Volume I - Annexes 1-22 | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Document Number

166-20180612-WRI-01-01-EN

Parent Document Number

166-20180612-WRI-01-00-EN

Case

166 - Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. R

Date of the Document

Tue, 06/12/2018 - 12:00

Document File

166-20180612-wri-01-01-en.pdf

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME I OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 1 Witness Statement of Ivan Gavryliuk (2 June 2018)
Annex 2 Witness Statement of Taras Stepanovych Horbatyi (31 May 2018)
Annex 3 Witness Statement of Kyrylo Ihorevych Dvorskyi (4 June 2018)
Annex 4 Witness Statement of Maksym Anatoliyovych Shevkoplias (31 May 2018)
Annex 5 Witness Statement of Igor Evhenovych Yanovskyi (31 May 2018)
Annex 6 Witness Statement of Dmytro Volodymyrovych Zyuzia (29 May 2018)
Annex 7 Witness Statement of Oleksii Oleksiyovych Bushnyi (5 June 2018)
Annex 8 Witness Statement of Vadym Skibitskyi (5 June 2018)
Annex 9 Witness Statement of Eliot Higgins (5 June 2018)
Annex 10 Witness Statement of Andrii Mykolaiovych Tkachenko (5 June 2018)
Annex 11 Expert Report of Lieutenant General Christopher Brown (5 June 2018)
Annex 12 Expert Report of Associate Professor Anatolii Skorik (6 June 2018)
Annex 13 Witness Statement of Andriy Shchekun (4 June 2018)
Annex 14 Witness Statement of Anna Andriyevska (4 June 2018)
Annex 15 Witness Statement of Eskender Bariiev (6 June 2018)
Annex 16 Witness Statement of Mustafa Dzhemiliev (31 May 2018)
Annex 17 Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko (6 June 2018)
Annex 18 Witness Statement of Lenur Islyamov (6 June 2018)
Annex 19 Witness Statement of Akhtem Chiygoz (4 June 2018)
Annex 20 Witness Statement of Ilmi Umerov (6 June 2018)
Annex 21 Expert Report of Professor Paul Magocsi (4 June 2018)
Annex 22 Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman (6 June 2018)

Annex 1
Witness Statement of Ivan Gavryliuk (2 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
WITNESS STATEMENT OF IVAN GAVRYLIUK
A. Introduction
1. I am Major-General Ivan Gavryliuk, a national of Ukraine. I hold the position
of the Head of the Main Department of Logistics – the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
2. I have been doing military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine since 1992.
Since 2008, I have held the positions of the Chief of the Staff of the Department of Rocket
Force and Artillery of the Army Corps, the Head of the Rear Services of the Army Corps, the
Deputy Head of the Organizational and Planning Department of the Rear Services of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the Head of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
3. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter – “GS UAF”) is
the main military authority responsible for planning the state’s defense; managing the use of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter – “UAF”); and coordinating the performance of
tasks in the sphere of defense by state executive bodies, bodies of local government, military
formations established in accordance with laws of Ukraine, and law-enforcement bodies.
One of the main tasks of the GS UAF is the direct military management of the UAF. Among
other functions, the GS UAF identifies needs in weapons, military equipment, material,
technical resources, and property necessary for the proper performance of the tasks by the
UAF and other military formations; and controls the receipt, register-keeping, distribution,
assignment, and decommissioning of military property in the bodies of military
management, contingents, military units, institutions, and organizations of the UAF.
4. In this statement I shall:
2
a. Describe the procedure for the register-keeping of armaments and
ammunition in the UAF, their supply to the units of the UAF, and their decommissioning;
and
b. Provide information about the availability of certain armaments and
ammunition in service and register of the UAF.
5. I am aware of the facts set out in this statement because, as the Head of the
Main Department of Logistics – the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of UAF, among other
things, I coordinate the activities of the appropriate subdivisions responsible for the supply,
register-keeping, and storage of weapons and military equipment of the UAF.
B. Procedures Used in the UAF to Track Weapons, Military Equipment
and Ammunition
6. Every unit participating in hostilities has a log of warfare, which is an
obligatory document. The log reflects in chronological order all the events occurring at the
line of engagement (including the time when hostilities began; the approximate type of
armaments used by the enemy; fire intensity; the amount of ammunition used; and losses in
personnel, armaments, and ammunition). If during hostilities, certain types of armament are
destroyed, this information must be included in the log. The commander of a unit is
responsible for inclusion of this information in the log.
7. Each unit, starting from the company (battery) level, keeps a numeric account
log of available armaments. For example, each multiple launch rocket system BM-21 has its
own factory number, which is recorded in an appropriate account log, including dates of its
registration and deregistration.
8. In the case of damage to or loss of an armament during hostilities, the
commander of a unit makes an appropriate record in the warfare log and reports back to the
commander of a military base. The commander of the military base launches an internal
investigation, the results of which are reflected in an appropriate report, which includes the
findings of the internal investigation on the loss of or damage to the military property. The
report includes explanations of military servicemen who witnessed the hostilities and the
loss of the armament, available photographic and video materials, excerpts from the log of
3
warfare, excerpts from the final combat report, and other documents pertaining to the
investigation.
9. In the event an armament is lost or cannot be repaired, a petition based on
the investigation report is submitted to an official authorized by the order of the Minister of
Defense of Ukraine to decommission armaments, with a request to allow the
decommissioning of the armament in accordance with established procedure. If the request
is granted, an appropriate central authority responsible for register-keeping and supplies
issues an inspection certificate for decommissioning/excluding the armament from the
register of the UAF.
10. A sample of the documents mentioned above may be found in Annex 187.
11. Based on the combat report as well as on a relevant request of the unit of
UAF, an appropriate central authority responsible for the register-keeping and supplies
provides a replacement for the lost armaments.
12. If armaments are damaged but can be restored, they are repaired at the
facilities of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine or State Enterprise “Ukroboronprom” and,
then, sent to the warehouses of the UAF ready to be supplied to the Army.
C. Facts Concerning Certain Types of Weapons
I. BM-21 “Grad”
13. The 122 mm MLRS 9K51 “Grad”, which includes combat vehicle BM-21
(hereinafter – “BM-21 Grad”), was designed and manufactured by Joint Stock Company
“Scientific and Production Association “Splav” (Tula, Russian Federation). It was approved
for use by the Soviet Army in 1963. BM-21 Grad, including its modification 9P138 “Grad-1”,
was inherited by the UAF from the Soviet Army after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.
14. As of 1 January 2014, the UAF had 309 units of BM-21 Grads in its service.
From the February 20, 2014 to March 1, 2015, the UAF lost 41 units of BM-21 Grads. This
includes the 18 units of the BM-21 Grad that were in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea at
the time of its occupation by Russia in 2014. This number also includes the 22 units of the
BM-21 Grad destroyed during hostilities in the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts,
and 1 damaged unit the UAF was forced to abandon near Debaltsevo on February 8, 2015 at
4
the time of retreat. These facts can be confirmed by appropriate inspection certificates
issued based on the results of internal investigations (a sample inspection certificate and
investigation document may be found in Annex 187).
15. Prior to Ukraine’s loss of control of certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts in spring 2014 and to the conflict that followed, no BM-21 Grad had been deployed in
these administrative territorial units of Ukraine. The nearest points of the BM-21 Grad’s
deployment were the city of Chuguyiv (Kharkiv oblast) and the village of Hvardiiske
(Dnipropetrovsk oblast). This information is confirmed by the report on the conventional
armaments of Ukraine as of January 1, 2014, submitted in accordance with the
requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which may be found in
Annex 54.
II. BM-27 “Uragan”
16. 220 mm MLRS 9K57 “Uragan”, which includes combat vehicle BM-9P140
(hereinafter – BM-27 Uragan), was designed by Joint Stock Company “Scientific and
Production Association “Splav” (Tula, Russian Federation) and manufactured by Public
Joint Stock Company “Motovilikha Plants” (Perm, Russian Federation). It was approved for
use by the Soviet Army in 1975. The UAF inherited this system from the Soviet Army after
the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.
17. As of January 1, 2014, the UAF had 138 units of BM-27 Uragan in its service.
From the beginning of hostilities in the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in spring
2014 to October 1, 2014, six units of the BM-27 Uragan were destroyed. That can be
confirmed by inspection certificates issued based on the results of internal investigations.
The UAF has the remaining 132 units in its possession.
18. Prior to Ukraine’s loss of control of areas in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in
spring 2014 and to the conflict that followed, no BM-27 Uragan had been deployed in these
administrative territorial units of Ukraine. The nearest point of deployment of BM-27
Uragan was the city of Sumy (Sumy oblast). This information is confirmed by the report on
the conventional armaments of Ukraine as of January 1, 2014, submitted in accordance with
the requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
5
III. BM-9A52 “Smerch”
19. The 300 mm MLRS 9K58 “Smerch”, which includes combat vehicle BM-9A52
(“BM-9A52 Smerch”), was designed by Joint Stock Company “Scientific and Production
Association “Splav” (Tula, Russian Federation) and manufactured by Public Joint Stock
Company “Motovilikha Plants” (Perm, Russia Federation). It was approved for use by the
Soviet Army in 1987, and is another type of multiple launch rocket system inherited by the
UAF from the Soviet Army after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.
20. As of January 1, 2014, the UAF had 81 units of MLRS Smerch in its service. 2
units of MLRS Smerch were lost during a warehouse fire in the city of Svatovo on October
29, 2015, with the warehouses being located outside the area of the Antiterrorist Operation.
One of the 2 units was totally destroyed (a copy of the internal investigative documents may
be found in Annex 137), and the other is being restored at the facilities of the Ministry of
Defense of Ukraine. The UAF has the remaining 79 units in its possession.
21. Prior to Ukraine’s loss of control of certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts in spring 2014 and to the conflict that followed, no MLRS Smerch had been deployed
in these administrative-territorial units of Ukraine. The nearest point of the deployment of
MLRS Smerch was the city of Kremenchuk (Poltava oblast). This information is confirmed
by the report on the conventional armaments of Ukraine as of January 1, 2014, submitted in
accordance with the requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
IV. MLRS 2B26 “Grad-K”
22. The MLRS 2B26 “Grad-K” is a modified model of the MLRS 9K51 “Grad”
mounted on the KamAZ-5350 truck. The MRLS 2B26 “Grad-K” was modified by the PJSC
Motovilikhinskiye zavody (the City of Perm, Russian Federation). The MLRS was first
introduced in 2011, and it has been supplied to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
since 2012.
23. The UAF has never had this MLRS model in its service.
V. Air Defense System 9K330 “Tor”
24. The air defense system 9K330 “Tor” (“ZRK Tor”) is a system inherited by the
UAF from the Soviet Army after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Although the UAF
6
maintains some air defense ZRK Tor complexes in certain arsenals and warehouses, the UAF
has not used this weapon for at least the last ten years. Neither has it ever lost such a
system. All such units are accounted for.
VI. Air defense system96K6 “Pantsyr-S1”
25. The developer of the air defense missile-gun system 96K6 “Pantsyr-S1” is JSC
“Instrument Design Bureau named after academic A.G. Shipunov” (City of Tula, Russian
Federation) and its manufacturer is JSC “NPO “Vysokotochnyye kompleksy” (Moscow,
Russian Federation). The 96K6 “Pantsyr-S1” is a relatively new weapon, which was approved
for use by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2012.
26. The UAF has never had such a system in its service.
VII. Heavy flame thrower system TOS-1 “Buratino”
27. The developer of the heavy flame thrower system TOS-1 “Buratino” (TOS-1
Buratino) is “Design Bureau of Transport Engineering” (Omsk, Russian Federation) and its
manufacturer is JSC “Omsk Transport Engineering Plant” (Omsk, Russian Federation). The
TOS-1 Buratino was approved for use by the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1980.
28. The UAF did not inherit any units of the TOS-1 at the time of dissolution of
the USSR and has never had such a system in its service.
VIII. Rocket-Propelled Assault Grenade Launcher RShG-1
29. The developer and manufacturer of the rocket-propelled assault grenade
launcher RShG-1 (“RShG-1”) is JSC “Scientific and Production Association “Basalt”
(Moscow, Russian Federation). RShG-1 was approved for use by the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation in 2000.
30. The UAF has never had the RShG-1 in its service.
IX. Main battle tank T-72B3
31. The main battle tank T-72B3 is a version of the tank T-72, upgraded by JSC
“NPK “Uralvagonzavod” (the city of Nizhniy Tagil, Russian Federation). It has been in the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation since 2012.
32. The T-72B3 variant of the T-72 tank has never been in service at the UAF.
X. Man-portable Rocket-Propelled Flame Thrower MRO-A
7
33. The developer of the man-portable rocket-propelled flamethrower MRO-A
“Borodach” is JSC “Scientific and Production Association “Basalt” (Moscow, Russian
Federation). The MRO-A “Borodach” was approved for use by the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation in 2004.
34. The UAF has never had the MRO-A in its service. Records of the UAF
specifically confirm that the UAF has never had the units of the MRO-A with the following
markings:
a. M􀇸􀇶-A 􀇴􀇶􀀑􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀓􀀕􀀃􀇩􀇩-03-􀀓􀀛􀇶􀀮􀇼O􀇳 􀇻-505 􀇩 533-1-08
b. 􀇴􀇸􀇶-􀇨􀀃􀇴􀇶􀀑􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀃􀀮􀇳4214 29 08
c. 􀇴􀇸􀇶-􀇨􀀃􀇴􀇶􀀑􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀓􀀓􀇴􀇶􀀑􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀖􀀚􀀔􀀘-2008
35. By its appearance and functional purposes, the MRO-A resembles and is very
similar to the rocket-propelled infantry flamethrower RPO-A “Shmel”, which has been in
service of the UAF since the times of the USSR.
XI. Man-portable air defense system “Grom-E2”
36. The man-portable air defense system “Grom-E2” (PZRK Grom-E2) is an
upgraded variant of man-portable air defense complex PZRK Grom. Its developer and
producer is Polish JSC “Mesko” (the city of 􀀶􀁎􀁄􀁕􀄪􀁜􀁖􀁎􀁒-Kamienna, Poland).
37. The UAF has never had PZRK Grom-E2 in its service.
XII. Medium Self-Adhesive Mine SPM (Limpet mine SPM)
38. The limpet mine SPM was developed by JSC “Research Institute of
Engineering” (city of Balashykha, Moscow oblast, Russia). It was approved for use by the
Armed Forces of the USSR in 1968.
39. After the collapse of the USSR, limpet mines SPM remained in service at
armed forces of former Soviet republics, including Ukraine. As of January 1, 2014, limpet
mines SPM were not located in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
40. The UAF’s records confirm that the UAF has never had in its service or stored
any SPM limpet mines with lot number 15-6-90 MC 􀀲􀇺􀇲-9 (manufactured in 1990). The
UAF has not had any limpet mines SPM manufactured after 1987 in its service.
8
41. I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to provide further testimony.
Signed in Kyiv on June 2, 2018.
By:_____/signed/_______
Ivan GAVRYLIUK
3ACTOCYBAHHH MIKHAPOJIHO] KOHBEHIIIi IIPO OPOTEY 3
IHAHCYBAHHHM TEPOP3MY TA MIKHAPO[HOY KOHBEHIUIY IPO
JIKBIJIAI[IO BCIX OPM PACOBOY JIHCKPHMIHAIIIf
KPAIHA
npor
POCICKO dEJIEPAIUi
CBIJUHEHHH IBAHA TABPHIIOKA
A. Bery
1. H, reepan-Maop Ian IaBpoK, rpoMap VKpain, o6iiiMato nocany
HaaHHKa TOnOBHOTO yIIDaBJIiHHH JIOTiCTHKH 3aCTyIIHHKa HaaJIEHHKa TeHepaoro
urra6y 36poi1x Cun YKpa1.
2. Ha iiconiii cry6i 36poinwx Cwnax /Kpain epc6ya1 3 1992 p0Ky.
lOao 3 2008 poxy 3aMan nocapt aamna rra6y iyutinry paerx i~cs i
aprnepii apMifcoro Kopnycy, Haan»a Ty apMiifCOro KOpnyCy, aCTyIHKa
Haan»Ka oprami3ario-nnaooro ypain rnry B6pox Cun /pain Ta
Haan»Ha THy 36po~ix Cun1 VKpai.
3. Teepani 1rra6 336p0ix CH VKpai (Jani "THI '3Cy") € TOJ1OBHHM
iiiCKOBHM OpFaIOM 3 IIaIyBaHIHH O60pOH J(CpKaBH, yIHpaJIiIHIHH 3aCTOCyBIHM
336poinnx Cn /pain (tari - "3Cy"), Koopmatii 3a nonan aaztan y cdepi
O6OpoHH OpraHaMH BHKOHaOi Ia/UH, MiCIteOTO CaMOBp/yBaHH, BiHCKOBHM
bopMyBaM, yTBOpeHHMM BiJIIOBiJIHO II0 3aK0Hin VKDai Ta IIDaBOOXOpOHHMH
OpraaMH. OHHM 3 OCHOBHHX 3aBJtaH, TIHI 33CY c Geanocepetc ic»Koe KepiBTno
33CV. [III 3Cy ioiqHo 0 noKaeHHX 3apaH», cepet ioro, BaHaae noTpe6H B
o36poei, iicsKoiii rexii, Marepianno-rexix pecypcax Ta MaHni, teO6xi/Ix
JUIH HaICKHOO BHKOHaHHH 3a/(aH 3CY Ta in1Mt icK0BM (popMyBaHMM, a
TaKOK 3J(icH€ KOHTpOJI» 3a ixHiM OTpMaHM, O6iKOM, DO'OJ1oM, 3aKpiteM Ta
CIHCaM opraax iCOOro yIIpai, 3'€Jax, Bi~cKOBHX aCTHHax,
yeraoax Ta oprai3attix 3CY.
4. yIHX CBiJIHHHHX OIIHCyO:
a. nponenypy o6nixy oa6poe ra 6oenpwnaciB y 3Cy, 3a6e3neeH HMM
ui/tpo3ptiniB 3CY, a TaKOK ix6OTO CIIHCaHH;
b. idopMario too Hanocri oKpeMx 3pa3Kin 036pOCH Ta 6ocnpnaci
a oa6poci Ta a o6nixy 3CV;
5. Mei Bi/10Mo 1po daKT, BMKaeHi y IoMy ciUHeHHi, OCKiIKH B KoCTi
HaaHa TOOBHOrO yIpaBi oriCT - 3aCTyIHHKa HaaHHa TIII 3CY s,
CepeI iOro, KOOp/Iyo isicr Bi/mnoipuHHx nip1po3inis, Ki BirtoBi1a0T 3a
nOCTaaHH, oGi Ta 36epiTa O36po€Hs 3CY.
B. IIpoue/1yp 33CY, Ki MKOpMCTOyIOT»C JUI BiJICJIiJUKOyB aHH
o36po ra 6ocnpnacin
6. Koe ptpo3tin, xi eye 6oiioi ii, Mac ypan 6oiox pii, to C
O6OB'3KOMM JIOKyMeHTOM. Y 3a3Hae0My KypHati i/(OfpaaOTCH y XpOHOJIOTM0My
nopuy ci oii, Ki ip6yaoTc Ha iii 3iTKHeH (BKIOaOHH, Ma€ IIOaTKy
6o~fox Jiif; OpiCTOHii TI O36po€, Ito BHKODHCTOyCT OporOM; iHTeHcHHiCT
BOTH; KinKieT HKOpHeTaHHx 6ocnpMaciB; BTpaTH B ocooBoMy cKaJi, o36pocHi Ta
6ocnpnacax). OTKe, Ko miJI aC fooBMx ii by 3teHi eBi BM/ 036pO€Hu,
inpopMaui npo e Mae 6yr necea po 3aanaenoro ypuany. KoMan/up mi1po3/1y
ece iptoniptaricr 3a nece iei inpopwaif pto ypnany.
7. Koe nippo3min, noaon 3 por (6arapei), Bee HoMepHi o6nix
HaBHOTO O36pO€HHS. Hanpnat, KoKHa peaTHHa cHCTeMa 3a1OBOTO BOTH0 DM-21
Mac cii 3aBoci HoMep, KMi 3a1MCyCT»CH y BiJUIOBJHy KHHTy O6JiKy, BKIOaOH
JaTH IIOCTaHOBKH ii Ha O6iK Ta 3HTTH 3 061iKy.
8. Y pa3i noumoppxenn a6o TpaTH o36poem nit ae Bente 6oiox IM,
KoMa/Hp i(po3try 3ticoe iroiyui sane po ypuary 6oiiox put ra ponoitae
KoMaHupy icooi aer. KoMapup icKooi aer pH3Haa€ eyOoBe
po3CI/yBaH, pe3yJITaTH KOTO Bi/to6paaoTc y Bi/IoBiJIHoMy aTi, KHi MiCTHT
BHCHOBKH CJIyROOBOTO DO3CIJIyBaHH 3a baTOM BTDaTH a60 IIOIIIKOJUKeHH Bi~iCKOBOTO
Maia. lo aKTy IIOIyaOTCH IIOCHeHH BiHCKOBOCIyK6OBIIiB, Ki 6yIM CBiJIKaMH
60ioBMx Ji Ta BTDaTM O36pOCHHH, HZHBHi pOTo Ta BiJIeOMaTepian, BHTHTH 3 KypHaIy
6o~OMX [iii, BHTHT 3 IIiJICyMKOBOTO 6oiiOBOTO IOIIeCeHIHH, ii JOKyMeHTH, Ki Ma1OT
3Ha JUI CIyKO0BOTO DO3CIJIyBaHHH.
9. y pa3i, HKIIIO O36pOCHHH BTpaeHo H He Ura€ BiJUHOBIeHHo, Ha micTaBi
aKTy CTyKOOBOTO DO3CIJIyBaHHH TOTyVCTCH KJIOIIOTaHH Ha IIOCaJIOBy OCOfy, Ka 3Ti/Ho
HaKa3y MiHicTpa Of0po VKDai Mae IpaBO CICyBaT O36po€H, 3 IIpOXaHHM
JIO3BOJIHTH CIJHCaHHH 3a3HaeHOTO O36p0CHH y BCTaHOBIHOMy IIODIIKy. Y pa3i HaJLaHH
IO3BOJIy, BiJIIOBiJIHOHO IIeHTDaJTEHOO CJ1yK60O o6niKy i 3a6e3neeHH BHJIaETCH
inceKTOpCKe nOCBiJ(Me Ha CIHCaHHH 3a3Ha€HOTO 036p0CH 3 061iKy 3CY.
􀀒􀀙􀀘􀀏
􀀒􀀙􀀘􀀊􀀏
􀀖􀀕􀀏
10. IIpHK1aJUH IUHX JIOKyMeHTiB MOKHa 3Ha~TH B /IO(aTKy
11. Ha nipcrai 6oionoro ponecen ra 3ax iuroiyroro mi/po3/tiny 3Cy,
inonipa IeTpaa enry6a o6niy i 3a6e3nee aifcHoc 3aMiy BTpaMeHOTO
O36pOCHH.
12. V pa3i KIO IOOIKee O36pOCH I/Ura€ Bi[HOBJIOHHO, IIDOBOJIHTC
ioro peMOHT Ha IOTyKHOCTX MiicTepCTBa 06opoH YKpai a6o JIK "Yp060po1pOM",
IIiC Oro Boo a6epira€Tc a cKnaJax 3CY roToHocTi po Mai y BiHCKa.
C. daer crocono opewx rnin 036po€n»
I. M-I"Tpat"
13. 122 MM PC3B 9K51 "Tpat", to Tao a€ 6oioy Many BM-21 (a1i
BM-21 "Tpa), 6y1a po3po6eHa Ta Bpo6neHa AKIiOepM TOBapHCTBoy "HayKooBHpO6Me
06'CJan "Ca" (M. Tya, Pociics»a bepepati). CMCTeMy yIO IIpHHHTO
Ha o36pocs Papucxoi ApMii y 1963 poi. BM-21 "Tpapr, BKoMao ii Mopupixartio
9I1138 "Tpat-1", 6ya yea/toana 3Cy Bit Papueoi ApMii ic po3nay CPCP B 1991
poi.
14. CTaHOM Ha 1 €ins 2014 pOKy 3CY MaH Ha O36pOCHi 309 OIUHHH1U BM-21
"Tpat".3 20 JOTO0 2014 D0Ky 210 1 6epe3 2015 pOKy 3CY BTDaTHIH 41 OJUWHHIUO BM-21
"Ipa. He BKIOMa€ BiCiMHaJUUIT OJUHHHIU BM-21 "Tpat", Ito nepefyBa B ABTOHOMHi~
Peery6ii KpM nic ii oxyaIii Poeieo 2014 poi. Ile raKo BKoa€ aJUUHT Ji
OHti BM-21 "Tpa", Ki 6ynu autei B xopi 6oioux ii ua repwropii J[one1soi Ta
Jlyrancoi o6acrei, Ta OJ(Iy IIOIIKOJUKCHy OJUHIHMIUIO, HKy 33Cy 6yJIH 3MyIIICHi 3aJIHIIHTH
min Je6amteo 8 Toro 2015 poKy iyt ac iycTyy, IHi baKTr Ii(TrepJUyor»CH
Bi(noiuM icneKropcMn nocieHMH, BJ(aHM Ha ipcTaBi pe3y.TaTi
CJyOOBHx DO3CJ(yBa» (3pa3K iHCIeKTOpCKOrO IOCBien Ta II0KyMeHTiB
po3CiJyBan MiCTT B JIOaTKy
15. Jlo TpaTH VKpaioo KoTpomo HaI paioaMu Jloeuoi ra Jlyracoi
o6nacreii anecni 2014 pOKy, a TaKOK IIepeJU KOH]IiKTOM, HKHji 31OJ10M p03TOpiBCH,
KOJUHx BM-21 "Tpat" e 6yno peroxoano uHx a(MiniCTpaTO-Tep»Topia1x
OJ(HHHIUHX VKDai. Hai6Ji TOK COKyBa toro o36poea 6yr Micro Hyryis
(Xapica o61.) Ta eMT Tapti~ice (J[inponeTpoca 061.). LL inpopMarti
IiJTBep/Kye€TC B 3BiTi II1OJI0 3BHMaHHHX O36pOCH VKpaiHH CTaHOM Ha 1 Ci 2014 DoKy,
nopaHoMy BiJIIOBiJIHo JI0 BHMor IoroBopy n1po 3Mai a6po~ii cn €poni, Ki
3HaXO[HTCH B [IOI1aTKy
􀀒􀀔􀀘
IL.
16.
M-27 Yparan
220 MM PC3B 9K57 "/para", to oac 6oiony Many BM-9II140 (ari
M-27 "Ypara"), 6y1a po3po6ea AKItiOHepHM TOBapCTBoM "HayoBo-BHpo6He
o6'epann "Cna" (M. Typa, Pocifca bepepatis) Ta Hpo6IeHa Ily6i9HM
aKItioepM TOBapHCToM "Moronixici 3aBonv" (M. IIepM, Poci~ca Penepauin).
CcTeMy 6y1O IIDHiHTO Ha O36p0CH PaJU1HcK0 ApMi€o y 1975 poi. 3Cy
yenapyan mo ccreMy in Papumes»Koi ApMii nicn po3nany CPCP B 1991 po1ti.
17. Cranow na 1 ci1 2o14 poxy 33CY wan a o36pocmi 138 0J(MI( BM-27
"Vpara". 3 noarxy 36po~oro opiry a repropimx loeoi ra Jlyracoi
o6nacre~ aeci 2014 pOKy II 1 KOTH 2OI4 DOKy 6yIO 3HHIIIeHO IIIiCT OIUHHHII BM-27
"Ypara". Ile IiTBepJUKyCTCH BiJITOBIHHMIH iHCIeKTOpCKHMH IIOCBiJIHeHHHMH,
BJaHMM Ha micTaBi pe3yTaTi8 CJTyKS0BX po30iJyBaHE, Perra 132 opuHHi
3aJtaoTcH y HaHo@Ti 33CV.
18. lo TpaTH VKpainoo KoTpoo Hat paionaMn JIoneusKoi Ta JMyrancKoi
o6nacre aseci 2014 pOKy, a TaKOK epet KO(iKTOM, HKHi 31TO/I0M p03rOpiBc,
KOJHHx BM-27 "para"He Sy1O JUHCIOKOBaHO B IUHX aJMiHiCTpaTHBHo-TepTopiaHHX
OJHIx VKDai. Hai6KO TOKOO JIHCIOKyBaHH BM-27 "Yparan" 6yo Micro
CyMM (CyMc»Ka 061aCT). LL idOpMaIi IiJTBepKy€TC R 3BiTi IIOI0 3BMMafHHX
036po€CH VKDaiH CTaHOM Ha 1 Ci 2014 DOK, IIOJaHOMy BiJIIOBiJIHO IO BHMor [I0roBOpy
npo 3aiii 36poi cn €poi.
III.
19.
EM-9A52 CMep
300 MM PC3B 9K58 "CMp, to oac oiony Many BM-9A52 ("M9A52
CMep"), 6y1a po3po6ea AT "HayKono-po6Me o6'cuaa "Cnna" (M. Ty1a,
Poci~ca detepati) Ta 8HpO6eHa IAT "MoroHixinci 3aor" (M. HepM, Pociica
Pepepatis). CHTeMa 6ya npMira a o6poca Pac»Koo ApMi€o y 1987 poi, Ta €
IIIe OIHMM BHJIOM CMCTeM 3aIIIOBOTO BOTHO, yCIIaJIKOBaHHX 33CY Bin PaucsKoi ApMii
nicnr po3nay CPCP B 1991 po1i.
20. Cranow na 1 cin» 2014 poxy 3Cy Mano a o36poei 81 OJ(HH1o PC3B
"CMepu". JIni outi PC3B "CMep 6yo TpaeHo B pesymrari nokei Biconx
cKaJiB y M. CBaTOBO 29 KOTH 2015 DOKy, Ki 3HaXOJUHJIHC ITO3a 30HOO
AHTTepopHcTHHoi orepam~i. 3 HHx oIIHa opHHHLU 6ya noBHicTo 3HHuteHa (oTi
MarepianiB Cy6OBOro pO3Ci(yBaHn MoKHa 3Hai~TH B JlOIaTKy ), a iuta
Bi(HOBJIOCTCH Ha IIOTyKHocTX MiHiCTepCTBa O6Opo VKpai. PeIrTa 79 OJHHHII
3araorcH y HaBHoCTi B 3CY.
21. /lo TpaT /Kpainoo KoTpo/o Ha paiionaMn J[oneuxoi ra JlyrancKoi
o6nacre nanecui 2014 p0Ky, a TaKo nepet KopiKToM, KHi 3rO/(0M po3ropiBc,
KOJIHOro PC3B "CMep" He 6yno JOoKoaHo Ha TepTopix tHx aMiicTpaToTepHTOpiaHHx
OH VKDai. Hai6Koo TOKOIO IHCIOKyaHH PC3B "CMep"
6yno Micro KpeMeHy (Horras»Ka o61.). LUr ipopMatti TaKo miTBepUy€Tc 3iTi
IOJI0 3BHHaHHHX O3po€H VKpaHH CTaHOM Ha 1 CH 2014 DOKy, IIOIaHOMy BiJIIIOBiJ(HO
no BMor J[oroopy npo awaiii afpoii Cun 6poni.
IV. PC33B 2626 Tpa-K
22. PC3B 2E26 "Tpat-K" c Motepi3oaoo Moreno PC3B 9K51 "Tpat" Ha
6a3i aToMo6is "Ka»A3-5350. Morepiaati PC3B 2526 "Tpat-K" npoenea a IIAT
"Moronixici a3anor" (M. HepM, Pocifc»a Pertepati). PC3B 6ya BepIe
npencra.ea y 2o11 poi, noCTa€T 36poiiM cwnaM Pociictoi depepaii 3 2012
poKy.
23.
V.
24.
3CY nixon ue Man ici PC33B a o3fpoci.
3enirii paxeri oMneKe 9K330 Top"
33eiri paxeri oMnnec 9K330 "Top" ("3PK "Top") e ccreMoo,
yCaoBaoo 3Cy Bit Pacoi ApMii nic po3a1y CPCP n 1991 poi. Xoa 3PK
"Top" 36epiraCTC Ha JeKx apCeanax Ta CKa/tax, 3CY He BHKODHCTOByBAIM II0 36p0IO
toHaiiMeme nporroM ocraix peer poKi Ta HiKoH He BTpaanH TaKHX cHCTeM. Bci
OJUHHMIL O6iKOBaHo.
VI.
25.
CereMa npornoirpoi 060po 96K6 IHaup-CL
Po3po6KoM 3eiTHOrO paKeTHO-TapMaTHOrO KOMIIIeKCy 96K6 "HartupCI"
c AT "KocTpyKTopee 6opo npunapto6yyya ix. aarteMiKa A.T. IInyHoa"
(M.Tya, Pociica Peepati), BHpO6HHK - BAT "HIIO "BcoKoroi KoMneKeH"
(M.MocKBa, Pociicsa depepati). 96K6 HaHp-CI € BiJ(HOCHO HOBO0 36po€o, Ka 6y1a
IpHHHMTa Ha 036pOCH 36pox cun Pocicoi depepauii y 2o12 poi.
VII.
26. 3CY Hixon e Man raKoi ccreu a o36poei.
Baa orHeMeTHa ccrera TOc-1 yparino"
27. PO3po6ox TOC-1 "Bypario" (creMa "Bypario") € "KOHCTpyKTOpcKe
6OpO TDaHCnOpTHOro Mato6yyBas" (M.OMc, Pocica Penepain), a
BHpO6HHKOM AT "OMCKHf 3aBOI TDaHCIODTHOTO Ma1IMHO6yJIyBaHHS" (M.OMCK,
Pociicsa Penepatis). CHcTeMa "Byparino" 6ya npHTa Ha 036po€H 36pox Cun
CPCP y 1980 po1ti.
28. 3Cy e yCIaJtoByBa1H KOIUHOi OJ(HHHIii TOC-1 nit ac po3nap(y CPCP Ta
Hixon e Ma mtiei ccreM a o36poei.
VIII.
29.
("PIIIT-+")
Peara rTypMoa rpanara PIIIT-1
Po3po6KoM Ta BHp06HHOM peaKTHBHoi TypMoBoi rpaHarn PIIT-1
€ AT "HayKOBO-BMDOOHHe 06'CJIHaHa "Ba3anr" (M.MocKBa, Pocica
Pepepanti). PIIT-1 npHHTa Ha 036po€HH 36poix cI Pociicsoi beepaii y 200o
poi.
30.
IX.
31.
3C ixon ne Mam PIT-1 a o36poci.
Oenonni 6oiioii Ta T-722E3
OcHoHi 6ofioi Ta T-72B3 € BapiaTOM Tay T-72, MOIIepHi3OBaHMM
AT "HII "Vpa1Baro3aot (M. Hii Tarin, Pocifca bepepatis). Ta
nocTaB€Te y a36po~ii cn Pociicoi depepaii 3 2012 poKy.
32.
x.
33
Moppixati T-7253 TaKy T-72 HiKonM He nepefyan a o36poci 3CY.
Ma.ora6apwri pearnii orueMer MPO-A
Po3po6ow Manora6apwroro peaxrnoro Boreery MPO-A "Bopopa"
€ beteparte epame yirapte mi;upcMcrno "lepane HayKoo-Bpo6He
IiUpeMcTno "Ba3ar" (M.MocKa, Poci~cs»a betepati). MPO-A "Bopota"
npiirwii a o36pocs a6poix en Pociictxoi epepauii y 2o04 poui.
34. 33CY uixon ne Man na o36poei MPO-A. Banc 3CY mi(Tep/yor» Te,
to 33CY ion ne Man a o36poci OJ1t MPO-A 3 IIaCTyIMM MaDKYBaIIHMIE:
a) MPO-A MO.1.10.02 BE-03-08OK0OJI N-505 5 533-1-08
b) MPO-AMO.1.10.01 KJ14214 29 08
C) MPO-AMO.1.10.00M0.1.10.011063715-2008
35. CBOiM BHTJLIIOM Ta pyHKI(iOHaJILHMM IIDM3Ha eHHM MPO-A JIyKe Hara/(ye
Ta e nopi6uM po peaxruBoro ixoTHOrO BorHeMeTy PT[O-A "ILIMe1I,", HKH 3HaXOJLHTCH
na o36poei 3CY 3 aci CPCP.
XI. IIepeoci aeirno-paKeri omnrec "Grom E2"
36. Hepeoci seiro-paxerni oMnneKe "Grom ED" (II3PK "Grom-E2") €
MOIepHi3OBaHM BapiaToM II3PK "Grom". Horo pO3po6KoM Ta BHpOOHHKOM €
once AT "Mesko" (M. CapKHCo-Kaea, Ilonuta).
41. H Iperao, Ito BHIIIOBHKJIaJOHi CBiJHeHH € JI0CTOBipHHMM i TOHHMH, Ta
IOrOUKyOC» IIOCTaTH IIepeJI CyJIOM y pa3i HO6xiJHOCTi Ha[ta JOaTKOBMX CiIeH.
Ian TABPHJIIOK
Cepepu npaoa Mina CIIM (Mina CIIM)
Po3pO6HOM Cepenoi Ipnaooi Mi CIIM e AT "HayKOBO3CY
mixon ne Ma a o36po€i I3PK "Grom E2".
38.
37.
XII.
40. 3aue 33CY nitrepruyor» Te, to 3CY iKo He Ma Ha o36pocHi a6o
Ha CKamax Mi CIHM oMepoM naprii: 15-6-90 MC OTK-9 (1990 pOKy BHTOTOBJIeHH»).
Kpi Toro, 33CV me nepeoyaor, Ha ocHautei Mir CIHM, TOTOBJeHi Hie1 1987 p0Ky.
39. Tien po3nay CPCP Mia CIIM 3aIac Ha 036po€Hi 36pox cw
IIepKa8 IOCTpaJUHCKOTO I1DOCTOpy, B TOMy HMOJIi VKpa. CTaHOM Ha 1 CHM 2014 p0Ky
Min CHM ne 3axopuc a TepTopiwx /loneoi Jlyranexoi o6nacreii.
Ioeipi ieepf iCTTryTr" (M. BaaIxa, MOcKocKa o61., Pociica berepati).
Mia npiTa Ha O36poC 36pox cw CPCP y 1968 poui

Annex 2
Witness Statement of Taras Stepanovych Horbatyi (31 May 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

1
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
________________________________________________________
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF IGOR EVHENOVYCH YANOVSKYI
________________________________________________________
1. My name is Igor Evhenovych Yanovskyi. I am a national of Ukraine. I hold the
position of the Head of the Fifth Unit of the First Department of Pre-Trial Investigations of the
Main Investigations Department of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU). I have been working
in the SSU for 23 years, since 1995. During my service in the state security bodies, I have held
the position of investigator in the regional departments of the SSU, and in 2011, I was appointed
to the Main Investigations Department of the SSU. In accordance with my duties, I manage my
unit and directly conduct pre-trial investigations for criminal cases that fall within the
competence of the SSU, including cases related to terrorist activities on the territory of Ukraine.
2. Beginning in April 2017, I have been supervising a pre-trial investigation in the
criminal case No. 22015050000000047 concerning the 24 January 2015 artillery shelling of a
residential neighborhood in the Ordzhonikidzensky district in Mariupol (also called the Shidnyi
or Vostochnyi in Russian [“Eastern” in both languages] district). Within the scope of my
responsibilities, I conduct general management and coordination of the pre-trial investigation in
the case; investigate the circumstances of the criminal case; collect, evaluate and verify evidence
in the criminal case; and review and examine the evidence obtained as part of covert
investigations. I am aware of all the facts and circumstances described in this statement, as I
2
supervise the investigative activities for this criminal case, and have personally reviewed the
materials referenced in this statement.
A. Summary of the Pre-Trial Investigation of the Shelling of the
Ordzhonikidzevskyi Residential Neighborhood of Mariupol on 24
January 2015
1. Overview of Investigative Methods Employed
3. On 24 January 2015, the Department of the SSU in the Donetsk region initiated
its pre-trial investigation in this criminal case. The investigation team, which included 45
investigators from the SSU and the Ministry of Interior, as well as various experts, determined
the central facts of the case. Specifically, on 24-31 January, 1-2 February, and 18 March 2015,
the investigation team of the SSU’s Department in the Donetsk region inspected the crime
scene; documented the location of the impact sites; examined and analyzed the shell craters;
and collected fragments of shells. The investigation team also identified and interviewed
witnesses and victims, obtained the expert reports mentioned below, and carried out a series of
covert investigations, including intercepting telephone conversations as described below.
4. The investigation team identified Valerii Kirsanov, a Ukrainian national, as
someone who cooperated with members of the so-called “Donetsk People Republic” (DPR) by
acting as a lookout and informant for them in Mariupol. The investigation team received
information about V. Kirsanov’s involvement in the artillery shelling of Mariupol from the SSU
office of field operations, which was monitoring V. Kirsanov’s telephone conversations in
accordance with a judicial order received from the investigative judge.
5. On 25 January 2015, the day after the Mariupol shelling, the SSU’s Department
in the Donetsk region served criminal charges against V. Kirsanov. Upon being arrested, V.
3
Kirsanov confessed his involvement in the artillery shelling of Mariupol to the investigation
team.1
6. In April 2017, the pre-trial investigation of the artillery shelling of Mariupol was
transferred to my unit at the Main Investigations Department of the SSU in Kyiv. I, along with
the investigation team of approximately 21 investigators and prosecutors, identified the
individuals involved in the shelling of the residential neighborhood in Mariupol, and verified
and confirmed the facts previously established by the pre-trial investigation. In particular, my
investigation team identified a list of telephone numbers, used by those involved in the shelling
of the residential neighborhood in Mariupol; reviewed and interpreted the recorded telephone
conversations mentioned below; and reviewed video, photographs, social media sites, news
sites, and other Internet resources.
7. Based on the pre-trial investigation team’s investigative activities, it was
established that on 24 January 2015 at approximately 9:15, 11:00, 13:00 and 13:21, members of
the DPR carried out the artillery shelling of the Ordzhonikidzevsky residential neighborhood in
the city of Mariupol. As a result of the shelling, residential buildings, a kindergarten, an art
school, and a city hospital located in the Ordzhonikidzevsky neighborhood of Mariupol were
damaged. Approximately thirty people died and approximately 118 people were injured, as
documented in relevant medical reports and forensic medical examinations.2
8. Forensic experts examined the fragments collected from the crime scene and
identified the weapons used in the attack as BM-21 “Grad” MLRS, equipped with 122-mm
unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shells.3
1 See Signed declaration of Valerii Kirsanov, Witness interrogation protocol (25 January 2015) (Annex 213). On 23
July 2015, the Ordxhonikidzevskyi Regional Court of the city of Mariupol entered a guilty verdict against V.
Kirsanov and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment.
2 See Letter No. 01/133-08-0 from the Mariupol City Council, Department of Health in Donetsk Oblast to the
Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (12 February 2015) (Annex 104).
3 See Expert Opinion No. 142, Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic
Examinations of the SSU (30 March 2015) (Annex 115).
4
9. Ballistic experts concluded that the shelling attacks originated from two
locations under the DPR’s control at the time of the attack: from a field located three kilometers
to the northeast of the village of Sakhanka of the Novoazovsk district, Donetsk region; and from
a field located three kilometers to the northeast of the village of Leninske of the Novoazovsk
district, Donetsk region.4
10. My investigation team also carried on a covert investigation that involved
collecting and reviewing intercepted telephone conversations, and identified several Ukrainian
members of the DPR involved in the shelling, including Serhii Ponomarenko, Oleksandr
Evdotiy, and Graur Egyazarian. My investigation team also identified several Russian nationals
involved in the shelling attack. They include Stepan Yaroshchuk, a general-major of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation, who provided support for the attack from Russian territory;
Oleksandr Tsapliuk, a colonel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation who advised the
DPR; and DPR members Maksim Vlasov, who has served in the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation, and Oleksandr Grunchev, who has served in the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation.
2. Investigation of the Crime Scene
11. The first shelling of the Ordzhonikidzevsky residential neighborhood in the city of
Mariupol began at approximately 9:15. The investigation team established this through
interviews of many residents of the neighborhood.5
4 See Expert Opinion No. 143, Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic
Examinations of the SSU (3 April 2015) (Annex 117).
5 See Signed testimony of Nataliya Anatoliyivna Mutovina, Record of victim questioning (30 January 2015) (Annex
217); Signed testimony of Nataliya Mykhaylivna Nikolaeva, Record of victim questioning (24 January 2015)
(Annex 211); Signed testimony of Yana Mykolaivna Demchenko, Record of victim questioning (24 January 2015)
(Annex 214); Signed testimony of Tetyana Aresnivna Chernova, Record of victim questioning (26 January 2015)
(Annex 215); Signed testimony of Oksana Olexandrivna Ivanova, Record of victim questioning (24 January 2015)
(Annex 212).
5
12. Soon after the shelling in Mariupol, at 10:00, the investigative team of the Office
of the Ministry of Interior in the Donetsk region arrived to the crime scene to establish the facts
of the shelling attack and collect and preserve evidence for the criminal investigation.
13. At around 11:00, Mariupol was shelled again, and the investigative team hid
together with civilians in the basements of several homes. Local residents,6 members of the
investigation team, and a video taken by a car dashboard camera — later published on the
Internet7 — confirm the shelling attack at 11:00. After the 11:00 shelling attack, the
investigation team continued to document impact sites from the shelling and damage to civilian
infrastructure, and recorded their findings in crime scene reports.8
14. The following day on 25 January 2015, the investigative group of the SSU’s
Department in the Donetsk region investigated impact sites from shells in the
Ordzhonikidzevsky residential neighborhood of Mariupol. The neighborhood was divided into
four sectors, so each sector was assigned an investigative team.9 In total, the investigative team
recorded and documented 154 impact sites from the shells.
15. Finally, the investigative team engaged a ballistic expert, who examined the
impact sites from the shells in order to determine the approximate location from which the
shelling of Mariupol originated. The expert concluded that the shelling came from two areas
controlled by the DPR: a field located three kilometers northeast from the village of Sakhanka in
6 See signed testimony of Oleksiy Oleksandrovych Demchenko, Record of victim questioning (30 January 2015)
(Annex 216).
7 See Video of the shelling of Mariupol (24 January 2015) (Annex 697).
8 See Record of crime scene inspection conducted by T.A. Belobokova, Lieutenant of the Police and Senior
Criminal Investigator with the Ordzhonikidze District Office of the Mariupol City Department of the Central
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (24 January 2015) (Annex 90).
9 See Record of crime scene inspection conducted by O.V. Starostenko, Senior Lieutenant of Justice and Senior
Criminal Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)
(Annex 97); Record of crime scene inspection conducted by M.M. Onyshchenko, Major of Justice and Senior
Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015) (Annex
Annex 92); Record of crime scene inspection conducted by O.V. Martyniuk, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice and
Senior Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)
(Annex 96).
6
the Novoazovsk district, Donetsk region; and from a field located three kilometers northeast
from the village of Leninske in the Novoazovsk district, Donetsk region.10
3. Intercepted Telephone Conversations
16. Based on a review of intercepted telephone conversations, my investigative team
determined that the DPR planned and carried out the shelling attack on the Ordzhonikidzevsky
residential neighborhood in Mariupol with the assistance of two units of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation. For example, the day before the attack at 18:00 on 23 January 2015,
the SSU office of field operations intercepted a conversation between two DPR members: O.
Evdotiy (call sign “Pepel”) and S. Ponomarenko (call sign “Terrorist”). O. Evdotiy tells S.
Ponomarenko: “I’ll do Vostochnyi tonight as well, don’t worry.”11
17. On 24 January 2015 at 10:36, after the attack at 9:15, DPR informant V. Kirsanov
called O. Evdotiy and reported that the following sites had been hit: “‘it went on houses [pause]
on houses, on nine-story buildings, on private residences, the Kievskiy market...”12 V. Kirsanov
made a similar report to S. Ponomarenko a few minutes later at 10:38.13
18. Other intercepted telephone conversations, discussed in detail below, established
that the DPR received the weapons used in the attack from Russia. On the morning of 24
January 2015, a group of DPR members met a convoy with Russian military equipment that
crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border from the territory of Russia at 7:00. DPR members
transported the convoy of Russian military equipment to the area from which Mariupol was
10 See Record of area inspection conducted by V.V. Romanenko, Captain of Justice and Senior Investigator with the
Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015) (Annex 94).
11 See Intercepted conversation between DPR representative O. Evdotiy (code name “Pepel”) and DPR
representative S. Ponomarenko (code name “Terrorist”) and metadata (23 January 2015) (Annex 418).
12 See Intercepted conversation between DPR representative O. Evdotiy (code name “Pepel”) and V. Kirsanov and
metadata (24 January 2015) (Annex 413).
13 See Intercepted conversation between DPR representative S. Ponomarenko (code name “Terrorist”) and V.
Kirsanov and metadata (24 January 2015) (Annex 414).
7
shelled. Later, DPR members deployed Russian BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems to
shell the Ordzhonikidzevsky residential neighborhood in the city of Mariupol several times.
19. After the shelling, DPR members, with the assistance of a member of the Russian
military, tried to hide the Russian multiple launch rocket systems used in the attack from the
OSCE observation mission. Finally, DPR members transported the Russian military equipment
across the uncontrolled part of the Ukrainian-Russian border into Russia.
B. Evidence Establishing that DPR Committed the Shelling Attack with
Russian Support
1. Identification of Telephone Conversations of DPR Members and
Others Involved in the Shelling of Mariupol
20. After reviewing V. Kirsanov’s telephone conversations and examining his cell
phone, my investigative team identified a list of cell phone numbers V. Kirsanov frequently
called and that appeared to be related to the shelling of Mariupol. The list of cell phone
numbers included cell phone numbers belonging to DPR members S. Ponomarenko
(“Terrorist”) and O. Evdotiy (“Pepel”).
21. I submitted a request to the SSU office of field operations to provide records of
intercepted conversations from the cell phone numbers of S. Ponomarenko and O. Evdotiy that
the office intercepted pursuant to investigative judge’s orders. A month later, the SSU office of
field operations provided the records. My investigative team reviewed these recorded telephone
conversations and identified another cell phone number of interest used by M. Vlasov (call sign
“Yugra”), a Russian national.14
22. My investigative team reviewed M. Vlasov’s recorded telephone conversations
and identified additional cell phone numbers connected to the shelling of Mariupol, including
cell phone numbers belonging to Russian nationals Oleksandr Tsapliuk (call sign “Gorets”
14 See Record of covert surveillance prepared by R.O. Narusevych, Senior Lieutenant and Field Agent with
the 4th Office of the 2nd Directorate of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Security Service of
Ukraine (16 August 2017) (Annex 408).
8
[Highlander]), Stepan Yaroshchuk, and Oleksandr Grynchev (call sign “Terek”). In the last
section of my statement, I explain how we identified the true identities of many of these
individuals.
2. The DPR, with Russian Support, Planned the Shelling Attack Against
the Residential Neighbourhood in Mariupol on 24 January 2015
(a) A Convoy with Russian Military Equipment Crossed the
Ukrainian-Russian Border
23. On 23-24 January 2015, the investigation team intercepted several conversations
between DPR members, given their context and timing, the investigation team determined
concerned the arrival of a convoy of military equipment from Russia.
24. At 17:59 on 23 January 2015, DPR advisor O. Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) called M.
Vlasov (“Yurga”) and notified him that he had “called over there where [he] was supposed to”
and he was promised that the military equipment would be delivered “there, where you’re
[“Yugra”] going now.”15 Two hours later at 20:19, O. Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) called M. Vlasov
(“Yugra”) and notified him that his Russian colleagues’ “organisms [a DPR term for “convoy”]
will be coming one by one. One will be there earlier, the second a little later . . .”16
25. At 20:56 on 23 January 2015, “Yugra” called “Pepel” and told him to go and that
“[e]veryone should meet their own.”17
26. At 21:29, “Yugra” called G. Egyazarian (“Shram”). During that conversation,
“Yugra” asked “Shram” to meet the convoy near the village of Kuznitsy in two hours.18 The
village is located near the Ukrainian-Russian border. Two hours later at 23:32, “Yugra” called
an unidentified member of the DPR. During the conversation the unidentified members of the
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
9
DPR notified “Yugra” that O. Grunchev (“Terek”) and an unidentified member of the DPR using
the call sign “Ruben” went to meet the Russian convoy.19
27. At 5:02 on 24 January 2015, “Ruben” called “Yugra” and notified him that he had
met the first convoy.20 At 7:19, “Terek” notified “Yugra” that he had met the second convoy,
which had just “crossed the, umm, ribbon [the border].”21
(b) The Convoy of Russian Military Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
Was Delivered to the Launch Site
28. The investigative team next established that DPR members, having met the
Russian convoy near the village of Kuznitsy, delivered it to the launch site near the villages of
Sakhanka and Leninske in the Novoazovsk district in the Donetsk region. In the process, they
passed through the villages of Markino and Bezimenne. These facts are confirmed by the
following telephone conversations.
29. At 8:10 on 24 January 2015, O. Grunchev (“Terek”) notified M. Vlasov (“Yugra”)
that he was approaching the village of Bezimenne, which is located approximately 40 km from
the village of Kuznitsy. During the conversation of O. Grunchev (“Terek”) and M. Vlasov
(“Yugra”) at 8:14, O. Grunchev (“Terek”) reported that the other part of the convoy stayed in the
village of Markino, which is located approximately 15 km from the village of Kuznitsy.22
30. At 8:54 on 24 January 2015, “Terek” informed DPR advisor O. Tsapliuk
(“Gorets”) that he was “in position.”23
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 See Intercepted conversation between DPR advisor O. Tsapliuk (code name “Gorets”) and DPR representative A.
Grunchev (code name “Terek”) and metadata (24 January 2015) (Annex 411).
10
31. At 9:11 on 24 January 2015, “Terek” informed “Gorets” that another battery was
located two kilometers from him and that an unidentified member of the DPR using the call sign
“Zhulien” was there.24
(c) The Shellings of Mariupol
32. Telephone conversations between DPR members confirm that M. Vlasov (Yugra)
coordinated several shellings of Mariupol from the village Bezimenne which is located near the
villages Sakhanka and Leninske of Novoazosk region of Donetsk, the launch site identified by
the Ukrainian experts, at approximately 9:15, at 13:00, and at 13:21. There was another shelling
at 11:00 which was not discussed in these conversations, but was established separately, as
discussed above.
33. At 9:13 on 24 January 2015, A. Grunchev (“Terek”) told M. Vlasov (“Yugra”) that
he was ready to fire.25 According to the metadata from the audio file of this conversation,
“Yugra” called from the area near the village Bezimenne which is located near the villages
Sakhanka and Leninske of Novoazosk region of Donetsk oblast.26 At 1:15, an unidentified
member of the DPR using the call sign “Ruben” notified “Yugra” that had had carried out a
shelling at about 8:55. 27
34. At 12:57 on 24 January 2015, “Terek” notified “Yugra” that he was almost ready:
“[o]pen fire right away . . . and then I pull out again.” Based on the metadata of the audio file of
this conversation, “Yugra” called from the village Bezimenne near the villages Sakhanka and
24 See Intercepted conversation between DPR representative O. Grunchev (code name “Terek”) and DPR advisor O.
Tsapliuk (code name “Gorets”) and metadata (24 January 2015) (Annex 412).
25 See Record of covert surveillance prepared by R.O. Narusevych, Senior Lieutenant and Field Agent with the 4th
Office of the 2nd Directorate of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Security Service of Ukraine (16
August 2017) (Annex 408).
26 See Metadata for intercepted conversation between DPR representative M. Vlasov (code name “Yugra”) and DPR
representative O. Grunchev (code name “Terek”) (24 January 2015) (Annex 410).
27 See supra, footnote 25 and relevant references.
11
Leninske of Novoazosk region of Donetsk oblast.28 Three minutes later at 13:01, “Terek”
notified “Yugra” that he had fired.29
35. At 13:21 on 24 January 2015, an unidentified member of the DPR with a call sign
“Zhulien” notified M. Vlasov (“Yugra”) that he had just fired.30 According to the metadata of the
audio file of this conversation, “Yugra”’s telephone was located in the area of the village
Bezimenne close to the villages Sakhanka and Leninske of Novoazosk region of Donetsk oblast.31
(d) TheMultiple Launch Rocket SystemsWere Hidden from OSCE
Observers
36. After the shelling attacks, the investigative team intercepted telephone
conversations on 24 January 2015 demonstrating that the DPR hid the multiple launch rocket
systems used in the attacks from OSCE observers. DPR advisor O. Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) learned
that the OSCE was investigating the shelling attack from S. Yaroshchuk.32 Then, “Gorets” passed
this information to M. Vlasov (“Yugra”). At 14:20, “Yugra” called O. Grunchev (“Terek”) and
asked him to “hide all the vehicles” because “the OSCE mission is coming.”33
(e) The Russian Multiple Launch Rocket Systems Were Transported
Back to Russia Through the Uncontrolled Part of the Ukrainian-
Russian Border
37. Finally, the investigative team established that DPR members transported the
multiple launch rocket systems borrowed from Russia back to the Russian Federation in the
evening on 24 January 2015. This fact is confirmed by the following intercepted telephone
conversations.
28 See Intercepted conversation between DPR representative M. Vlasov (code name “Yugra”) and DPR
representative O. Grunchev (code name “Terek”) and metadata (24 January 2015) (Annex 417).
29 See supra, footnote 25 and relevant references.
30 See supra, footnote 25 and relevant references.
31 See Metadata for intercepted conversation between DPR representative M. Vlasov (code name “Yugra”) and
unidentified DPR representative (code name “Julienne”) (24 January 2015) (Annex 409).
32 See Intercepted conversation between DPR advisor O. Tsapliuk (code name "Gorets") and Russian Army Major
General S.S. Yaroshchuk and metadata (24 January 2015) (Annex 416).
33 See supra, footnote 25, and relevant references.
12
38. At 15:11 on 24 January 2015, M. Vlasov (“Yugra”) called O. Grunchev (“Terek”)
and asked him to wait until 18:00 and then go to the border. Thirty minutes later at 15:45,
“Terek” notified M. Vlasov (“Yugra”) that he was approaching the village of Markino, which is
three kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian border. At 17:00, “Terek” called “Yugra” to say
that he was approaching the border.34
39. At 17:21, “Terek” notified “Yugra” that the first convoy crossed the border.35
Roughly thirty minutes later at 17:56, “Terek” called DPR advisor O. Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) and
also told him the first convoy had left Ukraine.36
40. At 18:06, an unidentified member of the DPR using the call sign “Ruben” notified
“Yugra” that the second convoy was approaching the village of Kuznetsi near the Ukrainian-
Russian border. At 18:26, “Ruben” notified “Yugra” that the second convoy had crossed the
border.37
3. Identification of Persons Engaged in the Shelling of the Residential
Neighborhood of Mariupol
41. The investigative team determined that the individuals discussed above were
members of the DPR or members of the Russian military who assisted the DPR through various
means.
42. During the pre-trial investigation, DPR informant V. Kirsanov testified that he
knew S. Ponomarenko (“Terrorist”) and identified him as a commander of the First Slavic Army
of Novorosia, an armed group affiliated with the DPR, and noted that he used the call sign
“Terrorist.”38 V. Kirsanov also testified that S. Ponomarenko instructed him to stay in contact
34 See supra, footnote 25, and relevant references.
35 See supra, footnote 25, and relevant references.
36 See Intercepted conversation between DPR advisor O. Tsapliuk (code name “Gorets”) and DPR representative M.
Vlasov (code name “Yuga”) and metadata (24 January 2015) (Annex 407).
37 See supra, footnote 25, and relevant references.
38 See Signed testimony of Valeriy Serhiyovych Kirsanov, Record of witness questioning (25 January 2015) (Annex
213).
13
with another member of the DPR who used the call sign “Pepel.” V. Kirsanov further identified
“Pepel” as a representative of the DPR. 39
43. The pre-trial investigation also determined that “Gorets” was the Russian
national Aleksandr Iozhefovych Tsapliuk.40 The investigation team also established that O.
Tsapliuk served as a colonel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In October 2014, O.
Tsapliuk secretly came to Ukraine in order to assist the DPR, and stayed into 2015. When he
returned to Russia, O. Tsapliuk was appointed as Head of the Penza artillery engineering
institute.41
44. The pre-trial investigation also identified that S. Yaroshchuk is a Russian national
and a general-major of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. As noted above, S.
Yaroshchuk warned the DPR that OSCE monitors were coming to investigate the shelling attack.
S. Yaroshchuk provided intelligence to the DPR from the territory of the Russian Federation.
The investigative team established that on 9 January 2011, S. Yaroshchuk had been appointed
Commander-In-Chief of the Rocket Forces and Artillery of the Russian Armed Forces Southern
Military District in the Rostov oblast.42
45. Finally, the pre-trial investigation determined that DPR member “Terek” was
actually the Russian national Grunchev. A social media profile for O. Grynchev shows that he
39 Ibid.
40 See Record of inspection of websites performed by M.V. Kalyta, Lieutenant of Justice and Investigator with the
5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (1 February
2018) (Annex 178); Record of inspection of websites performed by M.V. Kalyta, Lieutenant of Justice and
Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of
the SSU (1 February 2018) (Annex 178); Record of inspection of websites performed by M.V. Kalyta, Lieutenant of
Justice and Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative
Directorate of the SSU (1 February 2018) (Annex 178).
41 Ibid.
42 See Record of inspection of websites performed by O.O. Kryvoruchko, Captain of Justice and Serior Investigator
with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (15
May 2018) (Annex 180); Record of inspection of websites performed by O.O. Kryvoruchko, Captain of Justice and
Serior Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative
Directorate of the SSU (15 May 2018) (Annex 180).
14
served in the 4th guard tank Kantymyrov division of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
from 2009 to 2013.43
46. Pre-trial investigators also identified the a DPR member “Yugra” has the last
name Vlasov, and that he is a citizen of the Russian Federation. M. Vlasov has served in the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. He joined the DPR and helped coordinate activities of
DPR units. Profiles of M. Vlasov on social network sites show that he served as a major in an
artillery
regiment in Chebarkuli, Russia in 2010-2011 and was promoted to the rank of colonel in 2012.44
47. I swear that the above statement is true and accurate and I agree to appear before
the Court, if necessary, to provide additional evidence. My statement is based on my personal
knowledge as an investigator.
Signed in Kyiv, Ukraine on 31 May 2018
[Signature]
Igor Evhenovych Yanovskyi
43 See Record of inspection of websites performed by D.H. Davyd, Major of Justice and Senior Criminal
Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate at the Central Investigative Directorate of
the SSU (16 May 2018) (Annex 181).
44 See Record of inspection of websites performed by D.H. Davyd, Major of Justice and Senior Criminal
Investigator with the 5th Office of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate at the Central Investigative Directorate of
the SSU (16 May 2018) (Annex 181).
1
􀇯􀇨􀇹􀇺􀇶􀇹􀇻􀇪􀇨􀇵􀇵􀈇􀀃􀇴􀇟􀇮􀇵􀇨􀇸􀇶􀇬􀇵􀇶􀇠􀀃􀇲􀇶􀇵􀇪􀇭􀇵􀇾􀇟􀇠􀀃􀇷􀇸􀇶
􀇩􀇶􀇸􀇶􀇺􀈄􀇩􀇻􀀃􀇯􀀃􀇼􀇟􀇵􀇨􀇵􀇹􀇻􀇪􀇨􀇵􀇵􀈇􀇴􀀃􀇺􀇭􀇸􀇶􀇸􀇰􀇯􀇴􀇻􀀃􀇺􀇨
􀇴􀇟􀇮􀇵􀇨􀇸􀇶􀇬􀇵􀇶􀇠􀀃􀇲􀇶􀇵􀇪􀇭􀇵􀇾􀇟􀇠􀀃􀇷􀇸􀇶􀀃􀇳􀇟􀇲􀇪􀇟􀇬􀇨􀇾􀇟􀈆
􀇪􀇹􀇟􀇽􀀃􀇼􀇶􀇸􀇴􀀃􀇸􀇨􀇹􀇶􀇪􀇶􀇠􀀃􀇬􀇰􀇹􀇲􀇸􀇰􀇴􀇟􀇵􀇨􀇾􀇟􀇠
􀇻􀇲􀇸􀇨􀇠􀇵􀇨􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈐
􀇸􀇶􀇹􀇟􀇱􀇹􀈄􀇲􀇶􀇠􀀃􀇼􀇭􀇬􀇭􀇸􀇨􀇾􀇟􀇠
________________________________________________________
􀇷􀇰􀇹􀈄􀇴􀇶􀇪􀇟􀀃􀇹􀇪􀇟􀇬􀇿􀇭􀇵􀇵􀈇􀀃􀇟􀇫􀇶􀇸􀈇􀀃􀇝􀇪􀇫􀇭􀇵􀇶􀇪􀇰􀇿􀇨􀀃􀈇􀇵􀇶􀇪􀇹􀈄􀇲􀇶􀇫􀇶
________________________________________________________
1. 􀈇􀀏􀀃􀇟􀈋􀈖􀈘 􀇝􀈊􀈋􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟 􀈇􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑, 􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈑􀈔􀈈􀈦􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈈􀈌􀈛
􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈉􀈐􀀃􀇩􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈍􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐 􀀋􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀌. 􀇪􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈝􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻 􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈦􀈦 23 􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈐 􀈏􀀃1995
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈉􀈐􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈎􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈉􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈍􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈧 􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈑􀈔􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈈􀈌􀈐􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈋􀈭􀈖􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈝 􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀏􀀃􀈈􀀃􀈏􀀃2011 􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻. 􀇯􀈋􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈮􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈜􀈛􀈕􀈒􀈞􀈭􀈖􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈊􀂵􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐, 􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈦􀀃
􀈏􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈞􀈚􀈊􀈖 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈔 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈕􀈤􀈖 􀈏􀈈􀈑􀈔􀈈􀈦􀈙􀈤 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔 􀈌􀈭􀈧􀈔􀈐 􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈤􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈧􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈗􀈍􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃
􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈧􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈦 􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈮􀀃
􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀑
2. 􀇷􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀈏 􀈒􀈊􀈭􀈚􀈕􀈧􀀃2017 􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈦􀀃􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈞􀈚􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔 􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈹􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓47 􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃
􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛 (􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃
􀈕􀈈􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈈􀈦􀈚􀈤􀀃􀂳􀇹􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑􀂴􀀃􀈈􀈉􀈖􀀃􀂳􀇪􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈟􀈕􀈣􀈑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈦􀀌 􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕) 􀈊􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈭
􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤 􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛. 􀇪􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈔􀈒􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈮􀈝􀀃􀈜􀈛􀈕􀈒􀈞􀈭􀈖􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈦􀀃
􀈏􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈞􀈚􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈐􀀏
􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈎􀈛􀈦􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈐 􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈐, 􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈭􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈦􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈖􀈞􀈭􀈕􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈈 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈊􀈭􀈘􀈒􀈛
􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈭􀈊 􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈭, 􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀈦􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈊􀈟􀈈􀈦􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈔􀈒􀈈􀈝􀀃
􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀃􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀌􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀑 􀇴􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈭􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀏􀀃
􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈞􀈤􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈦􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈞􀈚􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃
􀈌􀈭􀈧􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈔􀈒􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈞􀈤􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈊􀈟􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈧􀈊􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈐, 􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃
􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈧􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈊 􀈞􀈤􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀑􀀃
A. 􀇯􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛
􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧
􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛
􀀔􀀑 􀇶􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧
3. 􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻 􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑 􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈈􀈓􀈖
􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈍􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀑􀀃 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈈
􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈟􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇴􀈭􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈕􀈛􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈠􀈕􀈭􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊 􀀋􀇴􀇪􀇹􀀌􀀏􀀃􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎 􀈘􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈭􀈊, 􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈖􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈐. 􀇯􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈈, 24-􀀖􀀔􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀀕􀀃
􀈓􀈦􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈉􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈 􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈓􀈈 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈛, 􀈏􀈈􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈈􀈌􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀏
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈎􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀏 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈛􀈟􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈜􀈘􀈈􀈋􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐 􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊.
􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈭􀈊 􀈚􀈈 􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈭􀈓􀈐􀈝, 􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈓􀈈
􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈒􀈐 􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍, 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈘􀈧􀈌􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈝 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝
􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀌􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊, 􀈧􀈒􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍.
4. 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃 􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈 􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀇪􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈧􀀃 􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀏􀀃 􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈈 􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀏
􀈧􀈒􀀃 􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈛􀀏􀀃 􀈧􀈒􀈈 􀈙􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈭􀈏􀀃 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀀃 􀈚􀈈􀈒􀀃 􀈏􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃 “􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃 􀇵􀈈􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀇸􀈍􀈙􀈗􀈛􀈉􀈓􀈭􀈒􀈐” (􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀈚􀈈􀀃 􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃 􀈭 􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃 􀈮􀈔 􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦􀀃 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃 􀈙􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦􀀃 􀈛 􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈭.
􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃 􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃 􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈤􀀃 􀇪􀀑􀀃 􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃 􀈌􀈖􀀃 􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃 􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃 􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃 􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛 􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀏􀀃 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑 􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃
􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈤􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖 􀈌􀈖􀈏􀈊􀈖􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈌􀈭.
5. 􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀏
􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻 􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈐􀈓􀈖 􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈛􀀃􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈍􀀃
􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀑 􀇷􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈠􀈚􀈛􀀃􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊 􀈏􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈫􀈮􀀃􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈭􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧.1
1 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈧􀀃􀇹􀈍􀈘􀈋􀈭􀈑􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈈􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈏􀈘􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀌. 􀀕􀀖􀀃􀈓􀈐􀈗􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈍􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈔􀀑􀀃
2
3
6. 􀇻 􀈒􀈊􀈭􀈚􀈕􀈭 2017 􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈍􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧 􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖
􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖 􀈔􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈭 􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀑􀀃􀀃􀈇, 􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈦􀀃
􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃21 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝 􀈚􀈈 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉, 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈊􀈭􀈘􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀀃
􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈭􀈠􀈍􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔. 􀇯􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈧 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈
􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈓􀈭􀈒􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃
􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈭􀀏 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈐􀀃
􀈏􀈋􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈕􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈓􀈈 􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈖􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀈜􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈘􀈈􀈜􀈭􀈑􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌 􀈙􀈖􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈈􀈑􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈙􀈛􀈘􀈙􀈭􀈊.
7. 􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃24 􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧 2015
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀈖􀀃􀀜􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀏􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀓􀀓􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀓􀀓􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃
􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈭 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈐􀀃􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈 􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇻􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈠􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃
􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈭 􀈉􀈛􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈧􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈈􀈌􀈖􀈒􀀏􀀃􀈝􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈎􀈕􀈦􀀃􀈠􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈓􀈭􀈒􀈈􀈘􀈕􀈦􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀀃
􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈔􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧. 􀇷􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈖􀀃􀀖􀀓 􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉
􀈏􀈈􀈋􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈓􀈖 􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈖􀀃􀀔18 􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈖, 􀈧􀈒􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈌􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈋􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈒􀈈􀈝.2
8. 􀇭􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐-􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈋􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌 􀈜􀈘􀈈􀈋􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈭􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮
􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃120-􀈔􀈔􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃
􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈕􀈖-􀈜􀈛􀈋􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈈􀈔􀈐 􀇴-􀀕􀀔􀀃􀇶􀇼􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈔􀀃
􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀃􀇩􀇴-21 “􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌􀂴.3
9. 􀇩􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈖􀈦 􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀈖􀈦 􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈏 􀈌􀈊􀈖􀈝
􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀈊􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈑􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈍􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀝􀀃􀈏 􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀖􀀃􀈒􀈔􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈖-􀈙􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈧􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈈􀈝􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃
􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈙􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈘􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇪􀀑􀀃
􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈘􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈉􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈓􀈭􀀑􀀃
2 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑􀀃􀇳􀈐􀈙􀈚􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈌􀈐􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈝􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈊􀂶􀈧􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈹􀀃
01/133-08-􀀓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈓􀈦􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀗􀀌.
3 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇪􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈒􀀃􀇭􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈹􀀔􀀗􀀕􀀏􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖-􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈐􀀃
􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀃􀈉􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀘􀀌.
4
􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀞􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀖􀀃􀈒􀈔􀀃􀈛􀀃
􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈖-􀈙􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈧􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈍􀀃􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀑4
10. 􀇴􀈖􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈭 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭 􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈭􀀌􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈮,
􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐 􀈏􀈭􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀏􀀃
􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈝􀀃􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈝 􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕 - 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸 - 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐􀀃􀇹􀈍􀈘􀈋􀈭􀈑􀀃􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀏􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀀃􀇝􀈊􀈌􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈛􀈘􀀃􀇭􀈋􀈐􀈏􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈕􀀑􀀃
􀇴􀈖􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈛􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈍􀈗􀈈􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈇􀈘􀈖􀈡􀈛􀈒􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈋􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈓-􀈔􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈘􀈈􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀞 􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈈􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀈈􀀏􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈛􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈖􀈋􀈛􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀞􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈟􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈒􀈙􀈐􀈔􀈈􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈, 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀈛􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈝􀀃
􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈈􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈈, 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀈛􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈝􀀃
􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮.
2. 􀇶􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈛
11. 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈔􀀑
􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈫􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀜􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔5 􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈭. 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈞􀈍􀈑􀀃
􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈠􀈓􀈧􀈝􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈉􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈚􀈤􀈖􀈝 􀈔􀈍􀈠􀈒􀈈􀈕􀈞􀈭􀈊 􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛.5
12. 􀇵􀈍􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀓􀀓􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈
􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇴􀇪􀇹􀀃􀈛􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈈 􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃
􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈭􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧.
13. 􀇶􀈘􀈭􀈫􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉 11 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭 􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈛 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧 􀈭
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈔􀈛􀈠􀈍􀈕􀈈 􀈏􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈞􀈐􀈊􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈝􀀃
4 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇪􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈒􀀃􀇭􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈹􀀔􀀗􀀖􀀏􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖-􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈐􀀃
􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀖􀀃􀈒􀈊􀈭􀈚􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀀃 􀀃􀀃􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀃􀈒􀀃 􀀃􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀚􀀌.
5 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇵􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈭􀀃􀇨􀈕􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈭􀈮􀈊􀈕􀈐􀀃􀇴􀈛􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀃
􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀁒􀈒􀀃􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀚􀀌; 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇵􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇴􀈐􀈝􀈈􀈑􀈓􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐 􀇵􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈖􀈮􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀖􀀃􀈓􀈦􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀌􀀞􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈇􀈕􀈐􀀃
􀇴􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈈􀈮􀈊􀈕􀈐 􀇬􀈍􀈔􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀗􀀌;
􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇺􀈍􀈚􀈧􀈕􀈐􀀃􀇨􀈘􀈙􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐 􀇿􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈮􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀘􀀌; 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇟􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇶􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈐􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀕􀀌.
5
􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈝􀀃􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀑􀀃 􀇼􀈈􀈒􀈚 􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈖􀈉􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃
􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈖 􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀈊􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈠􀈒􀈈􀈕􀈞􀈧􀈔􀈐,6 􀈟􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈖 􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈖􀈔􀀃
􀈏􀈕􀈧􀈚􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈫􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈘􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈭􀈊, 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈭􀈠􀈍􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈛􀈉􀈓􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈊􀀃
􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀈭.7 􀇷􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈖􀈉􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈎􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈙􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈐 􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧
􀈗􀈈􀈌􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐 􀈗􀈖􀈠􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈞􀈐􀈊􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈘􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈛􀈒􀈚􀈛􀈘􀈐
􀈠􀈓􀈧􀈝􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮.8
14. 􀇵􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈕􀈧, 􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊
􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈤􀀃􀈗􀈈􀈌􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈛
􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈛 􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧. 􀇴􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃
􀈕􀈈􀀃4 􀈙􀈍􀈒􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈐. 􀇬􀈖􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈎􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈒􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈒􀈘􀈭􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈.9 􀇪􀈙􀈤􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀗􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈓􀈛􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃
􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀑
15. 􀇵􀈈􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀏􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈛􀈟􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈉􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖
􀈊􀈐􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈊 􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈈􀈌􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊, 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀂵􀈧􀈙􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊 􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈫􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈍􀀃
􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍, 􀈏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀑 􀇭􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃
􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈊􀈖􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊, 􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀝􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃
􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀖􀀃􀈒􀈔􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈖-􀈙􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈧􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈈􀈝􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛
6 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇬􀈍􀈔􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈭􀈧􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈈􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀙􀀌􀀑
7 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇪􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛 􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀙􀀜􀀚􀀃􀀌􀀑
8 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇺􀀑􀇨􀀑􀀃􀇩􀈫􀈓􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈦􀀏􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈑􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈓􀈭􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇴􀇪􀇹􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀌􀀑
9 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀏􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈓􀈍􀈑􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃
􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔-􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀌; 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇴􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃
􀇶􀈕􀈐􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃
􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀀃􀈚􀀃􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀃􀀃􀈒􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀜􀀕􀀌; 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈕􀈦􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃
􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀜􀀙􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀃
6
􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀞􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀖􀀃􀈒􀈔􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈖-􀈙􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃
􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈧􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈍􀀃􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀑 10
􀀖􀀑 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐
16. 􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊 􀈔􀈖􀈫􀈦􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦 􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖
􀈏􀂶􀈧􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈗􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈈 􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈖􀈋􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈌􀈊􀈖􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇵􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛, 􀀕􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀝􀀓􀀓􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔
􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈔 􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀈌􀈊􀈖􀈔􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀝􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃
􀇝􀈊􀈌􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈫􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇷􀈍􀈗􀈍􀈓􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀌􀀑􀀃 􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇝􀈊􀈌􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈑􀀃
􀈒􀈈􀈎􀈍􀀃􀇹􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈛􀀝􀀃􀂳􀇩􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈚􀀏􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈐􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈟􀈕􀈣􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈛􀈑􀈙􀈧􀂴.11
17. 􀀕􀀗􀀃 􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃 􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃 􀈖􀀃 􀀔􀀓􀀃 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃 􀀖􀀙􀀃 􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀏􀀃 􀈗􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛 􀈖􀀃 􀀜􀀃 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃 􀀔􀀘
􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕, 􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈘􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇝􀈊􀈌􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈦􀀃􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃
􀈏􀈈􀈊􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃 􀈛􀈌􀈈􀈘􀈛􀀃 􀈗􀈖􀀃 􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃 􀈓􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈧􀈝􀀝􀀃 􀂳􀈐􀀃 􀈗􀈖􀈠􀈓􀈖􀀃 􀈗􀈖􀀃 􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈔􀀃 [􀈗􀈈􀈛􀈏􀈈] 􀈗􀈖􀀃 􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈔􀀏􀀃 􀈗􀈖
􀈌􀈍􀈊􀈧􀈚􀈐􀈥􀈚􀈈􀈎􀈒􀈈􀈔􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈒􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈛􀀏􀀃􀇲􀈐􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈘􀈣􀈕􀈖􀈒 . . . .”12 􀇿􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀏􀀃􀈖􀀃
10:38 􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊 􀈙􀈝􀈖􀈎􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦􀀃􀇹􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈛􀀑13
18. 􀇵􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈭 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭
􀈉􀈛􀈌􀈍􀀃 􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀀃 􀈖􀈉􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃 􀈕􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍􀀏􀀃 􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃 􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃 􀈡􀈖􀀃 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃 􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃 􀈏􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈦􀀏􀀃
􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈛􀀃 􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛, 􀈏􀀃 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀑 􀇪􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈞􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃 􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃 􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃 􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃
􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈏􀈛􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈦, 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈛􀈊 􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖-
10 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈧􀈕􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀈊􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀇪􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇲􀈈􀈗􀈭􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃
􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀜􀀗􀀌.
11 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈛 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇝􀈊􀈌􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈫􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀂳􀇷􀈍􀈗􀈍􀈓􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇹􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃
􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀛􀀌.
12 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈛 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈛 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇝􀈊􀈌􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈫􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃
“􀇷􀈍􀈗􀈍􀈓􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘 􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀖􀀌.
13 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇹􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀈔 􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀗􀀌.
7
􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃 􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀀃 􀈏􀀃 􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈮􀀃 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀃 􀈖􀀃 􀀚􀀃 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃 􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈛. 􀇷􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃 􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃
􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈐 􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧.
􀇷􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈔 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃 􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈈􀀃 􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈭􀈊􀀃 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈧􀈓􀈐􀀃 􀇶􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈌􀈏􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃 􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈝 􀈙􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈔􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀃􀇩􀇴-
􀀕􀀔􀀃􀂳􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌.”
19. 􀇷􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀏􀀃 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃 􀈏􀈈 􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈧􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃 􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝
􀈕􀈈􀈔􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃 􀈏􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈭􀀃 􀈙􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈔􀈐􀀃 􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃 􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀃 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃
􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃 􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀃 􀇶􀇩􀇹􀇝􀀑􀀃 􀀃 􀇯􀈘􀈍􀈠􀈚􀈖􀈦􀀏 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃 􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃 􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈛􀀃
􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈛􀀃 􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈛􀀃 􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃 􀈕􀈍􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈛 􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈕􀈛 􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖-􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃 􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃 􀈊􀀃
􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈦􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀇩􀀑􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈒􀈐
􀀔􀀑 􀇟􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈧 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈐􀈝
􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧
20. 􀇪􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛
􀈑􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃 􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃 􀈔􀈖􀈮􀈑􀀃 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀈑􀀃 􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈭􀀃 􀈊􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈤􀀃 􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈚􀈐􀀃 􀈙􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈖􀈒􀀃 􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃
􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈠􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧
􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀑􀀃 􀇾􀈍􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃
􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇹􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈛􀀃􀀋􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇝􀈊􀈌􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈦􀀃􀀋􀂳􀇷􀈍􀈗􀈍􀈓􀂴􀀌􀀑
21. 􀈇􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈊 􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈚􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈝􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈐
􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃 􀈏􀀃 􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃 􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈔􀈐 􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃 􀇹􀀑􀀃
􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇝􀈊􀈌􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈑􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈞􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈛􀈝􀈊􀈈􀈓􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈌􀈭. 􀇿􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃 􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈧􀈞􀈤􀀃 􀈧􀀃 􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈊􀀃 􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃 􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈐􀀃 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃 􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛 􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀑 􀇴􀈖􀈧􀀃 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃 􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈝􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃 􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃 􀈚􀈈
􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧 􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮
􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊 (􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴).14
14 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀇸􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃
􀇵􀈈􀈘􀈛􀈙􀈍􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈓􀈍􀈑􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇶􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀗􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃
􀇬􀈍􀈗􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈈􀈘􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈛􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀓􀀛􀀌􀀑
8
22. 􀇵􀈈􀀃 􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈭􀀃 􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀀃 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃 􀇴􀀑􀀃 􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈 􀀋􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀏􀀃 􀈔􀈖􀈮􀈑􀀃 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀈑􀀃 􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈭
􀈊􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈧􀀃 􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈚􀈐􀀃 􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈐􀀃 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀃 􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈐􀈝􀀃 􀈈􀈉􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀏 􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃 􀈔􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈠􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃 􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃 􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧, 􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐 􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈐􀀃 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃 􀈡􀈖􀀃 􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃 􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈈􀈔􀀃
􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃 􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃 􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈛 􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀈛 (􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃 􀀋􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀂴􀀌􀀏 􀇹􀈚􀈍􀈗􀈈􀈕􀈛 􀈇􀈘􀈖􀈡􀈛􀈒􀈛 􀈚􀈈
􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈛􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈛 (􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴). 􀇪􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈤􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈮􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈤􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈧􀈙􀈕􀈦,
􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉.
􀀕􀀑 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀏􀀃 􀈏􀈈􀀃 􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃 􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃 􀈙􀈗􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃 􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖
􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛
􀀋􀈈􀀌􀀃 􀇲􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀃 􀈏􀀃 􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈦􀀃 􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈦􀀃 􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈦􀀃 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈛􀈊􀀃
􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖-􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕
23. 23-􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈎
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀑􀀃 􀇪􀈘􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀈮􀈝􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈚􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀏􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃
􀈊􀈖􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈛􀈚􀈚􀈧􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈏􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀑
24. 􀇺􀈈􀈒􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈒􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒
􀀋􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀂴􀀌 􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀀋􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌 􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊 􀈑􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀂳􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈊􀈖􀈕􀈐􀈓􀀃􀈚􀈛􀈌􀈈􀀏􀀃
􀈒􀈛􀈌􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈖” 􀈭􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈞􀈧􀈓􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈧􀈚􀈤 􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈛 “􀈚􀈛􀈌􀈈, 􀈒􀈛􀈌􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈣 [􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴]
􀈙􀈍􀈑􀈟􀈈􀈙.”15 􀇿􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈐, 􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕, 􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒 􀀋􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀂴􀀌 􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃
􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀀋􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌 􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀂳􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈏􀈔􀈣􀂴􀀃􀀾􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈔􀈭􀈕􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀂳􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀂴􀁀􀀃
􀈑􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈍􀈋􀀃“􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈌􀈛􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈕􀈤􀀏􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈤􀈠􀈍􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈚􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈎􀈍􀀃􀀑􀀃􀀑􀀃
.”16
25. 􀇶􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀘􀀙􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕 􀀕􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀏 􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴 􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊
􀂳􀇷􀈍􀈗􀈓􀈛” 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈮􀈝􀈈􀈚􀈐, 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃“􀈒􀈈􀈎􀈌􀈣􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈟􀈈􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈍􀈋􀈖.”17
26. 􀇶􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴 􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊 􀇫􀀑 􀇭􀈋􀈐􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈕􀈛 (􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑
􀂳􀈀􀈘􀈈􀈔􀂴)􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈞􀈭􀈫􀈮 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈊 􀂳􀈀􀈘􀈈􀈔􀈈􀂴􀀃􀈏􀈛􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈚􀈐 􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭􀀃
􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇲􀈛􀈏􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈭 􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀑18 􀇾􀈍􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖-􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
9
􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀑􀀃 􀇿􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈖 􀀕􀀖􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈐, 􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴 􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊
􀈕􀈍􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈛 􀇬􀇵􀇸. 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈛,” 􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀀃(􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴) 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀂳􀇸􀈛􀈉􀈍􀈕” 􀈊􀈐􀈘􀈛􀈠􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈏􀈛􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈟􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀑19
27. 􀇶􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭 􀀕􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀂳􀇸􀈛􀈉􀈍􀈕􀂴 􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈭” 􀈭
􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈏􀈛􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀑20 􀇶􀀃􀀚􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃
􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈛􀂴􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈏􀈛􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈌􀈘􀈛􀈋􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑, 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈖􀀃““􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈛” 􀀾􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀁀 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈠􀈍􀈓.”21
􀀋􀈉􀀌􀀃􀇲􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈙􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓
28. 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦 􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸, 􀈏􀈛􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈠􀈐
􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑 􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈 􀇲􀈛􀈏􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈭, 􀈙􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀏 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈓 􀇹􀈈􀈝􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈍􀀃􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭. 􀇷􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈭􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈠􀈖􀈊 􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈 􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈒􀈭􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀇩􀈍􀈏􀈭􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈍. 􀇾􀈭􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈛􀈦􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀑
29. 􀇶􀀃􀀛􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊 􀀋􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊
􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈 􀀋􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀊􀈮􀈎􀈌􀈎􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈 􀇩􀈍􀈏􀈭􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈍􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈖 􀀗􀀓􀀃􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇲􀈛􀈏􀈕􀈭􀈞􀈐􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀇨􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈈 􀀋􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌 􀈭􀈏􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃
􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔 􀀋􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌 􀈖􀀃􀀛􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀏􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊 􀀋􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈈􀀃
􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈠􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈭 􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈒􀈭􀈕􀈖􀀏 􀈧􀈒􀈍􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈖 15
􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇲􀈛􀈏􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈭.22
30. 􀇶􀀃􀀛􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀘􀀗􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈
􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀈈 􀀋􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀂴􀀌, 􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃“􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈞􀈐􀈐.”23
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈛 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀇸􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀈖􀈔 􀀋􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀂴􀀌􀀃
􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈐􀈔 􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌
􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀔􀀌.
10
31. 􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀜􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈞􀈦,” 􀈡􀈖
􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈊􀈖􀈝􀀃􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈊 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈕􀈤􀈖􀈋􀈖, 􀈭􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈦􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈉􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈫􀀃
􀈕􀈍􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀂳􀇮􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈫􀈕.”24
􀀋􀈊􀀌􀀃􀇶􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧
32. 􀇺􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈛􀈦􀈚􀈤􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇴􀀑
􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀀃􀀋􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈝 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈭􀈊 􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃
􀇩􀈍􀈏􀈭􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈍􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈈􀈝􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈍􀀃􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃
􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃
􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐, 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀜􀀝􀀔􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀓􀀓􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀝􀀕􀀔􀀑 􀈁􀈍􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀝00,
􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀀏􀀃􀈈􀈓􀈍􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃
􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈖 􀈊􀈐􀈡􀈍􀀑􀀃
33. 􀇶􀀃􀀜􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀇨􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊 􀀋􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌 􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀈏􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀋􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈐 􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀈕􀈤.25 􀇯􀈋􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈏􀀃
􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈈􀈛􀈌􀈭􀈖􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈑􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈞􀈭􀈫􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀏􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈏􀀃
􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇩􀈍􀈏􀈭􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈒􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈓 􀇹􀈈􀈝􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈈 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈍
􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀑26 􀇶 􀀔􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕 􀈕􀈍􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀂳􀇸􀈛􀈉􀈍􀈕􀂴􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈛,” 􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈫􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀛􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀑􀀃27
34. 􀇶􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀘􀀚􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃“􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈭,” 􀈡􀈖
􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈑􀈎􀈍􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈑: “􀉫􀉪􀉚􀉡􀉭􀀃􀉨􀉬􀉤􀉪􀉵􀉜􀉚􀉸􀀃􀉨􀉝􀉨􀉧􀉶􀀃􀀑􀀃􀀑􀀃􀀑􀀃 􀉂􀀃􀉭􀉯􀉨􀉠􀉭􀀃􀉨􀉩􀉹􀉬􀉶.”
24 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈛 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈐􀈔 􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌 􀈚􀈈􀀃 􀇸􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃 􀇶􀀑􀀃 􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀈖􀈔 􀀋􀀃 􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃 􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀂴􀀌􀀃 􀈚􀈈􀀃 􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃 􀀕􀀗􀀃 􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀕􀀌􀀑
25 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀇸􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃
􀇵􀈈􀈘􀈛􀈙􀈍􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈓􀈍􀈑􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇶􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀗􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃
􀇬􀈍􀈗􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈈􀈘􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈛􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀓􀀛􀀌􀀑
26 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇴􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈮 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃
􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀌.
27 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 supra, 􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀘 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀑􀀃
11
􀇯􀈋􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐 􀈈􀈛􀈌􀈭􀈖􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈑􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈞􀈭􀈫􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀏􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀃
􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇩􀈍􀈏􀈭􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈒􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈓􀀃􀇹􀈈􀈝􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀇳􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈍􀀃􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀑28 􀇿􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈐􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈐, 􀈖􀀃􀀔3 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃
0􀀔􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀏􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃“􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈭”􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈊􀈎􀈍􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈐􀈊􀀑29
35. 􀇶􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀂳􀇮􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈫􀈕” 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃􀇴􀀑􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈 􀀋􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈖􀀃
􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀑30 􀇯􀈋􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈈􀈛􀈌􀈭􀈖􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈑􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀏􀀃
􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈐􀂴􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭 􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇩􀈍􀈏􀈭􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈒􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈓
􀇹􀈈􀈝􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈈 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈍􀀏􀀃􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭.31
􀀋􀈋􀀌􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈋􀈈􀈟􀈭􀈊􀀃
􀇶􀇩􀇹􀇝
36. 􀇷􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤􀀃
􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈋􀈈􀈟􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇶􀇩􀇹􀇝􀀑􀀃 􀇸􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈒􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸 􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀀃􀀋􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈊􀀃
􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀇹. 􀈇􀈘􀈖􀈡􀈛􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖 􀈚􀈍, 􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈕􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈭􀈧􀀃􀇶􀇩􀇹􀇝􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈫􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈧􀀑32 􀇷􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈔􀀃􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀈤􀂴􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃
􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈛􀀃􀀋􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀑􀀃 􀇷􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈞􀈤􀈖􀈋􀈖, 􀈖 􀀔􀀗􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕, 􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴 􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀇶.
28 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈛 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑
􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀚􀀌.
29 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 supra, 􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀘 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀑􀀃
30 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 supra, 􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀘 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀑􀀃
31 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇴􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈮 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃
􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇮􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈫􀈕􀂴􀀌􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃
􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀓􀀜􀀌.
32 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈛 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀇸􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀈤􀂴􀀌􀀃
􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇫􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈓-􀈔􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇹􀀑􀇹􀀑􀀃􀈇􀈘􀈖􀈡􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃
􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀔􀀙􀀌.
12
􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈛 􀀋􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌 􀈚􀈈 􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈖􀈉􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈤􀀃“􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈧􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈍􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈠􀈐􀈕􀈣” 􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈐􀀃􀂳􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈚􀀃
􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈧􀀃􀇶􀇩􀇹􀇭”.33
􀀋􀈌􀀌􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈒􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐􀀃
􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀈕􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈌􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈧􀈕􀈒􀈛􀀃
􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖-􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀈛
37. 􀇵􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈕􀈞􀈭 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸
􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈒􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈟􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈏􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈌􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈛􀈊􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛. 􀇾􀈍􀈑􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈛􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃
􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀃
38. 􀇶􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀀃(“􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌
􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈛 􀀋􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴􀀌 􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈟􀈍􀈒􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀀙􀀃􀈊􀈍􀈟􀈖􀈘􀈈􀀃􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈔􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇿􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕, 􀈖􀀃􀀔5 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀏􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈛
(“􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈊􀈎􀈍􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈎􀈈􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈒􀈭􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈍􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈤􀈖􀈝􀀃
􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈝 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖-􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇶􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃“􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈭”,
􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈎􀈈􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀑34
39. 􀇶 􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊 “􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈭”􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈑 􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑
􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈛􀈊 􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀀑35 􀇷􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈌􀈞􀈧􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕, 􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀘􀀙􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕, 􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀂴
􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀇸􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈛􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀈛 􀀋􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃
􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈮􀈝􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈎􀈭􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀑36
40. 􀇶􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀙􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔
􀂳􀇸􀈛􀈉􀈍􀈕􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈭,” 􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈘􀈛􀈋􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈎􀈈􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇲􀈛􀈏􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃
33 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 supra, 􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀘 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀑􀀃
34 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 supra, 􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀘 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀑􀀃
35 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 supra, 􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀘 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀑􀀃
36 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈛 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃􀇸􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀈤􀂴􀀌􀀃
􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀌􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌
􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀗􀀓􀀚􀀌.
13
􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖-􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀑 􀇶􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀂳􀇸􀈛􀈉􀈍􀈕􀂴 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈛,” 􀈡􀈖􀀃
􀈌􀈘􀈛􀈋􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈙􀈭􀈒􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈖􀈕􀀑37
3. 􀇟􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈛
􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤
41. 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐 􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈡􀈍􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈈􀈉􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇨􀈘􀈔􀈭􀈮􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃
􀈘􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀑􀀃
42. 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈘􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈊
􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈏 􀇹. 􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀃(“􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚”), 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃
􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈐􀈘􀈈 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈠􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈖􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇨􀈘􀈔􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇵􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀈮, 􀈖􀈏􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈫􀈕􀈖􀈮 􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈏􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀏􀀃􀈈􀀃
􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊 􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚.”38 􀇪􀀑􀀃
􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇹􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈘􀈛􀈟􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈊􀂵􀈧􀈏􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈭􀈏 􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀂳􀇷􀈍􀈗􀈍􀈓.” 􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀂳􀇷􀈍􀈗􀈓􀈈” 􀈧􀈒􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸.39
43. 􀇬􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀂳􀇫􀈖􀈘􀈍􀈞􀂴􀀃􀈫
􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈖􀈔 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈔􀂶􀈧􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀀃􀇱􀈖􀈏􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟 􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒.40 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃
􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈊 􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈝
􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀑􀀃 􀇻􀀃􀈎􀈖􀈊􀈚􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒 􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈗􀈭􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈛􀈊 􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀃
􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈉􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈠􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈔􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀑 􀇷􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃
37 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 supra, 􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀘 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀑􀀃
38 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈧􀀃􀇹􀈍􀈘􀈋􀈭􀈑􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈈􀀃􀇲􀈭􀈘􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃
􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈏􀈘􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀌.
39 Ibid.
40 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈭􀀃􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇴􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈦􀀏􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈑􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃
􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈓􀈦􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀌􀀞􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈭􀀃
􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇴􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈦􀀏􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈑􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈓􀈦􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃
􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀌; 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈭􀀃􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇴􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈦􀀏􀀃
􀇳􀈍􀈑􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈓􀈦􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀌.
14
􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇾􀈈􀈗􀈓􀈦􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀇵􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇷􀈍􀈕􀈏􀈍􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈭􀈕􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈚􀈛.41
44. 􀇬􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮
􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇹. 􀈇􀈘􀈖􀈡􀈛􀈒􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑 􀈫 􀈋􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈓-􀈔􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈔 􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮. 􀈇􀈒􀀃
􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈡􀈍􀀏􀀃􀇹􀀑􀀃􀈇􀈘􀈖􀈡􀈛􀈒􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈐􀈊􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈋􀈈􀈟􀈭􀀃􀇶􀇩􀇹􀇝􀀃
􀈕􀈈􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈉􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀑􀀃 􀇹􀀑􀀃􀈇􀈘􀈖􀈡􀈛􀈒􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃
􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈑􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈉􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈧􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀑􀀃 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃
􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀀜􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀇹. 􀈇􀈘􀈖􀈡􀈛􀈒􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈛􀈦􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀇸􀈈􀈒􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈖-
􀇨􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇪􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈛􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈊􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀇪􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀇶􀈒􀈘􀈛􀈏􀈭􀀃
􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈧􀀌􀀑42
45. 􀇬􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮
􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀂳􀇺􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈒􀈈,” 􀈟􀈐􀈫􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈎􀈕􀈫􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈭􀈏􀈊􀈐􀈡􀈍􀀃- 􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈒􀈈 􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈘􀈛􀈕􀈟􀈍􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈊􀀃
􀈙􀈖􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈛􀈫􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈛􀀃4-􀈑􀀃􀈋􀈊􀈈􀈘􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈑􀀃
􀇲􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈔􀈐􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈐􀈊􀈭􀈏􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈐􀈓􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀜􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀑43
46. 􀇵􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈕􀈞􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈋􀈘􀈈􀂴􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈭􀈏􀈊􀈐􀈡􀈍􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈫􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈖􀈔 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈝􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀑􀀃 􀇪􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈫􀈌􀈕􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈧􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈤 􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀑􀀃 􀇹􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈44
􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈖􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈏􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈘􀈈 􀈊􀀃
41 Ibid.
42 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀈛 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈘􀈐􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈛􀈟􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇲􀈈􀈗􀈭􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈔􀀃
􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀓􀀌􀀞􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃
􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈘􀈐􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈛􀈟􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇲􀈈􀈗􀈭􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃
􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀓􀀌.
43 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇬􀀑􀇫􀀑􀀃􀇬􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔-􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌
􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀔􀀌.
44 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇬􀀑􀇫􀀑􀀃􀇬􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔-􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀃
aprunepicKOMy IIOIKy y He6apKyii (Pocin) y 2010-2011, Ta 6yB IIiJUBHIIIeHH JI0 3BaHHH
IIiJIOJIKOBHHKa y 2012.
47. I IIpHCHTIO, IIIO BHIIIeBHKJIaJIeHi CBiJIHeHHH € JIOCTOBipHHMH i TOHIHHM Ta
IIOTOKyOC IIOCTaTH IIepeJ( CyJI0M y pa3i HeO6xiJ(HOCTi JULI HaJIaHHI JIOJIaTKOBHX CBiJIHeH.
Moi cBiJ(eHH TDyHTIOTCH Ha MOiX OCO6CTHX 3HaHIHHX, IK OJIiJ(OTO.
liJcaHo y KMei, VKpaia, 31 TpaB1HI 2018 p0Ky
Irop GBreHoBH IHOBCKi
15

Annex 6
Witness Statement of Dmytro Volodymyrovych Zyuzia (29 May 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

1
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
________________________________________________________
WITNESS STATEMENT OF DMYTRO VOLODYMYROVYCH ZYUZIA
________________________________________________________
1. My name is Dmytro Volodymyrovych Zyuzia, and I am a citizen of Ukraine. I am
a senior investigator of high-profile cases at the 5th Unit of the First Department of Pre-Trial
Investigations in the Main Investigations Department of the Security Service of Ukraine. I have
been working in the Security Service of Ukraine (“SSU”) for 16 years, beginning in 2002. I have
held various positions, including as a field agent and an investigator in the regional offices and
in the central office of the SSU. In accordance with my duties, I carry out the functions of an
investigator and carry on investigative activities related to the pre-trial investigation of criminal
cases that fall within the competence of the state security agencies, including cases related to the
prosecution of terrorist acts and terrorist activities on the territory of Ukraine.
2. Since 29 August 2016, I have been involved in a pre-trial investigation in the
criminal case 􀈹􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀔 concerning the shelling of a passenger bus near the town
of Volnovakha on 13 January 2015. As a result of the shelling, 12 civilians died and 19 civilians
suffered bodily injuries of various degrees of severity. My responsibilities include: management
and coordination of activities related to the pre-trial investigation in the case; comprehensive
investigation of the circumstances of the criminal case; collection, review, and analysis of
evidence; coordination among investigative, search, and expert units; questioning of witnesses;
2
evaluation and examination of evidence obtained as part of the covert (search) investigations,
including intercepted conversations.
3. In my statement below, I explain the procedures of a pre-trial investigation in
criminal cases, including the collection of evidence, and address specific issues of the pre-trial
investigation of the bus shelling near the Volnovakha. In particular, my statement addresses the
following issues:
􀁸 overview of covert investigative techniques to identify and examine telephone
conversations;
􀁸 summary of the pre-trial investigation in the criminal case No. 22015050000000021 on
the bus shelling near Volnovakha;
􀁸 evidence that established the DPR committed the attack, including a witness statement
and intercepted telephone conversations.
4. I am aware of the facts and circumstances set out in this statement because I am
the head of the investigation team and personally reviewed the materials available in this
criminal case, as well as collected additional evidence referenced in this statement. In addition,
as the head of the investigation team, I am directly responsible for collection, examination, and
review of evidence within the framework of the criminal proceeding related to the shelling of the
bus near Volnovakha.
A. Overview of Covert Investigative Techniques to Identify and Examine
Telephone Conversations.
5. Interception and monitoring of suspects’ telephone conversations is one of the
most effective covert investigative methods, if the information about the crime and the person
who committed it cannot be obtained by any other means. These covert investigations are also
carried out in criminal proceedings involving grave or especially grave crimes. Below I describe
how the prosecution identifies and collects intercepted conversations.
6. The prosecution and/or investigators have to obtain an approval from an
investigative judge to get information about cell phone numbers from cell phone providers
and/or to intercept phone conversations.
3
7. As an initial stage, the prosecution requests that cell phone providers (of which
there are only three in Ukraine) identify cell phone towers that enable cellular communication in
places relevant to the crime. After receiving a mandate from an investigative judge, the
investigator gets access to cell phone providers’ databases and identifies cell phone numbers
serviced by the cell phone towers during any period of time relevant to the crime. This
information includes both mobile and Internet communication from these cell phone numbers.
8. The investigator then obtains either a court approval for wiretapping of a
designated cell phone number or recordings of earlier intercepted telephone conversations
pursuant to an earlier court order. To obtain the latter, an investigator submits a request to the
SSU office of field operations, which determines if any of the identified cell phone numbers are
those the SSU regularly monitors given the difficult security situation in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions (such as cell phone numbers connected to other criminal investigations or
potentially suspicious conversations, etc.).
9. At the last stage, the investigator listens to the telephone conversations and
attempts to identify each participant through a holistic analysis of text messages associated with
the phones, social network pages, information discussed on the calls, etc. The investigator
identifies the location of each participant by providing the date and time of the call to cell phone
providers, which can then pinpoint the cell phone tower that serviced the call in question.
B. Summary of the Pre-Trial Investigation in the Criminal Case No.
22015050000000021 on the Bus Shelling Near Volnovakha
10. On 13 January 2015 at 14:25, members of the DPR shelled the Buhas checkpoint
located on the H-20 highway near the town of Volnovakha using BM-21 “Grad” MLRSs. As a
result of the shelling, 12 civilians died and 19 civilians received bodily injuries of varying
severity, as documented in relevant medical reports and forensic medical examinations. On the
same day, the Donetsk Regional Office of the Security Service of Ukraine (based in the city of
4
Mariupol) initiated a pre-trial investigation of this shelling in criminal case 􀈹􀀃
22015050000000021. The investigative team included 30 investigators and various experts.
11. The same day as the attack, the investigative team began work, and quickly
identified the basic circumstances of the case—the timing of the shelling, the type of weapons
and ammunition used during the shelling, the approximate location from which the shelling
originated, and the number of casualties and injured people. The investigative team inspected
the crime scene on 13, 14 and 16 January 2015; documented the location of the impact sites;
examined and analyzed the shell craters; collected projective fragments; inspected the passenger
bus damaged during the shelling; documented and described the crime scene in detail;
questioned witnesses and victims; conducted forensic examination of shell fragments collected
from the scene; and obtained expert reports mentioned below.
12. Beginning in August 2016, after the pre-trial investigation was transferred to the
Main Investigation Department of the SSU in Kyiv, I, along with my investigative team that
includes 6 investigators and prosecutors, identified the perpetrators of the shelling and their
accomplices, and verified and confirmed the facts previously established during the pre-trial
investigation. My investigative team employed numerous methods to identify the perpetrators
of the shelling attack: we identified a list of cellphone numbers used in the vicinity of the attack;
reviewed and analyzed telephone conversations mentioned below; and reviewed social network
pages, video hosting sites, news sites, and other websites. My team also obtained expert reports
on voice recognition based on an examination of video and audio recordings to confirm the
involvement of certain individuals in the shelling.
13. Based on the results of this investigation, my team established the following facts
and circumstances of the case. At 14:25 on 13 January 2015, members of the DPR shelled two
passenger buses with civilians on board, at the Buhas checkpoint near Volnovakha. The witness
statements collected by the investigative team and attached to this statement confirm the timing
5
of the shelling.1 One passenger bus was damaged in the shelling attack, 12 civilians died as a
result of shrapnel wounds, and 19 individuals suffered bodily injuries.2
14. Forensic experts examined the fragments collected from the crime scene and
identified the weapons used in the attack as three BM-21 “Grad” MLRSs, equipped with 122-mm
unguided rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shells.3
15. Ballistic experts examined shell craters at the crime scene and concluded that the
shelling attack came from the north-eastern outskirts of the town of Dokuchaevsk, the Donetsk
Region.4
16. The investigative team recorded 88 shell craters at the crime scene and marked
them on a Google Map.5
17. O. M. Pavlenko, an eyewitness interviewed by the investigator, confirmed that on
13 January 2015 at about 12:00 he personally saw the DPR moving three BM-21 “Grad” MLRS
1 See Signed testimony of Anton Ovcharenko, Record of Witness Questioning (18 January 2015) (Annex
206); Signed testimony of Serhiy Cherepko, Record of Witness Questioning (dated 20 January 2015)
(Annex 208).
2 See Record of crime scene inspection conducted by A. G. Albot, Investigator with the Investigative Office
of the Volnovakha District Department of the Donetsk Oblast Central Directorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine (13 January 2015) (Annex 85).
3 See Expert Opinion No. 38/6, Ukrainian Research Center for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic
Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine (18 May 2015) (Annex 126); Expert Opinion No. 16/8,
Ukrainian Research Center for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic Examinations of the Security
Service of Ukraine (7 May 2015) (Annex 123).
4 See Record of crime scene inspection conducted by V. V. Romanenko, Senior Investigator with the
Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine (16 January 2015)
(Annex 87); and Record of crime scene inspection conducted by S .S. Onikiyenko, Senior Investigator with
the Investigative Office of the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Prosecutor General’s Office of
Ukraine, with the participation of V. M. Levchenko, Senior Office with the Directorate of Rocket and
Artillery Forces of the Ukrainian Army Infantry Command (1 June 2016) (Annex 151).
5 See Map showing shell craters around the Buhas roadblock, which were marked by investigators after
inspecting the crime scene (20 January 2015) (Annex 89).
6
through the village of Olenivka from the direction of the city of Donetsk towards the town of
Dokuchaevsk in Donetsk region.6
18. The investigative team analyzed and interpreted telephone conversations
between members of the DPR on 13 January 2015 and identified a Ukrainian national Yriy
Mykolaevych Shpakov and a Russian national Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sinelnikov as individuals
connected to the shelling attack.
19. On 24 October 2016, based on the results of my team’s investigation, the
prosecution issued an indictment for Y. M. Shpakov for the bus shelling near Volnovakha. On
27 February 2017, the prosecution issued another indictment for A. A. Sinelnikov, a citizen of
the Russian Federation. On 7 April 2017, the Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office executed a request
for mutual legal assistance to the competent authorities of the Russian Federation and
requested assistance in serving A. O. Sinelnikov with the indictment.
C. Evidence Establishing that Individuals Affiliated with the DPR Committed
the Shelling Attack
20. Below I discuss a witness statement by O. M. Pavlenko and intercepted
conversations discussing the shelling of the bus near Volnavakha that helped my team
determine that individuals associated with the DPR committed the shelling attack.
1. Witness Statement of O.M. Pavlenko
21. The pre-trial investigators initially identified an eyewitness, Oleksandr
Mykolaiovych Pavlenko, who observed DPR's BM-21 Grad MLRS before the attack. The
investigator invited O. M. Pavlenko to the Donetsk Regional Office of the SSU for formal
questioning. On 23 January 2015, O. M. Pavlenko voluntarily appeared and provided a witness
statement for the case.
22. O. M. Pavlenko in his witness statement corroborated facts previously established
by the investigation team. Specifically, Pavlenko confirmed that on 13 January 2015 at 12:00, he
6 See Signed testimony of Oleksandr Pavlenko, Record of Witness Questioning (23 January 2015) (Annex
209).
7
personally observed three BM-21 “Grad” MLRS, accompanied by members of the DPR, moving
through the DPR checkpoint in Olenivka towards the town of Dokuchaevsk. The witness
identified members of the DPR by the DPR insignia depicted on the BM-21 “Grad” MLRS and on
the uniform of the individuals who accompanied the convoy. Approximately two or two and a
half hours later, at around 14:30, O. M. Pavlenko heard volleys of fire from the direction of
Dokuchaevsk.
23. My investigative team relied on other witnesses, expert opinions, and intercepted
conversations as part of our investigation which all collaborated Pavlenko’s statements about
the timing of the attack, the launch site, and the weapons used.
2. Intercepted Telephone Conversations
24. Intercepted telephone conversations also helped my team determine that (1) DPR
member Yuriy Mykolayovych Shpakov was involved in the shelling attack on the bus near
Volnovakha, and that (2) Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sinelnikov, a Russian national who has
served as a colonel with the Russian army was working with the DPR.
a) Identification of Yuriy Mykolayovych Shpakov
25. As discussed previously, the pre-trial investigators established that on 13 January
2015 at 14:25, three BM-21 “Grad” MLRS shelled the bus near Volnovakha from the northeastern
outskirts of the town of Dokuchaevsk. On 11 May 2016, the investigator identified the
cell phone towers and their coordinates serving the area of the north-eastern outskirts of the
town of Dokuchaevsk pursuant to the investigative judge’s orders.7 On 10 June 2016, a court
granted the prosecutor’s motion to obtain a list of cell phone numbers serviced by cell phone
towers in the town of Dokuchaevsk from 12 to 13 January 2015.8 The investigator narrowed this
7 See Case No. 757/21825/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv regarding temporary access
to and seizure of document copies from TOV Lifecell (11 May 2016) (Annex 148); Case No. 757/21828/16-
k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv regarding temporary access to and seizure of document
copies from PrAT MTS (11 May 2016) (Annex 149).
8 See Case No. 757/21811/16-k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv regarding temporary access
to and seizure of document copies from TOV Lifecell (10 June 2016) (Annex 152); Case No. 757/28210/16-
8
list down to cell phone numbers making calls near Dokuchaevsk on 13 January 2015, and cell
phone numbers receiving calls from the cell phones near Dokuchaevsk.
26. In August 2016, the SSU office of field operations identified the list of cell phone
numbers it monitored near Dokuchaevsk.9 On 20 September 2016, I received recordings of the
telephone conversations from one of the cell phone numbers (380 509 604816) identified by the
SSU office of field operations. As described below, we then identified this phone number as
belonging to Yuriy Mykolayovych Shpakov, a member of the DPR 􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃
(Yust) (we refer to this as a “call sign”).10
27. After reviewing the recordings tied to cell phone number 380509604816, the
investigators on my team established that the cell phone belonged to an individual who used the
call sign “􀈆􀈙􀈚” (Yust).11 For example, on 13 January 2015 at 12:23, the owner of the cell phone
received a call from an unidentified individual with the call sign “􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈣􀈑” (Opasnyi) and
identified himself as 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌􀀑
28. The investigator was then able to identify “􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌 as a commander of
artillery units of the DPR based on the content of his telephone conversations. For example, on
13 January 2015 at 9:22, “􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌 called an unidentified person with the call sign
“􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈” (Batyushka) and told him that he personally would adjust artillery fire onto a
checkpoint later that day. From this exchange, the investigator determined that 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌􀀃
played a commanding role in artillery shelling. This conclusion is further confirmed by a call
between 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌􀀃and 􀂳􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀥􀁄􀁗􀁜􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁎􀁄􀀌􀀏􀀃at 12:24. During this conversation, 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃
k, Order of the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv regarding temporary access to and seizure of document
copies from PrAT MTS (11 June 2016) (Annex 153).
9 See SSU Counterintelligence Department Letter No. 212/8-28412 of 11 August 2016 to the Prosecutor
General’s Office of Ukraine (Annex 154).
10 See Record of the results of a search operation conducted by the Department of Surveillance of the SSU,
prepared by R. O. Narusevych, field agent with the 8th sector of the 2nd directorate of the Criminal
Investigations Department of the SSU (dated 16 September 2016) (Annex 430).
11 See SSU Counterintelligence Department Letter No. 212/8-33394 of 4 October 2016 to the Pretrial
Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (Annex 158).
9
(Yust) ordered 􀂳􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀥􀁄􀁗􀁜􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁎􀁄􀀌 to start shelling and later in the conversation instructed
him to adjust the artillery fire. Finally, all of 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀂶􀁖􀀌 outgoing calls were made from the
territory in Donetsk under DPR control.12 From these facts, my team determined that 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃
(Yust) was a member of the DPR and performs command functions over DPR units.
29. The investigators also established based on these intercepted conversations and
the location of the cell phones used in these calls that 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌􀀃gave orders to the members
of the DPR with call signs 􀂳􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈣􀈑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀲􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁑􀁜􀁌􀀌􀀃and 􀂳􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀥􀁄􀁗􀁜􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁎􀁄􀀌􀀃to shell the area of
the Buhas checkpoint near Volnovakha with three BM-21 “Grad” MLRS. On 13 January 2015, at
13:41, 􀂳􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈣􀈑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀲􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁑􀁜􀁌􀀌 notified 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌 that he had arrived at the firing position. 13
minutes later at 13:54, 􀂳􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈣􀈑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀲􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁑􀁜􀁌􀀌 called 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌 and reported that he was
loading and, due to absence of artillery spotters, he would be firing with gun sights. The
outgoing call from the cell phone of 􀂳􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈣􀈑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀲􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁑􀁜􀁌􀀌􀀃was registered by the cell phone
tower that services the area of the town of Dokuchaevsk at the following address: the village of
Olenivka, Volnovakha District, Donetsk Region.13
30. At 15:29, after the shelling of the bus near Volnovakha, 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌􀀏 while
speaking to his wife on the phone, said that today he “blew a Ukropian checkpoint to hell ….” At
16:54 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌 had a conversation with a “colonel” who was later identified by the
investigators as Anatoliy Sinelnikov (who used the call sign “􀇯􀈈􀈝􀈈􀈘” (Zakhar)). During the
conversation, Sinelnikov asked “Yust” “Who is that [cursing] ‘Batyushka’ who shelled
Volnavakha...from Dokuchyaevsk today, that [cursing]?” As mentioned in paragraph 15 above,
the ballistic expert determined that the shelling originated from the north-eastern part of
Dokuchaevsk. The Buhas checkpoint was the only checkpoint located at that time near
Volnovakha. On 13 January 2015, the only shelling recorded near Volnovakha was the shelling
12 See Record of examination of a CD performed by S. O. Husarov, Senior Lieutenant of Justice and Senior
Investigator of the 1st Office of the 5th Department at the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the
Central Investigative Directorate of the SSU (4 May 2017) (Annex 172).
13 Ibid.
10
of the Buhas check point. Taken as a whole, therefore, my team concluded that these facts
indicate that 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌 was discussing, and took part in, the shelling of the Buhas
checkpoint.
31. The investigators next identified 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌 as Yuriy Mykolayovych Shpakov.
First, the investigators found the cell phone number of 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖t) on the web page of the
social network website Facebook. It was described there as the cell phone number of Yuriy
Mykolayovych Shpakov, a citizen of Ukraine, born in 1979.14 The investigators next identified
news interviews Y.M. Shpakov gave on Russian websites, and extracted voice samples. An
expert compared these voice samples to the recordings of 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀂶􀁖􀀌􀀃calls, and confirmed
that 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀼􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀌􀀃was Y.M. Shpakov.15
b) Identification of Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sinelnikov
32. During the pre-trial investigation, the investigators also determined that Y. M.
Shpakov called A. A. Sinelnikov to report on the results of the shelling of the bus near
Volnovakha. As noted above Y. M. Shpakov had a conversation with a “colonel” after the attack
at 16:54 during which A. A. Sinelnikov asked Y. M. Shpakov about a DPR member with a call
sign 􀂳􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀥􀁄􀁗􀁜􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁎􀁄􀀌 “Who is that [cursing] ‘Batyushka’ who shelled Volnavakha...from
Dokuchyaevsk today, that [cusring]?”
33. My team identified A. A. Sinelnikov as follows.16 In analyzing the telephone
conversations of A. A. Sinelnikov, the investigator determined that A. A. Sinelnikov occasionally
communicated with relatives who used cell phone numbers starting with the code +7. This is
14 See Record of inspection conducted by I.V. Budnyk, Captain of Justice and Senior Investigator with the
5th Investigative Office at the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate
of the SSU (26 September 2016) (Annex 157).
15 See Expert opinion No. 14986/16-35, Kyiv Research Institute for Forensic Examinations of the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine (Annex 135).
16 See Record of Inspection of Materials Obtained As a Result of a Covert Detective Activity, Carried by D.
V. Zyuzia, Lt. Colonel of Justice and Senior Special Investigator, Section 1 of Department 5, Pre-Trial
Investigations, Directorate 1 at the Main Directorate for Investigations of the Security Service of Ukraine
(18 February 2017) (Annex 166).
11
the international code for the Russian Federation. Through an Internet search of all cell phone
numbers that A. A. Sinelnikov called, the investigator identified a cell phone number belonging
to A. A. Sinelnikov’s son. The number was indicated as a contact number on one of the web
pages and described as belonging to Aleksey Anatolievich Sinelnikov.17 Based on further
Internet research, the investigator established that A. A. Sinelnikov previously had served as a
colonel in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Penza Region. In addition, in the
intercepted telephone conversations provided to the investigator, the interlocutors of A. A.
Sinelnikov called him Anatoliy Aleksandrovich. Based on the results of an inspection of the
social network website “Odnoklassniki” [Classmates], the prosecution identified his wife and
daughter, as well as his own photos.
34. The investigators also extracted voice samples of A. A. Sinelnikov from the news
website “Penza Inform.” An expert confirmed that the voice from the news website was the
same of the voice on the recorded telephone conversations.18 Moreover, in one of the telephone
conversations, A. A. Sinelnikov said that his “paradise” was “on Sovetskaya Street.”
Investigators determined that Sinelnikov had been in charge of a military registration and
enlistment office that was located on this street in the city of Penza from 2011 to 2014.
35. I swear that the above statement is true and accurate and agree to appear before
the Court, if necessary, to provide additional testimony. My statement is based on my personal
knowledge as an investigator.
Signed in Kyiv, Ukraine, on 29 May 2018
By:_____[Signature]__________________
Dmytro Volodymyrovych Zyuzia
17 See Record of Inspection of the Internet Pages, Carried by D. V. Zyuzia, Lt. Colonel of Justice and Senior
Special Investigator, Section 1 of Department 5, Pre-Trial Investigations, Directorate 1 at the Main
Directorate for Investigations of the Security Service of Ukraine (9 February 2017) (Annex 165).
18 See Expert Opinion No. 76/4, Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and
Forensic Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine (31 July 2017) (Annex 174).
1
􀇯􀇨􀇹􀇺􀇶􀇹􀇻􀇪􀇨􀇵􀇵􀈇􀀃􀇴􀇟􀇮􀇵􀇨􀇸􀇶􀇬􀇵􀇶􀇠􀀃􀇲􀇶􀇵􀇪􀇭􀇵􀇾􀇟􀇠􀀃􀇷􀇸􀇶
􀇩􀇶􀇸􀇶􀇺􀈄􀇩􀇻􀀃􀇯􀀃􀇼􀇟􀇵􀇨􀇵􀇹􀇻􀇪􀇨􀇵􀇵􀈇􀇴􀀃􀇺􀇭􀇸􀇶􀇸􀇰􀇯􀇴􀇻􀀃􀇺􀇨
􀇴􀇟􀇮􀇵􀇨􀇸􀇶􀇬􀇵􀇶􀇠􀀃􀇲􀇶􀇵􀇪􀇭􀇵􀇾􀇟􀇠􀀃􀇷􀇸􀇶􀀃􀇳􀇟􀇲􀇪􀇟􀇬􀇨􀇾􀇟􀈆
􀇪􀇹􀇟􀇽􀀃􀇼􀇶􀇸􀇴􀀃􀇸􀇨􀇹􀇶􀇪􀇶􀇠􀀃􀇬􀇰􀇹􀇲􀇸􀇰􀇴􀇟􀇵􀇨􀇾􀇟􀇠
􀇻􀇲􀇸􀇨􀇠􀇵􀇨􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈐
􀇸􀇶􀇹􀇟􀇱􀇹􀈄􀇲􀇶􀇠􀀃􀇼􀇭􀇬􀇭􀇸􀇨􀇾􀇟􀇠
________________________________________________________
􀇷􀇰􀇹􀈄􀇴􀇶􀇪􀇭 􀇹􀇪􀇟􀇬􀇿􀇭􀇵􀇵􀈇 􀇬􀇴􀇰􀇺􀇸􀇨􀀃􀇪􀇶􀇳􀇶􀇬􀇰􀇴􀇰􀇸􀇶􀇪􀇰􀇿􀇨 􀇯􀈆􀇯􀇟
________________________________________________________
1. 􀈇􀀏􀀃􀇬􀈔􀈐􀈚􀈘􀈖􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈔􀈐􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀀃􀇯􀈦􀈏􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈫􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇶􀈉􀈭􀈑􀈔􀈈􀈦􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈈􀈌􀈛
􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈈􀈎􀈓􀈐􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈉􀈐􀀃􀇩􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈍􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇪􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈝
􀇹􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈉􀈐􀀃􀇩􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈍􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐 􀀋􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀌 􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈦􀈦􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈭􀈊, 􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀈏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈉􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈑􀈔􀈈􀈊 􀈘􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈭 􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈈􀈌􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐 􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈈􀈌􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈘􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈 􀈚􀈈 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈋􀈭􀈖􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈞􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀇯􀈋􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈜􀈛􀈕􀈒􀈞􀈭􀈖􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈊􀂵􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈦􀀃􀈜􀈛􀈕􀈒􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈦􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀃
􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈤􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈗􀈍􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃
􀀦􀇩􀇻􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧
􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈧􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀑
2. 􀇷􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀈏􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈦 􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈞􀈚􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔 􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈹􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈖􀈔
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈈􀈎􀈐􀈘􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈 􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈈 􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇪 􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈭􀀃
􀈊􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛 􀈏􀈈􀈋􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈞􀈐􀈊􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀀔􀀜 􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈙􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈛􀈠􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃
􀈘􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈍􀈕􀈦􀀃􀈚􀈧􀈎􀈒􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇴􀈖􀈮 􀈜􀈛􀈕􀈒􀈞􀈭􀈖􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭 􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈚􀈤􀀝􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧
􀈏􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈞􀈚􀈊􀈈 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮 􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈭􀀞􀀃
􀈛􀈙􀈍􀈉􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀞􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈊􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏 􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈭􀈊􀀞􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈭􀈏􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦 􀈊􀈏􀈈􀈫􀈔􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮 􀈏􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈦􀈚􀈤
2
􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈖-􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈛􀀃􀈑􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈧􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈤􀀞􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛 􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀞􀀃􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏 􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀈊􀈐􀈊􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝 􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈊 􀈏􀈌􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈚􀈐􀈝 􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈔􀈒􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈝 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝 􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀌 􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀏􀀃
􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐 􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀑
3. 􀇻􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈮􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈝 􀈕􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈧􀈙􀈕􀈦 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈌􀈛􀈘􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈝􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈦􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈭 􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇯􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈦􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈤􀀝
􀁸 􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈌􀈛􀈘􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈝 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝 􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀌􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈖 􀈊􀈐􀈧􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈦 􀈚􀈈
􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀞
􀁸 􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭
􀈹􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈏􀈊􀀊􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈 􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀞
􀁸 􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈉􀈈􀈏􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐
􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈟􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐.
4. 􀇴􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈭􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈞􀈤􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭,
􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈫􀀃􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈊􀈟􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈧􀈊􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖
􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈭􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈧􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈊􀀃
􀈞􀈤􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇶􀈒􀈘􀈭􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈉􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈕􀈤􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈈􀈦􀀃
􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈭􀈘􀀏􀀃􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈊􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈔􀈒􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃
􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈 􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀑
􀀤􀀑 􀇶􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈌􀈛􀈘􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝 􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀌􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈧􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈦
􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊.
5. 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈕􀈋􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖
􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈫􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈫􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈝 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝 􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀌􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈡􀈖􀀃
􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈎􀈓􀈐􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀑􀀃
􀇺􀈈􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈭􀀌􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈌􀈧􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈝􀀃
􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈧􀈎􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈈􀈉􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈧􀈎􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀑􀀃 􀇵􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈧􀈙􀈕􀈦􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃
􀈊􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀑􀀃
3
6. 􀇹􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀒􀈈􀈉􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖
􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈌􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈏􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈛 􀈚􀈈􀀒􀈈􀈉􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀑􀀃
7. 􀇵􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈈􀈚􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈗􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈉􀈐􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈚􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝
􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈫􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈐􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈘􀈛􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃
􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈠􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈦􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈦􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀀃􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈛􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀇷􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈏􀈊􀈖􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈌􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈛􀈫􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈈􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃
􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈠􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐 􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈭􀈎􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈛􀀃
􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈛􀀑 􀇺􀈈􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈏􀈊􀀊􀈧􀈏􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈛􀀃
􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚.
8. 􀇵􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈗􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈛􀈫􀀃􀈛􀈝􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈛 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧
􀈗􀈍􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈈􀈉􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈛􀈫􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃
􀈖􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈕􀈭􀈝􀀃􀈛􀈝􀈊􀈈􀈓 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈛􀀑􀀃 􀇪􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈤􀈖􀈔􀈛 􀈊􀈐􀈗􀈈􀈌􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈉􀈐􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈚􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻, 􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈦􀈚􀈤 􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈓􀈭􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈐􀀏􀀃
􀈡􀈖 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈉􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈦􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈈􀈉􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈉􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈭􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻 􀈛 􀈏􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈙􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈙􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈫􀈦􀀃􀈊􀀃
􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈭􀀃􀇳􀈛􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈧􀈝 􀀋􀈏􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈏
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔 􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈤 􀈈􀈉􀈖 􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈞􀈭􀈑􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈉􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈍􀈟􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈔􀈐).
9. 􀇵􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈤􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈗􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈫􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈔􀈈􀈋􀈈􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧
􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈎􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈠􀈓􀈧􀈝􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈤􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈞􀈭􀈦􀈦􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈖􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈝􀀏􀀃
􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈤􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈕􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈡􀈖􀀑 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈦􀈫􀀃
􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈈􀈉􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈠􀈓􀈧􀈝􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈈􀈟􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈭􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈛􀀃􀈌􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈔􀀃
􀈙􀈚􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈎􀈛􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈐􀈚􀈐 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈮 􀈊􀈐􀈠􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈈
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀈌􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒.
4
􀇩􀀑􀀃􀇶􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈹􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈏􀈊􀀊􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈈􀈎􀈐􀈘􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈
􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀃􀀃
10. 􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀝25􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇶
􀇩􀇴􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃“􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌” 􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀀃“􀇩􀈛􀈋􀈈􀈙” 􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈭􀀃􀇵-􀀕􀀓􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇪􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈭􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈋􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈞􀈐􀈊􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈙􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈛􀈠􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈘􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈍􀈕􀈦􀀃􀈚􀈧􀈎􀈒􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈛􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈌􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖-
􀈔􀈍􀈌􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀑 􀇪􀀃􀈞􀈍􀈑􀀃􀈎􀈍􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈤􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈 􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃
􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇴􀈈􀈘􀈭􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤􀀌􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈈􀈚􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈍􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈹􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈 􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈 􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈛􀀃
􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈭􀈊.
11. 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈈􀈔􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈤􀀏􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈖
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓. 􀇩􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈏􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈈􀀃􀈏􀂶􀈧􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈐􀈗􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈖􀈫􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈫􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍, 􀈏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀏􀀃􀈒􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈎􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈎􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈝􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀞􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖 􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈈􀈌􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃
􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀞􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀞􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈛􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈜􀈘􀈈􀈋􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐
􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀞􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈈􀈎􀈐􀈘􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈, 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈎􀈌􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈊􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈒􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀞􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈛􀀞􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈭􀈓􀈐􀈝􀀞􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈠􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈛􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀞􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈋􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍.
12. 􀇯􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈍􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇲􀈐􀈫􀈊􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀀙􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀃
􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛, 􀈙􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊 􀈚􀈈 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈊􀈭􀈘􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈭
􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐 􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈭􀈠􀈍􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇴􀈖􀈧 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈
􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈘􀈧􀈌􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈌􀈛􀈘􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈔􀈒􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀃􀀋􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀌 􀈌􀈭􀈑 􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃
􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈝 􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈏􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈈􀀝􀀃􀈔􀈐􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭 􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧 􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈐􀀃
􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓; 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈝􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃
5
􀈕􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍􀀞􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈓􀈐 􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌 􀈙􀈖􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈖􀈝􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈕􀈋􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈈􀈑􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈐􀈝􀀃
􀈭􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒. 􀇴􀈖􀈧􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈗􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃
􀈉􀈈􀈏􀈛􀈦􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈊􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈖􀀃􀈭􀀃􀈈􀈛􀈌􀈭􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈉􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈐 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀑
13. 􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈧􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈭
􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈐􀀑 􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃
􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈊􀈖􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈑􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈞􀈐􀈊􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈉􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀀃􀂳􀇩􀈛􀈋􀈈􀈙􀂴􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐. 􀇿􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈛􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐􀀃
􀈏􀈭􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦.1 􀇻􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈠􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈑􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙.
􀇪􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈤 􀈏􀈈􀈋􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈞􀈐􀈊􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃
􀈚􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈛􀈠􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈤.2
14. 􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀈐􀀃􀈜􀈘􀈈􀈋􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈭􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮
􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃120-􀈔􀈔􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐
􀈜􀈛􀈋􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈕􀈍􀀃􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈠􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈤􀈖􀈝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪 􀇩􀇴-21 “􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌.”3
15. 􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈉􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈕􀈈
􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈭􀀃􀈏􀈓􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈏􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈖-􀈙􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈐􀈞􀈭􀀃
􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈈􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭.4
1 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇨􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇶􀈊􀈟􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈈􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌
(􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀙); 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀈍􀈘􀈋􀈭􀈧􀀃􀇿􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈗􀈒􀈈􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈈􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀛)􀀑
2 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇫􀀑􀀃􀇨􀈓􀈉􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛
􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧 􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇴􀈭􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈕􀈛􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈠􀈕􀈭􀈝 􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀀃
􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀛􀀘)􀀑
3 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇪􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈹􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀒􀀙􀀏􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖-􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈐􀀃
􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈉􀈐􀀃􀈉􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈍􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐 (􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛) (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀙); 􀇪􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈒􀀃
􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀒􀀛, 􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖-􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃
􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈉􀈐􀀃􀈉􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈍􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀚􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘 􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀖).
4 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇪􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃
􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛) (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀛􀀚); 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇹􀀑􀇹􀀑􀀃􀇶􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈭􀈫􀈕􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈛􀈘􀈐􀀃􀇫􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈛􀈘􀈐􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈦􀀃􀇪􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇳􀈍􀈊􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀏􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈜􀈭􀈞􀈍􀈘􀈈􀀃
􀈀􀈚􀈈􀈉􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈒􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀀃􀈭􀀃􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇲􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈛􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐 (􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃
􀀔􀀃􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛) (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀔).
6
16. 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈙􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀀛􀀛􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈙􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈛􀀃Google
Map.5
17. 􀇬􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈈􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈈􀈟􀈐􀈊
􀈧􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀓􀀓􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈧􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈔􀀑􀀃
􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀀋􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈐􀈡􀈍􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈊􀈒􀈈􀀌􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈧􀈓􀈐
􀈚􀈘􀈐􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇶􀀃􀇩􀇴-21 “􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌.”6
18. 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈 􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈦 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈎
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀃
􀈆􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀑􀀃􀀃
19. 􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈎􀈖􀈊􀈚􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛, 􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈫􀈦􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦􀀏
􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈏􀈘􀈛􀀃􀈆􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈛 􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃
􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀑􀀃 􀀕􀀚􀀃􀈓􀈦􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈡􀈍􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈏􀈘􀈛􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶.
􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈛 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮 􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀚􀀃􀈒􀈊􀈭􀈚􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀇫􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈈􀀃
􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈛􀈘􀈈􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈎􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈖􀈋􀈐􀀃
􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈗􀈍􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈔􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈧􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈘􀈛􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈏􀈘􀈐􀀃
􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈛.
􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈈􀈏􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸
20. 􀇵􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈠􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏 􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈈􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈
􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈦􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀏􀀃
􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈮􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈚􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐 􀈏􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀑􀀃
5 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇲􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈭􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈊􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀀃􀂳􀇩􀈛􀈋􀈈􀈙􀂴􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃
􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈮􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀛􀀜).
6 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈈􀀃􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈈 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛) (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀜).
7
􀀔􀀑 􀇹􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈈
21. 􀇬􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖
􀈉􀈈􀈟􀈐􀈊 􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇴􀀃􀇩􀇴-21 “􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌”􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈖􀈔. 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈐􀈊 􀇶􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃
􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈛 􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛 􀇶􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖 􀈌􀈖􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈏􀂶􀈧􀈊􀈐􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃
􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈒􀀑
22. 􀇹􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈈 􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈭􀈠􀈍􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭
􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈝􀀑􀀃 􀇯􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈈􀀏􀀃􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈋􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀓􀀓􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈐􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪 􀇩􀇴-21 “􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌” 􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈌􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃
􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈛􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈊􀈞􀈭􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈧􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇹􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈒􀀃
􀈊􀈗􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀈍􀈔􀈉􀈓􀈍􀈔􀈭􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇴􀀃􀇩􀇴-21 “􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌” 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈉􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈭􀈠􀈍, 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈊􀈭􀀃- 􀈌􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈐, 􀈌􀈍􀈙􀈤􀀃􀈖􀀃
􀀔􀀗􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀖􀀓􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀏􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈗􀈐􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈐􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈈􀀑
23. 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈠􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀏
􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈛􀈦􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇶􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃
􀇷􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈏 􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈮􀈮􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈖, 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈦􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈤􀀑
􀀕􀀑 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐
24. 􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈮􀈑􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈚􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀌
􀈟􀈓􀈍􀈕􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈆􀈘􀈭􀈑􀀃􀇴􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈑􀈔􀈈􀈊 􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈭􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧
􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇨􀈕􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈭􀈑􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟 􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀀏 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈈􀈘􀈔􀈭􀈮, 􀈙􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈏􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀑􀀃
􀈈􀀌􀀃􀇪􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐􀀃􀈆􀈘􀈭􀈧􀀃􀇴􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈
25. 􀈇􀈒􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈧 􀈊􀈐􀈡􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓
􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈 􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀝􀀕􀀘􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈖-􀈙􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈐􀈞􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒 􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈤􀈖􀈝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇴􀀃􀇩􀇴-21 “􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌.” 􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈠􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈦􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈊
8
􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈐􀈞􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈮􀈝􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈖􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈝􀈊􀈈􀈓
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈌􀈭.7 1􀀓􀀃􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌 􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃
􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈓􀈭􀈒􀈛 􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈫􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈭􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈚􀈈􀈠􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃
􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈠􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒 􀈏􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛.8 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈞􀈍􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈓􀈭􀈒􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊, 􀈏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈘􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈕􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃
􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈈􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛, 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈌􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈕􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈏􀀃
􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈈􀀑􀀃
26. 􀇻􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈐􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈓􀈭􀈒􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊
􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈭􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈈.9 􀀕􀀓􀀃􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈙􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀃􀀋􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀃􀀙􀀓􀀗􀀛􀀔􀀙􀀌􀀏􀀃
􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀑􀀃􀀃􀈇􀈒􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈌􀈍􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈐􀈎􀈟􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀏􀀃
􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈞􀈍􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈆􀈘􀈭􀈦􀀃􀇴􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈛􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈟􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀃
􀈭􀈔􀂶􀈧􀈔 􀂳􀈆􀈙􀈚􀂴􀀃􀀋􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈞􀈍􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈈􀈫􀈔􀈖􀀃􀂳􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀂴􀀌.10
27. 􀇷􀈘􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈧􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈛
􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀙􀀓􀀗􀀛􀀔􀀙, 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈫􀈮􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈐 􀈏􀂶􀈧􀈙􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀀃
􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈈􀈉􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑 􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊 􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚”.11 􀇺􀈈􀈒􀀏􀀃􀈊􀀃
􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈦􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃“􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈑” 􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈖􀀃
7 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇹􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈹􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀛􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀔􀀙-􀈒􀀏􀀃􀇻􀈝􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇷􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈐􀈫􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈐􀈔􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈮􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈗􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇺􀇶􀇪􀀃􀂳􀇳􀈈􀈑􀈜􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈓􀂴 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙 􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛) (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀛􀀌;
􀇹􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈹􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀚/21828/16-􀈒􀀏􀀃􀇻􀈝􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇷􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈐􀈫􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈐􀈔􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈮􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈗􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇷􀈘􀇨􀇺􀀃􀂳􀇴􀇺􀇹􀂴 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀜).
8 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇹􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈹􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀛􀀕􀀔􀀔􀀒􀀔􀀙-􀈒􀀏􀀃􀇻􀈝􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇷􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈐􀈫􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃
􀈚􀈐􀈔􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈮􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈗􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇺􀇶􀇪􀀃􀂳􀇳􀈈􀈑􀈜􀈙􀈍􀈓􀈓􀂴 􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀃􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀕)􀀞􀀃􀀃􀇹􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈹􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀚/28210/16-􀈒􀀏􀀃􀇻􀈝􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈􀀃􀇷􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇲􀈐􀈫􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈐􀈔􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈮􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈗􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈊􀀃􀇷􀈘􀇨􀇺􀀃􀂳􀇴􀇺􀇹􀂴( 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀓 􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀖).
9 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇳􀈐􀈙􀈚􀀃􀇬􀈍􀈗􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈹 212/8-28412 􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇫􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈛􀈘􀈐􀀃
􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈘􀈗􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛) (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀗).
10 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇬􀈍􀈗􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈖-
􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀈙􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀇸􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇵􀈈􀈘􀈛􀈙􀈍􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈔􀀏􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀛􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈒􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈛􀀃􀀕􀀃
􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇬􀈍􀈗􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈭􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈤􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈙􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃(􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃
􀀗􀀖􀀓).
11 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑􀀃􀇳􀈐􀈙􀈚􀀃􀇬􀈍􀈗􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻 􀈹􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀕􀀒􀀛-􀀖􀀖􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀃􀈌􀈖􀀃􀇻􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀗􀀃􀈎􀈖􀈊􀈚􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛) (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀛􀀌􀀑
9
􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈈􀈉􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈚􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈉􀈍􀀃
􀈧􀈒􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚”.
28. 􀇵􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈏􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈛 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚􀈈” 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈈
􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈫􀀃􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈞􀈚􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸. 􀇵􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈌􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀏􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚” 􀈖􀀃􀀜􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈭􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃“􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈” 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃
􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈌􀈍􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈋􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛 􀈗􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈭􀈠􀈍􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈎􀀃􀈌􀈕􀈧. 􀇵􀈈􀀃
􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈮 􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈊 􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈤􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚􀈈” 􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈭􀀏􀀃􀈏􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈈􀀏
􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈭􀈊􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇾􀈍􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈌􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈕􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃
􀈔􀈭􀈎􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈔” 􀈚􀈈􀀃“􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈖􀈦” 􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀗􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀑􀀃 􀈇􀈒􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈗􀈓􀈐􀈊􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈞􀈭􀈫􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀏􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚” 􀈌􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈛􀀃“􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈞􀈭” 􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈚􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀏􀀃􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈭􀈠􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈮􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀏􀀃
􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈭􀈊􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈌􀈖 􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈋􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀑 􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈧􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈􀀃
􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈌􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈕􀈒􀈐􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚􀈈” 􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈫􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈭 􀈚􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀏􀀃
􀈧􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸.12 􀇺􀈈􀈒􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈖􀈔􀀏 􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈞􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈜􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈧􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀏􀀃
􀈡􀈖􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚” 􀈫􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈫􀀃􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈞􀈚􀈊􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸.
29. 􀇵􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝
􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈞􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎 􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚”
􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈌􀈭􀈧􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈭􀈊􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃“􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈑” 􀈚􀈈􀀃“􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈” 􀈌􀈓􀈧 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛
􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈤􀈖􀈝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇴􀀃􀇩􀇴-21 “􀇫􀈘􀈈􀈌.” 13 􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧 􀈖 􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃
􀀗􀀔􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃“􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈑” 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚􀈈”􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈑􀈕􀈧􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈕􀈦􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇿􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈏􀀃
􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀏􀀃􀈖􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀘􀀗􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈐 “􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈑” 􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚􀈛” 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊, 􀈡􀈖􀀃
􀈊􀈖􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈎􀈈􀈦􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧, 􀈭, 􀈛􀀃􀈏􀈊􀂶􀈧􀈏􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈐􀈔, 􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈛􀈚􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈋􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐, 􀈊􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈔􀈛􀈚􀈤􀀃􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀈕􀈤􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈓􀈈􀈔􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇪􀈐􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈏􀈊􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃“􀇶􀈗􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖” 􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈦􀀃
􀈊􀈐􀈠􀈒􀈖􀈦􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈫􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈈􀈌􀈘􀈍􀈙􀈖􀈦􀀝􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀀑􀀏􀀃
􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈘-􀈕􀀑􀀏􀀃􀈙􀈔􀈚􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈭􀈊􀈒􀈈.13
12 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈚-􀈌􀈐􀈙􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇹􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇫􀈛􀈙􀈈􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈓􀈍􀈑􀈚􀈍􀈕􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀃
􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀃
􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀗􀀃􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀕).
13 Ibid.
10
30. 􀇶􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈫􀈦􀀃􀈌􀈘􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈕􀈖􀈦􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚” 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈕􀀃􀈙􀈤􀈖􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈭􀀃“􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈍􀈙􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈝􀈓􀈈􀈔􀀃
􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈙􀈒􀈐􀈑 . . . .” 􀇶􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀘􀀗􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈛􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚”􀈈 􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃“􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀏”
􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈏􀈕􀈭􀈠􀈍􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃􀇨􀈕􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈭􀈑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊 􀀋􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃
􀈊􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀂳􀇯􀈈􀈝􀈈􀈘􀂴􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈞􀈭􀈫􀈮􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈐􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑 􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈛􀀃
“􀈆􀈙􀈚”􀈈􀀃􀂳􀈒􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈑􀀃‘􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈’ 􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈓􀈧􀈓􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈧􀀃􀂫􀀃􀈙􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈍􀀢􀂴􀀃􀀃􀈇􀈒􀀃
􀈏􀈋􀈈􀈌􀈛􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈈􀈘􀈈􀈋􀈘􀈈􀈜􀈭􀀃15􀀏􀀃􀈏􀈋􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖 􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈈, 􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈞􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈌􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈕􀈦􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀏􀀃
􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈖-􀈙􀈝􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈫􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒. 􀇷􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈛􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃
􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀃􀈊􀀃􀈞􀈍􀈑􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈚􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈐􀀃1 􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚 􀈛􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈧􀈔􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇬􀈖􀈕􀈍􀈞􀈤􀈒􀀏􀀃􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀀃
“􀇩􀈛􀈋􀈈􀈙.” 􀀔􀀖􀀃􀈙􀈭􀈟􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀀃􀈚􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃
􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈉􀈓􀈖􀈒􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀀃“􀇩􀈛􀈋􀈈􀈙.”
31. 􀇵􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈍􀈚􀈈􀈗􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭 􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚” 􀈧􀈒
􀈆􀈘􀈭􀈧􀀃􀇴􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈈 􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇵􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈈􀈚􀈒􀈛 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭 􀈊􀈐􀈧􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈞􀈭􀀃􀈙􀈖􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈭􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈑􀈙􀈉􀈛􀈒􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚􀈈,” 􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀀃
􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀀃􀈆􀈘􀈭􀈧􀀃􀇴􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈈􀈑􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈈􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀏􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈌􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀜􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃
􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧.14 􀇷􀈖􀈚􀈭􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭 􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈭􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈊􀂶􀈦􀀃􀈆􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈 􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈝􀀃
􀈭􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈈􀈑􀈚􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈧􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈏􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈛􀀑􀀃 􀇭􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈧􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈋􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈭􀀃􀈏􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃
􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚􀈈”􀀏􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃“􀈆􀈙􀈚” 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈆􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈫􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈭􀈫􀈦􀀃􀈭􀀃
􀈚􀈭􀈫􀈦􀀃􀈎􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈦.15
􀈉􀀌􀀃􀇪􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈐􀀃􀇨􀈕􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈭􀈧􀀃􀇶􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈈 􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈
32. 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭 􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈆􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊
􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈛􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀈉􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖 􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈐 􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀈈􀈊􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈛􀈙􀈈􀀃􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈧􀀃
􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈐􀀑􀀃􀀃􀈇􀈒􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈡􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈆􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈛􀀃􀈏􀀃􀂳􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀂴􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈙􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈐􀀏􀀃
􀈖􀀃􀀗􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈭􀀃􀀘􀀗􀀃􀈝􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈕􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈧􀈋􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈆􀀑􀇴􀀑􀀃􀈀􀈗􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃
14 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓 􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀇟􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇩􀈛􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀏􀀃􀇲􀈈􀈗􀈭􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀇹􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀘􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻
(􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈙􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀚).
15 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇪􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈈 􀈹􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀙􀀒􀀔􀀙-35􀀏􀀃􀇲􀈐􀈮􀈊􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖-􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈚 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃
􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀀃􀇴􀈭􀈕􀈭􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀘).
11
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀀃􀈟􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈈􀀃􀇬􀇵􀇸􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀀃􀂳􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈􀂴 􀂳􀈒􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈑􀀃􀂵􀇩􀈈􀈚􀈦􀈠􀈒􀈈􀂶 􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈓􀈧􀈓􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈧􀀃􀂫􀀃􀈙􀀃
􀇬􀈖􀈒􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈍􀈊􀈙􀈒􀈈􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀇪􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀈍􀀢􀂴
33. 􀇴􀈖􀈧􀀃􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈛􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈 􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈗􀈕􀈐􀈔 􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈖􀈔.16 􀇷􀈭􀈌􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙
􀈈􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈏􀈛 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈 􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈐􀈧􀈊􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈌􀈭􀀃
􀈙􀈗􀈭􀈓􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈟􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈔􀈖􀈉􀈭􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈕􀈈􀈦􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈛􀀃􀀎􀀚􀀏􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈧􀈊􀈓􀈧􀈫􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧 􀈔􀈭􀈎􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈔 􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈔 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇷􀈘􀈐􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊 􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈭􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈧􀈒􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈊􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶. 􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈓􀈈􀈝􀀃
􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈭􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈕􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈊􀀃􀈙􀈐􀈕􀈛􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈. 􀇾􀈍􀈑􀀃
􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘 􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀈧􀈒􀀃􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈘􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀃􀈭􀈏􀀃􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈈􀈑􀈚􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈖􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀈧􀈒
􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈤 “􀇨􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈍􀈦 􀇨􀈕􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈐􀈍􀈊􀈐􀈟􀈛 􀇹􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈛.”17 􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃
􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈠􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈌􀈎􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈓􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀈐 􀈉􀈛􀈓􀈖􀀃
􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊 􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈛􀀃􀇯􀈉􀈘􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀇹􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈝􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈛
􀇷􀈍􀈕􀈏􀈍􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈮􀀃􀈖􀈉􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈭􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈫􀀃􀈏􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈􀀑 􀇲􀈘􀈭􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈛 􀈙􀈗􀈭􀈊􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈕􀈈􀈏􀈐􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐􀀃􀈑􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀈉􀈈􀈚􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈭􀀃–
􀂳􀇨􀈕􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈐􀈑􀀃􀇨􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈟.” 􀇯􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈙􀈖􀈞􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈭􀀃“􀇶􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈒􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐” 􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈈 􀈌􀈘􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈕􀈛 􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈟􀈒􀈛 􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈜􀈭􀈒􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈
􀈜􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈘􀈈􀈜􀈭􀈮 􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀑􀀃􀀃
34. 􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭 􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈎 􀈏􀈕􀈧􀈓􀈐 􀈏􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈛􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈈􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈈􀈑􀈚􀈛
“􀇷􀈍􀈕􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈭􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔.” 􀇭􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀀃􀈗􀈭􀈌􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈌􀈐􀈊􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈙􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈈􀈑􀈚􀈛􀀃􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈈􀈔􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈧􀈒􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈑􀀏􀀃
􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈐􀈙􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈝􀈖􀈗􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈝.18 􀇲􀈘􀈭􀈔􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏􀀃􀈛􀀃􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈏􀀃􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈜􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈝
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈊􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈫, 􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈈􀈑􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈤􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈊􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀈊􀈛􀈓􀀑􀀃􀇹􀈖􀈊􀈫􀈚􀈙􀈒􀈈􀈧􀀑􀀃􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈭􀀃
􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈡􀈖􀀃􀈕􀈈􀀃􀈊􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈭􀈑􀀃􀈊􀈛􀈓􀈐􀈞􀈭􀀃􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈑􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈒􀈖􀈔􀈈􀈚 􀈊􀀃􀈔􀀑􀀃􀇷􀈍􀈕􀈏􀈈, 􀈌􀈍􀀃􀇨􀀑􀇶.
􀇹􀈭􀈕􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈖􀈊 􀈉􀈛􀈊􀀃􀈒􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈐􀀑
16 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈭􀈊􀀃􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈏􀈈􀀃􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈔􀈐􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈋􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈠􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈏􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀇬􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇯􀈦􀈏􀈍􀈦􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀔􀀃
􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃
􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀈓􀈦􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀙).
17 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈓􀀃􀈖􀈋􀈓􀈧􀈌􀈛􀀃􀇟􀈕􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈕􀈍􀈚􀀃􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈭􀈕􀈖􀈒􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀇬􀀑􀇪􀀑􀀃􀇯􀈦􀈏􀈍􀈦􀀏􀀃􀇷􀈭􀈌􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔􀀃􀈦􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈞􀈭􀈮􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃
􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈐􀈔􀀃􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈐􀈔􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀘􀀃􀈊􀈭􀈌􀈌􀈭􀈓􀈛􀀃􀀔􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈏􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈛􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇫􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃
􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈟􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀈛􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈓􀈭􀈕􀈕􀈧􀀃􀇹􀇩􀇻􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀜􀀃􀈓􀈦􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌 (􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀘).
18 􀇬􀈐􀈊􀀑 􀇪􀈐􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈒􀀃 􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈈􀀃 􀈹􀀃 􀀚􀀙􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀃 􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈙􀈤􀈒􀈐􀈑􀀃 􀈕􀈈􀈛􀈒􀈖􀈊􀈖-􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈭􀈌􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀃 􀈭􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈚􀀃 􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈞􀈭􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈮􀀃
􀈚􀈍􀈝􀈕􀈭􀈒􀈐􀀃􀈚􀈈􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈝􀀃􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈏􀀃􀇹􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈉􀈐􀀃􀈉􀈍􀈏􀈗􀈍􀈒􀈐􀀃􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈮􀈕􀈐􀀃􀀋􀈊􀈭􀈌􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀃􀈓􀈐􀈗􀈕􀈧􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃􀈘􀈖􀈒􀈛􀀌􀀃(􀇬􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈒􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀗􀀌􀀑
35. H IpHCHTIO, IIIO BHIIIOBHKJIaJIeHi CBiJIHeHHI C JIOCTOBipHHMH i TOHHMH Ta
IIOTOJKyIOC IIDeJICTaTH IIepeII CyJ(OM y pa3i HeO6xi/(HOCTi JULI HaJIaHHH JIOJLaTKOBHX
cBiJ(He5. MO CBiJUeHHH IYDTVIOTCH Ha MO~X OCO6HCTHX 3HaHHHX, HK OJIJ(OTO.
liJ(Cao y M. KHis, VKpaii 29 TpaBH 2018 p0Ky.
MHpOBH 31031
12

Annex 7
Witness Statement of Oleksii Oleksiyovych Bushnyi (5 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

1
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
STATEMENT OF OLEKSII OLEKSIYOVYCH BUSHNYI
1. My name is Oleksii Oleksiyovych Bushnyi. I am a citizen of Ukraine and a
senior investigator for special cases in the Investigative Division of the Third Branch of the
Main Department of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
2. The Investigative Division of the Third Branch of the Main Department of the
SSU in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts carries out pre-trial investigations of criminal
proceedings that are within the competence of the SSU.
3. I have been serving in the SSU since 2004. From 2004 to 2009 I was a
student at the Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University (Kharkiv, Ukraine). From 2009 to
2017 I served as an investigator of the investigative division of the SSU department in
Luhansk oblast. From 2017 until now I have been a senior investigator for special cases in
the Investigative Department at the Third Branch of the Main Department of the SSU in
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
4. My current position involves conducting pre-trial investigations in criminal
proceedings within the competence of the Security Service of Ukraine, including the
investigation of the commission of criminal offenses provided for in Article 258-5 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine “Financing of Terrorism”.
5. In this testimony, I describe:
1. Financing and bank transfers that were used by the Luhansk People’s
Republic (“LPR”);
2
2. Banking records and emails obtained by the SSU in connection with
intercepted digital email communications; and
3. Sources and methods used to intercept and observe the e-mails of the
LPR, as well as to confirm the authenticity of these emails.
6. I am aware of the facts set out in this testimony because I conducted the pretrial
investigation in the relevant criminal proceedings in connection with the commission of
a criminal offense provided for in Part 3 of Article 258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, i.e.
the financing of terrorism with particularly large amounts of money by a group of persons
who have entered into conspiracy .
Facts established in the course of the pre-trial investigation
7. A regulation “on the settlement and cash center of the LPR”, approved by a
decision of the Council of Ministers of the LPR (No. 02-04/21/14 dated 25 December 2014)1
established a cash center and banking system in the territory controlled by the LPR called
the “Settlement and Cash Center of the LPR.”
8. According to the order “On Renaming of the Settlement and Cash Center of
the LPR” (No. 02-05 /40/15 dated 24 March 2015),2 the “Settlement and Cash Center of the
LPR” was renamed the “State Bank of the LPR”.
9. The “International Bank of Settlements” is a bank registered in South Ossetia
(a territory occupied by the Russian Federation), that was created in 2015.3
1 This regulation has the features of a regulatory document, but according to the legislation of Ukraine
is null and void.
2 This order has the features of a regulatory document, but according to the legislation of Ukraine is
null and void.
3 Information About the Commercial Banks of RSO, NATIONAL BANK: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA (last
visited 2 May 2018) (Annex 596).
A.
3
10. This “International Bank of Settlements” created the “International
Humanitarian Projects Assistance Fund,” registered in Moscow, Russia. The fund was
created on 22 December 2015. The head of the “International Humanitarian Projects
Assistance Fund” (the “Fund”) is Trishyn Oleksandr Sergiyovych. Before 21 July 2017,
Volodymyr Pashkov, a Russian politician, was its deputy.4
11. The Fund opened an account with “VTB” bank, which is a major Russian bank
that is majority state-owned. “VTB” bank is registered by the Russian Federation, namely
the Federal Treasury of Russia. Through intelligence gathering and covert information
collection, I know that various anonymous donors deposit funds to this “VTB” bank account.
These funds are consolidated into the account of the Fund and then sent through the Central
Bank of the Russian Federation to the “International Bank of Settlements” in South Ossetia.
In particular, these funds are deposited in the “International Bank of Settlements” with the
account number 301018110100000000105. Then the funds are transferred directly to
accounts of the LPR.
Banking records, budgetary documents, and other evidence indicating
Russia's participation in financing of the LPR
12. The “International Bank of Settlements” is connected to separate accounts of
the “State Bank of the LPR.” These accounts are linked to the Minister of Finance of the
LPR. The Security Service of Ukraine has account records showing that the “International
Bank of Settlements” sent approximately seven billion Russian rubles (approximately 100
million Euro at the 2017 exchange rate) to the “State Bank of the LPR” during 2017.5
4 Charitable International Humanitarian Projects Assistance Fund, Rusprofile (22 December 2015)
(Annex 645); Historical Data for the Period 22.12.2015–05.31.2018, International Humanitarian
Projects Assistance Fund, Rusprofile (31 May 2018) (Annex 667).
5 Consolidated Banking Records of Transfer Between the Fund and the State Bank of the LPR (various
dates) (Annex 434).
B.
4
13. These funds were routed to the account of the Ministry of Finance of the LPR
No. 40807810860000000002, which was opened in the State Bank of the LPR6.
14. These banking records were recovered from intercepted emails exchanged
between the “Minister of Finance” of the so-called LPR, Evhenii Manuilov, and an
unidentified person with a Russian e-mail address.7 Additional records recovered from these
intercepted emails show that such funding has been continuing at this pace since 2015,
meaning that the Russian-registered fund created by a South Ossetian bank has funded the
LPR with tens of billions of Russian rubles.
Procedure for Obtaining Evidence in Covert Investigations
15. Activities of the SSU investigator are regulated by the Code of Criminal
Procedures of Ukraine. Therefore, all evidence obtained within a criminal investigation is
collected as a result of investigative actions carried out within the framework and in
accordance with the procedure provided for by the CCP of Ukraine.
16. In this case, I have collected a great volume of evidence consistent with the
procedures set forth in Chapter 21 of the CCP of Ukraine. The investigation is still ongoing.
17. To collect the evidence referenced in this statement, I and my colleagues first
identified the appropriate emails through identification of the email addresses used by the
LPR Minister of Finance. In order to observe the above-mentioned emails, I worked with a
prosecutor to petition a court for approval of the monitoring of the emails.. The court
reviewed my petition and gave me appropriate permission to carry out the covert
investigation that allowed me to obtain the evidence about which I speak here.
6 Consolidated Banking Records of Transfer Between the Fund and the State Bank of the LPR (various
dates) (Annex 434).
7 For example, I have provided a sample email communication between Evgeny Manuylov and
“[email protected]” in which the record for a transfer of “payments” of 12 October 2017 were
attached to the message. This email communic432ation was provided to the Court as Annex 432.
c.
5
18. I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to provide further testimony.
Signed in Severodonetsk, Lugansk region, on ______5 June_________, 2018.
By:______/signed/____________
Oleksii Oleksiyovych Bushnyi
ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ КОНВЕНЦІЇ ПРО БОРОТЬБУ З
ФІНАНСУВАННЯМ ТЕРОРИЗМУ ТА МІЖНАРОДНОЇ КОНВЕНЦІЇ ПРО
ЛІКВІДАЦІЮ ВСІХ ФОРМ РАСОВОЇ ДИСКРИМІНАЦІЇ
УКРАЇНА
проти
РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ФЕДЕРАЦІЇ
СВІДЧЕННЯ БУШНОГО ОЛЕКСІЯ ОЛЕКСІЙОВИЧА
1. Мене звати Бушний Олексій Олексійович. Я громадянин України та старший
слідчий в особливо важливих справах слідчого відділу третього управління Головного
управління Служби безпеки України (СБУ) в Донецькій та Луганській областях.
2. Слідчий відділ третього управління Головного управління СБУ в Донецькій та
Луганській областях здійснює досудове розслідування кримінальних проваджень,
віднесених до компетенції СБУ.
3. Я проходжу службу в СБУ з 2004 року. З 2004 до 2009 року я був курсантом
Національного юридичного університету імені Ярослава Мудрого (м. Харків, Україна). З
2009 до 2017 року я обіймав посаду слідчого слідчого відділу управління СБУ в Луганській
області. З 2017 року до теперішнього часу обіймаю посаду старшого слідчого в особливо
важливих справах слідчого відділу третього управління Головного управління СБУ в
Донецькій та Луганській областях.
4. Моя нинішня посада передбачає здійснення досудового розслідування
кримінальних проваджень, віднесених до компетенції СБУ, в тому числі розслідування
вчинення кримінальних правопорушень, передбачених статтею 258-5 Кримінального
кодексу України «Фінансування тероризму».
5. У цих свідченнях я описую:
a) Фінансування та банківські перекази, які використовувалися Луганською
Народною Республікою (ЛНР);
2
b) Виписки з банківських рахунків та електронні листи, отримані СБУ в
зв’язку з перехопленими цифровими електронними листами; та
c) Джерела і методи, які використовувалися для перехоплень та
спостереження за електронною кореспонденцією ЛНР, а також для
підтвердження достовірності цих електронних листів.
6. Мені відомо про факти, викладені у цих свідченнях, оскільки я здійснював
досудове розслідування у відповідному кримінальному провадженні за фактом вчинення
кримінального правопорушення, передбаченого ч. 3 ст. 258-5 Кримінального кодексу
України, тобто фінансування тероризму за попередньою змовою групою осіб в особливо
великому розмірі.
A. Факти, встановлені в рамках досудового розслідування
7. Положенням «Про Розрахунково-касовий центр ЛНР», затвердженим
постановою Ради міністрів ЛНР (№02-04/21/14 від 25 грудня 2014 року) 1 , на
підконтрольній ЛНР території створено готівковий центр та банківську систему під
назвою «Розрахунково-касовий центр ЛНР».
8. Згідно з розпорядженням «Про перейменування Розрахунково-касового центру
ЛНР» (№ 02-05/40/15 від 24 березня 2015 року)2 «Розрахунково-касовий центр ЛНР»
перейменовано в «Державний банк ЛНР».
9. «Міжнародний розрахунковий банк» зареєстрований в Південній Осетії
(територія, окупована Російською Федерацією) і був створений у 2015 році.3
10. Цей «Міжнародний розрахунковий банк» створив «Фонд підтримки
міжнародних гуманітарних проектів» (Фонд), який зареєстровано в Москві, Росія. Фонд
був створений 22 грудня 2015 року. Головою Фонду є Трішин Олександр Сергійович. До 21
липня 2017 року головою був Пашков Володимир Ігорович, російський політик.4
1 Положення має ознаки нормативно-правового документу, але згідно із законодавством України є нікчемним.
2 Положення має ознаки нормативно-правового документу, але згідно із законодавством України є нікчемним.
3 Інформація Національного банку Республіки Південна Осетія про комерційні банки Республіки Південна Осетія
(останній раз проглядалася 2 травня 2018 року) (Додаток 􀀘􀀜􀀙).
4 Благодійний фонд підтримки міжнародних гуманітарних проектів, Rusprofile (22 грудня 2015 року) (Додаток 􀀙􀀗􀀘􀀌;
Історичні дані про період з 22 грудня 2015 року до 31 травня 2018 року, Фонд підтримки міжнародних гуманітарних
проектів, Rusprofile (31 травня 2018 року) (Додаток 􀀙􀀙􀀚).
3
11. Фонд відкрив рахунок у банку «ВТБ», що є великим російським банком, і в
якому контрольний пакет акцій належить державі. Банк «ВТБ» зареєстрований
Російською Федерацією, а саме Федеральним казначейством Росії. Завдяки збору
розвідувальних даних та отриманню негласної інформації мені відомо, що різні анонімні
донори депонують кошти на цей рахунок у банку «ВТБ». Ці кошти консолідуються на
рахунку Фонду та відправляються через Центральний банк Російської Федерації до
«Міжнародного розрахункового банку» в Південній Осетії. Зокрема, ці кошти
депонуються у «Міжнародному розрахунковому банку» на рахунку
№301018110100000000105. Далі ці кошти перераховуються напряму на рахунки ЛНР.
B. Виписки з банківських рахунків, бюджетні документи та інші докази,
що вказують на участь Росії у фінансуванні ЛНР
12.«Міжнародний розрахунковий банк» пов’язаний з окремими рахунками
«Державного банку ЛНР». Ці рахунки пов’язані з Міністром фінансів ЛНР. СБУ має
виписки з рахунків, які показують, що протягом 2017 року «Міжнародний розрахунковий
банк» переказав приблизно 7 млрд. російських рублів (приблизно 100 млн. євро за
курсом 2017 року) «Державному банку ЛНР».5
13.Ці кошти направлялися на рахунок Міністерства фінансів ЛНР №
40807810860000000002, що був відкритий у «Державному банку ЛНР».6
14.Відповідні банківські виписки були виявлені у перехоплених електронних
листах між «Міністром фінансів» так званої «ЛНР» Євгеном Мануйловим та
невстановленою особою з російською електронною адресою. 7 Додаткові виписки,
виявлені у цих перехоплених електронних листах, показують, що таке фінансування
триває із вказаною регулярністю з 2015 року. Це означає, що створений Південною
Осетією та зареєстрований в Росії Фонд профінансував ЛНР на десятки мільярдів
російських рублів.
5 Консолідовані банківські виписки про перекази між Фондом та «Державним банком ЛНР» (з різними датами)
(Додаток􀀃􀀗􀀖 􀀗 􀀃).
6 Консолідовані банківські виписки про перекази між Фондом та «Державним банком ЛНР» (з різними датами)
(Додаток􀀃􀀗􀀖 􀀗 ).
7 Наприклад, я надав зразок електронного листування між Євгеном Мануйловим та «[email protected]», в якому у
додатку знаходилося підтвердження переказу «коштів» від 12 жовтня 2017 року. Це листування надано Суду у Додатку􀀃􀀗􀀖􀀕.
4
С. Порядок отримання доказів у рамках негласних слідчих дій
15.Діяльність слідчого СБУ регламентується чинним Кримінальним
процесуальним кодексом України. Тому всі докази, отримані в ході розслідування
кримінального провадження, були зібрані в результаті проведення слідчих дій,
здійснених в рамках та порядку, передбаченому Кримінальним процесуальним кодексом
України.
16.У цьому провадженні я зібрав велику кількість доказів у відповідності до
процедур, передбачених Главою 21 Кримінального процесуального кодексу України.
Слідство ще триває.
17. Щоб зібрати докази, вказані у цих свідченнях, я та мої колеги спочатку
встановили відповідні електронні листи через ідентифікацію електронних адрес, які
використовував Міністр фінансів ЛНР. З метою спостереження за зазначеними
електронними листами мною було винесено клопотання до суду, погоджене з прокурором.
Суд розглянув моє клопотання та надав відповідний дозвіл на проведення негласних
слідчих дій, що надало мені можливість зібрати докази, про які я розповідаю у цих
свідченнях.
18.Я присягаю, що вищевикладені свідчення є достовірними і точними, та
погоджуюсь постати перед Судом у разі необхідності для надання додаткових свідчень.
Підписано у м. Сєвєродонецьк Луганської області, “05” червня 2018 року.
________________________
Олексій БУШНИЙ

Annex 8
Witness Statement of Vadym Skibitskyi (5 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

1
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
WITNESS STATEMENT OF VADYM SKIBITSKYI
A. Introduction
1. My name is Vadym Skibitskyi. I am a national of Ukraine. I hold the position
of the First Deputy Head of the Directorate – Chief of Information and Analytical
Department of the Defense Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
2. The Directorate, together with other information and analytical units of the
Defense Intelligence, is responsible for intelligence and information activities, which include
the organization and conduct of intelligence, information, and analytical work to provide its
consumers with intelligence in the general system of military intelligence of Ukraine. In
particular, the information and analytical units of the Directorate process intelligence
information received from authorities collecting and managing the military intelligence for
the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Security Service of Ukraine, the Intelligence Department of the
Antiterrorist Operation (ATO) Headquarters. The analysis of intelligence information is
carried out by subdivisions of the Directorate for further production of documents and their
circulation among users of intelligence information. Every day, the Directorate receives
information from the authorities of intelligence, thus achieving continuity and
comprehensiveness of intelligence information.
3. As part of the intelligence gathering process, the Information and Analytical
Department examines each piece of intelligence, evaluates it, and relies on information that
can be verified, or which the Department finds reliable.
4. I have been the First Deputy Head of the Directorate – Chief of Information
and Analytical Department of the Defense Intelligence since June 2014. Throughout my
2
career in the Defense Intelligence since 2000, I held all the positions of the Information and
Analytical Department, from an officer of the Department to its chief. In my current
capacity, I, inter alia, receive, study, and analyze intelligence dispatches, intelligence
information reports, and other documents received by Ukrainian government authorities,
officials, or experts dealing with weapons supplied from the Russian Federation to the socalled
Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and other
armed groups in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.
5. In this statement I describe:
a. the overall processes, sources, and methods used to collect
information related to the supply of weapons to the DPR and LPR from Russia;
b. the volume of the weapons supply to the DPR and LPR from Russia;
c. certain episodes related to the attacks in Mariupol, Kramatorsk, and
near Volnovakha in 2015.
6. I am aware of the facts set out in this statement from the intelligence
information compilations of the Defense Intelligence, documents of the authorities
managing the military intelligence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and original reports of
the 1st Army Corps of DPR and 2nd Army Corps of LPR obtained by units of the Defense
Intelligence. In addition, as the First Deputy Head of the Directorate – Chief of the
Information and Analytical Department of the Defense Intelligence, I provide and receive
briefings of intelligence officers on missions in the area of ATO.
B. Process, Sources and Methods of the Collection of Intelligence
7. Since February 2014, intelligence work of the Defense Intelligence has
intensified significantly due to a sizable increase in the volume of intelligence, and the
expansion of the list of the priorities of military intelligence of Ukraine in light of the supply
of weapons into our country from Russia.
8. In particular, the Defense Intelligence is responsible for the preparation of
daily dispatches and intelligence information documents as part of the information and
analytical support of the higher government and military leadership of Ukraine for the
3
adoption of diplomatic and strategic military decisions. For such documents to be produced,
all available intelligence information in the Defense Intelligence is used together with
relevant information obtained through the interaction with other intelligence agencies and
government institutions of Ukraine.
9. This means that the Defense Intelligence, and my Department in particular,
receive both reports with military intelligence data from all collecting agencies as well as
reports from civil government authorities of Ukraine.
10. In 2014-2015, the Defense Intelligence focused its activities on monitoring
and responding to the challenges in eastern Ukraine. The main directions of such activities
were: expanding the capabilities of agent intelligence; ensuring capacity building for
technical intelligence, electronic interception, and monitoring of telecommunications;
creation of a modern aerospace intelligence system based on new technological solutions;
improvement of information and analytical activities and open source information
processing; and strengthening the coordination between the intelligence authorities of
Ukraine.
11. Intelligence reports with information about weapon supplies and other
support to the terrorist groups, are classified documents that cannot be disclosed without
damage to the sources of intelligence and risk to the lives of agents. Some examples of such
intelligence documents are able to be safely disclosed and are presented as annexes. These
documents are redacted or provided only as extracts of relevant portions for the safety and
security of their sources, and to limit disclosure to matters that are material to the case.
12. Intelligence data contained in these reports, as well as the methods used to
collect basic intelligence material, are extremely sensitive classified information protected by
the Government.
13. I can confirm that each intelligence dispatch, intelligence report, and
information document was produced at the time of a described event or within the shortest
possible time after such an event occurred. Intelligence dispatches and other intelligence
4
documents are produced by intelligence officers on duty and individual analysts with
experience in intelligence.
14. The reliability of the information in the intelligence compilations is ensured
through the verification of intelligence data by various sources, including by visual
observation on the ground (for example, see Annex 134 for the intelligence dispatch on the
development of the situation in the ATO area as of 8:00, 14 September 2016, which contains
information about the delivery of three railway platforms with MLRS BM-21 Grads to the
Khartsyzk railway station controlled by the DPR). Verification of such intelligence
information may be obtained either from an actual witness (i.e. an agent working for
Ukrainian intelligence, or a local resident) or through technical means of reconnaissance.
15. If information is received from local residents, who observed the crossing of
weapons through the Ukraine-Russia border, it is subsequently verified by agents or
technical means of intelligence, including geospatial intelligence and unmanned aerial
vehicles as well as documents obtained by operational units of the Defense Intelligence in the
territory controlled by the DPR and LPR. When the reliability of the intelligence information
is confirmed by several sources, it is included in an intelligence dispatch to the higher
leadership of Ukraine.
16. Based on intelligence information, specifically the details and circumstances
under which events are observed, officers of my department make use of our professional
skills and experience to determine the accuracy of a report.
C. The supply of weapons to DPR and LPR from Russia
17. Based on the available intelligence as well as my personal knowledge and
experience in the intelligence and information activities, the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation (RAF) have been supplying to the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine and
handing over weapons, military equipment, ammunition, and other assets to the terrorist
groups of DPR and LPR since June 2014.
18. To be more precise, since June 2014, RAF has transmitted to the illegal armed
groups in Donbas at least:
5
a. 208 multiple-launch rocket systems, including 122-mm MLRS BM-21
“Grad”, 220-mm MLRS 9P140 BM-27 “Uragan”, and 9K58 BM-30 “Smerch”;
b. 475 main battle tanks, including T-64B, T-64BV, T-72A, T-72B, T-
72B3, T-72M, T-80, T-90;
c. 750 artillery and mortar systems, including 203-mm SAU 2S7 “Pion”,
152-mm 2S5 SAU “Giatsynt-S”, 152-mm SAU 2S19 “Msta-S”, 152-mm howitzer 2A33
“Giatsynt-B”, 152-mm howitzer 2A65 “Msta-B”, 122-mm SAU 2S1 “Gvozdika”, 122-mm
howitzer D-30, 120-mm 2S9 “Nona-S”, 120-mm 2B16 “Nona-K”, 120-mm mortar PM-38,
120-mm mortar 2S12 “Sany”, 82-mm mortar 2B9 “Gall”, 82-mm mortar 2B14 “Podnos”, 82-
mm mortar 2B11 “Vasyliok”;
d. 400 surface-to-air missile systems, including surface-to-air missile
system 9K33 “Osa”, short range surface-to-air missile system “Strela-10”, medium range
surface-to-air missile system “Pantsyr-C1”, short range surface-to-air missile system “Tor-
M1”, man-portable air-defense systems 9P516 “Igla”, antiaircraft twin-barreled autocannon
ZU-23-2, and towed anti-aircraft gun ZPU-4;
e. 870 armored combat vehicles, usually equipped with medium
automatic guns, such as BMP-1, BMP-2, BMD-2, and large-caliber machine guns such as
BTR-70, BTR-80, BRDM, BRDM-2, MT -LB equipped with 14,5-mm or 12,7-mm machine
guns.
19. The consolidated data mentioned above have been received from various
sources, one of which is a report by a DPR officer using the name Colonel Oleg Ustinov, the
chief of the operative department of the Headquarters of the 1st Army Corps of DPR (an
extract from his daily presentation for higher command, which related documents show was
provided on 31 July 2015, can be found in Annex 133).
20. In addition, during the period from 2016 to March 2018, approximately
26,000 tons of ammunition were delivered from the Russian Federation to the Donetsk and
Lugansk oblasts, including ammunition for MLRS BM-21 “Grad” and BM-30 “Smerch”.
6
21. It is likely that even more weapons have been provided, as 408 kilometers of
the Ukrainian border with Russia have not been controlled by Ukraine for a long period of
time, and full monitoring of the supply of weapons is not available.
22. I can further confirm that the specific weapons and weapon systems
mentioned below have been recorded by our agents by technical means or captured by
Ukrainian troops from the armed groups in Donbas, including the terrorist organizations of
DPR and LPR, from 2015 to 2016:
a. Surface-to-air missile system “Strela-10”;
b. Surface-to-air missile system 9K33 “Osa”;
c. Electronic warfare system RB-531B “Infauna”;
d. Complex of radio control “Torn-MDM”;
e. Complex REBT-330 “Zhytel”;
f. Electronic warfare system “Leer-3”;
g. Automated radio interference type radio R-934BMV;
h. Complex RR “Svet-KU”;
i. Jet infantry flamethrower RPO-A “Shmel”;
j. Anti-personal mine MON -50 with detonators MD-5M.
23. On the basis of intelligence available to the Defense Intelligence, by 11
January 2015, the DPR had created and deployed the following military groupings:
􀕢 In north-west outskirt of Dokuchayevsk (Donetsk oblasts) – a tank company (11
tanks), two artillery (13 self-propelled guns) and rocket-artillery (6 units of 122
mm MLRS “Grad”) batteries with an overall composition of 200 people;
􀕢 Yasne (Donetsk region) – a unit consisting of four tanks, two self-propelled guns,
and two 122-mm MLRS “Grad”.
24. According to analysts’ estimates, the said strike groupings reinforced by
artillery could have been involved in fire strikes and raids in the direction of Dokuchayevsk-
Volnovakha.
7
25. This information was received from agents operating undercover in the DPR
forces. After verification of the information by employees of the Intelligence Department of
the ATO Headquarters using the methods described above, it was included in the daily
intelligence report of the Intelligence Department (as of 11 January 2015, 20:00), which was
subsequently sent electronically to my Directorate in Kyiv. A redacted extract of the
intelligence information compilation prepared by the Defense Intelligence is included at
Annex 84 (as of 09:00, 12 January 2015), which I received on 12 January 2015.
26. According to intelligence information, on 12 January 2015, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV) were used near the town of Volnovakha to collect intelligence information.
This intelligence information was verified and was included in the intelligence information
compilation of the Defense Intelligence (as of 09:00, 13 January 2015). The redacted extract
from this document, which I received on 13 January 2015, is included at Annex 86.
27. On 23-24 January 2015, our intelligence found that 40 units of the MRLS
“Grad” entered the territory of Ukraine through the village of Kuznetsy in the direction of
Novoazovsk (partly to Telmanovo through Guselshchykovo). After verifying this information
by intelligence officers, it was included in the intelligence information compilation of the
Defense Intelligence (as of 09.00, 25 January 2015), which I received on 25 January 2015. A
redacted extract of this document is included at Annex 93.
28. Based on the analysis of intelligence received from different sources,
including embedded agents, multiple launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch” were
periodically brought from the territory of Rostov oblast of the Russian Federation to the
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts at night time. After completion of their missions, the multiple
launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch” were returned back to Russia. One of the areas
where the multiple launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch” were waiting to enter Ukraine,
was an outskirt of the village of Kuibyshevo in Rostov oblast (RF), just 6 kilometers from the
Ukrainian-Russian state border.
29. The presence of the multiple launch-rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch” in that
area is confirmed by the satellite images of the area near Kuibyshevo of Rostov oblast,
8
Russian Federation. On the satellite images of this area dated 3 December 2014, there are
seven units of the multiple launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch,” and six transporterloader
vehicles for the multiple launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch”:
Above: Translation of the title of this image reads, “Area 4 km South-East of Kuibyshevo city
(Rostov region, RF) (North latitude = 47 ° 46'37.85'', Eastern longitude = 38 ° 58'39.53'', Image date:
03.12.2014).” The left-most object identified reads “TLV [transporter-loader vehicle] 9T234-2 for
MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58 "Smer􀁆􀁋􀀅􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇺􀇯􀇴􀀃􀀜􀇺􀀕􀀖􀀗-􀀕􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃
􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶] and the right-most object reads “MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58 "Smerch"
􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶].”
30. On the satellite images of 8 January 2015, there are seven units of the
multiple launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch” and seven transporter-loader vehicles for
multiple launch-rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch”:
Pao s 4au nisgeHO-OX.pie M. Ky6ueso (Po0crosc%a 06nac Pd)
(f. Al47443744CL.A 38$839.4r ice 0.1224 p0y)
' '
9
Above: Translation of the title of this document reads, “Area 4 km South-East of Kuibyshevo city
(Rostov region, RF) (North latitude = 47°46'37,85''; Eastern longitude = 38°58'39,53'', Image date:
08.01.2015).” The left-most object identified reads, “TLV [transporter-loader vehicle] 9T234-2 for
􀀰􀀯􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀾􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁀􀀃􀀜􀀮􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀂶􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇺􀇯􀇴􀀃􀀜􀇺􀀕􀀖􀀗-􀀕􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃
‘􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶􀁀􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗-most object identified reads, M”LRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58
􀂵􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀂶􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶􀁀􀀑􀂴
31. On the satellite images of 17 February 2015, there are 3 units of multiple
launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch” and 5 transporter-loader vehicles for multiple
launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch”:
Pao s 4 au nisgeMo-ope M. Ky6wueso (Pocrosca obnac.PO)
(f. All47443744Or.A989.4Arie 01210y ----,en,,-.------:
10
Above: Translation of the title of this image reads, “Area 4 km South-East of Kuibyshevo city
(Rostov region, RF) (North latitude = 47°46'37.25''; Eastern longitude = 38°58'39.53'', Image date:
17.02.2015).” The left-most object identified reads, “TLV [transporter-loader vehicle] 9T234-2 for
􀀰􀀯􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀾􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁀􀀃􀀜􀀮􀀘􀀛􀀃􀀅􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀅􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇺􀇯􀇴􀀃􀀜􀇺􀀕􀀖􀀗-􀀕􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃
‘􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟’].” The right-most object identified reads, “MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58
􀀅􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀅􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶].”
Above: Translation of the title of this document reads, “Area 4 km South-East of Kuibyshevo city
(Rostov region, RF) (North latitude = 47°46'42,85''; Eastern longitude = 38°58'43,32'', Image date:
17.02.2015).” The left-most object identified reads, “TLV [transporter-loader vehicle] 9T234-2 for
MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58 ‘Smerch􀂶􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇺􀇯􀇴􀀃􀀜􀇺􀀕􀀖􀀗-􀀕􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃
􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶􀁀􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗-most object identified reads, M”LRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58
􀂵􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀂶􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶􀁀􀀑􀂴
Pao 4a mis/MO-Cue • Kywbues (Poro8ca 06nan P)
(he440eA4$re14014
Pao g4a mis,geHo-Cue M. Ky6ueso (Poerosca o5nae. P)
11
32. On the satellite images of 20 February 2015, there are 2 units of the multiple
launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch” and 5 transporter-loader vehicles for multiple
launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch”:
12
Above: Translation of the title of this image reads, “Area 4 km South-East of Kuibyshevo city
(Rostov region, RF) (North latitude = 47°46'37.25''; Eastern longitude = 38°58'39.53'', Image date:
20.02.2015).” The left-most object identified reads, “TLV [transporter-loader vehicle] 9T234-2 for
MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58 "Smerch" 􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇺􀇯􀇴􀀃􀀜􀇺􀀕􀀖􀀗-􀀕􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃
‘􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟’].” The right-most object identified reads, “MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58
􀀅􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀅􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶].”
Above: Translation of the title of this document reads, “Area 4 km South-East of Kuibyshevo city
(Rostov region, RF) (North latitude = 47°46'42,85''; Eastern longitude = 38°58'43,32'', Image date:
20.02.2015).” The left-most object identified reads, “TLV [transporter-loader vehicle] 9T234-2 for
MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 􀀜􀀮􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀂶􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇺􀇯􀇴􀀃􀀜􀇺􀀕􀀖􀀗-􀀕􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃
􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶􀁀􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗-most object identified reads, M”LRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58
􀂵􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀂶􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶􀁀􀀑􀂴
Pas4uneasewo-cup •Kyues (Poer0sci 5nac. Pb
Paws4mu nisew-igwiue u.Kues (Pero8ca o6nae Pb)
fl +44A+$.. 2042014%
13
33. On the satellite images of 22 February 2015, there are 8 units of the multiple
launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch” and 6 transporter-loader vehicles for multiple
launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch”:
14
Above: Translation of the title of this image reads, “Area 4 km South-East of Kuibyshevo city
(Rostov region, RF) (North latitude = 47°46'37.25''; Eastern longitude = 38°58'39.53'', Image date:
22.02.2015).” The left-most object identified reads, “TLV [transporter-loader vehicle] 9T234-2 for
MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58 "Smerch" 􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇺􀇯􀇴􀀃􀀜􀇺􀀕􀀖􀀗-􀀕􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃
‘􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟’].” The right-most object identified reads, “MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58
􀀅􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀅􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶].”
Above: Translation of the title of this document reads, “Area 4 km South-East of Kuibyshevo city
(Rostov region, RF) (North latitude = 47°46'42,85''; Eastern longitude = 38°58'43,32'', Image date:
22.02.2015).” The left-most object identified reads, “TLV [transporter-loader vehicle] 9T234-2 for
MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] 􀀜􀀮􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀂶􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇺􀇯􀇴􀀃􀀜􀇺􀀕􀀖􀀗-􀀕􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃
􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶􀁀􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗-most object identified reads, M”LRS [multiple launch rocket system] 9K58
􀂵􀀶􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀂶􀀃􀀾􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀝􀀃􀇸􀇹􀇯􀇪􀀃􀀃􀀜􀇲􀀘􀀛􀀃􀂵􀇹􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈟􀂶􀁀􀀑􀂴
Pao e 4 mis.eo-cxgiue , Kyes (Poer08c8aka 05nact, P)
Pa a 4au mis,pewwo-cxipiue u. Kywuues0 (P0coca o6nac. Pb)
ft 44440is94Ar %.e22022044 py
15
34. Furthermore, given information from different sources, including undercover
agents, we know that on 20 December 2014, 6 units of multiple launch rocket systems BM-
30 “Smerch” were brought into Ukraine. This intelligence information was included to the
intelligence information compilation of the Defense Intelligence (as of 9:00, 2 January
2015). A redacted extract from that document is attached to this statement at Annex 182).
35. Based on information received from an officer of the Intelligence Department
of the ATO Headquarters, who currently works for the Defense Intelligence, in January-
February 2015, the permanent presence of a significant number of multiple launch rocket
systems BM-30 “Smerch” in the rear of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts of Ukraine (the
territory controlled by the DPR and LPR behind the line of engagement) was confirmed. In
addition, on 9 February 2015, a discharge of ammunition for multiple launch rocket systems
BM-30 “Smerch” was noted at railway station “Ilovaisk”. Part of the ammunition was
dispatched to the city of Donetsk on the same day.
36. On 10 February 2015, at about 13;00, this intelligence officer personally
received information by telephone from an undercover agent about the passage of 4 units of
multiple launch rocket systems BM-30 “Smerch” on the road through Makiyivka to
Debaltseve.
37. On 11 February 2015, the Intelligence Department of the Antiterrorist
Operation received information that 4 units of multiple launch rocket systems “Smerch” with
empty launchers were taken out from Gorlivka to Makiivka and subsequently to Harzyzsk.
38. According to intelligence information, there were unmanned aerial vehicles
on 10 February 2015 in the city of Kramatorsk for collection of intelligence information. In
addition, intelligence aircrafts Su-24MR (at 10:15-11:25, 10 February 2015) and IL-20 (at
12:00-16:25, 10 February 2015) of the RAF performed reconnaissance of objects on the
territory of Ukraine, including in the area of Kramatorsk. Information about the activities of
the UAVs in the area of Kramatorsk and intelligence aircrafts of the RAF came to my
Department from units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, after its verification and
preprocessing, was included in the intelligence informational compilation of the Defense
16
Intelligence (as of 09:00, 11 February 2015), which I received on 11 February 2015. A
redacted extract of this document is attached to this statement at Annex 95.
39. Under my leadership and supervision, my Department has summarized the
intelligence information on the cases of weapons supply and support from the Russian
Federation to the terrorist groups operating in Lugansk and Donetsk regions that occurred in
2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. This summary is attached herewith as an Annexes 74, 155, and
175. It contains specific dates, supply methods, supply sites, list of units supplied. The
summary was compiled by information and analytical units of the Defense Intelligence using
original intelligence reports, on the basis of which the spreadsheet was prepared. This
description also includes the information contained in daily intelligence information
compilations of the Defense Intelligence during the specified period. This testimony is
accompanied by redacted extracts of intelligence information compilations of the Defense
Intelligence containing information on transfer of weapons and military equipment from
Russia to Ukraine, as mentioned above.
40. I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to provide further testimony.
Signed in Kyiv on 5 June 2018.
By: [Signature]
Vadym Skibitskyi
3ACTOCYBAHHI MIKHAPOJIHOY KOHBEHIII IIPO OPOTEY 3
<IHAHCYBAHHIM TEPOP33MY TA MIKHAPOJIHO] KOHBEHIIi IIPO
JIKBIJIAIIIO BCIX OPM PACOBO] JIMICKPMIHAIIi
KPA~HA
npomu
POCICKO] EJIEPAIi
CBIJUHEHHH BAIMMA CKIIHIKOTO
A. Bryn
1. Mee 3BaTH Ba(HM Ci6i1Ki. I TpOMaUHMH VKpain. O6iiMao noca/(y
nepmoro 3acryKa /pexropa peapraMery -- Haan1Ka ibopMariO-aaiToro
yIIpaBJ1in FOnoBHOTO yIIpaBJIiHHH DO3Bi/KH MiicTrepCTBa O60po YKpa~H.
2. JlenapraMer pa3oM 3 iM inpopMaio-aarirr mi/po3/tin1aM
TonoHorO yIpaiHH po3Bi/KH (ai - "TyP") 3(icoe po3ingyBann»no-ipopMarijy
piHieT, Ka BKoa€ opraHi3a1io i Be(en B 3araHii ccreMi BocHHOi DO3BiJUKH
yKpain po3i/(yBa1Hoi, inpopMai~oi Ta aaiTHof po6OTH IUIH HaJIaHHH
po3Bi/yBannoi inpopMai jj cnoxBaa. 3oKpeMa, iupopMaiio-ananirni mi/po3in
enapraMeTy 3Jic1OT» 06po6Ky po3Bi/(yBanoi inbopMai, xa apxoprrs Bit oprai
JI106yBaHHH, opraiB yIIpaB1in BiicK0BO10 DO3Bi/(KO0 36p0Hx CHI YKpai, C1yx6
6e3neKM VKpai, po3Biz(yam»noro Bi/uiry urra6y ATTepopHeTHHoi onepaii (ATO).
lip(po3pin zenapraMery 3iicooT, aaIi3 po3Bi/yam»Hof indopMaii put nopanmoi
IIiJUOToBKH IIoKyMeTiB Ta ix poBeeHH Io cnoKHBai po3BiyBaIoi inbopMamii.
IlopeHo Ha aztpecy zenapraMery Hauxopr indopMarin Biz yeix OpraiB po3Bi(K, M
IIOCHTa€Tc 6e3nepepBHicT po3i/UK Ta oHoTa po3i/1yBa.Hoi inpopMarji.
3. y paMax 36opy po3Bi/yBanrHHX IaHHX, indopMaiino-ananirne
ynpamin BHBa€ KoKHy JeTaI po3Bi/yBaIHoi ipopMaii, omioe muo indopMamiio Ta
CIHpa€TOH Ha 0Ka3H, Ki MOKyT 6yr iJ(Tep/UKeHi a60 HKi yIIpaBJIiH BBaKa€
JIOCTOBipHHMH.
2
4. H o6ii~Mao IOCaJy IIepIoro 3aCTyIHKa /IHpeKTOpa IIeIapTaMeHTy
Haanrnxa inbopMarino-ananirnoro ypaBis TVP 3 epBH 2014 poKy. 3a nepiopt
Mo€i po60TH TVP 3 2000 poKy I epe6ya Ha Bcix nocaptax inpopManino-aaiToro
yparimnn, noao 3 odinepa Biputiny no oro Kepimxa. Ha eBoi renepimii nocapti,
CepeJt iHI1Oro, OTpHMyIO, BMBaIO Ta aHa13yIO DO3Bi/IyBaJI»Hi JIOHCCCHHH, DO3Bi/IyBaJI5HOipopMaIii
IOKyMeHTH Ta iHIIi JI0KyMeHTH, OTDHMaHi yKDaiHCKHMH JICDKaBHHMH
yeTaHo0BaMH, I10CaJ(0BMH 0co6aMM, a6o eenepTaMH, Ito 3aMaore TaHHMH 36poi, HKa
nocTaa€Te 3 PociicKoi depepaii no Tax 3BaMx JIoHeIUKOi Hapooi Pecny6ix (JIHP)
Ta JlyracKoi Hapooi Peeny6nix (JIHP), a TaKOK ix o36pOCHHX TDyIIyBaH B
lone»Ki~ Ta Jlyrancsii o6acTHx.
5. yIMX CBiJIeHHHX H OIIHCyIO:
a) 3arami npottec, IUKepeJIa Ta MeTOJIM, HKi BHKODHCTOBVIOTCH JU1H 360py
inpopMa~, no'3anoi 3 I1OCTaaM 36poi J10 JIHP Ta JIHP 3 Pocii.
b) O6Cr IOCTaa 36poi J10 JIHP Ta JIHP 3 Pocii.
c) oKpeMi emi3op, no'3ai 3 HaIaJIaM Ha MapiyIon», KpaMaTopCK Ta 1106J1H3y
BooBax y 2015 po1i.
6. Mei BipoMi paKTr, BHKaJeHi y IboMy Bi/ueHHi, 3 DO3Bi/(yBa1HOinpopMaui~
x 3Bee FyP, pt0KyMeTi opraHi yIpaBi BiicK0BO10 DO3Bi/UK10 3C
VKpain, opriani 6oiox IIoKyMeHTi 1 apMiiCKOrO KOpIyCy JIHP Ta 2 apMic5Oro
KopnyCy JIHP, Ki 6y1 oTpHMai nip(po3inaM TyP. KpiM Toro, Ha nocapi nepm1oro
3acryIIHHKa IUHpeKTopa IeapTaMeHTy Haan»Ka ipopMaiio-aaiToro
yIpa1ins TyP s pooppKy Ta 3a01yXoByIo 6ppir obi1tepiB po3Bi/UK, Ki BHKOHyIOT»
3aBJ(aHHH B paoi IpOBeJ(es ATO.
B. IHponec, mepen1a Ta Mero 360py po3Bi/yBanMx JIax
7. IIOMHaO 3 JI0TOTO 2014 p0Ky, po3BiyBa1Ha po60Ta TyP 3Ha9HO
IIOCHJIHJIaCH, III0 6yJIO I1OB'H3a1H0 i3 3HaHHM 36imeM o6eris po3Bi/yBannoi
3
inpopMarji, po3IIpeM nepeIiKy IpiopTeTx 3aBIaH5 Bo€Hi po3Biyui VKpa y
3B'3Ky 3 nocTaaHM 0 Ham1Oi Kpa 36poi3 Pd.
8. TyP, 3oKpeMa, Bi/uIoBiae 3a mi/roTOKy IIoeHHHX IoHeceH Ta
po3Bi(yBaro-ipopMaix IoKyMeHTiB B paMKax inpopMario-aaiToro
3a6e3nee Oro JIepKaBHoro Ta Bi~cKOBOrO KepiBHHITBa VKpaiH, III Ip~HTTH 3 ix
yDaxyBaM pimes /HIoMaTHHoro Ta cTpareriHoro BicKooro xapaKTeDy. JI1H
Ii/rOTOBKH TaKHX JIOKyMOHTiB BHKODHCTOByETCH BC HaHBHa po3BiIyBaJIHa iHbopMari B
TyP, a TaKoK inopMai, orpMana no niij B3a€Moii 3 iIM po3Bi/(yBaHM OpraHaM
Ta JI€DKaBHHMH yCTaHOBaMH YKpaiHH.
9. Ile o3aa€, mo TyP, BoaoH Moe yIIpaIiHHH, oTpMy€ ponoi/Ii 3
po3Bi/(yarm1HM 7aMH BicKooro xapaTepy Bi/t ycix mi/po3iJi J(06yBa, a TaKOK
3BiTH BiJI yCiX IHBiJIHHX OpraHiB BJIaJ(M YKpaM.
10. y 2014-2015 poKax [yP en1pMyBan1O coo Ii»iCT Ha pO3BHTOK
po3Bi(yBamHHX cIpOMOKHOcTe 3 MeTOo COCTepeKeHH Ta pearyBaHHH Ha Io(ii Ha cxop
VKpaiHH. OCHOBHHMH HaIIDHMKaMM TaKOi J(iIHOCTi CTaIH: DO3IIIHDeHHI CIpOMOKHOcTe
areTrypHoi po3Bi/UK; 3a6e3nee DO3BHTKy CIIpOMOKHOCTe TexHiHOi po3Bi/(KH,
enIeKTpOHHOTO epexoneHH i MoHiTOpHTy TeIeKOMyHiKaIiH; cTBOpeHH cyacHO CHCTeMH
aepoKoeMinoi po3Bi/K Ha OCHOBi HOBHX TeXHOJIOTiHHX DiIIeHE; VJIOCKOHaJIOHHH
inbopMari~no-aarirnoi pimnocri, o6po6x Bi/KpTHX IUKepen1 inpopMari; IOCJ1ens
Koop/Ha po3Bi(yBarHx opraHi VKpain Ta ix B3a€Mop(i Mix co6010.
11. PosiygyBai 3BiTM, IO MiCTHT ibopMario Ipo IOCTaa 36poi Ta imy
IIiJITDHMKy TODODHCTHHMM TDVIIaM, € JI0KyMOHTaMH 3 O6MOKeHHM JIOCTyIIOM, HKi He MOKyTE»
6yTH po3rOOIeHi 6e3 IIIKOJIM JUIH IUKepOJI DO3BiJ(KM Ta DH3HKy JUIH KHTTH areHTiB. [lei
3pa3KH DO3Bi(yBaIHHX IIOKyMeHTiB MOKyT 6yT po3KpHTi 6e3 oHoi mIKoIIH Ta
IpecTaeHi y KocTi po1aTKi Io Hx cBigeH. Hi poxyMeHTH Bi/pearoaHi a6o
HaJIa10TCH JIHIIIe BHTITH, BHXOJUHHH 3 MipKyBaH5 6e3IIeKH JUKepeJI, a TaKOK 3 MeTOIO
06MeKeHHH DO3KDHTTH baKTiB, IKi € CyTTCBHMH /UIH CIpaBH.
􀀒􀀔􀀕
12.
4
Po3Bi/UyBaIHi JIaHi, Ki BHKJIaJIeHi B IIHX 3BiTaX, HK MeTOJIH, III0
BHKODHCTOBVIOTCI IUIH 360py 6a3oBoro po3Bi/(yBaHoo MaTepiany, € Ha/(3Baio
yr1Boo Ta ox0poHoBaHoo JIepKaBoo ceKpeTHOo iOpMaI[i€Io.
13. I MOKy IIiJITBeDJIHTH, IIIO KOKHe po3i/1yBa1He JI0HeCeHH, po3Bi/(yBa»Hi
3Bir Ta inbopMaii JoyMeT 6y1H po3po61eHi Ha MOMeT omMcyBaHoi noJij a60 B
Haopor ac mien iei op~i. Po3Bi/yBari /toeceHH Ta ii po3Biz1yBani
JOKyMeHT TOTyOTeH eprOBHM 3MiHaMH obi1epiB po3Bi(H, OKpCMHMH aHaJIiTHKaMH, Ki
Ma1OT Io€Bi/I po3Bi/IyBaIHOi po60TM.
14. JlocroBipicr, indopMami y po3Biz(yBax 3BiTax 3a6e3neyETCH
IIepeBipKOIO pO3BiJIyBaJIHHX JIaHHX 3 Di3HHX JUKODO.JI, BKJIOaIOH Bi3yaIHe CIIOCTODOKeHHH
Ha MicIi (Hap1at, I1H. JIoIaTOK - po3Bi/yBaJIHe JI0HeCeHHH IIIOJIO DO3BHTKy
cHTyaIij B ATO cTaHOM Ha 8:00 14 BepeCHH 2016 pOKy, HKe MiCTHT iHpOpMa1Ii1o I1po 11ocTaBKy
Tpox 3a1i3HHHx IaTbOpM i3 PC3B BM-21 Fpazt no 3ani3noi cram~ M. XapI3pK, 11IO
KOHTDOJIOCT JIHP). HirrepypKeHH TaKo po3Biz(yBanoi inpopMam~j Moe 6yTH
OTDHMaHO BiJI aKTHHHOTO CBiJIKa (HaIIDHKIaJI, aTeHTa, HKHf IIDaIUIOE Ha yKpaiHCKy DO3Bi/Ky
a6o MiceBoTO KHTe) a6o 3a 0110Moro0 TeXHiHMX 3a006iB pO3BiJ(KM.
15. y Ba/IKy oTpHMaHH iHpopMaii Bi/t MiceBHx KHTeIiB, Ki cnIOCTepiTaJIH
3a IIepeTHHaHHHM 36poi epes yKpaincKo-pociicKi KOpIIOH, LUI idOpMaIi TaKox B
IIOJIaJIIIIOMy IICDeBiDHCTCH aTeHTaM a60 3a IOI1OMOTOIO TOXHiHHX 3a06i pO3Bi/(KH,
BKJoao reopocTOpoBy po3Bi/Ky, 6e3ninori irani anapaT, a TaKOK JI0KyMeHTH,
3/106yTi oneparnM i/po3pinaM TyP a TepHTOpii, KOHTpOJIoBaii JIHP Ta JIHP. y
BHaJKy Ii/(Tep/pKeHHH IOcToBipHocTi inpopMarji, Ito Ii/TBepIUKy€TECH I(Ki1KOMa
ppKepen1aMH, po3Bi/IyBa1Hi paHi BKoaOTeI JI0 po3Bi/yBaHoro 0HeceHHI Ha a1pecy
BHIIIOTO JICDKaBHOTO KepiBHHIITBa VKpa~.
16. Ha mipcrasi po3ipryBanmoi inpopa~i - 3oKpeMa, Haax peTane Ta
06CTaBHH, 3a KHX cnocTepiraoTe oJi - opirtep Moro penapraMery, BHXoUHH 3i cBoix
Ipobecix aBox Ta /I0cBi/(y, BH3HaaT /OCTOBipHicT /IonoBi/Ii.
5
C. Iocraan a6poi a Poci JI0 JIHP Ta JIHP
17. BHxopu 3 HaBHoi po3Bi/(yBamHOi inpopMamii, Moix oco6crx 3HaH Ta
pt0cBiy po3Biz(yBa1no-inpopauiinoi zinoeri, 36poii cH PocijcKoi depepaii
(3CP) nocraaor Ha TepHTopio JlyrancKoi Ta [loner»xoi o6nacrei VKpa i a/ta1oT y
po3IIOpJKeHHH TODODHCTHHHM yTDyIIOBaHHHM IHP Ta JIHP o36poeH, Bi~coy TeXHiKy,
6ocpnac Ta imi MaTepia1 3 epB 2014 p0Ky.
18. BiII KOHKDOTHO, 3 epBHM 2014 pOKy 3CP Iepe/(an 36poM rpyuaM
Ha /on6aci monaMeme:
a. 208 paKeTHHX cHcTeM 3a1I1OBOTO BOT'HIO, TaKHX HK PC3B
122-MM EM-21 "Tpat", 220-MM PC3B 9II140 "Ypara", Ta 9K58 EM-30 "CMep";
b. 475 OCHOBHHX 60i0BMX TaHKiB, TaKHX HK T-645, T-645B,
T-72A, T-725, T-7253, T-72M, T-80, T-90;
c. 750 aprnepiCKIx Ta MiHOMeTHHX CHCTeM, TaKHX
2C7 "Ilion", 152-MM 2C5 CAY ~Tian(r-C", 152-MM CAY
152-MM ray61UH 2A33 ~TiaIr-", 152-MM ray6HI1H
122-MM CAY 2CI "TB03/10Ka", 122-MM ray6I1 II-30,
2A65 "Mera-E",
120-MM 2C9
K 203-MM CAY
2C19 "Mera-C",
"Hoa-C", 120-MM 2516 "Hoa-K, 120-MM MiHoMeT IIM-38, 120-MM MiHOMeT 2C12 "Can",
82-MM MiHOMeT 259 "Tar", 82-MM MiHOMeT 2B14 "TIoJ(Hoc", 82-MM MiHOMeT 2511
"BacHJ1OR";
d. 40o ccTeM pOTHoBiTpHHOi o60ponH "3en-oiTpH", CepeIt HMX:
3PK 9K33 Oca, 3PK "Crpena-10, 3PIK "Ila11Mp-C1", 3PK
3PK "Top-MI", II3PK 91516 "Ira", 3¥-23-2, 3I1¥-4;
e. 870 600BHX 6pOHOBaHHX MaIIIHH, 3a3BHa OCHaIIICHHX aBTOMaTHHHMH
rapMaraw cepepumoro Kai6py, TaKHX K BMII-1, BMII-2, BM/I-2, Ta KyJIeMeTaMH BOJIHKOTO
Kan1i6py, TaKHx »R BTP-70, BTP-80, BPJIM, BPJIM-2, MT-JIB, ocantei 14,5 MM a60 12,7 MM
KVJIOMeTaMM.
􀀒􀀔􀀔
6
19. Bute3a3aeHi KoHcoIiJoBaHi /aHi 6y1H oTpHMaHi 3 Di3HHx IUKepe1, OJUHHM i3
KHX € 3BiT opirepa IHP, SK BMKODHCTOBy€ iM' OJIKOBHHK OJ1eT VCTinHoB, HaaJIHHK
oneparHoro ypaiHH Ta6y 1 apMiicKOTO KOpIIyCy JIHP (BwTHT is ioro no/eHoi
JIOIIOBi/Ii JUI1 BHIIIOTO KOMaHJIVBaHHH, HKa 3Ti(HO 3 IIOB'3aHHMH JI0KyMeHTaMM 6y.1a
Ii/OTOBJIeHa 31 JIHIIH 2015 DO0Ky, MOKHa 3Ha~TH y /loIaTKy ).
20. KpiM Toro, y nepio/1 3 2016 pOKy IO 6epe3e5 2018 p0Ky 6JIM3KO 26000 TOH
6ocnpHnaci 6yo nocTaBIeHO 3 PocijcKoi be/eparii po Jloeroi Ta JlyracKoi o61acre,
y TOMy OJ1i 60CIpHIaCH JU1 PC3B BM-21 «Tpapp» Ta BM-30 «CMep».
21. HMoipno 6yo noTaIeHo Ha6araTo 6ime 36poi, OcKiK 408 KM
JIepKaBHOTO KODIIOHy He KOHTpOIOCTcH yKpain~KOO cTOpOHO0 TpHBai ae i nos
MOHiTODHHT IIOCTaBOK 36pOi HeMOKJIMBO 3J(icHTH.
22. H MOKy JIOIaTKOBO IIiJITBeDIHTH, IIIO BKa3aHa HHKHe KOHKDOTHa 36p0I H
ccTeM o36po€H 6yIM 3apixcoai HamM areraM 3a ponoMoroo TeXHiHHX 3aco6iB
a6o 3axoneHi yKpaiCKMH BiCKaMH y 36pOx yTpyIyBa Ha /lo6aci, BKJIIOaIOH
repoperi oprai3a~ /IHP Ta JIHP, y nepio/1 3 2015 110 2016 pix:
a. 3PK «Crpen1a-10»;
b. 3PK 9K33 «0ca»;
c. KoMIIeK& PEE PE-5315 «Hupaya»;
d. KoMIIIeKC paJ(ioKOTpOJ1IO «Top-MJIM»;
e. KOMIIIeKC PEE P-330 «KTeJ1»;
f. Kom1eRc PEE «Jleep-3»;
£. ABTOMaTH3oaHa cTaHi paionepemmo Try P-9345MB;
h. KoMInteKc PP «CBeT-KY»;
i. PeaxrBHi nixorHi BorHeMeTH PIO-A «IMeJ1»;
j. IIpornixora Mina MOH-50 3 3aaaM MII-5M.
􀀙􀀕
􀀙􀀗􀀏
7
23. Ha OCHoBi po3Bi/(yBax Jax, HaHBHMX y [VP, cTaHOM Ha 11 Ci 2015
DOKy JIHP erBopHa Ta po3ropHya HacTyHi O36pO€Hi yrpyIyBa:
Ha miBino-3axipi oxomi /loyaeBcKa (/loner(Ka o61.) -TaHKoa poTa (11
TaKiB), 7ui aprwepiici (CAY -- 13 071.) Ta pearHBHo-apTH1epic»Ka (122-MM
PC3B «TpaJp» - 6 01.) 6arapei aarannoo cennicro no 200 0ci6;
Cene Hcne (lone1Ka 061.) - 1i/(po3in y CKIaJ(i OTHpLOX TaHKiB, JIOX CAY Ta
118OX 122-MM PC3B «Tpa/1».
24. 3a oixaM aarirxiB, 3a3aei yyIapi yrpynoBa, nocHeHi
aprwepieo, Mor 3ayaTe Jo HaHeceHH BOrHeX yJIapi Ta IpoBeeHH pep(oBX J(iii
Ha HaIIpHMKy JIOKya€BCK-BonH0Baxa.
25. LU ibopMarin 6yra orpHMaHa Bi/t areriB, iHTerpoBax II0 CI JIHP. Hie
nepeip inpopMaii eniBpo6iTHMKaMH BiJUIiIy DO3Bi/IKM IITTa6y ATO i BHKOpMCTaHHHM
BI[eoIcaHX MeTOIiB, 3a3aeHa ibOpMaIi 6yIa BKJIOHeHa y II[OJIOHHHi JI0KyMeHT
po3Bi(yBanHoro BiUIJy (CTa1OM Ha 20:00 11 Ci 2015 pOKy), KMi y IIOJaIIIIOMy 6y
Hapiena eneKrponHM 3aco6aM /Io Moro IIeapTaMeHTy B KMei. JIoO Ix CBi/Ie
o/a€Tc pearoBaHHi BHTHT po3Bi/yBa1HO-ipopMatiOro 3BeIICHHI TyP, Ki
MiCTTECH y lOJIaTKy
2015 p0Ky.
(CTaHOM Ha 09:00 12 Ci 2015 poKy), KHi 0TpHMaB 12 Ci
26. 3rim1o 3 po3i/(yBar»Hoo ibopMa1i€1o 12 Ci 2o15 poKy 6e3ninori
Jiranti anapar (BIIJI) BKOpHcTOByBaIHeH pa~oi ce1a Bo0Baxa JU1 360py
po3BipgyBannoi inbopMaii. 3a3aea po3izqyBarna ipopManin 6ya nepeipea ra
BKoeHa /IO po3Bi/yBa1Ho-indopMattioro 3BeJIeHHH T'VP (@TaHOM Ha 09:00 13 0in 2015
poKy). PearOBai BHTHT 3 I»OTO IIOKyMeHTy, KH OTpHMaB 13 Ci 2015 pOKy,
3HaxOIHTCH y JI[OJ1aTKy
27. 23-24 Ci 2015 pOKy HaIIa DO3BiJIKa BM3HaHJIa, IIO 40 OJ1HHHI[, PC3B
«Tpapt» 3aim a Tepropio VKpain epe3 Ky3HeIi y HaIpMKy HOBOa3OBCKa (aCTK0BO
Ha TenMaoe epe3 IyCeJIM1moo). lie nepeipx ici inpopManii cniBpo6iTKaMH
􀀚􀀔􀀏
8
po3Bi1yBa1HHX opraHiB, BoHa 6y1a BKoeHa /Io po3Bi/1yBa1Ho-iHpopMai~Oro 3BeeHHH
T'VP (cranOM Ha 09:00 25 Ci 2015 DOKy), HKe 0TpHMaB 25 Ci 2015 poKy. Pearoai
BHTHT II5OTO JIOKyMeHTa MiCTHTCH B ]IOJaTKy
28. 3riqo 3 aanti3oM po3BipyBannoi inpopMaii, orpManoi 3 pi3x ppepe1, y
TOMy He1i i Bipt irerpoax areri, 3 TepHTOpij PocroBcKoi o61acTi PocicKoi Peneparii
Ha oKynoBaHi TepTopi y JloHeKii Ta Jlyrancii o6naCTx YKpa y TeMHy II0Dy J106M
IIeDpiOJ(HO 3ax0JUJIH DeaKTHBHi CHCTOMH 3aJIIIOBOTO BOTHO BM-30 «CMep». lien
BHKoHa eoix 3aB/a 3a3Haei PCB BM-30 «CMep» noepTa Ha3a/1 JI0 Pocii.
OI1HM 3 paois, zte 3a3Haeni PC3B BM-30 «CMep» OiKyBa cBOrO 3ax0/1y J10 YKpain
6yIH OKOJIHIIi HaCeJIeHOrO IyHKTy Kyi6meo y PocrocKii o6nacTi (Pb), Io 3a
6 Kin1oMeTpiB BiJI yKpaiHCKO-pociCKOTO JICDKaBHOTO KOD/IOHy.
29. Ilepe6yBas PC3B BM-30 «CMep» y 3a3aenoMy paioi IiJTBepJUKy€TeH
cyyTHHKoBHMH 3HiKaMH paoy no6Hay Kyi6eBo PocrocKoi o6acTi Pocicoi
eeparii. 3 TDyJIH 2014 DOKy Ha CyIIyTHHKOBx 3HiMKax y IOMy paoi 3o6paxeno ci
OJ(HHHI( PC3B BM-30 «CMep» Ta IIiCT TDaHCIIODTHO-3apJUKa10HX MaIIIHH J10 PC3B BM30
«CMep»
Pao s 4 mspewo-cupwrue Kyueso (Poroscra o6nac Pd)
( l +44431144 Cu $4$41%.4) o 0122014 p
Pa~o e 4 M nieoeuuo-cxiouiue • Ky~6uueeo (Pocmoaca o6nacm, Pb) (IIu.III.=4746'37.85"; Cx.JI. =38"°
58'39.53", ama a~oux 03.12.2014). Ha nieou ieumufixoaaouy o6'e xmi ancao T3M 9T234-2 0a PC33B
9K58 «CMepw», a ua npaeouy ioeumfixoeauouy o6'exmi uanucao PC33B 9K58 «CMepo»
9
30. Ha cyIyTHHKOBOMy 3HiMKy Bi1 8 ci 2015 pOKy -ciM OJI1 PC3B BM-30
«CMep» Ta ciM TpaHCIOpTHO-3apJUKaOx MaI /0 PC3B BM-30 «CMep»:
Pao s 4 mispewo-cxpHiue vrm""c n M. Ky6ueso (Pocrosca o6nacn.Pb) wr au 121pr
Pa~ou e 4 M niseuuo-cxiwiue u. Ky~6uueeo (Pocmoacxa o6nacm, Pd) (IIu. III.= 4746'37.85';'Cx. JI. =38°
58'39.53", ama a~ouxu o8.01.2015). Ha nisoa ioeumuixoeawouy o6'exmi anucao T3M 9T234-2 0an PC33B
958 «CMepv», a a npaeoy ieumfixoeaouy o6'exmi anucao PC3B 958 «Cuepv»
31. Ha CyIyTKOBHX 3HiMKax Bi/( 17 J1OTOTO 2015 DOKy TDH OJIHHMIi PC3B BM30
«CMep» Ta IL'HT» TDaHCIIODTHO-3apJUKaOMX MaIIIHH J10 PC33B EM-30 «CMep»:
Pao s 4 niegewo-cxpHiue M. Kyi6ueso (Pocrosca o6nacn. Pd)
(fw. , +474437 Cr. A4439.6, Ar we 17.42 2014 py
10
Pa~ou a 4 nieoeuuo-cxiouiue • Ky~6uueeo (Pocmoaca o6nacm, Pd) (IIu. III.=4746'37.25"; Cx.
JI. =38 ° 58'39.53", ama a~ouau 17.02.2015). Ha aisoMy ieumupixoaauoMy o6'exmi uanucao T3M 9T234-2
0an PC3B 958 «CMepvw», a a npaoouy ieumufixoeauouy o6'eami anucato PC3B 9K58 «CMepo»
Pai s 4 a niagewo-cgwe M. Kyiueso (Pocro8ca 06nac. Pd)
(f lg 44442C.A 3842 AT ..e 1792201% pry)
Pa~ou e 4 M nie~euo-cxiouiue u. Ky~6uueso (Pocmosca o6nacm, Pb) (Thu. III= 4746'42.85";
Cx. JI. =38 ° 58'43.32", 0ama a~0Mxu 17.02.2015). Ha aisouy ieumfixoeauouy o6'exmi ancao T3M 9T234-2
0a PC3B 958 «CMepv», a a npaeoy ieumufixosauoMy o6'emi anucao PC3B 9K58 «CMepv»
32. Ha cyIyTHHKOBHX 3iOMKaX Bi 2O JI0TOTO 2015 D0Ky -IIi OJIIHHIi PC3B BM30
«CMep» Ta I'T TDaHCIIODTHO-3apJUKaIOHX MaIIIHH J10 PC3B BM-30 «CMep»:
Pao s 4 a nispeHo-cxge M. Ky6ueso (ocro8ca o6nacn. Pd)
r"""""""oAwwsr.woe au
11
Pa~o e 4 M nieeuuo-cxiouiue t. Ky~6uueso (Pocmoscxa o6naem, Pb) (Thu. III.= 4746'37.25";
Cx JI.=38 ° 58'39.53", ama s~ouxu 2o.02.2015). Ha nisouy ieumfixoeauouy o6'exmi uanucauo T33M 9T234-2
0a PC3B 958 «CMepv», a ua npaeouy ieumfixoeauoy o6'emi uanucauo PC3B 9K58 «CMepv»
Pao s 4 a mus,peHo-cxipiue 4, Kvi6ueso (Pocrosca o6nacn Pd
(f Ail. 4744424$. Cr.A +4$41.l. Ar • 0.022914 pry
Pa~ou e 4 M ni@euo-cxiouiue t. Ky~6uueeo (Pocmoecxa o6nacm, Pb)
(II. III.=4746'42.85"; Cx.II. =38 ° 58'43.32", ama a~o0at 20.02.2015).
Ha aieouy ieumfixoeauouy o6'emi ancato T3M 9T234-2 0an PC3B 958 «CMepv», a ua npaeouy
ieumupixoeauouy o6'emi uanueao PC3B 9K58 «CMepw»
33. Ha CyIyTHHKOBHX 3HiMKaX Bi/ 22 JI0TOTO 2015 poKy -BiCiM OJI, PC3B
EM-30 «CMep» Ta miCT TDaHCIIODTHO-3apJUKaOHX MaIIHH J10 PC3B BM-30 «CMep»:
Pao s 4 as mispew+o-cxipiue ». Kyifueso (Pocrosca o6nacn. Pd)
f q ·448372$C.A 649,Am roe. 2.2 201 pry
􀀒􀀙􀀓􀀏
12
Pa~ou e 4 M nisoeuuo-cxiouiue t. Ky~6uueso (Poemoecxa o6acm, Pb) (Thu.III.= 4746'37.25"; Cx,JI. =38 "°
58'39.53", ~ama a~oMxu 22.02.2015). Ha nisouy ieumufixoaawoay o6' exmi uanucao T33M 9T234-2 0a PC3B
9K58 «CMepw», a ua npaeouy ieumudixoeauouy o6'exmi ancao PC33B 9K58 «CMepw»
Pao s 4 mepeo-cxgue 1. Ky6uueso (Pocroacsa o6nac. Pd)
(f lit 47464244 CA 441.A2. ah or. 22 02201 p0y
Ha 3opaceui: nepexnao ass «Pa~ou e 4 KM nieoeuuo-cxiouiue • Ky~6uureeo (Poem08cKa
o6naem, Pd) (Ihu.III.=4746'42.85"; Cx,JI.=38 ° 58'43.32", 0ama a~00x 22.02.2015). Ha nisouy
ioeumfixoeaouy o6'exmi anucao T3M 9T234-2 0an PC3B 9K58 «CMepv», a a npaeouy ieumufixoeauoMy
o6'emi anucauo PC3B 9K58 «CMepv»
34. Kpix Toro, BHxoJH 3 inpopMarji, orpManoi 3 pi3x zpKepen, y ToMy eIi
i iJ iTerpoBax areriB, MH 3Ha€MO, II0 20 1Dy/IHH 2014 DOKy 6 OJ1HHHI, PC3B BM-30
«CMep» 6y 3aBe3ei J10 VKpai. Ba3aea po3ipyBarna inbopMain 6ya JnoeHa
Io po3BipqyBan»no-idopMaiOro 3BeIeHIHI TVP (cTa0M Ha 09:00 02 Ci 2015 p0Ky).
PeparoBami BTHI 3 LI»Oro JI0KyMeHTy /Ioa€Te /Io X ci/1eH y /Io/1aTKy
35. Birosipuro po inpopMarji, xa 6ya oTpHMaHa Bi/ op1Oro 3 opirepis Bipuiny
po3Bi/K Ta6y ATTepopcTHHoi onepaii, Ki apa3i nparoe B TonoHoMy ypaiHi
po3Bi(M, y cii-oroMy 2015 poKy mi/Tep/UKeHo oTiie nepe6yBa 3aoi KimKocTi
PC3B BM-30 «CMep» y TH1y OKynoaHHx TepHTOpi loner»oi Ta JlyrancKoi o6acTei
Vpain (TepTopi, Ka KOHTDOJIOCTC JIHP Ta JIHP 3a ii€o 3iTKHeHH»). KpiM Tor0, 9
JoTOTO 2015 poKy Ha 3a1i3ii craii «InoacK» 3aiKCOBaHo DO3BaTaKeH
6ocnpHaciB /10 PC3B BM-30 «CMep», acrHa 3 KHx y To Ke pe 6y1a Ham1paBIeHa /IO
MicTa /[OHeII»K.
􀀚􀀖􀀏
􀀘􀀕􀀍􀀁􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀍􀀁􀀒􀀖􀀘􀀏
13
36. 10 J10TOTO 2015 DOKy 61H3Ko 13:00 e opinep oco6cro no Ten1ebony
oTpMaB ibopMartio BiJ( iTerpoBaHOro areTa Ipo IpOxOJUKe I1O /10p03i, IIIO IIDHMy€
epe3 MaK~~BKy y HaIpMKy JIe6a1IeBO 4 0/UHHHI( PC3B EM-30 «CMep».
37. 11 JOT0TO 2015 poKy Bi/in1OM po3Bi/(KM AHTHTepopcTHoi onepaii 6y1o
oTpHMaHo inpopMaio npo Bi/I 3 Miera Fop1iBKa JI0 Mai~BK, a y IIOJIaJIIIIOMy JI0
XapI3CKa 4 OJ1HHMIL, PC33B "CMep 3 1IOpOKHiMH IIyCKOBHMM HaIIpaBJLHIO HMM.
38. 3rig1o 3 po3Bi/(yam»Hoo inpopMaico, 6e3ninorHi irami anapaT
BHKODHCTOByBaJIHCH 10 JIOTOTO 2015 poKy B MicTi KpaMaTopCK JU11 36opy po3Bi/yBa1Hoi
inpopMarji. KpiM Toro, po3Bi/Ky o6'eTi Ha TepTOpii VKpain, y ToMy HeIi paioni
KpaMaropcKa, Ben1H JIiTaKH-DO3Bi/IHHKH Cy-24MP (10:15-11:25 10 J10TOTO 2015 poKy) Ta In20
(12:00-16:25 10 JIOTOTO 2015 p0Ky) 3CP. IHpopMaria npo pinier BILJIA paoi
KpaMaropcsKa Ta iraxis-po3Bi/(min 3CP atiina po Moro JenapTaMeTy Bi/1 mi/(po3/(iri
36pox CHI VKpain ra mien nepeipx i nonepezqmoi o6po6x 6ya BKnoeHa II0
po3Biz(ya.no-inbopMarioro 3BeJ(eHH T'VP (cTaHOM Ha 09:00 11 JI0TOTO 2015 p0Ky), Ke
1 0TpHMaB 11 J10TOTO 2015 DOKy. /lo I(IX CBiJ(eH JIO/Ia€TBCH De/(aTOBaHH BHTHT 1DOTO
IoKyMeHTa, HKHi MicTTOH y J[OJ1aTKy
39. IHiJ MOiM KepiBHHIITBOM Ta HaTJIHJ(OM MOC yIIDaBIiHHH y3aTaIHHJI1O
po3Bi/(yBary indopMaIi1o 1po BHIIaJIKH IIOCTaHaHHH 36pOf Ta IiJTpHMKM 3 60Ky PocicKoi
beptepaii pu Tepopernx rpyn, to or y JlyrancsKii ra J[one»ii o6nacrx, Ki
Man Mice y 2014, 2015, 2016 Ta 2017 poKax. Ilei or Iopa y [lopa1ax
O1IMC MiCTHT 3a3HaeHHH KOHKpeTHHX 2IaT, MeTOiB ocTaaHHH, Mic IOcTaaHHH, epeJiK
IIOCTaBJICHHX OJIMHHII. VaaraIHeHH 6y1o mi/rOTOBeHo idopMaio-aaiTHHMH
Ii/(po3JnaM [VP 3 BHKODHCTaHHHM ODHTiHaIHHX po3Bi/IyBaIHHX p0HeceH, Ha ocHoBi
KX cKaeHo Ta61HIuo. ]Io aoro omcy yBimra raKo inpopMaui, to Mier1ac B
J(060BMx po3Bi1yBa1Ho-inopMaix 3BeteHHx [yP 3a Ka3a nepio/. ]lo 1Xx
ci/(eH JI0/a0Te peparoBai BHTHH po3Bi/yBa1Ho-idopMauiix 3Bee TyP, si
MicrT» ipopMario npo nocraKM 36poi Ta Bi~cKOBOTO O6JIaJIHaHH 3 Poeij B VKpaiy, HK
3a3HaeHO BHIIIe.
14
40. H IpHCHTaIO, IIIO BHIIIeBHKJIaJIeHi CBi(eHHH € JI0CTOBipHHM i TOHMH, Ta
IIOTOJUKyC IIOCTaTH IIepeJI CyJ1OM y pa3i eO6xi/IOCTi HaJ(a J(OJ(aTKOBHX CBiJ(HeH.
me.st%.l.a- en#us 2018 p0Ky
Ba(IM 'KIILI6KHH
Annex 9
Witness Statement of Eliot Higgins (5 June 2018)

1
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
________________________________________________________
WITNESS STATEMENT OF ELIOT HIGGINS
________________________________________________________
1. My name is Eliot Higgins. I am a national of the United Kingdom. I am the
founder of Bellingcat, an investigative collective.
2. I lead investigations that rely upon, and verify and authenticate, “open-source”
information – for example, social media posts, satellite imagery, photographs, and videos.
My methodologies are described below. I have done extensive research using these
methodologies on the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine, and my
organization Bellingcat has published several reports summarizing the findings of this
investigation.
3. In particular, I have tracked the transport of the Buk missile launcher in
Ukraine around the time of the MH17 attack, tracked the transport of the Buk missile
launcher in Russia around the time of the MH17 attack, and identified the Buk across images
and videos in both Ukraine and Russia. Our findings about the launch site of the missile that
struck Flight MH17 and the route of the Buk missile launcher through Ukraine were
corroborated by a presentation made in September 2016 by the Dutch-led MH17 Joint
Investigation Team (“JIT”). Our findings about the route of the Buk missile launcher through
2
Russia and its connection to a military were corroborated by the JIT presentation made in
May 2018.
4. To understand Bellingcat’s findings, one must understand our methodologies.
I. METHODOLOGIES
5. 􀀰􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀯅􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁑-source, publicly-
􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀯅􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
with other analytical methods recognized by the International Criminal Court and national
courts around the world.1
6. A core methodology for verifying and relying on materials in open-source
investigations is geolocation. Geolocation involves using visual elements in photographs or
videos to find the precise location where they were captured, thereby verifying the location
claimed by the person sharing the photo or video online (or determining the location in the
first instance, if none is given online). Geolocation involves comparing the image to be
geolocated to reference images, which can include satellite imagery, other photographs and
videos of the same area that have already been geolocated, imagery from sources such as
Google Street View,2 and other available sources.
7. Images are often filled with specific visual elements that enable geolocation,
even if upon first glance, the image seems impossible to place. As such, it is important to pay
1 See, e.g., Keith Hiatt, Open Source Evidence on Trial, 125 Yale L.J. 323 (2016),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/open-source-evidence-on-trial (Annex 496); Els De
Busser, Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations, Groningen J.I.L. 2(2) (2014),
https://grojil.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/grojil_vol2-issue2_de-busser.pdf (Annex 494).
2 Google Street View is a technology featured in Google Maps and Google Earth that
provides panoramic views from positions along many streets in the world. To collect its
images, Google drives around and photograph the locations. To match each image to its
geographic location on the map, Google combines signals from sensors on the driving car
that measure GPS, speed, and direction. This enables it to reconstruct the car’s exact route,
and even tilt and realign images as needed. To avoid gaps in the 360-degree photos, adjacent
cameras take slightly overlapping pictures, and then Google “stiches” the photos together into
a single 360-degree image.
3
close attention to all landmarks in a particular image, whether they look unique to the
location or not.
8. If the individual or organization posting an image on social media does not
identify where the image was taken, then there are other methods of investigation that can be
used. Crowdsourcing can be used to ask the public for help identifying objects or locations in
the image, that can then be verified using other open source material. Due to the open source
nature of our work, and the evidence we use, any claims made by an individual who
participates in any crowdsourcing campaign can be reviewed and verified.
II. INVESTIGATION OF MH17 SHOOT-DOWN
9. A couple of days after the launch of the Bellingcat website, funded by a
crowdfunding campaign on the website Kickstarter, reports of an aircraft being shot down
over eastern Ukraine began to emerge on social media and shortly afterwards national and
international media. It was soon established that MH17 had been shot down over Ukraine. In
the aftermath of the shoot-down, photographs and videos were posted on social media sites
claiming to show various aspects of the incident, including videos claiming to show the
moment of the aircraft being shot down, missile launchers inside Ukraine and Russia which
were alleged to have been linked to the shooting down, statements from locals about what
they saw, and other details.
10. In this initial phase, much of the focus was on verifying images of a Buk
missile launcher photographed and filmed in Ukraine, reportedly on July 17th 2014.
11. In addition to the images of the Buk missile launcher, social media posts
discussing the movements of the missile launcher were also discovered, allowing a more
complete and accurate timeline of the missile launcher’s movements to be established.
4
12. In the months and years following the events of July 17th 2014 additional
images of the missile launchers travelling through eastern Ukraine were published, along
with additional data that further confirmed the movements of the missile launcher.
13. Bellingcat has spent the last 4 years continuing its MH17 investigation,
establishing that the Buk missile launcher came from the 53rd Air Defence Brigade,3 that the
specific Buk missile launcher used was number 332 from the 53rd Air Defence Brigade,4 the
identities of individuals on phone intercepts published by the JIT,5 and other information.
III. TRANSPORT OF THE BUK THROUGH UKRAINE IN JULY 2014
14. The following section details the route of the missile launcher through eastern
Ukraine on July 17th 2014, as per Bellingcat’s analysis of open source evidence, each part of
which I have personally examined and verified. The section is presented in the order in which
events occurred as the missile launcher travelled through eastern Ukraine on July 17th 2014.
15. On October 19th 2017, the Joint Investigation Team published a photograph of
a Buk missile launcher loaded onto a back of a low-loader, describing it as follows: “Recently
the JIT has received a new photograph of a BUK-TELAR. This picture was probably taken
on July 17, 2014 in the town of Makeevka, Ukraine. The JIT presumes that the picture
3 Daniel Romein, 􀀰􀀫􀀔􀀚􀀃􀣓􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade, BELL¿NGCAT (23 February 2016), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/
2016/02/23/53rd-report-en/ (Annex 451).
4 Bellingcat Investigation Team, The Lost Digit: Buk 3x2, BELL¿NGCAT (3 May 2016),
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2016/05/03/the_lost_digit/
(Annex 452).
5 Bellingcat Investigation Team, Russian Colonel General Identified as Key MH17 Figure,
BELL¿NGCAT (8 December 2017), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/
2017/12/08/russian-colonel-general-delfin/ (Annex 459); Daniel Romein, Identifying
Khmuryi, the Major General Linked to the Downing of MH17, BELL¿NGCAT (15 February
2017), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/02/15/identifying-khmuryi-themajor-
general-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/ (Annex 456).
5
contains the BUK-TELAR which is responsible for downing flight MH17.”6 The image is
shown below.
16. The Bellingcat Investigation Team was able to estimate the location based on
its understanding of the route of the missile launcher established in prior research. During this
earlier research a social media post made on the morning of July 17th 2014 at around 10:40am
describing a convoy passing through the town of Donetsk with a Buk missile launcher was
discovered.7 The original post was made on the social media site VKontakte (also know as
6 Landelijk Parket, JIT Requests for Information About Photograph BUK-Telar, OPENBAAR
MINISTERIE (19 October 2017), https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103187/jitrequests-
for/ (Annex 457).
7 􀈾􀉨􀉧􀉟􀉰􀉤􀀃- 􀉷􀉬􀉨􀀃􀉍􀉤􀉪􀉚􀉢􀉧􀉚􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁙􀁎􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁚􀁄􀁏􀁏-
67445695_68330?w=wall-67445695_68330_r68332 (Annex 618).
6
VK or VK.com), and is reproduced below (note, the default time zone for Vkontakte used to
display the message below is two hours different from local time in Ukraine):
17. The above text is translated as follows:
“Bad news. Around 9am, a hauler was going along the Makeevka highway
from Makeevka in the direction of Donetsk. On the platform was a BukM1-
M2? This AAMS proceeded to the intersection with Shakhtostroiteley
Boulevard. The system was accompanied by a convoy that was composed of 1
gray Rav4 SUV, a camouflaged UAZ, and a dark blue Hyundai van with
tinted windows. As of 9:15am, the vehicle was located at the intersection of
Shakhtostroiteley and Ilycha. The militants got out of their cars, blocking 2 of
the far left lanes. Obviously, they were waiting for logistical guidance.”
18. Based on this description, and a comparison between the location visible in the
photograph and Google Street View imagery of the location described above, Bellingcat
deduced there was a likelihood the social media post from the morning of July 17th 2014
described the scene visible in the photograph. Bellingcat reached out to local contacts in
Ukraine, who visited the site, and took photographs of the area. At the same time, other
individuals, including journalists, went to the same area and took their own photographs,
providing a selection of photographs of the area from multiple sources.
[oHeuK - 3To /KpaMHa!
Jul 17, 2014 at 8:40 am
+ Follow
[InOXMe HOBOCTM.
B paMoe 9 uacos M3 MaxeeBKM B cTOpOHy [loHeuKa no MaKeeBcKoMy Locce
npocneposan Tara Ha nnaTbopMe KOTOporO 6In yCTaHOBneH 3PK EyKM1-M2?
/Ka3aHHan 3PK npocnepoBana po nepeceen c 6ynbBapoM LLlaxrocTpoMrenei. Ee
con1poBoKpan KOHBOM B cocTaBe, 1 napKeTHMK ceporo uBeTa Rav4, KOMybnMpOBaHHBI
aBTOMO6Mn6 YA3 M MMKpOaBTO6yC XOHaM CMHerO LBeTa C TOHMpOBKOM. [l0 c0CT0HMO
Ha 9-15 0Mn1eKC HaXO[Mnc Ha nepeceeHMM LLlaxTocTporeneM Ana. DoeBMK
1OBBIXO[MM M3 a8TOMO6MneM 3aHB TaKMM 06pa30M 2 KpaMHMX neBBX 1On1OCBl
[8MKeHM. OeBM[Ho, 0KpanM [abHeMLMX OrMCTMeCKMX yKa3aHMM.
7
19. The below comparison of a rock with a distinctive pattern next to a tree,
showing the same landmarks where the Buk was seen, was done by Bellingcat:8
Left, photograph published by the Joint Investigation Team; right, photograph of the
same location taken by locals
20. Other comparisons were done by journalists who acquired their own images of
the location:9
8 Bellingcat Investigation Team, New MH17 Photograph Geolocated to Donetsk,
BELL¿NGCAT (20 October 2017), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/
2017/10/20/new-mh17-photograph-geolocated-donetsk/
(Annex 458).
9 Rudy Bouma, Twitter (20 October 2017),
https://twitter.com/rudybouma/status/921387895772078080
(Annex 655).
8
Left column, images of the Buk; right column, images taken by journalists of the same
location.
21. The probability of there being two different locations with a rock with
identical wear patterns in the same position in relation to a tree, next to a road with the same
features is extremely low, and even less probable when one considers that the identification
of one of those locations is based on the specific description posted on a social media
platform on the morning of July 17th 2014 describing the scene visible in the photograph.
22. In a video published by the Joint Investigation Team on September 28th 2016
the Joint Investigation Team included this approximate location as the first sighting of the
missile launcher on July 17th 2014.10 The video says the convoy stopped for some time at two
10 Joint Investigation Team, Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17,
Openbaar Ministerie (28 September 2016) (with accompanying animation, 3. MH17
Animation regarding the transport route and the launch site, at 02:54-03:34),
https://youtu.be/Sf6gJ8NDhYA?t=174 (Annex 39).
9
locations, “first at a crossing”, which is consistent with the location established by our
geolocation.
23. Based on the above analysis, the location of the photograph is the intersection
of Shakhtostroiteley Boulevard and Ilycha Avenue in Donetsk, at the co-ordinates 48.002791,
37.856160, taken at around 9:15am on July 17th 2014. This is consistent with the location
described in the social media post made at 9:40am described above.
24. The next captured image of the Buk was originally published by Paris Match
on July 25th 2014.11 On September 28th 2016 the Joint Investigation Team published a video
of the same moment, stating the Paris Match photograph was a still from the video.12 A
longer version of the video used in the JIT video was also published on the Dutch police
website.13 It is notable that the name of the video file posted on the JIT website is
vid_20140717_102354.mp4. This filename is automatically created when a video is created
by the device and is based on the date and time settings on the camera. This would mean the
image was captured on July 17th 2014, at 10:23am. Also visible in the video is a 2010 Toyota
RAV4, UAZ-469, and Volkswagen van. Later images would show the same vehicles in the
convoy with the Buk missile launcher loaded on the red low-loader. The location of the Buk
11 Alfred de Montesquiou, Un camion volé pour transporter le lance-missiles, PARIS MATCH
(25 July 2014), http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/EXCLU-MATCH-Uncamion-
vole-pour-transporter-le-systeme-lance-missiles-577289 (Annex 534).
12 See also Joint Investigation Team, Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation
MH17, Openbaar Ministerie (28 September 2016) (with accompanying animation, 3. MH17
Animation regarding the transport route and the launch site, at 03:17-03:34),
https://youtu.be/Sf6gJ8NDhYA?t=201 (Annex 39).
13 Politie,
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content/assets/politie/mh17/vid_20140717_102354.mp4
(Annex 692).
10
can be seen on 2011 Google Street View imagery, with similarly positioned billboards and
matching buildings in the distance:14
Above, image of the Buk from the Paris Match photograph; bottom, Google Street View
imagery of the same location.
25. It is possible to match additional objects and structures visible in the longer
version of the video to 2011 Google Street View imagery of the same street, for example a
red roofed building on the right side of the road:15
14 Google Street View,
https://www.google.com/maps/@48.0046232,37.8726847,3a,60y,42.39h,108.54t/data=!3m6!
1e1!3m4!1sRGnHwZ5YZnuGO-n_VvruWg!2e0!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 719).
15 Google Street View,
https://www.google.com/maps/@48.0034014,37.8715597,3a,75y,27.16h,93.81t/data=!3m6!1
e1!3m4!1skXWs7BRGzM064cu1mvlVpA!2e0!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 718).
11
Above, image from the video taken in Donetsk; bottom, Google Street View imagery of the
same location.
26. In the Joint Investigation Team’s September 28th 2016 video describing the
route of the Buk missile launcher according to its investigation, this approximate location is
also marked as the location of the Buk missile launcher.16
16 Joint Investigation Team, Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17,
Openbaar Ministerie (28 September 2016) (with accompanying animation, 3. MH17
Animation regarding the transport route and the launch site, at 03:06-03:35),
https://youtu.be/Sf6gJ8NDhYA?t=185 (Annex 39).
12
27. Based on the information described above, and Bellingcat’s investigation, I
have concluded that the Buk missile launcher was filmed at the coordinates 48.004645,
37.872821 on the morning of July 17th 2014.
28. The Buk was next filmed outside of Makeevka. On May 3rd 2016 a video was
posted on YouTube showing the Buk missile launcher being transported on the same lowloader
shown in other images of the Buk convoy. The Buk missile launcher is also
accompanied by a 2010 Toyota RAV4, UAZ and Volkswagen van, similar to what is seen in
the video filmed in Donetsk.17
29. There are details visible in the video which make geolocation of this video
possible. The clearest landmarks are the gas station visible from 0:50 onwards, and the traffic
􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀋􀉉􀉚􀉪􀉚􀉥􀉥􀉟􀉥􀉶􀀌􀀃gas station chain signs are
clearly visible. In Makiivka, through Google Maps we can find one location which is located
near a traffic circle, giving a good reference point for further validation.18
17 􀈻􀉭􀉤􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁜􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁚􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀢􀁙􀀠􀀤􀁙􀁚􀀫􀀓􀀷􀀕􀀺􀀦􀀱􀀓
(Annex 647).
18 48°01'03.5"N 37°59'00.1"E, Google Maps,
https://www.google.com/maps/place/48°01'03.5%22N+37°59'00.1%22E/@48.0177065,37.9
825478,302m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x0!8m2!3d48.017652!4d37.983353
(Annex 682).
13
Google Maps view of location from Makeevka video.
30. The roundabout and billboard visible at the end of the video matches that of
the roundabout featured in the video, just west of Kapitalnaya Park. An image of the
billboard can be found in an archived webpage that was used to advertise the availability of
the billboard for use:19
Image from archived website (above) showing the same billboard in the Makeevka
video (below).
19 Internet Archive, Wayback Machine,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160518011731/http://www.outdooronline.
com.ua/resources/view/223950 (Annex 729).
OTO nIOCKOCTM PACIIOIIOKEHME TIOCKOCTM
14
31. Further confirming the location is satellite imagery originally published by
Stratfor on May 13th 2016.20 The satellite image shows the convoy on the same road within
moments of the video being filmed:
The Buk missile launcher at 11:08am on July 17th 2014, via Digital Globe/Google
Earth
32. The above satellite image is listed on the Digital Globe catalog with the ID of
105041001104D000. According to metadata recorded with the image, the image was
captured at 11:08am local time on July 17th 2014.
33. In June 2016 the same satellite image was made available on the Google Earth
service, allowing any user of the free service to view that satellite image. This allowed for
20 Examining the Evidence of Russia’s Involvement in a Malaysia Airlines Crash, STRATFOR
(13 May 2016), https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/examining-evidence-russiasinvolvement-
malaysia-airlines-crash
(Annex 588).
Google Earth
15
further analysis by Bellingcat to further confirm it showed the Buk missile launcher in a
convoy of vehicles.21
34. Based on the above information, I have concluded that the Buk missile
launcher was filmed on Avtotransportna Street, on the south side of Makeevka, on July 17th
2014, around 11:08am, and was captured on satellite imagery as it was close to the coordinates
48.020433, 37.990787 at that exact time.22
35. The next recording of the Buk was a video posted onto Twitter by a user, who
included details of the time, date, and location the video was filmed. The original tweet has
been deleted, but copies of the video were downloaded and reuploaded on multiple platforms,
including a copy uploaded by Bellingcat.23 A screenshot of the original tweet can be seen
below.
21 Bellingcat Investigation Team, New Google Earth Satellite Update Confirms Presence of
Buk in Eastern Ukraine, BELL¿NGCAT (22 June 2016), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/ukand-
europe/2016/06/22/new-google-earth-satellite-update-confirms-presence-of-buk-ineastern-
ukraine/ (Annex 453).
22 48.020433, 37.990787, Google Maps,
https://www.google.ch/maps/search/48.020433,+37.990787?sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwie393dlsT
aAhWTasAKHRSuAeMQ8gEIJjAA (Annex 680).
23 July 17th 2014 - Buk sighting in Zuhres, Ukraine, YouTube (9 July 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xK3tXzqais0 (Annex 705).
16
Tweet with video of the Buk in Zuhres, Ukraine on 17 July 2014
36. Satellite imagery of the area indicated by the co-ordinates in the tweet shows
multiple matches between the area visible in the video footage, and the satellite imagery.
Some of the matches are shown in the below image:
a'lt Asiper A
t ·.± Follow
@djp3tros location 48.016970, 38.301823
youtube.com/watch?v=6OJsld ... 17.07.14
11:40
dve ransiation
d Reply etweet # Favorite » More
EJ Yours·
MG 0647
we
IMG 0647
View on web
17
Left, satellite imagery of the location in Zuhres24 with landmarks highlighted; right,
same landmarks in video from Zuhres
37. This video and location is also included in the Joint Investigation Team’s
September 28th 2016 video describing the route of the Buk missile launcher according to their
investigation.25
38. Journalists from Correct!v visited the location based on the above geolocation
and took a photograph which shows many of the features visible in the video, further
confirming the geolocation is correct:26
Correct!v photograph of the location seen in the Zuhres video
24 Google Earth/Digital Globe satellite imagery of Zuhres (17 February 2015), available at
Eliot Higgins, Two More Key Sightings of the MH17 Buk Missile Launcher, BELL¿NGCAT (28
July 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/07/28/two-more-keysightings-
of-the-mh17-buk-missile-launcher/ (Annex 698).
25 See also Joint Investigation Team, Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation
MH17, Openbaar Ministerie [Public Prosecution Service] (28 September 2016) (with
accompanying animation, 3. MH17 Animation regarding the transport route and the launch
site, at 04:01-04:09), https://youtu.be/Sf6gJ8NDhYA?t=241
(Annex 39).
26 CORRECT!V, Flug MH17: Der Weg Der Buk-Einheit (9 January 2015),
https://mh17.correctiv.org/wegbuk_german/ (Annex 551).
18
39. Based on the above information, the location featured in the video is
48.01670, 38.301823, located in Zuhres.27
40. The next image of the Buk is from the town of Torez, east of Zuhres. Visible
in the picture is the Buk missile launcher on the low-loader, along with a UAZ. This
photograph was shared widely on social media on the evening of July 17th 2014.
Image of Buk in Torez, Ukaine on 17 July 2014
41. Bellingcat published a geolocation of this image on July 18th 2014.28 It was
possible to identify the shop name as “􀉋􀉬􀉪􀉨􀉣􀀃􀈾􀉨􀉦”, and establish the shop was on 􀉍􀉥􀉢􀉰􀉚􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀃
27 48°01'00.1"N 38°18'06.6"E, Google Maps,
https://www.google.com/maps/place/48°01'00.1%22N+38°18'06.6%22E/@48.0167,38.3018
23,590m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x0!8m2!3d48.0167!4d38.301823
(Annex 681).
28 Eliot Higgins, Identifying the Location of the MH17 Linked Missile Launcher from One
Photograph, BELL¿NGCAT (18 July 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case19
􀉥􀉟􀉬􀀃􀉋􀉋􀉋􀉊 street in Torez. In addition, two dash camera videos filmed by a local resident and
posted onto YouTube were discovered, showing the same location, one as the vehicle drove
from the north to the south,29 and one as the car drove from the west to the east.30 Stills
shown below taken from those videos show the buildings visible in the above photograph:
studies/2014/07/18/identifying-the-location-of-the-mh17-linked-missile-launcher-from-onephotograph/
(Annex 443).
29 􀉝􀀑􀉌􀉨􀉪􀉟􀉡􀀏􀉍􀉤􀉪􀉚􀉢􀉧􀉚􀀏􀈾􀉨􀉧􀉟􀉰􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉥􀀑􀀏􀉭􀉥􀀑􀀘􀀓􀀃􀉥􀉟􀉬􀀃􀉋􀉋􀉋􀉊-􀉭􀉥􀀑􀉇􀉢􀉤􀉨􀉥􀉚􀉟􀉜􀉚-􀉭􀉥􀀑􀉉􀉨􀉩􀉨􀉜􀉢􀉱􀉚􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃
(20 October 2013), https://youtu.be/jbc6uma8rhM?t=60 (Annex 603).
30 􀉌􀉨􀉪􀉟􀉡􀀏􀀃􀉍􀉤􀉪􀉚􀉢􀉧􀉚􀀏􀀃􀈾􀉨􀉧􀉟􀉰􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉥􀀑􀀏􀀃􀉩􀉪􀀑􀀃􀈽􀉚􀉝􀉚􀉪􀉢􀉧􀉚􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀖 October 2013),
https://youtu.be/x-_GmpkC52A?t=88 (Annex 602).
20
Still images from two videos posted on YouTube of Torez, Ukraine
42. Based on the above information it was possible to establish the location the
photograph was taken as a petrol station in Torez, at 48.024053, 38.614804.
21
43. Following the publication of the Bellingcat geolocation of the site, journalists
from the Guardian31 and Buzzfeed32 visited the location identified, and spoke with several
witnesses who saw the missile launcher being transported “[j]ust before lunchtime last
Thursday [July 17th 2014]”.
44. The journalism organisation Correct!v also visited the location identified,
taking a photograph that recreates the photograph taken on July 17th 2014. From the
photograph (shown below) it is clear the location is the same:33
Photograph taken of location in Torez, Ukraine by Correct!v
45. Two Twitter accounts that share reports from local residents of military
activity in eastern Ukraine also shared reports of the Buk missile launcher travelling through
Torez, posting the tweets around lunchtime. The account “WowihaY” posted a tweet at
31 Shaun Walker, Ukrainians Report Sightings of Missile Launcher on Day of MH17 Crash,
The Guardian (22 July 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/22/ukrainesightings-
missile-launcher-mh17 (Annex 532).
32 Max Seddon, Locals Say Rebels Moved Missile Launcher Shortly Before Malaysian Plane
Was Downed, Buzzfeed News (22 July 2014), https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/localssay-
rebels-moved-missile-launcher-shortly-beforemala?
utm_term=.nhbAjO2e6#.hsgNbR19y (Annex 531).
33 CORRECT!V, Flug MH17: Der Weg Der Buk-Einheit (9 January 2015),
https://mh17.correctiv.org/wegbuk_german/ (Annex 551).
LRy" ;!:
; Air
i
• 4sh'
'
22
12:07pm local time detailing the sighting of the Buk.34 The translation of the tweet reads as
follows “A surface-to-air launcher just passed us in the direction of the city center. 4 rockets,
people are saying that it’s a Buk #stopterror #torez in the direction of #snizhne”.
46. The second tweet was posted by the account “MOR2537” at 12:26pm local
time and reads, “􀉉􀉪􀉨􀉜􀉟􀉡􀉥􀉢􀀃􀉪􀉚􀉤􀉟􀉬􀉧􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉤􀉨􀉦􀉩􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉫􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉬􀉹􀉝􀉚􀉱􀉟􀀎􀉞􀉜􀉟􀀃􀉦􀉚􀉲􀉢􀉧􀉵􀀃􀉩􀉪􀉢􀉤􀉪􀉵􀉬􀉢􀉹􀀃􀉱􀉟􀉪􀉟􀉡􀀃
􀉌􀉨􀉪􀉟􀉡􀀃􀉜􀀃􀉋􀉧􀉟􀉠􀉧􀉨􀉟􀀃􀉜􀀃􀀔􀀕-10.”35 The translated tweet reads, “They hauled a rocket complex on
a low-loader escorted by two vehicles through Torez towards Snizhne at 12:10pm.” This was
followed by a second tweet, which said “􀉉􀉨􀉯􀉨􀉠􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀈻􀉍􀉄􀀏􀀃􀉜􀉟􀉪􀉯􀀃􀉡􀉚􀉱􀉟􀉯􀉥􀉟􀉧􀀃􀉛􀉵􀉥,” describing
the “rocket complex” as a Buk missile launcher.36
47. Based on the above information, I conclude that after midday on July 17th
2014 the Buk missile launcher convoy passed through Torez, and was photographed close to
the co-ordinates 48.024444, 38.615501.
48. The next image of the Buk was taken in Snizhne, east of Torez. This shows
the Buk, now unloaded and separated from the low-loader seen in previous images.37
34 􀉉􀉪􀉚􀉤􀉬􀉢􀉱􀉟􀉫􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉪􀉭􀀶􀀶􀉨􀉮􀉨􀉛􀉢􀉹􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://twitter.com/WowihaY/status/489698009148837888 (Annex 620).
35 Roman, Twitter (17 July 2014), https://twitter.com/MOR2537/status/489702736766586880
(Annex 615).
36 Roman, Twitter (17 July 2014), https://twitter.com/MOR2537/status/489709431467171841
(Annex 615).
37 IgorGirkin, Twitter (17 July 2014),
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/489884062577094656
(Annex 614).
23
Photograph of Buk taken in Snizhne, Ukraine
49. On July 17th 2014, prior to the destruction of MH17, an Associated Press
reporter had observed a Buk missile launcher in Snizhne: “An Associated Press reporter on
Thursday saw seven rebel-owned tanks parked at a gas station outside the eastern Ukrainian
town of Snizhne. In the town, he also observed a Buk missile system, which can fire missiles
up to an altitude of 22,000 meters (72,000 feet).”38
50. In the video published by the Joint Investigation Team on September 28th
2016 the Buk is described as being unloaded near the Furshet supermarket39 in Snizhne.40
38 Peter Leonard, Ukraine: Air Force Jet Downed by Russian Missile, Associated Press (17
July 2014),
https://web.archive.org/web/20140721202112/http://bigstory.ap.org/article/russia-dismissesus-
sanctions-bullying (Annex 529).
39 Wikimapia, http://wikimapia.org/#lang=de&lat=48.018549&lon=38.753409&z=18&m=b
(Annex 675).
40 Joint Investigation Team, Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17,
Openbaar Ministerie [Public Prosecution Service] (28 September 2016) (with accompanying
animation, 3. MH17 Animation regarding the transport route and the launch site, at 04:27-
04:40).https://youtu.be/Sf6gJ8NDhYA?t=265 (Annex 39).
LL LI
24
51. The Furshet supermarket is located 200m north of the location the above
photograph of the Buk was taken.
52. The photograph of the Buk was shared on Twitter on the evening of the attack,
by the user @GirkinGirkin, who provided a description of the location.41 The location is
described as “􀀆􀉋􀉧􀉟􀉠􀉧􀉨􀉟􀀃􀉈􀀃􀉪􀉭􀉫􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉯 􀉡􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉬􀉱􀉢􀉤􀉚􀉯􀀃􀉢􀀃􀂵􀈻􀉭􀉤􀉟􀂶􀀃􀉜􀀃􀉋􀉧􀉟􀉠􀉧􀉨􀉦􀀃􀂵􀉷􀉬􀉨􀀃􀉞􀉨􀉦􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀃􀉥􀉟􀉬􀀃
􀉨􀉤􀉬􀉹􀉛􀉪􀉹􀀏􀀃􀉜􀀃􀉧􀉟􀉦􀀃􀉩􀉢􀉪􀉤􀉚􀀏􀀃􀉧􀉟􀉞􀉚􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉨􀀃􀉭􀉝􀉨􀉥􀉟􀉤􀀃􀉢􀀃􀉮􀉭􀉪􀉲􀉟􀉬􀂶”, which translated reads “#Snezhnoe on
the Russian air defense and the Buk on Snezhnoe - ‘this is a house at 50 years of October, a
pirk is in it, and the Ugolek and Furshet is nearby’”. This refers to a street, “􀀘􀀓􀀃􀉥􀉟􀉬􀀃􀉨􀉤􀉬􀉹􀉛􀉪􀉹”,
and restaurant, “􀉭􀉝􀉨􀉥􀉟􀉤”, both of which can be found on the map website Wikimapia in
Snizhne.42
53. Journalists from Correct!v visited the location based on the above information,
confirming the geolocation was correct:43
41 IgorGirkin, Twitter (17 July 2014),
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/489884062577094656
(Annex 614).
42 Wikimapia,
http://wikimapia.org/#lang=de&lat=48.017139&lon=38.754562&z=18&m=b&show=/27039
􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀒􀁕􀁘􀀒􀉩􀉥-50-􀉥􀉟􀉬-􀉈􀉤􀉬􀉹􀉛􀉪􀉹-3 (Annex 674).
43 CORRECT!V, Flug MH17: Der Weg Der Buk-Einheit (9 January 2015),
https://mh17.correctiv.org/wegbuk_german/ (Annex 551).
25
Photograph taken by Correct!v in Snizhne, Ukraine
54. Based on the above information I conclude the location of the Buk in the
photograph was 48.016631, 38.754672.
55. The next image of the Buk missile launcher was a video published on
YouTube shortly after MH17 was shot down.44 The original version of the video was quickly
removed, but I had downloaded a copy of the video, and reuploaded to YouTube at 18:41
UTC on July 17th 2014. Multiple copies of this video have since been uploaded to YouTube
and other video sharing sites.
56. The video shows the Buk missile launcher, moving under its own power,
travelling south out of Snizhne. The Buk is accompanied by a second vehicle. This location is
close to the previous image of the Buk in Snizhne, approximately 900 meters southeast of
where the photograph was taken.
57. On July 17th 2014 I detailed the geolocation of the video in a post published on
the Bellingcat website.45 A number of suggestions had been made of a possible location by
various individuals on the social media Twitter, the vast majority of which pointed to a
location south of Snizhne:
44 􀉈􀉪􀉭􀉞􀉢􀉟􀀃􀉭􀉛􀉢􀉣􀉫􀉬􀉜􀉚􀀃􀉦􀉚􀉥􀉚􀉣􀉡􀉢􀉣􀉰􀉟􀉜􀀃􀉋􀉧􀉟􀉠􀉧􀉨􀉟􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀓􀀚􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiI9s-zWLs4 (Annex 619).
45 Eliot Higgins, Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17,
BELL¿NGCAT (17 July 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/casestudies/
2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/
(Annex 442).
26
Satellite image of location south of Snizhne
58. Satellite imagery of the location showed the layout of trees in the center of the
road matched to what was visible in the video:
27
Above, satellite imagery, noting the layout of the trees; below, image from the Snizhne video
showing the same layout of the trees
59. Further features were also visible, such as a red roofed building with roads to
the north and south of it that connected to the main road:
28
Above, satellite imagery, noting the red roof and other landmarks; below, image from the
Snizhne video showing the red roof and the same landmarks
60. The video is also filmed from a high vantage point, and a likely vantage point
can be seen on the north end of the road:
29
Satellite imagery showing the likely vantage point
61. The same location is also featured in the Joint Investigation Team’s September
28th 2016 video describing the route of the Buk missile launcher.46
62. Based on the above information, I conclude the Buk was filmed at 48.011463,
38.7633437 heading south out of Snizhne in the early afternoon of July 17th 2014.
63. This is the last sighting of the Buk missile launcher on July 17th 2014 shared
on social media.
64. Following the attack on MH17, on July 18th, the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior
published a video showing a Buk on the same low-loader filmed on July 17th 2014 in the
separatist controlled town of Luhansk. The Buk was missing one of the four missiles a fully
loaded Buk TELAR would carry.47
46 Joint Investigation Team, Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17,
Openbaar Ministerie [Public Prosecution Service] (28 September 2016) (with accompanying
animation, 3. MH17 Animation regarding the transport route and the launch site, at 04:48-
05:12), https://youtu.be/Sf6gJ8NDhYA?t=283 (Annex 39).
47 􀈻􀉨􀉣􀉨􀉜􀉢􀉤􀉢􀀃􀉜􀉢􀉜􀉨􀉡􀉹􀉬􀉶􀀃􀉪􀉚􀉤􀉟􀉬􀉧􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉤􀉨􀉦􀉩􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉫􀀃􀀅􀈻􀉍􀉄􀀅􀀃􀉞􀉨􀀃􀉤􀉨􀉪􀉞􀉨􀉧􀉭􀀃􀉿􀉡􀀃􀉊􀉎􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4HJmev5xg0 (Annex 621).
30
Above: Photograph of the Buk missile launcher in Luhansk, Ukraine, 18 July 2014.
65. The video was referred to in a July 21st 2014 press conference held by the
Russian Ministry of Defence, which claimed the video was filmed in Ukrainian controlled
territory.48 They stated: “For example, media circulated a video supposedly showing a Buk
system being moved from Ukraine to Russia. This is clearly a fabrication. This video was
made in the town of Krasnoarmeisk, as evidenced by the billboard you see in the background,
advertising a car dealership at 34 Dnepropetrovsk Street. Krasnoarmeysk has been controlled
by the Ukrainian military since May 11.”
66. Geolocation verified the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior claim, and clearly
demonstrated the Russian Ministry of Defence claim was completely untrue.
67. Using a variety of online resources it is possible to confirm that the Luhansk
location is the correct location. A website with feeds for traffic cameras in Luhansk included
a camera pointing directly at the location that the Buk travelled through.49 Traffic cameras in
Luhansk had been shut down a week before July 17th, but preview images from the cameras
that were fed to the traffic camera website were still left online, viewable by anyone visiting
48 RT, Malaysian Airlines plane crash: Russian military unveil data on MH17 incident over
Ukraine (FULL), YouTube (21 July 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bNPInuSqfs#t=1567 (Annex 530).
49 􀉈􀉬􀉨􀉛􀉪􀉚􀉧􀉧􀉵􀉟􀀃􀉜􀉟􀉛-􀉤􀉚􀉦􀉟􀉪􀉵􀀏􀀃
https://web.archive.org/web/20140717204659/http://lc.lds.ua/cams/filter
(Annex 679).
31
the website. It should be noted since Bellingcat published its original work on the Luhansk
Buk video the traffic camera site has been shut down for unknown reasons, but was archived
on July 17th, where the preview image is still visible.50
Traffic camera image of the Luhansk location
68. The traffic camera is positioned to the right of the location of the camera in the
Buk video, which was pointing across the top of the trees in the bottom left corner of the
picture towards the billboards and intersection. Clearly visible is a billboard with the same
car advertisement and green border visible in the Buk video.
50 Ibid.
1293
32
Traffic camera image of the Luhansk location
69. Billboards are not unique, but it is also possible to explore the area using other
resources. While Google Street View is a well-known service for exploring ground level
imagery of towns and cities, Yandex Maps also offers a similar service, which, unlike Google
Street View, covers Luhansk, including the area visible in the Buk video. The imagery from
the area is a few years old, and the billboards are recent additions to the area, so are not
visible in the street view imagery from Yandex Maps.51
51 Yandex Maps,
https://maps.yandex.com/?text=48°32%2743.27%22N%2C%20%2039°15%2759.40%22E&s
ll=-
1.139759%2C52.636878&sspn=0.422287%2C0.124798&ol=geo&oll=39.266538%2C48.545
429&ll=39.266538%2C48.545429&z=17&l=stv%2Csta&panorama%5Bpoint%5D=39.2639
77%2C48.546191&panorama%5Bdirection%5D=137.102539%2C0.922508&panorama%5B
span%5D=104.021743%2C52.620374 (Annex 708).
33
Yandex Maps view of the Luhansk location
70. The absence of billboards in the area is apparent in historical satellite imagery
of the area from 2011 visible in Google Earth, with the earliest dated Google Earth imagery
available showing them in March 2014.
Left, Google Earth image dated September 7th 2011 of the Luhansk location; right, Google
Earth image dated March 22nd of the Luhansk location.
71. The age of the Yandex Maps imagery is also apparent when looking at the
nearby church, only partially constructed in the Yandex Maps imagery, but clearly visible in
the image from the traffic camera.
34
Top, Yandex Maps image of church in the Luhansk location; bottom, traffic camera image of
the partially-constructed church in the Luhansk location.
72. Of particular interest is a set of buildings with silver and red roofs near to the
church,52 visible in the traffic camera image to the right of the church. In the Buk video it is
possible to make out the red and silver roofs, as well as a red and silver chimney, matching
perfectly with these buildings.
52 Yandex Maps, https://maps.yandex.com/?text=luhansk&sll=-
1.139755%2C52.636876&sspn=0.422287%2C0.124798&ll=39.266431%2C48.543234&z=1
6&ol=geo&oll=39.307806%2C48.574039&l=stv%2Csta&panorama%5Bpoint%5D=39.2666
08%2C48.545068&panorama%5Bdirection%5D=119.912969%2C-
2.525107&panorama%5Bspan%5D=130.000000%2C65.761719 (Annex 709).
35
Top, Yandex Maps image of buildings in the Luhansk location; bottom, same buildings in the
Luhansk video of the Buk.
73. In addition to these matches a Luhansk local visited the site and took various
photographs which were then shared on Livejournal, a popular blogging website,53 including
a clear photograph of the billboards in the area and the local church.
53 vlad_igorev, Livejournal (23 July 2014),
https://evilmilker.livejournal.com/4379.html?thread=66587#t66587 (Annex 623).
36
Photo of Luhansk location taken by a local resident.
74. The photographer also took a picture of the red and silver roofed buildings
nearby, again confirming this is the same location shown in the video. It also shows that
despite the street view imagery being at least 3 years old the roofs and chimney are still the
same colour now as they were in the street view imagery and Buk video.54
Photo of Luhansk location taken by a local resident.
75. These images allowed smaller details in the video to be matched, such as the
detail on the lamp posts, and shape of the curb:
54 􀉂􀉧􀉮􀉨􀉪􀉦􀉚􀉰􀉢􀉹􀀃􀉨􀉛􀀃􀉢􀉡􀉨􀉛􀉪􀉚􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉢􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁙􀁉􀁏􀀑􀁕􀁘/fotos/11db052f5783734.html
(Annex 624).
37
Comparisons between photographs taken by Luhansk resident and the video of the Buk in
Luhansk.
76. It is also possible to identify a second billboard visible in the Buk video,
heavily obscured, and only visible briefly at the start of the Buk video. The same billboard is
also visible in the traffic camera image.
38
Comparison of second billboard in Buk video with traffic camera image.
77. Another image of the area was available on Panoramio, a website that allows
users to search for geotagged photographs posted by other users, described as being taken on
October 12, 2013, and showing a position closer to that of the position in the Buk video. The
Panoramio service was shut down, but an archived copy of the original link is available.55
55 􀈾􀉢􀉦􀉨􀉧􀀃􀈼􀉚􀳦􀀢􀉢􀉧􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁒􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀲􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://web.archive.org/web/20161029160735/http://www.panoramio.com/photo/97652158
(Annex 601).
39
Image of Luhansk location from Panoramio.
78. It is possible to match objects in the Buk video with objects in the Panoramio
photograph, and also establish that the position of the Buk video camera is to the right and
below the position of the Panoramio photograph camera. In the below image the position of
three features are highlighted: the right side of the billboard (red), the pole (green), and the
chimney (yellow).
Comparison of landmarks from Panoramio image and Buk video from Luhansk.
40
79. As we can see, to match the position in the Buk video the camera position in
the photograph would need to move to the right for the right side of the billboard to line up
with the pole, resulting in the chimney appearing to the right of the billboard and pole. That
would also mean the tree marked in green in the below image would appear further to the left
in the Buk video, obscuring more of the building marked in pink.
Comparison of landmarks from Panoramio image and Buk video from Luhansk.
80. It is also possible to make out the pole visible in the Buk video in exactly the
right position in the Panoramio photograph.
Comparison of landmark from Panoramio image and Buk video from Luhansk.
41
81. Near the pole the cable connectors visible in the Buk video can be seen.
Comparison of landmarks from Panoramio image and Buk video from Luhansk.
82. Yandex Maps street view imagery can be used again to show us the position of
the Buk video camera from the junction where the Buk was filmed. An image shows
apartments overlooking the trees visible in the Luhansk Buk video, further confirming this is
the correct location.56
56 Yandex Maps, https://yandex.com/maps/?text=luhansk&sll=-
1.139759%2C52.636878&sspn=0.422287%2C0.124798&ol=geo&oll=39.307806%2C48.574
039&ll=39.272549%2C48.546689&z=15&l=stv%2Csta&panorama%5Bpoint%5D=39.2648
76%2C48.545590&panorama%5Bdirection%5D=290.615000%2C6.767862&panorama%5B
span%5D=88.930385%2C44.986269 (Annex 710).
42
Image from Yandex Maps of Luhansk location.
83. It is now clear that the video was filmed in Luhansk, and based on the position
of buildings and structures in the video, it is clear the camera is positioned west of the road,
facing eastwards. In the first moments of the video a window frame is visible on the right side
of the shot, indicating the camera is positioned inside the apartment buildings overlooking
trees, which partly obscure the view of the road in the video. The following map shows the
approximate position of the camera and the Buk in the video.
43
Satellite image showing approximate location of Buk in Luhansk and vantage point.
84. The Russian Ministry of Defence had claimed, “This video was made in the
town of Krasnoarmeisk, as evidenced by the billboard you see in the background, advertising
a car dealership at 34 Dnepropetrovsk Street”, but this is clearly untrue. The photographs
taken of the billboard clearly show it says something completely different from what is
claimed by the Russian Ministry of Defence, which instead of a street address reads
“National Autodealer”.
Still frame of billboard seen in Luhansk video.
'.Kpacioapock,
•y n. A• enponerpouca, 34
44
85. Correct!v visited the same site, further confirming the location provided by the
Ukrainian government was correct.57 Later, 60 Minutes Australia also visited the same site,
again confirming the location provided was correct.58 This location was also included in the
Joint Investigation Team’s September 28th 2016 video on the route of the Buk.59
86. Based on the above information it can be confirmed that the location of the
Buk was in the precise location as described by the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior in
separatist held Luhansk, and claims by the Russian Ministry of Defence about the location of
the video are completely false.
IV. TRANSPORT OF THE BUK THROUGH RUSSIA IN JUNE 2014
87. Open-source evidence establishes that the Buk that traveled through Ukraine
on July and shot down Flight MH17 was the same Buk that was part of a Russian military
convoy traveling through Russia in June 2014 with the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. In
reaching this conclusion, my investigative team and I relied on 15 videos posted on social
media sites that showed the movement of a convoy in Russia. The videos were posted on a
􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀯅􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁅􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀹􀀮􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀹􀀮􀂴􀀌􀀃􀯅􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀕􀀖-25 June 2014. Using geolocation
methodologies, we identified the exact location at which each video was filmed. Our analysis
for each video is detailed below.
57 Internet Archive, Wayback Machine,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150204210929/https://mh17.correctiv.org/mh17-the-path-ofthe-
buk/ (Annex 685).
58 Michael Usher Travels to Ukraine to Track the Missile that Shot Down MH17, 60 Minutes
Australia (17 May 2015), https://www.9news.com.au/world/2015/05/17/05/37/60-minutesdigs-
into-mystery-surrounding-destruction-of-mh17 (Annex 575); NewsFromUkraine, MH17
Was Downed by Russian BUK. Special Investiigation. Part 2., (17 May 2015),
https://youtu.be/rb9Axg4DaeY?t=517 (Annex 704).
59 Joint Investigation Team, Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17,
Openbaar Ministerie [Public Prosecution Service] (28 September 2016) (with accompanying
animation, 3. MH17 Animation regarding the transport route and the launch site, at 10:08-
10:30), https://youtu.be/Sf6gJ8NDhYA?t=608 (Annex 39).
45
Video 1
88. The first video we examined was one posted on Instagram. The user tagged
the location of the video as Neznamo􀁙􀁒􀀃􀀋􀉇􀉟􀉡􀉧􀉚􀉦􀉨􀉜􀉨􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀲􀁖􀁎􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀋􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁇􀀃
Oblast, Russia), and uploaded it on 23 June 2014. The Instagram post has been deleted, but I
have preserved and archived the video, uploading it to the Bellingcat YouTube account.60
89. A military convoy can be seen in the video. Still images from the video are
below:
Still images from Video 1, at 0:01, 0:07, and 0:12, showing the military convoy.
90. 􀀷􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀂳􀉈􀈽􀉄􀂴􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀂳􀈺􀈽􀉁􀉋􀀏􀂴􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁄􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
these terms on the Internet and found that the gas station was located near Stary Oskol and
Neznamovo. A Wikimapia link gave us a location where the features in the area (roads, road
markings, buildings, etc.) matched the video.
91. We determined that this stretch of the road is an on-ramp to road P-188
heading south. The coordinates are 51.233946, 37.940584.
60 Video by kriskrukova, YouTube (8 November 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4Pigqq8A74 (Annex 694).
46
Google Maps Street View of the coordinates 51.233946, 37.940584, which matches the
location
in Video 1.61
Video 2
92. The second video we examined was one posted on VK by user Evgen
Krinichny.62 Krinichny said the video showed a “convoy” in Alexeyev􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀋􀈺􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉫􀉟􀉟􀉜􀉤􀉚􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
also referenced “Magnit,” a major Russian supermarket chain. He uploaded the video in the
morning of 24 June 2014. Although the VK post was still publicly available at the time of the
writing of this report, I have preserved and archived the video. The video was downloaded
and reuploaded to the Bellingcat-run MH17 Primer Videos YouTube channel.63
61 Google Street View,
https://www.google.com/maps/@51.233883,37.9404054,3a,75y,215.94h,85.44t/data=!3m7!1
e1!3m5!1siNFO6L4Q2R9rrvLtjX2W4A!2e0!6s%2F%2Fgeo1.ggpht.com%2Fcbk%3Fpanoid
%3DiNFO6L4Q2R9rrvLtjX2W4A%26output%3Dthumbnail%26cb_client%3Dmaps_sv.tacti
le.gps%26thumb%3D2%26w%3D203%26h%3D100%26yaw%3D47.65085%26pitch%3D0
%26thumbfov%3D100!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 722).
62 􀀨􀁙􀁊􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁋􀁑􀁜􀀏􀀃􀈻􀉟􀉥􀉝􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉫􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉥􀀑􀀃􀉝􀀑􀀃􀈺􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉫􀉟􀉟􀉜􀉤􀉚􀀏􀀃􀈾􀉦􀉢􀉬􀉪􀉨􀉜􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉦􀉚􀉝􀉚􀉡􀉢􀉧􀀃􀉆􀉚􀉝􀉧􀉢􀉬􀀑􀀃
􀉈􀉩􀉟􀉪􀉚􀉬􀉨􀉪􀀃􀀅􀉄􀉊􀉕􀉇􀀅􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀹􀀮􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://vk.com/video135321380_169811617?list=03e8088fdba765b187 (Annex 608).
63 􀈻􀉟􀉥􀉝􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉫􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉥􀀃􀉝􀀃􀈺􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉫􀉟􀉟􀉜􀉤􀉚􀀏􀀃􀈾􀉦􀉢􀉬􀉪􀉨􀉜􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉦􀉚􀉝􀉚􀉡􀉢􀉧􀀃􀉆􀉚􀉝􀉧􀉢􀉬􀀃􀉈􀉩􀉟􀉪􀉚􀉬􀉨􀉪􀀃􀉄􀉊􀉕􀉇􀀏􀀃
YouTube (1 September 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=po0p-olacdo
(Annex 639).
47
Image of a Buk in the military convoy in Video 2.
93. 􀀤􀀃􀀼􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁓􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀂳􀈺􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉫􀉟􀉟􀉜􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉆􀉚􀉝􀉧􀉢􀉬􀂴􀀃􀁊􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃
locations, one of which is next to a section of road that resembles the area where the trucks
can be seen turning in the video.
-
48
Yandex Map view that shows a section of road similar to that seen in Video 2.64
94. Using Google Maps Street View, we found that the location was identical to
what can be seen on the video. The coordinates are 50.624196, 38.649911.
Left, still images from Video 2. Right, Google Maps Street View of the same locations.
64 Yandex Maps,
https://yandex.com/maps/20192/alekseevka/?mode=search&text=50.624196%2C%2038.649
911&sll=-
2.036894%2C52.857715&sspn=1.139832%2C0.514530&ll=38.650661%2C50.623974&z=1
7&l=sat (Annex 711).
H I t
J . / ..
, .
A I + + 0
argon 'i 5 I
---9
49
Video 3
95. The third 􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁕􀀃􀉊􀉨􀉦􀉚􀉧􀀃
􀉊􀉨􀉠􀉧􀉨􀉜􀀑65 The metadata from the video shows it was uploaded on 24 June 2014 at 4:16
“Zulu time,” another term used for Coordinated Universal Time (“UTC”). This metadata can
be viewed using the Amnesty International YouTube Dataviewer.66 During the summer
months, Ukraine is on daylight savings time, meaning the time difference with UTC is +3
hours. As such, the local upload time of the video was 7:16 A.M. in the morning of 24 June.
The YouTube video is still publicly available as of the writing of this report.
96. The video shows a military convoy passing through the location:
Still image of military convoy in Video 3.
97. Given the third video’s upload time was the morning of 24 June, it likely was
shot sometime between the Neznamovo and Raskhovets videos. (The Raskhovets video is
65 􀈼􀉨􀉣􀉫􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉪􀉮􀀃􀉫􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉨􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁜􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁘􀀑􀁅􀁈􀀒􀁌􀀕􀀰􀀱􀁕􀁄􀀺􀁊􀁘􀁅􀁖
(Annex 606).
66 Amnesty International, Youtube DataViewer, https://citizenevidence.amnestyusa.org
(Annex 668).
50
explained next, as the fourth video.) Given the shooting locations of those videos, we
identified the routes the convoy may have taken between Neznamovo and Raskhovets:
The possible routes taken by the convoy between Neznamovo and Raskhovets.
98. One such suggested route goes through the village of Gorodishche
􀀋􀈽􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉢􀉳􀉟􀀌􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁒􀁖􀁎􀁒􀁏􀁖􀁎􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
both sides of the road, mixed together with trees. Gorodishche matched this description.
, Stary 0skol
Crap 0co
Nenano4o
4..0.
a1h3min
65.9km
ogov0ye
or08f0
• , Repye
Pe
f
ad 1h15min
940km
Krasn
Ostrov
Kpace
Oct \ b •
$ +
ets 􁁑
et Google 0 ¢ $ .ii ••
Map de214Geog en. -􁁑 n.goo@eon eport problem 0k
51
􀀵􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁆􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀋􀈽􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉢􀉳􀉟􀀌􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁒􀁖􀁎􀁒􀁏􀁖􀁎􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀑67
99. The route we identified is available on Google Street View, so we did a virtual
drive-through of the village. One feature visible at the beginning of the video is an arch on
the building next to where the video was shot. Scrolling through the Google Street View
images, on the east side of the village, a building can be found with arches similar to the
video. Several other features from Google Street View also matched the video: the fence and
buildings on the opposite side of the road matched the video, the intersection briefly visible
on the video could be seen in the Google Street View images, and from the frames where the
camera pointed towards the convoy, a nearby church’s dome was visible, with the buildings
and tree line visible in Street View imagery also matching the video. The coordinates are
51.137286, 38.064599.
67 Google Street View,
https://www.google.com/maps/place/51°08'25.9%22N+38°03'10.2%22E/@51.1405413,38.0
506453,553m/data=!3m2!1e3!4b1!4m14!1m7!3m6!1s0x0:0x0!2zNTHCsDA4JzE0LjIiTiAz
OMKwMDMnNTIuNiJF!3b1!8m2!3d51.137286!4d38.064599!3m5!1s0x0:0x0!7e2!8m2!3d
51.140538!4d38.052834 (Annex 723).
\ \ '
\
52
Top, still image from Video 3 at 0:38; bottom, Google Street View images. The red boxes
show matching landmarks. The box in the top image on the left-most side shows the fence and
buildings on one side of the road and matches the bottom left box. The red box in the top
image on the right-most side shows the arches on a building on the other side of the road and
matches the bottom right-most box.
53
Top, still image from Video 3 at 2:18; bottom, Google Street View image. The red boxes on
the left show the roof of a building. The red box in the middle shows a nearby church dome.
The red box on the right shows the matching tree line.
Video 4
100. The fourth video we examined was one posted on YouTube by user 􀈺􀉧􀉞􀉪􀉟􀉣􀀃
􀉇􀉨􀉜􀉢􀉤􀉨􀉜. It shows the convoy of vehicles during the day, reportedly at the Krasnensky
district of Belgorod oblast. The user uploaded the video on June 24th 2014. The YouTube
post has been deleted, but an archived copy of the page was made68 and various copies of the
video were uploaded on YouTube.69
101. Below is a still image of the military convoy passing through the location:
68 Internet Archive, Wayback Machine,
https://web.archive.org/web/20140910220159/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLtzYEH
olmg (Annex 687).
69 See, e.g.􀀏􀀃􀉛􀉟􀉥􀉝􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉫􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉥􀀃􀉄􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉧􀉟􀉧􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉪􀀃􀉨􀉧􀀃􀉄􀉨􀉥􀉨􀉧􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉨􀉣􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉢􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃
(11 June 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qAePW2kP_uw (Annex 636).
54
Still image of military convoy from Video 4.
102. The scenery in the video appears to show a countryside with a small number
of buildings, but it does offer some details for analysis. First, there are fairly long stretches of
straight road, with a curve at around 1 minute into the video. Near the curve, a pair of bus
stops is visible, as well as an intersection and a tall structure to the right. Two minutes in, two
large structures are visible to the right of the road.
- - - 2011, 01-9179:29:07
55
Top, frame from the video; bottom, the same location on Google Street View.
103. As the Krasnensky district presents a fairly large search area, the road shape
gave us a good starting point for narrowing the possibilities. Looking at the main roadways of
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁋􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀋􀉊􀉚􀉫􀉯􀉨􀉜􀉟􀉰􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀑
A satellite image of the Krasnensky district, showing the bend in a stretch of road that
matches Video 4.
104. Overview satellite imagery also showed two large structures along the road.
Zooming in on the satellite imagery of the area revealed two promising details: a pair of bus
stops near an intersection and a tall structure casting a long shadow. Using Google Street
View, we verified the location of the video using these landmarks. The coordinates are
50.902533, 38.458406.
Video 5
105. The fifth video we examined was one posted on YouTube by user 􀉊􀉭􀉫􀉫􀉤􀉨-
􀉭􀉤􀉪􀉚􀉢􀉧􀉫􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉣􀉧􀉚. The user described the location of the video as Stary Oskol, and uploaded
.. - \ ,,. =
.r r ±
/
e
2o¢ 4
r we ewe vi}.
56
it on June 23rd 2014. The YouTube post has been deleted, but the page was archived,70 and a
copy of the video was uploaded to Bellingcat’s MH17 Primer Videos YouTube channel.71
106. We were able to create a rudimentary panorama using still images from Video
5, which showed the military convoy passing through the location:
Bellingcat-generated panorama using still images from Video 5. The
panorama shows the military convoy.
107. On the very left of the panorama, rails and cables are visible. This seemed to
indicate the footage might have been filmed near a light rail or tram station. English
Wikipedia72 confirmed that there was one operating in the city, and Russian Wikipedia73
provided more details on it. Following the rail line south, we found a location on Google
Street View where a brick wall and a building appeared to match the video. We then
confirmed matches with other landmarks in the video and concluded that the video was
filmed from the light rail station. The coordinates are 51.311605, 37.897013.
70 􀉉􀈼􀉈􀀏􀀃􀉤􀉨􀉥􀉨􀉧􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉪􀉨􀉫􀉫􀉢􀉣􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉯􀀃􀉛􀉭􀉤􀉨􀉜􀀃􀉟􀉞􀉟􀉬􀀃􀉜􀀃􀉫􀉬􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉧􀉭􀀃􀉍􀉤􀉪􀉚􀉢􀉧􀉵􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://web.archive.org/web/20140624212507/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ryTmwvgf
XXs (Annex 607).
71 􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉈􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀓􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eit-25uDlZ8 (Annex 627).
72 Wikipedia, List of town tramway systems in Russia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_town_tramway_systems_in_Russia (Annex 676).
73 􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀺􀁌􀁎􀁌􀁓􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉨􀉨􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀉶􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉬􀉪􀉚􀉦􀉜􀉚􀉣􀀏􀀃
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁕􀁘􀀑􀁚􀁌􀁎􀁌􀁓􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁚􀁌􀁎􀁌􀀒􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉨􀉨􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀉶􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉣􀁂􀉬􀉪􀉚􀉦􀉜􀉚􀉣 (Annex 671).
57
Google Map Street View at 51.311605, 37.89701374.
Video 6
108. The next video we examined was one posted on YouTube by 􀈾􀉂􀈼􀈺􀉇􀀃
􀉈􀉇􀉅􀈺􀉃􀉇.75 The user describes the location of the video as Kursk, and uploaded it on 23
June. The YouTube post is still online.76
109. There is a military convoy in Video 6. We determined that the convoy in
Video 4 and Video 6 is the same. The first 16 vehicles are in the same order, an excerpt of
them here:
74 Google Street View,
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@51.3116771,37.897178,3a,75y,212.31h,86.62t/data=!3m7!
1e1!3m5!1sB_0wXoPaFJbuVAAkZ96D0w!2e0!6s%2F%2Fgeo3.ggpht.com%2Fcbk%3Fpan
oid%3DB_0wXoPaFJbuVAAkZ96D0w%26output%3Dthumbnail%26cb_client%3Dmaps_s
v.tactile.gps%26thumb%3D2%26w%3D203%26h%3D100%26yaw%3D331.59387%26pitch
%3D0%26thumbfov%3D100!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 715).
75 􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀓􀀙􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀉄􀉭􀉪􀉫􀉤􀀏􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉟􀉞􀉟􀉬􀀃􀉜􀀃􀉫􀉬􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉧􀉭􀀃􀉏􀉚􀉪􀉶􀉤􀉨􀉜􀉚􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉛􀉟􀉥􀉝􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉫􀉤􀉭􀉸􀀃
􀉝􀉪􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉰􀉭􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁜􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁚􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀢􀁙􀀠􀀘􀀷􀀬􀀹􀁝􀁊􀁍􀀚􀀛􀀛􀀗
(Annex 689).
76 Id.
58
Left, vehicles from Video 4; right, vehicles from Video 6.
110. To geolocate this video, we used a few clues: the reported location (Kursk),
tree lines on both sides of the road, a large blue sign on the side of the road, a crosswalk, and
a small reddish object on the road’s wide shoulder on the right. From overhead satellite
imagery, we saw that the road A144 on the east side of Kursk is lined by trees and includes
crosswalks. One section of this road has a wide shoulder near an intersection.
111. Google Street View showed other matching details: a wide shoulder as in the
video with a dark orange colored bus stop, a crosswalk next to it, and a big blue sign on the
side of the road. The coordinates are 51.722592, 36.336530.
Raskhovets Kursk
#1
#5
#6
59
Top left, Google Street View showing blue sign. Top right, still image from Video 6 showing
the same blue sign. Bottom left, Google Street View showing stretch of road with a crosswalk
and a small reddish object on the road’s wide shoulder on the right. Bottom right, same
reddish sign in a still image from the video. Bottom center, same crosswalk in a still image
from the video.
Video 7
112. The seventh video we examined was one posted on the Russian social media
platform OK.ru. According to the video description, the video was supposedly taken in
Troitskiy. The post has been deleted, but the video was downloaded from the original source
and reuploaded to YouTube on the Bellingcat Vehicle Tracking Project channel.77
113. The Buk used in the MH17 attack can be seen in Video 7:
77 􀀾􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀖􀁀􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉩􀉨􀉫􀀑􀀃􀉌􀉪􀉨􀉢􀉰􀉤􀉨􀉦􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀛􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r_zQVxMc4zo (Annex 699).
60
114. Troitskiy can be found east and slightly north of Stary Oskol. One possible
route from Kursk to Stary Oskol, the location of the next video, would have taken the convoy
down P190, which passes through Troitskiy. Using maps and overhead satellite imagery, we
found there were not too many intersections to check. One location in particular matches.78
The coordinates are 51.3590587,37.500688.
78 GoogleMaps,
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@51.3590831,37.5007226,3a,75y,244.95h,92.41t/data=!3m7
!1e1!3m5!1sAFKiLsYQTENA3b3SxXfVNQ!2e0!6s%2F%2Fgeo3.ggpht.com%2Fcbk%3Fp
anoid%3DAFKiLsYQTENA3b3SxXfVNQ%26output%3Dthumbnail%26cb_client%3Dmaps
_sv.tactile.gps%26thumb%3D2%26w%3D203%26h%3D100%26yaw%3D82.60872%26pitc
h%3D0%26thumbfov%3D100!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 725).
--- --- - -
•
61
Left, still image from Video 7 at 0.05. Right, Google Map Street View.
Video 8
115. The next video we examined was one posted on OK.ru by user 􀉆􀉚􀉤􀉫􀉢􀉦􀀃
􀉍􀉲􀉚􀉤􀉨􀉜. The user described the location of the video as Stary Oskol in the video description,
and uploaded it on June 25th 2014. The post has been deleted, but an archived copy of the
page was made,79 and the video was downloaded and reuploaded on Bellingcat’s MH17
Primer Videos YouTube channel.80
116. The Buk used in the MH17 attack can be seen in Video 8 at 2:02:
79 Internet Archive, Wayback Machine,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150401104503/http://goroskop.odnoklassniki.ru/video/138563
44715 (Annex 727).
80 􀈼􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉈􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9JWUPGLqzZ4 (Annex 642).
62
117. The video provides many landmarks, including an overpass, car dealerships,
and a light rail track. These landmarks place the video on P188, which runs through the city.
The coordinates are 51.324398, 37.882268.
Left, still image from Video 8 at 2:37; right, Google Street View.81
81 Google Street View,
https://www.google.fi/maps/@51.3246885,37.8819052,3a,15y,125.37h,92.17t/data=!3m7!1e
-·--.--.
63
Video 9
118. 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀈻􀉨􀉝􀉞􀉚􀉧􀀃􀉈􀉥􀉢􀉣􀉧􀉢􀉤􀀑􀀃
The user did not include any location information. It was uploaded on 19 July 2014. The
YouTube post is still publicly available.82
119. The video only features a single Buk TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher)
vehicle, so we had to establish the link to the bigger convoy. We did that by analyzing the
unique markings on the Buk TEL itself, as well as the trailer it was on. The TEL had paint
scratched off in a pattern that matches a TEL seen in Video 8. There were also missiles
loaded on both units; the markings and sticker placement on the trailers matched; and based
on a frame-by-frame analysis of the video from 0:55 to 1:20, the license plate appeared to
match as well.
Left, Buk TEL in Stary Oskol Video 8 at 1:06; right, still image of Buk TEL in
Video 9.
120. 􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀂳􀉉􀉨􀉩􀉨􀉜􀉵􀀃􀈾􀉜􀉨􀉪􀉵􀀏􀂴􀀃
Popovy Dvory. This is in the Kursk region, leading us to the exact location on road A144 /
E38, as pictured below. The coordinates are 51.6544589,36.7921105.
1!3m5!1sB6gbwgIB_Fsi0IdzugNrRw!2e0!5s20120701T000000!7i13312!8i6656?hl=en
(Annex 724).
82 􀉉􀉟􀉪􀉟􀉛􀉪􀉨􀉫􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉫􀉢􀉫􀉬􀉟􀉦􀀃􀉉􀈼􀉈􀀃􀉤􀀃􀉝􀉪􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉰􀉟􀀃􀉊􀉎-􀉍􀉤􀉪􀉚􀉢􀉧􀉵􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVq9lGZjbx8 (Annex 622).
64
Above, still image from Video 9 at 2:16; below, Google Street View.83
Video 10
121. The tenth video we analyzed was one posted on OK.ru by user 􀈺􀉧􀉧􀉚􀀃
􀉋􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉧􀉚􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉨􀉥􀉨􀉜􀉚􀀌􀀑84 The video description states the video is filmed in Stary Oskol and it
was uploaded on June 23 2014. A copy of the video was also downloaded and uploaded on
the Bellingcat MH17 Primer Videos YouTube channel.85
122. The video shows a military convoy passing through the location:
83 Google Street View,
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@51.6544838,36.7923959,3a,75y,147.52h,91.29t/data=!3m6
!1e1!3m4!1sC6oEMXeNN5dcMaF0Ih0VBA!2e0!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 717).
84 􀈺􀉧􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉋􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉧􀉚􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉨􀉥􀉨􀉜􀉚􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁒􀁎􀀑􀁕􀁘􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀒􀀔􀀙􀀓􀀗􀀜􀀓􀀙􀀗􀀙􀀙􀀜􀀙 (Annex 678).
85 􀈼􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉭􀉥􀉢􀉰􀉚􀉯􀀃􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉨􀉝􀉨􀀃􀉈􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀉚􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zPC96NVobyw (Annex 641).
65
123. This video was taken along the same light rail that we saw in Video 5, which
means we located the video along the same path as the one in Video 5. The coordinates are
51.3065105,37.9023863.86
86 Google Street View,
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@51.3064728,37.9024528,3a,75y,249.02h,94.05t/data=!3m6
!1e1!3m4!1sFVHkPl4ihBhO0uHdWWX9BA!2e0!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 714).
e ell
66
Above, two still images from Video 10 at 0.03 and 0.26;below, two Google Street View
pictures from the matching location.
Video 11
124. The next video we analyzed was one posted on VK by user Anastasia
Bondarchuk.87 The post has been deleted, but a copy was uploaded to the Bellingcat Vehicle
Tracking Project YouTube channel.88
125. The video shows a military convoy passing through the location:
87 Anastasia Bondarchuk, https://vk.com/id229298833 (Annex 683).
88 􀀾􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀘􀁀􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘be (8 March 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0fLFJ8IBTY (Annex 701).
67
126. Based on our previous experience, we thought that the overall appearance of
the roadways matched the Stary Oskol region. We examined overhead satellite imagery to
find possible matches, and we found a matching stretch of road just north of Neznamovo. The
coordinates are 51.2707467,37.9254813.
68
Above, two still images from Video 12 at 0:02 and 0:20; below, two Google Street View
pictures for comparison.
Video 12
127. The next video we examined was posted on VK by user Svetlana Smirnova.89
Smirnova uploaded the video on 24 June at 10:46 A.M. The post is still publicly available as
of the time of this report, but a copy was downloaded and uploaded to the Bellingcat MH17
Primer Videos YouTube channel.90
128. The video shows a military convoy passing through the location. The vehicles
in the video again matched the other videos of the 23-24 June convoy, down to the license
plates. The video was filmed on the same major road from Stary Oskol, as was the case in
many of the other videos. The coordinates are 51.3203988,37.886651.
89 􀈻􀉟􀉡􀀃􀉧􀉚􀉡􀉜􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉹􀀏􀀃􀀹􀀮􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁙􀁎􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁒􀀔􀀓􀀙􀀙􀀗􀀘􀀖􀀘􀁂􀀔􀀙􀀜􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀔􀀗􀀕
(Annex 609).
90 􀈻􀉟􀉡􀀃􀉧􀉚􀉡􀉜􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉹􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxMlbyiClWk (Annex 638).
69
Above, the convoy in Video 12 at 0:01;
below, reference image from Google Street View.91
Video 13
129. The next video we analyzed was one posted on VK by user Ekaterina
􀀽􀁘􀁅􀁄􀁎􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀂳􀉌􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉫􀉚􀀃􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉈􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀀃– 􀉈􀉗􀉆􀉄􀀏􀂴􀀃
meaning the light rail track between Stary Oskol and OEMK steel works. The user uploaded
the video on 24 June at 10:39 A.M.92 This video was downloaded and uploaded to the
Bellingcat MH17 Primer Videos YouTube channel.93
91 Google Street View,
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@51.3204402,37.8869015,3a,75y,200.1h,85.14t/data=!3m6!
1e1!3m4!1sylOYSxf8yZNhFg1vWi0qhg!2e0!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 716).
92 􀉌􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉫􀉚􀀃􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉈􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀀃- 􀉈􀉗􀉆􀉄􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀓􀀙􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀹􀀮􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://vk.com/video13319404_168999975 (Annex 611).
93 􀉌􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉫􀉚􀀃􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉈􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀀃􀉈􀉗􀉆􀉄􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀓􀀙􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KERgkqQdSO0 (Annex 644).
70
130. Using the location provided in the video and satellite imagery, we identified
the coordinates as 51.2441558,37.9365475.
Above, the convoy in Video 13 at 0:11; below, reference image from Google Street View.94
Video 14
131. The next video we analyzed was one posted on VK by user Alexander
Kleshnev. The video description states it is in Alexeyevka, and was uploaded on 25 June at
94 Google Street View,
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@51.2441012,37.9363074,3a,75y,249.56h,93.02t/data=!3m7
!1e1!3m5!1sP3eUx3FGLAyhiSQRWGxfnw!2e0!6s%2F%2Fgeo0.ggpht.com%2Fcbk%3Fpa
noid%3DP3eUx3FGLAyhiSQRWGxfnw%26output%3Dthumbnail%26cb_client%3Dmaps_
sv.tactile.gps%26thumb%3D2%26w%3D203%26h%3D100%26yaw%3D21.350794%26pitc
h%3D0%26thumbfov%3D100!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 713).
71
9:47 A.M. The post is still publicly available as of this report,95 and a copy was uploaded to
Bellingcat’s MH17 Primer Videos YouTube channel.96
132. The video shows a 3-minute stretch of the same road, providing a good
understanding of the overall surroundings and what kind of road shape to look for in
overhead satellite imagery. We found a search area with matching landmarks south of the
city, and again it was possible to confirm the location with Google Street View. The
coordinates are 50.5831713,38.7146552.
Left, still image from Video 14 at 2:19; right, Google Street View.97
133. The Buk used in the MH17 attack can be seen in this video at 0:53:
95 􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉜􀀃􀈺􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉫􀉟􀉟􀉜􀉤􀉟􀀏􀀃􀀹􀀮􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://vk.com/video91220754_168802710 (Annex 613).
96 􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉜􀀃􀈺􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉫􀉟􀉟􀉜􀉤􀉟􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hlM_QNs8i3w (Annex 640).
97 Google Street View,
https://www.google.com/maps/@50.5830758,38.7146827,3a,75y,297.32h,88.62t/data=!3m7!
1e1!3m5!1s8VSo0gwt8FbVEI2EFxhU3Q!2e0!6s%2F%2Fgeo3.ggpht.com%2Fcbk%3Fpanoi
d%3D8VSo0gwt8FbVEI2EFxhU3Q%26output%3Dthumbnail%26cb_client%3Dmaps_sv.ta
ctile.gps%26thumb%3D2%26w%3D203%26h%3D100%26yaw%3D88.251366%26pitch%3
D0%26thumbfov%3D100!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 721).
72
Video 15
134. The next video we analyzed was originally uploaded on OK.ru. The video
description states the video was filmed on the Millerovo-Lugansk highway and was uploaded
on 25 June at 11:31 A.M. The post has been deleted, but it was downloaded and uploaded to
the Bellingcat Vehicle Tracking Project YouTube channel.98
135. The video shows a military convoy passing through the location:
98 􀀾􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀗􀁀􀀃􀉂􀉞􀉭􀉬􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉣􀉫􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉤􀀃􀉝􀉪􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉰􀉟􀀃􀉬􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉫􀉚􀀃􀉆􀉢􀉥􀉥􀉟􀉪􀉨􀉜􀉨-􀉅􀉭􀉝􀉚􀉧􀉫􀉤􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀛􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VrjbVIv61qE (Annex 702).
73
136. Based on details visible in the video, we determined that the video was filmed
on a road running south of Millerovo towards the Ukrainian border 25 kilometers to the west.
The coordinates are 48.902343, 40.444658.
137. Google Street View in that area ends at the point where the video begins, but
we were still able to make some matches. For example, below, the positions of large poles
and the shape of the tree line match:
Top, still image from Video 15 at 0:02; right, image from Google Street View.99
99 Google Street View,
https://www.google.com/maps/@48.9025585,40.4483194,3a,75y,271.69h,94.08t/data=!3m7!
1e1!3m5!1sLgLc5p5CeM9SScQyaxjaIQ!2e0!6s%2F%2Fgeo3.ggpht.com%2Fcbk%3Fpanoid
25. 06. 2014 11:31:40
- - ---
74
138. At the start of the video, on the right hand side of the road, the small pole with
a blue sign is also visible. This was also visible on Google Street View:
Left, three still images from Video 15 at 0:01; right, image from Google Street View.
139. Several other elements visible in the Google Street View image are also
present in satellite map imagery and the video. The matches between the satellite imagery
(from Yandax Maps) and the Google Street View image are shown below. This confirms the
accuracy of the Street View imagery, further confirming the location of the video.
%3DLgLc5p5CeM9SScQyaxjaIQ%26output%3Dthumbnail%26cb_client%3Dmaps_sv.tactil
e.gps%26thumb%3D2%26w%3D203%26h%3D100%26yaw%3D134.93484%26pitch%3D0
%26thumbfov%3D100!7i13312!8i6656 (Annex 720).
75
Top, the satellite imagery from the area; below, the Google Street View image. The green
box shows the billboard that is just out of view at the start of the video. The red boxes show
four large poles on either side of the road. The yellow box shows a large sign on the north
side of the road. The pink shows two rows of smaller poles.
140. These landmarks match certain landmarks in the video. For example, eight
seconds into the video, the large sign on the north side of the road is visible, just ahead of the
large poles and the two rows of smaller poles:
76
141. Slightly further along the road, the large poles and individual smaller poles are
visible:
142. After six of the smaller poles pass, the tree line ends and opens up to a large
field:
25. 06. 2014 11:31:21
25. 06. 2014 11:31:24
77
143. Poles visible in the video are also visible in the satellite imagery:
144. We also counted the number of smaller poles the car passed, and found that
the car stopped at the ninth pole, shown below in red, with a sign on the right hand side of the
road also visible, shown below in yellow:
25. 06. 2014 11:31:37
' ... 􁁑.
78
145. We also saw scattered trees to the left of the car visible on the satellite map
imagery:
25. 06. 2014 11:31:67
79
Other Methodological Steps in Tracking the Buk Through Russia in the June Convoy
146. We used a local news report about the movement of the convoy to confirm our
findings.100 The report included images of vehicles from the same convoy, for example the
following photograph that shows a Buk marked 221, seen in multiple videos of the convoy:
100 KaviCom.ru, https://www.kavicom.ru/news-view-12861.html (Annex 525).
·- .... .
•• •• .:
-•• .•- z•• ••• -• •• • •• . • I - -- •• <.)
25. 06. 2014 11:32:02 .
±
A
80
Photograph of Buk 221 from the KaviCom.ru website
V. LINKING THE JUNE CONVOY TO THE RUSSIAN 53RD BRIGADE
147. It is possible to determine which Russian unit the Buk is likely to belong to by
examining the vehicles in the column. The videos of the convoy travelling to Ukraine show
that the vehicles have area code “50” on their registration plates, which indicates101 that they
belong to the Moscovskiy Voenniy Okrug (MVO) or the Moscow Military District.102
148. The area code “50” is visible on the registration plates of the vehicles in a
video taken in the Krasneyskiy area on the morning of the 24th of June.
101 Wikipedia, Vehicle Registration Plates of Russia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vehicle_registration_plates_of_Russia#Regional_codes
(Annex 677).
102 􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀺􀁌􀁎􀁌􀁓􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀉆􀉨􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉜􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉨􀉤􀉪􀉭􀉝􀀏􀀃
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%
D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%
D1%8B%D0%B9_%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3 (Annex 670).
• ' •' -"
•
+
'
.A#
et.udl I
I ',
' tu4 •I I '' . ' •
i
%
4 ' I du. • ' L
81
Truck in the convoy heading to Alexeyevka on the 24th of June (note: the timestamp
on the video is wrong).103
149. A resident of Stary Oskol also confirmed that the registration numbers on the
vehicles in the convoy had the “50” code. The user rokerrson posted on Instagram on the
23rd of June:
103 􀉛􀉟􀉥􀉝􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉫􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉥􀀃􀉄􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉧􀉟􀉧􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉪􀀃􀉨􀉧􀀃􀉄􀉨􀉥􀉨􀉧􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉨􀉣􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉢􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀔􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃
2015), https://youtu.be/qAePW2kP_uw?t=183 (Annex 636). The dashcam recording
available on YouTube appears to have a time/date stamp error, reading “2011.01.01”. This is
clearly wrong for numerous reasons, including the summer weather in the video is radically
different from the Staryy Oskol area in wintertime and the exact same vehicles are visible in
multiple videos filmed from 23 June 2014 to 25 June 2014. See 􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀓􀀙􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀉄􀉭􀉪􀉫􀉤􀀏􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃
􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉟􀉞􀉟􀉬􀀃􀉜􀀃􀉫􀉬􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉧􀉭􀀃􀉏􀉚􀉪􀉶􀉤􀉨􀉜􀉚􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉛􀉟􀉥􀉝􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉫􀉤􀉭􀉸􀀃􀉝􀉪􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉰􀉭􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TIVzgj7884&feature=youtu.be&t=3m45s
(Annex 689􀀌􀀞􀀃􀉌􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉫􀉚􀀃􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉈􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀀃- 􀉈􀉗􀉆􀉄􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀓􀀙􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀔􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀹􀀮􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀓􀀝􀀘􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃
2014), https://vk.com/video13319404_168999975
(Annex 611).
82
Instagram post about the convoy104
150. The following is a translation of the above post: “This evening, a column of
military hardware passed through our city, which included, mobile RLS [radar], ZRK [air
defense missile system] Buk (if correctly identified), a bunch of tented Urals and other
vehicles, generally around 80-100 units in total, including a field kitchen and refueling trucks.
Presumably, these are troops of the CVO [Central Military District] on exercises and they
moved in the direction of the Ukrainian border with the Belgorod region.” Later, the poster
added the following: “correction with the CVO… vehicles with Moscow numbers (50 rus)”.
151. The Moscow Military District has two anti-aircraft missile brigades that are
specially outfitted with Buk systems.105 These are the 5th Zrbr “Buk”, which is based in
Shuya and the 53rd Zrbr “Buk” which is based in Kursk. The 5th brigade can be ruled out
104 rokersson, Instagram (23 June 2014),
https://www.instagram.com/p/pmJZkzSA0s/?modal=true (Annex 691).
105 Internet Archive, Wayback Machine,
https://web.archive.org/web/20120611005952/http://www.ryadovoy.ru:80/forum/index.php?t
opic=423.0 (Annex 684).
.alexovflow71$erg_kosten gregorkalugin 24¢ ■ rokersson
36pave! p 1, no xopy. CTapt. CK0HOST Ha
yTumwatpM) I
2 months ago
Cerops seepo wepes au ropop npounaEdd
Kono4a 80e0i re0M 8 COCTa8e, MO6.ND
Pn. 3PK Sy (ecm eepno ono3awn), y
reTo8ab»bx Y'pa08 M npOMX Mau.MM, 0Ou[MM
xonwwecrso oono 80.100 epMu, 8Oa9
none8yo xyxo M 3an1pa8ug4008
floe pnonorento, 3T0 80icxa L4BO Ha yex M
per act 0Ms crop0Hy rpau.g6 /pa464 C
benropopcxoii o6nacrao. pnc #neo #3pK
crape0con #yxpone #pocc #sen
rokersson
@in_100gram_ sputnik_L_pogrom
rokersson
flonpaBxa c L4BO Mau46t C MOCK0BMMM
oMwepa (50 rus). A BOT 1yI BM[eO 0cshis
6paver
dryrepasno po6necsit apcen csxonoun a
ynumwaup. Aaby 06 ry pa36un
EH
EH
EH
E
0
rokersson
83
because according to multiple sources106 it has been moved out of the Moscow Military
District and into the Western Military District, and is now head-quartered in St Petersburg,
where it uses the “43” area code on its vehicles.107
152. As Kursk is relatively close to Staryy Oskol it makes sense that the convoy
was comprised of the 53rd brigade and departed from its base at V/Ch (Military Unit) 32406.
This is also confirmed by the earliest video of the convoy,108 taken during in the morning or
afternoon of the 23rd June, which shows the vehicles driving away from Kursk and in the
direction of Kharkiv. It is therefore likely that the Buk belongs to the 53rd brigade from
Kursk.
153. Moreover, it also appears the 53rd “Buk” brigade not only uses the “50” area
code on their registration plates, but their troops have uploaded pictures of some of the same
vehicles that can been seen in the videos taken around Staryy Oskol. Here are two photos of
the same truck, the first image is from the video in the Krasneyskiy area (Video 4) and the
second was uploaded by Ivan Krasnoproshin who serves in the 53rd brigade.109
106 See, e.g., Russian Wikipedia, 5-􀉹􀀃􀉡􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉬􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉪􀉚􀉤􀉟􀉬􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉛􀉪􀉢􀉝􀉚􀉞􀉚􀀏􀀃
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/5-
%D1%8F_%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_
%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B1
%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B0 (Annex 669).
107 Photograph of Soldiers, accessed at
http://cs305312.vk.me/u155194290/148022808/w_6a4c91a5.jpg (Annex 726).
108 􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀓􀀙􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀉄􀉭􀉪􀉫􀉤􀀏􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉟􀉞􀉟􀉬􀀃􀉜􀀃􀉫􀉬􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉧􀉭􀀃􀉏􀉚􀉪􀉶􀉤􀉨􀉜􀉚􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉛􀉟􀉥􀉝􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉫􀉤􀉭􀉸􀀃
􀉝􀉪􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉰􀉭􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁜􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁚􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀢􀁙􀀠􀀘􀀷􀀬􀀹􀁝􀁊􀁍􀀚􀀛􀀛􀀗􀀃
(Annex 613).
109 Bellingcat Investigation Team, Origin of the Separatists’ Buk: A Bellingcat Investigation,
BELL¿NGCAT (8 November 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/
2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-investigation/ (preserving a
copy of the social media post) (Annex 446).
84
On the left: a truck in the convoy to Alexeyevka on the 24th of June (Video 4).110 On the right,
the same truck photographed by Sergeant Ivan Krasnoproshin of the 53rd “Buk” brigade in
􀀮􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁎􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁖􀀃􀂳􀀓􀀙􀀖􀀜􀈺􀉇􀀘􀀓􀂴􀀑111
154. Here are pictures of a Buk Snow Drift Radar unit. The first was uploaded by
Kranoproshin in 2013 and the second is from the video of the convoy in Alexeyevka (Video
2).
110 􀉛􀉟􀉥􀉝􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉫􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉥􀀃􀉄􀉪􀉚􀉫􀉧􀉟􀉧􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉪􀀃􀉨􀉧􀀃􀉄􀉨􀉥􀉨􀉧􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉨􀉣􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉢􀀄􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀔􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qAePW2kP_uw&t=1m37s (Annex 636).
111 Bellingcat Investigation Team, Origin of the Separatists’ Buk: A Bellingcat Investigation,
BELL¿NGCAT (8 November 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/
2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-investigation/ (preserving a
copy of the social media post) (Annex 446).
85
The third vehicle from the left is a Snow Drift Radar that can be used as part of the
Buk system. The number on the side reads “201”.112
A Snow Drift Radar with identification number “201” in Alexeyevka on the 24th of
July (Video 2).113
112 Magnitsky, Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by
Russian Troops, BELL¿NGCAT (8 September 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/ukand-
europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russiacontrolled-
by-russian-troops/ (preserving a copy of the social media post) (Annex 445).
113 􀈻􀉟􀉥􀉝􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉫􀉤􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉥􀀑􀀃􀉝􀀑􀀃􀈺􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉫􀉟􀉟􀉜􀉤􀉚􀀏􀀃􀈾􀉦􀉢􀉬􀉪􀉨􀉜􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉦􀉚􀉝􀉚􀉡􀉢􀉧􀀃􀉆􀉚􀉝􀉧􀉢􀉬􀀑􀀃􀉈􀉩􀉟􀉪􀉚􀉬􀉨􀉪􀀃
􀀅􀉄􀉊􀉕􀉇􀀅􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀹􀀮􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://vk.com/video135321380_169811617?list=03e8088fdba765b187 (Annex 610).
86
Krasnoproshin inside one of the unit’s vehicles. The chevrons indicate that he is a
sergeant.114
155. A social media post by Vasily Ilyin, a member of the Brigade, shows the
numbered Buk units as well as the number plate of one of the transporters being used, which
matches vehicles visible in the convoy videos.115
Left: Photograph posted by Vasily Ilyin on VKontakte on 25 June 2014.116
Right: License plate XP 8236 50 in the June convoy (Video 8)117 and the same license plate
in Ilyin’s 25 June photograph.
114 Magnitsky, Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by
Russian Troops, BELL¿NGCAT (8 September 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/ukand-
europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russiacontrolled-
by-russian-troops/ (preserving a copy of the social media post) (Annex 445).
115 Bellingcat Investigation Team, Origin of the Separatists’ Buk: A Bellingcat Investigation,
BELL¿NGCAT (8 November 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/
2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-investigation/ (preserving a
copy of the social media post) (Annex 446).
116 Ibid.
117 􀈼􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀃􀉋􀉬􀉚􀉪􀉵􀉣􀀃􀉈􀉫􀉤􀉨􀉥􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://youtu.be/9JWUPGLqzZ4?t=164 (Annex 642).
l·.1
I
'
--=i
87
Top: Buk 231 in the June Convoy (Video 7).118
Bottom: Buk 231 in Ilyin’s 25 June photograph.119
156. The following picture shows Krasnoproshin at the headquarters of military
unit 32406; note the missiles in background which are displayed for show on the parade
ground.
118 􀀾􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀖􀁀􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉩􀉨􀉫􀀑􀀃􀉌􀉪􀉨􀉢􀉰􀉤􀉨􀉦􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀛􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃
https://youtu.be/r_zQVxMc4zo?t=60 (Annex 699).
119 Bellingcat Investigation Team, Origin of the Separatists’ Buk: A Bellingcat Investigation,
BELL¿NGCAT (8 November 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/
2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-investigation/ (preserving a
copy of the social media post) (Annex 446).
88
Ivan Krosnoproshin at the parade ground of the 53rd brigade on the 22nd of July
2012.120
157. The following image shows the parade ground of the 53rd brigade from above;
the same missiles are visible on the south side of the parade ground.
120 Magnitsky, Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by
Russian Troops, BELL¿NGCAT (8 September 2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/ukand-
europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russiacontrolled-
by-russian-troops/ (preserving a copy of the social media post) (Annex 445).
89
The missiles in the image above confirm Krasnoproshin’s location in the earlier
photo.121
158. Images posted to social media accounts of 53rd Brigade members show
certificates issued by the unit detailing their promotion after a training exercise that took
place between June 22nd and July 25th. These dates are significant as not only was the
convoy seen heading towards the border on June 23rd, but some vehicles returned to the base
before July 19th, near the end of the exercise as per the certificates, showing a consistency
between the dates of the 53rd Brigades movements, and the dates of the training exercise.
121 Yandex Maps,
https://yandex.ru/maps/?ll=36.303356%2C51.706292&spn=0.006759%2C0.002180&z=18&l
=sat&mode=search&text=%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F%2C%
20%D0%9A%D1%83%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F%20%D0%BE%D0
%B1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C%2C%20%D0%9A%D1%83%D1%8
0%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9%20%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BE%D0
%BD&sll=36.303056%2C51.705833&sspn=0.007328%2C0.002266 (Annex 712).
􀀘􀀓􀀙􀀊􀀏
•
Ye6e coop npoe
c 22 Mo no 25 woe 914 1o/
np woicxooil ae1 $406»
8 I0TOCT aaTM a pc ea
BYC-042D6
Kocoll rpMr e IpMee» S Mo.a 2941
ATTeCTOBaH opMep€KM COCTa
K........,,􁁑 IC 'fK"fN )241.)t,
no/OB9MK "Myre
Ilpcsoeo ape peer
npo4 MO PG on M
Haa dry/,re'Ta Be0r 0 06ywe
nomxosux A.Cary.a
ye6e c6opa npone
e 22 uous no 25 wop 2014 r0a
np no#cool acr 32406
8 10HO€TM HaaTHHKa pace'Ta
BY€-042800.
K soeHoi npMcre pHBeeH o 2014r.
ArreCTOBaM B 0pHICpCK COCTa8.
KOMa.Ip BOCxof acr» 32406
noxoBMMK C.Myxaes
IlpwcsoeHo ow} toe 38aMe ehreHaT"
pmaou MO P or No
Haaaux baryasreTa BoHHOOr 06ye
nOOBux A.Cary.a
Images of certificates posted by 53rd Brigade members on social media accounts.>
I 59. I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to provide further testimony.
Signed in g.th,kl.ale /A on _1.s 5Vi, + ,2018.
»».1
Eliot Higgins
? Internet Archive, Wayback Machine,
https ://web .archive. org/web/20 15 0910000404/https://instagram.com/p/q26ixzmRe TI
(Annex
90
Annex 10
Witness Statement of Andrii Mykolaiovych Tkachenko (5 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

1
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
WITNESS STATEMENT
OF ANDRII TKACHENKO
1. My name is Andrii Tkachenko. Since September 2015, I have been working for
the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, as the Deputy
Head of the Investigation Division of the Office for the Investigation of Crimes against the
national security of Ukraine, peace, safety of people, and international law and order.
2. I have been with the prosecution service in various positions since August 2005.
From 2005 to 2008 I held the position of investigator, senior-investigator, prosecutorcriminalist
at the Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Odesa Garrison. From 2008 to 2013, I
worked for the Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Southern Region as a senior investigator for
special matters and a prosecutor of a department. In 2013, I was Deputy Prosecutor of the
Kirovograd Prosecutor’s Office for supervising the observance of laws in the military sphere.
From November 2013 to May 2015, I was a senior investigator for special matters of the Main
Military Prosecutor’s Office. From May to September 2015, I was Chief of the investigative
division of the Department for supervising the observance of laws by the joint forces of the Anti-
Terrorist Operation of the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, the Prosecutor General’s Office of
Ukraine.
A. General information on the pre-trial investigation in the criminal
proceeding 􀈹􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀘􀀚
3. On 15 August 2015, I was appointed as a senior officer of the group of
investigators in the pre-trial investigation in the criminal proceeding No 42014000000000457.
Among other things, in the course of the criminal proceeding, we carry out the collection,
systematization, and analysis of evidence of the involvement of representatives of the Russian
2
government and servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (hereinafter –
“RAF”) and other persons in the activities of the illegal armed formations DPR and LPR. In the
course of the pre-trial investigation, we have collected evidence proving that since 2014
representatives of the Russian government and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
have been supporting the activities of the illegal armed formations DPR and LPR by providing
them with consultative assistance, weapons and ammunition, other assets, and manpower
through the uncontrolled parts of the state border of Ukraine.
4. The collection of evidence has been performed through investigative (search)
actions and covert investigative (search) actions; by demanding and receiving articles,
documents, information, and expert conclusions from the governmental agencies, Armed Forces
of Ukraine and other military formations, law-enforcement and investigative bodies,
enterprises, institutions and organizations, and officials and individual persons; and through
other procedural actions provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
5. Evidence has also been collected by reviewing the files of criminal cases, of which
pre-trial investigations are conducted by the National Police of Ukraine, Security Service of
Ukraine and contain evidence that may be of interest for the pre-trial investigation in the
criminal proceeding No 42014000000000457.
6. This criminal proceeding requires a great number of investigative and procedural
actions on the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and other regions of Ukraine, in
particular: interrogations of victims, witnesses, and suspects; and inspections of articles,
objects, and documents. The said investigative actions are carried out by:
􀕢 investigators and prosecutors involved in this criminal proceeding (in total, more
than 40 persons);
􀕢 upon a written order by an investigator or prosecutor, other bodies of the pre-trial
investigation or by operative units of the National Police, Security Service, and State
Border Service of Ukraine.
7. During the pre-trial investigation, if there is enough evidence to announce a
suspicion to a person (or persons) of committing criminal offences, the person is notified of the
suspicion. If necessary, the materials of the pre-trial investigation on the criminal offences by a
3
person can be allocated by a prosecutor into an individual proceeding, where the pretrial
investigation either:
􀕢 continues; or
􀕢 wraps up with the submission of an indictment against that person to a court for
further consideration of the case on the merits (including the special form of a
pretrial investigation with regard to suspects who are hiding from investigative
authorities); or
􀕢 a suspect is declared wanted.
8. According to the results of the pre-trial investigation of this criminal proceeding,
80 persons, including 49 citizens of the Russian Federation (21 officials, including the Minister
of Defense of the Russian Federation and his two deputies, the Head of the General Staff of the
Russian Federation and his first deputy, adviser to the President of the Russian Federation,
former plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the
“Crimean Federal District”, totaling 18 generals and admirals from among the higher command
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), have been brought to criminal responsibility for
crimes against the national security of Ukraine and public order.
9. 46 indictments with regard to 49 suspects (including 20 citizens of the Russian
Federation) have been submitted to courts. By court judgments, 31 people have already been
convicted, including 11 Russian citizens (which includes 3 servicemen of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation). These are the first sentences imposed by the Ukrainian courts.
10. During the pre-trial investigation in criminal proceeding No
42014000000000457, we have collected evidence of the provision of support to the illegal
armed formations DPR and LPR and other similar persons by the representatives of the Russian
government and command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in particular:
􀕢 documentary information about the results of the operative, search and
counterintelligence activities of the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Police
and other law enforcement bodies of Ukraine;
4
􀕢 documentary information about the results of the counterintelligence by the Main
Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and Foreign
Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
􀕢 statements of witnesses and victims, suspects and convicted;
􀕢 audio recordings and intercepted telephone conversations of more than 700 persons
among the representatives of the government and command of the RAF, leaders of
the illegal armed formations DPR and LPR and other similar persons, collected
during the period from 2014 to 2016 by the law enforcement and intelligence
agencies of Ukraine, which contain information about various crimes, including
information about the provision of weapons, military equipment, and others assets
from the territory of the Russian Federation, and staffing of the illegal armed
formations DPR and LPR to include military personnel of the RAF and Russian
citizens.
11. The majority of these audio recordings is restricted in terms of access, and is kept
in the materials of the criminal proceedings with the Security Service of Ukraine and National
Police of Ukraine, as well as its intelligence agencies.
12. Below, we present declassified information, including certain intercepted
telephone conversations of persons who are connected to the illegal actions in Donetsk and
Luhansk oblasts, which is part of the materials of the criminal proceeding investigated by the
Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine.
13. All the evidence discussed below has been collected, systemized and analyzed as
part of criminal proceeding No 42014000000000457 and have been checked and found as
acceptable.
B. The Glazyev Telephone Intercepts
14. As part of this investigation, my team obtained evidence that shows that, around
the same time Russia orchestrated its occupation of the Crimean peninsula from February–
March 2014, the leadership of the Russian Federation and representatives of the special services
of the Russian Federation, according to a previously crafted plan, facilitated mobilization of the
remonstrative potential of the population in the south-east regions of Ukraine and formation of
5
the internal opposition in those regions where, under their leadership, illegal separatist
referenda aimed at the violation of territorial integrity of Ukraine, was organized.
15. Many Russian government officials, including leadership of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation, took part in this plan. Sergey Glazyev, an advisor to Russian Federation
President V. Putin, oversaw this operation from late February 2014 to March 2014 while based
in Moscow. He was responsible for:
􀕢 working with Russian mass media to further this plan, including by writing news
articles calling on leadership of the RF and its armed forces to take measures against
Ukraine, allegedly in order to protect the Russian-speaking population;
􀕢 providing instructions and orders to pro-Russian Ukrainians and Russian Federation
citizens to organize mass protests and seize regional councils throughout eastern
Ukraine, and coercing them to make decisions on seceding from Ukraine and forcing
the councils to then declare “people’s republics.”
16. The investigation confirmed S. I. Glazyev’s involvement in this plan based on
audio recordings of S. I. Glazyev’s telephone conversations with numerous other Russian
officials and Ukrainians, in which he discussed various actions intended to carry out this plan.
In particular, the investigation collected the following types of evidence:
a) Audio recordings of the telephone conversation of S. Glazyev, which were obtained
by the Security Service of Ukraine with judicial authorization and submitted to the
Main Military Prosecutor’s Office for consolidation with the materials of the criminal
proceeding (including conversations of S. I. Glazyev with other representatives of
Russian government and separatists in eastern Ukraine).
b) Analysis of the audio recordings of S. I. Glazyev’s telephone conversations by a state
expert institution, which determined that the voice on the recordings belonged to S.
I. Glazyev by comparing the voice to voice samples of S. I. Glazyev.
c) Statement of a witness, deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, I. V.
Ponomarov, who personally was acquainted with S. Glazyev and confirmed the fact
of his involvement to the plan on destabilization of the situation in February-March
2014.
6
17. Audio recordings of the intercepted conversations of S. I. Glazyev collected as
part of this pre-trial investigation may be found in Annex 392.
C. Intercepted Telephone Conversations Related to the Murder of
Volodymyr Rybak
18. A team of investigators and prosecutors also are conducting investigations
related to the inhumane treatment of civilians and captured servicemen, including their murder,
torture, and exile for compulsory labour, by members of the DPR and LPR on the territories of
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
19. Among other crimes, the crime of kidnapping, torture, and murder of Volodymyr
Rybak, a member of the Horlivka City Council, on 17-19 April 2014, is being investigated.
20. The investigation has established that a leader of the illegal armed group I. Bezler
(with a nickname “Bes”) was involved in this crime. According to the intelligence, I. Bezler is
linked to the military intelligence service of the Russian Federation. We found that I. Bezler was
responsible for the crime based on a variety of evidence, including the statements of witnesses
and victims, audio recordings of intercepted telephone conversations, and expert conclusions.
21. In particular, recordings of the intercepted telephone conversations of I. Bezler
on 17 April 2014 with militants called “Federovych” and “Oleh Volodymyrovych” indicate that
Bezler was involved in organizing the kidnapping and torture of Mr. Rybak because of his public
pro-Ukrainian position.
22. The Security Service of Ukraine obtained the audio recordings of I. Bezler’s
telephone conversations in accordance with the requirements of Ukrainian legislation and after
receiving judicial authorization. The conversations were intercepted from channels of
connection with the subscribers who were present on the territory of Ukraine. At present, they
are used as evidence in the criminal proceeding.
23. Audio recordings and transcripts of the telephone conversations of I. Bezler
obtained during the pre-trial investigation are provided in Annex 386.
D. Evidence Showing Russian Supply of Military Equipment and
Ammunition to DPR and LPR Illegal Armed Groups
24. During the pre-trial investigation, the investigation team has collected evidence
showing that since April 2014, representatives of the government of the Russian Federation and
7
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been providing assistance to the activities of
the illegal armed groups of the terrorist organizations DPR and LPR. They have assisted
through the provision of advisory assistance, the coordination of actions, and the provision of
weapons, ammunition, and other property through the uncontrolled parts of the state border of
Ukraine.
25. The following evidence, showing support of the illegal armed groups of the
terrorist organizations DPR and LPR by the Russian Federation, has been collected in the
cri􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀈹􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀘􀀚:
a. Regular written intelligence reports, including those of the Security Service of
Ukraine. They were obtained on the basis of intelligence, operational, search and
counter-intelligence activities.
b. Physical evidence, including military equipment, ammunition, and other
property captured in different areas of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in Donetsk
and Luhansk oblast during clashes with the illegal armed units of DPR and LPR
(during the pre-trial investigation more than 100,000 pieces of the said physical
evidence have been collected).
26. The physical evidence shows that representatives of the government of the
Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are supporting the
activities of the illegal armed units of the terrorist organizations DPR and LPR, as demonstrated
by the following examples:
27. Multiple launch-rocket system BM-21 “Grad” mounted on the Ural truck, factory
number 4176. This MLRS BM-21 “Grad” was captured on 13 June 2014 by forces of the Anti-
Terrorist Operation from the illegal armed groups near the village of Dobropillia of Donetsk
oblast.
28. The said combat vehicle has not been in the service of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, other military formations, or law enforcement bodies, nor has it been imported to the
territory of Ukraine
29. The evidence that this weapon was originated in the Russian Federation includes
the 28 October 2015 protocol of inspection provided in Annex 136.
8
30. Man-portable air-defence system missile “Grom E2” No 1016: On 18 May 2014,
during a special operation for the liberation of the Kramatorsk airfield (Donetsk oblast),
servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine seized the air-defense missile system “Grom E2”
with serial number 1016 from illegal armed formations DPR and LPR.
31. In September 2015, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine received a request
by the Investigation Department for Special Matters of the Main Investigation Department of
the Department of Military Police of Georgia for international legal assistance in criminal case
No. 103080094. In the request, the law enforcement agency of the Republic of Georgia
confirmed that the air-defense system missile “Grom E2” with serial number 1016 belonged to
the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, and was lost on 11 August 2008 by the 51st battalion of the
fifth infantry brigade of the Armed Forces of Georgia during the shelling of the Kodori Valley by
the RAF and Abkhazian separatists with the use of military aviation and artillery.
32. The said type of ammunition has not been in service of the UAF, nor has it been
imported to the territory of Ukraine.
33. Evidence showing that the weapon belonged to Georgia, was lost and captured by
the Russian Federation, and then was captured by the UAF from the illegal armed groups in the
Donetsk oblast includes those documents provided in Annex 186.
34. Two T-72 tanks, modifications T-72B1, factory number I03VT6265 and factory
number I04VT8149. In August 2014, the said military equipment was captured by units of ATO
forces in the course of combat operations with the illegal armed groups in the areas of Mariinka
and Volnovakha of Donetsk oblast.
35. The investigation has determined the following identifying features that confirm
the above-mentioned tanks are in service of the Russian Federation. In tanks, which are used by
the Russian Federation, the air valves “IL” are located in the transmission unit, while in similar
Ukrainian tanks, they are located in the combat compartment. The nodes of these tanks have
factory sealings, another hallmark of Russian use. By contrast, all T-72 type tanks in service of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine have undergone depot overhaul at the armour factories in Lviv or
Kyiv, and therefore cannot have the factory seals of the manufacturer. These two tanks also
have counters that track motor hours on the move. Ukrainian tanks have not installed these
9
counters. There are fans of the “DV-3” type at the crew’s working places. On Ukrainian tanks,
foreign fans have been installed after the depot overhaul (mainly from China). There is a fuel
heating system in these tanks, but in T-72 tanks in service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine these
systems are dismantled during the depot overhaul.
36. The said military vehicles have not been in service of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, nor have they been imported to Ukraine. Evidence that establishes that the said tanks
originated in the Russian Federation includes those documents provided in Annexes 140 and
141, which are inspection reports from 23 November 2015 and 27 November 2015.
37. Launch tubes for small-sized rocket-propelled flamethrowers MRO-A: Tubes for
small-sized rocket-propelled flamethrowers marked “MRO-A MO 1:10:00” and “MO 1:02:00”
from 2014 to 2016 were seized by units of the Anti-Terrorist Operation forces in the territories
of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts immediately after clashes with illegal armed groups of DPR and
LPR organizations.
38. The said armament has not been in service of Ukraine, nor has it been imported
to Ukraine. Evidence that establishes that the said armaments were seized from the illegal
armed groups includes the document provided in Annex 144, which is a record of inspection
from 3 December 2015.
39. Testimonies of various people that were obtained directly by investigators and
prosecutors on the teams working on this proceeding, and also by specially instructed
investigators of other pre-trial investigation agencies and operational agencies. Below, I note an
example that demonstrates the Russian supply of weapons into eastern Ukraine, including to
DPR and LPR:
40. Testimony of A. Kharko who, being in captivity of the illegal armed groups of
DPR and LPR from June 2014 to March 2015, was involved in the unloading of Russian trucks
arriving under the guise of “Humanitarian Aid to Donbas” and military vehicles with military
number plates of the Armed Forces of Russia, which actually contained ammunition for
mortars, missile complexes “Grad”, artillery, and small arms. A copy of the protocol of
interrogation of the said witness is provided in Annex 250.
10
E. Evidence that confirms the existence of training camps for the militants
on the territory of the Russian Federation and in the occupied
Autonomous Republic of Crimea
41. During the pre-trial investigation, the team collected evidence on the creation of
training camps on the territory of the Russian Federation and the occupied AR of Crimea, which
conduct military training for militants within the illegal armed units of the terrorist
organizations DPR and LPR.
42. Among other evidence that confirm facts of existence of such training camps,
there are statements of certain persons, in particular:
i. Witnesses O. Sachava and O. Stemasov showed that from 2014 to 2016, there were
active combat training camps for individuals preparing to participate in the activities
of the terrorist organizations DPR and LPR. The camps were located in the territory
of the Rostov oblast of the Russian Federation, the occupied territory of the
peninsula of the Crimea, and the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and
were functioning under the leadership of the special services of the Russian
Federation.
ii. Testimony of I. Koval, who said that from October 2014 to March 2015, he, along
with other citizens from Russia, participated in illegal armed formations of the
terrorist organization DPR. In the period from 22 October 2014 to early November
2014, he, and other militants from the DPR, were trained in a military camp near the
city of Volgograd of the Russian Federation, where the servicemen of the RAF taught
them to use anti-aircraft missile system, as well as the “Strela-10” missile complex.
After the training in November 2014, I. Koval, along with other militants, was sent to
the town of Komsomolsk of the Starobeshevsky district of Donetsk oblast, where he
was included in an illegal armed formation of the DPR. During this period of
participation in the illegal armed formation, while at the railway station Ilovaisk, he
was involved in the unloading of wagons with ammunition for MLRS “Grad”, which
arrived from the Russian Federation.
43. Copies of the protocols of interview of the above witnesses may be found in
Annexes 207, 218, and 231.
11
44. I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to provide further testimony.
Signed in Kyiv on 05 June 2018.
By: [Signature]
Andrii TKACHENKO
3ACTOCYBAHHH MIKHAPOJIHO~ KOHBEHIIj IIPO OPOTEY 3
IHAHCYBAHHHM TEPOPI3MN TA MDKHAPO/IHOT KOHBEHIUI IIPO
JIKBI/IAIUIO BCIX OPM PACOBO JIHCKPHMIHAIII
yKPA~HA
port
POCIHCKOI EJIEPAIi
CBIJIHEHHH AHJIPII TKAHEHKA
1. H, AHIIpii TRaeHKO, 3 BepeCHH 2015 DOKy IIDOXOIUKy On1y6y y FotoHii
iicKoBii npoyparypi Feepanoi IpoKypaTypH YKpiHH Ha IIOCa/Ii 3aCTyIa Haan1Ka
CI~IIOTO BiJUIUIy yIIDaBJIiHHH 3 DO3CJIJIyBaHHH 3JIOHHHiB IIDOTH OCHOB HaIIOHaTEHOj 6e3neK
VKDaiHH, MHpy, 6e3neK JOJICTBa Ta MLKHaDOIIHOTO IIDaBOIIODIUKy.
2. BOpraHax npoKypaTyp npaIo0 3 CepI 2005 pOKy. B 2005-2008 pp. o6ii»a
nocanu cniuroro, crapmoro enintoro, npoxypopa-xpHMiHaicra Bi~coBoi 11pOKypaTypH
OI1eCKOIO TaDHi3OHy. 3 2008p 0 2013p npatOBaB y Bi~csoBi npoKyparypi IliBeoro
DeriOHy VKDaHH Ha IIOCaJIaX CTapIIIOIO CI/IMOTO B 0CO61HBO BaIHBHX cnpaBax Ta 1IpOKyp0pa
BiUIiry. 2013 pO11i 6y8 3aCTyIIHHKOM IIpOKypOpa KipOBOrpaICKOi IIpOKyDaTypH 3 HaTJUHIIy 3a
nopepaHHHM 3aKOHi y BOEHHij cpepi. 33 n€TOI1a21a 2013 DOKy II0 TpaBHH 2015 DOKy 6y
CTapIHM CI~JIHMM B 0CO61HO BaHHX cpaaX FOnoBHOi Bi~CKOBOi IIDOKVDaTyDpH. 33 TpaBHH
IO BepeCHH 2015 DOKy 3afMaB nOCay HaaHHKa CIJIMOTO BiUITy YIIpaBI]HHH 3 HaTJUHIy 3a
IIOIIeDpKaHHHM 3aKoHi O6ezHaHMH cHaMI AHTHTepopHcTHHoi onepa~i FonoBHoi
BicKOBOi IpOKypaTypH.
A. 3ara1Ha idOpMaIi IOIIO IOCyJIOBOTO DO3CIiIyBaHHM y
pHMiHaIHOM IIDOBZJUCHHi NO42014000000000457
3. 15 CepIHH 2015 DOKy MeHe IIDH3HaeHO CTaDIIIHM IDyIIH eIiIHX y 3icHei
IIOCy[IOBOTO DO3CJIi(yBaHHH y KDHMiHaIHOMy IIDOBZJUKeHHi N9 42014000000000457. Cepen
HI1Oro, y BKa3aHOMy KDHMiHaIHOMy IpOBaUeHHi MH 36Hpa€Mo, cHcTeMaTH3y€Mo Ta
2
aati3y€MO IIOK33H IIDHHeTHOCTi IIDeIICTaBHHKiB pOCiCKOi BI@IM, CJIyOOHX 0ci6 6pOHHx
CHI Pociicoi enepa~ (aIi -"33CPd") Ta iIx oci6 IO A»ocTi He3aKOHux 36pox
opMyBas [IHP Ta JIHP. IliI aC IIOCyJIOBOTO DO3CIiJIyBaHH 3i6paHO II0Ka3H, HKi
Ii1TBeDIUKOT, IIIO IIOHHHa0M 3 2014 DOKy IIDeAICTaBHHKH Ba/IH Pocicsoi epepaii ra
3€Pd aaor» niTpHMKy Ii»HOCTi He3aKOHHHM 36pOHHM bOpMyBaM [IHP Ta HP
IILJUHXOM HZLTHHH M KOHCyJITaTHBHOT IIOIIOMOTH, IIOCTaaHH O36po€HH, 6o~ox pHnaCi,
iIoro Maia Ta KHBOi CIH epe3 HeKOHTDOJIBOBHi /ILUHHKH JIeDKaBHOTO KODIIOHy 'KDaHH.
4. 336ip II0Ka3IB y KDHMIHaIHOMy IIDOBDKeHHI 3J1HCHOCTCH IILHXOM
poeztemu ex (po3uyoBHX) pi Ta HeracHHX eiX (po3IuIyKoBH) ii,
BHTpe6yBaHHH Ta OTpMMaHHH BiJL OpFaHiB JIeDKaBHOi BJIaJUH, 36pOHx CHI YKpaiHM, HIIIHX
Bi~CKOBHX (pOpMyBaH, IIpaBOOXOpoHHHX i po3Bi(yBa1HHX OpraHiB, iIIpHeMCT, CTaHOB i
opraHi3atit, cry6oBux Ta pi3ax oci6 pee, IoKyMerri, BioMocTe, MHOKi
eKcnepr3; npoenenu itux nportecyantx [if, nepe6aeHHx KpMianM
IIpOeCyaIHMM KOJIeKCOM YKpaHH.
5. [loa3 TKO 36paoTc LHXoM or/Uy MaTepianri KpHMiHaHX cpa,
ocypoi po3enigyaHH y HKHx 3coTe Harioannoo noiico Vpain i Cry601o
6e3IeKH VKpaiH Ta MiCTHTD IIOKa3H, HKi MOTE CTaHOBITH iHTeDeC JUI II0Cy2I1OBOTO
DO3Ci(yBa y KpHMiHaIBHOMy IIDOBaJUKeHHi N942014000000000457.
6. Ba3aHe KpHMiHaHe IIpOBaUeHH OTpe6y€ pOBeIIeHH 3HaHOTO 06cry
eiax i npottecyanx pi a repropi [loHe»oi ilyraneoi o6nacre, ix perioax
VKpain, 3opeMa nonMTi noTepiHX, cBiuiB, mi(o3poBaHHX; oruIi pee, npeteri i
noKyMeHTiB. Va32Hi ei pi IpOBOIre:
- CI(HM i npoypopaM, HKHX BKIOHeHO IIO CKIaJIY TDVIIH y IIDOMy KDHMIHaIDHOMy
IIpoBaveHHi (3aran1oM noHaI 40 0ci6);
- 3a IMCMOBHM DIODyHeHHHM CJIiJIHOTO a60 IDOKyDODa - iHIHMH ODTaHaMH JI0Cy/IOBOTO
poacrryaHHH a6o oneparHBHHM nipO3/IiaMH opraHi HaioanHoi nomuii,
Cry6H 6e3neK Ta /lepaBHOi npHKODIOHHOi CJ1yKOH VKpaiHH.
7. lint ac nocynoBoro po3cniJgyBa, 3a HaBHocTi pocTaTHo 3i6paHx p0Ka3i
UL iIo3p oco6H (H oci6) y BHHeHHi KpMiHaTHHX paBOIOpyIIIeH, ii nOBi/IOMIHETCH
3
npo mi1o3py. Y pa3i HeO6xi(HocTi, MaTepia IOCyJOBOrO pO3CIiJyBa IO/IO BHHeHHH
OCO60O KDHMHTHHX IIDaBOIIODVIIIOHD BHJIiUHIOTCH IIDOKyDODOM B OKpeMe IIDOBIUKOHHM y
HKOMy:
IIpOIOKyCTCH JIOCyJIOBe DO3CJIJIyBaHH; a60
3aBeDIIyETCH IIOCyJIOBe DO3OJI(yBaHHH 3 HaIIDaBJIeHHHM O6BHHVBaJIHOTO aKTy
cToco8Ho 0co6 2I0 Cy2Iy JUI po3py no cyTi (y Toy HOIi 3a cneiano popMoo
ocy7oBoro po3en(yanHH cTOcOBHo 0ci6, Ki nepeXOByoTcH BiI OpraHi cIitcTa );
a6o
/to3pIOBaHH OrOOIyETCH y DO3IIyK.
8. 3a pe3yTaTaM 3IHCHeHH IIOCyJIOBOITO DO3CJIJVBaHHH y BKa3aHOMy
KDHMiHZIDHOMV IIDOBaIUKeHHI, IIO KDHMIHIHOi Bi/IIOBiJIaJBHOCTi 3a BHHeHHH 3JIOHHHI
IpOT OCHO HaUiOHaIHOi 6e3eKH VKpaiHH i TpOMaICKOTO IIDaBOIODHIIKy IIDHTHTHyTO 80
oci6, y roMy oni 49 rpoMau PociicKoi dentepaii (cepen x 21 BMcoKOno~a/(OeIU», y TOMy
nomi Miierp o6opon PocicKoi benepa~ Ta Ia Oro 3aCTyIHHKH, HaaIHMK
Feepanoro rra6y 3CP i ioro nepmi 3aCTyIHK, pa lpe3era PociicKoi
Depepamii, oHi~ noBHOBaKHHi peICTaBHHK Hpe3nera Pocicsoi dentepaii
«KpHMCKOMy (eIIeDaTHOMy OKpy3i», Bcoro 18 reHepamis Ta a/uMipanis i3 ena BI1OTO
KOMaHIIHOTO CKIa1Ty 3CPD)
9. lo Cy/Uy HanpaBIeHo 46 06BHHyBaIHHX aKTiB 1II0/I0 49 00i6 (3 HHX 2O TDOMIUHH
PocicKoi epepai). 3 Hx BHpoKaMM cyJIiB 31 0co6y Be 3acypUKeHO, y TOMy HOi 11
rpoMan Pocicoi beptepan~ (cepet x 3 Kapoi BicKOBOC1y6oIi 3CPp). Ile nepm
BHDOKH ypaiHcKHX Cy/Ii.
10. Ilin aC 3piCHe IIOCyJIOBOITO DO3CIJIyVBaHHH KDHMiHaIBHOMy IIDOBIDeHHI
N942014000000000457 3i6paHo 2I0Ka3H Ha/aHHH peITaBHHKaMH BaJ Pb i epiB1Ta
3CPD Ii/TpMK He3aKOHHM 36pOHHM pOpMyBanM JIHP i JIHP ra iM oco6a,
30KpeMa:
IIOKyMeHTa1I6Ha H(bODMaIIiH I1pO De3yJITaTH 3IIiCHeHHH OIIeDaTHBHO-DO3IIyKOBOi Ta
KoTppo3iyBaHOi JInHOcTi Cy600 6e3IeKH VKpai, Hatioaoo
IIOJIiIi€Io Ta iHIM IpaBOOxOpOHHHMH ODTHaMH YKpaiHH;
4
IoKyMeHTa»Ha HpopMaH nIpO pe3y1TaTH 3IiceHHH po3Bi1yBa1Hoi IHI»HO€Ti
FonoHMM ypariHHHM po3BiIKH Miicrepera O60pOHM NKpaiHH Ta Cry600
3OBHiIIHLOi DO3Bi/IKH YVKpaiHH;
IOKa3aHH CBiJIKiB i IOTpIILIHX, IIiJIO3DIOBaHHX i O6BHHyBaeHMX;
OIIepKaHi ynpono8 2014 - 2016 DOKiB IIDaBOOXODOHHHMM i DO3BLIVBaIHMMM
OpraHaM VKpaiHH 3By'KO3aIIHCH TeJIebOHHHX DO3MOB IIOHa1 700 0ei6 i3 ea
UpetCTaBHHKB BIaIH P i KepiBHIra 33CP, BaTaKKiB KOHTDOJIBOBaHH
He3aKOHHHX 36pOfHHx bopMyBa [HP i JIHP ra ix oci6, y xx MicTHTCH
BLIOMOCTi BHHeHHH HHMH DI3HHX 3JIOHHHIB, BKIOaOHH IIOCTaHHH 3 TeDHTOp~ Pd
O3po€HH, BiicKoBoi TeXHIH Ta iHIIHx MaTepIaIHMX uocreii,
yKOMILIeKTyBaHHH He3aKOHHHX 36pOHMX dOpMyBaH JIHP i J[HP 3a paxyHOK
0CO6OBOTO CKIaTy 3CPd Ta rpoMa/UH P
11. BiIiCT BHIIIBKa3aHHX 3ByKo3aHCiB Ma1OT 06MeeHHi pocTyI,
36epiraTCH B MaTepiaax KDHMiHaIHHX IpOB@JUKeH Cry6H e3neKn VKpaiHM i
Hauioanno noiii VKpa~, a TaKO y po3Bi(yBaIHHx OpraHaX.
12. Hue Ha/Ia€TCH DO3CeKpeHeHa iHpOpMaIti, BKJTOaOHH 3ByKO3aIIHCH
TeneoHHHX po3Mo oci6, npHeTHHX Io poTHpaBHHX ii y JloHeii ra JlyracKiH
O61aCTHX, HKa MiCTHTC y MaTeDpiaax KDHMiHaJIBHOTO IIDOBaJUKeHHH, IIIO DO3CILJIy€TCH
FOJOBHOIO BiHCKOBOI IIpOKypaTyDOO TeHepaIHoi npOKypaTypH VKpaiH.
13. yei eHaBeeHi IoKa3 6yIM 3i6pai, ccreMar3oaHi Ta npoaHaIi3oBaHi y
DaMKax KDHMHaIHOTO IIDOBUKeHH N942014000000000457 Ta nepeipei a npeMer
ixsoi ponycrHMO~Ti.
B. IlepexoneHi reedOHi po3MOB Ina3€ma
14. BpaMKax IorO po3Ci(yBa, OIIepaHO JI0Ka3H, Ki BKa3yOT Ha Te, IIIO IIOpHI
3 oprai3oBaoo Poci€o OKynIaIi€ niBOCTpoBy KpHM y JOT0My-6epe3Hi 2014 DOKy, KeDiBHHITBO
Pociicoi bepepauii ra npencraBx cnetery6 Pociicoi benepauii, 3a 3a3ntaneriJ»
DO3po6IeHHM ILIaHOM, CIIDHHIH MO6ii3aii nporecTroro noTeHiaIy HaceneHH miBIeHHOcxiux
periois VKpain Ta popMyaHHo BHyTpimHoi onO3HIii B IUHX peTiOHax, Ii1
6eanocepepi
5
KepiBHHIITBOM HKHX OpTaHi3OByBIHC He'aKOHHi CeItapaTCTCK1
pepepeny, HampaneHi Ha nopyueHHH TepHTopiaHoi inieocri VKpaiHnL
15. BaraTo pociHCHx IIeDKaBHHX IIOCaJIOBIB, BKJIIOHaOM KeDiHHI(TO 33CPD,
6pan yaer y tu»oMy uaHi. Ceprii Da3EB, paIIHHK Ipe3HIeHTa Pd B.Ilyria, Har/uuta 3a
I(CO OIepaIi€o 3 KiLUH JIOTOTO 2014 DOKy Ta IIDOTHTOM 6epe3 2014 DOKy, 3HaXOJLHHC y
MoeKi, Ta Bi/Ioi/ta 3a:
po60Ty 3 pOCiHCKHMM 33MI 3 MeTOIO CIIDHHHHH IIOMy IUIaHy, BKJIOHaIOHH IIH€MOB
cTaTTi i3 3aKJIHKaMH JIO KepiBHHITa Pb Ta ii 36pOx CHI BHTH 3aXOIB 1DOTH
VKDaiHH IIJI IIDHBOJIOM 3aXHCTy DOCiHCKOMOBHODO HaCeIeHHH;
HZ/IHI BKa3iBOK Ta iHeTpyKILiH IIpODOCiCKH HTaIITOBaHMM VKDaIHIUHM Ta
rpoMaHaM PocicKoi eepaii, cnrpMoBax Ha opraHi3auio MacoBMx npoTeCTiB
Ta 3axonLeHHH MiceBHX opraHi BaIH no Bcii acrHi cxiIOj VKpaiHnH Ta
IDHMyIHIeHIH IIDHHHHTTH IIDeICTaBHHKaMH IIHX ODTaHiB BJIZIIH DiIIeHL IIpO BMXiJI 3i
CKJIaIIV VKDai Ta IIDOTOIOIIIeHHH TK 3BaHHX "HapOJUHHX peCIry6Ii".
16. Vuacr CIO.Ta3sea y uoMy LaHi mi(TBepUeHO OJIiICTBOM, rpyTyoHcL Ha
3ByKO3a1HCax TOJIO(OHHHX DO3MO CO.D1a31€Ba 3 6araTMa IHIIIMMM pOCiHC»KM
IIOCaIOBIUHMH Ta yKDajIUHMH, IIJI HaC HKHX BiH O61TOBODIOBaB Di3Hi 3aXOIUH JUIH BMKOHaHH
II»OTO ILJIaHy. {3oKpeMa, €Ii(CTBOM 6y/10 3i6paO TaKi BH/UM /I0Ka3i:
a. 3ByKO3aIIMCH TeJIepOHHHX DO3MOB C.O.Dia3€Ba, Ki 6y oepaHi CTyK6010
6e3neKM Vpaim Ha nitcrasi pie cyzy Ta nepenai FonoBii Bicoii
UIpOKyDaTypi III IDHCJIHaHHH IIO MaTeDiaiB I»OTO KDHMiHaIHOTO IIDOBaJUKeHHH
(BKJIO HOT» DO3MOBH C.Ta3ea 3 iuM npentcraBKaMH pociesKoi nat Ta
cenaparcraMn a cxozi /Kpal).
b. IOCIJUeH 3ByKo3anMciB TeIepOHHHX DO3MOB C.IO.Dna3tea, poeteHe
I(epaBHoo eKcnepTHO0 ycTaHOOO, HKa BcTaHoHa, Ito TOO¢ y 3yKo3aCaX
TeIe(bOHHHX DO3MOB HaIeKHT CO.DJIa3B€By IIIJUHXOM IIODiBHHHHH 3ByKo3anHCy
TeJIepOHHHX DO3MOB 3i 3pa3KaM TOJIOCy CO.DJ1a3€Ba.
c. noKa3 ciuKa, nenyTara JlepaHoi (yM Pociicoi benepaii LB.IIonoMapoa,
Hi e Oco6HTO 3Ha0MM 3 CO.Ta3L€BM, Ta niprTBep/UH paTH iforo
􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀏
6
perocri no nay 3 pecTa6inisaii cryat~i /KpaiHi y JTOMy-6epe3i 2014
DoKy.
17. 3ByKO3aIIHCH TOJIeOHHHX p03MOB C.O.Ena31€Ba, 3i6paHi B paMKax n0Cy)1ooro
cincra, MoHa 3HaTH y JlOIaTKy
C. Ilepexonei reetponi po3Mou, no'aaHi 3i B6H~TOM Bo.ouMpa
P6aa
18, Fpyna CIx i npoypopiB TaKOK DO3CI(ye 3IOMHH IIIOIO HeIOJICKOTO
IOBOIUKCHHH 3 IUHBLIDHHMM OCOOaMH Ta 32XOIUJIeHHMM Bi{CB»KOBOCTyKOOBIUHMM, BKIOHaOH
ixi B6HBCTBa, KaTyBaHHI Ta IIDHMyIIeHHH Io pai 3 60Ky ueHiB [IHP Ta JIHP Ha TeDHTOpLHX
loexoi i lyrancxoi o6acre.
19. CepeI iIx, po3CIJy€TC 3JIOHH IIIOIIO BHKDaJIeHHH, KaTyBaHH Ta B6HBeTBa
teyTaTa FopiBcKoi MicKOi pa(H Bo10I1HMHpa PH6aKa, Io Mano Micue 17-19 KBiTH 2014
DOKy.
20. PO3CJ(yBaH BCTaHOHIO, IIO II9 IoTO 3n10MHy pMeTHHi L.Beep,
KepiBHHK HO3KOH HOTO 36pOHOTO (OpMyBaHHH, HKH 3a OIIepTHBHHMH JIaHHMH € IIOB'3aHHM
3 BiCKOBOIO DO3BiJIKOO Pd (1pi3BHCKO «€e»). MH BHHBHIM, IO L.Be3rep Hece
BLJIIOBJITBHICT 38 3JIOHHH, Ha OCHOBi Di3HHX II0Ka3iB, BKJIOHaIOHH IIOKa3HHH CBLJIKI i eDTB,
OIIepK a HHX 3ByKO3aIIHiB TOJIebOHHHX DO3MOB.
21, 3oKpeMa, 3ByKo3aHe nepeXOIeHHx TeeboHHHX eperOopi I.Bean1epa Bit
17 KBiITHM 2014 p. 3 600BHKaMH, HKHX Ha3HBaJIH «De(OpOBH» Ta «OneT BO1OIIHMHDOBH»,
BKa3yOT Ha Te, III Bearep nper no opraniaaii Bpante Ta KaryBaHE B.PH6aKa epe3
oro ny6niy npoyKpaicy no3Hi.
22. 3ByKO3aIIMCM TeIe(OHHHX DO3MOB I.Be3Jepa OIIepaHO C1yK60 6e3neK
VKpan y BiuoBi/HocTi Io BHMor 3aKoHoIacTa VKpain Ta IIiCJ OTpHMaHHH Cy/IOBOTO
Io3Bo1y. TenepoHi po3MoBH nepexoLeHi 3 KaHaIiB 3B'3Ky 3 a6oHeHTaMH, Ki 3HaXO/IHnHCH
Ha TepTOpii VKpa~H. Ha Iei ac BOHM BHKODHCTOByIOTCH HK JIOKa3H y KDHMiHaIHOMy
IpoBaUeHHi.
􀀔􀀙􀀗􀀏
7
23. CTeHOTpaM 3ByKo3a1HiB TeIe(pOHHHX DO3MOB I.M. Be3nepa, oTpHMaHi int ae
IIocy pIoBoro ciIKTBa, MoHa 3Ha{TH B IOIaTKy
D. loaa nocraox a6poi, iicKooi TexHi Ta 6oenpwnaci
He3aKOHHM a6poM dOpMyBaM IIHP ra JIHP 3 Poci
24. Hit aC IOCyJIOBOrO po3CI(yBaHH 3i6panO II0Ka3H, Ki IIJITBepIUyOT», 1IO
IIOHHaIOMH 3 KBITH1 2014 DOKy IIDeIICTaBHHKH Ba PociicsKoj depepauii Ta 33CPD HaIIaOTL
nTpMKy He3aOHHHM 36pOHMM pOpMyBaHHM JIHP Ta HP. BOHM HITT IILITDHMKy
HXOM KOHCyJITaTHBHO IIOIIOMOTH, KOODIUHHai Ii, IOCTaa 36poi, O36pOCH Ta
HI1OTO MaHa epe3 HeKOHTDOJIOBaHi JILLHHKH IIeDKaBHOTO KODIIOHy VKpajHH.
25. y KDHMiHaIHOMy IIDOBaIUKeHHi N942014000000000457 3i6pao HacTymi
IIOKa3 II~ITDHMKH He3aKOHHHX 36pOHHX JOpMyBaH I[HP i JIHP PociicKoo bepepau€o.
a. Pery[Hpi IHcbMoi 3BiTH DO3BiIKH, BKIOHaOHH 3BiTH CIyK6H 6e3neKH
VKpaiH. BOHH 6yJIM OTpHMaHi Ha OCH0BI DO3BJIVBaIBHHX, OIIeDaTHBHO-pO3IIyKOHX Ta
KOHTppo3Bi/yaIHHx i.
b. Pe0Bi [IOKa3H, BKIaOH Bi~cKOBy TeXHiKy, o36pocHH Ta iHIe Maio,
3axonneHe y pix paioax npoene ATTepopHTHO onepai /lone»ii i
JIyrancij 06JaCTHx JI HaC 3iTKHeH i3 He3aKOHHHMM 36pOHHHMH ODMyBaHHIMH [[HP iJIHP
(II aC IOCyJIOBOTO DO3CILJIyVBHHH 3i6paHO IOHaI 100 THC. OIIHHHII BHIIeBKa3aHHX DeOBHX
21oKa3iB).
26. PeuOBi 1OKa3H IIiITBeDIUKyIOT, IUIO IIDeIICTaBHHKH aJIH Pd Ta 3CPD aJaoT»
ITpMy ItOCTi He3aKOHx 36pox dopMyBa IIHP Ta HP, LO IiITBepIUyere
HHeHaBeI(OHHMH IIDHKJIaIaMH.
27. PeaKTHHa CHCTeMa 3an11oBOrO BOTHO EM-21 «Tpa», Ha 6a3i aToMo6i1 YpaL,
3aBOIICKHi HOMeD: 4176, BKaaHi PC33B BM-21 «Tpa» 3axOIIeHO 13 epBHI 2014 pOKy
intpo3ztinaM ct ATHTepopHTHHoi onepaii y He3aKOHHHX 36pOHHHX (pODMyBaH6 1106J1H3y
Haceneoro ryTy JIo6poninu Jloexoi o6nacri.
􀀒􀀙􀀗􀀏
􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀏
8
28. 33aHaea 6ooa Mama a o36poei 3Cy, ix Bi~coHx popMyBa i
paooxopox opraHi VKpaiHH He nepeOypa.na, a ii imnopr ta repwropio /pain He
3tic1oBaBe.
29. loKa3 Toro, IO LL 36po noxO/HT i3 Pocicoi benepaii Boa0T»
IpOTOKOJ OFJHIIy BiJ1 28 KOBTHH 2015 DOKy, HKHf 3HAXOIUHTCH y JlOaTKy
3o. Beira epoana paera «IpoME2» N91016. «TpoM E2» i3 cepiM noepo
1016 6y1a BHJIy eHa 18 TpaBH 2014 pOKy BiicKOBOCIyK6OBILHMH 33CY y He3aKOHHHX 36pOHHHX
popMyBa I[HP Ta JIHP min ac cnenonepan~ 3i 3sine aepoIpoMy MicTa KpaMaTOpC
(Jloeta o6acr»).
31. y epeci 2o15 DOKy Io Fenepannoi npOKypaTypH VKpai HaIii0 3anr
CT~Oro yIIpaBiH 3 OCO6HBO BaIHBHX CIpaB FOJIOBHOTO CIJOTO yIIDaBJIHHHH
lenapraMery BicKoBoi noiuii Tpy3ij 1po HaaH MiHapOIIHO IpaBOBOi JIOIIOMOTH
KpHMiHaLHii cItpai N9103080094, y KOMy IpaOOxOpoHHHii opran Fpyii mi/Tep/Un
npunaemicr Miicrepery o6opon Ipy3ij 3eiroi KepoBaHOi paKeTM «TpOM E2», N91016,
Ka LI CepIHH 2008 pOKy 6ya BTpaeHa 51 6aTaIHOHOM I'TOi IixOTHOi 6pHra(H 336pox
Cw Fpy3ii int a 60M6apIyBa KOJIOpCOi yIteI 33CPd i a6xa3»KHMI CeIIapaTHCTaMM 3
BHKOpMcTaHHHM BicKooi aiauii i aprunepii.
32. BHeKa3aHH BMI 6oenpHnaci Ha O36po0cHHi B Vpaii e nepe6yma, ioro
iwopr a repropio /Kpain He 3piic10Banc.
33. JlOKa3H, Ki Ii/Tep/Uy1OT», III0 36po, HKa HaeKaa Fpy3ii, 6ya Brpaea i
3axopeHa Pocicoo eepa1ti€o, a 3roIoM -- 6yIa 3axOIJeHa 3Cy B He3aKOHHHX 36pOHHMX
popryBas y loHe»Kif o6nacTi, 3HaxOJUITC B JlonaTKy
34. Ila TaIL THy T-72, MOIHbiat~ T-7251, 3@BO/ICBKH HOMeD H03BT6265 1a
3ao[ICbHiH oMep Mo4BT8149, BKa3any iioy TexHiy y cepmi 2o14 poKy 3axonneo
ipo3pinaM cn ATO y xoIi 3iTKHeH 3 He3aOHHHM 36poHHMM popMyBaHMM y paioi
acenex nyTin Map'iKa Ta Boopaxa /lone1Koi o6acTi.
35. CipcroM TaHOIeHO HaCTyIHi iJteHTHpiKyOH O3HaKH, Ki CBiIaTE
IIepe6yBa BHIIICBKa3aHHX TaHKi Ha O36po€HHi Pociicoi dentepaii, y TaHKax, Ki
BHKOpHCTOBye Pociiicsa beptepain, noirpHi nan1aHI «HI» po3Mimei TpaHeMiciioMy
􀀒􀀕􀀑􀀁􀁊􀀁􀀒􀀕􀀒
􀀒􀀕􀀕
9
Bi/uIiIeHHI, a B no/Ii6HX yKpaiHcKHX TaHKaX -B 6oosoy BiuireHi. Ha BCix By3JIaX LUHN
TaHKIB HZIBHe 3aBOIICKe IDIOM6yBaHHH, IIIe OIUHH 3HaK BHKOpHcTaHH Pocico. Ha npoTary
II»oMy, Bci ari B eKcyaTai B6pox CHI VKDai TaHKH THI1y T-72 UpOHI1
KaITaIHHH DeMOHT Ha 6pOHeTHKOBHX 3aBOIIaX y M. JI,BiB a60 M. KHiB, a TOMy He MOAyT» MaTH
3aOICKOTO IUIOMOyBaHHH 3aBO/IV-BHDO6HHKa. V IIHX JIBOX TaHKOX HaHBHi JI~HI»HHK
MOTOrOIUH, Ki paxyT TOUHHH y pyci. B yKDaiHCKHX TaHKaX TaKi He BCTaHOBJIOBaIMC. Ha
po6ox MicIUHX eKiIIaKy HaBHi BeHTHTopH THI1y «JIB-3». B yKpaincKHx TaHKax IC1H
KaiTaHOTO DeMOHTy BCTHOBJIeHI BOHTHJUHTODH IHO3CMHOTO BHDO6HHIITBa (IIeDeBaKHO 3
Kwrao). B yKa3aux TaHKax HaHBHa cHcTeMa iirpiBy naIHBa, a Ha TaHKax THI1y T-72, 1uIO
3HaxopUHT»eH Ha o36po€HHi 6pox CHI VKpainHM, TaKa cHcTeMa y XOII KaIiTaJI»HOTO peMOHTy
eMOHTOBaHa.
36. BeBKa3aHi 6o~0Bi MaII Ha O36po€Hi 36pox Cun VKpaiHH He
nepefyBan Ta ix iMIOpT Ha TepTopio VKpaiHH He 3IIHCHOBaBCH. JIOKa3 Ha IIiJITBepIUKeHHH
TOTO, IIO BHIIeBKa3Hi TaHKH IIOXOIUHT 3 Pocicoi beepaIii, BKJIOHaIOT JIOKyMeHTH,
Hanenei y /lonarKax
nHcTona1a 2015 DOY.
37. Ty6yCH BiL MIOTafapTHHx peaKTHBHHx BorHeMeTi8 MPO-A. Ty6yc it
Ma1Ora6apTHHX peaKTHBHMX BOTHeMeTiB 3 MaDKyBaHHHMH «MPO-A MO 1:10:00», «MO
1.02:00» y nepi0II 2014-2016 poKi BHIyaIHcH mi/po3Ii1aMM CH.nI AHTHTepOpHcTHHOi
oneparii a repropi /loesoi iJlyrancsKoi o6acre 0I1pa3y IiCJ 3iTKHe 3 He3aKOHHHMH
36pOM pOpMyBa [HP iIHP.
38. BeBKaaaHi 6ocnpHacH Ha 036pocHHi B VKpaii He nepe6ypan, i ix iMopr a
TepTopi10 VKpa~HM He 3JiCHOBaBCH. IOKa3H, HK BCTaHOBJIOOT, II1O BKa3a1Ha 36p0 6y/1a
BHIyHeHa B He3KOHHHX 36pOHHX (bOpMyBaHD, BKIOaOT IIOKyMeHT, Hae(eHM y
Ki e nporoKon1aMM or1Ii Bi1 23 nMcTonaIa 2015 poKy Ta 27
IlonaTKy
39.
, KHi € IpOTOKOJIOM OTJLHIIy Bi/I 3 TDyJIHH 2O15 pOKy.
IloKaaan pi3x oci6, i 6y optepani 6esnocepezumo erinn Ta
IIpoypopaMr y i cnpaBi, a raKo cnemiannHo pH3HaeHHMH Ci/HM iHHX OpraHiB
ocyptoBoro po3eiJyBaHH Ta onepaTHBHHx miIpo31ii. Hwe HaBi IIDHKJIaJI, HKHi
IIOKa3y€ I1OCTaBKH 3 Poci 36poi a exit /Kpa~, BKIOaIOM IO JIHP Ta JIHP.
􀀓􀀖􀀑􀀏
10
40, IIOKa3aHH A.XapbKa, KHi in1 ac Iepe6yBaHH y nOJIOHi B He3aKOHHHN
36pOHx bOpMyBax I[HP ra JIHP y IepiOI epBn 2014 pOKy - 6epe3 2015 p0Ky
3a1yaBC IO DO3BaHTKeHHH pOCiHCKX BaHTaKHHX aBTOMO6ii, Ki pH6yBa LU
BHrHAIOM «Iyairapnoi onoMor lo6acy», Ta BiHcKoBHX aBTOMO6ii8 3 Bi€KO8HMM
HOMepaM 33CPD, B HKHX HaCIDaBJIi MiCTHJIHC 6OCIIpHIIaCM IIO MiHOMeTiB, DaKeTHH
KoMILIeKci «Tpant», aprntepii, crpiresoi a6poi. Konio nporoxony omMTy IorO CBiIKa
MO#Ha 3HaTr y [lo#ta'TKy
E. JIoKaa, mo mirepIoyor» icyau TpeHyaIHx Ta60pi JU1H
ooKi Ha TepHTopii Pociicoi depepamii ra n oynoaHii AToHoMHiH
Pecny6ini KpMM
41. Hi aC JIOCyIIOBOrO CIICTBa KOMaHIIOIO 6yJIH 3i6paHi IOKa3H CTBOpeHHH
TpeHyBa»HHx Ta60pi Ha TepHTOpii PocicKoi enepau~ Ta OKyIOBaHOi AP KpHM, Ki
pOBOIUrr» iCKOBy IIJUOTOBKy 6OOBHKiB He3aKOHHHX 36pOHMX (pODMyBH /IHP Ta JIHP.
42. Cepet Ix IIOKa3iB, Ki Ii(TBeDIUKVOT (baKTH HaHBHOCTi TaKMX TDeHyBIHHX
Ta60pi e noKa3 oKpeMHx oci6, 3oKpeMa:
i. CBiIK O.Caaa Ta 0.CreMaCOB IIOKa3aJIM, 1II0 3 2014 I10 2016 pOKiB iCHyBa1
aKTHBHo oi TpeHyBaHi Ta6op UH irOTOK oci6, Ki 6epyr yacT» y III»HocTi
IIHP Ta HP. Ta6Op DO3TaIOByBaIHCH Ha TeDHTOpii PocTocKoi o6nacTi Pociicoi
Pepepaii, oKynoaHi TepwTopii KpHMcKoro niBocTpoa, TepTopix /lone»xoi i
Jlyracsoi o6nacre, Ta byHKIiOHyBaJIH IIiII KepiBHHIITBOM CIIeIiaIHHX CJ1y6
Pociic»Roi benepaii.
ii. Ci(He L.KOBaH, KH I1OBi/IOMHB, IIIO 3 KOBTHH 2014 pOKy 20 6epe3H 2015 D0Ky
BiH pa30M i3 iIIM pociCKHMM TDOMaJUHHaMH 6paB yaCT B He3aKOHHMX 36pOHHHX
pOpMyBax JIHP. y 1epio/ 3 22 OBTHH 2014 DOKy IIO IOaTKy JIHCTOn1a/a 2014 p0Ky
Bin pa3OM i3 iIIM 6oiOBHKaMH 3 JIHP 1pOxOIUHIH TpeHyBaHHH y BicoBoMy Ta60pi
6i Micra Bonrorpant Pociicsoi betepaii, te BicKoi 3CP aaI ix
KODHCTyVBTHCH 3eHITHO-DaKOTHHMH KOMILJIOKCaMHM, a TaKOK DaKeTHHM KOMILJIeKCOM
«Crpe1a-10». Hiens TpeyBan y ncTona2Ii 2014 pOKy, I.Koman1» pa30M i3 imM
􀀓􀀑􀀘􀀍􀀁
􀀓􀀒􀀙􀀁􀁊􀀁􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀏
11
6oioHKaMH 6y1H HanpaBIeHi IO MiCTa KOMCOMOJICK, Crapo6eiBc»Oro pa~oHy
Jloetoi o6racri, Ie BiH 6y BKJIOHeHH JIO CKJI&IV He3aKOHHOO 36pOfHoro
bopMyan [HP. Hint ac oro nepiozy yacri He3aKoHoMy 36pooMy popMyBani,
tepe6yBao Ha 3ai3nHHii craii LOBafCEK, BiH AIOJIyaBCH AO DO3BaHTaeH
Baroni8 i3 6oenpacaM Jo PC3B «Tpap», Ki npHHLI 3 Pocijcoi bentepauii.
433. Ko~ nporoxonis ponri 3ratax ciuKi MoHa 3HaTH /Io/aTKax
44. H uperao, to Moi ciIenH noBHi Ta pocTOBipHi Ta I1OTO2UKyOCH 3 HTHCH
epeI( CyJIOM JUL Ha(aHHI IOJIIIIIHX IIOKa3aH.
Iliumcano M. A,, ·05
Annex 11
Expert Report of Lieutenant General Christopher Brown (5 June 2018)

􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀭􀀸􀀶􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀨
􀀤􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀹􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃
􀀶􀀸􀀳􀀳􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀩􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀬􀀶􀀰􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃
􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀹􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀨􀀯􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀤􀀯􀀯􀀃
􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀰􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀵􀀤􀀦􀀬􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀧􀀬􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱
between
􀀸􀀮􀀵􀀤􀀬􀀱􀀨
and
􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀵􀀸􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀤􀀱􀀃􀀩􀀨􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱
􀀨􀀻􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀷􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀲􀀵􀀷􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀯􀀬􀀨􀀸􀀷􀀨􀀱􀀤􀀱􀀷􀀃􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀫􀀵􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀲􀀳􀀫􀀨􀀵􀀃􀀥􀀵􀀲􀀺􀀱
1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Qualifications
1. I am a retired British Army lieutenant general with over 36 years’ active duty
service. I served in 8 different operational theatres of combat, of which I was directly or
indirectly responsible for artillery fire in the Falklands war, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Iraq. A full CV is attached. My relevant experience includes:
1. United Kingdom Armed Forces
a. Command as a field artillery officer from second lieutenant (1974) to lieutenant colonel
(1994 – 1996), including platoon, battery and regimental command of 105mm and
155mm artillery. Mentioned in dispatches for gallantry as an artillery forward observer in
the 1982 Falklands war. Five years’ service between 1974 and 1992 in Germany, where
my focus was on Warsaw Pact indirect fire systems, including battery command and
battalion operations officer (S3) with 155mm self-propelled conventional and nuclear
artillery (1984 – 1986).
b. Command of the 1st (UK) Armoured Division’s artillery gun and missile brigade (1999 –
2002), responsible for all aspects of gun and rocket artillery, manned by more than
2,000 soldiers.
c. Staff appointments including:
􀁸 As a major, lead briefer to the Army Executive Board and Defence Planning Staff on
all aspects of artillery and rocket systems with responsibility for resourcing all
artillery systems and ammunition (1987 – 1989);
􀁸 As a lieutenant colonel, instructor at the Army Staff College (1992 – 1994) with
responsibility for indirect fire tactics and doctrine;
􀁸 As a colonel, chief of plans branch of a multinational corps headquarters, responsible
for the planning of multinational artillery operations for NATO in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (IFOR, 1996), Kosovo (KFOR, 1999) and for NATO’s rapid reaction
contingency plans;
􀁸 As a brigadier, chief UK planner in US Central Command (2002), responsible for
coordination of all UK-US artillery planning for Afghanistan and Iraq.
d. Professional head of the UK Army Artillery Branch (2002 – 2003) covering all aspects of
artillery doctrine, technical training, professional development and certification of 7,000
personnel.
e. As a major general, Chief of Staff of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan (2006), responsible for the coordination of all artillery fires and the training
of Afghan National Army artillery using former Warsaw Pact weapon systems.
f. As a lieutenant general, head of the UK’s Iraq lessons programme (2009 – 2010), including
all lessons from artillery and rocket systems.
2
2. Expert witness
2. Since leaving the UK Armed Forces I have served as an expert witness for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, specializing in artillery, targeting,
harm to civilians and command decisions.
B. Assignment
3. My assignment is to provide an expert opinion in the case Application of the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination before the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). In particular, I have been asked by the Government of
Ukraine to opine on the use of particular weapons systems, including BM-21 Grad and BM-30
Smerch Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and to examine the circumstances of three shelling
attacks against civilian areas in eastern Ukraine in January and February 2015 near Volnovakha,
in Mariupol, and in Kramatorsk, and the shelling of the city Avdiivka over the course of January,
February and March 2017. I have been asked to prepare an independent report on: (1) the
general characteristics of multiple launch rocket systems, including their typical military uses
and effects, and their accuracy and consistency; (2) the weapons used in each shelling attack as
well as the probable launch site of each attack; and (3) the objective of each attack and its
anticipated consequences, including with respect to civilian harm.
4. Cited throughout my report are references to the background material which I
rely upon in this report. These documents include crime scene reports, witnesses’ statements,
statements of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies present in the area of the attack, forensic and
expert reports, intercepted telephone conversations, reports of the Special Monitoring Mission
to Ukraine of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and
3
independent non-governmental organizations. I also conducted site visits to Mariupol,
Kramatorsk and Volnovakha in January-February 20181.
II. USE OFMULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEMS (MLRS2) IN CIVILIAN AREAS
A. General Characteristics
5. Although rockets have been in military service since the early 19th Century,
modern MLRS owe much of their development to Soviet World War II MLRS. Current MLRS
typically have between 6 and 40 launcher tubes and deliver rockets out to ranges of between 10
and 100 km. MLRS are normally grouped in batteries of between three and six launchers, with
three batteries typically constituting a battalion. Although MLRS are not as common as artillery
guns3 or howitzers4, delivery of fire by rockets provides several advantages over guns:
a. Unlike a gun or howitzer, MLRS have no recoil. The launcher can therefore be light,
simple and cheap. At the basic end of the MLRS spectrum5, this results in a reduced
training requirement;
b. Because the initial acceleration of a rocket is typically significantly less than shells
delivered by artillery guns, launching does not put as heavy a strain on either the
platform or the projectile. The payload (the content of the rocket which creates the effect
required) therefore does not have to be as robust as that of gun artillery projectiles, so
sub-munitions such as bomblets or mines, chemicals and even propaganda leaflets may
be more easily carried by rockets;
c. A burst rate of fire far exceeding both conventional artillery and mortars. While
manually loaded conventional artillery may reach six shells per minute in short bursts,
and hardly more than three per minute in sustained fire, MLRS may fire the whole load
of up to 40 rockets in as little as 20 seconds. Consequently, a battery of MLRS can fire
hundreds of rockets onto an area within a short interval, resulting not only in physical
damage but also shock to those targeted.
1 In order to ensure that my analysis was conducted in climatic conditions as close as possible to those
that pertained at the time of the attacks.
2 Also known as Multi-Barrelled Rocket Launchers (MBRL).
3 An artillery weapon that is breech-loaded, as opposed to a mortar which is muzzle-loaded or a rifle
which is hand-held.
4 A short gun for firing shells on high trajectories at low velocities.
5 BM-21 Grad, discussed further below, is at the basic end of the MLRS spectrum.
4
These characteristics have endeared MLRS not only to conventional armies, but also to nonstate
actors.6
6. However, MLRS also have disadvantages:
a. Inaccuracy and inconsistency (see below);
b. A more pronounced signature. The smoke from a rocket launch is more visible than that
from a gun launch, resulting in easier detectability of MLRS. This, in turn, leads to a
common practice of moving away from the launch site as soon as rockets have been fired
to avoid possible counterattacks7;
c. A single fixed propellant8 charge (which is used to propel the rocket from the launcher).
Guns, howitzers, and mortars have a scale of propellant charges to suit all ranges within
the system’s capability. Because a rocket has a fixed propellant charge designed to reach
its maximum range, its trajectory is therefore flatter than gun/howitzer fire at short
ranges. This means that at short ranges a rocket has greater difficulty than gun/howitzer
shells or mortar bombs in engaging targets behind crests such as hills or high-rise
buildings. In order to overcome this ‘cresting’ problem, certain adaptations can be made
to reduce the velocity of a rocket, such as the fitting of a spoiler ring on the nose cone,
thereby requiring a higher trajectory to achieve a given range to the target;
d. Limited ability to deliver sustained fire because of a longer reload time than guns or
howitzers.
B. Accuracy and Consistency of MLRS
7. Accuracy is the relationship between the mean point of impact and the aim point
– i.e., how far is the actual centre of fire from the intended target. Consistency is the spread of
the fall of shot around the mean point of impact – i.e., how large an area will the rockets cover.
MLRS are typically less accurate and less consistent than conventional artillery guns/howitzers.
Both accuracy and consistency are a function of range, i.e., the distance between the MLRS and
its target:
1. Accuracy
8. Accuracy at the target depends on several factors, key amongst which are:
6 A man-portable rocket system (“Grad-Partisan”) was developed for use by the Viet Cong and has seen
service in multiple theatres since the 1960s.
7 This is often referred to as “shoot and scoot” tactics.
8 A low explosive charge or fuel, either solid or liquid, for propelling a projectile (e.g. an artillery shell or
rocket).
5
9. Accuracy of Survey of the Firing Position. In basic MLRS systems the exact
location of the firing position is calculated manually. Any inaccuracy in identifying the exact
location of the firing position translates into inaccuracy at the target9;
10. Meteorological Conditions. The length of a free-flight rocket makes its crosssection
particularly sensitive to side winds, especially in the initial stages of flight where its
velocity is relatively low in comparison with conventional gun shells.10 Inputting up-to-date
meteorological data into the calculation of firing data will mitigate this element of inaccuracy.
11. Accuracy of the Target Coordinates. The coordinates of a target may come from a
variety of sources with varying degrees of reliability. Traditionally, the most accurate target
coordinates would come from a trained artillery observer, increasingly using unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV, also known as drones), in a position to:
􀁸 calculate the target coordinates himself or verify the coordinates if provided by
another source; and
􀁸 adjust the fall of shot by firing an initial ranging round, then if necessary, applying a
correction to bring the fall of shot onto the target before ordering the full weight of
fire to achieve the desired effect.
12. Rocket fire is not, however, normally adjusted, because its relative inaccuracy and
inconsistency makes it best suited to large targets, and because its shock and surprise is diluted
if heralded by a ranging process. Instead, the coordinates of the target are typically selected
from a map or UAV and fire is opened at full weight, in the knowledge that the system’s
footprint will saturate the target area and will catch the target unawares. However, there is no
reason why rocket fire cannot be observed and adjusted in the same way as conventional
artillery guns. Observation and adjustment increases MLRS’ accuracy, but not its consistency.
9 Artillerymen strive to achieve the most accurate measurement of the gun or launcher position. For
example, survey by GPS would typically result in an accuracy to within 10 metres, while a simple map plot
could easily result in an accuracy worse than 100 metres.
10 BM-21 muzzle velocity is 50 metres per second, compared with a conventional gun where the muzzle
velocity will normally be measured in hundreds of metres per second.
6
2. Consistency
13. For any given range to a target, MLRS consistency11 is expressed in terms of
probable error (PE) for both range (i.e., distance between launcher and target)12 (PEr) and
direction13 (PEd) where 2 x PEd x PEr will delineate an ellipse in which 50% of a significant
sample of missiles fired from the same launcher will land; 4 x PEd x PEr will delineate an ellipse
in which 82% of missiles will land; 6 x PEd x PEr will delineate an ellipse in which 96% of
missiles will land; and 8 x PEd x PEr will delineate an area in which 100% of missiles will land.
As a general rule, PEr for MLRS will decrease as the range to target increases, while PEd will
increase as the range to target increases:
Figure (1) Typical MLRS Ellipse at Minimum Range:
(Arrow indicates the line between launcher and target)
Figure (2) Typical MLRS Ellipse at Maximum Range:
(Arrow indicates the line between launcher and target)
11 The data and calculations for this and subsequent sections of the report come from firing tables. Every
artillery system has its own firing table giving factors used in the calculation of firing data, including
probable error, effects of wind, etc. Firing table data are collected in experimental firings of the weapon
before release into military service. The table can be used to calculate firing data manually and the data
are also incorporated into computer programmes for the automated calculation of firing data.
12 I.e., along the line between launcher and target.
13 I.e., along a line perpendicular to the line between launcher and target.
7
3. Typical Military Uses of MLRS
14. MLRS are primarily designed to neutralize troop concentrations and soft-skinned
or lightly armoured vehicles. The inaccuracy and inconsistency of MLRS, relative to guns and
howitzers, means that the weapon system is optimally used against large areas (typically greater
than 500 x 500 metres), rather than small targets, such as individual buildings or vehicles. Any
target less than 200 x 200 metres would require a large number of projectiles to be fired at it in
order to guarantee destruction. In other words, in order to be confident of hitting a small target,
it would be necessary to fire a significant volley of rockets that would be expected to land across
a much larger area.
4. Use of MLRS in Residential Areas / Areas of Concentrated Civilian
Presence
15. MLRS is optimized for use in open, rather than residential areas. In residential
areas, the relative inconsistency and inaccuracy of MLRS make it difficult, if not impossible, to
discriminate between targets and civilians. The smaller the target, the more indiscriminate the
MLRS fire necessarily would be.
16. Physical Effect. Because the body of a rocket contains its propellant, in
comparison with conventional artillery shells where the propellant is separate, rockets tend to
carry less explosives, and therefore have less destructive power, than conventional gun-launched
artillery shells on a calibre for calibre basis.14 Buildings will be damaged by MLRS, but will
normally provide a degree of protection for their occupants; however, flying glass and collapsed
roofs will cause casualties inside buildings. Unprotected civilians caught in the open will be
highly vulnerable within the weapon’s lethal area.15 Because most MLRS missiles are designed to
penetrate light skinned military vehicles, civilian vehicles provide very little protection for their
occupants.
14 So, for example, a 122mm artillery shell contains a higher percentage of high explosive than a 122mm
rocket.
15 The size of the area that is completely affected by the warhead.
8
17. Psychological Effect. Unannounced MLRS fire has the effect of shocking and
surprising any military personnel in the target area, even if they are not killed or physically
injured. As an area weapon from which it is impossible to run or drive, unannounced MLRS fire
tends to cause fear, confusion and panic. Its unannounced saturation of an area combined with
the noise of multiple explosions16 is highly frightening and creates a sense of helplessness. It has
a similar, potentially greater psychological effect on civilians.
5. Targeting
18. The appropriateness of using any weapon system is governed by targeting policy
emanating at the strategic (predominantly national, but increasingly alliance or coalition)
level.17 An important principle for any military is that a target must offer a definite military
advantage. Offensive action must also be directed only at military objectives, making a clear
distinction between them, civilian objects, and civilians. All feasible precautions are to be taken
in the choice of means and methods of any target prosecution to avoid – or at least minimize –
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
19. Given the destructive power of MLRS, particularly the potential for damage to
civilians and civilian infrastructure if not targeted accurately, double checks should be
performed at several stages of the firing process. I understand that under Ukrainian and Russian
doctrine, the commander of the firing battery is responsible for confirming the target
coordinates and ensuring that the MLRS launchers correctly apply the direction and range
ordered by the battery command post that computes the firing data.
16 The wailing noise of the incoming rockets earned the nickname “Stalin’s organs” amongst the German
Army in World War II.
17 Summarised from NATO, NATO Standard, AJP-3.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting (April
2016) (Annex 366). Russia and Ukraine follow similar standards, having participated in Allied operations
under the Partnership for Peace Programme since 1994. See, e.g., NATO, Signatures of Partnership for
Peace Framework Document (10 January 2012) (Annex 363); NATO and Russia: Partners in
Peacekeeping (Annex 367); Mission of Ukraine to NATO, NATO – Ukraine Cooperation in the Military
Sphere (2012) (Annex 362).
9
III. SHELLING NEAR VOLNOVAKHA - 13JANUARY 2015
20. On 13 January 2015 at 14:25 the area around a civilian-vehicle checkpoint near
Volnovakha was shelled. One rocket exploded near a passenger bus carrying civilians that was
stopped in line at the checkpoint. Civilians were killed or injured in the attack.
A. The Weapons System and Launch Site Used in the Attack
1. Weapons System(s) Used in the Attack
21. Based on my analysis of investigations conducted by the OSCE and the Security
Service of Ukraine, I conclude that the most plausible explanation is that the weapon system
used was BM-21 Grad firing standard high explosive (“HE”) rocket18, based on three factors.
22. Duration of the Attack. Forensic reports by Ukrainian investigators,19 witness
statements, and footage from a surveillance camera at the checkpoint20, suggest that at least 88
explosions occurred in less than 30 seconds. In order to achieve this rate of fire with
conventional gun artillery or mortars21, at least 30 weapon systems would have to have been
used. This would require a large and complex operation involving the coordination of at least
two battalions. On the other hand, the achieved rate of fire could have been delivered by three
BM-21 launchers, each firing up to 40 rockets in 20 seconds.22
23. Distribution of Fire. The impact points of the shelling are depicted in an image
taken by an OSCE UAV and are also reported in an analysis conducted by Ukrainian Security
Service investigators at the time of the incident. The OSCE image and the Ukrainian analysis
are consistent with one another. They exhibit a spread of shot approximately 640 metres along
18 Designated 9M22 or M-21-OF.
19 Record of Review, drafted by V. Romanenko, Senior Investigator, Security Service of Ukraine (16
January 2015) (Annex 87).
20 Dashboard Camera Footage of Shelling on 13 January 2015 (video) (Annex 696); Footage from a
Surveillance Camera at the Checkpoint (10 January 2015) (video) (Annex 695).
21 Using a norm of 6 rounds per gun per minute.
22 BM-21’s nickname “Grad”, which means “hail” in Russian, stems from the saturation effect described in
Section II, Part B(4) above.
10
the deduced23 direction of fire and 580 metres perpendicular to the deduced direction of fire.
This is consistent with the firing pattern of BM-21 using standard high explosive projectiles (see
Paragraphs 29-30 below).
24. Effect of the Explosion. All evidence of debris24 from the explosions points
exclusively to BM-21 standard high explosive projectiles. A BM-21 standard high explosive
projectile has an 18.4kg warhead designed to dispense between 3,000 and 4,000 fragments,
each weighing between two and three grams. The lethal area of these fragments against
unprotected human beings has a radius of at least 15 metres.25 The bus was within the expected
lethal area of a BM-21 high explosive projectile. The skin of the bus would reduce the range of
the fragments, but at approximately 12 metres from the impact crater, humans inside the bus
would still face a high probability of incapacitation. The number, size and shape of the holes in
the bus are also consistent with BM-21 standard high explosive projectiles. This conclusion is
supported by the OSCE SMM reporting.26
2. Originating Location of the Attack
25. Craters are no longer evident, but were examined in the immediate aftermath of
the attack by both Ukrainian Security Service investigators27 and the OSCE28, including through
23 See Paragraph 25 below.
24 Inspection Report, drafted by O. Starostenko, Senior Investigator, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the
SBU (14 January 2015) (Annex 97); Expert Opinion Report No. 38/6, drafted by Ukrainian Scientific
Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine
(18 May 2015) (Annex 126).
25 Ove Dullum, The Rocket Artillery Reference Book, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (30
June 2010) (describing the lethal area as 700m2) (Annex 491).
26 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Based on Information
Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (14 January 2015) (Annex 322); OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (13
January 2015) (Annex 320).
27 Record of Review, drafted by Captain of Justice V. Romanenko, Senior Investigator at the Internal
Affairs Agency of the Investigations Department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in
the Donetsk Region (16 January 2015) (Annex 87).
28 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information
Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), (16 January 2015) (Annex 324).
11
the use of UAV imagery. These crater analyses indicate that the attack was launched from
territory that I understand was held by the DPR at the time of the attack. The method of analysis
used by the Ukrainian investigators is a world-wide standard battlefield procedure; it is not
exact, but is generally reliable ±20 degrees29: the greater the sample, the greater the accuracy. I
have reviewed the analyses of the Ukrainian investigators; they are credible and it is my opinion
that they have been accurately performed. The Ukrainian Security Service analysed 6 craters;
the bearings from the craters to the launcher positions are consistent to 4 degrees, ranging from
37 to 41 degrees. “The SMM conducted a comprehensive inspection, focusing on five craters . . . .
In the SMM’s assessment all craters examined were caused by rockets fired from a north-northeastern
direction.”30 On the basis of the crater analysis, it is not plausible to suggest that the
weapon system was fired from anywhere other than a north-east or north-north-east direction.
26. If we now turn to the range between the launchers and the target, the angle of
descent calculated during the Ukrainian Security Service analysis (between 52 and 55 degrees)
corresponds to a firing table31 range of between 19.4 and 19.8 kilometres. This equates to firing
positions in the town of Dokuchayevsk, which I understand was at the time under the control of
the DPR.32 As described in Paragraph 6c above, it is possible to reduce the range of BM-21
rockets, by fitting two types of safety ring spoilers to the nose cone of the rocket to reduce its
29 At maximum range for BM-21, this would place the launcher position within a radius of 7 km.
30 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information
Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (16 January 2015) (Annex 324). The OSCE report contains no detailed
figures for their analysis, but their conclusion that “all craters examined were caused by rockets fired from
a north-north-eastern direction” (45o) is consistent with the Ukrainian Security Service analysis to within
8 degrees.
31 The angle of descent of the rocket at impact is directly related to the range between the impact point and
the launcher position. By determining the angle of descent in a crater created by the impact of the rocket,
the firing table record of angles of descent can be used to calculate the distance from the impact to the
launcher. For the BM-21 system the firing table is Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Firing Tables for High
Explosive Fragmentation Projectiles M-21OF (1985) (Annex 599).
32 Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Pavlenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (23 January 2015), p. 1
(testifying about observing three BM-21 launchers passing south through the DPR checkpoint at Elenovka
(Grid Square 7398 5299), 7 km north-north-west of Dokuchaevsk, around 2.5 hours before the shelling of
Volnovakha) (Annex 209).
12
velocity. If that were done, however, one would expect to see evidence of such safety ring
spoilers at the impact site. There is no evidence that debris from safety ring spoilers was found
at the site of the attack. Moreover, even if the larger of the two types of safety ring spoiler33 were
used, the range corresponding to an angle of descent between 52 and 55 degrees would be
between 11.4 and 11.6 kilometres, which still places the launcher position in what I understand
to be DPR-held territory south-west of Dokuchayevsk, or in no-mans-land between the opposing
forces. It is therefore implausible that the Ukrainian Armed Forces could have carried out the
attack.
B. The Objective of the Attack and its Anticipated Consequences
1. Military Circumstances of the Attack
27. Based on all the circumstances of which I am aware, I cannot identify any
military justification for attacking the checkpoint. It is difficult to argue that the checkpoint was
taking an active part in the hostilities, or that its destruction gave the DPR any military
advantage. The function of the Volnovakha checkpoint appears to have been a continuation of
its long-standing civilian role of checking vehicles, albeit reinforced by armed personnel in order
both to provide a greater degree of protection to the police forces manning the checkpoint and
also to extend the role of the checkpoint to include checks for the movement of weapons and
separatist personnel.34 There is no evidence to suggest that the checkpoint played any offensive
role; indeed, its size and the number of personnel manning it suggest it could not even have
conducted any effective defensive role against anything more than attacks by individuals with
small arms. While the checkpoint could undoubtedly warn Ukrainian Armed Forces of any
impending attack along the road to Volnovakha, any advantage of a conventional military attack
on the checkpoint, either by direct assault or by indirect fire, would in my opinion be
33 The larger of the 2 sizes of safety ring spoiler achieves the greatest reduction in range.
34 Witness Statement of Maksym Anatoliyovych Shevkoplias (31 May 2018), paras. 9-10 (Annex 4)
[hereinafter “Shevkoplias Statement”].
13
outweighed by its waste of resources and a loss of surprise if it were a precursor to a larger
attack.
2. Civilian Harm
28. BM-21 is the most common of any MLRS in world-wide service today. A direct
descendent of the Soviet MLRS developed during World War II, BM-21 displays all the
characteristics outlined in Section II, Part A above. The checkpoint, its associated barriers and
the personnel manning it cover less than 100 x 90 metres (0.9 hectare). Given the consistency
and accuracy of BM-21, any attack on the checkpoint was more likely to impact on the road, and
any civilian traffic on it, than on the checkpoint itself.
29. Consistency. BM-21 is an unguided or free-flight MLRS. Its consistency at a
range of 19.6 km (the deduced mean firing range during the attack on Volnovakha: see
Paragraph 24 above) is expressed in terms of PE (probable error) (see Figure 1) as:
􀁸 50% of rockets will land in an ellipse 196m long (2 x PEr: along the line of fire) by
326m wide (2 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 96% of rockets will land in an ellipse 588m long (6 x PEr: along the line of fire) by
978m wide (6 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 100% of rockets fired from a single launcher will land in an ellipse 784m long (8 x
PEr: along the line of fire) by 1304m wide (8 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
30. Accuracy. In the attack on Volnovakha, the mid-point of the observed impacts
from the shelling is approximately 300 metres north-east of the checkpoint. Thus, assuming
that the attackers aimed at the checkpoint, the actual spread of fire illustrates the inaccuracy of
this kind of system. This inaccuracy is explained by the factors considered at Section II, Part
B(1) above. For example, the wind at 14:00 hrs on 13 January 2015 was 5 metres/second from
the south west35 (effectively a head wind); if this had not been factored into the ballistic
35 State Service of Ukraine for Extraordinary Situations, Ukrainian Hydrometereological Center Letter No.
01-20/419 (30 March 2018) (Annex 179).
14
calculations, at a range of 19.6 km this would account for a reduction in the rockets’ range of 404
metres.
Figure 1: Diagram (to scale) showing fall of shot pattern created by 122mm Rockets at 19.6
km range, using Firing Table data.36
31. The small size (0.9 hectare) and manning of the checkpoint would have been well
known to the attackers. The theoretical distribution of the fire (8 x PE) covers 80 hectares.
Within the 80 hectare theoretical area covered by the fire, the public road running through the
36 Ministry of Defence of the USSR, Firing Tables for High Explosive Fragmentation Projectiles M-21OF
(1985) (Annex 599).
8xPEd
(100%) =
1304m
8xPEr (100%) = 784m
6 x Er (969») = 588m I I I 2xPEr (50%) = 196m
8ml 98m 98m 98m 98m 98m
1PEr 1PEr
2 PEd
(s0ho)=
326m Line of fire
gun to target
(GT)
15
checkpoint extends approximately 640 metres by 30 metres (1.9 hectares). This would also have
been well understood by those firing the missiles. Even if the checkpoint had been accurately
targeted, they could not attack the checkpoint with their choice of weapon system without more
than 50% of their missiles (2 x PE) inevitably missing the target and falling in the surrounding
area, including the road where civilian traffic was lined up. The chances of hitting the road were
more likely than hitting the checkpoint. In the event, two missiles appear to have directly
impacted the road, plus a further seven were close enough that the road was within their lethal
area. In contrast, only one missile landed sufficiently close to the checkpoint that its lethal area
encompassed elements of the checkpoint, including the bus that was damaged. No missiles hit
the checkpoint itself. The greater chance of hitting civilian traffic on the road would have been
known to the firers, as it appears to have been common knowledge that civilian traffic used the
road through the checkpoint and stopped at the checkpoint itself.
32. Moreover, the checkpoint was open and manned 24 hours a day, seven days a
week; however, during the night traffic flow was minimal.37 The DPR would have known that,
not least because they had a similar checkpoint at Olenivka where the same road entered DPRheld
territory. If the attackers’ intent had been to destroy the checkpoint while minimizing
civilian casualties, they would have attacked at night. The decision to attack in daylight therefore
made civilian casualties even more likely. In other words, even if the checkpoint had been
accurately targeted and there had been some military reason to do so, the decision to attack in
daylight when civilian traffic flow was at its greatest made it more likely, indeed nearly certain,
that civilians would be harmed given the presence of civilians stopped at the checkpoint and on
the surrounding road.
37 Shevkoplias Statement, para. 7 (Annex 4).
16
3. Appropriateness of the Weapon System(s) Used
33. Given its inherent inconsistency and inaccuracy, the BM-21 is designed to
neutralize large areas, rather than to destroy small targets.38 The checkpoint covers an area of
100 x 90 metres (0.9 hectare). Assuming that there were some military value to damaging the
checkpoint, other weapons systems could have done so more accurately, and without the same
certainty of civilian harm, including:
34. Direct Fire Weapons. Tanks and/or infantry would be able to discriminate
between the forces manning the checkpoint and civilian traffic. Moreover, the weapons would be
sufficiently accurate to target the checkpoint with minimum chance of harm to civilians.
35. Observed Conventional Artillery. If an attacker could not use direct fire weapon
systems for any reason, an attack with conventional artillery guns rather than rockets,
particularly if adjusted by a trained artillery observer, would have been more accurate given the
size of the checkpoint. Observed fire from artillery guns would also have been capable of
discriminating between the checkpoint itself and civilians on the road.
36. Observed Rocket Fire. Although rockets are inherently less consistent than guns,
observation would at least have allowed rocket fire to be adjusted onto the target. As the attack
took place in daylight, a properly used observer would have been able to:
􀁸 achieve greater accuracy by firing an initial rocket at a known safe place, such as any
of the open fields surrounding the checkpoint, and then creeping the fire closer to the
checkpoint39; and
􀁸 minimise harm to civilians by launching the attack at a time when there was no
civilian traffic at the checkpoint.
38 Typically less than 200 x 200 metres. See Paragraph 14 above.
39 A standard procedure when targets are in close proximity to civilians, known in NATO terminology as
“danger close.” Even then, the laws of ballistics would make it extremely difficult to engage the checkpoint
with BM-21 without hitting the road as well, but at least this procedure would be more accurate than
unobserved rocket fire.
17
The attackers could have positioned trained artillery observer(s) or unmanned aerial vehicle(s)40
to adjust the fire onto the checkpoint while minimizing harm to civilians on the road; however,
there is no evidence of any attempt at such discrimination.
C. Summary of Conclusions on the Volnovakha Shelling
37. The Volnovakha shelling was carried out using BM-21 Grad MLRS firing high
explosive rockets from DPR-held territory.
38. There was no apparent military advantage in attacking the checkpoint.
39. The choice of weapon system and its method of targeting were incapable of
damaging the checkpoint without hitting the road and civilian traffic on it; indeed, the attackers
would have known that their actions would impact the road and any civilian traffic more than
the checkpoint.
40. The attackers appear to have made no effort to mitigate this inevitable result by
using an alternative weapon system, more accurate methods of targeting or attacking at a time
when civilian traffic was minimal.
IV. SHELLING OF MARIUPOL –24 JANUARY 2015
41. On 24 January 2015, the Eastern district of Mariupol containing a residential
neighbourhood was shelled multiple times. Civilians were killed or injured in the attack.
A. The Weapons System and Launch Site Used in the Attack
1. Weapon System(s) Used in the Attack
42. Based on three factors, the most plausible explanation is that the weapon system
used was BM-21 firing conventional high explosive rockets.41
43. Duration of the Attack. Witness statements and forensic reporting suggest that at
least 154 projectiles were fired into the residential area42, of which there was an initial
40 Also known as drones.
41 Designated 9M22 or M-21-OF.
18
“extremely heavy barrage lasting 35 seconds” at “approximately 09:15hrs.”43 In order to achieve
this rate of fire with conventional gun artillery or mortars44, at least 50 weapon systems would
have had to be used. This would require a large and complex operation involving the
coordination of more than two battalions. On the other hand, the achieved rate of fire could have
been delivered by four BM-21 launcher weapon systems, each capable of firing up to 40 rockets
in 20 seconds.
44. Distribution of Fire. The impact points analysed by the Ukrainian Security
Service investigators shortly after the attack exhibit a spread of shot approximately 1,177 metres
along the deduced direction of fire by 1,196 metres perpendicular to the deduced direction of
fire. This is a larger spread than would be expected from any single artillery weapon system (see
Section IV, Part A(1) below for greater detail and consequences for civilians). It also reinforces
the conclusion that several weapon systems were used in the attack. The spread of fire is
consistent with the expected distribution of fire from multiple MLRS, either:
􀁸 Launchers, potentially from different batteries, which were inaccurately surveyed (as
described in Paragraphs 8-12 above), firing at the same aim point; or
􀁸 launchers firing at separate aiming points in order to spread the fire more widely
than would be achieved by all launchers targeting the same aim point.
45. Effect of the Explosion. I have reviewed the Ukrainian Security Service reports45
of debris from the attack. All analysis of debris from the explosions points exclusively to BM-21
standard high explosive projectiles. I see no inconsistency in the Ukrainian reporting. This
42 Witness Statement of Igor Evhenovych Yanovskyi (31 May 2018), para. 14 [hereinafter “Yanovskyi
Statement”] (Annex 5); Expert Opinion Report No. 143, drafted by the Ukrainian Scientific Research
Institute of Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (3 April
2015) (Annex 117).
43 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Shelling Incident on
Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015), p. 1 (Annex 328).
44 Using a norm of 6 rounds per gun per minute.
45 Expert Opinion No. 142, drafted by the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Special Equipment
and Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (30 March 2015) (Annex 115); Expert
Opinion Report No. 143, drafted by the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Special Equipment and
Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (3 April 2015) (Annex 117).
19
conclusion is supported by the OSCE SMM reporting,46 except that the OSCE reports suggest
Uragan47 was used in addition to BM-21. After BM-21, BM-27 Uragan was the next generation of
Soviet MLRS, similar in principle to its predecessor, but larger in calibre and longer in range.
Although I have seen no analysis of, for example, debris to confirm the involvement of BM-27
Uragan, its presence or absence makes no difference to the opinions expressed below.
2. Originating Location of the Attack
46. Although impact craters on the ground have now been filled in, in Mariupol48 it is
still possible to see impact splashes on the vertical faces of residential buildings. In terms of the
direction from which the fire came, the impacts that I inspected all face east or north-east. This
is consistent with the Ukrainian Security Service forensic investigators’ shell crater analysis49,
which deduced bearings from craters to firing position between 1,300 mils50 and 1,433 mils
(between east and east-north-east). The impact splashes I observed are also consistent with the
OSCE reporting51 of firing positions in Oktyabr52 and Zaichenko.53 Although the Ukrainian
analysis differs from the OSCE SMM analysis by up to 41 degrees (more than I would usually
expect from crater analysis – see paragraph 25 above), the OSCE have not provided the detail of
their analysis.
46 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Shelling Incident on
Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015), p. 1 (Annex 328).
47 A 220 mm rocket system designated BM-27.
48 Unlike in Volnovakha where no rockets impacted buildings.
49 Inspection Report, drafted by Mykhaylo Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations
Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine (25 January 2015) (Annex
92).
50 A mil is 1/6000 of a circle; it is a more precise measurement of bearing than degrees (1/360 of a circle),
reflecting the potential accuracy of artillery systems. 1,300 mils equates approximately to 80 degrees;
1,433 mils equates approximately to 86 degrees.
51 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Shelling Incident on
Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015), p. 2 (Annex 328).
52 On a bearing of 45 degrees (north-east) from the impact of the attack.
53 On a bearing of 62 degrees (approximately east-north-east) from the impact of the attack.
20
47. Turning to range, the Ukrainian Security Service forensic examination recorded
“the angles of incidence of the munitions was 40o to 46o, which is consistent with a firing
distance of 16,400 to 17,800 m.”54 The range analysis is consistent with the OSCE SMM
conclusion that the firing positions were between 15 and 19 km away. For the purpose of
determining whether or not the originating location could have been anywhere other than
territory held by the DPR, the difference between the Ukrainian and OSCE reporting is in any
case academic, as I understand that the DPR were in control of both areas at the time of the
attack. Moreover, with or without safety ring spoilers fitted to the rockets -- and there is no
evidence that spoilers were used -- all the crater analysis place the firing positions in territory
held by the DPR.
B. The Objective of the Attack and its Anticipated Consequences
1. Military Circumstances of the Attack
48. I understand that there were no Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area at the time
of the attack as all available forces were committed to combat operations in other areas.55 The
security of Eastern Mariupol was the responsibility of the National Guard, which was stationed
at four sites. Three of the four sites are too far from the area attacked to be considered plausible
targets of the attack. The fourth site, a checkpoint that was closest to the area shelled, is also
highly implausible when distance and lack of military advantage are taken into account:56
a. The battalion headquarters was in eastern Mariupol at 37-A Prospect Peremohy, more
than three km south-west of the area attacked; its distance from the site of the shelling
represents a difference in elevation of more than 15 degrees (250 mils) from the target
actually engaged. The prime reason why mils, rather than degrees, are used in the
sighting of artillery systems57 is that the systems themselves and their ballistic data are
54 Expert Opinion Report No. 143, drafted by the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Special
Equipment and Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (3 April 2015), p. 11 (Annex
117).
55 Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, Main Department of the National Guard of Ukraine Letter No. 27/6/2-
3553 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (31 May 2018) (Annex 183).
56 Ibid.
57 Including BM-21.
21
generally capable of achieving accuracies in elevation and bearing which are sensitive to
changes of one mil; artillery sighting systems are calibrated to enable this. Any artillery
system unable to achieve accuracies of less than 5 mils would be useless as a battlefield
weapon system because it could never be guaranteed to hit the vast majority of targets. A
difference of 250 mils therefore represents 250 times the expected accuracy of the
system. It is therefore implausible to conclude that the battalion headquarters was the
intended target.
b. One company position58 was located approximately three km south-east of Mariupol,
even further away than the battalion headquarters. For the reasons explained above, this
distance is too great to be considered within the area of the attack on the residential area.
c. A forward outpost59 was located approximately 1 km from Mariupol. The mean point of
all 154 recorded impacts in the residential area is more than 1.5 km from this outpost.
This equates to a difference at the launcher of more than 3 degrees (50 mils) in elevation
and more than 3 degrees (50 mils) in bearing which is implausible for the reasons
discussed above.60
d. Finally there was a checkpoint61 at the junction of the two main routes running into
Mariupol from the east, approximately 575 metres north of the nearest impact (‘the
northern checkpoint’). The mean point of all 154 recorded impacts is approximately 920
metres from the checkpoint. This equates to a 3 degree (50 mils) bearing difference at
the launcher. An attack on the northern checkpoint that in fact resulted in the spread of
fire achieved cannot be explained by gross incompetence alone. The alternative
explanation that the northern checkpoint was not the actual target of the attack, for
reasons discussed below, appears more plausible.
49. The northern checkpoint was conducting tasks formerly carried out by police and
was manned by National Guard personnel equipped only with automatic small arms and
58 Ibid. (referred to as Company Position 4015 consisting of up to 85 servicemen to defend the coast road).
59 Ibid. (referred to as Company Position 4014A consisting of up to 35 servicemen).
60 Ibid. Intercepted conversations of an apparent DPR lookout with another DPR member at 10:38 on 24
January 2015 include a claim that the rockets “[o]verflew by approximately a kilometre,” and refers to the
area hit as “Vostochnyi” (“Eastern” in Russian). Intercepted Conversation between Valeriy Kirsanov and
Serhii Ponomarenko and Metadata (24 January 2015) (Annex 414); Yanovskyi Statement, para. 17 (Annex
5). However, the forward outpost was more than 1.5 km from the mean point of impact. There were also
reports of further shellings after the 10:38 intercepted conversation. Moreover, the day before the attack,
a DPR member had ordered another DPR member to attack Vostochniy, suggesting that what was actually
hit was the intended target. Intercepted Conversation between Oleksandr Evdotiy and Serhii
Ponomarenko and Metadata (23 January 2015) (Annex 418); Yanovskyi Statement, para. 16 (Annex 5).
61 Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, Main Department of the National Guard of Ukraine Letter No. 27/6/2-
3553 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (31 May 2018) (referred to as checkpoint No. 4014,
consisting of approximately 100 servicemen) (Annex 183). This was the nearest potential “military”
position to the shelling, approximately 575 metres to the north of the nearest impact. It suffered no
damage from the shelling. Ibid.
22
armoured personnel carriers .62 Although the checkpoint was effectively in the front line and the
National Guard posted there would have warned the Ukrainian Armed Forces of, and resisted to
the best of their limited ability, any attack from DPR forces, the checkpoint’s mission was
defensive in nature, rather than hostile, and its manning and equipment was insufficient to
conduct effective offensive operations. Neutralization by artillery is a temporary effect that gives
away surprise; any military advantage from neutralizing the checkpoint would therefore only
accrue if followed up immediately by a ground assault. No ground assault was forthcoming.63
There therefore would have been minimal military justification for targeting the northern
checkpoint.
2. Civilian Harm
50. Assuming for the sake of argument that the northern checkpoint was the object of
the attack, the checkpoint, its associated barriers and the personnel manning it cover less than
150 x 100 metres (1.5 hectare). This makes it too small to target with MLRS without the
majority of the rockets inevitably missing the target. As the checkpoint was at the convergence
of the main routes from Mariupol to the territory held by the DPR, along which civilian traffic
was flowing, the size and manning of the checkpoint would have been well known to the
attackers. The distribution of the fire (8 x PE) at a range of 17.4 km covers more than 70
hectares. Even if the northern checkpoint had been accurately targeted, more than 50% of the
missiles fired (2 x PE) would inevitably have missed the target. This would have been well
understood by those firing the missiles: they could not target the checkpoint with their choice of
weapon system without more than 50% of their missiles landing outside the target area.
Moreover, the civilian housing area covers a large swathe of the 70+ hectare area covered by the
fire. Given the choice of weapon system, it was therefore inevitable that the civilian residential
62 Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, Main Department of the National Guard of Ukraine Letter No. 27/6/2-
3553 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (31 May 2018) (Annex 183).
63 Ibid.
23
area would be hit, even if the northern checkpoint had been the target, and had been accurately
targeted. This too would have been known to the firers. As with the Volnovakha attack, the
inconsistency of BM-21 standard high explosive projectiles makes it even more inappropriate to
use this system in such a densely populated civilian residential area.
51. Consistency. BM-21 consistency at a range of 17.4 km (the deduced mean firing
range: see Paragraph 47 above) is expressed in terms of PE (See Figure 2) as:
􀁸 50% of rockets will land in an ellipse 214m long (2 x PEr: along the line of fire) by
268m wide (2 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 96% of rockets will land in an ellipse 642m long (6 x PEr: along the line of fire) by
804m wide (6 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 100% of rockets fired from a single launcher will land in an ellipse 856m long (8 x
PEr: along the line of fire) by 1072m wide (8 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
24
Figure 2: Diagram (to scale) showing fall of shot pattern created by 122mm Rockets at 17.4
km range using Firing Table data.64
3. Appropriateness of the Weapon System(s) Used
52. Assuming the northern checkpoint or the forward outpost discussed in
Paragraphs 48-49 above were a worthwhile military target -- and plausibly a target of the attack
-- there is no sound military reason for a commander to use BM-21 standard high explosive
projectiles. As with the attack near Volnovakha, many other weapons systems and/or methods
would have been more accurate, including:
64 Ministry of Defence of the USSR, Firing Tables for High Explosive Fragmentation Projectiles M-21OF
(1985) (Annex 599).
6xPEr (96%) = 642m
2lt (soho • 2a
)e8: m
107 m[107 m[107 m 107 m 107
1PER 1PER
8PE(
8xPEd
(100%) =
1072m """' I (50%) =
26'8 m Line of fre
gun to target
(GT
25
53. Direct Fire Weapons. Tanks and/or infantry would be able to discriminate
between the forces manning the checkpoint and civilian traffic. Moreover, the weapons would be
sufficiently accurate to target the checkpoint or outpost without collateral damage to civilian
residential areas.
54. Observed Artillery Guns. If an attacker could not use direct fire weapon systems
for any reason, an attack with conventional artillery guns rather than rockets, particularly if
adjusted by an artillery observer, would have been more accurate given the size of the
checkpoint. Ukrainian telecommunications intercepts suggest that an apparent DPR spotter was
active in eastern Mariupol65 and there is high ground to the east of the area shelled; observation
could have been achieved from either. Observed fire from artillery guns would also have been
capable of discriminating between the checkpoint itself and the civilian residential area. The
distance to the line of contact from the checkpoints and forward outpost was well within the
range of the standard artillery gun66 available to the DPR.
55. Observed Rocket Fire. Although rockets are inherently less consistent than guns,
observation by a trained artillery observer or UAV would at least have allowed rocket fire to be
adjusted onto the target. If a commander had no other choice of weapon system, a standard
procedure to minimize potential civilian harm, known as “danger close,”67 could have been
adopted by an observer adjusting the fire of the rockets from an initial safe aim point onto the
target. If the northern checkpoint was genuinely the target, its distance from the residential area
and the open areas to its east lend themselves perfectly for this tactic. However, there is no
65 Intercepted Conversation between Valerii Kirsanov and Oleksandr Evdotiy and Metadata (24 January
2015) (Annex 414).
66 Designated D-30, a 122mm gun with a range of over 15 km. The range from the line of contact to the
forward National Guard positions is on the limit of mortars available to the DPR.
67 An initial adjusting round is fired at a known safe distance from any non-combatants or friendly forces
and the fire is progressively advanced towards the intended target using observation of the fall of shot. In
the case of the northern checkpoint, there was ample open space to its north and east to conduct this
procedure if a commander intended to achieve an effective engagement with minimal collateral damage.
26
evidence that such measures were implemented, even though there is evidence of DPR observers
on the ground, as discussed in paragraph 54 above.
C. Summary of Conclusions on the Mariupol Shelling
56. The Mariupol shelling was carried out using BM-21 Grad MLRS firing high
explosive rockets from DPR-held territory.
57. The distance of any of the Ukrainian National Guard sites from the residential
areas shelled in the attack is too great for those National Guard sites to be considered a plausible
target of the attack.
58. There was no apparent military advantage in attacking the northern checkpoint
given that there was no ground assault in the wake of the attack.
59. The weapons system used in the attack and its method of targeting were
incapable of damaging the northern checkpoint without hitting the residential area even if the
northern checkpoint had been accurately targeted by unobserved rocket fire. In fact, no rounds
appear to have fallen closer than 575 metres from the northern checkpoint. The attackers would
have known that their actions would impact the residential area.
V. SHELLING OF KRAMATORSK – 10FEBRUARY 2015
60. On 10 February 2015, the city of Kramatorsk was shelled by multiple missiles68
which struck a residential neighbourhood and an airfield located about two km south-east of the
urban edge of the town. Civilians were killed or injured in the attack on the residential
neighbourhood; military personnel were killed or injured in the attack on the airfield.
A. The Weapons System and Launch Site Used in the Attack
1. Weapon System(s) Used in the Attack
61. Several factors indicate that BM-30 Smerch firing 9M55K rockets was used in
this attack. Kramatorsk lies approximately 50 km from the nearest point on the line of contact
68 At least three, more likely five, of which at least two, more likely four, impacted in the residential area.
27
between Ukrainian Armed Forces and DPR forces at the time of the attack. The only land-based
weapon system available to any of the parties to the conflict capable of achieving such a range is
BM-30 Smerch. Contemporary forensic reports confirm that all of the debris collected from the
attack site originated from BM-30, specifically the 9M55K sub-munition (bomblet) missile.69 I
see nothing inconsistent in these reports and their conclusion was agreed by the OSCE in
evaluating three shells from the attack: “[t]he SMM assessed that the three shells were 300mm
ammunition fired from a BM-30 Smerch.”70
62. Unlike all other MLRS in the armouries of the parties to the conflict, BM-30 is a
guided, as opposed to unguided or free-flight, system. It has a flight control system which
corrects pitch (up/down) and yaw (left/right) during the active part of the trajectory.
Contemporary launchers have inbuilt GPS allowing autonomous determination of the bearing of
fire. Its range normally results in its being reserved for targets that are well beyond line of sight
from the front line. In such cases, including the attack on Kramatorsk, observation and
correction of fire can therefore only normally be undertaken by coordinated use of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV or “drone”). There are in fact multiple reports of a UAV being fired at by the
SA-10 (Buk) air defence missile system located on Kramatorsk airfield approximately 30
minutes before the missile attack.71 This corresponds to the OSCE SMM reporting72 of a loud
69 Scene Inspection Report, drafted by A. Sorokina, Police Captain, Kramatorsk City Department (10
February 2015) (Annex 100); Scene Inspection Report, drafted by E. Abushov, Police Lieutenant,
Kramatorsk City Department (10 February 2015) (101); Record of Site Inspection, drafted by Major of
Justice A. Kholin, Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the
Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast (12 February 2015) (Annex 105); Expert Opinion No. 193,
drafted by Oleksiy Bordunos, drafted by the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Special Equipment
and Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (24 April 2015) (Annex 121); Expert
Opinion No. 8713/8714U, drafted by Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, Scientific Research Institute of
Forensic Expert Examinations, (23 November 2015) (Annex 139).
70 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Shelling in
Kramatorsk (10 February 2015), p. 2 (Annex 331).
71 Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Chorniy, Witness Interrogation Protocol (12 February 2015) (Annex
219); Signed Declaration of Denys Goiko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (20 August 2015) (Annex 238).
72 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Shelling in
Kramatorsk (10 February 2015), p. 1 (Annex 331).
28
explosion and smoke trail at 11:51 hours. Training to operate the BM-30 system competently,
especially in coordination with drones takes months, whereas training to fire BM-21 can be
achieved in days. BM-30 is a complex system and a significant step-change in weapon system
from BM-21:
BM-21 BM-30
Weight of Launcher 13.7 tonnes 43.7 tonnes
Calibre of Missile 122 mm 300 mm
Weight of Standard
Missile
66.6 kg 800 kg
Range of Standard
Missile
20.4 km 70 km
Standard Warhead 18.4 kg with 3000-4000
fragments @2-3 grams
72 sub-munitions, each 1.75 kg with 96
fragments @4.5 grams plus 360
fragments @0.75 grams
Maximum rate of fire
per launcher
40 missiles in 20
seconds (re-load time 10
minutes)
12 missiles in 38 seconds (re-load time
20+ minutes)
Approximate Cost of
Launcher (US$)
500,000 10-15 million73
Approximate Cost of
Standard Missile (US$)
100074 100,000
63. Even though the design dates from the 1980s, BM-30 is still considered to be one
of the most, if not the most, powerful MLRS in the world. Most countries possessing BM-30
consider it a high value national asset to be controlled at the military strategic level.75 Its
73 Smerch, Deagle (Annex 672).
74 Akiva Hamilton, Bankrupting Terrorism - One Interception at a Time, Jerusalem Post (24 November
2012) (reporting the unit cost of a missile as approximately US$1,000) (Annex 502). Russian designed
system that fired 122mm rockets cost a little more.
75 Ove Dullum, The Rocket Artillery Reference Book, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (30
June 2010), p. 77 (Annex 491).
29
potency demands that it be used sparingly for strategically important targets and its survival is a
high priority.76
2. Originating Location of the Attack
64. The maximum range of BM-30 firing the 9M55K missile is 70 km. Crater analysis
for a bomblet munition such as 9M55K is less accurate than a free-flight rocket because:
􀁸 bomblets fall vertically once their tape drogues77 take effect following ejection from
the carrier tubes, thereby giving no indication of direction of fire from their craters;
and
􀁸 the carrier elements of the missile (nose cone, tail, cassette and tubes) become
unstable once the missile opens to eject the bomblets.
65. Nevertheless, the impact pattern of the tail fins in relation to the bomblets
suggests a bearing from the firing position to Kramatorsk of between 325o and 330o. This is
consistent with the OSCE analysis.78 This places the firing position within a 10 km radius of the
centre of Horlivka: a firing range of between 50 and 70 km. I understand that the DPR
controlled Horlivka at the time of the attack.
B. The Objective of the Attack and its Anticipated Consequences
1. Military Circumstances of the Attack
66. The headquarters of the Anti-Terrorist Operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
was based on the airfield approximately two km south-east of the urban edge of Kramatorsk.
The airfield was also a helicopter base and the site of an SA-10 (Buk) air defence missile system.
Indeed, the list of military casualties79 suggests there were at least 26 military units on the
76 There is only one other documented use of BM-30 against the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the
conflict.
77 A short length of tape emanating from the base of the bomblet has the effect of slowing the bomblet
down and steepening its angle of descent.
78 Corroborated by the OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM):
Shelling in Kramatorsk (10 February 2015), p. 2 (“Based on the live observation, the pictures and map
analysis, the SMM assessed that the shelling was coming from the south-south-east direction.”) (Annex
331).
79 Headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation Letter No. 1696 og (12 February 2015) (Annex 102);
Headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation Letter No. 778 og (16 February 2015) (Annex 107).
30
airfield. Neutralization of such a target would significantly impact the operational capability of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine, particularly in terms of command and control, but also in damage
to material; personnel casualties were particularly heavy in senior officers, a reflection of the
level of the headquarters. It would be a high priority target for any enemy.
67. However, there is no evidence of any military targets in the residential area of
Kramatorsk that would justify targeting it with a BM-30 salvo. There were three governmental
buildings in the area of Kramatorsk that was targeted worthy of noting: a police station on
Mayakovskovo Street (diagonally opposite the Blooming Sports Stadium80 where the tail fin of a
9M55K missile landed), an Armed Forces recruiting office on Drujby (formerly Lenin)
Boulevard, and a Border Guard Service administrative office on Boulevard Heroi Ukraini.81
From the evidence available, none of these offices appear to have been taking an active part in
hostilities. Given that BM-30 would normally be used only when a target of strategic significance
presented itself, its use against these minor installations in Kramatorsk would make no military
sense.
2. Weapon System Considerations
68. Given the range to the target, unless a commander was prepared to launch an air
attack, BM-30 is not just the only weapon available, it is also the ideal weapon for neutralization
of an airfield and its associated infrastructure, accompanying units, tented accommodation and
soft-skinned vehicles. BM-30 firing 9M55K sub-munition missiles is optimized to defeat
personnel, armoured and soft targets in concentration areas, artillery batteries, command posts
and ammunition depots. Each rocket carries 72 sub-munitions, 1.75 kg each, loaded into 8 tubes
which are held in a cassette. The missile ejects the cassette at a height of 4,000 to 5,000 metres
above the target. The cassette in turn ejects the tubes which then dispense the sub-munitions
80Record of Site Inspection, drafted by Major of Justice A. Kholin, Senior Investigator with the Operative
Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast (12 February
2015), para. 26 (Annex 105).
81 Witness Statement of Kyrylo Ihorevych Dvorskyi (4 June 2018), para. 8 (Annex 3).
31
(bomblets). Unlike a normal missile such as a BM-21 rocket, the bomblets fall vertically,
stabilized by a tape drogue. The wind at the time of the attack was 3 metres/second from the
south.82 This would have had minimal effect on accuracy. At the target end, given the high value
of the BM-30 system and cost of the missiles, a commander would want if at all possible to
observe where the bomblets landed in order to ensure that its targeting was accurate for two
reasons:
􀁸 during the attack to adjust the fall of shot if the initial round(s) missed the intended
target; and
􀁸 in the aftermath of the attack to collect estimates of the damage done.
The most effective means of achieving this in the circumstances of this attack would be the use
of UAV.
3. Civilian Harm
69. BM-30 achieves a PEr of 230 metres and a PEd of 215 metres when firing at its
maximum range of 70km (see Figure 3 below). This means that:
􀁸 50% of missiles (2 x PE) will land within an ellipse of 460 metres x 430 metres
centred on its intended target at its maximum range of 70 km; and
􀁸 all missiles (8 x PE) will land within an ellipse 1840 metres x 1720 metres centred on
its intended target.
82 State Service of Ukraine for Extraordinary Situations, Ukrainian Hydrometereological Center Letter No.
01-20/419 (30 March 2018) (Annex 179).
32
Figure 3: Diagram (to scale) showing fall of shot pattern created by 300mm 9M55K
Rockets at 70 km range using Firing Table83 data.
70. An additional factor that must be considered when using BM-30 with 9M55K
rockets is where the carrier elements (nose cone, tail, cassette and tubes) of the missiles will fall.
The nature of a carrier missile such as the 9M55K is that, once the sub-munitions have been
dispensed, the carrier elements (nose cone, tail, cassette and tubes) continue a ballistic (freeflight)
trajectory, albeit unstable. Prediction of where they would fall in relation to the dispensed
sub-munitions varies since these carrier elements are no longer aerodynamic, but the consensus
from practical experience is that they will land some kilometres beyond the target, depending on
83 Extract of Smerch Firing Table, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (March 2018) (Annex 656).
8xPEd
(100%) =
1720m
230m 230m 230m
2xPEd
(5o%) =
430m
8PEr (100%) = 1840m
6xPEr(
2xPEr (50%) = 460m
230m 230m
1PEr 1PE l
230m 230m 230m
Line of fre
gun to target
(GI
33
trajectory (the longer the range to the target, the higher the trajectory, the steeper the angle of
descent84, the closer the carrier elements will land to the sub-munitions). Given that the 72 submunitions
total 126 kg and the propellant weighs 227 kg of the 800 kg missile, these carrier
elements rain 447 kg of scrap metal several kilometres beyond the target. As the carrier
elements of a 9M55K missile can cause as much, if not more, damage as the sub-munitions, the
targeting process must take this into account when deciding on weapon selection and launch
position.
71. On the basis of these factors, I reach the following conclusions.
72. Sub-Munitions (Bomblets). The dispersion of sub-munitions (bomblets) (i.e. not
including the carrier elements) in the attacks on Kramatorsk, including the airfield and the
residential neighbourhood, covers an area 5 km long x 0.6 km wide. This latitudinal
distribution conforms to the expected coverage of the system (see above) which suggests that the
launcher(s) did not change their azimuth during the fire mission. However, the longitudinal
distribution exceeds the expected coverage threefold.
73. Based on the dispersion of the bomblets in the residential neighbourhood, it is
highly unlikely that these bomblets were targeted at the airfield. Had the airfield been targeted
and missed to hit the residential neighbourhood, multiple incorrect crew drills in the targeting
process would have been necessary: the firers inputting incorrect data into the firing
computation; the double-checks described in paragraphs 8-12 above all failing. It is highly
unlikely that even poorly trained and supervised firers could commit an error of this magnitude
inadvertently, let alone well-trained operators with access to UAV observation. I have never
encountered such incompetence. Moreover, the coincidence of the missiles erroneously landing
in a civilian area, as opposed to the fields around the airfield target, further indicates that any
suggestion that this was an error would have to be viewed with extreme scepticism. Based on
34
these facts it is implausible that the bomblets which landed in the residential area, particularly
the Drujby Boulevard neighbourhood, were intended for the airfield.
74. Carrier Elements. Even if only the airfield had been targeted and that had been
done accurately, the choice of weapon system and the launch position in the Horlivka area made
it inevitable that carrier elements would fall on civilian residential areas of Kramatorsk. This
fatal decision could have been mitigated by selecting a launch position to the south-west of
Horlivka. This would have minimized the chances of carrier elements landing on civilian areas
of Kramatorsk. If the launch position had been in the area of Yasynuvata, the bearing from the
launch position to the target at Kramatorsk airfield would have been 345o; as a result, the
majority of carrier elements would have landed harmlessly in the open ground to the north of
the airfield. However, in this attack the firers failed to do this: they would have known that the
carrier elements would impact in residential areas beyond the airfield, and they chose to ignore
the consequences.
C. Summary of Conclusions on the Kramatorsk Shelling
75. The Kramatorsk shelling was carried out using BM-30 Smerch MLRS firing high
explosive bomblet rockets from DPR-held territory.
76. It is implausible that the bomblets which landed in the residential area,
particularly the Drujby Boulevard neighbourhood, were targeted at the airfield.
77. Even if all the rockets had been targeted exclusively at the airfield, and done so
accurately, the carrier elements would still have been expected to land in the residential area.
Given that the carrier elements are as much a part of the missile as the sub-munitions, the firers
would have known that the carrier elements would fall several kilometres beyond the bomblets’
impact points, with harm to civilians guaranteed.
78. This outcome could have been mitigated by choosing a different launch site to
attack the airfield. But once the choice of weapon system and launch position had been made, it
35
was inevitable that carrier elements would fall on civilian residential areas. The attackers would
have known that their actions would impact the civilian areas.
VI. SHELLING OF AVDIIVKA –JANUARY TO MARCH 2017
79. The town of Avdiivka lies near the contact line between Ukrainian Armed Forces
(UAF) and DPR forces. Between January and March 2017, residential neighbourhoods in
Avdiivka were shelled on multiple occasions. As this incident occurred in early 2017, it is still
the subject of ongoing investigations by Ukrainian authorities. I therefore am relying in part on
publicly available reporting on this incident. The NGO International Partnership for Human
Rights (“IPHR”) has estimated that “128 civilian residences [were] totally or partially destroyed,
and damage incurred to a school, a kindergarten, hospital and humanitarian assistance point.”85
Many of these locations were not in close proximity to Ukrainian firing positions or other
arguable military target. An attack on the Avdiivka Coke factory (“Koksokhim”) on 30 January
2017 resulted in a power outage across Avdiivka amid sub-freezing temperatures, leading to the
evacuation of civilians. I was not able to see first-hand the results of the attacks, but I have
reviewed reporting from multiple sources, including Ukrainian law enforcement investigation
materials and independent accounts from OSCE and IPHR.
A. The Weapons System and Launch Site Used in the Attack
1. Weapon System(s) Used in the Attack
80. OSCE and Ukrainian forensic reports, as well as the IPHR report, indicate that
multiple weapon systems were used in the attacks on Avdiivka: BM-21 MLRS firing high
explosive rockets,86 82mm and 120mm mortars firing high explosive bombs,87 125mm tank
85 International Partnership for Human Rights, Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure in Eastern Ukraine
(2017), p. 45 [hereinafter “IPHR Report”] (Annex 454).
86 Designated 9M22 or M-21-OF. See IPHR Report, p. 48-50 (Annex 454); Expert Conclusion No. 77,
drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment
and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017) (Annex 167); Expert
Conclusion No. 78, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for
Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017)
(Annex 168); Expert Conclusion No. 79, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian Scientific
􀀋􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀂫􀀌
36
shells,88 122mm and 152mm artillery firing high explosive shells,89 automatic grenade
launchers, and heavy machine guns.90 I have reviewed the various reports and see no
inconsistency between the Ukrainian, OSCE, and IPHR reporting. The targets hit are all within
range of these weapon systems.
2. Originating Location of the Attack
81. At the time of the attacks, I understand that DPR forces held the territory around
Avdiivka in an arc from south-west to north-east. A consolidation of the various reports suggests
that:
a. the damage to civilian homes on Kolosov and Zavodska Streets on 1 February 2017
originated from “MLRS BM 21 Grad rockets fired from the east-south-east (Yakovlika)
confirmed by witnesses and crater analysis”91;
b. the damage to civilian homes on 2 February 2017 resulted from “120mm mortars (8
craters measured 280cm across and 80cm deep) from south-east direction; [t]ank shells
(stabiliser found) – fired from DPR-controlled Yasynuvata and/or Yakovlivka”92 and the
OSCE SMM assessed the damage to residential buildings at the intersection of
Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine
(3 March 2017) (Annex 169); Expert Conclusion No. 80, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko,
Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations,
Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017) (Annex 170); Expert Conclusion No. 81, drafted by M.
Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic
Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017) (Annex 171).
87 OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information
Received as of 19:30 (5 February 2017), p. 2 (Annex 347); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (6 February 2017), p.
2 (Annex 348).
88 OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information
Received as of 19:30 (19 February 2017), p. 3 (Annex 349); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (5 March 2017), p. 4
(Annex 351).
89 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Casualties, Damage to
Civilian Infrastructure Registered in Donetsk Region Following Fighting (3 February 2017), p. 1 (Annex
345); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information
Received as of 19:30 (6 February 2017), p. 2 (Annex 348).
90 OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information
Received as of 19:30 (6 February 2017), p. 2 (Annex 348).
91 IPHR Report, p. 49 (Annex 454).
92 Ibid.
37
Vorobiova and Molodizhna Streets “as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a
south-easterly direction”93, i.e. DPR-held territory;
c. the damage to civilian residential homes on 3 February 2017 was caused when a “[s]hell
hit eastern facade of building”94, i.e. the shell was fired from DPR-held territory;
d. the damage to a seven-storey apartment building on Soborna Street on 3 February 2017
was “assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly
direction” and the damage to an ambulance at a school in Molodizhna Street where,
according to Ukrainian sources, a man had died from shrapnel wounds was assessed “as
caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction”95;
e. the damage to a collapsed house on Chernyshevskoho Street on 24 February 2017 was
assessed as caused “by a shell of at least 122mm in calibre fired from direction ranging
from east-south-east to south-south-east” and the “shrapnel damage to the north-eastfacing
wall of the house [on Ostrovskoho Street], damage to the roof and all the windows
broken . . . had been caused by a shell at least 122mm in calibre fired from directions
ranging from east-south-east to south-south-east”96;
f. the damage at a kindergarten on 2 March 2017 was “caused by artillery (122mm) or tank
(125mm) rounds, fired from an easterly or east-south-easterly direction”; “a large hole
in the east-facing wall of the fifth floor of an apartment building” on Haharin Street 8A
was “assessed as caused by a round fired from an easterly or east-south-easterly
direction”; the damage caused to another 5 storey apartment block at Haharin Street 1
where “[l]arge-size shrapnel fragments with copper bands on them were at the spot” was
assessed “as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from an east-south-easterly
direction”; “a large hole on the east-south-east-facing wall of the fourth floor of a
building” at Mendeliev Street 3 was assessed “as caused by artillery (122mm) or tank
(125mm) rounds fired from an east-south-easterly direction”; and “[o]n Komunalna
Street 10 the SMM observed a large crater about 10-15m from the main entrance of
School No.7, and assessed it as caused by a round fired from an east-south-easterly
direction.”97
82. I concur with the assessment that these reports indicate that the rounds
concerned were fired from DPR-held territory.
93 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Casualties, Damage to
Civilian Infrastructure Registered in Donetsk Region Following Fighting (3 February 2017), p. 1 (Annex
__).
94 IPHR Report, p. 49 (Annex 454).
95 OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information
Received as of 19:30 (5 February 2017), p. 4 (Annex 345).
96 OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information
Received as of 19:30 (26 February 2017), p. 3 (Annex 350).
97 OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information
Received as of 19:30 (5 March 2017), p. 4 (Annex 351).
38
B. The Objective of the Attack and its Anticipated Consequences
1. Military Circumstances of the Attack
83. According to IPHR reporting98:
􀁸 the main UAF defensive positions are on the south-eastern outskirts of the town,
where I would have expected them to be located in order to defend against any DPR
attack (between 250m and 1km from the nearest documented attacks);
􀁸 there was an artillery firing position by the lake to the north of the town (1.6km from
the nearest documented attack).
84. It is these targets which would have offered an attacker a military advantage. On
the other hand, the three reported UAF positions in the residential areas of the town were
assessed by IPHR to be checkpoints and quarters. I would concur with the IPHR assessment99
that there was no apparent threat to the DPR from the UAF positions in the residential areas of
the town and that it is difficult to see any military advantage in attacking them. Even accepting
that the OSCE and IPHR may not have documented all of the shellings on Avdiivka over this
period, I would therefore have expected from a normal military operation to see a pattern of
attacks concentrated on the obvious military targets in the south-eastern suburbs of the town
and on the artillery position by the lake to the north of the town. Instead, there were many
documented shelling impacts on the residential areas of the town itself. The Avdiivka Coke
factory to the north-west of the town (more than 4km from any reported UAF positions) was
also targeted, resulting in power outages to the city. Unless the Coke factory was in some way
supporting the UAF military operation, which is difficult to imagine, the objective of that attack
would not have been a military one. Moreover, there is no suggestion in the reporting that any of
the fire on Avdiivka was observed and/or adjusted onto intended targets to ensure its accuracy.
98 IPHR Report, para. 87 (Annex 454).
99 Ibid. para. 94.
39
2. Appropriateness of the Weapon System(s) Used
85. The proximity of Avdiivka to the line of contact offered a much wider choice of
weapon systems to the DPR than even the attacks at Volnovakha or Mariupol. I would have
expected the attackers to use BM-21 MLRS against the UAF artillery firing position by the lake
to the north of the town; it is the ideal weapon system for such a target in terms of both accuracy
and effect. I also would not have been surprised to find BM-21 MLRS used against the forward
UAF defensive positions on the south-eastern outskirts of the town, although conventional
artillery guns (122 and 152mm) and mortars (82 and 120mm) would normally be the weapons of
choice against defensive positions, both for their destructive and suppressive effect and also
because they are more accurate and consistent than BM-21. I would expect the forward-most
UAF positions in direct line of sight from the attackers to have been engaged with tanks and
machine guns which are both designed for direct fire100 and highly accurate in this role.
86. Assuming an attacker could justify engaging the checkpoints and quarters in the
centre of Avdiivka (even though, as explained above, I do not think they could), direct fire
weapons would almost certainly not be an option as tank crews and machine gunners would not
be able to see the target. Of the wide choice of indirect weapon systems available to the attackers
given the range to the targets, there is no sound military reason for a commander to use BM-21:
it is the least accurate of the systems available, particularly when unobserved, as appears to have
been the case here. An attack with conventional artillery guns or mortars rather than rockets,
particularly if adjusted by an artillery observer, would have been more accurate given the size of
the targets and their proximity to civilian housing (in some cases less than 100m), although even
100 Where the target is visible to the attacker, although both tanks and machine guns have the ability to
engage targets with indirect fire, where the target cannot be seen directly by the attacker, albeit relatively
inaccurately.
40
if ‘danger close’ procedures101 had been adopted, the chances of civilian harm would have
remained high (see below).
3. Civilian Harm
87. Based on IPHR and OSCE reporting on where the BM-21 fire originated:
88. BM-21 MLRS. There is suggestion that rockets were fired from Donetsk and
Yakovlivka. Using a typical range from firing position in Donetsk to Avdiivka of 17.4 km, BM-21
consistency is expressed in terms of PE (See Figure 4 below) as:
􀁸 50% of rockets will land in an ellipse 214m long (2 x PEr: along the line of fire) by
268m wide (2 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 96% of rockets will land in an ellipse 642m long (6 x PEr: along the line of fire) by
804m wide (6 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 100% of rockets fired from a single launcher will land in an ellipse 856m long (8 x
PEr: along the line of fire) by 1072m wide (8 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
101 Described in the sections on Volnovakha and Mariupol.
41
Figure 4: Diagram (to scale) showing fall of shot pattern created by 122mm Rockets at 17.4
km range using Firing Table data.102
89. As suggested in Paragraph 85 above, therefore, targeting of the UAF artillery
position by the lake to the north of the town with BM-21 would have carried little risk of civilian
harm. Even the UAF forward defensive positions to the south-east of the town could have been
engaged with BM-21 with relatively small risk of civilian harm. However, any BM-21
engagement of the UAF checkpoints in the residential areas would have invited certain damage
to civilian property and/or life. Moreover, the reports of BM-21 MLRS rockets targeting the coke
factory (more than 4km from the nearest UAF position) and residential areas more than 1km
102 Ministry of Defence of the USSR, Firing Tables for High Explosive Fragmentation Projectiles M-21OF
(1985) (Annex 599).
8xPEd
(100%) =
1072m
8PE(
6xPEr (96%) = 642m
2ls (soho • 2la
7m107 ml107 m 107 m 107 ml107 m
1PER 1PER
"P,Ed I (50%) =
26m Line of fre
gun to target
(GT
42
from the nearest UAF positions make it implausible that such firings were targeted at UAF
positions at all.
90. 122mm Artillery Guns. Using a typical range from firing position to target of 10
km, 122mm artillery gun consistency can be expressed in terms of PE (see Figure 5 below) as:
􀁸 50% of shells will land in an ellipse 46m long (2 x PEr: along the line of fire) by 12m
wide (2 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 96% of shells will land in an ellipse 138m long (6 x PEr: along the line of fire) by 36m
wide (6 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 100% of shells fired from a single gun will land in an ellipse 184m long (8 x PEr:
along the line of fire) by 48m wide (8 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
Figure 5: Diagram (to scale) showing fall of shot pattern created by 122mm Artillery Gun at
10 km range using Firing Table103 data.
91. Therefore, although observed fire from artillery guns would not have been
infallibly capable of discriminating between the checkpoints in the residential areas and the
civilian housing, it would have been far more consistent than BM-21. Given its greater
103 Normal Terrain Tabular Firing Tables for the 122-mm Howitzer Model D-30, R.T. No 0145 (Annex
686).
8xPEr(100%) = 184m
6xPEr (96%) = 138m
2xPEr (50%) = 46m
23m
Line of fre
gun to target
(GT
23m 23m
23m
1 PEr
23m
2 xPEd lPEr
(.0%1• 36m l ,----.:i:----1 I
8xPEd
(100%)=
48m
43
consistency, the reports of conventional artillery shells impacting residential areas more than
200m from the nearest UAF positions make it implausible that such firings were targeted at
UAF positions at all.
92. 120mm Mortar. Using a typical range from firing position to target of 4 km,
120mm mortar consistency can be expressed in terms of PE (see Figure 6 below) as:
􀁸 50% of bombs will land in an ellipse 72m long (2 x PEr: along the line of fire) by 42m
wide (2 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 96% of bombs will land in an ellipse 216m long (6 x PEr: along the line of fire) by
126m wide (6 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
􀁸 100% of bombs fired from a single mortar will land in an ellipse 288m long (8 x PEr:
along the line of fire) by 168m wide (8 x PEd: perpendicular to the line of fire).
Figure 6: Diagram (to scale) showing fall of shot pattern created by 120mm Mortar at 4 km
range using Firing Table104 data.
93. Similar to artillery guns, although observed fire from mortars would not have
been infallibly capable of discriminating between the checkpoints in the residential areas and
104 Tabular Firing Tables for the 120mm Mortar, OF-843A (Annex 673).
8xPEr (100%) = 288m
6xPEr (96%) = 216m ' I 2xPEr (50%) = 72m '
8xPEd
(100%)=
168m
36m 36m 36m
2'PEdI (50%) =
42m
36m
IPEr
36m
1PEr
36m 36m 36m
Line of fire
gun to target
(GT
44
the civilian housing, it would have been far more consistent than BM-21. Given their greater
consistency, the reports of 120mm mortar bombs impacting residential areas more than 300m
from the nearest UAF positions cast extreme doubt on whether such firings were targeted at
UAF positions at all.
Figure 7 - Comparison (to scale) of fall of shot pattern created by 122mm Rockets at 17.4 km
(left) versus patterns created by 122mm Artillery Gun at 10 km (right top) and 120mm
Mortar at 4 km (right bottom)
C. Summary of Conclusions on the Avdiivka Shelling
94. Over the course of weeks, Avdiivka was shelled numerous times from DPR-held
territory using different weapons systems, including BM-21 Grad MLRS, artillery guns and
mortars of various calibres, tanks and machine guns.
95. The shelling was not limited to military sites on the edges of the city: it was
carried out across the city. Many shelling attacks against residential areas were too far away
from any UAF site to be plausibly considered to have been directed at military targets. For
8xPEd
(100%)a
1072m
2xPEd
(50%) =
268' m
8xPEr(100%) = 856m
2xPEr (50%) = 214m
107 m 107 m 107 m 107 m 107
1PER 1PER
Line of fre
gun to targe
«GT)
8xPEr (100%) = 184m
8xPEd ooo-1 THI 48m
IPEr= 23m
8¥PE+ (100%) = 288m
S.PEd l (100%)=
168m
1PEre 36m
45
example, attacks on civilian areas include attacks using BM-21 Grad systems that landed more
than 2km away from any UAF position. They also include attacks using more consistent artillery
guns and mortars, but which nonetheless hit numerous civilian targets. These civilian attacks
cannot be attributed to technical error or incompetence.
96. Moreover, the weapons system used in the attack guaranteed that the civilian
areas would be hit. Even if the checkpoints and quarters in the city were plausibly the targets of
some of the attacks, they were within range of more accurate weapon systems than BM-21 Grad
MLRS. The use of BM-21 in an urban area was guaranteed to cause civilian damage. The
attackers would have known that their actions would harm civilians.
Attachments:
CV.
I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear before the
Court as needed to provide further testimony.
, 2018.
47
Lieutenant General (Retired) Chris Brown CBE
Telephone: +44 (0)1590 674439/ +44 (0)7473 746787
E-mail: [email protected]
Key Competencies
A leader by example with a record of solving seemingly intractable problems in pragmatic ways. A proven
collaborative manager from strategic planning to implementation, budget management and risk
reduction. A charismatic and supportive motivator of people, creating strong teamwork and a sense of
purpose. Highest levels of discretion, trustworthiness and security vetting (DV).
Career Summary
November 2010 to Date. International relations and security consultant. Roles include:
Chief Operating Officer Equilibrium Global Ltd and Equilibrium Gulf Ltd. Responsible for all aspects of
international relations contracts valued at over £5M.
Expert witness for the prosecution at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in
The Hague, responsible for technical advice to prosecution counsel, rebuttal of defence evidence and
preparation and delivery of expert witness reports for the prosecution.
Senior Expert on Security Strategy to African Union and Assessment and Evaluation Commission in
Sudan. Achievements:
􀁸 Advised AU Commission/High-Level Implementation Panel on post-referendum security.
􀁸 Facilitated formulation of security strategy with Sudanese parties and international actors.
􀁸 Drafted security agreements for the AU, UN and Sudanese parties.
January 1974 to October 2010. HM Forces, Army, Lieutenant General. Recent highlights:
August 2009 to October 2010 Iraq Study Team Leader, MoD. Responsible to Defence Board for:
􀁸 Ensuring key enduring UK and coalition military and cross-government lessons from 6 years’
operations in Iraq were recorded and applied, where appropriate, to Afghanistan/future campaigns.
􀁸 Assisting Sir John Chilcot and his public enquiry team to understand the military lessons from Iraq
in the wider context of the Government’s Inquiry.
􀁸 Weaving the lessons from Iraq into the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.
February to July 2009 Deputy Commanding General Multi-National Forces and Senior British Military
Representative in Iraq. Deputy to US 4 Star General commanding 120,000 Coalition Forces:
􀁸 Led the Coalition military campaign to reinforce Iraqi progress on economic, political and rule of law
plans in coordination with the US Embassy. Member of Iraqi National Security Council.
􀁸 Reduced British military presence from 4000 to below 100, allowing UK forces to redeploy for higher
priority tasks. Negotiated and implemented long-term UK-Iraq defence relationship.
􀁸 Planned and started the implementation of reducing Coalition military presence over the period
2009 – 2010 from 120,000 to 50,000 in coordination with US and Iraqi authorities.
2007-2009 General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (Major General). Headed 5000 full-time
military, 5000 reserves and cadets and 3500 civilian personnel, responsible for administration, finance,
welfare and security. Achievements:
􀁸 Completed the transfer of security responsibility in Northern Ireland to civilian authorities after 38
years of military involvement.
􀁸 Enabled 3000 military personnel (from a total of 5000) plus 1800 civilian personnel (from a total of
3500) to be redeployed to higher priority tasks, reducing running costs from over £100M per year to
under £50M per year, thereby allowing resources to be transferred to higher priorities.
􀁸 Commended in writing by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland for “sensitive handling” of complex
situation and promoted lieutenant general.
48
2004-2006 Chief of Staff Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (Major General). Led a multi-national and interagency
staff of 500 military and civilian personnel in Kabul:
􀁸 Harmonised the military campaign with International Organisations and Non-Governmental
Organisations to deliver improved security, infrastructure projects and governance within Afghanistan.
􀁸 Awarded Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service.
2003-2004 Director of Military Operations and Counter-Terrorism, Ministry of Defence (Brigadier).
Provided strategic advice and planning to MoD main board on all aspects of Army operations, including
intervention into Iraq and military assistance to Firemen’s strike. Achievements:
􀁸 Planned and implemented at the strategic level UK’s contribution in Afghanistan and Iraq, involving
the deployments of over 50,000 troops and 10,000 vehicles.
􀁸 Represented MoD at Deputy Prime Minister’s coordinating forum for resolution of firemen’s strike,
planned, deployed and, on successful resolution, redeployed all military forces involved.
􀁸 Reorganised department to lead new directorate for counter-terrorism and homeland security.
􀁸 Authored transition from military to civilian authority in Northern Ireland; secured Army Executive
Board agreement on the plan and initiated implementation.
􀁸 As a member of Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Associated Measures)
(ACPO(TAM)) and the principal military representative on the cross-Whitehall coordination body
(COBRA), coordinated military assistance to all terrorist-related incidents. Promoted major general.
2002-2003 Director Royal Artillery (Brigadier). Professional head of the Artillery Branch, responsible to
Army Board for technical training, professional development and welfare of 7000 personnel, while
simultaneously Deputy Senior British Representative United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida.
Achievements:
􀁸 Planned and integrated UK military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with US CENTCOM.
􀁸 Coordinated Commonwealth military contribution to operations in Afghanistan.
􀁸 Taught as senior military instructor (teamed with Dame Margaret Anstee, former UN SRSG) on
British Peace Support Team Senior Officers Planning Course in Nairobi, Kenya.
1999-2002 Divisional Artillery Brigade Commander, 1st Armoured Division. Achievements:
􀁸 Led, trained, administered and deployed 3000 troops for operations in the Balkans.
􀁸 Awarded Investor in People accreditation.
1996-1999 Chief Planner Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (Colonel). Led a multi-national and inter-agency
planning team of 20. Achievements:
􀁸 Planned the implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the first
elections and the transition from NATO’s Implementation Force to Stability Force.
􀁸 Planned NATO’s intervention in Kosovo which resulted in successful negotiations with Serbian
authorities, unchallenged ground forces’ entry into Kosovo and re-establishment of security, democracy
and rule of law. Awarded CBE. Promoted brigadier.
Education and Professional Development
2012 Elected Associate of the Brenthurst Foundation, Johannesburg.
2010-date Lecturer on Diplomatic Studies & Practice MA Course, School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London, and International Defence & Security MSc, Cranfield University.
2006-2007MPhil International Relations and International Law, Peterhouse, Cambridge. Thesis
published by the Pearson Peacekeeping Institute of Canada. Presented to President Kagame of Rwanda
and used by the Brenthurst Foundation in South Africa as a model in complex failed nation situations.
49
2005 United States Joint Force Land Component Commanders’ Course, Army War College,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
2002-2010 Trustee of Royal Artillery Charitable Fund and Museum.
1997 Joint Higher Command and Staff Course – Strategy and operations for senior military
leaders.
1995-1996 German language Civil Service Advanced Certificate level.
1992-1993 French language Civil Service Diploma following francophone United Nations Military
Observer Mission in Western Sahara.
1986-1989 City & Guilds Insignia Award in Technology.
1978 Top student of intake at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
1974-1977 LLB Law (Honours) University of Wales, Cardiff.
Interests
Writing – published works include Victory Among People, The Lessons from Northern Ireland:
Comparison with Iraq and Afghanistan, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies,
2011 (ISBN 0-85516-163-9); On the Fault Line: Managing Tensions and Divisions within Societies:
Northern Ireland and Iraq, Profile Books, 2012 (ISBN 978-1-84668-588-0); British Generals in Blair’s
Wars, Ashgate Publishing, 2013 (ISBN 978-1-4094-3736-9).
Annex 12
Expert Report of Associate Professor Anatolii Skorik (6 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
between
UKRAINE
and
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
EXPERT REPORT OF ANATOLII SKORIK, PH.D.
Expert Report by Anatolii Skorik, Ph.D.
I. Introduction
1. My name is Anatolii Skorik. I work as an associate professor at Ivan
Kozhedub Kharkiv University of the Air Force (Kharkiv Air Force University). I am a
retired colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Kharkiv Air Force University is a public
educational institution of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. It trains military professionals
specializing in aviation, radioelectronic systems, anti-aircraft missile systems, and automatic
control systems. I graduated summa cum laude from Dnipropetrovsk Higher College of Anti-
Aircraft Defense for Commanders in 1986. In 1990-1993, I completed a postgraduate
military education course at the Military Radioelectronics Engineering Academy named after
the Soviet Union Marshall Govorov. In 1998, I defended a Ph.D. thesis with a major in
armaments and military hardware. The topic of my thesis and the scope of my academic
interests focused on engineering of guidance systems for surface-to-air guided missiles and
the use of surface-to-air missile systems in combat. I have been teaching at the anti-aircraft
missile forces department of Kharkiv Air Force University since 1993. In 2005, I went to
China as part of a group of university professors to deliver a course of lectures. I helped train
military professionals specializing in anti-aircraft defense systems from Georgia, Azerbaijan,
and elsewhere. As a lead research fellow, I have been involved in research and development
work as part of Ukrainian projects to build anti-aircraft defense systems.
2. Over the course of my service in the army, I was repeatedly involved in field
firing practice using long-range surface-to-air (SAM) systems. I was subsequently involved
in Buk-M1 SAM system field firing practice. In the context of training military professionals
at Kharkiv Air Force University, I provide practical training for cadets in operation and
combat use of the Buk-M1 SAM system on an ongoing basis.
3. I have been teaching the aspects of the Buk-M1 SAM system and training
professionals in this area for over 15 years. As an associate professor, I have also given
lectures on the engineering and combat use of surface-to-air missile systems and long-,
medium-, and short-range anti-aircraft defense systems (S-200, S-300, and Buk-M1 SAM
system).
4. I have authored over 105 academic publications addressing various topics
concerned with anti-aircraft defense systems, including S-200, S-300, and Buk-M1.
5. I have been requested to describe the following as part of this expert opinion:
􀁸 Overview of the Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system;
􀁸 Operation of the Buk-M1 SAM system;
􀁸 Operation of Buk-M1 self-propelled transporter-erector-launcher-radar
(TELAR) in autonomous mode;
􀁸 Specific considerations of Buk-M1 TELAR system operation in the
presence of civilian aircraft.
II. Overview of the Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile system
6. Buk-M1 is a short-range mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) system
developed in the Soviet Union. In 1958, efforts began in the USSR to develop a mobile SAM
system for the anti-aircraft defense (AAD) forces of the infantry.1 In 1966, this SAM system
was developed and added to the weapons inventory with the designation 2K12 Kub. Efforts
to improve the system continued in subsequent years and resulted in the new Buk surface-toair
missile system being added to the weapons inventory in 1979. Further modernization
efforts created the Buk-M1 SAM system that was added to the weapons inventory of the antiaircraft
defense forces of the infantry in 1983.2 The new surface-to-air missile system
featured a range greatly improved performance metrics. The kill zone increased
considerably, with a possibility of intercepting higher cruise missiles and destroying
helicopters.
7. The next modernization stage of Buk SAM system continued in the early
1990s. The Buk-M1-2 SAM system developed between 1994 and 1997 was a further
improvement on the Buk-M1 SAM system. Combat performance of the SAM system
improved considerably owing to the new highly effective 9M317 guided surface-to-air
missile. The kill altitude increased to 25 km, and the kill zone at medium and high altitudes
increased to 42 km.3 The new SAM system was also able to fire at abovewater and
aboveground radar-visible targets. In 1998, the Buk-M1-2 SAM system was added to the
standard weapons inventory of the Russian Army.4 In 2008, the Russian Army added to its
weapons inventory the new Buk-M2 SAM system based on new self-propelled transportererector-
launcher-radar with a phased antenna array. A target illumination and missile
guidance radar (TIMGR) was also added, increasing the cruise missile kill range.5 Further
efforts to improve the Buk-M2 SAM system resulted in the Buk-M3 SAM system being
added to the weapons inventory of the Russian Army in 2015, that remained the general
1 E. A. Pigin, History and tendencies of development mobile surface-to-air missile systems of middle
range for infantry air defense system, Radio an Electronic Engineering, Vol. 12, Issue No. 2, p. 15
(2005) (Annex 487).
2 Ibid. p. 16 (Annex 487).
3 Ibid. p. 17 (Annex 487).
4 Ibid. (Annex 487).
5 K. Ribov, Surface-to-air missile systems of “Buk” family, Military Overview (3 August 2015),
https://topwar.ru/79989-zenitnye-raketnye-kompleksy-semeystva-buk.html (Annex 499).
structure of Buk-M2 SAM but dramatically exceeded its general tactical and technical
characteristics.6
8. The Buk-M1 SAM system is designed to destroy aircraft of army, tactical, and
strategic aviation, gunship helicopters, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles at
ranges from 3 to 32 km away, flying at altitudes from 15 meters to 22,000 meters, at a
velocity of up to 830 m/s. The Buk-M1 has a high probability of destroying its target. This
system can effectively repel massive enemy aviation attacks and provide cover for troops or
defense military industrial facilities.
9. The Buk-M1 SAM system includes: a combat control center, a target locator,
six self-propelled transporter-erector-launcher-radars (Buk-M1 TELAR), and three launcherloader
modules. These vehicles are mounted on a tracked chassis that ensures a high crosscountry
mobility, maneuverability, and fast deployment of the system.
Figure 1. Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile system, including combat control center (left), target
locator (second from left), TELAR (in the middle), launcher-loader (second from right), and
transport vehicle (right).7
6 A.V. Karpenko, Surface-to-air missile system 9K317M “Buk-M3”, Military Technical Collection
“Nevskiy Bastion” https://militaryarms.ru/boepripasy/rakety/buk-m1/ (Annex 498).
7 Surface-to-air missile system SAM Buk-M1 – history of development and technical overview (30 May
2018) https://militaryarms.ru/boepripasy/rakety/buk-m1/.
10. The combat control center is designed to automatically control the operation
and combat activities of the Buk-M1 SAM system (image in Figure 2).8 The combat control
center can process data of 75 aerial targets, display up to 6 target marks, issue a friendly
aircraft warning, receive and process data from a higher-ranking command center, target
locators, and the six TELAR. When a mobile communication hub (command post vehicle) is
deployed as part of the combat control center of the Buk-M1 SAM system, it enables
receiving information from other units of anti-aircraft defense (AAD) forces and radio-radar
forces.9 The combat control center identifies aerial targets, determines the ones that are the
most dangerous, issues a combat mission for each Buk-M1 TELAR, and collects and
processes air situation data and combat progress information.
􀀩􀁌􀁊􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀜􀀶􀀗􀀚􀀓􀉆􀀔􀀌􀀝􀀃􀀃􀉚􀀃– in traveling
configuration; b – in combat configuration.10
11. The target locator scans the airspace, detects aerial targets, determines their
official affiliation (friend-or-foe), and measures their coordinate (image in Figure 3). The
target locator can detect aerial targets at altitudes of up to 25 kilometers and over ranges of up
to 160 kilometers. The target locator normally operates in automatic mode without the
involvement of operators and transmits target data to the combat control center. Operator
involvement is necessary in the presence of interference or a large number of false marks.11
8 A. D. Skorik, O.D. Frolov, F.I. Nikiforov, O.F. Galutskiy, E.V. Morgun, Composition, Technical Use
and Combat Operation of Surface-to-air Missile System of Law Range. Self-Propelled Transporter-
Erector-Launcher-Radars 9A310M1. Outline of Lectures. Part. 1 p. 14 (2017) (Annex 497).
9 Ibid. p. 15 (Annex 497).
10 Picture taken by Skorik.
11 A false mark is a signal displayed on the screen of the target locator in a place where there is no
target. False marks can appear due to natural radio waves, reflections off clouds, birds and other
objects, etc.
􀀩􀁌􀁊􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀜􀀶􀀔􀀛􀉆􀀔􀀌􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑12
12. The self-propelled transporter-erector-launcher-radar (Buk-M1 TELAR) is an
autonomous combat vehicle designed to fire surface-to-air missiles at aerial targets (image in
Figure 4). The Buk-M1 TELAR is fitted with four missiles and a radar capable of detecting
aerial targets, determining the distance to them and their speed. The Buk-M1 TELAR can:
search for, detect, and identify (friend-or-foe) aerial targets; acquire and track the chosen
target; determine the type of the target being tracked (aerodynamic target (such as an
aircraft), ballistic target, or helicopter); calculate the kill zone, assess the firing conditions,
launch missiles, and determine whether the target has been destroyed by the explosion of the
missiles.
12 Picture by Skorik.
Figure 4. Self-propelled transporter-erector-launcher-􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀜􀈺􀀖􀀔􀀓􀉆􀀔􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁎-M1 SAM
system in firing position.13
13. The Buk-M1 TELAR is normally operated by a four-member combat crew:
the Buk-M1 TELAR commander, two operators, and a driver/mechanic (image in Figure
5).14 The Buk-M1 TELAR commander supervises the combat crew of the Buk-M1 TELAR;
reports to the commander of the anti-aircraft defense unit about the readiness of the Buk-M1
TELAR to fire, studies and evaluates the air situation,15 and chooses aerial targets to shoot
down; identifies aerial targets (friend-or-foe) and launches missiles from the Buk-M1
TELAR. The Buk-M1 TELAR operators (the operator and the senior operator) detect and
capture the aerial target, monitor the target tracking process, and use indicator screens to
determine whether the target has been destroyed by the explosion of the surface-to-air
missile. The driver/mechanic of the combat crew is involved in Buk-M1 TELAR deployment
(demobilization); turns on (off) the power supply system and monitors its operation. Buk-M1
TELAR hardware features a high level of automation. While the Buk-M1 TELAR is
normally operated by a full combat crew, its high level of automation essentially allows
performing combat operations by an incomplete combat crew. In fact, all functions can be
performed by the TELAR commander alone.
13 Picture by Skorik.
14 Picture by Skorik.
15 Evaluation of the air situation means that this evaluation is carried out by commander of Buk-M1
TELAR for determining the number and conditions of incoming targets expected in the launch area,
clarification of their characteristics, including single target, group target, aircraft, helicopter, missile,
faulty target, etc. The commander also confirms the existence of friendly aircrafts and defines other
targets followed by other Buk-M1 TELARs.
Figure 5. Workstations of the combat crew of the Buk-􀀰􀀔􀀃􀀷􀀨􀀯􀀤􀀵􀀃􀀋􀀜􀈺􀀖􀀔􀀓􀉆􀀔􀀌16
14. The launcher-loader module of the Buk-M1 system can store, transport, and
load up to eight missiles (image in Figure 6).17 Four missiles sit in the launching rack and
can be launched via commands from the Buk-M1 TELAR during combat operations. Four
more missiles sit in transport cradles. In the context of firing operations, the launcher-loader
module can be viewed as a remote launcher controlled via commands from the Buk-M1
TELAR.
16 Picture by Skorik.
17 A. B. Skorik, Composition, Technical Use and Combat Operation of Primary Units of Surface-to-air
Missile System Buk-M1. Study Guide (2018), p. 46 (Annex 497).
• •
.>
"t
Figure 6: General view of the Buk-M1 launcher-loader module.18
15. The Buk-M1 SAM system uses solid-fuel single-stage surface-to-air
missiles.19 The missiles have a radar guidance system with a semi-active operating principle
and a high-explosive fragmentation payload. At the initial stage of the flight, the trajectory is
adjusted using radio signals from the Buk-M1 TELAR. At the final stage of the flight, the
trajectory is adjusted by self-guidance.20 A payload weighing 70 kilograms destroys aerial
targets. The payload is detonated using a radio detonator.21 The shock wave and fragments
are the damaging agents of the missile.22
16. 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀝􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀖􀀛􀉆􀀔􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀖􀀛􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃
the 9M38M1 surface-to-air missile has more advanced radioelectronic equipment that has an
increased guidance range and firing altitude (image in Figure 7).23 The kill zones of the
􀀜􀉆􀀖􀀛􀉆􀀔􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀜􀉆􀀖􀀛􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁈-to-air missiles differ in many ways. Figure 8 shows vertical
cross-sections of the kill zone when different types of missiles are fired.24 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀜􀉆􀀖􀀛􀉆􀀔􀀃
guided surface-to-air missile is designed to take down aerodynamic targets, cruise missiles,
anti-ship missiles, helicopters (including helicopters hovering at extremely low altitudes) as
well as radar-contrast abovewater targets.
􀀩􀁌􀁊􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀝􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀖􀀛􀉆􀀔􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁈-to-air missile25
18 Ibid. (Annex 497).
19 Missile 9M38M1. Technical Guide. 9M38M1.0000.000 TO., p. 39 (1984) (Annex 482).
20 Ibid. p. 29-30 (Annex 482).
21 Ibid. p. 77 (Annex 482).
22 Ibid. (Annex 482)
23 See. supra, note 17, p. 21.
24 See. supra, note 17, p. 12.
25 See. supra, note 17, p. 21.
Figure 8. Vertical cross-sections of the kill zone when different types of missile are fired: a)
􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀜􀀰􀀖􀀛􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀞􀀃􀀃􀁅􀀌􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀜􀉆􀀖􀀛􀉆􀀔􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇.26
17. While the Buk-M1 TELAR normally operates as part of the entire complex
system, the technical capabilities of the Buk-M1 TELAR enable it to carry out combat
operations in autonomous mode. The operation of the Buk-M1 TELAR as part of the Buk-
M1 SAM system (Part III) and in autonomous mode (Part IV) is described in more detail
below.
III. Operation of the Buk-M1 SAM system
18. Combat operations of the BUK-M1 SAM system are carried out under control
from the combat control center. The Buk-M1 TELAR normally fires at aerial targets either
under the control of the combat control center, the centralized control mode, or while being
monitored by the combat control center, the standalone target location mode. In centralized
control mode, the Buk-M1 TELAR receives information about the target directly from the
combat control center, and the entire process of Buk-M1 TELAR operation is controlled by
the combat control center. In standalone target location mode, the combat control center
gives instructions to the Buk-M1 TELAR to operate in a specific sector of the airspace,
within which the Buk-M1 TELAR is assigned to locate and destroy targets on its own.
19. I will first explain the operation of the Buk-M1 SAM system in centralized
control mode. The primary operational phases of the Buk-M1 SAM system are: 1) target
detection; 2) target identification; 3) target acquisition; and 4) target destruction.
20. The target locator performs the primary target detection task by scanning the
airspace and displaying the information about the air space on the target locator screens.27
26 See. supra, note 17, p.12.
The indicator screens display all aerial targets and information about the distance to them,
their azimuth and altitude. The target locator also automatically performs friend-or-foe
identification without operator involvement, and relays all detected targets with the friend-orfoe
attributes to the combat control center. The friend-or-foe identification task is
implemented with the help of dedicated “Password” friend-or-foe identification hardware that
can automatically distinguish friendly forces and weapons from those of the enemy.
Identification is performed by a package of radioelectronic equipment that generates a query
signal and verifies the return signal that helps identify friendly forces based on an encoded
signal. The principle of friend-or-foe identification is described below in more detail.
International civilian aircrafts without “Password” identification hardware are relayed from
the target locator to the combat control center with the “unidentified” attribute. The target
locator scans the airspace in a 360􀉨 angle with a range of up to 160 km.28
21. The target identification stage is carried out by the combat control center that
processes information received from the target locator. The combat control center
automatically selects and captures up to 15 targets as information about them arrives from the
target locator and then determines their speed and coordinates (begins tracking).29 The next
task automatically performed by the combat control center involves allocating up to 6 targets
among the Buk-M1 TELARs depending on the time of arrival and the time that the target
spends in the kill zone. The operators in the combat control center monitor the automatic
identification process and adjust the allocation of targets among the Buk-M1 TELARs based
on information about the air situation. The operators of the combat control center make the
relevant decisions based on the information about the air space (including civilian air traffic
information) received from the Radio-Technical Troops of the Air Force and their radars.
22. At the target acquisition stage, the Buk-M1 TELAR automatically receives
information from the combat control center about the target coordinates, target speed, and
attribute (single or group target, etc.). The launcher and radar of the Buk-M1 TELAR
automatically turn to face in the direction of the target and begin scanning in a narrow sector
that allows quick target acquisition (the scanning zone time is 2 seconds). Within the narrow
scanning sector, the Buk-M1 TELAR commander observes on the monitor the target
identification mark shaped as a straight line that reflects the distance to the target, as well as
27 V.I. Zverev and others, Military Equipment of Radio-Technical Units of Air Defense Forces. Radar
Station 9C18M1. Study Guide. pp. 8-9 (2005) (Annex 488).
28 Ibid. (Annex 488).
29 G. M. Zebritskiy, A.S. Kiriliuk, V.V. Lekianchuk, P.Y. Hil, Composition, Technical Use and Combat
Operation of Command Control Center of Buk-M1 SAM. Part II, Command Control Center 9C470M1.
Study Guide, pp. 9-10, (2005) (Annex 489).
marks of other objects displayed on the radar. The Buk-M1 TELAR commander additionally
observes information about the distance to the target and the speed of the target (based on
data from the combat control center) displayed on the digital indicator screen, as well as
information on the target’s altitude and target motion parameters reflected on arrow
indicators (see Figure 9).
Figure 9: Digital indicator of target distance (left above) and speed (right above) and arrow
indicator of target altitude (left below) and motion parameters (right below)30
23. After the target has been detected, the Buk-M1 TELAR commander performs
friend-or-foe target identification. The senior operator with the help of the aiming indicator
screen and the operator with the help of the cross-hairs mark monitor the situation in the air
simultaneously with the Buk-M1 TELAR commander (see Figure 10). Upon detecting a
target on the aiming indicator screen, the operator acquires the target and begins its automatic
tracking by aligning the cross-hairs mark with the position of the target mark (see Figure 11).
After the target has been acquired for automatic tracking, the TELAR automatically
determines the type of target: aerodynamic, ballistic, or helicopter. The second operator
monitors the target on the indicator screen and can additionally identify the target based on its
image (see Figure 12), while the Buk-M1 TELAR commander additionally identifies the
target based on its acoustic portrait.
30 Pictures by Skorik.
Figure 10: Aiming indicator screen31
Figure 11: Aiming at a group target and alignment of the cross-hairs with the target
position.32
31 Pictures by Skorik.
Unmann
SU 27
Cross-
I ,, ' I •
l Hi
/ 0:14:11
li[
0:14:12
24. An experienced Buk-M1 TELAR commander and operator can fairly
accurately identify the target based on its parameters (dimensions, jet engines, if any). Figure
12 shows that the propeller of the Orlan-10 unmanned aerial vehicle causes additional signal
modulation compared to the jet-engine Reys unmanned aerial vehicle. The signal returned by
a Mi-8 helicopter has an even more pronounced modulation. The indicator screen clearly
shows the moment when the missile detonated and destroyed the unmanned aerial vehicle.
The altitude and speed of different types of aircraft (see Figure 9) are additional identification
factors. However, judging from my experience teaching cadets and officers, combat crews
rarely considered these factors in a highly stressful combat situation when they consider
initial firing data.
25. At the target destruction stage, the TELAR commander considers the target’s
position relative to its kill zone. If the target is located within the launch zone, the
commander launches the missile, if the combat control center has issued a launch
authorization command. The Buk-M1 TELAR operator can abort target destruction after the
missile launch by turning off the radar before the target has been destroyed, which activates
the missile self-destruct sequence. As a result, the missile destroys itself before destroying
the target.
32 Pictures by Skorik.
Figure 12. View of the indicator screen of the second operator tracking a jet-engine
unmanned aerial vehicle (Reys), a piston motor unmanned aerial vehicle (Orlan-10), a Mi-8
helicopter; at the moment of unmanned aerial vehicle destruction by a guided surface-to-air
missile33
26. As I discussed above in paragraph 18, the Buk-M1 TELAR can fire at aerial
targets in the standalone target location mode while being monitored by the combat control
center. I will now discuss this mode of operation of the Buk-M1 TELAR. This mode is
primarily different from the centralized control mode in that the Buk-M1 TELAR performs a
standalone search for targets within the sector determined by the combat control center. In
other words, in this mode the combat control center does not automatically relay target
instructions to the Buk-M1 TELAR at the target detection and identification stage as
33 Photo by Skorik.
Unmann
Dark crosshairs
Unmann
Target
Signal of the Reys
Unman
Signal of the Orlan-10
Signal of the Mi-8 helicopter
Destruction of the unmanned aerial
vehicle by a guided surface-to-air
described in paragraphs 20-21. In the standalone target location mode, the combat control
center specifies the location sector by determining the center of the location sector in terms of
the azimuth and selecting the target location echelon in terms of the altitude (target detection
at low and medium altitudes or target detection at medium and high altitudes). For example,
the combat control center can give an assignment to the Buk-M1 TELAR to search for a
target at lower altitude in the sector from 30 to 150 degree in azimuth. The remaining phases
of operation, including target acquisition and destruction, are carried out in the same way as
during the centralized control mode.
IV. Operation of the Buk-M1 TELAR in autonomous mode.
27. The technical capabilities of the Buk-M1 TELAR enable it to carry out combat
operations in autonomous mode, by which I mean without the involvement of other Buk-M1
SAM system elements and without coordinating its operations with the combat control center
and anti-aircraft defense forces. In this mode, the Buk-M1 TELAR commander makes an
independent decision to locate, detect, and destroy a target based on the combat mission at
hand.
28. Judging from my own experience and practice in using the Buk-M1 SAM
system, autonomous operation of the Buk-M1 TELAR poses a threat to friendly aircraft.
This is due to the fact that the Buk-M1 TELAR commander has limited information when
assessing the situation in the air. Moreover, the technical capabilities of the Buk-M1 TELAR
do not make it possible to accurately tell civilian aircraft from military targets. This is due to
the following key factors: 1) The Buk-M1 TELAR does not have transponders currently used
on civilian aircraft, as described below; 2) Information on Buk-M1 TELAR indicator screens
makes military aircraft practically indistinguishable from civilian aircraft in terms of their
signal attributes. In light of this, modern practice of combat use of the Buk-M1 TELAR
involves close coordination with the command center of the Armed Forces, including
cooperation with radio-technical troops of the Air Force with the use of modern
communications solutions.
29. As for the Buk-M1 TELAR survival under the conditions of modern antiaircraft
warfare, the time of Buk-M1 TELAR operation between the start of target location
and the missile launch generally should not exceed 20 to 24 seconds.34 This time span is
determined by the combat capabilities of the Buk-M1 TELAR and the ability of the enemy
aircraft to detect, jam, and destroy anti-aircraft defense systems. When the Buk-M1 TELAR
is operated in autonomous mode, the Buk-M1 TELAR commander has much less time to
34 See. supra, note 17, p. 13.
make the decision to destroy the target, on account of the need to spend additional time
evaluating the situation in the air.
30. When the Buk-M1 TELAR is operated by an incomplete combat crew or by
the commander single-handedly, these factors greatly complicate operations. Under such
conditions, the risk of detection and destruction of the Buk –M1 TELAR by the enemy
increases considerably. Such conditions create a substantial burden on the combat crew. The
highly stressful conditions are further exacerbated by the need to make independent decisions
in a combat situation without support from the combat control center, including the additional
information it provides, and radio-technical troops of the Air Force. The complex situation
greatly increases the probability of incorrect assessment of the situation in the air. As
mentioned earlier, in a highly stressful situation during autonomous operation the crew of the
Buk-M1 TELAR will hardly have time to pay attention to such factors as target altitude and
speed, specifics of signal modulation that would otherwise allow an operator to determine the
type of target and making an informed and independent decision as to whether or not the
identified object is a legitimate target.
V. Specific considerations of Buk-M1 TELAR operation in the presence of civilian
aircraft.
31. The Buk-M1 SAM system is very seldom used in situations where the airspace
is open to civilian aircraft. Moreover, operation of the Buk-M1 TELAR in autonomous mode
can be extremely dangerous for civilian aircraft as explained above. This is partly due to the
limited capability of the Buk-M1 TELAR to identify “friendly” aircraft. As mentioned
earlier, this technical capability is implemented in the Buk-M1 TELAR as part of the friendor-
foe identification system. However, this system is not capable of effectively ensuring the
safety of civilian aircrafts. Below is a detailed description of the operational features of the
friend-or-foe identification system designed to identify friendly military aircraft, followed by
the specific considerations of Buk-M1 TELAR operation in the presence of civilian aircrafts.
32. The friend-or-foe identification task is implemented with the help of dedicated
friend-or-foe identification hardware. Only two friend-or-foe identification systems currently
exist in the world: on the one hand – Russia and CIS member states (the “Password” joint
system for friend-or-foe radar identification), and on the other hand – the USA and NATO
member states (the MK12 radar identification system).35 In the context of the Buk-M1 SAM
35 Mikhail Hodarenko, “Password” is almost silent. Independent Military Review (15 December 2000)
http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2000-12-15/6_parol.html (Annex 500).
system, this means that all Buk-M1 TELARs and target locators are equipped with sets of
“Password” friend-or-for identification equipment.36
33. The operating principle of the “Password” system is as follows. The Buk-M1
TELAR radar has a transmitter that relays an encoded query signal into the space via the
radar antenna.37 The query signal is encoded using dedicated algorithms that are modified at
specific time intervals. All friendly military aircraft also have as set of “Password” hardware
onboard.38 After receiving the query signal, the “Password” hardware onboard the aircraft
analyzes the code of the query signal. If the code matches the code installed on the aircraft,
an encoded return signal is sent from the aircraft. The “Password” hardware of the Buk-M1
TELAR analyzes the incoming return signal. If it matches the valid codes, the indicator
screens of the commander and the senior operator show a distinctive “I am friendly” symbol
next to the target mark. In this case, the Buk-M1 TELAR commander disables the weapons.
In this mode, the “Password” equipment prevents a missile launch.
34. The Buk-M1 TELAR radar does not have transponders (transmitterresponders)
used in foreign-made civilian aircraft, making it impossible to identify foreign
civilian aircraft based on return signals. However, the civilian aircraft identification system
is effectively implemented in radar systems of civilian air traffic control systems. Each
command center of radio-radar forces has a dedicated team tasked with monitoring civilian
air traffic. This team cooperates with the civilian air traffic control system in monitoring the
traffic of civilian aircraft in the airspace. Command centers of radio-radar forces relay
information about civilian aircraft and helicopters to command centers of the Armed Forces,
from which this information is further relayed via the notification network to units of antiaircraft
defense forces. The command center of the Air Force in the area of operations is also
manned by aviation, radio-radar forces, and anti-aircraft defense forces professionals who
jointly carry out the tasks of monitoring the airspace and controlling the combat operations of
the personnel and resources of the anti-aircraft defense forces and fighter jets. It also stands
to mention that the commander of the unit with an armed Buk-M1 SAM system establishes
communication with the nearest unit of radio-radar forces to receive air situation updates.
Therefore, if the Buk-M1 SAM system operates in coordination with the combat control
center, information from radio-radar forces about civilian air traffic will be brought to the
attention of the commander of the Buk-M1 battery in a timely manner, thereby substantially
reducing the risk of attacks on civilian aircraft.
36 See. supra, note 17, pp. 77-80.
37 See. supra, note 17, pp. 77-80.
38 See. supra, note 17, pp. 77-80.
35. It is important to understand that the traffic safety of not just civilian aviation
but also friendly military aviation cannot be fully ensured using only hardware systems as
described above. As mentioned earlier, the stressful nature of the combat situation plays a
big role here along with the focus of the training of Buk-M1 TELAR operators. In the case
of the Buk-M1 SAM system, the differences between the training of Buk-M1 TELAR crews
and combat control center crews are crucial.
36. Buk-M1 TELAR operators are trained to quickly locate the target and destroy
it with lightning speed and accuracy, since the Buk-M1 TELAR normally operates in
coordination with the command center of the Armed Forces where all the key decisionmaking
takes place. Buk-M1 TELAR indicator screen output changes 5 times in the space of
4 seconds during target tracking, while an inexperienced specialist has a very hard time
telling target marks from marks representing local landmarks, clouds, or other false marks.
37. Combat crews of the Buk-M1 TELAR are trained to reflexively act with
lightning speed yet optimally when detecting and destroying aerial targets of the enemy. The
combat crew are trained to act automatically under the conditions of a duel with an airborne
enemy. The outcome of this duel more often than not depends on who fires first.
38. The training of combat control center crews is different in that these
professionals are taught to process large arrays of data, and know how to analyze this
information. These crews can assess the air situation and make decisions much more
effectively using the above-mentioned sources of information. If a civilian aircraft without a
return signal has been detected in the airspace above the battle field, the combat control
center operator can generate a specific target indication for the Buk-M1 TELAR with the
FORBIDDEN TARGET (FBT) attribute, in which case the target that must not be fired at is
appropriately marked on the screen of the Buk-M1 TELAR commander.
39. In my opinion, it is virtually impossible to ensure the desired level of safety in
a situation where civilian aircraft are present in the airspace during Buk-M1 TELAR
operation in autonomous mode. The technical capabilities of the Buk-M1 TELAR in
autonomous mode do not make it possible to distinguish a civilian aircraft from a military
one, and this situation is further exacerbated under highly stressful conditions experienced by
the combat crew of the Buk-M1 TELAR.
40. I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to provide further testimony.
Signed in the city of Kharkiv, Ukraine, on 6 of June 2018.
By:[Signature]
Anatolii Skorik
Attachments:
CV (Resume)
Anatolii Skoryk CURRICULUM VITAE
134/16 Akademika Pavlova St., 304 May 11, 2018
Kharkiv, Ukraine
+ 38 050 302 3509
[email protected]
Candidate of Technical Sciences in Armaments and Military Equipment
(Diploma DK No. 000712 of May 21,1998)
Scientific Position: Assistant Professor, Department of Combat Employment of Anti-Aircraft
Missile Troops (Assistant Professor Certificate 12DTs No. 016041 of December 22, 2006)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4327-8796
Place of work / job title: Assistant Professor, Ivan Kozhedub Kharkiv National Air Force
University
SCIENTIFIC PROFILE
Air defense systems, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), guidance systems
AREA OF RESEARCH
Theory of construction and combat employment of weapon systems using network-centric
warfare technology. Guidance system modeling
PUBLICATIONS
Published 105 scientific works (articles, conference reports, scientific research reports)
Work Experience and Education
1986: Graduated from Dnipropetrovsk Higher Air Defense Anti-Aircraft Missile
Command Academy with a gold medal [for exceptional academic performance] and was
assigned for continued military service to a military unit located in the City of Polyarnyi,
Murmansk Oblast [administrative region]; served there until 1990
1990–1993: Full-time graduate school at Marshal of the Soviet Union L.O. Govorov
Military Air Defense Radio Engineering Academy, City of Kharkiv
November 1993: Upon graduation from the graduate military school, appointed to the
position of Instructor with Kharkiv Military University
1998: Awarded a Candidate’s degree
2006: Lectured in People’s Republic of China
February 1999–July 2008: Served as Assistant Professor with Kharkiv Air Force
University
July 2008: Filed for discharge from the Armed Forces of Ukraine
November 2009–present time: Employed by Kharkiv Air Force University as Assistant
Professor
MEKJUVHAPOJIHIM CY JI OOH
IIPHMEHEHHE MEKIV HAPOJIHOH KOHBEHLIMH O EOPEE C
HHAHCHPOBAHHE TEPPOPH3MA H MEKIYHAPOIHO
KOHBEHIIMH O JIMKBHJIAIIHH BCEX (OPM PACOBO
JIACKPHMHHAIIHH
yKPAHHA
npomu
POCCHHCKOH «EJIEPAIIHM
KCIHEPTHI IOKJIAI KAHJIHJIATA TEXHHHECKHX HANK
AHATOIHH CKOPHKA
I. BBeeHHe
1. Me 3OByT AHaTOJIH CKODHK. I IOLI€HT XapKOBCKOTO HaIUHOHaJIHOTO
yHepcTeTa Bo3yIHX CHI HMeHH HBaHa Koep(y6a (XapKoBcKH yHHBepCHTeT
BO3/IyIIIHIX CHIT), IIOJIKOBHHK 3aIIaCa BOOpyKeHHIX CHI VKpaHHI. XapKoBCKH yHHBepCHTeT
BO3JIyIIIHIX CHI BeTC rOCyapCTBeHHIM ye6HMM 3aBeeHHeM MHHHcTepCTBa 06ODOHN
VKpaHHI, OCyIIIeCTBJLHIOLLIH IIOUTOTOBKy BOeHHIX CIIeLIHaIHCTOB B O61aCTH aBHaLHH,
DJ(HOTexHHeCKHX CHCTOM, 3eHHTHIX DaKeTHIX KOMIUJIeKCOB H CHCTOM aBTOMaTHeCKOTO
ypane. B 1986 roIy oKoHHnI c oTHeM JI[HenponerpoBcKoe BIcee yHIM1e
IIpOTHBOBO3JIVIIIHO O60pOHEH IUIH KOMaHJIHOTO COCTaBa. B 1990-1993 TOJIaX OKOHHT
aTIOHKTyDy B BoeHHOH HHKeHepHOH paIHOTeXHHeCKo aKa1eMHH HMeHH Maputana
CoBeTeKorO Co03a JI.O. FoopoBa. B 1998 roI1y 3a1uHTHI KaHHaTCKyo HccepTaIMO 1IO
CIIeIUHaJIHOCTH BOODyKOHHe M BOOHHaH TOXHHKa. TeMa ICCepTat O6naCT MOHX HayHHX
TepeCOB cBM3aHI c nIOcTpOeHHeM cHcTeM HaBe(eHI 3eHHTHIX ynpaBLHeMIX paKeT H
6OeBIM IIDHMeHeHHeM 3eHHTH5IX DaKeTHIX KOMILIeKCOB. Haan c 1993 101a, IIpeIOJa0 B
XapKOBcKOM yHHBepcHTeTe Bo3(yIHIX CHI Ha paKyITeTe 3eHHTHIX DaKeTHIX BOCK. B
2005 r. c rpyIo penoaaTee yHHBepcHTeTa BMe3a B KTai pH TeHH Kypa neKHi.
lpMan yacre B nOOTOBKe BOeHHIX ceHaHCTOB o6acTH cHCTeM
porBoo3/(yuHof o6opoHI H3 Ipy3H, A3ep6azpxana /pyrx rocyyapcrB. B IOKHOCTH
BeIIyIIIeTO HAyHHOTO COTDyJIHHKa IIDHHHMaI yHaCTHe B HayHO-HCCJIeJIOBaTOIBCKHX pa60Tax B
paMKaX yKpaHHCKHX IIDOCKTOB IIO CO3JaHHIO CHCTeM IIDOTHBOBO3JIVIIIHO 060pOHL.
2. B paMKax pOxOKIIeHHH BOOHHO CJITyKI MHOTOKDaTHO yHaCTBOBaI B
npoeze ye6no-6oeIX CTpeIL C 3eHHTHO-DaKCTHIX KOMILIeKCOB (33PK) 6on1LIO
tau»ocTH. B aHemeM yacTBoa poBeeHHH ye6Ho-60eBMX CTpe1L6 3PK ByKR-MI. B
DaMKaX IIOJUTOTOBKH BOOHHBIX CIICIIHaTHCTOB B XapKOBCKOM yHHBODCHTeTe BO3JIVIIIHIX CHI %
IIOCTOHHHOH OCHOBe OCyIIIeCTBJLHIO IIDaKTHHeCKyIO IIOJITOTOBKy KypCaHTOB nIO BoIIpOcaM
DKCIUIyaTaI[HM H 60eBOTO IIpHMeHeHHS 3PK EyK-MI.
3. H npenopao a3erHO-paKeTHI KoMIeKC DyK-MI 6onee 15 JIeT H TOTOBO
CIIeIIHaJIHCTOB B 3TO O6IaCTH. B KaeCTBe JIOIIeHTa HHTaI TaKKe JIOKLHH, CB3aHHIe c
IIOCTDOOHHeM H OeBEIM IIDHMOHOHHeM 3eHHTHEMX DaKOTH5IX KOMILIeKCOB M CHCTeM
nporHoBo3pyHo o60poH 6omIOH, cpeIIHef H MaIO IIaIHOCTH (C-200, C-300 I 3PK
By-M1).
4. H BUH0C aBTOpOM 105 HayHIX ny6HKaH Ha pa3nHHIe TeMI,
KaCaOIUeCc CHCTeM npOTHBOBO3JIVIIHO 060pOHI, BKJIOaH C-200, C-300 H Dy-MI.
5. KO MHe O6paTHIHC C 3a1aHHeM IIOJITOTOBHT TOT KCIIeDTHI JIOKIIaI O
HHKeCJIeJIyIOIIIeM:
• Oncae aero-paxerHoro KoMILIeK&a (3PK) Ey-M1;
2
􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀍶􀍺􀍹􀈌􀇤
􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀍶􀍺􀍹􀈌􀇤
􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀍶􀍺􀍹􀈌􀇤
􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀍶􀍺􀍹􀈌􀇤
􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀍶􀍻􀍻􀈌􀇤
• Pa6ora 3PK EyK-MI;
• Pa6ora caMoxopo oreBO yCTaOBKH 3PK By-MI (COY EyK-M1) B
aBTOHOMHOM DOKHMe;
• OCO6eHOCTH yHKIUHOHHDOBaHHA COY ByK-MI B yCJIOBHIX HaIHHHH
TpaKJIaHCKOH aBHaLUHH.
II. Oncae aero-paernoro KoMnIeKca Dy-M1
6. ByK-MI IIpeICTaBJLHeT CO6Of MO6HJIHI 3eHHTHI DaKeTHI KOMIUIeKC (3PK)
Ma1O IaOCTH, pa3pa6OTa B COBeTCKOM Coo3e. B 1958 r B CCCP Haan1ac pa3pa60rKa
MO6HIHOTO 3PK IULH IIDOTHBOBO3IIyIIIHOH O60pOHI (IBO) cyXOnyTHIX BOCK.' B 1966 r
IIaHHI 3PK 6BI pa3pa6OTa M IpHHHT Ha BOODyKeHHe IIOII HHIeKCOM 2K12 Ky6. B
IIOCIeJIyOIIIHe TO[II 6LIM IDOIIOJTKeHI Da6OTI IIO COBODIIIeHCTBOBaHHO KOMnIeKCa, B
peayrare K 1979 r01y 6uI npHHT Ha BoopyKeHHe HOH 3PK By. Jlanee pa6or» no
MOIIepHH3aIUHH IIpHBOJIH K CO3IIaHMIO 3PK ByK-MI, KOTOpI 6LI pHHHT Ha BOOpyKeHHe BOCK
IIpOTHBOBO3IIyIIIHO 060pOH5I (I1BO) CyXOIyTHIX BOCK B 1983 roIy.3 Y oBorO 3eHHTHOpaKeTHOTO
KOMIUIOKCa 6UJIH 3HaHTOTHO yJIyIIIeHI DHII OCHOBHIX XaDpaKTODHCTHK. Dun1a
3HaHHTOTHO yBOJIHHOHa 3OHa IIODaKOHHH H BO3DOCJIa B€DOHTHOCT IIODaKOHHH KDBL1aTIX
pDaKeT H BepTOJ1eTOB.
7. Ce1yoHi Tan1 Mo/epHH3a1HH 3PK By npoIIoDKHe B HaaIe 90-X TOI10B.
BoicKoBO 3PK By-MI-2, pa3pa60Tai B IIepHOII C 1994 110 1997 T, IpeIICTaBJLH1 CO60i
a»HeHee pa3BHTHe 3PK ByK-M1. 3a CeT MCIIOJI3OBaHHH HOBO BBICOKObbeKTHBHOf
3eHTHO-yIpaBLHeMo paKeTI (9M317), 3HaTeIHO nOBICHIHc TaKTHKo-TeXHHecKHe
XapaKTepHCTHKH 33PK. BLICOTa IIOpaKOHLI BO3DOCJIa JI0 25 KM, a 3OHa IIODaKeHHI Ha CDeIIHHX
M 6OIIx BICOTaX yBOJIHHJIaC II0 42 KM.3 KpOMe TOTO, 3PK nOIyHJ BO3MOKHOCT
CTDeI6I IIO Ha/IBO/HIM H Ha3eMHIM DaIHOKOHTDaCTHIM IIeJLHM. B 1998 TO21y 3PK By-M1-2
npn na oopyKee apM Pocc.+ B 2008 roIy Ha OOpyKeHHe Pocc nOCTynaer 3PK
byK-M2, B KOTODOM MCI1OJI3yOTCH HOBIe caMOXOJIHe orHewe ycTaHoBKH c pa3posaoi
aTeHHO peIIeTKO M BBOIIHTCH DaJIHOJIOKaTOp IIOIICBeTa H HaBeJIeHHS (PITH),
O6eCneHBaOIUHf 3HaTenHOe yBOJIHHeHHe JIaIHOCTH CTDOIL6 I1O KpLIaTIM paKeTaM.S
E. A. HHrHH, HCTOp H TeHIeHIIHH Da3BHTHH MO6HJIHIX 3CHHTHIX DaKeTHIX KOMILIeKCOB
Cpe(He JaOCT JULH IIDOTHBOBO3JIyIIIHO O60pOHI CyXOIIyTHIX BOCK, PaJ(HOTexHHKa H
9neKTpOHHKa, T. 12. N9 2, cTp. 15 (2005)
Ibid. crp. 16
Ibid. crp. 17
4 Ibid.
SK. P6o, 3euumue paxemwte xounnexct cee~cmea «Dy», BoeHoe o6o3pee (3
aryera 2015 roa) https://topwar.ru/79989-zenitnye-raketnye-kompleksy-semevstvabuk.
html
3
􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀍶􀍻􀍺􀈌􀇤
J[anneiee COBepIIeCTBoBaHe 3PK EyK-M 1pHBeIO K pHTHO Ha BOOpyKeHHe B POCCHH
B 2015 OIy 3PK ByK-M3, KOTOpI COXpaMB O6I(yIO CTpyKTypy 3PK ByK-M2, KapIUHHa1HO
IIDeBOCXOJIHT OTO IIO OCHOBHIM TaKTHKO-TOXHHHeCKHM XaDaKTODHCTHKaM.°
8. 33PK By-MI peIHa3HaeH pH yHHTOKeHH caMoeTOB apMecKoi,
TaKTHHeCKO H CTDaTOTHHeCKOH aBHaIHH, BepTOJIOTOB OIHeBOf IIOJUIeDKKH, KDLIaTIX DaKeT H
6eCIUIOTHIX JIeTaTOJI HIX aIIIIa DaTOB Ha JIaIHOCTHX OT 3 I10 32 KM, JIOTHIIIHX Ha BICOTaX OT 15
I10 22 000 MeTpOB CO CKODOCTHMH /10 830 M/c. 33PK ByK-MI HMeeT BICOKyIO BepOHTHOCT
IIOpaeH ten. Dror KOMLIeKc COCO6eH DpbeKTHBHO IIDOTHBOCTOHT MaCCHDOBaHH5IM
HaIeTaM BDaKeCKOH aBHaIUHH H IIDHKDBIT BOHCKa HIH BOeHHO-IpOMIIILIeHHMe 06eKT.
9. B cocra 60eBEX 3PK «ByK-MD» BXOIUHT: IIyHKT 60eBOTO yIIpaBJIeHHH,
DaJ(HOOKaLOHHa CTaHI 0630pa H IIeJIeyKa3aHHH, IIIeCT CaMOXOIIHIX OTHeBIX yCTaHOBOK
(COY By-M1) TpH IyCKOBMX 3apwKaox yCTaHOBKH. B KaecTBe 6a3M JUIH yKa3aHHIX
MaIIHH HCIIOJI3yCTCH IyCOHHHHOe IIIaCCH, TO O6eCneHBaeT BICOKyIO IIDOXOIIHMOCT,
MaHCBDOHHOCT H CKODOCT pa3BeDTIBaHHH KOMILIeKCa.
Puucyuox 1. euumuo-Paxemwu~ Kounexc Dyx-M1. IIuxm 6oeeoeo ynpaaneun (cneea),
paoonoxauowa cmagun obs3opa u eneyxaaauun (emopa cnesa), caMoxoouas oeueea
ycmaoexa (mpems cneea), nycosas 3apcaoua ycmaoexa (amopas cnpaea), u
mpaucnopma Maunuua (cnpa6a).7
·A.B. KapIeKo, 3eHHTHI paKeTHI KOMILIeKC 9K317M «BYVK-Mg», BoeHo- Texrec
C6opHHK «HescKH Bacro», http://nevskii-bastion.ru/buk-m3
7 3eHTHO-DaKeTHIH KOMILJIeRKC 33PK «ByK-ML» -- cTOpH co3aHM omHcaHHe (30 Ma
2018 r0/a) https://militaryarms.ru/boepripasy/rakety/buk-m1/
4
􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀀃􀍶􀍻􀍹􀈌􀇤
􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀀃􀍶􀍻􀍹􀈌􀇤
10. IlyHKT 6OeBOTO yIIpaBIeHH IIDeJIHa3HaeH JUL aBTOMaTH3HpOBaHHOTO
ypane pa6oroi 6oeMMM JeCTBH1MM CpeICTB 3PK ByK-MI (H306. Ha pH€. 2)." IlyHKT
60eBOTO yIIpaBJIeHHH MOKeT 06pa6aTHBaT HHODMAIUHIO O 75 BO3I(VIIIHHX IIOJLHX, BBL/(aBaT /IO
6 1eeyKa3aHHH, peynpeKaeT 0 noneTe IIpyKecTeHHO aHa1UH, o6ecneHaeT pHeM H
06pa6OTKy HHODMaIHM OT BHIIIeCTOHIII&TO KOMaHJIHOTO IIyHKTa, DUHOJIOKaIHOHHO CTaHLLHH
0630pa IeneyKa3au, tuecTH COY ByK-MI. IIp pa3BepTIBa a KOMaHoM nyTe 3PK
DyK-MI IIOIIBHKHOTO y3JIa CBH3H (KOMaHJIHO-IIITa6HaI MaIIIMHa) HMeeTCH BO3MOKHOCT
IIOIyeHHM HHODMaIUHH OT JIDyTHX IIOJIpa3JIOJIeHH BOCK IIDOTHBOBO3IyIIIHO 060pOHM
(IBO) H paUIOTexeCKx BOCK. IlyHKT 6OeBOTO yIIDaBICHHH IIDOH3BOJIHT HIeHTHJHKa1UHO
BO3/Uy1HIX IteneH, onpe/eHeT Ha6onee OIaCHIe H3 HHX, BB/(aeT 60eBMe 3a/IHM Ka/Io
COY By-MI1, a Taoe co6Hpaer o6pa6armaeT HHpopMa1po 0 Bo3/(yuHoif 06cTaHOBKe H XO/Ie
6oeBMX eicTBHf.
Puucyox 2. O6uu~ so myuma 6oesoeo ynpaaneu (9S470M1).o
11. PaIHOnOKaLoa CTau 0630pa H IIeJIeyKa3aHHH OCyIIIeCTBLHeT 0630p
BO3JIVIIIHOTO IIDOCTDaHCTBa, O6HapyKHBaeT BO3JIyIIIHMe 06eKTI, OIIpeIIOJLHOT HX
rocypapereryo npHHaUeKHocT (co/yoi) 3MepeT Koop/HHaTI (Hao6. Ha pHe. 3).
PaJOnOKaIUHOHHa CTaHIH 0630pa H IIeIeyKa3aHHH CIIOCOOHa O6HapyKHBaT BO3JIyIIHe
8 CRopHK A.B., 0po1oB O.JI., HixipopoB LA., Taut 0.b., Mopry €.B., IIo6y/0Ba,
Texia EKenuryaTatin ra Boone 3acTocyBaHH Gaco6is 3eHirHHx PaxerHx KoMnLeKciB
Manoi /lam»ocri. CaMoxia Bornea YcTaHOBKa 94310M1. KoeneKT JIeKLi. . H.1 cTp. 14
(2017)
•Ibid. crp.15
Io p0TO CIIOIaHHOe A.D. CKOpHKOM
5
􀀑
IIenIH Ha BICOTe JI0 25 H JaIHOCTH IIO 160 KHIOMeTpOB. Pa/HOOKaIHOa CTaHI 0630pa
eneyKa3aHHH, KaK npaBHI0, pa6oraer B aTOMaTHeCKOM peHMe be3 BMeaTe1CTBa
oneparopos nepenaer paHe o IIeUHX Ha IIyHKT 60eBorO ypaeHH. Pa6ora onepaT0po
HyKHa B yCJIOBHHX IIOMOX H HaIHHH 6OJIIIIOTO KOJIHHeCTBa JIOKHIX OTMeTOK.
,
rrr E
¢
Puucyyuox 3. Pauonoxauouua cmauu o6sopa u eneyxa3au (9C18M1) uuuxamopu
paovezo uecma onepamopo@ P/IC.a
12, CaMOxOHa OrHeBa yCTaoBKa (COy EyK-M1) sHeTOH aToHoMHHM 60eBHM
CDeICTBOM, IIDeJIHa3Ha HeHHIM JULH BOJIeHHH CTDOIOM 3CHHTHHMH DaKeTaMH IIO BO3VIIIHHM
uIeM (Hao6. a pc. 4). COY ByK-MI ocHauIeHa eTpM paKeTaMM H pa/HonoKaHoHHoii
CTaHIHOH, CIIOCO6HOH O6HapyKHBaT BO3IIyVIIIHMe IIeIH, OIIpeIOJUHT HX IIaTHOCTD, CKOpOCT.
COY ByK-MI o6ecneBaeT: nIOHeK, o6HapyKeHHe ono3HaBaHHe ("cBO-yKO") BO3VIIIHMX
tene; 3axaT BIpaHHO teIH Ha coIpOBOKIeHHe; pacno3HaBaHH THna con1pOBOKIaeMO
ten (apopuaMecKan uen (HanpMep, caMoner), 6ancrecKa 1ten1 HIM BepToeT);
DaCeT 3OHI IIODKeHHH H OIIeHKy YCJIOBH CTDOJI6I, IIyCK DaKeT H KOHTpOJIE IIOpaKeHHH LIeJIH
np nonptBe paKer.
J[OKHO OTMeTKOH HBJLHOTCH CHTHaI OTO6paKeHHI Ha KpaHe PIC MecTe B KOTOpoM HeT
IIeJH. IHpHaM nOBeH IOKHIX OTMeTOK MOIyT 6IT IIDHDOIUHIe DaJUHOBOJIHI,
OTpaeH OT O61aKOB, IITHI H IIDyTHX O6eKTOB, H T.JI.
a DOTO CIeIaHHOe A.D. CKOpHKOM
6
􀀑
􀀑
Puucyuox 4. CaMoxo~an oeuesas ycmauoexa 3PK Bx-M1 (9A310M1) a oeeeo~ no3uu.3
13. COY ByK-MI, KaK IIpaBHIO, YIpaBJLHeTCH 6OeBMM DaCeroM H3 4 en1OBeK:
KoMa/Hpa COY EyK-MI, pyx onepaTopoB M MexaHHKa-BoHTeL (Hao6. a pc.5).4
KoMa/up COY By-MI pyKoBOIUHT pa6oroi 6oeoro pacera COY By-MI; oKaBaeT
KOMaHJIHDy 3eHHTHOTO DaKeTHOTO IIOJIpaA3JIOIeHHH O TOTOBHOCT COY EyK-MI cTpeTe,
H3yaeT H OIeHHBaCT BO3IyIIIHyIO O6CTaHOBKy, OCyIIIeCTBJLHeT BI6Op BO3(VIIIHHX Leef JUL
o6cTpena; nIpoH3Bo/HT Ono3HaaHHe Bo3(yHX Lee (cBOi-yKOi), OCyIIIeCTBJUHeT IIyCK
paxer e COY yK-MI. OnepaTop COY By-MI (crap onepaTop onepaTop) 1po3BOIUrT
O6Hapyee H 3aXBaT BO3JIVIIHOH IIeIH, KOHTDOIHDyIOT IIDOIIeCC COIIDOBOKIIeHHH IIeJIM,
OIeHHBIOT IIO DKDaHaM HHJUHKaTODOB IIODaKeHHe IIeIH IIDH IIOIpBIBe paKeTH. MexaHKBoJuHTeI
» B cocTaBe pacera yacryer B pa3eprraHHH (cepTMaHHH) COY EyK-M1;
IpOH3BO/HT BKIOHeHHe (BIKIOHeHHe) CHCTeMI 3JIeKTDOIIHTaHH H KoHTpoHpyeT ee pa60Ty.
B annapaType COY EyK-MI BICOKH ypOBeH aBTOMaTH3aLUHM. Ka IpaBH1O, COy EyK-MI
yIpaBHeTC nOM 6oeBMM DaCeTOM, OIHaKO BICOKH yDOBeH aBTOMaTH3aIUHH, B
3 DOTO CIIeaHoe A.B. CKOpHKOM
4 OTO CIIeIaHHOe A.EB. CKOpHKOM
OueHKa BO3JIyIHO O6CTaHOBKH -- 3TO OlICHKa, OCyIIIeCTBIHCMa KOMAHHpOM COY EyK-MI,
JU BELCHeHH KOMecTBa napaMeTpOB JIBHKeHH BO3IyHIX Leef, OKHIaeMHX B 30He
IyCKa paKCT, yTOHCHH HX XapaKTepHCTHK: OIHoHa, pynnOBa, CaMOCT, BepTOeT,
KDBLJIaTa DaK€Ta, JIOKHa LICI H T.JAL., yTOHHCHHC HaIHHH B BO3IyXe CBOeH (IDyKeCTBCHHO)
aBMau M OnpeIeneH ueneH, KOTOpIe COIIpOBOKI@OTC IIpyTHM COY.
7
􀀏
􀀗􀀜􀀚􀈌􀇤
IIpHHIIHIIe IIO3BOJLHOT IIDOBOIHT 60eByIO pa60Ty HeIIOJIHHM 60eB5IM DaCeTOM, BIDIOT II0
BIIIOJIHeHHH BCeX pyHKIIHH KOMaHJUHDOM COY yK-MI.
Pucyuox. 5. Pa6owe Meema 6oesozo pacvema COY Bx-M1 (9A310M1)
14. IlycKoBa 3apwaoutan ycranoBKa KoMIeKCa DyK-MI MOKeT OCyIIIeCTBJLHT
xpanene, nepeBO3Ky JI0 BOCMH DaKeT, a TaKKe OCyIIIeCTBILHT HX IIOTpy3Ky (Ha06. a pc. 6).7
Heripe paKeTI HaXO/UHTCH Ha HanIpaBLHoUHX yCKoBorO yCTpoHcTBa H pH BeeHHM 60eBO
pa60TI MOIYT 6IT IIyIIIeHI IIO KOMaHJIaM c COY ByK-MI. Ee 4 paxer» pacnonoxer Ha
Tpacnoprtx onopax. BO BpeM CTDeI6I IIyCKOByIO 3apHKaOIII[IO yCTaHOBKy MOKHO
paCCMaTpBaT KaK JHcTaHIMOHHO BIHeceHHOe nyCKOBoe yCTpOcTBo, yIpaLHeMoe nIO
KOMaHJIaM c COY ByK-MI.
6 TO CJIeJIaHHOe A.. CKOpHKOM
?A.E. CopHK, IHocrpoeHe, TexHHecKa 3Kc1yaTaLI 6oeBoe npHMeHeHHe CTapTOB5IX
cpencrs 3eTHoro paKeTHoro KoMnIeKca DyK-MI, Ve6Hoe Iloco6e, cTp. 46, (2018)
(IIpunoKeHe
8
􀍶􀍺􀍴
􀍳􀍹􀇡
􀍳􀍹􀇤
Pucyuox 6. O6u~ sud nycxoso~ sapcaouei ycmaoexu xounnexca bx-M1.
15. 3PK ByK-MI co3yeT 3eHHTHe Tep/IoTonHBHIe o/HocTyneHaTIe
paKer1,"9 HCnon3yeMbIe DaKeTI HMCOT Da/IHOJIOKaIUHOHHyO CHCTOMy HaBeIeHHH C
non1yaKTHBHIM pHHIUHn1OM pa60TI H ocKooHo-pyracry0 6oeByo aCT. Ha HaaoM
3TaIIe IIOIeTa KODDOKIUHH TDaeKTODHH JIBHKeHH paKeTI ocyIecTeTC paIHoHrHa1aMH €
COY By-MI, a Ha 3aBepIaouteM - nyTeM CaMOHaBeeH. [UH IIOpaKeHHM BO3IyILIHIX
Uene HCnOn3yeTC 6OeBa aCT MaCCO 70 KHIOTDaMM, KOTODaH IIOJIDIBaCTCH C IIOMOIIIIO
DaJIHOB3pIBaTOJLH. IopaaOIM DneMeHTaMH paKeTI HBJIHeTCH yJIapHaH BOHa H
OCKOJIKH.
16. B KOMILIeKCe IIDeIIyCMOTDeHa BO3MOKHOCT BIIIOJIHeHHH 60eBOf pa60TI /IByM
THnaMH paKeT: 9M38M1 M 9M38. O6e paKeTI BITJLHJUHT IIDaKTHHeCKH MIIeHTHHO, MMe1OT
aanOrHHIe IIpHHIIHIII IIOCTDOeHHI, HO 3VP 9M38MI MeeT 60nee COBepIIIeHHyIO
patooneKTpoHHyIO aIIIIapaTyDy, TO IIO3BOJLHeT yBOIHHHTE JIIHOCT HaBeJIOHHM H BICOTy
CTpeJ16I (Hao6. a pc. 7).33 30HI IIOpaKeHHH JULI 3eHHTHIX DaKeT 9M38M1 H 9M38 MeOT
3HHTOJIHIe OTJIHUH. Ha pHc. 8 IIpHBe(CHI BeDTHKaJIBHIe COHOHHH 3OHI IIODaKOHHH IIpH
cTpen6e pa3IHHIMH THI1aMH paKeT.4 3erHa ynpaHeMaH paKeTa 9M38M1
IIpeI(Ha3aeHa JU OpaKeH apOIUHHaMeCKx uIeIeH, KDUIaTIX H IIDOTHBOKOpa0IHIX
8 Ibid.
Paera 9M38M1. TexwecKoe Oncae. 9M38M1.0000.000 TO., crp. 39 (1984).
(IpuoeHHe )
a0 Ibid. crp. 29-30
Ibid. crp.c. 77
Ibid.
3 Ct. supra, CocKy ,CTp. 21
24 Ct. supra, CocKy
9
paKeT, BepTOneTOB (B TOM HHCIe 3aBHCaOIIIHX Ha IIpeIIeIHO MaIIX BIcoTaX), a TaKKe
pa/UHOnOKa1MOHHO-KOHTDaCTHIX Ha/IO/HIX LIeIeH.
• •
Puucyuox. 7: 3eumas ynpaane«an paxema 9M38M135
6
F
20
10
5
Pucyuox 8. Bepmuxanwte ceveun a3owu nopcceu npu cmpenbe paanawvwuwu munauu
paxem a) np ucnovoaauuu paxem 9M38; 6) np ucnonvooauu paem 9M38M1.3
17. COy ByK-MI o6HO pa6oTaeT B COCTaBe BCOTO KOMILUIeKCa, OIHaKO IO CBOHM
TOXHHHeCKHM XaDaKTODHCTHKaM COy By-MI MoKeT BInoHT 6oeIe 3a1a aTOHOMHO.
HwKe 6onee erano omury pyKHoHHpoBaHe COY EyK-MI B COCTaBe 3PK ByK-MI (Hacr»
III) H aTOHOMHOM (Hacr IV) peKMe.
III. Pa6ora 3PK By-MI
18. BoeBa pa6ora 3PK BYVK-MI ocyuecTLHeTe npH ypaeHH c nyHKTa 60eBOTO
yIpaBe. Hp TOM, KaK npaBHIO, CTpeI6a COY ByK-MI IO BO3I(VIIIHIM IIe1HM
OCyIIeCTBJUHeOTCH JIM6O B DOKHMe IIeHTDaIH3OBaHHOTO yIIpaBIeHHH C IIyHKTa 60eBOTO
yIpaBIeHL, JH60 B DOKHMO CaMOCTOHTOJIHOTO IIOHCKa IIOITH IIOU KOHTDOIeM C IIyHKTa 60eBOTO
yIpaBe. B peKHMe IIeHTDaIH3OBaHHOTO yIIDaBIeHHH, COY By-MI non1yaeT
HHpOpMaIo O IIeIH, HeIIOCpeIICTBeHHO C IIyHKTa 60eBorO yIpaBIeHHH H Bec npOIeCC pa60TL
s Ce. Supra, COcKy 17, €Tp. 21
a6 Ct. Supra, CocKy 17, €Tp. 12
10
􀍶􀍺􀍺􀈌􀇤
􀍶􀍺􀍻
COy ByK-MI KOHTDOIHpyeTCH IIyHKTOM 60eBOTO yIpaBJIOHHH. B peKHMe CaMOCTOHTeJIHOTO
noHcKa I1eIM, COY ByK-MI nonyaeT oT nyHKTa 6oeBoro ynpaneHH yKa3aHHe Ha pa6oTy B
OIpeIeneOM CeKTODe BO3JIyIIIHOTO IIDOCTDaHCTBa, B KOTODOM COY ByK-MI CaMOCTOTe1HO
OCyIIeCTBJUHOT IIOHCK IIOIe JULI yHHTOKCHHH.
19. H BHaaIe paccMorpo pa6ory 3PK EyK-MI B eHTpaH3oBaHHOM peHMe.
OCHOBHIMH TaIIaMM pa60TI 3PK By-MI BOTCH: 1) o6apyKeHHe tee; 2)
HJ(eHTHpHKa1UH IIOJIH; 3) 3axBaT IIOJIH; H 4) yHHHTOKeHHH IIeJTH.
20. IepBHMHaH 3a1aa O6HapyKeHHH UIeIef BIIIOJIHHeTCH paJIHOJIOKaL[HOHHOf
cTa1Me 0630pa M IIeJIeyKa3aHHH, KOT0pa OcyIeCTBHeT 0630p Bo3/yuHorO 1pocTpaHCTBa
IIyTeM CKaHHDOBaHHH H BIBOJIHT HHpOpMaIUHO 06 BO3yHO o6craHOBKe Ha CBOH
HJHKaTODLL.7 Ha HHJUHKaTODaX OTO6paKaIOTCH BCe BO3(yIIIHHe O6&KTH H MHpOpMaIUHH O MX
tan»HOCTH, a3HMyTe H BICOTe. IHpH 3TOM DaJHOJIOKaIUHOHHaH CTaHIUH 0630pa H IIeIeyKa3aHHH
aTOMaTHeCKOM peKHMe 6e3 yacru oneparopos ocyuecTHeT 0no3HaBaHHe «cBoyKOH
» nepeIIaeT BCe O6HaDyKeHHIe IIeJIM C IIDH3HaKaMH «CBO-yKOH» Ha IIyHKT 60eBOTO
ypane. 3aaa onpenenen npaputenocr tee no npHHuHy "cBof-yKO"
peanayere c noMoutbio cnean3poBao annapaTypI TOCyJapCTBeHHOT'O OIIO3HaBaHHH
«Ilapo» KOTODaH JIaeT BO3MOKHOCT JULH aBTOMaTHHeCKOTO OIIO3HaHHH CBOHX BOHCK H
BOODyKeHHf OT BOHCK IIDOTHBHHKa. OIO3HaBaHHe OCyIIeCTBJLHeTCH KOMILIeKCOM
patorexecKx cpencr nyTeM 3anpoca BepHpHKaIUHH crHaIa, KOTOpM nIO3BOHeT
IeHTHbHLUHpOBaT CBOH BOCKa IIO KOJUHDOBaHHOMy CHrHay. Bonee peTaHO, I1pHHLUHI
OCyIIIeCTBICHHH OIIO3HaBaHHH «cBOf yKO» 6yper oHca HHKe. Hnocrpante rpaxnacKHe
caonerI, KoTOpe He MMeOT aIIIIapaTyDI OIIO3HaBaHHI «Ilapo» 6yI(yT BM/aaTC e PJIC
Ha IyHKT 6OeBOTO yIIDaBJIeHHH C IIpH3HaKOM «HeOIIO3HaHHHi». 0630p Bo3/1y1HOTO
npocrpancra paronoxauono crauei 063opa H IICICyKa3aHHM OCyIIIeCTLHeTC
BKpyT0By1O (360) Ha Ia1HOCTHX I10 160 KM."
21. Oran IIeHTHpHKaIUHH IeJTH OCyIIIeCTBJLHeTCH Ha IIyHKTe 6OeBOTO yIIpaBIeHHH,
TIIe IIDOBOJHTCH 06pa60TKa HH]OpMaIUHH, IIDHHHTO OT pa/UHOJIOKaLIHOHHOH CTaHIUMM 0630pa M
IIeJeyKa3a. IlyHKT 6OeBOTO yIpaBICHHH B aBTOMaTHHeCKOM DOKHMe OCyIIIeCTBLHeT BM6Op
H 3axBaTr II0 15 Lene IIO Mepe HX IIOCTyTLIeHHH OT DUHOIOKaIIHOHHOH CTaHLIHH 0630pa H
IeJIeyKa3aHHH C JIaJIHeHIIIHM OIIDCIIOJIOHHOM HX CKODOCTH H KOOpIUHHaT (3a83Ka Tpacc1).3
Cnegyoute 3ataef, peaeMo a nyKTe 6oeBoro yIpaIeHHH B aBTOMaTHHeCKOM peKHMe
7 B.I. 38cpe Ta in., O36po€H Paiorexix Iinpo3iris i Hacru IIIO. Panionoxauiia
Cratin 9CI18MI. Hasan loci6HK eTp. 8-9 (2005) (IIpuoeHMe
a8 Ibid.
•• M. 3y6pIIKHi, A.C. KHpH1OK, B.B. JIyK'HyK, IL.H. Xin, IIo6y/oa, Texina
EKcnyaTa i Bo0Be BHKOpHCTaHHH KOMaJIHOTO IlyHKTy 3PK BVK-MI. Hacrma II, IlyKT
Bo0BOTO KepyBaHH 9C470M1. HaBaHi loci6 cTp. 9-10 (2005) (IpuoKeHHe )
11
􀇤
ecr pacnpepeneHHe IO 6 Lee MOKIIy COY EyK-MI exopU 3 oUeTHorO BpeMeHM peMeHH
IIpe6IBaHHH IIOJIH B 3OHe IIODaKeHHH. IIpH 3TOM, OIIepaTODI IIyHKTa 60eBOTO yIIDaBIeHHH
KOHTDOJIHDyIOT aBTOMaTHHeCKHH IIDOUeCC HJIeHTHHKaIUHH H Ha OCHOBe HHODMaIIHH O
Bo3/yHo 06cTaHOKe KoppeKTHpyT pacnpeeeHHe Iee MOK(y COY ByK-MI. OnepaTOp»
IIyHKTa 6OeBOTO yIIDaBICHHH IIDHHHMaIOT COOTBOTCTByOIIIee DeIIIeHHe OCHOBHBaHC Ha
HHOpMaIUHH O BO3JIyIIIHO O6CTaHOBKe (BKIOaH HHpODMaIIHIO O IDaKII(aHCKOM TpapHKe),
IIOCTyIIaIOIIe OT DaJUHOTeXHHHeCKHX BOCK H HX pa/IapOB.
22. Ha arane 3axBaTa IIIH COY EyK-MI B aTOMaTHecKOM peKHMe oyaeT
HHpOpMaIUHO OT IIyHKTa OOOBOTO yIIDaBIeHHH O KOODJUHHaTaX IIeIH, ee CKODOCTH H IIDH3HaK
(opHoHa/rpyInoa 1IeI, M T.ID). Ilp 3ToM nyCKoBa ycTaHOBKa H pa/tap COY yK-MI
aBTOMaTHHOCKH Da3BODaHHBOTCH B HaIIDaBJIOHHH IIOJIH H HaHHHaIOT IIOHCK B y3KO 30He
CKaHHDOBaHHH, KOTODaH IIO3BOJLHeT 6ICTDO 3aXBaTHT IIeI (BDeMH CKaHHDOBaHHH 3OHM
cocTaHeT 2 0). B IpeIenax y3KOTO CeKTODA CKaHHDOBaHHH KOMaHIHp COY By-M1 Ha6moaeT
Ha MOHHTODO MeTKy IIOIeyKa3aHHM B BHIIe IIDHMOH JIHHHH, KOTODaH OIIDeIIOJLHOT JIaIHOCT /IO
IeH, a TaKKe MOTKH OT IIDyTHX O6eKTO OTO6paKaeMMX Ha pa/tape. KOMaJHp COY
JIOIIOJIHHTOJIHO Ha6IIOJIaeT HHpODMaIUHO O JaIHOCTH H CKODOCTH IIOIH (IIO JIaHHIM IIyHKTa
60eBOTO yIIDaBJIeHH), KOTOpa OTO6paKaere Ha LHppooM HHJUHKaTOpe, a TaKKe
HHpopMauuo o BICOTe M apaMeTpe JIBHKeHHH IIeIH, OTO6paKaeMIe Ha CTpeIOHHIX
/HKaTopax (cM. pHC. 9).
Puucyuox. 9: I/pposwe uuouxamopu anwocmu (cneea esepx) u cxopocmu uenuu (cnpaea
66epx) cmpenoowwe uouxamopt etcomt enu (cu3y enesa) u napaMempa enu
(cnpaea cuu3y).3°
23. IIocne O6apyKe Ien KOMaMp COy SyK-MI ocyecrLeT ono3HaaHHe
IIeIH: «cBOi» -- «yKOi». OJ(HOBDeMeHHO C KOMaHJUHpOM COy By-MI 3a BO3JIyIIIHOi
o6cTaHoBKo Ha6moaoT cTapH onepaTop C 1I0MOL1Io HHHKaTOpa HaBeeHH H onepaTOp
39 DOTO CIIeIaHHOe A.D. CKODHKOM
12
􀇤
c noMouo MeTKH IIpHe1a (CM. DHC. 10). IIpH O6HapyKeHH Ha HJIHKaTOpe HaBeJOHHH IIeJIH,
onepaTop ocymecrner ee 3axBaT Ha aBTOCOIIDOBOKIIeHHe IIVTeM COBMOIIIeHHH MeTK IpHen1a
(BH3Hpa) c noOKeHeM OTMeTKH oT eH (cM. pHC. 11). Ilocne 3axaTa IeH Ha
aroconpooKeHHe, COY EyK-MI aBToMaTHecKH opeeHeT THI eH: a3poHHaMHeCKa,
6aIHcTHecKaH, BepToneT. IIp TOM BTOpO onepaTop Ha6moaeT en Ha 3KpaHe
HHJIHKaTODa H HMeeT BO3MOKHOCT JIOIIOJIHHTeJIHO HIeHTHbHIHpoBaT IeI IO ee
H3O6paeHo (CM. pH€. 12), a KOMaH/Hp COY By-MI onoHHTeHo onpeIteeT TH IIeIH
no ee 3ByKOBOMy nOpTpeTy.
Pueyuox 1o. Hu~uxamopa aeeeuu3
3 OTO CIIeIaHHOe A.B. CKOpHKOM
13
􀇤
t I Hi l
/ 0:14:11
􁁑
BM3Mp
•
•·· EIHJIA
• •. ..I ,
• ·'
li[El
0:14:12 . - -
., l - - -
- Pucyuox 1. Ha@eeuue ua epynnoayo yen» u coexeueus emxu npuena (oaupa) €
nonoceuex emu.
a OTO CeIaHHOe A.B. CKOpHKOM
14
􀇤
IL.IA
Tetonoif
Br3ntp
I _ILIA
Crwa. IL.JIA «Peiic»
Craa or Beproaera M-8
Hi@
0:
Cuna. BIIJIA Op.aa-10
Papyuee opnyca ILIA mp
nopae 3P
Pucuox. 12. Bu uuouxamopa emopoeo onepamopa npu conpoeoceuuu peaxmeoeo
BILJIA (Pe~c); ILIA c nopuueeuu xomopox (Opaw-10); eepmonema Mu-8; e MoMeum
nopace@us BILJIA 3VP3
24. OTHIe KoMaHp M onepaTOp COY By-MI MoryT IocTaToHO TOHO
accHpHHpoaT xapaKTepHcTHK teH (pa3Mep, Ha1HHe peaKTHBHMX JHraTee). Ha
pc. 12 x0po1Io BH(HO, TO HaHe HHTa y 6e36eTHoro neTaTeHoro amapaTa (ILIA)
«OpJIaH-10» IIDHBOJIHT K IIOHBJIOHHIO AIOIIOJIHHTeIHOf MOJyLHIHH cHrHaa no cpaBHeHHO €
peaKTHBHEIM ILIA «Pelc». CHrHaI OT BepTOeTa M-8 Meer eute 60nee BEIDaKeHHyIO
MOJIyJUHIUHO. Ha UHKaTOpe OeH XOpoIIIO BHeH MOMeHT I0IpIBa paKeTI H pa3pyeHHe
Kopnyca BILIA. BIcoTa H CKopocT noneTa pa3HHX THn1OB caMoneTOB (cM. pHC. 9),
33 JOTO CIIeJIaHHOe A.B. CKODHKOM
15
BJUHIOTCH JIOIIOJIHHTeTHIM KIaCCHpHIUHDVIOIIIHM paKTOpOM. OIIHaKO, KaK IIOKa3HBaeT MOH
OIIT pa60TEI C KyDCaHTaMH H OpHIIeDaMH, B yCIOBHIX BICOKOTO HapDReH B 6oeBOf
o6craHoKe JaHHHe baKTOpI peIIKO 6epyTc BO BHHMaHHe 6oeM paceraM n1pH
Onpeene HCxOHIx IaHHIX JUL CTpeII.
25. Ha Drane yHTOKeHHH IIOIH KOMaHJUHp COY ByK-MI aHaIH3HpyeT IIOJIOKeHH
ten OTHOCHTeIHO 30HI ee nIOpaKeHHH. B Onyae HaXOKIIeHHH IIeJIH B 3OHe IIyCKa, KOMaHJUHp
OCyIIeCTBJIHeT IIyCK DaKeTI IIDH HaIHHH KOMaHIII pa3peIUIeHHI IIyCKa C IIyHKTa 60eBOTO
yIpaBe. OmepaTop COY By-MI HMeeT BO3MOKHOCT oTMeHHT yHHToKeHHe eH nocIe
3anyCKa paKeTI, IIyTeM BIKIOHeHHH DaIaDa JI0 IODaKeHHH IIOIH, ITO IIpHBOIUHT B JIecTBHe
IIpOrpaMMy CaMOKBaI paKeTI. TaKHM 06pa30M, paKeTa CaMOyHTOKaeTc p10
IIOpaeHUH IIeJIH.
26. Kax yKa3MBaIOC, BMIe naparpape 18, cTpe16a COY ByK-MI TO BO3I(yIIIH5IM
IIeJIM MOKeT OCyIIIeCTBJLHTCH B DOKHMe CaMOCTOHTOJIBHOTO IIOHCKa IeIH IIOI KOHTpOIeM C
nyHKTa 6oeoro ynpaeHMI. Teneps Onury pa6Ory COY EyK-MI B 3TOM peKHMe. DaBMM
OTJIHH HOM JIaHHOT'O DOKHMa OT DOKHMa IIeHTDOTH3OBHHOTO yIIDaBIOHHH BJLHeTCH TO, TO CO
Dy-MI ocyutecTBeT caMOCTOTeHH nIOHCK Lene B CeKTOpe, OIIpeIIOIeHHOM Ha IIyHKTe
60eBOTO yIIpaBJIeHHH. JIpyTHMH CJIOBaMH, B 3TOM peKHMe ITyHKT 6oeBorO ynpaeHH He
Iepeaer B aBTOMaTHeCKOM DOKHMe yKa3aHHH IIO IIeIH Ha COY EyK-MI Ha Tan1e O6HapyKeHHM
H HIIeHTHbHKaLUHH IIOJIH KaK OIIHCaHO B IIyHKTaX 20-21. B peKHMe CaMOCTOHTOJIHOTO IIOH€Ka
IeIH, IIyHKT 6oeBOro yIpaIeHHH 3aaeT ceKTOp noHcKa nyTeM onpeIIeeHH eHTpa ceKTOpa
IOHCKa I1IO a3HMyTy H B60pa IeIoHa nIoHcKa LeIM no BIcoTe (06HapyKeHHe Lee Ha MaIIX
cpenx swcoTax HM o6HapyKeHHe Lene Ha cpeuHHx 6om1HX BtcOTax). HanpMep,
IIyHKTOM 6oeBorO ynpaeHH cTaBHTe 3aaa COY EyK-MI ocyuecTHT noHeK Lee Ha
Mano IcoTe B ceKTOpe OT 30 /10 150 rpa/(ycoB IIO a3MMyTy. OcraHwe onepa1uHH I1O 3ax8aTy
H yHHHTOKeHHO IIeIH OCyIIOCTBJHOTCH aHaIOTHHHO DeKHMy IIeHTDaIH3OBaHHOTO
yIpaBeu.
IV. Pa6ora COY ByK-MI aToHoMHoM peHMe
27. TexHHeCKHe BO3MOKHOCTI COY ByK-MI no3BOHeT ef OCyIIeCTBJLHT, 60eByIO
pa6Ory aBTOHOMHO e3 yaCT OCTa1HMX cpeIICTB 3PK EyK-MI H 6e3 KOOpIUHHaIUHH CBOHX
IecTBHf C IIyHKTOM OeBOTO yIIpaBIeHHI H CHIaM I1BO. B TaKOM DOKHMe KOMaH/Hp COY
DyK-MI CaMOCTOHTeIHO IIpHHHMaeT DCIIIeHHe IIO IIOHCKy, O6HapyKeHHO H yHHHTOKeHHO 1IeJIH
exopUH M3 nocTaBIeHHO 60eBOf 3a1aH.
28. HcxOJU M3 MOeTO OIIITa H IIDaKTHKH IIpHMeHeHH 3PK EyK-MI aBTOHOMHaH
pa6ora COY ByK-MI co31aeT y1po3y CBOef aBHaIUHH. OTO O6yCnOBJIeHO TOM, ITO KOMaH/IHp COY
Dy-MI o6naaer orpaHeHHO HHbopMaL[He IIDH OIIeHKe BO3JIyIIIHO O6CTaHOBKH. KpoMe
TOTO, TeXHHHOCKHe BO3MOKHOCTH COY ByK-MI He IIO3BOIHOT JIOCTaTOHHO TOHO OTJIHHHT
16
TDaKIaHCKHe O6BOKTI OT BOHHIX LIeIe. OTO O6yCJIOBIOHO CJIeJIVOIIIHMH IIDHHIIHIIHaIHBIMH
paKTOpaM: 1) B COY ByK-MI oTcyTcTByOT TpaHcnoHpepI HcO3yeMe B HacTouIee BpeMH
B TDaKIIaHCKO aBHaIUHH, KaK OIIHCaHO HHKe; 2) HHpOpMaIILH Ha DKDaHaX HHJIHKaTOpOB COY
DyK-MI IpaKTHHeCKH He IIO3BOJLHeT Da3JIHHT BOeHHMe H IpaKIIaHcKHe caMoeTI I1O
CHTHaIHIM IIDH3HaKaM. B CBH3H C 3THM, COBDeMeHHaH IIDaKTHKa 6OeBOTO IIDHMOHeHH COY
ByK-MI IIpeIIyCMaTDHBaOT TOCHOe B3aHMOIIeCTBHH C KOMaHJIHHM IIOHTDOM BOOpyKeHHIX CHI,
BKJIOHaI B3aHMO[eHCTBHe C DaJIHOTeXHHOCKHMH BOHCKaMH, IIDH IIOMOIIUH COBDeMeHHIX
CDeIICTB CBH3H H KOMMyHHKaIIHH.
29. C TOKM 3DeHHH BBDKHBaHHH COY ByK-MI B COBDeMeHHOM I1DOTHBOBO3JIVIIIHOM
600, BpeM pa60TI COY ByKR-MI OT MOMeHTa HaaIa IIOHCKa IIOIH H JI0 3a11yCKa paKeT, KaK
IpaBuIo, He po1KHO peBIIIaT 20 - 24 CeKyHJI5L.34 OTO BpeMH OIIpCIIeLHeTCH 60eBBIMH
BO3MOKHOCTHMI COY EyK-MI H BO3MOKHOCTHMH aBHaLUHH IIDOTHBHHKa IIO O6HapyKeHHIO,
IIpOTHBOIeCTBMIO, H yHHTOKeHHIO CpeICTB IIBO. IIpH pa6ore COY ByK-MI B aBTOHOM1HOM
DeMe y KOMaHJIHpa COY ByVK M-1 3HaHTOTHO MOHIIIe BDOMOHH Ha IIDHHHTHe DeIIeHHH 1IO
yHHHTOKeHHIO IIOJITH, B CBH3H C HOO6XOJIHMOCTIO TDaTHTE JIOIIOIHHTOJIEHOe BDOMH Ha OIICHKy
BO3/(yIIIHO O6CTaHOBKH.
30. DOTH daKTOpI 3HaHTOTHO yCIOKHOT pa60Ty COY By-MI B cyae ecru COy
ByKR M-1 y1IpaBJLHeTCH He IIOJ1HIM 6OeBIM DaCHeTOM HIH eJUHHOJIHHO KOMaHJIHDOM. IIpH TaKHX
yCnOBHX pe3KO BO3paCTaeT BepOHTHOCT O6HapyKeHHM H yHHTOKeHHS COY EyK-MI
IIpOTHBHHKOM. TaKHe yCJIOBHH IIDHBOIUHT K 3HaHTeHOH Harpy3Ke Ha 6oeBO pacer. Yen1OBH
BICOKOTO HanIpHKeHH eIIIe 6One€ yCHIHBaOTCH B CHIy HOO6XOJIHMOCTH CaMOCTOHTeJIHOTO
npr peeHH B 6oeBo o6cTaHOBKe 6e3 IIOJUIeDKKH IIyHKTa 60eBOTO yIIpaBJIeHHH M
panorexecKx BOCK (PTB). COKHaH O6CTaHOBKa 3HaHHTOTHO yBeIHHBaeT
BeporHoer omIH6oHo oeHKH Bo3UyHO 06cTaHOBKH. Ka yKa3ano panee, B yCn1OBHHX
BICOKoro HanpweHH pa60Ta aTOHOMHOM peKMe, pacer COY By M-1, HaBpJU H, 6yeT
Mer» BpeM 06paTHT BHHMaHHe Ha TaKHe paKTODDI, KaK BICOTa, CKODOCT IIOJIH, OCOeHHOCTH
MOJ(yJUHIIHH CHTHaTa, KOTODIe IIO3BOJUHOT OIIeDaTODY OIIDeJIeJIHT THI IIOIH H IIDHHT
O60CHOBaHHOe H He3aBHCHMOe DeIIIeHHe O TOM, BJIHOTCH JIM HIeHTHbHIUHpOBaHHI 06eKT
HaJUIOKaAI[e I1eJ1IO.
V, OcO6eHHOCTH dyKIMOHpOas COY EyKR-MI1 B yCIOBHHX HaIHH
TDaJIaH€KOH aBHZIUHH
31. 3PK By-MI oe pe7Ko npHMeHHTc B cHTyaHH, Kor7Ia Bo371y1Hoe
IIpOCTpaCTBO OTKDITO JULH TpaKJaHCKOf aBHa1HH. Donee Toro, pHMeHeHHe COY By-MI B
aBTOHOMHOM DOKHMe MOKOT SITE OH€HE OIIaCHIM JULI TDaKIaHCKHX CaMOJIOTOB KaK 65LIO
OIHCaHO BIIIIe. OTO B aCTHOCTH O6yCJIOBJIOHO OTDaHHHeHHIMH BO3MOKHOCTHMH COY EyK-MI
34 CM. Supra, CHOCKy 17, €Tp. 13
17
􀍷􀍲􀍲
IO HJ(OHTHbHKaLUHH «CBOHX» Lee. KaK yKa3IBaJICH BEIIIIe, TaKaH TeXHHHOCKaH BO3MOKHOCT
pea3OBano B COY ByK-MI B CHCTeMM DaCIIO3HaBaHHI "CBOf-yKO." OJ1HaKO, IIaHHaH
cHcTeMa He MoeT 3pbeKTHBHO o6ecneHT 6e3on1aCHocT IpaKIaHCKO aBHapH. Jlanee,
no1po6no onury ocofeocr pyHK1HOHHpoBaHH cHCTeM pacnO3HaBaHH "cBo-yKO",
KOTOpaH IIDCIIHa3HaHeHa JULH HIIeHTHbHKaIUHH IpyKeCTBeHHIX BOeHHmX caMoneTOB, a 3aTeM
paccMoTpo OcO6eHHOCTH IeHCTBH 3PK ByK-MI B yCIOBHHX HaIHHHH IDaKIIaHCKOH aBMaLUHH.
32. 3anaa onpentene npantexocr tee no npHHHny "coif-yo"
pea3yeTC C IOMOItIO CIIeIUHaIH3HpoBaHHOH anIIIapaTYDI TOCyJIaDCTBOHHOTO OIIO3HaBaHH.
B acroutee BpeMH B MHDe CyIIIeCTByIOT TO/TKO JIBe CHCTeMN OIIO3HaBaHHH «CBO-yKOH»; €
OIIHOf CTOpOHL -- POcC H TOCyJIapCTBa-yaCTHHKH CHT (eua ccreMa rocyJapcTBeHHOTO
pauonoxauooro onoaaBa «Ilapon»), c Ipyro -- CIIIA H CTpaHI HATO (cHcTeMa
paHOnOKaIUOOro Ono3aBau MK12).3 IIpHMeHHTOTHO 3PK EyK-MI OTO 3HaHT, TO
Ha BCeX COY EyK-MI M Ha DaHOnOKaLUHOHHO CTaHIUHH 0630pa H IIOIeyKa3aHHH yCTaHOBIeHN
KoMLeKTI a1a paTypI rocyIapcTBeHHoTO 01IO3HaBaHH «Ilapon».3°
33. Pa6ory annapaTypt «Ilapon» Moo omHcaT ce/(yLUMM 0pa30M. Ha
patape COY ByK-MI eCT IIeDpeJIaTHHK KOTOpw nepeaeT B pocTpaHcTo epe3 aHTeHHy
DaJapa KOUHpOBaHIH 3anpOCH CHrHan.37 3a1pOCHIf CHTHAI KOIUHDyeTCH IIO CIIeIIHaIHBIM
aroprMaM, KoTOpie epe3 onpenteneHHH MHTepBaI BpeMeHH MeHHOTCH. Bce
pyxecrere (coH) BoeHHe caMoeTI TaKe MeOT KoMeKT am1apaTyDI «Ilapon».3
lpns aanpoc cran annaparypa «Ilapon» Ha CaMoneTe aa3pyer Ko1 3a1pocoro
CHrHaIa, H eCIH KoII cOoTBeTCTyeT yCTaHOIeHHOMy Ha caMoneTe, To c caMoneTa nepeaeTCH
orBeTHf Ko/HpoBaHHH cHrHa. B annaparype «lapom» COY ByK-MI anan3wpyere
IIpHHHTI OTB€THI CHTHaI H eCIH OH COOTBOTCTByeT IIeHCTByIOIIUHM KO/1aM, TO Ha
HHJ(HKaTOpaX KOMaHIUHpa H cTaper onepaTOpa BO3Ie OTMOTKH OT LIeJIH pOpMHpyeTCH
cneua 3Haox «H-cBoi». IIpH 3TOM, KOMaHIUHp COY EyK-MI BKIOMaeT 61OKHpOBKH
OpyKHA. B TaKoM peKMe anapaTypa «IlapOn» 6JIOKHpyeT 3aIIyCK paKeTH.
34. Ha pa/tape COy ByK-MI He npeycMOTpeHo HaHHe TpaHcnoHJIeDOB,
HCnon3yeMIX B TDaKJIaHCKOH aBHaIIHH HMIIODTHOT'O IIDOH3BOICTBa, ITO JIOIaCT HOBO3MOKHIM
opepenee rpanancKHX caMoIeToB nIo cHrHa1aM oTBeTa. OpHaKo HcTeMa paCnIO3HaBaHHH
rpaKacKHx caMoneTOB ppeKrHBHo peaH3oBaHa Ha pa1HonoKaLHOHHMX cHCTeMax (PJIC)
TDaKJaCKHX CHCTOM yIIDaBJIOHHH BO3JIVIIIHBIM JIBHKeHHOM. Ha KaKIIOM KOMaHJIHOM IIyHKTe
3 MHxaun XO1apeoK, "IIapom" noum ue cnuue, HesascMoe Boeoe O6o3pee (15
eKa6p 200o roa) http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2ooo-12-15/6 parol.html (IIpunoewe ).
36 CM. supra, CHocKy 17, CTp 77-80
7 Ce. supra, CHO€Ky 17, €TD. 77-80
8 Ce. supra, CH0cKy 17, €Tp. 77-80
18
paorexecKHx BOCK ecT cneIaHa rpyIna KOHTpoLH 3a no1eTOM IpaKaHcKOH
aBHaIM, KOTODaH COTDyJIHHaeT C TpaKIIaHCKOf CHCTeMO yIIpaBIeHHI BO3JIVIIIHIM
JIBHKCHHOM IIO KOHTpOIO IpOIeTa TDaKJaHCKHX CaMOJ1eTOB B BO3/yIIHOM nIpocTpaHCTBe. C
KOMaHJIHIX IIVHKTO PTB HbOpMaIu o rpatacKHx caMoneTax H BepToeTax nocTynaeT Ha
KOMaHJIHIe IIVHKTI BO3/IyIIHIX CHI H Ianee IIeDe/IaAeTCH IIO CeTH OIIOBCIIIeHHM B
Iopa3pees 3PB. KpoMe Toro, Ha KoMa/HOM nyHKTe Bo3pgyuHx Cu onepauHoHHof
30HM IIDHCYTCTByIOT CIIeIUHaIHCTI OT aBHaIUHH, PTB 3PB, KoTope coBMecTHo peaOT 3a/1a
KOHTDOJIH 3a BO3IIyIIIHIM IIDOCTDaHCTBOM H yIIDaBIeHH 6OeBIMH JIeCTBHHMH CHI H CpeIICTB
3eHHTHO-paKeTHIX BOC (3PB) H MCTpeHTOTHO aBHaLUHH. CeIyeT TaKRe OTMeTHT, TO
KOMaHJUHD IIOIIpa3JI01eHHI, BOODyKeHHOTO 3PK Sy-MI ycTaanHBaeT CB3 ¢ 6HKa1HM
IOI1pa3JeneeM paJHOTexecKx Boe (PTB) JULI IIOJTyeHHH HHpODMaLUHH 0 BO3yIIHOi
o6craHOBKe. TaKM o6pa3oM, cryae pa60TI COY EyK-MI BMeCTe C KOMaHJIHIM IIyHKTOM,
HHpopMaIUun or pa/IHoTexHHeCKHX BOCK o noeTe TpaIaHCKHX caMon1eTOB 6yIeT
CBOeBDCMeHHO JIOBOIUHTCH KOMaHJIHpy 6aTape byK-MI, TO 3HaHHTeIHO CHHKaeT DHCK
IIOpaeHHH TDaKJIaHCKHX CaMO1eTOB.
35. BaKHO IIOHHMaT, TO 6e3OIaCHOCT JIBHKHHH He TOIKO IDaKJIHCKO, HO H
paKe IIpyKecTBeHHO BOeHHO aBHaIUHH He MOOT 6IT IIOJIHOCT5IO O6eCneea TO1KO
TexHHecKHMH cHcTeMaMH KaK oIHcaHO BMIIe. {JeC» HTDaeT OIDOMHyIO DOJI» HaIIDHKOHHOCT»
6oeBo o6craHoBKH KaK 6Lo oHcaHo Be H HanpaeHHocT nOTOTOK onepaTOpOB COY
DyK-M1. JU 3PK EyK-MI oeH BaHM LHeTe pa3He B nOIrOTOKe paCeTOB COY ByKMI
H IIyHKTa 6OeBOTO Ha3HaHeHHH.
36. IloproroBKa onepaTOpOB COY ByK-M Han1paeHa Ha 6cTp noHcK teH H ee
MOJIHHeHOCHOe H TOHOe IIOpaKeHHe IIOCKOIKy COY ByK-MI pyHKIUHOHHDpyeT KaK IIpaBHIO B
B3aHMOJIeHCTBHH C KOMaHJIHDIM IIyHKTOM BOODyKCHHIX CHI TIIe IIDHHHMaIOTCH OCHOBHIe
peIe. Hao6paKeHH HHJUHKaTODOB COY By-MI pH noHcKe IeM cMeHHeTCH 5 pa3 3a 4
CeKyIII, IIDH 9TOM HOOIIITHOMy CIIeIUHaIHCTy OyJIeT OHeH CIOKHO OTJIHHHT OTMOTKH OT
Iene OT OTMeTOK MeCTHIX IIDeIMeTOB, O6IaKOB H IIDyTHX IIOMeX, H JIOKHIX OTMeTOK.
37. I1pH TpeHHpoKax 6oeoro pacera COY By-MI Ha ypoBeH pep1eKco
3aKJIaJIIBaOTCH MOJIHHOHOCHIe M OIITHMaIHIe peCTBHI IO 06HapyeHHO H IOpaKeHHO
BO3IUyIIHOTO IIDOTHBHHKa, DaCeT TOTOBHTCH IIeCTBOBaT KaK aBTOMaT B peKHMe IUy3IH €
BO3JIVIUHIM IIDOTHBHHKOM. H 3aacTyo pe3yITaT 3TO JIy3IH BO MHOIOM 3aBHCHT OT TOTO, KTO
nepBI BICTDOJIHT.
38. IoproroBKa paceros nyKTa 6oeoro yIpaBeHH OTHaeTCH TeM, TO TaM
CIeIHaHCTOB TOTOBHT yMeHHIO 06pa6aTIBaTE 6OJIIIHe MaCCHBI HHpOpMaIUHH,
aa3pOBaTE HHpODMaIUHIO H BOT OHM, HCI1OJI3yH IIeDOHHCIeHHMe BIIIIe HCTOHHHKH
HHpopMaIH HaMHoro 6onee pdeKTHBHI B OIIeHKe BO3JIyIIIHO O6CTaHOBKH M IIDHHHTHH
19
DeIen. B enryae, eC OnpeeneHo, To B Bo3pyHOM pOCTpaHCTBe HaI nIOeM 60
HaxopHT rpaKaHcKHf caMoneT 6e3 OTBeTa, OII€paTOD C IIyHKTa 60eBOTO yIIDaBIeHHH MOKeT
BaT cneMaHoe IeneyKa3aHe Ha COY ByK-MI c IIpH3HaKOM «3AIPETHAI LIEJI»
(3III) M Ha DKpaHe HHJIHKaTOpa KOMaHJIHpa COY ByK-MI OTMeaeTC Ien IIO KOTOpo
pecrByer 3anpeT cTpen16L.
39. IIo MoeMy MHeHHo, paKTHeCKH HeBO3MOHO 06ecneHT Tpe6yeMH ypOBeHE
6e30naCHOCTH B CHTyaIIHH, KOT/Ia TDaKI(aHCKaI aBHaLHI IIDHCyTCTByeT B BO3JIVIIIHOM I1pH
pa6ore COY By-MI B aBTOHOMHOM peKMe. TexHeCKHe BO3MOKHOCTH COY By-MI B
aBTOHOMHOM DOKHMe He IIO3BOJIHOT OTJIHHHTE TDaKJIaHCKHH CaMOJIOT OT BOCHHOTO, H IIaHHaH
CHTyaIIHH YCyIy6JLHCTCH B YCIOBHIX BICOKOTO HaIIDHKOHHH C KOTOpIMH cTaIKHBaeTCH 6oeBOf
pacer COY EyK-MI
40. H KLIHyC, HTO BEHIIIOH3IOKOHHIe 3aHBJIOHHH HBJLHIOTCH JIOCTOBODHIMH H
TOHHDIMH. H COrnaCe IpeICTaT IIepeI CyJIOM B CIyHae HeO6XOJHMOCTH M IIDeIIOCTaBHT
JIOIIOJIHHTOJI»HBIe IIOKa3aHHH.
IO/IHCao B T. XapKOB, VKDaHHa, 6 HOH 2018 TO1a.
BnOKeHHE:
orpad (PesoMe)
20
Anatolii Skoryk CURRICULUM VITAE
Ak. Pavlova 134/16 str., 304, May 11, 2018
Kharkiv, Ukraine
+38 050 302 3509
[email protected]
Candidate of Thecnical Sciences 􀉩􀉨􀀃􀉫􀉩􀉟􀉰􀉢􀉚􀉥􀉶􀉧􀉨􀉫􀉬􀉢􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉨􀉪􀉭􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀉢􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉚􀉹􀀃􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉢􀉤􀉚􀀃􀀋􀉞􀉢􀉩􀉥􀉨􀉦􀀃􀈾􀉄􀀃􀊋􀀃
􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀚􀀔􀀕􀀃􀉨􀉬􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀓􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀌
􀉍􀉱􀉟􀉧􀉨􀉟􀀃􀉡􀉜􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀝􀀃􀉞􀉨􀉰􀉟􀉧􀉬􀀃􀉤􀉚􀉮􀉟􀉞􀉪􀉵􀀃􀉛􀉨􀉟􀉜􀉨􀉝􀉨􀀃􀉩􀉪􀉢􀉦􀉟􀉧􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉹􀀃􀉡􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉬􀉧􀉵􀉯􀀃􀉪􀉚􀉤􀉟􀉬􀉧􀉵􀉯􀀃􀉜􀉨􀉣􀉫􀉤􀀃􀀋􀉚􀉬􀉬􀉟􀉫􀉬􀉚􀉬􀀃􀉞􀉨􀉰􀉟􀉧􀉬􀉚􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀈾􀉐􀀃􀊋􀀃􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀓􀀗􀀔􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀌
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4327-8796
􀉆􀉟􀉫􀉬􀉨 􀉪􀉚􀉛􀉨􀉬􀉵 (􀉞􀉨􀉥􀉠􀉧􀉨􀉫􀉬􀉶): docent Ivan Kozhedub Kharkiv National Air Force University,
􀊻􀊤􀋄􀋋􀊻􀊤􀋔 􀋁􀊿􀊫􀋉􀊰􀊤􀊸􀊰􀊯􀊤􀋉􀊰􀋔.
􀊯􀌖􀌦􀌛􀌯􀌦􀌼􀌖􀀃􀌬􀌌􀌡􀌖􀌯􀌦􀌼􀌖􀀃􀌭􀌛􀌭􀌯􀌖􀌥􀌼􀀃􀍾air defence system), 􀌚􀌖􀌦􀌛􀌯􀌦􀌼􀌖􀀃􀌱􀌪􀌬􀌌􀌏􀌣􀍁􀌖􀌥􀌼􀌖􀀃􀌬􀌌􀌡􀌖􀌯􀌼􀀃􀍾SAM)􀍕􀀃􀌭􀌛􀌭􀌯􀌖􀌥􀌼􀀃
􀌦􀌌􀌏􀌖􀌔􀌖􀌦􀌛􀍁 􀌱􀌪􀌬􀌌􀌏􀌣􀍁􀌖􀌥􀌼􀌵􀀃􀌬􀌌􀌡􀌖􀌯􀀃􀍾guidance system).
􀊻􀊤􀊿􀋀􀊤􀊦􀊸􀊫􀊻􀊰􀊫􀀃􀊻􀊤􀋄􀋋􀊻􀋏􀋈􀀃􀊰􀋁􀋁􀊸􀊫􀊪􀊽􀊦􀊤􀊻􀊰􀊱
􀋃􀌖􀌨􀌬􀌛􀍁􀀃􀌪􀌨􀌭􀌯􀌬􀌨􀌖􀌦􀌛􀍁􀀃􀌛􀀃􀌍􀌨􀌖􀌏􀌨􀌐􀌨􀀃􀌛􀌭􀌪􀌨􀌣􀌽􀌚􀌨􀌏􀌌􀌦􀌛􀍁 􀌭􀌛􀌭􀌯􀌖􀌥􀀃􀌏􀌨􀌨􀌬􀌱􀌙􀌖􀌦􀌛􀍁􀀃􀌛􀌭􀌪􀌨􀌣􀌽􀌚􀌱􀍀􀌺􀌛􀌵􀀃􀌯􀌖􀌵􀌦􀌨􀌣􀌨􀌐􀌛􀌛􀀃
Network-centric Warfare. 􀊺􀌨􀌔􀌖􀌣􀌛􀌬􀌨􀌏􀌌􀌦􀌛􀌖􀀃􀌭􀌛􀌭􀌯􀌖􀌥􀀃􀌦􀌌􀌏􀌖􀌔􀌖􀌦􀌛􀍁􀀃􀌱􀌪􀌬􀌌􀌏􀌣􀍁􀌖􀌥􀌼􀌵􀀃􀌬􀌌􀌡􀌖􀌯􀍘
􀊿􀋄􀊥􀊸􀊰􀊶􀊤􀋉􀊰􀊰􀍘􀀃
􀊰􀌥􀌖􀍀􀀃􀏭􀏬􀏱􀀃􀌦􀌌􀌱􀌸􀌦􀌼􀌵􀀃􀌬􀌌􀌍􀌨􀌯􀀃􀍾􀌭􀌯􀌌􀌯􀌖􀌜􀍕􀀃􀌔􀌨􀌡􀌣􀌌􀌔􀌨􀌏􀀃􀌦􀌌􀀃􀌡􀌨􀌦􀌴􀌖􀌬􀌖􀌦􀌶􀌛􀍁􀌵􀍕􀀃􀌨􀌯􀌸􀌖􀌯􀌨􀌏􀀃􀌪􀌬􀌨􀀃􀌪􀌬􀌨􀌏􀌖􀌔􀌖􀌦􀌛􀌖􀀃􀌦􀌌􀌱􀌸􀌦􀌼􀌵􀀃
􀌛􀌭􀌭􀌣􀌖􀌔􀌨􀌏􀌌􀌦􀌛􀌜􀍿􀍘
Work Experience and education
􀈼􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀙􀀃 􀉪􀉨􀉰􀉿􀀃 􀉡􀉚􀉤􀉿􀉧􀉱􀉢􀉜􀀃 􀈾􀉧􀉿􀉩􀉪􀉨􀉩􀉟􀉬􀉪􀉨􀉜􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉟􀀃 􀉜􀉢􀉳􀉟􀀃 􀉡􀉟􀉧􀉿􀉬􀉧􀉟􀀃 􀉪􀉚􀉤􀉟􀉬􀉧􀉟􀀃 􀉤􀉨􀉦􀉚􀉧􀉞􀉧􀉟􀀃 􀉭􀉱􀉢􀉥􀉢􀉳􀉟􀀃
􀉉􀉉􀉈􀀃 􀉡􀀃 􀉡􀉨􀉥􀉨􀉬􀉨􀉸􀀃 􀉦􀉟􀉞􀉚􀉥􀉥􀉸􀀏􀀃 􀉣􀀃 􀉛􀉭􀉜􀀃 􀉧􀉚􀉩􀉪􀉚􀉜􀉥􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉣􀀃 􀉞􀉥􀉹􀀃 􀉩􀉨􀉞􀉚􀉥􀉶􀉲􀉨􀉝􀉨􀀃 􀀃 􀉩􀉪􀉨􀉯􀉨􀉞􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉹􀀃 􀉫􀉥􀉭􀉠􀉛􀉢􀀃 􀉜􀀃
􀉜􀉿􀉣􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉨􀉜􀉭􀀃􀉱􀉚􀉫􀉬􀉢􀉧􀉭􀀃􀉦􀀑􀀃􀉉􀉨􀉥􀉹􀉪􀉧􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉆􀉭􀉪􀉦􀉚􀉧􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉨􀊀􀀃􀉨􀉛􀉥􀉚􀉫􀉬􀉿􀀑􀀃􀈾􀉟􀀃􀉫􀉥􀉭􀉠􀉢􀉜􀀃􀉞􀉨􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀃􀉪􀉨􀉤􀉭􀀑
􀉁􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀃 􀉩􀉨􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀃 􀉪􀉨􀉤􀉢􀀃 􀀃 􀉧􀉚􀉜􀉱􀉚􀉜􀉫􀉹􀀃 􀉜􀀃 􀉨􀉱􀉧􀉿􀉣􀀃 􀉚􀉞􀂶􀉸􀉧􀉤􀉬􀉭􀉪􀉿􀀃 􀈼􀉿􀉣􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉨􀉜􀉨􀊀􀀃 􀉿􀉧􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉟􀉪􀉧􀉨􀊀􀀃
􀉪􀉚􀉞􀉿􀉨􀉬􀉟􀉯􀉧􀉿􀉱􀉧􀉨􀊀􀀃􀉚􀉤􀉚􀉞􀉟􀉦􀉿􀊀􀀃􀉉􀉉􀉈􀀃􀉿􀉦􀀑􀀃􀉦􀉚􀉪􀉲􀉚􀉥􀉚􀀃􀉊􀉚􀉞􀉹􀉧􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉨􀉝􀉨􀀃􀉋􀉨􀉸􀉡􀉭􀀃􀀃􀈽􀉨􀉜􀉨􀉪􀉨􀉜􀉚􀀃􀉅􀀑􀀃􀉈􀀑􀀃􀀋􀉦􀀑􀀃􀉏􀉚􀉪􀉤􀉿􀉜􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀉍􀀃 􀉥􀉢􀉫􀉬􀉨􀉩􀉚􀉞􀉿􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀃 􀉪􀉨􀉤􀉭􀀏􀀃 􀉩􀉿􀉫􀉥􀉹􀀃 􀉡􀉚􀉤􀉿􀉧􀉱􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉹􀀃 􀉚􀉞􀂶􀉸􀉧􀉤􀉬􀉭􀉪􀉢􀀏􀀃 􀉩􀉪􀉢􀉡􀉧􀉚􀉱􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉣􀀃 􀉧􀉚􀀃 􀉩􀉨􀉫􀉚􀉞􀉭􀀃
􀉜􀉢􀉤􀉥􀉚􀉞􀉚􀉱􀉚􀀃􀉏􀉚􀉪􀉤􀉿􀉜􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉨􀉝􀉨􀀃􀉜􀉿􀉣􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉨􀉜􀉨􀉝􀉨􀀃􀉭􀉧􀉿􀉜􀉟􀉪􀉫􀉢􀉬􀉟􀉬􀉭􀀑
􀈼􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀃􀉪􀉨􀉰􀉿􀀃􀉡􀉚􀉯􀉢􀉫􀉬􀉢􀉜􀀃􀉤􀉚􀉧􀉞􀉢􀉞􀉚􀉬􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉭􀀃􀉞􀉢􀉫􀉟􀉪􀉬􀉚􀉰􀉿􀉸􀀏􀀃
􀉍􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀃􀉪􀉨􀉰􀉿􀀃􀉜􀉢􀊀􀉠􀉞􀉠􀉚􀉜􀀃􀉞􀉨􀀃􀉄􀉢􀉬􀉚􀉣􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉨􀊀􀀃􀉧􀉚􀉪􀉨􀉞􀉧􀉨􀊀􀀃􀉪􀉟􀉫􀉩􀉭􀉛􀉥􀉿􀉤􀉢􀀃􀉞􀉥􀉹􀀃􀉩􀉪􀉨􀉜􀉟􀉞􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉹􀀃􀉥􀉟􀉤􀉰􀉿􀉣􀀑
􀉁􀀃 􀉥􀉸􀉬􀉨􀉝􀉨􀀃 􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀃 􀉪􀀃 􀀃 􀉩􀉨􀀃 􀉥􀉢􀉩􀉟􀉧􀉶􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀃 􀉪􀉨􀉤􀉭􀀃 􀉩􀉪􀉨􀉯􀉨􀉞􀉢􀉜􀀃 􀉫􀉥􀉭􀉠􀉛􀉭􀀃 􀉧􀉚􀀃 􀉩􀉨􀉫􀉚􀉞􀉿􀀃 􀉞􀉨􀉰􀉟􀉧􀉬􀉚􀀃 􀉭􀀃
􀉏􀉚􀉪􀉤􀉿􀉜􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉨􀉦􀉭􀀃􀉭􀉧􀉿􀉜􀉟􀉪􀉫􀉢􀉬􀉟􀉬􀉿􀀃􀉉􀉨􀉜􀉿􀉬􀉪􀉹􀉧􀉢􀉯􀀃􀉋􀉢􀉥􀀑􀀃
􀉍􀀃􀉥􀉢􀉩􀉧􀉿􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀃􀉪􀉨􀉤􀉭􀀃􀉩􀉨􀉞􀉚􀉜􀀃􀉞􀉨􀉤􀉭􀉦􀉟􀉧􀉬􀉢􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉡􀉜􀉿􀉥􀉶􀉧􀉟􀉧􀉧􀉹􀀃􀉡􀀃􀉥􀉚􀉜􀀃􀉁􀉛􀉪􀉨􀉣􀉧􀉢􀉯􀀃􀉋􀉢􀉥􀀃􀉍􀉤􀉪􀉚􀊀􀉧􀉢􀀑
􀈼􀀃􀉥􀉢􀉫􀉬􀉨􀉩􀉚􀉞􀉿􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀜􀀃􀉪􀉨􀉤􀉭􀀃􀉩􀉪􀉢􀉣􀉧􀉹􀉬􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉪􀉨􀉛􀉨􀉬􀉭􀀃􀉜􀀃􀉏􀉚􀉪􀉤􀉿􀉜􀉫􀉶􀉤􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉭􀉧􀉿􀉜􀉟􀉪􀉫􀉢􀉬􀉟􀉬􀀃􀉉􀉨􀉜􀉿􀉬􀉪􀉹􀉧􀉢􀉯􀀃
􀉋􀉢􀉥􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉩􀉨􀉫􀉚􀉞􀉭􀀃􀉞􀉨􀉰􀉟􀉧􀉬􀉚􀀏􀀃􀉧􀉚􀀃􀉹􀉤􀉿􀉣􀀃􀉩􀉪􀉚􀉰􀉸􀉸􀀃􀉜􀀃􀉞􀉚􀉧􀉢􀉣􀀃􀉱􀉚􀉫􀀑
Annex 13
Witness Statement of Andriy Shchekun (4 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

1
􀀃
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
________________________________________________________
WITNESS STATEMENT OF ANDRIY SHCHEKUN
________________________________________________________
1.􀀃 My full name is Andriy Stepanovich Shchekun. I provide this witness statement
to illuminate for the Court the treatment suffered by ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea following
the Russian occupation and purported annexation of that territory.
2.􀀃 I was born in the village of Tukhlia in the western part of Ukraine and studied
Ukrainian language and literature at a local college. After graduation, I went to Crimea to earn
my master’s degree from Simferopol State University in Crimea (later renamed the Taurida
National University). From 1993 until March 2014, I lived in Crimea, and it was there that I
met my wife, who was born in Crimea. For most of that time, my wife and I lived in the town
of Bakhchysarai, Crimea (later with our sons).
3.􀀃 Since 2011, I have been the leader of “Ukrainian House” Crimean Center for
Business & Cultural Cooperation, a non-governmental organization. Before February 2014, I
was an activist and proponent of Ukrainian-language and Ukrainian cultural education and
media in Crimea. Now I continue this work from Kyiv.
Activities in Crimea before February 2014
4.􀀃 From 1998 to 2000 I worked as a teacher of Ukrainian language and literature
in Bakhchysarai School No. 1. All other subjects at that school were taught in Russian.
2
􀀃
5.􀀃 In 1999, I co-founded the NGO Ukrainian House in Bakhchysarai, together
with Aider Muzhdaba (a Crimean Tatar) and Hennady Samusev (an ethnic Russian). The
same year, Ukrainian House established Dumka [Thought], a printed newspaper, which
published in the Ukrainian language and focused on issues related to Ukrainian education,
culture and mass media. In 2003, I became director of the Information and Publishing Center
and Agency of Non-Government and Political News “Media-Crimea,” a role I retained until
2014. In or around 2009, I founded the web portal for that new agency. During my time with
Media-Crimea, I encouraged television and radio stations in Crimea to broadcast Ukrainianlanguage
and Ukrainian cultural programming.
6.􀀃 I also promoted publication of other newspapers and magazines in the
Ukrainian language and with Ukrainian cultural content. For example, I promoted Krymska
Svitlytsia [Crimean Ukrainian Room], a Ukrainian-language newspaper that was founded in
1992 and distributed exclusively in Crimea. Similar publications were available elsewhere in
Crimea. Ukrainian-language newspapers Dzvin Sevastopolia [Bell of Sevastopol] and Slovo
Sevastopolia [Word of Sevastopol] were distributed in the city of Sevastopol. Krymske Slovo
[Crimean Word] was distributed in the city of Simferopol. The content of these newspapers
was focused on the preservation of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian cultural heritage in
Crimea.
7.􀀃 Before February 2014, I also encouraged schools to expand the number and
diversity of classes that they offered in the Ukrainian language. In Bakhchysarai, for example,
I was involved in the establishment of classes in the Ukrainian language at Comprehensive
School No. 4. That school made all its classes in the first to eleventh years available in both
Ukrainian and Russian. Parents were permitted a free choice of which classes their students
would take and the language in which they would be taught. Demand from parents for
Ukrainian-language education was strong. In Simferopol, for example, the all-Ukrainian
preparatory school – which taught all subjects in Ukrainian – was oversubscribed and parents
found it hard to find a place for their children there. In fact, the
3
􀀃
all-Ukrainian school in Simferopol was only able to admit one out of every seven student
applicants, due to space constraints of the school building.
8.􀀃 Although much of the population of Crimea spoke Russian before February
2014, there was a healthy Ukrainian-speaking population on the peninsula. In addition, part
of the Russian-speaking population identified as Ukrainian based on their cultural and social
leanings. Recognizing this, media entities and schools in Crimea sought to increase their
Ukrainian-language and Ukrainian cultural offerings prior to February 2014. These
offerings included Russian-language programming designed to appeal to elements of the
Crimean population that self-identified as Ukrainian, even if they were not proficient in the
Ukrainian language, as well as programs to encourage Ukrainian-language education.
Environment in Crimea in February-March 2014
9.􀀃 In February 2014, it became clear that the Russian Federation was intent on
the military takeover of Crimea. I saw that pro-Russia political parties in Crimea were being
mobilized. Cossack groups and so-called Self-Defense Forces were also deployed across the
peninsula. Members of these groups carried Russian flags.
10.􀀃 As these events unfolded, I grew frightened. I observed that my house was
under surveillance, for example, and I saw suspicious people following me or watching me as
I went about my daily life. My wife did not want to leave Crimea, but she and our sons came
to recognize the danger presented by staying there. Our family strongly identified as
Ukrainian, both based on the language that we spoke and based on other aspects of our daily
life. In light of the danger we observed in Crimea to such overtly Ukrainian families, I was
eventually able to persuade her to relocate to Lviv in March 2014 with our sons.
11.􀀃 I remained in Crimea in February 2014 to continue my work promoting
Ukrainian culture and to do what I could to protest
4
􀀃
the Russian Federation’s attempt to occupy the peninsula. I also took precautions to protect
myself, however. For example, I started staying with friends, rather than sleeping at my own
house, since I knew my house was under surveillance by the Russian forces. In addition, my
fellow activists and I began meeting secretly as we planned events to preserve Ukrainian
culture in Crimea and protest the Russian Federation’s occupation. We were afraid to use our
phones, so we communicated through Facebook as much as we could.
12.􀀃 Despite these precautions, pro-Russian activists attempted to abduct me on 27
February 2014. That day, I saw news reports that the Crimean parliament had been occupied
by Russian forces, and I went to the Crimean parliament building with a journalist from
Portugal. Just outside another building in the vicinity, the Representative Office of the
President of Ukraine in Crimea, some of the pro-Russian activists who had gathered there
attempted to grab me by the collar and take me away. I told them that I was with a journalist,
however, and that there would be photos and videos of my abduction. The pro-Russia activists
let me go on that day—although they captured me later, as I will discuss below.
Pro-Ukraine Gatherings Leading up to the Referendum
13.􀀃 The Crimean Tatar community was already mobilized to hold pro-Ukraine
gatherings in the days following the entry of Russian forces into Crimea. On 26 February 2014,
for example, the Crimean Tatar community held a demonstration before the Crimean
Assembly building in Simferopol. The Mejlis organized this protest, and I was personally
called and asked to participate. We hoped to prevent members of the Crimean Parliament
from voting on the unlawful secession of Crimea from Ukraine. My fellow Ukrainian activists
and I gathered around 700 additional people to join this demonstration, in addition to the
approximately 3,500 Crimean Tatars.
14.􀀃 An hour after I joined the demonstration, pro-Russia forces began to arrive.
Many of them came on buses from Sevastopol but did not
5
􀀃
seem local to Crimea, as they had heavy Russian and Cossack accents. In spite of this
opposition, we managed to hold our ground in front of the Parliament, although it was not
easy. A few times I almost lost consciousness from the closeness of the crowd and was helped
to walk out of it.
15.􀀃 After the events of the following day, including the capture of the Crimean
Parliament building by Russian forces and the swearing in of a new government led by Sergey
Aksyonov, my fellow Ukrainian activists in Crimea and I understood that the occupation was
beginning. We met in secret on 1 March 2014 to discuss steps that we could take to preserve
Ukrainian culture in Crimea and oppose the coming occupation of the peninsula.
16.􀀃 We held our first anti-occupation rally on 2 March 2014, at the Taras
Shevchenko monument in Simferopol. We chose this location due to Shevchenko’s historic
role in promoting and preserving the Ukrainian language and culture. Because we were afraid
to provoke the ire of the occupation authorities, we gathered for only about 30 or 40 minutes
on this date. There were about 20 people in attendance.
17.􀀃 On 8 March 2014, the other Ukrainian activists and I held another, larger
gathering to protest the occupation of Crimea. We gathered about 500 meters from the
Council of Ministers building in Simferopol. After a few minutes, I learned that a group of
Russian-backed armed forces was approaching us, so we quickly disbursed and headed toward
a checkpoint of the military base in Simferopol, which was manned by Ukrainian military.
18.􀀃 Around this time we also created the All Crimean Ukrainian Council to protect
the interests of the local ethnic Ukrainian population. I became its coordinator. The Council
was tasked with collecting information on violations of the rights of Ukrainian citizens of
various nationalities on Crimean territory and passing that information to non-governmental
and international organizations. The Council was also tasked with coordinating
􀀃
6
􀀃
the activities of Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian organizations on the peninsula and
communicating with the state authorities and other non-governmental organizations.
Abduction and Detention
19.􀀃 On 9 March 2014 at noon, we planned a larger gathering in the city of
Simferopol, to mark the birthday of Taras Shevchenko. We planned to bring together around
3,000 people from different parts of Crimea. On that date, I went with my friend and fellow
activist Anatoliy Kovalski—who also identifies as Ukrainian—to the train station in Simferopol
to pick up Ukrainian flags at around 10:00 am.
20.􀀃 When we arrived at the train station, I sensed we were in danger. I saw people
watching me and mumbling into cell phones. Two members of the Self-Defense Forces of
Crimea grabbed me along with Kovalski, and forcefully took us to the police office located at
the train station. The police took our passports from us and told us to wait for the Self-Defense
superiors to arrive.
21.􀀃 At that moment, a friend from Bakhchysarai called to discuss the gathering we
had planned that day. I told my friend that I was being detained by the Crimean Self-Defense.
I hung up after the two Self-Defense officers shouted that I was not allowed to use my phone
and tried to take it away from me.
22.􀀃 Thereafter I was approached by a couple of individuals dressed in civilian
clothes. I later learned that they were members of the GRU, the Russian foreign intelligence
organization known formally as the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian
Armed Forces. I know this from conversations with my close acquaintances who confirmed
that Igor Girkin, a well-identified member of the GRU, admitted to having me in custody, and
then falsely promised that no harm would come to me. These men led me out of the train
station, dragging me by my jacket toward a car that was waiting nearby. I tried to get away,
but the men
􀀃
7
􀀃
hit me in the face, I fell on one knee and my lip began bleeding. They pulled the hood of my
jacket over my head. A few more men arrived, and they dragged me to a red van parked near
the train station. In a little while they also brought Kovalski. They drove us in an unknown
direction for about 10 minutes. Upon arrival at the destination they dragged us downstairs,
stripped us naked and tied us to chairs.
23.􀀃 For the next 11 days, until 20 March 2014, Kovalski and I were detained by
these men from the GRU and their associates. During this time, we were blindfolded and badly
mistreated—we were repeatedly interrogated, threatened with violence and subjected to
electric shocks. I was shot on the hands and knees with an air gun at least 20-25 times from a
distance of 4-5 meters. Some of my captors spoke with Russian language accents that differ
from the accents common in Crimea. In particular, some of my captors appeared to be from
either the Caucasus region or Chechnya. One of my captors was Igor Besler, a GRU member
with the call sign Bes (“the Devil”). The other captors would make ominous references to Bes,
such as Bes/the Devil is coming, while waiting for him to arrive and torture me. The captors
also identified him by his call sign while he was interrogating me.
24.􀀃 My abduction was initially announced publicly by Sergei Aksyonov, and later
denied. At a press conference, in response to a question from Kovalski’s son about our
abduction, Aksyonov and Sergei Tsekov both told the press that we were being held by the
Russian Unity Party and we would be released soon. When the media started questioning why
we hadn’t been released, Aksyonov and Tsekov then changed their stories and claimed not to
have us detained. Because of the phone call with my friend from Bakhchysarai at the train
station, however, news of my abduction quickly spread throughout the Ukrainian activist
community. A number of pro-Ukrainian activists left Crimea after hearing of my abduction,
as they feared that something similar would happen to them. I believe my abduction was
carried out intentionally and was intended to intimidate the Ukrainian community in Crimea.
After my abduction the activists’ meetings did indeed cease to be held as they had been
previously.
8
􀀃
25.􀀃 On 20 March 2014, the Russian occupation authorities released Mr. Kovalski
and me at the border with mainland Ukraine. Since that time, I have remained in mainland
Ukraine.
Post-annexation Media and Education in Crimea
26.􀀃 Although I am no longer based in Crimea, I am still active in promoting
Ukrainian media and education there, to the extent that I can do so under the conditions of
occupation. Unfortunately, I understand that Ukrainian media and education have largely
been extinguished in Crimea since March 2014.
27.􀀃 The media organizations that I had promoted, and which had been receptive to
providing Ukrainian-language and Ukrainian cultural programming, have been forced to
relocate to mainland Ukraine. The newspaper Krymska Svitlytsia, for example, moved to
mainland Ukraine after its landlord breached the lease agreement for the offices that the
newspaper had used, forcing the newspaper to vacate immediately. The Self-Defense Forces
expedited this eviction, threatening the staff to get them to leave the offices as quickly as
possible. United Print, which is responsible for the distribution of all newspapers in Crimea,
also breached its distribution agreement with Krymska Svitlytsia and refused to continue
circulating it. I am providing a copy of the letter confirming the breach to the Court.1 The
newspaper had no choice but to relocate to Kyiv.
28.􀀃 The situation is similar for Ukrainian-language education in Crimea. In
Bakhchysarai—where I had worked to ensure that all subjects were available in Ukrainian for
grades 1-11 at the Bakhchysarai Comprehensive School No. 4—the number of classes offered
in Ukrainian was cut to zero after the occupation. The occupation authorities appointed a new
school principal after the annexation. The occupation authorities
􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃 􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
1 Krymsoyuzpechat Private Joint-Stock Company Letter No. 773 to the General Director of
National Press Publishing State Enterprise dated 18 June 2014 (Annex 862).
9
􀀃
also pressured the parents of the students at this school who had previously requested that
their children be instructed in Ukrainian to apply to have their children taught in Russian
instead. What is more, this was done in a very cynical manner: classes with Ukrainianlanguage
instruction were not simply switched to Russian-language instruction; those classes
were completely disbanded and the approximately 200 students who used to study in
Ukrainian were reassigned to Russian-language classes.
29.􀀃 I have heard many such accounts from parents that either their requests for
Ukrainian-language education in Crimea are not being honored or that the occupation
authorities are pressuring them to withdraw their applications for Ukrainian-language
instruction. In January 2018, for example, 5 to 7 families in Kerch requested Ukrainianlanguage
education for their children, but the occupation authorities informed them that it
was not available.
30.􀀃 Before the occupation, Crimea had 571 comprehensive schools (that is, schools
teaching children of normal abilities). Of these:
•􀀃 368 had Russian as the language of instruction2;􀀃
•􀀃 15 had Crimean Tatar as the language of instruction; 􀀃
•􀀃 7 had Ukrainian as the language of instruction, with all subjects taught exclusively
in the official language of Ukraine;􀀃
•􀀃 1 had Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar as the languages of instruction;􀀃
•􀀃 133 had Ukrainian and Russian as the languages of instruction;􀀃
•􀀃 20 had Crimean Tatar and Russian as the languages of instruction;􀀃
•􀀃 27 had Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar as the languages of instruction.3􀀃
􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃 􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
2 The term “language of instruction” used in these statistics means that a student could take
all of his or her classes in the desired language.
3 Oleksandra Nezvanna, the “Diva” of Crimean Education Statistics, Holos Krymu [Voice of
Crimea] (25 September 2015) (Annex 1046).
10
􀀃
31.􀀃 Before Russia’s aggression in Crimea, in the academic year ending in 2014, the
peninsula had the following distribution in terms of the language of instruction:
•􀀃 89.32 percent of instruction was in the Russian language;
•􀀃 7.41 percent was in the Ukrainian language;
•􀀃 3.11 percent was in the Crimean Tatar language;
•􀀃 0.15 percent was in the English language.
32.􀀃 In addition to the above-referenced schools in which Ukrainian was offered as
the language of instruction for all subjects, 100% of students at comprehensive schools on the
Crimean Peninsula studied the Ukrainian language and literature as a subject, no matter what
the general language of instruction was.
33.􀀃 The purported annexation of the peninsula by the Russian Federation
fundamentally changed the language situation. The total number of students receiving
instruction in the Ukrainian language decreased drastically in the academic year 2014-2015,
from 12,867 to 1,990, with a further decrease in 2015-16. The share of instruction in the
Ukrainian language in 2015-16 was 0.5 percent (compared to 7.41 percent in 2013-14). The
share of instruction in the Crimean Tatar language was also reduced, although less severely,
to 2.76 percent (compared to 3.11 percent in 2013-14). I am providing the source of these
statistics to the Court. I found these data in the same report that I cited above. One general
change the Russian Federation has made is to require that all students in grades 10-11 be
instructed exclusively in Russian, as prescribed by Russian law.
34.􀀃 As for the lower grades, only one school, the Ukrainian School-Lyceum in
Simferopol, continues to offer all subjects in grades 1-9 in the Ukrainian language. However,
whereas this school used to offer five Ukrainian-taught classes in each year starting in the first
grade, this was reduced to one in the spring of 2014. Due to intimidation and interference by
the occupation authorities, however, in 2017 even this school did not have enough request
from parents that their children be instructed in Ukrainian to fill a single class. Moreover,
these children can only study Ukrainian in grades 1 through 9.
11
􀀃
35.􀀃 Already in 2015, the so-called Minister of Education of Crimea announced that
no school in annexed Crimea would in the future offer Ukrainian-language education in the
first grade.4 I am providing the Court with a copy of the article that mentions the press
conference where the “Minister” made this announcement. She attributed this to the fact that
there had been no requests from parents. Meanwhile, Ukrainian human rights activists have
repeatedly stated that Crimean school administrators are pressuring parents in an attempt to
convince them that “children do not need the Ukrainian language”. Pressure on parents and
students and rejection of applications for Ukrainian-language education have become
common practice in Crimea.
36.􀀃 I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to provide further testimony.
Signed in Kyiv, Ukraine, on June 04, 2018.
By: [signature]
Andriy Shchekun
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃 􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
4 Novosti Kryma, In Crimea, first-graders no longer study in Ukrainian (24 August 2015)
(Annex 1056).
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
3ACTOCYBAHHH MIKHAPOJ[HO] KOHBEHIIi IIPO IIPHIIMHEHHH
<IHAHCVBAHHI TEPOPH3MY TA MIHAPOIHOT KOHBEHIUI] IIPO
JIKBIJIAI[IIO BCIX OPM PACOBO] JIHCKPHMIHALIIi
(VKPA~HA npor POCICKO (EIEPAIIi)
CBIIHEHHI AHJIPII IIIEKV HA
I. Moc nose iM's - AH1pi CrenawoB LHeKyH. H Ha/aO LI CBiHeHH, 1106
noKa3aTH Cy1y cTaBeHH, Ke BiIyIM Ha co6i erHii yKpaiui B KpMy nicn pocifcKoi
oKynaii, uto Mana Ha MeTi npcua uici repropii.
2. H aponsc s ceni Tyxn B 3axipHif acri YKpai Ta BMBaB yKpaiHcKy
Moy Ta ireparypy y MicueBoMy KoepUi. Ilicn 3axienn asa noixaB Jo KpMy,
uo6 orpHMaTH cTyiH MaricTpa y CiMpepononcKOMy epKaBHOMy yHiBepcHTeTi (ni3Hite
nepeMeHoa y TaspicsK autioHan yiepcrer). 3 1993 poKy I0 6epe3H 2014
poKy KHB B KpMy, i caMe TaM 3y€TpiB CBOO JIpyKHHy, Ka HapOMaC B KpMy. Bintuy
acry acy Mo ppyHa i KM MicTi Eaxcapai, KpHM (II3HiIIe 3 HaIIIMMH CHHaM»).
3. IloHaon 3 2011 pOKy 6y TonoBoo KpHMcKOro teHTpy inoBoi Ta
Ky/TypHoi cnisnpati "YpaincKi niM", eypoof oprai3auii. Jlo Jororo 2014 p0Ky
6yB aKTHBiCTOM Ta IIpHXHIJHHKOM yKpaiHCKOf MoBM Ta yKpaiHCKOf KyITypHoi ocBiTH, a
Tax0K yKpa~oMoBHHx 3aco6is Macoof inpopMau~f y KpHMy. 33apa3 IpOIoByIO LUO pO60Ty 3
Kesa.
JlianicTt» y KpMy /1o 210T0r0 2014 pOy
4.31998 poKy no 2000 pix npauoBas BreneM yKpaincKo Mo Ta nireparyp B
BaxcapaicsKif umoni NI. Bci npeIMeT B Ltif IIKOni BMKaac pociCK0IO MOBOO.
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
5. y 1999 poui pa3oM 3 A1epOM MyKI1Ia6a (KpHMCEKHM TaTapHHOM) Ta
FeHaiCM CaMyC€BM (pOCiHOM 3a eTHiM IOxOKeHHM) 3aCHyBaB HeypHI0By
oprai3autio "YKpaicsi iM" y Micri Baxcapair. B LOMy K poLi «YKpaicsKi iw»
CTa1Ia 3aCHOBHHKOM "J[yMK»" ["Thought"], pyxosaoi ra3er, uto BHIaBa1aC YyKpa~c6Koo
MOB0IO i 3OCepeIUKyBa1aCH Ha IMTaHHX yKpaiHCKOi OCBiTH, KyITypH Ta 3aco6is Macosoi
ipopMau~i. Y 2003 poui cTas HpeKTopoM IHpopMautino-Bpasworo tewrpy, Areuii 3
HeypIOBHx Ta IIOIiTHHHX HOB "Mepia-Kp" i 3antasc a ui nocai po 2014 pOKy.
[Ipw6w3Ho y 2009 poui 3acyBas Be6-nopran nu uici osoi arenuii. Hin ac Moci po6or y
"Mepia-KpM" 3aoxoyBas rene- Ta patiocrauif B KpHMy TpaHCOBaTH yKpa~CK0IO MOBOO
Ta cTBOpoBaTH yKpaiHcKi Ky1TypHi IpOTpaMM.
6. HraKo cnpHB ny6iKaLii iuwx ra3er Ta KypHaiB yKpaicKoo MOBoo Ta
3 yKpaiHCKHM Ky1TypHHM 3MicToM. Han1pHK1ant, nponaryBas "KpMc»Ky cir1MIO"
["Crimean Ukrainian Room"], yKpa~oMoBy raery, Ka ya 3acHoBanHa 1992 poi i
nowposanacs Tin B KpHMy. [Hopi6i ny6nixauij 6yn nocryni i s iux Micux KpMy.
B Micri Ceacrononi nouwposanc yxpaicsi ra3er "J[Bi Ceacronos" [Bell of
Sevastopol"] ra "CoBO CeBacronos" [Word of Sevastopol"]. "KpMcKe COBO" ["Crimean
Word"] noIIptoBanoc» B M. CiMbeponons. 3Mier uMx ra3eT 6y 30cepepKeHi Ha 36epeeHHi
yKpaiHcKoi MOBH Ta yKpaiHCKO KyIBTYDHOi CIaIIHHH B KpHMy.
7. [lo moTor0 2014 pOKy TaKOK 3KIMKaB IIIKOIH 36iIIIHTH KiIKiCTE Ta BM/UH
KJIaCiB, y KHX BOHH IIpOIIOH yBaIH HaBaHH yKpaiHCKOO MoBOo. Hanpx.tan, B Daxcapar
npMas yacTs y 3acHyBaHHi KIaCiB 3 yKpa~HCKOIO MOBOIO HaBaHH B 3aa1HOOcBiTHiii
IuKoi No4. LL uKona HaaBa1a MOKHBicT BHBaTH yci npeMeTH 3 nepIOrO nIO
OJUHHaJILUTHM KIaC yKpa~HC6KOO Ta pOCiCKOIO MOBMH. DaTEKaM 6y/IO JIO3BOICHO Bi1HO
O6paTH, Ki KIaCH yJIyT BiJIBiJIyBaTH IX JIiTH i KOO MOBOO BOHM HaBaTHMyTc. Cepent
6aTEKiB 6yB Be&IHKH IIOIIHT Ha HaBaHH yKpaiHCKOO MOBoo. Hanpnan, y CiMdepononi
yKpaioMoHa Ko1a-riMHa3i, Ie BCi IpeIIMeTH BHKIaJIaIMC yKpaHCKOo, 6y1a
nepenOBHeHa, i 6aTKaM 6y/IO BaKKO 3HaTH B Hi MiCe JUL CBOCi JMTHHH. QaKTHHO, LU
2
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
yKpaicKa 1Ko.Ia B CiMpeponOni MOra npHMaT TiKH OIHy JIHTHHy 3 CeMH, Ha HKHX 6y/1O
IO/ao 3aBKH, epe3 6pax Micur y umKini 6ypisni.
8. He3Baao Ha Te, IIIO IO JOTOTO 2014 p0Ky 3HaHa acTHHa HaCeeHH
KpMy po3MOB.a pOCiCKOo, . . Ha mIBOCTpOBI cnocTepIra1aCH CyTTEBa KLIEKICT
yKpa~HOMOBHOrO HaCeICHH. KpiM TOTO, aCTHHa pOCiCKOMOBHOTO HaCeIeHH
interpixyBana cee K yKpaLiB, 6a3yOC Ha BIaCHHX KyITYDHHX Ta COIiaTHHX
Haxwax. B3Hao TaKy cHTyaLIi1O, 3MI Ta IUKOIH B KpHMy 6yJIM HaMaTa1MC II0 36iIIIMTH
cBoi yKpaioMoBi Ta yKpaiHCKi KyJI6TypHi 3ax0JIM. IIO JOTOTO 2014 poKy. LHi 3ax01
BKJIOHIM pOCiCKOMOBHe IIpOTDaMyBaHHI, IpH3HaMeHe JUIH 3aIyHeHHH HaCTHH KDHMCKOTO
HaCeIIeHHH, HKi CaMOBH3HHHJIHC HK yKpaiHLi, HaBiTE KIIIO BOHH He BOIOJIIH yKpa~HC6KOO
MOBOIO Ha JIOCTaTHEOMy DiBHi, a TaKOK 3a0XOyBaHH IO yKpaiHOMOBHOi OCBiTH.
O6cratoBKa B KpMy B OT0My-6epe3mi 2014 pOKy
9. y JOTOMy 2014 poKy cTano 3p03yMino, uo PocicKa enepaui Mac aMip
BicsKoBorO 3ax0nLIeHH KpHMy. I 6as, Io Mo6ini3yorc npopociicKi noirHHi napTii B
KpMy, a Ka3atKi yrpynOBaH Ta TaK 3BaHi CHIM CaMOO6OpOH KpHMy TaKOK 6y
po3ropyri Ha niBocrposi. He uuMx rpyn Hec pocicsKi npanopH.
10. Kon ui no/ii pO3rOpHyJc, nOaB BiyBaTM cTpax. HanpKnan,
noMirs, uto Mi ziM 6ys nip cnocrepeeHwM, i s 6as nino3pinx mope, Ki CTeKHIM 3a
MHOIO a60 CIIOCTepiTaIM 3a MHOO y IIOBCHKICHHOMy KHTTi. Mo ppyHHa He xoTin1a 3a1LLIaTH
KpM, ane BoHa Ta Hai cHH 3p03yMinM, LIO 3a1MtaTH TaM He6e3neHo. Hara po,pa
iTKO CaMOBH3HaMaIaC HK yKpaiHCKa, HK Ha OCHOBi MOBH, KOO MH p03MOB/IHM, TaK i Ha
OCHOBi iHIx acneKTiB HaI1Oro IOBCHKIIeHHOTO KHT1. 3 orAIy Ha Hee3neKy, Ky MM
cnocrepiran B KpHMy JUI TaKHX BHO yKpaiHCKHX pOIUHH, 8 3TO/IOM 3Mir IIepCKOHaTH
IpyKHHy nepeixar 3 HauwM caM po JlBoBa B 6epe3Hi 2014 p0Ky.
l. H 3a1MIaBc y KpMMy B JOTOMy 2014 pOKy, LI1O6 11pOIOBKyBaTH CBO
po6ory nIO IIpOCyBaHHIO yKpa~HcKOi KyTypH B KpHMy i po6rr re, uo Mir, Au poTeCTy
J
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
n1poTH cIp06H PocicKoi entepauij 3air niBocrpis. IHpoTre BKHBaB 3aX0/1iB, 1I106
3axcTHTH ce~e. HanpHKaJI, IIOaB 3aHIIIaTHC y I1py3iB, a He CIIaTH B MOCMy BJIaCHOMy
IIOMI, OCKJIKH 3HaB, III0 Mi 6yIHHOK 3HaXOJIHTC IIiI CIIOCTeDOKeHHHM DOCiCKHX CHI.
KpiM Toro, Moi KoeTH-aKTHBiTH i noaH 36HpaTHC Ta€MHO, ocKi1KM MM aHyBaH oi
JUL 36epeeHH yKpaicKOi KyTypH B KpHMy Ta npoTecTy npOTH OKynaLi Pociic6Koo
Dentepaui€o. MH 6OHC KOpHCTyBaTHCH HaIIIMMH TeICpOHaMH, TOMy MH ciIKyBaIHC epe3
Facebook HaCKiEKH MM MOT JIM.
I2. He3BaKaro Ha ui 3ano6ixHi 3axOUM, IpOpOCifCKi aKTHBiCTH HaMaTaIMC
Mee BHKpacT 27 m0TOTO 2014 poKy. Toro pH no6aMB noBiIOMeHH npO Te, IO
KpHMCKMi napaMeHT 6yB oKynoBa pocicKHM cHaMH, i Ii11o8 y 6y/iB/o
napnaMeHry KpHMy 3 KypHaiCTOM 3 Ilopryraii. Ilepent iutoo 6yiBneo no6n3y
IlpencTasMLTBO Ilpe3eHTa B ABTOHoMHi Pecny6niui KpHM - peKi npopociici
aKTHBicTH, Ki 3i6pane raM, HaMaraHCH BXonHTH MeHe 3a KOMip Ta BiITHFTH. OJ1HaK, M
cKa3aB, Ito 3 KypHaicToM, i to 6yyr pororpabif Ta Bieo npo MO€ BMKpJIeHH.
lpopociicKi aKTBicTH JI03Bo.IM MeHi niTH B TO JeH, xoa BOHM cXonM MeHe ni3Hite,
K Hp03II0BIM HHKHe.
lpoypainci i6pan, to Bi6ysac no pepepeyMy
13. KpHMcKoTaTapCKa rpoMaIa Be 6yna Mo6ini3oBaHa UH pOBeJIeHH
npoyKpaicxx 3i6pan y zHi nicn scryny pocicKwx BicsK no KpMy. Hanpxnan, 26
JOTOTO 2014 pOKy KpHMcKoTaTapCKa FpOMaIa IpOBeIa IeMOHCTpaLIiIO IIepeI 6yJIHHKOM
KpMcoi AcaM~nei y CiMpepononi. LHe nporecr 6yno opraioBao MepxnicoM, i Mee
IepCOHanHO 3anpoOIIyBan pHT y HOMy yaCT. MH CIOJIBaIHC HCIOyCTHTH
ronocyBaHH eHiB KpHMCKOTO IIapJIaMCHTy IIIOJIO He3aKOHHOTO BiJUIiJIeHH KpHMy Bil
YKpain. Mof yKpaincsKi roBapuri-aKTBicT Ta 3i6pa 613Ko 700 JI0IaTKOBMX JO1e,
uto6 npHcHaTHc Io tic~ peMoncrpauii, Ha JO1aTOK I10 11pH61H3HO 3500 pHMCKHX TaTap.
14. Hepe rony nicn Toro K npHeIHaBC» Io eMoHcTpaii, noan
npw6yBar npopocicsKi cHn. Dararo 3 HHX npHixan1M aTo6ycaM 3 Ceacronon, ane He
4
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
31aBa1MC KDHMCKHMM MeIIIKaHIUHMH, TOMy IIIO DO3MOBIHIH 3 CHIEHHM pOCiiCKHM a60
Ka3a1I6KHM aKueHTOM. He3BaKaro Ha ono3HLiO, MH 3yMiIM i pa1i cToTH nepeI
napnaMeroM, xo ue 6yno HeeTKo. JleKinKa pa3is Maire BTpaas cBioMicT epe3
TiCHoTy y HaTOBI1i, i MeHi IOIIOMaTaIH BHHTH 3 HaTOBI1y.
I5. Ilic no[if HaCTynHOrO JIHI, BKIOHIOH 3aXOILICHH IIDOpOCiCEKHMH
cHaMH 6yiBi napnaMery KpHMy Ta npHBCJIeHH IO IIpHCTH HOBOrO ypIy Ha oi 3
Cepri€M AKCOHOBHM, MOiM yKpaiHCKHM TOBapHIaM-aKTHBicTaM y KpMy Ta MeHi CTa1O
3po3yMino, uto noHHa€Tc oKynai. M TacMHo 3ycTpins I 6epe3Hs 2014 p0Ky, 1LIO
O6rOBOpHTH KDOKH, Ki MH MOT1H 6 3p06ITH IUH 36epeKeHH yKpaiHCKOf KyITypH B KpHMy
Ta npoTIi Mai6yrHii oxynaLii niBocTpoBa.
16. M npoBeM Hay nepIIy ny6iHy aKio npor oKynauii 2 6epe3HA 2014
poxy 6in naM'rxa Tapacy LlleseKy y CiMpepononi. M o6pa ue Micue 3aB/KM
icropif poi IlleseKa y nouwpeHi ra 36epexeHHi yKpaiCKOf MOBH Ta KyJITypH.
OCKiIKH MH 6OJ1MC CIpOBOKyBaTH po3paToBaHicT oKyaLiHoi Ba/IH, To 3i6pane are
pH63Ho Ha 30 a60 40 xBHIMH TOTO JIH. Dw3Ko 20 0ci6 B3IM yacT.
17. 8 6epe3» 2014 poKy Ta iui yxpaincsxi axrusicr nposen uute ope,
6imu Be1Ke 3i6paw, u106 npoTeCTyBaTH IIpOTH OKynaLi] KpHMy. MH 3i6pa1c np63o
3a 500 Merpis sin 6ypisni Pap MHicrpis y CiMpepononi. Hepe3 KinKa xBMMH Ii3HaBc, 1IO
IIO HaC IIiIXOJUHTE TDyIIa O36pOCHHX JIOJIeH, LIO IiJITDHMyBaIaCH pOCiCKOIO CTODOHOO, TOMy
MH IIIBHIIKO DO3iLHC B pi3Hi CTOpOH i BiJnpaBHC JO KOHTDOJIHO-IIpOIIyCKHOTO IIyHKTy
icsoBoi acrH B CiMpepononi, Ha KoMy nepeOyBa1H yKpaincKi BicKoBi.
18. IIp63HO B TO aC MM TaKOK CTBOpHH BceyKpaiHCKy pay KpHMy JUI
3axHcTy irrepeciB MiCIeBOro eTHiHOro yKpaiHCKOrO HaCene. H cTaB Ti KOOparopoM.
Pai 6yno nocrasneHo 3as/aH 36par ipopMautiio npo nopyureHn npaB rpoMa/UH
Ypain pi3wx Hauioannocreif a reprropi KpMy Ta nepeaaTH aHy inpopMaui1o
HeypoBHM Ta MiKHapOUHHM OpraHi3aLIiM. Papi 6yJo TaKOK IIOpyeHO KOOpJIHHyBaTH
5
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
pinHicrs yKpaincKHx Ta npOyKpaiHcKMX OpraHi3aui a niBocTposi Ta CIiJKyBaTc 3
JIIepKaBHHMH OpTaHaMH Ta iHIIIMMH HeyDHIIOBHMH OpFaHi3aLIiMH.
Bpatens ra arpMan
19, 9 6epe3» 2014 p0Ky B nIOIyIeH MH naHyBa npoBecTH 6imue 3i6pa
y Micri Ciubepononi, uto6 Bi3HaTH IeH HapOpKeHH Tapaca LHleBeHKa. MH TLIaHyBa1
3i6par 6w3KO 3000 ope 3 pi3wx acry KpHMy. Toro pH nios 3 MoiM ppyroM i
KoerOo, aKTHBicTOM AHaToi€M KOBaCKHM, KH Te iIeHTHbiKy€ cee K yKpaHeu, Ha
3a1i3Hy cTautio y CiMbepononi, to6 3a6par yKpaicKi npanop, npr6nw3no o I0
TOUHHi paHKy.
20. KOM MH IIpHXaIH Ha 3a1i3HHHy CTaHLIiO, BiIyB, IIIO MM IIOTpaIIM/IM B
He6e3neKy. H 6aHB, K JOH JHBTc Ha MeHe i 6ypMoyr y Mo6ini renedo. JlBa
eHM CH CaMoo6opo KpMy cxonMIM MeHe pa30M i3 IaHOM KOBaCKHM i CM1OO
pocTaBMM Hac B noiueicKe Bi/uieHH, po3TaOBaHe Ha BOK3a1i. Iloniuti ii6pana Hanni
IaCnoprH i cKaa1a HaM eKTH, IIOKH IIDH~yJIYT HaMaIBHHKH CaMoo6opoH.
21. y roil MoMeHT 3aTeneboHyBa Mil Jpyr 3 Bax9Mcapao, u106 06roBOpHTH
3i6paw, Ke MH naHyBa B Toll peHE, H cKa3aB cBocMy pyroBi, Io MeHe 3aTpHMa1a
KpHMKa caMoo6opoHa. H 3axis po3MoBy nicn Toro, K Bo€ opiutepiB CaMoo60pow
IO a KpHaTH, IIO MeHi He JI03BOIeHO KOpcTyBaTHC MOiM TeepoHoM, i HaMaTaMC Oro
Bi/IHHTH.
22. Ilicns uoro pIo MeHe iiuna napa mope, opurex y uuwBinHH OUT.
liie pi3naBc, uto BoH 6y neHaMI [Py, PocicsKo 3oBHituHoi po3Bi/IK, opiuio
BipoMoi sx FonoBHe po3Bi/(yBa»He ynpaBiHH FeHepanoro urra6y 36pox cH Pocii. H
3Ha10 n1pO 1Ie 3 p03M08 3 6/1H3KHM npHTeMH, Ki nip(TBep/UHM, Io lrop F ipKiH, IpO KOro
BKe JIOBCI&HO, IIIO BiH € CIiBpO6iTHHKOM [Py, BH3HaB, Io TpMae MeHe niI BapToo, i HaiT
aB 6pex.nBy o6itHxy, uto MeHi He 3a81a1yT uKoUH. LHi mop BBenM MeHe 3 BOK3a1y Ta
noTrH MeHe 3a KypTKy Io MaIIMHH, Ka eKana Opy. H HaMaraBc BHpBaTHC, a1e MO1OBiKH
6
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
BIapH.JIM MeHe B 061H, BnaB Ha O1He KoiHO, i MO Ty6a nOaa KDOBOTOHTH. Bo
HaTE IM KaIOIIIOH MOCT KyDTKH Ha MOO TOI0By. IHpH6yJO Ie Ki/Ka OJ1OBiKiB i BOHH IIOTTIH
MeHe po epoHoro MiKpoaBTO6yca, npHnapKoBaHor0 6in BoKay. 'Hepe JeKHf ac BOHM
TaKo pHBeIM naHa KOBaILCKOTO. BOHM Be3IM HaC y HeBiIOMOMy HaIIDHMKy I1pM6IM3HO IO
xBHHH. Hp»ixaBtu po Mic npH3HaeHH, BOHM 3aTrH Hac BHH3, oBHicTo po3UrH i
ps'3an po Kpicen1.
23. I1porroM HacrynHx IH ii8, Io 20 6epe3» 2014 pOKy naH KOBa1CKii
Ta 6ya 3arpMai tu oco6aM 3 [Py ra ixiM naprepaM. HporroM TOTO acy MH
6y/ i3 3aB'3aHHMH OHMa, IIO HaC KaXJIHBO CTaBHIHC - HaC HeOIH0pa30BO JIOIHTyBaIH,
nOrpOKyBAIM HaCHIBCTBOM i IiUIaBaIM yJapaM eneKTpHHMM cTpyMOM. Mei crpinn no
pyKax i Koninax 3 noBirpx pyuus npa~Mi 20-25 pa3is Ha BincTaHi 4-5 Me1pis. JleKi 3
Moix BHKpaaiB TOBOpHIM 3 pocicKMH aKueHTaMH, Ki BiIpi3OTC BiI aKLteHTiB,
IOIpeHux y KpMy. oxpeMa, peKi 3 Mox BMKpaaiB noXoHH 3 Ka8Ka3KorO periOHy H
lei. Oporo 3 BMKpaai 3Ba1H Irop Benep, Bi 6yB eoy [Py 3 no3MBHHM Bcc. Ii
BHKpaIai pO6HJ 3OBiCHi IIOCHIaHHH Ha HOTO, Ha KLITaT "Ee3 Be He", IOKH BOHH eKaIM,
uto6 Bit npoB i KaTyBaB MeHe. BMKpaIai TaKOK BKHBaM Moro n103HBHM, KOM BiH MeHe
JIOHTy BaB.
24. I1po Moe BHKpaeHH 6yo cnoaTKy ny6iHo orooueHo CepricM
AKCOHOBHM, a noTiM BiH ue 3anepeHB. Ha npec-KoHbepettii y Bi/nOBi Ha 3anMTa ca
naHa KOBaCKOTO IIpO HaIIIe BHKpaIeHH AKcOHOB Ta Cepri LHeKos 3aBM.H npeci, 1Io HaC
TpHMac pocicKa napris "CpHiCT", i CKOpo HaCc 3Bi1HT, KO 3MI nOaH IMTaTM, 0My
HaCc He 3BiIHeHO, AKcOHoB Ta LleKoB 3MiHHIH cBO Bepcii i 3aBM/IM, IIIO BOHH Hac He
TpHMaoT. IHpore, nicn TenebOHHoi po3MOBH 3 MOM IIpyTOM 3 DaxcapaIO Ha 3ai3oMy
BOK3aIi, HOBHHH IIpO MO€ BHKpaIeHH IIIBHIKo nOIMpHMc cepeI ycicf yKpaicKof fpoMan
aKTHBicTi. Hu3Ka IpOyKpaicKHX aKTHBicTiB 3a1MIIMIH KpHM, nOyBIIM pO MO€
BHKpaJICHHA, 60 60Mc, LIO 3 HMH cTaHeTc IO noIi6He. H BBaKaIO, LIIO MOC BHKpaIeHH
6yno 3icHeHo HaBMHeHO i MaIO Ha MeTi 3aKaTH yKpaiHCKy pOMaJIy B KpHMy. Ilic Moro
BHKpaneHH 30pH aKTHBicTiB JIiiCHO nepeCTa IIpOBOJMTHC, IIOpiBHHO 3 THM, K LIe 6y/IO
pantie.
7
􀀃 􀀃
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀃 􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀀃
􀀛􀀙􀀕􀀌􀀑
25. 20 6epe3n 2014 poKy pocijcsa oKynauiia Brana 3Bi1HM naHa
KOBaICKOrO Ta MeHe Ha KOpJIOHi 3 MaTepHKOBOIO aCTHHOO YKpa~, 3 Toro acy
3aIuaoc Ha MaTepHKoBi acrHi YKpa~HM.
3MI ra ocira B pwy nie anexcif
26. Xoua s 6iiue He npoBao B KpHMy, Bce uIe aKTHBHo nIpOCyBaIO
yKpaiHci 3MI Ta OCBiTy TaM, HaCKiIKH MOKy IIe pO6HTH B yMOBax oKynaLij. Ha Kan,
po3yMiro, uto yKpaici 33MI Ta ocBiTa B KpHMy B OCHOBHOMy 3HK OHHa0MM 3 6epe3
2014 p0Ky.
27. 3MI, Ki s nponaryBaB i Ki 6y/I CnpHrnBM nu 3a6e3nee
yKpa~HOMOBHOTO Ta yKpa~HCKOTO KyITypHoo nporpaMyBaHH, 6yH 3MyIeHi IIepeCeJIMTHCH
Io MaTepHKoBOf VKpai. HanpKnap, ra3era "KpMcsKa CBirnu" nepeixana Ha MarepHK
YKpain nicn Toro, K ii opepopaBeus» nopyus yrony npo openy obicis, Ki
BHKopHcTOByBaa ra3eTa, pHMyIIyOH Ta3eTy HeraHo BHixaTH. Ile BHCeIeHH 6y/10
IpHCKOpee CHJaMM CaMOOOpOHM, Ki IOrpOKyBaIM IIpaIiBHHKaM, IIIO6 BOHM IIOKHHyJM
npMiute KoMora cKopite. "United Print", Ka BinoBi/Ia1a 3a p03nOBCO/DKeHH Bcix ra3eT
y KpHMy, TaKOK IIODYIIHIa CBOO JIMCTpH6'IOTOpCKY YTOIIy 3 "KpHMCKO CBirHteO" Ta
BiJIMOBHJIaC IIDOJIOByBaTH ii po3OBCIOJDKeHH. $ Hanao Cyyy Konio JMCTa, Ki
nirBepppxye nopyueHH yropM'. Faera He Mana iHIoro BM~opy, K epeiXaTH JI0 KH€Ba.
28. CxoKoo € cHTyai 3 yKpaicsKoo ociroIo B KpHMy. Y Baxcapai, ne
patoBaB Ha1 THM, 11106 3a6e3neHTH HaBHiCT BciX npeIMeTiB B ycix KaCaX
Bax capafCKO 3araHOOcCBiTHOT IIIKOM N4, 3 ICpIIOTO IIO OJIHHaJUIUHTH, yKpaiHCKOIO
MoBoo, nicn oKynaLi cno KaCiB 3 yKpa~HCKOIO MOBOIO BHKIaJIaHH 6yJIO CKOpOHeHO JI0
Hy. OKynaLiHHi OpraH np3Haun oBoro pHpeKTopa IIKoM. OKynaLiHHi OpraH B1a/UH
Jer IHpsaroro axuioeporo roapcra "KpMcoo3ea1" N 773 fewepanoMy pHpeKTopy [III
Hauioanne raaero-ypHane suaBHHuTBO" Bin1 I8 epB 2014 poKy (/lOnaToK
8
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀃 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀗􀀙􀀌􀀁􀀑
TaKOK 3IiHCHOBaIH THCK Ha THX 6aTEKiB, Ki paHiIIIe IIpOCHJIM, LI1O6 ixHi JiTH HaBMaIMC
yKpa~HCKOIO MOBOO, IIIO6 BOHH IIOJIaIM 3aBKH Ha HaBHaHHH DOCiHCKOi MOBOIO. DiLI TOTO,
ue 6yo 3pO6eHo y IIyKe LUHHiHi MaHepi: KIaCH 3 yKpa~HOMOBHHM HaBHaHHM He IIpOCTO
nepeBen Ha pocicsKoMoBHe, - ix 6yno noBHicTo p03popMoBaHo, i npH63HO 200 yHiB, Ki
paiue HaBaC yKpaiHCKOo, 6yo nepeBeIeHO IO pi3HHX pOCiCKOMOBHHX KIaCiB.
29. H yB araro Taxwx icropii Bi 6aTKiB: jxHi 3anHT IO[IO HaBHaHH
yKpaiHCKOIO MOBOIO B KpHMy He 3a10BO1BHHIOTC a60 OKyIIaLifHa BIaJIa THCHe Ha HHX, LO6
BoHH 3a6pan cBOi 3aBH Ha yKpa~oMoBHe HaBaH. Hanpxnan, y ciui 2018 poKy, y Kepi
Bin 5 no 7 ciMe nonpoCn npo BHKIaIaHH yKpaiHc6KOO MoBOo au ixHix ire, ane
oKynaLia Baa iHpopMyBaa ix, uto TaKoj MoMBOcTi HeMa€.
30. Y KpHMy IO OKynaii pyHKLiOHyBa1O 571 3araHOOCBiTH AIKO1a (T06T0,
uuKoa LI JiTe 3 HOpMaIHHMH 3J1i6HOCTHMM), 3 HHX:
368 --3 pocifcKoo MOBOO BHKaaHH;
e 15-3KpHMCKOTaTDCKOIO MOBOO BHKIaIaHHH,
7 3 yKpa~HCKOIO MOBOIO BHKIaIaHH, IIe BCi IIpCIIMeTH BHKJIaIaIMC
BHKJIOHO IIeDKaBHOIO MOBOO,
• I-3KpHMCKOTaTaDCKOIO Ta yKpa~HCKOIO MOBaMH BHKIaJIHHH,
133-3pOCiCKOO Ta yKpajHCKOIO MOBaMH BHKIaIaHH;
20 -- KpHMCEKOTaTapCKOIO Ta pOCiiCKOIO MOBMH BHKIJIaHHH;
27- pOCiHCKOIO, yKpaiHCKOIO Ta KDHMCEKOTaTaDCKOIO MOBaMH BHKJIaIaHH'.
31. Hanepenopui arpecii Pocij B KpwMy, B y~ooMy poi, to 3axiwyBase y 2014 p.,
6yB HaCTyIHM}f pO3IIOJIiJ 3a MOBOIO BHKIaJIaHH:
2 TepMi "MOBa BHKIRJIaHH"B LIHX CTaTHCTHHHHX IIaHHX O3Ha a€ II[O yeHD MaB 3MOTy HaBaTHC BCiM
Ipe/MeraM O6paoo M0BO.
3 OeKcaH(pa He3aa, "JIHBa" KpHMCKOi OCBiTHOi CTaTHCTHKM, FOOc KpHMy (25 BepeCH 2015
poKy) (lonarox
9
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
• 89,32% BHKIaJIaHH IIpOBOJHIOCA pOCifCKOIO MOBOO;
7,41% BHKIaIaHHM IIDOBOJUHIOCH YKpa~HC6KOO MOB0I;
3,ll% BMKIaIaHHH IIDOBOIHJIOCH KpHMCKOTaTaDC6KOO MOBOO;
• 0,15% BMKJaJIaHH IIDOBOJIHJIOC aHTJIiHC6KOO MOB0IO.
32. OKpiM BHIIe3a3HaeHHX IIKi B KHX yKpaiHCKa MOBa BHKIaIaHH 6y1a I0CTynHa
nu ycix npenMeriB, yKpaicsKy Moy Ta ireparypy K npeMer BHBa1H 100% yHis B ycix
3afaI6HOOCBiTHiX IIIKOIaX KpHMCKOTO I1iBOCTDOB, He3aICKHO BiI TOTO KOO MOB0IO
3iHCHOBaIOCH 3aTaIHe BHKJIaJIaHH
33. Cnpo6a anexcii niocrpoa PociicKoo enepautico cyrrco 3Mina cwryauio y
MoHiif cpepi. y 2014 -- 2015 asanHoMy poi pi3Ko cKopoTMac KiKicT yHiB, Ki
HaBaHc yKpaiHc6Koo Moo 3 12 867 yHis 10 I 990, i3 IOIa1IMM CKOpOeHHHM y
2015-16 pOKax. YKpa~HCKOi MOB0IO B 2015-16 poKax HaBa1Oc» 0,5% yiB (y 2013-14 po0Kax
ix 6y1o 7,41%), a KpHMCKOTaTapC6KO 2,76% (y 2013-14 pp. ix 6yo 3,11%), To6ro
cKopoeHH 6yo MeHM. H Hanao Cy1y Konio pUKepea, Ie HaBOIHTc L cTaTHCTHKa. H
3Hai1uo ti paHHi B TOMy caMoMy 3BiTi, Io uHTyBaB paHie. O/Hico 3 3ara1HX 3MiH, Ki
BHeca Pociiicsxa enepauti, 6yno 3anpoBapen BMorM Io ycix yHi I0-11 Kaci
HaBHaTHC BHKOHO poci€KOO M0BOO, 3riJIHO pociHCKOTO 3aK0HO,/IaBCTBa.
34. LHlo crocy€Tc MooMx KaciB, To Tin1K oHa Kola, «YKpaincsKa tu1onariMa3i
» y CiMpepononi npooBy€ nponoHyBaTH Bci IIpCIMeTH B I-9 KIaCaX yKpaiHCKOO
MOBOIO. OIHaK, LUH IIIKO1a paHiIIe IIpOIIOHyBaIa BHKIaJIaHH yKpaiHcKOo y 'TH KaCaX
KOKHOTO pOKy, a BecHoo 2014 poKy ix KinKicrs 6yno cKopoeHo po ouHoro.. Hepe3 BTpyMan
Ta 3a1KyBaHH OKyIIaLiHHX OpraHiB BIaJUM, OIHaK, y 2017 poi 6yJO HaBiTE HeIOCTaTHO
3a8 Bi/L 6aTEKiB, IIIO6 HaIIOBHHTH OJIHH KaC. lpM OMy BHTHC yKpaiHC6KOO LI JIiTH MORyT
ue 3 I no 9 KaC.
35. A BKe y 2015 poui Tax 3BaHHf «MiHiCTp OCBiT»» KpHMy IOBiJIOMH1a, IO
KOJIHa IIKoa aHeKCOBaHOTO KpMy He 6yne Ha/aBaTH OCBiTy yKpaiHCKOIO MOBOIO y IIepIIMX
10
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁 􀀁
􀀁 􀀃􀀔􀀁􀀓􀀘􀀙􀀌􀀑
Knacax. H apao Cy1y Konio cTaTTi, B Ki 3rap1y€T npec-KoHpepeuti, nip ac xof
«MiHiCTp» 3pO6HJ1a IIe OTOIOIIICHH. I HOCHHIa LIe THM, Io He Mae 3aB Bi1 6aTKiB. B Tof Ke
Mac yKpaiHcKi IIpaBO3aXMCHHKH HeOJIHOpa30Bo HarooIyBaIM Ha ToMy, Io a/1MiHicTpautii
KpHMCKHX IIJKiI THCHyT Ha 6aT6KiB, IIepCKOHyOH ix y TOMy, LIO «yKpaicsKa MoBa /IiTM He
nOTpi6Ha». TCK Ha 6aTKiB Ta yHiB, BiJIMOB IDHMMaTH 3BM Ha HaBaHH yKpaHC6KO
Tenep € IIOIIMDCHOIO IIpaKTHKOO y KpMy.
36. H npMCTao, IIO BHIIICBKa3aHi CBiJIHeHHH € IIpaBIHBHMM i TOHHMH, i
nOrOIDKyIOC BHCTyIIaTH IepeII Cy/IOM y pa3i HeO6xiJHOCTi JU HaJIaHH JIOIaTKOBHX CBiIHeH.
nacao re vera ep,46< oss
AHpii ILleKyH
' HOBOCTH KpMMa, B KpIMy IIeDBOKIaCCHHKH 6OILIIe He yaTCH Ha yKDaHHCKOM H3HKe (24 CepIHM 2015
poKy) (lonarox
II
Annex 14
Witness Statement of Anna Andriyevska (4 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

􀀃􀀃
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
WITNESS STATEMENT OF ESKENDER BARIIEV
1.􀀃 My name is Eskender Enverovich Bariiev. I was born in Namangan, in the Uzbek
Soviet Socialist Republic, in a family of Crimean Tatars. I returned to permanently reside
in Crimea on 1 July 1991. Until 22 January 2015, I lived with my wife and two sons in Molodezhnoye
township, Simferopol district, Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
2.􀀃 On 14 May 1995, the I Crimean Tatar Youth Congress elected me Chair of the
Crimean Tatar Youth Center; since that time, I have been actively engaged in community work
among Crimean Tatars. I was elected as a delegate to the III Convocation of the Qurultay (National
Congress) of the Crimean Tatar People in 1996. I was elected as a member of the Mejlis
of the Crimean Tatar People at the IV Convocation of the Qurultay on 9 November 2001, and
I remained a member of Mejlis until 9 December 2007. In addition, I was elected as a member
of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People at the VI Convocation of the Qurultay on 27 October
2013, and I am still [a member] today. On 8 November 2014, I was elected as coordinator of
the Committee for Defense of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People.
3.􀀃 After the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, I was witness to
many incidents of discrimination by Russian occupying forces against the Crimean Tatar people,
and I was personally subjected to such discrimination; a number of these incidents of discrimination
are described below in this statement. I was unable to return to Crimea. I was in
Kiev when, on 29 January 2014, my wife informed me from Crimea that the occupying forces
had opened criminal cases under 4 articles of the Russian Federation Criminal Code against
me and other coordinators on the Committee for Defense of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar
2􀀃
􀀃
People. At present, I am continuing my legal and human rights work in Kiev as head of the
non-government organization Crimean Tatar Resource Center.
A.􀀃 Discrimination against Crimean Tatar cultural events
4.􀀃 Marches and other cultural events commemorating anniversaries of significance
to the Crimean Tatar people are an important part of our unique identification as one of
the peoples indigenous to the Crimean Peninsula. After the occupation of Crimea, however,
the Russian Federation made coordinated efforts to prevent Crimean Tatars from commemorating
events that are important for them, and also obstructs events that are held despite their
efforts.
1.􀀃 Surgun (Deportation)
5.􀀃 May 18 is the anniversary of Surgun (Deportation), the most important date in
the Crimean Tatar cultural calendar, because it is the date that Josef Stalin started his mass
deportation of Crimean Tatars from the peninsula. From 1990 through 2013, Crimean Tatars
held mass demonstrations in Simferopol on Lenin Square that attracted up to 50,000 people.
Furthermore, between 2007 and 2013, the Crimean Tatar Youth Center held a memorial requiem
called “Light a Fire in Your Heart” with between 3,000 and 7,000 people from various
ethnic groups participating. This memorial event was held at the same location as the mass
demonstration the next day – at Lenin Square in Simferopol’s administrative center – and was
often financed with public funds from the republic. It was always a peaceful event, and there
were never any incidents of violence.
6.􀀃 Crimean Tatars’ attempts to gather on 17 May 2014 as they had always done
before were disrupted by the joint efforts of Russian occupying forces and paramilitary groups
under their control. When the Crimean Tatars began arriving at Lenin Square, they discovered
that Russian Federation-controlled local authorities had blocked off the square with a fence.
Armored personnel carriers appeared on the streets. They drove around the perimeter of the
square to prevent people from entering. Groups of so-called “green men” and local self-defense
groups patrolled the area.
3􀀃
􀀃
7.􀀃 The sizeable and alarming military and paramilitary presence left no doubt that
we would have been subjected to violence had we made an attempt to hold the memorial event
at that location. Because of that, I called on Crimean Tatars to gather at a different location
and hold the memorial demonstration “Light a Fire in Your Heart” in the Ak-Mechet residential
neighborhood, where there is a high concentration of Crimean Tatars, in order to hold the
memorial event “Light a Fire in Your Heart.”
Photo: Eskender Bariiev 17 May 2014 Akmechet neighborhood
Ozenbash Street, the square in front of the mosque.
8.􀀃 Unfortunately, 2014 was the last year when Crimean Tatars were able to hold
the memorial event “Light a Fire in Your Heart.” The permanent organizer of the event was
the Crimean Tatar Youth Center. In following years, the Crimean Tatar Youth Center filed notices
to hold public events. However, the occupying forces did not permit demonstrations at
Lenin square; that said, they did suggest holding the event under Russian flags, and people
did not wish to participate. On 17 May 2018 in Simferopol’s Ak-Mechet neighborhood, law
enforcement detained around 20 young Crimean Tatars who held the memorial event “Light
a Fire in Your Heart.”
2.􀀃 Human Rights Day
9.􀀃 Prior to the occupation, members of the Crimean Tatar people gathered each
year on 10 December at Lenin Square to celebrate Human Rights Day and to underscore the
4􀀃
􀀃
importance of protecting our own rights. This day is important to the Crimean Tatar people.
Our national movement fought to restore our political and collective rights for seventy years
and gave birth to a constellation of Soviet dissidents, who endured prison, psychiatric hospitals
and forced exile. By celebrating Human Rights Day, Crimean Tatars remembered those
dissidents who supported their cause and called for restoration of the people’s political rights.
10.􀀃
Photo: qtmm.org, 10 December 2013, Lenin Square, Simferopol
11.􀀃 Following this tradition, on 28 November 2014, the Committee for Defense of
the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People filed a notice with the executive committee of the Simferopol
City Council that it would hold a Human Rights Day event on 10 December 2014 that
would include a chalk sidewalk drawing contest for children with the theme: “Crimea is My
Home” from 12:00 pm to 2:00 pm, as well as a photo exhibit entitled “Human Rights Activity
in the Crimean Tatar National Movement” from 12:00 pm to 3:00 pm on Sergeyev-Tsensky
Street across from the House of Unions building. There were also plans for a press conference
entitled “Human Rights in Crimea: problem and perspective” in the assembly room of the
House of Unions.
12.􀀃 On 2 December, we received a response from the executive committee of the
Simferopol City Council that refused permission for the event. I submitted this letter for the
Court to review along with other correspondence in our possession that we exchanged with
5􀀃
􀀃
authorities in connection with the celebration of Human Rights day.1 The official explanation
for the denial was that the proposed events would put local residents in danger. In its letter,
the executive committee of the Simferopol City Council invoked Federal Law No. 54-FZ dated
19 June 2001, namely Article 7(3), and stated that the notice supposedly did not list the number
of participants and the format of the event. The letter also invoked Article 8 of the same
law, which allows public events to be held in any space that is suitable for the purpose, provided
that the event does not pose a threat of destruction of the buildings or structures or other
threat to the safety of the event’s participants. As I already stated, our notice clearly stated the
time and format of the three events.
13.􀀃 On 5 December, the Committee filed a new notice to hold a small demonstration
at Lenin Square in Simferopol protesting the trampling of our civil rights. In all previous
years, events were held to celebrate Human Rights Day without any incident.2 The authorities
replied in a letter dated 8 December, which contained yet another denial. In this letter, the
authorities stated that holiday events and associated organizational activity were planned for
that area from 1 December 2014 through 7 January 2015. The Simferopol administration suggested
holding a small demonstration at Gagarin Park by the “Three Graces” sculpture. We
received this response from the Simferopol city administration on 9 December 2014, four days
after [our] notice was submitted and less than twenty-four hours before the proposed event.
14.􀀃 Traditionally, public events of a human rights and political nature in Simferopol
have been held at Lenin Square by representatives of all cultures, not just by Crimean Tatars.
Lenin Square is opposite the Council of Ministers (government) building.
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
1 Letter from the executive committee of the Simferopol City Council No. 981/24/01-66 to
the Committee for Defense of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People, 2 December 2014 (Annex
841).
2 Letter from the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People No.
001/12 to the Mayor of Simferopol, 5 December 2014 (Annex 844).
6􀀃
􀀃
Photo: Press Service of the Republic of Crimea office of the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation,
7 November 2014
Other traditional locations for holding public political and human rights events in Simferopol
are: the square opposite the Crimean Supreme Soviet (State Council of Crimea) building,
Soviet Square next to the statue of human rights activist Petro Grigorenko, and the square by
the statue of the famous Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko. Gagarin Park is a place where locals
and guests of Simferopol go for recreation, not a place with any historical or socio-political
resonance. Furthermore, the park is far from the administrative buildings, which makes
any protest at that location pointless.
15.􀀃 On 9 December, the Committee filed a notice for the third time with three other
suggested locations for the event.3 In addition, three of the Committee’s coordinators, Abmedjit
Suleimanov, Sinaver Kadyrov and I, contacted the Simferopol city administration to coordinate
the location for the event at an in-person meeting with authorities. We were given Resolution
No. 452 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea dated 12 November 2014
“On approving the list of locations for public events in the Republic of Crimea” and told to wait
for a response in writing. While we waited for a response at a café nearby, we were approached
by members of the so-called prosecutor’s office and police, who gave each of the coordinators
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
3 Letter from the Committee for Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatars to Viktor Nikolaevich,
No. 001/12, dated 9 December 2014 (Annex 847).
I , ' 􁁑- T f
4 d • • • •
7􀀃
􀀃
an official warning about administrative and criminal liability. At 10:00 pm that day, we received
another response from the local authorities.4 This time, we were denied again on the
grounds that our petition was filed less than 1 day in advance, which is significantly less than
the 10 days required by the law on demonstrations currently in effect in Crimea. By this point,
it was clear that the occupying forces were resolutely determined to prohibit us from celebrating
Human Rights Day, regardless of how we notified them, and that they would use any pretext
of procedural law that they could find in order to do so.
16.􀀃 For that reason, the Committee resolved to hold a press conference instead of
a demonstration on 10 December in order to protest the authorities’ refusal to allow an event
celebrating Human Rights Day. The press conference was held at the Simferopol regional
Mejlis building at 20 Chekhov Street, Simferopol, and I was one of the speakers. While we
were speaking, some unidentified persons approached the podium, threw green dye on us and
ran out of the room. This incident was clearly caught on video, which I submitted to the Court
for review.5 Nonetheless, we did everything we could to hold the press conference as it had
been planned. We called the police and filed a complaint concerning the material and moral
damages. After a while, we received notice of a refusal to open criminal proceedings in response
to the incident because there was no formal element of a crime.
3.􀀃 Event held on 17 January 2015
17.􀀃 Taking into consideration the attempts to prevent the press conference
for Human Rights Day, the Committee resolved to hold its II Crimean Conference on 17 January
2015 to discuss current conditions. We intentionally held the conference at the Marakand
Hotel in Simferopol, with which we signed a lease agreement, since events of that type are not
subject to the restrictions in Russian law on public events.
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
4 Letter from Administration of Simferopol to the Committee for Protection of Rights of the
Crimean Tatars, No. 12154/24/01-66, dated 9 December 2014 (Annex 846).
5 Video of Green Paint Being Splashed on Panelists at International Human Rights Day
(Annex 1102).
8􀀃
􀀃
18.􀀃 When the Committee members began to gather in the hotel’s conference
room on the appointed day, a large number of local police and a group of 30-40 athletic
young men in track suits with hoods appeared. It was obviously an attempt to disrupt the
event. The group blocked the entrance to the conference room and took all the unoccupied
chairs. Several minor conflicts arose when Crimean Tatars began to explain to the unidentified
men why they wanted to go into the conference room. At that point, to avoid violence and to
encourage the police to get involved and allow us to continue the event, I called on all the
Crimean Tatars in the room to raise their hands to show that they were not provoking a clash.
When the conference participants raised their hands, I called on the police to remove the troublemakers
and on journalists to get video footage of everything. I submitted a copy of the footage
of these events to the Court for review.6
19.􀀃 Until that point, the police had ignored my requests to remove from the room
the unidentified men who were trying to prevent the gathering from taking place. The police
helped the men enter the conference room and then refused to get involved. They did not even
get involved when the leader of the group (whom I recognized as the cousin of Ruslan Balbek,
deputy prime minister of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, currently a representative
to the Russian Federation Duma) hit one of the Crimean Tatars present. It was
only the fact that Crimean Tatars raised their hands that removed any ambiguity in the situation.
The police learned that Crimean Tatar activists were videotaping and live broadcasting
what was going on, and at that point they removed the men from the conference room. I understood
that the police presence had nothing to do with maintaining public order. They were
just waiting for one or more Crimean Tatars at the conference to react to provocation by the
unidentified men, which would have given them cause to detain and arrest Crimean Tatars.
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
6 Video of Bariiev Instructing the Crimean Tatars to Show Their Peaceful Intentions in the
Face of Provocation (Annex 1101).
9􀀃
􀀃
B.􀀃 Targeted persecution of Mejlis members
20.􀀃 In addition to creating barriers preventing us from celebrating important cultural
events, the Russian occupying forces also engaged in sabotage aimed at disrupting the
Mejlis, which is the representative body of the Crimean Tatar people.
21.􀀃 One of Mejlis’ many roles as the true representative body of Crimean Tatars
was the mobilization of the Crimean Tatar people in connection with social and economic issues
of importance to them, lobbying the Ukrainian Parliament and international organizations
on behalf of the Crimean Tatar people, providing assistance to the Crimean Tatar people
and establishing connections between them and Crimean Tatar diasporas that have not been
able to return to their homeland.
22.􀀃 The Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people is the highest representative body of
Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatar people is represented by 250 delegates to the Qurultay,
who are elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct franchise by means of secret ballots
[cast] by Crimean Tatars and their family members, regardless of their ethnicity. The Qurultay
is elected for a period of 5 years. The Qurultay decides the key socio-political, socio-economic,
cultural and other issues facing the Crimean Tatar people. The Qurultay determines the key
areas and forms of activity for the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people and for other bodies of
the Qurultay.
23.􀀃 The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people (“Mejlis”) is the sole authorized representative
executive body of the Crimean Tatar people between sessions of the Qurultay and is
elected by the Qurultay. The Mejlis is elected by the Qurultay from among Qurultay delegates.
The Mejlis consists of 33 people. In its activity, the Mejlis is subordinate to the Qurultay and
governed by its resolutions and the provisions of international law and the laws of Ukraine
that do not contradict those rules. The Mejlis’ primary goal is to remedy the effects of the genocide
committed by the Soviet government against the Crimean Tatar people, to restore the
ethnic and political rights of the Crimean Tatar people, and to exercise its right to self-determination
in its historical ethnic territory.
10􀀃
􀀃
24.􀀃 The existence of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People as a representative body
of the Crimean Tatar people was recognized in acts issued by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine, including Ukraine Presidential
Decree No. 518/99 dated 18 May 1999, Ukraine Verkhovna Rada Resolutions No. 2240-
XII dated 27 March 1992, No. 1532-III dated 2 March 2000, and No. 4475-III dated 20 March
2014, Ukraine Presidential Decrees No. 165/94 dated 14 April 1994, No. 475/2009 dated 23
June 2009, No. 809/2014 dated 14 October 2014, No. 945/2014 dated 20 December 2014, No.
190/2015 dated 31 March 2015, No. 195/2015 dated 3 April 2015, No. 247/2015 dated 28 April
2015, No. 604/2015 dated 23 October 2015 and No. 393/2016 dated 15 September 2016; Government
of Ukraine resolutions and decrees No. 636 dated 11 August 1995, No. 154 dated 18
March 2015, No. 736 dated 24 September 2015, No. 454-r dated 16 May 2014, No. 747-r dated
29 April 2015, No. 123-r dated 18 February 2016, No. 348-r dated 5 May 2016 and others.
25.􀀃 The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People is a permanent member of two international
organizations: the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization in 1991 and the
Federal Union of European Nationalities in 1993. In 1995, the Mejlis was accredited by the
United Nations inter-sessional Working Group on the draft United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution
1995/317 dated 25 November 1995 gave the Mejlis UN recognition as an organization
of indigenous people and allowed it to work with the UN in that capacity; using a special procedure,
this resolution was passed with the advance written consent of the countries of residence
of the organizations of indigenous people (meaning that Ukraine gave its consent for
the Mejlis to join the UN as an organization of indigenous people); the Russian Federation
never objected to the Mejlis’ work with the UN in that capacity.
26.􀀃 The Mejlis has also been recognized by the Crimean legislature in resolution
No. 1728-6/14 dated 11 March 2014 of the Russian Federation-controlled Supreme Council of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which offers the Crimean Tatar people “in the context of
11􀀃
􀀃
approving a new Constitution for the Republic of Crimea” “recognition of the bodies of national
self-governance for the Crimean Tatar people: the Qurultay (national congress) of the
Crimean Tatar people and the bodies established by it.
27.􀀃 As part of [its] strategy of intimidation and attempts to force Crimean Tatars to
remain silent, the Russian Federation has been especially harsh with Mejlis members. They
searched our homes and detained us and members of our families to prevent us from continuing
to organize the Crimean Tatar people and telling the truth that Crimea is part of Ukraine.
28.􀀃 For example, on 16 September 2014, officers from the Russian Federal Security
Service barged into my home at 6:30 in the morning. They searched my home for four hours,
saying that they were looking for weapons, drugs, or prohibited items and literature. Instead,
they seized the processor from my personal computer and my laptop, as stated in the search
protocol, which I submitted to the Court for review.7 Four men in camouflage and face masks
barged into the apartment with automatic weapons that they pointed at me, my wife and two
small children (the oldest was 4 years old, and the youngest was just 6 months old). They were
followed by two investigators from the Federal Security Service office for the Republic of Crimea
and Sevastopol. I did not resist, but I demanded that they show the documents sanctioning
the search. I was shown a court ruling. Then I announced that I wanted to bring in an
attorney, but I was denied that request. I asked to bring in my neighbors from the building as
witnesses. I was denied that request as well, and instead they brought in two young men. I
asked them what they were interested in specifically and told them I was prepared to give it to
them. I also offered them my air gun, but they refused to take it. They turned everything upside
down in one of the rooms of my apartment. When I tried to talk to my wife in the Crimean
Tatar language, we were forbidden to do so. When there was a call on the landline phone, they
did not allow us to answer it. It seemed to me that they weren’t so much looking for prohibited
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
7 Search Record, drafted by Senior Lieutenant I.S. Emelyanov, Operative, Russian Federal
Security Service Directorate in the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (16 September
2014) (Annex 896).
12􀀃
􀀃
items as they were trying to frighten my family and, with such searches as an example, the
entire Crimean Tatar people.
29.􀀃 At the same time, on 16 September 2014, Federal Security Service officers
searched the home of my colleague, chair of the Belogorsk regional Mejlis Mustafa Asaba.
When the search was complete, they seized five brochures: one on a religious topic and four
on the Crimean Tatar national movement. Mustafa Asaba’s home was searched again a year
later, on 14 April 2015. Law enforcement was looking for materials about the “26 February
case.” Ammunition was planted during that search, and I reported that on my Facebook page.
Afterwards, Mustafa Asaba was taken to the investigative committee in Simferopol; he was
later released.
30.􀀃 On the same day, 16 September 2014, a search was carried out at the building
of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People. After the search, the Mejlis building was seized and
sealed off. In addition, computers belonging to the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and the
Crimea Charitable Foundation were removed.
31.􀀃 The occupying forces stepped up their persecution of Mejlis members, restricting
our movements into and out of Crimea; this escalated to the point that they even deported
several Crimean Tatar leaders from Crimea. I was arrested for the first time at the border on
23 July 2014 when I was returning from Switzerland via Kiev after an international conference.
I drove over the border in a car with three friends: Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People delegate
Server Menanov, Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People member and Committee coordinator
Abmedjit Suleimanov, and Committee coordinator Sinaver Kadyrov. When we crossed
into Crimea, we were surrounded by 8 people with automatic weapons. They were rude to us,
forbidding us from speaking in our native Crimean Tatar language, searching our car, and then
arresting and questioning me for two or three hours. During the period between Russia's invasion
of Crimea and January 2015, I was personally detained at least 39 times when I crossed
the border between Crimea and mainland Ukraine.
13􀀃
􀀃
32.􀀃 On the night between 22 and 23 January 2015, Sinaver Kadyrov, Abmedjit Suleimanov
and I were detained when leaving Crimea for mainland Ukraine. The detention happened
after the conference on 17 January, which I mention in my statement, when we went to
Kherson to fly to Istanbul in order to deliver documents to the President of the Republic of
Turkey and to meet with members of the Crimean Tatar diaspora. We were taken into a portable
building that looked like a cell. We were questioned by Federal Security Service officers
about where we were going and for what purpose. Afterwards, Abmedjit Suleimanov and I
were allowed to get in the car. They took away the keys and locked us in the car, keeping us
there for about 6 hours. Meanwhile, Sinaver Kadyrov was taken away for interrogation. After
that, we were released and Mr. Kadyrov was taken to the court in Armyansk, which fined him
and issued a ban on his entering Crimea (Article 18.9(2) “Violation of the rules of stay in the
Russian Federation for foreign citizens and stateless persons,” Federal Law “On the legal status
of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation.”
33.􀀃 The intimidation and persecution had a negative effect on me and my family,
especially due to the heightened attention focused on me as a Mejlis member. When unfounded
criminal charges were filed against me, the prosecutor for the republic sent the investigators
six files to open criminal prosecution for indicia of the crimes described in Article
280.1(2) (public calls to action aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation),
Article 239(2) (establishing a non-commercial organization that infringes on the person
and rights of citizens), Article 282(2) (inciting hatred or enmity), Article 282.3 (financing
extremist activity), Article 212(1) (organizing mass riots) of the Russian Federation Criminal
Code. At that time, I was in Kiev and was preparing to return to Crimea with Abmedjit Suleimanov
when my wife called me from Crimea and told me that the prosecutor’s office had
opened criminal cases against us. As confirmation of my wife’s message, I saw the same information
on the site of the prosecutor’s office for the Republic of Crimea, published on 29 January
2015. On the same day, deputy chair of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People Akhtem
Chiygoz was arrested. Once I found a place to live in May 2015, my relatives brought my wife
14􀀃
􀀃
and two sons to me. We currently live in Kiev, when I continue to speak out about the liberation
of Crimea and protecting the rights of the Crimean Tatar people.
C.􀀃 The Russian Federation Bans the Mejlis
34.􀀃 In April 2016, the Russian Federation significantly escalated its campaign
against representative bodies of Crimean Tatars: the prosecutor’s office for the Republic of
Crimea opened a criminal case to declare the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People an extremist
organization and to ban the Mejlis as “the public association Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.”
35.􀀃 The Republic of Crimea Supreme Court decision dated 26 April 2016 in administrative
case No. 2a-3/2016 granted both of the prosecutor’s claims, which I have submitted
to the Court for review.8
36.􀀃 On 29 September 2016, the judicial panel for administrative cases of the Russian
Federation Supreme Court issued a decision on the appeal filed by the Mejlis of the Supreme
Court decision dated 26 April 2016. I submitted this document to the Court for review
along with my statement.9. In its decision on the appeal, the Russian Federation Supreme
Court ruled to uphold its previous decision and to deny the appeal filed by the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People.
37.􀀃 The [court’s] explanation was that the appeal contained no arguments refuting
the conclusions reached by the court of first instance or indicating that there were grounds to
revoke or amend the judicial act on appeal. The argument presented by the defense for the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People that the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People is not a public
association and represents the highest authorized representative body of the Crimean Tatar
people, established by means of elections, was described as being without merit by both the
Republic of Crimea Supreme Court and the Russian Federation Supreme Court. The Republic
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
8 Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision of 26 April 2016 of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea
concerning the appeal of the ban of the Mejlis (Annex 913).
9 Case No. 127-APG16-4 Decision of 29 September 2016 of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation concerning the appeal of the ban of the Mejlis (Annex 915).
15􀀃
􀀃
of Crimea Supreme Court ignored the arguments presented by the defense for the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People concerning the violation of provisions of international law concerning
indigenous peoples and international law on human rights, and the Russian Federation Supreme
Court found them to be without merit in its appeal ruling.
38.􀀃 However, the Crimean Tatar people and the international community clearly
saw that this was simply a pretext: Russia wanted to shut down the Mejlis because of its importance
for the Crimean Tatar people. Furthermore, the Russian Federation was upset by
Mejlis members’ refusal to alter their position that Crimea is a part of Ukraine and by the fact
that the Mejlis called for [people] to not participate in the unlawful referendum on 16 March
2014 and in local elections on 14 September 2014.
39.􀀃 I personally participated in attempts to revoke the ban on the Mejlis via the
Russian Federation court system since April 2017, when the International Court of Justice
released its resolution on provisional measures. On 12 July 2017, I filed a petition with the
Republic of Crimea Supreme Court for review of the final judicial act (Republic of Crimea Supreme
Court decision dated 26 April 2016) in administrative case No. 2a-3/2016 based on new
circumstances. I submitted a copy of my petition for review by the Court.10 My petition was
denied; the formal explanation for the denial was the fact that [I did not attach] a notarized
copy of the Russian translation of the resolution on provisional measures.11 I submitted the
entire set of documents I received to the Russian Federation Supreme Court. The letter is attached
to my statement.12 I clearly stated that the set of documents contained a Ukrainian
translation of the resolution on provisional measures, which is the official language of the Republic
of Crimea. However, the Supreme Court did not respond. We filed similar applications
on behalf of three other Mejlis members.
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
10 Case No. 2A-3/2016, Appeal of 12 July 2017 of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea
concerning the ban of the Mejlis and the Provisional Measures Order (Annex 921).
11 Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision of 21 July 2017 of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea
concerning the appeal of the ban of the Mejlis (Annex 922).
12 Case No. 2A-3/2016, Appeal of August 2017 of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
concerning the ban of the Mejlis and the Provisional Measures Order (Annex 923).
16􀀃
􀀃
40.􀀃 In addition, on behalf of the Crimean Tatar Resource Center, I sent a letter on
25 May 2017 to the Russian Federation Foreign Affairs Ministry. In the letter, I reminded [the
Ministry] of the requirement to immediately perform the requirements of the UN International
Court [of Justice] Order and proposed the immediate publication of an official Russian
translation of the above-mentioned resolution on provisional measures. Furthermore, I demanded
that the ministry send a duly authenticated copy of the full text of the official Russian
translation of the above-mentioned UN International Court [of Justice] Order to the Crimean
Tatar Resource Center for the defense of the rights of representative institutions of the Crimean
Tatar people and their members with judicial, law enforcement and administrative bodies
of the Russian Federation, both in and beyond the Russian Federation. However, Russian
authorities ignored my requests.
41.􀀃 However, the provisional measures contained in the court orders concerning
Mejlis have yet to be implemented.
42.􀀃 I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to provide further testimony.
Signed in ________________ on _______________, 2018.
____________________________________
Eskender Bariiev
NOGKDLDLGD􀀁KDECRL@OMCLMH􀀁IMLBDLUGG􀀁NM􀀁NODPDVDLGY􀀁
SGL@LPGOMB@LGZ􀀁QDOOMOGFK@􀀁G􀀁
KDECRL@OMCLMH􀀁IMLBDLUGG􀀁M􀀁JGIBGC@UGG􀀁
BPDT􀀁SMOK􀀁O@PMBMH􀀁CGPIOGKGL@UGG
RIO@GL@􀀁
( ) ' * &%􀀁
OMPPGHPIMH􀀁SDCDO@UGG
PBGCDQDJWPIGD􀀁NMI@F@LGZ􀀁XPIDLCDO@􀀁A@OGDB@
&#􀀁 Xmuà􀀁ovj{z􀀁fyrmulmx􀀁fujmxvjpÄ􀀁Ohxpmj#􀀁 g􀀁xvlpsyà􀀁j􀀁kvxvlm􀀁Yhthukhu!􀀁j􀀁
_oimryrvq􀀁]vjmzyrvq􀀁]v~phspyzpÄmyrvq􀀁\myw{isprm!􀀁j􀀁ymtÖm􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx#􀀁 P􀀁VxÑt􀀁
jmxu{syà􀀁lsà􀀁wvyzvàuuvkv􀀁wxvnpjhupà􀀁%&􀀁pásà􀀁 &..&􀀁 kvlh#
Rv􀀁''􀀁àujhxà􀀁'%&*􀀁kvlh􀀁à􀀁wxvnpjhs􀀁y􀀁nmuvq􀀁p􀀁lj{tà􀀁yÑuvjÖàtp􀀁j􀀁wvymsrm􀀁kvxvl"
yrvkv􀀁zpwh􀀁Xvsvlmnuvm􀀁]pt|mxvwvsÖyrvkv􀀁xhqvuh!􀀁Njzvuvtuvq􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑt#
'#􀀁 &)􀀁thà􀀁 &..*􀀁kvlh􀀁uh􀀁6􀀁]Émolm􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvq􀀁tvsvlmnp􀀁à􀀁iÑs􀀁poixhu􀀁
[xmlymlhzmsmt􀀁VxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁Xvsvlmnuvkv􀀁bmuzxh􀀁p􀀁y􀀁zm}􀀁wvx􀀁hrzpjuv􀀁ohupth"
áyÖ􀀁viÇmyzjmuuvq􀀁lmàzmsÖuvyzÖá􀀁yxmlp􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx#􀀁g􀀁iÑs􀀁poixhu􀀁lmsmkhzvt􀀁V{"
x{szhà􀀁>uh~pvuhsÖuvkv􀀁rvukxmyyh?􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁666􀀁]voÑjh􀀁j􀀁 &..+􀀁kvl{#􀀁g􀀁
iÑs􀀁poixhu􀀁Äsmuvt􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁uh􀀁V{x{szhm􀀁6<􀀁]voÑjh􀀁.􀀁uv"
àixà􀀁'%%&􀀁 kvlh!􀀁p􀀁à􀀁àjsàsyà􀀁Äsmuvt􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁lv􀀁.􀀁lmrhixà􀀁'%%,􀀁kvlh#􀀁Vxvtm􀀁zvkv!􀀁à􀀁
iÑs􀀁poixhu􀀁Äsmuvt􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁uh􀀁V{x{szhm􀀁<6􀀁]voÑjh􀀁',􀀁
vrzàixà􀀁'%&(􀀁kvlh􀀁p􀀁àjsàáyÖ􀀁zhrvjÑt􀀁lv􀀁uhyzvàÇmkv􀀁jxmtmup#􀀁-􀀁uvàixà􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh􀀁à􀀁
iÑs􀀁poixhu􀀁rvvxlpuhzvxvt􀀁Vvtpzmzh􀀁wv􀀁ohÇpzm􀀁wxhj􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh#
(#􀀁 [vysm􀀁vrr{wh~pp􀀁VxÑth􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlmxh~pmq􀀁à􀀁yzhs􀀁yjplmzmsmt􀀁tuv"
kvÄpysmuuÑ}􀀁wxvàjsmupq􀀁lpyrxptpuh~pp􀀁yv􀀁yzvxvuÑ􀀁xvyypqyrp}􀀁vrr{wh~pvuuÑ}􀀁jsh"
$
IIPHMEHEHHE MEKJIYHAPO/IHOH KOHBEHIIMH IIO IIPECEHEHMO
HHAHCHPOBAHHH TEPPOPH3MA H
MEKJIVHAPO[IHO KOHBEHIHM O JIHKBJIAIIHH
BCEX OPM PACOBO JIHCKPHMHHAIIHH
yKPAHHA
npomue
POCCHHCKO EJIEPAIIHH
CBJIETEJICKHE IIOKA3AHHH CKEHJIEPA BAPHEBA
I. Mes 3OByT CKeHJIep HBepOBH BapeB. H pOIHIC B TOpOJIe HaMara, B
y36eKCKoi CoBeTCKo CoacrHecxoi Pecny6Ke, B ceMBe KpMMcKx TaTap. B KpIM
BepHyJIC JUI IIOCTOHHHOTO IIpOKHBaHHS 0] HOD1 1991 ron1a.
lo 22 BapH 2015 TOJ1a IIpOKHBaI C KeHOH H JIIByMM CIHOBWMH B IIOCeIKe FOpOICKOTO
THIa MOJOJIeKHOe CHMpepOnOJCKOr O pafOHa, ABTOHOMHOki Pecny6HK KpIM.
2. 14Mas 1995 ro1a Ha I Ce3JI€ KpIMCKOTaTapCKOf MOIOJICKH 6L1 H36paH
lpenceareneM KpMcKoTaTapCKOro MonoeKHoro Llerpa c Tex Op aKTHBHO 3aHHMaOCE
O6III&CTBeHHO JICHTeJIHOCTIO CpCJIH KpIMCKHx TaTap. H 6LI 36paH eeTaTOM Kypynrra
[HarwoHaoro KoHpecca] KpIMcKoTaTapCKOro Hapoa IHI Co3MBa B I996 ro1y. H
6LI 36pa eHoM MeppHca KpIMcKoTaTapKoro Hapoa Ha Kypyrrae IV Co3Ma 9 HO6p
2001 ro/1a, M Be eHOM Me/UKIHCa I10 9 I1eKa6p 2007 ro1a. KpoMe TOTO,
61 w36pa ueHoM MerpxHca KpIMcKoTaTapcKOro Hapoa Ha Kypyrae VI Co3Ba 27
0KT6p 2013 TO1a H BLHOC TaKOBIM JIO HaCTOHIIICTO BpeMeHH. 8 H06p 2014 rop1a
6L1 H36paH Koop/IHHaTOpOM KoMHTeTa no 3auuHTe I1paB KpIMcKoTaTapCKOro Hap0/Ia.
3. Hoene oKKynaHH KpMMa Pocccxoi bepepauei cran cBpeTeeM MHOTOHHCICHHIX
IIDOHBJICHH JIHCKDHMHHaIIHH CO CTODOHI DOCCHHCKHX OKKyIIaIUHOHHIX BIa1
yzmq􀀁wv􀀁vzuvÅmupá􀀁r􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvt{􀀁uhxvl{􀀁p􀀁spÄuv􀀁wvljmxkhsyà􀀁zhrvq􀀁lpyrxp"
tpuh~pp0􀀁umrvzvxÑm􀀁wxvàjsmupà􀀁zhrvq􀀁lpyrxptpuh~pp􀀁vwpyÑjházyà􀀁upnm􀀁j􀀁uhyzvà"
Çmt􀀁ohàjsmupp#􀀁g􀀁um􀀁ytvk􀀁jmxu{zÖyà􀀁j􀀁VxÑt#􀀁Vvklh􀀁à􀀁uh}vlpsyà􀀁j􀀁Vpmjm!􀀁'.􀀁àujhxà􀀁
'%&)􀀁kvlh􀀁y{wx{kh􀀁yvviÇpsh􀀁tum􀀁po􀀁VxÑth!􀀁Äzv􀀁j􀀁vzuvÅmupp􀀁tmuà􀀁p􀀁lx{kp}􀀁rvvxlpuh"
zvxvj􀀁Vvtpzmzh􀀁wv􀀁ohÇpzm􀀁wxhj􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁vrr{wh~pvuuhà􀀁jshyzÖ􀀁vz"
rxÑsh􀀁{kvsvjuÑm􀀁lmsh􀀁wv􀀁)􀀁yzhzÖàt􀀁_V􀀁\`#􀀁P􀀁uhyzvàÇmm􀀁jxmtà􀀁wxvlvsnhá􀀁tvá􀀁hljv"
rhzyr{á􀀁p􀀁wxhjvohÇpzu{á􀀁lmàzmsÖuvyzÖ􀀁j􀀁Vpmjm!􀀁jvokshjsàà􀀁umwxhjpzmsÖyzjmuu{á􀀁vx"
khupoh~pá􀀁HVxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpq􀀁xmy{xyuÑq􀀁~muzxI#
@"􀀁 Cclekcgch[pcw􀀁]􀀁imhir`hcc􀀁enfumnkhto􀀁g`kijkcwmcd􀀁ektgleco􀀁m[m[k
)#􀀁 XhxÅp􀀁p􀀁lx{kpm􀀁r{sÖz{xuÑm􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà!􀀁wvyjàÇmuuÑm􀀁vouhtmuvjhupá􀀁
kvlvjÇpu!􀀁ptmáÇp}􀀁ivsÖÅvm􀀁ouhÄmupm􀀁lsà􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh!􀀁àjsàázyà􀀁jhn"
uÑt􀀁hywmrzvt􀀁uhÅmq􀀁{uprhsÖuvq􀀁plmuzp|prh~pp􀀁rhr􀀁vluvkv􀀁po􀀁rvxmuuÑ}􀀁uhxvlvj􀀁
VxÑtyrvkv􀀁wvs{vyzxvjh#􀀁[vysm􀀁vrr{wh~pp􀀁VxÑth!􀀁vluhrv!􀀁\vyypqyrhà􀀁`mlmxh~pà􀀁wxp"
shkhsh􀀁rvvxlpupxvjhuuÑm􀀁{ypspà􀀁y􀀁zmt!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁wvtmÅhzÖ􀀁rxÑtyrpt􀀁zhzhxht􀀁vztmÄhzÖ􀀁
jhnuÑm􀀁lsà􀀁up}􀀁yviÑzpà!􀀁h􀀁zhrnm􀀁wxmwàzyzj{mz􀀁wxvjmlmupá􀀁tmxvwxpàzpq!􀀁rvzvxÑm􀀁jym􀀁
nm􀀁wxvjvlàzyà􀀁jvwxmrp􀀁p}􀀁{ypspàt#
$"􀀁 Pn􀀁kmn􀀁c􀀁􀀂C`jikm[pcw
*#􀀁 &-􀀁thà􀀁J􀀁kvlvjÇpuh􀀁]{xk{uh􀀁􀀂Rmwvxzh~pp 􀀁J􀀁jhnumqÅhà􀀁lhzh􀀁r{sÖz{x"
uvkv􀀁rhsmulhxà􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh!􀀁lhzh􀀁uhÄhsh􀀁wxvjmlmuuvq􀀁Uvyp|vt􀀁]zhsp"
uÑt􀀁thyyvjvq􀀁lmwvxzh~pp􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁y􀀁wvs{vyzxvjh#􀀁]􀀁 &..%􀀁wv􀀁'%&(􀀁kk#􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁
zhzhxÑ􀀁wxvjvlpsp􀀁j􀀁]pt|mxvwvsm􀀁thyyvjÑm􀀁tpzpukp􀀁uh􀀁wsvÇhlp􀀁pt#􀀁Wmupuh!􀀁klm􀀁yvip"
xhsvyÖ􀀁lv􀀁*%􀀁zÑyàÄ􀀁Ämsvjmr#􀀁Vxvtm􀀁zvkv!􀀁y􀀁'%%,􀀁wv􀀁'%&(􀀁kk#!􀀁jmÄmxvt􀀁 &,􀀁thà􀀁VxÑtyrvzh"
zhxyrpq􀀁tvsvlmnuÑq􀀁~muzx􀀁vxkhupovjÑjhs􀀁zxh{xuvm􀀁tmxvwxpàzpm"xmrjpmt􀀁HThnkp􀀁vkv"
umr􀀁j􀀁yjvmt􀀁ymxl~mI!􀀁j􀀁rvzvxvt􀀁wxpupthsv􀀁{Ähyzpm􀀁vz􀀁(􀀁lv􀀁,􀀁zÑyàÄ􀀁Ämsvjmr􀀁xhouÑ}
%
CTeH IO OTHOIIeHHO K KDIMCKOTaTapCKOMy HapOIy H JIHHHO IIOJIBCDFaICH TaKOH JIHCKpHMHHaIIHH,
HeKOTODIe IIDOHBJIeHH TaKOH JIHCKDHMHHaIUHH OIIHCIBaOTCH HHKe B HaCTORIIeM
3aBIeHHH. H He CMOr BepHyTC B KpIM. Kora HaxoUHC B Kee, 29 9HBap
2014 rota cynpyra coo6ua Me H3 KpIMa, HTO B OTHOIIIeHHH MCH H IIDyTHX KOOpHHaTopoB
KoMTeTa nIO 3aIIIHTe IIpaB KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HapOIIa OKKyIIaIUHOHHaH BIaCT OTKpLIa
yTOJOBHIe JIeJ1a 11O 4 CTaTEN yK Pd, B HaCToutee BpeM IIpOJIOJTKaO MOO a1BOKaTCKyIO
H IIpaBO3aIIIHTHyIO JICHTCIHOCT B KHeBe, BO3TJIaBJIHH HeIIpaBHTCJICTBeHHy 0pFaHH3aHO
«KpIMCKOTaTapCKHf peCypCH5If IteHTp».
A. JcKpMaI B OTHOIIIeHHH y,JI»Ty DHIX MepOIIpHTHH pIMCHX TaTap
4. MapIIH JIpyrHe KyJITyDHMe MepOIIpHHTHH, IIOCBHIIICHHIe O3HaMCHOBaHHO
TOJIOBIIIHH, HMCOIIIHX 6OJIIIIOe 3HaCHHe JUI KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HapOIa, BJLHOTC BaKHEIM
aCIIeKTOM HaIIIe yHHKTHO HIICHTH'HKaIIHH KaK OIHOTO H3 KODCHHEIX HapOJ1OB
KpwMcKorO oyOCTpoa. Ilocne oKKyaLHH KpIMa, OJIHaKO, PoccicKas benepat npJaraI
a KOOpJUHHHDOBaHHIC yCHJTH C TeM, TO6I IIOMeIIIaT KpIMcKHM TaTapaM oTMeaTE
BaKHIC JUIH HHX CO6ITH, a TaKKe IIDCIIHTCTByCT IIpOBCICHHIO MCDOIIpHTH, KOTOpIe Bce
Ke IIDOBOLHTCH BOIIDCKH HX yCHJIHM.
1. Cypry (lenopranus)
5. 18Ma roouHHa CypryHa (/[enOpTraIM) BaKHe~II1a JIaTa Ky.JI6TypHOTO
KaIeHIap KpIMcKoTaTapeKor o Hap0,Ia, IaTa Haan1a pOBeIeHHO HocpoM CTa1HEIM
MaCCOBOf IIeIIOpTaIIHH KDIMCKHX TaTap C IIOIyOCTpOBa. C 1990 10 2013 TT. KpIMCKHe
TaTapbI IpoBO/UH.H B CMpeponone MaccoBre MHTHHTH Ha LoIaIH HM. JleHHHa, Te CO6Hpaocs
p10 50 Tic enoBeK. KpoMe TOTO, c 2007 no 2013 rr., BeepoM I7 Ma KpMCKOTaTapCKHf
MOJIOJICKHEI IIeHTp 0pFaHH3OB5IBaI TpaypHOe MepOIIpHTHe-DeKBHeM «3aKrH OroHeK
B CBOeM CepJIIe», B KOTODOM IIpHHHMaIO yHaCTHe OT 3 J0 7 TEICH HeIOBeK pa3HMX
2
uh~pvuhsÖuvyzmq#􀀁fzv􀀁zxh{xuvm􀀁tmxvwxpàzpm􀀁wxvjvlpsvyÖ􀀁j􀀁zvt􀀁nm􀀁tmyzm!􀀁klm􀀁wxvjv"
lpsyà􀀁thyyvjÑq􀀁tpzpuk􀀁uh􀀁ysml{áÇpq􀀁lmuÖ􀀁J􀀁uh􀀁wsvÇhlp􀀁Wmupuh􀀁j􀀁hltpupyzxhzpj"
uvt􀀁~muzxm􀀁]pt|mxvwvsà􀀁J􀀁p􀀁ÄhyzpÄuv􀀁|puhuypxvjhsvyÖ􀀁po􀀁xmyw{isprhuyrvkv􀀁iál"
nmzh#􀀁 fzv􀀁jymklh􀀁iÑsv􀀁tpxuvm􀀁tmxvwxpàzpm!􀀁uprvklh􀀁um􀀁yvwxvjvnlhjÅmmyà􀀁uprhrptp􀀁
ys{Ähàtp􀀁uhypspà#
+#􀀁 [vwÑzrp􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁vztmzpzÖ􀀁 &,􀀁thà􀀁j􀀁'%&)􀀁kvl{􀀁zhr􀀁nm!􀀁rhr􀀁vup􀀁vz"
tmÄhsp􀀁mkv􀀁xhuÖÅm!􀀁iÑsp􀀁yvxjhuÑ􀀁yvjtmyzuÑtp􀀁{ypspàtp􀀁xvyypqyrp}􀀁vrr{wh~pvuuÑ}􀀁
jshyzmq􀀁p􀀁jvmupopxvjhuuÑ}􀀁|vxtpxvjhupq!􀀁uh}vlàÇp}yà􀀁wvl􀀁p}􀀁rvuzxvsmt#􀀁Vhr􀀁
zvsÖrv􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁zhzhxÑ􀀁uhÄhsp􀀁wxpiÑjhzÖ􀀁uh􀀁wsvÇhlÖ􀀁Wmupuh!􀀁vup􀀁viuhx{npsp!􀀁Äzv􀀁
rvuzxvspx{mtÑm􀀁\`􀀁tmyzuÑm􀀁jshyzp􀀁vkvxvlpsp􀀁Üz{􀀁wsvÇhlÖ􀀁ohivxvt#􀀁Yh􀀁{sp~h}􀀁wv"
àjpspyÖ􀀁ixvumzxhuywvxzmxÑ#􀀁Zup􀀁molpsp􀀁wv􀀁wmxptmzx{􀀁wsvÇhlp!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁um􀀁w{yrhzÖ􀀁uh􀀁
umm􀀁sálmq#􀀁Qx{wwÑ􀀁zhr􀀁uhoÑjhmtÑ}􀀁HomsmuÑ}􀀁ÄmsvjmÄrvjI􀀁p􀀁ypsÑ􀀁yhtvvivxvuÑ􀀁whzx{"
spxvjhsp􀀁xhqvu#
,#􀀁 ^hrvm􀀁ivsÖÅvm􀀁p􀀁uhjvlàÇmm􀀁yzxh}􀀁wxpy{zyzjpm􀀁jvmuuÑ}􀀁p􀀁jvmupopxvjhu"
uÑ}􀀁yps􀀁um􀀁vyzhjsàsv􀀁yvtumupq􀀁j􀀁zvt!􀀁Äzv􀀁wxp􀀁sáivq􀀁wvwÑzrm􀀁wxvjmyzp􀀁whtàzuvm􀀁tm"
xvwxpàzpm􀀁uh􀀁Üzvt􀀁tmyzm􀀁tÑ􀀁wvljmxkspyÖ􀀁iÑ􀀁uhypspá#􀀁[vÜzvt{􀀁à􀀁wxpojhs􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁
zhzhx􀀁yvixhzÖyà􀀁j􀀁lx{kvt􀀁tmyzm􀀁p􀀁wxvjmyzp􀀁tpzpuk"xmrjpmt􀀁HThnkp􀀁vkvumr􀀁j􀀁yjvmt􀀁
ymxl~mI􀀁j􀀁npsvt􀀁xhqvum􀀁Nr"XmÄmzÖ!􀀁klm􀀁rvtwhrzuv􀀁wxvnpjház􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁zhzhxÑ!􀀁
ÄzviÑ􀀁wxvjmyzp􀀁hr~pá"xmrjpmt􀀁HThnkp􀀁vkvumr􀀁j􀀁yjvmt􀀁ymxl~mI#
􀀂
HaIHOHaIHOCTei. TO TpaypHOe MepOnpHTHe IpoBOIUHIOC B TOM Ke MeCTe, TIe IpOBOIUHJICH
MaCCOBIf MHTHHT Ha CIeIyOLIH eHE Ha nIoaIH JleHHa B aJIMHHHCTpaTHBHOM
IIeHTpe CHMpepOnOJ M aCTHo pHHaHCHpoBa1OC H3 DCCIIy6JIHKaHCKOTO 60JIKeTa.
TO BCeTIa 6ELIO MHDHOe MCDOIIpHHTHe, HHKOTJIa He COIIDOBOJIaBIII€OCH HHKaKHMH
CIyHaMH HaCHIMH.
6. IlonITKH KpIMCKHX TaTap OTMeTHTE, I7 Ma 2014 TOI1y TaK Ke, KaK OHH OTMean
erO paHBIIIe, 6LIH COpBHI COBMeCTHIMH yCHIHHMH DOCCHHCKHX OKKyIIaIUHOHH5IX
BJIaCTeH H BOCHH3HDOBaHHIX dOpMHDOBaHHH, HaXO/UHIIUHXCH IIOII HX KOHTpOeM. Kax
TOJI»KO KpIMcKHe TaTapI HaaTH I1pH6IBaT Ha noILaI JleHHHa, OHH O6HapyKHIH, TO
KOHTpOIHpyeMMe Pb MecTHie BacTH oropouHH Ty Lola/I 3a60poM. Ha yutax noBHHc
poHeTpaHcOpTepI. OHM e3/HM no epHMeTpy Iota/UH, TO6I He I1yCKaT Ha
Hee Jef. I pyII TaK Ha3IBaCMIX «3CI&HIX HCJIOBeHKOB» H CH1I CaMO060p0HI nIaTpyJHpOBaIH
pafOH.
7 TaKoe 6OIOe HaBOJUHIIIee CTpaX IIpHCyTCTBHe BOCHHIX H BOCHH3HpOBaHHIX
CHI He OCTaBIIO COMHeHHi B TOM, TO npH JO6Of OIIITKe pOBecTH aMTHOe MepOIpHTHe
Ha TOM MeCTe MI IIOIBCDTJIHC 6I HaCHJIHO. HOT0My IIpH3BI KpIMCKHX
TaTap CO6paTC B JIDyTOM MeCTe H IIDOBeCTH MHTHHT-DCKBHeM «aKTH OTOHeK B CBOeM
CepIte» B KHOM paOHe AK-MeeT, TIIe KOMIIaKTHO IIDOKHBaOT KpIMcKHe TaTapI,
TO6I IIDOBOCTH aKIUHIO-DCKBHeM «3aKTH OTOHeK B cBOeM cepIIe».
3
U MY
CSWS(􀀁DVOJMIJU􀀁;EUMJG!􀀁 #'􀀁QE`􀀁$"#&􀀁HSIE!􀀁>MOUSUENSR􀀁=OQJZJW^􀀂􀀁
XP!􀀁 ?LJRFE[􀀁RE􀀁TPS\EIOJ􀀁TJUJI􀀁QJZJW^_!
-#􀀁 V􀀁yvnhsmupá!􀀁'%&)􀀁kvl􀀁iÑs􀀁wvysmlupt!􀀁rvklh􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁zhzhxÑ􀀁ytvksp􀀁
wxvjmyzp􀀁hr~pá"xmrjpmt􀀁HThnkp􀀁vkvumr􀀁j􀀁yjvmt􀀁ymxl~mI#􀀁[vyzvàuuÑt􀀁vxkhupohzvxvt􀀁
Üzvkv􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà􀀁iÑs􀀁VxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpq􀀁tvsvlmnuÑq􀀁~muzx#􀀁P􀀁wvysml{áÇpm􀀁kvlÑ􀀁
VxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpt􀀁tvsvlmnuÑt􀀁~muzxvt􀀁wvlhjhspyÖ􀀁{jmlvtsmupà􀀁v􀀁wxvjmlmupp􀀁vi"
ÇmyzjmuuÑ}􀀁tmxvwxpàzpq#􀀁Zrr{wh~pvuuÑm􀀁jshyzp!􀀁vluhrv!􀀁um􀀁xhoxmÅhsp􀀁wxvjvlpzÖ􀀁
tpzpuk􀀁uh􀀁wsvÇhlp􀀁Wmupuh!􀀁uv􀀁wxp􀀁Üzvt􀀁wxmlshkhsp􀀁wxvjvlpzÖ􀀁Üzv􀀁tmxvwxpàzpm􀀁wvl􀀁
xvyypqyrptp􀀁|shkhtp!􀀁j􀀁rvzvxvt􀀁sálp􀀁um􀀁}vzmsp􀀁{ÄhyzjvjhzÖ#􀀁 &,􀀁thà􀀁'%&-􀀁kvlh􀀁j􀀁]pt"
|mxvwvsm!􀀁j􀀁tprxvxhqvum􀀁Nr"XmÄmzÖ!􀀁ypsvjprp􀀁ohlmxnhsp􀀁vrvsv􀀁'%􀀁tvsvlÑ}􀀁rxÑt"
yrp}􀀁zhzhx!􀀁wxvjvlpjÅp}􀀁hr~pá"xmrjpmt􀀁HThnkp􀀁vkvumr􀀁j􀀁yjvmt􀀁ymxl~mI#
%"􀀁 K`a_nh[ki_htd􀀁_`hu􀀁jk[]􀀁q`fi]`e[
.#􀀁 Rv􀀁umwxhjvtmxuvq􀀁vrr{wh~pp􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsp􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁
mnmkvluv􀀁yvipxhspyÖ􀀁 &%􀀁lmrhixà􀀁uh􀀁wsvÇhlp􀀁Wmupuh!􀀁vztmÄhà􀀁Xmnl{uhxvluÑq􀀁lmuÖ􀀁
wxhj􀀁Ämsvjmrh􀀁p􀀁wvlÄmxrpjhà􀀁wxp􀀁Üzvt􀀁umvi}vlptvyzÖ􀀁ohÇpzÑ􀀁uhÅp}􀀁wxhj#􀀁Rsà􀀁rxÑt"
yrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁Üzvz􀀁lmuÖ􀀁jhnmu#􀀁YhÅm􀀁uh~pvuhsÖuvm􀀁ljpnmupm􀀁ivxvsvyÖ􀀁oh􀀁jvy"
yzhuvjsmupm􀀁wvspzpÄmyrp}􀀁p􀀁rvssmrzpjuÑ}􀀁wxhj􀀁uh􀀁wxvzànmupp􀀁ymtplmyàzp􀀁smz􀀁p􀀁wvxv"
'
bomo: ceoep bapuea. 17 Mas 2014 2ooa. Muxpopaiou AMeems,
y. Ge6au a nouaoe nepeo eem6io
8. KCOKaIeHH0, 2014 1OJ1 6LI IIOCJICIHHM, KOT JI KDIMCKHe TaTapI CMOT JIH
IIpoBeCTH aKIUHO-peKBHeM «arH OroHeK B cBOeM epIe». HOCTOHHBIM OpFaHH3aTOpOM
TOTO MCDOIIpHHTH 6ELI KpIMCKOTaTaDCKHf MOJIOICKHI IICHTp. B IIOCIeJIYOIIIHe TOIL
KpIMCKOTaTapCKHM MOJIOJICKHIM IICHTDOM IIOJIaBTHC yBCJIOMJICHH O IIDOBCJICHHH 06IIIeCTBCHHIX
MCDOIIDHHTHH. OKKyIIaIIHOHHI BJIaCTH, OJUHaKO, He pa3DCIIIaIH IIpOBOJIHT
MHTHHT Ha IIJIOIIIaJI JleHHHa, HO IIDH TOM IIpCIUIaTaIH IIpOBOUHT TO MepOIIpHHTHe I1OJ
pOCCH~CKHMH pJaraM, B KOTODOM JIOJIH He XOTeJIH yaCTBOBaT. 17 Ma 2018 TO1a B CHMpeponone,
B MHKpOpaHoHe AK-MeeT, CHIOBHKH 3aICDKZIH OKOJ1IO 20 MOIOIIX KDIMCKHX
TaTAD, IIDOBOJUHBIIHX aKLUHO-peKBHeM «ar OrOHeK B cBOeM cepJIIe»
2. MeaayHapourii pen» pan eoBeKa
9. lo HenpaBoMepof oKKynaHH npeICTaBHTeJIM KpIMcKoTaTapKOro Hap0Ia
exeropHo co6panics I0 pea6p Ha noaIH JleHa, oTMeas MeKIyHapoJHtf JeH
npaB eOBeKa H IIOJUHepKHBaH IIDH TOM HOO6XOJIHMOCT 3IIIHTI HaIIIMX I1paB. /U1 Kp5IMCKOTaTapCKOTO
HapOJI TOT JI€HE BaKeH. Hae HaIOHaJHOe JIBHKeHHe 60pOIOC 3a BOCCTaHOBICHHe
IIOJIHTHCCKHX M KOJLICKTHBHIX IDB Ha IIDOTKCHHH CCMHJIeCHTH JIeT M I1OpO4
lpsv􀀁wsmàl{􀀁yvjmzyrp}􀀁lpyyplmuzvj!􀀁wmxmnpjÅp}􀀁záxÖtÑ!􀀁wyp}phzxpÄmyrpm􀀁smÄmi"
up~Ñ􀀁p􀀁wxpu{lpzmsÖu{á􀀁yyÑsr{#􀀁ZztmÄhà􀀁RmuÖ􀀁wxhj􀀁Ämsvjmrh!􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁zhzhxÑ􀀁jywv"
tpuhsp􀀁lpyyplmuzvj!􀀁wvllmxnpjháÇp}􀀁p}􀀁ivxÖi{􀀁p􀀁wxpoÑjhjÅp}􀀁r􀀁jvyyzhuvjsmupá􀀁
wvspzpÄmyrp}􀀁wxhj􀀁uhxvlh#
CSWS(􀀁5711!360􀀂􀀁 #"􀀁IJOEFU`􀀁$"#%􀀁HSIE􀀂􀀁TPS\EI^􀀁=JRMRE􀀂􀀁H!􀀁BMQYJUSTSP^
&%#􀀁 [xplmxnpjhàyÖ􀀁Üzvq􀀁zxhlp~pp!􀀁'-􀀁uvàixà􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh􀀁Vvtpzmz􀀁wv􀀁ohÇpzm􀀁
wxhj􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁vixhzpsyà􀀁j􀀁pywvsupzmsÖuÑq􀀁rvtpzmz􀀁]pt|mxvwvsÖ"
yrvkv􀀁kvxvlyrvkv􀀁yvjmzh􀀁y􀀁{jmlvtsmupmt􀀁v􀀁wxvjmlmupp􀀁 &%􀀁lmrhixà􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh􀀁tmxvwxpà"
zpq!􀀁wvyjàÇmuuÑ}􀀁Xmnl{uhxvluvt{􀀁luá􀀁wxhj􀀁Ämsvjmrh!􀀁j􀀁zvt􀀁Äpysm􀀁rvur{xyh􀀁lmzyrp}􀀁
xpy{urvj􀀁uh􀀁hy|hsÖzm􀀁uh􀀁zmt{/􀀁HVxÑt􀀁" 􀀁tvà􀀁\vlpuhI􀀁y􀀁 &'#%%􀀁lv􀀁 &)#%%􀀁p􀀁|vzvjÑyzhjrp􀀁
uh􀀁zmt{􀀁H[xhjvohÇpzuhà􀀁lmàzmsÖuvyzÖ􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uh~pvuhsÖuvkv􀀁ljpnmupàI􀀁y􀀁
&'#%%􀀁lv􀀁 &*#%%􀀁uh􀀁{s#􀀁]mxkmmjh"bmuyrvkv􀀁uhwxvzpj􀀁olhupà􀀁Rvth􀀁wxv|yváovj#􀀁[shupxv"
jhshyÖ􀀁zhrnm􀀁wxmyy"rvu|mxmu~pà􀀁uh􀀁zmt{􀀁H[xhjh􀀁Ämsvjmrh􀀁j􀀁VxÑt{/􀀁wxvismth􀀁p􀀁wmx"
ywmrzpjhI􀀁j􀀁hrzvjvt􀀁ohsm􀀁Rvth􀀁wxv|yváovj#
&&#􀀁 '􀀁lmrhixà􀀁tÑ􀀁wvs{Äpsp􀀁vzjmz􀀁vz􀀁pywvsupzmsÖuvkv􀀁rvtpzmzh􀀁]pt|mxv"
wvsÖyrvkv􀀁kvxvlyrvkv􀀁yvjmzh!􀀁yvlmxnhjÅpq􀀁vzrho􀀁j􀀁wxmlvyzhjsmupp􀀁xhoxmÅmupà􀀁uh􀀁wxv"
jmlmupm􀀁tmxvwxpàzpq#􀀁g􀀁wxmlyzhjps􀀁Üzv􀀁wpyÖtv􀀁uh􀀁xhyytvzxmupm􀀁]{lh􀀁jtmyzm􀀁y􀀁lx{kvq􀀁
vyzhjÅmqyà􀀁j􀀁uhÅmt􀀁xhywvxànmupp􀀁rvxxmywvulmu~pmq!􀀁rvzvxvq􀀁tÑ􀀁vitmupjhspyÖ􀀁y
(
JUHJIO IIJICJIy COBeTCKHX IHCCHJICHTOB, IICDCKHBIIIMX TOp6MI, nICHXHaTpHecKHe JeeHHIII
H IIDHHyJUHTeJIHyO CCL1Ky. OMea J[es npas enoBeKa, KpIMcKHe TaTapM BCI1OMHHZIH
JIHCCHIICHTOB, IIOJUICDKHBaIOIIIHX HX 6OpLy M IIDH3IBBIIIHX K BOCCTaHOBIeHHO
oHTHecKHX IpaB Hap0Ia.
bomo: qtmm.org, I0 0exa6pa 2013 ooa, nouao Jleua, e. Cuupepono
10. IIpHIIepKHBaHCE TO TpaJUHIUHM, 28 1H06p» 2014 roa KoMHTeT no 3au1HTe
IIpaB KDIMCKOTaTapCKOTO HapOJIa O6paTHJICH B MCIIOIHHTeIHI KoMHTeT CHMpepononcKorO
TOpOICKOro coBeTa ¢ yBeIOMIeHHeM o npoBeeHHM I0 peKa6p 2014 rop1a MeponpTH,
IIOCBHIIICHHIX MeKJIyHapOIHOMy JIHIO IIpaB HCIOBCKa, B TOM HHCJIe KOHKyDCa JICTCKHX
pcyKo Ha acpare Ha TeMy: «KpIM --Mo Popa» c 12.00 710 14.00 M pOTOBEICTaBKH
Ha TeMy «IlpaBO3aIHTHa IeTeIHOCT KDIMCKOTaTapDCKOT O HaLIHOHaIHOTO JIBHKCHH» C
12.00 710 15.00 a yn1. CepreeBa-I[ecKOro HanpoTrHB 3/1a9 JI0Ma npodcoo3oB. ILawpoBaa
TaKKe pecc-KoHpepetu Ha reMy «Ilpana enoBeKa B KpMy: npoOIeMa H nepCnIeKTHBa
» B aKTOBoM 3a1e /[oMa n1pop€oo3oB.
I1. 2IeKa6p MI IIOJIyHHJIH OTBeT OT HCIIOJIHHTeJIHOTO KoMHTeTa CHMpepoOJCKOrO
TOpOIcKOro coBeTa, COIepKaBIIM 0TKa3 B npeIocTaBeHHH pa3peIeHH Ha I1pOBeteHHe
MeponpHT. H pencTaBH To HMO Ha paCCMOTpeHHe Cypa BMecTe c IpyrOf
OCTaBIIIeHCH B HaIICM DaCIIODWKeHHH KODDeCIIOHJICHLIHeH, KOTOpO MI O6MeHHBaIHC C
5
jshyzàtp􀀁j􀀁yjàop􀀁y􀀁wxholuvjhupmt􀀁Xmnl{uhxvluvkv􀀁luà􀀁wxhj􀀁Ämsvjmrh&#􀀁P􀀁rhÄmyzjm􀀁
v|p~phsÖuvq􀀁wxpÄpuÑ􀀁vzrhoh􀀁iÑsv􀀁{rhohuv!􀀁Äzv􀀁wxmlsvnmuuÑm􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà􀀁wvljmxk"
u{z􀀁vwhyuvyzp􀀁tmyzuvm􀀁uhymsmupm#􀀁P􀀁yjvmt􀀁wpyÖtm􀀁pywvsupzmsÖuÑq􀀁rvtpzmz􀀁]pt|mxv"
wvsÖyrvkv􀀁kvxvlyrvkv􀀁yvjmzh􀀁yvyshsyà􀀁uh􀀁`mlmxhsÖuÑq􀀁ohrvu􀀁ã􀀁*)"`T􀀁vz􀀁 &.􀀁páuà􀀁
'%%)􀀁k#􀀁J􀀁j􀀁Ähyzuvyzp􀀁uh􀀁w{urz􀀁(􀀁yzhzÖp􀀁,!􀀁{zjmxnlhà!􀀁Äzv􀀁àrviÑ􀀁j􀀁{jmlvtsmupp􀀁um􀀁
iÑsp􀀁{rhohuÑ􀀁rvspÄmyzjv􀀁{Ähyzuprvj􀀁p􀀁|vxth􀀁wxvjmlmupà􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà#􀀁P􀀁Üzvt􀀁wpyÖtm􀀁
yvlmxnhshyÖ􀀁zhrnm􀀁yyÑsrh􀀁uh􀀁yzhzÖá􀀁-􀀁zvkv􀀁nm􀀁ohrvuh!􀀁wxml{ythzxpjháÇ{á􀀁jvotvn"
uvyzÖ􀀁wxvjmlmupà􀀁w{ispÄuvkv􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà􀀁j􀀁sáiÑ}􀀁wxpkvluÑ}􀀁lsà􀀁~msmq􀀁Üzvkv􀀁tmxv"
wxpàzpà􀀁j􀀁tmyzh}􀀁y􀀁zmt􀀁{ysvjpmt!􀀁Äzv􀀁mkv􀀁wxvjmlmupm􀀁um􀀁yvolhmz􀀁{kxvoÑ􀀁vix{Åmupà􀀁olh"
upq􀀁p􀀁yvvx{nmupq􀀁psp􀀁puvq􀀁{kxvoÑ􀀁imovwhyuvyzp􀀁{Ähyzuprvj􀀁lhuuvkv􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà#
Vhr􀀁à􀀁{nm􀀁{wvtàu{s!􀀁j􀀁uhÅmt􀀁{jmlvtsmupp􀀁iÑsp􀀁àyuv􀀁{rhohuÑ􀀁jxmtà􀀁p􀀁|vxth􀀁wxvjmlm"
upà􀀁zxm}􀀁tmxvwxpàzpq#
&'# *􀀁lmrhixà􀀁Vvtpzmz􀀁wvlhs􀀁uvjvm􀀁{jmlvtsmupm􀀁v􀀁wxvjmlmupp􀀁uh􀀁wsvÇhlp
Wmupuh􀀁j􀀁]pt|mxvwvsm􀀁umtuvkvÄpysmuuvq􀀁lmtvuyzxh~pp􀀁wxvzmyzh􀀁wxvzpj􀀁wvwxhupà􀀁
uhÅp}􀀁kxhnlhuyrp}􀀁wxhj#􀀁Yh􀀁wxvzànmupp􀀁jym}􀀁wxmlÅmyzjvjhjÅp}􀀁smz􀀁zht􀀁wxvjvlp"
spyÖ!􀀁imo􀀁rhrp}"spiv􀀁pu~plmuzvj!􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà!􀀁wvyjàÇmuuÑm􀀁Xmnl{uhxvluvt{􀀁luá􀀁
wxhj􀀁Ämsvjmrh#'􀀁 Pshyzp􀀁vzjmzpsp􀀁wpyÖtvt􀀁vz􀀁-􀀁lmrhixà!􀀁yvlmxnhjÅpt􀀁mÇm􀀁vlpu􀀁vzrho#􀀁
P􀀁Üzvt􀀁wpyÖtm"vzrhom􀀁jshyzp􀀁{rhohsp!􀀁Äzv􀀁uh􀀁{wvtàu{zvq􀀁zmxxpzvxpp􀀁wshupxvjhsvyÖ􀀁
wxvjmlmupm􀀁wxholupÄuÑ}􀀁tmxvwxpàzpq􀀁p􀀁yjàohuuhà􀀁y􀀁uptp􀀁vxkhupoh~pvuuhà􀀁lmàzmsÖ"
uvyzÖ􀀁j􀀁wmxpvl􀀁y􀀁%&􀀁 lmrhixà􀀁'%&)􀀁k#􀀁wv􀀁%,􀀁àujhxà􀀁'%&*􀀁k#􀀁Nltpupyzxh~pà􀀁kvxvlh􀀁]pt|m"
xvwvsà􀀁wxmlsvnpsh􀀁wxvjmyzp􀀁umtuvkvÄpysmuu{á􀀁lmtvuyzxh~pá􀀁wxvzmyzh􀀁j􀀁whxrm􀀁pt#􀀁
Qhkhxpuh!􀀁jvosm􀀁yr{sÖwz{xÑ􀀁H^xp􀀁kxh~ppI#􀀁XÑ􀀁wvs{Äpsp􀀁lhuuÑq􀀁vzjmz􀀁hltpupyzxh~pp
&􀀁GV_iZ\􀀁B_]\Y[V`SYi[\Q\􀀁C\ZV`S`N􀀁IVZbS^\]\Yi_X\Q\􀀁Q\^\R_X\Q\􀀁_\PS`N􀀁m􀀁
.-&$')$%&"++􀀁C\ZV`S`a􀀁]\􀀁ANgV`S􀀁G^NP􀀁C^hZ_X\`N`N^_X\Q\􀀁FN^\RN!􀀁'􀀁RSXNO^l􀀁'%&)􀀁Q\RN􀀃􀀛􀀁
'􀀂􀀁GG^VV_YiZ\T\􀀁SC[\VZSV􀀁􀀛`S`N􀀁]\􀀁ANgV`S􀀁G^NP􀀁C^hZ_X\`N`N^_X\Q\􀀁FN^\RN􀀁m􀀁%%&$&'􀀁Ej^a􀀁Q\^\RN􀀁IVZbS"
^\]\Yl!􀀁*􀀁RSXNO^l􀀁'%&)􀀁Q\RN􀀁􀀂Nkcfia`hc`􀀁
)
􀀛􀀗􀀔􀀌􀀑
􀀛􀀗􀀗􀀌􀀑
BJIaCTHMH B CB3H c I1pa3IHOBaHHeM Mex1yHapOIHoTO UH» paB eIoBeKa'. B KaecTBe
OpHIUHaHof IpHHI OTKa3a 6LIO yKa3aHO, HTO IIpCJUIOKeHHIe MCDOIIpHHTH IOJIepTHyT
onacHocTH MecTHOe HaceeHHe. B coeM nMcMe HOIHHTe.IHI KOMHTeT CHMbepoIIOJICKOTO
TOpOICKOrO coBeTa cocac Ha De1epan1HI 3a0 N 54-03 01 19 OH
2004T. -B MaCTHOCTH Ha IIyHKT 3 CTaT 7, yTBepKJIaH, HTO KO6EI B yBCIOMJICHHH He
6LJIH yKa3aHI KOJIHHeCTBO yHaCTHHKOB M pOpMa IIpOBeIIeHHH MCDOIIpHHTHM. B TOM IIHCMe
COIIepKaIaC TaKKe CCLIKa Ha CTaTIO 8 TOTO Ke 3aKOHa, IIpCIyCMaTDHBaOIIIyIO BO3MOKHOCT
IIpOBeIeHH IIy6IHHHOTO MCDOIIDHHTH B JIO5IX IIDHTOIHIX I tee Tor0 MepOIIpHTH
B MCCTaX C TeM yCIOBHeM, TO eTO IIpOBCICHHe He CO3JIaeT yIpO3I O6pyIIIeHH 31aHHH
H COODyKeHHf HJIH MHOH yTpO3I 6e3OIIaCHOCTH yHaCTHHKOB JIHHOTO MCDOIIDHATH.
KaK yKe yIOMHyJI, B HaIIICM yBCIOMJICHHH 6LIH CHO yKa3aHI BpeM H popMa npoBeneHH
Tpex MeponpHTHi.
12. 5peKa6p KoMreT IOIaI HOBOe yBeIoMIeHHe 0 nIpOBeIeHHH Ha IOI1a/UH
JleHHHa B CHMdepOnOIe HeMHOTOHCJICHHOH JIeMOHCTpaIUHH nIpOTeCTa I1pOTHB I1OIIpaHH
HaIIHX IpaKIaHCKHX IpaB. Ha IpOTKeHHH BCeX IIpeIIIIIeCTBOBaBIIIHX JIeT TaM I1pOBOUHJHC,,
6e3 KKHX-JIH6O MHLIHJICHTOB, MCDOIIpHHTHM, IIOCBHIIIeHHIe MeKIyHapOIIHOMy IUHO
pas enoBeKa. BaCTH OTBeTHIH IIHCMOM OT 8 JI€Ka6DH, COJIepKaBIIIHM CIIIe OJUHH 0TKa3.
B TOM IIHCMe-OTKa3e BIaCTH yK3aIH, ITO Ha YIIOMHyTOH TepDHTODHH ILIaHHpOBaIOC
IIpOBCIIeHHe IIDa3JIHHHHIX MCDOIIDHHTHf H CBW3aHHaH C HHMH ODFaHH3aIIHOHHa JeTeJIEHocT
» B nepHOJ1 c 0l JeKa6p» 2014 r. no 07 3HBap» 2015 r. AMHHHcTpaIUH TOpO1a CHMpepOnOJ
IpeIUIOKHIa IIDOBCCTH HeMHOTOHHCJICHHyO JIeMOHCTDIIHIO IIpOTeCTa B IIaDKe HM.
Farapa, Bo31e CKyIIITypH «Tp rpau». MI no1yHM aHHHf oTBeT aMHHHCTpa11HH
Ile»Mo Henonrenoro KoMTeTa CHMpepOIOJICKOTO TODOIICKOTO COBOTa N9 981/24/01-66
KoMTeTy nIO 3a1urre IIpas KpmMeKoTaTa pCKOrO Hapop1a, 2 I1eKa6p 2014 ro1a (IIpnoeHHe
Ile»Mo KoMwTeTa IO Banurre II pa KpIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO Hapopa N9 o01/12 Mopy ropopa CHMpepOnon,
5 eKa6p 2014 roa (IIpnoee
6
kvxvlh􀀁]pt|mxvwvsà􀀁.􀀁lmrhixà􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh!􀀁Ämxmo􀀁ÄmzÑxm􀀁luà􀀁wvysm􀀁jx{Ämupà􀀁{jmlvtsm"
upà􀀁p􀀁tmumm􀀁Ämt􀀁oh􀀁ljhl~hzÖ􀀁ÄmzÑxm􀀁Ähyh􀀁lv􀀁wxvjmlmupà􀀁wxmlshkhmtvkv􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà#
&(# ^xhlp~pvuuv􀀁j􀀁]pt|mxvwvsm􀀁w{ispÄuÑm􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà􀀁wxhjvohÇpzuvkv􀀁p
wvspzpÄmyrvkv􀀁}hxhrzmxh􀀁wxvjvlàzyà􀀁uh􀀁wsvÇhlp􀀁Wmupuh􀀁J􀀁um􀀁zvsÖrv􀀁rxÑtyrptp􀀁zh"
zhxhtp!􀀁uv􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsàtp􀀁jym}􀀁viÇpu#􀀁[svÇhlÖ􀀁Wmupuh􀀁uh}vlpzyà􀀁uhwxvzpj􀀁olhupà􀀁
]vjmzh􀀁tpupyzxvj􀀁􀀂wxhjpzmsÖyzjv #
CSWS(􀀁@UJVV VPXKFE􀀁<U]QVOSHS􀀁UJVTXFPMOERVOSHS􀀁SWIJPJRM`􀀁<@AC􀀂
,􀀁RS`FU`􀀁$"#&􀀁HSIE
Rx{kptp􀀁zxhlp~pvuuÑtp􀀁tmyzhtp􀀁lsà􀀁wxvjmlmupà􀀁w{ispÄuÑ}􀀁wvspzpÄmyrp}􀀁p􀀁wxhjvoh"
ÇpzuÑ}􀀁tmxvwxpàzpq􀀁j􀀁kvxvlm􀀁]pt|mxvwvsÖ􀀁àjsàázyà/􀀁wsvÇhlÖ􀀁uhwxvzpj􀀁olhupà􀀁Pmx"
}vjuvkv􀀁]vjmzh􀀁VxÑth􀀁􀀂Qvy{lhxyzjmuuÑq􀀁]vjmz􀀁VxÑth !􀀁wsvÇhlÖ􀀁]vjmzyrhà􀀁xàlvt􀀁y􀀁
whtàzuprvt􀀁wxhjvohÇpzupr{􀀁[mzxv􀀁Qxpkvxmurv􀀁p􀀁wsvÇhlÖ􀀁jvosm􀀁whtàzuprh􀀁ouhtmup"
zvt{􀀁{rxhpuyrvt{􀀁wvÜz{􀀁^hxhy{􀀁dmjÄmurv#􀀁[hxr􀀁pt#􀀁Qhkhxpuh􀀁àjsàmzyà􀀁tmyzvt􀀁vzlÑ}h􀀁
npzmsmq􀀁p􀀁kvyzmq􀀁kvxvlh􀀁]pt|mxvwvsà!􀀁h􀀁um􀀁tmyzvt!􀀁jÑoÑjháÇpt􀀁rhrvq"spiv􀀁pyzvxp"
Ämyrpq􀀁psp􀀁yv~phsÖuv"wvspzpÄmyrpq􀀁xmovuhuy#􀀁Vxvtm􀀁zvkv!􀀁Üzvz􀀁whxr􀀁uh}vlpzyà􀀁lhsmrv􀀁
vz􀀁hltpupyzxhzpjuÑ}􀀁olhupq!􀀁Äzv􀀁lmshmz􀀁sáivq􀀁wxvzmyz􀀁j􀀁Üzvt􀀁tmyzm􀀁imyytÑysmuuÑt#
*
ropona CMpeponon 9 eKa6p 2014 rota, epe3 erIpe IH nOCIe BpyeHH yBeIOMIeHH
M MeHee eM 3a JIBaIIIaTE, eTIDe HaCa JIO IIDOBCICHH IIDCLIaTaeMOT O MeDOIIpHHTH.
13. Tpa(HUHOHo B CHMbeponOne ny6Hie MepOnpTH npaBO3aIHTHoro
noHTHHeCKOTO XapaKTepa IIpOBOUHTCH Ha ILIOLLaIH JleHHHa He TOJIKO KDEIMCKHMH TaTapaM,
Ho npetcTaBHTeMH BceX 06uHH. IHnoutau» JleHHHa HaxOJIHTC HaIpOTHB 31aHH
COBeTa MHHHTpOB (IpaBHTeJ1CTBO).
bomo: Ilpecc-cyo6a KpuMcoeo pecny6uxaucxoeo omeeu KI1PD,
7o6p 2014 200a
JlpyrM TpaUIHOHHIMH MeCTaMH JUI IIDOBCIICHH IIy6IHHHIX IIOJIHTHHeCKHX H 11paBO3aIUHTHIX
MepOpHTHH B rOpOIe CHMpeponon» OTC: nIOIIaI Han1pOTHB 31aHH BepxoBHorO
CoeTa KpMa (TOcyJapcTBeHIf COBeT KpIMa), ILIOIII@I» COBeTCKa p1OM c
aMTHHKOM IIDBO3aIIUHTHHKy IHeTpo I propeHKO M ILIOIIIaJIE BO3IC IIaMHTHHKa 3HaMeHHTOMy
yKpaHHCKOMy oTy Tapacy LLleBeKo. IHapK HM. FarapHHa BeTC MeCTOM OT/1IXa
KHTee TOTe TOpOIa CHMpepoOnOJ, a He MeCTOM, BEN3BIBaOIUHM KaKOf-JIM60 HCTOpHeCKH
HJIH COILHaTHO-IIOJIHTHHeCKH pe3OHaHC. KpOMe TOTO, TOT IIaDK HaXOJ[HTC JIaIeKO
OT aJIMHHHCTDaTHBHIX 3/1aHHH, ITO JIeIaeT JIOOf IIpOTeCT B TOM MeCTe 6eCCMICIeHHIM.
7
&)# .􀀁lmrhixà􀀁Vvtpzmz􀀁jx{Äps􀀁{jmlvtsmupm􀀁j􀀁zxmzpq􀀁xho!􀀁wxmlshkhà􀀁zxp􀀁lx{"
kp}􀀁tmyzh􀀁wxvjmlmupà􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà#(􀀁 Vxvtm􀀁zvkv!􀀁zxp􀀁rvvxlpuhzvxh􀀁Vvtpzmzh!􀀁
Nitmlnpz􀀁]{smqthuvj!􀀁]puhjmx􀀁VhlÑxvj􀀁p􀀁à!􀀁vixhzpspyÖ􀀁r􀀁hltpupyzxh~pp􀀁kvxvlh􀀁
]pt|mxvwvsÖ!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁yvkshyvjhzÖ􀀁tmyzv􀀁wxvjmlmupà􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà􀀁j􀀁}vlm􀀁spÄuvq􀀁
jyzxmÄp􀀁y􀀁jshyzàtp#􀀁Yht􀀁wxmlvyzhjpsp􀀁wvyzhuvjsmupm􀀁ã􀀁)*'􀀁]vjmzh􀀁tpupyzxvj􀀁\my"
w{isprp􀀁VxÑt􀀁vz􀀁&'􀀁uvàixà􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh!􀀁HZi􀀁{zjmxnlmupp􀀁wmxmÄuà􀀁tmyz􀀁lsà􀀁wxvjmlmupà􀀁
w{ispÄuÑ}􀀁tmxvwxpàzpq􀀁uh􀀁zmxxpzvxpp􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑtI!􀀁p􀀁yrhohsp􀀁uht􀀁nlhzÖ􀀁wpyÖ"
tmuuvkv􀀁vzjmzh#􀀁[vrh􀀁tÑ􀀁nlhsp􀀁vzjmzh􀀁j􀀁uh}vlpjÅmtyà􀀁umwvlhsmr{􀀁rh|m!􀀁r􀀁uht􀀁wxp"
ispopspyÖ􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsp􀀁zhr􀀁uhoÑjhmtvq􀀁wxvr{xhz{xÑ􀀁p􀀁wvsp~pp!􀀁rvzvxÑm􀀁jx{Äpsp􀀁
rhnlvt{􀀁po􀀁rvvxlpuhzvxvj􀀁v|p~phsÖuvm􀀁wxmlvyzmxmnmupm􀀁vi􀀁hltpupyzxhzpjuvq􀀁p􀀁{kv"
svjuvq􀀁vzjmzyzjmuuvyzp#􀀁P􀀁''#%%􀀁zvkv􀀁nm􀀁luà􀀁tÑ􀀁wvs{Äpsp􀀁mÇm􀀁vlpu􀀁vzjmz􀀁vz􀀁tmyzuÑ}􀀁
vxkhuvj􀀁jshyzp#)􀀁Yh􀀁Üzvz􀀁xho􀀁uht􀀁yuvjh􀀁iÑsv􀀁vzrhohuv􀀁uh􀀁zvt􀀁vyuvjhupp!􀀁Äzv􀀁uhÅm􀀁}v"
lhzhqyzjv􀀁iÑsv􀀁wvlhuv􀀁tmumm􀀁Ämt􀀁oh􀀁&􀀁 lmuÖ!􀀁Äzv􀀁y{Çmyzjmuuv􀀁tmuÖÅm􀀁 &%􀀁lumq!􀀁wxmlwp"
yhuuÑ}􀀁j􀀁lmqyzj{áÇmt􀀁uÑum􀀁j􀀁VxÑt{􀀁ohrvum􀀁v􀀁wxvjmlmupp􀀁yvixhupq#􀀁V􀀁Üzvt{􀀁jxmtmup􀀁
yzhsv􀀁àyuv!􀀁Äzv􀀁vrr{wh~pvuuÑm􀀁jshyzp􀀁xmÅpzmsÖuv􀀁uhtmxmuÑ􀀁ohwxmzpzÖ􀀁uht􀀁vztmÄhzÖ􀀁
Xmnl{uhxvluÑq􀀁lmuÖ􀀁wxhj􀀁Ämsvjmrh!􀀁umohjpyptv􀀁vz􀀁zvkv!􀀁j􀀁rhrvq􀀁iÑ􀀁|vxtm􀀁tÑ􀀁p}􀀁up􀀁
{jmlvtsàsp!􀀁p􀀁wxpjml{z􀀁j􀀁rhÄmyzjm􀀁vyuvjhupà􀀁sáivq􀀁wxmlsvk􀀁wxv~myy{hsÖuvkv􀀁ohrvuv"
lhzmsÖyzjh!􀀁rhrvq􀀁zvsÖrv􀀁ytvk{z􀀁lsà􀀁Üzvkv􀀁uhqzp#
&*# [vÜzvt{􀀁Vvtpzmz􀀁wxpuàs􀀁xmÅmupm􀀁yvojhzÖ􀀁 &%􀀁lmrhixà􀀁wxmyy"rvu|mxmu"
~pá􀀁jtmyzv􀀁lmtvuyzxh~pp!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁jÑxhopzÖ􀀁wxvzmyz􀀁wxvzpj􀀁vzrhoh􀀁jshyzmq􀀁xhoxmÅpzÖ􀀁
wxvjmlmupm􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà􀀁lsà􀀁wxholuvjhupà􀀁Xmnl{uhxvluvkv􀀁luà􀀁wxhj􀀁Ämsvjmrh#􀀁
[xmyy"rvu|mxmu~pà􀀁wxvjvlpshyÖ􀀁j􀀁wvtmÇmupp􀀁]pt|mxvwvsÖyrvkv􀀁xmkpvuhsÖuvkv
(􀀁GV_iZ\􀀁C\ZV`S`N􀀁]\􀀁ANgV`S􀀁G^NP􀀁C^hZ_X\`N`N^_X\Q\􀀁FN^\RN􀀁m􀀁%%($&'􀀁G^SR_SRN`SYk􀀁IVZ"
bS^\]\Yi_X\Q\􀀁Q\^\R_X\Q\􀀁_\PS`N!􀀁 􀀂􀀁RSXNO^l􀀁'%&)􀀁􀀂G \TS[VS􀀁 #
􀀁GV_iZ\􀀁<RZV[V_`^NdVV􀀁Q\^\RN􀀁IVZbS^\]\Yl􀀁m􀀁&'&*)$')$%&"++􀀁C\ZV`S`a􀀁]\􀀁ANgV`S􀀁G^NP􀀁
C^hZ_X\`N`N^_X\Q\􀀁FN^\RN!􀀁 􀀂􀀁RSXNO^l􀀁'%&)􀀁Q\RN􀀁􀀂G^VY\TS[VS􀀁
+
􀀛􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀑
􀀛􀀗􀀙􀀌􀀑
14. 91eKa6p KOMHTeT BpyHII yBCIOMIeHHe B TpeTHif pa3, IIpCIUIaTaH TpH JIpyTHX
MeCTa IIpOBCICHHH MepOIIpHATH.' KpoMe TOTO, TpH KoopHHaTOpa KoMHTeTa,
A6Me;pKHT CypeMaoB, CHHaBep Ka1poB M , O6paTHIHC» K aIMHHHCTpDIUHH FOpOJ1a
CHMdeponOJ, TO6I COrIaCOBaT» MeCTO IIpOBCICHHH MepOIIpHHTH B XoIe IHHof
BcTpeH c BIacTMH. Ha npenocra nocTaHOBeHHe N 452 COBeTa MHHHCTpOB Peey61HK
KpIM OT 12 1H06p 2014 TOJ1a, «O6 yTBepKICHHH IIepeHH MeCT IUIH IIpOBCICHH
Iy61HIX MepOIIpHTH Ha TCppHTOpHH PeCny61HK KpEIM», M CK3a1H HM KIIaT IIHCMeHHorO
OTBeTa. HOKa MM KIa1H oTBeTa B HaXOHBIeMc HeOaeKy Kape, K HaM I1pH6I1H3HJIHCE
IIDCICTaBHTeJIH TaK Ha3IBaeMOH IIDOKyDaTyDI H IIOJIHIIHH, KOTOpIe BpyHJIH
KaKJIOMy H3 KOOpJUHHaTOpOB OpHIUHaIHOe IIpCIIOCTepOReHHe O6 a1MHHHCTpaTHBHOH H yrOJIOBHOH
OTBOTCTBCHHOCT. B 22.00 TOTO Ke JIHH MI IIOJIyHJIH CIIIe OJIHH OTBeT OT MeCTHIX
opraoB BIacT." Ha roT pa3 HaM CH0Ba 6IO OTKa3aHo Ha TOM oHoBaHHH, TO Hae XOpara~
crBo 6Lo noJaHO MeHee eM 3a l JIeH, TO cyIeCTBeHHO MeHIe I0 pHei, npeIIHCaHHIX
B JIeHCTByIOIIIeM HIHe B KpEIMy 3aKOHe O IIDOBCICHHH CO6paHii. K ST0My BpeMeHH
CTaJIO CHO, HTO OKKyIIaIIHOHHIe BJIaCTH DCIIIHTeJIHO HaMeDCHI 3aIIpeTHT HaM OTMeHaTE
MeKIIyHapOUHI JI€HE IIpaB IeIOBCK, He3aBHCHMO OT TOTO, B KaKOH 6I dOpMe MBI HX HH
yBeIIOMJIHJIH, H IIpHBCIyT B KaHeCTBe OCHOBaHHH JIO6O IIDeIUIOT IIpOIIeCCYaTBHOTO 3aKOHOJIaTeICTBa,
KaKOf TOJIKO CMOT YT JUIH TOTO Ha{TH.
15. IloroMy KOMHTeT IIpHHHI peIeHHe CO3BaT I0 peKap npecc-xopepeIIHIO
BMeCTO JICMOHCTDaIUHH, HT06I BIpa3HT IIpOTeCT I1pOTHB 0TKa3a BacTe pa3peIIT»
IIpoBeIeHHe MepOnpT JUI Ipa3IHOBHH MeKJIyHapOJIHOTO JIH IIpaB eIOBeKa.
lpeCc-KOHpepeHI IpOBOUHIaCE B IIOMCIIICHHH CHM'epOnOJCKOTO per HOHaIHOTO
' IlesMo KoMTeTa no 3anurre II pas KpwMcKoTaTapCKOrO Hapo/a N9 o03/12 IIpencepareno CHMbepononcKoro
ropoeKoro coBeTa, 9 peKa6p 2014 (IIpunoxeHe
4 IIHcMO IMHHHCTDAIUHH TOpOJ1a CHMdepOIOJH N9 12154/24/01-66 KoMTeTy IO Barre Ilpan
KpnMeoTaTapcKorO Hapopa, 9 /eKa6p 2014 ropa (IIpnowee
8
tmlnspyh􀀁wv􀀁hlxmy{􀀁kvxvl􀀁]pt|mxvwvsÖ!􀀁{sp~h􀀁cm}vjh!􀀁'%!􀀁p􀀁à􀀁iÑs􀀁vlupt􀀁po􀀁jÑyz{whj"
Åp}#􀀁[vrh􀀁tÑ􀀁jÑyz{whsp!􀀁r􀀁zxpi{um􀀁wxpispopspyÖ􀀁rhrpm"zv􀀁umvwvouhuuÑm􀀁sp~h!􀀁vi"
spsp􀀁uhy􀀁omsmurvq􀀁p􀀁jÑimnhsp􀀁po􀀁wvtmÇmupà#􀀁fzv􀀁wxvpyÅmyzjpm􀀁Ämzrv􀀁ohxmkpyzxpxv"
jhuv􀀁jplmvohwpyÖá!􀀁rvzvx{á􀀁à􀀁wxmlyzhjps􀀁uh􀀁xhyytvzxmupm􀀁]{lh#*􀀁^mt􀀁um􀀁tmumm!􀀁tÑ􀀁
ylmshsp􀀁jym􀀁jvotvnuvm􀀁lsà􀀁zvkv!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁wxvjmyzp􀀁wxmyy"rvu|mxmu~pá􀀁zhr!􀀁rhr􀀁vuh􀀁iÑsh􀀁
ohwshupxvjhuh#􀀁XÑ􀀁jÑojhsp􀀁wvsp~pá􀀁p􀀁wvlhsp􀀁ohàjsmupm􀀁y􀀁nhsvivq􀀁uh􀀁uhumymupm􀀁uht􀀁
tvxhsÖuvkv􀀁p􀀁thzmxphsÖuvkv􀀁{Çmxih#􀀁cmxmo􀀁umrvzvxvm􀀁jxmtà􀀁tÑ􀀁wvs{Äpsp􀀁{jmlvtsm"
upm􀀁vi􀀁vzrhom􀀁j􀀁vzrxÑzpp􀀁{kvsvjuvkv􀀁wxvpojvlyzjh􀀁j􀀁yjàop􀀁y􀀁Üzpt􀀁pu~plmuzvt􀀁jjpl{􀀁
vzy{zyzjpà􀀁yvyzhjh􀀁wxmyz{wsmupà#
&" K`kijkcwmc`!􀀁jki]`_`hhi`􀀁$*􀀁wh][kw􀀁%#$(􀀁^"
&+# _ÄpzÑjhà􀀁j􀀁vyvimuuvyzp􀀁wvwÑzrp􀀁jvywxmwàzyzjvjhzÖ􀀁wxvjmlmupá􀀁wxmyy"
rvu|mxmu~pp!􀀁wvyjàÇmuuvq􀀁Xmnl{uhxvluvt{􀀁luá􀀁wxhj􀀁Ämsvjmrh!􀀁Vvtpzmz􀀁wxpuàs􀀁xm"
Åmupm􀀁wxvjmyzp􀀁 &,􀀁àujhxà􀀁'%&*􀀁kvlh􀀁66􀀁PymrxÑtyr{á􀀁Vvu|mxmu~pá!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁viy{lpzÖ􀀁
zmr{Çmm􀀁wvsvnmupm􀀁jmÇmq#􀀁XÑ􀀁~msmuhwxhjsmuuv􀀁wxvjvlpsp􀀁Üz{􀀁rvu|mxmu~pá􀀁j􀀁kvyzp"
up~m􀀁HXhxhrhulI􀀁j􀀁]pt|mxvwvsm!􀀁y􀀁rvzvxvq􀀁tÑ􀀁ohrsáÄpsp􀀁yvkshÅmupm􀀁vi􀀁hxmulm!􀀁zhr􀀁
rhr􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà􀀁zhrvkv􀀁xvlh􀀁um􀀁wvlsmnhz􀀁lmqyzjpá􀀁vkxhupÄmupq!􀀁wxml{ytvzxmuuÑ}􀀁
xvyypqyrptp􀀁ohrvuhtp􀀁v􀀁w{ispÄuÑ}􀀁tmxvwxpàzpà}#
&,# Vvklh􀀁j􀀁uhouhÄmuuÑq􀀁lmuÖ􀀁ÄsmuÑ􀀁Vvtpzmzh􀀁uhÄhsp􀀁yvipxhzÖyà􀀁j􀀁rvu|m"
xmu~"ohsm􀀁kvyzpup~Ñ!􀀁zht􀀁nm􀀁wvàjpsvyÖ􀀁ivsÖÅvm􀀁rvspÄmyzjv􀀁tmyzuÑ}􀀁wvsp~mqyrp}􀀁p􀀁
kx{wwh􀀁po􀀁(%")%􀀁tvsvlÑ}􀀁sálmq􀀁hzsmzpÄmyrvkv􀀁zmsvysvnmupà!􀀁j􀀁ywvxzpjuvq􀀁vlmnlm􀀁y􀀁
rhwáÅvuhtp#􀀁fzv􀀁iÑsh􀀁àjuhà􀀁wvwÑzrh􀀁yvxjhzÖ􀀁tmxvwxpàzpm#􀀁_wvtàu{zhà􀀁kx{wwh􀀁oh"
isvrpxvjhsh􀀁j}vl􀀁j􀀁rvu|mxmu~"ohs􀀁p􀀁ohuàsh􀀁jym􀀁yjvivluÑm􀀁tmyzh#􀀁Vvklh􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsp
!􀀁>VRS\UN]V_i􀀁RSZ\[_`^V^akgNl􀀁XNX􀀁aeN_`[VX\P􀀁ESTRa[N^\R[\Q\􀀁@[l􀀁ANgV`h􀀁G^NP􀀁LSY\PSXN􀀁
\OYVYV􀀁USYS[X\W􀀁􀀂G^VY\TS[VS􀀁
,
􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀕􀀌􀀑
MepKca no aIpecy rOpo1 CHMpeponon, ya1Hua Hex0Ba, 20, H 6LI OJIHHM H3 BIcTyTIaBIIHx.
HoKa MEI BICTyIIaIH, K TDH6yHe IIDH6IH3HIHC KaKHe-TO HeOIIO3HaHHIe JIHLIa, 06JHJIM
HaC 3CIeHKOH H BIOKaIH H3 IIOMeIIIeHH. 'TO IIpOHCIIIeCTBHe HeTKO 3apCTHCTpHpOBaHO
BHICO3aIHCIO, KOTOpyo npecTaBHI Ha paccMoTpeHe Cya. Te He MeHee, MN
CIIeIaIH BCe BO3MOKHOC JUI TOTO, HT06I I1pOBeCTH IIpeCC-KOH]epeHIUHO TaK, KaK oHa 6L1a
3aILIaH H pOBaHa. MEI BEW3BaTH IIOJIHIIHIO H IIOJIaIH 3aBIeHHe C KaIO60i Ha HaHeCeHHe HaM
MOpa1Horo MaTepHaIHOro yIepa. Hepe3 HeKOTOpOe BpeM MEI IIOIyHHJIH yBeIoMIeHHe
06 OTKa3e B OTKDITHH TOIOBHOTO IIpOH3BOJICTBa B CBH3H C THM MHIIHJICHTOM BBHJIy
OTCyTCTBHH COCTaBa IIDeCTyILJIeHH.
3. Meponpure, npoenenoe 17 9HBap 2015 r,
16, yurIBa B OCO6eHHOCTH IIOIIITKH BOCIIpeILHTCTBOBaT IpOBeIeHHO npeCCKoHpepeHI,
nocBIIteHHO MeKIIyHapOIHOMy IIHo pa eIOBeKa, KoMHTeT IpHHI peeHe
nIpOBeCTH 17 9HBap 2015 Tr01a II BceKpIMCKyIO KOHdepeIo, To6 O6cyHr
TeKyLee OIOKeHHe Beef. MI IIeIeHaIIpDaBIeHHO IIDOBOUHJIH Ty KOHpepeHIUHIO B TOCTHHHIe
«MapaKap» CMpeponone, c KoTopof Mt 3aKoHIH coraIeHHe 06 apeHJIe, TaK
KaK MepOIIpHTH TaKOTO DO/Ia He IIOJUIOKaT JICHCTBHO OITDaHHHeHHf, IIDCIyCMOTDCHHIX
DOCCHfCKHMH 3aKOHaMH O IIy6JIHHHIX MepOIIpHHTHX.
17. KOr/Ia B Ha3HaMeHHIH JICH UIeHI KOMHTeTa HaIH CO6HpaTC B KoHpepeHIt-
3a1e TOCTHHHIII, TaM Ke IIOHBHJIOCE 6OJIBIIIOe KOJIHHeCTBO MeCTHIX IIOJIHIICHCKHX H
rpynna 3 304 0 MOJIOJIIX JIOJIe aTJIeTH HCCKOTO TCIOCIOKeHHH, B CIIOpTHBHOH OJIeKIe €
Kamor1oHaMH. ro 6La BHa noIrTKa cOpBaT MepOIpTHe. YnoMHyTa pyIII1a 3a6OKHpOBaIa
BXOII B KOHpepeHII-3a1 H 3aH1a BCe CBO6OIHIe MeCTa. KOr/a IpeCTaBHTeIH
5 BHJ(eO3a11HCE JIeMOHCTDHDyOIILaAH KaK yaCTHHKOB MeKI(yHapOIHOTO IH Bau1r II pas MenoBeKa
o6HH 3eneHKOj (IpHoeHHe
9
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁yzhsp􀀁viÉàyuàzÖ􀀁umvwvouhuuÑt􀀁t{nÄpuht!􀀁wvÄmt{􀀁vup􀀁}v"
zmsp􀀁jvqzp􀀁j􀀁rvu|mxmu~"ohs!􀀁jvouprsp􀀁umyrvsÖrv􀀁umouhÄpzmsÖuÑ}􀀁rvu|sprzvj#􀀁^vklh!􀀁
ÄzviÑ􀀁poimnhzÖ􀀁wmxm}vlh􀀁r􀀁uhypspá!􀀁h􀀁zhrnm􀀁lsà􀀁zvkv!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁wvi{lpzÖ􀀁wvsp~pá􀀁jtm"
ÅhzÖyà􀀁p􀀁wxmlvyzhjpzÖ􀀁uht􀀁jvotvnuvyzÖ􀀁wxvlvsnpzÖ􀀁tmxvwxpàzpm!􀀁à􀀁wxpojhs􀀁wxpy{z"
yzj{áÇp}􀀁j􀀁ohsm􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁wvluàzÖ􀀁x{rp􀀁jjmx}!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁zhrpt􀀁vixhovt􀀁wvrhohzÖ!􀀁
Äzv􀀁Üzv􀀁um􀀁vup􀀁wxvjv~px{áz􀀁yzvsruvjmupm#􀀁[vysm􀀁zvkv!􀀁rhr􀀁{Ähyzuprp􀀁rvu|mxmu~pp􀀁
wvluàsp􀀁x{rp!􀀁à􀀁wxpojhs􀀁wvsp~pá􀀁{lhspzÖ􀀁uhx{Åpzmsmq􀀁ywvrvqyzjpà!􀀁h􀀁n{xuhspyzvj􀀁
J􀀁yupthzÖ􀀁jym􀀁uh􀀁jplmvrhtmxÑ#􀀁g􀀁wxmlyzhjps􀀁rvwpá􀀁jplmvohwpyp􀀁Üzp}􀀁yviÑzpq􀀁uh􀀁xhy"
ytvzxmupm􀀁]{lh#+
&-# Rv􀀁Üzvkv􀀁tvtmuzh􀀁wvsp~pà􀀁pkuvxpxvjhsh􀀁tvp􀀁wxpoÑjÑ􀀁{lhspzÖ􀀁po􀀁ohsh
umvwvouhuuÑ}􀀁t{nÄpu!􀀁rvzvxÑm􀀁wÑzhspyÖ􀀁jvywxmwàzyzjvjhzÖ􀀁wxvjmlmupá􀀁yvixhupà#􀀁
[vsp~pà􀀁ywvyviyzjvjhsh􀀁j}vl{􀀁Üzp}􀀁t{nÄpu􀀁j􀀁rvu|mxmu~"ohs!􀀁h􀀁wvysm􀀁Üzvkv􀀁wxvyzv􀀁vz"
rhoÑjhshyÖ􀀁jtmÅpjhzÖyà#􀀁Zup􀀁um􀀁jtmÅhspyÖ􀀁lhnm􀀁rvklh􀀁x{rvjvlpzmsÖ􀀁Üzvq􀀁kx{wwÑ􀀁􀀂j􀀁
rvzvxvt􀀁à􀀁{ouhs􀀁ljváxvluvkv􀀁ixhzh􀀁\{yshuh􀀁OhsÖimrh!􀀁jp~m"wxmtÖmxh􀀁]vjmzh􀀁tpup"
yzxvj􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑt!􀀁j􀀁uhyzvàÇmm􀀁jxmtà􀀁àjsàáÇmkvyà􀀁lmw{zhzvt􀀁Qvy{lhxyzjmuuvq􀀁
R{tÑ􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlmxh~pp 􀀁{lhxps􀀁vluvkv􀀁po􀀁{Ähyzj{áÇp}􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx#􀀁^vsÖrv􀀁
zvz􀀁|hrz!􀀁Äzv􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁zhzhxÑ􀀁wvluàsp􀀁x{rp􀀁jjmx}!􀀁wvtvk􀀁{yzxhupzÖ􀀁lj{ytÑysmuuvyzÖ􀀁
wxvpy}vlàÇmkv#􀀁[vsp~mqyrpm􀀁{ouhsp!􀀁Äzv􀀁hrzpjpyzÑ􀀁po􀀁Äpysh􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁yuptház􀀁
wxvpy}vlàÇmm􀀁jplmvrhtmxhtp􀀁p􀀁jml{z􀀁wvzvrvj{á􀀁zxhuysà~pá!􀀁p􀀁zvklh􀀁jÑjmsp􀀁Üzp}􀀁
t{nÄpu􀀁po􀀁rvu|mxmu~"ohsh#􀀁Xum􀀁iÑsv􀀁wvuàzuv!􀀁Äzv􀀁wvsp~mqyrpm􀀁wxpy{zyzjvjhsp􀀁jvjym􀀁
um􀀁lsà􀀁zvkv!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁wvllmxnpjhzÖ􀀁viÇmyzjmuuÑq􀀁wvxàlvr#􀀁Zup􀀁wxvyzv􀀁nlhsp􀀁xmhr~pp􀀁
}vzà􀀁iÑ􀀁vluvkv􀀁psp􀀁umyrvsÖrp}􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx!􀀁{ÄhyzjvjhjÅp}􀀁j􀀁rvu|mxmu~pp!􀀁uh
+􀀁>VRS\UN]V_i􀀁RSZ\[_`^V^akgNl􀀁XNX􀀁Q\_]\RV[􀀁=N^VSP􀀁]\]^\_VY􀀁aeN_`[VX\P􀀁X\[bS^S[dVV􀀁]^\"
RSZ\[_`^V^\PN`i􀀁co􀀁ZV^[hS􀀁[NZS^S[Vl􀀁]􀀁im]`m􀀁h[􀀁jki]ie[pcv􀀁􀀂Nkcfia`hc`􀀁
􀀂
􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀌􀀑
KDEIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HaDOJIa CTaIH O6CHHT HeOIIO3HaHHIM MyKHHHaM, IIOeMy OHH XOTeIH
BOHTH B KOH]eDCHII-3a1, BO3HHKJIM HeCKOTKO He3HaHHTCIHIX KOH]IHKTOB. Torp1a,
TO6I H36CKaT IICDCXOJIa K HaCHIHIO, a TaKKe JUI TOTO, HTO6I IIO6yJIHTE IIOIHIUH BMeIIaTBC
H IpCIOCTaBHTE HaM BO3MOKHOCT IIDOIOTKHT MCDOIIpHHTHe, IIp3BAI IIpHCyTCTByIOIIIHX
B 3a1€ KpBIMCKHX TaTaD IIOJIHTE DYKH BB&DX, HTO6I TaKHM 06pa30M I1OKa3aT%,
TO TO He OHH IIpOBOIIHDyIOT CTOIKHoBeHHe. HOCe TOTO, KK yMaCTHHKH KOHpepeHLUHH
IIOUHIH pyKH, IIpH3BaT IIOJIHIUHIO YJIaUIHT HaDVIIIHTeIeH CIIOKOHCTBH, a KyYDHaIHCTOB
CHHMaT BCe Ha BHIeOKaMepM. H IIpeICTaBHI KOIHO BHIeO3aI1HCH THXx CO6ITH Ha paCcMorpee
Cypa.°
18. [lo TOrO MOMeHTa IIOIHIIHM HTHODHpOBaIa MOH I1pH3BIBI yJIa1HT H3 3a1a
HeOnO3HaHHIX MyKHHH, KOTODIe IIITaIHCE BOCIIpCILHTCTBOBaT IIDOBC,JICHHO CO6paHH.
lot CnocO6CTBOBaa BXOJIy THX MyKHH B KOH]epCHII-3a1, a IIOCJIe TOTO IIpOCTO OTKa3BIBaIaCE
BMCIIHBaTCH. OHH He BMCIIaTHC Jae Kora pyKoBOHTeI TOH TpyIII1M (B
KOTOpOM y3Ha1 IBOOpOHOrO 6para Pycnaa Ba6exa, Bue-peMepa CoBeTa MHHHcTpOB
Pecny6HKH KDIM, B HaCTOHIIIee BpeM BJHOIIICTOC IIeIIyTaTOM FOcyJapcTBeHHOi
JlyMs Pocccxo be/epaIH) yJIapHI OJIHOTO H3 yaCTByIOIIUHX KpIMCKHX TaTap. TO1KO
TOT paKT, TO KDIMCKHe TaTaDI IIOIIHJIM DyKH BBeDX, IIOMOT yCTpaHHT IIBYCMICIeHHOCT
IIpOHcxopUIeTO. IHOJMIteHCKHe y3HaIM, HTO aKTHBHCTI H3 HHCJIa KDIMCKHX TaTap CHHMaOT
IIpOHCXxOJUHIIee BHICOKaMepaMH H BCIYT IIOTOKOBYO TDHCIHIIHIO, H TOT/Ia BIBeIH THX
MyKHHH H3 KOHpepeHI-3a1a. MHe 6LIO IIOHHTHO, HTO IIOIHIIeCKHe IIDHCyTCTBOBaIH BOBce
He JUII TOTO, TO6I IIOJUICDKHBaT O6IIIeCTBCHHIH IIOpHJIOK. OHH IIDOCTO KJIaTH pCaKIIHH
XOT 6I OIIHOTO HIH HeCKOJIKHX KDBIMCKHX TaTaD, yHaCTBOBaBIIIHX B KOHbepeHIIHH, Ha
BJIeO3aIIHC IIeMOHCTDHDyOIIIAH KaK TOCIIOIUHH DapHeB IOIpOCH yaCTHHKOB KOH]eDeHIUHH IIpOIIeMOHCT9pH
pOBaT Hx MpHe HaMepeHH B oTpeT a nIpOBOKaH (Ip.oeHHe
10
wxvjvrh~pp􀀁umvwvouhuuÑ}􀀁t{nÄpu!􀀁Äzv􀀁lhsv􀀁iÑ􀀁pt􀀁wvjvl􀀁r􀀁ohlmxnhupá􀀁p􀀁hxmyz{􀀁
rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx#
B"􀀁 U`f`h[jk[]f`hhi`􀀁jk`lf`_i][hc`􀀁qf`hi]􀀁K`_afcl[
&.# P􀀁lvwvsumupm􀀁r􀀁yvolhupá􀀁wxmwàzyzjpq􀀁lsà􀀁wxholuvjhupà􀀁jhnuÑ}􀀁r{sÖ"
z{xuÑ}􀀁yviÑzpq!􀀁xvyypqyrpm􀀁vrr{wh~pvuuÑm􀀁jshyzp􀀁wxvjvlpsp􀀁zhrnm􀀁wvlxÑju{á􀀁lmà"
zmsÖuvyzÖ!􀀁uhwxhjsmuu{á􀀁uh􀀁yxÑj􀀁xhivzÑ􀀁yviyzjmuuv􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuvkv􀀁vxkhuh􀀁rxÑt"
yrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁J􀀁Xmlnspyh#
'%# Zluvq􀀁po􀀁tuvkp}􀀁xvsmq􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁j􀀁rhÄmyzjm􀀁wvlspuuvkv􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsÖ"
uvkv􀀁vxkhuh􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁àjsàshyÖ􀀁tvipspoh~pà􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁j􀀁yjàop􀀁y􀀁
jhnuÑtp􀀁lsà􀀁umkv􀀁yv~phsÖuÑtp􀀁p􀀁ÜrvuvtpÄmyrptp􀀁jvwxvyhtp!􀀁sviipxvjhupm􀀁[hxsh"
tmuzh􀀁_rxhpuÑ􀀁p􀀁tmnl{uhxvluÑ}􀀁vxkhupoh~pq􀀁vz􀀁ptmup􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh!􀀁
vrhohupm􀀁wvtvÇp􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvt{􀀁uhxvl{􀀁p􀀁{yzhuvjsmupm􀀁yjàop􀀁tmnl{􀀁uhtp􀀁p􀀁
lphywvxhtp􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx!􀀁rvzvxÑm􀀁wvrh􀀁um􀀁ytvksp􀀁jmxu{zÖyà􀀁uh􀀁yjvá􀀁xvlpu{#
'&# V{x{szhq􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁J􀀁jÑyÅpq􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuÑq􀀁vxkhu
rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx#􀀁VxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpq􀀁uhxvl􀀁wxmlyzhjsmu􀀁'*%􀀁lmsmkhzhtp􀀁V{x{szhà!􀀁po"
ixhuuÑtp􀀁uh􀀁vyuvjm􀀁viÇmkv!􀀁xhjuvkv􀀁p􀀁wxàtvkv􀀁poipxhzmsÖuvkv􀀁wxhjh􀀁w{zmt􀀁zhquvkv􀀁
kvsvyvjhupà􀀁rxÑtyrptp􀀁zhzhxhtp􀀁p􀀁Äsmuhtp􀀁p}􀀁ymtmq!􀀁umohjpyptv􀀁vz􀀁p}􀀁uh~pvuhsÖuv"
yzp#􀀁 V{x{szhq􀀁poipxhmzyà􀀁yxvrvt􀀁uh􀀁*􀀁smz#􀀁V{x{szhq􀀁xmÅhmz􀀁jym􀀁vyuvjuÑm􀀁yv~phsÖuv"􀀁
wvspzpÄmyrpm!􀀁yv~phsÖuv"ÜrvuvtpÄmyrpm!􀀁r{sÖz{xuÑm􀀁p􀀁lx{kpm􀀁jvwxvyÑ!􀀁rhyháÇpmyà􀀁
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh#􀀁V{x{szhq􀀁vwxmlmsàmz􀀁vyuvjuÑm􀀁uhwxhjsmupà􀀁p􀀁|vxtÑ􀀁lmà"
zmsÖuvyzp􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁p􀀁lx{kp}􀀁vxkhuvj􀀁V{x{szhà#
''# Xmlnspy􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁􀀂HXmlnspyI 􀀁J􀀁mlpuyzjmuuÑq􀀁wvs"
uvtvÄuÑq􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuv"pywvsupzmsÖuÑq􀀁vxkhu􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁j􀀁wm"
xpvl􀀁tmnl{􀀁ymyypàtp􀀁V{x{szhà!􀀁poipxhmtÑq􀀁V{x{szhmt#􀀁Xmlnspy􀀁poipxhmzyà􀀁V{x{s"
$$
IpOBOKaIHH HeOIIO3HaHHEIX MyKHHH, TO JI2IO 6I HM IIOBOJI K 3a1epaHHO H apeCTy
KpIMcKX TaTap.
B. Ile.aeanpas.aenoe npec.aeoBae aeon Me.Hca
19. BJIOIIOIHeHHe K CO3IaHHIO IIpeILTCTBHf IULH IIDa3IHOBaHH BaKHIX KyJIETyDHIX
CO6ITH, DOCCHHCKHe OKKyIaIIHOHHIe BIaCTH IIpOBOJIHIH TaKKe IIOIpIBHyO IeTeIHOCT,
HaIIpaBJICHHyIO Ha CpIB pa60TI CO6CTBeHHO IIDCICTaBHTCIHOTO ODTaHa KpIMcKoTaTapCKoro
Hap0Ia -MepKca.
20. Op1Ho H3 MHOrHX pone MeppKHca B KaecTBe IIOUIHHHorO peICTaBHTeHOTO
OpTaHa KDIMCKHX TaTaD HBIHJIaCE MO6HIH3aILH KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO Hap0I1a B CB3H €
BaKHBIMH JUI HOTO COLIHaIEHIMH H KOHOMHHeCKHMH BOIIpOCaMH, JI066poBaHHe IHapnaMeHTa
VKpaHHEM H MCKIIyHapOJIHIX ODTaHH3aLIHf OT HMeHH KpIMcKoTaTapCKOTO Hap0Ia,
OKa3aHHe IIOMOIIIH KDEIMCKOTaTaDCKOMy HapOJIy H yCTaHOBJICHHe CB3H MOKIIy HaMH H
JIHaCnOpaM KpIMCKHX TaTaD, KOTODBIe IIOKa He CMOTJIM BCDHyTCH Ha CBOO DOJIHHy.
2I. Kypynraif KpwMcorarapcKoro Hapoa BIcHH npeIcTaBHTeJIHIf OpraH
KpMCKHx TaTap. KpIMcKoTaTapcKH Hapot npeIcTaBeH 250 71eIeTaTaMH KypyJITa, H36pasM
Ha ocHoBe o6uerO, paBHOrO H npMoro H36HpaTeIHorO paBa IyTeM Ta~HOTO
TOJIOCOBaHHH KDIMCKHMH TaTapaMH H HJICHaMH HX CeMCH, HeaBHCHMO OT HX HaIUHOHa1HOcTH.
Kypyrrai w36paerc cpoxoM Ha 5 neT. Kypyraj peIIaeT BCe OCHOBHHe COL1Ha1HOIIOJIHTHHeCKHO,
COIUHaTBHO-KOHOMHHeCKHe, KyJITypHIe H JIpyrHe BOpOCI, KaaLHeC
KpIMcKoTaTapCKOro Hapo/Ia. Kypyrraf OnpeteJeT OCHOBHIe HaIIpaBJIeHHH popMI JIeTeHocTH
MeppKHca KpIMcKoTaTapCKOro Hap0a H pyx opraHOB KypyTa.
22, MeDKIMC KpIMeKoTaTapCKorO HapOIa («Me/pxHc») eIuHcTBeHHM n1OJIHOMO
HEIM IIDCICTaBHTeJIHO-MCIIOJIHHTeJTEHIH OpTaH KpIMCKOTaTapCKorO Hap0Ia nepHont
MeIy ceccHMH KypyTa, 36HpaeMii KypyraeM. Mepxc H36HpaeTc KypyF11
zhmt􀀁po􀀁Äpysh􀀁lmsmkhzvj􀀁V{x{szhà#􀀁Xmlnspy􀀁yvyzvpz􀀁po􀀁((􀀁Ämsvjmr#􀀁P􀀁yjvmq􀀁lmàzmsÖuv"
yzp􀀁Xmlnspy􀀁wvlÄpuàmzyà􀀁V{x{szhá!􀀁x{rvjvlyzj{mzyà􀀁mkv􀀁xmÅmupàtp!􀀁uvxthtp􀀁tmn"
l{uhxvluvkv􀀁wxhjh􀀁p􀀁ohrvuhtp􀀁_rxhpuÑ!􀀁rvzvxÑm􀀁um􀀁wxvzpjvxmÄhz􀀁Üzpt􀀁wxhjpsht#􀀁Zy"
uvjuvq􀀁~msÖá􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁àjsàmzyà􀀁{yzxhumupm􀀁wvysmlyzjpq􀀁kmuv~plh!􀀁yvjmxÅmuuvkv􀀁yv"
jmzyrpt􀀁kvy{lhxyzjvt􀀁j􀀁vzuvÅmupp􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh!􀀁jvyyzhuvjsmupm􀀁uh~pv"
uhsÖuÑ}􀀁p􀀁wvspzpÄmyrp}􀀁wxhj􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁p􀀁xmhspoh~pà􀀁mkv􀀁wxhjh􀀁uh􀀁yh"
tvvwxmlmsmupm􀀁uh􀀁yjvmq􀀁pyzvxpÄmyrvq􀀁uh~pvuhsÖuvq􀀁zmxxpzvxpp#
'(# ]{Çmyzjvjhupm􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁rhr􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsÖ"
uvkv􀀁vxkhuh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁j􀀁_rxhpum􀀁wxpouhjhsvyÖ􀀁 j􀀁yvvzjmzyzjpp􀀁y􀀁hr"
zhtp􀀁Pmx}vjuvq􀀁\hlÑ􀀁_rxhpuÑ!􀀁Vhipumzh􀀁Xpupyzxvj􀀁_rxhpuÑ􀀁p􀀁[xmoplmuzh􀀁_rxh"
puÑ!􀀁r􀀁Äpys{􀀁rvzvxÑ}􀀁vzuvyàzyà􀀁{rho􀀁[xmoplmuzh􀀁_rxhpuÑ􀀁vz􀀁 &-􀀁thà􀀁 &...􀀁ã􀀁*&-$..!􀀁
wvyzhuvjsmupà􀀁Pmx}vjuvq􀀁\hlÑ􀀁_rxhpuÑ􀀁vz􀀁',􀀁thxzh􀀁&..'􀀁ã􀀁'')%"aMM!􀀁'􀀁thxzh􀀁'%%%􀀁ã􀀁
&*('"MMM􀀁p􀀁'%􀀁thxzh􀀁'%&)􀀁ã)),*"&&&#!􀀁{rhoÑ􀀁[xmoplmuzh􀀁_rxhpuÑ􀀁vz􀀁 &)􀀁hwxmsà􀀁 &..)􀀁ã􀀁
&+*􀀁$􀀁.)!􀀁vz􀀁'(􀀁páuà􀀁'%%.􀀁ã􀀁),*$'%%.!􀀁vz􀀁&)􀀁vrzàixà􀀁'%&)􀀁ã􀀁-%.$'%&)!􀀁vz􀀁'%􀀁lmrhixà􀀁
'%&)􀀁ã􀀁.)*$'%&)!􀀁vz􀀁(&􀀁 thxzh􀀁'%&*􀀁ã􀀁 &.%$'%&*!􀀁vz􀀁(􀀁hwxmsà􀀁'%&*􀀁ã􀀁 &.*$'%&*!􀀁vz􀀁'-􀀁hw"
xmsà􀀁'%&*􀀁ã􀀁'),$'%&*!􀀁vz􀀁'(􀀁vrzàixà􀀁'%&*􀀁ã􀀁+%)$'%&*􀀁p􀀁vz􀀁 &*􀀁ymuzàixà􀀁'%&+􀀁ã􀀁
(.($'%&+0􀀁wvyzhuvjsmupà􀀁p􀀁xhywvxànmupà􀀁[xhjpzmsÖyzjh􀀁_rxhpuÑ􀀁vz􀀁&&􀀁 hjk{yzh􀀁&..*􀀁
ã􀀁+(+!􀀁vz􀀁 &-􀀁thxzh􀀁'%&*􀀁ã􀀁 &*)!􀀁vz􀀁')􀀁ymuzàixà􀀁'%&*􀀁ã􀀁,(+!􀀁vz􀀁&+􀀁thà􀀁'%&)􀀁ã􀀁)*)"x!􀀁vz􀀁
'.􀀁hwxmsà􀀁'%&*􀀁ã􀀁,),"x!􀀁vz􀀁&-􀀁|mjxhsà􀀁'%&+􀀁ã􀀁 &'("x!􀀁vz􀀁*􀀁thà􀀁'%&+􀀁ã􀀁()-"x􀀁p􀀁lx{kpm#
')# Xmlnspy􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁yzhs􀀁wvyzvàuuÑt􀀁Äsmuvt􀀁j􀀁lj{}
tmnl{uhxvluÑ}􀀁vxkhupoh~pà}/􀀁Zxkhupoh~pp􀀁umwxmlyzhjsmuuÑ}􀀁uh~pq􀀁p􀀁uhxvlvj􀀁
􀀂Ye\Z 􀀁j􀀁 &..&􀀁 kvl{􀀁p􀀁`mlmxhspyzyrvt􀀁yváom􀀁mjxvwmqyrp}􀀁uh~pvuhsÖuÑ}􀀁tmuÖÅpuyzj􀀁
􀀂\MdU 􀀁j􀀁 &..(􀀁kvl{#􀀁P􀀁 &..*􀀁kvl{􀀁Xmlnspy􀀁iÑs􀀁hrrxmlpzvjhu􀀁j􀀁Xmnymyypvuu{á􀀁xhiv"
Ä{á􀀁kx{ww{􀀁Zxkhupoh~pp􀀁ZiÉmlpumuuÑ}􀀁Yh~pq􀀁lsà􀀁xhoxhivzrp􀀁Rmrshxh~pp􀀁ZZY􀀁v􀀁
wxhjh}􀀁rvxmuuÑ}􀀁uhxvlvj􀀁􀀂d^ZX\ #􀀁]vkshyuv􀀁xmÅmupá􀀁fVZ]Z]􀀁ZZY􀀁 &..*$(&,􀀁vz
$%
TaeM H3 HCIa JIeIeTaTOB KypyITa. MeUKIMC COCTOHT H3 33 en0BeK. B cBoe pere1HOCTH
MeUKIHC IIOJIHHHeTC KypyJITaO, DyKOBOJICTByeTCH eTO pCIIICHHHMH, HODMaMH MeKIIyHapOIIHOTO
I1paBa H 3aKOHaMH YKpaHHI, KOTOpIe He I1pOTHBopeaT THM IIpaBHaM. OcHOBHOf
IeIIO Me/UKIHCa BJIHeTCH yCTpaHCHHe IIOCIeICTBH TeHOIIHIa, COBepIIICHHOTO COBeTCKHM
TOCyJIaDCTBOM B OTHOIIIeHHH KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HapOIa, BOCCTaHOBICHHe HaIIHOHa1HIX
H IIOJIHTHeCKHX I1paB KpIMCKOTaTapCKorO Hapo/Ia pea1H3a1UH ero npaBa Ha caMOOIIpCICJIeHHe
Ha CBOCH HCTODHHeCKOf HaIUHOHaTHO TeDpHTODHH.
23. CyuecrBoBaHHe Me/pKHCa KpIMCKOTaTapCKOro Hap0a KaK npeIcTaBHTe1EHOTO
OpTaHa KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HaDO/Ia B YKpaHHe IIpH3HaBZIOC B COOTBeTCTBHH C aKraM
BepxoBHo Pa1r VKpaHHI, Ka6eTa MHHHCTpOB YKpaHH Ilpe3neHTa YKpaHI,
K HHCJIy KOTOpIX OTHOCTC yKa3 IHpe3IeHTa YKpaHHI OT 18 Mas 1999 N 518/99,
IOCTaHOBIeHH BepxOBHOi Pa1I VKpaw or 27 Mapra 1992 N 2240-XII, 2 Mapra 2000 N
1532-III 20 Mapra 2014 N4475-III., yKa3 Ilpe3zewTa VKpaw or 14 anpen» 1994 N
165 /94, 01 23 1Mo» 2009 N 475/2009, 0T 14 0K116p8 2014 N 809/2014, 01 20 1ea6p
2014 N 945/2014, or 31 Mapra 2015 N 190/2015, or 3 anpen» 2015 N 195/2015, or 28 anpens
2015 N 247/2015, 0T1 23 0K186p» 2015 N 604/2015 OT I5 ceT86p» 2016 N
393/2016; nocTaHoBeHH H pacnOpwe IHpasrencrBa VKpaHM oT lH aBrycTa 1995
N 636, 01 18 Mapra 2015 N 154, 01 24 ceH16p» 2015 N 736, 01 16 Ma 2014 N 454-p, 0T
29 anpen 2015 N 747-p, 01 18 pepan 2016 N 123-p, OT 5 Ma 2016 N 348-p IpyrHe.
24. MeKIMC KDEIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HapOIa CTa IIOCTOHHHIM HIICHOM B IByX
MeKJIyHaDOJIHIX ODTaHH3aIUHX: OpraHH3aIUHH HeIIDCICTaBJICHHBIX HaILH H Hap0/1OB
(UNPO) 199] To1y H eepaHCTCKOM COO3e eBpOIIeCKHX HaIIHOHaIHIX MeHIIIHHCTB
(FUEN) B 1993 r01y. B 1995 ro1y Me/KIMC 6LI aKKpeJUHTOBaH B MececcHoyo pa6oyo
rpynny Opraw3a1 O6epueHIx Hat nu papa6om Jlexapa OOH o
npaBax KopeIx Hapo/1oB (UNDRIP). CornacHo peIeo KOCOC OOH 1995/317 or
12
'*􀀁uvàixà􀀁 &..*􀀁k#!􀀁Xmlnspy􀀁iÑs􀀁wxpouhu􀀁yv􀀁yzvxvuÑ􀀁ZZY􀀁vxkhupoh~pmq􀀁rvxmuuvkv􀀁
uhxvlh􀀁p􀀁j􀀁zhrvt􀀁rhÄmyzjm􀀁lvw{Çmu􀀁r􀀁xhivzm􀀁ZZY0􀀁yvkshyuv􀀁ywm~phsÖuvq􀀁wxv~ml{xm!􀀁
Üzv􀀁xmÅmupm􀀁wxpupthsvyÖ􀀁wv􀀁wxmljhxpzmsÖuv􀀁wvs{Ämuuvt{􀀁wpyÖtmuuvt{􀀁yvkshypá􀀁
yzxhu􀀁wxmiÑjhupà􀀁vxkhupoh~pq􀀁rvxmuuÑ}􀀁uhxvlvj􀀁􀀂zv􀀁myzÖ􀀁_rxhpuh􀀁wxmlvyzhjpsh􀀁zhrvm􀀁
yvkshypm􀀁uh􀀁lvw{yr􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁j􀀁ZZY􀀁rhr􀀁vxkhupoh~pp􀀁rvxmuuvkv􀀁uhxvlh 0􀀁\`􀀁uprvklh􀀁
um􀀁jvoxhnhsh􀀁wxvzpj􀀁lmàzmsÖuvyzp􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁j􀀁ZZY􀀁j􀀁zhrvt􀀁rhÄmyzjm#
'*# [xpouhupm􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁uhisálhmzyà􀀁zhrnm􀀁p􀀁j􀀁rxÑtyrvq􀀁smkpyshz{xm!􀀁yv"
kshyuv􀀁wvyzhuvjsmupá􀀁wvlrvuzxvsÖuvkv􀀁\`􀀁Pmx}vjuvkv􀀁]vjmzh􀀁N\V􀀁ã􀀁 &,'-"+$&)􀀁vz
&&􀀁thxzh􀀁'%&)􀀁k#!􀀁wxmlshkhjÅmkv􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvt{􀀁uhxvl{!􀀁Hj􀀁rvuzmryzm􀀁{zjmxnlmupà􀀁
uvjvq􀀁Vvuyzpz{~pp􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑtI!􀀁Hwxpouhupm􀀁vxkhuvj􀀁uh~pvuhsÖuvkv􀀁yhtv"
{wxhjsmupà􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁J􀀁V{x{szhà􀀁􀀂viÇmuh~pvuhsÖuvkv􀀁yÉmolh 􀀁
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁p􀀁vxkhuvj!􀀁rvzvxÑm􀀁vu􀀁|vxtpx{mzI#
'+# Vhr􀀁ÄhyzÖ􀀁yzxhzmkpp􀀁{yzxhÅmupà􀀁p􀀁wvwÑzvr􀀁ohyzhjpzÖ􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁oh"
tvsÄhzÖ!􀀁\vyypqyrhà􀀁`mlmxh~pà􀀁vyviv􀀁nmyzrv􀀁vixhÇhshyÖ􀀁y􀀁Äsmuhtp􀀁Xmlnspyh#􀀁Zup􀀁
viÑyrpjhsp􀀁uhÅp􀀁lvth􀀁p􀀁ohlmxnpjhsp􀀁uhy!􀀁h􀀁zhrnm􀀁Äsmuvj􀀁uhÅp}􀀁ymtmq!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁um􀀁lhzÖ􀀁
uht􀀁wxvlvsnpzÖ􀀁vxkhupovjÑjhzÖ􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpq􀀁uhxvl􀀁p􀀁kvjvxpzÖ􀀁wxhjl{􀀁v􀀁zvt!􀀁Äzv􀀁
VxÑt􀀁àjsàmzyà􀀁ÄhyzÖá􀀁_rxhpuÑ#
',# Yhwxptmx!􀀁 &+􀀁ymuzàixà􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh􀀁v|p~mxÑ􀀁_wxhjsmupà􀀁`mlmxhsÖuvq
ys{niÑ􀀁imovwhyuvyzp􀀁\vyypp􀀁jvxjhspyÖ􀀁j􀀁tvq􀀁lvt􀀁j􀀁+#(%􀀁{zxh#􀀁Zup􀀁viÑyrpjhsp􀀁tvq􀀁
lvt􀀁j􀀁zmÄmupm􀀁ÄmzÑxm}􀀁Ähyvj!􀀁{zjmxnlhà!􀀁Äzv􀀁pÇ{z􀀁vx{npm!􀀁uhxrvzprp􀀁psp􀀁ohwxmÇmu"
uÑm􀀁wxmltmzÑ􀀁p􀀁spzmxhz{x{#􀀁Ptmyzv􀀁Üzvkv􀀁vup􀀁poÉàsp􀀁wxv~myyvx􀀁tvmkv􀀁wmxyvuhsÖuvkv􀀁
uhyzvsÖuvkv􀀁rvtwÖázmxh􀀁p􀀁wvxzhzpjuÑq􀀁rvtwÖázmx!􀀁rhr􀀁{rhohuv􀀁j􀀁wxvzvrvsm􀀁viÑyrh!􀀁
rvzvxÑq􀀁à􀀁wxmlyzhjps􀀁uh􀀁xhyytvzxmupm􀀁]{lh#,􀀁P􀀁rjhxzpx{􀀁jvxjhspyÖ􀀁ÄmzÑxm􀀁Ämsvjmrh􀀁j
"􀀁G^\`\X\Y􀀁\Oh_XN!􀀁_\_`NPYS[[hW􀀁I`N^fVZ􀀁DSW`S[N[`\Z􀀁B#I#􀀁MZSYil[\PhZ!􀀁_YSR\PN`SYSZ􀀁
J]^NPYS[Vl􀀁KSRS^NYi[\W􀀁IYaTOh􀀁=SU\]N_[\_`V􀀁P􀀁HS_]aOYVXS􀀁C^hZ􀀁V􀀁Q\^\RS􀀁ISPN_`\]\YS􀀁
􀀂&+􀀁_S[`lO^l􀀁'%&)􀀁Q\RN 􀀁􀀂G^VY\TS[VS􀀁
$&
􀀛􀀜􀀙􀀌􀀑
25 1106p 1995 T., MeJUKIHC 6ELI IIpH3HaH CO CTOpOHI OOH Opra3ate KOpeHoro
Hapo/ta B TaKOM KaeCTBe IIOIIyIIIeH K pa6oTe OOH; coracHo cneaHo pOeIype,
TO pCIIICHHe IIDHHHMaIOC IIO IIDCIBaDHTeJIBHO IIOJIyCHHOMy IIHCBMCHHOMy COE JIaCHO
CTpa IpeBaHH Opraw3auf Kopetx Hapop1oB (To ecT YKpa»Ha npeOcTaBHa TaKOe
corn1ace Ha I0nyCK MeJUKIHCa B OOH aK OpTHH3aLHH KOpeHHOO HapOJ1a); Pb HKor1a
He Bo3paKa1a nIpOTHB /IeTeHocTH Me/pKHCa OOH B TaKOM KaecTBe.
25. Ip3HaHHe Me;pKJIHCa Ha6IOJIaeTCH TaKKe M B KpIMCKO erHcaType, coTJIaCHO
IIOCTaHOBJIHHIO IIOJIKOHTpOJTHOTO Pd BepxOBHOrO CoBeTa APK N 1728-6/14 0T
II Mapra 2014 T., IIpCUIaTaBIII&TO KDIMCKOTaTapCKOMy HapOIIy, «B KOHTeKCTe yTBepKICHH
HOBO KOHCTHTyIIHM PecIy6HK KpIM», «pH3HaHHe opraHOB Ha[HoHaIHorO caMOyIpaBneH
KpIMcKoTaTapCKOrO HapOa Kypy.ra (o6meauoannoro ce3/Ia)
KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOT O HapOJIa H OpraHOB, KOTOpIe OH popMpyeT»
26. KaK aCT CTpaTerH yCTpaIeH nOIITOK 3aCTaBHT KpIMcKHX TaTap 3aMo1aT,
Pocccxa epepaw oco6o ecro o6partanacs» c neHaM Me/pxHea. OHM
O66ICKHBaJIH HaIIIH JIOMa H 3a1epKHBaTH HaC, a TaKKe IeHOB HaIIHX CeMei, TO6I He JIaT
HaM IIpOIOJTKHT ODTaHH3OBIBaT KDEIMCKOTaTapCKHH HapOJI H TOBODHT IIpaBIy O TOM, TO
KpIM HBJLHeTCH HaCNIO YKpaHHI.
27. HanpMep, I6 ceHT6p» 2014 ropa opuep Y npasnens bepepan»no
CJ1yK6EI 6e3OIIaCHOCTH PocCH BOpBaIHC B MO JI0M B 6.30 y1pa. OHH OICKHBa1H Mo
JI0M B TeeHHe eTIpeX HaCOB, yTBepKIH, HTO HIIIyT OpyKHe, HapKOTHKH HM 3anIpeIIIeHHBIe
IIDCIMeTI H JIMTepaTypy. BMeCTO TOTO OHM H3IM IIDOIIeCCOD MO&TO IIeDCOHaIBHOTO
HaCTOJI»HOT O KOMITIOTCDa H IIOpTaTHBHIH KOMIIIOTeD, KaK yKa3aHO B IIpOTOKOIe O6ICKa,
KoTop peIcTaBHI Ha paccMoTpeHHe Cypa.' B KapTHpy BOpBaIHc eTIpe eOBeKa B
7 IIpoToKon1 06IcKa, cocTaBIeHH~ Crap1IM JIeirreHaTOM H.C. OMeJIHHOBMM, CIeoBaTeIeM
Vnpane depepannoi Cry6I Besonacocr Pecny6ne KpIM M opope CeacTonIOIe
(16 CeHTH6p 2014 ro/a) (IIpwoKeHHe
13
rht{|sànuvq􀀁|vxtm􀀁p􀀁ihshrshjh}!􀀁y􀀁hjzvthzhtp!􀀁rvzvxÑm􀀁uhwxhjsàsp􀀁uh􀀁tmuà!􀀁tvá􀀁
nmu{􀀁p􀀁lj{}􀀁thsmuÖrp}􀀁lmzmq􀀁􀀂yzhxÅmt{􀀁iÑsv􀀁)􀀁kvlprh!􀀁h􀀁tshlÅmt{􀀁jymkv􀀁+􀀁tmyà~mj #􀀁
Thzmt􀀁ohÅsp􀀁ljh􀀁ysmlvjhzmsà􀀁_􀀁wxhjsmupà􀀁`]O􀀁wv􀀁\myw{isprm􀀁VxÑt􀀁p􀀁k#􀀁]mjhyzvwvsÖ#􀀁
g􀀁um􀀁vrhoÑjhs􀀁yvwxvzpjsmupà!􀀁uv􀀁wvzxmivjhs􀀁wxmlvyzhjpzÖ􀀁lvr{tmuzÑ!􀀁yhur~pvupx{á"
Çpm􀀁viÑyr#􀀁Xum􀀁iÑsv􀀁wxmlyzhjsmuv􀀁vwxmlmsmupm􀀁y{lh#􀀁Thzmt􀀁à􀀁ohàjps!􀀁Äzv􀀁}vÄ{􀀁wxp"
kshypzÖ􀀁hljvrhzh!􀀁uv􀀁j􀀁{lvjsmzjvxmupp􀀁Üzvkv􀀁zxmivjhupà􀀁tum􀀁vzrhohsp#􀀁g􀀁wvwxvyps􀀁
wxpkshypzÖ􀀁wvuàzÑ}􀀁po􀀁Äpysh􀀁tvp}􀀁yvymlmq􀀁wv􀀁lvt{#􀀁Xum􀀁vzrhohsp􀀁j􀀁{lvjsmzjvxmupp􀀁p􀀁
Üzvkv􀀁zxmivjhupà!􀀁h􀀁jtmyzv􀀁Üzvkv􀀁wxpjmsp􀀁lj{}􀀁tvsvlÑ}􀀁sálmq#􀀁g􀀁ywxvyps!􀀁Äzv􀀁rvu"
rxmzuv􀀁p}􀀁puzmxmyvjhsv!􀀁p􀀁ohàjps!􀀁Äzv􀀁kvzvj􀀁pt􀀁Üzv􀀁wxmlvyzhjpzÖ#􀀁g􀀁wxmlsvnps􀀁pt􀀁
zhrnm􀀁yjvq􀀁wumjthzpÄmyrpq􀀁wpyzvsmz!􀀁uv􀀁vup􀀁vzrhohspyÖ􀀁mkv􀀁joàzÖ#􀀁Zup􀀁jym􀀁wmxmjmx"
u{sp􀀁j􀀁vluvq􀀁po􀀁rvtuhz􀀁tvmq􀀁rjhxzpxÑ#􀀁Vvklh􀀁à􀀁wvwÑzhsyà􀀁kvjvxpzÖ􀀁y􀀁nmuvq􀀁uh􀀁rxÑt"
yrvzhzhxyrvt􀀁àoÑrm!􀀁uht􀀁Üzv􀀁ohwxmzpsp#􀀁Vvklh􀀁wvojvups􀀁yzh~pvuhxuÑq􀀁zmsm|vu!􀀁vup􀀁um􀀁
xhoxmÅpsp􀀁uht􀀁yuàzÖ􀀁zx{ir{#􀀁Xum􀀁wvrhohsvyÖ!􀀁Äzv􀀁p}􀀁uhtmxmupm􀀁yvyzvàsv􀀁um􀀁j􀀁zvt!􀀁
ÄzviÑ􀀁pyrhzÖ􀀁ohwxmÇmuuÑm􀀁wxmltmzÑ!􀀁h􀀁yrvxmm!􀀁ohw{khzÖ􀀁tvá􀀁ymtÖá􀀁p!􀀁uh􀀁wxptmxm􀀁zh"
rp}􀀁viÑyrvj!􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpq􀀁uhxvl􀀁j􀀁~msvt#
'-# P􀀁zv􀀁nm􀀁jxmtà!􀀁 &+􀀁ymuzàixà􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh!􀀁yvzx{luprp􀀁`]O􀀁wxvjvlpsp􀀁viÑyr
j􀀁lvtm􀀁tvmkv􀀁rvssmkp!􀀁wxmlymlhzmsà􀀁Omsvkvxyrvkv􀀁xmkpvuhsÖuvkv􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁X{yzh|Ñ􀀁
NyhiÑ#􀀁^vklh!􀀁wv􀀁pzvkht􀀁viÑyrh􀀁iÑsv􀀁poÉàzv􀀁wàzÖ􀀁ixvÅáx/􀀁vluh􀀁J􀀁uh􀀁xmspkpvou{á􀀁zm"
thzpr{!􀀁p􀀁ÄmzÑxm􀀁J􀀁v􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvt􀀁uh~pvuhsÖuvt􀀁ljpnmupp#􀀁SÇm􀀁vlpu􀀁viÑyr􀀁j􀀁
lvtm􀀁X{yzh|Ñ􀀁NyhiÑ􀀁iÑs􀀁wxvjmlmu􀀁Ämxmo􀀁kvl!􀀁 &)􀀁hwxmsà􀀁'%&*􀀁kvlh#􀀁]psvjprp􀀁pyrhsp􀀁
thzmxphsÑ􀀁wv􀀁Hlms{􀀁'+􀀁|mjxhsàI#􀀁Pv􀀁jxmtà􀀁viÑyrh􀀁iÑsp􀀁wvlixvÅmuÑ􀀁whzxvuÑ!􀀁v􀀁Ämt􀀁à􀀁
ohàjsàs􀀁uh􀀁yjvmq􀀁yzxhup~m􀀁j􀀁`O#􀀁Thzmt􀀁Nyhi{􀀁X{yzh|{􀀁vzjmosp􀀁j􀀁]pt|mxvwvsÖ􀀁j􀀁ysml"
yzjmuuÑq􀀁rvtpzmz!􀀁wvonm􀀁mkv􀀁vzw{yzpsp#
'.# P􀀁Üzvz􀀁nm􀀁lmuÖ!􀀁 &+􀀁ymuzàixà􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh!􀀁iÑs􀀁wxvjmlmu􀀁viÑyr􀀁j􀀁olhupp
Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh#􀀁[vysm􀀁viÑyrh􀀁olhupm􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁iÑsv􀀁joàzv􀀁wvl
$'
KaMyb1KHO bOpMe H 6aaKaBax, C aBTOMaTaMH, KOTODIe HaIIDaBIHIH Ha MCHH, MOO
KeHy H IIByX MaeHKX eTe (cTapIeMy 6LIO 4 rop1HKa, a MaIeMy BceTO 6 MecuIeB).
3are 3a 1a creIoBaTe VmpaBeHH 0CE no Pecny6Ke KpIM H T. CeBacTOno1.
H He OKa3BIBI COIIDOTHBICHHH, HO IIOTDCOOBaI IIDCIOCTaBHT IOKyMCHTI, CaHKIIHOHHpyIOuHe
o6cK. MHe 6LIO npecTaBIeHO OpeIeeHHe cyIa. 3areM 3aBHI, TO XOy pHTJIaCHT
aIBOKaTa, HO B yJIOBIeTBODHHH TOTO TDeOOBaHHH MHe OTKa3aIM. H IOIIpOCHI
IIpHraCT IIOHTX H3 HCIa MOHX COCeIe IIO JIOMy. MHe OTKa3a1H B yJIOBIeTBODCHHH M
3TOTO TDeOBaHH, a BMeCTO TOTO IIpHBCIH JIByX MOIOIIX JIOIeH. H CnpOCHI, HTO KOHKDeTHO
HX HHTepeCOBaIO, H 3aBHI, HTO TOTOB HM TO IIDCIOCTaBHTE. H IpeIUIOKHJ1 HM
TaKKe CBOf IIHeBMaTHHeCKHf IIHCTOJIeT, HO OHH OTKa3a1HC eTO B3HT. OH Bce nepeepHyJJH
B OIHOH H3 KOMHaT MOCH KBapTHpI. KOr/Ia IIOIIITaICH TOBODHTE C KeHOf Ha KpIMCKOTaTapCKOM
3BIKO, HaM TO 3aIIpCTHJIH. KOr [Ia 1IO3BOHHI CTaLIHOHapHI Tee]OH, OHH He
pa3peIIH HaM CHT Tpy6Ky. MHe IIOKa3aIOC, ITO HX HaMCDCHHe COCTOJIO He B TOM,
TO6I MCKaT 3aIIpCIIIeHHIe IDCIIMeTI, a CKOpee, 3aI1yTaT MOO CeMBIO H, Ha pHMepe TaKHX
O6ICKOB, KDIMCKOTaTaDCKHf HapOJI 11eJIOM.
28. B To Ke BpeM, I6 ceH1A6p» 2014 TO1a, COTpyJHHK DC npOBOUHJIM O6LICK
B I0Me MOerO KoeTH, peIceaTe BenorOpcKorO perHoHaHOTO Me/pKMca Mycrap
ACa6I. Tora, IO HTOTaM O6ICKa OLIO H3ITO IHT OpOIIIOD: OIIHa Ha DeIHTHO3Hyo TeMaTHKy,
H HeTMD O KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOM HaI[HOH@THOM JIBHKeHHH. EI(e OIHH O6LICK B
oMe Mycrap Aca 6u1 npoBeIeH epe3 TO1, 14 a1pens 2015 TOI1a. CHIOBHKH HCKaIH
Marepant no «ten1y 26 beBpa1». Bo BpeM o6ICKa 6uH no6poeHI I1aTpOHI, o eM
3aB.1u.1 Ha cBoef cTpaHIte B DE. 3areM Aca6y Mycrady ore31H B CHMbepono B cneICTBeHHEH
KOMHTeT, IIO3Ke €TO OTIIyCTHJIH.
29. B3TOT Ke JIeHE, I6 CeHT6p» 2014 TO1a, 6LT IIpOBeIeH O6LICK B 3/1aHHH
Me/pKIHCa KpIMcKoTaTapCKOTO Hapop1a. Hoene o6sicKa 31aHHe Me/UKIHCa 66LIO B3TO I1OIL
14
hxmyz􀀁p􀀁vwmÄhzhuv#􀀁Vxvtm􀀁zvkv!􀀁iÑsp􀀁jÑjmomuÑ􀀁rvtwÖázmxÑ􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhx"
yrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁p􀀁OshkvzjvxpzmsÖuvkv􀀁`vulh􀀁HVxÑtI#
(%# Zrr{wh~pvuuÑm􀀁jshyzp􀀁{ypspsp􀀁wxmysmlvjhupm􀀁Äsmuvj􀀁Xmlnspyh!􀀁vkxh"
upÄpjhà􀀁uhÅp􀀁wmxmljpnmupà􀀁j􀀁VxÑt􀀁p􀀁po􀀁VxÑth!􀀁wxpÄmt􀀁Üyrhsh~pà􀀁lvÅsh􀀁lv􀀁zhrvq􀀁
yzmwmup!􀀁Äzv􀀁vup􀀁lhnm􀀁lmwvxzpxvjhsp􀀁umrvzvxÑ}􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrp}􀀁splmxvj􀀁po􀀁VxÑth#􀀁
[mxjÑq􀀁xho􀀁tmuà􀀁ohlmxnhsp􀀁uh􀀁kxhup~m􀀁'(􀀁pásà􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh!􀀁rvklh􀀁à􀀁jvojxhÇhsyà􀀁po􀀁
djmq~hxpp􀀁wvysm􀀁tmnl{uhxvluvq􀀁rvu|mxmu~pp􀀁Ämxmo􀀁Vpmj#􀀁 g􀀁wxvmonhs􀀁kxhup~{􀀁uh􀀁
hjzvtvipsm􀀁y􀀁zxmtà􀀁tvptp􀀁lx{oÖàtp/􀀁lmsmkhzvt􀀁V{x{szhà􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁
Xmuhuvjh􀀁]mxjmxh!􀀁Äsmu􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh!􀀁rvvxlpuhzvx􀀁Vvtpzmzh􀀁
Nitmlnpz􀀁]{smqthuvj!􀀁p􀀁rvvxlpuhzvx􀀁Vvtpzmzh􀀁]puhjmx􀀁VhlÑxvj#􀀁 Vvklh􀀁tÑ􀀁wxv"
m}hsp􀀁j􀀁VxÑt!􀀁uhy􀀁vrx{npsp􀀁-􀀁Ämsvjmr􀀁y􀀁hjzvthzhtp#􀀁Zup􀀁kx{iv􀀁vixhÇhspyÖ􀀁y􀀁uhtp!􀀁
ohwxmÇhsp􀀁uht􀀁kvjvxpzÖ􀀁uh􀀁uhÅmt􀀁xvluvt􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvt􀀁àoÑrm!􀀁viÑyrhsp􀀁th"
Åpu{!􀀁h􀀁ohzmt􀀁ohlmxnhsp􀀁p􀀁lvwxhÅpjhsp􀀁tmuà􀀁j􀀁zmÄmupm􀀁lj{}"zxm}􀀁Ähyvj#􀀁P􀀁wmxpvl􀀁
tmnl{􀀁jzvxnmupmt􀀁\vyypp􀀁j􀀁VxÑt􀀁p􀀁àujhxmt􀀁'%&*􀀁kvlh􀀁tmuà􀀁spÄuv􀀁vyzhuhjspjhsp􀀁um􀀁
tmumm􀀁(.􀀁xho!􀀁rvklh􀀁à􀀁wmxmymrhs􀀁kxhup~{􀀁tmnl{􀀁VxÑtvt􀀁p􀀁thzmxprvjvq􀀁ÄhyzÖá􀀁_rxh"
puÑ#
(&# P􀀁uvÄÖ􀀁y􀀁''􀀁uh􀀁'(􀀁àujhxà􀀁'%&*􀀁kvlh􀀁]puhjmx􀀁VhlÑxvj!􀀁Nitmlnpz􀀁]{smq"
thuvj􀀁p􀀁à􀀁iÑsp􀀁ohlmxnhuÑ􀀁wxp􀀁jÑmolm􀀁po􀀁VxÑth􀀁uh􀀁thzmxprvj{á􀀁ÄhyzÖ􀀁_rxhpuÑ#􀀁Th"
lmxnhupm􀀁wxvpovÅsv􀀁wvysm􀀁wxvjmlmupà􀀁jÑÅm{wvtàu{zvq􀀁j􀀁tvmt􀀁ohàjsmupp􀀁rvu|mxmu"
~pp􀀁&,􀀁àujhxà!􀀁rvklh􀀁tÑ􀀁uhwxhjsàspyÖ􀀁j􀀁amxyvu!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁jÑsmzmzÖ􀀁j􀀁]zhti{s􀀁lsà􀀁
uhwxhjsmupà􀀁lvr{tmuzvj􀀁[xmoplmuz{􀀁^{xm~rvq􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁p􀀁jyzxmÄp􀀁y􀀁wxmlyzhjpzm"
sàtp􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvq􀀁lphywvxÑ#􀀁Yhy􀀁ohjmsp􀀁j􀀁jhkvuÄpr!􀀁wv}vnpq􀀁uh􀀁rhtmx{#􀀁Yhy􀀁
ywxhÅpjhsp􀀁v|p~mxÑ􀀁`]O/􀀁r{lh􀀁tÑ􀀁mlmt􀀁p􀀁y􀀁rhrvq􀀁~msÖá#􀀁Thzmt􀀁tum􀀁p􀀁Nitmlnpz{􀀁]{"
smqthuvj{􀀁xhoxmÅpsp􀀁ymyzÖ􀀁j􀀁thÅpu{#􀀁Zup􀀁ohixhsp􀀁rsáÄp􀀁p􀀁ohrxÑsp􀀁uhy􀀁j􀀁thÅpum!
!
apeCT OIeaTaHo. KpOMe TOTO, 6LIH BIBe3CHM KOMIIoTepI Me/pKHCa KpMcKoTaTapCKOTO
HapOIa H BIIaTOTBOpHTCIHOTO DOH/Ia «KpIM».
30. OKKyIIaIIHOHHBIe BIaCTH yCHIMIH npecIeIoaHHe eHOB Me/pHca, oIpaHHHHBa
HaIIIH IIeDCJIBHKeHH B KpIM M H3 KpMa, pHeM CKaIaLLH IOLIa IO TaKO
CTeIIeHH, HTO OHH JIaKe JICIIOpTHDOBaTM HeKOTOpIX KDBIMCKOTaTapCKHX JJHIepOB M3 KpIMa.
lepBIH pa3 MeH 3a1€pKaIH Ha TpaHHIIe 23 M051 2014 TOI1a, KOT/Ia BO3BpaIIIaIC H3
LLlBetap nocne Me1yHapono KoHbepeu epe3 KeB. H npoe3Ka1 IpaHHIIy Ha
aBTOMOHJIe C TDCM MOHMH Ipy3MH: IIeeTaTOM KypyITa KpIMCKoTaTapCKOTO Hapo,Ia
MeanoBa Cepsepa, ne Me/pKca KpMcKoTaTapCKOTO Hap0Ia, KoopIHHaTOp KoMHTeTa
A6Me[DKHT CyJIeHMaHOB, H KOOpHHaTOp KoMHTeTa CHHaBep Ka1rpoB. Kora MI IIpOexan
B KpIM, HaC OKpyKHJ1H 8 eIOBeK C aBTOMaTaMH. OHM Tpy60 O6paIIaC» C HaMH,
3aIpeIaI HaM TOBODHTE Ha HaIICM DOJIHOM KDIMCKOTaTapCKOM 3IKe, O6ICKaH MaIIHHy,
a 3aTeM 3a1€pKaIH H JIOIIpaIIIHBaIH MeH B TeeHHe JIByX-TpeX Maco8. B IepHot
MeKIIy BTODKCHHeM POCCH B KpIM H Hape 2015 ro1a MeH HHo ocTaHaBBaH He
MeHee 39 pa3, KOT/Ia IIepCCeKaI TpaHHIIy MOKIIy KpIMOM H MaTepHKOBOf aCTEIO YKpaHHI.
31. BHoc 22 1a 23 Bap» 2015 ro1a CwaBep Kan1rpos, A6Merowr CyeMaHOB
H 6ELIM 3a/I€pKaHBI I1pH BIe3JIe H3 KpIMa Ha MaTepHKOByIO HaCTE YKpaHHM. 3aIIepKaHHe
IIDOH3OIILJIO IIOCJIe IIpOBCICHHH BIIIIeYIIOMHyTO B MOeM 3aBJICHHH KOHbepeHUH
17 sBap, KOTJIa MI HaIIDaBLJIHC B XepCOH, TO6I BELIeTeT B CTaM6yJI JUL
Han paBIeH oKyMeHTOB IHpe3eHTy TypeIxoi Pecny6x BcTpeH c npeIcTaBHTeJMH
KpIMcKoTaTapcKOH JHacop. Hac 3aBe B BaTOHHHK, I1OXOKH Ha KaMepy. Hac
cnpamsan oduep CE: Ky1a M eIeM H c KaKoH Ie1Io. areM MHe A6MepKHTy CyJIeHMaHOBy
pa3peIIH CeCT B MaIIIHHy. OHH 3a6paIH KIOHH H 3aKpBUTH HaC B MaIIIHHe,
15
zhr􀀁uhy􀀁wxvlmxnhsp􀀁vrvsv􀀁+􀀁Ähyvj#􀀁^mt􀀁jxmtmumt􀀁]puhjmxh􀀁VhlÑxvjh􀀁ohixhsp􀀁uh􀀁lv"
wxvy#􀀁Thzmt􀀁uhy􀀁vzw{yzpsp!􀀁h􀀁kvywvlpu􀀁VhlÑxvj􀀁iÑs􀀁lvyzhjsmu􀀁j􀀁y{l􀀁kvxvlh􀀁Nxtàuyr!􀀁
rvzvxÑq􀀁uhsvnps􀀁uh􀀁umkv􀀁Åzxh|􀀁p􀀁wvyzhuvjps􀀁ohwxmz􀀁uh􀀁jÉmol􀀁j􀀁VxÑt􀀁􀀂ÄhyzÖ􀀁'􀀁yzhzÖà􀀁
&-#.#!􀀁HYhx{Åmupm􀀁wxhjps􀀁wxmiÑjhupà􀀁j􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlmxh~pp􀀁puvyzxhuuÑ}􀀁kxhnlhu􀀁
p􀀁sp~􀀁imo􀀁kxhnlhuyzjhI!􀀁`mlmxhsÖuvkv􀀁ohrvuh􀀁HZ􀀁wxhjvjvt􀀁wvsvnmupp􀀁puvyzxhuuÑ}􀀁
kxhnlhu􀀁j􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlmxh~ppI#
('# Thw{kpjhupà􀀁p􀀁wxpzmyumupà􀀁umkhzpjuv􀀁vzxhopspyÖ􀀁uh􀀁tum􀀁p􀀁tvmq􀀁ymtÖm!
vyvimuuv􀀁po"oh􀀁lvwvsupzmsÖuvkv􀀁jupthupà􀀁rv􀀁tum!􀀁rhr􀀁r􀀁Äsmu{􀀁Xmlnspyh#􀀁Vvklh􀀁tum􀀁
iÑsp􀀁wxmlÉàjsmuÑ􀀁umvivyuvjhuuÑm􀀁{kvsvjuÑm􀀁vijpumupà!􀀁wxvr{xvxvt􀀁xmyw{isprp􀀁j􀀁
ysmlyzjmuuÑm􀀁vxkhuÑ􀀁iÑsv􀀁uhwxhjsmuv􀀁ÅmyzÖ􀀁thzmxphsvj􀀁lsà􀀁vxkhupoh~pp􀀁{kvsvjuvkv􀀁
wxmysmlvjhupà!􀀁wv􀀁wxpouhrht􀀁wxmyz{wsmupq!􀀁wxml{ytvzxmuuÑ}􀀁Ä#􀀁'􀀁yz#􀀁'-%#&􀀁 􀀂w{ispÄ"
uÑm􀀁wxpoÑjÑ􀀁r􀀁vy{Çmyzjsmupá􀀁lmqyzjpq!􀀁uhwxhjsmuuÑ}􀀁uh􀀁uhx{Åmupm􀀁zmxxpzvxphsÖ"
uvq􀀁~msvyzuvyzp􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlmxh~pp !􀀁Ä#􀀁'􀀁yz#􀀁'(.􀀁􀀂yvolhupm􀀁umrvttmxÄmyrvq􀀁vxkh"
upoh~pp!􀀁wvyàkháÇmq􀀁uh􀀁spÄuvyzÖ􀀁p􀀁wxhjh􀀁kxhnlhu !􀀁Ä#􀀁'􀀁yz#􀀁'-'􀀁􀀂jvoi{nlmupm􀀁umuhjp"
yzp􀀁spiv􀀁jxhnlÑ !􀀁yz#􀀁'-'#(􀀁􀀂|puhuypxvjhupm􀀁Üryzxmtpyzyrvq􀀁lmàzmsÖuvyzp !􀀁Ä#􀀁 &􀀁 yz#􀀁
'&'􀀁􀀂vxkhupoh~pà􀀁thyyvjÑ}􀀁imywvxàlrvj 􀀁_V􀀁\`#􀀁P􀀁Üzv􀀁jxmtà􀀁à􀀁uh}vlpsyà􀀁j􀀁Vpmjm􀀁p􀀁
{nm􀀁yvipxhsyà􀀁jvojxhÇhzÖyà􀀁j􀀁VxÑt􀀁y􀀁Nitmlnpzvt􀀁]{smqthuvjÑt!􀀁rvklh􀀁tum􀀁wvojv"
upsh􀀁po􀀁VxÑth􀀁nmuh􀀁p􀀁yvviÇpsh!􀀁Äzv􀀁j􀀁vzuvÅmupp􀀁uhy􀀁[xvr{xhz{xh􀀁vzrxÑsh􀀁{kvsvj"
uÑm􀀁lmsh#􀀁P􀀁wvlzjmxnlmupm􀀁yvviÇmupà􀀁tvmq􀀁y{wx{kp!􀀁à􀀁{jplms􀀁zm􀀁nm􀀁yjmlmupà􀀁uh􀀁yhqzm􀀁
wxvr{xhz{xÑ􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑt!􀀁vw{isprvjhuuÑm􀀁'.􀀁àujhxà􀀁'%&*􀀁kvlh#􀀁P􀀁Üzvz􀀁nm􀀁lmuÖ􀀁
iÑs􀀁hxmyzvjhu􀀁ohtmyzpzmsÖ􀀁wxmlymlhzmsà􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁N}zmt􀀁
cpqkvo#􀀁[vysm􀀁zvkv!􀀁rhr􀀁à􀀁ytvk􀀁vimywmÄpzÖ􀀁ymià􀀁npsÖmt􀀁j􀀁thm􀀁'%&*􀀁kvlh!􀀁tvp􀀁xvlyzjmu"
uprp􀀁wxpjmosp􀀁rv􀀁tum􀀁nmu{􀀁y􀀁lj{tà􀀁yÑuvjÖàtp#􀀁P􀀁uhyzvàÇmm􀀁jxmtà􀀁tÑ􀀁npjmt􀀁j􀀁Vpmjm!􀀁
klm􀀁à􀀁wv"wxmnumt{􀀁jÑyz{whá􀀁oh􀀁vyjvivnlmupm􀀁VxÑth􀀁p􀀁ohÇpz{􀀁wxhj􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhx"
yrvkv􀀁uhxvlh#
&+
TaK HaC IIpOIIepKa1H 0Koo 6 aco. TeM BpeMeHeM Canepa Karposa 3a6pa1 Ha opoc.
3aTeM HaC OTIIyCTHIM, a TOCIIOIHH Ka1IpOB 6LI JIOCTaBJIeH B CyJI TOpOIIa ApMHCK,
KOTOpIf HaIOKH.JI Ha Hero ITpap H nocTaHoBH.I 3apeT Ha Be3JI B KpMM (acT 2 cTaT
18.9., «HapyIeHe npaB npe~BaHH B PocccKo eepaI HHOCTpaHIX IpaKJIaH
H JIHII 6e3 TpaKJIaHCTBa», QDeIepaIHOTO 3aKOHa «O IIpaBOBOM IIOJIOKeHHH HHOCTDaHHIX
rpaxtan B PocccKoi eJepaI».
32. 3a1yrHBaHHH H IIDHTeCHCHHM HeTaTHBHO 0Tpa3HIH Ha MHe H Moe ceMe,
OCO6eHHO M3-3a JI0I1OJIHHTeTHOT O BHHMaHH KO MHe, KaK K eHy MepKHa. Kor pa MHe
6LJIH IIDCIHBIeHEI HOO6OCHOBaHHIe yTOIOBHIe OBHHeHHM, IIDOKyDODOM DCCIIy6IHKH B
CJIeICTBCHHMe OpTaHM 6IO HaIIDaBJI€HO III€CT MaTepHaIOB JUIH OpTaHH3aIHH yTOJIOBHOTO
IIpeCneIIOBaHH, IIO IIpH3HaKaM IIpeCTyI LJIeHHf, IIpeIyCMOTDeHHX • 2 CT. 280.1 (1y61MHIe
IIpH3BIBI K OCyIIICCTBIeHHIO JIeiCTBM, HaITDaBJICHHIX Ha HapyIIIeHHe TeppHTOpHa1Ho
enocrHocTH PocccKoi deepau), • 2 cr. 239 (co3aMe HeKOMMepecKo opraHH3aIHH,
IIOCATaIOIIIef Ha JHHOCT H I1paBa TpaKIaH), • 2 CT. 282 (8036y1eHHe HeHaBHCTH
JIM60 BpaKID), CT. 282,3 (pHHaHCHpoBaHe KCTpeMHCTCKOH ICHTOJIHOCTH), • I CT.
212 (0praHH3aIUHH MaCCOBIX 6eCnOpJIKo) yK P. B T0 BpeM HaxoHC B KHeBe H
yKe COHpaIC» BO3BpaIItaTBC B KpIM C A6MeIDKHTOM Cy1eMaHoB5IM, KO/Ia MHe I103BOHH1a
H3 KpIMa KeHa H COO61UH.JIa, TO B OTHOIeHH Ha¢ IHpOKypaTypa OTKpBL1a yTO1OBHIe
ea. B nOIITBepKIeHHe COO6LIeHH MOe CynIpyTH, yBHIeI Te Ke CBeIeHH Ha care
nIpoKypaTypI Pecny6K KpIM, OIIy6JIHKOBaHHie 29 1HBap» 2015 r0/1a. B TOT Ke IIeHE
6u1 apecroaH 3aMecTHTeI nIpeIceaTe Me/pKIHCa KpIMeKoTaTapCKorO Hapoa AxTeM
Hiro3. IHocne Toro, KaK cMor o6ecneHr ce6 KHeM B Mae 2015 ro1a, MOH pOncTBeHHHKH
IIpHBO3JIH KO MHe KeHy C JIByMM CIHOBMM. B HacToIIee BpeM ML KHBeM B KHee,
rte no-peKHeMy BIcTynaO 3a 0cBO6oKIeHHe KpIMa H 3auHTy paB KpIMcKoTaTap€
Kor0 Hap0Ia.
16
P"􀀁 Oillcdle[w􀀁S`_`k[pcw􀀁b[jk`s[`m􀀁K`_afcl
((# P􀀁hwxmsm􀀁'%&+􀀁kvlh􀀁rhtwhupà􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlmxh~pp􀀁wxvzpj􀀁wxmlyzhjp"
zmsÖuÑ}􀀁vxkhuvj􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁wxmzmxwmsh􀀁y{Çmyzjmuu{á􀀁Üyrhsh~pá!􀀁h􀀁ptmuuv/􀀁wxv"
r{xhz{xvq􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑt􀀁iÑsv􀀁jvoi{nlmuv􀀁{kvsvjuvm􀀁lmsv􀀁v􀀁wxpouhupp􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁Üryzxmtpyzyrvq􀀁vxkhupoh~pmq􀀁p􀀁v􀀁ohwxmzm􀀁lmàzmsÖuvyzp􀀁
Xmlnspyh􀀁rhr􀀁HviÇmyzjmuuvkv􀀁viÉmlpumupà􀀁HXmlnspy􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlhII#
()# \mÅmupmt􀀁Pmx}vjuvkv􀀁]{lh􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑt􀀁vz􀀁'+􀀁hwxmsà􀀁'%&+􀀁k#􀀁wv􀀁hl"
tpupyzxhzpjuvt{􀀁lms{􀀁ã􀀁'h"($'%&+􀀁iÑsp􀀁{lvjsmzjvxmuÑ􀀁vih􀀁ohàjsmuuÑ}􀀁wxvr{xvxvt􀀁
zxmivjhupà!􀀁rhrvjÑm􀀁à􀀁wxmlyzhjsàá􀀁uh􀀁xhyytvzxmupm􀀁]{lh#-
(*# '.􀀁ymuzàixà􀀁'%&+􀀁k#!􀀁y{lmqyrhà􀀁rvssmkpà􀀁wv􀀁hltpupyzxhzpjuÑt􀀁lmsht
Pmx}vjuvkv􀀁]{lh􀀁\`􀀁jÑumysh􀀁xmÅmupm􀀁wv􀀁hwmssà~pvuuvq􀀁nhsvim!􀀁wvlhuuvq􀀁Xmlnsp"
yvt􀀁j􀀁vzuvÅmupp􀀁xmÅmupà􀀁Pmx}vjuvkv􀀁]{lh􀀁vz􀀁'+􀀁hwxmsà􀀁'%&+􀀁k#􀀁g􀀁wxmlyzhjsàá􀀁Üzvz􀀁
lvr{tmuz􀀁uh􀀁xhyytvzxmupm􀀁]{lh􀀁jtmyzm􀀁yv􀀁yjvpt􀀁ohàjsmupmt#.#􀀁P􀀁yjvmt􀀁xmÅmupp􀀁wv􀀁
hwmssà~pvuuvq􀀁nhsvim􀀁Pmx}vjuÑq􀀁]{l􀀁\`􀀁wvyzhuvjps􀀁vyzhjpzÖ􀀁j􀀁ypsm􀀁wxpuàzvm􀀁pt􀀁
xhumm􀀁xmÅmupm􀀁p􀀁vzrhohzÖ􀀁Xmlnspy{􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁j􀀁{lvjsmzjvxmupp􀀁mkv􀀁
hwmssà~pp#
(+# fzv􀀁iÑsv􀀁hxk{tmuzpxvjhuv􀀁zmt!􀀁Äzv􀀁hwmssà~pvuuhà􀀁nhsvih􀀁um􀀁yvlmxnpz
lvjvlvj!􀀁vwxvjmxkháÇp}􀀁jÑjvlÑ􀀁y{lh􀀁wmxjvq􀀁puyzhu~pp!􀀁h􀀁zhrnm􀀁yjplmzmsÖyzj{áÇp}􀀁
v􀀁uhspÄpp􀀁vyuvjhupq􀀁lsà􀀁vztmuÑ􀀁psp􀀁potmumupà􀀁y{lmiuvkv􀀁hrzh􀀁j􀀁hwmssà~pvuuvt􀀁wv"
xàlrm#􀀁Nxk{tmuz􀀁ohÇpzÑ􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁v􀀁zvt!􀀁Äzv􀀁Xmlnspy􀀁
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁um􀀁àjsàmzyà􀀁viÇmyzjmuuvq􀀁vxkhupoh~pmq!􀀁h􀀁wxmlyzhjsàmz􀀁yv"
-􀀁@SY\􀀁m􀀁'<"($'%&+!􀀁HSfS[VS􀀁>S^c\P[\Q\􀀁IaRN􀀁HS_]aOYVXV􀀁C^hZ􀀁\`􀀁'+􀀁N]^SYl􀀁'%&+􀀁Q\RN􀀁P􀀁\`"
[\fS[VV􀀁\OTNY\PN[Vl􀀁UN]^S`N􀀁ESRTYV_N􀀁􀀂G^VY\TS[VS􀀁
#􀀁@SY\􀀁m􀀁 &',"<G?&+")!􀀁HSfS[VS􀀁>S^c\P[\Q\􀀁IaRN􀀁HS_]aOYVXV􀀁C^hZ􀀁\`􀀁'.􀀁_S[`lO^l􀀁'%&+􀀁Q\RN􀀁P􀀁
\`[\fS[VV􀀁\OTNY\PN[Vl􀀁UN]^S`N􀀁ESRTYV_N􀀁􀀂G^VY\TS[VS􀀁
$*
􀀜􀀔􀀖􀀌􀀑
􀀜􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀑
C. Poceiiea eepanu anpettaer Me1Me
33. Banpene 2016 ro1a KaMnaHH Pocccxoi enepatu npors npentcTaBHTeJIHIX
OpTaHOB KpMCKHX TaTap peTepea cyItecTBeHHyo cKa1aHo, a HMeHHO: 11pOKypaTypoi
Pecny6HK KpIM 6LIO BO36yIeHO yTOOBHoe eo 0 pH3HaHHH Me/pKHca
KDBIMCKOTaTapCKOTO HapOJIa KCTDeMHCTCKO OpTaHH3aI[He H O 3aIpeTe JIeHTeJIHOCTH
MeKIHCa KaK «O6IeCTBeHHOTO O6eIHHeHH «MeKIHC KDIMCKOTaTapCKOTO Hap0,/Ia»».
34. Perenew BepxoBoro Cypa Pecny6HK KpM or 26 am1pea 2016 r. no a1MHHHcTpaTHBHOMy
IIeIy N 2a-3/2016 6LIH yJIOBJIeTBOpeHEI 06a 3aBIeHHIX I1pOKypOpOM
Tpe6OBaHH, KaKOBMe npecTaBo Ha paccMoTpeHHe Cypa."
35. 29 CeHT6p» 2016 T., CyJIeHCKa KOJUIeTHS IIO aIMHHHCTpaTHBHIM eIaM
BepxoBHOrO Cya P mHeca peeHHe no aneLHOHHo aoGe, nOJaHHO Me;pKHCOM
B OTHOIIIeHHH DCIIIeHH BepxOBHOTO Cy/Ia or 26 anpeI 2016 r. H npeIICTaBILHIO 3TOT
IoKyMeHT Ha paccMoTpeHHe Cypa BMecTe co BOHM 3aBeHHeM.". B cBoeM peIIeHHH IO
aneJLIUoHof Kano6e BepxoBHI Cyp P nocraoBI ocTaHT B cHIe nIpHHTOe HM
paHee peIteHHe OTKa3aT Me/KJIMCy KDIMCKOTaTapCKOT O HapOJIa B YJIOBIeTBOpeHHH eTO
aneJIHILHH.
36. OTO 6LIO apIyMeHTHDOBaHO TCM, ITO aIIeJLLHIUHOHHa Ka1O6a He COIIepKHT
JIOBOJIOB, OIIpOBCpFaOIIIHX BIBO,III CyJIa IIepBOf HHCTaHIIHH, a TaKKe CBHJICTeICTByIOIIUHX
O HaIHHHH OCHOBaHHf JUI OTMeHEI HJIH H3MeHeHHM CyJIeOHOTO aKTa B aIIeJLLHIUHOHHOM I1OpIKe.
ApIyMeHT 3aIIUH TI MeIDKIHCa KDEIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HapOIa O TOM, TO MepKJIH
KpMcKoTaTapCKorO Hapo/Ia He BeTc 06eCTBeHHO 0pr aHH3aUHe, a npeICTa1eT CO8J[
en1O N9 2A-3/2016, Pemee BepxOBHOrO Cy/Ia PecIy6HK KpHM OT 26 anpen1 2016 1OJ1a B OTHomeHHH
O6aoBaHH 3anpera MeppHca (IIpunoeHHe
9 [en1o N9 127-AIII16-4, Pemee BepxOBHoro Cy/a Pecny6K KpMM OT 29 CeHTH6p 2016 rOJ1a B
orHoeHHH 06aoBaHH 3an1peTa MepunHca (IpunoeHe
17
ivq􀀁jÑyÅpq􀀁wvsuvtvÄuÑq􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuÑq􀀁vxkhu􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh!􀀁|vxtp"
x{mtÑq􀀁w{zât􀀁jÑivxvj!􀀁iÑs􀀁v}hxhrzmxpovjhu􀀁Pmx}vjuÑt􀀁]{lvt􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑt􀀁p􀀁
Pmx}vjuÑt􀀁]{lvt􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlmxh~pp􀀁rhr􀀁umyvyzvàzmsÖuÑq#􀀁RvjvlÑ􀀁ohÇpzÑ􀀁v􀀁
uhx{Åmupp􀀁ohwxmzvt􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁uvxt􀀁tmnl{uhxvluvkv􀀁
wxhjh􀀁v􀀁rvxmuuÑ}􀀁uhxvlh}􀀁p􀀁tmnl{uhxvluvkv􀀁wxhjh􀀁v􀀁wxhjh}􀀁Ämsvjmrh􀀁Pmx}vjuÑq􀀁]{l􀀁
\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑt􀀁wxvpkuvxpxvjhs!􀀁h􀀁Pmx}vjuÑq􀀁]{l􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlmxh~pp􀀁j􀀁hwmssà"
~pvuuvt􀀁vwxmlmsmupp􀀁yÄms􀀁umyvyzvàzmsÖuÑtp#
(,# Zluhrv􀀁lsà􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁p􀀁tpxvjvq􀀁viÇmyzjmuuvyzp􀀁j􀀁~m"
svt􀀁iÑsv􀀁vÄmjpluv!􀀁Äzv􀀁Üzv􀀁iÑs􀀁wxvyzv􀀁wvjvl/􀀁\vyypà􀀁}vzmsh!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁Xmlnspy􀀁iÑs􀀁oh"
rxÑz􀀁po"oh􀀁mkv􀀁jhnuvkv􀀁ouhÄmupà􀀁lsà􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh#􀀁Vxvtm􀀁zvkv!􀀁\vyypq"
yr{á􀀁`mlmxh~pá􀀁jvot{Çhs􀀁vzrho􀀁Äsmuvj􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁potmupzÖ􀀁yjvá􀀁wvop~pá!􀀁ohrsáÄh"
áÇ{áyà􀀁j􀀁zvt!􀀁Äzv􀀁VxÑt􀀁àjsàmzyà􀀁ÄhyzÖá􀀁_rxhpuÑ!􀀁p􀀁wxpoÑj􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁um􀀁{Ähyzjv"
jhzÖ􀀁j􀀁umohrvuuÑ}􀀁xm|mxmul{tm􀀁 &+􀀁thxzh􀀁'%&)􀀁kvlh􀀁p􀀁j􀀁tmyzuÑ}􀀁jÑivxh}􀀁 &)􀀁ymuzàixà􀀁
'%&)􀀁kvlh#
(-# g􀀁spÄuv􀀁wxpupths􀀁{Ähyzpm􀀁j􀀁wvwÑzrh}􀀁vztmupzÖ􀀁ohwxmz􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁Ämxmo
y{lmiu{á􀀁ypyzmt{􀀁\vyypp􀀁y􀀁zm}􀀁wvx!􀀁rhr􀀁j􀀁hwxmsm􀀁'%&,􀀁kvlh􀀁Xmnl{uhxvluÑq􀀁y{l􀀁ywxh"
jmlspjvyzp􀀁viuhxvlvjhs􀀁yjvm􀀁wvyzhuvjsmupm􀀁v􀀁jxmtmuuÑ}􀀁tmxh}#􀀁^hr!􀀁 &'􀀁pásà􀀁'%&,􀀁
kvlh􀀁à􀀁wvlhs􀀁}vlhzhqyzjv􀀁j􀀁Pmx}vjuÑq􀀁]{l􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑt􀀁v􀀁wmxmytvzxm􀀁jyz{wpj"
Åmkv􀀁j􀀁ohrvuu{á􀀁yps{􀀁y{lmiuvkv􀀁hrzh􀀁􀀂xmÅmupà􀀁Pmx}vjuvkv􀀁]{lh􀀁\myw{isprp􀀁VxÑt􀀁vz􀀁
'+􀀁hwxmsà􀀁'%&+􀀁kvlh 􀀁wv􀀁hltpupyzxhzpjuvt{􀀁lms{􀀁ã􀀁'h"($'%&+􀀁wv􀀁juvjÖ􀀁vzrxÑjÅptyà􀀁
viyzvàzmsÖyzjht#􀀁 g􀀁wxmlyzhjps􀀁uh􀀁xhyytvzxmupm􀀁]{lh􀀁rvwpá􀀁tvmkv􀀁}vlhzhqyzjh#&%􀀁 P􀀁
{lvjsmzjvxmupp􀀁tvmkv􀀁}vlhzhqyzjh􀀁iÑsv􀀁vzrhohuv0􀀁|vxthsÖuvq􀀁wxpÄpuvq􀀁vzrhoh􀀁iÑsv
&%􀀁@SY\􀀁m􀀁'<"($'%&+!􀀁<]SYYldV\[[Nl􀀁TNY\ON􀀁\`􀀁&'􀀁VkYl􀀁'%&,􀀁Q\RN􀀁P􀀁>S^c\P[hW􀀁IaR􀀁HS_]aO"
YVXV􀀁C^hZ􀀁P􀀁\`[\fS[VV􀀁\OTNY\PN[Vl􀀁UN]^S`N􀀁ESRTYV_N!􀀁N􀀁`NXTS􀀁IaRSO[\Q\􀀁]^VXNUN􀀁\O􀀁\OS_"
]SeV`SYi[hc􀀁ZS^Nc􀀁􀀂G^VY\TS[VS􀀁
&-
􀀜􀀕􀀔􀀌􀀑
6O BEICIIIM IIOJIHOMOHHBIH IIDCICTaBHTC.IHIf OpTaH KpIMCKoTaTapCKOTO Hap0,Ia, (pOpMHpyeMIf
IyTM BEI60pOB, 6LT OXapaKTepH3OBaH BepxOBHEIM Cy1OM PeCny6HK KpIM H
BepxOBHIM CyJI0M Pocccxoi eepaLH Kax HeCOCToTeIHIf. JI0BO1I 3aIIUHTH 0
HapyIeH 3anpeToM MeKIHCa KpBIMCKOTaTapCKOTO HapOIIa HOpM MeKIIyHapOIHOTO
paBa O KopeHHIX Hap0lax MeIyHapoHorO paBa 0 npaBax eoBeKa BepxoBHIf Cy
Pecny6nx KpmM poHr HopHpOBa1, a BepxoBt CyI Pocccxo enepatu B anenIUHOHHOM
OIIDCIICJIeHHH CH&JI HeCOCTOHTeJIHBIMH.
37. OJ1HaKO JUI KpIMCKOTaTapCKOTO Hap0Ia H MHpOBOf o6ueCTBeHHOCTH B IIe1OM
OLIO OeBHIHO, TO T0 6LI IpOcTO OBOE: Pocc xore1a, To6I MeppKc 6LI 3aKpIT
H3-3a €TO BaKHOTO 3HaHCHH JUIH KpMcKoTaTapCKorO Hap0Ia. KpoMe Toro, PoccirCKyIO
(De(epaI(Ho Bo3MyLIaI 0TKa3 IeHOB MeppHa H3MeHT coo no3Luo, 3aKoaOIIIyIOCH
B TOM, TO KDIM BJIHeTCH HaCTIO YKpaHHI, M I1pH3IB MeppKHca He ya€TBOBaT
B He3aKOHHHX pepepeyMe 16 Map1a 2014 TO1a H B MeCTHIX BE6OpaXx I4 ceHT6p»
2014 r021a.
38. HnHo npMa1 yacTHe B oITKaXx OTMeHHT 3anpeT MeppKIHca epe3
cype~Hyo cHcTeMy Pocc c Tex nop, KaK B anpene 2017 ropa Mex1yHapour cypt cnpaBe/
UIHBOcTH 06HapooBaI cBOe IOCTaHOBIeHHe O BpeMeHHHX MepaX. Tax, I2 HO1A 2017
rota no1an1 xo1aTafcTBO B BepxoBI Cy PeCny6HK KpIM O IIepeCMOTpe BCTyI1HBIIIeTO
B 3aKOHHyIO CHIy CyJIe6HOTO aKTa (peIIIeHH BepxOBHOTO Cy/Ia Pecny6HKH KpIM OT
26 an1pen1 2016 TO1a) IIO aIMHHHCTpaTHBHOMy IeIy N 2a-3/2016 11O BHOB OTKpBIBIIIHMC
o6cToTecTBaM. I npencraBI Ha paccMorpeHe Cypa KonH MOerO xoaTac1Ba." B
yJIOBIeTBODCHHH MOCTO XOJIaTafCTBa 6LIO OTKa3aHO; pOpMaHo pH Ho 0TKa3a 6LIO
J[en1o N 2A-3/2016, AI1eJLIHIUHOHHaH Ka1O6a OT 12 HOH 2017 rOJa B BepxoH Cyp Pecny6-
JHKH KpIM oTHoeHHH o6aoBaHH 3anpeTa Meprp.Ha, a TaKKe CyJIeOHOTO I1pHKa3a 06 06eceHTeJIHIX
Mepax (IIpunoeHHe
18
vzy{zyzjpm􀀁j􀀁wxpsvnmupp􀀁r􀀁wxvÅmupá􀀁ohjmxmuuvq􀀁rvwpp􀀁wmxmjvlh􀀁wvyzhuvjsmupà􀀁v􀀁
jxmtmuuÑ}􀀁tmxh}􀀁uh􀀁x{yyrpq􀀁àoÑr#&&􀀁 g􀀁wxmlyzhjps􀀁j􀀁Pmx}vjuÑq􀀁]{l􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlm"
xh~pp􀀁jmyÖ􀀁wvs{ÄmuuÑq􀀁tuvq􀀁rvtwsmrz􀀁lvr{tmuzvj#􀀁fzv􀀁wpyÖtv􀀁wxpshkhmzyà􀀁r􀀁tvmt{􀀁
ohàjsmupá#&'􀀁 g􀀁umlj{ytÑysmuuv􀀁{rhohs!􀀁Äzv􀀁rvtwsmrz􀀁lvr{tmuzvj􀀁yvlmxnhs􀀁wmxmjvl􀀁
wvyzhuvjsmupà􀀁v􀀁jxmtmuuÑ}􀀁tmxh}􀀁uh􀀁{rxhpuyrpq􀀁àoÑr!􀀁rvzvxÑq􀀁àjsàmzyà􀀁kvy{lhx"
yzjmuuÑt􀀁j􀀁\myw{isprm􀀁VxÑt#􀀁Zluhrv􀀁Pmx}vjuÑq􀀁]{l􀀁um􀀁vzxmhkpxvjhs#􀀁[vlviuÑm􀀁oh"
àjsmupà􀀁tÑ􀀁wvlhjhsp􀀁vz􀀁ptmup􀀁mÇm􀀁zxm}􀀁Äsmuvj􀀁Xmlnspyh#
(.# ^hrnm􀀁tuvq!􀀁vz􀀁ptmup􀀁VxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁\my{xyuvkv􀀁bmuzxh!􀀁'*􀀁thà
'%&,􀀁kvlh􀀁à􀀁uhwxhjps􀀁wpyÖtv􀀁j􀀁tpupyzmxyzjv􀀁puvyzxhuuÑ}􀀁lms􀀁\vyypqyrvq􀀁`mlmxh~pp#􀀁
P􀀁Üzvt􀀁wpyÖtm􀀁à􀀁uhwvtups􀀁v􀀁umvi}vlptvyzp􀀁imovzshkhzmsÖuvkv􀀁pywvsumupà􀀁zxmivjhupà􀀁
]{lmiuvkv􀀁wxprhoh􀀁X]􀀁ZZY􀀁p􀀁wxmlsvnps􀀁imovzshkhzmsÖuv􀀁vw{isprvjhzÖ􀀁v|p~phsÖuÑq􀀁
wmxmjvlh􀀁uh􀀁x{yyrpq􀀁àoÑr􀀁jÑÅm{wvtàu{zvkv􀀁wvyzhuvjsmupà􀀁v􀀁jxmtmuuÑ}􀀁tmxh}#􀀁Vxvtm􀀁
zvkv!􀀁à􀀁wvzxmivjhs!􀀁ÄzviÑ􀀁tpupyzmxyzjv􀀁jÑyshsv􀀁uh􀀁hlxmy􀀁VxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁\my{xy"
uvkv􀀁bmuzxh􀀁ohjmxmuuÑq􀀁j􀀁{yzhuvjsmuuvt􀀁wvxàlrm􀀁Üromtwsàx􀀁wvsuvkv􀀁zmryzh􀀁v|p~p"
hsÖuvkv􀀁wmxmjvlh􀀁uh􀀁x{yyrpq􀀁àoÑr􀀁jÑÅm{rhohuuvkv􀀁]{lmiuvkv􀀁wxprhoh􀀁X]􀀁ZZY!􀀁lsà􀀁
ohÇpzÑ􀀁wxhj􀀁wxmlyzhjpzmsÖyrp}􀀁puyzpz{zvj􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁p􀀁p}􀀁Äsmuvj􀀁j􀀁
y{lmiuÑ}!􀀁wxhjvv}xhupzmsÖuÑ}􀀁p􀀁hltpupyzxhzpjuÑ}􀀁vxkhuh}􀀁\`􀀁rhr􀀁j􀀁yhtvq􀀁\`!􀀁zhr􀀁p􀀁
oh􀀁mm􀀁wxmlmshtp#􀀁 Zluhrv􀀁xvyypqyrpm􀀁jshyzp􀀁um􀀁vzxmhkpxvjhsp􀀁uh􀀁tvp􀀁ohàjsmupà#
)%# Zluhrv􀀁uh􀀁ymkvluàÅupq􀀁lmuÖ􀀁wxml{ytvzxmuuÑm􀀁y{lmiuÑtp􀀁wxprhohtp
jxmtmuuÑm􀀁tmxÑ􀀁j􀀁vzuvÅmupp􀀁Xmlnspyh􀀁lv􀀁yp}􀀁wvx􀀁um􀀁wxvjmlmuÑ􀀁j􀀁npouÖ#
&&􀀁@SY\􀀁m􀀁'<"($'%&+!􀀁HSfS[VS􀀁>S^c\P[\Q\􀀁IaRN􀀁HS_]aOYVXV􀀁C^hZ􀀁\`􀀁'&􀀁VkYl􀀁'%&,􀀁Q\RN􀀁P􀀁\`[\"
fS[VV􀀁\OTNY\PN[Vl􀀁UN]^S`N􀀁ESRTYV_N􀀁􀀂G^VY\TS[VS􀀁
&'􀀁@SY\􀀁m􀀁'<"($'%&+!􀀁<]SYYldV\[[Nl􀀁TNY\ON􀀁]\RN[[Nl􀀁P􀀁NPQa_`S􀀁'%&,􀀁Q\RN􀀁P􀀁>S^c\P[hW􀀁IaR􀀁
HS_]aOYVXV􀀁C^hZ􀀁P􀀁\`[\fS[VV􀀁\OTNY\PN[Vl􀀁UN]^S`N􀀁ESRTYV_N!􀀁N􀀁`NXTS􀀁IaRSO[\Q\􀀁]^VXNUN􀀁\O􀀁
i\`lj`qcm`fuhto􀀁g`k[o􀀁􀀂Nkcfia`hc`􀀁
$,
􀀜􀀕􀀕􀀌􀀑
􀀜􀀕􀀖􀀌􀀑
OTCyTCTBHe B IIDHJIOKeHHH K IIDOIIIeHHIO 3aBCDCHHOH KOIIHH IIeDCBOJIa IIOCTaHOBICHH O
BpeMeHHIX MepaX Ha pyCCKHH 3m.' H npencTaBH1 B BepxoHI Cy Pocccxo enepaIHH
BeC IIOJIyHeHHIH MHOH KOMIII&KT JIOKyMCHTOB. TO IIHCMO IIDHJIaTaCTC K MOeMy
3a81eHHo.' ] eByCM6ICICHHO yKa3aI, HTO KOMILIeKT JIOKyMeHTOB co1epKaI nepeBOIL
IOCTaHOBJICHH O BDCMCHHIX MepaX Ha yKDHHCKH 3IK, KOTOpI BHeTC TOCy,IapCTBCHHIM
B Pecny6Ke KpM. OJIHaKO BepxoBH CyJI He oTpearpoBan1. Iloo6Hie 3aBJIeHH
MI IIOJIaBaIH OT HMeHH eIIIe TpeX eHOB Me;pKIHca.
39. TaKe MHO, OT MMeHH KpIMCKOTaTapCKOTO Pecypenoro IHerpa, 25 Ma
2017 rOJ1a HaIIpaBH.JI IIHCMO B MHHHCTeDCTBO HHOCTpaHHIX Ie PocccKoi eepaIH.
B TOM IHCMe HaIIOMHHJI O HCO6XOJIHMOCTH 6e3OTJITaTCJIHOTO HCIIOJIHeHH TDe6OBaHHM
CyJIeHOrO IIpHKa3a MC OOH IIpeUIOKHI1I 6e3OT1aTaTeJTHO OIIy6JIHKOBaT OpHLIHaIHii
nepeBOIa Ha pyCCKHf 3HK BIIIIeyIIOMHHyTOTO IIOCTaHOBJIeHH O BpeMeHHIX MepaX. KpoMe
Toro, nOTpe6oBa1, TO6 MHHHcTepCTBO BIcaTO Ha aIpeC KpIMCKOTaTapCKOTO PecypcHoro
IleTpa 3aBepeHHI B yCTaHOBJICHHOM IIOpHIKe K3eMIIHp IOIHOrO TeKcTa 0bHIIHaHOrO
IIepeBOIa Ha pyCCKHi 3IK BIIIeYKa3aHHOTO C yJIeOHOrO 11pHKa3a MC OOH, JUL
3aIUHTI IIDaB IIDCJICTaBHTCJICKHX HHCTHTyTOB KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOT O HaDOJI H HX II&HOB B
CyJIe6HIX, IIpaBOOXpaHHTCJIHIX H aIMHHHCTpaTHBHX OpraHax Pb ax B caMoji Pd, TaK
3a ee IpeeaM. OHaKO pOCCHCKHe BIaCTH He OTpeaTHpOBIH Ha MOH 3aBJIHHH.
40. OJ1HaKO Ha CeTOIIHHIIIHHH IIeH IIDCIyCMOTDCHHIe CYJICOHIMH I1pHKa3aMH
BDeMeHHIe MODI B OTHOIIICHHM MeUKIHCa JIO CHX IIOD He IIDOBCICHEI B KH3H.
" J[en1o N9 2A-3/2016, Peee BepxoHorO Cypa Peeny6n KpHM OT 21 Ho 2017 ro1a B OTHOme
oan1oBau 3anpera Merpnca (IIpunoee
Jleno N 2A-3/2016, AneuHoHHa Kao6a nopaHHa B aBryeTe 2017 ro1a B Bepxor Cy1
Peeny6nx KpMM B oTHoeHHH 06KaoBaHH 3anpeTa Mepuca, a TaKKe Cy/Ie6HOrO 11pHKa3a 06
o6ecnerrenIx Mepax (Ipnoene
19
)&# $ 􀀁rsàu{yÖ!􀀁Äzv􀀁jÑÅmposvnmuuvm􀀁ohàjsmupm􀀁yvvzjmzyzj{mz􀀁lmqyzjpzmsÖuv"
yzp!􀀁p!􀀁wv􀀁tmxm􀀁umvi}vlptvyzp!􀀁yvkshymu􀀁àjpzÖyà􀀁j􀀁]{l􀀁lsà􀀁lhÄp􀀁lvwvsupzmsÖuÑ}􀀁wvrh"
ohupq#
%#
41. HKLHHyC, HTO BMILICH3IOKCHHOe 32BI&HHe COOTBeTCTByCT JICHCTBHTeJIHOCTH,
H, IIO Mepe HeOOXOJIHMOCTH, COTIaCCH BHTCH B CyII IUIH JIaHH JIOIIOIHHTeJI6HIX IIOKa3a1Hf.
Ilocao a /e %..eons
7
cKeHIep Dapes
20
7
Annex 16
Witness Statement of Mustafa Dzhemiliev (31 May 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

􀀳􀀵􀀬􀀹􀀬􀀯􀀨􀀪􀀨􀀧􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃
􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀩􀀬􀀧􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀬􀀤􀀯􀀃
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁜􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃
1
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
________________________________________________________
WITNESS STATEMENT OF MUSTAFA DZHEMILEV
________________________________________________________
1.􀀃 My name is Mustafa Dzhemilev. I was born to Crimean Tatar parents on 13
November 1943, in the village of Bozkoy in the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic, a part of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) back then.
2.􀀃 On 18 May 1944, like all Crimean Tatars, my family and I were forcefully
deported from Crimea to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic of the USSR, where I
subsequently grew up. At the age of 17, I began a long struggle for recognition of the right of
Crimean Tatars to return home and founded the underground Union of Crimean Tatar
Youth, together with a number of my friends. Some 45 years later, in 1989, my family and I
were finally able to return home. We came back to Bakhchysarai, a city in Crimea, which by
then had become part of the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic of the USSR. During that time,
I was charged seven times by the Soviet authorities because of my political views and
activities. In total, I spent fifteen years in Soviet prisons for my political views.
3.􀀃 In 1991, the Crimean Tatars held elections of delegates to their National
Congress (Qurultay), which at its first session in June 1991 elected its supreme
representative body, the Mejlis of 33 people, and I was elected chairman of the Mejlis. I was
re-elected to the position several times and remained chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatars until October 2013. I have been a member of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of
Ukraine since 1998.
2
4.􀀃 The deportation of the Crimean Tatars from Crimea in 1944 (which we refer
to as the Sürgün) was the most horrible catastrophe in the history of these indigenous people
of Crimea. In the course of the deportation and during the next two years, in the horrific
conditions of the special settlements, the Crimean Tatars lost, by various estimates, from 38
to 46% of their population. Therefore, quite justifiably, the Parliament of Ukraine later
declared the deportation to be a crime of genocide against the Crimean Tatar people. The
Crimean Tatars who remained alive after the death of dictator I. Stalin began their peaceful
non-violent struggle to return to their historical homeland. This struggle continued for
several decades, and the gradual return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea became possible
only in the last years of existence of the Soviet Union. After declaration of Ukraine’s
independence in 1991, this return was also supported by the Ukrainian state.
5.􀀃 The objective of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars after World War
II, more accurately after the death of I. Stalin, was the complete return of all people to their
homeland, the return of or compensation for all the property taken from them, restoration of
all the rights granted to other citizens of the country and restoration of the autonomous
republic, which was unlawfully eliminated after deportation of the Crimean Tatar people.
Restoration of national institutions of the Qurultay and the Mejlis, which became possible
during the last years of “perestroyka” in the Soviet Union, had tremendous importance for
the efforts of the Crimean Tatars in asserting their legitimate rights. These organizations
made it possible to consolidate the people even further and to avert the danger of deviating
from the principles of non-violence while asserting their rights. These organizations were
highly esteemed by the people, since their members were elected directly from the people
themselves.
6.􀀃 In the process of returning to Crimea and getting established in their
homeland, the Crimean Tatars encountered numerous difficulties and problems. The
Crimean Tatars were underrepresented in the government entities of the Crimean
Autonomous Republic, as compared to their proportion in the population. There was obvious
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
3
ethnic discrimination of the Crimean Tatars, especially with the land issue. It was the local
authorities of the autonomous republic who carried the chauvinistic sentiments and were
almost entirely responsible for this discriminatory policy. Unfortunately, [the Ukrainian
state authorities in] Kyiv did not take sufficient measures to stop the arbitrary rule and
unlawfulness of the local authorities. But on the whole, the Ukrainian state’s contribution to
the process of returning the Crimean Tatars to their homeland can be called fairly
significant. This was also justly noted in the conclusions of the High Commissioner on
National Minorities of the OSCE in 2013.
7.􀀃 After deportation of the Crimean Tatar people in 1944, a large number of
people from regions of the Russian Federation were brought in and settled in Crimea. For
several decades the Soviet propaganda instilled in the minds of these people and, in general,
all citizens of the country that the Crimean Tatars were sent out of Crimea for betrayal of the
Motherland and because they allegedly killed Russians during the war. Assertions were
spread that after returning to Crimea, the Crimean Tatars would begin to take back their
homes and put onto the street the Russians living in those homes. Therefore, during the first
years of the return of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland, a certain inter-ethnic tension
was observed. The national organizations of the Crimean Tatars made great efforts to
overcome this distrust. The address of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people to all
residents of Crimea, adopted at the first session of the Qurultay in June 1991, stated that
Crimean Tatars were returning to their homeland after many years of exile with the intent to
live in friendship and good neighborly relations with all nationalities and that there would be
no claims against the people living in homes taken from the Crimean Tatars in 1944 was of
great importance. However, the numerous chauvinistic organizations actively supported by
the Russian special services continued to exist in Crimea, although overall, only 3-4% of
residents supported these organizations during elections. For example, the extremely
chauvinistic “Russian Unity” party, led by the current “prime minister” of the occupied
Crimea, S. Aksenov, who, together with the “Crimean Cossacks” engaged in nighttime
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
4
pogroms of Crimean Tatar settlements during the years when V. Yanukovich was the
President of Ukraine, gathered only 3% of the votes of the Crimea’s voters during elections to
the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 2010.
8.􀀃 In the years preceding the Russian occupation, the leadership of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, headed by A. Mogilev, who was appointed as the Prime
Minister of the ARC after the election of V. Yanukovich as the President of Ukraine, and also
fairly high-ranking officials in the Presidential Administration undertook active attempts to
split our people, not recognize the Mejlis as the representative body of the people and
support the individuals whom they handpicked among the Crimean Tatars, even though
those individuals were not rightfully elected and could not represent anyone. After the
occupation of Crimea by Russia, all those individuals became active collaborators and
supporters of the occupiers.
9.􀀃 􀀥􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁇􀀐􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜 2014, the Revolution of Dignity culminated on the streets of
Kyiv. The demonstrations continued and grew larger on the Independence Square beginning
from November 2013. During the fierce clashes from 18 to 21 February 2014, the
government’s armed forces killed more than 100 protesters. On 21 February, protesters took
control of the government quarter in the center of Kyiv, demanding the resignation of
President Viktor Yanukovych. Immediately after this, Yanukovych fled Kyiv to the Russian
Federation in search of asylum. On the following day, the Parliament of Ukraine declared
that Yanukovych had removed himself from the office of the President, scheduled the next
Presidential election and approved an acting President. Simultaneously with these events,
the Russian Federation began the illegal military intervention in Crimea. By 27 February
2014, Russian troops had taken the peninsula under their complete control.
10.􀀃 On 15 February 2014, Rostislav Vakhitov, the representative of the Russian oil
company “Tatneft” in Sevastopol, Crimea, whom I had known for many years, asked me to
meet with him. On that same day I met with him at the restaurant located between
Sevastopol and Bakhchysarai, that belonged to him. We talked about cooperation between
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
5
Tatarstan (the republic in Russia where “Tatneft” was headquartered) and Crimea, and also
about the plans to send business representatives of the Crimean Tatars to Tatarstan. We
agreed that the date for such a visit would be set up later and that the itinerary of the visit
would also include a meeting with the former president of Tatarstan, M. Shaimiev.
11.􀀃 At the end of the meeting, Rostislav Vakhitov told me, unexpectedly, that the
President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, would like to meet with me. At that time, President
Putin was in Sochi at the Olympic games, which meant that I would have to go to Sochi for
the meeting. I shuddered at the thought. I asked why I should go and what the Russian
President wanted to discuss with me. I had a very bad feeling about all this. Vaklhitov replied
that the discussion would concern the future of Crimea. I said that I did not understand why
I needed to speak with President Putin about the future of Crimea, which was part of
Ukraine. At that time I refused to meet with President Putin saying that I did not have
proper authority to do so and that Putin should meet not with me, but rather with the
leadership of Ukraine.
12.􀀃 The entry of the Russian troops in Crimea, the capture of state facilities by socalled
“detachments of self-defense of Crimea,” which were organized and armed by Russia’s
Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol and were made predominantly of persons hostile
towards the Crimean Tatars, as well as appointment by the occupiers of the head of the
extremely chauvinistic “Russia Unity” party as “prime minister” of Crimea. This party led by
the former crime boss nicknamed “Goblin,” Sergey Aksenov, forebode nothing good for the
Crimean Tatars and caused tension on the peninsula. Tension grew even more when on 3
March 2014, a Crimean Tatar and father of three children, Reshat Ametov, went on a oneman
picket in Simferopol with the Ukrainian flag and a sign “Down with the Occupation!,”
was captured by members of the “self-defense detachments” and taken by car out of the city,
and a week later his brutally tortured body was discovered.
13.􀀃 Three days after the abduction of Reshat Ametov and a week before discovery
of his tortured corpse with signs of heinous atrocities, on 6 March 2014, members of the
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
6
Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which was already taken over back on 27
February at night by the Russian Special Forces with no insignia, and under the supervision
of these Special Forces, adopted the decision to hold a referendum on 16 March and decide
on the future status of Crimea. It was extremely clear that the decision on holding the
appearance of a “referendum” and the date for holding it was made not by the members of
the Parliament themselves, but by the occupiers, who for some reason were in a great hurry
and disregarded any norms and procedures because it is virtually impossible to prepare and
hold this referendum in such a short period of time.
14.􀀃 Several days after announcement of the date of the “referendum,” I received a
call from the city of Kazan, and was offered to meet with the former president of the Republic
of Tatarstan and adviser to V. Putin, M. Shaimiev on 12 March 2014. Since M. Shaimiev is
one of the authoritative politicians in Russia on issues of Crimea and simultaneously is an
adviser to V.Putin, I thought at that time that I could ask him about Russia’s plans
concerning Crimea. After that, I agreed and instructed my assistants to get tickets to Kazan
for me and those who would accompany me. But a day later, I received a call from Kazan,
and I was told that the meeting was moved to Moscow, because V. Putin wanted to meet with
me after my meeting with Shaimiev. They asked if I would agree to such a meeting. All these
discussions about the dates and venue of the meeting were handled by my assistant Rustem
Umerov. M. Shaimiev’s assistants and another adviser to V. Putin by the name of Adam
Mikhaylovich Imadayev were engaged in the discussion from the other side.
15.􀀃 I did not give a precise answer to the proposal about a possible meeting with
V. Putin in Moscow. I agreed to change the place of the meeting with M. Shaimiev from
Kazan to Moscow, but regarding the meeting with V. Putin I said that it is one thing if he
wants to discuss the immediate and peaceful withdrawal of his troops from Crimea, but it is a
different thing if he wants to dictate the terms based on facts on the ground. I also added
that I would be able to give a final answer to this question only after discussing it with the
leadership of my country and the meeting with M. Shaimiev. On the next day after this
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
7
conversation, on 10 March, I met with the prime minister of Ukraine, A. Yatsenyuk. He told
me that he knows what the Russian president would say and therefore he didn’t see any
sense in this meeting. At the same time, he suggested that I decide for myself about the trip
to Moscow and meetings with M. Shaimiev and V. Putin.
16.􀀃 I arrived in Moscow on the night of March 11, 2014. At Sheremetyevo Airport
some officials met me and escorted us directly from the aircraft to the Hotel Ukraina (later
renamed the “Slavyanskaya”) bypassing customs and passport controls and providing several
cars for the escort. That same night I met with Ukraine’s ambassador in Moscow, Vladimir
Elchenko, and the ambassador of the Republic of Turkey, Aydyn Sezgin. Both ambassadors
recommended that I listen to V. Putin, arguing that listening to him would not mean
agreeing with him. During the dinner meeting with Turkey’s Ambassador A.M. Imadayev,
adviser to the Russian President, joined us. The next morning, I went to the representative
office of the Republic of Tatarstan to meet with Shaimiev. During the meeting, Shaimiev told
me that he would like to help the Crimean Tatar people and use all of his influence and
resources to do so. He also added that President Putin knew about our meeting. I told him
that Russia had made a big mistake by invading Crimea, because relations between our
countries would be ruined for many years and that he, as an adviser to Putin, should advise
the president to withdraw the troops from Crimea immediately. M. Shaimiev smiled and
replied: “Tell this to him yourself. He is waiting on the phone.” Then we went to the second
floor of the office and entered one small room, where besides a direct line to the president
was just a couch and one chair.
17.􀀃 In that room I had a telephone conversation with President Putin, which
lasted for 35-40 minutes. I recognized Putin’s voice, because I had heard his speeches on
television many times before.
18.􀀃 After exchanging greetings, I told him that I did not come there to give him
advice, because he, as president of a large and powerful state, has enough of his own
advisers, but I came only to express the point of view of the indigenous people of Crimea,
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
8
that is, the Crimean Tatars, regarding the events which were taking place in Crimea at that
time. I further said that the entry of the Russian troops to the territory of Crimea and the
measures taken by Russia in order to annex it are a flagrant violation of international law,
and that the Russian troops should be withdrawn immediately.
19.􀀃 President Putin at the start said that Ukraine itself also withdrew from the
USSR, having violated international law. He saidthat terrible things were taking place in Kyiv
– that “banderovtsy” [the nationalists] removed the legitimate President V. Yanukovich, that
they terrorize and murder large numbers of of people and so forth. I certainly knew that the
Russian propaganda against Ukraine used such assertions, but I did not at all expect that the
country’s president himself would say this. Moreover, that he would say this to a person who
traveled to Moscow from Kyiv and, accordingly, knows better than him what is actually
happening in that city. After that V. Putin suggested that we wait for the results of the
Crimean referendum scheduled for March 16, 2014 and then return to this subject. In
response, I said that this referendum is illegal, that it contradicts the Ukrainian laws and
international law, and expressed confidence that the international community will never
recognize the legitimacy of such referendum. I also added that the indigenous people of
Crimea, represented by their highest representative body – the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
people, have already made the decision to boycott this referendum. Putin again repeated his
suggestion to wait with the conclusions for four more days, when the “Crimean people”
themselves would determine the status of the peninsula in the referendum on 16 March.
20.􀀃 After this exchange of opinions, President Putin expressed his concern in
connection with possible clashes between the Crimean Tatars and Russian soldiers. What is
notable here, is that on that same day V. Putin stated to the press that Russia had no armed
forces in Crimea outside of the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol. I also expressed my
concern regarding possible threats to Crimean Tatars who, quite obviously, will continue to
defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
9
21.􀀃 In light of the numerous statements of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people
made in protest to Russia’s activities in Crimea, including the plans to hold an illegal
“referendum,” creation of chauvinistic so-called “self-defense detachments” and so forth, I
don’t think that President Putin expected to receive assurances of support for the annexation
on the part of Crimean Tatars. I got the impression that, in the least, he wanted to secure our
neutrality.
22.􀀃 Regarding the concerns about the possible provocations and clashes of
Crimean Tatars with Russian servicemen, expressed by V. Putin during the conversation, I
replied that there would be no provocations on the part of the Crimean Tatars, but expressed
a concern about actions of so-called Russian “self-defense detachments of Crimea,” which
could lead to major inter-ethnic clashes. In response Putin assured me that he had already
given the relevant instructions that the new authorities on the peninsula should treat the
rights of the Crimean Tatars with high respect. However, as the subsequent events have
shown, Crimean Tatars are still the main subject of persecution, intimidation, kidnapping
and murders, as well as widespread searches.
23.􀀃 Regarding the concern of possible clashes between Crimean Tatars and the
armed forces of Russia in Crimea expressed by V. Putin, I replied that, while protecting their
rights, the Crimean Tatars have always adhered to the principle of non-violence, and,
secondly, given such an obvious inequality of forces, one could hardly predict that
completely unarmed and small in numbers Crimean Tatars would withstand the Russian
military on their own. At the same time, I emphasized that in any event, the Crimean Tatars,
as citizens of Ukraine, will be guided in their actions by the decisions of their government.
24.􀀃 On a separate note, President Putin stressed that Russia, as a very powerful
country, can easily solve all of the social and legal problems of the Crimean Tatars, which, he
said, Ukraine had failed to solve in the last 23 years while being an independent country. I
agreed that the Crimean Tatars indeed face a lot of problems, but noted that the majority of
these problems were caused by the total deportation and genocide in 1944 when Crimea was
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
10
part of the Russian Federation. At the same time, I noted that if Russia wants to help the
Crimean Tatars, it should talk not to me, but to the Ukrainian leadership. I then added that
to make the discussion between the two countries productive, it was necessary to withdraw
the Russian troops from Crimea.
25.􀀃 President Putin also brought up the issue of Russia-Turkey relations and the
possible role of the big Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. He said that he considered Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, the Prime-Minister of Turkey, to be his friend, and that the Crimean Tatars
could become a connecting bridge between Russia and Turkey for strengthening the
relations between two countries. I did not comment on his statement, but only noted that
Erdogan is also a good friend of our country, and the Crimean Tatars are making great
efforts for the “bridge of friendship” to be strong between Ukraine and Turkey.
26.􀀃 After I described my point of view and repeated that the Crimean Tatars
oppose any revision of the state borders of Ukraine and will defend their country’s integrity,
President Putin said that he expected nothing else from me, for this is the position that every
citizen of his/her country should have and he had no doubts that I was a patriot of my
country. And then he added: “But let’s still wait for the results of the referendum on 16
March.”
27.􀀃 Upon conclusion of the conversation, President Putin said that he was willing
to discuss with me any issues and that the telephone over which we are conducting the
conversation operates around the clock, and that I could contact him at any time through M.
Shaimiev.
28.􀀃 From the first days following the entry of Russian troops into Crimea and
Russia’s declaration of the Crimean Peninsula being part of its territory, the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar people has stated that it does not recognize the occupation, and appealed to
various international organizations, including the UN, with a request to take measures and
prevent the illegal annexation of their homeland. Following the appeal of the Mejlis, virtually
all Crimean Tatar people boycotted the so-called “referendum” on 16 March 2014, organized
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
11
by the occupation authorities, that was held for justification of attempts to legalize the
annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation. Since that time, Russia and the occupation
authorities have begun to view the Mejlis as its main enemy in Crimea.
29.􀀃 Approximately one month after my conversation with Putin, I was banned
from entering Russia for five years. On 22 April 2014, I left Crimea to Kyiv voluntarily, since
I had to attend a session of the Verkhovna Rada, important meetings and travel overseas .
However, while crossing the border, the Russians read to me some order dated 19 April, but
without any signature or seal, saying that I was prohibited from entering the territory of
Russia for a period of 5 years.
30.􀀃 Reports of the ban for me entering Crimea were quickly spread in the
numerous Ukrainian and foreign media. However, certain Russian television channels, in
particular “Russia Today” and “Channel 24”, stated that there was no ban and that
information about the ban was concocted by me for my own self-promotion. Therefore, after
arriving in Kyiv, I, again, tried to openly cross the border established by the occupiers and
enter Crimea. Since air travel between Kyiv and Crimea was already suspended, on 2 May
2014 a friend and I tried to fly from Kyiv to Crimea via Moscow. But a member of the Border
Guards at the Sheremetyevo Airport, informed me that I was prohibited from entering
Crimea and gave me a return ticket to Kyiv. The next day, that is, on 3 May 2014, I, along
with several friends, headed towards Crimea by car to finally clarify the question of whether
or not I was prohibited from entering Crimea for the public, since it was known that there
would be many correspondents at the border. Upon arriving at the border near the village of
Armianskoe, we discovered that the entire territory near the checkpoint was sealed off by the
Russian soldiers, tanks and armored vehicles, and the barrels of sniper assault rifles were
aimed at us on both sides of the so-called “neutral zone” between Ukraine and occupied
Crimea.
31.􀀃 About 5,000 Crimean Tatars approached the checkpoint in motor vehicles
from the Crimean side, and demanded that I be allowed to enter Crimea. Some of them,
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
12
about 1,500-2,000, managed to break through the border and cross into the “neutral zone,”
where I met with them. Representatives of the Russian military stated that I was banned
from entering Crimea and they would not allow me to pass under any circumstances. At the
same time, they stated that they would not allow those Crimean Tatars who had broken
through the border and crossed into the “neutral zone” to return to Crimea. The situation
intensified. Since the events at the border were broadcast by some Ukrainian TV channels
on-line, I began receiving a great number of telephone calls. In particular, calls from
Moscow, from a member of the Russian State Duma, Aleksey Aleksandrov, who promised to
help me enter Crimea if I make a request to President V. Putin using him as an intermediary.
I replied that I would not appeal to the president of a foreign state with a request to permit
me entery to my homeland.
32.􀀃 Since tensions were increasing and a bloody clash between the Russian
military and the Crimean Tatars who had crossed into the “neutral zone” was likely to
happen, I stated that I was willing to leave the border and return back to Kyiv if the Crimean
Tatars who had crossed the border would be allowed to return to Crimea and would not be
subjected to any persecution on the part of the Russian authorities. The Russian military
accepted the proposal and I stood in the “neutral zone” until the last Crimean Tatar had
crossed the check point and made it to the territory of Crimea. Then I got in the car and
returned back to Kyiv.
33.􀀃 The Russian authorities did not keep their promise and later on hundreds of
Crimean Tatars were subjected to monetary fines, and some were arrested and charged with
participation in disturbances and confrontation with the Russian servicemen at the border.
34.􀀃 As the Russian authorities were becoming convinced that majority of the
Crimean Tatars and their representative body would not recognize the legitimacy of the
occupation of Crimea, repressions against them began. Searches of houses of Crimean Tatars
became more frequent, under the pretext of looking for “forbidden literature” and weapons.
People began disappearing without a trace or were murdered, and there were arrests. In
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
13
early July 2014, the leader of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, Refat Chubarov, was
prohibited from entering Crimea. Later on, his first deputy, Akhtem Chiigoz was arrested.
His second deputy, Ilmi Umerov, was charged with “violation of the territorial integrity of
the Russian Federation,” based on his television interview, in which he said that Crimea
belonged to Ukraine, but translation of his words was twisted.
35.􀀃 In April 2016, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people was banned by a
decision of the “Supreme Court” of the occupied Crimea, and then in September of that same
year that decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Russia
justified this ban by saying that the Mejlis is supposedly an “extremist organization,”
although the Russian authorities know full well that the Mejlis is a representative body of the
people and not an “organization,” and that it never, during all the years of its existence since
1991, had engaged in any “extremism,” but defended the interests of its people only by
peaceful and non-violent methods.
36.􀀃 In April 2017, the UN International Court of Justice ordered Russia to repeal
the ban on activities of the Mejlis, a representative body of the Crimean Tatar people elected
directly by them. This court decision was embraced by Crimean Tatars with gratitude and
optimism since the ban imposed by the Russian authorities was aimed at dividing the
Crimean Tatar people, and at depriving them of the opportunity to peacefully defend their
legitimate rights. The ban on the Mejlis was aimed at forcing the Crimean Tatars to reconcile
with the occupation of their homeland faster and easier. However, despite the Court’s
decision, the ban on the legal activities of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people has not
been removed to this day, and the bans on its leaders from entering Crimea also have not
been removed. Moreover Russian propaganda is continued and even increased in terms of
false publications aimed at presenting the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people as an extremist
or even terrorist organization. It is our hope that the Court will take effective measures to
ensure execution of its decision.
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
14
37.􀀃 The Crimean Tatar people especially need help in preventing the annihilation
of the remnants of their indigenous culture in Crimea, which was systematically destroyed
after the conquest of Crimea by the Russian Empire in 1783, and especially after the total
deportation of all Crimean Tatar people in May 1944 and right up until the collapse of the
USSR and the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence. Now, after the occupation of Crimea
in 2014, the same policy, essentially, continues.
38.􀀃 Russian propaganda has been spread in Russia, and especially in the occupied
Crimea actively advancing the idea that the Crimean Peninsula is the “originally Russian”
territory due to the fact that Crimea was conquered by the force of Russian weapons at the
end of the 18th century, and about supremacy of the Russian culture over other cultures.
School textbooks on the history of Russia and Crimea are being rewritten in the
corresponding spirit. Simultaneously, cultural monuments of the indigenous Crimean Tatar
people are being destroyed. I am convinced that the purpose of these measures is to create
the maximum amount of discomfort for the indigenous people and to force the Crimean
Tatars to “voluntarily” abandon their homeland. In parallel, Russia, by gravely violating the
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the status of occupied territories, is actively
providing incentives for permanent residency in Crimea to citizens from the territory of the
Russian Federation. According to various estimates, during the four years of occupation,
from 500,000 to 1 million Russian citizens have resettled to Crimea from the Russian
Federation.
39.􀀃 I confirm that the above testimony is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to answer possible additional questions.
Signed on 31 May, 2018.
[Signature]
Mustafa Jemilev
PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Attorney Work Product
*8842,*;276􀀁-.􀀁4*􀀁,76=.6;276􀀁26;.96*;276*4.􀀁87<9􀀁4*􀀁9@89.::276􀀁
-<􀀁/26*6,.5.6;􀀁-<􀀁;.99792:5.􀀁.;􀀁-.􀀁4*􀀁,76=.6;276􀀁
26;.96*;276*4.􀀁:<9􀀁4B@42526*;276􀀁-.􀀁;7<;.:􀀁4.:􀀁/795.:􀀁-.􀀁
-2:,92526*;276􀀁9*,2*4.􀀁􀀂<39*26.􀀁>!􀀁/@-@9*;276􀀁-.􀀁9<::2.
*8842,*;276􀀁7/􀀁;1.􀀁26;.96*;276*4􀀁,76=.6;276􀀁/79􀀁;1.􀀁:<889.::276􀀁
7/􀀁;1.􀀁/26*6,260􀀁7/􀀁;.99792:5􀀁*6-􀀁7/􀀁;1.􀀁26;.96*;276*4􀀁
,76=.6;276􀀁76􀀁;1.􀀁.42526*;276􀀁7/􀀁*44􀀁/795:􀀁7/􀀁9*,2*4􀀁
-2:,92526*;276􀀁􀀂<39*26.􀀁?!􀀁9<::2*6􀀁/.-.9*;276
ONJCHCMIU􀀁PDIEFQFKU􀀁LRPQCST􀀁EGFLIKFDC
'%􀀁 Zmuà􀀁 ovj{z􀀁 Z{yzh|h􀀁 Tnmtpsmj%􀀁 g􀀁 xvlpsyà􀀁 ')􀀁 uvàixà􀀁 '/*)􀀁 kvlh􀀁 j􀀁
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvq􀀁ymtÖm#􀀁 j􀀁ymsm􀀁Qvorvq􀀁j􀀁YxÑtyrvq􀀁Pjzvuvtuvq􀀁_vjmzyrvq􀀁
_v~phspyzpÄmyrvq􀀁 ^myw{isprm#􀀁 j􀀁 zv􀀁 jxmtà􀀁 iÑjÅmq􀀁 ÄhyzÖá􀀁 ^vyypqyrvq􀀁
_vjmzyrvq􀀁 bmlmxhzpjuvq􀀁 _v~phspyzpÄmyrvq􀀁 ^myw{isprp􀀁 _váoh􀀁 _vjmzyrp}􀀁
_v~phspyzpÄmyrp}􀀁^myw{ispr􀀁!___^"%
(%􀀁 '.􀀁thà􀀁 '/**􀀁kvlh􀀁à􀀁 p􀀁tvà􀀁 ymtÖà#􀀁 rhr􀀁 p􀀁 jmyÖ􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpq􀀁 uhxvl#􀀁 iÑsp􀀁
uhypsÖuv􀀁 lmwvxzpxvjhuÑ􀀁 po􀀁 YxÑth􀀁 j􀀁 aoimryr{á􀀁 _vjmzyr{á􀀁
_v~phspyzpÄmyr{á􀀁 ^myw{ispr{􀀁 ___^#􀀁 klm􀀁 à􀀁 jÑxvy%􀀁 R􀀁 jvoxhyzm􀀁 '-􀀁 smz􀀁 à􀀁
uhÄhs􀀁 lvsk{á􀀁 ivxÖi{􀀁 oh􀀁 wxpouhupm􀀁 wxhjh􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 jmxu{zÖyà􀀁 uh􀀁
xvlpu{#􀀁 vyuvjhj􀀁 jtmyzm􀀁 y􀀁 tvptp􀀁 lx{oÖàtp􀀁 umsmkhsÖu{á􀀁 tvsvlmnu{á􀀁
vxkhupoh~pá􀀁 K_váo􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvq􀀁 tvsvlmnpL%􀀁 ]xptmxuv􀀁 *+􀀁 smz􀀁
yw{yzà#􀀁 j􀀁 '/./􀀁kvl{#􀀁 tÑ􀀁 y􀀁ymtÖmq􀀁ytvksp􀀁 uhrvum~$zv􀀁 jmxu{zÖyà􀀁 lvtvq%􀀁 ZÑ􀀁
jmxu{spyÖ􀀁 j􀀁 Qh}Äpyhxhq#􀀁 kvxvl􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt{#􀀁 rvzvxÑq􀀁 r􀀁 zvt{􀀁 jxmtmup􀀁 yzhs􀀁
ÄhyzÖá􀀁 arxhpuyrvq􀀁 _vjmzyrvq􀀁 _v~phspyzpÄmyrvq􀀁 ^myw{isprp􀀁 ___^%􀀁 Wh􀀁
Üzv􀀁 jxmtà􀀁 à􀀁 ymtÖ􀀁 xho􀀁 iÑs􀀁 wxpjsmÄmu􀀁 r􀀁 vzjmzyzjmuuvyzp􀀁 yvjmzyrptp􀀁
jshyzàtp􀀁 po$oh􀀁 tvp}􀀁 wvspzpÄmyrp}􀀁 joksàlvj􀀁 p􀀁 tvmq􀀁 wvspzpÄmyrvq􀀁
lmàzmsÖuvyzp%􀀁 R􀀁viÇmq􀀁 ysvnuvyzp􀀁à􀀁 wxvjms􀀁wàzuhl~hzÖ􀀁smz􀀁 j􀀁 yvjmzyrp}􀀁
záxÖth}􀀁po$oh􀀁yjvp}􀀁wvspzpÄmyrp}􀀁joksàlvj%
)%􀀁 R􀀁 '//'􀀁 kvl{􀀁 rxÑtyrpm􀀁 zhzhxÑ􀀁 wxvjmsp􀀁 jÑivxÑ􀀁 lmsmkhzvj􀀁 j􀀁 yjvq􀀁
[h~pvuhsÖuÑq􀀁 yÉmol􀀁 !Y{x{szhq"#􀀁 rvzvxÑq􀀁 uh􀀁 yjvmq􀀁 wmxjvq􀀁 ymyypp􀀁 j􀀁 páum􀀁
'//'􀀁 kvlh􀀁 poixhs􀀁 yjvq􀀁 jÑyÅpq􀀁 wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuÑq􀀁 vxkhu􀀁 Zmlnspy􀀁 po􀀁 ))$}􀀁
Ämsvjmr#􀀁 h􀀁 à􀀁 iÑs􀀁 poixhu􀀁 wxmlymlhzmsmt􀀁Zmlnspyh%􀀁 [h􀀁 Üzvq􀀁 lvsnuvyzp􀀁 à􀀁
wmxmpoipxhsyà􀀁 umyrvsÖrv􀀁 xho􀀁 p􀀁 vyzhjhsyà􀀁 wxmlymlhzmsmt􀀁 Zmlnspyh􀀁
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁 lv􀀁 vrzàixà􀀁 (&')􀀁 kvlh%􀀁 [hÄpuhà􀀁 y􀀁 '//.􀀁 kvlh#􀀁 à􀀁
àjsàáyÖ􀀁lmw{zhzvt􀀁Rmx}vjuvq􀀁^hlÑ􀀁!whxshtmuzh"􀀁arxhpuÑ%
*%􀀁 Tmwvxzh~pà􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁po􀀁YxÑth􀀁 j􀀁 '/**􀀁kvl{􀀁 !rvzvx{á􀀁tÑ􀀁 uhoÑjhmt􀀁
:HF@qC"􀀁 àjsàmzyà􀀁 uhpivsmm􀀁 yzxhÅuvq􀀁 rhzhyzxv|vq􀀁 j􀀁 pyzvxpp􀀁 rvxmuuvkv
􀀂
APPLICATION DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE POUR LA REPRESSION
DU FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME ET DE LA CONVENTION
INTERNATIONALE SUR L'~LIMINATION DE TOUTES LES FORMES DE
DISCRIMINATION RACIALE (UKRAINE e. F~D~RATION DE RUSIE)
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION (UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
IIOKA3AHHH CBIIETEJIH MYCTAI JIKEMHJIEBA
l. Menn o6ym Mycmaqpa [Ioceuuee. poouc 13 uo6pa 1943 eo0a 6
Kp6uMcKomamapcxoiu cevbe, 6 cene boxoi s KpuMcxoi A6moounoi Cosemcxoi
Coyuaucmuuecxo Pecny6uxe, s mo @pew sue~ acmoo Poccuicxoi
Co@emcxo~ beepamusoi Coyuanucmuuecoi Pecny6nuxu Coo3a Cosemcux
Coyuaucmuuecux Pecny6nu (CCCP).
2. 18 Man 1944 eoa u Mo cetb, ax u 6ecv Kp6McKomamapcKui uapoo, 6tu
acuono oenopmupoeat u KptMa e V6excKyo CosemcKyo
Coyuaucmuuecyo Pecny6uxy CCCP, e 6poc. B eo3pacme 17 em
Haan ooeyo 6opv6y 3a npunaue npa6a KpuMcKux mamap 6epuymoc a
poouuy, ocHo6as &Mecme c Mouwu opy3bMu HeeeanbHyo Moo0eCHyO
opeauauo «Coo3 Kp6uMcKomamapcoi Monoecu». IHpuuepnuo 45 nem
cnycm, e 1989 2o0y, Mot c cewoeii cvoeu axoey-mo 6epymbe ovo~. Mt
6epuyucv s Daxuucapaii, 2opoo 6 Kpuwy, Komopoi moyy @peveu cma
acmio Vxpaucxoi Coeemco~ Coyuaucmuuecxoi Pecny6uxu CC€P. 3a
mo 6peu ceMb pa3 6un npu&nee K omeemcm@eocmu co6emcuwu
6acmMu u-3a Moux noumuuecux 3eoo6 u Moe~ nonumuuecxoil
oemeoocmu. B o6ueiu cnococmu nposen nmaoyamb em 6 co6emcRux
mopb.Max u-3a c6oux noumuwecKux 63en006.
3. B 199] 200y Kp6uMcKue mamapbl nposenu 6t6opt oeneeamos 6 csoiu
Hauonaowi ces (Kypymait), omopit a csoeit nepoi ceccuu s uone
199] 2oa u6pan csoi stcuui npeocmaeumenowoti opeau Meoocuc u 33-x
eno&ex, a 6u u6pa npeceameneu Meoocnuca. Ha mo~ oonocnocmu
nepeu6upanc ecKobKo pa3 u ocma@ac npeoceoameet Meoocnuca
Kp6uMcKomamapcxoeo apooa oo oKm~pa 2013 eooa. Hauan c 1998 2oa,
aocv oenymamow Bepxosno~ Pao (napaweuma) Vpaut.
4. [lenopmayu xpouwcux mamap u Kpa e 1944 2ooy (omopyo wt Ha36aeM
S~rgin) enemc au6onee cmpauuo amacmpodo~ e ucmopuu Kopeunoeo
1
uhxvlh􀀁 YxÑth%􀀁 R􀀁 }vlm􀀁 lmwvxzh~pp􀀁 p􀀁 j􀀁 zmÄmupm􀀁 wvysml{áÇp}􀀁 lj{}􀀁 smz􀀁 j􀀁
{nhyháÇp}􀀁 {ysvjpà}􀀁 ywm~wvymsmupq􀀁 rxÑtyrpm􀀁 zhzhxÑ􀀁 wvzmxàsp#􀀁 wv􀀁
xhospÄuÑt􀀁 v~murht#􀀁 vz􀀁 ).􀀁 lv􀀁 *,􀀁 􀀁 yjvmkv􀀁 yvyzhjh%􀀁 ]vÜzvt{􀀁 jwvsum􀀁
vivyuvjhuuv􀀁 whxshtmuz􀀁 arxhpuÑ􀀁 wvonm􀀁 wxpouhs􀀁 lmwvxzh~pá􀀁 rhr􀀁
wxmyz{wsmupm􀀁 $􀀁 kmuv~pl􀀁 wxvzpj􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh%􀀁 \yzhjÅpmyà􀀁 j􀀁
npjÑ}􀀁 rxÑtyrpm􀀁 zhzhxÑ#􀀁 wvysm􀀁 ytmxzp􀀁 lprzhzvxh􀀁 X%􀀁_zhspuh#􀀁 uhÄhsp􀀁
yjvá􀀁 tpxu{á􀀁 umuhypsÖyzjmuu{á􀀁 ivxÖi{􀀁 oh􀀁 jvojxhÇmupm􀀁 uh􀀁 yjvá􀀁
pyzvxpÄmyr{á􀀁xvlpu{%􀀁 fzh􀀁ivxÖih􀀁wxvlvsnhshyÖ􀀁 umyrvsÖrv􀀁 lmyàzpsmzpq#􀀁 p􀀁
wvyzmwmuuvm􀀁jvojxhÇmupm􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁j􀀁YxÑt􀀁yzhsv􀀁 jvotvnuÑt􀀁spÅÖ􀀁
j􀀁 wvysmlupm􀀁 kvlÑ􀀁 y{Çmyzjvjhupà􀀁 _vjmzyrvkv􀀁 _váoh%􀀁 ]vysm􀀁 wxvjvokshÅmupà􀀁
umohjpyptvyzp􀀁 arxhpuÑ􀀁 j􀀁 '//'􀀁 kvl{􀀁 Üzv􀀁 jvojxhÇmupm􀀁 iÑsv􀀁 wvllmxnhuv􀀁 p􀀁
{rxhpuyrpt􀀁kvy{lhxyzjvt
+%􀀁 cmsÖá􀀁 [h~pvuhsÖuvkv􀀁 ljpnmupà􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 wvysm􀀁 Rzvxvq􀀁 tpxvjvq􀀁
jvquÑ#􀀁 zvÄumm#􀀁 wvysm􀀁 ytmxzp􀀁 X%_zhspuh#􀀁 iÑsv􀀁 wvsuvm􀀁 jvojxhÇmupm􀀁 jymkv􀀁
uhxvlh􀀁 uh􀀁 yjvá􀀁 xvlpu{#􀀁 jvojxhÇmupm􀀁 psp􀀁 rvtwmuyh~pà􀀁 jymkv􀀁 vzuàzvkv􀀁 {􀀁
uhxvlh􀀁 pt{Çmyzjh#􀀁 jvyyzhuvjsmupm􀀁 jym}􀀁 wxhj#􀀁 rvzvxÑm􀀁 ptmáz􀀁 lx{kpm􀀁
kxhnlhum􀀁yzxhuÑ􀀁 p􀀁 jvyyzhuvjsmupm􀀁 hjzvuvtuvq􀀁xmyw{isprp#􀀁 rvzvxhà􀀁iÑsh􀀁
umohrvuuv􀀁 sprjplpxvjhuh􀀁 wvysm􀀁 lmwvxzh~pp􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh%􀀁
Rvyyzhuvjsmupm􀀁uh~pvuhsÖuÑ}􀀁puyzpz{zvj􀀁Y{x{szhà􀀁p􀀁Zmlnspyh#􀀁 rvzvxvm􀀁
yzhsv􀀁 jvotvnuÑt􀀁 j􀀁 wvysmlupm􀀁 kvlÑ􀀁 KwmxmyzxvqrpL􀀁 j􀀁 _vjmzyrvt􀀁 _váom#􀀁
ptmsv􀀁vkxvtuvm􀀁ouhÄmupm􀀁 j􀀁{ypspà}􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁wv􀀁vzyzhpjhupá􀀁yjvp}􀀁
ohrvuuÑ}􀀁 wxhj%􀀁 fzp􀀁 yzx{rz{xÑ􀀁 wvojvsàsp􀀁 mÇm􀀁 ivsÖÅm􀀁 rvuyvsplpxvjhzÖ􀀁
uhxvl#􀀁 wxmlvzjxhÇhsp􀀁 vwhyuvyzÖ􀀁 vzrsvumupà􀀁 vz􀀁 wxpu~pwvj􀀁 umuhypspà􀀁 j􀀁
vzyzhpjhupp􀀁 yjvp}􀀁 wxhj􀀁 p􀀁 wvsÖovjhspyÖ􀀁 j􀀁 uhxvlm􀀁 ivsÖÅpt􀀁 {jhnmupmt#􀀁
wvyrvsÖr{􀀁vup􀀁poipxhspyÖ􀀁umwvyxmlyzjmuuv􀀁yhtpt􀀁uhxvlvt%
,%􀀁 R􀀁 wxv~myym􀀁 jvojxhÇmupà􀀁 j􀀁YxÑt􀀁 p􀀁vi{yzxvqyzjh􀀁 uh􀀁 yjvmq􀀁xvlpum􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁
zhzhxÑ􀀁 yzhsrpjhspyÖ􀀁 y􀀁 tuvkvÄpysmuuÑtp􀀁 zx{luvyzàtp􀀁 p􀀁 wxvismthtp%􀀁
YxÑtyrpm􀀁 zhzhxÑ􀀁 j􀀁 umyrvsÖrv􀀁 xho􀀁 upnm#􀀁 Ämt􀀁 wxvwvx~pvuhsÖuv􀀁 r􀀁 yjvmq􀀁
Äpysmuuvyzp#􀀁 iÑsp􀀁 wxmlyzhjsmuÑ􀀁 j􀀁 yzx{rz{xh}􀀁 jshyzp􀀁 YxÑtyrvq􀀁
Pjzvuvtuvq􀀁 ^myw{isprp#􀀁 ptmsv􀀁 tmyzv􀀁 àjuhà􀀁 lpyrxptpuh~pà􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁
zhzhx􀀁 wv􀀁 uh~pvuhsÖuvt{􀀁 wxpouhr{#􀀁 vyvimuuv􀀁 j􀀁 omtmsÖuvt􀀁 jvwxvym%􀀁 [v􀀁
vzjmzyzjmuuÑtp􀀁oh􀀁Üz{􀀁lpyrxptpuh~pvuu{á􀀁 wvspzpr{􀀁wvÄzp􀀁 jym~msv􀀁iÑsp􀀁
tmyzuÑm􀀁 ÅvjpupyzpÄmyrp􀀁 uhyzxvmuuÑm􀀁 jshyzp􀀁 hjzvuvtpp#􀀁 h􀀁 Ypmj#􀀁 r􀀁
yvnhsmupá#􀀁 um􀀁 wxpupths􀀁 lvyzhzvÄuÑ}􀀁 tmx􀀁 lsà􀀁 wxmymÄmupà􀀁 wxvpojvsh􀀁 p􀀁
imoohrvupà􀀁tmyzuÑ}􀀁 jshyzmq%􀀁 [v􀀁 j􀀁 ~msvt􀀁 jrshl􀀁{rxhpuyrvkv􀀁 kvy{lhxyzjh􀀁 j􀀁
wxv~myy􀀁jvojxhÇmupà􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁uh􀀁yjvá􀀁xvlpu{#􀀁tvnuv􀀁yrhohzÖ#􀀁 iÑs􀀁
lvjvsÖuv􀀁 ouhÄpzmsÖuÑt%􀀁 fzv􀀁 iÑsv􀀁 ywxhjmlspjv􀀁 vztmÄmuv􀀁 p􀀁 j􀀁 jÑjvlh}􀀁
Rmx}vjuvkv􀀁 rvtpyyhxh􀀁 wv􀀁 lmsht􀀁 uh~pvuhsÖuÑ}􀀁 tmuÖÅpuyzj􀀁 \Q_U􀀁 j􀀁 (&')􀀁
kvl{%
-%􀀁 ]vysm􀀁 lmwvxzh~pp􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁 j􀀁 '/**􀀁 kvl{􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt􀀁 iÑsv􀀁
wxpjmomuv􀀁 p􀀁 ohymsmuv􀀁 ivsÖÅvm􀀁 Äpysv􀀁 sálmq􀀁 po􀀁 vishyzmq􀀁 ^vyypqyrvq
􀀂
Hapoa Kpt.Ma. B xooe oenopmayuu u e meeue nocneoyouux o6yx em 6
ycacaouux yco6ux cneunoceneut KpuMcKue mamapot nomepu, no
pa3uuout oyeuKaM, om 38 o 46 % coeeo cocmasa. IHomoyy «none
o6ocnosauno napaveum VKpau no3oce npu3nan enopmyuo KaK
npecmynneue - eeoyuo npomus p6tcKomamapcxoeo apooa. Ocmasuuec 6
Cu6blx KpblMcKue mamapbt, nocne cMepmu ouxmamopa H.Cmaua, aau
c6oo Mupyo Heacuocmseuyo 6op6y 3a 6o6pauyeue a c6oo
ucmopuuecxyo poouwy. ma 6op6a npooocaac ecKono oecmuemu, u
nocmeneoe 6036pauyeue KpbMcKux mamap e ptM cmao 603MOCH6lM ub
6 nocneoue eoot cyuyecm@o6au Cosemcxoeo Coo3a. IHocne npo6o3eaueu
ea6ucuocmu Vpautot e 199] eoy mo 6o36paueue 6uo nooepcano u
yK paucuM eocyoapcm6oM
5. Llenoo Hauoanooeo 6urceu KpouMcKux mamap nocne Bmopoi Muposoit
6oiuvt, mouee, nocne cMepmu H.Cmaunua, 6to nonoe 6o3apaueue 6ceeo
Hapooa a cGoo poouuy, 6036paupeue uu KoMnecayu 6ceeo omuumoeo y
Hapooa uwyuecm6a, 6occmano&eue 6cex npa6, Komopbte uMeom opyeue
epaorcoane cmpawot u occmano@neue a@moouoiu pecny6nuxu, Komopa 6ta
He3aKoHHo uK6uOupo6aa nocne enopmauu KpuMcomamapcxoeo Hapooa.
Boccmaoneue ayuonanonwonx uucmumymos Kypyma u Meoocnuca, Komopoe
cmano 6o3MoocHotM 6 noceoue eoot «nepecmpouxu» e CosemcKoy Coo3e,
uveno oepounoe 3avenue 6 ycuuux Kp6McKux mamap no omcmau6auo c6oux
3aKoHHbIX npa8. mu cmpyxmypt no6onu eue 6onoue Koconuoupo6amo
Hapo, npeoom6pauanu onacocm omKoeu om npuunos eacuu 6
omcmausauu csoux npae u no3o6aucb 6 Hapooe 6oouuuM y8aoceueM,
nocKobKy ou u6upaucb enocpeocmseuo cawuu uapo0M.
6. B npoyecce 6o6paueuu e KpuM u o6ycmpoicmea a csoei pooue KpbtMcKue
mamapt cmanusaucb c MHoeouceHHIM mpyoHocmuMu u npo6neMau.
KptwcKue mamapl 6 HeCKO6KO pa3 Huwe, eM nponopuoaoHo K c6oei
ucneuocmu, 6u npeocma@net 6 cmpyxmypax snacmu Kpuucxoi
Aemoouno~ Pecny6nuxu, uweno Mecmo ea oucxpuwunayu KpuMcKu
mamap no HayuoaboMy npuay, ocoeuo 6 3eMebHoM onpoce. Ho
omeemcm@eunuMu 3a my oucxpuwunauounyo noumuxy noumu @ceyeno 6uu
Mecmnte uoeuucmuuecKu Hacmpoenunote 6acmu a@mooMuu, a Kue8, K
coocaeHuo, He npuuMan ocmamonunx Mep on npeceeu npousona u
6es3aKou Mecmunx «acme~. Ho s yenow sxao yKpaucxoeo eocyoapcm6a 6
npoyecc 6o36pauyeu KpuwcKux mamap Ha c6oo poouuy, MocHo cKa3am6, 6
o6onono 3HaumeoouM. mo 6to cnpaseouso omMeeHo u 6 661600ax
Bepxoenoeo KoMuccapa no oenau auuoaonwbux Meouucme O5CE e 2013
eo0y.
7. [locne oenopmayuu xpouwcxomamapcxoeo apooa e 1944 eooy 6 KpM 6o
npuse3eno u aceneo onuuoe ucno ooei u3 o6acme~ Poccuicxoi
2
bmlmxh~pp%􀀁 fzpt􀀁 sálàt􀀁 p􀀁 jvviÇm􀀁 jymt􀀁 kxhnlhuht􀀁 yzxhuÑ􀀁 yvjmzyrhà􀀁
wxvwhkhulh􀀁 j􀀁 zmÄmupm􀀁 umyrvsÖrp}􀀁 lmyàzpsmzpq􀀁 ju{Åhsh􀀁 tÑysÖ#􀀁 Äzv􀀁
rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁jÑyshsp􀀁po􀀁YxÑth􀀁oh􀀁potmu{􀀁xvlpum􀀁p􀀁oh􀀁zv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁vup􀀁j􀀁kvlÑ􀀁
jvquÑ􀀁àrviÑ􀀁{ipjhsp􀀁x{yyrp}%􀀁 ^hywxvyzxhuàspyÖ􀀁zhrnm􀀁{zjmxnlmupà#􀀁 Äzv􀀁
rxÑtyrpm􀀁zhzhxÑ􀀁wvysm􀀁jvojxhÇmupà􀀁j􀀁YxÑt􀀁yzhu{z􀀁jvojxhÇhzÖ􀀁vzuàzÑm􀀁
{ 􀀁up}􀀁lvth􀀁p􀀁jÑixhyÑjhzÖ􀀁npj{Çp}􀀁j􀀁Üzp}􀀁lvth}􀀁x{yyrp}􀀁uh􀀁{sp~{%􀀁]vÜzvt{􀀁
j􀀁 wmxjÑm􀀁 kvlÑ􀀁 jvojxhÇmupà􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 uh􀀁 xvlpu{􀀁 uhisálhshyÖ􀀁
vwxmlmsmuuhà􀀁tmnuh~pvuhsÖuhà􀀁 uhwxànmuuvyzÖ%􀀁 [h~pvuhsÖuÑm􀀁 yzx{rz{xÑ􀀁
rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 wxpshkhsp􀀁 ivsÖÅpm􀀁 {ypspà􀀁 lsà􀀁 wxmvlvsmupà􀀁 Üzvkv􀀁
umlvjmxpà%􀀁 QvsÖÅvm􀀁 ouhÄmupm􀀁 ptmsv􀀁 vixhÇmupm􀀁 Y{x{szhà􀀁
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁 rv􀀁 jymt􀀁npzmsàt􀀁YxÑth#􀀁 wxpuàzvm􀀁 uh􀀁 wmxjvq􀀁
nm􀀁 ymyypp􀀁 Y{x{szhà􀀁 j􀀁 páum􀀁 '//'􀀁 kvlh#􀀁 klm􀀁 kvjvxpsvyÖ#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 rxÑtyrpm􀀁
zhzhxÑ􀀁 jvojxhÇházyà􀀁 uh􀀁 yjvá􀀁 xvlpu{􀀁 wvysm􀀁 tuvkvsmzumq􀀁 yyÑsrp􀀁 y􀀁
uhtmxmupmt􀀁npzÖ􀀁 j􀀁lx{nim􀀁 p􀀁 lvixvyvymlyzjm􀀁 yv􀀁 jymtp􀀁 uh~pvuhsÖuvyzàtp%􀀁
`hrnm􀀁kvjvxpsvyÖ#􀀁 Äzv􀀁uprhrp}􀀁wxmzmuopq􀀁r􀀁sálàt#􀀁npj{Çp}􀀁j􀀁vzvixhuuÑ}􀀁
j􀀁 '/**􀀁 kvl{􀀁 p}􀀁 lvth}#􀀁 um􀀁 i{lmz%􀀁 [v􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt{􀀁 wxvlvsnhsp􀀁 y{ÇmyzjvjhzÖ􀀁
hrzpjuv􀀁 wvllmxnpjhmtÑm􀀁 xvyypqyrptp􀀁 ywm~ys{nihtp􀀁 ^vyypp􀀁
tuvkvÄpysmuuÑm􀀁ÅvjpupyzpÄmyrpm􀀁vxkhupoh~pp#􀀁}vzà􀀁j􀀁~msvt􀀁vup􀀁uh􀀁jÑivxh}􀀁
um􀀁 uhipxhsp􀀁 ivsmm􀀁 )$*􀀁 􀀁 kvsvyvj􀀁 npzmsmq%􀀁 [hwxptmx#􀀁 rxhqum
ÅvjpupyzpÄmyrhà􀀁 whxzpà􀀁 K^{yyrvm􀀁 mlpuyzjvL􀀁 jv􀀁 kshjm􀀁 y􀀁 uÑumÅupt􀀁
KwxmtÖmx$tpupyzxvtL􀀁 j􀀁 vrr{wpxvjhuuvt􀀁 YxÑt{􀀁 _%PrymuvjÑt#􀀁 rvzvxÑq􀀁 j􀀁
kvlÑ􀀁 wxhjsmupà􀀁 wxmoplmuzh􀀁 R%gu{rvjpÄh􀀁 ohupthsyà􀀁 jtmyzm􀀁 y􀀁 zhr􀀁
uhoÑjhmtÑtp􀀁 KrxÑtyrptp􀀁 rhohrhtpL􀀁 uvÄuÑtp􀀁 wvkxvthtp􀀁 wvymsmupq􀀁
rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx#􀀁 uh􀀁 jÑivxh}􀀁 j􀀁 (&'&􀀁 kvl{􀀁 j􀀁 whxshtmuz􀀁P^􀀁Y􀀁uhixhsh􀀁 jymkv􀀁
vrvsv􀀁) 􀀁kvsvyvj􀀁poipxhzmsmq􀀁YxÑth%
.%􀀁 R􀀁 kvlÑ#􀀁 wxmlÅmyzj{áÇpm􀀁 xvyypqyrvq􀀁 vrr{wh~pp#􀀁 x{rvjvlyzjv􀀁
Pjzvuvtuvq􀀁 ^myw{isprp􀀁 YxÑt􀀁 jv􀀁 kshjm􀀁 y􀀁 P%ZvkpsmjÑt#􀀁 uhouhÄmuuÑt􀀁
wxmtÖmx$tpupyzxvt􀀁P^Y􀀁wvysm􀀁poixhupà􀀁wxmoplmuzvt􀀁arxhpuÑ􀀁R%gu{rvjpÄh#􀀁
h􀀁 zhrnm􀀁 lvjvsÖuv􀀁 jÑyvrvwvyzhjsmuuÑm􀀁 Äpuvjuprp􀀁 j􀀁 hltpupyzxh~pp􀀁
wxmoplmuzh􀀁 yzxhuÑ􀀁 wxmlwxpupthsp􀀁 hrzpjuÑm􀀁 wvwÑzrp􀀁 xhyrvsvzÖ􀀁 uhÅ􀀁
uhxvl#􀀁 um􀀁 wxpouhjhzÖ􀀁 Zmlnspy􀀁 j􀀁 rhÄmyzjm􀀁 wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuvkv􀀁 vxkhuh􀀁
uhxvlh􀀁 p􀀁 wvllmxnpjhzÖ􀀁 wvlvixhuuÑ}􀀁 ptp􀀁 yhtptp􀀁 sp~􀀁 po􀀁 Äpysh􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁
zhzhx#􀀁 rvzvxÑm􀀁 uprmt􀀁 um􀀁 iÑsp􀀁 poixhuÑ􀀁 p􀀁 uprvkv􀀁 um􀀁tvksp􀀁 wxmlyzhjsàzÖ%􀀁
Rym􀀁 Üzp􀀁 sálp􀀁 wvysm􀀁 vrr{wh~pp􀀁 YxÑth􀀁 ^vyypmq􀀁 yzhsp􀀁 hrzpjuÑtp􀀁
rvsshivxh~pvupyzhtp􀀁p􀀁wvyviuprhtp􀀁vrr{whuzvj%
/%􀀁 Y􀀁ymxmlpum􀀁 |mjxhsà􀀁 (&'*􀀁 kvlh􀀁^mjvsá~pà􀀁 lvyzvpuyzjh􀀁 lvyzpksh􀀁 yjvmkv􀀁
hwvkmà􀀁 uh􀀁 {sp~h}􀀁 Ypmjh%􀀁 RvoxhyzháÇpm􀀁 lmtvuyzxh~pp􀀁 wxvlvsnhspyÖ􀀁 uh􀀁
wsvÇhlp􀀁[mohjpyptvyzp􀀁y􀀁uvàixà􀀁(&')􀀁kvlh%􀀁 R􀀁}vlm􀀁nmyzvrp}􀀁yzvsruvjmupq􀀁
j􀀁 wmxpvl􀀁 y􀀁 '.􀀁 wv􀀁 ('􀀁 |mjxhsà􀀁 (&'*􀀁 kvlh􀀁 jvvx{nmuuÑm􀀁 ypsÑ􀀁 wxhjpzmsÖyzjh􀀁
{ipsp􀀁 ivsmm􀀁 yzh􀀁 wxvzmyz{áÇp}%􀀁 ('􀀁 |mjxhsà􀀁 wxvzmyz{áÇpm􀀁 joàsp􀀁 wvl􀀁
rvuzxvsÖ􀀁 wxhjpzmsÖyzjmuuÑq􀀁 rjhxzhs􀀁 j􀀁 ~muzxm􀀁Ypmjh#􀀁 uhyzhpjhà􀀁uh􀀁{}vlm􀀁
wxmoplmuzh􀀁Rprzvxh􀀁gu{rvjpÄh%􀀁 Wh􀀁Üzpt􀀁yxho{􀀁wvysmlvjhs􀀁wvimk􀀁gu{rvjpÄh
$
beepauu, muw noow u Goo6ue aceM epaocoaaw cmpabt cosemcxa
nponaeaa e meeue HecKonoux ecmuemu 6wyuaa Molctb, umo
KpuMcKux mamap stcnanu u Kpuua 3a u3Mey pooue u 3a mo, umo ou eot
6oiuwt Ko6t y6ueanu pyccux. Pacnpocmpawucv mace ym@epocoeu, umo
KpbtMcKue mamapbt nocne 6o36paueu 6 put cmaym 6o6pauyamo omumte
y Hux ooMa u st6pact6ams cu6yupux s mux oo.Max pyccKux a yuyy. IHomoMy
nepete eoot 6o6paueu KpuMcKux mamap Ha poouuy a6noanacv
onpeeneuna Meocayuonaba Hanpoceunocm. Hayuonanoble cmpymypbl
Kp6uMcKux mamap npuaeanu 6onouue ycuu on npeooneu moeo
eooepu. Doouoe 3avenue uweno o6pauyeue Kypyma
KpuMcKomamapcKoo Hapoa Ko &ceu ocumenu Kpuua, npuwmoe a nepsoi
ce ceccuu Kypyma « uoe 199] oa, ee eo6opuocv, mo KpuMcKue
mamapbl 6036pauaomc Ha coo po0uuy nocne MHoeoemei cc6tKu C
HaMepeueu cum 6 opypc6e u oo6pococeocme co 6cewu ayuonanoocmwu.
Taoice eo6opuocb, umo uKaKux npemew3ui noon.M, cu6yuux 6 omo6paux
e 1944 eooy ux ooMax, e 6yoem. Ho e Kpvuwy npoooocau cyuyecm6o6amt
aKmuso noepocusaevte poccucxuuu cneycnyoc6auu Poccuu
MHoeouceute uuouucmuuecue opeauayuu, xom e yeov ou na et6opax
He a6upau 6oee 3.4 % eoocos ocumenei. Hanpuwep, Kpaiue
uo6uucmuuecxa napmu «PyccKoe eoucmo» so ease c HIHeuHuM
«npewbep-Muucmpow» 6 OKKynupo6auno.M Kpuwy C.AKceHo6buM, Komop6ti 6
eooot npaneu npeueuma B.[wyKo6uua 3auac eMecme c max
Ha3bl6aeMblMu «KpbuMcKuM Ka3aKaMu» HOH6IM no2po.Mau noceeuu
KpuMcKux mamap, a st6opax e 2010 eooy e napnaveum APK a6pana sceeo
0Koo 3% eon0cos u6upamene~ KpuMa.
8. B eooot, npeouecmayouue poccuicxoi oKynayuu, pyKoso0cm6o
Aemoouo~ Pecny6nuxu Kpuu so ease c A.Mo2ue66tM, Ha3HaMeHH6IM
npewbep-wuuucmpou APK nocne u6pau npeuoeumou Vxpauu B.HwyKo6uua,
a maore osono 6tcoxonocmasneuvte uo&uxu 6 aoMuucmpapuu
npeueuma cmpan6 npeonpuuuau aKmu@note nonmxu pacxonomo Hau
Hapoo, He npua&am Meoocnuc e Kavecmee npeocma@umenonoeo opeaa
Hapoa u nooeporcuam noo6paunvux uMu cauuwu muy u3 uca KpbuwcKux
mamap, Komop6te uKeM He 6tu u6pabl u HuKoeo He Moeu npeocma6numb.
Bce mu oou nocne oKKynayuu Kptua Poccuei cmanu axmu6uwu
Koa6opauoucmaMu u noco6uxaMu oxKynaHmo6.
9. K cepeouue qdespan 2014 eoa Pesonoyu ocmouucmea oocmuena csoeeo
anoee a yuyax Kuesa. Bopacmaouue evocmpayuu npoooorcanucb Ha
nouaou He3a@ucuvocmu c no6p 2013 2oa. B xoe ocecmoxux cmonxnoeeuit
6 nepuoo c 18 no 21 qbespan 2014 eoa soopyoceute cut npa6umenocm6a
y6uu 6onee cma npomecmyouux. 2I qpe@pan npomecmyouue au noo
KoHmpo6 npa6umewcmeeunit 6apman 6 yeumpe Kueea, Hacmau6a a yxoe
npeueuma Buxmopa Huyxosuua. a muu cpa3y nocneoosan no6ee Hwyxo6uu
3
po􀀁Ypmjh􀀁 j􀀁 wvpyrh}􀀁{imnpÇh􀀁 j􀀁^vyypqyrvq􀀁bmlmxh~pp%􀀁 [h􀀁ysml{áÇpq􀀁 lmuÖ􀀁
]hxshtmuz􀀁 arxhpuÑ􀀁 wxpouhs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 gu{rvjpÄh􀀁 yhtv{yzxhupsyà􀀁 vz􀀁
vy{Çmyzjsmupà􀀁 yjvp}􀀁 ]xmoplmuzyrp}􀀁 wvsuvtvÄpq#􀀁 uhouhÄps􀀁 jumvÄmxmluÑm􀀁
]xmoplmuzyrpm􀀁 jÑivxÑ􀀁 p􀀁 {zjmxlps􀀁 jxmtmuuv􀀁 pywvsuàáÇmkv􀀁 viàohuuvyzp􀀁
]xmoplmuzh%􀀁 \luvjxmtmuuv􀀁 y􀀁 Üzptp􀀁 yviÑzpàtp􀀁 ^vyypqyrhà􀀁 bmlmxh~pà􀀁
uhÄhsh􀀁umohrvuu{á􀀁jvmuu{á􀀁 puzmxjmu~pá􀀁 j􀀁YxÑt{%􀀁 Y􀀁(-􀀁|mjxhsà􀀁(&'*􀀁kvlh􀀁
xvyypqyrpm􀀁jvqyrh􀀁joàsp􀀁wvs{vyzxvj􀀁wvl􀀁|popÄmyrpq􀀁rvuzxvsÖ%
'&%􀀁 '+􀀁 |mjxhsà􀀁 (&'*􀀁 kvlh􀀁 ^vyzpyshj􀀁 Rh}pzvj#􀀁 wxmlyzhjpzmsÖ􀀁xvyypqyrvq􀀁
um|zàuvq􀀁 rvtwhupp􀀁 K`hzum|zÖL􀀁 j􀀁 _mjhyzvwvsm#􀀁 YxÑt#􀀁 y􀀁 rvzvxÑt􀀁 à􀀁 iÑs􀀁
ouhrvt􀀁 tuvkv􀀁 smz#􀀁 wvwxvyps􀀁 tmuà􀀁 jyzxmzpzÖyà􀀁 y􀀁 upt%􀀁 R􀀁 zvz􀀁 nm􀀁 lmuÖ􀀁 à􀀁
jyzxmzpsyà􀀁 y􀀁upt􀀁j􀀁wxpuhlsmnhÇmt􀀁mt{􀀁xmyzvxhum#􀀁xhywvsvnmuuvt􀀁tmnl{􀀁
_mjhyzvwvsmt􀀁 p􀀁 Qh}Äpyhxhmt%􀀁 ZÑ􀀁 kvjvxpsp􀀁 v􀀁 yvzx{lupÄmyzjm􀀁 tmnl{􀀁
`hzhxyzhuvt􀀁 !xmyw{isprvq􀀁 j􀀁^vyypp#􀀁 j􀀁rvzvxvq􀀁 uh}vlpzyà􀀁Åzhi$rjhxzpxh􀀁
K`hzum|zpL"􀀁 p􀀁 YxÑtvt#􀀁 h􀀁 zhrnm􀀁 v􀀁 wshuh}􀀁 vzwxhjrp􀀁 ipoumy$􀀁
wxmlyzhjpzmsmq􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁j􀀁`hzhxyzhu%􀀁 ZÑ􀀁lvkvjvxpspyÖ#􀀁 Äzv􀀁lhzh􀀁
zhrvkv􀀁 jpopzh􀀁 i{lmz􀀁{yzhuvjsmuh􀀁 wvonm􀀁 p􀀁 Äzv􀀁 j􀀁wxvkxhttm􀀁 jpopzh􀀁 i{lmz􀀁
zhrnm􀀁jyzxmÄh􀀁y􀀁iÑjÅpt􀀁wxmoplmuzvt􀀁`hzhxyzhuh􀀁Z%􀀁ehqtpmjÑt%
''%􀀁 R􀀁 rvu~m􀀁 jyzxmÄp􀀁 ^vyzpyshj􀀁 Rh}pzvj􀀁 umvnplhuuv􀀁 yrhohs􀀁 tum#􀀁 Äzv􀀁
]xmoplmuz􀀁^vyypp􀀁Rshlptpx􀀁]{zpu􀀁}vzms􀀁iÑ􀀁 jyzxmzpzÖyà􀀁 yv􀀁tuvq%􀀁 R􀀁zv􀀁
jxmtà􀀁 wxmoplmuz􀀁 ]{zpu􀀁 uh}vlpsyà􀀁 j􀀁 _vÄp􀀁 uh􀀁 \sptwpqyrp}􀀁 pkxh}􀀁 p􀀁 Üzv􀀁
vouhÄhsv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁à􀀁lvsnmu􀀁iÑs􀀁vzwxhjpzÖyà􀀁j􀀁_vÄp􀀁uh􀀁jyzxmÄ{%􀀁 g􀀁jolxvku{s􀀁vz􀀁
Üzvkv􀀁 wxmlsvnmupà%􀀁 g􀀁ywxvyps#􀀁 ohÄmt􀀁tum􀀁 m}hzÖ􀀁 p􀀁 Äzv􀀁 ]xmoplmuz􀀁 ^vyypp􀀁
}vÄmz􀀁viy{lpzÖ􀀁yv􀀁tuvq%􀀁 a􀀁tmuà􀀁iÑsv􀀁vÄmuÖ􀀁wsv}vm􀀁wxmlÄ{jyzjpm􀀁wv􀀁wvjvl{􀀁
jymkv􀀁 Üzvkv%􀀁 Rh}pzvj􀀁 vzjmzps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 lpyr{yypà􀀁 i{lmz􀀁 rhyhzÖyà􀀁 i{l{Çmkv􀀁
YxÑth%􀀁 g􀀁 yrhohs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 um􀀁 wvuàs#􀀁 ohÄmt􀀁 tum􀀁 u{nuv􀀁 kvjvxpzÖ􀀁 v􀀁 i{l{Çmt􀀁
YxÑth#􀀁 rvzvxÑq􀀁àjsàmzyà􀀁ÄhyzÖá􀀁arxhpuÑ#􀀁 y􀀁wxmoplmuzvt􀀁]{zpuÑt%􀀁 `vklh􀀁
à􀀁vzrhohsyà􀀁 jyzxmÄhzÖyà􀀁 y􀀁 wxmoplmuzvt􀀁]{zpuÑt#􀀁 yvyshjÅpyÖ􀀁 uh􀀁zv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁
Üzv􀀁 um􀀁 tvq􀀁 {xvjmuÖ#􀀁 p􀀁 Äzv􀀁 ]{zpu􀀁 lvsnmu􀀁 jyzxmÄhzÖyà􀀁 um􀀁 yv􀀁 tuvq#􀀁 h􀀁 y􀀁
x{rvjvlyzjvt􀀁arxhpuÑ%
'(%􀀁 Rjmlmupm􀀁xvyypqyrp}􀀁 jvqyr􀀁 j􀀁YxÑt#􀀁 oh}jhzÑ􀀁 kvy{lhxyzjmuuÑ}􀀁viÉmrzvj􀀁
zhr􀀁 uhoÑjhmtÑtp􀀁 Kvzxàlhtp􀀁 yhtvvivxvuÑ􀀁 YxÑtL#􀀁 rvzvxÑm􀀁 iÑsp􀀁
vxkhupovjhuÑ􀀁 p􀀁 jvvx{nmuÑ􀀁 ihopx{áÇptyà􀀁 j􀀁 _mjhyzvwvsm􀀁 dmxuvtvxyrpt􀀁
|svzvt􀀁^vyypp􀀁 p􀀁 yvyzvàsp􀀁wxmpt{Çmyzjmuuv􀀁 po􀀁jxhnlmiuv􀀁 uhyzxvmuuÑ}􀀁r􀀁
rxÑtyrpt􀀁 zhzhxht􀀁 sp~#􀀁 h􀀁 zhrnm􀀁 uhouhÄmupm􀀁 vrr{whuzhtp􀀁 KwxmtÖmx$􀀁
tpupyzxvtL􀀁 YxÑth􀀁 x{rvjvlpzmsà􀀁 rxhqum􀀁 ÅvjpupyzpÄmyrvq􀀁 whxzpp􀀁
K^{yyrvm􀀁 mlpuyzjvL􀀁 jv􀀁 kshjm􀀁 y􀀁 iÑjÅpt􀀁 rxptpuhsÖuÑt􀀁 hjzvxpzmzvt􀀁 wv􀀁
rspÄrm􀀁 KSvispuL􀀁 _mxkmà􀀁Prymuvjh#􀀁 upÄmkv􀀁}vxvÅmkv􀀁 lsà􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁 um􀀁
wxmljmÇhsv􀀁 p􀀁 jÑoÑjhsv􀀁 uhwxànmuuvyzÖ􀀁 uh􀀁 wvs{vyzxvjm%􀀁 [hwxànmuuvyzÖ􀀁
jvoxvysh􀀁mÇm􀀁ivsÖÅm#􀀁 rvklh􀀁)􀀁thxzh􀀁(&'*􀀁k%􀀁 rxÑtyrpq􀀁zhzhxpu#􀀁vzm~􀀁zxvp}􀀁
lmzmq􀀁 ^mÅhz􀀁 Ptmzvj#􀀁 jÑÅmlÅpq􀀁 uh􀀁 vlpuvÄuÑq􀀁 wprmz􀀁 j􀀁 _pt|mxvwvsm􀀁 y􀀁
{rxhpuyrpt􀀁 |shkvt􀀁 p􀀁 wshrhzvt􀀁 y􀀁 uhlwpyÖá0􀀁 KTvsvq􀀁 vrr{wh~pá􀀂L#􀀁 iÑs!
u Kuesa e noucxax y@eocuua e Poccuicxo~ deepauu. Ha cneoyouui eo
Ilapnaveum Vpauw npuna, mo Huyxo6uua cavoycmpauc om
ocyuecm&eu c6oux Ilpeuoeumcxux nowovoui, a3au &eovepeote
Ilpeuoeumcxue s~opt u ymeepou @peMeno ucnowoueeo o63auocmu
Ilpeueuma. Ooopeveno c muuu coumuuu Poccuicxan deepau
Haaa we3axouuyo 6oeuuyo uumepseyuo e Kp6My. K 27 be@pan 2014 2oa
poccucue @oca su noyocmpoe noo qpuuuecxui xoumpo.6.
I0. 15 bespan 2014 2oa Poemucnas Baxumos, npeocmaeumee poccuicxoi
eqpmoiu Kounauu «Tameqpm» e Cesacmonone, KpuM, c Komop6uM 6u
3HaKoM MHoeo em, nonpocu Me 6cmpemumc c uu. B mom we oeuv
6cmpemuc c uu s npuuaoneoaueM eyy pecmopane, pacnonooceuuoM Mecody
Cesacmonoeu u DaxucapaeM. Mt eosopuu o compyouwecmee Me2coy
Tamapcmaow (pecny6uxo e Poccuu, e omopoi axooume uuma6-xsapmupa
«Tameqpmu») u KptwoM, a mace o naax omnpau 6uecnpeocmasumene
xpuvcux mamap e Tamapcmau. M ooeo@opuucb, mo oama
maxoeo 6uuma 6yem ycmano&ea no3ice u mo 6 npoepaue 6uuma 6yoem
maoice scmpea c 6wsuuu npeuoeumou Tamapcmaa M. LLHaiuuue66uM.
II. B oye 6cmpeuu Poemucnas Baxumos eocuoauno cKa3an MHe, mo
Ilpeueum Poccuu Bnaouwup Ilymu xomen 6t scmpemumc co uo~. B mo
6pew npeuoeum IHymu naxoouc e Couu a Ouunuicxux uepax u mo
o3aao, umo oocenu 6u omnpaumoc e Cou a scmpey. I e0poewyn om
moeo npeonooceu. I cnpocu, 3avet ue exam u umo lpeueum Poccuu
xoem o6cyoum co Mo~. N Meu 6to ovev noxoe npeowy&cm@ue no no6o0y
aceeo moeo. Baxumos om6emu, mo oucxyccu 6yem Kacamc 6yoyueeo
KptMa. I ea3a, mo He now, 3avet Me HyocHo eosopumo o 6yoyueM
Kpuwa, Komopotiu &emc acmio Vxpauwt, c npe3uoeumou Ilymuuuu. Toea
omKa3sac scmpeambc c npeuoeumow IlymuuuM, coca&uuucb Ha mo, umo
mo e Muoi ypo6ewb, u mo IHymu ooice cmpeamoc e co uoi, a c
pyKosocmsou /xpau6t.
I2. Beeoeue poccuicxux so~cx s KpuM, 3ax6amot eocyoapcm@euvux o6exmo6
max Hat6aevuwu «ompoauu cavoo6opot Kpuw», Komope 6tu
opeauo6at u 6oopyoce 6a3upyoupuwc e Cesacmonone 'HepoMopcKuw
qpomou Poccuu u cocmou npeuwyuyecmeeuno u3 @pace6no acmpoeHblx K
Kp6lMcKuM mamapaw uy, a mace Ha3HaeHue oKKynaHmaMu «npeMepMuucmpov
» KpuMa pyKo6ooumen Kpaie uoeuucmuuecxo~ napmuu
«PyccKoe eoucm6o» 6o ease c 6euuM KpuMuHabHblM a6mopumemot no
KuKe «To6uw» Cepee AKceosa, uweeo xopouueeo on Kp6uMcKux mamap He
npeseuano u 6bl6I6ao HanpeHHocmb Ha noyocmpose. Hanpocenocmo
6o3poca eue 6oouue, Koea 3 Mapma 2014 e. Kp6uMcKui mamapu, omey mpoux
oeme~ Peuam Auemos, sueouui a oouout nuxem e Cuuqpeponone c
yKpauucKuM qbaeou u naxamow c aonucoio: «[lono~ oKKyauo!», 6t
4
y}jhÄmu􀀁 Äsmuhtp􀀁Kvzxàlvj􀀁yhtvvivxvuÑL􀀁 p􀀁jÑjmomu􀀁 j􀀁hjzvtvipsm􀀁 po􀀁kvxvlh#􀀁
h􀀁Ämxmo􀀁umlmsá􀀁iÑs􀀁viuhx{nmu􀀁mkv􀀁zx{w􀀁yv􀀁ysmlhtp􀀁nmyzvrp}􀀁wÑzvr%
')%􀀁 dmxmo􀀁 zxp􀀁 luà􀀁 wvysm􀀁 wv}pÇmupà􀀁 ^mÅhzh􀀁 Ptmzvjh􀀁 p􀀁 oh􀀁 umlmsá􀀁 lv􀀁
viuhx{nmupà􀀁mkv􀀁zx{wh􀀁yv􀀁ysmlhtp􀀁 Ä{lvjpÇuÑ}􀀁wÑzvr#􀀁 ,􀀁thxzh􀀁(&'*􀀁kvlh#􀀁
lmw{zhzÑ􀀁 whxshtmuzh􀀁P^􀀁Y#􀀁 rvzvxÑq􀀁 mÇm􀀁 (-􀀁 |mjxhsà􀀁 uvÄÖá􀀁 iÑs􀀁 oh}jhÄmu􀀁
xvyypqyrpt􀀁 ywm~uhovt􀀁 imo􀀁 vwvouhjhzmsÖuÑ}􀀁 ouhrvj#􀀁 wvl􀀁 wxpytvzxvt􀀁 Üzp}􀀁
ywm~uhovj~mj􀀁 wxpuàsp􀀁 xmÅmupm􀀁 v􀀁 wxvjmlmupp􀀁 ',􀀁 thxzh􀀁 xm|mxmul{th􀀁 v􀀁
i{l{Çmt􀀁 yzhz{yh􀀁YxÑth%􀀁 QÑsv􀀁 wxmlmsÖuv􀀁àyuv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁xmÅmupm􀀁 v􀀁 wxvjmlmupp􀀁
jplptvyzp􀀁 Kxm|mxmul{thL􀀁 p􀀁lhzm􀀁 mkv􀀁 wxvjmlmupà􀀁 iÑsv􀀁 wxpuàzv􀀁 um􀀁 yhtptp􀀁
lmw{zhzhtp#􀀁 h􀀁 vrr{whuzhtp#􀀁 rvzvxÑm􀀁 wvÄmt{$zv􀀁 vÄmuÖ􀀁 zvxvwpspyÖ􀀁 p􀀁 um􀀁
yÄpzhspyÖ􀀁 up􀀁 y􀀁 rhrptp􀀁 uvxthtp􀀁 p􀀁 wxv~ml{xhtp#􀀁 wvzvt{􀀁 Äzv􀀁 j􀀁 yzvsÖ􀀁
rxhzÄhqÅpq􀀁 yxvr􀀁 wvlkvzvjpzÖyà􀀁 p􀀁 wxvjmyzp􀀁 uhyzvàÇpq􀀁 xm|mxmul{t􀀁
wxhrzpÄmyrp􀀁umjvotvnuv%
'*%􀀁 dmxmo􀀁umyrvsÖrv􀀁lumq􀀁wvysm􀀁viÉàjsmupà􀀁lhzÑ􀀁Kxm|mxmul{thL􀀁wvojvupsp􀀁po􀀁
Yhohup􀀁 p􀀁 wxmlsvnpsp􀀁 '(􀀁 thxzh􀀁 (&'*􀀁 kvlh􀀁 jyzxmzpzÖyà􀀁 y􀀁 iÑjÅpt􀀁
wxmoplmuzvt􀀁 ^myw{isprp􀀁 `hzhxyzhu􀀁 p􀀁 yvjmzuprvt􀀁 R%􀀁]{zpuh􀀁
Z%ehqtpmjÑt%􀀁 ]vyrvsÖr{􀀁 Z%ehqtpmj􀀁 àjsàmzyà􀀁 vlupt􀀁 po􀀁 lvjvsÖuv􀀁
hjzvxpzmzuÑ}􀀁 wvspzprvj􀀁 ^vyypp􀀁 p#􀀁 vluvjxmtmuuv#􀀁 yvjmzuprvt􀀁 R%]{zpuh#􀀁
zv􀀁 à􀀁 zvklh􀀁 wvl{ths#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 { 􀀁 umkv􀀁 tvnuv􀀁 i{lmz􀀁 xho{ouhzÖ􀀁 Äzv$spiv􀀁
vzuvypzmsÖuv􀀁 wshuvj􀀁 ^vyypp􀀁 wv􀀁 YxÑt{%􀀁 ]vzvt{#􀀁 à􀀁 lhs􀀁 yjvm􀀁 yvkshypm􀀁 p􀀁
wvx{Äps􀀁 yjvpt􀀁 wvtvÇuprht􀀁 wxpvixmyzp􀀁 ipsmzÑ􀀁 j􀀁 YhohuÖ􀀁 lsà􀀁 tmuà􀀁 p􀀁 zm}#􀀁
rzv􀀁 i{lmz􀀁tmuà􀀁 yvwxvjvnlhzÖ%􀀁 [v􀀁 Ämxmo􀀁lmuÖ􀀁 yuvjh􀀁wvojvupsp􀀁 po􀀁Yhohup􀀁 p􀀁
yrhohsp#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 jyzxmÄh􀀁 wmxmuvypzyà􀀁 j􀀁 Zvyrj{#􀀁 wvyrvsÖr{􀀁 wvysm􀀁 jyzxmÄp􀀁 y􀀁
ehqtpmjÑt􀀁}vzms􀀁iÑ􀀁 jyzxmzpzÖyà􀀁 yv􀀁tuvq􀀁p􀀁R%]{zpu%􀀁 _wxvypsp#􀀁 yvkshymu􀀁
sp􀀁à􀀁uh􀀁zhr{á􀀁jyzxmÄ{%􀀁 Rym􀀁Üzp􀀁wmxmkvjvxÑ􀀁v􀀁lhzh}􀀁p􀀁tmyzm􀀁jyzxmÄp􀀁jmspyÖ􀀁
y􀀁tvpt􀀁 wvtvÇuprvt􀀁 atmxvjÑt􀀁^{yzmtvt%􀀁 _􀀁zvq􀀁yzvxvuÑ􀀁 wmxmkvjvxÑ􀀁 jmsp􀀁
zhrnm􀀁wvtvÇuprp􀀁Z%ehqtpmjh􀀁 p􀀁 lx{kvq􀀁 yvjmzupr􀀁 R%􀀁 ]{zpuh􀀁 wv􀀁 |htpspp􀀁
Xthlhmj􀀁Plht􀀁Zp}hqsvjpÄ%
'+%􀀁 [h􀀁 wxmlsvnmupm􀀁 v􀀁 jvotvnuvq􀀁 jyzxmÄm􀀁 y􀀁R%]{zpuÑt􀀁 j􀀁Zvyrj{􀀁à􀀁 um􀀁 lhs􀀁
Ämzrvkv􀀁vzjmzh%􀀁g􀀁yvkshypsyà􀀁y􀀁wmxmjvlvt􀀁tmyzh􀀁 jyzxmÄp􀀁y􀀁Z%􀀁ehqtpmjÑt􀀁
po􀀁Yhohup􀀁 j􀀁Zvyrj{#􀀁 uv􀀁wvjvl{􀀁jyzxmÄp􀀁y􀀁R%]{zpuÑt􀀁 yrhohs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁vluv􀀁 lmsv#􀀁
mysp􀀁 vu􀀁}vÄmz􀀁 viy{nlhzÖ􀀁 imywxmwàzyzjmuuÑq􀀁 p􀀁tpxuÑq􀀁jÑjvl􀀁 yjvp}􀀁jvqyr􀀁
po􀀁 YxÑth#􀀁 uv􀀁 yvjymt􀀁 lx{kvm#􀀁 mysp􀀁 vu􀀁 }vÄmz􀀁 lprzvjhzÖ􀀁 {ysvjpà􀀁 uh􀀁 vyuvjm􀀁
yjmxÅpjÅmkvyà􀀁 |hrzh%􀀁 g􀀁 zhrnm􀀁 lvihjps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 vrvuÄhzmsÖuÑq􀀁 vzjmz􀀁 uh􀀁
Üzvz􀀁 jvwxvy􀀁 à􀀁 ytvk{􀀁 lhzÖ􀀁 spÅÖ􀀁 wvysm􀀁 viy{nlmupà􀀁 y􀀁x{rvjvlyzjvt􀀁 yjvmq􀀁
yzxhuÑ􀀁 p􀀁 jyzxmÄp􀀁 y􀀁 Z%􀀁ehqtpmjÑt%􀀁 dmxmo􀀁 lmuÖ􀀁 wvysm􀀁 Üzvkv􀀁 xhokvjvxh􀀁 à􀀁
jyzxmzpsyà􀀁 '&􀀁 thxzh􀀁 y􀀁 wxmtÖmx$tpupyzxvt􀀁 arxhpuÑ􀀁 P%g~muárvt%􀀁 \u􀀁
yrhohs􀀁tum#􀀁 Äzv􀀁wxmlwvshkhmz#􀀁 v􀀁 Ämt􀀁 i{lmz􀀁 kvjvxpzÖ􀀁xvyypqyrpq􀀁wxmoplmuz􀀁
p􀀁wvÜzvt{􀀁um􀀁jplpz􀀁ytÑysh􀀁j􀀁Üzvq􀀁jyzxmÄm%%􀀁 R􀀁zv􀀁nm􀀁jxmtà􀀁vu􀀁wxmlsvnpt􀀁
tum􀀁yhtvt{􀀁xmÅpzÖ􀀁jvwxvy􀀁v􀀁wvmolrm􀀁j􀀁Zvyrj{􀀁p􀀁jyzxmÄh}􀀁y􀀁Z%􀀁ehqtpmjÑt􀀁p􀀁
R%]{zpuÑt%
%
cx6ave eau «ompoo6 cavoo6opobD» u 6l6e3e 6 a6moo6ue u eopooa,
a epes eeno 6 o6napyoce eeo mpyn co cneoauu ocecmoxux noumox.
13. Hepe3 mpu onu nocne noxuueu Peuama AMemo6a u 3a eeo 0o
o6apyoceu eeo mpyna co ceauu uyoo6uuuux numox, 6 Mapma 2014 eoa,
oenymamt napavema APK, omoptit eue 2] bespa nooo 66u 3ax6ae
poccuiucxuw cneyaou 6e3 ono3a6ameowux 3HaKo6, noo npucMompov mux
cneya3o@yes npuwu peueue o npoeoeuu 16 Mapma pedepeoyMa o
6yoyuet cmamyca KpuMa. Duo npeenono co, mo peueue o nposeeuu
6uouvocmu «peqpepeoyMa» u oame eeo nposeoeu 6uo npuumo He cauu
oenymama.Mu, a oKKyaHmaMu, Komop6le noeMy-mo oeHt moponuucv u He
cumanucv Hu c KaKuMu HopMaMu u npoyeoypaMu, nomoyy umo 6 cmo6
Kpamaiuui cpox noeomoeumc u nposecmu acmouuiu peqpepedyM
npaxmuwecu He603MOM€HO.
]4.Hepe3 necxobo oeiu nocne of@neut oamt «peqdepeoyMa» no36ouu u3
Ka3au u npeoocuu I2 Mapma 2014 eooa scmpemumoc c 6euuv
npeuoeumow Pecny6uxu Tamapcmanu u coeemuxou B.Ilymun
M.LLHaiuuue66uM. IlocKooxy M.LLlawuee emc oouw u3 0060bnuo
a6mopumemonx nonumuxoe Poccuu u, oonospeMeno, co6emuou B.I]vmunua,
mo moeoa nooyMan, mo y Heeo Moco 6yem pay3name umo-nu6o
omocumenono nanoe Poccuu no Kpuwy. IHomouy, oa csoe coenacue u
nopyu cou noMoupuKaw npuo6pecmu 6uemt e Ka3av o Mew u mex,
mo 6yem Mew conposocoam. Ho epe3 oev co6a no6ouu u Ka3au u
cKa3au, mo 6cmpea nepenocumc e MocKy, nocKobKy noce 6cmpeu c
Ila~uuest.w xomen 6t scmpemumoc co uo~ u B.Iymuu. Cnpocuu, coeace
nu Ha mayo scmpey. Bce mu nepeeo6opt o oamax u Mecme 6cmpeu 6eucb
c Mouw nououpuxou Vvepotu Pycmevou. C mo cmopowot nepeeo6opt senu
maooce novouuxu M.LLlaiwueea u opyeoi cosemux B. Ilymua no qdavuuu
Huaoaee Aau Muxaioeuu.
I5. Ha npeonoceue o 6oMoocoi scmpee c B.Ilymuuouu 6 Moc6y He a
emxoeo omeema. I coenacuc c nepesooou Mecma scmpeu e M.LHHaiuue6uM
u Ka3au e Moc@y, Ho no@oy cmpeuu c B.Ilymu6u cKa3a, mo ooo eno,
ecu o xoem o6cycam 6ecnpenmcmeiu u Mupti 6vi6oo csoux 6oic
u KpouMa, Ho co6ceM opyeoe, ecu ou xoem ouxmo6am yco6ut Ha oco6e
c6epuuueueeoc qbaxma. H mace oo6asu, mo oxoamebwviu om6em a
mom sonpoc cMoey oamo uuv noce o6cyoceu c pyKo6oocmsou csoeil
cmpaHbt u 6cmpeu c M.LLlaiuue@but. 'Hepe3 oew nocne moeo pa3eo6opa
6cmpemuc I0 Mapma c npetbep-wuucmpow Vpauot A.HyeroxoM. Ou
cKa3a MHe, mo npeononaeaem, o e 6yem eosopum poccuicxui npe3ueum
u nomoyy e 6uoum cvbca s moi scmpee.. B mo e 6peu on npeooouv
Me caMoyy peuumb 6onpoc o noeoxe e Moc6y u 6cmpeax c M.Ha~uuuesuu u
B.IymuuM.
5
',%􀀁 g􀀁 wxpiÑs􀀁 j􀀁 Zvyrj{􀀁 uvÄÖá􀀁 ''􀀁 thxzh􀀁 (&'*􀀁 kvlh%􀀁 hÜxvwvxz{􀀁
KemxmtmzÖmjvL􀀁tmuà􀀁jyzxmzpsp􀀁rhrpm$zv􀀁 Äpuvjuprp􀀁 p􀀁wxàtv􀀁vz􀀁yhtvsmzh#􀀁
tpu{à􀀁 jyàrpm􀀁 zhtvnmuuÑm􀀁 p􀀁 whywvxzuÑm􀀁 rvuzxvsp#􀀁 j􀀁 yvwxvjvnlmupp􀀁
umyrvsÖrp}􀀁 hjzvtvipsmq#􀀁 wxpjmosp􀀁 j􀀁 kvyzpup~{􀀁 KarxhpuhL#􀀁 rvzvx{á􀀁 wvonm􀀁
wmxmptmuvjhsp􀀁 j􀀁 K_shjàuyr{áL%􀀁 `vq􀀁 nm􀀁 uvÄÖá􀀁 à􀀁 jyzxmzpsyà􀀁 y􀀁 wvysvt􀀁
arxhpuÑ􀀁 j􀀁 Zvyrjm􀀁 Rshlptpxvt􀀁 UsÉÄmurv􀀁 p􀀁 wvysvt􀀁 `{xm~rvq􀀁 ^myw{isprp􀀁
PqlÑuvt􀀁 _mokpuvt%􀀁 \ih􀀁 wvysh􀀁 xmrvtmulvjhsp􀀁 tum􀀁 jym􀀁 nm􀀁 jÑys{ÅhzÖ􀀁
R%]{zpuh#􀀁 hxk{tmuzpx{à􀀁 zmt#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 jÑys{ÅhzÖ􀀁 M􀀁 Üzv􀀁 jvjym􀀁 um􀀁 vouhÄhmz􀀁
yvkshypzÖyà􀀁 y􀀁 upt%􀀁 Rv􀀁 jxmtà􀀁 jyzxmÄp􀀁 y􀀁 wvysvt􀀁 `{x~pp􀀁 oh􀀁{npuvt􀀁 r􀀁 uht􀀁
wxpyvmlpupsyà􀀁p􀀁 yvjmzupr􀀁wxmoplmuzh􀀁^vyypp􀀁Xthlhmj􀀁P%Z%􀀁 [h􀀁ysml{áÇmm􀀁
{zxv􀀁 tmuà􀀁 wxpjmosp􀀁 j􀀁 wxmlyzhjpzmsÖyzjv􀀁 ^myw{isprp􀀁 `hzhxyzhu#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁
jyzxmzpzÖyà􀀁 y􀀁ehqtpmjÑt%􀀁 Rv􀀁 jxmtà􀀁 jyzxmÄp􀀁ehqtpmj􀀁 yrhohs􀀁 tum#􀀁 Äzv􀀁
}vzms􀀁iÑ􀀁wvtvÄÖ􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvt{􀀁uhxvl{􀀁p􀀁pywvsÖovjhzÖ􀀁jym􀀁mkv􀀁jspàupm􀀁
p􀀁 jvotvnuvyzp􀀁 lsà􀀁Üzvkv%􀀁 Tvihjps􀀁zhrnm#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 wxmoplmuz􀀁]{zpu􀀁ouhmz􀀁 v􀀁
uhÅmq􀀁 jyzxmÄm%􀀁 Yvklh􀀁 à􀀁 yrhohs􀀁 mt{#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 jzvxku{jÅpyÖ􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt#􀀁 ^vyypà􀀁
yvjmxÅpsh􀀁 ivsÖÅ{á􀀁 vÅpir{#􀀁 piv􀀁 uh􀀁 tuvkpm􀀁 kvlÑ􀀁 i{l{z􀀁 pywvxÄmuÑ􀀁
johptvvzuvÅmupà􀀁 tmnl{􀀁 uhÅptp􀀁 yzxhuhtp􀀁 p􀀁 Äzv􀀁 mt{#􀀁 rhr􀀁 yvjmzupr{􀀁
]{zpuh#􀀁ysmlvjhsv􀀁iÑ􀀁wvyvjmzvjhzÖ􀀁wxmoplmuz{􀀁umtmlsmuuv􀀁jÑjmyzp􀀁jvqyrh􀀁
po􀀁YxÑth#􀀁 Z%ehqtpmj􀀁{sÑiu{syà􀀁 p􀀁vzjmzps0􀀁 K_rhnpzm􀀁 mt{􀀁Üzv􀀁 yhtp%􀀁 \u􀀁
nlmz􀀁 uh􀀁 zmsm|vumL%􀀁 Whzmt􀀁tÑ􀀁 jtmyzm􀀁 y􀀁 upt􀀁 wvluàspyÖ􀀁 uh􀀁 jzvxvq􀀁Üzhn􀀁
v|pyh􀀁p􀀁jvÅsp􀀁j􀀁vlu{􀀁thsmuÖr{á􀀁rvtuhz{#􀀁 klm􀀁rxvtm􀀁zmsm|vuh􀀁wxàtvq􀀁yjàop􀀁
y􀀁wxmoplmuzvt􀀁iÑsp􀀁zvsÖrv􀀁lpjhu􀀁p􀀁vluv􀀁rxmysv%
'-%􀀁R􀀁Üzvq􀀁rvtuhzm􀀁{ 􀀁tmuà􀀁p􀀁yvyzvàsyà􀀁zmsm|vuuÑq􀀁xhokvjvx􀀁y􀀁wxmoplmuzvt􀀁
]{zpuÑt#􀀁 rvzvxÑq􀀁 wxvlvsnhsyà􀀁 )+$*&􀀁 tpu{z%􀀁 g􀀁 {ouhs􀀁 kvsvy􀀁 ]{zpuh#􀀁
wvzvt{􀀁Äzv􀀁umvluvrxhzuv􀀁ysÑÅhs􀀁mkv􀀁jÑyz{wsmupà􀀁wv􀀁zmsmjplmupá%
'.%􀀁 ]vysm􀀁vitmuh􀀁wxpjmzyzjpàtp#􀀁à􀀁yrhohs􀀁mt{􀀁v􀀁zvt#􀀁 Äzv􀀁um􀀁wxpm}hs􀀁yálh􀀁
lsà􀀁zvkv#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁lhjhzÖ􀀁mt{􀀁yvjmzÑ#􀀁 piv􀀁{ 􀀁umkv#􀀁 rhr􀀁{ 􀀁wxmoplmuzh􀀁ivsÖÅvkv􀀁
p􀀁 tvk{Çmyzjmuuvkv􀀁 kvy{lhxyzjh#􀀁 lvyzhzvÄuv􀀁 yjvp}􀀁 yvjmzuprvj#􀀁 h􀀁 wxpm}hs􀀁
zvsÖrv􀀁 lsà􀀁zvkv#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁 jÑyrhohzÖ􀀁 zvÄr{􀀁oxmupà􀀁 rvxmuuvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁YxÑth#􀀁
zv􀀁 myzÖ􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx#􀀁 uh􀀁 yviÑzpà#􀀁 rvzvxÑm􀀁 ymqÄhy􀀁 wxvpy}vlàz􀀁 j􀀁
YxÑt{%􀀁Thsmm􀀁à􀀁yrhohs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 jjvl􀀁xvyypqyrp}􀀁jvqyr􀀁uh􀀁zmxxpzvxpá􀀁YxÑth􀀁p􀀁
wxmlwxpupthmtÑm􀀁 ^vyypmq􀀁 tmxÑ􀀁 wv􀀁 mkv􀀁 huumrypp􀀁 àjsàázyà􀀁 kx{iÑt􀀁
uhx{Åmupmt􀀁 tmnl{uhxvluvkv􀀁 wxhjh#􀀁 p􀀁 Äzv􀀁 x{yyrpm􀀁 jvqyrh􀀁 lvsnuÑ􀀁 iÑzÖ􀀁
umtmlsmuuv􀀁jÑjmlmuÑ%
'/%􀀁 ]xmoplmuz􀀁]{zpu􀀁ywmxjh􀀁kvjvxps􀀁v􀀁zvt#􀀁 Äzv􀀁arxhpuh􀀁yhth􀀁zvnm􀀁jÑÅsh􀀁
po􀀁 yvyzhjh􀀁 ___^􀀁uhx{Åpj􀀁tmnl{uhxvluvm􀀁 wxhjv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 j􀀁Ypmjm􀀁 wxvpy}vlàz􀀁
yzxhÅuÑm􀀁 jmÇp􀀁 $ 􀀁 Kihulmxvj~ÑL􀀁 ytmyzpsp􀀁 ohrvuuvkv􀀁 wxmoplmuzh􀀁
R%gu{rvjpÄh#􀀁 zmxxvxpopx{áz􀀁 p􀀁thyyvjv􀀁{ipjház􀀁 sálmq􀀁 p􀀁 z%w%􀀁 rvumÄuv#􀀁
ouhs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 xvyypqyrhà􀀁 wxvwhkhulh􀀁 wxvzpj􀀁 arxhpuÑ􀀁 pywvsÖo{mz􀀁 wvlviuÑm􀀁
{zjmxnlmupà#􀀁 uv􀀁 uprhr􀀁 um􀀁 vnplhs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 zhrvm􀀁 yrhnmz􀀁 yht􀀁 wxmoplmuz􀀁
yzxhuÑ􀀁 p􀀁 wxpÄmt􀀁 Ämsvjmr{#􀀁 rvzvxÑq􀀁 wxpm}hs􀀁 j􀀁 Zvyrj{􀀁 po􀀁 Üzvkv􀀁 Ypmjh􀀁 p#􀀁
yvvzjmzyzjmuuv#􀀁 s{ÄÅm􀀁 mkv􀀁 ouhmz#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 uh􀀁 yhtvt􀀁 lmsm􀀁 wxvpy}vlpz􀀁 j􀀁 Üzvt
&
16. H npu6u e Moc6y owoo I1 Mapma 2014 2ooa. B aponopmy
«Lllepevembeso» Neu 6cmpemuu KaKue-mo uo6uKu u npuMo om caMo.nema,
MuHy scKue mauooceunuoe u nacnopmute KoHmpou, 6 conpo6oceuu
ecKooux a6moo6uei, npue3nu 6 eocmuuyy «Vxpaua», Komopyo no3oce
nepeuveo6au e «Ca&cKyo», To~ oce Hobo 6cmpemuc c nocoM
Vpauut e MocKee Bnaouupou Eneuxo u nocou Typeyxoi Pecny6uxu
Aiouou Ce3euou. O6a noca pexoveuoosanu Me sce oe 6tcyuamo
B.IHymuua, apeyveumupyn mew, mo 6tcyuamb mo 6o6ce He o3aaem
coeacumbc c Hut. Bo spew scmpeuu c nocnou ypuu 3a yocuoM K HaM
npucoeouuc u coemux npeueuma Poccuu Huaoaes A.M. Ha cneoyoupee
ympo Mew npuse3u s npeocmaeumencmso Pecny6uxu Tamapcma, umot
6cmpemumbcn c Lllai u wue6uM. Bo spew acmpeu ILlaiuwues ca3an Me, mo
xomen 6t noNob Kp6lMcKomamapCKO.My Hapoy u ucnob3o6am 6ce eeo &uuue
u 6o3MoocHocmu on moeo. [Io6asu maxoce, umo npe3uoeum Ilymu 3aem o
aue ecmpee. Koeoa cKaa eMy, umo @mopeuyuuuco Kpow, Poccu
co6epuua 6ouuyro ouuxy, u6o a MHoeue eoot 6yoym ucnopvebl
63auMoomouueu Mecoy HauuMu cmpaau u mo eMy, KaK CO6emHuKy
Ilymua, ceoosano t nocosemo6ams npeueumy Heveoeunto 6bi6ecmu soicKa
u3 Kpouua, M.LLla~uues ywt6uyc u om@emu: «Caocume euy mo cauu. O
ocOem Ha meeqboe». 3amet Mot 6Mecme c Hut nooucv Ha 6mopoi maow
oqpuca u souuu s ooy MaevKyo KoMHamy, ee KpoMe meeqpoa npoi c63u
c npeueumow 6tu monoxo ou&a u oono pecno.
I7. B mo~ xoMame y Mew u cocmoc meeqdouwvi pa3eo6op c npe3ueumoM
Ilymuwouw, Komoptit npoooocanc 35-40 uuuym. I y3Ha eooc Ilymua,
nomowy umo eoonoxpamo cnonuuan eeo vtcmyneu no meneeueuo.
I8. Hoene o6Meua npusemcm@uuuu, cKa3an eyy o mow, mo e npuexan cooa
on moeo, umot asamo eyy cosemt, u6o y Heeo, KaK y npeueuma 6onouoeo
u Moeyuecm@eunoeo eocyoapcmea, ocmamono csoux co6emuxo6, a npuexa
monoxo on moeo, umo6t 6vtcKa3am moKy 3peHu KopeHHoeo Hapoa Kp6tMa,
mo ecmo KpuMcKux mamap, Ha co6mun, Komopote ceiuac npoucxoom 6
Kpuwy. /lanee ca3an, umo 66oo poccuicxux soicx a meppumopuo Kp6uua u
npeonpuuuaeve Poccuei Mept no eeo auexcuu &omc e2py6tu
apyuueueM Meocoyapoonoeo npa6a, u umo pyccKue so~ca onocwot 6um
HeMeoneuno 6bu6eel.
[9. IHpeueum IHymu cnepea eosopu o mo, mo Vxpaua caMa moce 6vuua
u3 cocmaea CCCP uapyuuue Meocoyapoooe npaso, umo e Kueee npoucxoom
cmpauuote 6euu «6aepo6you» cMecmuu 3axouHoeo npes3ueuma
B.Myouua, meppopuupyom u Maccoso y6usaom node~ u m.n. I, oeHO,
3Han, mo poccucxa nponaeaoa npomue Vxpauut ucnon3yem nooo6vote
ymeporcoenu, Ho HuKaK He ocuoa, mo maKoe cKacem caM npeuoeum
cmpanot u npuueM enosexy, Komopit npuexan e Mocay u3 moeo Kuesa u,
coomeemem@euno, nyuue eeo 3Haem, umo Ha caMoy oene npoucxooum mot
6
kvxvlm%􀀁 Thsmm􀀁 R%]{zpu􀀁 wxmlsvnps􀀁 lvnlhzÖyà􀀁xmo{sÖzhzvj􀀁xm|mxmul{th􀀁 j􀀁
YxÑt{#􀀁 uhtmÄmuuvkv􀀁uh􀀁',􀀁thxzh􀀁(&'*􀀁kvlh#􀀁h􀀁ohzmt􀀁yuvjh􀀁jmxu{zÖyà􀀁r􀀁Üzvq􀀁
zmtm%􀀁 R􀀁vzjmz􀀁 à􀀁 yrhohs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 Üzvz􀀁xm|mxmul{t􀀁 umohrvuuÑq#􀀁 wxvzpjvxmÄpz􀀁
{rxhpuyrvt{􀀁 ohrvuvlhzmsÖyzj{􀀁 p􀀁 tmnl{uhxvluvt{􀀁 wxhj{#􀀁 p􀀁 jÑxhops􀀁
{jmxmuuvyzÖ#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 tmnl{uhxvluvm􀀁 yvviÇmyzjv􀀁 uprvklh􀀁 um􀀁 wxpouhmz􀀁 mkv􀀁
ohrvuuvyzÖ%􀀁 g􀀁 zhrnm􀀁 lvihjps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 rvxmuuvq􀀁 uhxvl􀀁 YxÑth#􀀁 j􀀁 sp~m􀀁 yjvmkv􀀁
jÑyÅmkv􀀁 wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuvkv􀀁 vxkhuh􀀁 $ 􀀁 Zmlnspyh􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁
uhxvlh#􀀁 {nm􀀁 wxpuàs􀀁 xmÅmupm􀀁 ivqrvzpxvjhzÖ􀀁 Üzvz􀀁 xm|mxmul{t%􀀁 ]{zpu􀀁
juvjÖ􀀁 wvjzvxps􀀁 yjvm􀀁wxmlsvnmupm􀀁wvlvnlhzÖ􀀁 y􀀁jÑjvlhtp􀀁mÇm􀀁 *􀀁 luà#􀀁 rvklh􀀁
KrxÑtyrpq􀀁 uhxvlL􀀁 yht􀀁 uh􀀁 xm|mxmul{tm􀀁 ',􀀁 thxzh􀀁 vwxmlmspz􀀁 yzhz{y􀀁
wvs{vyzxvjh%
􀀂􀀂􀀁 ]vysm􀀁 Üzvkv􀀁 vitmuh􀀁 tumupàtp􀀁 wxmoplmuz􀀁 ]{zpu􀀁 jÑxhops􀀁 yjvá􀀁
vohivÄmuuvyzÖ􀀁 j􀀁 yjàop􀀁 y􀀁 jvotvnuÑtp􀀁 yzvsruvjmupàtp􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 p􀀁
xvyypqyrp}􀀁yvslhz%􀀁 WlmyÖ􀀁 vÄmuÖ􀀁puzmxmyuv􀀁zv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁R%]{zpu􀀁 j􀀁zvz􀀁nm􀀁lmuÖ􀀁
ohàjsàs􀀁 wxmyym#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt{#􀀁 oh􀀁 wxmlmshtp􀀁 ihoÑ􀀁 dmxuvtvxyrvkv􀀁 |svzh􀀁 j􀀁
_mjhyzvwvsm#􀀁 umz􀀁uprhrp}􀀁jvvx{nmuuÑ}􀀁yps􀀁^vyypp%􀀁 g􀀁zhrnm􀀁jÑxhops􀀁yjvá􀀁
vohivÄmuuvyzÖ􀀁 wv􀀁 wvjvl{􀀁 jvotvnuÑ}􀀁{kxvo􀀁 lsà􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx#􀀁 rvzvxÑm#􀀁
jwvsum􀀁 vÄmjpluv#􀀁 i{l{z􀀁 wxvlvsnhzÖ􀀁 vzyzhpjhzÖ􀀁 zmxxpzvxphsÖu{á􀀁
~msvyzuvyzÖ􀀁arxhpuÑ%
('%􀀁 R􀀁 yjmzm􀀁 tuvkvÄpysmuuÑ}􀀁 wxvzmyzuÑ}􀀁 ohàjsmupq􀀁 Zmlnspyh􀀁
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁wv􀀁 wvjvl{􀀁lmqyzjpq􀀁^vyypp􀀁j􀀁YxÑt{#􀀁 wv􀀁 wvjvl{􀀁
wshuvj􀀁 wxvjmlmupà􀀁 umohrvuuvkv􀀁 Kxm|mxmul{thL#􀀁 yvolhupà􀀁 ÅvjpupyzpÄmyrp}􀀁
zhr􀀁 uhoÑjhmtÑ}􀀁 Kvzxàlvj􀀁 yhtvvivxvuÑL􀀁 p􀀁 wxvÄmkv#􀀁 à􀀁 um􀀁 l{thá#􀀁 Äzv􀀁
wxmoplmuz􀀁 ]{zpu􀀁 vnplhs􀀁 wvs{ÄpzÖ􀀁 ohjmxmupà􀀁 v􀀁 wvllmxnrm􀀁 huumrypp􀀁 yv􀀁
yzvxvuÑ􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx%􀀁 a􀀁tmuà􀀁 yvolhsvyÖ􀀁 jwmÄhzsmupm#􀀁 Äzv􀀁vu􀀁}vzms#􀀁 wv􀀁
tmuÖÅmq􀀁tmxm#􀀁ohx{ÄpzÖyà􀀁uhÅpt􀀁umqzxhspzmzvt%
((%􀀁 ]v􀀁 wvjvl{􀀁jÑyrhohuuÑ}􀀁]{zpuÑt􀀁 j􀀁}vlm􀀁 imymlÑ􀀁 vwhymupq􀀁 v􀀁 jvotvnuÑ}􀀁
wxvjvrh~pà}􀀁 p􀀁 yzvsruvjmupà}􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 y􀀁 xvyypqyrptp􀀁
jvmuuvys{nhÇptp#􀀁à􀀁vzjmzps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁yv􀀁yzvxvuÑ􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁vluvouhÄuv􀀁
um􀀁 i{lmz􀀁 rhrp}$spiv􀀁 wxvjvrh~pq#􀀁 uv􀀁 jÑxhops􀀁 vohivÄmuuvyzÖ􀀁 lmqyzjpàtp􀀁
x{yyrp}􀀁 zhr􀀁 uhoÑjhmtÑ}􀀁 Kvzxàlvj􀀁 yhtvvivxvuÑ􀀁 YxÑthL#􀀁 rvzvxÑm􀀁 tvk{z􀀁
wxpjmyzp􀀁 r􀀁 rx{wuÑt􀀁 tmnÜzupÄmyrpt􀀁 yzvsruvjmupàt%􀀁 R􀀁 vzjmz􀀁 ]{zpu􀀁
ohjmxps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁{nm􀀁 lhs􀀁 yvvzjmzyzj{áÇpm􀀁{rhohupà#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁 uvjÑm􀀁jshyzp􀀁uh􀀁
wvs{vyzxvjm􀀁 vzuvypspyÖ􀀁 y􀀁 ivsÖÅpt􀀁{jhnmupmt􀀁 r􀀁 wxhjht􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx%􀀁
\luhrv#􀀁 rhr􀀁 wvrhohsp􀀁 wvysml{áÇpm􀀁 yviÑzpà#􀀁 vyuvjuÑtp􀀁 viÉmrzhtp􀀁
wxmysmlvjhupq#􀀁 ohw{kpjhupq#􀀁 wv}pÇmupq􀀁p􀀁{ipqyzj􀀁sálmq#􀀁 wvjhsÖuÑ}􀀁viÑyrvj􀀁
yzhsp􀀁jym􀀁nm􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁zhzhxÑ%
()%􀀁 \zuvypzmsÖuv􀀁 jÑyrhohuuÑ}􀀁 R%􀀁]{zpuÑt􀀁 vwhymupq􀀁 v􀀁 jvotvnuÑ}􀀁
yzvsruvjmupà}􀀁rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁y􀀁 jvvx{nmuuÑtp􀀁 ypshtp􀀁^vyypp􀀁 j􀀁YxÑt{􀀁à􀀁
vzjmzps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 rxÑtyrpm􀀁 zhzhxÑ􀀁 wxp􀀁 ohÇpzm􀀁 yjvp}􀀁 wxhj􀀁 jymklh􀀁
wxplmxnpjhspyÖ􀀁 wxpu~pwh􀀁 umuhypspà#􀀁 h#􀀁 jv$jzvxÑ}#􀀁 $􀀁 wxp􀀁 zhrvt􀀁 àjuvt􀀁
umxhjmuyzjm􀀁 yps􀀁 jxàl􀀁 sp􀀁tvnuv􀀁 wxvkuvopxvjhzÖ􀀁 yhtvyzvàzmsÖuvm􀀁 jvmuuvm
'
2opooe. [lanee B.Iymu npeonoocu oocoamoc pe3ymamos pedepenuoyMa 6
Kpouuy, HaMeeuoeo a l6 Mapma 2014 eo0a, a 3ameu co6a sepuymbc moi
meve. B om@em cKa3an, umo mom pebepenoyu e3saxouwti, npomusopeum
yKpauHcKoMy 3aKoHoamenocmy u Meocoyapoooyy npa6y, u 66pa3u
y6epeocmo, mo Meocoyapoonoe coo6uecmso uxoeoa e npunaem eeo
3aKouHocm6. I mace oo6asu, umo xopeno apo KptMa, s uye csoeeo
6tcueeo npecmaeumenbnoeo opeaa -Meoocnuca KpuMcKomamapCKO2O
apooa, ypce npuw peuueue 6oxomupo6am mom peqdepeoyM. Ilymu
6no6 no6mopu csoe npeonooceue noocamo c 66oauu eue 4 ou, Koe0a
«p6uMeKui apoo» caw Ha peqpepeoyMe 16 Mapma onpeoeum cmamyc
no.nyocmpo6a.
20. Ilocne moeo o6vea ueuuwu npeueum Ilymu 66pa3u c6oo
o3a6oeuHocmv 6 c63u c 6o3MocH6Mu cmoKHo6eHuMu Kp6McKu mamap u
poccuiicxux coam. 3ecv oev uumepeco mo, mo BIlvmuu 6 mom oce eo
3a6. npecce, mo e Kpuwy, 3a npeeavu 6aw Hepuovopcxoeo qdoma 6
Cesacmonone, em uxaux 6oopyoceuoux cu Poccuu. H maxoce 6pa3u coo
o3a6oeuocm no no&ooy so3MoHlx yepo3 0 KpBLMcKu mamap, Komop6le,
6none oeeuono, 6yoym npoooocamo omcmau6am meppumopua6Hyo
yeocmocm /Kpauwt.
21. B cseme uoeouceuwux npomecmux 3a&eu Meoocuca
KpuMcKomamapcKoeo Hapoa no nosooy eicmeui Poccuu e Kpuwy, no no6ody
nano6 nposeoeu He3axouHoeo «peqpepenoyMa», co3au uuo6uucmuuecxux
max Ha36l6aeMnx «ompoo6 caMoo6opot» u npoeeo, He yMao, mo
npeuoeum IHymu ocuoan no1yumb 3a6epeu o noooepcxe auexcuu co
cmopot KpBuMcKu mamap. N Meu co3aocv sneameue, umo o xomen, no
MeHoueu Mepe, 3apyumbc Hauuu eiumpanumemoM.
22. Ilo no&ooy 6tcxaaunx IlymuuuM 6 xoe 6eceoot onaceui o 603Moocwonx
npo@oxayuux u cmono@euux KpuMcKu mamap c poecuicuwu
6oeuocyocauuwu, om6emu, mo co cmopot Kp6uMcKux mamap oouo3HauHO
ue 6yem KaKux-nu6o npo6oxayui, Ho 66ipau oa6oenocm oeicmuMu
pyccKux max Ha3bl6aeMbux «ompo6 caMoo6opout puMa», Komopble Moeym
npusecmu K KpymHbuM MewmHuecKuM cmoKHo&eHuM. B omeem Ilymu
3a6epu, umo yce an coomsemcm6youue yKa3au, umot Hoste acmu a
nonyocmpose omocuuc c 6onuuM y&arceueM npa6au KpBuMcKu mamap.
OoaKo, KaK noKa3au noceodyouue co6oumu, ocHoswbuMu o6exmaMu
npecneoosauii, 3anyeusauit, noxuueuiu u y6uicme noei, no6a6x o66cKo6
cmanu sce oce KpblMcKue mamapbl.
23. Omocumeono @tcxaaunx B.I/muuw onaceui o 6o3MoocHIx
cmoKuo6euux Kp6uMcKu mamap c 6oopyoceutMu cuauu Poccuu e KpuMy
om6emu, umo KplMcKue mamapt npu 3auume csoux npae 6ceeoa
npuepocusanucv npuuna eacuu, a, 6o-6mop6ux, - npu maKoM 6oM
Hepa&ecmee cu 6po u MoocHo npoeouposam cavocmomenonoe 6oeHoe
7
wxvzpjvyzvàupm􀀁 yvjmxÅmuuv􀀁 um􀀁 jvvx{nmuuÑ}􀀁 p􀀁 vÄmuÖ􀀁 thsvÄpysmuuÑ}􀀁
rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁 p􀀁xvyypqyrp}􀀁jvmuuÑ}%􀀁 Rtmyzm􀀁 y􀀁 zmt#􀀁 à􀀁 wvlÄmxru{s#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 j􀀁
sáivt􀀁ys{Ähm􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁zhzhxÑ#􀀁 rhr􀀁kxhnlhum􀀁 arxhpuÑ#􀀁 vÄmjpluv#􀀁 i{l{z􀀁 j􀀁
yjvp}􀀁lmqyzjpà}􀀁x{rvjvlyzjvjhzÖyà􀀁xmÅmupàtp􀀁yjvmkv􀀁wxhjpzmsÖyzjh%
(*%􀀁 \zlmsÖuv􀀁 wxmoplmuz􀀁 ]{zpu􀀁 wvlÄmxru{s#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 ^vyypà#􀀁 rhr􀀁 vÄmuÖ􀀁
tvk{Çmyzjmuuhà􀀁yzxhuh#􀀁 tvnmz􀀁smkrv􀀁xmÅpzÖ􀀁 jym􀀁yv~phsÖuÑm􀀁 p􀀁 wxhjvjÑm􀀁
wxvismtÑ􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx#􀀁 rvzvxÑm􀀁 arxhpuh􀀁 um􀀁 ytvksh􀀁xmÅpzÖ􀀁 oh􀀁 jym􀀁 ()􀀁
kvlh􀀁 yjvmq􀀁 umohjpyptvyzp%􀀁 g􀀁 yvkshypsyà#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 { 􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁
lmqyzjpzmsÖuv􀀁tuvkv􀀁 wxvismt#􀀁 uv􀀁ohtmzps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁ivsÖÅpuyzjv􀀁Üzp}􀀁wxvismt􀀁
àjsàázyà􀀁 ysmlyzjpmt􀀁 zvzhsÖuvq􀀁 lmwvxzh~pp􀀁 p􀀁 kmuv~plh􀀁 '/**􀀁 kvlh#􀀁 rvklh􀀁
YxÑt􀀁iÑs􀀁j􀀁yvyzhjm􀀁^vyypqyrvq􀀁bmlmxh~pp%􀀁 R􀀁zv􀀁nm􀀁jxmtà􀀁à􀀁vztmzps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁
mysp􀀁^vyypà􀀁}vÄmz􀀁wvtvÄÖ􀀁rxÑtyrpt􀀁zhzhxht#􀀁 vuh􀀁lvsnuh􀀁kvjvxpzÖ􀀁uh􀀁Üz{􀀁
zmt{􀀁 um􀀁 yv􀀁 tuvq#􀀁 h􀀁 y􀀁 {rxhpuyrpt􀀁 x{rvjvlyzjvt%􀀁 X􀀁 lvihjps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 lsà􀀁
wxvl{rzpjuvq􀀁 lpyr{yypp􀀁tmnl{􀀁 lj{tà􀀁 yzxhuhtp#􀀁 umvi}vlptv􀀁 viàohzmsÖuv􀀁
jÑjmyzp􀀁xvyypqyrpm􀀁jvqyrh􀀁po􀀁YxÑth%
(+%􀀁 ]xmoplmuz􀀁 ]{zpu􀀁 zhrnm􀀁 ohzxvu{s􀀁 jvwxvy􀀁 v􀀁 xvyypqyrv$z{xm~rp}􀀁
vzuvÅmupà}􀀁 p􀀁 jvotvnuvq􀀁 xvsp􀀁 ivsÖÅvq􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvq􀀁 lphywvxÑ􀀁 j􀀁
`{x~pp%􀀁 \u􀀁 yrhohs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 yÄpzhmz􀀁 ^mlnmwh􀀁 `hqpwh􀀁 fxlvkhuh#􀀁 wxmtÖmx$􀀁
tpupyzxh􀀁 `{x~pp#􀀁 yjvpt􀀁 lx{kvt#􀀁 h􀀁 rxÑtyrpm􀀁 zhzhxÑ􀀁 tvk{z􀀁 yzhzÖ􀀁
yjào{áÇpt􀀁tvyzvt􀀁tmnl{􀀁^vyypmq􀀁p􀀁 `{x~pmq􀀁lsà􀀁{rxmwsmupà􀀁p}􀀁vzuvÅmupq%􀀁
g􀀁um􀀁yzhs􀀁 rvttmuzpxvjhzÖ􀀁Üzv􀀁 mkv􀀁 jÑyrhoÑjhupm#􀀁 uv􀀁zvsÖrv􀀁ohtmzps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁
fxlvkhu􀀁 àjsàmzyà􀀁 ivsÖÅpt􀀁 lx{kvt􀀁 p􀀁 uhÅmq􀀁 yzxhuÑ#􀀁 h􀀁 rxÑtyrpm􀀁 zhzhxÑ􀀁
wxpshkház􀀁ivsÖÅpm􀀁{ypspà#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁iÑzÖ􀀁rxmwrpt􀀁Ktvyzvt􀀁lx{niÑL􀀁tmnl{􀀁
arxhpuvq􀀁p􀀁`{x~pmq%
(,%􀀁 ]vysm􀀁zvkv#􀀁 rhr􀀁à􀀁posvnps􀀁yjvá􀀁zvÄr{􀀁oxmupà􀀁p􀀁wvjzvxps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁
zhzhxÑ􀀁 jÑyz{wház􀀁 wxvzpj􀀁 sáivkv􀀁 wmxmytvzxh􀀁 kvy{lhxyzjmuuÑ}􀀁 kxhup~􀀁
arxhpuÑ#􀀁 p􀀁i{l{z􀀁ohÇpÇhzÖ􀀁 ~msvyzuvyzÖ􀀁 yjvmq􀀁yzxhuÑ#􀀁 wxmoplmuz􀀁]{zpu􀀁
yrhohs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁upÄmkv􀀁lx{kvkv􀀁vu􀀁um􀀁vnplhs􀀁vz􀀁tmuà#􀀁 piv􀀁ptmuuv􀀁zhrhà􀀁wvop~pà􀀁
lvsnuh􀀁iÑzÖ􀀁{ 􀀁rhnlvkv􀀁kxhnlhupuh􀀁yjvmq􀀁yzxhuÑ#􀀁h􀀁j􀀁zvt#􀀁 Äzv􀀁à􀀁whzxpvz􀀁
yjvmq􀀁 yzxhuÑ􀀁{􀀁umkv􀀁 umz􀀁 uprhrp}􀀁 yvtumupq%􀀁 X􀀁yuvjh􀀁 lvihjps0􀀁 K[v􀀁 lhjhqzm􀀁
jym$zhrp􀀁lvnlmtyà􀀁xmo{sÖzhzvj􀀁xm|mxmul{th􀀁',􀀁thxzh%L
(-%􀀁 ]v􀀁ohjmxÅmupp􀀁imymlÑ􀀁wxmoplmuz􀀁]{zpu􀀁 yrhohs#􀀁 Äzv􀀁kvzvj􀀁 viy{nlhzÖ􀀁
yv􀀁 tuvq􀀁 sáiÑm􀀁 jvwxvyÑ#􀀁 p􀀁 Äzv􀀁 zmsm|vu#􀀁 wv􀀁 rvzvxvt{􀀁tÑ􀀁 jmlmt􀀁xhokvjvx#􀀁
xhivzhmz􀀁 rx{ksvy{zvÄuv#􀀁 p􀀁 à􀀁tvk{􀀁 j􀀁sáivm􀀁 jxmtà􀀁tvk{􀀁 yjàoÑjhzÖyà􀀁 y􀀁 upt􀀁
Ämxmo􀀁Z%􀀁ehqtpmjh%
(.%􀀁 _􀀁 wmxjÑ}􀀁 nm􀀁 lumq􀀁 wvysm􀀁 uhÄhsh􀀁 jjvlh􀀁 xvyypqyrp}􀀁 jvqyr􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt􀀁 p􀀁
viÉàjsmupà􀀁 ^vyypmq􀀁 YxÑtyrvkv􀀁 wvs{vyzxvjh􀀁 ÄhyzÖá􀀁 yjvmq􀀁 zmxxpzvxpp􀀁
Zmlnspy􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁 ohàjps􀀁 v􀀁 umwxpouhupp􀀁 vrr{wh~pp􀀁 p􀀁
vixhzpsyà􀀁 j􀀁xhospÄuÑm􀀁tmnl{uhxvluÑm􀀁vxkhupoh~pp#􀀁 j􀀁zvt􀀁 Äpysm􀀁 j􀀁 \\[#􀀁 y􀀁
wxvyÖivq􀀁 wxpuàzÖ􀀁 tmxÑ􀀁 wv􀀁 wxmlvzjxhÇmupá􀀁 umohrvuuvq􀀁 huumrypp􀀁 yjvmq
(
npomusocmoue cosepuueno He oopyocennox u oeHb Manoucneulx
Kp6tMcKux mamap u poccuicxux soeuunx. BMecme c met, nooepxnuyn, mo 6
mo6ow cnyae Kpouucxue mamap6t, KaK 2paocoaue Vpau6t, oeeuono, 6yoym 6
csoux eicm6uux pyKo6oocmso6ambc peueuMu c6oeeo npa6umen6cm6a.
24. Omenonuo npes3ueum Ilymu nooepxny, umo Poccu, KaK oeb
Moeyuecmeenuna cmpaa, Moocem eexo peuumv @ce couabHbte u npa6ote
npo6newt KpuucKux mamap, omope Vpaua e cMoena peuum 3a ace 23
eoa csoe~ es3asucuvocmu. ] co2nacuc, umo y Kp6lMcKux mamap
oeicmsumebHo MHoeo npo6ne, Ho 3aMemu, umo 6onouucmso mux npo6neM
some cneocmueu momanooi oenopmayuu u eeoyua 1944 oa, Koe0a
Kpot 6un 6 cocmaee Poccuco~ deepayuu. B mo oce @pew omvemu, umo
ecnu Poccu xoem noMo KpbuMcKuM mamapaM, oa onoicHa eo6opumo Ha my
meMy e co uo, a c yKpaucKu pyKosocm@ou. H oo6aeu, mo ow
npooyxmusno~ oucxyccuu Mecoy o6yu cmpanaMu, neo6xoouuo o63amen6Ho
6bl6ecmu poccuicKue soicxa u pot.Ma.
25. IIpes3uoeum Ilymu maooce 3ampouyn sonpoc o poccuicxo-mypeyux
omouueuux u 6o3MocHoi ponu 6onouoiu puMcKomamapco~ ouacnopbl 6
Typyuu. O ca3a, umo cumaem Peoocena Taiuna pooeaa, npewoepMuucmpa
Typyuu, csouw opye0M, a Kp6uMcKue mamapbl Moeym cmamo
cs3youuu Mocmow Meorcoy Poccue~ u Typyue~ on yxpenneut ux omoueui.
He cman KoMMeumupo6am6 mo eeo 6lcKa3bl6aue, Ho mo1bKo 3aMemu, umo
pooeau emc 6onouuM opyeow u Haueit cmpawbt, a Kp6tMcKue mamapbl
npuaeaom 6onouue ycuu, mo6t 6um penKuM «Mocmo opyoc6ow» Meocoy
Vpauno~ u Typyuei
26. IHocne moeo, KaK uocu c6oo mouKy 3peu u no6mopu, mo KpuMcKue
mamapbt 66cmynaom npomue no6oeo nepecvompa eocyoapcmseuux epauf
Vxpau6t, u 6yoym 3auuuam6 yenocmocmb csoe cmpat, npeueum IHymu
cKa3a, mo uuweeo pyeoeo on He ocuan om Menu, u6o uueuno maxa no3uyu
ooocna 6um y Kacoeo epaocoaua coei cmpat, a 6 moM, mo nampuom
csoeiu cmpaHot y Heeo Hem uxaxux couneui. co6a o6a6u: «Ho a&aiume
6ce-maxu ooocevc peyomamos peqpepeoyua 16 Mapma.»
27. [lo 3a6epuueuu 6eceoo npeuoeum Ilymu cKa3an, umo eomos o6cycam
co MHoi no6e 6onpocot, u umo meneqpo, no KomopoMy Ml 6eeM pa3e2060p,
pa6omaem Kpyeocymono, u Moy 6 oboe 6pew Noey cs36amc c uM
epes M. LLlaiuwueea.
28. C nepoux oce oue~ nocne aaa sooa poccuicxux soicx e Kpow u
on@neu Poccuei Kpuucxoeo noyocmpo6a acmio csoei meppumopuu
Meoonuc KpblMcKomamapcKoeo Hapooa 3a6u o Henpuauu oKKyayuu u
o6pamuc 6 pa3uunute Meocoyapoowote opeauayuu, s mow uce e OOH, c
npocfo~ npuuums Mepot no npeoomepauyeuo eaKoo auHeKcuu c&oeit
8
xvlpuÑ%􀀁 ]v􀀁wxpoÑj{􀀁Zmlnspyh􀀁wxhrzpÄmyrp􀀁jmyÖ􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpq􀀁uhxvl􀀁
ivqrvzpxvjhs􀀁 zhr􀀁 uhoÑjhmtÑq􀀁 Kxm|mxmul{tL􀀁 ',􀀁 thxzh􀀁 (&'*􀀁 kvlh#􀀁
vxkhupovjhuuÑq􀀁 vrr{wh~pvuuÑtp􀀁 jshyzàtp􀀁 lsà􀀁 vwxhjlhupà􀀁 p􀀁 wvwÑzrp􀀁
smkhspoh~pp􀀁wxpyvmlpumupà􀀁YxÑth􀀁r􀀁^vyypqyrvq􀀁bmlmxh~pp%􀀁_􀀁Üzvkv􀀁jxmtmup􀀁
^vyypà􀀁 p􀀁 vrr{wh~pvuuÑm􀀁 jshyzp􀀁 uhÄhsp􀀁 xhyythzxpjhzÖ􀀁 Zmlnspy􀀁 rhr􀀁
kshjuvkv􀀁yjvmkv􀀁wxvzpjuprh􀀁j􀀁YxÑt{%
(/%􀀁 ]xptmxuv􀀁 Ämxmo􀀁 tmyà~􀀁 wvysm􀀁 tvmkv􀀁 xhokvjvxh􀀁 y􀀁 ]{zpuÑt#􀀁 tum􀀁 iÑs􀀁
ohwxmÇmu􀀁 jÉmol􀀁 j􀀁 ^vyypá􀀁 uh􀀁 wàzÖ􀀁 smz%􀀁 ((􀀁 hwxmsà􀀁 (&'*􀀁 kvlh􀀁 à􀀁 jÑmonhs􀀁 po􀀁
YxÑth􀀁 j􀀁 Ypmj􀀁 lvixvjvsÖuv#􀀁 zhr􀀁 rhr􀀁 wxmlyzvàsp􀀁 ymyypà􀀁 Rmx}vjuvq􀀁 ^hlÑ#􀀁
jhnuÑm􀀁 jyzxmÄp􀀁 p􀀁 ohx{imnuÑm􀀁 wvmolrp%􀀁 [v􀀁 wxp􀀁 wmxmymÄmupp􀀁 kxhup~Ñ􀀁
xvyypàum􀀁ohÄpzhsp􀀁tum􀀁 umrvm#􀀁 lhzpxvjhuuvm􀀁 '/$t􀀁 hwxmsà#􀀁 uv􀀁 imo􀀁rhrvq$spiv􀀁
wvlwpyp􀀁 p􀀁 wmÄhzp#􀀁 wvyzhuvjsmupm􀀁 v􀀁 zvt#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 tum􀀁 ohwxmÇhmzyà􀀁 jÉmol􀀁 uh􀀁
zmxxpzvxpá􀀁^vyypp􀀁yxvrvt􀀁uh􀀁+􀀁smz%
)&%􀀁 _vviÇmupà􀀁 v􀀁 tvmt􀀁 ohwxmzm􀀁 uh􀀁 jÉmol􀀁 j􀀁 vrr{wpxvjhuuÑq􀀁 ^vyypmq􀀁 YxÑt􀀁
iÑyzxv􀀁 xhywxvyzxhupsvyÖ􀀁 j􀀁 tuvkvÄpysmuuÑ}􀀁 {rxhpuyrp}􀀁 p􀀁 ohx{imnuÑ}􀀁
yxmlyzjh}􀀁 pu|vxth~pp%􀀁 \luhrv􀀁 umrvzvxÑm􀀁 xvyypqyrpm􀀁 zmsmrhuhsÑ#􀀁 j􀀁
Ähyzuvyzp􀀁 K9HGGA<􀀁 ;D><JL􀀁 p􀀁 KYhuhs􀀁 (*L􀀁 ohàjpsp#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 uprhrvkv􀀁 ohwxmzh􀀁 um􀀁
iÑsv#􀀁 p􀀁 Äzv􀀁 pu|vxth~pá􀀁 v􀀁 ohwxmzm􀀁 jÑl{ths􀀁 à􀀁 yht􀀁 lsà􀀁 yviyzjmuuvq􀀁
yhtvxmrshtÑ%􀀁]vÜzvt{􀀁wv􀀁wxpiÑzpá􀀁j􀀁Ypmj􀀁à􀀁wvwÑzhsyà􀀁vzrxÑzv􀀁wmxmymÄÖ􀀁
{yzhuvjsmuu{á􀀁 vrr{whuzhtp􀀁 kxhup~{􀀁 p􀀁 jÉm}hzÖ􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt%􀀁 ]vyrvsÖr{􀀁
hjph~pvuuvm􀀁yvviÇmupm􀀁Ypmjh􀀁 y􀀁YxÑtvt􀀁iÑsv􀀁{nm􀀁wxmrxhÇmuv#􀀁 (􀀁thà􀀁 (&'*􀀁
kvlh􀀁 à􀀁 wvwÑzhsyà􀀁 jtmyzm􀀁 yv􀀁 yjvpt􀀁 zvjhxpÇmt􀀁 jÑsmzmzÖ􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt􀀁 Ämxmo􀀁
Zvyrj{%􀀁 [v􀀁 j􀀁 hÜxvwvxz{􀀁 emxmtmzÖmjv􀀁 yvzx{lupr􀀁 wvkxhupÄuvq􀀁 ys{niÑ􀀁
yvviÇps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁tum􀀁ohwxmÇmu􀀁 jÉmol􀀁 j􀀁YxÑt#􀀁 p􀀁 jx{Äps􀀁tum􀀁vixhzuÑq􀀁 ipsmz􀀁 j􀀁
Ypmj%􀀁 [h􀀁 ysml{áÇpq􀀁 lmuÖ#􀀁 zv􀀁 myzÖ􀀁 )􀀁 thà􀀁 (&'*􀀁 kvlh#􀀁 jtmyzm􀀁 y􀀁 umyrvsÖrptp􀀁
zvjhxpÇhtp#􀀁à􀀁uh􀀁hjzvtvipsm􀀁jÑm}hs􀀁j􀀁uhwxhjsmupp􀀁YxÑth􀀁lsà􀀁zvkv#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁
jumyzp􀀁 vrvuÄhzmsÖu{á􀀁 àyuvyzÖ􀀁 lsà􀀁 viÇmyzjmuuvyzp􀀁 j􀀁 jvwxvym􀀁 ohwxmÇmuv􀀁
tum􀀁 jÉmonhzÖ􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt􀀁 psp􀀁 umz#􀀁 wvyrvsÖr{􀀁 iÑsv􀀁 pojmyzuv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 uh􀀁 kxhup~m􀀁
i{lmz􀀁 lvyzhzvÄuv􀀁 tuvkv􀀁 rvxxmywvulmuzvj􀀁 yxmlyzj􀀁 pu|vxth~pp%􀀁 ]v􀀁
wxpiÑzpp􀀁 r􀀁 kxhup~m􀀁 ispo􀀁 ymsh􀀁 Pxtàuyrvm􀀁 tÑ􀀁 viuhx{npsp#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 jyà􀀁
zmxxpzvxpà􀀁 jvosm􀀁 wxvw{yruvkv􀀁 w{urzh􀀁 iÑsh􀀁 v~mwsmuh􀀁 xvyypqyrptp􀀁
yvslhzhtp#􀀁 zhurhtp􀀁 p􀀁 ixvumjÑtp􀀁 hjzvtvipsàtp#􀀁 h􀀁 y􀀁 vimp}􀀁 yzvxvu􀀁 zhr􀀁
uhoÑjhmtvq􀀁 KumqzxhsÖuvq􀀁 wvsvyÑL􀀁 tmnl{􀀁 arxhpuvq􀀁 p􀀁 vrr{wpxvjhuuÑt􀀁
YxÑtvt􀀁uh􀀁uhy􀀁iÑsp􀀁uhwxhjsmuÑ􀀁l{sh􀀁yuhqwmxyrp}􀀁hjzvthzvj%
)'%􀀁 Y􀀁 wxvw{yruvt{􀀁 w{urz{􀀁 wvlÉm}hsp􀀁 uh􀀁 hjzvtvipsà}􀀁 vrvsv􀀁 +􀀁 zÑyàÄ􀀁
rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 yv􀀁 yzvxvuÑ􀀁 YxÑth#􀀁 rvzvxÑm􀀁 zxmivjhsp#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁 tmuà􀀁
wxvw{yzpsp􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt%􀀁 dhyzp􀀁 po􀀁 up}#􀀁 vrvsv􀀁 wvs{zvxh$lj{}􀀁 zÑyàÄ#􀀁 {lhsvyÖ􀀁
wxvxjhzÖ􀀁 rvxlvu􀀁 p􀀁 wmxmqzp􀀁 uh􀀁 K[mqzxhsÖu{á􀀁 wvsvy{L#􀀁 klm􀀁 tÑ􀀁 y􀀁 uptp􀀁 p􀀁
jyzxmzpspyÖ%􀀁 ]xmlyzhjpzmsp􀀁 xvyypqyrp}􀀁 jvmuuÑ}􀀁 ohàjpsp#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 tum􀀁
ohwxmÇmu􀀁 jÉmol􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt#􀀁 p􀀁 vup􀀁 tmuà􀀁 up􀀁 j􀀁 rvmt􀀁 ys{Ähm􀀁 um􀀁 wxvw{yzàz%
)
poouu. IHo nput6y Meoocuca npaxmuuecu sec KpuMcKomamapexui uapoo
6oiuxomuposan max Hao6aevi «pepepeoy.v» 16 Mapma 2014 eoa,
opeauo6au6tit oKKynauOHHIMu 6acmMu o onpa6au u nonumxu
.neeauayuu npucoeoueu Kpuua Poccuicxo~ eepayuu. C moeo 6peweu
Poccu u oKKynayuouHbte 6acmu aau paccMampu6am Meoocuc KaK
ea6Hoeo c&oeeo npomu6uxa 6 p6My.
29. Ilpuvepo epe3 Mecy noce Moeeo paeosopa c Ilymu6uM, Me 66u
3anpeuyenu eve3o e Poccuo a nm nem. 22 anpen 2014 eoa 6te3oca u3
KpouMa e Kues oo6po6oowo, max KaK npeocmou ceccu Bepxoso~ Pa0t,
6aocHte «cmpeu u 3apybecote noeoKu. Ho npu nepeceeuu epauybl
poccuune 3aumau MHe HeKoe, oamupo&auoe I9- anpe, no 6e3 KaKoi-nu6o
noonucu u neamu, nocmaoeeHue o moM, mo MHe 3anpeuaemc 6ve3o Ha
meppumopuo Poccuu cpoxow a nem.
30. Coo6ueu o Moe 3anpeme a @ve3o 6 oKKynupo&aunt~ Poccuei Kpt
6tcmpo pacnpocmpauocv 6 MHoeouceHHblX yKpauHcKu u 3apy6eCH6lx
cpeocmsax uqpopMayuu. OoaKo HeKomopbte poccuicxue menexaa6l, 6
acmuocmu «Russia Today» u «Kaan 24» a6uu, umo uxaxoeo 3anpema e
6.no, u mo uqpopMayuo o 3anpeme 66uoyMa caw on co6cmseunoi
caMopexawot. IHomouy no npu~umuo e Kues nonumanc omxpumo nepece
ycmaoeeuyo oKKynaHmaMu epauuy u 6vexam 6 Kpu. IHocKoKy
a6uayuounoe coo6uenue Kuesa c KpMou 6to yce npexpauyeno, 2 a 2014
eoa nonmac «Meeme co csouu moapuueu uemem e Kpuw epe3
Moc6y. Ho s aponopmy Lllepevembe6o compyoux noepauuoi cypc6t
coo6uu, umo ue 3anpeuen 6ve e KpuM, u @pyu une o6pamt~ 6uem 6
Kues. Ha cneoyouu dee, mo ecm 3 Ma 2014 eooa, eMecme c ecxonxuwu
mosapuuau, Ha aemoyo6ue stexan s anpasneuu pt.Ma on moeo, mo6t
6Hecmu oxoameouyo cHocmo on o6uecmeocmu 6 6onpoce 3anpeueHo
MHe 6ve3cam e Kpuw uu em, nocxonoxy 66uo u6ecmo, umo Ha epauye
6yoem ocmamoo uoeo Koppecnodemos cpeocme uqdopayuu. Ilo
npu~umuu K epauye 6u cea Apuncoe Mot o6uapyocuu, mo 6c
meppumopu so3e nponycKnoeo nyuxma 6a oyenea poccuiicxuMu
coamau, mauKawu u 6pones6uwu a6moMo6uuMu, a c o6eux cmopon ma
Ha3bl6aevoiu «eiumpaooi noocu» Mecoy Vxpauoi u 0KKyupO6aHuM
Kpuwou Ha uac 6uu anpa&et oya cHaunepcxux a6moMamo6.
3]. nponycxoMy nyuxmy nooexanu a a6moo6uax oKoo 5 mcu
Kp6uMcKux mamap co cmopot Kpuua, Komop6te mpe6osanu, mo Mew
nponycmuu e Kpu. Hacmu u3 ux, oKoo noymopa-o6yx mtc, yanoc
npopeam Kopon u nepemu a «Hempanoyo noocy», ede Mot c uMu u
6cmpemuuco. Ilpeocma@umeu poccuiucxux 6oeubux 3a6uu, umo MHe
3anpeuye 6eo 8 Kput, u ou MeH Hu 6 KoeM cyae He nponycmm
9
\luvjxmtmuuv􀀁 vup􀀁ohàjpsp#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 um􀀁i{l{z􀀁 wxvw{ÇmuÑ􀀁 vixhzuv􀀁 j􀀁YxÑt􀀁 p􀀁 zm􀀁
rxÑtyrpm􀀁 zhzhxÑ#􀀁 rvzvxÑm􀀁 wxvxjhsp􀀁 rvxlvu􀀁 p􀀁 wmxmÅsp􀀁 uh􀀁 KumqzxhsÖu{á􀀁
wvsvy{L%􀀁 \iyzhuvjrh􀀁 uhrhsàshyÖ%􀀁 ]vyrvsÖr{􀀁 yviÑzpà􀀁 uh􀀁 kxhup~m􀀁
zxhuyspxvjhspyÖ􀀁 umrvzvxÑtp􀀁 {rxhpuyrptp􀀁 rhuhshtp􀀁 j􀀁 xmnptm􀀁 vushqu#􀀁 à􀀁
yzhs􀀁 wvs{ÄhzÖ􀀁 tuvnmyzjv􀀁 zmsm|vuuÑ}􀀁 ojvurvj%􀀁 R􀀁 Ähyzuvyzp#􀀁 po􀀁 ZvyrjÑ􀀁
wvojvups􀀁 p􀀁lmw{zhz􀀁Svyl{tÑ􀀁^vyypp􀀁Psmrymq􀀁Psmryhulxvj#􀀁 rvzvxÑq􀀁vimÇhs􀀁
wvtvÄÖ􀀁 tum􀀁 jÉm}hzÖ􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt#􀀁 mysp􀀁 à􀀁 vixhÇ{yÖ􀀁 Ämxmo􀀁 umkv􀀁 y􀀁 wxvyÖivq􀀁 r􀀁
wxmoplmuz{􀀁 R%]{zpu{%􀀁 g􀀁vzjmzps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 um􀀁 tvk{􀀁 vixhÇhzÖyà􀀁 r􀀁 wxmoplmuz{􀀁
puvyzxhuuvkv􀀁kvy{lhxyzjh􀀁y􀀁wxvyÖivq􀀁v􀀁xhoxmÅmupp􀀁jÉm}hzÖ􀀁uh􀀁yjvá􀀁xvlpu{%
)(%􀀁 ]vyrvsÖr{􀀁 uhwxànmuuvyzÖ􀀁 jvoxhyzhsh􀀁 p􀀁 um􀀁 pyrsáÄhshyÖ􀀁 jmxvàzuvyzÖ􀀁
rxvjhjvkv􀀁 yzvsruvjmupà􀀁 tmnl{􀀁xvyypqyrptp􀀁 jvmuuÑtp􀀁 p􀀁 wmxmÅmlÅptp􀀁 uh􀀁
KumqzxhsÖu{á􀀁wvsvy{L􀀁rxÑtyrptp􀀁zhzhxhtp#􀀁à􀀁ohàjps#􀀁 Äzv􀀁kvzvj􀀁wvrpu{zÖ􀀁
rvxlvu􀀁 p􀀁 jmxu{zÖyà􀀁 vixhzuv􀀁 j􀀁 Ypmj#􀀁 mysp􀀁 wmxmÅmlÅpm􀀁 rvxlvu􀀁 rxÑtyrpm􀀁
zhzhxÑ􀀁 i{l{z􀀁 vixhzuv􀀁 wxvw{ÇmuÑ􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt􀀁 p􀀁 um􀀁 i{l{z􀀁 wvljmxkhzÖyà􀀁 yv􀀁
yzvxvuÑ􀀁 xvyypqyrp}􀀁 jshyzmq􀀁 rhrpt$spiv􀀁 wxmysmlvjhupàt%􀀁 ]xmlsvnmupm􀀁
iÑsv􀀁wxpuàzv􀀁xvyypqyrptp􀀁jvmuuÑtp#􀀁 p􀀁à􀀁yzvàs􀀁uh􀀁KumqzxhsÖuvq􀀁wvsvymL􀀁lv􀀁
zm}􀀁wvx#􀀁wvrh􀀁wvysmlupq􀀁rxÑtyrpq􀀁zhzhxpu􀀁um􀀁wmxmymr􀀁rvuzxvsÖuÑq􀀁w{urz􀀁p􀀁
wmxmÅms􀀁uh􀀁 zmxxpzvxpá􀀁YxÑth%􀀁 Whzmt􀀁à􀀁 yms􀀁 j􀀁thÅpu{􀀁p􀀁jÑm}hs􀀁 vixhzuv􀀁 j􀀁
Ypmj%
))%􀀁 ^vyypqyrpm􀀁 jshyzp􀀁 um􀀁 jÑwvsupsp􀀁 yjvmkv􀀁 vimÇhupà􀀁 p􀀁 wvonm􀀁 yvzup􀀁
rxÑtyrp}􀀁zhzhx􀀁iÑsp􀀁wvljmxku{zÑ􀀁lmumnuÑt􀀁Åzxh|ht#􀀁h􀀁umrvzvxÑm􀀁iÑsp􀀁
hxmyzvjhuÑ􀀁 wv􀀁 vijpumupá􀀁 j􀀁 {Ähyzpp􀀁 j􀀁 imywvxàlrh}􀀁 p􀀁 yvwxvzpjsmupp􀀁
xvyypqyrpt􀀁jvmuuvys{nhÇpt􀀁uh􀀁rvxlvum%
)*%􀀁 ]v􀀁tmxm􀀁zvkv􀀁 rhr􀀁xvyypqyrpm􀀁jshyzp􀀁yzhsp􀀁{imnlhzÖyà#􀀁 Äzv􀀁rxÑtyrpm􀀁
zhzhxÑ􀀁 j􀀁 vyuvjuvq􀀁 yjvmq􀀁 thyym􀀁 p􀀁 p}􀀁 wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuÑq􀀁 vxkhu􀀁 um􀀁 i{l{z􀀁
wxpouhjhzÖ􀀁 ohrvuuvyzÖ􀀁 vrr{wh~pp􀀁 YxÑth#􀀁 wxvzpj􀀁 up}􀀁 uhÄhspyÖ􀀁xmwxmyypp%􀀁
aÄhyzpspyÖ􀀁 viÑyrp􀀁 j􀀁 npspÇh}􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 wvl􀀁 wxmlsvkvt􀀁 wvpyrh􀀁
KohwxmÇmuuvq􀀁spzmxhz{xÑL􀀁 p􀀁 vx{npà#􀀁 uhÄhspyÖ􀀁 imyysmluÑm􀀁 pyÄmouvjmupà􀀁 p􀀁
{ipqyzjh􀀁sálmq#􀀁 hxmyzÑ%􀀁 R􀀁uhÄhsm􀀁pásà􀀁(&'*􀀁kvlh􀀁ohwxmzpsp􀀁 jÉmol􀀁 j􀀁YxÑt􀀁
splmx{􀀁Zmlnspyh􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁^m|hz{􀀁d{ihxvj{#􀀁 wvonm􀀁iÑs􀀁
hxmyzvjhu􀀁 wmxjÑq􀀁 mkv􀀁 ohtmyzpzmsÖ􀀁 P}zmt􀀁 dpqkvo#􀀁 h􀀁 wxvzpj􀀁 jzvxvkv􀀁 mkv􀀁
ohtmyzpzmsà#􀀁 XsÉtp􀀁 atmxvjh#􀀁 oh􀀁mkv􀀁 puzmxjÖá􀀁zmsmrhuhs{#􀀁 pyrhopj􀀁wmxmjvl􀀁
mkv􀀁 ysvj#􀀁 jvoi{lpsp􀀁 {kvsvjuvm􀀁 lmsv􀀁 wv􀀁 vijpumupá􀀁 j􀀁 KwvyàkhzmsÖyzjm􀀁 uh􀀁
zmxxpzvxphsÖu{á􀀁 ~msvyzuvyzÖ􀀁 ^vyypqyrvq􀀁 bmlmxh~ppL􀀁 oh􀀁 zv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 vu􀀁
jÑyrhohsyà􀀁j􀀁zmsmjpopvuuvt􀀁puzmxjÖá􀀁v􀀁wxpuhlsmnuvyzp􀀁YxÑth􀀁arxhpum%
)+%􀀁 R􀀁hwxmsm􀀁(&',􀀁kvlh􀀁Zmlnspy􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁 iÑs􀀁ohwxmÇmu􀀁
Kjmx}vjuÑt􀀁 y{lvtL􀀁 vrr{wpxvjhuuvkv􀀁 YxÑth#􀀁 h􀀁 ohzmt􀀁 j􀀁 ymuzàixm􀀁 zvkv􀀁 nm􀀁
kvlh􀀁wvlzjmxnlmu􀀁Rmx}vjuÑt􀀁y{lvt􀀁^b%􀀁 ^vyypà􀀁tvzpjpxvjhsh􀀁 yjvq􀀁ohwxmz􀀁
zmt#􀀁 Äzv􀀁àrviÑ􀀁 Zmlnspy􀀁 àjsàmzyà􀀁 KÜryzxmtpyzyrvq􀀁 vxkhupoh~pmqL#􀀁 }vzà􀀁
xvyypqyrpt􀀁 jshyzàt􀀁 ohjmlvtv􀀁 pojmyzuv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 Zmlnspy􀀁 àjsàmzyà􀀁
wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuÑt􀀁vxkhuvt􀀁uhxvlh#􀀁 h􀀁um􀀁 Kvxkhupoh~pmqL#􀀁 p􀀁Äzv􀀁 vu􀀁uprvklh#
"
Oouo@peweuno ou 3a6uu, mo e 6yoym nponyuet o6pamo e Kpuw u me
KpuMcKue mamapbl, Komop6le npop6au Kopoo u nepeuuu Ha «eiumpabHyO
noocy», O6cmanosxa aKaac6, IHocxooKy co6umu Ha epauye
mpacupo6aucb HeKomopbuMu yKpauHCKuMu KaHaaMu 6 pecuMe oHauH,
cman noyams MHoecmso meeqpOvux 360HKo8. B acmocmu, u MOCK6vl
no3sou u enymam Focoy.wot Poccuu Aexce Aexcaopo6, Komopt~ o6eua
noMo Me vexam e KpuM, ecnu o6pauycv epes eeo c npoc6o~
npeueumy B.Ilymuwy. H omeemu, umo we Moey o6pauamoc x npeuoeumy
uwocmpauoeo eocyoapcm6a c npoc6o~ o pa3peueuu 6exam a coo poouuy.
32. IlocKo6Ky Hanpoceocmo 603pacmaa u He ucKoanacv 6epomuocmb
Kpo&a6oeo cmonoeeu Meocoy poccuiucxuwu 6oeunbuMu u nepeuueouuwu a
«eiumpabyo noocy» Kp6McKuMu mamapaMu, 3a6u, umo eomos noxuuymt
KopooH u 6epymoc o6pamo e Kues, ecu nepeueouue Kopoo KpuMcKue
mamapt 6yoym o6pamo nponyuyewot e KpuM u e 6yoym noosepeamc co
cmopowbt poccuiucaux 6acmei KaKuM-u6o npecneoosauuu, IHpeooceue
6wno npuumo poccuicxuwu soeuuuu, u cmo ua «eiumpaooi nonoce» do
mex nop, noxa nocneouiu Kpuwcui mamapunu e nepecex KoHmpooniu nyum u
nepeuen a meppumopuo KpMa. 3ameu ce 6 Mauuuuy u texan o6pamo 6
Kue6.
33. PoccuicKue 6acmu He &nonuuu csoeeo o6euau u nooce comuu
Kp6uMcKux mamap @vu noosepewymt oeeocwbw uumpaqaw, a exomopote 6uu
apecmo6ab no o6sueuo 6 yacmuu 6 6ecnopoxax u conpomuneuu
poccuicxuw 6oeuHocyocauuM Ha Kopone.
34. lo Mepe moeo KaK poccuicxue &acmu cmau y6eocamoc, umo KpuMcKue
mamapol 6 ocHosoi csoeiu Macce u ux npeocma6umeow~nu opan e 6yoym
npuuasamo 3aKoHHocm oKKynau KpuMa, npomus aux Haauc penpeccuu.
Vacmuucv o6cu 6 cuuuax Kp6uMcKux mamap noo npeonoeoM noucKa
«3anpeueunoiu numepamypbu» u opycu, aauco 6eccneowte uce3noseut u
y6uicmea nooei, apecmt. B aae uo 2014 eoa 3anpemuu 6e3 6 KpLu
uoepy Meoocnuca xpuucxomamapcxoeo apooa Pebamy Hy6apo6y, no3oce 6u
apecmosan nepsi eeo 3aMecmumeo Axme 'luieo3, a npomus 6mopoeo eeo
3a.Mecmumen, Ho.wu /vepo6a, 3a eeo uumep6bro menexanay, ucKa3us nepeoo
eeo co6, so6youu yeono@oe eno no o6sueuo e «noceamecme a
meppumopuaouyo yeocmocm Poccuicxo~ eepauuu» 3a mo, umo o
66lcKa3a 6 mene6uuounoM uumep6bro o npuaoeococmu puMa /Kpauue.
35. B anpene 2016 o~a Meooicuc Kpouucxomamapcxoeo apoa 6u 3anpeue
«6epxo8buM cyoo» oKKynupo&auHoeo puua, a 3amet s ceumope moeo oce
eoa noomeepocoenu Bepxo6but cyooy Pb. Poccu vomueuposaa csoiu 3anpem
meM, mo Ko6t Meoonuc eemc «KcmpeMucmcxou opeauayueiu», xom
poccuucxuu 6nacmu 3aeeouo uecmo, umo Meooenuc 6emc
npeocmasumebHuM OpeaHoM Hapooa, a He «opeanuayueu», u mo on uKo2a,
10
oh􀀁jym􀀁 kvlÑ􀀁 yjvmkv􀀁 y{Çmyzjvjhupà􀀁 y􀀁 kvlh#􀀁 um􀀁 ohupthsyà􀀁 rhrpt$spiv
KÜryzxmtpotvtL#􀀁 h􀀁 pyrsáÄpzmsÖuv􀀁 tpxuÑtp􀀁 p􀀁 umuhypsÖyzjmuuÑtp􀀁
tmzvlhtp􀀁vzyzhpjhs􀀁puzmxmyÑ􀀁yjvmkv􀀁uhxvlh%
),%􀀁 R􀀁hwxmsm􀀁(&'-􀀁kvlh􀀁Zmnl{uhxvluÑq􀀁 _{l􀀁\\[􀀁viàohs􀀁^vyypá􀀁vztmupzÖ􀀁
ohwxmz􀀁 uh􀀁 lmàzmsÖuvyzÖ􀀁 poipxhmtvkv􀀁 yhtpt􀀁 uhxvlvt􀀁 wxmlyzhjpzmsÖuvkv􀀁
vxkhuh􀀁M􀀁 Zmlnspyh􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh%􀀁 fzv􀀁xmÅmupm􀀁 _{lh􀀁 iÑsv􀀁
jvywxpuàzv􀀁 rxÑtyrptp􀀁 zhzhxhtp􀀁 y􀀁 ivsÖÅvq􀀁 ishkvlhxuvyzÖá􀀁 p􀀁
jvvl{Åmjsmupmt#􀀁 wvyrvsÖr{􀀁uhsvnmuuÑq􀀁xvyypqyrptp􀀁 jshyzàtp􀀁ohwxmz􀀁 iÑs􀀁
jym~msv􀀁 uhwxhjsmu􀀁 uh􀀁 zv#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁 xhoviÇpzÖ􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpq􀀁 uhxvl#􀀁
spÅpzÖ􀀁 mkv􀀁 jvotvnuvyzp􀀁 tpxuv􀀁 ohÇpÇhzÖ􀀁 yjvp􀀁 ohrvuuÑm􀀁 wxhjh􀀁 p􀀁
vismkÄpzÖ􀀁 wxpu{nlmupm􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 r􀀁 ytpxmupá􀀁 y􀀁 vrr{wh~pmq􀀁 yjvmq􀀁
xvlpuÑ%􀀁 \luhrv#􀀁 umjopxhà􀀁 uh􀀁 xmÅmupm􀀁 _{lh#􀀁 ohwxmz􀀁 uh􀀁 smkhsÖu{á􀀁
lmàzmsÖuvyzÖ􀀁 Zmlnspyh􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁 lv􀀁 ymkv􀀁 luà􀀁 um􀀁 yuàz#􀀁
zhrnm􀀁 rhr􀀁 um􀀁 yuàzÑ􀀁 ohwxmzÑ􀀁 uh􀀁 jÉmol􀀁 j􀀁YxÑt􀀁 mkv􀀁x{rvjvlpzmsàt%􀀁 Qvsmm􀀁
zvkv#􀀁 xvyypqyrhà􀀁 wxvwhkhulh􀀁 wxvlvsnhmz􀀁 p􀀁 lhnm􀀁 {jmspÄpjhmz􀀁 snpjÑm􀀁
w{isprh~pp#􀀁 uhwxhjsmuuÑm􀀁 uh􀀁 zv#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁 wxmlyzhjpzÖ􀀁 Zmlnspy􀀁
rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁 rhr􀀁 Üryzxmtpyzyr{á􀀁 psp􀀁 lhnm􀀁
zmxxvxpyzpÄmyr{á􀀁 Kvxkhupoh~páL%􀀁 ZÑ􀀁 xhyyÄpzÑjhmt􀀁 uh􀀁 zv#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 _{l􀀁
wxptmz􀀁Ü||mrzpjuÑm􀀁tmxÑ􀀁wv􀀁wxpu{nlmupá􀀁r􀀁jÑwvsumupá􀀁yjvmkv􀀁xmÅmupà%
)-%􀀁 YxÑtyrvzhzhxyrpq􀀁 uhxvl􀀁 vyviv􀀁 u{nlhmzyà􀀁 j􀀁 wvtvÇp􀀁 p􀀁 wv􀀁
wxmlvzjxhÇmupá􀀁 {upÄzvnmupà􀀁 vyzhzrvj􀀁 yjvmq􀀁 yhtviÑzuvq􀀁 r{sÖz{xÑ􀀁 j􀀁
YxÑt{#􀀁 rvzvxhà􀀁 ypyzmthzpÄmyrp􀀁 {upÄzvnhshyÖ􀀁 wvysm􀀁 ohjvmjhupà􀀁 YxÑth􀀁
^vyypqyrvq􀀁 ptwmxpmq􀀁 j􀀁 '-.)􀀁 kvl{􀀁 p􀀁 vyvimuuv􀀁 wvysm􀀁zvzhsÖuvq􀀁 lmwvxzh~pp􀀁
jymkv􀀁rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁uhxvlh􀀁 j􀀁thm􀀁 '/**􀀁kvlh􀀁jwsvzÖ􀀁lv􀀁xhywhlh􀀁___^􀀁
p􀀁wxvjvokshÅmupà􀀁umohjpyptvyzp􀀁arxhpuÑ%􀀁 _mqÄhy#􀀁 wvysm􀀁vrr{wh~pp􀀁YxÑth􀀁j􀀁
(&'*􀀁kvl{#􀀁wv􀀁y{zp#􀀁wxvlvsnhmzyà􀀁zh􀀁nm􀀁wvspzprh%
).%􀀁 ^vyypqyrhà􀀁wxvwhkhulh􀀁rhr􀀁j􀀁~msvt􀀁wv􀀁jymq􀀁yjvmq􀀁yzxhum#􀀁 zhr􀀁vyvimuuv􀀁j􀀁
vrr{wpxvjhuuvt􀀁 YxÑt{􀀁 hrzpjuv􀀁 wxvjvlpz􀀁 tÑysÖ􀀁 v􀀁 zvt#􀀁 Äzv􀀁 YxÑtyrpq􀀁
wvs{vyzxvj􀀁 àjsàmzyà􀀁 Kpyrvuuv􀀁 x{yyrvqL􀀁 zmxxpzvxpmq#􀀁 uh􀀁 zvt􀀁 vyuvjhupp#􀀁
Äzv􀀁 YxÑt􀀁 mÇm􀀁 j􀀁 rvu~m􀀁 '.$kv􀀁 yzvsmzpà􀀁 iÑs􀀁 ohjvmjhu􀀁 ypsvq􀀁 xvyypqyrvkv􀀁
vx{npà#􀀁 v􀀁 wxmjvy}vlyzjm􀀁 x{yyrvq􀀁 r{sÖz{xÑ􀀁 uhl􀀁 vyzhsÖuÑtp%􀀁 R􀀁
yvvzjmzyzj{áÇmt􀀁 l{}m􀀁 wmxmwpyÑjházyà􀀁 ÅrvsÖuÑm􀀁 {Ämiuprp􀀁 wv􀀁 pyzvxpp􀀁
^vyypp􀀁 p􀀁 YxÑth%􀀁 \luvjxmtmuuv􀀁 hrzpjuv􀀁 {upÄzvnházyà􀀁 whtàzuprp􀀁
r{sÖz{xÑ􀀁 rvxmuuvkv􀀁 rxÑtyrvzhzhxyrvkv􀀁 uhxvlh%􀀁 g􀀁{imnlmu􀀁 j􀀁 zvt#􀀁 Äzv􀀁
~msÖá􀀁 Üzp}􀀁 tmx􀀁 àjsàmzyà􀀁 yvolhupm􀀁 thrypthsÖuvkv􀀁 lpyrvt|vxzh􀀁 lsà􀀁
rvxmuuvkv􀀁 uhxvlh􀀁 p􀀁 wxpu{nlmupm􀀁 rxÑtyrp}􀀁 zhzhx􀀁 r􀀁 zvt{#􀀁 ÄzviÑ􀀁 vup􀀁
KlvixvjvsÖuvL􀀁 wvrplhsp􀀁 yjvá􀀁 xvlpu{%􀀁 ]hxhssmsÖuv􀀁 ^vyypà#􀀁 kx{iv􀀁 wvwpxhà􀀁
wvsvnmupà􀀁 Vmumjyrvq􀀁 rvujmu~pp􀀁 '/*/􀀁 kvlh􀀁 v􀀁 yzhz{ym􀀁 vrr{wpxvjhuuÑ}􀀁
zmxxpzvxpq#􀀁 hrzpjuv􀀁 yzpt{spx{mz􀀁 wmxmmol􀀁 uh􀀁 wvyzvàuuvm􀀁npzmsÖyzjv􀀁 j􀀁
YxÑt􀀁 kxhnlhu􀀁 po􀀁 zmxxpzvxpp􀀁 ^vyypqyrvq􀀁 bmlmxh~pp%􀀁 ]v􀀁 xhospÄuÑt􀀁
v~murht#􀀁 oh􀀁 ÄmzÑxm􀀁 kvlh􀀁 vrr{wh~pp􀀁 po􀀁 ^vyypqyrvq􀀁 bmlmxh~pp􀀁 j􀀁 YxÑt􀀁
wmxmymsmuv􀀁vz􀀁+&&􀀁zÑyàÄ􀀁lv􀀁'􀀁tpsspvuh􀀁xvyypqyrp}􀀁kxhnlhu%
""
3a 6ce eoot csoeeo cyuecmosau e 199] oa, e 3auMac KaKuM-6o
«KcmpeMu3Moo», a ucKoumeTbHO MupHbMu u HeHaCu6cm6eHHblMl
.MemooaMu omcmau6an uumepecot csoeeo napooa.
36. B anpene 2017 eoa Meocoyapoowu~ Cyo OOH o63an Poccuo omveum6
3anpem a emenoocm u6upaeMoeo cauuu Hapooo npeocmaumeooeo
opeana --Meoocnuca powcxomamapcxoeo apooa. mo peuueue Cyoa 66to
6ocnpuumo KpblMcKuMu mamapauu c 6oouo~ 6aeoapocmbio u
6o00yue&eueM, noCKobKy HaoeHHIi poccuiicKuMu sacmwu 3anpem 6bu
6ceyeno anpaee a mo, mo6t pa3o6uum6 Kp6uMcKomamapcKui Hap00,
uuumb eeo 6o3MocHocmu MupnHo 3auuuamb cGou 3aKOHHble npa6a u
o6eeumo npuwyocoeue KpbuMcKux mamap cMupeuo c oKKyhayueii csoei
poouwt. Ooaxo, Hee3upa Ha peueue Cyoa, 3anpem a neea6yo
oemebocm Meoocnuca KpbucKomamapcxoeo Hapooa do ceeo ou He cum,
mace KaK He cHm6 3anpemot Ha 6ve3 e Kpout eeo pyosooumen. bonee
moeo, poccuicxa nponaeaoa npoooorcaem u ace yeeuuusaem ocu6te
ny6uxayuu, Hanpa&euwote Ha mo, moot npeocmasumo Meoocuc
Kp6McKomamapCKoeO HapoOa KaK KcmpeMucmCKyo uu aoce
meppopucmuuecxyo «opeauayuo». Mt paccumtsaeM Ha mo, umo Cyo
npuvem qdqpexmu6note Mept no npuwyoceuo K sunoneuo coeeo peuueu.
37. KpuMcKomamapcxui Hapo oco6o uycoaemc e novouu u no
npeoom@paueuo yuumooceuu ocmamos csoeiu cavomuoi Ky6myp6l 6
KpMy, Komopa cucmeuamuecxu yuumocaacv nocne 3a6oesau KpuMa
Poccuco uunepuei e 1783 eooy u oco~euo noce momaouoi oenopmauuu
6ceeo Kp6uMcKomamapcxoeo apoa 6 Mae 1944 eoa 6nom do pacnaoa CCCP
u npo6oeaueu ea6ucuwocmu /xpauut. Ceiuac, noce oKKynayuu KpuMa 6
2014 eo0y, no cymu, npoooocaeme ma ore nonumuxa.
38. Poccucxa nponaeaoa ax 6 yenow no ace csoei cmpane, max oco6euo 8
oKKynupo6aunot KpuMy aKmuo npo6ooum otcw o moM, mo KpuMcKuit
noyocmpo6 eemc «ucKouHo pyccKoi» meppumopueu, Ha moM ocHo6auu,
umo Kpout eue 6 Koe 18-eo cmonemu 6bu 3a6oesau cuoi poccuicxoeo
opyocu, o npesocxoocmee pyccxoi Ky6mypot Hao ocmaowouwu. B
coomeemcm@youe oyxe nepenucsaomc uxobHble ye6uxu no ucmopuu
Poccuu u Kpuwa. Goo@peveuno aKmuo yuumoocaomc nawmuKu
Ky16mypol KopeHHOeO KpuMcKomamapCKo2o Hapoa. I y6eocoeu e mo, umo
yeoio mux Mep enemc coaue MaKcuMaonoeo oucxouqpopma on
KopeHHoeo HapoOa u npuuyoceue Kp6McKux mamap moyy, mo6t ou
«oo6po6onono» noxuau csoo poouuy. IHapane6no Poccu, epy6o nonupa
nonoceu Kee@co~ oHBeuu 1949 pooa o cmamyce oKKynupo6aux
meppumopui, aKmuso cmuwyupyem nepee3 a nocmouoe ocume6cm6o 6
Kpuw epaocoanu u meppumopuu Poccuicxo~ eepayuu. Ilo pa3uu6uw
oyeuxa, 3a emotpe eooa oxynayuu u Poccucxoi beepauuu s KpuM
nepeceneno om 500 mcu oo I uuuona poccueux 2pacau.
11
g􀀁wvlzjmxnlhá#􀀁 Äzv􀀁jÑÅmposvnmuuÑm􀀁wvrhohupà􀀁àjsàázyà􀀁lvyzvjmxuÑt􀀁p􀀁
zvÄuÑt#􀀁 yvkshÅháyÖ􀀁 wxmlyzhzÖ􀀁 wmxml􀀁 _{lvt􀀁 wv􀀁 tmxm􀀁 umvi}vlptvyzp#􀀁
ÄzviÑ􀀁vzjmzpzÖ􀀁uh􀀁jvotvnuÑm􀀁lvwvsupzmsÖuÑm􀀁jvwxvyÑ
)'􀀁 thà􀀁 (&'.􀀁kvlh􀀁 ]vlwpyÖ
"#
H noomeepocoao, umo 6blueuoceubte noKa3au 6omc ocmo6epHbuM u
mow6uM, coenauaoc npeocmam nepeo Cyou no Mepe eo6xoouvocmu,
mo6t om@emumb Ha 603MOCH6le onoumeHble 60npoCbl
31 .Man 2018 2o0a
12
Annex 17
Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko (6 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
􀀃􀀃
􀀺􀀬􀀷􀀱􀀨􀀶􀀶􀀃􀀶􀀷􀀤􀀷􀀨􀀰􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀼􀀸􀀯􀀬􀀤􀀃􀀷􀀼􀀶􀀫􀀦􀀫􀀨􀀱􀀮􀀲􀀃
􀀃􀀃
􀀃
1.􀀃 I am currently the Head of the Democratic Processes Program at the Ukrainian
Center for Independent Political Research. I started handling Crimean issues related also to
livelihoods and reintegration of Crimean Tatars into Ukrainian society back in 2008. Before
the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, I worked on various educational projects in Crimea.
2.􀀃 In particular, during 2007-2010 I was the head of the project called “Towards
a Peaceful and Tolerant Society in Ukraine. Interethnic Relations in the ARC: Enlightenment
and Education”, which was supported by the High Commissioner on National Minorities (the
HCNM) of the OSCE. 736 people took part in the events of the project, including
representatives of local government bodies, executive authorities, teachers, activists of local
communities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
3.􀀃 After that, I continued working on similar projects. In 2010, I was the head of
the project “Multicultural Dialogue as an Integral Part of High-Quality Education” during
which focus groups were held in village schools and the educational problems of Crimea were
analyzed. This project was implemented by the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political
Research. In 2013-2014, just before the Russian occupation, my colleagues and I worked on a
project aimed at implementation of a pilot program of multilingual education in Crimea and
other regions of Ukraine.
􀀕􀀃
Education in Crimea before the occupation
4.􀀃 Before the occupation of Crimea, my colleagues and I had completed a research
project of public education in Crimea. We studied, among other things, the state of education
in Crimean villages as well as multilingual education. When conducting our research of rural
education, we discovered certain problems related to access to education in Crimea including
insufficient financial support to schools in the villages of Crimea. The Ukrainian government
was aware of these shortcomings and it worked to address them through cooperation with
local authorities, my colleagues and me, as well as using other methods.
5.􀀃 During our studies of multilingual education, we discovered that parents and
schoolchildren in Crimea wanted students to learn Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean Tatar at
the same time. For example, such results were confirmed by a sociological survey of 2,026
schoolchildren and their parents in various districts of Crimea. The survey confirmed that
students and parents acknowledged the fact that multilingual education would enable
students to be prepared to live and work in the multinational Crimea. 48.5 percent of students
who took part in the survey expressed their desire to study the culture of nations living next to
them, in Crimea, and 26.2 percent of those wanted this subject to be included in the school
curriculum. The results of the 2010 survey showed that the desire to learn languages and
cultures of other ethnic groups of Crimea was expressed by the students who identified
themselves as Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Similar results were obtained in the
focus groups conducted in 2011 and the possibility of multilingual education did not raise any
objections at that time.
6.􀀃 Following these studies, my colleagues and I supported multilingual education
in Crimea, and, starting from the beginning of 2014, this system of education was for the first
time introduced in the preschool learning institutions of many districts of Crimea, including
the Bakhchysarai District. We also conducted educational seminars with teachers to develop
methods of advanced teaching of languages. Generally, the Decision of the Panel of the
Ministry of Education and Science, Youth and Sports of the ARC No. 5/7 dated September 16,
􀀖􀀃
2013 “On the Experiment Concerning the Implementation of Multilingual Education in the
Educational Institutions of the ARC” and the Decision of the Panel of the Education
Department No. 2 dated September 27, 2014 were adopted. The latter was associated with the
implementation in the preschool learning institutions of the autonomous republic in the
2013/2014 academic school year of the pilot project “Crimean School” aimed at introduction
of multilingual education and the Order of the Education Department, in particular, the one
subordinated to the Simferopol District Administration, No. 555 as of October 7, 2013. Then,
in the 2013/2014 academic school year, the status of an experimental pre-school learning
institution was assigned to the pre-school learning institution Orliatko of the Chystenke
Village Council.
7.􀀃 Back in the early 2000s my colleagues developed the integrated course called
“Culture of Good Neighborliness,” which was introduced into the curricula of Crimean school
institutions of all levels.
8.􀀃 The course “Culture of Good Neighborliness” systematized the knowledge
already gained by students in the course of mastering the school subjects of the invariant part
of the Basic Curriculum, as well as new information gained when learning subjects such as
local history, source study, ethnic history of the region, ethnography, axiology and
conflictology taught during this course. The training course “Culture of Good Neighborliness”
consisted of the regional program on intercultural education of children of preschool age
“Crimean Wreath” approved by the Decision of the Panel of the Ministry of Education and
Science of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea No. 6-4 as of August 22, 2004 and twelve
interrelated and structurally uniform programs for grades 1-12 (35 training hours per year).
On December 20, 2006, at the meeting of the Academic Council of the Crimean Republican
Institute of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education, and on December 27, 2006, at the Panel of
the Ministry of Education and Science of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the course
syllabus was approved in its entirety for all grades of comprehensive schools. On April 25,
2007 the syllabus of the special course “Fundamentals of Good Neighborliness” for students
of higher educational establishments of the ARC was approved by the decision of the Panel of
􀀗􀀃
the Ministry of Education and Science of the ARC. During the 2007/2008 academic year, the
approbation and implementation was already being conducted in 128 educational institutions
(including 68 schools and 4 higher education establishments) in 12 cities and 11 districts of
Crimea. It involved 118 groups, 267 classes, 9 student groups which included about 6,000
persons aged 4 to 21.
9.􀀃 This course includes studying the history of Ukraine in general and of Crimea
in particular, geography, culture, arts and traditions of various national groups of Crimea, as
well as mediation techniques and other means of resolving conflict situations. This course is
aimed at promoting tolerance and harmony among members of different ethnic and religious
groups of Crimea and also allows peaceful resolution of disputes arising between them.
10.􀀃 According to this course, the government of Ukraine made the teaching of
tolerance a priority, as a key principle of democracy, and encouraged these programs that
support cultural and educational activities aimed at promoting respect for the culture, history,
languages, traditions and customs of different ethnic groups living in Crimea. The Ministry of
Education and Science, Youth and Sports of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea also
approved and introduced the courses on intercultural education at different levels of the
curriculum, recommended introducing several specialized courses dedicated to different
cultures and religions. It also initiated the process of revising the history curriculum in order
to raise standards and support a multicultural environment, in particular, by introducing the
“Culture of Good Neighborliness.” The Ukrainian government also financed printing of
textbooks and these textbooks were delivered to Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean Tatar
schools for free.
11.􀀃 Before the occupation, instruction in Crimean schools was mostly done in
Russian; Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar, as languages of instruction, were virtually exceptions
to the general rule. At that time, there were seven schools in Crimea where instruction was
performed only in Ukrainian. These schools were located in Simferopol, Yalta, Kerch,
Feodosia, the urban settlement of Sholkine and Alushta. In these schools, students studied
subjects as Ukrainian grammar, use of language and literature, and other subjects (for
􀀘􀀃
example, mathematics and natural sciences) were also taught in Ukrainian. Students could
study Russian (or French, English or other foreign languages) and these subjects were taught,
at least partly, in these foreign languages.
12.􀀃 In Crimean schools with the Russian language of instruction, students studied
Russian grammar, use of language and literature as school subjects from 1st to 11th 12th) grade
and mastered the other school subjects (for example, mathematics and natural sciences) in
Russian too. Studying Ukrainian language and literature was also mandatory in such Russianlanguage
schools, and these subjects were taught in Ukrainian.
13.􀀃 In Crimean schools with Crimean Tatar language of instruction, students
studied the Crimean Tatar language as a subject (grammar, use of language and literature)
from elementary to senior grades (grades 1-12). However, in elementary schools the native
language was often taught using Russian because, when children came to school, they either
did not know the native Crimean Tatar language or did not know it well. Later on students
mastered other school subjects in either Russian or, more rarely, in Ukrainian, using some
terminology in Crimean Tatar.
14.􀀃 Until March 2014, there were also some specialists who worked on issues
related to teaching in Ukrainian in Crimea. These officials were associated with the Ministry
of Education of Ukraine and an equivalent body in the local government of Crimea. Before the
occupation, Ukrainian language teachers for Crimean schools were prepared in the
V.I. Vernadskyi Taurida National University in Simferopol. This teacher-training program was
established in mid-1990s and had nearly 50 Ukrainian language teachers graduate each year.
Teachers of Ukrainian also came from the mainland of Ukraine to teach in Crimea. In addition
to this, by early 2014, the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University had a four-year
joint training program in both Ukrainian and English. It comprised about 240 students (1-4
years of study) and 21 employees.
15.􀀃 Before the occupation, Ukraine also supported education in the Crimean Tatar
language. This language was banned during Soviet times. After gaining independence, Ukraine
not only supported the existing native speakers of Crimean Tatar, but also contributed to the
􀀙􀀃
spreading of and deeper insight into this language. In 2004, the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine approved the state standard for basic and secondary education. There was no
difference in objectives and content of mastering native languages (Ukrainian and languages
of national minorities or indigenous peoples). The aforementioned was approved by experts,
and it was also a positive factor for proper study of native language by children of national
minorities. The analysis of model curricula has shown that a school subject called “National
minority language” was listed in the compulsory section of standard curricula for schools and
included studies in languages of national minorities and indigenous peoples.
16.􀀃 To support the Crimean Tatar schools, the government of Ukraine established
training programs for teachers at the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University and at
the Philology Department of V.I. Vernadskyi Taurida National University. The abovementioned
educational institutions trained teachers of Crimean Tatar language and literature
prior to Russian occupation.
17.􀀃 The education system in Crimea before the occupation was supported by young
people and it was successful. Apart from Ukrainian, Russian, and Crimean Tatar, students
studied English, French, and other languages. Such students had then an opportunity to study
abroad in European countries and showed good academic results. They also had an
opportunity to study in Turkey. For example, owing to activity of Crimean Tatar organizations,
there were several hundred students and dozens of graduate students who studied at and
graduated from higher educational institutions of Turkey. At different times, there were nearly
250 Crimean Tatar students who studied in Turkish universities for free. More than a hundred
graduates have already returned from Turkey, most of whom worked in their area of expertise
at enterprises in Crimea and all over Ukraine.
Education in Crimea after the occupation
18.􀀃 After the occupation, the Russian Federation had taken a series of measures to
liquidate multilingual education programs in Crimea developed and implemented by Ukraine.
On June 25, 2015, the so-called Ministry of Education of Crimea issued an order saying that
the education in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages should not be conducted in a
􀀚􀀃
manner that harms the education in the Russian language and the study of the Russian
language.1 On December 18, 2014, Sergey Aksenov issued an “order” that stressed the
importance of integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation and turning Crimean residents
into true patriots of the Russian Federation.2 This “order” was implemented in education as
well as in other aspects of life in Crimea. I provide the copies of both “orders” to the Court.
19.􀀃 In accordance with such instructions, the Russian Federation quickly
liquidated Ukrainian schools that existed in Crimea prior to 2014. A few months after the
beginning of the occupation, there were only a few Ukrainian schools left in Crimea, while
other Ukrainian-speaking programs supported by me and my colleagues were systematically
destroyed. Even according to the data of the Russian Federation, there is only one school, in
Feodosia, where Ukrainian is the only language of instruction. This school has 9 grades and
less than 150 students, compared to seven such schools before the occupation. According to
my information, Ukrainian-language programs have also been eliminated in schools with
Russian and Ukrainian languages of instruction.
20.􀀃 Moreover, in September 2014, the Department of Ukrainian Philology was
liquidated at V.I. Vernadskyi Taurida National University of Simferopol; most teachers of the
department were laid off. Such actions led, inter alia, to a sharp reduction in the number of
teachers of Ukrainian language and literature. In addition, they were forced to be retrained as
teachers of Russian language and literature. In particular, based on the “order of the Ministry
of Education of the Republic of Crimea No. 116 dated August 6, 2014,” about 300 teachers of
Ukrainian language and literature were retrained as teachers of Russian language and
literature.3 I provide a copy of this “order” to the Court. Also, the Ukrainian-English program
available at the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University, where approximately 240
students were enrolled in 2014, now has only 40 students who will obtain their university
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
1 Order of the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of Crimea No. 01-14/382 (dated June 25,
2015) (Annex 892).
2 Order of S. Aksenov No. 522-II, which established the concept of patriotic, spiritual, and moral
education of population in Crimea (dated December 18, 2014) (Annex 894).
3 Order of the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of Crimea No. 116 (dated August 6, 2014)
(Annex 893).
􀀛􀀃
diplomas in Russian language.
21.􀀃 At first glance, the Russian Federation supported Crimean Tatar schools at the
beginning of the occupation, but, in fact, it exploits the Crimean Tatar schools as a tool to
spread its propaganda. For instance, the Crimean Tatar schools are not operated
autonomously, and the Russian government requires the teachers at these schools to select
from among a number of pre-approved textbooks to be used for their particular study course.
In fact, the Russian occupation authorities did not provide textbooks for all Crimean Tatar
schools until the 2017-2018 academic year.
22.􀀃 In addition, many Crimean Tatar schools were subjected to raids aimed at
finding the so-called “extremist” literature. For example, on September 9, 2014, the Russian
police raided the boarding school for gifted children at the village of Tankove, Bakhchysarai
district of Crimea. As a result, the school administration was forced to remove all Crimean
Tatar symbols. Russian authorities also called on teachers of Crimean Tatar schools to report
children who were absent on May 18—the memorial day for the victims of deportation of the
Crimean Tatar people in Crimea. Due to demands by the authorities, lectures and talks on
countering extremism and “Islamic extremism” were often held at Crimean schools.
23.􀀃 The prejudice that currently exists in these Crimean Tatar schools can also be
observed in the version of history taught there. The history of Russia is taught in Crimea in
accordance with the “Concept of New Educational and Methodological Complex on the
National History” prepared in the course of 2013-2014 pursuant to instruction of V. Putin. The
purpose of this concept is to distort the history of Russia in support of the establishment of an
idealized Russian civil identity and patriotism. In particular, the Russian government portrays
Stalin as a hero and minimizes his participation in the deportation of Crimean Tatars.
24.􀀃 It is revealing that the events in Ukraine after 2004 are described in the history
books of the Russian Federation as “political and ideological pressure on the Russian-speaking
population” in Ukraine (10th grade, “History of Russia: Beginning of the 20th–Beginning of
the 21st Century” (Moscow: Drofa, 2016, authored by O. Volobuev, S. Karpachov, and
S. Romanov). In general, starting in 2014, the history of Ukraine and Ukrainian literature
􀀜􀀃
disappeared from the list of humanities at educational institutions. Even games played at these
schools are used for Russian propaganda. For example, Crimean Tatar students are invited to
draw their parents in traditional Russian clothes.
25.􀀃 Finally, according to numerous reports, the Russian authorities exert pressure
on parents, forcing them to refrain from demanding that their children obtain education in
Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian languages. When parents work up the courage to make such a
request, they are systematically refused. I heard similar stories from people I know who moved
from Crimea to Kyiv after 2014. According to these stories, parents feel unsafe about
requesting for their children to be educated in Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar schools, and
therefore, they fail to submit corresponding requests to schools.
26.􀀃 It has also been reported that school principals made special efforts within their
communities to advise parents not to apply for their children to study in the Crimean Tatar or
Ukrainian languages, arguing that learning Ukrainian is a waste of time, while the knowledge
of Ukrainian will reduce their opportunities to continue their education in universities. Such
statements are an integral part of reorienting the entire system of education in Crimea towards
that of the Russian Federation and estrangement from the Ukrainian system. This overall
reorientation also involved, for example, the transition of Crimean schools to the Russian fivepoint
grading scale (instead of the European twelve-point grading scale) and encouragement
of graduates from Crimean schools to study in Russian universities.
27.􀀃 In the light of my observations of the developments in the education system of
Crimea since 2014 and taking into account what I have learned from parents of children
studying in this system, I believe that the actions of the occupation authorities are intended to
eliminate Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar education from the Crimean school system.
28.􀀃 I swear that the foregoing testimony is true and accurate, and I agree to appear
before the Court to give additional testimony, if necessary.
Signed in the city of Kyiv on June 6, 2018
[signature]
Yulia Tyshchenko
3ACTOCYBAHHI MIKHAPOJIHO~ KOHBEHI~ IIPO 3AOPOHY
IHAHCYBAHHI TEPOPI3MY TA MIKHAPOJIHO~ KOHBEHIIIj II1PO
JIIKBI/IAIIIIO BCIX OPM PACOBO~ JIICKPMIHAIUi
yKPAHA
1poTH
POCICKOi EJIEPAIi
CBIJIHEHHI IO.Ii THIIIEHKO
1. Ha pan ac n oonoo IlporpaMy eMoKpaTMHHx poueCiB B
VKDaHCKOMy IIeHTDi He3aIOKHHX IIOJIiTHHHX JIOCIJUKeH. BIIepIIIe H IIOaJI IIDaIUIOBaTH
3 IMTaHHMH KpHMy, o61auTyaHH Ta peirerpauii KpMcKX TaTap B yKpaicKe
cyCniCTO 2008 poi. /Io noaTKy pocicKoi oKyaLij KpHMy, B 2014 poi, npauoan1a
Ha/I pi3HMM OCBiTHMM IIDOeKTaMH y KpMMy.
2. 30KpeMa, BI1DOI10BK 2007--2010 pp. 6y1a KepiBHHKOM npOeKTy "Ha3ycrpi
MHDHOMy TOJIeDaHTHOMy CyCIiJICTBy B VKpaii. MieTHii B3a€MHHH B AP KpHM:
npociTa Ta HaBaHH", KHi 3iCOaBC 3a IiJTpHMKH BepxoBHorO KoMicapa 0BC€ 3
nMTaH» HaIiOHaJIHMX MeHIIHH (BKHM). B 3ax0ax poeKTy B3n1 yaCT 736 0ci6, cepet
KHX 6yJIM IIDeIICTaBHMKH OpraHiB MiCIeBOTO CaMOBDJIyBaHHH, OpraHiB BHKOHaBOi BIaJIH,
BHTeIi, aKTHBiCTH MiCIIeBHX TDOMII AP KpHM.
3. liCJ Oro npOIOBKyBaIa IIDaIUIOBaTH HaJI CXOKHMM IIDOeKTaMM. B 2010
poui 6y1a KepiBHMKOM IpOeKTy "MyITHKyITypHH ianor K cKIaIoa acTHHa KicHoi
ocBiTH", BIDOIIOBK KOro npOBo/MICH poKy-rpyn Ci1CKX LIKo1ax Ta aHa1i3yBaIHCH
ociTHi npo6eMH KpHMy. Ile npoeKT peani3OByBaBC YKpa~HCKHM IIHTDOM He3aIOKHHX
nO1iTMHMX IIOCIiJKeH5. B 2013-2014 pp., caMe nepeIt pociCKOO OKyIIaIiCO, M 3
KOJIeTaMH IIDaLIIOBaIH HaJI IIDOeKTOM, MOTOIO HKOTO 6y10 BIIpOBaIUKeHH i1OTHO IpOTpaMH
My.THniHrBaIHOi ociTM B KpHMy Ta iHIMX periOHaX YKpaiH.
Ocira KpMy Io oKyma1ii
4. Jlo noarKy oKyaii KpHMy Ta MO KOJIeTH 3aBeDpIIHIH JIOCJIJIKeHHI
IIepKaHOf OCBiTH B KpHMy. MM BHBaIH, cepeI iHIIoro, cTaH ociTH B ceIaX KpHMy Ta
6araroMoBHy ociTy, IHin ac aux pocJxeH cinCKoi OCBiTM MM BBHIM neBHi
IpO6neM IIOCTVIIy IIO OCBiTH B KpHMy, BKIOaOH HeJIOCTaTHO MaTepiaHy IiJITDHMKy
uKin1 y cen1ax KpHMy. YKpaiHcKoMy ypIy 6y10 BipI0Mo npo Li Hepo1iK, i BiH I1pa1OBaB HaJI
ix BHpiIIeHHHM II1HXOM ciBIIpaLI] 3 MiCIIeBHMH ODTaHMH BJIaJIH, MOiMH KOJIOTaMH Ta MHOIO,
a TaKOK HIIIHMH CI10CO6aMH.
5. Hin aC HaIIx OCiIKe MyJITHJIHTBaIHO] OCBiTH MM BHIBHJIM, IIIO
aTKH Ta IIIKOJ1Hp B KpHMy BHCIOBJIIOBaIH 6aKaHHI, IIIO6 IiTH HaBaIHCH yKpaiHCKOIO,
pociCKOIO Ta KDHMCKOTaTaDCKOIO MOBaMH OJIHOaCHO. Tai De3yITaTH 6y1IH
Ii/ITBepIUKeHi, HaIDHKIaJI, COIiOIOTiHMM OIIHTyBaHHIM 2026 yHi Ta ix 6aTKiB B Di3HHX
pa{oHax KpHMy. OIHTyBaHH IiIITBeDIHIO, LIO yHi Ta 6aTKH BH3HaOT, I1IO
MyITHiHTBaHa OCBiTa 3IITHa IIiTOTyBaTH yHiB II0 TT Ta paLi B
6araroHauiOaoMy KpMy. Cepen yHis, ni 6pan yaCT B onMTyBaHi, 48,5 Bin1coTKiB
TOBODHJIH IIDO CBOC 6aKaHH BHBaTH KyJITyDH HaDOIIiB, IIIO IIDOKHBZIT IIODyM, y KpHMy,
B TOMy HIi - 26,2 BiJICOTKH, Ki 6aKa BKIOHTH IIO TeMy y IIKiIHy IpOTpaMy.
Pe3y/ITaTH OIIHTyBaHH 2O10 DOKy IIOKa3JIM, LIIO 6aKaHHH BHBaTH MOBH Ta KyJITyDH
iHIIHx eTHix rpyn KpHMy BB yHi, Ki ineTHbiKyan ce6e nK poci, yKpaiui
Ta KpHMcKi TaTapH. Cxoi pe3ynTaTH 6y1H oTpHMaHi B po6oTi pOKyCHMX rpyn, Ka
DOBOIIHJIaCH B 2011 DOIIi, KOJIM MOKJIHBiCT ~aTTOMOBHOTO HaBHHI He BHKIHKJI HiHKHX
3anepeeH.
6. Ha OCHOBi IIHX JIOCIJUKeH MOi KOI&TH Ta IIJITDHMaJIH MyITHJIiHTBaIHy
ociry B KpHMy, i, 3 IOaTKy 2014 p0Ky, TaKy cHCTeMy OciTH 6y10 BnepIIe 3a11pOBaJIKeHO y
IOIIIKiIHX HaBaIHX 3aK1a/1ax 6araTOX paoHiB KpHMy, BKIIOaOH
BaxcapaCH. M TaKOK IIpOBOIIHnIH 3 BHTeHMH OciTHi CeMiHapH IUIH DO3BHTKy
MeTOJUHKH IIeDeJIOBOTO BHKIaJIaHHH MOB. B inoMy 6yno yxBaIeHo piteHn Ko1erii
Miicrepcra ocir i ayK, MonoIi Ta CnOpTry APK Bi/ 16.09.2013 N9 5/7 «I1po
eKCIeDHM&HT IIO BIIDOBaJUKOHHIO MyJITHJIiHTBaIHO~ OCBiTH B HaBaIHHX 3aKIa1ax APK.»
Ta pieHHn Konerij Bi/iny OcBiTH Bi/1 27.09.2014 N 2. OcTaHH Man1o Micue B paMKax
peani3auii B JI0IIKiIHHX HaBaIHX 3aKIaIaXx aTOHoMii B 2013/2014 HaBaJIHOMy p0Ii
ninOTHOTO IpOeKTy «KpHMCKa IIIKOIa» I1O BIpOBa/IKeHHO MyITHiHrBaIHOi ociTH i
2
HaKa3y Bipuiy ociTH, 30KpeMa, CiMpepononcKOi P/IA, Bi/I O7 KOBTH 2013p. NO9 555.
BiJTaK, IIOIIKiIHOMy HaBaIBHOMy 3aKJIaJy «OpIHTKO» HcTeHcKi cincKoi pa/I B
2013/2014 HaBaIHOMy DOLi IIDHCBOCHO CTaTyC eKCIIeDHMeHTaJIHOTO JIH3.
7. IIIe Ha noarxy 2ooox, Moi Kon1er po3po6HIM irerpoaHi KypC "Ky1Typa
po6pocycincrBa", sKH 6yo BnpoBaJpKeHo porpaMH Ki1HHX 3aK1a1i KpHMy Bcix
piiB.
8. HaBan Kypc "Ky1TYDa II06pOCyCiJCTBa" CHCTeMaTH3yBaB 3HaHH, Be
Ha6yTi yHMH B IIDOIeCi OCBOCHHH HaBaIHX IpeIMeTiB iHBapiaTHOT aCTHHM Ba30BOTO
HaBa1Hor aHy, i HoBi /IaHi 3 Kpa€3HaBcTBa, IIKepenIO3HaBCTBa, eTHiHoi icropii periOy,
erHorpapii, axcionorij Ta KoHpniKToOrii, Ha6yTi Ii aC BHBeHHH II»OTO KypCy.
HaBani Kypc "Ky1Typa no6pocycincra" cKap1aBC 3 perioHa1of nporpaM 3
MixKyTypHoi ociT ire noKinHorO iKy "KpHMCKH BiHoo", 3aTBepIKeHoi
piIIeHM Konerii MiicrepCTBa OCiTM i HayK APK Bi/1 22.08.2004 p. N9 6-4, i /aHa/UT
B3a€MOIIOB'3aHHX i CTpyKTyDHO OIIHOMaHiTHHX IIpOTpaM JI1 1-12-x Kaci (no 35
HaBaIHX TOIIHH IIOpiHO). II[e 20 TDyJIH 2006 poKy, Ha 3acinai eoi pa KPIHIHIO,
Ta 27 TDyJIH 2006 p., Ha Ko1erij MiicrepCTa ociTM i HayK APK, 6y10 3aTBeDIUKeHO
nporpaMy KypCy B IOBHOMy 06c3i z1 cix Kaci 3araHOOCBiTHix IIIKi1. 25 KBiTH 2007
DOKy DiIeHM Koerij MOH APK 3aTepIpKeHa IDOTpaMa CIeIKypCy "OCH0BM
IO6pOCyCiJCTBa" IU1 CTVIeHTiB BHIIUHX HaBaIHHX 3aKIaJi APK. B 2007 - 2008
Haan1HoMy poi anpo6ain i BnpOBaJUeHH Be BOJIMCH B 128 (3 HHX 68 IIKi1, 4 By3H)
HaanHx 3aK1a1ax 12 Micrax i 11 paoHax KpMy. B Hii 6pan1 yacT 118 rpyn1 /267
Kaci/ 9 CTyII. TDVII, B IKHX HaBaIOTC 6inn 6000 0ci6, BiKOM Bi/1 4 110 21 poKiB.
9. Ile KypC CKIaJIaCTCI 3 BHBeHH icTopif /Kpa~H B InOMy Ta KpHMy
3oKpeMa, reorpadii, Ky1TypH, MHcTeTa i TpaMui pi3Hx HaIiOHaHMx TpyI KpHMy, a
TaKOK noCepepHuTa Ta ix 3aco6iB po3B'3aHH KOHbniKTHMx cMTyaii. Ile Kypc
HaIIDaBJIHH Ha DO3BHTOK TOIepaHTHOCTi Ta nOpO3yMiHHH cepeII eHiB pi3HHX eTHiHMX Ta
penirix rpyn KpHMy, a TaKOK JIOIIOMaTa€ MHDHOMy DO3B'I3HHIO CI1OpiB MiK HHMM.
10. 3ri/Ho 3 IMM KyDCOM, yDII YKpaiH 3po6 HaaHH TO1epaHTHOCTi, SK
3
KJIOOBOTO IpHHLMny IIeMOpaTii, IpiOpHTeTHMM HaIIDHMOM Ta CIIDHHB LIMM I1DOTpaMaM 3
IIi(TpHMKH KyJITyDHOf Ta OCBiTHOi JIHOCTi, CIDIMOBaHOi Ha BHXOBaHH IIOBaTH JI0
KyTypH, icropii, MoBH, TpaIii i 3Bai8 pi3HMx eTHiHMX TDyII, IIIO IDOKHBaIOT y
KpMy. MiicrepCTBo OcBiTM i HayKM, MOIOIIi Ta CIIOpTy ABTOHOMHOi Pecny6iK KpHM
TaKOK 3aTBeDJIHJIO Ta 3a1DOBaJIHIO KyDCM 3 MiKKyITypHOi OCBiTH Ha Di3HHX piBHIX
HaBaIHOi IDOTDaMH, a TaKOK DeKOMOHJIyBaIO IIDOBOIIeHHI KiIKOX CIIeLiaJ13OBaHHX
KyDCiB, IDHCBHeHHX Di3HHM KyITypaM Ta penirinM. BoHo Tao iiuioan1o npouec
nepernny HaanHoi nporpaM 3 icropii, 3 Meroo miHIeHH cTaHJapTiB i IiTpHMKH
6araToy1TypHoro cepeIoHIa, 30KpeMa, - 3anpoBaUKeHn "Ky1TypH po6pocycipcrBa".
YKpaincKMi ypp TaKoK npopiancya zIpy nippyHMKiB, i Ii IiJpyHK 6y1
6e3Ko1TOBHo nepeIaHi B yKpaiHcKi, pociCKi Ta KDHMCKOTaTaDCK] IIIKOJIH.
11. [lo oynaIii BHKIaJIaHHH B KDHMCKHX IuIKoIaX 3/€6i1II1OTO Be1OCH
pociCKOO MOBOO, a yKpaiHCKa Ta KDHMCKOTaTaDCKa HK MOBH BHKIaJIaHHH 6yJIH
IpaKTHHO BHHTKaMM i3 3aranHoro paBM1a. Ha Toi ac y KpMy 6y1o ciM 1Kin1, IIe
HaBaHH BOJIOCH TiJIKH yKpaiHCKOO Moo. Li umon 6yn po3TamoBaHi B CiMpepononi,
Ti, Kepi, beonocii, CBnaTopii, cMT IHloniHe Ta An1yuTi. B ux umKon1ax yHi BHBan1H
yKpaiHCKy TDaMaTHKy, BKHBaHHH MOBH Ta JiTepaTyDy HK HaBaJIHi IIDOJIMeTH, a TaKOK
ii IpeIMeT (HanpHKIa, MaTeMaTHKy Ta IIDHDOIHHi HayKH) yKpaiHCK0IO MOO0. /Hi
Mor1H BHBaTH pocicy (a60 bpaHuy3Ky, aricKy M ii io3eMi Mow), i ui
IIDeIIMeTH BHKJIaJIaJIHCH, IDHHa{MHi aCTKOBO, IIHMH iHO3eMHHMH MOBaMH.
12. B KDHMCKHX IuIKoIaX 3 pociCKOIO MOBOIO BHKIaIaHHI yHi BHBaIH
pociiCKy TDaMaTHKy, BKHBaHH MOBH Ta JiTepaTYDy K HaBaIHi IIDeJIMeTH 3 1 110 11 (12)
KJIaCM, i OnaHOByBan 3MiCT iHIx HaBanHHx npepIMeTi (HanpHKIaJI, MaTeMaTHKy Ta
IpHDOIIHHi HayKH) TaKOK i pociCKOI0 MOB00. BHBeHH yKpaiHcKOi MoB Ta iTepaTyDH
6y/IO TaKOK 060B'3KOBHM B TaKHX pOCiCKOMOBHHX IIIKOIaX, IIi IIDeIMeTH BHKJIJIaJIHCH
yKDaiHCKOO MOB0IO.
13. B KDHMCKHX IIIKOJIaX 3 KDHMCKOTaTaDCKOIO MOBOIO BHKIaJIHHI yHi
BHBHaJIH KDHMCKOTTaDCDKy MOBY HK HaBaIHHH IIDeIIMeT (TDaMTHKy, BKHBaHH Ta
4
nirepaTypy) 3 noaTKoBx no cTapIIi KI1aCM (1-12 KIaC). OIHaK, B nOaTKoBi Kori
BHBHeHHH piJIHOf MOBH aCTO Be1OCH i3 BHKODHCTaHHM poCiCKO MOBH, TOMy I1IO,
IIpHIIOBIIIM IIO IIIKOJIH, IIiTH He BOIOIiJIH a60 HeIIOCTaTHDO BOIOIIiJIH Di/HOO
KDHMCKOTaTaDCKOIO MOBOIO. IliBiIe iHIIi HaBaHi IpeIMeT IIIKOJ1Hpi OCBOIOBaJIM
pociC»Koo a60, pi/e, yKDaCKOIO MOBOIO, 3 BHKODHCTaHHM pIeKoi TepMiHoorij
KDHMCKOTaTaDCKOIO MOBOO.
14. TaKo 6y1 3a/ii baxiBui, Ki J10 6epe3n 2014 DOKy IpaIOBaIH HaJI
IHTaHHHMH BHKJIaJIaHHI yKDaiHCKOIO MOBOO y KpMy. LHi nocapoi oco6 6yIM nOB'3aHi 3
MiicrepCrBoM ociTH YKpaiH Ta aHa10riHMM OpraHoM y MicueBOMy ypi KpHMy. [lo
oKynaii BKaaiB yKpaiHCKOi MOBH JUI KpHMCKX Kin1 rOTyBanH TapiHCK0My
HauioHaHoMy yHiepcreri iMei B. I. BepHancoro y CiMpepononi. LU nporpaMa
nirOTO8KM BMTe1iB 6y1a BipIKpHTa cepepi 90-x poKiB Ta BHIIyCKa1a 61M3KO 50
BKaaiB yKpaiHCKOi MOBH IIIOpOKy. BKaai yKpaiHCKOi MOBH TaKOK IIDHi3JIHIM 3
MaTepHKOBO aCTHHM YKDa~HM JUI TOTO, III06 BHKJIaJIaTH B KpHMy. Ha JO/aTOK I10 1I»OTO, /IO
nIOaTKy 2014 DOKy, y KpMCKoMy iHeHepo-nearorinoMy yHiBepcTeTi icyBan1a
oTHpHpiHa cni1Ha nporpaMa yKpaiHcKoo Ta aHiHK0 MOBaMM. IIo Hi Haan1oc,
pH6nH3Ho, 240 0ci6 (e 1-4 Kypc»), a TaKo 6y1a 21 cTaBKa.
15. Jlo noarKy oKynaii /Kpaia Taro Hanaana nirpMy ociri
KDHMCKOTaTaDCKOIO MOBOO. OCTaHHH K 6yIa 3a60pOHeHa B DaJUHCKi aCM. Ilic TOTO,
YKpaiHa oTpHMaIa He3a1eKHiCT, BOHa He TinKH niITpHMya1a icHyoMX HoCii uiei
MoBH, ane npaIoBaa HaII nOIIHDeHHM Ta IIOTJIH6IeHHM ii po3yMiHH. B 2004 poui
Ka6ieroM Minicrpi /Kpa 6y10 3aTep/pKeHo /IepaHi cranapr 6a3ooi i cepensoi
ocBiTH. Y Li1x Ta 3MiCTi OCBOCHHH DiJIHHX MOB (yKpa~HCKOi Ta MOB HaIIOHaIHMX MeHIIIHH,
KODiHHHX HapOiB) He 6yJI0 KOIIHHX BiJIMiHHOCTei. Hae1eHe cxBamoBaIOC eKCIIepTaMH, a
TaKOK 6y/IO IO3HTHBHMM baKTODOM JUIH IIOBHOLIHHOTO BHBeHHH DiHOf MOBM JIiTMH
HaLIOHaJIBHHX MOHIIIH. AHa1Ii3 THIIOBHX HaBaIHHX IaHiB n10Ka3yBaB, IIIO HaBaIHHH
penMeT Ii/ Ha3BOO «MOBa HaIiOHaIHOi MeHIIIHHH» MiCTHBCH B 060B'3KOBOMy 61oui
THIIOBHX HaBaJIBHHX IIJIaHiB JUI IIIKiJI i BKJIOaB HaBaHHI MOBaMH HaIIiOHaJIHHX MOHIIIHH
5
􀀉􀏐􀒸􀒮􀒪􀒼􀒸􀒴􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀓􀀊􀀏
􀀉􀏐􀒸􀒮􀒪􀒼􀒸􀒴􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀕􀀊􀀏
Ta KopiHHX HapoIiB.
16. JU IiJITDpHMKM KDHMCKOTaTaDCKHX IIIKiJI yDII YKpa~HM CTBOpHB I1pOTpaMH
irOTOBKH BTei8 y KpHMCKOMy iKeHepHo-nearorioMy yHiBepcTeTi Ta Ha
dinonorinoMy paxyTeri TapicKoro HauioanmHoro yHiepcTeTy iMeni B. I.
BepHaCoro. BKa3aHi HaBan1Hi 3aKIaH MIO ociTH BHnyCKaIM pin1on1oriB-BHKIaIa iB
KDHMCKOTaTapCKOi Mo i nireparyp po pociicoi oKynauii.
17. CMcTeMa ocBiTM B KpMy epeI oKynauieo niITpHMya1aC MO1OuO Ta 6y1a
yCIiuIHoo. CTyIeHTM BHBaH He Ti1K yKpaiHcKy, pocicKy, KpHMcKoTaTapCKy, a
ariCKy, ppaHuy35Ky Ta iHIi MOBH. Li CTyIIeHTH IIOTiM MaJIH MOKJIHBiCT HaBMaTMC 3a
KOp/IOHOM y eBponecKHX KpaiHaX i nOKa3yBa xopoIi De3yITaTH. BOHM TaKOK MaIH
MoKHicT HaBaTHc B Typei. IHpMipoM, 3aBIHKH IIiJIHOCTi KDHMCKOTaTaDCKHX
oprai3au y BHLIHX HaBaIHHX 3a1aJIaX Type 3no6y10 ociTy a60 HaBa1OC
Kina coTeH cTyIeHTi i zecTKM acnipaTi8. B pi3Hi pOKH B TYDeLEKHX BH33 6e3KO1ITO8HO
HaBan1OCH MaKe 250 KDHMCKOTaTaDCKHX CTyIeHTiB. 3 TypeH Be IIOBDHyJIHCH
inure corHi nIOMoBaHMX paxiBuiB, 6iIiCT KHX IIpaIU0Ba1H 3a 321106yTOI0
cneianHicro Ha nippeMCTax y KpHMy Ta no Bcii YKpaii.
Ocira KpMy ic oyma1ii
18. Ilicnn oynaujj PocicsKa benepauin Ia pa nocioHMx 3ax01iB 3
iKi/aii npOrpaM MyJITHIiHTBaIHOi OCBiTH B KpHMy, DO3DO6IeHHX Ta BTiIeHMX y KHTTH
VKpaioo. 25 epBH 2015 p0Ky TaK 3BaHe MiicTepCTBo OCiTH KpHMy BHI1a1O HaKa3, B
KOMy 6yIO CKa3aHO, IIIO HaBMaHHH KDHMCKOTaTaDCKOIO Ta yKDaiHCKOO MOBaMM He
IIOBHHHO IIDOBOITCI y c1Ci6, KM 3aIIKOJIKyE HaBaHHo pocicKoo MOBOo Ta if
BHBHeHH10.' 18 TDyJIHH 2014 p0Ky Ceprii AKC0HOB BM/IaB «HaKa3», B KoMy Haro1OIIyBa1aC
Ban1BicT, irerpauif KpMMy y PocicKy beepauio i nepeTBOpeHH KpHMCKHX
MeIKaHLi Ha cnpaHix naTpioTi PocicKoi Pepepauij.? Ile «HaKa3» BHKOHyBaBCH
Haxa Minicrepcra ocBiTM, HayKM Ta MO1OJ1i KpHMy NM 01-14/382 (Bi/1 25 epBI 2015 p.).
HaKa3 C. AK&LOH0Ba N 522-U, JIe 3aTBepIUKy BaIaCI KOHICIIIIiH IIaTpiOTHHOTO, IIyXOBHOTO Ta MODaIBHOTO
BHXOBaIIHI HaCeJIeHHI KpHMy (Bi1 18 Tpy/1H 2014 p.).
6
􀀉􀏐􀒸􀒮􀒪􀒼􀒸􀒴􀀁􀀙􀀚􀀔􀀊􀀏
cTOcOBHO OciTH CepeI iIx acneKTiB KHTTH B KpHMy. H HaI1a10 Konij 060x «HaKa3i» Cy1y.
19. Y BinoBipHocTi po TaKHx HacTaHo, Pocica bezepauin npoBen1a IBJy
po6ory 3 iKipaif yKpaHCKMX IIIKi1, IIIO iCHyBan1H B KpHMy 7I0 2014 p0Ky. 'Hepe3 Ki1Ka
Micnuis nicn noary oynaii y KpMy 3a1HIM1OCH HIe Kin1Ka yKpaiHCKX Kin1, a
ii yKpaiHOMOBHi nDOTDaMH, Ki Ii/ITpHMyBaIHCH MO~MH KOJIeTaMM i MHOIO, 6yJ1H
CHCTeMaTHHO 3HHLIIeHi. HaBiT 3TiIHO 3 JIaHMM Pociicoj depepauii, iCHy€ TiKH O/Ha
Ko1a, B Peopocii, IIe HaBaHH BeIIeTCI BHKIOHO yKDaHCKOO MOO0. B ii umoni 9
aCi Ta MeHIIe 150 yHi, - y nopiBHHHi 3 ciMoMa TaKHM IuIKoaMH II0 0KynaLii. TaKOK,
3a Mo€o iHbopMaIieIo yKpaiOMOBHi IpOTDaMH y IIIKOJIaX, IIe BHKIaJIaHH Be1OCH
pocicKoo Ta yKpaiHCKOO MoaMH, 6y1H iKipIoBaHi.
20. BinuuIe Toro, y BepecHi 2014 DoKy B TapiCKOMy HaItiOHanHoMy
yHiepcreri iM. B.I. BepancKoro B CiMpepononi nixizyan baxyrer yKpaincKoi
pinonorii; 6intuicr Kaai paxyTeTy CKopoTHI. Cepep acnixi raxx pi - pi3xe
cKOpoeHHH HcIa Tei yKpaiHcKOi MoBM i niTepaTypH. KpiM TOTO, BOH BHMyIIeHi
6y1H nepeKBaibixoyBaTHC y BHTeiB pociicsKoi MoM i nirepaTyp. BoKpeMa, Ha
nincrai «Hara3y Miicrepcra ociTH PecnyiK KpHM N9 116 Bi/ 6 CepnH 2014 D0Ky»,
61H3KO 300 BHTeiB yKpaicKoi MoH i nireparyp npoun nepexanipixauio K
HTei pociicoi MoBH i niTrepaTyp.3 H HaIaIO KOIiO JIaHOTO «HaKa3y» Cy/Iy. TaKOK,
yKpaico-arniicKa nporpaMa y KpHMCKOMy iHKeHepHo-earoriHOMy yHiepcHTeTi,
3a Koo Haan1OCH y 2014 poi np6M3Ho 240 0ci6, Tenep Mae 1IIe 40 cTyJeHTiB, i Bci
BOHM OTDHMaOT IIHnIOMH 3 pociCKOi MOBH.
21. Ha nepmi nornn, Pociic»Ka Penepauin ninrpMyana xpMcKoTaTapci
Ko1 3 noaTKy oKynaii, ante, HacnpaBi, BOHa eKCIJIyaTYC KDHMCKOTaTaDCKi IIIKOIH HK
iHCTpyMeHT DO3IOBCOIUKeHHI CBOCi IDOIIaTaH/IM. HaIpHKIaJ, KDpHMCKOTaTaDCKi IIIKOJIH
He € aBTOHOMHHMH, i pociCKa BIaIa BHMaTaC, LIO6 BHKIaJIai B LIHX IIIKOJ1aX O6HpaIH
nHe 3 Ki1Kox 3a31a1erip cxBa1eHMX nipyHHKiB I cOix npeMeTi. HacnpaBi,
3 Hara3 Miicrepcra ocirH, HayKM Ta MOOJi KpHMy N 116 (Bi/1 6 cepI1 2014 p.).
7
pocica oKynaia B1aIa He 3a6e3IeyBa1a IiIDyHHKaMH BCi KDHMCKoTaTaDCKi
II1KO1H II0 2017-18 HaBaIHOTO DOKy.
22. KpiM TOrO, y 6araTOX KDHMCKOTaTDCKHX IIIKOJIaX IIDOBOIIHJIHCH O6IIyKH y
IOIIyKax TaK 3BaHoi "ecTpeMicrcoi" ireparyp. IIpMipoM, 9 BepecH 2014 pOKy
pocica noniuin npoena o6uy B riMasij-irepari z o6napoax ire c. TaKoe
Baxcapacoro paoy KpHMy. B pea3y1Tari aMiiCTpauio HaBanHOTO 3aK1a21y
3MyCHJIH IIDH6paTH BCIO KpHMcKoTaTapCKy CMMBoIiKy. PocicKa B1a1a TaKOK 3aK1Kan1a
BTeiB y KpHMCKoTaTapCKHX Ko1ax noBitoMITH po JiTei, Ki 6y1H Bi/cyTHi 18
TDaBH - B IIeH aM'Ti KeprB enopTai KpHMCKOTaTapCKOrO HapOIy B KpHMy. Hepe3
BHMOTH OpTaHiB BJIaIH, B KpHMCKHX IIKo1ax acTO Bi/I6yBaOTC IeKIij Ta 6eCiJ CTOCOBHO
npoTHii eKcTpeMi3My Ta "icnaMcoMy eKCTpeMi3My".
23. YBJIeHHH IIDO yJIIeDOIUKeHHH, Ke Hapa3i iCHy€ B IUHX KDHMCKOTaTaDCKHX
IIKOJIaX, TaKOK MOKHa OTDHMaTH, 3BepHyBIIH yBary Ha Bepcio icropii, Ky TaM BHKIJIaOT.
BKIaJIaHH icropif Pocii B KpHMy 3IiHCHOCTCH 3TiIIHO 3 «KOHIIeIIIIi€IO HOBOTO HaBa1HOMeTOJIHHOTO
KOMnIeKCy 3 BiTH3HHOi icropii», IiJrOTOBI€HOO IIDOTHTOM 2013-2014 DD.
3a I0pyeHHHM B. IIyTia. Mera uiei KoHuenuj - BHKpHBHTH BHKaJaHH icTopij Pocij I1
Ii/TpMKM bopMyan ineanisoaoi pociicoi rpoMacKoi inerHocTi Ta
naTpioT3My. BoKpeMa, pocicKa 1a1a 306paae CTania repocM i MiiMi3ye Oro yaCr
y penopTaLii KpHMcKX TaTap.
24. loKa3oo, to no/ii nicn 2004 poKy /Kpaii nippyxax icropii Pd
OIHCyIOTCH K «noiTHHH Ta ipe TMCK Ha pOCiCKOMOBHe HaCeIeHH» B YKpa~Hi (10
Tac «HcTOpn POcc Haano XX -- Haano XXI Bea» (M.: «lpopa», 2016, aBTOpCTa O.
Bono6yea, C. KapnaoBa Ta C. PoMaH0Ba). B Lin10My 3 2014 poKy 3 nepeniKy ryMaHiTapHHX
npe/Meri y Haan1HMX 3aKn1aax 3HHKIM icropin YKpa~, yKpaicKa niTepaTypa. HaBiT»
irp, B Ki rpaoT y IuHX IIKo1ax, BHKopHCTOByOTCH JUI pocicKoi npOIaTaHIIH.
HanpKa, KDHMCKOTaTaDCKHM IIIKOJIHDaM IDOIIOHy€TC HaMaoBaTM cOix 6aTKiB y
TpaioMy pocicoMy op113i.
25. HaOCTao, K 6aaerc i3 cneHHHx nOBiJIOMIeH, pocicKi OpraHH
8
Iliancano y L 2018 p.
BJIaJIH THCHyT Ha 6aTKiB, 3MyIIyoH x He BHMaraTH, Lu06 ~xi pir oTpHMyBaIM ocBiTy
KDHMCKOTaTaDCKOO a60 yKpaiHCKO MoaMH. KoH 6aTKH Ha6HpaOTO cMiHBoCTi
3BepTaTHC i3 TaKHMH 3aIIHTaMH, iM CHCTeMaTHHO BiJIMOBOT. Hopi6Hi icropii yn1a Bin
3HaoMx, Ki mien 2014 DoKy nepeiXa 3 KpHMy II0 KM€Ba. Brio i3 TaKHMH
IIOBiJIOMIeHHHMM, 6aTKH IIOyBaOTCH B He~e3neLi, ' 3BepTaIOMC i3 3aBaMH I1DO
HaBaHH cBOix pire B yKDaiHCKHX a60 KDHMCKOTaTaDCKHX IIIKOIaX, i TOMy BOHM He
noaoT Bi/IoBi/Hi 3a1BH /I0 ILIKin1.
26. Tao € noBiJIOMIeHH po Te, Io /MpeKTOp Ki1 IoKapa1H 0co6n1Mi
3yCHJIJI B CBOiX TpOMaIIaX, III06 DaIHTM 6aTKaM He 3BeDTaTHCH i3 IIDOXaHHHMH I1DO
HaBaHH ixHix ziTe KpHMCKOTaTaDCKOIO H yVKDaiHCKOIO MOBaMH, MOTHBVOH IIe THM,
IIIO BHBeHHH yKpa~HCKOi MOBH - IIe MaDHyBaHHI HaCy, i 3HaHHH yKpaiHCKOf 3HM3HT ix
MOKJIHBOCTi II1 IIDOIIOBKeHH HaBaHHH y By3aX. Tai 3aBM € CKIJIOBOIO aCTHHO
nepeopierauij ciei ccreM ocir KpMy Ha cHcTeMy Pociicoi bezepaif ra
BipuaeHHH Bi/I yKpaicKoi CMCTeMH. LUn 3araHa IIeDeOpiCHTai TaKo BKIoaIa,
HaIpHKIaJI, IIepeBeIIeHH KpHMCKX IIKinI Ha HaBaHHI 3a pOciCKOIO I'TM6aJI»HOO
uuIKano0 (a He 3a CBDOIIeCKOO JIBaHaILUHTH6aJIHOIO IIIKaIOO) Ta 3a0X0eHH
BHIyCKHHKiB KpHMCKHX IIKi1 HaBaTHC y pocicKX yHiBepcHTeTaX.
27. 3 OT11y Ha MOi CIOCTeDeKeHH 3a po3BHTKOM noIi y ccTeMi OCBiTH y
KpHMy 3 2014 p0Ky, a TaKOK Ha Te, Luo Ji3Han1acn Bin 6aTKiB irei, Ki HaBaOTC Li
ccTeMi, n BBaxa0, LIO ii oKynaLiOf BIaJIM € HaLIiJIeHHMM 3yCHJIJIHMH BHKJIOHTH
yKpaiHC»Ky Ta KDHMCKOTaTaDCKy OCBiTy 3 KDHMCKOi IIIKiIHOi CHCTeMH.
28. H nDHCHTaIO, IIIO BHIIIOBHKIaJIeHi CBiJIMeHHH C IIDaBIIMBHMM TOHMMH, i
nOTOIKyIOC BHCTVIIaTH IIeDeI CyJIOM IUIH HaIaHHH IIOJITKOBHX CBiJIeH, y pa3
Heo6xi1HocTi.
9
Annex 18
Witness Statement of Lenur Islyamov (6 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
________________________________________________________
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF LENUR ISLYAMOV
________________________________________________________
1.􀀃 Since 2011, I have been the owner of ATR holding, which consists of a
television channel ATR and other media outlets. In addition to this, I am the owner of Just
Bank in Moscow, as well as a car sales company, road transportation companies, which carry
out passenger and cargo, advertising agencies, a chain of stores, selling a high tech
production in Crimea, and other assets. I am a Crimean Tatar.
A.􀀃 The history of founding the ATR holding and its activities until the
attempt of annexation
2.􀀃 ATR holding was founded on February 25, 1994 in Crimea. TV and radio
broadcasting started January 1, 2000, covering the Krasnogvardeiski district of Crimea.
From April 28, 2006, the ATR TV channel broadcasts TV programs in Simferopol and
Simferopol district. Starting from January 31, 2012, ATR is engaged in satellite broadcasting,
covering not only the territory of Crimea, but also Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
and European countries. The ATR TV channel, as a main media outlet of the holding, has
been offering and currently offers a broad range of content, including news and political
shows, as well as entertainment, educational, historical TV programs and TV shows for
children, including movies and TV shows.
3.􀀃 The content shown on the ATR TV channel, which is the only Crimean Tatar
TV channel in the world, first of all, is aimed at meeting the needs and interests of Crimean
Tatars. 60% of broadcasting is carried out in Crimean Tatar language, and the remaining
40% in Ukrainian and Russian languages. The TV channel had a high rating in Crimea,
2
among all ethnicities, and was in TOP 3 of most watched TV channels in Crimea, from 36
national and regional channels, broadcasting in this republic (1+1, Inter, ATR). This is
confirmed by the data of multiple measurements of TV ratings, conducted by the
independent international agencies TNS and Nielsen.
4.􀀃 ATR holding also includes other media outlets, including a children’s satellite
television channel called Lale, which means “Tulip” from the Crimean Tatar language that
started to broadcast 24 hours per day, seven days per week on March 20, 2013. The content
of this channel included various entertainment, educational, and musical programs for
children of primary, middle and high school age, including cartoons, movies for kids and TVshows
in the Crimean Tatar language, to assist children in learning and developing their
native language skills.
5.􀀃 Other media outlets associated with ATR holding include two radio stations
“Meidan” and “Leader,” as well as informational portal/website “15 Minutes.” Radio
“Meidan” ('a square' in Crimean Tatar) has been broadcasting since June 16, 2004 in the
Crimean Tatar language. Its content included informational and entertaining programs. It
broadcast exclusively Crimean Tatar music, including folk and contemporary pop.
Significant attention was devoted to revitalization of ancient Crimean Tatar folklore. Radio
“Leader” was acquired by ATR holding on February 27, 2013. “Leader” broadcasted in both
Ukrainian and Russian, and offered a variety of informational and entertaining programs.
Web-site “15 Minutes” was created on March 23, 2013 and still offers news and videos.
Before the annexation of the Crimea all those media outlets of the ATR holding operated in
the Crimea. Since April 1, 2015 those media outlets, except for Radio “Leader,” were forced
to continue their operation in Kyiv, Ukraine, due to the Russian authorities’ denial their
licensing.
6.􀀃 In addition to its regular programming, prior to the attempted annexation of
Crimea, ATR Television Channel also organized and promoted an annual all-Crimean
children’s festival “TatliSes” meaning “Sweet Voice” in the Crimean Tatar language. Over
500 children of different nationalities participated in this festival each year; the festival
3
features songs, literature readings in the Crimean Tatar language and Crimean Tatar dance
performance. The aim of this festival that is conducted during a year and includes
preliminary rounds and grand finale, is to promote the culture of Crimean Tatars and
children creativity. Many prominent celebrities were engaged in this festival and
professionally trained children to perform. The winners of the festival further participated in
international festivals in different countries, promoting Crimean Tatar culture over the
world. Besides, ATR Television Station had its own orchestra, which had been founded not
only for performing at different cultural musical events but also in order to promote
traditional folk Crimean Tatar music and songs.
7.􀀃 Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the media outlets of ATR holding
operated freely in Crimea. The Ukrainian government did not influence the editorial content
of ATR Television Station or other Crimean Tatar media outlets before the annexation, nor
does it do so now.
8.􀀃 Prior to the termination of work in Crimea (up to April 1, 2015), ATR
television station was for the Crimean Tatars the story of huge success due to its high
popularity, credibility with the viewers and economic efficiency as broadcasting was
conducted without state support and was profitable. Crimean Tatars still consider ATR to be
a national asset, which allowed them to dive into and find out more about their history,
culture, traditions, language; furthermore, it gave them the opportunity to activate their civil
positions with reference to the restoration of rights in Crimea as native people.
B.􀀃 Pressure imposed on the ATR television station and other Crimean Tatar
mass media outlets as of February 2014 and onwards.
9.􀀃 Russian authorities understood profoundly the meaning of the television
stations and other mass media outlets, which operated in Crimea in February-March 2014,
and tried either to remove objectors or exploit Crimean mass media outlets as it moved
toward occupation of the peninsula. During the days prior to February 27, 2014, Russian
authorities leveraged “obedient” television stations and NGOs with the aim of their
4
propaganda expansion and tried to persuade Crimean citizens to support the Russian
Federation.
10.􀀃 One sign of the pressure, which was caused by the Russian authorities on the
television stations and other mass media outlets, was the demand sent to ATR television
station to replace the Ukrainian flag on its logo with the Russian one. I received a
communication to this effect on 10 March 2014 from Dmitriy Polonskyi, who is now
Chairman Deputy of the Council of Ministers of Crimea and Internal Policy, and Minister
Deputy in Information and Communication in the Republic of Crimea.
11.􀀃 ATR television station did not yield to pressure of the Russian authorities and
continued broadcasting with the Ukrainian flag on its logo instead. While Russian television
stations and majority of the Crimean mass media outlets that took their side performed
propaganda activities, ATR television station and other mass media outlets of the holding
showed online via leveraging of the portable LiveU devices everything that was taking place
in Crimea including events when armed people in uniform without any badges of merit
secured military objects in Crimea.
12.􀀃 As the result of the denial of ATR television station to support the coming
occupancy of Crimea, Russian authorities restricted its access to these mass media outlets to
the Crimean events highlighted by the media. As of March 2014, participation in such events
was provided exclusively to those mass media outlets, which highlighted news in the way
approved by Russian occupying authorities.
13.􀀃 Russian occupying authorities put pressure also on some journalists and other
individuals who were connected with ATR television station in February and March 2014.
There were executed searches in the houses of the Crimean Tatar journalists with due
reference to the fabricated accusations by the Russian authorities of terrorism or extremism.
For example, in March 2014 Ibrahim Umerov, journalist of ATR, was held for couple of
hours after he filmed the occupancy by armed people in uniform without any badges of merit
of the private car showroom, which belonged to a Ukrainian businessman in the district
Pnevmatika in the city of Simferopol. While detained, Ibrahim Umerov was exposed to
5
physical violence, as a result of which he suffered bodily injuries. Journalist of the ATR
television station Shevket Namatullaiev was threatened via telephone in March-April 2014.
For avoidance of arrest, Shevket Namatullaiev had to leave Crimea with his family and lives
at the moment in Kyiv, Ukraine.
14.􀀃 Television station ATR covered the news on May 3, 2014 at Kalanchak, the
administrative border of Ukraine with the Crimea, when Mustafa Dzhemilev tried to return
to Crimea. As a consequence, so called “prosecutor of Crimea” Poklonskaia N.V.declared a
warning on May 16, 2014 in relation to me on “extremist activity” and outlined that Russian
law forbids “circulating extremist materials via mass media outlets.” Copy of this letter is
presented by me for review by the Court intermediately by legal consultant.1
15.􀀃 In June 2014 I met with Marina Efremova, who during April-May 2014 with
the help of my friends and colleagues tried multiple times to set up a meeting with me.
During our conversation she indicated to me about her connections with the Central Bank of
Russia, the State Duma of the RF, and representative of president Putin in Crimea Oleg
Belaventsev; furthermore, she mentioned her connections with the FSB and that her
husband served in the FSB and participated in the occupancy of Crimea. She informed me
that Sergey Aksenov intended to buy control block of corporate rights of ATR holding. In
return, she proposed to “make myself the Chairman of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatar People”
and gave the clue that the FSB could arrange it. I recorded this conversation and presented
it for review by the Court.2
I declined this proposal. Russian authorities did not understand that they could not
carry over Mejlis and appoint it as Chairman of the Russian henchmen. Mejlis is a legal
representative of the Crimean people and its Chairman is elected via direct elections at the
1 Letter from the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation to Mr. Lenur Islyamov of ATR
Television Channel, dated 16 May 2014 (Annex 835).
2 Recording of conversation between M. Efremova and L. Islyamov (Annex 869).
6
Assembly, and even FSB can’t have influence on it. At the same time, that proposal was
offensive both to me, and to all Crimean Tatar people.
16.􀀃 Shortly after execution of the illegal referendum in Crimea, there were
searches conducted in some companies that belonged to me in Moscow and Crimea by the
representatives of the law enforcement authorities along with various controlling authorities
of the RF without any official justification. In March 2014, I was detained after the flight
from Crimea to Moscow by FSB representatives at the airport under the pretense of auto
vandalism. I was later informed that I was under guard with due reference to the denial of
ATR television station to cooperate with the Russian occupying authorities.
17.􀀃 As of January 26, 2015, the systematic pressure on the ATR television station
increased considerably. FSB and the Russian Investigation Committee executed a search in
its main office in the city of Simferopol, which took the entire day. This search was
conducted by military people in masks as shown at the Pic.1 below.
7
Fig. 1. Masked men searching the premises of the ATR TV channel
January 26, 2015
This search paralyzed broadcasting by the TV channel because both entry to and exit
from the building was prohibited. The TV channel was forced to cancel its regular shows on
that day, however the situation about the search [was broadcast] live. Some equipment,
video archives on hard disk drives, flash drives, and servers were seized. Also, during the
search, FSB officers broke down doors to inside spaces and damaged safe boxes and
bookcases where the TV channel kept its property. The FSB did not conceal the fact that the
search was an attempt to collect information regarding the persecution of Akhtem Chiygoz
and other persons associated with a meeting held on February 26, 2014 in the city of
Simferopol in support of the integrity of Ukraine covered by the ATR TV channel live.
C.􀀃 Blanket refusal to renew registration of Crimean Tatar media
18.􀀃 Although ATR TV channel’s license was valid until 2002 under Ukrainian law,
Russian law applied in Crimea pursuant to the occupation required all Crimean media to
replace Ukrainian broadcasting authorizations (licenses) with Russian documents before
April 1, 2015 in order to and enable the TV channel to operate. However, applications for
renewal of registration submitted by the ATR TV channel and other media of the holding
were repeatedly rejected on account of process breaches, which looked obviously farfetched,
especially given the mal-treatment that it had faced since February 2014.
8
19.􀀃 For example, the application for renewal of registration3 submitted by the
ATR TV channel on November 5, 2014 was rejected by the Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) on the excuse
that the application did not enclose duly certified copies of required documents.4 The
application for renewal of registration submitted by the ATR TV channel on December 16,
20145 was rejected because related charges were allegedly paid to a wrong account.6 The
ATR TV channel's application for renewal of registration submitted on February 6, 20157 was
rejected because the application allegedly did not include enough information about the
company's members.8 The ATR TV channel submitted one more application for renewal of
registration on March 20, 2015,9 just a few days before March 31, 2015—the final date for
renewal of registration, but this application was also rejected.
20.􀀃 Applications for renewal of registration of other media affiliated with the ATR
holding were rejected by occupation authorities on similar grounds. For example, the
application for renewal of registration of the children’s' channel Lâle10 submitted on
December 17, 2014 was rejected because charges associated with the application were
allegedly paid to a wrong account.11 Lâle's application dated February 6, 201512 was rejected
3 Application dated 5 November 2014 for re-registration of ATR Television Station (Annex 899).
4 Application􀀃for registration of a mass media outlet dated 5 November 2014 and Letter No. 720-
05/91 of 14 November 2014 (Annex 880).
5 Application of 16 December 2014 for re-registration of ATR Television Station (Annex 901).
6 Letter from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to ATR Television
Company, dated 26 January 2015 (Annex 850).
7 The ATR TV channel's application for renewal of registration (dated February 6, 2015) (Annex 908).
8 Letter from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to ATR Television
Company, dated 6 March 2015 (Annex 855).
9 Application dated 20 March 2015 for re-registration of ATR Television Station (Annex 909).
10 Application for renewal of registration of LALE TV channel dated December 17, 2014 (Annex 902).
11 Letter of the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation to the LALE
TV channel dated January 27, 2015 (Annex 851).
12 Application dated 6 February 2015 for re-registration of LALE (Annex 907).
9
because it allegedly did not include enough information about the company's members.13
Lâle's application for renewal of registration dated March 20, 201514 was also rejected like
subsequent applications of other entities of the ATR holding—15 Minutes15 and Meydan.16 I
produced these applications for renewal of registration and respective rejections to the Court
for consideration.
21.􀀃 When filing each subsequent application on reregistration of the television
channel ATR, the children’s channel “Lâle” and other enterprises of ATR Holding made
adjustments correcting the hypothetical omissions that were pointed out to by Russian
occupational authorities. In the process of filing subsequent applications by ATR, they were
compiled with both the help of a Russian law firm and accompanying regular consultations
with an employee of the local subdivision of Roskomnadzor.
22.􀀃 In late January 2015, the legal department of ATR Holding scheduled a
meeting to take place on February 12, 2015 with representatives of the occupational
authorities to discuss problems that we had encountered in filing applications for
reregistration of our enterprises in Crimea. Two days before holding this meeting, however,
the occupational authorities informed ATR Holding that this meeting was indefinitely
postponed. Having cancelled the meeting, the authorities sought to find new grounds to
deny each subsequent application for reregistration of the ATR television channel and other
Crimean Tatar mass media. I submitted a letter for consideration by the Court, sent by the
13 Letter from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to Lale, dated 6
March 2015 (Annex 856).
14 Application dated 20 March 2015 for re-registration of LALE (Annex 910).
15 Application dated 19 December 2014 for re-registration of 15 Minutes; Letter from the Ministry of
Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to 15 Minutes, dated 2 February 2015 (Annexes
905, 853).
16 Application dated 5 November 2014 for re-registration of Meydan; Application􀀃for registration of a
mass media outlet dated 5 November 2014 and Letter No. 720-05/91 of 14 November 2014;
application for renewal of registration of Meydan dated December 16, 2014; Letter dated 2 February
2014 from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to Meydan (Annexes
900, 880, 931).
10
ATR television channel to the occupational authorities after cancellation of the
aforementioned meeting.17
23.􀀃 From my conversation with Marina Yefremova, I understood that the
occupational authorities had refused to reregister the ATR television channel and other mass
media of the Holding Company for political reasons when I refused to meet the demands of
the Russian authorities to bring out editorial content in line with the wishes of the Russian
authorities.18
24.􀀃 After the television channel ATR was denied reregistration, further
broadcasting in Crimea was impossible under Russian law applied in Crimea after the
occupation. On the evening of March 31, 2015, the television channel ATR bid farewell to its
viewers and at midnight began broadcasting the image shown in Figure 2, instead of the
content that it had been showing for nearly 10 years.
17 Letter from ATR Holdings to Federal Service for Communications, Information, Technologies, and
Mass Communications, dated 12 February 2014; Letter from Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technologies and Mass Communications to Elzara Rustemovna, dated
10 March 2015 (Annexes 834, 857).
18 Recording of conversation between M. Efremova and L. Islyamov (Annex 869).
11
Figure 2. Farewell image of Television Channel ATR
[ATR T there is 0 days and 00:00:01 [minutes] until the end of broadcast]
25.􀀃 Even after ATR television stopped broadcasting in Crimea, pressure on
employees of the ATR television channel continued. For example, in April 2015, an operator
of ATR television channel, Eskender Nebiyev, was arrested and charged in connection with
participation in a rally on February 26, 2014, which he filed as an operator. Eskender
Nebiyev was given a suspended sentence of two years in prison. In addition, in April 2015,
police conducted a search at the home of former ATR operator Amet Umerov after he
allegedly published critical remarks towards occupational authorities on the social network.
26.􀀃 On November 2, 2015, Russian occupational authorities conducted three
coordinated searches. On this occasion, they searched my home and the homes of the editorin-
chief of the ATR television channel, Lilya Budzhurova, and the general director of ATR
television channel, Elzara Islyamova, on suspicion of terrorism of Lenur Islyamov. Having
encountered the threat of arrest throughout 2014–2015 and conviction on fabricated
charges, I was forced to leave Crimea and move to the mainland of Ukraine in July 2015.
27.􀀃 Lilya Budzhurova and Elzara Islyamova remained in Crimea and continued to
be persecuted. I know that on December 9, 2015, the home of Elzara Islyamova was again
searched, and L. Budzhurova received a warning in May 2016 regarding her allegedly
“extremist views,” the pretext for which were critical remarks published by her on social
G po Koua Beu1aHM9 0CTan0C6:
12
networks, devoted to the arrest of Crimean Tatars. Today, L. Budzhurova does not cover
political issues in her journalistic activities, but rather has concentrated on work in the
culturological sphere.
28.􀀃 Other ATR employees who remained in Crimea have also been subjected to
threats. For example, I know that on December 10, 2015, a search was conducted at the
home of former ATR editor Roman Spiridonov, and that FSB officers left bomb-producing
materials in order to fabricate a reason for charges of terrorism or extremism. Subsequently,
R. Spiridonov left Crimea and now resides on the mainland of Ukraine.
29.􀀃 In addition, Russian authorities confiscated various properties of mine, which
they sold at auction in November 2017. This property included: an administrative building
in Simferopol at 74A Kirov Avenue, a leisure and health complex in Gurzuf, on A. Pushkin
Embankment, and also two parking garages in Moscow.
30.􀀃 Now, the mass media as part of ATR Holding accomplishes activities on the
mainland of Ukraine, and the children’s contest “Tatli Ses,” performances of the ATR
Orchestra, and other cultural measures are organized by ATR on the Ukraine mainland. Due
to the blockade by Russia, their content is accessible on the Internet only though a virtual
private net-work (VPN), Facebook and special applications on tablets and smart phones.
31.􀀃 I swear that the above statements are true and accurate, and I agree, if
necessary, to appear in court to give an additional testimony.
Signed in _______________ on ____[handwritten]___June_ 6_______, 2018.
By:____________[signature]___________
__
Lenur Islyamov
IIPHMHHEHHE MEKIN HAPOIHOH KOHBEHLLHH
IO OPEE C HHAHCHPOBAHHEM TEPPOPH3MA
H MERIVHAPOIHOH KOHBEHLIHH O JIHKBHIALIHH
BCEX OPM PACOBO IHCKPHMHHAIIHH
YKPAHHA
pomu
POCCHCKOH EIEPAIIHH
IIOKA3AHHH CBHIETE.IM, IEHYPA HCIHM0BA
l. Haan c 2011 r. HBJWIOC BJIaICJJIICM XOLIMHTa ATR, KOTOpM BXoT TeeKana
ATR AIpyre CpeIcTBa MaCCOBOif pOpMa. KpOMe TOTO, H BUOC BIaIeIteM 6an1Ka
«UKCT Ba» MOCKe, a TaKKe KOMIIaHHOH IIO IIDOKe aBTOMO6Mei, aBTOTpaHCIIODTHIMH
KOMIIaHHHMH, OCyIIeCTBIHOIIIHMM IIaCCaKHDCKHe H Fpy3OBIe IeDeBO3KH, DeKIaMHIMH
areHTCTBaMH, CeTH Mara3HHOB, TODIyIOIIIHX BICOKOTeXHOO eCKOji npOIyKue B KpIMy, H AIpyTWX
aKTHBOB. H KDIMCKHi TTapHH.
He Top CO3Ia xOL/Ira ATR er0 IeTe»OCT I0 IIOIIITKH aHHOK€HH
2. XO1Hr ATR 6I ypeeH 25 de8pan 1994 r. B KpIMy, C 01 9HBap» 2000 r01a
aa.toc» ppoe re.e patoBeaHHe B KpacorBapntecxoM paioHe KpIMa. C 28 anpen1 2006
TO/Ia TeIeKaHaI ATR OCyIecTBIeT ppHOe TeIeBCIIaHHe B CHMpepOnOe CMpepOno1CKoM
paifoe. 31 pap 2012 TO1a ATR CTa eIIe OCyIICCTB.IWT CIy THHKOBOe TCICBCHIaHHe, 0XBaTBa
He TOI6KO TeDDHTOpHIO KpEIMa, HO H YKpaHHy, POCCHo, Ka3axCTa, V36eKHCTaH, CTpaLI EBpOIL.
TereKaa ATR, KaK OCHOBHOe cpeIcTo Maccooi HpopMaHH XoLHTa peLara.I peUIaraeT
IO HaCTOHIIIeC BDeMM IIIMDOKMM BEI~OD KOHTCHTa, BK.TIO'Ha HHbODMaLIHOHHIe H IOIHTHeCKHe
IpOrpaMM6I, a TaKKe pa3B.ICKaTCJIHIC, IIO3HaBaTCIEHSIC, MCTODHHeCKHe, O6pa0BaTe.ILHHe M [IeTCKHe
IIepeIaHH, B TOM HHC.Te H.I6MDI M CepHa.IL.
3. KOHTeHT, KOTOpM nOKa3IBaeTCH Ha TeIeKaHae ATR, KaK CIMHCTBeHHIH B MHpe
KpIMCKoTaTapKHi Te.eKaHa1, B epByIo oepet HanpaBeH Ha yIOBeTBOpeHHe OTpeOHocTei M
TepeCOB KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HapO/Ia, 60% BeIHIHM OCyIIIeCTB.IIOC M OcyItecTBeTc Ha
KDBIMCKOTTaDCKOM 3IKe, a OCTaBII1Mee9 40% Ha yKDaMHCKOM H DyCCKOM 3BIKaX. TeeKaHan HMeI
B KpIMy BICOKyIO IIOIIyIHDHOCT6 y BCOTO MHOTOHaIUHOHaTHOTO HaCeICHHM, BXO/HI B TpoiiKy caMIX
IHIOIyJJHDHIX Te.ICKaHaIOB B KpEIMy 1H3 36 HaLHOHaI6HIX H DeTHOHa.TH6IX TeICKaHa1OB BeIaBIIHX
B KpMy (I+I, Inter. ATR), TO IIOITBCpIaIOC JIaHHIMH CKeIHeBHIX 3aMepOB perFOB
Te.ICKaHaJIOB, IIDOBO/IHMIX He3aBHCHMIMH MOKIyHapOIHIMH areHTCTBaM TNS Nielsen.
4. XOIMHT ATR BKIOHaeT TKKe JIDyTHe CpeICTBa MaCCOBOf MHpOpMau, B TOM
MC.Ie IeTCKHi CIyTHHKOBIi TeIeKaHa «Lle» («He»), TO IepeBOUMTCH C KDEIMCKOTTaDCKOTO
3IKa KaK «T1o»nan», KOTOpIi Haa.1 eKeIHeBHOe KpyTIOcyTOHOe BeIaHHe c 20 Mapra 2013
TOI2, KOHTeHT TeIeKaHaIa BK.Oa.I pa3H006pa3Hie IeTCKHe pa3BIeKaTe/Hie, 1IO3HaBaTe.IBHIe,
06pa30BT&IHI, My BIKaTBHBIe IICDeIaH LI AIeTe MIUIIeTO, CpCIHeTO M IIOIDOCTKOBOTO BO3paCTa,
BKIOaH MyITbHIIMI, ICTCKHe (JJIMI M CepHaI, Ha KDEIMCKOTaTDCKOM W3IKe, LI
pa3BHTH IeTei, IIOIIyJIHDH3aHH M 3yMeHH IeTMM MX DO/IHOTO H3IKa.
5. K IpyFHM CDCICTBaM MaCCOBO] HHpOpMaIUHH, CB3aHHIM C XOJIHHTOM ATR. 0TrHocTe
Be pa,uHocTauHH «Mei1a» «tep», a TaKKe HHpopMa»OH opTa/caT «l
MHHyT», Pao «Me,ta» (B IIeDeBOIe C KDIMCKOTaTapCKOTO 3IKa 03HaaeT «IOLI\a1») BeLIaeT
€ I6 HOH 2004 TO/Ia Ha KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOM W3IKC, KOHTeHT HHODMaIIHOHHO- pa3BICKaTCJIHIi.
My36IKI»HOC HaIIOIHCHHe HCKIOHHTeJIHO KDBIMCKOTaTapCKOe, HapOIHaH H COBpeMeHHa IOI1yJIHpHa
My3EIKa. OTp OMHa DO/IE OTBOIHIaC BOCCTHOBJIHHIO yTDaeHHOTO CTpHHHOTO KDIMCKOTaTapCKOro
(ponK10pa. Pa(o «JIep» po~pere XxOUHHTOM ATR 27 bespa1 2013 r01a. BeLaHHe
OCyIIIeCTBJIHJIOC Ha yKDHHCKOM H Ha DyCCKOM 3MKe, KOHTCHT MH(pOpMaIUHOHHOpa3BIeKaTeJIHIi.
Caiir «15 MHy» co3/1an 23 Map1a 2013 ro1a, Ha KOTOpOM no HacTouee BpeM
Iy6nKyOTC HOBOCTHIe CTaT BHeo3anHc. [lo aeKc KpIMa yKa3aHHHe cpecTBa MacoBOf
MpOpMan B COCTaBe XO.LIHTa ATR OCyuIeCTBIH.IM IeTEIHOCT B KpMy. C 0l anpeI
2015 ro1a no HacTotee BpeM aHHIe cpeIcTBa MaCCOBo MbOpMatr (CMM), KpoMe pa/1o
«Jep», B CBW3M € 0TKa3OM BIaCTei POCC HM B epeOpOpM.Ie papeIIrenx BeaTe.JIHIX
IOKy MeHTOH, IIDOAIO.KHIM CBOIO ICHTeTHOT B VKpaHHe, B Kee.
6. B IOIOIHeHHe K CBOHM IIDOTpaMMAM IO aHHeKCHH KpEIMa, TeIeKaHaI ATR raKKe
Opra3OBIBI CKeTOIHIH H3BeCTHEIM BC&KDEIMCKHi IeTCKHi KOHKyDC IIO Ha3BaHHeM «Tatli Ses»
(«Tar.It Ce»), TO B IIEDeBO,IC C KDIMCKOTaTDCKOTO 36IKa O3HaaeT «CaIKHi TO100», B KOHKypce
eKero/Ho pHMaO yacTHe 6onee 500) IeTeil pa3IHHHIX HaIUHOHaJIHOCTei, LIaBHIM yCIOBHeM
KOTODOTO HB.IHCTCH HCIOIHCHHe IIeCHH, Xy IOKeCTBeHHOTO CIOB Ha KDIMCKOTTaDCKOM 3IKe H
KpIMcKOTaTapCKOro TaHua. LHeI TOTO MaCIITa6HOrO KOHKy DCa, KOTOpI IpOBO/ITCH Ha IpOTeHHH
TOIa CIIepBa OT6OpOIMH TypaMH, 3aTeM 3aBCpIIIeTCH TDaIHUHO3HEIM bHTHIM KOHIIepTOM
IIOIyIHpH3aIUH KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOH KyITyDI H JIeTCKOTO TBOD&CTBa. K TOMy IIpOCKTy IIOIKIOaOC
6OILIIOC KOJIHHeCTBO HaCTaBHHKOB M3 HCIa IIOITyIDHIX apTMCTOB, KOTOpIe pope€cHoHaIBHO
TOTOBHIM JIOTe K KOHKyDCy. [lo6e MTe.JIM IIDHHHM.IM JIaIHeHIIee yHaCTHe B MeIyHap0/IHIX
KOHKyDCAX Da3/1HHEIX CTDaH, TeM CaM6IM IIOIIyJIHpH3HDyH KDIMCKOTTaDCKYO KyITyDy I1O
BCeMy MMpy.
2
KpoMe Toro, y TeIeKaHaIa ATR 6 cBOii co6cTBeHHM OpKeCTp, KOTOpii 6LI co31a He
TOI6KO UI yHaCTH Da31MH6IX Ky.ITyDOIOT HHeCKHX My3IKTH5IX IIDOI DMMaX, HO H JUI BOCCTaHOBIIeHHH
yTDHeHHO CTapHHHOH HapO,THO KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOf My3IKH M neCeH,
7. JIo aHexcH KpwMa Poccei, CpeICTBa MaCCOBOf dOpMa B COCTaBe XO1IHHTa
A TR cBo6o/Ho pa6oran B KpMy, YKpaHcKoe npaBHTecTBO He BM.IO Ha peIaKLHOHHyo nOITHKy
TeIeKHa1a ATR H IpyTHX KpIMCKOTaTapCKHX cpeICTB MaccoBOii pOpMaLIHH H He IeIaeT
Toro ceijac.
8. [lo vowera npexpauten pa6ort KpIMy (Io 0I anpe1s 2015 ro1a) TeneKaHaI
ATR AB.IHIIC JUI KpIMcKHX TaTap MTOpMei 6onoro ycnexa, 6aaro.ap cBoeii BICOKo no1yJpHOCTH,
AIOBeDMIO 3pHTe.Ief M KOHOMHeCKOi pbeKTHBHOCTH, TaK KaK OcyIecTBI IeHTeIEHOeT
6e3 TOCy IapCTBeHHOf IIOLICDKKH, 6LIT IIpML.IHIM. KpIMCKHe TaTapI H IO Ce ICH CHHTa+
OT TeIIeKaHa ATR HaLuOHa1HIM JIOCTOHMeM, KOTOpI IIO3BOIHI KDIMCKHM TaTDaM y3HaTE
CBOIO HCTODHIO, KyITyDy, TDIMLIHH, 36IK, eIIe 6oee aKTHBH3HDOBaT CBOH TDaIaHCKHe IO3WILHH
IIO BOCCTaHOB/IeHHO I1paB B KpIMy, KaK KopeHHoro Hap0Ia.
IaBee, 0Ka3IBeMOC Ha Te.ICAHa.I ATR IpyFHe pIMCoTaTapCe cpeICTa
Maccosoii popMau s peBpa.are 2614 r. BIIOCICIC TBHM
9. POCCHCKe BIaCTH XOpOIIO IIOHHMaIH 3HaHeHHe TeICKaHaIOB H IpyFHX CpeICTB
MaCCOBof HpOpMatHH, IeiCTBOBaBIIIHX B KpIMy B beBpante-Mapre 2014 TOIa, M IIITaIMC J1H60
yCTpaHT HeCOT IaCHIX, 1H60 KCILIVTHDOBATE KDIMCKHe CpeICTB MaCCOBO HHpOpMaIM B
XOIIe OKKyIIaLIHH KpIMa. B HH, peLIeCTBOBaMe 27 bepa 2014 ron1a, poccice B.1aCT
HCIO/IE3OBIM «IIOCJIyIIIHIe» Te.IeKaHa1I H[IO B LIeLX DaCIDOCTDaHeHH CBOeiT IIDOIIaTaH,1I,
IIHTaC y~CUT KpIMHaH nOUIepaT PoccicKy1o De1epa1Mo.
[0, OHHM W3 IIpH3HaKOB IaBIeHH, KOTOpIe pOCCHHCKHe BIACTH OKa3IBaH Ha TeeKaHaTI
H IpyrHe cpeIcTBa MaccoBOi MHOpMaIM, 6MIO IpeTBeHHOe K TeeKaHay ATR Tpe6OBaHHe
aMeHT yKpaHHCKHi par Ha cBOeM IOTOTHne Ha pocccKMi par. H Toy.1 T0 Tpe6oBae
I0 MapTa 2014 T. OT IMHTpH [HOJOHCKOTO, KOTOpI B HacTOLee BpeMR 3aHMaeT IO/KHocTH
3aMecTHTe peICeIaTe.I COBeTa MHHHCTpOB KpIMa H MHHMCTpa BHyTpeHHef IIOJIHTHKH,
MHOpMa M CB3H PeCny6K KpMM.
II, TeteKaHar ATR He IOLIaICH IBICHHO CO CTOpOHI pOccHicKHx BacTe H BMeCTO
TOTO IIpOIOTKaI TDaHCJIWLIHH C yKDaHHCKHM pIaTOM Ha cBOeM OrOTHne. B To BpeM KaK poccMiCKHe
Te.IeKHIM H IIDHMKHy BIHIMe K HMM 6OJ1ELIHHCTBO KDIMCKMX CDCICTB MaCCOBOH MHpOpMaILHH,
OCyIteCTB.I.IM IIpOIaTaWHCTCKyIO IeTeIHOCT, Te.IeKaHaI ATR pyre CMH xonHHa 0Ka35IBaIH
B IIpHMOM pHpe C IIOMOII[IO IIODTaTHBHIx ycTpOcTB LiveU, 06o BCeM IpOCxoUIteM B
KpMy, BKIIOHa CO6ITH KOT Ia BOODyKeHHIe IOIM B yHHpOpMaX 6e3 3HaKOB OT.IMH 3aXBaTMBa/
H yKpaHHCKHe BOCHHMe 0eKTI B KpMMy.
3
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀛􀀖􀀘􀀌􀀑
12. B peyarare O1Ka3a Te1eKaHa1OM ATR [OUICpKaTE IpOIIeCC OKyIIaLHH KpIMa,
PoeciCKHe BIaCTH OIDaHHIH €My JIOCTyII K KDIMCKHM MepOIIpHTHM, ocBeIaeMIX IpeCCOH.
locnte Mapra 2014 r. pa3peIeHe Ha yacTHe B TaKHX MEDOIIDHHTHHX 6ELIO IDE/IOCTaBICHO TO/TKO
CpeICTBaM MaCCOBoif OpMaHH, BeIyIIHM DeIOpTaKH CIHOCO6OM, O/1OpeHH6IM DOCCHHCKHMH
OKKyIIaIIHOHHBIMH B.IaCTHMH.
13, POCCHCKHe OKKyIHIUMOHHBIe BIaCTH TaKKe OKa3IBTH IaB.ICHHe Ha OT1eIHBIX
Ky DHaIHCTOB H IDpyTHX IHII, CB3HHIX C TeICKaHa1OM ATR B beBpare MM Mapre 2014 1. B 10Max
KDEIMCKOTaTaDCKHX KypHaTHCTOB IIDOBOIHIMC O6ICKH IIO Cpa6pHKOBaHHEIM DOCCHHCKHM BaCTHMH
O6BMHeHHHM B TeppOpH3Me HIM KcTpeMM3Me. HanpMep. B Mapre 2014 r. KypHaIMCTa ATR
M6par HMa Y MepOBa 3atepKa Ha HeCKOJJKO HaCOB IIOCIe TOTO, KaK OH CHHMaI 3aXBaT BOOpyKeHHIMM
J1IOI6MM B pOpMe 6e3 OnIO3HaBTeIHIX 3HaKOB HaCTHOTO aBTOCIOHa, IIDHHIKaLIICTO
yKpaMHCKOMy 6H3HeCMeHy B MHKpOpafOHe IHeBMaTHKa T.CHMbepOnOH. 3a1epKaHHOTO M6paMa
yMepOBa nOBepr d3eCKOMy HaCHJIHIO, B De3yITaTe KOTODIX eMy 6HIM IIDHHHHOH5H
TeIeCHIe IIOBDOKJIeHHI. KypHaTy TeeKaHaa ATR [LleBery HaMary.aaey new3ecrHMe
Ia HeOHOKpaTHo yr poKaa no Te.IebOHy B MapTe-anpee 2014 TO/a. BO eKaHe aIepaH,
LlleBer HaMary.aeB c ceMei nOKHHy.I KpIM, B HaCTOHIIICC BDCMM HaXOITC B YKpaMHe, B KeBe.
14. TeneKaa ATR 03 Maa 2014 roa ocean co6rTH Ha aMHHcTpaTHBHo pate
YKpaHHI C KpIMOM Ka.aax, Kora MycrTapa ZbeMJteB IOIITaC BepHyTC B KpMM. B
CJ1e1 3a TM, TaK Ha3IBaeMI «npOKyDOD KpIMa» [HOK.IOHCKa H.B. 16 Mas 2014 ron1a BHeCa B
OTHOIIICHHH MCH IIpeIOCTepeKOHHe 06 «KCTDeMHCTCKOji ICHTeIHOCTH» oTMeT.Ia, TO pocccKoe
3aoHOaTe.cTBo 3apeaeT «paCIpOcTpaHee KcTpeMHTCKHx MaTepHaTO epe3 cpet€TBa
Maccoso dopMau». Kon Toro HcMa petcTaBeHa MHo Ha paccMoTpene Cy,1a 1Ip
ocpecrBe pHCKOHCyITa.I
15. B oHe 204 r. BcTpeTHC Mapoi EppeMosof, KoTopa TeeHMH anpeMas
2014 roa epe3 MOx Ipyelf KOJLIeT IDeIIIpHHHMZIa HeOIHOKpaTHIe IHOIITKH ODTaHH3OBaTE
CO MHO BCTpey, BO BpeM HaIIIeTO pa3TOBODa OHa Ia.Ia IIOHHTE O CBOHX CB3X C LHeHTpa.IHIM
6aHKOM Pocc, B Focytapcreno /lyMe Pp c npetcraBrenteM petera Ilyra
KpIMy, OIeTOM DeaBeteBIM, yIIOMHHaIa O CBOHX CB3HX € CE TO ee MyK CJyKHT B DC
yaCTBOBa1 B OKKyIIaUIHH KpIMa. COO6Iu.1a, To Cepre AKCeHOB XOTeI IIpMOOpCCTH KOHTpO.IHM
IHaKCT KODIIOpTHBHIX IIpaB XOLIMHTa ATR. BaMe oHa IpeLIOKHa «cteaT MeHM peIceIle,
MO 3 yIpaBIe upoKypopa Pocciiexoi etepat ry Jlenypy Mcvoy, Batey Te.eKaHaIa
ATR. 01 16 Mas 20141.
4
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀛􀀙􀀜􀀌􀀑
aTeeM MeKCIHCa KDIMCKOTaTapCKOTO HapO/Ia», HaMeKHyB Ha TO, TO (DCE MOT.1O 6I 3TO
ycTpoT. H 3aca.1 roT pa3roBOp M peocTaBMI Ty 3an1Mc Ha paccMoTpeHe Cy1a.
H OTBepr TO IpeIIoeHMe, POCCCKHe BIaCTH He IIOHHM@IM, TO OH He MoryT I1pHBIe
Ha CBOIO CTOpOHy Me IKeIMC M Ha3HaTE erO npeICeIaTeIeM DOCCMfCKOTO IIDHXBOCTH, IOCKOTEKy
Me UK.IMC BIWeTC 3aKOHHSIM IIDCICTaBHTC.THIM OpTaHOM KpIMCKx TaTap, npeIce,IaTeIL
KOTOpOTO, H36HpaeTC» IIpHMIM TO1OCOaHHeM Ha KypyITae Ha IIpHHTHe DCIICHMe KOTOpOTO
He B CH.IaX IIOBIHT6 Iae 0CE, TeM CaMIM TO IIpeUIOeHMO OLIO OCKODOHTCJIHIM He TO.1KO
LI MCHM, HO H ILL BCeTO KDIMCKOTaTpCKOTO Hap0Ia.
16. BeKOpe nOCIe He3aKOHHOTO IIpOBCICHHM pepepeHIyMa B KpIMy B HeKOTODIX M3
IpHHaLIeax MHe KOMIIaHHIX B MOCKBe M KpIMy, IpeICTaBHTe.IM IIpBOOXDaHHTeJIHIX OpTaHOB
COBMeCTHO C pa31HHEIMH KOHTDO.IHDyIOILIHMH OpraHaM PD, 6e3 OaIHOro 06CHeHHM
npoBen npoBepxn o~tcK. B Mapre 2014 ro1a no pHeTy M3 KpIMa B MocKBy, Me 3a1epKaH
pa6OTHK CE B apOIIOpTy IOU IpeUIOT OM IIOBpCKITCHH aBTOMO6H.1H, KOTOpIe IO3Ke CO0IIUu.
IM MHe, TO HaxOyC IOI CTpaei 3-3a oTKa3a TeeKaHaIa ATR coTpyHar» c poccCKHMH
OKKyIILIHOHHEIMH BJIaCTMM.
17. 26 5HBap» 2015 T, CHCTeMaTHeCKOe IaB.ICHMe, OK3IBaCMOC Ha TCICKaHa ATR,
3HaHTCHO yCH.IM1OC, DCD H Ce[ICTBeHHIH KOMMTeT PoccH npoBe ero rnaBHoM oce 8
CMbepono.e O6EICK, KOTOpEI JLIMIC BeC IeHL, TO1 O6LICK IIDOBO/IHJIC JIOJI6MM B BOeHHOi
popMe MacKax, Ka IOKa3aHo Ha pHe. I He.
Pe. I. Jon B MacKaXx, poBoMMe o6ic B noMeeHH Te.IeKaHa.Ta AT
26 9ap 2015 101a
TOT O6MCK IIapaOBa BeIIaTeJBHyIO JICHTCIHOCT TCICKaHaIa, TaK KaK 3IIpeTH.JIM
BXO/I H BIXOI H3 3IaH. TeeKaHa.I 6LI BIHyKIeH OTMCHHT B TOT JI&HE CBOH peTyIpHIe nepeIaM,
OJIHaKO B IIpHMOM pHpe CHTyaIUHIO IO O6LICKy. B XO1e O6EICKa 66LIM H3TI aCT6 060py,IO0BaHHM,
apXMBHIe BHICOMaTeDHaII Ha KeCTKHX IHcKax, pu-I3y cepBept. KpoMe roro, pa1
38yK03a14c pa3rOBOpa M. EbpeMooif L. He.woa
5
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀛􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀛􀀛􀀓􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀔􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀓􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀛􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀘􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀑
OTHHKH (DCE BO BDpeM O6ICKa CIOMaTH IBepH BHyTpeHHHX oMeIeHHii, noBpeM.H cepr
IKa(pI, B KOTODIX XDaHHIOC HMyLeTBO TeIeKaHa.Ia, DC He CKpBIBaIH TOT baKT, TO T01
O6EICK IpeICTaB.H.1 CO6O IIOnBITKy COOpa MHpOpMa, OTHOCHBIIeC» K npeceIOBaHHo AxTeMa
Hr03a H IpyTHX JIML, CB3aHHIX C MHTHHTOM 26 deBpa. 2014r. B r. CMdeponone, B 1IO,LIepRKy
IHeIOCTHOCTH VKpaMHI, KOTOpIf OCBCUIaICH TCI&KHA1OM ATR B 11pHMOM (pHpe.
MaccoBsji 0Ka3 nepepeTHCTpIIMH pIMCoTaTapeH cpeIeT MaccoBoii HdopMau
[8. He CMOTp a To, To Hue3 TeIeKaHaIa ATR 6La IecTBHTe1Ha IO 2020 r0Ia
COrIaCHO 3aKOHO,IATCJJCTBa VKDaMHEI, 3aKOHOIaTeICTBO POCC, KOTOpOe IIpHMeHM.IO B
KpIMy IDH OKKyIIaLIHH COIepKaIO TDe6OBaHHe O TOM, TO BCe CpeICTBa MaCCOBO HHpOpMaIUHH
KpIMa JIODKHI 6LIH IeDCDCTHCTDHDOBaT yKDaHHCKHe BCIIIaTCIHIC pa3DeIIMTeIHBIe IOKyMeHTI
(HueH3MH) Ha poccHcKe o 0l anpe. 2015 rota. Iu Toro To6I Te.eKaHa.I cMor pa6oraT%.
OHaKo 3aBeHH O nepeperMcTpauHH, OaHHMe TeIeKaHa1OM ATR Ipyr HMM cpeIcTBaMH MaCCOBOf
HHJOpMaLIHH XOJLIHHTa HeOHOKDaTHO OTKIOHIHC Ha OCHOBaHHM HapyIIeHH npOeCCya
»HIX HODM, BEITIICBIIIHX OCBMIHO Ha,Ty MaHHIMH, OcoeHnHo c yeroM HeHaLeaIIeTO 06paIteH,
c KOTOpHM cTa.KHaHC c peBpa 2014 r
19. HanpMep, noaHHoe 5 1Ho6p 2014 r. 3aB.eHHe TeeKaHaIa ATR o nepepercTpau
6.to oTKOHeHO poccHieKoi beepanHoit cry6oi no amopy B cpepe cs3, ndopMatMOHHIX
TeXHOIOTHf H MaCCOBBIX KOMMyHHKaLLHi (POCKOMHa,I3Op) IOI TeM IIDCLIOTOM, TO
3aB.ICHHe He BKTOHaJIO HaLIeKaILIHM 06pa30M 3aBCpCHHBIe KOIHH TDeOyeMIX IOKy MeHT0B.4 3aeHHe
O IepeperTpat, nOaoe TeeKaaoM ATR I6 1eKa6p» 2014 T.,< 6LIO OTKIOHeHO,
IIOTOMy TO COOTBeTCTBVIOI[He C6Op! KO6I 66LIH yILIaMeHI He Ha TOT ceT.6 aBeHHe Te.eKaHana
ATR O IepeperCTpaI, oaHHoe 6 peBpa.1 2015T. 6LIO OTKIOHeHO, IIOTOMy ITO 3a8JIeHHe
KO6I He CO,IepKaJIO IOCTaTOHOe KOIHHeCTBO MHpOpMaLIMM O6 yaCTHKax KOMIIaHHH.
TeneKaan ATR noa. eute O1Ho 3aBeHHe o nepeperHcTpauH 20 Mapra 2015 r.. 9 BCerO /1MI» 3a
3B.ICHHe TCICKaHaIa A TR O IICpCpCrCTpa or 5 Ho6p 2014r,
4 Ile5Mo McrepcTBa CB3I M MaCCOBIX KOMMyHHKa[Iii Pocciicoii be tepat re.reKaay ATR or
14 on6p» 2014r.
• 3as.eHe TeeKaHaIa ATR o nepepererpau or I6 /1eKa6p 2014 r.
6 IHCMO MHCTepcTBa CB3IM H MaCCOBBIX KOMMyHHKa PoccCoif DeIepat Te.teKata1y ATR OT
26 11ap» 20151
7 3a81eHHe TC.ICKaHaIa ATR O nepepercTpatu (or 6 depa 2015 r.).
HcMO MHCTepCTBa CB3M M MaCCOBIX KOMMyHMKaii Pocccxoi etepau re.eKaanry ATR or
6Mapra 2015r.
3a.eHHe TeeKaHaa ATR o nepepercrpain or 20 Mapra 2015T.
6
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀕􀀌􀀑
􀀃􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀔􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀚􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀙􀀌􀀑
􀀃􀀃􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀜􀀔􀀓􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉹􀀃􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀓􀀏􀀃􀀛􀀛􀀓􀀏􀀃􀀜􀀖􀀔􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉹􀀃􀀃􀀜􀀓􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀖􀀌􀀑
HeCKO.KO He Io McTee cpoKa nepeperHTpaI[HH 3] MapTa 2015r,, Ho TO 3aIeHHe TaKKe
6I.IO OTKIOHeHO
20, 3aBICHHH O IIepepeTHCTDaLIHH IpyTHX CDCICTB MaCCOBOf HHOpMaLIHH, CB3aHH6IX
C XOLIMHTOM ATR, 6LIM OTKIOHCHI OKKyHLIMOHHBIMH BJIaCTHMH Ha HaIOTHHHIX OCHOBHHHX.
HanpMep, IoaHoe I7 peKa6p 2014 r. 3aBeHMe o nepepercrpau tercKoro Te.eKaHa1a
«L~le» («Le») 6LIO OTKIOHeHO, B CB3H C TeM, TO C6Op»I, CB3aHHIC C 3aB.ICHHeM, KO6L
6uH yaeHI He Ha TOT ceT. 3as.ree KaHa.1a «L~le» («JI.e») o1 6 peBpa1s 2015 T.12 6L.1O
OTKIOHCHO, IOTOMy TO OHO KO6I He COIepKZIO IOCTaTOHOe KO.IHHeCTBO HHbopMauHH 06 yacTHHKax
KOMIIaAHHH.I 3aB.eHHe KaHaa «L~le» («Jle») o nepepercTpa or 20 MapTa 2015 r.
TaKKe 6ELIO OTKIOHeHO, DaBHO KaK H IIOCJIeIyOUIHe 3aBICHHe IpyTHX peIpHHTH XO1JHTa
ATR «I5 MIHyT»,Is «Meydan» («Melia»).6 H npecTaBa TH 3aIeHM o nepeperHcTpaIHH
M COOTBCTCTByIOIIIHe 0TKa3I Ha paccMoTpeHHe Cy,Ia
21 Ilp nonae Katoro noceyoIeTO 3aeHHM o nepeperHTpau Te1eKaHa.1
ATR, IeTCKH reeKaHa1 «L~le» («Jl.ne») pyrHe npeInIpHT XO.IHHTa ATR Boca nonpanKH,
yCTpHBIIMe IIDCIIIOIOKHTeIEHIe yIIyIICHHH, yKa3aHHSIe DOCCHHCKHMM OKyIII(HOHHEIMH B.IaCTM.
B npOIteCCe nOa OCeyOIx 3aBICHHH XOJLIHHT A TR OCyIIeCTBJI.IOC C I1OMOLLI6IO
pocccKof opHHeCKO ppMI H COIpOBOKIaOIIIHMHC DeTy/IHpHIMH KOHcyITaIMMH c pa6OTHHKOM
MeCTHOTO 10/1pa3/1eeHH POCK0MHa130pa.
22. B KOHLe HBap» 2015 TO/1a IOpH,IMeCK OTIe XO.LIHHTa ATR aapoBan Ha
L2pepa1 2015 r01a COBeIaHHe C IIDeICTaBHTCJLMH OKKyaIIHOHHIX BacTe c ueIiO 0cyKeHH
IIpO6ICM. C KOTODEIMH MI CTOIKHyJIHC IIpH IIOIaHe 3aB.IeHHi O IICpeDCTMCTDaLIHH HaIIIMX
IpeInprif B KpIMy. 3a IB IHA IO IDOBCICHH TOTO COBCHIaHHH, OIHaKO, OKKyIaLIHOHHIe
BIaCTH COO6I.I XOLIMHTy ATR, TO TO COBCLIIaHHe OTKIaIIBaeTCR Ha HeOIpeIeICHHIH CpOK.
o 3as.nee o nepepercrpa renexaana LALE or I7 eKa6pa 2014 r.
IHCMO MMCTepCTBa CB3M M MaCCOBX KOMMyHHKaHji Poccicxoi ecpan re.eKanany LALE or
27 8ap 20151.
3a.eHe o nepeperHcTpaMM TeeKaHaa LALE OT 6 eBpa.1 2015 r.
HMO MHCTepcTBa CB3 M MaCCOBMX KOMMyHHKa Poccitcoii (e Iepau TreeKaany LALE OT
6 Mapra 20151.
3as.tee o nepepercrpaun re.teKana.a LALE or 20 Mapra.
s 3a.eHMe o nepeperHcTpau ca~ra «5 MyD» oT I9 1eKa6p9 2014 1.; IMC»MO MMHIHCTepCTBa CB3IM M
MaccoBIx KOMMyHMKaHi Poceifcoi deepa pyKosocTay caira «I5 HyT» 01 2 beBpa.1 2015r.
+ 3a.eHe o nepeperHcTpaHH IpeIpHTH «Mei Ia» OT 5 1H06p» 2014 1,: IMC6MO MHHMCTepCTBa CB3H
MaccoBMx KoMMyHHKaii Pocciexoi De Iepatn pyKoBoIcTBy npepH TM «Me1a» OT I4 o6p
2014 ; aB.eHHe o nepeperTparum npeIpTH «Melia» oT I6 1eKa6p 2014 r ; mMCMO MHHcTepCTBa
CB3M H MaCCOBIX KOMMyIHHKaLi Pocccoit Detepat pyoBocTBy IIpe,I1pH TM «Meta» or
2 depa 2014 1
7
􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉹􀀃􀀃􀀛􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀛􀀘􀀚􀀌􀀑
􀀃􀀋􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉥􀉨􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀀃􀀛􀀙􀀜􀀌􀀑
OTMeHHB IIDOBC/IeHHe COBCLLIaHHH, BIaCTH CTDCMHHCE HaXOIHT HOBIe OCHOBaHHH JLIH OTKIOHCHHH
KaKIOTO H3 IIOCIeIyIOIIIHX 3aMB.IeHMif O IIepepeHCTpat Te.eKaHa.I ATR IpyrMX KpIMCKOTaTapCKHX
CDeIICTB MaCCOBO HHbOpMaLIMH. H IIpeICTaBH.I Ha DaCCMOTpeHe CyIa IMC6MO, 0TnpaJIeHHOC
TCJICKHZ.IOM ATR OKKyIIaIUHOHHBIM BICTHM IIOC.IC OTMeHEI BIIIIeyIIOMHHy TOTO COBCIIHHM,
a TaKKe IIHCDMO, IIOIyHCHHOe B OTBeT (B KOTODOM IpOCTO yKa3HO, TO IO/IaHHbIe paHee 3aB.IeHH
Ha IIepeperHCTpaIo e 6I y10BIeTBOpe1HD).17
23. H Moero pa3rosopa c Mapuoi EdpeMoo s no.I, To oKKyaLMOHHIe BIaTM
OTKa3a1H B IIepeDCTHCTDaIUHH TeJCKaHaIy ATR M IIDyTHM CMM XOIHHTa IO IIOJIMTHHeCKHM nIpHMHaM,
KOT IIa OTKa32IC BITIOIHHT TDe6OBaHH pOccicKHx BacTe o npHBeIeHM Haer0 peIKLIHOHHOT
O CO/IepKaHHH B COOTBeTCTBHe C IIOKCIaHHHMH DOCCHCKHK ODFaHOB BIaCTH.I
24. Iloefe TOro KaK TeIeKaHa1y ATR 6LIO 0TKa3aHO B nIepepeTHCTpaLIHH, IaHemee
ocyutecTBIeHHe eaTeIHOf IeTeJIHOCTH B KpIMy OLIO HeBO3MOKHO B COOTBOTCTBHM C 3aKOHOIIaTeICTBOM
POcCH, KoTOpoe npHMeHIOC B KpIMy oce OKKynaMH. BeepoM 3I Mapra 2015
rota TeIeKHa. ATR nOrpOtac CO CBOHMH 3DHTeJJHMM M B IIOJIHOE HHaJI TDaHCJ1Hp0BaT 306paeHHe,
IOKa3aHHOe Ha pHC. 2, BMeCTO KOHT&HT. KOTOpEI OH I1OKa3IBaI OT IO eT.
Pe. 2. IIpota.a»oe o6paeue reeaa.1a ATR
« G # po xoHua 8euta9 0Can0C6
0 pHe 00:00:01 &c ,@ ;)\Ii;
25. lame nocne Toro, KaK Te.eKaHa ATR npepara Beutae B KpwMy, IaBIeHHe Ha
pa6oTHHKOB TeeKaHaIa ATR, nponopKaocE. HanpMep, anpee 2015 r. oneparop re.eKaan1a
ATR eKeHep He~eB 66LI apeCTOBaH, M eMy 6LIO IIpeIBIeHO OBHeHHe B CB3H c yacreM B
MTre 26 bepans 2014 ro1a, KOTOpii oH CHHMa1, KaK OnepaTOp. CKeHIep He6en 6LI yC/1OBHO
IIpHTOBODeH K IByXIIeTHeMy TODeMHOMy 3aKIIIOeHHO. KpoMe TOTO, B an1pee 2015 T, nOJIHIH
IlCMO XOLIMHTa A TR etepa.no cay~e no Ha13opy cpepe cB3M, MHpopMatwostx rexHoori H
MaccoBIx KOMMyHKaii or 12 be8pas 2015 1., oTBeT Poeouaoopa or 10 Mapra 2015 10/1a
8 3ByKO3a1MC» pa31 00pa M. EppevoBoi JI. Her»Moa.
8
npoBena o6McK B AI0Me OIBIIeTO oepaTOpa ATR AMeTa Y MepOBa IOCe TOTO, KaK OH HKOO on1y6IHKOBA.
I KDHTHHeCKHe 3aMHaHH B ZIDCC OKKyIIaLIHOHHIX BaCTef B COIIHaIHOf CeTH.
26. 2106p 20]5 r. pOCCHicKHe OKKyIaIIMOHHIC BJIaCTH IIpOBeJIH TDH CKOOp/IHHHpOantx
o6cKa. Ha TOT pa3 O66ICKHBaIH MOi 10M H /I0Ma raBHOTo peaKTopa TeeKaHaIa ATR.
Ju. Dy,UKypoBof M Teepa»Oro IHpeKTopa TeeKaHaIa ATR, '3apI HenMoBoii, no no103peHM
B Teppop3Me Jleypa HCMOBa. CTOIKHyBIIIHC C yIpO3Of 3a1pKaHM Ha IIDOTKeHH
2014 -2015 TO1a M OCyKICHH IIO Ca6pKOBaHIM O~BHHeHHHM, 66LI BIHyKIeH IIOKHHyTb
KpIM M nepeexaT B MaTCpHKOBVO HaCT YKpaHHM B Moe 2015 ron1a.
27. Jlu By/ypoBa H n3apa HcMosa ocraBa1cs B KpMy H n1pOIO.DKaIM n0IBeprare
npecetOaHMM. MHe 3ecTHO, To 09 eKa6p 2015 ro/a B /IoMe )map Hc.Mono~
IOBTOpHO IIDOBOUHJICH O6MCK, a JL.Dy KyDOBa IIOIyHHJIa OT IIpoKypaTypI KpiMa npeIOcTepeeHHe
B Mae 2016 TO,Ia, OTHOCHBIIIHMCH K ee KO6EI «OKCTDOMHCTCKHM B3TIIaM», IIDCUIOTOM IL1
KOTODOTO IIOC.IyKJIM OIIy6IMKOBaHHIe eIO B COIIHaIBHBIX CCTHX KDHTHHCCKHe 3aMeaHM, IO€BMLIIeHHIe
apeCTaM KDIMCKHX TaTap. CerOHs L.Dy DKypOBa He OCBCIIIaeT IIOIHTHeCKHe BOIpOCI B
CBOeif KypHaICTCKof Jere.HocTH, a cocpetoronac Ha pa6ore B Ky.ITypOIOrHMeCKO cpepe.
28. [[pyre pa6OTHMK ATR, ocrauIMeC B KpMMy, TaKe IIOIBepFaIHC6 y1p03aM.
HanpMep, Me 3BeCTHO, To 10 /1eKa6p 2015 r. IpOH3BOIL.IC O6LICK B I0Me 6MBueTO peaKT0pa
ATR PoMaHa CpIOOBa, To opepi DCB nOIKHHyIH MaTepHaJH, IIpeIHa3HaeHHIe LI
3TOTOBI&HM 6OM6I, TO6» cda6pKOBaT IIpHHHHy JUI O6BHeH TeppopH3Me HIM KcTpeMH3Me,
BIOCIeICTBM, P, CT4pWIOHOB IIOKHHy.II KpIM H TCIIeD IIDOKHBAeT Ha MaTeDHKOBO aCTH
YKpaMHI.
29 KpOMe TOTO, pOCCHiCKHe BIaCTH KOH]HCKOBaIH MOe pa3HOe HMyIIIeCTBO, KOTOpOe
6LIO IIpOIaHO HMM Ha ayKLIHOHe B HOH6pe 207 01a. K TOMy HMyIIIeCTBy OTHOCHIHC: a1MHHHCTpaTHBHOe
3IaHe B CHMbepOnOe no IpOCneKTy KHp0Ba 74A, KOMILICKC OTIIXa M 03/10po01e1
B Typype, Ha a6epeKHO HMeHM A.IlyLIKHHa, a TaKKe JIBe aBTOCTOHKH B MOcKBe
30, Tenep CpetCTBa MaccoBOi HOpMa B COCTaBe XO/IHTa ATR ocyutecTB/OT
ICHTE.IBHOCTE Ha MaTepHKOBOf aCTH YKpaHHEI. a IeTCKH KOHKype «Tatli Ses» («Tart cec»), BICTyIAIeHHM
OpKeCTpa ATR JIpyTHe Ky.ITyDHIC MCDOIIDHHTHA ATR OpraH3yOTCH Ha MaTepKoBOf
aCT VKpaMHLI. THO Ipe 6OKpOBaHH POCCe Hx KOHTeHT IOCTyeH B HTepHeTe TO.I6Ko
epe3 BHpTya6Hyo acTHyIO CeT, (VPN), Facebook CneaHIe IIpH.IOKeHH Ha nIaHIIeTaX
M CMaprpoax.
3]. HKHyC, HTO BBILLIEH3IOKCHHI€ IIOKa3aHHH BIWIOTCH JIOCTOBeDHBIMH M TOH6IMM,
COEJaCeH B CJIyae HeO6xOIMOCT BHTCH B CyU 'UIM JIaHH JIOHOJIHMTeJI»HIX IIOKa3aHM.
no , £6
9
2018􁁑
Jlc11ypl􁁑

Annex 19
Witness Statement of Akhtem Chiygoz (4 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
________________________________________________________
WITNESS STATEMENT OF AKHTEM CHIYGOZ
________________________________________________________
1.􀀃 My name is Akhtem Zeytullaevich Chiygoz. I am a Crimean Tatar, and a
deputy head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People. I was born on 14 December 1964 in
Krasnogvardeysk, a village in the Samarkand Oblast of Uzbekistan. In 1989, I returned to
Crimea, from where my family had been expelled in 1944, along with the rest of the Crimean
Tatar people. I took up residence near Bakhchysarai and lived there until the events
described in this witness statement.
2.􀀃 I have been an active participant in organizations representing Crimean
Tatars since shortly after Ukraine’s independence. In 1992, I was elected head of the Mejlis
in the village where I lived. With this position, I automatically became a member of the
Bakhchysarai regional Mejlis. In 1998, I became deputy head of the Bakhchysarai regional
Mejlis, rising to head of that body beginning from January 31, 2002. I was first elected to be
a member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tartar People in 2002, becoming deputy head in
2007.
3.􀀃 In my capacity as deputy head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, from
2007 through 2013, I was responsible for relations with the executive bodies of Ukraine,
including the local regional authorities such as the Crimean Council of Ministers.
2
􀀃 The 26 February 2014 Demonstration and Persecution of Crimean Tatars
4.􀀃 On 29 January 2015, I was arrested and charged with organizing and
participating in a mass riot in front of the Crimean Parliament building on 26 February 2014.
The charges, brought pursuant to Article 212 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation,
related to my role in organizing a demonstration in support of Crimea’s continued existence
within independent Ukraine.1 A large number of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians attended
the demonstration. The authorities were notified about the demonstration, called by the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, as required by the Ukrainian law then in force. Unlike
the law subsequently imposed in Crimea by the occupying Russian forces, Ukrainian law did
not require permission from the authorities before a march or demonstration could take
place.
5.􀀃 On the morning of 26 February 2014, participants in the Mejlis-organized
demonstration assembled peacefully in the square outside the Parliament building. Shortly
afterwards, however, groups of pro-Russian demonstrators started arriving in the square to
take part in a counter-rally organized by Mr. Sergey Aksyonov, chair of the Russian Unity
party. As the day progressed, demonstrators spilled from the square into the inner courtyard
of the Parliament building. The leaders of the two rallies communicated frequently in an
attempt to control the situation and ensure that it did not get out of hand. Meanwhile, inside
the Parliament building negotiations took place to persuade the assembly members gathered
there (but fewer than needed to constitute a quorum) to defer their session to another day.
Notwithstanding these efforts, the situation became tense late in the afternoon and two
people died during a stampede in the crowd.
1 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation No. 63-FZ (13 June 1996) (Annex 874).
A.
3
6.􀀃 Following its purported annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation used
this event as an excuse to persecute Crimean Tatars. Criminal charges were filed against the
Crimean Tatar participants of the rally. In January 2015, Russian law enforcement opened a
criminal case against me and eight other Crimean Tatars who had participated in the pro-
Ukraine rally. Not a single participant in the pro-Russian rally was arrested or charged.
􀀃 Inhumane and Discriminatory Treatment During the Criminal
Proceedings
7.􀀃 Starting from the first day of my arrest, I was subjected to inhumane
treatment by the Russian authorities. On the day of my arrest, five or six masked men with
no insignia rushed into a café where I was sitting and forced me into a minibus with tinted
windows.
8.􀀃 Conditions in the facilities where I was detained were horrendous. I spent the
first ten days of my arrest in a solitary cell in the basement of the temporary detention
facility in the city of Simferopol. The cell was extremely damp and reeked of sewage. I
reported the horrible stench in the cell and the malfunctioning sewer with feces floating on
the surface, but received no response. There was a CCTV camera installed right above the
toilet, completely exposing the area around the toilet save for a small partition less than a
meter high on one side. The threadbare mattress stank of urine and was torn and soiled, as
was the pillow. I was not allowed to spend time in the open air although I was entitled to it.
9.􀀃 Moreover, I was often disallowed the basic conditions needed to observe the
religious requirements I follow as a faithful Muslim. All the food that was served to me
contained pork and pork fat. I was forced to go hungry during the first phase of my custody
until I was allowed to receive parcels. I could not observe salah (daily prayer required by
Islamic ritual) for almost all of the time I was in custody as, among other things, the small
and heavily grated windows made it impracticable to tell the time and identify the cardinal
directions. The facility officers kept refusing my requests for cardinal directions. I had to
guess the time of the day based on the time the officers woke us up (6 a.m.), and the time of
the routine “search” of my body and my cell (9 a.m.).
B.
4
10.􀀃 The horrible conditions continued in Pretrial Investigation Detention Facility
No. 1 in Simferopol. The cell was damp and cold, and the walls in my cell were smeared with
blood from bedbug bites. Although I was charged with a crime of moderate severity, I was
put into a cell with a man charged with homicide, punishable by life in prison. The food in
the cell was not edible, but I was allowed to receive parcels of a weight not exceeding 30
kilograms per month, so I began to subsist on bread crusts and tea.
11.􀀃 I was frequently subjected to undue influence or pressure by pretrial
detention facility officers. I was repeatedly summoned to offices where I sat for lengthy
interviews. The interviewers, who identified themselves as FSB officers, not only pressed me
to incriminate myself, but also asked me to sign documents with information besmirching
the honor and dignity of Mustafa Dzhemilev, Refat Chubarov, and the entire Mejlis and the
state of Ukraine. I was also subjected to searches that occurred five or six times a day, both
during the daytime and in the middle of the night.
12.􀀃 One day, after a series of such unjustified searches, I was moved for 10 days to
a basement room, a solitary confinement cell known as the “dungeon,” on false allegations of
possessing contraband in violation of pretrial detention facility rules. My lawyer’s complaint
about the falsity of the allegations was ignored. The cell was tiny, and the ceiling was so low
that I could not even stand upright. I showed my resistance to this fabricated accusation by
going on a hunger strike, which I managed to convey to the outside world through my
lawyer. Under pressure from the international community and because I was on a hunger
strike, the authorities decided to release me from solitary confinement, pointing to a doctor’s
note falsely reporting that I had a heart condition.
5
13.􀀃 On approximately 17 May 2015, I was again placed in a cell for inmates
serving life in prison, and the conditions in the cell were equally horrendous. One duty
officer at the facility said he was a former Berkut special forces officer, and told me openly
that he had intentionally transferred me to this cell. The horrendous conditions and
discriminatory treatment continued for almost another two years, until I was transferred to a
renovated cell on a different floor in March 2017. The transfer happened after repeated
petitions demanding my release and increased media attention to my case.
14.􀀃 The inhumane treatment continued after the investigation process had begun.
Before the interviews, I spent hours in a very small holding room where my head touched the
ceiling if I stood upright. I would then be held in another holding room for two or three
hours, sometimes longer, before being taken to the screening station. All that time, I was not
given food or water. I would typically leave my cell at 7 a.m. and not return until 10 or 11
p.m. This treatment continued for several months in a row.
15.􀀃 Other inmates did not have to go through this torture. The authorities did
this to make a simple point — to remind me how powerless I was, and to prove that my
status was not unlike that of an animal. Facility officers repeatedly said they had special
attitudes toward me. Everything was done with the knowledge of the government of the
Russian Federation. In fact, the warden of the facility while I was held there was from the
Russian Federation.
􀀃 Grossly Defective Trial
16.􀀃 On 20 July 2016, the Supreme Court of Crimea decided to sever my case from
those of other defendants, to distinguish me from the others as the “organizer” rather than a
mere participant in the mass riots, partly on the grounds of Article 212 of the Criminal Code
of the Russian Federation.
17.􀀃 As the trial progressed, it became increasingly clear that there were
insufficient grounds for the accusations against me. Of the 213 witnesses and victims in the
case, only four gave detailed testimony against me, and three of them were secret witnesses.
The use of secret witnesses impeded my ability to challenge the accusations against me.
c.
6
18.􀀃 Lacking sufficient evidence, the Russian authorities attempted to buy off
witnesses to give false testimony. On 6 March 2017, for instance, Mustafa Degermendzhi, a
defendant in one of the proceedings that had been severed from my own, testified that he
had refused an offer made by the FSB to testify against me in exchange for release from
detention. Furthermore, he testified that he had not even seen me during the events on 26
February 2014.
19.􀀃 Throughout the trial, I was consistently denied the right to fully and
effectively defend myself. In fact, I was denied the right to attend my own trial in person.
The court required me to take part through video conference, despite the fact that the
detention facility where I was held was about 500 meters from the court house where my
trial was held, and I repeatedly requested to participate in person.2 The court rejected
multiple motions that my lawyer filed to that effect without any explanation.
20.􀀃 Based on my lawyer’s research, I understand that the Russian Code of
Criminal Procedure was amended in May 2014 to permit a defendant to participate at trial
via video conference. I also understand that this amendment was intended to apply in cases
where a defendant is held in a facility that is far away from the courtroom where he or she is
being tried. It is my understanding that my case was the first time this procedure for socalled
participation by video conference was used.
2 Case No. 1-14/2016, Petition of 12 August 2016 filed on Behalf of A.Z. Chiygoz to the
Supreme Court of the Republic Crimea (Annex 914).
7
21.􀀃 Particularly because the detention facility where I was held was so close to the
courtroom where my trial was held, I believe the court’s decision not to allow me to appear at
my trial in person was based on political, rather than legal considerations. My case was
being closely watched by the Crimean Tatar community, among others, and it was no secret
that the court wished to discourage Crimean Tatars — who might hope to see me testify in
person — from attending the proceedings.
22.􀀃 Based on conversations within the Crimean Tatar community, I understand
that since my trial, so-called participation by video conference has been used in the trials of
six other Crimean Tatar activists. I am not aware of any instances in which Russian
defendants were forced to participate in their trials solely by video. My understanding is
that, in ordinary criminal proceedings, Russian occupation authorities transport defendants
as far as 900 km from the detention facilities in which they are held in order to participate in
person at their trials.
23.􀀃 The decision that I would participate in my trial by video conference was an
extraordinary measure, and it also seriously compromised my ability to effectively defend my
own case. The video connection was very poor, not to mention other technical problems that
disrupted the proceedings over and over. I could not even adequately see the evidence
presented against me. Further, at no point during the hearing of my case could I
communicate confidentially with my defense lawyers, as they had to be in the courtroom.
When I needed to talk to my lawyer, he had to physically come all the way to the jail, which
halted the process for almost the entire day. This opportunity, which I was fully entitled to,
was granted by the court only in exceptional cases — once a week on average — but not as
and when needed. I was told that this was the first time a court of first instance conducted
hearings via video conference. Filing written motions was also problematic. I had to file
written motions via mail, which made it impossible to file them on time.
8
24.􀀃 After my repeated complaints that I was not allowed to fully examine the
evidence in my case, the court allowed me to be transported to the court building to examine
evidence, but for a limited time – typically from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. It was utterly insufficient
to thoroughly examine the voluminous evidence. Also, the transfer itself was torture. They
kept me from 7 a.m. in the holding room before transporting me out, only to be held in
another holding room in the court. I would then be seated on a bench to read the case
materials, without a desk or food. This was a typical practice by the authorities to deter me
from claiming my rights. In fact, I started signing off on volumes of evidence just to avoid
being tormented and mistreated while being shuttled back and forth.
25.􀀃 The judges also ignored or did not allow the introduction of evidence that was
submitted to exonerate me. For example, the court refused to take measures to guarantee
the personal safety of my key defense witness, Refat Chubarov, in order for him to
participate in hearings, and later did not allow the defense to present his written and video
testimonies. The court also refused to call other key witnesses, such as Emirali Ablaev and
Ramzi Iliasov. Further, the court gave selective weight to the video footage presented by the
prosecution depicting the 26 February rally, including by simply ignoring the scenes in which
I tried to calm down demonstrators. About 17 to 18 witnesses who were at the scene also
testified that I had tried to calm down demonstrators and stop the violence. But again, the
court gave no weight to this testimony, without any explanation.
9
26.􀀃 I learned about my mother’s grave health condition in May 2017 and
petitioned the court repeatedly for permission to visit her. Despite all the medical reports
presented describing the severe condition of my mother – the fact that she was virtually on
her death bed – the court rejected my petitions. Just as any normal person in such a
situation would be, I was distracted from the proceedings. Every day was torture for me.
Then, one day, FSB and detention facility officers took me out of the facility without any
explanation. They put me in a vehicle, handcuffed me and put a bag over my head. During
the trip of over 50 kilometers, I felt weakened and terrified; I thought I was going to die.
Only when we drove up to my parents’ house and I stepped out of the car did I realize where
I was. I was allowed to speak to my mother for just about 10 minutes, after which I was
immediately taken back. They handcuffed me and put the bag over my head again. Those
rushed 10 minutes while in handcuffs were my last moments with my mother, and I was not
allowed to attend her funeral.
27.􀀃 On 11 September 2017, the Supreme Court of Crimea found me guilty on
charges of organizing a mass riot and I was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment under
article 212, part 1, of the Russian Federation Criminal Code.
􀀃 Threats of Deportation from Crimea if Appeal Was Not Withdrawn
28.􀀃 In early October 2017, two FSB officers from Moscow came to see me and
urged that I sign a pardon petition. They explained that it was a mandatory condition for my
release from detention as part of an agreement reached between Russian President Putin
and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They added that there were strict orders to
make this happen. They also demanded that I withdraw my appeal. When I rejected their
demands, threats followed. One of the officers told me that a man of my age would probably
not be able to survive the conditions of the transfer across Russia from a red zone (a special
supervision zone) to the next, all the way to Magadan. I recalled that some of the special unit
officers wearing masks had previously made similar threats, saying that they were waiting for
me and that I would suffer physical harm.
D.
10
29.􀀃 They also mentioned that there was no guarantee that my sentence would be
limited to 8 years. I know what this means in practice – they would fabricate charges during
the transfer to add to my term of imprisonment. I recognized one of the officers. He worked
at the Security Service of Ukraine in Simferopol before moving over to the FSB, and he was
actively involved in special operations targeting the Crimean Tatars. He was responsible for
forged reports and fabricated charges against Crimean Tatars accused of terrorism and
extremism.
30.􀀃 When I refused to cooperate, they began making serious threats against my
relatives, including my children. I recalled an incident involving my wife in the spring of
2017, when her personal safety and life came under a major threat. Neighbors passing by
our house saw several people hiding behind a tree near my house and a parked car up the
street. When the neighbors poured into the street and kicked up a fuss, these people fled the
scene in the car. My wife reported this to the police, but they threatened her with criminal
prosecution.
31.􀀃 My appeal was dismissed on procedural grounds. I felt absolutely helpless.
Being familiar with the methods and practices of the Russian authorities, and aware of my
fellow countrymen going missing only to be found dead, I felt that I had no other choice. I
was also seriously concerned about the lives of my next of kin and I was aware that my own
life was in danger. Eventually, I had my defense attorneys withdraw the appeal.
32.􀀃 On 25 October 2017, the Russian security services took me out of the
detention center and brought me to the Simferopol airport. At the airport, I was handed over
to another team, which put me on an airplane. I believe it was a special-purpose aircraft,
because there were around a dozen people in uniform on board. Without any explanation, I
was deported to Ankara, Turkey. I could not dare to return to the occupied Crimea,
especially as I was aware of repeated threats against me in the media on the part of the selfproclaimed
leader of the Republic of Crimea, Mr. Aksyonov, and his accomplices.
33.􀀃 On 27 October 2017, I arrived in Kyiv, and have resided there since then.
11
34.􀀃 I swear that the foregoing statement is true and accurate and agree to appear
before the Court as needed to provide further testimony.
Signed in Kyiv, Ukraine, on _____4 June___, 2018.
By:___[signature]____________________
Akhtem Chiygoz
IIPHMEHEHHE MEKJIYHAPO/IHOH KOHBEHIIMH IIO
IPECEHEHMIO HHAHCHPOBAHHH TEPPOPH3MA H
MEKJIVHAPO/IHOH KOHBEHIIHM O JIMKBHJIAIIMH
BCEX OPM PACOBO JIMCKPHMHHAIIMH
yKPAHHA
npomue
POCCHCKOH EJIEPAIIHH
CBHJIETEJIBCKHE IIOKA3AHHH AXTEMA HHTO3A
1. MeH 3OByT AXTeM Bery.LIaeBH HHr03, H KpMMCKHi TaTapHH 3aMecTHTeJI
DyKOBOJUHTe.JLH Me/pKJIHCa KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HaDOIIa. H pOJUMJC 14 /10Ka6p 1964 rOJ1a
KpacorBapneHCKe, To JepeB B CaMapKa/CKoif O6aCT Ya36eKHCTaHa. B 1989 TOI1y BepHyJIH
KpIM, OTKVJIa MOH CeMB 651a BICJaHa B 1944 TOIy BMeCTe C OCTaIHIMH KpIMCKHMH TaTapaM. H
IOCe.e Bo3ne DaxCapa H IIpOKHBa'I TaM IO HMaIa CO6ITHH, OIIHCaHHIX B HaCTOHLILHX
CBHAIeTeJIDCKHX IIOKa'aHHX.
2. HCTaIaKTHBHIM yHaCTHHKOM ODTaHH3aIHH, IIDeIICTaJIHIOIIUHX KpIMcKX TaTap,
BCKOpe nIOCJIe OpeTeHHH YKpaHHOH He3aBHCHMOCTH. B 1992 101y 6HI H36pa raBO MeppKHca
JIepeBHH, B KOTODOH H IIDOKHBaI. {aHHMaH TOT IIOCT, H aBTOMaTHHOCKH CTaI HJIeHOM
Bax capacxoro peroanorO MeppK.HCa. B 1998 ropy cTa1 3aMecTHTeeM peIce/LaTeJLH
Bax HCapaHCKOro perHOHaHOrO MepKIHca, a HaHHaH C 31 1HBapH 2002 TOJIa 6LJI BBJIBHHyT Ha
JIOJDKHOCT DyKOBOHTeJH TO opraHH3a1HH. Ilept pa3 MeH H36pa IeHOM MeppKHca
KpMcKo-TaTapCKOTO Hap0/1a B 2002 r0I1y, a B 2007 roIy cTaI 3aMecTHTeJIeM DYKOBOIIHTeJLH.
3. BCJIy 3aHHMaeMOf JIOJDKHOCTH 3aMeCTHTOJLH DyKOBOIIHTOJLH MeIDKJIHCa KpMMCKOTaTapCKOTO
HaDOIIa, HaHHHaH C 2007 H I1O 2013 TOIL H OTBeaI 3a OTHOIIIeHHM MOKIIy
HCIOIHHTeIHIMH ODTaHaMH YKpaHHDI, BKIO HaH ODTaHI MeCTHOH peTHOHaJIHOH BJIACTH, B
aCTHOCTH, COBeT MHHHCTpOB KpIMa.
1
􀏮􀀃
􀇨􀀑 􀇬􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈧􀀃26 􀈜􀈍􀈊􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈧􀀃2014􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀈐 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈙􀈓􀈍􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈒􀈘􀈣􀈔􀈙􀈒􀈐􀈝 􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈘􀀃
4. 􀀕􀀜 􀈧􀈕􀈊􀈈􀈘􀈧 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈈􀈘􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈐 􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈊 􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈏􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈐 􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈐 􀈊
􀈔􀈈􀈙􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈣􀈝 􀈉􀈍􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈒􀈈􀈝 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌 􀈏􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈍􀈔 􀇷􀈈􀈘􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈈 􀇲􀈘􀈣􀈔􀈈 􀀕􀀙 􀈜􀈍􀈊􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈧 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈􀀑 􀇶􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀀃
􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈐 􀈊􀈣􀈌􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈚􀈣 􀈗􀈖 􀇹􀈚􀀑 􀀕􀀔􀀕 􀇻􀇲 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈑 􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈊 􀈙􀈊􀈧􀈏􀈐 􀈙 􀈔􀈖􀈍􀈑 􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈦 􀈊 􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈏􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀀃
􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈊 􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈎􀈒􀈛 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈓􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈙􀈛􀈡􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀇲􀈘􀈣􀈔􀈈 􀈊 􀈙􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈍 􀈕􀈍􀈏􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈙􀈐􀈔􀈖􀈑 􀀃
􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈐􀈕􀈣1􀀑 􀇪 􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈕􀈧􀈓􀈐 􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈍 􀈉􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈠􀈖􀈍 􀈟􀈐􀈙􀈓􀈖 􀈒􀈘􀈣􀈔􀈙􀈒􀈐􀈝 􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈘 􀈐 􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈐􀈕􀈞􀈍􀈊􀀑 􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐
􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈐 􀈖􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈣 􀈖􀈉 􀈥􀈚􀈖􀈑 􀈙􀈖􀈏􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈑 􀇴􀈍􀈌􀈎􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈖􀈔 􀈒􀈘􀈣􀈔􀈙􀈒􀈖-􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈊 􀀃
􀈙􀈖􀈖􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈚􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈐􀈐 􀈙 􀈌􀈍􀈑􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈛􀈦􀈡􀈐􀈔 􀈏􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈔 􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈐􀈕􀈣􀀑 􀇪 􀈖􀈚􀈓􀈐􀈟􀈐􀈍 􀈖􀈚 􀈗􀈖􀈏􀈌􀈕􀈍􀈍 􀈕􀈈􀈊􀈧􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀀃
􀈖􀈒􀈒􀈛􀈗􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈖􀈕􀈕􀈣􀈔􀈐 􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈐 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈐 􀈏􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈈􀀏 􀈏􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖 􀇻􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈐􀈕􀈣 􀈕􀈍 􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈉􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈖 􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈊􀈈􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈘􀈍􀈠􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈊􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈍􀈑 􀈕􀈈 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍 􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈠􀈍􀈑 􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈑􀀑
5. 􀇻􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈔􀀃26 􀈜􀈍􀈊􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈧 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈐 􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈑 􀇴􀈍􀈌􀈎􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈖􀈔
􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈔􀈐􀈘􀈕􀈖 􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤 􀈕􀈈 􀈗􀈓􀈖􀈡􀈈􀈌􀈐 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌 􀈏􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈍􀈔 􀇷􀈈􀈘􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈈􀀑 􀇪􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈘􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈍 􀈥􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏 􀀃
􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈈􀈒􀈖􀀏 􀈋􀈘􀈛􀈗􀈗􀈣 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈐 􀈕􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈣􀈝 􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈖􀈊 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈐 􀈕􀈈 􀈗􀈓􀈖􀈡􀈈􀈌􀈤􀀃􀈌􀈓􀈧 􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈔􀈐􀈚􀈐􀈕􀈋􀈈􀀏 􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈍􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈔 􀈗􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈐􀈐􀀃􀂩􀇸􀈛􀈙􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈍 􀇭􀈌􀈐􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀂪 􀇹􀈍􀈘􀈋􀈍􀈍􀈔 􀀃
􀇨􀈒􀈙􀈍􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈣􀈔􀀑 􀀃􀈀􀈓􀈖 􀈊􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈧􀀏 􀈐 􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈚􀈣 􀈏􀈈􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈕􀈍 􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖 􀈗􀈓􀈖􀈡􀈈􀈌􀈤􀀏 􀈕􀈖 􀈐 􀈊􀈕􀈛􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀈌􀈊􀈖􀈘 􀀃
􀈏􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀇷􀈈􀈘􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈈􀀑 􀇳􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈣 􀈖􀈉􀈍􀈐􀈝 􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈑 􀈔􀈐􀈚􀈐􀈕􀈋􀈛􀈦􀈡􀈐􀈝 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈓􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈣􀈍 􀀃
􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈣􀀏 􀈗􀈣􀈚􀈈􀈧􀈙􀈤 􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈓􀈐􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈤 􀈙􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈦 􀈐 􀈐􀈏􀈉􀈍􀈎􀈈􀈚􀈤 􀈍􀈍 􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧􀀑 􀇺􀈍􀈔 􀈊􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈔􀀃􀈊􀈕􀈛􀈚􀈘􀈐􀀃
􀈏􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀇷􀈈􀈘􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈈 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈣 􀈙 􀈞􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈦 􀈛􀈉􀈍􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈠􀈐􀈝􀈙􀈧 􀈗􀈈􀈘􀈓􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈚􀈈􀈘􀈐􀈍􀈊 􀀃
􀀋􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈈􀈒􀈖􀀏 􀈊 􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈍􀀃􀈕􀈍 􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈖 􀈒􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈛􀈔􀈈􀀌 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈐􀀃􀈙􀈍􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈦 􀈕􀈈 􀈌􀈘􀈛􀈋􀈛􀈦 􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈛􀀑 􀇵􀈍􀈙􀈔􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈧 􀈕􀈈 􀈥􀈚􀈐 􀈛􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈐􀈧􀀏 􀈊
􀈚􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍 􀈌􀈕􀈧 􀈙􀈐􀈚􀈛􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈧 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈓􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈕􀈈􀈒􀈈􀈓􀈧􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧􀀏 􀈐 􀈊 􀈘􀈍􀈏􀈛􀈓􀈤􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈍 􀈌􀈈􀈊􀈒􀈐 􀈊􀀃􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈗􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈋􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐 􀈌􀈊􀈈 􀀃􀀃
􀈟􀈍􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈒􀈈􀀑
6. 􀇷􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈋􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈑􀀃􀈗􀈖􀈗􀈣􀈚􀈒􀈐 􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈐􀈐 􀇲􀈘􀈣􀈔􀈈 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈈􀈧 􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈧
􀈐􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈏􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈥􀈚􀈖 􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈣􀈚􀈐􀈍 􀈒􀈈􀈒 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈓􀈖􀈋 􀈌􀈓􀈧 􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈏􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈙􀈓􀈍􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀈒􀈘􀈣􀈔􀈙􀈒􀈐􀈝 􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈘. 􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈐􀈊􀀃􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈊􀈠􀈐􀈝 􀈊 􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈒􀈘􀈣􀈔􀈙􀈒􀈐􀈝 􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈘 􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈐 􀈊􀈣􀈌􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈚􀈣 􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖
􀈝􀈈􀈘􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈍􀈘􀈈􀀑 􀇪 􀈧􀈕􀈊􀈈􀈘􀈍 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈐􀈍 􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈖􀈖􀈝􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈣􀈍 􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈣 􀈖􀈚􀈒􀈘􀈣􀈓􀈐 􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈍􀀃􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈖 􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈐􀈊 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧􀀃􀈐 􀈍􀈡􀈍 􀈊􀈖􀈙􀈤􀈔􀈐 􀈒􀈘􀈣􀈔􀈙􀈒􀈐􀈝 􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈘 –􀀃􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈊 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈛􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈐􀈕􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈑 􀈌􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐􀀑
1􀀃􀇻􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈣􀈑􀀃􀇲􀈖􀈌􀈍􀈒􀈙􀀃􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈑􀀃􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐􀀏􀀃􀈙􀈚􀀑􀀃212􀀃􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀍺􀍹􀍶􀈌􀇤
HH OJUHH H3 yHaCTHHKOB IIDODOCCHCKOH JIeMOHCTDaIIHH He 6HI aDOCTOBaH, H HHKOMy HX HMX
He 6MJIH IIDeIIHBJIeHI O6BHHeHHH.
B. Becue.noenoe O6panteHe M IpoHIee JUCKpHMHHaI Bo pew
yroono-nponeccyam»Ix pecr
7. Hanan c caMoro neporo pu Moero apecra, HcnITaI Ha cefe 6ecenoenoe
o6paee pocccxx nacre. B peH apecTa HT HIM ecT eIOBeK B MacKax 6e3
OIIO3HaBaTeJIEH IX 3HaKOB BJIOMHJIHC B KabeTepHf, TIIe H HaXOJHJICH, H CHJIOf IIOCZJUHJIH MeHH B
MHHH aBTO6yC C 3aTeMHeHHIMH OKHaMH.
8. VCIOBHH, B KOTODIX MeHH COJIeDKaIH B H3OJUHTODaX JULH 3aIeDKaHHIX JIHIL, 6TH
yKacaouue. Hepsste ecHT He oce Moero apecTa npoBe B ouHHoHo KaMepe no/Ia1a
3orTopa peMeHHorO COIIepKaHHH B OpOpe CHMpeponone. B aMepe 6LIa KaCHaH CMDOCT,
BOHJIO H3 KaHaIH3aIIHOHHIX TDy6. H COO6In O6 yKaCHof BOHM B KaMepe M o Hepa6oraoutef
KaHIH3aIUHH, IIe Ha IIOBeDXHOCTH ILIaBaIH KaIOBBIe MaCCI, HO He IIOJIyHHJI HHKaKorO 0TeTa.
IIpMO HaI yHHTa3OM 6LIa yCTaHOBI€Ha KaMeDa BHJIOOHa6JOJIeHHH, OHa IIOJIHOCTI0 OXBaTHa1a
yaCTOK BO3Ie yHHTa3a, HCKIOHeHHeM 6HJIa TOJIKO MaJIeHKa IIeDeTODOIIKa BMCOTOH JIO OIIHOTO
MeTpa C OJIHOf CTOpOHI KaMeDH. MaTpaC, IpOITaH H BOHHIOIILH MOOi, 6HI 3aTaKeH M
H3HOIIIeH /IO IIIp, TaKOif Ke 6La M OJ(yIIKa. MHe He pa3pera wxo/HT Ha Bo3J1yx HecMoTpH Ha
To, TO HMeI Ha TO IIpaBO.
9. KpOMe TOTO, MHe HaCTO OTKa3HBaIH B O6OCIIOeHHM MHHHMaJIBHHX yCJIOBHH JUL
CO6JIOIIeHHH DeJIHTHO3HIX TDOBaHHH, KOTODIM H CJIeIIyIO KaK BeDOILUH MyCyJIMaHHH. BcH
IIpHHOCHMaH MHe eJIa COIIDKaIa CBHHHHy H CBHHOH KHp. H 6LI BIHyKIIeH ITOIOJIaT B XOIIe
IIepBOTO IIepHOIIa COIIeDKaHHH IIOJI CTpaKeH, IIOKa MHe He Da3DCIIHJIH IIOJIyHaT IIOCHIKH. H He MOT
COBepIaT» HOM3 (IHeBHVO MOJIHTBy KaK OCH3aTOIHVIO HaCT DHTyaIa MyCyJIMaH) Ha IIDOTDKeHHH
IIOTH BCOTO IIeDHOIIa COJIeDKaHHH IIOJI CTpaKeH, TaK KaK 3aKpITHe IyCTOH DeIIIeTKOf OKHa JIeJIaIH
HeBO3MOKHIM yTaIaT BDeMH CYTOK H CTOpOH ceTa.
3
Ha3HpaTeJ OCTOHHO OTKa3MBAIM MHe B IIpOCL6aX Ha3BaT» HaIIDaBJIeHH TODH3OHTa. H
6LJI BIH yKIIeH OIIDeJIOJLHT BDeMH CyTOK, OTTaIKHBac OT BpeMeHM OJ[eMa (6 yTpa), a IOTOM
BpeMe pyrHHHoro JHHOTO JI0cMOTpa H o6cKa B KaMepe (9 yTpa).
10. YKaCHe yCIOBHH COIIeDKaHHH 6HJIH H B CH30 N 1 r. CHM]epononH. KaMepa 6un1a
XOIOJUHO H CIDOH, H CTeHI KaMepI 3a6DI3TaHI KDOBIO OT yKYCOB KIOI1OB. HeCMOTpH Ha TO, TO
MeHH O6BHHHJIH B COBeDIIIeHHH IIDOCTyILJIeHHH CpeIIHe TDKeCTH, MOHH IIOMOCTHJIM B KaMepy C
enOBeKOM, OBHHHeMMM B OBepIIeHHH y6HicTBa, 3a KOTOpOe eMy IIpeIIyCMaTpHBaIOC
noKH3HeHHOe 3aKoeHHe. Ea B KaMepe 6a HeCe/IO6HOf, a MHe pa3DeIIIaJIH IIOJIyHaT IIOCLIKH
BecoM He 6onee 30 KT B MeCHII. H 6LI BIHyKIeH cyIeCTBOBaT Ha cyXapHX ae.
11. Ha Me aero oKa3MBaIH HepaBOMepHOe BO3IIeiCTBHe HJIM JIaBJIOHHe pa6OTHHKH
CH3O. MeH IIO MHOTO pa3 BI3HBaIH B Ka6HHeTM, TIIe CO MHO IIDOBOJUHJIH JUIHTeJIHIe JIOI1pOCL.
Jlonpauaoue, KoropMe npeICTaBHHc MHe KaK opHItepI DeJIepaIHOf CJ1yK6M
6e3OIaCHOCTH, He TOJIKO OKa3MBaIH Ha MOH JIaBIeHHe C TOM, TO6L OTOBODHJI Ce6H, HO H IIDOCHIM
Me no/HcaT OKyMeHTI c HHpopMa1He, nopoaei ecr» OCTOHHCTBO Mycrap
JUenea, Pepara My6apoa, cerO Me[UKJIHCa H yKDaHHCKOTO TOCyJIapCTBa B IIe1OM. MeH TaKKe
IOJIBepTaIH JIOCMOTpaM IIO ILHT-IIeCT pa3 Ha IeHD, KaK JIHeM, TaK H TJIy6OKOH HOO.
12. KaK-TO pa3 IIHeM, IIOCIe IIOIOTO DH/Ia TaKHX HOO6OCHOBaHHIX JI0CMOTpOB, MeHH Ha 10
IIHeif IOMeCTHIH B IIOMOIIIOHHe B IIOJIBaIe, OJIHHOHH yIO KaMeDy H3BeCTHIO IIOJI Ha3BaHHeM
«TeMHHIIa», IIO JIOKHIM O6BHHOHHHM B XDaHeHHH KOHTpa6aHJII B HaDVIIIOHHe IIDaBHJI IIOBeJIeHH
CH30. Ka1O6I MOeTO IODHCTa O JDKHBOCTH 3THx 06BHHeHH 6HH poHrHOpHpoBaHI. Kaepa 6una
KDOIIIHOH, IIOTOJIOK 6LI TaKOf HH3KHii, TO He Mor BCTaT Bo BeC pOcT. H, B KaecTBe
COIIpOTHBJIHHH Cba6pKOBaHHOMy O6BHHeHHIO, O6HBHJI TO1OIIOBKy, H MHe yJIaIoC epe3 MOeTO
aIBOKaTa IIeDeIaT» COO6IIIeHHe O TOJIOJIOBKe 3a CTeHI TOD»ML. IOI JaBJIeHHeM MeKJIyHapOIIHOTO
COO6IteCTBa H yHTIBaH TO, ITO H HaXOIUHJICH B COCTOHHHH TOIOJIOBKH, BJIaCTH DeIIMJIH OTIIyCTHT
MeHH H3 OUHoHOH KaMepI, KOO Ha OCHOBaHMH cIpaBKH OT Bpaa o TOM, TO y MeHH cepIeHOe
3a6oeBaHe, To 6Lo Hen1papoi.
4
􀏱􀀃
13. 􀇷􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈐􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖 􀈙 􀀔􀀚 􀈔􀈈􀈧 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈖􀈗􀈧􀈚􀈤 􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈊 􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈛 􀈙
􀈏􀈈􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈣􀈔􀈐􀀏 􀈖􀈚􀈉􀈣􀈊􀈈􀈦􀈡􀈐􀈔􀈐 􀈗􀈖􀈎􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈍 􀈏􀈈􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍􀀏 􀈐 􀈛􀈙􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈧 􀈊 􀈥􀈚􀈖􀈑 􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈍 􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈐 􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈐􀈍 􀀃
􀈎􀈍 􀈛􀈎􀈈􀈙􀈕􀈣􀈍􀀑 􀇶􀈌􀈐􀈕 􀈐􀈏 􀈌􀈍􀈎􀈛􀈘􀈕􀈣􀈝 􀈖􀈜􀈐􀈞􀈍􀈘􀈖􀈊 􀈥􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈛􀈟􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈙􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈓􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈘􀈈􀈕􀈤􀈠􀈍 􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈎􀈐􀈓 􀈊 􀀃
􀈙􀈗􀈍􀈞􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈐 􀂩􀇩􀈍􀈘􀈒􀈛􀈚􀂪 􀈐 􀈖􀈚􀈒􀈘􀈣􀈚􀈖 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈏􀈕􀈈􀈓􀈙􀈧 􀈔􀈕􀈍􀀏􀀃􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈛􀈔􀈣􀈠􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈖 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈊􀈍􀈓 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈊 􀈥􀈚􀈛 􀀃
􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈛􀀑 􀇻􀈎􀈈􀈙􀈈􀈦􀈡􀈐􀈍 􀈛􀈙􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈧 􀈙􀈖􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈎􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈐 􀈌􀈐􀈙􀈒􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈐􀈕􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈧 􀈊 􀈖􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈐 􀈙􀈖 􀈔􀈕􀈖􀈑 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈓􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤􀀃
􀀃􀈍􀈡􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈟􀈚􀈐 􀈌􀈊􀈈 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈􀀏 􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈈 􀈊 􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈍 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈕􀈍 􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈊􀈍􀈓􀈐 􀈊 􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈕􀈚􀈐􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈛􀈦 􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈛 􀈕􀈈
􀈌􀈘􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈔 􀈥􀈚􀈈􀈎􀈍􀀑 􀇷􀈘􀈖􀈐􀈏􀈖􀈠􀈓􀈖 􀈥􀈚􀈖 􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈍 􀈔􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀈟􀈐􀈙􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈣􀈝 􀈖􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀈙 􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈉􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧􀈔􀈐 􀈖􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀀃
􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈐 􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈔􀈛􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈛􀈊􀈍􀈓􀈐􀈟􀈐􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈤 􀈊􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈍 􀈙􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊 􀈔􀈈􀈙􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈑 􀈐􀈕􀈜􀈖􀈘􀈔􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈒 􀈔􀈖􀈍􀈔􀈛 􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈛􀀑
14. 􀇩􀈍􀈙􀈟􀈍􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈟􀈕􀈖􀈍 􀈖􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈓􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈤 􀈐 􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈍 􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈓􀈈 􀈙􀈓􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈙􀈙􀈈􀀑
􀇷􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈌 􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈓􀈖􀈔 􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈊 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈙􀈖􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈊 􀈖􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈤 􀈔􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈤􀈒􀈖􀈔 􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈖􀈔 􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈐,􀀃􀈐 􀈍􀈙􀈓􀈐 􀈧 􀀃
􀈊􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈈􀈓􀀏 􀈚􀈖 􀈔􀈖􀈧 􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈈 􀈒􀈈􀈙􀈈􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈤 􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈒􀈈􀀑 􀇷􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈔 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈊 􀈌􀈘􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈔 􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈊􀈖􀈑􀈕􀈖􀈔 􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈐􀀃
􀈕􀈈 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈧􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈐 􀈌􀈊􀈛􀈝-􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈝 􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈖􀈊􀀏 􀈐􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈌􀈈 􀈌􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈠􀈍􀀏 􀈐 􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖 􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈓􀈍 􀈥􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈖􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀈒 􀈔􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈛 􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈒􀈐􀀑 􀇪􀈙􀈍 􀈥􀈚􀈖 􀈊􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈧 􀈔􀈕􀈍 􀈕􀈍 􀈌􀈈􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈕􀈐 􀈊􀈖􀈌􀈣􀀏 􀈕􀈐 􀈗􀈐􀈡􀈐􀀑 􀇲􀈈􀈒 􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈖􀀏 􀈧 􀈊􀈣􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈓 􀈐􀈏 􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈍􀈑 􀀃
􀈒􀈈􀈔􀈍􀈘􀈣 􀈊 􀀚 􀈛􀈚􀈘􀈈􀀏 􀈈 􀈊􀈖􀈏􀈊􀈘􀈈􀈡􀈈􀈓􀈙􀈧 􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖 􀈊 􀀔􀀓 􀈐􀈓􀈐 􀀔􀀔 􀈊􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈘􀈈􀀑 􀇺􀈈􀈒􀈖􀈍 􀈖􀈉􀈘􀈈􀈡􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍 􀈙􀈖 􀈔􀈕􀈖􀈑 􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈌􀈖􀈓􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈤 􀈕􀈍􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖 􀈔􀈍􀈙􀈧􀈞􀈍􀈊 􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈘􀈧􀈌􀀑
15. 􀇬􀈘􀈛􀈋􀈐􀈍 􀈏􀈈􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈣􀈍 􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈐􀈔 􀈗􀈣􀈚􀈒􀈈􀈔 􀈕􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤􀀑 􀇪􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐 􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈥􀈚􀈖 􀈙􀈖 􀈔􀈕􀈖􀈑
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈖 􀈟􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈣 􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈤 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈛􀈦 􀈊􀈍􀈡􀈤􀀏 􀈈 􀈐􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈖􀀏 􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈕􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀈔􀈕􀈍􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈧 􀈉􀈍􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈓􀈍􀈕 􀈐 􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈤􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀀃
􀈔􀈖􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍 􀈕􀈍 􀈖􀈚􀈓􀈐􀈟􀈈􀈍􀈚􀈙􀈧 􀈖􀈚 􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈎􀈐􀈊􀈖􀈚􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀑 􀇶􀈜􀈐􀈞􀈍􀈘􀈣􀀏 􀈘􀈈􀈉􀈖􀈚􀈈􀈦􀈡􀈐􀈍 􀈊 􀈛􀈟􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈐􀀏 􀀃
􀈔􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖􀈒􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈕􀈖 􀈋􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈓􀈐􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈒􀈖 􀈔􀈕􀈍 􀈛 􀈕􀈐􀈝 􀈖􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈍 􀈖􀈚􀈕􀈖􀈠􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍􀀑 􀇪􀈙􀈍 􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈈􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈤 􀈙 􀈊􀈍􀈌􀈖􀈔􀈈 􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈑 􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐􀀑 􀇰􀀏 􀈌􀈍􀈑􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈐􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀀏 􀈕􀈈􀈟􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈖􀈔 􀈛􀈟􀈘􀈍􀈎􀈌􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈊 􀈚􀈖 􀈊􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈧􀀏
􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈌􀈈 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈚􀈈􀈔 􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈎􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈊 􀈏􀈈􀈒􀈓􀈦􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈐􀀏 􀈉􀈣􀈓 􀈟􀈍􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈍􀈒 􀈐􀈏 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈑 􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐􀀑
􀇪.􀀃􀇹􀈍􀈘􀈤􀈍􀈏􀈕􀈣􀈍 􀈕􀈈􀈘􀈛􀈠􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈉􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈
16. 20􀀃􀈐􀈦􀈓􀈧 2016􀀃􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀇪􀈍􀈘􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈣􀈑 􀈙􀈛􀈌 􀇸􀈍􀈙􀈗􀈛􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈒􀈐 􀇲􀈘􀈣􀈔 􀈊􀈣􀈕􀈍􀈙 􀈘􀈍􀈠􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍 􀈖 􀈊􀈣􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈐
􀈔􀈖􀈍􀈋􀈖 􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈈 􀈊 􀈖􀈚􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈍 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈐􀈏􀈊􀈖􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖 􀈙 􀈞􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈦 􀈖􀈚􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈖􀈚 􀈌􀈘􀈛􀈋􀈐􀈝 􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈧􀈍􀈔􀈣􀈝 􀈒􀈈􀈒 􀀃
􀂩􀈖􀈘􀈋􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈈􀂪􀀏 􀈈 􀈕􀈍 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈖 􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈕􀈐􀈒􀈈 􀈔􀈈􀈙􀈙􀈖􀈊􀈣􀈝 􀈉􀈍􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈧􀈌􀈒􀈖􀈊,􀀃􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈖 􀈕􀈈 􀈖􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈐 􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈤􀈐
21􀀕 􀇻􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀇲􀈖􀈌􀈍􀈒􀈙􀈈 􀇸􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈑 􀇼􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈈􀈞􀈐􀈐.
􀏲􀀃
17. 􀇪􀀃􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈍 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈉􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈 􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈐􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈤 􀈖􀈚􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈓􀈐􀈊􀈖 􀈧􀈙􀈕􀈖 􀈖􀈚􀈙􀈛􀈚􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈐􀈍
􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈟􀈕􀈣􀈝 􀈖􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀈌􀈓􀈧 􀈊􀈣􀈌􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈚􀈣􀈝 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈐􀈊 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀑 􀇰􀈏 􀀕􀀔􀀖 􀈙􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈑 􀈐 􀈎􀈍􀈘􀈚􀈊􀀏 􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈊􀈠􀈐􀈝 􀈗􀈖 􀈥􀈚􀈖􀈔􀈛 􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈛􀀏 􀈚􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖 􀈟􀈍􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈘􀈖 􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈘􀈖􀈉􀈕􀈣􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈐􀈊 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧􀀏 􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈍 􀈐􀈏 􀀃
􀈕􀈐􀈝 􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈐 􀈏􀈈􀈙􀈍􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈣􀈔􀈐 􀈙􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈧􀈔􀈐􀀑 􀇼􀈈􀈒􀈚 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈊􀈓􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈏􀈈􀈙􀈍􀈒􀈘􀈍􀈟􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈣􀈝 􀈙􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈑 􀈗􀈖􀈔􀈍􀈠􀈈􀈓
􀈔􀈕􀈍 􀈖􀈙􀈗􀈖􀈘􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀈊􀈣􀈌􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈛􀈚􀈣􀈍 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈐􀈊 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈧􀀑
18. 􀇵􀈍 􀈐􀈔􀈍􀈧 􀈌􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈟􀈕􀈣􀈝 􀈌􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊,􀀃􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈊􀈐􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈐 􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈑 􀈊􀈓􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐
􀈗􀈖􀈗􀈣􀈚􀈈􀈓􀈐􀈙􀈤 􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈒􀈛􀈗􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀈙􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈑 􀈌􀈓􀈧 􀈌􀈈􀈟􀈐 􀈓􀈖􀈎􀈕􀈣􀈝 􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈑􀀑 􀀙 􀈔􀈈􀈘􀈚􀈈 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈􀀏 􀈕􀈈􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈍􀈘􀀏 􀀃
􀇴􀈛􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈜􀈈 􀇬􀈍􀈋􀈍􀈘􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈌􀈎􀈐􀀏 􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈧􀈍􀈔􀈣􀈑 􀈊 􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈍 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈉􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈈 􀈖􀈌􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈐􀈏 􀈌􀈍􀈓􀀏 􀀃
􀈊􀈣􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈣􀈝 􀈊 􀈖􀈚􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖􀈍 􀈖􀈚 􀈔􀈖􀈍􀈋􀈖 􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈈 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈖􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈐􀈏􀈊􀈖􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀀏 􀈌􀈈􀈓 􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈖 􀈚􀈖􀈔􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈖􀈚􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈙􀈧 􀀃
􀈙􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈤 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈚􀈐􀈊 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧􀀏 􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈌􀈈 􀇼􀇹􀇩 􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈓􀈖􀈎􀈐􀈓􀈖 􀈍􀈔􀈛 􀈥􀈚􀈖 􀈙􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈈􀈚􀈤 􀈊 􀈖􀈉􀈔􀈍􀈕 􀈕􀈈 􀈖􀈉􀈍􀈡􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈍 􀀃
􀈊􀈣􀈗􀈛􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈚􀈤 􀈍􀈋􀈖 􀈕􀈈 􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈉􀈖􀈌􀈛􀀑 􀇩􀈖􀈓􀈍􀈍 􀈚􀈖􀈋􀈖􀀏 􀈊 􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈐􀈝 􀈗􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧􀈝 􀈖􀈕􀀃􀈙􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈓􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈕􀈍 􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈓 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈊􀈖 􀈊􀈘􀈍􀈔􀈧
􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈣􀈚􀈐􀈑 􀀕􀀙 􀈜􀈍􀈊􀈘􀈈􀈓􀈧 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈􀀑
19. 􀇪 􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈍 􀈊􀈙􀈍􀈋􀈖 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈉􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈙􀈙􀈈 􀈔􀈕􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈧􀈕􀈕􀈖 􀈖􀈚􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈣􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈊 􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈓􀈕􀈖 􀈐
􀈥􀈜􀈜􀈍􀈒􀈚􀈐􀈊􀈕􀈖 􀈖􀈙􀈛􀈡􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈓􀈧􀈚􀈤 􀈙􀈊􀈖􀈦 􀈏􀈈􀈡􀈐􀈚􀈛.􀀃􀇼􀈈􀈒􀈚􀈐􀈟􀈍􀈙􀈒􀈐􀀏 􀈔􀈕􀈍 􀈖􀈚􀈒􀈈􀈏􀈈􀈓􀈐 􀈊 􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈍 􀈓􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈖 􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈛􀈚􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈤 􀈕􀈈 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈉􀈕􀈖􀈔 􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈍 􀈙􀈖􀈉􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈈. 􀇹􀈛􀈌 􀈗􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈍􀈉􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈓 􀈔􀈖􀈍􀈋􀈖 􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈧 􀀃
􀈗􀈖 􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈖􀈙􀈊􀈧􀈏􀈐􀀃􀈕􀈍􀈙􀈔􀈖􀈚􀈘􀈧􀀃􀈕􀈈 􀈚􀈖􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈔􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈖 􀈙􀈖􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈎􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈗􀈖􀈌 􀈙􀈚􀈘􀈈􀈎􀈍􀈑,􀀃􀈊 􀈒􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈔 􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧 􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈎􀈐􀈊􀈈􀈓􀈐,􀀃
􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈓􀈖􀈙􀈤􀀃􀈕􀈈 􀈘􀈈􀈙􀈙􀈚􀈖􀈧􀈕􀈐􀈐 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈏􀈐􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈖 􀀘􀀓􀀓 􀈔􀈍􀈚􀈘􀈖􀈊 􀈖􀈚 􀈏􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈈􀀏 􀈊 􀈒􀈖􀈚􀈖􀈘􀈖􀈔 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈐􀈙􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈓 􀀃
􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈉􀈕􀈣􀈑 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈙􀈙 􀈕􀈈􀈌􀈖 􀈔􀈕􀈖􀈑􀀏 􀈐􀀃􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈧 􀈕􀈍􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖 􀈘􀈈􀈏 􀈏􀈈􀈧􀈊􀈓􀈧􀈓 􀈖 􀈎􀈍􀈓􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈐 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈛􀈚􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈤 􀈓􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈖2.
􀇹􀈛􀈌 􀈖􀈚􀈒􀈓􀈖􀈕􀈐􀈓 􀈕􀈍􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈠􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈣􀈝 􀈔􀈖􀈐􀈔 􀈈􀈌􀈊􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈚􀈖􀈔 􀈗􀈖 􀈥􀈚􀈖􀈔􀈛 􀈗􀈖􀈊􀈖􀈌􀈛􀀃􀈉􀈍􀈏 􀈒􀈈􀈒􀈐􀈝-􀈓􀈐􀈉􀈖 􀀃
􀈖􀈉􀈢􀈧􀈙􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑.
20. 􀇶􀈙􀈕􀈖􀈊􀈣􀈊􀈈􀈧􀈙􀈤 􀈕􀈈 􀈐􀈙􀈙􀈓􀈍􀈌􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧􀈝 􀈔􀈖􀈍􀈋􀈖 􀈈􀈌􀈊􀈖􀈒􀈈􀈚􀈈􀀏 􀈧 􀈗􀈖􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈦􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈊􀀃􀈔􀈈􀈍 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀈊
􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈙􀈐􀈑􀈙􀈒􀈐􀈑 􀈛􀈋􀈖􀈓􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈖-􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈙􀈙􀈛􀈈􀈓􀈤􀈕􀈣􀈑 􀈒􀈖􀈌􀈍􀈒􀈙 􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈈 􀈊􀈕􀈍􀈙􀈍􀈕􀈈 􀈗􀈖􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈒􀈈􀀏 􀈙 􀈚􀈍􀈔 􀈟􀈚􀈖􀈉􀈣 􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈤
􀈖􀈚􀈊􀈍􀈚􀈟􀈐􀈒􀈛 􀈊􀈖􀈏􀈔􀈖􀈎􀈕􀈖􀈙􀈚􀈤 􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈊􀈈􀈚􀈤 􀈊 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈉􀈕􀈖􀈔 􀈘􀈈􀈏􀈉􀈐􀈘􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈓􀈤􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈔 􀀃
􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈜􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈞􀈐􀈑􀀑 􀈇 􀈚􀈈􀈒􀈎􀈍 􀈗􀈖􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈦􀀏 􀈟􀈚􀈖 􀈥􀈚􀈈 􀈗􀈖􀈗􀈘􀈈􀈊􀈒􀈈 􀈌􀈖􀈓􀈎􀈕􀈈 􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈈 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈧􀈚􀈤􀈙􀈧 􀈊 􀈚􀈍􀈝
􀈙􀈓􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈧􀈝􀀏 􀈒􀈖􀈋􀈌􀈈 􀈖􀈉􀈊􀈐􀈕􀈧􀈍􀈔􀈣􀈑 􀀃􀈙􀈖􀈌􀈍􀈘􀈎􀈐􀈚􀈙􀈧 􀈊 􀈔􀈍􀈙􀈚􀈈􀈝􀀏 􀈕􀈈􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈧􀈡􀈐􀈔􀈙􀈧 􀈌􀈈􀈓􀈍􀈒􀈖 􀈖􀈚 􀈏􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈐􀈧􀀃􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈈􀀏 􀈋􀈌􀈍􀀃
􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈐􀈙􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈐􀈚 􀈍􀈋􀈖 􀈙􀈛􀈌􀈍􀈉􀈕􀈣􀈑 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈙􀈙.􀀃􀇵􀈈􀈙􀈒􀈖􀈓􀈤􀈒􀈖 􀈧 􀈗􀈖􀈕􀈐􀈔􀈈􀈦􀀏 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈞􀈍􀈌􀈛􀈘􀈈 􀈚􀈈􀈒 􀈕􀈈􀈏􀈣􀈊􀈈􀈍􀈔􀈖􀈋􀈖 􀈛􀈟􀈈􀈙􀈚􀈐􀈧
􀈗􀈖􀈙􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖􀈔 􀈊􀈐􀈌􀈍􀈖􀈒􀈖􀈕􀈜􀈍􀈘􀈍􀈕􀈞􀈐􀈐 􀈉􀈣􀈓􀈈 􀀃􀈊􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈊􀈣􀈍 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈍􀈕􀈈 􀈊 􀈔􀈖􀈍􀈔 􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈍􀀑
2􀀃􀇬􀈍􀈓􀈖 􀈹 􀀔-14/􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀏 􀇽􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈑􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈖 􀈖􀈚 􀀔􀀕 􀈈􀈊􀈋􀈛􀈙􀈚􀈈 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙 􀈋􀈖􀈌􀈈 􀈗􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈕􀈕􀈖􀈍 􀈊 􀇪􀈍􀈘􀈝􀈖􀈊􀈕􀈣􀈑 􀇹􀈛􀈌 􀇸􀈍􀈙􀈗􀈛􀈉􀈓􀈐􀈒􀈐
􀇲􀈘􀈣􀈔 􀈖􀈚 􀈐􀈔􀈍􀈕􀈐 􀇿􀈐􀈑􀈋􀈖􀈏􀈈 􀇨􀀑􀇯􀀃􀀋􀈗􀈍􀈘􀈊􀈖􀈍 􀈐􀈏 􀀔􀀕 􀈝􀈖􀈌􀈈􀈚􀈈􀈑􀈙􀈚􀈊 􀈙 􀈗􀈘􀈖􀈙􀈤􀈉􀈖􀈑 􀈖 􀈓􀈐􀈟􀈕􀈖􀈔 􀈗􀈘􀈐􀈙􀈛􀈚􀈙􀈚􀈊􀈐􀈐􀀌􀈋􀊞􀋓􀋋􀋎􀋑􀋉􀋈􀋐􀋋􀋈􀀃􀍻􀍳􀍶􀈌􀇤
21. B aCTHOCTH, IIOCKOJIKy IIOMeIIIeHHe JUIH COIIeDKaHHH IIOJI CTDaKef, B KOTODOM MeHH
yJIepHBaJIH, HaXOJUHJIOC OeH 61H3Ko K 3ay cypa, rIIe poXopuHIo Moe cype6Hoe pa36HpaTe1CTBO,
cTao, TO peIIeHHe CyJIa He Da3peIIIHT MHe BICTyIIaT Ha CVJIe JIHHO 6ELIO OCHOBaHO Ha
IIOJIHTHHeCKHX, a He IODHIIHHeCKHX COO6paKeHHHX. a MOHM JIOJIOM BHHMaTeJIHO CICIUHIa B TOM
HCJIe H KDIMCKOTaTaDCKaH OILUHHa, H TO He OHIO COKDeTOM, ITO CyII XOTO.I IIDeIIOTBDaTHT
IIDHCyTCTBHe KDDIMCKHX TaTD, KOTODIe HaJIOHJIMC yBHJIeT MOH JIaIOIIIeTO CBHJIeTeJICKHe
IIOKa3aHHH JIHHHO, B CyJIeOHOM 3aCeIaHHH.
22. OCHOBBIBaHC Ha pa3TOBOpaX BHyTpH KpHMcKoTaTapCKO o61LHHM, oHHMaO, TO ¢
MoMeHTa Moero cype6HOO pa36HpaTeICTBa, TaK Ha3MBaeMOe yHaCTHe IIOCDCIICTBOM
BHJIOKOHpepeHIUHH 6LIO HCIIOJI3OBaHO B CyIIe6HIX IIDOIIeCCaX IIIOCTH JIDTHX KDIMCKOTaTaDCKHX
aKTHBHCTOB. MHe He H3BeCTHM CIyaH, KOTJIa DOCCHHCKHe O6BHHHeMHe 6LIH BHH yKIIeHI
yaCTBOBaT B HX CyJIO6HIX IIDOIIeCCaX TOJTKO IIOCDCJICTBOM BHJIeO. H IIOHHMaIO, ITO B OOH HIX
yTOIOBHIX pa36HpaTOJICTBaX DOCCHHCKHe OKKyIIaIUHOHHIe BJIaCTH IIeDeBO3HT O6BHHHeMIX II0 900
KM OT MeCT COIIeDKaHHH IIOJI CTDaKeH, B KOTODIX OHH HaXOJUHTCH, IUIH yHaCTHH B HX CyJIeOHMX
IIDOIeCCaX JIHHO.
23. TaKoe peIIeHe O MOeM yaCT B CyJe6HOM pa36HpaTe1CTBe IIOCpeIICTBOM
HpeoKoHpepeHHH 6MIO He TOI»Ko pe3BaHo Mepoi, Ho HaHecIo cepe3HM yep6 Moeif
COCO6HOCT DppeKTHBHO OCyIIIeCTBJIHT CO6CTBOHH yIO 3IIIMTy. BHJIeOCBH3 OLJIa OMeH IL1OXOTO
KaecTBa, He TOBOpH yKe o Ipyrx TeXHHecKHX po6IeMaX, KOTOpIe BCe BpeMH IIpeDHBaIH
3ace/taHHH cypa. H aKe He MOT BO BCeH IIOJIHOTe yBHJ1eT /I0Ka3aTeJICTBa, IIDeIICTaBIeHHe I1DOTH
Me. Donee Toro, B Xoe BceX CIyIaHH MOeTO JIeJIa H He MOT KOHpHJIeHIIHaIHO 06IIaTCH C
MOHMH ZJIBOKaTaMH, TaK KaK OHH JIOJDKHI 6BLJIH HaXOJIHTCH B 3aIe CyJIa. KOT[Ia MHe HyKHO 6LIO
IIOTOBODHT C MOHM aJIBOKaTOM, OH JIOJDKeH OLJI JIHHHO IIDHeXaT KO MHe H3 CY2Ia B TODMy, ITO
3a/eDKHBaIO IIDOIIeCC IIOITH Ha IIeIIH IIeHE. TaKa BO3MOKHOCT, Ha KOTOpyIo H Meo noIHOe
IpaBO, IIpeIOCTaBJIaC MHe CyJIOM TOJI»KO B HCOHTeJIHHX OIyaHX, pa3 B Hee/IO, B CpeIUHeM,
Ho He nIO Mepe BO3HHKHOBeHHH He06xOJUHMOCTH H Tor/Ia, Kor7a 0Ha BO3HHKaa. Me €Ka3aIM, TO 1IO
MoeMy Iey cyJI epoi MHcTaHLUHH BnepBe nIpooII cyaHH c Hc1OJ3oBaHHeM
7
BHJ(eOCBI3H. EIe OJ[Ha MOH IpOIeMa - IIOJIaa XOJIaTafCTB B IIHCMeHHOM Be. H JIOJDKeH 6LT
OTIIDaBJIHT IIHCMeHHHe XO/IaTa(CTBa IIO IIOHTe, ITO IIeIaIO HOBO3MOKHIM IIOJIaT HX B
yCTaHOBJIeHHIe CDOKH.
24. IlOCne MOHx MHOTOHHCIeHHMX Ka106 Ha TO, TO MHe He pa3peeHo Bo Bce no1HoTe
O3HaKOMHTCH C JIOKa3aTOJICTBaMH IIO MOeMy JIeIy, CyJI Da3peIIIHJI I1pHBO3HT MeHH B 3aHHe Cy/Ia
JULH O3HaKOMJIeHHH C IIOKa3aTeIBCTBaMH, HO Ha OTpaHHeHHOe BpeMH, KaK IIpaBHI0, c 11 aco8 yTpa
II0 3 aCOB /UH. OTOTO BDeMHH 6MIO KDaHHe He'IOCTaTOHO JULH TOTO, TO6I TIIIaTeJIHO
O3HaKOMHTCH C MHOTOTOMHM /I0Ka3aTeICTaMM. KpoMe Toro, caM nepee3I JHICH IIMTKOH.
lepen noe3poi Me c 7 acoB yTpa JepKan KoHBOHoM noMeteHHH, a oTOM no pHe3e Cy/L
B IIDyTOM KOHBOHHOM IIOMOIIIOHHH yKe B CaMOM Cy[Ie. [UH TeHHH MaTeDHaJIOB JIeJIa MHe BLJIeUHIM
TOJI»KO CKaMeKy, Ha KOTOpO MOT CHJIeT, HH CTOJIa, HH eIII He JaBaJIH. DTa THIIHHHaH IIDaKTHKa
opranos BacT 6Ma HanpaeHa Ha TO, TO6M nepeCTaI TpeOoBaT co6oIeHHe MoHX nIpaB. H ,
Ha CaMOM JeJIe, HaHaJI OJI06pHT TOMa C IIOKa3aT€1CTBaMH TOJI6KO JULH TOTO, TO6M M36eKaT To
IIITKH M ILJIOXOTO O6paIIIeHHH BO BDeMH IIOe3JIOK TYJIa H O6paTHO.
25. CyJIH TaKKe IIDOHTHODHDOBaIH HIH IIpOCTO He pa3peIIHJIH IIpHO6ILUHT K en1y
JIOKa3aTeJICTBa, KOTODIe 6UJIM IIDeIICTaBIHI C IIeIO OIIpaBJIaT MeHH. HanpMep, CyI 0TKa3aICH
IIprr Mep Io 06ecneeHHo HHO 6e3onacHocTH raBHorO cpeTeH 3aLHTI, Pedara
Hy6apoBa, JUIH eTO yMaCTHH B CJIyIIaHHHX, a 3aTeM He II03BO/IHI 3a1UHTe IIpe/IOCTaBHT eTO
IIHCBMeHHIe H BHJIeO IIOKa3aHHH. CyII TaKKe OTKa3aICH BM3BaT JIDyTHX KOeBX CBHIIeTeeH,
TaKHX Ka OMHpa1H A6naeBa H PaM3 HnCOBa. KpOMe TOTO, CyJ Ia1 H36HDaTOJIHyIO OIIeHKy
BHAIeOMaTeDHaIaM IIDeZIOCTaBJIeHHIM IIDOKyDaTyDOI, KOTODHe H3O6DaKaJIM JIeMOHCTpa1UH0 26
bepa, B TOM HHCIO IIVTeM HTHODHDOBaHHH CIIeH, B KOTODIX H IIITZICH yCIIOKOHT JIeMOHCTDaHT0B.
OK0/IO 17-18 cBHIIeTeIeH, KOTODMe 6JIH Ha MeCTe IIDOHCIIIOCTBHH, TaKKe 3aCBHJIeTeJICTBOBaIH, TO H
IIITZICH yCIIOKOHT IIeMOHCTDaHTOB H OCTaHOBHT HaCHJIMe. HO OIHT» Ke, CYJU He IIpHJ(a1 60J1II1OTO
3HaeHHHM DTHM IIOKa3aHHHM 6e3 KaKHX-JH6O 06cHeHHi.
26. Hy3Har O TKeIOM COCTOHHHH 3JI0pOB Moe MaTepH B Mae 2017 TOI1a, H
MHOTOKDaTHO IIOJIaBaJI IIDOIIIeHHH B cyII, IpocHn pa3peIMT MHe HaecTHT ee. HecMorp Ha ce
8
IIpeIICTaBIeHHMe B CyJI MeIUHIHHCKHe 3aKIOHOHHH O CeDBO3HOM COCTOHHHH 3II0pOB Moe MaTeDH,
paxrHecKH, oHa 6Ha Ha cMepTHOM opIpe, - cyJI oTKa3a MHe B Moe IpOC6e. MeHH 3TO OTBJIeKIO OT
MOeTO Cye6HOTO IIDOIIeCCa, KaK H JIO6OTO IIDyTOTO HODMaJIHOTO HOJIOBeKa B TaKO CHTyaIIHH.
KaKJIH IIeH 6LJI JULI MeH IIITKO. 3aTeM, KaK-TO JIHeM DC H pa6OTHHKH CH330 BMBeJIH MeHH
OTTyLa e3 KaKHX-JIM6O O6CHeHHf. HOCaUHJ MeH B MaIIIHHy, HaJIOJIH HaDyHHKH, Ha TOI0By
Ha(eIH MeIIIOK. MEI IIDOeXaIH 6OJ1ee 50 KHJIOMeTDOB, H HCIIHTIBaI CJIa6OCT, MHe 6LIO CTDaII1HO,
IIyMaI, HTO yMDy. TOJI6KO KOT/Ia MM JIOeXaTH JIO JI0Ma MOHX DOJUHTeJIe, H BEHIIIeJI H3 MaIIIHHI, H
IIOHHJI, TIe HaXOKyC. MHe Da3DeIIMJIH IIOTOBODHT C MOef MaTepIO, TJIe-TO OKOJIO IO MHHYT, H MOH
€pa3y 3a6pan O6paTHO. OIHT HaIeIM HaDyHHKH M MeIIIOK Ha TOJIOBy, DTH 1O MHHyT, IIpOeIeHHIe
B cneIKe H B HapyHHKaX, 0Ka3aIHc» MOM oOeIHHMH MHHyTaMH c MaTep5IO. MHe He Da3peIIHJIH
pexaTs Ha ee IIOXOpOHL.
27. 11 ceHTH6pH 2o17 ropa BepxoBHI CyII PeCIy6HK KpIM IIDH3HaI MeHH BHHOBHIM B
OpraH3aIU MaccoBtX 6eCnOpIKOB H IIpHTOBODHJ1 K BOCMH TO/1aM T0pMI no cTaTe 212, • 1 VK
PoccicKoi deepaIU.
F. Yrpoar /enopTar a Kpsnra npn oraae oroamar» anenuuo
28. BHaane or6pH 2017 roa, pa opHItepa CE H3 MOCKBM IIDHIIIIH KO MHe H HaaIH
HaCTOHTOJIHO yTOBaDHBaT MOHH IIOJIIHCaT IIDOIIIOHHe O IIOMHJIOBaHHH. OHM O6HCHHJIH, TO 3TO
HBJLHOTCH O6H3aT€.J1HIM yCJIOBHeM OCBO6OKZICHHH H3 3aKJIOHeHHH KaK HaCT COTJIaIIIOHHH MeKJIy
IIpe3eHTOM POCC IlyTHIM H IIpe3IeHTOM TypIUHH Ta~HOM OporaOM. OHM JIO6aBHIH, TO
CyIeCTByeT CTDOTHH IIpHKa3 CJIOJIaT BCe, TO6H 3TO IIDOH3OIIIJIO. OHH TaKKe Tpe6OBaIH, TOM
OTO3Ba1 CBOIO aIIOJIJLHIUHIO. KOra OTBeDT HX TDe6OBaHHH, IIOCIeJIOBaJIH TDO3M. OILHH H3
opHepoB cKa3aI MHe, To eIOBeK B MOeM Bo3pacre CKOpee BCOTO He BDKHBOT B yCIOBHHX
JUIHTOIBHOITO IIeDeMeIIIeHHH epe3 BCO POCCHIO H3 KDaCHOH 3OHM (3OHa CIIeIUHaIHOTO Ha6JIOJICHH»)
Janee BCO /OpOIy IO Marataa. H BCIIOMHHJI, TO HeKOTOpNe OHIeDI CIIeIHaIHOTO
IIOIIpa3JIeeHH BICKa3IBaIH IIOXOKHe TDO3I, OHH OLIH B MaCKaX H TOBODHJIM, TO KIT MeHH H
MHe 6yper npHHHeH pH3HecKHi peJI.
9
29. OHH TaAKKe yIIOMHHyJIH, TO HOT HHKaKO TapaHTHH TO Ha3HaHeHHHf MHe K OT6ITH
CDOK HaKa3aHHH OIDaHHHTCH 8 TO/IMM. H 3HaIO, TO TO O3HaaeT Ha IIDaKTHKe: BO BpeMH
nepeMeIteH no cTpae 6yJIyT cda6pHKOBaHM O6BHHeHHH H 6yJIyT JIO6aB.I€HI HOB5Me CDOKH K
Ha3HaeHHOMy MHe CyJIOM CpOKy OT6ITH HaKa3aHHH. H y3HaJI OIIHOTO H3 OpHIeDOB, OH pa60Ta1 B
opraax 6e3onacocr B CHMpeponoIe nepeI IepeXOIOM DC, re npHHHMa aKTHBHoe yacTHe B
CIIeIIOIIeDaIUHHX IIDOTHB KpIMcKX TaTap. OH oTBeaI 3a IOKHIe oTeTI H capoBaHHHe
O6BHHeHHH IIDOTHB KDIMCKHX TaTap, O6BHHHeMIX B Tepp0pH3Me M KcTpeMH3Me.
30. KOr/I H OTKa3aICH BIIIOJIHHT HX TDOOOBaHHe, OHH CTaIH BICKa3HBaT cepe3HHe
yrpo3M B aJIpeC MOHX DOIICTBOHHHKOB, BKOaH MOHX IeTei. H BCIIOMHHJI HHIUHJIeHT,
po3omeruuf c Moe xeoi ecno 2017 roa, Kora Bo3HHKna cepe3Ha yrpo3a ee nHoi
6e3OIaCHOCTH M JaKe KH3HH. COCeIU, pOxOIUH MHMO HaIIeTO JIOMa, yBHJIeJIH, TO HeCKOJI»KO
enoeK npHyTCH 3a /IepeBoM Bo3e /0Ma, a KaKa-To MaHHa 3a11apKOBaHa yTb Ia»IIe no Haeif
yIHIte. KOr[a COCeJH IIUJIH Ha yJIHIIY H IIOJIHHJIH IIyM, TH JIOIUH CKpLIHC» B MaIHe. Mo eHa
COO6IUa 06 3TOM B IIOJIHIUHIO, B OTBOT e IIDHTDO3HJIH yTOJIOBHMM IIpeCIeIIOBaHHeM.
31. Mo anent 6ta orKoHeHa Ha ocHoBaHHH Heco6mopeHH IpOIeCCyaIHIX
HOpM. H yBCTBOBa1 Ce6H a6COJ1OTHO 6eCIIOMOIIIHMM. 3Ha1 MeTOIII H IIDaKTHKy DOCCHCKHX OpTaHOB
BJIaCTH H OCO3HaBaH, TO MOH COOTeeCTBeHHHKH IIDOIIaIaIOT 6e3 BOCTH H IIO3Ke HaXOJUHT HX TDYIII,
IIOyBCTBOBaI, HTO y MeHH HeT BI6Opa. MeH TaKKe CeDO3HO TDOBOKHJIH OIIaCeHHH 3a KH3HE MOHX
DOIIHIX, H H IIOHHMaI, ITO IIOJIBeDITO OIIaCHOCTH H CBOIO KH3HE. B KOHIIe KOHIIOB, H IIODyHHI MOHM
aIBOKaTaM OTO3BaT aIIOJLJLHIUH IO.
32. 25 0KTH6pH 2017 TO/Ia DOCCHHCKHe CI1yK6M 6e3OIIaCHOCTH BMBe3JIM MeHH H3 CH30 H
OTBe3JIM B a3pOIIOpT CHMpepOno. B a3ponopry Me nepeIa IIpyroi KOMa/Ie, KOTOpaH
IIOCaJUHa MeHH B CaMOJIOT. H JIyMaIO, ITO 3TO 6LI CaMOJIeT CIIeIIHa3HaeHHH, TaK KK B HeM 6LIO
np6a3HTeHo pecrTOK Ope opMe. De3 KaKHX-J1H60 06CHeHHH MOH JIeIIODTH pOBa1H B
TypIo, B AHKapy. H He OCMeJIHBaICH BeDHyTCH B OKKyIIHDOBaHHEH Kp5HM, B aCTHOCTH, M IIOTOMy,
10
TO MHe H3BeCTHO O IIOBTODOIIIHXC B MOH a1pee B CMH y,pO3ax CaMOnpOBO3rJaIIIeHHOTO [naBH
Pecny6nK Kp6IM TOCIIOJIHHa AKCeHOBa H eTO COO6LIHHKOB.
33. 27 0K186p» 2017 ropa npH~LI B KHes, M c TeX IOp HaXOKyC 3IeC.
34, HKHyC, TO BMLIeH3IOKCHHOR 3aBICHHe BLOTCH IIOCTOBCDHIM M TOHHIM H
cor natuaocs» npencTaT nepe CypoM no Mepe HeO6x01HMOCTH, TO6 npeIOCTaBHT IOnOHHTe.Hie
IOKa3aH.
noncao Kue»e. v+po«a. [1 [u4of 2018 ro21a.
11
AxTeM ro3
Annex 20
Witness Statement of Ilmi Umerov (6 June 2018)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51

APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UKRAINE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
________________________________
WITNESS STATEMENT OF ILMI UMEROV
_________________________________
1.􀀃 My name is Ilmi Rustemovich Umerov. I was born into a family of Crimean
Tatars on August 3, 1957 in Uzbekistan. My family returned with me to the Crimea in 1988.
Since then I have lived in Bakhchisaray, Crimea.
2.􀀃 Since Ukraine’s independence I actively worked on behalf of the Crimean
Tatar people at the local and national levels. In June 1991, at the second session of the
Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People I was elected a founding member of the Mejlis. Since
then I was a member of the Mejlis, and in April 2015 I became Deputy Head of the Mejlis. At
the same time, while working in the All-Crimean Mejlis, I was also acting head of the
Bakhchisaray District Mejlis.
3.􀀃 In March 1994 I was elected a member of the Crimean parliament and
remained at that post until October 1994, after which I resigned in order to become Deputy
Prime Minister of Crimea. In 2002 I once again became a member of the Crimean
parliament and was elected its deputy head.
4.􀀃 In January 2000 I was appointed deputy head of the Bakhchisaray district
administration, and in June 2005 appointed by President Yuschenko as its head. In 2010 I
was again appointed to this post by President Yanukovych, where I remained until I stepped
down in August 2014.
2
A.􀀃 My situation after Russia’s occupation of the Crimea
5.􀀃 In late February 2014 it became clear that Russia was planning something in
Crimea. A lot of military-looking people appeared on the streets, dressed in uniforms but
without any markings. Other pro-Russian militarized groups formed, including the so-called
“Self-Defense Forces” gathered by the “Russian Unity” party of Sergey Aksyonov. Although at
that time this party occupied few seats in the Crimean parliament, it was known for its
longstanding animosity towards the Crimean Tatar people. For example, on the night of
November 30–December 1, 2012, “Russian Unity” supporters vandalized some building lots
where Crimean Tatars were retrying to build houses. The creation of paramilitary
organizations sympathetic to “Russian Unity’s” way of thinking, such as the Self-Defense
Forces and Crimean Cossacks deeply concerned the Crimean Tatar people who had good
reasons to believe they would be targeted.
6.􀀃 As the situation developed, the Mejlis began to meet on a daily basis and not
once every three months as before. I participated at these meetings and supported the
statements made by the Mejlis at the time demanding that the slide towards conflict be
stopped, and more specifically, calling the Crimean parliament not to make any statements
in support of Russia’s grab of the Crimea, which clearly was happening.
7.􀀃 As for me personally, I also decided to speak the truth publicly about the
situation. Over the course of the following months I voluntarily made myself available to
journalists, gave many interviews, and also made numerous statements, including on
Facebook. In my statements I always pointed out that Russia’s occupation of the Crimea was
illegal and that from a legal perspective Crimea continued to remain a sovereign territory of
Ukraine. At that time I remained at my post, hoping that the Russian occupation would not
last long and that I could speed up its demise with my public statements. I often received
accolades and thanks for speaking the truth from everyday Crimeans whom I encountered on
the streets of Simferopol and Bakhchisaray, including many Russian-speaking Slavs. I think
that my willingness to speak openly on these issues together with my profile as he
Administrative Head of Bakhchisaray district administration and member of the Mejlis and
3
Crimean parliament brought attention to me from the Russian occupation authorities. In
mid-August I decided of my own accord to step down as head of Bakhchisaray district.
8.􀀃 On May 11, 2016, these authorities pressed charges against me. Official
accusations were based on supposed comments I had made on the ATR TV channel on
March 19, 2016 in the Crimean Tatar language. These charges were based on Article 280.1,
Part 2 of the Russian Criminal Code, which specify that calling for the violation of the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation through the mass media and internet is a
crime. The falsified and fabricated nature of these accusations became clear to me during
court proceedings, and I will talk about this below.
B.􀀃 Questioning and search of my home – May 2016
9.􀀃 Due to the charges levied against me, I was taken in for questioning on May
12, 2016. On that day Dmitriy Grachev, the head of the Bakhchisaray district police, and
Vladimir Shevchenko, former representative of the Ukrainian Security Services, who after
the Russian occupation of the Crimea this agency defected to the Russian Federal Security
Services (FSB), who was specifically responsible for watching the Crimean Tatars, came to
my home. For some time I expected that I would be detained due to my activities supporting
the Crimean Tatar community and I met Messrs. Grachev and Shevchenko, whom I already
knew well, at my garden gate when they approached my home. They showed me a document
that ordered me to come to the FSB headquarters in Simferopol for questioning.
10.􀀃 I invited Messrs. Grachev and Shevchenko into my home. My wife served
them tea and I prepared to go to Simferopol for my questioning. When I left my house to go
to my questioning, three police cars and two Spetsnaz [Special Forces] buses arrived and
parked in front of my home together with dozens of masked armed people. I did not resist
any attempts to take me in, and it appearing that the arrival of these vehicles was to make my
questioning exemplary in order to frighten the Crimean Tatar community.
11.􀀃 All five of these transport vehicles formed a column that headed for
Simferopol to my questioning. After this, when I arrived at the FSB headquarters in
Simferopol, they handed me a copy of the charges against me. The court can review the
4
document I was given1 as well as a record of my questioning, which took place that same
day,2 and the investigator’s decision to charge me under Article 280.1 of the Russian
Criminal Code.3
12.􀀃 Later, towards the end of the day in the evening, the FSB staff brought me
back home and also conducted a search of my house. We traveled in a column the whole way
home and I was held in Grachev’s car. When I returned home after the questioning, local
Crimean Tatar activists had already been informed and gathered in front of my house. The
FSB arrived at my home in six vehicles: two buses, three cars, and one truck. All these
vehicles were armored and in them sat many armed men in balaclavas. Again, I believe that
the presence of all these vehicles was disproportionate to the threat to public order and was
intended to frighten the Crimean Tatar community.
13.􀀃 Image 1 below shows the events of that day when I returned home from my
questioning and the occupational forces prepared to search my house. This image was taken
from a video shot by a Crimean Tatar activist that day, and it reflects what I remember of the
events that occurred in front of my home on May 12, 2016.
Image 1. Mr. Umerov returns home after questioning on May 12, 2016.
1 Decree for the Initiation of criminal proceeding and Pre-trial Investigation (12 May 2016)
(Annex 932)
2 Protocol, Interrogation of the Suspect (Annex 933).
3 Decision to Prosecute As Defendant Adopted by I.A. Skripka, Senior Lieutenant of Justice
and the Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Department of Federal Security
Service (FSB) of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (19 May 2016)
(Annex 934).
􀀃
5
14.􀀃 The search of my home conducted on May 12, 2016 was superficial and only
lasted a few minutes. I got the impression that the FSB officers wanted to finish it as quickly
as possible and probably it took them longer to fill out the record of the search than the
search itself.
15.􀀃 The brevity of this search again led me to believe that the objective these
actions, just as what followed, was to create an atmosphere of fear and to frighten the
Crimean Tatar people so that they would accept the reality of the Russian annexation of the
Crimea.
C.􀀃 Compulsory psychiatric evaluation – August and September 2016
16.􀀃 In August 2016 during judicial proceedings I was ordered against my will to
undergo a psychiatric evaluation for several weeks. When the investigator requested this
psychiatric evaluation I refused, so then the investigator contacted the court, which was
supposed to force me to undergo the evaluation. During the judicial examination of the
investigator’s request I began to feel ill and my blood pressure rose. An ambulance was called
and I was taken to the hospital and given a diagnosis of high blood pressure and at risk of a
heart attack. In my absence from the courtroom (while I was hospitalized) the judge
approved the prosecutor’s request and ordered me to undergo a compulsory psychiatric
evaluation.
6
17.􀀃 For me this evaluation was 21 days of torture. I was brought to a psychiatric
hospital to undergo the evaluation immediately after my hospital stay for high blood
pressure. At the psychiatric hospital I was locked up in a ward for patients with chronic and
incurable psychiatric illnesses. The hygiene was disgusting and I was held in a small space
with three other people. Although walls divided different sections of the psychiatric ward,
there were no doors in the doorways and sound traveled freely. Therefore, all of the
approximately 100 patients in the ward not only could hear everyone else at all times, but
they could approach one another. It often occurred that I would awaken at night and next to
my bed one of the patients would be standing there staring at me. It was dreadful.
18.􀀃 After about two weeks one of the medical staff informed me that she knew
that I was not psychiatrically ill but nevertheless I needed to stay there longer. I was
discharged the following week after 21 days in confinement.
19.􀀃 Before leaving the hospital I asked some of the staff if there had been other
cases when political prisoners had been brought in for evaluation. They answered that this
had never happened while the Crimea had been under Ukrainian rule and that I was the first
person subjected to this treatment since the Russians had taken over—accused of political
subversion and under criminal indictment, ordered by the court to undergo a compulsory
psychiatric examination. As I understand it, since then more than 20 other detainees (all
Crimean Tatars) were subjected to similar psychiatric evaluations.
D.􀀃 Court trial and verdict – from July to September
20.􀀃 During the judicial examination, which took over 20 court sessions from July
to September 2017, there were many mistakes and false accusations made about me to the
court. For example, the accusations against me were based on an incorrect translation of
statements I had made in the Crimean Tatar language on the ATR television channel. Words
were added to the Russian translation of statements I had actually made and the
prosecutor’s accusations against me were based on these added words. Despite my having
said in the Crimean Tatar language that if sanctions were strengthened, expanded, and
deepened to such an extent that the Russian Federation itself would give up the Crimea and
7
leave the Donbass region—that it would be a good thing if EU and U.S. sanctions forced the
occupiers to leave the Crimea—the FSB translated this into Russian as if I had said that the
Russian Federation must be forced to leave the Crimea and Donbass region. In other words,
their translation gave reason to believe I had said that Crimean Tatars must pressure the
Russian Federation to get out of the Crimea and Donbass region. By adding the word “must,”
which I had not said in the Crimean Tatar language, the prosecution based its accusations as
“calling for the violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.” In the
Crimean Tatar language there is a word, “kerek,” which means the same as the Russian
“must,” and I never pronounced this word. It was precisely this phrase that the prosecution
and linguistic evaluation based its accusations. I am attaching a transcript from my trial for
review by the Court, and this includes statements by an expert linguist on this issue.4
21.􀀃 The translator and other witnesses for the defense refused to support the
authenticity of this falsified translation of my statement in court. The judge presiding over
my case saw this but decided to ignore it and reached his verdict based on falsified
accusations against me. In fact, the judge even imposed a more severe sentence than what
the prosecutor had requested: the prosecutor had demanded I be sentenced to three months’
suspended imprisonment, but the judge sentenced me to two years’ forced labor in a penal
colony.
22.􀀃 I suffer from heart disease and Parkinson’s, and this sentence was extremely
severe for me. Only after coming to an agreement after negotiating with the governments of
Turkey and Russia was I given early release from having to serve my sentence and today I am
in the continental part of Ukraine.
23.􀀃 I believe that the criminal proceedings filed against me, my confinement in
the psychiatric hospital, the judicial examinations and sentence imposed were attempts to
frighten the Crimean Tatars as a people and to stifle their desire to continue resisting the
Russian Federation’s illegal annexation of the Crimea.
4 Excerpts of Hearing Transcript of Umerov (Annex 935).
8
24.􀀃 I swear that the statement above is true and accurate and I agree to appear
before the Court if required in order to present additional evidence.
Signed in [handwritten:] Kyiv, Ukraine, 06/06/2018 2018.
By: [signature]
Ilmi Umerov
CD<@9A9A<9􀀁@9:8GA6DB8AB=􀀁>BA79AJ<<􀀁CB􀀁
CD9E9K9A<M􀀁H<A6AE<DB76A<N􀀁F9DDBD<;@6􀀁<􀀁
@9:8GA6DB8AB=􀀁>BA79AJ<<􀀁B􀀁?<>7<86J<<􀀁
7E9I􀀁HBD@􀀁D6EB7B=􀀁8<E>D<@<A6J<<
G>D6<A6􀀁
'(&)%$􀀁
DBEE<=E>B=􀀁H989D6J<<
CB>6;6A<N􀀁E7<89F9?N􀀁<?L@<􀀁G@9DB76
&#􀀁 Pdl~􀀁fmarq􀀁Nj{kg􀀁Trpqdkmagv􀀁Wkdoma#􀀁^􀀁omcgjp~􀀁a􀀁pdk{d􀀁iozkpigt􀀁
q_q_o􀀁f􀀁_abrpq_􀀁&.*,􀀁bmc_􀀁a􀀁Wf`digpq_ld#􀀁Pz􀀁p􀀁pdk{dh􀀁adolrjgp{􀀁a􀀁Oozk􀀁a􀀁&.--􀀁bmcr#􀀁U􀀁
qmbm􀀁aodkdlg􀀁~􀀁nomega_j􀀁a􀀁b#􀀁I_tvgp_o_h􀀁a􀀁Oozkr#
'#􀀁 U􀀁qdt􀀁nmo!􀀁i_i􀀁Wio_gl_􀀁m`odj_􀀁ldf_agpgkmpq{!􀀁~􀀁_iqgalm􀀁f_lgk_jp~􀀁
cdj_kg􀀁iozkpimq_q_opimbm􀀁l_omc_􀀁l_􀀁kdpqlmk􀀁g􀀁l_ugml_j{lmk􀀁romal~t#􀀁J􀀁g}jd􀀁&..&􀀁
bmc_􀀁 Ororjq_dk􀀁iozkpimq_q_opimbm􀀁l_omc_􀀁aqmombm􀀁pmfza_􀀁~􀀁`zj􀀁gf`o_l􀀁vjdlmk"􀀁
mplma_qdjdk􀀁Pdcejgp_#􀀁U􀀁qdt􀀁nmo􀀁~􀀁~aj~}p{􀀁vjdlmk􀀁Pdcejgp_!􀀁_􀀁p􀀁_nodj~􀀁'%&*􀀁bmc_􀀁~􀀁
f_lgk_j􀀁cmjelmpq{􀀁f_kdpqgqdj~􀀁dbm􀀁bj_az#􀀁Rclmaodkdllm􀀁p􀀁o_`mqmh􀀁am􀀁apdiozkpimk􀀁
Pdcejgpd􀀁~􀀁gpnmjl~j􀀁m`~f_llmpqg􀀁bj_az􀀁Pdcejgp_􀀁I_tvgp_o_hpimbm􀀁o_hml_#
(#􀀁 J􀀁k_oqd􀀁&..)􀀁bmc_􀀁~􀀁`zj􀀁gf`o_l􀀁vjdlmk􀀁Oozkpimbm􀀁n_oj_kdlq_􀀁g􀀁
mpq_a_jp~􀀁l_􀀁|qmh􀀁cmjelmpqg􀀁cm􀀁miq~`o~􀀁&..)􀀁bmc_!􀀁imbc_􀀁~􀀁rwdj􀀁a􀀁mqpq_air!􀀁vqm`z􀀁
f_l~q{􀀁nmpq􀀁f_kdpqgqdj~􀀁nodk{do"kglgpqo_􀀁So_agqdj{pqa_􀀁Oozk_#􀀁J􀀁'%%'􀀁bmcr􀀁~􀀁mn~q{􀀁
pq_j􀀁vjdlmk􀀁Oozkpimbm􀀁n_oj_kdlq_􀀁g􀀁`zj􀀁gf`o_l􀀁f_kdpqgqdjdk􀀁dbm􀀁bj_az#
)#􀀁 J􀀁~la_od􀀁'%%%􀀁bmc_􀀁~􀀁`zj􀀁l_fl_vdl􀀁f_kdpqgqdjdk􀀁bj_az􀀁I_tvgp_o_hpimh􀀁
o_hmllmh􀀁_ckglgpqo_ugg!􀀁_􀀁a􀀁g}jd􀀁'%%*􀀁`zj􀀁l_fl_vdl􀀁Sodfgcdlqmk􀀁]xdlim􀀁dd􀀁
bj_amh#􀀁J􀀁'%&%􀀁bmcr􀀁~􀀁`zj􀀁alma{􀀁l_fl_vdl􀀁l_􀀁|qmq􀀁nmpq􀀁Sodfgcdlqmk􀀁^lrimagvdk!􀀁bcd􀀁
mpq_a_jp~􀀁cm􀀁pamdh􀀁mqpq_aig􀀁a􀀁_abrpqd􀀁'%&)􀀁bmc_#
IIPHMEHEHHE MEKJIYHAPOJIHOH KOHBEHIIHM IIO
IPECEHEHMIO HHAHCHPOBAHHH TEPPOPH33MA H
MEKJIVHAPOJIHOH KOHBEHIIHH O JIHKBJUAIIHH
BCEX OPM PACOBO JIHCKPHMHHAI[HH
yKPAHHA
npom6
POCCHCKO E/IEPAIUHH
IIOKA3AHHH CBHJIETEJIH HI»MM YMEPOBA
1. Me 3OByT HJIMH PyCTeMOBH YMepOB. H pOIUHJICH B CeMBe KDIMCKHX
TaTap 3 aBryCTa 1957 1OJ1a B Va6eKHcTaHe. MI c ceMe BepHyJIMC» B KpHM 1988 r021y.C
Toro BpeMeHH IpOKHBaI B T. Daxcapa B KpIMy.
2. CTex IOp, KaK VKDaHHa O6peIa HO3aBHCHMOCT, H aKTHBHO 3aHHMaICH
JeJIa MH KDBIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HaDOJIa Ha MeCTHOM H HaIIHOHaJIBHOM yDOBHHX. B Ho1e 1991
roIa KypyrTaeM KpIMCKOTaTaDCKOTO HapOIIa BT0DOTO CO3BIBa H 6BUI H36paH UJIeHOMOCHOBaTOJIeM
MeUKJIHCa. C TeX IIOp H HBLOC IeHOM MeppHca, a € anpen 2015 roIa
3aHHMaJI JIOJDKHOCT 3aMOCTHTOJLH OTO TJIaBEI. OJIHOBDeMOHHO C pa6OTO BO BCeKDIMCKOM
Mepp.ce HcnOH o63aHHocTH TaBI MeppHca Baxcapacxoro paioa.
3. BMapre 1994 r0/1a 6I H36paH eHOM KpIMcKoro apaMeHTa H
OCTaBa1CH Ha 3TO JI0TKHOCTH JIO OKTH6p 1994 IO/Ia, KOT/Ia H yIIIeI B OTCTaBKy, TO6M
3aT nIOCT 3aMecTHTeLH peMep-MHHHCTpa IIpaBHTOJICTBa KpIMa. B 2002 TOJIy H OILHT
cTan eHOM KpmMcKOro napaMeHTa H 6LI 36paH 3aMecTTe1eM eTO TJIaBBI.
4. BHape 2ooo roIa 6I Ha3HaeH 3aMecTHTeIeM TIaBI Baxcapacxoi
paOHO aJIMHcTpa1, a B Hoe 2005 6I Ha3Hae IIpe3pteroM OueHKo ee
TJIaBO. B 2O10 TOJIy 6DI BHOB Ha3HaeH Ha 3TOT IIOCT IIpe3JeHTOM HHyKoBHeM, Te
ocTaBan1CH JI0 CBOe OTCTaBKH B aBIyCTe 2014 rOpa.
@]T􀀁^]Z]UT\WT􀀁^]`ZT􀀁]YYb^OdWW􀀁>_f[O􀀁D]``WTX
*#􀀁 J􀀁imlud􀀁sdao_j~􀀁'%&)􀀁bmc_􀀁pq_lmagjmp{􀀁nml~qlm!􀀁vqm􀀁Tmppg~􀀁vqm"qm􀀁a􀀁
Oozkr􀀁nj_lgoma_j_#􀀁 Q_􀀁rjgu_t􀀁nm~agjmp{􀀁klmbm􀀁j}cdh􀀁amdllmbm􀀁agc_!􀀁mcdqzt􀀁a􀀁
smokr􀀁`df􀀁fl_ima􀀁o_fjgvg~#􀀁R`o_fmaza_jgp{􀀁corbgd􀀁nomomppghpigd􀀁amdlgfgoma_llzd􀀁
bornnz!􀀁aij}v_~􀀁q_i􀀁l_fza_dkzd􀀁Ugjz􀀁p_kmm`momlz!􀀁pm`o_llzd􀀁n_oqgdh􀀁CTrppimd􀀁
dcglpqamD􀀁Udobd~􀀁Hipdlma_#􀀁Ymq~􀀁a􀀁qm􀀁aodk~􀀁|q_􀀁n_oqg~􀀁f_lgk_j_􀀁ldfl_vgqdj{lmd􀀁
kdpqm􀀁a􀀁Oozkpimk􀀁n_oj_kdlqd!􀀁ml_􀀁`zj_􀀁gfadpql_􀀁pamgk􀀁c_algk􀀁ao_ecd`lzk􀀁
mqlmwdlgdk􀀁i􀀁iozkpimq_q_opimkr􀀁l_omcr#􀀁Q_nogkdo!􀀁a􀀁lmv{􀀁p􀀁(%􀀁lm~`o~􀀁l_􀀁&􀀁cdi_`o~􀀁
'%&'􀀁bmc_􀀁pqmomllgig􀀁 CTrppimbm􀀁dcglpqa_D􀀁nomgfadjg􀀁o_forwdlg~􀀁l_􀀁rv_pqid!􀀁bcd􀀁
iozkpigd􀀁q_q_oz􀀁nzq_jgp{􀀁nmpqomgq{􀀁cmk_#􀀁Umfc_lgd􀀁n_o_kgjgq_olzt􀀁mob_lgf_ugh!􀀁
pgkn_qgfgor}xgt􀀁m`o_fr􀀁kzpjg􀀁CTrppimbm􀀁dcglpqa_D!􀀁q_igt􀀁i_i􀀁U_kmm`moml_􀀁g􀀁
Oozkpimd􀀁i_f_vdpqam􀀁apqodamegj_􀀁iozkpigt􀀁q_q_o!􀀁r􀀁imqmozt􀀁`zjg􀀁mplma_qdj{lzd􀀁
nogvglz􀀁nmj_b_q{!􀀁vqm􀀁mlg􀀁`rcrq􀀁gf`o_lz􀀁kgwdl{}#
+#􀀁 Sm􀀁kdod􀀁o_fagqg~􀀁pgqr_ugg􀀁Pdcejgp􀀁l_v_j􀀁pm`go_q{p~􀀁dedcldalm!􀀁_􀀁ld􀀁
o_f􀀁a􀀁qog􀀁kdp~u_!􀀁i_i􀀁o_l{wd#􀀁^􀀁noglgk_j􀀁rv_pqgd􀀁a􀀁|qgt􀀁pm`o_lg~t􀀁g􀀁nmccdoega_j􀀁
noglgk_dkzd􀀁a􀀁|qm􀀁aodk~􀀁f_~ajdlg~􀀁Pdcejgp_!􀀁qod`r}xgd􀀁nodio_xdlg~􀀁pnmjf_lg~􀀁a􀀁
imlsjgiq!􀀁g!􀀁a􀀁v_pqlmpqg!􀀁nogfza_}xgd􀀁Oozkpigh􀀁n_oj_kdlq􀀁ld􀀁noglgk_q{􀀁lgi_igd􀀁
f_~ajdlg~􀀁a􀀁nmccdoeir􀀁f_ta_q_􀀁Oozk_􀀁Tmppgdh!􀀁vqm􀀁pm􀀁apdh􀀁mvdagclmpq{}􀀁qmbc_􀀁
nomgptmcgjm#
'
Moe nonoee noene oKKyaUHH KpIMa Poccei
5. BKoIe depa1H 2014 TO/Ia CTaHOBHJIOC IIOHTHO, TO POCH TO-TO B
KpIMy ILJIaHHpOBaIa. Ha yJIax IOHBJIOC» MHOTO JIOJIe BOHHOTO BHJIa, OJI€TIX B
popMy 6e3 3HaKOB pa3IHHHS. O6pa30BIBaJIHC IIDyTHe IIpODOCCHHCKMe BOeHH3HpOBaHHIe
TDyII, BKJIOHaH TaK Ha3IBaeMIe CH1I CaMO060p0HI, co6paHIe apTHe «PyecKoe
eJUHHCTBO» Cepre AKceHOBa. KOTH B TO BpeM Ta apTH 3aHHMaa He3HaHTeJIHOe
MeCTO B KpIMCKOM IIaDJIaMeHTe, OHa 6LJIa H3BOCTHa CBOHM JIaBHHM BDaKJIe6HIM
OTHOIIICHHOM K KpIMcKoTaTapCKOMy HapOIIy. HanpMep, B HO 30 Hop Ha 1 /1eKa6pH
2012 TOJIa CTODOHHHKH «PyCcKoro eIUeTBa» 11pOH3BeIH pa3pyIIeHHH Ha yacTKe, r/Ie
KpIMCKHe TaTaDI IIITZTHC IIOCTDOHT /I0Ma. Co3p\aHHe napaMTapHIX OpraHH3aI,
CHMIIaTH3HDyIOIIIHX 06pa3y MICJTH «PyCCKOTO eJUHHCTBa», TaKHX KaK CaMoo6opoa
KpIMCKOe Ka3a eCTBO BCTpeBOKHIa KpIMCKHX TaTaD, y KOTOpHX 6LH 0CHOBaTeIHIe
IIpHHHI IIOJIaTaT, ITO OHH 6yJ(yT H36paHI MHIIIeH5IO.
6. lo Mepe pa3Brun cryan Meppxnc Haan1 co6par eKeJHeHo, a He
pa3 B TDH MeCHIIa, KaK DaHIIIe. H IIpHHHMaJI yaCTHe B THX CO6paHHIX H IIOJUIeDKHBa
IIpHHHMaeMIe B TO BDOM 3aHBJIOHH Me/UKJIHCa, TDe6yIOIIIMe IIDeKDaIIIOHHI CIIOJI3aHHM B
KOHbJIHKT, H, B HaCTHOCTH, I1pH3IBaOIIIHe KpIMCKHf IIaDJIaMOHT He IIDHHHMaT HHKaKHe
3aBIOHHH B IIOJUIeDKKy 3axaTa KpHMa Poccei, To co BCe OeBHJIHOCT5IO TOT7Ia
IIpOHCxOJno.
2
,#􀀁 Zqm􀀁i_p_dqp~􀀁jgvlm􀀁kdl~!􀀁~􀀁q_ied􀀁odwgj􀀁nr`jgvlm􀀁bmamogq{􀀁no_acr􀀁m􀀁
pjmegawdhp~􀀁pgqr_ugg#􀀁J􀀁qdvdlgd􀀁ldpimj{igt􀀁pjdcr}xgt􀀁kdp~uda􀀁~􀀁`zj􀀁nm􀀁pamdh􀀁amjd􀀁
cmpqrndl􀀁cj~􀀁erol_jgpqma!􀀁c_j􀀁klmbm􀀁glqdoa{}􀀁g􀀁pcdj_j􀀁klmbm􀀁f_~ajdlgh!􀀁a􀀁qmk􀀁vgpjd􀀁
l_􀀁Xdhp`rid#􀀁J􀀁pamgt􀀁azpi_fza_lg~t􀀁~􀀁nmpqm~llm􀀁ri_fza_j􀀁l_􀀁qm!􀀁vqm􀀁miirn_ug~􀀁
Tmppgdh􀀁Oozk_􀀁`zj_􀀁ldf_imllmh􀀁g􀀁vqm!􀀁p􀀁qmvig􀀁fodlg~􀀁f_iml_!􀀁Oozk􀀁mpq_a_jp~􀀁v_pq{}􀀁
pradodllmh􀀁qdoogqmogg􀀁Wio_glz#􀀁J􀀁|qm􀀁aodk~􀀁~􀀁mpq_a_jp~􀀁l_􀀁pamdk􀀁nmpqr!􀀁l_cd~p{!􀀁vqm􀀁
omppghpi_~􀀁miirn_ug~􀀁nomcdoegqp~􀀁ldcmjbm􀀁g􀀁vqm􀀁~􀀁kmbr􀀁nmkmv{􀀁nog`jgfgq{􀀁dd􀀁imldu􀀁
pamgkg􀀁nr`jgvlzkg􀀁azpi_fza_lg~kg#􀀁 ^􀀁v_pqm􀀁nmjrv_j􀀁nmta_jr􀀁g􀀁`j_bmc_olmpqg􀀁f_􀀁
no_acr􀀁mq􀀁m`zvlzt􀀁iozkv_l!􀀁apqodv_awgtp~􀀁kld􀀁l_􀀁rjgu_t􀀁I_tvgp_o_~􀀁g􀀁
Ugksdomnmj~!􀀁a􀀁qmk􀀁vgpjd􀀁mq􀀁klmbgt􀀁orppimbmamo~xgt􀀁pj_a~l#􀀁^􀀁crk_}!􀀁vqm􀀁km~􀀁
bmqmalmpq{􀀁nr`jgvlm􀀁azpi_fza_q{p~􀀁nm􀀁|qgk􀀁amnomp_k􀀁a􀀁pmvdq_lgg􀀁p􀀁kmdh􀀁
nogkdqlmpq{}􀀁i_i􀀁bj_az􀀁Hckglgpqo_ugg􀀁I_tvgp_o_hpimbm􀀁o_hml_􀀁g􀀁vjdl_􀀁Pdcejgp_􀀁
g􀀁Oozkpimbm􀀁n_oj_kdlq_􀀁nogajdijg􀀁im􀀁kld􀀁algk_lgd􀀁omppghpigt􀀁miirn_ugmllzt􀀁
aj_pqdh#􀀁J􀀁pdodcgld􀀁_abrpq_􀀁~􀀁nm􀀁pm`pqadllmh􀀁amjd􀀁g􀀁odwdlg}􀀁nodio_qgj􀀁nmjlmkmvg~􀀁
bj_az􀀁I_tvgp_o_hpimbm􀀁o_hml_#
-#􀀁 &&􀀁k_~􀀁'%&+􀀁bmc_􀀁|qg􀀁aj_pqg􀀁nodcy~agjg􀀁kld􀀁m`agldlg~#􀀁Xmok_j{lm
m`agldlg~􀀁`zjg􀀁mplma_lz􀀁l_􀀁~im`z􀀁gkdawgt􀀁kdpqm􀀁imkkdlq_og~t!􀀁imqmozd􀀁~􀀁pcdj_j􀀁
l_􀀁qdjdi_l_jd􀀁HV^&.􀀁k_oq_􀀁'%&+􀀁bmc_􀀁l_􀀁iozkpimq_q_opimk􀀁~fzid#􀀁\qg􀀁m`agldlg~􀀁
`zjg􀀁azcaglrqz􀀁nm􀀁pq_q{d􀀁'-%#&!􀀁v_pq{􀀁'!􀀁Wbmjmalmbm􀀁Omcdip_􀀁Tmppghpimh􀀁Xdcdo_ugg!􀀁
nm􀀁imqmomh􀀁nogfza􀀁i􀀁l_orwdlg}􀀁qdoogqmog_j{lmh􀀁udjmpqlmpqg􀀁Tmppghpimh􀀁
Xdcdo_ugg􀀁nmpodcpqamk􀀁podcpqa􀀁k_ppmamh􀀁glsmok_ugg􀀁g􀀁Nlqdoldq_􀀁~aj~dqp~􀀁
rbmjmalzk􀀁nodpqrnjdlgdk#􀀁Us_j{pgsgugoma_llzh􀀁g􀀁ps_`ogima_llzh􀀁t_o_iqdo􀀁|qgt􀀁
m`agldlgh􀀁pq_j􀀁cj~􀀁kdl~􀀁mvdagclzk􀀁a􀀁tmcd􀀁prcd`lmbm􀀁o_f`go_qdj{pqa_!􀀁m􀀁vdk􀀁~􀀁
o_ppi_er􀀁lged#
􀀂
7. rO KaCaeTC Ho Me, TaKKe DeIIIMJ IIy6JIHHO TOBODHT IIpaBJ(y 0
CJIOKHBIIIeHCH CHTyaIUHH. B TeeHHe HeCKOJIKHX CIeyOUMX MeCHIIe 6LI Io cBoeH Bone
JOCTyIIOH JUIH KypHaHCTOB, /a.I MHOO HHTepBIo eIeaI MHOro 3aBeHH, B TOM Hoe
Ha beic6yKe. B CBOHX BICKa3IBaHHHX H IIOCTOHHHO VKa3HBaJI Ha TO, TO OKKyIIaIUHH
Pocce KpIMa 6LI HO3aKOHHOH H TO, C TOKH 3DOHHH 3aKOHa, KpIM OCTaBaICH HaCTIO
CyBepeHHO TeDDHTODHH VKDHHI. B 3TO BDeMH H OCTaBaJICH Ha CBOeM IIOCTy, HaJIeHC, TO
DOCCHHCKa OKKyIa1UH IpOJIepKHTCH He(OTO H TO Mory OMO pH6IH3HT ee KOHeII
CBOHMH IIV6JIHHHEIMH BICKa3BIBaHHHMH. H aCTO IIOJIyHaJI IIOXBaJTy M 6JITOJIDHOCTH 3a
IIpaBJ(y OT O6IHIX KpIMaH, BCTpeaBIHXe MHe Ha yIHI[aX Baxcapa
CHM]epOno, B TOM HCJIe OT MHOTHX DyCCKOIOBODHIIIHX CJIaBHH. H J(yMa1O, TO MOH
TOTOBHOCT IIy6JIHHO BICKa3IBaTCH IIO 3THM BoIpOCaM B COeTaHHH C Moe
IIpHMeTHOCTIO KaK TJ1aBI AJIMHHHCTpa Daxcapacxoro paona nea Meppnca
H KpIMCKOTO IIaDJIaMOHTa IIDHBJIOKJIM KO MHe BHHMaHH€ DOCCHHCKHX OKKVIIaIUHOHHIX
BnacTei. B CepeJHHe aBryCTa no co6CTBeHHO BOJI€ M DOIIIOHHIO IIDCKDaTHJI IIOJIHO MOH
rnaBI Daxcapacxoro paHoa.
8. 11 MaH 2016 TOJ1a 3TH BIaCTH IIDeIIHBHJIH MHe O6BHHOHHH. DOpMaJIHO
O6BHHeHH 6LJIH OCHOBaHI Ha KO6I HMOBIIIHX MCTO KOMMOHTa DHHX, KOTOpIe CJIeIaJ
Ha TOIeKaHaJIe ATR 19 MapTa 2016 TO/Ia Ha KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOM H3IKe. OTH OBHHeHH
6LIH BL(HHyTI nIO CTaTe 280.1, aCT» 2, VronoBHorO KoIeKca PocccKoi de/epaIH,
1IO KOTOpoH 11pH3IB K HapyIeHo TeppHTOpHaIHOH IeIOCTHOTH PocceKof
Pepeparm nocpencroM cpencr MaccoBo HpopMaIUHH M HHTepHeTa HBJLHeTCH
yronoBHHM pecTyeHHeM. CbancppoBari ca6pKoBaHi xapaKTep 3THx
O6BHHeHHf CTa IUIH MeHH OeBHJUHIM B XoIIe cyJeHOro pa36HpaTeICTBa, 0 eM
paCCKay HHe.
3
8]^_]`􀀁W􀀁]Pf`Y􀀁\O􀀁S][b􀀁􀀂 􀀁[OX􀀁" !#􀀁R]SO
.#􀀁 J􀀁pa~fg􀀁p􀀁|qgkg􀀁m`agldlg~kg􀀁kdl~􀀁mqadjg􀀁l_􀀁cmnomp􀀁&'􀀁k_~􀀁'%&+􀀁bmc_#􀀁J􀀁
|qmq􀀁cdl{􀀁i􀀁kmdkr􀀁cmkr􀀁nogdt_jg􀀁Lkgqogh􀀁Ko_vda!􀀁bj_a_􀀁I_tvgp_o_hpimh􀀁o_hmllmh􀀁
nmjgugg!􀀁g􀀁Jj_cgkgo􀀁[davdlim!􀀁`zawgh􀀁nodcpq_agqdj{􀀁Ujre`z􀀁`dfmn_plmpqg􀀁
Wio_glz!􀀁nmpjd􀀁omppghpimh􀀁miirn_ugg􀀁Oozk_􀀁ndodkdqlrawghp~􀀁a􀀁XUI!􀀁imqmozh􀀁
mqadv_j􀀁gkdllm􀀁f_􀀁l_`j}cdlgd􀀁f_􀀁iozkpigkg􀀁q_q_o_kg#􀀁 ^􀀁a􀀁qdvdlgd􀀁ldimqmombm􀀁
aodkdlg􀀁megc_j!􀀁vqm􀀁kdl~􀀁amf{krq􀀁nmc􀀁pqo_er􀀁gf"f_􀀁kmdh􀀁cd~qdj{lmpqg􀀁a􀀁nmccdoeir􀀁
iozkpimq_q_opimh􀀁m`xglz!􀀁g􀀁~􀀁apqodqgj􀀁b"l_􀀁Ko_vda_􀀁g􀀁b"l_􀀁[davdlim!􀀁imqmozt􀀁~􀀁
tmomwm􀀁fl_j!􀀁r􀀁amomq􀀁kmdbm􀀁p_c_!􀀁imbc_􀀁mlg􀀁nmcmwjg􀀁i􀀁kmdkr􀀁cmkr#􀀁Rlg􀀁nmi_f_jg􀀁kld􀀁
cmirkdlq!􀀁a􀀁imqmomk􀀁kdl~􀀁azfa_jg􀀁l_􀀁cmnomp􀀁a􀀁wq_`"ia_oqgor􀀁XUI􀀁a􀀁Ugksdomnmjd#
}#􀀁 ^􀀁nogbj_pgj􀀁b"l_􀀁Ko_vda_􀀁g􀀁b"l_􀀁[davdlim􀀁a􀀁kmh􀀁cmk!􀀁km~􀀁edl_􀀁
nogbmqmagj_􀀁cj~􀀁lgt􀀁v_h!􀀁g􀀁~􀀁pm`o_jp~􀀁dt_q{􀀁a􀀁Ugksdomnmj{􀀁cj~􀀁kmdbm􀀁cmnomp_#􀀁O􀀁qmkr􀀁
aodkdlg!􀀁imbc_􀀁kz􀀁azwjg􀀁gf􀀁kmdbm􀀁cmk_!􀀁vqm`z􀀁mqno_agq{p~􀀁l_􀀁cmnomp!􀀁qog􀀁
nmjgudhpigt􀀁k_wglz􀀁g􀀁ca_􀀁_aqm`rp_􀀁pndul_f_􀀁nog`zjg􀀁g􀀁nogn_oima_jgp{􀀁r􀀁kmdbm􀀁
cmk_􀀁akdpqd􀀁p􀀁cdp~qi_kg􀀁ammoredllzt􀀁j}cdh􀀁a􀀁k_pi_t#􀀁^􀀁lgi_i􀀁ld􀀁nomqgampqm~j􀀁
nmnzqid􀀁mqadpqg􀀁kdl~􀀁l_􀀁cmnomp!􀀁g􀀁nog`zqgd􀀁apdt􀀁|qgt􀀁k_wgl!􀀁i_f_jmp{!􀀁
nodcl_fl_v_jmp{􀀁cj~􀀁qmbm!􀀁vqm`z􀀁pcdj_q{􀀁kmh􀀁cmnomp􀀁nmi_f_qdj{lzk􀀁p􀀁udj{}􀀁
f_nrbga_lg~􀀁iozkpimq_q_opimh􀀁m`xglz#
Ionpoc o6ieK Ha IoMy Ma 2o16 rota
9. BOB3H C STHMH OOBHHeHHHMH MeHH OTBOIH Ha I0Ip0C 12 MaH 2016 r0/1a. B
3TOT JIeH K MOeMy oMy pHexaH JIMHTpH Tpae, rIaBa BaxcapacKoi pa~ooi
IIOJIHIUHH, H BJIaIIHMHp IHIeBeHKO, 6HBIH IIDeIICTaBHTeJIE CIyK6I 6e3On1aCHOCTH
VpaHI, nOCIe pOccHicKo oKKynaHH KpwMa nepeMeTHyBIHc B dCE, KOTOpMi
OTBOaJI HMeHHO 3a Ha6IOI€HHe 3a KDIMCKHMH TaTaDaMH. H B TOeHHe HeKOTOpOTO
BDeMeHH OKHJIaI, HTO MOHH BO3BMVT IIOJI CTDay H3-3a Moe JIeHTeIHOCTH B IIOJUIeDKKy
KDIMCKOTaTa DCKOf O6IIUIHI, H BCTpeTHI r-Ha IFpaea r-Ha LIIeBeHKO, KOTODBIX
XODOIIo 3Han1, y BODOT MO€TO CaJIa, KOTJIa OHH IIOIIOIILJIH K MOeMy JI0My. OH noKa3a1H MHe
IIOKyMeHT, B KOTODOM MeHH BI3BaIH Ha 7IOI1po B Ta6-KBapTHpy CE B CMpeponone.
10. Hnprnacn r-Ha Ipaea r-Ha LLIeBeHKO B MO JI0M, MOH KeHa
nproToBHa UH HHX af, o6pane exaT B CHMbepOno JU1H MoeTO JI0IpOCa. K TOMy
BDeMeHH, KOT/Ia MI BIIILIH H3 MOeTO JIOMa, TO6I OTIIDaBHT»CH Ha JIOIIDOC, TDH
IIOJIHIIeCKHX MaIIIHHI H /Ia aBTO6yca cne1Ha3a I1pH6 H IpHIapKOBaTH y MOeTO
JI0Ma BMeCTe C IeCHTKaMH BOODyKeHHHX JIOJe B MaCKaX. H HHKaK He IIDOTHBOCTOJI
IIOIITKe OTBOCTH MOHM Ha JIOIIDOC, H IIDH6HTHe BCOX 3THX MaIIIHH, Ka3a1OC,
IIDe/Ha3Ha anOC JULH TOTO, TO6EI CJIOJIaT MO JIOIIDOC IIOKa3aT0JI1HIM C I1e1IO
3a1yTHBaH KDIMCKOTaTa DCKO O61LHHI.
4
ÅÅ#􀀁 Jpd􀀁|qg􀀁n~q{􀀁qo_lpnmoqlzt􀀁podcpqa􀀁psmokgoma_jg􀀁imjmllr!􀀁imqmo_~
mqno_agj_p{􀀁a􀀁Ugksdomnmj{􀀁l_􀀁kmh􀀁cmnomp#􀀁Smpjd􀀁qmbm!􀀁i_i􀀁~􀀁nog`zj􀀁a􀀁wq_`"ia_oqgor􀀁
XUI􀀁a􀀁Ugksdomnmjd!􀀁kld􀀁aorvgjg􀀁imng}􀀁nodcy~ajdllzt􀀁kld􀀁m`agldlgh#􀀁Urc􀀁kmedq􀀁
mfl_imkgq{p~􀀁p􀀁cmirkdlqmk!􀀁imqmozh􀀁~􀀁nmjrvgj&!􀀁_􀀁q_ied􀀁p􀀁nomqmimjmk􀀁kmdbm􀀁cmnomp_!􀀁
imqmozh􀀁pmpqm~jp~􀀁a􀀁qmq􀀁ed􀀁cdl{'!􀀁g􀀁odwdlgdk􀀁pjdcma_qdj~􀀁m􀀁nogajdvdlgg􀀁kdl~􀀁i􀀁
mqadqpqadllmpqg􀀁nm􀀁pq_q{d􀀁'-%#&􀀁Tmppghpimbm􀀁Wbmjmalmbm􀀁Omcdip_k
&'# Smfed!􀀁a􀀁imlud􀀁cl~!􀀁advdomk!􀀁pmqorclgig􀀁XUI􀀁adolrjg􀀁kdl~􀀁cmkmh!􀀁_
q_ied􀀁nomadjg􀀁a􀀁kmdk􀀁cmkd􀀁m`zpi#􀀁Jp}􀀁cmombr􀀁kz􀀁dt_jg􀀁imjmllmh!􀀁kdl~􀀁rcdoega_jg􀀁a􀀁
k_wgld􀀁Ko_vda_#􀀁O􀀁kmkdlqr􀀁imbc_􀀁~􀀁adolrjp~􀀁cmkmh􀀁nmpjd􀀁cmnomp_!􀀁kdpqlzd􀀁
iozkpimq_q_opigd􀀁_iqgagpqz􀀁red􀀁`zjg􀀁radcmkjdlz!􀀁g􀀁mlg􀀁pm`o_jgp{􀀁r􀀁kmdbm􀀁cmk_#􀀁
XUI􀀁nog`zj_􀀁i􀀁kmdkr􀀁cmk􀀁l_􀀁wdpqg􀀁k_wgl_t􀀁"􀀁ca_􀀁_aqm`rp_!􀀁qog􀀁_aqmkm`gj~􀀁g􀀁mcgl􀀁
borfmagi#􀀁Jpd􀀁|qg􀀁_aqmkm`gjg􀀁`zjg􀀁`omlgoma_lz!􀀁g􀀁a􀀁lgt􀀁l_tmcgjmp{􀀁klmbm􀀁
ammoredllzt􀀁j}cdh􀀁a􀀁`_j_ij_a_t#􀀁Rn~q{􀀁ed!􀀁~􀀁pvgq_}!􀀁vqm􀀁nogprqpqagd􀀁apdt􀀁|qgt􀀁
k_wgl􀀁`zjm􀀁ldnomnmougml_j{lm􀀁rbomfd􀀁m`xdpqadllmkr􀀁nmo~cir􀀁g􀀁`zjm􀀁l_no_ajdlm􀀁
l_􀀁f_nrbga_lgd􀀁iozkpimq_q_opimh􀀁m`xglz#
&(# Nfm`o_edlgd􀀁Ä􀀁lged􀀁nmi_fza_dq􀀁nomgptmc~xdd􀀁a􀀁qmq􀀁cdl{!􀀁imbc_􀀁~
adolrjp~􀀁p􀀁cmnomp_!􀀁_􀀁miirn_ugmllzd􀀁aj_pqg􀀁nmcbmqmagjgp{􀀁i􀀁l_v_jr􀀁m`zpi_􀀁kmdbm􀀁
cmk_#􀀁L_llmd􀀁gfm`o_edlgd􀀁`zjm􀀁af~qm􀀁gf􀀁agcdm!􀀁pl~qmbm􀀁iozkpimq_q_opigk􀀁
_iqgagpqmk􀀁a􀀁|qmq􀀁cdl{!􀀁g􀀁c_llmd􀀁gfm`o_edlgd􀀁pmmqadqpqardq􀀁qmkr!􀀁vqm􀀁~􀀁nmkl}􀀁m􀀁
pm`zqg~t􀀁amfjd􀀁kmdbm􀀁cmk_􀀁&'􀀁k_~􀀁'%&+􀀁bmc_#
&􀀁Smpq_lmajdlgd􀀁m􀀁amf`recdlgg􀀁rbmjmalmbm􀀁nomgfamcpqa_􀀁g􀀁nogl~qgg􀀁dbm􀀁i􀀁nomgfamcpqar􀀁
nogl~qmd􀀁N􀀁#H#􀀁Uiognimh!􀀁Uq_owgk􀀁jdhqdl_lqmk􀀁}pqgugg􀀁g􀀁Ujdcma_qdjdk􀀁pjdcpqadllmbm􀀁
mqcdj_􀀁WXUI􀀁Tmppgg􀀁nm􀀁Tdpnr`jgid􀀁Oozk􀀁g􀀁bmomcr􀀁Uda_pqmnmj}􀀁􀀂mq􀀁&'􀀁k_~􀀁'%&+􀀁bmc_ #
'􀀁Somqmimj􀀁cmnomp_􀀁nmcmfoda_dkmbm􀀁nomadcdllmbm􀀁N#H#􀀁Uiognimh!􀀁Uq_owgk􀀁jdhqdl_lqmk􀀁
}pqgugg􀀁g􀀁Ujdcma_qdjdk􀀁pjdcpqadllmbm􀀁mqcdj_􀀁WXUI􀀁Tmppgg􀀁nm􀀁Tdpnr`jgid􀀁Oozk􀀁g􀀁bmomcr􀀁
Uda_pqmnmj}􀀁􀀂mq􀀁&'􀀁k_~􀀁'%&+􀀁bmc_ #
(􀀁Smpq_lmajdlgd􀀁m􀀁nogajdvdlgg􀀁a􀀁i_vdpqad􀀁m`agl~dkmbm􀀁nogl~qmd􀀁N#H#􀀁Uiognimh!􀀁Uq_owgk􀀁
jdhqdl_lqmk􀀁}pqgugg􀀁g􀀁Ujdcma_qdjdk􀀁pjdcpqadllmbm􀀁mqcdj_􀀁WXUI􀀁Tmppgg􀀁nm􀀁Tdpnr`jgid􀀁Oozk􀀁
g􀀁bmomcr􀀁Uda_pqmnmj}􀀁 􀀂mq􀀁&.􀀁k_~􀀁'%&+􀀁bmc_ #
!
􀀋􀇷􀈘􀈐􀈓􀈖􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍􀀃􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀇷􀈘􀈐􀈓􀈖􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍􀀃􀀜􀀖􀀖􀀌􀀑
􀀋􀇷􀈘􀈐􀈓􀈖􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍􀀃􀀜􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀑
11. BCe ?TH ILHTE TDaHCIIODTHIX CDeIICTB CbODMHDOBaIH KOJIOHHy, KOTOpaH
OTIIDaBHI1aC B CHMpeDOIIOJI Ha MO II0IIpOC. IIOCJe TOTO, KaK H IIpH6LI B IIITa6-KBapTHpy
dCE CHMpeponone, MHe BpyHIH Komo peITBeHHHx MHe O6BHHeHHi. CyIL MOKeT
O3HaKOMHTCH C JIOKyMeHTOM, KOTODLH IIOJIyHJI, a TaKKe C IIDOTOKOJ1OM MOero /Io1Ip0ca,
KOTOpHf COCTOHJICH B TOT Ke JIeH, H DeIIIeHHeM CJIeJIOBaTOJIH O IIDHBJIOOHHH MOHH K
oTBeTCTBeHHocTH no cTaTe 280.1 POCCHCKOrO VrOJIOBHOTO KopeKca.3
12. IO3Ke, B KOHIIe JIHH, BO€DOM, COTDyJIHHKH DC BepHyJIH MeH JI0Mo, a
TaKKe IIDOBOJIH B MOOM JIOMe O6EICK. BCO JIODpOIy MDI CXJIH KOJIOHHOH, MeHH JIeDKHBaJIM B
MaIHHe FpaeBa. K MOMeHTy KOT/Ia BepHyIC OMO noOe Io1IpOa, MeCTHBIe
KDIMCKOTaTa DCKHe aKTHBHCTI ye 6LIM yBeJIOMIeHI, oHH O6panHC y MoeTO 210Ma.
DCB IpH6LJIa K MOOMy JIOM Ha IIIeCTH MaIIIHHaX - I1Ba aBTO6yCa, TDH aBTOMO6HJLH H OJ(HH
TDy3OBHK. BCe 3TH aBTOMO6HJIH 6LIH 6pOHHDOBaHI, H B HHX HaXOJIHJIOC MHOTO
BOODyKeHHIX Jo/(e B 6aJIaKJIaBaX. OILHT Ke, H CHTaO, TO IIDHCyTCTBHe BCeX 3THX
MaIHH 6LIO HeIIDOIIODIIHOHaIHO yTpO3e O6IIIeCTBeHHOMy IIODJIKy M OLIO HaIIpaBJIeHO
Ha 3a11yTHBaHHe KDIMCKOTaTa DCKOf O6IIUHHI.
13. HO6paKee 1 HKe IIOKa3IBaeT IIDOHCXOJUHIIee B TOT JIeH, KOT/Ia H
BepHyJICH C JIOIIDOCa, a OKKyIIaI[HOHHIe BJIACTH IIOJTOTOBHIHC K HaaIy 06IcKa MOeTO
II0Ma. JlaHHoe 3O6paeHe 6LIO B3HTO H3 BHJIeO, CHHTOTO KDIMCKOTaTaDCKHM
aKTHBHCTOM B 3TOT JICH, H JIaHHOe H3OpaKeHH COOTBOTCTByeT TOMy, TO IIOMHO O
CO6ITHIX BO3JIe MOeTO J10Ma 12 Ma 2016 1OJ1a.
IIoeTaHOBIOHHe O BO36yKJIeHHH yTOJIOBHOTO IIDOH3BOJICTBa H IIDHHHTHM eTO K IIDOH3BOJICTBy
IpHHHTOe L.A. CKDHIIKOi, CTa pIMM neTeHaTOM IOCTHIIHH H CIeJIOBaTOJIeM CJIeJICTBeHHOTO
OT1e1a VCE PoccHH no Pe&Iy6He KpLIM H TOpOIIy CeBaCTOIIOJIO (OT 12 Ma 2016 ro2a).
IIporoxon pIonpOCa I1OJ103peBaeMOTO IIpOBeJIeHHOTO H.A. CKpHIIKoi, CTa pIHM JeTeHaHTOM
ocTHuHH CepIoBaTeneM ceICTeHHorO OT/ea YDC Pocc no PeCny6He KpIM H FOpOIIy
CeBaCTOnOo (OT 12 Ma 2016 r0Ia).
3 IOCTaHOBIHHe O IIpHBIOMOHHH B KaeCTBe O6BHHHeMOTO IIDHHHTOe L.A. CKDHIIKO, CTapIIIMM
JeTeHaTOM IOCTHIUHH H CIeIIOBaTOIeM CICIICTBOHHOTO OT/IeIa VCE Pocc no Pecny6e KpHM
M rOpOI(y CeBaCTOn1OJ1O (OT 19 Ma 2016 r0/1a).
5
Nfm`o_edlgd􀀁&#􀀁 K"l􀀁Wkdoma􀀁amfao_x_dqp~􀀁cmkmh􀀁nmpjd􀀁cmnomp_􀀁&'􀀁k_~􀀁'%&+􀀁b#
&)# R`zpi􀀁kmdbm􀀁cmk_􀀁&'􀀁k_~􀀁'%&+􀀁bmc_􀀁`zj􀀁nmadotlmpqlzk􀀁g􀀁nomcmje_jp~
apdbm􀀁ldpimj{im􀀁kglrq#􀀁W􀀁kdl~􀀁pjmegjmp{􀀁andv_qjdlgd!􀀁vqm􀀁msgudoz􀀁XUI􀀁tmqdjg􀀁i_i􀀁
kmelm􀀁pimodd􀀁f_imlvgq{􀀁dbm!􀀁g!􀀁adom~qlm!􀀁r􀀁lgt􀀁`mj{wd􀀁aodkdlg􀀁f_l~jm􀀁f_nmjldlgd􀀁
nomqmimj_􀀁m`zpi_!􀀁ldedjg􀀁p_k􀀁m`zpi#
&*# Oo_qimpq{􀀁|qmbm􀀁m`zpi_􀀁plma_􀀁ed􀀁c_j_􀀁kld􀀁nml~q{!􀀁vqm􀀁udj{􀀁|qgt
cdhpqagh!􀀁i_i􀀁g􀀁qdt!􀀁imqmozd􀀁nmpjdcma_jg􀀁c_jdd!􀀁pmpqmgq􀀁a􀀁qmk!􀀁vqm`z􀀁pmfc_q{􀀁
_qkmpsdor􀀁pqo_t_􀀁g􀀁f_nrb_q{􀀁iozkpimq_q_opigh􀀁l_omc!􀀁p􀀁qdk􀀁vqm`z􀀁ml􀀁nogl~j􀀁s_iq􀀁
omppghpimh􀀁_lldipgg􀀁Oozk_#
+
Hao6paee 1. I-H YMepOB Bo3BpaIaeTC OMO noOIe /IOI1p0Ca 12 Ma 2016T.
14. O661CK MOeTO 210Ma 12 Ma1 2016 TOI1a 6LI IIOBeDXHOCTHIM H IIDOIIOJKaICH
BCOTO HeCKOJIKO MHHyT. Y MeHH CIOKHIOC BIIeHaTJIeHHe, TO OHIIepI CE XOTeIH KaK
MOKHO CKOpee 3aKOHHHT €TO, H, BepOHTHO, y HHX 6OJ1IIIe BDOMeHH 3aHHIO 3aIIOIHeHHe
IIpOTOKOIa O6ICKa, HOKOTH CaM O6LICK.
15. KpaTKOCT 3TOTO O6ICKa CHOBa Ke JIaIa MHe IIOHHT, HTO IIOI THX
JeCTBHf, KaK H TeX, KOTODIe IIOCJICIIOBaJIH JIaIee, COCTOHT B TOM, TO6I €03/1aT
arMocpepy CTpaxa H 3anyraT KDIMCKOTaTaDCKHi HaDOII, C TOM TO6I OH IIDHHHI paKT
poccicKo aeKc KpIMa.
6
C_W\bSWaTZg\Oj􀀁^`WcWOa_WeT`YOj􀀁hY`^T_aWVO􀀁􀀂􀀁OQRb`a􀀁W􀀁`T\ajP_g􀀁" !#􀀁R]SO
&+# J􀀁_abrpqd􀀁'%&+􀀁bmc_!􀀁a􀀁o_ki_t􀀁prcd`lmbm􀀁nomudpp_􀀁kld􀀁`zjm􀀁nogi_f_lm!
nomqga􀀁kmdh􀀁amjg!􀀁nomhqg􀀁m`pjdcma_lgd􀀁r􀀁npgtg_qo_􀀁a􀀁qdvdlgd􀀁ldpimj{igt􀀁ldcdj{#􀀁
Ombc_􀀁pjdcma_qdj{􀀁f_nompgj􀀁|qm􀀁npgtg_qogvdpimd􀀁m`pjdcma_lgd!􀀁~􀀁mqi_f_jp~!􀀁g􀀁qmbc_􀀁
pjdcma_qdj{􀀁m`o_qgjp~􀀁a􀀁prc!􀀁imqmozh􀀁cmjedl􀀁`zj􀀁m`~f_q{􀀁kdl~􀀁nomhqg􀀁m`pjdcma_lgd#􀀁
Jm􀀁aodk~􀀁prcd`lmbm􀀁o_ppkmqodlg~􀀁c_llmbm􀀁tmc_q_hpqa_􀀁pjdcma_qdj~􀀁~􀀁l_v_j􀀁njmtm􀀁pd`~􀀁
vrapqama_q{!􀀁g􀀁r􀀁kdl~􀀁nmazpgjmp{􀀁ioma~lmd􀀁c_ajdlgd#􀀁Izj_􀀁azfa_l_􀀁pimo_~􀀁
kdcguglpi_~􀀁nmkmx{!􀀁kdl~􀀁mqadfjg􀀁a􀀁`mj{lgur􀀁g􀀁nmpq_agjg􀀁cg_blmf􀀁"􀀁bgndoqmlg~􀀁g􀀁
ogpi􀀁pdocdvlmbm􀀁nogpqrn_#􀀁J􀀁kmd􀀁mqprqpqagd􀀁a􀀁f_jd􀀁prc_􀀁􀀂a􀀁qmk􀀁aodk~􀀁i_i􀀁~􀀁`zj􀀁
bmpngq_jgfgoma_l 􀀁prc{~􀀁rcmajdqamogj􀀁tmc_q_hpqam􀀁m`agldlg~􀀁g􀀁m`~f_j􀀁kdl~􀀁nomhqg􀀁
noglrcgqdj{lr}􀀁npgtg_qogvdpir}􀀁|ipndoqgfr#
&,# \qmq􀀁mpkmqo􀀁`zj􀀁cj~􀀁kdl~􀀁'&"cldalmh􀀁nzqimh#􀀁Pdl~􀀁mqadfjg􀀁a
npgtg_qogvdpir}􀀁`mj{lgur􀀁cj~􀀁nomadcdlg~􀀁|qmbm􀀁m`pjdcma_lg~􀀁po_fr􀀁ed􀀁nmpjd􀀁qmbm!􀀁
i_i􀀁~􀀁l_tmcgjp~􀀁a􀀁`mj{lgud􀀁p􀀁bgndoqmlgdh#􀀁J􀀁npgtg_qogvdpimh􀀁`mj{lgud􀀁~􀀁`zj􀀁
f_ij}vdl􀀁a􀀁mqcdjdlgd􀀁cj~􀀁n_ugdlqma􀀁p􀀁tomlgvdpigkg􀀁ldgfjdvgkzkg􀀁
npgtg_qogvdpigkg􀀁f_`mjda_lg~kg#􀀁Kgbgdlgvdpigd􀀁rpjmag~􀀁`zjg􀀁mqao_qgqdj{lzkg!􀀁g􀀁
kdl~􀀁pmcdoe_jg􀀁a􀀁ld`mj{wmk􀀁nompqo_lpqad􀀁p􀀁qodk~􀀁corbgkg􀀁j}c{kg#􀀁Ymq~􀀁pqdlz􀀁
o_fcdj~jg􀀁o_fjgvlzd􀀁v_pqg􀀁npgtg_qogvdpimbm􀀁mqcdjdlg~!􀀁a􀀁cadolzt􀀁nomdk_t􀀁ld􀀁`zjm􀀁
cadodh􀀁g􀀁fari􀀁pam`mclm􀀁o_pnompqo_l~jp~!􀀁nm|qmkr􀀁i_eczh􀀁gf􀀁nogkdolm􀀁pq_􀀁n_ugdlqma􀀁
mqcdjdlg~􀀁kmb􀀁ld􀀁qmj{im􀀁pjzw_q{􀀁apdt􀀁mpq_j{lzt􀀁a􀀁j}`md􀀁aodk~!􀀁lm􀀁g􀀁nmctmcgq{􀀁corb􀀁
i􀀁corbr#􀀁Qdmclmio_qlm􀀁`zjm!􀀁vqm􀀁~􀀁nompzn_jp~􀀁lmv{}!􀀁_􀀁o~cmk􀀁p􀀁kmdh􀀁ioma_q{}􀀁pqm~j􀀁
iqm"qm􀀁gf􀀁`mj{lzt􀀁g􀀁nompqm􀀁pkmqodj􀀁l_􀀁kdl~#􀀁\qm􀀁`zjm􀀁mvdl{􀀁erqim#
&-# Sogkdolm􀀁vdodf􀀁'􀀁ldcdjg􀀁mcl_􀀁gf􀀁kdcguglpigt􀀁o_`mqlgu􀀁pmm`xgj_􀀁kld!
vqm􀀁ml_􀀁fl_dq!􀀁vqm􀀁~􀀁ld􀀁~aj~}p{􀀁crwdalm􀀁`mj{lzk!􀀁lm􀀁~􀀁apd􀀁ed􀀁cmjedl􀀁mpq_a_q{p~􀀁q_k􀀁
cmj{wd#􀀁^􀀁`zj􀀁mpam`mecdl􀀁l_􀀁pjdcr}xdh􀀁ldcdjd􀀁nmpjd􀀁'&􀀁cl~􀀁f_ij}vdlg~#
"
IIpyTe.JI»a nCxaTpHeCKa KcnepT3a - aBryeT M CeHTH6p» 2016 1op1a
16. BarycTe 2016 r0/1a, paMKax cyJe6Hor0 IIpOIIeCCa MHe 6LIO I1pHKa3aHO,
IIpOTHB MOe BOJIH, IIDOTH O6CJIeJIOBaHHe y IICHXHaTDa B TOOHHe HOCKOJIKHX He/IeJI.
KOr/Ia CIeJ(OBaTOJIE 3aIIDOCHJI OTO IICHXHaTDHHeCKOe O6CJIeJIOBaHHe, H OTKa3aJ1CH, H TOT7Ia
CJIeIIOBaTOJI O6paTHJICH B CyJI, KOTODI IIOJDKeH 6LI 063aT MeH IpoTH o60epIOBaHHe.
BO BDeMI CyJIe6HOTO paCCMOTpeHHH JIaHHoTo XoJaTacra cIeJIoBaTeJLH Haan1 1JI0XO ce6
yBCTBOBaT, H y MOHH IIOBEICHJIOC KDOBHHOe JIaBIOHHe. BL1a BI3BaHa CKOpaH
MeJHIIHHCKaH IIOMOIII, MOHH OTBO3JIH B 6OIHHIIV H IIOCTaBHJTH JIHaTHO3 - THIIeDTOHHH H
pHcK cepneHoro pHcTyIa. B Moe oTcyTCTBHe B 3a1e CyJIa (B TOM BDeMI KaK 6LI
TOCIHTaJIH3HDOBaH) CyJI JIOBJITBODHJI XOIIaTa HCTBO O6BHHeHHH H O6H3a1 MeHH IIpOHTH
IIpHHVJIHTeJIHVIO IICHXHaTDHHOCKyIO KCIIepTH3y.
17. 2TOT OCMOTD OJI JUIH MeHH 21-JIHeBHOH IIITKO. MeH 0TBe3JIH B
IICHXHaTDHHeCKyIO 6OJI1HHIIy /UH IpOBe/IeHHH TOTO 060eJI0BaHHI cpa3y Ke nIOOIe TOTO,
KaK HaXO/UHICH B 6on1He c rHnepTOHHe. B ICHXHaTDHHeCKO 6OJ1HHIIe 6LI
3aKJIOHOH B OTJIeIOHHe JUIH IIaIUHeHTOB C XDOHHHeCKHMH HOH3JIeHHMIMH
IICHXHaTDHeCKHMH 3a6OJ1€BaHHHMH. THTHOHHOCKHe yCJIOBHI 6LJIH OTBDaTHTOJIHIMH, H
MeHH COJIeDKaIH B HO6OJIIIIOM IIDOCTDaHCTBe C TDCMH JIDyTHMH JIOJIMH. KOTH CTeHH
pa3(eJJ pa3nIe aCT nCHXHaTDHeCKOTO OTJIOJIeHHH, B JIBeDHHX IIpOeMaX He 65LIO
uepe 3ByK CBO6OHO DaCIIDOCTDaHICH, IO3TOMy KaKJIIH H3 IIDHMeDHO CTa IIaILHeHTOB
OTJIOJIOHHH MOT He TOJI»KO CJIHIIIaT BCOX OCTaJIHIX B JIO6O€ BDOMH, HO H IIOJIXOJIHT JIDyT
K IIpyry. HeOHOKpaTHO 6LIO, TO H IIDOCIIIaJICH HOHIO, a DJ1OM C MOCH KDOBaTIO CTOHJI
KTO-TO H3 6OJI1HIX H IIDOCTO CMOTDOJI Ha MOHL. OTO 6LIO OeH KyTKO.
18. IIpHMepHO epe3 2 HeIOJIH OJIHa H3 MOJ(HIHHCKHX pa60THI1 coo61Ha MHe,
TO OHa 3HaOT, TO H He HBJLHIOC JIVIIIOBHO 6OJ1HIM, HO BCe Ke JIOKeH OcTaBaTOH TaM
IOJIIIe. H 6LJI O€BO6OIIeH Ha OIeJyOIIe Heee nIOCIe 21 JIHH 3aKJIOeHHH.
7
&."􀀁 Sdodc􀀁qdk􀀁i_i􀀁nmiglrq{􀀁`mj{lgur􀀁~􀀁pnompgj􀀁ldpimj{igt􀀁dd􀀁o_`mqlgima!
`zjg􀀁jg􀀁r􀀁lgt􀀁corbgd􀀁pjrv_g!􀀁imbc_􀀁nmjgqgvdpigd􀀁f_ij}vdllzd􀀁nogamfgjgp{􀀁l_􀀁
m`pjdcma_lgd#􀀁Pld􀀁mqadqgjg!􀀁 vqm􀀁|qmbm􀀁lgimbc_􀀁ld􀀁nomgptmcgjm!􀀁nmi_􀀁Oozk􀀁`zj􀀁nmc􀀁
rno_ajdlgdk􀀁Wio_glz!􀀁g􀀁vqm􀀁~􀀁ndoazh􀀁vdjmadi􀀁nmcadoblrqzh􀀁q_imkr􀀁m`o_xdlg}􀀁f_􀀁
aodk~􀀁omppghpimbm􀀁no_ajdlg~􀀁"􀀁m`agl~dkzh􀀁nm􀀁nmjgqgvdpimh􀀁pq_q{d!􀀁rbmjmalm􀀁
nodpjdcrdkzh!􀀁g􀀁nmjrvgawgh􀀁o_pnmo~edlgd􀀁prc_􀀁nomhqg􀀁noglrcgqdj{lr}􀀁
npgtg_qogvdpir}􀀁|ipndoqgfr#􀀁 O_i􀀁~􀀁nmlgk_}!􀀁p􀀁qdt􀀁nmo􀀁`mjdd􀀁'%􀀁corbgt􀀁f_ij}vdllzt􀀁
􀀂apd􀀁mlg􀀁iozkpigd􀀁q_q_oz 􀀁`zjg􀀁nmcadoblrqz􀀁nmcm`lmkr􀀁npgtg_qogvdpimkr􀀁
m`pjdcma_lg}#
-
19. Ilepe/ TeM KaK IIOKHHyVT 6OJIHHIIy H CIIDOCHJI HeCKOJI»KHX ee pa60THHKOB,
6UIH JIH y HHX JIDyTHe CJIyHaH, KOT/Ia IIOJIHTHHeCKHe 3aKJIOHeHHIe IIDHBO3HJIHC Ha
o6cneoBae. MHe OTBOTHJIM, ITO 3TOTO HHKOT/Ia He IIDOHCXOJUHJIO, IIOKa KpIM 6ELI I1OIL
yIIpaBIeHHeM YKDaHHDI, H TO H IIeDBI OJIOBOK IIOIIBODTHyTH TaKOMy O6paIIeHHO 3a
BDeMH DOCCHHCKOTO IIDaBJIOHHH - O6BHHHeMH IIO IIOJIHTHeCKO CTaTe, yTOJIOBHO
peeneyeMr, IO1yHBIIHi paCIIOpHKeHHe CyJIa IIDOTH IIpHHyJIHTeJIHyIO
IICHXHa'TDH eCKyIO DKCepTH3y. Kax n noHHMao, c TeX n1Op 6on1ee 20 JIpyTHX 3aKJIOHeHHIX
(BCe OHM KDIMCKHe TaTapt) 6JIM IIOJUBeDTHyTH IIOIO6HOMy IICHXHaTDHeCKOMy
06CJ1eJIOBaHHIO.
8
EbSTP\fX􀀁^_]dT``􀀁W􀀁^_WR]Q]_􀀁􀀂􀀁`􀀁WiZj􀀁^]􀀁`T\ajP_g􀀁" !$􀀁R]SO
'%# Jm􀀁aodk~􀀁prcd`lmbm􀀁o_f`go_qdj{pqa_!􀀁imqmomd􀀁pmpqm~jm􀀁gf􀀁`mjdd􀀁vdk􀀁'%
prcd`lzt􀀁f_pdc_lgh􀀁p􀀁g}j~􀀁nm􀀁pdlq~`o{􀀁'%&,􀀁bmc_!􀀁klmbmvgpjdllzd􀀁mwg`ig􀀁g􀀁jmelzd􀀁
m`agldlg~􀀁a􀀁kmh􀀁_codp􀀁`zjg􀀁o_fy~pldlz􀀁prcr#􀀁Q_nogkdo!􀀁kmg􀀁m`agldlg~􀀁`zjg􀀁
mplma_lz􀀁l_􀀁ldno_agj{lmk􀀁ndodamcd􀀁f_~ajdlg~!􀀁imqmomd􀀁~􀀁pcdj_j􀀁l_􀀁
iozkpimq_q_opimk􀀁~fzid􀀁l_􀀁qdjdagfgmllmk􀀁i_l_jd􀀁HVGG#􀀁Ujma_􀀁`zjg􀀁&+$#%('*-􀀁%􀀁
ndodamcd􀀁l_􀀁orppigh􀀁~fzi􀀁qdipq_􀀁f_~ajdlg~!􀀁imqmomd􀀁~􀀁pcdj_j􀀁l_􀀁p_kmk􀀁cdjd!􀀁g􀀁
m`agldlg~􀀁nomiromo_􀀁a􀀁kmh􀀁_codp􀀁mplmaza_jgp{􀀁i_i􀀁o_f􀀁l_􀀁|qgt􀀁cm`_ajdllzt􀀁pjma_t#􀀁
Qd􀀁pkmqo~􀀁l_􀀁qm!􀀁vqm􀀁~􀀁pi_f_j􀀁l_􀀁iozkpimq_q_opimk􀀁~fzid􀀁m􀀁qmk!􀀁vqm􀀁dpjg􀀁`z􀀁p_liugg􀀁
rpgjgjg!􀀁o_pwgogjg􀀁g􀀁rbjr`gjg􀀁l_pqmj{im!􀀁vqm􀀁TX􀀁,#)#􀀁mqi_f_j_p{􀀁`z􀀁mq􀀁Oozk_􀀁g􀀁
rwj_􀀁`z􀀁gf􀀁Lml`_pp_!􀀁vqm􀀁`zjm􀀁`z􀀁tmomwm!􀀁dpjg􀀁`z􀀁p_liugg􀀁MU􀀁g􀀁U[H􀀁f_pq_agjg􀀁
miirn_lqma􀀁Oozk_􀀁dbm􀀁nmiglrq{!􀀁XUI􀀁ndodadj_􀀁|qm􀀁l_􀀁orppigh􀀁~fzi􀀁q_i!􀀁i_i􀀁`rcqm􀀁~􀀁
pi_f_j!􀀁vqm􀀁l_cm􀀁azlrcgq{􀀁TX􀀁rhqg􀀁gf􀀁Oozk_􀀁g􀀁Lml`_pp_#􀀁Lorbgkg􀀁pjma_kg!􀀁gt􀀁
ndodamc􀀁c_a_j􀀁mplma_lg~􀀁nodcnmj_b_q{􀀁i_i􀀁`rcqm􀀁~􀀁pi_f_j!􀀁vqm􀀁iozkpigd􀀁q_q_oz􀀁
cmjelz􀀁c_agq{􀀁l_􀀁Tmppghpir}􀀁Xdcdo_ug}!􀀁vqm`z􀀁ml_􀀁r`o_j_p{􀀁gf􀀁Oozk_􀀁g􀀁Lml`_pp_#􀀁
Lm`_aga􀀁pjmam􀀁El_cmF!􀀁imqmomd􀀁~􀀁ld􀀁nomgflmpgj􀀁l_􀀁iozkpimq_q_opimk􀀁~fzid!􀀁
nomiro_qro_􀀁m`mplma_j_􀀁m`agldlgd􀀁a􀀁Enogfza_t􀀁i􀀁l_orwdlg}􀀁qdoogqmog_j{lmh􀀁
udjmpqlmpqg􀀁Tmppghpimh􀀁Xdcdo_uggF#􀀁J􀀁iozkpimq_q_opimk􀀁~fzd􀀁dpq{􀀁pjmam􀀁EidodiF!􀀁
imqmomd􀀁mfl_v_dq􀀁qm􀀁ed􀀁p_kmd!􀀁vqm􀀁pjmam􀀁El_cmF!􀀁g􀀁~􀀁|qm􀀁pjmam􀀁ld􀀁nomgflmpgj#􀀁Nkdllm􀀁
l_􀀁|qr􀀁so_fr!􀀁i_i􀀁mplmalr}!􀀁ppzj_jmp{􀀁pjdcpqagd􀀁g􀀁jglbagpqgvdpi_~􀀁|ipndoqgf_#􀀁^􀀁
nogj_b_}􀀁cj~􀀁o_ppkmqodlg~􀀁Urc_􀀁pqdlmbo_kkr􀀁kmdbm􀀁nomudpp_!􀀁aij}v_~􀀁nmi_f_lg~􀀁
|ipndoq_"jglbagpq_􀀁nm􀀁|qmkr􀀁amnompr#C
C􀀁Uqdlmbo_kk_􀀁nomudpp_􀀁a􀀁cdjd􀀁Ç􀀁 &"&,&$'%&,#
#
􀀋􀇷􀈘􀈐􀈓􀈖􀈎􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍􀀃􀀜􀀖􀀘􀀌􀀑
Cype6nri nponecc npronop - c on no ceHT6p, 2o17 ro1a
20. BO BpeMI CyJIe6HOTO pa36HpaTeICTBa, KOTOpOe COCTOH1O H3 6on1ee eM 20
CyJ(e6HIX 3aCe(aHHi C HIOJLH IIO CeHTHp 2O17 TOI1a, MHOTOHHCJIeHHHe OIIIHOKH H JIOKHHe
O6BHHeHHH B MOH aJIpeC 6LIH pa3ICHeHI CyJIy. HanpMep, MO O6BHHeHHM 6LJIH
OCHOBaHI Ha HeIIpaBHJIHOM nepeBOIIe 3aHBJIeHHH, KOTOpOe Cea1 Ha
KDIMCKOTaTa pCKOM H3LIKe Ha TOJIeBH3HOHHOM KaHaJIe ATR. CI0Ba 6L Oo6a8newt B
IIepeBOIe Ha DyCCKH 3HK TOKCTa 3aHBJIOHHH, KOTOpOe cIeaI Ha CaMOM IeIe, H
O6BMHeHHH Ip0Kyp0pa B MO a(peC OCHOBIBaJIHC KaK pa3 Ha DTHX /IO6aBIOHHIX OJ1OBaX.
He cMOTpH Ha TO, TO CKa3aJI Ha KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOM H3IKe O TOM, ITO eCJIH 6EI CaHKIUHH
yCHJIHJIH, DaCIIHDHJIH H yTJTy6HJIM HaCTOJIKO, To PD caMa oTKa3a1aC 6I OT KpIMa H
yIna 6I H3 JIOH6acCa, TO 6BL1IO 6H XOpOI1O, eCJIH 6EI CaHKIIHH EC H CILIA 3aCTaBHJ1H
OKKyIIaHTOB KpIMa OTO IIOKHHyTE, DCB IepeBOIa 3TO Ha pyCCKHi 3IK TaK, KaK 6yJITO
CKa3a1, TO HaJIO BIHyJIHT Pb yr H3 KpHMa JIoH6acca. JIpyTM enoBaM, Hx
IIepeBOJ IIaBaJI OCHOBaHHH IIDeJIIIOJIaTaT KaK OyJITO H CKa3a1, TO KpIMcKHe TaTap5I
IIOJDKHI JIaBHT Ha PocccKy be/epaIo, rro6 oHa y6panac» H3 KpMa H IoH6acca.
Jo6aBHB CJIOBO "HaJ10", KOTODOe H He IIDOH3HOCHJI Ha KDIMCKOTaTaDCKOM H3IKe,
npoyparypa o6ocnoBana o6BHHeHHe B "I1pH3Max K HapyIeHHo TeppHTOpHaHo
IeIOCTHOcTH PoccHcKoi deJepaIr". B KpIMCKOTaTaDCKOM 3He eCT OJ1OBO "KepeK",
KOTOpOe O3HaaeT TO Ke CaMOe, TO CJIOBO "HaJI0", M 3TO CJIOBO He IIDOH3HOCHI. HMeHHO
Ha 3Ty ppa3y, KaK OCHOBHyo, ccLaIOC cIeJICTBHe H JIHHrBHcTecKaH KcIepTH3a. H
IIpHJIaTIO JUIH DpaCCMOTDeHH CyJIa CTeHOTDaMMy MO€TO IIDOIIeCCa, BKJIOHaH IIOKa3aHHH
OKCIIeDTa-JIHHTBHCTa IIO 3T0My BOIIpOCy.'
4 CrenorpaMMa npouecca B Jene N9 1-171/2017.
9
'&#􀀁 Sdodamcvgi􀀁g􀀁corbgd􀀁pagcdqdjg􀀁m`agldlg~􀀁mqi_f_jgp{􀀁nmccdoe_q{􀀁
nmcjgllmpq{􀀁|qmbm􀀁ps_j{pgsgugoma_llmbm􀀁ndodamc_􀀁kmdbm􀀁f_~ajdlg~􀀁a􀀁prcd`lmk􀀁
nomudppd#􀀁Urc{~􀀁a􀀁kmdk􀀁cdjd􀀁agcdj􀀁|qm!􀀁lm􀀁odwgj􀀁nomgblmogoma_q{􀀁g􀀁azldp􀀁nogbmamo􀀁
l_􀀁mplma_lgg􀀁ps_j{pgsgugoma_llzt􀀁m`agldlgh􀀁nomqga􀀁kdl~#􀀁X_iqgvdpig!􀀁prc{~􀀁c_ed􀀁
l_jmegj􀀁l_􀀁kdl~􀀁`mjdd􀀁promamd􀀁l_i_f_lgd!􀀁vdk􀀁nompgj􀀁nomiromo!􀀁"􀀁nomiromo􀀁qod`ma_j􀀁
azldpqg􀀁nogbmamo􀀁m􀀁f_ij}vdlgg􀀁kdl~􀀁l_􀀁f􀀁bmc_􀀁rpjmalm!􀀁lm􀀁prc{~􀀁nogbmamogj􀀁kdl~􀀁i􀀁
cark􀀁bmc_k􀀁o_`mq􀀁a􀀁imjmlgg"nmpdjdlgg#
''#􀀁 ^􀀁pqo_c_}􀀁mq􀀁`mjdflg􀀁pdocu_􀀁g􀀁`mjdflg􀀁S_oiglpml_!􀀁g􀀁|qmq􀀁nogbmamo􀀁
`zj􀀁vodfazv_hlm􀀁pqombgk􀀁cj~􀀁kdl~#􀀁Vmj{im􀀁gf"f_􀀁cmpqgblrqmbm􀀁a􀀁tmcd􀀁ndodbmamoma􀀁
pmbj_wdlg~􀀁kdecr􀀁no_agqdj{pqa_kg􀀁Vrougg􀀁g􀀁Tmppgg􀀁~􀀁`zj􀀁mpam`mecdl􀀁mq􀀁mq`za_lg~􀀁
kmdbm􀀁nogbmamo_􀀁cmpomvlm􀀁g􀀁pdbmcl~􀀁l_tmerp{􀀁a􀀁k_qdogimamh􀀁v_pqg􀀁Wio_glz#
'(#􀀁 ^􀀁pvgq_}!􀀁vqm􀀁rbmjmalmd􀀁nodpjdcma_lgd􀀁kdl~!􀀁_􀀁q_ied􀀁kmd􀀁f_ij}vdlgd􀀁a􀀁
npgtg_qogvdpir}􀀁`mj{lgur!􀀁prcd`lmd􀀁o_f`go_qdj{pqam􀀁g􀀁azldpdlgd􀀁kld􀀁nogbmamo_􀀁
`zjg􀀁nmnzqi_kg􀀁f_nrb_q{􀀁iozkpigt􀀁q_q_o􀀁i_i􀀁l_omc!􀀁mq`gq{􀀁r􀀁lgt􀀁edj_lgd􀀁
nomcmje_q{􀀁nomqgampqm~q{􀀁ldf_imllmh􀀁_lldipgg􀀁Oozk_􀀁Tmppghpimh􀀁Xdcdo_ugdh#
')#􀀁 ^􀀁ij~lrp{!􀀁vqm􀀁azwdgfjmedllmd􀀁f_~ajdlgd􀀁~aj~dqp~􀀁cmpqmadolzk􀀁g􀀁
qmvlzk􀀁g􀀁pmbj_w_}p{􀀁nodcpq_q{􀀁ndodc􀀁Urcmk􀀁nm􀀁kdod􀀁ldm`tmcgkmpqg!􀀁vqm`z􀀁
nodcmpq_agq{􀀁cmnmjlgqdj{lzd􀀁nmi_f_lg~#
}
21. IIepeBOK JIpyTHe CBHJIOTOJIH O6BHHOHHH OTKa3aIHC IIOJUIepKaT
IIOJUIHHHOcT Toro cbanHpHLH poBaHHorO nepeBOJIa MO€TO 3aHBIeHHH B CyJIO6HOM
npoIecce. CyJI B MOeM JIeIe BHJIeJI 3TO, HO DeIIIHI IIDOHTHODHDOBaT H BIHeC IIDHTOBOD
Ha OCHOBaHHH CbaICHbHIIHDOBaHHIX O6BHHeHH IIDOTHB MOHS. DaKTHHeCKH, CyJI Jae
Han1OKHI Ha MeH 60nee CypOBOe HaKa3aHHe, HeM IIDOCH1 IIpOKyDOD, - Ip0KypOp Tpe60Ba1
BIHOCTH IIDHTOBOD O 3aKJIOHOHHH MOHH Ha 3 TOIIa yCIOBHO, HO CyJIH IIDHTOBODHJI MOH K
IIByM TOI1aM pa6OT B KOJIOHHH-IIOCOJIOHHH.
22. HcrpaJao or 601e3HH CepIIIa M 6OJ1e3HH IIapKHHCOHa, H STOT IIpHTOBOp
6LI De3BIaHHO CTDOTHM IULH MOH. Ton1Ko H3-3a p10cTHrHyToro B XoIIe nepeTOB0DOB
COrJIaIIeHHH MOKJIV IIDaBHTOJTCTBaMH TypIHM H POCCHH 6LI OCBO6OKIIeH OT OT6IBaHH
MOeTO IIDHTOBODa IIOCDOHHO H CeTOJUHH HaXOyC B MaTeDHKOBO HaCTH VKDaHHI.
23. Merao, To yroIOBHoe IpeCIeoaHHe MeH, a TaKe Moe 3aKIOeHHe B
IICHXHaTDH HeCKyIO 6OJIHHIIy, CyJIe6HO€ pa36HpaTeJICTBO H BIHeCeHHe MHe IIpHTOBOpa
6LJIH IIOIIITKaMH 3aIIVTaT KDIMCKHX TaTaD KaK HapOJI, OT6HT y HHX enaHHe
IIDOOKaT IIDOTHBOCTOTT He3aKOHHOH aHHeKHH KpMa PoccHcoi denepare.
24. HKJUHHyC, HTO BHIIIeH3IOKeHHOe 3aHBJIOHHe HBJIHeTCH JIOCTOBODHIM H
TOHIM H COTJIaIIIaIOC IIDeICTaT IIeDeII CyJIOM IIO MeDe HOO6XOJUHMOCTH, TO6M
II De/OCTaBHT IIOIIOJIHHTOJIHHe IIOKa3aHHI.
noel66z_{hpaaa, p60620IS ,osro. 􁁑􁁑==,,---,1---􁁑􁁑􁁑· ---------
p HnbMH YMepoe
10
Annex 21
Expert Report of Professor Paul Magocsi (4 June 2018)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
between
UKRAINE
and
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
EXPERT REPORT OF PROFESSOR PAUL MAGOCSI
2
I. Introduction
1. Counsel for Ukraine have asked me to prepare this report, which addresses the
historical evolution of the Crimean Tartar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea and its
relevance for developments in the peninsula since 2014. Section II describes my experience
as a historian focused on Ukraine and the surrounding region. Section III provides a brief
overview of two and one-half millennia of Crimean history from the sixth century BCE to the
early twenty-first century. It explains the ethnolinguistic and religious diversity of the region
and the various states that have ruled the peninsula, in particular the Crimean Khanate, the
Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and independent Ukraine. Particular emphasis is given in
Section IV to the evolution and fate of Crimea’s Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the renewal of Crimean Tatar and ethnic
Ukrainian civic, socioeconomic, and cultural life that was made possible after Ukraine
became independent in 1991. Finally, the closing Section VI reflects on how the historic past
has had a profound impact on Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians who are at present forced
once again to live under Russian rule.
II. Qualifications
2. For the past fifty years, I have visited, extensively researched, and lectured in
Ukraine. I have personally observed and studied Ukraine’s evolution from Soviet times to
independence to contemporary times. My particular area of focus has been the history of
nationalism and ethnic groups living in border areas.
3. Since 1980, I have been a professor in the Departments of History and Political
Science at the University of Toronto, where I currently hold the endowed John Yaremko
Chair of Ukrainian Studies. I teach courses on the history of Ukraine and on ethnic identity
questions among stateless peoples in Europe at the University of Toronto and as a visiting
3
professor at Prešov University in Slovakia. Over a period of four decades, I have been a guest
lecturer at nearly 300 university and public forums throughout the United States, Canada, all
the countries of central and eastern Europe, Turkey, and Israel. I have also served as a
consultant to Statistics Canada in Ottawa (1987), to the United States Bureau of the Census in
Washington, D. C. (1987), and as historian-in-residence at the Max Planck Institute for Social
Anthropology in Halle an der Saale, Germany (2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010).
4. Before teaching at the University of Toronto, I was a fellow at the Center for
Middle Eastern Studies (studying Ottoman and modern Turkish) at Harvard University. From
1973 to 1980, I became a senior research fellow at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
where I also served as the founding managing editor of the Harvard Series in Ukrainian
Studies (1975-1982).
5. In the course of my research, I have authored over 800 publications on
Ukraine, its historical development, and its ethnic composition. These works have included
two editions of a History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples (1996, 2010), which also
appeared in Ukrainian (2007, 2012, 2017) and Polish (2017) editions; an Illustrated History of
Ukraine (2007; Ukrainian edition, 2012); and several printings of Ukraine: A Historical Atlas
(1985, 1986, 1987, 1992). I have provided counsel with my complete curriculum vitae,
including a list of my published work.1
6. At the outset of the twenty-first century, as the Crimean Tatars were returning
to Crimea and experiencing a cultural revitalization, I visited Crimea on several occasions and
met with a wide range of Crimean Tatar leaders. I subsequently published a well-received
1 Curriculum Vitae of Paul Robert Magocsi (Annex 1093).
4
general history titled This Blessed Land: Crimea and the Crimean Tatars (2014; Ukrainian
edition 2014; Russian edition 2014; Turkish edition 2017).
III. Brief Overview of Crimean History
7. Because of its location and geographical configuration, Crimea has for
millennia been a contact and transit zone for sea and land routes that have connected the
steppelands of eastern Europe and central Asia to the Black Sea and beyond via the Bosporus
to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. As a result, the history of Crimea is one in which
successive cultures have co-existed, built on each other’s achievements, and occasionally
come into conflict. Understanding that history is essential to understanding the multi-ethnic
nature of today’s Crimean population and the relations between the different communities
within it.
8. Historical developments on the Crimean peninsula stretch back at least 2,500
years. During roughly the first two thousand years of that period, Crimea was primarily
linked to political entities based along the shores of the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, in
particular Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and the East Roman or Byzantine Empire.
Already in the sixth century BCE, Greek city states established several colonies along
Crimea’s southern Black Sea coast, some of which grew into significant trading ports like
Chersonesus (near modern-day Sevastopol), Theodosia (modern-day Feodosiia), and
Panticapeum (modern-day Kerch) along the Kerch Strait. These towns set a pattern for
Crimea’s subsequent socioeconomic development of major coastal ports. Trade with the
West only increased in intensity after Crimea came under the control of the Bosporan
Kingdom based in Crimea itself (at Panticapeum/Kerch) and of the Roman Empire (from 63
BCE) and its direct successor, the East Roman/Byzantine Empire.
5
9. During this phase of Crimea’s historical development, the northern part of the
peninsula — consisting of open steppe traditionally suitable only for grazing livestock and
separated from the coastal littoral by a chain of mountains — was controlled by tribal
confederations that invaded from the north, such as the Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans, Goths,
and Khazars. All these tribal and proto-state entities interacted with the Roman and
Byzantine authorities who controlled the coastal port cities that remained closely linked to and
dependent on trade with the capital of the East Roman/Byzantine Aegean-Mediterranean
world — Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul). In the late 1230s, the successors of the
Mongol Empire founded by Chinggis Khan (often referred to as Genghis Khan in western
sources) invaded eastern Europe and subdued the dominant political entities in the region at
that time: Kievan Rus’ and the Turkic tribal confederation which controlled the steppes of
Ukraine and southern Russia — the Kipchaks. The Mongols incorporated into their empire
the Kipchak-ruled steppe, together with Crimea, which they named the Kipchak Khanate
(after the Turkic tribes subdued by the Mongols). In western sources the Kipchak Khanate
came to be known as the Golden Horde.
10. While Crimea became linked politically to Central Asia through the Golden
Horde, it continued to function as a transit zone for east-west trade. The Mongols not only
controlled the famed Silk Route from Central Asia that culminated in Crimea (at modern-day
Staryi Krym), but from the 1280s they also allowed Mediterranean traders from Venice and
most especially Genoa to control the coastal ports of Feodosiia (renamed in Italian: Caffa),
Sudak (Italian: Soldaia), and Kerch (Italian: Cerchio), among others. A fleet of Genoese
trading ships sailing from Caffa to Sicily are reputed to have first carried an invisible
immigrant, the Black Death, to western Europe.
6
11. In the fifteenth century the Golden Horde entered a period of political disarray
and its territory eventually became divided into three smaller states, or khanates. One of these
was the Crimean Khanate, which came into being in the 1440s and was initially based in
Solkhat/Kirim (today Staryi Krym) and eventually Bahçesaray (today Bakhchisarai). The
founding ruler of the new state, Haji Giray (r. 1441-1466), established the first and only
dynasty to rule the Crimean Khanate throughout its entire history.
12. The Crimean Khanate was much larger than the peninsula and for most of its
existence it included, as well, the steppelands as far north as the Dnieper River (in present-day
Ukraine) and the Kuban region east of the Sea of Azov (in present-day Russia). On the other
hand, the Crimean Khanate did not control the peninsula’s Black Sea coastal region, which
from the 1470s was ruled by a new power in the region, the Ottoman Empire. This began a
period when the Ottoman Turks moved into Crimea’s Black Sea towns and trading centers.
The Crimean Khanate gradually became a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. It had a
special status, however, because through the Crimean khans of the Giray dynasty —
descendants of the Mongol emperor Chinggis Khan — the Ottomans legitimized their claims
for leadership over all the Turkic peoples living in the Central Asian steppelands formerly
part of the Mongol Empire.
13. Beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century, political control over
the peninsula shifted to the Slavic civilizations to the north of Crimea, specifically the Russian
Empire, Soviet Union, and, ultimately, independent Ukraine. The initial shift came about as a
result of the southward expansion of the Russian Empire, at the time ruled by Catherine II (r.
1763-1795). In 1774, following Russia’s victory after one of its many wars against the
Ottoman Empire, both powers agreed by treaty to recognize the independence of the Crimean
7
Khanate, but this time under the protection of the Russian Empire. Independence was shortlived,
however, because in 1783 Catherine II annexed Crimea to the Russian Empire in
violation of the treaty with the Ottoman Empire, incorporating most territories of the former
khanate into the newly created Russian province of Taurida. During the next 135 years of
Russian imperial rule that began in 1783, Crimea was drawn into the administrative and
socioeconomic system of a northern European state. This was also a period when the
majority of the Crimean Tatar population left the peninsula and was replaced by European
settlers from the north, mostly Slavs from the territories of modern-day Ukraine and the
Russian Federation, and, to a lesser degree, Germans and Jews.
14. When the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, Crimea experienced several years
of political turmoil marked by frequent change of governments and unsuccessful attempts of
Crimean Tatars to create an independent state. In November 1920, the military forces of the
Bolshevik regime that succeeded in taking control of much of what was the former Russian
Empire, drove from Crimea the last of the anti-Bolshevik “White” armies. One year later, the
Bolsheviks created the Crimean Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic within the framework
of the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic that eventually became a component of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — the Soviet Union. Although the majority of
inhabitants in Crimea remained Slavic, for a few years during the 1920s the government and
administration of the autonomous republic were dominated by individuals of Crimean Tatar
background.
15. Soviet rule was interrupted during World War II, when in June 1941 Nazi
Germany invaded the Soviet Union. By late October of that year, German armies reached
Crimea which, for the next few years, was ruled as a colony of Nazi Germany. During this
8
short period Crimea’s Jewish population (ca. 35,000) was exterminated, as were more than
twice that number of Slavs and Tatars, while an estimated 85,000 Russians were deported to
work as forced laborers (Ostarbeiter) in Germany. In the spring of 1944, the Germans were
driven out of Crimea by the Soviet Army. The returning Soviet authorities almost
immediately deported the entire Crimean Tatar population (288,000) as well as Armenian,
Bulgarian, and Greek inhabitants. Crimea was now a homogeneous Slavic land.
16. The Soviet authorities did not restore the prewar autonomous republic status to
the peninsula, but rather demoted it to an ordinary administrative subdivision (oblast) of the
Russian Soviet Federal Republic. A decade later, in 1954, the Crimean oblast was transferred
from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine, with which it had always been directly connected by
land via the Perekop isthmus. From 1954 to 1991, the Crimean oblast was administered by
the government of Soviet Ukraine and its Communist party based in Kyiv.
17. After the Soviet Union ceased to exist in December, in 1991, Crimea became
part of independent Ukraine and was recognized as such by the Russian Federation in
successive international instruments.12 The authorities in Kyiv restored Crimea’s prewar
status as an autonomous republic with its own parliament, responsible for governing the
peninsula, with the exception of the port city of Sevastopol and surrounding area which was
under the direct authority of Ukraine’s central government in Kyiv. It was also the policy of
Ukraine’s government to allow Crimean Tatars to return from exile in Soviet Central Asia to
their ancestral homeland.
2 These included the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with
Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (5 December
1994) (Annex 981), the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine (31 May 1997) (Annex 982), and several agreements and
treaties between Ukraine and Russia regarding the Black Sea Fleet.
9
18. In late 2013, widespread demonstrations broke out in Kyiv and other cities of
Ukraine in protest against then President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal, under pressure from
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, to sign a cooperation agreement with the European Union.
The anti-government protests in Kyiv escalated into what became known as the Euromaidan,
or Revolution of Dignity. In February 2014, President Yanukovych fled from office and
sought refuge in Russia.
19. In late February and March 2014, the Russian Federation occupied and
purported to annex Crimea.
IV. The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Communities in Multi-Ethnic Crimea
20. This section describes in more detail the history of the Crimean Tatar people
and the Ukrainian community in Crimea, which I understand to be the dual focus of Ukraine’s
claims under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
A. The Crimean Tatar People
21. The Crimean Tatars comprise individuals who describe themselves by that
ethnonym, who are Muslims of the Sunni variety, and who may (but do not necessarily) speak
or understand a Turkic language called Crimean Tatar. If the definition of what is a Crimean
Tatar is today more or less straightforward and based on conscious self-identification, the
origins of this people are much more complex.
1. Origins of the Crimean Tatars
22. Traditionally, European (Slavic and non-Slavic) scholars — and for that matter
Crimean Tatar writers as well — argued that the Crimean Tatars were descended from the
Kipchak Turkic nomads and warriors who arrived in the peninsula as part of the Mongol
invasion of eastern Europe toward the mid-thirteenth century. Such an understanding served
the ideological purposes of the two political entities that ruled Crimea during the last half
10
millenium (the Crimean Khanate and Russian Empire/Soviet Union). For the elite of the
Crimean Khanate, the Kipchak Turkic connection implied association with the prestigious
heritage of Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire. For the rulers of the Russian Empire and
the Soviet Union, the Kipchak Turkic connection implied that the Tatars were associated with
a nomadic warrior people who forcibly conquered the peninsula and for several centuries as
usurpers exploited the land in the service of a foreign power, the Ottoman Empire. According
to this narrative, it was only Russian imperial rule that developed Crimea and gradually
reinforced the Slavic demographic element that supposedly lived in the peninsula before the
thirteenth-century Mongolo-Tatar invasions.3
23. To be sure, archeological and historical evidence revealed that Crimea for nearly
two thousand years before the Mongolo-Tatar invasion had been home to numerous peoples
associated with either nomadic tribal peoples from the north (e.g., Taurians, Scythians,
Sarmatians, Alans, Goths, Kipchaks, and Nogay), or with sedentary urban-based settlers from
the south (Hellenistic Greeks, Romans, Byzantine Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Italians,
Anatolian Turks).4 It was these nomadic and sedentary peoples who over time intermarried
and assimilated to create the indigenous population of Crimea.5 During the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, these peoples of various ethnic origins, if they were not already Turkic
3 The Russian narrative is best illustrated by the Soviet historians Petr N. Nadinskii, Boris
Grekov, and the entry on the Crimean oblast in the Bolshaia sovetskaia entsyklopediia (The
Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Vol. XXIII (Moscow, 1953), pp. 551-554 (Annex 1008).
4 On the archeological evidence, see Michael Rostovtzeff, Iranians and Greeks in South
Russia (Oxford University Press 1922) (Annex 1007).
5 The narrative depicting Crimean Tatars as the indigenous population of the peninsula is best
presented by historians such as the Crimean Tatar Enver Ozenbashly, the American Brian
Glyn Williams, and the Russian Valerii E. Vozgrin. See the discussion in Gwendolyn Sasse,
The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict 74–79 (Harvard University Press
2007) (Annex 1015).
11
speakers, became linguistically turkicized. Many also adopted the Islamic religion, with the
notable exception of the Jews, Karaites, and the Christian Armenians and Greeks. This
population came to be known as Tats, who gradually became the dominant demographic
element in the peninsula. Known to the outside world as Crimean Tatars, the Tats spoke a
Turkic language derived from both Kipchak Turkic (of Inner Asian origin) and Oghuz Turkic
(related to the Turkish language of Anatolia) in the heart of the Ottoman Empire. This
amalgam language, enriched with numerous loanwords from Italian and Greek (reflecting the
historic presence of those peoples in Crimea’s port cities), eventually became the basis for a
unique literary language known as Crimean Tatar.
2. The Crimean Tatar National Movement
24. The national movement among the Crimean Tatars dates from the late nineteenth
century, a time when they were a stateless people living in the multinational Russian Empire.
Like other stateless peoples throughout Europe, the Crimean Tatars embarked on a process
called the national awakening, or revival, led by self-designated patriotic leaders who came to
be known as the nationalist intelligentsia.
25. The leading figure among the nationalist intelligentsia and “father” of the Crimean
Tatars was Ismail Gaspirali (1851-1914), also known by the Russian form of his surname,
Gasprinskii. Aside from his work as an educational reformer, Gaspirali was faced with the
question to what degree the Crimean Tatars were distinct from the rest of the empire’s Turkic
inhabitants. Gaspirali’s approach to this matter took the form of a compromise that was
reflected in the language of the first Crimean Tatar publications under his editorship. It was
basically Ottoman Turkish (in Arabic script) although with the addition of certain words and
phrases drawn from the Crimean Tatar vernacular speech.
12
26. The next generation of the nationalist intelligentsia that was most active during the
decade preceding the outbreak of World War I in 1914 moved from purely cultural to political
concerns: getting elected to imperial Russia’s parliament and placing greater emphasis on the
Tatars of Crimea rather than all the Turkic peoples of the empire. Such educational and
national conscious-raising work among the Crimean Tatar population, led by Noman Çelebi
Jihan and Jafar Seydamet, bore fruit during Russia’s revolutionary era that began in 1917.
Following the collapse of the tsarist empire in February/March and the Bolshevik-led coup in
October/November that launched Soviet rule, Crimea, like the rest of Russia, was plunged
into political turmoil. Among the contenders for control of the peninsula were the Crimean
Tatar nationalists. Before the end of 1917, they established a Provisional Crimean Muslim
Executive Committee, the first Crimean Tatar political party (Milli Firqa), a national
assembly (the Qurultay),6 and a governing body (National Directorate) which adopted a
constitution proclaiming on December 25, 1917 the formation of a Crimean Democratic
Republic.
27. The new Crimean Tatar republic lasted only a few weeks, however, because in
January it was driven out of its short-lived capital Simferopol by Bolshevik-led armed forces
loyal to Soviet Russia. Noman Çelebi Jihan, elected the first President of the Crimean
Republic by the first Qurultay, was captured by the Bolsheviks in 1918. He was executed by
a firing squad of the Black Sea Fleet, which then dumped his body into the sea. In early 1921,
the Crimean Tatar national movement was given a new lease on life. At that time the Soviet
government in Moscow decided to create a Crimean Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic
6 This term harks back to the assemblies called qurultay comprised of clan leaders in the
Crimean Khanate who met periodically to elect each new ruling khan.
13
within the framework of Soviet Russia.7 The Crimean republic’s Communist party and
government officials were to be drawn in large part from the local Crimean Tatar populace.
The expectation was that the ruling Communist party (Bolshevik) would be strengthened by
drawing Crimean Tatars into its ranks, and that the autonomous republic would at least on the
surface be a “Crimean Tatar” entity and therefore a beacon to the proletariat in Turkey and
other lands in the Near East to undertake their own Bolshevik-style revolutions.
28. In fact, for a few years (1923-1928) the Crimean Tatar national movement did
attain considerable success, albeit under Soviet auspices. The leading government and
Communist party figure during this period was the local Crimean Tatar, Veli Ibrahimov
(1888-1928), under whose leadership the policy of Tatarization was introduced. This meant
that Crimean Tatars were favored for positions in the autonomous republic’s administration,
in the local Communist party, and in state-owned industrial enterprises. On the cultural front,
the language question was resolved in favor of creating a distinct Crimean Tatar literary
language based on the local spoken vernacular. This standardized language (first using the
Arabic, then Roman, and finally Cyrillic alphabet) became the medium of instruction in the
peninsula’s expanded network of elementary schools. Pedagogical and research centers
devoted to Crimean Tatar history, culture, and language were established in Crimea’s newly
founded Taurida University, and a new generation of writers created a body of modern
Crimean Tatar literary works. For all these reasons, Crimean Tatars to this day look back on
the years 1923 to 1928 as their “golden age.”
7 The decree establishing the Crimea Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic issued by the
Council of People’s Commissars in Moscow, headed by Vladimir Lenin, was issued on 18
April 1921. The constitution for the new republic was adopted on 10 November 1921. Text
reproduced in V.P. Diulichev, Krym: istoriia v ocherkakh XX vek (Simferopol: RuBin, 2006),
pp. 112-115 (Annex 870).
14
29. The national movement was slowed down following the radical socioeconomic
reforms introduced in 1928 throughout Soviet Russia and the rest of the Soviet Union. By the
end of the 1930s, most Crimean Tatars were removed from the local ranks of the Communist
party and the autonomous republic’s administration, leading intellectuals were silenced, and
most mosques were closed and their clergy arrested in an effort to eliminate the traditional
symbolic relationship between Islam and Crimean Tatar identity. In short, the flourishing
Crimean Tatar national movement that was encouraged by the Soviet regime in the 1920s was
cut down by that same regime in the 1930s.
3. Exile—Sürgün
30. The entire period of imperial Russian rule in Crimea from 1783 to 1917 was
characterized by the absolute and relative decline in the number of Crimean Tatars. This
process continued during the following period of Soviet Russian rule until its culmination
during the closing months of World War II. According to informed estimates and official
census data, at the beginning of imperial Russian rule during the 1780s, Tatars comprised 84
percent of Crimea’s population. As a result of Soviet Russian rule, by the end of 1944, their
percentage was zero.
15
Table 1: Crimean Tatar population of Crimea, 1775-19598
Year Total
inhabitants
Number of
Crimean Tatars
Percentage of
Crimean Tatars
1775
1850
1858
1864
1897
1926
1938
1959
250,000
340,000
331,000
199,000
547,000
714,000
1,126,000
1,202,000
220,000
267,000
242,000
100,000
195,000
179,000
218,000
0
88
78
73
50
36
25
19
0
31. The steady decline in the absolute and relative numbers of Crimean Tatars was
the result of imperial Russian and Soviet Russian government policies, which took the form of
encouraging “voluntary” emigration in the nineteenth century and forced deportation in the
twentieth century. The two phases of this tragic separation from the homeland are referred to
by Crimean Tatars as the first exile (ilk sürgün) and second exile (ikinci sürgün). Those who
were part of the first exile emigrated to various parts of the Ottoman Empire; those in the
second exile were forcibly deported to Soviet Central Asia.
32. The first exile began in the 1780s, when the extended family of the ruling
Giray dynasty and high officials of the former Crimean Khanate sought refuge in the
Caucasus region of Circassia, at the time a vassal territory of the Ottoman Empire. The
refugees numbered between 20,000 and 30,000 emigrants. The next and largest wave came
after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), when Russian civil and Orthodox
religious leaders spoke of Crimean Tatars as “alien” Muslim collaborators who should be
8 The data in this table are drawn from a wide variety of secondary sources and official census
reports.
16
removed. This negative political environment combined with increasing discontent on the part
of the Crimean Tatar peasantry against the increasing exploitation by Russian and Crimean
Tatar landlords contributed to the departure of over 140,000 Crimean Tatars. The emigrants
were drawn to a land which was of their own Muslim faith, the Ottoman Empire, largely
settling in its capital Istanbul, in Anatolia, and in Ottoman-held European territories in the
Balkans. As a result of Tatar emigration abroad and the in-migration of Russians, Ukrainians,
and others (Germans, Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, and Ashkenazic Jews)
from various parts of the Russian Empire, the percentage of Crimean Tatars among the
peninsula’s inhabitants plunged to 50 percent in 1864 and further to 35 percent in 1897. The
descendants of Crimean Tatars who were part of this first exile (ilk sürgün) number by some
estimates as many as five million in present-day Turkey.
33. The second exile is directly related to the events of World War II. The
victorious Soviet authorities and Stalin in particular were determined to punish Nazi Germany
and its “fascist” allies as well as national groups within and beyond the Soviet Union that they
accused of collaboration with the wartime enemy. The Crimean Tatars en masse were
declared to have “betrayed the [Soviet] Motherland” and to have “collaborated with the
German occupying powers.”9 As collective punishment they were “to be exiled from the
territory of Crimea and settled permanently” in Soviet Central Asia.10 Beginning on May 18,
1944, remembered as the Qara Kün (Black Day), and continuing through the next two days,
183,200 Crimean Tatars were driven from their homes and deported on railway cattle cars to
9 Photoreproduction of the document signed by Iosif Stalin, in Paul Robert Magocsi, This
Blessed Land: Crimea and the Crimean Tatars 118 (University of Toronto Press, 2014)
(Annex 1020).
10 Ibid.
17
the east. Thousands died along the way, tens of thousands more died after arriving at their
destinations where in many cases they were dumped without any shelter. In their efforts to
cleanse the Crimea of “foreign elements,” the Soviet authorities also deported Crimea’s
remaining Armenians (9,800), Bulgarians (12,600), and Greeks (16,000), with the result that
by the time of the first postwar census of 1959, the vast majority of Crimea’s population (1.2
million) was comprised of people who described themselves as Russians (71 percent) and
Ukrainians (22 percent).
34. Most of the exiled Crimean Tatars (151,000 out of 195,000) were resettled in
Soviet Uzbekistan, with the rest going to the Udmurt and Mari oblasts of the Russian S.F.S.R.
As a result of the inhospitable climatic and unhygienic conditions they encountered by those
sent to Soviet Uzbekistan, nearly 27,000 died during their first year in exile. For over a
decade, Crimean Tatar exiles in Soviet Uzbekistan were denied the right to move freely
within the Soviet republic in which they resided, and they were specifically banned from
returning to Crimea. Even their ethnonym, Crimean Tatar, was abolished as a specific
nationality category.11
35. Particularly difficult was the adjustment for families whose traditional
livelihood in Crimea was in agriculture and livestock raising. Limited arable land in Soviet
Uzbekistan forced many to migrate to the republic’s capital Tashkent and other small cities
where they worked in mines and factories, usually at jobs not wanted by the local Uzbeks.
11 After their 1944 deportation and exile in Central Asia, Crimean Tatars were issued internal
passports that indicated their nationality as “Tatar,” with the result that they could not be
distinguished from Volga, Kazan, and other Tatars living in the Soviet Union. The ethnonym,
“Crimean Tatar,” was not reintroduced officially until the last Soviet census of 1989. Greta
Uehling, The First Independent Ukrainian Census in Crimea: Myths, Miscoding, and Missed
Opportunities, 1 Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 27 (January 2004) (Annex 1013).
18
The urban environment was primarily Russian, and most schools had Russian as the language
of instruction. For this reason the first generation of Crimean Tatars born or acculturated in
exile became Russian speakers. In short, exiled Crimean Tatars were not only physically
uprooted, they were also denied their traditional lifestyle, their language, and their very
identity.
4. Return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea
36. The first change in the status of the Crimean Tatars in exile came in the late 1950s.
Although not absolved of the charge of treason during World War II — as were several other
nationalities according to a Soviet decree issued in 1957 — the authorities did allow a degree
of cultural activity among the exiles. This included the establishment in Soviet Uzbekistan’s
capital Tashkent of a Crimean Tatar publishing house as well as a newspaper and teaching at
the city’s Pedagogical Institute of courses in language and literature. Younger Crimean
Tatars, albeit in exile, began to meet informally and through discussion and study to
rediscover — or discover for the first time — their ancestral roots. Inevitably this road to
self-awareness led to the desire for national rehabilitation and the right to return to Crimea.
37. Concrete steps to achieve those goals took the form of petitions submitted to the
Soviet authorities in 1957 and 1961. The government responded by arresting what were now
considered Crimean Tatar dissidents distributing “anti-Soviet propaganda” and “stirring up
racial discord.”12 The arrests only galvanized further the new generation of exiles who
formed in Uzbekistan the Union of Crimean Youth for Return to the Homeland, co-founded
by Mustafa Jemiloglu/Dzhemilev, destined to become the most famous Crimean Tatar
12 The petitions are discussed in Alan Fisher, The Crimean Tatars 176 (Hoover Institution
Press 1978) (Annex 1009).
19
dissident during the last decades of Soviet rule. In 1967-1968 an estimated 10,000 Crimean
Tatars simply left Uzbekistan and returned to Crimea. Most of the “illegals” were deported
back to Uzbekistan, although about 900 families managed to remain in Crimea, thereby
becoming the vanguard of a movement of return that by the 1970s had reached about 5,400.
These individuals received employment and housing from the authorities and integrated
relatively easily.
38. Real change in Soviet policy only became possible after the ascent to power in
1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev. Under his leadership, the Soviet Union introduced a series of
reforms known as restructuring (perestroika) and openness (glasnost). In the wake of a
Crimean Tatar demonstration on Moscow’s Red Square (July 1987), the Soviet authorities
finally took Crimean Tatar demands seriously. In November 1989, the Supreme Soviet
(parliament) of the Soviet Union issued a decree legalizing the right of exiled Crimean Tatars
to return to the ancestral homeland. The more lax environment under Gorbachev’s rule had
allowed for the return of about 20,000 Crimean Tatars, but after the November 1989 decree
and the symbolic return of the “living legend” Mustafa Jemiloglu/Dzhemilev, within a little
over a year (mid-1991) the number of returnees had risen to 135,000.
39. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of independent
Ukraine, return migration surged. Independent Ukraine’s census of 2001 recorded the number
of Tatars in Crimea as 243,000.13 Just over a decade later (2013) the number of returnees to
the peninsula was 266,000, so that unofficial estimates placed the number of Crimean Tatars
on the eve of the Russian occupation of Crimea at upwards of 300,000. All of this is to say
13 All-Ukrainian population census 2001, STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE (3 June
2018), accessed at http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/ (Annex 730).
20
that, under Ukrainian rule, the number of Tatars in Crimea at the outset of the twenty-first
century was greater than at any time in history.
40. The resettlement process was not easy. On the one hand, the central government
authorities in independent Ukraine were basically sympathetic and did not hinder the return
process. On the other hand, many of Crimea’s local officials and residents — formally
designated as Russians or Ukrainians, though in reality de-ethnicized Soviets (sovky) —
opposed the arrival in their midst of what they considered to be foreign usurpers from the
East. The returning Crimean Tatars may have been “home,” but most had nowhere to go, and
certainly not to their family homesteads which were lived in since World War II by sovietized
Russians and Ukrainians. Consequently, Crimean Tatar returnees simply settled on whatever
land they could find.
41. Faced, itself, with a whole host of political and socioeconomic problems,
independent Ukraine was ill-prepared to face the challenge of hundreds of thousands of inmigrants.
It did set up state- and republic (Crimean)- level committees to assist formerly
deported people, so that between 1991 and 2012, nearly 1.3 million hryvia were allotted to
assign land plots, to construct housing, and to meet other socioeconomic and educational
needs. But these government efforts, as laudable as they were, were insufficient. Fortunately,
the Crimean Tatar returnees had come to the attention of the world media, so that various
NGOs and the United Nations were prompted to assist with several million dollars in aid,
whether by bodies like the UN’s Crimea Integration and Development Program (est. 1994) or
the Turkish Agency for International Development.
42. Another serious problem was the legal status of the returnees, who at least initially
were not granted citizenship by Ukraine’s central government. Without citizenship, the often
21
unfriendly local authorities had a convenient excuse to refuse “non-citizens” resident permits
and the necessary documentation to find employment. Finally, as part of the attempt to obtain
legal resident status, Crimean Tatar spokespersons argued that their people should be
recognized as the indigenous inhabitants of the peninsula who had been illegally deported in
May 1944.
43. The government of Ukraine did make efforts to improve the status of Crimean
Tatars who returned to Crimea. But, despite various interim agreements on relations with
countries such as Uzbekistan and despite legal attempts to restore rights to former deported
peoples, as of 2013, Ukraine’s government and parliament had still not fully addressed the
pressing issues facing Crimean Tatar returnees: lack of adequate housing and social services,
unemployment, and their uncertain legal status.
B. Ukrainians in Crimea
This section discusses the origins and development of the Ukrainian community in
Crimea, a complex task that must address not only migration patterns but also identity
questions. Modern-day Ukrainians, together with Belarusans and Russians, all trace their
origins to various East Slavic tribes. Beginning in the late ninth century, several tribal leaders
formed a political entity known as Kievan Rus’, whose main political, socioeconomic, and
cultural center was in present-day Ukraine. The East Slavic inhabitants also had a common
religion, Orthodox Christianity, which for centuries served as the primary means of selfidentity
for the Rus’ people. Ethnic differentiation among the East Slavic Rus’ began to take
root only after Kievan Rus’ no longer existed and was initially evident in the sixteenth century
among, on the one hand, what came to be known as Ruthenians (modern-day Belarusans and
Ukrainians) and, on the other, Muscovites (modern-day Russians). Further differentiation
occurred in the nineteenth century, which witnessed the gradual tripartite division of East
22
Slavs into Russians, Belarusans, and Ukrainians, or to quote the commonly-used terms in
imperial Russia: Great Russians, White Russians, and Little Russians. By that time, ethnic
self-identity was to a large degree a reflection of state policy, whether that of the Russian
Empire in the nineteenth century or the Soviet Union in the twentieth century. Both those
states assigned ethnic/nationality categories or labels which did not necessarily reflect how
individuals might have identified themselves in the absence of government intervention.
Ethnolinguistic or national identity remains a fluid concept in post-independence Ukraine,
including Crimea, where identifying as Ukrainian may mean association with a specific
ethnolinguistic heritage, or with the state in which one resides and holds citizenship, or with
both.
1. Migration into Crimea
44. East Slavs from the lands of present-day Ukraine, were in Crimea in earlier
periods. These included the East Slavic Rus’ connected with the tenth-century principality of
Tmutorokan that included territory in eastern Crimea, the Zaporozhian Cossacks who
frequently raided the Crimean Khanate beginning in the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, and the hundreds of thousands of slaves captured in Ukrainian-lands in Poland-
Lithuania and in Muscovy during those same centuries. Although most of the slaves that
were transported to Crimea were sold to buyers in the Ottoman Empire, a certain portion
remained as property of the Crimean khans and eventually integrated into Crimean society.
45. When the Russian Empire annexed Crimea in 1783, it immediately encouraged
migration to the peninsula from other parts of the empire as well as from abroad. Initially, the
imperial authorities were not successful in attracting East Slavs, whose numbers at best
reached about 11,000 in the 1790s. Only from the 1820s did East Slavs migrate in larger
numbers and steadily during the rest of the nineteenth century.
23
46. According to the Russian Empire’s first census conducted in 1897, the number of
“Little Russians” (the term used to designate Ukrainians) reached nearly 65,000, which
represented about 12 percent of Crimea’s inhabitants. The proportion of the Crimean
population designated as Ukrainians, in Crimea was to remain basically the same during the
first half of the twentieth century, ranging from 11 to 14 percent.
Table 2: Ukrainian population in Crimea, 1897-200114
Year Total
inhabitants
Number designated as
Ukrainian
Percentage of
designated
Ukrainians
1897
1926
1939
1959
1970
1979
1989
2001
547,000
714,000
1,126,000
1,202,000
2,064,000
2,034,000
65,000
77,000
154,000
268,000
481,000
547,000
551,000
494,000
12
11
14
22
27
26
26
24
47. Profound demographic changes took place during World War II and the
immediate postwar years. As a result of war-related deaths and the subsequent deportations
carried out in 1944 by the Soviet authorities, the number of inhabitants in Crimea fell to
747,000 — in other words, 397,000 less inhabitants than had been living on the peninsula
before the war. In an effort to offset these demographic losses and to re-start Crimea’s
devastated economy, the central authorities in Moscow, beginning already in late 1944,
organized a large-scale program to resettle the peninsula with people from the territories of
the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics — in the latter case primarily inmigrants
from northern and central Ukraine. By 1948, however, nearly sixty percent of the
14 The data in this table are drawn from official census reports.
24
newcomers, discouraged by the dire economic situation in Crimea, returned to their homes in
southern Russia and central/northern Ukraine.
48. More successful were the resettlement efforts carried out after 1954, the year
Crimea was transferred from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine. The Communist authorities in
Kyiv began to invest heavily in the peninsula’s infrastructure in order to enhance agriculture,
industry, and tourism. Together with these developments came a new influx of in-migrants,
this time primarily from the western regions of Ukraine. As a result, already by 1959 the
absolute and relative numbers of Ukrainians in Crimea increased to 268,000, or 22 percent.
From that time until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, about one-quarter of Crimea’s
population were considered as having Ukrainian nationality. In general, the in-migrants from
Soviet Ukraine tended to settle in the northern steppe agricultural regions of Crimea, those
from Soviet Russia primarily along the Black Sea littoral.
2. Nationality designation in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union
49. As explained above, the nationality data generated by censuses carried out by
the Russian Empire and Soviet Union shed only limited light on how the citizens of those
political units actually self-identified. Indeed, Ukrainians did not really self-identify as such
until the twentieth century. Before then they described themselves as the people of Rus’,
thereby associating themselves consciously or unconsciously with the Orthodox Christian
civilization embodied in a medieval state, Kievan Rus’, located in present-day Ukraine,
Belarus, and much of European Russia. Those people of Rus’ who inhabited what is modernday
Ukraine had for centuries called themselves Rusyns (rusyny). They also came to be
known as Little Russians (malorossy), the official term used in the Russian Empire since the
eighteenth century to designate ethnic Ukrainians. Use of that derogatory term implied that
25
the Little Russians were only a branch, together with “Great Russians” and “White Russians”
(Belorussians), of a single so-called common-Russian (obshcherusskii) nationality.
50. Beginning in the first half of the nineteenth century, some intellectual activists
(nationalist intelligentsia) in the Russian Empire adopted the ethnonym “Ukrainian,” implying
that they were part of a distinct nationality, not merely a branch of some kind of single
Russian nationality. The efforts of Ukrainian-oriented activists in the Russian Empire, where
they were known as Ukrainophiles (ukrainofily), had only limited success.
51. Following the establishment of Soviet rule in the wake of the November 1917
Bolshevik Revolution, the new Communist regime rejected the term Little Russian (as a
remnant of the now disgraced tsarist Russia) and replaced it with Ukrainian. One of the
component republics in the Soviet Union was named the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic
reflecting the fact that its titular and numerically dominant nationality was henceforth
officially designated as Ukrainian.
52. Under Soviet rule, each inhabitant was required to have a nationality
designation on his or her official documents (identity card, passport, various kinds of
application forms) and to use that designation when responding to the nationality question on
required censuses undertaken periodically between 1926 and 1989. An individual’s
nationality designation did not have to reflect his or her mother tongue or spoken language.
Therefore, a Ukrainian by nationality was not necessarily a Ukrainian by language; he or she
could be a speaker of Russian or any other language. Similarly, a Ukrainian by nationality
could send his or her children to a Russian-language school (often the case) or to a school
using Ukrainian or any other language of instruction.
26
3. Crimea as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
53. The Crimean oblast was transferred in 1954 from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine.
The Communist authorities subsequently made a short-lived effort to promote Ukrainian
culture in Crimea. Already in February of that year the Soviet central authorities in Moscow
(Supreme Soviet) issued a decree calling for instruction in all schools of Crimea to be in
Ukrainian. A few months later the Crimean oblast Communist party accepted the central
government’s proposals on the Ukrainian language, which was introduced already in the
1954/1955 school year.15
54. There were two types of schools: those with classes in Ukrainian language and
literature (the rest of the subjects were taught in Russian); and those in which Ukrainian was
the language of instruction in all classes. During the 1954/1955 school year, there were 24
Ukrainian-language classes in 15 schools with 466 students. By 1958/1959 those numbers
had risen to 1,704 Ukrainian-language classes in 177 schools with 26,787 students. During
these same years, four middle-level schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction
were established.
55. Aside from the school system, measures to promote Ukrainian culture in Crimea
took several other forms. A Ukrainian-language edition of the Crimean oblast Communist
party newspaper (Radians’kyi Krym) began to appear, the government-owned oblast
publishing house included in its program Ukrainian-language titles, a Ukrainian-language
Music and Drama Theater was established in Simferopol, and departments of Ukrainian
15 Institute for Political and Ethnonational Research of the National Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine, CRIMEA IN ETHNOPOLITICAL MEASUREMENTS (2005), cited in Krym v
etnopolitychnomu vymiri (Kyiv: Instytut politychnych i etnonatsional’nykh doslidzhen’ NAN
Ukrainy, 2005), p. 370 (Annex 1014).
27
language and Ukrainian literature were opened at Crimea’s Pedagogical Institute to train
teaching cadres needed to staff the expanding Ukrainian school system. There was also an
effort to introduce Ukrainian signage on official buildings and offices.
56. The effort to promote Ukrainian culture in Crimea in this period did not have
lasting effects. In 1958-1959, the Soviet central authorities in Moscow issued a new school
law which gave parents the right to choose the language of instruction for their children’s
schooling without having to do so according to their designated nationality.16 The result was
a rapid decline in the number of Crimean students opting to be taught through the medium of
Ukrainian. Within the course of the next decade Russian became the language of instruction
in most schools in Crimea.
57. In effect, during the last three decades of Soviet rule, the Ukrainians of Crimea,
despite formally being part of Soviet Ukraine, had little or no opportunity to express and
enhance their national identity in the public sphere. Those who cherished their distinct
national identity could only do so in the private sphere among family and friends. On the
other hand, those whose primary identity was with the Soviet Union (so-called sovoks)
accepted as normal the all-pervading Russian environment in Soviet-ruled Crimea.
V. Manifestations of ethnic identity in Contemporary Crimea
A. Crimean Tatars
1. Political institutions/representation
58. In the course of 1991, the last year of Soviet rule, three political bodies came into
being, each with a different vision of how Crimea should be governed. The first body
16 The November 1958 theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union on the language reforms in schools was adopted in Soviet Ukraine (and Crimea) the
following year, as discussed in Roman Solchanyk, Language Politics in the Ukraine Isabelle
T. Kreindler, ed. 1985) (Annex 1010).
28
comprised local elites active in Crimea’s Regional Assembly (Oblastna Rada) based in
Simferopol. It carried out a referendum (January 1991) in which 93 percent of the eligible
electorate voted to restore the prewar Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
(Crimean ASSR) to be governed by its own parliament within the framework of a hoped-for
future restructured Soviet Union. The second body was Soviet Ukraine’s parliament
(Verkhovna Rada) based in Kyiv, which had earlier (July 1990) declared Ukraine a sovereign,
but not yet independent state. Ukraine’s parliament recognized (February 1991) the restored
Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, but within Soviet Ukraine. The third body
was the Qurultay or National Congress convened in Simferopol (June 1991) by Crimean Tatar
returnees with the goal to re-establish a sovereign and specifically national Crimean Tatar
republic. To promote this goal, the Qurultay elected an executive body called the Mejlis.
59. Crimean Tatars participated as deputies in all three political bodies: the parliament
of autonomous Crimea, the national parliament of Ukraine , and the Crimean Tatar Qurultay
and Mejlis, as well as in elected district (raion) and city councils and in the autonomous
republic’s public administration.
60. The most important Crimean Tatar political body in independent Ukraine was the
Qurultay, the national congress comprised of 250 delegates elected by Crimean Tatar local
communities. The Qurultay, in turn, elected an executive council, the Mejlis (33 members),
under the leadership of the former Soviet dissident Mustafa Dzhemilev (b. 1943). The Mejlis,
which derived its legitimacy from the Qurultay, was given the authority to represent Crimean
Tatars in all negotiations with the governing authorities, whether the autonomous republic of
Crimea or the national government of Ukraine. Whereas the government of Ukraine refused
to recognize the Mejlis as an institution of minority self-governance, it did in practice
29
consider it the main representative body of Crimean Tatars. For example, the Council of
Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People attached to the Office of Ukraine’s President
was generally comprised of Mejlis members.
61. The main activity of the Mejlis was to lobby government bodies to alleviate the
difficulties in the return process of deported Crimean Tatars and to assist the returnees to
obtain Ukrainian citizenship and land on which to live. The Mejlis also managed to establish
close ties with diasporan organizations, especially in Turkey. These included the General
Center of Crimean Tatar Associations, which formed the Qirim Foundation to collect funds
for the ancestral homeland. The Mejlis became the main distributor of this aid in Crimea.
The Mejlis was also in the forefront of the campaign to have Crimean Tatars recognized as
the indigenous inhabitants of Ukraine.
62. To achieve its various goals, the Mejlis encouraged participation in the electoral
process by voting for candidates of Crimean Tatar ethnicity in district, republic, and national
elections. Crimean Tatars were generally well represented as elected deputies in district and
city councils and in the autonomous republic’s public administrations, where on average they
held between 10 and 15 percent of the posts. Less evident was their presence in the 100-
member Crimean parliament, where Crimean Tatars comprised from 14 percent (1994) to
only 6 percent (2010) of the deputies.
63. Getting elected to Ukraine’s national parliament posed special challenges,
since all political parties were required to have a national base. This was a major
disadvantage for national minorities that were concentrated in certain geographic regions. To
overcome this problem, the Mejlis formed coalitions with nationwide parties that were
Ukrainian in orientation. Mejlis leaders like Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov (b.
30
1957) favored, in principle, the pro-Western political forces in Ukraine that worked for the
country’s acceptance into NATO and the European Union. The Mejlis also strongly
supported the Orange Revolution (2005) and the Euromaidan (2014) that opposed the pro-
Russian orientation in Ukraine. Such Ukrainian patriotism on the part of the Mejlis was
clearly not acceptable to the pro-Russian inclinations of the Crimean republic’s Council of
Ministers and of many deputies in Crimea’s parliament. The Mejlis did nevertheless maintain
its pro-Ukrainian orientation, even though the government of Ukraine did not accord it legal
status as an institution of self-governance and was unable to ratify the demand of Crimean
Tatars that they be classified as the indigenous inhabitants of the peninsula.
64. While the Qurultay and its Mejlis were among the first political and civic
representative institutions founded by Crimean Tatars, and have consistently enjoyed much
greater support within that community than any alternatives, they were not the only ones that
functioned during the period of independent Ukraine before 2014. Together with the Mejlis,
all organizations had common goals: to assist the return of Crimean Tatars to their historic
homeland with appropriate material compensation for property losses; to promote their
socioeconomic, national, spiritual, and cultural development; and to restore their political
rights. The organizations differed, however, with regard to strategy and tactics, some
cooperating with, and others opposed to, the Mejlis. The oldest of the civic organizations that
cooperated with the Mejlis was the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement,
formed in Uzbekistan (1989) and reconstituted in Crimea (1991). Since its first two chairmen
(M. Dzhemilev and R. Chubarov) were also leading figures in the Mejlis, it is not surprising
that the two bodies had the same ideological platform, although the National Movement was
less open to compromise in its negotiations with the authorities. Another civic organization
31
which cooperated with the Mejlis was the Avdet/Return (est. 2007), whose primary concern
was to assist returnees in their efforts to obtain land and living space. The political party
Adalet/Justice (est. 1995) had as its primary goal to assist the further return migration of
Crimean Tatars from Central Asia and the restitution of property illegally confiscated from
them during the forced deportation of 1944.
65. Among the political and civic organizations opposed to the Mejlis was the
National Movement of Crimean Tatars, which had a much smaller following but whose
origins are said to go back to the first days of the deportation in May 1944. During the early
1990s this organization supported the restoration of Crimean autonomy within the framework
of a post-Soviet geopolitical space under the aegis of Russia. Such views were diametrically
opposed to the Mejlis, which the National Movement refused to accept as the representative
body of the Crimean Tatars. As its influence declined, the National Movement initiated the
creation in 2002 of the Coordinating Council of Civic and Political Forces Among the
Crimean Tatar People. Included in the ranks of the Coordinating Council was the Milli
Firqa/National Party, a newly-formed entity recalling the Crimean Tatar nationalist body of
the same name founded during the revolutionary era back in 1917. The new Milli Firqa party
was fiercely critical of what it called the “genocidal policies” of the Ukrainian government
against the indigenous Crimean Tatars and other smaller minorities, and it called on the
Russian government to assist them in their struggle for national survival.
66. From its establishment the Coordinating Council and its few component civic
and political bodies unleashed a barrage of criticism against the Mejlis, especially its
chairman Mustafa Dzhemilev. No doubt personal jealousy toward Dzhemilev was the
motivation behind much of the criticisms against him. The pro-Russian leadership in
32
Crimea’s parliament and Council of Ministers generally looked with favor upon the Crimean
Tatar Coordinating Council as a means to weaken the dominant influence and authority within
the Crimean Tatar community of the pro-Ukrainian Mejlis. Such expectations were not
realized, so that the Coordinating Council remained marginalized in Crimean society. This
was largely because of displeasure toward the campaign of unsubstantiated accusations
against Mustafa Dzhemilev, a larger-than-life figure who continued to hold an esteemed
patriarchal-like status among most Crimean Tatars.
2. Media and publications
67. Print and broadcast media as well as books and other publications using the
Crimean Tatar language experienced a limited revival during the period of independent
Ukraine before 2014. The modest evolution of media and publications was directly related to
the status of the Crimean Tatar language. On the one hand, Crimean Tatars considered their
native language along with their Islamic religion as important defining elements of their
national identity. Language, however, functions not only as an instrument of speech but also
as a badge of ethnic loyalty and genealogical descent. It is therefore not surprising that an
estimated 92 percent of Crimean Tatars considered their mother tongue to be Crimean Tatar.
68. On the other hand, no more than 5 percent of Crimean Tatars were actually
fluent speakers and many, at best, knew only a few expressions in their “native language.”
The decades in exile together with Russian assimilationist language policies under Soviet rule
had taken their toll, with the result that in 2010 UNESCO’s Endangered Language Program
categorized Crimean Tatar as a severely endangered language. In practice, most Crimean
Tatars use Russian as their spoken language and the group’s civic and political organizations
issue their communications in Russian.
33
69. Therefore, the print media designed to serve Crimean Tatar readers used some
combination of the Russian and Crimean Tatar languages. The decade 1989-1999 witnessed
the initial appearance of 14 newspapers and 1 journal in Crimean Tatar. Some of these
proved to be short-lived or had small print-runs, and with a circulation limited to a single
town, district, or members of a sponsoring organization. Others, however, appeared more or
less regularly and served a readership throughout Crimea: the weeklies Kirim (Crimea—in
Russian and Crimean Tatar), Iany diunia (The New World—in Crimean Tatar), Golos Kryma
(The Voice of Crimea—in Russian), and the bi-weekly Avdet (The Return—in Russian).
These relatively successful publications received financial support from the government of
Ukraine.
70. Books and brochures were published in Crimean Tatar, and their numbers
gradually increased each year. Broadcast media contributed much further in the propagation
of the Crimean Tatar spoken language. As of 2012, Ukraine’s state-run Crimean television
channel GTRK Krim provided 31/2 hours weekly of Crimean Tatar-language programming.
The private television company ATR also broadcast programs for Crimean Tatars. ATR’s
television channel for children, Lale, helped to inculcate knowledge of the Crimean Tatar
language in younger viewers, for example by broadcasting popular cartoons dubbed into
Crimean Tatar. As for radio, one station Meidan broadcast in Crimean Tatar 24 hours daily,
although the signal was limited to the republic’s capital Simferopol and a few surrounding
areas.
3. Education
71. Similar to the media and publications situation, education in the Crimean Tatar
language suffered from the linguistic assimilation experienced during the years of exile in
Central Asia but made modest gains during the period of independent Ukraine. The
34
authorities in both Ukraine’s central government in Kyiv and in the Crimean Autonomous
Republic’s Ministry of Education, Science, Youth, and Sports in Simferopol seemed
committed to improving the status of schooling in Crimean Tatar. There were specialist
programs in Crimean Tatar subjects at the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University,
and a degree program in Crimean Tatar language and literature at the Tauridian National
University to train qualified teaching cadres. Community activists themselves set up an NGO,
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁯􀁌􀀃􀀷􀁈􀃺􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀀒􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁕􀀃
schools.
72. Despite these efforts, the central and autonomous republic authorities were
criticized for not doing enough to address the lack of school buildings, teaching cadres, and
adequate textbooks. While some of this criticism was justified, the existential realities facing
parents had much more to do with the reasons for the low numbers of student enrollment in
Crimean Tatar schools.
73. Ukraine’s educational system was based on a democratic approach, allowing
parents to choose to have their children educated either in Crimean Tatar, Russian, or
Ukrainian. The expectation was that one of those languages was that of the child’s parents
and home life. While the vast majority of Crimean Tatars did indeed declare that Crimean
Tatar was their “mother tongue” (92 percent in 2010), the reality was that the language
actually spoken by the child at home was most likely Russian. If a child were enrolled in a
Crimean Tatar school, he or she would be taught from grade 1 in Crimean Tatar and also
study Ukrainian, the state language, as a subject. This created serious pedagogical and
learning challenges, since neither Crimean Tatar nor Ukrainian was the child’s first language.
Moreover, Russian, and for that matter Ukrainian (as the state language), were perceived as
35
having higher prestige and sociocultural value. Given a choice, Crimean Tatars tended not to
send their children to schools where Crimean Tatar was the language of instruction.
74. It is therefore not surprising that by the first decade of the twenty-first century
only 16 percent of children of Crimean Tatar origin studied in schools with Crimean Tatar as
the language of instruction and 39 percent with some subjects in Crimean Tatar. According to
Ukraine’s official submission to the European Commission, only 5,644 students were enrolled
in elementary schools with Crimean Tatar as the language of instruction.17 This represented a
mere 3 percent of Crimean Tatar school-aged children, as opposed to nearly 90 percent
attending Russian and 7 percent Ukrainian schools. The dilemma faced by some wellmeaning
authorities and Crimean Tatar NGOs was how to convince Crimean Tatar parents to
send children to their “own” national language schools instead of the more practical and
socially advantageous Russian-language schools.
4. Public events
75. During their nearly half a century of exile in a foreign environment thousands of
miles away from their ancestral homeland, Crimean Tatars depended on cultivating historical
memory as the primary means to sustain their ethnic identity and pass it on to their children.
Historical memory could consist of legendary tales passed on by word of mouth from
generation to generation, or it could be a narrative created by patriotic intellectuals intent on
instilling pride in the ethnic heritage of a specific group, in this case Crimean Tatars. How
should historical events and developments be depicted; what individuals should be chosen to
form a pantheon of national heroes; how should the activity of those heroes be judged; and
how should enemies and allies be described? After returning to their homeland for the most
17 Razumkov Center, 5 National Security and Defense 109 (2009) (Annex 1016).
36
part during the period of Ukrainian rule, Crimean Tatar activists had the opportunity to apply
their bank of historical memories to the concrete homeland for which they had longed.
76. Public gatherings proved to be one means to revivify, even sanctify, the historical
past. Undoubtedly, the most significant of these gatherings was that which commemorated
the forced deportations of Crimean Tatars that began on May 18, 1944. Since the late 1980s,
an increasing number of Crimean Tatars gathered in Sevastopol and other Crimean towns to
remember what came to be known as the Black Day (Qara Kun). The point of this
commemorative event was to embed in the hearts and minds of the living that there was
nothing more tragic than May 18 in the entire modern history of Crimea and its Crimean
Tatars.
77. Building a pantheon of national heroes took the form of statues erected in
prominent squares of towns and cities connected with the life of a given individual. The
greatest of the national awakeners, Ismail Gaspirali, became the central figure in a larger than
lifesize sculptural complex in Bakhchysarai, while a monumental statue was raised to the
codifier of the Crimean Tatar language, Bekir Chobanzade, in his native town of
Bilohirsk/Karasubazar. Annual commemorative events held at these and other monuments or
plaques to national heroes, helped to reinforce pride among Crimean Tatars.
78. Cultural reclamation was central to embodying historical memory in Crimea’s
landscape. One goal was to restore to places the historic Crimean Tatar names they had
before the onset of imperial Russian and Soviet rule. Hence, for Crimea’s Tatars, the
autonomous republic’s capital Simferopol was really Akmesjit/Aq-Mescit, and new
generations were urged to know and remember Kefe instead of Feodosiya, Karasubazar
instead of Bilohirsk, and Közlëv instead of Yevpatoriya among numerous other places
37
throughout the peninsula. To drive the point home the Mejlis, at the behest of its chairman
Mustafa Dzhemilev, published large-scale maps of Crimea with only Crimean Tatar place
names and called for a campaign (never realized) to have signs erected with the historic
names at the entrance and exit to all towns and villages.
79. Accepting the principle that “architecture is a language” and that buildings
“speak,” Crimean Tatar activists put great emphasis on the value of restoring structures which
by their very presence would elicit pride in Crimean Tatars and respect for their culture in the
eyes of foreign visitors as well as their neighbors of other ethnicities. The most important
project was that funded by the government of Ukraine to restore to its eighteenth-century
glory the Palace of the Khans of the Crimean Khanate in old Bakhchesarai. The palace soon
became one of the peninsula’s main tourist attractions — one, moreover, that was exclusively
associated with the highest achievements of Crimean Tatar culture.
80. Other architectural restoration projects that spoke a Crimean cultural language
were the sixteenth-century Zinjirli medrese (theological college), the mausoleum of the first
Crimean khans, and the former nineteenth-century medrese now the La Richesse Crimean
Historical Museum—all in Starosillya/Salachik and all funded by the government of Turkey.
Of particular significance for promoting ethnic identity was the Gaspirali Crimean Tatar
National Library in Simferopol, a former Crimean Tatar villa restored with funds from the
Netherlands and other countries. During the period of Ukrainian rule, the National Library in
Simferopol initiated a series of public events to promote the Crimean Tatar language and
culture. Finally, there was an extensive program to restore and to build new mosques
(mechets) for every community where Crimean Tatars formed a significant proportion of the
population. The decades-long Soviet policy of destroying mosques was reversed during
38
Ukrainian rule, so that by 2014 there were 323 functioning houses of Muslim worship (95 of
which were new buildings). Most of the funding for construction came from the Arab
Emirates and from private sources in Turkey, in particular the business entrepreneur Murat
Ulker. The Muslim call to prayer five times a day, now heard throughout the peninsula, was
in itself a powerful manifestation of Crimean Tatar ethnic identity.
81. The flowering of Crimean Tatar cultural heritage in the public space during
the period of Ukrainian rule did not occur without controversy and opposition. In a land
overburdened with historic monuments that are sacred to numerous peoples and religions —
Christian Orthodox, Jewish, and Karaite as well as Muslim — it was inevitable that clashes
would occur over the restoration or construction of new buildings on land contested by some
other ethnocultural or cultural group. Some gatherings, in particular the May 18
commemoration of the forced deportation, often elicited protests on the part of the local
Slavic majority population. Nevertheless, in post-independence Ukraine the Crimean Tatars
were to a significant degree able to reassert their presence in Crimea’s cultural landscape
through public gatherings, monuments, and historic buildings.
5. Religion
82. One distinguishing feature of the Crimean Tatar people is the moderate
form of Islam that Crimean Tatars have traditionally followed. The roots of this tradition go
as far back as the beginning of Ottoman influence over the peninsula in 1475. One byproduct
of this influence was the proclamation of Hanafi Sunni Islam – favored by the Turks
and one of the four main Islamic schools of jurisprudence – as the official religion of the
Crimean Khanate. Hanafi Islam is one of the more liberal strains of the faith and is tolerant of
differences within Muslim communities. In the late nineteenth century, under the influence of
Ismail Gaspirali, Crimea became the cradle of Jadidism, a movement for political and cultural
39
reforms among Imperial Russia’s Muslims. Notwithstanding an influx of money and
preachers from Saudi Arabia following the end of Soviet rule, the Crimean Tatars have
proved resistant to the more radical doctrines associated with the Wahhabism popular in that
country. According to Crimea’s senior Muslim clergyman, Mufti Emirali Adzi Ablaev,
speaking in 2004, “Our nation, our ancestors never had those trends, those sects and they
won’t have them now.”18
B. Ethnic Ukrainians
1. Identity and language
83. At the establishment of independent Ukraine in late 1991 a large part of
Crimea’s population consisted of people who had grown up or moved to the peninsula when it
was part of the Soviet Union and who retained a Soviet mindset. These so-called sovoks
continued to associate with a geopolitical sphere known as the Russian World (Russkii mir),
the ideological pillars of which were an orientation toward Russian culture and language,
support of Orthodoxy as a spiritual and socially cohesive component of one’s existence, and
the unity of all East Slavs (Russians, Belarusans, and Ukrainians).
84. As a new generation grew up after 1991, however, attitudes toward
ethnolinguistic and cultural identity, and the relationship of Crimea to Russia and Ukraine,
gradually changed within that part of the Crimean population identifying as Ukrainian.
Comprehensive sociological surveys conducted during the first decade of the twenty-first
century revealed that the vast majority of Crimea’s Ukrainians (83 percent) considered
Russian their native language, with an even higher proportion (97 percent) reporting it as the
18Askold Krushelnycky, Ukraine: Crimea's Tatars -- Clearing The Way For Islamic
Extremism? (Part 4), RFE/RL (26 August 2004) (Annex 1033).
40
language spoken at home.19 With regard to sense of place, it was identity with Crimea or
one’s local community — an overwhelming 69 percent — that predominated among
Ukrainians, with a mere 10 percent identifying with the former Soviet Union or present-day
Russia.20 Similarly, only 11 percent of the peninsula’s Ukrainians believed that “Crimea was
Russia,” while 46 percent believed it was Ukraine.21 The sense of belonging to Ukraine
actually increased among all inhabitants of Crimea. In 2008, only 39 percent considered
Ukraine their homeland; by 2011 that percentage rose to 71, with a remarkable 69 percent of
ethnic Russian Crimeans also viewing Ukraine as their homeland.22
85. Who, then, comprised the inhabitants of Crimea that were committed to a sense of
Ukrainianess? In other words, which Crimeans considered themselves Ukrainians; that is, a
nationality distinct from Russians, notwithstanding which language they spoke? Sociological
data provides different results depending on questions asked, with 15 percent of documented
Ukrainians reporting their culture was Ukrainian, 19 percent claiming a Ukrainian identity,
and 33 percent calling for every resident of Crimea to know the Ukrainian language.23 Hence,
a sense of Ukrainianess among Crimea’s documented Ukrainians was much higher than the
percentages of those who spoke Ukrainian in the private familial sphere (2 percent) or who
associated with Ukrainian cultural traditions (10 percent).24 All of this is to say that language
was not necessarily the primary mark of ethnic self-identity for Ukrainians in Crimea.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Andrii Klymenko, Atlantic Council and Freedom House Report, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN
RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED CRIMEA, (6 March 2015) (Annex 948).
23 See Razumkov Center, supra note 17.
24 Ibid.
41
2. Expressions of Ukrainianess
86. During the period of Ukrainian rule, there were attempts to enhance the status of
Ukrainian culture in Crimea and to transform the region’s Soviet Ukrainians (sovki) into
persons who could take pride in belonging to a distinct Ukrainian nationality. These efforts
toward Ukrainianess were played out through organizations, the media, and schools.
87. Among the first and most influential organizations was the Taras Shevchenko
Prosvita Society, established in Sevastopol in 1989. Named after Ukraine’s nineteenthcentury
national bard (Taras Shevchenko) and with a clear purpose toward national
enlightenment (Prosvita), the society’s main goals were “to defend the Ukrainian language
and culture in all spheres of life.” It set out to lobby for the introduction of Ukrainian as a
required subject in all of Crimea’s schools, regardless of their language of instruction, and it
created so-called extracurricular “Sunday schools” as a first step in that direction. The society
also sponsored the Ukrainian National Choir, a theatrical circle, and musical evenings devoted
to Ukrainian composers. Aside from cultural work, the Prosvita Society took an active role in
promoting Ukrainian-oriented candidates in elections to Sevastopol’s city council and to
Ukraine’s national parliament in Kyiv.
88. Sevastopol was also the site of the Ukrainian Cultural and Information Center.
Opened in 1996 and housed in a modern building, the center with a 1200-seat auditorium and
stage was able to sponsor a wide range of events, including cultural evenings devoted to
famous Ukrainians from the past like the annual Shevchenko Festival that highlighted
Ukrainian literary life, art exhibits, and lectures. The center was also home to several song
and dance ensembles that promoted Ukrainian folklore, and of the Union of Ukrainian
Women (est. 1992), who often provided the logistical support behind many of the above
42
mentioned cultural events as well as the public processions that took place on the streets of
Sevastopol and other Crimean towns and cities on Ukraine’s national holidays.
89. During the first decade of independent Ukraine’s existence, the print and broadcast
media throughout the country was dominated by Russian-language newspapers, journals,
books, television programs, radio broadcasting, and cinema. Crimea was no exception to this
all-Ukraine norm. But whereas the status of Ukrainian-language print and broadcast media
improved by the outset of the twentieth century in many parts of Ukraine, Crimea continued
to lag behind. There were only two Ukrainian-language newspapers, the more stable of which
was Krymska svitlytsia (Crimean Brightness). Founded in 1992, the newspaper was
sponsored by Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism in Kyiv but located in Simferopol.
It had a circulation of only 1,000 copies and therefore a limited readership. The Prosvita
Society in Sevastopol published a monthly journal, Dzvin Sevastopolia (The Sevastopol Bell)
to promote Ukrainian cultural awareness. Begun in 1995, it ceased publication in 2010.
90. The status of the Ukrainian language in Crimea’s broadcast media was somewhat
better, thanks in part to the gradual introduction of subtexts or dubbing into Ukrainian of
some programs and films regardless of whether they were originally in Russian or another
language. Hence, if in 1999 only 12 percent of Crimea’s television programming was in
Ukrainian, by 2007 that percentage increased to 53. Analogously, during that same time
frame the percentage of Ukrainian-language radio broadcasts increased from 5 to 27 percent.
The number of Ukrainian-language books and brochures published in Crimea remained very
low, although here, too, there was a gradual increase, for instance from 22 in 2005 to 61 in
2008.25
25 Ibid.
43
91. In Crimea’s schools, instruction in Russian remained the norm, with 90 percent of
schools at all levels teaching in that language. Ukraine’s Ministry of Education in Kyiv did
make periodic efforts to improve the status of Ukrainian by requiring that a certain number of
hours be devoted to classes in Ukrainian subject matter (literature, history, geography,
language). More often than not, however, central government directives were blocked by the
pro-Russian oriented Crimean Parliament or they were simply ignored by local school
directors. Hence, by the first decade of the twenty-first century only 12,860 pupils in
elementary and middle-level schools were enrolled in Ukrainian-language classes, which
represented 7.2 percent of the total number of school-aged children.26
92. The largest and most important school with Ukrainian as the language of
instruction was the Ukrainian Gymnasium (senior high school). Founded in 1997 in Crimea’s
administrative capital Simferopol, it had on average 800 students. It had the best Ukrainianlanguage
library in the city and, with its wide range of standard Ukrainian curricula and extracurricular
activities, the gymnasium proved itself the most effective means of instilling a
sense of Ukrainianess in at least a portion of Crimea’s documented Ukrainian inhabitants.
Simferopol was also the site of the Svitanok Children’s Theatrical Circle, which from 1993
performed dozens of plays in Ukrainian and thereby instilling in a young generation respect
for the native language of their ancestors.
VI. Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Russian-Occupied Crimea
93. In March 2014, Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea was
unlawfully annexed to the Russian Federation. The annexation was carried out rapidly, by
force, and in the absence of any procedure that would have reflected the legitimate will of all
26 Ibid.
44
Crimea’s citizens, in particular those of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian ethnicity. Why is it that
Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians would not want to be part of Russia? The historical
discussion in this report would seem to provide an obvious answer.
94. During its over two millennia of historical existence, Crimea evolved into
an ethnically and religiously diverse land made up of peoples from various parts of Europe,
the Middle East, and Central Asia. Tolerance and mutual socioeconomic and cultural
interaction had become the norm for Crimea society. This characteristic was also the norm in
the Crimean Khanate, which from the 1440s to 1783 proved to be the longest lasting state
ever to exist on the peninsula.
95. Tolerance for ethnic diversity began to change, however, after 1783, when
Russia, then in the form of the Russian Empire, for the first time in history began to rule
Crimea. Almost immediately the new regime expelled the peninsula’s Greeks and
Armenians. But it was the Crimean Tatars who felt the greatest brunt of Russian imperial
rule. In various forms and at various times, upwards of 170,000 Crimean Tatars were exiled
from their homeland during the era of Russian imperial rule between 1783 and 1917. From
the Russian perspective, Crimea’s Tatars were foreigners from Central Asia who did not
belong in Crimea. Russian attitudes were given a new lease on life during Soviet times, when
in May 1944 all remaining Crimean Tatars (288,000) were forcibly deported to Central Asia.
In essence, Russian and Soviet rule had come to mean only one thing: exile from one’s
ancestral homeland.
96. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that Crimean Tatars did not welcome
the return of Russian rule in March 2014. Those fears have indeed proved justified as
Crimean Tatar political and civic organizations have been closed and their resident status
45
threatened unless they accept Russian citizenship, which for all intents and purposes has been
imposed upon them. Today, Crimea’s Tatars live under the cloud of history, a cloud which
has seen their ancestors repeatedly driven from their homes.
97. Ethnically conscious Ukrainians, whose numbers increased during the
quarter century of post-independence Ukraine, also were fearful of the return of Russian rule
in March 2014. Here, too, the historic record justifies those fears. In effect, neither the
Russian Empire nor the Soviet Union ever fully accepted the view that Ukrainians form a
distinct people entitled to statehood that is not influenced or dominated by Russia. Under
imperial Russia rule, Ukrainians were accorded recognition but only as “Little Russians” – a
branch of the larger all-encompassing Russian nationality. Under post-1920 Soviet rule they
were finally recognized as a distinct people called Ukrainian and even given a Soviet republic,
although only on the condition that their state would be fully subordinate to a Russiandominated
Central Soviet government and that their culture and language would draw closer
to that of their “elderly brother nation,” the Russians. When Ukrainians proved reluctant to
submit, they were subjected to exile (over a million kulaks/”wealthy” peasants were banished
to Central Asia) and to an artificially created famine in 1932-1933 which caused the death of
upwards of 4.5 million people. Popular Russian attitudes, inspired by Soviet and post-Soviet
governmental policies, viewed Ukrainians as extreme nationalists who allegedly were ever
ready to cooperate with outside forces (including Nazi Germany, capitalist America, and more
recently the bourgeois European Union) in an attempt to separate themselves from the world
of which supposedly they are a natural part — Russia.
98. After a quarter-century living in a Crimea that is part of Ukraine, in March
2014 ethnic Ukrainians were faced once again with the prospect of Russian rule. Fearing the
g_bcd"􀀁cY^SU􀀁(&'*􀀁cUfUbQ\􀀁dX_ecQ^T􀀁G[bQY^YQ^c􀀁XQfU􀀁\UVd􀀁5bY]UQ􀀁V_b􀀁]QY^\Q^T􀀁G[bQY^U"􀀁gXUbU􀀁
dXUi􀀁^_g􀀁\YfU􀀁Q􀀁`bUSQbY_ec􀀁UhYcdU^SU􀀁Qc􀀁bUVeWUUc$􀀁 FX_cU􀀁gX_􀀁XQfU􀀁bU]QY^UT􀀁Y^􀀁5bY]UQ􀀁XQfU􀀁
cUU^􀀁G[bQY^YQ^􀀁Se\debQ\"􀀁SYfYS"􀀁Q^T􀀁G[bQY^YQ^#_bYU^dUT􀀁bU\YWY_ec􀀁R_TYUc􀀁ceRZUSdUT􀀁d_􀀁S\_cebU􀀁Ri􀀁
dXU􀀁DeccYQ^􀀁QedX_bYdYUc$􀀁 G[bQY^YQ^#\Q^WeQWU􀀁cSX__\c􀀁XQfU􀀁RUU^􀀁beccYVYUT"􀀁Q^T􀀁G[bQY^YQ^#􀀁
\Q^WeQWU􀀁Q^T􀀁`b_#G[bQY^YQ^􀀁]UTYQ􀀁_ed\Udc􀀁S\_cUT􀀁T_g^$􀀁 :QdU􀀁c`UUSX􀀁cY^W\Y^W􀀁_ed􀀁G[bQY^YQ^c􀀁
gYdX􀀁^UWQdYfU􀀁Q^T􀀁fe\WQb􀀁TUb_WQdYfU􀀁U`YdXUdc􀀁XQc􀀁RUS_]U􀀁dXU􀀁^_b]􀀁Y^􀀁DeccYQ^􀀁`bY^d"􀀁U\USdb_^YS"􀀁
Q^T􀀁Uc`USYQ\\i􀀁c_SYQ\􀀁]UTYQ􀀁_ed\Udc$
//$􀀁 5bY]UQ􀀁]Qi􀀁XQfU􀀁^_d􀀁iUd􀀁Uh`UbYU^SUT􀀁W_fUb^]U^d#c`_^c_bUT􀀁`_`e\QdY_^
Uh`e\cY_^c"􀀁Red􀀁dXU􀀁^UWQdYfU􀀁Q^T􀀁_VdU^􀀁dbQWYS􀀁Uh`UbYU^SU􀀁_V􀀁dXU􀀁TYcdQ^d􀀁Q^T􀀁^_d#c_#TYcdQ^d􀀁`Qcd
S_^dY^eUc􀀁d_􀀁gUYWX􀀁T_g^􀀁e`_^􀀁dXU􀀁XUQbdc􀀁Q^T􀀁]Y^Tc􀀁_V􀀁5bY]UQ^􀀁FQdQbc􀀁Q^T􀀁UdX^YS􀀁G[bQY^YQ^c
Y^􀀁`bUcU^d#TQi􀀁DeccYQ^#be\UT􀀁5bY]UQ$
EYW^UT􀀁Y^􀀁P _^ <E9􀀁 􀀂@ $
*,
worst, since 2014 several thousand Ukrainians have left Crimea for mainland Ukraine, where
they now live a precarious existence as refugees. Those who have remained in Crimea have
seen Ukrainian cultural, civic, and Ukrainian-oriented religious bodies subjected to closure by
the Russian authorities. Ukrainian-language schools have been russified, and Ukrainianlanguage
and pro-Ukrainian media outlets closed down. Hate speech singling out Ukrainians
with negative and vulgar derogative epithets has become the norm in Russian print, electronic,
and especially social media outlets.
99. Crimea may have not yet experienced government-sponsored population
expulsions, but the negative and often tragic experience of the distant and not-so-distant past
continues to weigh down upon the hearts and minds of Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians
in present-day Russian-ruled Crimea.
Signed in
􁁑􁁑
46
Annex 22
Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman (6 June 2018)

􀀃
􀀃
􀀃
􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀸􀀵􀀷􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀭􀀸􀀶􀀷􀀬􀀦􀀨􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀤􀀳􀀳􀀯􀀬􀀦􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀹􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃
􀀶􀀸􀀳􀀳􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀩􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀱􀀦􀀬􀀱􀀪􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀵􀀲􀀵􀀬􀀶􀀰􀀃􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃
􀀬􀀱􀀷􀀨􀀵􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀹􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀨􀀯􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀤􀀯􀀯􀀃􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀰􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃
􀀵􀀤􀀦􀀬􀀤􀀯􀀃􀀧􀀬􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀬􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃
􀀃
􀀃􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃
between
􀀸􀀮􀀵􀀤􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀃
􀀃􀀃
and􀀃
􀀃􀀃
􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀵􀀸􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀤􀀱􀀃􀀩􀀨􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀃
􀀨􀀻􀀳􀀨􀀵􀀷􀀃􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀲􀀵􀀷􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀩􀀨􀀶􀀶􀀲􀀵􀀃􀀶􀀤􀀱􀀧􀀵􀀤􀀃􀀩􀀵􀀨􀀧􀀰􀀤􀀱􀀃
􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀃􀀃
􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀃
􀀃
􀀬􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀵􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀋􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁜􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀥􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃
􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀃 􀀴􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀀃􀁄􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁋􀁒􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀸􀀶􀀤􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀲􀁛􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁄􀁐􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀀴􀁘􀁈􀁈􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀋􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁄􀀌􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁛􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁅􀀏􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁄􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁜􀀃
􀁅􀁒􀁒􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃Comparative Human Rights􀀃􀀋􀀲􀀸􀀳􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀌􀀏􀀃Discrimination Law􀀃􀀃
􀀃
􀀖􀀃
􀀃
􀀋􀀲􀀸􀀳􀀏􀀃􀀕􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃Women and the Law􀀃􀀋􀀲􀀸􀀳􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀛􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁄􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀃􀀃
Discrimination and Human Rights: the Case of Racism 􀀋􀀲􀀸􀀳􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀃
􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀯􀀲􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀯􀀲􀀃􀀨􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀋􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀌􀀞􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁑􀁎􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁅􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂳􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀨􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃Progress of the World's Women 2014􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁅􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁒􀀐􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀐􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁊􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃
􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀪􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀐􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀃 􀀨􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃
􀀤􀀑􀀃 􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀀃
􀀗􀀃
􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀋􀀨􀀸􀀌􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀨􀀸􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀋􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀌􀀏􀀖􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀗􀀃􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀕􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀨􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀑􀀘􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀃See also􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃
􀀩􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀋􀀧􀁈􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀏􀀃􀀪􀀤􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀛􀀏􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀝􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀂫􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁛􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀒􀀗􀀖􀀒􀀨􀀦􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀋􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀛􀀕􀀚􀀌􀀞􀀃see also􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀨􀀸􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀑􀀃
􀀗􀀃See􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀚􀀗􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀶ee The Prosecutor􀀃􀁙􀀑􀀃Kunarac et al.􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀐􀀜􀀙􀀐
􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀐􀀤􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀚􀂱􀀔􀀗􀀛􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀐􀀤􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃Velásquez-Rodríguez􀀃􀁙􀀑􀀃Honduras􀀏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀜􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀛􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀚􀀌􀀞􀀃The Case against
Hartmann􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀐􀀓􀀕􀀐􀀘􀀗􀀐􀀵􀀚􀀚􀀑􀀘􀀐􀀤􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀜􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀘􀀃
􀀃
􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀃􀀋􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀑􀂴􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀌􀀞􀀚􀀃􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀌􀀛􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁚􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀌􀀑􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀂳􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀂴􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀑􀀔􀀓􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀥􀀑􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁖􀀑􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁛􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀋􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀌􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀙􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀚􀀃􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀒􀀦􀀲􀀱􀀩􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀖􀀒􀀜􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀕􀀚􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀋􀀖􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀃See􀀃
􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀝􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁌􀁆􀁆􀀐􀁆􀁓􀁌􀀑􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀁘􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀑􀀃
􀀛􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀶􀀒􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀒􀀛􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀚􀀗􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀜􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁚􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀶􀀒􀀵􀀨􀀶􀀒􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀚􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀃See􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀙􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀃
􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁉􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀨􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀑􀂴􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀙􀀃
􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀂴􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀂴􀀔􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀂲􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀂳􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀂲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀌􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃
􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀏􀀃􀂳􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀂵􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂶􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀏􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃General Recommendation XXIX on article 1,
paragraph 1, of the Convention (Descent)􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁜􀀐􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀋􀀔􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀜􀀙􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀀃Ibid.􀀃
􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁊􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀃The rights of minorities􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀀕􀀚􀀌􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀓􀀛􀀒􀀓􀀗􀀒􀀜􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀒􀀦􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀒􀀵􀁈􀁙􀀑􀀔􀀒􀀤􀁇􀁇􀀑􀀘􀀌􀀃􀀋􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀗􀀃Ibid. 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀂳􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀾􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀁀􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀃See 􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃Commentary of the Working Group on
Minorities to the United Nations Declaration on the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious
and linguistic minorities􀀏􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀀃􀀨􀀒􀀦􀀱􀀑􀀗􀀒􀀶􀁘􀁅􀀑􀀕􀀒􀀤􀀦􀀑􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀏􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀃See also􀀃
􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀀩􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀋􀀧􀁈􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀏􀀃􀀪􀀤􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀘􀀒􀀔􀀘􀀛􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀂳􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀙􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀚􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁒􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀂳􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁛􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀔􀀘􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀔􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁖􀀑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃Rutaganda􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃
􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀂴􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀔􀀙􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀔􀀚􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀐􀁅􀁜􀀐􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀑􀂴􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀐􀁅􀁜􀀐􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁛􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀃
􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul
Akayesu􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀙􀀐􀀗􀀐􀀷􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀌􀀝􀀃􀂳􀀲􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃travaux préparatoires 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀂵􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀂶􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀅􀁐􀁒􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀅􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀂴􀀃􀀋􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀙􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀃Ibid.􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀚􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃travaux préparatoires􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀂵􀁐􀁒􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀂴􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀛 Ibid.􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀛􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀛􀀃
􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃Tolimir􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁒􀁘􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁆􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀀃􀀋􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀌􀀑􀂴􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃
􀂳􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀑􀂴􀀕􀀕􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀦􀀑􀀃 􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀂳􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂴􀀏􀀃
􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀐􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃The Prosecutor v Tolimir􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀲􀀘􀀐􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀕􀀐􀀷􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀖􀀘􀀃
􀀋􀂵􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀐􀁅􀁜􀀐􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀑􀂶􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃The Prosecutor v Tolimir􀀏􀀃
􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀲􀀘􀀐􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀕􀀐􀀤􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀛􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀋􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀙􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀫􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀚􀀘􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀃Ibid.􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀃Ibid.􀀃
􀀃
􀀜􀀃
􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀲􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁖􀀑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁒􀁇􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀥􀀑􀀌􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀲􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁖􀂲􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
and􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂲􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀂲􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁚􀂲􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁏􀁘􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀂳􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀾􀁌􀁗􀁀􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀑􀂴􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃General Recommendation VIII concerning the
interpretation and application of article 1, paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Convention􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀐􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀀒􀀗􀀘􀀒􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀖􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀜􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀃 􀀃 􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀃
􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀑􀀕􀀗􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀑􀂴􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀋􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀏􀀕􀀙􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁒􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀵􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁏􀁉􀁕􀁘􀁐􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀀳􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀼􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀀗􀀛􀀜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀋􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀛􀀕􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀔􀀃
􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀂴􀀕􀀚􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁎􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁏􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁛􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁜􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁚􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁒􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu􀀏􀀕􀀛􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀵􀁚􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀷􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀁊􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁓􀁋􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃Akayesu􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁊􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁗􀁘􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁛􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀕􀀜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁄􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀌􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀛􀀕􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀛􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀙􀀐􀀗􀀐􀀷􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀜􀀃Ibid􀀑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀔􀀐􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀙􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀀃
􀀃
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀖􀀓􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀧􀁈􀁖􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀝􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀾􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁀􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁉􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁜􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁛􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁜􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁜􀁒􀁘􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀂫􀀖􀀔􀀃
􀀕􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃Akayesu􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀦􀀵􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀑􀀖􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃Kayishema􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
Ruzindana􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀝􀀃􀂳􀀤􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀞􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀋􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀞􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀌􀀑􀂴􀀖􀀖􀀃􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑 Rutaganda􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂲􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀂲􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀑􀀖􀀗􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀓􀀃Ibid􀀑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀓􀀃􀂱􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀔􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀔􀀃Ibid􀀑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀋􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀕􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀙􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀜􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀖􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀛􀀜􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀗􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀙􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀝􀀃􀂵􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀒􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀂶􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀖􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃Jelisic􀌗 􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁌􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀂴􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀂳􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃
􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀂴􀀖􀀘􀀃􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁐􀁄􀀝􀀃􀂳􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁜􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀖􀀙􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁐􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃Br􀃿anin􀀑􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁋􀁜􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁒􀀐􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀖􀀛􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀘􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Jelisic􀌗 􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀜􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀓􀀐􀀤􀀏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀓􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀙􀀃Ibid.􀀃
􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Br􀃿anin􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀜􀀜􀀐􀀖􀀙􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀛􀀖􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀛􀀃See 􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Bagilishema􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀤􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀚􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀘􀀃􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀛􀀐􀀗􀀗􀀤􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀔􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀙􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁐􀁘􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The
Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀘􀀐􀀘􀀗􀀤􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀕􀀃􀀭􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀖􀀓􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀜􀀜􀀚􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Semanza􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀚􀀐􀀕􀀓􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀘􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀚􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀐􀀙􀀗􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀙􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Muhimana􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀐􀀜􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀥􀀐􀀷􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀛􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Krsti􀃼􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀜􀀛􀀐􀀖􀀖􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀘􀀙􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀖􀀜􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀋􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀙􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀋􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀚􀀘􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀗􀀃
􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀂴􀀗􀀓􀀃􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀥􀀑􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁏􀁈􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁄􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀗􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁉􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀗􀀕􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀲􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀵􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀖􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀗􀀓􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀛􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀁌􀀌􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀋􀁌􀁌􀀌􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀃Ibid.􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀜􀀑􀀃
􀀗􀀔􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀪􀀑􀀃􀀹􀁈􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃ad hoc 􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀂴􀀏􀀃􀀗􀀜􀀃International and Comparative Law Quarterly 􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀘􀀜􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀖􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀗􀀕􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁕􀁉􀁘􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀃
􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃
􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃
􀁄􀀌􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀥􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀗􀀖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀀐􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁏􀁄􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁋􀁄􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀵􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀗􀀖􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃Travaux Préparatoires􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁇􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀾􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀁀􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃
A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark􀀃􀀋􀀖􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀒􀀦􀀒􀀚􀀔􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀖􀀚􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀚􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀙􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁗􀀑􀀃P.S.N. v. Denmark􀀃􀀋􀀖􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀌􀀏􀀃
􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀒􀀦􀀒􀀚􀀔􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀖􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀙􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀚􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀛􀀓􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀃
􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀝􀀃􀀃
􀀾􀀷􀁀􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀂵􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂶􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀂵􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂶􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁅􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀗􀀗􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃Tolimir􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁝􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀥􀁌􀀫􀀌􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀗􀀘􀀃􀀃􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁅􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁌􀀫􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀗􀀙􀀃􀀃
􀀖􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀁅􀀌􀀃 􀀦􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀀖􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀗􀀗􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀏􀀃The Prosecutor v. Br􀃿anin􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀜􀀜􀀐􀀖􀀙􀀐􀀷􀀏􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀗􀀘􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀷􀀼􀀃The Prosecutor v Tolimir􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀷􀀐􀀲􀀘􀀐􀀛􀀛􀀒􀀕􀀐􀀤􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀋􀀛􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀗􀀙􀀃Ibid. 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀜􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀃
􀀃
􀀖􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀦􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀂳􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃
􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀋􀁈􀀌􀀋􀁙􀁌􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀑􀀃
􀀗􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀦􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃
􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀑􀀗􀀚􀀃
􀀗􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀗􀀛􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀤􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀨􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃
􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀯􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀗􀀚􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀃􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀂫􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁏􀁘􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁎􀁈􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀗􀀛􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀛􀀃
􀀃
􀀗􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀬􀁑􀀃Kitok v Sweden􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀀾􀁗􀁀􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀑􀂴􀀗􀀜􀀃
􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃Lubicon􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀑􀂴􀀘􀀓􀀃􀀃
􀀗􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀏􀂴􀀘􀀔􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀘􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃Mahuika􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀀾􀁗􀁀􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃in abstracto 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀀾􀀑􀀑􀀑􀁀􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁄􀁓􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁑􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁜􀀑􀂴􀀘􀀖􀀃
􀀗􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀨􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀋􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀌􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀂳􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀂲􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀨􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀋􀀬􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀌􀀘􀀗􀂲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀗􀀜􀀃Kitok v. Sweden􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀒􀀦􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀛􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀋􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀌􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀚􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀓􀀃Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀚􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀸􀀑􀀱􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀱􀀲􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀓􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀀒􀀗􀀘􀀒􀀗􀀓􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀓􀀌􀀏􀀃􀂈􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀑􀀔􀀃􀀋􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀔􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀕􀀃Ibid.􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀑􀀕􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀖􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀘􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀒􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀃Mahuika et al v. New Zealand􀀏􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀀑􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀃􀀒􀀃􀀦􀀃􀀒􀀃􀀚􀀓􀀃􀀒􀀃􀀧􀀃􀀒􀀃􀀘􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀒􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀲􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀑􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀗􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀜􀀃
􀀃
􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁜􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀘􀀙􀀃􀀃
􀀗􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃inter alia􀀏􀀃􀂳􀁚􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁅􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀘􀀚􀀃􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂳􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀋􀀔􀀌􀀋􀁄􀀌􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁓􀀑􀀘􀀛􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀁆􀀌􀀃 􀀶􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀗􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀘􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀘􀀘􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀃Right of everyone to take part in cultural life􀀏􀀃􀀨􀀒􀀦􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀒􀀪􀀦􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀔􀀃
􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀙􀀃Ibid.􀀃
􀀘􀀚􀀃Ibid.􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀛􀀃Ibid. 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀗􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀜􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀃
􀀃
􀀗􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁖􀁜􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀀐􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀙􀀓􀀃􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀙􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁏􀁇􀀑􀀙􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀙􀀖􀀃
􀁇􀀌􀀃 􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃
􀀗􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃
􀀗􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁉􀂲􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀂲􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁎􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀨􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁜􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀙􀀓􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁋􀀏􀀃Social Identity, International Groups, and International Law􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀜􀀙􀀏􀀃in 􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀕􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀙􀀔􀀃Ibid.􀀃
􀀙􀀕􀀃Ibid.􀀃
􀀙􀀖􀀃Ibid.􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀜􀀚􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀃
􀀃
􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀀬􀀬􀀬􀀑􀀦􀀑􀀔􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁉􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀙􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀨􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀯􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀙􀀘􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁘􀁓􀀑􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀙􀀗􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁗􀁜􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀀨􀀒􀀦􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀒􀀪􀀦􀀒􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀔􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀙􀀘􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀨􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀯􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀗􀀚􀀒􀀔􀀖􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀖􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀕􀀃
􀀃
􀀘􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀂳􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀂴􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁎􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀐􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁛􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁏􀁘􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃
􀀬􀀹􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀀘􀀕􀀑􀀃 􀀤􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀀔􀀋􀀔􀀌􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀖􀀑􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀑􀀃
􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀗􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀀋􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀵􀀌􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀖􀀃
􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀑􀀙􀀙􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃D.H v Czech Republic,􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀪􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑􀂴􀀙􀀚􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀙􀀛􀀃
􀀘􀀘􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀋􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀌􀀑􀀙􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁛􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃effect or
purpose􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂴􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀑􀀚􀀓􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃
􀀘􀀙􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃
􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀑􀀚􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀙􀀙􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁆􀁒􀁏􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀵􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀂳􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁛􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀜􀀛􀀓􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀙􀀚􀀃DH v Czech Republic􀀏 􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀘􀀚􀀖􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀌􀀃􀀗􀀚􀀃􀀨􀀑􀀫􀀑􀀵􀀑􀀵􀀑􀀃􀀖􀀃􀀋􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀵􀀃􀀋􀀪􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁄􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀌􀀌􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀗􀀃􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀙􀀛􀀃Ibid. 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃Oršuš v Croatia 􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀘􀀕􀀃􀀨􀀫􀀵􀀵􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀋􀀨􀀦􀀫􀀵􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃
􀀔􀀘􀀚􀀙􀀙􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀓􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀙􀀜􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀗􀀜􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀷􀀶􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀑􀀃
􀀚􀀓􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀋􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀚􀀔􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀏􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀉􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀜􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀗􀀃
􀀃
􀂳􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀂴􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀂴􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀚􀀕􀀃􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀚􀀖􀀃
􀀘􀀚􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁜􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀚􀀗􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁄􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀑􀀚􀀘􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀚􀀕􀀃Ibid􀀑􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀬􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀐􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀐􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁜􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁒􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀑􀂴􀀃
􀀚􀀖􀀃See 􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀏􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀃
􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀃􀀋􀀦􀀨􀀧􀀤􀀺􀀒􀀦􀀒􀀪􀀦􀀒􀀕􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀓􀀌􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀃􀀋􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁛􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀀐􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀂴􀀌􀀃
􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀛􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀚􀀗􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃
􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁛􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀗􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀚􀀘􀀃􀀫􀀵􀀦􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀋􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀐􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀜􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀷􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀸􀀑􀀱􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀀑􀀃
􀀫􀀵􀀬􀀒􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀒􀀔􀀒􀀵􀁈􀁙􀀑􀀔􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀀋􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀋􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀛􀀚􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀘􀀃
􀀃
􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀚􀀙􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀀑􀀚􀀚􀀃
􀀘􀀛􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃
􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀋􀀕􀀌􀀃􀀬􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁛􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃directly or indirectly􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃has the intention or effect􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂴􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀚􀀛􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀃
􀀘􀀜􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁘􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀂴􀀚􀀜􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀚􀀙􀀃Cecilia Derksen v. Netherlands􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀚􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀒􀀦􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀜􀀚􀀙􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀃􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃
􀀜􀀑􀀖􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀕􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀚􀀚􀀃Ibid. See also Althammer v. Austria􀀏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀸􀀱􀀃􀀧􀁒􀁆􀀃􀀦􀀦􀀳􀀵􀀒􀀦􀀒􀀚􀀛􀀒􀀧􀀒􀀜􀀜􀀛􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀔􀀃
􀀋􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀖􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀑􀀕􀀃􀀋􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃
􀀚􀀘􀀔􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀚􀀛􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀏􀀃Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights􀀃􀀋􀀨􀀒􀀦􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀒􀀪􀀦􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀜􀀌􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀋􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀌􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀘􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀚􀀜􀀃Ibid􀀑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀙􀀃
􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀑􀂴􀀛􀀓􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀂳􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁛􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀑􀂴􀀛􀀔􀀃
􀀙􀀓􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀂳􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃purpose􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃effect􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁍􀁒􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀑􀂴􀀃
􀀋􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀙􀀔􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀵􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀂳􀀾􀁄􀁀􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀾􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀁀􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀏􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀂳􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀂴􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀵􀀧􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃
􀁑􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁌􀁐􀀑􀀃
􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀛􀀓􀀃􀀦􀀨􀀶􀀦􀀵􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀷he equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic,
social and cultural rights􀀃􀀋􀀨􀀒􀀦􀀑􀀔􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀒􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀘􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀃􀀋􀀤􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁛􀀃􀀚􀀘􀀗􀀌􀀑􀀃
􀀛􀀔􀀃Ibid.􀀃
signed in OX(@) on
27
In sum, international instruments generally view ethnic 62. identity as dynamic or
Sandra Fredman
le.d...
V. Conclusion
evolutionary, and distinguishing ethnicity typically involves consideration of both objective
and subjective criteria, such as language, culture, and political identity. International
instruments typically bar both direct and indirect discrimination, and define indirect
discrimination to include actions which have a disparate impact on a particular group
distinguished by prohibited criteria, even absent an intent to discriminate.

Document file FR

166-20180612-wri-01-01-fr.pdf

Document Long Title

Volume I - Annexes 1-22

Order