2014. The victim’s health subsequently deteriorated and he was
hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital34.
50. On 17 October 2015, a couple was attacked by two drunken soldiers from the
92nd Brigade in Kalanchak, Kherson region. As a result, the wife’s arm was broken.
On 5 December 2015, her property was attacked by intoxicated members of the
‘Aidar’ battalion (some of them armed), reportedly involved in the ‘civil blockade’
of Crimea35. On 18 December 2015 the same perpetrators attacked her on the street,
chased her, beat her, “saying dirty sexual words”. The police did not take any
measures, and according to the victim were afraid to protect her for fear of
antagonizing the perpetrators36. This case is now being investigated by the
Prosecutor’s office in Kherson region.
Armed groups
51. On 9 December 2015, in Donetsk a man was beaten and raped in SIZO No. 5.
He was taken outside for his daily walk, where he was confronted by a group of
‘masked riot police’, who hit his legs and back twice with a baton and insulted him.
Following the assault, the police stripped him down completely and forced him to
bend over in front of them. He described standing naked in front of the camouflaged
men in below 0 degree Celsius temperature. The ‘riot police’ mocked and insulted
him, and subjected him to a “rectal examination”. The victim named the
perpetrators and believes he was subjected to such treatment in retaliation for
applying to be transferred to Government-controlled territory to serve the remainder
of his sentence37.
52. Some Ukrainian soldiers who were held by armed groups for several months
also provide accounts suggesting sexual violence against women in armed group
custody. One of them, who was kept38 in the building of the ‘ministry of state
security’ in Donetsk city, reported that some local women were deprived of their
liberty for having violated the curfew or other violations of the ‘laws’. He referred
to the frequent turnover of the women, “sometimes [they were] taken somewhere
and never returned”. Although he never witnessed any incidents, he had serious
concerns that those women could have been subjected to sexual violence. Another
soldier, who was deprived of his liberty in Donetsk from February to April 2015,
was kept in a cell with a man and a woman who had come to Donetsk to register
their marriage. One day, drunken members of the armed group took the woman
with them and brought her back several hours later. She was intoxicated, her hair
and clothes were dishevelled and she was silent. The witness suspects that she was
raped39. OHCHR will attempt to obtain more information on the situation of women
33 HRMMU interview, 2 March 2016.
34 HRMMU interview, 2 February 2016.
35 See 12th HRMMU report, covering 16 August to 15 December 2015, pp. 29-30.
36 HRMMU interview, 22-28 February 2016.
37 HRMMU interview, 2 March 2016.
38 HRRMU interview, 5 April 2016.
39 HRMMU interview, 1 March 2016.
19
kept by armed groups, but remains constrained by the lack of access to places of
deprivation of liberty in armed group-controlled territories.
III. Accountability and the administration of justice
53. Two years since the beginning of the security operation on 14 April 2014 in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions, there remains a lack of accountability for human
rights abuses and violations committed in the course of the conflict. The human
rights aspect of crimes has not been adequately addressed, and as a result, the
conflict continues to be fought with little consideration for human rights. None of
the cases brought against the armed groups members to the courts have contained
charges for human rights abuses. All charges heard in courts pertain to violations
against the territorial integrity of Ukraine or crimes against public safety.
54. Impunity of law enforcement and security elements for human rights violations
remains widespread, and is often justified by the challenges posed by the ongoing
armed conflict. In territories controlled by the armed groups, law and order has
collapsed and illegal parallel structures have developed. These structures are
wielded as tools to intimidate and control the population under armed group control,
and to perpetrate further human rights abuses. OHCHR is cognizant of the
constraints faced by Ukrainian authorities, particularly due to their lack of access to
territories controlled by the armed groups and resulting inability to establish direct
perpetrators40. In many cases, starting in September 2014 under the Minsk
framework, persons detained in connection with the conflict have been exchanged
in the course of ‘mutual releases’, preventing accountability for potential human
rights violations. OHCHR also continued to follow a number of high-profile
individual investigations and prosecutions linked to the human rights crisis.
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the
east
55. OHCHR notes the efforts of the Government to bring perpetrators from its own
ranks to justice. Since 15 March 2014 until February 2016, the Office of the
Military Prosecutor has investigated 726 crimes committed by members of the
territorial defence battalions, including 11 crimes of killing, 12 – torture, 27 –
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 29 – creation of a criminal gang, 6 – banditry and 18
– unlawful appropriation of a vehicle. 622 people were charged, of them 381 –
indicted. Courts have heard and ruled on cases concerning 272 persons.
56. OHCHR is following the case of special police patrol battalion ‘Tornado’, 13
members of which have been charged with torture and illegal confinement or
abduction of a person41. 11 servicemen of the battalion have been indicted. Two
others were detained on 13 April 2016. The Office of the Military Prosecutor is also
investigating criminal cases against servicemen of the 24 territorial defence
battalion ‘Aidar’ on charges of intentional homicide, illegal abduction or
confinement of a person, brigandism, gangsterism and illegal appropriation of a
vehicle. In the course of investigation five ‘Aidar’ servicemen were charged, four of
them were placed in custody, and one was put on a wanted list. On 6 April, two
servicemen were indicted for several acts, including the abduction of a person.
57. OHCHR remains concerned about the administration of justice toward persons
accused of involvement in the armed groups. From the beginning of the armed
40 The Office of the Chief Military Prosecutor informed OHCHR that it is carrying out pre-trial
investigations into alleged cases of killing, torture and ill-treatment of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians by
members of the armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ in 2014-
2016. The Office informed OHCHR that 3,000 victims have been identified, including those deprived of
their liberty by members of the armed groups; over 450 victims have provided testimonies of having been
tortured or ill-treated.
41 See 11th HRMMU report covering 16 May to 15 August 2015, paragraph 123.
20
conflict, SBU has qualified any acts involving membership in, organization or
support of, or participation in, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ as involvement in a terrorist organization under article 258-3 or
the “creation of unlawful paramilitary or armed formations” under article 260 of the
Criminal Code. Many of those detained in pre-trial detention have been deprived of
their liberty because the current provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do
not envision non-custodial measures for terrorism-related offenses42. This runs
counter to European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence43, and contributes to a
perception among detainees that pre-trial detention is employed to punish those
suspected of being affiliated with the armed groups or maintaining links with
persons residing in armed group-controlled territory. Further, the application of a
counter-terrorism and security framework to conflict-related detention has created a
permissive environment and climate of impunity.
58. OHCHR documented allegations of unidentified armed men detaining people
living near the conflict zone due to their alleged affiliation with armed groups. They
complained about being subjected to ill-treatment and torture in order to extract
confessions that they assisted armed groups. Following their confessions, they were
taken to SBU premises and officially charged. OHCHR has consistently observed
that the SBU fails to inquire into the condition of detainees and the circumstances of
their capture. This pattern of conduct suggests that SBU investigators may either be
involved in certain cases of arbitrary detention, or fail to act to prosecute
perpetrators.
59. A resident of Mariupol was detained by three servicemen of the ‘Azov’
battalion on 28 January 2015 for supporting the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. He
was taken to the basement of Athletic School No. 61 in Mariupol, where he was
held until 6 February 2015. He was continuously interrogated and tortured. He
complained about being handcuffed to a metal rod and left hanging on it, he was
reportedly tortured with electricity, gas mask and subjected to waterboarding and he
was also beaten in his genitals. As a result he confessed about sharing information
with the armed groups about the locations of the Government checkpoints. Only on
7 February, he was taken to the Mariupol SBU, where he was officially detained.
60. Allegations of torture and ill-treatment are rarely investigated. There are few
prospects for accountability for abuses perpetrated by members of law enforcement
agencies. In some cases, attempts by victims of torture to complain to judges in the
course of a hearing have been met with inaction and callousness, with judges
frequently ignoring or dismissing complaints, revealing the judiciary’s lack of
impartiality.
61. On 11 March 2016, when considering a case44 of a person indicted under article
258-3 (facilitation of activity of a terrorist organisation) of the Criminal Code, the
Dobropilskyi District Court of Donetsk region disregarded the defendant’s claims
that he was actually apprehended two days before his official date of detention. The
court also disregarded the statements of an eyewitness to his apprehension,
challenging them with the statements of law enforcement members who detained
him. The court also disregarded the defendant’s claim that he was tortured and illtreated
during those two days saying that he was mistreated prior to his
apprehension.
42 The law ‘On Amendments to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding
Unavoidability of Punishment for Certain Crimes Against National Security, Public Order and Corruption
Crimes’ precludes to apply any other non-custodial measures of restrains to the persons suspected in
abovementioned crimes
43 Kharchenko v. Ukraine, European Court of Human Rights, no. 40107/02
44 Dobropilskyi District Court, 11 March 2016, 227/2128/15-к (accessible at:
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/56350801)
21
62. In another case45 on 12 February 2016, Prymorskyi District Court of Mariupol
admitted that the accused “was actually detained on 19 September 2015, and until
29 September 2015 was deprived of liberty without any court decision”, failing,
however, to take any action in relation to his unlawful detention.
63. In certain cases, courts fail to initiate criminal investigations into allegations of
torture, which appears to be due to a lack of an effective mechanism46. Allegations
of torture that arise in the course of court proceedings are referred to the
prosecution, which can more easily initiate a criminal investigation. Prosecutors,
however, are required to supervise the legality of the entire investigative process.
Thus, they are at risk of professional reprimand should the allegations of torture or
ill-treatment – rendering the obtained evidence inadmissible – be confirmed at a
later stage of the proceedings. As a result, the availability of a remedy for torture is
compromised at its initial stage, as allegations of ill-treatment raised during trial
either do not trigger any investigative actions, or do not yield any results.
64. OHCHR also notes that the armed groups have also taken steps to ‘prosecute’
perpetrators from their own ranks. On 17 March, the ‘office of the prosecutor
general’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ reported that ‘pre-trial investigations’
into the ‘criminal cases’ against the ‘Batman’ armed group and an armed group
headed by Serhii Kosohorov were completed. The criminal cases were submitted to
the ‘military court’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. Reportedly, members of the two
armed groups are accused of committing 53 crimes, including illegal detention,
torture, banditry, seizure of cars, drugs and weapons smuggling47.
B. Parallel structures of administration of justice
65. OHCHR continued to monitor the development of parallel ‘administration of
justice’ structures in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’. These structures have been established to impose the authority of the
armed groups over the population residing on the territories under their control and
to legitimize human rights abuses by the armed groups. Such structures contravene
the spirit of the Minsk Agreements.
66. On 6 April 2016, the ‘supreme court’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ reported
that, from the beginning of 2016, ‘courts of general jurisdiction’ had ‘considered’
3,318 criminal cases, including 11 pre-conflict cases. The ‘courts’ had reportedly
delivered ‘decisions’ in 461 cases, including two convictions regarding seven preconflict
detainees. In 2015, the ‘courts’ had reportedly ‘considered’ 18,678 criminal
cases and delivered decisions in 1,935 cases, including in 60 cases initiated before
the conflict. OHCHR has not been able to verify that the ‘judicial system’ of
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ meets the key due
process and fair trial standards in particular in relation to the non-derogable writ of
habeas corpus to provide a person deprived of liberty with an opportunity to
challenge the lawfulness of detention48. OHCHR is concerned that the development
of parallel structures of ‘administration of justice’ leads to systematic abuses of the
rights of persons deprived of their liberty by the armed groups and issuance of
decisions which contravene human rights norms.
45 Prymorskyi District Court of Mariupol, 12 February 2016, №234/18927/15-к (accessible at:
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/55707736)
46 HRMMU interview, 15 April 2016.
47 Luhansk Information Centre, “General Prosecution of the LPR hands over case materials on the case of
“Batman” and “Kosogora” to a LPR military court,” March 2016, (accessible at: http://luginfo.
com/news/one/genprokuratura-lnr-peredala-materialy-po-delam-betmena-i-kosogora-v-voennyi-sudlnr-
11660)
48 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’s “Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures
on the Right of Anyone Deprived of His or Her Liberty by Arrest or Detention to Bring Proceedings
Before Court”.
22
67. In the context of an armed conflict, only an impartial and regularly constituted
court may pass judgment on an accused person49. Unfair trials cannot provide
justice to victims of serious human rights abuses and violations of international
humanitarian law, and further contribute to the lack of rule of law and
accountability that has come to characterize the armed group-controlled areas.
C. Individual cases
Nadiia Savchenko
68. On 22 March, the Donetsk City Court of the Rostov region, Russian Federation,
sentenced a Ukrainian citizen, Nadiia Savchenko50, to 22 years of imprisonment for
her complicity in the death of two Russian Federation journalists in eastern Ukraine
and the attempted murder of another. She was also fined 30,000 RUB for crossing
the border illegally. Ms. Savchenko chose not to appeal the court decision. As of 10
May Nadiia Savchenko remains in a pre-trial detention facility in Novocherkassk,
Russian Federation. Without access to the territory of the Russian Federation,
OHCHR relies on the official statements of the Russian Federation authorities and
Ms. Savchenko’s defense lawyers. One of Ms. Savchenko’s defense lawyers
submitted a communication to the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention (WGAD) and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
Defenders. On 20 April, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation confirmed
having received a request from the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine for the transfer of
Ms. Savchenko to Ukraine in line with the 1983 Convention on the Transfer of
Sentenced Persons. According to one of Ms. Savchenko’s lawyers, on 29 April
Nadiia Savchenko formally consented to her transfer. According to her lawyers, the
health of Ms. Savchenko deteriorated significantly as a consequence of previous
hunger strikes. OHCHR is very concerned about reported breaches of due process
and fair trial rights in this case as well as the humanitarian consequences of Ms.
Savchenko’s continued detention. On 25 May, Ms. Savchenko was pardoned by the
President of the Russian Federation and transferred to Ukraine. She was released at
the same time as two Russian citizens, Aleksandr Aleksandrov and Yevgenii
Yerofieiev, who were pardoned by the President of Ukraine after being sentenced to
14 years of imprisonment for ‘waging an aggressive war’ against Ukraine51.
Nelia Shtepa
69. OHCHR continued to follow the case of Nelia Shtepa, the former mayor of
Sloviansk, Donetsk region, who remains in detention on charges related to seizure
of Sloviansk by armed groups in 201452. Due to the dismissal of the presiding
judge, who was found to have violated his oath53, the court proceedings in Ms
Shtepa’s case have re-commenced in March 2016. Ms. Shtepa remains in detention
in the Kharkiv pre-trial detention centre, where she has been held for over 22
months. During the reporting period Ms. Shtepa has had no complaints of
49 Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, and Article 6(2), Additional Protocol II to the four
Geneva Convention; Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary international humanitarian law, Volume I,
Rule 100
50 Nadiia Savchenko is a Ukrainian military pilot, who has been in detention in the Russian Federation since
July 2014, after being allegedly apprehended and transferred from Ukraine by armed groups. For more
information, see paragraph 88 of the 13th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering
period from 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraph 137 of the 12th OHCHR report on the
human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 16 August to 15 November 2015, paragraph 60 of
11th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering period from 16 May to 15 August
2015, and paragraph 54 of the 10th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering
period from 16 February to 15 May 2015.
51 This development falls outside of the reporting period, but has been exceptionally included as a critical
development.
52 See 13th HRMMU report covering 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraph 87; 12th HRMMU
report covering 16 August to 15 November 2015, paragraph 133.
53 See 12th HRMMU report covering 16 August to 15 November 2015, paragraph 135.
23
conditions of detention. OHCHR has not observed breaches of due process and fair
trial rights after the resumption of court proceedings against Ms. Shtepa.
Oleh Kalashnikov and Oles Buzyna
70. Oleh Kalashnikov, an opposition politician from the Party of Regions affiliated
with President Yanukovych, was assassinated on 15 April 2015. After one year54,
no suspects have been identified and there has been no progress in the investigation.
Similarly, the killing of chief editor of Segodnya newspaper, Oles Buzyna, on 16
April 2015, continues to be investigated. Buzyna55 was a critic of the Maidan
protests and a proponent of close ties between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
The investigation into his killing, which has been going on for over a year, has been
marred by procedural irregularities. The case has not yet been submitted to court.
Two suspects arrested on 18 June 2015 were released from detention in December
2015, subject to summonses to appear in court. In April 2015 the Minister of
Internal Affairs stated that he would personally oversee investigations into the death
of Oleh Kalashnikov and Oles Buzyna. OHCHR observes a lack of progress in
criminal cases involving persons affiliated with or perceived as political and
ideological supporters of the Government of President Yanukovych. It is essential
for justice to be impartial and to hold those responsible for the killings to account.
D. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public
disturbances
November 2013 – February 2014 demonstrations at Maidan, Kyiv
71. Two years after the mass killing of protesters and law enforcement officials at
the Maidan protests, there has been no meaningful progress in bringing those
responsible to justice, in particular individuals who were in positions of authority
and exercised control over those who shot at and killed protesters. Many former
senior officials left Ukraine for the Russian Federation. Numerous extradition and
judicial cooperation requests filed to the Russian Federation have been simply
ignored. Trial in absentia, which were introduced into the Criminal Procedural Code
of Ukraine in late 2014, are also not an option due to the strict requirement
envisaged in the Code that the suspect must be wanted by Interpol. Requests filed to
Interpol to issue international warrants for the suspects have been denied under
article 3 of its Constitution, which strictly forbids the Organization to undertake any
intervention or activities of a political character56.OHCHR notes progress made by
the Office of the Prosecutor General in relation to investigation into human rights
violations committed during Maidan protests. Despite fleeing of a large number of
suspects and loss of most of the documents and material evidence the criminal case
encompasses some 1,200 volumes, which allowed to file charges against a number
of former senior officials, including President Yanukovych, the Minister of Internal
Affairs, the Head of the Security Service57.
72. On 16 February 2016, the Sviatosynskyi District Court of Kyiv decided to
merge two episodes58 of killing 48 Maidan protestors at Instytutska street in Kyiv
on 20 February 2014 into one criminal case. In these circumstances charges against
two Berkut servicemen indicted on 24 February 2015, have been extended – they
have been accused of killing nine more protestors, whose death as established by
54 See 10th HRMMU report covering 16 February to 15 May 2015, paragraph 137.
55 See 11th HRMMU report covering 16 May to 15 August 2015, paragraph 148; 10th HRMMU report
covering 16 February to 15 May 2015, paragraph 67.
56 INTERPOL Constitution, Article 3: “It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any
intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.”
57 See 12th HRMMU report covering 16 August to 15 November 2015, paragraph 116
58 The initial episode, where two Berkut servicemen were accused with killing 39 protestors, which was
submitted to Sviatoshynskyi District Court of Kyiv on 24 February 2015 and the second episode, where
two other Berkut servicemen and a Berkut commander were accused of killing 48 protestors at Instytutska
street, in Kyiv on 20 February 2014.
24
the investigation have resulted from the same type of weapons and in the similar
circumstances. As of the date of this report they are reviewing the new case files.
73. Such decision of the court allowed to bring five accused (four servicemen and a
commander of ‘Berkut’ special police regiment) before a jury panel and may
contribute to expedite the proceedings. All those accused remain in custody and the
court continues to hear witness testimony in the case. Twenty other ‘Berkut’
servicemen, also charged with involvement in the killing of 48 protesters and
inflicting bodily injury to 80 others, are on a wanted list as they have evaded the
investigation.
74. Two ‘Berkut’ servicemen are awaiting trial for excessive use of force resulting
in the killing of three Maidan protestors at Instytutska Street and Kriposnyi Lane,
on 18 February 2014. Other servicemen have also been prosecuted for abuse of
power against Maidan protesters.
75. OHCHR is following the case of the only senior official currently undergoing
trial in relation to the Maidan events, the former head of SBU for the city of Kyiv
and Kyiv region. He is accused of leading an ‘anti-terrorist operation’ in central
Kyiv which inter alia resulted in the arson of the House of Trade Unions, aimed at
the forceful dispersal of Maidan protesters, which resulted in the death of 17 people.
On 21 April, Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv ruled to return the indictment
to the Prosecutor General for revision of inaccuracies, which the prosecution has
appealed on 28 April 2016. In particular the court came to a conclusion that while
the defendant is accused of intentional homicide of 10 persons, the indictment does
not contain specific information on time, place, modus operandi, motive of a crime
and other essential factors. The indictment according to the court contains only
statement of certain facts and list of victims. The court also ruled to extend his
custodial detention until 19 June 2016.
2 May 2014 demonstrations in Odesa
76. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, 27 individuals have been
indicted on charges under articles 115 (intentional homicide of two or more
persons, based on profit-gaining motives committed to conceal or facilitate another
crime), 263 (illegal handling of weapons) and 294 (mass disturbances) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine in relation to their involvement in the violent events
which took place on 2 May 2014 in Odesa and resulted in the death of 48 people.
OHCHR has noted that in addition to the shortcomings of the pre-trial investigation,
interference in the independence of the judiciary remains an obstacle to bringing
perpetrators to justice.
77. Despite the large number of casualties caused by the violence, only one
perpetrator, Serhii Khodiiak, an active member of ‘pro-unity’ movement, has been
identified and accused of shooting one person to death in the city centre of Odesa,
on 2 May. However, due to the pressure of other ‘pro-unity’ activists on the court,
he was released after two days in custody. Furthermore, although the pre-trial
investigation was completed in August 2015, the trial has not started. Over the
reporting period two district courts of Odesa refused to consider the case and
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Odesa Region, alleging that judges were
intimidated by both the claimant and the defendant camps, and warning of possible
clashes in the courts. On 29 February, the case was transferred to the Kyivskyi
District Court of Odesa. With only four district courts in Odesa59, should the
59 On 5 August 2015, the Court of Appeals of Odesa Region ruled to transfer the case from Prymorskyi
District Court of Odesa to Malynovskyi District Court of Odesa; on 27 January 2016, the Court ruled to
transfer the case to Suvorovskyi District Court of Odesa; on 29 February 2016, the Court ruled to transfer
the case to the Kyivskyi District Court of Odesa. The National Police launched an investigation into
allegations of pressure and interference with the judiciary under article 376 (interference with activity of
judicial authorities) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine concerning the incident of 27 November 2015, when
a group of ‘pro-unity’ supporters pressured judges in Malynovskyi District Court of Odesa not to release
25
Kyivskyi District Court also refuse to hear this case, it will be transferred to another
region. On 10 May, the Kyivskyi District Court of Odesa adjourned the preliminary
hearing for the second time due to the absence of victims and the defendant’s
lawyer. OHCHR observed approximately 50 ‘pro-unity’ activists, who behaved
aggressively toward the panel of judges, the prosecutor and a journalist from a ‘profederalism’
media website. The police presence in the courtroom was insufficient to
protect those involved in the proceedings.
78. On the other hand, the ‘pro-federalism’ supporters who were detained in
connection with the 2 May 2014 violence have been held in custody for up to two
years, pending trial. Moreover, through monitoring court hearings in the case of
‘pro-federalism’ activists accused of mass disorder in the city centre of Odesa on 2
May 2014, OHCHR noted serious shortcomings: the prosecution failed to provide
sufficient evidence against both accused citizens of the Russian Federation, it failed
to ensure the presence of witnesses and, after a year of hearings, requested to recuse
the panel of judges. Both citizens of the Russian Federation launched a hunger
strike. The panel of judges notified the General Prosecutor of Ukraine several times
about the low quality of the prosecution and reprimanded the prosecution for
delaying the proceedings. OHCHR is concerned about failure of the police to
prevent the attack of ‘pro-unity’ activists on a few ‘pro-federalism’ accused near the
court building on 10 March. The skirmish led to hospitalization of one of the
accused.
79. OHCHR is also concerned about the lack of progress in the investigation into
the House of Trade Unions fire and the failure of the fire brigade to respond. It took
the Office of the Prosecutor General almost six months to open a criminal
investigation into the negligence of the State Emergency Service of Odesa region
and another five months to charge its head under article 135 (leaving in danger) of
the Criminal Code. On 1 March 2016, the suspect fled after his deputy and two
other subordinates were detained by the police on the same charges. He has since
been put on a wanted list.
80. OHCHR welcomes the progress made in the investigation into failure of the
police to ensure public safety on 2 May 2014. On 26 February, the Office of the
Prosecutor General filed an indictment against former Head of Odesa Regional
Police, Petro Lutsiuk. He is accused of committing crimes under articles 136
(failure to provide assistance to people whose life is in danger), 364 (abuse of
authority or office) and 366 (forgery in office) of the Criminal Code. He is also
accused of not implementing a special plan (‘Volna’ - wave) aimed at counteracting
public disorder at mass assemblies and gatherings, which led to the death of 48
people and injuries of more than 200. He is also accused of intentionally leaving
people in danger. However, as of the date of this report, the court has not completed
the preliminary hearing due to procedural delays caused by the absence of the
parties to the trial and failure to duly notify all victims about the date of the court
hearing. The relatives of victims of the violence and the defendant’s lawyers
denounced the poor quality of the indictment in the case and have requested that the
court return it to the prosecution for revision.
IV. Fundamental freedoms
81. Since the Maidan events in 2014, Ukrainians have gained greater freedom to
exercise individual liberties, including their rights to freedoms of association,
peaceful assembly and expression. The last two years have seen a notable increase
in active civil society groups and volunteer engagement.
20 ‘pro-federalism’ defendants from custody on interim conditional release (for more details on the
incident see 13th HRMMU report covering 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraph 100).
26
82. At the same time, there are cases where counter-terrorism legislation has been
used to arrest and detain members of political parties, NGOs and media
professionals. Also, journalists and civil society organizations, including
humanitarian organizations, continued to face significant challenges in operating in
the conflict-affected area. Civil society actors, even those working in the areas
controlled by the Government, have described self-censorship. This includes
choosing not to discuss in public concerns related to the military occupation of
civilian homes, or media professionals limiting themselves when reporting from
areas near the contact line.
83. Almost all who publicly opposed the self-proclaimed ‘republics’ left the armed
group-controlled territories in 2014 due to intimidation and fear, including human
rights activists, members of some religious communities, media workers and civil
society. The few civil society actors remaining in these territories continued to be
targeted (see OHCHR 13th report), leading to the stifling of public scrutiny and
discourse.
A. Violations of the right to freedom of movement
84. Civilians’ freedom of movement remained restricted in the conflict-affected
area, including due to the Temporary Order and further controls imposed by the
armed groups. The period under review has been marked by two key developments:
a significant increase in the number of people crossing the contact line, reaching an
average of 30,000 people per day in mid-April 2016; and the temporary closure of
checkpoints reportedly due to deteriorating security and the first instance in which
civilians waiting to cross the contact line were killed by shelling.
85. New Government regulations concerning payments of social entitlements have
increased a sense of insecurity among people living in armed group-controlled
territories. As they can only receive their social entitlements in the Governmentcontrolled
territories, this leads to more frequent travel across the contact line as
many had to renew documentation to access entitlements, including pensions.
Persons also continue to cross the contact line to access health services, reunite with
family members, and for their livelihoods.
86. OHCHR regularly crosses the contact line and observes queues of 150 to 500
cars. At the Maiorsk entry-exit checkpoint, people reported spending up to 30 hours
in queues, often having to stay overnight in their cars between the checkpoints,
without access to water, food or sanitation facilities in an area contaminated by
UXOs and landmines. On 27 April, four civilians (three men and a woman) were
killed and at least eight (a woman, two men, 15-years-old boy, gender unknown for
the other four) were injured by shelling while queuing overnight at the Mariupol-
Donetsk transport corridor, near Olenivka, controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. The mortar shells hit an area where approximately 50 vehicles were
parked along the road. Following the incident the transport corridor was closed for
approximately one month, leaving only three operational corridors in Donetsk
region, which became severely overcrowded.
87. During the reporting period, OHCHR continued to document cases of people
detained at checkpoints by armed groups on the basis of ‘wanted lists’ or by
Government forces based on the ‘Myrotvorets’ (‘Peace-maker’) website database60.
60 It was announced that the website was closed on 13 May but was opened for access on 15 May 2016. The
website includes personal data and information available in social media about people, who are allegedly
involved in the activity of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. It is allegedly
maintained by volunteers, but is actively used by the Government forces at the checkpoints. As previously
noted by OHCHR, it not only includes armed groups members, but also the civil servants, who decided not
to move to the Government-controlled areas, as well as members of civil society who provide humanitarian
assistance in the areas controlled by armed groups. See 12th HRMMU report covering 16 August to 15
November 2015, paragraph 69.
27
OHCHR documented three new cases of civilians detained by armed groups of
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ based on such lists (See Right to life).
88. OHCHR continued receiving complaints regarding corruption at the
checkpoints, whereby bribes are demanded or goods confiscated to ease passage.61
In a few cases, when passengers say they will complain to the ‘Headquarters of the
Anti-Terrorist Operation’ hotline, they have been allowed to pass freely.
89. The situation of civilians in Luhansk region is particularly severe as there are
still no functioning official vehicle crossings between Government and armed
group-controlled territories. On 8 April, due to the deterioration of the security
situation, the Government temporarily closed the Stanychno Luhanske entry-exit
checkpoint, which was the only operational crossing in Luhansk - a pedestrian
crossing over a collapsed bridge. On average, between 3,000 and 5,000 people use
this crossing daily. Civilians started taking roundabout routes, with a high risk of
exposure to ERW and UXO. On 30 April 2016, the ‘Headquarters of the Anti-
Terrorist Operation’ of Ukraine re-opened the crossing in Stanychno Luhanske.
90. The Government’s attempt to open an additional, vehicular transport corridor in
Luhansk region with the entry-exit checkpoint in Zolote, on 31 March, has been
unsuccessful. The armed groups of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ let civilians
onto their territory and proceeded to block their further movement, claiming they
had agreed to the opening of a different corridor, which would also allow cargo62.
Consequently, 179 people were trapped for several hours between checkpoints
controlled by the Government and the armed groups of the ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’. Some civilians reported being verbally assaulted by members of the
armed groups. Reportedly, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the
Regional State Civil Military Administration organized buses to take people back
and put them up in tents for the night. As of 15 May 2016, the corridor remained
closed. OHCHR calls for additional checkpoints to be opened, for them to remain
operational to the maximum extent possible, and for simplified procedures to be
adopted to facilitate more efficient movement of civilians.
B. Violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief
91. Overall, during the reporting period, the majority of religious communities in
Ukraine could exercise their freedom of religion or belief. However, law
enforcement failed to ensure effective investigations into the few incidents
concerning violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief were documented.
92. According to a Muslim religious leader, on 5 February 2016, in Vinnytsia city,
worshippers leaving the Islamic cultural centre (which also serves as a mosque)
following Friday prayers, were confronted by 10 officials from SBU and the
Migration and State Border Services. They were requested to present their
identification documents and allowed to leave but the officials then inspected the
premises of the centre without providing grounds for such action. The Muslim
community has been uniquely targeted for such ID-checks and inspections of places
of worship.
93. On 24 March 2016, in Cherkasy city, at the beginning of the Jewish holiday of
Purim, graffiti were found on a building in the city centre (calling for “Death to the
Jews” and alleging that “the Jews have occupied Ukraine”). The same night, a
wreath that had been laid by the Israeli Minister of Justice at the Holocaust
memorial in Kyiv was burnt down. A representative of the Jewish community also
reported that in Kyiv, graffiti of swastikas were often painted on Jewish
kindergartens and schools. The community is not aware of investigations into these
incidents, despite security camera footage of the incidents being available.
Territory controlled by armed groups
61 HRRMU interview, 3 April 2016.
62 HRMMU meeting, 22 April 2016.
28
94. The situation of minority Christian communities in armed group-controlled
territories remained precarious. Three members of the Jehovah Witnesses
community were captured63 in Horlivka, on 17 January, by the ‘ministry of state
security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, and released on 16 February. While in
captivity, the victims were interrogated and accused of being members of a
“prohibited” “sect”64. Although the Jehovah Witnesses in Horlivka continue holding
meetings, the number of parishioners regularly attending the church has decreased.
During the reporting period, OHCHR was informed that the majority of one of the
Christian Charismatic communities had to leave Luhansk in 2014 because they
were persecuted by the armed groups65.
95. On 18 March 2016, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ‘national council’ passed a
‘draft law’ on ‘freedom of consciousness and religious unions’, which is not
publicly available. A representative of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ stated that
“1400 religious organizations were registered in Donbas [before 2014], the majority
of which were imposed from abroad”, adding they were “mainly sects, which aim to
brainwash people” 66. Religious communities that continue to operate in the territory
controlled by armed groups fear that the ‘law’ may announce a new wave of
persecution against them, as was observed after the adoption of the ‘constitution’ in
May 201467. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Muslim, Jewish, Greek-
Catholic and other religious minorities in areas controlled by the armed groups has
significantly decreased. OHCHR recalls that religious minorities should be
respected in their freedom of religion or belief without any administrative
registration procedures68.
96. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate continued facing
intimidation in the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. In February 2016, two
representatives of the ‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
demanded that a local priest in the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ sign a ‘cooperation
agreement’. A priest stated that parishioners did not feel safe at their place of
worship and were sometimes the targets of insults from local residents and the
armed groups.
C. Violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
97. On 19-22 February 2016, people across Ukraine held assemblies69 to
commemorate the two-year anniversary of violent clashes and civil unrest that led
to the death of over 100 people on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in
Kyiv. OHCHR monitored the assemblies across the country, observing their largely
peaceful nature. Law enforcement appeared well-prepared to address possible
provocations and generally did not interfere with the assemblies.
98. However, OHCHR observed increased tensions between ‘pro-unity’ and ‘profederalism’
activists in Odesa. ‘Pro-unity’ activists acted aggressively during mass
gatherings on 27 March, 2 April and 10 April, leading to clashes with ‘profederalist’
protesters. OHCHR observed that police failed to ensure adequate
security, impacting most severely ‘pro-federalism’ supporters, a majority of which
were elderly and female.
63 For more information, see 13th HRMMU report covering 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraph 123.
64 HRMMU interview, 29 February 2016.
65 HRMMU interview, 18 March 2016.
66 Official Site of the National Council of the Donetsk People’s Republic, “Member of Parliament Nikolai Ragozin urges
action to prevent the activities of destructive religious organizations on the territory of the DPR,” 24 March 2016, (accessible
at: http://dnrsovet.su/deputat-nikolaj-ragozin-prizval-ne-dopustit-deyatelnosti-destruktivnyh-religioznyh-organizatsij-naterritorii-
dnr/)
67 See 4th HRMMU report covering 8 June to 15 July 2014, paragraph 156.
68 Thematic report of the UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues, A/68/268, paragraph 61.
69 HRMMU interview, 19-22 February 2016.
29
99. During the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed supporters of ‘anti-Maidan’70
in Zaporizhzhia, who claimed that their fear of being assaulted by ‘pro-Maidan’
supporters and the inaction of police had resulted in a total absence of ‘anti-Maidan’
gatherings in Zaporizhzhia and Melitopol. On 21 February 2016, ‘anti-Maidan’
demonstrators from Melitopol who gathered in Zaporizhzhia to protest against the
demolition of a Lenin monument were physically prevented by ‘pro-Maidan’
supporters from conducting a gathering, which resulted in clashes and injuries of
several ‘anti-Maidan’ protesters. The police did not intervene. During the clashes,
OHCHR witnessed an elderly woman lying on a bench while a ‘pro-unity’ activist
threatened her. In a conversation with OHCHR, police officers observing the
incident openly refused to protect the ‘anti-Maidan’ activists, referring to them as
“separatists”. OHCHR interviewed a participant in the demonstration71 who claimed
to have been illegally arrested and taken to the Zaporizhzhia Regional SBU where
was allegedly interrogated without the presence of a lawyer, and intimidated. On 22
April 2016, the leader of the ‘Union of Left Forces’ was physically prevented by
‘pro-Maidan’ activists from conducting a press conference in Zaporizhzhia. He was
assaulted by ‘pro-Maidan’ supporters and received bodily injuries in front of the
police officers who intervened but did not apprehend the assailants. OHCHR
interviewed an associate of the victim who was also beaten by ‘pro-Maidan’
activists; he stated that about 15 police officers were present nearby but did not
react. The prosecutor’s office in Zaporizhzhia region conducted an inquiry into the
allegations, but found that no violations had taken place.
100. Overall the celebrations on 1, 2 and 9 May across Ukraine passed
relatively calmly with no major incidents reported and with heavy police presence
securing the main localities. In larger cities on 9 May, including Kyiv, Odesa, Lviv,
Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk, tensions did however lead to skirmishes between
demonstrators with Communist symbols and flags, and the St. George ribbon
(associated with ‘anti-Maidan’ and pro-federalist camps) and people of opposing
views, including members of the Azov Civil Corps in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv. The
police prevented several incidents from escalating by isolating aggressive
demonstrators. In Odesa and Mykolaiv police detained mostly ‘pro-federalism’
supporters and did not respond adequately to breaches of public order committed by
‘pro-unity’ activists. In several instances, the police asked demonstrators to take off
the St. George ribbon and explained the legal prohibition on the use of Communist
symbols and flags72. According to the Head of National Police, 100 persons were
detained throughout Ukraine, and the deputy Minister of Internal Affairs reported
that six police officers were injured. They also reported that most protesters were
detained for using prohibited Communist symbols and distributing ‘provocative’
leaflets.
101. OHCHR was informed that the SBU in Odesa conducted house
searches and interrogated ‘pro-federalism’ activists on 2 and 9 May, thus preventing
them from participating in the commemorative demonstrations. Furthermore, during
the 2 May commemoration, police in Odesa closed the symbolic Kulykove Pole
square, where 42 pro-federalists died, for relatives of the victims and ‘profederalism’
supporters intending to lay flowers. This was done allegedly after
receiving two bomb threat calls. OHCHR notes that law enforcers in Odesa have
also in the past used allegations of bomb threats to prevent participation of ‘profederalism’
activists in public events.
Territory controlled by armed groups
102. OHCHR continued to observe an absence of open and free assemblies
in territories controlled by armed groups. The space to articulate alternative views is
70 HRMMU interview, 21 February 2016.
71 HRMMU interview, 24 February 2016.
72 Law of Ukraine "On condemning the communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in
Ukraine and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols", No. 317-VIII of 9 April 2015.
30
severely limited and people are concerned that they may be ‘arrested’ if they
organize protests or assemblies against the policies of the armed groups.
103. The only assemblies that OHCHR observed in the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ have been in support of the local
authorities. In April, a few dozen young people organised two protests in front of
the OSCE office in Luhansk, calling the OSCE staff “agents of Kyiv” and accusing
them of encouraging the conflict. There are reasons to believe that the armed groups
organized these rallies, as all demonstrators arrived at the same time at the OSCE
office and did not appear to be informed about the substance of their demands nor
OSCE’s mandate.
104. Attempts to organize public protest to express disagreement with
actions or decisions of the armed groups have been met with restrictions. For
instance, OHCHR interviewed a coal miner who explained that, in December 2015,
in Makiivka, mine workers organized a protest to denounce their deteriorating
working conditions, the low or partial and irregular salaries, and violations of safety
rule.73 The ‘ministry of state security’ threatened the protesters and seven of them
were deprived of their liberty and subjected to forced labour. The ‘ministry of state
security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ then prohibited miners to protest.
105. On 9 April 2016, OHCHR monitored a demonstration in Donetsk
celebrating two years since the establishment of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
observing several thousand protesters gathered near the ‘house of government’
(former regional administration) and along nearby streets. Each group of
demonstrators was organized by an entity in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, such
as universities, districts, professional unions, and departments of the ‘republic’.
When asked about the purpose of the gathering many people were not able to
provide an answer, indicating that demonstrators may have been requested or
compelled to participate. There was a presence of ‘police’ and some uniformed
men, and the central street and a few others streets were blocked by the ‘police’. No
public unrest of violence has been reported. A similar situation was observed during
the 1 May demonstrations, where approximately 2,000 people were assembled
representing their respective professional unions, educational institutions and the
‘communist party of the Donetsk people’s republic’. The participants were chanting
“No to fascists”.
D. Violations of the right to freedom of association
106. In Kharkiv, OHCHR observed an increasing number of incidents
involving political and activist groups. These groups appear to be employed by
political and business actors to suppress political and social demands of the
populace through intimidation and violence.
107. In Dnipropetrovsk, the space to articulate alternative views,
particularly support to communism, remained limited. OHCHR interviewed74 the
leader of two organizations who stated that after March and April 2014, he and
members of his organization were subjected to threats and attacks by right-wing
activists. The State Registration Service within the Ministry of Justice submitted a
claim to the Dnipropetrovsk circuit administrative court with a request to prohibit
the activities of both organizations, accusing their representatives of publically
campaigning against the territorial integrity of Ukraine during demonstrations in
2014. The head of the organization claimed that SBU had conducted approximately
60 searches in the apartments of members of the NGO but had not brought charges
against them.
108. In Dniprodzerzhynsk, OHCHR is following the case of two members
of the ‘Communist party’ who were charged with trespassing the territorial integrity
73 HRMMU interview, 11 March 2016.
74 HRMMU interview, 23 March 2016
31
of Ukraine and unlawful possession of weapons in September 2014. Both were held
in custody in the Dnipropetrovsk SIZO until 19 April 2016 when the court released
them on bail. OHCHR observed that the case was marked by procedural violations.
Territory controlled by armed groups
109. Civil society organizations, including human rights defenders, cannot
operate freely or in the territory controlled by armed groups. Some Donetsk
residents informed OHCHR that they were being prosecuted (or afraid of being
prosecuted) by the ‘ministry of state security’ for their pro-Ukrainian views or
previous affiliation with Ukrainian NGOs.
110. In the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, there is allegedly a continuing
process whereby ‘state employees’, ‘officials’, coal miners, doctors, and teachers
are compelled to join the so-called ‘public movement’ ‘Free Donbas’ (‘Svobodnyi
Donbass’). The NGO’s website is frequently updated, and members’ names are put
online, raising concerns about their security should they wish to cross the contact
line. OHCHR received information from residents of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ that members of armed groups demand that employees of companies
operating in armed group-controlled territory either join the above ‘NGO’ or resign.
Allegedly, members of armed groups, accompanied by representatives of the ‘Free
Donbas’, conduct visits to offices and businesses to strongly advertise employees
join the ‘public movement’. Most report joining so as to not lose their jobs.
OHCHR is also aware that students of Donetsk State University of Management
have been forced to join the ‘Young Republic’ association.
111. OHCHR continued to follow the deprivation of liberty by the armed
groups of a citizen journalist from Kyiv, detained in early 2016, and a man with
open pro-Ukrainian views who was captured in 2015. A religious scholar detained
in January 2016 remains deprived of his liberty and continues to be denied access to
legal counsel. Meanwhile, the co-founder of a humanitarian organization who was
deprived of his liberty in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ was released75.
E. Violations of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
112. Journalists face restrictions when covering conflict-related issues on
the territories under Government control including increased pressure on journalists
by the owners of media outlets, as well as self-censorship of journalists working
near the contact line.
113. Journalists and civil society activists who criticise various state
authorities may also be targeted for investigation. On 25 March 2016, the General
Prosecutor’s Office opened criminal proceedings against the NGO Anticorruption
Centre76. Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv granted prosecutors the power to seize
the documents in possession of the NGO and allowed them to inspect their financial
records. On 11 May the General Prosecutor’s Office reportedly addressed
Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv requesting permission to access further
documents of the organization. The NGO is well known for its public statements on
anti-corruption, and believes that they have been targeted in retaliation. Reportedly
no illegalities have been confirmed at this stage. A well-known TV host whose
political talk shows provided a platform for participants to express diverse opinion,
including heavy criticism of authorities, had his work permit cancelled on 26 April
and went on a two-day hunger strike after deeming this cancellation “politically
motivated”. Some media experts believe77 such behaviour by law enforcement and
state bodies is meant to obstruct independent and critical journalism.
114. In Zaporizhzhia, the ‘Social Zaporizhzhia’ NGO has faced pressure
from the Zaporizhzhia Regional SBU. In December 2015, four members of the
75 See 13th HRMMU report covering 15 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraphs 136-139, 143-147.
76 HRMMU interview, 22 April 2016.
77 HRMMU interview, 27 April 2016.
32
NGO were granted witness status in a terrorism case, where they are expected to
testify about the activities of the NGO and whether they carried out acts against the
territorial integrity of Ukraine. One of the members told OHCHR that the NGO has
suspended all public activity, fearing that they may “go from being witnesses to
becoming the accused”78.
115. OHCHR has monitored attacks on the offices of three TV channels:
‘Inter’, ‘TV 17’ and ‘TRK Ukraina’. According to media reports, on 21 February
2016, unknown individuals attacked TV 17 journalists. In addition, the channel’s
office was partially destroyed and equipment looted. On 22 April a group of young
people entered the lobby of the office of the TV channel ‘TRK Ukraina’ and
scattered leaflets with the inscription: “There will be blood.” On 25 February
around 50 people associated with the civil corps of the Azov regiment blocked the
building of the largest Ukrainian TV channel Inter. This was apparently triggered
by explicit remarks on air by a Russian journalist working at Inter, perceived as
offensive towards those who died during the Maidan events. The previous day, the
SBU had forcibly returned the journalist to the Russian Federation following her
statements on air. In all three cases the police either launched an investigation or
opened criminal proceedings against suspects for the obstruction of journalistic
activities.
116. OHCHR continued to follow the case of two journalists79 detained in
the Zhytomyr SIZO since 24 November 2015, accused of creating a terrorist
organization. The lawyer of one of the journalists alleged procedural irregularities,
including unnecessary prolongation by the court of the pre-trial detention, which
has been extended until 25 May 2016. The indictment was filed on 28 April 2016.
The court proceedings are ongoing.
117. On 12 May 2016, the Ivano-Frankivsk city court sentenced the
journalist Ruslan Kotsaba, accused of treason and impeding the work of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine, to 3 years and 6 months of imprisonment.The court found that
Ruslan Kotsaba was preparing propaganda material on the request of Russian mass
media aimed at preventing activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. According to
the court's ruling, the judges took into account the public prosecutors’ information
on Kotsaba’s links with the armed groups. At the same time the court excluded
from the charge the accusation of high treason. The lawyers of the journalist
indicate that an appeal will be filed.
118. The Ukrainian Parliament approved amendments80 to the February
2015 law on the ban of Russian-produced films. Though minor, this and other
similar decisions indicate a tendency toward further restrictions on the free flow of
information.
119. On 10 May 2016 the Ukrainian website “Myrotvorets” published the
personal data of 4068 Ukrainian and international journalists supposedly accredited
to work in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. The information included their names,
telephone numbers and addresses. One media professional based in the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ indicated to OHCHR81 that the list includes individuals who are
not journalists and who were working in Donetsk also prior to the conflict. It is of
concern that those on the list are portrayed in the Government controlled areas as
cooperating with terrorists, something which may endanger the individuals.
OHCHR recalls the importance of ensuring that personal data is protected to avoid
misuse, and also notes that the website publishing this data is the same which
publishes data utilized by Government forces at the check-points at the contact line.
78 HRMMU interview, 22 April 2016.
79 HRMMU interview, 28 March 2016.
80 Law on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Cinematography" on movies from a state-aggressor (№ 3359)
81 HRMMU interview, 10 May 2016.
33
120. The Ministry of Information Policy established an inter-departmental
working group as part of the implementation of the Human Rights Action Plan. The
working group will propose amendments to legislation concerning freedom of
speech with the goal of harmonizing legislation in the field of media and freedom of
expression with European standards. It is vital that this process be transparent and
involves consultations with civil society.
Territory controlled by armed groups
121. In the territories controlled by the armed groups, freedom of
expression, including the ability to openly express dissenting views, remained
severely restricted. Persons living in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ know that expressing their opinion freely and publicly is not
acceptable in armed group-controlled territory. When asked why no one would
protest and publicly speak out against the ‘republics’, residents inform OHCHR that
such actions would be unimaginable.
122. On 3 March 2016, the freelance journalist Maria Varfolomieieva – who
was abducted by armed groups of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ on 9 January
2015 – was released following the exchange for a detained female member of the
armed groups. To many journalists seeking to report from the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, her prolonged deprivation of liberty was
a signal of the intolerance and danger of free opinion and expression in areas under
the control of the armed groups.
123. On 8 March 2016 a group of five Russian journalists of ‘Russia Today’,
‘Pervyi Canal’, ‘Pyatyi Canal’, ‘RIA Novosti’ came under fire near Yasynuvata
checkpoint of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ on the Yasynuvata-Horlivka
highway. Reportedly, the journalists were not injured. The journalists were
identifiable and reportedly had communicated their coordinates to the military
forces present in the area. OHCHR recalls that journalists enjoy special protection
during armed conflict under international humanitarian law.
124. On 1 May 2016, at the Kurakhove checkpoint several ‘officers’ of the
‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ denied entry to two
British and one Australian journalists working for the Turkish media outlet ‘TRT
World’ despite having received accreditation on 29 April. The reason for the denial
is not confirmed.
125. OHCHR has observed a further stifling of media providers who operate
on the territories controlled by the armed groups. In addition to the 150 websites
that were previously banned by the ‘ministry of justice’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ on 22 March 2016, the ‘ministry of information, press and mass
communications’ registered an ‘order’82 prohibiting operators and providers of
telecommunications services to disseminate information in violation of the
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ rules. According to the ‘ministry of justice’, such
restrictive measures had been taken to further protect the ‘national security of the
republic’.
126. OHCHR received information that armed groups are directly
influencing and shaping the content in local media when it comes to depicting the
leaders of the armed groups as well as the conflict-related developments. According
to local journalists only a very few Internet websites or online channels provide a
platform where people and media professionals can freely express their views
without censorship.
82 Order’ of the ‘Ministry of Information, Press and Mass Communications’ of the ‘LPR’ on March 22, 2016
№ 10-OD "On the prohibition of the dissemination of information resources that publish information
in violation of the ‘Luhansk People's Republic’ legislation and ban of broadcasting" registered in the
Ministry of Justice LC April 25, 2016 for № 181/528
34
V. Economic and social rights
127. Two years of conflict have significantly affected the enjoyment of
social and economic rights of civilians throughout Ukraine. Measures introduced by
the November 2014 decisions83 of the Government of Ukraine continue having a
detrimental impact on civilians living in the areas controlled by armed groups. The
withdrawal of all public services resulted in decreased protection and greater
vulnerability of the population. Unless registered in the Government-controlled
areas, citizens cannot access their social entitlements, bank accounts or civil
registration documents.
128. According to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, there are 1.78
million registered internally displaced persons (IDPs). Many IDPs are denied their
rights and equal protection under the law. The law on local elections of 14 July
2015 excluded IDPs from voting in the October 2015 local elections. OHCHR
interviewed a Crimean IDP who through multiple court procedures received the
right to vote in one of the rounds of the 2015 local elections. OHCHR urges the
Parliament to adopt legislative acts to ensure the voting rights of IDPs, and calls
attention to the fact that durable solutions that would ensure their integration have
not yet been developed. IDPs continue to live in great insecurity and may be at risk
of becoming second-class citizens.
129. Victims of torture, families of the missing and demobilized soldiers
have difficulties accessing necessary rehabilitation services. Adequate State
services remain largely unavailable.
130. The entire population of Ukraine has been affected by the deteriorating
economic situation. According to a World Bank report84, the ongoing armed conflict
has put a significant burden on the national budget. Military expenditure represents
an estimated 5 per cent of GDP for 2016 (almost four billion USD). On 1 March
2016, the NGO Patients of Ukraine organized a peaceful demonstration outside the
Cabinet of Ministers to raise awareness about the budget currently lacking UAH
four billion (USD 157,201.96) for life-saving medication. On 7 April, the World
Bank85 set out that the annual GDP growth rate for Ukraine in 2015 was negative 10
percent, with the sharpest decline in private consumption in all of Eastern Europe
and Central Asia86.
131. On 16 March 2016, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the national
Strategy to Overcome Poverty87, indicating that 23.8 per cent88 of the population
lived under the relative poverty line.
83 The Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of 4 November On Immediate Measures
Aimed at the Stabilization of Socio-Economic Situation in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, enacted by the
Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 875/2014 on 14 November 2014, as well as the consequent resolution
of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Nr.595 as of 7 November 2014, On the Issues of Financing of State
Institutions, Payment of Social Benefits to Citizens and Provision of Financial Support for Some enterprises
and Organizations of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
84 25 February 2016 – World Bank Workshop report: Conflict in Ukraine and the road ahead
85 World Bank, “The economic outlook for Europe and Central Asia,” 7 April 2016 (accessible at:
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2016/4/684961459973316876/Presentation-ECA-Economic-Update-April-
2016.pdf)
86 UNDP January: Socio-Economic Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
87 The Order of the Cabinet of Ministers Nr. 161-p, 16 March 2016.
88 The estimates were made in 2015.
“Why us, why us? It is not a life. We are a family of six surviving on two
pensions. Neither of us can afford medication. They would have better killed us
here than suffering like this”
- Elderly woman with cancer living in Donetsk city
35
132. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is concerned that
the continued deterioration of the economic situation in Ukraine may create
conditions that encourage the growth of human trafficking. NGOs providing
services to victims of trafficking in regions with a high influx of IDPs reported to
OHCHR that while the number of identified victims remains low, it was noted that
local men are more eager to go abroad (predominantly to the Russian Federation
and Poland) to find employment as there are very few opportunities in the region. It
is particularly concerning that due to the same factors even those who have
experienced exploitation in the past still continue to accept labour that may lead to
repeated exploitation. Traffickers are also targeting IDPs, who are often most
economically vulnerable. Currently, a counter-trafficking NGO in Kharkiv is
providing rehabilitation services to two sisters from Torez who were trafficked to
Finland and three young men from Donetsk region, who reportedly were exploited
in the Russian Federation.
A. Right to social security and protection
133. On 17 February 2016, the Parliament held its first hearing since the
start of the conflict on the situation of IDPs and citizens of Ukraine living in the
territory not controlled by the Government. Based on this hearing and in
coordination with civil society89, the Parliament adopted a comprehensive set of
recommendations, foreseeing the establishment of a central coordination body on
IDP matters. This has materialized with the establishment of a new Ministry on
temporarily occupied territories and IDPs, on 14 April 201690.
134. On 21 February 2016, the Cabinet of Ministers announced a residence
verification process for IDPs as a condition for entitlements and benefit payments.
On 16 February, the Ministry of Social Policy instructed its regional offices and
local departments to suspend all social payments for IDPs, pending verification of
their presence in Government-controlled territory, with the view to combating
fraud. Previous regulations introduced in November 2014 linked eligibility to social
entitlements (pensions, disability benefits, maternity leave and assistance to single
parents and families with more than three children), to IDP registration. As a result,
persons internally displaced but not registered as an IDP are denied entitlements,
which is in violation of the 16 October 2015 Supreme Administrative Court
decision.
135. Available information indicates that following the Cabinet of
Ministers’ decision, SBU provided regional administrations with lists of
individuals, recommending that their social entitlements be revoked pending
verification. OHCHR reviewed a list which SBU submitted to the regional
administration in Kharkiv. It seems to have been developed based on information
from the SBU database of individuals who received permits to cross the contact
line. OHCHR has interviewed IDPs in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk,
Kramatorsk and Zaporizhzhia regions about the impact of the verification process,
and has noted widespread concern about the criteria and their application.
136. According to international human rights law91, the usage of personal
data must not be discriminatory. Furthermore, even in the context of fighting
terrorism, data collection and processing should be proportionate to the aim for
which the collection and processing are foreseen. Such misuse of information about
the people who have applied for permits has adversely affected their ability to enjoy
89 Resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine ‘On recommendations of the parliamentary hearings on human rights situation of
the internally displaced people and citizens of Ukraine living in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine and the
territory uncontrolled by the Ukrainian authorities in the area of the anti-terrorist operation’, No. 4273 of 18 March 2016.
90 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 4424, 14 April 2016
91 ICCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy) of the Human Rights Committee, The
Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation,
adopted on 8 April 1988; Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism adopted by the
Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002 at the 804th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
36
their economic and social rights and raises concerns as to how such information
may be further used. OHCHR also conducted an interview92 with IDPs from Crimea
who allege their right to privacy has been violated by the administration of the
temporary facility where they reside, whose administration allegedly opened their
correspondence.
137. On 1 April, the local department of social protection in Berdiansk
published a post on its website encouraging residents of the city to verify the factual
residence of IDPs according to a published list of addresses. The representatives of
the department argued that their intent was to ease the verification process for IDPs
and avoid long queues. Yet, it is of serious concern that a host community was
encouraged by officials to provide information on IDPs in this manner, potentially
impacting prospects for local integration and exposing IDPs to negative sentiments.
The post was removed on the same day, but led to negative reactions in social
media.
138. The new regulations have had a particular impact on older persons and
people with disabilities whose limited mobility impedes their access to social
protection departments and/or pension funds to verify whether they have been
included in the lists or to prove their residence address. As a result, vulnerable IDPs
have suffered from groundless suspension of their social entitlements and pensions
without prior notification, depriving some of any means and exposing them to
impoverishment. OHCHR interviewed a woman93 with disabilities in Kramatorsk,
who is an IDP and the single parent of a 13-year-old daughter. She incidentally
discovered that she was on the “suspicion list” and, when she went to the pension
fund, found that all her other social payments had also been cut, including her
disability pension.
139. On 28 March and 5 May 2016, OHCHR and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees addressed a joint letter to the Government of Ukraine,
recommending a transparent process be put in place for IDP status verification, a
mechanism to appeal such decisions, and de-link social entitlements, which are not
connected to displacement, with IDP status. The Government of Ukraine has not yet
responded to the letter.
140. In addition, contradicting provisions of recent legislative acts further
hinder internally displaced persons from accessing their social entitlements and
rights. Amendments to the IDP law of 24 December 2015 simplified procedures for
IDP registration by cancelling the requirement to have a stamp from the State
Migration Service in their IDP certificate to prove their place of residence.
However, the Cabinet of Ministers failed to meet the three-month transitional period
to amend its bylaws and procedures to comply with the new state of legislation.
Reinstatement of benefit procedures has varied by location, creating confusion. As a
result, social protection departments at the local level still require a stamp from the
State Migration Service. At the same time, according to the amendments to the Law
“On the Freedom of Movement and free choice of residence”, which entered into
force on 4 April, the Migration Service no longer can confirm the place of
residence, as this function was delegated to the administrative service centres.
141. The requirement that IDPs be physically present to renew bank cards to
receive social entitlements, as set out in the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 167,
further discriminates against people with disabilities or limited mobility, and those
living in areas controlled by the armed groups.
Territories controlled by armed groups
142. Access to employment remains one of the biggest challenges in the
areas controlled by armed groups. According to the ‘employment centre’ in Donetsk
92 HRMMU interview, 22 April 2016.
93 HRMMU interview, 8 April 2016.
37
city, in the period from 1 January to 3 May 2016, some 29,000 people were
officially registered as unemployed, out of them only 5,600 were able to find
permanent employment.
143. Coal miners and railway employees appear to be among the most
affected by the armed conflict, as their two industries have either ceased operations
or dramatically reduced their activities. Many receive reduced salaries with severe
delays, or not at all. Most are not eligible for humanitarian assistance as they are not
considered to be of a vulnerable demographic. Railway workers in Yenakiieve and
Debaltseve have been officially registered on the Government-controlled side and
had to cross the contact line in order to get paid; however they have not received
salaries from the Ukrainian Government since February 2016. The employees are
concerned about the lack of payment as well as the lack of clarity regarding their
future. Approximately 70 per cent of the railway employees are women.
B. Civil registration and access to public services
144. Civil registration documentation, such as birth and death certificates,
issued in the territories controlled by the armed groups are not valid in Ukraine.
Such documentation remains a prerequisite to access certain types of public
services. The documents are only recognized by Ukraine after a court procedure, in
violation of international jurisprudence requiring recognition through an
administrative procedure – rather than a court.
145. The new simplified court procedure introduced by the Ministry of
Justice set out that individuals have to travel to the territory controlled by the
Government of Ukraine, pay a court fee of approximately UAH 275.60 (USD 10),
and that the process will take on average between one and three days. This has
reportedly reduced the waiting time to access entitlements conditional upon a
recognized birth certificate.
146. Interviews conducted by OHCHR show that identification documents
impact people’s access to entitlements and social services. OHCHR was informed
that orphans evacuated from areas controlled by the armed group- and former
detainees transferred from such areas often do not have identity documents, which
prevents them from accessing education, employment, humanitarian or social
assistance. While this has been known since 2014, the Government of Ukraine has
still not developed a procedure on how to restore documents. People living in the
areas controlled by armed groups who need to renew their passports face further
complications.
Territories controlled by armed groups
147. OHCHR is concerned that civilians who return to the territories
controlled by the armed groups may be at risk of discrimination and viewed as
“traitors”. According to HRMMU interlocutors, a special procedure of ‘public
voting’ can be applied to decide whether a returnee can or cannot be employed,
especially as a doctor, teacher or a civil servant.
148. Since 16 March 2016, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ started issuing
its own ‘passports’. Priority was given to those who reached the age of 16, 25 or 45
(age at which the passport is issued for the first time or requires an update) or those
who lost their identification documents. Reportedly, 34,000 ‘passports’ will be
issued by June 201694 and will be required for people to be able to vote, but will not
affect access to other public services. It is of concern that unless children aged
between 16-18 living in armed group-controlled areas cross the contact line to apply
94 Donetsk News Agency, “More than 34 thousand passports of ‘republican’ issue will be issued to young
citizens of the DPR by summer,” 16 March 2016, (accessible at: http://dan-news.info/politics/bolee-34-
tysyach-pasportov-respublikanskogo-obrazca-do-leta-poluchat-molodye-grazhdane-dnrzaxarchenko.
html)
38
and obtain Ukrainian passports, they will not have any identification documents
recognized outside the areas controlled by the armed groups.
C. Housing, land, and property rights
149. Housing, land and property rights remain a major concern for civilians
living on either side of the contact line. The Ukrainian Government has not yet
established a comprehensive response, including compensation mechanisms.
Continued fighting and occupation of houses constitute impediments for people to
permanently return to their homes. Furthermore, checking on their property is
reportedly one of the main reasons IDPs return to the conflict affected area due to
the reports of looting and further damage of civilian property.
150. During the reporting period OHCHR conducted a number of interviews
revealing the use and seizure of private houses by the Ukrainian military. OHCHR
also witnessed the military occupation of residential homes in Luhanske95. A house
was occupied from 7 January 2015 to March 2016, looted and partially damaged by
members of ‘Aidar’, ‘Dnipro-1’ battalions and soldiers of the Ukrainian armed
forces. UAF left following the victims complaint about the occupation of her house
submitted to the Department of the National Police of Ukraine, in Novoaidar.
However, the property is occupied by other groups. A private house has been used
by the military in Pshenychne village of Stanychno Luhanske district (Luhansk
oblast) since December 2014, reportedly until present time. The police have not
taken any measures following the complaints of the owner against the servicemen
occupying his home. OHCHR observes that the local police and law enforcement is
often unwilling to investigate violations of housing, land and property rights
committed by the Ukrainian military.
151. During the reporting period a resident of Sloviansk successfully
litigated damages to private housing inflicted in the course of the conflict. Unlike
previous rulings on this matter, on 15 March 2016, the Donetsk Regional Court of
Appeals in Bakhmut, ordered the State to compensate for the damage caused to a
property as a result of shelling in June 2014. Referring to domestic anti-terrorism
legislation97, the court reaffirmed the Government’s obligation to compensate for
property damage resulting from “a terrorist act” regardless of the perpetrator.
OHCHR welcomes this court decision and will monitor its implementation.
152. OHCHR welcomes the fact that on 25 March 2015 the Ministry of
Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine
created98 a working group to develop the mechanism for compensation for property
that was damaged as a result of the conflict, as envisaged in the National Human
Rights Action Plan. During the reporting period, several legislative initiatives to
pave the way for ensuring remedy for civilians whose property has been damaged
were introduced for consideration by the Parliament. OHCHR urges the
Government of Ukraine to put in place an effective mechanism for restitution and
compensation for damaged property, taking into account relevant international
human rights standards and best practices.
153. OHCHR met with IDPs residing in the collective centre on
Kustanaiska Street, in Kyiv (under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice),
including families with children, people with disabilities and elderly. The IDPs
stated that they felt discriminated based on their origin. They referred to the
disruption of communal services, such as electricity, heating and hot water, during
harsh winter conditions. OHCHR observed a similar situation in Odesa’s collective
centre where the Odesa Regional State Administration and the centre’s
95 HRMMU interview, 22 April 2016.
96 HRMMU interview, 7 March 2016.
97 Article 19 of the Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism”, No. 638-IV of 20 March 2003.
98 Order of the Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal services of
Ukraine №69 of 25 March 2016.
39
administration failed to agree upon the accommodation terms of several dozens of
IDPs with disabilities as was promised to the IDPs. As a result, at the end of April
about 50 IDPs were served with eviction notices. As of 10 May, several families
have already moved to another collective centre to avoid eviction. In these cases,
IDPs cannot fully enjoy their right to housing.
Territory controlled by armed groups
154. In the territories controlled by armed groups, looting, seizure, damage
and military use of property continues. During the reporting period OHCHR
interviewed people who reported that their property had been looted and partially or
fully destroyed by the armed groups in 2014 or 2015.
155. Some of the victims believed they were targeted due to expressing pro-
Ukrainian positions99. A couple from Alchevsk in Luhansk region reported that
their neighbour had witnessed the looting of their property by armed groups and
heard them saying that “pro-Ukrainian” were living there, using a derogatory word
(“Ukropy”). A similar case was reported by a man100 from Sverdlovsk in Luhansk
region who is a former serviceman and currently an IDP. On 27 June 2014 the man
was allegedly detained by armed groups and subsequently interrogated and tortured
by three persons who identified themselves as representatives of the Main
Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation. He alleged that the armed groups
destroyed his logistics business including 30 trucks, several stocks, garages, cars
and equipment worth 20,000,000 UAH (approximately 780,000 USD) in total.
According to the witnesses of the complete destruction of his property the armed
groups used explosive devices jeopardizing the lives of peoples residing nearby.
156. In July 2014, a businessman in Druzhkivka101 was kept for five days by
the armed groups and tortured for resisting his business expropriation and refusing
“to cooperate with new authorities”. His wife and daughter were threatened with
sexual abuse and his business and property were looted.
D. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health
157. The health care system in Ukraine generally suffered systemic
challenges prior to the conflict and the situation of patients requiring lifesaving
treatment has further deteriorated since 2014. The State budget allocated to the
health sector only covers treatment for 30 per cent of people living with HIV, 37 per
cent of patients with tuberculosis, 9 per cent of patients with hepatitis, 66 per cent
of children with cancer and 27 per cent of adults with haemophilia102. In addition,
tenders for the purchase of such treatment remains protracted, which may lead to
interruption and therefore to serious risks for the patients.
158. The need for psychological assistance remains high both for many
civilians and soldiers. OHCHR was informed about a dramatic increase in heart
diseases and cancer, on both sides of the contact line, attributed by medical
specialists to psychological hardship and stress. The Ministry of Defence reported
that out of 200,000 soldiers who obtained the status of participants in the ‘antiterrorist
operation’, only 20,000 have received psychological services. Among
civilians, children remain at particular risk and have specific psycho-social support
needs in time of conflict which are largely unmet. Statistics from a well-known
hotline for children, which averages 4,000 calls per month, shows that more than 40
per cent of the calls pertain to mental health issues.
99 HRMMU interview, 18 March 2016.
100 HRMMU interview, 5 May 2016.
101 HRMMU interview, 3 April 2016.
102 NGO Patients of Ukraine, accessible at: http://patients.org.ua/2016/03/01/uryad-spisav-pomirati-bilshe-
100-tisyach-smertelno-hvorih-patsiyentiv/
40
159. Whereas soldiers released from armed group captivity can access basic
medical diagnostics and treatment free of charge, State services for civilians remain
largely unavailable and are exclusively provided by civil society organizations.
There is a crucial need to ensure the availability of tests for hepatitis and other
blood-borne communicable diseases as conditions of detention combined with
physical torture and ill-treatment make detainees particularly vulnerable to such
illnesses. Currently, civilians who were deprived of their liberty by armed groups
and have been released are not eligible for free testing or treatment, which is
prohibitively expensive.
160. OHCHR received alarming reports about the lack of medical care in
pre-trial detention facilities, sometimes leading to death in custody; particularly
SIZO No. 7 in Mariupol, Stryzhavke SIZO No. 81 in Vinnytsia region, SIZO in
Dnipropetrovsk No. 4, pre-trial detention facilities in Zaporizhzhia and Mariupol.
Only basic medication is available for detainees and no proper diagnostic
procedures are in place. Protracted pre-trial investigations and trial proceedings
often result in detainees spending up to one year in these facilities. Without proper
medical assistance, their health deteriorates dramatically due to a combination of
poor nutrition, lack of fresh air and heating.
Territory controlled by armed groups
161. In the areas controlled by armed groups, medication remained largely
unavailable and unaffordable. While in the main cities, private pharmacies offer a
wide variety of basic medication, patients rarely can afford prescribed medication
due to limited financial resources and high prices.
162. Access to specialized care remains extremely limited. Since November
2014, due to the Government’s decisions103 on the relocation of all public
institutions, hospitals in the areas controlled by armed groups have not received
live-saving medication. According to local interlocutors, the healthcare system there
survived thanks to humanitarian assistance, which has enabled the provision of
basic medical care. In the reporting period, OHCHR received information about the
lack of HIV tests, diagnosis and anti-retroviral treatment for new patients, as well as
of tuberculosis and oncological treatment.
163. Organizations working in the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ reported that approximately 62,000 children and adults needed treatment
against cancer and that 9,810 of these patients were in a critical condition. Some
patients even come from the Government-controlled areas as the Donetsk oncology
centre used to be one of the best in Ukraine. In February 2016, hospitals in the
territories controlled by the armed groups ran out of specialized life-saving
oncological medication which had been delivered by international humanitarian
organizations in November 2015. Currently, it is no longer possible to provide
radiotherapy, and the number of surgeries has decreased by half due to lack of
equipment compared to the pre-conflict level. Moreover, 85 per cent of the
diagnosis equipment is out of order. Access to quality healthcare services is further
affected by the state of medical equipment, most of which could not be maintained
during the conflict.
164. The World Health Organisation, as well as NGOs, reported that 15,000
people living in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and 7,000 in ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ are in daily need of insulin, while the supplies are insufficient. The
103 The Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of 4 November On Immediate Measures
Aimed at the Stabilization of Socio-Economic Situation in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, enacted by the
Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 875/2014 on 14 November 2014, as well as the consequent resolution
of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Nr.595 as of 7 November 2014, On the Issues of Financing of State
Institutions, Payment of Social Benefits to Citizens and Provision of Financial Support for Some enterprises
and Organizations of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. For more information see 8th OHCHR report in the
Human rights situation in Ukraine, covering the period from 1 to 30 November 2014, paragraph 47.
41
mortality rate among children with diabetes has increased due to the fact that the
type of insulin delivered from the Russian Federation is of a different type to what
patients used to receive before the conflict104.
165. The situation in the rural areas and the outskirts of cities is even more
alarming due to the lack of professionals and/or the absence of medical facilities.
Due to the shortage of medical personnel, remaining doctors are overstretched,
telling OHCHR that they routinely receive 50-70 patients per day.
166. In Horlivka, it was reported that doctors refused to attend to elderly
people unless paid and that some were not admitted at hospital due to their age. For
instance, OHCHR interviewed a woman, whose elderly husband passed away on 27
February, after he was refused to be hospitalised due to the “lack of space for such
patients”105. The ‘authorities’ told OHCHR that anyone could receive the care free
of charge; however even on the outskirts of Donetsk civilians reported that if
admitted to the hospital, patients are expected to cover all medical expenses, which
is often unaffordable for many106.
167. The need for psycho-social services remained high. In the outskirts of
Donetsk, Horlivka and Makiivka, which continue to be shelled, OHCHR noted that
civilians, mainly women, often cry and show visible signs of distress while talking
about their lives. The situation of approximately 400,000 children living in the
territories controlled by the armed groups is most alarming, particularly as
humanitarian actors face restrictions in providing psycho-social support.
VI. Legal developments and institutional reforms
168. The reporting period was characterized by a number of legal
developments which could positively affect rights-holders. Ukraine ratified the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a
communications procedure, thus opening the way for enhanced protection of
children’s rights. The implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan,
adopted in November 2015 has started. Ukrainian citizens living in territories not
controlled by the Government of Ukraine appear to have generally benefited from
the simplified court procedure for the recognition of civil documents. The
Government established a State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) whose work is
expected to assist criminal justice reform. On the other hand, one year after its
establishment, the National Agency on the Prevention of Corruption has not started
operating. In addition, no noticeable progress has been achieved in amending the
Constitution of Ukraine.
A. Ratification of United Nations treaties
169. On 16 March, the Parliament of Ukraine ratified the Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure107.
While welcoming the recognition of the competence of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child to receive and consider individual and inter-State
communications, OHCHR notes that the ratification was accompanied by a
declaration whereby the Government stated that the application and implementation
by Ukraine of its obligations under the Optional Protocol was “limited and not
guaranteed” on territories deemed to be occupied and uncontrolled, and that this
104 HRMMU meetings on 19 and 21 April 2016.
105 HRMMU interview, 13 April 2016.
106 HRMMU interview, 20 April 2016.
107 Ukraine also ratified the 1952 ILO Social Security (minimum standards) Convention No. 102. It accepted
obligations under the following parts of the Convention: Part II – Medical care, Part III – Sickness benefit,
Part IV – Unemployment benefit, Part V – Old age benefit, Part VI – Unemployment injury benefit, Part
VII – Family benefit, Part VIII – Maternity benefit, Part IX – Invalidity benefit, and Part X – Survivor’s
benefit.
42
situation would apply until the complete restoration of constitutional order in, and
the effective control of the Government over this territory. This raises concern that
people living in Crimea and in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
controlled by armed groups may be prevented from submitting individual
communications to the Committee.
B. Implementation of the Human Rights Action Plan
170. During the reporting period, Government agencies began to implement
the National Human Rights Action Plan, adopted on 23 November 2015. The
Ministry of Justice published the quarterly implementation report gathering the
inputs of all responsible authorities. The report indicates that the implementation of
most of the 44 activities that were to be accomplished in the first quarter of 2016 is
still on-going, while some activities have been implemented ahead of the expected
period.
171. According to a preliminary OHCHR assessment and the monitoring
conducted by some civil society organizations, some activities that were marked as
completed in the report, in fact, were implemented only partially or not in
substance. One of them is the development of amendments to the national antidiscrimination
legislation. Paragraph 105(1) of the National Human Rights Action
Plan provides for the elaboration of amendments to legislation so as to bring the list
of prohibited grounds for discrimination in line with European Union directives,
including sexual orientation and gender identity. In November 2015, the Parliament
adopted amendments to the labour legislation introducing such prohibited ground in
employment relations108. OHCHR urges the authorities to also reflect this provision
in the general anti-discrimination legislation.
C. Criminal justice
172. On 29 February, the Government formally established109 the State
Bureau of Investigation (SBI)110, which is mandated to investigate crimes
committed by high-ranking officials, members of law enforcement, judges and
members of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Special Anti-Corruption
Office of the General Prosecution, as well as military crimes, with the exception of
disclosing military information constituting a state secret, which remains under the
jurisdiction of the SBU. According to the law, the Head of SBI is to be selected by a
special commission111 whose composition was finalized on 29 March. Until the
operationalization of SBI112, investigators of the relevant law enforcement bodies,
prosecution system and security service will continue exercising investigative
functions, which they were temporarily vested with, according to the transitional
provisions of the Criminal Procedural Code113. The establishment of the SBI is an
important step in the creation of an independent criminal justice system.
173. On 12 May, the Parliament made amendments to the transitional
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code modifying the conditions allowing for
criminal proceedings to be carried out in absentia114. According to the amendments,
which were enacted on the day of adoption, a lower threshold for proceedings in
108 Law of Ukraine ‘On amendments to the national labour legislation concerning harmonisation of antidiscrimination
provisions with the law of the European Union’, No. 785-VIII of 12 November 2015.
109 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers ‘On the establishment of the State Bureau of Investigation’ No. 127, of
29 February 2016.
110 Law of Ukraine "On the State Bureau of Investigation", No. 794-VIII, of 12 November 2015.
111 Selection Commission consists of nine persons: three persons chosen by the government, three by the
president and three by the parliament.
112 The Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine provides that it shall take place no later than 20 November 2017.
113 The amendments to the transitional provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code made on 12 May enable the investigators
of the prosecution system to complete the investigations in the cases that were opened before the launch of the SBI, but no
longer than two years after the SBI has started to operate.
114 Law of Ukraine ‘On amendments to legislation concerning the activity of the Prosecutor General’s
Office’, No. 1355-VIII of 12 May 2016.
43
absentia will be applicable temporarily, until 15 April 2017. The modified
conditions, however, appear to lack sufficient safeguards, which may lead to
violations of due process and fair trial rights. For instance, an individual staying in
the area of “anti-terrorist operation”, which includes the localities controlled by the
Government, may be subjected to the proceedings in absentia having no knowledge
about criminal charges against him/her.
D. Civil registration
174. The first results of the implementation of the simplified court
procedure for the recognition of births and deaths occurring in the territories
controlled by the armed groups in the east, as well as in Crimea show that during
the first two months of implementation of the relevant amendments to the Civil
Procedure Code of 4 February 2016, the Ukrainian registration authorities issued
1,085 birth certificates and 1,138 death certificates on the basis of court decisions,
which are generally in favour of the applicants.
175. OHCHR recognizes progress resulting from the amendments to the
Civil Procedure Code but is concerned about the cost of the procedure115, which
frequently appears to be prohibitive for people with limited economic means. The
National Human Rights Action Plan envisages the introduction of an administrative
procedure to recognize births and deaths occurring in the temporary occupied and
uncontrolled territories116. OHCHR encourages the Government to follow through
by implementing this measure.
E. Reform of the civil service
176. On 1 May, the law “On the civil service” of 10 December 2015 entered
into force. In general, OHCHR positively assesses the law as it enables a
comprehensive reform of the civil service system and aims to eradicate corruption
at State and local levels of government. It establishes a competitive system of
selection for all civil service positions. The law provides for clear distinction
between the civil service positions and other (political or patronage) posts. It also
introduces an institute of professional managers at the Ministries - so called
Secretaries of State. However, OHCHR remains concerned that the provisions of
the law concerning the staff selection procedure may affect the independence of the
Ombudsperson’s Office by authorising an external commission to nominate the
Chief of Staff of the institution and entitling that person to appoint other staff
members.117 This also conflicts with the existing provisions of the law “On the
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights”.
177. On 28 March, draft amendments to the law ‘On the civil service’ were
registered that would allow the Ombudsperson to recover his or her competence to
appoint staff, had been compromised by the law “On the civil service”. OHCHR
supports these amendments as they would prevent the risk of undermining the
independence of the Ombudsperson’s Office and would reaffirm the autonomy of
the institution, in accordance with the requirements of the Paris Principles118.
115 The court fees amount to 275.60 UAH.
116 Paragraphs 126(3) and 129(1) of the National Human Rights Action Plan provide that in the second quarter of 2016, the
Ministry of Justice is to elaborate “with the participation of non-governmental organizations and international experts, and
taking into account international experience (Moldova), and submit for consideration to the Cabinet of Ministers, a draft law
on amending the law of Ukraine ‘On the State Registration of Acts of Civil Status’ which shall establish administrative
procedures for the registration of acts of civil status” occurring in Crimea and in certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions where State authorities temporarily cannot exercise their powers or do not exercise their powers in full.
117 See the 13th HRMMU report covering 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraph 180.
118 See “Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism,” Principles relating to the status of national institutions
(the Paris Principles), approved by the General Assembly in 1993, annexed to General Assembly resolution, 48/134.
44
VII. Human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the city of Sevastopol119
178. Two years ago, the Russian Federation assumed control over Crimea
after a “referendum”, which was not authorized by Ukraine and had “no validity”
according to UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262, was held on the peninsula.
Since then, Crimean residents have witnessed a sharp deterioration of the human
rights situation, including the imposition of a new legal framework restrictive of
civil liberties, abductions and disappearances, the shutting down of opposition
media outlets and the silencing of dissenting voices through the initiation of
repressive measures, including abusive criminal proceedings, targeting mainly pro-
Ukrainian activists and Crimean Tatar institutions.
179. During the reporting period, the activities of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis
were banned after a ‘court’ declared the Mejlis to be an extremist organisation.
Several ‘police’ operations targeted members of the Crimean Tatar community. A
deputy head of the Mejlis was arrested. Court proceedings were held involving a
Maidan activist. Freedom of expression contributed being curtailed as one journalist
was accused under separatism charges and the Simferopol city authorities issued a
decision to ban all public assemblies.
A. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity
180. Thus far in 2016, there have been no reports of disappearances due to
possible criminal or political causes. However, nine people who went missing in
2014 and 2015 remain unaccounted for120. There are grounds to believe that they
were abducted, allegedly by members of the so-called Crimean self-defence
paramilitary group, while most were known for their pro-Ukrainian positions. There
has been no progress in investigations into the death of Crimean Tatar activist
Reshat Ametov, who was killed in March 2014 after being pulled out of a peaceful
protest by men in military-style uniforms. Likewise, the cases of ill-treatment and
torture of people illegally arrested in the run-up to, and after the March 2014
‘referendum’, remain not investigated. The failure of the authorities to follow up on
such serious cases creates an atmosphere of impunity and of insecurity, particularly
for Crimean Tatars.
181. The ‘police’ arrested two Crimean Tatars in Krasnokamianka on 18
April and four in Bakhchysarai on 12 May. They were charged for their alleged
membership in the Hizb-ut-Tahrir organization. A pan-Islamic religious group that
is considered an extremist organisation and banned in the Russian Federation but
not in Ukraine. Fourteen people in total, mostly Crimean Tatars, are currently in
custody in Crimea awaiting trial for their membership in the organization. Four
were arrested in 2015, and so far ten have been detained in 2016.
182. On 12 May, Ilmy Umerov, one of the three deputy heads of the Mejlis,
was arrested by the Russian FSB in Simferopol and charged with the offence of
making “public calls and actions aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation”, an offense which carries a prison sentence of up to 5 years.
The accusation against Mr. Umerov refers to statements he made to the Ukrainian
media on March 2016 and internet publications. He was released on the same day
but is under the obligation not to leave Crimea. Another deputy head of the Mejlis,
119 The Autonomous Republic of Crimea technically known as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol. OHCHR has not been granted access to Crimea and has no in situ presence there. It has been able to follow the
human rights situation through contacts with Crimean residents on the peninsula and mainland Ukraine, and relying on a
variety of interlocutors, including representatives of political, religious, civil society organizations, victims, relatives and
witnesses of alleged human rights violations, members of the legal profession, journalists, entrepreneurs, teachers, doctors,
social workers, human rights activists and other categories, including individuals with no specific affiliations. OHCHR has
continued to seek access to Crimea.
120 This number includes three ethnic Ukrainians and six Crimean Tatars
45
Akhtem Chiihoz, has been detained in Crimea since 2015 for his alleged role in
organizing violent protests on 26 February 2014.
183. OHCHR is increasingly worried about the growing number of largescale
‘police’ actions conducted with the apparent intention to harass and intimidate
Crimean Tatars and other Muslim believers. On 1 April, armed and masked people
entered a café located in the village of Pionerske (Simferopol district) and started
behaving rudely, destroying furniture, reportedly in search for drugs. They took
35 Muslim men, mostly Crimean Tatars, to the police ‘centre for countering
extremism’ in Simferopol. The men were detained four hours, during which they
were interrogated, photographed, asked what form of Islam they followed and what
mosque they attended. Their fingerprints and DNA samples (saliva) were taken.
They did not have access to legal counsel. They reported seeing other Muslim men -
Chechens, Dagestanis, Azeris - who had previously been detained. Before being
released, all had to sign protocols stating they had no complaints against the police.
Attempts were reportedly made to recruit some as police informants. The
Crimean ‘prosecutor’ declared on 2 April 2016 that actions of a ‘preventive’
character had been conducted in various night clubs and places of entertainment in
the peninsula, stating that the police were looking for people who appeared in
various ‘wanted’ lists.
184. On 6 May 2016, about 50 armed men stormed into a mosque in
Molodizhne village of the Simferopol district after Jumu’ah service (Friday
prayers). According to a Crimean Tatar lawyer, approximately 100 Muslims were
taken in an unknown direction. Later, all were released but issued summonses to
appear before the police in the coming days.
185. On 7 May 2016, the ‘police’ detained 25 Muslim men at a central
market in Simferopol. The action was reportedly linked to the search for suspects in
a murder case which occurred in Russia’s Krasnodar region. There was no
explanation of the reason why Muslim residents had been targeted. After being
interrogated, they were released and no charges were brought against them.
B. Minority and indigenous peoples’ rights
186. On 26 April, the ‘supreme court of Crimea’ declared the Mejlis - a selfgoverning
body of the Crimean Tatar people - to be an extremist organization and
banned its activities in Crimea. In addition to prohibiting any public activity and the
use of bank accounts, the decision means that the estimated 2,500 members of the
national and local Mejlis bodies can now incur criminal liability and could face up
to eight years in prison for belonging to an organization recognized as ‘extremist’.
The judgment was passed following a petition filed on 15 February 2016 by the
‘prosecutor of Crimea’ who accused the Mejlis of inciting violence and actions
aimed at disrupting the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Earlier, on 13
April 2016, the ‘prosecutor of Crimea’ had suspended the activity of the Mejlis
pending the ‘supreme court’ decision and the Ministry of Justice of the Russian
Federation had included the Mejlis in the general list of public and religious
associations whose activity in the Russian Federation has been suspended.
187. The chairman of the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, informed OHCHR that
prior to the Mejlis ban, on 19 February, a majority of its members (23 out of 33)
had given him the power to issue decisions on behalf of this institution if
“insurmountable circumstances” would prevent its normal functioning. Using this
authority, Mr. Chubarov set up on 26 April a 9-member “special council”121 with
decision-making powers, which have assumed the functions of the Mejlis. The
council is based in Kyiv.
188. OHCHR considers that the decision to outlaw the Mejlis confirms the
significant restrictions already imposed by the de facto authorities on this institution
121 The “special counsel” includes Mustafa Dzhemilev and eight Mejlis members, including Refat Chubarov,
46
since March 2014. The ‘judgment’ refers to Russian Federation anti-extremism
legislation of 2002, which allows for a wide interpretation of what may constitute
extremism and unduly restricts internationally recognized freedom of speech
standards. In addition, the ‘ruling’ appears to be based on prejudicial evidence and
could be perceived as a collective punishment against the Crimean Tatar
community.
C. Due process and fair trial rights
189. OHCHR has been following legal proceedings involving Andrii
Kolomiiets, a Maidan activist arrested in the Russian Federation on 15 May 2015,
and transferred to Crimea (Simferopol), where he has been held in custody since 13
August 2015. A Ukrainian citizen from the region of Kyiv, he is accused of murder
or attempted murder of a law enforcement officer during the Maidan protests in
Kyiv and of possession of drugs. If found guilty, he risks a prison sentence of up to
20 years. During a court hearing, on 30 March, Mr. Kolomiiets’ lawyer stated his
client had been tortured following his arrest, which was allegedly confirmed by a
witness of the defence. The lawyer also claimed that the charges had been
fabricated and that Mr. Kolomiiets was forced to testify against Oleksandr
Kostenko.
190. The Kolomiiets case follows a pattern observed in the Kostenko case
and the legal proceedings against the deputy head of the Mejlis and six other
Crimean Tatars122. All have been convicted or indicted on the basis of legislation
introduced after the March 2014 ‘referendum’ for facts which occurred before that
date. This raises serious concerns of compliance with the principle of legality, and
particularly the retroactive application of the law.
D. Violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
191. On 7 March 2016, the ‘head’ of the Simferopol city administration
prohibited by decree all rallies and other public events on the territory of the city,
with the exception of those organized by the de facto and local authorities.
Restrictions to public events - which have been applied since 22 November 2015
due to the state of emergency proclaimed by the de facto authorities following the
interruption of energy supplies from mainland Ukraine123 - were amended to enact a
total ban.
192. This blanket prohibition of public gatherings is the latest in a pattern of
serious violations of the fundamental freedom to hold peaceful public assemblies.
No recent deterioration of public order in Simferopol would justify such a drastic
measure.
193. In the other Crimean territorial unit, the city of Sevastopol, a protest
action planned by the “Union of Entrepreneurs of Sevastopol” on 15 April was
banned by reference to a decree of the Governor imposing a state of emergency
limiting the conduct of public events in the city of Sevastopol as of 22 November
2015. However, the protestors who intended to criticize the policy decisions of the
Governor of Sevastopol in the socio-economic sphere, defied the ban. They
conducted their protest rally, which was peaceful and did not lead to any ‘police’
intervention.
E. Violations of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
194. On 1 April 2016, a new television channel (‘Millet’) in the Crimean
Tatar language started satellite broadcasts from Crimea. Ruslan Balbek, a ‘deputy
prime minister’ of the de facto government, declared that the aim of the channel
was to counter “anti-Russian propaganda.”
122 See 13th HRMMU report covering 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraph 187.
123 See 13th HRMMU report covering 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraphs 199-200
47
195. On 1 April, during a search at the Department of All-Ukrainian
Shevchenko Society “Prosvita” (“Enlightenment”) in Sevastopol, Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB) officers seized over 250 books. FSB officials stated that 18
copies of 9 editions figured in the federal list of extremist material, claiming the
confiscated literature was meant to propagate “Ukrainian nationalism and separatist
ideas among the inhabitants of Russia.”
196. On 19 April, Mykola Semena, a contributor to a news site about
Crimea run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) was arrested in Crimea
by the 'police' acting upon a request of the ‘prosecutor of Crimea’. He was accused
of issuing “calls for undermining the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation
via mass media” and faces up to 5 years in prison. After being interrogated, Mr.
Semena was released but ordered as a pre-trial measure of restraint not to leave the
peninsula while investigations are underway. On the same day, the 'police' also
searched the homes of several local journalists and confiscated computers and data
allegedly proving that materials of an extremist character had been under
preparation.
F. Violation of the right to freedom of movement
197. In addition to the absence of air, maritime or railway links between
mainland Ukraine and Crimea, freedom of movement was further restricted by a
decision taken on 1 April 216 of the de facto authorities affecting the use of
vehicles. All Crimean residents were required to re-register their vehicles by
switching to Russian number plates by 1 April 2016, or face administrative
sanctions, including the prohibition to use their vehicle for up to three months.
OHCHR is aware of cases where people who temporarily left for mainland Ukraine
before April 2016 without having changed their number plates were prohibited from
returning to the peninsula with their vehicles after 1 April 2016. Another worrisome
aspect of this decision is that re-registration is conditioned upon the possession of a
passport of the Russian Federation. Those who have refused Russian Federation
citizenship (and passports) will thus be denied the possibility to use a vehicle.
G. Transfers of persons deprived of their liberty outside of
Crimea
198. According to several sources, including the Ukrainian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, at least 179 prisoners were transferred from Crimea to penitentiary
institutions in the Russian Federation since March 2014. The majority of cases
concern people who were sentenced in Crimea before Ukraine ceased exercising
effective control over the peninsula. This raises serious concerns about the
retroactive application of laws. Moreover, while many were later amnestied under
Ukrainian law, the de facto authorities have refused to release them.
199. A number of people transferred to the Russian Federation had been
arrested by the de facto authorities after the March 2014 ‘referendum’, including
Oleh Sientsov, Oleksandr Kolchenko, Hennadii Afanasiev and Oleksii Chyrnii, all
arrested in Simferopol in May 2014 and sentenced for terrorism by Russian
Federation courts124. Transfers to remote facilities, often difficult to reach from
Crimea, endanger the family links of detainees.
200. According to a report of the de facto ‘Crimean Ombudsperson’ for
2014, 22 convicts serving their sentences in Crimea filed petitions to be extradited
to Ukraine after the March 2014 ‘referendum’ and 18 rejected Russian citizenship
in writing. However, information at the disposal of OHCHR indicates that no
prisoners have yet been sent back to mainland Ukraine.
124 Oleh Sientsov is believed to be in Yakutsk, Oleksandr Kolckenko in Kopeiska (Chelyabinsk region), and Gennady
Afanasiyev in Mikuni (Republic of Komi). Aleksey Chirnyi is believed to be in a psychiatric hospital in Moscow since
August 2015.
48
H. Conscription into military service
201. A representative of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation stated
on 31 March that close to 2,000 Crimean residents would be called to serve in the
army in the spring of 2016. He added that, as in 2015, Crimean conscripts would
serve on the territory of the Crimean peninsula. Crimean Tatar representatives told
OHCHR that members of their community had received military notifications and
that failure to present themselves at recruiting centres could expose them to criminal
sanctions.
I. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health
202. On 3 April, a Crimean woman died as a result of delays in getting
medical treatment. The woman sought to be admitted to a public hospital in
Simferopol but was initially refused access because she did not have a medical
insurance. It should be noted that one can only benefit from medical insurance if
she or he possesses Russian Federation citizenship and a Russian passport, which
the woman had rejected in 2014. After her condition worsened due to high blood
pressure, she was admitted to the hospital but died of a heart attack in the reception
room. OHCHR documented a similar case occurred in December 2015125. OHCHR
recalls that the refusal to hospitalize anyone with a serious health condition -
including due to his or her origin or status, such as citizenship - constitutes a grave
violation of the internationally protected right to the highest attainable level of
physical and mental health.
VIII. Conclusions and recommendations
203. Only the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements will result in
conditions allowing due respect for international human rights norms. In order to
ensure that Ukraine’s international human rights and humanitarian law
commitments have a genuine impact for individuals, OHCHR has provided support
to the Government to develop the National Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan,
and will continue to monitor its implementation. It will expand its work to further
support and advise the Government, parliament, the Ombudsman Institution, civil
society and the international community on means and ways to ensure that
recommendations made by the UN Human Rights mechanisms, as well as OHCHR
through its reporting, are transformed into action that bring about meaningful
change in the protection of human rights.
204. OHCHR has already provided advisory services by commenting on a
number of draft pieces of legislation including on missing persons, the civil service
and advocated for legal amendments regarding freedom of movement for civilians
and equal protection under the law for IDPs. By highlighting where draft legislation
falls short of international standards, OHCHR has assisted the Government in
complying with its international obligations. This has bolstered the protection
afforded under Ukrainian domestic legislation. By further monitoring the
implementation of legislation, OHCHR is working to ensure that all people in
Ukraine benefit from equal protection under the law, particularly those in conflictaffected
areas.
205. Ukraine has an important reform agenda, that OHCHR will continue
monitoring, built around strengthening democratic institutions and public trust and
fighting corruption. The success of reforms will depend, in large part, on the ability
to establish an independent justice system, where judges will feel protected and be
able to work free from political interference and other forms of pressure aimed at
influencing judicial decision-making.
125 See 13th HRMMU report covering 15 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraph 195.
49
206. OHCHR has also advocated on critical issues which may threaten to
undermine human rights, including equal access to civil documentation,
incommunicado detention and the use of torture and ill-treatment, and arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, among others. OHCHR’s advocacy has yielded an
improvement in some of these areas: conditions of detention in certain locations has
improved following OHCHR visits, the adoption of a simplified court procedure for
the recognition of civil documents for births and deaths in armed group-controlled
areas, and transfers of pre-conflict detainees from armed group-controlled areas to
Government-controlled territory by facilitating the work of the Ombudsperson’s
Office.
207. Monitoring the human rights situation in Ukraine and engaging with
relevant authorities has also allowed OHCHR to identify areas where the
international community can focus its support. Particular attention and resources
have been dedicated to working with humanitarian actors to ensure that OHCHR’s
human rights findings could be utilized to shape a protection-focused response to
address the needs of the most vulnerable in the conflict-affected population.
208. Bringing a meaningful end to hostilities in the eastern regions of
Ukraine and fully complying with the provisions of the Minsk Agreements is
critical and the only viable strategy for achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict.
The parties to the conflict, as well as influential States, must ensure that civilian
protection and accountability for violations and abuses of human rights and
violations of international humanitarian law are discussed during the Minsk Talks.
The restoration of full control by the Government of Ukraine over parts of the
border with the Russian Federation in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions, the withdrawal of foreign fighters, pull-out of all heavy weaponry, pardon
and amnesty through law and with due regard for human rights is critical. OHCHR
reiterates that an environment conducive to the promotion and protection of human
rights in Ukraine – and in particular in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea –
depends on respect for General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the territorial
integrity of Ukraine.
209. OHCHR’s civilian casualty documentation work has also acted as a
reference for many international – and national – actors seeking to understand the
human cost of the ongoing armed conflict. The statistics and analysis provided by
OHCHR on civilian casualties, the location of each incident, and disaggregated data
on the cause of death or injury can also help inform civilian casualty mitigation
efforts by the Ukrainian armed forces and armed groups.
210. OHCHR’s monitoring and reporting from Donetsk and Luhansk
regions serves to inform policy and decision-makers, as well as Ukrainian’s at large,
about the realities of life under armed group control and the socio-economic
conditions of those living in close proximity to the contact line. OHCHR has acted
as a link between detainees in Government facilities and their families in armed
group-controlled areas. OHCHR has also worked to maintain links between people
across the contact line, through conducting cross-line field visits, monitoring the
freedom of movement, and advocating for free and safe passage of civilians.
211. OHCHR has issued recommendations in each of its public reports.
These recommendations have served as the foundation for OHCHR’s engagement
with Government and armed groups toward respect human rights standards. The
recommendations draw from OHCHR’s interviews with civilians living on either
side of the contact line, their immediate protection needs and long-term human
rights concerns. They include a number of immediate and medium-term domestic
human rights measures that could contribute to the outcome of sustainable peace
and address systemic human rights abuses and violations, as any durable solution to
the ongoing crisis must also address the underlying nature of human rights abuses
and violations in Ukraine. Recommendations made in OHCHR reports on the
human rights situation in Ukraine published since April 2014, which have not yet
50
been acted upon or implemented, remain valid. OHCHR calls upon all parties to
also implement the following recommendations:
212. To the Government of Ukraine:
a) The Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Internal Affairs to ensure that
its armed and constituent forces take all feasible precautions in attack,
and protect civilians and persons hors de combat;
b) Investigate and provide remedies in relation to all incidents of damage,
confiscation and looting of property, including by the Ukrainian armed
forces; establish a mechanism for restitution and compensation for
damaged property, taking into account international human rights
standards and best practices;
c) The General Prosecution and Military Prosecution to ensure equal
treatment under the law, including through uniform charging of
criminal conduct and through requesting proportional sanctions;
d) The ‘Anti-Terrorism Operation’ Prosecutor’s Office to conduct
effective, independent and prompt investigation of all allegations against
officials accused of extrajudicial killing, arbitrary detention, torture and
other forms of ill-treatment, inhuman detention conditions, denial of the
right of access to lawyer and doctor;
e) The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) to treat all persons detained in
the context of the ‘anti-terrorism operation’ humanely and without
adverse distinction in compliance with binding international human
rights law and standards;
f) The SBU to cease the practice of extracting confessions or selfincriminating
statements under duress and to immediately release any
individuals in unlawful detention;
g) The Ministry of Justice and Penitentiary Service to facilitate contact of
detainees with the outside world, including through taking measures to
ensure that detainees whose families are in armed group-controlled
areas can communicate with their relatives at regular intervals, both
through correspondence and receiving visits;
h) The Government to establish an independent and impartial, centralized
State authority for tracing missing persons and identifying human
remains, with sufficient capacity and reach to carry out its mandate
effectively;
i) The Ministry of Justice to initiate the waiving of the court processing fee
in civil registration cases stemming from the armed group-controlled
territories and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in order to ensure
equal access and protection of the law without discrimination on the basis
of origin and place of birth or residence;
j) The Cabinet of Ministers to implement the Supreme Administrative
Court decision of 16 October 2015 to pay pensions to all citizens of
Ukraine, regardless of their place of origin or residence; de-linking of
the payment of social entitlements such as pensions and other benefits
from IDP registration;
k) Parliament, the General Prosecution and the National Police to adopt and
take effective measures to protect judges from interference and pressure
in high-profile cases such as the ongoing 2 May 2014 violence trials in
Odesa;
51
l) The SBU to review the legality, necessity and proportionality of the
provisions of the Temporary Order vis-à-vis imposed restrictions on the
freedom of movement, delivery of medication and foodstuffs and other
basic supplies;
m) Parliament to draft and adopt legislation providing free legal aid to
internally displaced persons, who are currently denied such services; and
to implement the IDP law of 6 January 2016 requiring harmonisation of
contradicting legislative acts concerning the registration of IDPs;
n) The Parliament to amend the Law on fighting terrorism allowing a
person suspected of terrorism to be held in preventive detention for up
to 30 days without initiating criminal proceedings and appearing before
a court; and to ensure, in particular, compliance with article 9(3) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
o) The Government to establish a mechanism for periodic independent
review by the Parliament of the necessity of measures derogating from
the ICCPR and lift the derogation as soon as it is no longer strictly
required;
p) Law enforcement agencies should take measures to secure assemblies
and protect protesters regardless their political affiliation, sexual
orientation, origin or nationality, and investigate cases of violations in
due course;
q) Law enforcement agencies should ensure immediate and effective
investigation of allegations of hate crimes based on ethnicity, religion or
other grounds, to prevent impunity and guarantee access of victims to
legal redress;
r) SBU, National Guard and State Border Service to facilitate free and
unimpeded passage by civilians across the contact line by increasing the
number of transport corridors and entry-exit checkpoints;
s) Law enforcement to document and investigate all allegations of conflictrelated
sexual violence and ensure that services for the survivors (male,
female, boys and girls) are created;
t) Parliament and Cabinet of Ministers to put in place specific measures
ensuring protection of civil society, journalist and whistle blowers
engaged in anti-corruption work.
213. To all parties involved in the hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions, including the armed groups of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk people’s republic’:
a) Ensure free and unimpeded passage of civilians across the contact line;
b) Facilitate access for human rights monitors and legal counsel providers’
to the checkpoints established as per the Temporary Order ensuring
effective mechanisms for civilians to report complaints or human rights
abuses and violations;
c) Immediately release all persons arbitrarily deprived of their liberty
without delay and in conditions of safety;
d) Treat all persons deprived of their liberty, civilian or military,
humanely and according to international human rights and
humanitarian law standards;
52
e) Ensure unimpeded access of OHCHR and other international monitors
to the places of deprivation of liberty in the conflict zone, including
unofficial and ad hoc locations;
f) Commit to not pass ‘sentences’ or carry out executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable, recalling that such acts
violate binding provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and incur individual criminal responsibility under
international criminal law;
g) Address all allegations of conflict-related sexual violence and ensure
that services for the survivors (male, female, boys and girls) are created
and available, as well as services for victims of torture, including by
facilitating the work of international humanitarian actors;
h) Ensure that the bodies and remains of people killed as a result of
hostilities are treated with due respect and dignity, providing free and
safe access to areas where bodies are buried, ensuring their
identification and return to their families. Preserve evidence of possible
summary executions, bearing in mind future accountability;
i) Respect the housing, land and property rights of displaced persons,
including taking measures to ensure that civilian property is not used
for military purposes;
j) Ensure that returnees are guaranteed their housing, land, and property
rights, and do not face discrimination upon return to their homes;
k) In line with the international customary and international humanitarian
law, guarantee the right to freedom of religion or belief and the right
not to be subjected to discrimination on any grounds, including religious
affiliation;
l) Ensure that freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom
of assembly can take place in the territories controlled by the armed
groups allowing the implementation of free and fair elections envisioned
as part of the Minsk Package of Measures;
m) Continue to cooperate towards the transfer of pre-conflict detainees to
Government-controlled areas to serve their sentences and the transfer
of pre-conflict case materials and files with a view to preventing further
delay in proceedings, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and ensuring
accountability;
214. To the de facto authorities of Crimea and to the Russian
Federation:
a) Repeal the decision to outlaw the Mejlis and allow the Crimean Tatar
community to choose its own self-governing institutions;
b) Repeal the decision banning leaders of the Mejlis from entering the
peninsula;
c) Ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty both at the pre-trial and
trial stages benefit from all legal guarantees, including equal treatment
before the law, the right not to be arbitrarily detained, the presumption
of innocence, and the prohibition from self-incrimination;
d) Guarantee fair trial proceedings and independent judicial-making in the
cases involving the Crimean Tatars accused of involvement in the
protests of February 2014, alleged members of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir
organization, and Maidan activists;
53
e) End the practice of retroactive application of laws, and the application of
Russian Federation law in accordance with General Assembly Resolution
68/262;
f) Refrain from transferring people detained in Crimea to the Russian
Federation;
g) Investigate all allegations of ill-treatment, torture, abductions,
disappearances and killings involving members of the security forces and
the Crimean ‘self-defence’; identify and punish their perpetrators;
h) End the practice of restricting free media reporting and opening criminal
proceedings against journalists, bloggers and activists for expressing
their views and opinions;
i) Enable Crimean residents, without discrimination, unfettered exercise of
the right to freedom of assembly and lift administrative measures
imposing partial or total bans on the holding of public events;
j) Ensure equal rights and non-discriminatory access to employment,
healthcare, education, social services and entitlements for all Crimean
residents, including those who do not have Russian Federation
citizenship and passports;
k) Protect and promote the rights of all minority groups and indigenous
peoples’ and enable them, in particular to maintain and develop their
national identity and use their native language, including in the
education sphere;
l) Ensure direct and unfettered access to the Crimean peninsula by
established regional and international human rights monitoring
mechanisms to enable them to carry out their mandate in full conformity
with General Assembly resolution 68/262.

Annex 772
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2016)

1
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
16 May to 15 August 2016
2
Contents Paragraphs Page
I. Executive Summary ................................................................................................ 1–14 5
II. Legal developments and institutional reforms ........................................................ 15–30 7
A. Notification of derogation from provisions of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ............................... 15–17 7
B. Constitutional amendments concerning the judiciary ..................................... 18–22 8
C. Law on the judicial system and status of judges ............................................. 23–24 9
D. Legal framework for internally displaced persons .......................................... 25–29 9
E. Implementation of National Human Rights Action Plan ................................ 30 10
III. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity ............................................. 31–62 10
A. Violations of international humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities ..... 31–37 10
B. Casualties ........................................................................................................ 38–41 12
C. Summary executions, enforced disappearances, unlawful and arbitrary
detention, and torture and ill-treatment ........................................................... 42–53 13
D. Sexual and gender-based violence .................................................................. 54–62 16
IV. Accountability and administration of justice ........................................................... 63–98 17
A. Impunity for gross violations and abuses of human rights ............................. 63–71 17
B. Amnesty law ................................................................................................... 72–73 19
C. Due process and fair trial rights ...................................................................... 74–80 20
D. Arbitrary detention in conflict-related cases ................................................... 81–84 21
E. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public disturbances .......... 85–90 22
F. Parallel structures in armed group-controlled areas ........................................ 91–98 23
V. Fundamental freedoms ............................................................................................ 99–120 24
A. Violations of the freedom of movement ......................................................... 99–102 24
B. Violations of the freedom of peaceful assembly ............................................. 103–105 25
C. Violations of the freedom of association ........................................................ 106–110 26
D. Violations of the freedom of opinion and expression ..................................... 111–120 26
VI. Economic and social rights ..................................................................................... 121–152 28
A. Economic and social rights and early warning ............................................... 121–128 28
B. Social security and protection of internally displaced persons ....................... 129–135 30
C. Housing, land and property rights................................................................... 136–144 31
D. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health .......... 145–152 33
VII. Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea .......................................... 153–183 34
A. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity ..................................... 153–156 34
B. Due process and fair trial rights ...................................................................... 157–162 35
C. Violations of the freedom of peaceful assembly ............................................. 163–167 36
D. Violations of the freedom of opinion and expression ..................................... 168–171 37
E. Violations of the freedom of movement ......................................................... 172–175 37
F. Minority and indigenous peoples’ rights ........................................................ 176–179 38
G. Rights of detainees .......................................................................................... 180–183 38
VIII. Technical cooperation and capacity-building
toward the promotion and protection of human rights in Ukraine .......................... 184–193 39
IX. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................... 194–210 40
3
UKRAINE
All maps contained herein are provided to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission by the Ukraine Shelter Cluster.
4
5
I. Executive Summary
1. Based on the work of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
(HRMMU), the fifteenth report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation of human rights in Ukraine1 covers the period from
16 May to 15 August 2016. The report also provides an update of recent developments on cases
that occurred during previous reporting periods.
2. During the period under review, the Government of Ukraine continued institutional
reforms and adopted constitutional amendments related to the judiciary, creating an
opportunity to break with the past, to protect and enforce rights and replace the arbitrary use
of power. At the same time, the Government has continued to derogate from certain
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
weakening human rights protections where they are needed most (See Chapter II on Legal
developments and institutional reforms). The human rights situation in certain areas of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine has worsened on both sides of the contact
line due to escalating hostilities and continued disregard for civilian protection by
Government forces and armed groups. The conflict in the east continues to undermine any
real progress that would lead to systemic changes in the promotion and protection of human
rights for the whole of Ukraine.
3. In the east, the proximity between Government forces and armed groups at the contact
line – some 300 to 500 metres apart in certain locations – contributed to rising in the
intensity of the hostilities during the reporting period. The practice of Ukrainian armed
forces, the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’2 and the self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’3 to position their fighters and weapons in populated residential areas has
heightened risks and harm to civilians. The inflow of ammunition, weaponry and fighters
from the Russian Federation continues to fuel the conflict. OHCHR has serious concerns that
the proliferation of arms and ammunition facilitates human rights violations or abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law. OHCHR is further concerned by reports of the
paramilitary DUK (Voluntary Ukrainian Corps ‘Right Sector’) members positioned close to
the contact line, noting that this group remains outside of the chain of command of the
Ministry of Defence. Developments during the period under review demonstrated that
ceasefire violations have a clear human cost and highlighted the urgent need for the warring
parties to fully withdraw from the contact line (See Chapter III on Rights to life, liberty,
security and physical integrity).
4. Between 16 May and 15 August 2016, OHCHR recorded 188 conflict-related civilian
casualties in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine, marking a 66
per cent increase since the previous reporting period. More than half of all civilian casualties
recorded in June and July were caused by shelling around the contact line, including
allegedly through the use of weapons expressly prohibited by the Minsk Agreements. The
number of civilians who died as a result of the secondary effects of violence, such as lack of
access to food, water or medicine and healthcare, is unknown.
5. OHCHR has noted incremental improvements in access to places of deprivation of
liberty. During the reporting period, OHCHR was able to meet in the presence of local
authorities some pre-conflict prisoners held in penal colony No. 124 in Donetsk region under
the control of the armed groups, as well as 31 men deprived of their liberty in the context of
hostilities held in colony No. 97 in Makiivka, Donetsk region. The ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ continued to deny external observers unhindered
access to all places of deprivation of liberty, raising concerns that cases of torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (ill-treatment), including sexual and
1 HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout Ukraine
and to propose recommendations to the Government and other actors to address human rights concerns. For more
details, see paragraphs 7–8 of the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of
human rights in Ukraine of 19 September 2014 (A/HRC/27/75).
2 Hereinafter ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
3 Hereinafter ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
6
gender-based violence, may be greater than reported. Following the suspension of the visit of
the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (SPT) on 25 May 2016 due to obstruction
and denial of access to some places of detention that are under the authority of the Security
Service of Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine provided assurances that allowed the SPT to
resume its visit in September. OHCHR notes that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has
undertaken trainings for its personnel on torture prevention4. Despite this positive
development, OHCHR has continued to document cases of torture and ill-treatment by the
Government and armed groups, once more underscoring the urgent need for regular access to
places of deprivation of liberty, provision of medical care for victims, and accountability for
documented violations and abuses.
6. Civilians living in the conflict-affected area continued to be deprived of much needed
protection, access to basic services and humanitarian aid, aggravated by restrictions in
freedom of movement. Those living in areas controlled by the armed groups are subject to
arbitrary rule and various human rights abuses. Parallel structures developed by the armed
groups affect the inalienable rights of people living under their control. There is no
mechanism for victims of these structures to secure protection or redress. This is rarely
articulated due to the lack of space for civil society actors and for people to exercise their
rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, association, opinion and expression in armed groupcontrolled
areas (See Chapter V on Fundamental Freedoms).
7. Journalists who have reported on the conflict or from armed group-controlled areas have
found themselves as targets of online attacks carried out with the tacit consent – and at times
declared support – of high-ranking Government officials. Freedom of expression has become
a political issue, with the Deputy Information Policy Minister resigning on 3 August 2016
over the unwillingness of Government authorities to investigate abuses against journalists.
Journalists report of harassment and intimidation, leading to self-censorship, when viewed as
being critical of some particular Government policies and the conduct of the Ukrainian
armed forces in the conflict.
8. Together with the Government of Ukraine, OHCHR continued to work towards ensuring
that those responsible for human rights violations and abuses are held to account. Under
international law, Ukraine is obliged to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of
such violations and abuses, regardless of their allegiance. Such efforts must be prompt,
independent, impartial, thorough and effective. This report highlights again that there has
been little accountability for violations and abuses committed in the course of the armed
conflict between Ukrainian security forces and a number of armed groups in eastern Ukraine.
In cases where conflict-related cases have been prosecuted there have been serious concerns
about due process and fair trial rights5. Based on extensive trial monitoring, OHCHR finds
that mandatory pre-trial detention for all defendants charged with conflict-related crimes
without regard to individual circumstances violates the prohibition on arbitrary detention
(See Chapter IV on Accountability and administration of justice).
9. OHCHR has advocated for victims’ access to their right to reparation, which includes
restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction. Allegations of military use of
residential property - a trend that has been on the rise during the reporting period in villages
adjacent to the contact line - have illustrated the need for the return of property and
compensation to those displaced and affected by such practices (See Chapter VI on
Economic and social rights). The presence of Government forces and armed groups in
residential areas increases the risk of sexual and gender-based violence and militarization of
summer camps on both sides of the contact line.
4 Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, “Ombudsman jointly with the Swiss experts provides
training on prevention of tortures in activities of the State Security Service of Ukraine,” 28 July 2016
(http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/en/all-news/pr/28716-mx-ombudsman-jointly-with-the-swiss-experts-providestraining-
on-preventi/)
5 See in particular Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Human
Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, “Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016,” 14
July 2016.
7
10. In seeking to protect the rights of civilians affected by the conflict, OHCHR has also
been vocal in advocating for facilitation of freedom of movement and resolution of the
ongoing denial of social entitlements to people living in the conflict-affected area and
internally displaced persons (IDPs). Approximately 85 per cent of IDPs interviewed by the
NGO Right to Protection residing in Government-controlled areas indicated that they were
severely or critically affected by suspensions of payments of social entitlements6. In armed
group-controlled areas, this concerned 97 per cent of IDPs. Equal protection of all people
affected by the conflict is crucial for the peaceful reconstruction of Ukrainian society.
11. Tensions in and around the Crimean peninsula spiked after Russia’s security service
(FSB) announced on 10 August that it had arrested a group of people near the northern
Crimean city of Armyansk, allegedly sent by the Ukrainian intelligence service to commit
terrorist acts, something the Ukrainian side officially denied, including during consultations
at the UN Security Council called for by Ukraine. According to the FSB, armed clashes left
two Russian Federation security officers dead, and at least three members of the alleged
sabotage group were arrested. Security was reinforced on both sides of the Administrative
Boundary Line. OHCHR has noted a continued deterioration of the human rights situation in
Crimea with the further administrative integration into the Russian Federation’s southern
federal district, in violation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the
territorial integrity of Ukraine.
12. The right to peaceful assembly has been further curtailed in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea by the de facto authorities and people continued to be interrogated and harassed by
law enforcement agents for expressing views that are considered as extremist. A deputy head
of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis was ordered by a Crimean ‘court’ to undergo a “psychiatric
assessment”. The search for missing persons remains inconclusive and investigations have
yielded no results. The absence of accountability and redress for victims nurtures impunity.
13. The findings in this report are grounded in data from in-depth interviews with 214
witnesses and victims of human rights violations and abuses during the period under review.
In 60 per cent of cases documented, OHCHR carried out individual response follow-up
actions to secure human rights protection.
14. OHCHR has been advising duty-bearers within the Government and the armed groups on
the results of its findings, works with civil society partners on how to advocate on their
implications, and raises awareness and support among others in order to respond and take
action. OHCHR also engaged with the Government toward ensuring the rights of victims to
justice, reparation, truth, and guarantees of non-recurrence7. Through providing technical
cooperation to the Government and civil society in implementing legislative, policy and
institutional reforms, OHCHR contributed to bringing about greater respect for the rule of
law and at strengthening the protection of human rights.
II. Legal developments and institutional reforms
A. Notification on derogation from the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
15. On 6 July 2016, the Government of Ukraine notified the United Nations Secretary-
General that following a review of the security situation in certain areas of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, it would maintain its derogation from certain obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) “until further notice”8. The
6Monitoring Report on the suspension of IDP certificates, social payments and pension payments for IDPs in
Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Dnipro regions, conducted by the NGO Right to Protection.
7 See in particular General Assembly Resolution 60/147 on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights. Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law; Human Rights Council Resolution 18/7 on the creation of a Special Rapporteur
on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence; E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005)
8 In June 2015, the Government of Ukraine submitted a communication to the United Nations Secretary- General,
notifying him of its derogation from the following rights under ICCPR: Effective remedy (paragraph 3, Article 2);
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention and related procedural rights (article 9); liberty of movement and
8
notification indicated that as of 14 June 2016, the territorial application of the derogation had
not changed, covering the localities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions under the Government’s
total or partial control, including large towns and cities.
16. While welcoming this review of the derogation, OHCHR notes the importance of regular
review, with a clear independent mechanism ensuring periodicity and objectivity. Moreover,
OHCHR remains concerned as to the compliance of the derogation with the standards set by
Article 4 of ICCPR. Article 4 requires the official proclamation of the existence of a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation, and that the derogation measures must be
proportionate and non-discriminatory. It also provides that their duration, geographic and
material scope must be limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation. The derogation must not be inconsistent with other obligations under international
law, including applicable rules of international humanitarian law.
17. In the light of these principles, some derogation measures, particularly, the extension of
the period of detention of individuals suspected of involvement in ‘terrorist activities’ from
72 hours to 30 days without any court decision9 appear to be excessive even during an
emergency. Other derogation measures grant prosecutors in the conflict area additional
powers normally attributed to investigating judges, such as the authority to decide upon
issues related to custodial measures, access to property, searches, and wiretapping. The
derogation also allows the military and civil administrations established as temporary state
bodies in Government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions to impose
restrictions on freedom of movement (e.g. curfews), conduct security searches, checks and
other measures allegedly to protect public safety. OHCHR notes that not all measures
envisioned in the derogation are applied in practice10.
B. Constitutional amendments concerning the judiciary
18. On 2 June, Parliament adopted amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine regarding the
judiciary11. These amendments provide an opportunity to strengthen the independence of the
judiciary and to build a system of governance based on the rule of law, essential for the
restoration of public trust, promotion of accountability and achievement of justice.
19. The amendments give a central role and new powers to the High Council of Justice and
guarantee its independence. They provide that the majority of Council members will be
judges and will be empowered to make decisions on the selection, dismissal, transfer,
sanctions, promotion and immunity of judges. Parliament and the President no longer have
decisive roles in these processes, which limits potential interference from the legislature and
executive in the judiciary. Judges are given life-long tenure, abolishing probationary periods
that made judges vulnerable to pressure. A judge can no longer be dismissed for the vague
offense of “breaching the oath”12. The amendments also abolish broad prosecutorial
supervisory powers and institute an extended non-renewable term for the Prosecutor General.
20. The right to establish and abolish courts, formerly a presidential prerogative, has been
transferred to Parliament, which has also been granted the competence to request opinions
from the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of international treaties. Upon the
exhaustion of domestic remedies, an individual may also challenge the constitutionality of
legislation as applied in court. Other positive aspects include the right to a hearing within a
reasonable time and the obligation for courts to oversee the execution of judgments.
21. While the amendments generally form a solid basis for a reformed judiciary and
administration of justice, OHCHR is concerned that some provisions of the law could be
freedom to choose one’s residence (article 12); fair trial (article 14); privacy of personal life (article 17). See
HRMMU report of 16 May - 15 August 2015, paragraphs 159-161.
9 One of the derogation measures referred to in the notification and introduced into national legislation through
amendments to the Law “On combatting terrorism.”
10 HRMMU meeting with Head of Donetsk Regional Police, 2 August 2016
11 Law of Ukraine “On amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (regarding the judiciary)”, No. 1401-VII of 2
June 2016, which will enter into force on 30 September.
12 A new formulation was introduced: “The commission of serious disciplinary offences, grave or systematic neglect
of duties that is incompatible with the status of a judge or that revealed his/her unsuitability for the post.”
9
restrictive. In particular, Parliament retains the competence to issue a no confidence vote to
the Prosecutor General, which can affect prosecutorial independence. Constitutional Court
judges will be subject to a lower level of anti-corruption scrutiny than ordinary judges.
22. In addition, some provisions will be implemented gradually following the amendments’
entry into force; thus, the President will retain the right to decide on the transfer of judges for
two years; Ukraine will be able to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
after three years; and until the penitentiary service is reformed prosecutorial oversight of the
execution of verdicts and custodial measures will remain.
C. Law on the judicial system and the status of judges
23. Also on 2 June, a law “On the judicial system and the status of judges”13 was passed to
facilitate the implementation of the amendments and regulate the structure of the judicial
system. A procedural framework for reforming the judiciary has yet to be adopted.
Moreover, it is envisioned that the High Council of Justice will be formed in two years,
which will delay the reform process.
24. The law introduces a three-tier system of courts and leaves the Supreme Court as the
highest judicial body with powers to rescind and quash lower court judgements. It also
provides for civil society engagement in the selection and assessment processes through a
new consultative body, the Public Integrity Council. The law allows anyone to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against a judge before the High Council of Justice, and imposes
anti-corruption measures on judges.
D. Legal framework for internally displaced persons
25. While noting improvements in the legal framework for IDPs OHCHR is concerned that
amendments to Resolution No. 637 on social entitlements for IDPs may create undue
obstacles to access such benefits on the basis of their place of origin, limit their choice of
residence, freedom of movement and subject them to intrusive scrutiny.
26. On 8 June, the Government of Ukraine amended Resolution No.50914 on IDP registration
and Resolution No.63715 on social benefits for IDPs to ensure their compliance with
amendments to the Law on IDPs of December 201516 - the implementation of which was
delayed for five months. The Government also adopted two regulations on allocating and
controlling social payments and pensions to IDPs17. Amendments to Resolution No.50918 are
generally positive as they ease administrative burdens and increase protection for IDPs.
27. However, the Resolution No.63719 amendments on social entitlements for IDPs do not
reflect the provisions of the IDP law, supporting regulations or relevant international
standards. The amendments retain the link between the payment of pensions and various
social entitlements to IDP registration. OHCHR considers it essential to de-link the IDP
situation from social entitlements, so that the loss of IDP status does not lead to denial of
social entitlements.
28. Additionally, the amendments provide for inspections of “living conditions” at IDPs’
place of residence every six months and on an ad hoc basis. If the IDP is absent at the
13 Law of Ukraine “On the judicial system and the status of judges”, No.1402-VIII of 2 June 2016.
14 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers ‘On amendments to the resolution of 1 October 2014 No. 509’, No. 352 of
8 June 2016.
15 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers ‘Certain issues regarding the payment of social benefits to internally
displaced persons’ No. 365 of 8 June 2016.
16 Law of Ukraine ‘On amendments to certain legal acts concerning the enhancement of human rights guarantees for
internally displaced persons’, No. 921-VIII of 24 December 2015. See 13th HRMMU report covering 16 November
2015 to 15 February 2016, paragraph 175.
17 Regulation ‘On allocation (reinstatement) of social benefits to internally displaced persons’ and Regulation ‘On
exercise of control over the payment of social benefits to internally displaced persons at the places of their factual
residence’ approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers ‘Certain issues regarding the payment of social
benefits to internally displaced persons’ No. 365 of 8 June 2016.
18 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers ‘On registration of internally displaced persons’ No. 509 of 1 October 2014.
19 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers ‘On payment of social benefits to internally displaced persons’, No. 637 of
5 November 2014.
10
moment of the inspection, he/she will be subject to residence verification and further
administrative checks, with the risk of losing all social entitlements.
29. These provisions on verification impose significant restrictions on IDPs’ right to freedom
of movement, guaranteed by Article 12 of ICCPR and Principle 14 of the Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement. They also can be considered as discriminatory, as similar
inspections are not foreseen on any other category of residents of Ukraine receiving social
payments. The provisions could further violate the right to privacy and family life as
prescribed in Article 17 of ICCPR. It should also be noted that the amended resolutions were
not publicly discussed prior to their approval.
E. Implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan
30. In June 2016, in the course of implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan
(NHRAP), adopted on 23 November 2015, the Ministry of Justice held a series of
consultations involving civil society and international organizations, including OHCHR. The
outcome of these consultations was reflected in draft amendments to the Action Plan
prepared by the Ministry of Justice in July, which have to be approved by the Government.
They include the establishment of the new Ministry on Temporary Occupied Territories and
IDPs as an implementing authority; clarify some responsibilities and formulations, and
postpone some activities.
III. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity
A. Alleged violations of international humanitarian law in the
conduct of hostilities
31. The military conduct of both Government forces and armed groups in recent months
precipitated an escalation in hostilities in June and July, endangering civilians. According to
civilians living on either side of the contact line, Ukrainian armed forces and armed groups
have engaged in hostilities from residential areas, with civilians suffering the impact of
return fire20. This is a widespread practice. In the reporting period, OHCHR has documented
such dynamics in the Government-controlled towns of Avdiivka, Mariinka, Krasnohorivka,
and Chermalyk, and in the territory controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ in
Petrovskii, Kuibyshevskii, Kyivskyi districts of Donetsk, Makiivka, Dokuchaievsk, Horlivka,
Kominternove, Zaitseve, Spartak, Sakhanka, and Yasunuvata.
32. A woman living in Stanytsia Luhanska showed OHCHR houses used by Ukrainian
armed forces and described how soldiers would drive infantry fighting vehicles to the middle
of the road and fire rounds in the direction of the military positions of the ‘Luhansk people’s
republic.’ Return fire would impact nearby residential homes21. Other residents of Stanytsia
Luhanska complained of being used as “human shields.”22 While OHCHR is not able to
confirm whether this was the intent of the warring parties, the risks of such practices for
civilians are of utmost concern.
20 Article 13(1) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions stipulates that “the civilian population and
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations.” This
includes the obligation for each party to the conflict to avoid, to the extent feasible, locating military objectives
within or near densely populated areas. Location military objectives in civilian areas runs counter to his obligations.
Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary international humanitarian law, Volume I, Rule 23.
21 HRMMU interview, 28 June 2016
22 HRMMU interview, 28 June 2016
“We do not know who shoots. The fire comes from both sides. We can only hear 'tiokhtiokh-
tiokh’ - this is an automatic rifle, and then 'gukh-gukh-gukh’ - these are grenade
launchers.”
- Resident of Zhovanka
11
33. In Bakhmutka, Donetsk region, remaining residents told OHCHR that Ukrainian soldiers
were living in empty houses23. OHCHR observed soldiers in one house as well as six
armoured personnel carriers nearby, some mounted with artillery guns. In Zhovanka, one
resident alleged that Ukrainian armed forces had fired at night from his garden, after which
fighters of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ had shelled his neighbourhood24. In Lopaskine
village, Luhansk region, OHCHR spoke to local residents who complained that since soldiers
had moved into residential homes, exchanges of fire had increased and tensions among them
and military had intensified “dramatically.”25 In Kryakivka village, in Novoaidar district,
Luhansk region, members of the Government-affiliated ‘Aidar’ and ‘Dnepr-1’ battalions and
soldiers of the Ukrainian army have used residential homes since January 2015, when
members of the ‘Aidar’ battalion threatened civilians into surrendering their house keys26.
One soldier, stationed in a private home in Lopaskine, told OHCHR that his unit had been
ordered to position themselves in the village by their commander based in Trokhizbenka27..
34. OHCHR has observed a notable increase in damage to critical civilian infrastructure,
often with cross-line implications. Residents of Zhovanka showed OHCHR a gas pipeline
that was damaged in hostilities and noted that the water supply was periodically
interrupted28. Moreover, a high voltage power line was reportedly damaged in recent
hostilities, leaving Zhovanka, Bakhmutka and other villages without electricity.
35. It is also of particular concern that Ukrainian forces and armed group continue to
disregard the protections afforded under international humanitarian law to schools as civilian
objects used for educational purposes29. On the night of 9-10 July 2016, a school in
Sakhanka, School No. 84 in Mykytivka in Horlivka, and School No. 7 in Horlivka were
damaged by shelling. At the time, approximately 20 local residents were hiding in the
basement of School No. 84 in Mykytivka. When visiting the schools in late July 2016,
OHCHR did not observe any arms or fighters inside the buildings or in their vicinity.
36. Hospitals used for medical purposes have also been frequently hit by artillery fire, in
violation of their protected status under international humanitarian law30. On 24 June 2016,
the children’s ward of a polyclinic on Biuriuzove Street in Donetsk city shelled, breaking
windows, damaging doors and the heating system. On 23 July 2016, Hospital No. 21 in
Kuibyshevskii district of Donetsk city was fired upon for two hours, while the hospital was
attending to the medical needs of 60 patients. Two patient rooms and the surgical ward were
severely damaged by mortar and automatic rifle fire, seriously affecting the hospital’s
capacity31.
37. In some cases, Government forces and armed groups have used educational and health
facilities for military purposes. For instance, in Zaitseve, armed groups of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ are reportedly positioned in a local school and hospital, in the immediate
vicinity of the contact line. As a result, local residents must travel to nearby towns to access
medical services. The proximity of the contact line, with opposing military positions less
than a street away, highlights the urgent need for military forces to fully withdraw from
civilian areas and refrain from using educational or health facilities for military purposes.
OHCHR has verified that in July 2016 a school in Pavlopil continued to be used by
Ukrainian armed forces.
23 HRMMU interview, 7 July 2016
24 HMRMU interview, 7 July 2016
25 HRMMU field visit, 28 July 2016
26 HRMMU interview, 25 May 2016
27 HRMMU interview, 27 June 2016
28 HRMMU interview, 7 July 2016
29 Article 13(1), Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventions; Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary
international humanitarian law, Volume I, Rule 23.
30 Article 11, Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Conventions; Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary
international humanitarian law, Volume I, Rule 22.
31 World Health Organization, Situation Report, 1 August 2016
12
B. Casualties
38. In total, from mid-April 2014 to 15 August 2016, OHCHR recorded 31,814 casualties in
the conflict area in Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine, among Ukrainian armed
forces, civilians and members of the armed groups. This includes 9,578 people killed and
22,236 injured.32 The number of civilians who died as a result of the secondary effects of
violence, such as lack of access to food, water or medicine, is unknown.
39. During the reporting period, an increase in ceasefire violations on both sides of the
contact line led to a 66 percent increase in civilian casualties compared to the previous
reporting period. Between 16 May and 15 August 2016, OHCHR recorded 188 conflictrelated
civilian casualties: 28 killed (three women and a girl, 20 men and four boys) and 160
injured (47 women and four girls, 97 men and ten boys, and two children whose sex is
unknown), while between 16 February and 15 May 2016, 113 casualties were recorded (14
killed and 99 injured).
40. An increase in civilian casualties caused by shelling from various artillery systems was of
particular concern. Between 16 May and 15 August 2016, OHCHR recorded 109 civilian
casualties caused by shelling (11 killed and 98 injured). This is 60 per cent more than the
number of casualties caused by shelling during the previous 8.5 months, between the
ceasefire of 1 September 2015 and 15 May 2016, when 67 casualties from shelling were
recorded (12 killed and 55 injured). Of those killed by shelling: two were women and nine
were men. Besides, two boys were killed by electrocution after a power line was destroyed
by shelling. Of those injured by shelling: 37 were women and three were girls, 54 were men
and four were boys.
41. Mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), booby traps and improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) caused 13 deaths (a woman and a girl, nine men and two boys) and 41 injuries (five
women and a girl, 29 men and four boys, and two children whose sex is unknown). Besides,
seven civilians (a woman and six men) were injured by unidentified explosives (either by
shelling or ERW or abandoned explosive ordnance). Exchanges of fire from small arms and
light weapons and sniper shots accounted for 13 casualties: two civilians (both men) were
killed and 11 (four women, five men and two boys) were injured. Three men were injured
from unspecified firearms.
32 This is a conservative estimate of OHCHR based on available data. These totals include: casualties among the
Ukrainian forces, as reported by the Ukrainian authorities; 298 people from flight MH-17; civilian casualties on the
territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine, as reported by local authorities and the regional departments of
internal affairs of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; and casualties among civilians and members of the armed groups on
the territories controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, as reported by the
armed groups, the so-called ‘local authorities’ and local medical establishments. This data is incomplete due to gaps in
coverage of certain geographic areas and time periods, and due to overall under-reporting, especially of military
casualties. The increase in the number of casualties between the different reporting dates does not necessarily mean that
these casualties happened between these dates: they could have happened earlier, but were recorded by a certain
reporting date.
13
C. Summary executions, disappearances, deprivation of liberty, and
torture and ill-treatment
42. On 14 July, OHCHR released a report on accountability for killings in Ukraine from
January 2014 to May 201633, documenting over 60 cases and 115 victims of arbitrary
deprivation of life, summary and extrajudicial executions and deaths in detention. During the
reporting period, OHCHR continued to document cases of summary executions that occurred
before May 2016 and for which there has been no accountability.
Ukrainian armed forces and law enforcement
43. In April 2016, a married couple was apprehended by SBU in Odesa, suspected of
assisting the armed groups. They were held in the premises of the Odesa SBU building,
33 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine, “Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016,” 14 July 2016.
“I wake up, I go to bed, I walk constantly carrying this uncertainty on my mind. The
day he was detained, time stopped.”
- Mother of a Ukrainian soldier detained by armed groups
    

        


        
        
    

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14
where they were reportedly subjected to a night of sleep deprivation, interrogated without the
presence of a lawyer, denied requests for legal counsel and subjected to threats. OHCHR is
concerned that SBU recorded their detention 20 hours after the time of their arrest. During
this period, they were held incommunicado34. They are currently held in pre-trial detention.
The SBU confirmed to OHCHR that the two individuals were detained and subsequently
charged with terrorism-related offenses under article 258-3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
44. OHCHR continued to receive information about cases of secret detention by SBU in
Kharkiv, Kramatorsk, Mariupol and Zaporizhzhia35. The families of the victims often
approach OHCHR afraid and desperate for information about their relatives. The secrecy, the
insecurity caused by the denial of contact with the outside world, and the fact that relatives
have no knowledge of their whereabouts and fate contributes to the families’ suffering.36
OHCHR advocates with the authorities on individual cases calling for the immediate release
of all persons in secret detention.
45. Over the reporting period, approximately 70 per cent of cases documented by OHCHR
contained allegations of torture, ill-treatment, and incommunicado detention prior to transfer
into the criminal justice system. The majority of allegations implicate SBU officials37,
police38, and members of the paramilitary DUK ‘Right Sector’39. OHCHR findings indicate
that Ukrainian authorities have allowed the deprivation of liberty of individuals in secret for
prolonged periods of time. OHCHR confirmed the release, on 25 July and 2 August, of
thirteen individuals from the Kharkiv SBU who had been subject to enforced disappearances
for periods of up to two years40.
46. In April 2016, SBU allegedly detained a Russian Federation citizen after he was
sentenced and released by a court in Berdiansk on 15 April. OHCHR received information
that the man has since been held incommunicado in the Mariupol SBU basement41. The SBU
denied this allegation.
47. In an emblematic case, armed men in camouflage bearing no insignia apprehended a man
in his house in Government-controlled areas of Donetsk region in October 2015. He was
handcuffed, blindfolded and taken to an indoor shooting range in the basement of the SBU
building in Mariupol. There, he was beaten, suffocated with a plastic bag, submerged in cold
water, and had his ribs broken by a man who jumped on his torso. He was forced to sign a
confession, read it in front of a camera, and was subsequently charged under article 258-3 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Still in detention, he is afraid of reprisals and unwilling to
complain about his ill-treatment to the authorities42. Four additional verified cases from 2015
corroborate the use of the Mariupol SBU basement indoor shooting range for
incommunicado detention and torture43.
48. OHCHR received new information that detainees had been subject to torture and illtreatment
to extract confessions at the Zaporizhzhia Regional SBU Department in 2014 and
2015. One man was beaten all over his body, leaving him with two fractured bones, and was
suffocated with a gas mask. Another man described being severely beaten in the basement of
the SBU building, with his ribs consequently broken44. The SBU acknowledges the detention
of one of the men and alleges that his injuries were caused during attempts by officers to
assert security and control over the detainee. The victims’ accounts make clear that the
34 HRMMU interview, 5 July 2016.
35 HRMMU interviews, 27 May 2016, 31 May 2016, 13 June 2016, 23 June 2016, 29 June 2016, 11 July 2016, 12
July 2016, 5 August 2016, 11 August 2016.
36 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 19 January 2011, A/HRC/16/47, para. 54.
37 HRMMU interviews, 29 June 2016, 31 May 2016, 23 June 2016, 21 July 2016, 16 August 2016; 13 June 2016, 14
July 2016; 20 May 2016; 17 May 2016, 14 June 2016, 6 July 2016, 5 July 2016.
38 HRMMU interviews, 23 May 2016, 31 May 2016, 9 June 2016, 2 July 2016, 4 July 2016.
39 HRMMU interview, 31 May 2016, 15 July 2016, 15 August 2016.
40 HRMMU interviews, 31 July 2016, 4 August 2016
41 HRMMU interview, 18 June 2016.
42 HRMMU interview, 11 May 2016.
43 HRMMU interviews, 29 July 2016, 23 June 2016, 14 June 2016.
44 HRMMU interviews, 20 June 2016, 6 July 2016.
15
serious harm suffered continues to affect their lives, their families and communities, and that
there is an urgent need for recognition, medical care and rehabilitation of torture victims.
Armed groups
49. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented an increase in detentions and
disappearances at checkpoints controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic.’ On 27 May
2016, a former armed group member went missing in Novoluhanske while travelling into the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ from Government-controlled territory where he had been
deprived of his liberty. Following repeated inquiries, his mother found that he had been
deprived of liberty at a ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ checkpoint, transferred to Horlivka and
then into ‘police custody’ in Donetsk. On 4 July, she was told that the ‘police’ no longer held
her son. She has since been unable to ascertain his fate or whereabouts45.
50. Members of the ‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ continued
to deprive individuals of their liberty and keep them incommunicado. While in some cases,
relatives were allowed to deliver packages of food, medicine and clothing; none were able to
visit the victims. Armed groups near Novoazovsk District Hospital apprehended a doctor
from Pavlopil on 16 June 2015. The local ‘police’ told his wife that he was held by the
‘ministry of state security’, which the latter confirmed in writing. She has not heard from him
since, but has been informed that his case will be ‘examined’ by the Novoazovsk ‘court’ of
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.46 OHCHR is concerned that deprivations of liberty are often
accompanied by torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and
may in itself constitute such treatment. OHCHR is concerned at the continuation of persons
being deprived of their liberty and then held incommunicado in the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, spreading fear among civilians, in particular
because of the arbitrary nature of abductions. OHCHR notes that the Military Prosecutor’s
Office is investigating many of these cases.
51. Maria Varfolomeeva, a photojournalist, was detained by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
on 9 January 2015 and released on 3 March 2016 to Government-controlled territory. She
was deprived of her liberty after taking photos of residential houses used by the ‘Vostok’
battalion as their base. She reported having been beaten and held in poor conditions while in
custody, naming the individuals responsible. The Military Prosecutor’s Office is conducting
an investigation into her detention and ill-treatment. The ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
continues to deprive people of liberty in the basements of the former main department of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs in Luhansk region on Polskogo Street No. 3, and the ‘ministry of
state security’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ on Gradusova Street No. 1a, according to
victim accounts.
52. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ continue to hold
individuals who were detained prior to the conflict. OHCHR has received allegations that
such detainees are held in poor conditions of detention and have inadequate or no access to
medical assistance. On 1 June 2016, the Assistant Secretary General for Human Rights was
granted access to pre-conflict prisoners held in penal colony No. 124 in Donetsk region
under the control of the armed groups. OHCHR welcomes the periodic transfer of preconflict
prisoners to Government custody under the auspices of the Ombudsperson’s Office
as necessary to restore family access to detainees and ensure that persons arrested, tried or
convicted are subject to a consistent legal framework in line with the principle of legality.
53. These allegations demonstrate the urgent need for the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ to grant external observers unhindered access to all places of
deprivation of liberty. On 6 August, OHCHR was able to meet 31 men deprived of their
liberty in the context of hostilities held in colony No. 97 in Makiivka, Donetsk region in the
presence of a ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ‘official’. All had been held incommunicado for
approximately two months, causing considerable suffering for their families. OHCHR has
observed that many families whose fathers, husbands, or sons are in armed group detention
45 HRMMU interview, 11 July 2016
46 HRMMU interview, UKR/16/0514.
16
lack support networks and struggle alone as they face emotional distress and financial
insecurity.
D. Sexual and gender-based violence
Ukrainian armed forces and law enforcement
54. OHCHR continued to document cases of sexual violence, amounting to torture, of
conflict-related detainees, both men and women. It includes cases of rape47, and threats of
rape or other forms of sexual violence towards victims and/or their relatives.
55. In March 2016, a man48 was apprehended by eight masked individuals in camouflage and
taken to an abandoned building, where he was interrogated about the positions of the armed
groups. As he could not provide any information, the perpetrators undressed him and tied his
legs and arms behind his back to a metal cage. One of them took the ramrod and started
inserting it into the man’s urethra. He pulled it up and down, inflicting the victim severe
pain. A second perpetrator filmed the torture on his mobile phone. While beating the victim,
they threatened to upload the video on his social media page. He eventually signed
documents admitting his guilt on all charges.
56. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented three cases following a similar pattern
of women detained in 2015 in Government-controlled areas adjacent to the contact line and
subjected to threats of sexual violence amounting to torture. All three cases took place in
different locations but within the same geographic area. In one case, a woman49 apprehended
in her home on 19 January 2015 by 10 masked men wearing camouflage was kept for more
than a week in the basement of an SBU building, where she was beaten and tortured with
electric shocks and burning plastic. The perpetrators threatened to rape her daughter if she
refused to confess to have supported the armed groups in 2014. In June 2015,50 another
woman was apprehended by 10 masked armed men in black uniforms without insignia and
taken to the basement of an unfinished building, where she was handcuffed to a large pipe in
a stress position. Two men kicked her head and body and beat her with their fists and a metal
tube, threatening to rape and kill her. As of August 2016, she remained in pre-trial detention.
In a third case, a woman was apprehended in her home by 10-12 armed masked men wearing
military uniform without insignia. Her daughter, a minor, witnessed the arrest and search of
the apartment. The victim was taken to a building in Bakhmut, where she was insulted,
humiliated, and beaten. She was also threatened with being handed over to soldiers on the
frontline and that her young daughter would be gang raped in front of her. After she agreed
to cooperate, she was transferred to SBU premises for interrogation. The same threats
continued until she recorded her confession51. As of July 2016, she remains in detention. An
investigation into her allegations of torture and ill-treatment has been launched. Despite one
of the victims giving testimony in court regarding being subject to sexual and gender-based
violence, no charges were brought against the perpetrators. The SBU informed OHCHR that
this was due to the absence of conclusive forensic evidence.
47 Rome Statute, Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-1, War crime of rape, whose elements are defined as: (1) The perpetrator
invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the
victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any
other part of the body; (2) The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person
incapable of giving genuine consent.
48 HRMMU interview, 29 June 2016.
49 HRMMU interview, 13 June 2016.
50 HRMMU interview, 26 May 2016.
51 HRMMU interview, 13 June 2016.
“They didn’t beat me, only threatened from time to time to cut off my testicles or bury me
in a forest”.
– Conflict-related male detainee held in a Government prison
17
57. On 5 May 2016, SBU detained a man in one of the southern regions of Ukraine and
transferred him to SBU building. Later, he was brought to an office, stripped naked and
fastened to a heating battery. During the following two days, four SBU officers allegedly
tortured him, making him kneel, insulting, humiliating and hitting him on the head, kidneys,
groin, and applying electric shock to his tongue. Most of this time he had a plastic bag over
his head, and did not receive either food or water.
58. OHCHR continued to follow the case of former member of the ‘Tornado’ special police
patrol battalion. On 15 July, the Novopskovskyi District Court of Luhansk Region sentenced
him to six years of imprisonment for torture and rape52. The court found that in June 2015, he
had tortured, raped and threatened a woman with a hand grenade in Novopskovskyi district.
OHCHR welcomes investigations into all allegations of conflict-related sexual violence.
Armed groups
59. During the period under review, it was not possible to obtain first-hand accounts
regarding conflict-related sexual violence in the areas controlled by armed groups. One
interlocutor reported being threatened by the ‘authorities’ if they disclosed information about
the cases.
60. The incidents reported to OHCHR as second-hand accounts mostly took place in 2014-
2015 and it has not been possible to contact the victims or direct witnesses. A 26-year-old
woman was allegedly beaten and raped by three members of the armed groups in September
- October 2015. She was deprived of her liberty while she was passing a checkpoint and
could not present her passport53. The case was ‘investigated’ by the ‘military prosecutor’s
office’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and reportedly punitive steps were taken.
61. A man deprived of his liberty by armed groups54 in March-April 2016 in ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ reported about two women who were kept in a room next to him.
According to him, they were reportedly abducted at a checkpoint when crossing the contact
line from the Government-controlled side. He heard armed groups elements harassing them
and attempting to rape them. They were reportedly taken away two days later; their identities
and whereabouts were unknown to the interviewee.
62. A former armed group member told OHCHR about a well-known case within his unit
where a commander of the ‘Kalmius’ brigade allegedly raped a civilian woman in
Hryhorivka village, Donetsk region in late May 2015 and was consequently dismissed in
September 201555.
IV. Accountability and the administration of justice
A. Impunity for gross violations and abuses of human rights
63. Despite efforts by the Ukrainian authorities to bring perpetrators of human rights
violations and abuses in the east to account, impunity for human rights violations and abuses
prevails. OHCHR has documented extensive allegations of violations by armed groups and
Government forces, and notes that accountability for acts such as executions by armed
groups of Ukrainian soldiers is particularly lacking56. According to OHCHR trial monitoring,
52 Articles of 127 (torture), 152 (rape), 153 (violent unnatural gratification of sexual desire) and 263 (illegal handling
of munitions) of the Criminal Code.
53 HRMMU interview, 15 July 2016.
54 HRMMU interview, 8 July 2016.
55 HRMMU interview, 29 June 2016.
56 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine, “Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016,” 14 July 2016.
56 HRMMU interview, 5 July 2016.
“People have no real access to justice.”
– High-level judicial official in Government-controlled Luhansk region
18
assessments of investigations and analysis of prosecutions, such impunity largely stems from
pressure on the judiciary, inability and unwillingness of the Office of the Prosecutor General
and Office of the Military Prosecutor to investigate gross violations and abuses of human
rights perpetrated in the context of the armed conflict. OHCHR has been informed that the
Office of the Military Prosecutor is carrying out pre-trial investigations into alleged cases of
killing, torture and ill-treatment of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians by members of the armed
groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, but notes that
they have yet to yield any results.
64. OHCHR is particularly concerned by the lack of progress in investigations into the
conduct of Ukrainian armed forces and SBU. In over two years, neither party to the conflict
has taken responsibility for any civilian deaths caused by shelling. While noting significant
investigative challenges, OHCHR urges the Government to take all possible steps to
investigate civilian deaths that occurred during military operations.
65. OHCHR notes the absence of investigations into the 2 June 2014 aerial attack on the
Luhansk Regional State Administration building in Luhansk, which resulted in the deaths of
seven civilians57. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, the date and location of
the incident has been established but no subsequent investigations have been undertaken due
to a lack of access to the crime scene58. OHCHR notes that military conduct can be
investigated by, among others, interviewing witnesses including members of Ukrainian
Armed Forces and through obtaining access to classified military information. OHCHR is
also monitoring the ongoing civil suit brought by the wife of one of the victims killed in the
attack. On 25 May, the Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed a claim59 for pecuniary
and non-pecuniary damages for the loss of life of her husband on the grounds that the court
lacked relevant subject-matter jurisdiction.
66. Impunity also affects cases of enforced disappearances and of missing persons. In an
emblematic case, on 12 July 2014, three men and a 17-year-old boy were detained by three
soldiers at a checkpoint near Krasnoarmiisk and then allegedly handed over to an SBU
officer, who took the four victims in an unknown direction. Their families have since had no
information about their whereabouts and suspect that the police have been unwilling to
investigate the disappearance due to pressure from SBU60. The Office of the General
Prosecutor informed OHCHR that an investigation was ongoing into the detention of the 17-
year-old boy but that they did not have any information regarding the apprehension and
disappearance of the three men.
67. In a similar case, a man was detained by members of the ‘Aidar’ battalion on 21 July
2014 at a checkpoint near Varvarivka, Luhansk region, and disappeared. Although the police
identified and arrested the perpetrators, the court released one of them later on the personal
guarantee of a Ukrainian MP. The perpetrator absconded and the investigation into the
disappearance has been suspended61.
68. OHCHR continued to monitor the trial of two SBU officers accused of the torture and
death of Oleksandr Agafonov on 14 November 2014. At a hearing on 10 August, the accused
testified to their involvement in his interrogation but denied subjecting him to any physical
violence. The Military Prosecutor’s Office presented video footage showing Agafonov in
clear physical distress following his interrogation. OHCHR will continue to monitor the
trial62.
57 OHCHR recalls that persons affiliated with the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ who did not have a continuous
combat function, retained their civilian status, such as Nataliya Arkhipova, the ‘minister of health’ of the ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’, who was killed in the attack.
58 Meeting between HRMMU and Office of the General Prosecutor, 1 August 2016.
59 Ruling of Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeals of 25 May 2016, available at:
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/57925068.
60 HRMMU interview, 25 May 2016.
61 HRMMU interview, 25 May 2016, and HRMMU meeting, 25 May 2016, 27 July 2016. Office of the General
Prosecutor confirmed to OHCHR that investigation has been stayed as suspect has absconded.
62 HRMMU trial monitoring, 10 August 2016.
19
69. OHCHR observed continued pressure on the judiciary in high-profile cases. A hearing at
the Kyiv City Court of Appeals on 3 July, on the extension of the pre-trial detention of a
commander of the ‘Aidar’ battalion, arrested and charged with abduction and other violent
crimes, illustrates the nature and extent of such pressure. A group of ‘Aidar’ battalion
soldiers and members of Parliament attended the hearing and demanded the defendant be
released from custody. The Prosecutor General also attended the hearing and expressed
doubt that the investigation had sufficiently established the material facts of the case given
that they took place “near the frontline.” He supported the release of the detainee and stated
that he expected Parliament to find a way to absolve soldiers from being subjected to civilian
justice for acts committed in the course of their military duties. Such interventions by the
Prosecutor General undermine the independence of investigations and the judiciary.
70. OHCHR welcomes efforts of the Government to prosecute members of the armed groups
for alleged human rights abuses. OHCHR acknowledges that without access to areas
controlled by the armed groups, Ukrainian law enforcement entities often do not have access
to the crime scenes, witnesses, and material evidence.
71. However, some armed group members and commanders have been tried in absentia.
OHCHR recalls that while trials in absentia are not prohibited under international law, they
must adhere to international human rights standards, including the rights of the accused to be
informed of the charges against them and the consequences of not appearing at trial63. This
includes the obligation that sufficient steps be taken to notify the accused persons and that
the notice be given sufficiently in advance to allow the preparation of a defence and presence
at the hearing. In absentia proceedings against persons accused of being members of armed
groups are increasingly frequent following the 12 May legislative amendments64. While
OHCHR observes that steps are taken to apprehend or secure the appearance of the accused
at trial, the in absentia procedure is not invoked consistently and recent changes in criminal
procedure lack sufficient safeguards to protect due process and fair trial rights.
B. Amnesty law
72. Considering the general lack of accountability for human rights violations committed by
the Ukrainian military or security forces, OHCHR is concerned about the 7 July law ‘On
amnesty in 2016’65 which provides inter alia that individuals who received combatant status
for participation in the ‘security operation’ in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
of eastern Ukraine will be absolved of criminal responsibility for non-grave crimes, except
for crimes against life and health and certain military crimes66 as well as sex offences, and
crimes against peace67.
73. OHCHR is alarmed that participation in the ‘security operation’ is considered as a ground
for lesser charges, more lenient sentences68 and amnesty. It is essential that the conduct of
military and security forces personnel, acting in their official capacity and exercising
authority over civilians, armed and tasked with carrying out hostilities or detention
63 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Trial Chamber, Decision to Hold Trial In Absentia, STL-11-01/I/TC,
1 February 2012
64 See paragraph 173 of the 14th OHCHR public report, covering period from 16 February to 15 May 2016.
65 Law of Ukraine ‘On amnesty in 2016’, Draft No. 4255 of 17 March 2016. The law is pending Presidential
approval.
66 Qualified crime of desertion (Article 408(2,3,4) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) , appropriation, extortion or
fraudulent obtaining of weapons, ammunitions, explosive or other warfare substances, vehicles, military or special
enginery, or abuse of office, by a military serviceman (Article 410), and wilful destruction or damage of munitions
(Article 411(2,3,4)).
67 In total the law enlists some 98 articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, to which amnesty will not apply, such as
terrorism-related offences (Articles 258 - 258-5), creation of criminal organisation (Article 255), crimes against
peace (Articles 437, 439, 442, 443, 446, 447), including genocide and use of mercenaries, qualified military crimes
(Articles 404-406, 408, 410, 411), sex offences (Articles 252-256), some corruption crimes (Articles 368 – 368-4,
369 ), threats, violence or trespass against life of a journalist (Article 345-1(3,4) and 348-1), a member of law
enforcement (Articles 345(3,4), 348 and 349), or a judge (Articles 347 and 379).
68 OHCHR is aware of at least one court decision in which a former soldier was not sentenced to imprisonment for
the commission of a grave crime as participation in the security operation was viewed as a mitigating circumstance:
e.g. verdict of Ivankivskyi district court of Kyiv region of 10 June 2016, available at:
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/58249890.
20
operations, be subjected to stricter scrutiny. OHCHR reiterates that no amnesty can be given
to any individual suspected of, accused of, or sentenced to war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or gross violations of human rights, including gender-specific violations.
C. Due process and fair trial rights
74. Clear and consistent allegations documented by OHCHR suggest that conflict-related
criminal investigations and prosecutions are characterized by an abuse of process. OHCHR
continued to document a pattern of arbitrary detention by Government forces of civilians
living near the contact line69. The victims70 are usually apprehended and held for some time
by unidentified armed men who, after extracting confessions under duress, bring them to
local law enforcement or security forces. On 12 July, OHCHR raised concerns with SBU
leadership regarding such practices71. The SBU stated that investigators had no choice but to
detain people brought to them, and explained that injuries are caused in the course of arrest.
75. Moreover, the right to fair trial is frequently hampered by ineffective legal representation
by lawyers from free legal aid centres. In numerous court proceedings, OHCHR has
observed criminal defence lawyers decline to assist their clients in filing complaints about
torture, ill-treatment and their conditions of detention72. On 20 May, OHCHR interviewed a
conflict-related detainee, who claimed that he was subjected to torture by SBU during more
than 48 hours; however no complaint was filed by his defence lawyer73.
76. OHCHR received numerous allegations of false evidence planted by SBU investigators
in conflict-related criminal cases. In particular, defendants allege that SBU officials plant
grenades or small arms during house searches to justify their detention74.
77. Government law enforcement and security forces use video and audio recordings of
alleged confessions by persons accused of being members of or affiliated with armed groups
to justify the arrest and detention of the accused. Various international and regional human
rights bodies have recommended the installation of video and/or audio recording equipment
in rooms where interrogations related to criminal investigations are undertaken, such as
police stations. OHCHR recalls that the purpose of such recommendations is to effectively
prevent instances of coerced confessions, torture and ill-treatment and to ensure that they will
not be admitted as evidence in courts75. OHCHR has documented numerous instances when
such confessions were extracted under duress, following torture and ill-treatment, without the
presence of a lawyer. OHCHR is further alarmed by the practice of disseminating such video
recordings online, either on the official SBU website or through leaks to media, often prior to
trial. The publication of such material violates the presumption of innocence principle and
the right to privacy of the suspect. The extensive scope and extent of this practice suggests
that it is utilized as a war propaganda tactic. The vast majority of conflict-related detainees
interviewed by OHCHR have had their ‘confessions’ filmed by the SBU and published on
their website. These videos are often re-published by online and traditional broadcast media.
78. OHCHR has also observed undue delays in proceedings in apparent retaliation against
those who oppose military misconduct. In Dnipro, the trial of a former member of the
‘Dnipro-1’ battalion for opposing the crimes of his commander has been repeatedly delayed.
Since January 2015 only three co-defendants have been questioned and the trial has been
postponed, suggesting deliberate denial of fair trial to a soldier who opposed his battalion
commander76.
69 See 14th HRMMU report covering 16 February to 15 May 2016, para. 58.
70 HRMMU interviews, 29 June 2016.
71 1 August 2016, OHCHR meeting with Deputy Head of Main Investigative Department of the Security Services of
Ukraine
72 HRMMU interview, 17 July 2016. According to the Head of Donetsk Regional State Legal Aid Service, appointed
lawyers must assist their clients in preparing complaints about torture, ill-treatment and their conditions of detention.
However, further legal representation is initiated by such complaints proceedings, requiring the appointment of a
different lawyer from the State Legal Aid Centre.
73 HRMMU interview, 20 May 2016.
74 HRMMU interviews, 23 May 2016, 24 May 2016.
75 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 16 February 2009, A/HRC/10/21, paras. 69-70.
76 HRMMU interview, 14 July 2016.
21
79. OHCHR continued to observe patterns of pressure on the judiciary by ‘pro-unity’
activists and the authorities. The permissive attitude of the authorities, including the Office
of the Prosecutor General, towards such interference in the judicial process risks eroding the
rule of law. Notwithstanding numerous appeals sent by the Court of Appeal for Odesa
Region and State Judicial Administration to the state authorities, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs has not provided courts and judges with sufficient security. While police reform77
envisions that the judiciary will have its own security units for ensuring safety and
protection, OHCHR has not observed any progress in this area78.
80. On 8 July, approximately 40 ‘pro-unity’ activists at the Suvorovskyi District Court of
Odesa disturbed the trial of paramilitary DUK ‘Right Sector’ members. According to the
indictment, the Head of Odesa office of the ‘Right Sector’ and one of its members are
charged with kidnapping, robbery and the illegal handling of weapons. During the
preliminary hearing about 15 ‘pro-unity’ activists entered the courtroom, 25 other activists
stayed outside blocking the entrance, and seven police officers were posted near the
courtroom and none inside. After brief deliberations, the judge, concerned by the overall
aggressive atmosphere, ruled to send the case to the Court of Appeals for Odesa region to
determine the relevant jurisdiction.
D. Arbitrary detention in conflict-related cases
81. OHCHR has documented a clear and consistent trend that human rights violations against
persons charged with conflict-related or national security and ‘terrorism’-related offenses79
often begin with arbitrary pre-trial detention. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure,
as amended in October 2014, pre-trial detention is mandatory for all conflict-related or
national security and ‘terrorism’-related cases80. According to the Minister of Justice,
“custodial detention for separatist and terrorist crimes… increases the efficacy of a pre-trial
investigation”81.
82. OHCHR recalls that the prohibition of arbitrary detention82 prescribes that detention in
custody of persons awaiting trial must be exceptional, based on an individualized
determination that it is reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances, for such purposes
as to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime.83 Such relevant
factors should be specified in law,84 and should not include vague and expansive standards
such as “public security.”85 Critically, pre-trial detention should not be mandatory for all
defendants charged with a particular crime, without regard to individual circumstances86.
83. Through trial monitoring, OHCHR has observed that neither the prosecution nor the
judges address the grounds for continued detention at review hearings. Courts rarely examine
77 Law of Ukraine “On National Police”.
78 HRMMU interview, 30 May 2016.
79 Articles 109 (Actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order or take-over of
government), 110 (Trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine), 1102 (financing of actions
committed with the aim to forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order or take-over of government,
territorial changes or state border of Ukraine), 111 (high treason), 112 (Trespass against life of a statesman or a
public figure), 113 (subversion), 114 (espionage), 1141 (interference with lawful activities of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine and other military formations), 258 (terrorist act), 2581 (involvement in commission of a terrorist act), 2582
(Public incitement to commit a terrorist act), 2583 (creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization), 2584
(Facilitation to commission of a terrorist act), 2585 (financing of terrorism), 260 (Creation of unlawful paramilitary
or armed formations) and 261 (Attacks on objects which contain any items of increased danger to the environment)
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
80 Paragraph 5 of article 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
81 Explanatory note to the draft law no. 4448a of 8 August 2014, introducing amendments to article 176 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.
82 Human Rights Committee, 1128/2002, Marques de Morais v. Angola, paras. 6.1, 6.4.
83 Human Rights Committee, 1502/2006, Marinich v. Belarus, para. 10.4; 1940/2010, Cedeño v. Venezuela, para.
7.10; Human Rights Committee, 1547/2007, Torobekov v. Kyrgyzstan, para. 6.3; 1887/2009, Peirano Basso v.
Uruguay, para. 10.2.
84 See Human Rights Committee Concluding observations Republic of Korea 1999, para. 141; Senegal 1997,
para. 63; Armenia 1998, para. 107; Kyrgyzstan 2000, para. 393.
85 See Human Rights Committee Concluding observations Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006, para. 18.
86 See Human Rights Committee Concluding observations Bolivia 1997, para. 208; Argentina 2000, para. 10; Sri
Lanka 2003, para. 13.
22
alternatives to pre-trial detention, such as bail or other conditions to guarantee appearance for
trial, which would render detention unnecessary in particular cases87.
84. OHCHR finds that the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing
for mandatory pre-trial detention for accused charged with conflict-related or national
security or terrorism offenses are contrary to international human rights standards and result
in excessive and at times arbitrary detention. In May 2015, Ombudsperson filed an appeal
with the Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality of the amendments citing the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Ombudsperson’s
Office withdrew the appeal, for unexplained reasons.
E. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public
disturbances
Maidan
85. OHCHR notes positive developments in pursuing accountability for human rights
violations committed during the Maidan events. On 23 June 2016, the Prosecutor General’s
office reported that four members of the ‘Berkut’ special police battalion of Kharkiv region
were detained in relation to the Maidan violence and charged with killing three protestors.
They are accused of following illegal orders and replacing the rubber bullets with hunting
ones thus killing three persons and inflicting bodily injuries to 35 persons on 18 February
2014. With this arrest, there are currently five ‘Berkut’ members charged with crimes against
life perpetrated on 18 February at Maidan88. All have been placed in custody for 60 days
pending the pre-trial investigation.
86. There has also been some progress in the investigation of the Maidan killings of 20
February 2014. On 21 June 2016, prosecutors presented evidence connecting two
submachine guns to two Berkut servicemen arrested in April 201489. According to the
evidence, three people were killed and two injured with these weapons.
2 May 2014 violence in Odesa
87. There continued to be significant pressure on the judiciary regarding the 2 May 2014
violence case. OHCHR has closely monitored the judicial proceedings against one of the
suspects – a “pro-federalism” activist - allegedly involved in the mass disorder in Odesa city
centre. On 27 May 2016, the Malynovskyi District Court of Odesa ruled to release him from
pre-trial detention and placed him under house arrest. OHCHR has since observed three
instances in which ‘pro-unity’ activists have protested inside the courtroom, threatened the
judges and defendant’s lawyers with violence, and obstructed the course of justice. Such
pressure resulted in arbitrary detention. On 27 May 2016, ‘pro-unity’ activists blocked the
courtroom, trapping the ‘pro-federalism’ defendants, several of their lawyers, and searched
all departing vehicles for passengers to prevent the release of the main defendant. Later that
day, police charged him with threatening to kill a prosecution witness, despite the absence of
probative evidence, and re-arrested him.90
88. On 7 June 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Odesa region was blocked by
approximately 40 ‘pro-unity’ activists after the judges released the defendant, finding that
there were no grounds for his arrest. The activists accused the judges of treason, threatened
them with violence and warned that the defendant would be “torn to ribbons” if released.
After several hours of being blocked in the courtroom, police put the defendant into
administrative detention as a sanction for allegedly using explicit language in the courtroom.
None of the ‘pro-unity’ activists were arrested or sanctioned for the disorder they caused in
the court. On 8 June 2016, the ‘pro-unity’ activists who blocked the courtroom were called as
witnesses for the prosecution and testified against the defendant.
87 Human Rights Committee,1178/2003, Smantser v. Belarus, para. 10.3; see Concluding observations Argentina
2010, para. 16; Panama 2008, para. 12.
88 See 14th HRMMU report covering 16 February to 15 May 2016, paras. 72-74
89 See 14th HRMMU report covering 16 February to 15 May 2016, paras. 74.
90 Under Article 208 (Lawful apprehension by a competent official) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine.
23
89. On 22 June, while the defendant’s appeal was being heard, ‘pro-unity’ activists - some of
whom were in military uniform - were present around the court and inside the courtroom.
They openly threatened the defendant’s lawyers and commented on their pleading before the
judges. The latter refused to consider the evidence presented by the defence and, after about
10 minutes of deliberation, upheld the decision to extend the defendant’s pre-trial detention.
Police presence around the court and inside the courtroom was insufficient. On 1 August
2016, during a meeting with OHCHR, a high-level official from the Office of the Prosecutor
General stated that the “initiative” of such activists is a critical bulwark against a biased and
partial judiciary. OHCHR is concerned that such statements indicate the tacit consent of the
prosecution in interference with the independence of the judiciary.
90. OHCHR is also deeply concerned about lack of progress in the trial of Serhii Khodiiak,
an active member of ‘pro-unity’ movement, who has been identified and accused of killing
one person in the city centre of Odesa on 2 May. On 31 May 2016, the Kyivskyi District
Court of Odesa returned the indictment to the prosecution for revision. The court stressed
that the indictment lacked critical information to justify the charges. The prosecution’s
appeal of the court decision is scheduled for September.
F. Parallel structures in armed group-controlled areas
91. Parallel structures, including ‘courts’, continued to develop and operate in the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. OHCHR reiterates that these structures
have no legal status under Ukrainian legislation and contradict the spirit of Minsk
Agreements. Furthermore, such structures affect the inalienable rights of people living in
territories controlled by armed groups, function in an arbitrary manner and present no
mechanism for victims of this system to get protection or redress.
92. The ‘supreme court’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ reported that from 1 January to 1
June, ‘courts of general jurisdiction’ accepted 37,256 ‘cases’, including 10,444 criminal
ones. Also, according to the information reported by the ‘prosecutor general’s office’ of the
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ 2,215 individuals were sentenced to various types of
punishment, including imprisonment in the first half of 2016. OHCHR has received regular
complaints from relatives of people accused of alleged crimes committed before the outbreak
of the armed conflict. Having spent several years in pre-trial detention without judgment,
such detainees now face ‘trial’ by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ‘courts’.
93. OHCHR was informed that ‘courts’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ have heard or
initiated proceedings in 29 criminal cases of rape against 33 accused. Nine criminal cases on
espionage are under ‘consideration’ by the ‘supreme court’.
94. The ‘criminal code’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ envisages death penalty as a sanction
of last resort, however, according to the ‘president’ of the ‘supreme court’ of ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’91, in only one case did the ‘supreme court’ resorted to such punishment.
The convict was ‘found to be guilty of’ a number of killings, participation in an armed gang
and illegal handling and storage of weapons and ammunition. The ‘sentence’ has not yet
been carried out.
95. All conflict-related detainees are under ‘criminal investigation’ for crimes against the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’. Having referred to principles and norms of international law
which are guaranteed by the ‘constitution’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, the ‘president’
of the ‘supreme court’ considered that the armed conflict, having a non-international
character, does not envisage “prisoner of war” status for persons who directly participated in
hostilities. He concluded that in these circumstances nothing prevents the ‘prosecution’ of
individuals for their participation and conduct in hostilities.
96. The ‘supreme court’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ also reported initiating in absentia
‘criminal proceedings’ against judges, prosecutors and investigators working in various
regions of Ukraine, based on provisions of the ‘criminal code’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
91 Information provided on 22 August 2016 to HRMMU. Although outside the reporting period, HRMMU believes
it is important to mention these findings.
24
related to the ‘intentional prosecution of an innocent person’ and ‘intentional passing of
illegal judgement’, in reprisal for decisions that may not have been favourable to members of
the armed groups or in retaliation for the perceived political partiality of the judges.
97. As of 16 June, the ‘military tribunal’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ - whose main
function is described by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ as the “administration of justice…
for crimes committed by military servicemen” - had reportedly ‘heard’ 60 ‘criminal cases’.
41 ‘cases’ were still being considered, nine had been transferred to ‘general courts’, while a
‘decision’ on ‘exemption from criminal responsibility’ had been issued in 12 ‘cases’. The
‘military tribunal’ rendered 18 ‘sentences’ for various types of crimes, including murder.
98. The ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ has adopted several ‘legislative acts’ that foresee the
establishment of a ‘supreme court’, ‘arbitration court’, ‘military court’ and 18 district, city
and city-district ‘courts’ in the territory under their control. Local interlocutors in Luhansk
informed OHCHR that several ‘first instance courts’ were established and are operating.
While there have been no developments in the establishment’ of a ‘supreme court’, OHCHR
was informed that there are persons ‘accused’ of grave crimes and deprived of their liberty in
Luhansk awaiting ‘trial’ by the ‘supreme court’.
V. Fundamental freedoms
A. Violations and abuses of the freedom of movement
99. Civilians’ freedom of movement across the contact line remained constrained. Since
early June, parties to the conflict started moving closer to each other, violating the Minsk
agreement. This resulted in a relocation of checkpoints on at least three transport corridors92
(two in Donetsk and one in Luhansk region) and a shrinking of the “no-man’s land” in
between, which may reignite hostilities and endanger civilians. There are inadequate water,
sanitary or medical facilities at the new entry-exit checkpoints. Areas around all transport
corridors are mined, but not marked properly according to the International Mine Action
Standards.
100. There were a number of security incidents at checkpoints, leading to the brief
closure of Zaitseve and Stanytsia Luhanska transport corridors. On 16 June, an exchange of
fire was reported at the Mariinka entry-exit crossing point, with one civilian consequently
wounded. The checkpoint operations were suspended until the following morning.
101. Crossing the contact line remained arduous. With 26,000-32,00093 people
crossing the line daily, there were long queues at all five operational transport corridors.
People waited for up to 36 hours, including overnight, with not or limited access to shade,
latrines, water, medical aid, or shelter in case of shelling. As temperatures exceeded 30
degrees Celsius, some people, mostly elderly, lost consciousness while standing in line.
92 On the Horlivka-Artemivsk transport corridor, the Government-controlled entry-exit checkpoint Zaitsevo was
moved 800 meters towards the checkpoint controlled by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
created a new ‘military’ checkpoint 600 meters towards Government-controlled side. The distance before was of
about 2 kilometres. Now the distance is of approximately 600 meters. On the Donetsk- Mariupol transport corridor,
the entry-exit checkpoint Novotroitske was moved three kilometres towards the checkpoint controlled by ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’. The previous distance of four kilometres, now is reduced to 1 kilometre. On the pedestrian
crossing of Stanytsia Luhanska, ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ moved its checkpoint 450 meters towards that
controlled by the Government of Ukraine.
93 This is a conservative estimate of the average number of people crossing the contact line daily based on the data
provided by the State Border Service. On some days, the number of people crossing exceeded 32,000 people.
“I cannot trust anyone. I came to talk to you because I know you. I am afraid to talk on
the phone. Everyone says that all conversations are tapped. Isn’t that prohibited?”
- A woman living in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
25
There is a lack of availability of ambulance service in close radius to the contact line94.
During the reporting period, three civilians died95 at checkpoints due to delayed emergency
medical assistance.
102. OHCHR received complaints regarding corruption at the Governmentcontrolled
checkpoints to ease passage, as well as reports of derogatory treatment,
particularly at Zaitseve, Stanytsia Luhanska, and Mariinka checkpoints. While there is a
Government hotline and a mechanism established by an NGO to receive complaints, people
are often unaware of these mechanisms. On 29 June, a media professional informed OHCHR
that at the end of May, while crossing Kurakhove checkpoint, she witnessed96 one of
the officers of the State Border Service verbally harassing civilians. After she complained
that such remarks were unacceptable, the officer arbitrarily searched her
personal belongings. Other officers present at the site did not intervene97.
B. Violations and abuses of the freedom of peaceful assembly
103. While monitoring the ‘Equality March’ on 12 June and Orthodox Processions98
held on 27-28 July, OHCHR noted significant progress made by the National Police of
Ukraine in securing peaceful assemblies. Those who wanted to protest against the ‘Equality
March’ were allowed to assemble. 57 individuals were temporarily detained and released
after a few hours on administrative charges of minor hooliganism. A large police presence
and high level of coordination between law-enforcement agencies was also observed during
the Orthodox Procession. While no major incidents occurred, police effectively responded to
several threats.
104. On the evening of 4 July 2016, more than 100 persons protested peacefully
against the presence of military equipment in the centre of Toretsk, Donetsk region. Police
arrested eight men and charged them with wilful disobedience99, interrogated them without
lawyers and did not bring them before court within three hours, as required by domestic
law100. SBU officers threatened and intimidated the detainees and demanded access to their
social media, interrogating them about their affiliation with the armed groups. The detainees
spent the night sleeping on the floor of a small cell with only one mattress and a wooden
bench. After the hearings, they were forcibly brought back to the police station although they
had been officially released from custody. There, the Head of Police in Donetsk region
allegedly insulted and threatened them. The Head confirmed to OHCHR that after the court
hearings he ordered his subordinates to bring the eight men to him for a “disciplinary
lecture.”
Territories under the control of the armed groups
105. During the reporting period, OHCHR observed several rallies in the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’. While no incidents were reported, there are concerns as to whether
participation was voluntary. On 10 June, OHCHR monitored a peaceful rally in Donetsk city
against the deployment of an OSCE armed police mission to Donbas. Based on a range of
accounts, it is evident that the gathering of about 12,000 – most of whom were employees of
‘state-funded institutions” or students – was organized by the authorities of the ‘Donetsk
People’s Republic’. OHCHR witnessed that people taking part in the protest were warned by
‘volunteers’ that if they would leave the site, their ‘misbehaviour’ would be reported to their
superior or the ‘authorities’.
94 World Health Organization, Situation Report, 1 August 2016; OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Ukraine Issue 13, 1-
31 August 2016
95 On 25 May, a man died of a heart attack while waiting for passage at the pedestrian crossing of Stanytsia
Luhanska. On 13 June, an 82-year-old woman died of an epileptic attack at the same checkpoint. On 7 July, a 62-
year-old man died at the Zaitseve checkpoint due to the deterioration of his health. Although first aid was provided,
professional medical help was not available.
96 HRMMU interview, 29 June 2016.
97 HRMMU interview, 19 July 2016.
98 The procession started on 3 July in Sviatohirsk Lavra in Donetsk region and on 9 July from Pochaiv, Ternopil
oblast, and was dedicated to the day of Baptism of Rus (on 28 July 2016).
99 Article 185 of the Code of Administrative Infractions.
100 Article 263 of the Code of Administrative Infractions
26
C. Violations and abuses of the freedom of association
106. OHCHR continued to document repeated cases of harassment of Communist
party members101. On 28 June, the apartment of a 68-year-old first secretary of the Kharkiv
local branch of the Communist Party was searched and she was charged with trespassing the
territorial integrity of Ukraine and bribing State officials102. On 30 June, a Kharkiv court
ruled to place her in pre-trial detention. She informed OHCHR that her physical condition
was stable but her health had deteriorated while in custody103.
Territories under the control of the armed groups
107. OHCHR observed continued restrictions on civil society in the areas controlled
by armed groups, limiting their ability to operate and deliver humanitarian aid. According to
reports, due to the absence of a ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ‘law’ governing nongovernmental
organization (NGO) registration104, the ‘ministry of justice’ informs NGOs
operating in armed group-controlled areas that they cannot be registered.
108. On 21 July 2016, a co-founder of a humanitarian organization in Donetsk was
deprived of her liberty by people who identified themselves as members of the ‘ministry of
state security’ for the second time after her release at the end of February 2016105. On 9
August 2016, OHCHR was informed of her release.
109. While independent NGOs have been facing restrictions, OHCHR observed the
growth of organizations created under the auspices of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. For
example, the number of members of the civil society “Donetsk republic” organization has
reached 140,000106. The NGO ‘Peace to Luhansk Area’, which reportedly aims at “fighting
fascism and aspiring to the Russian world” has a membership of 72,500, compared to 11,500
in early 2016. Reportedly, membership is required for public sector employees107. There are
serious concerns concerning the mandatory nature of membership, as well as data protection
issues, as the lists of members are published online.
110. There is little to no space for free trade unions not affiliated with ‘authorities’.
OHCHR learnt108 that only one trade union established by the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’
was allowed in Luhansk.
D. Violations and abuses of the freedom of opinion and expression
111. According to OHCHR interlocutors109, Ukrainian media professionals have
continued experiencing pressure from SBU or the Armed Forces when reporting on sensitive
matters, such as military lossesor unlawful conduct of Ukrainian soldiers. Some journalists
also mentioned self-censorship when they feel that certain information could harm the
Ukrainian Armed Forces or fear that Russian or armed groups media could exploit such
information for propaganda purposes. In a notable increase in violence against journalists,
OHCHR documented three incidents in Zaporizhzhia region and three in Kyiv. The cases
appeared related to the professional activities of the journalists, intended to threaten them and
stifle their reporting, and are being investigated by National Police of Ukraine.
112. On 8 July, the press centre of the ‘Anti-Terrorism Operation Headquarters’
(ATO HQ) requested SBU to suspend the accreditation of two Ukrainian and one Russian
journalist reporting from Avdiivka, Donetsk region. After filming attacks that killed two
Ukrainian soldiers110, the journalists were requested by the Ukrainian armed forces to delay
their publication by one day. The subsequent publication of the video was considered by the
101 See 14th HRMMU report covering 16 February to 15 May 2016, para. 108.
102 Articles 110 and 369 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
103 HRMMU interview, 15 July 2016.
104 HRMMU interview, 22 June 2016.
105 See 14th HRMMU report covering 16 February to 15 May 2016, para. 111.
106 As of 24 May 2016.
107 HRMMU interview, 9 August 2016.
108 HRMMU interview, 16 June 2016.
109 HRMMU interview, 22 June 2016.
110 HRMMU interview, 19 July 2016.
27
ATO HQ to be a violation of the rules of conduct of media professionals working in conflict
areas111 because the material disclosed the soldiers’ faces, positions and weaponry. While the
Government can introduce restrictions on journalists’ activities along the contact line based
on national security considerations, such restrictions must be provided by law, proportional
and should not be arbitrarily applied. In this case, OHCHR considers that the response of the
ATO HQ was disproportionate considering the measures taken by the journalists to comply
with the requests of the Ukrainian armed forces.
113. On 31 May, the Presidential decree112 on the enactment of the resolution of the
National Security and Defence Council “on some personal sanctions” came into force,
imposing sanctions113 on 17 Russian journalists in addition to the previous sanction lists114.
At the same time this decree lifted sanctions against 29 foreign journalists.
114. On 24 May, the website database Myrotvorets115 published the names and
contact details of an additional116 304 media professionals (300 international and 4 national),
leading to adverse effects on people included in the list. Some media professionals have
received offensive remarks or threats, and were labelled as ‘separatists’. OHCHR
interviewed several people who claim their bank accounts have been frozen due to their
inclusion on the list or for anti-Maidan expressions.
115. On 14 July, journalist Ruslan Kotsaba, who had been sentenced117 to three years
and six months of imprisonment for having allegedly prevented activities of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine, was declared innocent and released. The Ivano-Frankivsk regional court
of Appeal overturned his conviction by the city court of 12 May 2016.
116. On 20 July, a prominent journalist, Pavel Sheremet working at Ukrainska
Pravda, a popular Ukrainian online news outlet, was killed in a car bomb explosion in
central Kyiv. The car he was driving belonged to one of the founding editors. The General
Prosecutor stated that the incident was investigated as a murder.
Territories under the control of the armed groups
117. A media professional from Donetsk stated118 that the analytical department of
the ‘ministry of information policy’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ thoroughly checks
journalists’ work and exercises strict oversight over publications, as a condition for
accreditation. Media professionals in Donetsk reported that in recent months, most foreign
journalists (except for Russian media professionals) were denied “accreditation” by the
armed groups, leading to a drastic decrease of foreign journalists working in territories
controlled by the armed groups.
118. On 21 June, the ‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
‘published a video of a Ukrainian journalist deprived of her liberty, ‘confessing’ that she had
111 Rules of conduct of media professionals working in the ATO zone. published by the State Committee of TV and
Radio broadcasting: http://comin.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=129965&cat_id=114334
112 Presidential Decree №224 / 2016 On the decision of the National Security and Defense of Ukraine of 20 May
2016 “On some special personal restrictive measures (sanctions)”
113 Denial of issuance and cancellation of visas for residents of foreign States or other means of banning their entry
into the territory of Ukraine.
114 National Security and Defence Council decision of 2 September 2015 "On application of special personal
economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions)", enacted by presidential decree of Ukraine from 16 September
2015 №549, containing a list of 388 individuals and 105 legal entities.
115 The website includes personal data and information available on social media about people who are allegedly
involved in activities of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. It is allegedly
maintained by volunteers but has been actively used since 2014 by the Ukrainian forces at the checkpoints. As
previously noted by OHCHR, it includes armed groups members as well as civil servants, who did not move to
Government-controlled areas, as well as members of civil society who provide humanitarian assistance in the areas
controlled by armed groups. See 14th HRMMU report covering 16 February to 15 May 2016, paragraph 87.
116 On 10 May 2016 the Ukrainian website “Myrotvorets” published the personal data of 4068 Ukrainian and
international journalists supposedly accredited to work in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
117 On 12 May 2016 the Ivano-Frankivsk city court sentenced the journalist Ruslan Kotsaba accused of treason and
impeding the work of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, to 3 years and 6 months of imprisonment. See more details in
14th HRMMU report covering 16 February to 15 May 2016, paragraph 117
118 HRMUU interview, 29 June 2016
28
been approached by SBU before travelling to Luhansk and requested to gather information
about the members of a ‘municipal council’ and the armed groups. The ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ stated she had been charged for ‘espionage’, which is punishable with up to 10 to
20 years of imprisonment under article 336 of the ‘criminal code’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’.
119. In Donetsk, a blogger and activist from Kyiv remains deprived of his liberty by
the ‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ since January 2016 and
charged with the unlawful possession of weapons119. On 27 June, there was reportedly a
‘hearing’ by a ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ‘court’, during which the blogger plead guilty and
confirmed to have brought two grenades to the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’120. During the
“hearing”, he managed to give his father his sweater, which was covered with blood, raising
concerns about possible ill-treatment by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ‘investigators’.
120. On 1 June 2016, the ‘head’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ signed a decree ‘On
measures to protect state secret and official information”121. The ‘decree’ bans all ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ ‘civil servants’ from using open communication channels, including
Ukrainian mobile networks, email accounts and social media, when contacting anyone
outside the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ (excluding the Russian Federation). The
humanitarian community has noted the negative impact of such measures which, for
instance, prohibit the sharing of necessary information on health care and social protection.
VI. Economic and social rights
A. Economic and social rights and early warning
121. The entire population of Ukraine continues to be affected by the deteriorating
economic situation as a result of the conflict and instability in the east. In the first six months
of 2016, prices increased by 4.9 per cent. Since 1 July, utility rates for heating increased by
75-90 per cent on average122, whilst the average salary remained constant at UAH 4,934
(approximately USD 197). On 6 July, OHCHR monitored an all-Ukrainian demonstration
organized by The Trade Union to demand an increase in the minimum wage123 and a
decrease in utility rates and rates for gas. While most demonstrators were working age men
and women, there were also many older persons. Considering that 60 per cent of all
pensioners receive between UAH 1,300 and 3,000 (USD 52 to 120), increased utility rates
are a serious burden for most pensioners, despite Government subsidies to all households
whose spending on utilities exceeds 15 per cent of their income.
122. According to the Ministry of Social Policy, 1,714,388 individuals were
registered as IDPs as of 15 August 2016. Their integration has remained impeded by the
absence of a State strategy and the consequent absence of allocation of financial resources,
leading to the economic and social marginalisation of IDPs. Most communities hosting large
numbers of IDPs have not received additional resources from the State and fully rely on
humanitarian actors. Employment and accommodation are among IDPs’ most pressing
needs.
119 On 16 August 2016, the 'central city district court' of Makiivka ‘sentenced’ him to two years of imprisonment for
the 'illegal possession of weapons'.
120 HRMMU interview, 12 July 2016
121 Accessible online: http://old.dnr-online.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Ukaz_N155_01062016.pdf
122 On 1 July 2016, the cost of utilities for heating and hot water doubled.
123 Recognized as the economically minimum viable salary.
“We sacrificed our lives working for this pension. Haven’t we earned it?”
- Resident of Kuibyshevskii district of Donetsk city
29
123. OHCHR has observed a worrisome trend of employers’ refusing to hire former
soldiers and members of volunteer battalions. Coupled with the lack of services for socioeconomic
rehabilitation, insufficient mental health support, proliferation of arms and
substance abuse, this may destabilize communities and contribute to human rights violations.
The International Labour Organisation’s guidelines124 on socio-economic rehabilitation of
ex-combatants highlight the importance of creating employment opportunities for former
soldiers, which are more sustainable and more effective than provision of short-term benefits.
Territories under the control of the armed groups
124. The increased hostilities during the reporting period have led to an isolation of
some villages close to the contact line. For instance, in Yasne there is no public
transportation, pharmacy, grocery store, medical facility, and phone reception has been very
weak for more than a year. Yasne’s residents have to use a taxi or walk to the closest town,
Dokuchaievsk (some seven kilometres away) to buy groceries or access medical care125.
125. Limited access to water remains one of the major concerns in the ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’. In the period under review, the water supply on both sides of the contact
line has been mostly affected by damage to electricity stations as a result of indiscriminate
shelling, which then affects ability of water stations to operate. Continued exchanges of fire
have on several occasions prevented repair teams from accessing damaged infrastructure, and
have put the lives of their staff at risk. Negotiating ‘windows of silence’ to allow access and
restore essential services has become more difficult as parties to the conflict continue to
disregard humanitarian principles protecting vital civilian infrastructure. In addition,
significant financial investment is required to rehabilitate water networks that have degraded
due to a lack of continuous maintenance. Water utilities are reliant on humanitarian
assistance to procure basic water treatment chemicals. There are increasingly frequent water
supply interruptions as a result of continued conflict-related damage aggravating pre-existing
vulnerabilities stemming from aging infrastructure, operational inefficiencies and
unsustainable revenue streams. Overall, this affects the continuity and quality of water for
the conflict-related population, particularly in the areas controlled by the armed groups.
126. Collective centres accommodating IDPs from the conflict-affected area are
reportedly overcrowded. Many people therefore prefer staying in their sometimes heavily
damaged apartments or insecure areas. With the intensification of shelling in recent months
and increased damage to residential houses, more people are likely to need alternative
accommodation. This may result in deteriorating conditions in collective centres, rise in the
level of homelessness, and increased number of violations of housing, land and property
rights.
127. Employment opportunities remain very limited. Before the conflict, the majority
of the male population in Donetsk and Luhansk worked in coalmines, many of which have
closed. OHCHR visited Trudovska mine, which employed 1,800 people prior to the conflict.
Since closing in January 2015, 800 employees still registered at the coalmine have not
received any salary and are not entitled to any social payments. In Zaitseve, armed groups
are stationed in the local school and hospital, the chemical plant has closed down, and the
coalmines either closed or are unable to pay salaries, thus leaving the majority of residents
unemployed. The situation is similar in many other towns and villages. To tackle
unemployment, in some towns, local ‘authorities’ have organized community works, for
which residents receive a monthly salary of 2,500 RUB (nearly 40 USD) or food.
128. Many people in areas controlled by the armed groups continued to report that
their relatives join the armed groups for financial reasons, as a last resort, unable to find other
gainful employment126.
124 Available at:
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_141276.pdf
125 HRMMU interview, 16 June 2016.
126 HRMMU interview, 16 June 2016.
30
B. Social security and protection of internally displaced persons
129. IDPs continued to face impediments to their economic and social rights. During
the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed IDPs whose registration certificates were
cancelled and payments suspended as a result of the verification procedure initiated in
February 2016127. IDPs complained that they were not informed about the decision of local
authorities to suspend payments, and described difficulties in reinstating their payments. A
woman128 from Perevalsk, Luhansk region, was accused by the Kharkiv Department of
Social Protection of being a “cheater” and instructed to return her social entitlement
payments to the State.
130. Approximately 85 per cent of IDPs residing in Government-controlled areas
were severely or critically affected by such suspensions. In areas under the control of the
armed groups, this concerned 97 per cent of IDPs. For the vast majority of IDPs (84 per cent)
the procedure to renew IDP certificates and/or access social benefits and pensions was
unclear, indicating a lack of or inadequate communication from the authorities129.
131. The amendments adopted on 8 June 2016130 have exacerbated the hardship
experienced by IDPs, allowing automatic termination of benefits and proscribing two to six
months for reinstatement, depending on the grounds for termination. OHCHR is concerned
about the slow progress in the creation of special commissions for the verification of IDP
residences.131 For IDPs from Crimea, the situation is further aggravated by the fact that their
IDP certificate is considered to be their only proof of residence in Government-controlled
territory. Losing their IDP certificate leads to a loss of residency status.
132. While a recent study showed an overwhelmingly positive or neutral attitude of
Ukraine’s population towards IDPs132, OHCHR has consistently observed cases133 of
discrimination against IDPs in accessing employment, accommodation or banking services
based on the place of their origin. Checks of IDPs’ ‘living conditions’ have contributed to the
reluctance of landlords to rent housing to IDPs and to evictions. OHCHR also interviewed
IDPs who were denied access to their bank deposits and credit.
133. Many IDPs believe that measures taken by the Government of Ukraine, against
a backdrop of decreasing standards of living and limited social services throughout Ukraine,
exacerbated by the mass cancellation of social entitlements134, are aimed at forcing them to
return to the armed group-controlled areas as a form of collective punishment. One woman
told OHCHR that she travelled to the territories controlled by the armed groups to give birth
as her payments had been suspended and she could not afford living in the Governmentcontrolled
areas anymore135.
134. By depriving IDPs of their social entitlements, the Government is further
deepening the socio-economic hardships of IDPs and their dependency on humanitarian aid.
The deteriorating situation caused by the IDP laws may force the State authorities and
international donors to reintroduce major humanitarian projects in the Governmentcontrolled
territories instead of focusing on integration and recovery programmes.
127 See 14th HRMMU report covering 16 February to 15 May 2016, paras. 134-141. See also:
http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/58003597; http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/57907662;
http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/57705871; http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/57486306;
http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/57125552; http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/58009943
128 HRMMU interview, 29 June 2016.
129 Monitoring Report on the suspension of IDP certificates, social payments and pension payments for IDPs in
Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Dnipro regions, conducted by the NGO Right to Protection.
130 See paragraphs 26-30 in “Legal framework for internally displaced persons”.
131 See paragraphs 30-31 in ‘Legal framework for internally displaced persons’.
132 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology Studies, June 2016. The survey shows the following attitude towards
IDPs across Ukraine: 43 per cent- positive, 47 per cent neutral, 6 per cent negative; and 58 per cent, 34 per cent and
two per cent respectively in the five eastern regions.
133 HRMMU interview 4 June 2016.
134 R2P IDP monitoring report, VostokSOS monthly reports
135 HRMMU interview, 17 July 2016.
31
135. Several legislative changes136 have imposed undue and discriminatory obstacles
for IDPs to access their social entitlements. As of 1 June 2016, IDP pensioners started
receiving special bank cards (meant to also serve as identity documents) from the statedowned
‘Oshchadbank’ bank. As of 1 July 2016, all social benefits and pensions must be paid
to IDPs only via this bank, while all other recipients of social entitlements are free to use any
other bank in Ukraine. IDP pensioners are also requested to undergo physical identification
in Oshchadbank branches twice during the first year, followed by an annual visit. In case of
failure to do so, all operations with the person’s account will be suspended automatically by
the bank until the IDP presents himself or herself. This provision imposes an additional
burden on people with disabilities as well as for IDPs living in rural and remote areas.
OHCHR also received information137 that people receiving pension payments into their bank
accounts cannot conduct online payments or purchases with their bank cards from the
territories controlled by the armed groups. Allegedly, payments are only possible from
Government-controlled territory.
C. Housing, land, and property rights
136. OHCHR has documented an increase in cases of people who are forced to pay
high utility bills incurred by the use of their homes or apartments by either the Ukrainian
armed forces or armed groups. Many of those affected have accumulated large debts that
they cannot afford to pay. Some civil society organizations noted that this was a widespread
issue in the Mariinskiy district and in areas adjacent to the Donetsk airport.
137. One woman reported how, despite repeated complaints to the Department of the
National Police of Ukraine in Novoaidar District, soldiers continued to be stationed in her
house during the reporting period, which was looted and damaged138. Another woman, whose
house in Avdiivka was used by different groups of soldiers for over a year, received a high
electricity bill in May 2016. As an ad hoc solution, she was provided a certificate by the local
military commander’s office and was able to appeal to the utility company139. OHCHR
continued to follow a civil claim concerning destroyed property where a resident of
Sloviansk successfully litigated the damages to her house inflicted in the course of the
conflict140. OHCHR notes that the Ministry of Justice has appealed the decision. These cases
show that there is no mechanism of complaint and remedy for civilians whose property has
been used for military purposes or damaged in hostilities. OHCHR recalls that all IDPs have
the right to restitution of their housing, land and/or property, of which they were arbitrarily
or unlawfully deprived and to be compensated for any loss or damage141.
138. OHCHR witnessed the use of private houses by members of Ukraine’s armed
forces, in Shchastia, Staryy Aidar, Lopaskine, Trokhizbenka, Bakhmutka, Nyzhnia
Zhovanka, Verkhnia Zhovanka, Kriakivka in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In Governmentcontrolled
areas, despite complaints from the affected population to local authorities, the
National Police is often either reluctant to investigate such cases or unable to do so due to
lack of access to areas near the contact line.
139. The lack of a mechanism to conduct inspections and assess damage to property
– which is indispensable for future justice processes – hinders victims’ ability to seek remedy
in restoring their property rights. Although both the National Human Rights Action Plan and
the Comprehensive IDP State programme142 envisage the establishment of a compensation
136 Cabinet of Ministers, Resolution No. 167 “On Introducing Changes to some Resolutions of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine”, March 2016. The Resolution amends three other Government acts regulating registration of
IDPs and the provision of social benefits for IDPs.
137 HRMMU interview, 7 July 2016.
138 HRMMU Interview, 25 May 2016, 15 August 2016.
139 HRMMU Interview, 6 July 2016, 23 July 2016.
140 On 15 March 2016, the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeals in Bakhmut, ordered the State to compensate for the
damage caused to a property as a result of shelling in June 2014.See 14th HRMMU report covering the period 16
February – 15 May 2016,
141 Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (“Pinheiro Principles”),
Principle 2.
142 Cabinet of Minister Resolution No. 1094 “On the approval of the Comprehensive state programme of support,
social adaptation and reintegration of citizens of Ukraine who moved from the temporarily occupied territory of
32
mechanism for damaged and destroyed housing, land and property, no concrete steps have
been taken in that regard. OHCHR is concerned that Ukrainian courts have continued to
reject claims on the basis of insufficient evidence establishing individual responsibility.
140. OHCHR continued to observe the alarming accommodation situation for IDPs
in collective centres across Ukraine. In Odesa, since December 2015, around 400 IDPs
predominantly with disabilities (including 42 persons in wheelchairs) inhabiting Kuialnyk
sanatorium have been subjected to threats of forced eviction due to outstanding debts for
accommodation. In addition to constant threats of eviction, owners utilize electricity and
water cuts as a means to pressure regional authorities to cover the accommodation costs of
IDPs.
141. On 24 June 2016, a number of IDPs, together with a ‘self-defence’ group in
Odesa, seized a communal building after numerous attempts at obtaining support from the
regional authority to solve their housing problems.143 OHCHR notes a worrying tendency to
resolve pressing socio-economic and political issues with the help of voluntary battalions and
paramilitary groups.
Territories under the control of the armed groups
142. Armed groups continued to loot and use civilian homes and other property for
military purpose. During a monitoring visit to Kuibyshevskyi district in Donetsk, OHCHR
observed that members of armed groups were present in the neighbourhood’s bomb
shelter144. Some residents mentioned having been expelled from this shelter by members of
the armed groups and having nowhere to go when shelling takes place. Some also indicated
that armed group members used to stay in residential apartments. Residents also claimed that
armed group members had looted shops and apartments. Residents did not provide any
details, noting that complaints to the armed groups tended to be followed by intimidation.
143. The vast majority of private houses, dormitories and apartment buildings in
Kuibyshevskyi district have been damaged. During the reporting period, the area was further
shelled. Due to the ongoing shelling and damage to civilian homes, the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ appears reluctant to provide funding for the restoration of damaged property. The
few remaining residents reported that they did not leave their homes to protect their property
from looting and armed group presence. Some informed OHCHR that despite a ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ commission’s visit to the area in May 2015 and their commitment to
restore the damaged buildings, no action has been taken to date.
144. Armed group-controlled parallel property registration systems are being
developed or already in force, negatively affecting persons owning, inheriting, selling or
buying property. According to its ‘internal regulations’145, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
recognizes only property registration documents issued by their ‘structures’. As a result,
people either residing in or owning property in areas controlled by the armed groups are
forced to register it on both sides of the contact line, paying double taxes and administrative
fees. Unresolved disputes over housing, land and property prevent durable solutions for
returnees, may force returns by those seeking to defend their property rights, and threaten
peace and stability prospects146.
Ukraine and the areas of anti-terrorist operation in other regions of Ukraine for the period till 2017”, 16 December
2015.
143 HRMMU Interview, 8 July 2016.
144 HRMMU interview, 19 May 2016.
145 The ‘cabinet of ministers’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, No. 17-3, 2 September 2015, prescribes that
property documents issued between 11 May 2014 and 3 September 2015 by Ukrainian authorities must be legalized
by the inter-agency commission at the ‘ministry of justice’ to be regarded as having legal force. On 12 July 2016 the
‘Donetsk people’s republic ‘supreme court’ issued an ‘explanatory letter’ providing that property registration
documents have to be “legalized” according to this procedure.
146 See Early Warning and Economic and Social Rights, paragraph 23.
33
D. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health
145. Former detainees, including victims of torture, continue to face difficulties in
accessing medical care. Most military personnel who had been detained by armed groups can
access free specialized medical services in military hospitals, including testing and treatment.
However, despite legislation guaranteeing psycho-social rehabilitation of demobilized
soldiers, there is no referral procedure and there is a lack of adequate service providers.
Those who had been members of volunteer battalions are not entitled to free treatment. The
absence of a comprehensive State rehabilitation programme does not allow for proper
integration of demobilized soldiers and members of volunteer battalions into communities.
146. Civilian conflict-related detainees face even greater challenges. Upon their
release, they are unrecognized and thus not entitled to any medical, psychological or social
services and support. State entities often lack the skills and capacity to deal with these
groups, which can lead to their re-victimization. Consequently, civilians released from
captivity and the relatives of missing persons rely on the assistance of volunteers and civil
society organizations.
147. Conflict-related detainees continue to have limited access to medical treatment
in detention. OHCHR has noticed the deterioration of the medical state of several detainees
at SIZO premises in Mariupol and Zaporizhzhia region. At the Vilniansk SIZO, as of 21 July,
a conflict-related detainee was denied medical assistance despite a 5 April 2016 court
decision mandating his transfer to a medical facility and treatment.
Territories under the control of the armed groups
148. In the areas controlled by the armed groups, OHCHR noted persistent
difficulties with availability147 and accessibility148 of healthcare for civilians. Medical
facilities and first aid are particularly limited along the contact line. In the village of
Olenivka (near a checkpoint), controlled by the armed groups, the sole ambulance was
reportedly149 relocated to Dokuchaivsk (10 kilometres away), making it difficult for people to
access first aid. The situation is worsened by the fact that telephone mobile networks barely
function in Olenivka. In armed group-controlled Zaitseve, armed groups are positioned in the
hospital (See: Alleged violations of international humanitarian law, para. 36) and the
residents can only receive first aid in a polyclinic in Mykytivka (18 kilometres away); those
injured can only be hospitalized in Horlivka hospital (20 kilometres away). OHCHR learned
about a woman who died because the ambulance could not come to her assistance150. The
residents of Kuibyshevskiy district reported similar problems.
149. In armed group-controlled Sakhanka village, 700 people (including 130
children) are without medical care or assistance. The village’s only doctor left at the outbreak
of the armed conflict, and a nurse resigned in early July 2016.
150. According to the chief doctor of one of the major hospitals in Donetsk city,
there is shortage of nurses; approximately 80 per cent of them live in rural areas that are
across or near the contact line, and are no longer able to get to the hospital.
151. Medical facilities in armed group-controlled areas still largely depend on
humanitarian aid. Since humanitarian actors are not allowed to operate freely in the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’, treatment for some groups of patients remains limited and often
147 For the purpose of this report, availability means that functioning public health and health care facilities, goods
and services must be available in sufficient quantity within a State.
148 For the purpose of this report, accessibility means that facilities, goods and services must be accessible physically
(in safe reach for all sections of the population, including children, adolescents, older persons, persons with
disabilities and other vulnerable groups), as well as financially, and in a non-discriminatory manner. Accessibility
also implies the right to seek, receive and impart health-related information in an accessible format (for all,
including persons with disabilities).
149 As reported by OSCE SMM monitors on 2 June 2016.
150 HRMMU interview, 15 July 2016.
34
inaccessible. The wife of a man recently diagnosed with diabetes alleged151 they could not
receive insulin in two Donetsk hospitals and had to cross the contact line to purchase
medication. While on 12 July 2016152 the ‘minister of health’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
stated that there was sufficient supply of insulin, the type available is not suitable for all
patients. He did add that overall only 20 per cent of medication required by hospitalised
patients is available in the medical facilities under control of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
152. The need for psycho-social support remained high and largely unmet. Residents
in conflict-affected areas of Donetsk have complained about sleep deprivation due to
exchanges of fire every night. Civil society and international organizations providing psychosocial
support remain severely restricted by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
VII. Human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea153
A. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity
153. Tensions between Ukraine and the Russian Federation rose after Russia's
Federal Security Service (FSB) stated on 10 August that it had detained a group of saboteurs
on Crimean territory, near the northern city of Armyansk, and had prevented terrorist acts on
the peninsula organized by the Main Intelligence Department of the Ukrainian Defense
Ministry. Twenty improvised explosive devices containing more than 40 kilograms of TNT
equivalent, ammunition, mines and grenades were said to have been found. An FSB officer
and a Russian serviceman were allegedly killed in armed clashes with the group of
infiltrators on 6 and 7 August 2016. The Ukrainian General Staff denied any involvement,
and Ukrainian President Poroshenko called the FSB claims “a provocation”. On 11 and 13
August 2016, two alleged members of the group were arrested and remanded in custody for
two months. A third suspect was reportedly arrested on 30 July 2016 in Simferopol airport.
154. On the night of 24 May 2016, a Crimean Tatar, Ervin Ibragimov went missing.
His father found his car abandoned outside their home, with the doors open and the key left
in the ignition. Ervin Ibragimov is a member of the Coordination Council of the World
Congress of Crimean Tatars and of the Bakhchisaray regional Mejlis. Footage from a CCTV
camera shows a group of men forcing him into a van and driving away. On 25 May 2016,
Ervin Ibragimov’s father went to the FSB in Simferopol to file a complaint and provide the
CCTV footage. The FSB officers allegedly refused to file the complaint and told him to send
it by post. The ‘police’ in Bakhchisaray opened an investigation into the incident. A week
before he disappeared, Ibragimov had told his friends he had noticed a car waiting outside his
house that later followed him during the day. On 25 May 2016, he was due to travel to the
town of Sudak to attend the court hearing of a group of Crimean Tatars charged for holding
an “unauthorized” gathering on 18 May 2016 to mark Crimean Tatar Deportation
Remembrance Day. On 1 June 2016, Ervin Ibragimov’s employment record book and
passport were found near a bar in Bakhchisaray. This is the tenth case recorded by OHCHR
151 HRMMU interview, 19 May 2016.
152 Roundtable chaired by the head of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ with the ‘minister of health’ and chief doctors
of the hospitals, Donetsk city, 12 July.
153 The Autonomous Republic of Crimea technically known as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol, in line with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
OHCHR has not been granted access to Crimea and has no in situ presence there. It has been able to follow the
human rights situation through contacts with Crimean residents on the peninsula and mainland Ukraine, and relying
on a variety of interlocutors, including representatives of political, religious, civil society organizations, victims,
relatives and witnesses of alleged human rights violations, members of the legal profession, journalists,
entrepreneurs, teachers, doctors, social workers, human rights activists and other categories, including individuals
with no specific affiliations. OHCHR has continued to seek access to Crimea.
“They put a gas mask with a hose on my head, opened the bottom valve and sprayed gas. I
started vomiting and choking. Then, they removed the mask, gave me smelling salts, and
started again.” - Genadii Afanasiev
35
since March 2014 – and the first in 2016 – of a person missing in circumstances, which could
indicate the existence of political motivations.
155. On 21 June, OHCHR met Larisa Shaimardanova, the mother of Timur
Shaimardanov, in Strilkove, Kherson region. Timur is one of the 10 people who went
missing in Crimea in circumstances that appear to be politically motivated since March
2014. When the events in Crimea began in late February 2014, he took part in pro-Ukrainian
rallies. After the March 2014 ‘referendum’, he initiated the creation of ‘Ukrainsky Dom’
(Ukrainian house), a civic association promoting Ukrainian culture and language in Crimea.
On the day of his disappearance, on 26 May 2014, Timur Shaimardanov called his parents,
saying he had “important things to do” and would not be able to be in touch for a while.
Three days later, his disappearance was reported to the police. Several seemingly unrelated
facts were mentioned to OHCHR by his mother but none have proven to be decisive in
shedding light on his disappearance. Timur Shaimardanov’s latest job was to advise a local
politician and businessman from Simferopol on financial issues; he allegedly converted to
Islam; he was acquainted with Oleg Sentsov, Gennady Afanasiyev and Oleksandr Kolchenko
who were arrested by the Crimean de facto authorities in May 2014 and sentenced for
allegedly planning terrorist acts. In March 2014, Timur Shaimardanov was trying to organize
a “resistance movement” in Crimea and was reportedly trying to establish contacts in
Ukraine for that purpose.
156. Two individuals reportedly told Ms Shairmardanova that her son was alive and
detained in Crimea, which could not be verified. She met with the Crimean investigators in
charge of her son’s case several times, but to no avail. Several hundred witnesses have
allegedly been interrogated and the case file concerning Timur Shaimardanov contains 11
tomes of documents.
B. Due process and fair trial rights
157. On 10 June 2016, a Crimean court sentenced Andriy Kolomiyets, a resident of
Kyiv region, to 10 years' imprisonment in a high-security prison. He was sentenced to six
years for allegedly attacking a Ukrainian Berkut riot police officer in Kyiv during the Maidan
events in February 2014, and to four years for possession of drugs. Kolomiyets was arrested
in the Russian Federation on 15 May 2015 and transferred to Simferopol, where he has been
held in custody since 13 August 2015. He is the second Maidan activist sentenced in Crimea,
following Oleksandr Kostenko, who was sentenced on 15 May 2015. Both men were
convicted on the basis of legislation introduced after the March 2014 ‘referendum’ for acts
that occurred prior to that date. This raises serious concerns about compliance with the
principle of legality, particularly due to retroactive application of the law.
158. On 22 July 2016, OHCHR interviewed Genadii Afanasiev, a pro-Ukrainian
activist, in Kyiv. He was arrested in Simferopol on 9 May 2014, and sentenced to seven
years on terrorism charges, allegedly for plotting terrorist acts in Crimea together with filmmaker
Oleg Sentsov and Oleksandr Kolchenko. He was pardoned on 14 June 2016 and
exchanged. During the interview he provided information on human rights violations relating
to the right to life, and freedom from torture, as well as extensive violations of due process,
procedural guarantees and fair trial rights.
159. Genadii Afanasiev stated he had not been involved in any political activities
until 23 February 2014 when Russian Federation troops started blocking Ukrainian military
units in Crimea. From that moment, he started organizing people to provide the Ukrainian
military with humanitarian help and was an active participant of pro-Ukrainian rallies.
160. On 9 May 2014, armed men in civilian clothes abducted him on the street,
pushing him into a car, putting a mask over his head and beating him on the stomach and
head. He was asked to confess that he intended to blow up the Eternal Flame monument in
Simferopol and knew Oleh Sentsov and Oleksandr Kolchenko, and threatened with summary
execution. Ten days after a Crimean judge ordered him to be placed in remand detention, he
was transferred on 19 May 2014 to an FSB prison facility in Moscow.
161. Various forms of torture – including beatings, electrical shocks, choking and
threats of sexual violence – were regularly applied to him during the two years of his
36
detention, both in Crimea and the Russian Federation. He was forced to incriminate himself
by confessing to intentions he did not have. Having entered a plea agreement, Genadii
Afanasiev was sentenced on 24 December 2014 by the Moscow City Court to 7 years of
imprisonment. Physically exhausted, he also agreed to testify against Sentsov and
Kolchenko. However, on 31 July 2015, during a court hearing in the Military court in
Rostov-on-Don, Afanasiev revoked his earlier testimony against Kolchenko and Sentsov,
stating they were extracted under duress.
162. He was later sent to a strict regime colony in Syktyvkar, Republic of Komi,
located 3,000 km from Crimea. During the months that preceded his exchange on 14 June
2016, he continued being subjected to abuses and ill-treatment: he was denied medical care
for weeks, refused the right to attend religious service, repeatedly placed in isolation cells,
regularly insulted, and prevented from filing complaints about his treatment to the
prosecution and police.
C. Violations of the freedom of peaceful assembly
163. 18 May marked the Day of Remembrance of the victims of the Soviet
deportation of Crimean Tatars. Peaceful gatherings, prayers, and requiems were organized
throughout Ukraine.
164. In Crimea, a memorial complex dedicated to the victims of the deportation was
inaugurated by the de facto authorities in the Bakhchysaray district, near the railway station
that was used by Soviet authorities to deport Crimean Tatars. The complex is expected to be
completed in 2019 on the 75th anniversary of the deportation. Initiatives from groups or
individuals not affiliated with the de facto authorities were viewed with suspicion. The
Crimean ‘police’ briefly detained and interrogated several people who had taken part in
unauthorized motor rallies. ‘Legal proceedings’ were initiated against four Crimean Tatar
men from Sudak. The ‘court’ eventually cleared them of the accusation that they had
committed an administrative offense by taking part in an unauthorized motor rally during
which they waved the Crimean Tatar flag. Representatives of the Mejlis could not organize
any events as Crimea’s ‘supreme court’ declared it an extremist organization and banned its
activities on 26 April 2016.
165. On 4 July 2016, the de facto ‘government’ of Crimea amended a November
2014 resolution154 listing all the places in the ‘republic of Crimea’ where public events can
be organized. According to the 2014 resolution, notifications for public events could be made
for 665 locations in 11 cities and 14 districts throughout the ‘republic of Crimea’. The July
2016 amendments155 reduce the number of locations to 366 – almost by half – without
explaining the motives for the decision.
166. The city of Kerch, the second most populated city in Crimea, is the most
affected with the number of locations for public events reduced by 80 per cent (from 15 to 3).
In eight Crimean districts156 and two cities157 between 50 and 75 per cent of the places
formerly designated for public gatherings can no longer be used for such purposes. In three
cities158 and three districts159, the reduction involves from 10 to 50 per cent of the original
locations. Four cities160 and two districts161 retain the same number of locations for public
gatherings, and in one city162 and one district163, the number of places for public events has
increased.
154 See Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea N 452 “On approving the list of places for
the conduct of public events on the territory of the Republic of Crimea”, 12 November 2014.
155 See Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea N 315 of 4 July 2016 “On Amending the
Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea N 452 of 12 November 2014”.
156 The districts of Bakhchisaray, Dzhankoy, Krasnogvardeisk, Lenin, Nizhnegorsk, Razdolnensk, Saki and
Chernomorsk.
157 The cities of Dzhankoy and Krasnoperekopsk.
158 The cities of Armyansk, Evpatoria and Sudak.
159 The districts of Kirov, Simferopol and Sovietkiy
160 The cities of Simferopol, Alushta, Saki and Feodosiya.
161 The districts of Belogorsk and Pervomaisk.
162 The city of Yalta.
37
167. OHCHR notes that the July 2016 amendments further restrict the possibility of
Crimean residents to organize and hold peaceful public events. They mention “specially
designated places” for public gatherings. Such terminology implies that the exercise of the
right to peaceful assembly applies within a reduced public space and by way of exception.
The UN Human Rights Committee has noted that “the relation between right and restriction
and between norm and exception must not be reversed164”. In addition, blanket legal
provisions which ban assemblies at specific times or in particular locations, require greater
justification than restrictions on individual assemblies165. The imposed restrictions do not
appear to be necessary, in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the
protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others,
and appear to be designed to dissuade the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly166. 
D. Violations of the freedom of opinion and expression
168. Pressure, in the form of questioning, house searches, and warnings, continued to
be exercised on people by the ‘police’ and FSB for expressing their views or engaging in
activities, abusively deemed ‘extremist’.
169. On 30 May 2016, Lilia Budzhurova, deputy director of the Crimean Tatar
channel ATR and a contributor to AFP, was warned by Crimean ‘prosecutors’ against
expressing “extremist” views due to her criticism of the arrests of Crimean Tatars on social
media.
170. On 18 July 2016, the head of the Ukrainian Cultural Centre in Simferopol,
Leonid Kuzmin, was summoned for questioning by the ‘police’ in relation to his activities at
the Centre. On the same day, a former Maidan activist from Yalta, Larisa Kitayskaya, was
briefly detained and interrogated by the FSB and her home was searched. In both cases, the
individuals are free and no charges have been pressed against them.
171. It is OHCHR view that the pattern, seen in other cases, of exposing individuals
to police actions without any justification, can be considered as a form of harassment, which
is often accompanied by interferences with privacy.
E. Violations of the freedom of movement
172. The three crossing points between Crimea and mainland Ukraine were closed on
several occasions in early August, causing hardship and long queues for people who were
prevented from freely moving across the administrative boundary. While there were rumours
about unspecified ‘military activity’ inside Crimea, the situation remained unclear until the
FSB declared on 10 August that a group of Ukrainian infiltrators preparing terrorist acts had
been arrested. As of 15 August 2016, the movement of vehicles and people had fully
resumed but was slowed by enhanced security measures, particularly in the direction of
mainland Ukraine.
173. People from mainland Ukraine and Crimea complained to OHCHR of the
difficulties of transporting personal belongings to and from Crimea. The issue became
particularly acute following the adoption by the Ukrainian government of decree No. 1035 of
16 December 2015 prohibiting transportation of personal items, with the exception of
property mentioned in a list of allowed items contained in Article 370 of the Custom Code of
Ukraine. Affected people underlined to OHCHR that this feeds corrupt practices.
174. Crimean residents also faced challenges in their freedom of movement due to
regulations on travel with children. In order to enter mainland Ukraine, Crimean children
accompanied by one parent need to have the notarized approval of the other parent.
However, ‘notary acts’ – or any other acts – issued in Crimea are not recognized by Ukraine.
This means that parents must go to mainland Ukraine or the Russian Federation to obtain
163 The district of Krasnoperekopsk.
164 See General Comment No 34 of the Human Rights Committee, paragraph. 21 (12 September 2011).
165 See A/HRC/31/66 para. 30, A/HRC/23/39 para. 63
166 A/HRC/31/66 para. 29, 34.
38
notarized permission, which is time consuming and a financial burden. OHCHR interlocutors
have stressed that legal and administrative barriers further isolate Crimeans from Ukraine.
175. A security issue was also noted by OHCHR at the Kalanchak and Chaplynka
crossing points. It relates to the presence of insufficiently marked minefields on both sides of
the road leading to the Administrative Boundary Line. The representatives of the State
Border Service said they had no maps indicating mine locations near the crossing points.
Although small triangular mine signs are visible, there is a real risk of accidentally walking
into an ill-marked minefield.
F. Minority and indigenous peoples’ rights
176. In an undated letter seen by OHCHR on 29 May, the ‘vice prime minister of
Crimea’ informed the heads of local governments in Crimea that the Mejlis was found by the
“supreme court” of Crimea to be an extremist organization. The letter mentions that all
activities, rallies or gatherings conducted on behalf of the Mejlis are prohibited but claims
this does not affect the rights of the Crimean Tatars. It further requires local officials to
report to the ‘prosecutor’ of Crimea any violations committed by Mejlis members or
activists.
177. OHCHR notes that on 25 May the Mejlis lodged an appeal to the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation against the Crimean court ‘decision’. The letter thus appears
to take no account of this fact or to anticipate a rejection of the appeal. Furthermore, the ban
on the Mejlis, which is a self-government body with quasi-executive functions, appears to
deny the Crimean Tatars – an indigenous people of Crimea – the right to choose their
representative institutions.
178. A ‘court’ in Crimea has ruled on 11 August that Ilmi Umerov, one of three vicechairmen
of the Mejlis, must be placed in a psychiatric clinic for examination. The court
decision was based on a motion filed by the investigators. Mr. Umerov was charged with
separatism in May 2016 after he made public statements denying that Crimea was a part of
the Russian Federation. He was allowed to stay home during investigations into his case.
During the court hearing, Mr. Umerov’s tension rose and he was hospitalized.
179. On 26 May, searches were conducted by the Crimean ‘police’ as part of an
operation allegedly targeting illegal migration. Four Crimean Tatars running a joint business
were detained and released after a few hours. In total, at least 20 people, including Crimean
Tatars and citizens of Uzbekistan, were interrogated in this context. The first deputy head of
the Mejlis criticized the “utter arbitrariness” of the actions of the de facto authorities.
OHCHR is concerned that a series of police actions conducted since the beginning of 2016
seem to disproportionately target members of the Crimean Tatar community.
G. Rights of detainees
180. While Genadii Afanasiev is the first sentenced Crimean resident who has been
transferred to mainland Ukraine, there is only fragmented information about the situation of
detainees on the peninsula.
181. Crimea has one pre-trial detention centre (in Simferopol) and two penitentiary
institutions, including a strict regime colony in Simferopol and a general regime colony in
Kerch. There are no prisons for women in Crimea. Thus, all women sentenced to prison
terms on the peninsula are transferred to penitentiary institutions in the Russian Federation.
Between 18 March 2014 and 15 June 2016, 240 women convicted by Crimean ‘courts’ were
sent to the Russian Federation to serve their sentences167.
182. The Simferopol and Kerch prisons have between 600 and 700 male convicts
each. According to the Crimean ombudsperson up to 380 convicts could be Ukrainian
citizens with registration in mainland Ukraine. However, many have no documents and are
believed to have purposefully ‘lost’ them in order to get Russian Federation citizenship.
167 Information contained in a letter of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service for the Republic of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol of 22 June 2016.
39
Sixteen Ukrainian citizens are said to be held in remand in the pre-trial detention centre in
Simferopol. There is no confirmed information about the number of prisoners from Crimea
who rejected Russian citizenship and filed petitions asking to be extradited to Ukraine.
183. A representative of the Ukrainian Ombudsperson’s institution informed
OHCHR that the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Ombudspersons agreed to cooperate on
the issue of prisoners. A first list of 18 prisoners who wish to be transferred to Ukraine has
reportedly been drawn up and agreed upon by both sides. All were sentenced in Crimea by
Ukrainian Courts at a time when Ukraine still exercised full control over the peninsula. Both
sides reportedly agreed to work to establish an ad hoc mechanism providing practical
solutions, avoiding politically sensitive formulations and any references to international
conventions, to facilitate the transfers.
VIII. Technical cooperation and capacity-building toward the
promotion and protection of human rights in Ukraine
184. OHCHR is increasingly providing technical cooperation to and capacitybuilding
of national and international partners in Ukraine. This is particularly relevant within
the Constitutional reform framework. OHCHR advises duty-bearers within the Government
and the armed groups on the results of its findings, works with civil society partners on how
to advocate on their implications, and raises awareness and support among others in order to
respond and take action.
185. OHCHR leads a UN human rights working group that supports the
Government in a number of areas, including by providing technical cooperation and
expertise for the implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan. It has been
facilitating preparations for a training session involving Government officials and UN
agencies on applying a human rights-based approach to the development of the United
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). OHCHR with other UN agencies
has also been supporting Ukraine to set its own development platform based on
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda launched in September 2015, in
particular by advocating for the platform to reflect international human rights instruments
and standards. OHCHR has also engaged with the Government working group on judicial
reform, whose work culminated in the constitutional amendments concerning the judiciary. 
186. OHCHR advocated for amendments to the Law “On the civil service”. The law
adopted in December 2015 would deny the Ombudsperson the ability to select her staff. This
situation could undermine the independence of the national human rights institution
according to the ‘Paris Principles’. A number of legislative initiatives are currently under
discussion to address this situation.
187. OHCHR closely cooperated with the National Preventive Mechanism against
torture, established by the Ombudsperson’s Office in 2012 in accordance with Ukraine’s
obligations as a party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In strategic cases, OHCHR has
shared allegations leading to regular visits to high-risk places of detention and strengthened
human rights protection. OHCHR also partnered with the Ombudsperson’s Office and
international NGO Physicians for Human Rights to prepare a consultative workshop on
medical aspects of documenting torture to be held in early September 2016. The workshop
will address challenges and technical cooperation needs in introducing the Istanbul Protocol
in Ukraine. OHCHR also extended grant support to two national human rights NGOs to
implement projects on recording human rights violations, advocacy and assistance to victims
of the conflict in the east of Ukraine, and on comprehensive socio-psychological assistance
to former conflict-related detainees, victims of torture and families of missing persons,
respectively.
188. Through monitoring individual cases of IDPs requiring protection, OHCHR has
noted that the absence of a State strategy and the consequent absence of allocation of
financial resources have led to the economic and social marginalisation of IDPs. Working
40
together with Government organs at the State and local level, OHCHR has raised the
importance of protecting IDP rights within an anti-discrimination framework. 
189. Throughout the reporting period, OHCHR contributed actively and substantially
to a number of UN advocacy documents on human rights concerns arising directly from the
conflict. This included the 2 August 2016 statement by the High Commissioner on a
significant increase in civilian casualties, issued at a critical moment to bring the attention of
the international community to the human cost of ceasefire violations in eastern Ukraine. 
190. During the reporting period, OHCHR has rigorously advocated with the
Government to combat impunity. Through issuing a public thematic report on accountability
for killings168, OHCHR issued and engaged with relevant entities on a set of actionable
recommendations toward effective investigations of violations committed in the context of
the conflict in the east as well as during the Maidan and Odesa events in 2014, which fuelled
instability. 
191. Accountability is critical for stability, human rights and effective governance. It
is also an important step for future reconciliation, and plays a role in achieving peace, justice,
and strong institutions based on the rule of law as part of the Sustainable Development
Goals, on which OHCHR will work with the Government and partners. 
192. Documented cases of human rights violations and abuses and violations of
international humanitarian law provide indicators of ongoing and developing trends, and
their registration in a database in accordance with OHCHR best practices and methodology
provides a concrete tool to support efforts toward accountability. Verification and follow-up
of the violations and abuses documented in this report was undertaken through meetings with
State officials at national and regional levels and members of the armed groups, to discuss,
advocate and act where appropriate on these reported violations, including allegations of
arbitrary detention, deprivation of liberty, torture and ill-treatment, disappearances, including
enforced disappearances, and issues related to freedom of expression, association, and
movement. 
193. OHCHR findings on critical human rights and humanitarian challenges as well
as broad sets of recommendations aim to de-escalate tensions and strengthen human rights
protection. OHCHR is well positioned to carry out its mandate to monitor, report, and
advocate on the human rights situation in Ukraine, as well as provide sustained technical
cooperation to the Government, some State institutions, and civil society. 
IX. Conclusions and recommendations
194. The escalation in hostilities and drastic increase in civilian casualties between
16 May and 15 August demonstrates the urgent need for Government forces and armed
groups to recognize and act to prevent harm to civilians. OHCHR urges all parties to the
conflict to take all necessary steps to protect civilians. This entails a full withdrawal of
military personnel, fighters and weapons from the contact line, removing them from
protected objects such as schools and specially protected facilities such as hospitals and
medical centres, and refraining from using mortars and rockets in areas populated by
civilians. All parties to the conflict should comply with a full ceasefire, in line with the
Minsk Agreements.
168 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine, “Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016,” 14 July 2016.
“I want us to live in peace. We always did. We are all brothers and sisters. For what
and for whom is this war? Not for me. Not for them.”
- Woman living in Ternopil, mother of a Ukrainian soldier
41
195. The continued inflow of ammunition, weaponry and fighters from the Russian
Federation into armed group-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions has fuelled
hostilities leading to a protracted conflict. The human rights violations and abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law documented by OHCHR highlight the legal –
and moral – imperative that the supply of arms and ammunition to those responsible is
brought to an end.
196. In addition to the importance of respecting the fundamental values and norms
embodied in international human rights and humanitarian law to protect human rights and
civilians in times of armed conflict, respecting those values in the context of the armed
conflict in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions can also facilitate dialogue between
the warring parties and ultimately the restoration of peace.
197. As the conflict in eastern Ukraine continues, people living near the contact line
suffer the cumulative effects of the conflict. Residents have told OHCHR that the lifethreatening
reality that they have survived for over two years has led to constant concerns
about security, shelter and livelihoods. The contact line continues to severely restrict civilian
freedom of movement, as Government forces and armed groups have not taken measures to
ensure safe passage for the 26,000 to 32,000 civilians who cross daily.
198. People living near the contact line in armed group-controlled areas are deprived
of any certainty concerning the basics of day-to-day life, or endangered while moving to seek
basic necessities, including food, water, medical care, and education. Parallel structures,
including ‘courts’, play an increasingly active role in the lives of people living under armed
group control, adversely impacting their inalienable human rights and running counter to the
spirit of the Minsk Agreements.
199. In this context, it is particularly critical for Ukrainian authorities to ensure equal
protection of law towards people living in armed group-controlled areas and IDPs. The
creation of obstacles toward obtaining social entitlements, including through amendments to
Resolution No. 637, places undue burdens on persons on the basis of their origin, limits their
freedom of movement, and subjects them to intrusive scrutiny. By depriving IDPs of their
social entitlements, the Government is further deepening the socio-economic hardships of
IDPs, making them dependent on humanitarian aid. Moreover, continued lack of ensuring
respect and fulfilment of certain rights of the ICCPR further deprives persons living under
armed group control or near the contact line of their human rights and freedoms169.
200. OHCHR monitoring of investigations into human rights violations and abuses
has revealed entrenched impunity. OHCHR is concerned that without genuine investigations
and effective prosecutions of persons responsible for gross human rights violations and
abuses and violations of international humanitarian law committed in the context of the
armed conflict, Government authorities will not be able to contribute to a real sense of justice
or build the confidence of the people of Ukraine in the institutions of justice. The inability or
unwillingness to prosecute perpetrators may lead to a perception of arbitrary or selective
justice. OHCHR views this as wasting an important opportunity to transform Ukraine into a
society with confidence in the rule of law and embrace a national political culture based on
respect for human rights and accountability.
201. Victims and their families of the Maidan violence that precipitated the human
rights crisis in Ukraine and the subsequent violence in Odesa continue to await justice. While
there has been some progress in the complex investigation into the killings on Maidan,
investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators involved in the violence in Odesa continue to
be marred by interference in the independence of judges and the judicial process. The
success or failure of the Ukrainian justice system to deliver accountability for victims of
these events will serve as an indicator of the ability and willingness of the Government to
combat impunity.
169 General Comment 32, paras 6, 16 and 59; and Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29 (States of
Emergency), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), paras. 7, 15.
42
202. The gradual regression of fundamental freedoms in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, whose status is defined by UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the
territorial integrity of Ukraine, is of serious concern. First-hand testimonies of widespread
human rights abuses of detainees suggest that with increasing integration into the Russian
Federation, there is a lack of accountability and redress for victims.
203. Despite incremental improvements in access to places of detention and the
release of thirteen individuals subjected to enforced disappearances at the Kharkiv SBU,
OHCHR continues to receive numerous allegations regarding conflict-related violations and
abuses in detention perpetrated in 2014 and 2015. These accounts make clear that the serious
harm suffered by persons deprived of their liberty, disappeared, tortured and ill-treated, in
connection with the conflict continue to affect the lives of victims, their families and
communities, and in some cases, violations have led to subsequent abuses, violations and
harms, often within the criminal justice system.
204. It is thus critical that recent amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine be
viewed as an opportunity to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and build a system
of governance based on the rule of law. This is essential to restore public trust, achieve
justice and promote accountability.
205. Through collecting and recording victim and witness accounts of human rights
violations and abuses, and through documenting incidents and identifying actors bearing
responsibility, OHCHR seeks to contribute to realizing the right to truth. OHCHR also
reminds the Government of Ukraine that measures such as truth commissions, investigation
panels, documentation of violations and the securing and declassification of archives are
necessary to build a sustainable culture of accountability and rule of law.
206. In order for Ukraine to be in a position to adopt the amnesty provisions
envisioned as part of the Minsk Package of Measures, it is critical for there to be an
independent and robust judiciary, willing and able to prosecute war crimes, crimes against
humanity or gross human rights violations and abuses, including gender-specific violations in
national courts. Impunity and the inclusion of individuals responsible for serious violations
in any positions of authority would directly undermine the credibility of all the parties to the
conflict and the legitimate needs of Ukrainians. As human rights violations and abuses have
been a problem in the conflict, so human rights protections must be part of its solution.
207. Most recommendations made in the previous OHCHR reports on the human
rights situation in Ukraine have not been implemented, and remain valid. OHCHR calls upon
all parties to implement the following recommendations:
208. To the Government of Ukraine:
a) Security Services of Ukraine, General Prosecutor’s Office and Military
Prosecutor’s Office to recognize and take prompt actionto investigate and
prosecute allegations of torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary and incommunicado
detention, and sexual and gender-based violence;
b) Security Services of Ukraine to provide unhindered access to external monitors to
all places where people may be detained, acting to ensure that no persons in SBU
custody are held incommunicado, forcibly disappeared, or subject to torture or illtreatment;
c) Ukrainian Armed Forces and Ministry of Social Affairs, in coordination with the
Security Services of Ukraine, to provide support and assistance to the families of
persons deprived of liberty by armed groups in connection with the conflict;
d) Security Services of Ukraine provide timely and adequate information to families
of persons detained in connection with the conflict, refraining from withholding
information;
e) Build capacity of lawyers appointed by Free Legal Aid Centres to guarantee the
right to effective legal representation and counsel to conflict-related detainees and
43
improve mechanisms of free legal aid provision, ensuring continuity of
representation;
f) National Police to take a pro-active role in securing the safety of courtrooms, and
for all relevant Government organs including the Office of the General Prosecutor
to ensure non-interference with the independence of the judiciary;
g) Parliament to remain seized with amending the ‘Law on Civil Service’ (No. 2490)
in accordance with the ‘Paris Principles’;
h) Ombudsperson’s Office to pursue its challenge of the constitutionality of Article
176(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it leads to arbitrary detention;
i) Government to introduce respective legislative changes enabling persons to access
justice, remedy and redress in housing, land and property matters;
j) Parliament to establish independent transparent and non-discriminatory
procedures of documentation, investigation and verification of housing, land, and
property ownership, and to establish a registry of lost and damaged property;
k) Cabinet of Ministers to de-link IDP registration from all social entitlements not
related to the IDP situation, including pensions. Seek ways to ensure citizens of
Ukraine living in territories controlled by armed groups have access to their
pensions;
l) Government to change the recently introduced IDP residence verification system
ensuring IDPs’ right to freedom of movement and free choice of residence;
m) National Police to ensure transparency and effectiveness of the investigation of
attacks on media professionals and other civil society representatives;
n) City administrations and courts to avoid using blanket bans of peaceful assemblies
which are intrinsically disproportionate and discriminatory measures impacting all
citizens seeking to exercise their freedom of peaceful assembly;
o) Ministry of Justice to ensure that the dissolution of associations is a last resort
measure and ensure that the procedure of dissolution complies with international
standards. Ensure that prosecution of members of political parties on ‘terrorism’ or
‘separatism’ charges are not politically motivated and are based on legally gathered
evidence;
p) Ministry of Defense to ensure that the perimeter of the mined area near the
Kalanchak and Chaplynka crossing points on the Ukrainian side of the
Administrative Boundary Line is visible and well protected;
q) State Border Service to obtain from the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine maps
indicating mine locations near the Administrative Boundary Line.
209. To all parties involved in the hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
including the armed groups of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and selfproclaimed
‘Luhansk people’s republic’:
a) Ensure full implementation of the ceasefire, including full withdrawal of military
forces and weapons from the contact line;
b) Respect international humanitarian law, particularly by complying with the
principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution and, in any situation,
refrain from indiscriminate shelling of populated areas, and refrain from locating
military objectives within or near densely populated areas, including medical
facilities and schools, and damaging objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population (i.e. electricity and water filtration facilities);
c) Allow for regular and unhindered access to external monitors to all places of
deprivation of liberty;
44
d) Facilitate civilians’ freedom of movement across the contact line by creating
additional transport corridors, equipping checkpoints with necessary facilities,
simplifying procedures, taking effective measures to fight corruption, allowing
access of independent monitors, taking into account the need to ensure the safety of
civilians in situations of active hostilities;
e) To ensure that freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly are
exercised freely and residents are not forced to involuntarily partake in
demonstrations or organisations;
f) To refrain from the practice of blocking certain residential areas, restricting
civilians to access their housing and other property, unless justified by the need to
protect civilians from the effect of hostilities, as well as looting and using such
property for military purposes;
g) Ensure that schools and hospitals are respected, including through removing any
military personnel, fighters, or weapons from their territory and facilities;
h) Ensure free and unimpeded access for humanitarian actors to all areas as well as
the rapid and non-discriminatory delivery of humanitarian assistance, while
adhering to international norms and ensuring the protection of humanitarian
actors.
210. To the de facto authorities of Crimea and to the Russian Federation:
a) Effectively investigate the abduction of Ervin Ibragimov and other cases of
abductions and bring the perpetrators to justice;
b) Enable the unfettered exercise of the right to freedom of assembly and ensure that
any restrictions are justified by legitimate aims prescribed by international human
rights instruments, which should neither be supplemented by additional legal
grounds nor loosely interpreted;
c) Uphold fair trial rights and procedural guarantees for all persons in detention and
thoroughly investigate all claims of torture and ill-treatment;
d) End all intimidating practices, including questioning and the issuing of warnings by
the ‘police’, aimed at deterring people from expressing their views;
e) Stop invoking the anti-extremism legislation to criminalize freedom of speech,
including views, comments and opinions expressed publicly, via articles or social
media;
f) Ensure necessary medical care to Ilmi Umerov and refrain from practices, such as
forcible placement in a psychiatric hospital, which may amount to ill-treatment;
g) Collaborate with the authorities of Ukraine to set up a mechanism for the transfer
of Ukrainian prisoners who wish to serve their sentence in mainland Ukraine and
enable those transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation to be visited by
Ukrainian consular authorities;
h) Provide OHCHR and other international human rights monitors with full access to
the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.
Annex 773
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August –15 November 2016)

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
16 August to 15 November 2016
2
Contents Paragraphs Page
I. Executive Summary ................................................................................................ 1–16 5
II. Right to life, liberty, security and physical integrity ............................................... 17–65 8
A. International humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities ........................... 17–20 8
B. Casualties ........................................................................................................ 21–26 9
C. Missing persons and recovery of mortal remains ........................................... 27–29 11
D. Summary executions, disappearances, deprivation of liberty, and torture
and ill-treatment .............................................................................................. 30–57 12
E. Sexual and gender-based violence .................................................................. 58–65 18
III. Accountability and administration of justice ........................................................... 66–94 20
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east ................. 66–74 20
Accountability for abuses committed by the armed groups .................... 66–68 20
Accountability for violations committed by the Ukrainian military or
security forces ................................................................................................ 69–74 21
B. Human rights impact of armed group structures ............................................. 75–81 22
C. Due process and fair trial rights, interference with independence of
judiciary .......................................................................................................... 82–86 23
D. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public disturbances .......... 87–94 24
Accountability for the killings of protesters at Maidan ......................... 87–89 24
Accountability for the 2 May 2014 violence in Odesa ........................... 90–91 25
Accountability for the 31 August 2015 violence in Kyiv ........................ 92–94 25
IV. Fundamental freedoms ............................................................................................ 95–124 26
A. Freedom of movement .................................................................................... 95–101 26
B. Freedom of opinion and expression ................................................................ 102–112 28
C. Freedom of association ................................................................................... 113–116 30
D. Freedom of peaceful assembly ....................................................................... 117–124 31
V. Economic and social rights ..................................................................................... 125–154 32
A. Civil documentation and access to public services ......................................... 125–128 32
B. Right to social security ................................................................................... 129–136 33
C. Housing, land, and property rights.................................................................. 137–145 35
D. Situation of internally displaced persons living in collective centres ............. 146–151 37
E. Rights of minorities and discrimination .......................................................... 152–154 38
VI. Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea .......................................... 155–181 40
A. Arbitrary detention, due process and fair trial rights ...................................... 157–166 40
Arbitrary detention of persons accused of ‘separatism’ ....................... 158–159 40
The case of the ‘Ukrainian sabotage group’ .......................................... 160–163 41
Hizb-ut-Tahrir cases .............................................................................. 164–166 42
B. Rights of minorities and indigenous peoples .................................................. 167–169 42
C. Freedom of movement .................................................................................... 170–171 43
D. Rights of detainees .......................................................................................... 172–176 44
E. Political rights ................................................................................................. 177–178 45
F. Right to education ........................................................................................... 179–181 46
VII. Legal developments and institutional reforms ........................................................ 182–198 46
A. Judicial reform ................................................................................................ 182–192 46
B. Criminal justice reform ................................................................................... 193–194 48
C. Draft law “On the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” ................... 195–198 49
VIII. Technical cooperation and capacity-building
toward the promotion and protection of human rights in Ukraine .......................... 199–206 50
IX. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................... 207–225 52
3
UKRAINE
4
5
I. Executive Summary
1. Based on the work of the United Nations Human Rights
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), the sixteenth report
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) on the situation of human rights in
Ukraine1 covers the period from 16 August to 15 November
2016.
2. The findings in this report are grounded in data from indepth
interviews with 176 witnesses and victims of human rights
violations and abuses during the period under review. OHCHR
continues to document and report violations and abuses that
occurred in 2014 and 2015 for purposes of accountability. In 75
per cent of cases documented, OHCHR carried out individual
response follow-up actions to facilitate human rights protection.
3. The impact the conflict in eastern Ukraine has on the human
rights situation illustrates the need for the full implementation of
the provisions of the Minsk Agreements, especially the return of
the full control by the Government of Ukraine over parts of the
border with the Russian Federation in certain areas of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, the withdrawal of foreign fighters, pull-out
of all heavy weaponry, pardon and amnesty through law and
with due regard for human rights. During the reporting period,
the conflict in eastern Ukraine has been marked by a surge in
diplomatic efforts to de-escalate hostilities. The 21 September
Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to
disengagement of forces and hardware initially limited fighting
around selected areas. However, Ukrainian Armed Forces and
armed groups controlling certain areas of the Donetsk region
(self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’2) continued to
exchange fire around Avdiivka and Yasynuvata, as well as north
and east of Mariupol, and other places along the contact line3,
resulting in a notable rise in hostilities by mid-November.4
While Luhansk region has seen fewer hostilities between
Government forces and armed groups of the self-proclaimed
‘Luhansk people’s republic’5, the situation remains tense and
dangerous for civilians. In both regions, weapons prohibited
under the Minsk Package of Measures remain in areas from
which they should be withdrawn, and continue to be used.
1 HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human
rights situation throughout Ukraine and to propose recommendations to the
Government and other actors to address human rights concerns. For more details,
see paras. 7–8 of the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine of 19 September 2014
(A/HRC/27/75).
2 Hereinafter ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
3 The contact line is a de facto line between last positions in governmentcontrolled
territories and armed group-controlled territories in Donetsk and
Luhansk regions. Minsk documents referring to the line are not publicly
available.
4 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission briefing, 18 November 2016, Kyiv,
Ukraine. On 11 November 2016, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission noted
that “the overall level of explosions remained high with over 800 and 200 in both
[Donetsk and Luhansk] regions, respectively.” Latest from OSCE Special
Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of
19:30, 10 November 2016 (Accessible at: http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/
281081).
5 Hereinafter ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
6
4. Between 16 August and 15 November 2016, OHCHR
recorded 164 conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine. Due
to the renewed commitment to the ceasefire on 1 September,
there was a 13 per cent decrease compared to the previous
reporting period. In October, OHCHR recorded eight times more
civilian casualties in armed group-controlled territories than in
Government-controlled areas of the conflict zone, indicating that
civilians in territories controlled by the armed groups continue to
be particularly at risk of injury and death. OHCHR interviews
with families of killed and injured civilians reveal the
devastation and harm caused by the ongoing armed conflict in
Donetsk and Luhansk region. The reported continued flow of
weapons and ammunition to the conflict area, which results in
serious human rights violations and abuses and violations of
international humanitarian law, compounds their suffering. In
total, from mid-April 2014 to 15 November 2016, OHCHR
recorded 32,453 casualties, among Ukrainian armed forces,
civilians and members of the armed groups. This includes 9,733
people killed and 22,720 injured.6
5. Over two years since fighting broke out in Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, causing people to flee their homes, internally
displaced persons (IDPs) lack security of tenure, shelter and are
subject to onerous and disproportionate obstacles to obtaining
their social entitlements.
6. Disproportionate restrictions on freedom of movement
across the contact line severely affect an average of 25,000
people per day (800,000 per month). As families and
communities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions struggle to remain
connected, their movements are sharply constrained as they can
only cross through five entry-exit points and are subject to
arbitrary and long delays across mined and poorly marked areas.
The wooden ramp for pedestrians connecting parts of a
destroyed bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska remains the sole crossing
for civilians in Luhansk region. OHCHR has documented cases
of sexual and gender-based violence at checkpoints.
7. The exact number of individuals who are missing as a result
of the conflict is not known. The families of missing persons
continue to search for their relatives, suffering from a lack of
coordination between Government agencies and cooperation
between the Government and armed groups in facilitating the
identification of mortal remains.
8. Delays in simultaneous releases of detainees and surrounding
negotiations have caused uncertainty and suffering to their
families, who see them being treated as human currency between
the warring parties. OHCHR has continued to document
summary execution, incommunicado detention, enforced
disappearance, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture and illtreatment
against persons perceived to be affiliated with the
parties to the conflict.
9. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ armed groups continue to deprive of liberty an
unknown number of people. During the reporting period, despite
6 This is a conservative estimate of OHCHR based on available data.
7
repeated requests, armed groups continued to deny OHCHR
unfettered access to places of deprivation of liberty. OHCHR has
identified 26 penal and pre-trial detention facilities where preconflict
detainees are held, and at least eight places of deprivation
of liberty in Donetsk and three in Luhansk region, where the
armed groups hold individuals captured in connection with the
armed conflict. The lack of access to persons deprived of their
liberty raises concerns that they may be subject to torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (illtreatment),
including sexual and gender-based violence. OHCHR
monitoring has highlighted the vulnerability of persons living in
armed group-controlled territories to arbitrary and selective
sanctions from what the armed groups refer to as ‘courts’,
‘judges’, and ‘prosecutors’.
10. The human rights situation in ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ has been marked by continuing
restrictions on fundamental freedoms, exacerbating the isolation
of persons living in these regions and their access to information.
These restrictions and a prevailing feeling of fear among
residents, particularly pronounced in Luhansk region, pose
obstacles for OHCHR to obtain meaningful information on the
exercise and enjoyment of fundamental freedoms in armed
group-controlled territories, despite repeated efforts.
11. OHCHR has noted some progress in investigations and
prosecutions carried out by the Prosecutor General’s Office
against sergeant and major rank perpetrators of human rights
violations in the context of the violence in Maidan and the armed
conflict. Proceedings into the 2 May 2014 violence in Odesa
continue to be characterized by unjustified delays inconsistent
with the intent to bring those responsible to justice and
interference with the independence of the judiciary. The
Prosecutor General’s Office has also reported progress in
investigating human rights violations and abuses attributable to
commanders of armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. However, incidents of largescale
violations and abuses, such as the August 2014 battle for
Ilovaisk, remain largely uninvestigated.
12. OHCHR welcomes the Constitutional amendments regarding
the judiciary introduced on 30 September, setting out a clear
path of reform toward the restoration of public trust in the
judiciary.7
13. At the same time, OHCHR notes with concern that a draft
law ‘On the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine’,
contains provisions that undermine human rights and are
contrary to Ukraine’s international obligations. The provisions,
which, if adopted, would violate inter alia the right to equal
protection without discrimination, and in terminating water and
electricity supplies to armed group-controlled territories and the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, would contravene both
customary rules of international humanitarian law concerning
relief and human rights law requiring the Government to ensure
7 See VII. Legal developments and institutional reforms.
8
minimum essential humanitarian supplies for the civilian
population.8
14. Ukraine’s June 2016 decision to derogate from certain
human rights obligations under United Nations and Council of
Europe conventions was discussed on 19 September during a
round table organized by the parliamentary committees on
foreign affairs and human rights. Following broad agreement on
the need to clarify inter alia the duration and territorial
application of the derogation, the heads of the parliamentary
committees committed to establish a working group. OHCHR
supports this initiative and expresses readiness to take part in
working group discussions.
15. OHCHR continued to actively monitor the human rights
situation in Crimea, utilizing a network of contacts and
conducting monitoring visits to the administrative boundary line.
OHCHR documented several cases of abuses in detention and
ongoing sanctions against members of the Mejlis. The continued
prosecution of Crimean Hizb-ut-Tahrir members in Russian
courts, and transfer of detainees from Crimea to penitentiary
facilities in the Russian Federation raise serious concerns and
further illustrates the human rights impact of the ongoing
violation of General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the
territorial integrity of Ukraine.
16. Throughout the reporting period, OHCHR bolstered its
technical cooperation and capacity building activities, assisting
partners, including the Government of Ukraine in
operationalizing and fulfilling its obligations toward the
promotion and protection of human rights.9
II. Right to life, liberty, security and
physical integrity
A. International humanitarian law in the
conduct of hostilities
17. In this reporting period, renewed commitments to the
ceasefire and concerted efforts to withdraw forces and weapons
from the contact line, including in civilian and populated areas
under the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group
relating to disengagement of forces and hardware
of 21 September 2016,10 led to an initial de-escalation of
hostilities in the areas covered by the Decision. However, a lack
of full compliance by the warring parties – the Ukrainian Armed
Forces and ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
8 See VII. Legal developments and institutional reforms, C. Draft law “On the
Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine”.
9 See VIII. Technical cooperation and capacity-building toward the promotion
and protection of human rights in Ukraine.
10 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Framework Decision
of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and
hardware,” 21 September 2016 (accessible at: http://www.osce.org/cio/266266).
“We just want to know when will this infernal war end.”
- Woman living in an IDP centre in Donetsk
9
republic’ armed groups – has continued to endanger civilians
and led to intensified hostilities in October. Civilians living in
areas close to the contact line continue to face daily risks due to
the presence of armed forces and groups in their homes, on the
streets, and suffer long-lasting effects of military damage to vital
public infrastructure. Regular daytime shelling was noted as
presenting particular risks for civilians, including one case on 21
September 2016 that interrupted the delivery of humanitarian
aid.
18. OHCHR recalls that attacking, destroying, removing or
rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population, as well as civilian objects, is prohibited
under international humanitarian law.11 In the Governmentcontrolled
village of Stepne, residents have had no access to
water since the near-by power station in Dokuchaievsk was
damaged in shelling on 15 April 2016. Water pipes across
territory controlled by the ‘Luhansk people’ republic’ have been
severely damaged due to shelling, limiting access to water for
the population. In Makiivka, a town under ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’- control, critical electrical equipment was damaged on
14 September and 5 October. Also on 14 September, a water
filtration station located between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata was
shelled. In Zhovanka neighbourhood of Zaitseve, residents have
had no electricity since June 2016.
19. Schools and educational facilities in the conflict zone
continue to be damaged in shelling and exchanges of fire.
Between 13 and 14 September, two schools in territory under
‘Donetsk people’s republic’-control were hit; School No. 44 in
Makiivka was shelled, and bullets from small arms hit School
No. 3 in Dokuchaievsk during the school day. On 4 October,
School No. 2 in Government-controlled Marinka was shelled.
The following day, on 5 October, schools No. 77, and
kindergarten No. 154 suffered damage from a nearby explosion.
20. OHCHR recalls that parties to the conflict have the
obligation to take all feasible measures to protect the population
under their control from the effects of hostilities. Residents told
OHCHR that they fear that the presence of Ukrainian military
positioned near their homes12 endangers them and puts them at
risk of attack. OHCHR has also documented a worrying case of
punitive damage to property in Donetsk by members of the
armed groups targeting the house of a member of the
Government-affiliated ‘Dnipro-1’ battalion.13
B. Casualties
21. During the reporting period, the intensity of hostilities in the
conflict zone of eastern Ukraine and levels of civilian casualties
varied. The second half of August was marked by an escalation
of clashes in a number of hotspots in Donetsk region and rise in
deaths and injuries among civilians. In September, following the
renewed commitment to a ceasefire, the number of civilian
11 Article 14, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
12 HRMMU interview, 2 September 2016; site visit 26 September 2016.
13 HRMMU interview, 9 September 2016.
10
casualties substantially decreased. In October, they once again
scaled up, mirroring the new upsurge in fighting along the
contact line. In the first half of November, hostilities somewhat
de-escalated, and the number of civilian casualties decreased.
22. Between 16 August and 15 November 2016, OHCHR
recorded 164 conflict-related civilian casualties: 32 deaths (ten
women, 21 men and a boy) and 132 injuries (44 women and two
girls, 77 men and five boys, and four adults whose sex is not
known). This is a 13 per cent decrease compared to the previous
reporting period of 16 May – 15 August 2016 when OHCHR
recorded 188 civilian casualties (28 deaths and 160 injuries).
23. Shelling from various artillery systems caused over 60 per
cent of all civilian casualties: 13 killed (three women and ten
men) and 88 injured (37 women and a girl, 48 men and a boy,
and an adult whose sex is not known). 20 per cent of these
casualties (three killed and 18 injured) were recorded in the
Government-controlled territories, while 80 per cent (10 killed
and 70 injured) were recorded in the territories controlled by the
armed groups.
24. Mines, explosive remnants of war, booby traps and
improvised explosive devices caused 10 deaths (two women and
eight men) and 25 injuries (two women and a girl, 15 men and
four boys, and three adults whose sex is unknown). Small arms
and light weapons accounted for 21 casualties: five killed (three
women, a man and a boy) and 16 injured (four women and 12
men). Two deaths (a woman and a man) and two injuries (a
woman and a man) were caused by road incidents with military
vehicles in the conflict zone. A man was injured from
unspecified firearms. One woman and one man died of heart
attacks at checkpoints, unable to obtain adequate medical care.
25. OHCHR estimates the total number of civilians killed during
the whole conflict period (mid-April 2014 – 15 November 2016)
to be over 2,000, with an additional 298 passengers killed as a
result of the MH-17 plane crash. The number of conflict-related
civilian injuries is estimated at 6,000-7,000.
26. In total, from mid-April 2014 to 15 November 2016,
OHCHR recorded 32,453 conflict-related casualties in Ukraine,
among Ukrainian armed forces, civilians and members of the
armed groups. This includes 9,733 people killed and 22,720
injured.15
14 OHCHR investigated reports of civilian casualties by consulting a broad range
of sources and types of information that are evaluated for their credibility and
reliability. In undertaking documentation and analysis of each incident, OHCHR
exercises due diligence to corroborate information on casualties from as wide
range of sources as possible, including OSCE public reports, accounts of
witnesses, victims and other directly affected persons, military actors,
community leaders, medical professionals, and other interlocutors. In some
instances, investigations may take weeks or months before conclusions can be
drawn. This may mean that conclusions on civilian casualties may be revised as
more information becomes available. OHCHR does not claim that the statistics
presented here are complete. It may be under-reporting civilian casualties given
limitations inherent in the operating environment, including gaps in coverage of
certain geographic areas and time periods.
15 This is a conservative estimate of OHCHR based on available data. These totals
include: casualties among the Ukrainian forces, as reported by the Ukrainian
authorities; 298 people from flight MH-17; civilian casualties on the territories
11

C. Missing persons and recovery of mortal
remains
27. The exact number of individuals who are missing as a result
of the conflict is not known. Documentation of the missing was
disrupted by the conflict in 2014 and subsequently resumed
separately in Government-controlled and armed groupcontrolled
territories. Moreover, the lack of coordination
between various government bodies has resulted in different
accounts of the number of missing in the conflict zone, varying
from 488 to 1,376.16
28. Some individuals considered missing by the Government
may be held incommunicado in the territories controlled by the
armed groups or vice versa. Hundreds of bodies remain
unidentified (in morgues or buried) in the territories controlled
by the Government and in the territories controlled by the armed
groups. The recovery of mortal remains from areas that saw
heavy fighting is ongoing. Since autumn 2014, the Government
of Ukraine has carried out systematic DNA profiling of
unidentified bodies and the relatives of the missing leading to the
identification of hundreds of mortal remains. In the territories
controlled by the armed groups, however, there is no capacity to
controlled by the Government of Ukraine, as reported by local authorities and the
regional departments of internal affairs of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; and
casualties among civilians and members of the armed groups on the territories
controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’,
as reported by the armed groups, the so-called ‘local authorities’ and local medical
establishments. This data is incomplete due to gaps in coverage of certain
geographic areas and time periods, and due to overall under-reporting, especially of
military casualties. The number of casualties between the different reporting dates
does not necessarily mean that these casualties happened between these dates: they
could have happened earlier, but were recorded by a certain reporting date.
16 According to the Main Department of the National Police in Donetsk region,
from the beginning of the Government ‘security operation’ until 26 October
2016, 865 individuals are missing in Donetsk region. The Main Department of
the National Police in Luhansk region reported 572 missing persons as of 10
October. The list of missing persons maintained by the SBU contained 495
names as of 26 October 2016. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ recorded 488
missing persons as of 21 October 2016. Moreover, the National Police of
Ukraine maintains an open – but outdated – database that lists 1,376 individuals
(Accessible at: https://www.npu.gov.ua/uk/publish/article/1141400).







 
     








     



    











 
 










    



    





 




    











    
             
 
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12
conduct DNA sampling, and there is no exchange of forensic
data between the Government of Ukraine and the armed groups.
29. In a positive development, draft legislation ‘On the legal
status of missing persons’, developed under the auspices of the
Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs foresees
the establishment of a commission for missing persons, which is
crucial for the fulfillment of Ukraine’s obligation under
international humanitarian law to take all feasible measures to
account for persons reported missing and to provide their family
members with information on their fate.
D. Summary executions, disappearances,
deprivation of liberty, and torture and illtreatment
Summary executions
30. During the reporting period, OHCHR continued to verify
allegations of summary executions and wilful killings of
Ukrainian servicemen, civilians and individuals associated with
armed groups in the conflict zone in 2014 and 2015, namely in
Ilovaisk in August 2014 and Debaltseve in February 2015.
OHCHR will present its findings in its 17th report on the human
rights situation in Ukraine.
31. OHCHR also documented an account that suggests that
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ members beat a man to death in
October 2014. A former member of the ‘Donbas’ volunteer
battalion affiliated with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while
deprived of his liberty by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ members
in the former SBU premises at 62 Shchorsa Street witnessed the
severe beating of a person deprived of liberty and heard a
paramedic refusing to render the victim medical assistance. He
never saw the victim again and was later told that the man
“kicked the bucket”.17
Enforced disappearances and abductions
32. OHCHR is concerned that the Security Service of Ukraine
(SBU) continues to perpetrate enforced disappearances, holding
individuals incommunicado and undertaking steps to conceal
their fate and whereabouts. Abductions by armed groups have
continued to cause suffering and uncertainty to relatives of
victims.
Ukrainian Armed Forces and law enforcement
33. OHCHR interviewed a man who was allegedly detained
incommunicado and subjected to enforced disappearance by the
SBU for six months. After spending over 15 months in pre-trial
detention, on 15 April 2016 a court in Berdiansk released him in
17 HRMMU interview, 4 November 2016.
“We’ve got a thousand methods to make you talk. You have
already managed to hold out for more than a day, it is almost
a record here!”
– Government official to a victim of incommunicado
detention in Pokrovsk 
13
the courtroom for time served. While leaving the courthouse, he
was apprehended by the SBU once again and transferred to
Mariupol SBU. There, he was held incommunicado in an indoor
shooting range and an arms room. According to the Prosecutor
General’s Office, on 30 August 2016 the Donetsk Regional
Prosecution initiated a criminal investigation into his unlawful
detention by law enforcement personnel.18 Between 4 and 11
September 2016, he was relocated to a private apartment in
Mariupol. He was released on 14 October 2016. The SBU denies
ever having apprehended or held the victim in their custody.19
34. OHCHR is also aware of two other disappeared detainees.
They were detained incommunicado in Mariupol SBU. In
September 2016, they were temporarily moved to a private
apartment.20 OHCHR notes that the transfer of the abovementioned
three detainees from the Mariupol SBU to private
apartments coincided with the visit of the UN Subcommittee on
the Prevention of Torture (SPT) to Mariupol SBU on 7
September 2016.
35. At least five individuals held in Kharkiv SBU continued to be
forcibly disappeared. One man held in Kharkiv had been abducted
by the SBU after the Starobilsk district court released him from
pre-trial detention on 21 April 2016.21 The SBU continues to
deny apprehending or holding any individuals in the Kharkiv
SBU building.22
Armed groups
36. On 24 August 2014, three men aged 21, 22 and 35 were
taken from their houses by Cossack armed group members. The
members of armed groups handcuffed the three individuals,
covered their eyes and put them in cars. Reportedly, they were
taken to the Stakhanov ‘komendatura’ but disappeared after a
few days. Since then, the relatives of the three individuals have
not heard anything about their fate or whereabouts.23 On 17
September 2014, a businessman was taken from his office by
two armed ‘Cossacks’, and two hours later the same men came
to the victim’s office, searched it and seized his belongings. His
whereabouts have been unknown since.24 All three cases of
abductions occurred in 2014 in Stakhanov, Luhansk region when
the area was under the control of Cossack armed groups.
Unlawful and arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment
Ukrainian Armed Forces and law enforcement
37. During the reporting period, OHCHR also documented a
number of cases demonstrating that the pattern of intimidation
and coercion during the initial stages of detention has not
significantly improved since 2014 and 2015.25 OHCHR has
18 Under article 365-2 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code, according to information
provided by the Prosecutor General’s Office to HRMMU, 5 December 2016.
19 Security Service of Ukraine, information provided to HRMMU, 5 December
2016.
20 HRMMU interviews, 23 September, 15 and 19 October 2016.
21 HRMMU interview, 26 September 2016.
22 Security Service of Ukraine, information provided to HRMMU, 5 December
2016.
23 HRMMU interview, 1 September 2016.
24 HRMMU interview, 1 September 2016.
25 HRMMU interview, 23 August 2016.
14
sufficient verified information to believe that individuals detained
in connection with the armed conflict are often kept in illegal and
incommunicado detention. Upon apprehension, formal registration
of their arrest is often delayed, depriving them of access to legal
assistance, medical care, and the outside world.26 During this
period of unregistered deprivation of liberty, detainees are kept in
unofficial places of detention before being transferred to police
and remand facilities, such as temporary police detention centres
(ITT) and pre-trial detention centres administered by the Ministry
of Justice (SIZO).
38. During the reporting period, OHCHR continued to enjoy
effective access to Government-administered official places of
detention.27 Between 5 and 9 September, the SPT visited Ukraine
to complete its visit from May 2016. During the visit, the SPT
was provided with full and unimpeded access, including to a
number of administrative premises of the SBU.28
39. As of October 2016, OHCHR estimates that 150-250
individuals are either under investigation by the Government and
in remand detention or on trial for conflict-related charges,29 with
a further estimated 200-300 individuals sentenced for conflictrelated
conduct in 2014-2016 and serving their sentences. In
September 2016, the Donetsk Regional Department of the
National Police reported on the detention of 220 individuals
“associated with illegal armed formations”30 during the first nine
months of 2016. Of them, 37 were placed in remand custody.
40. On 27 June 2016, Ukrainian Armed Forces captured eight
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ members near the Governmentcontrolled
village of Shyrokyne, Donetsk region. Several of the
detainees claimed that they were hooded for three days and
beaten. On the fourth day of detention, they all were brought to
the basement of the Mariupol SBU, where they spent the night,
and then delivered to Mariupol ITT (police temporary detention
facility). On 1 July 2016, all eight detainees were placed to
Mariupol SIZO.31 On 9 October 2016, one of the detainees was
brought from Mariupol SIZO to a hospital, where he underwent
26 In one case a man was held for 10 days without his detention formally
registered. HRMMU interview, 2 March 2016.
27 SIZOs (pre-trial detention centres), penal colonies and ITTs (temporary police
detention centres), as well as the only official detention facility of the Security
Service of Ukraine (SBU) – SBU SIZO in Kyiv (all other SBU detainees shall be
held in general SIZOs).
28 Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, “UN torture prevention body concludes
Ukraine visit”, 13 September 2016 (Accessible at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2047
5&LangID=E).
29 Charged under articles 109 (actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the
constitutional order or take-over of government), 110 (trespass against territorial
integrity and inviolability of Ukraine); 111 (high treason), 112 (trespass against life
of a statesman or a public figure, 113 (sabotage), 114 (espionage), 258 (act of
terrorism), 258-1 (involvement in a terrorist act), 258-2 (public incitement to
commit a terrorist act), 258-3 (creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization),
258-4 (facilitating a terrorist act), 258-5 (financing of terrorism) and 260 (creation
of unlawful paramilitary or armed formations) of the Criminal Code.
30 Charged under articles 260, 256, 294 and 258-3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
31 HRMMU interview, 7 July 2016.
15
urgent surgery. The detainee told OHCHR that he “stumbled and
fell” in his cell.32
41. On 28 February 2015, a member of the armed groups was
detained at a checkpoint staffed by Ukrainian soldiers. There he
was beaten, handcuffed and blindfolded with duct tape, and then
brought to a basement of an unknown building. For two days,
men in camouflage “poked him with a knife”. He was then
transferred to the Mariupol SBU, where he was placed in one of
the rooms in the basement and then moved to a shooting range in
the building. He saw 15 other detainees, some of whom were
bruised and injured.33
42. In March 2015, a detainee was taken by camouflaged men to a
police precinct in Bakhmut, Donetsk region, where he was forced
to kneel, and then kicked and beaten with truncheons. At some
point one of the perpetrators drew a target sketch on a piece of
paper and pinned it to the victim’s back. He was beaten for
several hours until he agreed to give self-incriminating
statements.34
43. In May 2015, a man detained by the SBU in a private
apartment, was handcuffed, kicked on his legs and torso. Then
an SBU officer in balaclava stepped on his chest and stood there
until the victim began to suffocate. The victim’s family members
were also threatened, after which he agreed to cooperate and sign
a confession. Later, he complained about his treatment, but no
official investigation was launched.35
44. OHCHR is concerned that medical personnel of SIZOs at
times neglect their obligation to document detainee injuries such
as bruises, fractures, concussions, and internal traumas. For
instance, during the visit to Starobilsk SIZO on 23 August 2016,
OHCHR found that the documentation of injuries was not
undertaken in cases when police or SBU provided an
explanation of the injuries. Medical personnel of the SIZO
systematically failed to provide detainees with copies of medical
certificates attesting to their injuries despite a legal obligation to
do so. A similar pattern was observed in Bakhmut SIZO.
45. OHCHR also continued to document human rights violations
committed by members of Ukrainian voluntary battalions in 2014,
as well as continuing cases in early 2016. On 20 January, a group
of ‘Dnipro-1’ battalion members raided a house in Avdiivka,
severely beating a man, subjecting him to asphyxiation with a
plastic bag and mock execution.36
46. In three separate cases between August and November 2014,
members of the ‘Donbas’ battalion took a total of seven civilians
hostage, tortured and ill-treated them at their base in Pokrovsk
(formerly Krasnoarmiisk), and extracted large ransoms. One
victim said, “the pain was so unbearable that I wanted to die… I
really asked them to kill me, I could not stand it.”37
32 HRMMU interview, 21 October 2016.
33 HRMMU interview, 6 September 2016.
34 HRMMU interview, 6 September 2016.
35 HRMMU interview, 23 August 2016.
36 HRMMU interview, 10 November 2016.
37 HRMMU interview, 31 August 2016.
16
Armed groups
47. New allegations documented by OHCHR support a
previously established pattern of armed groups routinely
subjecting persons deprived of their liberty to torture and illtreatment.
Victims were often afraid or reluctant to speak about
the treatment they suffered.
48. On 18 September 2016, a man was detained at the Uspenka
checkpoint between ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ territory and the
Russian Federation. Between 1 and 11 October, his fate and
whereabouts were unknown while his family repeatedly inquired
about his fate and whereabouts to the authorities of the Russian
Federation and ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. By 18 October, he
was transferred from a police detention facility in Taganrog,
Russian Federation to the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ‘ministry of
state security’ to a ‘pre-trial detention facility’ in Donetsk, where
he was charged with espionage. OHCHR is concerned about his
detention outside of the protection of the law and his treatment
during a period of 10 days when his whereabouts were unknown.
OHCHR further notes that the facts suggest that the authorities of
the Russian Federation transferred the man into the custody of the
‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
49. On 14 September 2016, OHCHR was able to visit four
children deprived of their liberty in Donetsk city. OHCHR
understands that the children were detained on 30 or 31 August
2016 and held in separate cells in the premises of the ‘ministry
of state security’ on Shevchenko Street 26 in Donetsk city.
OHCHR is concerned that the juvenile detainees had no contact
with their families for a period of at least two weeks.38 OHCHR
was later informed that the children were transferred to ‘SIZO’
(‘pre-trial detention facility’) in Donetsk on 24 October 2016.
50. In June 2016, two men were abducted by armed members of
the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ and were beaten, kicked, and
tortured by men wearing camouflage, who accused them of
espionage. One man died.39
51. In August 2014, a resident of the city of Donetsk (controlled
by the armed groups) suspected of being a gun-spotter for
Ukrainian forces, was deprived of liberty in his apartment and
taken to a former police academy building. There he was taken
to the basement and beaten with truncheons and five litre plastic
bottles filled with water all over his body. One of the
perpetrators burnt his shoulder, hand and back with a cigarette.40
52. The exact number of individuals deprived of their liberty by
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
armed groups is unknown. The majority of them are pre-conflict
convicts kept in correctional colonies and centres (there are 14 in
territories controlled by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and 12 in
territories controlled by ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ armed
groups) and individuals who were in pre-trial detention when the
conflict erupted and whose cases had not yet been heard in courts
(pre-trial detainees are kept in Donetsk and Luhansk SIZOs). As
of November 2016, OHCHR estimates their total number at 9,500
38 HRMMU interview, 14 September 2016.
39 HRMMU interview, 20 October 2016.
40 HRMMU interview, 28 October 2016.
17
(approximately 5,000 in ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ territory, and
approximately 4,500 in ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ territory). In
2015-2016, at least 131 such persons deprived of liberty were
transferred from armed group-controlled territories to Government
control.
53. Another category of persons deprived of liberty comprise
individuals who have been either under ‘investigation’, or already
have been ‘sentenced’ by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ ‘courts’.41 Their exact number is not
known. According to the ‘chair’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ ‘supreme court’, as of 18 October 2016, a ‘martial court’
was considering 61 cases in regard to 72 individuals of whom 42
were in custody; 32 cases in regard to 39 individuals were already
heard with 17 accused in custody. ‘Courts of general jurisdiction’
were considering 14,404 criminal cases in regard to 15,555
individuals of whom 5,013 were in custody.42 They are civilians
and members of the armed groups charged with criminal offences
and disloyalty. A distinct group of persons deprived of liberty
comprise Ukrainian soldiers and civilians suspected of supporting
the Government (including ‘subversive activities’ or ‘spying’).
Their exact number is not known. For instance, the ‘ministry of
state security’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ reported “during
nine months of 2016, they detected, proved and stopped the
intelligence activity of 70 agents and trusted persons of special
services of Ukraine”; their fate is not known.
54. According to the SBU, as of 26 October 2016, there were 100
such persons deprived of liberty whose release is sought by the
Government. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ maintains that it has
only 42 of these detainees. There are other conflict-related
detainees whose release is not being sought by the Government.43
55. OHCHR is aware of a number of places where different
categories of persons deprived of liberty are likely held. In
Donetsk, these places include: SIZO at 4 Kobozeva Street; a
‘military unit’ known as “5 Molodizhna Street” at 11 Panfilova
Street44; former SBU building at 62 Shchorsa Street45; premises
of the ‘ministry of state security’ at 26 Shevchenko Street46,
‘department on fighting organized crime’47 and IVS (isolator of
temporary detention)48. In Horlivka, the ‘military commandant’s
office’49; and in Makiivka – colony No. 97. In the territories
controlled by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ these places
include Luhansk SIZO at 4 24th Liniia Street and ‘department on
fighting organized crime’ in Stakhanov50. The list of the places
of deprivation of liberty is not comprehensive; for instance, on 7
August 2015 two men were detained in Donetsk, allegedly in
relation to their business activities. They were kept in a base of
41 See paragraphs 75-81.
42 These 5,013 individuals reportedly include both pre-conflict detainees and those
detained since mid-April 2014.
43 HRMMU interview, 14 September 2016.
44 HRMMU interview, 20 September 2016.
45 HRMMU interview, 20 September 2016.
46 HRMMU interview, 14 September 2016.
47 HRMMU interview, 20 September 2016.
48 HRMMU interviews, 20 September, 7 November 2016.
49 HRMMU interview, 20 September 2016.
50 HRMMU interview, 7 October 2016.
18
the armed groups near Abakumova mine, not far from
Staromykhailivka village51.
56. During the reporting period, despite repeated requests,
OHCHR continued to be denied unfettered access to places of
deprivation of liberty on the territories controlled by the armed
groups. Accordingly, OHCHR was not able to comprehensively
assess the condition of detention in the territories controlled by the
armed groups, and continued to have concerns that persons
deprived of their liberty may be subject to torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (illtreatment),
including sexual and gender-based violence.
According to former inmates, relatives of current inmates and
other sources52, these conditions vary from facility to facility: in
some nutrition is described as sufficiently adequate, while in one
facility inmates receive mainly “barley porridge and soup without
or very little meat” and bread; in some colonies, heating is
inadequate and inmates suffer from low temperatures; in some
colonies access to medical care and treatment remain inadequate.
A standard disciplinary measure used across places of
deprivation of liberty is up to 15 days solitary confinement.
57. During the reporting period, a number of individuals were
deprived of their liberty on the territories controlled by the
armed groups for being “Ukrainian spies and subversives”.
Several young men were deprived of their liberty in October and
November in Luhansk; their video “confessions” were made
public by the ‘ministry of state security’ of ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ in early November. A judge from Luhansk, who
moved to Government-controlled Sievierodonetsk in 2014, was
deprived of liberty on 15 October 2016 while travelling to the
town of Krasnodon (controlled by the armed groups) to attend
the funeral of his father. He is allegedly “accused” of “state
treason” by ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ armed groups. OHCHR
is concerned with the conditions of detention and treatment of
these detainees and has requested access to those deprived of
their liberty. OHCHR has so far been denied access.
E. Sexual and gender-based violence
58. OHCHR continued to document cases of conflict-related
sexual violence. In addition to a continuing pattern of sexual
violence occurring in conflict-related detention, OHCHR
documented cases that indicate the sexual violence and
harassment of young women at Government-controlled entryexit
checkpoints along the contact line.
59. On 12 September 2016, a woman was travelling via one of
the transport corridors in Donetsk region. At a Government
checkpoint she was told that there is a problem with her permit
and was referred to a coordination centre at the checkpoint. An
51 HRMMU interview, 9 September 2016.
52 HRMMU interview, 21 October 2016.
“If you are going to rape me, then I would prefer that you
shoot me on the spot.”
– A woman detained at a checkpoint
19
officer put her passport aside, asked her to enter the container,
closed the window and locked the door. He told the victim that
he noticed her a month ago and intentionally made an error
while renewing her permit. He then said that she should go with
him to a hotel; otherwise, she would be kidnapped and buried
alive. Then, the perpetrator forcefully made her sit on his lap and
touched her body. She told OHCHR that she was crying and
begging him to let her go. After 1.5 hours, he agreed to release
her on the condition that she would return to the checkpoint,
threatening her with blackmail and physical violence. The victim
agreed to come back because she wanted to be set free. OHCHR
assisted the victim in filing a complaint to the police.53
60. In March 2016, three women54 drove to Toretsk to receive
humanitarian aid. They were stopped at a checkpoint controlled
by the ‘Aidar’ battalion. The commander refused to let the car
pass claiming that the husband of one of the women was on a
SBU wanted list. Her passport and phone were seized. The
‘Aidar’ battalion commander then got into the car, put his hand
on the victim’s lap and said that the issue could be easily
resolved. When the victim refused, the commander called armed
men in camouflage without insignia, who drove the women to
the nearest police station. There, the women were questioned
and their phones were checked. When the victim asked police
officers to present proof that her husband is on the wanted list,
they failed to do so. Several hours later, following numerous
appeals of the victim and the two other women, they were
released.
61. OHCHR also documented additional cases that illustrate a
previously identified pattern of sexual violence perpetrated in
detention against those perceived to be a part of or affiliated to
armed groups or their relatives in order to punish or humiliate, or
extort a confession.55
62. A woman56 was detained in her home in June 2015 by ten
armed unidentified men and taken to the basement of the
Mariupol SBU. There she was tortured, interrogated, stripped
naked and humiliated. When the victim was forced to confess on
camera, it was visible that she was not wearing all of her
clothing. As of 15 November 2016, she remained in detention.
Despite the victim testifying in court regarding her torture, the
SBU informed OHCHR that there was no conclusive forensic
evidence to support her allegations.57 OHCHR notes that in cases
of gender-based and sexual violence, evidence other than
forensic findings can be considered probative.58
63. A man and his wife,59 allegedly associated with the armed
groups were detained in August 2014 by unidentified armed men
53 HRMMU interview, 16 September 2016.
54 HRMMU interview, 16 September 2016.
55 HRMMU interviews, 26 August 2016, 27 September 2016.
56 HRMMU interview, 26 August 2016.
57 Security Service of Ukraine, information provided to HRMMU, 5 December
2016.
58 International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual
Violence in Conflict (accessible at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31
9054/PSVI_protocol_web.pdf).
59 HRMMU interview, 27 September 2016.
20
“It was war time. We did not ask many questions. It meant
that it had to be that way.”
- SBU officer testifying in court regarding the illtreatment
of Oleksandr Ahafonov
and transferred into the custody of local police. There the man
was interrogated, tortured and threatened with execution.
Meanwhile his wife was interrogated separately; beaten and
threatened with rape. Later that day both of them were
released.60
Armed groups
64. It remains difficult to obtain first-hand accounts of conflictrelated
sexual violence in territories controlled by armed groups.
Due to overall impunity, absence of services for survivors of
sexual violence, access to justice and fear of reprisals, victims
and their families are hesitant to report incidents of conflictrelated
sexual violence. This is aggravated by a lack of access to
persons deprived of their liberty by the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, which prevents any
independent oversight, raising concerns that the worst may be
expected, including that they may be subject to sexual and
gender-based violence.
65. OHCHR recorded allegations and attempted to conduct
inquiries into the killing of a 20-year-old woman found on 16
April 2016 in Alchevsk, Luhansk region. According to local
sources, she was raped and strangled. Allegedly, her body was
found not far from a ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ position.
Relatives refused to speak to OHCHR.
III. Accountability and the administration
of justice
A. Accountability for human rights violations
and abuses in the east
Accountability for abuses committed by the armed groups
66. During the reporting period, the Prosecutor General’s Office
reported progress in investigating crimes committed by ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ armed group
commanders.
67. On 31 August, Podilskyi District Court of Kyiv ruled in
favour of a trial in absentia for the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
‘head’ for the abduction of Nadiia Savchenko. According to the
Prosecutor General’s Office, 17 persons are expected to testify in
the course of the trial.
68. On 14 September, the Office of the Chief Military
Prosecutor reported that a preliminary investigation against the
commander of the ‘Somali’ battalion of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ had been completed, finding grounds to charge him
with abduction, unlawful deprivation of liberty, and violations of
60 Under article 258-3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
21
the laws of warfare.61 He is accused of ill-treating captured
Ukrainian soldiers, including Ihor Branovytskyi,62 who
according to witnesses was executed on 21 January 2015 by a
citizen of the Russian Federation, the commander of the ‘Sparta’
battalion of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
Accountability for violations committed by the Ukrainian
military or security forces
69. OHCHR has followed a number of emblematic prosecutions
of members of the Ukrainian armed and security forces. Despite
prosecutions being carried out against a number of SBU officials
on various charges, OHCHR continued to monitor cases where
SBU officials enjoy impunity, particularly for human rights
violations committed in the course of their duties.
70. A certain number of Ukrainian soldiers and law enforcement
officials have been detained on charges related to the conflict,
such as torture, excess of power and state treason, with some held
in solitary confinement, in one case lasting for more than seven
months.63
71. The ongoing trial of two SBU officers charged with torturing
Oleksandr Ahafonov illustrates the systemic obstacles to holding
state officials accountable for crimes perpetrated in connection
with the armed conflict. Only two SBU officials have been put
on trial, despite the involvement of two other officials from the
SBU in Izium in Ahafonov’s transfer and detention. OHCHR is
moreover concerned that the heads of the Izium police and SBU
orally condoned the practice of police transferring detainees into
SBU custody, but have not been charged for their involvement.
72. Most members of voluntary battalions who committed
human rights violations in the early stages of the conflict in
Donetsk and Luhansk have not been brought to justice. Despite
victims’ and witnesses’ accounts of such violations,64 it appears
that investigations into these incidents often face political
interference and obstruction designed to shield perpetrators.
73. Five members of the ‘Donbas’ battalion have been accused
of a number of crimes against civilians including abduction,
armed robbery, extortion, banditry, hooliganism, and illegal
possession of weapons. Four members of parliament including a
former commander of the ‘Donbas’ battalion attended one of
their preliminary hearings on 30 August. They requested the
court to release the defendants on their personal guarantees. The
members of parliament overtly exerted pressure on the judges,
threatening to initiate corruption proceedings. They also verbally
insulted the victims, accusing them of separatism. Ultimately,
the defendants were released on the personal guarantees of the
parliamentarians.
61 Also charged under article 146 (illegal abduction or confinement of a person),
258 (terrorist act), 253 (creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organisation), 437
(planning, preparation and waging aggressive war) and 438 (violation of the
rules of warfare) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
62 OHCHR Thematic report: Violations and abuses of the right to life in Ukraine
from January 2014 to May 2016, Annex I, para. 25.
63 HRMMU interview, 4 October 2016.
64 HRMMU interview, 31 August 2016.
22
74. Twelve members of the ‘Tornado’ special police patrol
battalion remain in custody pending trial accused of grave
human rights violations including arbitrary detention, abduction
and torture. According to the General Prosecutor’s Office, the
accused are responsible for the unlawful deprivation of liberty
and torture of over 10 individuals, only eight of whom have been
identified. The whereabouts of two other victims are unknown.65
B. Human rights impact of armed group
structures
75. OHCHR continued to monitor the human rights impact of
what the armed groups refer to as ‘courts’, ‘judges’, and
‘prosecutors’. These structures do not comply with the right “to
a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law” as enshrined in article 14
of the ICCPR. OHCHR notes that both international human
rights and humanitarian law incorporate a series of judicial
guarantees, such as trial by an independent, impartial and
regularly constituted court. These structures in the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, prima facie,
do not meet these requirements.
76. OHCHR attempted to monitor a ‘court hearing’ on 4 October
2016 held by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ to verify the fate
and whereabouts of the accused but was denied access as the
‘hearing’ was closed to the public.
77. The enforcement of decisions issued by such structures
raises further concerns. In November 2016, a ‘court’ in the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ruled on a pre-conflict civil claim
ordering an asset seizure. The defendant was subsequently
prevented from leaving the territory of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ by the ‘ministry of state security’, raising serious
concerns about the legality of the sanction, resulting arbitrary
restrictions on movement, and the conduct of the ‘ministry of
state security’ in carrying out the decisions of ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ ‘courts’.66
78. On 18 August, OHCHR held a meeting with the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ ‘supreme court’. OHCHR was informed that
not all ‘courts’ are operational, and some of them are
understaffed. There are 73 ‘judges’ currently working in 13
‘courts’ (24 in the ‘supreme court’ and 49 in ‘courts of general
jurisdiction’). In two years, these ‘courts’ have heard 57,119
cases67. If accurate, tens of thousands of people living in the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ have been subject to what appears to
be summary decisions without access to legal remedy.
79. OHCHR is concerned that these structures decide on the fate
of individuals detained prior to the conflict. As of 15 November,
16 pre-conflict detainees have cases pending before the ‘supreme
court’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. These detainees are
deeply concerned about the legality of the proceedings.
65 General Prosecutor’s Office, information provided to HRMMU, 5 December
2016.
66 HRMMU interview, 9 November 2016.
67 HRMMU meeting, 18 August 2016.
23
“Everybody knows that I am innocent but no one wants to
admit that they made a mistake because they do not want to
be held responsible.”
- A man from Avdiivka currently on trial for
conflict-related offenses
80. OHCHR was informed that Ukrainian soldiers captured in
the course of hostilities are also ‘prosecuted’ in ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ ‘courts’. As of 15 November, nine conflictrelated
‘criminal cases’ are pending in front of the ‘supreme
court’. On 31 October, the ‘supreme court’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ reportedly sentenced the alleged organizer of
an assassination attempt against the head of the ‘republic’ to 14
years of deprivation of liberty. The ‘ministry of state security’ of
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ released the name of the accused
and alleged that he served with the SBU. OHCHR recalls that
the sentencing of an individual by the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ without due process or basic judicial guarantees
including trial by an independent, impartial and regularly
constituted court, may amount to a war crime68 and violations of
international human rights law.
81. According to the ‘ministry of justice’, as of 13 September
150 lawyers have been admitted to the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ bar. On 10 November and 15 November, the
Prosecutor General’s Office reported that 45 ‘judges’ and 53
‘prosecutors’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ were charged
with “facilitation of the activities of a terrorist group or terrorist
organization”.69 Reportedly, some were Government civil
servants that joined the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ after the
onset of the armed conflict.
C. Due process and fair trial rights,
interference with independence of judiciary
82. Through trial monitoring and interviews with individuals
accused of affiliation with armed groups, OHCHR has
documented persistent and systematic violations of due process
and fair trial rights in Ukraine. OHCHR has observed a
consistent and ongoing pattern of violations during the initial
stages of detention where a person is arbitrarily detained and his
detention not recorded.70 OHCHR has gathered sufficient
verified information to conclude that torture and ill-treatment
allegedly perpetrated by law enforcement and security forces are
closely linked to the administration of justice in conflict-related
cases.
68 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8.2.c.(iv).
69 Office of the Prosecutor General, Prosecutor’s Office of Donetsk region jointly
with the Donetsk regional office of the SBU charged 53 prosecutors of the
terrorist organization ‘DPR’”, 15 November 2016 (accessible at:
http://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=196302);
Office of the Prosecutor General, “Prosecutor’s Office of Donetsk region
charged 45 judges of the terrorist organisation ‘DPR’” (accessible at:
http://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=195991&fp=
30 - on 'judges', 10 November).
70 Report on the visit of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to Ukraine,
CAT/OP/UKR/1, 2011, para. 50.
24
83. Interviewees subjected to arbitrary detention complained
about violations of a number of their due process and fair trial
rights, including access to legal counsel, instruction on rights,71
and right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or confess
guilt.
84. OHCHR has noted that a lack of trust in law enforcement
organs and the judiciary prevents victims from complaining
about torture and ill-treatment to the prosecution or judges.
Some interlocutors also complained that the lawyers provided by
the Free Legal Aid Centres fail to take any steps to file their
torture claims with the relevant authorities.
85. While many interviewees complained to OHCHR about the
alleged lack of impartiality of judges, none filed formal
complaints with the High Qualification Commission of Judges,
which until 29 September 2016 had the mandate to carry out
disciplinary proceedings against judges.
86. Interference with the independence of the judiciary remains
of critical concern. OHCHR has noted patterns of political
interference in the investigation and prosecution of Ukrainian
military and security personnel for human rights violations
committed in the context of the conflict72. Such patterns have
been systematically observed in Odesa region, where members
of the judiciary have openly complained about attempts by
politicians and “patriotic” organizations to exercise pressure to
influence the outcome of judicial decisions. Even though such
pressure often takes the form of explicit threats in the courtroom
during proceedings, law enforcement habitually fail to respond.
OHCHR recalls that the Government of Ukraine is obligated to
ensure independence of the judiciary from any interference, as it
could undermine the right to fair trial and basic judicial
guarantees, eroding trust in the judiciary and amounting to
violation of human rights.
D. High-profile cases of violence related to
riots and public disturbances
Accountability for the killings of protesters at Maidan
87. OHCHR continued to follow the prosecution of former
Berkut special police regiment servicemen accused of killing
protestors during the Maidan protests in Kyiv, noting some
progress in bringing low and mid-level sergeants and majors to
account.
88. Over the reporting period, Sviatoshynskyi district court in
Kyiv held a number of hearings in the case of five former Berkut
servicemen accused of killing 48 and inflicting bodily injuries to
80 protesters on 20 February 2014 at Maidan. The five accused
remain in custody while the victims testify in court. As of 4
October only the relatives of 20 out of the 48 victims have
testified.
89. In a different case, four Berkut servicemen are accused of
inflicting bodily injuries while forcefully dispersing protesters
71 Principle 13, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
72 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, para 70.
25
on 18 February 2014. After spending some 18 months in
custody, the former commander of the Kharkiv Berkut unit
confessed in court to failing to take any measures to prevent his
subordinates from using force against protesters. He named a
group of his fellow servicemen who received shotguns and
shotgun shells instead of rubber bullets. He also testified to
seeing them firing at the protesters. According to the Prosecutor
General’s Office, 110 protesters sustained bodily injuries of
various levels of severity on 18 February 2014.
Accountability for the 2 May 2014 violence in Odesa
90. OHCHR continued to monitor the trials concerning the
2 May 2014 events in Odesa, noting that over two and a half
years after the events that resulted in the death of 48 people,
investigations and prosecutions have been markedly slanted in
one direction against members of the ‘pro-federalist’ movement.
OHCHR has observed that despite authorities’ long-standing
knowledge of the crimes committed in the course of the events,
the overall investigative steps taken and evidence presented
appears manifestly inadequate in light of evidence and steps
available. The proceedings have also been characterized by
unjustified delays inconsistent with the intent to bring those
responsible to justice.
91. For over two years, the five men accused of mass disorder in
the Odesa city centre have remained in pre-trial custody. Since
27 November 2014, all court hearings assessing the renewal of
their detention order have been attended by a group of male
‘pro-unity’ activists supporting the prosecution and demanding
the continued detention of the accused. OHCHR has observed
instances of the group exercising pressure on the judiciary, most
recently during hearings on 25 and 27 October.73 Such pressure
has caused delays in the proceedings.
Accountability for the 31 August 2015 violence in Kyiv
92. OHCHR continued to follow developments of related to the
31 August 2015 incident of violence in front of parliament when
four National Guard servicemen were killed and 152 other
persons injured by a hand grenade explosion and subsequent
clashes, observing violations of due process and fair trial rights
in the efforts of the authorities to bring those responsible to
account.
93. After almost a yearlong investigation, the case has been
transmitted to Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv for review of
the merits. In parallel, a local court is examining the merits of a
case against 15 individuals involved in the subsequent riots and
clashes.
94. OHCHR interviewed the two accused, currently held in
SIZO.74 Both were held in police custody at odds with Ukrainian
legislation75. One of them claimed to be beaten at the moment of
arrest and subjected to numerous threats at the police department
on the day of detention. The administration of the facility and the
investigators disregarded his requests for legal assistance and
73 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, paras 88-90.
74 HRMMU interview, 20 October 2016; HRMMU interview, 19 February 2016.
75 Article 2, Internal Rules of Conduct in Temporary Detention Facilities of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs.
26
informally questioned him several times a week without the
presence of his lawyer. The defendant believes that his illtreatment
by law-enforcement was triggered by statements to the
media of the Minister of Internal Affairs76. The custodial
detention of both suspects was routinely prolonged for more than
one year without adequate justification and review.77
IV. Fundamental freedoms
A. Freedom of movement
95. Limitations of freedom of movement continue to cause
disproportionate suffering to the civilian population in the
conflict-affected area. Between August and November,
approximately 25,000 civilians78 crossed the contact line daily
through five designated crossing points, including a wooden
ramp for pedestrians connecting parts of a destroyed bridge. The
number of people crossing decreased compared to the previous
reporting period as the operating hours of the checkpoints were
reduced and OHCHR continued to regularly observe long queues
at all entry-exit checkpoints. Armed groups sometimes
arbitrarily close checkpoints, adversely impacting civilian
freedom of movement.79
96. The relocation of entry-exit checkpoints and a shrinking of
the “no man’s land”80 has also continued. On 21 October, the
State Border Service of Ukraine relocated Zaitseve entry-exit
checkpoint to Maiorsk checkpoint,81 closer to the contact line.82
On 1 November, OHCHR visited the checkpoints in Maiorsk
and in the “no man’s land” between Ukrainian Armed Forces
and ‘Donetsk people’s republic’-controlled checkpoints,
observing long queues of civilian and cars. Several individuals,
who regularly cross the checkpoints told OHCHR that the
relocation did not ease civilian passage through the checkpoints.
They also complained that the processing time was still long and
there was lack of necessary facilities.
76 “Avakov named responsible for the terrorist act the Parliament on 31 August”,
Forbes Ukraine, 17 September 2015 (accessible at:
http://forbes.net.ua/news/1402128-avakov-nazval-vinovnyh-v-terakte-pod-radoj-
31-avgusta).
77 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, D. Arbitrary
detention in conflict-related cases.
78 According to the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.
79 Between 10 and 12 November, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ closed the
checkpoint between Novoazovsk and Mariupol.
80 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, para. 99.
81 Horlivka – Artemivsk transport corridor.
82 As a result of relocation of entrance/exit crossing point, such towns and
villages as Zaitseve, Maiorsk, Kurdiumivka, Odradivka, Mykolaivka and
Kodyma will no longer be in the so-called “grey zone” or “no man’s land” and
its residents will not need to pass entry-exit checkpoints on the way to other
Government-controlled territories.
“I do not know how high my pension should be to make me
go through all the humiliation associated with crossing the
contact line again.”
– A man in a wheel chair travelling across
Zaitseve entry-exit checkpoint
27
97. The proximity of checkpoints to the contact line increases
security risks for civilians. On 27 October, the Maiorsk
checkpoint was closed due to ongoing mortar shelling and
exchanges of fire and in the evening another entry-exit
checkpoint in Marinka was targeted by small arms fire and
automatic grenade launcher. The same checkpoint was shelled
on the night 8 November, while civilians were queuing nearby.
No casualties were reported.
98. During the reporting period, many civilians faced technical
difficulties renewing the electronic permit required for crossing
the contact line. Electronic permits were introduced in July 2015
and expired after one year. Some civilians were trapped at the
entry-exit checkpoint with expired permits. Many of those
affected were elderly persons who required assistance renewing
the permit. Bio-metric passport holders83 were unable to apply
for a permit online. Limited information about the renewal
procedures created distress for civilians crossing the contact line.
99. Checkpoint personnel retain the ability to deny entry or exit
to any person perceived to be a “threat to national security”.
Without clear criteria, civilians may be arbitrarily denied
movement across the contact line.
100. As temperatures fall and checkpoints operate for
fewer hours, crossing the contact line for civilians who do not
have personal transportation becomes more arduous.84 Buses
cannot go through the “no man’s land” between checkpoints, so
civilians have to walk across the contact line by foot for
approximately 3 kilometres. This disproportionately affects older
persons and families with children. Persons with disabilities face
even more difficulties while crossing the contact line. There are
no toilets accessible for wheelchair users. Although railway
transport corridors were initially foreseen for civilian movement
across the contact line, none are functional, while freight trains
cross the contact line daily.
101. Civilians living in the vicinity of the contact line,
and especially those who live in the area between Government
and armed group checkpoints, face disproportionate restrictions
in their freedom of movement. They have to queue at official
entry-exit checkpoints, or take roundabout paths that are
dangerous due to the presence of mines and explosive remnants
of war (ERWs). A number of villages in this “no man’s land”
have no public transportation, restricting residents’ mobility.
Residents of Novooleksandrivka85, which is located between
Government-controlled Popasna and armed-group-controlled
Pervomaiske, reported that they can only get in and out of their
village by foot or bicycle as only two cars are allowed to enter or
exit the village per month. Residents have to pass through
checkpoints to get to the nearest shop, hospital and pharmacy
located ten kilometres away.
83 Introduced on 12 January 2015.
84 In June 2015, official public transportation via the contact line was prohibited
for “security reasons” following amendments to the Temporary Order – para 1.6.
85 HRMMU visit, 5 September 2016.
28
B. Freedom of opinion and expression
102. During the reporting period, there was a rise in
inflammatory language and hate speech by public officials,
which may contribute to discrimination against vulnerable
groups including IDPs, and runs counter to the spirit of article 20
of the ICCPR.
103. On 23 September, in an official statement86, the
Minister of Internal Affairs attributed an increase in the crime
rate to an inflow of IDPs. On 26 September, a number of NGOs
expressed87 their outrage and called upon the Minister to either
present supporting evidence or revoke his statement. No action
followed. On 8 October88, the Deputy Head of the National
Police of Ukraine highlighted that the number of thefts has
grown in the regions with the highest numbers of IDPs,
instigating a negative attitude towards IDPs. OHCHR addressed
these issues with representatives from the Ministry of
Information and Ministry on Temporarily Occupied Territories
and IDPs, raising concerns about discrimination, hate speech and
that such rhetoric is not conducive to future reconciliation.
104. OHCHR also noted a rise in hate speech on social
networks and incitement to violence against Roma after the
incident in Loshchynivka (See Rights of minorities and
discrimination, paragraph 152). OHCHR identified more than 40
reports89 in regional and national media outlets containing hate
speech and inflammatory language, using offensive and
stereotypical terms as ‘gypsies’. Many reports referred to Roma
as “murderers” and “criminals”, contributing to further
escalation of tensions and discriminatory attitude towards them.
One Roma family that was forced to leave Loshchynivka has
been treated as criminals and denied residence in other villages,
impacting children and their access to education, and the rights
of the family to adequate housing and secure tenure.
105. OHCHR remains seriously concerned about the
lack of genuine investigations into high-profile killings, assaults
86 Particularly, the minister stated: “during the years of war approximately a
million refugee-migrants from the Donbas territory came into Kyiv. Across the
country two to three million people also create certain problems”. The statement
was published on the official website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(Accessible at:
http://www.mvs.gov.ua/ua/news/2974_Arsen_Avakov_zaklikav_Radu_pidtrimat
i_zakonoproekt_pro_kriminalni_prostupki_FOTO_VIDEO.htm).
87 ‘Public position of civil society organisations with regards to the statement of
the Minister of Interior of Ukraine concerning IDPs’ published 26 September
2016 (Accessible at: http://vostok-sos.org/avakov_hate_speech/#twitter).
88 Troian, Vadym, Zerkalo Nedeli, “War at the Criminal Forefront”, 8 October,
(Accessible at: http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/viyna-na-kriminalnomu-fronti-_.html).
89 Some of the examples may be found here: Newspaper Economic News,
“Gypsy raped and killed 9-year-old girl in Odesa region, people destroy the
community”, 28 August 2016 (accessible at:
http://news.eizvestia.com/news_incidents/full/463-cygan-iznasiloval-i-ubil-9-
letnyuyu-devochku-v-odesskoj-oblasti-lyudi-gromyat-obshhinu-fotovideo); TV
channel ICTV, “In Odesa region a Gypsy raped and killed 9-year old child,
unrest in the village (PHOTOS, VIDEO)”, 28 August 2016 (accessible at:
http://fakty.ictv.ua/ua/index/read-news/id/1593001).
“I am afraid to talk. I don’t know who to trust.”
- A woman living in armed group-controlled territories
29
and violations of the rights of journalists. Little progress has
been made in identifying those responsible for the killing of Oles
Buzyna on 16 April 2015 in Kyiv. The killing of Pavel Sheremet
on 20 July in a car bomb explosion is under investigation by the
Main Investigation Department of the National Police together
with an inter-agency operational group, comprised of the
National Police, the SBU and officers from the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
106. According to the Main Investigation Department of
the National Police of Ukraine, 159 criminal proceeding have
been launched in 2016 into attacks against journalists.90 While
this marks a 29 per cent increase from 2015, OHCHR is
concerned that criminal proceedings into such cases rarely yield
results. In 2016, only seven suspects have been identified in 95
investigations into the obstruction of journalist activities.
Territories under the control of armed groups
107. Freedom of opinion and expression continues to be
curtailed by the armed groups. Such limitations are particularly
pronounced in territories under ‘Luhansk people’s republic’-
control, where residents are more reluctant to speak to external
monitors.
108. The registration and accreditation of foreign
journalists by armed groups continues to be largely arbitrary.
OHCHR interlocutors report that ‘loyal’ journalists benefit from
certain privileges such as extended accreditation. One media
professional relayed how the armed groups exerted pressure by
sending ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ‘police’ to the hotel where
his crew was staying while preparing a report on a sensitive
topic. The same media professional mentioned being
apprehended not far from the Donetsk airport with a colleague,
taken to a military base and questioned for 1.5 hours by
members of the armed groups in March 201591 and forced to
erase all their recorded material.
109. On 16 August, the ‘central city district court’ of
Makiivka ‘sentenced’ a blogger92 and civil society activist from
Kyiv to two years of imprisonment for the ‘illegal possession of
weapons’. On 24 October, his case was heard in the ‘court of
appeal’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and was sent for an
additional investigation to the ‘district prosecutor’s office’ in
Makiivka.
110. OHCHR observed that people living in the
territories controlled by armed groups continued to have limited
access to information. Ukrainian television channels are not
broadcast on cable television, however they are accessible online
and on satellite television. A number of websites have been
blocked, hindering the free flow of and access to information.93
90 Under articles 345-1, 347-1, 348-1, 349-1 and 171 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine.
91 HRMMU interview, 31 August 2016.
92 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, para. 119.
93 UN General Assembly (110(II), 290 (IV), 380 (V)) addressed incitement and
propaganda as containing “measures tending to isolate the peoples from any
contact with the outside world, by preventing the Press, radio and other media of
30
111. Considering the above-mentioned findings,
OHCHR commends the endeavour of the Government of
Ukraine to enlarge the broadcasting capacity of existing
television towers and rebuild damaged or destroyed ones, so that
people on both sides of the contact line have broader access to
information.94
112. Hate speech against certain groups remains visible
both in the media as well as among the general public. During
the ‘simultaneous release’ of conflict-related detainees on 17
September, a foreign journalist used derogatory and offensive
language towards Ukrainian journalists and detainees in a
publicly available video. OHCHR recalls the limitations of
article 20 of the ICCPR, which prohibit “any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.”
C. Freedom of association
113. OHCHR continued to monitor the prosecution of
Communist Party members, noting that targeted legal action
continues to impact freedom of association.95
114. On 13 October, OHCHR monitored a hearing in the
case of the 68-year-old head of the Kharkiv branch of the
Communist Party charged with trespassing against the territorial
integrity of Ukraine.96 The Court of Appeals of Kharkiv region
ruled to transfer her from pre-trial detention to house arrest
referring to a life-threatening health condition and substantiating
the decision by citing international standards. Even if
international human rights law establishes that pre-trial should
be the exception, OHCHR notes that national legislation does
not provide alternatives for custodial detention in terrorismrelated
cases.97
Territories under the control of armed groups
115. Civil society and NGOs continued to face
restrictions in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’, impacting their work, members, and
beneficiaries.98
116. OHCHR received information that NGO premises
were searched and their staff questioned by the ‘ministry of state
security’ and ‘military police’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. According to local interlocutors, the ‘Donetsk peoples
republic’ target NGOs they consider “uncomfortable”, and stifle
any civil society or humanitarian organization that does not have
close links with them. This adversely impacts people relying on
assistance provided by such organisations. Civil society
organisations are reluctant to report incidents of interference by
the armed groups in their activities fearing retribution and
persecution. OHCHR has also observed the continued rapid
communication from reporting international events, and thus hindering mutual
comprehension and understanding between peoples.
94 Statement of Deputy Minister Artem Bidenko, 10 November 2016.
95 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, para. 106.
96 She was charged with trespassing against the territorial integrity of Ukraine
and giving a bribe (under articles 110 and 369 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).
97 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, para. 82.
98 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, para. 109.
31
development of the association ‘Mir Luganshchine’ (‘Peace to
Luhansk’) created by the armed groups; it now claims a
membership of 77,800 persons, compared to 72,500 during
previous reporting period. OHCHR is concerned that participants
are being forced and coerced to partake in the organization and
its activities.
D. Freedom of peaceful assembly
117. Since the Maidan events of 201499, the number of
bans of peaceful assemblies across Ukraine has steadily
decreased. However, OHCHR notes that such restrictions are
still used.
118. In Odesa, weekly gatherings of ‘pro-federalism’
supporters continued to face restrictions imposed by lawenforcement
grounded on alleged bomb threats, despite the
manifest lack of credible risk.
119. The absence of legislation protecting and regulating
peaceful assembly has allowed local councils and courts to
arbitrarily limit the freedom of assembly.100 A decision adopted
by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine101 on 13 September was
an important development, upholding that legal provisions
requiring prior permission from authorities for religious
gatherings are not compliant with the Constitution of Ukraine.
The court also affirmed that any notification to the authorities is
not an authorization procedure.
120. However, Ukrainian courts continue to apply
arbitrary limitations on assemblies to allegedly mitigate risk to
public order. Law-enforcement regularly cites the anticipated
‘polarity of views’ of participants as grounds for limiting
assemblies and is selectively enforced.102
121. On 20 September, OHCHR observed assemblies
organised near Russian Federation consulates in Kyiv and Odesa
in response to the Russian Federation elections that were held in
Crimea by the de-facto authorities in violation of General
Assembly Resolution 68/262. One person who came to vote at
the Russian Federation consulate in Kyiv was beaten. Those
involved in the violence were taken to nearby police precincts
for questioning, and subsequently released. Some of them were
charged with hooliganism and resisting arrest.
99 Demonstrations which turned violent in November 2013 - February 2014 and
led to a change of government in Ukraine.
100 These include: the organisation/preparation of a peaceful assembly;
cooperation with the police during a peaceful assembly; the terms of notification
for a peaceful assembly; the appeal procedure when an assembly is rule to be
prohibited.
101 Decision of the Constitutional Court in case of Constitutional submission
made of the Ombudsperson Office regarding compliance with the Constitution of
Ukraine (constitutionality) of provisions article 21 of the Law ‘On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organizations’ (case on advance notifications on
holding of public worships, religious rites, ceremonies and processions) No. 6-
рп/2016 as 8 September.
102 Decision of District Administrative Court of Lviv region adopted on 5
November 2016.
32
122. OHCHR monitored two peaceful demonstrations in
Kyiv demanding the release of Roman Sushchenko, a Ukrainian
journalist who was detained in Moscow on 30 September.103
Territories under the control of armed groups
123. OHCHR monitoring found that employees of public
‘budget-funded’ institutions, as well as students and school
graduates are obliged to participate in demonstrations that take
place in the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. Similar conduct has
been observed in territories under control of ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ armed groups.
124. On 10 October, a rally took place in Luhansk
against the deployment of an armed OSCE monitoring mission,
the latest in a pattern of armed group-organized assemblies.104 As
reported by local media105, the protest gathered 17,000 people.
Notably, ’Luhansk people’s republic’ media emphasized that it
was a ‘improvised rally’ with ‘hand-made posters’ to underline
the voluntary nature of the protest. The accounts collected by
OHCHR suggest that the participants had to sign a paper
obliging them to participate in the rally, while ‘student trade
unions’ were responsible for ensuring student participation.
V. Economic and social rights
A. Civil documentation and access to public
services
125. People living in the territories controlled by armed
groups continue to face difficulties with restoring or obtaining
civil registration documents, which impedes their access to other
public services.
126. In order to restore, receive or apply for civil
documentation, people have to travel to Government-controlled
territories at least twice for several days106. Despite the
simplified procedure introduced by the Ministry of Justice of
Ukraine in February 2016 for persons living in armed groupcontrolled
territories to obtain civil documentation, it remains
cumbersome and lengthy. Interviewees in several cases
confirmed that the procedure takes up to two weeks,107 often
requires the engagement of legal representation,108 and report
instances of corruption.
127. The ongoing reform process has presented
additional difficulties for the conflict-affected population.
103 On 30 September, Roman Sushchenko, the correspondent of Ukrainian
National News Agency Ukrinform was detained in Moscow.
104 Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies,
A/HRC/31/66, para. 39.
105 Donpress, “Luhansk: LPR stated that 17.000 persons attended
demonstration,” published on 10 October 2016 (accessible at link:
https://donpress.com/news/10-10-2016-lugansk-v-lnr-zayavili-chto-na-mitingprishli-
17-tysyach-chelovek).
106 HRMMU interview, 6 October 2016.
107 As regulated by relevant amendments to the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine
introduced on 4 February 2016.
108 HRMMU interview, 6 October 2016.
33
According to new procedures109 effective 1 June 2016, children
have to obtain a new ID card at age 14 instead of a passport at
16. Both children living in territories controlled by armed groups
and those internally displaced will be unable to obtain ID cards,
as one of the requirements is to have an official place of
residence registered in Government-controlled territories.
128. Pre-conflict detainees, who were released after
serving sentences in armed group-controlled territory, whose
documents were lost or expired, face additional challenges, as
they must also confirm the legality of their release, which is
virtually impossible due to the absence of unified register or
database of prisoners. Conflict-related detainees, who were
“simultaneously released” without their passport or whose
passport photos have to be renewed, do not have any valid
documentation and cannot travel to Government-controlled
territories to renew their passports.
B. Right to social security
Social security of internally displaced persons
129. The suspension of social and pension payments to
IDPs until verification of their residential address takes place is
an ongoing concern.110 This continues to have a negative impact
on IDPs’ access to social entitlements. Social protection
departments in the eastern regions of Ukraine face serious
challenges when conducting the verification due to understaffing
and lack of financial and technical resources.
130. IDPs in Berdiansk have to wait around a month to
undergo the verification procedure, leading to delays in the
resumption of payments. An audit conducted by the State
Financial Inspection upon instruction of the Ministry of Finance
concluded that 25.9 per cent of IDP housing subsidy allocations
were erroneous.111
131. Many IDPs, especially those who rely on state
financial support as their prime source of income, indicate that
they would be forced to return to territories controlled by the
armed groups due to suspension of benefits and increased utility
prices in 2016. According to the Ministry of Social Policy, 88
per cent of IDP renewal claims have been processed.112
However, IDPs have complained to OHCHR that the social
payment resumption and verification mechanism lacks
transparency and presents excessive bureaucratic obstacles.
132. While OHCHR recognises the legitimate right of
the Government to combat fraud and control social payment
allocation, the process should be conducted in a transparent
109 In line with the Law of Ukraine Nr. 3224 “On amending some laws of
Ukraine regarding documents that confirm citizenship of Ukraine, identify a
person or their special status, aimed at visa liberalisation with the European
Union”, which entered into force on 1 June 2016.
110 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, paras. 129-131.
111 Data was presented by the State Financial inspection during the
parliamentary hearings on the results of verification organised by the
parliamentary committee on social policy, employment and pensions.
HRMMU attended the hearings on 19 October 2016.
112 Ministry of Social Policy, information provided to HRMMU, 30 November
2016.
34
manner, delinking pensions and social entitlements from
residence registration and IDP certification. A comprehensive
national legislative framework regulating such procedures
should be developed, paying special attention to data protection.
OHCHR welcomes the launch in October of the unified database
of IDPs, administered by the Ministry of Social Policy, marking
a positive step toward more systematic information management.
Social protection of demobilized soldiers and injured civilians
133. During a parliamentary hearing,113 various actors
highlighted that demobilized soldiers continue to face systemic
hurdles in exercising their rights due to inadequate mechanisms
for implementing legislative provisions that foresee certain
entitlements and services. Despite the existence of a State
Agency on Veterans and Participants of the ‘Anti-Terrorist
Operation’ Affairs114 and a number of State programs, such as on
housing, psychological rehabilitation and career counseling,
former soldiers do not always have sufficient information on
available social services. Furthermore, high-quality services are
available in cities, with little or no assistance available in smaller
towns and rural areas.115
134. Mobilized soldiers have fewer social guarantees
than those serving under contract. For example, mobilised
soldiers have to pay for HIV and hepatitis screening, unlike
Army personnel serving under contract. As a result, a very low
number of soldiers undergo such examinations, aggravated by
low levels of awareness about communicable diseases.
Interviews also indicate that members of volunteer battalions do
not have access to free treatment in military hospitals.
135. As previously noted by OHCHR,116 Ukraine lacks a
comprehensive State rehabilitation programme for demobilized
soldiers and members of volunteer battalions, to facilitate reintegration
into communities. Most programs include short-term
stays in sanatoriums for soldiers and their families. OHCHR
welcomes the plans of the Ministry of Social Policy to develop a
comprehensive model of assistance for soldiers with posttraumatic
stress disorder. After returning from the conflict area,
soldiers face unemployment, lack of job opportunities and few
opportunities for requalification training. Allocation of
agricultural land to demobilized soldiers, envisioned as the part
of a reintegration program, remains mired in procedural hurdles.
136. Ukraine lacks a unified registry of civilians who
suffered physical injuries as a result of hostilities in Donetsk and
Luhansk regions. Furthermore the Government has not
determined their legal status, nor allocated any entitlements to
victims of the conflict. As a result, civilians injured in hostilities
– often due to indiscriminate shelling – suffer both the effects of
their physical injuries, and denial of social and legal protection.
113 19 October 2016, Parliamentary hearings on ‘State Guarantees for Social
Protection of ATO and Revolution of Dignity Participants and Their Family
Members: Current Situation and Perspectives’.
114 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 326, 11 August 2014.
115 Ministry of Social Policy, information provided to HRMMU, 30 November
2016.
116 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, para. 123.
35
C. Housing, land and property rights
137. OHCHR continues to observe the negative impact
of military presence on access to housing, property and
livelihoods in the conflict-affected area. During monitoring visits
along the contact line, OHCHR observed military use of and
shrapnel damage to houses in Government-controlled Avdiivka,
Lopaskyne, Novozvanivka, Opytne and Tonenke. In
Novozvanivka – a village of 77 residents – OHCHR noted
significant presence of Ukrainian Armed Forces in residential
areas. Several private houses were used by military personnel.
OHCHR received allegations117 that the military fired weapons
from yards of civilian homes. This frequently attracted return
fire, endangering the civilian population.
138. During a meeting with OHCHR, a deputycommander
of the ‘Anti-Terrorism Operation’ in Kramatorsk
confirmed the military use of residential property in the conflict
zone, stating that utilized homes belong to “separatists who
escaped to the other side”118. The ‘Anti-Terrorism Operation’
command has advised individuals and families who have been
affected by the military use of their homes to complain to local
police, local authorities or military commanders. OHCHR notes
that few victims file formal complaints, either due to fear of
reprisals by the military or absence of effective remedial avenues
through the judiciary for such cases.
139. In Avdiivka, individuals and families whose homes
are used for military purposes by Ukrainian Armed Forces
complained about high utility bills incurred by soldiers.
According to the families affected, the utility company has
refused several of their requests to cut off the electricity supply
to their houses and continues to bill them for electricity used by
soldiers.
140. One resident of Novooleksandrivka told OHCHR
he was concerned about tensions with Ukrainian soldiers and
military positions close to areas where civilians graze their
livestock.119 Agricultural land used for military purposes and
contaminated by mines and ERWs has a detrimental impact on
people’s access to livelihoods. A man from the village
Pryovrazhne in Donetsk region expressed his despair at losing
his land in 2014 when Ukrainian Armed Forces seized
agricultural lands to build trenches and other fortifications,
rendering the lands unsuitable for future agricultural use. Apart
from the fact that residents of the village do not have access to
their sole source of income, they are required to pay land taxes
and rental charges.120 Residents of Mykolaivka village, Donetsk
region complained that 60 per cent of the land previously used
for agriculture can no longer be used due to mine contamination
or because the land is used for military purposes.121
117 HRMMU interview, 5 September 2016.
118 HRMMU interview, 7 September 2016.
119 HRMMU interview, 5 September 2016.
120 The case was presented on 7 September 2016 during a round-table on “Access
to Justice” organised by the Danish Refugee Council. HRMMU carried out
follow-up action on 19 October 2016.
121 HRMMU site visit, 7 November 2016.
36
141. The lack of compensation mechanisms for
destroyed, damaged and militarily utilized property remains one
of the most prevalent problems faced by the conflict-affected
population. Those who lost their property receive free legal aid
and submit complaints to courts but with little success. When
rejecting such claims, Ukrainian courts continue to find that they
do not meet the minimum threshold to establish liability, either
due to absence of evidence connecting destruction of property to
the armed conflict or inability to establish responsibility.
Territories under the control of the armed groups
142. OHCHR received reports122 that ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ armed groups continue to loot apartments in Luhansk
city. Allegedly, in a consistent pattern of conduct, persons in
camouflage or in civilian clothes enter residential buildings and
seize private property after breaking into individual apartments.
Armed group members cite ‘legal’ grounds related to ‘searches’
and collecting evidence for ‘criminal investigations’. According
to OHCHR interlocutors, armed groups actively monitor and
target apartments whose owners have left Luhansk.
143. Similar concerns arise due to the conduct of
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ armed groups. IDPs often express
their fears that their property was occupied by members of
armed groups or was ‘nationalized’ by the armed groups (in
particular for non-payment of utilities). OHCHR observes that
people take personal safety risks and travel to areas with ongoing
hostilities to check on their property. According to a public
statement of the representative of ‘Donetsk city authorities’, the
property of ‘enemies’ who have left the territories under the
control of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ armed groups will be
confiscated and made communal.123
144. OHCHR continues to document violations and
abuses of housing and property rights that occurred in 2014 and
2015.124 In August 2015, the ‘ministry of state security’ in
Donetsk abducted a businessman125 from Novoazovsk, subjected
him to torture and ill-treatment, and looted his home and
property. An IDP from Luhansk told OHCHR126 how armed
groups looted her son’s apartment in February 2015 because he
participated in combat operations against the armed groups and
had pro-Government views.
145. Armed groups have also targeted the property of
IDPs who left armed group-controlled territories. One IDP was
threatened by individuals claiming to represent a ‘bank’ of the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ to confiscate her property if she did
not pay her mortgage and fees to them.
122 HRMMU interview, 28 September 2016.
123 Statement of Igor Martynov of the Donetsk 'city administration', 18 October
2016 (Accessible at: http://www.62.ua/news/1408979).
124 HRMMU interview, 13 October 2016.
125 HRMMU interview, 30 August 2016.
126 HRMMU interview, 28 August 2016.
37
D. Situation of internally displaced people
living in collective centres
146. According to a recent study127 conducted by
UNHCR in Ukraine, at least 637 IDPs across Ukraine are facing
threats of eviction, including in Odesa (Kuialnyk and Senetatia
collective centres), in Kyiv (Kustanaiska Street, Soty and
Dzherelo collective centres) in Zhytomyr and other cities.
According to data128 from 46 surveyed collective centres, 35 per
cent saw cases of IDP evictions. 79 per cent of collective centres
are not equipped to accommodate people with disabilities. 43 per
cent of IDPs indicated that their health condition deteriorated
since they settled in collective centres.
147. The situation in two collective centres in Odesa
region – Kuialnyk and Senetatia – that have been hosting IDPs
with disabilities, including mental disabilities, from the onset of
the conflict until the end of September 2016 is of particular
concern. Due to inhuman and degrading conditions imposed on
IDPs in the collective centres – electricity and water supply cuts
and no access to elevators – IDPs were forced to return to
Donetsk region, including to territories controlled by the armed
groups.129 It is of concern that State and regional authorities did
not intervene and did not provide any durable housing solutions
and humanitarian assistance forcing 139 IDPs to leave their
place of living. Such treatment of IDPs violates their right to
equal protection and prevents their enjoyment and exercise of
human rights without discrimination on account of their
displacement.
148. A similar situation has been observed in a collective
centre130 in Kyiv where the administration of the building has cut
electricity, heating and other utilities endangering the health of
the IDPs, including children, older persons and persons with
disabilities. Due to the absence of contracts with the owners of
the premises, IDPs are often required to pay higher utility rates
under the threat of eviction.131
149. OHCHR notes that much of the documented
suffering of IDPs stems from the absence of a systemic approach
to durable housing and comprehensive legal framework
protecting the most vulnerable IDPs residing in collective
centres, despite housing identified as a priority in the
127 UNHCR monitoring report on the threat of eviction of IDPs in Ukraine,
presented on 12 October 2016.
128 NGO “Right to Protection”, Results of Monitoring of collective centres of
IDPs in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kharkiv region,
2016 (Accessible at: http://vpl.com.ua/uk/materials/zvit-za-rezultatamymonitorynhu-
mkp/).
129 HRMMU interviews, 18 October, 27 October and 27 October 2016.
130 Kustanaiska Str 6, Kyiv.
131 HRMMU interviews, 4 October and 11 November 2016.
“No one listens to us. To get any help we need to go through
all the circles of hell.”
- Woman living in an IDP centre in Donetsk city
38
comprehensive state program for IDPs.132 The Government has
the obligation to identify and recommend free accommodation to
IDPs providing the latter pay for utilities. In practice, however,
only regional authorities are able to do so but often refer to a
lack of available accommodation. As a result, IDPs are not
offered accommodation or are evicted. Jointly with other
international agencies, OHCHR has advocated with the
Government of Ukraine for the maintenance of appropriate
living conditions in collective centres in accordance with
international standards133 and development of sustainable
solutions to satisfy the right to adequate housing. Despite
engaging the issue, the Government of Ukraine has not taken
any measures to safeguard the rights of IDPs with disabilities.
Territories under the control of the armed groups
150. Conditions in collective centres in territories
controlled by armed groups of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ raise serious concerns. Such centres
host many older persons, persons with disabilities and hundreds
of children, and do not satisfy adequate standards of living and
housing.134 OHCHR noted that the population in collective
centres is often mixed (civilian IDPs, former combatants, current
members of armed groups), which raises certain protection
concerns. According to available data, there are 8,160 persons
‘registered’ as IDPs in the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’; while
most live in private houses or apartments, 3,024 reside in
collective centres.135
151. Living conditions in collective centres vary. In one
of the centres to which OHCHR was granted access, living
conditions, including hygiene standards, were manifestly
inadequate: the elevator was not functional, the only showers in
the multi-storey building were on the ground floor, with
unhygienic rooms and sanitation facilities.
E. Rights of minorities and discrimination
152. Incidents of discrimination against minority groups
on the basis of ethnic or sexual identity over the reporting period
have highlighted the ongoing need for measures to reinforce and
build confidence that minority rights are protected by law and in
practice. An incident involving violent destruction of Roma
houses and forced eviction of Roma families took place in
Loshchynivka village, Odesa region after local police disclosed
132 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 1094 “On the approval of the
Comprehensive state programme of support, social adaptation and reintegration
of citizens of Ukraine who moved from the temporarily occupied territory of
Ukraine and the areas of anti-terrorist operation in other regions of Ukraine for
the period till 2017”, 16 December 2015.
133 Principle 18 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
article 2.
134 Principle 8, “The Pinheiro Principles,” United Nations Principles on Housing
and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons.
135 The socio-humanitarian overview of the situation in the self-proclaimed
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ for the period from 29 October to 4 November 2016,
7 November (Accessible at: http://ombudsmandnr.ru/obzor-sotsialnogumanitarnoy-
situatsii-slozhivsheysya-na-territorii-donetskoy-narodnoyrespubliki-
vsledstvie-voennyih-deystviy-c-29-oktyabrya-po-4-noyabrya-2016-
goda/).
39
the name and ethnicity of a man suspected of killing and raping
an eight-year-old local girl on 27 August 2016. On 29 August,
the local council decided to evict 24 Roma (including 15
children) without providing them alternative accommodation or
any other guarantees, including ensuring continued education of
children. OHCHR observed negligence by police at the scene, a
lack of accountability for those who attacked and destroyed
Roma homes,136 and use of hate speech and false information in
national and local media. OHCHR and human rights NGOs have
facilitated a dialogue between the Roma community and local
authorities and advocated against the eviction of people outside
the protections of the law. A complaint regarding police
misconduct during the incident was submitted to the Odesa
regional prosecution office, and a criminal investigation was
initiated on 22 September.137 OHCHR is concerned that the tacit
consent of the forced eviction and absence of measures taken by
police or local authorities to protect Roma in Loshchynivka
village may amount to collective punishment.
153. On 5 October, the Parliamentary Committee on
Human Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations,
concluded that the Government has inadequately implemented
the Strategy for the Protection and Integration of the Roma
National Minority and its Action Plan, echoing the concluding
observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) released on 26 August 2016.138 Roma
community representatives and civil society provided examples
to OHCHR of difficulties that they continue to face in accessing
healthcare and other basic public services. For example, in
September 2016 two persons did not receive proper medical
services, and authorities withheld a woman’s passport upon her
release from custody on the basis of her Roma ethnicity. It was
also reported that Roma children still experience bullying in
public schools or segregation in education.139 The rates of
illiteracy among Roma are persistently high.140
154. OHCHR also notes that during the reporting period
people belonging to or sympathizing with the LGBTI
community experienced aggressive behaviour and threats from
radical groups such as ‘Azov’ civil corps and ‘Right Sector’.141
For example, members of the ‘Azov’ civil corps and ‘Right
Sector’ disrupted a film screening on LGBTI issues on 18
October in Chernivtsi and on 4 November in Kremenchuk city.
Law-enforcement did not intervene to protect the event from
disruption.
136 Police launched investigation under article 194-2 (intentional damage to
property of citizens) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
137 Investigation initiated under article 367 (negligence of official duty) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine.
138 CERD Concluding Observations, CERD/C/UKR/CO/22-23, 26 August 2016.
139 There are still at least four segregated schools in Zakarpattia region. UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations
E/C.12/UKR/CO/6, 13 June 2014, p. 8.
140 European Roma Rights Centre, International Charitable Organisation “Roma
Women Fund “Chirikli”, Written comments on Ukraine for Review by the
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
20 September 2016.
141 HRMMU meeting, 1 November 2016.
40
VI. Human rights in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea142
155. On 15 November, the UN General Assembly Third
Committee approved a draft resolution presented by Ukraine on
the “Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)”. The resolution
refers to Crimea being under the “temporary occupation” of the
Russian Federation and reaffirms the non-recognition of its
“annexation”. It calls on the Russian Federation “as an
occupying power” to bring an immediate end to “all the abuses
against residents of Crimea,” and to ensure proper and
unimpeded access to the peninsula. The UN Secretary General is
invited, through consultations with the UN High Commissioner,
“to seek ways and means” to ensure access to Crimea to regional
and international human rights monitoring mechanisms, and
OHCHR is requested to prepare a thematic report on the
situation of human rights in Crimea before the 72nd UN General
Assembly session.
156. On 14 November, the Office of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court released its annual report on
preliminary examination activities. In its report, the Office of the
Prosecutor found the Crimean peninsula to be under the
occupation of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, the
prosecutor will apply an international armed conflict legal
framework to her analysis of facts and alleged crimes
perpetrated in Crimea.143
A. Arbitrary detention, due process and fair
trial rights
157. HRMMU continued to follow the situation of
people whose arrest and detention could amount to an arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. Human rights concerns include abusively
resorting to anti-extremism and anti-terrorism legislation to
criminalize the expression of non-violent views, opinions and
beliefs; cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;
and violations of due process, including the right to unimpeded
access to legal counsel.
Arbitrary detention of persons accused of ‘separatism’
158. OHCHR documented several cases of abuses and
ongoing sanctions against members of the Mejlis, amounting to
142 The Autonomous Republic of Crimea technically known as the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, in line with United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
OHCHR has not been granted access to Crimea and has no in situ presence there.
It has been able to follow the human rights situation through contacts with
Crimean residents on the peninsula and mainland Ukraine, and relying on a
variety of interlocutors, including representatives of political, religious, civil
society organizations, victims, relatives and witnesses of alleged human rights
violations, members of the legal profession, journalists, entrepreneurs, teachers,
doctors, social workers, human rights activists and other categories, including
individuals with no specific affiliations. OHCHR has continued to seek access to
Crimea.
143 Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, “Report on
Preliminary Examination Activities 2016,” 14 November 2016, paras. 155-158
(Accessible at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-
PE_ENG.pdf).
41
arbitrary detention. On 7 September 2016, Mejlis Deputy
Chairman Ilmi Umerov was released from the psychiatric
hospital where he was placed against his will on 18 August,
following a Crimean ‘court’ decision. Umerov is accused of calls
to violate the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and
risks being sentenced to a prison term of up to 5 years. OHCHR
considers that his forced institutionalization in a psychiatric
hospital for three weeks may have amounted to ill-treatment.
Umerov is currently free but is prohibited from leaving the
Crimean peninsula. On 7 November, Umerov’s Russian
Federation lawyer, Nikolay Polozov, told a Ukrainian media
outlet that he was “under pressure” from the Russian Federation
Security Service (FSB) to drop Umerov’s case.
159. On 11 October, Suleyman Kadyrov, a member of
the regional Mejlis in Feodosiia, was arrested and charged with
publicly calling for actions aimed at violating the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation. As of 15 November, he is
still in detention. On 29 March 2016, he had publicly stated
“Crimea is Ukraine”.
The case of the ‘Ukrainian sabotage group’
160. Yevhen Panov is one of the suspects arrested by the
FSB in Crimea for his alleged participation in a Ukrainian
sabotage group.144 His lawyer told OHCHR that his client had
not been kidnapped in mainland Ukraine, as had long been
speculated, but arrested on 7 August 2016 after entering Crimea.
His lawyer told OHCHR he was held incommunicado for days,
tortured, forced to confess to preparing a series of terrorist acts
targeting vital infrastructure on the peninsula, and officially
charged on 10 August.
161. On 10 October, a Crimean ‘court’ extended the pretrial
detention of Yevhen Panov and Andrii Zakhtei, another
arrested suspect, until 10 December. Earlier, in August, the
European Court of Human Rights had refused to order the
extradition of Yevhen Panov to Ukraine, as requested by his
family who invoked the Court’s Rule 39 and the risk of torture in
detention. Instead, the European Court accepted the position of
the Russian Federation that the Russian authorities will review
the complaints of the accused and investigate the conditions
under which he sustained injuries.
162. On 10 November, the FSB said it prevented a
new sabotage attack plotted by Ukrainian military intelligence
operatives in Crimea intended to target military facilities
and critical civilian infrastructure in Sevastopol. The infiltrators
allegedly had high-power explosive devices, firearms and
ammunition, secure communications equipment, as well as maps
of the targets. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence released a
statement rejecting the accusations. Three suspects were arrested
on 9 November and placed in pre-trial detention for two months,
and on 15 November, two other residents from Sevastopol were
arrested.
163. OHCHR has information about various forms of
violations of the right to defence and the presumption of
144 15th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, para. 153.
42
innocence in relation to members of the group. The accused do
not enjoy regular access to their lawyers, they are pressured by
the investigators to renounce their right to legal counsel, and in
some cases, defence lawyers have advised their clients to confess
and ‘cooperate’ with the prosecution. 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir cases
164. The continued prosecution of Crimean Hizb-ut-
Tahrir members in Russian courts raise serious concerns about
the human rights impact of the ongoing violation of General
Assembly resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of
Ukraine. On 7 September, a military court in Rostov-on-Don
(Russian Federation) found four Crimean Tatars arrested by the
FSB in 2015 guilty of planning and participating in the activities
of an illegal organization. All were recognized by the court
as members of Hizb-ut Tahrir, a religious group labelled and
banned as extremist in the Russian Federation, but not in
Ukraine. Their defence lawyers portrayed their clients as Muslim
believers and argued for their rights to freely practice their
religion. Three men were sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment
while the alleged organizer of a Hizb-ut-Tahrir cell received a 7-
year sentence. These are the first verdicts involving alleged
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members from Crimea.
165. On 12 October, the FSB forcefully broke into six
Crimean Tatar houses, conducting searches in the presence of
children and women, and confiscating religious literature
prohibited in the Russian Federation. Five Crimean Tatar men
known by their neighbours for being practising Muslims were
arrested on suspicion of being members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. All
five were placed in pre-trial detention until 11 December 2016.
So far, in 2016, 15 Crimean Tatars and Muslims have been
detained by the de facto authorities in Crimea on suspicion of
membership in Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
166. On 3 November, the Crimean de facto authorities
mandated a psychological evaluation of six of the Crimean
Tatars accused of membership in Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
B. Rights of minorities and indigenous peoples
167. In April 2016, the ‘supreme court of Crimea’
declared the Mejlis an extremist organization and banned all its
activities. On 29 September, the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation rejected an appeal against the Crimean court
‘decision’ and upheld the ban.
168. Eight members145 of the Mejlis were fined by
Crimean ‘courts’ for holding a meeting on 28 September. They
were gathering in the house of Ilmi Umerov, one of three deputy
chairmen of the Mejlis, to discuss internal issues and suspend the
membership of three Mejlis members who collaborated with the
de facto authorities.146 All eight Mejlis members were found
guilty of committing the administrative offense of taking part in
145 The eight Mejlis members who were fined are: Ilmi Umerov, Ali Khamzin,
Sadikh Tabakh, Shevket Kaibullaiev, Bekir Mamutov, Emine Avamileva,
Mustafa Maushev and Diliaver Akiiev.
146 The three Mejlis members whose membership was suspended are: Emirali
Ablaiev, Aider Adzhymambetov and Ruslan Yakubov.
43
an “illegal meeting” and ordered to pay fines ranging from RUB
750 (USD 12) to RUB 1,000 (USD 15).
169. The Mejlis is viewed by many Crimean Tatars as a
traditional organ of an indigenous people: its members, forming
an executive body, were elected by the Kurultai, the Crimean
Tatars’ assembly. In addition to the national Mejlis - which has
33 members - there are about 2,500 regional and local Mejlis
members in Crimea. While approximately 30 Crimean Tatar
NGOs are currently registered in Crimea, none can be
considered to have the same degree of representativeness and
legitimacy as the Mejlis and Kurultai.
C. Freedom of movement
170. On 24-25 October, OHCHR monitored the freedom
of movement at the Chonhar, Kalanchak and Chaplynka crossing
points on the administrative boundary line with Crimea. During
this monitoring visit, OHCHR heard repeated complaints – both
from people from mainland Ukraine and Crimea – about the
difficulties of transporting personal belongings to and from
Crimea. They claim that disproportionate legal and
administrative barriers imposed by Ukraine feed corruption and
unduly restrict freedom of movement. This issue became
particularly acute following the adoption of Government
Resolution No. 1035 in December 2015 prohibiting
transportation of goods147.
171. Article 370 of the Customs Code of Ukraine
contains a list of personal belongings that people can transport
across the administrative boundary line. Even though Odesa
district administrative court ruled on 26 September that the list
was not exhaustive, people travelling between mainland Ukraine
and the Crimean peninsula are often restricted in the items that
they can carry when these are not listed. One Crimean resident
stated that she moved from Crimea to Mykolaiv in mainland
Ukraine, but was not allowed by the Ukrainian Customs Service
to transport any furniture to her new place of residence due to
Resolution 1035. Another Crimean resident said that he sold his
apartment in Sevastopol but was not permitted to transport the
proceeds from the sale because the sum exceeded UAH 10,000
(approximately USD 385), the maximum amount allowed under
Ukrainian law due to limitations imposed by the Law “On the
establishment of the Free Economic Zone “Crimea”.148 OHCHR
has also recorded reports of corruption at the Kalanchak crossing
point.
147 On 9 November, a Kyiv court of appeal confirmed a first instance
administrative court decision rejecting the request of a Crimean IDP to recognize
Resolution No 1035 as illegal.
148 See Article 12.8 (3) of the Law of Ukraine “On Establishment of the Free
Economic Zone “Crimea” and Peculiarities of Providing Economic Activity on
the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” No. 1636-VII of 12 August
2014.
44
“If you are sick, you are treated as if you are not even a
person anymore. You can be destroyed. I want justice and to
improve my health.”
- Prisoner in pre-trial detention centre No. 1, Simferopol
D. Rights of detainees
172. OHCHR continued gathering information about the
rights of detainees and prison conditions in Crimea. Due to a
lack of specialized penitentiary facilities, many detainees could
not be held on the peninsula. This situation has led to the
transfer, since 2014, of a sizeable number of the prison
population from Crimea to the Russian Federation into
specialized penitentiary facilities. The transfers have included
juvenile delinquents, convicted women, people sentenced to life
imprisonment, and prisoners suffering from serious physical and
mental illnesses. The transfer of detainees from Crimea to
penitentiary facilities in the Russian Federation further illustrates
the human rights impact of the ongoing violation of General
Assembly resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of
Ukraine.
173. According to one Ukrainian NGO representative, at
least 600 women from Crimea and mainland Ukraine are
currently held in mixed or female colonies in the Russian
Federation. The penitentiary service of the Russian Federation
has reported that 240 female prisoners were transferred from
Crimea to the Russian Federation between 18 March 2014 and
15 June 2016. An unknown number of transfers have also
involved prisoners and individuals held in custody who did not
belong to any of the above groups.
174. Persons detained in Crimea or transferred to the
Russian Federation are often denied proper medical treatment
and hospitalization, in violation of their right to health. A woman
from Sevastopol was sentenced on 22 May 2013 to three years
of imprisonment in accordance with the Criminal Code of
Ukraine, and on 18 December 2015 to two years of
imprisonment in accordance with the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation. She is currently in custody in Sevastopol
and is not given medical treatment despite suffering from
hepatitis ‘C’ and HIV. A man from Mykolaiv, Ukraine, was
sentenced in June 2015 by a Crimean ‘court’ and transferred to
Penal Colony No. 1 of the Republic of Adygea (Russian
Federation). He suffers from hypertension and health
complications that developed as a result of head and spine
injuries. He is being denied medical care. A man from Feodosiia,
Crimea, was sentenced by a Crimean ‘court’ on 24 March 2015
and transferred to serve his sentence in Penal Colony No. 2 of
the city of Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation. He suffers from
a third stage HIV infection, hepatitis ‘B’, tuberculosis and
psoriasis. Despite complaining to the prison administration, he
has not received any treatment nor been hospitalized.149
149 HRMMU interviews, 4 October 2016, 1 and 2 November 2016.
45
175. OHCHR is aware of one case of a death in custody
involving a detainee from Sevastopol transferred to the Russian
Federation. On 8 September, Valerii Ispendiarovych Kerimov
died in a prison facility in Tlyustenkhabl, a settlement in the
Teuchezhsky district, Republic of Adygea, Russian Federation.
Kerimov was a Ukrainian citizen residing in Sevastopol. On 2
December 2014, he was arrested in Sevastopol for theft and, on
17 July 2015, sentenced by a ‘court’ in the same city to 6 years
and 1 month in prison. At the moment of his arrest, Kerimov was
said to suffer from hepatitis ‘B’, ‘C’ and tuberculosis. During his
time in custody and prison, he did not receive adequate
treatment, and in early 2016, was transferred to a prison colony
in Tlyustenkhabl, Russian Federation. However, his condition
only worsened. The prison administration did not provide
Kerimov’s lawyer with any documents concerning his client’s
state of health and medical treatment. The Kyiv-based Regional
Centre for Human Rights (RCHR) and the Ukrainian Helsinki
Human Rights Union (UHHRU) sent requests to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Consul of Ukraine in Rostovon-
Don to visit Kerimov, but the visit was not carried out. On 29
August, the UHHRU invoked Rule 39 of the European Court of
Human Rights on interim measures, which resulted in the Court
requesting the Russian Federation to inform it of Kerimov’s
health condition and his medical treatment. The legal procedure
was interrupted on 8 September, when Kerimov died.
176. On 7 October 2016, Russian authorities rejected
Ukraine’s extradition request for Oleh Sentsov, who was
arrested in Crimea and transferred to the Russian Federation in
2014 for trial and detention. The extradition request was rejected
on the grounds that Sentsov is a citizen of the Russian
Federation, despite confirmation of his Ukrainian citizenship in
April 2016 by the Russian Federation Commissioner for Human
Rights.
E. Political rights
177. On 18 September, the Russian Federation held
parliamentary and local elections. For the first time, voting for
national elections also took place on the Crimean peninsula, in
violation of UN GA Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity
of Ukraine. Seven candidates from the ‘republic of Crimea’ and
the city of Sevastopol were elected to the Russian Federation
Parliament.150
178. Even though the election campaign and voting
appear to have proceeded without incident, it is of note that no
international observers were present. Nonetheless, OHCHR
received credible information that employees of state and public
sector institutions in Crimea were instructed to vote and
threatened with reprisals, including dismissal, if they failed to
turn up. In addition, before the vote, there were reports of
150 Mikhail Sheremet (Vice Prime Minister), Ruslan Balbek (Vice Prime
Minister) and Natalia Poklonskaya (Prosecutor General) were elected under the
proportional system; Konstantin Bakharev (First Vice Speaker of the
Parliament), Andrey Kozenko (Vice Speaker of the Parliament), Svetlana
Savchenko (Head of the State Committee for Culture and Protection of Cultural
Heritage) and Dmitry Belik (deputy director of the ‘BIG-CRIMEA’ company)
were elected under the majoritarian system.
46
pressure and house searches conducted by the ‘police’ against
Crimean Tatar activists and Mejlis members who were
advocating for a boycott of the elections. Earlier, the head of the
Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, had called on Crimean residents not to
vote so as not to legitimize the ‘occupation’ of the peninsula.
F. Right to education
179. The start of the 2016-2017 school year in Crimea
and the city of Sevastopol confirmed the continuous decline of
Ukrainian as a language of instruction, a phenomenon observed
since Ukraine’s loss of de facto sovereignty over the peninsula in
March 2014, while an increasing number of Crimean Tatar
parents appear to be making use of the possibility of educating
their children in the Crimean Tatar language.
180. There are 533 schools in Crimea. Of the seven
Ukrainian language education institutions that existed until 2014,
the Simferopol Gymnasium School is the only one remaining.
This year, however, it ceased instruction in Ukrainian in the first
and second grade. The spokesperson of the Crimean ‘ministry of
education’ attributed this to a supposed lack of interest among
parents for continuing Ukrainian-language instruction.
181. Instruction in the Crimean Tatar language is
provided in 14 national schools, which is one more than in 2014.
Another 19 schools have classes in the Crimean Tatar language:
six of them have two languages of instruction: Russian and
Crimean Tatar; and 13 schools use Russian as a language of
instruction but have classes in Crimean Tatar. According to the
head of the Crimean Tatar NGO ‘Maarifchi’, Safure
Kadzhametova, out of approximately 20,000 first-grade children,
825 are educated in Crimean Tatar language.
VII. Legal developments and institutional
reforms
A. Judicial reform
182. On 30 September, Constitutional amendments151 on
the judiciary and the law ‘On the judicial system and the status
of judges’152 entered into force, launching the process of
reforming the judiciary. A central feature of the reform is the
intention to cleanse the judicial branch in order to restore public
trust in an institution that has, for decades, been perceived as
corrupt and lacking independence.
183. All judges appointed prior to the entry into force of
the constitutional amendments will undergo an assessment of
their compatibility,153 which could result in dismissals.154 This
will primarily affect 1,232 judges who were appointed for an
initial period of five years and whose tenure will be
151 Law of Ukraine “On amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (regarding
the judiciary)”, No. 1401-VII of 2 June 2016.
152 Law of Ukraine “On the judicial system and the status of judges”, No.1402-
VIII of 2 June 2016.
153 The assessment will concern competence, professional ethics and integrity.
154 The starting date and order for the compatibility assessment of judges, to be
determined by the High Qualification Commission of Judges, is not known.
47
automatically terminated at the end of their terms unless they
pass such assessment.
184. The restructuring of the Supreme Court of Ukraine
will lead to a reduction in the number of positions of judges in
high judicial instances from the current 365 to 200. It is not clear
whether current judges of the Supreme Court who fail to be reappointed
will be dismissed or transferred to lower instance
courts, thus creating uncertainty and opposition to the reform.
185. Ukraine has 765 courts whose proper functioning
requires the presence of 9,071 judges.155 As of 15 November,
6,614 judges were employed. Six courts156 have no judges and
cannot operate while almost 25 per cent of courts are
understaffed by up to 50 per cent.
186. On 8 and 22 September 2016, Parliament approved
the resignation of approximately 1,000 judges, a majority of
whom served for over 20 years. According to the head of the
High Qualification Commission of Judges, courts could lose
between 35 and 40 per cent of judges by the end of 2016 due to
such resignations.157
187. A small number of judges have been dismissed
under the lustration procedures established in the post-Maidan
period. A temporary special commission found 46 judges guilty
of having delivered politically motivated judgments in relation to
the Maidan protesters.158 The High Council of Justice upheld
these findings for 29 judges, recommending their dismissal.159
Allegations of violations committed by judges during Maidan
were also addressed to the High Qualification Commission of
Judges, which found seven judges guilty of disciplinary
violations and recommended their dismissal.160 To date,
Parliament and the President have dismissed 31 judges.
188. Since December 2014, the High Qualification
Commission of Judges recommended dismissal of 340 judges, in
the majority of cases due to their collaboration with the de facto
authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city
155 Interview of the Head of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, Yaroslav Romaniuk,
published in the official newspaper of the Parliament of Ukraine ‘Holos Ukrainy’
- 2016.10.27. – № 204 (available at: http://www.golos.com.ua/article/277914).
155 Information provided by the High Qualification Commission of Judges in a
letter to HRMMU of 11 November 2016.
156 Three courts do not operate due to the absence of hired judges:
Mahdalynivskyi district court (Dnipropetrovsk region), Karlivskyi district court
(Poltava region) and Shpolianskyi district court (Cherkasy region). Another three
courts do not operate because the judges are awaiting the approval of their
indefinite appointment upon termination of their five-year appointment:
Yaremchanskyi city court (Ivano-Frankivsk region); Lokhvytskyi district courts
(Poltava region); and Radyvylivskyi district court (Rivne region).
157 HRMMU meeting with the Head of the High Qualification Commission of
Judges on 3 October 2016.
158 7th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, paras. 184 - 185.
159 The remaining complaints involving 305 judges, which have not been
considered by the now defunct temporary special commission, are being
reviewed by the High Council of Justice. As of mid-September 2016, the HCJ
opened disciplinary proceedings against 46 judges, three of which have been
completed. As a result two judges have been recommended for dismissal.
160 In connection to the Maidan events the HQCJ received 149 complaints against
judges and opened 98 disciplinary proceedings resulting in eight judges being
brought to account with seven recommendations for dismissal on the grounds of
violation of the oath. Other proceedings were closed as unsubstantiated (57) or
due to an application of a statute of limitations (31).
48
of Sevastopol (295 judges) or with the armed groups in the
Donetsk (20) and Luhansk (1) regions.161 As of 15 November,
299 judges have been dismissed.
189. Judges were also vetted under a lustration procedure
launched pursuant to the Law “On the Cleansing of
Government”,162 resulting in the dismissal of eight judges.163
190. While the situation with understaffing precedes the
current reform164, the high rate of resignations poses serious
challenges to the rule of law and administration of justice.
Effective selection and appointment procedures will therefore be
required to make up for the resignations and dismissals and
sustain proper operation of the court system.
191. The High Qualification Commission of Judges,
which is in charge of the selection of judges, is considering the
introduction of a simplified recruitment process for former
candidates. This would reportedly allow around 400 positions to
be filled.
192. In the context of the judicial reform, a draft law ‘On
the High Council of Justice’ was developed and passed the first
reading in Parliament on 3 November. Its adoption will give
effect to the new powers of this body regarding the appointment,
transfer, dismissal and disciplinary liability of judges. The new
composition of this body, which aims to eliminate excessive
influence of the executive, shall however only be effective by 30
April 2019 and therefore significantly delayed.
B. Criminal justice reform
193. On 7 September, Parliament adopted a set of
amendments165 elaborated by the Ministry of Justice and the
State Penitentiary Service facilitating the realisation of the right
to pension by convicted persons, lifting some of the limitations
on the use of personal money by such persons and allowing them
to access the Internet. The amendments also grant convicts,
including those sentenced to life imprisonment, the right to
receive extended visits. They harmonise existing legal acts with
the law ‘On probation’ adopted in February 2015 and provide for
further humanisation of criminal legislation by prohibiting the
imposition of a life sentence for the preparation of crimes and
attempted crimes, with the exception of crimes against national
security (articles 109-114-1) and crimes against peace (articles
437-439, 442(2), and 443). The amendments also enable the
transfer of persons from one correctional centre to another, if
161 Another 24 recommendations for dismissal issued by the HQCJ were based
on other general grounds and concerned judges from other regions.
162 Law of Ukraine ‘On the cleansing of government’, No.1682-VII of 16
September 2014.
163 According to the law on Government cleansing, the judges are subjected to
the general lustration process in the country. For the two years of its application,
the Ministry of Justice have submitted to the HCJ the information on about 70
judges providing grounds for their lustration, eight judges were dismissed
according to the lustration criteria.
164 On 1 January 2013, with a similar number of courts, 8,215 judges were
employed.
165 Law of Ukraine ‘On amendments to certain legislative acts of Ukraine
concerning the enforcement of verdicts and realisation of the rights of convicts’,
No. 1491-VIII of 7 September 2016 (entered into force on 8 October 2016).
49
there are valid reasons for the placement of a convict closer to
the place of residence of his/her relatives.
194. Also on 7 September, Parliament adopted
legislative amendments166 enhancing access to justice for persons
held in pre-trial detention and imprisoned convicts. The
amendments clarify that the appeals against decisions of the
prison administration authorities and pre-trial detention
institutions are to be reviewed by administrative courts. They
also exempt convicts from the payment of court fees following
the execution of a sentence provided they do not have enough
money on their personal accounts. The amendments also provide
for an urgent review - within 24 hours - of complaints
concerning the disciplinary transfer of individuals to an isolation
facility and complaints concerning forced feeding.
C. Draft law “On the Temporarily Occupied
Territory of Ukraine”
195. On 19 July, 29 members of parliament registered a
draft law No. 3593-d ‘On the Temporarily Occupied Territory of
Ukraine’ defining a single legal regime for Crimea and parts of
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are not controlled by the
Government. OHCHR has actively engaged with the
Government and provided comments outlining the human rights
impact of the draft law, if adopted in its current form.167
196. OHCHR is of the view that this draft law, which is
mainly driven by security considerations, if adopted as it
currently stands harms human rights, contravenes Ukraine’s
international obligations and is likely unconstitutional. The fact
that the draft law abrogates the responsibility of the Government
to protect the life, health, property rights and ensure social
obligations runs counter to the principle of territorial jurisdiction
whereby the Government has positive obligations to use all legal
and diplomatic means available to guarantee the rights of
persons in uncontrolled territory. In addition, the blanket nonrecognition
of documents issued in the territories not controlled
by the Government is not in line with international standards,
supported by international jurisprudence, which imply the
recognition of certain acts, such as civil registration documents
(e.g. birth, death and marriage certificates), issued by de facto
authorities. Differential treatment of residents of “temporarily
occupied territory” with regard to sale, transfer, alienation and
inheritance of property as well as moratorium of fines and
penalties would violate the right to equal protection of the law
without discrimination contained in article 26 of the ICCPR and
article 14 of the ECHR. Terminating water and electricity
supplies to the “temporarily occupied territory” would
contravene both customary rules of international humanitarian
law concerning relief, and human rights law requiring the
Government to ensure minimum essential humanitarian supplies
for the civilian population.
166 Law of Ukraine ‘On amendments to certain legislative acts of Ukraine (on
enhancing the access to justice for persons held in pre-trial detention or prison
facilities)’, No. 1492-VIII of 7 September 2016 (entered into force on 8
October).
167 See paragraph 201 for further information.
50
197. It is also questionable whether the wide restrictions
to be applied – after the ‘liberation’ of the so-called ‘temporarily
occupied territories’ – to the exercise of civil and political
rights168 as well as the freedom of movement, assembly and the
media, conform to the principle of proportionality. In human
rights law, restrictive measures must not only serve permissible
purposes, they must also be necessary to protect them and
constitute the “least intrusive instruments amongst those, which
might achieve the desired result.” 169
198. Also noteworthy is that the draft law, if adopted in
its present form, would supersede existing legislation,170
including the law ‘On interim self-government order in certain
areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions’. The draft law would
run counter to UN Security Council Resolution 2202(2015),
which endorses the “Package of measures for the
Implementation of the Minsk Agreements” adopted on 12
February 2015.
VIII. Technical cooperation and capacitybuilding
toward the promotion and
protection of human rights in Ukraine
199. Throughout the period under review, OHCHR
continued to develop its technical cooperation and capacitybuilding
activities in Ukraine, guided by its mandate and further
to its work within Human Rights Up Front to boost early
warning throughout the UN system and its response to the
ongoing crisis in Ukraine.
200. As a result of its findings, OHCHR has prioritized
providing targeted technical cooperation on torture prevention.
On 8-9 September, OHCHR organized a consultative workshop
on the documentation and investigation of torture in Ukraine
under the Istanbul Protocol, in partnership with the
Ombudsperson’s institution, and carried out a range of follow-up
activities with medical experts, government officials, and civil
society to support Government efforts in fighting impunity and
strengthen accountability for human rights violations. The results
of the workshop will guide, in particular, OHCHR technical
168 According to the draft law, following the lifting of martial law, local elections
are prohibited for a period of 2 to 6 years, depending on the administrative unit
level, and voting for national elections is prohibited for 6 years.
169 See General Comment No. 27, 1999, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, paras 11-16.
170 The draft law would supersede the Law of Ukraine ‘On ensuring civil rights
and freedoms and the legal regime on temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine’,
No. 1207-VII, of 15 April 2014; Law of Ukraine ‘On creation of the "Crimea"
free economic zone and on specifics of economic activity on the temporarily
occupied territory of Ukraine’, No. 1636-VII, of 12 August 2014; Law of
Ukraine ‘On temporary measures introduced for the period of anti-terrorist
operation’, No. 1669-VII, of 2 September 2014. In addition, while not mentioned
in the draft law, it would also replace legal acts governing the procedure of
movement to and from non-Government-controlled territory: the ‘Temporary
Order for monitoring of movement of persons, vehicles and goods along the
contact line within Donetsk and Luhansk regions’ approved by a Decree of the
First Deputy Head of the Anti-terrorist Centre within the State Security Service
of Ukraine No.27 of 22 January 2015; and the ‘Order of entry to the temporarily
occupied territory of Ukraine and exit from it’ approved by a Decree of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 367 of 4 June 2015 (applicable to Crimea
only).
51
cooperation and capacity building efforts with partners in
Ukraine in the area of torture prevention for the remainder of
2016 and into 2017.
201. Following the workshop, OHCHR took part, on 23
September in a round table discussion on forensic services
organized by the Parliamentary Committee for Healthcare and
attended by parliamentarians, forensic experts, medical
practitioners, lawyers, NGOs and ICRC. OHCHR presented its
views on key parameters for an effective forensic service based
on the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on Torture
contained in his 2014 report. Since, the General Prosecutor’s
Office has requested assistance in identifying international
forensic expertise, which OHCHR will facilitate. Upon
invitation, OHCHR joined a working group that will draft a law
“On the National Forensic Bureau of Ukraine”. Through such
activities, OHCHR contributes to the reform and strengthening
of the forensic service of Ukraine, an essential step toward
improving documentation and investigation of torture and illtreatment,
and advancing the administration of justice in general.
202. OHCHR supported the start of the preparation of a
new five-year compact between the UN system in Ukraine and
the Government, known as the United Nations Development
Action Framework (UNDAF), which will cover the period of
2018-2022. OHCHR strengthened the capacities of UN agencies
to use a human rights-based approach to develop the UNDAF by
organizing a dedicated learning and training session for UN
system agencies and by integrating international human rights
norms and standards assisting at identifying discriminatory
practices that impede development into the Country Analysis.
203. OHCHR has also supported Ukraine in its
engagement with UN human rights mechanisms. From 1 to 9
September, OHCHR in conjunction with UNHCR, supported the
visit of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs,
Chaloka Beyani, to follow up on the recommendations made in
his 2014 report to the Human Rights Council.171 During the same
period, the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of
Torture (SPT) concluded its visit to Ukraine that had been
suspended in May 2016 after being unable to access some places
under the authority of the SBU. In advance of the mission,
OHCHR facilitated the visit of one member of the SPT
Secretariat to Kyiv in August, who led a joint OHCHR-Council
of Europe-UNDP workshop on torture prevention which helped
to raise awareness of the activities and mandate of the SPT
among duty-bearers. This visit, combined with further advocacy
and relationship building with relevant authorities, allowed the
experts to return to Ukraine from 5 to 9 September to resume
their mission, noting that Ukraine has made progress in
improving conditions of detention in the country, in particular
171 “Ukraine: UN expert calls for comprehensive strategy to address IDPs’ plight
as winter closes in” 9 September 2016, Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (Accessible at:
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20472
&LangID=E).
52
through reducing overcrowding in pre-trial detention centres.172
In 2017, OHCHR will lead the joint UN submission to the
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) assessing Ukraine’s
compliance with its international human rights obligations.
204. OHCHR has also supported the Government of
Ukraine in ensuring that its policies comply with international
human rights standards. OHCHR participated in expert
discussions organized by the Ministry of Justice on amendments
to the National Human Rights Action Plan (NHRAP). OHCHR
successfully advocated for improvements aimed at defining
concrete implementing authorities (ministries), and for the newly
created Ministry on Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs
to be included in activities relating to the protection of IDP
rights and activities toward the protection of the rights of persons
residing in Crimea and the territories controlled by the armed
groups in eastern Ukraine. On 20-21 September, OHCHR
contributed to a workshop aimed at better developing relevant
indicators to measure the implementation of the NHRAP by
sharing OHCHR-developed human rights indicators. In areas
where Government policy raises human rights concerns,
OHCHR has undertaken constructive engagement.
205. On 19 September, OHCHR participated in a round
table discussion on Ukraine’s derogation from human rights
treaties, organized by the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the Committee on Human Rights. During the
discussion, representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prosecutor General’s Office
supported some of the recommendations made by OHCHR and
the Council of Europe and acknowledged that some clarification
of the duration and territorial application of the derogation was
needed. The heads of the parliamentary committees on human
rights and foreign affairs concluded by committing to establish a
working group tasked to amend the May 2015 parliamentary
Resolution on derogation.
206. OHCHR has also actively engaged with the
Government on the draft law on temporarily occupied territory,
conveying concerns in a written advisory communication to two
parliamentary committees and the Ministries of Temporarily
Occupied Territories and IDPs, Justice and Foreign Affairs.
IX. Conclusions and recommendations
207. The apparent unwillingness of the parties to the
conflict to implement their obligations stemming from Minsk
Agreements has endangered civilians by continuing a pattern of
hostilities in densely populated towns and neighbourhoods.
Civilians living close to the contact line frequently appeal to
OHCHR to bear witness and heed the destruction and damage
that the ongoing conflict causes to their lives, while weapons
prohibited by the Minsk Agreements remain in areas from which
they should be withdrawn, and continue to be used.
172 Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment debriefing with the Government of Ukraine,
13 September 2016.
53
208. The 13 per cent decrease in civilian casualties
between 16 August and 15 November 2015 is testament to the
importance of the full and effective implementation of the Minsk
Package of Measures. The restoration of full control by the
Government of Ukraine over parts of the border with the Russian
Federation in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the
withdrawal of foreign fighters, pull-out of all heavy weaponry,
pardon and amnesty through law, in line with international law
and with due regard for human rights is critical to ensure human
rights protection for all those living in the conflict-affected area
and the establishment of the rule of law in Ukraine.
209. The consistent presence and operations of OHCHR
on either side of the contact line allow for early and responsive
monitoring of the human rights situation in the conflict-affected
area. Information gathered during the reporting period confirms
that the local population suffers from insecurity, military
engagement near their homes, the threat of mines and
unexploded ordnance, and severe and disproportionate
restrictions on their freedom of movement. The reported
continued flow of weapons and ammunition to the conflict area,
which results in serious human rights violations and abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law, compounds their
suffering.
210. Civilians living in close proximity to the contact
line have limited or no access to water and electricity as a direct
result of ongoing hostilities. It is of deep concern that
Government forces and armed groups operating in civilian areas
do not take all feasible precautions against the effects of
fighting, resulting in damage to schools, kindergartens, and
medical facilities. Ukrainian military forces and armed groups
continued to be positioned in civilian homes and buildings in
villages and towns adjacent to the contact line.
211. The lack of protection for the civilian population is
exacerbated by the armed groups’ undue restrictions preventing
civil society and humanitarian actors from carrying out
humanitarian activities including protection on territories
controlled by the armed groups.
212. The derogation of the Government from the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in June
2016 toward people living in the territories controlled by the
armed groups broadens the protection gap. The registered draft
law ‘On the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine’ risks
undermining human rights and contravening Ukraine’s
international obligations, violating the right to equal protection
and customary rules of international humanitarian law
concerning relief, and human rights law requiring the
Government to ensure minimum essential humanitarian supplies
for the civilian population.
213. IDPs have faced eviction as the Government has
shown disregard for their rights and particular needs. During his
visit to Ukraine, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
internally displaced persons found that IDPs in Ukraine face a
number of problems when accessing their rights, ranging from
54
freedom of movement to social protection and housing, land and
property issues.173
214. Ukraine still lacks a comprehensive policy
regarding national minorities. The most recent case of Roma
forced eviction from Loshchynivka village, Odesa region, was a
stark reminder of the need for a human rights-based approach at
all levels of government.
215. Judges and lawyers have an essential role to play in
protecting persons against discrimination, particularly women,
children and minorities, and ensure that existing laws and
regulations prohibiting discrimination are respected in legal
practice. Such protections apply equally to IDPs, Roma and
survivors of conflict-related human rights violations and abuses.
To play this role in providing equal protection to all Ukrainians,
judges and lawyers must be protected from politicized assaults
on their independence. Repeated interference with the
independence of the judiciary in the cases relating to the 2 May
2014 violence in Odesa have aggravated the slanted nature of
investigations and resulted in unjustified delays. Deficit in good
governance and widespread corruption continue to contribute to
a lack of trust in Government institutions and instability.
216. The majority of individual cases documented by
OHCHR in Ukraine concern violations and abuses of human
rights in detention and places of deprivation of liberty. While
armed groups continued to deny external independent monitors
access to persons deprived of their liberty, OHCHR was able to
record and verified allegations of torture and ill-treatment in
armed group custody. However, without unfettered access to all
those deprived of their liberty by the armed groups, OHCHR has
serious concerns that they may be subject to torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (illtreatment),
including sexual and gender-based violence.
OHCHR also continued to record cases of incommunicado
detention by the SBU, and noted that Ukrainian courts regularly
enforce mandatory detention of suspects in conflict-related
cases, raising concerns of arbitrary detention and highlighting
the need to bring the Code of Criminal Procedure in line with
international standards.
217. While there has been some progress in
investigations into the killings at Maidan in January and
February 2014, OHCHR notes that perpetrators of human rights
abuses and violations enjoy a persistent and broad climate of
impunity. This jeopardizes accountability and the right of
victims to remedy. Throughout its work and engagement with
the Government of Ukraine, OHCHR has emphasized the need
for accountability to promote reconciliation, the rule of law in
accordance with international human rights law, and restore
confidence in the institutions of the State.
173 “Ukraine: UN expert calls for comprehensive strategy to address IDPs’ plight
as winter closes in” 9 September 2016, Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (Accessible at:
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20472
&LangID=E).
55
218. The significant rise in cases of killings and attacks
on journalists appear related to their professional activities and
intended to threaten and stifle their reporting. Such attacks take
place against a backdrop of political figures using damaging
rhetoric that encourages a lack of respect for the life and work of
journalists. Greater protection for journalists is critical for
ensuring society’s access to information and for government
accountability, across the country.
219. To ensure accountability and curtail impunity, it is
critical for Ukraine to have a robust and independent judiciary.
The Constitutional amendments regarding the judiciary
introduced on 30 September set out a clear path of reform. An
independent – and fully staffed and resourced – judiciary is
critical for ensuring accountability for human rights and
international humanitarian law violations, and providing an
impartial and objective foundation upon which to ensure that all
Ukrainians enjoy equal protection under the rule of law.
220. The human rights situation in Crimea continued to
raise serious concerns. The arbitrary detention of individuals on
grounds of their political opinion and expression continues to be
worrying. The 18 September Russian Federation parliamentary
and local elections held on the Crimean peninsula were held in
violation of UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the
territorial integrity of Ukraine, and were marked by intimidation
and violations targeting Crimean Tatars and members of the
Mejlis, contributing to the climate of repression against
dissenting voices.
221. OHCHR has been progressively integrating support
to humanitarian, development, technical assistance and capacitybuilding
dimensions in its work, including through targeted
cooperation with key Government institutions and ministries.
OHCHR has also engaged on the protection of human rights
with the armed groups of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and
‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
222. Most recommendations made in the previous
OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine have
not been implemented, and remain valid. In addition, OHCHR
calls upon all parties to implement the following
recommendations:
223. To the Government of Ukraine:
a) Judiciary to enforce the principle that laws and policies
of the Government of Ukraine are bound to respect
human rights standards, including the right to equal
treatment and the principle of non-discrimination; and
ensuring broad application of such equal protection to
minorities, persons affected by the armed conflict, IDPs,
older persons and persons with disabilities;
b) Cabinet of Ministers to take measures to facilitate
freedom of movement to and from Crimea, including by
reconsidering restrictions on the transportation of
personal belongings stemming from Resolution 1035 of
16 December 2015;
c) Headquarters of the ‘Anti-Terrorism Operation’ to
reconsider the restrictions on freedom of movement
56
imposed by the Temporary Order vis-à-vis international
law, particularly the legality, necessity and
proportionality of the restrictions on movement of
civilians and goods, while the State Border Service take
measures to shorten processing time, provide necessary
facilities and establish effective complaint mechanisms;
d) Penitentiary Service to ensure that medical personnel in
pre-trial detention facilities (SIZO) provide medical
certificates to detainees and register any recorded
injuries with specific attention to the situation of female
detainees;
e) Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) to immediately
release all persons held incommunicado in unrecognized
places of detention, including the five remaining
individuals held in the Kharkiv SBU and three
individuals held in Mariupol SBU;
f) National police to ensure the protection of courtrooms,
including judges, lawyers, accused, victims and witnesses
through adequate and effective presence during trials,
with adequate support and resources allocation by the
Government;
g) Ombudsperson’s office to pursue its challenge of the
constitutionality of article 176(5) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure as it leads to arbitrary detention;
h) Main Investigation Department of the National Police
together with the inter-agency operational group, to
promptly proceed with the investigation into Pavel
Sheremet’s death on 20 July 2016 to ensure
accountability; Ministry of Internal Affairs to ensure
effective investigation into the killing of Oles Buzyna on
15 April 2015;
i) Cabinet of Ministers to set up a register of civilians who
suffered physical injuries as a result of hostilities in
eastern Ukraine, determine their legal status and
consider extending social entitlements to this category of
persons;
j) Ministry of Social Policy to ensure the availability of
specialised psycho-social support and counselling to
relatives of missing persons;
k) Cabinet of Ministers, particularly the Ministry of Social
Policy, to act on the observations made by the Special
Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons during his visit to Ukraine in September 2016, to
urgently delink pensions and social benefits from
registration, as this has affected around 500,000 IDPs,
whose situation is further aggravated by the onset of
winter;
l) Cabinet of Ministers, particularly the Ministry of Social
Policy and the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied
Territories and IDPs, in a coordinated manner, to
prioritise durable housing for IDPs, many of whom are
elderly and have disabilities, together with access to
livelihood opportunities;
57
m) Government to develop a comprehensive legal
framework including a fact-finding and assessment
mechanism for damaged and destroyed property, and
enable the affected population to access effective
remedy, noting that many IDPs left property behind in
armed group-controlled and conflict-affected areas;
n) Government to strengthen accountability and protection
services to ensure survivors’ rights to seek redress and
reparation for sexual and gender-based violence.
224. To all parties involved in the hostilities in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the armed groups
of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’:
a) Adhere to the ceasefire and implement other obligations
contained in Minsk Agreements, in particular regarding
withdrawal of prohibited weapons;
b) Comply with the 21 September Framework Decision of
the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement
of forces and hardware;
c) Guarantee the facilitation of unimpeded humanitarian
assistance to civilians in need without distinction;
d) Target only military objectives in line with binding legal
obligations, prohibit indiscriminate attacks – which do
not distinguish between civilians and fighters, and
ensure that subordinates do not direct attacks against
civilians;
e) Avoid under all circumstances carrying out any attacks
that are expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects
excessive to the anticipated concrete and direct military
advantage;
f) In order to ensure greater protection of the civilian
population and essential infrastructure, cease the use of
mortars and other indirect and imprecise weapons in
civilian-populated areas, and not place soldiers, fighters
or other military objectives in populated areas;
g) Treat all those detained in connection with the conflict
including soldiers and fighters humanely in all
circumstances;
h) Allow unfettered access to international independent
and impartial observers to persons deprived of their
liberty, keep a detailed register of every person deprived
of liberty and inform families of detainees where they
are held; and ensure that the detention of juveniles
comply with the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (Beijing Rules), and the United Nations Rules for
the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty;
i) Facilitate civilians’ freedom of movement and
transportation of goods across the contact line according
58
to norms and principles of international humanitarian
law.
225. To the de facto authorities of Crimea and to the
Russian Federation:
a) Guarantee the human rights of all inhabitants of
Crimea, without discrimination;
b) Bring an end to the displacement from the territory of
Crimea to the Russian Federation of persons who have
no Russian citizenship, including those sentenced to
imprisonment;
c) Respect and ensure the right to health, including sexual
and reproductive health rights of all persons detained in
Crimea or transferred to the Russian Federation
following such detention, including proper medical
treatment and hospitalization, when necessary;
d) Ensure adequate medical care and treatment to
detainees in pre-trial detention facilities and prisons;
e) Refrain from practices such as forcible psychiatric
hospitalization, which may amount to ill-treatment;
f) Uphold freedom of opinion and release all persons who
have been arrested and charged for expressing their
views on the status of Crimea;
g) Allow Crimean Tatars to choose their own selfgoverning
institutions;
h) Allow unimpeded access to Crimea for all regional and
international human rights bodies in order to enable
them to monitor the human rights situation in
accordance with their mandates.
Annex 774
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2017)

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
16 February to 15 May 2017
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Executive summary ................................................................................................. 1–15 1
II. Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity ............................................. 16–68 4
A. International humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities ........................... 16–26 4
B. Civilian casualties ........................................................................................... 27–29 6
C. Missing persons .............................................................................................. 30–31 8
D. Summary executions, deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances,
torture and ill-treatment, and conflict-related sexual violence ................................ 32–68 8
1. Summary executions .................................................................................. 33–36 9
2. Unlawful/arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances,
and abductions .............................................................................................. 37–45 10
3. Torture and ill-treatment ........................................................................... 46–58 12
4. Exchanges of individuals deprived of liberty ............................................. 59–61 14
5. Transfers of pre-conflict detainees to Government-controlled territory ... 62 15
6. Conflict-related sexual violence ................................................................ 63–68 15
III. Accountability and administration of justice ........................................................... 69–98 17
A. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public disturbances .......... 71–82 17
1. Accountability for the killing of protestors at Maidan............................... 72–76 17
2. Accountability for the 2 May 2014 violence in Odesa ............................... 77–80 18
3. Accountability for the 31 August 2015 violence in Kyiv ............................ 81–82 19
B. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east ................. 83–88 20
C. Due process, fair trial rights, and interference with the judiciary ................... 89–92 22
D. Human rights impact of armed group structures ............................................. 93–98 23
IV. Fundamental freedoms ............................................................................................ 99–114 24
A. Freedom of movement .................................................................................... 99–103 24
B. Freedom of opinion and expression ................................................................ 104–109 26
C. Freedom of association, peaceful assembly, and religion or belief ................ 110–113 27
D. Discrimination against persons belonging to minorities ................................. 114 28
V. Economic and social rights ..................................................................................... 115–139 28
A. Right to social protection ................................................................................ 117–121 29
B. Situation of internally displaced persons ........................................................ 122–126 30
C. Housing, land and property rights................................................................... 127–131 32
D. Humanitarian situation ................................................................................... 132–135 32
E. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health .......... 136–139 33
VI. Human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and city of Sevastopol ....... 140–174 34
A. Administration of justice and fair trial rights .................................................. 141–145 34
B. Conditions of detention................................................................................... 146–152 36
C. Military conscription ...................................................................................... 153 37
D. Housing, land and property rights................................................................... 154–159 37
E. Right to education ........................................................................................... 160–162 39
VII. Legal developments and institutional reforms ........................................................ 163–174 39
A. Legislative developments ............................................................................... 166–167 40
B. Criminal justice reform ................................................................................... 168–170 40
C. Judicial reform ................................................................................................ 171–173 41
D. National Human Rights Institution ................................................................. 174 42
VIII. Technical cooperation and capacity-building .......................................................... 175–179 42
IX. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................... 180–189 43

1
I. Executive summary
1. Based on the work of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in
Ukraine (HRMMU), this eighteenth report of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the human rights situation in Ukraine covers
the period from 16 February to 15 May 2017.
2. HRMMU is mandated to monitor, document and publicly report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine. The findings presented in this report are grounded in data collected by
HRMMU through in-depth interviews conducted with 252 witnesses and victims of human
rights violations and abuses, as well as site visits in both Government-controlled and armed
groups-controlled territory. HRMMU also carries out follow-up activities to facilitate the
protection of individuals concerned in the cases it documents, including through trial
monitoring, detention visits, referrals to State institutions, humanitarian organizations and
non-governmental organizations, and cooperation with United Nations Human Rights
Council Special Procedures mandate holders and Human Rights Treaty Bodies.
3. During the reporting period, the conflict entered its fourth year and the risk of a
significant escalation remains high. Since it broke out in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of
eastern Ukraine in April 2014, the conflict has been exacerbated by the inflow of foreign
fighters, and supply of ammunition and heavy weaponry, reportedly from the Russian
Federation.1 Daily ceasefire violations recorded by the Special Monitoring Mission of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)2 demonstrated the routine use
of heavy weaponry, and that indiscriminate shelling continued to take a heavy toll on civilian
lives, property and critical infrastructure, including those supplying water, electricity and gas,
and health and educational facilities. Despite efforts to peacefully resolve the conflict, the
parties continued to fail to implement their commitments made under the Minsk agreements,3
notably a full and immediate ceasefire, and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the
contact line.
4. Between 16 February and 15 May 2017, OHCHR recorded 193 conflict-related
civilian casualties: 36 deaths and 157 injuries, 42 per cent of which were caused by shelling.
This is a 48 per cent increase compared with the previous reporting period of 16 November
2016 to 15 February 2017, when OHCHR recorded 130 civilian casualties (23 deaths and 107
injuries; 65 per cent caused by shelling). In total, from 14 April 2014 to 15 May 2017,
1 OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 February to 15 May 2015,
paragraphs 2, 6; OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 May to 15
August 2015, paragraphs 2, 58-59; OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from
16 August to 15 November 2015, paragraphs 2, 22 (see also fn. 128); OHCHR report on the human rights situation
in Ukraine covering the period from 16 February to 15 May 2016, paragraph 2 (see also fn. 3).
2 OSCE daily reports on ceasefire violations, available at http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports/.
3 The Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements calls for: an immediate and
comprehensive ceasefire; withdrawal of all heavy weapons from the contact line by both sides; commencement of a
dialogue on modalities of local elections; legislation establishing pardon and amnesty in connection with events in
certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons;
safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian assistance on the basis of an international mechanism;
defining of modalities for full resumption of socioeconomic ties; reinstatement of full control of the state border by
the Government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area; withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, military
equipment, and mercenaries from Ukraine; constitutional reforms providing for decentralization as a key element;
and local elections in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. United Nations Security Council Resolution
2202 (2015), available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11785.doc.htm. See also Protocol on the Results of the
Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group regarding Joint Measures Aimed at the Implementation of the Peace
Plan of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and Initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin,
available at http://www.osce.org/home/123257; Memorandum on the Implementation of the Protocol on the Results
of the Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group regarding Joint Measures Aimed at the Implementation of the
Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and Initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation V.
Putin, available at http://www.osce.org/home/123806.
2
OHCHR recorded 34,056 casualties among civilians, the Ukrainian military and members of
armed groups. This includes 10,090 people killed, including 2,777 civilians, and 23,966
injured.4
5. With no end to the conflict in sight, there is heightened concern for the protection of
civilians as the summer months approach, when hostilities may spike (as witnessed in
previous years). It is crucial to ensure that residential areas and critical civilian infrastructure
is not targeted, and that uninterrupted operation of water and power supply, among other lifesaving
infrastructures, can be maintained.
6. Lack of progress or tangible results in investigations and legal proceedings
connected to conflict-related cases, including those which are high profile, contribute to the
sense of stagnation of the conflict. Three years after the violence at Maidan in Kyiv and
Odesa, which together claimed the lives of at least 169 people, no one has been held
accountable for these deaths.
7. OHCHR recorded new accounts of summary executions, arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, and torture/ill-treatment committed on both sides of the contact line, most of which
occurred prior to the reporting period, but were only recently documented.5 In conflict-related
cases, detention on remand was often utilized as the only measure of restraint by the
judiciary, despite international standards pertaining to the right to liberty and security of
person and the presumption of innocence, which call for consideration of alternative
measures. Previously identified patterns of torture and ill-treatment by Ukrainian forces of
individuals accused of conflict-related charges persisted throughout this reporting period,
although at a lesser gravity and frequency compared with previous years of the conflict.
OHCHR is deeply troubled by allegations indicating the systematic use of torture and illtreatment
by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) against conflict-related detainees in
order to extract confessions. The lack of effective investigation into complaints of torture and
ill-treatment fuels a sense of impunity surrounding such actions. Conflict-related sexual
violence also persisted, most often in the context of deprivation of liberty, at a similar level
as recorded in the previous reporting period.
8. Restrictions on the freedom of movement at the contact line had a wider impact on
the population due to a sharp rise in the number of people crossing it in March. The increase
was caused by a new Government requirement that internally displaced persons (IDPs)
entitled to pensions and social payments renew their bank registration at locations in
Government-controlled territory. Long queues at entry-exit checkpoints exposed civilians,
particularly the most vulnerable, such as pensioners, persons with disabilities and women, to
degrading conditions for protracted periods and to the risk of injury or death from shelling.
Restrictions on freedom of movement in some villages located near the contact line impeded
the enjoyment of social and economic rights, including the rights to social protection, to the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and to housing, land and property.
Access to some of these villages was so restrictive that IDPs who had fled them earlier due
to the conflict were unable to return, reunite with families, check on their property, or farm
their land. Those who have remained in such villages are isolated and fully dependent on
either the Ukrainian military or armed groups to deliver essentials such as water, bread and
fuel.
9. OHCHR observed the ongoing deterioration of freedom of expression in conflictaffected
areas, particularly in territory controlled by armed groups. Access to information,
4 This is a conservative estimate based on available data. This data is incomplete due to gaps in coverage of certain
geographic areas and time periods, and to overall under-reporting, especially of military casualties. Injuries have been
particularly under reported.
5 Not all new cases are reflected in this report, as OHCHR strives to maintain the highest protection of individuals
through strict adherence to the principles of confidentiality and informed consent. Several victims and witnesses
interviewed by OHCHR either did not want to share essential information, or did not consent to their accounts being
publicly reported, for fear of reprisals.
3
freedom of the media and plurality of opinion remained severely limited and journalists
exposed to intimidation and threats. Impunity continued to prevail for those obstructing
journalists’ activities, with only 7.1 per cent of related criminal complaints reaching courts.
10. The space for civil society and humanitarian activities shrank significantly during
the reporting period, impacting vulnerable groups and persons with scarce economic
resources. Notably, in territory controlled by armed groups of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’, a major private organization providing humanitarian assistance to 500,000
individuals was forced by armed groups to halt operations. Access to persons in need by
humanitarian organizations in territory controlled by armed groups has been seriously
hindered by an ‘accreditation’ system imposed by these groups. Humanitarian and human
rights activists operating in Government-controlled territory also faced impediments at
checkpoints.
11. The fragile socio-economic situation of people living on both sides of the contact
line fell to a new low, hampered by economic stagnation with limited employment prospects
and means to carve out a livelihood. Demobilised soldiers and former members of volunteer
battalions in Government-controlled territory continued to block the transportation of cargo
over the contact line. Armed groups of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and
‘Luhansk people’s republic’6 seized control of approximately 54 enterprises located in areas
under their control and introduced a form of “temporary external management”. The
Government endorsed the blockade as an official policy. The accumulated impact of these
actions on the people living on both sides of the contact line has yet to be seen.
12. In the absence of access to Crimea, OHCHR continued to monitor the human rights
situation from its offices in mainland Ukraine, guided by United Nations General Assembly
resolutions 68/262 and 71/205. In that context, it observed that several court decisions were
issued against members of the Crimean Tatar community, in apparent disregard for fair trial
guarantees. Gross violations of the right to physical and mental integrity were also
documented on the basis of interviews conducted with 12 convicts formerly detained in
Crimea and the Russian Federation. On 1 April, the 2017 campaign for military conscription
in the Russian Federation army started which, in the case of Crimean residents, violates the
international prohibition to compel them to military service in the armed forces of the
Occupying Power.7 OHCHR also analyzed recent decisions affecting property rights in
Crimea and noted with concern the diminishing space for Ukrainian as a language of
instruction in education.
13. On 19 April, the International Court of Justice delivered its Order on provisional
measures in proceedings brought by Ukraine, concluding that the Russian Federation must
refrain from maintaining or imposing limitations on the ability of the Crimean Tatar
community to conserve its representative institutions, including the Mejlis, and ensure the
availability of education in the Ukrainian language.8 The Order also asserts that the Russian
Federation and Ukraine should work towards full implementation of the “Package of
Measures” in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
14. Ukraine continued to implement judicial reform measures on the basis of
constitutional amendments adopted in June 2016. Several codes and legal acts were
amended, introducing notably e-governance, subject-matter jurisdiction rules, and the use of
mediation as a means of dispute resolution. In the area of criminal justice, Parliament
6 Hereinafter ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
7 Article 51, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
8 The court also found that the conditions required for the indication of provisional measures with regard to
Ukraine’s claims against the Russian Federation based on the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism were not met. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 19
April 2017, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/166/19394.pdf.
4
expanded the list of crimes in relation to which proceedings may be pursued in absentia. It
also extended the application of a lower threshold for such proceedings, which was
introduced in May 2016 as a temporary measure. OHCHR reiterates its position that this risks
violating due process and fair trial rights.9
15. OHCHR continued to engage in technical cooperation and capacity-building
activities with the Government of Ukraine and civil society in order to strengthen the
protection and promotion of human rights.
II. Rights to life, liberty, security, and physical integrity
A. International humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities
16. On 14 April, hostilities in eastern Ukraine entered their fourth year. Amidst
continuing diplomatic efforts to ensure compliance with the Minsk agreements, the situation
remained tense and dangerous for civilians, with spikes in late February and early and late
March, and recurrent fighting in several hotspots10 along the contact line, as in previous
reporting periods.
17. Decisions by the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk re-committing the sides to
adhere to the ceasefire from 1 April, and again from 13 April, did not take hold, with the
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) recording brief respites followed by upsurges of
ceasefire violations. The main ingredients for the escalation of hostilities – presence and use
of heavy weapons near the contact line and in proximity of opposing positions – were not
removed, despite the parties’ commitment to the withdrawal of heavy weapons, with
devastating impact on civilian lives, property and infrastructure. The use of artillery,
including multiple-launch rocket systems, continued in Donetsk and Luhansk regions
throughout the reporting period.11
18. Indiscriminate shelling and the presence of Ukrainian Armed Forces and armed
groups near water facilities in Donetsk region continued to have a detrimental impact on the
supply of water on both sides of the contact line. The Donetsk Filtration Station, which serves
345,000 people12 in Avdiivka, Yasynuvata and parts of Donetsk, stopped operations six times
during the reporting period due to renewed shelling and resulting damage.13 Each such
incident resulted in water supply interruptions on both sides of the contact line and threatened
the life and physical integrity of employees. Mariupol, where nearly 450,000 people currently
9 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 February to 15 May
2016, para. 173.
10 Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport, areas east of Mariupol, the western outskirts of Horlivka, and the areas
south of Svitlodarsk, all in Donetsk region; and the Popasna-Troitske-Pervomaisk area in Luhansk region.
11 See SMM daily reports, e.g. of 1 May 2017, available at http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-toukraine/
314691, and 4 May 2017, available at http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/315686.
12 Figures provided to the WASH Cluster by water supply company ‘Voda Donbasa’ as of December 2016.
13 According to WASH Cluster reports, DFS was non-operational on 18 February and from 24 February to 4 March,
5 to 8 March, 11 to 17 March, 29 March to 5 April, and 2 to 7 May 2017.
“We have been expecting response fire for a while. It is wrong when they shoot from the
village and hide behind our houses. They should shoot from [the fields] instead.”
- Resident of a village near the contact line
5
reside, has been receiving insufficient water and relying on a natural back-up reservoir since
January 2017 due to damage to the South Donbas water pipeline. Another concern is shelling
in the vicinity of the First Lift Pumping Station of the South Donbas water pipeline.14 This
facility is an essential part of water infrastructure as it supplies raw water to five filtration
stations which, in turn, process water for over one million people living on both sides of the
contact line, from Mariupol in the south to the northwestern border of Donetsk region.
19. OHCHR is particularly concerned that chlorine warehouses at the Donetsk Filtration
Station were hit by shelling several times during the reporting period, as was a wastewater
treatment plant in Yasynuvata. While leakage of chlorine was reportedly prevented, OHCHR
recalls that five water facilities located close to the contact line, on both sides, which store in
total almost 350 metric tons of chlorine, are exposed to shelling, which would pose a major
risk to public safety and the environment.
20. The presence of a large number of mines and unexploded ordnance in areas close to
the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions continued to pose a serious threat to
civilians. In violation of their commitments under the Minsk agreements, all sides continued
laying new mines rather than systematically clearing or marking mines and other hazards, or
fencing them off.15 On 23 April, a vehicle of an OSCE SMM patrol was destroyed in an
explosion, most likely caused by a land mine, on a regularly used road in Pryshyb village
(controlled by armed groups) of Luhansk region, killing one and injuring two patrol
members.16 The following day, in Fashchivka village (armed-group-controlled), also in
Luhansk region, a tractor came into contact with a land mine, which caused the death of three
civilians.17
21. During the reporting period, OHCHR continued to witness the positioning of
Ukrainian Armed Forces and armed groups in or nearby residential areas, without taking
necessary precautions, in violation of international humanitarian law.18 According to
residents, the occupation and use of residential neighbourhoods by Ukrainian Armed Forces
have often been followed by shelling of the areas.19
22. In Government-controlled territory, OHCHR recorded the military use of residential
civilian property by Ukrainian Armed Forces in numerous towns and villages.20 In
Novoluhanske, the military occupied a multi-story house close to a school, and in Toretsk, a
military base was located in a communal property building close to the city hospital. In
Novotroitske, OHCHR observed that a former boarding school in the immediate proximity of
14 The 1st Lift Pumping Station was shelled on 27 and 28 February; 11, 27 and 31 March; and 1, 27, 28 and 29 April
2017.
15 See Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014 and TCG decision on mine action of 3 March 2016. In early May,
the SMM noted anti-tank mines for the first time both in territory controlled by the Government and territory
controlled by armed groups, see the Mission’s daily reports, e.g. of 8 May 2017, available at
http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/315996. For Ukraine, this is also a violation of its
obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.
16 The event claimed the first fatality since the Mission’s establishment in March 2014. See
http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/312971.
17 See SMM daily report of 30 April 2017 available at http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-toukraine/
314571.
18 Article 13(1), Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions stipulates that “the civilian population and
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations.” This
includes the obligation for each party to the conflict to avoid, to the extent feasible, locating military objectives
within or near densely populated areas. The location of military objectives in civilian areas runs counter to this
obligation. Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I, Rule 23.
19 E.g. in Luhanske, HRMMU interview, 30 March 2017; Vidrodzhennia, HRMMU field visit and interviews, 6
April 2017; Nevelske, HRMMU interview, 29 March 2017; Kamianka, HRMMU interviews, 23 March 2017; and
Krasnohorivka of Yasynuvata district, HRMMU interviews, 23 March 2017.
20 During the reporting period, OHCHR observed military occupation of civilian property in Pisky, a Governmentcontrolled
part of Zaitseve, Novoselivka Druha, Avdiivka, Zolote-4, Klynove, Roty, Novozvanivka, Vidrodzhennia,
Troitske, Novoluhanske, Toretsk, Luhanske, Shchastia, and Pervomaiske in Yasynuvatskyi district.
6
a functioning kindergarten, as well as a vacant building of a local hospital were occupied by
the Ukrainian military.21
23. OHCHR has received numerous reports of, and observed signs of looting of private
houses temporarily abandoned by owners displaced from villages along the contact line.22
There are indications that elements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces may be implicated in
some such incidents. Some civilians informed OHCHR that they had opted to remain in their
homes to protect their property after witnessing the looting of neighbouring homes,23 which
exposes them to the dangers of active hostilities, including shelling. OHCHR recalls that
pillage is prohibited under customary international law applicable in both international and
non-international armed conflicts, as well as explicitly by the Fourth Geneva Convention.24
24. In territory controlled by armed groups, OHCHR observed a similar pattern of armed
formations using residential areas for firing positions and occupying residential property.
OHCHR was informed that three houses in Lozove25 were at the time occupied by members
of armed groups. On 10 April, in Dolomitne, where OHCHR observed the presence of armed
groups close to residential houses, the home of an elderly couple was hit by a projectile and
burned down. When visiting shelled areas in territory controlled by armed groups, OHCHR
often noted fresh traces of heavy vehicles, indicating the recent presence of armed
formations.26
25. OHCHR reiterates that presence in or use of civilian housing, by Ukrainian Armed
Forces and armed groups puts civilians at risk, and violates the obligation of parties to a
conflict to take all feasible measures to spare civilians from harm,27 besides violating the
rights to adequate housing and property.
26. As in the previous reporting period, OHCHR noted examples where the Ukrainian
Armed Forces vacated their quarters in residential neighbourhoods in Vidrodzhennia28 and
Nevelske29, which led to a reduction in shelling in such areas. OHCHR commends the
Government of Ukraine for taking such action, which demonstrates that measures to protect
civilians during armed conflict are both feasible and effective towards compliance with
obligations under international humanitarian law.
B. Civilian casualties
27. Between 16 February and 15 May 2017, OHCHR recorded 193 conflict-related civilian
casualties30: 36 deaths (21 men, 11 women, three boys, and an adult whose sex is unknown)
21 HRMMU field visits, 11 April, 3 May 2017.
22 Villages of Pisky, Nevelske, Klynove, and Novoselivka Druha.
23 HRMMU interview, 27 April 2017.
24 Article 4(2)(g), Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
25 HRMMU interview, 27 March 2017.
26 A pattern also regularly reported by the OSCE SMM, see, e.g., http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-missionto-
ukraine/304526. Although OHCHR regularly observes the presence of armed groups in villages close to the
contact line, civilians are reluctant to speak of or complain about the use of their neighbourhoods by armed groups
for firing positions.
27 Article 13(1), Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions; Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary
International Humanitarian Law, Volume I, Rules 22 and 23.
28 HRMMU field visit and interviews, 6 April 2017.
29 HRMMU interview, 29 March 2017.
30 OHCHR investigated reports of civilian casualties by consulting a broad range of sources and types of information
which are evaluated for credibility and reliability. In undertaking documentation and analysis of each incident,
OHCHR exercises due diligence to corroborate information on casualties from as wide a range of sources as possible,
including OSCE public reports, accounts of witnesses, victims and other directly affected persons, military actors,
community leaders, medical professionals, and other interlocutors. In some instances, investigations may take weeks
or months before conclusions can be drawn. This may mean that conclusions on civilian casualties may be revised at
a later date as more information becomes available. OHCHR does not claim that the statistics presented here are
complete. Civilian casualties may be under-reported given limitations inherent in the operating environment,
including gaps in coverage of certain geographic areas and time periods. The increase in the number of casualties
7
and 157 injuries (90 men, 55 women, nine boys, a girl and two adults whose sex is unknown).
This is a 48 per cent increase compared with the previous reporting period of 16 November
2016 to 15 February 2017, during which OHCHR recorded 130 civilian casualties (23 deaths
and 107 injuries).
Adults Children Women Men Sex unkn. Girls Boys Sex unkn. Total
Killed 11 21 1 3 36
Injured 55 90 2 1 9 157
Total 66 111 3 1 12 193
Type of incident/weapon
Killed Injured
Adults Children Adults Children Total
Mines, ERW, booby traps,
IEDs and explosions of
ammunition depots
19 3 60 4 86
Shelling (mortars, guns,
howitzers, MLRS and tanks) 11 66 5 82
Small arms and light weapons 2 21 1 24
Other conflict-related incidents 1 1
TOTAL 33 3 147 10 193
28. During the whole conflict period, from 14 April 2014 to 15 May 2017, at least 2,479
civilians were killed: 1,367 men, 826 women, 90 boys and 47 girls, and 149 adults whose sex
is unknown.31 An additional 298 civilians, including 80 children, were killed as a result of the
MH17 plane crash on 17 July 2014. The number of conflict-related civilian injuries is
estimated at 7,000-9000.
between the different reporting dates does not necessarily mean that these casualties happened between these dates. They
could have happened earlier, but were recorded by a certain reporting date.
31 Numbers may change as new information emerges over time.



    











    
    

    





 
  





 

 
 

    

 
 
     

    







    


    
            
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8
29. In total, from 14 April 2014 to 15 May 2017, OHCHR recorded 34,056 conflictrelated
casualties in Ukraine, among civilians, Ukrainian military and members of the armed
groups. This includes 10,090 people killed and 23,966 injured.32
C. Missing persons
30. The exact number of individuals missing as a result of the conflict remains
undetermined.33 The lack of coordination among the governmental bodies concerned and the
absence of exchange of forensic information between the Government of Ukraine and
relevant actors of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ persisted. OHCHR encourages the Government of Ukraine and armed groups to
exchange DNA material and anthropometric data to facilitate the process of identification of
bodies.34 OHCHR is of the view that the whereabouts of a considerable number of those
missing could be established, and the uncertainty and despair borne by their relatives relieved,
if a proper search mechanism was put in place. OHCHR regrets that the adoption of
legislation ‘On the legal status of missing persons’, which foresees the establishment of a
commission for missing persons, was still pending as of 15 May 2017.35
31. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented additional cases of persons who
have been missing since 2014 and 2015. During individual interviews, victims’ relatives
complained that they could not access information about the fate or whereabouts of their
loved ones.36
D. Summary executions, deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances,
torture and ill-treatment, and conflict-related sexual violence
32. In territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine, OHCHR continued to enjoy
effective access to official places of detention, and interviewed conflict-related detainees in
pre-trial detention facilities (SIZOs) in Bakhmut, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mariupol,
Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Starobilsk, Vilniansk, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr. In territory
controlled by armed groups, OHCHR continued to lack full and unfettered access to places of
deprivation of liberty. Access to persons detained was granted only on an ad hoc basis, and on
such occasions, interviews could not be conducted confidentially.
32 This is a conservative estimate based on available data. These totals include: casualties among the Ukrainian military,
as reported by the Ukrainian authorities; 298 people from flight MH17; civilian casualties on the territory controlled by
the Government, as reported by local authorities and the regional departments of internal affairs of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions; and casualties among civilians and members of the armed groups on the territory controlled by the selfproclaimed
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, as reported by the armed
groups, the so-called ‘local authorities’ and local medical establishments. This data is incomplete due to gaps in coverage
of certain geographic areas and time periods, as well as overall under-reporting, especially of military casualties. Injuries
have been particularly under-reported.
33 The open database of individuals who went missing in the context of the conflict maintained by the National
Police of Ukraine listed 1,335 persons as of 20 April 2017. The Security Service of Ukraine considered 416
individuals as missing as such as of 21 March 2017. The ‘ombudsperson’s office’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
recorded 450 missing persons as of 19 April 2017.
34 OHCHR recalls the obligation of parties to a conflict to take all feasible measures to account for persons reported
missing as a result of armed conflict and provide family members with any information it has on their fate.
Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I, Rule 117.
35 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017,
para. 150-152.
36 HRMMU interviews, 24 and 27 March 2017.
9
1. Summary executions
33. During this reporting period, OHCHR documented cases of summary executions and
wilful killings that occurred since 2014 until now. Some illustrative cases are presented
below.
34. OHCHR welcomes the efforts of the Government to investigate recent cases of
extrajudicial executions and other killings. Investigative actions have become timelier;
suspects were identified and detained shortly after the incidents. It is of concern, however,
that superiors who may have ordered or concealed crimes have not brought to justice. For
example, in the ongoing trials regarding the torture of Oleksandr Agafonov37 whilst in SBU
custody and his subsequent death in Izium police station in 2014, as well as the case of two
members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces38 suspected of killing two women in Luhanske on 14
June 2015,39 the actions of the commanders were not examined.
35. OHCHR has been following two recent cases of extrajudicial executions and other
killings allegedly committed by Ukrainian forces. On 10 March, the body of a man who went
missing in Avdiivka on 3 March 2017 was found near Krasnohorivka. An SBU officer
suspected of committing the crime was taken into custody in March, but released on bail. The
pre-trial investigation is ongoing, with concerns for the safety of relatives and witnesses.40 In
another case, a man discovered on 23 September 2016 that his house in Pishchane had been
looted and set on fire, and that his relative who had been living there was missing. Police
discovered the relative’s body buried in a nearby forest, with traces of four bullet wounds.
Out of 11 members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces suspected of involvement in this crime,
only five are on trial, and only one has been charged with committing murder.41
Armed groups
36. OHCHR is also following the case of two residents of Horlivka who went missing in
October 2016. Their bodies were reportedly found on 20 March 2017 buried in Horlivka, but
their relatives were not able to see and identify the bodies. The victims were allegedly shot
dead by members of armed groups in October 2016. Their relatives were informed that the
alleged perpetrators were being detained and the ‘investigation’ ongoing.42
37 For further details, see OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16
August to 15 November 2015 (para. 114) and covering the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016
(para. 71).
38 The defendants were acquitted on 3 February 2017 despite strong evidence presented in court. Relatives of the
victims and the prosecutor filed an appeal. The verdict was quashed on 11 April 2017 and the case sent back to the
first instance court.
39 HRMMU interviews, 6 March, 11 April 2017.
40 HRMMU interviews, 16, 21, 22 and 24 March, 21 April 2017.
41 HRMMU interviews, 23 February, 21 March 2017.
42 HRMMU interview, 21 March 2017.
“There are many sick people walking around with guns these days. No UN or OSCE can
protect us. If they want to kill us, they will just come. Who can protect us from this?”
- Resident of a village near the contact line
10
2. Unlawful/arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances, and abductions
37. OHCHR continued to document cases of individuals unlawfully or arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty or subjected to enforced disappearances and abductions. While some
of these cases occurred in 2014 or 2015, OHCHR continued to receive recent testimonies
indicating that such practices were persisting, particularly in territory controlled by armed
groups. In a number of cases, the victims’ families did not have access to those detained and
had no information on their whereabouts, which may amount to enforced disappearance.
38. In April 2017, two men were detained by police in Bakhmut, taken to an unknown
location outside town, where one was kept for three days and the other for one day
incommunicado. They were each tortured while being questioned about their participation in
armed groups in 2014. Both were severely beaten and one was subjected to electric shocks in
the genitals. Both victims were transferred to the pre-trial detention facility and charged with
participation in an armed group.43
39. On 19 November 2016, a former member of an armed group was detained at the
border while crossing into the Russian Federation, and was interrogated by Ukrainian border
guards.44 The following day, he was taken by police investigators to Sloviansk, with his hands
tied with duct tape. He was detained in the Sloviansk police building for two weeks,
repeatedly interrogated, constantly moved from one room to another, and signing in and out
of the logbook every four hours “in order to comply with the law”.45 He could not inform his
relatives about his whereabouts and had no access to a lawyer. On 9 December 2016, the
Sloviansk city district court remanded him to pre-trial detention. He only met his free legal
aid lawyer in court and, as of 15 May 2017, remained in detention.
40. OHCHR also continued to observe that in conflict-related cases46, detention is often
used as the only preventive measure.47 Under international human rights standards pertaining
to the right to liberty and security of a person, individuals awaiting trial shall not be detained
as a general rule.48 Rather, pre-trial detention must be demonstrated as necessary in the
specific case, “to prevent flight, interference with evidence, or the recurrence of crime”49 and
“should be an exception and as short as possible.”50
Armed groups
41. During the reporting period, OHCHR continued to document cases of armed groups
of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ detaining individuals
suspected of affiliation with the Ukrainian Armed Forces or for having ‘pro-Ukrainian’
views. For example, in January 2017, a 16-year-old girl was detained at a checkpoint with her
43 HRMMU interview, 4 May 2017.
44 HRMMU interview, 15 February 2017.
45 HRMMU previously documented the case indicating same practice of arbitrary detention.
46 These individuals are mostly detained on the following charges: actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of
the constitutional order or takeover of Government (article 109 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine); trespass against
territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (article 110); high treason (article 111); trespass against life of a
statesman or a public figure (article 112); sabotage (article 113); espionage (article 114); intentional homicide
(article 115); act of terrorism (article 258); involvement in a terrorist act (article 258-1); public incitement to commit
a terrorist act (article 258-2); creation of a terrorist group or organization (article 258-3); facilitating a terrorist act
(article 258-4); financing of terrorism (article 258-5); and creation of unlawful paramilitary or armed formations
(article 260). In rare cases, articles 437 (planning, preparing and waging aggressive war or military conflict) and 438
(violation of law and customs of war) have been applied.
47 Pursuant to changes in the Criminal Procedure Code since 7 October 2014, all forms of preventive measures other
than detention cannot be applied in conflict-related cases, while they are allowed for all other crimes. See also “Due
process, fair trial rights, and interference with judiciary” below.
48 ICCPR, article 9 (3).
49 Communications No. 305/1988, Van Alphen v. Netherlands, Views adopted by the Human Rights Committee on
23 July 1990, para. 5.8; Communication No. 248/1987, Campbell v. Jamaica, Views adopted by the Human Rights
Committee on 30 March 1992, para. 6.3. See also European Convention on Human Rights art. 5(1)(c).
50 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 8, para. 3.
11
father. She was interrogated for seven hours by ‘ministry of state security’ (‘MGB’)
representatives without the presence of her parents or a lawyer. She was searched by a man,
although she insisted on a woman conducting the body search. She was released on the same
day.51
42. OHCHR is following the cases of two individuals detained by ‘MGB’ of ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’. A blogger who lived in Luhansk and published information about daily
life there was detained in November 2016. He was ‘charged’ with “espionage” against the
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ on behalf of the Ukrainian authorities and “inciting inter-ethnic
hatred”. Apart from a few videos of his “confession” which were published by ‘MGB’, there
is no information about his whereabouts or fate. Vitalii Rudenko, a judge at the Luhansk
regional court of appeal, was detained at the Stanytsia Luhanska crossing point in October
2016. As of 15 May 2017, he remained detained in Luhansk and OHCHR was denied access
to him.52 In addition, OHCHR remains concerned about the fate of five adolescents from
Yasynuvata who have been detained by ‘MGB’ in Donetsk since the end of August 201653
and calls for their immediate release.
43. Armed groups continued the practice of 30-day ‘administrative arrest’, during which
victims are not allowed to see lawyers or relatives, and which is often prolonged. OHCHR
documented the cases of two men detained by ‘MGB’ in Donetsk city in February 2017.54 In
one case, armed men wearing camouflage and balaclavas broke into a man’s house in
Donetsk and arrested him in front of his family, including his child.55 The following day,
'MGB' confirmed the man was under 30-day ‘administrative arrest’. In March, 'MGB'
informed his family that the detention was prolonged for another 30 days, without providing
any information on his whereabouts. The victim was only allowed to call his wife twice56, and
during the first call, she understood by his voice that he was in physical pain. In April, the
family was informed that the victim had been charged with “espionage”. As of 15 May, his
place of detention remained unknown and his lawyer did not have unimpeded access to him.57
44. In November 2016, armed men in camouflage and balaclavas entered a woman’s
house in Donetsk, conducted a ‘search’, and took her to an unknown direction. Her relatives
were later informed by ‘MGB’ that she was under 30-day ‘administrative arrest’ but with no
indication as to the reasons for this or her whereabouts. In February 2017, the family was
informed that the victim was transferred to the ‘pre-trial detention facility’ (‘SIZO’) in
Donetsk city where she remained as of 15 May.58
45. OHCHR documented cases of detention of civilians by the ‘police department for
fighting organised crime’ (‘UBOP’) in Donetsk city. For example, in December 2016, a man
was apprehended by unknown armed men in his home in Donetsk. A ‘search’ was conducted
and some of his personal belongings were ‘confiscated’. Allegedly, the victim was detained
by ‘UBOP’, severely beaten, and required medical care at a hospital before being admitted to
the ‘SIZO’ in Donetsk.59
51 HRMMU interview, 11 April 2017.
52 HRMMU interview, 24 April 2017.
53 HRMMU interview, 28 April 2017.
54 HRMMU interview, 19 April 2017.
55 HRMMU interview, 10 March 2017.
56 On 6 and 27 February 2017.
57 The lawyer does not have regular access to his client, and when he is able to speak with him, there are restriction
placed. HRMMU interview, 24 April 2017.
58 HRMMU interview, 24 April 2017.
59 HRMMU interview, 22 February 2017.
12
3. Torture and ill-treatment
46. OHCHR documented new cases of individuals accused of conflict-related charges
being subjected to torture and ill-treatment on both sides of the contact line, a pattern which
has been previously identified by OHCHR.60 While the gravity and frequency of such cases
has reduced compared to the previous years of conflict, the practice has persisted. Victims of
torture who remained in detention continued to have limited access to healthcare, which often
aggravated their condition.61
47. OHCHR recorded new accounts from victims and witnesses suggesting the
systematic use of torture and ill-treatment of conflict-related detainees by SBU officals in
order to extract confessions.
48. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented five cases involving nine
individuals who were tortured at the Kharkiv SBU premises in 2015-2016,62 some of which
are described below. On 29 April 2015, an anti-Maidan activist was detained by 15
unidentified armed men, who took him to the Kharkiv SBU building, where he was beaten
with a baseball bat and subjected to waterboarding. The perpetrators also removed his pants
and burned his buttocks with a lighter, while demanding he confess to storing weapons. The
victim consequently suffers from a permanent limp.63 Another victim was detained and beaten
in his apartment by SBU Alfa squad on the night of 30 May 2015, before being taken to the
Kharkiv SBU building, where he was thrown on the floor, kicked and punched by officers
while handcuffed. During interrogation, the victim was subjected to the “swallow” torture
method: while standing on his back, the perpetrators raised the victim’s arms behind his back,
causing great pain to joints.64 Another victim was brought to the Kharkiv SBU building on 29
May 2015, after being detained at a checkpoint. Officers beat and punched him, demanding
he confess to terrorist activities.65 All three victims were transferred to the pre-trial detention
center in Kharkiv, where they remained as of 15 May 2017.
49. OHCHR also documented new cases of torture and ill-treatment of former members
of armed groups. On 8 October 2016, a member of an armed group was captured by
Ukrainian forces near Vodiane village. Although he had been shot, he was not provided with
medical aid. He was taken to the Mariupol SBU building, where he was interrogated about
the armed groups’ military positions. He was kicked until he fell to the ground, and a plastic
bag was fixed over his head with duct tape, causing suffocation. The perpetrators threatened
to hurt his family and to send him to clear a minefield. The victim remained in detention as of
15 May.66 Similarly, a member of the armed groups was detained in April 2015 and brought
to the SBU building in Mariupol. He was kept for a five-day interrogation, during which he
was beaten all over the body, electrocuted, waterboarded and threatened with execution. The
60 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 November 2016 to 15
February 2017, para. 42-50.
61 HRMMU interview, 6 April 2017.
62 HRMMU interviews, 28 February, 7, 10, 15 and 29 March, 12 April 2017; Trial monitoring, 14 and 26 April
2017.
63 HRMMU interview, 7 March 2017.
64 HRMMU interview, 10 March 2017.
65 HRMMU interview, 29 March 2017.
66 HRMMU interview, 15 February 2017.
“Thinking about my finger being cut off was too much for me, so I told them what they
wanted to hear.”
– Victim of torture
13
detainee was then transferred to the pre-trial detention centre in Starobilsk, where he
remained as of 15 May.67
50. In December 2016, a former member of an armed group was detained in Zolote-4.
He was shot in the leg, then his hands were duct-taped and his head was covered. While he
was lying on the ground, the officers hit his face with the butt of a gun, breaking his lip. He
was then put in a vehicle, where he was beaten and kicked while being interrogated. After a
few hours, he was brought to the Sievierodonetsk SBU, where he was further interrogated.
The investigator presented him his ‘testimony’, forcing him to sign it without reading. He was
subsequently allowed to see a lawyer and taken to a hospital. As of 15 May, the victim
remained in pre-trial detention centre in Starobilsk.68
51. On 24 June 2016, members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces detained a member of an
armed group in Luhansk region, after wounding him. He was transferred to SBU in Starobilsk
where he was interrogated and beaten by three SBU officers for four hours until he signed a
“confession” written by one of the officers. He was then taken to a hospital and tied to a bed.
One of the officers who guarded him directed a lamp into his eyes and left it on for two days.
After he was released from hospital, the victim was transferred to Sievierodonetsk SBU,
where he had access to a lawyer for the first time. As of 15 May, he remained in pre-trial
detention centre in Starobilsk.69
52. OHCHR is concerned about ineffective investigations into allegations of torture and
ill-treatment brought by victims to law enforcement officers or raised in court. According to
the SBU, the incidents in June and December 2016 described above were reviewed, however
neither the investigating judge nor regional SBU office found grounds to request an official
investigation. Three investigations and 14 audits of possible human rights violations in SBU
facilities in Luhansk region were also carried out, however no unlawful acts were found.,
Furthermore, there have been no developments in the investigations led by the Military
Prosecution of allegations of arbitrary detention and ill-treatment in 13 incidents allegedly
involving SBU officers in Odesa and Zaporizhzhia. The victims have not yet been
interviewed by the prosecutor.70
53. OHCHR also followed at least 12 individual cases where victims raised allegations
of torture and ill-treatment before court. In these cases, undue delays occurred in entering the
allegations in the unified registry and in taking investigative steps. OHCHR recalls that the
Government bears primary responsibility to conduct full-scale, prompt, impartial and
effective investigations into human rights violations and to prosecute perpetrators, whether
they are elements of Government forces or members of armed groups. The Government must
also establish effective complaint mechanisms, prompt and effective ex officio investigation
into cases of torture and ensure that any person who has been subjected to torture has access
to an effective remedy.
Armed groups
54. OHCHR continued documenting cases of torture on territory controlled by armed
groups. Due to limited access to places of deprivation of liberty, OHCHR is often able to
document such cases only after the release of individuals, when they move to Governmentcontrolled
territory and are able to speak more freely about their experiences.
55. In October 2016, a man was detained at a checkpoint controlled by armed groups in
Donetsk region and brought to a ‘police unit’ in Donetsk. He was interrogated on three
occasions, and severely kicked and beaten with fists and a truncheon while handcuffed. Three
67 HRMMU interview, 13 April 2017.
68 HRMMU interview, 21 February 2017.
69 HRMMU interview, 21 February 2017.
70 See OHCHR report OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16
November 2016 to 15 February 2017, para. 66.
14
or four times, a plastic bag was put over his head, causing him to suffocate. One of the
interrogators threatened to cut off one of his fingers, and made him believe this act was
imminent. Another perpetrator threatened him with a gun, saying his body would be found in
the river. The victim was also subjected to electric shocks on his back, head and the flank of
his body. He was released in December 2016.71
56. OHCHR also documented the case of a man who was detained at a checkpoint run
by an armed group in March 2015, and brought to Dokuchaievsk. He was tortured by armed
men in uniforms of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, beaten with truncheons until they broke,
subjected to electric shocks, and smashed in the head. He was brought to a hospital and then
transferred to the seized former SBU building in Donetsk city, where he was tortured again in
the same manner. Later, the victim was tied to a chair, interrogated, and beaten with a plastic
pipe. One of the perpetrators fastened a belt around his neck and tightened it until the victim
lost consciousness. Electric shocks were used repeatedly. The perpetrators also threatened
that he would be forced to blow himself up. The victim was released in April 2016.72
57. OHCHR obtained more details on the case of 13 Ukrainian soldiers captured by
armed groups near Debaltseve in February 2015.73 The victims were struck in the head with
rifle butts, forced to remove their jackets despite the very low temperatures, and ordered to
kneel for four hours in the snow, causing their legs to go numb. Some members of the armed
groups put knives to their faces and threatened: “What do you want me to cut off, an eye or an
ear?” All the victims were subsequently transferred to a building in Luhansk, allegedly
housing the ‘separate commandant’s regiment of the 2nd army corps of 'Luhansk people’s
republic army’. During interrogations, the soldiers were severely beaten. One soldier was held
in a cell with a civilian whose body was completely blue, ostensibly as a result of severe
beatings. The civilian stated that he was accused by armed groups of being a spotter and was
tortured until he ‘confessed’. The soldiers were later released while the fate of the civilian
remained unknown.
58. OHCHR also documented the case of three Ukrainian soldiers who were captured by
armed groups of ‘Prizrak’ (phantom) battalion in Luhansk region in August 2014. They were
beaten all over their body by several armed men every evening. One perpetrator with the call
sign “Leshyi” stabbed the victim in the palm, cut his finger and broke his arm with the butt of
a machine gun. Requests for medical aid were denied and food was not provided. The victims
were also subjected to mock executions. One victim was transferred to another building,
where he was kept in solitary confinement and regularly beaten. The perpetrators also poured
icy water on his head, broke his arm and shot him in the foot. He was taken to the toilet and
severely hit with riffle butts. When he was lying on the floor, bleeding, a fake grenade was
thrown into the toilet. After that, the wife of one of the commanders urinated on him. He was
released towards the end of the 2014.74
4. Exchanges of individuals deprived of liberty
59. No releases within the “all for all” exchange foreseen in the Minsk agreements took
place during the reporting period, despite ongoing discussions of the Working Group on
Humanitarian Issues of the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk, and the attestation of the
willingness of individuals in Government custody to be relocated to territory controlled by
armed groups upon their release which was carried out from 28 April to 12 May.
60. The Government continued to urge for the release of 121 individuals who are believed
to be held in captivity by the armed groups, while the armed groups acknowledged holding only
71 HRMMU interview, 22 February 2017.
72 HRMMU interview, 16 February 2017.
73 HRMMU interviews, 23 February 2017. See also OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
covering the period from 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017, para. 50.
74 HRMMU interview, 14 April 2017.
15
47 of them.75 The armed groups were seeking the release of 771 individuals who they
believed were held or residing in Government-controlled territory.
61. OHCHR considers it essential that individuals who are exchanged are not relocated to
the other side of the contact line against their will. OHCHR also reiterates that no impunity
should be granted to perpetrators of war crimes in the context of the pardoning or amnesty
envisaged in the Minsk agreements.
5. Transfers of pre-conflict prisoners to Government-controlled territory
62. The total number of pre-conflict prisoners in territory controlled by armed groups is
estimated at approximately 9,500.76 On 11 April, 14 pre-conflict prisoners from several penal
colonies controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ were transferred to Mariupol SIZO.
According to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsperson’s
Office of Ukraine), since 2015, 147 prisoners were transferred from territory controlled by
armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. As of May 2017, at least 735 prisoners had
filed requests to the Ombudsperson’s Office of Ukraine and supposedly to the relevant
‘authorities’ of the ‘Donetsk people‘s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ indicating
their wish to be transferred to Government-controlled territory.
6. Conflict-related sexual violence
63. During the reporting period, OHCHR continued to document cases of conflictrelated
sexual violence. Most of the cases reflected in the report took place in 2015-2016.
Similarly as for torture, these cases are often reported only after a certain time has passed
following the violation. As described in previous report of HRMMU,77 sexual violence has
most often been perpetrated in the context of deprivation of liberty, against both men and
women and may, in some instances, amount to torture.
64. The presence of armed actors in residential areas remained one of the highest risk
factors for sexual and gender-based violence, especially against women. When victims have
reported these crimes, effective investigations have been rare due to shortcomings in
legislation and lack of will and capacity of law enforcement. Victims living in territory
controlled by armed groups have been particularly hesitant to report the incidents, including
due to fear and absence of access to justice. The identification and documentation of sexual
violence cases has also been impeded by the lack of regular access to places of deprivation of
liberty in territory controlled by armed groups.
65. OHCHR continued to verify allegations of torture with elements of sexual violence
perpetrated by SBU officers against conflict-related detainees with a view to extracting
confessions.78 For example, OHCHR interviewed two men detained by SBU in April 2015 on
conflict-related charges.79 One was stopped on the road by unidentified armed men,
handcuffed and hooded, and brought to the Kharkiv SBU building. He was interrogated and
ordered to confess to being a member of “Kharkiv partisans”. He was kicked in the stomach
and hit on the head. One of the SBU officers grabbed and twisted the victim’s genitals.
During this ordeal, which lasted for about an hour, officers continuously threatened his
family.80 In another case, a man was detained by SBU at his friend’s house, where he was
beaten in the groin before being interrogated. The SBU officers put a gas mask over his head
75 Forty-two held in territory controlled by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ armed groups and five in territory controlled
by ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ armed groups.
76 Based on data of the Penitentiary Service of Ukraine from before the conflict.
77 See OHCHR report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Ukraine covering the period from 14 March 2014 to
31 January 2017, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportCRSV_EN.pdf.
78 HRMMU interviews, 11 and 12 April 2017.
79 Articles 258(2)-(3) (1), (terrorism) 263(1) (unlawful handling of weapons), 110(2) (trespass against territorial
integrity and inviolability of Ukraine), 201(2) (smuggling) with article 28(2) qualification (group commission).
80 HRMMU interview, 15 March 2017.
16
and closed the inhale/exhale tube to cause suffocation, threatening him with additional
physical violence. When the SBU officers threatened to give his girlfriend’s address to the
Right Sector81, saying they would “do anything” to her, the victim agreed to ‘cooperate’ and
sign everything.82 Both victims remained in detention as of 15 May 2017. Similarly, a man
arrested in his home in January 2015 was brought to Volnovakha SBU, where he was tied to a
radiator, beaten and kicked on his body and head, causing him to lose consciousness several
times. The perpetrators forced him to sign a ‘confession’, threatening that they would rape his
wife, cut her to pieces and force him to eat them.83
66. OHCHR also documented three cases of sexual and gender-based violence
perpetrated against women by members of Ukrainian Armed Forces positioned in residential
areas. In October 2016, in Marinka, a woman was alone in her house when two drunk soldiers
broke in.84 They started touching her and one tried to pull her skirt down. She screamed and
struggled, and one of the perpetrators hit her in the face with a metal bowl, injuring her nose
and lip. She managed to escape to another room and call the owner of the house who
contacted the police and the commander of the military unit. A complaint was filed with the
police department, but when the police questioned her, they told her the incident was her
fault. Later the police investigator told her the case had been closed due to lack of evidence.
Armed groups
67. On 5 May, in Petrivske, a member of the armed groups equipped with an assault rifle
intimidated an unarmed female patrol member of the OSCE SMM by making comments of a
sexual nature and threatened to stop the patrol from moving further until his demands were
met. The OSCE monitors left the area via a different road.85
68. On 28 June 2014, in a village controlled by armed groups in Luhansk region, a
woman and her four-year-old daughter were outside their house when six armed men drove
up and ordered her to open the garage.86 When she refused, one of the men threatened to rape
her with his machine gun. He poked at her daughter’s buttocks with the gun, threatening to
rape her together with her daughter. He shot several times into the ground near the woman’s
legs, injuring her toe. On the same day, the victim’s husband reported the case to the
commander of the armed group. A month later, he was detained by the same armed group and
severely beaten for six days. The family left the territory controlled by armed groups
immediately after his release.
81 The Right Sector defines itself as a national liberation movement, which consists of a political party founded in
November 2013, a battalion called Ukrainian Volunteer Corps formed in April 2014 and a youth wing called “Right
Youth”. It is considered by many a far-right political and military group, and has been implicated in several human
rights violations.
82 HRMMU interview, 17 March 2017.
83 HRMMU interview, 12 April 2017. According to the SBU, none of the seven persons of Volnovakha region or
surrounding areas who were detained in January 2015 raised a claim of torture or ill-treatment.
84 HRMMU interview, 20 March 2017.
85 Latest from the OSCE SMM, based on information received as of 19:30, 5 May 2017, available at
http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/315761 and statement of 8 May 2017, available at
http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/315891.
86 HRMMU interview, 9 March 2017.
17
III. Accountability and administration of justice
69. The reporting period covers the third anniversary of the killings of protesters at
Maidan in Kyiv, launch of the security operation in eastern Ukraine and 2 May 2014 violence
in Odesa, events which had significant detrimental impact on the human rights situation in the
country. Three years after these events, victims continue to seek accountability for killings
and other human rights violations. Investigations and prosecutions against perpetrators of
violence during the demonstrations in Kyiv and Odesa appear to be selective and lacking
examination of possible responsibility of senior officials. Human rights violations and abuses
perpetrated in the context of over three years of armed conflict remain largely uninvestigated,
preventing accountability for such violations. The resulting environment of impunity for such
actions may lead to further violations and abuses.
70. When judicial proceedings do move forward in conflict-related cases, there are
indications of possible bias against individuals prosecuted for alleged affiliation with armed
groups, resulting in violations of the right to a fair trial. In territory controlled by armed
groups, OHCHR continued to observe the development of parallel structures to replace the
judiciary, law enforcement, and security forces in certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions. The operation of these structures contradicts the Constitution of Ukraine and Minsk
agreements and they do not comply with basic principles and standards of fair trial and the
right to liberty and security of person.
A. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public disturbances
71. Three years after the killing of protestors and law enforcement officers at Maidan,
Kyiv, and the violence in Odesa, OHCHR is concerned that efforts to bring perpetrators to
account have still not produced tangible results.
1. Accountability for the killing of protestors at Maidan
72. Despite efforts of the Office of the Prosecutor General to bring those responsible for
the killing of protestors and others during the Maidan events in Kyiv, no former senior
official has been held accountable.87 As of 15 May, the Office of the Prosecutor General had
identified the individuals responsible for the killing of 65 protestors, and brought charges
against a number of them,88 while investigations into the deaths of 13 other protestors were
ongoing.
87 See OHCHR report on accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016, Annex I, Table 1.
88 Three Berkut servicemen are charged with killing three and injuring 33 protesters on 18 February 2014; one
protestor is on trial for killing another protestor on 18 February 2014; six Berkut servicemen and former SBU senior
officials are charged with killing ten and other intended actions that led to deaths of two protesters as a result of
‘anti-terrorist operation’ launched in central Kyiv into the night of 19 February 2014; three individuals (the so-called
‘titushky’ hired by officials to attack protestors in order to legitimize police intervention dispersing protests under
the guise of ensuring public order) are charged with killing journalist Viacheslav Veremii on 19 February 2014 (the
pre-trial investigation against two suspects is ongoing, while the third suspect was put on a wanted list) and 32
Berkut servicemen accused of killing 48 and attempted killing of 80 protestors on 20 February 2014 (five remain in
custody pending trial while the others have escaped jurisdiction).
“The investigator said in the presence of my lawyer, ‘but these were our guys. Why
would we collect evidence against them?’ - explaining why he did not take finger prints
at the site of looting in my house.”
- Resident of a village near the contact line
18
73. OHCHR welcomes the completion of the pre-trial investigation into the killings of
three protestors and attempted killing of 33 protestors at Kriposnyi Lane on 18 February
2014.89 However, OHCHR notes the failure of the authorities to prevent the accused, a Berkut
serviceman, from fleeing justice shortly after his release from pre-trial detention,90 along with
two other Berkut servicemen accused of torturing Maidan protesters.91
74. While noting that the measure of pre-trial detention should be applied only where
necessary, OHCHR recalls that the release of accused persons “may be subject to guarantees
to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise,
for execution of the judgement”.92 Given that at least 12 Berkut servicemen suspected of
killing protestors at Maidan had already fled to the Russian Federation,93 OHCHR is
concerned whether the judiciary took adequate precautions to ensure the appearance at the
trial of the recent absconder. This is especially troublesome considered together with the
propensity of courts to impose pre-trial detention in conflict-related cases (see Due process,
fair trial rights, and interference with the judiciary below).
75. OHCHR reiterates its concern with lack of progress in the investigation into the
killings of 13 police officers on 18-20 February 2014,94 due to legal provisions prescribing
that individuals who participated in mass gatherings and are suspected or accused of crimes
during the Maidan protests, including violence against a law enforcement officer, shall be
exempted from criminal responsibility.95 The authorities have thus failed in their obligation to
ensure an effective remedy for relatives of the killed police officers.
76. The trial in absentia of former President Viktor Yanukovych on charges of high
treason, facilitating infringement of territorial integrity of Ukraine, and facilitating waging
aggressive war against Ukraine, commenced on 4 May. He is also suspected, along with other
former senior officials, of abuse of authority or office in relation to the forceful dispersal of
protesters on 30 November 2013 that marked the beginning of the Maidan protests.
According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, the investigation into the role of the
former president in the Maidan events is on hold due to his escape. Thus, OHCHR is
concerned that the most senior officials may escape accountability for the human right
violations committed during the Maidan events.
2. Accountability for the 2 May 2014 violence in Odesa
77. No progress was observed in bringing to account those responsible for the death of
48 people in Odesa on 2 May 2014.96 Actions taken thus far appear selective and suggest
possible bias.
78. On 15 May, in the trial of 20 members of ‘pro-federalism’ groups, which has lasted
for over two years, the Malynovskyi district court of Odesa disqualified the presiding judge
89 On 27 March, the Office of the Prosecutor General reported the submission of an indictment against two Berkut
servicemen on charges of killing three protesters on 18 February 2014 at Kriposnyi Lane.
90 On 14 April 2017, the accused, along with three other Berkut servicemen (two accused of torturing a Maidan
protester in January 2014 and the third accused of attacking journalists at a checkpoint in Kharkiv region) uploaded a
video on YouTube stating they had fled to the Russian Federation as they had no faith in a fair trial by Ukrainian
courts. The Head of the Special Investigations Department of the Office of the Prosecutor General confirmed that
they had absconded.
91 On 6 April 2017, the court of appeal of Kyiv changed the measure of restraint for the accused from remand in
custody to personal commitment to appear in court for trial.
92 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9.3.
93 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 November 2016 to 15
February 2017, para. 82.
94 See OHCHR report on Accountability for killings in Ukraine covering the period from January 2014 to May 2016,
Annex I, Table 2.
95 Law “On prevention of persecution and punishment of individuals in respect of events which have taken place
during peaceful assemblies and recognizing the repeal of certain laws of Ukraine”. The law also calls for the
destruction of case files.
96 See OHCHR report on Accountability for killings in Ukraine covering the period from January 2014 to May 2016,
Annex I, Table 3.
19
and two of the three judges on the bench.97 The case will now need to be retried from the
beginning. On the same day, the Malynovskyi district court submitted an appeal requesting to
transfer the case to another court as it is unable to form a new panel in compliance with the
Criminal Procedure Code.98 OHCHR is concerned that the protracted proceedings may result
in prolonged detention of five of the defendants who have been remanded in custody since
May 2014.
79. By contrast, the trial of one member of ‘pro-unity’ activist groups, who is the only
individual charged with killing, has not yet commenced, and he enjoys full freedom, without
any measure of restraint. Three officials of the Odesa regional department of the State
Emergency Service accused of failing to assist persons trapped in the burning House of Trade
Unions, which resulted in 42 deaths, are also free pending trial.
80. To address public distrust in the investigation of 2 May 2014 violence, the Office of
the Prosecutor General is seeking independent foreign experts to assist in defining the precise
cause of death of 34 people who perished in the Trade Union building.
3. Accountability for the 31 August 2015 violence in Kyiv
81. The investigation into the violence which occurred in front of the Parliament in Kyiv
on 31 August 201599 was divided into two categories: mass disturbances and terrorist act.100
Both investigations have been completed, resulting in the indictment of 15 individuals,
including four former members of Parliament from the ‘Svoboda’ political party and two
former participants in the security operation in the east. The first case, before the Podilskyi
district court of Kyiv,101 has been characterized by delays and regular rescheduling of
hearings, particularly due to non-appearance of the parties, victims or witnesses. Preparatory
hearings for the trial in the second case,102 before the Shevchenkivskyi district court of Kyiv,
have not yet begun due to the failure of the court to compose the jury panel.
82. In a separate proceeding, on 17 March 2017, the Bratskyi district court of Mykolaiv
region issued the first judgement on this incident, convicting one of the participants and
sentencing him to six years in prison.103 The decision has not yet entered into force pending
an appeal.
97 The court disqualified the presiding judge and two panel members, referring to Article 76(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code (Inadmissibility for a judge to re-participate in criminal proceedings) as well as an official response
from the Supreme Court of Ukraine to the court of appeal for Odesa region.
98 Because one of the accused was a minor at the time of the incident, the presiding judge must be authorized to
conduct criminal proceedings involving juveniles. Article 31(10), Criminal Procedure Code.
99 See OHCHR report on Accountability for killings in Ukraine covering the period from January 2014 to May 2016,
Annex I, para. 5.
100 According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, mass clashes between protesters and police officers, and the
explosion of a hand grenade claimed the lives of four National Guard servicemen and left 144 law enforcement
personnel injured.
101 On 28 July 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor General reported completion of the investigation into mass
disturbances near the Parliament and submission of an indictment against 15 individuals to Pecherskyi district court
of Kyiv.
102 On 7 July 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor General reported completion of the investigation into the terrorist act
near the Parliament against two individuals.
103 The court admitted this individual case from the 31 August event after the accused perpetrated another crime in
Mykolaiv region.
20
B. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east
83. After three years of hostilities, victims continue their quest for accountability and
redress for conflict-related human rights violations. Accounts, for example, of those detained
on charges of membership in armed groups reveal widespread practices of enforced
disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, carried out by or at the behest of
Government authorities.104 These techniques are used for the purposes of compelling victims
to testify against themselves with a view to prosecuting them.
84. At the same time, Ukrainian law enforcement and security forces often refute
detainees’ complaints of human rights violations as a defence tactic, which may contribute to
the systemic failure to adequately investigate such allegations. Such an attitude has, to a large
extent, contributed to victims’ mistrust in national redress mechanisms, leading them to
refrain from filing complaints.105 The conditions of people subjected to torture and illtreatment
often deteriorated due to the failure of the medical personnel of penitentiary
facilities to properly document the injuries of victims upon their arrival.106 OHCHR recalls
that the Government bears the responsibility to investigate allegations of grave human rights
violations including torture, ill-treatment and arbitrary detention. OHCHR stresses that
victims of abuse of power are entitled to access to justice and to prompt redress, as provided
for in national legislation, for the harm that they have suffered.107
85. OHCHR welcomes the completion of the trial against 12 former members of the
‘Tornado’ special police regiment charged with grave human rights violations including
arbitrary detention, abduction, torture, and violent “unnatural gratification of sexual desire”
during the security operation in the east.108 On 7 April, after a year-long closed trial, the
Obolonskyi district court of Kyiv convicted all defendants, sentencing eight of them to
various prison terms and releasing four on probation. OHCHR is concerned that despite
strong evidence of the killing of at least one individual,109 none of the perpetrators was held
accountable for this act. OHCHR continues to follow cases involving other battalions,
including the 24th separate storm battalion ‘Aidar’110 and ‘Donbas’ special battalion of the
104 Over the reporting period, OHCHR documented at least seven cases (HRMMU interviews, 21 and 22 February
2017) of individuals arbitrarily detained and ill-treated by armed men near the Government-controlled city of
Mariupol. After a period of time, the individuals were handed over to law enforcement agencies and prosecuted on
charges of membership in the terrorist organization ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. This raises concerns that the
perpetrators acted with the consent or acquiescence of the Security Service of Ukraine.
105 HRMMU interview, 21 February 2017: The victim stated that three days after being arrested by Ukrainian
soldiers, he was brought before the SBU investigator and then first met his lawyer. Despite clear bodily signs of
physical abuse, neither of the investigator nor the lawyer reacted. Pressured by torture and death threats, the victim
signed a paper containing self-incriminating statements.
106 HRMMU interviews, 21 February, 12 and 13 April 2017.
107 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, A/RES/40/34, 29 November
1985, 96th plenary meeting.
108 Eight defendants, including the commander of the battalion and his deputy, were sentenced to terms of
imprisonment ranging from eight to 11 years. Four others were released on probation. Both the prosecution and
defence counsel expressed intention to appeal the verdict.
109 See OHCHR report on Accountability for killings in Ukraine covering the period from January 2014 to May
2016, Annex I, para. 106-108.
110 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 February to 15 May
2016, para. 56.
“You need to be a kamikaze if you register your injuries. If they learn about it, they will
make you disabled and will deal with your family.”
- Conflict-related detainee, subjected to torture
21
National Guard,111 whose members, according to victims’ accounts, have perpetrated grave
human rights violations while taking part in the security operation.
86. OHCHR continued to follow the ongoing investigation conducted by the Office of
the Prosecutor General into arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances112 at the premises
of the Kharkiv Regional Department of SBU113 but is not aware of any developments in this
regard. OHCHR further notes a lack of progress in ensuring accountability for the killings of
Oleh Kalashnikov114 and Oles Buzyna,115 on 15 and 16 April 2015, respectively.
87. Despite continued lack of access to territory controlled by armed groups, which
negatively affects the ability of Ukrainian law enforcement to conduct full investigations, the
Office of the Prosecutor General and SBU continued investigating human rights abuses
perpetrated by the armed groups.116 On 13 May, SBU charged in absentia “nine leaders of the
so-called ‘penal corrections department of the ministry of internal affairs of Luhansk people’s
republic’” with membership in a terrorist organization, but did not address evidence
suggesting that they perpetrated grave human rights violations.117 The Office of the
Prosecutor General informed OHCHR that since the beginning of the security operation on 14
April 2014, the National Police have opened 2,845 pre-trial investigations for illegal
detention, abduction of persons and hostage-taking in Donetsk and Luhansk region, which
resulted in 79 indictments.
88. OHCHR notes that none of the members of the armed groups has been brought to
account for such human rights abuses as torture, ill-treatment or arbitrary deprivation of life.
Instead, the majority are prosecuted for their mere armed group membership. OHCHR further
notes that, for the first time, charges of violation of rules and customs of war have been
brought against seven members of armed groups with regard to the arbitrary execution, illegal
detention, torture and ill-treatment of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians.118
111 Five members of the battalion are currently on trial in Krasnoarmiiskyi district court (Donetsk region) facing
numerous charges including abduction, armed robbery, extortion, banditry, and hooliganism. For more details, see
OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 August to 15 November 2016,
para. 73.
112 HRMMU interviews, 24 and 26 February, 7 March 2017.
113 See OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the periods from 16 November 2016 to 15
February 2017 (para. 41), 16 August to 15 November 2016 (para. 35) and 16 May to 15 August 2016 (para. 45).
114 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 February to 15 May
2016, para. 70.
115 Ibid.; OHCHR report on Accountability for killings in Ukraine covering the period from January 2014 to May
2016, Annex I, para. 79-82.
116 For more details see 17th OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16
November 2016 to 15 February 2017, para. 63-65.
117 On 15 May, SBU released a video of a former prisoner released from Alchevsk penitentiary facility no. 13
(facility dedicated for prisoners with tuberculosis, located in the territory controlled by armed groups) stating that the
prisoners were subjected to physical suffering and deprived of medical treatment and protection. Prisoners who
refused to obtain a ‘passport’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ reportedly suffered the most. Moreover, during
active hostilities, for instance in Debaltseve, prisoners were forcefully recruited into the armed groups. If they
refused, they were subjected to solitary confinement and deprived of food. After they were handed over to the armed
groups, their documents were destroyed and they never returned. See SBU press release, 15 May 2017, available at
https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/4/category/21/view/3340#sthash.I1BfhtGM.gcbeTIzy.dpbs.
118 The suspects include the ‘commander’ of the ‘Somali’ battalion of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, ‘commander’ of
the ‘All-great army of Don’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, ‘commander’ of the ‘investigators’ of the ‘separate
commandant’s regiment of the 2nd army corps’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, Major General of the Armed Forces
of the Russian Federation holding the position of the ‘deputy minister’ of the ‘ministry of state security’ of ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’, First Deputy Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and
Ukrainian members of armed groups of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
22
C. Due process, fair trial rights, and interference with the judiciary
89. OHCHR continued monitoring of trials of individuals charged with affiliation with
armed groups, and other high-profile cases, noting systematic violations of the right to a fair
trial and other related human rights standards. In particular, OHCHR observed that courts
continued to apply custodial detention to suspects accused of affiliation with armed groups
without assessing its necessity.119 This approach also entails the practice of automatic
extension of pre-trial detention,120 and undermines the process of judicial review of
lawfulness of detention. OHCHR recalls that pre-trial detention should not be mandatory for
all defendants charged with a particular crime, but should be based on an individualized
determination that it is reasonable and necessary, taking into account all circumstances of the
individual case.121
90. OHCHR also noted repeated delays in trials122 which, coupled with the abovementioned
practice, inevitably lead to prolonged pre-trial detention and may therefore
jeopardize the presumption of innocence.123 OHCHR recalls that individuals subjected to
remand custody pending trial must be tried as expeditiously as possible, and that when delays
become unavoidable, the court must reconsider alternatives to pre-trial detention.124
91. In the course of trial monitoring and interviewing of defendants in conflict-related
criminal cases,125 OHCHR received credible accounts of the SBU obtaining evidence by
torture, including witness ‘testimony’ and ‘confessions’. Such evidence has subsequently
been admitted by courts,126 sometimes despite victims’ complaints to the court regarding their
nature. For example, on 20 March, Dobropillia city district court of Donetsk region issued a
guilty verdict against the defendant despite an ongoing investigation into his complaint of illtreatment
and arbitrary detention.127
92. OHCHR continued to witness attempts by various actors to interfere with the
judiciary. During trial monitoring, it observed intimidation and physical abuse of judges by
organized groups of individuals claiming to be ‘patriots’.128 Tolerance of such behaviour by
119 Article 176(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine prohibits the use of any measure of restraint other than
detention on remand for individuals suspected or accused of, inter alia, membership in terrorist organizations or
unlawful armed formations, which are the charges most often lodged against conflict-related detainees.
120 HRMMU trial monitoring of Zhovtnevyi district court of Dnipro, 15 and 16 March 2017; HRMMU trial
monitoring of court of appeal of Zaporizhzhia Region, 6 April 2017; HRMMU trial monitoring of Zhovtnevyi
district court of Zaporizhzhia, 16 March 2017.
121 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35 Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), para. 38.
122 HRMMU monitors trials in conflict-related cases as well as a few emblematic criminal cases and noted that
courts often cannot proceed with the hearing of the case due to failure of parties or witnesses to appear, or failure to
transfer defendants from the pre-trial detention facility, yet they regularly extend defendants’ remand in custody (e.g.
case of Anastasiia Kovalenko, in pre-trial detention since December 2014, and case of former mayor of Sloviansk, in
detention since July 2014 and awaiting fourth retrial).
123 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35 Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), para. 37.
124 Ibid.
125 HRMMU trial monitoring of Dzerzhynskyi city court of Donetsk Region, 26 March 2017; HRMMU trial
monitoring of Slovianskyi city district court, 4 April 2017; HRMMU trial monitoring of Starobilskyi district court of
Luhansk Region, 13 March 2017; HRMMU trial monitoring of Lysychanskyi city court of Luhansk Region, 5 April
2017.
126 HRMMU interviews, 13 March, 5 April 2017.
127 HRMMU interview, 6 April 2017; Court decision of Dobropilskyi city district court of Donetsk region, 20 March
2017, available at: http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/65401324.
128 HRMMU trial monitoring at the Malynovskyi district court of Odesa, 13 April 2017.
“Why I changed my testimony and plead guilty now? I just want this trial to end.”
- Defendant in conflict-related case, detained since October 2015,
seated in metal cage during the hearing and breaking into tears
23
law enforcement, through insufficient police presence or refusal to act to secure the
courtroom, remains concerning.
D. Human rights impact of armed group structures
93. OHCHR continued to monitor the impact of parallel structures of ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ on the human rights of people residing in territory
controlled by armed groups. OHCHR reiterates that armed groups are bound by international
humanitarian law which inter alia prohibits sentencing and executions without prior judgment
by a regularly constituted court that offers essential guarantees of independence and
impartiality.129
94. On 20 April, OHCHR met with the ‘deputy chair’ of the ‘supreme court’ of ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ and was informed that ‘courts’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ continue
application of procedural laws of Ukraine so far as they are not in contradiction with the
‘constitution’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
95. OHCHR was also informed that in 2015, the ‘courts’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
took up 5,247 pre-conflict criminal cases against 6,003 individuals, including 777 detainees,
which had been interrupted by the conflict and the evacuation of courts to Governmentcontrolled
territory. Reportedly, 4,763 cases against 5,439 defendants were examined by the
‘courts’ as of April 2017.130 OHCHR was not able to verify whether the detainees concerned
had been granted any procedural rights and safeguards. OHCHR is aware of a case involving
a pre-conflict detainee whose trial began in 2014.131 In 2015, a ‘court’ of ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ convicted and sentenced the defendant to four years and six months imprisonment.
One year later, a ‘court of appeal’ returned the case for a new ‘trial’ due to the fact that the
‘investigation’ was carried out under Ukrainian law which did not comply with ‘legislation’
of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. The defendant has spent a total of five years in detention and
the ‘retrial’ has not yet commenced.
96. As of 15 May, a prominent religious scholar, Ihor Kozlovskyi, remained in
‘detention’ in Donetsk.132 He was deprived of his liberty on 27 January 2016 and held
incommunicado until 29 January 2016, when his wife was informed that the ‘MGB’ was
detaining him. HRMMU was able to monitor the “hearings” in his case before a ‘military
tribunal’, and on 3 May observed the pronouncement of the ‘judgment’ and ‘sentence’ of two
years and eight months in a high-security prison on conviction of illegal possession of
weapons. Notably, that 'court' imposed maximum penalty in his case - imprisonment in a
penal colony, although the 'prosecutor' requested to send him to a colony-settlement (lesser
security and control, where prisoners are allowed to go outside of the settlement and visit
their families etc.).
97. Parallel structures reportedly also conducted ‘investigations’ into human rights
abuses. On 17 March, the ‘chair’ of the ‘supreme court’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
reported a ‘sentence’ imposed against a Ukrainian police officer for torturing supporters of
129 Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions; Article 6, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions;
Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I, Rule 100.
130 HRMMU meeting, 20 April 2017.
131 HRMMU interview, 3 March 2017.
132 HRMMU interview, 6 April 2017.
“I cannot summon Zakharchenko's soldiers for questioning.”
- Father of victim of summary execution by members of ‘Oplot’ armed
group in Donetsk, quoting an ‘investigator’ on the case
24
armed groups.133 On 20 April, the ‘deputy chair’ of the ‘supreme court’ informed OHCHR
about 46 ‘criminal cases’ against 82 ‘officials’ of ‘law enforcement bodies’ for alleged human
rights abuses which had been or were being examined by ‘courts’ of ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. She also indicated that 24 such ‘officials’ had been ‘sentenced’ in nine ‘criminal
cases’. On 3 March, the ‘prosecutor general’s office’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ placed a
former member of the ‘ministry of state security’ on a ‘wanted list’ in relation to charges of
abduction, arbitrary detention, and death threats.134
98. OHCHR collected credible accounts demonstrating a lack of effective remedy for
victims of human rights abuses through parallel structures. An illustrative case is that of a
local businessman killed on 8 November 2014 in Donetsk, allegedly by members of ‘Oplot’
battalion. The ‘office of the military prosecutor’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ started an
investigation, which reportedly identified three witnesses – members of the ‘Oplot’ battalion.
Progress, however, seems to have stalled due to reluctance of investigators to summon
members of the battalion for interrogation.135
IV. Fundamental freedoms
A. Freedom of movement
99. This reporting period saw a sharp increase in the number of people crossing the
contact line, with a daily average of 29,000 crossings and a peak of 45,200 in March136 –
which was substantially higher than in previous months.137 In the second half of March,
OHCHR observed alarming situations at all five crossing routes in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions. In ‘Marinka’ corridor, where the road is the narrowest, hundreds of cars were
queuing in four lines. People complained of corruption on both sides of the contact line, and
about long waiting hours in degrading conditions (for example, without shelter, exposed to
extreme temperatures, with limited access to potable water and toilets, sometimes carrying
cumbersome luggage) including at night, when the risk of shelling is high.138 This increase of
movement was caused by the new requirement for IDPs entitled to pensions and social
payments to renew their bank registration. The current regulations demand that pensioners
registered in territory controlled by armed groups register as IDPs and undergo a number of
verification processes in order to realize their constitutional right to social protection (see
Situation of internally displaced persons below).
133 https://dan-news.info/ukraine/sud-dnr-vpervye-zaochno-prigovoril-sotrudnika-mvd-ukrainy-k-14-godamlisheniya-
svobody.html.
134 Website of the ‘prosecutor general’s office’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ (available at http://gplnr.su/vnimanierozysk/
2186-denisov-boris-aleksandrovich.html).
135 HRMMU interview, 28 February 2017.
136 Daily numbers provided by the State Border Guard Service, available at http://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/news/1490249414-
situaciya-v-kontrolnih-punktah-vizdu-viizdu-na-linii-rozmezhuvannya/.
137 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 November 2016 to 15
February 2017. During that period, between 16,000 and 25,000 civilians crossed the contact line daily.
138 HRMMU visits, 13, 17, 20, 23 and 24 March 2017.
“We had to stay overnight in the queue of cars that wasn't moving at all. You can hear the
shooting there. I don't care who started it all! I just want to see my daughter!”
- Elderly resident of a village near Donetsk airport
25
100. Movement across the contact line has also been affected by a number of legislative
changes regulating the transfer of goods,139 as well as amendments introduced on 14 April to
the Temporary Order which regulates movement of people.140 The major positive outcome of
the amendments is that permits for crossing the contact line will no longer expire. It is,
however, important to ensure that previously-issued permits will also be recognized as
indefinitely valid. Another welcome development is that residents of settlements adjacent to
the contact line on the Government-controlled side will no longer need a permit to cross (as
previously required). This is not, however, foreseen for those living close to the contact line
on armed-group controlled territory.
101. On the other hand, other recent changes to the Temporary Order related to
invalidation of a permit and to the refusal to allow a person to cross the contact line into
Government-controlled territory are of concern. The clause which invalidates a permit if there
is information that its holder facilitated an offence or another person’s evasion of
responsibility141 is vague and does not indicate how the holder would be notified regarding
such information. Also of concern is that the State Border Guard Service can deny entry to a
person leaving armed-group controlled territory who “fails to prove the purpose of entering
the Government-controlled territory”.142 Finally, OHCHR noted with regret that public
passenger transportation across the contact line remained prohibited.
102. Recognizing that, in exceptional circumstances, the necessity to protect national
security and public order may justify certain restrictions on freedom of movement, OHCHR
notes that some measures may still be assessed as unnecessary and disproportionate. This is
the case with the prohibition of travel in certain types of vehicles and the strict limitations on
type and quantity of personal belongings allowed to be transferred which are set by the
Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories. Such restrictions also create space for undue
discretion and broad interpretation, providing grounds for corruption. This is at odds with the
Government’s Action Plan defining State policy towards citizens living in territory controlled
by armed groups, which prioritizes fighting corruption at the contact line and improvements
of crossing procedures.143
103. Restrictions on freedom of movement have a severe impact on the realization of
social and economic rights, as described below in Chapter V. For example, for security
reasons, residents of Pisky144 who fled the area due to hostilities in 2014 are denied access to
the village and cannot reunite with their families, check on their property, or farm their lands.
The few who remained in the village are isolated and fully dependent on Ukrainian military
personnel for delivery of potable water, bread, gas cylinders and electricity supplied from
generators. Dolomitne village (controlled by armed groups) has become isolated since the
Ukrainian Armed Forces closed the road to the neighbouring village of Novoluhanske
(Government-controlled) on 1 January 2017. The village has no grocery store, pharmacy,
clinic, or public transportation, and the mobile phone connection is poor.
139 Resolution No. 99 of Cabinet of Ministers ‘On establishing the order of transferring goods to or out of the antiterrorist
operation area’, 1 March 2017, available at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/cardnpd?docid=249790429;
Order No. 39 of the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs ‘On defining the list and amount of
goods allowed for transferring to/from humanitarian-logistics centres and across the contact line’, 24 March 2017,
available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0417-17.
140 Temporary Order on the control of movement of people across the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions
(entered into force as of 21 January 2015), available with latest changes approved by the ‘Centre of the Anti-
Terrorist Operation at the Security Service of Ukraine’, available at https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/pages/32.
141 Ibid, para. 7.9, point 3.
142 Ibid, para. 5.9.
143 The Cabinet of Ministers Action Plan aimed at implementing some principles of internal policy in specific areas
of Donetsk and Luhansk regions where public authorities temporarily do not exercise their powers, as of 11 January
2017.
144 A Government-controlled settlement in Donetsk region, in the immediate proximity to the contact line, 13
kilometres from Donetsk airport.
26
B. Freedom of opinion and expression
104. OHCHR notes an ongoing deterioration of freedom of opinion and expression in
conflict-affected parts of Ukraine, particularly in territory controlled by armed groups who
continued to block Ukrainian broadcasting, including through a ban of over 350 websites,145
and to restrict access to printed Ukrainian media. On both sides of the contact line, OHCHR
observed intimidation of, and attacks on media representatives and outlets, as well as selfcensorship
among journalists and bloggers.
105. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, 645 criminal proceedings were
registered regarding the obstruction of journalist activities during 2013-2016 across the
country. Half of these cases were terminated during the pre-trial investigation phase. Only 7.1
per cent (46 cases) have been transferred to courts so far. OHCHR reiterates that effective
investigation of violations against journalists would provide a more secure media
environment and improve public trust in the judiciary.
106. OHCHR observed worrying signs in the domain of access to public information and
open data for the general population, and particularly for investigative journalists in Ukraine.
On 23 March, the apartments in Kyiv of the Chief Executive Officer of “Youcontrol”
company, which monitors open data financial reports, were searched by SBU.146
“Youcontrol” is used by many anti-corruption non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
investigative journalists.147 In light of amendments to the law on anti-corruption adopted on
23 March (see paragraph 112 below), OHCHR recalls that transparent information flow
should be ensured, and organizations providing access to information and promoting
accountability should be shielded from political interference or intimidation.
Territory controlled by armed groups
107. Hennadiy Benytskyi, a blogger detained by ‘MGB’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ in
December 2016, was reportedly released on 14 March. Journalists who have been granted
‘accreditation’ must still inform the ‘press department’ of the ‘ministry of foreign affairs’ if
they plan to visit areas close to the contact line.
108. Even ‘accredited’ journalists were not always permitted access to all areas they
wished to visit. When crossing checkpoints, journalists have been exposed to arbitrary
demands, such as being required to show their footage, questioned about the purpose of their
mission, or subjected to searches of personal belongings. A foreign media representative
informed OHCHR that he had realized he should not report about “provocative” issues in
order to be allowed to enter again, and that he avoids filming in certain locations or covering
certain topics such as the seizure of commercial property by armed groups.
109. Access to information and Ukrainian internet services remained restricted. After
armed groups in ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ seized control of the provider Ukrtelekom on 1
March, customers had intermittent or no internet access. On 21 April, the ‘minister of
communications’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ announced that the ability to call emergency
145 Statement of OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović, available at
http://www.osce.org/fom/295336.
146 The investigation is based on the Shevchenkivskyi district court of Kyiv decision on 3 March 2017 that
“YouControl” illegally used an open state register in violation of the criminal code.
147 HRMMU interview, 30 March 2017.
“Many people do not understand how we can work on both sides of the contact line.
People say that we have to choose one side and report from there.”
- Journalist working in Donetsk region
27
services (ambulance, police, fire-fighters) on short numbers (101, 102, 103, 104) was no
longer available for customers using mobile operator “MTS-Ukraine” on territory controlled
by ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ armed groups.148 Although envisaged in the Government
Action Plan149, access to Ukrainian and international information material in territory
controlled by armed groups and at checkpoints remained limited.
C. Freedom of association, peaceful assembly, and religion or belief
110. OHCHR noted an improvement in the policing and security provided for various
anniversary and commemorative events throughout Ukraine. The Maidan commemorations,
at the end of February, were held peacefully, with isolated disturbances. OHCHR also
observed improved law enforcement measures at the 2 May commemoration in Odesa, which
prevented clashes. While the commemoration events of 9 May, which attracted approximately
600,000 participants around Ukraine, were generally peaceful, some were marred by minor
skirmishes in several big cities, including Dnipro, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia,
resulting in bodily injuries of 32 people, the detention of 89 people and the initiation of 19
criminal proceedings.
111. Over the reporting period, OHCHR noted a worrisome development in the
regulation of activities of NGOs in Ukraine. On 23 March, the Parliament voted for
amendments to the Law ‘On prevention of corruption’, which extend financial disclosure
requirements, normally applicable to civil servants, to anti-corruption NGOs.150 The
amendments include several ambiguous provisions and definitions, which may be subject to
broad interpretation or abuse. The amendments could have a chilling effect on civic anticorruption
activity, as a very broad range of entities may fall within its scope.151 OHCHR is
concerned that the amendments are discriminatory in nature, targeting anti-corruption NGOs,
and may violate the right to privacy of their staff.152
Territory controlled by armed groups
112. In territory controlled by armed groups, the space for civil society, media, and
religious and humanitarian organizations remained considerably restricted. ‘Authorities’ of
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ reminded religious organizations to provide documents to
reconfirm their registration and legal status by 18 May 2017. While no sanction for violation
of the deadline was announced, OHCHR is concerned about the possible forceful expulsion of
those operating without ‘confirmation’.
113. Freedom of peaceful assembly in territory controlled by armed groups has also
steadily deteriorated. Since the armed groups seized control, no pro-Ukrainian demonstrations
or open protests against the armed groups have taken place. For assemblies which do occur in
Donetsk, participants are transported in buses in an organized manner, indicating that some
attendance, for example by students and employees of ‘state’ enterprises, may not be fully
voluntary.
148 See http://lug-info.com/news/one/abonenty-mts-ukraina-bolshe-ne-mogut-zvonit-na-korotkie-nomeraekstrennykh-
sluzhb-lnr-23646.
149 Cabinet of Ministers Action Plan aimed at implementing some principles of internal policy in specific areas of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions where public authorities temporarily do not exercise their powers.
150 Draft law No. 6172 ‘On amendments to article 3 of the law on prevention of corruption’.
151 Not only do staff members and experts of anti-corruption NGOs and donor and implementing organizations fall
under the new provisions, but so do their contractors and service-providers.
152 The required e-declarations require automatic disclosure of a significant amount of personal data.
28
D. Discrimination against persons belonging to minorities
114. Various sources, including human rights defenders and civil society activists,
reported about the forced displacement of a Roma community in Kyiv in early April.153
Violent threats and searches conducted by unknown individuals wearing balaclavas occurred
in a Roma camp located in Berezniaky district on 30 March. Fearing persecution, the Roma
left the camp, which was then completely destroyed by fire on 6 April. As a result,
approximately 150 members of the Roma community have been displaced. Authorities were
not able to provide information on the cause of the fire, and no investigation154 into the
incident was being conducted. OHCHR urges local authorities in Kyiv to prevent forced
displacement, conduct proper investigations into this incident, and ensure the victims the right
to an effective remedy, including access to compensation. OHCHR is further concerned about
the lack of investigation in the case concerning the forced eviction of Roma families in the
Loshchynivka case in Odesa region.155
V. Economic and social rights
115. The conflict in eastern Ukraine has not only induced humanitarian needs among
affected communities, but also aggravated a number of pre-existing systemic issues which
worsened human suffering in general, and the situation of the most vulnerable in particular.
Certain Government-imposed restrictions further aggravated the distress of some three
million people living in territory controlled by armed groups and these unnecessary
impediments may be perceived as punishment for not fleeing these areas.
116. Access to and quality of water in armed-group controlled territory of Luhansk region
is of great concern. A functioning mechanism for payment for water supplied by a public
utility on Government-controlled territory to territory controlled by armed groups has not
been effectively implemented,156 and the water supply company continues operating while
accumulating large debts for electricity use. On 25 April, a private power-supply enterprise,
“Luhansk Energy Union”, cut off electricity supply to armed-group controlled territory. In
addition, on 4 May, due to a broken pipe, a water company stopped supplying safe drinking
water to some 460,000 in Luhansk region, 410,000 of whom reside in territory controlled by
armed groups. The ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ immediately began using alternative sources
of water and power supply, including electricity from the Russian Federation. Those sources,
however, are considered not sustainable, and the quality of the water is questionable. This is
especially worrisome for the summer season, when lack of quantity or quality of water can
lead to spread of infectious diseases. This is of concern also for Donetsk region where people
on both sides of the contact line suffer from irregular water supply due to frequent damages of
water infrastructure (see International humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities above).
153 See appeal concerning the events, referring to its character as “ethnic cleansing”, available at
http://www.irf.ua/allevents/news/zayava_schodo_podiy_u_kievi_yaki_nosyat_kharakter_etnichnikh_chistok/”.
154 According to the Advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs, there is no investigation because no one filed a
complaint with the police and there are no applicants or victims.
155 OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 November 2016 to 15
February 2017, para. 124; OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16
August to 15 November 2016, para. 152.
156 A mechanism was established on 25 August 2016 by the economic sub-group of the Trilateral Contact Group in
Minsk but has not functioned consistently. According to agreement No. 16-15, Limited Liability Company
‘Dzherelo Novoho Zhyttia’ transfers payments for water from armed-group controlled territory to the public utility
company ‘Popasnianskyi Vodokanal’ on Government-controlled territory. As of 1 April 2017, the debt of ‘Dzherelo
Novoho Zhyttia’ to ‘Popasnianskyi Vodokanal’ was 28,521,634 UAH.
29
A. Right to social protection
117. Despite numerous consultations at various levels, the Government has not yet
addressed the issue of payment of pensions to all eligible citizens of Ukraine. At least
160,000 pensioners residing in territory controlled by armed groups did not receive their
pensions between December 2014 and December 2016157 because they were not registered as
IDPs, as required by Government resolutions adopted in November 2014.158 Those who did
register as IDPs were subjected to a cumbersome verification procedure159 which, in 2016,
resulted in the discontinuance of pension payments for 43 per cent of eligible IDPs (over
400,000 people). In its 2016 annual report, the Pension Fund of Ukraine presented this result
as “a cost-saving achievement”.160
118. OHCHR reiterates that linking pension payments with IDP registration, as well as
suspending them as a result of consecutive verification procedures, contradicts Ukrainian
national legislation, its international obligations, and certain decisions of domestic courts161 as
well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.162
119. OHCHR welcomes the recommendation for a mechanism of payment of pensions
by the working group of the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPsThe
mechanism would allow pensioners residing in territory controlled by armed groups to apply
for their pension in any office of the Pension Fund (on Government-controlled territory), with
no requirement to be registered as IDPs. For pensioners with mobility constraints, the
recommendation is to reserve funds to cover their pension payments while working with
international organizations to design an acceptable payment mechanism. A procedure of
physical verification of pensioners is also envisaged in the proposal.
120. On 15 March, the blockade of cargo across the contact line initiated by former
members of the ‘Aidar’ and ‘Donbas’ volunteer battalions during the previous reporting
period163 was legitimized by the Government.164 On 1 March, armed groups of ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ seized control of, and introduced
‘temporary external management’ of approximately 54 enterprises in territory under their
control, including several private and commercial metallurgic factories and coal mines,
hotels, a stadium, the offices of a humanitarian organization, as well as railways. These
actions left thousands of people with uncertainty about their employment and livelihood. A
number of enterprises on both sides of the contact line, including power thermal plants, have
157 As of August 2014, 1,278,200 pensioners were registered in armed-group controlled territory of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions. From that time until December 2016, 1,118,200 pensioners residing in these areas applied for
pension in the Government-controlled territory, which implies that at least 160,000 eligible pensioners have not
applied for their pension since August 2014.
158 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 595 on ‘Certain issues of financing state institutions, paying of social
benefits to the population, and providing financial support to certain enterprises and organizations in Donetsk and
Luhansk regions’ as of 7 November 2014, available at
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/cardnpd?docid=247734847, and Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 637
‘On making social payments to internally displaced persons’ as of 5 November 2014, available at
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/637-2014-%D0%BF.
159 See Situation of internally displaced persons below.
160 Financial and statistical indicators of the Pension Fund in 2016, available at
http://www.pfu.gov.ua/pfu/doccatalog/document;jsessionid=951F213D2DA7A695E0FC97EBBF1FAEB7.app2?id=
277122.
161 Decision of High Administrative Court of Ukraine, 2015, available at http://document.ua/pro-viznannjaprotipravnoyu-
ta-skasuvannja-postanovi-kabinet-doc248223.html; Two decisions of Pavlohrad city district court of
Dnipropetrovsk region, 2017, available at http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/64542884 and
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/64542918; Decision of Donetsk Appellate Administrative Court, 2017, available
at http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/65383449; Decision of Dnipropetrovsk Appellate Administrative Court,
2017, available at http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/65383315.
162 Pichkur v. Ukraine (2013), App. 10441/06.
163 OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 August to 15 November
2016, para. 109.
164 Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine “On urgent additional measures to counter
hybrid threats to the national security of Ukraine”, available at http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/documents/441.html.
30
reduced or stopped operations, lacking access to sales markets, or coal, or required raw
materials from beyond the contact line.165 According to available information, workers in
territory controlled by armed groups receive irregular pay. For many on both sides of the
contact line, salary has been significantly cut since the Government prohibited all cargo
movement across the contact line and the armed groups took control over the enterprises.
121. Furthermore, some 22,000 Ukrainian railway employees in armed-group-controlled
territory in Donetsk and Luhansk regions have not received a salary since March 2017.166
Their employer, the Ukrainian public railway company ‘Ukrazaliznytsia’, has neither
dismissed them nor notified them of the termination of payments. They continued working to
support infrastructure and maintain operation of railway connections within territory
controlled by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ armed groups.
OHCHR encourages the Government to undertake all necessary measures to prevent the
increase of unemployment and ensure social guarantees for workers.
B. Situation of internally displaced persons
122. Many IDPs continued to face bureaucratic impediments and discrimination due to
various legislative acts adopted since the beginning of the conflict. Being deprived of political
rights, subjected to regular checks by authorities, and facing disproportionate hardship in
accessing basic public services, IDPs are at risk of becoming marginalized in society, further
deepening their dependence on external aid. After three years of the displacement crisis, the
Government is still struggling to elaborate a comprehensive and durable strategy for IDPs,
including for their socio-economic integration, especially as the conflict lingers without a
foreseeable end. Yet, according to a recent study, 88 per cent of IDPs said they are partially or
fully integrated into the local community.167
123. In March 2017, OHCHR observed long queues at Oshchadbank branches, the only
bank where IDP pensioners are entitled to receive their payments. This was largely due to a
compulsory, Government-imposed identification process for IDP pensioners at the bank.168
IDPs reportedly received text messages from the bank informing them that their payments
would be suspended unless they complete ‘identification’ at the relevant bank branches in
Government-controlled territory by 3 April 2017. Consequently, long queues at checkpoints
registered a record in March, with over 960,000 crossings compared with 550,000 in February
(see Freedom of movement above). Some people travelling from territory controlled by
armed groups needed up to three days to complete the identification, and were forced to stay
overnight in Government-controlled territory at their own expense.169
124. On 22 March, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine postponed the deadline for
completion of the identification process to 1 May 2017, and Oshchadbank took some positive
165 HRMMU interviews across the country on 4 April, 15-16 May 2017, field visits on 17 and 19 May 2017.
166 HRMMU interview, 26 April 2017.
167 IOM National Monitoring System Report “On the Situation of Internally Displaced Persons” covering the period
of February-March 2017.
168 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No 167, 14 March 2016.
169 OCHA humanitarian snapshot from 3 April 2017, available at
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/infographic/ukraine-humanitarian-snapshot-03-april-
2017.
“The IDP pensioners got a text message that on 3 April all their money will turn into
pumpkin.”
- NGO worker from Kramatorsk, commenting on
the identification procedure
31
steps to ease the process.170 Yet, OHCHR maintains that the requirement to undergo
identification, applied only to IDP pensioners, is discriminatory and creates unreasonable
additional barriers for accessing pensions, besides causing hardship for hundreds of thousands
Ukrainians having to cross the contact line.
125. Further hardship is expected due to the potential suspension of payment of pensions
and social allowances to IDPs following the issuance of new lists by SBU. OHCHR received
information that in March 2017, local departments of the Ministry of Social Policy received
lists171 of people registered as IDPs in their area who allegedly stayed outside of Governmentcontrolled
territory for over 60 days with instructions to these departments to suspend
payment of their pensions and benefits pending “verification”. OHCHR recalls the negative
impact of the previous IDP verification initiated by the Government in February 2016, and
warns of hardships that the continuation of such practice would bring, including forced
returns. According to a recent survey, 58 per cent of IDPs stated they did not visit territory
controlled by armed groups after displacement, and only one per cent voiced their intention to
return to their place of origin in the near future.172
126. IDPs, along with internal labour migrants,173 continued to be deprived of their
political right to influence self-governance bodies by exercising their voting rights. Although
eligible to vote in national elections, their participation in local elections is limited.174 Under
Ukrainian law175 a citizen’s voting address is his/her registered permanent place of residence.
Thus, people whose permanent residence is in territory controlled by armed groups cannot
exercise their voting rights. Recalling that it is vital to create favourable conditions for equal
participation of IDPs in matters of national and local importance,176 OHCHR welcomes
legislative initiatives aimed at ensuring voting rights of IDPs and other internal migrants,
specifically the newly registered draft law prepared by representatives of civil society and
international organizations which would enable citizens to establish their temporary current
residence as their voting address.177
170 Oshchadbank opened a mobile office near entry-exit points in Kurakhove and Volnovakha and arranged buses to
transport people from the central department to other offices.
171 The lists are based on data provided by the State Border Guard Service which registers IDPs crossing the contact
line and the state borders of Ukraine.
172 The main reason for this was the perception that it was “dangerous for life”. IOM National Monitoring System
Report “On the Situation of Internally Displaced Persons” covering the period of February-March 2017.
173 According to a study conducted by IOM, in 2014-2015 the number of internal labour migrants in Ukraine
exceeded 1.6 million or nine per cent of the economically active population of the country, while internal migration
demonstrated a stable tendency of increase. More information available at
http://iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/ff_ukr_21_10_press.pdf.
174 Law No. 1706-VII adopted by Parliament in June 2015 requires that IDPs establish permanent residence in the
oblast in which they are based. However many are understandably reluctant to do so for fear of losing their property
in territory controlled by armed groups.
175 Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine “On State Register of voters.”
176 United Nations Guiding principles on internal displacement, principle 22(1)(d) states “Internally displaced
persons, whether or not they are living in camps, shall not be discriminated against as a result of their displacement
in the enjoyment of the following rights: The right to vote and to participate in governmental and public affairs,
including the right to have access to the means necessary to exercise this right.”
177 Draft law No. 6240 “On voting rights of internally displaced persons and other mobile citizens inside the country”
registered on 27 March in Parliament.
32
C. Housing, land, and property rights
127. Housing needs of the affected population are becoming increasingly acute as
prolonged displacement outlasts individual savings and available assistance. While housing
support for IDPs provides assistance in covering utility bills, Government authorities did little
to protect IDPs against forced evictions from collective centres and often did not offer
reasonable alternatives.
128. The lack of a compensation mechanism for damaged or destroyed property
compounded the situation, and remains one of the biggest concerns among the conflictaffected
population. OHCHR supports the current work of the Ministry of Temporarily
Occupied Territories and IDPs on the elaboration of a long-term restitution concept and
reiterates that this should be embedded in a comprehensive national housing strategy.
129. On 23 March, Parliament adopted amendments to the law on IDPs,178 according to
which IDPs residing in collective centres179 will be charged for utilities at standard rates
applied to the population and not the higher rates applicable to legal entities, as was often the
practice before (since collective centres operate as legal entities).
130. While OHCHR welcomes these positive steps in the domain of IDP housing,
negative trends in the administration of collective centres across Ukraine, and related
violations of the right to adequate housing of IDPs, such as security of tenure, remain. In
Kyiv, OHCHR observed negative implications for the security of tenure and adequate living
standards due to attempts by owners to evict IDPs, as well as the local authorities’ inability to
offer IDPs adequate housing opportunities. On 20 March, six unknown people dressed as
construction workers entered the collective centre “Dzherelo” (Kyiv region) in an attempt to
evict IDPs. The men, allegedly paid by the owner of the collective centre, damaged electricity
lines, broke windows and doors in the IDPs’ rooms, and harassed the IDPs.180
131. Right to adequate housing and property rights continued to be tightly connected to
the displacement patterns in Ukraine. According to a recent study, 78 per cent of returnees
mentioned ownership of private property and the absence of rent payment as the main
reasons for their return.181 Among IDPs, housing remains the most needed type of support.182
D. Humanitarian situation
132. Provision of humanitarian assistance remained challenging in territory controlled by
armed groups in the eastern regions. Humanitarian access to persons in need continued to be
seriously hampered by the ‘accreditation’ system imposed by armed groups. The termination
of operations of both an international and national humanitarian organization in armed groupcontrolled
territory of Donetsk region negatively impacted vulnerable groups and persons
with scarce economic resources.
178 Law of Ukraine ‘On amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On ensuring the rights and freedoms of IDPs’
concerning the right of IDPs to receive utility services’, draft law No. 2481 of 27 March 2015.
179 Such as modular houses, camps, dormitories, sanatoriums, hotels, etc.
180 HRMMU interview, 28 April 2017.
181 IOM National Monitoring System Report “On the Situation of Internally Displaced Persons” covering the period
of February-March 2017.
182 According to 84 per cent of key informants. IOM National Monitoring System Report “On the Situation of
Internally Displaced Persons” covering the period February-March 2017.
“‘People live here’ is written on many gates. It is just to make sure that you don’t find
some soldiers living in your house when you come back from shopping.”
- Resident of a village near the contact line
33
133. The space for humanitarian actors to operate shrank particularly when a major
humanitarian organization providing assistance for people living in territory controlled by
armed groups of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ was forced to halt operations. On 28 February,
armed groups entered the main Donetsk office and warehouses of “Pomozhem” humanitarian
centre183 of Rinat Akhmetov’s Foundation and blocked its operations throughout the territory
under its control. Staff and volunteers no longer had access to the premises, humanitarian aid
or stocks.184 In a number of interviews, people residing in these areas stated they depend on
this assistance for survival. According to the Centre, 500,000 individuals were affected by the
disruption of its work. According to the latest Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis, an
estimated 620,000 people in the Donbas are food insecure, nearly 38,000 are IDPs.185
134. Of particular concern are the increasing large-scale humanitarian and human rights
consequences of hostilities in Avdiivka (Government-controlled) and Donetsk city (armedgroup-
controlled). Interruptions and cuts to power supply, and consequently to water and
heating, endanger the right to an adequate standard of living of hundreds of thousands
civilians on both sides of the contact line, threatening in particular the lives and health of the
most vulnerable individuals, such as those living in social protection institutions.
135. Humanitarian and human rights activists operating in Government-controlled
territory also described impediments created by police and servicemen at checkpoints, such as
demands for permits and other documents not legally/officially required, which may
exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the conflict zone.
E. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
136. OHCHR welcomes steps undertaken to reform the health care system and commends
the launch of the State programme ‘Affordable medications’186 which enables patients with
heart diseases, diabetes and asthma to obtain medication without payment. OHCHR
encourages the Government to take further targeted steps to improve the right to health, and
in particular, to consider the draft law “On state financial guarantees for providing medical
services” and to adopt the national targeted programme to fight tuberculosis. OHCHR also
commends measures instituted to subordinate medical personnel in detention facilities to the
Ministry of Healthcare.187
137. At the same time, OHCHR observed that essential elements of the right to health,
such as availability, accessibility (to everyone without any discrimination) and quality of
health care, were not always granted in the vicinity of the contact line. Villages on both sides
remain isolated, with disproportionate restrictions of freedom of movement (see Freedom of
movement above). In some areas, one medical practitioner served several hundred188 to
several thousand189 people, with the nearest emergency room located 20 to 30 kilometres
away from the settlement. In villages such as Dolomitne, Nevelske, Novooleksandrivka,
Opytne, Pisky, Roty, and Vidrodzhennia, medical care is inaccessible: there is no doctor or
paramedic, and ambulances are either not allowed to enter by Ukrainian Armed Forces or
armed groups, or would not come in the evening or at night due to the security situation. In
Vidrodzhennia, a woman told OHCHR she had had to pay to fill the gas tank of an ambulance
183 The Humanitarian Center was the main distributor of humanitarian aid in non-Government-controlled areas since
the beginning of the conflict. It provided about 11,700,000 food parcels to vulnerable categories of people, assisting
up to 1 million beneficiaries.
184 http://www.fdu.org.ua/news/26105.
185 http://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/food-security-and-vulnerability-analysis-february-2017.
186 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 152 ‘On the provision of availability of medical means as of 17 March
2017, available at http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/152-2017-%D0%BF.
187 OHCHR report on the human right situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 November 2016 to 15
February 2017, para. 167(h).
188 Such as Sopyne and Lebedynske. HRMMU field visit, 23 February 2017.
189 Such as Holmivskyi, Horlivskyi district. HRMMU field visit, 9 March 2017.
34
in order to be transported to a medical facility.190 In areas which ambulances are not allowed
to access or where public transportation is not available, civilians must rely on military
personnel or members of armed groups to be transported to hospital.
138. The armed conflict also affected the right to healthy natural and workplace
environments.191 Water treatment facilities in territory controlled by armed groups are in
critical shortage of personal protection equipment (PPE) for hazardous materials incidents.
The equipment, which is supplied from Dnipro, has not been approved for transport across the
contact line as humanitarian delivery due to its potential “dual use”.
139. The ban on cargo movement across the contact line also complicated supply of PPE
for coal miners from Donetsk to Government-controlled territory. Coupled with the failure to
evacuate the mine rescue equipment back in 2014, it resulted in a critical lack of PPE and
rescue equipment in coal mines in western Ukraine. OHCHR was informed that the ‘Stepova’
coal mine in Lviv region has a 60 per cent shortage of PPE.192 On 2 March, an accident at this
mine resulted in 31 casualties. An investigative commission of the Cabinet of Ministers
concluded that the main reason for the accident was substandard equipment.193
VI. Human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
city of Sevastopol
140. OHCHR deplores the lack of access to Crimea. It nevertheless continued to record
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law affecting people residing in the
peninsula, including non-respect of fair trial guarantees, retroactive application of criminal
law, forced transfers of protected persons from Crimea to the Russian Federation, death in
detention, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the absence of
access to mechanisms for effective remedy. Concerns also exist regarding protection of the
right to property and education in native language.
A. Administration of justice and fair trial rights
141. Crimean courts discontinued all judicial proceedings under Ukrainian law and
retroactively applied criminal legislation of the Russian Federation during the re-examination
190 HRMMU interview, 6 April 2017.
191 In line with article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights calls on States to adopt “… preventive measures
in respect of occupational accidents and diseases; the requirement to ensure an adequate supply of safe and potable
water and basic sanitation; the prevention and reduction of the population’s exposure to harmful substances such as
radiation and harmful chemicals or other detrimental environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact
upon human health. Furthermore, industrial hygiene refers to the minimization, so far as is reasonably practicable, of
the causes of health hazards inherent in the working environment…”, available at
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf.
192 HRMMU interview, 4 April 2017.
193 Preliminary results of the Cabinet of Ministers’ inspection, available at
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=249831971&cat_id=244276429.
“Everyone can get into trouble there, especially Crimean Tatars.”
- Crimean Tatar IDP residing in Odesa
35
of individual cases, which contravenes the international humanitarian law principle to
continue using the penal laws in place before occupation.194
142. During the reporting period, several court decisions were issued in apparent
disregard for fair trial guarantees in relation to members of the Crimean Tatar community
and one defense lawyer.
143. On 21 February, a Crimean Tatar man from Kamenka was sentenced by a Crimean
court to 11 days of administrative detention for posting on a social media network, in 2013,
material featuring an organization prohibited in the Russian Federation.195 In a similar case, a
Crimean Tatar man from Bakhchysarai was sentenced to 12 days of administrative detention
for having uploaded on a social media network in 2011-2012 material featuring an
organization prohibited in the Russian Federation and four folk songs of a Chechen singer
containing anti-Russian rhetoric.196 In both cases the judges found the defendants guilty of
promoting extremism and disregarded the fact that the alleged violations took place before
the implementation of Russian Federation laws in Crimea. OHCHR recalls that the
retroactive application of penal law violates international humanitarian and international
human rights law.197
144. Mass arrests were conducted by police in Crimean Tatar neighbourhoods. On 21
February, 10 Crimean Tatars who were filming the police search of a home belonging to a
Crimean Tatar man suspected of extremism were arrested. They were found guilty of
breaching public order and impeding the movement of civilians, and sentenced to five days
of administrative arrest. The judgments were passed in separate trials in one day and, at least
for some, in violation of fair trial standards: no representatives of the prosecution were
present; two men were convicted in the absence of lawyers; and in at least one proceeding the
judge ignored the public retraction of a witness statement supporting the claim that the
individuals were breaching public order and freedom of movement. 198 On 13 April, the police
carried out a raid in Bakhchysarai and arrested two Crimean Tatars for posting “extremist
materials” on a social network. Five other Crimean Tatars who had gathered on the street
watching the police raid were arrested and charged with “unauthorized public gathering”. All
seven men were sentenced, six to administrative detention (from two to ten days) and one to
a monetary fine. During the court hearings, several of the individuals were denied the right to
legal representation and told that they had no right to a lawyer.199
145. On 14 February, the supreme court of Crimea dismissed the appeal of Russian
Federation lawyer Nikolay Polozov against the decision of a first instance court200 in
Simferopol allowing an FSB investigator to interrogate him as a witness in a criminal case
concerning one of his clients, Ilmi Umerov, the Deputy Chairman of Mejlis. On the basis of
this initial court decision, Nikolay Polozov had forcefully been taken by security officials
from his hotel in Simferopol to the FSB Crimea headquarters on 25 January and questioned
by the FSB investigator in Ilmi Umerov’s case.201 The supreme court decision argued that the
194Article 64, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, according to
which, penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or
suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the
application of the present Convention.
195 HRMMU interview, 23 February 2017.
196 To justify the conviction, the judge referred to the “personal evaluation report” drawn up by the head of
Bakhchysarai police, in which the defendant was described as “displaying hatred towards the Russian-speaking
population and supporting anti-Russian propaganda”. HRMMU interview, 5 April 2017.
197 Articles 65 and 67, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949;
Article 15, ICCPR.
198 HRMMU interview, 5 April 2017.
199 HRMMU interview, 21 April 2017.
200 At the request of the FSB, the Kyivskyi district court in Simferopol ruled on 13 December 2016 that Nikolay
Polozov should be compelled to testify as a witness in Ilmi Umerov’s case, despite being his lawyer.
201 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 November 2016 to 15
February 2017, para. 128.
f
36
interrogation of Nikolay Polozov as a witness did not interfere with his rights as a defence
lawyer because it allegedly concerned facts which had happened prior to the moment when
he assumed the defence of his client. OHCHR is gravely concerned by this decision, which
not only undermines the confidentiality of communications between lawyers and their
clients, but also the ability of lawyers to perform their professional functions without
intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interference.202
B. Conditions of detention
146. OHCHR documented several cases of grave ill-treatment of people in detention.
147. On 26 April, a Crimean resident from Kerch who was convicted and began serving
his sentence in Crimea before its temporary occupation by the Russian Federation, cut his
wrists and throat in protest against his planned transfer from a detention facility in Simferopol
to one located in the Republic of Mordovia (Russian Federation). After being hospitalized,
and contrary to medical recommendations, he was transferred on 2 May to the Russian
Federation where he started a hunger strike. OHCHR recalls that the forcible transfer of
Ukrainian detainees to penal colonies and pre-trial detention facilities in the Russian
Federation involves protected persons and therefore constitutes a violation of international
humanitarian law.203
148. On 17 March, the Russian Federation transferred to Ukraine 12 pre-conflict convicts
(11 men and one woman) who were all serving their sentences in Crimea when Russian
Federation authorities took control of the peninsula, and had been subsequently transferred to
various penitentiary institutions in the Russian Federation. Their return to Ukraine is the
result of lengthy negotiations between the Ombudspersons of Ukraine and the Russian
Federation, during which they had agreed to focus efforts on securing the transfer of
Ukrainian citizens who had been sentenced by courts in mainland Ukraine or Crimea before
2014 and wanted to be transferred to mainland Ukraine.
149. OHCHR interviewed all 12 convicts in the pre-trial detention centre in Kharkiv,
from where they will be transferred to penal institutions throughout Ukraine to serve the
remainder of their sentences. They provided accounts of serious human rights violations,
including threats, inhumane conditions of detention, torture, prohibited forms of punishment
including unjustified strips, detention in solitary confinement, harassment and abuse on
ethnic grounds.
150. Following the March 2014 referendum in Crimea, correspondence with mainland
Ukraine was blocked and family visits were denied for weeks. In addition, significant
pressure was placed on detainees by the penitentiary administration to become Russian
Federation citizens. When they refused, they were intimidated, placed in solitary
confinement, and sometimes beaten. The female detainee said personnel of the Simferopol
pre-trial detention centre warned her that she could be killed for her refusal to become a
Russian Federation citizen.204 Compelling the inhabitants of an occupied territory to adopt the
citizenship of the Occupying Power is tantamount to obliging them “to swear allegiance” to
the latter, which is forbidden under international humanitarian law.205
151. OHCHR interlocutors complained about ill-treatment, threats of sexual violence,
and denial of confidential meetings with Ukrainian consuls. Some detainees claimed they
202 See UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 27 August to 7 September 1990, Principles 16 and 22.
203 Articles 49 and 76, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. See
also OHCHR report on the human right situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 November 2016 to 15
February 2017, para. 134-135.
204 HRMMU interview, 21 March 2017.
205 Article 45, Hague Regulations.
37
were ill-treated by prison guards based on their Ukrainian origin. One of them reported that
upon arrival to colony no. 7 in the settlement of Pakino (Vladimir region), he was forced
daily by local prison guards to strip down to his underwear in sub-zero temperatures, after
which they beat him with their fists, legs and batons while using derogatory language.206
152. Both in Crimea and the Russian Federation, medical assistance was reportedly
inadequate. One prisoner was allegedly denied medical treatment in penal colony no. 102 in
Simferopol because he did not have a Russian Federation health insurance.207 OHCHR has
first-hand information that a Crimean inmate, Andrii Levin, died on 6 March 2017 in a penal
colony of the Russian Federation (Tlyustenkhabl, Adygea region) where he had been
transferred from Crimea on 1 November 2015. He was suffering from HIV, tuberculosis,
chronic pancreatitis and chronic paranephritis, and had applied on 16 February 2017 to the
Prosecutor of Adygea complaining that no medical treatment was provided to him. Two other
inmates suffering from serious ailments and transferred from Crimea to the same penal
colony had died in 2016, also due to a reported lack of medical treatment: Valeryi Kerimov
on 8 September 2016, and Dmytro Serpik on 4 December 2016. Under international
humanitarian law provisions, the Occupying Power must provide detainees with medical
attention required by their state of health.208 Failure to provide medical assistance and
healthcare to detainees violates the right to health and may amount to a violation of the right
to life.
C. Military conscription
153. A campaign on the conscription of Crimean residents into the ranks of the Russian
Federation Armed Forces began on 1 April. It is expected that up to 2,400 men will be
conscripted. Since 2014, conscripted Crimean residents have been serving in military units of
the Russian Federation on the territory of the Crimean peninsula. In 2017, for the first time,
they will also be sent to military units in the Russian Federation.209 During a press conference
on 12 April, the Military Commissioner of the Russian Federation in Crimea declared that a
criminal case had been opened against a resident of Crimea who refused to serve in the
Russian Federation army. OHCHR wishes to stress that under the Fourth Geneva Convention
(Article 51), an Occupying Power may not compel civilians in the occupied territory to serve
in its armed or auxiliary forces.
D. Housing, land and property rights
154. The question of housing, land and property in Crimea is sensitive, particularly for
Crimean Tatars who returned from exile starting in the late 1980s. The unmanaged return
process and the perceived injustices in land allocation have led to Crimean Tatars settling on
unoccupied or public land.210 After taking control of the peninsula, the Russian Federation
authorities in Crimea pledged to legalize the unauthorized appropriation of land or allocate
alternative land plots to Crimean Tatars.211
206 HRMMU interview, 21 March 2017.
207 HRMMU interview, 21 March 2017.
208 Article 76, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
209 According to Article 7 of the Treaty of Accession between the Republic of Crimea and the Russian Federation of
18 March 2014, Crimean residents who are called to serve in the Russian Federation Armed Forces will undertake
their military service on the territory of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol until 31 December 2016.
210 See August 2013 Needs Assessment of the OSCE HCNM: “The Integration of Formerly Deported People in
Crimea, Ukraine”, pp. 9-15.
211 On 10 May 2014, the Russian Federation Minister of Crimean Affairs stated at a press conference that the Russian
authorities would deal with cases of unauthorized acquisition of land in Crimea "with full responsibility and caution”;
See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 15 June 2014, para. 320.
38
155. Nevertheless, this issue has not been addressed, and concerns have arisen after legal
steps have been taken by the Russian Federation authorities in Crimea to allow the demolition
of buildings constructed without necessary permits. The most recent decision applied to
Crimea’s capital, Simferopol.212 It envisages that buildings constructed on land plots located
in areas of restricted use, such as public areas and areas near utility facilities, will be torn
down. Similar decisions have been adopted after Crimea’s occupation in other parts of the
peninsula.
156. The demolition of such buildings, ordered by local administrations and special
“demolition commissions”, could result in evictions disproportionately affecting the Crimean
Tatars who, upon their return from deportation, constructed their houses on land plots they
did not own. According to case law of the European Court of Human Rights, any person
risking the loss of his/her home should be able to have the proportionality of the measure
determined by an independent tribunal in light of the relevant principles under Article 8 of the
ECHR.213 OHCHR considers that neither the “commissions on demolition” nor the local
administrations can be regarded as independent tribunals. In the absence of legal safeguards
conforming to international human rights standards, forced evictions constitute a gross
violation of a broad range of human rights, in particular the right to adequate housing and
freedom from arbitrary interference with home and privacy.214 OHCHR recalls the importance
of eliminating forced evictions by inter alia repealing legislation which allows for such
practice and taking measures to ensure the right to security of tenure for all residents.215
157. The confiscation of public and private property, referred to as “nationalization”
under the Russian Federation legislation, which began in Crimea after the referendum in
March 2014216 continued. As of 12 May 2017, 4,575 public and private real estate assets had
been “nationalized”.
158. The Russian Federation authorities took steps to compensate owners of property
“nationalized” since March 2014 by adopting special legislation217 on 28 December 2016.
However, the compensation is limited and does not offer a fair remedy to those affected.
Indeed, the scheme is only applicable to private property218 and excludes individuals accused
of “extremism”. The latter limitation raises particular concerns in view of the arbitrary
application of anti-extremism legislation by the Russian Federation authorities in Crimea. The
amount of compensation will be determined by reference to the market value of the object on
21 February 2014, a date which precedes the application of Russian Federation legislation in
Crimea and the “nationalization”. Moreover, payment of compensation can be postponed for
10 years.
159. OHCHR recalls that, according to international humanitarian law, private property,
as well as the property of municipalities and institutions dedicated to religion, charity and
education, the arts and science may not be confiscated,219 and that immovable public property
212 Resolution No. 2206 “On the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in the municipal district of Simferopol”
adopted on 23 September 2016.
213 ECHR Judgment, Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, no. 46577/15, 21 April 2016, § 53.
214 ICESCR, Article 11(1); ICCPR, Article 17(1).
215 Resolution 1993/77 of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights; Resolution 2004/28 of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights.
216 The first legal act which initiated the process of property nationalization in Crimea was the Resolution of the
‘State Council of the Republic of Crimea’ “On property nationalization of agricultural companies, institutions and
organizations in the Republic of Crimea” No. 1836-6/14 (adopted 26 March 2014).
217 The Law of the Republic of Crimea “On special aspects of regulation of some of the property relations in the
Republic of Crimea” No. 345-ЗРК/2016 came into force on 14 January 2017.
218 The law applies to private property included in the list of nationalized property according to Resolution No. 2085-
6/14 of the ‘State Council of the Republic of Crimea’ (30 April 2014).
219 Hague Regulations, Articles 46 and 56.
39
must be administered according to the rule of usufruct.220 Destruction of property may only be
justified if required by imperative military or public order necessity.221
E. Right to education
160. Statistics released by Crimea’s Ministry of Education in March 2017 show the
continuing decline of Ukrainian as a language of education in schools across the peninsula.222
The number of children following their education in Ukrainian decreased from 12,694 in
2013 to 371 in the 2016/2017 academic year. There were seven Ukrainian language schools
and 875 classes in Crimea in 2013. As of March 2017, there remained only one school - in
Feodosiia - attended by 132 children from grades 1 to 9. The other 239 children were in
Russian-language schools which have a few classes delivered in Ukrainian. In total,
education in Ukrainian language is offered in 28 classes across the peninsula.
161. The reasons for this dramatic decrease include a dominant Russian cultural
environment, the departure of thousands of pro-Ukrainian Crimean residents to mainland
Ukraine, claims of pressure from some teaching staff and school administrations to
discontinue teaching in this language, and negative media reporting in Crimea and the
Russian Federation about developments in Ukraine, which may have led to reluctance or fear
to be branded ‘anti-Russian’ through the choice of Ukrainian as the language of instruction.
162. According to the information of Crimea’s Ministry of Education, the Crimean Tatar
language was used at the beginning of the 2016/2017 academic year by 5,330 children, a
figure comparable to the situation prevailing in 2013.223 Fifteen schools continued to provide
education exclusively in the Crimean Tatar language, a number that has not changed in three
years.
VII. Legal developments and institutional reforms
International Court of Justice
163. On 19 April, the International Court of Justice delivered its Order regarding the
request for provisional measures submitted by Ukraine on 17 January 2017224 in the case
concerning “Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination” (Ukraine v. Russian Federation).
164. With regard to the situation in Crimea, the Court concluded that, in accordance with
its obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Russian Federation must refrain from “maintaining or imposing
limitations on the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to conserve its representative
institutions, including the Mejlis”, and must ensure the availability of education in the
Ukrainian language. With regard to Ukraine’s claims against the Russian Federation based on
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the Court
found that the conditions required for the indication of provisional measures were not met.
The Court also instructed that Ukraine and the Russian Federation refrain from any action
which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to
resolve, and expressed its expectation that both Parties work towards full implementation of
220 Hague Regulations, Article 55.
221 Hague Regulations, Article 23(g).
222 Available at http://monm.rk.gov.ru/rus/index.htm/news/355733.htm.
223 5,551 children were taught in the Crimean Tatar language in 2013.
224 Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/166/19394.pdf. See OHCHR report on the situation of human
rights in Ukraine covering the period from 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017, para. 146.
40
the “Package of Measures” in the Minsk agreements in order to achieve a peaceful settlement
of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
165. The International Court of Justice Order on the request for provisional measures does
not prejudge the future ruling on merits.
A. Legislative developments
Draft Law on Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine
166. On 12 April, the Parliamentary Committee on State Building, Regional Policy and
Local Self-Government recommended that the Parliament reject the draft law ‘On
Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine’ (No.3593-d), which was registered on 19 July
2016.225 The draft law had been criticized by civil society groups, the Council of Europe and
the UN system (OHCHR, UNHCR and IOM), which advocated inter alia against abrogating
the responsibility of the Government to guarantee the social rights of residents of territory not
controlled by the Government, and prohibiting the delivery of minimum essential
humanitarian supplies to them. A revised draft text was developed by a working group of the
same parliamentary committee and registered in Parliament on 20 April.226 While it narrowed
the scope of the initial document and removed some controversial provisions, including on
discontinuation of essential water and electricity supplies, other problematic provisions of the
first draft law were kept, including the prohibition to pay pensions to residents of non-
Government controlled territory and the blanket non-recognition of documents issued in such
territory, contrary to international jurisprudence.227
167. Solutions addressing some of the most controversial issues remaining in the draft law
were proposed in alternative legislative initiatives introduced to Parliament on 10 May.228 One
proposal would enable residents of territory not controlled by the Government to receive their
pensions in Government-controlled territory through a mechanism to be developed by the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The other draft law introduces a distinction by offering a
similar mechanism for residents of eastern regions that are not under control of the
Government, and yet prohibiting the payment of pensions to residents of Crimea. Positively,
both alternative draft laws provide for an administrative procedure for the establishment of
the facts of birth and death occurring in non-Government controlled territory instead of the
current judicial review.229
B. Criminal justice reform
168. On 16 March, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code
of Ukraine, which entered into force on 13 April. They are intended to address practical
225 See OHCHR report on the situation of human rights in Ukraine covering the period from 16 August to 15
November 2016, para. 195-198.
226 Draft Law ‘On temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation territory of Ukraine’ No.6400 of 20 April 2017.
227 ICJ Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 – Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), para. 125; Loizidou
v. Turkey (Merits), Judgement of 18 December 1996, ECHR (1996), para. 45; Cyprus v. Turkey (Merits), Judgment
of 10 May 2001, ECHR (2001), para. 90 and “MRT” (See Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russian Federation,
Application n. 48787/59, Judgment of 8 July 2004, para. 458-461).
228 Draft Law ‘On temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation territory of Ukraine’ No.6400-2 of 10 May 2017;
and Draft Law ‘On the territory of Ukraine temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation and the territory not
controlled by the Government as a result of an armed conflict with the involvement of terrorist groups receiving
external support’, No. 6400-1 of 10 May 2017.
229 Addressing the issue of non-recognition of documents issued by ‘authorities’ in territory not controlled by the
Government, one of the alternative draft laws explicitly permits using such documents as evidence in the process of
establishing births and deaths. The provisions of the other alternative document concerning this issue appear to be
contradictory.
41
problems concerning criminal proceedings in absentia against the former president Viktor
Yanukovych and other ex-officials who have absconded.230
169. The amendments, in particular, expanded the list of crimes in relation to which
proceedings can be pursued in absentia to also cover the creation of a criminal organization,
assisting members of such organizations or covering up their criminal activity, and
gangsterism. They also extended the application of a lower threshold for proceedings in
absentia which was introduced in May 2016 as a temporary measure.231 For instance, an
individual staying in the area of the “anti-terrorist operation”, which includes localities
controlled by the Government, may be subjected to proceedings in absentia, having no
knowledge about criminal charges against him/her.
170. The temporary rules, which were previously assessed by OHCHR as creating a risk
of violations of due process and fair trial rights232, will continue to apply until the State
Bureau of Investigation starts operating, which must be no later than 19 November 2017.
Positively, some of the most problematic provisions, such as those extending the term of pretrial
investigation and detention in custody from 12 to 18 months and mandating the
publication of summons to proceedings in print media, were removed from the text of the law
before its final adoption.
C. Judicial reform
171. The establishment of the new supreme court is one of the large-scale initiatives
within the framework of the judicial reform which started with the June 2016 constitutional
amendments.233 Ukraine took into account recommendations of the Venice Commission to
transfer from a four-tier to three-tier judicial system. Thus, a single supreme court is being
formed instead of three high specialized courts and the current functioning supreme court.
172. The recruitment of 120 judges to the supreme court began in November 2016, and
was organized around four specialization tracks: civil, criminal, administrative and
commercial law. On 21 April 2017, the process reached the stage where applicants who
successfully passed the anonymous testing and practical assignment competitions started
being interviewed. All interviews are public and may be observed through an on-line stream.
Of the 382 candidates remaining, 73 per cent are judges, 10 per cent are attorneys, 10 per cent
are academics and 7 per cent have mixed background. The deadline for the process to be
completed, 31 March 2017, was not met. No new deadline has been set.
173. To enable the supreme court to operate in line with the judicial reform, the President
submitted to the Parliament on 23 March a draft Law “On Introducing Changes to
Commercial Code, Civil Procedure Code, Code of Administrative Court Procedure and Other
Legislative Acts”.234 The draft law was developed by working groups within the Council on
Judicial Reform, which is an advisory body to the President of Ukraine. It entails relevant
changes, which OHCHR views positively, concerning introduction of e-governance,
simplification of the court process, subject-matter jurisdiction rules, and the use of mediation
as a means of dispute resolution.
230 Law of Ukraine ‘On amendments to the Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine (on strengthening the mechanisms
for meeting the objectives of the criminal proceedings)’, No. 1950-VIII of 16 March 2017.
231 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 February to 15 May
2016, para. 173.
232 Ibid.
233 See OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine covering the period from 16 May to 15 August 2016,
para. 18-22.
234 Draft law ‘On amendments to the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine, Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine,
the Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure and other legislative documents’, No. 6232 of 23 March 2017.
42
D. National Human Rights Institution
174. On 27 April, the five-year term of tenure of the current Ukrainian Parliament
Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsperson’s Office of Ukraine) expired. According to
the law, the current Parliament Commissioner continues to exercise her functions until the
appointment of a new one.235 In line with the procedure, no less than one fourth of deputies or
the Speaker of the Parliament can nominate candidates for the post by 17 May.236 OHCHR
recalls that, according to the Sub-Committee on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of
National Human Rights Institutions, the existing procedure for selection and appointment of
the Parliament Commissioner must be revised to ensure its compliance with the Paris
Principles.237 The process shall promote transparent, merit based and participatory selection in
order to ensure the independence of, and public confidence in, the national human rights
institution. Particularly, the selection and appointment procedure should require
advertisement of the vacancy, establish clear and uniform criteria to assess the merit of
applicants, an promote broad consultation and participation.
VIII. Technical cooperation and capacity-building
175. OHCHR regularly engages in technical cooperation and capacity-building activities
in order to assist the Government in meeting its international obligations to protect and
promote human rights.
176. On 23 March, OHCHR submitted the joint contribution of United Nations agencies
in Ukraine to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) assessing Ukraine’s compliance with its
international human rights obligations. It also attended a presentation of alternative reports
submitted by over a dozen Ukrainian civil society organizations and coalitions to the UPR,
organized by the United Nations Development Programme and the Ombudsperson’s office
on 19 April. During this event, OHCHR encouraged the Government and non-states actors to
engage in a consultation process ahead of the submission of Ukraine’s national report, due by
12 August 2017, to ensure proper inclusion of the perspectives and human rights concerns of
broads segments of society, in addition to the activities and obligations of the Government.
177. OHCHR notes positive response of the Government of Ukraine to the OHCHR
thematic report on conflict-related sexual violence in Ukraine released on 16 February. On 24
February, the Office of the Prosecutor General sent a letter to HRMMU showing interest in
the report and informing about a dedicated investigator who will look into the cases included
in the report.
178. Over the course of the reporting period, OHCHR participated in seven events held
by partner organizations at local, national and international levels, during which it presented
its thematic report on conflict-related sexual violence. More than 300 actors from
international organizations, State agencies, and civil society have been briefed on key
findings of the report, including actionable recommendations to all parties of the conflict.
179. OHCHR remains committed to supporting implementation of the Istanbul Protocol
on Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.238 In March 2017, OHCHR concluded training sessions
on the Istanbul Protocol which had commenced in January for approximately 400 newly
235 Law of Ukraine ‘On the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights’ No. 776/97-BP of 23 December
1997, Article 9.
236 Ibid, Article 6.
237 ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation Report, October 2014, pages 35-36.
238 Available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training8Rev1en.pdf.
43
recruited regional prosecutors. OHCHR also began collaborating with UNDP on
development of a joint project to provide technical assistance to combat the use of torture.
IX. Conclusions and recommendations
180. Little evidence suggests any serious intention for the implementation of the Minsk
agreements in the near future. Renewed “commitments” to the ceasefire, repeated before and
during the reporting period, consistently prove to be superficial and short-lived with the
routine employment of heavy weaponry by all sides. Meanwhile, the civilian population on
both sides of the contact line continues to suffer the brunt of the consequences. While they
remain resilient, they express a rising sense of despair and a diminishing hope of a return to
normalcy.
181. The three-year anniversaries of the violence at Maidan and Odesa passed without
any significant security incidents, reflecting an improvement in the policing and securing of
commemorative events. Nonetheless, there was no notable progress in the investigations and
prosecutions to hold perpetrators of the violence and killings accountable. Coupled with new
accounts of human rights violations and abuses, committed on both sides of the contact line,
these factors contribute to a sense of impunity surrounding such actions.
182. Disproportionate restrictions on the freedom of movement continued to have a wide
impact on the population, with greater effect in March due to a surge in the number of
civilians, especially pensioners, who needed to cross the contact line in order to secure their
social and economic benefits. The growing isolation of some villages located near the contact
line, where movement is most greatly restricted, poses a great threat to the health, safety, and
livelihood of residents. The ongoing deterioration of freedom of opinion and expression has
had a profound effect on public access to information and plurality of opinion.
183. These trends, together with the shrinking space for humanitarian organizations,
particularly in territory controlled by armed groups, which provide essential assistance to
vulnerable sections of the population, paint a bleak picture for future reconciliation and
development. OHCHR stresses that the only durable pathway to a peaceful resolution of the
conflict and for the future development of Ukraine is the full and resolute implementation of
the Minsk agreements.
184. OHCHR remains concerned by human rights violations and violations of
international humanitarian law applicable to the occupation of Crimea by the Russian
Federation, and particularly by the impact on the Crimean Tatar population. OHCHR will
continue to monitor and report on the human rights situation in Crimea, including with regard
to compliance with provisional measures issued by the International Court of Justice.
185. Most recommendations made in the previous OHCHR reports on the human rights
situation in Ukraine have not been implemented and remain valid. OHCHR further
recommends:
186. To the Ukrainian authorities:
a) Cabinet of Ministers to establish a mechanism for investigation of cases
of looting, seizure and military occupation of civilian property;
b) Security Service and other law enforcement agencies to ensure
detainees’ access to a lawyer immediately after their detention and to
refrain from carrying out any investigative actions in absence of the
latter;
44
c) Cabinet of Ministers to include the implementation of the Istanbul
Protocol in the Human Rights Action Plan to foster effective
investigation and documentation of torture;
d) Prosecutor General’s Office to investigate all allegations of arbitrary
detention and/or torture and ill-treatment of conflict-related detainees
by the Security Service elements or persons or groups of persons acting
with their authorization, support or acquiescence and ensure
accountability notwithstanding that the violations could have been
committed by persons acting in official capacity;
e) Courts to adequately review confessions submitted as evidence and
exclude those obtained by torture or coercion;
f) Courts to ensure that trials of individuals on charges of affiliation with
armed groups are carried out without undue delay and in full respect of
all fair trial guarantees;
g) Courts to refrain from automatic extension of measure of restraint of
custodial detention for conflict-related detainees charged with affiliation
with the armed groups;
h) Headquarters of the Anti-Terrorism Operation, Cabinet of Ministers
and Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs to lift
unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions on freedom of movement,
and ensure that 1) civilians may cross the contact line by all types of
vehicles, including public transportation; 2) civilians may transfer
personal belongings necessary for their adequate standard of living; 3)
permits for crossing the contact line can only be invalidated on proved
legal grounds, with proper notification and an established appeal
procedure;
i) State Border Guard Service to collect sex- and age-disaggregated data
on people crossing the contact line in order to provide adequate facilities
for men, women and children, thus mitigating restrictions on freedom of
movement;
j) Headquarters of the Anti-Terrorism Operation, State Border Guard
Service of Ukraine, State Fiscal Service of Ukraine to establish and
ensure effective functioning of a complaint procedure for victims of
human rights violations at checkpoints;
k) Headquarters of the Anti-Terrorism Operation to entrust one state
entity with overall responsibility for maintenance of checkpoints,
including administrative, sanitary and security measures, and to ensure
its financial capacity;
l) Presidential administration to develop amendments to the Law “On
Corruption Prevention” and create favourable conditions for anticorruption
organizations to operate in Ukraine;
m) Government of Ukraine to guarantee that residents of all villages in
immediate proximity to the contact line can exercise their social and
economic rights and enjoy their fundamental freedoms. In particular,
either by establishing a new local administration or by extending powers
45
of the existing ones, to ensure that executive authorities effectively
operate in the villages of Pisky, Vodiane, Sieverne, and Opytne in
Donetsk region;
n) Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Social Policy to guarantee all
eligible citizens of Ukraine the right to receive their entitlements,
including pension and social payments, regardless of IDP registration or
place of residence;
o) Cabinet of Ministers to adequately address the housing and
accommodation situation of IDPs living in collective centres;
p) Parliament of Ukraine to adopt proposed legislative amendment which
would allow IDPs and other internal migrants to fully exercise their
voting rights;
q) Cabinet of Ministers to establish independent, transparent, and nondiscriminatory
procedures of documentation and verification of housing,
land, and property ownership, and to establish a specific registry of
destroyed or damaged housing and other property and a comprehensive
legal mechanism for compensation, including for people residing in
territory controlled by armed groups;
r) Parliament of Ukraine to revise the procedure for selection and
appointment of the Ombudsperson in line with the recommendations
made by the Sub-Committee on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of
National Human Rights Institutions and include requirements to:
publicize vacancies broadly, assess candidates on the basis of predetermined,
objective and publicly available criteria, and promote broad
consultation and/or participation in the screening, selection and
appointment process.
187. To all parties involved in the hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
including the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and armed groups of the self-proclaimed
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’:
a) Adhere to the ceasefire and implement other obligations committed to in
the Minsk agreements, in particular regarding withdrawal of prohibited
weapons and disengagement of forces and hardware;
b) Refrain from indiscriminate shelling of populated areas and locating
military objectives within or near densely populated areas, medical
facilities, and schools, in line with precautionary measures called for
under international humanitarian law;
c) Terminate all military activity around civilian infrastructure and
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, especially
near power lines and water facilities. Guarantee immediate, secure and
unimpeded access to repair teams fixing damages to such
infrastructure;
d) Allow regular and unhindered access to external monitors to all places
of deprivation of liberty and guarantee that interviews can be conducted
in confidentiality;
e) Undertake comprehensive measures to protect civilians travelling across
the contact line, ensuring that crossing routes and entry-exit checkpoints
46
are a no-fire area and enhancing protection against sexual- or genderbased
violence;
f) Facilitate free and unimpeded passage by civilians across the contact
line by increasing the number of crossing routes and entry-exit
checkpoints, especially in Luhansk region;
g) Guarantee security and freedom of movement for residents of villages in
the ‘no man’s land’ and in the immediate vicinity to the contact line, and
facilitate (including by providing regular transportation) access to their
rights to health, education, and social security.
188. To the Government of the Russian Federation:
a) End the practice of retroactive application of penal laws to acts
committed prior to the implementation of Russian Federation laws in
Crimea;
b) Ensure adequate medical assistance to all individuals detained in
penitentiary institutions in Crimea irrespective of their citizenship,
nationality or origin;
c) Return to Crimea all protected persons transferred to the Russian
Federation, pursuant to international humanitarian law provisions
prohibiting the forcible transfer or deportation of protected persons
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power;
d) End the practice of compelling Crimean residents to serve in the armed
forces of the Russian Federation;
e) Repeal legislation which allows for forced evictions and confiscation of
private property in Crimea.
f) Refrain from maintaining or imposing limitations on the ability of the
Crimean Tatar community to conserve its representative institutions,
including the Mejlis;
g) Ensure the availability of education in the Ukrainian language.
189. To the international community:
a) Use all diplomatic channels to press all parties involved to end
hostilities, by emphasizing the suffering of civilians and the human
rights situation caused by the conflict; in particular, call for the parties
to adhere to their commitments to cease fire, withdraw weapons and
engage in mine action;
b) Remind all parties involved in the hostilities to strictly abide by
international human rights law and international humanitarian law in
ensuring the protection of civilians;
c) Urge the parties involved in the hostilities to guarantee secure and
unimpeded access of repair teams to damaged civilian infrastructure.

Annex 775
OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2017)

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine
16 May to 15 August 2017

Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Executive summary ................................................................................................. 1–21 1
II. Violations of the rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity ................... 22–68 4
A. International humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities ........................... 22–31 4
B. Civilian casualties ........................................................................................... 32–36 6
C. Missing persons and recovery of human remains ........................................... 37–38 8
D. Summary executions, deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances,
torture and ill-treatment, and conflict-related sexual violence ................................ 39–68 8
1. Summary executions and killings ....................................................... 39–42 8
2. Unlawful/arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances
and abductions ....................................................................................... 43–51 9
3. Torture and ill-treatment .................................................................... 52–62 11
4. Conflict-related sexual violence ......................................................... 63–66 13
5. Exchanges of individuals deprived of liberty ..................................... 67 14
6. Transfer of pre-conflict prisoners to government-controlled territory 68 14
III. Accountability and administration of justice ........................................................... 69–89 14
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east ................. 69–73 14
B. Fair trial rights ................................................................................................ 74–77 16
C. Human rights impact of armed groups structures ........................................... 78–81 16
D. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public disturbances .......... 82–89 17
1. Accountability for the killings of protesters at Maidan ...................... 83–85 17
2. Accountability for the 2 May 2014 violence in Odesa ........................ 86–89 17
IV. Fundamental freedoms ............................................................................................ 90–106 18
A. Freedom of movement .................................................................................... 90–94 18
B. Freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association.......................... 95–104 20
C. Freedom of religion or belief .......................................................................... 105–106 22
V. Economic and social rights ..................................................................................... 107–130 23
A. Right to an adequate standard of living .......................................................... 108–112 23
B. Right to health ................................................................................................ 113–116 24
C. Right to social security and social protection ................................................. 117–118 26
D. Housing, land and property rights................................................................... 119–126 26
E. Human rights in humanitarian action .............................................................. 127–130 28
VI. Discrimination against Roma .................................................................................. 131–132 29
VII. Human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol . 133–159 29
A. Administration of justice and fair trial rights .................................................. 134–137 30
B. Freedom of expression .................................................................................... 138–140 30
C. Freedom of peaceful assembly and association ............................................. 141–145 31
D. Freedom of movement .................................................................................... 146–149 31
E. Freedom of religion or belief .......................................................................... 150–152 32
F. Forced transfers and deportations of protected persons .................................. 153–156 32
G. Right to property ............................................................................................. 157–159 33
VIII. Legal developments and institutional reforms ........................................................ 160–170 33
A. Derogation from international human rights obligations ................................ 160 33
B. Judicial reform ................................................................................................ 161–167 34
C. Draft Law on restoring state sovereignty ........................................................ 168 35
D. National Human Rights Institution ................................................................. 169–170 35
IX. Technical cooperation and capacity-building .......................................................... 171–175 36
X. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................... 176–185 37

1
I. Executive summary
1. This nineteenth report on the situation of human rights in Ukraine by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is based on the work of the United Nations
Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)1, and covers the period from 16 May
to 15 August 2017.
2. The findings presented in this report are grounded on data collected by HRMMU
through 293 in-depth interviews with witnesses and victims of human rights violations and
abuses, as well as site visits in both government-controlled and armed group-controlled territory.
HRMMU also carried out 264 specific follow-up activities to facilitate the protection of human
rights connected with the cases documented, including trial monitoring, detention visits, referrals
to State institutions, humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms.2
3. During the fourth summer of the conflict, armed hostilities persisted in eastern Ukraine
in an unpredictable and fluctuating manner, endangering lives, damaging property and
threatening the environment. Heavy weapons, such as explosive weapons with a wide impact
area or the capacity to deliver multiple munitions over a wide area, continued to be frequently
employed, including in residential areas and where critical civilian infrastructure is located, in
disregard of commitments under the Minsk agreements to withdraw such weapons from the
contact line.3 The situation has been exacerbated since the beginning of the conflict by the
presence of foreign fighters, and the supply of ammunition and heavy weaponry reportedly from
the Russian Federation.4 OHCHR continues to call on all parties to the conflict to immediately
adhere to the ceasefire and to implement all other obligations committed to in the Minsk
agreements, including the withdrawal of prohibited weapons and disengagement of forces and
hardware.
4. From 16 May to 15 August 2017, OHCHR recorded 161 conflict-related civilian
casualties (26 deaths and 135 injuries), slightly more than half of which were caused by shelling.
The monthly totals of civilian casualties decreased from May to June and again from June to
July, possibly attributable in part to the “harvest ceasefire” which commenced on 24 June.
Nevertheless, the daily reality of sudden spikes and drops in armed hostilities, including shelling,
continued to pose physical risks and psychological trauma.
5. The practice of placing military objectives near civilian objects and facilities necessary
for the survival of the civilian population continued on both sides of the contact line, increasing
1 HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout Ukraine and
to propose recommendations to the Government and other actors to address human rights concerns. For more details, see
paras. 7–8 of the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in
Ukraine of 19 September 2014 (A/HRC/27/75).
2 United Nations Human Rights Council Special Procedures mandate holders and Human Rights Treaty Bodies.
3 See daily and spot reports from the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), available at http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports.
4 OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2015, paras. 2 and 6; OHCHR
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 May to 15 August 2015, paras. 2, 58-59; OHCHR Report on the
human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 August to 15 November 2015, paras. 2 and 22 (see also fn. 128); OHCHR
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2016, para 2.
“We only see political ambitions on both sides. They are dividing something, but they
forgot that there are people here.”
- Resident of a village near the contact line
2
the risk of shelling of such objects and facilities. Hospitals and schools were affected by shelling,
as well as other types of infrastructure, which resulted in disruptions in the supply of water,
electricity and gas.
6. OHCHR documented cases of summary executions, enforced disappearances,
incommunicado detention, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture/ill-treatment and conflictrelated
sexual violence,5 most of which occurred before but could only be documented during the
reporting period. In particular, during the reporting period, individuals were subjected to
enforced disappearances and held incommunicado in territory controlled by armed groups.
7. In government-controlled territory, OHCHR continued to enjoy cooperation with the
authorities and access to official places of detention, allowing for confidential interviews of
conflict-related detainees in line with international standards.
8. By contrast, OHCHR continued to be denied access to detainees and places of
deprivation of liberty in the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and self-proclaimed
‘Luhansk people’s republic’6, despite repeated requests, raising serious concerns regarding
detention conditions, including possible further human rights abuses, such as torture and illtreatment.
9. OHCHR was nevertheless able to document, on both sides of the contact line, the
persisting practice of torture, ill-treatment and sexual violence involving conflict-related
detainees, often to extract confessions. OHCHR also documented a new development linked to
the arrest and detention of citizens by law enforcement under terrorism charges for conducting
business and paying ‘taxes’ in territory controlled by armed groups.
10. The persistent lack of accountability for human rights violations and abuses contributed
to the prevailing sense and state of impunity. For instance, little progress was achieved in
bringing to justice those responsible for the killings of protesters at Maidan in 2014 and for the 2
May 2014 violence in Odesa.
11. Ukrainian authorities continued to fail to effectively investigate human rights violations
perpetrated by members of the Ukrainian military or security forces. In cases against members of
armed groups, however, prosecutions have begun to address specific human rights violations
(such as unlawful detention, torture and ill-treatment) rather than relying on more general
charges of terrorism.7
12. Credible accounts from persons apprehended and detained by parallel structures of
‘administration of justice’ in territory controlled by armed groups demonstrated a lack of
guarantees or safeguards in place, leading to human rights abuses.
13. Restrictions on freedom of movement affected record numbers of people, with over one
million registered occasions when people travelled across the contact line in May, in June and in
July. Despite increased operational hours at all entry-exit checkpoints (EECP), long queues
continued to be observed. Civilians, in particular the elderly, persons with disabilities and other
vulnerable persons, were exposed for protracted periods to very high summer temperatures,
degrading physical conditions, inadequate sanitary conditions, and serious security risks due to
the ongoing shelling and presence of mines, explosive remnants of war (ERWs) and unexploded
ordnance (UXO) near the checkpoints. Additional control measures at ‘internal’ checkpoints
operated by the National Police of Ukraine, targeting residents of territory controlled by armed
groups, further restricted freedom of movement.
5 Not all incidents documented by OHCHR which occurred during the reporting period are reflected in this report in order
to maintain the highest protection of individuals through strict adherence to principles of confidentiality and informed
consent.
6 Hereinafter ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
7 See Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east below, and OHCHR report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para 88, footnote 118.
3
14. OHCHR observed a worrying trend in legislative initiatives which may negatively
impact the enjoyment of freedoms of expression and association. In particular, a package of draft
laws introduced would require public financial disclosures of civil society organisations reaching
a low threshold of annual revenue and public reporting requirements which appear intrusive. In
addition, in two high-profile cases, criminal convictions were handed down based on non-violent
expressions of opinion. In territory controlled by armed groups, media representatives were
hindered in their work and residents did not feel free to openly express views or opinions.
15. OHCHR also noted mixed developments pertaining to freedom of assembly. There was
an overall decrease in judicial prohibitions of public assemblies and better policing of large
public assemblies throughout Ukraine. Smaller demonstrations, however, received insufficient
police protection, particularly those organized by persons belonging to minority groups or
opposition political movements, with cases of participants attacked and injured by members of
radical nationalistic groups.
16. The socio-economic situation in eastern Ukraine continued to deteriorate due to
hardships caused by armed hostilities, measures hindering economic prosperity, and increased
levels of poverty and unemployment. In addition to frequent shelling of water facilities in
Donetsk region, financial deficits of the electricity enterprise in Luhansk region led to even
further disruptions in public supply of water and electricity, impacting the right to an adequate
standard of living. OHCHR is also concerned about health and possible environmental risks,
posed either directly by the armed hostilities or as secondary consequences.
17. OHCHR documented further incidents of violence and discrimination against the Roma
community, some involving local authorities, including the shooting to death of one Roma in
Vilshany and the destruction of a Roma camp in Lviv. A notable lack of investigations into
forced evictions and displacement of Roma prevented accountability for such human rights
violations.
18. Restitution and rehabilitation of civilian property destroyed or damaged due to the
conflict, or compensation, remain among the most pressing unaddressed socio-economic issues.
OHCHR stresses the need for a property inventory and inspection procedures, including a
mechanism for documentation and assessment of damages caused by the conflict. In the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’, at least 109 private markets passed to ‘state ownership’ since April 2017, and
procedures to remove property rights of owners of “abandoned” property commenced.
19. HRMMU continued monitoring the human rights situation in the Autonomous Republic
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol8 from its offices in mainland Ukraine on the basis of United
Nations General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine and resolution
71/205 referring to Crimea as being occupied by the Russian Federation. OHCHR recorded
violations of due process guarantees and fair trial rights, as well as the disregard of the freedoms
of expression, peaceful assembly, movement and religion or belief. Several Ukrainian citizens
lacking Russian citizenship were deported from Crimea for violating immigration rules of the
Russian Federation. Infringements on the right to property in Crimea may, in effect, amount to
the confiscation of property without reparation.
20. Judicial reforms continued, with the adoption of a law on the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine which introduced a new constitutional complaints mechanism. There remains a
significant shortage of judges as a result of reforms initiated in 2016 and the situation has
worsened as retirement, resignation and dismissal of judges outpaced the selection and
appointment of new ones. Following the failure of the Parliament to hold a vote on a new
Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsperson), OHCHR advocated that a new
selection process be conducted according to a revised procedure that is transparent, merit-based
and participatory.
8 Hereinafter “Crimea”.
4
21. OHCHR continued to engage in technical cooperation and capacity-building activities
with the Government of Ukraine and civil society in order to strengthen the protection and
promotion of human rights. One particular endeavour aimed at assisting the Government and
partners with regards to the third Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Ukraine by the United
Nations Human Rights Council, through the preparation of an updated compilation of
thematically clustered recommendations addressed to Ukraine by United Nations Human Rights
mechanisms, and including recommendations made by HRMMU.
II. Right to life, liberty, security, and physical integrity
A. International humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities
22. Hostilities in eastern Ukraine continued despite efforts by the Trilateral Contact Group
(TCG) in Minsk and the Normandy Four (France, Germany, the Russian Federation and Ukraine)
to ensure greater compliance of the parties with their commitments under the Minsk agreements.
Local communities on both sides of the contact line, in anticipation of the surge in hostilities
during August, and eager to bring in their crops safely, proposed a ‘harvest ceasefire’ from 24
June to the end of August, which was endorsed by the TCG on 21 June 2017.
23. Although this ceasefire never fully took hold, it may have contributed to an overall
reduction in the number of daily ceasefire violations. Relatively calm periods were often
interceded by abrupt increases and equally sudden drops in the number of ceasefire violations.
The volatility and unpredictability of the security situation made daily life particularly risky for
civilians residing near the contact line. In addition to the threat of shelling, civilians continued to
be at risk from mines, unexploded ordnance and booby traps, as the parties to the conflict failed
to systematically demine, or mark and fence contaminated areas highly frequented by civilians,
such as crossing routes and residential areas.9 OHCHR notes that placement of booby traps and
trip wires in such areas can amount to the use of an indiscriminate weapon.
24. Heavy weapons, including explosive weapons with a wide impact area (such as artillery
and mortars) or the capacity to deliver multiple munitions over a wide area (such as multiple
launch rocket systems), continued to be present near the contact line and used frequently, in
disregard of the Minsk agreements.10 Further, OHCHR recalls that the use of such weapons in
civilian populated areas can be considered incompatible with the principle of distinction and may
amount to a violation of international humanitarian law due to their likelihood of indiscriminate
effects.
25. OHCHR remained concerned that placing military objectives in densely populated areas
and near civilian objects and facilities necessary for the survival of the civilian population, and
the resulting shelling of such areas, objects and facilities, remained a general pattern in the
hostilities, suggesting that insufficient regard has been given to their protection.11
26. Firstly, the placement of military objectives in densely populated areas, through military
occupation and use of civilian property, continued,12 heightening the risk to civilian lives on both
9 See Civilian casualties below.
10 Under the Minsk agreements, the parties pledged to withdraw heavy weapons from the contact line.
11 OHCHR notes that on 9 June 2017 the Ministry of Justice registered an Order of the Ministry of Defence, enforcing the
instruction on the procedure for implementation of the rule of international humanitarian law within the Ukrainian Armed
Forces (no. 704/30572).
12 Military occupation or use of civilian property was documented by HRMMU in Donetsk region in Luhanske (23 May
2017), Avdiivka (20 June 2017), Zhovanka - government-controlled part of Zaitseve (21 June 2017), and in Luhansk
region in Teple (17 May 2017), Muratove (18 May 2017), Orikhove-Donetske (18 May 2017), Kriakivka (18 May 2017),
Lopaskyne (18 May 2017), Malynove (5 July 2017), Shchastia (6 July 2017), and Zolote (10 August 2017).
5
sides of the contact line.13 In a reversal of a positive development previously reported,14 OHCHR
documented the return of Ukrainian Armed Forces to Kamianka village (Yasynuvata district of
Donetsk region) and use of civilian property from April 2017. As a likely consequence of
renewed military use, HRMMU noted increased shelling of the village in May, and the injury of
a boy by shelling in June.15 In Lopaskyne (Luhansk region), following advocacy by OHCHR, the
Ukrainian Armed Forces vacated a private residential building, enabling its rightful owner to
return.16
27. OHCHR noted the offer in late June of the Bakhmut Civil-Military Administration to
relocate the remaining residents of Zhovanka, a government-controlled part of Zaitseve village,
which is divided by the contact line, for their protection. This initiative, however, was largely
unsuccessful, due to lack of adequate financial compensation, conditions of temporary
accommodation, and fear of looting and damages to homes.17 Where use of a locality is justified
due to military necessity, parties must take measures for the protection of civilians residing
nearby.18 Where evacuation of civilians becomes necessary, it must be conducted in a voluntary
manner that provides procedural safeguards and remedies, including the ability to register as an
internally displaced person (IDP), even within the same locality, and the provision of adequate
housing (accommodating the needs of persons with disabilities) and compensation.
28. Secondly, placing military objectives near civilian objects and facilities necessary for
the survival of the civilian population put these objects and facilities at risk. Namely, hospitals
and schools continued to be affected by shelling on both sides of the contact line. On 28 May
2017 in government-controlled Krasnohorivka, the central hospital (marked with a 4-metre red
cross on its roof) and school no. 2 both sustained direct hits.19 Boarding schools in the armed
group-controlled Trudivski settlement of Petrovskyi district, Donetsk city, and in Yasynuvata
town were affected by shelling on 15 and 17 June respectively.20
29. Also, during the second quarter of 2017, the severity of incidents affecting water supply
facilities significantly increased.21 In total, 24 incidents were documented by the WASH Cluster
within the reporting period.22 In one major series of incidents, shelling between 6 to 10 June
forced the First Lift Pumping Station23 of the South Donbas water pipeline to repeatedly halt
operations, interrupting water supply to approximately 400,000 people on both sides of the
contact line for up to 10 days. The Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS),24 which processes water for
approximately 345,000 people on both sides of the contact line, was de-energized due to shelling
between 2 and 6 June, and between 30 June and 3 July. While welcoming the agreement reached
in Minsk on 19 July on the establishment of safety zones around two water facilities in Donetsk
13 See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017, paras. 19-22;
OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, paras. 21-22.
14 OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017, paras. 18-27.
15 HRMMU visit and interview, 20 June 2017.
16 HRMMU visit, 18 May 2017.
17 While some residents interviewed by HRMMU expressed willingness to seek secure refuge by purchasing property
elsewhere, adequate financial compensation for property damaged/destroyed by shelling or uninhabitable due to security
risks was not offered and they opted to stay in the remnants of their dwellings where they could grow food and keep
poultry. Other residents stated they had declined the offer for relocation due to poor living conditions in the dormitory
where authorities intended to temporarily accommodate them, limited livelihood possibilities, and the fear that their
homes would be looted and destroyed if left unattended. At the time of the interviews, HRMMU observed signs of
continued military occupation of the neighbourhood.
18 Customary International Humanitarian Law rules no. 24, 131 and 133.
19 HRMMU visit, 31 May 2017. While both the school and hospital were in use at the time of impact, no casualties were
reported.
20 HRMMU visit, 28 June 2017.
21 If in the first quarter of 2017 an average incident would cause water to be stopped for 123,000 people, in April-June an
average incident caused a 24-hour water stoppage for 287,000 people. WASH Cluster Ukraine Alert Bulletin, 1 May – 31
June 2017, Issue No. 9.
22 Incident reports by WASH Cluster, 16 May to 15 August 2017.
23 The First Lift Pumping Station is located between the armed group-controlled villages of Vasylivka and Kruta
Balka, in immediate proximity to the contact line.
24 DFS is located in ‘no man’s land’, approximately 15 kilometres north of Donetsk city, between government-controlled
Avdiivka and armed group-controlled Yasynuvata. From 1 January 2017, the DFS has had to stop operations 13 times.
6
region – the DFS and the First Lift Pumping Station – OHCHR regrets that actual disengagement
has not commenced.25
30. OHCHR documented other cases when shelling damage of critical infrastructure caused
water, electricity and gas shortages, including in government-controlled Krymske and Avdiivka,
where residents have been left without gas supply since 5 and 7 June, respectively. In
government-controlled Toretsk and surrounding villages, the water supply has been limited to
one hour per day, while some neighbourhoods have not had access to running water at all due to
huge water loss from a damaged water pipeline in ‘no-man’s land’ between Toretsk and armed
group-controlled Horlivka. This situation has been unresolved since January 2017, as the parties
to the hostilities failed to negotiate a “window of silence” to allow for repairs on the pipe.
31. OHCHR recalls that water and power supply, as well as heating in the winter period, are
critical to the survival of the civilian population, and that placing military objectives in
residential areas, particularly near hospitals, schools, or facilities necessary for the survival of the
civilian population, may amount to a violation of international humanitarian law.
B. Civilian casualties
32. Between 16 May and 15 August 2017, OHCHR recorded 161 conflict-related civilian
casualties: 26 deaths (11 women and 15 men) and 135 injuries (74 men, 46 women, 12 boys, 3
girls).26 This is a 16 per cent decrease compared with the previous reporting period (16 February
to 15 May 2017), when 193 civilian casualties were recorded, and a 14 per cent decrease from
the same time period in 2016 (16 May to 15 August 2016), when 188 civilian casualties were
recorded.
33. The feared increase in civilian casualties anticipated for August, based on the previous
years of the conflict, did not materialize during the first two weeks of the month. The “harvest
ceasefire”, which commenced on 24 June, may have contributed to the decrease in civilian
casualties caused by shelling in July and during the first half of August.
25 On 28 July, three projectiles hit the area of the First Lift Pumping Station. The DFS lost power due to shelling on 22
July, and was shelled again on 3 August. On 4 August, OSCE SMM members and their contracted workers were caught
in small-arms fire at the DFS while installing a camera on its roof. On 9 August, the camera was shot and destroyed. See
SMM spot reports available at http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/334146 and
http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/335026.
26 OHCHR investigated reports of civilian casualties by consulting a broad range of sources and types of information
which were evaluated for credibility and reliability. In undertaking documentation and analysis of each incident, OHCHR
exercises due diligence to corroborate information on casualties from as wide a range of sources as possible, including
OSCE public reports, accounts of witnesses, victims and other directly affected persons, military actors, community
leaders, medical professionals, and other interlocutors. In some instances, investigations may take weeks or months
before conclusions can be drawn, meaning that conclusions on civilian casualties may be revised as more information
becomes available. OHCHR does not claim that the statistics presented in its reports are complete. It may be underreporting
civilian casualties given limitations inherent in the operating environment, including gaps in coverage of certain
geographic areas and time periods.
“A peaceful man was killed in this courtyard. Nobody will tell who is responsible for the
shelling.”
- Brother of a man killed by shelling
7
Shelling (mortars, guns,
howitzers, tanks, MLRS)
Small arms and
light weapons
Mines, ERW,
booby traps and IEDs
Killed Injured Total Killed Injured Total Killed Injured Total
Donetsk region (total) 9 70 79 1 12 13 8 20 28
Government-controlled 1 24 25 4 4 5 10 15
Armed group-controlled 8 46 54 1 8 9 2 10 12
‘No man’s land’ 1 1
Luhansk region (total) 10 10 1 1 8 21 29
Government-controlled 2 2 2 2 4
Armed group-controlled 8 8 1 1 6 19 25
Kharkiv region 1 1
Grand total 9 80 89 1 13 14 16 42 58
Per cent of total 55.3 8.7 36
34. During the entire conflict period, from 14 April 2014 to 15 August 2017, at least 2,505
civilians were killed: 1,382 men, 837 women, 90 boys and 47 girls, and 149 adults whose sex is
unknown. An additional 298 civilians, including 80 children, were killed as a result of the MH17
plane crash on 17 July 2014. The total number of conflict-related civilian injuries is estimated to be
between 7,000 and 9,000.
35. In total, from 14 April 2014 to 15 August 2017, OHCHR recorded 34,766 conflict-related
casualties in Ukraine, among civilians, Ukrainian armed forces and members of the armed
groups. This includes 10,225 people killed and 24,541 injured.27
36. More than three years after the beginning of the armed conflict, no national mechanism
has been put in place by the Government of Ukraine to afford adequate, effective, prompt and
27 This is a conservative estimate based on available data. These totals include: casualties among the Ukrainian forces as
reported by the Ukrainian authorities; 298 people from flight MH-17; civilian casualties on the territory controlled by the
Government as reported by local authorities and regional departments of internal affairs; and casualties among civilians and
members of the armed groups on territory controlled by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, as
reported by armed groups, the so-called ‘local authorities’ and local medical establishments. This data is incomplete due to
gaps in coverage of certain geographic areas and time periods, and due to overall under-reporting, especially of military
casualties. Injuries have been particularly under reported. The increase in the number of casualties between the different
reporting dates does not necessarily mean that these casualties happened between these dates: they could have happened
earlier, but were recorded by a certain reporting date.
2
10
3
8
4
12 10
15
8 9 7
3
10 12
16
13
8
12
7 5
16
24
38 37
32
57
73 73
14
55
28
18
29
60
54
57
68
53
42
11
18
34
41
45
36
69
83
88
22
64
35
21
39
72 70 70
76
65
49
16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine
1 January 2016 - 15 August 2017 (source: OHCHR)
Killed Injured Total
8
appropriate remedies, including reparation, to civilian victims of the conflict, especially to those
injured and to the families of those killed.28
C. Missing persons and recovery of human remains
37. During the reporting period, OHCHR observed no progress in establishing the
whereabouts of hundreds of individuals who went missing in the context of the armed conflict.29
The exact number of missing persons is unknown. In the absence of properly functioning
coordination between Government bodies, and exchange of relevant information between the
Government and armed groups, publicly available figures on the number of people missing in the
conflict zone differ considerably. As of 15 August 2017, the public database of the National
Police of Ukraine listed 1,476 individuals30 who went missing in the conflict zone since mid-
April 2014. According to the Main Department of the National Police in Donetsk region, 1,646
individuals have gone missing in the region since the beginning of the conflict. According to the
‘ombudsperson’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, 50931 individuals are registered as missing.
OHCHR believes these figures reflect only the numbers of applications for the search of missing
persons received by the various actors. Some people may be included in multiple lists while the
whereabouts of others listed may have already been established.
38. OHCHR also believes that many of those reported as missing may be dead, with their
bodies either not found or unidentified. Exchange of forensic data and other relevant information
on missing persons between the Government of Ukraine, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the
‘Luhansk people’s republic’, would help identify some individuals whose remains are either
stored in morgues or have been buried as unidentified. This would decrease the suffering of
relatives caused by the uncertainty about the fate of their loved ones. DNA profiling was
available in Ukraine prior to 2014, and has been conducted on government-controlled territory
since the conflict began. On territory controlled by armed groups, DNA profiling of human
remains and relatives of missing persons has started to be carried out in Donetsk city, but is not
yet available in Luhansk city. Some individuals reported as missing may be alive and held in
secret or incommunicado detention, either in government-controlled territory or in territory
controlled by armed groups.
D. Summary executions, killings, deprivation of liberty, enforced
disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, and conflict-related sexual
violence
1. Summary executions and killings
39. OHCHR continued to receive allegations of killings and enforced disappearances which
may have led to death and occurred before the reporting period, mainly in 2014. These
allegations further attest to the complete collapse of law and order in the conflict zone at the
initial stages of the conflict, and to the prevailing impunity for grave human rights violations and
abuses. The following are examples of such cases.
28 The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law require States
to provide compensation for economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the
violation and circumstances of each case resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and serious
violations of international humanitarian law, such as: (a) Physical or mental harm; (b) Lost opportunities, including
employment, education and social benefits; (c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential; (d)
Moral damage; (e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social
services.
29 Mainly in 2014-2015, but also in 2016-2017.
30 1,243 men and 233 women.
31 As of 21 July 2017.
9
40. On 17 July 2014, three men and a woman disappeared while travelling by car from
government-controlled Krasnohorivka to armed group-controlled Makiivka (both in Donetsk
region). The burned remains of their car were found near a checkpoint of Ukrainian forces. Some
time later, the bodies of two men and a woman identified as three of the missing persons32
reportedly underwent forensic examinations in government-controlled territory, which found that
the cause of death for all the victims was bullet wounds to their heads.33 The Donetsk regional
department of the National Police launched a criminal investigation into the case, however with
no progress.
41. In October 2014, a resident of Antratsyt, in Luhansk region (controlled by armed groups)
was summoned to the local “commandant’s office” where he was reportedly beaten to death. His
body was found in a coal mine one year later.34
42. In June 2017, OHCHR documented a case which demonstrates the recurrent character of
killings and enforced disappearances in the conflict zone. A young man who made his living
carrying luggage for people travelling across the contact line in Stanytsia Luhanska left for work
on 27 April 2017, and never returned. On 2 May, his family saw a media report stating that his
body had been found by an ambulance in Zhovtnevyi district, in Luhansk city (controlled by
armed groups) on 27 April. According to the death certificate, the man died of haemorrhagic
shock linked to a complex trauma to his head, limbs, and body bones, and multiple injuries of
internal organs. The ‘police’ in Luhansk did not provide his relatives with any information on the
circumstances of his death. The Troitske police department of the National Police in Luhansk
region launched a criminal investigation into the case. Earlier in 2015, the young man had been
arbitrarily detained by the Tornado company35 in the government-controlled territory, in Stanytsia
Luhanska, and had spent several days in unofficial detention places.36 The Military Prosecutor’s
Office is investigating this incident.
2. Unlawful/arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances and abductions
43. In government-controlled territory, OHCHR continued to enjoy cooperation with the
authorities and access to official places of detention, and interviewed conflict-related detainees in
pre-trial detention facilities in Bakhmut, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mariupol, Mykolaiv, Odesa,
Poltava, Starobilsk and Zaporizhzhia.
44. OHCHR also continued documenting cases of members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
detaining individuals in relation to the conflict and keeping them incommunicado for
approximately 24 hours before transferring them to an official detention facility. For example, in
June 2017, four persons were held incommunicado for approximately 24 hours, during which
32 The bodies were never seen by the families of the victims, however were officially identified as the victims on a
forensics document.
33 HRMMU meeting, 13 July 2017.
34 HRMMU interview, 9 August 2017.
35 For more details on human rights violations by the battalion, please see OHCHR report on the human rights situation in
Ukraine covering the period from 16 February to 15 May 2017, para 85.
36 HRMMU interview, 14 June 2017.
“I am afraid to go out to the street. People ask me ‘What are you hoping for? They are
dead.’ My heart is cut in pieces when they say that. What I am hoping for?! For a
miracle!”
- Mother of two sons whose whereabouts are
unknown since July 2014
10
time, at least one victim was hit and another threatened with physical violence, including electric
shocks, in order to extract information.37
45. In territory controlled by armed groups, OHCHR continued to be denied access to
detainees and places of deprivation of liberty, despite repeated requests, including in regard to
specific individuals whose whereabouts are known. OHCHR was assured that all individuals
deprived of their liberty in this territory were treated humanely, with due respect of their rights.
First-hand information received by HRMMU coupled with this denial of access, however raise
serious concern regarding their conditions and treatment, and suggest a high likelihood that grave
human rights abuses may be occurring.
46. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented the arrests and detention by law
enforcement of individuals under terrorism charges, allegedly for running businesses and paying
‘taxes’ in ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. For example, four entrepreneurs who left Donetsk after
the conflict began were detained by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) under allegations of
terrorism38 for activities related with running businesses in territory controlled by armed groups.39
As of 15 August 2017, all four individuals remained in pre-trial detention in Mariupol. OHCHR
is concerned that more people may be detained under such charges.
47. OHCHR documented new cases during the reporting period in which individuals have
been subjected to enforced disappearance, particularly in territory controlled by armed groups. In
many cases, individuals were held incommunicado for at least a month. One interlocutor told
HRMMU this was an established practice used by the ‘ministry of state security’ (‘MGB’) in
‘Luhansk people’s republic’ in order to hold a suspect until there was enough evidence to bring a
‘charge’.40 Some emblematic cases are described below.
48. On 18 April 2017, a man was detained by ‘police’ in Luhansk city and reportedly
released the same day, but went missing before reaching home. The following day, ‘MGB’
searched his house and seized some personal belongings. The victim was held incommunicado
until 31 May, when his family was informed that he had been arrested by the ‘border service’ of
‘MGB’. Accused of ‘high treason’, he remained in detention as of 15 August.41
49. On 3 June 2017, a blogger in Donetsk city known as Stanislav Vasin was detained by
‘MGB’ and held incommunicado for more than a month, despite inquiries by his family. On 15
July 2017, his mother was informed of his detention.42 As of 15 August, he remained in
detention.
50. OHCHR is concerned by this practice by armed groups, especially in the absence of
access to detainees by international organizations. OHCHR notes that the prohibition of enforced
disappearance is absolute under international human rights law.43 As pointed out by the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on torture, “torture is most frequently practiced during
incommunicado detention”.44 Furthermore, incommunicado detention may, in itself, constitute a
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or torture.45
51. OHCHR also continued to document cases of individuals who disappeared between
2014 and 2016 and whose whereabouts remain unknown. For example, on 28 May 2014, a man
known for his pro-Ukrainian views was apprehended by unidentified men in plain clothes in
Stanytsia Luhanska, which was controlled by armed groups at that time. His sister witnessed his
37 HRMMU interviews, 9 August 2017.
38 They were charged under article 258(3) (creation, participation or facilitation of a terrorist group) and 258(5) (financing
a terrorist group) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
39 HRMMU interviews, 21 June and 19 July 2017.
40 HRMMU interview, 19 May 2017.
41 HRMMU interview, 9 June 2017.
42 The victim’s mother was then allowed to see him in ‘detention’. HRMMU interviews, 7 June 2017 and 15 July 2017.
43 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Article 1.
44 UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/34, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, para. 926(d).
45 UN doc. E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.2, Theo van Boven, UN Special Rapporteur on the question of torture; Visit to Spain,
paras. 34-41.
11
abduction.46 In another case, on 12 July 2014, two men disappeared near government-controlled
Plotyna. A witness saw them being abducted by men in black uniform without insignia.47 In both
cases, the families never heard from the victims again, although investigations were launched by
the Luhansk regional department of the National Police.
3. Torture and ill-treatment
52. OHCHR continued to document allegations of torture and ill-treatment of conflictrelated
detainees, often for the purpose of extracting confessions or coercing suspects to
“cooperate” with the investigative authorities.
53. In government-controlled territory, HRMMU recorded several cases of interrogation
techniques which may amount to torture, including mock executions and electrical shocks. Such
cases are often reported well after the violation, as victims often remain in detention, or do not
report the violations due to fear of persecution or lack of trust in the justice system. OHCHR
notes that the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is absolute,
and no derogation is permitted,48 even in times of public emergency, terrorism or armed
conflict.49
54. Recent cases recorded by HRMMU show that such practices persisted. On 2 June
2017, a woman in Kramatorsk was abducted by unknown men dressed in black, without any
insignia. She was threatened at gun point, and questioned about her family for approximately 90
minutes. The perpetrators demanded that she provide information about armed groups’ military
equipment. When she refused, she was violently grabbed by the hair, and threatened to be taken
to the front line. She was then taken to a forest marked as a minefield and threatened to be made
to walk through it. The perpetrators videotaped her “confession”. She was then told to leave the
city immediately and remain silent, or she would be killed.50
55. In May 2017, a woman in Mariupol was lured to an Azov battalion position, where she
was blindfolded and transported to an unknown destination. She was hit in the knees with a rifle
butt and threatened to be buried on the spot, and therefore forced to cooperate. After the
perpetrators informed the police that they had caught a member of an armed group, the police
interrogated her without a lawyer, and she signed the interrogation protocol, incriminating herself
as a member of an armed group. The next day, her “confession” was filmed, and then she was
brought to the Mariupol SBU building where she had to repeat her confession to two officers.
After one of the officers left the room, the other one locked the door and ordered her to undress
for a physical examination. He photographed her scars and tattoos without explanation, making
her uncomfortable. OHCHR notes that forced nudity during such an examination, which was not
conducted by a medical professional, may amount to sexual violence. The victim was then taken
to her flat, which had been searched, and she was held there by two SBU officers for three days.
She was then taken to court, where an SBU officer punched her twice in the stomach in the
corridor, causing severe pain.51 The Military Prosecutor’s Office has launched an investigation
into the conduct of the SBU.
56. Cases which occurred before the period under review, but which OHCHR was only
able to document during the reporting period, demonstrated the long practice of torture and illtreatment,
as well as the difficulty in seeking accountability for such human rights violations.
46 HRMMU interview, 17 May 2017.
47 HRMMU interview, 15 June 2017.
48 Convention against Torture, Article 2(2). Also see General Comment No.2, ‘Implementation of Article 2 by State
Parties’, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP/1/Rev.4 (2007), Advance Unedited Version at para.1.
49 Interpretation of Torture in the Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International Bodies, United Nations
Voluntary Fund for the Victims of Torture, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Torture/UNVFVT/Interpretation_torture_2011_EN.pdf.
50 HRMMU interview, 19 July 2017.
51 HRMMU interview, 19 July 2017.
12
57. In September 2016, three armed, masked soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
stormed into a man’s house near government-controlled Trokhizbenka. The victim was kicked,
taken to another building, and beaten, purportedly because his children live in the Russian
Federation. When he was released the next morning, the perpetrators threatened to shoot him and
his wife if he complained. The beatings left bruises on the victim’s chest and he was bedridden
for a week.52 He complained to authorities and was interviewed by a military prosecutor, but no
official investigation was launched.
58. OHCHR documented the cases of eight individuals detained and tortured by SBU in
Kharkiv in 2015.53 For example, three of these individuals were arrested separately in May 2015,
handcuffed and had bags placed over their heads. They were taken to the Kharkiv SBU building,
where they were interrogated and tortured separately for hours by methods including suffocation
with a gas mask54, dislocation of joints55, electric shock, and mock execution. The detainees also
received death threats and threats of a sexual nature against their families. SBU officers forced
these men to sign self-incriminating statements and refused them access to a lawyer. They were
transferred to a hospital where a doctor refused to document visible injuries. In another example,
also in May 2015, a man was arrested by SBU. On the way to the Kharkiv SBU building, the
perpetrators stopped the vehicle and tortured him with electric current. Upon reaching the SBU
building, the victim was further tortured until he “confessed” to planning terrorist acts.56 As of 15
August 2017, all four of these victims remained in pre-trial detention. The Military Prosecutor’s
Office has launched an investigation into these allegations.
By armed groups
59. With no access to places of deprivation of liberty in territory controlled by armed
groups, OHCHR cannot fully assess the conditions of detention. The continued denial of access
of international observers to carry out interviews of detainees in line with international standards,
together with first-hand information received, leads OHCHR to fear that those detained may be
subject to torture and ill-treatment. In the absence of access to detainees in line with international
standards, the likelihood that they are subjected to torture and ill-treatment is high.
60. Nevertheless, HRMMU was able to document cases of persons who were held in
territory controlled by armed groups and subjected to treatment which could amount to torture or
ill-treatment. These included both cases which occurred before and during the reporting period.
Not all cases are reflected in this report in respect of confidentiality and in order to protect
victims and their families.57
61. After nine months of detention by armed groups, a judge of the court of appeal of
Luhansk region was released on 14 July 2017.58 Detained at the Stanytsia Luhanska checkpoint
in October 2016, he was held incommunicado by the ‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’. He spent 48 days in solitary confinement. The conditions of detention were
poor, including insufficient food, cold temperatures, limited space and sanitary conditions.
OHCHR considers that these conditions may amount to ill-treatment. During his detention, the
victim heard other detainees taken for ‘interrogation’, who were apparently subjected to beatings
and electric shocks. He was forced to record a propaganda video against Ukraine. During his
detention, OHCHR repeatedly requested access to him. Until the day of his release, when he was
52 HRMMU interview, 18 May 2017.
53 HRMMU interviews, 25 and 31 May, 7 June, and 13, 21 and 26 July 2017.
54 Also known as “elephant”.
55 Also known as “swallow”.
56 HRMMU interview, 15 June 2017.
57 Not all new cases are reflected in this report, as OHCHR strives to maintain the highest protection of individuals
through strict adherence to the principles of confidentiality and informed consent. Several victims and witnesses
interviewed by OHCHR either did not want to share essential information, or did not consent to their accounts being
publicly reported, for fear of reprisals.
58 For more details, see para 42 of OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017.
13
presented to HRMMU, the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ refused to provide any information about
his whereabouts or fate.59
62. On 13 July 2017, a woman with a hearing disability, who had publicly criticized the
‘Luhansk people's republic’ on social media, was detained at a checkpoint controlled by armed
groups at the Stanytsia Luhanska crossing route. She was held incommunicado for 16 days by the
‘ministry of state security’ of the ‘Luhansk people's republic’, during which time it consistently
denied to her family that she was being detained. The woman was interrogated four times without
legal representation. During one interrogation session, one of her fingers was dislocated with a
pair of pliers. She was threatened to be moved to the basement with male detainees and told she
would “have a fun night”. On 29 July, she was brought back to the same checkpoint and told to
cross to the government-controlled side.60 An investigation into this case was launched by the
Luhansk regional department of the National Police.
4. Conflict-related sexual violence
63. OHCHR continued to record allegations of conflict-related sexual violence, many of
which occurred before the reporting period but were documented later when victims felt able to
speak about their ordeal. OHCHR recalls that cases of sexual violence are generally underreported
due to unease about this issue, trauma suffered by the victims and the stigma associated
with sexual violence, as well as fear of reprisals. In addition, due to its particular nature, sexual
violence often takes place with no witnesses or the only witnesses acting as accomplices.
64. As previously documented, sexual violence is most often used as a method of torture
for conflict-related detainees. For example, a man detained in the Kharkiv SBU building in May
2015 was tortured for hours in an attempt to extract a confession. He broke down when a person
claiming to be a doctor entered the room with a set of surgical tools and started pulling down his
pants while threatening to cut off his testicles. SBU officers then took him to the investigator’s
office where he was compelled to sign several self-incriminating statements.61 In another case, a
woman arrested in April 2015 by Kharkiv SBU was subjected to various acts of torture, including
threats that the SBU officers would hand her daughter over to the Right Sector or Aidar battalion,
so she could “watch how they play with her”.62
65. OHCHR commends efforts of the Government to investigate cases of sexual violence.
It notes that the Military Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation into one of the cases of
sexual violence allegedly committed by members of the Ukrainian forces and established the
facts constituting the crimes.
By armed groups
66. OHCHR documented the case of a woman who was gang-raped in June 2014, when
her village was under the control of an armed group. According to witness accounts, she was
59 HRMMU interviews, 14 July and 17 August 2017.
60 HRMMU interviews, 17 July and 11 August 2017.
61 HRMMU interview, 31 May 2017.
62 HRMMU interview, 25 May 2017.
“Then the officer told me, ‘We will bring your family into the basement, and we will rape
them in front of you’.”
- A detainee
14
attacked by three men who sprayed something in her eyes to obscure her vision and then anally
raped her. She was severely injured, underwent surgery and was hospitalized for three weeks,
with medical costs partially covered by the commander of the armed group that was stationed in
her village. Whilst in hospital, she was questioned by ‘police’ and a ‘criminal investigation’ was
opened, however, she never received a forensic examination, and the case was reportedly closed
shortly after.63
5. Exchanges of individuals deprived of liberty
67. During the reporting period, no progress was observed in the implementation of the ‘all
for all’ exchange stipulated by the Minsk agreements.64 The Working Group on Humanitarian
Issues of the Trilateral Contact Group continued to discuss the issue in Minsk, meeting twice a
month. As of 31 July 2017, the Government continued to urge for the release of 137 individuals
whom it believes remain in captivity of the armed groups, while the latter acknowledged only 71
of those individuals. As of 11 August, the armed groups sought the release of 502 individuals
from the Government, including some who are not held in custody. OHCHR considers it
essential that within the exchanges, individuals are not relocated to the other side of the contact
line against their will.
6. Transfer of pre-conflict prisoners to government-controlled territory
68. Since 14 April 2017, there were no transfers of pre-conflict prisoners from territory
controlled by armed groups. During the reporting period, OHCHR received and followed up on
complaints from pre-conflict prisoners in four penal colonies65 in territory controlled by ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ that their requests to be transferred to government-controlled territory remain
unsatisfied. Most reported having lost contact with families due to the conflict and the
cumbersome procedures to cross the contact line for their relatives. Some prisoners stated they
were subjected to forced labour; others worked voluntarily, but were not paid. They also
indicated a lack of medication and insufficient food.66
III. Accountability and administration of justice
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east
69. Accountability for human rights violations is a key element of the right to an effective
remedy.67 Failure to bring to account perpetrators of grave human rights violations such as
torture or ill-treatment, summary execution or arbitrary killing, and enforced disappearance could
give rise to a separate breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In
addition, impunity for these violations largely contributes to their recurrence.68
70. Despite continued lack of access to territory controlled by armed groups, Ukrainian law
enforcement agencies investigated some cases of human rights abuses perpetrated by members of
armed groups. On 19 June 2017, the Office of the Prosecutor General reported that investigations
based on the testimonies of over 900 persons formerly detained in armed group-controlled
63 HRMMU interviews, 25 May and 3 August 2017. There was never a criminal investigation of the incident by Ukrainian
authorities due to lack of an official report filed by the victim.
64 The Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of 12 February 2015, para 6 calls for “the
release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons based on the ‘all for all’ principle”.
65 Penal colonies in: Yenakiieve No.52, Donetsk No. 124, Makiivka No. 32 and Michurine No.57.
66 HRMMU meetings, 7 July and 10 August 2017.
67 ICCPR, Article 2(3).
68 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 31, “The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant”, para 18.
15
territory had led to the identification of 13 persons (captured Ukrainian soldiers and civilians)
arbitrarily killed by armed groups and “military servicemen of the Russian Federation”.69
71. With some exceptions,70 HRMMU continued to observe that Ukrainian authorities have
yet to effectively investigate human rights violations alleged to have been perpetrated by
members of the Ukrainian military or security forces.71 Emblematic cases include the enforced
disappearance of a number of individuals believed to be affiliated with armed groups who were
detained at the Kharkiv regional department of SBU and the alleged airstrike of the Luhansk
regional state administration building on 2 June 2014. Similarly, other human rights violations,
including torture and ill-treatment, allegedly perpetrated by SBU elements, have not been
effectively investigated.72 Failure of the Government to hold perpetrators accountable sends the
signal that they are immune to responsibility for human rights violations perpetrated against
conflict-related detainees.
72. OHCHR has previously noted that human rights abuses perpetrated by members of
armed groups are often neglected in the course of criminal investigations, with the vast majority
of perpetrators prosecuted solely on charges of affiliation with armed groups.73 While this
practice has persisted,74 it was notable that on 1 June 2017, the Slovianskyi town-district court of
Donetsk region convicted a member of the armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ for
violating the rules and customs of war for the illegal capture, detention, torture and ill-treatment
of Ukrainian servicemen and others at the former premises of the Donetsk regional department of
SBU in 2014.75 This was the first conviction of a member of an armed group since the beginning
of the conflict for crimes committed, and not on affiliation to an armed group.
73. On a positive note, OHCHR welcomes a civil judgment of the Prymorskyi district court
of Odesa76 in an action brought by a victim of abduction, unlawful detention, and severe torture
(including mutilation) by members of the Aidar battalion. The court ordered the Government to
pay four million UAH in compensation for pain and suffering. A criminal investigation into these
human rights violations is ongoing.
69 RBC Ukraine news agency, available at https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/svideteli-soobshchili-massovyh-kaznyahsovershennyh-
1497867366.html.
70 For example, the investigation into members of Tornado special police patrol company for arbitrary detention,
abduction, torture and “unnatural gratification of sexual desire” which lead to some convictions on 7 April 2017 (see
OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para. 85), and the investigation
into the fatal shooting of a civilian at the Maiorsk EECP on 14 December 2016 by a military serviceman (see OHCHR
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017, para 88).
71 See, e.g., the killings of Serhii Kostakov and Dmytro Shabratskyi (OHCHR thematic report on accountability for
killings, Annex I, paras. 115-118); The enforced disappearance of Maksim Popov (OHCHR thematic report on
accountability for killings, Annex I, paras. 106-108); And the killing of Roman Postolenko (OHCHR thematic report on
accountability for killings, Annex I, paras. 11-14).
72 HRMMU interview, 31 May 2017; HRMMU meeting with Military Prosecutor of Kharkiv garrison, 18 July 2017;
HRMMU trial monitoring, 25 July 2017. See also OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February
to 15 May 2017, para 86.
73 See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para 88.
74 This practice is especially concerning when it comes to persons whose ‘position’ within the armed groups confers
greater ability to negatively impact the human rights of those living in territory controlled by the armed groups. For
instance, on 19 June 2017, the ‘deputy minister of state security’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ was indicted in
absentia for membership in a “terrorist organization”, and on 12 June 2017, the Selidivskyi town court of Donetsk
region acquitted in absentia the ‘president’ of the ‘supreme court’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ of similar
charges.
75 For more details, see OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para 88.
76 Decision dated 15 June 2017, available at http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/67397157.
16
B. Fair trial rights
74. In its monitoring of conflict-related criminal cases, HRMMU noted that fair trial rights
and judicial guarantees were often disregarded.
75. In cases involving persons suspected of affiliation with armed groups, courts continued
to rubberstamp prosecution motions to extend pre-trial detention based solely on abstract
reference to article 176(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code.77 When sanctioning and prolonging
pre-trial detention, the courts ignored individual circumstances, including the defendant’s social
standing, family circumstances, health condition and the length of time already spent in
detention. OHCHR recalls that the imposition of pre-trial detention must be based on an
individualized determination of necessity and reasonableness thereof. Pre-trial detention must not
be mandatory for all defendants charged with a particular crime without consideration of
individual circumstances.78
76. OHCHR also observed undue delays in trials of conflict-related detainees while the
accused remained in custody.79 OHCHR recalls that individuals charged with criminal offences
have the right to be tried without undue delay; persons who are not released pending trial must be
tried as expeditiously as possible80 or released from custody.81 Further, prolonged pre-trial
detention may jeopardize the presumption of innocence.82
77. Over the reporting period, OHCHR documented a number of cases where conflictrelated
detainees complained of being compelled to admit guilt by means of threats, torture and
ill-treatment, and where such allegations were not sufficiently examined by the court.83
C. Human rights impact of armed group structures
78. OHCHR continued to monitor the development and impact of parallel structures of
‘administration of justice’ established by armed groups in territory under their control.
79. HRMMU continued collecting credible victim accounts that no guarantees or
safeguards were in place for individuals apprehended and detained by the ‘MGB’ of ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ or ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, particularly when they were ‘charged’ with
espionage, subversion or cooperation with Ukrainian forces. The ‘MGB’ denied holding the
individuals in question, which is tantamount to enforced disappearance.84 Furthermore, detainees
were deprived of access to a lawyer or information regarding the grounds for their detention, and
77 Article 176(5) states, “measures of restraint in the form of personal commitment, personal warranty, house arrest and
bail may not be applied to persons suspected or accused of having committed the crimes specified by Articles 109-114-1,
258-258-5, 260, and 261 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine”. During its trial monitoring, HRMMU observed numerous
hearings during which detention was extended based solely on this article, without consideration of specific risks or
circumstances relevant to the individual case.
78 Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 35 Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), para 38.
79 HRMMU trial monitoring, 12, 17, 19 and 20 July 2017; HRMMU interview, 25 May 2017.
80 Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 35 Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), para 37.
81 ICCPR, Articles 9(3) and 14(3)(C).
82 Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 35 Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), para 37.
83 HRMMU interviews, 2 June 2017, 21 and 26 July 2017.
84 See Unlawful/arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances and abductions above.
“We will let you free if you prove [that you are innocent].”
- Presiding judge in a criminal proceeding
17
were forced to give self-incriminating statements.85 OHCHR notes that ‘MGB’ ‘investigations’
and detentions are not subject to any forms of review.
80. In the absence of a functioning ‘supreme court’ in ‘Luhansk people’s republic’,
individuals ‘convicted’ by ‘first instance courts’ could not have their ‘sentence’ ‘reviewed’.
Those who ‘appealed’ their ‘conviction’ entered a judicial limbo while remaining imprisoned, as
the first instance ‘verdict’ does not enter into force pending ‘appeal’, yet there is no possibility of
the ‘appeal’ being heard. OHCHR received information that this situation negatively affects
many people ‘convicted’.86
81. On 1 August 2017, the ‘military tribunal’ of the ‘supreme court’ of ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ reported the ‘conviction’ of four individuals of “espionage”, bringing the total number
of such ‘convictions’ during 2016 and 2017 to eight.87
D. High-profile cases of violence related to riots and public disturbances
82. More than three years after the violent killings perpetrated during the Maidan protests
in Kyiv and on 2 May 2014 in Odesa, little progress has been achieved in bringing perpetrators to
account, and many suspects have fled Ukraine, contributing to impunity for these grave human
rights violations and lack of justice for victims.
1. Accountability for the killings of protesters at Maidan
83. The Sviatoshynskyi district court of Kyiv continued holding hearings on the merits of
the case of five former ‘Berkut’ servicemen accused of killing 48 protesters on 20 February 2014
in Kyiv. They remain in custody pending trial, which is still at the stage of collecting testimonies
of victims and examination of case files.
84. On 21 July 2017, the Office of the Prosecutor General reported that the Russian
Federation had denied its extradition request for 21 ‘Berkut’ servicemen who had fled Ukraine
and were also wanted for suspected involvement in the killing of the 48 protesters. Fifteen
suspects have reportedly been granted Russian citizenship, and three temporary asylum. OHCHR
is concerned that failure to ensure their appearance at trial contributes to the longstanding
impunity of perpetrators, particularly more senior former officials suspected of organizing and
ordering the killings of protesters.
85. On 29 July 2017, the alleged organizer of an abduction of two Maidan protesters (one
of whom died),88 was placed in detention for 60 days.89 He is charged with organizing the
abduction, torture and killing of a hostage in collusion with a group of people.
2. Accountability for the 2 May 2014 violence in Odesa
86. Equally little progress was observed in judicial proceedings to bring accountability for
the killings that occurred in the city centre of Odesa and during the House of Trade Unions fire.
87. Following numerous recusals of judges in all four district courts of Odesa, and the
subsequent inability to form a bench, on 26 May 2017, the court of appeal of Odesa region
transferred the case of 20 ‘pro-federalism’ activists accused of mass disorder to the Illichivskyi
85 HRMMU interview, 11 August 2017.
86 HRMMU interview, 18 May 2017.
87 Reportedly, two defendants were local residents while the others were from other parts of Ukraine, the Russian
Federation and Uzbekistan.
88 See OHCHR report on accountability for killings from January 2014 to May 2016, Annex I, table 1.
89 Ruling of the Pecherskyi district court of Kyiv, 29 July 2017, available at http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/68090613.
18
town court of Odesa region.90 Five of the accused remained in pre-trial detention since May
2014. The first court hearing in this case was held on 27 November 2014.
88. The only ‘pro-unity’ activist accused of killing remained free pending trial, which has
not yet commenced since his indictment more than two years. OHCHR notes the arbitrary
approach of the courts dealing with the 2 May cases; while some of those accused of mass
disorder have been detained for more than three years, a person accused of killing enjoys his
liberty. OHCHR notes that the nature and gravity of the alleged offence should be duly taken into
account when assessing the proportionality of the measure of restraint.
89. On 25 July 2017, the Office of the Prosecutor General reported that the Russian
Federation denied its request for extradition of the former Deputy Head of the Odesa regional
police because the suspect had been granted Russian Federation citizenship. The suspect is
charged with “Excess of Authority” and “Neglect of Official Duty” in relation to alleged failures
to act to maintain public order and security during the 2 May 2014 violence and for his decision
two days later to release 63 people from police custody who had been arrested for mass disorder.
IV. Fundamental freedoms
A. Freedom of movement
90. This reporting period saw a record increase in numbers of people travelling across the
contact line. Over one million individual crossings were recorded each month in May, June and
July, with the trend continuing at the beginning of August.91 On average, 36,000 people travelled
across the contact line each day, compared with 29,000 during the previous reporting period.
OHCHR is concerned about security risks faced by civilians at or near checkpoints, including
from shelling, land mines and other explosive devices. Eight incidents related to explosions of
mines or shelling resulting in casualties or temporary closure of EECPs were recorded within the
reporting period.92
91. Extreme heat, lack of cooling spaces, and inadequate physical and sanitary conditions at
checkpoints exacerbated the already aggravated situation of people crossing and increased
90 Ruling of the court of appeal of Odesa region, 26 May 2017, available at http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/66724977.
91 Movement across the contact line continued to be boosted by Government requirements for IDPs entitled to pensions to
undergo cumbersome identification procedures in person. See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine,
16 February to 15 May 2017, paras. 99, 123-125.
92 For example, on 8 June 2017, a civilian resident of Trudivski neighbourhood in Donetsk was killed by an IED in the
‘grey area’ between Marinka and Trudivski neighbourhood; On 7 July, one person was killed and another injured by an
explosive device on the side of the road in government-controlled territory between Zhovanka and the Maiorsk EECP; On
16 July, a man received a gunshot wound at the Marinka EECP. At least eight incidents of shelling near EECPs during
operation hours were recorded during the reporting period, at least two of which resulted in the suspension of operations.
State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, http://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/news. See also “UKRAINE: CHECKPOINTS -
Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 26 July 2017)”, available at
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/infographic/ukraine-checkpoints-humanitarian-snapshot-
26-july-2017.
“I have my parents and relatives on the other side of the contact line. They receive
information we don’t, and we don’t have information they have. The void between us is
deepening. That terrifies me. We are losing connection with every day passing.”
- IDP from Donetsk region
19
protection concerns, especially for persons with disabilities, the elderly, children and women.
The situation was particularly alarming in Luhansk region, where Stanytsia Luhanska remains
the only crossing route, accessible only by pedestrians, with unsafe wooden ramps connecting the
pieces of a destroyed bridge. OHCHR observed insufficient availability of wheelchairs on the
government-controlled side of the bridge, and their complete absence on the side controlled by
armed groups, despite the high demand for such assistance. Moreover, the poor conditions of the
ramps pose a physical risk to pedestrians attempting to cross. On a single day, OSCE SMM
monitors observed three pedestrians falling, 10 persons losing their footing, and a man with
disabilities accidentally dropped by porters.93 At crossing routes in Donetsk region, buses
circulating between the ‘zero checkpoint’ and an EECP were not equipped for persons with
disabilities. OHCHR is also concerned that ambulances were not regularly present at each
checkpoint during operational hours.94
92. OHCHR documented incidents when unnecessary or disproportionate restrictions and
inspections at checkpoints impeded not only freedom of movement, but also the enjoyment of the
right to liberty and security.95 For example, on 11 July 2017, at the Marinka checkpoint, SBU
elements questioned about possible connections to armed groups for several hours a female
volunteer from Donetsk who frequently crosses the contact line to visit her elderly mother in
armed group-controlled territory and her grandchildren in Zaporizhzhia (government-controlled
territory).96
93. OHCHR is concerned by impediments to freedom of movement at so-called ‘internal’
checkpoints which are unrelated to crossing routes and operated by the National Police of
Ukraine. HRMMU documented cases of special profiling of individuals with residence
registration in armed group-controlled territory, as well as of staff of humanitarian organizations,
as well as cases of collection of cell phone IMEI codes. In one case, members of a Ukrainian TV
crew were subjected to physical violence at an ‘internal’ checkpoint on the road between
Kurakhove and Mariupol.97 OHCHR was informed that armed groups also started collecting
IMEI codes from civilians crossing at ‘Maiorsk’ checkpoint.98
94. Restrictions on freedom of movement continued to disproportionately affect civilians
residing in the immediate vicinity of the contact line, impeding their access to medical,
education, social, administrative and legal services.99 Further, this artificial boundary, and the
93 Daily report of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 21 June 2017, available at
http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/324881.
94 EECP checkpoints are open from 6:00 to 20:00 hrs, however ambulances are not stationed at EECPs during full
operational hours. For example, an ambulance is present on the government-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska EECP
from 10:00 to 14:00 hrs, and on the side controlled by armed groups from 8:00 to 17:00 hrs. On the governmentcontrolled
side of Marinka EECP, the first-aid point operates from 9:00 to 16:00 hrs. At Maiorsk EECP, NGO “Premiere
Urgence” maintains a first aid tent which is open until 15:30 hrs. A military paramedic remains on duty at the EECP from
15:30 to 20:00 hrs. At Pyshchevyk/Hnutove (government-controlled side), Oktiabr and Olenivka (armed groupcontrolled)
checkpoints, a paramedic is present during all hours, however, an ambulance will not go to Pyshchevyk. In
case of emergency, servicemen take a person in need to Talakivka, where an ambulance would come from Mariupol. An
ambulance will come to Oktiabr from Novoazovsk, which would take at least 30 minutes.
95 HRMMU interviews, 28 June and 18 July 2017.
96 HRMMU interview, 13 July 2017.
97 Following an internal investigation of the incident by the Donetsk Regional Department of the National Police of
Ukraine, the case is now with the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office. HRMMU interview, 14 August 2017.
98 HRMMU interview, 13 June 2017.
99 On 18 May 2017, HRMMU visited Orikhove-Donetske village of Luhansk region (government-controlled) where 32
residents, mostly elderly, face a lack of public transportation and are subjected to arbitrary travel restrictions at
checkpoints surrounding the village. Residents complained of complications to access medical care and other essential
social and administrative services available in Trokhizbenka. On 24 May, HRMMU visited Novooleksandrivka village,
located in the ‘no man’s land’ of Luhansk region, where mainly elderly residents remained. Freedom of movement is
restricted by Government forces and armed groups: Residents can only access the village by foot or bicycle through a
government-controlled checkpoint, and by motorbike through an armed group-controlled checkpoint. Elderly and
disabled residents lack access to administrative services and social and pension payments, which would require a sevenkilometre
walk through a swamp to Popasna, possibly exposing them to mines. Ambulances cannot enter
Novooleksandrivka, further restricting access to medical care. OHCHR observed similar isolation of residents in
Kamianka and Starolaspa, where there is no public transportation, grocery shops or pharmacy, and ambulances were
sometimes denied entry.
20
complicated procedure to cross it, divides families, causing hardships. HRMMU spoke with an
80-year-old man who must queue and walk across the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge every week to
visit his wife in hospital.100 OHCHR regrets that the provision introduced in April 2017 to the
Temporary Order allowing for non-expiring permits (required to cross) has not been
implemented.101
B. Freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association
95. OHCHR observed a worrying trend in legislative initiatives which, if adopted, would
negatively impact the enjoyment of freedoms of expression and association, and may
consequently, limit civil society space. On 10 July 2017, the President of Ukraine submitted a
package of draft laws to Parliament102 which may create undue burden for small civil society
organisations as it requires public financial disclosures from those reaching a low threshold of
annual revenue. The amendments also introduce additional public reporting requirements
regarding donors, beneficiaries and staff which may affect the latter’s rights to respect for
privacy and confidentiality. Other Government policies may also unduly interfere with access to
online information and communication. For instance, on 16 May 2017, the President signed a
decree imposing sanctions on 468 companies, including blocking of popular social networks and
an email service, and requiring Ukrainian internet providers to restrict access to their sites.103
While these measures may be lawful and follow a legitimate aim, there are concerns as to their
proportionality.
96. OHCHR also noted an increase in online “troll” attacks and defamation campaigns on
social media targeting activists and media professionals engaged in investigative journalism and
promotion of accountability.104 Physical and online attacks are often not investigated, or
investigations are protracted.
97. A year after the killing of journalist Pavel Sheremet on 20 July 2016, little progress was
observed in the investigation into this case. Following the release of an investigative
documentary on this case, which revealed additional information, the journalists who made the
documentary were included into the inter-agency investigation group, comprised of
representatives of SBU, the National Police and the Office of the Prosecutor General. OHCHR
welcomes this step and urges the authorities to ensure an effective investigation into the killing of
Mr. Sheremet as a step towards ending to impunity for attacks and murders of journalists.
100 On 2 June 2017, at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, HRMMU spoke to a man travelling from (government-controlled)
Makarove village to Luhansk in order to visit his wife being treated in a hospital. He had to cross the contact line on a
weekly basis to go to hospital.
101 Temporary Order on the control of movement of people across the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions,
available at https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/pages/32; see also OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16
February to 15 May 2017, para. 100.
102 Draft laws no. 6674 and 6675 (proposing amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine and other legislative acts) both
purportedly aim at “enhancing the transparency of funding of public organizations and of the use of international technical
assistance.”
103 The presidential decree targeted “legal entities of the Russian Federation, the activity of which threatens information
and cyber security of Ukraine” and included sanctions against social networks VK.com (VKontakte) and Odnoklassniki,
search engine Yandex, and the Mail.ru email service.
104 These include actions by anonymous online users posting false information about certain civil activists, anticorruption
workers and journalists, threats and intimidations, attempts to show the person in a bad light and publicly
shaming or attacking their private accounts and email.
“The first things we were hiding were the Ukrainian costumes and Ukrainian flag… It
appeared that the Government of Ukraine does not care about us.”
- Resident of a village near the contact line
21
98. Criminal convictions based on expressions of opinion against mobilisation also raised
concern. For instance, on 15 May 2017, the Henicheskyi district court of Kherson region
sentenced Eduard Kovalenko to five years of imprisonment for expressing opposition to military
mobilization during a public assembly in 2014. On 1 June 2017, the High Specialized Court of
Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases annulled the acquittal of journalist and blogger Ruslan
Kotsaba105, charged with treason in connection with a video he posted online opposing
mobilization and his perceived cooperation with Russian media.
99. On 7 July 2017, the National Police opened a criminal case106 against the website
“Myrotvorets”, which, since August 2014, has been publicly posting personal data of thousands
of people, including media professionals, NGO activists, labelling them as supporters of armed
groups and “terrorism”. OHCHR welcomes this development and urges the authorities to conduct
the investigation in good faith and take measures to remove personal data from the website.
100. During the reporting period, OHCHR continued to observe improvement with regard to
respect for freedom of peaceful assembly, as illustrated by a decrease in judicial prohibitions of
public assemblies and better policing of large public assemblies throughout Ukraine.107 Yet,
OHCHR noted that smaller demonstrations continued to suffer from insufficient security and
protection by police, particularly those organized by persons belonging to minority groups or
opposition political movements.
101. On several occasions, demonstrations organized by such groups were attacked by radical
nationalistic groups, resulting in bodily injuries of participants. The police were either not present
to secure the assembly or were unable to provide adequate security. Further, the police have been
reluctant to take effective measures to properly investigate such cases and bring those responsible
to justice.
102. For example, on 17 May 2017, in Kharkiv, members of the Right Sector and other
radical groups attacked participants of the peaceful rally “LGBT Rights are Human Rights”.
Police were present but unable to prevent violent skirmishes. They initially refused to classify the
attack as a “hate crime”, however following victims’ appeals, and pursuant to an investigative
judge’s decision, on 2 August the case was registered under Article 161 of the Criminal Code
(Violation of citizens’ equality based on their race, nationality or religious preferences).108 On 14
June, a group of young people forcibly prevented a demonstration against gender-based
discrimination, sexism, violence and sexual harassment from taking place at the Kyiv Mohyla
Academy. Although the police were called, they arrived 40 minutes later. On 16 June, a
demonstration against the renaming of Vatutina Avenue, in Kyiv, organized by the Socialist
Party of Ukraine was attacked by a group of young people109, resulting in the hospitalization of
some participants. While informed in advance of this event, the police failed to provide adequate
security. A feminist demonstration planned in Kyiv for 21 June was cancelled due to threats of
violence and the refusal of police to ensure security. On 9 July, a lecture on the rights of
transgender people in Kyiv was disrupted by 10 youths wearing masks, reportedly affiliated with
“Svoboda” nationalistic political party. The Odesa Pride Equality March on 13 August was
forced to stop halfway through its planned 700-metre route by a counterdemonstration by
nationalist far right wing organizations110 whose participants engaged in hate speech including
incitement to violence. The police failed to adequately secure the route of the march, and the one
105 Kotsaba was released on 14 July 2016 after 18 months in custody.
106 For “Obstruction of the lawful professional activity of journalists”, Article 171(1) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
107 On 18 June 2017, police effectively provided security for participants of the KyivPride Equality March despite
attempts by opponents to disrupt it by violence.
108 Art. 161 prohibits “willful actions inciting national, racial or religious enmity and hatred, humiliation of national honor
and dignity, or the insult of citizens' feelings in respect to their religious convictions, and also any direct or indirect
restriction of rights, or granting direct or indirect privileges to citizens based on race, color of skin, political, religious and
other convictions, sex, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics.
109 They were allegedly members of the C14, National Corps and Right Sector.
110Vulychnyi Front, Prava Molod, Svoboda and Sokil youth wing.
22
person arrested for violent behaviour was charged only with “minor hooliganism” and not a hate
crime.
Territory controlled by armed groups
103. In territory controlled by armed groups, OHCHR continued to observe systematic
attacks on civil society space severely hindering the work of media representatives. HRMMU
documented cases of media professionals detained by armed groups111 while some were
subjected to intimidation and interference with their work. Journalists entering territory
controlled by armed groups of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ must inform the ‘press centre’ of the
‘ministry of defence’ about their activities on a daily basis, are arbitrarily required to show their
video footage at checkpoints,112 and are accompanied by members of armed groups when
travelling close to the contact line.
104. Due to restrictions on civil society and on the exercise of fundamental freedoms, citizens
were less prone or simply afraid to openly express their views. Citizens openly expressing pro-
Ukrainian views continued to experience intimidation or attacks.113 Residents of territory
controlled by armed groups feared “saying too much” when complaining of everyday realities.114
C. Freedom of religion or belief
105. During the reporting period, OHCHR noted a worrisome development of infringement
on freedom of religion or belief against Jehovah’s Witnesses. In government-controlled territory,
Jehovah’s Witnesses faced attacks on their religions buildings, and reluctance of law enforcement
agencies to investigate such cases.115
106. In territory controlled by armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, Jehovah’s
Witnesses were accused of extremism and subjected to harassment, arbitrary searches of religious
buildings, and confiscation of religious literature.116 Members of the Jehovah’s Witness
community were summoned to ‘police’ or ‘prosecution offices’ and informed they had to cease
operations until their religion organization was ‘registered’; however no procedure for obtaining
such ‘registration’ was established. On 7 July 2017, the ‘supreme court’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ declared two religious publications of the Jehovah’s Witnesses as “extremist” and
prohibited their dissemination.117 Reportedly, since the beginning of the conflict, nine religious
buildings of Jehovah’s Witnesses have been seized by armed groups.118
111 See Unlawful/arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances and abductions above.
112 A similar practise of journalists required to inform state agencies by journalists about their activities around the
contact line as well as the checking of video footage, was also observed in government-controlled territory.
113 See Torture and ill-treatment above.
114 HRMMU field teams generally hear this sentiment while engaged with the public, as well as specifically during formal
interviews. HRMMU interviews, 18 May and 2 June 2017.
115 For example, on 19 June 2017, several men forcibly entered a Kingdom Hall in Khust during a religious service,
threatening to blow up the building and shoot the parishioners inside. Reportedly, the police ignored numerous calls and
arrived 90 minutes after having received the first report of the ongoing crime. No investigation has been initiated into the
case. See Jehovah’s Witnesses: Report on Observance of Freedom of Religion in Ukraine by The Religious Center of
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ukraine.
116 HRMMU interviews, 21 and 22 August 2017.
117 HRMMU interview, 21 August 2017.
118 “Kingdom Halls” (religious buildings of Jehovah’s Witnesses) were seized in Horlivka, Donetsk, Perevalsk,
Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch), Boikivske (formerly Telmanove), Yenakiieve and Brianka. OHCHR report on
the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2015, para 90; OHCHR Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine, 16 May to 15 August 2015, paras. 84 and 85; See also Jehovah’s Witnesses: Report on
Observance of Freedom of Religion “Certain Territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions”, Religious Center of
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ukraine, April-June 2017.
23
V. Economic and social rights
107. Increased levels of poverty and unemployment coupled with record-high food prices119
have affected the lives of 3.8 million people in the conflict zone, in addition to daily hardships
caused by the armed hostilities and related policies120 imposed by all sides. This situation has
been further exacerbated by legislative measures that led to impeded access to social entitlements
and pensions. OHCHR recalls that legislative measures should aim at progressively achieving the
full realization of economic and social rights, not restricting them.121 OHCHR further notes the
Government’s commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals contained in the 2030 Agenda,
which are part of a consensus framework that applies to all countries, including those in a
conflict situation. 122
A. Right to an adequate standard of living
108. OHCHR observed a particularly dire situation in villages located in the immediate
vicinity of the contact line.123 In one emblematic example, for three years, residents of Spartak
village (in territory controlled by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’) have not had access to centralized
supplies of electricity, water and gas, and have relied on wells and a generator which they rarely
have money to fuel. There is no public transportation, grocery store, pharmacy or medical unit in
the village. Ambulances do not come to the village due to security constraints. Due to the high
intensity of shelling, residents often live in degrading conditions in basements.124 The two
children in the village walk 20 minutes to catch a bus to attend school in Yakovlivka village, also
located close to the contact line (in territory controlled by ‘Donetsk people’s republic’). They are
often forced to skip school due to the critical security situation. While this is a unique case, there
are many such villages on both sides of the contact line whose residents experience similar daily
hardships.
119 Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster Food Security Assessment, data collection undertaken in June and July, 2017.
Preliminary findings available at http://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/fslc_dashboard_january_-
_june_2017_final.pdf.
120 For example, the cargo blockade and imposition of “temporary external management”.
121 Article 2 (1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
122 See in particular SDGs regarding the eradication of poverty (Goal 1), ensuring healthy lives and well-being (Goal 3),
availability of clean water and sanitation (Goal 6), access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy (Goal 7),
promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, productive employment and decent work (Goal 8),
making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (Goal 11), ensuring sustainable
consumption and production patterns (Goal 12). The Agenda is available at
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development
%20web.pdf.
123 HRMMU teams visited Shevchenko and Boikivske on 17 May 2017, Zaitseve on 25 May, 21 June and 3 August,
Kamianka on 20 June, Luhanske on 23 May, Novooleksandrivka on 24 May, Lopaskyne and Orikhove-Donetske on 18
May, Zolote-4 on 19 May, Starolaspa and Sartana on 5 June, Spartak on 3 July, and Oleksandrivka on 2 August.
124 HRMMU visited one basement where five people, including an 11-year-old child, have been living since 2014, in
degrading conditions: damp, with dim light and walls affected by fungus.
“People are left without work and no pensions, with high prices for food. People have no
rights. All have diseases and no money to get treatment. We live in constant fear and
constant despair. We have no hope and no future. We are Ukrainian citizens and we have
Ukrainian passports. We want this horror to end and live in a state with the rule of law,
where human rights are above all.”
- Resident of a village near the contact line
24
109. While shelling directly endangered staff and operations of critical civilian
infrastructure,125 the failure to introduce adequate normative frameworks regulating water and
power supplies, as well as crisis management for key enterprises in Luhansk region126 caused
further interruptions in public water and power supplies.
110. In June, Luhansk Energy Union (LEU), the sole distributor of power in Luhansk region,
informed OHCHR that it could not continue to distribute electricity or perform network
maintenance due to delay of payments for electricity previously supplied on both sides of the
contact line and the resulting accumulated debt to the state-owned electricity enterprise,
Enerhorynok.127 At least four water supply companies in Luhansk region accumulated large debts
to LEU for electricity supplied.128 The financial situation of LEU has been aggravated by the
reported unauthorized and non-remunerated connection of military positions and objects to
electricity lines.129 As a result, LEU began cutting power to water facilities.130 This crisis, coupled
with frequent breakdown of old water pipes, has been limiting access to safe drinking water of
approximately 220,000 people on both sides of the contact line.
111. In western parts of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, water supplies decreased threefold
compared with pre-conflict time.131 Residential households, hospitals and schools receive water
irregularly, sometimes only once for a few hours in two days, and delivery of drinking water is
sometimes sporadic. Persons with disabilities face additional difficulties in accessing water
delivery points and carrying bottles home. In some villages, residents collect water from
boreholes, heightening the risk of outbreak of infectious diseases. Since water filtration stations
must frequently halt operations due to shelling, water quality has reportedly deteriorated. In
Brianka, the water is red, brown or yellow.132
112. OHCHR is concerned that if the water supply issues are not resolved well before the
winter, irreversible damage to infrastructure may be unavoidable on both sides of the contact
line, as the centralized heating system requires uninterrupted water flow through the pipes.
B. Right to health
125 See International humanitarian law in the conduct of hostilities above.
126 Luhansk Energy Union (Luhanske Enerhetychne Obiednannia), a privately-owned enterprise, has accumulated more
than five billion UAH (nearly 200 million USD) in debts to the state bulk-distributor of electricity. LEU was sanctioned
and had its bank accounts frozen. LEU cut salaries and shortened the work week to three days, resulting in the resignation
of 200 employees in 2017. The management claims the company has no money for petrol in order to send repair teams to
fix the frequent damages to electricity networks along the contact line caused by the hostilities.
127 HRMMU interview, 15 June 2017.
128 Lysychansk, Popasna, Starobilsk and Rubizhne water companies.
129 On 14 June 2017, the LEU management sent a formal complaint to the Government, including at national level,
detailing the company’s financial losses caused by unremunerated use of electricity by military facilities in Luhansk
region (HRMMU received a copy on 15 June). As of 15 August, the company had not received any substantive reply to
this complaint.
130 On 11 July 2017, LEU cut the electricity supply to a number of pumps of the Lysychansk and Popasna Water
Companies, as well as to the Popasniansky District Water Company. As of 20 July, water supply to Lysychansk was
renewed but the debt remained unresolved, signalling that further cut offs may be imminent.
131 The decreases resulted from multiple factors, including old infrastructure and conflict-related damage to pipes.
132 HRMMU interview, 7 June 2017.
“I am not used to crying but I am crying now. It is so unjust. You come and go and I will
stay here and have to survive. There is no help from the state.”
- A man with disabilities
25
113. Frequent damage to critical infrastructure also poses environmental threats which could
greatly impact the right to health. Shelling around a wastewater treatment plant near
Dokuchaievsk and a phenolic plant in Novhorodske risks contaminating groundwater and the
environment with sewage and toxic liquid waste.133 Shelling damage to water facilities or power
lines which causes water pumps to stop operating may result in the flooding of coal mines which,
in this industrial region, may force toxic methane gas to the surface and into basements in
residential areas.134 In view of continued hostilities, failure by the parties to the conflict to respect
and implement their agreement in principal on the creation of safety zones around key
infrastructure,135 or to efficiently negotiate “windows of silence” prevented necessary repairs and
further aggravated the situation.
114. OHCHR continued to document limited access to and availability of health care in areas
close to the contact line, on both sides, as some 130 facilities remain either partially or fully nonoperational.
136 A number of places where residents had access to specialized doctors before the
conflict now only have a paramedic available, usually only once a week.137 In locations where
public transportation ceased operating and/or the area is not accessible for ambulances due to the
armed conflict, residents who are unable to drive must hire a taxi or walk to access medical
care.138
115. These conditions render persons with disabilities in particular more vulnerable.
Frequently in need of medical care, they face greater physical obstacles travelling and crossing
checkpoints to receive specialized treatment, or simply fleeing from shelling. Many patients cross
the contact line to continue with the treatment they were receiving before the conflict. For
example, the hospital in Donetsk city is particularly renowned in treating cancer and continues to
provide treatment for patients residing on both sides of the contact line.139
116. OHCHR welcomes the ongoing healthcare reform, which may not only resolve
systemic issues, but also address certain conflict-related obstacles. If adopted, a draft law “On
state financial guarantees for providing medical services” would allow IDPs to receive medical
care throughout Ukraine, regardless of their residence or IDP registration.140
133 On 11 July 2017, the waste water treatment plant near Dokuchaievsk (‘Donetsk people’s republic’) came under
shelling and its staff was evacuated. For 24 hours, wastewater from the town’s population of over 24,000 was discharged
into the environment. In Novhorodske, on the government-controlled side, a sludge collector of a phenolic plant was
overfilled with toxic liquid waste. Due to ongoing hostilities and the lack of agreement on a local ceasefire, no repair
works were conducted for the last two years. If the dam is damaged, toxic waste would contaminate the rivers of Kryvyi
Torets and Siverskyi Donets, which are water sources for the whole Donbas region.
134 These concerns were voiced by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination Ukrainian spokesperson, available at
https://ua.112.ua/video/zatopleni-shakhty-poblyzu-toretska-v-donetskii-oblasti-zalyshaiutsia-tekhnohennoiu-zahrozoiustskk-
240545.html. However, Toretsk local authorities rejected such allegations, claiming that all necessary maintenance
work in the mines, at least in government-controlled territory, was being undertaken. HRMMU interview, 3 August 2017.
135 On 19 July 2017 at the Trilateral Contact Group meeting in Minsk, the parties expressed their commitment to
create safety zones around the First Lift Pumping Station and Donetsk Filtration Station. See statement of the TCG
Coordinator, available at http://www.osce.org/chairmanship/330961.
136 World Health Organization, http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/emergencies/health-response-to-thehumanitarian-
crisis-in-ukraine/news/news/2017/08/world-humanitarian-day-who-urges-more-health-aid-to-addressukraines-
humanitarian-crisis.
137 HRMMU visit to (government-controlled) Trokhizbenka, on 18 May 2017, Zaitseve, on 25 May, 21 June and 3
August 2017, and Luhanske, on 23 May 2017.
138 HRMMU visit to Starolaspa, on 5 June 2017, and Spartak, on 4 July 2017 (both in ’Donetsk people’s republic’), and
Novooleksandrivka, Luhansk region (‘no man’s land’), on 24 May 2017. On 13 June 2017, an injured woman in Avdiivka
(government-controlled territory) had to walk over one kilometre because the ambulance could not access the area due to
shelling. HRMMU interview, 20 June 2017.
139 HRMMU interview, 12 July 2017.
140 The text of the draft law is available at http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=61566.
26
C. Right to social security and social protection
117. Negative trends in the sphere of employment may be further aggravated should current
conditions persist. In 2016, the unemployment rate in Luhansk region was more than double than
in other regions of Ukraine.141 A number of key enterprises in ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ have
stopped or reduced their operations since 2014, when the banking system stopped functioning
and transportation of goods became difficult.142 Due to the trade blockade introduced in 2017,143
at least two large enterprises in ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ lost access to raw materials and sales
markets, resulting in the reduction of salaries by 50 to 70 per cent.144 In both ‘republics’, the
situation worsened after armed groups introduced “temporary external management”145 of
enterprises in territory under their control. OHCHR was informed that after coal mines closed in
‘Donetsk people’s republic’, some miners joined armed groups to secure their livelihood, 146 a
trend which had been previously identified by OHCHR.147 Enterprises in government-controlled
territory which previously depended on anthracite coal from territory now controlled by armed
groups have taken further steps since the trade blockade to identify other sources. While they
continued to operate, they have faced financial losses.148
118. Approximately 600,000 people with residence registration in armed group-controlled
territory have been deprived of social entitlements, most significantly, payment of pensions,
since the government’s mandatory verification process.149 This has a significant impact on the
lives of thousands, as for many, pensions are the only source of income. OHCHR reiterates its
recommendation to de-link the right to pension from IDP registration. OHCHR welcomes the
proposed legislative amendments to the law on ‘Mandatory state pensions insurance’150 which
would protect pension rights of citizens deprived of their liberty and citizens residing in areas not
under the control of the Government. If adopted, the draft law would reinstate the right of all
citizens to receive their pension, regardless of IDP registration or residence location.151
D. Housing, land, and property rights
119. The restitution and rehabilitation of destroyed or damaged property or compensation
remain among the most pressing unaddressed socio-economic issues. Damage to property may
stem from shelling and armed hostilities or from military occupation and use of civilian property.
141 According to the World Food Programme, before 2014, the unemployment rate was decreasing across the five eastern
regions, however since 2014, it has been increasing drastically. In 2016, the unemployment rate in Luhansk region
reached 16 per cent whereas the average across Ukraine was seven per cent.
142 These conditions led to further economic hardships and job losses for up to 5,000 people. HRMMU interviews, 27
July, 8 and 10 August 2017.
143 A blockade of trade across the contact line was initiated by former members of volunteer battalions in January 2017
and regularized by the Government on 15 March 2017. See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16
February to 15 May 2017, para 120.
144 HRMMU interviews, 19 May and 28 July 2017.
145 See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para 120.
146 HRMMU interview, 14 August 2017.
147 See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017, para 110.
148 HRMMU interviews, 1 and 3 August 2017.
149 See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, paras. 117-119.
150 Available at http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=61678.
151 The draft law also foresees that pensions will be paid in government-controlled territory retroactively and without any
time limitations.
“My mother, 91, cannot get her pension since 2014. She is too old to travel to the
government-controlled side. She worked for it all her life.”
- Resident of a village near the contact line
27
The conflict-affected population, including IDPs, continued to suffer from unregulated claim
procedures152 and lack of inventory of such property, making it hard to pursue related claims.
OHCHR notes that only in a few instances claimants were able to win court cases, and thereby
gain legal right to compensation for loss of property.153
120. On 31 May 2017, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted amendments154 which would allow
authorities to deny housing assistance (rent and utility subsidies) to IDPs if the IDP or a family
member owns residential property or a part thereof in government-controlled territory. Moreover,
these amendments aim to further narrow the eligibility criteria for such assistance. Only IDPs
originating from settlements “where state authorities temporarily do not exercise their powers or
located along the contact line”, or those whose housing was destroyed or has become unsuitable
for living as a result of the conflict are considered as eligible.
121. For over two years, IDPs from Shyrokyne have been denied access to their property due
to security constraints. However, high officials accompanied by representatives of the
international community regularly visit the village. During a field visit to Shyrokyne on 20 July,
HRMMU was informed by a commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces that the village
remained unsafe because the security situation had prevented demining and only the main road
had been cleared.155 Residents complained that, based on photos and videos available online,
private houses have been looted, supposedly by members of volunteer battalions present in the
village.156
Territory controlled by armed groups
122. Parallel procedures that ‘regulate’ inheriting, selling and buying of property put in place
by armed groups continued to create unnecessary hardship for the population. According to
‘legislative initiatives’,157 all real estate transactions executed after 11 May 2014 must be
registered with the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. Such ‘initiatives’ result in additional financial
burden due to the double registration of transactions that is required, considering that the
Government of Ukraine does not recognize such ‘registration’ as valid.158
123. Military occupation and use of civilian housing by armed groups hindered the ability of
displaced persons to return to their homes. OHCHR was informed about a woman who returned
to Luhansk city and could no longer access her apartment because the lock had been changed.159
Interlocutors from Luhansk alleged that apartments were being opened and given to armed
groups.160
124. Armed groups further restricted the right to unimpeded use of privately-owned
commercial premises or other business-related property.161 On 5 July 2017, a member of the
‘people's council’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ reported that 109 private markets had
152 The lack of regulation on documentation and assessment of damages caused by hostilities leaves it to local authorities
to arbitrarily decide how to request a housing inventory and document a claim.
153 For instance, on 27 June 2017, the Selydovskyi town court of Donetsk region decided to compensate from the state
budget the cost (UAH 2,059,000, equivalent to USD 80,000) for the real estate of a resident of the town of Avdiivka
which was destroyed by armed hostilities in 2015. The decision entered into force on 10 July.
154 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution No.370 ‘On amendments to the Resolutions No.505 and No.646’ of 31
May 2017.
155 HRMMU site visit, 20 July 2017. During this visit, HRMMU observed that all of the houses appeared to have been
damaged by the armed hostilities.
156 HRMMU interview, 18 July 2017.
157 On 5 July 2017, a ‘law’ of ‘DPR’ on ‘amendments’ to the law “on state registration of real rights to immovable
property and their restrictions (encumbrances)” entered into ‘force’.
158 HRMMU recalls that previous documents issued by notaries in territory controlled by armed groups were equally
not considered as valid by the Government of Ukraine.
159 HRMMU interview, 26 July 2017.
160 HRMMU interview, 6 August 2017.
161 See also OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para 120.
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passed to ‘state ownership’ since April 2017.162 The owner of a small market told HRMMU he
had to pay additional money to the ‘state management’ to be allowed to continue managing a
small shop there.163
125. On 4 July 2017, the ‘fund of state property’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ announced
the filing of an appeal to the ‘arbitration court’ requesting declaration of property rights
concerning “abandoned” property.164 OHCHR is concerned that these developments may
unlawfully interfere with property rights.
126. Legal experts operating in territory controlled by armed groups reported increased
information requests concerning the ongoing process of mandatory ‘registration’ of vehicles
under ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ ‘legislation’.165 The process reportedly includes a special fee
for ‘registration’, paid through the ‘central republican bank’. Owners who failed to ‘register’
their vehicle would be fined between 340 to 510 roubles,166 and their vehicles would be held until
the fine was paid. Not only does this incur additional expenses for residents, it also places them
in a difficult legal predicament, as any ‘official’ payments of ‘fees’ into the ‘budget’ of the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ may be interpreted as funding of terrorism by law enforcement
agencies of Ukraine.167
E. Human rights in humanitarian action
127. The space for humanitarian action continued to be restricted in territory controlled by
armed groups, with very few humanitarian actors able to operate. Protection activities, including
psycho-social support, education and mine action, remained difficult to implement, negatively
impacting the most vulnerable.168
128. Access to quality psycho-social support in rural areas in government-controlled territory
and in “no-man’s land” also remained a concern due to a general lack of medical personnel. Most
of the individual, ad hoc programmes implemented by non-governmental actors and international
organizations are addressed short-term critical needs. There remains, however, a need to address
long-term recovery and development solutions. The situation was especially dire in schools,
where there were often no psychologists, speech therapists or defectologists despite the high need
for psycho-social support for children living in the conflict zone.169
129. OHCHR observed a growing humanitarian need for both food and non-food items in
territory controlled by armed groups. This resulted from, inter alia, the cargo blockade,170 the
prohibition of large humanitarian NGOs (“People in Need” and “Pomozhem” humanitarian
centre of Rinat Akhmetov’s Foundation) from operating in ‘Donetsk people’s republic’171 and
Government restrictions limiting access to pensions of residents living in armed group-controlled
territory.
162 https://dan-news.info/obschestvo/v-gossobstvennost-dnr-s-aprelya-2016-goda-pereshlo-109-rynkov-po-vse-territoriirespubliki.
html.
163 HRMMU interview, 6 July 2017.
164 Available at http://dnr-online.ru/fond-gosimushhestva-dnr-uvedomlyaet-o-podache-iskov-v-arbitrazhnyj-sud-dnr-napredmet-
priznaniya-prava-sobstvennosti-na-nedvizhimoe-imushhestvo-ryada-yuridicheskix-lic/.
165 HRMMU meeting, 23 May 2017.
166 http://smdnr.ru/gai-preduprezhdaet-ob-otvetstvennosti-za-narushenie-srokov-registracii-avtotransporta/.
167 See Unlawful/arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances and abductions above.
168 See, e.g., OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, paras. 132-135.
169 The standard is one psychologist in a school with at least 300 students. For schools with less students, the psychologist
would work part time. Ministry of Education Decree No. 616 ‘On the provision on psychological service in the education
system of Ukraine’, 2 July 2009.
170 See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para 120.
171 See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para 133.
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130. OHCHR notes an acute need to increase mine action, including mine-risk awareness
activities, as many agricultural land plots remain contaminated with UXO, ERWs and landmines.
Humanitarian workers expressed hesitation to scale up livelihoods programmes for fear of
placing at risk civilians who would engage in agricultural activities, as well as the staff of the
humanitarian organizations.172
VI. Discrimination against Roma
131. OHCHR observed the continuation of a worrisome trend of violence and discrimination
against Roma people throughout Ukraine, in some cases involving local authorities.173 Thus, on
16 May 2017, in a violent escalation of a dispute between a local leader and the Roma
community in Vilshany village (Kharkiv region), a group of men led by a member of the Kharkiv
regional council and the head of the Vilshany village council attacked a group of Roma, shooting
and killing one and wounding three others. Following the incident, some representatives of local
authorities engaged in hate speech and threatened to evict Roma families from the village.174 On
21 July 2017, in Lviv, a Roma camp was set on fire, and another two smaller Roma camps were
abandoned, following a statement by a member of the Lviv city council, on 20 July, urging local
authorities to take more rigorous actions to “resolve” the Roma issue, including by evicting
Roma from Lviv.175 The police informed HRMMU that no investigation had been initiated into
this incident, stating that “there were no victims”.
132. OHCHR is concerned about the lack of investigations of crimes committed against
members of the Roma community, particularly regarding the forced displacement of a Roma
community in Kyiv, in April 2017, and the forced eviction of Roma families in Loshchynivka
village, Odesa region, in August 2016.176 On 28 July 2017, the Odesa regional prosecution closed
the criminal investigation into police misconduct177 during the forced eviction of Roma families
in Loshchynivka village, Odesa region due to lack of corpus delicti.
VII. Human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol
133. OHCHR has continued to seek access to Crimea in order to fulfil the mandate of
HRMMU to monitor, document and report on the human rights situation throughout Ukraine, and
to implement United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/205 which, inter alia, requests
OHCHR to issue a report on the human rights situation in Crimea.178 OHCHR continued to
record violations of fair trial rights and fundamental freedoms. Further, a number of forced
transfers and deportations of Ukrainians took place. In Sevastopol, the security of tenure of
property owners has been compromised by judicial decisions confiscating land plots.
172 NRC general coordination meeting, 2 June 2017.
173 Incidents of hate speech were also noted, such as fliers depicting racial slurs and possible incitement to hatred against
Roma which were posted in Odesa by a right-wing youth organization.
174 “IRF's Statement about violence against Roma in the village Vilshany”, International Renaissance Foundation, 18
May 2017, available at http://www.irf.ua/en/allevents/news/roma_vilshany_irfstatement/.
175 “Open statement concerning incident with Roma settlement in Lviv”, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 27
July 2017, available at https://helsinki.org.ua/appeals/vidkryta-zayava-schodo-intsydentu-iz-romskym-poselennyam-ulvovi/.
176 See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 August to 15 November 2016, para 152.
177 Based on article 367 of the Criminal Code, “Neglect of official duty”.
178 On 19 December 2016, the General Assembly adopted resolution 71/205 on the “situation of human rights in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol”. Recalling General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the
“Territorial integrity of Ukraine”, it refers to Crimea as under “temporary occupation” and calls on the Russian Federation
“as an occupying power” to bring an immediate end to abuses against residents of Crimea.
30
A. Administration of justice and fair trial rights
134. Administration of justice in Crimea continued to be tainted by concerns of political
motivation. Legal proceedings involving people in opposition to the Russian Federation
authorities in Crimea, or perceived to be, often failed to uphold due process and fair trial
guarantees. In such cases, claims of abuse in detention were dismissed by courts without proper
judicial review.
135. Two men arrested under accusations of being part of alleged Ukrainian sabotage groups
sent to Crimea to commit terrorist acts were convicted of other charges and sentenced to prison
terms. On 18 May 2017, one of the defendants was sentenced to three years of imprisonment on
drug-related charges. He stated in court that he had been tortured in order to force a confession
which was filmed and presented as evidence. He also complained that the drugs found in his car
had been planted by the Federal Security Service (FSB). No investigations were conducted to
verify his claims. Similarly, on 17 July, the other defendant was sentenced to three years and six
months for weapons-related rather than terrorism charges. According to his wife, he was arrested
at the Armiansk crossing point, detained overnight, and taken to Simferopol where he was
“arrested” with a gun planted on him.179
136. On 4 August 2017, a court in Crimea sentenced a farmer and pro-Ukrainian activist to
three years and seven months in prison for possession of weapons and explosives. On 29
November 2016, he had affixed a sign to his house that read “Heavenly Hundred Street” in
reference to Maidan protesters who died in February 2014 in Kyiv. Ten days later, FSB officers
searched his home and allegedly found bullets and explosives in the attic, for which he was
arrested. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed that the case against him was fabricated.
137. Lengthy legal proceedings marked the case of a deputy chairman of the Mejlis, who was
arrested in January 2015 and whose detention has been repeatedly extended ever since.180
OHCHR considers that the practice of automatic extension of pre-trial detention undermines the
process of judicial review of lawfulness of detention.
B. Freedom of expression
138. The application of anti-extremism legislation to statements, articles or views expressing
criticism or contravening an official position constricted the right to freedom of expression.
139. OHCHR noted for the first time the criminal sanctioning of a social media post on 7 July
2017. A Crimean Tatar from Sevastopol was sentenced to one year and three months
imprisonment for “publicly inciting hatred or enmity”. The conviction related to his Facebook
posts in 2016, which mentioned the “oppression” of Crimean Tatars, referred to Crimea being
“occupied” and “annexed”, and quoted a Crimean Tatar leader who organized the food and trade
blockade of Crimea in September 2015.
140. Trials involving a deputy chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis and a Crimean
journalist on separatism-related charges based on public statements made opposing the
annexation of Crimea were underway as of 15 August 2017. If convicted, they could be
imprisoned for up to five years.
179 HRMMU interview, 8 May 2017.
180 The Deputy Chairman is charged with organizing public disorder outside the Crimean parliament on 26 February
2014, when Crimean Tatars activists clashed with pro-Russian activists. His trial started in October 2016.
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C. Freedom of peaceful assembly and association
141. During the reporting period, unauthorized public events were prohibited, as were
events involving the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, which was banned in September 2016.
142. Commemorative ceremonies were organized in mainland Ukraine and Crimea to mark
the 73rd anniversary on 18 May 2017 of the 1944 deportation of 250,000 people, mostly Crimean
Tatars, accused by Soviet authorities of collaborating with Nazi Germany. City authorities in
Simferopol banned such commemorations in the central square and detained eight Crimean
Tatars for conducting unauthorized actions by walking in the street while displaying a Crimean
Tatar flag. In Bakhchysarai, five drivers of cars carrying Crimean Tatar flags were detained, and
in Feodosiia, the police blocked access to a memorial stone where people were planning to lay
flowers.
143. On 8 August, an elderly Crimean Tatar man was arrested for holding a one-person
picket in support of prosecuted Crimean Tatars in front of the building of the Supreme Court of
Crimea in Simferopol. He was charged with unauthorized public gathering and resisting police
orders and sentenced to an administrative fine of 10,000 RUB and 10 days of detention. The man
reportedly suffers from numerous health conditions, including Parkinson’s disease.
144. The only functioning Ukrainian Cultural Centre in Crimea closed in June 2017 due to
lack of funds.181 The Centre had not applied for registration under Russian Federation law, and its
members were regularly summoned by police or FSB and warned not to engage in “extremist
activity”. Public events organized by the Centre, which included paying tribute to Ukrainian
literary or historic figures, were often prohibited. For example, on 7 March 2017, city authorities
banned a public commemoration of Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, claiming that the
application to hold the commemoration had been improperly filed. In fact, since 2014, only one
of the Centre’s requests to organize a public event was granted while six were turned down.182
145. OHCHR recalls that restrictions to the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly may
only be justified if they are necessary, in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.183
D. Freedom of movement
146. OHCHR continued monitoring freedom of movement at the Chonhar, Kalanchak and
Chaplynka crossing points on the administrative boundary line (ABL) with Crimea. As in
previous reporting periods, one of the most common complaints was the difficulty of transporting
personal belongings to and from Crimea.
147. On 14 June 2017, the administrative court of appeal of Kyiv held that the ban on
transportation of goods and personal belongings across the ABL between Crimea and mainland
Ukraine was unlawful and invalid.184 The ban had been denounced by Ukrainian human rights
organizations as encouraging corruption and restricting freedom of movement.
181 According to its Head, the Centre does not have funds to pay rent for its premises in Simferopol.
182 HRMMU interview, 14 June 2017.
183 UN doc. A/HRC/31/66, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association and of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of
assemblies, paras. 29 and 34.
184 The ban was instituted by Government Resolution no. 1035 of 14 December 2015, which set up an exhaustive list of
23 types of goods allowed to be transported across the ABL.
32
148. Based on its monitoring at the ABL, HRMMU observed that the court decision was not
consistently applied. In some cases, Ukrainian officers required travellers who were unaware of
the decision to comply with the invalided Resolution. In other cases, particularly when they were
shown a copy of the court decision, officers allowed unrestricted crossing. Moreover, as of 10
August 2017, the invalided Resolution was still displayed at the ABL crossing point “Chonhar”.
149. In a positive development, foreign lawyers and human rights activists were added to the
list of persons who may apply for a special permit for crossing the ABL. Prior to 29 July 2017,
Ukrainian legislation only exempted from the general prohibition of foreigners crossing between
Crimea and mainland Ukraine persons with family or religious reasons, journalists, and
foreigners owning real estate in Crimea.185
E. Freedom of religion or belief
150. On 1 June 2017, all 22 congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Crimea were deregistered.
186 The decision was made pursuant to an April 2017 decision of the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation, which found that the group had violated the country’s anti-extremism
law. Without registration, a religious community may still congregate, however it cannot enter
into contracts (for example to rent state-owned property or pay utility bills), employ people or
invite foreigners to participate in religious activities and trainings. An estimated 8,000 believers
in Crimea were affected by this development.
151. On 9 June, a Jehovah Witness was told at a military conscription center in Crimea that
that he could not invoke his right to an alternative civilian service under Russian Federation
legislation unless he renounced his faith and changed his religion.187 On 27 June, the head of a
local committee of Jehovah’s Witnesses was summoned to court, charged with unlawful
missionary activity.188
152. OHCHR stresses that limiting the right to freedom of religion or belief may amount to
a violation of international human rights law. In addition, as the occupying power in Crimea as
per General Assembly resolution 71/205, the Russian Federation is bound to respect individuals’
religious convictions and practices.189
F. Forced transfers and deportations of protected persons
153. Among the most vulnerable groups of Crimean residents are those Ukrainian citizens
who, at the time of start of the occupation, had no formal registration (“propiska”) in Crimea and,
therefore, did not qualify for the Russian Federation citizenship. Russian authorities in Crimea
consider them “foreigners” and subject to Russian Federation immigration laws.
154. Several persons lacking Russian Federation citizenship were deported from Crimea to
mainland Ukraine for violating immigration rules of the Russian Federation, which were imposed
185 The State Migration Service issues special permits to foreign citizens or stateless persons travelling to/from Crimea
“with the purpose to provide legal aid to the victims of violations committed by unlawful public authorities and their
agents”, or as part of the independent human rights missions. Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 544 “On amendments
to the procedure for entry to the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine and exit from it”, 19 July 2017.
186 Pursuant to Russian Federation legislation imposed in Crimea, public organizations, including religious communities,
were obligated to re-register to order to obtain legal status.
187 http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1497831415. A central tenet of the Jehovah’s Witness faith is opposition to serving in
the military.
188 He was charged under Article 5.26 part 4 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of Russia (carrying out missionary
activity in violation of the requirements of the law). The man reportedly died later that day of a heart attack.
https://uawire.org/news/jehovah-s-witness-follower-in-the-crimea-dies-after-his-trial.
189 Article 27, Fourth Geneva Convention.
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in Crimea in violation of General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of
Ukraine.
155. In January 2017, the Crimea-born chairman of an NGO providing free legal aid was
convicted of “illegal stay” and ordered to be deported.190 The court found him to be a foreigner
who violated immigration rules by staying in Crimea beyond the authorized 90-day period.
Following the ruling, he was transferred from Crimea to Krasnodar (Russian Federation),
detained for 27 days, and then deported to mainland Ukraine where he currently lives as an IDP.
He is banned from entering Crimea, where his wife and son live, until 19 December 2021.
156. This case illustrates the adverse effects stemming from the unlawful implementation of
Russian Federation laws in Crimea. The forced transfer and deportation of this man contravene
international humanitarian law rules applying to protected persons in situations of occupation.191
The entry ban violates his freedom of movement and right to family life by separating him from
his relatives.192 OHCHR received information that 20-25 other Ukrainian citizens have been
similarly deported from Crimea to mainland Ukraine.193
G. Right to property
157. During the reporting period, the issue of real estate acquired by private individuals from
the city of Sevastopol prior to the occupation of Crimea became particularly acute. The owners of
approximately 600 private properties acquired from the city of Sevastopol are at risk of being
deprived of their right to property.
158. Several real estate owners received court decisions cancelling their purchase contracts,
which were concluded before Crimea was occupied by the Russian Federation in 2014. The
judgments stated that the transactions were illegally authorized by the city administration instead
of the city council. They did not take into account the three-year statute of limitations invoked by
several owners, nor did they provide for any financial compensation.194
159. The judgments, in effect, amount to the confiscation of property without reparation.
HRMMU recalls that, according to international humanitarian law, private property, as well as
the property of municipalities and institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the
arts and science may not be confiscated.195
VIII. Legal developments and institutional reforms
A. Derogation from international human rights obligations
160. June marked one year since the Government reviewed its derogation from certain
human rights guarantees under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
European Convention on Human Rights in light of the security situation in the conflict area.196
190 HRMMU interview, 5 May 2017. The person’s “propiska” had been cancelled in 2012 on procedural grounds,
disqualifying him from the ability to obtain Russian Federation citizenship after March 2014.
191 Article 49, Fourth Geneva Convention.
192 See Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
193 HRMMU interview, 26 May 2017.
194 HRMMU interview, 29 May 2017.
195 Hague Regulations, Articles 46 and 56.
196 The Government notified the United Nations Secretary-General of its derogation from these international instruments
in June 2015. See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 May to 15 August 2016, paras. 15-17.
34
Since then, an inter-agency state commission was established on 19 April 2017 to review the
scope, territorial application and necessity of these derogations. As of 15 August, information on
the progress or results of the review had not been made available. OHCHR underlines the
importance of a regular review of the necessity and proportionality of derogation measures by an
independent mechanism so as to ensure the temporary nature and objectivity of the assessment.
B. Judicial reform
Constitutional Court
161. On 13 July 2017, the Parliament adopted a law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine197
pursuant to constitutional amendments in force since 30 September 2016.
162. One of the new provisions introduced a new constitutional complaints mechanism,
enabling individuals and legal entities to appeal to the Constitutional Court when a law applied
by an ordinary court in a final decision concerning their case is believed to contradict the
Constitution. Prior to adoption of the law, 111 constitutional complaints had been lodged in
accordance with the constitutional amendments but none had been processed due to the absence
of a review procedure. The new law provides that the Court must decide on the opening of
constitutional proceedings within one month of the assignment of a case to a judge rapporteur198
and that a complaint shall be reviewed within six months.
163. The law also created legal conditions to fill vacant positions in the Constitutional Court.
As of 15 August, five out of 18 positions of judges at the court were vacant and could not be
filled due to the absence of a procedure for selection based on the constitutional amendments.
According to the law, the selection of candidates shall be carried out by screening commissions
functioning under each of the three authorities entrusted by the Constitution to appoint six
judges, namely the President, Parliament and Congress of Judges.199 The appointing authorities
no longer have a role in the dismissal of judges, which can take place only by decision of at least
two-thirds of the total number of judges of the Constitutional Court itself.
164. OHCHR hopes that enactment of the new law will avert a crisis in the operation of the
Court, which has a backlog of cases and has not issued any judgments in 2017.200 It recalls, for
example, that important pieces of legislation are pending review by the Court, including
provisions of the 2014 lustration law, the 2012 law on language policy and the 2014 law on
decommunization.
Staffing of courts
165. It would appear that resignations and dismissals of judges continued to occur at a higher
pace than the selection and appointment of new ones. Ukrainian courts therefore experienced a
further decrease in the number of judges, which started prior to the ongoing judicial reform and
affects the duration of court proceedings and overall administration of justice.201
166. Following the entry into force, on 30 September 2016, of constitutional amendments
and of the law ‘On the judicial system and the status of judges’, which aimed at ‘cleansing’ the
judicial branch in order to restore public trust in the judicial institution, the number of judges
employed further decreased from 6,614 to 6,063 between 15 November 2016 and 30 June 2017,
leaving Ukraine short of one third of the judges needed to staff its courts.202 The majority
197 Law ‘On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine’, No.2136-VIII of 13 July 2017 (entered into force on 3 August 2017).
198 This term can be extended by the Grand Chamber.
199 Screening by Parliament will be conducted by the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Policy and Justice; the Council
of Judges of Ukraine will act as a screening commission under the Congress of Judges of Ukraine; and the President will
establish a special screening commission.
200 The Constitutional Court issued seven judgments in 2016, five in 2015, and seven in 2014.
201 HRMMU report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 August to 15 November 2016, para 182.
202 There are 765 courts in Ukraine, whose effective functioning requires 9,028 judges. Information provided by the High
Qualification Commission of Judges on 14 July 2017 upon written request of HRMMU.
35
resigned while others were dismissed following disciplinary sanctions.203 The number of judges
authorized to administer justice is even lower, since the initial terms of 1,245 judges have ended.
An additional 1,271 judges are now eligible to retire.204 As of 30 June 2017, nine courts had no
judges and did not operate205 and 13 per cent of the courts were understaffed in respect of judges
by over 50 per cent.206
167. To mitigate this situation, on 31 May 2017, the High Council of Justice temporarily
transferred 32 judges to local courts facing the greatest staffing needs. In addition, between 1
January and 30 June 2017, the High Council of Justice appointed 199 new judges.
C. Draft law on restoring state sovereignty
168. A draft law207 aimed at restoring state sovereignty over certain areas of Luhansk and
Donetsk regions was developed by the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) upon
request of the President of Ukraine, but not yet registered in Parliament.208 OHCHR calls on the
Government to conduct broad consultations on this draft law, including with civil society. It
needs to ensure that the proposed new framework for the security operation incorporates human
rights guarantees in line with international standards.
D. National Human Rights Institution
169. On 17 July, OHCHR addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Parliament of Ukraine
advocating for a new selection process for the position of Parliamentary Commissioner for
Human Rights (Ombudsperson). This should follow a revision of the current procedure in
conformity with the Paris Principles and the 2014 recommendations of the Sub-Committee on
Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions requiring transparent,
merit based and participatory selection.209
170. This initiative came after Parliament failed to hold a vote on three candidates nominated
by deputies within the prescribed 20-day deadline, but later adopted a new voting procedure for
selection of the Ombudsperson (contained in above-mentioned law on the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine). OHCHR is concerned that claims of irregularities and backdoor political deals
surrounding the selection of a new Ombudsperson risk undermining public trust in the institution,
and calls on the Government to protect the integrity and independence of the national human
rights institution.
203 From 1 January to 30 June 2017, the High Council of Justice dismissed 390 judges, of whom 222 resigned and 168
had faced disciplinary sanctions.
204 Information reported by the Head of the State Judicial Administration at a meeting of heads of courts of appeal, held
on 9 June 2017, at the High Specialized Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases.
205 Five courts did not operate due to the absence of hired judges: Yaremchanskyi town court of Ivano-Frankivsk region;
Lokhvytskyi district court of Poltava region; Radyvylivskyi district court of Rivne region, Kulykovskyi district court of
Chernihiv region, and Zhydachivskyi district court of Lviv region. Four courts did not operate because the judges were
awaiting approval of their indefinite appointment upon termination of their initial five-year appointment: Karlivskyi
district court of Poltava region, Novovodolazkyi district court of Kharkiv region, Skadovskyi district court of Kherson
region, and Putylskyi district court of Chernivtsi region.
206 The number does not include courts located in territory not controlled by the Government.
207 Draft law “On the aspects of the state policy on the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty over the temporarily occupied
territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”.
208 Three other draft laws on the temporarily occupied territories were pending in the Parliament as at 15 August 2017.
See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, paras. 166-167.
209 OHCHR recommended such revision to the Parliament of Ukraine previously, see OHCHR Report on the human
rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para. 186.
36
IX. Technical cooperation and capacity-building
171. OHCHR conducts technical cooperation and capacity-building activities to assist the
Government of Ukraine in meeting its international obligations to protect and promote human
rights. During the reporting period, HRMMU engaged with numerous prosecution offices,
penitentiary staff, SBU, the Ombudsperson, and various government ministries, as well as civil
society organizations, to provide guidance and assistance in addressing human rights issues.
172. Together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other partners,
including from civil society, HRMMU developed a broad advocacy campaign focused on
ensuring access to pension payments by all entitled citizens. The campaign calls for the delinking
of the right to pension from IDP or residence registration, as this is an obstacle which
hinders access to pensions, particularly for Ukrainians residing in territory controlled by armed
groups. In this context, HRMMU held advocacy meetings with the Minister of Temporarily
Occupied Territories and IDPs, the head of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, as
well as international partners, embassies, and other stakeholders. The campaign has already
resulted in a few legislative initiatives, for instance one that, if adopted, would reinstate the right
of all citizens to receive their pension, regardless of IDP registration or residence location.210
173. In preparation for the third UPR cycle of Ukraine in November 2017, OHCHR
encouraged the Government to use it as an opportunity to communicate their expectations for
capacity-building and specific requests for technical assistance and support. HRMMU also
updated its thematic compilation of recommendations made to Ukraine by United Nations human
rights mechanisms (treaty bodies, special procedures and previous UPR cycles).
174. HRMMU continued to raise concerns regarding specific allegations of torture and illtreatment
of detainees and to support implementation of the Istanbul Protocol.211 HRMMU
provided human rights training to civil society monitors of the National Preventive Mechanism in
May and to SBU officers in Odesa in July, focusing on means of preventing and addressing
torture. In June and July, OHCHR held separate discussions in Kharkiv with the Regional
Prosecutor, Military Prosecutors and the head of SBU on accountability for torture and illtreatment
of conflict-related detainees allegedly perpetrated by SBU officers in specific cases
documented by HRMMU. On 30 June, OHCHR organized the presentation of the report of the
United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture on its 2016 visit to Ukraine to
representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor General, SBU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
various human rights NGOs, followed by a dialogue concerning best practices in documentation
of torture, complaint and oversight mechanisms, and treatment of conflict-related detainees.
HRMMU drew attention to persisting cases of torture, and reminded the Government of its
obligation to develop a road map for the full implementation of the Subcommittee’s
recommendations. In July, HRMMU gave a presentation to deputy heads of penitentiary
institutions on its key findings pertaining to torture and international obligations to prevent and
address this practice.
175. Jointly with United Nations and NGOs, HRMMU helped develop guidelines for the
inspection by special commissions of real estate damaged or destroyed during the armed conflict,
as well as a draft inspection act for such damaged or destroyed property. The guidelines and act
will soon be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers as tools to assist the Government in addressing
the impact of the conflict on civilians.
210 See Right to social security and social protection above.
211 The Istanbul Protocol on Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training8Rev1en.pdf.
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X. Conclusions and recommendations
176. In eastern Ukraine, as the civilian population endured the fourth summer of the conflict,
it faced continuing volatility of armed hostilities alongside a dearth of progress in efforts to
resolve the conflict and bring about peace and reconciliation. The parties to the conflict
repeatedly failed to honour commitments made under the Minsk agreements and subsequent
renewed agreements to cease fire. Instead, they chose to perpetuate the conflict through the
continued use of heavy weapons and laying of additional mines, as well as the implementation of
measures which deepened the divide between communities on either side of the contact line. The
resulting costs to civilian lives, health, family bonds and property have become a steady fixture
of the conflict.
177. On both sides of the contact line, those most affected by the conflict are increasingly
voicing anger and frustration at its continuation. This shared perspective should bode well as a
basis for local level conflict resolution activities. More needs to be done to ensure that policies of
discrimination and exclusion do not further the divide marked by an arbitrary boundary, that of
the contact line; and that information provided to civilians promotes inclusion and a respect for
individuals and their dignity.
178. Serious human rights violations and abuses, in particular enforced disappearances,
incommunicado detention, torture, ill-treatment and sexual violence, perpetrated in connection
with conflict-related suspects, compounded the suffering of the population and further fuelled an
atmosphere of fear and distrust. At the same time, accountability for past and ongoing violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law remained elusive, perpetuating a sense of
impunity.
179. Against the background of a further deteriorating socio-economic environment, in
particular in territory controlled by armed groups, the future looks bleak. Only a serious
commitment to peace and reintegration by the parties to the conflict, translating into sincere
action, can reverse this trend.
180. OHCHR remains concerned by human rights violations and violations of international
humanitarian law applicable to the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, particularly
the impact on the Crimean Tatar population. HRMMU will continue to monitor and report on the
human rights situation in Crimea, including with regard to compliance with provisional measures
issued by the International Court of Justice.212
181. Most recommendations made in previous OHCHR reports on the human rights situation
in Ukraine have not been implemented and remain pertinent and valid. OHCHR further reiterates
or recommends the following:
182. To the Ukrainian authorities:
a) Government of Ukraine to develop a national mechanism to make adequate,
effective, prompt and appropriate remedies, including reparation, available to
civilian victims of the conflict, especially those injured and the families of those
killed;213
b) Cabinet of Ministers to ensure the development and provision of timely, nondiscriminatory
and comprehensive assistance to all conflict-affected individuals,
particularly injured civilians and victims of torture and conflict-related sexual
212 See OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2017, para. 163.
213 In line with the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.
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violence, including medical, psycho-social and legal services, livelihood support,
and other multi-sectoral services, such as housing, taking into account the
specific needs of persons with disabilities;
c) Cabinet of Ministers to set up a property inventory and inspection procedures,
including an effective and accessible mechanism for documentation and
assessment of damages caused by the conflict;214
d) National Police and Office of the Prosecutor General to investigate, in a timely
and impartial manner, allegations of human rights violations committed at socalled
‘internal checkpoints’ in the conflict zone, in particular, incidents
involving the use of disproportionate and unnecessary force or violence by law
enforcement;
e) General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to ensure that all personnel
carrying out service, in particular those in the conflict area, are aware of the
legal procedure of detention and adequately supervised to abide by it;
f) Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights to step up the work of the
office’s regional representatives in the ATO area to ensure their pro-active role
in promoting human rights compliance, in particular during detention and trials
of conflict-related detainees, and rights of persons passing through checkpoints;
g) Office of the Prosecutor General and other law enforcement agencies to classify
appropriately, thoroughly investigate and prosecute hate crimes,215 including any
crimes committed on the basis of ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender
identity;
h) National Police to promptly and effectively investigate alleged violations in
connection to “Myrotvorets” website;
i) National Police to provide adequate security to public assemblies throughout
Ukraine and provide personnel with methodological guidelines and training on
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly;
j) National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities Sector
to regulate power supply in Luhansk region, ensuring uninterrupted distribution
of electricity;
k) State Fiscal Service to comply with the court decision invalidating the ban on
transportation of personal and consumer goods across the ABL established by
Government Resolution 1035;
l) Inter-agency commission to ensure regular periodic review of the necessity and
proportionality of the Government’s derogation measures and make public the
results of such review; and lift the derogation as soon as it is no longer strictly
required;
m) President to ensure that the National Security and Defence Council consults
broadly with civil society in the development of the draft law “On the aspects of
214 In pursuance of paragraph 20 of the Comprehensive State Programme on Support, Social Adaptation and Reintegration
of Citizens of Ukraine, Who Have Resettled from the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine and Areas Where Anti-
Terrorist Operation Is Ongoing to Other Regions of Ukraine, For the Period Till 2017.
215 As set out in Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
39
the state policy on the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty over the temporarily
occupied territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, and that the proposed
new framework for the security operation incorporates human rights guarantees
in line with international standards;
n) Government, Parliament and other relevant State bodies to eliminate obstacles
which prevent Ukrainian citizens from having equal access to pensions,
regardless of place of residence or IDP registration;
o) Parliament to ensure that legislation is in place to support health care reform in
a manner which guarantees accessibility and availability of quality health
services for all Ukrainian citizens, without discrimination;
p) Parliament to adopt legislation allowing for participation of civil society actors in
the provision of psycho-social services to citizens of Ukraine;
183. To all parties involved in the hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including
the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and armed groups of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’:
a) Bring to an end the conflict by adhering to the ceasefire and implementing other
obligations undertaken in the Minsk agreements, in particular regarding
withdrawal of prohibited weapons and disengagement of forces and hardware,
and until such implementation, agree on and fully respect “windows of silence”
to allow for crucial repairs to civilian infrastructure in a timely manner;
b) Strictly respect agreed safety zones around Donetsk Filtration Station and the
First Lift Pumping Station by refraining from shelling in the area and
withdrawing all fighters and equipment;
c) Facilitate free and unimpeded passage by civilians across the contact line by
increasing the number of crossing routes and entry-exit checkpoints, especially in
Luhansk region;
d) Remove security risks infringing upon freedom of movement in settlements
located close to the contact line, such as Shyrokyne, Novooleksandrivka and
Starolaspa, by demining the area and adhering to the ceasefire agreements, so
that access of humanitarian aid workers and the general public is not hindered;
e) Ensure unimpeded access of OHCHR and other independent international
observers to all places of deprivation of liberty, including for private confidential
interviews with detainees;
f) Immediately release all persons arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, particularly
those subjected to incommunicado detention;
g) Take measures to ensure that persons with disabilities residing near the contact
line have equal access to quality health services, including by facilitating freedom
of movement and providing accessible transportation;
h) Armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ to respect and protect the right to freedom of expression, and to
refrain from acts of infringement, including intimidation or harassment of media
professionals or persons expressing “pro-Ukrainian” or other politically diverse
views;
40
i) Armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ to refrain from creating parallel ‘legislative’ procedures for
registration of real estate or property, including vehicles;
j) Armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s
republic’ to halt the practice of seizing and placing under ‘temporary external
management’ private or communal property such as private markets and real
estate objects owned by churches or research institutions.
184. To the Government of the Russian Federation:
a) Implement General Assembly Resolution 71/205 of 19 December 2016, including
by ensuring proper and unimpeded access of international human rights
monitoring missions and human rights non-governmental organizations to
Crimea;
b) Uphold freedom of opinion and release all persons charged or sentenced for
expressing critical or dissenting views, including about political events or the
status of Crimea;
c) Refrain from forcible deportation and/or transfers of Ukrainian citizens lacking
Russian Federation passports from Crimea;
d) Investigate all allegations of torture and ill-treatment made by individuals
deprived of liberty in Crimea, including those accused of terrorism and
separatism related charges;
e) Respect religious convictions and practices, including by providing alternative
military service for conscientious objectors, and reverse the decision to de-register
Jehovah's Witnesses congregations in Crimea.
185. To the international community:
a) Use all diplomatic channels to press all parties involved to end hostilities,
emphasizing the effect the conflict has on the human rights situation, and call on
them to strictly adhere to their commitments under the Minsk agreements,
including an immediate and full ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons;
b) Continue to provide technical assistance to further develop the free legal aid
system in line with international human rights standards, offering support aimed
at increasing the quality of legal assistance and the quantity of defence lawyers
offering services in eastern Ukraine, in particular in Luhansk region;
c) Consider funding NGO projects which provide free legal aid to affected civilians
in cases of illegal expropriation of property by the Ukrainian military and armed
groups and forced displacement of civilians;
d) Support the Government of Ukraine in developing a system of comprehensive,
timely, and non-discriminatory assistance to all conflict-affected individuals,
particularly injured civilians and victims of torture and conflict-related sexual
violence, including medical, psycho-social and legal services, as well as livelihood
support, taking into account the specific needs of persons with disabilities;
e) Support projects of civil society on trial monitoring of conflict-related cases to
promote compliance with fair trial guarantees and to gather evidence for
recommendations aimed at implementing ongoing legal and judicial reforms.