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UN'TED NAT'ONS Distr.
GENERAI
A/ 32/228
1+ October 1977
ENGLISH
ORIGINAI: A3ABIC/ENGLISH/
FFENCH
GENERAL
A S S E M B LY
Thirty-second session
UNTTED NATIONS ENWRONIONT PFOGRAMME
Livi4g conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied tenitories
Report of the Sec retary-Gener€-I
1. The present report, is subnitted pursuant to resolution 3l-/110 of
16 December f976, in which tbe ceneral Assembly requested. the Secretary-General', in
collaboration with the relevsnt United Nations organs and. specialized, agencies, to
pTepare and sub4it to the Assenbly at its thi"ty-6econd session a report on the
Iiving conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. ft further
lequested. the Secretary-General , in preparing the rgport, to consul-t and. co-operate
vith the Pal,estine l,iberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian
people ,
2. At tbe 45th neeting of the Second Connittee, on 17 Novenbet L976, r'hen the
d.raf't resofution on the living conditions of the Palestinian peopl-e in the occupied
territories was schedr[ed. to be voted on, the Conmittee was informed that, if the
Secretary-GenereJ- were requested to prepare a report on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied territories, the task vould be entrusted to the
Department of Econoeic and Social. Affairs. The Second Comaittee was fu.rther
info"med. that wh11e the task $ou-Ld present certain difficulties every effort wou.ld
be made to prepare a:rd subnit the report if it were requested. Since the
Secretariat had. no independent source of information about the occupied territories,
it ttould have to l-ook to the Governments and organizations concerned to provide tbe
necessary information to enab]-e it to submit a report to the GeneraL Assenbly at its
nexr sessron \see Alv.zl 3Ll uf{.4)/,
3, In accordance with the statement made by the Seeretary-General r s representative
at the second. Comittee referred to above, a note verb€J-e was sent on 16 lilay 1977 to
the Pern8nent Missions to the United Nations of Egrpt, fsrael , Jordan and the
Syrian Arab Republic, as well as to the permanent observer of the PsJ-estine
Liberation Organization, draving attention to the resolution and requesting such
infomation as night be mad.e available on the subJect-matter of the report requested.
77 -18698
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by the GenereJ Assembly. fhis was folJ-owed by a second. note verbale dated
?1 {"a" 1977 r^rhich requested that the necessary infornation be submitted by 1l August l!Jl.
l+. Pertinent information for the report vas requested. from the rntemational
Labour Organisation, Food and A€xiculture Orgenization of the United Nations,
united. Nations xducationa,l , scientific ena cutturat Organization, world Hear-th orgenization, Econonic conmission for western Asia, united Nations Relief and works
Agency for Parestine Refugees in the Near East and from the speciar cbairnxan of the conndttee to rnvestigate rsraefi practices Affecting Hura"., Rights of the Population of the Occupied. Territories.
5. 0n 19 August L971 , i-he permanent Representative of Egrpt traflsnritted. a report prepared by the Eggptian authorities. Ttris reporb is reproduced in its entireiy in arnex LA.
o' -Lne rerma.nent Hepresentative of Israel to the United Nations in a note verbale
dated 16 August 1977 addressed to the Secretary-General stated that the position of rsrael on the subJect-natter of the resolution in question was made clear by the delegate of rsrael in the second co.eittee on 1f Novenber 1976, and was reflected in do:unx:n! A/c.2/3L/sR.\5, the refevant paragraphs of which (pa".". 5l+ to 61) were attached, These paragraphs are reproduced in annex I.B.
7- The PermEnent Missjon of Jordan to the united Nations, in a note verbsre datecl 10 Augus t 1!/J' subnitted a report which dealt prinarily *itrr the situation in the occupied parts of Jerusalen and requested that, in view of the vasior:s references to the security co.ncil resor-ution on the subJect, the report be circur-ated as a
docr.ment of the security councir (s/123T8). Fu."ther, the note verbare indicated that the Government of Jordan wourd, in due course, transrnit further reporbs covering the situation of the rest of the cccupied West Barlk and the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees" in aaaition to those of the indi.geaous inhabitalts. These additional reports had not been received at the tirse nr rrr'rr'no
bhis report.
8. The Permanent Mission of the syri an Arab Republic trars'itted the report prepared by the competent authorities of the Republic ,,rith a note verbale dated
25, JDJY I97T, Subsequently, in a note verbafe aated 23 Augus t 19TT, the pennanent
Mj.ssion requested, upon instructions from its Government, that this stu{y be circulated as an official docr-rment of the General Asserrbly under items 30, 3r and 6a (a/12lrAo)
9. The Pa"lestine Liberation Organization has, to date, made no information available directly to the secretary-General, Hovever, the statement of the FAo includes a note verbale from the P;litical- Department of PLO to the Director-General- of tr'AO informing hin of the hardships experienced by the palestinians withtn the occupied territories. fhis note rrerbale is included as part af annex II .8.
10' The Chairnen of the Special- Conrnittee to Investigate Israeli practices Affecting the Hunan Fights of the populatlon of the occupied rerritories referred. in his reply to the retrnrt subnitted by the special corulittee to the Generat Assembty at its
Al32/ 228
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tlrirty-first session (A/37/2fB), and drev attention in particular to sections rv and
VI which contained infornation on the situation of iivilians in the territories
^...r-iaa hrr Terael Sin..e hhis renorf, is availab-Ie as a document of the Cenelal
Assenbly, it is not reproduced.
11. The ILo drew attention to a report on the situation of wo"kers in the
territories occupied. by Israel-, which vas included in the report of the Director-
General on the activities of the ILO in 1976, presented to the rnternational Labour
Conference at its sixty-third session (f977). \J Relevant sections have been
excerpted therefrom and. constitute annex II.A of this report.
I2. A fornal- statement from the Director -General- of FAO is included in ful-l in
aJrnex f LB.
13, ui\lESCO stated. that it did not have any recent infornation col-lected directfy
l.r^h tha nan-rniod .f-rri+^1.iF q. An errnert rn.issinn to collect information on
ed.ucation and cultural l-ife in the occupied territories is being planned and the
findings will be nade available in due course. UNESCO did subnit, however, a copy
of the report of the Director-General on the inplementation of resolution 13'1 ,
adopted by the General Conference at its eighteenth session' concerning the
educational and cul-tural institutions in oecupied Arab territories ( doctr.nent
f9C/73, and its annex 99 nX/50). Pertinent excerrts from these docunents are
incfuded in annex II C.
1l+. llHO stated that the Thirtieth World Health Assenbly, which took place at Geneva
in t4ay 1977, had on its agenda t,he question of "Health assistance to refugees and
displaced persons in the l4iddle Eastrr, for vhich the background documentation
included the progress report of the Sub-Conmittee of Experts set up by the Director-
General to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied
territories in the lJiddle East ( document 4.30/36) and, as an annex to that document,
the abbreviated annual report of the Director of Health of UNRWA for the year 1976
( docr:ment A.30/WP/1). Selected paragraphs from the latter document have been
excerpted on the basj.s of their perti.nence to the matter at hand and are transcribed
in annex II .D.
1), UNICEI stated that, as it clid not have pl-oiecbs specifically dealing viLh the
PalesLinian people in the occupied territories, it was unable to prov-ide infornation
relevant to the subj ect ,
16. The statement received fron UNRWA is reproduced in annex II.E.
I7. The stateroent received fron the Executive Secretary ol ICWA is i.ncluded in ful-f
in annex II.F.
1/ rsBN 9?-2 -!or72\ -9, pp. )+7 to 59.
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Rer:lies received. fron Member States
A.
I.
forigitt"J-, a".tig7
1. Ranullah prison is overfil].eit $ith citizens fron the West Bank who were
a^rrested by thi Israeli authorities on charges of resisting the occupation. These
authorities persist in their oppressive policy towards Arab atetainees, which lecl
those Jailed in Al pra1i1 (ffenron) Prison to threaten to go on a hun6er-strike to
the death. The head of AI Kha-Lil Muni.cipality hes appealed to the lsraeli Military
Governor to tahe lreasures to improve the conditioas of those prisoners, and even
expressed villiugness to provitte then with food and clothing at the expense of the
Municipality.
2. The occupation authorities berred the alelegations of Nablus and Remulleh from
visiting the Arab Gulf states, thus raising obstacles to the idea of fraternity
betteen the toxns of the occupied territories and other Arab towns ' Those
authorities further banned the head. of Ra:nullatr Mrmieipafity fron going to the
united states, where he was due to attend. the annu€I congress organized by the
migrants fron that to'tn, lest their coloniel 4ethods should be exposed" The
occupation autborities further refused to al]-ow the head of Nablus Municipslity to
travel to Rone to attend a neeting of he8'ds of denocratic nunicipalities '
3. The Israeli authorities J-evy heaw taxes on consumer gootls in the occupie'l
territories, causing a fligtrt of Arab capital to Jordar, vhicb in turn has
contributed to e further deterioration of economic conditions.
!. UnenpLoyment increases among the Arabs because of the Israeli designs to force
Arabs to feave the occupied territories. In this respect ' the occupation
authorities pensionetl off a 1a"ge number of teachels in the west Bank' The mmber
of citizens who l-eft the West lant auring last year is estinated at L51000' most of
then youths lrho were forced to enigrate by vari ous Israeli pressu"es ' Bhe
population has actually declined t; 58l,ooo, coBpared to B5l+'000 before the
196? agression.
5. The lfilitary Governor of the llest 3al1k banned the esteblislment of 8r$r prtoJects
there under ttre pret ext of exa!0ining their soufces of financing and ascertaining
that Buch proJects vere not funded by the Palestine liberation Organization' This
measure hai resulted in a freezing of funtis supplied by some Axab Gulf States to
suppos the West Bank nunicipal councils.
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6' rsraeli authorities impose exorbitart go to visit their reletives-in custom duties on Arab citizens vhen they fhis the occupied territories during the sunner troliaays. action is meant to euich the rsra-eli treasury, on the one hand, and to mal{e Life harder for Arab citizens, on the other.
7' The occupation authorities have prevented the resid.ents of the A1 Maareh srea in sinai froro going near water vell-s. As a result, rates for fresh vater soared and l-iving conditions beceme even nore difficurt, 1,/hi ch forced the population to leave the area.
If, Israeli settlenents in the occupied. territories
1. In the fiefd of s ettl-ement operations, the occupatLon authorities continue to expropriate large areas of Arab land, part i.cularly in the Turkrun and Jenin areas, prior to the estabrishment of settienents on that 1and. The victory of the Likud bloc has encouraged- pro-settLenent groups, especially the Gosh fu.oniu, to proceed vith the establishnent of settlenents- on Arab r,and. The above-mentioned group pla's the estabrishnent of 10 settlernents in the west Bank over the next fev
lw:"olhrk: .i s uTndheer swenaey tgoro uspe ti s about to set up a settl-enent on the Jerus al_en Road.. up two other setllements, one on the hius of Nablus a,d the other in the Abul_ I'orneh area in Nablus.
?' The lvfinisteria-r comnrittee for settlement Affairs has atlocated 30 nillion fsraeli pounds for the inplenentation of a new proJect that envisages the establislxnent of 110 new settlenents in the Rafih area over the neit 10 years.
3' The fsraeli lr{inister of Agxicur-ture, Ariel sharon, announced that a te€m of experts fron l,ikud had elaborated a programne for the creation of five new rsraeli towns in the Viest Bank to_accoumoaate f5O,OOO persons. The progranme envisages linking these towns vith Jerusarem ana rei Aviir via a network of hishr,rays. The progra'ume further cal1s for the establistr:nent of rr3 industriar and Lrilurturar settlements in the West Bank,
)+' Teddy Kolek, the Ivlayor of occupied Jerusalem, has announced that Israel $i1l-
b1e"" d?ilv igdlet!d uapg aJienr uusnadJe-re n' whatever the sor-utions to be reached., nor vil1 Jerusaren any circumstances.
5' The rsraeli ivlinister of state, rsraer Gafilee, announced that the number of settl'ements established since the 196r var tota.rled 100, at a cost of )+ nillion rsraeLi pound.s ' He added that the united states had not exercised any pressure on rsrael in this respect, aJrd. that the rsraeli Government,s decisions were not dependent upon the position of the United States.
6' The rsraeli Minister of Defence, Ezra weizna,n, visited Kiryat settlenent near A1 l{halil arld urged rsrael-i settlers to exert effoats to turn their settlenent into a 1ar6e city.
7' Rabbi i{eir Kahane of rsrael (a fanaticar rabbi) denanded that the rsraeli
A/a:?. Eng-l:," t"it!g
Anney t- .
GoveTnment should implement Menahim Begints promises of considering the t{est Bank
a ]iberated Israeli land, and al1ow the establishnent of settlements there' He
d.ecl-ared his intention to set up a settlenent vithin the borders of Nabl-us '
8. The Israeli authorities proceed.ed to survey the land in the vicinity of
Bei.t Amer village in A.l Khafil, in preparation for the establishnent of a number of
settlements in that region'
g, The region of lhan A-]. Abmer in the West Bank is being transforned into an
industrial region' Industria-l establ-ishnents are being set up' anong which is a
plant for sophisticated nilitary industries that ri11 begin production during the
next fer,' months. Moreover, 5,000 residentiaJ- units are to be set up in the
above-mentioned region to accc&modate Jewish sett.l-ers.
l-0. The Israeli authori.ties are planning to set up a nrrnber of banks in the region
of lftran a.f Ahmer near the bridges connecting the west'Bank and the East Bank ' so
that citizens vould. not be allowed to bring in any foreign currency and woufd have
to chalge arhatever currencies they might have into fsraeli currency at the branches
of those banks situated in the arla of residence of all arrivals in the occupied
territories.
addressed to the Secret arv-General
a
/6rieina1: Englis!/
1, The PermsnentTepresent ative of Israel to the United Nations stated-that
" That resofution l|Cenlrar As senbJ-y resolution 3]./110 of 15 December t9T.{/ ' whicir
vas based. on resolution 3 adopt ed at Habitat: United, Nations Conference on Human
Settlements on l-l- June 19?6, conpletely preiudges the issue, and leaves no room
for an objective report". ihe Pernanent Representati.ve of Israel further stated
that "The position if Israel on the subiect-natter of the resolution in ouestion
was made clear by the delegate of Israel in the Second Comittee on
ii tco,t.lrl.r 1976 and is reilected in docunent A/c'2/3r/sR'\!, the relevant
paragraphs of which (paras. 54 to 51) are attached.rr
2, These paragraphs are herer+ith quoted verbatim:
"5\, Mr. ELIASHIV (Israel) said that the initiators of d raft resolution
l/C. Z7Titfrffi singled out a so-ca1led. econonic issue rhich cou.Ld not be
divorced from the complex Mid.dl-e East problem as a whole' MoreoYer t the
questions referred to in the dra.ft resol-ution 'were being dealt with by other
United. Nations bodies.
"55. The first preambul ar paragraph of the draft resolution recalled
resolution 3 of the Vencouier -on?""".r"., which referred' to a so-caLled rfactt
'
namely, that rthe Pafestinian people have been forced to abandon their
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Anf r. :: _l
Fa6;: +
indigenous hcmelandr. That base.Iess and false assertlon was politically motivated and aimed at attributing the to fsraet exclusive responsibility for a.L1 consequences of the continuous aggression comritted by Arab states against Israel since 19)+8. Israel had not cilated the patestinian problen. Tbe Pal estinian tragedy vas a direct result of the aggression launched. by the Arab states in f9l+8. To .efer to the rsraer,i presence-in the occupied. areas since 195T vhile ignoring the fact that Israel ;ad arrived there in the course of a war of Arab making was to pervert fund.ment€.,_ truth. The continuation of that occupation vas a direct consequence of the refusa.l of the Arab States to enter into negotiations with rsraer to establish a firm and just peace in the area. rsrael-rs Declaration of rndependence hart contained a,' appea-r for friendship addressed to the Arab people in Israel and the neighbouring Alab States, In response' the Arab states hail proclained. war against rsrael, ana itreir arnies had clossed the borders in arr att enpt to crush it at bifth. At that time, the Arab population of Israel- had been irged ana incited by the Arab leadership to leave their hones and seek to'npor"ilr shelter in neighbouri"t Ar"; countries. Several. hundreds of thoussnds of iatesiine Arats had heedeai those ord.ers. In that connexi on, he read out quotati.ons fro[ axticles which had appeared in Lebanese, Jord.anian a^nd Egpdia.n pulricaiions and which d.emonstrated that those facts had been recognized ald adraitted by Arabs and. others. The Jewish authorities on the other hand in an att enpt to prevent that ' flh-iagdh rta. unched. appeals to Arab residents in rsrael
"J5. In view of those historical facts, the attenpts of Arab spokesmen ro bl€me others for the creation of the problen and their professed" interest in the rel-I-being of the refugees rang hluowo r.rhen those feople could have becone independent arrd self-sufficient naiy years ago but for the calculated opposition of the Ar ab States to anlr Lonstructive approach. As a consequence
9f. nrat aggression, a.massive exchange of population had. ta.hen place in the
it{haed dlli.i' :d !dTlet. EasAt practically equaJ" nriber o?'J""" from the Arab countries of and North Africa had. come to Israel-, the vast nqjority of theJ' forced' out of their forner hones in a state of destitution, rsraer hacl lrel comed. its refugees. and nad.e then an integral and vigorous part of the nation. The Arab States had left their breihren in camps so is to use them as a political weapon against rsraer' Jordan ha. paid the price for that inhr:man end short-sighted policy in septmber 19?0, vhen a pal_esiinian Arab uprising had been suppressed. in a massacre vhich trai cost thousands of lives and- d.estroyed thousands of humsn habitatisns. Lebanon was also paying the price in tbe fratri cid al struggle in wtrich that entire nation was .rg;:;. "
"5?' I^Ihik that terribr-e hr.rman tragedy was going on in r.ebanon, the ro4jority of the Palestinian Arabs in the aoiinistere6 areas were living in conditions of nid.ening contact lrith the rsrael-i. population on a basis of mutual human :d.1e1fin"9itti oann,d do.fifgenreitdy which, though stiil ctouded by a ]-ack of politica]- trre prospeci of a peaceful future. tis country w.as ful1y conscious of the problem of the patestinian .Arabs and did not requ-ire persuasion or preaching on the need. to solve it peacefull-y ana ironouralfy. Such a sol-ution could only be achieved. in the context of a genuine peace settl-ement in the I'ricrdle East r which his country vould make every effort to
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achieve. tr'ancifuf allegations and distorted reports vould not deter Israelfrom
pursuing its positive policy of economic and socia'l- progress in the
adnin-istered areas, maintaining ihe J-avs in force in the territories and
conducting its administratj.on in accordance vith the refevant rules of
int er nat ion 4.1 conventions until a iust and durable peace was achieved'
-
Objective observers, including hundreds of thousands of visitors flom the
lrab States, affirroed- the success of that policy' There h€d been a reaJ"
grorth of a.n average of 18 per cent pea alnun in the GNP in bottr territories'
ind. per caoita income had increased by BO per cent in the llest Bank and by
f2O ;;l;;t-T" Gaaa in eight vears. The unenployoent rate had drop.ped fron
fO per cent in the west Sarlk and alnost 30 p"t
""-,tt
in the Gaza Strip in 1967
l; ;.;" by June 19?6. Educationar facilities within the free education system
in the West BaIk and Gaza had been increased. by \6 per cent. Over I biflion
fsraeli pounds had been spent on the rehabilitation of refugees in Gaza'
Construction pJ-ans to provide housing for tens of thousands of fanilies 'wouL'l
continue, and th€ area of construction in the West Bark and Gaza had exparded
rrom B8o,ooo square feet i" igge to 6.9 nittion square feet in L971+'. The
adninistration had spared and would spare no effort to improve the structure
of the caitps, insta.l- water and el-ectricity, p"epare playgrounds ' pave
.
sidevaJ-ks and provj.de sewage works and other iu"ititi""' One thousand housing
units vere being construct!{ every year in both territories' and ?0 nil-lion
Israeli pounds had been ealnarked- for new schfles to provide conmunity
serviees such as schools, shopping centres and clinics'
"!8. Israel's concern for the wel-l-being of the Palesti'nian Arabs in the
territories had been inpugned and rid.iculed by certain Arab Governnents ' It
vould appear that those Governments vouf? rather see stagnation and misery
prevail and wou1d seek a restoration of the situation prior to L967 ' "Ihen
during l-9 yea"s of oppression and persecution the inhabitants of Gaza had
leen klepi in aeproralte living eonditions by the Eeypt iarr military authorities'
"59. operative para€raph 2 of the d'raft resolution requested bhe
Slcret-ary-Cen.t-uf , io preparing the report, to consult and co-operate with
the so-c8.Lfed rPalestine iit."utiott Organizatiortr. That request made a
uoekery of the United Nations Charter' since PLO was a notorious organLzatlon
vhich na.de no secret of its avowed. obiectives of destroying Israel, a state
Member of the United Nations' ana aepriving its peopl-e of their independence '
sovereignty alld self-deterninat ion. Arbicl-e t9 of the PLO covenant openly
declared that the existence of the State of Israel was nul-1 and voi'd '
arbicle 20 denied sny histo"ical links between the Jewish people and the Holy
Land, arld article 2l- reJected arry form of solution for the probl-em ' apart
in effect from the d.estruction of Israel. AIy report produced 1l.ith the
co-operation of the so-ca.I]-ed PLo vou-Id conta'in false assertions' such as the
'big ]'ie', aLready contained in resolution 3 of the Vancouver Conference' that
Ithe cultuxal habitat has been vi1fu1ly destroyedi ' lsrael woul-d not
co-operate in such a vicious propaganda exercise'
tt50. I{is delegation strongly reJecteal the resolutions enr'r:ner at ed in the
preambular paragraphs or trte Orart resol-ution' ftrrthermore ' it vished to place
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on record its firn objection to any kind. Pr'O, a terror of co-operation and consultati.on vith organization which pretencled to speak for the parestinians and uhich had brought misery, nurd.er l,nd assassination to the Middle East, incfuding the terrifyin! -
nlrn"r, t".e.ay- i"-ill"r"",
"61. Draft resolution A/c"a/3r/L.r3 rras of a pofiti.cs.L, propagandistic nature extra.neous to the Connittee. It singled out an issue wnicfr- eJula not le divorced fron the c onq)l_ex Middle Easi probiur. Furthermore, it ignored. the responsibility of the Arab States, whi-ch coul_d not escape tt.
of their ovn aggression against fsraer-. rt ras biased. a,,d one"-osniJd"eqdrr.u. r,r"t" "ras based on faJ-se asserti:ns.ald distorted quas i_historical allegations, and j.t ignoxed. the plight of Jewish
"on rejected it unlti.s'i., -Arab countries. iis delegatton eonpletely, hoped. that those d.el_egations vhich had refused to support resolution 3 in Vancouver wou].d. slso reject the present reso.lution, artd cal-fed on ottrer d.elegations to do so."
Englisb/
/The reply of Jordsn was issued on 10 August 19?? unrler s /L237
c.
/origina1
the synbo]. eJ
D.
/6rieinal-: Arabic /E::gli sh1-
sW.b ofrl :A^l/3:l2*/l! 89. /of the Syrian Arab Republic was issued on 25 August f9T? under the
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ANNEX II
es received from ialized
of the United }trations sYstem
Englis!/
The ILo alrew attention to the Director-General r s report on the activitieg
of ttre ILO in 19'16, nhich l,'as presented to the International Labour Conferelce at
its sixty-third session (fgff). a/ This report included a progress report on the
stud.y of the situation of workerE in the teiritories occupied by Is"ael' The
foll-owing statements are taken fron this progress report, as reproducetl in the
report oi the Director-General on the activities of the ILO in ]19762
NXPORT SiJBI,TITTED BY THE DINECTOR-GENENAI TO TTTE
199TH SESSION OF TI1E GOWRNING BODY
PNOGRESS BEPORT ON THE STTIDY ON TIIE SITUATION OF
WORKERS OI' THE TERBITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISBAEI
I. opportunities for emplolrment and vocationat training
lrnh l
^rm6h+
3. The airns and effects of official economic anil social policy'
particularly employnent pollcy, as analyseil in sone of the stuclies, V ney be
ir:nmarised as follovs: because of 8Jr acute shorba€e of labour in fsra'el after
the l-95? vax the authorities suddenly reversed. their earlier policy of Tefusing
Arab wo"kers from the occupied. territories adrnission to Israel; recruitment
was officially organised. througb a systelo of labour exchanges in the
territories and was facilitated by tire existence of a reserve of poor a'nil
unenployed. workers; there resulted- a nigratory novement froo the occupied'
territories to Israel, the number of A"ab vorkels e!4ployed in Israel having
risen frorL Just over 1o'0oo in 1969 to nearly 701000 or about 21'5 per cent
/origina^l:
1/ ttRaplorb sur la situation des travailleurs arabes dans les te?"itoires
de liP€Je;;ine oecup6e", in Dossier Palestine 1' Geneva (r:nclated), pp'.61-75;
"Conditions of vork for Arabs under the yoke of Israel-i occupation", Beirrrt
(undated); and note on condition of Arab workers in the territories occupied
after 1!3'i, cornmunicated to the Director-General by the Palestine Trade union
Federation (8 I'etruary 1975 ) .
g/ "Activities of the rLO 19?6!r.
International Labour Conference, I9TT
(rsBN 92-z-10t72\-9).
Re'oort of the Director-General to tbe
(Part z), IL0, Geneva, 19??
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of the total labour force of the quot€d. territories in 19TI+, The studi.es here take the view-that the fa1l in unemployment and the rise in purchasing pover in the occupied territories have beei due not to the developnent of the loca1 econorny but to the enplo)rnent of Arab workers in fsrael. Government policy' it is cl-ained, is traving adverse consequences such as the breal.arown of the occupational structure and of smal-l-sca1e agriculture in the teffitories, the appearance on the employrnent market of women and of young people vho have given up school, and a d_rain on the human resources required by the econmy of the territories, which are suffering fron a labour shortage. The d.rain on manpower is said to be accompanied by other measures such as the d.isplacement of population, the establishment of israeli agricultural settlenents in the occupied. territories and. the appropriation of lando vhich aggravate the situation of the local. popufation. -!/
t.h. at A1r.a b vAos lkfoelr se imnp tlohfeo ent itself, and in practice, some sources e/ mairntain oceupied ierritori-es suffer rtor ai
" "
ririi-"t:.o' in access to enploynent ald. occupation. since they d.o not have free choice of ernplo;ment they are being ehannelled by the labour exchanges into particular branches and tlryes of vork, aecoraing to the same sources Arab workers in Israel have 1itt1e security in their enifoynent, which is dependent on the needs of the fsraeli economy and on political d_ecisions. In the erent of coll-ective mass dismissal, it is saii, they stand. little chance of finding neu jobs in the territories, where the economy is so structured as to be
to absorb much more labour. 3/ 'nab1e
5. Other sources of information give a different account of the
I/ .In a conmunication of B February 1976 the palestine Trade Union Federation nentioned.o among other things, the lg7l_ xeport of the special United Nations coumittee set up to invesiigate israeti practices affecting the human rights of the populaiion of the 6ccupied t""rito"i"",-*a-p"i"t.a out that that connaiti ee had not been a.dmitted io fsrael and the occupied
l:::1^t:.11"" j \raro€Lscus, 1^9-1fJ, )",t 1vhqi cbhy i sth eap Gpeennde.erda lt otr 'ethdeer aatbioonve o_mf eJontridoanne dT croardnren uUnin cioantsior,, also gives infounation on the subject.
-B o-d y.f?s/_ 1 f!9ltth esxeasnspiloen, t(hcen .Ber6b/rzaoc/2t "fr onnp pM"r".a Ni*a-isirrrj;s stthatee ment at the coverning addressed by the note of 5 october 19?5 Arab Labour.Office lo tne nirector_ceneral , and the above_ mentioned note cormunlcated (g February iifZj- ri the palestine Trade unian Tla.lFr'+i^-
ref^e rs! torn t hites cnuonteen ot fd 8ir fFieeubrtu_atirlys rgoji G the palestine Trade union trederation the^building the Israeli economy fp*ii""i*iy-i" industry) and,the threat they pose mainly to the enployment of Arab vorkers ' rt considers that the rl"i - uill cause rup.triation of r.memployed Arabs an economic crisis in th" ;;";i;;rill, *n."" half the national revenue cones fron eernings fron empLolment in fsrae].,
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objectives s.nd practical application of enploynent policy. l-/ According to
those sources the naJor principles underlying that policy are the maintenance
of full employment in the occupied territories and ensuring that !"orkels fron
those teraitories in Israel enjoy the ssme conditions as tlo Israeli vorkers r
while msintaining the integrity of the labour force in the territories.
Substanti.al changes are alleged to have occurred since June 1967 in the
volume and structure of ernployment.
7. The growth of employnent opportunities in Israel, it is said' has
xlade a great impact on the traditionaf distribution of fabour by braJrch of
activity. According to the statisties suppliecl on the distribution of the
wo"king population by brarch of activity in the territories, half the workers
are engaged in agriculture, and 5 per cent in the building industry' as against
20 and 50 per cent respectively in Israel. As regard.s access to skil]ed
empl-olrnent, it is stated that Arab workers in general have no difficul"ty'
denanal having exceed.ed. supply for some years. rn January 19?5 over half the
Arab workers in the buifding industry vere skilled or seni-skilled.
Vocational ed.ucation and training
9. Some inforrnation is available on secondary vocationat education in
the territories, fhere is information, revealing different trendsr on rates
of increases in the nuber of pupils on the ltlest and. East banks of the Joralan
between 1965-66 and, 197?-73. 2/ ft is a]-so alleged that secondary commercial
education is disappearing on Th. llest bank, 3/ Tt is also repoxted that there
has been a generai increase in the mmber of pupilsr teachers and schools on
the West bank since the 196? war, and in particular the organisation of
courses of basic vocational education and pre-vocational training ancl a courSe
'I / 'rh r irfoarna+.icrn given below is drar,m mainly fron notes sddressed to the
DirecTor-General by the Ministry of Labour of Israel- (t9 lune 19?5) and by the
Histadrut (20 May 1975) snd from a. study entitled "Labouters flom the
adniniste"ed. territories vorking in Israel" (Tef aviv, May 19?5) by the
Ministry of Labour, the Executive Conmittee of the Histadrut and the
Industrialists Federation in Israel, Use has also been made of the periodic
reports of the Ministry of Defence on the tenitories ("Four yesrs of uilitary
administration't, !967-TIt and "The adrninistered territories" . ]-97l--7 2 end
:972-7 3) and a study by the Sank of Israef entitleil "Scononic growbh in the
adml.nlstereo. arease ryoo-t-y lJ \Jerusaleln, Lyl)t.
2/ Infonuation supplied by the Government of Jordan to UNESC0 and
reproduced in paragraph 58 of the "Report of the Director-General on the
situation of the national education alld the cultural life of peoples in the
occupied Arab territories" (UNESCO, Paris' 1974).
3/ Report of the Director-Geners"1 of UNEsco, op. cit. ' para. 9.1'.
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in coumercial eilucation r,rhich in 19?1 was fo11owed. by I,,BOO pupils in Judea
and Saroaria, ! Vocational training schools are reported to have been established in 1973 and others to be planned. 2/
t_ra i-n i1n0g. i-nD itfhfeer ing opinions are given of the aims anat the system of vocational occupied. territories. Accord.ing to certain stuoies tne
establ-ishnent of apprenticeship centres in the territories is just one of a series of measures designed to 'exploit cheap Arab labour for ihe benefit of the rsraeli econmy". 3/ rn support of that charge attention is dravn to ttre kintls of training proviared, the channer-r,ing of pupils and trainees into certain inclustries or traales in vhich there is a s' esruiocuhs a ssh bourtialdgien go,f vlatrbicohu,r iitn- isrs rasaeird.. , Dariesc piirrenicnisaetiolyn those
against Avabs in access to enproynent J+/ in Tsrael, it is said, is 1ea-ding to a decline in their levers of skilr. or traipering their acquisition of Job skills and experience. !
1l-. Accortling to the authorities I olm explanation of the principles
untlerlying anpover poLicy in the territories, vocational training is one of its basic ains and naJor a.spects. 6/ fne information received refers to the establishnent since 1!68 of-20 vocational traini.ng centres in Judea and. Sanaria (where there were only three before 196T ) and seven in the ce7, Ar-iand
sinai (vbere there was onr.y one oerore riBT). rh.-;;;;; pi""ii"-t""i"ire for 18 trades af,rd between 1968 a.nd 19?5 prod.uced a mrmber of graauates f/ which' it is saittn accounts for about 1! per cent of the total_ labour force in the territories. Special progra'mes ,id .rtort" are
"eported to have been
devotecl to the training of young people and ronen, and since 1971 certificates
have been issuecl to buil,ding so?kers entitling them to the lowest grade on tbe skilled worker scale in Israel.. Apart from traditional vocational trainins
ni.l_it.a Vry lbaiddn:,i,npiasrtraa, ti5o9n1, ,l dinistry of Defence of Israel: r'I.our years of ].967-.1:., op. cit., pp. 101_102; arrd "ihe administered territories'r , I7TI-72, -op.__9-{. , pp. t3e_f39, and. L97Z_73, p. 1lB.
2/ See !'labourers from the adsinistered territories vorkine in Israel . op. cit,
3/ "Bapport sur l-a situation cles travailleurs a"abes dars l-es territoires
d.e l-a Palestine occup6e", op. cit., p. 71,
4/ See para. ! above.
- ^ 2/ l4r. Nasrrs statement at the Governing Body's 195th Session, and note of
5 0ctober 1975 s.ddressed by the Arab Labour office to the Direct or-General.
$-/ uote of 19 June Lgl j ftom the Ministry of Labour to the Director_
General; see eJ.so ttlaboulers fron the administered territories vorking in Tezo o l rt ^i+ LL. La e.
^r. !/ ttrat.is: -18,582 graduates, li! per cent of them in the building trades,
24 per cent in ind.ustrial_ occupations and 20 per cent in tailoring and enbroidery: ttlabourers from the administered. territories working in Israel", op. cit. , Append.ix A, table l+.
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pase 5
prograrnnes, other forms of activity a"e nentioned' such as the supply of advice'
technical assistance and services to Arab farmers in the territories' !
Renarks
I2. The inforilation supplied by different sources on employment and
vocational training concurs ii-t "ot"
respects. In some cases' however, it is
difficult to interpret or cal-1s for cl-arification'
'l? Tn c},nr".l. - thFre seems to be a need. for further analysis of several
problems, which in the nain relate to: (g) tfre organisation of recrujtment
and free choice of enployment; (q) tir. ext-ent of equality of opportunity and
treatment in regard. to vocatione"l- guidance and. trainingn access to emplolrment
Brd. occupation, promotion and security in enploynent, and (9) more genera,fly,
policy regarding the use and develolment of the hunan resources of the
occupieat territories.
II. Wages, social benefits and. working conditions
Situation of workers fron the occupied territories enployed in Israel
ll+. According to infoynation fron Israel-i governnent and trade union
sources, the general principle of equality in regard to uages, social benefits
and working conaitions for Isra.eli vorkers and. Arab vorkers f1.om the occupied
territories in Israe1 has been offieially proclaimed. V In partieuler ' the
principle of equal pay for equal work is statetl to apply not only to the gross
i^rages paia by the erdployer but afso to the net wages actual'1y received bJ the
volker. For this there a.re tr,to reasons: a desire to prevent adverse effects
on the errploynent of Is"aelis and a tlesire to protect Arab ltorkers fLorl
expJ-oitation. The application of the principle is closely supervised by the
Isiaeti trade r:nion roovement. J/ rhe stuay mentioned above on economic grou'th
in the administered ter"itorieF also refers to the difficulty of evaluating
data on avera€e wage J.eveJ.s in d.eternining whet'her the principle is applied' 6/
1/ See the reports of the Ministry of Defence:
adninistration", 19b7-lt' op. cit., pp.4o' Lb>-b;
territories", L97r-7 2, op.ait., pp. 60 and 2\o'
rr!'our yeats of nilitary
"The aclministered
)+/ For example, note of 19 June lL97 5 fTom the MinistTy of Labour to the
Direc{or-Generaf; and a st atement of t3 Decembet 1972 by Mr. Moshe Dayar,
former Minister of Defence, and a decision of February a973 of the Central
Comtittee of the gistadrut, cited in "Labourers from the administered.
territories LTorking in Israel", op. cit.
5/ More particularly, the special team set up by the Eistadrut in
co-op;Iation with the &nploynent Service mainly to guide and instruct Arab
workers coming to Israet (see para. 3l+ below).
6/ ltrie Bregman: "Economic gro'.rbh in the adninistered areas", Bank of
Israel-, op? ci3. , p, 27.
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rase o
l-5- According to other sources of inforrnation actual va€e
"ates
are much
l-ower for Arab workers than for Tsraelis. V It is alIeged, in particular,
that wages are paid through the authoritief, who ms_ke deductions variously
assessed at 33 to l+O per cent. These dealuctions, it is said, are paid. into a special fund 2/ snd. are contributions to the social security system anal also to the war effort. / However, the Arab worker a11egedly d.oes not receive al-l the benefits enJoyed. by the IsraeLi worker in return for the same
deductions legally made fron his vages ... on the grounds that he is not a
menber of the Histadrut, \/
fT. Several- sources of infornation also refer to the residence rights
and transport and housing conditions of nationals of the occupied ter"itories
vho l,tork in Israel. Aceording to those sources 5/ Israeli regulations forbid.
l"orkers frorn the territories to reside in fsrael. Instead they must nake a
long arduous Journey every day whicb adds to the duretion of the working d.ay.
The cost of transport, borrre by the L'orker himself, nay a:nount to a qualter of
his vages. Some Arab labourers, for example, frorn Gaza, are compelled by the
distance from home to workplace alrd by transport conditions to rive in rsrael in conditions of hardship, sometines in rest camps run by the enployers.
L9. Accord.ing to certain sources of inforraation, differences in treatneat
may be found. in Israeli undertat<ings, They relate, for exampte, to systenatic
assignment of Arab workers to night shifts or even discrimination in the use of
plant facifities.
1/ Note of the Arab labour Office of 5 October 19?5,
2/ According to some sources the sums d.educted fron wages are paid into
a fund. in the neme of the State of Israel and between 1p68 and 19Tl+ totalled
1,090 nillion Israeli pounds (US $z5b miLlion at 1973 prices) ('rConditions
of vork for Arabs under" the yoke of Israeli occupation'r, op. cit.).
3/ lfr. Nasrrs statement at the coverning Bodyrs 195th Session.
y See, for example, the note of the Arab Labour Office of 5 October 19?5,
"Rapport sul la situation des travailleurs arabes dans l-a patestine occup6et',
op. cit., and" the note of 8 f'ebruary 1976 comrunicated by the palestine Trade
Union Federation,
5/ For example, the note addressed on ! october :-975 to the Director-
General- by the Arab Labour office; rrBapport sur 1a situation des travaillers
arabes dans 1a Palestine occup6e", op. cit.; nemorandum of the Israeli League for lluma.n and Civil- Rights, nentioned in that report; the note of
8 February 1976 comrnuni c at ed by the palestine fracle Union Federation, vhich
refers in particular to information in Israeli ner^rspapers; Mr. llasrrs statement
at the Governing Bodyrs 195th Session.
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Reference is aLso matle tO the dangers facing rorkers who lodge conplaints abOut
their working conditions. 1/ According to other sources only a very low
percentege of Arab vorkers-fron the territories (2 per cent) is assigned to
shift work, p.lant facilities are available to el-L workers without
discriminations , and working cond.itions in any given undertaking are
detersined by collective agreement applicable to al.l vorkers without
clistinction.2/
Situation of workers in the oecupied territories
20. It has been said. that "there is a great disparity betveen the nages
which the ATab worker of the occupied territories reeeives in ttrose territories
and ttre wages he can earn in Israel". 3/ AvailabLe statistics show that the
disparity dirninished between L969 and 19?3 but renains wide' The Arab
'worker t s daily vage was on the average 80 per cent higher in Israe] than in
the territorils in fg6g and stiU 50 per cent higher in f973, y Even though
there has been a J.arge increase in noninal. vages in the territories, certain
sources of infornation point out that in real wages there has not' Any
increase in the cost of living in Israel has a direct effect in the
territories, vhere the substantial increase in prices between 1969 8^nd 1974
hi.t the poorer ltorkers pa.rticularly haJd,. 5/ Other sources of information
indicate a rapid rise - even more rapid than in Israel - in prices in the
territories, but at the same tine af,] average yearly rate of increase in real
vages higher than that record.ed. in Israel for Arab wo?kers fron the
territoriei. 5./
2!. Little infomation is available on the matter of social benefits
and. sf.fowances enJoyed by workers in the territories.
22. As regards working conditions in the administered territories '
1/ Note of B Februery 1976 of the Palestine Trad-e union Federation and
statement by Mr. Nasr at the Governing Bodyrs l95th Session.
3/ lainistry of Lsbour in Israe]., note of 19 June L9'15 to the Director-
General.
3/ ttRapport sur Ia situation des travailleurs arabes dans les territoires
de Ia Palestine occup6e", op. cit., p. 67,
l+/ ryre gar}k of Israel study on economic growth in the adninistered'
terrifories, tabl-e III.6, p. 37. Figures relate to net wages.
5/ "Conditions of worh for Arabs under the yoke of Israeli occupation" '
op . clt . , pp. l-l+-f 5.
5/ See the Barck of Israel study on economic growbh in ttre administered
terrilories, p. 13 and table IIf,5, p. 37.
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Annex 1l
according to infornation received !/ the conpetent authorities are enforcing
Jorda'ian labour law on the west l-ant (ror s]orntr'1e in regard to occupational
safety, vork disputes, hours of vork, l_eave and so on) and Egyptian labour J-av in the Gaza strip. Accord.in€ to the s a:ne sources of j.nformation official_s in
the competent rninistry are co-operatiag closely rrith sone l+00 local enployees. fn Jud.ea and Salrari a Arab officials continue to perfonr the functions
prescribed. under Jord.aaial J.aw in rega.rd. to the supervision of working
conditions,
Renarks
23. Initial- study of remuneration €.ntt workibg conditions reveals certain
points requiring further clarification and examination. In the nain the
problens relate to:
(C) the appJ-ication in practice of the principle of equal remuneration for
Israeli workers and workers fron the territories enployed in Israel,
remuneration being understood to include social benefits alrl various
aLlowences and. foms of compensation;
(q) the trend of official policy in, regard to residence rights, housing and. the cost and conditions of transpolt for Arab workers empLoyed in lsrael;
(t) the supervisory and other neasures ta}en to ensure that Arab workers d.o not suffer forus of cliscrinination in certain undertakings in regald" to
r^rorking conditions; and
(gl trend"s in vages in relation to the cost of living, in other working
cond.itions and in social benefits in the occupied territories themselves.
ITI. Trade union rights
Trade union rights in the occupieil territories \.
25. According to certain sources of information the ?iAht to orAanise
. is not respected. in the occupied. territories, where trade unions and
occupational- associati.ons are subject to pressure and repression of various
kinds. a/ ftems of infornation concerning, a.nong other things, the arrest
1/ Note of 19 June 1975 fron the fsraeli Ministry of Labour to the
Director-General ; note by the Histadrut of LB Mav f9T5 addressed to the
Director-General; antl ttlabourers from the administered territories workins in Israe1", op. cit.
?/ fVote of 8 tr'ebruary Jr976 ot the Palestine Trade Union tr'ederation.
Mr. Nasrrs statenent at the Governing Bodlrrs 195th Session, Mr. Nasr's letter
of 6 March 1975 to the Director-General and note fron the Arab Labour Office
of ! October 1975.
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and. expulsion of trad.e r.rnion leaders and nenbers have been subnitted to the
Governing Body or addressed. to the Director-General.
29, The fsraeli Government has stated. 1/ that no trade unionist is
penalised or punished because of his trade u-nion activities, ... According
to an Israeli source the emergency regu.lations of 1945 are stil-I in force on
the West Bank since they have nevel been repealed by Jordan. 2/
30. In examining sinile.r conplaints subnitted to it concerning the exile
or aryest of members or Leaders of trade r:aions in the territories occupied by
Israel, the Conmittee on Freedom of Association found that the complainents
bad. not exercisecl their right to submit more detaited informa.tion concerning
the reLationship between the above-nentioned. neasures and traale union
activities, and the Conmittee was unable to carry out a more d.etailed
exanination of the conplaints. 3/
Tra.de union rights of vorkers of tbe occupied. territories employed in
Israe].
32. The sa-lient features of trade union orgalisation in Isr'ael are the
unity in fact achi.eved by the Histadrut and. the seope of its activities'
which extends large]-y beyond. the scope of trade union protection ia the strict
sense arrd includes social protection as wefl. 4/
33, According to some sources of infornation, workels of the occupied
territories neither enjoy nor exercise trade union rights. Thus it has been
stated that "the workers, when they come frorn the occupied territori.es to vork
in the other territories, are denied the protection of the Arab labour union
in their hone country because they a"e working in factories in the other part.
And. of course they are not protected by the trs.de unions in the other part
becsuse they a.re resid.ents of the occupied territories.'r 5/ The right to join
or to folm s. trade union is allegedly not grarted to Arab vorkers from the
!i Note of ].p June a975 to the Director-General.
ful Meit Shamgar, Attorney-General of fsrael: "The observance of
international- l-aw in the administered. territoriesrr, in Israel Yearbook on
Ilr.rnan Rights , Vot. 1, 19?1 , pp . 262 f f .
3/ See the 1l4th, 122nd and 1l+7th Reports of the Conrnittee on Freedom of
Association: Official Buftetin, Supplement, Vo1. LIII , 1970, No. 2,
paras. 121+-11+1; v"1. LI1I J971, No. -, paras. 55-83; and GB.II\ /II/?T ,
paras. 91-98,
^V, !." "Social secr:rity in Israelrr , Histaclrut, Tel Aviv, 19?3, especiauy
pp. J, 4) and 4b.
)./ Mr. Nasr's sts.tenent at the coverDing Body's 195th Session.
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occupied territories nho ale eDployeat in Israel. V ft is alleged. that the Israel-i authorities are trying to secure Histadrui, henbership for Arab
workers, but that such nembership does not protect thee against discrinination. !/
3l+. According to other sources Alab workers frc,n the ad$iniEtered. territories lrho are enployed in rsrael enJoy freedon of association and tbe rlght_to organise. They nay Join tbe Eistadrut, 'rthough rmclerstandably
/ttrey,/ a^re und.er pressure not to Join ...t'. 3/ Their etigititity for
menbership in the plovid.ent firnds affiriated with the Histad.rut is express\r
provid.ed for by a decision of FebruarJr 1973 ot the Centra]- Comittee. l+/
Bxpress instructions have been given to af1 Labour couacils and. vorkerJ'
comittees to ensure equality of treatuent lrith regard to assistance and. protecbion, At tbe tevel of production units the workers I interests are
fepresented. without ttiscrinination a:od colLective agreenents a.re appliceble to
al]- workers nithout distinction. 7 rt is also reported that tbe Histadrut
has tal(en special &easures for thE information ancl education of such
workexs. 6/ Finally, tbe Histaatlut points out that building vorkers in Israel
fare comparativery welr because of the strength of the ,nions in that inttustry
sJrd that naJry Ars.b workers heve benefited. as a result since about half of
then, as has been said, are enployed in builcling in Isra,el.
lenarka
35. As regards tlad.e union rights, a nore d.etailed. exaninati.on on the
! Report on |tContlitions of wor.k for Arabs under the yoke of fsraeli
occupationtr, op. cit., p. 13. In its note of B Febxua{r I9?5 the palestine
Trade union tr'edelation states that at the end of 19?1" the rsraeri authorities
considered the question of adnitting Arab worke"s froo the occupied. territorieo to roenbership of the Histatlrut, but that the tenporary nature of Arab
enploytrent has so fer preventeal the tahing of antr decision.
2/ .In t]ne above-nentioned study by the General Fetleratlon of Jordan Trade
Unions (Damascus ).
3l Statenent by the General Secreta.ry of the Histadrut in l9?3, quoted in the stuqy "Labourers fros the adninistered territories vorking in Israelti.
op, cit. In its conclusions the study states that 8,000 norkers frotr the
aduinistered territories who are employed in rsraeL have becone nembers of the Histadrut. The stualy gives a sin ar ftrgu'e for the east side of Jerusaren.
(See note to para. 3l_.)
.l+/ fnis clecision al.so rel-ates to equality of renuneration ancl vorking
eonditions, referred. to in the previous chapter.
|-/ Accorcling to the reply by the Ministry of Labour to Mr. Nasrrs
alJ-egations (note of 19 June I9T5 to the Director-General ) .
- A/ see the second footnote to para. 14, which
"efers
to the establislrment, in co-operatiou with the enBlolment serwice, of a special tearo vith nainly
ed.ucationaL functions.
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basis of further i.nformation appeals to be Decessar)r, in partlcula,r on the
foll-oving points :
(a) the precise reasons untterlying ar:,y repressive neasures taken n'ith regaral
to leaalexg or lneobers of trade unions in the occupietl territorieE and artlr
connection vhich those reasons may have with the lavful" exercise of trade
union freecloros anal rights;
(!.) the. conditions for the fornation an<l operation of trade unions in the
occupietl territories both in law aJttl in practice antl their scope for i:'
action e:ral col-lective bargaining;
(S) the extent to vlrich vorkers from ttre occupiecl territories vho are eloIrloyed
in Israel enJoy equality of treatnent in regartl to freedom of association'
the right to orga,nise anil benefits provialetl for under collective
bargaining.
ceneva, 1l februarry 1!75.
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3. St a.t enent by the DES_cJgI-General of the fo
Aaricultural Orse-nization of the United llations
: Ingl-a 5n/
The following statement dated. l+ August 1977 was received in the form of a
letter to the Und.er-Secretary-General- for nconornic and Sociat Affairs:
"fn your letter dat ed. 16 Msy 19??, you drev ny attention to
GeneraJ- Asserably resolution 31/uo of 16 Decenber 1pJ5 eoncerning living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and. invited
me to supply you, by I Ju1y, with any information that night be usefu]- in the
conpil-ation of the report vhich the Generaf Assenbly had asked the Secretary-
Gene"al to prepare.
"fn ny letter of 15 June 19?T I inforrned you that ve vere not yet in a
position to pfavid.e very detailed infornation on the living cond.itions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied territories. Ilovever, in view of the
general subJeet-rnatter and the fact that the second pleambufar pafagraph of
the General As senbly resol-ution also referred to the Econonic and Social
Cor:ncil resolutj,on 2026 (LXf) on the assistance to the palestinian people,
f consid.ered it appropriate that the report of the Secret€xy-General , in
response to the above-ment ioned. General Assembly resolution, could also
reflect the action I had taken regarding the assistance to the Palestinian
people.
"Accord.ingly, f inforned. you of the process of consultation which I had
vith both the. Executive Secretary of the Economic Coumission for Western Asia
€nd the Chairman, Palestine National Fund, ?alestine Liberation Organization,
on action that tr'AO might talre to assist the Palestinian people.
"I had also infonned you of the emerBency food aid from the World Food
Progra:mre resources vhich I had sanctioned for Palestinian refugees in the
Lebanon and. those under the caxe of UNRWA. I do not wish to repeat the
d.etail-s of this action as they have al-ready been reported in fu-1l in the
Secretary-General r s report to the sixty-third session of the Economic and"
Social Council (E/5005).
rrci h^a '*i +.i - ^ that letter, I received a note verbale fron Farouk Kadd.uni,
Presid.ent of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberaiion Organization
inforning ne of the hardships being experienced by the Palestinians rdthin the
fsraeli occupied. territories whose Livelihood depend.s mainly on agricul-ture.
As this note verbale was relevant to the Secretary-General t s report, I quoted
it in fuJ.I in ny cable to hin of 15 Jufy 1977, in the original ltalian
language in which it was couched together with an unofficiat English
translation for facility of reference. I reproduce herer-rnder the unofficial
English translation .
'The ?LO (Political- Deparbnent ) presents its conplinents to the Food aJId
/ urlgr.nar
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Agrj.culture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and wishes to
inforn that Organization thet the fsraeLi occupation authorities have
persisted., ever since the tine of tbeir occupation of palestine, iu
varied. and. continuing att enpts to force the sons of our palestinian
people to abandon their Iands, either by the use of fo?ce or by the
promulgat ion of unjust 1aws.
rBesj.des these inhr.rmen and aggressive practices of the Israeli
oceupation authorities o vhich have been occurr:ing for nany years vithout
interruption, these sane authorities have now tigtrtened. tbe circl"e around
the sons of our people by confiscating thousand.s of dununs of fertil_e
lands owned by Palestinian citizens arrd by aggression against the sources
of water, as has recentl-y occurred at the aqueiluct of Ein Samia, vhich
sefves more than 80 tovns and viI]aees in the resions of Ranal-Lah and
Bireh, so that the inhabitants of those areas ha;e been deDrivetl of
water.
rFurthernore, the Israel-i occupation authorities. pe"sisting in thejr
policy of land. confiscation, have pronulgated, through tbe Military
Govelnor of the Gaza region, Ordi.nance No. L98 on the use of vater
resou?ces, which compels the or^mers of ffe11s, excavated by Palestinian
f€J'mers at their orm expense and on their oxn land, to use only part of
the wat er of suctr we11s, thereby liniting the are& of lantl which can
benefit from these taters, leaving the remaincler inpossible to cultivate.
rThese acts conn:itted. by the Israeli occupation antho"itie€, sre
considered. by us as flagrant acts of oppression against our people in
the occupied territories, ailred at compelling the sons of our people to
aband.on their olm lands, in ordea to requisition them afterwards through
repressive laws based on the right of rnight.
tfn registering these facts lrith !'AO, we hope this organization will
intervene in order to put an end to such crininal acts against our
people and our motherland.
rPL0 avails itself of this opportunity to preGent to FAO its best
sal-utations and. cornpliraents. (signed) Farouk KADDUMf, Presid.ent of tbe
Po11tica1 Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization.'
ifn the sa.ne cable f had suggested to the Secretary-General that as he
trad al-ready asked. the Governnent s of Egypt, fsrael, Jordan and the Syria,n
Arab Republic as wel-l as the Palestine Liberation organization to supply
information relevant to his report, he night vish to take this note verbale
also into account in compiling his report. f had afso assured. hin that he
could count on ny fu11 support in vhatever action he vished to take to respond.
adequately to the objectives of the General As senrbly resoLution.'l
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rage -14
: .-r rencn.,/- -LftsJ.._.7Lsn/
1. The repry subnitted by UNESCO states that pusuant to resolutioD 13.1 adoptetl at the eighteenth session of the General Conference of UNESCO, the Director-GenelaL
subnitted to the Executive Board. at its ninety-ninth session a report on the imllenentation of this resol,ution concerning educational and cul-tural institutions in the occupied -Arab territories, l-/ Subsequently, the Executive Board. in its
resol-ution 9.2 invited the Director-ceneraL to report to the ceneral Confelence at its nineteenth session on the inpl eroent€.t ion of the resoLution,
?. In his report to the nineteenth session of the General Conference
(oct_ober 1976), the Director-General outLined the steps he had ta.ken to inplenent
18C/resolution l-3.1 concerning access to national education s;nd culture by the
popul-ation of the occupied Arab territories. Z/
3' The repl'y fultber states that in the period between the eighteenth se'sion of
the General Conference a.rld. the opening of the ninety-ninth session of the Executive
Board ' in order to ascertain directry the situation with regard. to ed.ucation and
cul-tt,Ie in the occupied Arab territories, the Director-General- nad.e a nunber of
unsuccessful, approaches to the rsraeli authorities, 3/ the rsraeri Government being
unable to extend to UNESCO the requisite facilities.-
l+. In the period between the ni.nety-ninth session of the Execut ive Board. and the
nineteenth session of the General- Conference (a9 rvfay to 25 October 19?6), the
Director-General cont inued. his efforts to obtain the necessary faciLities fron the
IsraeLi Covernment in ord.er to inplenent f8C/xesofution 13,1. l+/
,' Shortly before the announcement of the nineteenth sessi_on of the Genera.I
conference, the Director-Generer received a conmrnicati.on informing hin of the rsrae]i Government I s rragreement in principle. for the sending of a nission to
gather information on the state of education and cu]-ture in the "territories ad-ministered by Israe1", and stating further that a].l the necessary facilities would
be exbended to the representatives of the Director-General to enable them to perfotu
their tasks. rt was, however, not possible for the mission to tsle place untiJearLy
in 1977.
ll 99 Ex/5o.
U r9c/73.
11 99 Ex/50, paras. 12, 1\, 23, d+, ?5,27,28 and,29.
y L9c /73, paras. 16-25.
/0rigina]
Nations Educationa].
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6. In view of the absence of a report reflecting an on-the-spot assessment of the
functioning of ed.ucational and cu1tu"a1 institutions in the occupied territories,
the feport to the Executive Board, 5/ vhich forns annex f of the Director-General r s
report to the GeneraL Conference 6/-is confined to the connunications adtlressed to
hiro directly by the covernments oF Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Syrian Arab
Republic, anil by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (pf,O), tfre League of
Arab States and the Arab Eatucational-, Cultural ancl Scientific Organisation
(ALECSo), as wel-l- as by some Governnents of Arab States concernetl about the
situation of historical- and religious mom;ltents in the occupied te"ritories.
Belov are extracts fron this document (99 EX/5O) vhich reports infornation on
Sinai and the Gaza Strip conmunicated by the Egyptian Government i on the situation
on the West Bank of the Jordan conmunicated. by Jordsn, Israel, PLO and ALECSo;
€rtl on the Golan ]leights communicated by the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as
the conment s on the occupied. territories as a whole whicb Egypt, PLO and ALiECSO
ad.dTes s€d. in letters and reports to the Director-Generaf:
"A. Infornation concerning Sinai anil the Gaza Strig
"37. ttre Egyptian Governrnent has sent the Director-General a tist of
the educational and cuLturaf institutions situated in the occupied
territo"ies of Sinai and the Gaza Strip (primary schools, preparatory
sehools, secondaxy schocls, a religious education institute, an
agrieultural training institute, vocational training centres, a
teacher-training co11ege, cinenas, public and private libraries,
sports clubs, clubs for young people, magazines).
"38, With
"egard
to the operation of the institutions and activities
mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Egyptian Government l-isted.
a number of difficulties stemling fron the fact of the occupation enrt
preventing these institutions frorn carrying out their work fully. T'he
facts brought to the Direetof-GeneraL rs attention a.re the following:
t'39. In the school-s situated in the Gaza Strip a,nd not controlled
by IJNRIIA/UNESCO, pupils do not have the necessary textbooks because the
Israel-i authorities do not al-low textbooks printetl in Egypt to be
inported for these school-s. Stud.ents must tberefore make do with
summaries arld notes prepared for then by the teachers, though these
sunmaries and notes are in most cases insufficient.
5.1 99 Ex/50.
6/ \9c/73.
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"40. ftre schools in the Gaza Strip are to a large extent short of
teachers. Sefore the occupation there va6 6n average of one teacher for every
35 pupils I since L97:-:l972 this has fallen to one teacher for every 1+7 pupils.
Eilucational- personnel vho had been abl.e to epecialize in higher etlucational
establishnents in Egypt and who have retumed to Gaza are prevented. by the
occupation authorities fron practising their lrofession,
"l+1. Most of the teachers in the Caza scbools have received insufficient
teacher training, especial-1y tbose at the seconilary Ievel. where the qualified
staff are supplenented. by, anong others, stualent teactrers fron the internediate
teacher-training centre in Banel-leh. Soroe schools have even talen on as
teachers civil- servants rho have had no teacher training whatever.
"l+2. To this rDust be atliteil the fact that since the builalings destroyed. in
1967 trave not been rebuilt, tbe Gaza aecto! is suffering froh a shortage of
school-s and, in the schools that ato exist, a shortage of classroons. Before
the occupation the average for the yeat t966-t96? was l+B pupils per classroom;
since 19?1-1"9?2 it has been 55 pupils per classroom.
r?l+3. The onl-y three cultural centres in the sector, which vere in the towns
of Gaza, Iftran Yunis and Rafah, hsve been closed. Those three centres ' each of
which possessed. a large library, attractetl large nunbers of inhabitants in the
sector antl gerveal as cultural neeting pLaces.
"Ll+. Ttre one comercial college at second.ary ]-evel that existed in the
Gaza sector has likevise been closed on the Dretexb that it coltstituted a
threat to public sequrity.
'rB. Infornation regarding the West Bank of the Jor<Ian
"\7. ttre Jord.anian Governnent stated tbat a raclio-broadcasting station
used to opelate under its control in Arabic at Ranaff€h ' Since the occupation
of the territory that station has forned part of the Israeli broadcasting
netvork.
"l+8. Wbil-e pointing out that in the present circurstances it is inpossibl'e
for the Jordanian Government to obtain accurate figures and infornation
regariling tbe situation an{I functioning of educational and cultura}
institutions in the occupieal territories, end that in its viev Unesco vas in a
better position to canry out such investigation work, the Jordanian Government
infomed the Director-Ceneral" of the following:
"\9. the occupation authorities heve derrclished severaf school buildings
in the territories situated on the West Bank of the Jord€Jt, inclucling two
schools at Imwas, two schools at Yalu antl tvo schooJ-s at Seit Nuba, sll a'ithin
the d.istrict of Ramallah.
A/32 /228
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"50. fwo schoo.Is Institute have been cfosed. by the oceupation authorities: the of Business Adminj.stration at ieit-Hanina and the "A1 aq"." gi;i" school. As a pretext for the d.en0olition of the latter, the occupation authorities alfeged the craeks that were visible in the wal-ls of the schoor.
The Jordanian Government points out that the fissu"es in question .were caused by the excavation work carried out by the occupation authorities in the vicinity of the school.
au.t-h o"?ri1ti:e As ninu mtbheer toefr rpituopriiless a nal teachers have been interned by the occupation of the West Bank or sent ar4ray fron those territories.
"52. As regards the report which AIECSo has sent to the Director-General- containing the concl-usions of a group of experts on education in the occupied. Arab teffitories, the following facts have been brought to the attention of Unesco:
"53. tn the West Bank territory the occupation authorities have nade
changes in the curricula and tertbooks - which used to be the same as were used. in Jordan - whieh have altered their nature.
"51+. On the preterb that most of the textbooks being used contained. chapters or paragraphs that night genelate hatred towards rsrae.r in the nind.s of AJab pupils, these textbooks have either been banned. and replaced in nost
cases by 'notes' and 's'nrnariest which are quite often poorly printed, or else nodified afber whole chapters or paragraphs were deleted or rewritten, particularly in textbooks of history, geography, literature and religious instruction. Many te)cbbooks - includ.ing "or" n fri"f, were used in the
UNRWA/Unesco schools - have however been retaineal after a cotrmittee of international experts appointed. by Unesco found that nothing in them vas of
suctr a nature as to jeopardize the spirit of internationaL r:nderstanding. (1)
"55. fhe chs.nges and al-terations made in curricula and textbooks in the
occupied territories of the I'Iest Bank of the Jordan tend, according to the
ALECSo r'eport, to:
(") create a new generation of palestinians i.n whose nind.s the reliaious
and national heritage vilL no longer exist;
(b) r'es.ken the links that yourg ps.lestinians have vith their native land
through tbe elinination of al_l- reference to their past in books on sociology, the Arabic language and. Islamic religion;
(f) ryris question was includ.ecl in the agend.a of eight sessions of the
Executive Board. between a967 and. r97\. rt gave rise to s number of decisions
on the part of the Board.: TT/IX(/Decision 5.8; T8 EX/Decision l.)+;
82 EX/Decisio" \.2,5; 83 trx/Decision \.2.3; 8[ Ex/oecisioo l*.a.f ;' 85 Ex/Decision )+.t.2; 8T Ex/Decision l+.2.ll; BB D(/Decision l+.r.r.
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Annex 1I
-Hage -Lo
(c) veaken the spirit of resistance to the occupation, by tleleting from all
the textbooks poems and even expressions of a nationaf or patriotic
character I
(d) I'eaken l-inks with Jord.an and everybhing related to Arab and Islamic
unitY :
(i) by doing away with the emb].es of the l{ashemite Kingdon of Jordau and
the name of the Ministry of Education of that country which appealed
on textbook covers , and
(ii) by eliminating references to the Jehad, the life of tbe Prophet and
the sacred charaeter of the ho.ly places '
"56, for each of the facts adduced in the report (e) tire ALECSo experts
have given relevant references to legislative texts, adroinistrative decisions
and book titles, and have quoted the paragraphs that have been criticized in
the school textbooks.
"57, As
"egards
the A-1,-Ibrahi.ni Mosque (Hebron), the Secretary-General of
the League of Arab States consid.ers that Israelis decision to divide the
buildings of the Mosque between the Moslem and Jenish conmunities constitutes
a violation of the charter of the united Nations and the Geneva conventions
and a rejection of the resolutions of the United Nations General As senbly and
the Unesco General Conference, and a serious affront to Moslem sensitivity anal
to the sacred chsracter of these places of prayer.
u . .J erusa_Lem
"t8. According to the ALECSO report and the con::nunication fron the
Jordanian Government, the Arab educational institutions situated in the city of
Jerusalen, which prior to the occupation fo1lo$ed. the curricufa in use in the
Hashernite Kingdon of Jordan, have been purely and sinpl-y brought untler tbe
general education system of the State of Israel. That systen is governed by
Act No. 5713 of 1953, which stipulates o according to the analysis nade of it
by the authors of the report, that one of the aiEs of public educetion is "to
base ed.ucation on the values of Jewish culturetr.
'r59. Far from fostering the access of Arab pupils to their national
cufture and. education, as the resol-ution of the Unesco General Conference
prescribes, the fact of imposing Israeli curricula on Arab pupils constitutes in the viev of the ' ALECSO experts, a serious threat to their cultural
identity, because these curlicula tend to:
(Z) frre ALECS0 report as vefl as the coomunications received by the
Director-General a"e at the d.isposal of the Executive Board.
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Pa.ra 'lO
(a) make the Arab pupils believe that Pal-estine was a Jetd sh l-and. from
remote times, persuad-e then to accept the expansionist intentions of the State
of Israel antl make then admit that such expansion is naturali
(b) constitute an affront to Arab dienity, sociologically and
econohically, and nake their und.erdevelopment obvious;
(c) nake Arab pupils feel thet the Jevish race is superior in all
respects so that they lose confidence in thenselves and their people;
(d) describe Arab history as a eatalogue of conquest and piracy
perpetuated. against the eountries where the Arabs settled;
(e) inculcate and develop in the pupils the feeling of belonging to a
religious tlenomination ;
(f) d.eprive Arab pupils of scientific and technological- culture,
especially at the levels of secondary and higher education; antl
(g) strip .Arab pupils of the values and trad.itions of Arab and fslamic
culture so as to underhine their feeling of belonging to the Arab nation.
"60. ft].e ALBCSO comittee of experts also points out that afl- Arab pupils
stualying in schools situated in Jerusal-em are obliged to do twice as much
school" $ork since, on the one hand, they must foIlow the official lsraeli
curricuLrm and sit for the end.-of-course State exaninations vhile, on the
other, they are inpelled to prepare privately for the West Bank examinations
vhich viLl enable them l-ater to enter Arab universities. Ihis double burden is
for the Arab pupils, in ALECSOTs words, a cultural and educationel torture
whi.ch is not to be founal an)rwhere el-se.
1161. trIith regard to the historic mom:ments of Jerusalen which represent s.n
essential feature in the spiritual, and cuftural- life of the Moslen conmunity,
the Government of Kuwait, in a conmunication dated. B March 1p16, expresseci
concern about the serious threat wbich it conside"s the excavation work
undertaken by the occupation authorities is causing to a mrmber of historic
build.ings of great inportanee, especially those housing the Arab Orphanage and
the Al-0thmanya School- (1,t.hich constitutes the central- part of the western r€11
of Al-Ilaran Ash Sharif snal vhich is situated in the innediate vicinity of tvo
incomparable components of that rmique group, namel-y the Gate of Al-Kattanine
and the Minaret of Quaitabay).
"52. lbe Government of Kuwait also reports that the Isreeli authorities
intend to build a new roaal running beside the ol-d ra$parts of Jerusalem.
According to the plan which has been draryr up, this would entail the
d.esecration of tvo ancient Moslem ceneteries (Bab A1-Rahna and Yusfiah).
"53. As
"egards
the TechnicaL High School of Jerusalem, the Jordanian
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Annex If
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Government, in a conmunication dated 9 March 1975, sent a statement to the
Director-General, together with photographs and a report of an fsraeli expert,
on the daroage done to the school , rrhich is, in the Government t s vier, the most
important specialized Arab establishnent in the city, as a result of woxk
(excavations using dynamite and earthworks ) undertaken by the Israeli
authorities in the inmediate vicinity of the school, where a road and an
industrial complex are being bui1t.
r'6\. tn addition to the large and dangerous cracks in the wa11s of the
building, the Jordanian Government ha6 dral'n the Director-Generaf I s attention
to a number of facts vhich, in the Government rs view, constitute pressures
brought by the occupation authorj.ties on the students and teaching staff of the
school as part of their policy of. encouraging the Arab inhabitants to feave the
country. Thus the occupation autho"ities have refused- to a11ow the opening of
the hotel- management section of the school, for which equipnent and naterialhave
been availeble since 1!5J, and they have a.lso closed the main road
leading to the school.
"D. Golan Heights
"65. In a letter dated 18 March 1976, the Permanent Delegate of Syria to
Unesco complained, on behalf of his covernment, that the occupation authorities
wil-1 not 1et the Syrian students in the terri.tory of the Golan Heights continue
their stud.ies in Syrian universities as Arab students in the other sectors of
the occupied. Lrab territories have been a1lowed to do.
"65. In calling the Director-General r s attention to this prohibition and
to various difficulties net with by Syrian students in the Oolan Heights -
such as the destruction of houses and the lack of educational and scientific
faci.lities - the Syrian covernment hoped that Unesco voufd intervene vith the
Israeli. Government to put an end to this serious situation.
"8. Bemarks concerning the occupied territories as a whol-e
"67. tn conctuding its report, the ALECSO cornrnittee of experts expresses
the view that the policy folloved by the occupation authorities 'with regard to
the education of young Palestinians is contrary to the Universal Declaration of
Huran Rights, especially Article 25 which states in paragraph 3 that 'Parents
have a prior right to choose the kind of ed.ucation that shaIl be given to thei"
children '.
"68. The P!O, for its part, has called the Director-General ' s attention to
facts which it considers infringenents of the ?alestinians' rights to a
national education. It has referred. in particufar to the d-ecision of the
fsraeli Government to forbid. Palestinians betveen the ages of 16 to 35 fron
leavlng the occupied territories unless they agree to spend a period of at
least six months outside those territories.
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"69. Since this measure affects, annong those belonging to the age gloup
in question, the nany Palestinian students enrolled vith Arab universities (in
which they are folloving cor?esponalence courses ) who leave the occupied
territories every Jre ar for short perio<Is in ord.er to sit exaninations in those
universities, the PLO considers that sucb a measure in reality constitutes
pressure which the occupation s,uthorities are bringing to bear on the stutlents
so that they vi].] leave the country.
"70. In the same communication, the PIO inforneil the Director-GeneraL that
the occupation Buthorities are taking pupils fron school-s of general education
and. forcing them to enrol in special centres for nanuaf vork. lbis practice is
apparentLy increasing antl the PLO considers that it is rneant to loner the
cultulaL level of the peoples in the occupietl territories in order to nake them
a reserve of nanpower for Israeli ind.ustry. "
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D. Reply submitted. by the Worl,al Health Orsanization
/urr.grnal: -ung-j.lsa
The reply of lillo lras subnitted in the forn of extracts from the annual report
of the Director of Ilealth of UNRWA for the year tg76, vhich was subnitted. as a
docunent to the Thirtieth lfor1d Hea]-th Assembly. V The relevant paxagraptrs are
quoted verbatim;
"1h. The long civil war in Lebanon cl-ained many victims, Palestine
refugees as wefl as Lebanese. Precise figures are not yet available. Many
Ifere kiIIed, nan]r nore injured.. There was also widespread displacenent of
refugee faoilies, who either had. been living in canps (about !0 per cent) or
\tho had been living in tovns and. villages, Several ca ps have been partial-ly
or tota].l"y d.estroyed. and the mnber of displaced refugees is estinated at
30,000, Energency assistanee in the forn of rattresses, blankets, clothing,
shoes, kitcben kj.ts, food., conmod.ities, skin nilk and. soap has been distributed.
where needed anrl to the exbent that funds, including generous contributions
from vollurtary agencies, pernitted. I4any of the Agency's installations have
been danageal or destroyetl. Schoo] builtlings had to be repaired and many desks,
benches, textbooks and scbol,astic supplies replaced. This task is not yet
conpl-eted. Apa.rt from schools, other UNRWA installations must be repaired,
inch:iling the Agencyrs cent?a] varehouse in Beirut, which r,ras hit by rockets
and seriously da.n&getl by fire. l,lany of the general- supplies stored. there were
lost and have to be replaceal. The Agency is unable, in present circumstances,
to estinste precisely the cost of repairs and replacement.
''CURATWE MEDTCAT SERVICES
tt15. These services were nad.e availabfe in 131 bealth cent"es and health
points (98 UNRWA, 1? government and 16 volr:ntary agencies). Two new diabetes
antl derroatology cLinics were establ,ished during the year in addition to the
existing ones. Attendances for medical consultation continued. almost at the
same rete, except in Lebanon. In Beirut, the naJority of the refugees resid.ing
in Dbayeh, Dikrf,aneh antl Jisr el--Basha canps fled to the western sector of the
city where they sha?ed. accomnodation with relatives and friends or occupied.
deserted alartment s and unfinished buildings. An emergency service vas
established to provide then with basic rnedical care services.
|l
V Health assistance to refugees and d.isplaced. persons in the Mi.ddle East
(mo/wp/r) , 2'l Lprir 1977.
^/
32/22a
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Annex fI
'r0utpatient dental c are
"18. This consists of consultations, sinple fillings, dental X-rays, tooth extraction anat gum treatment and. rninor oral surgery. More emphasis rras given to the preventive aspects of dental health and hygiene anong school
chi'I dren and. pregnant vomen. During the year a nel, dental clinic was established in New A.nman Calrp, east Jordan, increasing the nuxnber of clental clinics providing this service to the refulees to 21, Dental care rras aLso iuproved by the provision of an additional dental r:nit in Jaramana camp in Syrj.a .
'rMental hea]-tL
"23. The denand for outpatient and inpatient services for uenta.l ir-lness continued to increase. Consequently, the _A,gency is giving nore thought and attention to the preventive aspects of mental health.
tl
I'PREVH'IT rvE MEDrcAr smvrcEs
"28. Xarly in July there was En outbreak of cholera in Syria, whi ch started in the no"th-east district of Hasaka and soon spread. to other localities. Pronpt control measures were taken by the IINRWA Field Heafth
Departnent in coord.ination with the nationar health authorities, particular].y in refugee camps. These included chlorination of L'eter sources, suspension of distribution of reconstituted nirk and of serving fresh fruits and v-getables in ttre suppler@ntaxy feeding centres, mass vaccination of the popuration at risk, and promulgation of health guidance on food. and personal hygiene in
Agency schools, health centres and. other installations. These controt measures proved effective: only two cases were reported anong the refugee population in spite of ttre videspread nature of the epidenic, and both cases vere cured.
The other Fieltls were inne ili ate 1y put on the alert and. the necessary precautionary neasures were taken. cholela was transmittetl, horever, to Jordan
and later to the occupied terlitories of the west Bark anil Gaza strip r,rhere 1!, + and 14 cases respectively occur'"ed a,nong the refugees, though no fatal-ity ras reported. The situation in l,ebanon renained obscure due to lack of
comunications It_vas, howeve'r ,b pooths sinibtleer tnoa lvlya cacninda etex ttehren arelffyu,g eaes caa rneps puolpt uolaf ttiohne ciniv ir var. Bripoli the area throu€h the help of the Tnternationat co-.iitEe of the Fed cross
and to apply strict sanitary measures in these camps, No confirmed case r,ras
reported. .
Al 32/ ?28
English
Annex fI
Page 2l+
"29. Conearetl with 19?5 there was litt1e change in the incidence of
d.iarrhoeal cliseases and dysentery in the area of operations as a whole.
$phoitt and pars.typhoid were further
"educed
from 6)+ cases in ir975 to 53 cases
in l-9?6, of rhich )+7 were reported from Syria. The incidence of infectious
hepatitis, on the other hand., showed a renarkable increase in all Fields, from
596 to IO)l cases foltowing the general trend in the area. Polionyelitis has
surprisingly reached. moderate epidenic proportions in Gaza, sinilar to those
of 19?l+, despite the prinary and booster doses of oral polio vaccine given
routinely to children below thlee years of age attending the Agency's child
heal-th clinics. Fifty-five cases r.rere reported, mainly in July and August, as
against only six cases in 1975. The epid.ernic subsided towards the end of the
year. Ttre efficacy of the vaccine and the 1eve1 of protection are being
investigated. in an attenpt to find. an explanation for the outbreak. There vas
a substsntial drop in the incid.ence of measles, fron 28)+O to 11+)+7 which eould
be attributed. to a nore extensive irnnuni zat ion coverage of the children at
risk. Comunicable eye diseases, mainly in the form of acube conJunctiv-itis
occurring particularly d.uring sr.rnmer months, have continued to show a modest
dovnward. trend which coultl, in part, be s.ccreditetl to improvement of sanitary
facilities in camps antl heal,th education centTed on personal hygiene.
"30. InfLuenza showed. an upward. trend, nainly observed ea?1y in 1975 but
resusing again late in the year, {ith Gaza and Syria principally accounting
for the increase. While no ind.igenous cases of malaria were reported during
the yea.r, only two irported ones were cliscovered in Gaza. Newly detected cases
of respiratory tuberculosis dropped. fron 1?5 last year to 1l+1 this yeax.
Beporting fbom Lebanon Field nay be considered as incomplete.
rrMaternal and chil-d health services
tt33. In the prenatal clinics , 29 006 womerr rrere registered for maternal
care' which included regular health supervision and the issue of extra rations,
nilt aad iron-folate tablets through pregnancy and the nursing period. For
the 29 397 tleliveries, care wss p"ovideat in the homes nlainly by the Agencysupervised.
dayahs (for 51 per cent), in UNRWA maternity centres (nainly in Gaza)
by UNRWA nursing staff and in hospital for women with difficulties or increased
risk. In al"l-, five naternal deaths were reported., i.e.0.02 per 1O0O live
bilths, while the reported still--birth rate was 10.2 per 1000 total births.
"31+. A total of 85 618 children O-3 years of age have benefited. fYom the
services p"ovided at the 79 child health cfinics.
A/ 32 / 228
English
Annex tl
Paoa )\
'IENVIRON},IEMAL ItrALTH SEBVICES
"l+3. The programrne is concerned. nainly with the provision of potable r,rater supplies, sanitary disposal of sol_id and liquid wastes, drainage storm water and control of insect and rod.ent vectors of disease. A total of 65! 736 refugees and displaced persons living in g: ,"i"e..-"".;"
-lurr.rit"a
from the progranme, which has been maintained at a satisfactory level in most of the camps. However o due to prolonged civil warfare in Lebairon, the services were adversely affected, Furthermore, in the West Bank, the saniiation services continued. to suffe" from difficurties encormtered in the recruirmen-c of sanitation labouxers. Ad hoc arrangements had to be nade to prevent any serious hea"lth hazard.s. Due-to-the "e"io* financial sit'ation -facea Agency by the throughout the year, support of the self-help canp inproveraent schene
had to be reduced consid.erably. The programme Iras ba"el-y nalntained through a sublidv of approximately $ z5 0oO againsi a total requirenent initially estimated at $ 171 OOo. Nevertheless, with the cooperation of ]-ocal- authorities and the sustained participation of
"efugee camp conmunities, a
nurb er of improvements were carried out as detailed in the folrowine para€raphs.
. l',*,*. Schemes for providing private water connexions to refugee shelters
have been progressing very sati.sfactoril-y. Through a self-he].p programae, three caups in the west Bank have been provided. vith private water connexions
and two camps in Gaza are to benefit from a silailar prog"arme very shortly. Municipal r^7ater s upply schemes for two camps in the lfest Bank and three ca-ups in Gaza are progressing steadily. The Government of Jordan has overcome the chronic water shortage of suf c amp vith a newly drilled well and the syrian
L;overriment (General Authority for palestine Arab Refugees ) is pranning to dri11 an additional well to conplete the private vater connexion scheme at Ktran Eshieh camp. Three caeps in Lebanon and two in Syria continue to experience water shortages, but augmentation schemes for the two camps in Syria are in progress,
"l+5. Replacement of public latrines lrith private ones continued to progress satisfactorily and. current]y about 9l+ per cent of the refugee
popul-ation in camps have been provided with private latrine facilities.
ttl+6. fn Syria, on cornpletion of the constructj.on of lateral ser^rerg in three canps, about 75 per cent of the camp inhabitants are now served by
sewersge systems. The Agency is planning to extend the sewerage faci]ity at
Dera'a carnp to cover the additional shelters reeentJ_y constructed. by the
refugees .
ttl+7- The ongoing self-he1p scheme for the constructi.on of surface drains
and pavement of pathways benefited. 15 canps in the West Bank, two camps in Gaza, one camp each in Jordan and Syria and a fev ca.mps in Lebanon. it.
scheme solves vaste-wa.ter disposal problerns, facil-itates refuse eollection, provides better access to rertlgee shelters and ca.mp instar-lations and herps in the abatement of dust and nud. Consequently it continues to be very popular
Al32/aza
Engl i sh
Annex 1I
rage zo
rlith the refugees. Efforts are being maale to provide adequate support floor the Ageacy in the forn of building nateriais.
uLB, Ifith the provision of a scooter cart at Neirab canp for the transport of refuse, only thtee camps in Sjrria are 1e f.t, with nuLe carts; a tipper-truck is uader procurement for inproving the efficiency of the fefuse
coLlection services. !\Ether iqprovenent of garbage collection and diEposel services is envisaged by the prowision very shortly of additional- vehicles in
the tebanon and l{est Bank trields to neet the lrorkLoad.
''NUTNITION AND SI'PPLEMET'ITANY FMDING SERVICES
"\9. The Depaltnent of IIeoLth attaches great inportance to the
supervision, protection anal pronotion of the nutritional status of the refugees.
These functions are entrusted to the Nutrition and supplenentar5r Feeding Division. The services proviiled by this Division are directed particularly
torrards the nost vuLnerable groups anong the refugees e nane\r infants,
pre-school and elenentary gchool children, plegnant anrl lactating vouen,
non-hospital-i zetl tuberculosis patients an<t nedically reco@encleil hardship cases.
The services comprise the distribution of (a) nift, (b) ni cld.ay hot nea1s, (c) extra dry rstions and (tt) vitanins. fhe emelgency feetting progranne
established after the L95T hostiLj.ties for the benefit of the disptaced
refugees antl others affected by the confJ-ict and its afternath, rres
roai.ntained drring 19?6 , but with ni.nor changes ( for cletails of the p"rLo"gorame
see Appendix 2).
A/ 32/?28
Annex 1I
PaBe 27
T: pa-r,. -r,},h;++6.] L,, +he United \ations Celief and l{orks
djr-r-y 1"r P.laciintr qefuda=A=. -i.r. =t.l:^_e= 'T caT fast ._ /0riginal: rngf 1sn/
1. UI{RWA provides essential services to Palestine refugees in the Near East,
including the occupied terri.tories of the West Sank and the Gaza Strip. The
primary task, the determination of the needs of the Pafestine refugee population
in the area of operations and the implenentation of p"ografines to neet then in the
fi-1dq nf p/lr.afi^n hF,lt.h 'nd relief i" a nnntin'nr,< -hic r'5 reflected
in the Conmissioner-General's annual- report to the General Assembly. -s/ The report
gives an accor.ut of the services rendered by the Agency ald also forecasts in the
Agencyrs budget the requireroents to help ensure adequate living conditions for the
refugees - albeit at a ninimr.xl ]-evel.
2. The 5l+8,627 registered Palestine relhgees in the occupied territories, like
the other 1,057,859 living in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab lepublic and Nast Jordan,
benefit from UIIRWA education, health and relief services. UNESCO and lrrllO
respectively provide technical- expertise and professional guidance for the
education ar]d training progra$rnes ard the health services (incfuding, anong others,
suppJ-ementary feeding and sanitation) vhich are almed at rnaintainin€! a stardard
at feast equivalent to that established by the Arab host Governments for the
indigenous population. Relief services include distributicn of basic dry rations
to about one half of the registered refugee Fopulation ( about 324,000 in the
occupied territories), Jimited assistance in the provision of shelter (about
272,OOO registered. refugees live in earnps in the occupied territories), and wel Fare
services on a smal-I scale to hardship cases (about lt,500 in the occupied
terrltor1es,J .
3. Tn 1977, UNRWA expenditure is estimated at $131+ milIion, approximatefy
$l+2 mittion of vh-ich vill be spent for the occupied territories. Tn 1978, merely
to naintain services at their present leveI, the Agency estinates its r-equirements
at $1\8 ni11ion, of which approxirnately $46 nillion is for the occupied territories.
These estimates take into accou-nt extrapolations of population fiepres which have
a direct effect on education requirements and alsc - thaugh not as direct - on
health, relief and support services. I/Uxether all the pro€lranmes can be executed
to the fu11 extent wifl depend on the receipt of sufficient voluntary contributions
for the purpose, As at 30 June 19?7, the shortfall of contributions against the
d! tyfur+
F. Statenent submitted by the lconornic !_e"4.g
"
t_gll_Igt iiestern Asia
Infornation obtained by ECWA indicates the following trends in these living
cond.itions:
a/ OfficiaL Recq4ls of the--General Assen ly, Thirty-se!9nd Se ' ijuD0tement No. i J \A/ Jclf J./.
^/32
/2?B
English
Annex fI
Page 28
I. Land ounershi! and use
LalgeamountsoflandhavebeenreserYedbytheoccupatianauthoritiesfor
various putpo"a", includ.ing military uses. The ovners of these lands are denied
access Lo them. AgricutLu-ra-t deve1opment of the occupied berribories has been
advexsefy affected. g/
2.
At the beginning of the period of occupa'tion, about 25 per cent of the
poputation of the occupied territories left these territories' On-Iy a sna11 -triction of these people have returned. controls on movenent in and out of the
occupied territories are strict, especially for celtain groups of Palestinians.
There is continued migration for economic reasons' to the rapidly devefoping Arab
cor.mtries and to the developed countries. In ad.dition, there has been a large
number of forcible deportations' often of conmunity leaders ' V
3. Changes in settienent patterns
Dr.]tr.lng and inrnedlately following the 196T r'"ar, a mlrber of villages were
totauy or partially destroyed. some of these have been rebuilt, vhile othel's
have not.
An im.cortant development is the establisbnent of new non-Palestinian
settlements in the occupied territories. In a number of cases, the establislment
of these settlements has been officially approved by the occupation authorities.
These nev settlernents, in some instances, have niilitary and strategic significance.
Their establishment tends to change the character of the occupied territoTies. c/
4, Housing
Two trends in the housing field nay be noted. One is the deliberate
destruction of houses by the occupation authorities as an act of punishment. The
nufl ber ol houses desr,.royed is large.
A second trend is the construction of new housing proiects reserved for
non-Palestinian individuals, This has taken place especially in the area arould
J erusa-Lem. o/
'., Yiodle East Tnterna.Lional,
off_icf-alffi
London, lvYay 1975, p. 22. See also Israeli
\967, pp. 2690-269l. regard ing various 1ar'rs on
confiseation of land.
b/ United llations General Assenbfy anrl Sec,rity Councif debates for June to
lec enler 196l. l:ote a.lso varjous reporls of the United Nations Specjal CouniLbee
Inr.qq qqa lrlg lsraeli Pracrices AffecLing Human Rjghts in 0ccupied Territories,
1tE9-197-6: c"n.".
c/ Reports of Special Or:nmittee, op. cit.
d/ Tbid, In addition note U.S. House of nepresentatives Cornmittee on Foreign
Affairs. Probleras of Frotecting Qlvitians under International Lar^r in the Middle
last Col rf f!ce, Flea.ines'
A/ 32/ 228
Annex ff
,. Urban change
The legaI status of east Jerusalem has been changed Israel, separating this area from the t'West Banktt sector
by the covernnent of
of Jordan.
East Jerusafern has great rerigious and curturar signi ficance, an important as velr as oei:rg urban centre in the west Bank. clearing of buildings fron parts of east Jerusalem has resurted in large-scare urban change. At the same time, the construction of high-rise apartment houses has alterecl the environment and the character of the city.
Several of the refugee catnps have alsc been affected by the clearing of far€le
numbers of buildings. U]{RWA reports that inadequat e p:-ovi.sion was made for the resettlement of families displaced by the process of urban clear.ance. e/
C/ TsrAAli .)ffini -- t'oaal r-a ^^ ^,,
UN'TED NAT'ONS
DIVISION .
0I'
€ErYElAt dSSS,rBi,y
:=-t a
- -/.r
E:
illl,l r>e
Distr,
GENERAI,
A/ 33/ 35)1
2 November lpJB
OBIGINAI: ENGLTSH
GENERAL
A S S E M B LY
Thirty-third session
Agenda iten 68
HU}{AN SETTLF,I,fENTS
Living conditions of the palestinian
f'Ii-n tU h-tLc J^U^...,P,J^ i-..rE U +L C^T--Ji'*-L'LUfJES
1' In its resolut i,JD 3z/IT7 of t9 Decenbe r I9T.{ , the cenera.l Assenrbly requested the secretary-General , in colLaboration r+ith the re]evarrt United Nations organs and specialized agencies, particularly the united Naticns Rerief and works Agency ibr
111:"1::,",. T.rygee s in the Near last (ulnwa) and the Econonic Commission for Western
'A'-.a' (ruwp/' to prepar^e and subrnit to thc Asseul]y aL its thirty-:hir-d session a comprehensive and analyticaJ- report on the sociar and economic impact of the Tsraer-i oecupation on the riving conditions of the palestinian people in ine occuprea teritories. It fu"ther requested the Secret ary_General in preparing the reporr, to consult arrd co-operate witli the pafestine Literation Orga.tlization, the representative of the palestinian peopfe.
2' The resolution folloved and expanded the scope o| ceneral Asser'bly resorution 3l/110 of 15 December 1976,. on tt"
"u*u ""f;."i" pursuant to resolutjcn 3ll110, the secret arv-cenerar- submitted a report (e/ zz/zeg) to the Assernbi;;l-;"" thrrty- second session. rt nay be recalled that the representative of the secretary-General explained that' because the sec ret ary-Generar- hia no independent saurces of infcrmationo the report consisted of replies and pertinent excerpts from docr.rnentary material subnittec by the countrfes concerned as we]] as the relevant united l{ations orga'ns and specialized agcncies in response tc the secret ary-Generar r s request r.or informaticn on the subject_matter of tie report.
3,- -The ceneral Assernbly at its thit-ty_second s€ss1on submitted. by the ge cret ary-General , expressed the view f\rrther analysis in ordet, to neet fJ1l; the objectives
, afder considering the rcport
that there t/as need for
of resolution 31/110.
Gr-n erol A e e amhl.'
r.,hi ^h +lr d --*^-+
a rah^7+ lrr eo.r ^h
4. In view of the broa.d scope of the report now requested by the snd recognizing the difficult ccnstraints of time a.nd pface under would have to be paepared, the secret ary-Generat decaded to subnit an inpartial expert €nalysis af the
"o"iu-t .r, a econom]c irqpact.
5. In order to discharge the task requested of hirn in the resolution
78-2tl+6)+
a^td to ensure
./
Al33/3J\
En 91i sir
Page 2
r 1-alnnnor awr--f ,.i-,, f lra S6l-?d f prv_aFnara t ntanncd to utiLize the services of a
J ea'n of three consu,Ltants, conprising a physical planner, an econonist snd ,.
, ocioLogist. Tt was envisaged that the consultants" accompanied by an officiat 01'
UNRWA or ECWA, would visit the countries cci.rcerre.1, incfuding particutarly the
territories occupied by Tsrael as a result of the hostilities of June 1967, in
ordet to provide a fi-st-hand account of the sociaf and economic inrpact.
to co-operate in providing and obtaining other information as needed" Available
l,ritten material would have to be supplemented thTough personal interviews and
other direct inquiries in the fie1d, In that connexion, the Secretary-General
intended that the eonsultants should also visit the headquarters of thc Palestine
Liberation Organization, UNRI^IA and ECl,iA in Beirut,
'(" At an early stage, the Secretariat undertook the selection of candidates in
each of the three fields of expertise, paying particular attention, in view of the
nature of the assignment s.r]d the tine available to compfete it" to the professional
competence and re.Ievant experience of the candldates unde" consideration. Three
candidates suitable for the task and available to underlake the assignment at that
time r'rere tentatively s elect ed.
B. fhe Secretary-General sent a note verbale dated 9 I'{ay 1p7B to the Permanent
Representative of Israelo dral,ring attention to the tresolution and Tequesting s',ich
i nformaticn as night be avajlable on the subject-matter of the report requeste4 by
the General Assembly. The note requested that the information be provided by
30 Junc 19?8. In infcrming the Perroanent Fepresentative of Israel of his intention
to send to the occupied te"ritories a mission comprisin€! the consultants
acccrpanied by an official oC I]-\FWA or fCIIA, the Sec retary-Ceneral requesLed that
tbe Tsraeli authorities extend to the rnission the necessary assistance and
co-operation. In particular, the Permanent lepresentative of fsrael r,ras informed
that the proposed visit by the consultants to the occupied territories was of
s-oecia.L importanec for Lhe per formance ofl their tasks. A repJy was requested by
31 ]'{ay 1978.
9. The Permanent Rcp;esentative of Tsrael, in a note verbale dated 3f ltay 1978"
expressed concern regarding the tenor o,f the resolution. However o he stated that
his Goverrurent would be ready to supply the Secretary-General with information
Sernane to the matter, Subsequently, certain materials r+ele transmitted to the
Secretariat by the Permanent Miss:i.on of Israel. The note verbale fron the
6. The Secretary-General afso
Covernnenbs o' Ie"y,ot, Jordan and
Liberation Organization to make
declded to request the Government of fsrael and the
the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the Palestine
available such information as they rni ght have and
7a^ r rac + +1.,-+
free access
with the
request in a note verbale dated
_Ly lo, tne rermanenr t"If sslon 01 -Lsrae-L
mqrv vis.'tors to r,he l-,er-ri tories
Pernanent Fepresentative made no l:eference to the Se cretarlr-General ts
the consultants, acccmpanied lry a.rr official of UltrRI4rA or ECWA, be given
to, and freeaom of movenent in, the occupied territories in connexion
preraration of the report "
10, The Secretary-General reiterated bis
2l Jrly 1o7$. .Ln a reply dated tB August
noted that the reporLs and iropressions of
A/33/3r\
Engli sb
Fage 3
administered by Israel since 1967, including, and health and labour inter afia, economists, sociologists experts, ful1y ilrustiatEE ti." improvement in livirig conditions of the parestinians in tlo"" t""tiioti.", rnd it therefore deemed the sending of a roission of experts unnecessary.
11. In a nobe to the permanent l.,tission of Israel dated 11 Septenber IgTBr the s ecretary*General stated that he considered the visit to the occupied terrrtories essential if he r'rere t'o be abfe to submit a-n independent and objective re,port to the Generat Assenbfy based on a fiTst-hand
impact. Tn that connexion, the """orrn" of the social and economic Goverrr'ment of rsrael S ecretary_General expressed the hope that the might extend to the
facilities to gather trre I'elevant informa"toior,n" ai,n1 i.tohte" tohcecu npeiecde stsearrryi tocor-ieopse.ratr-on and
ll;-"-l:"n.tl:t-1?J9:,1". s ecretary-Generat also addressed notes verbates to the
*::*i?: l: ll: :":*"lion and requesting """n avaitabte on the subject-matter r"r.i.,"#,;^; ;;;;'i!',*au Thc rar orir,u ,.iorJ-;";;;;;;;";;i;. ;;;'J;J";l]ior.,. a [l;.i:l",i::"i::::-:P:":': ::l:i':':"" ;"";;.;;;;"o,'ii"""" isiEl""i;'"5'JiiI;"""-
::l:::l^:r_": 1il:.i*.rn: permanent R.;";;";;;;i;;; ;i ;;"";;":'::;*;i:"";:il3
:::::::i"^:",,^T,i* i.-':::.1"n' comprisin! -.-ir''.""""":J;;';;';"".illlili'orl'.1 official of UNnWA or ECWA- to rhai1. .^r,h+-i^-
ess.isienna ahn ^^ ^^^-^.,,':-rl "tair ccuntr-res, uiLh r_ie reouesL t_rat the necessary :::::::l:"_i"d co-operation be extended t.-.r-'" "."""i;;";;:-'il.";#";ffi"fi:.;:::
in a note verbale dated 30 l.4ay 19T8,
a visit by the consultants, accompanied
the preparation of the report of the .,
requested to reply by 31 l,lay 19?8.
13. In a note verbale dated 26 Ilay alf}, the pernanent Fepresentative oi. the syTian Arab Republic stated that t is co".etn .nt velcomed the team of consurtants for the preparation of the report anrr that the coriet"nt authorities in the syrian Arab Republic vould extend to the consultant" afi-pissible assistance and co_operation.
tl. .tL" Fernanent Representative of Egylt, ,stated that the Egyptian authorities oretclroeO by an officiaf of UIIRI,IA or ECI^IA, in regarA io Secret ary-General .
L5' The Per"rnanent Rerrresentative of Jordan, in-a note verbale dated fT July lplg" informed the secret ary-General of his Goverrirnent r s readiness to provide ar-r possibre assistance and co-operation to the propo""a f"u* of experts. He further informed the secretary-General that a conmittee of the cent-ra1 Bank of Jordan' the "N.aut'ilo.in"gaf cfo;uendc, if fccro npslaisntinnign go, ft hreep Rreosyeanr tastoivceiesty for scientific Research and the Executive orrice ror the Affairs of the bccupied Territories, to prepare a report on the conrj.itions of the refugees.
16. No reference vas made
Republic to the request for
in the replies of Egylt,
information refevant to
Jordan and the Syrian Arab
Lle subjecc-r-atte- of tfe reporL.
sent a nolle verbale to the
Organization, drarn ing attention to
as might be available on the subject_
17. Also on 9 l.{ay 19?8, the Secretary_Ceneral
Pernanent Obsel:rrer of the palestine f,iieration
the resolution and requesting such information matter of the report requested by the General
A/ 33/3r)+
English
18. The Secret ary-General, in a note verbafe dated 5 Septenber 1!18, again drev
the attention of the lemanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Or'Sanization
to the resalution and reiterated his reouest for infornation gen4ane t'o the
subject-matter ol the relort. lio reply to the S ecretary-General ' s noie verbale
of 9 llay 1978 to the Permanent Observer of the Palestjne Liberaticn Organization
has ieen received as of the d-ate of this interirn report.
L9. l.{eanr,ihile " after consuftation r,rith the Executive Secretary of ECUA and the
S,.-ni:- jve
^r' -.1-r. sFcr-e..pt-v-CF*eral in Beirul , it r,ra s oecioeo th:t in
vier.r of the situation rrevailing ln Beirut the mission should not proceed to the
area at this time.
2A. In the fight of the circunstances relerred to above, it has not been possible5
despit'e every ef'ort tc oo so, to lrcpare lre ful.L reporL cal-Leo for by resolrtion
32/L7\ in tir:re fcr subnission to the ceneral Assenbly at its thirty-third sesslon.
The Se cret ary- General holes that a fuli report on the social and economic irapact
of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the ?alestinian people in
'hF --. r'itrd r,.r-ir.*i6s '.;-l ho r-on.*cl rrd subritted Lo I'he ASSer0bly et its
thiTtv-fourth se s s ion.
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
UNITED NATIONS
Distr.
GEI\fERAL
A/34/536 f LOH ,!
25 October 1979
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC/ENGLISH
Thirty-fourth session
Agenda item 65
HUMAN SETTLEI1ENTS
Living conditions of the Palestinian people
in the occupied territories
Report of the Secretary-General
1. In its resolution 33/110 of 18 December 1978, the General Assembly requested
the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs
and specialized agencies, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the Economic Commission for
Western Asia (ECWA), and the Special Co~nittee to Investigate Israeli Practices
Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, to
prepare and submit to the Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a comprehensive
and analytical report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on
the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories.
It further requested the Secretary-General, in preparing the report, to consult and
co-operate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people.
2. The resolution covered basically the Sffine scope as General Assembly
resolutions 31/110 of 16 December 1976 and 32/171 of 19 December 1977 on the same
subject. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 31/110, the Secretary-General
submitted a report (A/32/228) to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session
and pursuant to Assembly resolution 32/171~the Secretary-General submitted another
report (A/33/354) to the thirty-third session.
3. In this regard, it may be recalled that at the thirty-second session of the
General Assembly, while intrOducing the earlier report, the representative of the
Secretary-General had explained that, because the Secretary-General had no
independent SOurce of information, the report had, of necessity, to consis~ of
replies and pertinent excerpts for documentary material submitted by the Governments
79-27388 / ...
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of Egylt, Israel, Jord.an V ana the Syrian relevant Arab Republic Z/ as well as the united ivations oigur" and specialized ;J;;;;"ii "JJporrse secretary-General-rs request for to the information on the subject-matie"-.r-in.'ti.po"t.
l+. In his report of 2 November tgTB (A133/3]>\), the Secretary_General indj.cated" thato in vielr of the broad. scope of the report requested. by the General_ Assernbly and the difficult constraints of time and pru."u uncler which th" ;;;;;i-"""io'n";" to be prepared', he intend.ed. to util-ize the services of three consurtants - a physical planner' an economist, and. a sociologist - who would und.ertake an impartial expert analysis of the social and economic impact of the rsraeli. occupation on the living cond.irions of the Pal-estinian people in the occupied territories' However, in response to the secretary-Generalrs requests that the consultants be given free access to the occupj.ecl territories, the permanent Mission of fsrael sta+'ed' that the reports and impre""iorr" of many visitors to the territori.es administered. by rsrael since L967, inctuiing economists, sociologists and health and labour experts, fu11y ill-ustrated. the iiproveraent of the l-iving cond,itions of Pal-estinians in those territories. consequently, the rsraeli Goverrurent deemed the send.ing of a mission of ex,oerts unrl€c:^ss&r;r.
5' The secretariab of the united Nations centre for lluman settl-ements (Hatitat) has continued' its efforts to dispatch the mission of experts to the area. However, the inforrnation i.t has obtained. as at October 1979 e]early ind.icated that the position of the Government of rsrael on this matter has not changed. rn these circumstances, the Secretary-General consid.ered that d.ispatching to the area an expert mission which voul-d have no access to the occupied. territories themselves r,rould' serve little purpose and was unlikely to facilitate the preparation of the comprehensive and analytical report requesied by the General- Assembly in j.ts resol-ution 33/110. The secretaiy-General vill tontinue his efforts to d.ispatch a mission of experts as soon u." ti"".,rstances permit.
9co' unMciel aonf vthhilee ,u wniittehc lr eference to General Assemb]y resolution 33/110, the Governing Nations Environment progra:mu (unsp)r-ly-it" d.ecision T/2 of 13 May L979, requested. the Executive Director of UNEp to ensure an adequate assessment of the environrnental cond.itions of the pal-estinian people. After eonsulting vith the secretary-General, the Executive Director Lr uivsp requested. the Governments of Egl'pt, rsraern Jordan and the syrian Arab Republic, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization, to provid.e him with relevant information on this subj eet ' A report based- on an analysis of information provided. in response to this request by the Governments of trgypt, Jord.an and the syrian Arab Republic as vel-l as the Palestine Liberation organizaiion is presented" as annex r. rn preparing this reportn information was arso obtained. for ECI,IA3 ul\lRwA and the ulvDp offices in Jord.an and the syrian Arab Republic. The report covers major aspects of the social and. economic irapact of the rsraeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied. Arab territories.
V circur-ated- as a docr-rment of the security council (s/tzzTil.
(a/s227/ fciiilr.curated' as a d'ocument of the General Assembly under items 30, 31 and, 62
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T, In accord.ance with the provisions of General Assenrbly resolution 33/110r the
Secretarv-General also undertook to consult and co-operate vith the Palestine
Liberation Organizati.on. fn response to his request, PLO, on I August 1979,
submitted to the Secretariat a report which is reprod.uced, in annex II.
I.
rr.
Annex I
Environmental cond.itions of the Pal-gstinian people
Report of the Executive Director of the United
itrations Environment Proqramme
CONTENTS
TITTFQNNI INT'T N N aaaaaaaaaaa.aaaa aaaa
POPULATION A}TD SHELTER
A. Density of populaticr in reletion to housinl units.
'l PJ avnvrsra] vrvorr* i nn a a a a a a a a a a . a .
2. l4ovement of popul
3. Demolition of set
new settlements i
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Annex I
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J.I J
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10
10
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4. East Jerusal-em: changes in housing and.
settlement policy . r . . . . . . . . . ., . .
5. Palestinian refugee settlements and. camps . .
5
6
6
T
T
o
18-20
2L-23
d4
2r-28
2a-?1
32-36
3T -39
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D. fmpact of Israefi settlement
B. Bui.lding industry and housing construction
I H t 6^t?a na f at
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A. Medical- personnel and facilities . .
B. Infant rnortality and. malnutrition " .
C. Water-borne d.iseases . .
D. Environmental- health services . . .
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NATURA],RESOURCES . I ' ' ' '
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1. llater resources
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IV.
2. l"Iater for refugee camtrs
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CONTENTS ( continued)
lorlu a a a a o a a a a a a a a a a a a a o
Paragraphs Page
\B-:: lt
48 r-1
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l-. Land occupation pattern . . . . . . .
2. Desertification . . o .
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V. WORK]NGENVTRONI\MNT.. . . O ' ' ' ' ' ' O, ' O
A. Labour conditions . . . . . . . . . . r r . . . . o
B. Depeasantization of the pafestinian people . . o . .
VI. CONDITIOTIS OF SCHOOL BUTLDTNGS
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I" INTRODUCT]ON
I. The General Assembly in its resolution 33/110 of 18 Decernber lgTB called. upon
the Cecretary-General to prepare and submit to the Assembly at its thirty-fourth
session a comprehensive and analytical- report on the social- and econornic impact of
the fsraeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied" Arab territories. On 13 May 1979, by its d,ecision 7/2 on the environmental
cond.itions of the Palestinian people, the Governing Council- of the United. lTations
Environment Programme (uNSp) recalled the above General Assembly resol-ution and.
requested. the Executive Director of UNEP to ensure an ad-equate assessnent of the
environmental concliiions of the Palestinian people in its implementation.
2" In ord.er to implement the Governing Council d,ecision and. after consultation
with the Secretary-General, the Executive Director requested the Govern-ments of
Egypt, Israel , Jord.an and the Syrian Arab llepublic, as rrell as the Pal-estine
Liberation Organization (PLO), to provide hin with rel-evant information on the
environmental- cond-itions of the Pal-estinian people. The present report is based
on an analysis of information provided. in resnonse to that recluest by the
Governments of Egypt, Jord.an and the Syrian Arab Republ-ic and by PLO, as r^rell as
information available to ECI'IA, Ui\lRlIA and the UNDP offices in Jordan and. the
srrrien Anqlr Ranrrbl-ic. The ngmbe:r s in nerenthcaqL-c s if,nfl tuhrr! e rfvolrvlrvlfolr6 trinp nlJasr .rasb.rr "rasl./nrrrhs refer to the sources of informationo which are listed. at the end. of the annex.
II " POPULATION AI\TD SHNLTER
A" Density of population in relation :p__bgggpg.f4*g
l-. Population
3. The population of the llest Bank, includ.ing nast Jerusalem, was estimated in
I9T5 at about 725"0OO, of whom 290,000 vere refugees registered with UNRITIA.
Situated on the I'Iest Bank of the Jqrdan River, the area is rich in historical and
archaelogical- sites. Its )+,820 km' have traditionally been a centre for
agriculture and tourism. (fe)
4. In 197\ the Gaza Strip had a population of \92eOOO, of vhom 327,500 had
refugees status vith UNRl,[A^and 151+")00 vere non-refugees. The area of the
Ga.za. Sutrr inry 'is lD aouhvuun rrf J?-r irIc l'nZ or'rr''-- r'r- ana ^r +Le hir"hr.st nonrrla.tion d.ensities in ^Mt : 6f v I116 a U VIlq Uf UII! lrr€.,!ru
the world (t,5OO per kmz) " The refugees in the Gaza Strip who J-ive in the
eight carnps built by UNR\^IA constitute 35 per cent of the total Palestinian refugees
registered with UNRWA. (fB)
- ^ /-
construction being only one tenth of vhat it had been in 1955. The marked increase
in buifding which has taken place since 197I+ is stil-] not sufficient to meet the
housing needs of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza" (q)
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5' - Lor''rer population d.ensity (t5o/rr*z) ano prod'uced- better physical environroent have better housing cond.itions in the l^/est Banl< than those in the Gaza strip. In general , _h ou)s-LinIBg scuo.-nrLdrriLtilo-onnss aa.rr.ee rreerp.,onrrti.eedd tron Ibe better in the urban areas than rn the ruraf areas" (f)
T " Of the Palestinian dwerl-ing houses in the Ilest Bank 20 per cent have only one
:'2:t'2i^,oio"}o fam39il--ileust ocef n5t ttwoo 1 r1o opmerss,o wnsh illiev eth ein average family size is seven members. of the one-room dwel-lings and r*o,ooo-i"riii." same size in tr'ro-room dvelring houses, vith average occupancy of 3.2 persons per room' It has been estimated. thatr?at l-east 2OO,0OO teople lr.lrrgurrtly in need' of rehousing in the occupi.ed territories, r.rhich means that a minimum of 2r'o0o new dwelling houses i,s required.i' (B persons per dwe}ling hou;e). (rzj
2. Ugfgm""t .of -p.ofut"tion (tz;, (5), (L)
B' In f9l+8, an estj-niated. TSOrOOO Pal-estinians rrere rrermnnenr'l rr rjiqnt:ocrt frnm their homes. During and ronowing tne igei-ii", ;;;r;;il"i'"i"'1,-;;;5;';;"=.1"r""" fl-ed fron the liest Bank and Gaza. some were refugees from uNRI,^,iA carnps, whire others vere fleeing for the first time. of this nurnber approximatery [orooo,."" perni.tted to return.
9' Prior to 1967, the population of the West Bank and. Gaza had experienced. prosperlty and growth in various sectors. This vas reflected in the construction of housing and schools and the development of tovns and municipalities. (fz) The various municipalities in the trr7est Bank have retained., in their building and architecture, much of their historie trad.itions, while at the same time taking ful-l advantage of mod-ern facil-ities" rn the p*st, there vas therefore consid.erabl-e urban immigration.
10' Hor'rever, under occupation, the growth process has been sfowed d.own by the clestruction of houses as a result of nilitary occupation and by the lack of construction of new accommod.ations for the Pafestinian inhabitants.
l-1 ' since L96T' a mrmber of villages have been d.estroyed" and others partially d'estroyed-. Villages totall-y d-estroyed. during and fol-l-owing the 196T wlr irr"iro.u, Yalu, Beit Nuba, amwas, Ar:Buy, Beit Awa, Beit l{arsam, anc, Jiftliq" shops, hospitals, businesses and offices have been demolished as well, deprivirrg t] . inhabitants of their means of subsistence.
]-2" ITo provisions for nev housin€l are reaclily available. Therefore, the inhabitants are l'rithout shelter and. means of livelihood-, having been d.eprived. of their homes and l-and-" Out of frustration, they leave the occupied territories to seek refuge in nearby States" (5)
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? Demolition of settlements and. construction of new settlgl'4ents in the Gaza Strip lTtfGbl,lr2l, (ra)
13. In 1970, recommend.ations were rnad.e by the Israelis suggesting that the
refugee features of the UI\RI'IA camps be changed. to l-ead to the integration of the
refugees into urban l-ife. Economic incentives were to be offered. and- nev houses
were to be constructed. The plan ca1Ied. for the abolishment of refusee camts in
the Gaza Strip and the Tilest Banli.
l-4. In l-971, large-scale d-emolition of refugee camp housingr in the Gaza Strip
took place. About 3,500 homes occupied. by about 2)+,000 people were ilestroyed.,
without provision for alternative housing. UNRT{A repeated.ly cal}ed. for the rectification of the situation, but by Ju]-y 1973 reported that of p)+2 families
interviewed., 706 were stil-l inadequately housed. fotlowing the d.emolition of their
homes. By April L973, d.enolition of houses for new road.s had begun in Rafah and
Khan Younis, and- recent reports indicate that the Rafah settl-ement is beins
red.eveloped..
Li " lTew apartment houses were constructed. in the occupied- territories to house
Jei,rish immigrants. These irnmigrants were also pernitted" to l-ive in the homes of Arabs, who were not permitted. to return" Und.er Israel-i law, new Israel-i
anan'f 14ah+ Luur1rru"r''rlr^tr.o' nnq rsrr pe rnrvnuf q:rvr@alirlogU|lfgg tUOU IntUOIt-nd-tjJWebV. S. TJIhl(je InltejWW d(lWv.tje-Ll-_l- -i-ne,ss a.re p,enera.llv
locatecl in the Arab sector of Jerusa]-em.
16. Folloruing the r,rar in 1967, the fsrael-is developed a settlenent policy i,rhich
deeply affected. the occupied areas. The first phase was the establ-ishment of
agriculturaL "nahalrr settlements with military features in the West Bank, on the
Jordan River, on the Golan Heights and in the Gaza Strip" The seconil stage was
the building of i,ndustrialized centres of r,rhich one, betr^reen Jerusalem and Jerichoo
is invofving a substantial amount of planning and. investment.
17" 0f the new settlements established. since 1967, the majority are in the
territories occupied. in the l-957 war: 23 in the llest Bani: and7 in the Gaza Strip.
New plans for ad.d.itionaf settlements are periodically announceal. The resul-t of
the d.emolition and settlement policy is, i$€r_ef.ta" to r.reaken attachments to
homes and to the cultural- heritage, often forcing the homeless to emigrate.
4" East Jerusal-em: changes in trg5_ing__ele
settlelr-e_nt pol-icy ()+), (fe)
18. Accord"ing to United. Nations resol-utions, the status of .ierusalem remains
Iegally unchanged." Flor,rever, the o'Law and Administrative Ordinance: Procl-arnation
of Enlargement of the Municipal Area of Jerusal-em' , of 28 June L96T, designated
an area inhabited- by 100"000 Arabs to be und-er Israefi rule, I,trithin the last
12 years, an estimated.20-301000 Arabs have d.eparted. from the OId City.
19 ' The clearing of 82 metres along the \Iail-ing 'Wall entailed the demol-ition of
msnrr dr'rarrr'noc oround. the Haram Al- Sherif , 3f buil-dings, and the four Arab q,uarters
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surround"ing the area : r'rhich vas estimated to be 20 per cent of al-l the Arab property in the OJ.d" City. The 2OO hones destroyed. round the L{ailing 1,.Ia11 were replaced by a nel^r Israel-i p1aza, and the Pal-estine Archael-ogical Museum was expropriated. and its rel_ics confiscated.
20 - ^Arn/nvrrnvv^im!uq@* "caJ-y 1r200 hectares of land in East Jerusalem vere confiscated and
expropriated- und.er the "Land Acquisition for Public Purposes Act". rn this process, four square ]iilonetres near East Jerusalem which incl-uded l-'OLB apartment*^, \ZT stores and a factory' were expropriated,. Many new hi.gh-rise apartments were constructed" and became the subject of much controversy, both internationally and vithin the occupied territories and- fsrael itself, involving the aesthetic effect
on the land-scape of historic Jerusal-em and. the subsequent d.isplacement of people.
, " Palestinian refunee settlements and g_ggp!-
2l-" Fol]-owing the first pal_estinian var, in l9)+T-I9\8, the country's Arab population was d"ivid.ed into four main groups. Less than hal-f of the Arab population remained, in their original homes: about l5O,OOO in Israel-, some
350,000 und.er Jordanian ad:ninistration on the I'Iest Banh, and about
70'000*100,000 urrd"er Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip, in add.ition to
about 750,000 refugees d"ispersed. in the above areas and. in Lebanon, the
Syrian Arab Republic and Transjordan. (S)
22" By L975 almost half of the 3,0OO,O0O Palestinians scattered. through the
Itliddfe Xast were resistered as refrrr"ees r,rith TTlvRI,fA. Over a third of the rafrrope /1,_^ ^^^\
ut-rLUr v/f, url vr.rllvvn. VVSI a, UIll-I'u- vr utrs rgf,U6CUS
\+)9zOO0) vere official-ly registered. in Ul$RIdA established canps. Those
registered. in camps constituted nearfy 6O and. 25 per cent of the totaf population
in Gaza and the I^Iest Bank respectively. These figures excl-ud.ed. refugees wno aid not
receive UI\IRI'IA shelter in camps, but vere recipients of other United lrTations
servi-ces' Actual- camp population exceed.ed. the official registration by about
10 per cent due to the presence of unregistered. refugee d.ependants. fn add.ition
to a total- of 53 ''established-'' camps in East Jordan, the llest Bank, Gaza, the sr'iqn arah Ra-rrllic and" Lebanon, over 1)+OrOO0 Arabs lived in 5 Jordanian and lr s"nio' r?o*o-^^ncYtt camps organized. after the 1957 r^rar. About 99,ooo inhabitants
of the "emetgency'' camps were UNRtr/A refugees" The bal-ance vere other "persons
d.isplaced" as a result of the 195T war. (:)
23. The main housing problems faced. in the UI,IRWA carnps are; (a) over-crovding
^ua1 1lr^o^u"^s-'l--^n g 'u'--n'+^lr. s: in a number: of cases far.rilies share the same unit; (l) inability
to expand- housing units vertica]l-y or horizontally, (c) aging of the present units; end fag /) -},v^vr ^- ^^hmunication networks and sanitary infrastructure. (13); (r>)
B. !g44&r--ua
il+. Build.ing materials, vith the exception of o-uarry stonee are in short sunply
and. must be inported from outside the region at very high cost. This is
narj-jnrr'lor] 1' +Fl,e of steel rrvoudJ,s - musUeAtatr l TfrIaAImIIEeJ s 4aInlUd Ucegir:LngellUn.t . AA Ucetr:mlllLerrnu t, [email protected] ilDs
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still in the planning stage. The establ-ishment of a large ancl increasing nr:mber
of Israeli settlements has placed ad.d.itional constraints on building activity in
the l,Iest Bank and. the Gaza Strip" hrployment of construction workers within
fsrael itself has oriented the labour force away from development in their ovn
territories. Furthermore, the destruction of an estimated. 19r000 houses in the
llest Bank and Gaza since 196T nas aggravated an alreacty critical problem. Housing
problems are accentuated by the land. confiscation and. expropriation policy and
the Absentee Property Law of the occupying authorities" (fZ)
c. Elgg!11icifi,
2r. Prior to the l-967 war, there were 11 separate electrieity-generating concerns
in the lJest Bank. These were either coumercial companies, Iike the Jerusalem
Governorate Electricity Company, municipal companies like Nablus or some
co--operatives in the larger vil1ages. Total generating capacity was about
21 . 5 },fi,r. (13 )
26. Folloving the war, Israel tried. for several reasons, to tie the electricity
grid. in the l,trest Bank to that of Israel, particularly for cities where electric
grid.s were ila^maged by the war. Some cities responded and connectecl their supply
to the Israel-i gricl, whi1e others d.id. not. Those relying on their own generating
capacities, at least in partn include Jerusalem and }Iablus. Among those localities
connected. to the Israel,i gricl are Hebron, Tulkarm anct Qal-qielyeh. Sinilarly,
some vil-lages close to the armistice line of 19hB were eonnected., like Azzoun and
Deir-a1-Ghsoun.
27. The Jerusalem Governorate Eleetricity Company is subJect to Israeli 1aws,
and is buying electricity from the Israeli Comopany to supply the requirements of
Israeli settlements. The Israeli authorities have asketi the Conpany to seII
electricity at fixed 1ow prices. fsraeli authorities estimate that the generating
capacity of the Jerusalem Company will d.ecl-ine from 20 lvlW in 11976 to 1l+ MW
in 1980, while need.ed. capacity vi1I rise fron 30 MW to 5l+ MW. Currently" the
Company supplies eleetricity to about 75 villages and canps in the I'Iest Bank in
ad.ctition to cities like Bethlehem, Ramallah, Birch and Jericho, nine Israeli
army campsu and 12 Israeli settlements or residential quarters. (fS)
28" The Nablus electricity, however, is sti1l supplied by the punicipality, using
two generating units install-ed in 1,977. The following villages in the Nablus
Governorate are al-so supplied fron Nablus: Deir Sharaf, Rameen, Beit Leect, Zeita,
a1-Badan and Tel. (fE)
D. Impact of Israel-i settlement
29. Of a total area of 550,OOO hectares on the l^trest Bank of the Jordan, fsrael
has taken possession of about 15O"OO0 hectares comprising about 27.3 pet cent of
the area of the l{est Bank. (fO) The ner,r settlements occupy about 35'000 hectares
(about 6.3 per cent of the West Bank area) most of which is agricultural land.
/.".
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vaoa r,
There were 68 settlements up to the end of Jg|B, housing more than gOTOOO persons,
divid'ed. as follows: 11 settlements around Jerusalem, 12 around. Ramallah and. Biera, 12 in Hebron and Bethl-ehem, ll+ Israel around Nablus and 19 in the Jordan Va]Iey. has been concentrating housing around" the Jerusalem area, a fact evid.enced
by the 76,OOO people who live in these settl-ements. (Z)
30. Israel is still earrying out its settlement-buil-ding policies. Six more are
planned" to be built soon. As this continues, it necessarily means that Arab land will- be emptied in favour of the Israeli population rather than its Arab
owners.
31. InL96T, the infrastructure (road.se sewerage, etc., includ.ing electricity) in
the I'Iest Bank and Gaza Strip was better than that of most countries in the region. Very little has been d.one since either to improve or to maintain the existing l-evel. The pattern of nilitary road. d.evelopment and. restrictions on electricity and. water expansion have impected building construetion projects. Few existing sewerage systems ha..'e been expanded", resulting in stoppage, blockage and. overflor.rs. (rS) -
rII. HUMA}I HEALTH
A. Iriedical- personnet- an4 facilities (11)
32" Specialists in paecliatrics, pathology, laboratory technologies and rad.iology are either in short supply or non-existent. The chances for West Bank physicians to acquire scholarships in any of the sorely needed. specialities are virtually nil" (11)
33. i{ursing and pararnedical- services are no better off in terms of quantity or quality. There is a great shortage in laboratory and X-ray technicians,
physiotherapists, blood bank technieians and pharmacists. (11)
3\. The heal-th infrastructure has not developed in recent years. on the contrary,
d.ue to a reorganization of hospital services and red.istribution of responsibilities,
the number of public hospitals d.ecreased. from 11 operating, and 3 on the ver.ge of
operation, in L967, to 8 operational plus a mental:hospital and a tuberculosis
hospital in a975. The total number of beds also d.ecreasecl from 1,02J in 1968 to
9\S in l9'tr5, thus lowering the rate of beds per 1,000 population i"or 1.5 in ag68 to l-.3 in 1975. Admissions increased fron 23,593 in 1958 to 36J6o in 1975. (r:)
3r. In the I'lest Bank, most of the Palestinian Red Crescent activities operated.
before L96T nave been drastieally curtailed. There are sti1I units, mainly
out-patient services, in some l+ or 5 towns: in Gaza Red. Creseent onerates a clinic and a small surgical hospital.
36. Preventive activities and elementary sanitation are somewhat neglected..
Preventive and curative activities are not integrated. in a comprehensive health
servicel health ed.ueation of the public is al-most non-existent" and the community
does not fee]. concerned. as it is not involved.. (U), (fS)
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B. Infant rlortality and malnutrition
37. The lr{ed.ical Association of the lrlest Bank reports that infant nortal-ity
increased frora 70.9 per thousand in 19?3 to ?3.8 per thousand in 1971r and to
80.3 in l-975 in the particular area stud.ied, in which some 2,100 births a year
took place (tne total number of births a year in the llest Banh is approxfunately
30,500). The sa,me study quotes Israeli statistics to the effect that over-all
infant nortality increased. from 3? per thousand in 1971+ to 39.5 per thousand in
1975. Infant mortality rate for the Arab population in the llest Bank fluctuated
around an average of \O.O per thousand fuom L966 to L975; the figure decreased
fron l+l.B per cent in l.966 to 39.5 per cent in 1975" but with a high of
l+\.3 per eent in ]-:967 ancl a Lor of 3?.0 per cent in 197\.
38. In spite of their great discrepancy, these figwes agree, at least' that
infant nortality has not clecreased. significantly over the 1O-year period
L966-L975, antl may have increased since L973. Moreover, neonatal nortality
(deattr of infants up to the ege of 30 tlays) as well as the number of still-births
have increasecl.
39. Protein malnutrition is relatively frequent cturing the weaning period,
together with gastro-intestinal infections. Iron cteficiency anemia is reported in
approxinately 2J per cent of chiltlren uncler 3 years of age.
C. Water-borqq 3;lsqgqes (1l)
l+0. In the hrest Banli ancl Gaza, as well as in host countries, diarrhoeal diseases
are by far the naJor causes of norbidity and nortalityu especially among infants
and young children. Speeific inforrnation on other water-borne diseases is not
available.
D. Environmental health services
\f. UNRI,IA environmental health services for the Palestinian people (refugees)
comprise nainly provision of potable water supplies, sanitary clisposal- of solid
and liquid wastes, stom water clrainage and control of insect and roclent vectors
of disease. A toial of 653,5\9 refug-es antt tlispJ-acetl persons living in 53
refugee canps benefittett from the services, vhieh were maintainetl at a satisfactory
leve1 in most of the camps. During the year L977, the annual cost of the services
provi4ed by the Agency r,rorked out at $:.50 per beneficiary. The inflationary
trend and other factors are likely to increase the cost in coming years. (f6)
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W. I{ATURAL RESOTACES
A. Itrater
l-. Irlater resources
)+2. Water availability (from both und.erground and. surface resources) and its use are of crucial importance to possibilities l"trest Bank agrieulture. Although promising seem to exist (""g., building of small d.ans or other run-off
storage facilities in various catchment areas) (e) " available information shows that not a single irrigation project has been plannecl or inplemented. in the llest Bank since L96T "
l+3. Drilling of nev wells for the development of und.erground. water resources has
been practieally prohibited since June 1957. The flow from existing wells has been reduced and put und.er strict control . There are claims that there is al-so d-epletion and d.ecreasing water levels in a number of Arab wel]s. Since occupation, a total of t-2 wells have d.ried up (fZ) " During th.e year I97T h978, a total ot
331 we1ls were in operation: 31\ 'rArabtrwells prod.uced.33 nillion m3 of water.
l+l+. This pattern of water resources use is explained by the lr{ilitary Goverrurent in terms of und.erground. water conservation policy. Hovevero hydrological surveys
have shor,m that a sizable part of fsraelrs water supply originates in the
itrest Bank (through run-off, seepage and underground vater). The West Bank reported.ly has an annual water surplus of at least 6OO nniUior, *3, while in I9T9
J?1""1 wiJ-1 experienee a deficit of 26, mil-lion m3, which may reach nearly
5Oo mit-t-ion mi in 1985. (T), (13)
45. The situation of und.erground. water in the Gaza Strip is equally disturbing.
Water discharge has been going at an excessive rate, resulting in a d.eclining r"te" table and increasing salinity. Competition of neighbouring fsraeli we11s for
r,rater is also keen. (i)
't+6. The importance of better use of avai1able water resollrces is often indieated
by referring to the fact that until 1978, only 8"100 hectares were und-er irrigation
in the I'lest Bank (l+ per cent of the area und.er cultivation) and.9,OOO hectares in
the Gaza Strip (L5 per cent. of the land und.er cultivation). Dry lands are
supported. by a rainfall of I+OO-5OO nnu nuch of whieh is r,rasted in run-off water,
drained nostly to Israel. Despite the critical importance of water, 1itt1e seems to have been done to conserve rainfal-l vater through such projeets as terraqes, earth damsr and pools. (e)
2 " llatgr for refu.gee*camps
\f" Schemes for provid.ing private water supply to refugee shetters continued. to
progress satisfactorily at two canps in the l{est Banko six camFs in the Gaza Strip,
one ca-ltrp in Lebanon and two camps in east Jord.an. Currently \5 per cent of canp
inhabitants are served by private water supply and the rest continue to d.raw waler
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from publie stanil-pipes. A water augmentation scheme for Jaramana camp in the
Syrian Arab Republic is nearing completion. The Amman llater and. Sewerage Authority
is executing a scheme to provid.e private water supply together vith sewerage
systems at two carnps located in Anman city. The Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic has provid.ed. an ad.clitional well, pumping station and elevated water
reservoir to noeet the growing need.s of refugees at Khan Eshieh camp where all
shelters have been provid.ed. with private water supply. (f5)
Land
1" Land- occupation pattern
hB. The fol-lowing table gives an indication of land occupation patterns in the
I.iest Bank.
Lantl resources in the l,'Iest Bank
- Ration of confiscatetl land to total area of West Bank 27.r%
- Ration of settlements area to l'trest Bank 5 "3% (z), (i), (l), (rr)
2. Desertification
t+g. The main causes of clesertification are overgrazing, clearing of vegetation
for agriculture, burning, faulty irrigation systems" expansion of agriculture on
shal-lov soiL and steep slopes, lack of anti-erosion measures, etc. These have led
to degradation of the vegetation cover, loss of soil fertility and productivity,
and several other forms of desertification. The situation is deseribed. in the
following paragraphs.
l-. Dry-l-and trees
50. Orchard.s on hi11y slopes of the West Bank are receiving a much inferior
level of husbandry than vegetables and farm orchards under irrigation. As a
Land. use Area (hectares)
West Bank total
Confiscated. land
Total settlements
550,000
l-l+8,856
3l+,71+B
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result of accumulated negligence, the status of figsu almonds, grapes anil even of ol-ives is d.eteriorating. About l+O per cent of all trIest Bank olive trees are
100-l-50 years old and. need. rejuvenation. Olive trees al-so need. to be protected.
by Iaw against destruction by invad.ing flocks of sheep and. goats. Better fertil-ization and. more effective pest control are necessary measures. (z) Forestry
contributed. less than 1 per cent of the agricultural income in rgTI+-r9Tr.
2. frrigation tgcbniques (2)
7. Experience gained over the past three years has clearly demonstrated. the superioritlt of drip irrigation to former practices. Among severaf other
ad-vantages, drip irrigation saves over 50 per cent on water use and pO per cent
on labour in comparison with trad.itional method.s of irrigation. There are now
730 hectares und.er d.rip inigation in the West Bank and. 900 hectares in the
Gaza Stripc at an estimated. cost of $3OO per hectare" (Z)
Sal-inization
52- Al-kal-ine soil-s occur urainly in the Jericho areae due to slow drainage of
highly saline soils (pH B "j-9).
l, Pastures
53. There are vast areas on the West Banh hil-ls which are fit for pastures.
Effective progra.lnnes of pasture development require first of all restoration of public ownership of the land. Much of this land, which has traditionally been natural grazing land, is now zoned. out for military or settlement purposes. It
is reported" that 5,000 hectares coul-d. be turned. into good. grazing 1and. (a)
WORKING ENVIRONI{ENT
Labour cond.itions
,1" llest Banli workers, numbering some 60o0o0, form about 5 per eent of the
Israel-i fabour force. (f:) ft is claimed that Arab labourers enployed in fsrael
are paid l-ess for the sarne job than their fsraeli counterparts. (Z) Approximately
l+0 per cent of the Palestinianst wages go to the fsraeli treasury: while the
same is true of the Israel-i labourer, the latter nevertheless receives more social
benefits, pensions, health insurance and. unemployment benefits. (6) Often travel
to and from fsrael- entails four to six hours of travel d.aiIy, thus ad.ding to the
length of the working day. Those who d.o not wish to travel often sleep in
makeshift shelters within Israef" or in their place of work, the cellars of
build.ings under construction, kitchens of restaurants, orehard.s or other
agricultural areas. (l+) The relatively higher wages in fsrael and. high rate of
unernployment in the Gaza Strip have been used. to attract workers away from the
V.
A.
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Strip with a view to reducing population density. Professionaf doctors, engineers,
professors ancl other qualified persons are reported to be unable to find work in
ihu o"",rpied territories. They frequently leave the area out of economic necessity,
thus draining the occupied teritories of qualified persons needed to supply
necessary seivices. From 19?lr on, unemplolment steadily increased as a result of
a decrease in capital- investlient within Israel. (\)
B. Depeasantization of lbe PaErstinian people (3)
,5. The most salient change among the Palestinianse one that is leading to the
over-a1l restratification of the Palestinian population because the refugees
constitute half their nr:mber, has been their depeasantization. This te:sl is used
to inclicate that the refugees lose their skills and eapacities as agrieulturists
cr peasants vithout becoming integrated. into the urban centres which their canps
aa3oin or acquiring new non-farming occupational skil-ls. I'lith the loss of
substantial agricul-tural hold.ings and the displacement of other peasants who have
no land. from their rural communities" there has been a major shift away from
agriculture. (Z)
VI. CONDITTONS OF SCHOOL BUILDINGS
55. Available reports show that schools in the occupied territories are in very
old buildings, most of which are about to fal1 dornm. Some classrooms are
d.escribed "- t.ing like rat-holes, and many do not have access to fresh air or
natural J-ight. It is reported. that only one and a half schools were built cturing
10 years of oecupation ( from 196T to !977). (rf)
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\.
5.
l_.
2"
3.
Provid.ed by Amman" Jord.an. Jorcl.an.
ing. Providect by pLO. 1979.
ffi :T:"51;1":Tiliill;"T"il"'#:"'$;;1.u", p. 15. Providett by Jorclan.
P{3LOq.i1 Htla1 "The Palestinians of the trdest Bank and. Gaza strip',. provicred by
9. , Beirut, Lebanon. VoI. Vff No. 1, 1977, pp. zb-47. provideti by pLO.
10' Idahd'i abct-El-:lladi t'The rsraeli Settlements in Jerusalem and. the West ffihought Forum, Jerusalem, May 19?8, pp. 5r-9r; Ann "rsraeli settlements in the oecupied. TerritorLesi'. p"iiria"a ny rr,o.
11' The l{eclic"l Alsoci?tion or the westgant. Report on Medical rnstitutions and.
O and Jorclan.
l,2. $taat gap+. Housing problems in the West Bank. (Otricial pl,o ideas for liuman settlenaents) sanetl, special issue No. [-12, December 19?g (Laui"). Provid.ed. by pLO.
13" n*oevasl Jord?nian-scientitic sociglg "The significance of some Idest Bank ffi"ry 1e?e-i;;;ii;;i.-priiju.d. by Jordar..
1l+' glatisticpl-qata for Arab Population in occupied rerritories and rsrael. (Syria - Office of the palestinian Refirgees, Damascus). provided by Syria.
!€ere_nce.g_
'lr?b--Lg9gg+gsli;tytF o{ Ar?p cairo. 1978. (erauicll-provi.ae-sil-btgy gsisyeri.a nrh Ae rapba rR.eesptiunbialicn.s in the Arab states,
4yPrPli.g' Al-RaJah l{ational university. Nablus. }Iest Bank. ',Agrieulture in the l{est Bank and Gaza strip, problems Lna erospectsr'. provicl"a"ty er,o.
PNetnw gY9or.kI! .a" t (BPirnogfehsasnotro no)f. PttPoalilteisctainli aSnc ience at the State university of social stratification'r. provid.ed. by pLO.
Ectr{+: social Development and lh:man settleurent Divisi.on. paper on soeial cond'itions in the oceupied Arab territories of the llest Bank and. Gaza. Beirut. May 1977.
.7
8.
Bank,
lesch
19?9 on
(General
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Annex f
page 15
Assistance to
AssembJ-y resolution
15. UNDP (Report of the Inter-Agency Task Force Aprii_
Pal-estinian People to the Inter-Agency Meeting).
33ht+T). Provid.ett by ECIdA.
16. Ui$RI'iA Annual Report of the Director of Health of
Docnment A/3I/I4P/1. Provid.ect by UIIRI^IA.
UNRUA for the year 1979.
17. Irleqt Barlk Education in Government*Schools l-967-]-977.
University Publication. July 1977. provictecl by pLO.
F. S. Ilasru Birseit
/...
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/orieinaf: Arabic/
Eggf o:l the Jordanian Parlianent
for the occu'oied- Idest Bank and a senior official of the Political
Dejpgrlpent of the Palestine Liberation O_rgAnisatj.on a.,
!I.r).r'-6L+'u ,€.-^--"' th€ start of the third. fsraeli invasion, on 5 June 1967, of the
Pal-estinian Arab land. not yet und.er Israel-i occu'oatjon -- r,rhat was known as the
West Bank and. the Gaza Strip - there began a campaign of expelling the Arab
population, d.estroying their homes, seizing their landsu establishing fsraeli
housing projects, factories, public and private establishments, training centres
for the army, military posts, security zones and Israeli settleraents and the
transferring of Jewish immigrants to them from all parts of the rnrorld., within the
framework of the nel-l-,'known and openly d.eclared fsraeli plan to d.rive the
Palestinian Arabs from their country in ord"er to Judaize it and to allow Zionist
inmigrants to take over the property and homes of the l+ million Palestinians,
after they have been d.riven from their homeland and d.ispersed. throughout the worl-d..
I. THE NAMALLAH AREA
At the outset of the fsraeli forces o occupation of the l.lest Bank and the
Gaza Strip in June 1967 , three Arab vil-l-ages to the west of the town of Ramallah,
namelyu Amr^ras, Yalu and Beit }Tuba, were bl-own up and destroyed, although these
villages were Arab and. the lands had long been handed dor,rn by inheritance from
father to son. These three villages had. a total population of 51050, covered an
area of \fr65O dunums and eontained. lr328 houses, four Islamic mosques, six
schools, a large library and valuable antiquities. They were totally d.estroyed
and their population was dispersed. and expeIled" Then they took over the land.s of
Latrun, comprising 21000 dunr.rms, and on the ruins of these Arab villages they
established. six fsraeli settlements: Kfar Buth, Shayelet, I.{oud"i1im, 0aryat
It4ilrehin Rq?ir rlsl and. I{evo lloron. In 1976, the Israeli authorities approved a ) vs rL project for the unification of these settl-ements e so that they would. eonstitute
one large Israeli city, and for a broad paved highr,ray eonnecting then with the
cities of Jerusalem and. Tel Aviv and. with the settlements along the Palestinian
littoral. A network of highways was to run off from this rnain highr,raye connecting
it with nine other Israeli settlements nhich the fsrael-is had also established on
Arab lands in the Ranallah district after tlne 196T r.rar and linking those
settlements with Jerusalem. The settlements in cluestion were Rafet, Our, Givton,
Shilohu Beit Horon, Ramot, Kochav llashahar, Beit Rael and Neve Zuf. The main
highway then passed through the settlenent of Atarot, which the lsraelis established.
a/ tne representative of the Palestine
nap with this report" For technical- reasons
is availabl-e for consultation.
Liberation Organization submitted a
this rnap cou1t1 not be reprod-uced but
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after 1957 near Jerusalem airport, of this project, and extend.ed. as far as Jerusal-em. The purpose as the competent Israeli official stated, was to relieve the pressure of the population d.ensity in the Te1 Aviv area and on the coast, to provide a better place for Israeli inmrigrants to settle in, instead. of TeI Aviv anc Jerusalem, t'o alleviate the density of traffic between Tel Aviv and the eoast, on the one hand-, and Jerusalem on the other and to establish a eoneentration of fsrael-i population in the hill-s overlooking the Palestinian littoral in ord.er to provid.e a better line of d.efence.
The total- area of the Arab land.s in the Ramallah area seized. by the fsraeli authorities llas 7\ rT5O dunums, on which they established. 15 Israeli settlements,
as r'rell as army posts and training zones, entry to which was prohibited.
IT. THE JERUSAIE}.{ AREA
fn,the part of Jerusalem whieh was not und.er rsraeli occupation prior to June 1957, after its occupation and during the period T to 11 iune f9"57, the fsraelis blew up 135 Arab homes in old Jerusalen within the waIlr exDelred their owners and the Arab inhabitants, who numbered 6Jo, and, blewup two rslamic mosques
and. an Arab plastics factory"
on 2T June l-957, the rsraeli l(nesset decided, und.er article 1I (b) of the Israeli Law and" Adninistration Ordinance of l_91+8 to annex the Arab sector of i
Jerusal-em occupied. in 196T to the Israeli sector occupied in 19\8. At the same time,theArabareasurroundingJerusa1em,eomprisingthenunicipatityoi
Jerusal-em and. containing Jerusalem airport ancl the .riu"g"" or Sur sahir, Beit Safafa, Tur, Issawiya, Anata, Ram and. Shaefat and. with a population of frOOO Arabs,
was al-so annexed-. In 1958, the Israeli authorities, acting und.er the Law of Acquisition of Land. for the Publie rnterest, promulgated. under the British manclate j-n 1943, seized- an area of 3,26 d.unums in old Jerusalem eontaining four Arab quarters: l. The Magharba quarter; 2. The Silsila Gate quarter; 3. The Sharaf quarter; h. The Suq al_-Husur quarter. fn these quarters, Arabs owned )p! pieces of real- estate, includ.ing lrOl+8 apartments, \27 commercial warehouses, ! Tslanic
mosques, )+ school-s and 2 Islanic chapels. These quarters were inhabited by
6,000 Arabs. On 30 August t970, issue No. 1,656 ot the fsraeli Official Gazette contained.ad.ecreefortheappropriationofanareaof11,68od'um
in the Jerusat_em area, und.er the 19h3 British Law of Acquisition of Land for the
Publ-ic Interest. This may be broken d.or,rn as foll.ows:
l-. l+,8)+O d.um:ms of the lands of the villages of Beit Hanina and Nabi Samwi1 to the north of Jerusalem;
2" 2,7A0 d.unums of the lands of the village of Beit Safafa to the south of
Jerusalen;
3. 2,d+O d.unums of the lands of the villages of Sur Bahir and Jabal
al-Mukabber to the south of Jerusalem:,
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l+. l'2OO d.unums of the lands of the village of Qalandiya near Jerusalem
sa*irr rn}a/v*4. v t
5. l+70 dum:ncs of the l-ands of the villaee of Ram to the north of Jerusalerc:
6. 120 dunums within the limits of the Arab municipality of Jerusalem:.
T. 100 d.unums in the vicinity of the wal1 of Jerusalem;
Total : l-1,680 d.unums.
0n these lands the Israeli authorities constructed- more than h rOO0 housing
units and established. industrial zones near Jerusalem airport and transferred. to
them factories and. workshops, includ.ing Central Hashbirha, Faraj, Erodat, I''iotsdi"
Papruskalim, Hatsrakhirn, Eshrabatonu Dimox and Haf ratal.
They also took over the Matman A1lah cemetery in Jerusalem and set up a
comrnercial centre and a garage on the site. They then proceeded to buil-d 13
tourist hotel-s, with a total of \,t65 rooms, on the lands which they had seized
from the Arabs in Jerusalem. The fsraelis then took over an area of 6OO d,unums of
At"ab land. in Ash-Sheikh Jarah and the surrounding areas and built a whole large
quarter to trhich they gave the name Eshkol quarter and r.rhich blocleed the glorious
historic views of Jerusalem.
In 1975, the Israeli authorities began constructing a lrall of vast resid.ential
apartment bl-ocks around both parts of the city of Jerusalem and around. the
adJoining areas, and", as the Israelis themselves have said, these buildings are
being constructed. as vast strong defence fortresses.
The total amount of Arab lands seized. by the fsraelis in the Jerusalem area
is 1121297 d"unr-us, which may be broken d.or,m as follows:
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1. The l,ia5;harba quarter
2. Land. of Jabal- a.L."l{ukabber
3. Lands vithin the rcunicipal- limits
4. Land.s of Ash-.Sheikh Jarrah and Scopus
5. Lan'4-s in the Beit ,T:Ianina area
6. Lands in the Qalandiya area
7. Lands to the east of Sharfat
B. Land on l{ount Scopus
9. Lands of lTabi Samlril
10. Ld,nds of Beit Safafa
LI. Lands of the village of Ram
l.'2. Lands of l*ran Al-.-Atrmar
13. Lands of Srata
1\. Land.s of Abu Dis
15. Lancls of As*Sarnmar
16. Land.s in the area to the east of A1-Izriya
up to Khan Al-*Ahmar
17. Lands of Salr,ran
f8. Lands in the Sir area
L26
540
l-,3L6
3,870
l-2,l+70
1,200
1,700
l+lo
h,Bho
2 r7oo
L,800
3,000
5,000
2,000
200
?o,000
1 r000
6o
dunwos
dunums
dunums
clunums
dunums
d.unums
dunums
dunums
dunums
dunums
dunums
clunums
d.unr:ms
dunums
d.unums
d.unums
d"unums
clunums
TotaL: ]-]-2,297 dunums
The Israelis buil-t the following settlenents on these lands:
1. lTeve Ya lacov 2. Atarot
3. Sanhedria \. I4etzpeh
5. I{arale Adonim 6. Talpiot
7. Ranot 8. l,latalat Defna
9. l,laiale Atloninr B
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In ad"d.ition, a number of residential- quarters were buift on the boundaries of'
the municipality of Jerusalem. These include the follotring:
1. The Anatot q_uarter 2" The Febrew University residential
quarter
4l-- . The riaskubia quarter
6. The Al-l'lasanir quarter
fn May 1979, a ne\r Israeli organization, the Zionist Construction Groun,
announced. the establishnent of a nel,r settlement called l{odirin.
TTT. THE ARIHA ARIA
Tn the Ariha area, which is generallv recognized. as coming under the
administration of the City of Jerusalem, the Israelirs took over \3r0OO d-untrms
of Arab l-and. The breakdor.n: is as foll-or,rs:
1. The Ain At-Turaba area to the r,rest of the Dead" Sea 10 ,OOO dunums
2" The Kal-ia area to the south of Ariha 1B,OOO dunu-ms
3. Land"s of A1.-Awja Al*Far,rqa I+,OOO d.unums
l+. Lands of A1-Awja At-Tahta 5,OOO d.unums
,. Land.s to the south of Jiftlik 2,000 dunums
6. Land.s in the Central Jordan Va11ey I+,OOO dunums
Total: h3,ooo dunums
The fsraelis blew up all the houses in A1-Filat between the town of Ariha
and the Jord,an River and established. seven fsraeli settlements in the Ariha
areae namely:
3. The I'4arman A1la quarter
,. The Tel- el*Faras quarter
'l
l.{itzpe Shalem
Nararan
Yitav
Netiv Hagdud
Ct
4"
Almog (rari.a)
I(adesh Bartig
l4n osh i mi m
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Ar:nex ff
raf;e L_l
IV. TI{E BET}ILFJ{]N{ DISIRrCT
1*he rsraeris took over 85,oo0 dunums of Arab Iand in
brealidown is as follolrs:
1. Lands of Al*Firdaws
e " Land"s of Qumran
3. Lands of Beit Fajjar
l+. Lands of Tabat Al_-ltralr
5. Lands of Ad..:Dahisha
6. Lands of Beib Jala
T, Lands of Jabal Ar-.Ras
8. Land.s of At-Talamara
the Bethlehem area.
l+,000 dunums
11000 dunums
1 ,500 clunurns
500 dunums
500 d.unums
5,000 d.unums
505 d.ununrs
72,000 dunums
The
Total: 85,ooo dunrms
They established there military Gilo firing and training zones and two settlements, and Hamuzit.
V. THE IIEBRON DTSTRICT
The Israelis took over 55,650 d.unums of Arab land is as follows:
in Hebron. The breakdown
't
2"
4"
.|
Y.
10.
11.
t2"
J-J.
1l+.
'lq
They built there the town of Qiryat Arba,
cloninating the town of Hebron, and nine other
1" Yattir 2"
3. Takosh lt.
5. Elezar 6.
T. Rosh Tzurim B.
9. Idigdal 0z
Land.s to the east of the town of Hebron
Lands to the north of Hebron
Land.s of Khi11a Jalis
Lands of the vill-age of Beit Amr
Land.s of the village of Ad"-Dahira
Land.s of the villaee of As=Samur
Land.s of Tarkumiya
Lands to the south of Asyun
Lands adjoining the town of Sharqa
Land.s of the village of Aksariya
Lands of the vill-ase of Surif
Land.s of Dora
Land.s of Al-l{ajnuna
Lands of Sarir and A1:,1.{ukhabba
Land.s r,rithin the bound.aries of the nrunicipality
25,750
3 rooo
)v
A ncn \r tv /v
avv
500
?,800
6, ooo
3,000
1,000
200
1,500
300
250
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Annex TT
PAOA T
dunums
dunums
d.unums
dunums
d.unums
dunums
d.unums
dunums
dunums
d.unums
d.unums
d-unums
dunums
d.unums
dununs
Total: 55,650 dunums
adjacent to and strategically
settlements u narnely:
Bedulam
I(far Etzion
Alon Shvot
Efrat
They then annexed. 1,000 d.unums more to the town of Qiryat Arba and built new
resid.ential and ind.ustrial ertensions there, and they occupied the Dabar,riya area
in the town of Hebron and set about building a new Jewish residential quarter there.
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VI. TIIE }IABLUS DISTRTCT
Ttre Tsraelis took over 65,800 d-unums of Arab land in the lTablus district. The
breakdown is as follows:
1. Lands of }lorthern Asira
2, Lands of Kafr Qad"d.r:m
3. Land.s of Talluza in the locality of Kalb
Ash.-Shanaro
3,000 dunums
5 r5OO d.unums
300 dunums
5,000 dunr:ms
3,000 dununs
5 1000 dumrms
7 1000 dummrs
b,ooo d.unums
6rooo dunums
6 r12oo d.ununs
7,000 dunums
3,000 d.unums
3,500 d.unums
3 1000 d.unums
1,000 dunums
2r000 dunums
11000 dum.ims
l,
.7
lc
a
v.
10.
l_1 "
12.
1\"
'lq
t6.
r1lF.7
Lands of the village of Al-l.,lughayyir
Lands of the village of Deir Sharaf
Land.s of the village of l4esha
Lands of the villages of Bardal-a and. Ain el-Beid.a
in the Tubas area
Land of Fasayil
Land in the Damya Brid.ge area
Land.s of the village of Beit Dajan
Land.s of the village of Agraba
Land.s of Al-Buqaiya
Land.s of the village of Dr:ma
Land-s in the Jarzim area
Lands of the village of Tel Haris
Land.s of the village of yasuf
Land.s of the village of Sabastiya
Total: 55,800 dunums
In the }Iablus district they established. 2l+ settlements, two of which have not
yet been given their final names. The others are as follows:
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1.
2.
3.
t,
q
6.
7.
B.
Mehola
t10 t_
Bega"ot
Arganan
Massuah
' a;- -rnalza J!:I
Tomer
lvrevo bnl_l-on
Ramonim
10. Ma-al Ephrain
11. Gitit
].2. Hamra
13. Batoah
- 1. J_+. fl.ar].s
15. Vad.eem
16. Elon Moreh A
L7. Shomron
18. Gi1gal
l-9. lJew Massuah
20. l{ekhora
2I. Ariel
22. Elon l{oreh B
9.
The Israelis are nor^r trying to consolidate a settlement which they establishetl
on Mount Jurzim, which strategically doninates the tor,m of }Tablus, and to turn it
into a tovn called' shekan, iust as previously, in 191+8, they established on the
hi1ls overLooking the Arab tol'm of Nazareth, the tovn of Nasira Elet and near the
Arab town of Acre, the town of TtTew Akko, which formed a kind. of belt around the
Arab town. Sinilarly, in 1968, they set up the town of Qiryat Arba on the hi1ls
overlooking the town of Hebron.
VII. THE TULKANM DISTRICT
fn 19)+8, the Israelis took over more than 90 per cent of the level- lancls
of Tulkarm, which were fertile antl planted with lenon and orange trees, and left
the inhabitants of the Tulkarm area, who nr:mbered. over 150'000, with only the
hiI1y regions and.10 per cent of the level 1ands. Even so, the fsraelis
considered. the existence of the town and district of Tulkarm as a thorn in ttreir
sicle and- something to be got rid of, and.o in the l-!67 va?, even though there were
no nilitary forces fighting the Israeli arny in Tulkarm or in Qalqiliya, whieh
were situated, on the armistice line, it was a part of the Israeli major objective
to occupy these two towns and the surrounding Arab villages and to expel their
inhabitants. Accorilingly, the forces of the fsraeli arny' as they advanced' blew
up and d.estroyecl the houses there. At the same timer over 200 large trucks came'
preced.ed by fsraeli army officers in Jeeps carrying loud-speakers calling on the
inhabitants to save their lives and get in the trucks to be taken to the bridges
across the Jord.an River and, in the words of these officers to "go to King Hussein
in east Jordanrt. Some cleparted. and some stayedo and. the end. result was that the
Israelis blew up more than 5OO .nrat houses.
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Thprr qrr}.e'^uently took over an area of I,OOO d-unums belonging to the Khaduri AgriculturaL College and establ-ished. there a factory for fruits. the packing of citrus They then took over 100 d.unums in the town of Qalqiliya and established. a military centre there ancl 3,OOO dunums in the Qa1qiliya """., where they
established' the settlement of Qarnay-Shomron. They also took over S'OOO dunums in the Jabla area and established there the settlement of Sal-it a colonization
centre on an area of 150 dunrrms in the Nur Shams area to the east of the town of Tu1karm. ln 1979, they established the settlement of Qarnay-shonoron to the south of Tulkarro.
They built five fsraeLi settlements in the Jenin area.
\, .. tvlel_ amt- A
Mei-ami B
Terseleh
Ma]ki Shua
Dotan
These are as follows:
)r
They then established a settlement centre in the Harish area to the east of the vil-lage of Jaba', as well as many zones to which the randor^rners and inhabitants
were forbidd-en entry. The total area of the Arab lands on the l,iest Bank taken over by the fsraelis is more than 1 million d.unums.
VTII. THTI GAZA STRIP
1.
1.
Although the total land area of the Gaza only 5) per cent of which is cultivable, and
and a refugee camp and. has an Arab popul_ation
took over 31000 dunums and established. seven
These settlements are as follows;
Katif
I(atif
l'4orag
Strip is no more than 35Lr00O d.unums, it contains three torrnso 1! villages
or \5OrOOO, the Israelis nevertheless
fsrael-i settlements on that lantt.
I'letzarim
Netzer Hazani
,7 Azoor
1.
1t
4. Kfar Darom
The fsraelis al-so took over 115,OOO dunums and. barred. access to them. A1so, after blowing up 185 houses in the Gaza Stripr the Israelis established a plant for the packing and waxing of eitrus fruit, the fsraeli Karli Plant, three banks, the Leumi Bank of fsrael, the Discount Bank and the llapo'elem Bank, and a number of military centres.
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Th-i+o r.rrAapf. for'lo7Q- the Israel-i Government earmarked. a half a billion lll !uD wuuF\su rvl L7 l7) vrrL
Israeli pound.s for the establishnent of more Tsraeli settlement.s on Arab land on
the l.,lest 3ank, und.er the supervision of Ariel Sharon, and it was d'ecid-ed to
establish 20 Tsraeli settlements on the l,,lest Bank in 1980. The Co-Chairman of
the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency announced that no fsraeli official
could even think of removing the Jewish settlers from the l^Iest Bank and the Gaza
Strip. He said further that measures were being taken for the iruoigration of
58rObO Jewish fanil-ies from abroad to Palestine and. that they wou1d. be accornmodated
in the \5 settlements which it had been decid.ed were to be built during the next
five years. In preparation for takin€{ over more Arab territory in the lowland's,
the fsraelis have d.ug deep wid.e ditches, large enough for a car to pass through'
between orange and. banana plantations on the pretext of security and had preventedthe
owners of the plantations from irrigating their fand.s. This wi11'
unquestionably, nean that the plants will wither and d.ie for lack of irrigationo
and the fsraelis will then take over the lands in ord.er to establish new
settlements. In early lr{ay 19?9, Hamd.i Khalaf, Basil Al-Husseini and
Al-Haj Khalid. Al--i-o.omi, acting on behalf of owners of plantations covering an area
of 5rOOO d.ununs in the low1and.s, submitted a complaint to the Israeli Military
Governor and asked. permission for them to irrigate their Iands, even by pipelines
if necessary. The Military Governor has so far not responded to this request.
The Israeli authorities have prevented" the Arab citizens fron d.igging artesian
we1ls on their lands without a permit, which is very difficult to obtain here.
The owners of existing wells are forced, by order of the Military Governor, to
install water meters and. are all-owed to irrigate their plantations only with the
amount of their water specified by the fsraeli agricultural offieer and at specific
tines. Natura1ly, the amount a1Iowed is not sufficient to irrigate the plantations
properly, and results are therefore inadeq,uate both quantitativel-y and
qrr"1it.live1y. The owners are suffering great losses. fn order to force them
to leave their land so that they can take it over, the fsraelis often resort to
various fraudulent means, including forgery. The fsraeli Suprerae Court, by its
decision on the fsraeli Government's confiscation of Arab l.ands in the village
of Bettine in Ramallah on the pretext of security, gave the Israeli Government
the 1ega1 right to confiscate 1and. if the purpose was security. The Israeli
authorities find it very easy i'o plead reasons of security, and. they often
confiscate 1and. and claim that the confiscation is for reasons of security, but
the land. is not returned to its owner, vho is offered some compensation for it
if he concurs. The fsraeli occupation authorities use numerous means to gain
control of Arab lands and then establish settl-ements there, on the well-known
Jewish principle of ftabsentee propertytt, which means the expulsion of the
inhabitants and seizure of the land.
Arabs on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip are not al-lowed. to plant trees
on their land. unfess they have a permit, and- such a pernit is hard. to obtain.
The purpose of this is to remove ihe land.ovner's confidence and hope that he will
remain on his land. and plant it with tr:ees that will bear fruit after a number of
year:s, in order to facilitate their seizure of it. They even prevent Arabs
irorn planting even a single tree to replace the tree or trees vhich have died on
their land.
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There have been numerous instances of the fsraelis causing damage or
destruction to Arab water pumps on Arab farms in ord"er to ruin the trees or other
crops through lack of irrigation.
The Israeli Government claims that it is establishing the settlements or some
of them on land which does not belong to the Arab citizens living in the country.
They argue that those land.s were the property of the pred.ecessor State and" that
fsrael, as the suceessor State, automatically owns this 1and. and.u by virtne of
its ovnership, has a right to dispose of this land as it wishes.
f d.o not want to embark here on a refutation of this argument and d.emonstrate
the 1ega1 invalidity of the right which the Israeli Governmentrs cIaim, but, as
a Palestj.nian Arab l-and.ovner and farmer, T shall attempt to d.ispel some of the
deliberate vagueness and obscurity surrounding this issue.
Palestine, like some of the other Arab countries, was formerly ruled by the
Turkish State in the narne of the fslarnic Caliphate. Turkish rule l-asted. from
15f7 to agfl, Und.er Turkish ru1e, a l-and.owner was the person who disposed. of
and cul-tivated the 1and., resid.ed, lived and d.ied there and passed it on by
inheritance from father to son. The landowner paid. the Turkish Government as a
1and. tax 10 per cent of the produce of the 1and. This tax was known as the tithe.
In 1858, the Turkish Government nromulgated. the tapu (lana registration) law
under which all land was to be registered. in the name of its ovner with the new
Department of tapu. The furkish Government began voluntary registration in
Palestine about 18?0. The Turkish Government was in decline, anil there was no
trust between it and the Arab citizens, so that all the Lands were not properly
registered.. The Turkish Government registered vith the Department of tapu all
the previously unregistered lands whose owners registered them in their nanes
and. continued. to d.ispose of them as their property and to pay tithes to the State.
tr"lith the end of Turkish rule and the beginning of British occupation in the
thirties ' the British mand.ate authorities in Palestine began an operation to
survey and classify the land of Palestine and to register it in the or^merrs name,
together with demarcation of the bound.aries and specification of the area to the
last dunum, in preparation for the registration of lands in the owners I names
with the Department of Land Registration (tapu). Since this was a project of
tremend.ous proportions and. required a great d.eal of time, the British mandate
authorities proeeeded. to register the l-and tax in the name of the owner as
registered" in the land tax records issued by the Survey Department in 1935. This
remained. the situation up to the end of the British mand.ate in l-91+8, while the
process of registering the land with the Department of Land Registration proceeded.
s1owly and was never completed,
The registration of land in the name of the Government d.id. definitely not
mean that the Government actually owned. the land. It was merely a formal measure
pending the completion of the lega1 proced.ures for registration. No Government
utilized. as its property any piece of land that was utilized and being cultivated
by a fanner. The land. registered in the name of the State was intended for the
public benefite such as forests, land, wel-1s, rivers and. land. donated as waqf by
ind.ivid.ual-s to sehool-s and mosques.
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Tlra qrrnrrov WaS carried. out in many villages, and in SOme of them parts Of
the land- were registered with the Department of Land. Registration. I^Ihen the
British mandate ended., the other villages had still not been surveyed., owing to
the complicated. nature of such matters because of such factors as d.ivision by
inheritance and objections before the courts.
f shal-l show you some d-ocuments which substantiate this statement and prove
the falsehood of this claim of the Israeli Government, as well as its legal
invalidity. They concerned the ow:ership of the 1and. of an Arab vilLage' my own
native village where my property is and from the fruits of whose soil I and ny
forebears lived for tens of thousands of yeers, before the birth of the Jewish
religion.
In 19)+8, the Israeli forces occupied. !0 per cent of the land of our village
of Ronmana, whieh was outsid.e the portion allocated to Israe1 and the United.
Nations resolution of 19)+T on the partition of Palestine, and in 1967 the
fsraeli authorities took over the rest of Palestine, including this vi11age.
After the 1967 occupation, the fsraelis made an attempt to disguise their
aggressionist nature and made an offer of peace to the Arab citizens who were left
und.er their rule after t967.
fn the settlement of Givat Oz, which was built on the lands of our villageo
the Israeli offieial in charge proposed to some of the Arab lead.ers of the area
friendly and peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Jews. Before he had gone
very far with this proposal, f asked hinr to tell us about himself. He replied
that he had been born in Bulgaria and. had immigrated. to Palestine in 1952. Then
I asked him about the establishment of this settlement, and he replied that the
settlement had been established in L952 and. that he had come to live there in
1954, Then f asked" him who had planted the olive tree whose branches shad.ed his
house, and. he blushed in embarassment when he was unabfe to answer. I told him:
"f planted this tree with my own hands. This land is my 1and. This
settlement was built on my land, and you come to us from Bulgaria to usurp
our land and drive us from it and then you ask for peace.tt
At this point he replied angrily:
"You Arabs have got to untlerstand that the wheel of history turns as time
passes. The wheel has turnecl now, and we are coming to Palestine from
Bulgaria and the other I'r.rropean States and from the Arab States, such as
Egypt, fraqo Morocco, Syria and Yemen. A11 you have to d.o is to turn with
this wheel and go to fraq, Syria or any Arab country you like. They are not
far away from us, and then there wouId. be coexistenee in friend.ship, security
and. peace between the Arab people and the Jewish people. That wou1d. be real
peace. tt
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f then replied.:
"is this peace or destruction, dispersal and aggression.tt
Then all withdrew from the settlement.
Only a few d.ays later T was in an fsraeli prison on tn:mped-up security
charges. I spent 13 nonths in prison, and then they sent me away from my viIIage,
where f myself had seen these irnnigrants establishing two settlements and
exploiting the fruits of the Iand.
Then Moshe Dayan, currently the L{inister for
in a speech which he gave in 19hB at the Tekhnion
"Politieally there is no raore PaLesti.ne. ft
it does not exist and we are here in Israel.
Joshua Hoben Forat said:
"The primary fact is that there can be no
Jewish State without the expuLsion of the
fencing off of the 1and.'l
Foreign Affairs of fsrael, saitl
Institute in Haifa:
,,existed before 19\8, but now
zionism without settlement and. no
Arabs and the confiscation anti
Again, Menachem Begin denies in principle the very existence of the
Palestinian Arab peopleo when he states that these people are nov inhabitants in
the sense of having administrative self-rule und.er lsraeli sovereignty in Jud.ea
and Samaria. That is merely a preparatory step for their expulsion from the land
in orcler to attain Israelirs openly declared goals.
Prisons and prisoners
Statistics compiled since the fsraeli occupation in 196? ana up to the
beginning ot 1979 indicate that the average number of Arab prisoners and
detainees incarcerated. by the Israeli occupation authorities has on no occasion
dropped. below l+rOOO persons. This figure has sometimes been as high as I'OOO or 51000 on the occasion of Arab d.emonstrations against the oecupation or of
Palestinian guerrilla operations in certain parts of the country. These prisoners
are incarcerated und.er inhuman and extremely unhealthy eonditions in approximately
l0 prisons dispersed. throughout the country. Some of these detention centres
are set aside for hideous torture while others are intended for prisoners serving
1ife terms, sentences of 5-]-5 years or terms of less than 5 years while others
are carnFs established. by the Israelis in the southern desert for prisoners
sentenced to hard labour.
These Arab victims are subjeeted by the fsraeli authorities to the most
atrocious kinds of torture and. intimidation such as:
1. Painful beating on the body with sticks and hard instruments.
2, Beating and d.amaging the genital organs of both men and women and
injecting then with hot pepper.
upsid.e d.own by their feet.
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3. Hanging prisoners This type of torture is known
as "the nightrnarett.
\. Applying electric
5. Pulling out nalIs
shocks to the bod.ies of detainees.
with pincers.
Breakins teeth.
I. Filling the mouth with salt.
8. UnLeashi.ng trained police dogs to bite prisoners.
9. Attempting to force detainees to practise pederasty with their colleagues in
d.-etention. If they refuse or are unable to ilo this, they are forced. to beat their
colleagues violently with sticks.
l-0. Bringing the wife, sister or mother of the prisoner to the detention centre
ancl threatening to abuse them sexually if the prisoner does not make the required
concession.
11. Tying the prisone?fs hands behind. his back, blindfolding hin and placing him
in a cel1 for a nr:mber of days during which he is burnt with eigarette stubs on
various parts of his body.
In many cases, detainees and. convicted persons have been afflicted with
chronic illnesses, blindness, paralysis or deafness. In some cases the bones of
their hands or feet have been broken and in others, the victims have been left
unconscious and. finally d.ied. Detainees and convicted persons in these prisons
are kept in d.isgustingly overcrowd.ed conditions in cel1s 150 centimetres long'
80 centimetres wide and 2 metres hieh. There are now \OO-5OO prisoners in the
Maskubiya Prison in Jerusalem which was originally intendeti to acconnod.ate
l!O-2rO detainees. Betr,reen 5OO-7OO prisoners are crowd.etl into the l\Tablus prison
whieh vas intend.ed. to accommodate 2OO persons and celI block No. 6 of this prison,
vhich was intended fcr 20 prisoners, is now ercwd.ed" r,rith 110 prisoners. Ttre Ramle
Central Prison, which was intcndecl to hold 500 prisoners, nov contalns
2rOOO-2r5OO prisoners. The Kfar Yona Prison, intend.ed to hold" 75 prisoners' now
contains 2OO-250 prisoners. The Ashkelon Prison, intended. to hold" 300 prisoners,
is now crowded. with 500-700 prisoners. The Shatta Prison" intended to holct
150 prisoners, now contains LOO-500 prisoners and the temperature in the region
in which this prison is located (the geisan Va11ey) reaches l+0" C in the sunmer.
The Beer-Sheba Prison, which was built by the Israelis after the year 1957 to
accommoclate 5OO prisoners, is now crowded. with 700-11000 prisoners.
The same is true of the prisons at Damoun, Nabi Salih, Maasiyahuo Jalama,
Tell Mond., Neve Tirza, llebron, Bamallah, Jenin, Tulkarm, Bethlehenn Jericho,
Acreo ZikhronYataqov, Had.era, Jaffa, TeI Aviv, Khan Yunis, Rosh Beit' 41 Bassa,
Safed, Afula, Nazareth, Shaimesh, Nahalal, IVahariya, MaJilu, Karkur and the camps
at Ur:am Kilab, Amer and" Al Buyuk,
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The method in which adninistrative detainees are he1d. in custody indicates
a lack of any lega1, proceilura1 or human element of restraint in Tsrael where
the inhabitants can be arrested. in their homes or places of vork or even on the
street without having committed any crime. They are then subJected to the most
hid.eous forms of torture and. thrown into fsraeli prison cells for months and
even years without being ind.icted or brought to trial- on any charge. In some
cases, people have even been deported. from the country.
Such d.eportation of the inhabitants is a d.evice used by fsrael for the purpose
of removing the owners of land., which can then be expropriated. The ed.ucated
el-ite, consisting of persons such as physicians, engineers and skilled technicians,
is also being expelled in order to sabotage the Arab economy on the l^Iest Bank and
the Gaza Strip whose inhabitants wou1d, consequently, be obliged to emigrate in
order to earn a living. The Arab inhabitants living under this tyrannicaloccupation
are foreed. to sell their land antl emigrate for fear that they may be
expelled and. lose their land without compensation,
Over 21000 of the Arab population were expelled from the occupied teruitories
between 196T-1979.
There are no limits to Tsraelrs viol-ation of every international 1aw and
convention and of the prineiples of social justice and hr:nan conduct. Even
houses of worship and holy places have not escaped. their evil attacks, On the
eve of Easter Sunday, 2l April l9TO, Israeli poliee officers occupied the
Orthod.ox Coptic Patriarchate and its ehurches in the Coptic Monastery.
In October of 19?0, the fsraelis attenpted., through the nedir::n of the
Hinafuta Company, to fraudulently seize the French Convent of Notre Da:ne in
Jerusalem from the French Catholic Monastic Ord.er in New York through the American
Zionist Samuel Conran, which forced. His Holiness the Pope to personally intervene
and delegate Archbishop Hanna Kald.ani to make representations on his behalf to
the courts in Jerusalem in order to protect the convent fron Zionist treachery and
spoiliation.
The fsraeli occupation authorities also seized building land belonging to the
Greek Orthod.ox Patriarehate in the neighbourhoocl of the King David Hotel in
JerusaLem.
0n 2\ March 1971 sone Israeli. youths pretend.ing to be tourists entered the
Chureh of the Holy Sepulchre in which they smashed. the oil lamps and cand.les
placed on the Holy Sepulchre r,rhich they trampled under foot. The monks in the
church, who had also been attacked, were able to capture one of the intruders
whom they hand.ed over to the fsraeli police. The latter subsequently announced
that he was an American Jew and no more was said. about this crine.
The Israeli police are occupying the Magharba Gate which provid.es access
through the walL to the Noble Sanctuary (a1 Haram A1 Sharif) in Jerusalem
and have been maintaining a permanent police checkpoint at this Gate sinc e 1967.
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Young Israelis of both sexes have on several occasions entered the court of
the Holy Al-Aqsa l"{osque in Jerusalem where they have dancedn sung, chanted.'
indulged in r.^rild and. indecent behaviour and attacked Mustim worshippers. They
have behaved in a similar manner in the }Toble Sanctuary of Abraham in the town
of Hebron, the greater part of which was taken over by the fsraelis and. converted
into a Jewish synagogue.
On 2l August 1969, a black day in human history, the fsraeli authorities set
fire to the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque and attempted to prevent the Arab population and
the Arab municipal fire engines, which had. hurried to the scene, from carrying
orrt. t.heir. r*rt.w rrf extinguishing the fire in the mosque. This attempted. qsvJ
obstruction was, howevero thwarted by the A.rab population. Christian clergymen
rushed past the fsraeli police forces into the Al-Aqsa Mosque crying and shouting
"the houses of God are being burnt" and Muslims and Christians alike followed
their example and rushed. forward to extinguish the Israeli fire which was
consuming the d.ome of the Holy Al-Aqsa tr4osque. fsrael clairned that the fire
had been caused, by an electrical short circuit but reports by Arab engineers
clearly showed. that the fire had been set by crininal hands. This compelled the
fsraeli Government to claim that a 29-year-old. Australian cal1ed
Dennis Michael l,Iilliam lr{ohano who had entered Israel'four months bef,ore the d'ate
of the fire, had. actually comnitted the crime, had been arrested and would be put
on trial. Shortly after, fsrael announced that he had been released on ground.s
of insanity.
The Palestine Archaeological Museum in Jerusalem was seizerl on the first
d.ay of the fsraeli occupation of the city in t96T and., in violation of articles 17
an6 18 of The Hague Convention, the rarest and most valuable items in this
museum, including the Dead Sea scrolls and the Lachish letters were transferred
bw t.he Tsraet'i authorities to their own museums. These authorities aLso seized vJ
the Temple scrol-I from Mr. Kandors house in Bethlehem.
The archaeolcgical excavations are no less serious than other fsraeli
aggressive actions. Since L96B and. in spi.te of the successive resol-utions adoptedly-
international bodies, the fsraeli authorities have been continuing their
excavations on the pretext of searching for traces of Solomonts Temple. These
excavations were begun in t967 under the houses of the Arab population, und.er
mosques and schools and under the }Tobl-e Sanctuary. Beneath this sanctuary the
fsraeli authorities dug a long and deep tunnel in which they placed a copy of
the Torah and. established. a Jewish synagogue. fn a ceremony narking the
inauguration of this synagogue, the Chief Rabbi made a speech in which he declared
that, "Today we celebrate the inauguration of the synagogue which we have
temporarily established under the Sanetuary. Tomorrow we will celebrate the
destruction of this sanctuary, the establishnent of our greater synagogue and the
reconstruction of our temple on its site, which is our 1and, and none of these
Arab aliens will remain in our country.tt
As a result of the excavations, cracks appeared. in the wa1ls of many
residential houses, mosques, Islamic chapels and schools on which the Israeli
police placed signs forbid.d.ing the passage of pedestrj.ans and. ordering the
evacuation of the inmates on the pretext of protecting them from the danger of
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the col-lapse of these structures. Shortly thereafter, fsraeli engineers prepared.
reports justifying the need to clemolish these crunbling establ-ishments in order
to ensure the safety of the population. Following their dernolition, fsraeli
residential buildings were constructed. to house fsraeli immigrants and the
dispossessed Arabs were driven away to join the long procession of their homeless,
tormented. brothers in search of justice.
The totaL number of Arab residential houses blown up by the Israelis d.uring
the period L96T-I9?9 anounts to 2,875, aistributed as follows:
Number_ of houses
350
L,IT,
tto5
115
q?n
5O
250
z,BT,
District of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho
District of Rama]-lah
District of Hebron
u]-sl'r]-ct' of' r\aolus
District of Tulkarm
District of Jenin
District of Gaza
Total
Even ed.ucation has not escaped. from their malevolence since they have changed.
the ed.ucational eurricul-a which was being followed before their occupation in
ord.er to make the teaching syllabuses more consistent vith their aims and.
d.esires. They have forbid.den the teaching of the Koranic verses urging holy war
in d.efence of religion and the homeland.. Despite all the modern advances nade in
the fieLd. of health care throughout the worldn in this respect the situation in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip is deteriorating and. the total lack of health care
might al-most be preferable to the present deplorable facilities.
At a seninar held in New York in L978, Professor Tsrael Shahak, Professor of
Chemistry at the Hebrew University in fsrael and Chairman of the Human Rights
Cornmittee, made the following conments on the treatment by the Tsraeli Government
of the Arab population suffering under its oceupation:
1. An Arab citizen d.oes not have the right to Join a kibbutz and a young '
lsrael-i lroman was expelled from such a settlement since she wanted to marry an
Arab.
2. Thousand.s of Arabs work inside Israel in fsraeli factories, projects antl other
institutions which d.esperately need this source of rnanpower. However, the fsraeli
authorities forbid these workers to spend. the night in fsrael and, therefore,
they must travel to the l^Iest Bank and. Gaza Strip in the evening, returning the
A/3\/16
English
Annex II
Fage 19
following mornin64. l4any of the workers are unable to make this trip twice a
day and are thus compelled to sleep in fsrael. In the evening, the police forces
can be seen driving those people to the police stations where they are all beaten
by police officers wield.ing sticks. Many fsraeli citizens living close to police
stations have thus been obliged to complain to the Chief of Police that they are
unable to sleep at night d.ue to the screams of Arab workers being tortured and
beaten in the police stations.
3. In March 1978 the fsraeli police aruested 200 Arab students in schools in
Ranallah ancl A1 Bireh from whence they were herd.ed, into a police station.
Professor Shahak said that, when he happened to pass by the poJ-ice station and
observed. this distressing scene, an Israeli police officer approaehed hini and
said t'This is the rough way we treat those who d.o not like ustt, to which the
professor replied ttNo, this is the rough vay you treat those that you do not liker'.
The professor could hardly bel-ieve that this incid.ent had taken place in
Israel and on the West Bank in the year 1978 and. not in Tzarist Russia in 1884
when the Jews were being subJected. to torture merely because they were Jews.
However, Arab students were being subjected. to torture here merely because they
were Arabs. A society which tolerates such acts wifl neet a worse fate than the
Palestinians are presently enduring at the hands of the Israelis.
These are the true facts of our situation and this is what we are enduring
as a result of the destruction, pilIage, robbery and murder brought about by the
sinister d.esigns of the fsraelis and their crimes against our people. They are
launching criminal attacks upon us with the most modern produets of the American
nilitary machine, including clestructive weapons which have been forbid.den by
international Iaw. Menahem Begin, their Prime Minister, is not ashamed to
announce that he will track downo pursue and ki1l the Palestinian people wherever
they are and wherever he can in the name of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Our people now number four million persons of which the overwhelming majority
are highly educated and only want to return to their homelancl and live as free
men in the sane way as the other peoples of the free wor1d. 't^Ie are a hard.
working, constructive and not destructive, people and have helped to d.evelop this
and other regions. We shoul-d not be deprived of the right to sel-f-d.etermination
and to a freeu independent and sovereign life in our homeland..
fn submitting this factual information for your consideration, ve call upon
the international comnunityo through you, to shoulder its responsibilities by
pronptly halting the Zionist invasion, pillage and exploitation of our land and
putting an end to their occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands. In so doing,
we will be serving the cause of peaee based on justice in the Middle East and in
the worlcl as a whole.
Thanking youn
(siened) Naj ib AL-AHI4AD
Political DePartment of the
Palestine Liberation Organization
27 May I9T9
A/i+ /i36
English
Annex II
Page 20
APPEI.IDIX
rsraeli settlements on the ltres! Bank in the period 196?-l4ay 19?9
Name of
]!o " se.ttl-ement Location Area Date of
(in dunurns) establishment Srpe and. affiliation
1 Mehola
Almog
(xaria)
3 Kfar Etzion
\ Argaman
5 Phatza'!El
6 qiryat-Arba
J Rosh Tzurim
B Mevo Horon
9 Yitav
On the land of
Bardala
On the northern
shore of the Dead
Sea
Between Bethlehern
and Hebron
Near the Dam3ra, Briclge
in the Central Jordan
Val1ey
Fazayil area in the
Central Jord.an Va11ey
Near the town of
Hebron
Between Bethlehem
and Hebron
On the 1and.s of
Beit }Iuba
0n the lands of
Al-AwJa north :f
Jericho
Central Jord.an Valley
north of Jericho
7 0c0
IB OOO
1 000
5 000
l+ OoO
I 000
2 000
10 000
2 TOO
1 A67
l-967
L96T
1968
1958
l968
L969
ltg69
r970
Agricultural moshav
containing installations
belonging to Hapo'e1
Hamizrahi
Agricultural Kibbutz
belonging to the Union
of Kibbutz l4ovements
Agriculture and Fishing
Agricultural kibbutz
belonging to the
religious kibbutzin
Agricultural moshav
belonging to Herut
Agricultural moshav
belonging to the
i,,{oshav Movement
fnd.ustrial belonging
to Haporel Hanizrahi
Agricultural kibbutz
belonging to the
religious kibbutzim
Agricultural kibbutz
belonging to Agutlath
Israel
Agricultural kibbutz
belonging to the Union
of Kibbutz Movements
Agricultural and
Fishing kibbutz
belonging to the Union
of Kibbutz Movements
10 Gi1ga1 3 300 T9TO
A/3\ /136
English
Annex II
Page 21
No.
Name of
settlement Loeation Area Date of
(in aunums) establishment Type and affiliation
11 it{itzpe
Shalem
12 Massvah
13 Atrot
1It Hamra
L5 Alon Shvot
16 Mekhor:a
LT i{ar al
Ephraim
18 Begatot
19 Gitit
Between Kalia ancl
Ain Hatli
'ilne Jr_rtt].K br]-dge
in the Central
Jordan Valley
On the land.s of
Qalandiya north
of Jerusalem
0n the lands of
Beit Dajan east
of Nablus
Between Bethlehem
and Hebron
On the lands of
Beit Dajan east
of Nablus
On the lands of the
village of Aqraba
east of lVablus
On the lantls of
the village of
Al-Buqaiya east
of Nablus
On the lands of
Aqraba east of
Nablus
Near Beit Hanina
South-east of
Jerusalem
1V
2L
Neve Yaracov
Talpiot
5 000
t-0 000
5 000
1 000
I 500
2 000
2 000
5 000
)+ ooo
10 000
t9TO
1 07c)
L970
L9TT
'l o71
L9TI
L97:-
1 472
1 A72
T9T3
'r 07?
Agricultural kibbutz
belonging to the Union
of Kibbutz Movements
Agricultural and
fishing moshav
belonging to the
llorkers of Zion
Industrial
Agricultural and
poultry raising moshav
bel-onging to the
Agricultural Union
l.{unicipal service
centre and religious
school belonging to
Haporel Hamizrahi
Agricultural moshav
belonging to the
Agricultural Union
Regional centre
belonging to the
Moshav Movement
Agricultural moshav
belonging to the
Agricultural- Union
Agricultural moshav
belonging to the
Agriculturaf Union
Herut
Industrial
Residential
^/3\
/536
English
Annex II
Peoo ))
No. Name of
settlement Location Area Date of
(in dunums) establishment $pe and affiliation
22 Gilo
23 Ramot
Mae a]ouf
Defna
Sanhedria
26 Ro'r
27 Maeale
Ad.omin
zo Elazar
29 Takoah
30 Ofra
3f Kochav
Hashahar
32 Magshinim
55 l\etlv
Hagdud
Between Jerusalem
antl Beit Jal-a
On the lands of
Nabi Samwil north
of Jerusalem
East of Jerusalem
North-east of
Jerusalem
Central- Jordan
Val1ey south of
14ehola
Between Jerusalem
and Jericho
Between Hebron
and. Bethl-ehem
Between Hebron
and Bethlehem
North-east of
Ramallah
On the lands of
Deir Jatir and. Kafr
Malik/Ranallah
Near Almog on
the Dead. Sea
Central Jorclan
Valley
h ooo
I0 000
2To
500
70 000
t_ 000
3 000
350
l+ ooo
5 000
'l o7?
L973
r973
r973
r97\
LgTt+
L9T5
I9T5
r975
L97'
r976
Resiclential
Resiclential
Residential
Resid.ential
Agricultural nahal
Large ind,ustrial
belonging to the
Emunim bloc
fndustrial moshav
belonging to Haporel
Hamizrahi
Agricultural kibbutz
belonging to Hapotel
Hamizrahi
Agricultural belonging
to the Bnonim bl-oe
Agricultural kibbutz
belonging to the
Union of Kibbutz
IUovements
Agricultural moshav
belonging to the
It{oshav }.rtovement
3 000 r976
nnl /aJ-l ' Il t)rJ,av(,
H nO t r q n
Annex II
Page 23
No.
Name of
settlement Location Area Date of
(in aunuros) establishment Trrnp "nd affr'I -iation
^J1.4 lrlevo bn]-ton
Elon ivioreh
t^ \
I f l9ddlrm ] \ asuu \Irr /
l{aliki
Shua
l\./l or 'rmr { A I
Rarrhqn
lle]. 'am1' \/t-J \/
Reyhan
l4igdal Oz
40 Yattir
41 Kfar Ruth
l^4 Z _Ua' 1r '1'e1
l-
L+ ^j bnayel-et
411 -F adeen
On the l-and.s of
the rrill:oc ,rf
u^u/-n-a- -/ I\a blus
On the land.s of
Kafr Qad"dum/Nablus
On the lands of
-Faqou'a/Jen]-n
On the l-and-s of
llmrr Rarrhen/Ve/hafl
On the land"s of
Ilnrn Revha n /Ya. e ba d
Between Hebron
and Bethlehem
South of Hebron
On the l-ands of
Latrun
On the lands of
Latrun and. fmwas
On the lands of
Tntrttn- Trmvae anfl
Yalu
On the lands of
l{es t ha rrest of
Nablus
North of Jericho
500
500
I C00
5 000
3 0c0
r 5oo
100
5 000
Q nnn
1 000
L9T 6
T97T
L9T7
1 477
L9T7
L9T7
107'l
T9T7
1Q't7
L9T6 Settlement centre
35 1976
1O
3T
3B
39
Settlement centre
hc'l onrri no' l-.o th c
Emonim bloc
Settlenent centre
hel ons'inrr to Tla.nor el
Hamizrahi.
-Agricultural kibbutz
halnnoino tn iha
national hibbutzim
IIosha.v bel ongino' to
the Workers of Zion
Moshav helonp'ins'to
Pan^, al Homf ?rah1
Settlement centre
l_\a I nhor ho tn f ha
EtrIIONlM b-LOC
I\.losha.v be'l onp'inq' to
lha q ori nrr'l trrrr I
Iloshav l'lovement
l\ nc flzrr hp I nn or na tO
the l4oshav l'{ovement
l'4nshtrr hFlnnI-rn/T tO
the llorkers of Zion
Movement
Ha I nhot no Tn T ha
Emoni.m bloc
i ioshav bel onEi nc to
the l.,riorkers of Zion
)+, Ramonim 300 a977
A/3\ /16
rlJlhro:bl + rr uch r!
Annex Tf
lage 2+
lTo. "Dls?uui:a^s!:]E:-rl+rJ Location ,,_o1.11..*-, __::l?_,:t-. _ ,un" and. arruiation f l_n ounums I estaDllsnment
146 shomron on the land.s of 500 rgTT settlement centre
Deir Sharaf/Nablus belonging to Gosh
Emonim
4T Efrat North of Hebron I ooo r97T Agricultural
Etzion bloc
hB Hamuzit South of Bethlehern I OOO I/TT Settlement centre
L+g Kadesh Central- Jord.an Valley 2 OOO L977 Agricultural moshav Bad-tigh north of Jericho
50 Moud.i e im On the land.s of 10 000 I9T7 To convert thern into a
Yalu and fmvas town vith neighbouring
settl-ements
5L Qaryat 0n the tand.s of 5 OO0 L7TT Agricultural
l4ikabin Yal-u and fmwas
52 Rafet on the land-s of fo 0oo L9T7 Agricultural
thA lrr I lqoa At'
Rafat/Ramallah
,3 }Jataran central- Jord.an 1 ooo rgTo Agricultural
Va1ley
,14 Ariel On the lands of I9T9
Saffit and Sikaka/
Nablus
5, Bed.ul-am On the land.s of 1 OOO I9T7 Agricultwal
Beit llmar /Hebron
55 Our On the tand.s of 2 000 I9T,( Agricultural
the rril lssa nf
u^/n ur/fiamal-l.an
5T Tomer ltrorth of Jericho I 0OO I97T Agriculturaf moshav
belonging to the
Illoshav Movement
58 Saf it Between Tulkarm 2 OOO LTTB Agricultural belonging
and Qalgiliya to Herut
/...
^/3\
/16
H:nC tl en
Annex II
Page 25
l\rs-mo nf 1nT\U^ .
<aff | 6hahf Location Area Date of
(in dunums) establishment Tlpe and affiliation
,9 Shil-oh
o/^u l1atoan
o/-I 'f ersef eh
at Linlres
oa^.J ljeIt Horon
5l+ Givr on
o> (4arnay-
bnamron /^\ \AJ
Uest of Ramallah
On the land,s of
Yasuf south of
Nablus
North of Sail_at
Dhahr
On the land.s of the
village of Haris/
Nablus
On the lands of
uur .al-l avqa/I
Ramallah
On the lands of
Ef-Jib /Ramallah
I'a.st of OaT nil irrg $s! \ar! rJ !
r- 500
I 000
500
300
500
2A0
2 000
500
500
5oo
l_ 000
L97B
I o7B
1978
T97B
LgTB
1978
LgTB
1978
IgTB
IgTB
LgTB
IgTB
I O70
300
Agricultural belonging
to frnonim bloc
Settlement centre
Settlement centre
hF I nnol no tn (lnsfi
Emonim
Settlements centre
helonp'ino i.o Clnsl
trnonim
Settlement centre
belonging to Gosh
Bnonim
Settlement centre
be lonp'r no to (instl
Elnonim
Settlement centre
hp I r)n cr no tn (',nc[
Flnonim
Tnd.ustr j-al belonging
to Gosh Emonim
Settlement centre
trelonr"ino to Gosl
I,monim
Settlement centre
hF I .)nr'r ncr tn (lrlsh
Emonim
Settlement centre
a drl nlr I f r1r4 |
oa/o ri].tzpen
/no t be1l fiael-
58 Neve Zuf
09 lJotan
ldest of Jericho
On the l-and.s of
T.na 1rf I lqoa Af-
Bettin/Ramall-ah
On the lands of
Nabi Saleh
On the l-ands of
Qibatiya/Jenin
Central- Jordan Valley
A1 Khan A.l Ahmar
TO
TT
New Massvah
Ma ral-e
Adomim (B)
n /a)t /r.a(, at Ja I )Jv
F:nf ll qh
Annex fI
v20a ^/6/
No. T?T: tt , Location Area Date of settl-ement " (in aunums) establ_ishment T'JV ne anrt au.rflfriltr qia'tion
T2 Elon. /*\ On the lands of Moreh (B) Har"rwara and
Al Rahib/Nablus
T3 Qarnal.*/ -\ Between Qalqiliya Shonron (B) and Tufkarm
'1 070
I q7A
n lal, lc,a(, nl Ja I /Jv
H:nd I l qn
Annex If
Page 27
ISRAELI SETTLEI\{ENTS IN THE GAZA STRTP FROI4 1967 TO MAY 1979
lln Name Location Area Dltc of
in dum.ims cstablishment lype ano al 11r1ar1on
Kfar Darom
2 Azoor
Netzer
Hazani
Netzarim
i[ear Deir
El Bal-ah
Near Beit Hanun
Near Deir
El Balah
District of Nuseitat
between Gaza and Deir
EI Balah
District of Umm
Kil-ab between Rafah
and Khan Yunis
Betveen Rafah and
Khan Yunis
Betveen Rafah and
Khan Yunis
5 Mnres'
6 ratir R
Katif B
4oo
Boo
300
7oo
200
l+OO
rqn
L967
L969
I9TO
1 q72
LgI2
L977
TgTB
Agricultural nahal
hal nnsi no to Hano ! vvrvrrL>rlro el-
Hamizrahi
fndustrial Union of
Kibbutz Movements
Agricultural moshav.
Moshav i'4ovement
A ^--" ^' '
-l *.'.ra'1 n6rILUtrUuI@J.
RolAhorno fn fhA
religious kibbutzim.
/\ o7a
^tt
I f tlTt I
Re'l onoins to thr. Union
of Krbbutz Movements"
nAbarr -inrrerl#rrro'l
Belonoins to Hanoeel-
Hamizrahi
Aori arrl''|-rrral
Belonging to Hapo-el
Hamizrahi
A/3\ /536
English
Annex II
rage izo
RNSIDEiITTAL QUARTERS ESTABLTSJIED BY TjTE ISRAELIS ON ARAB TANDS IN JERUSaln{
AFTER 1957
AREA IN
DUNUI4S
DATE OF
ESTABLISHMENT
Hqhknl llrrrrf6r Ks\Lr evr
Jelrish Quarter
French Hi]-l
Gilo Quarter
Thc. Citadel Quarters
Hebrei'r University and Hadassah 2OO
5oo
LZO
r 500
300
12 000
l.959
1959
1959
1 477
I9T7
I q75
A/3\ /n6
Ensl]-sn
Annex II
Page 29
List of the names of owners and" the area of Falestinian Arab lands taken over hIr fha l<?qal1 ' Duthorities in the villase ovf f ir'r.etaJ idal- Beni Fad,al in the d"istrict of
ItTabl-us on the West Bank for the establ-ishment of an Israeli settlernent consisting
of 320 resid-ential units containing around. 1,000 residential rooms and
appurtances.
No.
la
3
l+
5
6
T
B
9
10
11
t2
l-3
l_4
IO
17
1B
Name
Asaad- Sal-im Mansour
Sal-im Ahmad. Sal-im
Salama Ahraad Salim
Abdul Azi-z }4uhammad Yussuf
Abd-ul Fattah Hussein
Muhammad Hamid. Hamd"an
Rid-ha l'uhammad. Abd. Khateeb
Ahmad. A1 Haj Asaad. I(hateeb
s2 lt h l/llraq Yqhlr9
Fakhri Abdul Hameed. Abd"ul Majeed
Mustafa Auda Ismail
Ismail Auda Ismail
Ibrahim Auda Ismail
l{ustafa Abdul Haleem Mustafa
Ahmad. Abdul Haleem
Muhamnad Abdul Hameed Yussuf
Sulaiman Abd.ul Hameed Yussuf
Abdul-l-ah Abdul- Hal-eem Mustafa
Abd,ul Majeed. Abdul Hameed
Mashhoor l4uhammad Abu lluslih
I{ustafa Ahmad Abu lt{uslih
Salih Abdul- Rahnan Abu i{uslih
Abdul Rahman lluhanmad Abu Muslih
l.4uhanmad Ahrnad llussein
Shawkat Abdul Rahman Al Jabr
Salih Ahnad Salih
Mahmoud. Ahmad- Salih
Qasim it{uharmrad Qasim
Area in clunr.ms
,o
20
'tq
+/
20
20
3'
50
30
35
20 (Harneed)
15
tq L/
L7
)+O (ttateem)
20
30
25
20
t5
2\
20
10
5
-l 5
L2
10
25
15
tq
20
2I
22
23
24
25
26
2T
2B
n /a)' lc.cA
^t J- I )Jv
H:no | 1 qn
Annex fI
Page 30
Irjo.
2q
30
31
32
33
a)r
?s
JO
3T
"A
39
40
4-L
)+2
)r?
)r Il
45
4t)
a1l,7
r+B
Lo
1l
\2
53
5)+
55
>o
q,7
/l
cA
IIame
l'{uharcrnad. Qasirn Jawhar
Nawfal l4uhammad. Nawfal
Hussein Zahir Khalifa
Abdul Rahman l{uharnmad l(hudheir
Hus sein l'4uha^rlnad- ICeud_heir
Muhanmad l(hud.heir l4uhammad
Faiz Hasan l{uhammad
l{uhammad Hamdan Muhammad.
fbrahirn Abd.ul Rahman Shahadeh
Sulaiman Asmar Rizk
Sulaiman Asmar Rizk
l{ustafa Ahnad. Samtin
Ahmad lt4ahrnoud Saadeh
Ismaif Abdul- Aziz l4ahmoud
Hussein Hifzi
Abdul Rahman Abdul- Rahman
Yussuf Salim Saad"ud
Muhammad Salim Saadud
Muhammad. Sal-ih Rabbah
Abdullah Eid l,{uhsin
Muheisin Salman
Abdu Muhsin Ubaid
Sal-ih Muhammad" Muhsin
Sulaiman lr{uharunad. l,{uhsin
Muhammad Yussuf Salaous
Zaal Yussuf Salaous
Mustafa Musa Sal_ous
Hasan Yunus Hasan
Sulaiman l4uhamrnad liammad
Yussuf Saadeh Yussuf
Area in d,umrms
10
tq L/
10
30
20
't5
20
15
20
rR fv
20
t5
l_0
tl
10
20
fE
+/
l_0
20
2\
15
20
2\
EN
10
ta
10
L2
10
- - al
r 9 rva uulf @lD
t/zLr />26
English
Annex IT
Page 31
The total- a'rea of the lands taken over establishment of by the rsrael-i authorities for the a settlement comprising 320 residential- units consisting of three rgoms (cement, with appurtenan""ri. T;;*-i"na-i"tor,gs to the inhabitants of the: village of l4ajdaf Beni Fadal- in the district of Nablus. These agricultural 1ands, situated near Fasayel and knor.m as the area of Ruweiha and Masateeh" are registered in the names of their owners in the cadastral survey.
.JiVrTfi' f$Ay$cN$
GhNERAL
A S S A M B [-Y
Distr.
GENERAL
A/3\ />36 /corr.1
/ trl^ar^mh6r I tJ , (f
I rrvv L/t/
ENGLISH, FRE}trCH, RUSSTAN
AND SPANTSH OI{LY
*hi rtv- forrrth session
l\genda lten1. oa-)
TIUYIAII SETTLEI'{ENTS
Living conditions gf the Pglestinian people
in the occupied" territgries
Report ojl the Secretary-Generaf
Corrigendum
Anncx II, paqe 2, section U" lecond. paragraph, line 5
For 1,000 Arabs read" 100,000 Arabs
79:29L60
--------.-t-------
-^
t: z+iE=
{.,N;TgD NATJONS
Gfih.I ERAL
A S 5 E M B LY
lastr.
GI]T'I!RAI
rv/t>/Il3.J Clq-ff ,l
17 October 1980
ORIGTNA],: EI,]GLISII
Alen(ia ]'l]en i\_L \e/
DIIVXL0P-'{,,'IrT hlD TrITnllIATIOlllti, ECOiirOL'lTC CO-OPInATIOII
Report o" the SecretarY-Gen eralf.
Tn ibs resolution 3\/113 of 1\ Decentrer 1979, the Gen--ra1 Assenbly lecluested
the secretary-General " in colfaboration r,rith the lelevant united llations oTFjans
'.ri - oniit:-pIr-6..ips. n4Fti.- rar'lv i.r-e ll|ited latiors lelief and llorks Agencl'
for Pales'oine Refu.lees in the llear .-ast (Ui'IRIIA) " the rconoroic corurission for
l'iestern Asia (XCflA) aniL the Specr'-a1 Corlrtrittee to Investigate Israeli Practices
Affectinq the Hunan Rights of tlre Popr-r-lation of the Occupied Territories, to
-prepare and submit -,.o the lsser.bllr at its thirty-fifth session a comprehensive and
analytical report on the social and- eeononic impact of the Israeli occupat'ion on
the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories'
l. '.re resoLutior. l'sd 5asical-Ly the sane scoDe as Cenera-L Assenl]fy resol'rtions
31/110 or 15 December L975, 32/171 of 19 December 19?7 and 33/110 of
18 December 1978 on the sane subject. Pursuant to resolution 31/u0, the
Secretary-General submitted a report (A/32/228) to the Assenbly at its thirty-second
sessron; pursuant .to resolution 32/17:_" he submitted a second r epott (A"/.33/351i) to
tl,,e Assembly at its thirty-thircl sessioni and pursuant to resolution 33/110, he
subfiitted a further report (A/31+/535 and Corr.].) 'tto the Assembly at its
thirtv-fourth session.
3, In subnittinl: t1'Ie above reports, the representatives of the Sec retary-General
explainecl that' becarse the Secretary-General had no indepentlent sources of
in iorrna.t ion, the relorts ha.d' of necessity' to consist of replies and pertinent
e).cerris froin docunentary -iaterial sllbmitted, by the Governr.ents of nfl-ylt' Israel"
Jordan a[d rue sfrian Are-l) ]enubl ic, as irel-L as by the Palestine l,iberabjon
organization and the relevant united- tJations organs anc'l- slecialized agencles" rn
response to the Secueta-ry-General I s reg-uest for inforination on the subi ect'-matter
of the rer..ort,
11. At the thirtlr-fourth session, after consid-ering the Secretary-General r s report
uo-r]'irt / " '
Iif ihd ^^ndi+i^h. ^f in the oc cupiecl
A/ 3' / 533
Engli sh
Page 2
(A/:\/536 and Corr,f) " the ceneral Assenbly in paragraph 1of its resolution
3L/]13 expressed the vie.,r that it afthough thl report contained rlany relevant f.acts, was not sufficiently analytical. Accordingly. in paragraph 2 of the s ame resolution, the Assembly req_uested the Secretary- General " inter a1ia, to prepare
and submit to the Assembly at its thiTty-fifth session tne-EZifii ensive and analytical report on the sociaf and econonic imDact of livins conditions of the ?atestinian people referred to in p*"gi.prr-r-"i.r". ' aii ii"t.l"i"ri" ""^"" t" co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report.
5" so as to enabre the secretarv-General to prepare and subnit ta the thirty-fifth session of the General Assernbly the required 'rcomprehensive and anafytical report'' , and in an effort to ensure a balanced- ard objective expert view, the Secretaxy_
G€neral used the services of three experts, Their narnes and a description of their backgrounds are given in annex fI belov,
6. The experts were to prepaxe the report on the basis of roateriaf available fron the United Nations and. its subsidiary bodies and from the specialized agencies,
and other published and unpublished literature pertaining to the subJect. They
were also to gather infornation throtgh visits to Egypt, Jordan and ihe syrian
Arab Republic and the occupied territories and through discussions vith governnent offieials and others, as well as ',rith representatives of the palestine Liberation
Organi zation.
7. As perrnission to visit the oceupied territories had not been granted by the
Governnent of Tsrael, the experts, in preparing their report, had io rely on
secondary sources of infofination, particularly the reports of nissions of the rnternational Laboux organisation (tLO), the united Nations Educational, scientific and Cultural 0rganization (uWfSCO) and the l.trorld Health Organization (mO) tt.t fr"a visited the territories, reports published by the Palestine Liberation Organi zation a report furnished by the Government of rsrael and, as o in its suggested by that Governrnent note verbale dated lB "{arch 1980" "... information published by journalists,
scholars, scientists, clergymen and tourists vho have visited the territories".
Relevant information vas also received from the Governments cf ngypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Relub1ic.
8. The question of the living conditions of the palestinian reople has been a natter of concern in many intergovernmentar bodies and subsidiLy organs of the United Nations, for exampfe of the Palestinian People, t"h eth eco Crnonoisnsitiotene c onn H tuhmea nE Rxeigrchitsse, tohfe t hsep efcniaalli ecnoambmleitt eReights to rnvestigate rsraeli Practices Affecting the l{uman Rights of the population of the Occupied Territories and the Security Council" to mention some. Because of the
consiclerable volume of rnaterial available in the united Nations. as wel,l as other published material in books, periodical-s, journals and the pr€ss, it was agreed that one expert T{oufd rernain irr ller,r york to car"y out the ertensive research required and the other two experts wculd go on mission to gather infornation from united Nations organs and. the specialized agencies in nurope and the r4iddle East
and vou-ld visit Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the headquarters and units of the Falestinian Liberation Organization at Damascus and Beirut.
Al35/533
English
pa*e 3
g, The t\'{o experts left on mission early in April l-980. They visited' the
headquarteTs of 1JNESCO in Paris and of the ILo and l.lHo at Geneva. In Esrpt '
Jordan and the S1'rian A.rab Republic, they held discussions witlr senior government
officials dealing with natters rel-ated to the occupied territories ' with
?alestinian refugees living in those countries, I'ith persons dePorted from the
occupied territorles and {itb residents of tbe occupied territories -visiting those
counlries " as 1,e11 as vith recent visitors to the occupied territories ' They also
held discussions vith United Nations officials stationed in those countries. The
experts visited valious acadenic and research institutions in the three countries
in o"der to collect from then and- from government sources as nuch d'ata and
published rnaterial as possible pertaining to conditions in the occupied. territories
and in the three countries visited.'
10. In lebanon " the experts visited and had extensive discussions vith officials
from ECI,IA, TINRWA anct UNESCo, as wefl as with several ilepartments and leaders of
the Palestine Liberation organi zaticn and the Instltute of Palestine studies. on
the lray back" they visited UNRWA head.quarters at vienna, and at Geneva they held
ertensive discussions vith the office of the speciaf cornmittee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the l{uman Rights of the Population of the occupied.
Territories,
11. The tvo experts returned to United Nations Headquarters in nid-May 1980
to draft the report with the expert who had renained. in New York. The principal
docunents consulted are listed in annex fII belov.
]-2. ftle report prepared by the experts is reproduceal as annex I belov'
ANNU( I
CONTEIVTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. SRIEF' SUMMARY OF FII{IINGS
A. Denographic characteristics
B. Politica]. and administrative framework ' ' '
c. Econoldc framevork
D. Agriculture anal inilustry in the context of human
settlenents growbh and developnent
E. Macro-econornic ind.icators
F. The social fra.nework
G. fuploynent, incone and consr:mption
III. THE HWIAN SEET!ts{4IT SYSTN4 IN THE OCCIJ?ID TERRITORIES
Al 3r/533
English
Annex f
Paragraphs Page
1-3 3
t4-67 h
].56
16-21 7
22-37 9
38-\5 lL
h6-\? 16
LB_51 1?
52-67 18
5B - 119 24
58 - '12 2t+
?3-Br
82-89
g0 - 103
1Ol+ - 115
t-15 - 119
)q
al
55
A.
E.
Tr
The pattern of human settlenents . .
Housing and infrastructule .
InDact of Jewish settlenents .
Heaftb services
EalucationaL services
Social'welfaxe seavices
Appendices
I. Salance of traate in the occupiecl teffitories ' ' '
I1. Extraordinary buttgetB of towns in the west Bank and the Gaza Strip
III. water consumption in Israel
IV, Agricultural production in the West Bank
?A
5v
l+0
4r
43 V. Buildings conpleted antl begun tluring the period 19?3-197?
t,/ 35 / r33
ln651i.sh
Alrnex I
Page 2
CO]{TXT,ITS (continued)
Resources and incone, Itrest Bank
Workers fron the occupietl territories enplolred in tbe territories
aod. in Israel" by occupation, IglZ and. 19?B
VIII. Average daily wage of .workers
44 vr.
VII .
IX. Consumer price index
X. iiousing statistics
4>
)+6
LB
l+9
Ll35 /r33
nnglish
^nnex I
paae 3
r. IIITRODUCTION
1. The previous report' subnitted to the General Assenbly at its thirty-fourth
session (A/3\/n6 ani corr.l), contained information on population and housing'
healtho natural resources - iand and water, emplolrment and conditions of school
build.ings. Durin€! the consideration of that report in tbc Second Conmittee '
observaiions were nade on various points, includinq the need for more details
on the living conditions of the peopte in the occupied territories and fu"ther
analysi s of those conditions.
2. The experts have interpreted the request to the Secretary-General in
resolution 3l+/113 for a comprehensive and analytical report to nean the
consideration of a broader ia.nge of conditions in the occupied telritories, which
deternine the quality of life of the Arab population in the torrns and villages of
the occupied territories. section II of this repolt, sumrnarizing the findings of
the Group of Experts therefore relates to sorne of these conditions " particui-aItly the
pattern or traae an(l- investment, lrhich often determines the road and c ornraunic at ions
'netvorks
among the settlements and the economic, social and physical infrastructure
that t,inds then together. Land and water are important determinants of t'he
location of hunal settfements, while the agricultural and ind.ustrial activities
often provide the stimulus for the groL'th and devefopnent of hunan settlements
and hierarchical interconnexious a-nong them. The compcstion of the population, its
social characteristics and empLoynent pattern, provide the dynamics of improved
livin{ conditions in terms of consumption of goods and services and satisfaction of
h',]man neods in the context of huran settlcnents. Section TII of the report
examines in nore ttetail the hulan settlements systen in the occupied territories'
including conditions of housing and infrastructure, impact of the new Jevish
settlernents, and health, educational and social ttelfal'e sefvices in the framevork
of human settlements.
3. !'o11owing the June 196T war,Israel occupied the folJ.olu/ing territories: the
llest Banh of the Rivel Jordan " including East Jelusalem; the Gaza Strip; the Sinai;
and the Golan Heights. Most of the literature and economic and social data
availlble refer to the Gaza strip and liorthern sinai, ancl the west Bank excluding
East Jr:rusa1em. ),/ Consequently, this report is largely confined to the atove two
aneas. The data Siven in the appendices are not complete, because they do not
include East Jerusalem.
l/ \'lherever the llest Ba,nk is referred to
East Jcrusel-em- Regarding llorthern Sinai see
in the reporL, it e::cludcs
foot-note 3/.
Al 35 /533
Inglish
Annex I
Page 4
IT. BRIEF SUIOIANY OF FINDINGS
lt' rn th' broad context of the the re'ort of Ha.bitat: recorr&endat ions for nationa.I aetion contained. in united Nations conference on Human settlements, held at Vancouver in 1975, 2/ it vould appear that:
(") There is no hunan settl-ements policy that has been ad.opted for the occupied territories to ensure a rational distribution of the pai-estinian people based on social and econonic eonsiderationsi rather, any policy tha.t cloes exist for settlernents in the territories is confined to the nev Jexish settrements that are being established;
(b) The absence of a policy for the development of hrman settlennents in the occupied territories is a consequence of the lack of an over-a1r econornic ancl social developraent policy and planning for the occupied territories, which courd ensure an equitable all0cation of conventionar- resources to the improv€ment of human settleroents;
-b ot-h p("r1iv aTteh ea innds ceocnunruitnya tl,h haat sp ervades the issue of 1and ovnership and tenure, been a deterrent to the inlrovemeni of the envi.onment' of human settlements in the occupiod territories, in particurar, the rural settlenents l,rhich in the West Bank proiride she]-ter for approximatety l0 per cent of the lopulation.
5' As territorie"rsi' l-i nb es seecetino nf? ormrr thbeel oerx,ra" n3in/ avteiorny loitft rheu rnapnr .saentntrienrga,e nt in the occupied devoted to.the resettlement if any at ar1, has been of the-refugees in the r^rest Bank, $ho constitute +o per cent of the population. No public housin6; seems to have been ihitiated conmensuratr rrith the rnagnitude of the need. rn the Gaza strip and Northern Sinai,-l/ the occupying authorities have a policy for resettlement of the refueiees, yet only a fraction of those refugees ha.ve ieen provided vith housing .,-it". Th.r. is little docu.nented- inforrnation on assistance to peoplp in housing, except in the Gaza stri.p, \rh€re plots prepared for buikr-ing are rnade available to refugees, onith cash grants for families to build their own homes. Few, however, have macle use of this facility. l+/ t'to such infornation is avair-able for the west Bank to inalicate assistance to individuals or housing co-operatives or other non-governmental
2/ Sa-ih"" ; , chap. II.
Vanc
and
.7 (, 1\r .r
3/ For r"rant of data for ar-r. the occupied territories, the coverage of this report is lirnited to the Gaza strip, l\Iorthern sinai and the !trest Bank excluding East Jerusafexr' for rhich a.rone docunented data are avair-abre. For the purposes of this report, ilorthern Sina.i refers to the occupied territories as of l-97g and extends from Xl-Arish in the r.rest to the caza Strip in the east, and fron the llediterranean in the north to Ras r.{uhanmad in the south. rt nay be noted that si.nce 25 llay 1979 the occupied part of sinai extends fron a fine east of El-Arish to thF C€ za Strip.
- -u sl"P-
,
#'J{3i'
Annex I
Page 5
agencies; nor is informati on readily available on funds fron outside soul:ces
"hi"h ""u channetl-ed into housing or the irnprovenent of connunity facilities.
6. As regard.s housing in general, both in the caza Strip and the West Sank there
is rnuch overcrolrding in the dlae.l-ling units, to a n0uch higher degree than vtrat is
regarded. as an acceptable fevel, of accomodation. This conclition of ovelcrowding
seems to be vorse in the rural areas and refugee camps than in the toa'ns '
7. As mentionecl in the previous report, in 1967 the infrastructure (roads'
6e.werage, eLectricity etc.) in the occupied territories was better than that of
most countries in the reeion (a/3\/536 and' corr'l" para' 31)' over the years" the
occupied territories have uitnessed a deterioration of this infrastructu"e, as very
fittle bas been done either to iuprove or rnaintain it. Instead., ne1,l| networks have
been established to serve and strengthen the nilitary, econonic and'security links
vith Israel, often to the detrinent of the existing Areb settfements ' The
developrnent of the physical envirorrment and infrastructure of the occupied
territories to meet the needs of the nev Jer^r'ish settlernent s has diverted resources -
physical, natural and financial - fron iroproving the environment of the settlenents
populated by the Palestinian people.
8. The appropriation by the occupying power of over a quarter of the l-and o both
in the l,Iesl Bank and in the Gaza Strip, has meant that less of this resource is
availabLe for use by the Palestinian people for their housing and agricultural
need.s. Sinilarly, th-- diversion of water for the needs of the new Jewish
settlements has adve.rsely affected the traditionaf habitat of the PaLestinian
people. The destruction of houses for rnilitary and security reasons and the
lack of vater resources for comsumption and procl.uction purposes have forced. malry
people to abandon their original land and homes, move into overcrowed conditions
of existing settleuents and seek a living as unskil-1eal labour in the occupied
territories or in Israel. A. consequence of thiS enforced. Ilove&ent has been that
the abandoned land is appropriated by the occupying authority under an existing
lav relating to absenteF proprietorship.
9. As regards services, it woufd appear that environmental health services have
not inproved connensulate vith population inclease. A consequeflCe has bee-n that
gastro-intestinal d.iseases have become a naior cause of nrorbidity and mortality.
The incidence of these diseases ha.s al.so been increasing in the Arab ruraL
settLements, no doubt owing to inadequate potable water and se.vera€e systers '
l-0. According to the }eport of the I,JHO mission which visited the territories flom
? to 21 April 1980" 5/ rhile inmunization programes appear to have satisfactory
j./ I.Iorld l-tealth Organization, 'rlIealth conditions of the Arab population in the
occup-ied Arab territories, including Palestine: report of the Special Colrfiittee
of Experts Appointed to Study the Health Conditions of the Inhabitants of the
Occupied Territori-s" 1a 33/er ) .
Al 35 / 533
English
Annex I
faJ]e rl
coverage, certain preventive rreasures in the field of naternal and child health,
decided upon foflor.ring the visit of a l,rHo specialist, did at not seem to be x€flected the leve1 of th. various units. preventive activities and health checks for
schoof ehi.l-dren ancl uorkells renain weak and in many instances are non-existent. Ilealth education and public information on health problens do not appear to be welf developed.
1l-. Health activities are based on short-term planning without an adequate data
base for ri^terraining tho utilization of services, the attitudes o-t physicians or of the population or for anatysing feft needs in relation to the needs as determined.
btr the doctors. The li.vel of participation of the conmunity in the public health fielcL is very lindted and in soue places non-existent.
12. As r'rill- be seen from the paragraphs dealing with health in s.ction rrr beIow, there is a significant variance in the data available fron different sources r.rith
regard to health services in the occupied territories. The lrHO mission found
inadequacies, particularly in x-ray and other diagnostic servicesl there had been no significant chanco in the nurber of hospitals and beds sinc. 1962, As regards nedical care, the ratio of population to physicians is considerably higher than in thc neighbouring countrjes.
f3' As regards educational services, one significant developnxent has been the
establishment of tirree universi.ties in the llest Bank and one in the Gaza strip
which are private institutions. The experts on mission r,iere told by offi.cials " and rcpresentatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization that they existed. and functioned not b€,.cause of any assistance given by thc occupying power but in spite of discouragement and harassment. There ha.d been an increase in thc number of other educational institutions both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and enrohent had also increased significantly. Hovever, the politicar clinate and acticns of the occupying authorities have not been conducive to providing a learning environr,rent free fror. a sense of insecurity among both leachers ancl students.
14. fn the delivery of social welfare services" the occupying authorities have made
them more accessibfe to the recipients by increasing the nulber of welfare bureaux
and social rqorkers. The number of recipients of services, particurarry financial
assistance, ha-s decreased considerably, partly because of the high level of
e mplolnnent existiql in the oceupied territories and partly because of the rehatrilitative services introduced bl. the occupying authorities vith financial
resources made avai]able by international organizations. A number of l-oca1 velfare
organizations are also involved in delivering services, although it is not clear vhat the relationsbip is between then and the administering auihority, ol what professional ancl financiar c,rnn^r+ ir dn-' +L^-' ge.t from the authorities.
A, De4oeraphic,_chp.r,agqgIls_U\!g
15. At the end of 197?, the population of the r..rest Bank vas 681,zoo ruith a natural increase af 2O.5 per I,OOO, an actual increase of 10.3 per I,OOO and a
Al 35 / 533
I]nglish
Annex T
FaAe 7
net nigration rate of -10.2 per 7,oaA. Q/ Of this population ' 317,5f4 vere
regist.ered as refugees ltith iNFWA, Ba,\6\ or them living in 20 camps, leaving
=g},fl6
inhabitants ( sorne of vhom vere unregistered refugees) Iiving in the tovns
and villages of thre llest Bank. 7/ fhe population of the Gaza Stri! and Northern
Sinai was )+)+1,300, with a natural increase of 15.3 per 1,000' an actual increase
of I2.3 per 1,000 and a net nigration of -3.0 I)3r 1'OOO in l-977' il Of.these'
:6:,ooo irere registered as refugees with uNRI'trA, 2o2,91+L of them living in eight
camps. 8/ The breakdor+n of the population by age groups was as follows:
Polulat ion at the
end of 1977
O-14 years
l.t+-29
30-44
tr:-trS
50+
I,les:b Egrir
l\T nli6r Pa,^6h+. .'a
316 000 )+6. )+
l-B3 l+00 26.9
7? 8oo 11.l+
60 5oo 8.9
l+3 3oo 6.t1
681 ooo 1oo. o
Gaza Stlip and
Northern Sinai
:qs&sa' Ssss$cre.
2O9 7OO
f23 1oo
50 3oo
3T 700
21 100
)+ j+1 300 100. 0
)+T .5
27 .8
11. l+
1.8
As vilt be 6een from the above, almost half the population Lres less than 1\ years o1d'
a fact which ha.s a bearinc on the health and educationaf services'
B. Political anq administ.rative ffq4elrork
16. As occupied territories, the l.lest Bank and the Gaza Strip are subjected to the
political viLl of the occupying auttrorities r,rithout any mecha.nisms for the people
of the terr:itories to inftuence basic policy decisions. The territories a-re
governed under a military adrinstration. Over-alf policy is de.termined by the
Israeli Prime Minist.er and the Cabinet. In practice, howevel ' the Ministly of
Defence plays the most i&portant l'ole j,n rnaking and. executing policy affecting the
occupied territories.
lLl. Thesp occupied areas are divided into districts' each headed by a rnilitary
governor who is responsible to the ni.Iitary comraander. The military governor is
assisted by personnel recruited from the various goverfincnt ministri.es, including
health, education, agricultlrre o labour, trade and tourism" social wPlfare and
6/ Palestine Liberation Organiza.tion, Central Bureau of statistics' Pcls-EEdsn
stati;tical Abstra.ct. !?f9 (Damascus, 1979) " p. 35"
7/ Officia-L Recqtdg of the General Ass"mblv, Tbi4v !94'
Supplenent No. 13 (A/3\/f3), anncx I" table 4.
B/ st,atisticaf Abstracts of Israel. 1978 (Jerusalem, Centra.l Buleau of
qfatr'ctirq- lQ78) r, t6.$.
^E/n3g5l"/i5s3h3
Anhex I
Page B
Justice, and he also has advisers from both the police and foreign affairs roinistries. The budrae.t for the occupied territories is controlled by the nititary governors.
18. The n.unicipalities in the territories a.?e reslonsible for local- affairs except police functions. They are subJect to the over-a11 authority of the nilitary on mF,ttels which affect Israeli national security ard public peace, although instances are not tacking rhere approvar of the rni.litary has to be obtained. beforehand for land use and invesinents, even ffhen the funding has been asgured by outside sources. The second nunicipal erections since the occupation - the first being ln rgTz - were herd in ze or the 2)+ I,Iest Bank towns; in the other t.wo the number of candidates rras equal to the numberl of sFats available. supporters of the Palestine Liberation 0rg,anization won sweep:,.ng victories in the el-ections. The naJoritv of the candidate""leronged t.-fr'i"i". nein groups; the Nationar. Front, which support s the parestine t ireration oie..ri""tion, and the united. Front, which is nore traditionar - of those etected " iiE;;; elected for the first tine and. only 48 had been re-e.r-ected' conpleteiy new councils were elected in Nablus, IIelron, Jericho, Beit JaLa ana Be].t s"rro"r, ,fr... the ltrational Front gaineil control of previousry conservative councirs. The pro-ralestine Liberationa organization mayors ancr councillors of Ranalla, Al-Beira and rulkarm were re-elected r^rith increased nal orities.
19, The WeBt Bank elections had been conducted und_er the terns of a l-955
*u:n:dttF:,r: lt he Jtaowrtl.asnpieaen iflyaitnrs" tthhearte n vuansi cip"r ui""tin"" should be hetd every four years. no direct ba.Iloting for the post of mayor, and the rnterior Minister selected the nayor aiier tne nunicipal elections. After the 1972 el-ections in the west Bank' the israeli M'ritary Governor perldtted. the councils to norninate their mayors.
-a
1976 elections. The former Jordanian 1"iarwii rrir as ipmroecneaeodu reto w paes rfmolirt- owwoemde ni nto t hveote to sts.nd for office for the first ime. and 9/
t?h.a0t' .pThoeli tnicnailli taly authorities had informed candi.dates to the nunicipar- er.ections propaganda coul-il not be resorted to ir.t election campaigns. In EI Bireh' the centraf nrinting rton"u r""
-"uporiea
nilitary for having printed to have been closed dovn by the election campaign Leafleis. In Bethlehem, the holding of ar neeting in a public place -was
bannea fy the authorities, 1E
2r. on 30 April 1976, g=a_legst s reported. a.n article by y. Litani, who en.merateal several instances or int J::JerFic e by rsraeli authoriiies, such as p.o""u"" ro" sorne ca.ndidates to run in the.eLectio"",
"iiurpi " to persuade some ma.yors to
iil.:1.:irlfi:eed list of candid.ates and the ""i"r"ton-or "or. ".naiauies stanaing
9/ A ab neport and. necord, 1-5 Aprit. 1976, p. 239"
!g/ Hai atetz, 6 April- f976.
^/35
/5t3
Eor'-Li I'r
Annex I
page 9
C, Economic framework
22. Following their occupation in June l-95?' the Gaza Strip and the \'tre st Bairk vere
drawn lrogresJivel-y into -a state of interdependency vith the Tsraeli economyu vhich
tras inioriant inplications for their long-tem growth and development ' Irom a
position where there were absolutely no trade or financial connexions prior to
.fune fg5Z, these territories found themselves W Ig77 exportin6l 51 per cent of
their products to rsraef and inporting 91'1 per cent of their require.ments ' The
chance in the compostion in foreign trade can be seen from appendix I belov' In
Telative termsr the exports to Jordan fel-1 from \3'2 per cent of the value of all
""p."t"- f"-iSe6 i" :1.! of the value of exports Ln \977' while at the sare tine the
exports to Israel- rose from )+)+ per cent of the value of
-all
exports in 1958 to
Ll-.] our ccnt in D77. A sirnilar change can be tliscerned in the case of inports'
i"'i"iiir.i"-f"il" l'itpott" frcm Jordan decreasecl frorn ?'3 per cent of the value of
iotri-irport" in iq5g to an insignificant 0.9 pe" cent in 1977, vhile the value of
iil;;; ?ron tsrael increased during the s ame period from ?6'B per cent to
91.1 per cent of the value of imports '
?3. It should be noted that the exports to Israel included those far re-expo"t '
According to infornation obtained from some Gaza businessnen interviewed by
the experts in Cairo and confirned by representatives of the Palestine Liberation
Organi-zation, d.irect exports of proalucts overseas from the occupied teritories
are not al-towed by the occupying authorities and all such exports have to be
channelletl through Israeli trade organizations '
2\. Israelrs donination of the inport trade is clear.Iy indicated by the data'
Most, if not all, of the inports are Israeli nanufactured goods" vhieh have found
a lising d enand in the occupied territories because of growlh in incomes - both
local as welf as through the l-abour enployed in Israel - and remittances from
abroad. With the exception of irnport s from Jordan' al1 overseas import s to the
occupied territories trave to come through the Israeli narket ' rmports fTom Jordan
t a.re" r.gi"tuted a refative decline because of the apptication of Israeli inport
tariffs to goods from that country. Considering that the occupied territories are
the second iargest trading partner with Israel, next to the United states of
Anerica, ttre near n,c,nopol'isiic rofe that rsrael- industrial products bave in the
lrarkets of the occupied territories" the lack of any serious coepetition from
locaIly manufactured p oducts and the steady source of relatively cheap
seni-skiBed ancl unskilled labour for econonic activities in lsrael' thcre is
every reason to believe that the naintenance of these tratling links with the
o""oii"d territories is extremely important for t'he Israeli econorlv'
25. This point vas repeatedly stressed to the experts on mission by the officials
of the Arab Governments and tle representatives of the Palestine Liberat'ion
Organj.zation. In their opinion, the current trad'ing pattern is an inhibiting
factor in the growth and development of the occupied territories' The production
of these territories" as we].l as the pbysical and econonic infrastructure
necessa.ry for such production, are geared tovards the need's and requirements of the
Israeli ."onoory. The inhabitant" oi ttt" occupied territories are denied the
nppo"t""ity to establish overseas markets for their products and to meet their
Al35/;3J
Eng,lish
Annex I
Page 10
il'port recluire L'nts dirFctly fron overseas sources. l'urthermore, they are unable
-:?,::ll"t" il "':"19 narkets uncer their or:n identity. The present
r'1f,11l;41. agaanst th,- devefopment of an indi8enorrs industrial base w"hoici,ha iwtioifrfr " servr,, the needs of the loca.l econony, as well as export needs, and to provide eraployment to those r.rho are" nol,r eompelled to seek employz.rent in Israel and other countrics _ a large-reso'rce of manpower r"hich cannot be used for the devel.pment of the occunied countries thenserves. The occupied territorips are se€n as providing a ca.ptive marhet for Is.rapli goods ard "o"iri".".
?-6' The experts r'rere informed by officials of the Palestinp Liberation organizaticn th*t the occupied te*itories tacked the financiar infrastructure to mobilize sawings and provide funds for investment in productive enterprises and for car:itaf formation ' The branches of rsraeri ianks that had repraced the Jordanian and foxeign banks in the Lrpst Banh after the June :-967 wa.r dii not corulana the sare neasure of conficence of the savers and i.nvestors in the occupied territories. crecit obtaine(t from the banks, vhich is rather rinited and high-cost, is usuarfy for: operating expens.rs. Little is used for capital invFstment, which is usuafly financed fron the current earnings of enterpri-ses or frem rernittances from abload. Most of the investment is private, particulirly in dwellings, sorne of rhi"l., *. constructed by individuals and others by housing co-operatives, which sometimes receive funds fron Arab sources abroad- Funds from neighbouring Arab countries ar- also Lrade avaiLable through various unofficiat channels, fl:re most Tecent case beiirg the support given for the estabrishnent of a cenent factory in the west Bank. ?hesq, funds are administerecl by the n.unicipalities. Ilowever, vaxi.ous derays and clifficu'l-ties are encounte'ed in realizing these investments, not the least of which is approval from the adninistering authorit,ies. soneiimes this ;;plovaJ- is t'tithhel-cl and the projects cannot be carried out. one instance in which such a'pproval was withhefd wes reported to the mission by the Mayor of Harhut, vho stated that he r,ias refused permission to buird a market after a site had been obtained and al]. architecturaf and engineering design= completed and funds oblieated from abroaal. The current situation ana uncertainties about the future exert a strong influence on private and public investment decisions.
27. The nunicipalities continue to make pubric investments in the for.n of nunicipal establishi ents, roads, markets and other constructions, As shoun in appendix II belov, tllese investments arnounted to fI 223,1+36,000 i; lili-Wf S. They were financed from loans fronx the adrninistration and fron the financial resources of the local- inhabitants.
28' rnformation on pubric investments is hor^rever not readily available in the absence of thp capital budgets for the occupied terri.tories.
f. Lano
29' Thc total fand area of the occupied territories is given es approxixxatefy 5'939,000 ,lunr.rns, of r.rhich j,,Tz,OOO a-:e in the l.Iest Bank and 36?,000 in th- Ca.za strip' of this? arr area of 2,Bl+o"ooo aunrrns'rr"a been under cultivation in ]'96r, rr/
^s-ta ,.t1r1s.t r/c sS,! e!iEtical Abgjract o.f lsraef (Jerusalem, Central Bureau 01' 196))" p. 5)+OAl35153"'
Enel i sh
Annex T
Paae 11
but this had alFclineal to 2"1-\O,O0o dunums by 19?!, or ?5 per cent of the land,
cultivated in 1967. yll Tne reasons for this tlecline are not discussed in the
Israeli publicationiavailable to the nission but in its discussions r''ith officials
of the Palestine Liberation Organization and officiafs of the Gover lents of
neighbouring Arab countries the experts rrere told t-nat the decline vas due to
three nain factors. First, l-arge areas had been declared "c.Iosed" areas and
put out of procluction for Eecurity reasons. Seconrlfyn large areas of land hac'l
been alproprieted by the occupying power for the establishment of nev Jewish
settlFments. Third.ly, nany famer$ hed been conpelled to abandon their land,
becausF of difficulties and inpedinents, which all- but nade it impossibLe for then
to continue to cu-ltivate the 1and. Accurate figures are hard to colte by' as these
have not been nad.e public and, furtherurore " 'vhe interpretation of the legal status
of some lands is still in dispute. Hor,lever, it is estinated that by SeFtenber 1979
the occupying authorities had taken possession of approxinately f.5 million d.ununs
in the l^Iest Bank and Gaza Strip, equivalent to approxinatcly 25 per cent of the
total area (A/3\/631, para. ].05).
30. The inpact of Tsraeli occupation on the question of land in the occuaied
territories and its role in neeting the econornic and social needs of the people
have five inportant irrplications; (a) a sense of insecurity in th€ possesEion of
the landi (t) a lack of notivation to mahe l-ong-tertn investm€nts in the land,
arising out of the sense of insecurity; (c) frapentation of holdings beeause. of
the increase of population and decreaae in the quantun of Land available for
cu-ltivation, as wel-l- as for shelter n due to appropriation by the occupying power;
(d) unfair corrrpetition fron IsraeLi subsittized agricul,tural protlucts, conPelling
nany Palestinians to abandon farroing i and (e) the restrictions placeal by the
authorities on the exploitation of vater resources for irrigation by Pafestinian
Alabs.
31. fhe rnission found that the sense of insecurity stenned. frorn the various l-avs
and regulations appli-.d by tbe occupying authorities for requisitioning lancl, the
rnost inportant of which were l the Ottonan Bupire laws of l-858, governing State
]and rbich had been sanctionetl by the Mand.atory Polrer but returnetl to niri status
by the Jordania.n authorities; article L25 of the Eore-rgency ordinances of 1945,
enacted by the Mandatory ?ower, which enabled the author ity to consid.er sone
areas "cl-osedrr for security reasons; the Israeli Absentee Proprietors Law of 1950,
8nd conpulsory purchase. Because land can be taken avay frorn the otmers und.er any
one of the above l-avs or the regulations fra.ned. under then, there hFS been no
notivation for investment to improve either protluctivity or shelte.r, or the
infrastructure of settlemFnts.
2. Waler
32. The queBtion of vater both for agricul-tural end donestic purposes is the
most difficult to resolve " inasmuch as Israel and the occupietl territories
fy' AAriculture in the llest Bank (nama ah" DePartnent of Agriculture, l9?lr),
cited in (lirabLus, 1978), P. 9.
Al35/533
English
Annex I
Page 12
constitute a single naturar anal georogicar region for water The question is collection and fr.ows. conpound.ed by the fact that the paLestinians are not invoLvecl in the alecisions affecting the use of wa,ter in the t..rritories.
33.- The.region has only tr.ro, rather scatce, pernanent sourees of watel-: (r) tir. Jortlan river and its tributary systen, wirictr lan provid€ for about 1,!ooroo0 dr:nrurs of-irrigated rand; ancr- (l) trre ".,bt"tr.rr""n .q.rif.., which at present is providing l-00 aillion cubic metres annuar.r.y to the rlest
-nanr
ano 5oo nilr-ion cubic metres annuaLl-y to rsraeL' rn the coastal plains the over-exproitecl aquifer provides the Gaza Strip agriculture rrith lO0 nitlion
"rrti" ,itr.". !l
3l+. Tahal,.tr{ater Pl-anning. for fsraeL ltd. gives the folloving as the quantity of water uhich can becone availablc for Israeli
Joralan Watey
Return flows, Jordan Basin
Springs in the eastern watershed.
Springs in the vest ern vatershed (ineluaing
the Yarkon Springs )
Ground water
FLootl f.Lows
Beturn flow fron irrigation
Ile-use of <Iomestic and industrial vater
Total-
For domestic and industriel_ use
Availabl,e for irrigation
Millions of gubic gstres
per annum
l+50
5o
150
350
l+50
t_00
100
150
r,800
300
1 ,500
Source: Taha1" (rer aviv- 1955) , p, r,ar.The master pl-an for Israel develoFnent of inigation,,
35' The latest data on rater conaumption in rsr:ael are given in appendix rrr belou. ?wo important consitr-erations arr.se ri.r iul- a"i.. !,irst, since 1!5!, rsrael has been using more than 83 per cent of its provealenevable lrat er reserves. The average of use fron that year to 197? is B9 per cent, with a variabiliiy of less than 5 per ceut, which ind.icates a rairry stitie tevel. This, together with the
L_e x-in !g1tof nV Bivoioahns ,B ul]. " The l{est Bank. Is ft Viable? ( Lexington , },{a.ssachuseEs , I9T5 )lAl3rl533
ff:l"l
Paae 13
high variability of rains in the region, which can reach 23 per cent or Dore, gholts
tha.t the belance of r.rater in the region ls ver"y precarlous and uay hnve reecheal
a critical point.
36. Secondly, since 1969, Israefts total consuDption of weter in domeetLe anC
industrial uges exc"ed.ed the 300 nilLion cublc metreg allottetl in the qaster plan,
a situation that can only becoee vorse vith tire, in ao far as use lncreases with
the inerea.se in population. This is borne out w a stat enent tn the glggloglgg
Judaicg, as follorvs: "Betveen 19!9 and t96B the utlllzatlon of proven water
resources rose from 17 per cent, roaihly fron ].ocal grounat wEtelr to ahost
90 per cent ( inclutling the utiLization of the Yarkon anil Jortlan rl,vers)."
3'1 . Ttre foll,owing table gives sone LnrlLcation of the Fnortnous dlfferenee betwe€n
aater consu[ption leve-ls in Israe]. and the ltest Benk:
Agricultur:e
Intlustry (conbined vith house consumption )
llouse consunlltion
Tot aI
Genera^L rate of consuraption per indivldual
Rete of home consumption per indivlilual
!E€!-g
90
10
100
lh2
13
I6rae1
I 325
95
300
537
B6
l ?20
Sources.: For Israel, I(fDl{A: Israel Journal. of _lqrrelopuent, 1ro, 10 (19??)! ror the lrest Bank, palestrnEEficnli-ffial-riiE6icourffiffi porlcles ln
the l.,lest Bankr: (n. d.. ) , p. lr.
It viI1 be noteal fron the above table that the fsraeLl consulrptlon of lrater for
agricultural- purposes alone is nore than 13 tlnes the total constuptlon Ln the
I'Iest Ba"nk antl for doraestic purposes and intlustry it is alnost lr0 tines thef of the
llest Bank. The nission llas tolil that the Israeli authortt lFs hB.(l takFn a number of steps to ensure that the consuaption of vat Fr by the Paleatlnians ms kept at
those low levels " r,rtlile the consuoption by Iaraell settlenents antl agrl,culture r,us
allowed to rise. The follor,:ing arF exa$ples of actions taken to restrl,ct sat€r
use by the PalFst.inians in the occupled terrltorl,es I
The instalLstion of meters at well-heacls to llnlt the anouDt of uEter that can
be alravn and. the inposltion of fines for exceeding the ll!0lts lnpoeed;
The non-lssuance of perrd.tE to Paleitl,niaas for tllg6lng rreir r.ells for
agricultural purposes in the occupieil territorleB wblt€ severel, bev vplla have
been tlug to provide new Jevish spttleuents anil farns tdth nater!
A/35/ 533
Erglish
Annex I
Page 14
The di.gging of deep we11s by
use of pcr,rerful pr.rmping equipnent,
discharge from the old Arab wel1s
r,rp11s.
the Islael,is near functioning Arab wells and the
resuLting in a severe reduction of the vater or, in some cases, a conplete drying up of these
D.
F ettlements growth a"d
38' Agricultur€ of r'ras and continues to be the nain productive sector in the econony the occulicd te*itories. - Arthough
since 1970' it still emol-oyed, in tgiT, "rf*pir,lo!Zyr .nt in this sector has been falling
in the territories, or ]0.5 pot ""t of a total of 1111,500 enDfoyFd.
report ' a€ricul-t're in the occup"ie."ai : tef.uF/i-t'oAr;i"eosr awtrarsg i nto a a bna crksvraa.redl.i sctaovteer npmreiontr to ll: 196I y*:9 . r^ed.iatelv "rt* irr"-""
""prt r on,
-ir.
range of technofogicaf innovations to raise output ana inc"r"eiiar.s"er irp."r-oinaturoc{divuictye,d a" naa incornes in this sector. considerations telina i,hese actions included the expansion of narkets for rsraeli agro-industrial produetion input s ana iit.-a.r.uropr"nt or products r,rhich were conplenentary to, rather than conpetitive with, agricultural products produced in rsrae]. The product nix was ar.so changed tc encourage the production of crops for inport substitution, as well as for producing i.nput s for rsrael-i processing pr'ants covelnment report ackno*rle' dlgrehsic thh tahte tnr reex ip-eorciei a tohfe t hfiensiesh ed product. The rsraeu. agriculture in the changes has been to rink occupiecl territories more closely to the Israeli econony. 16/ Official-s of the par-estine r,iberation orgenizaiion and residents of the JI;ri*
:a" :c1lo1s:e:" li-:i:n.k i nbteetrwveieewn eadg. riincu lrq.tu*r'e ainn ctl tJreor dan point out that, in seeking to forse occuiied. territories and the israer-i econony' the rsraelis have taken act:'.ons to discourage the prod.uction of certain traditional crols when these \,rourd compete with sinilar products from rsrael. Exanples of such actions include restrictions pIu".o o'the use of water for irrigation purposes by farmfrs prod.ucing competing agricultural- products and
tlhhues d cuonprdinpge- floinfg l othr'ree ri nphriacbeidta nprtosd .ucts on the iarkets of the occupied territories, of the r-atter to selt their produce below cost. As a resul-t of thpse and sinir-ar actions, nany farners have had to a.bandon their traditional- means of livelihood and put ihur""r'rru" out as hired. labour in rsrael. Thusr the tlansfomation of agricultire that has taren pla.ce essentially serves the interests of the rsraeli econony anr' has noi contributed to the over-a'l develoFment of the occupied territories. rt is arso the view of those interviewed that t'he prospects for real aGricurturar- development to serve the interests of the inhabitants of the occupied territorie" ."u fr"ri.."d by the absence of any long-term cteveLotrrnent pr-an and particurarly o.re
* for the agricultural sector.
39. fndustry in the occupied territories can be described as relatively
".^..+{ uratastr.c$s!,a !iq!icaf Abglract of Israe]., I9T8 (Jerusalem, central Bureau of l_9TU ) , p, T8g.
(tJ_e rusUa.le/ mS, ttg9lB* 0o)f, pIs,l a6e. l-, Ministry of Defence, A Twelve:year Sgrveyr !?67_19?9
t:!-/ mia., p. T.
in the cqnt ext of hr:man
ffitj3i'
Page 15
undeveloped. Its conposition and contribution to the national- product have not
changed nuch since before the June 196? var. In 1968 it ernployed 19'700 persons'
or 15.)+ per cent of those enployed., whil-e in Jauary-Septernb et 1979, it enployed
22,BOO, or f5.f peT cent of those employed. 17/ fts contribution to the national
product has remained at axound 7 per cent, lts activities are Largely confined to
craft work in 1ow-productivity, labour-intensive operations, except fo]' beverages
and tobacco manufacture. Manufacturing plants are srdaIl and efiploy 10 persons on
the average, and most of the work is perforned nanua11y. There are only seven
enterprises enploying 100 or more persons, all in the I{est Bank and none in the
caza Strip. af1 ttese "large" firrns had been established before 196?.
l+0. In the West Bank, the rnain industrial branch in terms of revenue earned in
I97T r,tas food, beverages and tobacco, fol]-or,red by textiles and cl"othes' rubber,
plastics and chemical products. There has been an expansion of Production in
textil-es' plastics ancl rubber ' furnitu.re and building naterials, mainly owing to
a system of subcontracting by Israeli firms.
1+1. In the Gaza Strip, the estabfishment of an industrial zone at the Erez
checkpoint near Gaza has been a significant development. Most of the plant s ere
ovned. by Israelis, and. they produce nainly netal good.s, textiles, and wood and
rubber products. The zone provid.es erploynent for a sizeable number of Gaza
c+ ri h s6c i /:l ah+ 6
l+2. Apart from the local demand, indus t.ry in these territories is gearecl to lsraeli
demand, and this has been selective. The maj or itens produc ed or processed for
the Is"ae.Ii market are: cfothing (subcontracts), wood products, ticker and other
types of fi.rrniture ' rroven textiles (carpets)' plastic good,s and buiLding rnaterials '
1+3. The ]ack of appropriate natural resources or a tfaditlonaf branch or skills
in manufacturing in these territories points to the need for an agricultural
oriented ind.ustry, both as an input provider and raw naterial plccesser, Iiowever,
the potential for even such industrial development in the occupied. territolies
is clearfy linitec because of the more efficient and. technol-ogj.cally advanced
industrial production system of rsrael, vhich has a. neax monopolistic advantage in
the markets of the occupied territories. 18/
1+l+. Construction activity is generally an index of capital forrnation.
unfortunately, not much inforrnation is availabl-e on this sector in the publ ished
fi/ For the 1979 figures, see FepoTt of the Direc , International
labour-Conference, sixty-sixth session ( Geneva, InGruational labour Office, 1980),
appendix III, tabie 6; -see also Statistical Abstrac (Jerusalen,
central Bureau of statistics, r9691;l:-U*:-
18/ For firrther informatj-on on the industrial sector' see Arie Bregman
" 1968-1973 (Jerusalem, Bank of Israel'
Resea-rch Department, 197 van Arkadie, Benefits and Durdens:
A
e nndor'rment for International- Peace' 1977
Al35 /533
E:rg]-ish
Annex I
rase -Lo
material concerning the occupied territories. building, both in The data available pertain only to the annuar statistical abstracts and the report furnished by the Government of fsrael. The data are given in append.ix V betow. It woul-d. aprear that most of the building construction has occurred in the private sector both in the llest Bank and the caza strip, mueh of it in residentiai building. There ha.s been a negligible amount of pulfic residenti€r' buildi.ng in the hrest
Sank cons't rwuchteiled tfhoer tdhaeta r efofurg etehse. Gaza strip would reflect the housing that fias being
l+r. Another indicator of capital forration is the investnent naale by the nunicipa.lities in improving the in1'1'u"lructure and eonmunity faeilities, T11e data
-
availabl-e are given in appendix fI befow. The figures for 19TB/?9 show a considerable increase over those tor 19T6/77. This is an outcom€ of'a policy of the Arab league to promote "twinning" of citi"s in the Gulf and. other Arab stat€s and those in the occupied territories. Beginning in late !:g|G, th;;"yo""" sometimes along vith delegations, trom Rarnau-ah, Hebron, Nablus, BethLehem, Gaza and Qalqiliya, among others, visited the neighbouring Arab states to secure resources to irnprove conrnunity facilities in their torms. Negotiiations for such grants and loans arr subJ eet to prior approval of the occupying authorities in respect of the specific proJects ror r.rhictr funds are sought and close supervision in the utilization of such funds.
E. l.{g.cro-economic indicators
146' According to the rsraeri Governnent report, ].9/ the gross national prod.uct in the occupied territories increased at an- average annua.f rate of about 13 per ccnt in real terrns since the occupation, vhile gross national product
?er-capila increased at an average annual rate of 11 per cent in rear terns during the same period. r.Ihile over-arr private consr:mption increased at an average annual- rate of 9 per cent in real terms, private consurnption per capita increased, at an average annual rate of J per cent.
47. The mission was unable to obtain evidence of the existence of any over_al1" developnent plans to provide directlon for systematic economic develoinent and social progress in the occupied territories. The rconomic Develop'eni plan for rsrael, l-97r-l-975 State of Israel w'i thsipne ictsif icparelly-J usntaet et9s6 Tth afrto tnhteie rfrsa,r evwitohr kt hfoer a tdhdei tpiolann o rfe fers to the Jerusalem' East Thus" the rest of the occupied territories vas excfuded fron the pr.an for this period.. Development planning for subsequent periods vas also conducted on the same basis, The absence of any development plan for the rest of the occupied territories is an imped.iment to an oiderty and rational d.evelopnent of the areas to serve the interests first and foremost of the people of those afeas.
19/ State of Israel-, Ministry of Defence, op. cit., p. 3,
E^n/3s-5L /15S 3n3
Annex I
Paee 17
I' . Thq,Slgla1 fr.a4etlork
l+8. The present Palestinian society in the 1^Iest Bank and Gaza Strip is composed
of those living in refug€e canps (285,\05), trrose registered as refugees but
livins in the to'wns and villaEes in the territories (395, 209) and the original
inhabltants ()rl+1,885), "ot" oi vhom have been displaced for various reasons fron
their original 1ands, homes and conmunities. 20/
\9. Over the years, including the period after .lune 1967, many Pa.lestinians of
worhing age, mostLy technically and professionafly qualified persons, have
e.nigrated. at an average of 2O'OO0 persons per year' 21/ in search of gainful
enploynent in the neighhouring Arab states and beyond, because of the lack of
Jobs in the l-ocaI areas, as we11 as in Israel, conmensurate rrith their education
and training. Some have also been deported and others have fled for political
and other reasons, They have not been able to return because of various
restrictions imposed by the occupying power. Young people in seaxcb of higher
education have afso left, mol'e so among the nal"e youth. A situation has therefole
arisen in the occupied. territories in whieh there is a considerable nunber of
Patestinian households without a ma].e head, a situation with grave consequences
for fanily fife and social stability.
50, A further disrupting efement in the social rnifieu of the llest Bank and the
Gaza Strip has been the establisl rent of Jevish settle.ments in strategie locations
in the terlitories. The impostion of ruilitary rule and the presence of an ali.en
culture and religion, compounded by resPntment at occupation, has created an
atmosphere of tension whicb affects not only the social relations betlreen the
Palestinians and the Jewish settfers but sometines also among Palestinians
thenselves - the traditional 6l-ite and the new emerging leadership, the o1d and
the youth, those vorking in the territories and. those who ha.ve accepted. emplolrment
in Israel.
51, Most of the refugees had comF frolo a mral- backcround and vere unaccustomed
to the crovd€cl and pseudo-urban living cond.itions of the camps. They had been
uprooted. fron tbeir socio-cultural- habitat, dispossessed of the only resource
they knew to exploit - land - and their skills in farming vere useless in the camp
setting. They hacl becone the bottom layer of the social structure, doing
unskiLled work wheneyer available" often seasonally, The refugees in the towns and
villages were likewise farm labourers or unskilled workers in conmerce and
industry, often conrpeting with the ].onq-tinle residents for the few available
jobs and sornetiles being resented. The original residents in the tor'ns a:rd
villages vere the most stable group in the society, yet living rrith a sense of
insecurity as to their lega1 and social rights.
20/ Total-s computecl from figu?es in para. 15 above,
{/ Report of the Direetor-General ' International Labour Conference,
si*ty--si"@a1 Labour office, 1980), appendix rrr'
para. 8l+.
A/3i / 533
A.nnex I
rafe -L5
C, fuplo rment, income and consumption
5", According to the in data available, p/ in f96g, unemployment was 1O.g per cent thp \iest Bank and 16,9 per cent in iFe Gaza strip, giving an overal-l unenployment rate of 13.8 per cent for the occupied ierritoiies. ly iSfZ, tlr" rat e r.ras dorvn to 1 , 2 per cent in the llrest Bank anal O .1 per cent in ih. G""" strip' eiving an overall rate of 0.6 per cent, The nission was informed. by repr€sFntatives of the palestine Liberation Organization that the p.in"ip.t- reason for this 1owerin61 of the rate of unenploy:nent vas withdrawal fronx the labour force of nany who would othervise be
-econonicer-1y
fron the territories of active an. emigration territories, able-bodied young men vho, if they had remained in the r+ould have swel_Ied the rankJ of the unenployed.
53. There were" as of Sept ember 1979, 6\3,600 persons of working age, conprising 309,500_men and 33\,OOO won!!. Of tbese, ifB,fOO r,rere in the J-abour forceo conpri sing _lBB, L00 nen and 29,Too women. Tbe pa.rticipation rate i.r-tir. ruuo.r. force was 60,9 rr"r cent for men and g.g p"i--""it for \romen. This represents sore 34.0 per cent of the- working
"g.
pop.rl"tin.r,
"no rate is'_therefore, the overall. paxticipation very 1ov, wiih . "o""ia"""tre disequilibrir:m l-etween tne sexes' Ferr'ale particitation rates are generar.ry 1ow in the region, but the rate for the occupiecl territories is lower than the rates in tt,p other^ countries.
tToh oth::e 1 l9arr €rlaet epsro opfo rptiaornt icoifp ation in econonic activity are mainly *iiri-Lrtrlf. young people in the poputation, the relative imbalance betteen men and voxflen of working ag"^ r" " "e=,-,rt soeial factors influencing or e.nigration and- tradition.l fernale participation in the labour force. As a general rule, a fairly 10lr participation rate inilicates that a large nr:rnber or adults of vorliing age are absent frorn the labour narket and, consequently, that the per capita j.ncone is correspond.ingly Lower. In the case of th; Gaza Strip and the llest Bank (exeluding East Jerusale.m), onLy a. thirct of the popul.ation vas providing the 3oods and services needed. by thp rest.
5)''- or th' empfoyed labour force, those employed in the Gaza strip and l,rest Bark numbered l"L1,6oo" r,lhil,e those working in fsraei numbered 75,100 or 3l+.f per eent.
lilt::l 1978. ana f9?9, those enployel in tneselvo tenitories fe1l froo
)ulyu,:t1u9u0 r oto _r)l,[Jl:'u!oo,o a-n ian creredausceti oonf oi z,6oo, *a tnouo ernployed in rsrael rose from 51400 or f.J per eent.
55- The labour force in the tvo teritories during this period increased by 2,300 persons, rrhile the number of those etrpfoyea fel]- by 2,600. ft woul-d appear, therefore" that ir,9oo persons r,rere seeking L" r""a in need of errployraent cluring the_period. considering that the nunter if persons from these territories enployed in fsrael during the sane peri.od. inlreased by 5rl+00, ii
-"ro -u.-."
that those persons entering the labour nark€t and seeking employnent " as ve"LuLroa
as another 500 already enployed" found
attraction of higtrer vages or the lack
Nurnber
(thousands
)
A/35 /5 33
Xngl.ish
Annex I
Page 19
emplo;nnent in Israel because of the
of grolrth in the territories, 23/
'I O?Q
J6- The trend- in the distribution of e-rnployrnent by place of r,rork is as
follovs: N
L973 r977
P.rcentage
Nulrbgr
(thousands
)
t.rcerlgre.
Number
( thousand
s ) "-.. r
" ".
Pafestinians
tnrkiro i n .
and l^Iest Banh
Israel
),5?.7 BB.1 133 . l+ 68 . j 1l+1. 5 6g .z 1l+1. 5 55.1+
20.6 ]-1. 9 6r.3 31" 5 62.9 30.B 75.r 34.6
ft voukl appear that e-nplolrment in the two territories dropped to a 1ofi in 1973,
ros., by 5 per cent in 1977 and reraained practi.cally the same in 1979. At the
same tine" empfolnrent of Palestinians in Israel had risen by 19?.5 per cent by
f973, rogistering a further rise of 2.6 per cent by 197? and another rise, of
19.4 per cent by f9?9. This Inould see.m to indicate a lack of growth in e-mploynent
in thc occupi::d territories that appears tc stem fToo the economic policies
pursuecl- by the occupying pover,
2l/ Thc figurcs in paragraphs 53-55 have been computpd from !g9g!-g[-tirn
Director-General, Tnternational T,abour Conference, sixty-sixth sescion (Geneva,
fnterr':rticnal labour Office, 1980), appendix III, table 1.
2Ll ci.tie+i-.1 A}\al-?a^+ ^f T<rqal loTA
Director-Genera1, International l,abour Conference"
Internationaf Labour Office, 1980), apnendix IfI,
.p.... ._7_8.3-. .a.-n.7d. =E.e,p94--9!-!b:
sfxty-Slxth SeSSlon (Uen(ava table 1, '
A/ 35 / 533
English
Annex I
lage 20
5"1 , fn so far as the various economic
as ro-t-Lows: l>l
'I O7n
OcSu-
Pied
Terrifsrael
tories
branches are concerned, the trend has been
PerpSnleees
Agriculture
Construction
Other a/
'la??
0ccuhi
6A
Terd-
Israel torieg
to ? ?r ?
tA I rq l
5r.7 6.l+
1,4
Lv.7 + | ,.^.
0ccuniaui
Terr i -
Israel tories
!979_
0ccu-
Israel Ierll- tories
a/ fncludintj coruaerce, restaurants, hotels, transport, storafle, and public
and c ornnun ].ty scrvlces.
Emplo]'raent in agriculture has been fau.ing both in the two territories and in
Tsrael. In ind.ustry, it has been rising in Tsrael- whiLe in the tvo territories it
had risen in 1973 but fallen slightly i.n !977 to rise again in f979. In
constructiono emploJanent has been falling in fsrael, with a slight rise in 1979"
while in the tvo territories it haat faLl-en in 1973 but risen in 1977 and 1979.
It vill be noted that the econonic branch which showed greatest expansion betlteen
1970 and 19?3 was services included in the '?other" category. By 1979, this branch
employed almost half of the workers in the two territories, r,thi].e about one in
every six ?a,l-estinians rnrcrking i.n Israel ras enployed in this branch'
Fepresentaives of the Pal-estine liberation Organization and officials of Arab
Governments consulted. by the nission point out ths-t the disproportionate size of
enployment in this category is due to the fact that the Palestinians are enployed
in menial and lolr-paying jobs formerly being perforrned by Israelis' whil-e the
Israelis nove on to higher-paying Jobs.
58. In vieri of the fact that the annual- Statistical Abstract of fsrael gives data
^'' nrnnl^vr^r+ ih rcy'aal of non-Jews from Vithin the country as ve11 as of pcrsons
from the occurried territories, some interesting observations can be Eade on the
trend of such er'iployment, For instance, in the a.gricultufal sector, uhile the
total of employees dropped in absofute terns by 1n7oo persons betwee-n L970 and 19?7'
the number of non-Jewish emplcyees rose by 3,)+00 persons. In fel-ative terms, the
proportion of non-Jelts increased fron l+2.5 per cent of the total erpl-oyees in 1970
2Lt .l4
_L_L , O
54.3
9.7
38.7
13.8
B.l+
_LO. Z
2r.3
)r <
"
r7.2
30.5
l+ .2
9.1
\6.2
t).+
_LO. +
28.7
-LO.l-
10.1
+) .1
25l Statistical Abstract of_f srael. ]-978 . . . , p. 7B3 ?nd_ Bs!gl!-€-!h.
olrector-cenirar " International l,abour ConFerence, sixty-sixth session ( Geneva'
International Labour Office, 1980), appendix IIf, tables 1+ and 6.
Al35/533
English
Annex f
Paae 21
to 55.4 per cent in 19??. Of these proportions, non-Jers from fsrael fell fron
6e.)r per cent in 1970 to 38.9 per cent in 197?, while those fron the occupipd
territories increased frorn 37.6 per cent to 61.1 per cent.
59. fn industry, vhii-e the tot;al of employees increased. in absofute terms by
47,000 pF'rsons betr,reen f97o arld 197?, the number of non-Jewish employees increased
by ]6,1+00, fn refative terms" the proportion of non-Jer,rs increased from
7.8 per cent in 1970 to 12.5 per cent in f9??. Of these proportions, the number
of non-Jelrs from Israel- decreased from 86,2 per cent in l-9TO to 6O.l+ per cent
in f917 " while those from the occupied territories increased frox0 13.0 per cent
to 39.5 per cent during the sajoe period.
60. fn construction, vhilr' the total employed increased in absolute terms by
23'300 during the period 197 0-:.-97'1 , the m:mber of non-Jews employed increased by
25r90Q. fn relative ternxs, the proportion of non-Jews increased from 31.8 per cent
in 1970 to 47.9 per cent in L9T'1 . Of these proportions, the mrmber of non-Jews
from Israel d.ecreased from 6L.9 per cent in f97O to )+B.O per cent in 19??, while
those fron the occupied territories increased froro 3B.l per cent to
52.0 per eent , $/
61. The trend vould appear to indicate that in the movement of labour in Israel,
as Jewish and non-Jewish employees in Israel move upward s and outwards in the
employnent structure, the vorkers from thc occupied territories move in to fil_1
the places at the bottom of the struct.are as semi-skilled and unskilled fabour,
The educational and voca.tional- training patterns in the occupied territories
reinforce this vier.r, and would seem to confirm that palestinians from the occupied territories are employed nainly on the lor4,er rungs of the occupationa] .l-adder.
62. The occupationaf categoLies of the employecl persons among the palestinian
population are $iven in appendix VIf below. In 1978, agricultural workers and
skilled and unskilted workers in industry, mining, building and transport formed
the bulk of the enployed (72.0 per cent). this proportion has not charged nuch
since 1972 (71.3 per cent). Scientific, professional and adrninistrative workers
forned 10.6 per cent, a decrease fron 11./ per cent in f972, The relative paucity
of Jobs requiring this kind of expertise, as indicated. by the tr€nd, is no doubt one
of the principAL causes of emigration of professionally qualified persons. The
expert s rtere told by officials of the neighbouring countries and representatives
of the Palestine Liberation Organization that the principal reasons for the lack
of enployr0ent opportunities for scientific, professional and id:ninistrative
pprsonnel in the occupied territories vere:
(a) The tach of expansion of the public services and the virtual freeze in
the employnent of certain categories of professional workers in the public sector,
such as teachers and nurses;
42/ Ahe figures have been computed fron Stati.stical Abstract of fsrqgl ...,
1973 to ]9?8.
A/35 / 533
Xnglish
Annex f
Paee 2?
(b) The relati.vely 1ov salaries prrid to professional vorkers such as medical
porsonnel connerec rrith their counterparts in the lsrae-Li public service;
(c) The difficulties faced by somp professionals in acquiring the equipment
nec es s aly for th^ir vork;
(d) The heavy burden of Israeli taxation on individ.ual professionals
working on their oan account,
6. As for incomes, the report furnished by the Goverrutrent of Israel mentions
that the incomes of self-enployed farmers grew at an average annual rate of
some 20.0 1)er cent in the l,/est Bank and 15.O per cent in the Gaza Strip, vith
sinijar incorne grcvlh rates for agricultural enploycps. This incrFase in income
r,ras, accord-ing to the report, nainly rlue to structural changes introduced,
increased. utilization of hi6;her quality production inputs and the closer ties
established betlreen the economies of the occupied territories and Israel. 27/
0+. The trend in r,rage rates of those working in the Caza Strip and l,lest Sank and
those in fsrael, both in current and real terns, can be seen from aplcndix VI
belo1'r,
65. The 1eve1 of r,rages paid to the vorke?s f"om the tvo territories working
within the territories and in Israel has risen significantly in current terms over
the past 10 years. The average, daily vage per uorker rose from 7.9 Israel pounds
in 1970 to 68.O lsrael pounds in 1977 in thr- t.lest Bank, while in the Gaza Strip
and Northern Sinai the average daily wage per worker rose fron 5.! Israel pounds
in 1970 to 55.5 Israel pounds in l-97?. 28/ Wnen the incomes are deflated by the
index of consurer prices, the rise in ti? -Level of incones does not appear as
great as it does at first sight. A revision of the d.ata to take account of
inflation vould indicate that for the \,trest Bank the average real daily wage of
erployees lrorliing there rose frorn 7.31 Israe1 pounds in 1970 to 11.81+ Israel pounds
in I97'l " giving an aver^age annuel increase of under f per cent at 1968 prices.
The increase in real irages for enployees from the West Bank working in Israel vas
very insignificant, The average daily vage for this c&tcgory increased in real
terrns (at 1968 priees) fron tO.9 fsrael pounds in 1970 to only 12.5 fsrael pounds
in 1977, an average annual increase in real \rages of 2 per cent, Thus, the real
wa€les of e.mployees fron the triest Bank workers in Israel remained virtually the
sa.me over the eight-year period.
56. During the early ypars of the occupation, there was a great difference in the
level of wagcs oaid to workers in the occupied territories and thaL paid to those
lrorking in Israel. This gap has nov narror,red considerably. llhile in 1970 wages
paid in the two territories were slightly nore than half the wages paid in Tsrael,
27/ State of Israel, Ministry of lefence, op:_qj!,, p. 5.
2B/ Statistical Abstract of Tsrael, 1978 .,,, Fp. 376 and. TB9.
/...
Nl35 /533
Bnglish
Annex I
Page 23
by 19?8 the former constituted about 60-90 ppr^ cent of the latter according tc
sector. 2Q/ There also seems to .be
some convergence between avel age Israeli
wa€es and average wages paial to workers fron the occupied territorles. In 1970
the average raages paid to r'rorkers fron the occupied territories vorking in
fsrael constituted 59,0 per cent of the avel'age wages paid to Israelis. By 7977 the proportion had increased to 73.0 per cent. 30/ This achievement is '
counterbalanced by the high r^ate of inflation in fsrael, vhich is transrnitted to
the occupied territories because of the close relationship between the tvro
economies. The movement of the consuner price index from 1970 to 1979 is given
in appendix IX below,
67. Increased incomes fron emplo]'ment have partly contributed to higher' 1eve1s
of consumption, fn the !trest Bsnk, between 1968 anA 1978, the value of
agricultural goods consrmed rose, at current prices, from €T 123 nillion to
T3,038 nillion, that of indust.riat goods from 5.I 133 nil-tion to t3,187 mil-lion
and, that of services from fT 99 mi].lion to tI 2,021- mi].lion. In the Gaza Strip,
during the same period" the value of agriculturat products increased from
SI l+7 nilLion to tI 985 miJ-1ion, that of industrial goods from fI 57 million
to tI l-,652 rnillion and that of services f"oix tI l+t rniuion to €I BB1 mi11ion. 31/
The number of households possessing durable goods had a.1so risen considerably
particularly in the case of electrical and gas stoves for heatin6r and rarGes for
cooking' refrigerators, ser,ring machines, television sets, telephones and motor
vehicles, 'S?il Mucb of the increase in consumption can al.so be attributed to the
substantial renittances frcm abroad., vhich in the Gaza Strip had increa.sed from
fI 2 nxi.l-Lion in 19bb to fI 864 million in L977 and in thp Wpst Bank from
tI 17 roillion in 1968 to SI ],572 rniflion in 19??, 33/ Aeain, officia.ls of the
Palestine Liberation Organizetion question the base data on the possession of
durable goods. They believe that the proportions or'ming durable goods befol:e the
occupation vere much higher thah those given in the Israeli statistics,
?2/ S_!p!fqme4_t9 -!bg Report qq lhe Dileq! or- Cs4qre l, rnternational Labour
Conlerence, sixty..sixtn session, (C"-neva - -fntErn-a1-i"naf falour office, L179).. p, 26,
J_qi stClr_E1lSer-_4_S_EtICSt _Clrsrael, 1978 ..., pp. 376 and 789.
t r*.'".,,-.'oo","u"*o,'".,u,-"*,]1..., p. ??1.
32/ Sta1. of Israet, Depa-rtnlenL of Defence, op.cit,, p. 31.
33/ Statistical Abstra.ct of Israel, 1978 ..., pp. 768 and 769.
t.,,
A/35 /r33
Annex I
vage 24
III. THE 1iUI.IA]I SETTLEI,IENT SYSTA1 T1i THE OCCUPII,D TXBRITORINS
A. the pattern of human settlenents
trJ. 'lhe hest tsank cornprises a total area of l+,8e0 kilometres (A/3\/j36 and. Corr.l,
annex 1, paras. 3 and )+) and had a Dopulation of 581 ,200 at the end of L)17, 3U
giving a lopulation density of approximately 1l+1 persons per soruare kilonet"e.
Around 30 per cent of the population l-ive in urban areas; the rest of rhe population,
nanely J0 per cent, l-ive in villages vith populations of from 50 to 5,000 persons
each .
69. The Gaza Stri! and llortb.ern Sinai compri.se an area of 3)+5 square kilonetres I ^ !^r t-^. tA/341536 and corr.l-, annex I, paras. 3 and Ir) lrith a population of U+l-,300 at the
end of 1977, 3)+/ giving a population density ot f
"279
persons per square kil"onetre,
one of the highest in the world. About BO per cent of the population ]ive in urban
areas and refugee canps and the other 20 per cent in small rural settlenents. The principal t orn'ns in this territory are Gaza and Rafah.
70. A significa:rt feature of human settlertents in these two territoxies is the fact
that a large proportion of the population live in refugee camps, a situation
brougbt about by the lrar of 19)+8 and. aggravated by the l_96T hostilities and. other
:actors arisinA from the occupation. In the \,trest Bank, the number of refugees
registered r,rith UlIRliA was l1J"51Ir as of June 1979. 32/ of these, 82,461+ r,rere
. actual-ly living in 20 camps. The nunber of registered refugees constituted.
approximat e1y 46 per cent of the population of tbe hrest Bank at the end of L978" and
since nany refugees are not registered. '"'ith UllnllA, the proportion of refugees in
the tota-l popular,ion of the l.lest Bank is likely to be much higher. Those living in
camps constituted about 12 per cent of the population.
?1, In tbe Gaza Strip, there were 363"005 refugees registered vith Ll{RliA as of
June f979, 0f these, 2C2"9\1 were actually living in eight camps. 35/ Thus
80 per cent of the popufetion of the Gaza Strip rrere refugees and l+5 per cen"t of
rhe population vere actual-Iy livini in refugee camps. The size of the refugee
situation in Gaza is such that it comprises almost the whole of the population, if
the fiSure given for registered- refugees is augmented by the undetermined nrmber of
unregistered refugees.
72, In ad.dition to the indigenous lopulation of these two territories sJrd. the
Gclan Heights, nernr Jewish settlements are being estabfished. in the territories by
the oceupying Power or with its support and by July l?79 79 of these neu settfements
had. been established. in the l^lest Bank, 18 in the Gaza Strip and llorthern Sinai and 2! in the Golan Hei6hts (s/13450/Add.1, annex III).
34/ Statistical Abstract of Israef, 19?8 ... , p. 76j,
35l official Fecords of the Cenera-r As s erob It4r_lE!I!X=[9!ILL_g€!9!,
Supplen:]ent ITo. 13 (A/34/I3), annex 1" table lr.
A/35 /533
t,in sl- 1s n
Annex I
B. Housing and infrastructure
73. The large nr.u0.ber of refugees in tlle occupied teffitories poses a serious
problem in the fi el-d. of housing. Apa"t from the fact that tbe infLux of refusees
into these areas has put consi.derable pressure on existing acconnodation, the
denolition of nany refugee canp units by the occupying authority has exacerbated
the situation. In 1971, about 3,000 refugee shelters had. been denolisheai in the
Gaza Strip. The occupying authority undertook to resettle the displaced falrilies
and. others numbering 30,500. As of 31, December :..9'lB ) ZrBgZ units had been compLeted
and L,260 were und.er construetionl 26,\18 fatrilies were yet to be resettled. In the absence of a visit to the territory, no corurents -36/ can be nade on the quality
of housing provided. by the authorities in the Gaza Strlp. Ilo'weve?, tbe figures
gi.ven in the Statistical- Abstracts of Islael indicate that the average size of the
dwelling units buil-t by the authorities ii lluch sna"ll-er than the average size of
units in Israel or of those built by the private sector in the Gaza Strip.
Approximately 1!,000 houses had been destroyed. by the occupying authority since the
beginning of the occupat ion (a/!t/556 ard Corr.1, annex I, para. 24) and this has
aggravated the housing problem in the occupied. territories.
74. In the llest Santr, despite a consid.erable movement of leople to the toms, no
progra.Ime of public housi.ng see:ns to ha.ve been foruulated. and inpfemented. Ilousing
construction appears to be soJ-e]y in the haDd,s of the private sector. No prografi[re
of publ-ic assistance to facil-itate the productj.on of houses appears to be in
operation. The private sector has produced a creditable anount of housing,
especially since 1975, but this is far below the requirenents,of the population.
7r, Sone indication of the pressure of population on housing can be derived frorn
tables 1-6 in appendix X below. In the caza Strip and Sinai, the proportion of
fa:nil"ies living in housing units of tvo rooms or less feLl frorn 68,5 per cent in
1972 to 53,1+ per cent in 19?l+. It fel"t further to 51.6 per cent in 197?. l{hile
this nay be regarded as sone inprovement in the situation in the Gaza Strip and
Sinai as a vhole, in the refugee camps of that territory the lropoxtion rose fron
52.9 per cent in a972 to 53.8 per cent in f97?.
76. h the tr{est Bank, the proportion of ferilies living in housing units of two
rooms or less fel-1 fron 73.9 per cent ln !972 to 6l+,)+ per cent in 19?l+ and. to
61.1+ per cent in 1977. fn the ruyel a"eas of the llest Banli, the proportion cf
fanilies living in sueh dvelling units fel-I from 69 per cent in 19?)+ to 66,, per cent
in 1977, uhil-e in the tolms it feLl slightl-y from \6.9 per cent to )+5.8 per cenr
during the same period.
77. Although the figures shov some inprovement betneen 19?2 and 197?, t}e degree of
congestion suggested by the 19TT figures can only be described. as severe. The tvo
rooms per housing uni.t which has been taken as a cut-off point represents a very
1or.r stsndard of acconmodat ion. The loed.ian Arab fanil-y in the tr,ro territories
36/ State of Israel, tlinistry of Defence, op.cit., append.ix 18,
Al35 /533
-Einql L 5 n
Annex I
raPe to
consjsts of seven persons. ?hat nur.lber of persorrs living in two rooms Cives ar person/roor,: ratio of 3.5, rr,ni ch is much hig'trer ti:an the ratio for r.rhat may be regarried as an acceptable level- of thir'is acconriodaticn, In the West Bank, about t,,ro oi all f a-milies ',rere living at this 1eve1 or lor,rer o 'rhile in the (iaza str-ip
anci sinai' rilore than hali th.e fanilies were living in such conditions in f.9T-(. irhe situation contrasbs rrith that prevailing anong Jer,rish families in fsraef . r,ess than
30 per cent of Jewish families, vith a typical farnily size of Just over half that, of Arab fanilies, lived in d,.,e11ing units of two roons or less. The pieture of overcror'rcling vllich can be inferred from the farge proportion of paleslinian Are.b fami.lies lir.ing in dr.relling units of two rooms o" 1"s"" is reinforced. by an e:lamination of the clata in tabre J in appendix x berow, vhich gives the proportions of families living at varioul room densities,
78' uhife some ir.prover.ents have t arien pr-ace between 1972 and. :'977, t,,e fever of overcrouding revealed. by the figures is stift verlr high, In 1977, tl.re lowest nedia.n
roorn density vas ?.'1 , obtained from the tolms of the ''{est Bank and tte Gaza strip. fn the Gaza Strip, the median roon d.ensity for the territory- as a r,rhol-e lnas 2.9, uhile it r'ras 2.J in the towns and. 2.9 in the refu6ee canps. The situation vas sinrilar in the West Bank, where in l:977 the med.ian room density vas 2.T for tl:te tolms and 3.2 for the rural areas,
79' rf a person/room ratio of 2.5 is regarded as acceptabr,e o r.rith any ratio higher than that constituting overcror'rd.ing, €nd if it is ass'med that half the famiries in the range 2.o t,o 2,9 are living above this standard and tbe other harf belor"i it, then about 50 per cent of trre families in the caza strip and d3 p;r ""r.t or failiries in the r,4est Bank rnrere living in cond.itions of overcrording r.rith rnany living in ccnditions of very serious overcror"rd.ing during l-9TT.
Bo. The fiSuxes on house size and room d-ensities reveal that the si.tuation is \40rse in rural areas or refugee camps than in the to'rns. Tn the Gaza Strip and Sinai, the overcror,rding is vorse in the ret\rgee camps than in the torms, vhile in the l,,'est
Bank the tol,ms ale better off than the rural areas, It would appear that the rural areas anc'l the refugee canPs act as the roajor areas for the absorption of popul-ations
displaced by r,rar or by psychological or pi:ysical pressure resutting fron the occupation. The stati.stics that are available d.o not permit an evaluation of the
sj tuati.on in individual settlenents that would lrake it possible to assess the direct r"npact of such actions as denor-ition of houses and forced xelocation of rarge po';ulation groups, such as the Bed.ouins. ft is, hor,rever, safe to concluc]e that there is a connexion betveen the higher revers of cong;estion in the refugee canps
ar:iL tjre rural areas and the various actions taken by the administering authorities leading to a di.splacement of families and conmunities,
B1' As nentioned earlier, the private sector in the occupied territories i:as been the nost active i.n house construction. However, the fact that nost buildj.ng naterial-s, vith the exception of quarry stonez a"e in short supply and have to be inported either from Israe] or fron abroad. at a high cost rnakes it difficuft for the private sector to lroduce as much housing as it would lihe. The shortage of building materials is particularry acute in the case of cement, steer rods and
^E/n3F5l /i5s3h3
Annex f
Paae ?7
metal fralles. 37/ Further:.rore, the establishment of an increasing nr.rnber of Je1,/ish
settlements in the occupied territories has reclucetl the supply and increased the
prices of building nxateria.Is for house construction in the occupied territories.
C. ImDact of Jerrish settleoents
82. The question of Jewish settlenents in the occupied territor'ies has engaged. the
attention of nany United llations organs and agencies. In the course of the
discussions vith official-s of Arab Governments and the Palistine Liberation
Organization, it r'ras impressed. on tbe rnission that the problems posed by the
existence and. expansion of those settldrents vere central- to any consideration of
the present situation in the occupied territories, ?he problem has roany dinensions
but the follorring analysis of the irnpact of Jeldsh settlenents is limited to some "
of the effects these settlenents are having on the living conciitions of the
Palestibian people in the occupietl territories and is based on discussions with
representatives of the PaLestine Liberation Organization alld the Goverr,nents of
neighbouring Arab countries, as well as on qritten antl unpublished sources.
83. Since 1967, sone 133 ner Jewish settl-ements have been constructed or are in
the process of being constructed i.n the occupied tcrritories. These settl,enents
are l-ocated. betr,reen s.nd. among existing A-rab settLements, scnetimes, as in East
Jerusalem, surrounding then €nd cutting tben off froe direct contact with other
.Arab settler0ents. This tends to veaken and disr]tpt traditional ties and.
relationships betr.Ieen the Arab settlenents so affected.
Bl+. In pursuaace of the policy of settlement creation, the inhabitants of the
occupied. territories, especiaLLy those liv:ing in the l.Iest Bank and Jerusaleu, are
subjected. to continuous plessure to ernigrate to na-he room fot ne'w JeI^Iish sett]-ers'
\,lith respect to the Golan Heights, the Syrian authorities stated thar. 1.34,000
inhabita.nts had been expeu.ed, leaving only $1999 or about 6 per cent of the
origj.nal population living in the area, This, added to the inposition of Israeli
Law and the Israel-i educational systen0' on the territory, would indicate an attempt
at annexation of the area, 29 Jevish settlenents having been established there to
date.
85. The policy of settl-ement creation is causing drastic and. irreversible changes
in the denographic and spatial coafiguration of the texritories, in violation of the
rights, feelings and. sensibilities of the original inhabitants.
86, A very noti.ceabfe effect of the Jeeisb eett]-ement movement on the living
conditions of the Pal-estinian people tiving in the .occupied territories is the
3?/ Citeti from the report of the Interagency Task !'orce on Assistance to the
Patestinian People, subrdtted. to the Interagency lr{eeting on the Inplenentation of
ceneraL As sembl-y Resolution 33/LIt7, held at Geneva from 30 April to 1 llay 19?9.
^in/3g5li/sr3h3
Annex I
fape 2t1
contribution it makes to the generation of an over-a1l feeling of insecr:rity among them. This feeling of insecufity arises largely fron certain actions of the
occupying Fower, which are basic to the process of settlement creation. Some of
these actions are:
(") The continuing expropriati.on and confiscation not only of privately owned
land but also of rniri land" to which individuals and families, and sometimes
communities, have-definite rights hand.ed doun from generation to generation: it is
estimated that about 27 per cent of the llest Bank and the whole of the Golan
Hei€hts have been seized by the fsraeLi authorities for settlertrent creation oa for
other purposes ; 38/
(b) The demolition of Arab homes for various reasons, folloved by the
creation or expansion of Jevish settlements, as in East JerusaLen and. in Kiryat
Arba;
(c) The destruction af Arab farros n either through defoliation or thxough the
Cestruction of tree crops by bulldozing, cornpelling the Arab owners to leave the
land and thereby rendering it l-iable to confiscation and alienation to Jewish
settlers under the Absentee PToperty Law of 1950 or orders mad.e under the Defence
(rrnergency) Regulations of 19)+8, Some of the land thus alienated ha.s been used to
establish or expand Jewish settlements; on other 1ands, Jer,rish groups have been
permitted to settle on their ovn. This afienation of property owned by the Arab
population and the setfLernent of Jevish groups on it are deeply resented by the
peopfe, who feel insecure and helpless because they have no control over the
processes leading to the transfer of their l.and,. 39il
87. The proliferation of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories has also
1ed to encroachment on the vater resources of existing Arab settl-ements, d.epriving
the'n of a considerabl-e oroportion of their traditional water supplies, not only for
agricu-1tural use but also for domestic uses. A ease in point is the tovn of
Ramallah, which is experiencing serious rater shortages as the ner,i Jevish
settlements and nilitary ca&ps axound it d?aff water from its traditional sources.
Raralfahrs water supp]ies had been cut off by the occupying authority at one point
in orcler to force the town to connect its water supplies to the fsraeli water
system. )+O/ lfhen the woter shortage becomes very severe, the Arab poputation is
sornetimes compelled to leave the settfement, thus starting a process which usua1ly
enc]s in the loss of the land,
38/ Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, Bulfetin No, 2 (tetruary, fgBO),
p. 17.
39_/ ExT ples of these c.ctions are given in the rcport of the S ecretary-C eneral
u^|- rr !v'.r',6-. i*- ^^-r-'+: -*^ ^- fhA Do'l-a+liLnrruia'r ri }nJucvnPfnLle in ihe occltnied territories (A/!+/*6 and Corr"1), annex II, ancl the report of the SpeciaL Cornnittee to
Investiqate Israeli Fraetices Affecting the Er:man Rights of the Population of the
Occupied Territories (A/3\/63f), parasr T9-!05,
.l+0/ Arab Repgrt and Fecord, t-31 October 19??, p, 887 (intervier^r given by the
iUayor o[ Fanallah" Mr. Karim Khalaf).
Al35/533
_E;na,LlS n
Aniex r
Page 2)
88. Ttre proxinity of some of the Jer^rish settlements to Arab settlenents has been a
source of friction, often resulting in violent confrontation between the Arab
inhabitants and the Jewish settlers" for example, betveen those in Hebron anci
Kiryat Arba. The steps taken by the authorities to naintain lav and ord.er, such as
frequent day and night eurfew and secu.rity checks? seriously affect the living
cond-itions, because production suffers, religious obl-igations cannot be discharged
a"rrd social and cultulal contacts are disrupted.
89. one resul-t of the existence of the Jewish settlements in the occupied
territories is the fact that the settlements aJe almost always provided with basic
infrastructure " such as piped water, electricity and road end cornmunication
netvorks, and Arab vill-ages close to these settlements or through which certain
facilities ps.ss can be provided with these arnenities or facilities. However, such
moves by the occupying authority to connect Arab willages to the Israeli
electricity grid. and ffater system are generally viewed by the leadership of the
occupied territories as steps towards annexation" 41/
D. Health services
90. l,iithin the context of human settlenents in the occupied territories" the
impact of the occupation on the health cond,itions of the Palestinian people can be
exa.mine4 in terrns of the quatity of environmental health services avail-able to the
people and the availability and deJ-ivery of preventive and curative health services
to the connunities.
91. Reference has alI'eady been rnacle to the fact that sewelage facilities in the
territories are gene]'ally inad-equate to cope l^tith incTeasing demand and that the
availability of potable water is far flom satisfactoly because of the restrictive
water practices of the occupying authority. The result, accorcling to UNRWA
repo"ts, is that gastro-intestinal- d.iseases are on the increase and constitute a
maJor cause of norbidity and nortafity' pa.Tticu].arly during the sumer months '
Inio::nation on other aspects of environmental health care' such as the control of
aliBease vectors, and on the extent and quality of preventiwe services a].e not
readily avaifable. Data are, however n availabl-e tbat nake some assessment of
curative services possible.
92. There has been no significant change in the mrnber of hospitals in the
occupied territories since 19?)+. )+2/ According to the west Bank xledical
Association, there has been no chJnge between f967 and 197\' The information in
the Israel-i Goverrunent report that new hospitals and medical centres have been
estabLished in the territories would seen to be a refeTence to the operational
sections and. departments that have been added to existing iirstitutions. l+3/
!,!/ r'or information on the wate" situation, see Arab BePort ?nd Fgcor'|"
1-15 SEptenber f977, V. 762; for infomation on the electricity situation' ibid.,
1-I5 August 1977, p. 668.
l+2/ Statistical Abstract of Israel, 19T8..., p' 8oB.
E/ _rEd." p. ff .
Al35/533
Englisl:
Annex I
Page JO
93. I'Iith regard to hospital becls, the rsraeri Govermlent report states that the
number. increased faon 1,351 to l"37l+ between 1!68 and 1!fB in the l{est Bank and fron 947 to 1,070 in the Gaza strip. !+/ This means that the number of beds per
1'000 population vas 2.6 in the Gaza strip and 2.3 in the llest Bank in 1968" wrrire in 1978 the corresponding figures" accorcling to the population data in the rsraeli
Gove"nnent report, were 2,0 for the llest Bank and 2.1+ ior the Gaza Strip. l+!/
These-figures
"epresent
a d-ecl-ine but compa?e sornevhat favourably with conditions in neighbouring countries, with the exception of iebanon " vhere the ratio in was 3.? 1977. However, there seera to be gl-aring discrepanci.es in the figures available.
For instance, a report presented. to the l^Iorld Eealth Assembly at its thirty-second
session by the fsraefi l{inistry of Health ]6/ p,rt" the becl-population ratio fot:
Gaza in f97B at 3.5 beds per 1,000 populati6n " a ratio tfrat- is far higher than that
calculated on the basis of figures on the number of hospital beds and the
population of the territory for 1!f8, The repoyt does not give any figures fol the
west Bank. Hovever " the figures presented to the I,IHO rnission that visited. the
occupiecl territories in April 1980 give the number of bed.s in Gaza strip as ?o? at that date. This gives a bed-population ratio, using the population figure of
4!O,2OO, of only 1.6 per l,OOO popufation.
9l+. The population per physician in the l,Iest Bank is estiroated at l+,319
]n 1976. \/ The ratio for the sane year was 2"358 in the Syrian Arab Republic,
980 i.n Lei;non and 2 ,332 in Jord.an , A" u. ,"u."*" of the avail_ability of health
caxe, the trIest Bank appears to be well below the standaads operating in the
ne:'.ghbouring countries. However, it fares better than these countxies with respect to other health personnel, For exampJ.e, the ratio of qlralified nurses to
1,000 population r"as 0.33 in 7976 in the \.Iest Bank, while in the neighbouring
countries the ratio r,ras fess than 0.3 in 1978, except in Lebanon, where it
was O. 68.
95. Tnfant nortality is reported by the fsraeli Ministry of Health to be
?7,4 per 1"000 in the liest Bank in t97T, It5/ This figure contrasts with that given
in a report by the west Bank Medical Asso-ciation and made availabl-e to the nisiion
by the Palestine Liberation Organi zation, which indicated an over-all rise in
infant mortafity fron 30.? per cent in 1971+ to 38.1 in 1975. The mission also
obtained directly fron UNRWA headquarters at Vienna the figures on infant rnortality
i.n the llest Bank, d.erive{]. frorn studies mad.e by the agency in a number of carnps over
the past 20 years. According to these studies, infant nortality, defined as deaths
44/ rbid., p. )+2.
h/ rria,, p. 17.
)+6/ tiorl.d Health Organization " "Heal-th conditions of the Arab population in
the occupied Axab territories, inelud.ing palestine't (A32/INI'. Doc " 1) , annex.
)r7/ Basecl on figures from the report on health senrices in the West Bank,
Jorclan 1977, presented in Pal-estine Liberation Organization, Central Bureau of
Statistics" Pal-estinian Statistical Abstract, 1979 (Damascus, t979), p. 5\,
Al35/533
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Annex I
of infants befow one year of age per t,OOO live births" decfined from 157 in f96O to 46 in a979" lV
96, One indication that the inhabitants of the occupied territories nay be living
uncler stressful conditions is the fact that the psychiatric hospital in the
territories, located at Bethlehem, with the l-argest nunber of beds in the West
Bank, is the only hospital with an occupancy rate of more than 1OO per cent. \9/
In 1979" 5,186 cases were record-ed there, including 6t), nerr cases but exc-Lucling
cases of depression" vhich, if added, vouLd increase the mr,nber of new cases
to 1,100. 49/ According to the director of the hospital , for every I,OOO patients
seen at the hospital, one r,/ou1d expect about BOO neurotics, IOO epileptics an,1
100 schizophrenics, manic depressives etc" 50/
97, fhe W}{O mission which visited the territories in April 1980 found that " in
general " the health facilities in the occupied territories Ltere not always
adequate. The inadequacy was especially acute in the field of X-ray and other
diagnostic equipment. In namallah hospital, regarded as the best equipped in the
territories,tne nission found that such basic facilities as equiprnent for certain
kincts of bl-ood tests and biocherical analysis vere lacking" Patients f]'om tbis
hospital were refe"red for such tests to Tsraeli hospitals, thus pl-acing a burden
on the hospitalts Limited budget. fn some cases" for exa,lnple, in Nablus and Hebr'on
hospitals, the maintenance of physical plant and equipaent was poor'
98" The VII{O mission also noted. Sreat differences in the provision of health
services in the occupied. territories compared Lrith Israel-. Israeli hospitals had
more up-to-d.ate equiprnent " and. the quality of health care provitled vas much higher.
99. The differences in heafth care provision in the occupied territories and in
fsrael- can perhaps best be appreciated through a comparison between resources
avaifabl-e to a niddle-of-the-l-ine fsraeli hospital- and the resoulces availabl-e to
all the llest Bank governrnent hospitals in L975. The Israeli hospital selected for
the comparison is the Shaare'Sadek hospital,
l+8/ Information received by telex front UIEWA headquarters on 1)+ May 19BO'
l+9/ Wor1d Eealth Organi zation, 'tHeal-th conditions of the Arab population in
the oi-cupied Arab tevritories, including Palestine: report of the Special
Cornmittee of Experts Appointed to Study the Health Conditions of the Inhabitants of
the occupied- Territoriesrr (af:/er), p. g.
tol rbid. , p. 10.
A/35/533
Annex I
Beds
Nu,TSing staff
Paramedical- staff
Non-nedical staff
&nployees per bed
N,rFeac n6r had
Total adnissions
1O77 hrrdop+
bnaare 'DaoeK
h^ani +q l
280
,,AQ
101
2,81
f.09
'11, lnA
tf 105 nrillion
A11 Government hospitals
in the llest Bank
eT3 (9u)
529
76
)6q
O.L
o.d (o"67)
0.28
,4 ^y, -(.o^t | -^ .^^\ \ >t royy )
tI 38 nillion
Ig!g, Figr:res in parentheses are official figures or are computed fron
official figures obtained fron Statistical- Abstract of fsrael, 1978.
1OO. The above information, which was supplied by the West Sank l4ed.icaf
Association, revea-ls a great variation in the l-evef of resources evailable to alf
the West Bank goverrfient hospital-s and one Israeli hospital. According to the
Israeli Ministry of Health report referred to earlier, the budget for health
services in the West Bank for 1978 was tf 132 !0il-1ion, 'which represented a
!O per cent increase over 19??. 51/ Ttrls wou1d mean that the budget for 1977 uas
[1 88 nilIion. A.lthough this figure is nuch higher than the one given by the West
Sank Medical- Association, it is stiu be].o'w the budget uhich the Association says
was allocated to the Shaare I Sadek hospital.
101. The inadequacy of itiagnostic faciLities and. specialists in the occupied
territories often necessitates the referal of patients to Israeli hospitals fox
diagnosis and treatnent. This proced.ure, according to the Palestine Liberation
Organization officials, constitutes a mal or constraint to the improvenent of
health services in the territories, because most of the fees levied by the IeraeLi
hospitals for such diagnosis anil treatment of VJest Bank patients are charged to the
West Bank medica]. budget, and to that extent fewer resources are available for the
improvement of heaLth facilities ancl medical services in the West Bank.
102. The question of paying hospital fees is one which pl-aces a financial, burden on
some of the inhabitants. Free med.ical service was according to the PLo officials
provided in the West Bank prior & f967; now, ttre people have to pay for these
setvices. The authorities have introd.uced. a health insursnce scheme' which bas
been in operation since February I9?8. Accortling to the Israeli Goverrlnent
report, about 5oo,0oo inhabitants of the two territories have joined the schene as
at January 1,980, fl This is somewhs.t less than half the totaL population in those
)_L / rolc.., P. J.
52/ State of Israel, Ministry of Defenee, 9!=_jjl_:, p' fe.
Al35/533
hgli.sh
Annex f
Page 33
territories. For the many rrho have not joined, either because they have an
imperfect unclerstanding of the scheme or because they lack a regular source of
incone, the cost of hospital treatment aJId cane is hi6h in relation to
ind.ividual incomes and. the mission \.'as told that nany of the uninsured founal it
difficult to obtain the free nedical care they had. been accustomed to before the
oceupation.
103. I^lhi1e health care facilities seem to be evenly distributed in a regional
sense, the unavailability of adequate d.i.agnostic facilities and specialist services
in nany of the institutions militates against the provision of ad.equate health
care within a reasonable distance from the homes of the patients.
E. Educational services
L0l+. The level- and t)rpes of ed.ucation available to a cornnunity are relevant to the
living conditions of the people because of the crucial roLe education plays in
the life of the individuaL in terms of his capacit.v to earn anci thereby improve his stand.ard of living, to kee.p himself inforned. anal to enJoy the accumuLated
knowledge and experience of manhind.
105. Ttte systet! of ed.ucation is nuch the same throughout the occupied. territories.
It starts with kindergarten for chil-dren belorv the age of six, folloued by the
elementary or primary school- for children who are nornally between the ages of
six and twelve, who then proceed to the preparatory school for three years.
The primary and preparatory schools form the conpulsory cycle of ed-ucation antl are
fol-lolred by secondary, vocational. and teacher training in6titution6 and institutions of higher learning.
l-06. The educational" institutions are rnanaged by the occupying authority, by
private bod.ies or by UNBWA. In general, the schools fou_ov the Jordanian
curriculun of education in the 'ldest Sanh anal the Egyptian curricul-um in the
Gaza Strip. Ilowever n many books used by the systems have been banned and sections
excised. from others by ord.er of the occupying authority. There are also
restrietions on the inport fron other -Arab countries of books \,ftich are the
pr imary sou?ces for literature in Arabic. Duties are ehsrged on the irnports
of such books and equipnent.
l-07. In the lfest 3ank, the number of educational- institutions increased from
BzI in !961 /68 to l",ooo in 1976/77, an inerease of 21.8 per cent. similarly,
the number of institutions in the Gaza Strip increased from 165 in 1967 /68 to
27O in 19'(6/77, an increase of 38.5 per cent. 53/ Durine the sane period, the
number of educationaL institutions grevr by 33 per cent in the Syrian Arab Repub]-ic,
by 32.5 per cent in lgypt and by 78.6 p€r cent in Jordan. 2V fir" Irest Bank is
thus behind the others in the *ror^rbb of educationa] institutions.
5y Statistical Abstract of Israel, f9?B ..., p. BO?.
5V Calcula.ted fron figures given in 1968-1977 statistical Abstrqc! of the
regionlf the Econonic Corrnission for l]est .
A/ 35 / 533
Enslish
Annex I
faEe J4
1oB. Enrolment lates hal'e increaged. significantly since 1967. A conparison of these
rates with those of neighbouring countries shows, however, that th€ growth in
enrolment in the two territories has Dot kept pace with the rate of growth of
enrolment in neighbouring countries rluring the deca,le ending in 19TT. This is
shown in aFpendix X, table 1" belo'r'. In terms of over-a]-1 grolrth, the llest Bank
and the Gaza Strip were narginally ahead of Egypt only among the neighbouring
countries.
109. While growth in en"oLment rates is one measure of access to education, another
measu?e is the enrolment ratio, lrhich relates the enrofx0ent by various age groups
to the population in those age groups. The statistics that are available d"o not
perx0it direct application of thi.s neasure. The situation can, however, be exanined
indirectly. rn a stu y of erlucation i.n the !trest Banh, it was found that enrol-nent figules in the first grade " that is, the first year of prinary school to the total
population had decreaseal frorn 3.2 per cent in lg58/6g to 2.T per cent in
I9'l\/7r, 22/ In a population vith a high rate of natural increase due largely
to hi €!h fertility, the fal-f in the propoltion of children in the first year of
school in refation to the tota"l population suggests that proportionately fewer
children are entering the school systen despite the growth in nunbers, thus
indicating a potential lovering of the literacy leveL of the population.
110, One neasure of the tiroe and attention vhich a pupil receives from his or her
teacher is the pupil/teacher retio, Comparative fisures for this neasure for
the West Bank 16 il and Jordan 5T/ are given belov;
tg6\/69
1969/7o
r970/T.
r97r/ 72
1977 /78
West Bark
28.0
27.6
)Ao
26.2
27.6
Jordan
35 .1
33. 1
)1. I
32.0
)'t 6
It appears from the above figures that, for most of the periocl 1968/69 b f977/78,
the west Bank fared better than Jordan and that, theoretically" school children in the l"Jest Bank shoufd be better off than their counterpa"ts in Jordan. I{owever, it should be noted that the situation in the West Bank has shown 1ittle iurprovement
since 1!68, while that of Jordan has improveal remarkabJ-v.
_^.ff_/ fatniya Said. Nasru, Ed.ucation in the West Bank Governnent Schools,
1968/69 to :_976/77 (Bir zeit uni"eGIW, 19?Tl;ffi
.56/ K. Mahshi and R. Rihan, Ed.ucation in the west Bank, (nir Zeit University"
lO7ol n lE
2JJ -tne Hashenoite Kingdon of Jorclan, $g&lsticsf Educational ye
1977:78 (Arnnan, l,tinistry of Education, pirffirfre of naucation.af pfannins"
1979), p. 6:.
A/35 /53-i
English
Annex I
Page 35
ili" Altho'gJr uNRl^lA and the occupying authorities vocational training have set up a number of pro€rarnmes, there are few corresponding Job opportunities for those trained in the various skills. According to the fI,o uission report of 1979, approxirnately 3!"000 trainees received diptomas in various sutJects between
]"968 and 197? fron the various vocational training institutions. 58/ However. according to the mission, in one centre only 20 per cent of those-ieceivin,l liplomas r^rere able to obtain jobs in the occupied teruitories after graduation. it was pointed out in the report, however, th;t the Israeli authorities had indicated to the rnission that about )+O per cent of at1 graduates from the vocationaf training centres found Jobs in the occuried terri.tories, vhile
50 per cent founcl jobs in rsrael. The report also gives the inpression that the 1evel of training in these vocational training institutions is not very high, the tra.inees generally being prepared for semi-skill.ed occupations in the rsraeli
economy,
112. Itith regard to higher education, there are three universities in the llest Bank and one in the Gaza Strip, where there had been none before the occupation. These universities have been created. and ere rrm throug,h the initiative of the ]ocal Palestinians theroselves ' with sorne financiaf assistance from Palestinians living abroad.. These universities receive no financial assistance from the occupying authorities and they exist and function in spite of discouragenent and harassment by the authoriti.es. one of the restrictions placed on the vork of the universities is the requirement that the sefection of sludents and the recruitment of staff are
subJect to approval by the nilitary g,overnor. The riniversities a-lso exnerience preat difficulty in obtaining Arabic books and journals. The financial probrens are exacel'bated by the taxes leviecl on books and equipment. The experts were told by a ,croup of educators flon the west Bank that, while rsraeli educationat institutions vere subJect to the same taxes, the amounts paid by them were refr-rnded to them by the Governrnent in the forn of grants; no grants were made to the universities of the trIest Banl< and the caza Strip.
113. rn d'iscussions vith educators from the west Eank, it vas repeatedly pointed out to the experts that the clirnate of occupation was not conducive to the creation of suitable conditions for the educational process. In the first p1ace, because the
economy r'ras under the control of an occupying power arid- pol-itical pover was exercised by the arqy ' the normal eclucational and nanpower planning process to rneet national goals coulal not be und.ertakeu, There were no national p1ani, for whictr
manpower reqrrirernents could be identified, leading to the fornulation of appropriate educational and training strategies to eet the anticipated requirements of the econony and society.
11)r. Secondly' although the occupying authorities had not interfered. directly with t'he general system of education prevailing in the west Bank and caza strip before the occupation, the exlerts nere told trr.i thu banning of certain books and excltlsion of passages fron some others, which were considered inportant by the t'eachers, created a certain fee.ling of fru.tlation and uneasinesi, because the tea'chers found it difficult to hefp their students to appreciate certain aspects of their cuJ.ture and history,
^. . 5y. lgtort gf tbe Directo"-ceneral , fnternational Labour Conference
ilxty-srxth session (ceneva, fnternational Labour Office, 19go), appendix" fTI, Dara. Io^
E/n3g5l/i5sh33
Annex I
Page 36
115. It voultl appear that the occupying authorities, through their actions, have
created and sustsined. a feeling of insecr:rity among teachers and students in alled.
ucational institutions. The experts vere told of con6tsJrt harassnent of students
and staff. fhese hsJassmeDts took tbe forn of frequent arrests, beatings,
adninistrative cletentions and cl-osure of schools. Sometines teachers and students
were transferred, to renote rural areas. Plactical- training for stutlent teachers
in the school-s of the West Bank anat the Gaza Strip vas often disalloved' Those
actions ve"e Justified. by the occupying authorities on grounds of security and
maintensnce of 1av and. older. Hovever, they created conditions which vere quite
detrimental to the tleliverv of educational services.
F. Social wel-fare services :9./
l-l-6. since the occupation, the occupying authority has made efforts to reorganize
the social velfare system in the occupietl territories. TtIe authorities had al-so
organized in-service training for the Arab social- rdorkers to enabl-e them to orient
their thinking antl functioni.ng to new approaches to sociaL casework, group volk
and comuaity organization. These actions have made the services more accessible
to the recipients and have helped. to irprove ttreir quality.
1L?. Rehabilitative services have been introduced to enable intlividuals and fa:nilies
to be sel-f-supporting through productive snall-scale enterprises, for vhictr loans
ane mad.e available throu8h funtls establisheal by the Swectieh organization for
Individual Reliefn CARE and the Catholic Relief Services' Sr:mer camps have been
organized for children from needy farnr'lies and froro institutions, ard special
vocational rehabilitation centres, as tlistinct from nornsl centres, have also been
establlshed.
118, There appear to be a consialerable number of 1oca1 welfa,re organizations
(f35 in the weBt Bank and ? in ttre Gaza Strip) providing such services as comunity
centre activities, homes for the aged, kindergartens, institutions for the deaf
and the mute, sewing courses and da;r-care centres for babies. These activities
at the local 1evel are financed by Arab vomen r s organizations ' the Red Crescent religious and charitable organizations, village organizations and. branches of '
international charitable organizations.
119. The budget for social velfsxe serr-ices has been increased fron eI 5.8 nillion
in 196? to tI 13t.5 niuion ]n t978/79. @! Hov this budset is d.isbursed a.nong
the adninistrative, institutional and direct services is inpossible to deternine
in the absence of rel-evant data. There is al-so no infornation avail-able on vhat
services ttle occupying authority is provialing directl"y and. what propoltion of the
59/ For" further infornation, see Jogn Hooper, "Social work in Israeadminl-
stered te rritoricsi; , EIg.14j---Iq-aSI Journat of -DevelgiIgl' llo. l+
\ J anuary-Jrprrr Jy ty, ,
a^l r,+^+- ^f Td$aat \{ini6+sr af iafanaa Yg:---:ni-i:+' pnnpndirc 27-
A/35/533
English
Annex I
Page 37
budget is given as grants to the neny voluntary organizations active in this fielil. There is not data available of institutions on the range a"nd kind of services provided, the number and a profir-e of the ptopre who are benefitin{ fron the various
services provided. The onry infornation availabr.e is that the numbe" of persons receiving sone fof,m of wetfare assistance in 19?6 vas 3z,Ooo ""a tirt ii igl}/lg the nleber of fanilies receiving financial a.ssistance ,.= B,hrz (t,3tt in tr,e !'Iest Bank ' 7"02r in the caza strip and g0 in the cor"" uerehts).'do7
^htg35li/65h33
,Arlnci I
Pas€ 38
Appeldix I
Bal€nc; of traale in the occupied territorles
Table 1. occq)ieil territories t bslance of tladle
(Mi[ion3 of Israel pourals, cErent prices)
Vest Ba* Gaza Strip
Tradins ps.rtner f,968 r9't7 195B r973 1968 1977
Istael
Total
Jo!tun
Iarael
Totdl
JordaD
Israel
Total
16 59 ,! 85
a25 l+25
106
182
Irports
5
8
2B
T2
\9 66
97 2\3
r0,8
452.7
1250.9
[8. ?
2 \59 .r
2 7\2.8
221+.2
-+14
1 681, ?
L \9L '9
r30.2
\22.O
t rttt
r?6,{
.1
z 261.8
2 438.3
\5.2
-l+2r.9 r \26.3
1 050.6
r.ul
884.7 t 6L2.9
2 638,6
411.4
1r8.8
[ 7a0.9
5 181.1
270.\
-835.9
3 108
2 ,t2.,
20
I7
139
176
39 ',13 rB r? r89 803
2\6 893
\2
tBir
,\2
1t
-58
,r58
)-4+ 2 -rB 2I3
\2 169
19 !0
-32 -50 92 309
'(9 299
I-nports
19 3r
50 3r9
10 351
Ieport surpfus
\ -26
134
121
source: sta.tistical Abstrs.ct or Isra.ef, I9?Q (Jerusslen, central 3uleau of stati6tics' l9?8), p. 1?3 and
kleEG6-en,(Jerusal€n,BsnkofIs!ae1Rese€.rchD€!arLnent197I)'
p. d4.
Teble 2, Occupied territorieEr bal,ance of trade, by coModltie€
(MlUions of Israel Founal6 )
Consodity 1968 19T3 r977
lgricultulal lroduce
Industriel Aoods
Iotal
.A€ricu-Ltur€tr produce
lndustriaL gooils
Totaf
Agricultusf produce
Inalustrial gooals
Total.
Exporte
Irports
I 121+.1
151!,5
2 6*,6
933
4 21+8, t
60 ]'67
258
\25
L6'
728
893
r19
168
B?
!2-
2\6
_E
121
z I J5.o
2
'\2.5
^l3' / 533
&Al.lsh
Annex f
Page 39
Appendix fI
Extraordins,rf,/ budgets of tovns in the West Ban]{ snd the Gaza StriD @
rg'to/77 1976/77 1978 / 79
West Bank
Extraordinary budget expenditure
Road s ana other construction
Estab].ishnents
I{arkets
Other
lnccme
Ioans frou administration and factors
outside the region
crants fron administretion
],oca,I ps"ticipation and other
Gaza S}liD
nxtraordinary erpenditure
fioad.s
Es tab]- i sbrnent s
Obher
Income
l"oans fron adninistration and. factors
outside the region
Grents from Ldninistration
Ioca]. participation and other
2 983 ,
1 394
682
1't2
r 660
10\?
\67
146
22 0a?
1) ?L?
6 967 I 380
2 204
12 038
5 58r
3 99t+
95 005
18 112
\9 a93
2T 7oo
I 121
2 ?15
1502
23 730
5 L32 r, 931
2 663
2\ 739
128 l+31
\6 't67
26 \7\
t 3 8J+[
l+1 3)+6
152 850
oq 12?
l+5 893
26 832
26 398
357
112
220
331
a-L
)rq
4)
3 8r3 I 302
L2 62ll
Source:
of Defence,
1972 erd 1973, and state of Israeil-, Ministry
Jerusaten. J.you.r.
F
o\
FI
d
@
Fo\
il doll rl *ulll
crl
:l
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\0Fo\.-loJ@@L\o@
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F
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Jc - c(nO cO\\t (FnJ \o O' tn !a\ \O .D O .) (\l (.) (n tn tn \Loa \ \Lon \Lon (ol.\\ (F\l \Fo : \rj
rl -1 d .-t .-t .1 r-{ .-{ .-l -t -t .t
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dlii o P'P O)
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Annex I
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lc)
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o 1.9 hl; Po ll'.--ll dt=
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Al351533
Englisb
Annex I
Pege 4JAppend.
ix IV
Agricultural" prod.uction in the West Bank
Table 1. Structure of gross agricultural protluction in tbe
West Bank, 1969 erLd. L976
(Percentage )
Cormodity/
Comnodity
Weight at
1968 prices 1tF---rcr6 Current prices 1e-6------f76
Vegetables
Melons
O-Lives
Ci.trus fruit
Other fruits
Total crops
Meat
Mi].k
Eegs
Total l-ivestock
prodrrcts
Forestry artl new
fruit llentations
Tota].
jr.9
]'2.7
D'l
22.6
'7i
}}.8
68.l
19 .0
10.9
ti
?1 0
il
100.0
6.8
10 0
1l+ .5
f0.7
1\.2
66.t1
22.7
8.9
2.O
5J. O
il
100.0
L.y
l-l.u
2.6
l-9 .3
t.t
12 .8
A.r ?
1X I
10 .0
J].J
rl,
100.0
7.7
r I .o
t9,5
9.\
14.5
5g.o
20.5
R.?
1)
JU.O
0.4
r00. 0
Soutce: Economic Comission for Westem Asian Agricul-ture and Developnent t
uo. a-lEF), p. 37.
a/ Not included in the total-.
u\\orio-Jm
rq rlN60\_r\o
9
-il
ol
9I
I
3l
9l
J
.:
a
fr
pl
;l
.l
?t
ril !l 'rqll
;
"i
6l
o r-{ v, J ho
noJF\FoacvtF-Jl<{no
.oo\moo<o..{\o@
{lhooFO
oFl-loJ€o
o\DolNmo
rl .o ..1 o5@
6.to
o F\o 6 (n 0
o(\J<Dlnrt
6oFlo\o\
cn \oc4i!m5.1 mN
c\ lY) co .o
^
o\
m .: .l <\j r.l r4 . . i
Frlo!,i
r.l
€E A^
* _ul _dt ! 'd n
h lq d .r. 4
€ +rl d o i k
o h0 a\ n .a + ,4 d r-{ .{}
a>=o(JO5:::r
r{
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.-l
^/
35l r33
En6lteh
Arner I
q
H
Appenriix V
West Bank
Total building: public building completed public buifding begun
Private building compl-eted
Private building begun
Residential building: public buil-ding conpletect public buil_ding begun
Private buil_ding conpleted
Private building begun
Gaza Strip
Total building:
51 400
,3 7oo
2 306 l+oo
2 783 l+00
1 700
700
1 923 5oo
2 295 7oo
93 500
105 l+00
700 500
9Tr ?oo
B1 ooo
83 2oo
At J)/ ) 5J
English
Annex I
Besidential building:
Publie bu-ilding completed.
Public buil-rling begun
Private build.ing conpleted
Private builtting begur
Public builtling conpleted
Public buil-tting begun
Private building completett
Private buiJ.ding begun
Source : Statistical Abstract of lerqgJ., 19T8, p. "oR
5r2 \oo
8)+2 7oo
(Square netres )
€o'
q9
?"
iit c
o
iil
9t
BI
F
oo.tN.-t(\lAlal
co^oqtF\o60
FFiI(Ff)IFTrIN.t<AoI5J6mFN
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^
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o' \o F<\r.+
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rl Fi rl .1 rl
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d-
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o o
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rl
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E
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z.g
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,onat I
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Al 35 / r33
English
Annex I
rage +>
Appendix VIT
ti
anrl in Tsrael, by occupation, 1972 antl 1974
1 0'f D r o"R
Thousands Percentage Thousands Percentage
TO[AI,
University-trainetl and.
technical uorker s
l4ana€eriaI, clerical and
related. vorkers
Sales vorkers
Service vorkers
Agricultural workels
Skill-ed r,rorkers in industry,
nining, building and transport,
and, other skil].ed workers
other ltorkers in industry,
tf,ansport and builtting and.
unskilled volkers
188.8
1\. 9
7.1
19. B
]-2,5
43. 5
3l+.3
100
7.9
3.8
5.6
30. o
23.1
IB.2
2tr.g
-LO. _L
5.\
'rR 2
,3.7
l+2.\
100
l.o
3.0
f0.1
"1 .2
10. I
20. 0
Source: Report of the Direetor Ceneral, International labour conference'
sixty:;T;ff, "e@ou" office, 1980), appendix lrr,
table 3.
A/ 35 / r33
Annex I
fage 4b
Appendix VIfI
Avgrage daily vage of workers
Table 1. Avc"age daily vage per €nployee working in the
occupied teruitorics
Sector ]970 1 q7 l+
( Israel pounds )
I9T7
Ag"iculture
fndustry
Construction
Coxuerce, rest aurants and hotels
Translort e storage, communi cation
Pub1ic and comnunity scrviees
Other
Agriculturc
Industry
Constauction
commercc, restaurants and hotels
Transport, storage, connunication
Publi c and co,ururity serviccs
Other
I,I€st Bank
qA
6.6
'tn ?
.)7.o4
4.7
Gaza Strip.
2r.9
23.0
30. 8
19 .8
??o
23.9
18. I
)O.U
60, o
79.r
6r.9
=t l,
qq?
7.0
3,7
6.2
?o
t?i
D7t
32.9
24.4
cao
z).+
53.9
O L..L
04.)
6?.r
73.2
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, f9T8' p. 789.
A/35/533
Bnglish
Annex I
Page 1+T
TabLe 2. Averagc daily wage per ernployce of the occupicd
territories workins in Israel
Sector 1970 r97\ 1977
( ISraef pounos ,l
Agriculturo
Construction
Othcr
Agriculturc
Construction
0thcr
From the \,trest Sank
9.0 22.7 55'o
10.9 27 .2 69.7
13. o 31. 5 79 ,7
10.5 2l+.)+ 68.0
f 0.7 d+.8 58.2
11.6 3f.2 68.5
l.2.5 33.8 7\.9
11.9 30.9 7r.5
Al3r/533
Engli sh
Annex I
Page \B
Appendix Ix
Consumer price index
-Gtffi760--- rooj--
Territory l-!f0 r97L t972 1973 19?4 L97' t976 1977 rgTB 1070
I,lest Sank 108.1+
Gaza Strip 105.1
125.9 1l+8.1 179.9
r.28.1 155.r tgo.3
256.5 361.\
29\.3 t+52.7
t+22.I 574.2
5r2.5 645.8
863.8 1l+l+7.6
979.6 r 688.6
Note: Dcrived fYola Stetistical Alst-ract of fsrael , 1973 and 1978. The base
hatl bE6-changecl to 100 o@rcs for 19?5 onwards have
bec-n obtaineal by erafting the percenta€e increase rturing the perioat 1976-1979 to
the index number in f975 on base 1958/69 = 100.
Al35/533
!;ngllsh
Annex T
Page 4!
Appendix X
Housing statistics
Table 1. tr'anilies by size of dweDing , 1972
(Pcrccntage of families )
Itrunber of roons
per dwelling tr^Iest Bank Gaza and. Sinai Both territories
h+.
3
1
9.1+
rA .l
37.2
50, {
LL.9
r-y. o
1r3.8
2\. B
lo. )+
r7.7
5Y.o
J1. J
Source: Statistical .Abstract of Israel, 1973, p. 707.
Table 2. Families by size of dwe1Iing, Gaza and sinai, 1974
(Pcrccntage of fa.rnilies )
llurbey of roons
per dvelling Refugee ca.nps
Jrr
'I
20.9
26.2
5+. )
18.1+
29.2
5+.) rtr ),
2\.\
dt.6
17.9
Source: Statisligal Ab"trgg!_sg_I"r*fr_.Uf.2, p. 696,
Table 3. FanoiLies by size of dwelling ' Gaza and Sinai, 197?
(?crcentage of faloilies )
Hurber of roons
per dweDing Refugee canps
4+
3
I
l-9-9
25.3
33.2
20.6
25.o
5J. O 'l? 7
45. J
tq I
J4,5
Source: statistical Als.Egg!_9llr"g!r_U]q " p. 779.
A/35 /533
Annex J
Table 4. Fanilies by size of dr"clling, ilest Bank' l-974
ll'fibcf of rooras
VilLages Tovns Tot aJL.+
3
2I
28. 3
?5.8
29.3
-t t.o
rtr R
20.1r
38. T
)\ '7
Sourcc: Sta;bistical- Abstract of fsrac - 1975, p, 699.
Tab].e 5, Famil-ies by size of dvcIling, Ilest Bank, I9T7
L'rumber of rooms
per d.welling Villages Tota"l-
4+
3
2
1
12.0
2t.5
)'? I
<.1. +
25.9
28 .4
17. 4
2?.9
39.7
t1 7
Source: Statisticaf- Abst@ el-Israclr_:-219 , p. 779.
Table 6, Fanilies by size of dueLling, Israel ' L97T
Number of rooms
na, ,lir^l Iihd Jer+s llon--Jews
3
2
L
19. 8
2\,7
L+.2
r-t,J
35. I
34. 5
12. k
Source: Statistical Ab=!gg9!_ol_Eryelr__L9?i, p. 315,
Al35 /533
ElBltEh
An[ex I
Page 51
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A/3r/533
English
Annex II
ANIIH( ]T
lienbers of the Team of ExDerts
Dr. P. Austin Tetteh (chana)
Ptofessor, Departnent of Planning
Unj.versity of Science anal Technology
Kunasi, Ghana
Dr. Sernaralo E. Bati.z (ttexico )
Chief of technical Services
Direcci6n Genexa]- De Planificaci6n
Departaeento Del Distrito FederaL "
Universitlad Anahuac
Mexico, D,tr'., Mexico
Dr. Dudley l4ada{eta (Sri fant<a )
Fomerly Co-ord.inator of Units
Social- DeveLopnent Branch
Cent"e for Social Developnent and.
Hunanitari an Affairs
Deparfment of International- Economic and
Social Affeirs
Uaited Nations, New York
^/35
/533
Annex IIf
AI']I]EX TII
List of docunents and publications consulted
A. General Assembly
Thirty-second. session, 1!JJ - docurnents subnitted in respect of the following
agenda itens:
ltem 30 - Question of Palestine: report of the Comnittee on the Brercise of
the Inal-ienable Rights of the Palestinian ?eop1e
Iten 50 - United Nations Relief and l,Iorks Agency for Falestine Refugees in
the Near East
Iten 5? - Report of the Special Corlmittee to Investigate Israeli ?ractices
Affecting the Hunan Rights of the Population of the Occupied
Territories
Iten 52 - United Nations Environnent Progranme, particularly d.ocunent A/32/228
thirty-third session, 19?B - docunents submitted in respect of the following
agenda items:
Iten 31 - Question cf Palestine: report of the Conaittee on the Exercise of
the InaJ-ienable Rights of the Pa-testinian People
Iten 5\ - United. Iiations Refief srld. Works Agency for Pg.lestine Refugees in the
i'{ear East
Item 55 - Report of the Special Connittee to Investigate Israeli Prsctices
Affecting the Hunan Ri€hts of the Population of the Occupied
Territories
Item 68 - United Nations Environrnent Paogranme, particularly document A/33/35\
Thirty-fourth session, 1979 - docunents subrcitted in respect of the fo11o\ting
agenda items:
Itern 2\ - Question of Palestine: report of the Comtittee on the Exercise of
the Inalienable Riglrts of the Pal-estinia:: People
Iten 50 - United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East
Iten 51 - Report of the Special Cornaittee to fnvestigate Israeli Practices
Affecting the Human Rights of the PopuJ-aticn of the Occupied
Territories
Iten 6J - Human settlements, verbatim reeords and document A/i.+/536 anal corr,l
At 5)t)53
E:rglish
Annex III
Page 2
B. Security Council
Reports of the Secu.rity Council Connission Establistlett under
Reso.lution U+6 (1979) (5/131+50 and Add.l ana 3/136?9)
C. Reports ertd publications from Unitert Nations orqans and units
Report of the Connissioner-ceneral of the United Nations 8e1ief and. Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 Ju]-y 1!??-30 June 1978:
of the General
Report of the ConnLissioner-GeneraL of the
Agency for PaLestine Refugees in the Near East,
United Nations
1 July 19?8-30
Relief and Works
June l-979 ,
"United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,
Definitions and statisticsr'" 30 Jure 19?9
United. Nations Relief and Works Agency fo" Palestine Refugees in the Near East-
United Nations Xducational" Scientific and Culturaf Organization, Departnent of
Education, Statistical Yearbook, l-976-1977
United Nations Relief ar.d. Works Agency for Pal-estine Refugees in the lVear East,
Annual Report of the Director of l{ea1th " 1977 antl 19?8
Econornic Coumission for ltrestern Asia
fiDenographic situation of the PeLestinian people" (8 May 1979)
"survey of economic and social developments in tbe ECWA region, 19?0-19?8
(B/ECWA/BO )
"survey of econonic and soci.al developments in the ECIfA region, 1980 (lpril 1980 )
rrspeciel neasures of assistance to the Palestinian wcnnanrl
( E/EcwA/SDHs/CoNF. )+/5 /Rev.2 )
"sociaf and econonic conditions of Palestinian woman inside and. outside the
occupied telritories ( E/ECI.IAISDHS/cotrf . ).r/6 /nev. f )
United l,lations Rel-ief and. Works Aaenc
Palesti.ne Refuaees in ttre llear East
^ft/r3g5li/s5h33
Annex III
Page 3
Statistic€l Abst"act of the Regi on of ESWA, third issue (Beirut, 19BO)
"Social progranmes and data for the ECWA region" (felruary 1980 )
rrDcnographic anal related socio-econotnic tlata sheets for countries of ECI,,tArt,
No. 2 (Beirut, January 1!18)
Coptrittee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Right s of the
Palestinian People
fhe Righ! of Return of the PaLestinian People (Unitea Nations publication,
Sales No. E.?8,I.21)
The Right of Self-Detenoination of the Palqstinian People (Unitea Nations
put fi
. the Origins anal Evolution of the Palestinian Problen, part l, f91?-194?
(Unitetl i{ations pub}ication" Sales I\To. 8.78.I.f9)
"Acquisition of 1g;nd in Patestinel' (l-9?9 )
Dse Hamarskj 6ld Library
PaLestine Question: A Select Biblioeraphy (1976)
Cornniss ion on Aunan Rinhts
Beport on the thirty-fifth session, 12 February-16 March L9?9: official
Recortls of the Econonic and SociaL Cowlcil. SuppLenent No. 3 @/L979 /36)
neport on the thirty-sixth session, l+ Fetrualy-lI+ Msrch 19801 offlclaL
Record.s of the Econosic and. SociaL Council. Suppl-enent No. 3 (E/1980/13)
Unitetl Nations Developnent Progra:rnne
I'Imqrlementation of General Assenbly resolution 33/1\? on assistance to the
Palestinian people" (DPl!10 )
Report of the Inte!-Agency Task Force on Assistance to the PaLestinian ?eople
to the fnteragency l.{eeting" 20 Aprif Illp
A/35 /533
Annex lII
Page 4
the Human
tories
Sumaries oJ reports appearing in the press
'Ler.r1t,or-Les lmonl,n_Ly lssues I rom L9 t) To 19 Iy )
Selected records of testimony taken by the
Nines vhile in the resion
ecial Coumittee to fnvesti Israeli
of the
ces Affect
in Israel and the oceuPied
Specia.l Conrnittee at di fferent
United Nations centTe for Hrjman settlements (Habita!)
of ilabitat: United llations Conf on Sett
-11 June ted i'lations lublication" Sales 1To. E.76. TV. T and
corrigendum
Report of the Regional Preparatory Conference for Asia and the Pacific,
Teheran, 1\-19 June 19?5 (A/COl,rF. ?0 /RPC /10 )
Habitat: United lilations Conference on Hrman Settlements " "Global revie'+ of
human settfementsrt (A/coiilF ,7o / A/r)
World Ilousing Survey, 19?\ (unitea i{ations publication " Sales llo. Fr.T5'Iv'B)
D. Reports and publications from the specialized agencies
fnternational Labour Organisation
SuoDlenent to tire Rr
-ernational
Labour
conre Labour office, \919 ) ' annex.
Report of the Directar-Generaf , TnternaLiona] labour Conference, sixty-sirth
session (Geneva, International Labour office, 1980), appendix I11.
"rnplementation of .18 c/resolution 13.1 and 19 c/resolution 15'1 concerning
educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories: report of
ihe Direct or-General on the mission he sent. to the AIab teruitories occupied blr
fsrael to coLlect on-the-spot infornation on the educationaf and cultural situation"
(ro4 nx/52 )
"Jn,plenentation of "esolutions 18 C/f3.1" 19 C/]5.1 and 20 C/I5'l. ccncernin5
educationa.I and culturaf institutions in the occupied territories: report of the
lri r-.ctor-cenera1" (lOU XX/12 )
^E/n3g5l/isr3h3
Annex lII
Para 5
World Health Organi zation
"Hea-1th conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories,
inc1uding Palestine; Teport of the Special Connittee of Cperts Appointed to
study the Hea]th conditi.ons of the rnhabitants of the occupied rerritories '' (A33/2r )
I'Health assistance to refugees, ilisplaced. persons anar the Arab population of the oceupied Arab territories in the l"Ii ddle Easl" (A3e/Wp/\)
"col-laboration with the united Nations system: health assist,rce to refugees,
d.isplaced persons and the Arab population of the occupied Arab territories in the
Midd-1e East" (A3e/?6)
''Health cond.itions of the Arab
inclu<ting Palestine,r (A33/I.Ipl1 )
population in the occupietl Arab territories,
I. Reports and publications of Government s
Eevpt
Official statenent of the Govenment of ngypt, entitled ',Negative social
and. econonic effects of the rsraeli occupation on the living eonditions of the
Pal-estinian Arab people in the occupied territories'l
t_ St3.t,e o_l^ l11ael-, Ministry of Defence, A TveLve-year Survey, 196?-19?9
\deIUSaLem, _l,yaro,l
Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel
Y of the Re
Mobilization and Stati cs, July 1979
Rouhi A1-Itratib ,
Cent"al Bank of
Ststistical ilu].letin,
Jordan, Departnent of Research and Studies, Monthly
vol. 15, i'lo. 12 (December I9?9 )
( Central- Agency for Public
Israel
\rrovemDer -Ly ly,
Jordan
The Judaization of JerusaLen (.omlan, A1-Tawfiq press, 19?9)
Territories
^ft/r3g5li/sr3h3
Annex III
rage o
Ministry of, DeveLopment
ulI_t_J_eT.In. .l_y ly \1n AraDlc ,,
anal Reconstruction ' fnfornation and Statistical
, The Statistical Yearbook for the Year. f9?2/1973
1979)
Hea].th ces (March I
Education r979)
(,rury r9T9 )
ts
Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1978, No' 29
Ministry of Education, Yearbook of
Yearbook of EalUcationaf Statistics
The Statistical Equcqtional Yearbook " 197?
Hashenite Kingdon of Jordan, report subnitteal to the Security Council
Conmission Established in Accordance with Security Cor.:nci1 Resolution !l+6 (19?9)'
!'Israeli settl-ements in the occupied West Bank, including Arab Jerusalem since 196?"
(May l9l9 )
Royal Scientific Society, Aruoan, Jordan, Econornic Department:
The Five-Iear ects €nd In (october 197? )
The Sisnificance o uruary 19?9 )
dex for
Nuneri c a1 Index for
cs1 dex f
Numerical Inalex for Tourisn (January 1979)
ffit atrq corr',-i
"
ati ons (.rury rg?9)
Nrmeri.cal Inde{ for nlectricity (August 1979)
Syrian Arab Republ"i c
Centra.l Bureau of Statistics, Statistical nt-g!g!r- l9I9-, No. l+05,
J arruary Jyou
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Statistics Dirrisic'n:
Tlee Annual Statisticaf Butletin, 19?7 (Decenber 19?B)
ro].o. , ry lo tucrooer ry I L
Ibid. , 19?5 (November 1976)
Ibid. , 19?\ (October L975)
A/35 /r33
&rglish
Annex rlf
F. Miscellaneous books and publications
Bri an van Arkadie, BeDefi
es s].n Itlew York, N.Y. , Carnegie Elalowment for
the
Gaza
Internat
^
Ali: BreFEal, Econonic Grorth in the Adninistered Area6, 1968-19?3 (Jerusalem,
l'anK or tsraet, t{esearch Departnent, llf4)
.^_^ |yk of_ Israel,. Reseaxch Department, Ttre Econoqr/ of the Administerecl Areas, gE Lr erusarem. lg (4 )
State of Israel, Ministry of Finance, Econonic planning Authority, Econonic Plans, L9?1-75 a.rd 197\-?8
Mortle chai Nisan" fsrael anrl the Territories; A Stuqy in Control". 196?-19?? (na&at Gan, Turtledoveffi
Edward. W. Said, The Question of palestine (New york, N.y., Tines Books, 19?9)
Statisticqi Abstract of Israel, various years (Jerusalen, statisti-EJJ--.:- Cent"al Bureau of
Vivian A. Bul-t, fhe West Bank - Is It Viable? (Lexington, Massachusetts,
Lexington Books, 1975 )
G, Publications of resear:ch institutions
Cai"o DenoAraptric Centre
(Cairo, 19?2 )
Urbanization antl Migration in some Arab and African Countries (Cairo, 19?3)
hstitute for PaLestine Studies, Beirut, Lebanon
JournaL of Palestine Stud.ies, issuee fron Autum l9?l to Winter I9B0
Fathiya Saicl Nasru, nducation in the West Bank covernment Schools (.fufy f9??)
K. l4ahshi and R. Rihan, Education in ttre West Bank
Central Bureau of Statistics.
A/35 /533
Annex III
fage o
Palestine Liberation Organization
Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestinian Statistical Abstract ' 19?9' No. 1
irlational report of Palestine (undated and unpublished)
The Economie and Sociaf Afternath of the Israeli
Condi ons of th Arabic
Israeli Settlernents on the !trest Bank and Confiscation of land (in Arabic)
Zianist violations of tiuman Rights in the Occupied Teraitories (undated')
Zionist Settlement Movement (r"rndated )
"The Zianist poliey of settlement in the occupied territoriesr? (undated and
unpublished )
"Palestinian children under Israeli occupation" (undated and unpublished)
Various reports issued. by the Occupied Hoseland Affairs Office' Beirut ' Lebanon, on such matters as the Jerusalem Electricity Conpany " educatj-ona1
activiL-ies in the occupied territories 1 water resources, Israeli settlements, the
struggle of the Patestinian r,rorkjng class etc.
The com0ittee for the Defence of Palestinian Human Rights rmder Israeli
Occupation " Beirut, Lebanon: various statements issued regarding student unrest cond.itions of Arab labourers in the occupied territories, education, condition o'f
teachers , settlements
Central Bureau of Statistics, Agricultural Statistical Bulletin for the \'Iest
Bank and Gaza Strip, 1979, vo1. 1.
Palestine lrTat ional Fund, r?llater resources and policies in the West Bankil
fni npoorerhail )
Arab Report and Record.
Bi-nonthly issues, 1976, :-9'17, and 19TB and Arab Report, 1979.
tt. Other Dublications consuLted
Rouhi Al-lQratib, Tbe {uqsi?C.tig4 9! {9rus-C19!q, (-Annan, A1-Tawfiq Press, 1979)
E:rcyc].opedia Judaica
H. H. Avartami, ilest Bank Agriculture: A New Outfook (Nablus, 1978)
:z=/aa^ tE:
UN'IED N4T'ONS
GENf;RAL
ASSEMBLY
Distr.
GXNNNAI
A/ 35 / 533/ Cory "I
20 October lpBO
IIfGLf SH INTII)
SPff,ITSH OI]LY
Thirty-fifih session
Agenaa itern 51 (t)
DEVEI,OPIIEI\]T A]-fD INTENI.IATTONAI, ECOIVOiIJIC CO-OPNRATIOII
Corri{Iendum
The itern shoul-d read Agenda itern 61 (1)
Livin€.col.ditions 9f bhe palesL:inian peoole rn Lne occuored Arab teffitories
Bo-26rBj
UN'IED NAI'ONS =ii=
,t-str.
GENERA],
A/36/260
29 May 1981
ORIGINAL: ENGT,ISH
GENERAL
A S S E M B LY
fhirty-sixth session
Item 69 (k) of the prelininary listx
DEVNLOPI"IENT AISD INTERNATIONAI ECONOI,{IC CO-OPEMTION :
iruMAN SETTLEMENTS
Living conditions of the palestinian people
Report of the Secretary-General
l. In its resolution 3l+/I13 of 1\ Decernber I9Tg, the General Assembly requested. the secretary-General, in coll-aboration with the rerevant united Nations organs
and specialized agencies, particularly the united Nations Rel-ief and works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near nast, the Economic conmi.ssion for western Asia
and the special committee to Tnvestigate rsraeri practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the occupied rerrir:,ories, to prepare anJ submit to the
Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a comprehensive and anal],tica1 report on the social and economic impact of the rsraeli occupation on the living conditions of
the Palestlnian people in the occupied Arab territories.
?. Ar its thirty*fifth session, after considering the secretary-cenerar r s report
(A/35/r33 and corr.I)" whieh had been subrnitted pursuant to the above-mentioned
resolution, the ceneral Assembly, i.n paragraph I of its resolution 35/.15 of
5 December 1980 noted with satisfaction the repo"t of the secretary-Generar on the living conditions of' the Falestinian people in the occupied. Arab territories and" in paragraph L" called upon all states to co-operate with united Nations agencies,
organizations and organs and local- Palestinian authorities to all-eviate the trasic 'I i\finn .^.Aiii^hc ^e +-h.-a- DPoar6l-e+si-.ti^in- ian peonle caused by the Israeli occupation.
Furthermore " the Assenblys in paragraph !, requested the Secretary-General to
submir a comprehensive and anarytical report to the Assemory at its thirty-sixth
session, through the Economic and Social Council- .n thc n.r'.,I'.r"pss martc in f,hs
implementation of the resolution.
3. So as to enable the Secretary-General to prepare and submit the required
Teport to the General Asseubly at its thirty-sixth session, the Executive Director of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) addressed a note verbale
x A/36/5o
B1-11+3BI
A/36/260
English
Page 2
on ) -bebruary -l9Ul to the Permanent ReDresenlarive of lsrael to UNCHS aL Na,irobr
dra.-'iing the attention of his Governrnent to the above-mentioned resolution. The
rrote requested him to inforro the Executive Director of the action taken or
contemplaced by the Governnenr of Tsrael in response to resolution 35/75. The
attention of the Pemanent Representative was also drar{n to the report of the
Secre t ary -Genera1 (A/31/533 and Corr.]), which, in its annex, referred to severaL
aspects -f the living conditions of the Palesrinian people, inc-Luding the various
{ .-^- i 4e'e-mirino rr ilflllpneind 6 iuihrruF \n1ruroefflu Ji +.v nf Iifa vnrf tehlrev nArurva h rPrv-yns'rrlaLiOn in
e toffns and- villages within the occupied territories.
)+. In a note verbale dated 13 Februa.ry l-9B]" the Permanent Representative of
Tsrael to UNCHS inforned" the Exeeutive Director that the note of 5 I'ebruary had
been received and conveyed to the relevant authorities in Israel and that, as soon
as a reply had been received, it would be conmunicated. to him.
5. In l,lay 1!81, the Executive Directoa addressed notes verbafes to all States,
specifically dTawin€ their attention to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resol-ution
35/7J anA requesting that he be informed of the action taken or contenplated by
then in response bo the resofution. ln his note, the ExecuLive Direcbor indica"ted
that the intention was to submit the required report to the Assembly at its
thlrty-sixth session through the Economic and Social Councit.
6, As the rerort, which r,rill be issued as an addendru to the pr-esenL docunenL,
vill be prepa,red on the basis of the replies from Governments ? it is hoped that
those replies r,riI1 be received. at an early enough date to enabfe the Secaetary-
General bo prepare and submib Lhe reporL to the Cenera-L Asseobly at its thiTty-sixrh
session thrcugh the Econcmic and Social Council.
UNITED
NATIONS
General Assembly Distr.
GENEML
Al37 l23S
15 June 1982
ORIGIML: ENGLISH
Thirty-seventh session
Itern 71 (j) of the prelimitrary list*
DEVEIOPMENT AI{D INTERNATIOML EOOI\OI'{IC (II{PERATION: HUMAN SETTLE}GNTS
Living conditions of the Palestinial people
in the occupied Palestinian territories
Report of the Secretarv-General
I. In its resolution 341L13 of 14 December L979, the General Assenbly requested
the Secretary-@nera1, in collaboration with the relevanE United l{ations organs and
specialized agencies, particularly the United ltations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UXnWA), the Econonic Corunission for Western
esia (nClfA) and the Special Corunittee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting
the Hurnan Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, to prepare and
subrnit to lhe General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a comprehensive and
analytical report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on
the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories.
2. At its thirty-fifth session, afEer considering the Secretary-Generatrs report
G/35/533 and Corr. 1), which had been submitted pursuant to the abovernentioned
resolution, the General Assembly, in paragraph 1 of resolution 35/75 ot,
5 December 1980 took note with satisfaction of rhe report of the Secretary-General
on the living conditions of the Palestin:i.an people in the occupied Arab terriCories
and, in paragraph 4 of the same resotrution, called upon all StaEee to co-operate
with united ltations agencies, organizations and organs and local Paleetinian
authorities to alleviate the tragic living conditions of the Palestinian people
caused by the Israeli occupation, FurEhermore, in paragraph 5 of the resolution,
the Assembly reguested the Secretary-General to submit a co'mprehensive and
analytical report to it at its thirty-sixth sesEion, through the Economic and
Social Council, on lhe progress made in the implernentation of the resolution.
* Al 37 ls0lRev. 1.
82-L6444 3432e ($) 1...
Al 37 / 238
Eng I ish
Page 2
3. At its thirty-sixth session, after considering the Secretary-Generalrs report
G/36/260 and Add. 1-3) which had been submitted p,rrs,rar,t to its resolutior- 357t5,
the Assembly, in paragraph I of resolution 36/73 of 4 Decernber 19g1, took note of
the report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the palestinian
People and, in paragraph 6 of the same resolution, requested the Secretary-General
"to prepare a comPrehensive and analytical report on the deteriorating living
conditions of the PalesLinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories and to
subrnit it to the General Assenbly at its thirty-seventh session, through the
Economic and Social Council". In paragraph 7 of tn. resolution, the Assembly also
requested the secretary-General, in preparing the report, t,to consult and
co-oPerace wiEh the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative Palestinian of the people".
4. So as to enable the SecreLary-General to prepare and submit the required
rePort to the General Assernbly at its thirty-seventh session, and in an effort to
ensure a balanced and objective expert view, the Secretary-GeneraI used the services of two experts (see annex II below).
5. The experts were to prepare the reporE on the basis of rnacerial available from the United lbtions and its subsidiary bodies and from the specialized agencies, and other published and unpublished literature pertaining to rhl subject. ift"y or"i. also to gather inforrnation through visits to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian
Republic and the occupied territories and through discussions with government officials and others, as well as with representatives of the palestine Liberation
Orga niza t ion.
6. Since permission to visit the occupied Palestinian territories rdas not granted
by the GovernmenE of Israel, the experts, in preparing their report, had to iely on secondary sources of information, including the ieporis of a nission of the International Labour Organisation (IIO) anl another of the hrorld HeaIth organization (wHO), r^rhich had visited the occupied rerritories in 1981.
7. The question of the living conditions of the Palestinian people has been a matter of concern in rnany intergovernmental bodies and subsidiary organs of the United lrbtions, for example, the Conrnittee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
Rights of the Palestinian People, the Conunission on Hurmn Rights, the Special
Connnittee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the tfurnan Rights oi the Population of the occupied Territories and the Security Council. Because of the
considerable volume of material available in the United I.btions, as well as other
published material in books, periodicals, journals and the press, it was agreed that
one exPert would rernain at United lrbtions Headquarters to carry out the extensive
research required and the other expert would go on mission to iather information
from the relevant United lrhtions prograrunes and the specialized agencies in Europe and rhe Middle East and would also visit Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian araU Republic
and the offices of the Palestine Liberation organization in Beirut and hrnascus.
8. Accordingly, while one of the experts rernained at the United ttrations
Headquarters, the other h,as on mission frorn 8 February to 19 March Lg82, visiting Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, where he held discussions with senior
government officials dealing with rnatters related to the occupied palestinian
Al 37 / 238
English
Page 3
territories, with Palestinian refugees living in those countries and with residents
of the occupied territories visiting Ehose countries, as well as with recent
visitors to the occupied territories. He held further discussions with United
l{ations officials sEationed in those countries. Discussions were also held with,
and inforrnation gathered from, the representatives of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PIr) in Beirut and Darnascus. Inforrnation rdas also collect.ed from
various academic research insCitutions in the neighbouring Arab countries.
g. The expert also visiced the headquarters of, and gathered relevant infomation
and data from, ECWA, the United lbtions Educational, Scientific and Grltural
organization (uNssoJ), w&, ID and uNRl,lA. Various united I'btions reports dealing
with conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories were also reviewed,
Particularly those of the Special Cormuittee to Investigate Israeli Practices
Affecting the tfurnan Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, the
Security Council Corunission established under resolution 446 (1979) and the
Corrnittee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The
exPerts reviewed material received from the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United lbtions (fAO), the United lbtions Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the United libtions Environment Prograrrne (utwp) and the United l,Iations
childrenrs Fund (uNIOEF).
10. The report prepared by the experts is reproduced in annex I below.
ANNEX I
Reoort of the Group of Experts on the Living
Conditions of the Palestinian Peopte in the
Al 37 / 238
English
Annex I
Page I
Paragraphs Page
1-5 2
6-14 Z
15-38 4
15-18 4
L9-26 6
27-29 9
30-38 11
39-65 18
39-51 18
52-57 22
58-61 25
62-63 27
64 29
65 29
66-90 30
66-72 30
73-81 32
82-90 34
Chapter
I.
II.
III.
@NTENTS
INTRODUCTION . o.......... r.... '. o. o.... o.... o.... " ' '
ST MMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . o . . . . . o . . . . . . . . .'''
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCII,RE, I"AI{D AllD WATER .......... . ..
A. Land and gettlementS . ....... ...... o o....... o... o
B. l{atgr ... a a. a a.. o.......... t.............. " " t "
C. Physical infrastructure .......o.................
D. Population and housing . r. o.... o...... o. o... .....
EOI|OMIC FACIORS . . . .. . . . . o . . . ... . . . o . o.. . . . . . t . . ... .
A. Employlent ... o.......... o.................. .. ' o '
B. Incomg .. a.a...o...... .. o......4a........oao
C. ConsumptiOo ........ o.... o.. o. o o o. o......... " ' t '
D. Savings . o.................... o o............. o o..
E. Invgstment ....... o...... t. '.... r. ........ " " " o
F. Inflation .................................o.....
SOCIAL AND CULI1rRAL FACIDRS ... o.... o........ o.. o. ...
A. Social and cul,tural environment ................o
B. Hea I lh . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . o o . . . ' ' ' t ' ' '
C. Education ....o o....o....... o.....o.... ao........
rv.
V.
Appendices
I. Land recenEly appropriated by the occuPying Power ......... o... o o... 39
II. Congumer price index (1968169 = 1,00) .......o..e...o................ 40
1...
Al 37 / 238
English
Annex I
Page 2
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In resolution 36/73, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to
PrePare and submit to it at its thirty-seventh session, through Ehe Economic and
Social Council, a comprehensive and analytical report on the deteriorating living
conditions of the Palestinian people Living in the occupied Palestinian territories.
A previous report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the Assembly at its
thirty-fifEh session, in response to resolution 34/L13, dealt with the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories (A/35/533 and
Corr. l) .
2. Accordingly, in the present report, the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the I'lest Bank of the River Jordan, including East Jerusalem, and the C,aza Strip are examined with a view to determining the extent and scope of deteriorat,ion
in che sociat and economic conditions of the people over the period of occupation.
3. Although data are readily available in officially published documents in
resPect of the l{est Bank and the Gaza Strip, they are less readily available and are
less reliable for East Jerusalem. The analyses in the report are therefore nainly
related to conditions in the l,lest Bank and the C,aza Strip, with some inforrnation,
gathered from'secondary sources, on conditions in East Jerusalem as regards the
social and cultural factors.
4. In the absence of a visit to the occupied Palestinian terricories, it was not
possible for the expert to observe and record infornration and data at first hand.
However, an ILO mission and a WtO mission visited the occupied territories as
recently as 1981, and relevant inforrution contained in thl reports of those
missions has been taken into account in the analysis of ernployment conditions and
the health services prevailing in the territories. Information was also obtained
by the exPert who was on mission in Febnrary and llarch L982, visiting the
neighbouring Arab countries and United lbtions institutions, offices and programneg
in the Middle East and Europe.
5. The present report e:<amines three broad areas affecting the social and
economic conditions in che occupied Palestinian Eerritories. Section III deals
with the physical and infrastructural factors, including housing and comnrnity
facilities; section IV deals with the economic factors; and section V the social
and cultural factors, as well as health and educational aspects.
II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
6. Employment in the occupied Palestinian territories has been declining since
the occupation. As the economy of the occupied territories has not generated the jobs required to absorb the increase in the labour force, growing numbers of
unskilled workers have sought ernployment in Israel - 34.9 per cent of the total
ernployed in 1979 - while skilled and professionally qualified persons have been
emigrating to neighbouring Arab States and beyond. The absenee from home of
migrant workers and the long daily coruuuting of those working in Israel, have
1...
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adversely affected family and cornnunity life in the territories. Structural
changesin the production and distribution secEors conseguent on the integration of
the -"oto*y wiltr ttrat of Israel have contributed to the decline in employment
opportunities.
7. In spite of the decline in employrnent in Ehe occupied territories themselves,
the incomes of the people in the territories have rised, in both current and real
terrns. This is due to increased emplo)nnent in Israel, sErucEural changes in
production, a rise in wages in the area and a significant increase in remittances
irom abroad. The increaie in incomes has led t,o increased consumption and savings
which rose at a relatively fast rate during the period 1968-1973, with a slowing
down in the period, Lg73-I979. The decline in the growth rate of consumption and in
the proportion of savings \das the effect of accelerated inflation during the period
L973-L979.
8. In the absence of an appropriate institutional structure to rnobilize ar.d invest
eavings, the people in the occupied territories have found their purchasing Power
eroding owing to inflation. Due to lack of incent,ives to save, there has been a
tendency to hoard gold, Jordan dinars and other hard currencies, and most of the
investment has been made in improving private dwellings. There are few
opportunities to invest in income-producing activities because of the existing
econornic structure and the pattern of production and distribution in the industrial,
agricultural and trade sectors. This has an adverse effect on the development of a
viable economy to serve the long-tenn economic and social needs of the Palestinian
people living in the occupied territories.
g. Policies adopted by the occupying Power regarding land and htater usage in the
territories are adversely affecting the living conditions of the Palestinian
conunrnities. The continued appropriation of parcels of culEivable land, often for
the use of existing Israeli sltttetnents or proposed ones, has created a sense of
insecurity and frustration among the Palestinian people. The restrictions on the
use of water by the local people and iEs increasing diversion for use by the new
settlements have adversely-affected the agricultural activities of the Palestinian
commrnities.
1.0. Apart from the abovernentioned eeonomic irnpact, the social and cultural life
of the Palestinian people has also been affected by the various constraints and
rest,rictive actions of the occupying Power, which have been intensified in recent
years. For instance, collective punishment, incarceration without trial,
deportation, and resErictions on freedom of movement, association and expressionr.
.t. r".r," by which the development of national consciousness and cultural identity
among the P;lestinian people living in the territories is restricted. A serious
factor which is affecting peaceful living conditions is the continuing friction
between the local Palestinian coruuunities, on the one hand, and the Israeli
authorities and settlers, on the other. Following the dismissal of the elected
llayors of El. Bireh, llablus and Rarnallah in March \982, clashes broke out in the
Weet Bank, East Jerusalem and the C'aza Strip, leading to injury and loss of life.
11. As far as health is concerned, although certain improvements have been made in
the curative and preventive systems of health care, they have not kePt pace with
Al37 /238
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the increase in population and the need for specialist services and care wichin the
hospital system in the occupied Palestinian territories. Shortages of medical
personnel, nursing staff and technicians are widespread. Diagnostic equipment and
services are often lacking in the principal hospitals, and referrals continue to be
made increasingly to Israeli hospitals for specialist diagnosis and care. There
have been no significant changes over the past tvro years in the health services as
regards the establishment of health units or strengthening of medical staff. About half the population of the territories (the tlest Bank in particular) who have not
joined the health insurance schemes are worse off than before in obcaining health
care and needed medical services.
L2. I{ith respect to education, the number of classes, teachers and students in the
territories has increased since 1968. However, the enrolment ratios for Ehe West
Bank are lagging behind those of the Gaza Strip and neighbouring Arab countries.
The frequent closing down of schools and harassment of students have created an
atmosphere of anxiety and apprehension which hinders the normal educational
development of the students. The application of Military order No. 854 to the
universities has operated to deprive them of academic freedom.
13. As far as housing is concerned, the increase in housing stock since the
occupation has not kept pace with the rate of dilapidation. Even though there have
been marginal inprovements in room densities, the state of overcrowding in the
occupied territories rernains severe.
L4. The high rate of migration from the occupied territories, especially
since L975, tras been attributed to lack of employment opportunities and the
atmosphere of tension and uncertainty resulting frorn the continuing occupation.
For those reasons and because of the prospect of better emplolment opportunities in
the Gulf States, migratory flows from the territories have accelerated. Since
migration generally involves young males of working age, the Eerritories are being
deprived of their most valuable hurnan resource.
IrI. PUYSICAL INFMSTRUCruRE, LAND AND WATER
A. Land and seftlements
15. Land and ltater resources continue to be of the greatesE concern to the
Palestinians since they are critical factors in a detemination of the living
conditions of the people. The total land area of the occupied Palestinian
territories has been given as approxirnately 5r939r000 dunums, of which
51572,000 dununs are in the !{est Bank and 367,000 in the Gaza strip. By
September L979, 115001000 dunums or approxinately 25 per cent of the total land
area had reportedly been expropriated by the Israeli authorities (see
A/34/63L, Para. 105). In the case of Ehe West Bank, the land expropriated had
increased from 27 per cent in 1979 to 34 per cent, or some Lr862r000 dunums, by
t...
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I"larch 1981. a/ Of Ehe land expropriated in the llest Bank, 1l per cent ldas reported
to have been utilized for Lhe building of new Israeli setElemencs. A total of
123 such settlements had reportedly been built in the occupied Palestinian
Eerritories by the middle of 1981: 10 in EasE Jerusalem, 103 in the West Bank and
10 in Ehe Gaza Strip. b/
16. The process of expropriation, in association with ocher factors, has led to a
decline in the amount of land used for agriculture and, to some extent' in
agricultural output of certain cormnodities t.raditionally produced in the occupied
territories. As mentioned in the report submitt.ed to the General Assembly at its
thirty-fifth session (see A/35/533, annex I, para. 28), the toEal land area under
cultivation dectined from 2,8401000 dunums in 1967 to 211401000 dunums in 1974
(i.e., 75 per cenE of the land cultivated in f967). !,Iith Ehe further expropriation
of land since then, it is reasonable fo suppose Ehat the amount of land cultivated
by the Palestinians is srnaller today than it was in L974.
L7, That expropriation of land is widespread and is continuing, adversely
affecting the lives and livelihood of the Palestinian farming population, is
supported by Ehe inforrnation presented to the Special Conrnittee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Hurnan Rights of the Population of the Occupied
Tenitories and set, forth in its report to Ehe General Assembly at its thirty-sixth
session A/36/579, paras. 102-118). Most of the land has been seized or
expropriated for the expansion of new Israeli settlements. The effect of these
measures on Palestinian farmers and conrnunities has been a heightened sense of
insecurity and a reluctance ro rnake any long-term investments to improve the land.
18. In addition t.o the direct expropriation of land under existing emergency laws
and Israeli regulations, the expert on mission was inforrned by Arab sources that'
in certain municipalities, the authoriEies have recently started inserting a clause
in building permits to Ehe effect that while the applicant has permission to build
a house on the land, the Land on which the house stands does not belong'Eo him.
There is reason to believe thaE Ehis applies rnainly to urban land, especially when
the authorities believe that the land comes under the category of absentee ownerrs
ProPerty.
a/ Arab Labour Organization, Arab Labour
their effecE on the conditions of Arab Workers in Palestine and other occupied
0ffice, Israeli Settlernents and
Arab
t,errr-t orr.es l'larch
y/ The H,ashernite Kingdom of Jordan, MinisEry of Occupied Territories
Affaiis, A Brief Survey of che Living Conditions of the Palestinian People in the
occupied Territories (Arnrnan, February f982) .
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B. hla ter
19. From the point of view of the Palestinians, the situation with regar{ to rilater
has worsqned. The problem appears intractable in the prevailing circumstances
which do not permit of the adoption of strategies for the developmenE and utilization of water resources for the benefit of the Palestinians.
20. As the occupying Power, Israel is the sole authority for the conservation,
control and use of the water resources in the occupied territories. This question
is complicated by the fact that both Israel and the West Bank share nany sources of
Idater and that sorne of the sources, part,icularly the underground aquifers straddle
the border between the hlest Bank and Israel. Dre to the stratification of the hills dividing Israel and the West Bank and the slope of the strata, much of the rain falling on the hills percolates dorrrnwards and eastwards, issuing as springs in
the West Bank or adding to the aquifers. Some of the aquifers are s.tperimposed on
each other, so that exploitation of the lower aquifers by deep drilling can cause
shortages or drying up of the upper aquifers. c/
2L. The nain sources of water in the occupied territories are wells and springs.
Water from these aources is used for agricultural and domestic purposes. Since
occupation in 1967, the use of only two wells for agricultural purposes has been permitted. In the urban areas of llablus, Kalkiliya, Tirl-karam and Kaffir the use of a few wells is perrnitted. In addition to the ban placed on the digging of new wells, a restriction has been placed on Ehe amount of water that can be diawn from
existing wells, often at the level that was established at the time of occupation,
and meters have been fitted co all wells to ensure that the lirnits placed are not
exceeded. Legal sanctions including fines are imposed on Ehe owners of wells if
the amount of water drawn exceeds the l,irnits
22. The rescrictions placed on the utlllzation of rdater for agricultural use have,
according t.o Palestinian sources, pr€vvrrted the expansion of agricultural
enterprises and, in some cases, have led to the virtual destruction of farms, particularly sraa1l farms which are predorninant in the l^test Bank, because there is
insufficient q,ater to keep crops alive. Data on agricultural output indicate th,at after the initial surge resulting from the introduction of new techiques by the'
Israeli authorities, output of rnany agricultural products declined or rernained at
the same level after L975-I976. d/
9/ See "Review of the economic conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Arab territories'r (TD/B/870), para. 55.
9/ See ttPermanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories: _ repor! 9f the Secretary-General" (A/36/64il, annex, appendix IV, and
the report of the Minister of Health of Israel, presented to the lrtorld Health
Assernbly at its thirty-fourth session (a34/INF.DOC/1), annex.
23.
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Table 1 below illustratee water usage in the West Bank between 1967 and L979t
Table I. I{ater consumpEion in the l{est Bank
(Mi1lions of cubic metres)
Year
1967 I 68
L977178
L978179
Domestic
use from
springg
2.O
2.6
2.2
Domestic
use from
wells
3,4
9.0
10. 3
Domestic
use from
Mekorot
Company a/
0.4
2.L
Agricultural
use from
wells
30.8
30.5
30.0
Agricultural
uge from
springs
37.0
37.0
37.0
Source: Report
Xea I tI-E-o =-emb ly a t i t s
of the Minister of Health of Israel, presenEed to the t{orld
thirty-fourth session (Rl4/INF.Doc/t), annex.
a/ The lerael.i Water Company.
It will be observed that the data preeented by the Minister of Health of Israel
supports the clairn by the Palestinians thet Ehe use of water for agricultural
prrrpo"e" has been re!ericted to pre-1967 levels. The Israeli authorities state
Ltrat ttris has become neceaaary because of the need t,o exploit the !ilater reaourceg
in a rational manner by ensnritg that, in the developmenE of farms, consideration
is given to such factors as the availability of water in the area and to the
rnaiitenance of the balance between water resources and their exploitation in order
to prevent over-exploitation and salinization. As regards permission for the
aigging of new wells, the Israeli authorities state that between 1967 and 1979,
3QJppiications out of 80 were approved for permits to prospect, but not a single
new well was sunk during the period, owing to Ehe high cost involved (see
At36l26O/Add.1, para. Z6). Tt"r. is no inaication, however, that any policy existe
to assist the Palestinian people to meet Ehe high cosEs Ehrough loans, granta or
any other form of financial assistance. On the contrary, as the exPert lrag
iniormed, nany restrictions seem to be placed on the receipt of funds from abroad
for development projecEs, including the improvement of the water supply.
24. In general, the Palestinian population perceives the Israeli authoritiea as
perrnitting qhe israelie far greater use of water for agricul.tural, donestic and
industriai p,trpoees than they do the Palestinians in the occupied territories.
f...
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Available data point to the fact that
than it is in the l{est Bank, as table
water consumption in Israel is much
2 below illuetrates.
higher
Table 2. I{ater consumption
(uiLtions
the ldeet Bank and lerael, L977
cubic metres)
1n
of
Agriculture
Industry
Houeeholds
t{eet Bank
90
LO al
Israel
L,325
95
300
Tota I L 1720
Source: KIDMA; Israel Journal of Development, No. 10 (1977).
a/ Including consumption by industry.
Although there is undoubtedly a need to utilization, conserve wacer through controle on its the fact that the general rate of nater cone.rnpiion per capita in rsrael is almost four times thai in rhe t{est Bank G/35/533, pa""iT7ffrTiaee justification for the view thet the lrater policies of the occupying autirorities
deny to Palestinians the use of water resourcea at the same level as ie permitted
to Israeli citizens. In the circumetances, the linits placed on the coniunption of
nater by Palestinians in the l{est Bank constitute a conEtraint on the agricultural
and industrial development of the occupied territories.
25. The difference in the usage of water in the occupied rerrit,ories and lerael ie
substantial. Additionally, there are clear indications thst the new Israeli
eettlements in the occupied territories are reeeiving preferential treatment. Sorne of che weter policies introduced in the l{est Bank appear to be directly related to
the exploitation of water resources for the benefit of the new settLements. For
instance, the rsraeli l{ater company (Met<orot) received permission ro drill 30 wells
to eerve the new settl.ements eetablished in the occupied territories. The wells
are nonElly drilled into the deep aquifers, thus affecting the upper aquifere
which are the normal source of suppl.y for the Palestinian corununili"". Details of
the output from these wells are not avail.able, but for the period 1976-L977, the
volume of punping from the artesian wells alone in Ehe territoriea rdas officiallv
given as follows:
100
f...
Table 3.
Jordan valley and
eastern foothills
l{estern foothills
and coastal region
Israeli weLls
Volume of pumping from artesian wells'
(Thousands of cubic metres)
lfunber
of wells
119
181
Quantity
of water
L217O0.2
20,3 78.0
L976-L977
Al371238
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Percentage
of total
25.9
43.1
300
T7
3L7
33 r078.0
L4,L44.8
47,223.0
70.0
30.0
100.0
.ry: Yearly report on output of wells .in West Bank, Water Administration,
rc"aeEi-p of Wesr Bank, June 1978 (see also TD/B/870, table 17).
26. Instances have been cited by residents of the occupied terricoriee whereby as
alternatives to permission for sinking wells, the applicants have been offered the
option of purchaiing water from newty established setttements or hooking up to the
,.t.r grids that are being set up to supply the seEtlements. The affected
palestinian coruntrnities hive viglrousfy- relisted these options as affronts to their
sOvereignty over their own natural resources and, as a resultr the econornic
activities of a number of Palestinian farnilies have been reduced to near
subsistence level.
C. Physical infrastructure
27. The level, quality and gr.rantity of physical infrastructure facilities in the
occupied terriioiies have remained low. Major road networks have been constructed
by the Israeli authorities or are in the process of construcEion. However, these
highways have largely been constnrcted to serve Israeli settlements and the
stiateiic p.trpo""" of the occupying authorities. Access roads to about 25 per cent
of all viliagls in the t{est Bank "r,d th" Gaza StriP are lacking. Ttris fact, by
iteelf, if related to the situation in other developing counEries, does not aPPear
to be " *jor deficiency. It can only be regarded as such in the context of the
large surns of money rnade available by the authorities for providing infrastrucEure
facilities, incl.uding roads and drains, to Israeli settlements. In rnany of the
villages of the o"c,rtied territories, even those with access to the rnain highways'
. r""Joroble internri "tre"t system is lacking, and rnany houses in these villages
lack vehicular access.
f...
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28. In a study prepared for EO{A, it haa been observed that modern serrage eystems
are conpletely lacking in the villagee while they are relatively undeveloped in the
citieg. Modern nater eupply and reticulation systems are unavailable for about
75 per cent of the villagee of the t{eet Bank, electriciEy eupply is inadequate and,
in the case of 72 pet cent of the t{eet Bank villages, non-exigtent. g/
29. Table 4 below, compiled from data collected by the Secretary of the t{orld
Courrcil of Churchee, showe the degree to which the rural areas of the occupied
territorieg lack certain basic infraatructural facilities.
Table 4. Distribution of village infrastructure by type and
district in the l{eat Bank and the Gaza Strip
lfumber of
v3Ll3,Ee3
Digtrict
Jerusalem 32
Rarullah
Bethlehen 32
Hebron
Nablue
Tnlkaren 46
Villagee without
e lectricity
Villagee rrithout
a water sygtem
Villages with a
poor connection
to a highway
lfumber Percentage
9 28.0
6 8.6
2L 65.6
19 31.6
37 29.8
7 I5.2
16 25..O
115 26.8
4 19.0
119 26.4
_![rqbe: Percentag lfurnber Percentage
15 46.8 2L
70 43 6L.4 3g
32 69.6
50 79.1
65.6
54.3
23 50.0
53 82.8
72.2
problems
p. L4.
27 84.4 22 68.8
60 39 65.0 40 66.6
L24 106 85.5 ll4 91.9
Jenin
Tota I
I{egt Bank
Caza
429 3L2 72.7 321 74.8
2L 5 23.9 4 19.0
Grand toEal 450 3L7
Source: Bakir
in the West Bank and
70.4 325
Abu{(iehkr "Human eettlements :
Gaza Strip" (EGUA, March 1981),
and eocial dinensione
gl Bakir Abu{ishk, ttHuman settlemente: problems and eocial dinensions in
the l{est Bank and Gaza Striprr, (nCWe,, March 1981), p. 13.
f...
Al 37 1238
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D. PoPulation and housing
30. The population of the occupied Cerritories has increased considerably since
1957 owing lo high fertility and relatively low mortality. In the West Bank, the
popularioi n.a iicreased from 581,700 in t9O8 to 699,600 by the end of L9791 The
popufation in the @za Strip increased from 3551900 in 1968 to 432,60Q in L979'
31. Although the terriEories have registered sizable increases in pogulation-, the
Palestinians state thaE those increases would have been higher had there not been
substantial emigration from the territories owing to the lack of suitable job
opportunities aid deteriorating conditions with respect t,o personal security.
ttrlre is considerable evidence to support the contention that there has been
significant migration from the occupiea territories since 1967 (see table 5 beLow).
Table 5. Popul.ation changes in the occupied territories
A. l{est Bank
L967
1968
L969
1970
t972
L974
L975
L976
L977
1978
L979
L967
1968
1969
1970
t972
L974
L975
L976
L977
1978
L979
(1)
l'Iatural
increase
( thousands )
3.0
1r. 7
L2.3
13.7
16. 8
18.1
18.6
20.3
20.5
18.6
20.9
(2)
Actua 1
increase
( thousands )
-10.2
-4.0
13.5
8.7
11.7
15.4
3.5
5.8
10. 3
9.2
9.2
(3)
Annual ltate
of increase
(percentage)
-L.7
-0.7
2.3
1.5
1.9
2.4
0.5
0.9
1.5
1.4
1.3
-2.3
-6.6
1.8
1..5
2.0
2.8
2.4
2.5
2.9
2.O
2.9
(4) = (2)-(1)
Difference
( thousands )
-L3.2
-L5.7
L.2
-5.0
-5. I
-2.7
-15.1
-L4.5
-10.2
-9.4
-11.7
B. Gaza Strip and NorEh Sinai
3.3
7.4
9.2
8.8
11.5
L3.2
13. 8
14.8
15, 3
14.1
16. r
-8.8
-25.O
6,3
5.5
7.6
11.3
10.0
10. 5
L2.3
8.9
L2.4
11. 1
32.4
2.9
3.3
3.9
1.9
3.8
4.3
3.0
5.2
3.7
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1980 (Jerusal.em, Central &rreau of
Statistics, 198
/...
Al 37 / 238
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32. In table 5, the amounc of natural increase and the amount of actual increase
for most of the years between 1967 and 1979 are compared. The difference for each
year ftly be taken as an estirnate of migration for that year. In column (3), ttre
annual rate of actual increase is much lower than the rate for the region and is
much lower than the average annu:rl rate of population increase for such
neighbouring countries as Jordan (3.6 per cent) and the Syrian Arab
Republic (3.3 per cent). !/
33. It will be observed from the table that in the case of the lrlest Bank,
emigration from the territory involved an average of less than 5r000 persons a year
between 1970 and 1974. From 1975, the volume of emigration increased considerably,
involving an average of more than I2r000 persons a year. In the C,aza Strip, the
volume of eruigration has been fairly steady, involving about 3r500 persons
annually. the selective nature of emigration, involving mainly rnales in Ehe
working age groups rnay be deduced from Eable 6 below.
Table 6. Population of the West Bank and the C,aza Strip
by age group and sex, 1979
( Thousands )
Age group
0-L4
15 29 30 44
45 64
65 and over
Tota I
Ferna les Ma les Tota 1
L34.7
L57.9
80.0
64.0
19.7
567.3
270.7
169. I
54.L
52.3
19. 3
565. 5
5L6.4
327.0
134.1
116. 3
39.0
1,132.8
and Statistics, Statistical Year
Source3 Report of the Minister of Health of Israel, presented to the World
Health Assembly at its thirty-fourth session (A34/INF.DOC/1), annex, tables II and
XXIV.
The table shows low male-fenale sex ratios for the age groups 30-44 and 45-64,
indicating a preponderance of fernales which can be attributed to the outrnigrat.ion
of rnales from these age groups. Thus the incidence of migration, as rnay be
expected, seems to fal1 heavily on males in the working-age groups. Another
indication of the incidence of migration can be obtained from changes in the age
!/ Central Agency for Public Mobilization
Book, (Arab Republic of Egyptr July 1980).
Al37 /238
English
Annex I
Page 13
structure of the population during the period. In the I'Iest Bank, the ProPortion of
the population in the age group 3C-.44 fell from 13.6 per cenE in 1968 to
11.7 per cent in L979; while in the Gaza Strip, the proportion of the population in
that age group fell from 13.7 per cent in 1968 to 12.0 per cent in L979.
34. Although the population of the occupied territories has increased considerably
since 1967 no institutional arrangements have been created at the official level Eo
ensure adequate provision of housing for Ehe increase in population Eo alleviate
Ehe prevalent overcrowding, or to ensure replacements for dernolished or dilapidated
housing. In the West Bank there are no public housing schemes, or any publicly
supported financial institutions for the development of housing. In the Gaza Strip
a number of housing units have been built by the authorities in public housing
projects which "are primarily for rehabilitation of refugees and goverrutrent
employees". gl Four thousand housing units have been completed for these PurPoses
since L967, ind 11500 new roons have been added to existing shelters. h/
35. In spite of the efforts of individuals, self-help and co-operative societies
in housing construction, the number of housing units produced since the occupation
does not appear to be anywhere near the number required. The extent to which new
housing construction has failed co meet the needs of an increasing population
living in dwellings with a high dilapidation rate is demonstrated in table 7
below. It can be observed from the figures thaE in the l,test Bank there was a
decline in housing units of 7.1 per cenL between 1967 and L977 while in the C'aza
Strip and North Sinai the decline was 1.3 per cent during the same period.
gl Report of the Minister of Health of Israel, presented to the l{orld Health
Assembly at its thirty-fourth session (e3+/INF/Doc/1), p. 15, table IX.
Lt rbid.
/...
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Al 37 I 238
Englieh
Annex I
Page 15
36. Tab1es 8 and 9 below give the percentate distribution of families according
to roolrr deneity at different Points of time during the occupation.
Table 8. Dietribution of farnilies according to room density in
EaEt Jerusatem, the l{est Bank and the Gaza Strip,
L967, L97L, 1975
(Percentage)
Persons
Der room
-
I
I - 1.99
2 - 2.99
3 or more
Persons
Der room
-
Tota I
Less than I
1.0
1.1 - 1.9
2.O - 2.9
3.0 - 3.9
4.O - 4.9
5.0 - 5.9
5 and over
Average number
per household
Median housing
density
Eaet Jerugalem
L967 1971 L975 L967
3.3 3.5
19.1. L9.7
2L.l 22.4
56,4 54.4
Gaza Strip
L967 L97L L975
2.L 2.6 3.6
19.0 19.6 2L.2
26.5 27.3 28.0
52.4 50.5 47 .2
!{est Bank
9.5
27.5
20.9
42.L
L975
3.7
20.3
23.5
52.5
9.7 9.9
28.0 28.0
2L.9 23.O
40.4 38.6
.9g: Bakir Abu{(ishkr.-ttHurun settl.ements: problems and social dimeneions
in ttril$E Bank and Gaza Srriprr. (nOlA, !{arch 1981) table 4.
Table 9'. Distribution of families by number of persone Per
room in the t{est Bank and the Caza Strip, L979
(Percencage)
Gaza and North Sinai
Refugee
camDs
-
100.0
( 3.5)
g.g
L4.7
3L.2
20.8
L2.O
( 5.8)
(3.1)
6.5
2,7
Vi I lages
100.0
4.4
8.0
11.4
25.9
20.8
13.3
8.1
8.1
6.8
3.0
Tota I
100.0 100.0
( 5.5) 4.7
8.5 8. I
18.1 13.0
26.2 25.7
17.3 20.4
10.9 13.0
( 5. 21.) 7 .5
( 7.3) 7 .6
6.7 6.8
1.00.0
(4.6)
(5.7)
16.8
30.3
19.8
L2.2
(5.3)
(5.3)
7.4
2.8
Tota I
100.0
4.3
7.4
15.4
30.4
20.4
L2.3
5.5
4.3
7.O
2.8 2.6 2.9
!ggg: StatisEical Abstract of Israel' l'980 ...; p.688.
&t Figuree in parenthesis are baeed on estirmtes or have a high relative
sampling error.
Al37 / 238
English
Annex I
Page 16
In all the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, there was a decline of
8.4 per cent in the housing stock between 1967 and L977. It is not surprising that
roorn densities are as high as revealed in tables 8 and 9. There have been some
rnarginal improvements in housing density since L967, but the over-all state of
overcrowding persisEs. If three or more persons Eo a room is regarded as
overcrowding, then more than half the families of the occupied lerritories are
living in euch conditions.
37. Apart from che shortage of houeing units relative to the population, the
provieion of basic facilitiee within housing units also seerus to be inadequate.
Table l0 below gives the distribution of eelected basic home facilitiee in 1967 and
L974. t{hile there hae been some improvement in the situation since L974, the most
recent data on thie subject is that provided by the Minister of Health of Israel in
his report to the the World Health Assenbly at its thirty-fourth session (Wtp
document A34/INF.DOC/1, annex). According to that report, in the t{est Bank the
proportion of homes with electricity increased from 48 per cent in 1975 to
74.2 per cent in 1978, while in the Gaza Strip it increased from 36.7 per cent in
1975 to 75.0 per cent during the period L977-L978 falling to 58 per cent in 1979.
No reason ie given in the report for the decline between 1978 and L979. No einilar
inforrmtion ie given in Ehe report about, the poeseseion of bathrooma or toilets
after L974, although infornation ie given with regard to such goods as
refrigeratora, television sets, radioe and electrical or gas cooking ranges, the
posseseion of which has grorrn between 1975 and L979. It nay be assumed that the
eituation with regard to toilete, bathrooms and kitchens has not improved
significantly since 1974.
f...
Al37 1238
English
Annex I
Page 17
Tabl.e 10. Selected basic housing facilities
in the occupied territoriee
( Percentage of farailiee having the facility inaicated)
Facilitv
Toilet
None
Kitchen
None
Shared
Water GIt
Tap in courtyard
Tap in dwelling
Electricitv
None
Bathroom
None
Weet Bank
L974
C,aza Strip
L967 L967 L974
L4.4
54.0
2.3
27.8
9.9
N.A.
2L.L
35.9
2.9
33.0
L7.L
23.5
52.5
76.3
29,O
43.7
4.7
27.9
27.3
N.A
61. I
79.7
2L.O
L7.6
14.0
30.0
6. 15
13.9
76.L
82.3
64.3
81. 7
Sourcei For 1967 figures, see Bakir Abu{(ishk, "Hu"'an eettlemenEs: problems
and social dimensions in the t{eet Bank and Gaza Striprr (nOle, March 1981), and for
1974 figures, see Statietical Abgtract of Israel, 1975... p.697.
38. From informtion provided by Governmente of Arab States and the PIO, it seems
that the official housing policy in the l{eet Bank and, to a leoser extent, in the
C,aza Strip, is not merely one of ttbenign neglectrt but, in rnay inetances, one of
poeitive obetruction of effort,s of individuals to build houses. Brilding permits
are difficult to obtain and, in some casea, applications have been pending for as
long as two years. It is stated that Palestinians, in desperation, have resorted
to 6uildir,g [.o,re"s without the required pemit and Ehat these houses are demolished
by the aut[oritiea as unauthorized. Such demolition, which does nothing to
alleviate the acute houcing shortage, has been carried out in addition to the
punitive dernolition of 1r259 houses carried out by the end of 1980. l\rthermore,
aifficutties are placed in the way of charitable and eelf-help organizations which
utilize funds from abroad for development projects, including housing projects.
For example, according to rePorts compiled from the Israeli Press as at
12 October 198L by th- Special Cormittee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting
the ltrrun Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories' several l{est Bank
1...
Al37 | 238
English
Annex I
Page 18
towns and societies were facing problems owing to the ban imposed by the military
authoritiea on funds coming from abroad. This Led to the freezing of eeveral.
development projeccs. In addition, the military administration was reported to
have iesued an order prohibiting the expansion or construction of buildinge in
refugee camPs. Thus it appears that the rninimL housing construction in the tfest
Bank since the occupation has taken pl.ace in spite of several difficulcieg
encountered from the authorities and, aecording to one source, has been possible
largely through remittances from Palestinians living abroad which, in 1980,
amounted to $uS 200 million. i/
IV. E@ISMIC FACIORS
A. Emplovment
39. Ibta from various sourcea indicare that emplo)nnent in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip hae declined during the period of occupation, in spite of an increese in
the population as a whole - from 9661600 in 1957 to 111321300 in 1979 - and in the
working-age population - frorn 4911200 in 1967 to 6431600 in 1979. In 1969, the
number of people working in Ehe occupied terriEoriea t aa 1511000. fy 1974 the
nurnber had declined to 1411700 and by 1979 ro 1381000. j/
40. The decline in the number of enployed persons can be attributed partLy to the
emigration of a considerable nurnber from the occupied territories, estirnated at an
annuil average of 2Or000. E/ There is no doubt that'rpull'r factors in the fom of
well.-paid jobs in the Srlf region play some part in the migratory process.
However, it was impreseed on the expert by severaL Arab governmental
representatives, PD officiale and residents of the territorieg who met the expert,
that the enigration is a direct result of the unsatisfactory living conditions in
the territories, in addition to the lack of employrnent opportunities for educated
and skilled people in the economy of the territories, particularl.y recenBl.y
qualified young people. The expert nas also informed that there i.t" p"."licaffy
no job oPPortunities in the professional, nanagement and technical fielde and rnany
engineers, doctors, architects and similarly qualified persons were often inpelled
to accept jobe nuch below their level of competence and experience.
Ll Minietry of occupied Territories, Hasemite Kingdo'r:n of Jordan, Living .!g!f1 Conditions of the Palestinian People in the occupied Territoriee (Amnan,
Jordan, February L98D.
il Arie Bregrnan, Economic Growth in the Adminietered Ar"."--199tfZl
(Jeruealen, Bank of tsra ct of
Ierael. 1980 ...
Yl Report of the Director-General, International Iabour Conference, eixty:sixt;1I.abouroffice,19so),appendixI'II,
para.84.
1...
Al37 /238
English
Annex I
Page 19
41. Another reason for the decline in employment is that, because of the
competition of products from Israe1 and the new lsraeli settlemenEs established in
the terriEories, which have unrestricted entry into the ruarkets of the occupied
t,erriEories, indigenous producers have found it uneconomical to pursue their
traditional income-producing activi.ties particularly in agriculture and, as an
alternative, have had to seek wage employment prinarily in Israel. This became
possible with the opening up of the Israeli unskilled labour rnarket to workers from
the occupied territories mainly in construction, indusrry (processing) and
agriculture (seasonal and migrant).
42. The sharpest decline in emplolrment r.ras in agriculture, from 641000 in 1969
(42 pet cent of the employed) to 38,600 in 1979 (28 per cent of the employed).
This has been attributed by the occupying authorities to the structural changes and
the new technol.ogy chat lrere introduced irrnediately after the occupation. It would
appear Ehat the changes were directed towards eliminating those crops which posed a
threaE to production in Israel - melons and pumpkins in particular. Imports
substitution crops were promoted and new ones introduced for which there was a
denand for exporE to and for processing in Israel. The new technology and
eguipment, including loans from the rnilitary administration to purchase them, have
been rnade available prirnarily for such crops, while the production of traditional
croPs has been largely overlooked. As a result, those fanners who were engaged in
producing traditional crops on snall holdings of up ro 20 dunums or were farming
rnarginal.ly productive land experienced a severe decline in their earnings and have
had to abandon farming which not only met their food needs and provided cash
incomes, but was also a way of life for both the fanily and Ehe corununity.
43. It is not uncomon for these farmers to seek employment in Israel, leaving the
family farm to be tended by the fernale members, children and the elderly. In other
instances, they have had to seek employment in nearby Israeli settlements, such
employment enabling them to avoid to a great extent the restrictions that accompany
employment in Israel itself, for example, recruitmenE through the labour bureaux or
"in an organized fashion". Available data indicate that in 1.969, 64rOO0 persons
were employed in agriculture in the occupied territories, while 2r000 Palestinians
were employed in the agricultural sector in Israel. 1/ By L974, the figures hrere
47,700 in the occupied Eerritories and 13r1OO in Israel. m/ By L979, the figures
had declined to 38r600 in the occupied territories and 10;900 in Israel. n/
44. In industry, Ehere rdas some growth in employment in the occupied territories,
from 19,000 persons in 1969 to 23,100 persons in 1979, while empl.oyment in Israeli
ll Arie Bregnan, op. cit. r p. 32.
m/ Statistical Abstract of lerael. L975
Statistics, I975), p.707.
!/
(Jerusalem, CentraL Bureau of
Statistical Abstract of Israel 1980 .o.1 p.696.
Ll 37 I 238
English
Annex I
Page 2O
industry of people from Ehe occupied territories increased from 2,000 in 1969 to
161900 in L979. o/ The growth in emplo)rment in this sector can be attributed
paitly to the gr6wth in incomes in the occupied territories resulting from
increasing emplolrment in lsrael, but largely to the jobbing orders executed for
Israeli firms in such rna.nufacturing sub-sectors as wood and wood products' PaPer
and paper product.s, metal fabrication, textiles and garment rnanufacture.
45. In construction, the number of persons employed in 1969 was 13,000, which fell
to 8,800 in L974. From 1975 the number rose, reachinS 13,900 by L979. Two
contributory factors to this increase would appear to be the significant increase
in privat.e remittances from abroad which were generally invested in improvements to
private housing and the assistance that, despite restrictions' was flowing from
Arab countries into public projects.
46. In the clerical, sales and service sectors, taking the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip together, the number of persons employed increased by 1r000 betrdeen L974 and
LgTg', frorn 40,400 to 41,400 (from 19.0 per cent to 19.4 per cent of the total
number of persons employed in boEh the occupied territories and Israel. Z/ It is
not possibie to determine from the published data wheEher this increase occurred in
the lerritories or in Israel. The expert on mission was informed Ehat there had
been a significant decrease in tourist services. Apart from tourists from Arab
countries, the tourist trade in general has been organized and serviced by Israeli
firms. According to Arab sources, small-scale conrnercial, industrial and service
enterprises, which provide rnany job opportunities in the clerical, sales and
servite sectors, are hindered from expanding because of high taxation, bureaucratic
regulations, interminable delays in licensing and unfair competition from Israeli
esiablishnents which are subsidized by the Government. One example cited was that
of bakeries: mosE of fhe bakeries operated by Palestinians have been compelled to
close down because of unfair competition from the government-subsidized Israeli
bakeries.
47. Employment has been falling, in both absolute and proportionate terms, in the
professional, academic and administrative categories, as is evident from table 1l
below.
o/ Ibid.
L/ Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1975
lsrael. 1980 .. .
... and SLatistical Abstract o!
Al 37 / 238
English
Annex I
Page 2L
Table 11. Employment in the professional, academic
and adminisErative categories
Year Gaza Strip I,lest Bank
Number
employed
( thousands)
Percentage of
tota 1 employed
Number
employed
( thousands )
Percentage of
total employed
L974
L979
5.8
5.2
11.8
11.0
8.6
8.3
8.0
6.6
Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1975 ... and Statiscical
Israel. 1980 ...
48. The enplo)rment situation in the occupied territories obviously constitutes a
push factor-for the people in the areas to seek employment in Israel. This,
however, has proved to be a mixed blessing. Although such employment has helped to
eliminaie unemployment and has provided an income for the worker and his family, it
entails rnany hard"t ip" and insecurities. The worker is debarred from residing in
Israel. He has to commrte daily from his home in the territories to his place of
work, which often takes two to four hours. He is subjected to inspection at
various checkpoints, and has to leave Israeli territory at the end of his day of
work. If he is found remaining there after his hours of work, he can be subjected
to various penalties and loss of employment. The Palestinian's wages are lower
than those paid to his counterparts in the Israeli labour force; yet he is subject
to the same taxes and deductions. It was mentioned to Che exPert mission that
inspections at the checkpoints and other conErols in connexion with conmuting to
and from work have become more strict in recent years.
49. In spite of those hardships, the number of Palestinians working in Israel has
increased over the years of occupation, from 121000 in 1969 to 741100 in 1979, or
from 7.4 per cent of the total ernployed in 1969 to 34.9 per cent in L9_79. g/ .These
figures tlf". to workers who "re lng.ged through official channels. In addition,
there are a considerable number of persons who seek ernployment, on their own or are
engaged through unauthorized agents or contractors. It is extremely difficult to
"""""" this number which, accoiding to various sources, including officials of the
gl Arie Bregrnan,
Source3 RustriffiF
1980 ...r p.696.
op. cit. , p. 32, and Statist.ical Abstract of Israel,
Al 37 | 238
English
Annex I
Page 22
PI{) and knowledgeable persons in the territories, would amount to more than a
quarter of those recorded as recnrited through the official bureaux. In addition,
there is the growing number of Palestinians who, on their own behalf, are seeking
employment in the newly established settlements, a number not easy to quantify.
The working conditions of these "i1lega1lytr engaged workers are said to be much
worse than those of workers engaged through official channels.
50. Most of the Palestinians working in Israel are employed at the lower leve1s of
the emPlolnnent sEructure in jobs which are poorly paid, being nanual and unskilled
work. The largest number are employed in construction: 11r000 in 1970, rising to
341000 in 1979 - almost half the number of Palestinians employed in Israel. The
number working in agriculture atmost doubled during the period, while in the
category of rrothertt employment, the number increased six times as mrch and in
industry almost seven times. Table 12 below illustrates the pattern.
Table 12.
Cons truc tion
1 1.21
35.99
34.L7
Indus try
2.40
12.07
16.93
Agriculture
5.0
13. 1
11.0
1980 ...
Palestinians from the l'Iest Bank and the
Gaza Strip ernployed in Israel
Year
L970
I974
t979
Other
1.99
7.54
12. 0
Tota 1
20.6
68.7
74.L
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel
51. The workers employed in Israel have no job security. They are engaged on
short-term work permits, and the continuity of their jobs largely depends on
fluctuations in the Israeli economy. They are the first to be laid off in times of
recession and the lasE to be engaged in tirnes of economic recovery. They are not
entitled to unemployment benefits. It was mentioned to the mission that, very often
skilled workers seek unskilled jobs, because of the lack of suitable opportunities
conmensurate h,ith their ski1ls either in Che occupied territories or in Israel.
B. lncome
52. Incomes of the people in the occupied territories have risen significantly
since L967. This can be attribuEed to emplolrment in Israel and the reorientation
of production in the occupied territories to meet Ehe requirements of the Israeli
economy with ernphasis on agricultural conrnodities which have a dernand for export
and for indusErial processing in Israel. l.lages in the occupied territories have
also risen relative to wages paid in Israel for compa.rable occupations in
agriculture, industry and services. A considerable increase in private remittances
from Palestinians working in Jordan, the neighbouring Arab States and other
countries has contributed significantly to the incomes in the occupied
Al 37 / 238
English
Annex I
Page 23
territories. Although incomes in current Eerms have shown gains since L967 ' they
have to be discounted in ter:ns of the accelerating inflationary trends in the
Israeli econony, which have a direct inpact on inconer consumPtion and savings, as
is evident from the analyses that follow.
53. Earnings through employment in Israel constituted 5.8 per cent of the gross
nationl product (Glw) of the territories in L969, at factor prices. By 1974, the
proporti;n had increased to 30 Per cent and by L979 to 34.5 per cent. Representing
rorl tn.r, a third of GNP, these earnings, togeEher with Ehe considerable private
remittances from abroad, have had a mrltipli'er effect in the constnrction,
rnanufacturing and service sectors of the occupied territories. Income from
empLoyment in Israel is, of course, dependent on the levet of activity in the
fsraeii economy itself, particularly in those sectors which employ the rnajority of
workers from the o"".tpi.b territorils. Fears have been expressed t'hat in the event
of a recession or a ch"tge of existing poLiclr a fall-off in the number of
Palestinians employed in Israel could have severe rePercussions on the economy of
the occupied terrigories. However, according to the inforrnation conveyed by the
Ieraeli authorities to the IIO mission in l,larch 1981, this did not seem to have
occurred to any significant extent, although at that time the economy of Israel was
going through " p"iioa of economic recession, galloping inflation and rising
unerryloynent. g/
54. In the production sectors, agrieulture is predoninant in the economy of the
occupied teriitories. Income originating in agriculture amounted to
[I 149.9 mil.lion in L967168 (at
",rtr"r,t
prices). It rose to f,I 996.8 nillion in
Lg73l74 and ro gI 51191.3 rnillion Ln L978/79. sl Wtren viewing this increase' one
has to take into account variations in the output of crops due to weather and
rainfall, which are important factors in the l{est Bank where much of the
cultivaCion is on unirrigated Land. Variations in price based on supply and dernand
and changee in the value of the Israeli pound due to inflation and devaluation are
other variables that have to be taken into account. Fluctuations in outPut and
value are mogt evident in the olive crop (al.most excl.usively in the l{est Bank), as
illustrated by table 13, below:
ll Report of thg DirectorGeneral, Ilt_er-national Labour Conference,
sixty:sevena1I,abouroffice,1981),appendixIII,
para. 18.
zl
Ierae I .
Statistical Alstract of Israel, 1975 1eE6- ... and Statistical Abstract of
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Year
L967 | 68
L9731 74
L975177
L977 / 78
L978/79
Table 13:
Output
(thousands of tons)
28
110
L7
85
2L
Output and value of olives
Value
(mi1lions of Israeli pounds)
19.6
308.0
135.0
L,275.O
1r056.8
Value per ton (Israeli pounds)
700
2,800
8,000
15,000
50,323
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel L975 ...8nd Statistical Abstract of
Israel. 1980
55. There are nany obstacles in the way of enlarging the agricultural base with a
view to increasing output and income. As mentioned earlier in the present report,
the progressive loss of cultivable land through seizure and appropriation by the
occupying auEhoritiee, the restrictions on the uge of water by Palestinian rural
coumrnities, together with the virtual prohibition of sinking new wells, and the
cornpetition from sirnilar crops produced by IeraeLi fanners and enterpises both in
Israel itself and in the new settlements in the occupied territories on a more
cost-efficient basis have all cornbined to lirnit the potentialities of the local
fatmers to increase their output and incomes. Furthennore, the rising cost of
purchaeed inputs, the increasing rdages for hired labour and accelerating inflation
are eroding the purchasing power of the income earned by Palestinian farmerg.
56. The average daily wage in the l{est Bank rose from EI 7.9 in 1970 to ET 25.3
Lt L974 and i,I 181.7 in 1979. In the Gaza Strip, it rose from lI 6.5 in 1970 and
ET 27.2 in L974 and to EI 199.2 Ln L979. t/ These rises in current terns have to
be viened in relation to the consumer priEe index for those yeare (see table 14
below and appendix II).
Table 14. Consumer price
L970
108.4
L05.1
index 0968/ 69 = 100)
L974
256.5
294.3
L979
I,618.8
L,824.7
l{est Bank
Gaza Strip
9/ rbid.
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A revision of the data to take account of inflation would indieate that for Ehe
!{est Bank, the average daily wage of employees rose from fI 7.3 in 1970 to fI 9.9
in L974 and to [I 11.2 Ln L979, at L968169 prices. In the Gaza Strip, it rose from
EI 6.1 in 1970 to [,I 9.2 La L974 and to f,I 10.9, also at. L968/69 priees. It would
appear, therefore, that in Ehe period L970-L974 ldages, in real terms' rose in the
l{est Bank by 35 per cent and in the period 1974-L979, by 13 per cent. In the Gaza
Strip, they rose by 50 per cent in the period 1970-1974 and by 18.4 Per cent in the
period 1974-L979, in real t,erms.
57. Private transfers fromabroad, that is, from Palestinians working in Jordan,
the neighbouring Arab States and other countries, rose significantly during the
period under review. These transfers amounted to lI 108 rnillion in 1968, rising to
EI 160 rnillion in 1973 and to f,I 2,036 rnillion in 1979. The very sharp increase
between 1973 and 1979 reflects partly the large number of Palestinians who had
sought employment abroad and partly the progressive devaluation of the IsraeLi
pound and the resuLting fa11 in its value vis-l-vis foreign currencies.
C. Consumption
58. Levele of consumption expenditure, savings and investment are indicative of
the standard of living of the people. However, the rnacro-indicators which are
nornally used do not reveal the real distribution of consumption, savings or
investment among the various social groups and geographical locations.
Nevertheless, they give a fair idea of the t,rend in these factors conEributing to
standards of living.
59. The growth of incomes among the people in the occupied Palestinian
territories, through rising wages in Ehe territories themselves, emplolnnent in
IsraeL and private remitEances from abroad, has, no doubt, contributed to the
higher leve1s that are observable in consumption. Table 15 below illustrates Ehe
trend.
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Table 15. Private
(uillions of
consumpt ion epxenditure
Israeli pounds)
1968 r973
L42 547 359 1, 145
L42 294
359 531
38.6
27.7
100.0
At current pricee
Gaza Strip
I{eet Bank
Ar 1968 prices
Gaza Strip
!{est Bank
L979
6,9O7
18, 148
405
937
Source: See source note Co table 1.4.
60. It will. be obeerved that, at 1968 prices, in the first period, L968-1973,
consumption expenditure in the C'aza Strip increased by 107 per cent or an annual
average of 2L.4 per cent, while in the second period, 1973-1979, it rose at a
slower rate, namely, 37.7 pet cent or an annual average of 7.5 per cent.
Comparable figures for the West Bank are, for the first period, 75.7 per cent or an
annual average of I5.1 per cent and, for the second period, 48.5 per cent or an
annual average of 9.7 per cent. The slower growth in coneumption in the second
period ie, no doubt, prirnarily due to the escalation of prices of both agricultural
and induetrial goods, as well ae in the price of services as a resul.t of
accelerating inflation during the period.
61. The proportions of the domestic private coneumption expenditure spent on
agricultural goods, industrial goods and services over the period of occupation are
shown in table 16 below:
Table 1.6. Domeetic private consumption expenditure
(including net coneumption by non-regidents)
Agricultural goods
Industrial goods
Services
Percentage
1958 L973 T7 15
43.9
22.6
100.0
43.O
24.2
100.0
Source: See source note to table 14.
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The data indicaLe that there rdas no significant change in the consumption Pattern
over the period; there was a slight downward trend in the consumption of
agricultural goods. Consumption of industrial. goods increased by about 5 per cent
in the period 1968-1973, but felL during the period I973-L979. Consumption of
services decreased in Ehe first period by about 5 per cent and increased in the
second period by 1.6 per cent. Higher consumption of industrial goode,
particularly household and personal durable goods, is indicative of a rising
standard of Living. AvaiLable data bear this out in respect of the occupied
territories where the largest increaae occurred in the purchase of gas and electric
stoves and ranges for cooking, electric refrigerators, television sets and tape
recorders. u/
D. Savings
62. Savings constitute the difference between private disposable income fron all
sources and private consumption. Relevant data are shown in table 17 below.
Table 17. Rate of consumption and saving
llest Bank and Gaza Strip
1968 L973 L979
Gross disposabLe private income
from al.1 sourceg
(rnillions of Israeli pounds)
Private consumption (millions of Israeli pounds)
567 2,L57 31, L9l
501 L,692 25,055
Rate of consumption (percentage)
Rate of saving (percentage)
!g=S: see
data indicate that
fell off close to
100.0 100.0 100.0
source note to table 14.
the rate of savings almost doubled between 1968 and L973'
tlro percentage points between 1973 and L979. Nevertheless,
88.4
11.6
78.4
2L.6
80.3
L9.7
The
but
ul rbid.
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it would appear that by 1979 the people in Ehe occupied terriEories hrere saving a
higher proportion of their disposable privaEe income than in 1968. llhen viewing
this increased rate of saving over the period of occupation, it should be borne in
rnind that private transfers from abroad, namely, remittances from Pal.estinians
working in Jordan, the neighbouring Arab countries and beyond, increased
significantly during this period. It would be reasonable to conclude that during
the period 1968-1973, more was being saved from Ehe incomes accruing to the people
in the occupied territories, while in the period L973-L979, less was being saved in
spite of the significant increase in remitEances from abroad. The erosion of
purchasing power of the Israeli pound and a disincentive to save because of rapid
inflation could be cited as contributory causes of this situation.
63. There is more speculation than fact as to what is being done with savings.
Owing to uncertainties about the political future of the territories and the
absence of a cormrercial banking system to mobilize savings and invest in
income-producing enterprises, there has been a tendency to hoard. Savings in gold
or Jordan dinars which are legal tender in the l{est Bank, are much more stable than
the Israeli pound and are convertible into other currencies. Those who do have
their savings in Israeli pounds have witnessed a progressive loss in their value
over the past fen years because of the high rate of inflation and periodic
devaluation of the Israel.i pound relative to the Jordan dinar and other hard
currencies. For instance, the exchange rate between the Israeli pound and the
Jordan dinar for the years 1971 to 1978 is shown in table 18 below.
Table 18. F.:<change rat.e between the Israeli pound and
the Jordan dinar, L97L'L978
Annual devaluation of
lfumber of Israeli pounds in the Israeli pound
Year one Jordan dinar a/ (percentage)
L97L
L972
L973
L974
L975
L976
L977
L978
10, 5
L2.6
13.4
L7,2
20.5
29.r
32.0
54.8
19.7
6.6
28.0
19. 8
4L.9
9.8
7L.3
a/ Based on quarterly averages, recorded by the Karsou Exchange Office,
I'tabtui (see TD/n/alo, table 35).
A conseguetrce of this situation is that in the absence of opportunities to invest
savings and earn a return, the Palestinian people have found that Eheir savings
have dwindled in purchasing polrer over the years.
1...
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E. Investnent
64. The lack of a consnercial banking system has inhibited investments by the
people of the occupied territ,ories in productive enterprises. There is a
reluctance on their part to obtain investment funds from the Israeli bank branches
that have been escablished in the territories. Loans granted by these banks are
subject to the approval of the Military Government, and they are usually given for
operational activities, rnainly for agricultural projects promoted by the Israeli
authorities, and to manufacturing establishnents which undertake subcontracts for
Israeli fir:rns. Agricultural and rnanufacturing enterprises producing for the locaI
rnarket rely mostly on profits and remitlances from abroad for their operating and
investment needs. Even here, there is some reluctance to expand production and
improve qr.rality because of the keen competition from similar items produced by
Israeli firms and marketed without restrictions in the l{est Bank and the Gaza
Strip. More recently, local producers have had Eo compete with products from the
new Israel.i seEtlements which enjoy the same privileges as firms in Israel.
Consequently, rnany sna1l producers and enlrepreneurs in the occupied territories
have ceased from investing in their enterprises. Some of them have had to abandon
their traditional sources of earning a livelihood, their conditions of living have
deteriorated and they have had to seek employment which gives them less income than
otherwise.
F. Inflation
65. The impact of inflation on the living conditions of the people in the occupied
territories has been referred to above in connexion wich consumption, savings and
investments. The close economic links that have been established between the
occupied territories and Israel have rnade the forrner highly susceptible to
fluctuations in the Israeli economy, particularly its inflaEionary trends. In the
first period of occupation up to 1973, inflation in the West Bank and the C,aza Strip, taken as a whole, was in the neighbourhood of 20 per cent annually. In 1974
and 1975, it accelerated to around 49 per cent annually, dropping to an average of
22 per cent in 1976 when there was a recession in Israel. In L977, the rate of
inflation inereased to 37 per cent; in 1978 to 46.6 per cent; and in 1979 to
70.3 per cent (see appendix II below). Available data indicate that the rate of
inflation in the occupied territories rose faster than it did in Israel, so that
the living conditions in the territories rdere more adversely affected. Those who,
because of their circumstances, had to have their resources in Israeli currency
which was progressively losing its purchasing porder, have been affected more
adversely than those who were in a position to have their resources in Jordan
dinars, boEh currencies being legal tender in the l.Iest Bank. Lack of detailed
income data for various social groups in the occupied territories makes it
difficult to identify those who were affected most seriously. It would be
reasonable to assume, however, that persons already employed in the territories at
the time of occupation and persons who had to seek alternative employment within
the territories as a result of the changing economic and occupational structures
would have been affect,ed the most because of che lag in increase in wages and the
higher inflationary rate in the territories relative to rhat in Israel.
1...
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V. SOCIAL AND CULI]IJRAL FACIORS
A. Social and cultural env-lgcnmenll
66. The living conditione of the people in the occupied territories have been
profoundly affected by the constraints and restrictions imposed by the occupying
-Po*er as iegards their eocial activities, outloook, aspirations -and cultural
developmentl Instances of actions deerimental to the growth and development of a
natio;l identity among the Palestiniane in the territories have been documented
and reported to ,rarious bodies of the united Nations system. v/ An attempt is nade
it ttr"'present ""p"ii Eo rnarshall some of these instances sucEintly with a view to
focusin! attention on their inpact on the social and cultural life of the people in
the occupied territories.
67. First and foremost should be mentioned the deep sense of insecurity that has
spread throughout the Palestinian population in the territories' The Defense
(ilo"ie"""y) iegulations, L945, undlr-which they live, and the regulations imposed
by th- riiitary adminisEration have tended to deprive the people of their rights to
land, water and other resourcea and facilities which could be preserved and
deveioped for their own advancement. As mentioned earlier, more than one quarter
of the land, public and privately owned, has been taken over by the occupying
Power, and water reaources have Leen tapped for the benefit of the new Israeli
settlernents in the territories, often at the exPense of the requiremenEs of
existing Palestinian villages. Deetruction of dwellings has taken place under-Ehe
"r"tg"r,iy laws. Coll.ectivE punishmenE has been imposed on tohtns and villages in
the iake- of public demonstrations and acts of violence. Imprisonment and
incarceration without trial have taken place and deportation has been resorted to
for political and other reasons. Restrictions have been placed on freedom of
assotiation and expreesions of non-violent protest, sueh as closing of trading
establishments, displaying the colours of the flag adopted by the Palestinians and
gatherings for refiiiols prrtpo""". All these actions have had a negative effect on
EUe "pirlt of the pitestinians in the territories as far as development and
progregs are concerned.
68. The incidence of such restrictive actions seemed to increage after the
rmrnicipal elections of L976, when representatives, including mayors, from the
National Front which
",1ppori"
the PII) came to the forefront of nunicipal politics'
v/ See, for e:<ample, reports of the Special Cornrnittee to Investigate Israeli
practices Affecting the }fuinan iigttt" of the Population of the occupied Territories;
reports of the SecJrity Council dornnission established under resolution 446 (1979);
reports to the governing bodies of uMS@, the IIn and l{llc; reports of the
Setretary-General subrniited Eo the General Assenbly on'such subjects as living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories, pemanent
sovereignty over national resolrcls in the occupied Arab terriLories and the
situation in the I'tiddle East.
1...
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the highest form of repreeentative government in the occupied territories. Thet
these actions continue and with much more freguency and inteneity is evident from
the information gathered and documented in the most recent report of the Special
Corrnittee to Investigate Ieraeli Practices Affecting the Hurnan Rights of the
Population of the occupied Territoriee (A/36/579). In 1980 and 1i81, actions taken for rrnational securityrr reaaons, included evacuat,ion of families from their homes in East Jenrsalem, Beit Ikea and lhbi-Sarmil and the demolition and sealing of
houees and comnercial premiees in the districts of Jenin, Nablue, the C"aza Strip,
Ranallah, Hebron and other torrns. Hundreds of citrus trees along the Deir El Balah
road were uprooted, caueing an annual loes of 400 tone of produce. The Jericho
rnunicipality was forbidden to implement any town proj""t,rl.tho.tt the approval of
the Military Government. Curfews were impLsed on .r"iio,r" towns, vilLaies and
refugee camPs, sometirnes extending into violence. days following individual acts of More recently, in March 1982, tire dismissal of the elected Mayors of Al Bineh, lbblus and Ranallah gave rise to wideepread clashee between thl
Paleetinian people and the Israeli authorities resulting in some cases in loss of
I ife.
69. Instances of restrictions to freedom of movement aleo appear to have increased in recent yearso There were nany occasions when rnayore and notaUtee were refueed pennission to cro88 the borders to Jordan and to Egypt or to travel beyond. Caza residents were refused perrnission to cross the Alla;by Bridge into Jordan as from
19 Novenber 1980 for an undetermined period. Restric-ting iiaividuale to their
towns of reeidence or their homes nas corrnon. The Militiry Government of the west
Bank issued some 33 orders in a brief period restricting mayors, rnunicipal
councilors and other-public figures to their tolrns of residlnce (A/36/sis,
Para. 278), In one instance, a group of 28 schoolgirls from Helhul were ordered to
rernain at nilitary headquarters along with their parents from 8.30 a.m. to 2 p.m. daily for a period of one month. nestrictions of movement were imposed on a number of editors of Arab nelrspapere in the occupied territories and the movement of a Jenin religious leader was restricted for a period of six monthg.
70. The increaeing number of Israeli settlements in the lJest Bank and the Gaza Strip is poeing a real threat to peaceful conditions of living for the palestinian
people in the territories. Apart fron the economic consequenies in so far as the production of these settlements competes with indigenous agriculture and industry,
the cloee proxinity of some of the settl.ements to Palestinian villages and towng has given rige to friction between the settlers and the local people. In some cases, Palestinian far:mere have been prevented from cultivating their fields on the
grounds that the land belongs to a nearby settlement. Houses belonging to local
peopLe have been occupied illega1ly. Land belonging to Palestinian-farmers hae
been seized by settlere from nearby eettlements.- Tiere is widespread belief among the Paleetinians that theee incidents are often overlooked by thl occupying authorities, condoned in some instancea and supported in othlrs.
7L. There is evidence which has been reported in newepapers and documented by the PIo, and which lras also conveyed to the expert on missio" Uy residents of the
occupied territoriee vigiting neighbouring Arab countries, ihat social and religious activities are being progressiv-ly curtailed ae a deterrent to political
1...
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or rrsubversivett activities which undermine rrnational securityrr. Restrictions on
the activities of social clubs and organizations include scrutiny and approval of
those elecEed to their governing bodies or directorships. Clubs are asked to elect
new officers acceptable to the authorities; otherwise they are closed. Banning the
formation of new clubs and associations for cultural and social purposes is
cormon. Library associations, theatre clubs and literaty regazines are often
subject to control. Scripts of plays have Lo be approved by the adminisErative
authorities and journals of folklore are subject to censorship. It was also
mentioned that religious sermons on Fridays have often to be presented beforehand
to Ehe authorities for approval.. Development of a cultural consciousness among the
Palestinians living in the territories has been adversely affected by the banning
of the distribution of a number of books recently published in Egypt, Jordan and
Lebanon.
72. SociaI and cultural condiEions have deterioraLed sharply for the Arab
population of East Jerusalem. They are subject t,o Israeli law, jurisdiction and
administration, including taxes and language requirements. Social, cultural and
sports activities among the Arab residents are being actively discouraged. The
Jordanian educational system which prevailed before 1967 has been replaced by the
Israeli syatem. The circulation of certain Arabic books has been prohibited as has
the entry of certain books and publications dealing with Arab culture and history.
Censorship of the Arab press is mrch more strict than that of the Israeli prese,
particularly because of the wide circulation of the Arab daily newsPaPers published
in East Jerusalem in other parts of the occupied territoriee.
B. Health
73. In a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session (see
Al36l26}lAdd.1), the Government of Israel stated that, as from 1957' the
administration undertook a wide-ranging prograrme of improvementa to the health
services in the occupied territories. The prograrme included Ehe introduction of
advanced medical technology and expertise provided by Ieraeli nedical teams;
expansion of existing training facilities for local Arab teams; the establishment
of new hospitals, medical centres, nursing schools and paramedical schools; the
introduction of new equipment; expansion of iumrnization prograrunes, the
establishment of schooL health services; the installation of running water and the
establishment of mother and child health care centres. According to the report'
health insurance schemes were also introduced, a cornpulsory scheme for
adninistrative workerg and occupied territory residents working in Israel, and a
voluntary scheme for all other residents. Around 6001000 residents, about hslf the
population of the occupied territories, are reported to have joined the schemes.
74. In the absence of a visit to the occupied territories, it is difficult to
aaseaa the inpact of these measures on the living conditions of the people in the
territories. As regards hospitals, available data w/ indicate that since 1974 the
yl Statistical Abstract of Israel 1980 ...
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nuraber of hospital.s in the Gaza Strip has been reduced from seven (eix of which are
goverrurental) to six, the reduction being in respect of one of the governmental
hoepitals. In the t{est Bank, the number of hospitals has been increaeed fron 16 (eight of thern governmental) to 17, the additional hospitaL being a governmental
one. There rras an overalt reduction in the number of hoepital beds in the
goverrunental hoepitals in the Gaza Strip and a negligible increase in the tfest Bank
between 1974 and L979, in spite of an increase in population in the territories and
in the number of hospitalized patients.
75, Ae regards equipment, in a report nade available to the experts 1/ mention ie
rnade of widespread shortages of modern equipment at the principal hoapitale in the
lfeet Bank. These shortages include monitoring equip'rnent in intensiverare units,
incubators for babies born prermturely, X-ray equipment, advanced laboratory
equipnent for diagnoeis, and operating and sterilization equipment.
76. Ae regards specialist eervices, the head of the West Bank Medical Aseociation,
in a report entitled t[edical eervices in the occupied Weet Bank'r, a/ hae asserted
thet there are deficienciee in such medical fields as paediatrics, pathology and
radiology. Shortages are experienced among nurses and paramedical pereonnel. The
lack of an adequate suppLy of X-ray technicians, physiotherapists, blood-bank
technicians and pharrnacists was deeply af fecting the efficient del.ivery of heal.th
services.
77. The inadequacy of services in the rnain hospitals in the l{est Benk has
conpelled local physicians to refer an increasing number of Arab patients to
hospitals in Israel. In such cases, the patient is charged one third of the cost
and the renaining two thirde ie charged to the West Bank budget for health
services. These chargee for l{est Bank patient care in Israeli hospitals, which ie
on the increaser are mentioned aa one of the obstaclee to the improvement and
development of the health services in the l{est Bank.
78. The worst off among the population in the occupied territories in tenrs of
health care are those who have not joined the health insurance echenee - about half
the population - because they are not qualified to join the conpulsory gcheme or
because of an irnperfect understanding of the scheme or becauge they lack a regular
source of income. firey find the costs of medical care too high in relation to
their resources and nany of them find it difficult to obtain the kind of free
rnedieal treatment they were accustomed to before the occupation.
79. Some of the ehort,conings in the health system mentioned above were observed
and comnented on by the Special Corunittee of E:rperts of the tforld Health
x/ "The deficiency of medical instruments in tlest Bank hospitalsrr, report by
the Conunittee for the Defense of Pal.estinian Human Rights under leraeli Occupation,
Lebanon, 1979 (rnineo).
y/ Reproduced by the Corunittee for the Defense of Palestinian Human Rights
under Ieraeli Occupation, Lebanon, 29 March 1979 (mimeo).
f.r.
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Organization which visited the oecupied territories in April I98L. 3l . Particular
mention has been made of the shortaie of essent,ial equipment and Eechnicians in the
laboratories 1rhich were being established in the health districts under a recent
policy of decentralization of these services. The hospitals in the territories
,0"t. L"p"riencing shortages of physicians and nurses who, because of poor work
conditions and Sy, n "r"-leaving
the territories in eearch of employnent in the
neighbouring AraU countries. AnoCher reaaon for phyeicians leaving was given as
the lack of opportunities for post-graduate training which for budgetary reasons
was not being ruade available t; the;. Shortages of drugs were widespread. A11
these shortcomings add to the feeling of frustration in the occupied territories on
natters pertaining to health care.
80. According to the WIXC Special CormiCtee, some improvements had been nade in the
infrastructure for the delivery of health services and in the supply of equiPment.
Yet, much more had to be done in order to serve the needs of the growing
population. liedical care in the occuPied territories was stiLl dependent on
Israeli facilities for a nunber of specialist eervices. According to the
Cornnittee, there had been no significant changes during the past tno years in the
health seivices with regard to the establishnent of health units or strengthening
of medical staff. The i'ystem of centralization in planning for health gervices was
noE conducive to cormunily participation in the public health effort and left the
local medical authorities v-ry little room for initiative. The health budget did
not allow for desirable developrnents in the heal.th services. Extrabudgetary
resources from non-governmental and philanthropic institutione and gssociations or
the corunrnity were often refused by the Israeli authorities.
81. The Corrnittee observed that services provided through the rnaternal and child
health centres rilere adequately organized, and the immrnization Progranme uas
pursued in all the t.tritoriei. Developments were also observed in environmental
sanitation, particularly through the conetrucEion of sewage treatment pLants and in
the supply of drinking water which, in general, was good and had been extended to
cover a- t"rger propotiion of the residents through individual connexions.
C. Education
AZ. Education is an important element in the living conditions of a people since
it not only provides thl opportunity and mechanism for self-improvement but also
rnakes po""iUi" upward occu'Stional mobility, an increase in a personre ability to
earn and the entrancement oi t i" standard oi tivir,g. In dealing wich education as a
component of living conditions, it is not enough to consider the existence, levels
and distribution oi educational institutionsl the individualts access to the tyPe
of education relevant to his needs and the over-a11 conditions under which
education is provided should also be considered.
Zl See t{I{O, "Report of
the health conditions of the
the Special Conunittee of Experts appointed t9 lludy
intrabilants of the occupied territories' (A34lL7) '
1...
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83. The system of education is basically the same in all the occupied
territories. It starts with t<inaergarten for children under the age of six,
followed by elementary or prirnary school for chiLdren between the ages of six and
12r who then proceed to preparatory school, normally for three years. The prinary
and preparatory.schools form the compulsory cycle of education and are followed by
secondary, vocational and teacher training institutions and institucions of higher
learning.
84. The educational inetitutions are rnanaged by the government, private bodies or
UNRWA. As far as practicable, the schools folLow the Jordanian curriculum in the
I'Iest Bank and the Egyptian curriculum in the Gaza Strip. However, books used by
the schools are subject to Israeli censorship. Some books have been banned by the
authorities and others have been reprinted, the sections considered offensive by
the Israeli authorities being eliminated.
85. There has been a considerable increase in educational institutions in the territories since L967. In the l{est Bank and the C,aza Strip the number of
educational institutions increased from 1,091 in L967/68 ro 1r366 in 1979/80 and,
according t,o an Israeli official report, the number of classrooms increased by
80 per cent, from 61187 in 1967/68 to 11,187 in 1979/80, while the average number of pupils in a class rernained stable at around 36 (see Al36/260/Add,1, p. 18,
Para. 72). However, from 1967 Eo 1977 enrolment rates in the l{est Bank and the
Gaza StriP ttere somewhat behind those of neighbouring countries. Data are not
available for evah.ntion of the situation since L977; but from indirect data on
enrolment of refugee pupils one can infer Ehat while the sitr.ration has improved in
the Gaza Strip, the situation in the West Bank does not appear to have kept pace nith that in the neighbouring territories.
86.' The enrolrnenE ratio which relates the enrolment in each age group to the population in that age group is a good measure of the extent to wtrictr-persons who are eligible for education are attending school. The proportions in ttre first year of the compulsory cycle give a good indication of the enrolment ratio generally
because the higher the enrolment ratio of first-year entrants into the educational
s-ystem, the higher the enrolment ratio for succeeding years at al.l ages. Although direct information on the enrolment ratio in the occipiea territories is not available, such inforrnation has been compiled by UI{RWA with respect to refugee
students in all the areas in which UI{RWA operates. If it is assumed thaE
educational trends among the refugee population reflects the trends in the host
countries then the infonnation given in table 19 below can be regarded as reflecting the Erends in enrolment ratios in the various countries and territories. The table shows the enrolment ratios at age six for refugee children in the @za Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. It
will be observed that these ratios are very high for boys and, in the case of Gaza
and the Syrian Arab Republic, almost all the sixlear-olds are in school. The West
Bank has the lowest enrolment ratio at year six. Flrrthermore, this ratio declined
between L9771 78 and 1979/80. In 1980/81 ir picked up to a high of 65.8 per cenr
which is only about two thirds of the ratios for the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Arab Republic. Ttre enrolment ratios for girls are compared with those of other
developing countries. But the ratio for the hrest Bank is nmch less than that for
/...
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Engl ish
Annex I
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the other countries and the C,aza Strip. Furthermore, the low ratio aPPears to be
stable with a noticeable decline between L979/80 and 1980/81' The l'Iest Bank, which
has the lowest enrolment ratios in 1977/78, is the only one of the four
neighbouring countries and territories wifh declining enrolment ratios. The
decline in the ratios in Lebanon since L979/80 rnay be attributed t,o the unstable
political and military situation in that country. In all four countries and
territories the population of school children who are girls rose from about one
quarter in the 1950s to almost half in 1980/81. This achievement seems Eo be
co*ooq to all the countries and territories in Ehe region and may be a reflecEion
of a greater awareness of the inPortance of education in socieEy.
Table 19. FirsE-year primary school enrolment raEios
for refugee children in selected countries,
L977/ 78 ro 1980/8r
Year
L977/78
L97 8/ 79
L979 / 80
19 80/ 81
L977 / 78
L978/ 7e
L979/ 80
1980/81
Gaza
98.3
95.7
99.2
99.4
96.3
94.0
94.9
98.2
66.7
7 6.2
80. 0
82.8
60.7
70.0
82.9
84.0
94. I
93.6
82.4
7 6.7
93. 3
96.1
81.8
7L.2
West Bank
64.3
63.7
63. 0
60.8
60.2
60.2
60. 5
58.9
Girls
Svrian Arab Republic
Bovs
Jordan Lebanon
97.3
98.5
99.6
99.5
96.4
98.9
98.4
95.6
Source: UNRWA StatisEical Ye4lBoc\, Lg77/78, I978/79, L979/80 and 1980/81
editions.
87. From informat,ion supplied Eo the IIO mission which visited Israel and the
occupied territories in March 1981, it appears that, considerable efforEs are being
made by the authorities !o provide opportuniEies for vocational training. The
26 vocational training centies (18 on Ehe WesE Bank and eight in Gaza) have
Al 37 1238
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Annex I
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provided training for over 401000 people. g/ According to the mission' the role
or tt. rraining E"iii.", which had'beln toJrovide unemployed adulte with basic
;;rili"g-pri""ip"iii-"iit a view to enploymlnt in the constnrction sector in
Israelr-naa changed- Ln 1972 and at preient, *prograrutes are rnainly directed at
young ieopte who-do not wish to continue their academic education aC s.econdary
level and concentrate on the acquiaition of manufacturing skillstr. !!/ In.general,
it appears the vocationsl training centres provide trainilg rminly for semi-skilled
jobs in industry and construction. Infor:nation received fron Arab sources
lmphasizes the point that the training which ie given ie Largely geared Eowards
meeting the needs of the Israeli econoq/. Moet of thoee who co:nplete the training
progr.rroee therefore find jobe in Israel or elge migrate to the Arab Gulf
"o.tttri.s.
In a visit to lwo training centres in 1981, the IIO mission found that
only a small percentage of persone completing these courses (between 5 per cent and
20 ier cent) rnanaged or atEenpted to find emplo)nnent loca,lly. The mission
concluded that be;idee the polential long-term Lenefits from acquisition of skilLs
in jobs outside the occupied territoriesrrr the training aystem' as at Present
organized, does not serve the real development needs of the oceupied territories.
beiause iL is not based on a planned roatch of nanpower needs and resources". cc/
EE. l{ith regard to higher education, there are three univeJeities in the West Bank
and an Institute of lelamic Religious Studieg in Gaza. They are supported by
private foundations and individuals and receive PracticalLy no assistance from the
bovernment. They cater for Arab students not only from the occupied territories
but al.so from Isiael itself. The universities have long been experiencing numerous
problems with the adminietering authoritieg. These Persistent problems, however,
i""r to have inteneified within the past fer yeare, especially with resPect to
Bir-Zeit University. The rnain reason for thie appeare to be Israeli Military
Order 854 of 8Ch July 1980, r'an order concertring the law of Education and Culture
t[o. (16) of Lg64 - Amendment (.ludea and saruria) No. (s54) of 1960rr. This order
placed all the educational institutions, including the universities in the occupied
lerritories, under the sbsolute control of the nilitary authorities. By this order
all institutions of higher education, nhether in exigtence at the date of the order
or not, have to obtain-a pernit fron the Military Governor in order to oPerate and
all teachere have to be cleared by the Military Governor and his office before they
can obtain employment in the Univereity or continue in such emplo)rment. In
addition, all- foieign studente, including students from the C'aza Strip, have to
obtain permite to enable them to attend the universities.
89. The haraeament of etudente is not confined to the inetitutions of higher
learning. l.bny secondary schools geem to be subjected to similar harassment. In
aal Report of thg DirestoT-Gegera,l, International Labour Conference,
sixtyEeve our Office, Geneva, 1981), p. 31.
bbl gig.
ccl E.
Al 37 I 238
English
Annex I
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1980/8f, 12 echools were shut down by the nilitary authorities for varioua periode
and three of Ehese, Prince Hassan Secondary School at Bir Zeit, Abu Diss Science
College and Ossana Bin Munkiz School at Hebron were shut down permanently.
90. tJhile progress has been achieved in the numbers of echoolo, claases and
teachers, as well as in enrolment, the freguent closure of schools and
universities, the continual harassment of staff and etudents and the restrictions
on the academic freedom of the univereities have created an atmosphere of fear,
uncertainty and helplessness, unconducive to the proper and effective conduct of
teaching and learning.
f...
Appendix I
Land reeentlv appropriated bv the occupving ,Power
Ila te
August 1980
August 1980
August 1980
Septenber 1980
November 1980
October 1980
Decernber 1980
December 1.980
Decenber 1980
December 1980
February 1981
February 1981
February 1981
February 1.981
February 1.981
February 1981
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Annex I
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400
(lana exproPriated)
850
50
2, 500
50
(lana confiscated)
1r000
60
45
7,000
1r500
(lana confiscated)
6,000
8r000
11,000 (decl.ared
rrstate landtt before
acquisition)
Amount of land confiscated
Location
Deir El tlatab
Deir-Jarir
Ram.rn
l,lardah
Qatana
Beit Sahur
Ketel lLaris
Sirir
Si lwad
Ein Yabaad
Tarqumiya
Betunia, Ajaiby, Ajadira, Rafat
Jenin
Salfit
Trrbas
Abu Dis
Sourcei 'rReport of the
Affecting the ttuimn Righte of
Al 361 579), paras. 102-118.
Special Corunittee to Investi.gate Israeli Practices
ttre roputation of the occupied Territoriee"
f...
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Aooendix 1l
Consuner price index (1968/69 o 100)
Territorv 1970 1971 L972 L973 L974 L975 L976 L977 1978 L979
tfeet Bank 108.4 L25.9 148.1 179.9 256.5 367.4 470.5 640.0 962.7 1618.{
Gaza Strip 105.1 12E.1 155.1 190. 3 294.3 452.7 533.8 74L.L I 058.6 L 824.',
Israel 106.1 118.8 134.1 160.9 224.8 313.1 4LL.2 553.5 833.5 1 486.1
Source: Corryiled frou Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1975 ... 8rd
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Annex II
Plage I
ANI{EX II
Mepbers of the Tean of Experts
Dr. P. Aratin Tetteh (Gtrena)
Profeeeor, Department of Planning
University of Science and Technology
Kurnsi, Ghana
Dr. lhrdley Madawela (Sri lanka)
Formerly Co-ordinator of Units
Social Developnent Branch
centre for social Development and Hursnitarian Af faire
Department of rnternational Econonic and social Affairr
United llatione, lbw york
UNITED
NATIONS AE
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.
GENERAL
A/38/278
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Thirty-eighth session
Item 78 (h) of the preliminary list*
DEIlELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONClolIC
CO-OPERATION: HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Second regular session of 1983
Item 15 of the provisional
agenda**
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN
THE FIELD OF HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS
Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territories
Report of the Secretary-General
1. In its resolution 34/113 of 14 December 1979, the Gener~l Assembly requested
the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and
specialized agencies, particularly the united Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNFWA) , the Economic Commission for Western
Asia (ECWA) and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting
the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, to prepare and
submit to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a comprehensive and analytical
report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories.
2. At its thirty-fifth session, after considering the Secretary-General's report
(A/35/533 and Corr.l), which had been submitted pursuant to the above-mentioned
resolution, the General Assembly, in paragraph 1 of resolution 35/75 of
5 December 1980, took note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories
and, in paragraph 4 of the same resolution, called upon all States to co-operate
with United Nations agencies, organizations and organs and local Palestinian
* A/38/50/Rev.1.
** E/1983/100.
83-16597 0791t (E) / ...
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authorities to alleviate the tragic living conditions of the Palestinian people
caused by the Israeli occupation. Furthermore, in paragraph 5 of the resolution,
the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive and
analytical report to it at its thirty-sixth session, through the Economic and
Social Council, on the progress made in the implementation of the resolution.
3. At its thirty-sixth session, after considering the Secretary-General's report
(A/36/260 and Add. 1-3) , which had been submitted pursuant to its resolution 35/75,
the General Assembly, in paragraph 1 of resolution 36/73 of 4 December 1981, took
note of the report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people and, in paragraph 6 of the same resolution, requested the
Secretary-General "to prepare a comprehensive and analytical report on the
deteriorating living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territories and to submit it to the General Assembly at its
thirty-seventh session through the Economic and Social Council".
4. At its thirty-seventh session, after considering the Secretary-General's
report (A/37/238), which had been submitted pursuant to its resolution 36/73, the
Assembly, in paragraph 1 of resolution 37/222 of 20 December 1982, took note of the
report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people
in the occupied Palestinian territories and, in paragraph 8 of the same resolution,
requested the Secretary-General "to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at
its thirty-eighth session, through the Ec·onomic and Social Council, a comprehensive
report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territories".
5. So as to enable the Secretary-General to prepare and submit the required
report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, and in an effort to
ensure a balanced and objective expert view, the Secretary-General used the
services of a team of three experts: Mr. Dudley Madawela, formerly Co-ordinator of
Units, Social Development Branch, Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian
Affairs, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, united Nations,
New York, Mr. Harald Kristiansen, Senior Research Officer, Norwegian Building
Research Institute, Oslo, Norway; and Mr. Edward Balassanian, archite~t, urban
designer and city planner, New York.
6. The experts were to prepare the report on the basis of material available from
the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies and from the specialized agencies, and
other published and unpublished literature pertaining to the sUbject. They were
also to gather information through visits to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian
Arab Republic and the occupied territories and through discussions with government
officials and others, as well as with representatives of the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
7. Since permission to visit the occupied Palestinian territories was not granted
by the Government of Israel, the experts, in preparing their report, had to rely on
secondary sources of information. Accordingly, from 11 February to 24 March 1983,
the experts visited and had discussions with the relevant government officials of
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Further discussions were held
/ ...
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with United Nations officials stationed in those countries. Discussions were also
held with the relevant officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization in
Damascus and Amman. Meetings were also held with five profeSsors, who had been
expelled from the universities in the West Bank in OCtober 1982, the former Mayor
of Halhul, the former Mayor of East Jerusalem, the head of the PLO Palestinian
Fund, and with Palestinians now living outside the occupied territories, who had
information on conditions within the territories either through recent visits there
or from relatives living there. The experts also visited the King Hussein Bridge
in order to obtain a first-hand view of conditions and procedures for crossing the
Bridge and interviewed at random some of those crossing into Jorda~
8. The experts also visited the headquarters of, and gathered relevant
information and data from ECWA, UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNIWA, the lLO, UNESCO, and WHO.
various United Nations reports dealing with conditions in the occupied Palestinian
territories were also reviewed, particularly those of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the
OCcupied Territories, the Security Council Commission established under resolution
446 (1979), of 22 March 1979, on the situation in the occupied Arab territories and
the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
A substantial amount of relevant material and information was gathered from those
sources, which supplemented other information and data available in published
documents of various other organizations of the United Nations system that were
made available to the experts and material published in books, periodicals and the
popular press, as indicated in the various footnotes contained in the report
prepared by the experts.
9. The report prepared by the team of experts is reproduced in the annex below.
I ...
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ANNEX
Report of the Team of Experts on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the occupied Palestinian Territories
Chapter paragraphs
I. INTRODOCTION · . 1 - 5 6
U. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6 - 19 7
IU. PHYSICAL FACTORS: HOUSING, INFRASTRUCTURE, LAND
AND S~LEMENTS, AND WATER ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 20 - 43 9
Housing ••••••••••••••..••••••••• • ,'"... . •••••••• •• •• ••• •• 20 27 9
B.
C.
D.
Infrastructure ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 28 - 32
Land and settlements ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 33 - 38
Water ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.• 39 - 43
12
13
15
IV. ECONCMIC FACTORS ........................................... 44 - 97 18
A. Economic framework ..................................... 44 - 48 18
B. Population and employment ••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••• 49 - 53 19
C. Income ................................................. 54 19
D. Aggregate income, gross domestic product and gross
national product •••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 55 - 59 20
E. Disposable private income and wage-income 60 - 66 21
F. Capital formation •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 67 - 68
Consumption and savings •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 69 - 72
24
25
H.
I.
Taxation
Monetary
· .
situation •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
73 - 77
78 - 81
27
29
J. Sectoral structure of the economy •••••••••••••••••••••• 82 30
Sectoral structure of employment ••••••••••••••••••••••• 83 - 84 31
L. Agriculture . . 85 - 90 32
M. Industry · . 91 - 96 36
/ ...
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ANNEX (continued)
Chapter
N. Other sectors· ..
paragraphs
97 37
V. sex: IAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS .. 98 134 38
A. Social and cultural conditions ................................................ 98 111 38
B. Education .......................................................................................... 112 124 41
C. Health •.••..•.•...••..•..• '•••••••••••••••..••..•.••••• 125 - 134
APPENDICES
44
I.
11.
111.
Houses demolished, 1967~1981 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Population growth in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and
the Gaza Strip, 1979-1981 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Employed persons by economic branch in the occupied territories and
51
52
in Israel ........................ •'. S3
IV. Employed persons of the occupied territories by selected economic
branch and place of work ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 54
V. Education in the occupied Palestinian territories .. . 55
VI. COnsumer price index, West Bank and Gaza Strip ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 56
VII. Wage-income by sectors and location of employment, 1981 •••••••••••••••• 57
I ...
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present report has been prepared in pursuance of General Assembly
resolution 37/222, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare
and submit to it at its thirty-eighth session, through the Economic and SOcial
Council, a comprehensive report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people
in the occupied Palestinian territories. It is a follow-up to the comprehensive
and analytical report submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session
(A/37/238), pursuant to its resolution 36/73 of 4 December 1981 on the "living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories".
2. Considering that the occupied Palestinian territories comprise the west Bank
of the River Jordan, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, the experts have
endeavoured to collect available data pertaining to the two territories. However,
data in respect of East Jerusalem have been difficult to collect, because of the
practice of the Israeli authorities of including them in the overall data for
Israel. Consequently, information on East Jerusalem contained in the present
report has been drawn from indirect secondary sources, including the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the former mayor of East Jerusalem and the mayor of
Halhul, and other West Bank residents knowledgeable about the situation in East
Jerusalem. The bulk of the analysis in the report is mainly concerned with
conditions in the west Bank and the Gaza Strip.
3. In the absence of a visit to the occupied territories, it was not possible for
the experts on mission to gather first-hand information on conditions there,
particularly on such aspects as the condition of housing and public facilities, the
state of the agricultural and industrial sectors, the practical aspects of
education and the utilization of health-care services. However, much relevant
information and data were gathered during the visit to the neighbouring Arab
countries and United Nations institutions, offices and programmes in the Middle
East and at Vienna, Geneva, Paris and New York.
4. The present report analyses the changes that have occurred in those areas
which have affected the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territories. Chapter II gives a brief summary of findings.
Chapter III deals with physical factors, namely, housing and physical
infrastructure, land and water and chapter IV examines selected economic factors
which affect living conditions. Chapter V deals with social and cultural factors
recapitulating, in the process, information and findings pertinent to the issue
under consideration contained in other reports submitted to bodies of the United
Nations system, particularly the report of the Special Committee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the HUman Rights of the Population of the Occupied
Territories to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (A/37/485l, the
report of the Director-General of the International Labour Organisation to the
International Labour Conference at its sixty-eighth session in 1982, and the report
of the WHO Special Committee of Experts appointed to study the health conditions of
the inhabitants of the occupied territories submitted to the World Health Assembly
at its thirty-fifth session in 1982. !I
/ ...
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5. In the preparation of the present report, the experts relied as much as
possible on pUblished sources, which were supplemented by interviews with people
knOWledgeable about the situation in the occupied territories. COnclusions in the
summary of findings (chapter 11) are documented and substantiated in the main body
of the report.
11. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
6. The shortages of basic facilities in the occupied territories are quite
evident from the data available. The number of new dwelling units built since 1968
is not adequate to alleviate the deterioration and dilapidation of existing housing
or to meet the housing needs of the population.
7. Measures reported by the occupying authorities with regard to the provision of
infrastruotural facilities are not commensurate with the growing needs of the
Palestinian communities in the occupied territories. There is a tendency to
segregate services provided to Israeli settlements and Palestinian towns and
villages in certain sectors, such as postal services, telecommunications,
agriculture and industry. There is pressure on the Palestinian communities to
obtain other services, such as water and electricity, from a common network serving
the Israeli settlements as well as Israel.
8. There is continual expropriation of land by the occupying authorities, and
Israeli settlers have taken possession of blocks of private land adjacent to the
settlements.
9. These expropriations have reduced the land available to the Palestinian
residents to earn a living and improve their living conditions. The increase in
the establishment of Israeli settlements and their location on the periphery of
Arab towns and villages have become an obstacle to the growth and expansion of the
latter.
10. The economy of the occupied territories, as measured by the real rate of gross
domestic and gross national products, has improved. However, it continues to be
handicapped by lack of long-term planning and programming designed to generate
development for the benefit of the indigenous population. The trend so far has
been towards further integration of the economy with that of Israel, thus exposing
it to the high rate of inflation characteristic of the Israeli economy.
11. The disposable private income and the GNP per capita have increased in real
terms, although the distribution of the income is not known. private consumption
as a percentage of gross disposable private income has risen, and the percentage of
savings has declined. As there are restrictions affecting investment opportunities,
disposable income is channelled into the consumption and purchase of durable goodS.
12. capital formation has been low compared to that occurring in Israel and
Jorda~ Conditions existing in the productive sectors, combined with the unsettled
socio-economic and political situation attributed to the occupation, has made
capital investment risky for the local Arab residents. The only type of investment
of any significance has been in improvements to existing private housing and, to a
lesser extent in new houses.
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13. The level of taxation is proving a burden to the Arab population, particularly
in the application of certain elements of the Israeli tax system which are not in
consonance with the underdeveloped nature of the economy of the occupied
territories.
14. Local employment has been falling in the agricultural and industrial sectors
and rising in all other sectors, led hy the construction industry. More workers
from the territories are commuting to Israel for emp+oyment, where their conditions
of employment have not shown any appreciable improvement from past years. That
almost two thirds of the actively engaged labour force is in one way or another
working in and for the Israeli economy is a deterrent to initiating employment
opportunities within the territories that would serve indigenous economic interests.
15. Agriculture in the occupied territories continues to be hindered by loss of
land through continuing expropriation by the occupying authorities, lack of capital
for improving production methods and shrinkage in markets. The agricultural
sub-sectors which are expanding are the growing of vegetables and melons, the
former finding a principal market in Israel. Melons are exported chiefly to
Jordan. Further growth in those two sub-sectors will depend on the availability of
irrigable land and increased allocation of water resources for agriculture, which
at present is severely restricted.
16. The structure of industry has not shown any significant change over the years
of occupation. It is dominated by small enterprises and a high proportion of those
establishments are in sub-sectors which execute orders for Israeli enterprises,
particularly textiles and clothing, leather, wood and metal products. The
industrial sector is handicapped by lack of capita+ for improvements in buildings
and equipment, difficulties in importing new technology, export restrictions and
competition from Israeli products.
17. Social and cultural conditions of the Palestinians living in the occupied
territories have continued to deteriorate. The traditional family pattern is
breaking down owing to pressures caused by incomes which are inadequate to meet
escalating costs-of-living due to high inflation. The daily living activities of
the Arab residents have been disrupted by frequent curfews, the ever-present
possibility of confrontation with Israeli settlers in the occupied territories and
restrictions in movement, association and expression. Culturally, they are
deprived of many books and periodicals in the Arabic language. There have been a
number of instances when actions by the Israeli settlers have interfered with their
freedom of worship in such places as the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and the
AI-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
18. In education, although facilities at the school level have been keeping pace
with increased enrolment, the content of education does not seem to be progressing
along the lines that curricula are being developed in Jordan and Egypt. Many
books, particularly in literature and the social sciences, are revised for or
barred from use in the educational system in the occupied territories, which
follows the Jordanian system in the west Bank and the Egyptian system in the Gaza
Strip. The universities in the West Bank have had many setbacks during the past
few years, including the dismissal and deportation of professors and new
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regulations affecting financial support from abroad. The closing of the
universities in the wake of demonstrations and the frequent arrest and
interrogation of students suspected of participating in them, together with the
inability to obtain books and periodicals needed for research, have interfered with
the quality of education provided by the universities.
19. As regards health, the availability of hospital beds has not kept pace with
the growth in population or the number of people seeking hospital care. Reporting
of health data does not follow a uniform pattern for the occupied territories. New
services have continued to be introduced in the hospitals in keeping with the
policy of decentralizing specialist services to the district hospitals. Other
measures and services related to environmental health, immunization and maternal
and child care are being provided by an adequate network of clinics and health
centres. The efficiency of the health care system continues to be hampered by
limitations in equipment, qualified staff and distribution of drugs. Some of these
shortcomings have been remedied to some extent through inputs from international
organizations and local voluntary associations as well as the Red Crescent SOciety.
Ill. PHYSICAL FACTORS' HOUSING, INFRASTRUCTURE,
LAND AND SETTLEMENTS, AND WATER
A. Housing
20. There has been no significant change in the housing conditions within the
occupied territories since the last report of the Secretary-General, submitted to
the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (A/37/238, annex I, paras. 34 to
38). The main findings of that report are summarized below:
(a) Supply of new housing disproportionate to popUlation growth,
(b) A lack of institutional means of providing housing to the poorl
(c) A decline of housing stock,
(d) Overcrowded housing,
(e) A shortage of basic utilities and sanitary facilities in houses,
(f) Bureaucratic obstacles in transfer of funds for housing from abroad.
21. With respect to basic housing facilities, table 10 of the report of the
Secretary-General (A/37/238, annex, p. 17) can be updated as follows:
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Table 1. Selected basic housing facilities in the occupied territories
(Percentage of families having the facility indicated)
Facility West Bank Gaza Strip
.ill.l .!2..?! ill! .ill.l .!2.2! 1981
Toilet
None 14.4 21.2 14.7 29.0 21.0 2.2
Kitchen
None 24.0 35.9 25.5 43.7 17.5 3.6
Shared 2.3 3.1 1.3 4.7 14.1 16.3
illlli.
Tap in courtyard 9.9 17. o· 20.4 27.3 61.5 44
Tap in dwelling NA. 23.5 44.9 NA. 13.9 51.(
Electr icity
None 76.1 54.2 18.4 8Ll 65.5 11.5
Bathroom
None 82.3 76.3 49.3 79.7 81.7 38.8
Source: For 1967 figures, see Bakir Abu-Kishk, "Human settlements: problems
and social dimensions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (ECWA, March 1981), p. 7,
and for 1974 and 1981 figures, see Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982 (Jerusalem,
Central Bureau of Statistics, 1982), pp. 746 and 747.
22. Table XXVII/3l of the Statistical Abstract of Israel 1982, entitled "Area of
buildings, by initiating sector and purpose", shows no activity by the public
sector in residential construction since 1978 in the Gaza Strip and, since 1968, in
the West Bank. However, according to the report prepared by the Office of
H.R.H. the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan •••• the Israeli
Government has heavily subsidized settlement housing, which makes apartments there
at least two thirds cheaper than their equivalent in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem". B/
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23. Total residential construction, by initiating sector, is as follows:
Table 2. Residential buildings completed, by initiating sector, 1967-1981
(In thousands of square metres)
Private
Public
Total
West Bank
3,318.2
36.1
3,354.3
Gaza and northern Sinai
1,256.8
52.7
1,309.5
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982 ••• , p. 766.
24. The table below compares the increase in the number of households with the
increase in dwelling unit~·
Table 3. Comparison of the increase in the number of households with
the increase in the number of dwelling units, 1967-1981
Population increase, 1967-1981
Average family size, 1981
Number of families increased, 1967-1981
Total residential construction, 1967-1981
Average size of dwelling units, 1979-1981
Number of dwelling units increased, 1967-1981
West Bank Gaza Strip
125,600 95,700
6.9 6.6
18,203 14,500
3,354,300m2 1,309,500m2
116. 5m2 132m2
28,792 9,920
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982 (Jerusalem, Central Bureau of
Statistics, 1982), table XXVII/I, p. 7331 table XXVII/14, p. 7441 and
table XXVII/32, p. 7671 and table 2 of the present report.
25. It will be observed that construction activities in the category of
residential buildings in the Gaza Strip is 4,580 units short of satisfying even the
need of population growth. In the West Bank, after satisfying population growth,
construction over the past 14 years has only contributed a total of 10,589 units
(less than 800 units per year) to decrease residential density and/or to upgrade
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the housing standard. To illustrate further the insignificance of the present
level of construction activities in alleviating the problem of substandard housing,
it should be mentioned that by one estimate the current housing stock of the
occupied territories is about 200,000 units, of which 70 per cent (140,000 units)
is substandard and must be replaced. si
26. While there are few dwelling units in the refugee camps that may be considered
adequate, housing structures have been improved by r~fugee residents in the
following successive steps~
(a) Wood frame and corrugated sheet-metal walls and roof,
(b) Cement-block walls and corrugated sheet-metal roof,
(c) Cement-block walls nd reinforced-concrete roof,
(d) Second floor addition.
27. In the Gaza Strip, the occupying authorities have only replaced those houses
which have been demolished because of the construction of security roads through
refugee camps (a total of about 1,000 units). According to Palestinian sources,
however, Israeli authorities have developed plans for several housing complexes
outside and adjacent to the camps where they have subdivided the land into small
residential parcels and offered them to the Palestinians under the following
condi tions.·
(a) Recipient must be a refugee-camp dweller,
(b) He must vacate his camp residence,
(c) The camp dwelling has to be demolished and never reconstructed,
(d) Recipient has to pay the price of the new parcel, however, he receives a
99-year lease and not an ownership title.
Punitive demolition of housing by Israeli authorities has further reduced the
number of dwelling units. The number of houses demolished from 1967 to 1981 is
given in appendix I below.
B. Infrastructure
28. Although progress has been reported in the provision of infrastructural
services to the residents of the occupied territories in the supply of electric
power, telecommunications and public transport, EV the reported progress is in no
measure commensurate with the needs of the residents of the area.
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29. According to the report of the Government of Israel, electric power consumed
in the West Bank was six times greater in 1981 than in 1968, and the increase was
even higher in the Gaza Strip. However, according to the same report, 3 per cent
of urban households and 27 per cent of rural households in the West Bank, and
11 per cent of the households in the Gaza Strip were still without electricity. ~
30. According to a report by Meron Benvenisti, former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem,
Israeli authorities in the process of locating and designing Jewish settlements in
the West Bank, make sure "that the location of the settlements in fact restricts
the physical expansion of adjacent Arab villages and farms as well as controls the
high ground for security purposes". Moreover, one of the principles of designing
road networks in the occupied territories is that "areas of Arab population should
be circ wnvented, i. e., avoided'l. y
31. According to the same source, Israeli planning and infrastructure is based on
the concept of complete spatial separation between Jewish and Arab areas, and so
far the following sections have already been either completely, or partially,
separated:
Postal services
Telecommunications
Water
Roads
Electr icity
Industry
Agricultural
marketing
School busing
Vehicle licensing
(separated)
(separated)
(partially separated)
(partially separated)
(partially separated)
(separated, including differential tax and
incentive systems)
(separated)
(separated)
(separated) !31
32. The report prepared by the Office of H.R.H. the Crown Prince of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan points to a highly disproportionate investment policy by the
Government of Israel for Jewish and Palestinian localities of the occupied
territories. !y
C. Land and settlements
33. Agricultural land and water resources in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
provide the major sources of livelihood, and therefore are of deep concern to the
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Palestinian people in the occupied territories. As mentioned in the previous
report of the Secretary-General (A/37/238, annex I, para. 15), by September 1979
25 per cent of the total land area of the West Bank (1,500,000 dunums, equivalent
to 1,500 km2 ) had been expropriated by the Israeli authorities. Of the
expropriated land, 11 per cent was reported to have been allocated to a total
of 123 Israeli settlements. Since then the amount of expropriated land has risen
to 44 per cent of the total land (2,452,975 dunums, equivalent to 2,453 km2), and
by February 1983 the number of Israeli settlements in occupied territories had
risen to 139. l!
34. Distribution of cultivatable land in the occupied territories and type of
their cUltivation is as follows:
Table 4. Land resources of the occupied territories and
distribution in each region, 1980
(In thousands of dunums)
Total Total Under Under dry
~e1 cultivatable irrigation farming
West Bank 5,755 1,853 87. 5 1,765.5
Gaza Strip 369 193 102 91
Total 6,124 2,040 189.5 1,856.5
Source: P. G. Sadler and B. Abu-Kishk, "Options for development: Palestine,
Part I" (unpublished), pp. 30 and 31.
~: 1 dunum: 1,000 m2 : 0.25 acre (approx.)
eI These figures include grazing land, forests and idle land. The gazing
land was estimated as 1.85 million dunums.
35. The practices of expropriation and confiscation of land by Israeli
authorities, combined with their practices with regard to the use of water
resources (see below) , have resulted in a significant decline in the agricultural
activities of Palestinians in the occupied territories. various sources differ on
the estimate of the total cultivated land appropriated for Jewish settlements.
However, there seems to be a consensus that, since 1967, the decline of the amount
of land cultivated by Arab citizens has been very significant. iI
36. categories used by the Israeli authorities for expropriation of land in the
occupied territories up to 1979 have been listed and discussed by the former Deputy
Mayor of Jerusalen in a report presented to the American Enterprise Institute.
Those categories have been classified as follows: 11
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(a) "Absentee" property in respect of which the Israeli authorities act as
custodianl
(b) "Registered State Domain", the occupying authority (Israel) replaces the
previous Government, Jordan or the JOrdanian Kingl
(c) "Land requisitioned for military purposes", land remains under private
ownership. The Military Government pays for the use of the land. According to
Benvenisti, many settlements have been built on these lands,
(d) Lands closed for military purposesl
(e) "Jewish lands", lands owned by Jews prior to 1948 and administered by
the JOrdanian custodian of enemy propertYI
(f) Lands purchased by Jewish bodies (organizations) I
(g) Lands expropriated for public purposes.
37. Since 1970, Israeli authorities have adopted a new policy based on the old
Turkish Land Code, whereby any vacant land, such as mountains, rocky places, stoney
fields and grazing grounds, under certain circumstances can be considered ~
(dead) land, and anyone who is in need of such land can, with the permission of the
official, cultivate it on the condition that the ultimate ownership shall belong to
the SUltan, to whom the Government of Israel considers itself to be a
successor. 11 In 1968, the Military Government had already "temporarilY halted"
all title settlement procedures (Military Order No. 291). At that time only one
third of the occupied territories were "settled" by definition and entered into the
Land Registry, According to Raja Shehadeh, mI Israeli authorities by means of the
above-mentioned two instruments (the turkish Law and Military Order NO. 291) can
virtually expropriate any piece of property they wish.
38. The report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli practices Affecting
the Human Rights of the Population of the occupied Territories submitted to the
General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session contains several references pointing
to a distinct and comprehensive policy adopted by the Government of Israel for
changing the ethnic, religious and racial composition of the population of the
occupied territories to such an extent that, for all practical purposes, the
Palestinians find themselves standing on much weaker and unstable ground in any
future dispute and claim over territorial sovereignty (A/37/485, chap, IV,
sect. 4), The evidence presented is mostly direct quotations from statements by
high-ranking Israeli officials reported by either Israeli or international news
media and agencies. !y
D. \i!l!!.
39. A report prepared by the Government of Israel, a shortened version of which
was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session
(A/37/347 and Oorr.l, annex), contains information on improvements in exploitation
and distribution of water resources in "Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District", 21
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40. Under the heading 'Waterworks", the following activities were mentioned:
(a) Three large wells were dug near Herodion, which increased the supply of
water from 150 cubic metres per hour in 1970 to 700 cubic metres per hour,
(b) The Ramallah region received 70 per cent of its water needs from the
Israeli systemI
(c) Two new wells supplied five times more water to Jenin compared with 1970,
(d) In Nablus, a 200 cubic rnetre-per-bour well sUbstantially alleviated the
water shortage I
(e) Two new east-west pipelines in "Samaria" tl est Bank) were laid to supply
water to dozens of villages. The connection to initial villages was planned for
the current year,
(f) A 30 kilometre pipeline was being laid in the western Hebron Hill region
(southern West Bank) to supply water to 10 villages. £I
41. With regard to water, the Palestinians object to the policies and practices of
the occupying authorities related to the development of water resources by
Palestinians and its distributio~ These objections can be classified in the
following groups:
(a) Legal obstacles and problems of ownership of water resources/
(b) Inequitable treatment of Jewish and Palestinian residents of the area
with respect to water distribution and usage.
42. Examples and evidence in supp~rt of the above objections are as follows:
(a) Legal obstacles. Jordanian Law No. 31 on supervision of water,
promulgated in 1953, required the approval of the manager of the Department of
Irrigation and Water for any irrigation scheme. This was amended by Israeli
Military Order No. 158, which provides that installations for drilling subterranean
water (wells etc.) require a licence from the Area COmmander. The licence ~as to
be obtained for setting up, assembling or possessing and/or operating a water
installation. This has brought existing water operations within the jurisdiction
of the Area COmmander, who could, at his discretion, approve or disapprove water
usage from existing installations. The Area COmmander may refuse to grant a
licence without showing cause and may decide to cancel any licence or to amend it
or to make it conditional. si A method similar to that discussed above with regard
to land own~rship and transactions has been adopted for water rights, according to
Raja Shehadeh, who concludes as follows:
"The Custodian has claimed the wells and shares in water rights owned by
non-residents. A prohibition similar to that for transactions in land is
placed over the water rights making it illegal to transfer them without prior
permissio~" !I
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(b) Inequitable treatment. On the grounds of conserving water resources,
which are indeed extremely crucial for the region in general and the West Bank and
Gaza Strip in particular, Israeli authorities have devised various restrictive
regulations and practices, such as licensing, metering etc. However, there are
scores of instances cited by Palestinians which point to the discriminatory
application of those regulations in favour of Jewish settlements and to the
detriment of Palestinians. For example, permission was refused to complete a
well-digging project in the Saljet area of Nablus, and later Israeli authorities
themselves completed it, but pumped the water to the Jewish settlement of
Alqan~!I Since 1967, Israeli authorities have thwarted a number of attempts by
the Ramallah water Board to create an autonomous water-supply system sufficient to
meet the area's needs. At the time of the occupation, the Government of Jordan was
nearing completion of a project to increase the water supply to Ramallah by digging
new wells 12 ~iles to the west of Shibteen. With the occupation, the Israeli
authorities ordered the termination of that project. In the meantime, the Israeli
settlement of Kfar Shuba has received permission to bore new wells for its own
use. !!
43. According to Meron Benvenisti,
"The impact of Israeli settlements on West Bank water is a function of the
amount of land irrigated by the settlers and not of the actual number of
settler~ Indeed the settlements today are 2-3 per cent of the West Bank
population and use 20 per cent of the total water consumption of the area.
Yet 96 per cent of this amount is for irrigation." ~
Other statistics obtained from Israeli sources indicate that in 1977-1978 there
were 314 Arab-owned artesian wells in the West Bank which discharged 33 million
cubic metres of water, whereas 17 wells drilled by the Israeli Water Company to
serve Israeli settlements discharged 14.1 million cubic metres of water. In other
words, 17 Israeli wells discharged 30 per cent of the total water, whereas
bureaucratic measures and economic factors prevented Palestinians from boring and
utilizing similar wells. ~ As was stated in the previous report of the
Secretary-General, only 30 out of 80 applications by Palestinians for permission to
dig wells were approved (A/37/238, annex, para. 23). However, because of the high
cost involved, amounting to a quarter of a million dollars per bore, ~ not even a
single well was dug. There is no evidence that economic assistance programmes to
enable Palestinians to overcome those extremely high costs have been devised by the
occupying authorities. At the same time, there are various prohibitive measures
restricting the transfer of funds from abroad for development purposes, including
water development projects. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities are approving and
financing water-development projects for the Jewish settlements in the occupied
territories.
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IV. ECONCMIC FACTORS
A. Economic framework
44. A stUdy of economic structure of the occupied territories necessitates some
understanding of the environment in Which the economic activities are taking
place. The main feature of this environment is the systematic effort of the
occupying authorities to integrate the economy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
with that of Israel through such measures as monetary and taxation policies,
employment, production in agriculture and industry and trade practices. The
policies adopted and implemented by Israel have resulted in a high level of
economic dependency of the occupied territories on the Israeli economy, including
its inflationary trends, thus preventing the generation of conditions which, in the
long run, could benefit the indigenous population.
45. The lack of economic planning and programming is another feature of the
economic life of the occupied territories. This has especially had an adverse
effect on the development of an economic infrastructure that could sustain a
process of self-generating growth in the territories. In a self-perpetuating
manner, the paucity of opportunities for higher education and training in technical
fields and in agriculture has become a constraint to future planning, programming
and implementation capabilities.
46. Moreover, the Palestinians have no control Over the monetary and fiscal
policies of the territories. They have no decision-making power on public
expenditures and, therefore, are unable to influence the decisions or to monitor
economic trends. This applies even to the local authorities whose bUdgets have to
be approved by the occupying authorities.
47. In addition to the general characteristics of the economy of the occupied
territories, some technical problems make a meaningful analysis of this economy
more difficult, among which are the following:
(a) Inaccessibility to the civilian budget for the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, which is subsumed in the budget for the Military Administration and
considered classified and not available for public scrutinYI
(b) Non-availability of data on economic activities in East Jerusalem,
(c) Non-availability of any data and information, besides the revenues and
expenditures, on the economic role of the municipalities, the highest form of
self-government in the occupied territories,
(d) Unreliability of data and estimates used from Statistical Abstract of
Israel, 1982, the introductory note of which speaks of caution in this regard.
48. Under the circumstances described above, the best that can be attempted is to
examine selected elements of the economy of the occupied territories, excluding
East Jerusalem, and observe their behaviour over a span chosen for the present
report as a follow-up to the previous reports in order to determine the degree of
change that has occurred.
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B. Population and employment
49. The population of the occupied Palestinian territories continues to rise,
although at a lower rate than in previous years. In the.West Bank (excluding East
Jerusalem), it rose from 699,600 at the end of 1979 to 707,300 at the end of 1981.
In the Gaza Strip, it rose from 431,500 at the end of 1979 to 451,600 at the end of
1981. The actual increases have been less than in previous years. In the West
Bank, the actual increase in 1980 was 3,500 (natural increase: 20,600) and in
1981, 4,200 (natural increase: 20,000). In the Gaza Strip, the actual increase in
1980 was 10,500 (natural increase: 15,600) and, in 1981, 9,600 (natural increase:
15,000) (see appendix II below).
50. The difference between natural increase and actual increase is an indication
of the level of emigration. Thus, in the West Bank, emigration amounted to 17,100
persons in 1980 and 15,800 in 1981. In the Gaza Strip, it amounted to 5,100
persons in 1980 and 5,400 in 1981. Those levels are much higher than in previous
years, particularly in the cae of the West Bank (see appendix 11 below and
A/37/238, table 5).
51. According to the report of the Director-General of the International Labour
Organization to the International Labour Conference at its sixty-eighth session in
1982, a significant characteristic of employment in the occupied Palestinian
territories is that about one third of the labour force works in Israel. ~
52. Those Arab workers from the occupied territories employed in Israel continue
to be disadvantaged in many ways with respect to their conditions of work in
comparison with similar categories of Israeli workers. Employment is subject to a
work permit, which has been extended up to six months for jobs in the industrial
sector, which benefits only about 18 per cent of the employed persons in Israel.
There seem to be special problems in extending this privilege to those working in
construction and agriculture (66 per cent of those employed) because of the
seasonal or temporary nature of the work.
53. With regard to the trade union movement' in the occupied territories, the ILO
mission which visited the territories in November/December 1981 made the
observation that on the whole, the "movement does not seem to be very developed and
its capacity to defend the workers' interest is still limited." 11 Only three
trade unions were registered in the West Bank during 1981/82.
c. Income
54. There are generally two sources of private income for the people of the
occupied territories: (a) income generated from economic activities of people
living in these territories, and (b) income generated outside the territories by
those Palestinians living and working abroad and remitting their incomes to their
families back home. Both types of income are reflected in the national accounting
for the territories. On the basis of available data, the following analysis to a
degree of disaggregation feasible, are made on: gross domestic and gross national
product, disposable private income and wage-income and income generation by various
economic sector&
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D. Aggregate income, gross domestic product and gross
national product
55. Data for the gross domestic product (GDP) and the gross national product (GNP)
and their percentage changes over years 1975-1981 are shown in table 5 below:
Table 5. Gross domestic product and gross qationa1 product
(In millions of Israeli shekels at 1968 prices)
Aver-
1968 ~ 1976 .!222 1978 !22.2. 1980 l2!!. age !!/
Gaza Strip: GDP 13.1 22.9 25.8 27.2 27.3 30.7 29.7 30.5
(12.7) Y (5.4) (0.4) (12.5) (-3.3) (2.7) (4.9)
GNP 13.1 34.0 38.4 40.4 42.3 47.1 46.4 48.5
(12. 9) (5.2) (4.7) (11.3) (-1. 5) (4. 5) (6.1)
West Bank.' GDP 33.3 65.6 77.4 74.8 89.2 83.7 106.6 98.9
(18.0) (-3.4) (19.3) (-6.2) (27.4) (-7.2) (7.1)
GNP 34.4 88.3 101.5 99.8 116.5 113.2 135.6 127.6
(14.9) (-1. 7) (16.7) (-2. 8) (19.8) (-5.9) (6.3)
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
y All figures in parenthesis show percentage change over previous year.
!!/ Average annual growth rate 1975-1981.
56. The percentage annual changes in gross national product per capita for both
territories follow the Same fluctuation as was observed for the GDP and the GNP. The
average annual growth rates of the GNP per capita for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
over the period 1975-1981, are 4.7 and 5.1 per cent, respectively.
57. On the average, both territories have enjoyed a reasonable rate of growth, well
above the population growth rate, over the six-year period from 1975 to 1981. The GDP
and GNP of the Gaza Strip grew at average annual rates of 4.9 and 6.1 per cent
respectively, and those of the West Bank rose at 7.1 and 6.3 per cent.
58. The Gross National Product per capita at 1978 prices and the percentage annual
changes for 1975-1981 are shown in Table 6 be1ow~
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Table 6. Gross national product per capita
(At 1968 prices)
~ .!ill .!ill. 1122 l12! .ill.2. 1980 1981
Gaza Strip 36.4 81.9 90.2 92.5 94.3 107.2 105.8 108.0
(lO.l) !I (2.5) (1.9) (13.7) (-1.3) (2.l)
West Bank 59.5 132.6 150.9 146.5 167.7 160.8 191.2 178.4
(13.8) (-2.9) (14.5) (-4.l) (l8.9) (-6.7)
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
!I All figures in parentheses show percentage change over previous year.
59. The percentage annual changes in gross national product per capita for both
territories follow the s.me fluctuation as was obcerved for the GDP and GNP. The
average annual growth rates of the GNP per capita for the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank over the period 1975-1981 are 4.7 and 5.1 per cent, respectively.
~ Dipposable privata income and wage-income
60. Data on gross disposable private income from domestic sources, transfers to
private persons from abroad, gross disposable private income from all sources and
the rates of their variations over the three-year period from 1979 to 1981 are
shown in the table 7 below:
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Table 7. Disposable private income for the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank
(In millions of Israeli shekels at 1968 prices)
Gross national product
(At factor prices)
46.2
Gaza
44.4 47.0
(-3.9) !I (5.9)
108.6
West Bank
131.6
(21.2)
125.0
(-5. 0)
Transfers from Government 0.5
and local authorities
Less income tax and transfers 2.7
to the Government.
Gross disposable private 43.5
income from domestic sources
Transfers to private 3.1
persons from abroad
Gross disposable private 46.6
income from all sources
0.5
(0.0)
2.5
(-7.4)
42.4
(-2.5)
4.7
(51.6)
47.1
(1.1)
0.6
(20.0)
44.9
(5.9)
5.1
(8.5)
50.0
(6.2)
0.8
4.3
105.2
7.4
112.6
0.9
(12.5)
4.4
(2.3)
128.1
(21.8)
6.8
(-8. 1)
134.9
(19.8)
1.0
(11.1)
4.9
(11.4)
121.1
(-5.5)
7.0
(2. 9)
128.0
(-5.1)
Source: Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
!I All figures in parentheses show percentage change over the previous year.
61. The gross disposable private income from all sources and from domestic sources
has increased over the three-year period. The transfers to private persons from
abroad have fluctuated in an inverse relation to the increase or decline of the
gross disposable private income from domestic sources.
62. Wages constitute a high proportion of the aggregate income in the occupied
territories. They include wages earned by workers in the territories as well as by
those employed in Israel - about 35 per cent of the actively engaged labour force.
Daily wage rates for workers in the territories and those employed in Israel,
in 1981, are given below:
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Table 8. Daily wages of employees working in the territories
and in Israel by selected economic sector, 1981
(In Israeli shekels)
Branch In Gaza Strip In West Bank In Israel
Agriculture 75.7 70.6
Mining and manufacture 85.0 89.2
Construction 112.9 122.0
Conunerce, restaurants and hotels 86.1 92.1 )
)
Transport, storage and communications 100.3 92.3 )
)
Public and community services 126.7 108.4 )
)
Other 74.9 80.8 )
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
76.7
99.4
120.4
103.5 !I
!I An average for the four sectors, as the published data do not give
figures separately.
63. An approximation of income thrugh wages can be computed by relating these
rates to the numbers employed in the various sectors in the territories and in
Israel (see appendix VII below) and assuming a work-year of 240 days in the case of
Israel and 300 days in the territories. !I
64. The total wage income based on this computation (see appendix IV below) in the
occupied territories approximated IS 5.8 billion in 1981, or 35.4 per cent of the
combined gross national product (at factor prices) of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Of this, almost IS 2 billion or 33.7 per cent was contributed through
wages earned by the workers from occupied territories working in Israel. The
significance of this phenomenon is that if, for one reason or another, employment
in Israel ceases to exist, the economy of the occupied territories will be
seriously affected.
65. The data concerning the sectoral composition of national income are not
available. The only sector for which some data exist is agriculture. A summary of
the income generated in this sector is shown in table 9 below:
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Table 9. Output, purchased inputs and income originating
in agriculture
(In millions of Israeli shekels at current prices)
Gaza West Bank
1978/79 y 1979/80 1980/81 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81
Output-Grand Total 192.3 392.7 953.3 536.7 1,716.4 3,107.2
(100.0) !¥ (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Purchased inputs 52.2 120.6 290.4 95.7 226.8 611. 0
(27. 1) (30.7) (3 O. 5) (17.8) (13.2) (19. 7)
Income originating 140.1 272.1 662.9 441.0 1,489.6 2,496.2
in agriculture (72.9) (69.3) (69. 5) (82.2) (86.8) (80.3)
Source: Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
Y All figures in parentheses show percentage of OUtput-Grand Total in each
year.
!¥ Agricultural Year: 1 October-30 September.
66. The income originating in agriculture constitutes 72.9 per cent of the total
output of this sector for Gaza and 82.2 per cent for the West Bank in 1978/79, and
has decreased for both territories over the three-year period, ending up at 69.5
and 80.3 per cent in 1980/81 for the two territories, respectively.
F. Capital formation
67. Gross domestic capital formation in Israel, Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank as percentages of gross national product· for the years 1968 and 1975
through 1981 is shown in table 10 below:
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Table 10. Gross domestic capital formation as percentages
0f gross national product
~ ~ ~ !ill. l2.ll 1979 ~ 1981
Israel y 23.6 32.7 28.1 25.0 27.9 28.2 24.7 NA
Jordan y 16.2 25.7 27.7 31.6 31.6 33.5 32.6 NA
Gaza Strip !?I 8.4 19.7 21.4 20.5 20.8 20.8 18.8 19.6
West Bank !?I 7.3 18.2 20.4 20.7 24.8 23.1 29.4 19.9
y Derived from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary
Fund, 1982.
!?I Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
68. Although the rate of capital formation in the occupied territories is high
relative to those of many developing countries, nevertheless it is low in relation
to the rates for Jordan and Israel. The contribution of Government to the
development budget in capital investment is minimal. In 1980, the Government's
input in the development budget amounted only to IS 50 million, or 11 per cent of
the total. !!I Capital formation has occurred in the housing sector through
investment of private savings.
G. Consumption and savings
69. private consumption expenditure in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as shown
in table 11, has risen, at current prices, from IS 2,395.5 million in 1979 to
IS 6,012.7 million in 1980 and to IS 13,903.5 million in 1981. In terms of
1968 prices, the percentage increases have been 3.8 per cent in 1980 and
4.9 per cent in 1981 for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank combined.
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Table 11. Private conswnption expenditure
(In millions of Israeli shekels)
At current prices
Gaza Strip
West Bank
Total
1979
694.3
1 701.2
2 395.5
1980
1 716.3
4 296.4
6 012.7
1981
4 052.4
9 851.1
13 903.5
At 1968 pr ices
Gaza Strip
Percentage change
West Bank
Percentage change
Total
Percentage change
38.7 39.0 40.5
(0.7) (3.8)
92.7 97.4 102.6
(5.1) (5.3) --- - -
131.4 136.4 143.1
(3.8) (4.9)
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
70. The pattern of conswnption expenditure for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
are shown in table 12 below:
Table 12. Domestic private consumption expenditure in agricultural
and industrial goods, and services as percentage of total
for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
Gaza West Bank
1979 ll!!.Q !ll! 1979 !ill. 1981
AgriCUltural goods 24.3 23.0 26.8 27.2 35.3 35.4
Industrial goods 50.0 48.2 42.7 37.5 37.8 34.9
Services 25.7 28.8 30.5 25.3 26.9 29.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
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71. Domestic private consumption expenditure on agricultural and industrial goods
has decreased for both territories. while the same type of expenditure on services
has increased over the three-year period 1979-1981.
72. As can be seen from table 13. the rate of consumption for the two territories
combined has dropped from 78.5 per cent in 1979 to 77.0 per cent in 1980. to rise
again in 1981 to 81.4 per cent. Correspondingly. the rate of private savings has
risen from 21.5 per cent in 1979 to 23.0 per cent in 1980 and dropped to
18.6 per cent in 1981.
Table 13. Consumption and savings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(In millions of Israeli shekels)
Gross disposable private income
from all sources
Private consumption
Savings
Percentage
Rate of consumption
Rate of saving
1979
3 052.1
2 395.5
656.6
78.5
21.5
100.0
1980
7 804.3
6 012.7
1 791. 6
77.0
23.0
100.0
1981
17 084.3
13 903.5
3 180.8
81.4
18.6
100.0
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel. 1982.
H. Taxation
73. No comprehensive account of the taxation system in the occupied territories
exists. Information from various sources indicates that the Jordanian system of
taxation on properties and buildings. on income and on land still prevails. and it
has been modified to conform to the Israeli tax system. However. new taxes have
been imposed. the most significant of which is the value-added tax.
74. The only detailed account of taxation exists for the West Bank. as is shown in
table 14 below:
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Table 14. Incane and taxation of towns in the West Bank
(In thousands of Israeli shekels)
Budget years
Income-Grand Total
Taxes and fees - Total
Property tax
Fuel tax
From fees
Vegetables and fruit fees
Slaughtering fees
Industry, craft and building licenses
Other fees
1980/81 1981/82
178 511 337 709
(100.0) 100.0
22 639 52 725
(12.7) !I (15.6) !I
7 423 19 458
(32.8) !!I (36.9)
2 457 4 845
(10.8) !!I (9.2)
12 759 28 432
(56.4) !!I (53.9)
8 118 15 859
(63.6) El (55.8)
659 1 597
(5.2) El (5.6)
659 6 285
(5.2) El (22.1)
1 907 4 682
(15.0) El (16.5)
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
!I Taxes and fees-total as percentage of incane-grand total.
!!I As percentages of taxes and fees-total.
El As percentages of "from fees".
75. The total amount of taxes and fees collected, as a percentage of the total
income of towns in the West Bank, has been 12.7 and 15.6 for the budget years of
1980/81 and 1981/82, respectively.
76. The property tax constitutes 32.8 per cent of the IS 22.6 million in taxes and
fees collected in 1980/81 and has risen to 36.9 per cent of the total of
IS 52.7 million collected in 1981/82.
77. The different type of fees charged by the occupying authorities make the bulk
of the total taxes and fees at 56.4 per cent in 1980/81 and 53.9 per cent in
1981/82.
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I. Monetary situation
7~ One significant result of the predominant trading activities between the
occupied territories and Israel and the wages earned by the workers from the west
Bank and Gaza Strip employed in Israel as well as those working in the territories
on subcontract for Israeli enterprises, has been the virtual integration of the two
economies, with the Israeli shekel as the main monetary unit of exchange. The
Jordanian dinar continues to be legal tender in the West Bank and a preferred
currency for holding by the residents owing to depreciation of the Israeli shekel,
but its influence is diminishing with the reduction of trade with Jordan and other
countries since 1981.
79. The table below illustrates the changes in the value of the Israeli shekel and
the Jordanian dinar in SDR value since 1973.
Table 15. Monetary exchange rates in SDR value !I
Year
end
Israeli shekels
per SDR
Jordanian
dinars per
SDR
Israeli shekels
per one Jordanian
dinar
Annual devaluation
of Israeli shekels
related to Jordanian
dinars
%
1973 0.507 0.397 1.277
1974 0.735 0.386 1.904
1975 0.831 0.388 2.142
1976 1.017 0.388 2.621
1977 1.869 0.388 4.817
1978 2.477 0.388 6.384
1979 4.657 0.388 12.003
1980 9.627 0.388 24.812
1981 18.163 0.388 46.812
9.0
49.1
12.5
22.4
83.8
32.5
88.0
106.7
88.7
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, 1982.
!I
exchange
rates.
SDR is a calculated "dollar" value taking into account the changes in
rate regimes, that is, from the par value period of floating exchange
80. There has been a further fall in the value of the Israeli shekel subsequent to
1981. EB/ At the same time, the inflation in the Israeli economy of more than
100 per cent per annum during the past few years has further eroded the value of
the shekel. The mere recovery of the real value of money on loan or in savings
would require an annual interest rate of more than 100 per cent, causing all
transactions in business, production credits, investments and savings a hazardous
undertaking.
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81. Branches of Israeli banks aealing mainly in Israeli shekels constitute the
monetary market in the occupiea territories ana continue to proviae the creait
requirements of the Palestinian entrepreneurs. However, they have not been
utilizea to any great extent, except for current transactions with Israel.
J. Sectoral structure of the economy
82. The lack of aata about the sectoral activities of the occupiea territories
aoes not allow any meaningful analysis of the prevailing conaitions.
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K. Sectora1 structure of employment
83. The data on employment by sector available for the West Bank and Gaza Strip
are shown in table 16.
Table 16. Employment by sector
Gaza West Bank
diff. diff.
1979 1980 1981 81-79 1979 1980 1981 81-79
Total - '000 79.6' 80.9 82.5 2.9 132.8 134.8 133.4 0.6
- percentages ) (10 0.0) (100.0) (100.0) -2.0 (100.0) (100.0) (100. 0)
Agriculture, forestry 16.2 15.0 14.2 -2.0 33.6 35.3 32.2 -1.4
and fishing (20. 4)!I (18.5) (17.3) (25.3) (26.2) (24.1)
Industry (mining and 15.8 15.8 14.2 -1.6 24.3 22.8 21.9 -2.4
manufacturing (19. 8) (19. 5) (17.2) , (18.3) (16. 9) (16.4)
Construction (b1dg. 18.3 18.7 21.9 3.6 30.0 30.5 32.0 2.0
of public works) (23.0) (23.1) (26. 5) (22. 6) (22.6) (24. 0)
Commerce, restaurants 10.0 11.3 11.7 1.7 16.9 17.1 16.6 -0.3
and hotels (12.5) (14.0) (14.2) (12. 7) (12.7) (12.5)
Transport, storage 5.1 5.3 5.6 0.5 5.8 6.1 6.5 0.7
and cornme rc e (6.4) (6.6) ,(6.8) (4. 4) (4.5) (4.9)
Public and community 9.6 10.5 10.6 1.0 17.0 17.9 19.0 2.0
services (12.1) (13.0) (12.8) (12.8) (13.3) (14.2)
Other 4.6 4.3 4.3 -0.3 5.2 5.1 5.2 0.0
(5.8) (5.3) (5. 2) (3. 9) (3.8) (3. 9)
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
!I All figures in parentheses show percentages of tbe total for each year.
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84. There is a marked resemblance between the sectoral structure of employment in
the Gaza and the West Bank. The importance of both territories' agricultural
sector as a primary employer of the labour force is diminishing. From 1979 to
1981, the share of that sector in employment was reduced by 3.1 and 2.4 percentage
points for the Gaza and the West Bank, respectively. The industrial sector also
lost its share of employment within the same period by 2.6 per cent for the Gaza
Strip and 1.9 per cent for the West Bank. The rest of the sectors raised their
share of employment, construction leading with 3.5 per cent for the Gaza and
1.4 per cent for the West Bank. All the changes show further reliance of the
territories' economy on the economic life of Israel, a~ the employment
opportunities decline in the vital sectors of the economy, that is, agricultural
and industry, non-productive and services sector tend to employ a higher percentage
of the labour force.
L. Agr iculture
85. Table 17 summarizes the activities of the agricultural sector in broad
categories.·
Table 17. Output in agriculture
(in millions of Israeli shekels)
Gaza West Bank
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81
output - Grand total 192.3 392.7 953.3 536.7 1,716.4 3,107.2
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Crops - total 144.8 294.9 693.4 326.3 1,277.7 1,886.8
(75.3) !I (75. 1) (72. 7) (6 O. 8) (74.4) (60.7)
Livestock and live- 47.5 97.8 259.9 210.4 438.7 1,220.4
stock products (24.7) (24.9) (27.3) (39.2) (25.6) (39. 3)
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
!I All figures in parentheses show percentages of the output-Grand total for
each agricultural year.
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86. The percentage of crop production to the total output of the agricultural
sector has decreased over the three--agricultural-calendar-year period for the Gaza
Strip, but it rose for the West Bank in 1979/80 by 13.6 per cent to the
74.4 percentage level, to fall back again to almost the same percentage in
1918/79. In the livestock and livestock products, there has been a reciprocal
trend, that is, an increased share in the total output for the Gaza strip and
keeping to almost the same level of 39.2 and 39.3 percentage points for 1978/79 and
1980/81 for the West Ban~ Crop production, even with its declining percentage in
1980/81, still constitutes an output more than 2.6 times the output derived from
livestock and livestock products for the Gaza Strip. The same proportion for the
West Bank is only 1.5 times the output.
87. Agriculture in the West Bank is characterized bY a high proportion of small
farms, mainly for dry farming, amounting to about 1.77 million dunums with only
about 88,000 dunums under irrigatio~ In the Gaza Strip, of the total cultivatable
land amounting to about 193,000 dunums, about 102,000 dunums are under irrigation
devoted mostly to citrus cultivatio~ Data on agricultural output in the two
territories during the years 1978/1979 to 1980/1981 are given in the table below:
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Table 18. Agricultural production in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(Thousand tons)
Gaza West Bank
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81
Field crops 33.2 42.5 41.2
(28.0) !I (-3.0)
Vegetables and 51.4 60.0 72.3 140.9 145.4 159.5
potatoes (16.7) (2 0.5) (3.2) (9. 7)
Melons and 3.6 4.3 4.6 8.0 19.6 42.7
pumpkins (19. 4) (7.0) (145.0) (117.9)
Olives 21.1 120.0 45.0
(468.7) (-62.5)
Ci trus 192.2 171.5 179.3 79.1 74.3 73.5
(-10.8) (4.5) (-6.1) (-1. 0)
Other fruit 18.9 21.4 20.8 87.0 85.9 105.9
(13.2) (-2.8) {-I. 3) (23.3)
Meat 4.8 5.6 6.2 23.5 23.1 25.7
(16.7) (10.7) {-I. 7) (11. 3)
Milk 15.5 14.7 13.9 39.4 36.7 38.8
(-5.2) (-5.4) (-6.8) (5. 7)
Fish 1.5 1.2 1.4
(-20) (16.7)
Eggs (million) 47.5 42.8 45.6 44.5 44.5 50.0
(-9.9) (6.5) (0.0) (12.4)
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
!I All figures in parentheses show percentage change over previous year.
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88. Agricultural production over the three-year period has shown a considerable
degree of fluctuation most possibly owing to climatic conditions. As most of the
farm products are cultivated under dry farming conditions, weather conditions play
an important role in productivity. On the other hand, those crops grown largely on
irrigated land, namely, vegetables and melons, show significant increases in output.
89. More than 43 per cent of the vegetable crop of 1980/81 was exported to the
Israeli market for processing or export. The main market for melons and pumpkins
is Jordan, to which almost 48 per cent of the crop of 1980/81 was exported. The
flow of trade in the supply of fruit and vegetables' in the West Bank in 1980/81 is
given in table 19 below:
Table 19. Supply of fruit and vegetables in the West Bank
by source and disposal, 1980/81
(thousand tons)
Disposal Source
Israel Local Local
and con- product-
Gaza export Jordan sumption Gaza Israel ion Total
TOTAL 5.3 99.3 103.3 262.5 26.9 61.9 381.6 470;4
Fruit
(exc!.
olives) 5.1 23.5 65.5 115.0 7.5 22.2 179.4 209.1
Vegetables 0.2 68.8 18.7 114.4 19.0 23.6 159.5 202.1
Melons and
pumpkins 7.0 19.1 33.1 0.4 16.1 42.7 59.2
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
90. The agricultural sector in the territories continues to operate under many
disadvantages, inclUding loss of cultivatable land through confiscation and
"closure" for military and other purposes, restrictions in the use of water for
agricultural purposes, shortage of capital for investment, and inability of Arab
farms to compete with Israeli enterprises, including the settlements in the
occupied territories. Export constraints have further diminished the profitability
of agriculture in the occupied territories.
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M. Industry
91. OWing to lack of data comparable to that available in the agricultural sector,
the type of analysis in the industrial sector would be different from what was
chosen in analysing the structure of the agricultural sector.
92. The structure of industry has not shown any significant change over the years
of occupation. It is still characterized by small firms, low capitalization, low
level of technology and a preponderance of manually operated machinery and
equipment. There has been a sharp drop in the number of establishments in the West
Bank, from 4,029 in 1969 to 2,206 in 1979. ccl The distribution of establishments
by groups and level of employment is shown ~ table. 20 below_
Table 20. Distribution of establishments in the West Bank
by major groups and level of employment, 1979
Distribution by level of employment
Major groups Total 1 2-3 4-7 8-10 11-20 21+
(persons)
Food, beverages and tobacco 232 85 61 65 7 6 8
Textiles and clothing 484 132 170 107 26 40 10
Leather and its products 234 62 117 52 2 1
Wood and its products 437 160 205 59 7 6
Rubber, plastic and chemical 51 6 14 II 5 3 12
Non-metallic minerals 1'22 4 32 63 II 10 2
Basic metals and metal products 419 57 236 117 3 4 2
Other industrial products 227 79 85 44 10 6 3
Total 2,206 585 920 518 71 76 37
Source: E/EO'IA/UN lOOM P• 1 (1981), p. 18, table 7.
93. The data indicate that most of the enterprises are small-scale establishments;
68 per cent of the establishments employ one to three persons, while another
23 per cent employ four to seven persons. The number of establishments employing
more than 21 persons is less than 2 per cent. The structure is not very different
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in the Gaza Strip. Of the 1,334 establishments there in 1979, 62.1 per cent
employed three or fewer persons, while another 25.7 per cent employed four to seven
persons. The number of establishments employing more than 21 was 2.2 per cent. ~
94. Taking both territories together, it is observed that enterprises engaged in
production of textiles and clothing, wood and its products, basic metals and metal
products, and leather and its products dominate the industrial structure.
Establishments engaged in food, beverages and tobacco mainly supply the local
market with some specialized items, such as soap and processed olive oil for export
to Jordan. However, exports to Jordan, and through it to other Arab countries, are
limited by the requirement that the raw material used in the manufacture should
originate in the occupied territories. This requirement creates serious problems,
since, according to the ECHA/UNIDO survey undertaken in 1980, between 70 per cent
and 100 per cent of all raw materials used in manufacturing processes in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip are imported from or through Israel, except in the food,
beverages, printing and pUblishing industries in the West Bank. The Gaza Strip
relies most heavily on raw materials imported from Israel because of the extreme
scarcity of local raw materials. ~
95. Industrialists in the occupied territories face the problem of mobilizing
adequate finances to improve their establishments and to modernize production
methods. Most of them have had to rely On private initiative or partnership
financing. Only about 3 per cent of the establishments in the random sample
undertaken in the ECHA/UNIDO survey had obtained loans from banks. !!I
96. Apart from the problem of financing, other problems faced by industrialists in
the occupied territories include difficulty in obtaining permits to import
manufacturing equipment from abroad because of delays or refusals by the occupying
authorities to issue such permits. Furthermore, the authorities are reluctant to
permit the establishment of new facilities. It was reported that permission to
build a cement factory, a factory for batteries and another for the extraction of
citrus juice had been refused. A recent PLO economic report mentioned that the
purchase of a private, Israeli-owned eXisting juice-extracting unit to process
unsold oranges had been refused. 2S/
N. Other sectors
97. As in other production sectors, there is no long-term planning and programming
to reorganize and vitalize the industrial sectors to respond to the demand for
industrial products by residents of the occupied territories or to develop an
export market for the products. This situation is likely to prevail as long as the
indigenous leadership in the industrial sector is excluded from directing
industrial development and as long as no local institutions are available to meet
the technological, commercial and financial needs of those sectors.
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v. sa:IAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS
A. SOcial and cultural conditions
98. Policies and practices of the occupying Power embodied in various military
orders, amounting to more than 975 since the occupation, have brought about many
changes in the life style of the Palestinian families living in the occupied
territories. Restrictions in the use of water for agricultural purposes and the
frequent expropriation of land, both private and public, have evoked a sense of
deep insecurity and a disincentive to pursue the traditional rural-agricultural
mode of life. Some family members have had to seek wage employment, particularly
in the Israeli economy or in nearby Israeli settlements, while others have obtained
employment in the Gulf States and other countries.
99. Where the wage earners live in the family household, as is customary in
Palestinian society, their contributions towards the upkeep of the home, together
with remittances from abroad, have enabled the head of the household to retain his
land mainly as a means of family security rather than a productive asset. Where
there is no outside income to support the family household, the head has had to
seek employment himself, thereby neglecting the family farm. Sometines he has had
to sell the land. Since 1979, this has been facilitated through the policy of the
occupying Power which legalizes the purchase of private land in the occupied
territories by Israeli firms and individuals. For instance, it was reported that
15,000 dunums of Arab land in the West Bank had been purchased by an Israeli
company for the construction of Israeli housing (A/37/485, para. 178).
100. Actions amounting to harassment of farmers by Israeli settlers have become
much more frequent in recent years. It is due, in part, to the establishment of
more settlements and the "thickening" of existing settlements. That those
settlements are being established On the periphery of Arab towns and villages has
given rise to more friction in day-to-day relationships between the Arab residents
and the settlers and very often to physical confrontation in public places.
Instances have been reported where settlers have taken over land belonging to local
villagers, as in the village of Beit Awwa (A/37/485, para. 136). Settlers from the
Shilo settlement have fenced off 500 dunums belonging to the village of
Quryut. hh/ Eight-hundred dunums have been claimed by Adumin settlers from the
residents of Rumein and Anatra villages (A/37/485, para. 143).
101. Cases of individual harassment have frequently been reported. Palestinian
farmers have been threatened or molested while working on their land by settlers
who claimed the land belonged to the settlements. Fruit trees on private land have
been uprooted or destroyed. Armed settlers have tried to take over houses
inhabited by Arabs, have attacked residents and have sometimes kidnapped them,
particularly students and young people, on the grounds that they had participated
in demonstrations (A/37/485, paras. 136, 138, 139 and 141).
102. Those confrontations have become more serious, following the formation of
Israeli settlers and civil administration employees into paramilitary units to
assist the security forces in maintaining law and order in the occupied
territories. Members of those units, along with security forces, have used
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firearms, wounding and sometimes killing Arab residents participating in
demonstrations. That has been justified by the occupying authorities as being in
compliance with Zahal directives, which authorize such shooting in case of danger
of life. ii/
103. The Arab residents of the occupied palestinian territories continue to be
restricted in their movements, more so since the escalation of demonstrations
against the occupation, in general, and against specific policies and actions of
the occupying authorities, in particular. The frequent curfews imposed on Arab
towns, villages and refugee camps disrupt the daily aotivities of the people in
commerce and business, travel to work, including work-places in Israel, attendance
at school and performance of religious duties. Most affected by those curfews were
the residents of Ramallay, El Bireh, Halhul and the refugee camps of A-Dahaysha and
Askar and Balata.
104. Movement of individuals representative of the Arab leadership in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip continues to be restricted by their confinement to their towns or
places of residence or by the Government's refusal to issue travel permits. The
editors of the newspapers Al Fajr, Asha'b and Attalia were placed under house
arrest and not allowed to leave their towns of residence.
105. New regulations and,procedures have been introduced with regard to crossing
the bridges between the West Bank and Jordan, which have made it more difficult for
the Arab residents of the occupied territories and their relatives living and
working abroad to maintain communication and family relationships. As at
June 1982, West Bank residents could no longer fill in the required forms
themselves, attach a revenue stamp and travel to the bridge. Fees for crossing the
bridges have been increased to 15 Jordanian dinars for an adult to cross from the
West Bank into Jordan and 5 JD for a child. There is a further "service" charge of
5 JD for an adUlt, and a charge of 1 to 3 JD is made on luggage. The fee for a
person crossing from Jordan into the West Bank is 20 JD and the fees have to be
paid in Jordanian dinars or other hard currencies. If the person leaving the West
Bank is under 26 years of age, he cannot return before nine months, on the
assumption that he is a student. Those above 26 years of age are allowed to stay
out of the occupied territories up to three years, whereas previously it waS
one year. A Palestinian who exceeds the three-year limit even by a day, is
disqualified from returning to the occupied territories.
106. Relatives living abroad who want to visit their families in the occupied
territories have to uwait a permit, which the family has to obtain beforehand from
the occupying authorities. On arrival at the bridge, the person, whether visiting
or residing in the territories, is subject to a number of physical examinations.
Contents of suitcases are electronically examined. A person can take in only
1,000 JD and anything above that amount would be confiscated unless prior approval
had been obtained. On entering the occupied territories, the person cannot leave
until a week has elapsed, otherwise, special permission has to be obtained to leave
the territories. It should also be noted that there is no telephone communication
or mail service between Jordan and the occupied territories. All this information
was gathered from travellers crossing the King Hussein Bridge during the experts'
visit there on I March 1983 and from the personal experiences of relatives living
in Jordan who had occasion to visit their families in the occupied territories.
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107. The truckers of produce from the occupied territories, who were interviewed by
the experts on mission at the King Hussein Bridge on 1 March 1983, mentioned the
various disadvantages under which they operated. They have to use pre-1967 trucks,
as those are registered under Jordanian law. Yet they have to obtain Israeli
operating licences, which have to be removed on entry into Jorda~ Any new trucks
purchased cannot be used for transport of goods into Jordan. The trucker has to
pay a number of fees every time he crosses the bridge and everytime he returns to
the West Bank, his truck is sUbjected to inspection, for which he has to pay a
fee. He has to return to the territories within 24 hours and, if he overstays that
period, his truck is subjected to a thorough inspection, which can immobilize his
use of the truck for up to a week. The extra taxes and fees he has to pay, all in
Jordanian dinars, add to the delivery costs of the produce.
108. Other instances of haraSSment, which have been reported both in the Israeli
press and in Arabic newspapers, include parents who are punished for actions by
their children; whole communities which are punished for individual acts of
protest, arbitrary arrest and removal for interrogation, demolition of houses for
alleged terrorist activities, punishment by expulsion; arrest, interrogation,
release on bail and then rearrest as a deterrent to participation in demonstrations.
109. The flow of information to residents of the occupied territories has been
further curtailed through new regulations governing censorship. The Arab
newspapers, Al Fajr, A~ and Al Quds, had received new orders from the Military
Administration requesting them to submit to its censorship all articles and
photographic materials before publication. The order was to be in force until the
end of 1982. It has not been possible to ascertain if this order is still in
force. The Civil Administration, which was established in the latter part of 1981,
has, on a number of occasions, prevented the distribution in the West Bank of the
three East Jerusalem Arabic daily newspapers. Asha'b was confiscated for 43 days.
Al Fajr (English edition) was heavily censored. About 50 per cent of the articles
submitted were totally censored, although some of them had been quoted from the
Israeli dailies (A/37/485, para. 100).
110. The prerogative of self-determination in matters of local concern, heretofore
exercised by the Arab population of the occupied territories through their elected
municipal councils, has been severely eroded by the dismissal of mayors and the
dissolution of certain councils and the ever-present fear that similar action might
be taken against other mayors and councils, if they decided to pursue policies
which were at variance with those of the occupying authorities. The appointment of
village leagues, which have no popular base, ~nd the support given to those leagues
by the occupying authorities have tended to diminish further the role of the
elected bodies to make decisions for advancing the development and well-being of
the indigenous population of the occupied territories.
Ill. Recent events, particularly involving the Israeli settlers in the occupied
territories, have caused serious concern among the Arab population about their
freedom of worship and development of their culture in consonance with current
trends in the Arab countries. There has been constant interference with religious
worship, for example, at the Tomb of the Patriachs in Hebron, where Israeli
settlers from Kiryat Atba tried to gain entrance on numerous occasions. Incidents
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occurred at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, where Israelis have tried to
break i~ In another instance, a student tried to set fire to the Mosque, he was
arrested by the Israeli Police. Kiryat Arba Yeshiva students burst into the Temple
Mount area and tried to bold prayers there (A/37/485, paras. 133, 134, 140 and
142). The firing that occurred at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in April 1982 is well known.
The latest incident, which was reported in The London Times of 12 March 1983,
involved 40 heavily armed Jewish militants, among whom were some from the Israeli
military forces, who attempted to establish a symbolic settlement on the Temple
Mount, which is regarded as one of the holiest Islamic Shrines after Mecca and
Medina.
B. Education
112. School attendance in the occupied territories continues to increase in keeping
with the population increase in the school-going age groups. In the West Bank
(excluding East Jerusalem), the number of pupils increased by 14,598 in the
two year period, 1979/80 to 1981/82, an annual average of 7,299 pupils. To
accommodate this increase, the number of schools has increased by 24. The number
of classes has increased by 464. There has been a slight increase in the average
number of pupils per class, which was around 35 in 1981/82, both in the Government
and UNBWA schools. The average per class in the other private institutions had
been less1 namely 28. In the Gaza Strip, the number of pupils increased by 10,892
in the same two year period, an annual average of 5,446 pupils. The number of
institutions increased during the period by 26 of which 19 were UNFWA
institutions. The number of classes increased by 242. The average number of
pupils per class was around. 40 in government schools and 45 in the UNFWA schools.
Because of the large refugee population residing in the Gaza Strip, UNBWA plays a
major role in the educational system there. iiI
113. The educational system follows the normal structure of 6 years of primary and
3 years of preparatory education (both compulsory), followed by secondary,
vocational, teacher training and/or university education. The curricula continue
to be those in use at the time of the occupation, namely, the Jordanian one in the
West Bank and the Egyptian one in the Gaza Strip. In East Jerusalem, the Israeli
educational system and curriculum have been adopted in the education of the Arab
pupils.
114. The Ministry of Education of the Jordanian Government continues to have an
interest in the state of education in the west Bank and keeps abreast of
developments. Approximately 2,000 teachers who had been appointed before the
occupation, continue to be paid by the Jordanian Government, although it has no
administrative control over the system. The high school diploma issued by the
Military Administration of the occupied territories is replaced by one from the
Jordanian Ministry of Education.
115. It is the view of the Jordanian Ministry of Education officials, who met with
the experts on mission, that although the structure of education in the West Bank
remains the same as prior to the occupation, the content of education is in a state
of stagnation. Developments which have occurred in the Jordanian system are not
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reflected in the system in the West Bank. There was constant interference in
attempts to revise the curriculum to incorporate changes in Arab culture and
society. Books which are recommended for use in classes are closely scrutinized,
modified, revised and reprinted by the occupying authorities. The revisions often
distort facts as they relate to the students' understanding and perception of their
socio-cultural background and heritage. Most affected by this practice are books
in literature and in the social sciences. Teachers who try to remedy these
shortcomings and attempt to create nationalistic sentiments in the students are
sUbjected to transfers, dismissals and other punitive measures including arrest,
detention and fines. There have been also occasions when pupils expressing such
sentiments have been arrested, incarcerated or transferred to other schools.
School attendance and fulfilment of course requirements have been seriously
affected in those localities, including the refugee camps in which UNIWA imparts
education, where curfews have been imposed for various reasons.
116. University education has been subjected to further pressures during the last
few years, which have affected the quality of the education imparted. Two military
orders which directly affect the universities are Order No. 854 of 8 July 1980 and
Order No. 973 of 9 June 1982. The most significant event arising from the
application of Order No. 854 has been the expulsion, in OCtober 1982, of
28 professors of Palestinian origin teaching in the various universities in the
West Bank for refusing, as a matter of principle, to sign a "pledge" not to support
any "terrorist organization". Twenty-one of them have been from the Al Najah
University. Seven professors of foreign nationality were debarred from lecturing
for the same reason. The result was a reduction in the number of elective
courses. Other consequences were a reduction in the required hours for a course
and larger attendance in classes. Frequent closing of the universities has
aggravated the situation. For example, the Bir Zeit university was closed from
19 February to 19 April 19821 Bethlehem university from 13 June to 5 July 1982 and
Al Najah University from 14 to 23 January 1983. ~
117. The security forces of the occupying authorities have continued to put up road
blocks at the entrances to universities. Soldiers have entered the university
premises on occasion and searched student dormitories, confiscating books, reviews
and posters. On other occasions students have been arrested and detained for
varying periods of time (A/37/485, para. 94).
118. The universities are subjected to other forms of control under Order NO. 854
as well as administrative directives, the more significant of which are the need to
renew annually the licence to operate the university and to obtain the Military
Administration's approval of the annual budget. No books can be ordered directly
from abroad. They have to be obtained through booksellers in Israel, and they have
to be approved by the Military Administration. In the process, many books and
periodicals, mostly in literature, history, culture and related sUbjects, which are
essential for research, have been banned, although they are available in the
Israeli universities and libraries. In the view of the professors expelled from
Al Najah University, some of whom met with the experts on mission in Amman, those
actions by the occupying authorities have seriously undermined the scope and
quality of university teaching in the West Bank and affected the standard of
education achieved by the student body, comprising approximately 10,000.
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119. Military Order No. 973 of 9 June 1983 pertaining to the transfer of funds to
the occupied territories has created difficulties for the universities, whose
resources are from private donations, to be financially viable. By that Order, any
money coming from abroad, and this would include donations to the universities,
requires a permit to be issued at the discretion of the Head of the Civil
Administratio~ A provision in the Order (para. 3 (b») stipulates that a "permit
will not be granted unless the bringing in of money to the 'region' is intended for
remittance to the Fund established by Order No. 974 also of 9 June 1982, entitled,
Order with regard to the Region Development Fund. The purpose of the Fund is
stated to be to give grants or loans for development programmes in the "region" and
for the relief of the populatio~ The "region" is defined as "Israel and any other
Region occupied by the Israel Defence Forces".
120. In the view of the former professors and university officials, the
implications of the provisions of these two orders, in so far as the universities
are concerned, are that any donations from abroad, most of which come from other
Arab countries to the universities, are beyond the control of the university
authorities, who have no assurance that the Fund will disburse the donations for
the purpose for which they were intended.
121. With regard to vocational training, the lLO mission, which has access to the
occupied territories, has been evaluating the quantitative and qualitative aspects
of the programme during the past few years. It should be mentioned that UNEWA is
actively involved in it, and th~re are significant inputs to it from the United
Nations system, notably UNDP, UNICEF, the lLO, UNESCO, UNIDO and WHO in the form of
equipment and fellowships.
122. UNFNA operates vocational training centres, two in the West Bank (Kalandia
Vocational Training Centre and Ramallah Women's Training Centre) and one in Gaza
(Vocational Training Centre). Courses are said to be designed for the acquisition
of skills in designing, producing, assembling, servicing or repairing manufactured
products and in business and office practice, land surveying, paramedical skills
etc. The training is available to refugee children. !!I
123. The Israeli authorities have stated that the programme sponsored by them for
non-refugee youth has been expanded to include new fields, such as draftsmanship,
accounting, office work and cosmetic training, in addition to such trades as
carpentry, construction, metal-working, sewing and embroidery and dressmaking,
which formed the bulk of vocational training in previous years (A/37/347 and
Corr.l, annex, p. 5). According to information supplied to the ILO mission by the
occupying authorities, new courses have been introduced in manufacturing skills,
and special vocational training programmes have been introduced for youths 14 and
15 years of age who continue to pursue academic studies, courses are offered in
vocational skills during school holidays. !!V
124. In its evaluation of the programme, the lLO mission has observed that:
"The training courses still tend to be short and the level of skills they
provide does not seem to have risen significantly. Moreover, the training
centres operate in close liaison with the placement offices in the occupied
territories, essentially so as to meet the demand for labour from employers in
Israel." !!!!I
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During a visit to the biggest vocational training centre in Gaza, the 110 mission
observed that 80 per cent of the graduates worked in Israel. On a visit to a
training centre in the 111 est Bank, it was observed that almost half of the graduates
worked in the Arab countries of the Gulf, while the other half worked in Israel and
the occupied territories. ~
c. Health
125. It is a complex task to analyse the nature and scope of a health-care system
that would meet the needs of a given population at a given time, because of such
variables as demographic structure, stage of socio-economic development,
orientation of the people to health care, utilization of the services provided and
the availability of trained manpower to deliver those services, among others. In
the case of the occupied Palestinian territories, the World Health Assembly has
received in recent years annual reports on the health conditions of the inhabitants
of the occupied territories from various sources, in response to its resolutions
beginning with WHA 26.56 of 23 May 1973. Three reports were submitted to the World
Health Assembly at its thirty-fifth session in 1982, namely, the report of the
Special Committee of Experts appointed to study the health c~nditions of the
inhabitants of the occupied territories (A35/16), a report by the Palestine
Liberation Organization (A35/INF.Oo.::./3) and a report by the Ministry of Health of
Israel (A35/INF.DOC./4). Additionally, the annual Statistical Abstract of Israel
gives data on hospitals and hospitalization.
126. Statistical data pertaining to hospitals in the occupied territories of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip are as follows,
Table 21
West Bank Gaza Strip
1979 1980 1981 1979 1980 1981
Hospitals (total) 17 17 17 6 7 7
of which,
governmental 9 9 9 5 6 6
Actual beds (tota 1) 1,406 1,311 1,363 890 928 904
of which.·
in governmental
hospitals 970 970 970 815 853 858
Hospitalized patients 64,019 65,011 65,302 51,948 53,230 55,378
OCcupancy (percentage) 83.0 81.4 79.2 66.7 66.1 64.0
Surgical operations 14,604 14,454 14,085 13,750 12,973 13,294
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
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127. In the Gaza Strip, the number of hospital beds increased slightlY from 1979 to
1980, only to decrease in 1981. In the West Bank, there was a sharp drop from 1979
to 1980, with a modest increase in 1981. The variance in bed availability has been
attributed by the Israel Ministry of Health to be the temporary closure of certain
sections in the voluntary hospitals in the West Bank. £SI There are
inconsistencies in the data given in the report of the Ministry of Health of Israel
and in the annual Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982. For instance, the total
number of beds in the five governmental hospitals in the Gaza Strip is 845 in the
report of the Ministry of Health, ggI while the data above gives it as 858 in
1981. The nine governmental hospitals in the West Bank are reported as having 650
beds, !!I while the data above indicates 970.
128. An added constraint to analysing meaningfully the health-care data is that
their compilation and presentation by the Israel Ministry of Health vary for the
two territories. The WHO Special Committee of Experts has noted that "the
statistical data are extremely contradictory, depending on the source". ~ It has
been reported that in the Gaza Strip, a monthly and an annual medical bulletin have
been published since 1981, while in the West Bank, only an annual report has been
preparedI a new monthly information system is in the course of preparation.!1I It
is to be hoped that the information will be presented in a uniform manner so as to
make the data of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip comparable, and that more
information will be provided on the data pertaining to the voluntary hospitals,
which constitute almost half of the institutions and provide almost 29 per cent of
the beds available in that territory. It will also be useful to know how the
services of the voluntarY hospitals are integrated into a total health-care system
for the West Bank.
129. As regards services provided by the hospitals, the Israel Ministry of Health
report mentions a number of new services introduced since 1967. Since 1979, the
following new services have been set up in the hospitals in the occupied
territories:
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Table 22
Hospital
west Bank
Nablus
Ramallah
Be it Jallah
Hebron
Rafidia
Gaza Strip
Shifa
Khan Unis
Ophthalmic Hospital
Services
Coronary care Unit
Oncology clinic
Physiotherapy and rehabilitation
Ear, nose and throat
X-ray
Neonatal unit
Physiotherapy
Gynaecology/obstetrics
OFbthalmology
Dermatology
Intensive care unit
Ear. nose and throat
Maxillofacial surgery
Burn unit
Bacteriology Laboratory
Intensive coronary unit
Library and lecture hall
Psychiatry
Psychiatric outpatient department
1980
1981
1981
1979
1979
1980
1979
1979
1979
1981
1980
1980
1980
1981
1981
1981
1981
1979
1980
SOurce, Report by the Ministry of Health of Israel transmitted to members of
the World Health Assembly under the symbol A35/INF. DOC./4.
130. This expansion of services seems to be in keeping with the policy of the
occupying authorities to decentralize activities and services to the level of
district hospitals and peripheral health centres. However. according to the
WHO Special Committee of Experts. limitation of equipment and qualified staff
to deliver these services make it necessary for an increasing number of patients
from the occupied territories to be referred to Israeli hospitals. Other measures
and services related to environmental health. immunization and maternal and child
care are provided through a network of clinics and health centres.
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131. The WHO Special Committee of Experts, during its visit to the territories in
April 1982, observed that there had not been any fundamental change in the health
infrastructure during the previous year. uu/ Medical and surgical equipment
supplied during the year, particularly the more sophisticated items, included many
given by international organizations and local charitable organizations. All new
equipment installed at the Ramallah hospital had been financed by local charitable
organizations. A new dialysis unit and an echocardiograph installed at the Hebron
hospital were provided by UNDP.
132. Inadequacies were observed by the Special Committee of Experts at various
hospitals. Taking Ramallah and Nablus hospitals, which according to the Israeli
authorities serve as regional as well as district hospitals, vv/ shortcomings
included cardiology and radiology services and equipment, shortage of drugs and
lack of adequate staff. Other problems at hospitals include ambulance services,
lack of co-ordination at the central level in drug distribution, and difficulties
in recruiting teaching staff. It was mentioned to the WHO Special Committee of
Experts by the local doctors and mayors that "substantial funds could be mobilized
immediately to develop medical services and public health infrastructure that was
lacking, but that the requests submitted to the Israelis had been
unsuccessful". ww/ Refusal of a request submitted to the Israeli authorities by a
local association in Hebron to build a hospital is cited as a specific example.
133. The number of hospital beds has not shown a real significant increase during
the last 10 years, in spite of the growth in popUlation. The organization of teams
of specialists and adequate resources to respond to the basic health needs of the
people is a feature that is lacking in the planning and delivery of health care
services in the occupied territories. There is no systematic programme of
education for health and nutrition. Sanitation is far from satisfactory, although
the Israel Ministry of Health has reported that many improvements have been made in
the towns and villages of the occupied territories, particularly the Gaza Strip.
134. There are significant inputs to the health care system in the occupied
territories by UNDP, WHO, UNICEF and by local organizationrs and the Red Crescent
Society. This has become necessary because of the low level of budgetary resources
allocated to the system. A significant shortcoming would appear to be a lack of
planning for the health needs of the population in association with local medical
professionals, leaders and community organizations. Community participation at the
present time appears to be only at the level of implementing projects and
programmes already formulated by the Israeli authorities or the provision of
physical facilities for services which have been predetermined, rather than at the
formulation stage.
Notes
~/ A35/16.
B/ The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of OCcupied Territories
Affairs, The OCcupation ••• Israeli Colonization of Arab Lands (revised edition)
(Amman, January 1983), p. 10.
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sf P. G. sadler and B. Abu-Kishk, "Options for development: palestine,
Part I" (unpublished), p. 68.
21 "Living conditions in JUdea-Samaria and the Gaza District", summary of
the report prepared by the Government of Israel, submitted to the General Assembly
at its thirty-seventh session (A/37/347 and Corr.l, annex), pp. 2-4.
!/ Ibid., p. 2.
!/ Meron Benvenisti, "The West Bank and Gaza Data Base Project: pilot Study
Report", presented to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1982
(unpublished), p. 55.
si
!!I
Y
Affairs,
February
~., p. 67.
The OCcupation ••• , CP. cit., p. 9.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of OCcupied Territories
"Palestinian living conditions in the Arab territory" (Amman,
1982 to February 1983) (unofficial translation), paras. 2 and 3.
jj See, for example, Showkat Mahmoud, West Bank Water and Agriculture under
Israeli OCcupation (Ministry of OCcupied Territories Affairs, Amman,
November 1982), p. 2 (31.6 per cent between 1967 and 1979), and Emile Sahliyeh,
'West Bank industrial and agricultural development: the basic problems", Journal
of Palestinian Studies, No. 42 (winter, 1982), p. 64 (27.3 per cent between 1967
and 1973).
~ Meron Benvenisti, op. cit., pp. 29-31.
y Ibid., p. 32.
!y Raja Shehadeh, "The West Bank and the rule of law", The International
Commission of Jurists and Law in the Service of Man (Geneva, 1980), pp. 59-62.
B! The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, cp. cit., p. 9.
s! Israeli terminology for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
0p.
l?!
ci t. ,
"Living conditions in Judea-samaria and the Gaza District",
p. 10.
si Janet Abu-Lughod, "Israeli settlements in occupied Arab lands~ from
conquest to colony", Palestinian Rights: Affirmation and Denial,
Ibrahim Abu-Lughad, ed. (Medina Press, Wilmette, Illinois, 1983), pp. 135-336.
!I Raja Shehadeh, op. cit., p. 62.
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Turkaya Ataov, "The Israeli use of Palestinian waters", Palestinian
Affirmation and Denial, op. cit., p. 153.
Ibid., p. 154.
Meron Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 25.
Raja Shehadeh, op cit., p. 66.
See Al37/347 and Corr. 1, annex, p. 9.
31 International Labour Conference, Sixty-eighth Session, 1982, Report of
the Director-General, appendix 11, para. 7.
xl .!2!2., para. 31.
~ For Israel~ 8 months of work in agriculture and construction and
12 months in industry and other branches, giving an average of 10 months or 40
weeks of 6 days each wee~ For the territories~ 50 weeks of 6 days each wee~
!!I Heron Benvenisti, cp. cit., p. 16.
~ For instance, the Jordanian Times of 28 February 1983 quoted the
Jordanian dinar at 113.46 Israeli shekels.
££/ See "The industrial and economic trends in the west Bank and Gaza Strip",
(E/EOfA/UNIDO/lfP.l, tables 5 and 7).
dd/ !EM., table 15.
1lI .!.2.!.!!., p. 37.
!!I !EM., p. 33.
~ Report from the Economic Department of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, 10 March 1983, p. 29.
!!!!I Al Fajr Weekly, 8-14 January 1982.
W Jerusalem Post, 16 May 1983, and Al Fajr weekly, 28 May-3 June 1982.
1iI Figures derived from the data in appendix V below.
~ Hashemite Kingdom of JOrdan, Report of the Ministry of Occupied
Territories Affairs, February 1982 to February 1983, anneX 8.
!!I tllmWA/UNESCO Department of Education, 1980-81 Report, p.31.
!!!!!I International Labour Conference, op. cit., para. 23.
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nn llli., para. 24.
eel World Health Organization, "Health and health services in Judaea,
Samaria, Gaza and Sinai, 1981-1982", a report by the Ministry of Health of Israel
to the Thirty-fifth World Health Assembly, Geneva, March 1982 (A35/INF. DOC./4),
annex, table 41.
gsI llli., table 14.
E!..! ~., table 41.
!!I World Health Organization, "Report of the Special Committee of Experts
appointed to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied
terri tories" (A35/l6), para. 2.1.
tt/ World Health Organization, A35/INF. DOC./4, annex, p. 17.
uu/ See World Health Organization, A35/16.
'!:!./ See World Health Organization, A35/INF. DOC./4, annex, p. 70.
~ See World Health Organization, A35/l6, para. 3.3.
I ...
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APPENDIX I
HOuses demolished, 1967-1981
.!!!!. Number
1967 130
1968 140
1969 301
1970 191
1971 231
1972 35
1973 34
1974 61
1975 77
1976 24
1977 1
1978 2
1979 8
1980 24
1981 32
TOTAL 1 291
1 263 on the West Bank
28 on the Gaza Strip
Sourcel Ministry of the Occupied Territories Affairs, Amman, JOrdan.
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APPENDIX II
Population growth in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem)
and Gaza Strip, 1979-1981
('1tIousands)
End of Number of Actual Natura1.
year persons increase increase Difference
West Bank
1979 699.6 9.2 20.9 -11.7
1980 703.1 3.5 20.6 -17.1
1981 707.3 4.2 20.0 -15.8
Gaza Strip
1979 431.5 12.4 16.1 -3.7
1980 442.0 10.5 15.6 -5.1
1981 451.6 9.6 15.0 -5.4
SOurce, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1981 and llli (Jerusalem, Central
Bureau of Statistics, 1981 and 1982).
/ ...
APPENDIX III
Employed persons by economic branch in the occupied
territories and in Israel
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1979 1980 1981
west Bank
Total (thousands) 133.4 134.8 132.8
Percentages
100.0 100.0 100.0
1. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 25.3 26.2 24.1
2. Industry, mining, manufacturing 18.3 16.9 16.4
3. Construction 22.6 22.6 24.0
4. Commerce, restaurants, hotels 12.7 12.7 12.5
5. Transport, storage, communications 4.4 4.5 4.9
6. Public and community services 12.8 13.3 14.2
7. Other 3.9 3.8 3.9
Gaza strip
Total (thousands) 79.6 80.9 82.5
Percentages
100.0 100.0 100.0
1. Agriculture, forestry. fishing 20.4 18.5 17.3
2. Industry, mining. manufacturing 19.8 19.5 17.2
3. Construction 23.0 23.1 26.5
4. Commerce, restaurants, hotels 12.5 14.0 14.2
5. Transport, storage, communications 6.4 6.6 6.8
6. Public and community services 12.1 13.0 12.8
7. Other 5.8 5.3 5.2
source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
APPENDIX IV ;;?~.t:~
OGOG f-Jw
mf-'\.OO::>
1-'. ('0_
Employed persons of the occupied territories by selected VI m W.f\)
.r=-::>_--:l
economic branch and place of work --'CD
--'
In Israel In the occupied territories
Other Con- Total other Con- Total
ear branches struction Industry Agriculture • 1000 branches struction Industry Agriculture • 1000
West Ban!
1979 18.1 47.7 23.9 10.3 100.0 39.8 40.8 11. 8 15.9 31. 5 100.0 92.5
"_980 19.0 50.1 21.0 9.9 100.0 40.6 40.9 10.7 15.2 33.2 100.0 94.3
~981 19.9 52.7 18.1 9.3 100.0 39.9 41.9 11. 9 15.7 30.5 100.0 93.5
Gaza Str ip
1979 14.0 44.3 21.6 20.1 100.0 34.3 53.7 7.0 18.2 21.1 100.0 45.5
1980 16.8 44.0 20.9 18.3 100.0 34.5 55.3 7.3 18.6 18.8 100.0 46.3
1981 15.9 49.5 18.4 16.2 100.0 35.9 57.1 8.4 16.5 18.0 100.0 46.6
~: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
:--
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APPENDIX V
Education in the occupied Palestinian territories
Academic year
1979/80 1981/82
West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem)
Number of institutions 1 012 1 036
Number of classes 7 457 7 921
Nwnber of pupils 253 826 268 424
Gaza Strip
Nwnber of institutions 281 307
Number of classes 3 455 3 697
Nwnber of pupils 142 113 153 005
Academic Year 1981/82
Insti tutions Classes Pupils
West Bank
Government 802 6 069 208 867
UNHi/A 93 1 058 37 267
Other 141 794 22 290
1 036 7 921 268 424
Gaza Strip
Government 112 1 749 68 852
UNHi/A 157 1 791 79 493
Other 38 157 4 660
ID 3"6'9'7 153 005
Source: statistical Abstract of Israel, 1981 and ~.
/ ...
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APPENDIX VI
COnsumer price index, West Bank and Gaza Strip
West Bank Gaza Strip
Year percentage increase Percentage increase
1975 = 100
1979 440.6 402.9
1980 1 054.5 139.4 1 031. 0 155.9
1981 2 257.5 114.1 2 160.5 109.6
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
/ ...
• ,
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APPENDIX VII
Wage-income by sectors and location of employment, 1981
GAZA STRIP
Number
'000
Agriculture 5.8
Indus try 6. 6
Construction 17.8
Other 5.7
Total (per day)
Number
'000
Agriculture 3.7
Industry 7.2
Construction 21.0
Other 8. n
Total (per day)
In Israel
Daily wage
(Israeli Total
shekels) IS '000
76.7 444.9
99.4 656.0
120.4 2 143.1
103.5 590.0
3 834.0
WEST BANK
In Israel
Daily wage
(Israeli Total
shekels) IS '000
76.7 284.0
99.4 715.7
120.0 2 520.0
103.5 828.0
4 347.7
In Gaza Strip
Daily wage
Number (Israeli Total
'000 shekels) IS '000
8.4 75.0 635.9
7.7 85.0 654.5
3.9 112.0 436.8
26.6 100.5 Y 2 673.3
4 400.5
In West Bank
Daily wage
Number (Israeli Total
'000 shekels) IS '000
28.5 70.6 2 012.1
14.7 89.2 1 311.2
11.1 122.0 1 354.2
39.2 97.4 Y 3 818.1
8 495.6
~: Wage-income In Israeli shekels
West Bank: Employment in Israel 4 347 700 (daily) x 240 days = 1 043 448 000
Employment in West Bank 8 495 600 (daily) x 300 days = 2 548 680 000
...__ . ._- -.- West Bank subtotal 3 592 128 000
Gaza Strip: Employment in Israel 3 834 000 (daily) x 240 days = 920 160 000
Employment in Gaza 4 400 500 (daily) x 300 days = 1 320 150 000
Gaza subtotal 2 240 310 000
West Bank and Gaza TOTAL 5 832 438 000
Source: Derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982.
y Weighted average for commerce, transport, public and community services
and other.
AE UNITED
NATIONS
@ General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.
GENERAL
A/39/ 233
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25 l4ay 19 84
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
G-T]NEFAL ASSEMBLY
Thrrty-eighth session
Ilem 80 (j) of the preliminary list*
DEiTELOPI'4INT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOIIIC
CO-OPERATION3 HUMAN SETTLEIIENTS
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
second reg ular
Ilem 15 of the
agenda**
INTERNATIONAI
THE FIELD OF
SETTLEI4ENTS
sessi.on ot 19 8{
provisional
CO-OPEFETION IN
HUMAN
Report of Che Secretarv-General
L The General Assenbly, at' lts thirty-erghth session, considered the
Secretary-General I s report on the l-iving conditions of the Palestinian people j.n
the occupr.ed Palestrnran terrrtbries (A/38/27 8-E/ L983/17) , whrch had been subnieted
pursuant to its resoLution 37/222 of 20 Decenber 1982. On 19 Decenber 1983 it
adopte(r resolution 38/166, tn paragraph I of, whrch it requested the
Secretary-General
"to prepare and subnj.t to the ceneral Assetnbly at its thirty-ninth session,
through the lconomr.c ano Socral- Councll, a conprehensrve report on the current
and future impact of the Israeli settlenenes on the Iiving conditions of the
Palestlnran people in the ocrcupied Palestintan territories, including a
conparison between the lj.ving condj.Cions of the latter ahd those of the
residents ot the Israeli sebtlemenls".
2. So as to enable the Secre tary-ceneraL to prepare and submit the required
report to the General Assenbly at its thirty-nrnth session, and in an effort to
ensure a balanced and objective expert view, the Secre tary-ceneral used the
A/39/sO.
Econom.ic and Social Council decision I984/LOI.
terrrtor ies
84-13684 42O4e lE,
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Page 2
services of three consultants: Dudley Madaldela, formerly Co-ordinator of Units'
SociaL DeveLopment Branch, Centre for Socia]- Developnent and Hunanitarian Affairs,
Department of International Econonic and Social Affairs of the United Nalions
Secretarlati llduard Ealassanran, architect, urban deaigner ano city planneri and
Mirtha Halin, economist. The consultants srere requested to prepare the report on
the basj.s of naterial available fron the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies
and fron the specialized agencies' and olher publlshed and unPublished literature
pertar.ning to the subject. They h'ere also to gather information through visits to
bgypt, ,Jordan, the Syrj.an Arab Republic and the occupred territories, and through
or,scussrons with goverrulent offic].als and oehers. as well as with representatives
of the Palestine Lrberation Organization.
3. srnce perrnrssion to visit the occupied terriCorres was not granted by the
Govelnnent of Israel, the consultants. in preparing their repor!, had to rely on
secondary sources of infortEtion. From 22 .fanuary to 28 February l-984' the
consullants vrsited and had discusstons with the relevant goverrunent off rci.als ot
!;gl4)t, ,lordan and the syrtan Arab RePublic' Further discussions nere held with the
Unrted Nations officiaLs stati,oned ln Ehose counCries. Discussions were also held
with the relevant off j.cials of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Damascus
and Anman. Meetings were held with the former Minister of Arig af and HoIy Places'
the former l"layors of Jerusal,en' Ealhul and ttebron, former p{ofessors fron the West
Bank, and wich Palestinians who had recently visited the occupred territorl'es or
who had knowledge ot recent developments in those terrilories.
4. The consultants also visrted the headquarters of. and gathered relevant
infornation and data from the following bodies: lcononic connission for western
Asia (ECWA) r United Nations conference on Trade and DeveloPment (UNCTAD), office of
the United Nations High corunissioner for Refugees (UNCHS), United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near Easf (UNRWA), International
Labour Organrsation (IIO), Unj.ted Nations Educational, sciehti'f ic and Cultural
Organization (uNESco) and the world Health Organizati.on (nHO). Various United
Natrons reports deaLing rrith conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories
lrere also revier.red, particularly those of the Special Comnittee to fhvestigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Hunan Rrghts of the Population of the OccuPied
Territories, the securrty council corunission established under resolulion
44a; (1979) oi 22 March 1979 on lhe sj.tuation in the occupied Alab Cerritorres, and
the Committee on the llxercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestj.nian people.
A substantial. anount ot relevant naterral and intornatLon was gathered tron those
sources' which supplernented other information and data available in publj.shed
documents ot various other organrzations of the Unlted Nati.ons syslen that were
nade available to the experts and material publi.shed in books, Periodicals and lhe
popular pressr as indicated in the various footnotes contaj.ned in the report
prepared by lhe consultants.
5. The repor! prepared by the three consuLeants is reproduced j.n the annex below.
A/39/ 233
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ANNEX
coNtElils
I. INTRODUCTION
I I . SUMIvIARY OF FI NDINGS
III. SITTLIMINT TRTJNDS ...
A. Overview
ts. Plan fornuratlon ....
C. Ihvestment in the settlenent progralm€
IV. IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTLNMENTS ON IAND AND WAI'ER RESOURCES '
HOUSING, PUBLIC AIENITIES' AND INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES...
A. Inpact on growth and expansion of Paleatinian
towns and villages
B. Irnpac t on water resources ....'
C. Inpact on hous ing
V. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTI,EMENTS
A. Inpact on Production and trade
B. Inpact on labour and €n[)loynent
c. Inpact on money and finance
D. Aggregate inpact .
VI. II'IPACT OF ISRAELI SETTI,EMENTS ON THE SOCIAL LIFE
AND RTJLIGIOUS PRACIIC};S OF T}1I; PALT$TINIANS ..
IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTI,EMENTS OTI TIIE JUDICIAI, AND
I€CAI GOVTRNqENT SYSI'F.I.4S IN T}Tb OCCUPIED TTJRRITORIES ....
Paraqraphs Paqe
r- 7 5
a-24 6
25-43 9
25-32 9
33-37 L2
38 - 43 13
44-65 14
44 - 50 14
51 -54 L7
ss-65 19
57 - LO6 23
67-78 23
79-88 32
89-98 37
99 - 106 38
r07 - 120 43
47
VII. I2r - 126
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CONTENTS (continued)
APPEATDIC!.S
I. Settlements in the viest Bank and caza, wiCh projections
to the year 2010
A. Settletnents established fron lgOZ to 1983
B. seltlenents planned for establishnent fron ].9B3 to 1986
Land confiscaled during the period February 1983 to February I9g4 ..
Houses delplished in the West Bank ahd the caza Strip by the
occ upyrng authorities as a punitrve rneasure, 1967-1992
Page
II.
I II.
57
57
60
63
65
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I. I I\IRODIJCl tON
1. llhe present report has been prepared in response to General Assenbly
resolutron 3A/L66 ot 19 Decernber 1983, in whrch the Assenbly requested the
Secretary-General to prepare and suhmit to it at its thirty-ninth session, through
the lj.;onornrc ano Socral Oouncrr, a cor[prehensive report on the current and future
lnpac t of the IsraeLi sett.Lemenls on the living conditrons of the Palestinran
people rn the occupied Palestrnian territories, including a comParrson betr.reen the
Lrvrng condatrons of the latter and those ot the resrdents of the Israelr
settlements.
2. Whrle the previous repores on this guestion subnrcted to the General Assembly
ItV34/536 and corr.lr A/35/533 and corr.Lr A/37/23s, A/38/ 27 8-E/ L983l77) dealt with
the livihg conditions of the Palestinian beople in the occupied Palestinian
lerrrtorres under the general condi,tions of occupation' this report, 1n corlPlrance
erth the Assembiyrs request, focuses and examines the direct impact of the Israelr
settler0ents on the livihq conditions of the Palestinians in the occupj.ed
terrrtories, In thrs context sorne of the overall poli.cies and practices of the
occ upyi. ng Power have had to be exanined j.n order to deternine this impact.
3. As in previous reports' the occupied Palestinian terrigories are defined as
the l{est Bank, rnc],udrng East Jerusalen, and Gaza. In view ot the fact that data
on Last Jerusalen are not publrshed separate.Ly by the Israeli authoritres, as is
done tor the West Bank and Gaza. the consultants have had to rely on rnformation
conveyed to then by persons knonledgeable of the conditions there, including lhe
tormer Minj.ster of Ahgaf and Ho.Ly Places and lhe fornler Mayor of Jerusalem,
4. A natter of particular difficulty in preparj.ng this report was the gatherj'ng
ot rntornaclon on the Irvrng condrtlons rn the Israell settlenents for purPoses of,
conll)arlng chen wtth lhose in PalestinJ,an communi,lies. since 1t ['as not Possible to
gather frrEt-hand rntornatlon, lhe consultants have had to rely on secondary
sources of infornation obtained through interviews and frorn publj.shed naterial and
have had Eo arrtve at some generaa concrusrons. These have been rncruded ln the
respectj.ve chapters and seclions dealr.ng lrigh lhe current and tuture inPact of, the
Israelr settlements on che lrvrng condi.tlons ot the Palestr.nrans in the occupred
!er rr tof r es.
5. Section II of the report contains a sumnary of findings whrch are documented
and substantraEed rn Che body of lhe report, Section III gives an overvrehr of
Israeli settlenent trends and plans, I'lost of the infornatron h,as gathered froln the
reports ot the special Conunittee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the
Hunan Rrghts of the Population of the Occupred Territories, news items aPPearing rn
the popular press and intornation supplied by the Palestrne Lrberation
Organlzation. Although tbe press reports are generally quoted frorn the Israeli
newspapers. the sane information did appear in the Arab newspapers in the occuPred
territories, particularl,y AI Fajr. Asharb and AL Quds. virtua]'ly aII of the Press
reports were extracted from the reports of the Special Conmittee !o Investlgate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Hunan Rights of the Population ot the occuPled
'fer ritortes.
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6. Section fV exanines the sj.Cuation as it affects the growth and expanslon of
Palestinian towns and villages, water resources and housrng. Section V describes
the inpact of the fsraeli settlenents on the econony of th€ occupied territories,
section VI, the inpact on the social life and religious practrces of the
PalesCinians, and section vlf, the impact on the judicial and local government
systens in the territories. In each of these aspects of 1iving, the future inpact
has been assessed on the basis of a continuation of current poli.cies and practices. An empj.rical corrparison of lhe Iiving conditions of the Palestrnians in
the occuPied terrj.tories with those of the Israel.i residents in lhe settlenents has
aaso been included under each ot the aspects.
'1 . Ih the preparatron of this report, the consultants relied as nuch as possible
on published sources vrhich were supplenented by interviews vrith people
knowLedgeable of the condiEions in the occupied territories. The consultants wi6h
to place on record ther.r appreciatron ot the co-operatron oftered them by ninisters
and officials of the covernments of the Arab Republi.c of EgypE and the Hashenite
Krngdorn of Jordan, off iciaJ.s ot the cbvernnent ot the syrian Arab kepublic,
leplesentatives and officials of the Palestine Liberation Organrzation, individuals
in Ajrunan who are cl-osely in touch vrith current .deveLopments in the occ upied
terlrtorles, and officials of the speciatized agencies and other organizalions of
lhe United Nations system,
lI. SU!4I,IARY OF FIIIDfNGS
8. According to ilordanian sources, at the end ot i983 the State of Israel had
expropriated 2,607,9OI dunums (260,790 hectares) or 47.4 per cent of the West Bank
territory, while aqcording to some Israeli sources, Israel controls at. present
between 50 and 60 per cent of the land in the occupied territories. Of the
expropriated land, 26 per cent. has been all@ated to Israeli settlenents.
Estinales based on Israe.l,j. and paLestinian data indicate that by now alnost a]-l of
the Jordan Valley's potentially cultivabLe land has been expropriated for the
fsraeli settlenents,
9. fsrael continues to establish settlements j.n a manner that Iirnits and,/or
lmPairs the expansion and growth of Palestinian towns and villages. As a net'
devel-opment, as has been done in East ,Jerusalem, fsrael has rnitiated tbe
escablishment of an urban settlenent in the centre of Hebron, l.he Government of
Israel has also announced a plan known as the .8€n porat plan., a najor feature of
whrch j.s to rel(rate residents of Palestj.nian refugee c aunps to nerv residential
quarters in various }ocations.
J.0. The inpact of Israel-i settlenents on vrater resources is a funclion of the
anount ot exproprj.ated cultivab_te land rather than the number of settlers, As a
general ruLe 100,000 people consume 6 nillion cubic netres of rrater per year for
donestic purposes, whereas an agricultural settl,enent containi.hg about 30Cl f,amilies
(1,200 people) farning 2,500 dunulns (250 hectares) of sultivable land uses
2.4 miUion cubic netres of water per year for irrigation purposes.
Y,"Z!'fii'
English
Page 7
11. Water resources of the Gaza are in a critical siguation. But in the west Bank
annual precipitation suppLies elght times more than lhe Present water requirements
of,th€ area. However, lsraeJ-j, authoricres, by cornbining the need of Israel proper
with that of the vlest Bank, have declared lrater resources in the west Bank at a
critical stage as we1L. As a consequence they are inposing a series ot restrictive
measures oh the indigenous population ot the area, such as naintaining the usage of
ltater at 196? levels. On the other hand, preferential treatment has been reported
to be practised by the occupying authorities in supplying rvater to Israell settl.els.
L2. There is an overall annual dec],ine in residential construction in towns and
villages of the occupied territories in spite ot a 24 per cent increase in towns in
Gaza. New construction of housing barely covers the need resulting trom lhe
natural increase of the population. consequentLy, since 1967 the housing industry
has contributed virtually nothing towards anelioration of dilapidated and
substandard housing.
13. There has been no pub].ic]y subsidized and,/or initialed 1ol, income housing for
nany years. Punitive denolieion of houses continues at an accelerated rate. In
addition, a nerd punitive tneasure of sealing houses or roons nith concrete is being
applied by the occupying authorities.
14. Absehce of construction to replace dilapidated and substandard housing, along
with the restriclive policies ot the oceupying authorities as regarda buj.Iding
permits and transfer of funds from abroad, is expected to worsen the already
serious housing conditions. The virtually stand-stilL state of public housihg, and
the non-existerre of fi.nancial neasures to assist low income fanilies to acquire
proper housing are added dinensj.ons to the above-rnentioned problem,
15. Indications at the present tine are that the Israeli Goverhment v,'ilL contj.nue
to fol-row the policy ot establishing settl.enents in lhe occupied territories and
settling rnore Israelis in then. to a projected ninimum of 100,000 by 1987
and I90,000 by 2010. These nunbers exclude Israelis in East Jerusalen and other
Palestinian locali.ties incolporated into the City irunediately after the 196? war.
16. 'the policies designed to pronoeer protect and develop the settlements have a
dj,rect economic effect in that they dimrnish the arpunt of land and nater resources
avarlable to the Palestiniahs. The j.ncreasing control exercised by the o€upation
authorities over what agricultural products can be produced and where, the
restrrctions on induscrj,a.l, production, the control of flErketi'ng that linits ahd
directs exchange over the "open bridges" to Jordan ano "open border" with Israel,
and the negaEive ef,fecc on investnent caused by the absence of a tinanclal system,
the restrictions on building, the continuous devaluation of the Israeli shekel, and
the general feeling of insecurity' are factors that contribute to inportant
structural changes in the economy of the occupied territories. These changes can
be surunarized as! dininished inportance of the agricultural sector nithout a
corresponding development of an industrial baset rel-ative lack of opportunities for
enploynent in the occup ied territories, with consequent daily corunuting to Israel
by the Pal-estinian labour force; increased concentration of Palestinian labour in
the buiLding tradesi reorientation of production towards goods that can be sold to
and through Israel, nhj,Ie Palestinian consumption is met by increased inports fronl
A/39/233
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rsraeli deveropnent of a chronic trade deficit for the terri.tories that is not
baranced by lhe earnings of rorkers or lhe surprus trade with ,fordan, and is partLy offset only by renittances from palestinians abroad.
L7. The econonic policres of the occ upying power have, therefore, creaced a , artuation of total dependence of the econorny of the West Bank and caza by controlring production to and reducing the capacity to create jobs in aucb a rnanner as dimrnish the potential for econ6rnic aevi:.oprn-ent. The growth of incone that is
rePorted staeisticalLy hides the tno fact6 of rack of indi.genous deveLopnent and econonic dependency. The persistence of a dual currency systen in the l{est Bank provides an outlet for palestinian savinjs, ehich are not invested in ghe territories, to a safe haven in .tordan. Dinars are also hoarded as protectlon
against the inflation characteristic of the rsraeri econorny. This duar system a1so provides Israel rrith a useful rneans to acquire hard currency.
18. under a 'ysten that appears to be designed to attract rsraelig to settrements
ahd to conpel palestinians to leave the territoriee, Chere is a rrride difference in
the access to earning opportunitj.es that each group enjoys. While the settlers are often on the goverrunent payrolt or ln private or public ehterpri€es, the Paleatinians are hinctered frorn t{orking their rand, and if highry educaced, have no access to elplolrment, unless they enigrate or join the ranks of connuting nanual Iabourers. In producCion, the settlers are subsidized. and enjoy aasured markets at guaranteed prices, while palestinians are impeded by restrictions, regulations,
and direct controls, and have no access to credit, ].€t alone subsidies.
19. The settlers enjoy aII the benefits of full citizenship, including those of
the NatlonaL lnsurance Scheme, vrhile the pal-estinians erorking in Israe1 are denied
such benefits on the grounds of non-residence in rsraer, arthough they are furl contributors to that system. The settrers enjoy a standard of riving superior to that of the Parestlnians by the design of the settrenents and the at'enities they offer, while Palestrnians are forbidden to inprove thei.r houses and gardens and discouraged from investing in industry. The lwo groups rive under ryidery disparate conditions. The firat are able to look forward Co growth and develqrmentl the
second are fearful of total dispossession, which they believe !o be the aim of the occupying Por{er.
20- The increasing nun rer of rsraeris who are Dovlhg into the settlements that are being estabrished is affecting adversery the sociar rife of the palestinians rn the
occupied territories and disrupting their daily'acgivities. The current pol icy of estabrishing rsraeli settLenents in crose proxinity co parestinian popuralecl towns
and vil-Iages has given rise to lllore frequent interaction between the settrers and the Palestinians. Hordever, the interaction has been predoninantly one of conflict
and confroneation often reading to viorence. I'he settlers form a privileged class
i,n the occupied territories, have the support of the adnini.sterj,ng authorities and the Goverrunent, are permitted to carry firearns and often get involved in
nalntaining law and order.
Zri The intervention of the setrrers in the day-to-day life of the palestrnr.ans ih
the occup ied territori.es has included interference with farrning actj.vities,
obtaining ' rrith the support of the administration, land from the villages f,or
A'/39/233
b/1984/79
Eng l ish
Paqe 9
terri.torial expansion of their setclenents and for provision of infrastructure to
thent diaruption of classes and school activities because of alleged stone-throwing
incrdents by studentsi confrontation in places of religious h'orshiP and, rnore
recenlIy ' violent acts intended to danage or destroy such places. The latter has
been attribuged to terrorist groups. The Palestinian aesidenCs of some of the
refugee canps have been subjected to frequeht harassment, partly because of the
resrsEance ot the c anp dwellers to a plan by the IsraeLi Governmen! to rerocate
then efsenhere.
22. The occupi.ed territories are subject to two different judicial and locaf
gover nent systens. A seParate systen of local government operates for the Israeli
settlements ehich, all|Jng other privileges, have powers fo! pl-anning and developnent
of a.l-.]- the areas which are beyond the existing territorial boundaries of the
Palestinian towns and villages. Israeli law is extended to the setllers' while the
Palestrnlans are subject to nrlitary la!t; and lustice is dispensed to the Israeli
settlers through Israeli courts' white the Palestinians are subject Eo the
jurisdiction of military courts, ghe judgenent of which cannot be aPpealed'
23- The faci-Iities avarlable to the Israeli settlers to neet their educational and
health needs' appear !o be superio! to lhose avaj.lable to the Palestinians in the
territories. thi systens available to the settlers are of the same high standard
and quality as those in Israet. In contrast, the facilities and services avai'Lable
to the Paleslinians are below average and not cor nensurate with the increase in
population and advances in the educationaf and medical sciences'
24. While the Israeli settlers are quite free to pursue their social and cultural
inlerests and activities vtithin the terri.tories without any hindrances, the
Palestinians are subjected Lo frequent curfews whrch restrict their acEj'vities'
security checks carried out by nilitary Personnel, the police. and the settlers at
any tine of the day or night are routine happenrngs'
rI r. SETTLEI{LNT TRLNDS
A. Ove rvie$
25. The t.rends in the establrshnent
occupied after June l-967 can roughly
of Israeli seltfenents in the
be divided j.nto three Phases,
Arab terrrtories
name ly :
(a) 1967 to
(b) -i9 7I to
(c) 1977 to
'lhese periods do
consj.dering that
the influence of
Goverrunents. The
pol icy.
L970.,
1977 when the Labour Governnent rrras ln power i
the presenc during the tenure of the Likuo (bverrunent'
not forn distinct phases buE rather a continuous Process,
the Labour c-verrunent itas tn poner during the first tlro Phases and
the NationaL Religious Party has been continuous in both
diff,erences lre nore in erolrhasis than in radi'cal changes rn
N39/ 233
E,/1984./79
lnglish
Page 10
26. In the tirst phase, 1957 to Lg7O. aithough there does not seen to have been an inj.tral declaratj.on of pol-icy, the Defence ltinistry undertook the establishnent of nl-llEary outposts, conmon].y known as "nahals,,, in straEegi.c areas, as security
neasures and for the purpose of naintarning Iaw and order in the territortes.
Nanals were established in the Jordan VaUey - three in 1968 (Mehola, (alia and
Araganan) i one in 1969 (Patazael) i and four in 1970 (ci].gal, ltassua, yitav and
Maele Bfravrn). A nahal outpost was a]-so established i.n the caza (Kfar Darom -
L970). !/ Meanwhite, the Ministry of Housing and Construction undertook the
construction of urban residentia]- units r.rj.Chin the Arab area incorporated in the city of Jerusalen, nafieLy the Arab sector of Jerusa,Iem and the surrounding Arab
viLlages of Sour Baher, Biet Safafa, Eltour, Elatrm, E] Assaweh and Anata as hrell as the area arouhd the airport. Uni,ts nere being constlucted, particularly in the
Jewish Quarter of the Old City, Ramat. Eshkol and French HLII. Z/ private groups ot
rs.raeris were arso active in estabrishing a presence in the occupied territories.
Thus, a former .fewish settrement at Kfar Etz\on, which had been abandoned atter the
1948 war, was re-established by the children of the original settlers, and a reLigious group irlegally estabrished a settlement at Kiryat Arbara, a suburb of Hebron. one crvilran setttenen! was established in 1969 in the .Ltzion Block north of Hebron (Rosh Tzurin) and one i.n 1970 (ALon shvot). A religious co-operative,
(mashav), tlevo Horon, i{as arso estabrished in the r,atrun salient in .ranuarv 1970.
27. On the whole, the establishnent of Israeli sectlenents during this pertod
appears to have folloned the All-on plan, presented by the then Deputy prime
Minister. Mr. Yigal AlLon, to lhe covernment on 13 July 1967, which included fixing the ,Jordan Rlver as Israel's ,'secure border', wj.th Jordani holoing 20 kilometres a strip of 15 to wide i.n the .lordan Valley which would include the iirst ridge of
mountalns west of the Vauey, holding the eastern slo{res of l,tt. Hebron and the
./udaean Desert to the Dead sea, and making minor border adjustments in places like
Latrun and the Etzion B1ock. 3,/
28. By Lhe beginning of the second phase in 1971, there was growrng evidence of an
emerging policy on settlenent. The press nade reference to the existence of a Ministerial Conmittee for the settlement of the occupied territories, and
announcenenCs to that eff,ect nere nade by Israeli covernnent ministers and readers. g/ white settlernents during this period were established in th€ priority
areas outlined in the Atlon plan, other considerations appear to have influenced the shaping of poricy, as was indicated in a statenent in the Knesset made on
19 'fuly 1972 by Mr. rsraer carili, l4ini.ster r.rithout portfol-io and chairman of the !'linisteriaL connittee for settlenent. He rvas quoted as saying that the rsraeri
Government had put no area out of bounds for J€wish settl,enents and lhae the only
limj.tations to Israeli settlemeht i.n the €cupied territories grere noral ones, and that setttement policy was not dj.ctated by security alone but historical right as nell, if not nore so. 5/
29. Further indications given by rsraeri ministers as to the trends in settrenent policy incl'uded a statement nade by l4r. Moshe Dayan that the west tsank was part. of
the fatherrand and rsraeris had the right to settle there on a permanent basrs rn
accordance h,ith covernment poricy decisions. V During the period 19Tr-1976.
settlements were establi.shed as follows: in the Jordan varley, 7t Bethelen, It
Nablus, ]-i Ranallah, Ii caza, 2i and East .ferusalem, l0 (see appendix I-A), The
A/ 39 / 233
L)/ L9 84 / 79
English
Page lll
gettlements in the East .lerusalen area were established according to a naster PIan
drawn up in t97I for the construction of aPproximately 2]-,000 residential units' 7
30. with the election of the Likud ciovernnent in ear.l-y f977, settlernent trends in
the occupied territoriea were influenced by certain decisions taken by the
covernment,particularlyto'.thicken'tandstrengthenalreadyestabLishedsettlements
and to accelerate the Pace of establishing new ones' g/ while continuing to
establish settl-enents tn the priorigy areas deterninea by the Labour Goverrunent ' the
Likud cover nent opened nev areas for settlement' which included the northern west
tsank' the eestern slopes of the Jerusalern hiLls and the vicj'nities of Palestinlan
lorrns ' such as Rarnallah, Nablus arld Jenin. Not on]'y was tbe G'overrunent to establish
settlenents in these areas, but also Private grouPs, notabLy the Gush Enunin' 9'l
some of the conslderatrons which led to this expansion were articulated fron tine
to time by Goverrulent minlsters and other leadersi for exanpte' l4r' AIieI Sharon'
Minister of Agriculture and chailman of the Mrnisterial comnittee for settlenent,
on 3 July 1978 stated that settlements had been Iocated on the northern West Bank
"partly lo outflank the 300,000 palestinians who straddle the former Armistice Line"
(N33/356, para. E2). on 18 ,tanuary 1979, he stated that "'fenish setElenent ia
netesiary eist of Nablus in order to protect a Proposed approach road to the Jordan
valley fron the coastal Plains" (A/347f;.I, Para' 5?)' He waa also rePorted to have
stated during a cabinet di.scussion on the macter that "'Jews had every Iight to
rebuild therr homes in the centre of Hebron, especially a! sites Iike the Hadassa
hospital where Jewish title is indisPutable'r. L9/ 14'' Drobles, co-Chairnan of the
Jerrish Agency's settrenent Departnent, staled on I8 May 1979 at a press confererrce
that the Seate of Israel mus! for political and other reasons develop the entire
region of "Judea and sanaria" (west Bank) (N34/63r, Para' 49)
'
and referring to
naial outposts established in the fiscal year L982/83 | he said that they were
designed io curb "iuegal spread of Arabs in vital areas" (A./37/485' Para' 209) '
31. Durlng the perloal 1977 Lo 1983' settlenent3 were established as follofls:
.lordan valley' 17t East .Ierusalem' Ili Gaza' IIi Hebron, 15i Bethlehem' 8i
Ramallah' I7t Nablus' 2Ii and .fenin' 5 (see append j'x I-A)'
32. In a survey of the activities of his l'linistry' the Minister of Science and
Development, Mr. Yuval Ne'enan, who is also the Acting chairman of the \toint
comnittee on settlenent of the Government of Israel and lhe llorld zionist
organizationr seated on 13 March 1984 that
uthere isnrt enough settrenent ... There lsnrt enough - no!-:o- lu"h in terms
of the nurdrer - but the problem is rate, since we are establishing
settlements, but unfortunately they took J-ike settlenents set up by the
pre-stale Jewish co[ununity, when there was no state yet' r ]'ould hoPe that at
the tin|e when this is being done by Ehe state, there would not be 15 housing
unrts at the beginning, lul fOO ana ZOO.'. If you look at ny survey and see
where lhe 48 selt.Lenents have been established in the last years' you will
find that settlemenes not in accordance wi.t'h the rAllon Planr can be counted
on one hand ... only srx or seven of the settlenents we established were
outside the (pararneiers of the) pLan. of course, if you Put the Allon Plan tn
a narrower corrrdor, then nany nore settlements are outside the plan"' fy
A/39/233
E/1984,/79
Eng.]-ish
Page l-?
B. plan fornu I at ion
33. 'According to the infornation gaChered by the soufces, consultants fron secondary formulation of settlenent plans is done by various bodies, notabLy the l'linj.stries directly concerned lrtth ;ettlement, for exanpte, the Ministries of
lu?r:gl:alintrl:z.a, Eron Hrso uaslrsnog aancdti vDeelyfe nce. The Settlenent Departnen! of the t{ortd ?ionist engaged in settlement planning, and in one lnsc,ance, the Gush Enunim a.l-so had produced a naster p],an. However, final approval lies with the Ministerial conunittee for settrement an; the rsraeri covernment cabinet. The I'tinisterial Comni.ttee is conposed of seven ninisters of covernnent and an equal nunber of nernbers of the world zionist organizition. !L/ The Irtinisterial Conmietee as well as the Settlenent Department of the World Zionist Organization announce fron tine to tirne various plans which have been formuLated by each body, scmetlnes short-tern and at other times. Iong-term.
34' rh its planning, the settlenent Deparcnent of the worrd zionist organization, lrhich is said to be identicar lrith the settlement Departmen! of the Jewiah Agency vthich has responsi.bil j,ty for settlemenc within Israel proper (A,/33,/356) r can draw on Ehe experience i'n estabtisbing settr-enents within rsrael during the period from 1948 to 1967' The Planning is on a regional basis and conprises rural settlements, rural service qentres and regional t.owns, as for example in the Lakhish regron within Israel 13/ Evidence of this approach is conralned 1n a report in the I'la'ari'v of 3 l"hrch r-9?4 that prans had been drawn up for the estabrishment rn the Gaza Strip of 6 noshavin and 3 kibbutzin ar-ong with a nunicipal centre. The regronaL centre of Aton shvut for the Etzion tslock of settle;ents l,l,/ ana Iita'aLeh Ephra j.n as a service centre f or settlers in the Jordan ValGy !N,z are further exanples of the regi.onal planning approach.
35. Since 19?7, coincidj.ng with the election of the Likud covernment, the settl-enent Department of the world zionist organization appears to have becorne nore actrve i.n forrnulating its oh,n plans, which Thus the Jerusaren post of rg January rg77 "aenide thseu olr3a",cat retotz c oovf er1a3u nJeann! uaap-ptr orvga7.?L. reporLed a ro-ur-vffi-pTan by the sutir"^."tJ"pJr.^"rra ro estabr-ish 56 rural settlements, incLuding 27 in the occupied territories. A five-year project for establrshing 59 settr.enents in the weit Bank was put forwarar in rg80 by the Settlenent Departrnent of the World Zionj.st Organization. Thirty of them had already been estabrished since 19?g and zo weie io oe reaoy by 1983. rril Another
g]3n-yas-put forward by the sertlenen! DeparlnenE to establish ?0 settlenenEg r'!4 L' rr eacn year) between rgg0 and 19g5, They vrere to be rocaged in proxirnity to other estab.l-ished settlenents around Hebron, Ma'a1eh Adunin, Jerusalem, and Jenin ar€a and the Jordan valley. !Z/ In a new deveLoprnent, a comnittee of experts drann from various ministries of covernnent (Defence, Housing and constructlon, Labour ahd social services) and representatives of tna sattt.nent Department of the world zionist organization have drawn up a naster pran to estabrish Gueh Enunr.n settlenents in the west tsank (15 according to Al Iitihad). I8l
36: In the survey of the activities of his Ministry of Science and Developnent referred to ear1j,er, the Minister, Mr. yuval Joint comnittee Ne I eman nentioned tha! since 19g2, the on sett]-enent had decided on the estabrishnent of 4g settlements of wh.rch I were to be i.n the .'Samaria,' nountains, Z in western ,,Sanariar,, Z in the
y,1?ffi|,
EngIish
Page 13
itordan vaueyi 5 in the ,terusalen-Etz ion tslock areai 2 on the Hebron Plateaui 9 in
the Yattir regiont 3 in Gaza, and 3 In the Arava, the other 4 being in GaIiIee- of
these, 43 t{ere either populated or started to be buj'lt. In 1984 and 1985 sorne
12 new settlenents trere to be established by the Settlement Division of the World
zionlst Organization. Some of these Hould be arny outpoats converted into civilr'an
aettlenents, "exploiting infrastructure constructed as part of defense activitiesr"
some rrould be settlenents in ehtirely netr areas. I9l
37. According to infornation provided bY the DeParttnent of occupied Honeland
Affairs of the Palestine Lib€ration organizati.on ( aPPenal ix II-B), Plans have b€en
formulated to establish another 72 setclements during the period 1983-1987,
distributed as follo({ss .lordan va11ey, 4i tsethlehem, 9i Nablus' 33i Hebron, 10,
Ramallah, 7t unspecified, 9.
C. lnvestnent in the settlenent proqratr,ne
38. It, is difficult to deternine precisely the nagnitude of resources expended in
the establiahnent of the Israeli settlements, particutarly because the resources
are nade avaitable from various 6ources, as the analysis belotr indicates. It tould
alpear that funds for the initial establishment, as weII as oPerations and
naintenance are included in the budgets of various nlnistries of Government,
notably those concerneal with agricuLture, houslng and defence, the last for the
establishment of nilitary outposts (nahals) r rniny of vthich have been converted
subsequently to civilian aettlements. The World U ionist Organi.zatj.on, through its
Settlenent Department, channels subslantial resources not onLy touarda the
establishnent of the setttenents, but also for Procuring settlers and naintenance
of outposta. 3gl The .lerish National Fund expends resources on buying and
reclaining land, and the Israeli Land Authority also Purchases land for settlelnent
purposes. 2I,/ According to th; infornalion gathered by the consultants' the Parent
bodies of various novements, such as Moshav and Kibbutz, and religious groups often
bear part of the costs of oPeracions and rnaintenance during Che inltial stag€s of
developing the settlements affiliated with thern. The resources invested Here in
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories as lrel.l as the Golan Heights
and, up to 1979, j.n the Sinai.
39. There is no record readily available of the reaources expended during the
initial years of the settlement [ovenent, apart from a report aPPearing in the
Uararetz of lO Februaly 1975 which nentioned Israeli pounds (I€) 800 nillion as the
anount q)ent on the settlem€nts since 1967' Another tePort i.n the qEelg of
I February L9?? rnentioned a decision of the Ministerj.al Connittee on Settlenent to
allocate I€ 225 million for estab.Lishing 25 settletnents, 17 of which were to be
built in the occr4)ied territorres.
40. l'1or€ precise infornation began to be released to the public nith the advent of
the Lj.kud Governnent in 19?7. speaking as the Charrman of the Ministerial
Com[iEtee on settlement, Mr, Sharon had said that the committee "intends to spend
Ie log n1lIion, one third of the development budget on new sitestrt as re!'orted in
the :Iwlen_!9st of 6 March 1978. A repors appearing in the B:gIglg of
6,June 19?8 mentioned that the Minister of Housing and Construction had budgeted
A/39/233
E/1984/19
lngL rsh
Page 14
I€ 80 nluion for constructions in neh, settlenents in the northern region of the
West Bank, out of a gtobal provision of I€ I70 nillj.on earmarked for settlenents.
The Israeli Goverrunen! budget for L978,/79 had the follovring breakdolrn for
setglements (A/33/356. para. 50):
I€ 2.5 billion for nev, settlenents and extension of existing ones
I€ 830 miUion for the Housing l4inistry
I€ 600 mitlion for the Agricultural Mihistry.
41, The declsion of the covernnent of Israel on 16 september 1979 to authorize the
purchase of ]-and in the West Bank and caza by Israel-i citizens and corporations
opened the door for private investnent to floo ingo lhe settlement novement, and so did the progranme of "Build your Oh,n Hone,', sponsored by the ,Jewi.ah Agency, rrbich
provided attractive incentives to prospective settlers.
42. By 1980, the expenditure on settlements rdaa increasing rapidly both because of
the accelerated programne of establishing them and also the fall in value of the
Israeli pound, It was reported that the Goverrunent was to invest at least
I€ 7.5 brlrion during the fiscal year 1980 in th€! occupied territories. A budget
of I€ 3 biuion had been allocated by the World zionist Organization Settlenent
Deparlnent to the developrnent of .103 settlements in the occupied territories
lU35/425, paras. 93 and 94),
43. Concernj.ng the fiscal yar L984/A5, the Jerusalen post of 2? October I9g3
reported tha! the !'j,nance llinister, Mr. yigal Cbhen-Orgad, had stated at the
Knesset Finance coruDittee meeting on 26 october that the expenditure on settlenents
Ln the occupied Palestinian territorres and lhe C.olan Heights for the fiscal year
L984/85 lrould be Israet j. shekels (Is) 35 biUion (pounds changed into shekets
in 1981).
IV. ,IPACT OF ISIIAE.LI SETTII]MENTS ON LAND AND WATER RESOURCES,
HOUSING, PUBI,IC AMNNITIES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
A. Inpact on grorth and expansion of pal.estinian towns and villageg
44. Palestinian comunities inhabiting the !{est Bank and caza are basically
agricutural. To them Che basic elenents of Land and water are of vital
i.nportance. The Ministry of occupied rerricories Affarrs of the coverrunent of
{tordan reports that up to January 1984, the State of Israel had taken pogsession of
2,607,90I dununs (260,790 hectares) of l{est Bank territory, vrhich constitures
47.4 per cent. of the total area. According to the sane source, 26 per cent of this
land has been allocated to the 165 fsraeli settlements created by the end of
,Iuly 1983. 22/ According to the WashingCon post, some Israeli sources have
estinated rsraeri control.l.ed land in the west Bank at over 50 to 60 per cenc of ita
total area. 2a/ Ihe example of the Jordan Valley can serve as an ilLuslration of
the nagni.tude of Israeli expropriaCion of palestinian lands. Elisha Efrat, an
Israe.]-i geographer, states that "!he Jordan Vauey is estinated to contain
,\,,/39/233
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Elng 1i sh
Page 15
16,500 acres (66,7?5 dunums or 6,677 hectares) of cultivable land unevenly
distributed along the l-ength of the valley. U sy his calculacion, on the basis
of 7.5 acres (30 dununs) ot land per agricultural unit, and apProxi.nately
80 agricultural unlts per settlenent, the Jordan ValLey could suPport between
18 and 25 Israeli settlenents. '4i The nost recent account of the Departnent of
Occupied HorneLand Affairs of the Palestine Liberation organization shorvs that by
the end ot 1983 IsraeL had established 31 settlenents of various types in the
,Jordan vaIley (see appendix I-A).
45. According to Elisha Efrat, the criteria for Locating Israeli settlements in
the occupled territories are to use the least surtable agricuftural land, to avoj.d
densely pq)ulated Palestinian localities and to refrain frorn impairing the grovtlh
of Palestrnlan vrlrages. :16,/ Hovteve r. according to Meron BenvenLstr (ex-Deputy
l'tayor of 'Jerusalem) the main criteria for planning and locating Israeli settlemenls
are as follovrs:
(a) Abolishing the independent ptanning poriers of Palestinian village
councils and district planning connissions, and vesting all planning powers in lhe
Hlgher Planning council, a body conposed of Israeli officials onLy, 4/
(b) Circunventing Patestinian villages, 39.,/
(c) r-ocating settlenents so that they restrict expansion of adjacent
Palestinian viltages and f,annst 29/
(d) segregating public services betneen Palestinian and Israelj.
settlenentst 30/
(e) Iocating Israeli settlements on higher ground for a nilitarily nore
secure and superior positioni 3I/
(f) Restricting fueure sPatial expansion of Palestinian tonhs and vil-l'ages by
Liniting their maximum built-uP area by restrictive land use regulations, and
desj.gnating the remaining spaces either "special areas" (i.e. al].ocated or Planned
to be allocated t'or Iaraeli settlemenEs) or agrlcultural land' natural reserveg or
areas for future planningi !?,/
(9) creating extremely wide building Iines on either sides of naih roads
(100 and I5o metres) in order to obstruct traditional exPansion of Palestiniah
housing along main arteries. fil
46. A very recent development in Israeli settlenents I policy is Locating Israeli
seetlenents inside denseLy populated Palestinian urban cenlres. The lvlinistry of
the Occq)ied Territorles Affairs of Jordan reports lhat the Goverrunent of Israel,
j.n spite of the strong oPPosition of the local poPulation, has initiated a plan of
establishing an urban sectlernebt in the niddle of lhe city of Hebron in lhe
west Bank at the location of the central vegetable narket which nas burnt down
during Israeli-iq)osed curfew hours. 34,/
^E//3L99/8243/739
EngIish
Page 16
47. Accordlng to recent press reporta, "the rsraeli authorities are considering a plan drarrn up by a conrnittee chaired by Minister lrordechat porat for the
resettlenent of Palestini.an refugees living rn ca|Ips in th€ West Bank,,. S,/ A
najor obJective of this plan which is known as the o8en porat plan'r, is to dernolish
aome of the canpa and construct proper housing i.n specified locations, in order to
relocate the refugees to ner{ and adequate living quarters. Sone Igraeli newspapers
have announced that the United Nationa Relief and Works Agency for palestine
Refug ees in the Near East (uNRvtA) triu be lnvolved in this project. !p/ In a statenent to che press, on 14 Decernber 1993, the coruIli6s i.oner-ceneral of uNIltyA nade clarifiations to Ehe effect that:
(a) T NRWA has not been associated Hith the plan and does not envisage being
involved in 1ts execution t
(b) The agency will not oppose voluntary acceptance of the npve to new
quarters by the refugees, but rritl strongly object to any co€rcive attenpt to rnake
refugees conFly with any particular attenpt,
(c) The agency i{ill expect to continue providlng its services to relocated
refugees, since their slatus and eligibtlity as refugees tvill not be affected by the rpve. But reLocating installations, such aa schools and clinics, irill require
addiCional funding. g,/ Palestinian sources consider the sBen porat plann another
atternpt by the covernment of Israel in Che dir€celon ot dj.sperslng palestinians
within the occr4ried territories rrith the objective of creating a more honpgeneous
nosa i.c of Jewish settlemenes and palestinian comnunities in th€ region, and
diamantrihg the catlps which bave become stronghol,ds of paleatinian resistance
against assinilation and erosion of palestinian national ldentity. !9.,/
48, The future j.r|I)act of the Israeti settlernents on the growth and expansion of
Palestinian towns and vr'l1ages in the ooc upied territoriea rrill be deternined by
the nurnber of settrenents that nul be established in the comlng years and the
lncrease in the Israe]i popuLation living in then, According to the data coq)iled tv th€ Department of occupied uqnerand Affairs of the palestine r,iberation
Organization fron Israeli sources, sotne 78 new settlenenta wiII be e€tablished
durrng the period t983-1987 (see appendix f-B). At preseht, approxinatefy
35,000 Israelis are said to be 11vin9 j.n the settlenents, and accarding to
government plahs 100,000 are expected to live j.n Cbern by I98? h,ith a projected
figure of 190,000 by the year 2OIO. 22!/
49. considering that investment resources are being provided on an increasing
scale for the settlenent movement (see paras, 38-43 above), and Israeli fafiilies
are incllned to move into the settrementa becauae of the inproveal quarity of life
in then and cheaper prices of houses, .j!,]q/ tfre target for 1987 appears to be a possibility' and that for 2010 a nore ne-eburous one. According to one esti.nate, ily during the period 1985-1994, the natural increase of the Palestinian population in
the territories ia exp€cted to be approxinatety 685,000. over lhe next decade the
above-nentioned increase in the nunber of IsraeLi settlers, plus the natural groffth of the Pareslinian popuration, even vrithout considering lhe conceivable return of a portion of Palestinian refugees, is expected to double the existing populatioh of
the territories. This means that, even at. the present unacceptable standards,
A/39/233
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Pag e 17
there rill1 be a doubling of the need for lrater, cultivabLe land' housing. public
anenities and services, infrastructural facllities etc.
50. Previous polici,es and Practices of the (bverrment of rsrael in exproPriatrng
land for the settlements ih the occupied territories indicate that to accomnodate
an additional 65,000 to 155'000 Israeli settLers lrj.lhin the next 26 years t,ill
require further expropriaeion of large quantieies of land not only for Providing
the settlenents with the necessary infrastructure but also for their expansion.
This would mean that Pal-estinian towns and villages eill not have enough land for
their future grovrch and expansion to acconnodale the increase in the Palestinian
population projected above.
B, Ilr['act on water resources
5I. According to Meron .Benveni.stj.,
"The inpact of Israeli settlements on west Bank water is a function of the
amount of land irrigated by !h€ settLers and not of the actual nurnber of
settlers. Indeed, Israeli settlers today are 2-3 per cenc of the west Bank
population and use 20 per cent of the tolal ltaLer consunption of the area'
Yet 96 per cent of this anpunt is for irrigation". !)/
The supply of rraler in tshe West Bank and Gaza is estinated to be apProxinately
800 niLlion cubic netres (m3) ana 50 rnj-U-ion .3 p.. y.u, respectively' The
annual consunption of vrater for agricgltural and donestic uses in each of lhese tto
regions is estimaled at I0O ni]-lion n5 per year. This neans that nhil-e the
annuat supply of water in the .West Bank is eight tines nore than its consunPtron,
Gaza consumes about double the anbunt of nater available t'rom annual
precipitation. !l/ The fotloyring table presents water resources and their
allocation to donestic and agricultural uses.
52. whrLe the situation in caza is very serious and requires innediate renecly to
prevene rapid drop of undergound water level belov, the red line' increase of
salinity, and intrusion of sea lrater into the land, the suPply of tater in the
West Bank is nore than adequate for the present and the future needs of a nuch
1arger population and extended agricultural activities. 44/ Ho'rtever, Israeli
sources, by oefining the region to be served by the available water resources of
the West Bank as the area belneen the MediLerranian Sea and the .tordan River, Hhich
includes the State of Israel, arrive at the folloiring opposite picture and
conclusions !
"The scarcily of water in the region bet\,reen the l{editerranian Sea and the
.tordan River has resulted in a situation where all the najor groundwater
aquifers at€ already fuUy exploited. In the Gaza strip and in the western
and northeastern basins of Judea and Sanaria, the groundltater aquifers are
already overexploited, Exploitation of lrager resources must end in .tudea and
Sanaria and decrease in the Gaza Slrip. According to Plesent forecasts of
demographic and econornic developmen!, there vtill be a water deficit by the end
of lhe century of 200-400 mrltj.on mJ p.r y*"r in these two areas.'' j!
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Page lU
Table I3 l{ater resourees and their allocation to donestic and
irriqation uses: 198 2
Allocation
Land under Available of waterirrigation
nater (nil-l-ion n'.)_
PopuLation (thousand (nillion Irriga- Domes-
(thousands) dununs) n3) tion a/ t.rc b,/ Total
Annua.I
def ic it
or
surplus
(miIlion
m-,
West Bank
Gaza Strrp
74A
4'l6
87. s
J.0 2
800
50 Lo2
I5
9,5
.1-02.5 +697 .5
i.lr. 5 -61.5
Sourcesi
l'or populatlon figures, Stacisticel Abstlact of Israel, l9B3i
I'or I'Palestinred;n d unoer rrrrgatlon, Uniteci Nattons Conterence on Trade and ljeveloplEnt, optr.ons ror deve.Lopnent" (,!'D/B/96O), reporr prepared by P. c. Sadler
and ts. Abu [ishk. II lrhy 1983, p. l-8i for available water, p. I9t
l'or calcul-ating altocated water tor 1rr1gatron, }j].].sha Bfrat, ',Spatiat
Palterns ot Jewlsh and Arab settlenents in Judea and Sanarra", rn ljanre.l- J. Elazar,
eo.' Judea, Samaria and Gaza3 Vrews on the present and l.uture (washrngton, D.c.,
tunerican lnterprise Instltute, I9A2) , p. 22t
I'or calculating all-ocated water for domestrc use, Meron tsenvenrstr, The
Eest Bank and Gaza, Data Base Project (vtashington, D.C,, American EnEerprise
Instrtute, 1982), p. 23,
a/ At -1,000 m',/yr,/dunum.
p/ At 20 m3lyrlperson.
53. Reasons for the above-nentioned conclusion of fsraelr sources, whrch are drawn
rn splte ot the trgures presented Ln the precedlng tabLe, is beyond the scope of
thrs report. this conclusion, hohrever, has resulted in restrictrve measures
rll[)osed by the occupylng authorrtles in terns of linj.ti.ng the usage of lrater by the
Palest.inian population to the naximun level used in 1967. 4,9-/ l''hLch has had a
olrect and detrrnent.al rmpact upon the trvrng condttLons or the Patesti.nran
People. A! the same tine, Israelr seEtlements are being createq in lncreasrng
nutdbers every year. bach Israell aErrcuLturar settlement consunes an average of
2.4 million mr of waLer per year. 47/ "DriIIing of irrigation wells has been
severeJ,y restrrcteo rn rhe l{est Bank srnce 1967, whrie che Israelr Watser Corpany
was given pernission, to driu. 30 new wells there. Since 1967, only tlro neh, vr,ells
tor agrrcultural use have been pernitted to the (Palestinian) people of the
West Bank". 48l
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Paie Iu
54. As vre seated before, I6rae1 considers the wes! Bank aquifers as serving Israe1
and the west Bank, and according to the previous quotation, in paragraph 52, the
na]pr aquiters in this area are already fuuy exploited and even in sor e areas
overexpl.oited. For all pralj.cal purposes, therefore, the fact seens to be that the
aquifers ot the West Bank, instead of serving a populaCion of 748,001, PalesLinians
and 35,000 rsraelj. settlers, also serve a sighificant portion of over 3 nillion
fsraelis within Israel proper. If this practice continues, the need created by tbe
future increase of Israeli settlers and the natural growth of population in the
West Eank alone. rvill surpass the capacity of the !{est Bank vrater resources.
C. Inpact on hous ing
55. According to figures presented in the @, the anount ot residential- buiLding conpLeted du{ing I98I in the West tsank towns and
villages declined by 15.4 and 4.I per cent respecti\rely cornpared with 1980. In
Gaza' residentral construction in the towns had increased by 23.9 per cent, h,hiLe
decreasing by 5.8 per cent in th€ villages. The cornbined figures of West Bank and
Gaza show a decline of I.2 per c€nt j.n tovrns and 4.3 per cent ih villages, This is
illustrated i.n the table below.
Table 2: Area of residential and non-residential buildinqs
con{rleted in 1980 and l98I
(thousands of n2)
West Bank Gaza Strip Total
1980 1981
change
(percentage)
r980
Change
(Percen-
I98I tage) 1980
Change
(percen-
198I tage)
Tota]-
To'rrns
V].iJ'ages
589.0 534.3
27I.7 229.8
3\7.4 304.5
772.7 -2.6
420.7 -L.2
352 -4.3
-I5. 4
-4 .1
204.5 238.4 +16.6 79 3.5
r54.I I90.9 +23.9 425.8
50.4 47.5 -5. I 367.8
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983, table XXltIl/36, p. 798.
56. The above-nentioned dectine becane nore significant in che Light of the fact
that by one estinate there are 200,000 residential units in the West Bank of tthich
7u per cent (14U,00C unitsl need to be replaced because of either d:.lapidatlon or
unaccePtable standards. !2/ In terms of square metres of construction on the basis
of 120 m2 per dnelling unit, this neans 16,800,000 m2 of needed residentiaJ.
constructlon.
57. As rras sgated ln the report of the Secre tary-ceneral to the General Assenbly
at rts thlrty-eighth sessi.on lA/38/ 278-A/L983/77 , annex, para. 24), there has been
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a srgnificant discrepancy in the anount of residentj.al construction in relation to
total housing need, which is comprised of need created by population growth plus
replacenent of dilapidated and substandard housing. The folloning table updates
the figures presented in the above-mentioned repor C on the supply of housing in
relation to housing need in the occupied terri.tories. It can be readily observed
that the hous.ing industry over the 15 years since the L967 occupation, after
satisfying the housihg need of 38.589 units resulting fron population growth, has
only contributed a total of 6,72I units (an average of 450 units per year) tonards
replacing the estinated 140,000 dilapidated and substandard units.
'Iable 33 cotl|}rar ison of supply of housj. g v,/rth housinq need in Ehe
lqlestinian rerg!94€E!_f9!f:f9!?
West Bank Gaza Strip Total
Population increase, L967-!9BZ,A/
Average family size, L9g2 D/
Number ot tanr.Iies, lncrease, I967-L9A2
Number of families living in substandard
and dilapj.dated housing, I9B2 c/
Total housing need, 1982
Toeal residential construction conp.l-eted,
1967-1982 E/ {rInz)
Average size of drreuing units cofipleted,
19 79-1981 g/ G^2)
TotaL nunber of dwelling units, increase,
196 7-I9 82
3 888 800 .1 615 800
161 600
6.7
24 rL9
116.6
33 069
95 500
6.6
L4 4'tO 38 589
L32
L2 24I
I40 000
I78 589
45 3I0
. Sources: Statistr.cal Abstract of Israel, 1983: g,/ tabte XXVII/jt
q,/ table xxvll/t4r 5!/ tabte Xxvrr/33, g,/ rable Xxvrr,,/:a;
9/ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Pa.LesLines options
for developrnenttt |TD,/B/96O), report prepared by p. G. Sadter and ts. Abu Kisnx,
11 May 1983, p. 4L,
58. The long-term impac t of the occupying authorities' Iack of attention to
resrdentrar construction in parti.curar and consbruction activiti.es 1n general,
could be expected to further aggravace the shortages in housing units ind pubJ-ic buildings in the fuCure. The same could be sard of the restrlctlve praclrces of
the occupying authorities in terms of adninistrative obstacres to issuing building
pernits !9./ ana transf,ers of funds frorn abroad. 5V
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59. There has been no activi.ty j.n resi.dential conslruction by the public sector
since 1968 in the Weat Bank and since I9Z8 in caza. 52,/ This means that the
occupyi,ng authorrties have not taken any measures coHards helping lov.,€r income
groups of the local population to acquire adequate housing since those dates. At
the sane tlne, virtually aII ot the IsraeLi settlers enjoy sone kind of direct or
indirec! subsrdy rn the form of long-term Low rnterest governneht loans, and
government provision of publl.c anenilies, and intrastructural facilities, lvhich
further decreases cost of Che housrng etc. !)/
60. l'he contrast in housing and coffnunity facrlrties is nost apparent in occup ied
Arab rterusalem, While nen apartment conplexes have been built in and around it
with all modern amenities, paved roads and cpen spaces, little or no irnprovement
has been nade to the housing and intrastructure in the Arab sector of the city.
This neglect is said !o extend to nunicipal servi.ces also, such as garbage
collection, street cleaning and public l-ighting. vthe re other urban aettlenents
have been established, such as Ariel, Maraaleh Aduntrn, Maraaleh Etrain and Kiryat
Arba'a, the same high standards as in Jerusalern would have been applied, as is
evident in the demoli.shed settler0ent of yanit in northern Sinai.
61. So far as the standard of housing is concerned, there are many indications,
and rt i6 r€asonable to a6sume, that the houses in the Israeli settlements are
conslructed and equipped at a rnuch higher standard than those occupied by the
Palestrnians. Assurning Chat alt new house construction in the selllenents includes
such facilities as kitchen, bathroon. !oile!, runhing water and electricity, an
assessnent of the Lack ot these fac j.J'it'ies in palestinian homes in the occup red
territories can be rnade fron the table belon, extracted fron the statistical
Abstracr ot Israel 19 83.
lable 4. Eousehofd tacilities in the ttest Bank and caza, I98I
(percentages)
West tsank
Total vill-ages Towns
Ret u9 ee
Total ca[ps Tovrns
Kitchen exclusively
for household
No bathroon
No toilet
Running water in
dI^,eJ.l rng
Elect.ricity round
the c]'ock
39.7 63.1
83.9 89.2
49,3
44.9
50. 6
65.8
59.6
2L.5
29,3
26.9
86,4
26.2
2.4
79.0
95.8
80.I 85.5 77.4
38.8
2.2
51. 4
88.5
48. 9 30. 3
r.0 r.7
s9!!9! : stat ist icai Abstlggg_9lElgglr.Jgl, tabf e xxvl I/3 6.
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62, Israeli rural settlements go through various stages of development, such as
tenporary acconmodation in the nahals to prefabricated buildings and ultillEtely to
pernanent structures of houses with public buildings, electricity, water supply,
approach roads and other arnenities. Conunenting on th€ facilities available in the
settlernents, l,tr. Nafez Nazzal, in his article on 'rl,ind tenure, the sett.l-ements and
peacerr rn the book, A Palestinian Aqenda for the West Bank and Gaza' 1L,/ writes
that the houses are air-condrtioned, and those situated in the ,fordan VaLley are
equrpped wj.th a ponerful apparatus capable of deating krith the heat of the valley.
Each house, or in sotne cases every pair of houses, has access to a huge arrconditioned
shelter, dug in the ground and overtopped by boulders, which is
connected by a paved way to the front of each house. ttor{s of electric larq)s
crlss-cross each settlenent and surround Che tence. The settlements ale flood-lit
in the night. Inside the settlenent there is a central area covered by grass which
requj,res considerable amounts of nater to keep it green. Comnunity services, such
as ki.tcheh, cl-ubs and di.ning roons are air-conditioned,
63. The Israeli regional planning concept ot rural settlements, rural service
centres and regional tovrns has been applied vrith advantage to provide the basic
necessj.ties and services to the Israeli settlers. Ho$ever, no such Planning
approach has been applied to improve the living conditions of the PaLestinian
residehts. Palestinian conununities have been Iimited by various regulations flotll
undertaking nelr constructions whether private or public, and rnunicipalities have
been restricted fron inproving services or provldlng nen faciLiti.es. Uahy
restriclions have been placed on improving water aervice and electricity supply,
whrle the neighbouring setglements have been provided generously lrith these
anenrttes.
64. The inpac t ot the above-mentioned discrepancy and differing standards in
housing conditions of, Israeli settlers and Arab populatlon ia expected'to have
far-reaching effects of deprivation, frustration and antagonism of the local
inhabitants of th€ area against the f sraeli-.terrish population in the neighbouring
settlenents. Sone of the violent incidents betvreen Israelis and palestinians,
recoEded in the reports of the Special Conmittee to Investigate fsraeli Practices
Affecting the Hunan Rights of the population of the Occupied Territories, E/ can
be reasonably assurned to have been parlly due to the frustration resulting fron
preferentiaL treatnent of Israeli settlers.
65, The occupying authorities are continuing their practices of demolishihg houses
and therefore Punishing the families of those suspected or convicted of cotruni tt i ng
vrolent acts or engaging in demonstrations, stone throrring etc. against Israeli
settlers and authorities, Appendrx III presents the number or- houses demoliiahed
by Israeli authoritie€ frorn 1967 to 1982. It can be observed from this table' that
srnce 1977' when such demolition was reduced to one, there has been a marked
increase of up to 55 units in L982. The total nunber of houses denplished for
punrtrve reasons over the 16-year perj.od of occupation has been I,346 units, 28 of
which were denoli.shed ih caza.
66. Accordr.ng to info.rnatioh sr4rplied to the consullants by palestinian sources
and confirmed by news reports in Israeli papers, 56l in addition to denplishing
houses, Israelr aulhorities have devised a new nethod of punishment, by whlch the
house' or the nain roon of lhe house of the fanily whose rnember is accused of stone
throwing, i6 sealed off with concrete instead of being denoli.shed.
u 39/233
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V. ECONOMIC I!{PACI' OF ISRAIiLI SETTI,E;I4EIiTS
A. Inpact on production and trade
57. The noat irmediate and direct consequences of the acceleralion of Israeli
3ettlenent in the occupied territories are on oh'nership and use of land. These, in
Lurn' ilpoae radical shanges j.n Che econqny of the territories, the central
:haracteristic of trhi.ch has been the Predominance of agriculture. ExproPriatlon
rnd confiscation, by their nature, Iinit the land area accessible to Palestrnian
c-arners, q/ arii the associated control of lrater resources by Israel g,/ directly
iffects the utilization and productivity of this land.
i8. other measures aaloPted by the occuPying Polder j.h resPonae to tbe requlrernenEs
f its oon econony, and to its political and security considerations, further
:estrict the freedon of Palestinian farners in the use of their land and inpede the
Independent developtnent of the agricultural sector. Exatq)les of such neasures are:
(a) opening of roads to connect settlements aJrong themselves and with IaraeL
rhrough agricultural land, 39/ ana the naintenance of 'safety' zones along them,
rhere Pal-eatinians are not al-lowed to plant or build, lig,/
(b) Restrictions on the use of grazing Land, 9L/
(c) Linitations on the areas cultivated nith speciflc Products or in sPecif ic
,eographical areas, e.g. restrictlon on Planti.ng of citrus fruit trees in the liest
rank, @/ and its prohlbi.tion in Gaza, 63/ restrictions on Plantj.ng of tonatoes and
ggplanc in the .tiftlik reglon (Jordan Vauey) t $!,/ and on a].l crops in the Ghor
/atley (West Bank) where the pattern of production is to b€ deternined by the
.urhoritiesi !9/
(d) Prohibition of overnigbt stays in the Ghor valley by Palestinian
.gricultural workers residing elserrhere, so as to discourage their work in this
tea, t9/
(e) Prevention of the establishment of agricultural co-oPeratives by
alestinian farners, and of their access to agricultural credit trorn East Bank
nstitutions. gf.,/
9. Related to Che pol iclr of "open borders" between Israel and the Lerritories'
hich has been naintained ai'nce 1969' g-/ che agricultural sector has been
e-oriented in response to the need of the Palestinian farmer to emPhasize those
ropa that can be sold in Israel, and de-enPhaslze those which, iven if for local
onsulPtionr are produced nore cheaPly in Israel. In their endeavours to use
arket opportunitles in Israel, Palestinian farmers have beneflted fron access to
sraeli lechnology, but a great part of technical progress, Particularly in the
econd half of the nineteen seventies, haa been due also to technicaf and financial
id from .tordan and charitabLe organizationst or it has been inicative of
evelopments in .lordan. The obstacle to faster groldth of agricuLture, it has been
baerved, Iies j.n Israeli land and vrater policies !9,/ whictr are associated with the
ettletnent thrust. Use ot- irrigation by Palescinian f,arners i.s ]'inited. Thus,
ields vary according to rarnfall, particularly in the West Bank.
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70. The cbntribution of agriculture to the GNp of the territories tends te
fructuate year to year in uniaon with the ftuctuations output, in the value of agricultural ehich reapond, in turn, to the volurne of rain, Ilowever, a dininutj.on of thrs contribution between the periods L96g to 1974 and l9z5 to 1980 can be observed in the l{est Bank, and a dorenward trend is evident in caza, as shoirn in table 5.
Thus the rerative ilportance of the agricurturar sector has clearly alecliheal.
71- &ployment in agriculture has decreased in boch territories, a€ evidencecr ln
tabre 6. Given the increaae in value ot agricultural product, i! would seen that labour productivity has increased. Thrs is corroborated by the gronth in value
added per trorker ot 6.9 per cent in caza and 8 per cent in the t{est tsank b€Eween
1975 and L98I. 70/
72. The labou! freed by increased productivity in agriculture has not been
absorbed in the tnduatrral sector ot the terrrtorres but, as will be drEcu€sed later, has had to find ernployment in Israel..
73. rhvestnent rn industry has been aevereJ-y llr0iced by a number ot tactors: zv
(a) Lack of an indi.genous financial systetn rrhtch rrould provide producers rrith
credr,t, specralized knowledge, and advicei
(b) Uncertahty, both policical and financj,al, the lagter being the
con6equence ot the hrgh rates of infrat.j.oh ln rsraer, and the continued devaluation of the fsraeli shekel,
(c) Lack of participation by parestinians in major econolnic poL icy deci.sions that affect thern, whlch resurt.s in lack of protection tor thei.r lndustries,
Particularly agai.nst corq)etiti.on from IsraeLrs far more developed induEtrles,
n-il-i.t ar(yd ) goInvePrnorrnte nlitc ensing of industrial nachinery, under the authorlly of the t
(e) Building licences, the fees for which are high for tbe level of capitalization ot Palestj.nian industries, and the process lengthy,
(f) Restrictions on the use of, water and prohibition on the sinki.ng of new we11s. Wher€ new industry is prohibiled in or near towns or cities, and weII
sinking is restricted elsewhere, lack of h'ater becones an inpedinent to ner
induscry t
(s) I'axes and custorDg duties. The Jordanian income tax of 25 per cent and
Socral- Eervrce tax of I2.5 per cent. bave been reEained. In addition, a value adoed tax of 8 per cent was Lntroduced in 1975, raised to 12 per cent in 1977 and to
J.5 per ceht in 1981. Custons dutres are hi.dden in the prrces charged by the Israeli lnporters through uhom inports are to be made, and an addltional value
added tax on the transaction wrth the rlq)orter must be borne by the frnaL buyer.
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Table 5. Contribution of the agricultural sector to gross natlonal product
in the West Bank and caza, 1968-1980
(l4illions of Israeli pounds in current Drices)
West Bank
Contribution
Va1ue ot of
a9rrcuICuraI agrrculture
product (perceneage)
cohtribution
Value ot of
agricultural agriculture
product (percentage)
1968 330. 0
1969 420.0
L970 481.0
L97L 722,0
L972 I 118.0
1973 .t 305.0
L974 2 257.0
r.97s 3133.0
1976 4 705.0
L977 6 280.5
t9?8 l-1 560,0
L979 20 080. r
1980 5L 920.9
115.0
153.0
14]..0
203.0
307.0
340.0
796.0
ILJ.V
r 243. 0
I 380. I
3 090.4
4 430.2
t5 r80.7
128. 0
r54, 0
206.0
288. 0
450.0
671. 0
96r.0
r 428. 0
2 t78. O
3133.0
5 068.0
l-0 045. 0
21 457 .0
34. I
36.4
29 .3
28.1
27 .4
26.O
35.2
22.7
26.4
21.9
26.7
22.O
29.2
36.0
41.0
54.0
73.0
106.0
134.0
L76.O
297.O
485.0
685.0
997.0
L 487.0
24, L
26,6
26.2
25.3
23. s
18. 3
20.7
22.2
21. a
1v. b
r4.8
12.3
Source: David Xahan, Agriculture and Water in the ltese Bank and Gaza
(Jerusalem, West Bank Data Base Project, 1983), table 5, p. 16.
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English
Page 25
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A/39/233
s/L984/79
English
Page 27
74. Under the condit.rons described above, lhe induslrial seclor of the territorles
renains one of snal]- enterprises (98 per ceng of then enploy I0 or fewer vJorkers)
concentrated in the folLoning occupations: reparr trades, 13 per centi quarrying
and,cenent block and trle nanufacturrng, l.L per cent, carpentry and crafts,
15 per centi and seh'ing and garment nanufacturing, 20.5 per cent. llost tirms are
operatrng at around 50 per cent capacity. 72/ rhe combined industrial value added
in the West Bank and Gaza equals about one per cent of the value added in Israeli
industry. 73/ t4ost firns are onner-financed and cannot offeE enplol.rnent and nage
conditions conpegrtrve wj.th lhose in IsraeL. Those in sevring and garment
manufacCuring perform finishing work ufiCer subcontract for Israeli firms utilizing
very lov-Paid fena.l-e labouri thus, they contrj.bute very Little to industrial value
added in the terr itori es.
75. The agricuttural and industrial activities of the settlers, in contrast, are
Pronoted and subsidized by the (bverru0ent of Israef. The extensive use of
irrigation by the settlers has been described in section IV, section B. The high
degree of protection of Israelj. goods is well documented, as is the use of price
guarantees for agricultural products. 4/ tn additlon, the recent settlement drive
is conplenented by an indusCr iali zation plan for the West Bank which is designed to
attract rnduatry and Israeli labour to this "hinterlando, according to nhich there
wj.Il be by the year 2015, over 85,000 Jeuish r.,orkers in Israeli West Bank industry
and only about 23,000 PaLestinian workers. The plan proposes the largest fsraelr
rndustrra]. concentrations to be located riithin the nost densely populated regiona
of the West Bank and hear the najor Israeli population areas. 75/
76. Israel exercises total- control ot trade b€tvreen the occup ied territories and
the rest of the norld, including Israel. The territories have become an important
nErket for lsrae1i products, whlle exports ot their products are restrlcted. In
the case of agriculcural products, restrictions to their exportation to Israel
protect Israeli products fron conpetj.tion. lS-/ At the sane time, Israeli
restrictive policies do not pernit the developnent of alternative industriaL
exports. 77/ an]us the "open bordersl policy has operated in one drrection. On the
other hand, a policy of "open bridges" (those cohnecting lhe Wes! Bank nj.th Jordan,
across the Jordan River) has also been applied, Iri.th linitations. On the exPort
side. the Arab boycott of Israeli products has restricted industrial exports to
.lordan, mostly originating in the l{est Bank, as local industrj.es have had to buy
their ihputs from or through Israel. LV On the inport side, restrictions,
Iicences and dulies, and lhe adninistrative and security controls illE)osed have
discouraged glowth. Trade with the rest of the norld has not developed, as it has
to be channe.Lled through Israeli agenls, and is thus subject to Israel-i control and
direction. Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the pattern of trade that has evolved under
these conditions for the West Bank and Gaza, respectively.
77. It. is apparent from tabl,es 7 and 8 that, in all years since 197I, the
territories have had a negative trade balance. Most inportantly' the balance
vis-a-vis Israel - a country with which trade },as practically ni.l- before the
occupation - has been hot only hegative, but cohsistently larger than the total
trade deficit. Thus the surplus achieved in the trade with Jordan only partly
oftsets the persistent defrcit wtth the rest of the vorld and nith Israel. Net
transfers by Palestinians living abroad paid 2L Eo 28 per cent of the West Bank
trade deficit and 39 to 44 per cen! of tha! of caza betneen 1980 and 1982. 3A1
A/39/233
E/ L984t/79
English
Page 28
78. Israel becane very quickly (by fgZI, rrhere the frgures rn table 9 st.art) the nalor trading partner ot the Cerritories. 80/ According to tabJ-e 9, roughly
50 Per cent of West Bank and 80 per cent of c."u exports for Israe].' 1921-1980 went to whi,le 79.8 to 87.8 per cent of West liank rrports and 84.9 per cent to
9L per cent of those of caza origj.nated in Israel. fndustrial products
consti.tuted, in alt years, over 80 per cent ot totaL itrports of boeh territories
fron Israel. The territoriea have becone Ehe nost inportant matket for Israeli
products after that of the United States.
A/ 39 /233
E/r98\/Tg
Enel i sh
Pa.ge 29
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E/r9B\/79
English
Page 31
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E/L984/79
Englrsh
Page 32
B. Inpact on labour and enployment
79. Israel has utilized increasing numbers of workera fron ttte occupied terrj.tories. While in L970 on1y lI.9 per cent of palestinian workers were erqrJ-oyed in Israelr the percentage had increased to 32.4 by f975 and 35.5 by 1982, and
enPiolznent in the uerritorles declt ned fron 88.I per cent in 1970 to 64.5 per cent in 1982 (see table I0). The doninan! feaeure in the alistribution of patestinian
labour in Israel has been the overlrhe.hrng irportance ot the construction sector,
where, according to IIO, 9y there is "a disproportionate conceneration of workers
from rural area6'. It nould seen that the marked reduction in agricultural
elPloyment in the occupied territories provides a poo]. for enployment in I6raeL,
mostly in cohstruction, but increasj.ngly also in the induserial sector, where by
Che end of the nineteen seventles, it accounted for about 5 per cent of the total
rnrpower. !_2,/
80. It is also lo be noted that enploynent of Palestinians 1n Israe]' rose fastest
uP to 1973, when the country enjoyed a booming econony, and declined fron 1r.975 to 1977, foLlowing the general recession in Israel, suggesting the contribution
tnade by Palestinian Iabour to the expansion of the Israelr econony, and its role as
"buffer" in lime of recession. I! rnay be noted ln thls regaral that durlng the
recessron years of J.973 to 197b, I€raeli unelploynent increased insignif icantly -
from 2.6 per cent in 1973 to 3.6 in 1976 - corq)ared with unenployment during the
l9ti5-L967 recession, 83,/ whrch was 3.6 per cent rll 1965 anct I0.4 per cent in 1967.
81. Thus' the Land and hrater poLicles associated Hith the settleneht policl', oy
reducrng agrrculturaL enplo].ment in the territories, have modified not only tbe
structure of enployment therein, but, it has been cl.ained, the class structure of
Palestinian society, aa a large porti.on of those engaged in agriculture have been
transformed into rrage-labourr that is, into an industrial prolecariat q_V which,
however r i.s not utilized tor ihdustr la1i zationt this is iq)eded by ocEupat ion
policies on ]-and and $ater, agricultural production, industrial productlon and
trade, as dlscussed above. The figures in table I1 seem to confirn thl€ claim.
The increased employment in Israel has not gone into agriculture and, in the
territorj.es, ihe declining toCal of elployed norkers concentratea nDre and lrpre in
conatruction, industry and services, a shift that could be attributable to
settlement construction, and subcontracting for Israeli industry.
82. It has also been observed that thls is "proletariani zation vrithout
urbanization', 85/ as workers have to return to their hond€ in caza and the We€t
Bank every day, According to table IZ, rpre than 80 per cent do so.
83. As table 12 shows, the majority of palestinian workers are young. OnIy
15 per cent of then have recerved no schooling, the najorj.ty, 54.4 per ceht, have
attended beti{een one and eight years of school. and a sizeable group, 30.5 per cent
of the total, have rDore lhan 9 years of education.
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lab1e .1,0. llnploynent of riorkers frotn Lhe occupied territorj.es,
bv place of work, 1970-1982
Year
enp loyed
( thousands)
Ery)Ioyed in the
occup ied ter rilor ies
(thousands) (percentage)
unptoyed in Israel
(thousands) (percentage)
197 0
1971
L97 2
1973
L97 4
19 75
L976
L977
L978
L9 79
r980
1981
1982
r7 6.5
188.7
194.7
2IO.4
204.9
205.8
204.4
210. 9
2L2.1
2I5.7
2L5.9
222.'t
L52,7
L42.7
13 6. 3
I33, 4
I4I. 7
I38.6
I40. 9
141.4
L42.7
138. 0
140. 6
140.I
143. 6
88. r
80.6
68. s
67 .3
68.5
69.2
67 .3
65. r
65.2
64.9
{t4. 5
20.6
33. I
52.4
61.3
bu. /
66.3
64. 9
63. 0
68.2
74.L
75.L
75.8
79.r
ll. 9
t9.4
27.8
3l-, 5
32.7
32.4
3t,5
30.8
34,9
34.8
35.1
35.5
Source: For all years, except l97I and 1973, Seatistical Abstract of Israel.
r.983.
For years l97I and L978, United Nati.ons conference on Trade and Developnent,
"Palestine: opt.ions for developmenxtt pD/3/96O'1, report by P. c. Sadler and B.
Abu Kishk, ll l.,tay 1983, table I.7, p. 9.
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Table lL. Enployment of h,orkers from the occupied terrrtorles, by
selected econornic branch an9 place of rrrork, 1970-1982
(Percentage)
Enployed in the occupred territories
Year Agr rculture Induscry Construction (percenlage) (chousands)
l9 70
19 71
L972
L973
L974
r97 5
1976
1977
19 78
L9'19
1980
r98I
L982
L970
19 7t
1972
r973
1974
r97 5
19 76
L977
L97a
L9? 9
1980
r981
19a2
38.7
36.8
33. 5
JI. J
33.8
31.8
3r. 4
30.5
29. 5
28. O
24. 4
26.3
27 .6
24.4
22.3
19.3
t9. I
L4. 3
15. 4
L6.2
I6, 8
.L4. I
r3. 7
12.7
I2. I
r3. I
13. 6
r3. 9
15. I
14. 0
.l-4 . 5
14. 4
14 ,2
15, 2
r6, 8
15, 3
16, 0
15. 5
].L. 6
.t4.I
r7.1
18.1
I7. 5
r8.4
19.7
2r.3
zz.6
?o, e
18.2
L7.7
8,4
5.6
6.2
6.4
6.2
T.J
4.2
9.1
9.5
r0 .1
9.6
r0, ?
9.9
54.3
52.3
49. 5
>L. T
52.5
54 .4
50.3
45.3
44.8
47.4
5r.0
52.8
39.1
43. 8
46.4
46.O
46, 4
46.0
46.2
45.5
45.I
45.7
47.O
47.O
9.7
10.6
10.3
I0.9
r0.9
12.9
I4. 6
L6.2
16. 2
r8. 0
I8. I
I6. 7
I00.0
100. 0
r00.0
100. 0
r00. 0
t00.0
r00.0
r00.0
100.0
100. 0
r00. 0
100.0
r00. o
100. 0
L00. 0
r00. 0
L00. 0
100. 0
r00. 0
I00. 0
l-00. 0
100.0
100. 0
r00. 0
r00.0
r00.0
L52.7
136.3
133. 4
141.7
138.5
L40.9
141.4
r42.7
r38.0
r40.6
r40.1
143.6
20.6
33.8
52.4
61.3
68.7
66.3
64.9
63. 0
64.2
74.L
75.1
7 5.A
79.r
En€loyed in Is r ael
lgre: !'or all years except 1971 and t978, Sgatistical Abstract of Israel,
1983.
For years I97I and 1978, Unrted Nations Oonference on Trad€ and Development, fflaJ-estine; oplrons ior oeveJ-opment't. gD/b/gb|), by P. c. sad.ter anq
B. Abu Kishk, l.l lrlay 1983, table I.B, p. 10.
Table 12.
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l,
Number
(thouEands)
Percentage
Aqe
L4-24
25-34
35-54
55 up
Yeara of schooling
0
l-6
7-8
9up
Frequencv of returninq hone
Blrery day
once a rveek
Other
Toeal 70.1
29. L
r8,9
I8.I
4.0
10.5
27.O
11.2
4!-1
41.5
27.O
25.8
). t
r00. o
15.0
38.5
16.0
30.5
TotaI 70. r 100. 0
56.4
9.5
4.2
80. 5
13. 5
6.0
Total 70.t
@s statistt cal ADErls!:t cJ IISSL_!9.g3..
r00. o
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84. The participation of Palestinian labour in the economy of Israe.L has b€en
aLded by Lsraell trarnlng in the West Bank and caza, aimed at skill developnent
Primarlly rn industrial and lrahsport trades, !9/ ana by the estabtrshment ot "a
dense network of enploynent offices in the occupied territories to whicb Israeli
employers are required to apply for hirlng workers, cotnpulsory registering of
workers and rssurng of a work permit for a given job, and paynent of wages and
social benetrts through the paynent divlsi.on of the enplol.rnent service,'. 87,/
a5, It. has been pointed out by I]. that lhere are defrciencies in vocational
tral,n1ng at interrnediate level, and a ',lack of planned actron based oh the needs ot'
the Local economy", a8/ The consuLtants were inforned by officials of Ehe Ministry
of bducation of .lordan, as well as by Bgyptian authorities and representatrves of
the Palestine Liberation Organization that the occupyj.ng authorities not only have not iniliated action in thj.s direccron, but have so far denied several requests by
Palestinians to be aLLoeed to introduce applied sciences and technolog ical training
progralnmes in Palesti.nian universities. in the curricula of rrhich the hunanities
and socral sciences are dominant. 89/ In 1980, only 1l9 .university graduates rere
enPloyed in West Bank industry, according to Meron Benvenisti. Thus the higb
enr.gratlon raCe of the hr.ghly educated. 90,/
86. II,o has also reported that ithe residency requirenent for entitlement to
certar,n benefrts under the Natronal Insurance Lavr (old age and survivorsr benefils,
invalidity benefits, child allowances, unemplolment benefits), excludes
non-resrdent workers from coverage even though they are required to contribute to
the schene". !1/ that "the special system under t{hich wages and social benefrta are
pald not drrect.ly by the employer but through the ery)Ioyment service neans that
payments tend to be held vp", !2/ and that concentration of workers from the
occupred terrrtorj.es ].n the constructlon sector means that they suffer most from
the dlsadvantages of self-enployment and subcontracting and "from the high accident
rate rihrch is p.revaLent in the sector. 93/
47. The phenomenon ot "rrlega]',, workers - those hired outsrde the system set up by
IsraeL - is described as "intractable,' by IL. 94,/ This organizati.on refers to a
1983 .ferusalen PosC survey of r.rorkers from caza, the findings of whlch rvere that
14,000 of the 22,000 "lIIegat" workers are pa1d through lhe payments division of
the emproynent servicei that there was a "hard core', of 8,000 '.r11e9a1,, workers rrho
were contracted by the day or the hour and viho spent the night at their place of
work, also "it1egalJ-y"1 and that hiring children was also a practice. W flo
reports the eslimate of "il.legal" norkers of ghe covernment of Israel to be
25 pe! cent of the Palestinian Iabour force enployed in Israel, while Histadrut
(the General l'ederation of Labour in Israel) estimates the nunber to be 25,000 to
30'000 workers, or about 33 per centi and, sinilarly, the coverrunent of .Tordan
esclmates it to be 27,000 workers, If this last figure is accepted and added to
those in table 5 (rdhich does not include ,,illegal,' workers), for l98l and 1992, the
percentage of the Palestrnlan labour force erq)loyed in fsrael rises to
43 per cent. 96/
88. ith respect to wages. most sources agree that the average wage for rdorkers
tron Ebe territories has remained at about 50 per cent of that for Israeli workers
in the sane occupatrons, 21/ but the gap betneen wages rn Israel and in lhe
lerritorres has alnost disappeared. According to II.o, 98/ increased dernand for
A/ 3e / 233
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thrs labour in Israel has resulted in a rate of grordth of darly renuneration' in
real terns, of 5 per cent b€tween 1970 and I98L.
C. Impact on noney and.finance
89. One aspect where the economy of the occupied territories has not been rendered
totally dependent on that ot Israel is the nonetary system. After 1967, Israel
closed all comnercial banks,
'rhi.ch
were integrated with Egyptian banks in Gaza and
?ith .Jordan bank.s in the West tsank, and replaced then by Israeli banks. But, at.
the sane time, Israel allowed the continued circu].ation of the Jordanian dinar in
order Co facrlitate recovery and trade with .fordan. Consequently, Israeli banks
have not been ab.Le to establish themselves strongly, and a dual nonetary system
perststs, where the Israelr shekel j.s the prinary means of exchange, but the
stronger and nore stable drnar is lhe reserve ot value. Possibly because of the
strong preference of Palestini.ans to hold dj.nars, a nunber of measures have been
j.ntroduced to control lhe anounts taken into lhe Wes! Bank, such as Military
Order 973, which linits the flori of funds and transfers to the occup ied
territori.es. 99/ A new measure to discourage rilthdrawals frofir Palesti.nian bank
accounts is a 3 per cent tax on such withdrawals. I00,/
90. 'lhere also seems to be a tendency tor savlngs to be held outslde the West
Bank, in ,Jordanian banks, and Co be j.nvested in ,fordanian rea]- estate. An informal
money na.rket also exists, consisting of exchange agencies that act as
j,ntermediaries with the banks in AI nan, accepting checks against accounts in those
banks. lov
91. The systen ot taxation in existence before the occupalion nas kept by Israel
in the territories. However, the increased consumption of Israeli goixis means that
the consumer pays the taxes thaC affect those goods as wel1 as Israeli import
duties. Thus the increased demand by Palestinians of Israeli goods not only
enlarges the narket for those goods and thus contributes to the growth of the
Israell economy i it also contributes to the Israeli f i.scus. Of greater inportance,
norkers ale subject to payroll deductions, which are sizeable, although they do not
receive the corresponding benefies. As ot Jahuary 1983 for caza and February for
tshe West Bank, the Jordanian income tax was replaced by an fsraeli one. For
purposes of estlmatr,ng the tax base, resrdents had to dec.l-are at1 theit property,
roovable and inunovabte, including furnlture and jewelry, and their sons' properties
insr.de and ourside the territories. !92/
92. In contrast, residents of most settLements are granted a reduction of
7 per cent in incone tax up to a certain tncone. purchase taxes, ghe Land Regj,stry
aax and capital gains taxes on sa.Le of, property do not apply to them in the Vlest
Bank. 'rhey are, hor{ever, entitLed to all the benefits of the trational Insurarrce
system bV an extra-Iegal arrangenent. I03/
93. According to Meron Benvenistj., public investment cones fron two budgets: the
military governmentrs civilian budget, r{hich depends on that of Israel's Ministry
of Defense and serves the Arab popu.l-atj.on, and the budgets of the civllian Israeli
ninistries, lrhich serve the Jewtsh populalion, that is. the secBlenents. 104/ The
lnvestnent share of the mi.Iitary budge! was 1I per cent in 1980. 105,/
A/39,/233
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94. In additj.on, there is a civil adninistratj.on, l!li/ ana tvo levels of local
govelnnent: the Local councils in charge of settlenents I affai'rs' and municiPal
councrls in charge of local Palestinian affairs. Both have jurisdictron over
qtrestions rel-atj.ng to roads, water, electricity, ga6' sewage' crafts and
industries, health, cleanliness, public places, parks etc., !of_/ but no infornation
was avarl-abte on the leve1s or proportioil of their expenditures in any ot these
aspects.
95. The crvrl,ian adninistration receives funds fron lhr€e 6ources: (a) from the
Goverrunent ot Israel, 28 Per centi (b) t rotn income tax paid by Palestinians vJorklhg
rn lhe terrrtories, value added cax, indirect taxes and fees, 47 per cenct and
(c) from the "Deductj.on Fund", 25 per cent. I08/ The Palestinian nunicj'palities
dePend on incone fron goverrunent sources, yrhich has declined from 36.8 to
I7.l per cent of the totat resources between L969/7O and \979/80' on taxes (nEinly
sales and property) , and on transfers fron the Arab world which by L980 constituted
close to 50 per cent of therr resources. I09,/
96. The Deduction Fund is constituted by the deductions laken by the emplolmenC
selvice from the wages of Palestinj.ans norking i.n Israel, estinated at about
30 per cent of the eage biU. since Palestinj.ans are not eligible for benefits
fron the national insurance systen, the Fund is supposed !o be utilized for
development - i.e. investment - in the occupied territories. Howeter, the Eund is
not direcl]y transterred to Ehe cr.vili.an administration, as Provided by Israeli
ravr' but to the Chref Accountant (IsraeLrs Treasury), trho has, on the average,
transterred betrdeen 55 and 80 per cent of the tota.L to the civrlian admrni.stration
and kept the rest for use j.n Israel. Il0,/
97. The property tax payable tp the Palestinian municj.Pallties is not collected by
then, but by the l'lrnistry of i'rnance, and a]-l funds thus collecled are kept in
trust for the rnunicipal ities. A percentage is distributed to them according to
decrsions of che Councrl of Mrnisters upon the recorunendation ot the Minlstry of
the Int.erior, and sone of these funds nay be allocated to other Purposes. Ily
98, Wrth respect to adninistration of finances, Iaraeli local councils have total
discretion without i.nterference, includj.ng appointnent of their oen accountants.
Paiestin.ran munr.crpal counci..Ls are subject to regulatrons Published by the Ministry
of the Interior, rrith the agreenent ot the Counctl of ltlinisters, and the
accountants lrho inspec! their finances are selected by the council of
Ministers. U2l
D. A99regate inpact
99. The growch of gross donestic product and gross nati.onal product is portrayed
in tables .L3 and 14. Even after deflation, the constant price figures sholv an
uPlrard trend, nore pronounced in the WesC Bank than in Gaza. ReaL GNP per caPita
also greh' at retatively hrgh raees, at least, up to 1980 when the raee of groflth
starled to faII. It cannot be ascertained, however, irhether these figures rePorted
by Israeli statistics incLude the Product generated in the Israelj. settlements, or
refer only to the Palestinian economy.
Al39/233
rh98\/79
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Page 39
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a/ L984/79
EngI i.sh
Page 41
100. The contribution to cNP nade by labour earnj.ngs abroad (i.e. Israel) stood
about 24 per cent throughout the 1976-1982 peri.od for the West Bank, and between
33 and 39 per cent for caza. II3/ Thj,s underscores the importance of these
earnings in the growth of cNP and in the increased capacity go spend of lhe people
in the terrrtories. In addj.tron, tf the increased spending vrere on tocalty
produced outputs, it' could be said tha! these earnj.ngs would contribute to econonrc
growthi but, si.nce they fi,nance tmports from Israel, lhe eftect is lost in the
terri,tories. Thus the growth rn GNp and the resuLting increases in private
consunpeion are externally generated and not the resuLt of or cause for econonic
developmenl vriehin the terr i tor ies.
l0l. The consultants were not ab].e to oblain data on distribution of incotne either
between Israelr and Palestinian residents of the occupred terrilories, or anrong Palestinians at different income levels. Israeli data on disposable private income
and private consunption expenditures in the lerritories are not disaggregated by
group ( I srael i/palestinian, or incorne group).
102. In sum, it' has been the pollcy of Israel to encourage econonic linkages
between its economy and that of the West Bank and caza in a selecti.ve nanner. The
sale of Israeli products in the territories has been unhanpered, r{htle entrance of
goods from the West Bank and caza into Israel j.s subjec! to stri.ct linj.tations.
The brrdges connecting the EasC and West Banks of the .fordan River have been kept
open, uhder selective controls. The enplol.ment of workers from ghe CerritoEies in
Israel has been encouraged. The subcongracting of work by Israeli firns to
individuals and firns in the West Bank and caza has been pernitted, while
development of inlrastructure and indusery has been inpeded. This polrcy, conbined
with those of expropriation and confiscation of land, control of riager resolrrces,
and restrictron on agrrcultural actrvity, has deternined the nature of the econony
of the territories as conplenedtary to and dependent on the econony of Israel.
.L03. consequently, a signrf j.cant number ot pa.l_estinians enigrate, as illustrated in
table 15. Posi.tive nigration occurred only in 1969 and 1973 in the West Bank and
1973 in Gaza, AIi other years register enrgration at rates ranging froll'i. 2.2 to
2.4 per thousand in the West Bank and fron 4.7 to 11.5 in caza. Emigration has
increased srnce 1980 in both territories. A view expressed by nany of the
officials contacted by Che consuLtants was that lhe occupatron policies in the
terricorles are deslgned, as a vrhole, to prornote the emigration ot pa1esEinians and
thus nake the colonization of the Iand by Israel easier. The lower rates of
emlgration fron Gaza ret'lect not only the distance trom .Iordan, but aLso the 1e9al
difficultj.es for Gazans to travel due to the fac! that they are not entitled to
Passports recognized by the counlries of destination.
I04. Enlgratj.on has been particularly high anong males aged .14 to 25, as this group
tends to seek employment in the Arab countries. This selective pattern of
emigralion affects the denographic structure of the population. By increasing the
percentage of women in childbear.rng age reLtive to the total populatj.on, it nay
sustain relatively high rates of natural increase, even in the face of declining
fercility. It arso contributes to increasrng the number of dependants per wage
earner: dependency ratios, consequently also to a sloirer rise in the standard of
Irvr.ng. !'ina1Iy, it has led to lower labour force partlcipation rates,
particularly in the West Bank.
A/39./233
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Tab]e 15, Migration, llest Bank and Gaza, 1967-198I
West Bank Gaza
Nurnbe r l€te per 1000 Number Rate per 1000
19 67
.t 968
r969
1970
I9 7I
t972
19 73
L97 4
19 75
L97 6
L977
r978
19 79
t 980
I9 8I
-r3 000
-15 800
+ I 300
- 5 000
- 2 500
-7200
+ 300
- 2 800
-I5 I00
-r4 400
-I0 400
- 9 400
-12 600
-r7 300
-r5 700
2L.8
27.O
2.2
4.1
.5
4.2
22,5
2L.2
L4.7
13. 4
21.6
-12 300
-32 300
-2900
-3300
-2400
- 4 000
+ r 700
-1900
- 3 500
-4200
- 2 900
-4700
- 4 800
-5100
- 5 300
32.0
ll1.)
8.I
9.0
5.5
r0. 4
4.3
6.5
r0. 3
10. 3
II. 3
.r.t. 5
Sourc€: Lr.tan Sabatello, The populatj,ons of Che Adninistered Territories:
some Dernog r aph rc Trends and Irnplications, (,terusalen, West Bank Data }3ase
Project, l-983), tabt-e 10, p. 29 A.
.J-05. Wrth respect to future inpact, j.t seens apparent that the central questions
are not econonlc. Ye! the new interrelationships developed betneen the Cerritorres
and the economy of Israel in the context of, expanded settlenents are j.nportant.
106. Freeing ot sizeable nunbers ot workers tron agricultural arld induseraal
occuPation r.n the West Bank and caza and lherr consequent enployment ]'n Israel is
the most ilP6rtant aspect of Che new relationship, which has been characterized as
ohe of dependence. If present trends of expropriatioh of tand and water resources,
prohibition or restriction of specif ic cultures, Iinitations to induatrial
developnent, and incengrves for PalestinJ.ans to seek wage-emplo!'nent j.n Israel
contrnlre' it nay be expected that the com|luting labour force nould continue to
increase' at the expense of a further shrinking agrlcuLtural work force. If
Present policies on production and exports of agrlcultural produce also continue,
the exPosure to the nore advanced fsraeli technology and to the Israeli market
ttou1d create pressure to increase and diversify agrrcultural ouq)ut. Honever, if
ylz#)i,
Ing.]'ish
Page 43
supPressing agrlcultural develq)ment ls, as is clained by nany authors, an Israelr
goal' then it would iq)Iy additional restrictions and controls to achieve this
goal. The possibility of lncreased numbers of Palestinians yielding to frustraeion
and leaving the lerrilories nay b contemplated. On the other hand, the potentia.L
for development through the mobilization of the groning wage-Iabour class and the
nore technically arrare peasantry must also be considered. In this eventuality, the
issue of Che presence of the Israeli settlernents would still retnain.
VI. IMPACT OT' ISRAELI SETTIJT4ENTS ON THE SOCIAT LIFE AND
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES OF TIIB PAI.ESTINIAI./S
107. The novenent of an increaslng nutnber of Israelis ihto the settlements that
have been and are being set up j,n the occupied terri.tories is affecting adversely
the social life and disrupting the daily activities of the pa]-estinians in the
territorj.es. What is occurring rs the energence ot t9,o societies, each distinct
fron the other in tnatters of culture. religion, language, customs, outlook,
attrtudes and behaviour, .l.he situation is further aggravated by certain other
factors tha! nake peaceful coexistence nore difficult. The Israeli seltlements
contarn only Jelrs, since non-Jewrsh Israeli.sT for instance Arab Israelis, are not
admitted !o then. U4/ this tends to segregate even nrcre the Israelis in the
setllenents tron the nerghbouring palestinran connunj.ties and hinders any
neaningful relationships arrsing be tween theru. That the setllenenls are usually
Iocated, particularl-y in non-urban areas, on high ground overlookihg che
countryside, are fenced in and have their entrances guarded, often from a
watchtoner, nake lhe presence of the settl-ementa even nore forbidding to the
residents of the nearby palestinian villages.
108. The Palestinaans view the fsraeli settlers as intruders in a land in which
they have 1lved and farned for generations and centuries, lrho have usurped their
space and are exploiting their resources to saeisfy a Life styl,e quite different
from their own. The Israeli settlers, on the other hand, perceive the Palestinians
as an alien group of people in a Iand nhich, according to the pronouncenents of
thei.r .Leaders, is conaidered part of the Israeli fatherland. lI5,/
109. The current policy of establishing settlernents in clusters in proxinity to
Palestinian conmuniCies has tended to increase the tension between the palestinians
and the IsraeLi s€ttlers. The tension has been highest and the incidents of
controntation nost nunerous in those areas where the Israeli settlements coll|I)rise
members of radrca]- retigi.ous groups, such as in Hebron and Nablus.
II0. The permissioh grahted to the Israeli settlers to carry arms and to be
involved in niaj.ntaining lavr and order has had a direct impact on the nornal
day-to-day activities of the Palestinians. According to residents of the West Bank
vrsiting ArurEn, I{ho r{rere intervieeed by the consultants. the streets in palestinian
villages ahd towns are deselted after nightfaLl. people confine thenselves to
their hones, fearr.ng to 90 out rest they be a@osted by either the armed settlers,
the police or arny personnel on patrol, asked to show their idenlity papers and
questroned at Length. The presence of a group of armed sett.Lers in a narket p.l,ace
ot on patrol is sufficient cause for palestinians to becone apprehensive of any
4...
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encounter ' hora,ever peaceful it n19ht be. While the Israelt setElers are free to
npve as they please and are ab.Le Co pursue therr social and cultural interescs
nithout any hindrances, the Palestinians are subjected to frequent curfews. The
need to obtaln permissroh fron the occupying authori,ties to hold neelings, vJhlch is
often denied, and the close supervision exercised over Ehe acti.vities of
Palestinian institutions and organizations in the oocup ied territories has further
curtar.led lhe social and cultural activities of the Palestinian residents.
IlI. The Israeli settlers, in the exercise of their role as naintainers of Iaw and
order and having the sr4)por t of the nilitary authorities administerlng the
territories, have been khown to exceed their powers and harass Palestinian6
individually as weII as collectively. For j.nstance, the Ha'areez of 15 May l98l
reported that Rabbi Kahane had adnitted that menbers of his group fron Kiryat
Arbata have arned patrols in the streets of Hebron, check identity papers and enter
houses rdhich had once belonged to Jerrs in order to get the Palestinian occ upants to
leave. Nurnerous incidents have also been reported in the press of settlers
harassing farmers and interfering in their farming activities on the grounds that
the land they r^'ere h,orkrng on bel-onged to the settlenent. Such incidents have been
most conmon rn lhe Etzron B.Lock area between Hebron and Jeruslaem. 116,/
lL2. Incidents of slone throh,ing as an expression of resistance to the occupation,
usually by Palestinian youths, have brought about severe reprisals by Israe.Li
settlers in thej.r role of guardians of law and order, l'hese reprisals have been
usual-Ly di.rected against educatronal inst.itutrons and have otten led to
interference 1n their funct.ioning and disruption of classes. A particulally
serr.ous incrdent presunabl-y rn retaliati.on for a slone throwlng incident' reported
during the past year, was che attack by nasked gunmen, believed to be settlers, on
Hebronrs Is.]-anr,c University in the ]ast week of iluly 1983, when three students were
killed and 33 injured. l-17. on another occasion, fotlowing an incident in phich a
minrbus carrying chil"dren fron the settlernent a! Yattir to school in Klryat Arbara
was stoned near a PaLestinian school in Hebron, settlers travelling on the bus as
guards broke into the school f j.ring shots into che air. After farl-i.ng to catch the
youths they suspected of the attack, they detained the headnaster and look hrn
first to Kiryat Arbara and then to the local rnilitary authorities. subsequently,
the army ordered the schooL closed for a nonth. lI8/
113. with the increase in the number of settlements. Palestinlan schools' including
those rnanaged by UNRWA for refugee children, situated close to the roads frequented
by traffrc to and from lhe settlenents, have beeh subjecled to nany harassments by
settlers in their efforts to curb stone throwing by students. There have been
nunerous instances when seltlers, usualty arned, have entered these schools.
disrupting classes in order to question students, taking sone students alray for
further questioning and closing the school for a f,ew days until inquiries were
coltpleted. As far as the UNRWA schools are concerned. suggestions have been nade
by the nrlrtary authorj,tj.es lhae concrete walls, two netres high, should be built
al"ong the length of the school facing the road, or that the school should be
reLocated away fron the road. I19/
lI4. Interference in religious pl-aces and rrith religlous performances has increased
and enlarged in scope in recent years. The nunerous incidents involving the
A,/ 39 / 233
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A1 Aqsa Mosque in .rerusalem hav€ been wj.dely publicj.zed, the latest being on
27 January 1984, when a cache of handjrenadel and exprosives r.rere discovered in
the rslani.c cemetery abutting the Mosque and the guards a! the Mosque had arso
discovered tadders and ropes dangling over the waLL. !!!./ Anolher holy place that
has been the scene of frequent confrontagioh betrreeh parestinran l,tusrims and rsraeli ,rens i.s the Patriachrs cave at Hebron, Jews have been allowed access to
the (5ve to hold prayer neetrngs at which timee the Arab Muslins mus! keep away. rn tact, access by Mua]-iJns to the cave has b€en progressively curtailed. According to the Hararetz ot 11 Septenber and Al Falr of 1g Septenber I9g3, lhe Civrl
Admrhistration in the we6t Eank had uposed restri.ctrons oh Musiin prayers during
the .Iewrsh holidays (the .Jewish Nerrr yearrs Day, the Day of Atonenent, ehe Feast of
the Tabernacles, and the Rejoicing of the I€w) al]' occurring over a period of three
weeks in Septenber.
ll5. A nurnber of viorent atcacks agarnst r{usriJn as well as chrlstian religrous places have beeh wideLy reporEed during the past year. These have rnc].udtd the
stabbing of tvo nuna in lhe convent of the Russian orthodox church in .r€rusalemi
the planting of explosive devices in noaques at }lebron and Nabtus, in a ChrrsEran
church at Bethany and a Russian Orghodox church at Ain Haren near Jerusalemi and
Che burning of the Ubrary of the Angtican Church in Jerusatem. !?V Tbese incidents have been attributed to rsraeli groups, such a6 the so-calred .Terror
Agalnst Terror', group, whrch have emerged in Jerusalem and the occup ied territories
and whoae inteht, according to .fordanian and palestinian sources, is to harassp
inCinldate and terrorize palesttniana, In coq)elling them to leave the territori.es, thra connection, the Israeli Chief of, Staff, !4oshe Levy, reportedly told a
Knesset Connittee that he di.d not know if a Jewish underground existed rn the territorie€, but he could not rule out the possibility that n sotne dangerous
novement is underway". J.22,/
ll5- The refugee canps have been the targets of, freguent interference by settrers
and tniritary personnel, rrho believe that the canp residents are crosery involved in
incidents of, unrest, denronstrations and stone throvring. W The lntert'erences
bave been most grave in those camps irrhich have been earnErked in connection irith
the plans being prepared by the Government of Israel to relocate the refugees, such as Dheisheh and Ja.lazun,
-1I7. The excessea connitted b!. the Israeli settlers in the West Bank in their dealings rr,i th Palestinian residents and the laxity of the law enforcement
authorities in pursuihg these cases red to the appointment by the coverrunent of Israel, rn l-981, of what has cone to be known as the Karp Comisaion. The
Connissron I a report a'as re.Leased recently, tl|clre than 20 rDnths afler its
presenlation to the Mrnister of ,Juati.ce. In ita report, the Comlission rnentions that the civirran porice are hindered in their inveseigati.ons into crinihal
offences because of the pressure brought to bear by the I'rrlitary Goverrulent for the
release of pergons detained for gue€tioning. The report al-so describes lhe settlers as retusing to co-operate ryith the po.J.tce and the distrj.ct attorney and
concludes that the current situatioh contained 'rthe beginnrngs of a dangerous
process t{hose end is di.ff icult to foresee,,. I24,/
A/ 39 / 233
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U8. The proglessive increase in the nuDer of Israelis living in the occup ied
territorres is bound to aggravate the current contlicts between then and the
Palestinian residents in the pursuit of their daily activities. The Paleslinians
feei that the establishnen! of Israelr setttements in ciose proxinity to therr
loh'ns and villages and often aurrounding then is intended to preven! then frorn
rnaintaini.ng close ties with their neighbouring communities. Moreover, the frequent
security checks which are carried out both by the security forcea and the settlers,
and the curfens frequently imPosed, are seriously affecting therr sense of
solr.darrty and social cohesion. This wj.ll be further affected by the intentions of
the Goverrunent ot Israel !o disperse the refugees in the Present camps' tihich are
Iocated close to Palestinian popuLated areas.
lI9. A conparison of the standards ot social servj.ces avarlable to the Israeli.
settlers with thoae avallable Eo the Palestinians becomes difficult in the absence
of factual data regarding the former. However, based on enpirical observation and
infornatj.on trotn secondary lrources, lt can be stated that the clusCering of Iaraeli
settlenents has made it eaBier to provlde the seetlers tith facilities ac a level
adequate to neet their needs ln education and health and thei'r social and cullural
interests, The larger settlements have their own tnedlcal clinics, kj'ndergartens
and facilities for social and cultural activities, The smaller or under-populated
sectlements are provided with the neans and facilities to IrEk€ use of chese
Services available at lhe rural centres and regi,ona.L towns. The road networks that
are being establj.shed to interconnect the segtlenents and provj.de access to
metropolitan centres in Israel, enable the settLers to use educationa.L and health
services and to pursue therr 6oc i.a]' and cultural activi.Cies nilhout any
inpedinents. In regard to educacion, welfare and religi,ous services, the standards
aPplied to the segtlements r'n the West tsank are satd to be nore generous than in
Israel proper. !3V these' as well as heaJ-Eh services, are provlded exclusrvely
for the benetit of the settlers, 'enphasj.u ing the segregation of the Israelis ahd
PalesCinians living ih the territories.
I20. where the Palestinians are concerned, it is knovrn that their educational
institutions are often overcrov.rded, and there are shortageg of equipnent and
teaching personnel. therr activitj.es are frequenlly interlupted by curf,ens lnpoged
on the Iocal ity ' closure because of suspected stone throvring by the studentar and
classes are often disrupted by security forces and arned settl-ers enEering in
search of alleged stone lhrowers. As far as medical servlces are concerned' the
system available to the Palestinians is considered inadequate and is oft€n affected
by shortage of nedica]- personnel and equipment and lack of medical supplles.
According to the reports of the special cornmi ctee of Expelts appointed by the world
Health Organ1zation, 'dhich visits the occupied territories annually to study the
health conditions of the inhabitants, the inProvements made to the health services
are far fron adequate co neet tbe needs ot a growing populalion and to reflect the
advancenents nade 1n nedical sclence. Efforts by Iocal Palestinian groups to
provide fiIore facilrties and ill{)rove servrces have often been thwarted b!7 the
adninistering auehoriti€s, an exanFle being the refusal by the (bvernment ot' Israel
to approve the construction of a new hospitsal in Hebron which had been initiated
through voluntary ettorl. !29/
A/ 39 / 233
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VI I. IMPACT OI' ISRAELI SETTI,TT.4ENTS (N THE .'UIJICIAI AND I.OCAI
@VERNITENT SYSTE&IS IN THE @CUPIED TERRIT9RIES
121. An anornalous situation has emerged in the occupied territories of the West
Bank and Gaza where people occupying a conulon territorial space are governed by two
different Judici.a1 and local government systems. L4/ ThLs has come about rvith the
steady increase in Israeli settlenents established j.n the territories and the
progressrve applrcation of Israeli. 1aw to the residents of these settlements, whiie
the Palestinians continue to be subjected to Jordanian law and the Defense
Regulatlons ot L945 enacted by the British mandatory authorrties, boeh tn force at
the time of Israeli occupation in 1967, which have b€en amended since by military
orders rssued from tine to titne by the lqilltary Cornnand administerihg lhe
territor ies.
l-22. According to a report prepared by the Ministry of Occupied TerriEories Affaira
of Jordan !:9/ an attenpt is nolr being made to formalize and factJ-itate the
aPpli.cation of Israel-i law to che occupr.ed terrltories through a Knesset resolueion
of 2 January 1984 approvrng two laws. One of the lahrs 1a applied to the Jewish
settlers, r,hiLe the emergency ]-alr used by the British Mandate in 1945 conCinues to
be applied to the Arab crtrzehs. 't'he nen laws pernj,t the Israeli authoritres the
right to apply the articles of the civil l-aw and the penal larv in the occupied
territories, rt the .1,e9 aI Oonmittee of the Knesset approves it, wlthout recourse to
a l(nesset vote.
123. Since the occupaeion, the Military Conmand has j.ssued nore than a thousand
Orders, most of then amending .lordani.an law, Violati.ona of these are tried in
military courts, alchough they are deened to be anendments to Jordanian lavrs. The
judgenent of the nilitary courts cannot be appealed. The lvlilitary Conunand aJ-so
issues from time to tine Orders whrch are applic;ble to the settlers or ttre
settlements. Violations of these as h,el.l as of Israeli laws appLicable to the
settlers are tried in the Israeli courls.
124. .l3eginning in 1979, the settl-ements have been incorporaged into local and
regional councils by the extension of the Israeli nunicipal lai to Chern. This was
done through the issue ot l{j.Iitary Orders No, 783 of 20 l4arch 1979 and No. 982 of
I !,Iarch 1981, Nee settlements are eligible for incorporation as Local councils if
they are urban sett.l,ements or as menbers of a regional council if they are
non-urban. Their method of incorporation and their funclions are sinilar to those
of municipa]. and regional councils in Israel. The Israeli settlerDents in the West
Bank and Gaza have, therefore. elected self-governing bodies enpowered !o issue
by-1aws and having jurisdiction over those natters vrhrch cone within the purviev, of
the municipal law, including planning tor tbe territorial space assj.gned t'o then.
Thrs rncludes not only the land a.Llotted to them drrectly but also land seized for
rnj,lrtary use and land declared as rrstate domain". ]29,/
I25. there have ari.senf theEefore, in the Weat Bank and Gaza two systems of ,local
governnent and adtninistralion, one conprising the Israeli settlenents operating
under IsraeLi nunj.cipal Iaw and Ehe other conlI)rising the Pa.Lestinian towns and
vr.L1ages operatrng under f,olmer Jordanian law as anended by niJ-rtary orders. While
the aettlenent councils are subjec! to the due process of ].aw for any omissions or
M39/233
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conmissions, the Palestinran councils are subject to unrlatera.L aceion by the
adnrnr.stering authority ih the territories either by military order or surunary
action, as in the case of the disni,ssal of mayors and dissolution of the elected
counclls by the Clvil- Mmrniseration a few years back. While the powers and
functions of the Palestinian toyrns and villages are berng restri.cted or curtailed'
for examp.Le, rn matters such as lhe rssue of building pernits and lhe collection of
Caxes, those of the Israeli, settlernents and therr resldents are being expanded
through legislation that is enacted in the Knesset or through nilitary orders
extendj.ng Israeli law to them. I30/
126. Inplications for the future of the present polic!' ot having a dual systen of
Iocal government and administration in Ehe occupied territories of the West Bank
and Gaza are tlrof o]-d. The steady increase in the number of settlements and Che
tendency of the occupyi ng aulhorities to confiscate more and more land, which rviu
be allotted to then, will progressively reduce the territorial space that h,i]'.l
renain under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian tovrn and villages. The fact that
the Israeli secglenents, through their counci.Ls, are involved in high level
decisions pertaining to inf rastructuraL, l-egal, economic, seculity, Iand and water
rnatters in the territories and that they, through the "Council of Jewish
settlenents in Judaea and samariarr, forn a powerful Lobby at central, Governnent
Ievel, will further erode the porrers and functions of.the Palestinian torrna and
villages j.n these natter s.
Notes
y See appendix I-A for settlenents in the West Bank and Gaza.
Z/ Reply received by the Special Committee to Investiage Israeli Practicea
Affecting the Human RighLs of the Population in the Occupied Territories from lhe
Government of Jordan (A/8089), annex V, pp. 4 and 7. See also appendix f-A of the
present document.
3-/ Yigal Allon' "Israel: the case for defensible borders", Foreiqn Affairs
Review' voI. 55, No. I (october f976) , pp, 38-53. See also che statenent of
Mr. Raymond Tanter, Professor of Potitical Science, University of Michigan, in his
testj.mony before the Subcorimittee on International Organizations and on Europe and
the Middle East of the House Committee on fnlernationaL Rel?tions, 95th Cohg,,
Lst sessron, 12 and 2I Septenber and L9 October 1977 (Washington, D.C., (bvernment
Printing Off j.ce, f978), p. 55.
!/ Report of the Special Conunittee to Investigate Israeli Practices
Atfecting the Hunan Rights of the Populati.on ot the Occupied Territories, (A/8389) , pp, 27-32.
2/ Jerusalen Post, 20 JuIy 1972,
V Hararetz, 24 Jtrly 1974.
Z/ Jerusalen Post, 5 March 1971.
A,/ 39/233
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Page 49
Notes (continued)
y See statements by Mr. Ariel sharon, reported in the Jerusalen l,ost, Il November 1977, and by Mr, weissman in Hararetz, t3 March 197b.
2/ The Goverrunent's decision to aIlovr the cush Emunim to set up- sett.renents in arny camps nas reported in the .lerusalen post, 2 Decenber 1977. and AI euds, 2 December 19 ?7.
&/ Jerusalen post , 7 laay l-g7g.
!L/ covernmen! of Israel, xFron the Knesset,,, press release (Jerusalem,
covernment Press Off,ice, 14 t4arch 1984).
!2/ Ma'ariv, 6 .ruLy 1977.
!1/ covernment of Israel, "Facts about Israel,,r Uini.stry of Foreign Affairs,
Intornation tj1vrslon (1966) , p. 101.
!!/ t'tarariv, 14 August l_9?4.
!!/ l"lararrv, 14 August 1975.
!9/ l1nes (London), l-6 May l.9g0t Asha,b and AI euds, 19 May 19g0.
n_/ Asharb and AI lttihad, t9 and 23 septenber 1980.
g/ Jerusalem post, 14 February 1979, A] Ittihad, 20 February L980.
P/ Governnent of Israel ,'Fron the Knesset',, press release (Jerusalen,
covernment press office, l-4 t4arch l9B4),
n/ Hararetz, 12 t4arch 1980i lla'aretz, G .fune 1978.
2!/ Hararetz, 3l January 1977.
?4 Offl.ce of the Crovrn prince of the Hashenite Kingdom of Jordan, 'IsraeLi colonization of Arab lands', (Anunan, August I9g3) r €lnn€x table L.
22/ Washihgton Post, 12 septenber 1982 as referred to in Office of the Crown Prlnce of the Hasher0ite Kingdom of .tordan, ',Israelr co]-onization ,..,,, p. g.
2!/ Lfrat, "Paltern of Jewrsh and Arab settlements in Judea an<l sanaria',, Danrei Elazar, ed., in Judea, Sanaria, and caza: Vj.ews on the preseht and I'uture
(Washrngton, D.C,, LgAZ), Anerrcan I
2!/ IbLd,, p. 22.
Ibid. , pp. 18, 2.1- and 23.
A/39/233
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!91!€ (continued)
4/ Melon lJ€hvenisti, "The lcest llank ano Gaza Data Base Projectt pil'ot atudy
report', presented to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (1982),
pP. 35-36.
4/ rb:x!., p. 5s.
P/ I!i9., P. ss.
39/ Ibid., p. 57.
1-v &:.{., p. ss.
32/ Ibia., pp. 37 and 38.
21/ rbid.
4/ Hashenite xingdom of .tordan, "R€port presented to che IrNcEs delegation,
for Perj.od February 1983 to February I984r, Mini6try of OccuP i.ed Territories
Affairs (Annan), pp. 9-I0. Unoffi.cial translatlon.
!!/ Uhited Nations presa release (PAI.,/I534), 14 Decenber 1983.
39/ Al-Harualshmar (hewspaper in lGbr€w), 27 Novenber 1983, as referred to in
Otfrce of the crqn Plince of the Hashenite Kingdom of \tordan, "UNRFA in ,Jo!dan:
current sltuation" (Anftan, rlanuary 1984), p. 5.
37_/ United Nation6 prea6 releaae (PAL,/1534), 14 Decenber 1983.
39/ Hash€nite Kingalom of, ,tordan, Mlnletry of occupied Terrltories Affairs,
uReport pres€nted to ul,IcHS ...' pp. 2-5.
32/ ru:isl., P. I0.
!p/ see Hararetz, 4 August 1983, reporting the reoults of, a survey conducted
in .luly L983.
!!J Uniteo Natrons Conference on Trade and Develcrptnent, rPalestlne: opcions
for development" (rD/ts/ga},, report by P. G. Sacller and B. Abu xishk, U May 1983,
p. 5, para. 12.
!.2/ BenvenisEi' op. clt., p. 25.
g/ UlrcTAD, opr cit. p. 19, para. 50.
!!/ rbid., p. .L9, paras. 49 and 53.
!9/ J. schwart?, "I{ater resourcea in .tudea. sanaria, and the Gaza strip", ln
Elaza!, ed., op. clt., p. I00.
A/39/233
a/Le84/79
EngIish
Page 5r.
E!€ (continued)
!s./ ul,lcTA-D, "Palestines options ... "; p. 33.
!J/ Efrat, gP:l:l!!., p, 22.
!9/ office of the Crorrn Prince of th€ Hashemlte t( ingdon of .rordan, rlsraeli
colonization ...", p. 15.
!2/ UNCTAD, rPa]'estlne: options ...", p. 4I, para. 90.
50/ verbaL evidence presented to the consuLtant6 by the offlclals of the
office of the cronn Prince of the Haahemlte Kingdon of Jordanr 23 February 1984.
Ey office of the Crorrn Prince of the liashenite Kingdom of ,Iordan, nlsraeli
coLonizatj.on ..,", pp. 16 and 17.
521 Statistical, AbsCract of Israel, 1983' table XXI|II-/?3 ' p. 749.
t2/ see for exarPLe: Efrat, gp.:l:I!., P. 23, on educational and health
servlces and supply of utilities to settlernentst Offlce of the Croln Prlnce of the
dashemite Kingdon of .fordan, "Israeli colonization ...", Pp. 9 and I0, on the
rnagniCude of, the Governnent of Israel'a subs rdy to the settlenentst Benvenlsti.
op. clt. PP. 53-52, on the planning and deaign of l€raeli settlenentat and on subsrdized houstng, the tegtinpny of Dr. Iarael shahak, Profeasor, Hebrew
Unlversity, Jerusalen, before the Subcorurittee on Inurlrgration and Naturallzatron of
the Senate Corulittee of .Judiciary, 95th Cong., first session on the quegtlon of
west Eank setllementa and the treatment of Arabs in the Israell-occupied
terrrtories, Octob€r I7-LB L977, (Waahington, D.C.r U.S. Cioverntr€nt Printlng
off i.ce, L978'l , p. 7.
tll Edited b'y lihile A. Nakhleh and published by Alerlcan Enterpriaes
rnst.itute for Publlc Policy Research (waahington, D.c. 1980), P. 116.
E/ see in particular, special conmitcee r€porta of th€ Paat flve years
(A/33/356, 13 l.lovenb€r )-9?8, A/34/63, 13 Novenber 1979, A/15/a25, 6 octob€r 1980,
M35/579, 26 october I98Ir and A/37/485. 20 october 1982).
!9/ Reported ln Ha raretz and !4!Ij!g, 13 and l{ Decenber 1983, aa rePorted
by the Special Cotnnittee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affectlng the Hunan
Rights of the PopuLation of the occuPied 'terrltories in deunent A/AC.Ns,/R.276,
29 Decenber 1983, para. 20. See also ltaahenite Kingddl of ilordan, Mlnlatry of
occupied lErritorres Attairs, "r€port preaented to IrNcHs ..." pp. I anal I7.
!1/ For the inPact of settlenents on land, aee chaP. Iv, sect. A of, the
Preaent rePort.
g/ chap. IV, sect. B, of the present report detaits the methods and lI|E act
of Israeli control of water resourceg.
,...
A/ 39/233
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Page 52
Notes (continued)
59-/ offrce of the crown Prince of the Hashenrite Kingdom of .tordan, "Israeli
colonization ...rr.
!0/ In Raja Shahadeh, "Jeeish settlenents in the occuPied West Bank: how the
rand was acquired for their use and how they are structureddr PaPer Preaented at
the eighth United Nations ser0inar on the Question of Palestine, 9-13 May 1983,
Jakarta, Indonesia' organized by the Divi.sion of PaLestinian Rights on the therne.
"The Inalienable Rights of the PaLestinian Peoplec.
S!/ offrce ot the crorrn Prince of the Hashemice hingdon of .fordan, "Israeli
colonization ...", p. f4.
52/ rbid.
91/ Antoine lilansour, Palestine: une 6conornie de rdsistance en cisiordanie et
i caza, (Paris, Editions IrHarnattan, 1983), p. 14I.
92/ United Nations, special coru0ittee to Investigate IsraeLi Practlces
Affecting the Human Rights of the Populatron of the occupied tbrritories, "Sumrmry
of reportsn (A/AC.I45/R.273), 14 November 1983.
52/ office of the crown Prj.nce of the Hashetnite Kingdon of Jordan' "Israeli
colonization ...", p. 4,
99_/ r bid .
57/ rbid.
9!/ A review of the "open border" poLicy is found in Brian van Arkadie,
tsenefits and Burdens: A Report on the l,test Bank and Gaza Strip Ecorionies Since
12-g.Z (lew York' carnegie bndoh'men! for Inlernational Peace, 1977), chap. 1.
92/ For exanple, by Benvenisti, op. cj.t,
19-/ David Kahan, Aqriculture and Water in the lfest Bank and Gaza, ('Jerusalen.
West Bank Data Base Project, 1983), table 43, p. 79.
J!/ lnlornatlon obtai.ned lrom "Survey of the manufacturlng rndustry in the
West Bank and Gaza strip*, report prepared by P. G. sadler, V. Kazi and E. Jabr for
the United Nations lndustrial DeveLq)nen! organization, JuJ.y 1983.
l2/ "survey of the manufacturing industry ...", pp. 3 and 4 and L9-2I.
J)/ xahan' op, cit., P' l.
l!/ See, for exarple, Brian Van Arkadie, op. cit,, pp. 88-95.
A/39/ 233
ij/1984/79
8rt91l€h
Page 53
IEIE (continued)
19 Office of the Crown prince of the Hashemite Kugdorn of alordan, trIsraeli
colonization ,..', p. 11.
!l/ UNCTAD, "palestines options ...n, p. 35,
l!/ For further explanation of this point, see Brlan Van Arkadle, 9p. cit.,
Pp. 33, 34, 80 and BI.
12/ Flgures calcutared frotn staristlcal 4betlgs$ll9.Iggll_lg.qL, tables XXVII,/IO anal XXVII/II
g/ The growth of iq)orta and exportg ts not as relevant to the arguDent as the rerative uportance of the different narketa, trh ich 1s il-lustrated oy taute s.
g/ Interftional Iabour
Director ceneral, appendix III, p, 26.
92/ Ibid., p. 27.
91/ Mansour, s. cit., p. 59.
9.!/ See for exaflple, Najwa Makhoul, .Change ln the erp}ol.ruent structure of
Araba-in laraelr, 1n .'ournal of palestine St,udles, vol.. XI, No. 3 (Spring I9g2), pp.77-102.
!2/ r4akhoul, Ioc. cir.
93/ _ @!g!!9l3!-]!-!9gr conference, stxty-ninth €e66ion, 1983, Report of th€ Dlrector-General, appendix III, p. 40.
y/ Ibid., p. 27.
W Ibid., p. 4I.
99/ Office of the Crown prince of the H,ashemite Kingalom of Jordan, ilsraeli
colonizatlon ...,, p. 18, items 2 and 5.
29/ Fisch, op. c j.r., p. 74.
U rro, op. cit., tr)p. 27 and 28.
z/ rbid.
2!/ rbid.
2!/ Ibid., p, 2e.
A/ 39 / 233
E/1984/79
English
Page 54
9!g (continued)
E/ On this subject, "illegal" recruitment of chi'ldren as norkers' lhere have
been numerous reports ]'n Arab periodical literature' and research,papers have been
prepared by a number ot oigitti"ations' e'9' International Labour organisation (not
availabre to the consult;;i;t; il conualtiee for the Defense of Palestinian Hunan
Rights under Israelr ar""op"iiott, Slave !'[arketst The Exploltation of Paleslinran
chj.ldren bv Israel (Beirut, May 1979) '
g/ some autrlors Put the Proportion aE high as 75 per cent' e'g' M' lti' xhouja
and P. G. sadler' tn anai. a.Ioit,- P,.pated for Ul'lCfi\D ' "Review of che econonic
condllionsofthePalegtinianPeoPleintheoccuPiedArabterritoxLes",(ID/B/a?o|,
26 Aug usg 1981.
2J/ see, for exarq)Ie' IIo, q: slUq., p' ZZ, ana Benvenisti' op' cit"
pp, 7 and I'
9!/ Ilo, op. cit. PP- 35 and 37.
g office of the crowh Prince of the ltaahemite Kingdon ot ilordan' "rsraeli
colonization ,..", P. 15.
Hashemite Kingdon of Jordan, MlniatrY of Labour, rftectg oq lsragli
a9/ ,,? .^h^i ri.lns in the Arab occup ied Te!! lle
PT
aturfne fggg (JanuarY 1984). Unoffic translation.
$l/ ltansour, op. cit., chap. Iv.
LO2/ office of the croHn Prince of the gashetnlte Klng'lon of Jordan' rrrsraeli
colonization ...', PP. 16 and 17.
!92/ Meron BenveniEti' rsraeli Rore in qhe west Bank' Legir ald - 44ministralive
aspliTs, (Jerusalen, west Ba;T;;Ea BaseEoject, 1983), PP' r7 and 18'
!9!/ Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 16.
LO5/ rbid.
L99/ The civilian adniniseration Has created by tuilitary order 947 of
8 Novenber 1981, to taxe over the powers of the military adninistration in civilian
nalters. In acguality rt is subordinate to the Milltary comnander of the Defense
Forces' who al4)ornts rts Head. see l"leron Benvenisti' "israeli ttole ""'' pp' 19-32'
ry/ shahadeh, 9E-9i!. , P. L00.
199/ Davrd (deddr) zuckor' Avner HalPerin, zeev Haspar' Hagar Kahana'
ni,,Fr..,in, *."."'.n "l I*e" *'=el.:,1!,.1_s H'tiisrIilitl'i;iiii'il-+llt' (lel Aviv, Inttrnatronal center for Peace rn the !
n2/ -LPlg, P. 73.
A/39/233
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Page 55
ElS (continued)
n9/
!!/
Ibtd., pp. 76 a\d 77.
Ibid. , p. I0l.
!p/ rbid., p. 102,
!]]/ Theee are, ln percentage terns, the attff€renceB betteeen cNp anal cDp 1n
the West Bank and caza, respectrvely. They are accounted for by net facgor
payrn€nts fron abroad (in this case prfunarily nage lncome of palestlnians working
abroad).
I!/ See testi[pny of Dr. fsrael Shahak, professor, Hebrew Unlversity,
Jerusa.Len, IsraeL, before the Subconunittee on fruligration and Naturalizatlon of the
Comni. ttee on the iludiciary, Irnited States Senate. ninety-fifth Congregs, ftrat
session on the quescion of west Bank settlenents and the Treatment of Arabs in the
r srael i-occlpied rerrrtories, october 17 and 18, r9zz, (united states covernnant
Printing office, 1978), pp. 2 and 3.
LLs/ I!rr. Dayan as reported in l{araEetz, 24 ,Iuly I9?4 and Mr. Begln as reported in Lrltr(press, 23-29 Ftay L977.
ry/ For details of these incidentE, see "Report of the Specj.al CoDtnttee to
Investrgate lsraeli Practices Affecting the Hunan Righta oi the populatlon of the
Occq)ied Territoriest (A/36/579'r, paras. I49 to 194. Also aee state of lErael, the
RePort of the karp Comission, press bulletin (Jerusalem, 9 f'ebruary 1984).
V/ Jerusalen Post, 2 and 3 August 1983.
lL&/ Jerusalem Post, 10 November 1983.
LL2/ Inforrnation gatherecl from the United Nationg Relief and t{orks Agenqr for
Pa].eitine Refugees in the Near Bast.
!29/ Hashemite Kingdon of Jordan, Ministry of Occupleal Terrj,tories Affalrs,
'Report presented to the consultantstr.
!2)/ Theae incident€ have been docunEnted in the report pleaented to the
consultants by the ,Jordani.an Ml.nlstry of Occupteal Terrltorlea Affaira.
n2/ Jeruaalem post, and Hararetz, 14 December 19g3.
I23/ Theae and other details regardlng the rehabilltation of the refugee canpa in the West Bank appeared in Hararetz, 13, 14 and 2l Novenb€r, the .Ierueal€m poat,
2t l,bvember, and l,ra'ariv, 22 Novenber 1983. For incidents see Hararetz,
ll November , lterusalen post and Ha I aretz, 27 Novenber and AI-gi! of
25 liovenber 1983.
A/3e/ 233
E/L984/79
EngJ-ish
Page 56
Ig']!E (continued)
L24/ state of Israel, press bulletin (concluding sectlon of the I€rP report'
(.terusaLem, ? February 1984).
!E/ Benvenlsti, @. cit. , p. 47.
n9/ Horld Health organization, docurEnte A/35/L6 ana A/36/L4'
g/ For turther detailG of these isaues, see A/38/282. Paras. 5-33'
g/ Hashenite Kingdonr of alordan, uinistry of occuPied Terrltories Affalrs,
report presented to the consultantar P. L.
n2/ Benvenisti, 9fi!.. p. 45.
L3o/ &19., p. 42.
A/39/233
E/1984/19
Engllsh
Page 57
APPENDTX T
Settlements in the !{est Bank and Gaza with proJections
to tbe vear 2010
compiled by the Palestlne Liberation organlzation
Departnent of Occupied Honeland Affairs, Anunan, Jordan
A. Settlernents established fron 1967 to 1983
Settlenents
(Total
nurnbet ) l,oca t ion
Resldentlal
{dunums} unita Fanilies
G Present. 20L0 Present 2010 Present 2010
1967 t2\
Jewish quarter E. Jerusalen
Rfar Ezyon
!959 (s)
Arganan
Fafiya
Siri.at Arba
Mehola
Rarlat AshkoI
I9jg (4)
Fatazael
Rosh Zorirn
French Hlll
Eaddassa
1970 (7)
cilgal
AIon Sbvut
a4assuu
ltevo HoroD
Yitav
Atarot
!'tua1e Sfraylrn
r97r t2l
Ilamra
ti'lizpe Shalen
I9f3 (r)
Bekdut
1973 (11)
Newe Yaaqov
Ranot
GilIo
Talbl0t
san Haalrla
Glvat Shaul
Ranat Rahel
Bethlehen
Jordan Valley
Jordan va1ley
Hebron
ilordan valley
8. Jerusalern
Jordan vaIIey
Bethlehen
E. Jerusalen
E. Jeru€alem
Jordan vaIley
Bethlehem
Jortlan Valley
RanalIah
Joralan valley
E. JeruEaletn
Jordan Valfey
Jordan va1ley
Jordan ValLey
Jordan Valley
E. Jerusalem
E, Jerusalem
E. Jerusaleh
8. Jerusalen
E. Jerusalen
E. Jerugaleil
8. Jerusalen
- 40 160
- 26 160
I 700 I r00 4 000
- '10 160
- I 700
65 r20
2A 150
t8
750 15 000
39 7D Z/
s0 195 Lo1 4 250
30 80 9/ 46 80
:o :o!
264 3 000
40 l2o gj/
32 160
870
I 900
900
600
2 000
400
15 000
- 80 r20
tl
x
xx
x
xx
x
-92
- 2 400
160
720
50 809/ 20 100 v
2 300
470
1050
2 300
10 000
2 300
t 000
4 000
:
2 500
r60
- 90 120
- 272 600
- 50 160
- 48 160
- 50 120
- 61 9/
4 000 240 2 500
-60 I60
80
xx
x
x
x
- 1500 I000
- 4 500 10 000
- 3 500 5 000
::oo:
A/39/233
E/1981/79
EnqliBh
Page 58
Appendir. I-A (contlnued)
Settlenents
(Total
nunber)
Area
G Present
Residentlal
unlts Familles
Iocatlon 2OI0 Present 2010 Present 2010
!!23 (continued)
civat Eamiftai E. Jerusalen
Gittit
Mekhora
lilezr l{azani
f9zg (r)
Jordan VaIley
Jordan valley
Gaza
30
30
170
100
200 23
400 90
r52 9t 7s
45o t/ r30 2s0 73
300 27
160 26
r20 30
720 13
320 25
150 25
t60 38
250 60 tt_o
:n
250 40
2 500 I 300
3 500
'
:oo
850
1 000
:uo
270
.2600
1900
254
2 000
t 000
850
650
2 300
:'o
200
106?
100
2 000
350
320
350
900
1205
':o
120
3 000
,:o
1{00
r60
!2o tl !q
lo0 ul
2 000
80 1/
,:o
? 000
:
75 D/ 6s!
I20
320
75 1/
L20
250
'10 v
2 410
200 v 3 000
26
'20
75 e/
:on
- 300
-55
Kafar Barorn g/ Gaza
rgf: (6)
8I Azar
Oedumin
ofra
Mishor Adomin
Pezael
l.lihlag Dafna
19?6 t1)
Netiv Hagevue
I2Z (r8)
Alrnog (A) 9/
Beit El {A)
Beit EI (B)
Bethlehern
l.lablus
Ralnallab
E. Jerusalen
Jordan Valley
E. Jerusalen
Jordan valley
Jordan vaIley
Fafiallah
nanallah
xx
x 120
300
El oana Nablus
x
x
xx
xx
xx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
,a
x
,a
x
x
x
68
42
139
t11
280
115
60
50
70
48
50
50
40
:,
80
Halamish RanalIah
xafat Ruth Fanallah
Xokhav llashahar Ratnallah
tttigdal Oz Bethlehen
li'lahan Glvon E. Jerusaletn
Nj-ran (Naaran) Jordan valley
Rehen Jenin
Rlnonim Ramall.ah
Roi Jordan val1ey
sallt Nablua
shave Shoheron Nablus
lteqoa Bethlehen
shelonzi rryon Jordan valley
B€it ltoron Ramallah
1978 (10)
Ariel
Har cirlo
- 20 000 1 010
2A4 - 80
40
100 4?r 5'l
40
2 700 - 74
Xarne Shonron l.lablus
Nablus
Bethlehetr
Jei)in
E. Jeru6alen
tilablus
Jordan valley
Hebron
Mevo Dotan
lrizpe Yer iho
l(far Tapuab
Tonef
Zohar
Shavnot llebola Jordan Valley
300
2 500
112
200
47L
160
160
50
500
20
2l
30
l8
41
^E//3r998/24/373 9
Eng1i6h
Page 59
Appendlx f-A (continued)
Settlenents
(TotaI
nunber )
Area Residential
Iocation w
ldunum6)
Present 20I0 Preseht 20r0
Farnil ies
Present 2010
!929 (s'
Atznonah
Ganeitaf
Shillo
zot i
Xefr Adurnun
Gaza
Gaza
RanaIlah
iloralan valley
E. Jerusalem
Jordan Val1ey
Ranallah
I 600
700 I 500
2.r00
2 400
3 500
1' :o
252 65
2SO E0
4 000 180
1 500 80
120 22
200
250 20
200 25
230 46
140 36 t:o :'
200 23
200 18
250 50
400 6l
300 24
210 l.s
5 000 I 200
2 000 28
200 1
160 16
104 35
250 {0
150 45
200 40
2s0 40
{00 30
:
160
5 000
1500
200
200
200
200
250
65 9,/
I20
200
,:o
2SO
,to y
r00
80
,:o
^.^
250
:
2 500
:o
100
30
250
2s0
x
710
10 000
20
124
",
2l
330
124
:o
50
30
50
44
!1!lll (11)
Belt ltaarava Jordan Valley
Efrata Bethlehem
EIon Monreh Nab1u6
Givon ltadasha E. Jerusalem
Eendat ly iroratan Valfey Homesh Nablus
oiryatin Hebron
t4aale shonron Nablus
Vered Yerlho E. iferusalen Yafit Jordan Valley
llezairn caza
x
x
x
x
x
'C
r981 (r6 )
A1no9 (B) 9/
Ateret
Bett Abba(Barkn) Nablus
Beit Arieh
civon
Hinanit
itaale Adunlm
llaale Anos
Maon
li,lattityahu
NilIi
Pesagot
Telern
Ig.ga (37)
EI David
Adura
Brakna (A)
Alfe l4ehashe
Einav
Elei Sinai
Aseel
Eshklot
Gadiv
Ganor
cinnat g/
Javat Zeev
Ranallah
B. Je!usaleh
,f,en in
8. Jerusal,en
Bethlehen
Sebron
RamaIlah
_-4 2 {5
800 s0
50 50 _ 40
- 2 800
- 60 _11
680 ,10
-40
r:o
:o
_-5 0 40
32
:'
20
35
40
t21
20
x
L
t(
1900
400
200
950
2 350
2 400
s00
t 610
2100
Uaalellikbnas Ranallah
xx
:l
x
x
x
x
Yaqir Nablus
Shaqid Jenin
Ranallah
Rarnallah
Hebron
Bethfehem
Ileb!on
Nablus
tdablus
Nablus
Gaza
RanaIIah
Ilebron
Gaza
Jenin
E. Jerusalen
Nablus
x
:a
xx 350 350
250 350
300 300
s00 I s00
200
200
2 500
':o
100
L20
164
250
2 000
250
i,
20
23
I10
x
x
Ar/39/ 233
E/79A4/79
English
Page 60
Appendlx I-A (continued)
Se!tlenents
(Total
nuhber) Iocation w
ReEidential
units Fanilles
Present 2010 Present 2010
Area
(dunums)
1982 {continued)
Rafira
!,laskiot
llo!ag
I,lulnevo
li'aana
llerare Dequlin
Negohot
libot Adonin
Ne ta fin
Netje Daniel
Ranat oialron
Samur
shaaretiqre
sheqef
Bedoloh
Eisha
Yaqin
Yatir
Yoezer
Noat Oedunin
Nisalnit
OtmleI
Rotetn
Anassa
Alnon (A)
Alron (B)
Farmel
Ennanuel
sussia
Zavta
Naaleh
ofarim (A)
E. Jerusalen
Jordan vaIley
Gaza
Jordan vafley
Jordan valley
c,aza
Hebron
Hebron
Nablu6
Bethl-ehen
Bethlehem
lrablu s
116blus
Eebron
Gaza
ilordan Valley
llebron
Hebron
NabluE
Jo!dan Valley
Ga za
Hebron
Jolalan Valley
Hebron
E. Jerusalen
E. Jerusalen
llebron
NabIu6
Hebron
Nablus
namallah
Ramal.lah
- 350
- 200
- 120
l4 60
10 120
- 250
- 2so
60
- 2 000 !_" ':'
- 200
500
-
,:.
it tuo
11 250
20 200
- 4 000
- 250
- 1100
- 2 s00
x
x
L
x
x
xxx
x
x
x
x
xx
xxxx
:t
x
5 800
3 300
170
400
200
200
2 400
r 000
400
1000
500
500
350
200
120
tao
250
150
200
2 000
230
':'
2r)n
':'
tuo
250
200
10 000
200
2 SOO
1100
2 500
70
40
70
105
5
30
880
300
B. Settlenents planned for establishnent from 1983 to 1986
S€ttlements
lTotal
nunber)
Area Residential
Present 2010
Fami l ies
Loca tlon w Present 2010
(dununs)
Pre6ent 2 010
1983-8'l (30)
Ankbi
Ataia
Atniel
DoIev
Elqana (C)
canei l4odin
canin
Caiesh
l(abirit
Bethlehen
NabIuB
Eebron
Ratnallah
Nab1u6
Ranallah
Nab1u6
llablus
lrabl u3
xxxx
x
x
ll
:a
200
200
2s0
350
r20
200
300
700
700
200
250
250
L20
200
200
300
700
700
200
250
^E//31998/213/739
EngI i sh
Page 6l
Appendix I-B (contlnued)
Settlenents
(fotaI
nulnbe( )
Area
(dunutns)
Resl.dentlal
Loca t lon G Pre6ent 2010 ptesent 2010 Pregent 2010
Fanllie6
1983-84 (continu€d)
tratzik Ranallah
Xhalilirn Hebron
llavley Yarak Nablug
trokhavEinalon Bethleben
Lev BashoiEon Nablus
Mazleh Levona(A) Nablue
uazleh Levona(Bl Nablus
llatar Nablus
Uattl yahu (B) Ranallab
x
xxx
!a
x
xxx
x
x
x
zx
x
x
:a
,a
t(
500
100
,t00
1.00
I70
200
250
400
250
450
200
250
250
800
200
200
2 000
200
250
200
500
230
250
200
200
500
230 y
400
250
,io s, :
'2o tl :
350 t:o
_
,100
250
300
2o0 y
500
35o 9/
200
250
150 y
200
250
400
450
200
250
250
800
200
200
200
250
200
250
500
250
250
200
200
200
250
r50 y
t 000
s00
500
200
I50
1000
2SO
2s0
700
4 400
200
150
250
,:o
200
200
1500
230
1200
700
TeI Falim Nablus
Zalaf
Brosh Jordan Valley
lrtgdali.n
Mikhmetat
Uizpe tehuda
llarci ss
l{ava
tle ta
Olarlft
Oranlt
Pragot
Nablua
tbbLu6
B€thlehen
NabIu6
Nablus
Hebron
tlebron
Nablus
Bethleheral
llebron
Nablus
Nablu6
lbbLus
Eeth lehem
NabIur
Eshtanoa Eebron
Reshet Yehonaton llablus
Hur Nablug
Iternesh North l.tablus
Naggtd Bettrlehen
Raha Bethlehen
1984-85 (I8)
Adoraln
Akrabit
Aviel l{eBt
Avnelkhefez
Be itar
Brukheil
x
xx
x
x
x
t(
xx
x
lt
I
,l
l(
x
x
250
150
300
50
200
I000
500
s00
200
150
Raa Carker
Telen (B)
Te! zah
turltadulun
Ratnallah
Bethl€hern
NabIus
Bethlehem
I000
250
250
700
400
200
150
250
,:o
200
200
I 500
I200
700
zik ltebron
Jewlsh quarter ttebron
198s-86 (,t)
Barakha (B)
Naaran (B)
Ofarim {B)
Rlhan (B)
!9!g (ro)
ELqana (D)
Glvat Ehud
Nablus
Jordan Valley
Ranarl'ah
NabIus
Nablus
Ranallah
!(
xx
x
A/39/233
E/L984/19
Engllsh
Page 62
Appendix I-B (continued)
settlerrents
(Tota1
nurnb€i ) Locatlon
Area Residentia:
fi.""nt 2oIO Present 2oIO Present 2010
!g!li (coDtlnued)
Har uanilakh tlebron
llernesh Nablu6
Nraba (B) Jolalan valley x
Llahal zorl tordan valley x
Nrhal zohar ltebron x
Rthanlt V
Shornoronlt V [ablus x
tete. v x
300 200
250
200
L20
':o
5 000
2 000
300
3 300
- 200
- 200
- !_20
- 250
- 5 000
- 2 000
I9ESZ (2)
Delr Xalaa
saLit (B)
N.hal ltn
Blria
Yart lt
Partl Bebron
Zur Nltan
Nablus
Nablus
llab1us
ull.ltlrv. or no lnfolmation available E/
Uarleb Yonatan
ui2peh Adulam
lib atate avsilable
Elqana (B) NabLus 1500 - r 500
souEcesr 'rsraeli settlenente ln Gtta an'l the llest Bank (lflc1udinq Jerusalenlt thelr nature and
al'lle (united Natlons. 1982)r rrrie*-oi seitiernents, letEt.salL ang cg+g:. 'ret)t "t]s::u-r-v1e.y- "oTf r3g:r-a-e:Tr t'i:l:a:P:n o:.f
July I983t planned, April 1983 (Jeru6alem, }Jest Bank Data Ba
6ettlehentB ln Eretz Israel'. Settlenent Deptrtnent of the Jewish Agencyt settlement Divlsion of the
zlonlst orqanlzatton (.retuearei, tsizlr tiasi'elntte RlnEdon of Jor'lan' 'Jeru6alem" rePort Prepare'l by
the ulnletry of Forelgn Affairs and the Btlecutlve cottmittee of the occupied Territories (Amlan' 1980)'
J! Edst Jeru6alent l{! lfest Bankt Gl Gaza stript a dash (-) indicates that the infoination is not
avallablc.
Expecteal 1991.
Expected 1995.
Total nurnber of factorles estab116bed3 6I.
ulLltary lnfornatlon, othertlse none available'
I(nolrn algo bY the nane rAnatotr.
Expecteal 1986.
wlll be built after 1984'
$tU be built after 1985.
4
v
9/
v4
v
s/
v
M39/ 233
E/Le84/79
English
Page 63
APPI;NDIX II
rocatj.on/vl IIages Area confiscated
(dunums)
subtotal
Ramallah
Jibia, Umsafa and Nabi Saleh
Bert IIlo
Be itounia
Det r Dibwan
Ranallah City
Bethl.ehem-Hebron
Yatta
lletueen Hebron and the Dead Sea
Arn Fares, Abul U uluf
Itas lanat Saleh
Slir
Tarqourn, A
Tafouh
SharnJah I'anily
Sourif
Bei.t oner
Al Burj
Beir Razel
Beit OuIa
tseit. Sahour
Beit Sahour
Ush AJ--chrab-Beit Sahour Area
AL-Khader
Nablus-TuIkarn-\tenin
Salen Vr.ILage tand
Delr Hatabhaznour
Akaaba
.tabal- AI Raz
Kafr Sour
Shoufa, &ouri, Beit Heed. Safareen
Akaaba
Al Mazrara, Al eibtineh
9alqrIya
Raba, A.L Zababoeh
Al-Zababdeh
2,OOO
400
600
200
3.2O7
245, L96
23,000
t 70,0oo
20,000
800
s,000
500
200
10, 000
430
2, 000
4,000
6,000
2,000
6
z>v
1,000
2, 800
4,000
2,000
1,250
1,300
I0,000
Lr 600
3,000
4,000
5,000
400 35,350
A/39/233
E/Lee4/79
Eng.l'i6h
Page 54
Iffat ion,/ViIIages
Area confiGcated
(dunums) Subtotal
alerusalenr
Raf at
Isaarl.yeh
shuifar
Bei,t Hani.na
2,25O
7,000
6
s,000
TOTALT
14,2s6
298,009
Source: lashenite Kingalotn of .tordan, !&ePort of the Ministry of OccuPied
Territori.es Affalrs" (Annan, February 19841, annex IV.
A,/39/233
E/L984/79
Eng.Lish
Page 65
APPEIiDIX III
Houses denol ished in the
u r
L967
r968
r969
19 70
1971
L97 2
L9't3
L97 4
LA T>
L976
1977
r9 78
t979
I980
t9 8I
r982
130
r40
30L
r91
23r
35
34
6I
77
24
I
8
24
32
ToCaI 1,346
of vhich 1,318 on the west Bank
2E on the caza Strip
Source: Eashemi. te Kingdorn of ,Jordan, tlinistry of Occupied Terrilories Atfarrs (Amman).
UNITED
NATIONS AE
.rAV General Assembly
.W Economlc and Social Council
Di str.
GENERAL
A/40/373
E/r98s/99
14 June 1985
ORIGINAT: ENGLISH
Living conditions of the Palestinian people iD the
, occupied Palestinian territories
Report of the Secretarv-General
1. The General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, considered the report of the
Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territories lA/39/233), which had been submitted pursuant to
its resolution 38/L66. It adopted resolution 39/169 on Iiving conditions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories, in paragraph 6 of which
it reguested the Secretary-General:
" (a) To organize in 1985, a seminar on remedies for the deterioration of
the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territoriesi
" (b) To make the necessary preparations for the seninar, providing for
the participation of the Palestine tiberation Organizationi
" (c) To invite experts to present papers to the seminar;
" (d) To invite also relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental
orqanizations;
" (e) To report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session, through
the Economic and Social Council, on the seminar."
GENERAL ASSEITIBLY
Fortieth session
Item 84 (S) of the preliminary list*
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
CO-OPER,ATION: HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
t A/40/50/Rev.L.
** E/L985/L00.
85-L7822 1811c (E)
ECONOIIIC AND SOCIAT COUNCIL
Second regular session of 1985
Item 15 of the provisional agenda**
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE
FIELD OF HU!,IAN SETTLEIIENTS
A/40/373
E/Legs/99
Enqlish
Paqe 2
2. In compliance with the above request, invitations were sent to the palestine
Liberation Organization to participate in the seminar and to a number of experts to
attend the seninar and present papers. Invitations nere also sent to relevant
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and to appropriate United
Nat ions organizations.
3. The seninar was held at the Vienna International Centre from 25 to
29 March 1985. The report on the-seminar is contained in the annex below.
^E//4L0e/g3s7/e39
English
Page 3
CONTSNTS
Paragraphs Page
r- rNTRoDucrroN. l-4 4
II. OVERALL DEVETOPMENT .. . 5 - L7 4
rrr. AGRTCULTURE .- 18 - 30 7
IV. INDUSTRY 31 - 38 IO
v. TRADE 39 - 47 t-3
VI. }IONETARY SITUAIION 48 - 58 15
VII. TAXES AND DUTIES ... 59 -'63 18
Vrrr. HoUSTNG 64 - 69 19
a IX. HIGT{ER EDUCATION . 70 - 75 2L
r: socrAl WELFARE 't6 - 90 23
APPENDICES
AI{NEX
Report on the seninar held at Vienna from 25 to 29 tlarch 1985
in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 39,/169
participants .
papers presented Eo the seminar
I. LiSt
II. List
28
30
of
of
A14O/373
E/L985/9s
Enql ish
Page 4
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The seminar, which was requested by the General Assembly in paragraph 6 of its
resolution 39/169 on living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territories, was held at the Vienna International Centre from 25 to
29 March 1985, Twelve experts participated in the seminar. fn addition, a
delegation of the Palest,ine Liber-ation Organization participated, as provided for
in the resolution. Representatives of UNIDo, UNCTAD and $lHo also participated.
2. Twelve papers prepared by the experts rdere presented, which together wi.th a
background paper prepared by a consultant, formed the basic working documents of
the seminar. A list of the participants in the seminar is contained in appendix I,
and the papers represented to the seminar are listed in appendix rr.
3. Six plenary meetings and five working group meetings were held. The first
four plenary meet.ings rdere devoted to the opening of the seminar, organization of
work, introduction of the background paper, and presentation of and discussions on
each of Lhe papers prePared by the experts. The seminar established three working
groups which respectively discussed (a) overall economic and social developmenE,
(b) economic issues, and (c) social issues. The reports of the working groups trere
considered at the last two plenary meetings.
4. Among the economic and social issues examined were agriculture, industry,
trade, the monetary situation, fiscal policies, housing and basic facilities,
higher education and social welfare. Each topic was examined in terms of t,he
current situation and trends, proposals for possible remedies and ways and means of
implementing the proposed remedies. The views expressed and suggestions made by
the participants are summarized in the sections that follow.
II. OVERALL DE\IELOPMENT
5. The participants examined the question of overall development in the light of
the information contained in the background paper and in Lero papers presented to
the seminar entitled "The current economic situation in the $lest Bank and Gaza
StriP and prospects for the futurerr and rVocational training and employment:
constraints and proposals for possible renedies,'.
5. The overall constraints to self-generating developnent in the occupied
territories were identified as the demographic structure as it affected the quality
of human resources available for developnent, and the policies and practices of the
occupying authorities as they affected land and water usage by ttre indigenous
population in the occupied territories, employment opportunities and the direction
and flow of trade, particularly external trade. Those constraints would have
important implications for any remedies that could be proposed.
^E//4109/83s7/939
English
Page 5
A. DemograPhic asPects
7. The population of the occupied Palestinian territories continued to grow
although at a lower rate than in previous years. The estimated annual actual
increase was much lower than the estimated annual natural increase, the difference
being accounted for by emigration. a/ Over the years of the occupation, emigration
fron the West Bank had numbered 1391600 persons and from the Gaza Strip,
871900 persons, for a total of 227 1500 persons (A/39/233, annex, table 15). The
significance of the emigration indicated ttrat it had affected prinarily those
groups of working age, Particularly the males in those groups.
8. Those who emigrated were usually the educated youth who, lacking suitable
opportunities for work or further training in the occupied territories, sougbt such
opportunities in other countries, prinarily the neighbouring Arab States. The
policies and practices of the occupying authorities often prevented the youth fron
returning to the territories and complicated the issue of creating the conditions
necessary for economic and social progress in the territories based on their
knowledge and experience. Other conditions prevailing in the occupied territories,
particularly economic stagnation, restrictions to freedom of movement and
expression and tight security measures were recognized by the participants as clear
disincentives for those of working age to make any meaningful contribution to the
economy and society of the occupied territories.
B. Land and water
9. Land and vrater were the basic natural resources in the occupied Palestinian
territories. Under the occupation, the Palestinian people lacked full control over
both of those resources. As regards land, according to data compiled by the
Jordanian Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, the occupying authorities had
taken possession of 2.607 1901 dunums in the tdest Bank by January 1984, constituting
4?.5 per cent of the total area. Other sources estimated that the occupying
authorities controlled 50-60 per cent of tbe Land area in the occupied Palestinian
territories lA/39/233, annex, para. 44).
10. Of the land expropriated and under the control of the occupying authorities,
26 per cent had been allocated to Israeli settlements, 165 of which had been built
in the occupied Palestinian territories by the end of July 1983 lA/39/233, annex,
para. 44). As Israeli settlements continued to be built' it was expected that more
of ttre land expropriated would be allocated to them for both initial establishment
and expansion.
11. The adverse economic irnpact of the expropriation and confiscation of
Palestinian lard was further aggravated by the loss of control over their water
resources. $later r:sed for agriculture had been restricted since tbe time of the
occupation. That had been accomplished by prohibiting the digging of new wells by
Palestinians, installing meters on existing ones, limiting the use of water from
existing wells to the levels used before the occupation and imposing fines for
exceeding the linits specified.
A/40/373
E/rees/e9
English
Page 6
C. Economic development
L2. An important characteristic of the national aggregates for the occupied
Palestinian territories was the increasing difference between gross domestic
product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP), the former was usually lower than
GNP, which included transfers from abroad. From IS 1.1 million in 1968 (equivalent
to 2.3 per cent of GNP) the difference rose to Is 36.7 million in 1976 and to Is 49.5 million in 1982, both at t968 prices (equivalent to 26.3 per cent and
28.1 per cent, of GNP, respectivefyl. V The increase in the difference to
approximat,ely a third of GNP was due to the earnings of Palestinian workers fronr
abroad remitted to the occupied territories. GNP was therefore not a good measure of the economyrs productive achievement, because it was clear that a percentage of
GNP was not generated by the local economy.
13. Thus, in that case, GDP was the better measure. GDp more than doubled in tbe
eight years from 1968 to 1976 and it rose at an annual rate of 3.7 per cent from
1976 to 1982, c/ which was below the rate of growth of GNP - 4.1 per cent - for the
same period. In per capita terms, there vras practical.ly no growth, since GDp per capita was 103.1 shekels in 1976 and 100.7 shekels in 1982. Thus, eliminating
the inward remittances of the earnings of workers outside the territories showed a different picture of growth, when GDP tras utilized instead of GNp. That was
consistent with the structural changes observed in the economy, namely, a declining
share of the agricultural sector in GDP and total employment, accompanied by
stagnation in industry and increased shares of services in GDp and total
ernployment, the latter explained by increases in demand disproportionate to the
econonyrs capacity to produce, because of the high proportion of income earned
outside the territories.
14. Ernployment in the occupied Palestinian territories reached a high in L9Z0 of
f52r7OO Persons. Despite the growth of the population, as of 1982 employment had
not yet returned to that level. fn relation to the population, employment in the territories had declined, while the percentage of those employed in Israel had risen from 11.9 per cent in 1970 to 35.5 per cent in l9g2 (A/39/233, annex, table l0). Emplolrment in Israel and emigration from the occupied territories were
explained to a large extent by reduced opportunities in the occupied territories.
15. The discrepancy between GNP and GDP also meant that the economy could not satisfy internally, from GDP, the total demand for goods and services, thus causing
increased imports. Consequently, the balance of trade of the occupied palestinian
territories had been negative in all years since 1971. The balance of trade with Israel had been negative and larger than the total trade deficit (A/39/233, annex, tables 7, 8 and 9). Trade with Jordan had partly offset the deficit, while a much larger portion had been covered by remittances from abroad. fsrael had become the
most inportant trading partner for the territories. Between 1971 and 1990,
50 per cent and 80 per cent of the exports from the tfest Bank and the Gaza Strip,
respectivelyr went to Israel, wbile 79.8-87.8 per cent of tiest Bank imports and
84.9-91 per cent of Gaza inports originated in IsraeL (A/39/233, annex, table 9 and paras. 74-781. For Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories had become the
nost important exPort market, after the export market of the United States of
America.
A/40/373
E/L985/e9
English
Page 7
16. The overall picture that energed was that of an economy unable to absorb its
own workers thus offering a ready supply of labour for the Israeli economy. The
industrial sector, deprived of capital and credit, and burdened by restrictions,
prohibitions and the competition of the more technologically advanced Israeli
producers, had stagnated at a minimal level, while service activities requiring
little or no capital investment had increased. The economy depended on Israel for
a large proportion of what it consumed - particularly industrial products. The
trend appeared to be a process of attrition of the indigenous industrial base,
while Israel continued to build its industrial parks in the west Bank in line with
the 1980 plan for Jewish indust.rialization of the area.
L7. It is important to emphasize that, ultimately, the improvement of the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories will
depend on the development of their oqrn economy. This necessitates the promotion of
productive investment therein, which in turn requires that the Palestinians must be
able to determine their own priorities and plan for them.
III. AGRICULTURE
18. The participants discussed the state of agriculture in the occupied
Palestinian territories and ways to improve it based on the information in the
background paper and a paper presented to tfre seminar entitled "Development
prospects of agriculture in the West Bank and Gaza Strip".
19. Agriculture was considered to be of special significance to the economy of the
occupied Palestinian territories, since it consEituted the primary comPonent of
GDP, which was estimated at 30-40 per cent and provided employment for a sizeable
part of the labour force, which was approximately 20-22 per cent. Moreover,
agriculture continued to play a conventional role as the source of food supply for
the local population.
20. Since the occupation, income fron agriculture had undergone wide
fluctuations. Notwithstanding conflicting claims, income originating in
agriculture had shown a high rate of growth at an overall average of about
10 per cent during the first decade of the occupation. But that growth was induced
largely by a marked rise in the productivity of certain high-priced products and
not by a corresponding rise in aggregate output. In the past seven years,
agricultural income grew at erratic rates.
2L. [tajor changes in output and cropping patterns had emerged during the period of
the occupation. Those changes had reflected important transformations in tbe
economics of production and profound constraints on land and water use. Based on a
three-year average prior to the occupation (1954-1956), average output during
1976-1979 had undergone the following changes; wheat dropped by 38 per cent,
melons by 74 per cent, tomato by f3 per cent and the number of cows by 57 per cent.
22. Despite pronounced variations in the t{est Bankrs physical geography, its
agriculture was dominated by relatively few types of farming. OIive production rdas
by far the most importantr with an average share of 20 per cent of agricultural
/...
A/40/373
E/Le8s/99
English
Page 8
income. Other important types included vegetable crops (l? per cent), citrus
(10 per cent) and grain crops (6 per cent). The livestock and poultry sectors made
up approxinately a third of the gross farm income.
23. It would aPpear that production of field crops and fruits had not shown any
appreciable increase over the years of the occupation. Those crops were cultivated
under dry farming conditions, and their productivity depended on rainfall. The field crops and fruits had not attracted tbe same measure of attention from the
occupying authorities as crops grovrn under irrigated conditions, especially those with a ready market in Israel, such as vegetables, tobacco and citrus.
24. Changes in the area under major crop cultivation f,rere even more pronounced
than those of output. The changes between the periods mentioned earlier indicated
a drop of 29 per cent in the area under field crops, 59 per cent in the area under
vegetables and 95 per cent in the area under melons.
25. The division of land according to the aource of water revealed that the area fed by rainwater constituted approximately 95 per cent of all cultivated land in
the West Bank. The area under irrigation rras estimated at 85 km2, or 5 per cent of the area. Surprisingly, the ratio of irrigated land to total cultivated area
was considerably lower than in most countries in the Middle East. The amount of
water used in agriculture in the west Bank was estimated to be 90 million cubic
metres as against 1r280 million cubic metres in Israel.
26. Services supportive to agriculture had undergone important changes during the period of the occupation. Services rendered by the occupation authorities had cone
almost to a complete standstill due to severe budgetary cuts and reduction in staft.
27. Institutional sources of agricultural credit had also come to an end since the occupation. The nilitary administration had not only refrained from creating alternative sources but it had also severely controlled the flow of funds from other sources.
28. Co-operative organizations served a potentially important role in accelerating
agricultural development, especially because of the absence of a national
agricultural authority. Hordever, the role of co-operatives had not been particularly effective. In addition to several administrative deficiencies,
co-operatives were tightly controlled by the nilitary adninistration. Despite the
importance of agriculture, the Vlest Bank was deficient in agricultural education,
while the existing educational system was practically devoid of agricultural
subjects. The occupying authorities had responded negatively to requests by certain local universities to establish a faculty of agriculture. Several
voluntary organizations comenced in recent years to provide financial support to certain forms of rural development. Despite the small scale of their operations,
however, the functioning of those organizations had been hampered by many problens,
the nost itnPortant of whiclr was the opposttion of the military adninistrat,ion to
development-oriented projects. While sone of those organizations were less efficient than others and some lrere inadequately responsive to the development priorities of local conmunities, voluntary organizations, on the whole, had played
an important role in identifying and implementing development projects.
A/40/373
E/L985/99
English
Page 9
Propoeals for possible remedies and measures to implement them
29. The following remedies were proposed by the working group that considered the
guestion, with a view to overconing the obstacles and shortcomings that confronted
the agricultural sector in the occupied Palestinian Eerritories and inhibited its
growth and developnent:
(a) Planning and programming of agricultural production and development
should be undertaken in a more systematic manner than currentlyi
(b) A programme of in-service training should be initiated for extension and
research staff engaged in agricultural activities;
(c) Sources of credit on favourable terms were essential if agriculture in
the occupied territories was to progress. Particular attention should be given to
the financiaL needs of those groups of agricultural graduates and educated youth
who were desirous of starting agricultural enterprises on a commercial basis;
(d) The agrlcultural co-operatives in the occupied territories required much
support, if they were to play an effective role in the agricultural sector. They
required educational and training support, as well as guidance in pursuing
business-oriented policies ;
(e) Given that agriculture was a most important comPonent of the gross
dcrnestic prodtrct of the occupied territories, various measures should be taken to
assure its products a stable market in the occupied territories, particularly
protecting them from unfair competition of subsidized Israel,i products currently
marketed freely in the territories. At the same time, steps should be Eaken to
liberalize trade in agriculturaL products with Jordan and other Arab countries, as
well as with both eastern and western European countries;
(f) Farmers should be encouraged to employ more efficient irrigation
techniques on a wider scale, especially in citrus groves. That would require the
provision of adequate credit facilities and the availability of reliable technical
back-up servicesl
(s) serious thought should be given to establishing appropriate
agro-lndustrial and other supporting services to enable the producers to maximize
the profitabili'ty of their undertakings.
30. In order to give effect to the proposed remedies, the following measures were
proposed:
(a) An agricultural unit, either autonomous or affiliated with a university
in the occupied territories, should be established. A primary function of that
unit would be to formulate short-term and long-term plans for agricultural
development based on surveys and feasibility studies undertaken in co-operation
with other institutions and entities in the occupied Palestinian territories
concerned with agriculturei
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(b) A faculty of agriculture should be established in one of the universities
in the occupied territories. The faculty could provide training for extension
workers and other agricultural officials, undertake research that. would provide
inputs to the work of the proposed agricultural uni.t, and provide education and training to graduates in agriculture, as well as to competent farmers, and furnish
orientation and guidance to agricultural businessmen;
(c) The feasibility of establishing a co-operative college should be
explored. Such a college could impart instruction and training in all aspects of
co-operative activity to various personnel in the co-operative movement. Action
could be initiated through a bilateral agreement, for example, with a Government that had experience in assisting co-operative novements in developing countries, or
tbrough technical assistance from appropriate international organizations;
(d) A modern soil-water laboratory should be established to render advisory
services on various problems relevant to irrigaLion and fertilization practices;
(e) Negotiations should be initiated with the occupying authorities, if
needed through the intermediary of international organizations, to lift
restrictions that had been imposed on the use of water for agricultural purposes,
the functioning of the co-operatives, the sale of agricultural products in Israeli
markets, and trading with other countries. It was also important to negotiate with
the occupying authorities ways and means of eliminating the unfair competition that
subsidized Israeli products posed to similar products grown and market,ed in the
occupied Palest.inian territories;
(f) Voluntary agencies having programmes in the occupied palestinian
territories should be persuaded to allocate more of their resources to agricultural
development projects, in both operational activities and supporting services. A co-ordination of their efforts and the involvement of local expertise and recipients of their aid in a more organized fashion would enhance the guality of
their inputs to agricultural develbpment in the occupied territoriesi
(e) The participants in the seminar felt tbat international organizations
could be of, great assistance in the development of agriculture in the occupied Palestinian territories through direct involvement in the various measures proposed
above and also in initiating a dialogue with the occupying authorities eo
facilitate the process of agricultural development in the territories.
IV. INDUSTRY
31. The background paper and two papers presented to the seninar entitled IThe
position of Palestinian industry in ttre occupied regions since L967: the $lest Bank
and Gaza Stripr and "Present situation and sustainment of palestinian industry in
occupied territories", provided the information on which the participants
considered the situation of the industrial sector in the occupied palestinian
territories and suggested possible renedies and measures to implement thern.
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32. The participants noted that industry in the occupied territories was
underdeveloped before the occupation. As far as could be ascertained, the Gaza
Strip had not developed any kind of industrial base. The $lest Bank was not
identified as an area for industrial development in the regional development Plans
of the Government of Jordan. Conseguently, the industries in the occupied
territories nere operated on a small scale, largely confined to craft work in lory
productivity and labour intensive operations. The territories also lacked the
infrastructure to provide an impetus for industrial growth. Conditions had not
changed since the occupation.
33. The industrial sector in the occupied Palestinian territories comprised a
small segment of Ehe total economy. Nevert,heless, it had a crucial role to play in
the development process, since its growth could make an important contribution to
the econony in terms of providing employment to labour displaced by a rnodernizing
agricultural sector and to those persons coming into the labour market through
population growth. At present, opportunities for employment in industry are quite
limited. Conseguently, nany job seekers either entered the labour narket in Israel
or took in work subcontracted by Israeli firmsi others emigrated to neighbourinq
Arab countries and beyond in search of empl-oyment.
34, A dynarnic industrial sector would afford opportuniEies for investment of
savings generated in other sectors of the economy, thus providing a multiplier
effect to internal growth and development. current industrial activities were
conducted in workshops and in-servicing outlets and included the minimal processing
of agricultural prodrrcts, for example, olive oil processing and pickling. There
was little factory organization, and manufactures were generally of a simple Eype,
such as cement block manufacture, handicrafts and carpentry.
35. There wae minimal industrial- export, and that mainJ-y to Israel, consisting for
the rnost part of finished goods subcontracted by Israeli firms to establishments in
the occupied territories. The industrial exports to non-Israeli destinations
consisted of over 50 per cent of agricultural products requiring a small an<iunt of
processing, such as olive oil.
35. The industrial enterprises in Ehe occupied territories suffered from
under-capitalization, restrictions in the marketing of Products and in the
acquisition of nachinery and raw materials. They were unable to obtain funds and
technical support to modernize their operations. It{ost of them were said to be
operating at 50 per cent of their capacity.
Proposafs for possible r
37. It was the view of the working group that considered the issue that whatever
proposals that could be made to remedy the existing situation of the industrial
sector nere contingent on the rernoval of the many restrictions imposed by the
occrrnrirrn authorities, particularly Land use, industrial zoning, water usage for
industrial purposes and the irrport of eguipment and raw materials. Nevertheless,
the following remedies seemed feasible in the current contexts
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(a) The current under-utilization of capacity should be brought into full use
by a rationalization of the enterprises in question supported by a drive to widen
the markets for Palestinian products bot,h within the occupied Palestinian
territories and abroadi
(b) New techniques in water conservat,ion and recycling should be investigated
so that the maximum use of water could be attained, given the fact that water was,
and will remain, a scarce resourcei
(p) There nas a need for a substantial upgrading of the industry, in both
technigues and attitudes. There was also a need to strengthen the organization
within the occupied Palestinian territories so that industrialists and
entrepreneurs couLd co-operate with each other to mutual benefit. Under-utilized
capacities could be shared, and different processing levels integrated so that
value added could be rnaximized. Through that and other means, processes currently
not carried out in the occupied territories could be introduced, thus giving added
strength to the economy as a whole;
(d) Funding rdas a crucial element in industrial activityr for both capital
investment and operational expenses. Vtays and means should be explored to mobilize
the capital needed for industrial development; mobilization should be undertaken
within the occupied Palestinian territories as well as frqrr sources abroad;
(e) Energy resources were scarce in the occupied Palestinian territories.
All means of energy conservation and the adoption of new technigues, including
solar energy, should be explored. lfhile those might be of limited appticability in
tbe short term, the long-term implications must not be overlooked;
(f) Given an efficieht and viable industrial organization, there sould be
greater incentives for external private funds to be invested in the occupied
territories. Joint ventures could be encouraged, and specific projects that were
complenentary to the industrial structure in the territories coul-d also be
encouraged. Those projects should be evaluated according to Eheir effectiveness
within the economy and their profitability;
(S) The construction industry in the occupied Palestinian territories needed
special attention in the context of development of the indust,rial sector. There
r.tas an urgent need for a feasibility study of t,he industry, possible introduction
of prefabrication, the introduction of standardized technigues and appropriate
designs to reduce the costs of construction and inprove output.
38. In exploring ways and means to implernent the proposed remedies that would
substantially increase the contribution of the industrial sector to the GDP of the
occupied territories, the working group made t,he following suggestions:
(a) With a view to mobilizing the capital needs for new enterprises and
modernizing existing ones, the possibilities should be explored of creating credit
institutions specializing in industrial act.ivity. Hire-purchase and other
appropriate forms of credit mechanisms should be established and designed for the
specific needs of tbe Palestinian environment. Only when those mechanisms were
efficiently organized could one expect outside funds to be forthcoming on a
business, as opposed to a charitable, basisl
/...
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(b) Co-operative activity should be initiated in the industriaL sector, not
only by the establistrnent of industrial co-operatives but also of a viable system
of co-operation anong such individual co-operat,ives. That would permit local
co-operat.ives to combine for purposes of plant maintenance, product
standardization, information sharing, and so on. It could also be a cbannel for
the efficient distribut,ion and control of financial assistance. Moreover, it would
be invaluable in the marketing process by establishing and enforcing standards and
grades and by promoting I'brand'r names and varieties. It would also be a convenient
means of organizing current outwork activity into more viable industries without
establishing the factory syst,em. The co-operative college suggested under tbe
section on agriculture could provide needed support services to the industrial
co-operat ives;
(c) Technical inst,itutes and universities in the occupied territories should
be encouraged to develop technologies appropriate to conditions in the
territories. They could seek help from similar institutes in other countries and
fron international organizationst
(d) The part.icipants in the seminar considered that ttre efforts of the
international corununity, through the organizations of the United Nations system, to
establish projects and to give assistance within the occupied territories should be
supported and strengthened, particularly in project identification and
inplementat,ion based on the results of more general investigations al.ready made and
the appropriateness of such projects taking into account the output structure in
neighbouring Arab countries and the feasibility of such projects being undertaken
on a national or regional (joint venture) basis. The international community could
also be of assistance in exploring the possibilities of energy conservation and the
introduction of low-technology alternative energy production.
V. TRADE
For the consideration of trade in the occupied territories, the participants
before them the informat.ion in the background paper and a paper presented to
seminar entitled I'Domestic and foreign trade in the occupied territories".
40. It was evident from the information in the background paper and in the various
reports of the Secretary-General on living conditions of the Palest,inian people in
the occupied Palestinian territories submitted to the General Assembly, that the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip had been progressively drawn into a close trading
relationship with Israel since the occupation. From a position where there was
absolutellt no trade with fsrael before L957 | the territories found themselves by
1982 exporting to fsrael 56.7 per cent of their total exports and importing
89.0 per cent of their total imports, both in value terms. d,/
41. Many factors contributed to the predominance of trade with Israel. Factors of
major significance rdere the opening of Ehe borders between the territories and Israel and the prohibition by the occupying autborities of direct exports from the
occupied Palestinian territories to countries other than Jordan, in particular the
neighbouring Arab countries and certain eastern European countries with which
39.
had
the
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Israel had no trade relations. Other contributing factors were the channelling of
exportable prodrrts from the territories through Israeli trade outlets to those
countries having trade relations with Israel, the orientation of production in the
territories to agricultural crops having a denand in Israel. for processing and
exporti the demand for building materials in Israel and the Israeli settlenents
that were being established in the territoriesi and the practice of finishing and
returning to Israel manufactured goods subcontracted by Israeli firms to
establishrnents in the occupied territories.
42. The other major trading partner of the occupied Palestinian territories was
Jordan. The value of exports to Jordan had fallen frorn 43.2 per cent of total
exports in 1958 to 31.7 per cent in L982. Irnports from Jordan had remained low,
and during the period of the occupation they had fallen fron 7.3 per cent of the
total value of inports in 1968 to 1.2 per cent in 1982. ImPorts from Jordan were
llmited to the nest Banki the Gaza Strip inported nothinq from Jordan.
43. Trade with other countries had been fluctuating during the period of tshe
occupation. The value of exports had fallen from a high of approximately
13.0 per cent of total exports in 1968 to 1.5 per cent in L982. Imports had fallen
fronr approximately 16.0 per cent of the total value of imports in 1958 to
9.8 per cent in L982. e/
44. The net result of those trading activities showed that for Israel, the
occupied Palestinian territories had been consistently registering a negative
balance of trade since the occupation. The balance of trade with Jordan had been
positive all along, and trade with other countries had been registering a negative
balance consistently. The overall trade balance for both the grlest Bank and the
Gaza Strip had been negative throughout the period of the occupation. The
consistent adverse balance of trade had been largely net through the earnings of
palestinians working in Israel and the considerable remittances from Palestinians
working outside the territories. f/
Internal trade
45. The trade and transport sectors together contributed about 36 per cent to the
GDp of the $lest Bank and about 25 per cent to the GDP of the Gaza Strip. The
trading activities of the Gaza Strip were less than half the volume of the trading
activities of the glest Bank, whose total and per capita income nere greater than
Ehose of the Gaza Strip. Trading activities fluctuated fronr year to year due to
several causes, sucb as obstacles to issuing licences for the establishment of
firms; the imposition of taxes; the imposition of curfews by the occupying
authorities from time to time; the freguent confiscation of identity cards in the
commercial markets by soldiersi strikes by inhabitants to protest the behaviour and
activities of the occupying authorities and the occupation in general. The result
of alt those impedinents nas the reduction in the number of effective working days
in the occupied territories. About one fourth of the working year was lost because
of such practices.
46.
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Proposals for possible remedies and measures to implement them
The working group that considered the topic was of the view thats
(a) Currently Palestinian trade was facing unfair competition in the internal
markets resulting from subsidized products coning from Israel and the Israeli
settlements. If Palestinian products were to hold their own, let alone prosper,
and be subjeet to market forces, support should be extended to the local producers
and traders at the level that was being given to Israel.i agricuLtural and
industrial products;
(b) The narket for PaLestinian products abroad should be widened. This could
be achieved if Palestinian producers and distributors were afforded opportunities
to establish direct contact with counterpart producing and marketing organizat,ions
in other countries.
47. The following ways and means to implement the remedies were suggested:
(a) A marketing authority should be established for Palestinian products.
The authority should devel.op standards and promote brand names on behalf of
Palestinian producers. It could act as a link between narkets and producers, as a
source of credit for working capital and as an agency for marketing organizations
and firms abioad willing to "purchase forwardtr the crops or prodrrcts of Palestinian
producers. The authority could also be used for the identification of market
opportunities for new industrial products that might be developed in the occupied
territor ies;
(b) Cbambers of comnerce and Palestinian organizations generally should be
encouraged to launch a far more active campaign inside the occupied Palestinian
territories to promote indigenous products;
(c) Export credit facilities should be developed, and that function could be
a najor activity of an indigenous banking and connercial system that might emerge
in the occupied PaLestinian territories;
(d) Conmunications should be irnproved, and faciltties such as telex allowed
to be established in the occupied Palestinian territories, without which no firm
could hope to compete on world markets;
(e) The inport-export trade sbould not be restricted to a few points under
Israeli control but should include seaports, airports and other outlets, not only
to inprove facilities for rapid export of high-priced perishable products but also
to pernit the participation of Palestinians in the procesa of trading and
increasing their share of the value added to the palestinian outputi
(f) Negotiations should be conducted, perhaps through the Arab League, to
persuade Arab countries to liberalize their irportatlon of PaLestinian products
under fair market conditions;
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VI I. TAXES AI{D DUTIES
59. For t,he consideration of taxes and duties, the participants had before tbem
the paper entitled "The effect of taxes imposed on the population of the occupied
Palestinian territoriesn. According to the information and data presented in that
paPer, prior to the occupation in 1967, t,here had been two types of taxes in force
in the $lest Bank. The first was the incqne tax; the second comprised other taxes,
such as the education tax, the land tax, customs duties and revenue stamps. Since
the occupation' significant changes had been made in those taxesi in addition, a
nen tax, the value-added tax (vAT) of 8 per cent, had been introduced in
August 1976, which had currently climbed to 15 per cent.
60. Changes in the existing taxes, which were effected through military orders,
included increases in tax rates and changes in tax collection procedures. Ttre
appeal procedures had also been changed by replacing the special tax court
established under Jordanian law by a military conmittee.
51. Those changes, particularly in the tax rates and the collection procedures,
supposedly introduced to conform to policies and practices prevailing in Israel,
had had a profound effect on the personal incomes of the Palestinians and on trends
in economic development in the Eerritories, which were at a different stage of
development from that of Israel. The tax burden of the Palestinians in the
occupied territories had been estinated at 33 per cent of their incomes. It should
also be noted that inflation' which had reached unprecedent,ed rates in recent
years, constituted a hidden tax, in the absence of adjustments to income brackets
on which income tax was calculated. The tax burden on the Palestinian people and
its impact on living conditions was bound t'o worsen in the future because of the
erosion of purchasing power through inflation, a lag in the adjustment of wages and
earnings comparable to the system in Israel and the differences in the services and
benefits provided by the occupying authorities.
Proposals for possiblq remedies and measures to implement them
62. The working group t.hat considered possible renedies to the problem of taxes
and duties expressed the view that:
(a) Changes in the tax structure and in the rates imposed after the occupation
should be exanined to deternine whether they were in conformity with the provisions
of international law as they applied to the occupied Palestinian territories, and
whetber they were equitable vis-h-vis taxes imposed on Israeli ciEizens, not only
in terms of rates but also in terns of their inpact on living condit,ions;
(b) Under the cardinal principle of trno taxation without representationrr, a
system should be established to ensure that the proceeds of the taxes imposed on
the Palestinians would be used solely for the benefit of the people in the occupied
Palestinian territories and disbursed, as far as possible, through their own
represeneative bodies;
'":) The tax appeal court that existed prior to t,he occupation should be
re:nti::.ated in place of the present rnilitary committee to ensure equity and justice
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to those Palestinians appealing the decisions of the tax enforcers, whose
impartiality was often open to question.
53. In considering ways and means of iroplenenting the remedies proposed, the
working group made the following observations:
(a) There was little likelihood that the proposed remedies could be
irnplemented without international intervention to persuade the occupying
authorities to recognize that a sysEem of taxation applicable to a more advanced
economy and society could be lnequitable in the context of the economic and social
conditions prevailing in the occupied Palestinian territoriesi
(b) There was an urgent need to assess (i) the levels and incidence of taxes
currently imposed on the Patestinian peoplet (ii) the ways in which taxes collected
from the Palestinian people were disbursed; and (iii) the levels of taxes diverted
to purposes not in accordance with international law;
(c) Concerned individuals and institutions in the occuPied Palestinian
territories might want !o undertake studies to clarify the above issues, monitor
changes in the tax structure and tax enforcenent procedures and publicize their
findings both within the occupied territories and outside.
VIII. HOUSING
64. Discussions by the participants on the situation of housing in the occupied
Palestinian territories were based on the information in the background paper and
tyro papers entitled 'rPolicy recorunendations to alleviate the housing problem in the
occupied Palestinian territories" and "The contribution of the housing sector to
the econony of the occupied territories".
65. The participants noted that the poor state of housing in the occupied
territories was a conseguence of many years of neglect and an absence of planning.
The situation bad been aggravated by the occupation. The following two indicators
were recognized as useful in measuring the extent of the housing shortage in the
occupied Palestinian territories:
(a) Density per roomi
(b) Avaitability of domestic faciLities in the existing units. About
40 per cent of the farnil.ies lived in houses with a density that dxceeded three
persons per room. By international standards that was considered to be unaccePtabLy
high. The size of the Palestinian household was increasing over time owing to the
need to accommodate newly formed families. As regards domestic facilities' over
50 per cent of the housing units in the $lest Bank did not have running water, and
close to 50 per cent had no bathroorn. Also, the supply of electricity in the $lest
Bank was inadeguate, about half of the units having no electricity. Furthermore,
one quarter of the units had no kitchen (A/39/233, annex, table 4).
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66. The supply of houses in the occupied territories was less than the rate of
fanily formation and the need for replacement of dilapidated units. Figures
extracted from the Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983 showed that over a l5-year
period of occupation (frqn l-957 to 1982) 45r310 residential units vrere constructed,
against a net increase of 381589 households. In ot,her words, during that period
roughly 6r700 additional units were constructed against an estimated stock of
140r000 substandard or dilapidated units. The Statistical Abst,ract of Israel, 1983
also showed that there had been no residential const,ruction by the public sector in
the west Bank since 1958 and in the caza Strip since 1978.
67. It was further noted that there was a marked discrepancy in the housing
conditions of fsraeli settlers and those of the indigenous Palestinian population,
the Israeli settlersr housing being far superior to that of the Palestinians. In
addition to establishing settlements in unpopulated areas, Israeli settlements were
being created within the densely populated areas of Palest,inian towns. That new
phenomenon, besides bringi.ng the unegual housing conditions of the Palestinians and
the Israeli set,tlers into closer proximity, burdened the already densely populated
urban areas and diminished the area available for urban development to alleviate
the housing shortage of the indigenous population.
Proposals for possible remedies and measures to implement them
68. The working group that considered the housing problem proposed the following
remedies:
(a) The demolition and sealing-off of houses should ceasei
(b) The authority of Palestinian village councils and district planning
commissions should be restored and the authority for issuing building permit,s and
other regulatory responsibilities should be vested in them;
(q) Effective inst,itutions should be established at local, regional and
national levels to resolve the housing problem and implement housing policies and
plans;
(d) Institutional arrangements should be made to establish a housing bank to
finance housing projects on acceptable terms, taking into account tbe low level of
per capita income in the occupied territories and the rate of inflat,ioni
(e) A data base should be established to determine housing needs in both
cities and villages in the occupied Palestinian territories. (Such data, based on a
sample survey of more tban 150r000 households, is available at Birzeit University.)
69. To implement those remedies, the working group proposed the following:
(a) lleasures should be adopted for the eguitable and effective distribution
of housing to Ehe target population. The allocation of housing units should be
based on the following factors3
(c) Funds to finance public housing should
authorities, local authorities, and regional and
institutions, The feasibility of establishing a
repository for such funds should be explored.
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be allocated by the occuPYing
international funding
housing bank that could act as a
(i)
(ii)
How recentLy the recipient fanily was formedl
The degree of overcrowding in the unit occupied by the fanily;
(iii) Household incomei
(iv1 The availability of basic facilities in the family dwe11in9, namely,
sewerage, Ytater and electricitY;
(v) nhether the family owns or rents its dwelling;
(b) A housing council should be established with an adeguate number of field
offices in the occupied territories to exanine the applications of the potential
recipients, to supervise the actual execution of housing projects and to authorize
the release of the funds needed to facilitate construction activitiesi
IX. HIGIIER EDUCATION
70. The participants in the seminar examined the guestion of higher education in
the occupied.Palestinian territories on the basis of a paper entitled "Palest,inian
higher education: problens and suggested remedies". Tbe establishment of a
Palestinian system of higher education which included six universities serving more
than 10rOO0 students, was considered a singular achievement in a society under
occupation. It was all the more remarkable in that it was an indigenous etfort
that had received no encouragement fron the occupying authorities. Palestinian
universities not only offered educational opportunities but also enriched the
cultural tife of the society. They helped other institutions by supplying them
with the personnel they needed but could no longer get fron outside as a result of
the severe lirnitations on the recruitment of personnel inposed by the occupying
authorities.
7L. However, owing to the conditions of nilitary occupation and the practices of
the ecupying power, the further development of the Palestinian system of higher
education was severely hindered. Furthermore, its abiLity to function and to
implenent projected plans for the enlargement and diversification of programnes
compatible with the future socio-econonic needs of the Palestinians was seriously
impaired. The future of the systen was threatened. Palestinian higher'education
was suffering from three serious problems as a result of Israeli practlces:
(a) Constraints on the autonomy and freedom of academic institutions. In
addition to the various types of controls and constraints imposed since the
beginning of the occupation, some of which affected Palestinian society as a wbole
(such as curfews, road-blocks, censorship and restriction of movement), the Israeli
authorities had imposed further restrictions designed to bring higher education
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under the imnediate and direct control of the occupying authorities. Military
Order 854, promulgated in the sumner of 1980, gave an officer in the military
Government supervisory jurisdiction over higher education, required academic
institutions to obtain annual Licences and to obtain permission for nen programmes,
for the employment of faculty and administrative personnel and even for the
admission of students;
(b) The absence of an effective local Palestinian aut,hority to plan,
co-ordinate, ard suPport higher education. The Council for Higlrer Education, a
private Palestinian organization established in L977 to perform such functions, was
not recognized by the occupying authorities, and its work was impeded primarily by
restrictions on the movements of its members;
(c) The scarcity of resources due to Ehe conditions of underdevelopment,
prevailing in the area, as well as the continuing appropriation of Palestinian
resources by the Israeli occupation authorities. The scarcity of resources yras
conpounded by rest,rictions imposed by the occupying authorities on the entry of
funds and the wit,hdrawal of the tax-exempt status enjoyed by educational
institutions prior to the occupation.
72.
Proposals for possible renedies and measures to implement then
The following remedies were proposed by the working group:
(a) A1l. measures of collective plrnishment imposed on academic institutions,
such as the closure of universities, military checkpoints that impeded access by
students, faculty and employees, and curfews on college campuses, should ceasei
(b) All measures curtailing the autononqr and restrict,ing the normal academic
functions and freedons of universities should end. That would mean rescinding
Military Order 854, the cessation of book-banning and censorship, and the
restoration of institutional freedom concerning instructional prograrnmes, faculty
recruitment and student admission;
(c) Restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities on the work of the
Council for Higher Education, especially restrictions against the freedom of the
members of its Executive Cornmittee and General Assembly to travel and to meet,
should be removedi
(d) The Council for Higher Education
international and national agencies as the
of higher education and as the appropriate
institutions;
should be recognized by the appropriate
local Palestinian authority in the field
liaison with Palestinian academic
(e) Israeli restricEions on the entry of funds and other types of
contributions to Palestinian higher education should be lifted;
(f) Universities and other national bodies abroad concerned with higher
education should be encouraged to establish links with comparable Palestinian
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institutions and to explore with them possible co-operation and joint -Projects,
such as research and student exchange;
(S) Appropriate international, regional and national agencies interested in
nigher education strould be encouraged to co-ordinate with Palestinian institutions
of higher education to establish needed community-wide training and continuing
education programnes, such as literacy campaigns, public health education and
in-service teacher training, as well as extension work in agriculture, industry and
the like.
73. It was the opinion of the working group that international assistance was of
the utmost importance for further progress in higher education in the occupied
Palestinian territories. Structures already existed for channelling such
assistance. At the local level, there was the Association of Arab Universities (of
which Palestinian universities were members) and the Arab Leaquers Educational,
Scientif ic and Cultural Organization (ALES@) . The nationaL universities in the
Arab world could also provide appropriate institutional linkages for collaboration
and assistance to Palestinian universities.
74. Concerned international organizations could be helpful in monitorinq Israeli
practices and alerting lrtember States and the public to violations of acadenic
freedom and independence.
75. Various organizations and bodies of the United Nations system' such as the
United Nations Development Programme (tNDP), the United Nations Relief and llorks
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (tNRI{A), the United Nations
University, the International Labour Organisation (II,o), the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) r United Nations Educational, Scient'ific
and Cultural Organization (tNESCO) and the World Health Organization (tlllo), could
provide co-operation and assistance at the functional level. They were
particularly suited to involvement in and the funding of joinC research, planning
and programme development. Non-governmental organizations could also be useful
conduits for international assistance to Palestinian higher education.
X. SOCIAL I{ELFARE
76. To facilitate their discussion of this topic, the participants had before them
a paper entitled "social welfare services in the Itlest Bank and Gaza: appraisal,
constraints and proposals for possible remedies". It was noted that until
recently, a coherent social welfare programme for the occupied Palestinian
territories had been largely overlooked by those concerned with the welfare of
Palestinian society. The causes of the poverty and deprivatlon in the territories
included the separation of the farnily, health hszards and a low level or lack of
household income. The basic relief functions to the deprived sectors of the
population had been provided in the form of cash subsidies, food rations, medicaL
facilities, community development projects and other kinds of rehabilitation
services.
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Engl.ish
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Nutrition
gg. Dleasures should be adopted to educate the public, particularly the poor, about
proper nutrit,ion, since a lack of proper diet and nutrition was a najor problem of
peopte living in poverty. It would also be necessary to conduct public campaigns
on the harmful effects associated with specific patterns of food consumption'
Assistance to voluntarv indigenous activities
99. Some palestinian rnedical age-ncies had mobitized local professional people in
the medical area to suppty essential health and medical facilities to the very poor
at the grass-roots leve1 on a self-help basis. Those agencies should be encouraged
through financial assistance and the provision of medical facilities and eguipment,
to extend tbeir work to the less accessible regions of the territories. In
addition to providing health services, Palestinian welfare socieEies performed a
variety of welfare functions, such as primary education, traininq of women, child
care and nursing. A11 of those activities nere indispensable for the welfare of
the people in low-income brackets. Those welfare societies should be given the
required aid to encourage and assist them in every possible way. That would enable
them to expand their activities in all directions, including the health improvement
activities for the disadvantaged population.
90. It was noted that the proposed remedies related to the social welfare
programtne could not be carried out in the absence of a national agency in the
trlest Bank and the Gaza Strip. International agencies such as $lHO' UNR$IA, the
United Nations Centre for lluman Settlenents (Ifabitat) and others must be included
in the implementation of those remedies. !{ith the aid of bodies and organizations
of the United Nations system and Arab financial and social development
institutions, 1t would be possible to establish a welfare centre outside the
occupied palestinian territories to monitor and maintain the welfare activities in
the occupied territories. lrlore foreign investments should be channelled through
international bodies active in the area of welfare services to provide new
facilities and upgrade existing ones. The non-governmental voluntary agencies,
both foreign and national, should be encouraged to collaborate through a national
council of voluntary agencies to identify priority areas of assistance to the less
privileged groups in the occupied territories and should co-ordinate their services
for maximum ef fectiveness.
g/ For details of population increases and levels of emigration, see the
reporEs of, the Secretary-General on living conditions of the Palestinian people in
the occupied Palestinian territories (A/37/238, annex, table 5 and A/38/278, annex,
appendix II).
E/ Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983.
g/ Calculated frorn the figures in the report of the secretary-General on
fivin6 conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territori.es
(A/39/233, annex, table 13).
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NqFes (continued)
9/ Conputed from the figures in the report of the Secretary-Genera1 on living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied palestinian territories
(A/39/233, annex, tables 7 and B).
9/ The ratios and percentages have been computed from the figures in the report of the Secretary-General on living conditions of the Palestinian people in
the occupied Palestinian territories (A/39/233, annex, tables z and g).
!/ rbid.
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APPENDIX I
List of ParticiPants
Experts
Bakir Abu-Kishk
Hisham Awartani
Edward Balassanian
Mirtha Carrera Halim
Muhamnad Ballaj
Abdel-Razek Hassan
Bisham Jabr
Omar Kazi
D. Madawela
Antoine Mansour
Padle M. Naqib
Nidal R. Sabri
Delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization
Jamal Sourani, Head of Delegat,ion
Daoud Barakat, Deputy Head of Delegation, Permanent Observer for the Palestine
Liberation Organization, Vienna
M. Abu-Koash
Mohieddin Massud
United Nations
P. G. SAdlCr, UNCTAD
Tariq Al Khudeyri, UNIDO
fssan El-Zair, UNfDO
N. Ayyash, WHO
H. Hiddlestone, WHO
A. J. S. Jabra, WHO
Secretar iat
D. Johal, Habitat
J. Mugai, Habitat
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A/40/373
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Englisb
eage 30
APPENDIX II
List of papers presented to the seminar
"The current economic situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and prospects
for the futuretr (F. M. Naoib)
"The position of Palestinian indu5try in the occupied regions since 1967, the West
Bank and Gaza Strip" (Abdel Razek Hassan)
'Present situat,ion and sustainment of Palestinian industry in occupied territories"
(I. El-Zaim)
trDomestic and foreign trade in the occupied territories" (B. Jabr)
'Monetary situations constraints and proposals for possible remedies" (A. llansour)
"The effect of taxes irnposed on the population of the occupied Palestinian
territoriesn (N. Sabri)
"Development prospects of agriculture in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (H. Awartani)
"Folicy reconunendations to alleviate the housing problem in tbe occupied
Palest,inian territories" (E. Balassanian)
rrThe contribution of the housing sector to the economy of the occupied territoriestr
(8. Abu-Kishk)
"Palestinian higber education: problerns and suggested rernedies" (M. Ballaj)
"Vocational training and employnent: constraints and proposals for possible
remedies" (M. Carrera Halin)
"Social welfare services in tbe West Bank and Gaza: appraisal, constraints and
proposals for possible rernedies" (O. Kazi)
"Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian
territories: a background paper" (D. Madawela)
U}IITED
ilATrOlrs AE
,rrAs General AsremblY
EIum-r^r-?Gl{ f//r Wg Eonomla and Soctal Goundl
Distr.
GENERAL
A/42/L83
E/1987/53
13 ApriL 1987
ORIGINAL: ENGI,ISH
GENERAL ASSEUBLY
Forty-second session
Item 12 of the PreliminarY list*
REPORT OF TITE E@NOIUC At{D
socrAt @ttNcrr,
E@NOUIC AND SOCIAI, @T'NCIt
Second regular session of 1987
Item 11 of the Provisional
agenda**
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
IN THE FIETD OF HUIIAN
SETTLEIIENTS
Livinq conditions of the PgLe,stini?n pgop1e in the occupied
Palestinian territories
Report of the S'ecretary-General
l. The General Assembty at its fortieth session, after considering the report of
the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied palestinian territories ti/qO/glZ-E/L985/99), adopted resolution 40,/201'
in paragraph 5 of which it reguested the Secretary-General: (a) to organize by
April 1987, a seminar on priority development projects needed for inprovinq the
living conditions of the Palestinian people ln the occupied Palestinian
territories, including a comprehensive general housing programtner 89 l€colnlllended in
resolution g/3 of ttre cormrission on Human settlementsi (b) to make necessary
preparations for the seminar, providing for the Participation of the Palestine
Liberation Organizationl (c) to invite experts to present PaPers to the seminari
(d) to invite also relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations;
(e) to report to the Assenbly at its forty-first session, through the Economic and
Social Council, on the preparations for the seminar; (f) to report to the Assembly
at its forty-second session, through the Econonic and Social Council, on the
seminar.
A/42/50.
See Economic
87-09332 2492c (El
and Social Council decision 1987,/108.
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2. The Secretary-General accordinqly for subnitted a progress report on preparatione the seminar (A/4L/4LS-E/LII6/LO4! to the General Aseernbly at its forty_first session, through the Economic and Soclal Council. The General Assenbly took note of the report in decision 4L/453.
3. The Serninar was held at
6 lrlarch 1987. The report on report.
the Vienna fnternatlonal Centre fron 2 to
the Seninar ls contained in the annex to the present
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ANNEX
the Seminar on the Livlnq Conditions o! the Palestinian
in
(Vienna, 2-6 llarch 1987)
@NTENTS
I. TNTRODUCTION .............. o......... -...... . " "
II. GENERAL FRAIIIEIIORK ..... .t"o """"""
III. SUMITIARIES OF PROJEeI PROPOSALS ...."'"o "'""''
A. Establishment of an Arab cement company in the nest Bank
of
Paragraphs Page
1-3 5
4-5
5
oaa..
5
6
7
I
9
1I
L2
B. Developnent of a seaport in Gaza ."" """"'
C. Establishrnent of a co-operative factory to process
selected Local fruits and vegetables .......""""""'
D. Establishment of a marketing agency for Palestinian
agricultural Products .. ... "
E. Establishment of a training and production centre for
arts and crafts .....
F. Production and training centre for textiles and
ready-nade garments ........
Ceranics factory in llebron ..... "''' "'"
Sardine canning factory in Gaza ... o. " " " " "
Development of sheep stock and training of farmers ' " ' '
Establishment of a poultry hatcbery ...
Propagation and use of jojoba . ..
satisfaction of housing needs ..... ..... .."' 'o""' 22
Satisfaction of the energy needs of rural cotmunities .. . 23
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
u.
14
15
16
L7
I9
20
ied Pale ian Territories
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N.
o.
P.
Appendix.
CoNTEN,fu (continued)
Organization and provision of an inexpensive transport
network as a co-operative venture
fmprovement of the road network .....
Irlater utiLization . .
List of participants ............. o.. .....
Page
25
26
27
29
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I. INTRODUCTION
l. The Seninar on the Living Conditions of the Palestinian People in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories was held at the Vienna International Centre from 2 to
6 !,[arch 1987, Bursuant to General Assembly resolution 40/2OL.
2. The Seminar xras attended by 10 experts who prepared project proposals for the
Seninari the representatives of two United Nations Secretariat units, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Centre for Socia1 Devet'opment
and Humanitarian Affairs of the Department of International Econonic and Social
Affairs; and the representatives of one specialized aqency, the trlorld Health
Organization. Representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization also
participated, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 4O/20L. The League of
Arab states rilas also represented. A list of participants is given in the appendix'
3. The Seminar established three working groups, which examined project proposals
related to:
(a) Agriculture and industrY;
(b) Traininq, rnanponer development and employmenti
(c) ItousinE and infrastructure.
Sununaries of, the project proposals, as agreed upon by the working groups' were
considered at the final plenary meetinq and are presented in section fII below'
II. GSNERAL FRAUEWORK
4. To facilitate the work of the Seninar, the participants agreed to consider the
project proposals in a general framework for project identification and
assessnent. The following general framework was agreed upon:
(a) As there is at present no integrated plan for development in the occupied
palestinian territories, it is necessary to select individual projects that can
eventually be imPlemented;
(b) Project identification and selection shouLd focus
(i) Agriculture, industry and utilization of land and
(iit ttousins, to establish the people on the land and
not Yet confiscatedi
on:
other resourcesi
protect that which is
(iii) Development of manpower and irnprovement of technological skills as
central prerequisites for development, providing job opportunities and
expanding the number of beneficiaries of the development processi
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(iv) rnstitution-building to inculcate the values of co-operation, group
action and solidarityi
(c) Scarce financial resources should of be used optinallyi hence, duplication orojects should be avoided, bearirg in mind the prograrmes and activities of the organizations of the United Nations system, governlnental, non_governnental and other bilaterar and rnultilateral sources of assistance to the palestinian people in the occupied palestinian territories;
(d) The constraints imposed by the rsraeli occupation and the need to be inventive and selective in the choice of projects should be borne in mind.
5' The participants agreed to give high priority to projects directed towards the following objectives:
(a) rncreased productivity and the expansion, diversification and improvement of production in agriculture and industry;
(b) The use of surplus perishable agricultural
the establishment of agro-industries in which there
two sectorsi
produce, particularly through
is conplementarity between the
(c) The promotion of housing and related activities through a progranme to make greater use of physical and financial resourcesi
(d) rncreased inport substitution and export potential;
(e) An improvement in the oeographical distribution of projects, taking into account resource endovrment.
The central theme underlying all these objectives was labour absorption and the
entrenchment of the Palestinian people in their homes and on their land.
III. ST'I,IItIARTES OF PROJECT PROPOSALS*
6' The participants presented a number of project proposals to the Seninar, which are sunmarized below.
ft nas agreed that the
taking into account the conments
forward their revised proposals
Settlenents (Habitat) .
participants would revise their project proposals
nade durirg the discussion at the Seminar, and to the United Nations Centre for Human
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A. Establishment of an Arab cement cdnpanv in the $lest Bank
1. Development objective: To promote the growth of industry' Partlcularly
in the cqtstructio" s."t"r, includinq housinq and related infrastructurer in
the occupied Palestinian territories.
2. Imrnediate objective: To establish an Arab cement company in the tfest
Bank.
3. Backqround and justification: At present, almost all cement requirements
orttreoccupieaffioriesaresuPp1iedbyIsraelunderaguota
systen which neets less than 50 per cent of the demand for cement. The
remaining demand is usually met frm private Israeli wholesalers at very high
prices. Owing to the Israeli nonopoly of the cenent market, there are'
periodical shortages of cenent in the occupied Palestinian territories' As
cenent is an essential conunodity f,or developnent prollrammes, esnecially
housinq and infrastructure construction, the productlon of cenent localIy will
help: (a) to nake the occupied territories self-eufficient in cementt (b) to
nobilize the idle hurnan and natural resources in the occupied territoriesi
(c) to create direct ernplolment oppurtunities for about 1r000 workers, as well
ae significant indirect enployrnent opportunities in the construction sector
and ancillary industries. Studies indicated that the ran naterials needed for
cement production are available and that it is possible to establlsh a cenent
factory in ttre vicinity of Hebron.
tl. Outputs:
(a) FeasibilitY studY rePortt
(b) Construction of a cenent factoryi
(c) Production of Ir500 tons of cement per day.
5. Activities:
(a) Raw materials investigationsi
Feasibility study based on the above investigations,
Constitution of the cdnpanyt
Cqrstructiqr of the cenent factoryt
Recruitment of nanpower for operation and nanagement.
Inputs:
(a) consultants and experts to conduct a feasibility study'
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
6.
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(b) Utilization of the raw'rnaterials available in the occupied Palestinian territoriesi
(c) ttlobilization of nanpower avaiLable in the occupied territories;
(d) Provision of electricity and water to the sitei
(e) E:rpertise from abroad to erect and conmission the factory;
(fl Purchase and installation of equipnrent and nachinery.
7. - PTeTequisitgg: rt will be necessary to obtain permits authorities for different from the occupying activltles such as drilling, building, using land, driuing of, water wells, constructing a power station and inporting equipnent
and nachines as weLl as eventual mining.
8. Estimated costs:
Pre-investment activities
Investments
tforking capital
TOTAL
$us I 000 000
48 r00 000
2 000 000
$us sl 100 000
9. Possible sources of fundings
(a) Founder shareholdersi
(b) Other shareholders;
(c) Long-/mediunr-term loans frorn suppliers of equipment and nachines;
(d) Development banks and other financial sources.
10. Availabre docunentationr said J. Haifa, nBstablishment of an Arab cement
company in the west Bank" paper prepared for the seninar, vienna, lgg?.
B. Developrnent of a seaport in Gaza
tl:h e eDcoenvoemloipc naenndt osobcieiaclt icvoen:d iTtioo ndse velop the infrastructure in Gaza to improve of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories.
P?'a- les.rt9inrniagnd iapteeo opblej ewcittihv es To develop a seaport in Gaza which wiII provide the an outlet to the sea.
3' Bagkground and justifications In view of the iEolation of Gaza under occupation, there is an urgenE need to find an outlet for ite products and
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access to outside markets. A seaport can Provide such an outlet, thus
irnproving the quality of life and relievinq sqne of the pressures that exist
in the Gaza Strip.
4. Outpuis:
(a) Feasibility stdy reporti
(b) Technical report on design and construction of a conmercial seaporti
(c) Commercial seaPort.
5. Activities:
(a) Geological, oceanographic, clinatical and economic surveysi
(b) tt{odelinq, that is, naking a model of the seaPorti
(c) Preparation of the full feasibility report.
6. Inputs and estimated costs:
Data collection and survey $US 150 000
Modeling 120 000'
Port design by variq.rs specialized
engineers 450 000
Transportation 20 000
Economic evaluation and financial
analysis 215 000
Administration 32 ooo
Construction of the seaport (to be determined)
TOTAT sus 98? 000
7. Institutional framework: To be managed by an independent port autbority.
8. Availab1e documentation: Said A. Assaf, iDevelopment of a seaport in
Gaza", paper prepared for the Seminar, Vienna, 1987.
C. Establishment of a co-operative factorv to Process selected
local fruits and vegetables
L. Development objectives:
(a) To broaden the industrial sector and increase the contribution ratio
of the industrial sector to the GDP, which is now not more than 5 per centi
A/42/L83
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(b) To help revlve the agricultural aector by creating price stability
for farn. products as well as increasing the value of such productsi
(c) To reduce foreign trade balance deficits for the occupied territories.
2- Irnmediate objectives To process a substantial part of the surplus of
vegetables and fruits. The proposed procesEim capacity is 501000 tons of
f,arn products annually. fn addition, the factory will nanufacture by-products
and residues.
3. Background and justifications At present there is on average a surplus of 292rOO0 tons of fruits, vegetables and olives per year in the tfest Bank and
Gaza Strip. None of the existing agricultural co-operatives and local
business firns have succeeded in establiehing pernanent markets for farm products in the Arab, European or other countries, although pre-feasibility
studieE have shown the potential for such markets. This co-operative factory nilL have the advantage of being operational in all seasons, and of hiring
workers on a pernanent basis, slnce it will process a variety of farm products in dlfferent seasons, incruding citrus, tqnatoes, figs, cucumber, orives,
eggplants, peaches, Peas and beans. Several alternative processing methods will be avallabre, which rnay be adopted according to the narketing needs or
existing farn product surpLus. These include extracting, canning, pickling,
dryingl freezing of fruits and vegetabres, cooking of fruits, jans, jeLries,
butter and rnarrnalades. The project will be cmpleted in tsro years and will
provide direct enplrynent for 150 persons.
4. Outputss
(a) Feasibility study reportl
(b) An output of 1?1500 tons of flnal food and juice products yearty, in
various flanours, types, packages, weights and deslgnsi
(c) Other by-products which nay be processed further or sold in raw form.
5. Actlvitiess
(a) conducting detailed narketing research to identify brands,
trademarks, ingredients, components ard packaging;
(bl Conductinq an economic feasibilitv study to test the profitability
of the suggested process alternativesi
(c) Depending on the findlngs of the feasibility study, the followinq
steps will be initiateds establishing the co-operative firm; designing and
constructing the factory; recruiting nanporreri testing of production process.
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6.
Land
Construction
Equipment
Establishment expenses (including the
. feasibility study)
tlorking capital
TO|rAL
$us
$us 3 000 000
7. Institutional framework: An institution based on a co-operative firm,
owned by at least 800 farmers, will'be established.
8. Availab1e documentation: Nidat R. Sabri, "Establishment of a
co-operative factory to process selected local fruits and vegetables in
the tlest Bankr, paper prepared for the Seminar, Vienna, 1987.
D. Establishnent of a narketing agency for Palestirlian
agricultural Products
t. Development objective: To promote the economic independence of the
Palestinlan piopie by facilitating the marketing of Patestinian agricultural
products at the local and international levels.
2. Immediate obiective: The establishment of a marketing agency for
agricultural products, which would assist in solving marketing problems,
identifying narketing opportuniEies and improvinq marketing organization and
nethods.
3. Background information and justification: The occupied Palestinian
territories fage numerous problems and constraints in marketing their surpLus
of agricultural products. Discriminatory regulations govern trade with
Israel. Local. markets in the occupied territories are unconditionally open to
Israeli produce while export of farm products from these territories to
Israeli markets are permitted only on a strictly selective basis. In
addition, Palestinian exports to the Arab and other markets face various
adninistrative and procedural obstacles including lack of direct access. The
constraints to marketing of Palestinian products are aggravated by the absence
of any group.or institution to deal with the whole narketing process and the
absence of an effective market research and information system. The proposed
narketing agency is intended to fill these gaps.
4. Output: A report on the feasibility of estabLishing a narketing agency
for Palestinian agricultural products, identifying its functions and its
relationships with existing co-operatives and other producers' associations.
1s0 000
500 000
2 100 000
50 000
200 000
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5. Activities:
(a) Survey on advisory services needed at the farm nature of grading, level and on the packing and storage required to serve local as weII as foreign marketsi
(b) Generar survey of specific markets to be served;
(c) survey of credit avairabre for marketing fruits and
(d) rdentification of investment opportunities in fruit processing enterprises.
vegetables;
and vegetable
5. Inputs and estinated costss
Local and international consultants
&<pertsr travel and other expenses
Adninistrat ive support
TOITAL
$us 204 000
25 000
-5 000
$us 234 000
7._ . TpstituFionar framework: The narketing agencv may carry out its activities with the assislance of several institutions in the vtest Bank, such as the Bir zeit university and the Rural Centre for Research and studies in Al-Najah university. rn addition, the rocal existing agricultural co-operatives wirl corlaborate in the projectrs activities.
9. PTeTequisites and obligations: Removal of Israeli restrictions on Palestinian exports to araU ana other markets.
9. - . Ayailabre docunentation: Antoine llansour, "project proposal on the establishment of a marketing agency for palestinian products;'i and
Hisham Awartani, nEstablishrnent of an agricultural export corporation', papers prepared for the Seminar, Vienna, 1997.
E. Establ_isnent of a tra on centre for arts
and crafts
I. Development objectives:
(a) To expand production and increase job opportunities and income earnings in the handicraft sector;
(b) To improve productivity and product guality through appronri.ate technologies and developnent of skills.
?' -.r-Trnediate objective: To establish a production and traininE centre for traditional arts and crafts to:
(b) Develop training facil-ities and other services in product design,
production and managementi
(c) Train, on a regular basis, a significant number of entrants to the
various handicraft areas.
3. Background and justification: At present, there are more than 700 sma1l
enterprises ernploying about 3r700 people engaged in producing handicrafts and
supporting L41000 dependants. This traditional industry is faced with a
series of problems leading to poor economic returns, particularly low quality
of products and cornpetition from cheap imported articles. It is proposed that
the centre as defined above will be established within a period of two years
and will conmence its activities with international support for an additional
period of one year.
Output: Production and training centre for traditional arts and crafts.
Activities:
Designing and constructing the centre in Bethlehem (tfest Bank);
(b) Designing, formulating and conducting training progratmtes at the
centre.
(a) Develop demonstrative, promotional
starting with specific arts and crafts which
areas of priority;
5. Inputs and estinated costs:
Personnel
Land
BuiLdings
Equiprent
1!OAAL
Running costs for the first year (estinate) s
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and comnercial Production,
wouLd have been identified as
$us 100 000
200 000
800 000
300 000
$us l- 400 000
$us 500 000
4.
5.
(a)
7. Institutional framework: The centre will be an independent unit
operating in close collaboration with craft associations and co-operatives,
universities and vocational instiEutes.
8. Available documentation:
(a) Palestine Liberation Organization, "A preliminary techno-economic
feasibility study for the establishment of a production and training centre
for the tourist trade industries in the ttest Bank"i
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(b) S. Kanaan6, "A proposal for the esEblishment of a centre for
traditional Palestinian arts and craftsi, papers prepared for the Seminar'
Vienna, t-987.
F. Production and training centre for textiles and
readv-made qarments
1. Development obJectives:
(a) To expand production and increase job opportunities and income
earnings, especially for women in the textile and garment industries;
(b) To improve productivity and product quality through appropriate
technoJ-ogies and development of skills.
2. Immediate objectives To establish a production and training centre for
textiles and ready-made garments tos
(a) Develop denonstrative, pronotional and cornmercial production,
starting in specific textile and garment nanufacture areas, which would have
been identified as areas of priorityl
(b) Develop training facillties and other services in product design and
quality control, production and managementi
(c) Train on a regular basis a significant number of entrants to the
various textiles and ready-made garment areas.
3. Background and justification: There are at present more than 819 firms
in the textiles and ready-made garment industries employing 21800 people. The
majority of these firms are enall workshops employing less than five people.
The quality of their products vary and they have not been able to respond
adeguately to changes in donestic demand in terrns of guality and variety as
they lack the necessary knowledge and capacity to innovate and modernize their
production nethods. The proposed centre will help these firms in these
aspects of production. The project wilL produce various types of children'sp
nenrs and woments outer and undergarments, socks, stockings, towels and other
itens. The industry will rely on a variety of raw materials, such as cotton'
wool and nixed fibres and dyes. Traditional designs and motifs will be
especially encouraged and adapted to present reguirements and artistic tastes.
4. Output: A training and production centre which witl produce various
types of textiles and garments and provide opportunities for related training
services to the local industry.
5. Activities:
(a) Designing and constructing the centre in Gaza;
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(bt Designing, formulating and conductlng tralning proqrarmles at the
centre.
5. s
Personnel
Land
Building
Eguipment
TOtrAI,
Running costs for the first Years
$us 100 000
200 000
800 000
500 000
$us r 600 000
$us 400 000
7. Institutional franework: The centre will be an independent unit
operaryatiqr with the textile producers and workers
aesociations as well as the chenical departnent of the IsLanic Universlty and
local vocatlonal institutes.
8. Available docunentation: PaleEtlne Liberation Organization, "A
prett@feas1bl1ity8tudyfortheestab1ishmentofa
training and production centre for the textlles and ready-made garments
industry in the occupied Palestlnlan territories', Paper prepared for the
Semlnar, Vienna, 1987.
G. Ceranics factorv ln Hebron
1. Developnent obiective: To lncrease employnent oPPortunities and earnings
Uy irnproving the quafity of ceramlc products ln the occuPied Palestinian
territories.
2. frnmediate. objectives:
(a) To obtain specific aeotoclcal data on available clayi
(b) To determine rnethods of upgrading and diversifyinq local Production
of ceramicsi
(c) To prepare a feasibility study for constructing a clay processlng
plant. :
!. Backqroun4 and justificationc Pottery ls a traditlonal handicraft in the
Palestinianterrffi,there1sa9reatneedtoup9radetheskil'1e
of the producers who still use tradltional nethods which make the produced
articles below standards acceptable to buye(e. [he duration of the proJect
will be 24 nonths.
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4. Outputss
(al A feasibility study including a geologlcal survey for appropriate
clayt
(b) A raarketing studyg
(c) A feaslbility study for a ceramics plant.
5. Inputs and estlmated costs:
Surveys and research reports
Engineering deslgn for the factory
Itliscellaneous expenses
Transport
Adminlstration co6ta
1UTAL sus 269 000
6. Institutional franrework: Appropriate institutlonal arrangements will be
made to carry out the project in colraboration with existlng local
institutions.
7. Available documentationr Said A. Assaf, rProject proposal for a ceramics factory in llebronrr p6p€r prepared for the Seminar, Vienna, l9g7.
H. Sardine canninq factorv in Gaza
1. Developnent obiectives To inprove the economy of the Gaza Strip by
increasing self-sufficiency in fishneal production and narketing and by
processing and marketing the abundant surplus of sardines.
2. Irnrnediate obiective: To determine the feasibility of establishing a
sardine canning factory in the Gaza Strip.
3. Backqround and justificationr Fishinc is an irnportant industry in the
Gaza Strip. I\to thirds of the fish harvested are sardines. During the
f ishinq period for sardines (l.tay and October) , there is a glut in the market,
and as they cannot be frozen, prices fructuate greatly. canning of the
surplus will help stabilize prices and also afford a wider market. rhis
project, with a duration of 12 rpnths, will benefit 2,500 fishermen in the
Gaza Strip.
4. Outputss
(al A report on available sardine resourcest
$us 224 000
22 000
17 000
2 000
4 000
(b) A technlcal rePort on
factoryt
(c) An econonic and flnancial report.
5. Activitiess
(a) Preparation of a feasibility study on resources avallablel
(b) preparatiqr of a technlcal, economic and financial study on the
canning facility.
6. Inputs and estlnated costss
Data collectlon on resources
Data collection f,or establishing a
canning factory
Preparation of rePortg
TechnicaL designs for canning factory
Econqnic evaluation
Admlnistrative costs
Cqrstruction costs
IFOITAI,
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the f,easibility of, eEtablishlng a cannlng
$us 18 000
12 000
16 000
24 000
9 000
I 000
(to be deterrnlned)
ous 99 000
7. Institutional framework: A local scientific institute with profeasional
fo"d mers will. undertake the feasibility study and
support other actlvitleE of a techni,cal nature.
8. Avatlable docunentations Said A. Assaf, "Project proPosal for a sardlne
canni er prepared for the Semlnar, Vienna, 198?'
I. Developruent of Sheep stock and trainlm of farrne!9
1.@s
(a) To increase the sheep Etock and the production of sheep nilk, neat
ard other by-prodrrts, with a view to rnaking the population more
self-suf,ficient ln foodl
(b) To promote the breedlng of the two prevalent sheep breeds (Syrlan
AwasEi and Assaf hybrtd of Freisian on Awassi);
(c) To funprove sheep breeding technigues.
/...
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2. frmediate objectlvesr
, (ll To assess the Present sltu.tlon of dcnand and supply of sheep stock
and sheep productsi
(b) To examine the potentlal of Araegl aheep and the Assaf hybrid sheep
through the provisiqr of a laboratory for research and the application of
appropr late technologyl
(ql To develop tralnlng proqra@s to denonEtrate and disseminate
lnforaratlon on managenent and the uee of hormnee, drugsr feed.
3. Backqrgund and tustlflcattonr Paleetlnlan farnere frave been raising gheep for thousands of year8. Follalng the ecupatlon ln 196?, the number of
Eheep decreaeed by roughly 50 per cent due to grazlng restrictione. I'he
proposed pro1ect aims at lncreaslng the nrnber of AEeaf sheep, a hybrid breed nor nunbering over 71000 ln the flegt Bank. Assaf sheep have the advantage of thrlvlng rell in confined spaces and belng aore productive ln rneat and mi1k. lhe project is also designed to lncrease the eheep stock through the propgr
aelection and breedlng of the local Arassl sheep. The proposed project wiLl
have a duration of two years.
l. Outputss
(a) A study assesslng the preeent denand and supply of sheep stock and
sheep prodrrcts;
(b) A feaslbility study on the potentlal and appropriate selection of local Awassi sheep and the propagatlqr of the hybrid Aseaf sheept
(c) Appropriate trainlng nraterlals and pJogratntles and dissemination of, lnfornatlon to co-operatlves ard sheep ornerat
(d, Demonstration sesslons on eheep ralslng.
5. Actlvities:
(al Preparation of a study on sheep regourcea and narketsi
(b) Preparatlqt of a feaelblllty study on propagatiqr of the Assaf
hybrld sheep and on the selectlon fro the Arassl breedl
(c) Preparatiqr of naterlals for tralnlng prograflunes and denonstration
sesslons, and for dissenlnatlon of lnfornatlonS
(dl organizatlqr of demrstratlon gesslone for sheep orners.
/...
6.
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InDuts and estimated costs:
Personnel including consultants
Output (a)
Output (b)
output (d)
SUBNOTAL
Assistance to sheeP ownerq
Equipment
Educational materials
and technlcians
rTNAL $us 400 000
7. Institutional framework: The Arab scientiflc Instttute for Research and
Transferorrechi6fffi},a1oca1institutlonbasedinEI-B1reh,lttest
Bank, has already been actively involved in the selection of the local Awassi
breed and the development and introduction of a new Assaf hybrid breed. This
institute and its existing experimental station could serve as a focal point
for the implementation of the project.
8. Available docurnentation: Said A. Assaf, 'Project proposal for sheep
aeve@andGazaStripusin9transferoftechno1o9yof
Assaf hybrid sheepn; and H. Awartani, iDevelopment of sheep raising", papers
prepared for the Seminar, Vienna, 1987.
J. Establishnent of a poultrv hatcherv
1. Development objectivess
(a) Improvement of the quality and productlvity of the poultry sectori
(b) . Integration of technologles ancl services in poultry farnlng'
2. Immediate obJectives
(a) The provision of chicks to poultry farmers in the occupted
ter ritoriesi
(b) Establishment of a hatchery to provide 15 to 20 Per cent of the
local needs.
3. Backqround and justification: During the Period 1960-f967, the poul'try
inaus ed at a rapid pace but has undergone
fundamental changes since then. However, poultry farning stlll continues to
occupy a prominent place in the farminq sectors of the tfest Bank and Gaza
Strip. This two-Vear prolect will create direct employment for 30 people and
indirectly for 200.
$us 20 000
20 000
15 000
200 000
1oo 000
A/42/r83
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4. Outputss
(a) An updated feasibility report on the establishment of a poultry
hatchery and a breeder farm, in whlch the capacity of both will be determined;
(b) Establishment of a poultry hatchery and a breeder farm.
5. Activities:
(a) Preparation of an updated feasibility study on the economic and technical aspects of the projectl
(b) Preparation of a feasibility study on the project financiaL aspects of the including resources and cost of the project.
6. Inputs and estinated costs:
Consultants
Land
Construction
Equipnent
Breeder flock
Other fixtures
TCTIAL $us 96s 000
7 - Institutional framqork: The project will be implemented by the Rarnallah poultry co-operative.
8. Available docunentation3 H. Awartani, nBstablishment of a poult.ry
hatcheryi, paper prepared for the Seminar, Vienena, 1987.
K. Propagation and use of jojoba
1. Development objectives To inprove and diversify the agricultural sector
which will lead to an increase in the income of Pal-estinidn farners.
2. fnunediate obiectives To propagate the jojoba tree and encourage its planting and harvestinq by farmers.
3. Background and justification: The fruit of the jojoba tree yields an oil
which is very similar to olive oiL. This multistem tree has been found suitable for the clirnate in the tlest Bank and Gaza Strip through experiments carried out by the Arab Scientific Institute for Research and Transfer of
Technology (AsrR). The jojoba produces rapidly, requires little care and
minimal water. It can be groffn on marginal lands. fts cultivation can provide an additional source of incqne to the farmers in the west Bank and
Gaza strip. This two-year proJect witl provide enployment for expert trainers, agricultural technicians and benefit trainees, students and farmers.
/...
$us ls 000
80 000
320 000
380 000
100 000
70 000
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4. Outputs:
(a) A feasibility studyl
(b) Disseminatiqr of infornation;
(c) Production of 500,000 jojoba plant seedlings;
(d) Planting 100 hectares of jojoba in the first t$o yearsi
(e) Investigation of the possibility of producing jojoba shampoo,
cosmetics and other useful agro-industrial products by the local cosmetics,
pharmaceutical and nedicinal factories;
(f) Training of farmers, agriculture graduates and studentsi
(S) Setting up a co-operative of Arab or Palestinian jojoba grovters.
5. Activities:
(a) Dissemination of infornationi
(b) Demonstrations and extensioni
(c) Establishment of a solvent extraction syston on a pilot scalei
(d) Setting up of a jojoba press within an existing olive oil nill;
(e) Assistance to farmers in introducing and planting the treei
(f) Initiating development of various products using jojoba oil.
6. Inputs and estimated costsl
Feasibility study
Dissenination of infornation
Physical facilities
Equipment
Supplies
Irrigation systen
Drip irrigation
Shared costs with farmers
Rental of space (per year)
TOTAL
$us 20 000
38 000
76 000
280 400
74 600
9 000
19 000
45 000
6 000
$us 568 000
7. Institutional fram.ework: The project will- be carried out in close
cottaffite1ocaI'institutions,especia1l.yt'heArab
Scientific Institute for Research and Transfer of Technol"ogy (ASIR).
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8. AvaiLable documentationl said A. Assaf, "project proposal for the
propagation and use of jojoba (hohoba) in the t{est Bank and Gaza Strip", paper
trrepared for the Seninar, Vienna, l9BZ.
L. Satisfaction of housing needs
1. Developnent obiectives To improve housing and living conditions of the
Parestinian people in the occupied palestinian territories.
2. fmnediate objective: To determine the type, size and cost of affordable
housing as well as the organization and technologies required for a
comprehensive housing progranne in the occupied territories.
3. Backqround and justification: Estirnates of the present housing shortage in the occupied territories vary between 19r0oo and 301000 units. rn
addition, annual demand resulting fron population growth, and movement from
rural-to-urban and urban-to-rural areas and replacement of old houses is
estimated to be at least 7r20O units. Approximately 51600 housing units are
now beirg cdrstructed annually throuoh local initiatives. Any housing
progranme that would effectiveLy alleviate the problem should aim towards at
least doubling that number. In addition to the guestion of financing and
organization, the achievement of this objective reguires the development of
the construction sector and the use of alternative technologies for low*income housing. The duration of the project will be 12 months.
4. Outputs:
(a) A report on the income structure of households, target income groups
in both rural and urban areas and the housing they can afford;
(b) A report on the cost of housing employing traditional construction
nethods' including the cost of land, infrastructure, taxation and permit feesi
(c) A rePort on the availability of land for housing const,ruction;
(d) A report proposing an organizational structure for the financinq and
adninistration of the housing programnei
(e) ModeL house designs for the different tarqet income groupsi
(f) A report on the applicability of att,ernative technologies;
(S) A final consolidated report.
5. Activities:
(a) Preparation of a study on the income structure of househords;
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(b) Preparation of a study on construction costs and technologiesi
(c) Preparation of a study on land usei
(d) Determination of houslrq costs and target income grouPsi
(e) Preparation of a study of required organizational structurei
(f) Preparatiqr of model house deslgns;
(S) Preparation of a study on the applicability of Building system V and
other alternative technologies;
(h) Preparatlon of a final consolidated report.
6. Inputs and estinated costs:
Staff services
Travel, etc.
Transport
IOTAL
$us r35 200
12 000
2 800
$us 150 000
7. Institutional frameworks Bir Zeit University and the Buildinq Research
Centre of the Royal Scientific Soclety of Jordan will provide the proJect
staff and guide its activities. Each instltute should appoint a manager' one
of whqn will be designated project co-ordinator. The co-ordlnator wilL follow
up the joint activities to ensure that the variqrs phases of the work are
properly accomplished and will conrplle and produce the reports.
8. Available documentation: Daud Jabaji, "Technologies and organization for
ttre salisfaltiqr of trousing needs in the occupied territorieso, paper prepared
for the Seminar, Vienna, 1987.
Irl. Satisfaction of the enerqy needs of rural gmrnunities
1. Developnent objectives:
(a) Pronotion of more cqufortable llving conditions in rural conrrunitiesl
(b) Expansior of emPloynent opportunitiesl
(c) Utilization of local renewable energy resources.
2. hnediate opjectivess
(a) To develop an efficient integrated eolar/wind energy source for
rural cormunitiesi
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(b) To establish a factory to supply the requlred equipxnent for the
suggested hybrid solar/wind energy systen.
3. Backqround and justification: One of the rpst serious impediments to
rural development and an improved quality of life is the lack of adeguate
energy. In fact' 70 per cent of the rural conunities in the nest Bank are
without electricity. This 20-nonth proJect will create enployment for
35 workers.
4. Outputs:
(a) A report on the feasibility of alternattve energy sources for the
rural corununities;
(b) A plant for manufacturing solar and wind energy units.
5. Activitiess
(a) A study on possible alternative enerqy sources for space heating,
dqnestic water heating and house electrlficationi
(b) The investigation of the feasibility of solar,/wind energy in
comparison to the independent generation of electricity enrploying conventional
methods;
(c) Studying the feasibility of setting up a manufacturing facility of
solar and wind systetn corponents;
(d) Construction of the plant.
6. Inputs and estimated costs:
Research
Engineering design
Staffing
Land and buildings
Eguipment
Other expenses
T(}TAL sus 573 000
7. Institutional framework:
(a) Bir Zeit University will provide the research and the engineering
design teansi
(b) An interested group will form a business firm to manufacture the
components.
$us 60 000
30 000
20 000
250 000
200 000
13 000
A/42/L83
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8. Ayailable documentations A. T. Hanad, iBnergy needs for rurar
comnunities in the tlest Bank and Gaza Strip", paper prepared for the Seminar, Vienna, 1987.
N. organi,zatiotr and provision of an inexpensive transport
network as a co-operative venture
1. Developrnent objective: Irnprovement of accessibility to employment and service centres for the rural population, particularly in renote areas.
2. Irnnediate objectivesl The establishment of a rnodel transportation
co-operative using three mini-buses in the village of tafouh-Ilebron, and strengthening the existing transport co-operatives in eatanneh and Beit Ikssa
by providing one bus to each. Thie will be foltorrred by the creation of an additional 10 transportation co-operatives forrning an integrated transportation network of services for the occupied territories.
3. Background and justification: Public transportation in the rural areas of the occupied territories is often inadequate and sometimes non-existent. tfithout inexpensiver reliable public transportation, fanilies are forced to
leave their villages and settLe in urban centres to be near work, schools and markets. cheap and reliable transportation is also a najor factor in
narketing agricultural produce to twns and cities. The project will provide
enplqznent for about 50 persons.
4. Outputs:
(a) One new transportation co-operative;
(b) considerable strengthening of trc existing transportation
co-operatives;
(c) Ten new transportation co-operatives established on the basis of the
experience of the above threei
(d) A maintenance unit to Eervice 35 buses.
5. Activities:
(a) Organization of co-operativesi
(b) Registration and licensing;
(c) Purchase of buses and settinq
(d) Provisiqr of transport for an
the villages concerned.
up of maintenance units;
average of 50 per cent of passengers
1n
A/42/L83
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6. Inpgts and estinated costs:
35 mini-busee
l{iscellaneous costs
IOAAIT
$us 2 27s 000
158 000
$us 2 433 000
7. Institutional f,ranflork: A board of dlrectors will be elected by the
members of each co-operative. Each board will appoint a manager for the
co-operative who will rnanage the overall activities. ?he co-operatives will
be supervised by the Co-operative Departnent and the ilordan Co-operative
Organization (il@).
8. Available docunentationt A. Obeldat, 'Organization and provision of an
insrpeGive tiansport network as a co-q)erative venture', paper prepared for
the Seninar, Vienna, 1987.
O. fnprovement of the road network
1. Deyelopment obJectives:
(a) Promotion of econonric Arowth and social Progress in the occupied
territories by reducing travel and transportation costsi
(b) Improved accessibillty to sources of goods and services to increase
the opportunity for people to obtaln them.
2. Immediate obJectives fmprovement of the existing road network to
strengttren Linkagres betneen PaLeetinian villages and townsr oDd creation of
new linkages for unserved areas.
3. Backqround and justification: The road plans prepared and inplemented by
tne occupyin@ completely the existing road system and
concentrate nainly on connectlons between ilewish settlements and the Israeli
road system. lLany rural Palestinian comnunlties renain poorly connected with
urban centres wtrich are the narkets for agricultural Produce and in which new
employnent opPortunities and essential personal Eervices exist. The
inadequacies and poor quality ln the form, extent and configuration of the
road network lead to a considerable waste of tirne, effort and energy in the
novement of people and goods.
4- gslP$s
(a) Reports on present travel and transportation problems;
(b) Estinates of the future leveL of denand for road transporti
(c) Testing of alternative tranaport network imProriementsi
A/42/L83
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network improvements.
5.
(al) Reconmendations
Activities:
for the implementation of road
(a) Data gathering and surveying;
(b) Travel denand analysis and rnodeL building;
(c) Forecasting and plan generationi
(d) Evaluation and fornulation of reconmendations.
6. fnputs and estimated costs:
Uanpower
Survey costs
Computer
Reports
TCITAI,
7. fnstitutional framework; The project
Centre for Development and Planning of the
8. Available docunentation: S. H. Abid,
the occupied territoriesi, paper prepared
$us 1s0 000
25 000
I0 000
5 000
sus 190 000
nray be located in the Engineering
Bir Zeit University.
nlmprovement of the road network in
for the Seminar, Vienna, 1987.
P. l{ater utilization
1. Developrnent objective: Conservation and utitization of rrater resources
to improve the living conditions of the Palestinian peopLe in the occupied
PaLestinian terr itories.
2. Irnmediate objective: Identification of the problems in providing and
utiLizing available water resources with a view to formulating remedial
neasures.
3. Background and justi_ficaEion: water resources in the occupied
Palestinian territories are limited and constantLy declining. The provision
of sufficient water supply is a prereguisite for the improvement of the quality of lj.fe. The present system of obtaining and distributing water is
inadequate for the majority of the palestinian population.
4. Outputs A report on the present system of obtaining and distributing
water in the occupied territories.
5. Activitiess
(a) A survey of the present system of obtaining and distributing wateri
/.--
A/42/L83
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(b) Identification of the problen areas related to abovei
(c) Recormtendations for renedial measures.
6. Inputs and estimated costs:
Local expertise
Staff
Transport
tlater analysis
Adninistrat ive support
TOTAL
$us 80 000
150 000
50 000
15 000
15 000
$us 310 000
7. Institutional framework: Suitable institutional arrangements will be
made to carry out the survey.
8. Available documentation: Said A. Assaf, iProject proPosal for the
eva1u1anddrinkingwatersituationinttretrlestBank
and Gaza Strip and the potential for its development under prevailing
conditionso, paper prepared for the Seminar, Vienna, 1987.
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APPENDIX
List of participants
brperts
Samih Abid
Said A. Assaf
Said J. Haifa
A. T. Hamad
Daoud Fahed ,Iabaj i
Sharif Kanaana
Antoine Mansour
Adnan Obeidat
Nidal R. Sabri
f. El-Zain
United Nations
s" Kazemi, united Nations conference on Trade and Developrnent
Dorota Gierycz, Centre for Social Development and Hunanitarian Affairs, Departrnent for International Econonic and Social Affairs
Specialized agencies
H. Hiddlestone, World Health Organization
A. Robertson, World Health Orqanization
Palestine Liberation Organization
Yousef Sayegh
Khaireddin Abdul Rahman
I'larwan Abdul Hamid
Deif Al-Akhrass
liloh. Abu Koash
Daoud Barakat
I'tuhieddin tlassoud
League of Arab States
Khaled Abdullah
l{ail Khaiyal
Khaled Abu Hajalah
Secretariat of the Seminar
Darshan Johal, United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Ilabitat)
Joseph ltungair United Nations Centre for lluman Settlements (Habitat)
NITED
NATIONS A
General A8sembly
Distr.
GENERAL
A/44/534
5 October 1989
ORIGINAL, ENGLISH
Forty-~ourth session
Agenda item 82 (h)
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
Living conditions of the Palestinian people
Note by the Secretary-General
1. In its resolution 42/190 of 11 December 1987, entitled "Living conditions of
the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories", the General
Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare an in-depth study on future
needs in the field of infrastructure for the Palestinian people in the Palestinian
territories occupied since 1967 and to report to the Assembly at its forty-fourth
session, through the Economic and Social Council, on pro~ress made in the
implementation of the resolution.
2. Responsibility for the preparation of the study way entrusted to the United
Nations Centre f~r Human Settlements (Habitat). In implementation of the
resolution, consultations were held with representatives of the Palestine
Liberation Organization with a view to ascertainin~1 more clearly on which specific
future needs of the occupied Palestinian territ~~ies in the field of infrastructure
a study could be prepared. As a result of these consultations, and bearing in mind
the limited resourc~s availab~e for an extensive study, it was decided that the
report should focus on the specific area of transport infrastructure. Other
aspects of infrastructure may be covered in future reports, subject to the
availability of the financial reaources ~equired for carrying out such work.
3. In the preparation of the study Habitat engaged the services of a private
consultant. The independent study prepared by the consultant with the assistance
of a team of specialized experts, is annexed hereto (see annex).
89-23754 ll82e (E) I • ••
A/44/534
Enql1sh
Paq. 2
ANNEX
~ure transportation infrastructure needs for the Palestinian
peopl~ the West Bank and in the GazA-itr1P AI
CONTENTS
Paragraphs ~
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................ 1 - 7 4
11. EVOLUTION OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ••••••••••••••••••••• 8 - 27 5
Ill.
I'v •
EXiSTING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
PROPOSED TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
.............................
.............................
28 - 56
57 - 115
8
12
A. Basic objectives ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 57 13
B. Forecast of future travel demand ••••••••••••••••••••••• 58 - 70 13
C. Proposed road transportation system ••••••.••••••••••••• 71 - 103 16
D. Proposed public transport system ••••••••••••••••••••••• 104 - 108 22
E.
F.
Proposed sea transportation syster,.
Proposed air transportation system
.....................
. .
109 - 110
111 - 115
23
23
V. INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 116 - 118 25
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ••••••••••••••••••••• 119 .- 126 26
LIST OF TABLES
1. Classification of West Bank roads in 1947 and 1967 •••••••.•••• •••••••• 28
2. Road service to population centres in the West Bank in 1947 and 1967 28
3. Extent of road network in the West Bank according to the Israeli
regional road master plan of 1983 ••••..••••••.••.••..••.•••••• ••.••.•• 29
4. Existing road network 29
~I Report suhmitted by Dr. Rami Abdulhadi, Lirector, Center for Engineering
and Planning, Rarnallah, West Bank.
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CONTENTS (continued)
5. Conditions of the ~xiAt~ng road network in the West Bank . . 30
6.
7.
Characteristlr.s of some major i~ter-urban bus routes •••••••••••••••••••
Characteristics of some major inter-urban shared taxi routes •••••••••••
30
31
8. Basic travel damand detarminants for base and design years according to
scenario A , •••••••••••••• , ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 32
9. Basic travel demand detArminants for base and design years according to
scenario B ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 32
10. Summary of basic ttavel demand determinants . . 33
11. Projected traffic volumes at key routes . . 34
12. Number of lanes for some major corridors ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 35
13. Extent of existinq and proposed road network in the West Bank and Gaza
Stri'2 ........•..•..........• t. .• J •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 35
14.
1.
2.
Constructio~ and improvement re~uirements for the proposed road network
LIST OF FIGURES
Existing road network , , , .
Schematic aiagram of regional traffic corridors ••.•••••••••••••••••••••
36
38
3. Proposed transportation Rystem •••.•••••••••••••••.••••.•••••••••• ...... 39
4. Existing major public transportation routes ••••.••••••••••••••••••••••. 40
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. General Assembly resolution 181 of November 1947 called for the es~ablishment
of an Arab state and a Jewish state in Palestine. Under the partition plan, the
borders of the two States were to be arranged to allow for direct contact between
all parts of each. However, the actual borders of the State of Israel as declared
in 1948 differed from the bor~ers outlined in the partition plan, so that direct
contact between what is now known as the Nest Bank and the Gaza Strip came under
Jordanian and Egyptian control respectively. Only after the Israeli occupation of
these two areas in 1967 was direct contact made possible.
2. As a result of these developmenta, the transportation sector in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, like other economic sectors, was unable to develop to a level
that would have enabled it to provide effective transport services for those
regions.
3. Th~ constraints imposed on the Palestinian transportation sector in the West
Bank ana the Ga~a Strip were coupled with the development of a transportation
network aimed at enhancing the Jewish settlement activities in the occupied
territories by providing relatively higher quality roads to link those settlements
with each other and with the metropolitan Israeli road network. This situation
inevitably hindered the e'volution of a national Palestinian transportation system
consistent with the basic requirements for Palestinian economic development. It
also resulted in a dual-t:ransportation systeml a privileged one effectively
serving the Israeli policy and programme of expanding Jewish settlements throughout
the Nest Bank and th'.. Gazl! Strip, and an underdeveloped one that is incapable of
meeting the needs ol the Palestinians or performing its economic functions in an
integrated national development process.
4. This report assumes the establishment of a Palestinian State in the occupied
Palestinian territories of tha Nest Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the
United Nations r~solutions. The new State is also expected to undertake a massive
economic development programme supported and assisted by the international
community and the United Nations agencies, in order to make up for deticiencies
created by the prolonged Israeli military occupation and to accommodate the
Palestinian returnees.
5. A 1987 report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) estimated the total number of Palestin~ans residing outside
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip at 3.15 million. The number of Palestinians
expected to return to live and work in the new State during the first five years
after its conception has been estimated at 1.5 million. They will be settled in a
large number of towns and villages of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in new
urban and rural settlement centres that will be built and developed in areas where
the potential for economic activity and absorption i~ expected to be high.
6. For the purpose of this report, two scenarios repreRenting two possible future
trends were exami~ed. Scenario A assumes that only the Palestinians presently
residing in the Nest Bank and the Gaze Strip, inclUding residents of Jerusalem and
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those who are currently working abroad, will constitute the total population o~ the
new State. According to this scenario, the total population in the year 2010 is
estimated to be 3.20 million, with an urban/rural distributior ratio of 38 per cent.
Scenario B allows for the possible return of 1.5 million Pale3tinians 1uring the
first five years after the conception of the State. According to th!s scenario,
the total population in the year 2010 is estimated to be 5.39 million, with an
urban/rural distribution ratio of 43 per cent.
7. The vital task of the transportation sector will b~ to enhance the unity and
integration of all parts of the new State, includinq safe and reliable linkage
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to Assist the development of other
economic sectors through appropriate and effective trannport services and
facilities, and to connect the new State with the outside w~rld through appropriate
ground, sea and air transportation.
11. EVOLUTION OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
8. Historically, Palestine has been a bridge connecting the three continents of
Asta, Africa and Europe. It is a link between the Arabian Peninsula and the
Mediterranean, and between the eastern and western parts of the Arab world.
Road development
9. Construction of paved roads in Palestine began in the past century. The
oldest of these was the Jerusalem road, constructed in 1867 during Ottoman rule.
10. During the early part of the British mandate, which started in 1917, the roads
open to traffic in Palestine were concentrated in the mountainous area, most of
which is now known as the West Bank. The major axis ran from north to south,
connecting the major urDan centres and generally following the paths of ancient
historic roads. In addition, two transverse roads connected Jerich~, Jerusalem and
Jaffa in the centre, and Tiberias, Nazareth and Haifa in the north. ,. ,'le, but not
all, were given asphalt surfaces. However, the road ~etwork developc between 1936
and 1945 was developed to satisfy Briti~h logistic requirements, not to meet local
needs. That period saw the constructiol. of roads linking the central part of
Palestine with Jordan, and southern Palestine with Egypt through Sinai. In 1945
the total length of the paved roads in Palestine was 266 km, while the dry-weather
roads totalled 1,56ti km.
11. During the Briti~h mandate, the primitive road network in the area now known
as the West Bank had two axes, one running from north to south along the mountain
series, and the other in the Jordan Valley area. TheDe were linked with transverse
roads running fr~m east to west from the valley to the coast. !n th6 Gaza Strip
there was only one major road running from north to south, and the majority of
local roads serving the smaller towns and villages were dry-weather tracks only.
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RQad deyelQQment between 1948 and 1967
12. The establishment Qf the State Qf Israel in part of Palestine in 1948 saw the
~est Bank CQme under Jordanian rule and the Gaza Strip CQme under Egyptian rule.
This re ,lted in considerable changes in the transPQrtation system. FQr example,
the Arab tQwns and villages in the cQastal areas of the new State of Israel wera
discQnnected from the interiQr regional Towns such as Jenin, Tulkarn\ and Qalqilia,
in the fQrmer heart Qf Palestine, becam~ tQwns Qn the frQntier with the new State.
This severance, tQgether with Qther factors, saw rapidly dete~iorating eCQnQmic
cQnditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the dichQtQmy of control
(Jordan in the West Bank, Egypt in the Gaza Strip) saw these areas subsumed as
regions of those countries.
13. The road system in the East Bank of Jordan was realigned to replace the
east-west axes by a :.•orth-south axis linking Aqaba-Ma' an-Amman-Irbid with Damascus,
thus dispensing with the West Bank as a major regiQnal transport centre. HQwever,
improvement plans to roads built there during the British mandate were implemented,
and the network was expanded to reach almost all the smaller towns and villages of
tha West Bank, although it was often poorly sarviced.
14. Table 1 compares the conditions of the road network in the West Bank at the
end of the British mandate in 1947 with the conditions at the end of Jordanian rule
in 1967. The proportion of class I and 11 roads increased from 46 per cent to
93 per cent in that time.
15. The quality of service to 366 of 424 urban and rural settlements in the East
Bank, cla~sified accQrding to the condition of roads serving them, is shown in
table 2 for the samA years, and the figures reflect the effQrts made by the
JQrdanian Government to improve the road network, although the area was considered
a fringe area of Jordan as a whole.
16. In the Gaza Strip, no significant improvements to the road network took place
between 1947 and 1967.
17. After the Israeli Qccupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, the
Israeli authorities prepared a national highway master plan. This regarded as a
priority the linkage of the newly occupied areas with Israel. In accordance with
this plant (knQwn 3S T/M/A/3), the Israeli authorities began to construct new
rQads, motivated by their claimed security and settlement needs. uuring the years
between 1967 and 1977, three major north-south roads were completedz the Jordan
Valley road, the Dead Sea rQad and the Allon road. The l~st was built on the
eastern foot of the mountains of the West Bank, and separated the Arab towns and
villages in the mountain areas from the intensified Israeli settlement projects in
the Jordan Valley. This was in accordance with the Allon settlement plan, which
considered the Jordan Valley as part of Israel. Only minor improvemeats to some Qf
the major roads serving the Arab population centres in the West Bank took place
during the same period.
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18. After .17, the Israeli strategy was modified to provide for the full
integration of the West Bank network with the Israeli transportation system in
order to promote Jewish settlement in all parts of the region. Roads such as the
Trana-Samaria road and the Trans-Judea road (by Samaria and Judea the Israeli
authorities refer to the northern and southern parts of ~he West Bank,
respectively) ran from east to west, linking Israel with areas of new Israeli
settlement.
19. A new plan (regional mas~er plan/order no. 50) was introduced in 1983, based
on the national plan referred to above. Although r:je~ted as a result of Arab and
international protest, a number of the planned roc-us were still constructed, linking
n~w Jewish settlements to the main road network in Israel. The plan classified
four types of roads (see table 3) and proposed a total network length of 1,873 km.
All the roads planned were to link the West Bank wit~ the I,raeli highway network
and to form an integral part of it. The plan suggested only minor improvements to
the existing north-south Jenin-Hebron road and the Jordan Valley-Dead Sea road.
20. In general, highways constructed since 1967 are not intended to serve Ar~b
towns and villages. Instead, they by-pass them in a manner that deters c.he
expansion ~dd development of Arab population centres.
21. In the Gaza Strip, only minor improvements of the ruad network have taken
place since 1967. Again, the roads improved or constructed mostly serve the
Israeli settldments. A major highway is also planned across the central area of
the Strip to strengthen the link between Jewi~h settlements in the south with
Israel.
Rail transportation
22. The construction of ~ailways in Palestine began in the year 1889, during the
Ottoman rule. The first line connected Jerusalem with Jaffa, through an 87 km long
track. Later, more lines were opened, such as the oue connecting Haifa with Samakh
and Dera'a in southern Syria.
23. During the first decade of the British mandate, the authorities supported the
construction of new railway systems between the Palestinian towns and also between
Palestine and neighbouring countrios. The period witnessed the construction of the
Rafah-Haifa-Al Naqura line, with a len~th of 250 km, ana the Affulah-JeninNablus-
Tulkarm line, 80 km. The railroad development programmes were terminated by
the late 1930s, when attention was directed more towards the road system.
24. After the establishment of Israel in 1948, those parts of the railroad which
were in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were taken out of service and abandoned,
with large sections of the tracks being dismantled.
Sea transportation
25. Small ports have existed on the Mediterranean coast throughout history. At
the beginning of this century Palestine had three small seaports: Akka, Jaffa and
Gaza. These ports hosted mainly sailing boats, but in some cases small trade ships
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also. However, because these ports were not capable of handling the increasing
military and trade traffic that developed during the British mandate, planning for
a IBr~1, modern seaport at Haifa began in 1923. The port was opened to traffic in
1929 and the role of the other ports became marginal thereafter.
26. After 1948, Gaza was the only seaport available to Palestinians for
communication with the outside world, and handled only small trade ships and
fishing boats.
Air transportation
27. In 1935, the Lod airport was constructed and opened to air traffic to serve
c6ntra1 and southern Palestine, including Gaza, and the Haifa airport was built to
serve the north. By the end of the 1930s. the Lod airport had achieved the central
role in air transport to Palestine. During the Second World War, the British built
other smaller military-oriented airfields. A civilian international airport at
Qalandia was opened to air traffic in 1952. International service from here was
discontinued after the Israeli occupation in 1967, but the Israeli authorities
continu. to use the airport, mainly for local flights and general aviation. The
only other usable airfield in occupied Palestinian territory is Al Qubbah airport
to the east ~f Gaza City, which prov1des for limited flights and general services
only.
Ill. EXISTING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Road transportation
28. The total lengths of the existing highway network in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip are 1,890 km and 168 km, respectively. The roads of the networks are
classified as main, regional and local roads. The existing road networks in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip are shown in figure 1 and table 4.
29. The main road network of the West B~nk ~onsists of two major north-south
corridorsl the mountainous Jenin-Hebron road, and the Jordan Valley-Dead Sea
road. It also includes four major east-west roads: the Damiah Bridqe-Nablus roadwhich
forks to Tulkarm and Qalqilia, the Allenby Bridqe-Jericho-Rarna"~~-BeitSira
road, the Jericho-Jerusalem road and the so-called Trans-Judea road.
30. The regional road network is also dominated by north-south and east-west
axes. The north-south roads include the Jenin-Tubas-Al Fara road, the Northern
Jordan Valley-Majdal Bani Fadel road. the Allon road, the TUlkarm-Beit Sira road
and two roads on the eastern and western Hebron foothills. The east-west roads
include the so-called Trans-Samaria road, the road from A'tara junction on the
Nablus-Ramallah highway to A'bud. and the Ramallah-Ne'lin road. There are no
regional east-west roads in the southern part of the West Bank. The local road
system covers virtually all villages, but in general provides a poor service.
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31. The conditions of the West Bank road network are pr.sented in table 5. The
proportion of roads maintained in good pavement condition does not exceed
50 per cent of the total, and the proportion of tadly maintained roads forms around
40 per cent, most being local roads that serve the centres of Arab population.
32. The pr.esent density of paved roads in the West Bank does not exceed 0.33 km
per square km, while it was around 0.24 km per square km in 1967. This represents
an increase of only 0.09 km per square km since Israeli occupation in 1987, and
this slight incr~ase is due mainly to the construction of roads that serve Israeli
interests. Road density in kilometres per 1,000 population is currently around
1.~, while it was around 2.4 in 1967. Thus, the limited expansion has not kept
pace with the growth of population. Moreover, the primitive and poorly maintained
roads generally serve Arab towns and villages, while the modern and better roads
generally lead to Jewish settlements.
33. In the Gaza Strip, the road network consists mainly of a major highway that
runs from north to south along the eastern part of the Strip, and a regional road
that runs along parts of the coast. In addition, a number of local roads connect
the villages and refugee camps with these two roads. The quality of the netwotk in
the Strip is even lower than that of the West Bank.
34. The road density in the Gaza Strip is 0.46 km per square km, compared with
0.33 for the West Bank. The apparent improvement is attributable to a higher
density of population. Road density in kilometres per 1,000 population is 0.26,
which is lower than the 1.7 figure for the West Bank.
35. In summary, the existing highway network, the only means of transportation in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and ths only direct access to neighbouring
countries, is still underdeveloped and inadequate for proper economic and social
development. The planning, construction and improvement of roads takes place with
the interests of Jewish settlements and the occupying authorities in mind. The
local Arab authorities have no significant influence over the development of the
main and regional road network; the responsibility for such d~velopment lies with
the Public Works Deparlment, which is headed by an i5ra&li officer. In addition,
the limited financial resources of these local authorities preclude any practical
independent initiatives on their part.
36. This absence of a Palestinian national authority in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip is considered a major constraint to the development of the road network.
However, the pooling of financial resources, along with the initiative of
Palestinian institutions to define development priorities in the transportation
sector, would lead to the creation of a highway network that would serve the
comprehensive development of both areas.
37. In addition to the national road network, there are agricultural roads
constructed to facilitate access of farmers to the fields and the transportation of
products to the markets and consumption centres. The total length of the
agricultural road system in the West Bank is about 880 km. No reliable data are
available on agricultural roads in the Gaza Strip.
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38. Agricultural road construction has increased substantially over the last few
years through the initiativds of local residents in co-operation with local
societies and international charitable '·rganizations. A considerable share of
these newly-opened roads are in the He} vn mountain range and foothills, w~ere
there have been ~xtensive efforts to 0~4n up new lands for agricul~ural
development.
Public transportation
39. Road-based modes of transport carry all intra-urban, inter-urban and rural
public transportation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The system is based on
private enterprise, but the Israeli authorities issue route operation permits,
regulate the frequeucy of service and determine fare brackets.
40. The inter-urban passenger public transportation system depends on two modesl
the bus and the shared tB)~1. B'lses oper"te between the main urban centres and the
smaller towns and villages, an~ arJ supplemen~.d by shared taxi services. The
~otal number of registered buses is around 710 in the West Bank and 70 in the Gaza
Strip. Of th~se ~e9istered in the West Bank, 378 buses operate on fixed public
transport routes. ~his fle9t is owned by 100 bus companies, 70 of which operate
one bus onl~, wn.~J~ the largest operates 36 buses. Only 149 buses operata on
inter-urba~ routes, whil~ the rest operate on intra-urban and rural routes. The
vast majority of the inter-urban buses are cor. ,ntional, with a maximum srating
capacity ~f 50. A small number ~f minibuses operate on routes with lower passenger
demand.
41. In the Gaza Strip, bus oervices are very l~mlted and op~rate on a few routes
only.
42. The number of registere~ "axis has remained almost the same since 1967 OWi:lg
to a strict Israeli policy l~miting their number. During the past 20 years, the
total number of operating taxis has fluctuated betwee~ 1,050 and 1,100 in the West
Bank and between 760 and 810 in the Gaza Strip. To isfy the increasing demand,
many private automobiles and double-cab pickups opel~ 4e without permits on many
rural routes, esp6cially within the Gaza Strip.
43. Both the bus and shared-taxi routes are generally radial in pattern. A major
hub is located at Jerusalem, which serves several destinations in the West Bank as
well as the city of Gaza. Others are located at Nablus, where service to all
northern ~nd cen'~~al urban centres of the West Bank originates, and Gaza, with
services to all parts of the Strip.
44. The iuter-urban tus service generally follows a fixed time schedule.
Nevertheless, the number of passengers is small owing ~o the poor service and the
very frequent stops to serve rural area pa3senqers. Recently, express bus services
were introduced on a few major routes, such as Nablus-Ramallah-Jerusalem and
Ramallah-Jerusalem.
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45. On inter-urban routes, shared taxis provide better, more frequent and faster
service, and operate according to a flexible schedule. To remain competitive,
buses charge lower fares than the minimum fare brackets set by the authorities.
46. Various criteria have been used to evaluate the performance of inter-urban
public transportation on several major routes: (a) ridership; (b) time headway,
the time between two successive vehicles leaving the origin; (c) vehicle
utilization, the average total number of passenger trips per vehicle per day;
(d) service utilization, levels of service and the revenue passengers per
vehicle-km. Tables 6 and 7 show these parameters for some major bus and shared
taxi routes.
47. Table 6 shows that bus services on the routes connecting Jerusalem with
Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron attract the highest daily average ridership with a
minimum exceeding 5,000 passengers per day. These routes are the most efficient,
with vehicle utilization higher than 250 passengers per bus per day, and are the
most effective, with a service utilization exceeding one revenue passenger
per vehicle-km. It should be noted here that ridership on these routes represents
all boarding passengers, including village passengers. These are not actually
inter-urban passengers and may represent from 25 to 70 per cent of the total.
48. The figures for the shared taxi service are presented in table 7. This shows
that the routes with highest demand are the Nablus-Tulkarm, the Jerusalem-Ramallah
and the Jerusalem-Hebron routes, with ridership exceeding 4,000 passengers per
day. Almost all passengers make the full trip. Frequency of service on these
routes averages 3 minutes or less. In addition, the routes with the highest
vehicle utilization are the Nablus-Qalqilia and the Tulkarm-Qalqilia routes.
Revenue passengers per vehicle-km are the highest for these routes, followed by
those of the Bethlehem route, while service to Gaza from Jerusalem and Qalqilia is
the poorest. The apparently high ridership indicates a high demand for inter-urban
travel, mainly owing to workers and university students commuting between these
areas. In addition, thousands of Muslims visit Jerusalem from all parts of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, especially on Fridays.
Freight transportation
49. The annual agricultural production of the occupied Palestinian territory,
including livestock and its products, averaged over the 1985/1986 an~ 1986/1987
periods, totalled 869.2 thousand tons in the West Bank and 194.7 thousand tons in
the Gaza Strip. Agricultural production generated 21.7 per cent of the gross
domestic product (GDP) of $US 1,180 million in 1986 in the West Bank, while it
generated a higher share (32.8 per cent) of the GDP of $US 315 million in the Gaza
Strip during the same year. No data are available on the total tonnage of mining
and industrial production. The share of industrial production reached
12.7 per cent of the GDP of the West Bank's GDP but only 7.6 per cent of the GDP of
the Gaza Strip.
50. Data is only available for the movement of agricultural products between the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Only 4.9 thousand tons of agricultural products were
transported from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip in the year 1986/1987, while
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40 thousand tons were transportod from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank. This
transport generated an estimated total of 5.5 million ton-km on the roads of the
West Hank, th~ Aaza Strip, and the permitted roads connecting them.
51. As for exports, available data for 1982 indicate agricultural exports of
112 thousand tons to Jordan and other Arab countries via the check-points on the
River Jordan . ~ 72 thousand tons from the Gaza Strip to these same areas. Exports
of agricultural products to Israel and to other non-Arab countries via Israeli
ports totalled around ~2 thousand tons from the West Bank an~ 105 thousand tons
from the Galb Strip.
52. Mining produots of the West Bank, wt~.ch consist mainly of marble and stone,
generated exports of 127 thousand tons to ~ordan and other Arab countries in 1982.
Exports of industrial products from the West B~nk to Jordan and other Arab
countries (mainly soap and vegetable oils) reached 17 thousand tons. No data are
available on the export of other industrial products to Jordan (including plastics,
processed foods and other products), which represented only a very small share
(5.5 per cent) of the total of .US 40 million in industrial exports to Jordun. N,
data on the tonnage of industrial exports from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip la
Iarael and other countries are available.
53. Freight exports of products with known tonnage had generated an estimated
total movement of 22 million ton-km on the road systems of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, and within the green line to Israeli consumption markets, exporting
ports, and border check-points.
54. Regarding imports, no data are available on the tonnage involved, except with
respect to agricultural products from Israel to both the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
which reached 47.9 and 43.9 thousand tons, respectively, in the y,ar 1986/1987.
This generated an estimated 2.3 million ton-km on the roads of ~he West Bank and
Gaza Strip.
55. There is no transit movement through the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. All
internal and ext"rnal freight traffic in the West Bank and Gaza Strip depends on a
fleet of over 20,000 trucks and commercia~ vehicles (4,400 in the Gaza Strip and
15,900 in the West Bank). This represents a nine-fold increase in the total numbel"
of vehicles in operation since 1967.
56. Like the buses, the inductry is based totally on private enterprise.
IV. PROPOSED TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
A. Basic obJectives
57. The transport system here proposed provides for adequate road, sea and air
transportation, to fulfil a defined set of objectives consistent with an integrated
national development plan. Thase objectives include the followingl
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(a) Unityl proviae adequate ana safe linkage within the W~st Bank ana the
Gala Strip ana, between them, enS'lre that all parts of the two regions are
accessible to each other.
(b) Self-tAlianCel minimize the effects of political change on the system
anl\ lower the possibility of system failure under specific aaverse conaitions,
especially in the provosea corriaor linking the West Bank with the Gaza Strip.
(c) Mobilityl facilitate the efficient movement of people ana gooas ana
achieve the capacity to hanale projectea aemand for passenger travel and freight
movement with ace ptable speeds ana at reasonable costs for the whole population.
(d) Accessibilityl op&n up areas that are now inaccessible, ana increase
accessibility to those parts not aaequately servea at present.
(e) Economic growth I promote er.onomic development by providing proper means
and facilities to enhance developmental activities in agricultut'e, inaustry, mining
ana tourism.
(f) Social develQ;mentl satisfy the needs of Palestinian sQciety in the
educational, cultural, social ana health sectors.
(g) connection with other countriesl provide links between the West Bank ana
the Oaza Strip, and between the surrounai~'J Arab countries ana others.
(h) Quality of passenger trayell provide quality service for passenger
travel in general, ana for public transportation in particular, by providing proper
links, vehicles, ana terminals ana by reaucing congestion, especially in urban
areas, as well 08 incentives to encourage public transportation use.
(i) Blduced trayel costl reauce cost by minimizing the distance between
travel aemand centres ana upgraaing the quality of the network. Future
transportation planning ana policies should aim at rea1lcing the operating costs of
vehicles, lowering taxes on public transportation, ana reaucing energy consumption.
(j) Improyed safltyl A major objective of the proposea transportation system
is to improve safety for all modes of transportation.
(k) Reauced harmful Inyironmental impactl Plans will aim to preserve natural
resources, such as agricultural land, forests and wildlife. New transportation
facilities must avoid harmful effects on sites that have religious, historical and
aesthetic value. Aesthetic enhancement by beautification ana development of scenic
facilities along rights of way will be ~onsiQered.
B. Forecast of future trayel demang
58. The projected population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for the year 2010
is calculated on the basi~ of the two scenarios mentioned earlier. Scenario A is
based on the natural growth of the present Palestinian population of the occupied
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West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip (including 11 holders of
residency cards issued by Israeli authorities, even if they, living abroad), in
addition to the Arab residents of Jerusalem. Scenario B incl .Jes A, with an
additional 1.5 million Palestinians who would return from their present places of
residence abroad during the period 1991 to 1995.
50. Available data indicate that the present Palestinian population of the
occupied West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the Gaz~ Strip is about 1.8 million,
and is increasing at an annual rete of 3.0 per cent in the West Bank and
3.4 per cent in the Gaza Strip. The average number of persons per household in
these regions is 6.13 and 6.50, respectively.
60. The pr~iected d~mographic characteristics for the year 2010 according t.o
scenario A are presented in table 8, based on the following assumptionsl
(a) The annual rate of growth will tend to decrease with the expected
urbanization and rise in '.iving standards.
(b) Owing to increased economic growth in the Gaza Strip, the annual rate of
growth of popUlation will tend to drop more rapidly than in the West Bank, reducing
the disparity between the two regions.
(c) The expected socio-economic changes will cause the number of extended
families living in the same dwelling to decline, and the number of new nuclear
families will tend to rise, thus incressing the demand for independent transporl
(d) The effects of migration to other countries are negligible and may be
ignored.
61. Based on these assumptions, the total popUlation of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip is expected to increase to about 3.2 million by the yuar 2010, a net increase
of 176 per cent over 1989.
62. For scenario B, the distribution of the returning 1.5 million Palestini3ns is
assumed to be 80 per cent to th~ West Bank and 20 per cent to the Gaza Strip.
After 1095, the total popUlation will increase naturally up to about 5.4 million by
the year 2010, with a net increase of about 296 per cent over 1989. The projected
characteristics for the year 2010 according to scenario B are presented in table 9.
63. Consequent upon a political settlement, it is expected that returning
Palestinians, continued financial remittances, and foreign aid and investment would
result in much higher per capita incomes. This, along with the projected increase
in the number of households, forms the basis fQr projecting the number of vehicles
in general, and private automobiles in particular, in the year 2010. It is
estimated that the net increase in the total number uf vehicles will be almost
150 per cent for scenario A and 340 per cent for scenario B (see tables 8 and 9 for
Borne major travel demand determinants). It should be noted here that the estimate
does not consider the drop in the rate of increase in the number of vehicles after
1987, due to the conditions created by the intifadah.
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64. ~he increase in the total number of vehicles is expected initially to follow
the current average annual growth rate of 8 per cen~ for both the West Bank and the
Ga~a Strip. It is assumed that growth will continue at that rate until the
year 2000. After that, the growth rates will decrease to a steady level, as the
results of public transportation policies are realized. ~y the year 2010 the total
numbers of vehicl~d and private automobiles per 1,000 p.~sons are estimated to
reach 111 and 7., respectively, in the West Bankl and 59 and 42, respectively, in
the Gala Strip. (The number of vehicles per 1,000 persons was 770 in the United
States of America in 1980, 130 in Bahrain in 1981, 101 in Jordan in 19861 and 194
in Israel in 1986).
65. Although vehicle and private automobile ownership in the West Bank ~nd the
Gaza Strip are expected to increase in the manner shown, there will still be a
definite n.ed to expand the role of public transportation.
66. The number of drivers, as with vehicles, il also expected to increase, but at
a decrealing rate. The number per 100 households is forecast to increase from 55
in 1989 to 75 in 2010 in the Welt Bank, and from 51 to 61 in the Gaza Strip. It
may be noted that the number of drivers il forecast to be at least twice the number
of private automobiles per 100 households. This may be attributed to the
relatively high number of persons per household and to the sharp increase in the
number of driving licence holders in the 1980s. The increase in the number of
licence holders il predominantly among the young age groupl who believe that
poslessing a driving licence increases the poslibilitiel of finding a job and helps
in commuting to work. Demographic projectionl Ihow that the Ihare of potential
driverl (those 18 to 65 years of age) of the total population will increase
slightly from 38.5 per cent currently to 39.6 per cent by 2010.
67. Under scenario B, it is assumed that a r4riod of time will elapse before the
1.5 million returning Palestinians will adjust to the requirements of their new
life. This normalilation process is expected to last until the year 2000. During
this period, private automobile ownerlhip of the returning Palestinian~ i~ expected
to be lower than that of the original relidents. It is assumed that by the end of
this period the distribution of private automobile ownership for the whole
population will become relatively uniform.
68. The changes in the travel demand determinants for the whole population
according to both scenarios are presented in table 10.
69. Studies have shown that the increase in the total number of vehicles over a
specific period is closely related to the increase in the number of person/trips
per day, and m~re importantly, to the number of vehicle km of travel. Thus, the
demand for travel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is expected to increase by at
least 240 per cent for scenario A, and by 415 per cent for scenario B, by the
year 2010.
70. Present and projected trafti~ volumes on key routes of the network are
presented in table 11.
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C. Praposed road transportation system
71. The following guidelines and pri~:iples have been used in the development of
the proposed highway networkl
(a) The design must ftnsure an integrated highway network, so that movement of
traffic from one area to another is as smooth, direct and continuous as possible.
(b) The structure of the network should be designed according to a
classification system of highway links, based onl (i) capacity requirements to
satisfy projected traffic volumes, and (1i) the function and quality of links.
(c) The system must be co-ordinated with oth.r modes of transportation in a
compatible and inteqrated framework.
(d) The structure of the proposed network should inclUde existing highway
links whenever possible, and meke provision for necessary improvements to be
connected with the existing highway system in a proper and economic manner.
(e) Alternative highways to those crossing urban centres should be considered
il'1 order to facilitate through traffic, reduce urban congestlon and improve safety.
(f) Compatibility with the topography and consideration of highway design
standards are to be satisfied.
72. The following highway classification system is used in this studYI
(a) National express highways I The primary function of these highways is to
ensure efficient and fast movement of traffic, especially long-distance through
traffic. These highways hav. a minimum of four divided lanes with a median, are
access-controlled, and have grade separation at intersections whenever possible.
(b) National major highWAYS' These highways connect large population ~entres
and major production/consumption locations. They also have great mobility and
little access to abutting land. They consist of one or two lanes in each dire~tion.
(c) Regional secondary highwaysl These highways provide access between the
smaller cities and ~owns, connecting them both with one another and with the
national highway system. In general, they serve regional rather than national
demard, with moderate travel distances and speeds, and are designed to the
standards of the two-lane rural highways.
(d) Local village roadsl The local village road system serves the smaller
villages and rural areas, connecting them with the main highway system. They carry
low traffic volumes over relatively short travel distances at low speeds.
73. The interrelationships between the major traffic generation and attraction
c~ntres and the consequent travel demand requirements are presented schematically
in figure 2. Three national traffic corridors are suggested to run from north to
south in the West Bank, while another is planned in the same direction along the
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Gaza Strip. The proposed network connects the Wes~ Bank with the Ga,-~ Strip
through an east-west national corridor running within a neutral zone across
Israeli-controlled territory. In addition, three national tranSVA~se corridors
across the West Bank connect major urban areas with major product~on and
con~umption centres and facilitate passenger and fr~ight traffic to and from
neighbouring countries.
74. A supporting regional highway system is planned to serve areas with less
travel demand and smaller through traffic volumes. The proposed hl~hway network
also includes a local village road system which links the smaller rural settlements
with one another and with the regional and nationbl major highway networks. This
system will make remote locations, which are now ignored in many c.ses, more
accessible.
75. In the West Bank, the proposed main north-south corridor runs through Jenin,
Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron and Al Dahiriyah. An alternative
express highway is suggested to bypass the highly populated area &xtendin~ from
Ramallah in ',:le north to northern Hebron in the south. This highway wHl carry
through tratiic across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, connecting the West Bank
with Jordan and other Arab countries in the east, and the Gaza Strip with Egypt and
other Arab countries in the west. A second parallel national corridor will serve
the Jordan Valley and the area west of the Dead Sea, where there ~s significant
potential for economic development. A third corridor will conne~~ Tulkarrn in the
north-west with Beit Sira in the south, where it will link up with a transverse
corridor leading to Jerusalem.
76. Three national highway corridors are planned to cross the We3t Bank i~ an
east-west direction. One connects Tulkarm and Jenin to North~rn Jordan via
Al Maleh Bridge. A second connects Tulkarm and Qalqilia through Nablus to the
Damiah Bridge, leading to Amman, in the centre. The third connects Beit Sira with
the Abdullah Bridge, penetrating the Jerusalem-Ramallah area and running to the
south of Jericho.
77. In the Gaza Strip, it is suggested that a national traf.fic corrid~r be
constructed in the eastern plains from the far north to the southern border with
Egypt. An extension around the city of Gaza will selve a proposed beaport, the
industrial zone, and the airport to the s~uth o~ the city.
78. A traffic corridor has been proposed to link the West Bank with
through a neutral zone passing through Israeli-controlled territory.
will link the southern part of the West Bank to the northern part of
via Idna and Beit Hanoun.
the Gaza Strip
This corridor
the Gaza Strip
79. The directional peak hour demands shown in table 12 were calculated assuming
that 14 per cent of the total daily traffic is concentrated during the peak hour,
and that 55 per cent of total traffic is carried in one direction. The number of
lanes per dire~tion was calculated on the assumption that heavy vehicles, including
buses and trucks, represented 10 to 15 per cent of the total traffic volume. A
level of service is expected on these highways consistent with stable operations at
relatively high to moderate average travel speeds.
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80. The national and regional highways that constitute the backbone of the
proposed highw~y network for the West Bank and the Gala Strip are shown in
figure 3, and a comparison between the total l.ngth of the existing and proposed
road networks i. presented in table 13. The proposed highway network will increase
road density per square kilometre from 0.33 ~.~ 0.47. The density per 1,000
population will decrease slightly from 1.13 to O.Ql. The extent of the required
new construction, rehabilitation and improvement is illustrated in table 14.
81. Further information on the proposed n~tional highway syst~m is provided below.
West Bank-Gaza corridor
82. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are t~o geographically distinct regions
separated by a minimum distance of 33 km. Thvy will need to be ccnr 3cted via a
neutral demilitarized corridor. The sugg~~ted lone would .xte~d from the northern
end of the Gaza Strip eastward to the western foothills of the Hebron mountains in
the West Bank. The length of the lone would be approximate~y 37 km and the width
would vary from 2 to 4 km, with a total aroa of about 120 square km. A national
expre•• highway is planned to run between Hebron and the Gaz. Strip through this
neutral lone. The criteria for s~lecting the location of the highway, and
consequently the neutral zone, were as follows.
(a) The highway should be as direct an~ 31 ahort as possible,
(b) It should avoid as far as possible any interference with existing Israeli
settlement patterns along the neutral lone,
(c) The highway should have a minimum number of cros.ings of existing Israeli
road., minimizing the need for bridges, tun~9l8, etc.,
(d) The highway should satisfy the topographic requirements and geometric
design standards for express highways.
83. The proposed route satisfies these criteria better than all others
considered. The planned highway forms an integral part of the proposed national
expre•• highway system. It runs from northern Hebron w~Btward via Idna through
through the neutral zone to reach the northern part of the Gaza Strip at
Beit Hanoun, where it connects with the Gaza Strip segments of the national highway
system. The total length of this highway is approximately 54 km, of which 37 km
are within the proposed neutral zone.
84. The travel demand on this highway by the year 2010 is projected to be around
32,400 vehicles per day according to scenario A, and 56,000 vehicles per day
according to scenario B. This would require the congtruction of a six-lane highway
with no access, designed according to the st~ndards of express highways.
Jenin-Al Dahiriyah national major highway
85. This major highway in the West Bank rurlS from Jenin in the north to
Al Dahiriyah in the south, serving the urban centres of Nablus, Ramallah,
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Jerusalem, Bethl.hem and Bebron. The travel demand north of Nablus and south of
Hebron is satisfied by two-lane hiqhway seqments designed to the s.:ndards of rural
major hiqhways. The higher travel demaud of the rest of the hiqhway is
accommodated by four-lane highway segments. For scenario A, extra capacity has to
be provided between Je~usalem and Bethlehem (table 11). for scenario B, extra
capacity has to be provided between Ramallah and Hebron. Fo& both cases, three
lanes in each direction would be needed. However, the combined capacity of this
hiqhway and the par&llel Ramallah-Hebron national expressway will satisfy the
projected total demand.
86. Bxistinq parts of the proposed highway must be upqraded.
some minor horizontal curve realiqnments and the construction
order to avoid existinq difficult topographic terrain, and to
popUlation centres (length, 176 km).
Bamallab-HebrQD national elpress highway
This will include
of new sections in
by-pass conqested
87. The Jerusalem area is expected to form the bottleneck of the national hiqhway
Iystsm. Projected traffic volumes, especially for scenario B, justify the
construction of a new hiqhway connectinq Ramallah to Hebron runninq to the east of
Jerusalem and Bethlehbm, and to the west of Jericho. This will be a divided
four-lane hiqhway with acce8S control and qrade separation at the junctions, three
connectors linkinq the hiqhway to Jerusalem, Jericho (and on into Jordan), and
Bethlehem. Nsw construction is required for most of the hiqhway, but short
segments of existinq roads can b~ upqraded and inteqrated with it. A lenqth of
63 km with seven interchanges is suqqested.
lin 11 Baydah-Dead Sea national major highway
88. This hiqhway runs from north to south almost parallel to the axis of the major
Jenin-Al Dahiriyah national highway to the west, and the River Jordan to the east.
It reaches the proposed industrial compl.·x on the western shore of th~ Dead Sea,
via the proposed Damiah major urban settlement and Jericho. The major function of
this highway is to meet the requirements of the projected socio-econom:Lc
development in the Jordan Valley. It is Jxpected to carry larqe freight traffic
volumes, especially in the section between the Damiah and the Abdullah Bridges,
where four lanes would be justified. The rest of the highway is planned as a
two-lane rural highway. Minor upqradinq and rehabilitation of the existinq highway
is recommended. The total length is 115 km.
Abdullah Bridge-Jerusalem national express highway and Jerusalem-Beit Sira national
major highway
89. This corridor links the Abdullah Bridge with the Gaza Strip through Jerusalem,
Bethlehem and Hebron areas. It runs as a national express highway from the
Abdullah Bridge on the River Jordan to Jerusalem. At the location between
Jerusalem and the Ramallah-Hebron express highway, a major highway branches to
connect with the TUlkarm-Beit Sira national highway north of Beit Sira, crossing
the Ramallah-Jerusalem national highway south of the Qalandia International
Airport. The length of this segment is 39 km, and it requires upgrading to meet
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the standards of express highways. (The length of the major highway segment is
32 km, and it requires improvement to upgrade it to a four-lane high' y. Four-lane
segments of this corridor between Qalandia and Beit Sira are now unde
construction. )
Tulkarm-Beit Sira national major highway
go. This highway runs on the western foothills of the mountain range, extending in
the northern and central parts of the West Bank. It connects Tulkarm with
Beit Sira, passing east of Qalqilia and linking with the Jerusalem-Beit Sira
national highway near Beit Sira. Its major function is to facilitate the movement
of passengers and goods between the north-western areas and Jerusalem, Hebron and
the Gala Strip. The expected volume of traffic will not require more than two
lanes in both directions. The existing highway will be upgraded to the standards
of major roads, where widening and minor re locations are also r~quired. Its length
is approx.imately 61 km•
Tulkarm-Al Maleh Bridge national major highwAY
91. This highway is suggested to improve the connections of the northern parts of
the West Bank with one another, and to facilitate their linkage with Jordan through
Al Maleh Bridge, to be constructed across the River Jordan to the south-east of
Ein El Baydah. It connects Tulkarm to the bridge, by-passing Anabta and Tubas and
crossing the Jenin-Nablus a~is to the south of Jenin. The projected volume of
traffic on this highway is less than 5,000 vehicles per day, justifying a two-lane
configuration. Its length is approximately 53 km, most of which requires new
construction, with upgrading and rehabilitation of existing sections.
DamiAh Bridge-Tulkarm national major highway
92. This runs from the Damiah Bridge in the Jordan Valley to Nablus, crossing the
Ein El Baydah-Dead Sea national highway near the proposed ,major urban settlement of
Damiah. The highway then forks at Nablus into two branches; one continues to
Tulkarm, while the other conti~ues to Qalqilia. The expected high demand on this
highway justifies a four-lane configuration, except for the Nablus-Qalqilia link,
which will need two lanes only. The Damiah Bridge-Nablus-Tulkarm highway is 68 km
long, while the Nablus-Qalqilia highway is 32 km.
Gaza national express highway
93. A national express highway is proposed along the eastern plains of the Gaza
Strip. It will have four lanes according to scenario A, and six lanes according to
scenario B, both with limited access. It will carry through traffic between the
West Bank (and possibly neighbouring Arab countries) and Egypt. In addition,
traffic within the Gaza Strip will use this facility. Six interchanges are planned
to serve Gaza city and its seaport, Gaza Airport, Deir-El-Balah, Khan Yunis and
Rafah. The highway connects with the Hebron-Gaza national express highway at the
far north of the Strip near Beit Hamoun, and ends at the border with"Egypt south of
Rafah. The existing major highway runs parallel to this corridor, and would be
reclassified as a regional secondary highway. Its length is 42 km. Another
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13 km-long section of highway is planned to loop around the city of Gaza, running
as a national major highway fronm Beit Hamoun to the coast, then extending towards
the seaport and the Gaza airport.
~qional secondary highway system
94. The Tulkarm-Jenin regional secondary highway links Tulkarm to Jenin in the
north of the West Bank via Ya'bad. The existing Tulkarm-Ya'bad section needR
improvement, while the Ya'bad-Jenin link must be constructed (length, 37 km).
95. The Jenin-Tubas regional secondary highway runs from Jenin to the south east,
crosses the Tulkarm-Al Maleh Bridge national highway near Tubas, and continues
south to intersect with the Damiah Bridge-Nablus national highway. A short
connector links this highway with Qabatio. Most of the highway already exists but
needs surface and alignment improvements (length, 32 km).
96. The Ein El Baydah-Qalandia airport junction regional secondary highway runs
from Ein Al Baydah in the far north to the Qalondia Airport junction on the
Ramallah-Jerusalem national highway via Ml1khmas. It runs at the eastern foot of
the mountainous areas between the Ein El Baydah-Dead Sea and the Nablus-Ramallah
national highways. Most of the highway is already constructed to an acceptable
level, but some sections require minor alignment improvement (length, 85 km).
97. The Masha-Fasaye1 regional secondary highway connects Masha, at the western
foot of the central mountains, with Fasayel in the central part of the Jordan
Valley, crossing the Jenln-Al Dahiriyah national highway south of Huwara. Most of
this highway has been recently constructed by the Israeli authorities to connect
Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley with the Israeli highway network (length,
55 km).
98. Tbe A'bud-A'tara regiQnal secondary highway connects the two major north··sQuth
natiQnal corridors of the TUlkdrm-Beit Sira and the Nablus-Ramallah highways via
A'tara. SectiQns Qf this highway were recently constructed to acceptable
standards. Other sections require surface and alignment improvements (length,
20 km).
99. The Ni'lin-Raroallah regional secondary highway CQnnects the TUlkarm-Beit Sira
and the Nablus Ramallah national highways and links several rural settlements with
Ramallah. The existing road requires many majQr imprQvements (length, 21 km).
100. The Hebron Mountain regional secondary highway loop a regional secQndary
highway that runs almQst parallel to the boundaries of the sQuthern part of the
West Bank. TopographJ and the distribution of settlements necessitates a
circumferential highway system in this regiQn. It runs from Bethlehem towards the
western fOQthills, where it meets the Hebron-Gaza highway close to Idna and
continues south to reach Al Dahiriyah. It then runs east and north to Bethlehem
via Al Samou'. A connector links the IOQp with the Dead Sea Highway. The eastern
part of the loop and the Dead Sea connector need to be constructed, while the
existing nQrthern and western sections of the loop need major upgrading and
improvement (length of the loop, 128 km; the connector, 20 km). Another ~ection of
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21 km is ~lanned to complete a smalle~ loup connecting Hebron with Al Dahiriyah via
Ban! Nol' im.
101. The GIll Strip regional secondlry highway. The Gala Strlp reglonal hlghway
system consists of two north-south highways and three east-west highways. One of
the north-south highways runs parallel to the national .xpress highways along the
ea"tern plains of the Strip and serves as a service road to the national express
highwa~·. The other ru~s parallel to the coast in the west, Ind is considered In
extension of the major hlqhway serving the seaport and the airport. Transverse
reglonal secondary highway~ connect the longitUdinal highways and serve the urban
arels of Deir El-Balab, Khan Yunis and lafah. Existing 10cIl roads consLitute most
of the sections of this highway system, but ~lll requtre major upgrbding and
improvement (lenqth of the netw~rk, 80 km).
102. Local village rOld system connects the Palestinian villages with the national
and the region~l highway systems. Moreover, it connects neighbouring villages with
one other. The major c~ncern of this system is spatial. coverage. All the villag{ls
in the Helt Bank and the Oaza Strip are connected \ith the national and regioDal
systems, but the qualit.y of service on mOlt of thet" is poor. Major improvement
plans need to be pr~pared to upgrade such roads. Also, new local roads have to be
constructed to connect neighbouring villages in order to facilitate overall
development needs. It is estimated that the total length of village local roads
wl1l increase by 60 per cent.
103. The expanding role of the agricultural se'ltor of the Palestinian economy
ree;tuires the ",onstruct!on of roads to facili ·'.ate the accessibility to, and thft
opening up of, new lands for agricultural development. Some of these roads may
need asphalt Burfa:•• , while the rest may be all-weather, surface-stabilized roads.
D. Proposed public transport system
104. 06velopment plans for the Hest Bank and the Oaza Strip emphasize a need for
expanded public transportation. The use of buses and shared taxis for public
transportation should be encouraged, and the possibilities of constructing a rapid
transit rail system should be investigated. In order to improve public
transportation services, the establishment of one or more public-owned bus
transportation companies is recommended. Shared taxi services should be regulated
and co-ordinated with the buu service to help upgrade the quality of service
provided, otherwise more private automobiles may b~ purchased and use~ ~ith
consequent deleterious effects. The ~lternative use of public transpo~tation
should be encourGge~ th:ough policies of tax exemptions and the imposition of
higher taxes on private automobile ownership.
105. The mode of public tr~nsportation that should be supported on each route will
depend on the passenger demand for the rout a and the route capacity. Bus service
is appropriate when public transportation .'emand is high and the volume of traffic
is large in relation t~ capacity. In other cases, ohared taxis may be more
appropriate.
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106. Rail transit systems for the very hiqh passenger travel demand corridorR, such
as the Ramallah-Jerusalem-Bethlehem corridor and the cor~idor along the Gaza Strip,
should be subjected to a thorouqh economic and technical feasJbility stud~t as
should other rail transport facilities, such as a railway connectinq the W••t Bank
with the Gala Strip, and poss4bly connecting Gala with Eqypt, before any de~ailed
recommendations are made.
107. The proposed inter-urban transportation network in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, unlike the existing network, will provide direct access between regional
urban centres without the need to transfer throuqh existinq and other hubs, and
also access to direct ,ervices from many urban centr~s to neighbourinq Arab
countdes.
108. The suqgested network will depend for its success upon a complete upgrading of
existing services, including better quality vehicles, more frequent and tiqhter
schedules, and the provision of terminals and passenger facilities, especially in
major centres.
E. Proposed sea transportation system
109. A commercial ftdaport is proposed for construction on the coast of Gala in
order to serVA the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and also neighbouring countries
that have no direct access to the Mediterranean, such as Jordan, Iraq and the Arab
Gulf States. The seaport is planned to handle exports of aqricultural, mining and
industrial products and imports of food, raw materials, industrial products and
fuel. No data are available on projected tonnage of these exports and imports or
on transit freight, and any attempt to provide detail.d estimates would be subject
to wide marqins of er~or.
110. However, it seems obvious that a major modern port will be vital to the
economic development of future Palestine. A recent study has demonstrated the
technical feasibility of constructing a seaport on the coastline of the Gaza
Strip. It concludes that coastline characteristics present no major technical
problems, and the most favourable location of thos~ examined for the seaport
development lies on the stretch to the west of Gala City and south of the presently
existing two jetties. The proposed highway segment which will link the seaport to
the propsed highway network would offer the basic and necessary infrastructure for
expected heavy freight traffic to and from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and
neighbouring countries.
F. Proposed air transportation system
111. An examinat3.on of future transportation needs clenrly indicates the necessity
for air transpo~t~ services to handle the projected passenger and cargo air travel
within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and between them and other parts of the
world. This requires the construction of a major international airport and local
airports. The Oalandia airport north of Jerusalem, which is currently operated by
the Israeli authorities for local flight services within Israel, is suggested as
the site for the proposed international airport.
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112. The main advantage of the Qalandia site over others considered is ita central
location and accessibility via the two proposed national major highways, which
intersect a short distance south of the airport. Other major advantages are its
proximity to Jerusalem and its location in relation to other major urban centres.
The airport will be around 40 minutes by automobile from both Nab111s and Hebron,
and around 80 minutes from both Jenin in the far north, and Gaza City in the south
west, once the planned highway system is established. The area has been thoroughly
investigated according to requirements for public safety set by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and proper zoning will ensure thi~ will be
safeguarded. Land is available for expansion in the eastern directJ.un, where the
topography does not pose problems.
113. The existing airport should be expanded to satisfy the requirements of a
modern international airport, and a recent report eltimated annual enplaned
passenger air travel demand to be close to 2.g5 million passengers by the year 2010
for scenario A. This forecast was based on the analysis of possible travel demand
for three major travel groupsl Palestinian residents and visitors (1.32 million),
Muslim visitors (0.77 million) and Christian pilgrims, Holy Land and other tourists
(0.86 million). According to scenario B, the total number of enplaned passengers
is estimated to be 3.~0 million by year 2010. No data are currently available on
the projected import and export cargo demand.
114. The estimated annual travel demand is expected to generate no more than 40,000
annual aircraft opefations for scenalio A, and no more than 50,000 annual aircraft
operations for scenario B. This will require a single runway system with a
capacity of at least 80,000 annual operations. Theref~re, a system consisting of a
single r~nway, with a parallel taxiway, would be adequate. The length of runway is
estimated to be 3,500 m, which can serve non-stop flights of the Boeing B-747
aircraft with a range reaching Rabat and London in the west, and Islamabad in the
east. Land is available for upgrading and construction work commensurate with
these requirements.
115. In addition to the international airport at Qalandia, three smaller local
airports are suggested, at Gaza CitYI Jalameh, north of Jeninl and a site to the
east of Jericho. The Gaza airport is to be c~r.8tructed on available land close to
the shore to the south of Gaza City and its proposed seaport, where it will be
JirAed by ~n extension 0' the national highway system. A1 Qubbah airf.ield, to the
east of Gaza City, was found unsuitable 'or development owing to its proximity to
Israel and consequont interference with Israel air space. The Jenin and Jericho
airports will be constructed on old neglected airfields that were built by the
British during the mandate period. The air corridor required for flights between
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may be provided through the air space over the
proposed neutral land lone. There may be no need to construct an a1r route traffic
control centre, since the newly constructed c~ntre in Jordan covers a large
geographic area including the West Bank. However, terminal approach control
facilities at aalandia International Airport will be required.
/ ...
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v. INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
116. The proposed transportation system for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cannot
be implemented without a proper organizational framework for the planning,
execution and control of its development. Sectoral policies, goals, objectives and
priorities within the general context of national interest and financial
constraints must be clearly defined and understood. Unfortunately, there has be.n
a complete absence of such a framework for the 22 years of Israeli oocupation. Tha
only official organizations operating within the transportation sector today are
the remains of the extensions of the Jordanian and Eqyptian transportation
departments which operated until the occupation of 1;67. These are now controlled
by Israeli officers according to the policies and regulations set by the Israeli
author! ties.
117. The three major departments in the West Bal ~ and Gaza Strip are the Public
Works Department, the Highway Traffic Department and Licensing Department. The
Public Norks Department is responsible for the planning, construction and
maintenance of roads that fall outside municipal boundaries. The Highway Traffic
Department is responsible for traffic and safety regUlation and control. The
licensing department is responsible for vehicle claslification and registration 8S
well as the issuing of driving licences. In addition, the Central Planning
Uepartment and the Higher Planning Council, which are also composed of and
controlled by Israeli officers, are usually involved in the planning and
co-ordination of activities in the transport sector.
118. A number of Palestinian operational organizations are needed to cope with the
requirements of achieving the objectives of the proposed development plan. The
establishment of the tollowing organizations is prQposedl
(a) A ministry of transportation for the strategic planning and co-ordination
of the activities of all transport organizations,
(b) A highway authority for the construction and maintenance of the road
system and the introduction of adequate axle load regulations and overload control
measures,
(c) A traffic departmenL for road safety, registration and licensing of
d~ive[s and vehicles,
(d) A public transportation authority for the overall pla~ninq, regulation,
and promotion of all modes of public transportation,
(e) A civil aviation and meteorology authority f.or the planning and
co-ordination of air tran~port, including the Qperation and maintenance of the
proposed airports and the possible future operati~ns of a national airline and
local flight services,
(f) A F.eaport authority for the operation and maintenance of the proposed
commercial and fishery seaport facilities in Gaza, and the possible future
operations of a national sea line,
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(9) A training school for providin9 the sector with adequately trained
professionals at all levels and undertakin9 research on matters pertaining to
sector development.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
l19. In this study, future sectoral requirements based on the year 2010 have been
predicted' on the basis of two Icenariol. In one scenario, the predicted future
popUlation is aSlumed to result from the natural 9rowth of the present population
of the West Bank and the Gala Strip only. In the other, the total future
population is assumed to result from the combined effect of the natural growth of
the exilting population and the return of 1.5 million Palestinians who are at
present living elsewhere.
120. The structure of the proposed system was based on the assumption that the
re9ions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will form a single political entry
maintainin9 Itron9 political and economic relations with Jordan and Egypt. It was
also assumed that the returning Palestinians will be absorbed in the present
cities, in the large rural popUlation centres, and iu a number of new urban
settlements.
121. The preliminary layout of the proposed highway network is intended to utilize
the existing network to the maximum extent possible. Construction of the new
facilities, and expansion and development of existing ones, are recommended to meet
the future air and sea transport requirements.
122. It was found that the locations of the proposed main highway corridors overlap
with the location of the existinq road network for almost 80 per cent of the total
length. However, baeic changel in the classification of the present traffic
corridors are proposed to satisfy objectives of the proposed highway network.
Approximately 39 per cent of the len9th of the proposed network will need to be
constructed. Affected existing road sections will require improvements in order to
upqrade them to the standards of the new system. The total length of the proposed
highway network is approximately 2,900 km, an increase of around 41 per cent over
the existing system.
123. In the development of the physical il1frastructure, priority should be given to
the construction of the West Bank-Gaza Strip corridor, and timely arrangements must
be concluded for establishinq the neutral lone required. In addition, serious
consideration should be given to the construction of the international airport at
galandia and the Gaza seaport in order to meet the espected demand for passenger
travel and cargo movement.
124. Proper
essential.
the sector,
provided to
and effective operation and maintenance of the highway network are
Incentives must be established to attract competent professionals to
and continuous training of professional and technical staff must be
ensure efficient performance ot the transportation system.
/ ...
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125. Iflortl must bl made to ensure that the eSlential institutional infraltructure
of thl transportation syatem il developed at a pacI compatible with the development
of the phyeical infrastructure.
126. rinally, it is recommended that a comprehensive study be conducted to
investiqate in more detail the design alternatives for the elements of the prcposed
transportation system, to set up an evaluatiol ~echanism for testing and comparing
altornMtives, to identify priorities, and to define appropriate implementation
programmes •
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Tobl. 1
Classifigation of W.lt Bank roaas in 1947 ana 1967
1947 1967
Road claBl L"n<Jth (km) .... of total Length (km) .... of total
I 273 19.3 368 26.0
11 383 27 .0 954 67.3
III 386 27.2 46 3.2
IV 376 26.5 50 3.5
Total 1 418 100.0 1 418 100.0
Where.
Class I refers to first class paved roads, width of surface 4.0 metres or more.
Class 11 refers to second class paved roads, width of surface 2.5 to 3.0
metres.
Class III refers to other roads, usually unpaved.
Class IV refers to unpav.d track paths, partly inaccessible to vehicles, with
high slopes and small widths.
Table 2
Roaa service to population centres in the West Bank
in 1947 and 1907
-- -
1947 1967
-
Road class Length ( km) " of total Length (km) " of total
I 31 8.5 45 12.3
II 80 21.9 267 72.9
III 128 34.9 30 8.2
IV 127 34.7 24 6.6
Total 366 100.0 366 100.0
- - _.
/ ...
Tabl. 3
I'st.nt of [004 Detwo[k in th. W.st Bank acoo[4ing ~
the Israeli r.gional roa4 master plan of 1983
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Set back from
Highway width c.ntr6 line of Length of
Highway type (metre) highway (metre) highWayS (km)
Express highways 120 150 93.5
Main highways 100 120 517.5
Regional highways 60 100 636.0
Local highways 4 70 626.0
Total 1 873.0
Table t
Existing ro04 n.twork
West Bank Gaza Strip
Road type Length (km) '\ of total Length (km) '\ of total
Main 520 27.5 48 28.6
R.gional 520 27.5 42 25.0
Local 850 45.0 78 46.4
Total 1 890 100.0 168 100.0
~I Urban and agricultural roads are not included.
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Tabl. 5
,anditions of the existing road network in the West Bank
-
Road condition Length , of total
Good 920 48.7
Medium 210 11.1
Bad 760 40.2
Total 1 890 100.0
I
UQ.tA1 This classification of road cC·llditions followed that
of the Public Works Department in cha~ge of highway maintenance
iD the West Bank.
Table 6
Characteristics of some majgr inter-urban bus routes
Average Average Total Revenue
ridership headway passengers pass per
per revenue
Route (pass/day) (min) vehiclCJ vehicle-km
Nablus-Ramallah 1 280 30 75 0.78
Nablus-Tulkarm 2 250 SO 188 1.67
Nablus-Jenin 1 600 30 228 0.95
Jeru~alem-Ramallah 9 250 7 430 2.67
Jerusalem-Bethlehem 5 280 15 480 3.33
Jerusalem-Hebron SI 000 10 250 1.39
~I Ridership represents all boarding tW0-directiondl passengers, including
rural area passengers who alight on the way before reaching destination.
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Table 7
Characteristigs of some majo', inter-urban shared taxi routes
Total Revenue
A.verage A.verage panenqers pass per
ridership headway per revenue
Route (pass/day) (min) vehicle vehicle-km
Nablus-Ramalloh 1 510 7 27 0.15
Nablus-Tulkarm 3 920 3 71 0.26
Nablus-Jenin 560 18 23 0.17
Nablus-Qalqllia 1 260 10 70 0.22
Tulkarm-Qalqilia 840 15 70 0.39
Qalqilia-Gala 170 50 24 0.07
Jerusalem-Ramallah 6 530 2 65 0.46
Jerusalem-Bethlehem 1 050 10 42 0.58
Jerusalem-Hebron 4 100 3 56 0.19
Jerusalem-Jericho 530 19 38 0.18
Jerusalem-Gala 350 25 14 0.07
HQtAt Ridership represents all boarding two-directional passengers, including
rural area passengers who alight on the way before reaching destination.
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Table 8
Basic travel demand determinants for base ond design yeors
accgrding to scenario A
West Bank Gaza Strip
Parameter 1989 2010 1989 2010
Population (millions) 1.13 1. 94 0.69 1. 26
Households (thousands) 184 359 107 222
Total vehicles (thousands) 87. " 214 .0 28.8 75.5
Private autos (thousands) 55.7 139.1 19.4 52. ~;
Licensed drivers (thousands) 106.5 269.0 59.2 135.0
Vehic1es/1,000 persons 78 111 43 59
Private autos/1,000 persons 52 72 32 42
Private autos/lOO households 31 39 20 24
Licensed drivers/lOO households 57 75 53 61
Table 9
Basic travel demand determinants for base and design yearl
according to Icenarto B
West Bank Gaza Strip
Parameter 1989 2010 1989 2010
Population (millions) 1.13 3.69 0.69 1.70
Households (thousands) 184 683 107 304
Total vehicles (thousands) 87.7 404.4 28.8 103.3
Private autos (thousands) 55.7 266.4 19.4 72.1
Licensed drivers (thousands) 106.5 512.2 59.2 184.9
Vehicles/1,OOO persons 78 111 43 60
Private autos/1 , OOO persons 52 72 32 42
Private autos/lOO households 31 39 20 24
Licensed drivers/lOO households 57 "5 53 61
/ ...
Table 10
Summary of basic traye1 demand determinants
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Scenario A Scenario B
Base year (2010) (2010)
conditions Per cent Per cent
Parameter (1989) Total increase Total increase
Population (millions) 1.82 3.20 176 5.39 296
Households (thousands) 291 581 199 987 339
Total vehicles (thousands) 116.5 289.0 248 512.5 440
Private autos (thousands) 75.1 191.6 255 338.5 451
Licensed drivers (thousands) 165.7 404.0 244 797.1 481 -
/ ...
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Table 11
Pro'ected traffic volumes at key routes
Average daily vo!ume of traffic
(yehicle/day)
Projected rrojected
Present volume volume
Road volume (1) scenario A. scenario B
Nablus-Ramallah 5 100 12 200 21 200
Ramallah-Jerusalem 7 300 17 500 30 300
Jeru~alem-Jericho (2) 4 800 11 500 19 900
Jerusalem-Bethlehem (3) 12 300 29 500 51 100
Bethlehem-Hebron 8 000 19 200 33 200
Gaza-Beit Hanoun (4) 13 500 32 400 56 000
--
(1) Tratlic volume estimates for 1987 are based on Department of Public Works
statistics.
(2) Existing trat£ic includes Israeli settlers movements, which may rerresent
up to 30 per cent of the tot~l volume, which is expected to be offset by the
increased tra"el to Jordan when projecting fut\lre demand.
(3) Bxisting traffic includes Israeli settlers movements, which may represent
up to 25 p~r cent of the total volume, which is expected to be offset by the
increae~d tourist travel and travel to Gaza Strip when projecting future travel
demand.
(4) Bxisting traffic includes Israeli settlex's moverllents, which may represent
up to 10 per ctint of the total volume, which is expected to be offset by the
increased travel to Jordan when projecting future demand.
Table 12
Number of lan,. for some major corridors
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- -10 A. - -fn A
Total Directional Total 1)irectional
traffic ~eak hour No. of traffic p\tak hour No. of
volume volUlne lanes volume volume lanes
(vehicle (vehicle per (vehicle (vehi.c'., per
Corridor per day) per hour) direction per day) per hour) direction
Nablus- 12 .lOO 940 2 21 200 1 360 2
Ramallah
Rama:6 J.ah- 17 50l" 1 350 2 30 300 2 330 3
Jerusalem
Jef\.''Jalem- 11 500 a90 2 19 900 1 530 2
Jeric;ho
Jeru..alem- 29 500 2 270 3 51 100 3 930 3
Bethlehem
Beth1ehem- 19 200 1 480 2 33 200 2 560 3
Hebron
Gaza-Belt 32 400 2 500 3 56 000 4 310 3
Hanoun
Table 13
Extent of existing and proposed rOld network in the
West Bank ond Gaza Strip
I
Existing Proposed
Highway clasb Length (km) , of total Length (km) , of total
National express 0 0.0 198 6.8
National major 568 27.6 575 19.8
Regional secondary 562 27.3 627 21.6
Local village road 928 45.1 1 500 51.7
Total 2 058 100.0 2 900 100.0
-00
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Table 14
CQn8tru~tiQn/imprQyement rlQuirlments fgr tbe propOled road netxQXk
New Major Minor
construction improvement.s improvements
Highway (KM) (KM) (KM)
4 or 6 lane national 411 5 0
2 lane national 60 90 207
4 lane r.gian"l 32 0 0
2 lane region&l 97 201 297
Looal roaeS 530 400 1 210
Total 1 130 696 1 974
__ .--_1._....-
/ .. ,
A/44/634
Enqllsh
Paqe 37
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FIGURE 1 EXISTING ROAD NETWORK
/ ...
A/U/534
Bn91hh
P&;8 38
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/ ...
A/U/1l34
BncaUSh
Paq. 39
Seal Q 1:750,000
o ~ 10 I~ 10 km
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NATIONAL MAJOR HIGHWAY
REOIONAL SECONDARY HIGHWAY
f- INTERCHANGE
~ AIRPORT
~ SEAPORT
N01E; LOCAL ROADS ARE
NOT SHOWN
FIGURE J . PROPOSED TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
/ ...
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EnCjJUsh
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FlOUR E. L, : EXISTING MAJOR PU8L1C TRANSPORTATION ROUTES
UNITED
NATIONS
• aeneral Aeeembly
Economic and Ioclal Council
AE
Distr.
GENERAL
A/46/262 /
E/1991/95
18 June 1991
ORIGINALI ENGLISH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Item 78 (9) of the preliminary list*
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC COOPERATION I HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL' COUNCIL
Second regular session of 1991
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC COOPERATION I HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS
Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory
Nrte ~y the Secretary-General
In its resolution 44/17~ of 19 December 1989, entitled "Living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory", the General
Assembly took note of the study annexed to the note of the Secretary-General
concerning the infrastructure needs of the Palestinian people (~/44/534),
requested the Secretary-General to assure the preparation of the comprehensive
study on the economy of the occupied Palestinian territory and requested him
to report to the Assembly at its forty-sixth session, through the Economic and
Social Council, on tbe progress made in the implementation of the resolution.
The report annexed to the present note is submitted in pursuance of that
request.
* A/46/50.
91-20170 3093a (E) / ...
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ANNEX
Report on liying conditions of the Palestinian people in
the ocgupied Palestinian territory
INTRODUCTION
1. The ~resent document, prepared pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 of General
Assambly resolution 44/174 of 19 December 1989 on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in th~ occupied Palestinian territory, reports on progress
made in thn preparation of a comprehensive study on the economy of the
occupied Palestinian territory referred to in that resolution.
2. The study is intended to be an action-oriented, intersectoral analysis of
the ~roblems and prospects of the Palestinian economy, bearing in mind the
alarm expressed in the above-mentioned resolution at the deterioration, as a
result of the Israeli occupation, in the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the Palestinian occupied territory, and the growing need for an
integrated approach to ~eal witt the problems being encountered by the
Palestinian people in reviving their economy and ensuring its sustained growth.
3. The design of the study in terms of substantive scope and orientation, as
depicted in the outline annexed to the present report, takes into account the
provision of Trade and Development Board resolution 239 (XXIII) of
9 October 1981, referred to in General Assembly reSOlution 44/174, in which
the Board specifically called for the preparation of a comprehensive and
in-depth assessment of the economy of the occupied Palestinian territory, an
elaborate analysis of the potentials for its development in various sectors
and the formulation of proposals for alternative development strategies.
Accordingly, the study, entitled "The West Bank and Gaza Stripl Prospects for
sustained development", will encompass the following three partsl
Part One. An assessment of the economic and social situation in the ocgupied
Palestinian territory
4. This part constitutes a thorough examination of the economic and social
situation of the Palesti~ian peopla in the West Bank ~nd Gaza Strip during the
past 24 years of Israeli occupation. In partiCUlar, it is intended to
evaluate growth and development trends at the aggregate and sectoral levels.
Attention will be focused on the growing impact of measures imposod by the
occupation authorities on the Palestinian economy $ince 1967. It will assess
the immediate outlook for the economy, taking into consideration the
socio-economic implications of the Palestinian uprising and of the recent
developments in the region affecting the economic and social situation of the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory.
5. The examination in part one is aimed at highlighting the main
characteri3tics of the structural transformati~n of the Palestinian economy in
the occupied territory and its performance since 1967, identifying the
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impediments to its growth and development, and examinin9 feasible measures
needed for its immediate revival. Special attention will be 9iven to the
urgent needs of the economy in the wake of the Palestinian uprisin9 and the
recent developments in the re9ion.
Part Twol Prospegts for the future
6. Based on the analysis and findings under part one and bearin9 in mind
9rowth and development expectations and potentials of the Palestinian people,
part two of the study will attempt at discerning probable future pattern.. of
growth of the Palestinian economy and working out their implications for
feasible strategies and policy options. The approach to be followed is based
on a macroeconomic analysis of resource availabilities and uses. Given the
limited data available, emphasis will be placed on ascertainin9, throu9h
parametric exercises, the internal consistencies amon9 major aggregates by
investigating resources gaps - with particular emphasis on savings and
investments, foreign trade and employment gaps. At the sectoral level, an
attempt will be made to examine such consistencies in leading sectors by
lookin9 into the sectoral composition of output, as well as employment and
resource (physical, human and financial) availabilities and needs.
7. The examination of the aggregate and sectoral consistencies will be
extended under varying assumptions to consider alternative scenarios,
including one for an independent and (lelf-reliant Palestinian economy. This
will entail identifying different growth and development objectives,
priorities, targets and policy options at both the a~gregate and sectoral
levels ~ithin a specified time-frame and in line· with the socio-economic needs
and potentials of an evolving future Palestinian society. Particular
attention will be given to those sectors and areas of production in which the
economy of the territory would clearly demonstrate comparative advantages and
provide possibilities for promoting external complementarities.
Part Three. A substantive framework for the sustained growth and deyeloRment
of the Palestinian economy in the 1990s
8. Based on the results of the investi9ations and the conclusions reached
under parts one and 1.\>10, part three will deal with the formulation of a
consolidated substanc.l Vll framework for the growth and ~.evelopment of the
~aiestiniau economy into the year 2000. The framework will outline Btrategy
9uidelines and policy options for action at various levels.
9. In line with the work plan for the preparation of the study, the
secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
has embarked upon a number of activities. Within the overall substantive
scope of the stUdy, a total of 25 sectors, subsectors and issues have been
identified for in-depth investigation leading to the preparation of specific
studies. These cover the following subjectsl
1. Population and demography
2. Public administration
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3. Aggregate economic and social performance
4. Labour, employment and human resources
5. Money and banking
6. Public finance
7. Agriculture
8. Manufacturing industries
9. Mining and quarryinq
10. Energy resources and development needs
11. Public utilities
12. Housinq and construction
13. Israeli settlements
14. Merchandise trade
15. Services
16. Transport and communications
17. Education system
18. Public health conditions and services
19. Social welfare services
20. Women in development
21. International assistance
22. Socio-economic statistics
23. Water resources
24. Dynamics of social change
25. Tourism and related activities.
10. Detailed outlines wore developed for the preparation of specific studies
on eacL of the above subjects. The outlines of the stUdies are structured in
such a manner as to correspond to the three parts of the general outline of
the overall intersectoral stUdy iteself. They are particularly designed to
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provide for. (a) an analysis and assessment of economic and social
developments over tIle p~st 2& years of occupation, (b) an investigation of
prospe~ts for the fu~ure, ~,r.d (c) the for~ulation of a frame of reference for
feasible strategies. ~~!1CY o~tions and measures for action. Accordingly,
27 experts have been c~r.~iBsi~r.ed to prepare these studies. A team of senior
development experts has a\~~ b~en engaged to assist the UNCTAD secretariat in
the evaluation and review of the individual studies and in investigating
prospects for the future development of the occupied Palestinian territory.
11. rho outlines of the specific studies were also brought to the attention
of the relevant organizations of the United Nations system with a view to
coordinating efforts and soliciting their observations and possible
contributions. These include the F~od and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO). the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), ~he International Labour
Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency f:.,r Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations Centre for Human
Settlements (Habitat) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as
well aa the Department o~ International Economic and Social Affairs (DIESA),
the Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (nTCD), the Centre for
Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs - Division for the Advancement of
Women (CSDHA) and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia (ESCWA). All these agencies, programmes and secretariat
departments have responded positively indicating their willingnoss to
cooperate in the preparation of the intersectoral study, the ~ajority of them
have also provided UNCTAD with their substantive contributions to the
preparation of the intersectoral stUdy by reflecting on the overall outline of
the intersectoral study itself and the detailed outlines of the respective
specific stUdies of interest to them and by prov!ding material as input to
these stUdies. UNDP, through the logistical support provided by itd Programme
of Assistance to the Palestinian People, has offered to facilitate the task of
the UNCrAD secretariat in undertaking these specific studies.
12. Similar contacts were established with regional Arab and other
organizations involved in providing assistance to the Palestinian people.
These included the Fund for International Development of the Organization of
Petroleum-Exportil~gCountries, the Arab Organization for Agricultural
Development, the Arab Organization for Mining and InduAtrial Development, the
Is1arr\i~ Development Bank, and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social
Development, as well as the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States.
The Arab Organization for Mining and Industrial Development and the OPEC Fund
for International Development also made financial contributions. These
contributions have been appliea to the investigation of sectors/issues of
relevance to the concerns of the contributing agencies. The Economic and
Soclal Council of the League of Arab States has also earmarked a sum to assist
in the financing of specific activities of the projoct.
13. In view of the positive and encouraging responses received from both
international and regional organizations, the UNCTAD secretariat will
endeavour to benefit from their expertise and to promote further cooperation
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with each one of them towards the completion of the intersectoral study, thus
providing an integrated framework which will aim at effectively guiding the
nature, magnitude and direction of international assistance to the Palestinian
people and enhancing its effectiveness.
14. The UNCTAD secretariat has alao held consultation~on the study with
relevant government authorities in Egypt and Jordan. Consultations were also
held with representatives of Palestine. One of the objectives behind these
consultations has been to identify areas of complementarities between the
economies of the region and that of the occupied Palestinian territory and to
investigate possibilities of exploiting and promoting such complementarities
for the mutual benefit of all concerned. The Secretary-General of UNCTAD is
in contact with the Israeli authorities with the view to hold\ng similar
consultations on the subject.
15. Paral161 to embarking on the preparation of the in-depth studies on
specific sectors/issues, the UNCTAD secretariat has also intensifi~d work on
the development of i~s database on the economy of the oCfupied Palestinian
territory. This was intended, inter alia, to pruvide an adequate common basis
for meeting the quantitative needs of the intersectoral study in general and
of the specific studies in particular. This entailed identification of
reliable data sources, followed by the classification of available data in
accordance with the system of Economic Time Series (ETS) in use at the UNCTAD
secretariat, the entry of the data for the period 1968-1990 into the computer
system, including verification and tabulation, covering such series as
national accounts, balance of payments, external merchandise trade,
population, labour bnd employment. Accordingly, a fully computerized
statistical base on the economy of t" e occupied Palestinian territory has been
established covering the West Hank a. Gaza Strip separately and combined. In
addition to serving as a consolidated set of statistical series on the
~alestinian economy, covering over 20 years of occupation, the new set of
statistics also provides the basis f~r work under way at present in the UNCTAD
secretariat on assessing futuro prospects for the Palostinian economy.
16. Accordingly, and applying the statistical series so established, the
UNCTAD secretariat has initiatied work on developing a conceptual/analytical
framework which will provide technical guidelines for investigating, under
different scenarios, futuro pr~spects in each of the economic and social
fields where specific studies are being prepared. Upon the completion of this
framework and the finalization of part one of the specific studies, a meeting
of the experts involved in the preparation of these studies will be convened
to examine and adopt the guidelines so established, thus providing a common
basis for the experts to investigate future prospects in parts two and three
of their respective studies. The major findings emerging from the specific
studies will be subsequently consolidated into a substantive frame of
reference outlining immediate problems and needs, growth and development
prospects, strategies and policy Qptions for action at various levels. In
view of the recent crisis in the rogion and the diffiCUlties encountered in
comm0ncing the preparation of the intorsectoral study, work on the project is
now expected to bo completed during the first semoster of 1992 with the final
report and other l"elated Clocumentation appearinq soon thereafter.
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Annex
THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP' PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINED
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(Provisional outline)
INTRODUCTION (including objective, scope, definitions and methodology)
Part One
AN ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, IMPACT OF PROLONGED
OCCUPATION AND THE IMMEDIATE OUTLOOK
Chapter I. Salient feature; of the occupied PalestiniAn territory
A. Area, topography, popUlation and demographic characteristics
B. Economic and social structures
C. Public administration setting, executive, legislative and judicial
systems
Chapter 11. Aggregate ec~nomic performance. with particular reference to
deyelopment~ since the Pale9t~nian uprising
A. Structure and leval of output
B. Income and consumption
C. Pattern and level of savings and investments
D. Trade and payments
E. Labout and employment
Chapter Ill. Resource availability and use
A. Natural resources
1. Land and water, including land tenure and wator rights
2. Forest, livestock and fisheries
3. Minerals
4. Others
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B. Human resources
1. Labour and employment situation. by gender and socio-economic
sectors (formal and informal)
2. Development of skills. fields and types of training both
institutional and on the job ~.
3. Degree of labour absorption and technology mix
4. Economic and social consequences of mi9ration
5. Other related factors
6. Women in development
C. Financial resources
1. The monetary, banking and financial system, including insurance
(structure and performance)
2. Public finance
a. Revenues (sources, structure and performance)
b. Expenditures (current and development)
3. External resources
a. Factor income
b. Unrequited transfers (private and official)
Chapter IV. Scctoral performance and constraints
A. AgriCUlture
1. Relative importance of agriculture in the PBlestinian economy.
sources of output (land, livestock, forests and fi~heries)
2. Food consumption and nutritional status of the Palestinian
people. aspects of food security
3. Structure and pattern of output by major branches. aspects of
agriCUltural policy
a. Crops, changes in crop area, yield and composition and
their underlying causes (e.g., land use, cropping
intensity and irrigation, crop yield and the use of modern
farm inputs, cropping patterns and changes in the relative
shar9 of low- and high-valued crops) .
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b. Livestock and fisheries. production pattern and Jmmediate
prospects and needs
c. Agricultural output and the immediate potential for food
processing industries
4. Land tenure an6 water rights, farm organiaation, finance
(private and public sources) manpower (male and female),
technology, energy, infrastructures (physical and
institutional) and related supporting services as well as
factors affecting their availability, efficient allocation and
management
5. Agriculture and rural employmen~ and income situation
6. Channels of distribution - access to markets
a. Domestic
b. External
7. Policies and support measures affecting agricultural
performance (prices, subsidies, wages, technology, markets,
financial resources, 1nfrastructures, etc.)
8. Prospects for the immediate revival of the agriCUlture sector
B. Industry
1. Relative importance of industry in the Palestiniau economy
2. Manufacturing
a. Structure, raw materials, and orientation oZ output 3nd
consumption
b. Labour and employment, fixed and working capital
financing, institutional requisites (inclUding technical
and managerial capacities and needs), sourceB of raw
materials, etc., and factors affdcting their availability
and efficient use
c. Wages and productivity, inclUding technology choice and
dependency
d. Siae and orientation of markets (internal and e.ternal),
includinr dubcontracting ~nd competltion with Israeli
industrial products and prospacts for import substitution
and export promotion in markets of both developed end
developing countries
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e. Constraints affecting the growth and development of
manufacturing and consideration of remodial measures for
immediate revival
3. Mining and quarrying
a. Role and structure of the mineral tndustry
b. Capital, labour and infrastructures (physical,
institutional and human resources), needs and immediate
prospects
4. Energy (role and sources, supply/demand situation and outlook,
environmental factors, tech~lcal and institutional capacities,
financial and human resources needs and immediate prospects)
C. Construction
1. Housing
a. Prevailing situation
b. Urban and rural residential needs I demograrhic
considerations
2. Public works and othe~ non-residential constructions
3. Capital, man~ower, raw material and infrastructural (both
physical and institutional) rAquisites and constraints I
immediate prospects
D. physical infrastructures
1. Spatial planning and environmental considerations (urban, rural
and regional)
2. Surface, sea and air transportation systems
3. Other physicll infrastructures
E. Israeli settlements and their implications (geographic, demographic,
economic, social, cultural and others)
F. Trade and services
1. Trade
a. Internal
b. External (exports/imports)
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2. Other services
a. Transport and communication networks
b. Tourism
c. Professional and other private services
Chapter V. The role of spgial and welfare serviges in Palestinian economic
development
A. Education I formal and informal (by gender, level, type ~nd field)
B. Health servicesl with emphasis on the growing impact of occupation
and the concomitant recent developments on the health of
specifically vulnerable categories of population such ar women,
children, youth, handicapped and aged
C. Social welfare services
Chapter VI. Main findin90 and oonoluoionOI outlook for the immediate revival
of the Palestinian economy
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Chapter I. The dynam~ of growth and development of the Palestinian economy I
an examination of the needs and potentials of the economy under
varying premises over a medium-term per~
A. Internal consistencies I alternative scenarios
1. Major aggregates (resources gaps, trade gap and employment gap)
2. Leading sectors (composition of output and resources)
B. Growth objectives, priorities and targets
Chapter 11. Contribution of agriculturel objeotiveo. strategies and policy
options
A. Objectives
B. Strategies and policy considerations
1. Structure, pattern of output and food securityl possib~l~ties
for upgradinq nutritional status of the Palestinian people in
the territory includinq rural poverty alleviation
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2. Comparative advantage: feasible options
a. Emphasis on fruit plantation
b. Horticulture versus staple food production
-.0.
c. Livestock production (includinq fisheries)
d. Links with aqro-based industries
3. Agricultural output, regional complementarities and
possibilities for entry into new markets
4. Efficiency and productivity in agriculture (including
ownership, farm orqanization, production relations, wages,
prices bnd subsidies)
5. Agriculture and employment opportunities (includinq rural
development dimension)
6. Agricultural development Bnd resource needs
a. Land and water
b. Investments (maqnitudes and types including equipment and
inputs)
c. Human resources (includinq technical, managerial and
entrepreneurial skills)
7. Infrastructural needs
a. Physical (including spatial and environmental
considerations)
b. Institutional (includinq administrative, legal, credit,
marketing, research and development, cooperatives,
extensioL services, trai~ing and other requisites)
C. Potentials for ag.dcuJ.tural development and policy considerations
Chapter Ill. Contribution of industry; objectiyvs. strategies and policy
options
A. Objectives
B. Strategies and policy options
1. Sectoral composition, structure and size
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a. Industrial base and potential for restructuring (including
prospects for backward/forward linkages in both
traditional and modern manufacturing industries, labour
(by gender) and technology mix, energy and other such
considerations)
b. Prospects for agro-based and main traditional industries
c. Natural resources exploitation - mining and quarrying
d. Other industries
2. Complementarities and interdependence
a. Market potential (demand considerations, including export
promotion and import substitution prospects)
b. Economies of scale (internal and external)
c. Industrial zoning and joint ventures
d. Free trade area (costs and benefits)
e. The dynamics of comparative advantage (involving
traditional pr~ducts and technological innovation in new
areas of manufacturing)
3. Industrial labour force - in the formal and informal sectors
a. Compositions by branch, gender and age
b. Wages and productivity
c. Human resources developme~t and needs (inclUding technical
and managerial skills)
4. Investment strategy
a. Directly productive activities (consumer and capital goods)
b. Social over-head capital and external economies
c. Rural versus urban industrial development
d. Industrial development and environmental considerations
e. Entrepreneurship and inducement mechanisms, incl11ding the
provision of technical, managerial and other forms of
support services
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5. Infrastructura1 re~uisites
a. Physical (including industrial zoning)
b. Institutional capacities (including quality control,
staDdardization and R and D)
c. Financing industrial development
c. A synthesis of opportunitie& for the development of Palestinian
industry
Chapter IV. The role of trade and services
A. Trade I objectives, strategies and prerequisites
1. Internal
2. I.ternal (regional, developed market economy countries,
developing countries and socialist countries)
B. Services I objectives, strategies and prere~uisites (transport and
communication, tourism, finance, and others)
Chapter V. Ipfrastructure and sogial and welfare seryicesl ob1ectiyes and
strategies
A. Transport and communication infrastructures I surface, air and ~ea
transport links inclUding railroad, airport and seaport facilities
B. Public utilities (inclUding water, electricity, public transport,
PTT, etc.)
C. Housing (inclUding infrastructu~e needs and related basic services)
D. Bducation (formal and informal)
B. Health
r. Welfare services
G. Public administr&tion network (including legislative and judicial
systems at the central and local levels)1 the dynamics of an
emerging society
H. Role of local non-goverDJllental organizations and "participatory
development" programmes
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Chapter VI. Resources mobil~lJml objer.tlyes Dn~Bsrategies
A. En~r9Y resources
1. Sources
2. Supply and dema~d situation - medium- to 10n9-term prospects
3. Investment requirements - infrastructures
4. Institutional and manpower requirements
B. Human resources
1. Population, labour force and employment opportunities (a supply
and demand analysis and forecast by gender)
2. Size and scope of technical, managerlal and other skills
3. Entrepreneurship and development needs
4. Wages and productivity (an examination into labour versus
capital intensive approaches to development)
5. Labour service exports - economic and social implications
6. Manpower development needs I role of formal and informal
education and trainin9 programmes
7. The role of women in Palestinian economic and social development
c. Financial resources
1. Savin9s and investments (capital formbtion versus aggregate and
sectoral rates of growth)
2. Domestic finance
a. Public finance (central and local authorities)
Revenues (tax and non-tax)
Expenditures (current and development)
b. Private finance
c. Money and banking (including the role of a central
monetary authority)
d. Role of specialized development finance institutions
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3. aesource gap
4. External financial flows
a. Factor incoma and remittances
b. Grants and loans
D. Assessment of international as~istance (including substantive ana
institutional considerations - short- and long-term perspectives)
earS; Three
A SUBSTANTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUSTAINED GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
or THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY INTO THE 1990s
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Doyolagment gbjegtiyes and prigrities, medium- and long-term
porClpogtiyoa
StrAtegy gonsiderations, options
Chapter 111. eQligy guidelines, overall ond segtorDl
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Resolutions
93
11. Welcomes the continuing initiative exercised by the
United Nations Development Programme in maintaining close
liaison among the specialized agencies and other organizations
of the United Nations system, including the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and the
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and
in providing assistance to the peoples of the Non-Self-
Governing Territories;
12. Encourages Non-Self-Governing Territories to take
steps to establish and/or strengthen disaster preparedness and
management institutions and policies;
13. Requests the administering Powers concerned to
facilitate, when appropriate, the participation of appointed and
elected representatives of Non-Self-Governing Territories in the
meetings and conferences of the specialized agencies and other
organizations of the United Nations system, in accordance with
relevant United Nations resolutions and decisions, including
resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the
Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples related to
specific Territories, so that the Territories may benefit from the
related activities of those agencies and organizations;
14. Recommends that all Governments intensify their
efforts in the specialized agencies and other organizations of the
United Nations system of which they are members to accord
priority to the question of providing assistance to the peoples of
the Non-Self-Governing Territories;
15. Draws the attention of the Special Committee to the
present resolution and to the discussion held on the subject at
the substantive session of 2004 of the Economic and Social
Council;
16. Welcomes the adoption by the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean of its
resolution 574 (XXVII) of 16 May 1998 160 calling for the
mechanisms necessary for its associate members, including
small island Non-Self-Governing Territories, to participate in
the special sessions of the General Assembly, subject to the
rules of procedure of the Assembly, to review and assess the
implementation of the plans of action of those United Nations
world conferences in which the Territories originally
participated in the capacity of observer, and in the work of the
Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies;
17. Requests the President of the Council to continue to
maintain close contact on these matters with the Chairman of
the Special Committee and to report thereon to the Council;
_______________
160 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1998,
Supplement No. 21 (E/1998/41), chap. III, sect. G.
18. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the
implementation of the present resolution, paying particular
attention to cooperation and integration arrangements for
maximizing the efficiency of the assistance activities undertaken
by various organizations of the United Nations system, and to
report thereon to the Council at its substantive session of 2005;
19. Decides to keep these questions under continuous
review.
50th plenary meeting
23 July 2004
2004/54. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including Jerusalem, and the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 58/229 of
23 December 2003,
Also recalling its resolution 2003/59 of 24 July 2003,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council
resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November
1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 446 (1979) of 22 March
1979, 452 (1979) of 20 July 1979, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980,
476 (1980) of 30 June 1980, 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980,
497 (1981) of 17 December 1981, 904 (1994) of 18 March
1994, 1073 (1996) of 28 September 1996, 1397 (2002) of
12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and
1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special
session of the General Assembly, including resolutions
ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003
and ES-10/16 of 20 July 2004,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949, 161 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by
Israel since 1967,
Stressing the importance of the revival of the Middle East
peace process on the basis of Security Council resolutions
242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978,
1397 (2002), 1515 (2003) and 1544 (2004) and the principle of
land for peace, as well as compliance with the agreements
reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine
_______________
161 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
Resolutions
94
Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian
people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of
peoples under foreign occupation over their natural resources,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded
the efforts to achieve sustainable development and a sound
economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan,
Gravely concerned about the deterioration of the
economic and living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan and the
exploitation by Israel, the occupying Power, of their natural
resources,
Gravely concerned also by the grave impact on the
economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people caused
by the construction of the wall by Israel inside the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and the resulting violation of their
economic and social rights, including the rights to work, to
health, to education and to an adequate standard of living,
Gravely concerned at the extensive destruction by Israel,
the occupying Power, of agricultural land and orchards in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, during
the recent period, including, and in particular, as a result of the
construction of the wall,
Acknowledging the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July
2004 by the International Court of Justice on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory,162
Expressing grave concern about the continuation of the
recent tragic and violent events since September 2000 that have
led to many deaths and injuries,
Aware of the important work being done by the United
Nations and the specialized agencies in support of the economic
and social development of the Palestinian people, as well as the
assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and
development of the economic and social infrastructure of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as the urgent need to address the dire humanitarian crisis
facing the Palestinian people,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under
the road map163 in cooperation with the Quartet,
1. Stresses the need to preserve the national unity and
the territorial integrity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
_______________
162 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1.
163 S/2003/529, annex.
including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of
movement of persons and goods in the Territory, including the
removal of restrictions on going into and from East Jerusalem,
and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world;
2. Also stresses the vital importance of the construction
and operation of the seaport in Gaza and safe passage for the
economic and social development of the Palestinian people;
3. Demands the complete cessation of all acts of
violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement
and destruction;
4. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end its
occupation of Palestinian cities, towns and other populated
centres, to end the imposition of all forms of closure and curfew
and to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural fields;
5. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian
people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan to
all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel,
the occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or
depletion of these resources;
6. Also reaffirms that Israeli settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and
the occupied Syrian Golan are illegal and an obstacle to
economic and social development;
7. Stresses the importance of the work of the
organizations and agencies of the United Nations and of the
United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace
Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to
the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian
Authority;
8. Urges Member States to encourage private foreign
investment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, in infrastructure, job-creation projects and social
development in order to alleviate the hardship of the Palestinian
people and improve their living conditions;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the
General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session, through the
Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation
of the present resolution and to continue to include in the report
of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the
living conditions of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with
relevant United Nations agencies;
10. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and
social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in
the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of its substantive
session of 2005.
50th plenary meeting
23 July 2004
Resolutions
118
and to focus, in the meetings of the regional coordination group organized by the Commission, on
the progress of the region towards the realization of those goals;
5. Requests the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia to provide support to
member countries in realizing the internationally agreed development goals, including those
contained in the Millennium Declaration, including by building capacities to formulate policies,
monitor the progress made, measure its impact and prepare regional reports;
6. Requests the Executive Secretary to submit a report on the progress made in this
regard to the Commission at its twenty-fourth session.
40th plenary meeting
27 July 2005
2005/51. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 59/251 of 22 December 2004,
Also recalling its resolution 2004/54 of 23 July 2004,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions,
including resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,
446 (1979) of 22 March 1979, 452 (1979) of 20 July 1979, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980,
476 (1980) of 30 June 1980, 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980, 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
904 (1994) of 18 March 1994, 1073 (1996) of 28 September 1996, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002,
1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly,
including ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003 and ES-10/15 of 20 July
2004,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949120 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Stressing the importance of the revival of the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002),
1515 (2003) and 1544 (2004) and the principle of land for peace as well as compliance with the
agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization,
the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation
over their natural resources,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan,
Gravely concerned about the deterioration of the economic and living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab
population of the occupied Syrian Golan and the exploitation by Israel, the occupying Power, of
their natural resources,
Gravely concerned also by the grave impact on the economic and social conditions of the
Palestinian people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation
Resolutions
119
of their economic and social rights, including the right to work, to health, to education and to an
adequate standard of living,
Recalling, in this regard, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,77 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights77 and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child,47 and affirming that these human rights instruments must be respected in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Gravely concerned at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of
agricultural land and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
during the recent period, including, and in particular, as a result of its unlawful construction of the
wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
Recalling the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,119
recalling also Assembly resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the
obligations mentioned therein,
Expressing concern at the recent escalation of violence that has been characteristic of recent
years following a period of relative calm, and, in this context, expressing its concern about the
tragic and violent events that have taken place since September 2000, which have led to many
deaths and injuries,
Aware of the important work being done by the United Nations and the specialized agencies
in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, as well as the
assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and
social infrastructure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the
urgent need to address the dire humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map139 in cooperation
with the Quartet,
1. Stresses the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of
movement of persons and goods in the Territory, including the removal of restrictions on going
into and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world;
2. Also stresses the vital importance of the construction and operation of the airport and
the seaport in Gaza and the establishment of the safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza for
the economic and social development of the Palestinian people;
3. Demands the complete cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror,
provocation, incitement and destruction;
4. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end its occupation of Palestinian cities,
towns and other populated centres, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural fields and to end the imposition of all forms of closure and curfew,
which impede efforts aimed at the amelioration of the economic and social conditions and the
development of the Palestinian people;
5. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the
occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
_______________
139 S/2003/529, annex.
Resolutions
120
6. Also reaffirms that Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and an obstacle to economic and social
development, and calls for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions;
7. Stresses that the wall being constructed by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is seriously
debilitating to the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in this
regard for full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice119 and in Assembly resolution ES-10/15;
8. Emphasizes the importance of the work of the organizations and agencies of the
United Nations and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and
the Palestinian Authority;
9. Urges Member States to encourage private foreign investment in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in infrastructure, job-creation projects and social
development in order to alleviate the hardships being faced by the Palestinian people and improve
their living conditions;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixtieth
session, through the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present
resolution and to continue to include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an
update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with relevant United
Nations agencies;
11. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of
its substantive session of 2006.
40th plenary meeting
27 July 2005
2005/52. Science and technology for development
The Economic and Social Council,
Welcoming the work of the Commission on Science and Technology for Development on its
theme “Science and technology promotion, advice and application for the achievement of the
internationally agreed development goals contained in the United Nations Millennium
Declaration”,
Taking note of initiatives that call for substantial support for institutes of higher education
and centres of excellence in developing countries, particularly in Africa, such as that of the
Commission for Africa,140
Expressing its appreciation for the support provided to the Commission for Africa by donors
including the generous financial contributions of the Governments of Italy and Pakistan to the
network of centres of excellence to be established, as well as the financial support provided by
Austria to expand the Internet connectivity benchmarking tool and the financial and technical
support provided by the Centre for Information Technology of the state of Geneva to assist the
least developed countries for building capacity in information and communication technologies,
Taking note of General Assembly resolution 58/200 of 23 December 2003, in which the
relevant bodies of the United Nations system engaged in biotechnology were urged to work
cooperatively so as to ensure that countries received sound scientific information and practical
_______________
140 See www.commissionforafrica.org.
Resolutions
127
Acknowledging that second-hand smoke at the workplace is a fully preventable occupational
health hazard,
Recalling article 8 of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control,141 entitled “Protection from exposure to tobacco smoke”, which states, inter alia, that
each party shall adopt and implement measures to provide “protection from exposure to tobacco
smoke in indoor workplaces, public transport, indoor places and, as appropriate, other public places”,
Emphasizing the importance of protecting the well-being of individuals in their working
environments,
1. Recommends that the General Assembly, at its sixty-first session, consider the
implementation of a complete ban on smoking at all United Nations indoor premises, at
Headquarters as well as at regional and country offices throughout the United Nations system, and
the implementation of a complete ban on sales of tobacco products at all United Nations premises;
2. Also recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to submit a
report on the implementation of the present resolution to the Economic and Social Council at its
substantive session of 2008;
3. Decides to continue its consideration of the agenda item entitled “Tobacco or health”
at its substantive session of 2008.
42nd plenary meeting
27 July 2006
2006/43. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 60/183 of 22 December 2005,
Recalling also its resolution 2005/51 of 27 July 2005,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions,
including resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973)
of 22 October 1973 and 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly,
including ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003 and ES-10/15 of 20 July
2004,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,24 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Stressing the importance of the revival of the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002)
of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and the
principle of land for peace as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation
over their natural resources,
_______________
141 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2302, No. 41032.
Resolutions
128
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Gravely concerned about the deterioration of the economic and living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab
population of the occupied Syrian Golan and the exploitation by Israel, the occupying Power, of
their natural resources,
Gravely concerned also by the formidable impact on the economic and social conditions of
the Palestinian people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting
violation of their economic and social rights, including the right to work, to health, to education
and to an adequate standard of living,
Recalling, in this regard, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,20 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights20 and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child,21 and affirming that these human rights instruments must be respected in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Gravely concerned at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of
agricultural land and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and, in particular, as a result of its construction of the wall, contrary to international law, in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
Recalling the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,19
recalling also General Assembly resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the
obligations mentioned therein,
Extremely concerned at the dire humanitarian crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
further exacerbated by the current Israeli military operations, the severe restrictions on the
Palestinian people, and Israel’s withholding of Palestinian tax revenues,
Expressing grave concern at the increasing number of deaths and injuries among civilians,
including children,
Commending the important work being done by the United Nations and the specialized
agencies in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, as well as
the assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and
social infrastructure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the
urgent need to address the dire humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people,
Affirming that the Israeli occupation is a major obstacle to the economic and social development
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the occupied Syrian Golan,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map142 in cooperation
with the Quartet,
1. Calls for the lifting of the severe restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people,
including those arising from the current Israeli military operations, and for other urgent measures
to be taken to alleviate the desperate humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
2. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April
1994143 and urgently transfer Palestinian tax revenues;
_______________
142 S/2003/529, annex.
143 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
Resolutions
129
3. Stresses the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of
movement of persons and goods in the Territory, including the removal of restrictions on going
into and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world;
4. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace the destroyed civilian infrastructure, including
the only power station, where Israeli air strikes on Gaza’s power plant have had a far reaching
impact on Gaza’s hospitals, food production facilities, water and sanitation systems; as well as
water networks, schools, bridges, the airport, the seaport and Palestinian ministries and
institutions;
5. Urges the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of
15 November 2005, particularly the urgent reopening of Rafah and Karni crossings, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, as well as the access of the
United Nations agencies to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
6. Urges all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law, and to refrain
from violence against the civilian population in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;24
7. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the
occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
8. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste
materials in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely, water and land resources,
and pose an environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian populations;
9. Reaffirms that Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and an obstacle to economic and social
development, and calls for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions;
10. Stresses that the wall being constructed at an accelerated pace by Israel in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international
law and is isolating East Jerusalem and dividing up the West Bank and is seriously debilitating to
the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in this regard for full
compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice19 and in Assembly resolution ES-10/15;
11. Emphasizes the importance of the work of the organizations and agencies of the
United Nations and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and
the Palestinian Authority;
12. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-first
session, through the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present
resolution and to continue to include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an
update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with relevant United
Nations agencies;
13. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of
its substantive session of 2007.
42nd plenary meeting
27 July 2006
Resolutions
68
participated in their capacity as observers, and in the work of the Economic and Social Council
and its subsidiary bodies;
19. Requests the President of the Economic and Social Council to continue to maintain
close contact on these matters with the Chairman of the Special Committee and to report thereon
to the Council;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the present
resolution, paying particular attention to cooperation and integration arrangements for maximizing
the efficiency of the assistance activities undertaken by various organizations of the United
Nations system, and to report thereon to the Council at its substantive session of 2008;
21. Decides to keep the above questions under continuous review.
46th plenary meeting
26 July 2007
2007/26. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 61/184 of 20 December 2006,
Recalling also its resolution 2006/43 of 27 July 2006,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions,
including resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973)
of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly,
including ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July
2004 and ES-10/17 of 15 December 2006,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,37 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Stressing the importance of the revival of the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002)
of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and the
principle of land for peace as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation
over their natural resources,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Gravely concerned about the deterioration of the economic and living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab
population of the occupied Syrian Golan and the exploitation by Israel, the occupying Power, of
their natural resources,
Gravely concerned also about the serious repercussions on the economic and social
conditions of the Palestinian people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated
regime inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the
resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the right to work, to health, to
education and to an adequate standard of living,
Resolutions
69
Recalling, in this regard, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,33 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,33 and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child,34 and affirming that these human rights instruments must be respected in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Gravely concerned at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of
agricultural land and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and, in particular, as a result of its construction of the wall, contrary to international law, in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
Recalling the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,32
recalling also General Assembly resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the
obligations mentioned therein,
Extremely concerned about the dire humanitarian crisis in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, further exacerbated by the repeated Israeli military operations, the severe restrictions on
the Palestinian people and Israel’s withholding of Palestinian tax revenues, part of which has
recently been transferred,
Expressing grave concern at the increasing number of deaths and injuries among civilians,
including children and women,
Gravely concerned by various reports of the United Nations and the specialized agencies
regarding the inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread poverty and severe humanitarian
hardships, including food insecurity and a rise in health-related problems, among the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Commending the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized
agencies and the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the
Palestinian people, as well as the assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and
social infrastructure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the
urgent need to address the dire humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Authority, with international
support, to rebuild, reform and strengthen its damaged institutions, and emphasizing the need to
preserve the Palestinian institutions and infrastructure,
Affirming that the Israeli occupation is a major obstacle to the economic and social
development of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the occupied
Syrian Golan,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map106 in cooperation
with the Quartet,
1. Calls for the lifting of the severe restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people,
including those arising from the repeated Israeli military operations, and for other urgent measures
to be taken to alleviate the desperate humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
2. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April
1994,107 takes note, as a first step, of the partial transfer by Israel of withheld Palestinian tax and
customs revenues, and reiterates its call for the immediate, complete and regular release of the
remaining and future funds;
_______________
106 S/2003/529, annex.
107 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
Resolutions
70
3. Stresses the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of
movement of persons and goods in the Territory, including the removal of restrictions on going
into and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world;
4. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure,
agricultural lands and governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of
its military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
5. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and
Access of 15 November 2005,108 particularly the urgent reopening of Rafah and Karni crossings,
which is crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, as well as the access
of the United Nations agencies to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
6. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to
refrain from violence against the civilian population in accordance with the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;37
7. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the
occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
8. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste
materials in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely, water and land resources,
and pose an environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian populations;
9. Reaffirms that Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and an obstacle to economic and social
development, and calls for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions;
10. Stresses that the wall being constructed at an accelerated pace by Israel in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international
law and is isolating East Jerusalem and dividing up the West Bank and is seriously debilitating to
the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in this regard for full
compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice of 9 July 200432 and in Assembly resolution ES-10/15;
11. Emphasizes the importance of the work of the organizations and agencies of the
United Nations and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and
the Palestinian Authority;
12. Expresses its hope that the recently called for Middle East peace conference will pave
the way for the establishment of the independent Palestinian State;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-second
session, through the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present
resolution and to continue to include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an
update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with relevant United
Nations agencies;
14. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of
its substantive session of 2008.
46th plenary meeting
26 July 2007
_______________
108 Available from http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf.
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65
12. Also invites the Peacebuilding Commission to continue to inform it about the
economic and social aspects of peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau;
13. Decides to consider this matter at its substantive session of 2009 under the item
entitled “African countries emerging from conflict”.
44th plenary meeting
25 July 2008
2008/31. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 62/181 of 19 December 2007,
Recalling also its resolution 2007/26 of 26 July 2007,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions,
including resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973)
of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly,
including resolutions ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of
20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of 15 December 2006,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,28 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,24 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights24 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,25 and affirming that these human rights instruments must be respected in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Stressing the importance of the revival of the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002)
of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and the
principle of land for peace as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation
over their natural resources, and expressing concern in this regard about the exploitation of natural
resources by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the
consequent deterioration of economic and living conditions,
Gravely concerned, in this regard, about the continuation of settlement activities by Israel
and other related measures in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around
occupied East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan in violation of international
humanitarian law and relevant United Nations resolutions,
Gravely concerned also by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions
of the Palestinian people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime
inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the
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66
resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the right to work, to health, to
education and to an adequate standard of living,
Recalling, in this regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International
Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory,23 recalling also Assembly resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to
comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of
properties, agricultural land and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, including, in particular, in connection with its construction of the wall, contrary to
international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing deep concern about continuing Israeli military operations and the continuing
Israeli policy of closures and severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, including
humanitarian personnel and food, medical, fuel and other essential supplies, via the imposition of
crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact on the socio-economic situation of
the Palestinian people, which remains that of dire humanitarian crisis, in particular in the Gaza
Strip,
Gravely concerned by various reports of the United Nations and the specialized agencies
regarding the inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread poverty and severe humanitarian
hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including high levels of
malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the increasing number of deaths and injuries of civilians,
including children and women,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the
cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and
destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and
social infrastructure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the
urgent need to address the dire humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people,
Commending the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized
agencies and the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the
Palestinian people, as well as the assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Authority, with international
support, to rebuild, reform and strengthen its damaged institutions and promote good governance,
and emphasizing the need to preserve the Palestinian institutions and infrastructure and to
ameliorate economic and social conditions,
Stressing the importance of national unity among the Palestinian people, and emphasizing
the need for the respect and preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map106 in cooperation
with the Quartet,
1. Calls for the lifting of the severe restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people,
including those arising from ongoing Israeli military operations, and for other urgent measures to
_______________
106 S/2003/529, annex.
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67
be taken to alleviate the desperate humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
especially in the Gaza Strip;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of
movement of persons and goods throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April
1994;107
4. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure,
agricultural lands and governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of
its military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
5. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and
Access of 15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of Rafah and
Karni crossings, which is crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies,
including fuel, as well as the unhindered access of the United Nations agencies to and within the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, and expresses deep concern at any actions that threaten the
integrity of the border crossings and the distribution of fuel;
6. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to
refrain from violence against the civilian population in accordance with the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;28
7. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the
occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
8. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and
properties, economic institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan;
9. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste
materials in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely, the water and land
resources, and pose an environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian populations, and calls
for the further implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment
plant in the Gaza Strip;
10. Reaffirms that Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to economic
and social development, and calls for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council
resolutions and compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with international law, including the
Fourth Geneva Convention;28
11. Also reaffirms that Israel’s ongoing construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and
is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank and seriously debilitating the economic
and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in this regard for full compliance with
the legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the
International Court of Justice23 and in Assembly resolution ES-10/15;
_______________
107 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
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12. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and
to facilitate the visits of Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose family members
reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaitra entrance;
13. Emphasizes the importance of the work of the organizations and agencies of the
United Nations system and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace
Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation
Organization and the Palestinian Authority;
14. Expresses its hope that the resumed peace process will speedily advance to pave the
way for the establishment of the independent Palestinian State and the achievement of a just,
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement in accordance with relevant United Nations
resolutions, and stressing in this regard the importance of the Madrid Conference, the Arab Peace
Initiative108 and the principle of land for peace;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-third
session, through the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present
resolution and to continue to include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an
update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with relevant United
Nations agencies;
16. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of
its substantive session of 2009.
44th plenary meeting
25 July 2008
2008/32. Report of the Committee of Experts on Public Administration on its seventh
session
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling its resolutions 2002/40 of 19 December 2002, 2003/60 of 25 July 2003, 2005/3 of
31 March 2005, 2005/55 of 21 October 2005, 2006/47 of 28 July 2006 and 2007/38 of 4 October
2007 on public administration and development,
Recalling also General Assembly resolutions 50/225 of 19 April 1996, 56/213 of 21 December 2001,
57/277 of 20 December 2002, 58/231 of 23 December 2003, 59/55 of 2 December 2004 and 60/34
of 30 November 2005 on public administration and development,
Recalling further paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005,
Taking note with appreciation of the pioneering work of the United Nations Programme on
Public Administration, Finance and Development in supporting Member States with administrative
reforms, public institution-building, civil service training and post-conflict reconstruction of public
administrations during the past sixty years, since its inception in 1948,109
Recognizing that although the conditions and context of development and governance have
changed, public administration priorities, including capacity-building for development and
ownership of national development, still remain critical cross-cutting issues for the achievement of
the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals,
1. Takes note of the conclusions on the topic of capacity-building for development in the
report of the Committee of Experts on Public Administration on its seventh session;110
_______________
108 A/56/1026–S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
109 See General Assembly resolution 246 (III).
110 Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2008, Supplement No. 24 (E/2008/44).
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84
19. Requests the President of the Economic and Social Council to continue to maintain
close contact on these matters with the Chair of the Special Committee and to report thereon to the
Council;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the present
resolution, paying particular attention to cooperation and integration arrangements for maximizing
the efficiency of the assistance activities undertaken by various organizations of the United
Nations system, and to report thereon to the Economic and Social Council at its substantive
session of 2010;
21. Decides to keep the above questions under continuous review.
45th plenary meeting
31 July 2009
2009/34. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 63/201 of 19 December 2008,
Recalling also its resolution 2008/31 of 25 July 2008,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions,
including resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973)
of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly,
including resolutions ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of
20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of 15 December 2006,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,12 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and to other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,61 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights61 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,62 and affirming that these human rights instruments must be respected in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Stressing the importance of the revival of the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002)
of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and
1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008, the principle of land for peace and the Arab Peace Initiative,137
as affirmed at the twenty-first session of the Council of the League of Arab States, held at summit
level in Doha on 30 March 2009, as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation
over their natural resources, and expressing concern in this regard about the exploitation of natural
resources by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
_______________
137 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
Resolutions
85
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the
consequent deterioration of economic and living conditions,
Gravely concerned, in this regard, about Israel’s continuation of settlement activities and
other related measures in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied
East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian
law and relevant United Nations resolutions,
Gravely concerned also by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions
of the Palestinian people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime
inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the
resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the right to work, to health, to
education, to property and to an adequate standard of living,
Recalling, in this regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International
Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory138 and General Assembly resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to
comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of
properties, including homes, economic institutions, agricultural lands and orchards in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and, in particular, in connection with its
construction of the wall, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continued policy of home demolitions and
displacement of the population in and around occupied East Jerusalem in particular, as well as
over measures to further isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, including through
the accelerated construction of settlements, the construction of the wall and the imposition of
checkpoints, which have seriously exacerbated the already dire socio-economic situation being
faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about continuing Israeli military operations and the
continuing Israeli policy of closures and severe restrictions on the movement of persons and
goods, including humanitarian personnel and food, medical, fuel and other essential supplies, via
the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit regime throughout the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact on the socioeconomic
situation of the Palestinian people, which remains that of dire humanitarian crisis,
particularly in the Gaza Strip, where grave hardships continue to mount as a result of Israel’s
imposition of a blockade and siege as collective punishment of the entire civilian population,
Deploring the Israeli military aggression against the Gaza Strip that was launched on
27 December 2008, which caused heavy casualties among civilians, including hundreds of
children and women, and widespread damage to homes, vital infrastructure, hospitals, schools and
several United Nations facilities, gravely impacting the provision of vital health and social
services to Palestinian women and their families, and in this regard calling for the expeditious
commencement of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip with the assistance of donor
countries, including the disbursement of funds pledged at the International Conference in Support
of the Palestinian Economy for the Reconstruction of Gaza, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on
2 March 2009,
_______________
138 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.
Resolutions
86
Gravely concerned by various reports of the United Nations and the specialized agencies
regarding the almost total aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, the inordinate
rates of unemployment, the widespread poverty and the severe humanitarian hardships, including
food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including high levels of malnutrition, among
the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the increasing number of deaths and injuries among civilians,
including children and women, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be
protected in accordance with international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the
cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and
destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and
social infrastructure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the
urgent need to address the dire humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people,
Commending the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized
agencies and the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the
Palestinian people, as well as the assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Authority, with international
support, to rebuild, reform and strengthen its damaged institutions and promote good governance,
and emphasizing the need to preserve the Palestinian institutions and infrastructure and to
ameliorate economic and social conditions,
Stressing the importance of national unity among the Palestinian people, and emphasizing
the need for the respect and preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map139 in cooperation
with the Quartet,
1. Calls for the lifting of all mobility restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people,
including those arising from ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closures
system, and also calls for other urgent measures to be taken to alleviate the desperate humanitarian
situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in the Gaza Strip;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of
movement of persons and goods throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, signed in Paris on 29 April
1994;140
4. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure,
agricultural lands and governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of
its military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
5. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and
Access of 15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings
_______________
139 S/2003/529, annex.
140 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
Resolutions
87
into the Gaza Strip, including the Rafah and Karni crossings, which is crucial to ensuring the
passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate fuel
supplies, as well as the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies to and within
the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
6. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to
refrain from violence against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;12
7. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the
occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of these resources;
8. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and
properties, economic institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan;
9. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of
natural resources, including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of
waste materials in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the
occupied Syrian Golan, which activities gravely threaten their natural resources, namely, their
water and land resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and health threat to their
civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that
obstruct the implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment
plants in the Gaza Strip;
10. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related
infrastructure in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied
Syrian Golan are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to economic and social development, and
calls for the full cessation of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including all measures
aimed at advancing the illegal settlement campaign, in compliance with relevant Security Council
resolutions and international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War;
11. Also reaffirms that Israel’s ongoing construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and
is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank and seriously debilitating the economic
and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in this regard for full compliance with
the legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the
International Court of Justice138 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15;
12. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate the visits of Syrian citizens of
the occupied Syrian Golan whose family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian
Arab Republic, via the Qunaitra entrance;
13. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies
and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal
Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority;
14. Reiterates the importance of the revival of the peace process on the basis of Security
Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004)
and 1850 (2008), the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace and the Arab Peace
Initiative,137 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, in order to
pave the way for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State and the achievement of a
just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
Resolutions
88
15. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth
session, through the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present
resolution and to continue to include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an
update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with relevant United
Nations agencies;
16. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of
its substantive session of 2010.
45th plenary meeting
31 July 2009
2009/35. Report of the Committee for Development Policy on its eleventh session
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 59/209 of 20 December 2004 on a smooth transition
strategy for countries graduating from the list of least developed countries,
Recalling also its resolutions 2007/34 and 2007/35 of 27 July 2007,
Expressing its conviction that countries graduating from the least developed country
category should not have their positive development disrupted or reversed, but rather should be
able to continue and sustain their progress and development,
1. Takes note of the report of the Committee for Development Policy on its eleventh
session;141
2. Requests the Committee, at its twelfth session, to examine and make recommendations
on the themes chosen by the Economic and Social Council for the high-level segment of its
substantive session of 2010;
3. Takes note of the proposals made by the Committee regarding its future work
programme;142
4. Endorses the recommendation of the Committee that Equatorial Guinea be graduated
from the list of least developed countries;143
5. Recommends that the General Assembly take note of the recommendation of the
Committee that Equatorial Guinea be graduated from the list of least developed countries;
6. Reiterates the importance for development partners to implement concrete measures in
support of the transition strategy of ensuring durable graduation;
7. Requests the Committee to monitor the development progress of countries graduating
from the list of least developed countries and to include its findings in its annual report to the
Economic and Social Council;
8. Invites the Chair and, as necessary, other members of the Committee to continue the
practice of reporting orally on the work of the Committee.
45th plenary meeting
31 July 2009
_______________
141 Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2009, Supplement No. 13 (E/2009/33).
142 Ibid., chap. VI.
143 Ibid., chap. V, sect. C, para. 20.
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121
14. Encourages the Non-Self-Governing Territories to take steps to establish and/or
strengthen disaster preparedness and management institutions and policies;
15. Requests the administering Powers concerned to facilitate, when appropriate, the
participation of appointed and elected representatives of Non-Self-Governing Territories in the
relevant meetings and conferences of the specialized agencies and other organizations of the
United Nations system, in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions and decisions,
including the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on
specific Territories, so that they may benefit from the related activities of those agencies and
organizations;
16. Recommends that all Governments intensify their efforts within the specialized
agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system of which they are members to
accord priority to the question of providing assistance to the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing
Territories;
17. Draws the attention of the Special Committee to the present resolution and to the
discussion held on the subject at the substantive session of 2010 of the Economic and Social
Council;
18. Recalls the adoption by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean on 16 May 1998 of its resolution 574 (XXVII),168 in which the Commission called for
the necessary mechanisms to be devised to permit the associate members of regional commissions,
including the Non-Self-Governing Territories, to participate, subject to the rules of procedure of the
General Assembly, in the special sessions of the Assembly to review and appraise the
implementation of the programmes of action of those United Nations world conferences in which
the Territories had originally participated in their capacity as observers and to participate in the
work of the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies;
19. Requests the President of the Council to continue to maintain close contact on these
matters with the Chair of the Special Committee and to report thereon to the Council;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the present
resolution, paying particular attention to cooperation and integration arrangements for maximizing
the efficiency of the assistance activities undertaken by various organizations of the United
Nations system, and to report thereon to the Council at its substantive session of 2011;
21. Decides to keep the above questions under continuous review.
46th plenary meeting
23 July 2010
2010/31. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 64/185 of 21 December 2009,
Recalling also its resolution 2009/34 of 31 July 2009,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions,
including resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973)
of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
_______________
168 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1998, Supplement No. 21 (E/1998/41), chap. III,
sect. G.
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122
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly,
including resolutions ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of
20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of 15 December 2006,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,6 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,30 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights30 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,31 and affirming that these human rights instruments must be respected in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Stressing the importance of the revival of the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002)
of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and
1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008, the principle of land for peace, and the Arab Peace
Initiative,169 as affirmed at the League of Arab States summit held in Sirte, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, on 27 and 28 March 2010, and the Quartet road map,170 as well as compliance with
the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation
over their natural resources, and expressing concern in this regard about the exploitation of natural
resources by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent
deterioration of economic and living conditions,
Commending, in this regard, the efforts of the Palestinian Authority to improve the economic
and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Gravely concerned, in this regard, about Israel’s continuation of settlement activities and
other related measures in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied
East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian
law and relevant United Nations resolutions,
Gravely concerned also by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions
of the Palestinian people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime
inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the
resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the right to work, to health, to
education, to property and to an adequate standard of living,
Recalling, in this regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International
Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory171 and General Assembly resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to
comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of
properties, including homes, economic institutions, agricultural lands and orchards, in the
_______________
169 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
170 S/2003/529, annex.
171 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.
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123
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and, in particular, in connection with its
construction of the wall, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continued policy of home demolitions, evictions,
revocation of residency rights and displacement of the population in and around occupied East
Jerusalem, as well as measures to further isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs,
including through the accelerated construction of settlements, construction of the wall and
imposition of checkpoints, which have seriously exacerbated the already dire socio-economic
situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about Israeli military operations and the continuing Israeli
policy of closures and severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, including
humanitarian personnel as well as food, medical supplies, fuel, construction materials and other
essential supplies, via the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit regime
throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent
negative impact on the socio-economic situation of the Palestinian people, which remains that of a
dire humanitarian crisis,
Taking note of recent developments regarding the situation of access to the Gaza Strip,
although grave hardships continue to prevail as a result of the prolonged Israeli closures and severe
economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, and calling in this regard
for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with a
view to ensuring the full opening of the border crossings for the sustained and regular movement
of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial flows and construction materials,
Deploring the heavy casualties among civilians, including hundreds of children and women,
the internal displacement of thousands of civilians and widespread damage to homes, vital civilian
infrastructure, hospitals, schools, food supply installations, economic, industrial and agricultural
properties and several United Nations facilities in the Gaza Strip, which gravely impact the
provision of vital health and social services to Palestinian women and their families and their
socio-economic living conditions and were all caused by the military operations carried out
between December 2008 and January 2009,
Recalling, in this regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the
Economic and Social Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia172 and the
Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread
destruction and the hampering of the reconstruction process by Israel, the occupying Power, on the
socio-economic and humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza
Strip, and calling in this regard for the expeditious commencement of the reconstruction process in
the Gaza Strip with the assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of funds
pledged in the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy for the
Reconstruction of Gaza, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 2 March 2009,
Gravely concerned by various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies
regarding the almost total aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of
unemployment, widespread poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity
and rising health-related problems, including high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian
people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the increasing number of deaths and injuries among civilians,
including children and women, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be
protected in accordance with international humanitarian law,
_______________
172 See A/65/72-E/2010/13.
Resolutions
124
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the
cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and
destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and
social infrastructure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the
urgent need to address the dire humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by
ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian assistance and the sustained and regular flow
of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Commending the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized
agencies and the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the
Palestinian people in line with their national development and State-building plan, as well as the
assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Authority, with international
support, to rebuild, reform and strengthen its damaged institutions and promote good governance,
and emphasizing the need to preserve the Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure and to
ameliorate economic and social conditions,
Welcoming in this regard and expressing strong support for the plan of the Palestinian
Authority entitled “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, for constructing the
institutions of a Palestinian State within a twenty-four month period,
Stressing the importance of national unity among the Palestinian people, and emphasizing
the need for the respect and preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with
the Quartet,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with
Security Council resolution 1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained
and regular flow of persons and goods and the lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the
Palestinian people, including those restrictions arising from ongoing Israeli military operations and
the multilayered closures system, and for other urgent measures to alleviate the desperate
humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in the Gaza Strip, and calls
for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under international
humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in this regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of
movement of persons and goods throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and
infrastructure for the provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to
contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;173
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure,
agricultural lands and governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of
its military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
_______________
173 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
Resolutions
125
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and
Access of 15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings
into the Gaza Strip, including the Rafah and Karni crossings, which is crucial to ensuring the
passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate fuel
supplies, as well as the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian
Territory;
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to
refrain from violence against the civilian population in accordance with the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;6
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the
occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of these resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and
properties, economic institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of
natural resources, including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of
waste materials in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the
occupied Syrian Golan, activities which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely, their
water and land resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and health threat to the
civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that
obstruct the implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment
plants in the Gaza Strip;
11. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related
infrastructure in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied
Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to economic and social development and
to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation of all settlement and settlement-related
activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the demographic composition,
legal status and character of the occupied territories, including, in particular, in and around
Occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions and international
law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
12. Also reaffirms that Israel’s ongoing construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and
is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank and seriously debilitating the economic
and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in this regard for full compliance with
the legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the
International Court of Justice,171 in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and in subsequent
relevant resolutions;
13. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of
the occupied Syrian Golan whose family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian
Arab Republic, via the Qunaitra entrance;
14. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies
and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal
Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority;
15. Reiterates the importance of the revival of the peace process on the basis of relevant
United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),
425 (1978), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004) and 1850 (2008), the Madrid Conference, the
Resolutions
126
principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative169 and the Quartet road map,170 as well as
compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, in order to pave the way for
the establishment of the independent Palestinian State and the achievement of a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace settlement;
16. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth
session, through the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present
resolution and to continue to include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an
update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with relevant United
Nations agencies;
17. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of
its substantive session of 2011.
46th plenary meeting
23 July 2010
2010/32. Consolidated List of Products Whose Consumption and/or Sale Have Been
Banned, Withdrawn, Severely Restricted or Not Approved by Governments
The Economic and Social Council,
Noting the entry into force in 2004 of the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade,174 and
of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,175
Noting also that detailed information on products whose consumption and/or sale have been
banned, withdrawn, severely restricted or not approved by Governments is readily accessible on
the Internet,
1. Takes note of the notes by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the United
Nations Environment Programme on the chemicals volume of the Consolidated List of Products
Whose Consumption and/or Sale Have Been Banned, Withdrawn, Severely Restricted or Not
Approved by Governments176 and the report of the World Health Organization on the pharmaceuticals
volume of the Consolidated List;177
2. Decides to discontinue consideration of the Consolidated List of Products Whose
Consumption and/or Sale Have Been Banned, Withdrawn, Severely Restricted or Not Approved
by Governments at its future substantive sessions.
46th plenary meeting
23 July 2010
2010/33. Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling its resolution 2004/69 of 11 November 2004, by which it decided that the Ad Hoc
Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters would be renamed the Committee
of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters,
_______________
174 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2244, No. 39973.
175 Ibid., vol. 2256, No. 40214.
176 See E/2010/79.
177 See E/2010/84.
Resolutions
109
20. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the present
resolution, paying particular attention to cooperation and integration arrangements for maximizing
the efficiency of the assistance activities undertaken by various organizations of the United
Nations system, and to report thereon to the Council at its substantive session of 2012;
21. Decides to keep the above questions under continuous review.
49th plenary meeting
28 July 2011
2011/41. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 65/179 of 20 December 2010,
Recalling also its resolution 2010/31 of 23 July 2010,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions,
including resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973)
of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly,
including resolutions ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of
20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of 15 December 2006,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,30 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,60 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights60 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,61 and reaffirming that these human rights instruments must be respected in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Stressing the importance of the revival and acceleration of serious and credible negotiations
within the Middle East peace process on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967),
338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of
19 November 2003, 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008, the
principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative145 and the Quartet road map,146 as well as
compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation
over their natural resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation of natural
resources by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the
consequent deterioration of economic and living conditions,
_______________
145 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
146 S/2003/529, annex.
Resolutions
110
Commending, in that regard, the efforts of the Palestinian Authority to improve the
economic and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in the areas of
governance, the rule of law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors, education and
culture, health, social protection, infrastructure and water,
Gravely concerned, in that regard, about the accelerated construction of settlements and
implementation of other related measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in
violation of international humanitarian law and relevant United Nations resolutions,
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation
and incitement by illegal armed Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, against Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, including
historic and religious sites, and agricultural lands,
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of
the Palestinian people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting
violation of their economic and social rights, including the right to work, to health, to education, to
property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of access and movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International
Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory147 and General Assembly resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to
comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of
properties, including the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, agricultural lands
and orchards, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in
connection with its construction of the wall, contrary to international law, in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing and intensifying policy of home
demolitions, evictions and revocation of residency rights, which have caused the further
displacement of the Palestinian population in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as
measures to further isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, including through the
accelerated construction of settlements, the construction of the wall, the confiscation of land and
the continued imposition of checkpoints, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical
socio-economic situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about Israeli military operations and the continuing Israeli
policy of closures and severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, including
humanitarian personnel and food, medical, fuel, construction material and other essential supplies,
via the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit regime throughout the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact on the socioeconomic
situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestinian refugee population,
which remains that of a humanitarian crisis,
Taking note of recent developments regarding the situation of access to the Gaza Strip,
although grave hardships continue to prevail as a result of the prolonged Israeli closures and
severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, and calling in that
regard for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009
with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border crossings for the sustained and regular
movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial flows and construction
materials,
_______________
147 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.
Resolutions
111
Deploring the heavy casualties among civilians, including hundreds of children and women,
the internal displacement of thousands of civilians and widespread damage to homes, vital civilian
infrastructure, hospitals, schools, food supply installations, economic, industrial and agricultural
properties and several United Nations facilities in the Gaza Strip, which have a grave impact on
the provision of vital health and social services to Palestinian women and their families and on
their socio-economic living conditions, all caused by the military operations in December 2008
and January 2009,
Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the
Economic and Social Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the
Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such
widespread destruction and the hampering of the reconstruction process by Israel, the occupying
Power, on the socio-economic and humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian civilian population
in the Gaza Strip, and calling in that regard for the immediate acceleration of the reconstruction
process in the Gaza Strip with the assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of
funds pledged at the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy for the
Reconstruction of Gaza, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 2 March 2009,
Gravely concerned at various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies
regarding the substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of
unemployment, widespread poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity
and rising health-related problems, including high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian
people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths and injuries caused to civilians, including children,
women and peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must
be protected in accordance with international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the
cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and
destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including hundreds of children and
women, continue to be held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and
social infrastructure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the
urgent need to address the humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring
the unimpeded provision of humanitarian assistance and the sustained and regular flow of persons
and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Commending the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized
agencies and the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the
Palestinian people in line with their national development and State-building plan, which is to be
completed by the end of August 2011, as well as the assistance being provided in the humanitarian
field,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Authority, with international
support, to rebuild, reform and strengthen its damaged institutions and promote good governance,
and emphasizing the need to preserve the Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure and to
ameliorate economic and social conditions,
Welcoming in that regard, and calling upon the international community to continue its
strong support for, the plan of the Palestinian Authority entitled “Palestine: Ending the
Occupation, Establishing the State”, for constructing the institutions of a Palestinian State by
September 2011,
Resolutions
112
Stressing the importance of national unity among the Palestinian people, and emphasizing
the need for the respect and preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with
the Quartet,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with
Security Council resolution 1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained
and regular flow of persons and goods and the lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the
Palestinian people, including those restrictions arising from ongoing Israeli military operations and
the multilayered closures system, and for other urgent measures to be taken to alleviate the serious
humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is critical in the Gaza Strip,
and calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under
international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of
movement of persons and goods throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and
infrastructure for the provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to
contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, signed in Paris on 29 April
1994;148
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure,
agricultural lands and governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of
its military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and
Access of 15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings
into the Gaza Strip, which is crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies,
including construction materials and adequate fuel supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered
access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular commercial flows necessary for
economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to
refrain from violence against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;30
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the
occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and
properties, economic institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of
natural resources, including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of
waste materials in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the
occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely, the water, land and
energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian
_______________
148 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
Resolutions
113
populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that obstruct
implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the
Gaza Strip;
11. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related
infrastructure in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied
Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to economic and social development and
to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation of all settlement and settlement-related
activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the demographic composition,
legal status and character of the occupied territories, including, in particular, in and around
Occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions and
international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War;
12. Also reaffirms that the ongoing construction by Israel of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and
is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank and seriously debilitating the economic
and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in that regard for full compliance with
the legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice147 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant resolutions;
13. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of
the occupied Syrian Golan whose family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian
Arab Republic, via the Qunaitra entrance;
14. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority;
15. Reiterates the importance of the revival and accelerated advancement of negotiations
of the peace process on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security
Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004)
and 1850 (2008), the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace
Initiative145 and the Quartet road map,146 as well as compliance with the agreements reached
between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of
the Palestinian people, in order to pave the way for the establishment of the independent
Palestinian State and the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
16. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth
session, through the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present
resolution and to continue to include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an
update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with relevant United
Nations agencies;
17. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of
its substantive session of 2012.
49th plenary meeting
28 July 2011
2011/42. Strengthening crime prevention and criminal justice responses to protect cultural
property, especially with regard to its trafficking
The Economic and Social Council
Recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:
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67
2012/23. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population
in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 66/225 of 22 December 2011,
Recalling also its resolution 2011/41 of 28 July 2011,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and
497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, including
resolutions ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/17
of 15 December 2006,
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949,113 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 114 the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights114 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,115 and reaffirming that these
human rights instruments must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well
as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Stressing the importance of the revival and acceleration of serious and credible negotiations within the Middle
East peace process on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March
1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and
1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008, the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative116 and the Quartet road
map,117 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation of natural resources by Israel, the occupying
Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable development and
a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent deterioration of economic and living conditions,
Commending, in that regard, the efforts of the Palestinian Authority to improve the economic and social
situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of law and human
rights, livelihoods and productive sectors, education and culture, health, social protection, infrastructure and water,
Gravely concerned, in that regard, about the accelerated construction of settlements and implementation of
other related measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East
Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant
United Nations resolutions,
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation, vandalism and incitement
by illegal armed Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, against Palestinian
civilians, including children, and their properties, including historic and religious sites, and agricultural lands,
_______________
113 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
114 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
115 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
116 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
117 S/2003/529, annex.
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68
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian
people caused by the construction by Israel of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights,
including the right to work, to health, to education, to property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of
access and movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,118 and General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of properties, including
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks, agricultural lands and orchards, in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in connection with its construction of the
wall, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing and intensifying policy of home demolitions, evictions and
revocation of residency rights, which have caused the further displacement of the Palestinian population in and
around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as measures to further isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs,
including through the accelerated construction of settlements, the construction of the wall, the confiscation of land
and the continued imposition of checkpoints, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical socioeconomic
situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about Israeli military operations and the continuing Israeli policy of closures
and severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian personnel and food, medical,
fuel, construction material and other essential supplies, via the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a
permit regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative
impact on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestinian refugee population,
which remains that of a humanitarian crisis,
Taking note of recent developments regarding the situation of access to the Gaza Strip, although grave
hardships continue to prevail as a result of the prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement
restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, calling in that regard for the full implementation of Security Council
resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border crossings for the
sustained and regular movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial flows and
construction materials, and emphasizing the need for security for all civilian populations,
Deploring the heavy casualties among civilians, including hundreds of children and women, the internal
displacement of thousands of civilians and widespread damage to homes, vital civilian infrastructure, hospitals,
schools, food supply installations, economic, industrial and agricultural properties, and several United Nations
facilities in the Gaza Strip, which have a grave impact on the provision of vital health and social services to
Palestinian women and their families and on their socioeconomic living conditions, all caused by the military
operations between December 2008 and January 2009,
Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the Economic and Social
Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread destruction
and the hampering of the reconstruction process by Israel, the occupying Power, on the socioeconomic and
humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, and calling in that regard for the
immediate acceleration of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip with the assistance of the donor countries,
including the disbursement of funds pledged at the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy
for the Reconstruction of Gaza, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 2 March 2009,
Gravely concerned about various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies regarding the
substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread
_______________
118 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1.
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69
poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including
high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths and injuries caused to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be protected in accordance
with international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the cessation of all
acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and women, continue to be
held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions, including unhygienic conditions, solitary
confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, lack of proper medical care and denial of family visits and
of due process, that impair their well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill-treatment and
harassment of Palestinian prisoners and all reports of torture, while taking note of the recent agreement reached on
conditions of detention in Israeli prisons and calling for its full and immediate implementation,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and social infrastructure
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the urgent need to address the
humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian
assistance and the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Authority, with international support, to rebuild,
reform and strengthen its damaged institutions and promote good governance, emphasizing the need to preserve the
Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure, commending in that regard the implementation of the 2009 plan
of the Palestinian Authority, entitled “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, for building the
institutions of an independent Palestinian State within a 24-month period and the significant achievements that have
been brought about, as confirmed by international institutions, including the United Nations, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in their reports to the meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the
Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians held on 13 April 2011, and acknowledging the
development plan of the Palestinian Authority for the period 2011–2013,
Commending, in that regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies
and the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people in line with
their national development and State-building plan, completed at the end of August 2011, as well as the assistance
being provided in the humanitarian field,
Stressing the importance of national unity among the Palestinian people, and emphasizing the need for the
respect and preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with the Quartet,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council
resolution 1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and regular flow of persons and
goods and the lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, including those restrictions
arising from ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closures system, and for other urgent measures
to be taken to alleviate the serious humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is critical in
the Gaza Strip, and calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under
international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure for the
provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to contribute to the promotion and
protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
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70
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization, signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;119
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure, agricultural lands and
governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its military operations in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of
15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings into the Gaza Strip, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate
fuel supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and
emphasizes the need for security for all civilian populations;
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;113
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit,
endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of natural resources,
including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their
natural resources, namely, the water, land and energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and
health threat to the civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that
obstruct implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza Strip;
11. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a
major obstacle to economic and social development and to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation
of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the
demographic composition, legal status and character of the occupied territories, including, in particular, in and
around Occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions and international law,
including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
12. Also reaffirms that the ongoing construction by Israel of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting
the West Bank and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in
that regard for full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice rendered on 9 July 2004118 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant
resolutions;
13. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose
family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaitra entrance;
14. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and
the Palestinian Authority;
_______________
119 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
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71
15. Reiterates the importance of the revival and accelerated advancement of negotiations of the peace
process on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967),
338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004) and 1850 (2008), the Madrid Conference, the
principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative116 and the Quartet road map,117 as well as compliance with the
agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative
of the Palestinian people, in order to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine
living side by side in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, and the
achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
16. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session, through
the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution and to continue to
include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people, in collaboration with relevant United Nations agencies;
17. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the
living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of its substantive session of 2013.
47th plenary meeting
26 July 2012
2012/24. Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes in the United Nations system
The Economic and Social Council,
Reaffirming its agreed conclusions 1997/2 of 18 July 1997 on mainstreaming a gender perspective into all
policies and programmes in the United Nations system,120 and recalling its resolutions 2001/41 of 26 July 2001,
2002/23 of 24 July 2002, 2003/49 of 24 July 2003, 2004/4 of 7 July 2004, 2005/31 of 26 July 2005, 2006/36 of
27 July 2006, 2007/33 of 27 July 2007, 2008/34 of 25 July 2008, 2009/12 of 28 July 2009, 2010/29 of 23 July 2010
and 2011/6 of 14 July 2011,
Reaffirming also the commitments to gender equality and the advancement of women made at the Millennium
Summit,121 the 2005 World Summit,122 the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly on the Millennium
Development Goals123 and other major United Nations summits, conferences and special sessions, and reaffirming
further that their full, effective and accelerated implementation is integral to achieving the internationally agreed
development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals,
Reaffirming further the commitment made at the 2005 World Summit to actively promote the mainstreaming
of a gender perspective in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all
political, economic and social spheres and to further undertake to strengthen the capabilities of the United Nations
system in the area of gender,
Reaffirming that gender mainstreaming is a globally accepted strategy for achieving gender equality and the
empowerment of women and constitutes a critical strategy in the full, effective and accelerated implementation of
the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action124 and the outcomes of the twenty-third special session of the
General Assembly,125
Recalling the section of General Assembly resolution 64/289 of 2 July 2010 entitled “Strengthening the
institutional arrangements for support of gender equality and the empowerment of women”,
_______________
120 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/52/3/Rev.1), chap. IV, sect. A, para. 4.
121 General Assembly resolution 55/2.
122 General Assembly resolution 60/1.
123 General Assembly resolution 65/1.
124 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13),
chap. I, resolution 1, annexes I and II.
125 General Assembly resolution S-23/2, annex, and resolution S-23/3, annex.
Resolutions
49
1. Welcomes the cooperation on the project for the link through the Strait of Gibraltar between the
Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic Commission for Europe, the Governments of Morocco and Spain,
and specialized international organizations;
2. Also welcomes the progress made in the project studies as a result, in particular, of geological and
geotechnical exploration and the technical, economic and traffic update studies currently being finalized, and the
fact that a new action plan for the period 2013–2016 will be adopted;
3. Commends the Economic Commission for Europe and the Economic Commission for Africa for the
work done in preparing the project follow-up report requested by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution
2011/12;13
4. Renews its invitation to the competent organizations of the United Nations system and to specialized
governmental and non-governmental organizations to participate in the studies and work on the fixed link through
the Strait of Gibraltar;
5. Requests the Executive Secretaries of the Economic Commission for Africa and the Economic
Commission for Europe to continue to take an active part in the follow-up to the project and to report to the Council
at its substantive session of 2015 on the progress made on the project studies;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide formal support and, to the extent that priorities permit, the
resources necessary, from within the regular budget, to the Economic Commission for Europe and the Economic
Commission for Africa, to enable them to carry out the activities mentioned above.
40th plenary meeting
19 July 2013
2013/8. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 67/120 of 18 December 2012 and 67/229 of 21 December 2012,
Recalling also its resolution 2012/23 of 26 July 2012,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by force and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and
497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, including
resolutions ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/17
of 15 December 2006,
Taking note of the report by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and
social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as
transmitted by the Secretary-General,15
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949,16 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
_______________
15 A/68/77-E/2013/13.
16 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
Resolutions
50
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,17 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights17 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,18 and affirming that these human rights
instruments must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the
occupied Syrian Golan,
Taking note of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012,
Stressing the importance of the revival and acceleration of serious and credible negotiations within the Middle
East peace process on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March
1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and
1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008, the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative19 and the Quartet road
map,20 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation of natural resources by Israel, the occupying
Power, and Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, particularly as a result of settlement activities, which are illegal under international law,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable development and
a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent deterioration of economic and living conditions,
Commending the efforts of the Palestinian Government, despite the many constraints, to improve the
economic and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of
law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors, education and culture, health, social protection, infrastructure
and water,
Gravely concerned about the accelerated construction of settlements and implementation of other related
measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as
in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant United Nations resolutions,
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation, vandalism and
incitement by illegal armed Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, against
Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, including homes, historic and religious sites, and
agricultural lands,
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian
people caused by the construction by Israel of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights,
including the rights to work, to health, to education, to property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of
access and movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory21 and General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of properties, including
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks, agricultural lands and orchards, in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in connection with its construction of
settlements and the wall and confiscation of land, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
_______________
17 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
18 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
19 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
20 S/2003/529, annex.
21 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1.
Resolutions
51
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing forced displacement of Palestinian civilians, including the
Bedouin community, due to the continuing and intensifying policy of home demolitions, evictions and revocation of
residency rights in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as measures to further isolate the city from its
natural Palestinian environs, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical socioeconomic situation being
faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of closures and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods via the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit
regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact
on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestinian refugee population, which
remains that of a humanitarian crisis,
Taking note of recent developments regarding the situation of access to the Gaza Strip, although grave
hardships continue to prevail as a result of the prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement
restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, calling in that regard for the full implementation of Security Council
resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border crossings for the
sustained and regular movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial flows and
construction materials, and emphasizing the need for security for all civilian populations,
Deploring the heavy casualties among civilians, including hundreds of children and women, the internal
displacement of thousands of civilians and widespread damage to homes, vital civilian infrastructure, hospitals,
schools, food supply installations, economic, industrial and agricultural properties, and several United Nations
facilities in the Gaza Strip, which have a grave impact on the provision of vital health and social services to
Palestinian women and their families and on their socioeconomic living conditions caused by the military operations
between December 2008 and January 2009 and in November 2012,
Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the Economic and Social
Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread destruction
and the hampering of the reconstruction process by Israel, the occupying Power, on the socioeconomic and
humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, and calling in that regard for the
immediate acceleration of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip with the assistance of the donor countries,
including the disbursement of funds pledged at the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy
for the Reconstruction of Gaza, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 2 March 2009,
Gravely concerned about various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies regarding the
substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread
poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including
high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths and injuries caused to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be protected in accordance
with international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the cessation of all
acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and women, continue to be
held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions, including unhygienic conditions, solitary
confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, lack of proper medical care and denial of family visits and
of due process, that impair their well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill-treatment and
harassment of Palestinian prisoners and all reports of torture, while taking note of the agreement reached in May
2012 on conditions of detention in Israeli prisons and calling for its full and immediate implementation,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and social infrastructure
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the urgent need to address the
humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian
assistance and the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
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52
Recognizing the efforts by the Palestinian Government, with international support, to rebuild, reform and
strengthen its damaged institutions and promote good governance, emphasizing the need to preserve the Palestinian
national institutions and infrastructure and commending in that regard the implementation of the 2009 plan of the
Palestinian Authority, entitled “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, for building the
institutions of an independent Palestinian State within a 24-month period and the significant achievements made, as
confirmed by the positive assessments regarding readiness for statehood made by international institutions,
including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations, in their reports to the meeting
on 13 April 2011 and subsequent meetings of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the
International Assistance to Palestinians, and acknowledging the Palestinian National Development Plan 2011–2013
on governance, economy, social development and infrastructure,
Commending, in that regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies
and the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people in line with
their national development and State-building plan, completed at the end of August 2011, as well as the assistance
being provided in the humanitarian field,
Stressing the importance of national unity among the Palestinian people, and emphasizing the need for the
respect and preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map, in cooperation with the Quartet,
Aware that development and fostering healthy economic and social conditions are difficult under occupation
and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council
resolution 1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and regular flow of persons and
goods and the lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, including those restrictions
arising from ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closures system, and for other urgent measures
to be taken to alleviate the serious humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is critical in
the Gaza Strip, and calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under
international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure for the
provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to contribute to the promotion and
protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization, signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;22
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure, agricultural lands and
governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its military operations in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of
15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings into the Gaza Strip, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate
fuel supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and
emphasizes the need for security for all civilian populations;
_______________
22 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
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53
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;16
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit,
endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of natural resources,
including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their
natural resources, namely, the water, land and energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and
health threat to the civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that
obstruct implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza Strip;
11. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a
major obstacle to economic and social development and to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation
of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the
demographic composition, legal status and character of the occupied territories, including, in particular, in and
around Occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions and international law,
including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
12. Calls for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, recalls in that regard Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March 1994,
and stresses the need for its implementation;
13. Reaffirms that the ongoing construction by Israel of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West
Bank and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in that regard
for full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
rendered on 9 July 200421 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant resolutions;
14. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose
family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaitra entrance;
15. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and
the Palestinian Authority;
16. Expresses appreciation to the Member States, United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, regional
and non-governmental organizations that have provided and continue to provide economic and humanitarian
assistance to the Palestinian people, which has helped to ameliorate their critical economic and social conditions,
and urges the continued provision of assistance, in cooperation with official Palestinian institutions and consistent
with the Palestinian National Development Plan;
17. Reiterates the importance of the revival and accelerated advancement of negotiations of the peace
process on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967),
338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004) and 1850 (2008), the Madrid Conference, the
principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative19 and the Quartet road map,20 as well as compliance with the
agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative
of the Palestinian people, in order to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine
living side by side in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, and the
achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
Resolutions
54
18. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session, through
the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution and to continue to
include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people, in collaboration with relevant United Nations agencies;
19. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the
living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of its substantive session of 2014.
40th plenary meeting
19 July 2013
2013/9. Assessment of the progress made in the implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the
World Summit on the Information Society
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling the outcome documents of the World Summit on the Information Society,23
Recalling also its resolution 2006/46 of 28 July 2006 on the follow-up to the World Summit and review of the
Commission on Science and Technology for Development and the mandate that it gave to the Commission,
Recalling further its resolution 2012/5 of 24 July 2012 on the assessment of the progress made in the
implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the World Summit,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 67/195 of 21 December 2012 on information and communications
technologies for development,
Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General on the progress made in the
implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the World Summit at the regional and international levels,24
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Internet broadband for an inclusive digital
society”,25
Expressing its appreciation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development for his role in helping to ensure completion of the aforementioned reports in a timely manner,
Taking stock: reviewing the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information
Society
1. Notes the ongoing implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society,23
emphasizing, in particular, its multi-stakeholder nature, the roles played in this regard by leading agencies as action
line facilitators and the roles of the regional commissions and the United Nations Group on the Information Society,
and expresses its appreciation for the role of the Commission on Science and Technology for Development in
assisting the Economic and Social Council as the focal point in the system-wide follow-up to the World Summit;
2. Takes note of the reports of many United Nations entities, with their respective executive summaries,
submitted as input for the elaboration of the annual report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the
Commission and published on the website of the Commission as mandated in Council resolution 2007/8 of 25 July
2007, and recalls the importance of close coordination among the leading action line facilitators and with the
secretariat of the Commission;
3. Notes the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit at the regional level facilitated by the
regional commissions, as observed in the report of the Secretary-General on the progress made in the
implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the World Summit at the regional and international levels,24
_______________
23 See A/C.2/59/3 and A/60/687.
24 A/68/65-E/2013/11.
25 E/CN.16/2013/3.
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105
2014/26. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 68/235 of 20 December 2013 and 68/82 of 11 December 2013,
Recalling also its resolution 2013/8 of 19 July 2013,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967)
of 22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980
and 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, including ES-10/13
of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of 15 December 2006,
Taking note of the report by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and
social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as
transmitted by the Secretary-General,195
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949,196 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,197 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,197 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,198 and affirming that these human
rights instruments must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in
the occupied Syrian Golan,
Taking note, in that regard, of the accession by Palestine, on 1 April 2014, to several human rights treaties and
the core humanitarian law conventions,
Taking note also of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012,
Stressing the importance of the revival and acceleration of serious and credible negotiations within the Middle
East peace process on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March
1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and
1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008, the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative199 and the Quartet road
map,200 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation of natural resources by Israel, the occupying
Power, and Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, particularly as a result of settlement activities, which are illegal under international law,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable development and
a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent deterioration of economic and living conditions,
_______________
195 A/69/81-E/2014/13.
196 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
197 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
198 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
199 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
200 S/2003/529, annex.
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106
Commending the efforts of the Palestinian Government, despite the many constraints, to improve the
economic and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of
law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors, education and culture, health, social protection,
infrastructure and water, and welcoming in that regard the United Nations Development Assistance Framework,
launched on 15 August 2013, which is aimed at, inter alia, enhancing developmental support and assistance to the
Palestinian people and strengthening institutional capacity in line with Palestinian national priorities,
Gravely concerned about the accelerated construction of settlements and implementation of other related
measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well
as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant United Nations
resolutions,
Encouraging all States and international organizations to continue to actively pursue policies to ensure respect
for their obligations under international law with regard to all illegal Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly Israeli settlements,
Taking note of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications
of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people
throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,201
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation, vandalism and
incitement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular by illegal armed Israeli
settlers against Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, including homes, historic and religious
sites and agricultural lands, and calling for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated in that regard,
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian
people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights,
including the rights to work, to health, to education, to property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of
access and movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory202 and General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of properties, including
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks, agricultural lands and orchards, in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in connection with its construction of
settlements and the wall and confiscation of land, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinian
civilians, including the Bedouin community, due to the continuing and intensifying policy of home demolitions,
evictions and revocation of residency rights in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as measures to further
isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical
socioeconomic situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of closures and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit
regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact
on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestinian refugee population, which
remains that of a humanitarian crisis,
Expressing grave concern, in particular, about the continuing crisis in the Gaza Strip as a result of the
prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, and
_______________
201 A/HRC/22/63.
202 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1.
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107
calling in that regard for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with
a view to ensuring the full opening of the border crossings for the sustained and regular movement of persons and
goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial flows and construction materials, and emphasizing the need for
security for all civilian populations,
Recognizing the prolonged negative impact of the military operations between December 2008 and January
2009 and in November 2012 on the economic conditions, the provision of social services and the living conditions
of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, including as a result of the heavy casualties among civilians,
including hundreds of children and women, the internal displacement of thousands of civilians and the widespread
damage to homes, vital civilian infrastructure, hospitals, schools, food supply installations, economic, industrial and
agricultural properties and several United Nations facilities in the Gaza Strip,
Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the Economic and Social
Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread destruction
and the hampering of the reconstruction process by Israel, the occupying Power, on the socioeconomic and
humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, where the humanitarian crisis
continues to deepen, and calling in that regard for the immediate acceleration of the reconstruction process in the
Gaza Strip with the assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of funds pledged at the
International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy for the Reconstruction of Gaza, held in Sharm
el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 2 March 2009,
Gravely concerned about various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies regarding the
substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread
poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including
high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths and injuries caused to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be protected in accordance
with international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the cessation of all
acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and women, continue to be
held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions, including unhygienic conditions, solitary
confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, lack of proper medical care and denial of family visits and
of due process, that impair their well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill-treatment and
harassment of Palestinian prisoners and all reports of torture, while taking note of the agreement reached in
May 2012 on conditions of detention in Israeli prisons and calling for its full and immediate implementation,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and social infrastructure
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the urgent need to address the
humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian
assistance and the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Recognizing the efforts by the Palestinian Government, with international support, to rebuild, reform and
strengthen its damaged institutions and promote good governance, emphasizing the need to preserve the Palestinian
national institutions and infrastructure, and commending in that regard the ongoing efforts to develop the institutions
of an independent Palestinian State, including through the implementation of the Palestinian National Development
Plan 2011–2013 on governance, economy, social development and infrastructure, and the significant achievements
made, as confirmed by the positive assessments made by international institutions regarding readiness for statehood,
including by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians, while also expressing concern about
the negative impact of the current financial crisis being faced by the Palestinian Government,
Commending, in that regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and
the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people in line with their
national development and State-building plan, as well as the assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
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108
Welcoming the formation of the new Palestinian Government of national consensus under the authority of
President Mahmoud Abbas, in line with the Quartet principles, and emphasizing the need for the respect and
preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map, in cooperation with the Quartet,
Aware that development and fostering healthy economic and social conditions are difficult under occupation
and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council
resolution 1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and regular flow of persons and
goods and the lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, including those restrictions
arising from ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closures system, and for other urgent measures
to be taken to alleviate the serious humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is critical in
the Gaza Strip, and calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under
international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure for the
provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to contribute to the promotion and
protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;203
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure, agricultural lands and
governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its military operations in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of
15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings into the Gaza Strip, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate
fuel supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and
emphasizes the need for security for all civilian populations;
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;196
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit,
endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, and to prevent Israeli settlers from perpetrating such illegal activities;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of natural resources,
including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their
natural resources, namely, the water, land and energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and
health threat to the civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that
obstruct the implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza
_______________
203 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
Resolutions
109
Strip, and notably to provide electrical power needed for the work on the northern Gaza emergency treatment
project, and stresses in that regard the urgency of the reconstruction and development of water infrastructure,
including the project for the desalination facility for the Gaza Strip;
11. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a
major obstacle to economic and social development and to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation
of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the
demographic composition, legal status and character of the occupied territories, including, in particular, in and
around occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions and international law,
including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
12. Calls for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and recalls in that regard Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March
1994, and stresses the need for its implementation;
13. Reaffirms that the ongoing construction by Israel of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting
the West Bank and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in
that regard for full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice rendered on 9 July 2004202 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant
resolutions;
14. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose
family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaitra entrance;
15. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and
the Palestinian Authority;
16. Expresses appreciation to the Member States, United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, regional
and non-governmental organizations that have provided and continue to provide economic and humanitarian
assistance to the Palestinian people, which has helped to ameliorate their critical economic and social conditions,
and urges the continued provision of assistance, in cooperation with official Palestinian institutions and consistent
with the Palestinian National Development Plan;
17. Reiterates the importance of the revival and accelerated advancement of negotiations of the peace
process on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967),
338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004) and 1850 (2008), the Madrid Conference, the
principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative199 and the Quartet road map,200 as well as compliance with the
agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative
of the Palestinian people, in order to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine
living side by side in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, and the
achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
18. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session, through the
Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution and to continue to include in
the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in
collaboration with relevant United Nations agencies;
19. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 2015 session the item entitled “Economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan”.
45th plenary meeting
16 July 2014
Resolutions
58
15. Requests the administering Powers concerned to facilitate, when appropriate, the participation of
appointed and elected representatives of Non-Self-Governing Territories in the relevant meetings and conferences of
the specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system, in accordance with relevant
resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, including the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly
and the Special Committee on specific Territories, so that they may benefit from the related activities of those
agencies and organizations;
16. Recommends that all Governments intensify their efforts within the specialized agencies and other
organizations of the United Nations system of which they are members to accord priority to the question of
providing assistance to the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories on a case-by-case basis;
17. Draws the attention of the Special Committee to the present resolution and to the discussion held on the
subject at the substantive session of 2015 of the Economic and Social Council;
18. Recalls the adoption by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean on 16 May
1998 of its resolution 574 (XXVII),85 in which the Commission called for the mechanisms necessary for its
associate members, including the Non-Self-Governing Territories, to participate, subject to the rules of procedure of
the General Assembly, in the special sessions of the Assembly convened to review and assess the implementation of
the plans of action of those United Nations world conferences in which the Territories had originally participated in
their capacity as observers, and in the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies;
19. Requests the President of the Council to continue to maintain close contact on those matters with the
Chair of the Special Committee and to report thereon to the Council;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the present resolution, paying
particular attention to cooperation and integration arrangements for maximizing the efficiency of the assistance
activities undertaken by various organizations of the United Nations system, and to report thereon to the Council at
its 2016 session;
21. Decides to keep the above questions under continuous review.
50th plenary meeting
20 July 2015
2015/17. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 69/241 of 19 December 2014 and 69/92 of 5 December 2014,
Recalling also its resolution 2014/26 of 16 July 2014,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and
497(1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, including ES-10/13
of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of 15 December 2006,
Taking note of the report by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and
social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as
transmitted by the Secretary-General,86
_______________
85 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1998, Supplement No. 21 (E/1998/41), chap. III, sect. G.
86 A/70/82-E/2015/13.
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59
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949,87 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,88 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights88 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,89 and affirming that these human rights
instruments must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the
occupied Syrian Golan,
Taking note, in this regard, of the accession by Palestine to several human rights treaties and the core
humanitarian law conventions as well as other international treaties,
Taking note also of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012,
Stressing the urgency of achieving, without delay, an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and a
just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement on all tracks on the basis of Security Council resolutions
242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of
19 November 2003, 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008, the principle of land for
peace, the Arab Peace Initiative90 and the Quartet road map,91 as well as compliance with the agreements reached
between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian
people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation of natural resources by Israel, the occupying
Power, and Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, particularly as a result of settlement activities, which are illegal under international law and which,
deplorably, continued during the reporting period,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable development and
a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent deterioration of economic and living conditions,
Expressing alarm, in this regard, about the extremely high levels of unemployment in the Gaza Strip in
particular, which, according to World Bank estimates, is 43 per cent, with youth unemployment reaching
60 per cent, and is exacerbated by the prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions
that in effect amount to a blockade, and about the continuing negative repercussions of the military operations in the
Gaza Strip on economic and social infrastructure and living conditions,
Commending the efforts of the Palestinian Government, despite the many constraints, to improve the
economic and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of
law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors, education and culture, health, social protection,
infrastructure and water, and welcoming in this regard the United Nations Development Assistance Framework,
launched on 15 August 2013, which aims at, inter alia, enhancing developmental support and assistance to the
Palestinian people and strengthening institutional capacity in line with Palestinian national priorities,
Gravely concerned about the accelerated construction of settlements and the implementation of other related
measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as
in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant United Nations resolutions,
Encouraging all States and international organizations to continue to actively pursue policies to ensure respect
for their obligations under international law with regard to all illegal Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly Israeli settlements,
_______________
87 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
88 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
89 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
90 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
91 S/2003/529, annex.
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Taking note of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications
of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people
throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,92
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation, vandalism and
incitement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular by illegal armed Israeli
settlers against Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, including homes, historic and religious
sites, and agricultural lands, and calling for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated in this regard,
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian
people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights,
including the rights to work, to health, to education, to property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of
access and movement,
Recalling, in this regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory93 and General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of properties, including
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks, agricultural lands and orchards, in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in connection with its construction of
settlements and the wall and confiscation of land, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinian
civilians, including the Bedouin community, due to the continuing and intensifying policy of home demolitions,
evictions and revocation of residency rights in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as measures to further
isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical
socioeconomic situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of closures and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit
regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact
on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestine refugee population, which
remains that of a humanitarian crisis,
Expressing grave concern, in particular, over the continuing crisis in the Gaza Strip as a result of the prolonged
Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, stressing that
the situation is unsustainable, and calling in that regard for the full implementation of Security Council resolution
1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border crossings for the sustained and
regular movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial flows and construction materials,
and emphasizing the need for security for all civilian populations,
Deploring the conflict in and around the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014 and the civilian casualties caused,
including the killing and injury of thousands of Palestinian civilians, including children, women and the elderly, the
widespread destruction of or damage to thousands of homes and vital civilian infrastructure, including schools,
hospitals, water, sanitation and electricity networks, economic, industrial and agricultural properties, public
institutions, religious sites and United Nations schools and facilities, as well as the internal displacement of hundreds
of thousands of civilians, and any violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, in
this regard,
Gravely concerned about the consequent prolonged and extensive negative impact of the military operations
in July and August 2014, as well as between December 2008 and January 2009 and in November 2012, on
economic conditions, the provision of social services and the social, humanitarian and physical living conditions of
the Palestinian civilian population, including the Palestine refugee population,
_______________
92 A/HRC/22/63.
93 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1.
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Recalling, in this regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the Economic and Social
Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread destruction
and the hampering of the reconstruction process, by Israel, the occupying Power, on the socioeconomic and
humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, where the humanitarian crisis
continues to deepen, and calling in that regard for the immediate acceleration of the reconstruction process in the
Gaza Strip with the assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of funds pledged at the Cairo
International Conference on Palestine: Reconstructing Gaza, held on 12 October 2014,
Gravely concerned at various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies regarding the substantial
aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread poverty and
severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including high levels of
malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths and injuries caused to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be protected in accordance
with international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the cessation of all
acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and women, continue to be
held in Israeli prisons or detention centres, subject to harsh conditions, including unhygienic conditions, solitary
confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, lack of proper medical care and widespread medical
neglect, including for prisoners who are ill, with the risk of fatal consequences, and the denial of family visits and of
due process, that impair their well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill-treatment and harassment
of Palestinian prisoners and detainees and all reports of torture, while taking note of the agreement reached in May
2012 on conditions of detention in Israeli prisons and calling for its full and immediate implementation,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and social infrastructure
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the urgent need to address the
humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian
assistance and the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Recognizing the efforts by the Palestinian Government, with international support, to rebuild, reform and
strengthen its damaged institutions and promote good governance, emphasizing the need to preserve the Palestinian
national institutions and infrastructure, and commending in this regard the ongoing efforts to develop the institutions
of an independent Palestinian State, including through the implementation of the Palestinian National Development
Plan 2011–2013 on governance, economy, social development and infrastructure, and the significant achievements
made, as confirmed by the positive assessments made by international institutions regarding readiness for statehood,
including by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations and the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians, while also expressing concern about
the negative impact of the current financial crisis being faced by the Palestinian Government,
Commending, in this regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and
the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people in line with their
national development and State-building plan, as well as the vital assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Welcoming the formation of the new Palestinian Government of national consensus under the authority of
President Mahmoud Abbas, in line with the Quartet principles, emphasizing the need for the respect and
preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and
affirming the need to support the Palestinian Government of national consensus in its assumption of full government
responsibilities in all fields in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with the Quartet,
Aware that development and fostering healthy economic and social conditions are difficult under occupation
and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability,
Resolutions
62
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council
resolution 1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and regular flow of persons and
goods and the lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, including those restrictions
arising from ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closure system, and for other urgent measures
to be taken to alleviate the serious humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is dire in the
Gaza Strip, and calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under
international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure for the
provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to contribute to the promotion and
protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;94
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure, agricultural lands and
governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its military operations in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of
15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings into the Gaza Strip, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate
fuel supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and
emphasizes the need for security for all civilian populations;
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;87
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit,
endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, and to prevent Israeli settlers from perpetrating such illegal activities;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of natural resources,
including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their
natural resources, namely, the water, land and energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and
health threat to the civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that
obstruct the implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza
Strip, notably the provision of the electrical power needed for the work of the northern Gaza emergency sewage
treatment project, and stresses in this regard the urgency of the reconstruction and development of water
infrastructure, including the project for the desalination facility for the Gaza Strip;
11. Calls for the assistance necessary for the safe removal of all unexploded ordnance in the Gaza Strip,
which endangers Palestinian lives and has a negative impact on the environment and on reconstruction and
development efforts, and urges support for the efforts of the United Nations Mine Action Service in this regard;
_______________
94 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
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63
12. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a
major obstacle to economic and social development and to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation
of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the
demographic composition, legal status and character of the occupied territories, including, in particular, in and
around occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions and international law,
including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
13. Calls for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, recalls in this regard Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March 1994,
and stresses the need for its implementation;
14. Also calls for urgent attention to be paid to the plight and the rights, in accordance with international law,
of Palestinian prisoners and detainees in Israeli prisons, and for efforts between the two sides for the further release
of prisoners and detainees;
15. Reaffirms that the ongoing construction by Israel of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting
the West Bank and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in
that regard for full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice rendered on 9 July 200493 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant
resolutions;
16. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose
family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaitra entrance;
17. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and
the Palestinian Authority;
18. Expresses appreciation to the Member States, United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, regional and
non-governmental organizations that have provided and continue to provide economic and humanitarian assistance to
the Palestinian people, which has helped to ameliorate their critical economic and social conditions, and urges the
continued provision of assistance commensurate with their increased socioeconomic and humanitarian needs, in
cooperation with official Palestinian institutions and consistent with the Palestinian National Development Plan;
19. Reiterates the importance of and need for increased and renewed international efforts on the basis of
relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978),
1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004) and 1850 (2008), and the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for
peace, the Arab Peace Initiative90 and the Quartet road map,91 as well as compliance with the agreements reached
between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian
people, in order to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine living side by
side in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, and the achievement of a just,
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventieth session, through the
Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution and to continue to include in
the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in
collaboration with relevant United Nations agencies;
21. Decides to include in the agenda of its substantive session of 2016 the item entitled “Economic and
social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan”.
50th plenary meeting
20 July 2015
Resolutions
52
2016/14. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 70/1 of 25 September 2015, 70/89 of 9 December 2015 and 70/225 of
22 December 2015,
Recalling also its resolution 2015/17 of 20 July 2015,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and
497 (1981) of 17 December 1981,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, including resolutions
ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of
15 December 2006,
Taking note of the report by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as transmitted by the
Secretary-General,84
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, of 12 August 1949,85 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab territories
occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,86 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,86 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,87 and affirming that these human rights
instruments are applicable and must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Taking note, in this regard, of Palestine’s accession to several human rights treaties and the core humanitarian
law conventions as well as other international treaties,
Taking note also of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012,
Stressing the urgency of achieving without delay an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and a just,
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement on all tracks on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967),
338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003,
1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008, the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace
Initiative88 and the Quartet road map,89 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government
of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation of natural resources by Israel, the occupying
Power, and Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian
Golan, particularly as a result of settlement activities, which are illegal under international law and which, deplorably,
continued during the reporting period,
_______________
84 A/71/86-E/2016/13.
85 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
86 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
87 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
88 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
89 S/2003/529, annex.
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53
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable development and a
sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent deterioration of economic and living conditions,
Expressing alarm, in this regard, about the extremely high levels of unemployment in the Gaza Strip in
particular, which according to World Bank estimates is 43 per cent, with youth unemployment reaching 60 per cent,
exacerbated by the prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount
to a blockade, and the continuing negative repercussions of the military operations in the Gaza Strip on economic and
social infrastructure and living conditions,
Commending, despite the many constraints, including the obstacles imposed by the ongoing Israeli occupation,
the efforts of the Palestinian Government to improve the economic and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors,
education and culture, health, social protection, infrastructure and water,
Stressing the importance of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which was launched on
15 August 2013, and which aims, inter alia, at enhancing development support and assistance to the Palestinian people
and strengthening institutional capacity in line with Palestinian national priorities,
Gravely concerned about the accelerated construction of settlements and implementation of other related
measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well
as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant United Nations
resolutions, and stressing that such illegal measures are main sources of other Israeli violations and discriminatory
policies,
Encouraging all States and international organizations to continue to actively pursue policies to ensure respect
for their obligations under international law with regard to all illegal Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly Israeli settlements,
Taking note of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of
the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,90
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation, vandalism and
incitement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular by illegal armed Israeli settlers
against Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, including homes, historic and religious sites and
agricultural lands, and calling for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated in this regard,
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people
caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the
rights to work, to health, to education, to property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of access and
movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,91 and General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Deploring all loss of innocent civilian life and injury to scores of civilians, and calling upon all parties to fully
respect international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, including for the protection of
civilian life, as well as for the promotion of human security, the de-escalation of the situation, the exercise of restraint,
including from provocative actions and rhetoric, and the establishment of a stable environment conducive to the
pursuit of peace,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of properties, including
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks, agricultural lands and orchards, in the
_______________
90 A/HRC/22/63.
91 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1.
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54
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in connection with its construction of
settlements and the wall and confiscation of land, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinian
civilians, including the Bedouin community, due to the continuing and intensifying policy of home demolitions,
evictions and revocation of residency rights in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as measures to further
isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical
socioeconomic situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of closures and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit
regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact
on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestine refugee population, which remains
that of a humanitarian crisis,
Expressing grave concern, in particular, over the continuing crisis in the Gaza Strip as a result of the prolonged
Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, stressing that the
situation is unsustainable, and calling in that regard for the full implementation of Security Council resolution
1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border crossings for the sustained and
regular movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial flows and construction materials,
and emphasizing the need for security for all civilian populations,
Deploring the conflict in and around the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014 and the civilian casualties caused,
including the killing and injury of thousands of Palestinian civilians, including children, women and the elderly, as
well as the widespread destruction of or damage to thousands of homes and vital civilian infrastructure, including
schools, hospitals, water, sanitation and electricity networks, economic, industrial and agricultural properties, public
institutions, religious sites and United Nations schools and facilities, as well as the internal displacement of hundreds
of thousands of civilians, and any violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, in this
regard,
Gravely concerned about the consequent prolonged and extensive negative impact of the military operations of
July and August 2014, as well as the military operations between December 2008 and January 2009 and of November
2012, on economic conditions, the provision of social services and the social, humanitarian and physical living
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population, including the Palestine refugee population,
Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the Economic and Social
Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread destruction and
the hampering of the reconstruction process, by Israel, the occupying Power, on the socioeconomic and humanitarian
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, where the humanitarian crisis continues to deepen,
and calling in that regard for the immediate acceleration of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip with the
assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of funds pledged at the Cairo International Conference
on Palestine: Reconstructing Gaza, held on 12 October 2014,
Gravely concerned about various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies regarding the
substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread
poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including
high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths and injuries caused to civilians, including children, women and peaceful
demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be protected in accordance with
international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the cessation of all acts
of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and women, continue to be
held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions, including unhygienic conditions, solitary
Resolutions
55
confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, including of children, lack of proper medical care and
widespread medical neglect, including for ill prisoners, with the risk of fatal consequences, and denial of family visits
and of due process, that impair their well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill-treatment and
harassment of Palestinian prisoners and detainees and all reports of torture, while taking note of the May 2012
agreement reached on conditions of detention in Israeli prisons and calling for its full and immediate implementation,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and social infrastructure
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the urgent need to address the humanitarian
crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian assistance and
the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Recognizing the efforts by the Palestinian Government, with international support, to rebuild, reform and
strengthen its damaged institutions and promote good governance, emphasizing the need to preserve the Palestinian
national institutions and infrastructure and commending in this regard the ongoing efforts to develop the institutions
of an independent Palestinian State, including through the implementation of the Palestinian National Development
Plan on governance, economy, social development and infrastructure (2014–2016), and the significant achievements
made, as confirmed by the positive assessments made by international institutions regarding readiness for statehood,
including by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians, while also expressing concern about
the negative impact of the current instability and financial crisis being faced by the Palestinian Government,
Commending, in that regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and
the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people in line with their
national development and State-building plan, as well as the vital assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Affirming the need to support the Palestinian Government of national consensus in its assumption of full
government responsibilities in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in all fields, as well as through its presence at
Gaza’s crossing points, and Palestinian national reconciliation, and emphasizing the need for the respect and
preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with the Quartet,
Aware that development and fostering healthy economic and social conditions are difficult under occupation
and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council resolution
1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods and the
lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, including those restrictions arising from
ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closure system, and for other urgent measures to be taken to
alleviate the serious humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is dire in the Gaza Strip, and
calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under international humanitarian
law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure for the
provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to contribute to the promotion and
protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;92
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92 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
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5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure, agricultural lands and
governmental institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its military operations in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of
15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings into the Gaza Strip, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate fuel
supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and emphasizes
the need for security for all civilian populations;
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;85
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger
or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, and to prevent Israeli settlers from perpetrating such illegal activities;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of natural resources,
including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural
resources, namely, the water, land and energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and health threat
to the civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that obstruct the
implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza Strip, notably
the provision of the electric power needed for the work of the northern Gaza emergency sewage treatment plant, and
stresses in this regard the urgency of the reconstruction and development of water infrastructure, including the
desalination facility project for the Gaza Strip;
11. Calls for the assistance necessary for the safe removal of all unexploded ordnance in the Gaza Strip, which
endangers Palestinian lives and has a negative impact on the environment as well as reconstruction and development
efforts, welcomes the efforts exerted by the Mine Action Service of the United Nations to date, and urges support for
the efforts of the Service in this regard;
12. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a
major obstacle to economic and social development and to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation
of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the
demographic composition, legal status and character of the occupied territories, including in particular in and around
occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions and international law, including
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
13. Calls for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and recalls in this regard Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March
1994 and stresses the need for its implementation;
14. Also calls for urgent attention to the plight and the rights, in accordance with international law, of
Palestinian prisoners and detainees in Israeli prisons, and calls for efforts between the two sides for the further release
of prisoners and detainees;
15. Reaffirms that Israel’s ongoing construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in
and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank
and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and in that regard calls for
full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice91 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant resolutions;
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16. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose
family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaytirah entrance;
17. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority;
18. Expresses appreciation to the Member States, United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, regional and
non-governmental organizations that have provided and continue to provide economic and humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people, which has helped to ameliorate their critical economic and social conditions, and urges the
continued provision of assistance commensurate with increased socioeconomic and humanitarian needs, in
cooperation with official Palestinian institutions and consistent with the Palestinian National Development Plan;
19. Reiterates the importance of and need for increased and renewed international efforts on the basis of
relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978),
1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004) and 1850 (2008), and the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace,
the Arab Peace Initiative88 and the Quartet road map,89 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between
the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, in
order to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace
and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, and the achievement of a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace settlement;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session, through the
Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution and to continue to include in
the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in
collaboration with relevant United Nations agencies;
21. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the
living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of its 2017 session.
44th plenary meeting
25 July 2016
2016/15. Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011–2020
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling the Istanbul Declaration93 and the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the
Decade 2011–2020,94 adopted by the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, held in
Istanbul, Turkey, from 9 to 13 May 2011, and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 65/280 of 17 June
2011, in which the Assembly called upon all the relevant stakeholders to commit to implementing the Programme of
Action,
Reaffirming the overarching goal of the Istanbul Programme of Action of overcoming the structural challenges
faced by the least developed countries in order to eradicate poverty, achieve the internationally agreed development
goals and enable graduation from the least developed country category,
Recalling the Political Declaration adopted by the Comprehensive High-level Midterm Review of the
Implementation of the Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011–2020,
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93 Report of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Istanbul, Turkey, 9–13 May 2011 (A/CONF.219/7),
chap. I.
94 Ibid., chap. II.
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the impact assessments of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Secretariat and the monitoring
reports of the Committee on countries graduating or graduated from the least developed country category;
7. Encourages the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Development
Programme, the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization, the secretariat of the Enhanced Integrated Framework, the World Trade
Organization, the Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing
Countries and Small Island Developing States and the regional commissions, among others, to provide inputs to the
impact assessments prepared by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, to further contribute to the smooth
transition of countries graduating from the least developed country category, highlighting those entities’ operational
activities relating to building productive capacity in the least developed countries and the possible impact of
graduation on such activities;
8. Reiterates that treating the least developed countries as a group on the basis of their low per capita income,
human asset development and economic vulnerability remains the fundamental premise for special measures in their
favour and that wider recognition of least developed country status could stimulate and facilitate better integration of
the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011–2020221 into development policies,
and in this regard encourages the entities of the United Nations development system to consistently apply the least
developed country category in the provision of international support measures, including through the adoption of
common guidelines in this regard;
9. Also reiterates the invitation by the General Assembly to the governing bodies of the United Nations funds
and programmes and other multilateral organizations and international financial institutions to contribute to
implementing the Istanbul Programme of Action and to integrate it into their work programmes, as appropriate and
in accordance with their respective mandates;
10. Requests the entities of the United Nations development system to continue to prioritize resource allocations
to the least developed countries, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 71/243 of 21 December 2016;
11. Also requests the entities of the United Nations development system to provide assistance to graduating
countries in the formulation and implementation of their national transition strategies and to consider country-specific
support for graduated countries for a fixed period of time and in a predictable manner;
12. Invites the Committee to brief the Council every four years, in the year preceding the quadrennial
comprehensive policy review, on how the United Nations development system is applying the least developed country
category;
13. Acknowledges with satisfaction the contributions made by the Committee to the various aspects of the
programme of work of the Council, reiterates its invitation for increased interactions between the Council and the
Committee, and encourages the Chair and, as necessary, other members of the Committee to continue this practice,
as specified in Council resolution 2011/20 of 27 July 2011, within existing resources and as appropriate.
49th plenary meeting
25 July 2017
2017/30. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 71/97 of 6 December 2016 and 71/247 of 21 December 2016,
Recalling also its resolution 2016/14 of 25 July 2016,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980,
497(1981) of 17 December 1981 and 2334 (2016) of 23 December 2016,
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Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, including resolutions
ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of
15 December 2006,
Taking note of the report of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as transmitted by the
Secretary-General,224
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, of 12 August 1949,225 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,226 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights226 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,227 and affirming that these human rights
instruments are applicable and must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Noting with concern that it has been 70 years since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of
29 November 1947 and 50 years since the occupation of Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, in 1967,
Taking note, in this regard, of Palestine’s accession to several human rights treaties and the core humanitarian
law conventions as well as other international treaties,
Taking note also of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012,
Stressing the urgency of achieving without delay an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and a just,
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement on all tracks on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967),
338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003,
1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004, 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008 and 2334 (2016), the principle of land for peace, the
Arab Peace Initiative228 and the Quartet road map,229 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation, endangerment and depletion of natural
resources by Israel, the occupying Power, and Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, particularly as a result of settlement activities, which are illegal under
international law and which, deplorably, continued during the reporting period,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve environmentally sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and in the occupied Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent deterioration of economic and
living conditions,
Expressing alarm, in this regard, about the extremely high levels of unemployment in the Gaza Strip in
particular, which remains at over 40 per cent, with youth unemployment reaching 60 per cent, exacerbated by the
prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, and
the continuing negative repercussions of the military operations in the Gaza Strip on economic and social
infrastructure and living conditions,
Commending, despite the many constraints, including the obstacles imposed by the ongoing Israeli occupation,
the efforts of the Palestinian Government to improve the economic and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian
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224 A/72/90-E/2017/71.
225 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
226 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
227 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
228 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
229 S/2003/529, annex.
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Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors,
education and culture, health, social protection, infrastructure and water,
Stressing the importance of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which was launched on
15 August 2013 and which aims, inter alia, at enhancing development support and assistance to the Palestinian people
and strengthening institutional capacity in line with Palestinian national priorities,
Gravely concerned about the accelerated construction of settlements and implementation of other related
measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well
as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant United Nations
resolutions, and stressing that such illegal measures are main sources of other Israeli violations and discriminatory
policies,
Encouraging all States and international organizations to continue to actively pursue policies to ensure respect
for their obligations under international law with regard to all illegal Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly Israeli settlements,
Taking note of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of
the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,230
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation, vandalism and
incitement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular by illegal armed Israeli
settlers against Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, including homes, historic and religious
sites and agricultural lands, and calling for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated in this regard,
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people
caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the
rights to work, to health, to education, to property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of access and
movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,231 and General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Deploring all loss of innocent civilian life and injury to scores of civilians, and calling upon all parties to fully
respect international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, including for the protection of civilian life,
as well as for the promotion of human security, the de-escalation of the situation, the exercise of restraint, including
from provocative actions and rhetoric, and the establishment of a stable environment conducive to the pursuit of peace,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of properties, including
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks, agricultural lands and orchards, in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in connection with its construction of
settlements and the wall and confiscation of land, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinian
civilians, including the Bedouin community, due to the continuing and intensifying policy of home demolitions,
evictions and revocation of residency rights in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as measures to further
isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical
socioeconomic situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of closures and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit
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230 A/HRC/22/63.
231 See A/ES-10/273 and A/ES-10/273/Corr.1.
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regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact
on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestine refugee population, which remains
that of a humanitarian crisis,
Expressing grave concern, in particular, over the continuing crisis in the Gaza Strip as a result of the prolonged
Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, stressing that the
situation is unsustainable, as reflected in numerous reports, including the report of 26 August 2016 of the United
Nations country team, entitled “Gaza: two years after”, and calling in that regard for the full implementation of
Security Council resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border
crossings for the sustained and regular movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial
flows and construction materials, and emphasizing the need for security for all civilian populations,
Deploring the conflict in and around the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014 and the civilian casualties caused,
including the killing of and injury to thousands of Palestinian civilians, including children, women and the elderly, as
well as the widespread destruction of or damage to thousands of homes and vital civilian infrastructure, including
schools, hospitals, water, sanitation and electricity networks, economic, industrial and agricultural properties, public
institutions, religious sites and United Nations schools and facilities, as well as the internal displacement of hundreds
of thousands of civilians, and any violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, in
this regard,
Gravely concerned about the consequent prolonged and extensive negative impact of the military operations of
July and August 2014, as well as the military operations between December 2008 and January 2009 and of November
2012, on economic conditions, the provision of social services and the social, humanitarian and physical living
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population, including the Palestine refugee population,
Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the Economic and Social
Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread destruction and
the hampering of the reconstruction process, by Israel, the occupying Power, on the socioeconomic and humanitarian
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, where the humanitarian crisis continues to deepen,
and calling in that regard for the immediate acceleration and fulfilment of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip
with the assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of funds pledged at the Cairo International
Conference on Palestine: Reconstructing Gaza, held on 12 October 2014,
Gravely concerned about various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies regarding the
substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread
poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including
high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths of and injuries caused to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be protected in accordance with
international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the cessation of all acts
of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and women, continue to be
held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions, including unhygienic conditions, solitary
confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, including of children, lack of proper medical care and
widespread medical neglect, including for ill prisoners, with the risk of fatal consequences, and denial of family visits
and of due process, that impair their well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill-treatment and
harassment of Palestinian prisoners and detainees and all reports of torture,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and social infrastructure
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the urgent need to address the humanitarian
crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian assistance and
the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
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Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Government, with international support, to reform,
develop and strengthen its institutions and infrastructure, emphasizing the need to preserve and further develop
Palestinian institutions and infrastructure, despite the obstacles presented by the ongoing Israeli occupation, and
commending in this regard the ongoing efforts to develop the institutions of an independent Palestinian State,
including through the implementation of the Palestinian National Policy Agenda: National Priorities, Policies and
Policy Interventions (2017–2022),
Expressing concern about the risks posed to the significant achievements made, as confirmed by the positive
assessments made by international institutions regarding readiness for statehood, including by the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the
International Assistance to Palestinians, owing to the negative impact of ongoing instability and the financial crisis
being faced by the Palestinian Government and the continued absence of a credible political horizon,
Commending, in that regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and
the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people in line with their
national development and State-building plan, as well as the vital assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Affirming the need to support the Palestinian Government of national consensus in its assumption of full
government responsibilities in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in all fields, as well as through its presence at
Gaza’s crossing points, and Palestinian national reconciliation, and emphasizing the need for the respect and
preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with the Quartet,
Aware that development and fostering healthy economic, social and environmental conditions are difficult under
occupation and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council resolution
1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods and the
lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, including those restrictions arising from
ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closure system, and for other urgent measures to be taken to
alleviate the serious humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is dire in the Gaza Strip, and
also calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under international
humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure for the
provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to contribute to the promotion and
protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;232
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure, agricultural lands and
government institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its military operations in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of
15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings into the Gaza Strip, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate fuel
supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and emphasizes
the need for security for all civilian populations;
_______________
232 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
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7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;225
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger
or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, and to prevent Israeli settlers from perpetrating such illegal activities;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of natural resources,
including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural
resources, namely, the water, land and energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and health threat
to the civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that obstruct the
implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza Strip, notably
the provision of the electric power needed for the work of the northern Gaza emergency sewage treatment plant, and
stresses in this regard the urgency of the reconstruction and development of water infrastructure, including the
desalination facility project for the Gaza Strip;
11. Calls for the assistance necessary for the safe removal of all unexploded ordnance in the Gaza Strip, which
endanger Palestinian lives and negatively impact the environment as well as reconstruction and development efforts,
and welcomes the efforts exerted by the Mine Action Service of the United Nations to date;
12. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a
major obstacle to economic and social development and to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation
of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the
demographic composition, legal status and character of the occupied territories, including in particular in and around
occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2334 (2016),
and international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
13. Calls for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and recalls in this regard Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March
1994 and stresses the need for its implementation;
14. Also calls for urgent attention to the plight and the rights, in accordance with international law, of
Palestinian prisoners and detainees in Israeli prisons, and calls for efforts between the two sides for the further release
of prisoners and detainees;
15. Reaffirms that Israel’s ongoing construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West
Bank and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in that regard
for full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice231 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant resolutions;
16. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose
family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaytirah entrance;
17. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority;
18. Expresses appreciation to the Member States, United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, regional and
non-governmental organizations that have provided and continue to provide economic and humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people, which has helped to ameliorate their critical economic and social conditions, and urges the
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continued provision of assistance commensurate with increased socioeconomic and humanitarian needs and in
cooperation with official Palestinian institutions and consistent with the Palestinian National Development Plan;
19. Reiterates the importance of and need for increased and renewed international efforts on the basis of
relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978),
1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004), 1850 (2008) and 2334 (2016), and the Madrid Conference, the principle of
land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative228 and the Quartet road map,229 as well as compliance with the agreements
reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people, in order to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine living
side by side in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, and the achievement of
a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-second session, through
the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution and to continue to include
in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people,
in collaboration with relevant United Nations agencies;
21. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the
living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of its 2018 session.
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25 July 2017
2017/31. Support to Non-Self-Governing Territories by the specialized agencies and international
institutions associated with the United Nations
The Economic and Social Council,
Having examined the report of the Secretary-General233 and the report of the President of the Economic and
Social Council containing the information submitted by the specialized agencies and other organizations of the United
Nations system on their activities with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,234
Having heard the statement by the representative of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,235
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 1541 (XV) of 15 December
1960, the resolutions of the Special Committee and other relevant resolutions and decisions, including, in particular,
Economic and Social Council resolution 2016/20 of 27 July 2016,
Bearing in mind the relevant provisions of the final documents of the successive Conferences of Heads of State
or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the African Union, the Pacific Islands Forum and the Caribbean Community,
Conscious of the need to facilitate the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),
Welcoming the current participation, in their capacity as observers, of those Non-Self-Governing Territories that
are associate members of the regional commissions in the world conferences in the economic and social sphere,
subject to the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and in accordance with relevant resolutions and decisions
of the United Nations, including resolutions and decisions of the Assembly and the Special Committee on specific
Non-Self-Governing Territories,
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233 A/72/69.
234 E/2017/59.
235 See E/2017/SR.50.
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to development challenges in a more flexible and effective manner, with special emphasis on an integrated approach
to capacity-building, and encourages all development partners, including the United Nations system and developing
countries, to support such modalities;
9. Calls upon the Government of Haiti and development partners to support civil society organizations in
Haiti, to benefit from their local knowledge and to strengthen their capacity to engage in the development process and
become more effective agents of change in support of Haiti’s development objectives;
10. Invites donors to align their efforts with the National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti
(2013–2022), the new United Nations approach to cholera in Haiti and the national health plan, as well as with other
national activities to prevent waterborne diseases, and to provide the financial resources necessary for their
implementation, and welcomes the efforts undertaken by the United Nations Special Envoy for Haiti to mobilize
adequate funding to eliminate cholera from Haiti;
11. Calls urgently for adequate funding for humanitarian activities, including the cholera epidemic response,
as presented in the 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan for Haiti, and encourages partners to connect short-term
activities with long-term development to build resilience and reduce the recurrence of crises;
12. Encourages all relevant actors within the United Nations system, including the peacebuilding architecture,
as appropriate, to consider ways in which they can coordinate their efforts, at the request of the Government of Haiti,
to better contribute to the strengthening of national institutions and the implementation of strategies and programmes
to support reconstruction and sustainable development;
13. Decides to extend the mandate of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti until the conclusion of the 2019
session, with the purpose of following closely and providing advice on the long-term development strategy of Haiti
to promote socioeconomic recovery, reconstruction and stability, with particular attention to the need to ensure
coherence and sustainability in international support for Haiti, based on the long-term national development priorities,
building upon the Strategic Plan for the Development of Haiti, and stressing the need to avoid overlap and duplication
with respect to existing mechanisms;
14. Expresses its satisfaction to the Secretary-General for the support provided to the Advisory Group, and
requests him to continue to support the activities of the Group adequately and within existing resources;
15. Requests the Advisory Group, in accomplishing its mandate, to continue to cooperate with the Secretary-
General and his Special Representative for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti,
the United Nations Sustainable Development Group, relevant United Nations funds and programmes, the specialized
agencies, the international financial institutions, regional organizations and institutions, including the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community,
the Union of South American Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank, other major stakeholders and civil
society organizations, and in this regard welcomes the continuation of the dialogue between the members of the
Advisory Group and the Organization of American States;
16. Also requests the Advisory Group to submit a report on its work, with recommendations, as appropriate,
to the Economic and Social Council for its consideration at its 2019 session.
50th plenary meeting
24 July 2018
2018/20. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 72/86 of 7 December 2017 and 72/240 of 20 December 2017,
Recalling also its resolution 2017/30 of 25 July 2017,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980,
497 (1981) of 17 December 1981 and 2334 (2016) of 23 December 2016,
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Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, including resolutions
ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of
15 December 2006,
Taking note of the report of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as transmitted by the
Secretary-General,126
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, of 12 August 1949,127 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab territories
occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,128 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights128 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,129 and affirming that these human rights
instruments are applicable and must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Noting with concern that more than 70 years have passed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution
181 (II) of 29 November 1947 and 51 years since the occupation of Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem,
in 1967,
Taking note, in this regard, of Palestine’s accession to several human rights treaties and the core humanitarian
law conventions as well as other international treaties,
Taking note also of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012,
Stressing the urgency of achieving without delay an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and a just,
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement on all tracks on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967),
338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003,
1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004, 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008 and 2334 (2016), the principle of land for peace, the
Arab Peace Initiative130 and the Quartet road map,131 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation, endangerment and depletion of natural
resources by Israel, the occupying Power, and Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, particularly as a result of settlement activities, which are illegal under
international law and which, deplorably, continued during the reporting period,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve environmentally sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and
in the occupied Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent deterioration of economic and
living conditions,
Expressing alarm, in this regard, about the extremely high levels of unemployment in the Gaza Strip in
particular, which remains at over 40 per cent, with youth unemployment reaching 60 per cent, exacerbated by the
prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, and
the continuing negative repercussions of the military operations in the Gaza Strip on economic and social
infrastructure and living conditions,
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126 A/73/87-E/2018/69.
127 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
128 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
129 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
130 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
131 S/2003/529, annex.
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Commending, despite the many constraints, including the obstacles imposed by the ongoing Israeli occupation,
the efforts of the Palestinian Government to improve the economic and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors,
education and culture, health, social protection, infrastructure and water,
Stressing the importance of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which aims, inter alia, at
enhancing development support and assistance to the Palestinian people and strengthening institutional capacity in
line with Palestinian national priorities,
Gravely concerned about the accelerated construction of settlements and implementation of other related
measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well
as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant United Nations
resolutions, and stressing that such illegal measures are main sources of other Israeli violations and discriminatory
policies,
Encouraging all States and international organizations to continue to actively pursue policies to ensure respect
for their obligations under international law with regard to all illegal Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly Israeli settlements,
Taking note of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of
the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,132
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation, vandalism and
incitement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular by illegal armed Israeli settlers
against Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, including homes, historic and religious sites and
agricultural lands, and calling for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated in this regard,
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people
caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the
rights to work, to health, to education, to property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of access and
movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,133 and General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Deploring all loss of innocent civilian life and injury to scores of civilians, and calling upon all parties to fully
respect international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, including for the protection of civilian life, as
well as for the promotion of human security, the de-escalation of the situation, the exercise of restraint, including from
provocative actions and rhetoric, and the establishment of a stable environment conducive to the pursuit of peace,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of properties, including
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks, agricultural lands and orchards, in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in connection with its construction of
settlements and the wall and confiscation of land, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinian
civilians, including the Bedouin community, due to the continuing and intensifying policy of home demolitions,
evictions and revocation of residency rights in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as measures to further
isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical
socioeconomic situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
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132 A/HRC/22/63.
133 See A/ES-10/273 and A/ES-10/273/Corr.1.
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Expressing grave concern further about ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of closures and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit
regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact
on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestine refugee population, which remains
that of a humanitarian crisis,
Expressing grave concern, in particular, over the continuing crisis in the Gaza Strip as a result of the prolonged
Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, stressing that the
situation is unsustainable, as reflected in numerous reports, including the report of 26 August 2016 of the United
Nations country team, entitled “Gaza: two years after”, and calling in that regard for the full implementation of
Security Council resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border
crossings for the sustained and regular movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial
flows and construction materials, and emphasizing the need for security for all civilian populations,
Deploring the conflict in and around the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014 and the civilian casualties caused,
including the killing of and injury to thousands of Palestinian civilians, including children, women and the elderly, as
well as the widespread destruction of or damage to thousands of homes and vital civilian infrastructure, including
schools, hospitals, water, sanitation and electricity networks, economic, industrial and agricultural properties, public
institutions, religious sites and United Nations schools and facilities, as well as the internal displacement of hundreds
of thousands of civilians, and any violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, in this
regard,
Gravely concerned about the consequent prolonged and extensive negative impact of the military operations of
July and August 2014, as well as the military operations between December 2008 and January 2009 and of November
2012, on economic conditions, the provision of social services and the social, humanitarian and physical living
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population, including the Palestine refugee population,
Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the Economic and Social
Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread destruction and
the hampering of the reconstruction process, by Israel, the occupying Power, on the socioeconomic and humanitarian
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, where the humanitarian crisis continues to deepen,
and calling in that regard for the immediate acceleration and fulfilment of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip
with the assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of funds pledged at the Cairo International
Conference on Palestine: Reconstructing Gaza, held on 12 October 2014,
Gravely concerned about various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies regarding the
substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread
poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including
high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths of and injuries caused to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be protected in accordance with
international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the cessation of all acts
of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and women, continue to be
held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions, including unhygienic conditions, solitary
confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, including of children, lack of proper medical care and
widespread medical neglect, including for ill prisoners, with the risk of fatal consequences, and denial of family visits
and of due process, that impair their well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill-treatment and
harassment of Palestinian prisoners and detainees and all reports of torture,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and social infrastructure
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the urgent need to address the humanitarian
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crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian assistance and
the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Government, with international support, to reform,
develop and strengthen its institutions and infrastructure, emphasizing the need to preserve and further develop
Palestinian institutions and infrastructure, despite the obstacles presented by the ongoing Israeli occupation, and
commending in this regard the ongoing efforts to develop the institutions of an independent Palestinian State,
including through the implementation of the Palestinian National Policy Agenda: National Priorities, Policies and
Policy Interventions (2017–2022),
Expressing concern about the risks posed to the significant achievements made, as confirmed by the positive
assessments made by international institutions regarding readiness for statehood, including by the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the
International Assistance to Palestinians, owing to the negative impact of ongoing instability and the financial crisis
being faced by the Palestinian Government and the continued absence of a credible political horizon,
Commending, in that regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and
the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people in line with their
national development and State-building plan, as well as the vital assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Affirming the need to support the Palestinian Government of national consensus in its assumption of full
government responsibilities in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in all fields, as well as through its presence at
Gaza’s crossing points, and Palestinian national reconciliation, and emphasizing the need for the respect and
preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with the Quartet,
Aware that development and fostering healthy economic, social and environmental conditions are difficult under
occupation and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council resolution
1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods and the
lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, including those restrictions arising from
ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closure system, and for other urgent measures to be taken to
alleviate the serious humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is dire in the Gaza Strip, and
also calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under international
humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure for the
provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to contribute to the promotion and
protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;134
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure, agricultural lands and
government institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its military operations in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of
15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings into the Gaza Strip, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate fuel
supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and emphasizes
the need for security for all civilian populations;
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134 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
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7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;127
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger
or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, and to prevent Israeli settlers from perpetrating such illegal activities;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of natural resources,
including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural
resources, namely, the water, land and energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and health threat
to the civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that obstruct the
implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza Strip, notably
the provision of the electric power needed for the work of the northern Gaza emergency sewage treatment plant, and
stresses in this regard the urgency of the reconstruction and development of water infrastructure, including the
desalination facility project for the Gaza Strip;
11. Calls for the assistance necessary for the safe removal of all unexploded ordnance in the Gaza Strip, which
endangers Palestinian lives and negatively impacts the environment, as well as reconstruction and development
efforts, and welcomes the efforts exerted by the Mine Action Service of the United Nations to date;
12. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a
major obstacle to economic and social development and to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation
of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the
demographic composition, legal status and character of the occupied territories, including in particular in and around
occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2334 (2016),
and international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
13. Calls for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and recalls in this regard Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March
1994 and stresses the need for its implementation;
14. Also calls for urgent attention to the plight and the rights, in accordance with international law, of prisoners
and detainees, and calls for efforts between the two sides for the further release of prisoners and detainees, and deplores
the practice of withholding the bodies of those killed, and calls for the release of the bodies that have not yet been
returned to their relatives, in line with international humanitarian law and human rights law, in order to ensure dignified
closure in accordance with their religious beliefs and traditions;
15. Reaffirms that Israel’s ongoing construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in
and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank
and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in that regard for
full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice133 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant resolutions;
16. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose
family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaytirah entrance;
17. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority;
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18. Welcomes and urges further engagement by the Secretary-General and the United Nations Special
Coordinator to assist, in cooperation with concerned partners, in the efforts to address urgent infrastructure,
humanitarian and economic development needs, including through the implementation of projects endorsed by the
Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians;
19. Expresses appreciation to the Member States, United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, regional and
non-governmental organizations that have provided and continue to provide economic and humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people, which has helped to ameliorate their critical economic and social conditions, and urges the
continued provision of assistance commensurate with increased socioeconomic and humanitarian needs and in
cooperation with official Palestinian institutions and consistent with the Palestinian National Development Plan;
20. Reiterates the importance of and need for increased and renewed international efforts on the basis of
relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978),
1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004), 1850 (2008) and 2334 (2016), and the Madrid Conference, the principle of
land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative130 and the Quartet road map,131 as well as compliance with the agreements
reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people, in order to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine living
side by side in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, and the achievement of
a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-third session, through
the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution and to continue to include
in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people,
in collaboration with relevant United Nations agencies;
22. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the
living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of its 2019 session.
50th plenary meeting
24 July 2018
2018/21. Admission of French Guiana as an associate member of the Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean
The Economic and Social Council,
Taking note of resolution 726 (XXXVII) of 11 May 2018 of the Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean, by which the Commission decided that French Guiana should be granted associate membership in the
Commission,
Approves the granting to French Guiana of associate membership in the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean.
51st plenary meeting
24 July 2018
2018/22. African Institute for Economic Development and Planning
The Economic and Social Council,
Taking note of resolution 956 (LI) of 15 May 2018 of the Economic Commission for Africa Conference of
African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, by which the Conference endorsed the updated
statute of the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning,
Endorses the updated statute of the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, as set out in the
annex to the present resolution.
51st plenary meeting
24 July 2018
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levels by, inter alia, promoting women’s capacity, leadership, participation and engagement in political, economic and
humanitarian decision-making;
12. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to review the situation, to assist Palestinian women by all
available means, including those set out in his report, and to include information on the gender-specific impact of the
occupation and the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution in his report on the economic and
social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan to the Economic
and Social Council at its 2020 session.
37th plenary meeting
23 July 2019
2019/29. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 73/98 of 7 December 2018 and 73/255 of 20 December 2018,
Recalling also its resolution 2018/20 of 24 July 2018,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980,
497 (1981) of 17 December 1981 and 2334 (2016) of 23 December 2016,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, including resolutions
ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of
15 December 2006,
Taking note of the report of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as transmitted by the
Secretary-General,206
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, of 12 August 1949,207 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab territories
occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,208 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights208 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,209 and affirming that these human rights
instruments are applicable and must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Noting with concern that more than 70 years have passed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution
181 (II) of 29 November 1947 and 52 years since the occupation of the Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem,
in 1967,
Taking note, in this regard, of Palestine’s accession to several human rights treaties and the core humanitarian
law conventions as well as other international treaties,
_______________
206 A/74/88-E/2019/72.
207 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
208 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
209 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
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Taking note also of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012,
Stressing the urgency of achieving without delay an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and a just,
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement on all tracks on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967),
338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003,
1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004, 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008 and 2334 (2016), the principle of land for peace, the
Arab Peace Initiative210 and the Quartet road map,211 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation, endangerment and depletion of natural
resources by Israel, the occupying Power, and Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, particularly as a result of settlement activities, which are illegal under
international law and which, deplorably, continued during the reporting period,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve environmentally sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and
in the occupied Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent deterioration of economic and
living conditions,
Expressing alarm, in this regard, about the extremely high levels of unemployment in the Gaza Strip in
particular, which remains at over 40 per cent, with youth unemployment reaching 60 per cent, exacerbated by the
prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, and
the continuing negative repercussions of the military operations in the Gaza Strip on economic and social
infrastructure and living conditions,
Commending, despite the many constraints, including the obstacles imposed by the ongoing Israeli occupation,
the efforts of the Palestinian Government to improve the economic and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors,
education and culture, health, social protection, infrastructure and water,
Stressing the importance of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which aims, inter alia, at
enhancing development support and assistance to the Palestinian people and strengthening institutional capacity in
line with Palestinian national priorities,
Gravely concerned about the accelerated construction of settlements and implementation of other related
measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well
as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant United Nations
resolutions, and stressing that such illegal measures are main sources of other Israeli violations and discriminatory
policies,
Encouraging all States and international organizations to continue to actively pursue policies to ensure respect
for their obligations under international law with regard to all illegal Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly Israeli settlements,
Taking note of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of
the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,212
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation, vandalism and
incitement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular by illegal armed Israeli settlers
against Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, including homes, historic and religious sites and
agricultural lands, and calling for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated in this regard,
_______________
210 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
211 S/2003/529, annex.
212 A/HRC/22/63.
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Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people
caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the
rights to work, to health, to education, to property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of access and
movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,213 and General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Deploring all loss of innocent civilian life and injury to scores of civilians, and calling upon all parties to fully
respect international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, including for the protection of civilian life, as
well as for the promotion of human security, the de-escalation of the situation, the exercise of restraint, including from
provocative actions and rhetoric, and the establishment of a stable environment conducive to the pursuit of peace,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of properties, including
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks, agricultural lands and orchards, in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in connection with its construction of
settlements and the wall and confiscation of land, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinian
civilians, including the Bedouin community, due to the continuing and intensifying policy of home demolitions,
evictions and revocation of residency rights in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as measures to further
isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical
socioeconomic situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of closures and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit
regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact
on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestine refugee population, which remains
that of a humanitarian crisis,
Expressing grave concern, in particular, over the continuing crisis in the Gaza Strip as a result of the prolonged
Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, stressing that the
situation is unsustainable, as reflected in numerous reports, including the report of 26 August 2016 of the United
Nations country team, entitled “Gaza: two years after”, and calling in that regard for the full implementation of
Security Council resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border
crossings for the sustained and regular movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial
flows and construction materials, and emphasizing the need for security for all civilian populations,
Deploring the conflict in and around the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014 and the civilian casualties caused,
including the killing of and injury to thousands of Palestinian civilians, including children, women and the elderly, as
well as the widespread destruction of or damage to thousands of homes and vital civilian infrastructure, including
schools, hospitals, water, sanitation and electricity networks, economic, industrial and agricultural properties, public
institutions, religious sites and United Nations schools and facilities, as well as the internal displacement of hundreds
of thousands of civilians, and any violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, in this
regard,
Gravely concerned about the consequent prolonged and extensive negative impact of the military operations of
July and August 2014, as well as the military operations between December 2008 and January 2009 and of November
2012, on economic conditions, the provision of social services and the social, humanitarian and physical living
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population, including the Palestine refugee population,
_______________
213 See A/ES-10/273 and A/ES-10/273/Corr.1.
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Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the Economic and Social
Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread destruction and
the hampering of the reconstruction process, by Israel, the occupying Power, on the socioeconomic and humanitarian
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, where the humanitarian crisis continues to deepen,
and calling in that regard for the immediate acceleration and fulfilment of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip
with the assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of funds pledged at the Cairo International
Conference on Palestine: Reconstructing Gaza, held on 12 October 2014,
Gravely concerned about various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies regarding the
substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread
poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including
high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths of and injuries caused to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be protected in accordance with
international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the cessation of all acts
of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and women, continue to be
held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions, including unhygienic conditions, solitary
confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, including of children, lack of proper medical care and
widespread medical neglect, including for ill prisoners, with the risk of fatal consequences, and denial of family visits
and of due process, that impair their well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill-treatment and
harassment of Palestinian prisoners and detainees and all reports of torture,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and social infrastructure
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the urgent need to address the humanitarian
crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian assistance and
the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Government, with international support, to reform,
develop and strengthen its institutions and infrastructure, emphasizing the need to preserve and further develop
Palestinian institutions and infrastructure, despite the obstacles presented by the ongoing Israeli occupation, and
commending in this regard the ongoing efforts to develop the institutions of an independent Palestinian State,
including through the implementation of the Palestinian National Policy Agenda: National Priorities, Policies and
Policy Interventions (2017–2022),
Expressing concern about the risks posed to the significant achievements made, as confirmed by the positive
assessments made by international institutions regarding readiness for statehood, including by the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the
International Assistance to Palestinians, owing to the negative impact of ongoing instability and the financial crisis
being faced by the Palestinian Government and the continued absence of a credible political horizon,
Commending, in that regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and
the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people in line with their
national development and State-building plan, as well as the vital assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Affirming the need to support the Palestinian Government of national consensus in its assumption of full
government responsibilities in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in all fields, as well as through its presence at
Gaza’s crossing points, and Palestinian national reconciliation, and emphasizing the need for the respect and
preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with the Quartet,
Aware that development and fostering healthy economic, social and environmental conditions are difficult under
occupation and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability,
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116
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council resolution
1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods and the
lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, including those restrictions arising from
ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closure system, and for other urgent measures to be taken to
alleviate the serious humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is dire in the Gaza Strip, and
also calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under international
humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure for the
provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to contribute to the promotion and
protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;214
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure, agricultural lands and
government institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its military operations in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of 15
November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings into the Gaza Strip, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate fuel
supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and emphasizes
the need for security for all civilian populations;
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;207
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger
or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, and to prevent Israeli settlers from perpetrating such illegal activities;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of natural resources,
including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural
resources, namely, the water, land and energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and health threat
to the civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that obstruct the
implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza Strip, notably
the provision of the electric power needed for the work of the northern Gaza emergency sewage treatment plant, and
stresses in this regard the urgency of the reconstruction and development of water infrastructure, including the
desalination facility project for the Gaza Strip;
11. Calls for the assistance necessary for the safe removal of all unexploded ordnance in the Gaza Strip, which
endangers Palestinian lives and negatively impacts the environment, as well as reconstruction and development
efforts, and welcomes the efforts exerted by the Mine Action Service of the United Nations to date;
_______________
214 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
Resolutions
117
12. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a
major obstacle to economic and social development and to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation
of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the
demographic composition, legal status and character of the occupied territories, including in particular in and around
occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2334 (2016),
and international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
13. Calls for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and recalls in this regard Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March
1994 and stresses the need for its implementation;
14. Also calls for urgent attention to the plight and the rights, in accordance with international law, of prisoners
and detainees, and calls for efforts between the two sides for the further release of prisoners and detainees, and deplores
the practice of withholding the bodies of those killed, and calls for the release of the bodies that have not yet been
returned to their relatives, in line with international humanitarian law and human rights law, in order to ensure dignified
closure in accordance with their religious beliefs and traditions;
15. Reaffirms that Israel’s ongoing construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in
and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank
and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in that regard for
full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice213 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant resolutions;
16. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose
family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaytirah entrance;
17. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority;
18. Welcomes and urges further engagement by the Secretary-General and the United Nations Special
Coordinator to assist, in cooperation with concerned partners, in the efforts to address urgent infrastructure,
humanitarian and economic development needs, including through the implementation of projects endorsed by the
Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians;
19. Expresses appreciation to the Member States, United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, regional and
non-governmental organizations that have provided and continue to provide economic and humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people, which has helped to ameliorate their critical economic and social conditions, and urges the
continued provision of assistance commensurate with increased socioeconomic and humanitarian needs and in
cooperation with official Palestinian institutions and consistent with the Palestinian National Development Plan;
20. Reiterates the importance of and need for increased and renewed international efforts on the basis of
relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978),
1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004), 1850 (2008) and 2334 (2016), and the Madrid Conference, the principle of
land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative210 and the Quartet road map,211 as well as compliance with the agreements
reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people, in order to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine living
side by side in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, and the achievement of
a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-fourth session, through
the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution and to continue to include
in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people,
in collaboration with relevant United Nations agencies;
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118
22. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the
living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of its 2020 session.
37th plenary meeting
23 July 2019
2019/30. Developing the work of the Technical Committee on Liberalization of Foreign Trade,
Economic Globalization and Financing for Development
The Economic and Social Council,
Taking note of resolution 332 (XXX) of 28 June 2018 of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia,
Approves the splitting of the Technical Committee on Liberalization of Foreign Trade, Economic Globalization
and Financing for Development into two committees, the Committee on Financing for Development in the States
members of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Committee on Trade Policies in the States
members of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, which will each hold biennial sessions, in
accordance with the provisions of Commission resolution 332 (XXX), annexed to the present resolution.
37th plenary meeting
23 July 2019
Annex
Resolution 332 (XXX)
Developing the work of the Technical Committee on Liberalization of Foreign Trade, Economic
Globalization and Financing for Development
The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia,
Referring to its resolutions 313 (XXVII) of 10 May 2012 on the frequency of sessions of the Technical
Committee on Liberalization of Foreign Trade, Economic Globalization and Financing for Development in the
Countries of the Region of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and 214 (XIX) of 7 May 1997
on the establishment of that Committee,
Recalling the Doha Declaration on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
adopted by member States at the twenty-ninth session of the Commission, in which they requested that focus be
placed on financing for development and that a forum for discussing the issue be created,
Taking into consideration the recommendations of the Technical Committee on Liberalization of Foreign Trade,
Economic Globalization and Financing for Development at its twelfth and thirteenth sessions on splitting the
Committee into two committees, which would each hold biennial sessions,
Realizing the importance of increased participation of member States in prioritizing, planning and developing
Commission programmes on financing for development,
Aware of the need to enhance coordination and complementarity between the Commission and Arab regional
organizations in their work on financing for development policies, in order to respond to the needs of member States
and build their capacity to finance national development plans,
Recognizing the importance of the role of the Commission in tackling trade policy issues to support Arab States
on the path towards regional integration and sustainable development,
Guided by action taken by other United Nations regional commissions to develop the work of their subsidiary
bodies to better respond to the priorities of their member States,
1. Approves the splitting of the Technical Committee on Liberalization of Foreign Trade, Economic
Globalization and Financing for Development into two committees, the Committee on Financing for Development
in the States members of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Committee on Trade Policies
in the States members of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, which will each hold biennial
sessions, without any additional financial implications;
Resolutions
22
Taking note also of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia doc uments on
progress in the reform of the Commission13 and on the proposed programme plan for 2021,14
Taking note further of Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia resolution 335 (S-VI)
of 21 December 2019, by which the Commission adopted its programme plan for 2021,
Endorses the new strategic vision of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
as outlined in the note by the Secretary-General.
1st plenary meeting
14 September 2020
2021/4. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 74/88 of 13 December 2019 and 74/243 of
19 December 2019,
Recalling also its resolution 2019/29 of 23 July 2019,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Cou ncil resolutions, including
resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October
1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980, 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981 and 2334 (2016) of 23 December
2016,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly,
including resolutions ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of
20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of 15 December 2006,
Taking note of the report of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the
economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, an d of the Arab population in
the occupied Syrian Golan, as transmitted by the Secretary -General,15
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,16 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 17 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights18 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,19
and affirming that these human rights instruments are applicable and mus t be respected in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
_______________
13 E/ESCWA/S-6/14.
14 E/ESCWA/S-6/16.
15 A/75/86-E/2020/62.
16 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
17 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
18 Ibid.
19 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
Resolutions
23
Noting with concern that more than 70 years have passed since the adoption of General
Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 and 53 years since the occupation of the
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, in 1967,
Taking note, in this regard, of Palestine’s accession to several human rights treaties and the core
humanitarian law conventions as well as other international treaties,
Taking note also of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012,
Stressing the urgency of achieving without delay an end to the Israeli occupation that began
in 1967 and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement on all tracks on the basis of Security
Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March
2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004, 1850 (2008) of 16 December
2008 and 2334 (2016), the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative20 and the Quartet road
map,21 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation
over their natural resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation,
endangerment and depletion of natural resources by Israel, the occupying Power, and Israeli settlers
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
particularly as a result of settlement activities, which are illegal under international law and which,
deplorably, continued during the reporting period,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the effo rts to achieve
environmentally sustainable development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, and expressing
grave concern about the consequent deterioration of ec onomic and living conditions,
Expressing alarm, in this regard, about the extremely high levels of unemployment in the
Gaza Strip in particular, which remains at over 40 per cent, with youth unemployment reaching 60 per
cent, exacerbated by the prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions
that in effect amount to a blockade, and the continuing negative repercussions of the military
operations in the Gaza Strip on economic and social infrastructure and living conditions ,
Commending, despite the many constraints, including the obstacles imposed by the ongoing
Israeli occupation, the efforts of the Palestinian Government to improve the economic and social
situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of law
and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors, education and culture, health, social protection,
infrastructure and water,
Stressing the importance of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation
Framework, which aims, inter alia, at enhancing development support and assistance to the
Palestinian people and strengthening institutional capacity in line with Palestinian national priorities,
Gravely concerned about the accelerated construction of settleme nts and implementation of
other related measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around
occupied East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international
humanitarian law and relevant United Nations resolutions, and stressing that such illegal measures
are main sources of other Israeli violations and discriminatory policies,
_______________
20 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
21 S/2003/529, annex.
Resolutions
24
Encouraging all States and international organizations to continue to actively pursue policies
to ensure respect for their obligations under international law with regard to all illegal Israeli practices
and measures in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly Israeli
settlements,
Taking note of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate
the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights
of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 22
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation,
vandalism and incitement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in
particular by illegal armed Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians, includi ng children, and their
properties, including homes, historic and religious sites and agricultural lands, and calling for
accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated in this regard,
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the
Palestinian people caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation
of their economic and social rights, including the rights to work, to health, to education, to property,
to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of access and movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International
Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory,23 and General Assembly resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the
obligations mentioned therein,
Deploring all loss of innocent civilian life and injury to scores of civilians, and calling upon
all parties to fully respect international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, including
for the protection of civilian life, as well as for the promotion of human security, the de-escalation of
the situation, the exercise of restraint, including from provocative actions and rhetoric, and the
establishment of a stable environment conducive to the pursuit of peace,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of
properties, including the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks,
agricultural lands and orchards, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in
particular in connection with its construction of settlements and the wall and confiscation of land,
contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing forced displacement and dispossession
of Palestinian civilians, including the Bedouin community, due to the continuing and intensifying
policy of home demolitions, evictions and revocation of residency rights in and around occupied Eas t
Jerusalem, as well as measures to further isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, which
have seriously exacerbated the already critical socioeconomic situation being faced by the Palestinian
population,
Expressing grave concern further about ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of
closures and severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, the imposition of crossing
closures, checkpoints and a permit regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian
people, in particular the Palestine refugee population, which remains that of a humanitarian crisis,
_______________
22 A/HRC/22/63.
23 See A/ES-10/273 and A/ES-10/273/Corr.1.
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25
Expressing grave concern, in particular, over the continuing crisis in the Gaza Strip as a
result of the prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect
amount to a blockade, stressing that the situation is unsustainable, as reflected in numerous reports,
including the report of 26 August 2016 of the United Nations country team, entitled “Gaza: two years
after”, and calling in that regard for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1860
(2009) of 8 January 2009 with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border crossings for the
sustained and regular movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial flows
and construction materials, and emphasizing the need for security for all ci vilian populations,
Deploring the conflict in and around the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014 and the civilian
casualties caused, including the killing of and injury to thousands of Palestinian civilians, including
children, women and the elderly, as well as the widespread destruction of or damage to thousands of
homes and vital civilian infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, water, sanitation and electricity
networks, economic, industrial and agricultural properties, public institutions, religiou s sites and
United Nations schools and facilities, as well as the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands
of civilians, and any violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, in
this regard,
Gravely concerned about the consequent prolonged and extensive negative impact of the
military operations of July and August 2014, as well as the military operations between December
2008 and January 2009 and of November 2012, on economic conditions, the provision of social
services and the social, humanitarian and physical living conditions of the Palestinian civilian
population, including the Palestine refugee population,
Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the
Economic and Social Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human
Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such
widespread destruction and the hampering of the reconstruction process, by Israel, t he occupying
Power, on the socioeconomic and humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the
Gaza Strip, where the humanitarian crisis continues to deepen, and calling in that regard for the
immediate acceleration and fulfilment of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip with the
assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of funds pledged at the Cairo
International Conference on Palestine: Reconstructing Gaza, held on 12 October 2014,
Gravely concerned about various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies
regarding the substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of
unemployment, widespread poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and
rising health-related problems, including high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian people,
especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths of and injuries caused to civilians, including children,
women and peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be
protected in accordance with international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the
cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction,
and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and
women, continue to be held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions, including
unhygienic conditions, solitary confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, including of
children, lack of proper medical care and widespread medical ne glect, including for ill prisoners,
with the risk of fatal consequences, and denial of family visits and of due process, that impair their
well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill -treatment and harassment of Palestinian
prisoners and detainees and all reports of torture,
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Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and
social infrastructure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the
urgent need to address the humanitarian crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring
the unimpeded provision of humanitarian assistance and the sustained and regular flow of persons
and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Government, with international
support, to reform, develop and strengthen its institutions and infrastructure, emphasizing the need to
preserve and further develop Palestinian institutions and infrastructure, despite the obstacles presented
by the ongoing Israeli occupation, and commending in this regard the ongoing efforts to develop the
institutions of an independent Palestinian State, including through the implementation of the Palestinian
National Policy Agenda: National Priorities, Policies and Policy Interventions (2017 –2022),
Expressing concern about the risks posed to the significant achievements made, as confirmed
by the positive assessments made by international institutions regarding readiness for statehood,
including by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians, owing to the
negative impact of ongoing instability and the financial crisis being faced by the Palestinian
Government and the continued absence of a credible political horizon,
Commending, in that regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the
specialized agencies and the donor community in suppo rt of the economic and social development of
the Palestinian people in line with their national development and State -building plan, as well as the
vital assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Affirming the need to support the Palestinian Go vernment of national consensus in its
assumption of full government responsibilities in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in all fields,
as well as through its presence at Gaza’s crossing points, and Palestinian national reconciliation, and
emphasizing the need for the respect and preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with
the Quartet,
Aware that development and fostering healthy economic, social and environmental
conditions are difficult under occupation and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, i n line with
Security Council resolution 1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and
regular flow of persons and goods and the lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the
Palestinian people, including those restrictions arising from ongoing Israeli military operations and
the multilayered closure system, and for other urgent measures to be taken to alleviate the serious
humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinia n Territory, which is dire in the Gaza Strip, and also
calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under
international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement
of persons and goods throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and
infrastructure for the provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to
contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
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4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April 1994; 24
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure,
agricultural lands and government institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its
military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and
Access of 15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings
into the Gaza Strip, which is crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and e ssential supplies,
including construction materials and adequate fuel supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered
access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular commercial flows necessary for
economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and emphasizes the need for
security for all civilian populations;
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to
refrain from violence against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of
the occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and
properties, economic institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occ upied Syrian Golan, and to prevent Israeli
settlers from perpetrating such illegal activities;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of
natural resources, including water and mining resources, and to cease th e dumping of all kinds of
waste materials in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely, the water, land and energy
resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian populations,
and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that obstruct the
implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza
Strip, notably the provision of the electric power needed for the work of the northern Gaza emergency
sewage treatment plant, and stresses in this regard the urgency of the reconstruction and development
of water infrastructure, including the desalina tion facility project for the Gaza Strip;
11. Calls for the assistance necessary for the safe removal of all unexploded ordnance in
the Gaza Strip, which endangers Palestinian lives and negatively impacts the environment, as well as
reconstruction and development efforts, and welcomes the efforts exerted by the Mine Action Service
of the United Nations to date;
12. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related
infrastructure in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, includi ng East Jerusalem, and the occupied
Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to economic and social development and to
the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation of all settlement and settlement -related
activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, legal
status and character of the occupied territories, including in particular in and around occupied East
Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions, i ncluding resolution 2334
(2016), and international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War;
_______________
24 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
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13. Calls for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and recalls in this regard Security Council
resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March 1994 and stresses the need for its implementation;
14. Also calls for urgent attention to the plight and the rights, in accordance with
international law, of prisoners and detainees, and calls for efforts between the two sides for the further
release of prisoners and detainees, and deplores the practice of withholding the bodies of those killed,
and calls for the release of the bodies that have not yet been returned to their relatives, in line with
international humanitarian law and human rights law, in order to ensure dignified closure in
accordance with their religious beliefs and traditions;
15. Reaffirms that Israel’s ongoing construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolati ng
East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank and seriously debilitating the economic and social
development of the Palestinian people, and calls in that regard for full compliance with the legal
obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and
in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant resolutions;
16. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the
occupied Syrian Golan whose family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab
Republic, via the Qunaytirah entrance;
17. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary -General
to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority;
18. Welcomes and urges further engagement by the Secretary-General and the United
Nations Special Coordinator to assist, in cooperation with concerned partners, in the efforts to address
urgent infrastructure, humanitarian and economic development needs, including through the
implementation of projects endorsed by the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the C oordination of the
International Assistance to Palestinians;
19. Expresses appreciation to the Member States, United Nations bodies and
intergovernmental, regional and non-governmental organizations that have provided and continue to
provide economic and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, which has helped to
ameliorate their critical economic and social conditions, and urges the continued provision of
assistance commensurate with increased socioeconomic and humanitarian needs and in coopera tion
with official Palestinian institutions and consistent with the Palestinian National Development Plan;
20. Reiterates the importance of and need for increased and renewed international efforts
on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions, inclu ding Security Council resolutions 242
(1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004), 1850 (2008) and 2334
(2016), and the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the
Quartet road map, as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, in order
to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine living side by side
in peace and security within recognized borders, b ased on the pre-1967 borders, and the achievement
of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement;
21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy -fifth
session, through the Economic and Social Council, a report o n the implementation of the present
resolution and to continue to include in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an
update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, in collaboration with relevant United
Nations agencies;
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29
22. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syria n Golan” in the agenda of its
2022 session.
1st plenary meeting
14 September 2020
2021/5. Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women
The Economic and Social Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General,25
Recalling its relevant resolutions and all other relevant United Nations resolutions,
Recalling also Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, including its
call upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and
protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, and its emphasis on the responsibility of all
States to put an end to impunity,
Recalling further the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women,26
Recalling the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women27 as it concerns the
protection of civilian populations,
Reaffirming the obligations of States and all parties to armed conflict to comply with
international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable, and the need to end
all violations of international humanitarian law and all violations and a buses of human rights,
Reaffirming also the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women,28
the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,29 the outcomes of the twenty-third special session
of the General Assembly, entitled “Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the
twenty-first century”,30 and the political declaration on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of
the Fourth World Conference on Women adopted by the Commission on the Status of Women at its
fifty-ninth session, 31 and reaffirming its commitment to their full, effective and accelerated
implementation,
Reaffirming further the importance of increasing the role of women in peacebuilding and
decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and the peacefu l resolution of conflicts as part of
efforts to ensure the safety and well-being of all women in the region, stressing the importance of
women’s equal participation and involvement in all efforts for the achievement, maintenance and
_______________
25 E/CN.6/2019/6.
26 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, No. 20378.
27 General Assembly resolution 48/104.
28 Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality,
Development and Peace, Nairobi, 15–26 July 1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IV.10), chap. I, sect. A.
29 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995 (United Nations publication, Sales
No. E.96.IV.13), chap. I, resolution 1, annexes I and II.
30 General Assembly resolution S-23/2, annex, and resolution S-23/3, annex.
31 Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2015, Supplement No. 7 (E/2015/27), chap. I, sect. C, resolution 59/1,
annex.
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115
17. Recommends that all Governments intensify their efforts within the specialized agencies and other
organizations of the United Nations system of which they are members to accord priority to the question of providing
assistance to the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories on a case-by-case basis;
18. Draws the attention of the Special Committee to the present resolution and to the discussion held on the
subject at the 2022 session of the Economic and Social Council;
19. Recalls the adoption by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean on 16 May 1998
of its resolution 574 (XXVII),150 in which the Commission called for the mechanisms necessary for its associate
members, including the Non-Self-Governing Territories, to participate, subject to the rules of procedure of the General
Assembly, in the special sessions of the Assembly convened to review and assess the implementation of the plans of
action of those United Nations world conferences in which the Territories had originally participated in their capacity
as observers, and in the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies;
20. Requests the President of the Council to continue to maintain close contact on those matters with the Chair
of the Special Committee and to report thereon to the Council;
21. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the present resolution, paying
particular attention to cooperation and integration arrangements for maximizing the efficiency of the assistance
activities undertaken by various organizations of the United Nations system, and to report thereon to the Council at
its 2023 session;
22. Decides to keep the above questions under continuous review.
34th plenary meeting
22 July 2022
2022/22. Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan
The Economic and Social Council,
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 76/82 of 9 December 2021 and 76/225 of 17 December 2021,
Recalling also its resolution 2021/4 of 14 September 2020,
Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations affirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by force, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980, 497
(1981) of 17 December 1981 and 2334 (2016) of 23 December 2016,
Recalling the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, including resolutions
ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/17 of
15 December 2006,
Taking note of the report of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as transmitted by the
Secretary-General,151
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, of 12 August 1949,152 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab territories
occupied by Israel since 1967,
_______________
150 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1998, Supplement No. 21 (E/1998/41), chap. III, sect. G.
151 A/77/90-E/2022/66.
152 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
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116
Recalling the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,153 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights154 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,155 and affirming that these human rights
instruments are applicable and must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan,
Noting with concern that more than 70 years have passed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution
181 (II) of 29 November 1947 and 55 years since the occupation of the Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem,
in 1967,
Taking note, in this regard, of Palestine’s accession to several human rights treaties and the core humanitarian
law conventions as well as other international treaties,
Taking note also of General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012,
Stressing the urgency of achieving without delay an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and a just,
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement on all tracks on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338
(1973), 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, 1544
(2004) of 19 May 2004, 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008 and 2334 (2016), the principle of land for peace, the Arab
Peace Initiative156 and the Quartet road map,157 as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sovereignty of peoples under foreign occupation over their natural
resources, and expressing concern in that regard about the exploitation, endangerment and depletion of natural
resources by Israel, the occupying Power, and Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, particularly as a result of settlement activities, which are illegal under
international law and which, deplorably, continued during the reporting period,
Convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve environmentally sustainable
development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and
in the occupied Syrian Golan, and expressing grave concern about the consequent deterioration of economic and
living conditions,
Expressing alarm, in this regard, about the extremely high levels of unemployment in the Gaza Strip in
particular, which remains at over 40 per cent, with youth unemployment reaching 60 per cent, exacerbated by the
prolonged Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, and
the continuing negative repercussions of the military operations in the Gaza Strip on economic and social
infrastructure and living conditions,
Commending, despite the many constraints, including the obstacles imposed by the ongoing Israeli occupation,
the efforts of the Palestinian Government to improve the economic and social situation in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, especially in the areas of governance, the rule of law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors,
education and culture, health, social protection, infrastructure and water,
Stressing the importance of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, which aims,
inter alia, at enhancing development support and assistance to the Palestinian people and strengthening institutional
capacity in line with Palestinian national priorities,
Gravely concerned about the accelerated construction of settlements and implementation of other related
measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well
as in the occupied Syrian Golan, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant United Nations
resolutions, and stressing that such illegal measures are main sources of other Israeli violations and discriminatory
policies,
_______________
153 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
154 Ibid.
155 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
156 A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221.
157 S/2003/529, annex.
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117
Encouraging all States and international organizations to continue to actively pursue policies to ensure respect
for their obligations under international law with regard to all illegal Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly Israeli settlements,
Taking note of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of
the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,158
Expressing deep concern about the rising incidence of violence, harassment, provocation, vandalism and
incitement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular by illegal armed Israeli settlers
against Palestinian civilians, including children, and their properties, including homes, historic and religious sites and
agricultural lands, and calling for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated in this regard,
Gravely concerned by the serious repercussions on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people
caused by Israel’s construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the
rights to work, to health, to education, to property, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom of access and
movement,
Recalling, in that regard, the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,159 and General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, and stressing the need to comply with the obligations mentioned therein,
Deploring all loss of innocent civilian life and injury to scores of civilians, and calling upon all parties to fully
respect international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, including for the protection of civilian life, as
well as for the promotion of human security, the de-escalation of the situation, the exercise of restraint, including from
provocative actions and rhetoric, and the establishment of a stable environment conducive to the pursuit of peace,
Expressing grave concern at the extensive destruction by Israel, the occupying Power, of properties, including
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, historical landmarks, agricultural lands and orchards, in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in particular in connection with its construction of
settlements and the wall and confiscation of land, contrary to international law, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern also over the continuing forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinian
civilians, including the Bedouin community, due to the continuing and intensifying policy of home demolitions,
evictions and revocation of residency rights in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as well as measures to further
isolate the city from its natural Palestinian environs, which have seriously exacerbated the already critical
socioeconomic situation being faced by the Palestinian population,
Expressing grave concern further about ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of closures and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, the imposition of crossing closures, checkpoints and a permit
regime throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the consequent negative impact
on the socioeconomic situation of the Palestinian people, in particular the Palestine refugee population, which remains
that of a humanitarian crisis,
Expressing grave concern, in particular, over the continuing crisis in the Gaza Strip as a result of the prolonged
Israeli closures and severe economic and movement restrictions that in effect amount to a blockade, stressing that the
situation is unsustainable, as reflected in numerous reports, including the report of 26 August 2016 of the United
Nations country team, entitled “Gaza: two years after”, and calling in that regard for the full implementation of
Security Council resolution 1860 (2009) of 8 January 2009 with a view to ensuring the full opening of the border
crossings for the sustained and regular movement of persons and goods, including humanitarian aid, commercial
flows and construction materials, and emphasizing the need for security for all civilian populations,
Deploring the conflict in and around the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014 and the civilian casualties caused,
including the killing of and injury to thousands of Palestinian civilians, including children, women and the elderly, as
_______________
158 A/HRC/22/63.
159 See A/ES-10/273 and A/ES-10/273/Corr.1.
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118
well as the widespread destruction of or damage to thousands of homes and vital civilian infrastructure, including
schools, hospitals, water, sanitation and electricity networks, economic, industrial and agricultural properties, public
institutions, religious sites and United Nations schools and facilities, as well as the internal displacement of hundreds
of thousands of civilians, and any violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, in this
regard,
Gravely concerned about the consequent prolonged and extensive negative impact of the military operations of
July and August 2014, as well as the military operations between December 2008 and January 2009 and of November
2012, on economic conditions, the provision of social services and the social, humanitarian and physical living
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population, including the Palestine refugee population,
Recalling, in that regard, the relevant United Nations reports, including those of the Economic and Social
Council, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Human Rights Council,
Expressing deep concern about the short- and long-term detrimental impact of such widespread destruction and
the hampering of the reconstruction process, by Israel, the occupying Power, on the socioeconomic and humanitarian
conditions of the Palestinian civilian population in the Gaza Strip, where the humanitarian crisis continues to deepen,
and calling in that regard for the immediate acceleration and fulfilment of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip
with the assistance of the donor countries, including the disbursement of funds pledged at the Cairo International
Conference on Palestine: Reconstructing Gaza, held on 12 October 2014,
Gravely concerned about various reports of the United Nations and specialized agencies regarding the
substantial aid dependency caused by prolonged border closures, inordinate rates of unemployment, widespread
poverty and severe humanitarian hardships, including food insecurity and rising health-related problems, including
high levels of malnutrition, among the Palestinian people, especially children, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the deaths of and injuries caused to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, and emphasizing that the Palestinian civilian population must be protected in accordance with
international humanitarian law,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians, and calling for the cessation of all acts
of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, and all firing of rockets,
Expressing deep concern that thousands of Palestinians, including many children and women, continue to be
held in Israeli prisons or detention centres under harsh conditions, including unhygienic conditions, solitary
confinement, excessive use of administrative detention, including of children, lack of proper medical care and
widespread medical neglect, including for ill prisoners, with the risk of fatal consequences, and denial of family visits
and of due process, that impair their well-being, and expressing deep concern also about any ill-treatment and
harassment of Palestinian prisoners and detainees and all reports of torture,
Conscious of the urgent need for the reconstruction and development of the economic and social infrastructure
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as the urgent need to address the humanitarian
crisis facing the Palestinian people, including by ensuring the unimpeded provision of humanitarian assistance and
the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip,
Recognizing the efforts being undertaken by the Palestinian Government, with international support, to reform,
develop and strengthen its institutions and infrastructure, emphasizing the need to preserve and further develop
Palestinian institutions and infrastructure, despite the obstacles presented by the ongoing Israeli occupation, and
commending in this regard the ongoing efforts to develop the institutions of an independent Palestinian State,
including through the implementation of the Palestinian National Policy Agenda: National Priorities, Policies and
Policy Interventions (2017–2022),
Expressing concern about the risks posed to the significant achievements made, as confirmed by the positive
assessments made by international institutions regarding readiness for statehood, including by the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the
International Assistance to Palestinians, owing to the negative impact of ongoing instability and the financial crisis
being faced by the Palestinian Government and the continued absence of a credible political horizon,
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119
Commending, in that regard, the important work being done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and
the donor community in support of the economic and social development of the Palestinian people in line with their
national development and State-building plan, as well as the vital assistance being provided in the humanitarian field,
Affirming the need to support the Palestinian Government of national consensus in its assumption of full
government responsibilities in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in all fields, as well as through its presence at
Gaza’s crossing points, and Palestinian national reconciliation, and emphasizing the need for the respect and
preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Calling upon both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map in cooperation with the Quartet,
Aware that development and fostering healthy economic, social and environmental conditions are difficult under
occupation and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability,
1. Calls for the full opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council resolution
1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and regular flow of persons and goods and the
lifting of all movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, including those restrictions arising from
ongoing Israeli military operations and the multilayered closure system, and for other urgent measures to be taken to
alleviate the serious humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which is dire in the Gaza Strip, and
also calls for compliance by Israel, the occupying Power, with all of its legal obligations under international
humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions in that regard;
2. Stresses the need to preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as to and from the outside world;
3. Also stresses the need to preserve and develop Palestinian national institutions and infrastructure for the
provision of vital public services to the Palestinian civilian population and to contribute to the promotion and
protection of human rights, including economic and social rights;
4. Demands that Israel comply with the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Paris on 29 April 1994;160
5. Calls upon Israel to restore and replace civilian properties, vital infrastructure, agricultural lands and
government institutions that have been damaged or destroyed as a result of its military operations in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory;
6. Reiterates the call for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access of
15 November 2005, particularly the urgent and uninterrupted reopening of all crossings into the Gaza Strip, which is
crucial to ensuring the passage of foodstuffs and essential supplies, including construction materials and adequate fuel
supplies, as well as to ensuring the unhindered access of the United Nations and related agencies and regular
commercial flows necessary for economic recovery to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and emphasizes
the need for security for all civilian populations;
7. Calls upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;
8. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger
or cause loss or depletion of those resources;
9. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic
institutions and agricultural lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as
well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, and to prevent Israeli settlers from perpetrating such illegal activities;
10. Also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to end immediately its exploitation of natural resources,
including water and mining resources, and to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied
_______________
160 See A/49/180-S/1994/727, annex, entitled “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”, annex IV.
Resolutions
120
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural
resources, namely, the water, land and energy resources, and present a serious environmental hazard and health threat
to the civilian populations, and also calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to remove all obstacles that obstruct the
implementation of critical environmental projects, including the sewage treatment plants in the Gaza Strip, notably
the provision of the electric power needed for the work of the northern Gaza emergency sewage treatment plant, and
stresses in this regard the urgency of the reconstruction and development of water infrastructure, including the
desalination facility project for the Gaza Strip;
11. Calls for the assistance necessary for the safe removal of all unexploded ordnance in the Gaza Strip, which
endangers Palestinian lives and negatively impacts the environment, as well as reconstruction and development
efforts, and welcomes the efforts exerted by the Mine Action Service of the United Nations to date;
12. Reaffirms that the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and constitute a
major obstacle to economic and social development and to the achievement of peace, and calls for the full cessation
of all settlement and settlement-related activity, including full cessation of all measures aimed at altering the
demographic composition, legal status and character of the occupied territories, including in particular in and around
occupied East Jerusalem, in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2334 (2016),
and international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
13. Calls for accountability for the illegal actions perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and recalls in this regard Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March
1994 and stresses the need for its implementation;
14. Also calls for urgent attention to the plight and the rights, in accordance with international law, of prisoners
and detainees, and calls for efforts between the two sides for the further release of prisoners and detainees, and deplores
the practice of withholding the bodies of those killed, and calls for the release of the bodies that have not yet been
returned to their relatives, in line with international humanitarian law and human rights law, in order to ensure dignified
closure in accordance with their religious beliefs and traditions;
15. Reaffirms that Israel’s ongoing construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in
and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank
and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in that regard for
full compliance with the legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent relevant resolutions;
16. Calls upon Israel to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and to facilitate visits of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose
family members reside in their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic, via the Qunaytirah entrance;
17. Emphasizes the importance of the work of United Nations organizations and agencies in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority;
18. Welcomes and urges further engagement by the Secretary-General and the United Nations Special
Coordinator to assist, in cooperation with concerned partners, in the efforts to address urgent infrastructure,
humanitarian and economic development needs, including through the implementation of projects endorsed by the
Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians;
19. Expresses appreciation to the Member States, United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, regional and
non-governmental organizations that have provided and continue to provide economic and humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people, which has helped to ameliorate their critical economic and social conditions, and urges the
continued provision of assistance commensurate with increased socioeconomic and humanitarian needs and in
cooperation with official Palestinian institutions and consistent with the Palestinian National Development Plan;
20. Reiterates the importance of and need for increased and renewed international efforts on the basis of
relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397
(2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004), 1850 (2008) and 2334 (2016), and the Madrid Conference, the principle of land
for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet road map, as well as compliance with the agreements reached
Resolutions
121
between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian
people, in order to pave the way for the realization of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine living side by side
in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, and the achievement of a just, lasting
and comprehensive peace settlement;
21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session, through
the Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of the present resolution and to continue to include
in the report of the United Nations Special Coordinator an update on the living conditions of the Palestinian people,
in collaboration with relevant United Nations agencies;
22. Decides to include the item entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the
living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan” in the agenda of its 2023 session.
34th plenary meeting
22 July 2022
2022/23. Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women
The Economic and Social Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General,161
Recalling its relevant resolutions and all other relevant United Nations resolutions,
Recalling also Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, including its call upon all parties
to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls,
especially as civilians, and its emphasis on the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity,
Recalling further the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,162
Recalling the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women163 as it concerns the protection of
civilian populations,
Reaffirming the obligations of States and all parties to armed conflict to comply with international humanitarian
law and international human rights law, as applicable, and the need to end all violations of international humanitarian
law and all violations and abuses of human rights,
Reaffirming also the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women,164 the Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action,165 the outcomes of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly,
entitled “Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century”,166 and the political
declaration on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women adopted by
the Commission on the Status of Women at its sixty-fourth session,167 and reaffirming its commitment to their full,
effective and accelerated implementation,
Reaffirming further the importance of increasing the role of women in peacebuilding and decision-making with
regard to conflict prevention and the peaceful resolution of conflicts as part of efforts to ensure the safety and wellbeing
of all women in the region, stressing the importance of women’s equal participation and involvement in all
_______________
161 See A/77/90-E/2022/66.
162 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, No. 20378.
163 General Assembly resolution 48/104.
164 Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality,
Development and Peace, Nairobi, 15–26 July 1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IV.10), chap. I, sect. A.
165 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13),
chap. I, resolution 1, annexes I and II.
166 General Assembly resolution S-23/2, annex, and resolution S-23/3, annex.
167 Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2020, Supplement No. 7 (E/2020/27), chap. I, sect. A.
98-20576 (E) 150798
* Reissued for technical reasons.
** A/53/50.
United Nations A/53/163*–E/1998/79*
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
*
Distr.: General
14 July 1998
Original: English
General Assembly
Fifty-third session Substantive session of 1998
Item 100 of the preliminary list** Agenda item 11
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian Economic and social repercussions of the
people in the occupied Palestinian territory, Israeli occupation on the living conditions of
including Jerusalem, and of the Arab the Palestinian people in the occupied
population in the occupied Syrian Golan over Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
their natural resources and of the Arab population in the occupied
Economic and Social Council
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on
the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 1997/67 of 25 July 1995, entitled “Economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian
Golan”, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to the
General Assembly at its fifty-third session, through the Council, a report on the
implementation of the resolution. The General Assembly, in its resolution 52/207 of
18 December 1997, reiterated the request for a report. The annexed report, covering the
period from June 1997 to May 1998, which was prepared by the Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia, is being submitted in response to that request.
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2
Annex
Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia
I. Introduction
1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 52/207 of
18 December 1997, aware of the additional, detrimental
economic and social impact of the Israeli settlements on
Palestinian and other Arab natural resources, especially the
confiscation of land and the forced diversion of water
resources, took note of the report of the Secretary-General on
the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
settlements on the Palestinian people in the Palestinian
territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan (A/52/172-
E/1997/71 and Corr.1), reaffirmed the inalienable rights of
the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied
Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including land and
water, and requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at
its fifty-third session a report on the progress made in the
implementation of the resolution. The present report is
submitted in response to that request and covers
developments through May 1998. This report also constitutes
a response to Economic and Social Council resolution
1997/67 of 25 July 1997.
II. Economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation
2. The stalling peace process has been accompanied by
continuing hardship for the Palestinians in the occupied
territory as well as for the Arab population of the occupied
Syrian Golan. Israeli occupation policies and closures of the
occupied territories continued to aggravate the living
conditions of the Palestinian people.
3. Israeli settlements have been built at some 200 sites
seized by civilian and military bodies representing the
Government of Israel, as well as by Israeli civilians
empowered by Israel to undertake such activity. The land
under exclusive Israeli control amounts to about 72 per cent
of theWest Bank (area C)1 and 40 per cent of the Gaza Strip.
In addition, 30 per cent of the area of East Jerusalem is under
effective Israeli ownership. No similar estimates are available
for the Golan Heights, where some 15,000 inhabitants of
Syrian nationality are living in a few villages close to the
Syrian-Lebanese border.2
4. Israel has established approximately 150 settlements
in the West Bank, with a civilian population of 170,000; in
East Jerusalem, approximately 180,000 Israelis are resident;
in the Gaza Strip, 5,500 settlers live in 16 settlements; and
in the Golan Heights, 15,000 settlers reside in 36 settlements.
By the end of 1998, more than 350,000 Israelis will be living
in over 200 communities established since 1967 in the West
Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights.3
5. The Jabal Abu Ghneim (Har Homa) project represents
a specific example of this policy. Although Israel’s decision
to establish the new settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim has been
opposed in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the
present Government has declared that it has no intention of
halting or suspending the project. It is intended to become one
of the largest settlement projects initiated to date. It is located
south of Jerusalem and overlooks the cities of Bethlehem and
Beit Sahour. The area of the land set aside for the project
amounts to 1,850 dunums (a dunum is equal to approximately
1,000 square metres); the master plan covers an area of 2,056
dunums. In the first stage, this settlement is expected to
accommodate 4,000 settlers in 1,000 housing units, gradually
increasing to 30,000 settlers occupying some 6,500 units in
the final stage.4
6. The second half of 1997 was marked by a substantial
increase in building construction throughout the occupied
territories. New construction has been observed at 93 of the
130 settlements in the West Bank, in settlements close to
Jerusalem, as well as isolated posts in the West Bank
heartland. Because of their distance from existing facilities,
at least 13 of these construction sites could be characterized
as new settlements, although they are considered by Israel to
be part of existing settlements. Press reports in Israel place
the number of new units under construction at 5,000 during
1997. Other sources have confirmed the approval and initial
construction of 4,000 units in West Bank settlements, enough
to increase the settler population in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip by more than 10 per cent. There are currently more than
160,000 Israelis living in 45,000 units in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.5
7. The situation of Israeli settlements expansion in the
occupied territories, at the end of 1997, could be summarized
as follows:
A. Settler population
West Bank: 165,000
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Gaza Strip: 5,500 was for Israelis. The figure translates into an annual pace of
Golan Heights: 15,000 apartment construction of 2,170 for Israelis and only 230 for
East Jerusalem: 180,000 Palestinians. Housing construction for Israelis in East
B. Settlement expansion
New settlement areas established: 13
New dwellings begun in settlements: 4,500-5,000
C. Number of new dwellings formally approved
(August 1996-March 1998): 2,268
D. Number of units sold in West Bank settlements:
1,560
E. Number of units completed in West Bank
settlements: 4,000
F. Total lands confiscated in 1997: 25,000 dunums
Bypass roads: 4,951 dunums
New settlements: 723 dunums
Settlement expansion: 14,784
Industrial settlements: 4,480
G. Palestinian homes demolished by the Israel
Defence Forces, area C: 233 in 1997
290 from January 1997 to March 1998
_______________
Sources: Foundation for Middle East Peace. Report on Israeli
Settlements in the Occupied Territories (Washington, D.C., March 1998),
pp. 1-2, Khalil Tufakji, Orient House; Palestinian Society for the
Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, E-mail communication,
24 April 1998.
8. The plans of the Ministry of Housing and Construction
for 1998 include tendering land for the first 1,000 units to be
built in the settlement of Har Homa, as well as 820 units in
the “greater Jerusalem” settlement of Givat Ze’ev. These
allocations are part of a 1998 programme to tender more than
27 per cent of the national total of 23,000 units in land
occupied in 1967, a goal which, if implemented, will indicate
a significant campaign of intended settlement expansion.5
9. Settlement expansion in the West Bank appears to be
occurring not only in those areas within easy commuting
distance of Jerusalem and the Tel Aviv metropolis, but also
in the rural, isolated outposts throughout the West Bank. The
increasing dependence on market forces in the housing market
appears not to have stopped the expansion of settlements in
these latter areas.
10. Since 1967, only 12 per cent of all new construction in
Jerusalem has taken place in East Jerusalem. During the
period 1977-1983, for example, 90 per cent of construction
Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, has been critical to the
overall growth of the city. The 180,000 Israelis who today
live in this area comprise 76 per cent of the total increase in
Jerusalem’s Jewish population since 1967.6
11. Government restrictions on Palestinian housing
construction, and the complementary boom in Israeli
construction that has amounted to more than 40,000
apartment units built in East Jerusalem settlement
communities, have ensured that Palestinians today comprise
no greater a share of the city’s population than they did in
1967. An additional 46,300 housing units are planned for the
entire city. Out of these, about 10,000 will be built on 14,000
dunums (3,500 acres) of Israeli territory included in West
Jerusalem in May 1996. An additional 17,710 units will be
located in East Jerusalem settlement communities.7
12. During the next 15 years, the outer ring of settlements
of greater Jerusalem might accommodate more than 200,000
new settlers, in addition to the 50,000 currently residing
there, according to some estimates. During this period,
completion of the Israeli suburban sections within Jerusalem
itself (Har Homa and other locations) is expected to increase
the number of East Jerusalem’s 180,000 Israeli citizens to at
least 250,000. In that sense, settlement expansion in East
Jerusalem continues to play a crucial role in offsetting
Palestinian population growth. This increase in Israel’s settler
population would bring the total number of Israeli settlers in
and around East Jerusalem by the year 2015 to 500,000. The
Palestinian population is expected to double over the same
period, to 1.5 million within greater Jerusalem and to 1
million in the metropolitan region.8
13. The scheme9 for development of this area has
significance beyond the territory that it encompasses,
demonstrating the degree to which settlement expansion has
been integrated into Israel’s national planning schemes. E-1
controls the main axis of socio-economic development for
Israel itself, as outlined in the metropolitan master plan,
completed in 1994-1995. This critical area runs along the
trajectory of road 45, which originates in greater Tel Aviv and
leads via Ben Gurion Airport – with expansion planned in
conjunction with large industrial zones around the new city
of Modi’in to greater Jerusalem at the West Bank settlement
of Givat Ze’ev. The road continues along the recently
developed archeological site next to the Prophet Samuel’s
tomb – to be surrounded at a distance by gentrified housing
estates – and passes the East Jerusalem settlement community
of Ramot and the expanding high-technology industrial park
of Har Hotzvim to arrive at the projected “Eastern Gate”
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4
settlement site in East Jerusalem. From there it passes to 1967, and only for personal use, not for agriculture and
Ma’ale Adumim, with its industrial zone, also scheduled to economic development. “The status quo”, wrote Leopold
expand greatly, and another large residential area projected Laufer in a recent report for an Israeli think tank, “has
at Tibek Kuteif, on the heights above the Jordan Valley. effectively barred economic development in the territories and
14. In 1967, 2,300 square kilometres of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip were under Palestinian cultivation. In 1989, the 18. In both the bilateral and multilateral negotiations which
figure had been reduced to 1,945 square kilometres, or 31.5 began in Madrid, Israel has sought to protect its continuing
per cent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Agriculture control over this resource in the West Bank, which was
comprised 24 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in described by Israel’s State Comptroller in February 1993 as
1966, the same percentage as in the period 1980-1985. By the principal reservoir of drinking water for the Dan region,
1994, the percentage had decreased to less than 15 per cent.10 Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Beersheba, and the most important
In 1966, the agricultural sector provided employment for long-term source in the national water system.
55,000, or 43 per cent of total employment, whereas in the
period 1980-1985, there were 40,000 employed in the
agricultural sector, comprising 24 per cent of those
Palestinians employed.11 In 1993, the percentage of employed
persons working in agriculture was 22 per cent.12
15. These gross indicators, however, cannot lead to any larger than the areas accorded to the Palestinians for irrigation
specific conclusions regarding the real effect of settlements in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, respectively.
on agricultural employment or production, or land under
cultivation. Settlements are only one of a number of variables
that must be considered when assessing these trends.
16. In this context, there are regions such as the Jordan cultivation and that the digging of new deep wells for
Valley where a direct link may be established between the settlements, particularly in the Jordan Valley, has caused
loss of Palestinians’ agricultural opportunities and Israeli subsequent shortages for Palestinian farmers.
settlements. Contamination by sewage also directly affects
Palestinian agriculture, albeit on a smaller scale, in the region
around Kiryat Arba near Hebron. The confiscation of
agricultural lands and their transfer to settlements, which has
occurred on numerous occasions, may well result in loss of
agricultural income and employment, though this has never
been quantified beyond anecdotal reporting. There are also
costs associated with Israeli-owned industries in the occupied
territories, such as a recycling plant for used motor oil, stone
quarries and other plants where harmful and toxic by-products
are produced.
17. Limited access to water remains the greatest obstacle
to Palestinian agricultural development. According to a recent
report by Miriam Lowi for the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, almost the entire increase in Israeli water use since
1967 derives from the waters of the West Bank and the upper
Jordan River.13 However, Israel is today in the midst of a
water emergency. Even with the resources acquired in 1967,
it is pumping more water from aquifers than nature can
replace. In the West Bank, Israel is exploiting water
amounting to 15 per cent of total consumption for its own
population in Israel and the occupied territories. It is also
preventing the Palestinian community from increasing its
water use to barely 20 per cent beyond the amount used in
in Gaza”.14
14
19. In 1987, when settlers were barely 10 per cent of the
Palestinian population in the West Bank, Palestinian
consumption totalled 115 cm3 while settler consumption
equalled 97 cm3.15 A report by Peace Now noted that the
Jewish settlers’ per capita irrigated areas are 7 and 13 times
15
20. A report prepared by the Jerusalem Media and
Communication Center in November 1992 notes that lack of
water has forced Palestinian farmers to remove tracts from
16
21. There are approximately 260 Israeli-owned industrial
enterprises in the West Bank. Environmental regulations on
soil, air and water quality, and restrictions on industrial
development, have generally been far less comprehensive and
much less enforced in the occupied territories compared to
Israel proper.17 Combined with state-subsidized incentives
for Israeli concerns to locate to industrial parks in and nearby
settlements, the relative laxity of environmental enforcement
and monitoring has led to the relocation of polluting industries
into the occupied territories.
22. The factories posing an environmental risk generally
utilize wet processes in the industrial sectors of packaged
food, manufacturing, metal coating and textiles.18
23. The Shomron Municipal Environmental Association,
a governmental body established by settlements in the
northern part of the West Bank to monitor and improve
environmental quality, acknowledges that “waste-water
effluents from these plants and from nearly 100 residential
communities in our region, if not properly treated, pose a
threat to the groundwater quality in the region. In addition,
industrial air emissions and noise generation can be
problematic at some factories”.19
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5
24. There are 45 enterprises operating in the industrial park 28. The report further points to clear evidence of polluting
of Burkan adjacent to the settlement of Ariel. Most are groundwater through leakage of chemicals, and proof of the
engaged in the production of fabric and plastics for export. improper disposal of wastes and by-products.
The owners of these factories escape the tighter rules on
health and the environment inside Israel itself to work in the
West Bank where they get tax breaks.20 In addition to Burkan,
Palestinians have complained about the operation of industrial
facilities at Ariel, Karne Shomron, Kiryat Arba, and
Adumim.21 Of particular concern is the effect of industrial
development on the quality of groundwater, which Palestinian
investigators have found to be “significantly more polluted”
near settlements than elsewhere.21
25. The settlement of Kiryat Arba has been identified by soil and groundwater has similarly received inadequate
Palestinian investigators as “the main source of pollution in attention.
the Hebron area”.22 A tile factory located in the settlement’s
industrial area was flushing its wastewater through the
sewage system, resulting in numerous problems. The city of
Hebron successfully petitioned the court to stop this practice.
The wastewater is now trucked off in tanks and dumped on
Palestinian fields.22 The water contains high levels of calcium
carbonate, increasing the already high pH level of the land.
26. Geshurei Industries, a manufacturer of pesticides and Palestinian owners. Several factories are located less than 100
fertilizers, was originally located in the Israeli town of Kfar metres from residential housing.
Saba. Public concern about the environmental effects of the
factory – on land, public health and agriculture – resulted in
an Israeli court order in 1982 closing the plant. Since 1987,
the factory has been operating across the Green Line, in
Tulkarm, where there are effectively no controls on waste
disposal or air pollution. Other Israeli industrial polluters,
including those working in the fields of asbestos, fibreglass,
pesticides and flammable gases, also relocated to the Tulkarm
area. According to a report by the Palestinian Society for the
Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, the factory
pollution directly affects 144 dunums of prime agricultural
land and causes substantial damage to the public health.23 The
Israeli court has ordered some remedial action, including
compensation to affected farmers, but the plant remains in
operation.
27. The same report notes severe negative effects of the
factory operation on the nearby community, including decay
of a majority of trees and other vegetation around the plant,
chemical dust and residue and a liquid substance causing a
decrease in productivity in field and hot house agriculture,
and factory by-products, including sodium and salt, prominent
in soil samples of land found to be non-arable. These effects
are a consequence of factory by-products and waste-water
contamination of agricultural land.
23
29. The report also documented a very high ratio of healthrelated
problems among farmers and people living around the
factory, including severe headaches, itchy eyes, spastic and
chronic coughs and bronchial asthma.23 The Palestinian
Ministry of Agriculture notes that the public health of the
community has not been well documented owing to decades
of military occupation and direct conflict, suggesting that
environmentally related health problems may be more
pervasive than currently estimated. The long-term impact on
24
30. As a consequence of the harmful effects of Israelioperated
industry around Tulkarm, the Palestinian Ministry
of Agriculture estimated that 17 per cent of Tulkarm’s
agricultural land has been affected by pollution originating
at the six Israeli concerns that have located in the Tulkarm
area. Three of the factories are sited on what Palestinians
claim to be Waqf land. Other sites are claimed by private
24
31. There are hundreds of sites for the disposal of trash in
the occupied territories, including dozens that are
unauthorized. There are 246 sites in the West Bank north of
Jerusalem alone. Most of the sites are simple, primitive sites
with few if any environmental safeguards. And none is used
exclusively by settlements or Palestinian communities. The
Shomron Municipal Environmental Association
acknowledges that the sites are improperly maintained,
generating odours and smoke which are a nuisance to
neighbouring residents, as well as posing a threat to
groundwater quality.25
32. The site in Jiyous near Kalkilya is typical. Located on
12 dunums, 200 metres from the wadi that serves as a source
of drinking water for the village of Azoun, the site opened in
1990. It is used principally by the settlements of Karnei
Shomron, Keddu and Ma’al Shomron. The Shomron
Municipal Environment Association is now being pressured
by trash contractors in Israel to permit them to use the dump
for trash generated in Israel, after the Israeli dump they had
been using was closed by the Israeli Government.26
33. Israel conducted a geographical information system
study in 1996 as part of an effort to develop a master plan to
establish an order of priorities to improve and consolidate the
system of trash disposal in the West Bank. The master plan
for trash disposal in the West Bank is being conducted
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exclusively by Israel, without official or informal Palestinian Strip. The 1996 closures differed from those in preceding
participation. years in that they were in effect for much longer periods,
34. There are literally thousands of stone quarries on the
West Bank, supplying 80 per cent of the material needs of
Israel’s construction sector.Many of these stones are used in
settlement construction.26 The clouds of white dust produced 40. Frequent Israeli closures have been a major factor
by the quarries pose certain health risks. Recent reports note behind the 18 per cent drop in gross national product (GNP)
that those residing near such enterprises suffer from increased in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the 35 per cent drop in
levels of asthma and acute bronchial infections.27 per capita GNP between 1992 and 1996. In addition, in 1997
35. The mitigation of environmental problems in the
occupied territories, including those caused by the existence
and expansion of settlements, are viewed by Israelis as a
forum for joint Israeli-Palestinian action. Yet, Israeli
environmental planners in the territories continue to view
Palestinians as junior partners, at best. Palestinians, for their
part, are willing to cooperate with Israeli communities within 41. However, economic indicators show that the actual
Israel’s pre-1967 borders, but they refuse, as a matter of deterioration in standards of living has been far more dramatic
principle, to participate in joint efforts with settlers.26 in theWest Bank, with a 19.7 per cent loss of per capita GDP
36. Palestinians have traditionally made up the bulk of the
workforce engaged in the construction and daily maintenance
of settlements throughout the occupied territories. Some
12,000 Palestinian labourers work in Israeli settlements;
3,500 work in the Erez industrial zone and settlements in the 42. Frequent closures have also negatively affected trade,
Gaza Strip, and 8,500 in industrial parks and settlements in particularly exports from the territories, causing long delays
theWest Bank27 not including those working in the settlement at the border which are detrimental to export goods,
communities of East Jerusalem. particularly vegetables and fruits. In addition, the delay in
37. The unemployment situation in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip remains critical, in particular owing to closures and
increased reliance of Israel on expatriate workers from
outside the region. The number of Palestinian workers in 43. Bank lending and deposits in the West Bank and Gaza
Israel dropped from an average of 120,000 on a monthly basis Strip have been modest. In 1997, lending remained at about
in 1992 to an average of about 25,000 in 1996.28 19 per cent of the total assets, reflecting a depressed demand
38. The overall economic environment in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip inhibits investment and growth owing to the
continued ambiguity of the legal and political situation.
According to the Palestinian Economic Policy Research
Institute, “the complex overlay of laws and Israeli military
orders in force during the occupation remains in place. This
is further aggravated by border closures which include 44. Tourism, which was one of the first economic sectors
banning movement of goods, factors of production and people to benefit from the peace dividend as it boomed during the
between the Palestinian areas and Israel and the Gaza Strip, period 1994-1995, has been affected by the stalemate in the
and between the rest of the West Bank and Jerusalem. Closure peace process. According to the Palestinian Economic Policy
also often entails banning movement between the West Bank, Research Institute, “the Israeli authorities refuse to issue
Jordan and the Gaza Strip”.29 permits for new hotels or for expanding existing ones in East
39. In the period 1993-1996, there were a total of 342 days
of closure affecting the Gaza Strip and 291 days in the West
Bank. In 1996 alone, closures increased over the year before
by 57 per cent in the West Bank and 35 per cent in the Gaza
which has a significant effect on the continuity and regularity
of production, marketing, income generation and
employment.30
gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated to have grown
by 1.2 per cent, down from 5.5 per cent in 1996, as estimated
by the Palestinian Authority and the International Monetary
Fund, while the population growth was estimated at 4.5 per
cent, thus explaining the further deterioration in GDP per
capita in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.31
compared with 8.4 per cent in the Gaza Strip in the period
1993-1995. This drop does not reflect the further
deterioration, which occurred with the lengthy closures and
widespread confrontations in later years.32
arrival of raw materials from Israel to the West Bank and
Gaza Strip leads to the upsetting of production plans and to
a lowering of capacity utilization.33
for credit by investors. The relatively low deposit/GDP ratio
was, at the end of 1996, about 57.5 per cent. A further
substantial increase in total bank deposits is not, however,
expected to take place before a successful conclusion of final
status negotiations. Owing to political uncertainties, many
residents maintain bank accounts abroad.34
Jerusalem. This resulted in the freezing of the number of
rooms at Arab-owned hotels in East Jerusalem at their 1967
level while the number of rooms at hotels operating in the rest
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip declined. As a result of
Israeli licensing policies, the number of Palestinian guides
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in East Jerusalem dropped from 154 in 1967 to 47 in 1995, on 300 dunums, and at the settlement of Ortal, a $4.5 million
and their number in the rest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip dairy, the largest in the Middle East.
was down to 24 in 1995, six of whom were newly licensed by
the Palestinian Ministry of Tourism. Furthermore, the fact that
the Israeli authorities neglected the infrastructure in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip has made it difficult for the tourism
sector to attract new investments”.35 Visitors to the West
Bank and Gaza Strip still come through Israeli airports.
Palestinian travel agents are prevented from meeting arriving
clients and there are no tourist bus companies based in the
West Bank outside East Jerusalem.36
45. While incentives and investment continued to promote
the Israeli civilian presence in the Syrian Golan, the Arab
population faces further deterioration in their living
conditions owing to Israeli settlements, restrictions on
employment opportunities and education, as well as the Israeli
taxation policy.37
46. In the Golan Heights, there are currently 15,000 Israelis will be established as part of the first stage of the expansion.
living in 33 settlement communities established in the wake Despite such efforts to increase the Golan settler population,
of Israel’s 1967 capture of the Golan Heights. The Syrian by May 1996, settlement leaders were complaining that there
population, numbering an equal amount, resides in five was an “enormous gap” between settlement plans and their
villages in the Golan’s north-eastern corner.38 actual implementation.
47. Some 2,000 dwellings are in various stages of 52. At the outset of a campaign to expand residential
construction in the Golan settlements. The completion of construction and to increase the settler population – part of
some was frozen by previous governments. Others were the “Golan 2000” programme – settlement leaders reported
rented to army officers stationed in the area. A few completed that the settler population in the Golan is to increase by
units remained empty in previous years because of the lack 10,000 to more than 25,000 by the year 2000.
of demand in view of the uncertainty created by negotiations
between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic over the Golan’s
future.39
48. In the months before Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Israelis residing in the Golan, 3,000 are employed by the local
election, this picture was already changing. After the collapse government council, and one third are engaged in agriculture.
of the negotiations with the Syrian Arab Republic in February In 1996, agricultural production reached $240 million, while
1996, then Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered the sale of industrial production reached $100 million, tourism $40
many of these apartments, and made building plots available million, sales and services $50 million, and public services
for private construction. The last of the 700 units built during $20 million. Investment in industrial production amounted
the past three years at Katzrin, the largest settlement, had to $16 million in the period 1992-1996. Settlement
already been sold. Katzrin’s population grew by 50 per cent expansion is concentrated at the settlement of Katzrin, with
during this period, from 4,000 to 6,000. A full 20 per cent of a current population of 7,000, the largest among 32 Golan
the area’s residents arrived during 1996.40 Planning and site settlements. Three hundred new units were begun in
work for 1,000 additional units is currently under way. Some mid-1997 and formal approval from the Minister of Defence
115 new units for the Elad settlement were approved in April was awaited to begin construction of an additional 1,000
1996.41 And inMay 1996, the Golan Regional Council began units. To enable construction of the 1,000 units, the municipal
a drive to sell 250 units scattered throughout the area’s 32 area of Katzrin was expanded by 1,200 dunums bordering a
settlements. nature reserve.
49. Among the most prominent projects now under way are 54. For the first time since the beginning of Israeli
a $130 million tourism and hotel project at Hamat Gader, a settlement in the Golan, a private sector contractor, as
deal between MacDonald’s and the kibbutz settlement of opposed to government companies, undertook a residential
Merom Golan to grow potatoes for the company’s french fries construction project. The 300 cottages being built at Katzrin
42
50. At meetings with Golan settlers soon after his election,
Prime Minister Netanyahu reiterated his commitment to
increase Katzrin’s population to 15,000 during his tenure. He
also announced his approval of the “Golan 2000” plan
presented to him before the election. The plan calls for a $202
million public sector investment in infrastructure, and new
housing construction in 10 settlements, to reach the goal of
increasing the plateau’s Israeli population by 10,000 during
the next four years.43
51. On 20 January 1997, construction began on 600 new
units at the settlements of Hmat Ghadar, Ramot and Gamla.44
“In fact”, noted Ma’ariv on 30 December 1996, “we are
speaking of an ‘expansion plan’ according to which new
settlements will be established in the Golan, under the rubric
of ‘expanding’ existing settlements”.45 Three new settlements
46
47
53. Settlement leader Yehuda Wolman reported that 1,600
units had been constructed in the period 1989-1996, at a rate
averaging 225 units annually. He also noted that of the 14,000
48
49
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8
sell for $95,000 to $110,000. The State provides subsidized Notes
grants, benefits and loans comprising 90 per cent of this
amount.49 For example, beginning in October 1997, 35
building plots were marketed in the settlement of Katzrin as
part of the popular “build your own house” programme. The
one-half dunum plots were offered at no cost. Buyers were
required to pay $10,000 towards development costs, one half
the actual investment by the State. By mid-December, more
than 100 prospective buyers had signed up for the 35
available lots.50
55. A number of incentives were adopted to attract
prospective Israeli settlers into the Golan Heights, including
individual grants of 50,000 shekels (equivalent to US$
16,500) and mortgage facilities as high as 95 per cent of the
value of the house, with generous repayment terms.51 In
addition, substantial state subsidies are provided in various
economic sectors to strengthen the Israeli settlements policy.
This includes an ongoing plan for the development of tourism
in the Golan Heights, which is estimated at about US$ 5.5
million. Of that sum, $4 million is in the form of government
funding. The Ministry of Tourism sponsors this project, in
cooperation with the Jewish agency and the local council of
settlements in the Golan.52
56. Employment opportunities for the Syrian Arab
population in the Golan Heights are extremely restricted,
since the movement of the Arab population between the Golan
and the Syrian Arab Republic remains problematic with the
current stalled peace process. Hence, the only employment
opportunities available to the Syrian population in the Golan
are limited to unskilled and semi-skilled daily wage labour.
In most conditions, these workers have no access to social
benefits, and health insurance and are under constant threat
of being made redundant with no compensation. In addition,
a substantial differential in wages prevails, to the detriment
of the Syrian Arab population of the Golan.53 Furthermore,
improvement of living conditions is further aggravated owing
to restrictions on expanding educational facilities, facilitation
of education in the Syrian Arab Republic and access to
education in Israeli colleges.54
57. The Arab population living in the Golan are subjected
to prohibitive levels of taxation, including tax on income,
health services, local councils, land and housing ownership,
value added, ownership of cattle and use of water resources.
Such measures have systematically deterred the Arab
population from investing in agricultural or small-scale
industrial development and have incited many of them to give
up farming, or move to other areas and seek wage labour
employment.55
1 On 28 September 1995, in Washington, D.C., Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. This accord detailed the mechanisms for, and the
limitation of, the extension of Palestinian self-rule to
significant portions of the West Bank. The main feature of
the Agreement was the provision for the division of the West
Bank into three areas, each with varying degrees of Israeli
and Palestinian responsibility. Area A consisted of the seven
major Palestinian towns, Jenin, Kalkiliya, Tulkarm, Nablus,
Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron, in which Palestinians
would have complete authority for civilian security. In area
B, which comprised all other Palestinian population centres
(except for some refugee camps), Israel would retain
“overriding security responsibility”. In area C, which
includes all settlements, military bases and areas, and State
lands, Israel would retain sole security authority.
2 Based on the report of the Civil Administration for the West
Bank, chart 8.7 (no date).
3 Based on the Economic and Social Commission for Western
Asia, The Socio-Economic Impact of Israeli Settlements (to
be issued shortly).
4 Israeli attorney Daniel Seidemann, as quoted in Foundation
for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlements in the
Occupied Territories (Washington, D.C., March 1997), p.
8.
5 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli
Settlements in the Occupied Territories (Washington, D.C.,
March 1998), p. 1.
6 Nadav Shargay, in Ha’aretz, 31 May 1992.
7 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli
Settlements in the Occupied Territories (Washington, D.C.,
July 1997), p. 1.
8 Jan de Jong, in “Greater Jerusalem”, a special report of the
Foundation for Middle East Peace (Washington, D.C.,
summer 1997), p. 4SR.
9 E-1 Development Plan and Environment 1998; E-1 analysis,
presented in “E-1 settlement expansion plans – preempting
the growth of Arab Jerusalem”, a special report of the
Foundation for Middle East Peace (Washington, D.C.,
winter 1998).
10 Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel,
1995, p. 764.
11 Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel,
1995 and 1992.
12 Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel,
1995, p. 776.
13 Miriam Lowi, “West Bank water resources and the
resolution of conflict in the Middle East”, American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, September 1992.
14 Al-Wasat, 21 April 1993.
15 Peace Now, “The real map – a demographic and
demographical analysis of the population of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip” (Jerusalem, January 1993).
A/53/163
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9
16 “Israeli obstacles to economic development in the occupied Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, The
territories”, report prepared by the Jerusalem Media and
Communications Center, November 1992, p. 49.
17 Aookued Research Institute, “Environmental profile of the
West Bank” (Jerusalem, no date).
18 Shomron Municipal Environmental Association Report (no
date), p. 5.
19 Ibid., p. 6.
20 Hisham Abdallah, “A tour of the West Bank: from
settlement to settlement”, Agence France Presse, 17
October 1997.
21 The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights
and the Environment, “Water quality in the West Bank”
(October 1996), p. 6.
22 The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights
and the Environment, op. cit., p. 9.
23 The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights
and the Environment, “The slow death of man and the
environment” (March 1992).
24 Palestinian Authority, “Environmental pollution as a tool for
post-Oslo Israeli control: the case of Tulkarm”, report
prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture (undated).
25 Palestinian Authority, op. cit., and Shomron, op. cit., p. 7.
26 Ha’aretz, 14 November 1997.
27 Israeli Foreign Ministry, Information Division, “Economic
relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority”,
background paper (Jerusalem, February 1998).
28 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Survey
of Economic and Social Developments in the ESCWA
Region, 1997-1998 (to be issued shortly).
29 Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS),
MAS Economic Monitor, No. 1, 1997, pp. 2-3.
30 Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute, op. cit., pp.
7-9.
31 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Survey
of Economic and Social Developments ..., p. 25.
32 Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute, op. cit., pp.
11-13.
33 Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute, op. cit., pp.
8-9.
34 Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute, op. cit., pp.
31-36.
35 Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute, op. cit., p.
19.
36 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia,
“Impact of the peace process on trade in services: the
tourism sector in the ESCWA region, case studies on Egypt,
Jordan and Palestine” (E/ESCWA/ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT/ 1997/8), p. 56.
37 Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Report
on Israeli practices against human rights of Syrian citizens
in the occupied Syrian Golan” (June 1997), pp. 12-20.
38
Socio-Economic Impact of Israeli Settlements ...
39 Yediot Aharanot, 13 August 1996.
40 Ha’aretz, 17 June 1996.
41 Ha’aretz, 28 April 1996.
42 Ha’aretz, 8 July 1996.
43 Ha’aretz, 9 July 1996.
44 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli
Settlements in the Occupied Territories (Washington, D.C.,
March-April 1997), p. 4.
45 Ma’ariv, 30 December 1996.
46 Ma’ariv, 5 May 1997.
47 Yediot Aharanot, 20 June 1997.
48 Ha’aretz, 20 June 1997.
49 Yediot Aharanot, 6 May 1997.
50 Ma’ariv, 30 December 1997.
51 Yediot Aharanot, 21 March 1996, as quoted in “Report on
Israeli practices against human rights of Syrian citizens in
the occupied Syrian Golan” ..., p. 9.
52 El-Quds Press, January 1997, as quoted in “Report on
Israeli practices against human rights of Syrian citizens in
the occupied Syrian Golan” ..., p. 10.
53 “Report on Israeli practices against human rights of Syrian
citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan” ..., pp. 16-17.
54 Ibid., pp. 20-24.
55 Ibid., pp. 14 and 15.
99-18734 (E) 190799
* A/54/50.
United Nations A/54/152 – E/1999/92
General Assembly
Economic and SocialCouncil
Distr.: General
25 June 1999
Original: English
General Assembly
Fifty-fourth session Substantive session of 1999
Item 104 of the preliminary list* Agenda item 11
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian Economic and social repercussions of the
people in the occupied Palestinian territory, Israeli occupation on the living conditions of
including Jerusalem, and of the Arab the Palestinian people in the occupied
population in the occupied Syrian Golan over Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
their natural resources and the Arab population in the occupied
Economic and Social Council
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on
the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 1998/32 of 29 July 1998, entitled “Economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian
Golan”, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to the
General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session, through the Council, a report on the
implementation of the resolution. The General Assembly, in its resolution 53/196 of
15 December 1998, reiterated the request for a report. The annexed report is submitted in
response to the two above-mentioned resolutions.
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Annex
Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia
I. Introduction
1. At its forty-fifth plenary meeting on 29 July 1998, the
Economic and Social Council adopted resolution 1998/32 on
the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people
in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan. In that
resolution, the Council, inter alia, stressed the importance of
the revival of the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) of 22
October 1973 and 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, and the
principle of land for peace as well as the full and timely
implementation of the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people. It
also stressed the need to preserve the territorial integrity of
all of the occupied Palestinian territory and to guarantee the
freedom of movement of persons and goods in the territory,
including the removal of restrictions into and from East
Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the
outside world. The Council further stressed the vital
importance of the operation and construction of the Gaza
airport, the seaport in Gaza and safe passage to the economic
and social development of the Palestinian people. The
Council called upon Israel to cease its measures against the
Palestinian people, in particular the closure of the occupied
Palestinian territory, the enforced isolation of Palestinian
towns, the destruction of homes and the isolation of
Jerusalem. The Council reaffirmed the inalienable right of the
Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied
Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources and
called upon Israel not to exploit, endanger, or cause loss or
depletion of those resources. It also reaffirmed that Israeli
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including
Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, were illegal and
an obstacle to economic and social development. The Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General
Assembly at its fifty-fourth session, through the Council, a
report on the implementation of the resolution.
2. In its resolution 53/196, of 15 December 1998 on the
permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the
Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan over their
natural resources, the General Assembly took note of the
report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Palestinian
territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
(A/53/163–E/1998/79, annex). It reaffirmed the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including
land and water; and called upon Israel, the occupying power,
not to exploit, to cause loss or depletion of or to endanger the
natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. It
recognized the right of the Palestinian people to claim
restitution as a result of any exploitation, loss or depletion of,
or danger to, their natural resources, and expressed the hope
that the issue would be dealt with in the framework of the final
status negotiation between the Palestinian and Israeli sides.
It requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the
Assembly at its fifty-fourth session. The present report
responds to the two above-mentioned resolutions.
II. Economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation
A. Occupied Palestinian territory, including
Jerusalem
3. The failure to fully implement the terms of agreements
reached between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) has caused continuing hardship to
Palestinians in the occupied territory. Israeli settlement policy
and closures of occupied territory continue to aggravate the
living conditions of the Palestinian people and of the Arab
population of the occupied Syrian Golan.
4. Civilian Israeli settlements have been built at some 200
sites seized by civilian and military bodies representing the
Government of Israel and by Israeli civilians empowered by
Israel to undertake such activity. The land under exclusive
Israeli control amounts to around 71.8 per cent of the West
Bank (Area C) and 20 per cent of the Gaza Strip. In addition,
30 per cent of the area of East Jerusalem is under effective
Israeli ownership. No similar estimates are available for the
Golan Heights, although it is known that over 17,000
inhabitants of Syrian nationality are living in a few villages
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close to the borders of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon 1999, 14 of the 20 roads were in advanced stages of
and that a similar number of Israelis have settled there. construction. 1 In addition to many bypass roads whose
5. Israel has established approximately 150 settlements
in theWest Bank with a civilian population of 175,000. There
are approximately 180,000 Israeli residents in East
Jerusalem. In the Gaza Strip, there are 6,000 settlers in 16
settlements and 16,500 settlers in 33 settlements in the Golan
Heights. By the end of 1999, more than 375,000 Israelis will
be living in over 200 communities established since 1967 in
theWest Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Golan
Heights.2
6. The geographic distribution of settlements in the
occupied Palestinian territory severely restricts the growth
of Palestinian communities. In most cases, settlements either
surround Palestinian communities, and therefore prevent their
natural growth, or huge tracts of Palestinian land are
confiscated for future settlement expansion. A clear example
is the Bethlehem area, which is surrounded in the south by the
Gush Etzion bloc; in the west by Har Gilo and Beitar Ilit, as
well as by two bypass roads; in the east by Tekoa and a bypass
road; and in the north by Gilo and a bypass road. In the north
also lies the site of the proposed settlement of Jabal Abu
Ghneim.3
7. Israeli Government sources claimthat 20,000 dwelling
units have been constructed, if not necessarily completed and
occupied, in the Palestinian territory under the new
Government formed in 1996. Almost 14,000 units have been
sold during the same period.4 During 1998, existing West
Bank settlements were expanded by 8,219 dunums (a dunum
is equal to approximately 1,000 square metres), and those in
East Jerusalem by 8,400 dunums.5 The Prime Minister of
Israel has inaugurated six new industrial parks, in the south
Hebron area, near Ma’ale Mikmash, at Keddumim, Shaked,
Ma’ale Ephriam and Ariel. Twenty new neighbourhoods in
existing settlements and over 100 new “footholds”, some of
which are destined to evolve into new and distinct
settlements, have been established. Five paramilitary
settlements, known as “nahals”, have been transformed into
permanent civilian settlements: at Giva’ot near the Etzion
Bloc, at Rachelim near Shilo and at Hemdat, Avnat and
Baroush in the Jordan Valley. The Government has created 11. Peace Now reported on 19 July 1998 that 11 per cent
five regional colleges, in Kiryat Arba, Ma’ale Ephraim, of the apartments that had so far been built and marketed by
Avnat, Elon Moreh, and Kedumim.6 the Ministry of Construction and Housing in 1998 were
8. In the aftermath of theWye accords, the Israeli Cabinet
approved the construction of 20 bypass roads at a cost of
$70 million throughout the West Bank. The purpose of the
roads is to strengthen the Israeli presence in the West Bank
by forging modern communication, security and transport
links between the settlements and Israel.7 By early January
construction has been facilitated through negotiations with
the Palestinian Authority, comprising 18,036 dunums in 1998
alone, the Government of Israel has spent close to $70 million
on major road construction projects in theWest Bank, notably
along the length of the Jordan Valley, the “Trans-Samaria
Highway” crossing the northernWest Bank, the road from the
East Jerusalem community of Ramot to Ben Shemen in Israel,
and Road 45, a major transport route from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem.8
9. According to theWyeMemorandum, agreements about
the southern safe passage route, designed to connect Gaza
with theWest Bank via Hebron, should have concluded within
a week of the date of entryinto force of theMemorandum, and
operation of this route should have begun as soon as possible
thereafter. Agreements on the southern route have been
delayed by unresolved issues relating to the northern route.
There is no confirmed opening date for any safe passage
between the Gaza and West Bank areas. Opening the port of
Gaza has been similarly delayed owing to security demands
by Israel. On the other hand, the international airport in the
Gaza Strip, under joint Israeli and Palestinian Authority
supervision, opened to limited traffic in late 1998. Continuing
restrictions on the Palestinian Authority’s operation of the
facility have contributed to its failure, until now, to make a
recognizable contribution to the Palestinian economy.
10. Peace Now reports that housing starts in West Bank
settlements increased by 136 per cent during the first half of
1998, compared with a similar period in 1997. Using figures
compiled by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Peace Now
reports that there were 1,420 starts in the first half of 1998,
compared with 600 in the same period one year earlier.
Government construction increased by 245 per cent, from 290
to 970 units, while private sector construction in settlements
increased by 45 per cent, from 310 to 450 units. At the end
of June 1998, there were 3,390 units in various phases of
construction, an increase of 16 per cent over June 1997. The
public sector contribution to this figure increased by 41 per
cent, from 1,660 units in June 1997 to 2,340 in June 1998.9
located in settlements (excluding East Jerusalem). Figures
from the Ministry and the Israel Land Authority reveal that
5,242 of the 48,862 units that were planned for marketing in
1998 were located in settlements (excluding East Jerusalem).
In November 1998, theMinistry of Construction and Housing
issued tenders for the first 1,000 units to be built in the
settlement of Jabal Abu Ghneim. This allocation was part of
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4
a 1998 programme to tender more than 27 per cent of the dwelling units are currently under construction alongside
national total of 23,000 units in lands occupied in 1967. The 1,300 existing houses. Hundreds more 10 are under construction
construction under way attests to a significant campaign of in the larger settlement towns of Efrat, Ma’ale Adumim and
intentional settlement expansion. Betar Ilit. A new industrial plant for the production of
12. More than 20 per cent of all land to be marketed by the
Ministry of Construction and Housing during 1999 is located
in the occupied Palestinian territory. The Ministry intends to
market land for 3,729 dwelling units in the occupied
Palestinian territory during 1999 and 1,320 units at Jabal Abu
Ghneim in East Jerusalem. Nationally, land for only 19,800
units will be marketed. The Ministry sales do not give a
complete picture of the housing market, however, as they are
geared towards young families and others eligible for
Government assistance. Sites selected for sales in 1999
include Ariel (500 units), Alfe Menache (500), Emmanuel
(400), Beitar (636), Efrat (100), Ma’ale Adumim (600),
Givat Ze’ev (811) and Adam (182).11 On 21 January 1999,
the first contract was signed for the sale of apartments at Jabal
Abu Ghneim.12
13. Close to 80 per cent of the 4,000 to 5,000 dwelling units
on which construction began in theWest Bank and Gaza Strip
settlements during 1997 have been sold, according to
numbers compiled by the Office of the Prime Minister.13 The
relatively attractive value of the settlements is the product of
a number of factors: the classification of settlements as
Development Area A, which entitles them to the highest level
of public subsidy, including 50 per cent of the land costs; the
low profit margins accepted by Amana, the construction arm
of the settlement movement Gush Emunim and by settlementbased
contractors; and less stringent building codes than
apply in Israel. Construction costs of $500 to $600 per square
metre result in selling costs of only $700 per square metre,
far less expensive than similar charges in central Israel.14
Notwithstanding this expansion in theWest Bank, Peace Now
reports a current vacancy rate of 25 per cent — 454 units out 16. The Palestinian Center for Human Rights reported on
of 1,800 — in the Gaza settlements, a number disputed by 12 December 1998 that “wide-scale bulldozing can be
settlement leaders as inflated. Tenders for the construction witnessed in various areas of the Gaza Strip, especially close
of 100 new units were issued in mid-1998 for the settlement to the settlements in the agricultural areas (Khan Younis and
ofNisanit, near the Jabaliya refugee camp. On 10 December Rafah City) and the area of Tel Zorub, which lies close to the
1998 a tender for the construction of four additional homes Egyptian border. It is clear that Israeli settlement activity has
was published.15 taken on a new life, especially after the signing of the Wye
14. The upsurge in settlement expansion in the West Bank
continues. Thousands of apartment units are planned for 17. The report of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights
settlements east of Jerusalem, in order to produce a ring of also noted the following activities:
Israeli settlements around Jerusalem and a territorial bridge
between Ma’ale Adumim and the settlement communities
north and west of Jerusalem. Thousands of dunums of land
currently under military control will be transferred to civil
authorities for housing construction. In the Etzion Bloc of
settlements south of Jerusalem, for example, 630 new
concrete has opened in the settlement bloc, the first in the
settler area, to respond to the increased demand for
construction materials.16 In the “Benjamin region” (northwest
of Jerusalem), more than 20,000 Israelis live in 30
settlements. In this area, there are 1,500 new dwellings under
construction, enough to increase the population by 6,000.
Expansion is occurring at Bet El, where 150 of these new
homes are under construction, with an additional 50 expected
to begin before the end of 1998. Located just north of
Ramallah, Bet El is already home to almost 700 families and
is one of the few settlements that may be in closer proximity
to territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority after an
anticipated redeployment of the Israeli military forces
required by the Oslo and Wye accords.17 Even in the Jordan
Valley settlements, depressed by economic problems and a
stagnant population, a new wave of expansion is under way.18
15. Israeli television channel one reported in June 1998 that
there were 3,600 mobile homes, 1,400 of which stood empty,
stationed in West Bank settlements, and 1,700 State-owned
apartments were also reported empty. Amana, which was
responsible for receiving the trailers, has become the almost
exclusive controller of State assets in the West Bank in the
past two years.19 Peace Now reported on 13 August 1998 that
5,892 new units were under construction and that 2,888 out
of approximately 42,000 dwellings in occupied Palestinian
territory settlements were empty.20 The Council of Jewish
Communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza reported in May
1998 that 95 per cent of current construction consisted of
structures begun but later frozen by the Governments of
Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres.21
River Memorandum on 23 October 1998.”
(a) Three hundred and fifty dunums of land has been
bulldozed in Tel Gnam, in the Khan Younis agricultural area
and on land beside the Neve Dekalim settlement;
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(b) Since 2 December 1998, Israeli bulldozers have 20. Even though Israel continues to retain security control
been bulldozing a parcel of 150 dunums next to the Pe’at of Area B and the access roads to settlements in close
Sade settlement in an attempt to confiscate the land; proximity to areas under Palestinian control, the security of
(c) On 6 December 1998, Israeli bulldozers stepped
up their activities on a 30-dunum parcel along the road
between the Gush Katif settlement and the Bedolah
settlements (in the Rafah agricultural area);
(d) On 9 December 1998, five dunums of land
planted with trees bearing unpicked fruit were bulldozed in
the Tel Zorub area in Rafah (near the Egyptian border);
(e) The transport of sand from the Rafah agricultural
area was also reported during the latter part of 1998;
“These activities”, notes the Palestinian Center for Human
Rights, “not only contribute to negatively changing the
geography of the land, but also must be considered part of the
organized theft of Palestinian natural resources by Israel.”22
18. During 1998, Israeli authorities demolished 100
Palestinian homes in the West Bank and 45 in East
Jerusalem. Approximately 23 2 per cent of the West Bank has
been confiscated for the use of bypass roads constructed since
January 1996. In many, if not most, cases, confiscation orders
date from 1993 or earlier.24 According to a report in Ha’aretz,
“since Oslo, 35 square kilometres of bypass roads have been
paved for Israelis. Thousands of olive trees have been cut
down and are being cut down in the process of the expansion
of these roads. Palestinian villagers report that, in September
1998, 4,000 olive trees were uprooted in the area of Salfit
near the settlement of Ariel.”25
19. Bypass roads are built with a safety buffer of 50 to 100
metres on either side where all Palestinian residential and
commercial construction is prohibited. “Existing Palestinian
houses located in areas close to planned bypass roads”, noted
a recent study by a Palestinian researcher, “are being
systematically demolished. The bypass roads built in the West
Bank to date exceed 276 kilometres in length; those in the
planning stage are estimated to reach 425 kilometres. With
the safety buffer zone they enjoy, the construction of these
bypass roads requires the confiscation and destruction of
approximately 109,000 dunums of Palestinian land, most of
which is agricultural, depriving owners of their main source
of income.”26 Where bypass roads cross agricultural areas,
there is an immediate financial impact. For example, along
Road #60 running south from Jerusalem, one dunum sells for
$60,000. The value of one dunum of grapes planted in the
Hebron area is $2,800. Expected confiscations for the Arroub
bypass south of Bethlehem, on lands known for their
agricultural value, will have a particularly severe economic
impact.27
these settlements remains impaired. A few settlements, such
as Sanur, west of Jenin, which is already almost empty, are
not likely to survive as civilian settlements. In this regard,
former head of Israeli military intelligence noted that
protecting access roads to these settlements will be a constant
source of provocations and conflict. The example of Netzarim
in the Gaza Strip is most frequently recalled in this context.
All travel from this isolated settlement proceeds under Israeli
Defence Forces escort. Yet, the population of this isolated
outpost has grown from60 people to more than 200 in recent
years.28
21. On 2 July 1998, a stand-off developed along the road
from the Gaza town of Deir al-Balah to the al-Mouassi district
after Israeli Defence Forces prevented a group of Palestinians,
including a minister, from passing. The road had been closed
to Palestinian traffic for three years. Palestinians, in response,
blocked major road junctions near settlements. During the
incident, Israeli Defence Forces reinforcements were sent to
Gaza. Settlers were unable to enter or leave many settlements
owing to the Palestinian blockades. At one point, the Israeli
Defence Forces offered residents of Netzarim an airlift by
helicopter to their settlement, but the 50 men, women and
children stranded at the Karni crossing declined the offer. The
road was opened to Palestinian traffic in early 1999.29
22. The immediate repercussions of Israeli settlement
activity in the occupied Palestinian territory are the constant
frictions between the settlers and the Palestinians. According
to a report published by the Palestinian Authority in late
August 1998, there have been attacks in the Hebron region
involving firings at vehicles belonging to the Palestinian
police and civilians. Reports of settlers torching Palestinian
vehicles and trying to forcibly enter homes were received.
Reports of a similar nature were received in the Nablus
region, along with reports of settler attempts to establish
control over Palestinian lands, as at the Yitzhar settlement,
uprooting fruit trees, destroying crops and contaminating
drinking water.30
23. Settlers continued to expose themselves to attacks,
increasing tension in the occupied Palestinian territory.
Towards the end of 1998, Israeli security officials noted that
settlers had been targeted by Palestinian opposition groups.
Locations where everyday friction between Palestinians and
settlers occurs, particularly in Hebron, as well as in the
Nablus region, were cited as probable sites for violence
against settlers. Both areas had experienced an upsurge in
attacks on settlers and soldiers in the latter part of 1998,
including the killing of two settlers from Yitzhar near Nablus
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on 5 August, the murder of a settler in Hebron on 20 August, 28. Numerous restrictions imposed by Israel for security
an attack on a bus travelling to Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus on reasons negatively affect Palestinians. For example, at a
10 September and a grenade attack in Hebron on meeting on 28 April 1998 to discuss environmental issues,
30 September in which soldiers were injured. The constant the Palestinian delegation demanded the removal of military
friction in Hebron is leading to the de facto division of the roadblocks on the road leading to Shuwaykah north of
city. Tulkarm, and the Nazlat ‘Isa 31 roadblock in the West Bank,
24. According to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights,
Israeli settlers and soldiers either shot and killed or otherwise
caused the death of 34 Palestinian civilians during 1998.
Settlers were directly responsible for 11 deaths in the
occupied Palestinian territory.32
25. The repercussions of Israeli occupation on Palestinian
health care has been severe. Responsibility for health care has
been transferred to the Palestinian Authority as part of the
Oslo I agreement, but has been largely supported by private
organizations. The Palestinian Authority has not been able
to cope financially with the burden of high population growth
and extremely limited economic resources. As indicated in
a 1993 survey, clinics in the West Bank numbered 85. There
were 19 hospitals consisting of only 365 beds in 1993, 47 per
cent of which were sponsored by the Government, 39 per cent
by charitable organizations and 9 per cent by the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA).33 These health services cater to a
population of 2,018,818,34 which by 1998 had grown to an
estimated 3,017,296.35 In 1993, only 18 per cent of the West
Bank rural population was enrolled in the Government health
insurance scheme.36
26. Regarding the occupation’s repercussions on education,
movement restrictions continue to affect school attendance
for those students who must cross Israeli-controlled
checkpoints. Furthermore, the increase in the size of the
population in the occupied Palestinian territory is clearly
reflected in the number of students attending schools. Student
enrolment in the 1993/94 school year totalled 528,276. The
total enrolment had grown to 832,729 by the 1996/97 school
year. However, the increase in the number of students was not
matched by an increase in the number of teachers. On the
contrary, the number of teachers’ training institutes decreased
from 21 in 1993 to 16 in 1997.37
27. Economic development in Israeli settlements can have
deleterious effects upon the Palestinian community. For
example, at the settlement of Migdalim, the expansion of a
leather factory resulted in the construction of a factory on 500
dunums of land claimed by a resident of the village of Jurish.
New roads were opened to the factory site, near the main road
leading to the village, which prevented landowners from
reaching their lands.38
which divides Nazlat ‘Isa in two parts and obstructs the
movement of citizens. The Palestinian side also demanded the
reopening of Hablah Old Road, which had been closed by the
Israelis. The Israelis replied that the road was closed for
security reasons and stressed that these issues were being
discussed by the higher security and civilian bodies. The
Israeli side also said reopening Hablah Old Road would
create many problems and cause several accidents. The
Khirbat al-Hafasah road, which passes through a settlement,
is the only road linking the village with the outside world. The
Israeli side stressed that citizens and vehicles could not travel
this road for security reasons and to prevent any friction with
the settlers. The Israelis stressed the need to find an
alternative route.39
29. The confiscation of lands declared by Israel as “State
land” as a prelude to their transfer to Israeli control has a
critical impact upon the Palestinian community. For example,
at a 28 April 1998 meeting to discuss environmental issues
at the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee
headquarters in the settlement of Keddumim, the Palestinian
delegation protested periodic Israeli efforts to alienate
Palestinian land. The delegation cited the case of the Kafr
al-Labad lands, which were annexed to the settlement of
Avnei Hefetz, the Ramin lands, which were annexed to Enav
settlement and the confiscation of lands and the uprooting of
trees in Kafr Qaddum, near the settlement of Oranit. The
Israeli delegation responded by stressing that no new
confiscation orders would be issued, and emphasized that the
areas noted by the Palestinian delegation included government
land.40
30. Between 1972 and 1997, the Israeli population in East
Jerusalem grew from 10.3 per cent to 48.1 per cent. It now
comprises almost half of the sector’s population. The Israeli
population of East Jerusalem has increased to 17 times its
1972 level over this period, compared with the Palestinian
population, which more than doubled over the same 25 years
(118 per cent growth).41
31. Reports of the large-scale depopulation in Palestinian
areas of East Jerusalem have been confirmed by a recent
census conducted by the Palestinian Authority. Palestinians
holding Jerusalem identity documents issued by Israel are
generally believed to number almost 200,000. The number
of Palestinians physically residing within the municipal
boundaries enlarged by Israel is less than half that number.
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The number of Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian Commander) and, in essence, will come under the direct
territory, including East Jerusalem, in 1998 was 2,895,683. 42 control of civilian Israeli authority.”
32. A continuing factor in the Palestinian exodus from 35. Israeli occupation is strictly affecting and undermining
Jerusalem is financial. Many thousands of Palestinian the Palestinians’ supply of drinking water as well as its
residents of East Jerusalem have moved to more affordable quality. A report issued on 9 September 1998 by the Israeli
housing in the nearby West Bank. In hundreds of cases, human rights group B’tselem charged that Mekorot, Israel’s
Palestinians with Jerusalem identity documents who reside national water company, drastically cuts water to Palestinian
outside the city have been forced by Israel to surrender their communities in the West Bank during the summer to meet
Jerusalem identity documents and thus their right to reside in increased consumption in Israel and its settlements in the
the city. From January 1996 to March 1998, 2,000 territory. The report notes that the current division of water
Palestinians carrying East Jerusalem identity documents were in the occupied territory is “based on an unfair division of
denied the right to live in East Jerusalem by Israel, compared resources shared by Israel and the Palestinians. Israel created
with 327 during 1987–1995.43 The total number of identity a system of restrictions that prevents the Palestinians from
documents confiscated in 1998 was 788 according to Israel’s utilizing water resources in a manner that meets their basic
Ministry of Interior. The number is in accord with needs and population’s birth rate.” The report also indicates
independent assessments.44 that Israel has imposed obstacles to the drilling of new wells,
33. According to a report in Kol Ha’ir, on 6 February 1999,
the Mayor of Jerusalem ordered that the demolition of
“illegally built” structures in East Jerusalem be stepped up.
From his election in 1994 to June 1998, the Mayor of
Jerusalem has overseen the demolition of 49 Palestinian
homes constructed without permits.45 Peace Now reported on
22 June 1998 that, from January to June 1998, the
Government of Israel had demolished 68 Palestinian
dwellings in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, compared
with 14 during a similar period in 1997. Ha’aretz reported
that 249 Palestinian dwellings had been demolished in 1997
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.46 According to the
Palestinian Authority, 40 Palestinian buildings were
destroyed in East Jerusalem during the first six months of
1998.47
34. The plan for an “umbrella municipality” for Jerusalem
and its environs, unveiled in June 1998, will, if implemented,
bring West Bank settlements into “Greater Jerusalem” one
administrative step further along the road to de facto
annexation. The new plan would invest Israeli civilian
agencies with more extensive powers over the development
and expansion of settlements to be included in the scheme.
Israeli officials insist that the proposal, important details of
which remain to be approved, “is entirely an internal Israeli
matter on the municipal administrative level rather than on
the international level.”48 No settlements were specified for
inclusion in the proposal but it appears likely that Ma’ale
Adumim, Givat Ze’ev and Betar Ilit, with a combined
population of almost 40,000, are high on the list of potential
participants.49 An analysis of the proposal by the United
States Department of State was reported to note, “Insofar as
planning and construction is concerned, the relevant Jewish
settlements in the West Bank will be functionally detached
from the authority of the Civil Administration (the Military
50
established quotas on the water drawn from wells,
expropriated wells owned by Palestinians and neglected to
maintain water systems. The report further notes that Mekorot
supplies an unlimited amount of water to Israeli settlements,
while denying nearby Palestinian communities a sufficient
amount. One result has been an increase in infectious diseases
from the use of unclean water.51 According to the Oslo II
agreement, of the 601 million cubic metres (mcm) of water
available annually in the three main West Bank aquifers, 340
mcm (56.6 per cent) is earmarked for use in Israel, 143 mcm
(23.8 per cent) for use by the 170,000 West Bank settlers
(excluding those residing in East Jerusalem) and 118 mcm
(19.6 per cent) for the 1.2 million Palestinians living in the
West Bank.52 It was reported in Ha’aretz on 27 July 1998 that
more than 500,000 Palestinians in the West Bank, one third
of the population, were without reliable regular sources of
water. Palestinians blame the distribution policies of Israel’s
water carrier, Mekorot, a charge denied by Israel. Ha’aretz
reported on 20 August 1998 that Palestinians are supplied
with 50 to 85 litres of water a day, while settlers consume 280
to 300 litres a day.
36. Israeli control and neglect of the occupied Palestinian
territory is having negative repercussions on the environment.
There are approximately 260 Israeli-owned industrial
concerns in theWest Bank. These factories are located either
in Israeli-operated industrial zones or inside settlements.
Information about these industrial activities is scarce. Some
products have been identified, but detailed information on
quantities produced, labour and waste generated is not
available. The major industries within these industrial zones
include: aluminium, leather tanning, textile dyeing, batteries,
fibreglass, plastics and other chemical industries. For Israeli
industrialists, the West Bank has, at least in one sphere, a
comparative advantage over Israel.53 Environmental
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regulations on soil, air and water quality and restrictions on 40. There are 45 concerns operating in the industrial park
industrial development have generally been far less of Barkan adjacent to the settlement of Ariel. Most are
comprehensive and much less assiduously enforced in the engaged in the production of fabric and plastics for export.
occupied Palestinian territory as compared with Israel itself. Until recently, the owners of these factories escaped the
Combined with State-subsidized incentives for Israeli tighter rules on health and the environment applicable in
concerns to locate to industrial parks in and near settlements, Israel by operating in theWest Bank, where they also receive
the relative laxity of environmental enforcement and tax breaks. In addition to the industrial facilities at Barkan,
monitoring has led to the relocation of polluting industries industries operating at Ariel, Karnei Shomron, Kiryat Arba
into the occupied territory. On 16 October 1998, a military and Keddumim have been the target of Palestinian
order was issued enabling Israel’s Ministry of Environment complaints. Of particular concern is the effect of industrial
to undertake enforcement actions and to enforce Israeli development on the quality of groundwater, which Palestinian
environmental legislation in West Bank settlements. It is too investigators have found to be significantly more polluted
early to assess the record of enforcement under this new near settlements than elsewhere.
regulation.54
37. According to the Applied Research Institute of issues at the Israeli Civilian Liaison headquarters in the
Jerusalem, a Palestinian environmental organization, “The settlement of Keddumim, the Palestinian delegation demanded
accurate composition of industrial waste cannot be easily the closure of Israeli factories built near the border area to the
determined unless laboratory analysis is conducted, as its west of Tulkarm, especially the Geshurei and Dickson Gas
quality depends on the type of manufacturing process factories that were moved from inside Israel. The Israeli
involved. Palestinian scientists face difficulties in collecting delegation confirmed that an environment team had recently
waste samples owing to lack of access to the effluent source. conducted a study on the subject but had not presented its
Therefore, only estimates of the composition of the generated final report; it added that the Palestinian side would be
waste can be made, where the type of industry indicates the informed of the results.
major constituents of the hazardous material in the waste. The
generated industrial wastes contain toxic elements, such as
aluminium, chromium, lead, zinc and nickel. For example, the
aluminium industry produces aluminium and acidic wastes.
Electroplating produces nickel, chrome and acidic wastes.”55
38. Reliable data about waste-water generated in the dust produced by the quarries pose certain health risks.
settlements is difficult to obtain. Approximately 4.3 million Recent reports note that those residing near such enterprises
cubic metres of waste-water is generated annually from suffer from increased levels of asthma and acute bronchial
settlements in the West Bank. A large amount is dumped, infections.
untreated, on Palestinian land, creating a health hazard for
many communities.56 According to the documented statements
of the PalestinianMinistry of Health, and the Environmental
Health Department, the waste-water of numerous settlements
flows onto the lands of Palestinian villages and towns
nearby.57
39. Settlers acknowledge the problems caused by the and settlements in the Gaza Strip and approximately 8,500
increasing amount of waste products generated by expanding in industrial parks and settlements in the West Bank, but
settlements. Settlers in Ofra, concerned about inadequate excluding those working in the settlement communities of
sewage disposal, agreed in early 1998 to fund a new treatment East Jerusalem. The number of such workers has risen by
facility in part with municipal funds. Lack of attention to this around 50 per cent since the imposition of the closure in
issue in the construction phase is a more general problem, 1993, in parallel to an increase in the number of Israelinoted
an environmental official in the settlement government owned factories in the occupied Palestinian territory.
offices. Ofra is not the only settlement where settlers
acknowledge the problem. At nearby Kochav Ya’acov and
Adam, sewage flows into streams and wadis.58
59
60
61
41. At an 28 April 1998 meeting to discuss environmental
62
42. Numerous stone quarries in the West Bank supply 80
per cent of the material needs of Israel’s construction sector.
Israeli concerns operate six West Bank quarries, covering
1,673.3 hectares.63Many of these quarries are located in close
proximity to Palestinian residential areas. The clouds of white
64
43. Palestinians have traditionally made up the bulk of the
workforce engaged in the construction and daily maintenance
of settlements throughout the occupied Palestinian territory.
Palestinian labourers working in Israeli settlements number
between 10,000 and 12,000 in more than 100 Israeli
enterprises, including some 3,500 in the Erez industrial zone
65
66
44. In contrast to the salaries of Palestinians employed in
Israel itself, those of Palestinians employed in the settlements
are not paid through the Payments Section of the State
Employment Bureau. The Payments Section ensures that
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workers are paid at least the minimum wage and enjoy the The employment rate was 69.2 per cent (70.4 per cent in the
accompanying social benefits (holidays, rest and recuperation West Bank, and 65.7 per cent in the Gaza Strip). The
pay, sick pay and pension funds). Wages paid to Palestinians underemployment was 9.3 per cent (11.4 per cent in the West
working in the settlements range from 7 to 13 shekels per Bank and 2.7 per cent in the Gaza Strip). The same source
hour, although the legal minimum hourly wage is 14.3 shekels indicates the average wage for the Palestinians was 54.4
(the exchange rate is approximately 4 shekels to 1 United shekels in theWest Bank, 43.5 shekels in the Gaza Strip and
States dollar).67 90.7 shekels in Israel.
45. In cases of work accidents in settlements, only workers 48. The macroeconomic impact of Israeli occupation on the
who are Israeli citizens are insured by Israel’s National occupied Palestinian territory inhibits investment and growth
Insurance Institute. Employers are required to provide as a result of the continued ambiguity of the legal and political
Palestinian employees with private medical insurance, but situation. There is no basic investment code in the areas
there is no supervisory authority ensuring that they do so, nor controlled by the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, there is
is there any State supervision concerning safety conditions no final status agreement with Israel. In fact, “the complex
for Palestinian workers in the settlements. Furthermore, overlay of laws and Israeli military orders in force during the
representatives of Palestinian trade unions are prevented from occupation remains in place. This is further aggravated by
visiting workplaces in the settlements. In cases of litigation border closures which include the ban on the movement of
initiated by Palestinian workers against settlement employers, goods, factors of production and people between the
the latter choose the courts in the occupied territory and Palestinian areas, Israel and the Gaza Strip, and between the
benefit from the application of the laxer Jordanian labour law rest of the West Bank and Jerusalem. Closure also often
still in force there.68 entails banning movement between theWest Bank and Jordan
46. The unemployment situation in the occupied Palestinian
territory remains critical, owing in particular to closures and 49. Closures have a significant effect on the continuity and
the increased reliance of Israel on expatriate workers from regularity of production, marketing, income generation and
outside the region. The number of Palestinian workers in employment. “Comprehensive closures were imposed on
Israel dropped from an average of 120,000 on a monthly basis 26 days during 1998 ... Excluding weekends and holidays,
in 1992 to 45,800 during the first half of 1998.69 This there were 14.5 effective closure days, a loss of 5.2 per cent
situation worsened on 11 September 1998, when the Israeli of total potential workdays, as compared with a 20.5 per cent
authorities imposed a comprehensive closure on the occupied loss in 1997.” According to a source at the International
Palestinian territory, thereby invalidating over 45,000 work Monetary Fund (IMF), “the regime of border closures has a
permits, and approximately 21,000 business persons’ permits particularly adverse impact both because of the direct effect
to enter Israel. On 17 September, the Israeli authorities began on investment incentives in the context of an already weak
to issue valid work permits. By 29 September, 13,800 permits productive base and a small domestic market, and because the
for Gaza workers and 9,500 forWest Bank workers had been severe economic costs it imposes tend to slow or divert efforts
issued. On that day, the Israeli authorities re-imposed the by the Palestinian Authority and donors to alleviate the other
comprehensive closure, which, except for 2 October, lasted significant impediments to private investment in the West
until 13 October when permits began to be re-issued.70 In Bank and Gaza Strip.” According to one source on issues
September 1998, the reduction in labour flows resulted in related to property taxes, 240 commercial outlets inside
estimated wage income losses of $11.4 million for permitted Jerusalem’s Old City have closed down as a result of the
Palestinian workers, with perhaps greater losses for unofficial closures imposed since 1991.
workers. By the end of 1998, more than 100,000 Palestinians
were reported to be employed by Israeli enterprises, including
60,000 lawfully employed in Israel and 13,000 working in
industrial zones and settlements.71
47. The July to September (1998) round of the Labour
Force Survey Series conducted by the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics reveals the labour force participation rate
in the occupied Palestinian territory to be 41.4 per cent (44.3
per cent in the West Bank and 34.4 per cent in the Gaza
Strip). The unemployment rate was 21.5 per cent (18.2 per
cent in the West Bank and 31.6 per cent in the Gaza Strip).
72
and between the Gaza Strip and Egypt”.73
74
75
76
77
50. According to a recent report by the Office of the United
Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories
(UNSCO), real per capita GDP and GNP at end– 1998 were,
respectively, about $1,380 and $1,630, a 3.4 per cent decline
in the former and a 2.1 per cent decline in the latter, as
compared with 1997.78
51. Frequent border closures have also negatively affected
trade, particularly exports from the territory, causing long
delays that are detrimental to export goods, particularly fruits
and vegetables. In addition, the delay in the arrival of raw
materials from Israel to the occupied Palestinian territory
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upsets production plans and lowers capacity utilization. final status 79 negotiations. Owing to political uncertainties,
Nevertheless, fewer imposed closures in 1998 resulted in an many Palestinians maintain bank accounts abroad.
improvement in trade flows.Monitored truckload movements
exiting and entering the territory grew an estimated 12.4 per
cent in 1998 relative to 1997. Imported truckloads grew by
14.7 per cent while the number of exported ones grew by only
1.9 per cent. In nominal shekel value terms, total trade with
Israel grew by about 9.3 per cent, with exports rising by 17.3
per cent (to about $492 million) and imports growing by 7.2
per cent (to about $1,714 million) as between 1997 and 1998.
Direct registered imports from countries other than Israel
grew by about 24.3 per cent (to about $143 million).80
52. The revival of private investment anticipated at the time
of the Oslo accords has not materialized. Estimates show that
the share of private investment in GDP fell from 19 per cent
in 1993 to about 10 per cent in 1997. Moreover, private
investment has been focused on the residential construction
sector rather than on the traded-goods sectors.81 In this light,
“the new surface area licensed by Palestinian local authorities
for private construction rose by 4.6 per cent in 1998. The area
licences for residential construction rose by only 0.1 per cent
while that for business construction increased by 32.6 per
cent. Slower growth in overall construction licensing, despite
the relative improvement in economic conditions, may be due
to increased uncertainty regarding the peace process and/or
a relative surplus of housing after several years of rapid
expansion.”82
53. The current uncertain border status and closures are the
key reasons why expectations for a revival of private
investment following the signing of the Oslo peace accords
have not been met. The regime of closures, the failure to open
a secure transport link and the failure to open the anticipated
port in Gaza have reduced the profitability of the critical
export sector and have resulted in a distorted pattern of
investment in the occupied Palestinian territory. The opening
of the airport in late 1998 may reduce the uncertainty
regarding exports of certain goods.83 Real private investment
is estimated to have declined by an average of 10 per cent per
year between 1993 and 1997, and private investment’s share
of GDP to have declined from 19 per cent of GDP, in 1993
to 10 per cent of GDP in 1997.84 According to a top IMF
economist, the year 1998 did not witness a significant change
in real private investment.85
54. Bank lending and deposits in the occupied Palestinian
territory have been modest. In 1997, lending remained at
about 19 per cent of total assets, reflecting a depressed
demand for credit by investors. The relatively low deposit to
GDP ratio was, at the end of 1996, around 57.5 per cent. A
substantial increase in total bank deposits is not, however,
expected to take place before the successful conclusion of
86
B. Occupied Syrian Golan
55. In the occupied Syrian Golan there are currently 16,500
Israelis, including 7,000 in the settlement community of
Katzrin, the most populous in the region.87 Settlers reside in
33 settlement communities established in the wake of Israel’s
1967 capture of this area. The Syrian population of 17,000
resides in five villages in the north-eastern corner of the
Golan.88
56. Settlement expansion in the Golan is concentrated at the
settlement of Katzrin, with a population of 7,000, making it
the largest. Three hundred new units were begun in mid-1997,
and formal approval from the Minister of Defence is expected
for the construction of an additional 1,000 units. To enable
construction of the additional units, the municipal area of
Katzrin was expanded by 1,200 dunums bordering a nature
reserve.89 For the first time since the beginning of Israeli
settlement in the Golan, a private-sector contractor, as
opposed to Government companies, undertook this residential
construction project. The 300 cottages being built at Katzrin
sell for $95,000 to $110,000. The State provides subsidized
grants, benefits and loans comprising 90 per cent of this
amount.90
57. InMay 1998, 380 garden homes in 14 settlements were
put up for sale. Monetary assistance of up to 95 per cent of
the value of the property was offered. In August 1998, the
Government of Israel unveiled a plan to almost double the
settler population by constructing 4,500 new dwellings,
including 2,500 vacation homes. A December 1998 report
by Israel’s Ministry of the Interior advises expanding
settlement as part of a national effort to encourage the
expansion of village settlement.91 During the first eight
months of 1998, 84 Israeli families moved to settlements in
the Golan. In late January 1999, the Government of Israel
decided to expand a number of settlements: 200 homes would
be built in four settlements. If tenders for these projects prove
successful, additional projects will be tabled. In August 1998,
Israel’s National Planning Council approved the tripling of
the population in the settlements.92
58. A second home in a settlement in the Golan is also
viewed by some Israelis as a vacation/financial investment.
During the first weeks of 1999, 20 residents from Tel Aviv
purchased, for $2.6 million, homes in the settlement of
Katzrin for investment purposes. Since the beginning of the
decade, the average price of a home has more than doubled.93
In early February 1999, the establishment of a settlement at
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11
the paramilitary outpost of Nimrod, located between the
Syrian villages of Masada and Majdal Shams, was reported.
Up to eight families were expected to settle at the site.94
59. Israeli-controlled territory in the occupied Golan,
excluding considerable military zones and settlement areas,
encompass nature reserves (24,908 hectares), cultivated areas
(8,100 hectares), grazing areas (46,575 hectares) and
orchards (2,531 hectares). 95 With regard to water, important
streams flowing to Galilee, the Jordan River, as well as the
Banias and the Dan rivers, originate in the Golan. These
sources provide more than 300 cubic metres of water to Israel
annually.96 Local environmentalists in the Golan claim that
Government officials have failed to do enough to protect the
area’s wildlife and to take into consideration the needs of
local farmers seeking to protect their livestock. Poison placed
in the area by local farmers to kill wolves attacking livestock
appears to be the cause of what some environmental experts
are calling an “ecological disaster”. According to laboratory
tests, the poisons used may continue to have an effect on the
wildlife in the area for years to come and take as long as two
decades to totally break down.97
60. While incentives and investment continue to promote
the Israeli presence in the occupied Syrian Golan, the Arab
population faces further deterioration in living conditions
resulting from Israeli restrictions on employment and “The Israeli occupation forces step up settlement in the
education in Israel, as well as from Israeli taxation policy.98
Employment opportunities for the Arab population in the
Syrian Golan are extremely restricted since movement
remains problematic, particularly in the light of the current
stalled peace process. The employment available to the Syrian
population in the Golan is limited to unskilled and semiskilled
daily wage labour. In most instances, these workers
have no access to social benefits or health insurance. Job
security is extremely precarious, with no provision for
unemployment compensation. Over and above these concerns,
substantial wage differences prevail, to the detriment of the
Syrian population of the Golan.99 The improvement of living
conditions is further inhibited by measures that restrict the
expansion of educational facilities, and limited access to
education in the Syrian Arab Republic or in Israeli colleges.100
Notes
1 “Report of the Civil Administration for the West Bank”,
mimeo, chart 8.7 (no date).
2 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, “The
socioeconomic effects of Israeli settlement” (forthcoming).
3 “Current and projected Israeli redeployment according to
the Wye Memorandum-1998 (map)”, Report (November
1998), p. 5.
4 Yerushalim, 11 December 1998.
5 According to the Palestinian geographer Khalil Tufakji.
Yerushalim, 11 December 1998; Ma’ariv, 3 January 1999.
6 Yerushalim, 11 December 1998; Ma’ariv, 3 January 1999.
7 Ma’ariv, 3 January 1999.
8 Yerushalim, 11 December 1998; Ma’ariv, 3 January 1999.
9 Ha’aretz, 17 December 1998.
10 Report, March 1998, p. 1.
11 Ha’aretz, 8 January 1999; Yerushalim, 22 January 1999.
12 Ha’aretz, 8 January 1999; Yerushalim, 22 January 1999.
13 Report, May 1998, p. 1.
14 Report, May 1998, p. 1; Yediot Aharanot, 10 December
1999.
15 Ibid.; Yediot Aharanot, 10 December 1999.
16 Report, September 1998, p. 9.
17 Ibid.
18 Report, September 1998, p. 1.
19 Report, September 1998, p. 7.
20 Ibid.
21 “What’s really happening in the settlements”, Margot
Dudkevitch, Jerusalem Post, daily Internet edition at
http://www.jpost.co.il/com/Archive/21.May.1998/
RealEstate/Article-21.html.
22
Gaza Strip”, 12 December 1998, Palestinian Center for
Human Rights.
23 Jordan Times, 7 January 1999.
24 Report, January 1999, p. 11.
25 “Trespassers on their own land — The backbone of the
Palestinian economy, and the traditional, emotional
mainstay of Palestinian existence — the olive tree — is
under attack by Jewish settlers”, by Amira Hass, Ha’aretz,
16 October 1998.
26 Report, January 1999, p. 11.
27 Estimates provided by Orient House officials in November
1998.
28 Report, July 1998, p. 4.
29 Report, September 1998, p. 7.
30 Ha’aretz, 25 August 1998.
31 Report, January 1999, pp. 6–7.
32 Press release, Annual Report of the Palestinian Center for
Human Rights, 15 February 1999.
33 The West Bank Rural PHC Survey online, 1993;
“Infrastructure and Health Services in the West Bank”.
34 Ajun L. Adlakha and others, “Demography of the
Palestinian population, with special emphasis on the
occupied Palestinian territory”, ESCWA Population
Bulletin, No. 43, ESCWA, Amman, 1995.
A/54/152
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12
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, and the Association to deal with 35 problems, violations and
Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for
Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia as Assessed in 1998, Table 1, Population by
age group (forthcoming).
36 The West Bank Rural PHC Survey online, 1993;
“Infrastructure and health services in the West Bank”.
37 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia,
Statistical Abstract of the ESCWA Region, number of
students by level of education and number of schools,
institutes and universities by level of education, eighteenth
issue (forthcoming).
38 Al Quds (Internet version), www.cmep.com/
september9.htm#Israel.
39 Ibid., 29 April 1998.
40 Ibid. The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee is a
body created by the Oslo accords with the PLO to
coordinate activities and responses to incidents in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.
41 Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 1997; Table III/13:
“Population of Jerusalem, by age, population group, quarter
and sub-quarter, 1996” (pp. 46–51).
42 Results of a census taken in 1997 by the Population Bureau
of the Palestinian Authority, Ma’ariv, 21 January 1998.
East Jerusalem is defined as the old city occupied and
annexed by Israel in 1967.
43 Kol Ha’ir, 18 December 1998.
44 E-mail dated 27 March 1999 from the Palestinian Society
for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment.
45 The name of the Jerusalem Mayor referred to is Ehud
Olmert. In contrast, during the last four years of Mayor
Teddy Kollek’s administration, 91 homes were destroyed.
Ha’aretz reported in mid–1998 that five structures had been
demolished. See Report (September 1998), p. 6.
46 Report, September 1998, p. 6; Ha’aretz, 22 June 1998.
47 Report, September 1998, p. 6.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 7.
50 Excerpts from a United States Department of State analysis
of the proposed plan for an “umbrella municipality”,
including undetermined West Bank settlements, approved
by the Israeli cabinet on 21 June 1998, Report (July 1998),
p. 8.
51 Steve Rodan, “B’tselem decries denial of water to
Palestinians”, The Jerusalem Post Daily Internet Edition,
10 September 1998.
52 Report, September 1998, p. 8.
53 “Environmental profile of the West Bank”, Applied
Research Institute of Jerusalem (no date).
54 The Israeli Ministry of Environment and the Manufacturers
Association of Israel have signed an agreement to reduce
industrial plant emissions in order to meet standards that
have been set by the Ministry, based on European Union
standards. A joint committee will be set up by the Ministry
complaints regarding the agreement (Economic Survey,
Israel Government Press Office, 16 November 1998).
55 Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (www.arij.org).
56 “Environmental Impact”, p. 34.
57 “Environmental Pollution and Settlements”, in Water
Environment, Saleh Rabi and Ramez Titi, The Palestine
Hydrology Group, February 1998, pp. 33–37.
58 Kol Ha’ir, 20 March 1998.
“Burkan Settlement waste-water flows into Kufr Ad
Diek, Bruquain and Surtah area sometimes reaching Balout.
This kind of waste-water is the most dangerous since it
consists of industrial waste-water, such as metal plating and
others. Enamel settlement waste-water flows to the
collection station of waste-water in Qana valley in Salfeet.
Waste-water is then pumped to the foot of the near
mountain for planting purposes and the excess of the wastewater
flows in the valley. Even the pumped water is returned
to the valley. An inefficient desalination plant for wastewater
is found in Ariel. The waste-water flows into Al
Matwi Valley west of Salfeet, where it mixes with the
flowing water from Al Matwi Valley, which is then used for
agriculture.
“Waste-water flows from the settlement of Shar’arei
Tikva to the agricultural lands of Beit Amin in Kalqilia,
causing agricultural damage. The sewage of Alfe Menashe
flows through a closed pipe to the pumping station of wastewater
within the boundaries of 1948. The inefficiency of the
pump has led to sewage and waste-water flowing into the
village of Habla and Kalqilia. Waste-water from Efrat flows
to the agricultural lands in Bethlehem. Waste-water flows
from the settlement of Neve Daniel, damaging agricultural
lands in Bethlehem and in el Khader village as well as
groundwater aquifers.
“The Israeli army camp of Al Majnouneh near
Hebron causes environmental damage owing to the wastewater
flowing into the al Fawwar spring. This spring is
usually used for agricultural purposes”, “Environmental
Pollution and Settlements”.
59 Hisham Abdallah, “A tour of the West Bank: from
settlement to settlement”, Agence France Press, 17 October
1997.
60 Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and
the Environment, “Water quality in the West Bank”
(October 1996), p. 6.
61 Ibid.
62 Al Quds (Internet version), 29 April 1998.
At the meeting, the Palestinian side demanded an end to the
Israeli works in the industrial zone in ’Izbat al-Tabib and
Jayyus quarries. The Israeli side responded by saying all
works in ’Izbat al-Tabib area would be stopped at the
request of the Palestinian side, and added that all the work
that had been done in the past had not been coordinated
with the military bodies. Within the same context, the Israeli
side said that work in the Wadi al-Tin area had been
stopped at the Palestinians’ request following a thorough
study of the subject that had lasted over one year. Minister
A/54/152
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13
al-Tarifi referred to the issue of bribes associated with the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, op. cit., pp.
quarries, and Major General Ya’cov Or responded that a 31–36.
committee had been set up to investigate the subject and
presented its recommendations to the Israeli defence
minister, adding that the report did not reveal that any
Israeli official acted inappropriately.
Applied Research Institute 63 of Jerusalem, “Wadi Teen
Quarry and the Systematic Expropriation of Palestinian
Natural Resources”, www.arij.org/paleye/waditeen/, p. 2.;
“Legislative Council Investigates Israeli/Palestinian
Partnership in Stone Production”, People’s Rights, July
1997, p. 6.
64 Palestine Report, 27 June 1997.
65 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division,
“Economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority”, background paper (February 1998).
66 Kav Le’oved (Workers’ Hotline) Newsletter, August 1998.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Survey
of Economic and Social Developments in the ESCWA (in Arabic), pp. 12–20.
Region, 1997–1998 (E/ESCWA/ED/1998/5); UNSCO report
on Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Autumn
1998), Salem Aulini, Head, Economic and Social
Monitoring Unit, Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator in the Occupied Territory, Gaza, p. 2.
70 UNSCO, op. cit., pp. 5–6.
71 The Prime Minister’s Report, 25 November 1998, issued by
the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
72 Nakba Report, “The Palestinian territories in statistical
figures and indicators”, Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics, May 1998.
73 “Palestine Economy Policy Research Institute (MAS)”, Mas
Economic Monitor, No. 1 (1997), pp. 2–3.
74 Ibid., pp. 7–9.
75 UNSCO report on economic and social conditions in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, spring 1999.
76 “Private investment and uncertainty in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip”, Oussama Kanaan, Economy, p. 25.
77 Al Ayyam, 23 October 1998.
78 UNSCO, op. cit., p. 3.
79 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, op. cit., pp.
8–9.
80 UNSCO report on economic and social conditions in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, spring 1999.
81 “Introduction”, Milan Zavadjil, in Economy, p. 2.
82 UNSCO report on economic and social conditions in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, spring 1999.
83 “Introduction”, Milan Zavadjil, in Economy, p. 2.
84 Oussama Kanaan, op. cit., p. 18.
85 Oussama Kanaan, 6 April 1999.
86
87 Report, September 1998, p. 5.
88 Ibid.
89 Report, September 1998, p. 5; Ha’aretz, 22 August 1998;
Yediot Aharanot, 20 December 1998.
90 Ibid.
91 Report, September 1998, Ha’aretz, 23 August 1998; Yediot
Aharanot, 20 December 1998.
92 Ha’aretz, 31 January 1999.
93 Ibid.
94 Ha’aretz, 9 February 1999.
95 Golan Heights information server (www.golan.org.il).
96 Ibid.
97 IsraelWire, 5 July 1998.
98 “Report on Israeli practices against human rights of Syrian
citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan, by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic, June 1997 (Mimeo)
99 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
100 Ibid., pp. 20–24.
United Nations A/55/84–E/2000/16
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
14 June 2000
Original: English
00-48058 (E) 110700
`````````
General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Item 100 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in
the occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2000
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 1999/53 of 29 July 1999, entitled “Economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan”, the Economic and Social Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth
session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution. The
General Assembly, in its resolution 54/230 of 22 December 1999, reiterated the
request for a report. The annexed report, which has been prepared by the Economic
and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), is submitted in response to the
two resolutions.
* A/55/50.
** E/2000/100.
2
A/55/84
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Annex
Report prepared by the Economic
and Social Commission for
Western Asia
I. Introduction
1. At its substantive session, the Economic and
Social Council adopted, on 29 July 1999, resolution
1999/53 on the economic and social repercussions of
the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan. The resolution, inter alia,
stressed the importance of the revival of the Middle
East peace process on the basis of Security Council
resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of 22 October
1973, and 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, and the
principle of land for peace as well as the full and
timely implementation of the agreements reached
between the Government of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people. It also stressed the need to preserve
the territorial integrity of all of the occupied
Palestinian territory and to guarantee the freedom of
movement of persons and goods in the territory,
including the removal of restrictions on going into and
from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to
and from the outside world. The resolution also
stressed the vital importance of the operation and
construction of the Gaza airport, the seaport in Gaza
and safe passage to the economic and social
development of the Palestinian people. The resolution
called upon Israel to cease its measures against the
Palestinian people, particularly the closure of the
occupied Palestinian territory, the enforced isolation of
Palestinian towns, the destruction of homes and the
isolation of Jerusalem. The resolution reaffirmed the
inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab
population of the occupied Syrian Golan to all their
natural and economic resources and called upon Israel
not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of
those resources. It also reaffirmed that Israeli
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan,
were illegal and an obstacle to economic and social
development. In the resolution, the General Assembly
requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on
its implementation to the General Assembly at its fiftyfourth
session, through the Economic and Social
Council.
2. In its resolution 54/230 of 22 December 1999, the
General Assembly took note of the report of the
Secretary-General on the economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Palestinian
territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian
Golan.1 It reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the
Palestinian people and the population of the occupied
Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including
land and water; and called upon Israel, the occupying
Power, not to exploit, to cause loss or depletion of or to
endanger the natural resources in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and in the
occupied Syrian Golan. In the resolution the Assembly
recognized the right of the Palestinian people to claim
restitution as a result of any exploitation, loss or
depletion of, or danger to, their natural resources, and
expressed the hope that the issue would be dealt with in
the framework of the final status negotiations between
the Palestinian and Israeli sides. It also requested the
Secretary-General to submit a report to the Assembly
at its fifty-fifth session. The present report responds to
the two above-mentioned resolutions.
II. Economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation
A. Occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem
3. The delays in the implementation of the
agreements reached between Israel and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO), the fact that those
agreements are not usually fully implemented and
Israeli practices, particularly with regard to settlement
expansion and to the closure of passage routes from
areas controlled by the Palestine Authority to Israel,
continue to aggravate the living conditions of the
Palestinian people.
4. On 23 October 1998, Israel and the PLO agreed
in the Wye River Memorandum to a revised timetable
for the phased implementation of the first and second
further redeployments of Israeli military forces as
outlined in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
3
A/55/84
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on the West Bank and Gaza (Oslo II). The Sharm
el-Sheikh Memorandum on implementation of the
timetable of outstanding commitments of agreements
signed and the resumption of permanent status
negotiations was signed on 4 September 1999. The new
format splits into three parts Israeli redeployments that
were to have occurred, according to Wye in two
phases, and according to Oslo II, in one phase. From 10
to 13 September 1999, 7 per cent of the West Bank was
transferred from Area C status, where Israel retains
exclusive security control to Area B status, where
Israel retains overriding security responsibility. On 20
January 2000, an additional 3 per cent was transferred
from Area C to Area B status, with an additional 2 per
cent moving from Area B to Area A status, where
Palestinians have complete authority for civilian
security. The third redeployment phase was scheduled
for 20 January 2000, but postponed. On 19 March
2000, the Israeli cabinet approved the third and last
stage of Israeli redeployment undertaken during the
interim period set forth in the Oslo II accords. The
transfer of 5.1 per cent from Area B status and 1 per
cent from Area C status to full Palestinian control was
implemented on 21 March 2000.2 Wye makes no
mention of a date or the territorial extent of the third
redeployment called for in Oslo II that was to have
been implemented in October 1997, nor does the Sharm
el-Sheikh agreement.3
5. The bulk of the transfers from Area C outlined in
the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum — all but 100-200
square kilometres of a scheduled 600 square
kilometres — is located in the Nablus-Jenin region and
south of Hebron. Although neither area is heavily
populated by settlers, they comprise part of the
heartland of the occupied Palestinian territory. The
territory to be surrendered to Palestinian civil control
in the Nablus region is much less problematic from the
settlers’ perspective than comparable transfers around
Ramallah would have been. With few exceptions,
settlements in affected areas will be connected by
bypass roads, either existing or planned, to main
transport routes to Israel. Twelve new bypass roads,
costing $70 million, are in various stages of planning
and construction. In addition, new Israeli military bases
are being established throughout the West Bank,
according to the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharanot,
“particularly next to isolated settlements. The intention
is not to leave isolated settlements in the heart of
Palestinian areas without an army base nearby. The
camps to be established, therefore, will separate the
territory under Palestinian control from the
settlements.”
6. Civilian Israeli settlements have been built at
some 200 sites seized by civilian and military bodies
representing the Government of Israel as well as by
Israeli civilians empowered by Israel to undertake such
activity. The land under exclusive Israeli control
amounts to 60 per cent of the West Bank (Area C) and
20 per cent of Gaza. In addition, 30 per cent of the area
of East Jerusalem is under effective Israeli ownership.
Israel has established approximately 170 settlements in
the West Bank with a civilian population of
approximately 190,000. There are approximately
200,000 Israeli residents in East Jerusalem and 7,000
settlers live in 16 settlements in Gaza. In the Golan
Heights, 17,000 settlers reside in 33 settlements. By the
end of 2000, more than 400,000 Israelis will be living
in over 200 communities established since 1967 in the
West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the
Golan Heights.4
7. The geographic distribution of settlements on the
occupied Palestinian territories severely restricts the
growth of Palestinian communities. According to an
Amnesty International report, the Oslo Accords have
created 227 separate areas under Palestinian control. Of
these areas 190 measure less than 2 square kilometres.
While only 40,000 Palestinians live within Area C,
under exclusive Israeli military and civil control, all
Palestinians live within 6 or less kilometres of it. The
Amnesty International report states that since Oslo, all
the 200 applications for building permits in Area C
have been rejected.5
8. Regarding the future of Israel’s settlement
population of 200,000 in the West Bank (193,000) and
Gaza (7,000), according to Ha’aretz the new Israeli
Prime Minister noted that the settlements of “Alfe
Menache, the Etzion Bloc, Ariel, Nirit, the Corridor,
the Jordan Valley settlements, and many more places
are part of the State of Israel, now and in the permanent
agreement.”6 As to territorial settlement with the
Palestinians, the principles underlying such a
settlement are broad: “united Jerusalem under Israeli
sovereignty; no return to the 1967 borders; no foreign
army west of the Jordan River; most of the Judea and
Samaria settlers — not even most of the settlements —
to remain under our sovereignty in the permanent
arrangement; a defence and settlement presence in the
Jordan Rift Valley.”7 “As for the borders, it would
naturally make no sense to draw them prematurely. The
4
A/55/84
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borders will be determined in the permanent-status
talks.”8
9. In an on-site survey of settlement expansion
carried out by Peace Now in May 1999, 6,500 housing
units were under construction in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, a 14 per cent increase compared to May
1998.9 According to Ma’ariv, the Ministry of Housing
approved a plan for the construction of 1,800 dwelling
units in the West Bank adjacent to the East Jerusalem
settlement suburb of Neve Ya’acov. The new
construction will form a territorial link between the
settlements of East Jerusalem and the West Bank
settlement of Adam. Ma’ariv also reported that the area
will be annexed to Jerusalem upon the completion of
construction.10 Other construction in the area includes
450 units in Tel Zion (out of 1,000 approved) and 300
in Adam.
10. Settlements continued to expand during the first
months of the new Government. The Ministry of
Housing issued tenders for the construction of 3,196
new units in the West Bank and Gaza Strip settlements,
excluding East Jerusalem, during the first six months
of Mr. Barak’s government, a rate higher than annual
averages.11 In December 1999, Mr. Barak announced a
temporary halt in the issuance of new tenders for
settlement housing construction. This prohibition does
not, however, extend to scores of smaller settlements.
11. According to Peace Now, between 15 October
and 13 December 1999, the Israeli Government
approved building plans for 2,757 new dwellings in six
West Bank settlements, the “deposit” of plans for an
additional 2,139 units, and the placement of 85 mobile
homes in settlements.12 At the end of February 2000,
there were more than 7,120 units in various stages of
construction, enough to increase the settler population
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by 30,000. Thousands
of others have already been approved and await only a
decision by contractors to begin construction. There are
no restrictions on settlement expansion in East
Jerusalem, where construction at Jebel Abu Ghneim
and at Ras al Amud, among other locations, proceeds
apace.13 The five-year plan of the Ministry of Housing
calls for the construction of 12,000 new dwelling units
in West Bank settlements, including 3,000 in Ma’ale
Adumim, 2,000 in Kiryat Sefer, and 1,500 in Ariel.14
12. The relative attractive value available in
settlements is the product of a number of factors: the
classification of settlements as Development Area A,
which entitles them to the highest level of public
subsidy, including 50 per cent of the land costs; the low
profit margins accepted by Amana, the construction
arm of the settlement movement Gush Emunim, and by
settlement-based contractors; and less stringent
building codes than apply in Israel. Construction costs
of $500 to $600 per square metre result in selling costs
of only $700 per square metre, far less expensive than
similar charges in central Israel. Despite early
indications that he might do so, Prime Minister Barak
has not changed the preferential access of many
settlements and settlement-based industrial enterprises
to state benefits and subsidies.15
13. The confiscation of lands declared by Israel as
“state land” as a prelude to their transfer to Israeli
control has a critical impact upon the Palestinian
community. During 1999, Israel took formal possession
of 40,178 dunams of Palestinian land, of which 19,691
dunams were used for settlement expansion and the
establishment of new settlements, and 16,657 dunams
were used to build new bypass roads. Projects to build
nine additional roads which will require about 10,875
dunams were approved. Six new bypass roads are to be
built covering 5,782 dunams. An additional 7,550
dunams were levelled; 15,180 trees, mostly olive,
almond and fig trees, were uprooted or burnt.16
14. Settlement expansion exacts immediate costs to
nearby Palestinian communities. Israeli settlers
residing in Efrat, a city that has been built in part on
lands belonging to Al Khader, are making rapid
progress in paving a road that will connect Efrat with
Herndon to the east. The road will use the sole land
reserves of several Arab villages, as well as
Bethlehem’s land reserves. However, the villages are
forbidden to construct a hothouse or sheep-shed or
even to plant a tree beyond the boundaries of the
Area B land allotted to them.17 The joint Israeli-
Palestinian Civilian Affairs Committee met on 27 May
1999 to hear complaints of Palestinians from the
Jordan Valley village of Nu’ema who charged that
settlers from nearby Na’ami had placed mobile homes
and a water tower on their agricultural land. Israel
maintains that the disputed land is “state land.”18
15. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights
reported on 25 August 1999 that settlers from Netzarim
in the Gaza Strip established a 450 metre-long water
pipe from their settlement to a piece of land (estimated
at 500 dunams) located to the south of the settlement,
thereby paving the way to expand the borders of
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Netzarim to the south. The move was the latest in a
series of expansions to Netzarim since the signing of
the Oslo Accords. The military post situated on the
western side of Netzarim has also been expanded.
Construction activities include the construction of a
synagogue and 35 additional houses. The future port of
Gaza, where construction is scheduled to begin in
March 2000, will be built on the beachfront south of
Gaza City, three kilometres from the settlement.19
16. LAW (Palestinian Society for the Protection of
Human Rights and the Environment) reported that
during 1999, Israel demolished 93 homes, barracks and
water reservoirs in various Palestinian areas, including
53 houses and barracks, 7 agricultural nurseries, 8
stores, 10 reservoirs and water wells, and 6 walls.
These properties were distributed as follows: 33 in
Jerusalem, 17 in Bethlehem, 15 in Nablus, 10 in
Hebron, 7 in Ramallah, 7 in Khan Yunis, 3 in Jenin and
1 in Kalkilya.20
17. According to LAW’s documentation, during
1999, 460 Palestinians received notifications that their
houses or barracks or other facilities would be
demolished. Most of these properties are located in
Jerusalem and Hebron. Two of the buildings threatened
for demolition are used as mosques, one of them is
located in Ras al-Amud in Jerusalem and the other in
the village of al-Walajeh in Bethlehem. Three schools
in Ramallah, Jenin and Hebron are also threatened with
demolition.21 Israeli forces also on occasion prevent
residents from cultivating the land adjacent to their
houses. Many people were detained because of their
attempts to cultivate their own land. Moreover, water
supplies to their neighbourhood were cut off.22
18. On 5 May 1999, 16 military orders were issued,
declaring that any person entering lands in 69 villages
in the West Bank would be prosecuted under Israeli
military laws.23 In November 1999, Israeli authorities
notified citizens from Jaloud and Qaryout villages in
the Nablus area of their intention to confiscate their
lands in order to expand the Rahalim settlement.
According to the Legal Centre for Lands Defence, the
area of land in that region, which Israel claims as state
land, is estimated at 2,306 dunams.24
19. Bypass roads are built with a safety buffer of 50
to 100 metres on either side, where all Palestinian
residential and commercial construction is prohibited.
“Existing Palestinian houses located in areas close to
planned bypass roads,” noted a recent study by a
Palestinian researcher, “are being systematically
demolished. The bypass roads are estimated to reach
425 km. With the safety buffer zone they enjoy, the
construction of these bypass roads requires the
confiscation and destruction of approximately 109,000
dunams of Palestinian land, most of which is
agricultural, depriving owners of their main source of
income.”25
20. Even though Israel continues to retain security
control of Area B and the access roads to settlements in
close proximity to areas under Palestinian control, the
security of these settlements remains impaired. A few
settlements such as Sanur west of Jenin, which is
already almost empty, are not likely to survive as
civilian settlements. In this regard, a former head of
Israeli military intelligence noted that protecting access
roads to these settlements will be a constant source for
provocations and conflict and the example of Netzarim
in the Gaza Strip is most frequently recalled in this
context. All travel from this isolated settlement
proceeds under IDF escort. Yet the population of this
isolated outpost has grown from 60 people to more
than 400 in recent years.26
21. During 1999, seven Palestinians were killed by
the Israeli occupying forces, one by the Israeli police,
two by settlers and three workers died after being
crushed by cars. Two people died in Israeli prisons, two
others were killed as a result of the eruption of land
mines and another two died from injuries suffered
during the intifada.27
22. The list of isolated settlements appearing in the
February 2000 IDF planning map contains few
surprises to anyone familiar with the principles guiding
Israel’s successive redeployments. Kfar Tapuach,
which now sits astride one of the most vital
transportation junctions in the West Bank, may be
marginalized when a new road linking Ariel with the
settlement of Rachelim, south of Tapuach, is
completed. Inclusion of the Allon Road settlements of
Rimonim and Kochav Ha Shahar is said to suggest an
Israeli willingness to establish a secure Palestinian
corridor between the Ramallah region and Jericho. The
Allon Plan, devised within weeks of the 1967 war,
outlined such a corridor along the Ramallah-Jericho
road. Today, IDF planners appear ready to consider a
5-6 kilometre-wide corridor running across the Allon
Road where the settlements of Rimonim and Kochav
Ha Shahar are now located. There are, however, ways
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of establishing such a corridor without impacting either
of these two settlements.28
23. Both Prime Minister Barak and Deputy Minister
of Defence Ephraim Sneh denied that the settlements
on the list are marked for evacuation, but settlement
leaders, who convened an emergency meeting to
discuss the issue, assume that is just what is on offer.
“Whoever splits the country also splits the people of
Israel,” declared one settlement leader, “and this is
what seems to be happening now by those examining
planning options.”29 Peace Now was less circumspect,
noting that “the published list proves that the
government of Israel recognizes the principal of
evacuating settlements in return for peace.”30
24. In East Jerusalem, Israel has expropriated more
than 5,845 acres of mostly Palestinian-owned land —
one third of East Jerusalem — for the construction of
10 major Israeli settlement neighbourhoods. These
areas, with a population approaching 200,000, ring
almost the entire northern, eastern and southern
perimeter of the city.31 Ha’aretz reported on 2 March
1999 that of 201 demolition orders issued by the
Ministry of Interior in 1998 for Palestinian properties
in East Jerusalem, only 9 were implemented. The
municipality destroyed 13 additional homes.
Palestinians requested 320 building permits, of which
254 were granted.32
25. The Jerusalem municipality estimates that it will
cost $180 million to bring infrastructure in the
Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem to the prevailing
standard in West Jerusalem. The 1999 municipal
budget allocated $100,000 for the planning of
settlement areas in East Jerusalem, a 25 per cent
increase over the 1998 development budget. At least
$20 million was to be spent on improving major new
roads in East Jerusalem, facilitating movement between
the city, the coastal region, and Greater Jerusalem
settlements.33
26. The number of Palestinians holding Jerusalem
identity documents issued by Israel is generally
believed to number almost 200,000, which would put
the Palestinian percentage in the entire city — West
and East — at 30 per cent. The census, however, along
with other investigations undertaken by Palestinian
officials at Orient House, suggests that the number of
Palestinians actually residing in the city is half that
number, or approximately 100,000. In addition, there
are 30,000 Palestinians without Jerusalem documents
who currently reside in the city, as well as 20,000 who
live in the West Bank villages, such as Anata, that are
considered to be within Jerusalem’s municipal borders.
Palestinians with Jerusalem documents who live
outside Palestine number 50,000.34
27. According to figures compiled in the Statistical
Yearbook of Jerusalem, Israel’s share of the population
in East Jerusalem was much smaller than the
Palestinian share in 1972, but it increased steadily until
1986, when the two groups were almost equal. Since
1986, however, there has been a small, fluctuating
Palestinian majority in East Jerusalem, based upon the
number of Palestinians entitled by Israel to residency
in East Jerusalem.35
28. According to a study by the Badil Resource
Centre for Palestinian Refugee Rights, 8 per cent of
Jerusalem residents are forced to leave Jerusalem and
reside in the West Bank every year owing to Israeli
discriminatory measures in the city. The number of
Jerusalemites and their descendants forced to leave
their city since 1948 is 480,000, the study reported. In
addition, prior to the 1948 war, Palestinians owned 80
per cent of lands in Jerusalem. Today, only 6,000
dunams, or 7.3 per cent of the East Jerusalem is
Palestinian-owned. That number decreases to 4.3 per
cent if the entire Jerusalem area is taken into account
(al-Quds).36
29. The revocation of residency rights of Palestinians
in Jerusalem continues to be a problem. By the
beginning of November, five months after the
formation of Mr. Barak’s government, complaints
continued to arrive in the offices of civil rights
organizations in Jerusalem. More than 100 Palestinians
complained that they had received notices from the
Interior Ministry in East Jerusalem informing them that
they had lost their residency rights.37
30. Many of the requests of those who had appealed
in the past to register births and marriages went
unfulfilled, while the requests of those who asked to
have their confiscated identity cards returned were
ignored.38 Many Arabs living in East Jerusalem do not
have identity cards for numerous reasons. According to
different estimates, the situation applies to thousands
of Arab families whose registration in the city has not
been set in order. For example, there are couples of
whom one person is not a resident of Jerusalem; their
children, therefore, are also not registered as permanent
residents of Israel. These children are not eligible to
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study in Jerusalem schools or to receive medical care.
Another typical case involves a man who does not have
an Israeli identity card and who therefore cannot
legally live with his wife and children.39
31. According to LAW, during 1999, three
Palestinians were killed in the city and the residency
rights of 393 Palestinians were revoked, increasing the
number of Palestinians whose residency rights had
been revoked to 3,309 since 1987. Israel demolished 33
constructions during 1999 in addition to tens of
demolition warnings received by Palestinians in the
city.40
32. Construction in East Jerusalem faces many
hurdles. Planning measures ban construction of more
than three storeys tall in Palestinian neighbourhoods
and an extremely difficult and slow process is required
for obtaining building permits.41 On the other hand,
land for new construction in 1999 was offered
principally in the East Jerusalem settlement
communities of Har Homa and Pisgat Ze’ev.42
33. An Israeli inter-ministerial committee on
Jerusalem recommended that in order to maintain a
70/30 per cent Jewish majority in Jerusalem, Israel
needs to build 116,000 new dwelling units in the city
for Jews by 2020, an annual rate of 5,500, far higher
than is currently the case.43 In May 1999, settlement
construction of 130 units in the East Jerusalem
neighbourhood of Ras al-Amud commenced on a
3.5-acre site.
34. The Ministry of Housing approved, according to
Ma’ariv, a plan for the construction of 1,800 dwelling
units in the West Bank adjacent to the East Jerusalem
settlement suburb of Neve Ya’acov. The new
construction will form a territorial link between the
settlements of East Jerusalem and the West Bank
settlement of Adam. The newspaper reported that the
area will be annexed to Jerusalem upon the completion
of construction.44 Other construction in the area
includes 450 units in Tel Zion (out of 1,000 approved)
and 300 in Adam.
35. The continuing Israeli occupation is severely
affecting and undermining the supply of drinking water
to Palestinians. Rainfall in the West Bank amounted to
some 220 millimetres (the average at eight measuring
stations), while the normal average rainfall is 537
millimetres. While this decline has significantly
disrupted the supply and pressure of water resources in
villages linked to a running water system, the shortage
has most detrimentally affected those villages that are
unconnected to a supply network. The West Bank has
some 180 unconnected villages, in which close to
300,000 persons live, comprising approximately 20 per
cent of the West Bank’s Palestinian population.
Another group suffering from the drought is the
Bedouins living in the West Bank, who number about
20,000 persons.45
36. For Palestinians in unconnected villages and for
Bedouins, rainfall is the primary source of water for
their household needs. In most houses in the occupied
Palestinian territory, and particularly in unconnected
villages, the residents maintain containers on their
roofs and in their yards for the collection of water.
Water collected in this way during the winter meets
part of their summer needs. These families rely,
primarily in the summer, on nearby springs, from
which water is collected in canisters and other vessels.
The West Bank has more than 500 springs, some of
which flow only during the winter. Of those that are
active also in the summer, a few are used by
Palestinians to meet their household needs. The
drought during 1999 clearly reduced the amount of
water flowing in these springs and in some instances,
even dried them up completely.46
37. The overall current water consumption in the
West Bank varies between 110 and 115 million cubic
meters (mcm) annually and in Gaza it is about 100
mcm a year. These figures have hardly changed since
the Israeli occupation in 1967, despite growing water
needs due to the nearly 3 per cent population growth,
as well as the needs of socio-economic development.47
38. Israel has control over the majority of available
water in the occupied Palestinian territory. For
domestic consumption, the occupied Palestinian
territory uses 53 mcm of water, settlements 13 mcm
and Israel 520 mcm. For agricultural purposes, while
the occupied territory uses 152 mcm of water, Israel
uses 1,200 mcm. The settlements use more water than
Israel itself. Israel currently consumes 80 per cent of
the water in the West Bank.48 There has been a severe
lack of progress in the implementation of the Oslo
Agreement, specifically article 40, in which Israel
committed to give the Palestinians 28.6 mcm of water
immediately after its signature. Until now, they have
only given 10 mcm.49
39. Israel controls water distribution through control
of permits for drinking water networks and for drilling
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wells. Israel takes the liberty of tapping into mountain
aquifers in times of water shortages while the
Palestinians are prohibited to do so, even for
agricultural purposes. Another problem Palestinians
face is Israel’s demolition of water-harvesting storage
pools. According to the Palestine Report, “For
example, in the Hebron areas of Aroub and near the
Israeli settlement Kiryat Arba, some farmers tried to
build storage tanks to collect rainwater, but the Israeli
authorities destroyed them.”50
40. Palestinians are faced with the growing problem
of pollution from water waste coming from Israeli
settlements. These settlements dump their wastewater,
especially industrial waste, into Palestinian lands. This
not only pollutes agricultural lands but also
groundwater.51
41. Contamination of water resources by residential
and commercial development can have a deleterious
effect on public health. Ma’ariv reported that
Palestinian children near prosperous settlements fall ill
because they lack water and suffer from poor
hygiene.52 A study by Bethlehem University reported
that the water sources of many Palestinian villages are
contaminated to a degree that endangers the lives and
health of their residents.53
42. Tests carried out on the mountain aquifer near
Herndon and Beit Fager showed that 60 per cent of the
samples contained unsafe levels of bacteria, caused by
sewage contamination. In addition, many of the
samples also contained nitrates and other organic and
industrial impurities known to be hazardous to human
health.54 Water from some 70 springs was found to be
unfit for human consumption, but due to the absence of
any viable alternative the population continued to use
the water for both domestic and agricultural purposes.55
43. Israeli’s control of the occupied Palestinian
territory has had negative repercussions on the
environment. There are approximately 260 Israeliowned
industrial concerns in the West Bank. These
factories are either located in Israeli-operated industrial
zones or inside settlements. Information about these
industrial activities is scarce. Some products are
identified, but detailed information on quantities
produced, labour and waste generated is not available.
The major industries within these industrial zones
include: aluminium, leather tanning, textile dyeing,
batteries, fiberglass, plastics, and other chemical
industries.
44. Environmental regulations on soil, air, and water
quality, and restrictions on industrial development have
generally been far less comprehensive and much less
assiduously enforced in the occupied Palestinian
territory as compared with Israel itself. Combined with
State-subsidized incentives for Israeli concerns to
locate to industrial parks in and near settlements, the
relative laxity of environmental enforcement and
monitoring has, until recently, led to the relocation of
polluting Israeli industries into the occupied
territories.56 Another major problem is foreseen by the
construction of large quarries near Avnei Hefetz and
south of Ofra.57
45. Reliable data about waste water generated in the
settlements is difficult to obtain. Approximately 4.3
million cubic metres of waste water is generated
annually from settlements in the West Bank. A large
amount is dumped, untreated, on Palestinian land,
creating a health hazard for many communities.58 On
14 November 1999, Israeli forces prevented Palestinian
citizens from erecting a sand barrier in order to stop the
flow of waste water from untreated sewage coming
from the Kfar Darom settlement in southern Gaza.59
Thus, the flow of waste water from settlements
increases mosquitoes and other insects and contagious
diseases, particularly skin disease among children. The
amount of waste water spilled into the valley is quite
substantial, leading to flooding and overflowing into
people’s houses, as well as the submersion of
thousands of dunams nearby.60
46. Palestinian health officials estimate that during
the past four years, 66,000 people have been
hospitalized with water-pollution-related illnesses, and
another 290,000 sought outpatient care. There is no
breakdown for cases caused by pollution originating in
settlements and that originating in Palestinian areas.61
Solid wastes from Israeli industrial zones are routinely
dumped in Palestinian areas. Wadi Beit Hanoun, for
example, is the receptacle for wastes from the nearby
Erez industrial zone.62
47. A report by Palestinian Ministry of Environment
states that, since 1987, Israel dumped solid waste in the
Azzoun area near Qalqilia, leading to a marked
increase in dangerous diseases such as cancer among
the Palestinians in the area. The report reviewed the
many attempts to smuggle Israeli solid waste into the
Palestinian land. The report also warned against the
Israeli attempts to relocate factories causing
environmental hazards from within Israel into West
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Bank settlements and pointed out that 40 out of the 160
factories in the settlements pose real environmental
hazards.63
48. Palestinians have traditionally made up the bulk
of the work force engaged in the construction and daily
maintenance of settlements throughout the occupied
territories. Palestinians working in Israeli settlements
number between 10,000 and 12,000 in more than 100
Israeli enterprises, including 3,500 in the Erez
industrial zone and settlements in Gaza, and 8,500 in
industrial parks and settlements in the West Bank, not
including those working in the settlement communities
of East Jerusalem. The number of such workers has
risen by about 50 per cent since the imposition of the
closure in 1993, paralleling an increase in Israeliowned
factories in the occupied Palestinian territory.64
There are another 35,000 Palestinians with permits and
another 40,000 Palestinians without permits working in
Israel.65
49. The macro-economic impact of Israeli occupation
of the Palestinian territory is to inhibit investment and
growth due to the continued ambiguity of the legal and
political situation. There is no basic investment code,
nor a settled legal code in the areas controlled by the
Palestinian Authority. Moreover, there is no final status
agreement with Israel. In fact, “the complex overlay of
laws and Israeli military orders in force during the
occupation remains in place. This is further aggravated
by Israeli-imposed restrictions on the movement of
goods, factors of production and people between Israel
and the West Bank and Gaza, and between the West
Bank and Jerusalem”.66
50. According to the Wye Memorandum, agreements
about the southern “safe passage” route should have
concluded within a week of entry into force of the
Memorandum, and operation of this route should have
begun as soon as possible thereafter. The southern
route was opened on 25 October 1999. Passage of
Palestinians is, however, effectively restricted by
Israeli security protocols.67 There has been no
agreement regarding the opening of the northern
passage. The opening of the port of Gaza has been
similarly delayed due to security demands by Israel,
although work on the three-year project is expected to
commence this year. On the other hand, the
International Airport in Gaza, under joint Israeli and
Palestinian Authority supervision, opened to limited
traffic in late 1998. Continuing restrictions on the
Palestinian Authority’s operation of the facility have
contributed to its failure, until now, to make a
recognizable contribution to the Palestinian economy.
51. According to LAW, during 1999, the Israeli
occupying forces closed all the occupied Palestinian
territory including the areas controlled by the
Palestinian Authority for 11 days, far fewer than in
previous years.68 However, despite the few days of
total closure in 1999, the Palestinian economic
situation remains precarious due to limited economic
activity. In particular, investment and exports have
been stagnant — the two most critical variables for
sustainable private sector-led employment growth.
Also worrisome was the downward trend in public
investment, the result of reduced levels of donor
disbursements in 1999.69
52. In nominal terms, Palestinian registered exports
to Israel amounted to US$ 222.6 million, while
registered imports from Israel were $843.5 million in
first half of 1999. Palestinian direct registered imports
from third countries increased to an estimated $87.4
million, a 43.4 per cent nominal increase in the last
year. Higher transaction costs, border and mobility
restrictions, limited access to foreign markets, as well
as low levels of investment in productivity continue to
hinder export development.70 Political uncertainty
about the shape of the permanent status and the still
weak legal and institutional environment, particularly
from the point of view of foreign capital, constitute
continuing obstacles to investment in the occupied
Palestinian territory.71
53. Beginning in March 2000, Israel imposed a
number of restrictions on Palestinian economic
transactions, including the suspension of the “convoy
system”, which allows vehicles from Gaza to pass
through Israeli territory under military escort for the
purpose of export and import. The Office of the United
Nations Special Coordinator in Occupied Territories
estimates show that the average number of trucks using
the convoy system on a monthly basis in 1999 was 18.6
per cent lower than in 1990 (3,868 versus 4,756,
respectively). This includes exports of agricultural
products to Israel (and foreign markets via Israel) and
imports of a range of commodities from Israel (and
foreign products via the Israeli ports). Thus, there is a
downward trend in use of the convoy system.72
54. Israel announced that from March 2000 it would
admit only the passage of persons through the Erez
border crossing between Gaza and Israel. Until now
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Erez crossing has been used for the passage of vehicles
as well. From March, all commercial transactions and
passage of goods will be admitted only through the
Karni border crossing, located in the east of Gaza.
Palestinian vehicles are not allowed to pass through
Karni crossing, but instead are forced to unload their
product, which must be reloaded into Israeli vehicles
after a lengthy security check. Consequently,
transportation costs are significantly higher than under
the convoy system and is estimated to increase by
100-110 per cent under the new restrictions. The
Palestinian Authority will also be unable to tax
shipments from Karni.73 Thus, restrictions on the
movement of goods has contributed to further decline
in economic growth.
B. Occupied Syrian Golan
55. The Golan Heights, captured from Syria in June
1967, has an extensive, yet comparatively small
settlement infrastructure. The 17,000 Israeli settlers,
residing in 33 settlements, represent an increase of 18
per cent since 1994. By comparison, the settler
population of the West Bank (excluding East
Jerusalem) has almost doubled to 200,000 during the
same period. This slower pace is in no small part due to
the location and small number of Syrians remaining
after 1967, clustered in four villages at the plateau’s
northern tip.74 Israeli-controlled territory in the
occupied Golan, excluding considerable military zones
and settlement areas, encompass nature reserves of
24,908 hectares, cultivated areas comprising 8,100
hectares, grazing areas of 46,575 hectares, and 2,531
hectares of orchards.75 In September 1999, a new
settlement, Nimrod, was established. Fewer than 10
families live at the outpost, located 1.5 kilometres from
Majdal Shams.76
56. In spite of possible evacuation of settlements as
part of a peace agreement with Syria, settlement
expansion in the Golan Heights is still going on. In
April 2000, the Israeli Government authorized the
establishment of a tourism project which entails the
construction of a 400-room hotel, a commercial centre
and a boardwalk at Kursi Junction on the eastern shore
of Lake Kinneret, about 5 kilometres north of kibbutz
Ein Gev. In addition, a small hotel of 28 rooms is
planned near the Hamat Gader hot springs. In the town
of Katzrin, the already existing industrial zone is to be
expanded. With regard to agriculture in the Golan
Heights, the Israeli authorities plan to allocate 1,157
dunams of land in seven settlements.77 Moreover, 358
new homes will be built in 11 settlements. In the long
run, there are plans for 2,500 homes in the four
settlements of Had-Ness, Knaf, Gamala and Ramot. In
Katzrin, hundreds of homes are under construction; in
Ein Zivan, 40 dwellings are being built and in Neot
Galan, 55 new dwellings were recently completed.78
57. Employment opportunities for the Arab
population in the Syrian Golan Heights are extremely
restricted, since the movement of the Arab population
between the Golan and the Syrian Arab Republic
remains problematic. The employment available to the
Syrian population in the Golan is limited to unskilled
and semi-skilled daily wage labour. In most instances,
these workers have no access to social benefits or
health insurance, and job security is extremely
precarious, with no provision for unemployment
compensation. Over and above these concerns,
substantial wage differences prevail, to the detriment of
the Syrian Arab population of the Golan.79
Improvement of living conditions is further inhibited
owing to measures that restrict the expansion of
educational facilities, as well as limit access to
education, either in the Syrian Arab Republic or in
Israeli colleges.80
58. Only about 400 of the approximately 18,000
residents of villages in the northern Golan Heights —
Masadah, Majdal Shams, Ein Kiniya and Rajar —
agreed to accept Israeli citizenship. Every few months
the holders of the Israeli identity cards organize a
protest demanding to be permitted to renounce their
citizenship — so far unsuccessfully. The boycott
extends into almost every sphere of life, from family
celebrations to funerals, which the holders of Israeli
citizenship are not permitted to attend, and to an
absolute ban on greeting them in the street, even by a
nod of the head.81
59. On 15 February 2000, Syrians in the Golan
protested Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights 18
years ago. About 1,000 participated in the
demonstration and six were injured by tear gas and
rubber-coated bullets fired by Israeli troops.82
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Notes
1 A/54/152-E/1999/92, annex.
2 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli
Settlement in the Occupied Territories (henceforth
referred to as Report), March-April 2000, p. 1.
3 Report, September-October 1999, p. 1.
4 Ha’aretz, 2 February 2000; Ha’aretz, 28 February 2000;
Ha’aretz, 21 February 2000.
5 Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied
Territories: The Demolition and Dispossession of
Palestinian Homes, December 1999.
6 Ha’aretz, 2 February 1999.
7 Report, July-August 1999, p. 4.
8 Ibid., p. 1.
9 Report, September-October 1999, p. 5.
10 Ma’ariv, 27 June 1999.
11 Ha’aretz, 23 January 2000.
12 Peace Now press release, 26 December 1999.
13 Peace Now press release, “Settlement Situation under
the Barak Government”, 23 February 2000.
14 Report, September-October 1999, p. 6.
15 Report, May-June 1998, p. 1; Yediot Aharanot,
10 December 1999.
16 LAW (Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human
Rights and the Environment), “A Summary of 1999
Annual Report on Human Rights Violations”, 18 January
2000.
17 Ha’aretz, 10 February 1999; Report, March-April 1999,
p. 3.
18 Report, September-October 1999, p. 6.
19 Report, November-December 1999, p. 4.
20 LAW, “Law Publishes a Summary of its 1999 Annual
Report on Human Rights Violations”, 18 January 2000.
21 Ibid.
22 LAW’s Settlement Chronicle, “Escalation of Settlement
Activity Since Wye”, 2nd report, 18 April 1999.
23 For details about the orders, see Land Defence Council,
e-mail from Issa Samander, head of Land Defence
General Committee, 20 January 2000.
24 Palestine Report, published by Jerusalem Media and
Communications Centre (JMCC), 17 November 1999.
25 Report, January 1999, p. 11.
26 Source: interview with Arale Tsur, Chairman of the Hof
Aza [settler] Regional Council, 27 February 2000.
27 Press conference by LAW, 18 January 2000, in
Ramallah; LAW, “LAW Publishes a Summary of its 1999
Annual Report on Human Rights Violations”, 18 January
2000.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Report, May-June 1999, p. 7.
32 Ibid., p. 4.
33 Ibid., p. 5.
34 Ibid., p. 7.
35 Ibid., p. 8; Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 1997:
table III/13; 1996: table III/14; 1992: table III/12; 1991:
table III/1; and 1982: table III/10.
36 Palestine Report, 25 August 1999.
37 Ha’aretz Daily Newspaper — English Internet edition,
15 January 2000.
38 Ibid.
39 Ha’aretz Daily Newspaper — English Internet edition,
15 January 2000.
40 LAW, “LAW’s Director Meets with Finnish Minister of
Justice”, 26 January 2000.
41 Report, May-June 1999, p. 10.
42 Ha’aretz, 11 April 1999.
43 Ha’aretz, 19 April 1999.
44 Ma’ariv, 27 June 1999.
45 From Betzelem, Water Shortage in the West Bank,
Update: Summer 1999, 28 July 1999.
46 Ibid.
47 Palestine Report, 28 July 1999.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Middle East Mirror, 19 October 1999.
53 Ha’aretz, 16 June 1999.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
12
A/55/84
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56 Report, November-December 1999, p. 4.
57 Arutz Sheva News Service, 10 September 1999.
58 “The Environmental Impact of Jewish Settlements in the
West Bank”, Violent Qumsieh, Palestine-Israel Review,
vol. V, No. 1, 1998, p. 3.
59 Al-Hayat al-Jadida, 15 November 1999; Palestine
Report, 17 November 1999.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Palestine Report, 8 December 1999.
63 Palestine Ministry of Information, 30 October 1999.
64 Report, September-October 1999, p. 3.
65 Ha’aretz, 10 February 2000.
66 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS),
MAS Economic Monitor, No. 1 (1997), pp. 2-3.
67 Information Brief Number 26, “Closure and Apartheid:
Seven Years of ‘Peace’ through Separation”, Allegra
Pacheco, The Centre for Policy Analysis on Palestine,
6 March 2000.
68 LAW, “LAW Publishes a Summary of its 1999 Annual
Report on Human Rights Violations”, 18 January 2000.
69 Executive Summary of the Report on the Palestinian
Economy, prepared by the Office of the United Nations
Special Coordinator, Autumn 1999.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Palestinian Report, 16 February 2000.
74 Report, November-December 1999, p. 6.
75 Golan Heights Information Server, www.golan.org.il.
76 Report, January-February 2000, p. 6.
77 Ha’aretz, 14 April 2000 (Internet edition).
78 Ha’aretz, 14 April 2000 (Internet edition) and Report,
November-December, 1999, p. 6.
79 Report on Israeli Practices Against Human Rights of
Syrian Citizens in the Occupied Syrian Golan, by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic, June
1997 (mimeo) (in Arabic), pp. 12-20.
80 Ibid.
81 Ha’aretz, 1 August 1999.
82 Israel Wire, 15 February 2000.
United Nations A/56/90–E/2001/17
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
20 June 2001
Original: English
01-41971 (E) 100701
*0141971*
General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Item 114 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2001
2-27 July 2001
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 2000/31 of 28 July 2000, entitled “Economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan”, the Economic and Social Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth
session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution. The
General Assembly, in its resolution 55/209 of 20 December 2000, also requested a
report. The annexed report, which has been prepared by the Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), is submitted in response to the two
resolutions.
* A/56/50.
** E/2001/100.
2
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Annex
Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia
I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2000/31, adopted on 28 July
2000, on the economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan, the Economic and Social
Council stressed, inter alia, the importance of the
revival of the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22
November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and
425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, and the principle of land
for peace as well as the full and timely implementation
of the agreements reached between the Government of
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the
representative of the Palestinian people. In the
resolution, the Council reaffirmed the inalienable right
of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of
the occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and
economic resources and called upon Israel not to
exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those
resources. It also reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in
the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem
and the occupied Syrian Golan, were illegal and an
obstacle to economic and social development.
2. In its resolution 55/209 of 20 December 2000, the
General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of
the Palestinian people and the population of the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources,
including land and water; and called upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, to cause loss or
depletion of or to endanger the natural resources in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and
in the occupied Syrian Golan. In the resolution, the
Assembly recognized the right of the Palestinian
people to claim restitution as a result of any
exploitation, loss or depletion of, or danger to, their
natural resources, and expressed the hope that the issue
would be dealt with in the framework of the final status
negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides.
3. The delays in the implementation of the
agreements reached between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the fact that those agreements
have not been fully implemented and the delay in
reaching a final status agreement intended to settle all
outstanding claims between the two parties continue to
have an adverse effect on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people. Moreover, these delays and Israeli
practices, particularly with regard to settlement
expansion and the closure of passage routes, were
among the primary causes of the outbreak of current
tensions and violence, with thousands of people,
including children, killed or wounded.
4. As a consequence of the crisis, restrictions on the
mobility of the Palestinians have increased. For most
of the period since October 2000, mobility between the
West Bank and Gaza, and between the occupied
Palestinian territory and the rest of the world, has been
severely impeded. Travel for Palestinians between the
West Bank and Gaza via the “safe passage” route has
been blocked by Israeli authorities since 6 October
2000. As a consequence, students from the Gaza Strip
have been unable to attend classes in the West Bank
and relatives unable to visit one another; financial ties
between the two areas have been damaged. According
to the Oslo Accords, two routes were to be designated
as safe passages. Israel is entitled, for security reasons,
to close one of them or to alter the terms of entrance
but must ensure that one of the passages is always
open.1 Today there is only one safe passage, thus
obliging Israel to allow Palestinians to use it to travel
between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
5. The Gaza International Airport and the border
crossings at Rafah and the Allenby/Karameh Bridge
have been closed for extended periods. Palestinian
foreign trade has also been affected. Imports and
exports trans-shipped through Israeli ports have been
delayed or blocked completely for most of this period,
while the commercial crossings at Rafah and the
Allenby/Karameh Bridge have been closed about
70 per cent and 12 per cent of the time, respectively,
between 28 September and 26 November 2000.
6. There have been varying levels of restrictions on
mobility between cities, towns and villages in the West
Bank and Gaza owing to reduced levels of security on
roads and the imposition of internal closures by the
Israeli authorities. Such measures have routinely
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included the placement of physical barriers between
Palestinian villages and cities and the deployment of
military checkpoints on main roads. In addition, the
Israeli authorities have imposed curfews on several
areas in the West Bank, most notably in the city of
Hebron and on numerous villages in the Nablus area.2
II. Economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation
A. Occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem
7. During its 34-year occupation, Israel has
established a range of civilian and military installations
throughout the occupied Palestinian territory. Civilian
Israeli settlements have been built at some 200 sites
seized by civilian and military bodies representing the
Government of Israel as well as by Israeli civilians
empowered by Israel to undertake such activity. The
land under exclusive Israeli control amounts to 59 per
cent of the West Bank (Area C) and 20 per cent of the
Gaza Strip. In addition, 30 per cent of the area of East
Jerusalem is under effective Israeli ownership.
8. Israel has established approximately 170
settlements in the West Bank with a civilian population
of approximately 200,000. Approximately 180,000
Israelis reside in East Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip,
7,500 settlers live in 16 settlements.
9. With few exceptions, settlements are connected
by bypass roads, either existing or planned, to main
transport routes to Israel. As a consequence of the
unrest that began in September 2000, Israel has
engaged in a wide-ranging campaign to construct
scores of new roads aimed at ensuring safe passage
between the settlements and Israel. Israeli military
bases have been established throughout the West Bank,
according to the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharanot,
“particularly next to isolated settlements. The intention
is not to leave isolated settlements in the heart of
occupied Palestinian territory areas without an army
base nearby. The camps to be established, therefore,
will separate the territory under Palestinian control
from the settlements”.3
10. The Government of Israel granted building
permits for 1,184 housing units during the first 10
months of 2000. Data from the Central Bureau of
Statistics and the Ministry of Construction and Housing
indicate that 529 of those units were in the greater
Jerusalem area. However, many permits were also
granted in settlements far from Israel. They included
permits for 59 units in Kedumim, 13 in Talmon and 18
in Psagot.
11. During 2000, the Ministry of Construction and
Housing began building 1,943 housing units in the
territory, up from 1,367 in 1999. However, this number
does not include private construction, which can range
from 50 to 150 per cent of public building. In addition,
the population of the settlements rose by 8 per cent
during the year, to 203,068 people. The Israel Land
Administration sold 2,804 lots for building in the
territories in 2000, or 12.5 per cent of the total number
of lots it sold that year.4
12. The geographic distribution of settlements on the
occupied Palestinian territory restricts the growth of
Palestinian communities. Although settlements
themselves directly control less than 10 per cent of the
West Bank and 5 per cent of the Gaza Strip, prospects
for Palestinian sovereignty would be compromised by
the extensive security measures required to ensure their
existence. This necessarily includes the ever-expanding
system of roads linking settlements with each other and
with main access arteries to Israel, and the permanent
presence of the Israeli army in the territory.5
13. According to the mayor of Khan Yunis,
“settlement continuity poses a major obstacle to the
Palestinian Authority and its sovereignty over the land
and, in addition, the settlements prevent any real
development activity in the area. The settlements
control 34 per cent of the Khan Yunis area, amounting
to 112 square kilometres. The presence of the
settlements adversely affects developments in tourism
and fishing. The entire settlement policy places the
region on the brink of a volcano and on the way to a
huge new [crisis] that, this time, will not end until the
settlements are removed”. The mayor termed the
struggle over the settlements “a major aspect of the
conflict”, explaining that “no peace is possible in the
shadow of the settlements”.6
14. Israel has declared 290,970 acres of the West
Bank (20.2 per cent of its total area), mostly in the
Jordan Valley, as closed military areas, and has created
an additional 29 closed military areas in Gaza (420
acres). Moreover, Israel maintains 71 military bases in
the West Bank (9,563 acres). Although most of these
areas have low agricultural value, they constitute the
4
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major grazing areas in the West Bank. Since
Palestinian pastoralists are denied access to these areas,
the remaining grazing areas suffer from severe
overgrazing and are under threat of permanent
desertification. Furthermore, the wildlife and rich
biodiversity that characterize these areas are harmed by
the use of heavy military vehicles and tanks.7
15. According to Palestinian sources, Israel seized
around 48,904 dunums (one dunum equals 1,000
square metres) of West Bank land and demolished more
than 53 houses in the period from May 1999 to May
2000.8
16. In the Khan Yunis area, Israel is reinforcing
military posts near the Amal quarter, and fortifying
posts near the settlements close to the Mawasi area.
These fortifications, composed of tons of cement and
sandbags and yards of barbed wire, are topped by new
machine-gun emplacements. The work involves the
annexation of a hundred-yard strip within the city
boundary. Incursions have also been made into Area B
land near Mawasi.9
17. In March 2000, Israel’s Ministry of Construction
and Housing prepared plans for the construction of
22,410 new units in the (East) Jerusalem region of the
West Bank, whose settler population at the end of 1997
was 40,000. The Ministry’s objective is to increase the
number of Israelis living in this area to 250,000 by the
year 2020. The Israel Land Administration plans to
merge the settlement of Beitar with nearby Sur
Hadassah in Israel.10
18. On 10 April 2000, the Knesset’s Budget and
Security Committee approved $400 million for
settlement security and construction of 12 bypass roads
in the occupied territory. The funds will be taken from
$1.2 billion in aid from the United States of America
promised as part of the Wye River agreement in
October 1998. Overall expenditures on settlements are
approximately $500 million annually.11
19. In addition to settlement expansion and the
seizure of land, water remains a critical issue for
Palestinians. Over 150 West Bank villages, home to
some 215,000 Palestinians, are not connected to a
network to supply running water.12 As a result, a
number of municipalities in the West Bank have been
forced to establish a rotation programme between
different areas of the town, in order to distribute the
little water they have.13
20. The scope of Israeli control of the critical water
sector did not significantly change as a consequence of
the Oslo-related agreements between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority, according to the Israeli human
rights organization B’Tselem. Israel’s control is evident
in its power to veto any new water project for
Palestinians, both through the Joint Water Committee
and through the Civil Administration.
21. The starting point for the agreement on the
division of water from the shared sources is that the
amount of water for Israeli consumption, both within
the Green Line (pre-1967 border) and in the
settlements, is not reduced. According to this principle,
any additional water that the Palestinians utilize comes
from new sources, not from a redivision of existing
sources. From the perspective of Israeli-Palestinian
water needs, the sole achievement in this agreement is
the Israeli-Palestinian understanding to increase the
water supply to the occupied Palestinian territory by
approximately 30 per cent during the interim period,
from September 1995 to May 1999. As of June 2000,
only half of the promised additional quantity was
produced and supplied to the Palestinians. B’Tselem
concludes that “the [Israeli] Mekorot water company
continues to conduct a policy of discrimination. Mostly
during the summer months, Mekorot does not increase,
and even decreases, the quantity of water supplied to
Palestinian towns and villages so that it can meet the
increased demand in settlements that receive water
from the same pipelines”.14
22. According to the Director of the Palestinian
Hydrology Group, “the overall current water
consumption in the West Bank varies between 110 and
115 mcm (million cubic metres) annually and in Gaza
it is 100 mcm/year. All throughout the Israeli
occupation from 1967 to the present, these figures have
hardly changed, despite growing water needs due to the
nearly three per cent in population growth, not to
mention socio-economic development”.15 “In
Palestinian society, the agricultural sector consumes
more water than any other sector, around 70 per cent of
the available water in the West Bank and Gaza. In
terms of distribution, water usage can be divided into
the West Bank and Gaza (including settlements) and
Israel, which has control over the majority of available
water in the West Bank and Gaza and in Israel proper.
For domestic use, the occupied Palestinian territory as
well as Palestinian Authority-controlled areas, use 53
mcm, settlements use 13 mcm and Israel swallows up
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520 mcm. In agriculture, for example, while
Palestinians consume 152 mcm, Israelis use up 1,200
mcm. In overall consumption, while Palestinians
consume 114.5 mcm per year, the settlements consume
a total of 592 mcm and Israelis consume 400 mcm. The
settlements actually use more water than Israel proper.
Israel currently consumes 80 per cent of West Bank
water”.16
23. It was reported in June 2000 that Israeli
authorities had sabotaged 20 ancient water cisterns
located on Islamic Waqf land near the Jewish
settlement of Efrat, west of Bethlehem. It was also
reported that the Israeli authorities had ruined the water
channels that feed the cisterns in order to diminish
local farmers’ reserve waters for irrigation. The
cisterns are located in an archeological site near
Bethlehem where new housing units are being built to
expand Efrat. The settlers continue to pump their
sewage into the cisterns and agricultural land, ruining
1,000 dunums or 250 acres of land.17
24. The construction by Israel of security trenches in
the Jericho and Ramallah regions in March 2001 also
impacted the provision of water for Palestinian
communities. The water pipes leading to the village of
Surda, north of Ramallah, for example, were destroyed
by the construction of these barriers, creating a
temporary interruption in the water supply.18
25. Not only does waste produced by Israeli
settlements located in the occupied Palestinian territory
continue to degrade the area’s water resources, but
Israeli practices in the occupied Palestinian territory
remain insensitive to environmental considerations,
thereby compromising the Palestinian population’s
quality of life. The Jordanian environmental institution
has confirmed that the condition of the water in the
River Jordan has deteriorated dramatically owing to
wastes coming from Israeli settlements which affected
the river’s fish and led to the loss of an important
source of water life.19
26. In April 2000, after years of complaints that the
Israeli settlement of Kfar Darom was dumping its raw
sewage into the Palestinian town of Deir Al Balah,
causing sickness and polluting coastal water,
Palestinians attempted to improve the situation.
However, Israeli occupation forces intervened to
prevent a Palestinian bulldozer from redirecting the
sewage away from populated areas.20
27. Voice of Palestine reported that lands in the West
Bank’s Salfit district had been adversely affected by
the dumping of waste produced in the Israeli
settlements of Ariel and Burkan. The settlers had been
pumping wastewater and chemicals from their factories
on Palestinian agricultural land and into freshwater
sources. The Salfit region is the Palestinians’ main
source of freshwater, which comes from artesian
wells.21
28. Sewage from homes in the West Bank settlement
of Adam, East of Jerusalem’s Neve Ya’akov settlement
neighbourhood, is seriously contaminating the springs
that feed into Wadi Kelt, causing a stench and killing
animal life, according to an investigation by Israel’s
Nature Reserves and National Parks Authority. The
study said the sewage overflow was due to an increase
in the number of families who had moved into Adam,
despite the lack of a proper sewage infrastructure to
accommodate them.22
29. The Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture warned
of imminent environmental disaster in the village of
Deir Ballout in the district of Nablus. Apparently, the
area has been polluted by waste from an Israeli military
base, Israeli dumping ground and sewage, and dirty
wastewater from surrounding settlements.23
Additionally, the construction of at least seven
industrial zones in the West Bank by the Government
of Israel has contributed to the pollution. Located
mainly on hilltops and occupying a total area of
approximately 746 acres, these industries produce
industrial wastewater and solid waste that often pollute
adjacent Palestinian lands. At least 200 factories are
located in the West Bank, notably aluminium, leathertanning,
textile-dyeing, battery, fibreglass, plastic and
other chemical factories. Clear evidence that Israeli
factories operating in the occupied Palestinian territory
do not follow pollution prevention measures is
provided by the Barqan industrial zone, which houses
factories producing aluminium, fibreglass, plastic,
electroplating, and military items. Industrial
wastewater from this zone flows untreated into the
nearby valley, damaging agricultural land belonging to
the Palestinian villages of Sarta, Kufr Al-Deek and
Burqin, and polluting the groundwater with heavy
metals. In the central part of the Gaza Strip, the Israeli
settlement of Kfar Darom releases sewage and
chemical waste from its industrial plants to the Al-Saqa
valley.24
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30. A declaration stating that water and sewage
infrastructures must not be harmed despite the military
conflict was signed by Israeli and Palestinian
representatives at the Erez Junction on 31 January
2001. In the declaration, the two sides promised to take
all the necessary steps, despite the current difficult
circumstances, to provide water and treat sewage in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to quickly repair
malfunctions and damage to the systems. Both sides
made it clear in an appeal to their public opinions, that
the water systems of the two peoples were intertwined
and serve both populations, and that any harm done to
them would cause damage to Israelis and Palestinians
alike.25 However, Palestinians from the village of
Hares report that water has regularly been cut off since
the recent crisis began — not by the Israeli water
company that provides it, but by Jewish settlers
operating under cover of darkness.26
31. A report in November 2000 noted the “domino
effect” of Israeli curfews on the environment. For
example, medical waste produced in the hospitals is not
being disposed of properly. Transportation means to
central and regional dumping facilities are being cut off
(that is, Bethlehem hospitals dispose of their waste in
Hebron) and local autoclaving units are overwhelmed
and often inoperable.27
32. In the Gaza Strip, numerous solid waste piles
accumulated and collection efforts were interrupted,
owing to the continued closure of transportation routes
to disposal sites and prolonged harassment of
municipality workers attempting to remove the existing
garbage. Municipality employees and volunteer
workers were the targets of Israeli guns, even while
collecting the trash overnight.28
33. Concurrently, the Hebron-Bethlehem joint landfill
project funded by the European Investment Bank has
come to a halt, as have preparations for a solid waste
project intended for implementation in Ramallah. In
Jenin, the World Bank sanitary landfill project was
stopped, and two projects in Tulkarem (the installation
of an incinerator in Anabta along with an Italian
landfill project) have been placed on hold
indefinitely.29
34. On 21 February 2001, Ramallah and Al Bireh
municipalities held a protest against Israeli measures to
stop the movement of Palestinian garbage to local
dumps. From early January, the Israeli authorities
prevented solid waste from being dumped at the Al
Bireh landfill, forcing garbage dumps to deposit their
load at the Ramallah landfill, which had been closed
the year before. Palestinian environmental affairs
ministry officials warned that the seepage from the
landfill could cause an epidemic in the area.30
35. According to a recent study, the total area in the
West Bank and Gaza officially designated as forest
land decreased from 300,736 dunums in 1971 to
231,586 dunums in 1999. More than half of the
affected areas are in Gaza, where 95 per cent of the
forests have disappeared (from 42,000 dunums in 1971
to 2,000 dunums in 1999).31
36. About 80 per cent of the deforestation of land in
the occupied Palestinian territory is attributable to the
Israeli occupation: 78 per cent to settlements, about
2 per cent to the establishment of military bases, and
less than 1 per cent to bypass roads. Local Palestinians
are responsible for deforesting 14 per cent of the land,
while the remaining 6 per cent is privately owned.32
Moreover, the Israeli army and Jewish settlers have
uprooted more than half a million fruit trees, mainly
olive trees, on privately owned land.33 Olive trees have
become targets in the cycle of provocation and reprisal.
As of 9 November 2000, 4,495 trees have been cut
down by Israeli forces.34
37. Israeli occupation inhibits economic growth and
investment, as a result of the continued ambiguity of
the legal and political situation. There is no basic
investment code in areas controlled by the Palestinian
Authority, nor is there a settled legal code passed and
signed by the chairman of the Palestinian Authority. In
fact, “the complex overlay of laws and Israeli military
orders in force during the occupation remains in place.
This is further aggravated by Israeli-imposed
restrictions on the movement of goods, factors of
production and people between the areas controlled by
the Palestinian Authority, Israel and the Gaza Strip, and
between the rest of the West Bank and Jerusalem”.35
38. Under the closure measures, Israel closes all the
exits from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory and
prevents Palestinians from entering into Israel. Usually,
imports from and exports to the Gaza Strip are also
prevented under these measures. Under a partial
closure, a limited number of citizens are allowed to
move between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and
to work inside Israel.36
39. The Israeli occupation forces continued imposing
restrictions and obstacles on the trading activities of
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the Gaza Strip. In February 2000, the Israeli occupation
authorities announced that, from March 2000,
Palestinian commercial vehicles would no longer be
able to pass through the Erez checkpoint under the
convoy system. Under this system, Palestinian trucks,
after extensive searching, which sometimes lasts up to
six hours, have been able to pass into Israel in a convoy
with an Israeli military escort. More than 450 Gazan
vehicles operated under this system, with more than
150 trucks using it daily.37
40. From March 2000, all commercial vehicles have
been required to go to the Karni checkpoint, where
they have to unload their product and have it reloaded
onto Israeli trucks. Palestinian industry officials have
estimated that, under the new restrictions, transport
costs will increase by 100 to 110 per cent.38
41. According to the Wye River Memorandum,
agreements on the southern “safe passage” route should
have been concluded within a week of entry into force
of the Memorandum, and operation of this route should
have begun as soon as possible thereafter. The southern
route was opened on 25 October 1999. Passage of
Palestinians, however, is effectively restricted by
Israeli security protocols.39 There has been no
agreement regarding the opening of the northern
passage. Opening the port of Gaza has been similarly
delayed owing to security demands made by Israel,
although work on the three-year project commenced in
2000. The international airport in the Gaza Strip, under
joint Israeli and Palestinian Authority supervision,
opened to limited traffic in late 1998. Israel has shut
down the facility for extended periods since the
outbreak of violence in September 2000. The
continuing restrictions on the operation of the airport
have contributed to its failure, until now, to make a
recognizable contribution to the Palestinian economy.
42. The crisis that erupted between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority in September 2000 ended more
than three years of limited economic recovery and
progress in the areas of the Palestinian Authority. The
recovery from the crisis of 1996 was robust enough to
substantially reduce unemployment rates, stem the
decline in real wages and reduce poverty rates. There
had also been some significant progress in the
rehabilitation and expansion of the physical
infrastructure and institution-building projects. This
progress has been undermined since the beginning of
the crisis.40
43. The Palestinian gross domestic product (GDP)
during 2000 was $580 million less than expected.
According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics, GDP had fallen to $3.99 billion for all of
2000 from a forecasted $4.57 billion, owing to the
Israeli closure and the siege on Palestinian towns since
late September 2000.41
44. Private economic losses during the first three
weeks of the crisis were estimated at $186.2 million.
Lost income-earning opportunities were estimated at
about half of the value of domestic production and
nearly all of the income earned by Palestinians working
in Israel. Since then, the economic losses have been
compounded, while the loss of life, injuries and the
physical destruction of private and public property
have become more widespread.42
45. The lack of freedom of movement for people and
goods caused by the current crisis has resulted in socioeconomic
hardships in the territory controlled by the
Palestinian Authority. During the 123-day period from
1 October 2000 to 31 January 2001, the Israeli-
Palestinian border used for labour and trade flows was
closed for 93 days or 75.6 per cent of the time. Internal
movement restrictions and internal closures, partial or
severe, have been in place 100 per cent of the time in
the West Bank and 89 per cent of the time in Gaza. The
international border crossings to Jordan (from the West
Bank) and to Egypt (from Gaza) have been closed for
29 per cent and 50 per cent of the time, respectively.43
46. The main impact of mobility restrictions and
border closures has been the disruption of productive
activities and the circulation of goods. The short-term
economic losses include a reduction in the income of
farmers, workers, merchants and business people who
cannot reach their places of employment in the
occupied Palestinian territory or who are unable to
obtain inputs or sell their goods and services. This has
been the case for a broad spectrum of economic
activities, including agriculture, manufacturing,
construction, trade, transportation and services.44
47. It is estimated that, in 1999, Palestinian workers
earned about $750 million from jobs in Israel proper,
Israeli settlements and industrial zones. In the first half
of 2000, there was an average of about 125,000
Palestinians employed in Israeli-controlled areas on a
daily basis. The average worker was earning a daily
wage of about $27.50. As a group, these workers were
earning approximately $3.4 million for each normal
8
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working day prior to the crisis. Assuming no border
closures and no change in the average number of
workers or the average wage, Palestinian workers in
Israel could have earned an estimated $822 million in
2000. Internal movement restrictions and border
closures substantially reduced such income-generating
opportunities for the last quarter of the year.45 In the
aggregate, excluding material damage to property and
other losses, Palestinians are estimated to have lost
$505.0 million during the 60-day period from 28
September to 26 November. The estimated losses are
more than 2.5 times the value of donor disbursements
to the Palestinian Authority during the first half of the
year ($183 million). If these losses are distributed over
normal working days in the occupied Palestinian
territory, of which there were 51 during this period, the
average daily loss is estimated at about $10 million.46
48. Prior to the crisis, there were approximately
70,000 unemployed Palestinians. It is estimated that
another 190,000 persons have lost their jobs since
September 2000. Thus, it is currently estimated that
there are more than 260,000 unemployed persons in the
occupied Palestinian territory. Evidence suggests that
the average employed Palestinian supports
himself/herself plus four others. Therefore, in addition
to the negative impact on the livelihoods of 190,000
workers, the crisis has directly reduced the income of
760,500 other Palestinians. In total, more than
1,000,000 persons, or about one third of the population
in the occupied Palestinian territory, have been
immediately and negatively affected by mobility
restrictions. If previously unemployed persons and
their dependants are included (some 350,000 persons)
the number of Palestinians enduring a certain amount
of economic distress rises to 1,370,000 or 45.5 per cent
of the population.47
49. Loss of employment in Israel plus mobility
restrictions and border closures have resulted in an
average unemployment rate of 38 per cent (more than
250,000 persons) as compared with 11 per cent (71,000
persons) in the first nine months of 2000. Owing to the
high dependency ratio, unemployment now directly
affects the incomes of about 900,000 Palestinians or
29 per cent of the population.48
50. The direct economic losses arising from
movement restrictions are estimated at 50 per cent of
the GDP for the four-month period from October 2000
to January 2001 and 75 per cent of wage income earned
by Palestinian workers in Israel. The GDP loss is
estimated at $907.3 million while the loss of labour
income from employment in Israel is estimated at
$243.4 million. The total loss is estimated at $1,150.7
million, equal to 20 per cent of the projected GDP for
the year 2000 (assuming no border closures). The loss
is about $11 million per working day or $3.50 per
person per working day during the reporting period.49
51. In addition, there has been hundreds of millions
of dollars in damage to public buildings and
infrastructure and to private property and agricultural
land as well as in costs for caring for more than 11,000
injured Palestinians, and in public revenue losses and
other effects of the closures.50
52. During the period from 29 September 2000 to 15
January 2001, the Israeli occupation forces razed
6,291.5 dunums of land in the Gaza Strip, about
4,776.5 dunums (76 per cent) of which were
agricultural lands, and about 1,515 dunums (24 per
cent) were wooded and sandy areas. During the period
from 19 December 2000 to 15 January 2001, the Israeli
occupation forces razed 1,835.5 dunums of land, about
1,240.5 dunums (67.6 per cent) of which were
agricultural lands and 595 dunums (32.4 per cent) were
wooded lands. These figures do not include houses and
civilian and agricultural facilities established on these
properties, which were also razed and demolished.
Bulldozers of the Israeli occupation forces also
demolished 88 Palestinian houses during the period
from 29 September 2000 to 15 January 2001, leaving
the residents homeless.51
53. Since the beginning of the crisis, there has been a
50 per cent increase in the number of people living
below the poverty line, estimated by the World Bank at
$2.10 per person per day in consumption expenditures
(less than 9 new shekels per day). The number of poor
people has increased from about 650,000 to 1 million.
The poverty rate has increased from 21 per cent to 32
per cent.52 Thus, the occupation and the ensuing crisis
have had deleterious effects on the welfare and quality
of life of the Palestinian people.
B. Occupied Syrian Golan
54. The Golan Heights, captured from the Syrian
Arab Republic in June 1967, has an extensive yet
comparatively small settlement infrastructure, with
17,000 Israeli settlers residing in 33 settlements. Over
17,000 Syrians are clustered in five villages close to
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the borders of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon.
Israeli-controlled territory in the occupied Golan,
excluding considerable military zones and settlement
areas, encompass nature reserves of 24,908 hectares,
cultivated areas comprising 8,100 hectares, grazing
areas of 46,575 hectares, and 2,531 hectares of
orchards.53
55. The effective failure of negotiations between
Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic in March 2000
resulted in a number of policy decisions aimed at
reinvigorating settlement expansion in the Golan
Heights. Subsequently, Israel’s Ministry of Industry
and Trade approved a $6.5 million investment for the
expansion of an industrial concern in the Golan
settlement of Mevo Hama. The producer of
polypropylene exports 80 per cent of its production to
Europe and the United States of America.54 Israel’s
Ministry of Construction and Housing approved a new
housing development in the Golan settlement of
Katzrin, the first such action in many months.55
56. In April 2000, the Office of Prime Minister Barak
informed the Golan Regional Council that the twomonth
ban on new construction in the Golan Heights
had been lifted. Golan officials moved to implement
new construction plans that focus on promoting
tourism. Future plans include 2,500 homes in the four
settlements Had-Ness, Kanaf, Gamla and Ramot.56
57. Employment opportunities for the Arab
population in the Syrian Golan Heights continue to be
restricted, since the movement of the Arab population
between the Golan and the Syrian Arab Republic
remains problematic. The employment available to the
Syrian population in the Golan is limited to unskilled
and semi-skilled daily wage labour. In most instances,
these workers have no access to social benefits or
health insurance, and job security is precarious, with no
provision for unemployment compensation. Over and
above these concerns, substantial wage differences
prevail, to the detriment of the Syrian Arab population
of the Golan.57
58. Improvement of living conditions is further
inhibited owing to measures that restrict the expansion
of educational facilities, as well as limited access to
education, either in the Syrian Arab Republic or in
Israeli colleges.58
59. Israel’s taxation policy, according to a Syrian
report, enhances the deterioration of living standards of
the Golan Arab population. Taxation covers radios,
television sets, households, income, land crops and
local government. Almost all aspects of life are heavily
taxed.59
Notes
1 Oslo II Accords, Appendix 1, para. (c) (4)X.
2 United Nations, Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator, The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of
Confrontations, Mobility Restrictions and Border
Closures, 28 September-26 November 2000, February
2001, http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/unsco/nov00/
nov00.html, p. 1.
3 Report, September-October 1999, p. 1.
4 Ha’aretz, 16 January 2001; 5 March 2001.
5 See A/55/84-E/2000/16, para. 3.
6 Hatzofe, 16 March 2000, p. 10.
7 Jad Issac, “The Environmental Impact of the Israeli
Occupation”, Centre for Policy Analysis on Palestine,
Information Brief, No. 27, 14 March 2000.
8 Palestinian Affairs Department, Annual report, 2000.
9 Ramattan Daily, cited in Hear Palestine, 24 January
2001.
10 Report, “Settlement Timeline”, vol. 10, No. 3, May-June
2000.
11 Ibid., No. 4, July-August 2000.
12 B’Tselem, “Thirsty for a solution: the water crisis in the
occupied territories and its resolution in the final status
agreement”, July 2000, p. 59.
13 Ibid., p. 7.
14 Ibid., p. 95.
15 Palestine Report, “Building Palestine”, vol. 6, No. 5, 28
July 1999.
16 Ibid.
17 Report, “News Shorts”, vol. 7, No. 1, 21 June 2000.
18 Ha’aretz, 12 March 2001.
19 Hear Palestine, 23 January 2001.
20 B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories, Position Paper
entitled “Thirsty for a solution: the water shortage in the
Occupied Territories and its solution in the Final Status
Agreement”, July 2000, p. 7.
21 Report, “News Shorts”, vol. 7, No. 21, 18 June 2000.
22 Ibid., vol. 6, No. 35, 23 February 2000.
10
A/56/90
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23 Hear Palestine, 13 July 2000.
24 Jad Issac, Information Brief, No. 27, 14 March 2000.
25 Ha’aretz, 13 February 2001.
26 The Independent, 18 November 2000 (according to
mayor Hassoun Daoud in Hares).
27 Jordan Times, according to a report of the Palestinian
Ministry of Environmental Affairs, 22 November 2000.
28 Ibid.
29 The solid waste project is an initiative undertaken by
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ), a German service company in international
development cooperation, and KFW, a German
promotional bank.
30 Report, “Building Palestine”, vol. 7, No. 35, 21 February
2001.
31 Jad Issac, Information Brief, No. 27, 14 March 2000.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 The Independent Palestinian Information Network, 30
November 2000, http://www.infopal.org.
35 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS),
MAS Economic Monitor, No. 1 (1997), pp. 2-3.
36 Submission to the Commission on Human Rights at its
fifty-sixth session by the Palestinian Centre for Human
Rights, under item 8, Human rights violations in the
Palestinian territories. The submission was presented on
behalf of the following organizations: Fédération
Internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme, the
Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights
and the Environment, Arab Organization for Human
Rights, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Arab
Lawyers’ Union, World Federation for Democratic
Youth, South-North Organization, and the Palestinian
Centre for Human Rights.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Allegra Pacheco, “Closure and apartheid: seven years of
peace through separation”, The Centre for Policy
Analysis on Palestine, Information Brief, No. 26,
6 March 2000.
40 “Palestinian document on economic losses due to Israeli
siege — 1st installment”, 16 November 2000, Jerusalem,
Al-Quds (in Arabic), 16 November 2000, p. 14.
41 The Palestine Report, “Building Palestine”, vol. 7, No.
29, 10 January 2001.
42 UNSCO report, February 2001, p. 3.
43 UNSCO, summary report (1 October 2000-31 January
2001), 17 February 2001.
44 UNSCO report, p. 1.
45 Domestic output and income amount to $388,000,000 and
labour income from Israel amount to $117,010,080. Thus, total
income losses would amount to $505,010,080. For further
information refer to UNSCO report, February 2001, p. 2.
46 Ibid., p. 3.
47 Ibid.
48 UNSCO, summary report, 17 February 2001.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 “Uprooting Palestinian trees and leveling agricultural
land”, The Fourth Report on Israeli Land Sweeping and
Demolition of Palestinian Buildings and Facilities in the
Gaza Strip, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Hear
Palestine, 26 January 2001.
52 UNSCO, summary report, 17 February 2001.
53 Golan Heights Information Server, www.golan.org.il.
54 Report, 27 March 2000, vol. 10, No. 4, July-August
2000, p. 6.
55 Report, 28 March 2000, vol. 10, No. 4, July-August
2000, p. 6.
56 Report, 14 April 2000, vol. 10, No. 4, July-August 2000,
p. 7.
57 Report on Israeli practices against human rights of
Syrian citizens in the Occupied Syrian Golan, by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic, May
2000 (mimeo) (in Arabic), pp. 15-16.
58 Ibid., pp. 16-20.
59 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
United Nations A/57/63–E/2002/21
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
17 May 2002
Original: English
02-39274 (E) 120602
*0239274*
General Assembly
Fifty-seventh session
Item 93 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and
of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over
their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2002
1-26 July 2002
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General***
In its resolution 2001/19 of 25 July 2001, entitled “Economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan”, the Economic and Social Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fiftyseventh
session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the
resolution. The General Assembly, in its resolution 56/204 of 21 December 2001,
also requested a report. The annexed report, which has been prepared by the
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), is submitted in
response to the two resolutions.
* A/57/50/Rev.1.
** E/2002/100.
*** Because of lack of official sources for most of the information contained in the present report, a
longer period for clearance was required for extensive consultations within the various United
Nations entities at Headquarters and in the field. The report was therefore delayed for processing
by four weeks.
2
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Annex
Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia
Summary
Continued occupation of the Palestinian territory by Israel, the delays in the
implementation of the agreements reached between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), and the delay in reaching a final solution intended to
settle all outstanding claims between the two parties continue to aggravate the living
conditions of the Palestinian people.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have resorted to excessive use of force, house
demolitions, increasingly severe mobility restrictions and closure policies, negatively
affecting the Palestinian economy and living conditions. Internal closures have, in
effect, divided the West Bank and Gaza Strip into 54 isolated areas. At the end of
2001, the Gaza International Airport and the Gaza harbour were severely damaged by
the Israeli army. In addition, the strict closure policy and movement restrictions
imposed by the Israeli authorities since September 2000 have seriously impeded the
ability of aid agencies to deliver humanitarian assistance.
The Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory remain the primary
issue fuelling the conflict between the two peoples. There are some 190 settlements
in the West Bank and Gaza, inhabited by approximately 380,000 settlers, of whom
some 180,000 live in the East Jerusalem area. Settlements are linked to each other
and Israel by a vast system of bypass roads. These settlements and roads, which
separate Palestinian communities and deprive Palestinians of agricultural land, have
fragmented both land and people.
There is an extensive yet comparatively smaller settlement infrastructure in the
occupied Syrian Golan Heights with some 17,000 Israeli settlers in 33 settlements.
The failure of negotiations between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic in March
2000 has resulted in decisions aimed at reinvigorating settlement expansion.
Employment opportunities for the Arab population in the Syrian Golan Heights
continue to be restricted and access to education facilities are limited.
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I. Introduction
1. The present report covers the period April 2001
to March 2002. In its resolution 2001/19 of 25 July
2001 on the economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan, the Economic and Social
Council stressed, inter alia, the importance of the
revival of the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) of
22 October 1973 and 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978,
and the principle of land for peace as well as the full
and timely implementation of the agreements reached
between the Government of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people.
2. In its resolution 56/204 of 21 December 2001, the
General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of
the Palestinian people and the population of the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources,
including land and water; and called upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, to cause loss or
depletion of or to endanger the natural resources in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem and
in the occupied Syrian Golan.
3. The delays in the implementation of the
agreements reached between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) continue to aggravate
the living conditions of the Palestinian people and to
sustain, relentlessly, the current cycle of violence. In
his briefing to the Security Council on 21 February
2002, the Secretary-General stated that:
“a reduction in the violence is the most
immediate priority. But I have become more and
more convinced that trying to resolve the security
problem on its own cannot work. Security cannot
be dealt with in isolation. It has to have a context.
It has to be addressed alongside key political
issues, particularly the question of land, and the
economic and social issues, including the
increasing critical desperate conditions of the
Palestinians. Failure to address these issues
together will only spawn new and perhaps
deadlier exchanges of reciprocal violence.”1
II. Occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem
Upsurge in violence
4. Since the report of last year, the upsurge in
violence has continued to rise and the nature of
confrontations has increased in severity as
characterized by the utilization of heavy conventional
weapons, extrajudicial killings and collective
punishment of the civilian population. Between 28
September 2000 and 31 January 2002, the records of
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) indicate
that an estimated 558 Palestinians were killed in the
West Bank, and an estimated 364 Palestinians were
killed in the Gaza Strip. According to the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics, 54 of the fatalities and
1,600 of the injured in the Gaza Strip were children
under the age of 18. Twenty-nine of those killed and
700 of those injured were UNRWA pupils.2
5. As the situation has continued to deteriorate,
Israeli security forces have resorted to heavier
weaponry, including tanks, combat helicopters and
fighter jets. Currently, most Palestinian deaths result
from Israeli missile attacks directed at selected
individuals suspected of terrorism, but which,
inevitably, have also killed innocent bystanders, and
from shootings carried out by soldiers and settlers,
sometimes after an exchange of gunfire. Lately,
intensive military incursions into Palestinian areas
controlled by the Palestinian Authority have resulted in
many civilian deaths. Israeli deaths have largely been
caused by suicide bomb attacks in Israel itself and by
gunfire directed at settlers on bypass roads or in the
proximity of settlements. The Secretary-General has
continually condemned, in the strongest possible terms,
suicide bombing attacks against citizens of Israel. He
has also repeatedly stated that such indiscriminate
terrorist attacks are morally repugnant and harmful to
the Palestinian cause.
6. There have been 58 extrajudicial killings, or
targeted assassinations, of Palestinians by Israel since
September 2000. In some cases, other Palestinians have
been killed by helicopter missile fire, tank fire and
gunfire in the course of carrying out the
assassinations.3 Many innocent civilians were also
killed in the bombing of villages or in gunfire
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exchanges, in circumstances indicating an
indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force.
7. The Israeli authorities have continued the
widespread practice of destruction of property.
UNRWA recorded 167 home demolitions in the West
Bank in 2001. In the Gaza Strip, between September
2000 and 31 January 2002, UNRWA recorded the
complete or partial destruction of 660 homes housing
845 families. Of these, 407 shelters housing 551
families — including 320 dwellings belonging to 448
refugee families — were completely destroyed.4 Most
such demolitions took place at night, without any
advance warning being given to the residents; some
residents were forced to flee their homes without being
able to even remove their possessions. Dozens of
houses have also been destroyed or damaged as a result
of the use of heavy weaponry. Moreover, during the
current crisis, IDF has destroyed a significant amount
of agricultural land, especially in Gaza. The creation of
buffer zones for bypass roads and settlements has
resulted in the “sweeping” of large areas of agricultural
land by bulldozers. A total of 385,808 fruit and olive
trees have been uprooted, and wells and agricultural
constructions destroyed.
8. UNRWA recorded 772 instances in 2001 when
settlers in the West Bank attacked Palestinians,
vandalized their property, blocked roads, or bulldozed
agricultural land. In the Gaza Strip, where the settler
population is small and largely confined to settlement
enclaves, settler activity was minimal by comparison.5
It should be noted that a substantial segment of the
settlers carry weapons that they received from IDF.6
9. All such acts of violence and the occupation itself
have a negative impact on the psyche of the Palestinian
population. However, considering the high percentage
of the population which is under the age of 18, the
impact can be expected to significantly affect the next
generation for years to come. Many people reportedly
experience an overwhelming fear of the future and
feelings of hopelessness. Studies show that, as a result
of the crisis, there are high incidences of post-traumatic
stress disorder among Palestinian children and youth.
10. Over 600 Palestinian children were arrested by
the Israeli authorities between September 2000 and
September 2001; around 160 remained incarcerated in
Israeli jails. Moreover, almost all Palestinian child
detainees face physical and psychological torture while
under interrogation. While in prison, children are also
denied the right to education and visits from family and
lawyers.7
11. The crisis has serious gender impacts. As children
are afraid of leaving the house, it has become more
difficult for women to seek employment or education
outside the house. Furthermore, the incidences of
gender-based violence within families have been
multiplying. The destruction of homes, the death of
male heads of households coupled with men’s
frustration due to unemployment and immobility have
resulted in a sharp increase in incest and domestic
violence. According to the Gaza Mental Health Clinic,
some former prisoners use the same tactics they
experienced during interrogation to torture their wives
and children.8
12. The sense of hopelessness and frustration due to
unemployment tends to be associated with a loss of
status for male household heads when they are the only
or main economically active family members and can
no longer meet their families’ basic needs. This
psychosocial impact of unemployment in turn is
associated with an increase in domestic violence.9
Mobility restrictions and closure
policies
13. Checkpoints, closures and curfews severely
impede access to medical care, education and
employment. There were many reports that Israeli
authorities treat Palestinians in an abusive manner at
checkpoints, subjecting them to verbal and physical
harassment. Each day, hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians who wish to travel between Palestinian
towns and villages must pass through one or more of
the approximately 130 Israeli checkpoints across the
occupied territory.10
14. Israeli closure policy has become the single most
important factor negatively affecting the Palestinian
economy and living conditions. Closure implies
varying degrees of movement restrictions on
Palestinian people, vehicles and goods: within the West
Bank and Gaza; between the West Bank and Gaza and
Israel; and at the international crossings between the
West Bank and Gaza and neighbouring Jordan and
Egypt. Generalized movement restrictions were first
imposed in the West Bank and Gaza during the Gulf
War in 1991 and have become more formalized and
pervasive since 1993.11
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15. For most of the period since October 2000,
mobility between the West Bank and Gaza, and
between the occupied Palestinian territory and the rest
of the world, has been severely impeded. Travel for
Palestinians between the West Bank and Gaza via the
“safe passage” route has been blocked by the Israeli
authorities since 6 October 2000. The passage was
closed even though the Oslo Accords forbid its closure.
According to the Accords, two routes were to be
designated as safe passages. Israel is entitled, for
security reasons, to close one of them or to alter the
terms of entrance but must assure that one of the
passages is always open.12
16. IDF has substantially increased the restrictions on
movement of Palestinians in the occupied territory
during the al-Aqsa intifada. Many of those harmed by
these restrictions have been persons requiring medical
treatment, mainly newborns, women and the elderly.
From 1 October 2000 to 3 March 2002, there were 23
births at Israeli military roadblocks in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. Among these, three miscarriages were
caused by tear gas grenades and an additional three
miscarriages were caused by the delays and
harassment.13 According to the Badil Resource Centre
for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 435
Palestinian children have been killed since September
2000.14 Furthermore, since September 2001, more than
165 Palestinian ambulances have been hit by IDF fire;
about 135 members of medical teams have been
wounded and 8 killed, according to Physicians for
Human Rights.15
17. While internal closure measures seemed to have
been relaxed during the second quarter of 2001,
internal closure in the West Bank was tightened again
in June and has remained so to date. Internal closure is
much more severe in the West Bank than in Gaza.16
Israeli forces further restricted freedom of movement
of Palestinians by imposing curfews, often for
extended periods, on specific Palestinian towns or
neighbourhoods. IDF practice on the ground involves
the placement of checkpoints at the entrances to
villages. Consequently, entry and exit are often
possible only via dirt roads, entailing enormous
hardships.
18. International border crossings have also been
severely affected. Between October 2000 and February
2002, all of Gaza’s border crossings through which
residents, exports and imports transit, were closed for
lengthy periods. The Gaza International Airport has
remained closed since February 2001. In December
2001, the radar station and parts of the runway were
destroyed by IDF. In January 2002, the runway was
bulldozed. The Gaza harbour was destroyed by IDF
during the last quarter of 2001.17 Israeli attacks have
resulted, according to the Palestinian Authority’s
Ministry of Transport, in the direct loss of 68 km of
main roads between cities and the destruction of
121 km of secondary roads between Palestinian towns.
In addition, the Ministry also indicated that 654 public
buses and 3,450 trucks have been forced out of service
and that 6,505 public vehicles are working at 50 per
cent of capacity.18 Owing to these restrictions and
attacks, Palestinian foreign trade has been affected, and
imports and exports, trans-shipped through Israeli
ports, have been delayed or blocked completely for
most of this period.
19. Mobility restrictions have been made even more
burdensome by road checkpoints, which have become a
regular feature of Palestinian life. Palestinians are
obliged to wait for long periods while Israeli soldiers
check vehicles and inspect identity documents. In order
to avoid these delays, Palestinians often abandon their
cars or leave their taxis and cross the checkpoint on
foot to catch a taxi on the other side of the checkpoint.
20. By mid-2001, there were 97 Israeli military
checkpoints in the West Bank. Roads were also blocked
with piles of earth, ripped up, or cut across with
trenches. These measures divided the West Bank into
over 100 separate, isolated sectors. In Gaza, there were
32 Israeli military checkpoints.19 A study by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development
indicated that internal closures have, in effect, divided
the West Bank and Gaza Strip into 54 isolated areas.20
From September 2000 to December 2001, 33
Palestinian civilians have died as a result of being
prohibited from reaching hospitals or seeking medical
treatment. Such delays occur most frequently at
checkpoints established by IDF.21
21. Israel’s imposition of severe restrictions on
freedom of movement carries a devastating impact on
the already fragile Palestinian economy. The
Palestinian population is poor even under normal
conditions, with 50 per cent living in refugee camps.
The imposition of additional burdens on such a
population inevitably creates severe material, social
and psychological hardships.
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22. The strict closure policy and movement
restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities since
September 2000 have seriously impeded the ability of
aid agencies to deliver both regular and emergency
humanitarian assistance to the refugees in need.
UNRWA staff, numbering 3,500 in the West Bank and
7,000 in Gaza, experienced severe work disruptions
owing to IDF checkpoints that frequently delayed them
or prevented them outright from reporting to their
schools, clinics and field offices. The financial cost to
UNRWA of forced workplace absences and lateness is
estimated at US$ 2.8 million.22
23. The chief impact of the strife in the occupied
Palestinian territory on UNRWA health services has
been an increased demand for medical care. UNRWA
regular health services have been burdened by the
growing number of refugees who previously used
private health providers but turned to UNRWA for free
medical care because of the economic hardships
associated with the closure. Another serious initial
outcome of the restrictions on movement in the West
Bank was a temporary decline in the number of
children immunized in late 2000. Other indicators of a
breakdown in preventive services in the West Bank, in
particular, include an increase in stillbirths and low
birth weight rates; late registration and irregular
attendance of pregnant women for antenatal care; an
increase in anaemia rates (an indicator of deterioration
in nutritional status) and declining follow-up with
medical providers by patients suffering from noncommunicable
diseases, such as diabetes, with a
concomitant drop in control rates.23
24. Restrictions on the freedom of movement
imposed by the Israeli authorities have had severe
impacts on education. Reports indicate that 190 schools
have been temporarily closed, 55 per cent of older
students have experienced difficulties in reaching
higher education institutions and 1,300 students from
Gaza have been unable to reach their universities in the
West Bank.24 There was a marked deterioration in
scores on final examinations in UNRWA schools in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2001, resulting from both
psychological trauma triggered by the strife and
disruptions in learning caused by the persistent
absences of teaching staff who were prevented from
reaching their schools during internal closures.
The Palestinian economy
25. The crisis and the growing atmosphere of
profound political and economic uncertainty had a
devastating impact on the Palestinian economy.
Consequently, the percentage of Palestinian people
living below the poverty line ($2 per person per day) is
reaching 50 per cent, which is more than double the
poverty rate prior to the current crisis. The Office of
the United Nations Special Coordinator in the
Occupied Territories (UNSCO) estimates that the total
income losses to the Palestinian economy, during the
period 1 October 2000 to 31 December 2001, range
between $3.1 and $4.1 billion.
26. The World Bank estimates per capita gross
national product (GNP) in 2001 to be 30 per cent lower
than it was in 1994, at the beginning of the Oslo peace
process. In 2000, real gross domestic product (GDP)
contracted by between 6 and 7 per cent mainly owing
to the poor performance of the Palestinian economy in
the last quarter of 2000. The economy had been
performing relatively well until the outbreak of
violence. In 2001, the World Bank projected an
additional 10 per cent decline in real GDP. The
estimated decline of GNP is larger, at around 14 per
cent, since the volume of worker activity abroad is
expected to be over 30 per cent lower than in 2000.25
27. The cumulative effect of the restrictions on the
freedom of movement of people and goods is perceived
by the Palestinians as a siege. It has resulted in severe
socio-economic hardships. The restriction on the entry
of Palestinians into Israel has meant denial of access to
their places of work in Israel to an estimated 115,000
Palestinians. The consequences have been devastating:
the families of these workers are now suffering from a
complete lack of income. Over 50 per cent of the
Palestinian workforce is now unemployed.26
28. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
reported that the volume of goods imported into the
occupied Palestinian territory had dropped by 8.5 per
cent during the last quarter of 2000 compared with
1999 figures; the drop continued in 2001 to 47 per cent
as a result of Israeli closure measures. Palestinian
exports declined by 4.9 per cent in 2000 and 52 per
cent in 2001. The Bureau reported that the number of
people working in industry declined by 38 per cent
between 1 October 2000 and 31 May 2001. During the
same period, the number of workers in construction
dropped by 20 per cent; in home trade by 26 per cent;
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in transportation and telecommunications by 23 per
cent; and in the services sector by 36 per cent.
Production levels in agriculture dropped by 13 per
cent, in industry by 19 per cent; in construction by 29
per cent; in home trade by 14 per cent; in transportation
and telecommunications by 2 per cent; and in other
activities by 23 per cent between 1 October 2000 and
31 May 2001.27
29. A survey undertaken by the Palestinian
Federation of Chambers of Commerce found that total
imports into the West Bank and Gaza had declined by
56.1 per cent compared with pre-crisis levels.28
Especially large declines were observed in the
following import categories: capital goods (83.7 per
cent); vehicles (79 per cent); household equipment
(63.3 per cent); construction materials (52.7 per cent);
and consumption products (48 per cent). Imports from
Arab countries decreased by 62.2 per cent; from Israel
by 44.5 per cent; and from Europe by 41.5 per cent. In
addition, the survey indicates an increase of 25 percent
in the cost of imports and an increase of 46.1 per cent
in import time delay.29
30. The survey found that, during the crisis, total
exports from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Israel
and other countries had declined by 50.3 per cent
compared with pre-crisis levels. Palestinian agriculture
exports declined by 52.6 per cent while industrial
exports fell by 49.6 per cent. Palestinian exports to
Israeli markets declined 51.9 per cent while exports to
Arab countries dropped by 27 per cent.30
31. The Palestinian Authority’s fiscal situation and
prospects have been severely impacted by the current
crisis. With closure measures disrupting tax collection,
the contraction of the Palestinian economy eroding the
Palestinian tax base and with the Israeli suspension of
tax clearances, the fiscal revenues declined by about 57
per cent during the first nine months of the crisis. The
international community has responded to the
Palestinian Authority fiscal crisis by providing large
amounts of direct fiscal support. By the end of 2001,
the Palestinian Authority had received approximately
$575 million, primarily from Arab countries and the
European Union.31
32. According to the survey by the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics, 14 per cent of households
have reported that they have lost their sources of usual
income during the past year. Of these, 10.1 per cent
(35,000 households) were in the West Bank and 21.9
per cent (38,000 households) in the Gaza Strip. About
47.7 per cent of the households reported that they had
lost more than 50 per cent of their usual income. The
median monthly income of Palestinian households has
decreased from 2,500 Israeli shekels before the
outbreak of the crisis to 1,500 shekels in October 2001.
The median income in March 2001 was 1,200 shekels
and in June 1,300 shekels. The median income in the
West Bank decreased from 3,000 shekels to 1,700
shekels and in the Gaza Strip from 1,944 shekels to 900
shekels.32
33. The current crisis has compounded the long-term
economic decline of East Jerusalem’s economic base.
A study prepared by the Palestinian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry revealed that Arab hotels in
Jerusalem witnessed the cancellation of 94 per cent of
their reservations during the period from October 2000
to March 2001. Debts accrued in the tourism sector
during early 2001 were approximately $13.5 million.
Losses in the tourism sector between October 2000 and
March 2001 were approximately $50 million.
34. A World Bank report concluded that,
notwithstanding security and political considerations,
unless the Palestinian territory is able to achieve high
levels of economic growth, the prospects for future
poverty reduction are not encouraging. Not only will
the number of poor Palestinians grow rapidly, but their
share in the population will also increase, which could
become a socially destabilizing factor. Furthermore,
unless Palestinians gain greater access to external
markets and to better paying jobs, whether in Israel or
in higher productivity occupations in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, it will be difficult for them to escape
poverty.
Water, environment and natural
resources
35. In general terms, the environmental impact of
Israeli measures taken during the crisis fall into three
broad categories: land degradation, water resource
damage and a halt to essential infrastructure work.
Land degradation is occurring rapidly owing to the
felling of thousands of trees and orchards and the
blockade of roads used by Palestinians, resulting in
thousands of new dirt tracks being created as
alternative transport routes. Water resource damage is
occurring through damage to environmental facilities,
particularly sewage infrastructure, and due to
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restrictions imposed on proper waste disposal. Owing
to the internal closures, outlying Palestinian villages
are being denied access to drinking water. Many
infrastructure projects supported by the international
aid community to improve the Palestinian environment
have been brought to a halt because of the closures.33
36. Two hundred thousand Palestinians living in 218
West Bank villages are not connected to a water
network and therefore have no running water. This
population suffers a severe water crisis. They are
unable to meet their basic water needs, including basic
personal hygiene and house cleaning, and as a result,
face significant health risks. The restrictions on
movement imposed by IDF since the beginning of the
crisis aggravate the situation and make it difficult for
tankers to transport water to affected communities.34
37. Since the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority, Israel has continued to maintain almost
complete control of the water sector in the occupied
Palestinian territory. Every new water project,
including projects in Area A (in which Palestinians
would have complete authority for civilian security),
requires the consent of Israel’s representatives on the
Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee. The
additional water quantities that Israel and the
Palestinian Authority developed pursuant to the Interim
Agreement led to a certain improvement in the supply
of water for household and urban use in various areas
of the West Bank. However, in the summer, many
Palestinians continue to suffer from frequent
disconnections of the water network. These
disconnections result from the allocation programmes
that various cities are compelled to implement because
of the increased demand in summer months.35
38. The average Palestinian in the West Bank
consumes 60 litres of water a day. The precise
consumption of residents in communities that are not
connected to a water network is not known. However,
it is significantly less than the overall average. By
comparison, average per capita consumption in Israel
and the settlements is 350 litres a day. The minimum
quantity of water recommended by the United States
Agency for International Development for household
and urban use alone is 100 litres a day per person.36
39. There are 36 Palestinian villages that are
completely dependent on water vendors to supply their
water needs. During periods of the siege, these villages
(with a total of 86,255 inhabitants) are reported to have
had no water supplied to them for periods ranging from
a week to two months.37 Furthermore, owing to the
difficulties in access to water springs (many being in
Area C, where Israel retains sole security authority),
the price of trucked water has increased considerably at
a time when employment and income for Palestinians
has plummeted.38
40. The occupation legacy is responsible for the gross
lack of attention to environmental issues and
investment in physical infrastructure within the
Palestinian cities and villages themselves. This
includes a degraded solid waste management
infrastructure, lack of wastewater treatment plants and
proper water supply facilities, and degraded
groundwater quality and quantity (particularly in
Gaza). A report written by the World Bank Reform
Campaign claims that there has been no effort to
improve the sewage situation in the southern West
Bank and untreated sewage threatens to pollute the
water supply.
41. Land confiscation for establishing settlements has
had a major impact on Palestinians and their economy,
especially the agriculture sector, which accounts for
about 30 per cent of Palestinian national income. The
dispersed location of Israeli settlements is an important
factor in the reduction of open spaces, including in
some cases the loss of biologically important areas,
such as forests and sensitive ecosystems.39 Bypass
roads, which are established to enable settlers and
military vehicles to move around without traversing
Palestinian residential areas in the belief that their
security is improved, contribute to a further
deterioration of the environment. The roads are
designed for moving at high speeds, which require that
the angles be minimized: wadis are therefore filled up
and hills bulldozed to make way. No buildings or trees
are allowed to remain on a wide strip of 50-100 metres
on either side. This translates into a 350-metre wide
swath40 of landscape destruction over more than 200
kilometres of bypass roads already built. An additional
250 kilometres of bypass roads are in the planning
stages.41
Israeli settlements
42. The great majority of the Member States regard
Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza as
contrary to article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which prohibits an occupying Power from
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transferring parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies. Numerous resolutions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly have
condemned the settlements as illegal. In the words of
the Special Rapporteur on Israeli Practices, “Expanding
settlements, demolition of houses and the destruction
of property, restrictions on freedom of movement and
the economic blockade are a constant reminder to
Palestinians of the occupation”.42 Moreover, apart from
the fact that settlements are a constant source of
friction between the two peoples, assuring the security
of the settlements and roads is imposing a tremendous
burden on Israel. It is estimated that the numerous
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory require
the defence of borders 10 times longer than the 1967
Green Line (a border approximately 2,000 miles
long).43
43. Today, there are some 190 settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza inhabited by approximately 380,000
settlers, of whom some 180,000 live in the East
Jerusalem area. Settlements are linked to each other
and Israel by a vast system of bypass roads (from
which Palestinian vehicles are excluded) which have a
50- to 75-metre buffer zone on each side in which no
building is permitted. These settlements and roads,
which separate Palestinian communities and deprive
Palestinians of agricultural land, have fragmented both
land and people. In effect, they seriously hamper the
possibility of a Palestinian State as they destroy the
territorial integrity of the occupied Palestinian
territory.44
44. More than half of the net increase of 2,561 in the
settlement population during the first half of 2001 was
due to increases at three religious settlements: Beitar,
south-west of Jerusalem; Tel Zion/Adam, bordering the
north-east corner of East Jerusalem; and Modi’in Ilit,
on the Green Line between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. In
the Gaza Strip, where clashes have been the most
violent, the 17 settlements with a population of
approximately 7,000 have sustained a small net
increase in population during 2001.
45. According to an Israeli Housing Ministry report,
most of the thousands of housing units constructed in
public housing projects in Givat Ze’ev and Ma’ale
Adumim over the past six years remain unsold and
empty. Despite the existence of empty units, the
Ministry issued a tender for an additional 496 units for
Ma’ale Adumim on 5 April 2001. The Ministry noted
that 76 per cent of the housing units offered in Har
Homa between 1999 and 2000 (2,200) remained unsold
in early 2001. In efforts to encourage prospective
settlers, a programme offering a grant of $6,250 and a
subsidized mortgage for an equal amount to buyers was
initiated. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics,
there are currently 6,130 units under construction in
settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza.
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
46. There is an extensive, yet comparatively small
settlement infrastructure in the Golan Heights in the
Syrian Arab Republic, occupied by Israel since June
1967. Some 17,000 Israeli settlers, residing in 33
settlements, represent an increase of 18 per cent since
1994. Over 17,000 Syrians, remaining after 1967, are
clustered in five villages close to the borders of the
Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon.45
47. Negotiations conducted between Israel and the
Syrian Arab Republic aimed at ending Israel’s
occupation of the Golan Heights and establishing
peaceful relations between the two countries ended in
failure in March 2000. This resulted in a number of
decisions aimed at reinvigorating settlement expansion
on the Golan Heights. The Golan Heights Regional
Council intends to open a campaign in early 2002 for
the construction of 1,000 new dwelling units in Israeli
settlements during the next three years.46
48. Employment opportunities for the Arab
population in the Syrian Golan Heights continues to be
extremely restricted, since the movement of the Arab
population between the Golan and the Syrian Arab
Republic remains problematic. The employment
available to the Syrian population in the Golan is
limited to unskilled and semi-skilled daily wage labour.
In most instances, these workers have no access to
social benefits or health insurance, and job security is
extremely precarious, with no provision for
unemployment compensation. Over and above these
concerns, substantial wage differences prevail, to the
detriment of the Syrian Arab population of the Golan.47
The improvement of living conditions is further
inhibited owing to measures that restrict the expansion
of educational facilities, as well as limited access to
education, either in the Syrian Arab Republic or
Israel.48
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Notes
1 United Nations, Department of Public Information, press
release, SG/SM/8129; SC/7305; 21 February 2002.
2 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) estimates, dated
6 March 2002.
3 B’Tselem, “Statistics on the al-Aqsa Intifada:
Assassinations — Extrajudicial Executions”.
4 UNRWA estimates, 6 March 2002.
5 UNRWA contribution to this report, 6 March 2002.
6 B’Tselem, Tacit Consent: Israeli Policy on Law
Enforcement toward Settlers in the Occupied Territories.
7 These rights are conferred by article 37 of the
Convention of the Rights of the Child.
8 United Nations Development Fund for Women
(UNIFEM) contribution to the present report dated
6 February 2002.
9 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights contribution to the present report,
8 March 2002.
10 United States, Department of State, 2001 Human Rights
Report, Israel and the occupied territories.
11 United Nations, Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator (UNSCO), Closure Update Summary: “The
Impact on the Palestinian Economy of Confrontation,
Border Closures and Mobility Restrictions”, 1 October
2000-30 September 2001.
12 See Oslo II Accords, appendix 1.
13 Al-Haq.
14 BADIL (Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and
Refugee Rights).
15 Ha’aretz, 22 March 2002.
16 UNSCO contribution to the present report dated
21 February 2002.
17 UNSCO contribution to the present report, 21 February
2002.
18 Communication of the Ministry of Transport to ESCWA,
9 February 2002.
19 BADIL, 23 August 2001.
20 UNCTAD, Secretariat Report on UNCTAD Assistance to
the Palestinian People, Geneva, August 2001.
21 Hear Palestine, 8 December 2001.
22 UNRWA estimates, 6 March 2002.
23 Ibid.
24 UNSCO Closure Update Summary: “The Impact on the
Palestinian Economy of Confrontation, Border Closures
and Mobility Restrictions”, 1 October 2000-
30 September 2001.
25 The Economist, The EU Country Report October 2001,
pp. 52-53.
26 OHCHR contribution to this report, 8 March 2002.
27 Ha’aretz, 5 October 2001.
28 Palestinian Federation of Chambers of Commerce,
“Palestinian External Trade and Israeli Impediments”,
July 2001 (Arabic).
29 UNSCO Closure Update Summary: “The Impact on the
Palestinian Economy of Confrontation, Border Closures
and Mobility Restrictions”, 1 October 2000-
30 September 2001.
30 Ibid.
31 UNSCO contribution to the present report, 21 February
2002.
32 The Jerusalem Times, 5 October 2001.
33 Applied Research Institute — Jerusalem (ARIJ),
“Israel’s Double Standard towards Environmental
Protection”, 2001.
34 B’Tselem, Not Even a Drop: The Water Crisis in
Palestinian Villages without a Water Network, 5 August
2001.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Palestinian Hydrology Group, Report on Israeli
aggressions against Palestinian water sector during
Al-Aqsa intifada, December 2000.
38 Applied Research Institute — Jerusalem, “Israel’s
Double Standard towards Environmental Protection”,
2001.
39 Ibid.
40 From the Israeli Coalition Against House Demolitions
and other sources.
41 Applied Research Institute — Jerusalem, “Israel’s
Double Standard towards Environmental Protection”,
2001.
42 OHCHR contribution to the present report, 21 February
2002.
43 Report, May-June 2001, p. 2.
44 Ibid.
45 Report, November-December 1999, p. 6.
46 Ma’ariv, 25 November 2001.
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47 Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
“Report on Israeli Practices Against Human Rights of
Syrian Citizens in the Occupied Syrian Golan”, June
1997, pp. 12-20.
48 Ibid., pp. 20-24.
United Nations A/58/75–E/2003/21
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
12 June 2003
Original: English
03-39666 (E) 080703
*0339666*
General Assembly Economic and Social Council
Fifty-eighth session
Item 105 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan over their natural resources
Substantive session of 2003
30 June-25 July 2003
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General***
In its resolution 2002/31 of 25 July 2002, the Economic and Social Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fiftyeighth
session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the
resolution. The General Assembly, in its resolution 57/269 of 20 December 2002,
also requested a report. The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit the report
requested, which has been prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia and is submitted in response to the two resolutions. A report on
assistance to the Palestinian people, covering the period June 2002 to May 2003, is
also being submitted to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social
Council, as requested in resolution 57/147 of 16 December 2002. The annual report
of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East provides information, inter alia, on the socioeconomic
conditions of the registered population in the occupied Palestinian
territory.1
* A/58/50/Rev.1 and Corr.1.
** E/2003/100.
*** As official sources were lacking for most of the information contained in the present report, a
longer period for clearance was required for extensive consultations within the various United
Nations entities at Headquarters and in the field. The report was therefore delayed two weeks for
processing.
2
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Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia* on the economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Summary
The occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel continues to have a serious
detrimental effect on all aspects of the living conditions of the Palestinian people.
The Israeli army has continued to resort to excessive use of force, arbitrary
detention, house demolitions, increasingly severe mobility restrictions and closure
policies, as well as the confiscation and bulldozing of productive Palestinian
agricultural land.
The Palestinian economy continues to accumulate losses, currently equal to half
of its annual gross domestic product. Unemployment has increased threefold, and
poverty has risen among more than two thirds of the population.
Women and children bear a special and enduring burden resulting from the
occupation. Palestinian children face exposure to mounting violence, and their access
to educational opportunities and health facilities have been reduced to unacceptably
low levels. Educational outcomes are consistently declining, as are nutritional
standards and public health conditions.
As noted in previous reports, Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian
territory remain one of the principal issues fuelling the conflict between the two
peoples. The geographic distribution of Israeli settlements in the occupied
Palestinian territory severely restricts the growth of the Palestinian communities.
The Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan Heights continues to witness settlement
expansion beyond the 33 settlements already in place. Social services such as
schooling, higher education and medical facilities remain insufficient for the Arab
population in the Syrian Golan Heights.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge with
appreciation the substantive contributions of the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Population Fund, the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the World Health Organization and the
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories to this report.
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2002/31 of 25 July 2002, the Economic and Social Council
stressed, inter alia, the importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the
basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973)
of 22 October 1973 and 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, and the principle of land for
peace as well as the compliance with the agreements reached between the
Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative
of the Palestinian people. The resolution reaffirmed the applicability of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12
August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and other
Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The resolution stressed the need to
preserve the territorial integrity of all of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to
guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods in the territory, including
the removal of restrictions on going into and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom
of movement to and from the outside world. The Council reaffirmed the inalienable
right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan
to all their natural and economic resources and called upon Israel not to exploit,
endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources. It also reaffirmed that Israeli
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem and the
occupied Syrian Golan, were illegal and an obstacle to economic and social
development. The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General
Assembly, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution.
2. In its resolution 57/269 of 20 December 2002, the General Assembly
reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural and economic resources, including land
and water; and called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, cause loss or
depletion of or endanger the natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan. In the resolution, the Assembly
recognized the right of the Palestinian people to claim restitution as a result of any
exploitation, loss or depletion of, or danger to, their natural resources, and expressed
the hope that this issue would be dealt with in the framework of the final status
negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The Assembly requested the
Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its fifty-eighth session.
3. On 30 April 2003, the Secretary-General warmly welcomed the formal
presentation of the road map for Middle East peace, declaring that it gave the Israeli
and Palestinian people a real chance to end their long and painful conflict, and thus
a chance for all the people of that troubled region to establish, at last, a just and
comprehensive peace. The Secretary-General expressed his belief that the road
map’s goal of two States, a secure and prosperous Israel and an independent, viable,
sovereign and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, must
be the focus of all energies and efforts.
4. It has been noted that humanitarian assistance is not the answer to the crisis in
the occupied Palestinian territory. The crisis is fundamentally political, as observed
by the United Nations Technical Assistance Mission following its visit in October
2002 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory: the crisis will continue to worsen unless
political decisions are taken to lift closures, curfews and other restrictions on the
civilian population. Durable and productive security cannot be achieved by violence
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or the construction of walls and barricades. It depends on trust and respect between
people.2
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem
Deaths and injuries
5. From the beginning of March 2002 until 7 May 2002, Israel endured an
estimated 16 bombings, the large majority of which were suicide attacks. More than
100 persons were killed. On 29 March 2002 Israel launched Operation Defensive
Shield. The operation included incursions into a number of Palestinian cities,
including Jenin, which have resulted in numerous Palestinian civilian deaths (see
A/ES-10/186). As the report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General
Assembly resolution ES-10/10 indicated, a total of 497 Palestinians were killed in
the course of the Israeli army reoccupation of Palestinian area A from 1 March to
7 May 2002 and in the immediate aftermath.3
6. The Palestinian Ministry of Health reported 2,520 Palestinian deaths by
occupation forces between 29 September 2000 and 24 September 2002. Israel
reported 624 Israeli deaths from 27 September 2000 to 26 September 2002. Several
thousand injuries have resulted on both sides. However, the Palestinian death rate
has been at such a high level that it has directly affected the general Palestinian
mortality rate, which has increased by about 2 per cent since 2001.
7. Israel continues to pursue a policy of extrajudicial killings of Palestinians
suspected of involvement in armed attacks against Israelis. In 2002, there were 51
extrajudicial killings/attempts, resulting in the death of 66 suspected persons and 46
bystanders.
8. Many of the civilians killed have been children. Over 450 children have been
killed in the conflict since September 2000. The Israeli army and settlers have killed
367 Palestinian children (under 18). However, Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets
have killed 82 Israeli children.
9. Medical facilities and personnel administering to the wounded have been
attacked. The Israeli army has killed 18 health workers and injured 370; and it has
damaged 240 ambulances and destroyed 34.
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
10. The Israeli army’s house-to-house searches have affected from 30 to 50 per
cent of Palestinian homes in various areas of the occupied Palestinian territory, and
between 12 and 36 per cent of households have reported the arrest of at least one
family member. Mass arrests were conducted, as illustrated by the Friday, 29 March
2002 raid on Al-Bireh (West Bank), where the occupation army assembled all male
residents aged 15 to 45 in a school yard. They forced the majority to remain in the
school throughout the day and night, releasing some the next morning, but hauling
others away in buses.
11. During the two major Israel army incursions into the occupied Palestinian
territory, in February and in late March 2002, the number of Palestinians arrested
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was 10,000. Some have been released, but about 4,000 persons remain in detention,
including 38 women prisoners (A/57/207, para. 37). Prior to the launch of Operation
Defensive Shield, 60 Palestinians had been held in administrative detention.
According to B’Tselem, an Israeli non-governmental organization, as of January
2003, more than 1,000 Palestinians were being held in administrative detention.4
12. Israeli forces have also detained local staff of the United Nations. The United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) has been refused access to and information about its detained staff
members. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East has also complained that its buildings have been used repeatedly as
detention centres. On 9 April 2002, special Israeli forces and army units broke into
the UNRWA Ramallah Men’s Training Centre, arresting its dean and 104 others.
13. Children are affected by arbitrary detention, not only by being deprived of
family members and their right to visit them in detention, but also as detainees and
prisoners themselves. A total of 280 children have been detained. The Israeli army
has confirmed that it prohibited Palestinian juvenile detainees at Ofer Camp from
meeting their families and from continuing their studies.5
Population displacements
14. The destruction of Palestinian homes and the military siege and curfews on
residential areas have had multiple effects on the population of the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem. Both those rendered homeless and those
facing military threat in their place of residence have been obliged to seek refuge
elsewhere. At the end of the 2002 incursions, between 23 and 37 per cent of the
families housed other families as a result of life-threatening danger around the
displaced family’s home, demolition or confiscation of homes by the Israeli army, or
being stranded and unable to reach home.
15. From late 2000 through 2002, Israeli measures have compelled some 70,000
Palestinians (1.3 per cent of the West Bank population, and 2.6 per cent in the Gaza
Strip) to change their residence. Direct military activity has caused 60 per cent of
the displacements. Those forced to endure long detentions and humiliation by the
Israeli military at checkpoints have had to shift residences to ensure access to work
or study. More than two thirds of the displaced persons expected the change to be
temporary, which implies yet another displacement in the future. Statistics show a
higher proportion of displaced males than females (15/20).
16. The military siege, closures and curfews also isolate residential areas for long
periods. In certain areas, especially Al-Muwasi, in the southern part of the Gaza
Strip, and in Al-Syafa, in northern Gaza, the siege has meant full isolation. Only
local residents are allowed in and out, at the army’s discretion. Construction
materials are not allowed to enter, nor are medical personnel. Hundreds of families
have been displaced as a result, and such population transfer appears to be the
objective of military operations, extinguishing all aspects of normal life for
Palestinians living near Israeli settlements.
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Property destruction
17. In November 2001, the Committee against Torture concluded that Israeli
policies of closure and house demolition may, in certain circumstances, amount to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and called on Israel to desist
from the practice (CAT/C/XVII/Concl.5, paras. (i) and (j)). The Israeli forces
escalated their acts of forced eviction, seizure, demolition and closure of Palestinian
structures throughout the occupied Palestinian territory in 2002 and 2003. During
the period, Israeli forces demolished well over 1,275 Palestinian homes. UNRWA
has reported that, between March and November 2002, the army destroyed 304
refugee homes in the West Bank, in addition to the approximately 600 refugee
housing units destroyed in their assault on Jenin (April 2002).
18. Following the army incursions of spring 2002, between 31 and 87 per cent of
Palestinian families in the Occupied Palestinian Territory reported considerable
destruction to their neighbourhoods, and between 28 and 59 per cent reported
exposure to shooting and/or destruction of their homes. In the single raid on Jenin
refugee camp, the Israeli army completely destroyed some 600 homes with bombs
and bulldozers, leaving an additional 200 homes unfit for habitation and 1,250
families (over 6,000 individuals) homeless, including a majority of children.
19. On 29 January 2003 in Rafah, the Israeli army shelled the Tal al-Sultan
neighbourhood. The destroyed apartments had been newly built to house Palestinian
families that army attacks had previously rendered homeless. The families were to
take delivery of the new apartments on 1 February 2003.6
20. Such operations are accompanied by intensive fire, preventing the victims
from salvaging their belongings. In most cases, the Israeli authorities do not warn
the affected civilians in advance. Israel has escalated the destruction of Palestinian
homes with explosives since early September 2002, following the policy of
destroying the homes of Palestinians suspected of armed resistance.
21. During 2002, in occupied Jerusalem, Israeli authorities escalated the
demolition of Palestinian houses by destroying more than 120 structures of different
types. This practice has reached its highest level since 1987.7
22. In the Gaza Strip, a total of at least 2,424 Palestinian homes had been damaged
by the end of 2002. The Israeli army has completely destroyed 704 homes, leaving
23,122 people homeless, including a majority of children. This preceded the army’s
destruction of 439 Palestinian homes in the north Gaza governorate in 2003,
representing a sharp increase over the rate of destruction in 2001-2002.8
23. In addition to family homes (worth $66 million in 2002), the Israeli army has
destroyed private assets in the form of buildings; equipment and inventory ($97
million); physical infrastructure ($88 million, of which $64 million were road
networks); cultural heritage ($48 million); Palestinian Authority assets, including
ministries and municipalities ($20 million); private and public cars ($6 million); and
non-governmental organization and private social services ($56 million). Loss of
institutional memory and equipment have made basic functions impossible,
particularly with the Israeli army’s destruction and confiscation of vital records,
computers and software in the key Palestinian Authority ministries (Finance,
Education and Interior). The army’s destruction of water, electricity generation
facilities and grids, solid waste disposal stations and road networks, and its
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confiscation of equipment and machinery of private institutions alone have
generated an estimated $360 million in losses in April 2002.9
Mobility restrictions and closure policies
24. Between 1 October 2000 and 31 December 2002, Israeli authorities closed the
main Gaza crossing at Erez checkpoint completely for 362 days, and partially for
262 days. Erez industrial zone was closed for 67 days; Karni commercial crossing
was completely closed for 143 days and partially for 41 days. Sofa was closed for
275.
25. In May 2002, Israel introduced a new feature to the pass system under which
Palestinian residents need special permits from the Israeli Civil Administration to
travel between Palestinian localities within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The
new policy formally fragmented the West Bank into eight blocks, creating 64
Palestinian distinct enclaves, maintained by 46 permanent checkpoints and 126
roadblocks.
26. The Israeli Government has initiated the construction of physical barriers
running through the West Bank to separate the Israeli and Palestinian populations,
initially with over 100 kilometres of high concrete walls, fences, buffer zones,
trenches and security watchtowers. According to the long-term plans, two walls will
extend the entire 360-kilometre length of the West Bank.10
27. The construction is taking place in the most fertile and dense agricultural
valley areas of the western Occupied Palestinian Territory. It has already severed
farmers from their plots. In the Qalqilya governorate alone, the wall will stretch
along the fields of 300 farmers, and 1,000 farmers will lose significant portions of
land to the western side of the wall. The loss of wells will deprive the remaining
accessible land of water needed to farm it, while the close proximity of Israeli armed
guards will pose a threat to farmers cultivating what fields remain. As of December
2002, documentation of wall-related destruction of agricultural land and assets had
been conducted in 53 communities in Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqilya districts, an area
containing an estimated population of 141,800. Direct damage to those communities
from wall and barrier preparations and construction up to that time included the
destruction of some 83,000 olive and other fruit trees, and 615 dunums of irrigated
land, including greenhouses, 37 kilometres of water networks and 15 kilometres of
agricultural roads. In addition, a total of 238,350 dunums of land (238.3 square
kilometres) were being isolated between the Green Line and the Wall; 57 per cent of
that area was cultivated land, planted mostly with olive trees and field crops.11
Israeli settlements
28. The geographic distribution of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory continues to severely restrict the growth of Palestinian communities and is
an obstacle to their economic and social development. The settlements have been
condemned as illegal under numerous resolutions of the Security Council and the
General Assembly.
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29. Forty-five Israeli settlements are being expanded by 11,128 dunums; four of
the settlements are new, and the new outposts (care vans) number 113, spread across
the West Bank.
30. Israel contends that the expansion of settlements is a function of the existing
population’s “natural growth”. This term has never been precisely defined.
Successive Israeli Governments have strongly encouraged migration from Israel to
the settlements by offering generous financial benefits and incentives. The current
annual increase of 11 to 12 per cent in settler numbers far exceeds the 2 per cent
population growth inside Israel (E/CN.4/2003/5/Add.1).
31. A critical factor affecting Palestinian life is the lavish allotment of land
resources for settlement. Planning maps remain largely inaccessible to the public.
However, available data indicate that the authorities have allotted 41.9 per cent of
all the West Bank to settlements as building, planning and development zones.12 For
example, in the Migilot settlement in the Judean desert, Israeli planning authorities
have allotted 700,000 dunums of land to its settler population of 900
(E/CN.5/2003/5/Add.1, para. 39).
32. The Israeli Government finances some 50 per cent of settlement costs in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory and 25 per cent of housing inside the Green Line.
Israeli illegal settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, who recorded the highest
per capita income of Israelis in the 1990s, receive $520 per capita in subsidies from
the budgets publicly disclosed, while, in the communities of Arab citizens of Israel,
the most disadvantaged individuals receive the equivalent of $235 in public
benefits.13
33. In its 2002 budget, the Government of Israel appropriated $154 million for
infrastructure, industrial investment grants, housing, agricultural programmes and
educational subsidies for the settlements. For 2003, it is devoting 1.9 billion new
sheqalim (NIS) ($452 million) from its budget for the settlements.14
34. It is reported that there are plans to construct five new settlements in Rimal
Halutza, in Gaza near the Egyptian border. The location is planned to attract around
15,000 Israelis into an area of 80,000 Palestinian dunums, with implementation
anticipated in 2004.15
35. Settler bypass roads also impose the demolition of structures and closure of
over 150 metres of Palestinian lands to each side.16 The bypass roads link Israeli
settlements to each other and to Israel proper, and this easy access allows for
attractive living conditions for settlers, thus facilitating the expansion and
consolidation of settlements. The network divides the occupied Palestinian territory
into areas separated and surrounded by military-controlled roads, cutting the
Palestinian areas into a number of isolated homelands. That network, along with
other planning restrictions, prevents the development of Palestinian towns and
villages, exacerbates overcrowding, prevents Palestinian territorial contiguity and
further disconnects Palestinian communities from each other. The network undermines the
Palestinian economy by restricting movement and impeding commerce.
36. Settler actions against Palestinians include erecting roadblocks to disrupt
normal movement, shooting at roof-top water tanks, burning cars, smashing
windows, destroying crops and uprooting trees, and harassing merchants. Settlers
have also attacked paramedics and fire fighters. Monitors recorded at least 156 cases
of such attacks during the period 1 March to 30 November 2002. Settler violence in
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the past year concentrated on preventing and confiscating the autumn olive harvest
in the West Bank, the main source of livelihood for most rural Palestinians.
37. The confiscation of land and properties is a dominant feature of Israeli
occupation and population transfer policy. The confiscated land area has reached
well over 70 per cent of the entire West Bank; and in the Gaza Strip, roughly one
third of the land. Settlements implanted near built-up Palestinian areas impose a
500-metre buffer zone, creating a planning pretext for removing Palestinian homes
and buildings and confiscating a wide swath of land around the settlements, at the
expense of the Palestinian owners.
38. By end February 2002, the army had destroyed 31,283 hectares of agricultural
land and 485,665 trees in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, leaving 5,243 farmers
without a livelihood.17
Water and environment
39. Palestinian entitlements to water include the aquifers of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, in addition to their rightful share as riparians of the Jordan River.
However, patterns of Israeli military and settler land use coincide with severe
discrimination against Palestinians in access to water throughout the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and excessive consumption by the Israeli settlements (see
E/C.12/1/Add.27, paras. 10, 24, 32 and 41).
40. Israel extracts more than 85 per cent of the Palestinian water from the West
Bank aquifers, accounting for about 25 per cent of Israel’s water use. Under Israeli
restrictions, Palestinian water consumption per capita is 82 cubic metres as
compared with 326.5 cubic metres for Israeli citizens and settlers. Figures for daily
per capita water use indicate that Israelis use five times more water (350 litres) than
Palestinians (70 litres). In the water-scarce Gaza Strip, Israeli settlers consume 584
litres per day, or about seven times the Palestinian per capita consumption there.
Moreover, leakage from poor infrastructure is estimated to decrease the Palestinian
allotment by another 24 to 36 per cent.18 The World Health Organization (WHO)
recommends a 100-litre per capita minimum daily consumption.19
41. In a pre-dawn assault on 29 February 2003, Israeli tanks and army bulldozers
invaded Rafah (Gaza Strip) and completely destroyed the town’s two main waterwells.
The wells had produced 50 per cent of the town’s scarce water resources.20
42. About 150 Palestinian communities have no independent water supply. Army
closures and movement restrictions have cut them off completely from any water
source. Armed Israeli settlers and uniformed soldiers occasionally destroy cisterns,
contaminate collection tanks and damage pumps belonging to Palestinians. Israeli
soldiers have destroyed water supplies of refugee camp families by shooting holes in
roof-top cisterns.21
43. The shortage of water has obvious effects on the region’s fragile environment.
At the Wadi Gaza catchment, extending from Jabal Khalil (West Bank) to the Gaza
coast, a levee on the Israeli side prevents the natural flow of water from reaching
Gaza, although some flooding occasionally takes place. Aerial photos show the
Gaza border as demarcating a land deprived of water. The site where the Israeli
army recently extirpated some 26,000 trees had been the only significant green area
in the northern Gaza Strip east of Beit Hanun.22 The Israeli occupation has also left
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95 per cent of the few forested areas in the Gaza Strip denuded.23 The remaining
green areas, such as El-Mawasi on the south Gaza coast, are the sites of intense
settler activity and the current subject of Israeli military siege and comprehensive
curfew on 15,000 Palestinian citizens.
44. The Desk Study on the environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
conducted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), observed that
biodiversity and conservation problems had been aggravated in the present conflict
by various means, including the following:
• Direct degradation from military operations
• Population pressures on natural systems owing to high growth rates and the
continuing refugee crisis
• Growth of Israeli settlements where land is already scarce
• Restrictions on communications, movement and access, limiting environmental
management measures
• Construction of the separation fence, blocking terrestrial fauna and cutting
ecological corridors
• Solid waste and wastewater pollution
• Israel’s clearing of vegetation for security, settlement and other purposes
• Fragmentation of areas, enforced by interim arrangements, making coherent
and integrated approaches to environmental management impossible
• Lack of trust and cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian Authority
institutions concerned with the environment, impeding cooperation.24
45. Industrial and waste-management practices are generally inadequate to
preserve environmental health, and the required investment in treatment and
protection measures is beyond the current means of most Palestinian institutions,
even with the modest level of international assistance to date. More stringent Israeli
standards do not apply in its settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
owing to fiscal incentives and non-enforcement. Reportedly, this has caused
migration of polluting Israeli industries, including asbestos, fibreglass, pesticide and
flammable gas, notably in the settlements near Tulkarem (West Bank).25 Further
cooperation and field studies are needed to assess conflicting claims about
contamination, such as from polychlorinated biphenals (PCBs) and radioactive
waste, including possible depleted uranium munitions.26
46. Israeli closures and destruction of water and sanitation facilities and other
infrastructure have degraded environmental health conditions, with children
typically being affected disproportionately. Owing to army-imposed closures, solid
waste disposal in the Gaza Strip has been particularly restricted, and this is also the
case in all West Bank towns under the intermittent Israeli army curfews imposed
since June 2002. Israeli army destruction of both the water network and sewage
lines in Balata and Askar refugee camps (West Bank) has caused sewage to
contaminate the water line, while Israeli army closures have hampered both
personnel access to affected areas and material access to chlorine to administer
needed remedial measures to treat the water supply. The World Health Organization
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reported an outbreak of over 600 cases of shigellosis there between December 2002
and January 2003.
Public health
47. The World Health Organization has warned that the occupied Palestinian
territory health system is in danger of collapse.27 The crisis is reflected in a shortage
of medicine/antibiotics used to treat injuries encountered; the inability of health
personnel and patients to gain access to health facilities; and the lack of food, water
and electricity. Frequent and long utility cuts have affected medicine supplies in
central stores, and maintenance and other personnel have been prevented from
reaching refrigerators and other equipment when needed to save precious supplies.
48. Closures and curfews have resulted in Palestinian health facilities operating at
only 30 per cent capacity. There has been a 60 per cent decline in the
implementation of school health programmes and similarly dramatic interruption of
immunization coverage, including that for measles, tuberculosis (BCG) and polio.28
UNRWA reports that only 46.5 per cent of refugee children are being immunized
according to schedule. In addition, the Agency has reported a reduction in the use of
preventive health services and a 52 per cent decrease in women attending post-natal
care. Meanwhile, Israel’s curtailment of Palestinian and international health worker
movements has impeded epidemiological surveillance in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, making impossible the timely identification of, and response to, dreaded
epidemic outbreaks.
49. On most days, 75 per cent of UNRWA health services personnel cannot reach
their workplace. Consequently, 14,278 health staff workdays have been lost in the
West Bank alone.29 Despite the upgrading of 65 primary care centres, a recent
survey by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) found that health workers
had been unable to attend the clinics and that most centres had run out of essential
medical supplies. The Director-General of the International Committee of the Red
Cross described as absolutely unacceptable the fact that “useless humiliations take
place” against Red Cross and Red Crescent staff and delegates in the field
(A/57/207, para. 42).
50. Throughout the occupied Palestinian territory there are 100,000 persons with
disabilities, either congenital or resulting from accidents. During the current crisis,
Israeli settlers and soldiers have rendered 5,300 individuals permanently disabled
through various acts of violence (Ibid., para. 61), such as incidents at the
checkpoints and shootings. In the Jenin refugee camp assault, for example, three
blind youths were left handcuffed in the street by the Israeli army for two and a half
days. Other individuals with disabilities were also exposed to targeted army
shooting (Ibid., paras. 62 and 63).
51. The Palestinian Ministry of Health reported that delays at checkpoints had
resulted in 46 women delivering their babies while waiting for permission to pass
through; as a result, 24 women and 27 newborn babies had died.
52. Soaring poverty has limited the local Palestinian food basket, leading to
micronutritional deficiencies. Children and women are of special concern for
nutritional depletion. A recent survey has shown a 15.6 per cent rate of severe
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anaemia among children 6 to 59 months of age, and 6.6 per cent among nonpregnant
women 15 to 49 years of age.30
53. The proportion of Palestinian children in the occupied Palestinian territory
with wasting or acute malnutrition, one symptom of recent stress, is 9.3 per cent,
four times the norm. The cases in the Gaza Strip are three times those in the West
Bank (4.3 per cent versus 13.2 per cent), and the incidence is higher in non-urban
areas than in urban centres (12.1 per cent as compared with 13.2 per cent).
54. Birth registers show a decline in the total number of births over the past
several years, reflecting a trend begun before the Intifada and rooted in changing
socio-economic conditions. While the birth rate was above 30 per 1,000 population
per year in the mid-1990s, it dropped to less than 30 in 2001; the change is also
partly attributable to delayed marriages.
55. The nature of the occupation and local conditions makes the collection of
reliable data on population dynamics difficult, especially those on fertility, mortality
and migration. While available mortality statistics are reported above, the birth rate
has been a matter of considerable speculation.
56. Almost all children are exposed to violence, including shooting, witnessing
violent death, and the destruction of their home and property, despite parental efforts
to protect them from such horrors. Sleep-related dysfunctions are the most common
manifestations of trauma. Distress among children especially leads to nightmares,
bedwetting, insomnia and interrupted sleep patterns. Psychosomatic afflictions are
common, including stress, headaches, stomach cramps, skin diseases, developmental
regression, withdrawal, risk-taking behaviour, rebellion and rejection of authority,
aggression and depression.
57. At the end of the 2002 incursions, a Bir Zeit University study showed 70 to 93
per cent of the interviewees reported at least one member of the family with mental
health problems. Symptoms included great fear among children, manifesting in
shivering, crying, appetite loss and sleeplessness.
Education
58. Violence and mobility restrictions keep children from educational
opportunities. Neither teachers nor students can reach schools, and the Israeli army
has destroyed 185 schools, while, of the 275 schools in the line of fire, others have
been closed or are disused. Normal levels of classroom concentration are impossible
in the unstable and often violent circumstances, especially when the army or settlers
kill or injure a fellow student.31
59. There is no available assessment of academic achievement in the current
school year, since Israeli-imposed closures and curfews have rendered examinations
difficult to administer. Nevertheless, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East reports that final exam scores among refugee
pupils in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for main curriculum subjects fell
dramatically in 2002 as compared with 2000 and 2001. The proportion of students
obtaining passing grades in Arabic declined from 71 per cent in 1999 and 2000 to 38
per cent in 2001; and the proportion with passing grades in mathematics dropped
from 54 per cent to 26 per cent during the same period. The UNRWA compensatory
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educational programme has since resulted in some recovery, but student
achievement is still below the pre-2000 rates.
60. UNRWA schools reported the loss of 75,571 teacher days in 2001/2002, which
is a 14-fold increase over the previous academic year. The consequent material cost
to UNRWA regular school operations in 2001/2002 was $1,959,417, and an
additional cost of $111,340 was incurred by the Agency’s technical and vocational
training programme.
61. With many schools closed, recreational and social activities are insufficient to
meet children’s needs. Moreover, many parents keep children indoors for their
safety, although that does not prevent them from observing the conflict and suffering
the moral and material losses.
62. With school systems failing to function, young people — the majority of
Palestinians — have few productive outlets for their energies. Many children have
sought odd jobs and dropped out of school to support the family, including selling
gum and candy, washing car windows and selling newspapers. They run a high risk
of long-term mental instability, physical insecurity, domestic violence and selfdestructive
behaviour. In East Jerusalem, this manifests itself in increased drug use
and sales, reportedly with full knowledge of the Israeli police.32 With 66 per cent of
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem living below the poverty line, the common
correlation between indigence and drug abuse makes this aspect of life another
indicator of Arab Jerusalem as the concentrated microcosm of the negative effects of
occupation.
Economic situation
63. Owing to closures and the consequent loss of employment, Palestinian per
capita gross national product declined by 12 per cent in 2000, 19 per cent in 2001
and 24 per cent in 2002. The sharp decline in Palestinian workers employed in Israel
led to income losses of $757 million from October 2000 to end April 2002, or about
20 per cent of gross national income (GNI).
64. The decline in GNI has been considerable, dropping 23.2 in 2001 and 26.4, in
2002.33 Estimates show that the crisis has already cost the Palestinian economy $5.4
billion in GNI, equivalent to the entire 1999 GNI, and over 50 per cent of 1999
gross domestic product. This is compounded by some $728 million in physical
damage, including $150 million damage to donor-funded infrastructure.34
65. Poverty has risen substantially: 66.5 per cent of households are living below
the poverty line, with a disproportionate number (84.6 per cent) in Gaza. Poverty
levels have long-term consequences for public finance, trade balance, the savingsinvestment
gap and social services. The Palestinian Authority has been forced into
heavier dependence upon donor support for basic functions, diverting attention from
long-term development goals.
66. Remittances from abroad have only partially offset the losses at the family and
national levels. A total of 56.5 per cent of Palestinian households have lost more
than half their income; more than 25 per cent (33 per cent in Gaza; 22 per cent in the
West Bank) reported a loss of over 75 per cent; and 58.3 per cent have received
humanitarian assistance, mostly in food aid. The dependency ratio has burgeoned to
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more than 50 per cent. Whereas each bread winner was supporting an average of 5.1
persons in September 2000, she/he had to support 8.1 persons as of September 2002.
67. In comparison with the 128,000 workers from the occupied Palestinian
territory employed in Israel in 2001, today 32,000 have been issued permits, of
which only half can be used. In the meantime, foreign workers have filled the
positions of many Palestinians formerly working in Israel, foreclosing the prospects
of a return to former levels.
68. Recovery efforts seem remote. Most forms of aid seek to provide minimum
welfare through humanitarian assistance. An unlikely doubling of donor support to a
level of $2 billion could reduce the poverty rate only by 10 per cent,35 and that only
temporarily.
69. Production losses (manufacturing, construction, commerce, public and private
services) have drastically increased where internal trade is nearly halted, reflecting a
75 per cent contraction in domestic output, for example, in April 2002. Palestinian
enterprises have scaled down production activities, laying off employees; others
have shut down completely. Diminished access to finance capital and building
materials, and reductions in savings have forced a rapid decline in residential
construction. Closures and destruction of crops have devastated the agricultural
sector. Prior to 2002, the Israeli army had already destroyed 17 per cent of
Palestinian productive agricultural crops, leading to a drop in production.36
70. Some 44 per cent of Palestinian households have had to reduce the quantity of
their food, while 66 per cent have reduced the quality of food. Most (75 per cent)
reported the reduction of monthly expenditures on meat of all kinds and on fruits,
and 58 per cent have reduced their consumption of milk and milk products.37
71. Until recently, Israel had withheld Palestinian Authority revenues collected by
agreement under the clearance system, including customs duties and excise taxes.
By end February 2002, the loss amounted to $507 million. That, plus the declining
ability to collect tax revenues, contributed to mounting Palestinian Authority budget
deficits, leading to salary reductions and delayed liability payments,38 borrowing on
the commercial market and generally reducing expenditures on services. Through
2002, donors had contributed $40 million per month, or about half of Palestinian
Authority spending, totalling $1.1 billion by the end of the year.39 The Palestinian
Authority public debt rose sharply to $1.2 billion by mid-2002.40
72. The informal economy, especially in West Bank villages, has expanded as
impoverished households have resorted to desperate subsistence strategies. By 2002,
the protracted conflict had exhausted most coping strategies, rendering families
increasingly more dependent upon humanitarian assistance, including direct food aid
and financial assistance.41
73. More Palestinian men than women have directly undergone the physical
violence of Israel’s military occupation, such as killing, injury, imprisonment and
torture. In addition, as a result of the closures, detention and outright humiliation of
commuting to jobs through Israeli checkpoints, the overall economic depression and
resulting poverty have combined to prevent Palestinian men from performing their
traditional role as breadwinners. Meanwhile, women’s domestic roles and
responsibilities have expanded, while their socio-economic roles and position have
deteriorated. Among the consequences are the high levels of anxiety and despair that
translate into domestic and apparently gender-based violence.
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74. The socio-economic burden on Palestinian women has increased with their
assumption of the role of head of household in the absence of the husband. In acute
poverty, women have adopted coping strategies to maintain the domestic economy,
such as planting, bartering or selling foodstuffs.
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
75. Israel has occupied the Golan Heights in the Syrian Arab Republic since 1967.
76. Under such a prolonged occupation, the consequences have been extensive,
affecting all aspects of life for families, villages and communities. There has been
no change in Israeli policy regarding the occupied Golan. The number of settlers has
increased, with the 37 existing settlements expanded during the period under
review.42 Relations between the settlers and the Arab population remain tense,
particularly where settlements are located close to Syrian villages.
77. The occupation of the Syrian Golan has perpetuated the separation of families
who live on either side of the valley constituting the demarcation line. Syrian
students returning to their families in the Syrian Golan Heights reportedly face
severe interrogations and confiscation of their belongings. Others are reportedly
held in arbitrary detention for many days, facing torture and humiliation.
78. School facilities are inadequate to cover the needs of all Syrian children of
school age: among a population of 25,000 located in five villages, only 5,500 boys
and girls are in overcrowded classrooms. A rapid school drop-out rate is putting the
children in the labour market in Israel, where they receive a lower salary than others
doing the same job. There is a shortage of health centres, hospitals or clinics,
maternal care, and laboratories for basic analysis and emergency services.
79. The economic consequences of the occupation for the local population include
a lack of equal employment opportunities, heavy taxes, fixed low prices imposed on
the main agricultural products (for example, apples), arbitrary arrest and detention,
and inadequate health care. Israeli authorities have depleted the Golan environment
by uprooting trees, burning forests and allowing dumping of untreated chemical
waste from factories in the Israeli settlements.
80. Settlers compete with Syrians in economic activities, especially in agriculture,
the principal activity of the Arab population. This is compounded by the Arab
population’s restricted access to water as compared with the settlers.
Notes
1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/58/13).
2 United Nations Technical Assessment Mission, Humanitarian Plan of Action 2003 for the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (New York and Geneva, 2002).
3 A/ES-10/186. Area A designates the vicinity where the Palestinian Authority has complete
authority over civilian security.
4 B’Tselem; available from http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/imprisoned.asp.
5 In response to a letter sent by the Public Committee against Torture in Israel (PCATI), 26
November 2002; available from http://www.stoptorture.org.il/eng/press.asp?menu=7&
submenu=1&item=94.
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6 Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, “Families have their homes destroyed for the second time;
the IDF target water resources in Rafah” (press release 8/2003, 30 January 2003), available from
http://www.mezan.org/main.htm.
7 Land Research Center (Jerusalem); see http://www.lrcj.org.
8 Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights; see http://www.mezan.org/main.htm.
9 E/CN.4/2202/184, para. 15; A/57/207, paras. 32 and 69; and World Bank, Fifteen Months —
Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment (Washington, D.C., 2002),
chap. 3.
10 See Mission to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group of the Local Aid Coordination
Committee, The Impact of Israel’s Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities
(2003).
11 Ibid.
12 Yehezkel Lein, “Land grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy on the West Bank” (B’Tselem, 2000).
This is in addition to some 30 per cent of West Bank land that the Israeli army have confiscated
and closed for other purposes.
13 Shlomo Swirski, Etty Konor-Attias and Alon Etkin, Government Funding of the Israeli
Settlements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights in the 1990s of Local Governments,
Home Construction, and Road Building (Tel Aviv, Adva Center, 2002). Values based on
exchange rate of NIS 4.45 per United States dollar.
14 See Dror Zaban, Israeli Government Expenditures for Settlements, 2001-2002 (Jerusalem, Peace
Now, January 2003).
15 “Plan for five new colonies in Rimal Haloutza near the Egyptian border”, Monitoring Israeli
Colonizing Activities in the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza (Applied Research Institute
Jerusalem, 14 January 2003), available from arij.org/paleye/index.htm.
16 According to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (Gaza), for each 100 km road, some
10,000 dunums (2,500 acres) of land are confiscated. Available from http://www.pchrgaza.org/.
Path: Statistics/Settlements.
17 Ministry of Agriculture, “Report on Palestinian agriculture losses due to recent Israeli action:
September 2000-February 2002” (Ramallah, Palestinian Authority, 2002).
18 B’Tselem, “Thirsty for a solution: the water shortage in the occupied territories and its
resolution in the final status agreement”, position paper (Jerusalem, 2000).
19 United States Agency for International Development, “Report of the West Bank and Gaza
mission”, (Washington, 1999); and World Health Organization, Guidelines for Drinking Water
Quality (Geneva, 1998), available from http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/
guidelines/en.
20 Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, op. cit.
21 See B’Tselem, “Not even a drop: the water crisis in Palestinian villages without a water
network” (Jerusalem, B’Tselem, 2001).
22 The World Bank had counted 23,000 by early November 2001. See Fifteen Months — Intifada,
Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment (2002). See also Applied Research
Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ).
23 The 42,000 dunums in 1971 had already been reduced to 2,000 by 1999. See http://www.arij.org.
24 Based on findings of the Desk Study on the Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
(Nairobi, United Nations Environment Programme, 2002), available from
http://www.unep.org/Documents. Path: press releases, July 2002.
25 Ibid.
17
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26 Ibid.
27 World Health Organization, West Bank/Gaza Strip Health Update (4 April 2002).
28 Ibid.
29 Palestinian Ministry of Health.
30 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), al-Quds University and Johns Hopkins University have shown an
increase in malnourishment and anaemic children. The Bureau survey showed 9.2 per cent
moderate to severe malnutrition among children 6 to 59 months old. In the same survey, nonchildbearing
women from 15 to 49 showed moderate to acute malnutrition at 5.5 per cent. The
USAID survey showed those instances at 13.2 and 9.3 per cent respectively.
31 See Conal Urquhart, “Playground bombing injures 20 Palestinians”, The Guardian (UK), 10
April 2003. Jewish extremists from the shadowy “Revenge of the Infants” group claimed
responsibility for exploding a bomb in a West Bank school playground on 9 April 2003 at the
village of Jaba’a, south of Jenin, wounding 20 children.
32 Amira Hass, “Under the noses of the Israeli police”, Ha’aretz, 4 February 2003.
33 World Bank, Two Years of Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment
(Washington, D.C., 2003)
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), “People under
siege: Palestinian economic losses, September 2000-September 2001” (Ramallah, 2002).
37 According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
38 $527 million in arrears at June 2002.
39 World Bank, Two Years of Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment
(Washington, D.C., 2003). The Arab League contributed $840 million, and the European Union
$230 million.
40 MAS Economic Monitor, No. 6, April 2000; “Interview with Palestinian Authority Finance
Minister Salam Fayyad”, Al-Ayyam (Ramallah daily), 6 July 2002.
41 United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, “Paying the price: coping with
closure in Jericho, Gaza City and in two Palestinian villages” (Gaza, January 2002).
42 Some 77 per cent of the residents are European/North American by birth. Available from
http://www.fmep.org/images/charts/chart0007_1.jpg.
United Nations A/59/89–E/2004/21
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
7 June 2004
Original: English
04-37944 (E) 300604
*0437944*
General Assembly
Fifty-ninth session
Item 94 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2004
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General***
In its resolution 2003/59 of 24 July 2003, the Economic and Social Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth
session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 58/229 of 23 December 2003, also requested the
Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its fifty-ninth session. The annexed
report, which has been prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia (ESCWA), is submitted in response to the two resolutions. A report of
the Secretary-General on assistance to the Palestinian people is also being submitted
to the Assembly through the Council, as requested in Assembly resolution 58/113 of
17 December 2003. The annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) provides information, inter alia, on the socio-economic conditions of the
registered population in the occupied Palestinian territory.
* A/59/50 and Corr.1.
** E/2004/100.
*** A longer period for clearance was required for extensive consultations within the various United
Nations entities at Headquarters and in the field. The report annexed to the present note was
therefore delayed three weeks for processing.
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Annex
Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan*
Summary
The occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel continues to deepen the
economic and social hardship for Palestinians. The Israeli army continues to resort to
extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, household demolition, severe mobility
restrictions and closure policies.
Economic indicators continue to show negative trends: unemployment reaching
70 per cent in some areas; greater dependence on food aid; and untold losses from
physical destruction of Palestinian homes, public buildings, agricultural assets,
infrastructure and private property. Israel’s confiscation of Palestinian land and water
resources for settlements and the erection of the West Bank barrier accelerated during
2003, affecting one third of West Bank inhabitants. Refugees, women and children
bear the major brunt of these measures. Malnutrition and other health problems
afflict a growing number of Palestinians at a time of curtailed access to needed
services. Israeli restrictions regularly impede humanitarian services to the occupied
Palestinian territory.
Israeli settlements and the construction of a barrier in the occupied Palestinian
territory, contrary to the Geneva Convention and other norms of international law,
continue to fuel the conflict, having detrimental repercussions on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people.
Expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights
continues unabated. Access to natural resources and social services, in particular
schooling, higher education and medical facilities, remains inadequate for the Arab
population in the Syrian Golan Heights.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge with
appreciation the substantive contributions to the present report of the United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Human Settlements
Programme (UN-Habitat), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat
(OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization
(WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) as well as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2003/59 of 24 July 2003, the Economic and Social Council
stressed the importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of
22 October 1973, 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002,
and the principle of land for peace as well as compliance with the agreements
reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people. In the same resolution,
the Economic and Social Council reaffirmed the applicability of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949,1 to the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and
other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967; stressed the need to preserve
the territorial integrity of all of the occupied Palestinian territory and to guarantee
the freedom of movement of persons and goods in the territory, including the
removal of restrictions on travel to East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to
and from the outside world; reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinian people
and the Arab population of the Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic
resources, and called upon Israel not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion
of those resources; also reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, were
illegal and an obstacle to economic and social development; and requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, through the Council, a report
on the implementation of the resolution.
2. In its resolution 58/229 of 23 December 2003, the General Assembly
reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including land and water; and
called upon Israel, the occupying power, not to exploit, cause loss or depletion of or
endanger the natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, including
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. In the same resolution, the Assembly
noted the detrimental impact on Palestinian natural resources of the wall being
constructed by Israel inside the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem, and of its grave effect on the economic and social conditions
of the Palestinian people; recognized the right of the Palestinian people to claim
restitution as a result of any exploitation, loss or depletion of, or danger to, their
natural resources, and expressed the hope that that issue would be dealt with in the
framework of the final status negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides;
and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its fifty-ninth session
on the implementation of the resolution.
II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem
Deaths and injuries
3. Between 1 December 2002 and 31 December 2003, 785 Palestinian fatalities as
well as 5,130 injuries were recorded.2 Children bear a particular brunt of the
conflict. Since September 2000, 512 Palestinian children have been killed, and more
than 9,000 have been injured.3
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4. Israel has intensified its policy of extrajudicial killings of Palestinians
suspected of involvement in armed attacks against Israelis, which culminated in the
assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin on 22 March 2004 and of Abdelaziz Rantissi
on 17 April 2004. From October 2000 to 1 March 2004, Israeli army extrajudicial
killings/attempts resulted in the deaths of 349 Palestinians, including at least 137
bystanders, among them 35 children and 25 women.4 The Secretary-General
repeatedly expressed his apprehension that extrajudicial killings would lead to
further bloodshed and death and acts of revenge and retaliation, reiterating that these
acts were against international law and calling upon the Government of Israel
immediately to end that practice.5
5. While the purpose of the present report is to describe the effects of the Israeli
occupation on the Palestinian people, it is important to point out that, since
September 2000, 946 Israelis have been killed and injured as a result of the conflict.
The Secretary-General has condemned acts of terrorism and has called upon the
Palestinian Authority to bring to justice those who plan, facilitate and carry out
attacks on Israeli civilians.
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
6. Approximately 8,000 Palestinians remain in Israeli prisons and detention
centres,6 including 70 women and 175 juveniles as young as 12 years of age.7 Some
800 persons remain in administrative detention, without any charge or judicial
procedure.8
7. At least for the first half of 2003, “hundreds of Palestinians have been
subjected to one degree or another of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, at the hands of the GSS (General Security Service) and bodies working
on its behalf”.9 This is in addition to other forms of abuse, including harsh solitary
confinement and neglect of Palestinian prisoners’ medical needs, which has resulted
in deaths.10
8. Responding to an August 2003 High Court petition, the Israeli Government
admitted the existence of a secret military prison (Camp 1391). Prisoners, their
lawyers and their families do not know the prison’s location, and Israeli authorities
have censored the media’s publication of the prison’s location, or prisoners’ names
or conditions. The Israeli Government has banned the International Committee of
the Red Cross, Knesset members and media access to the facility. On 1 December,
the High Court ordered the Israeli Government to release information on this prison
by 20 February 2004; however, it remains secret.11
Population displacement
9. Israel transferred at least 19 Palestinians from their residence in the West Bank
to Gaza in 2003. The Israeli High Court dismissed all of their appeals.12 In
December, Israel denied entry to three Palestinians deported from abroad to the West
Bank and Gaza, returning them to the deporting country, where they currently reside
as stateless persons.13
10. Israel’s confiscation and destruction of Palestinian homes and lands swelled
the numbers of homeless and internally displaced Palestinians by 13,000-16,000
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persons in 2003,14 without their recognition as refugees eligible for international
relief and protection. This has been in addition to some 2 per cent of the Palestinian
population already forced to change their place of residence during October 2000-
May 2001 owing to Israeli house demolitions and incursions.15
Property destruction and confiscation
11. Home demolition is among the most destructive Israeli practices in socioeconomic
terms. Some 28,000 Palestinian homes remain under threat of demolition
at any moment.16 The violence accompanying these demolitions was dramatized on
16 March 2003, when an Israeli bulldozer crushed to death United States solidarity
worker Rachel Corrie while she tried to defend a Palestinian home in Gaza from
destruction.17 From 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2003, the Israeli army
demolished 511 homes in the West Bank, of which 77 were shelters of refugees
whom Israeli forces had previously dispossessed. In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army
completely or partially demolished at least 858 homes in 2003, of which 776 were
refugee shelters.18 In largely refugee neighbourhoods of Rafah, southern Gaza, Israel
has totally demolished 961 homes, leaving 9,434 people homeless.19
12. In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army bulldozed 1,107 acres of land with their
132,840 trees, and destroyed five water wells, while also demolishing houses during
2003. Cumulatively, Israeli forces have levelled 10 per cent of Gaza’s arable land.20
However, Israel conducted most 2003 confiscations in the path of the barrier in the
West Bank. From 29 September 2000 to 31 May 2003, Israeli army and settlers
uprooted hundreds of thousands of olive, citrus and other fruit trees, destroyed 806
wells and 296 agricultural warehouses, tore up 2,000 roads and blocked thousands
of others with concrete and dirt mounds.21 According to the World Bank, damage
inflicted on agriculture reached $217 million in 2003.22
13. Israeli military ordnance and equipment, as well as Israeli soldiers and settlers,
have damaged or destroyed both private and public Palestinian infrastructure.
Deterioration of equipment and infrastructure was calculated at $700 million-
$800 million towards a combined value of $1.7 billion lost at the beginning of 2003.
Calculable physical damage to the Palestinian economy from September 2002
through April 2003 stands at $370 million, cumulatively totalling $1.1 billion since
October 2000.23 This indicates sharp reductions in existing capital stock, thereby
contracting domestic supply capacities. Israel’s destruction of Palestinian-built
environment and infrastructure contrasts with its simultaneous build-up of
settlements and related infrastructure facilitating illegal population transfer.
Mobility restrictions and closure policies
14. Restricting movement of goods and persons exacerbates the humanitarian
crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory by deepening unemployment and poverty,
preventing health care, interrupting education and generally humiliating the
Palestinian people individually and collectively. Curfews in 2003 generally were
less severe than in 2002. An average of 390,000 civilians were under curfew in
November 2002-April 2003, compared with 520,000 in the second half of 2002.
However, inhabitants of Hebron, Jenin and parts of Gaza came under tighter and
more continuous curfew during 2003.24
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15. Since March 2003, the construction of 85 new checkpoints, 538 different types
of trenches and ditches, 47 road gates and blockades, and innumerable “flying”
(mobile) checkpoints has effectively dissected the entire occupied territory into
more discontiguous, isolated pockets.25
16. Between December 2002 and December 2003, the Israeli army closed the Erez
Checkpoint (Gaza) for 138 days, the Erez Industrial Zone for 15 days, and the main
commercial crossing at Karni, Gaza, for 57 days, plus 51 partial days, with the
southern Gaza checkpoint at Sufa closed for 141 days. The Israeli army completely
closed the Rafah crossing, on the Egyptian border, and closed the border to 15-35
year-old Palestinian males for 105 days. Within the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army
prevented passage on the main north-south access road at Gush Qatif settlement for
336 partial days, and entirely for two days, while fully foreclosing all traffic through
Gaza’s north-south artery at Netzarim Junction for 342 days. Israeli occupation
forces maintained the complete closure of the Gaza Airport throughout the period,
and allowed no effort towards its repair or operation.26
Israeli settlements
17. Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, deemed illegal by the
international community, continue to fuel the conflict, with detrimental
repercussions on the living conditions of the Palestinian people. In the West Bank,
Israel has more than 136 settlements with 236,000 settlers. In the Gaza Strip, 17
settlements house some 7,000 settlers. About 180,000 settlers live in occupied East
Jerusalem. Some of the settlements are now completely developed towns and
villages, as is the case for the Ariel (population 17,000), in the West Bank, and
Ma’aleh Edumim (East Jerusalem), with a population of 28,000.27
18. There is no “freeze” on the construction or growth of settlements, as the road
map of the Quartet (S/2003/529, annex) demanded. All settlement categories remain
a significant portion of Israel’s public investment28 and new building in settlements
actually increased in 2003 by 35 per cent.29 In 2003, the Israeli Government
budgeted 1.9 billion Israeli new shequalim (NIS) for settlements,30 while
construction activity inside Israel itself has fallen to its lowest level in more than a
decade.31 Moreover, settlement population growth is increasing 16 per cent under
the current government, compared with 1.8 per cent in Israel. In Gaza, Kfar Darom
grew 52 per cent, and Netzarim 24 per cent in the last three years. In the West Bank,
Tupuach increased by 50 per cent, Yitzhar by 30 per cent and Hebron settlements
grew 15 per cent.32
19. More significant than the numbers of settlers is the land area exclusively
allotted to settlements. The planning zone for Ma’aleh Edumim extends from the
Palestinian village of al-`Azariyya to the outskirts of Jericho, nearly the entire width
of the West Bank at that point. Already in 2002, the settler planning zones had
absorbed 41.9 per cent of West Bank land.33 A 400-metre-wide “sterile zone”
surrounds most of them, while bypass roads and other infrastructure linking
settlements to each other and to Israel strategically consume Palestinians’ land.34
20. The total area confiscated for settlements, or designated as military zones in
the Gaza Strip, amounts to 165.04 square kilometres (km2), or 45 per cent of the
Gaza territory, benefiting 7,000 settlers. This compares with the situation of over
1 million Palestinians eking out a living on the remaining 55 per cent of land.
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Gaza’s Palestinian population density is one of the world’s highest, and almost 100
times that of Israeli settlers.35
21. The Israeli Government’s settlement entrenchment is symbiotic with the West
Bank separation barrier, which has led to the confiscation and fragmentation of
Palestinian land. Such a policy has given rise to serious concerns about the future
possibility of establishing an independent, contiguous and viable Palestinian State.
Official Israeli perseverance manifests in generous allocation of military and
financial resources to settlements and the barrier.
22. Despite Israel’s official budget commitment to settlements, a July 2003 Israeli
poll revealed that 74 per cent of the settlers in the occupied territory would leave
their settlements in return for compensation.36
Barrier
23. The barrier is a complex of 8-metre-high walls, trenches up to 4 metres deep,
earthen and concrete mounds, double walls, fences with electronic sensors, asphalt
two-lane patrol roads, a trace strip to detect footprints and a stack of six barbed-wire
coils. The barrier also features several “depth barriers”, ancillary structures 150
metres long, placed a few kilometres further east, apparently to channel traffic flows
towards five checkpoints. In addition, 26 “agricultural checkpoints” were planned in
the first phase.37
24. With a total length — both planned and built — of 638 km,38 the barrier’s
design incorporates 975 km2 (16.6 per cent) of occupied land on the side towards
Israel. This constitutes the occupied territory inhabited by 320,000 settlers,
including those in occupied Jerusalem.39
25. Only 6 per cent of the barrier lies within 100 metres of the Green Line. It
deviates up to 22 km inside the West Bank.40 Approximately, 191,000 acres — or
about 13.5 per cent — of West Bank land (excluding East Jerusalem) will lie
between the barrier and the Green Line, according to Israeli government projections.
This will include 39,000 acres enclosed in a series of enclaves and 152,000 acres in
closed areas between the Green Line and the barrier. This land, some of the most
fertile in the West Bank, is currently the home of more than 189,000 Palestinians
living in 100 villages and towns. Of these people, 20,000 will live in closed areas —
areas between the barrier and the Green Line. Another 169,000 will live in nine
enclaves — totally surrounded by the barrier. The barrier will also affect those
people living east of it who need to have access to their farms, jobs and services.41
26. With the barrier, Israel effectively will annex most of the western aquifer
system (which provides 51 per cent of the West Bank’s water resources). It severs
communities from their land and water, leaving them without other means of
subsistence, and forcing many Palestinians living in these areas to leave, as has
already been the case with 6,000-8,000 Qalqiliya residents. Reportedly, some 600
shops and enterprises have closed in Qalqiliya as a result.42 Israeli military forces
accompanying the process have destroyed homes and commercial structures in their
course, as in the town of Nazlat Issa, to the north of Qalqiliya, where Israeli forces
demolished at least 7 homes and 125 shops to make way for the barrier wall.43 In
Aqaba village (West Bank), 12 out of its 18 structures face demolition. Israel has
destroyed many thousands of fruit and olive trees in pursuance of the construction.44
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27. To acquire land for the barrier, Israel’s West Bank Military Commander has
issued military orders, requisitioning private property. Similarly in Jerusalem, the
Ministry of Defence has issued requisitioning orders for land.45 Confiscation orders
become operative when signed, whether or not they are served to the owner. The
owner generally has one week from the signature date to appeal the requisition.
Some such orders are retroactive. However, most of the petitions to the Appeals
Committee or the High Court have been denied, although some confiscations have
been delayed and reduced under appeal46 and the High Court has urged negotiations
with affected villages regarding the route. The speed with which the occupying
Power is building the barrier, working 24 hours a day, makes any proper judicial
process difficult. The Government of Israel has announced that it will change the
route of the barrier so that it will be closer to the Green Line.
28. On 2 October, Israel’s Military Government in the occupied territory issued a
series of Military Orders determining that “no person will enter the ‘seam zone’ and
no one will remain there”. These directives affect 73 km2 and some 5,300
Palestinians living in 15 communities. Indigenous residents so far have been able to
obtain permits to remain in their homes at considerable expenditure of time and
resources, but only for incremental periods of one, three or six months. According to
the Israeli army, there are 27 gates (out of a total 46 gates) through the barrier open
to Palestinians with the correct permit, although the Palestinians claim only 19 can
be used. In some agricultural areas, crossings are open for 15-30 minutes, three
times a day, or according to Israeli soldiers’ arbitrary criteria.47
Natural resources, water and environment
29. On average, Palestinians use 70 litres of water per capita daily. Israelis in the
settlements use 350 litres (or 500 per cent of Palestinian consumption).48 Israel
extracts more than 85 per cent of its water from occupied Palestinian territory
aquifers and inequitable Israeli distribution has created a serious water shortage in
the occupied territory, despite local resources. Under the system of checkpoints and
closures, water tankers cannot always reach villages, leaving some communities
without water for days at a time.49 The situation is desperate for some 280 rural
communities in the occupied territory with no access to wells or running water, who
depend completely on municipal or private water deliveries. Under present
economic and trade dependence, Palestinian tanker services have typically
purchased water from the Israeli national water carrier at 80 per cent inflation after
September 2000,50 and 60 per cent of Palestinian families depend on tanker water,
which costs 17-40 per cent of household incomes in summer months.51
30. In the first phase of the barrier construction, Palestinians lost 29 wells with a
total annual yield of 3,880,000 cubic metres (m3).52 In Abu Nujaym (Bethlehem
area), the Israeli army severed the water delivery system by digging up and
destroying the pipelines.53 Physical damage to the occupied territory water and
waste-water sector from Israeli military actions is valued at about $140 million.54
Food
31. Occupation policies and practices have depleted Palestinians’ food
consumption by 25-30 per cent since September 2000, and Palestinians are now
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consuming less protein-rich foods.55 The main cause is job loss and curfews.56 The
occupied Palestinian territory is not currently self-sufficient in food: much of the
cereals, sugar and oils, making up 65 per cent of current dietary calories, are
imported. Some 1.4 million people (40 per cent of the population) live with food
insecurity, and another 1.1 million (30 per cent) face imminent threat of food
insecurity if present conditions continue.57 As of 2003, 13.2 per cent of children in
the Gaza Strip under age 5, and 4.3 per cent of children in the West Bank, suffered
from acute malnutrition. Chronic malnutrition now afflicts 17.5 per cent of children
in the Gaza Strip and 7.9 per cent of children in the West Bank.58
32. The United Nations and other international and non-governmental
organizations provide food aid to the Palestinians. However, food aid offers no
sustainable solution. Relief food supplies provide 80 per cent of the total dietary
energy supplies (mainly wheat flour). Domestic production is essential in
augmenting this diet.59
Housing
33. Overcrowding has resulted from the waves of population transfer. New and
expanding settlements have severely depleted Palestinian housing and housing
prospects, especially around hill-top settlements.60 With a current population of 3.3
million Palestinians in the occupied territory, and a projected total of 4.0 million by
2010, natural growth now places housing needs at 151,000 units over 2001-2010, or
roughly 15,000 units per year.61 In addition to Israel’s seizure of Palestinian habitat,
prohibitive economic conditions under closure, and current Palestinian institutional
capacity (producing under 10,000 units per year) prefigure an increased housing
deficit and still greater density. High density of housing is a source of a range of
family-level problems, from skin ailments to domestic violence.62
34. Besides destruction and confiscation of Palestinian habitat, there is the
increasingly prohibitive cost of building needed homes. Building restrictions have
depleted the potential housing supply, pushing up housing prices in time of crisis.
Closure has also inflated the cost of transportation and building materials, having
raised housing costs by 12 per cent during the first 15 months after September
2000.63
35. At the level of the Palestinian Authority, housing finance institutions do not
provide appropriate solutions for the neediest segments of the population, and the
Palestinian Housing Ministry has developed no housing policy to date. The essence
of the challenge lies in the lack of Palestinian control over land and resources.64
Public health
36. Checkpoints and curfews have lowered health standards by preventing access
to hospitals and clinics, impeding health-care programmes (for example,
vaccinations) and leading to untreated psychological trauma arising from the
physical, economic and social consequences of occupation.65 Despite constrained
capacity, budget and movement, the demand for UNRWA medical services increased
40.3 per cent in the West Bank, and 45.1 per cent in Gaza, totalling 4.4 million visits
during the period from mid-2002 to mid-2003.66 With the increase in demand, the
quality of service has declined, especially with most facilities operating with
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reduced staff and inadequate transport, water, electricity and medical supplies under
Israeli-imposed restrictions.67
37. The accessibility, affordability, availability and quality of reproductive health
have deteriorated. Anaemia afflicted 48 per cent in 2003, up from 31.5 per cent in
2002 and 23.4 per cent in 2001. The percentage of birth deliveries in hospital has
declined annually. Only 33 per cent of mothers received antenatal care, and just 19
per cent received any post-natal care last year.68 Owing to deteriorating water
quality, dysentery and intestinal parasites have increased significantly.69
38. The Palestinian birth rate in the occupied territory is estimated at 3.6 per cent,
but low birth weight cases increased by 25 per cent in 2003, and infant weight
monitoring declined by 5 per cent.70 The 36 per cent decline in the numbers of
infants immunized on schedule prefigures disease outbreaks, including cross-border
infections.71
39. The barrier is likely to further aggravate public-health conditions and services,
leaving 73.7 per cent of the people to its west without access to a health facility.
Medical personnel will be obstructed from reaching 76.4 per cent of them, and
resulting economic destitution will leave 69 per cent unable to pay for services,
including 65 per cent without any maternal care.72
Youth and education
40. In the occupied territory, 67 per cent of the population are aged 24 years or
younger. The psychological effects of the conflict on children and youth derive from
exposure to political violence, disruption of family life, loss of educational
opportunities or other productive outlets, and general decline of living conditions.
Most of the 9,000 children injured are adolescents (aged 13-18), a group more
vulnerable to aggression, rebellion, risky behaviour, helplessness, frustration,
depression and withdrawal. They manifest symptoms of sleeplessness, emotional
problems, headaches, loss of appetite and volatility, running greater risk of mental
disorder, domestic violence and self-destructive behaviour. About 75 per cent of
adults report that children are experiencing more and greater emotional problems
than one year ago.73 Hypertension is the principal psychological symptom among
student-age children, who account for a quarter of all cases.74 The long-term
consequences include the loss of confidence in adults, lack of respect for authority
institutions, acceptance of violence as a means of solving problems, and diminished
hopes or belief in a just or meaningful future.75
41. A decade of effort to improve the educational system has been lost with the
closures and mobility restrictions, affecting nearly 1 million students and over
39,000 teachers in 1,900 schools. In the West Bank, 68 per cent of students reported
obstacles to reaching their institutions in November 2002-November 2003.76 At least
498 schools closed during the 2002-2003 scholastic year, owing to movement
restrictions that confined children to their homes. Israeli forces destroyed or
damaged at least 269 schools.77
42. Palestinian students’ overall success rate dropped by 14.5 per cent in
scholastic year 2002-2003, compared with scholastic year 2001-2002.78
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Economic and social indicators
43. During 1998-2000, the occupied Palestinian territory’s economy had shown a
steady 5 per cent annual growth. However, closure and curfew in 2003 led to losses
and trade stagnation, raising unemployment and poverty.79 These conditions drove
Palestine’s economy to be heavily dependent on informal sector activity, and petty
commercial and rent-seeking services. Agriculture, forming the base of the
Palestinian economy, is still practised, but under extremely repressive conditions.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has begun
to refer to Palestine as a “war-torn economy”, because it shares the structural
factors, external constraints, fiscal constraints and private sector performance
common to other war-torn countries.80
44. Three years of economic decline have accumulated losses in the key indicators.
In real terms, the Palestinian economy has lost all the growth it achieved in the
preceding 15 years, with real gross domestic product (GDP) now below its 1986
level.81 The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Palestinian
Authority’s Ministry of Finance point to an estimated growth rate of 4.5 per cent
which, when matched with the population growth rate, indicates that per capita
income remained constant in 2003. However, as a result of mobility restrictions,
Palestinians still cannot resume normal, regular economic and trade relations, either
inside the West Bank or with Israel — a prerequisite of economic recovery.82
45. The annual unemployment rate declined in the fourth quarter of 2003 to 26 per
cent according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition, compared
with a rate of 31 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2002. However, unemployment
remained well above the pre-crisis (third quarter of 2000) level of 10 per cent. In
2003, jobs were recovered across various sectors of the economy: but according to
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data, Palestinians increasingly are selfemployed
and working at unpaid labour. They are also turning to low productivity
sectors like agriculture and commerce to find work, often creating disguised
unemployment. That more Palestinians are now employed in agriculture than in
construction, once a major source of jobs, is indicative of significant structural
change in the economy. This change has been partly due to loss of jobs in Israel,
which declined from 135,000 before the crisis to 57,000 in 2003.83
46. Israel resumed its payment of some clearance revenues owed to the Palestinian
Authority, amounting to some $130 million in January-September 2003.84 However,
the downward trend in most other indicators persisted. The political uncertainty,
Israel’s cessation of clearance revenue payments, decreasing donor disbursements,
Palestinian losses arising from the progressive construction of Israel’s West Bank
barrier, breakdown of the ceasefire, and tougher Israeli restrictions on movement
contributed to the net decline in macroeconomic indicators.85
47. By end-March 2003, household median income had plummeted to its lowest
point, decreasing by 44 per cent since October 2000.86 About 47 per cent of
households had lost more than 50 per cent of their income in the same period.
Taking into consideration the 13 per cent growth in the population and the over 46
per cent drop in real incomes since 1999, poverty is increasing, with the rate having
risen to 60 per cent, in 200287 and to 63 per cent, in mid-2003. Calculated as living
on less than $2.1 per day, this rate of absolute poverty now afflicts 2 million fooddependent
Palestinians.88
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48. Combined factors brought unprecedented economic hardship and poverty in
2003. Salaries and social services to be provided by the Palestinian Authority (49
per cent of total household wage income) were not delivered.89 Moreover, Israeli
army and settlers prevented farmers from accessing their fields to plant, tend,
harvest or market produce. Most Palestinian workers in Israel — many originating
from expelled and dispossessed communities inside the Green Line — lost their
wages owing to closure, and unemployment which had been 10 per cent in 200090
reached 70 per cent in some areas.91
49. Households cope by drastically reducing consumption and expenditures for
basic needs. Food consumption is down by 86 per cent92 and utility payments are
delayed by 60 per cent. While 63 per cent of families have resorted to informal
borrowing from friends and relatives to make ends meet, 20 per cent of families
have had to sell assets such as jewellery and other belongings as a kind of “erosive
coping strategy”, irreversibly depleting their subsistence base.93 By March 2003, 42
per cent of families were destitute and dependent upon humanitarian assistance.94
Child labour, having doubled over 2001-2002 and now at 3.1 per cent,95 forecloses
educational opportunities, reduces future productivity and depresses livelihoods
across generations.
50. The most vulnerable fall into two categories: the chronic poor (social hardship
cases) and the “new poor”. The former category typically comprises households
with a high proportion of women, elderly and children, having no savings, enduring
poor living conditions and with no stable source of income. The new poor are those
who have recently lost their homes, income, assets or livelihood and have a limited
capacity to recover. This category includes, especially, many farmers who have
experienced the destruction, confiscation or foreclosure of access to land, water,
crops, other means of production and markets by Israeli settlers and/or the military.
Gaza fisherfolk, Bedouins, and daily wage earners denied access to job markets
exemplify those belonging to this category. Those with stable incomes have to
support a greater number of persons. Dependency ratios have increased from 5.9 to
6.6 in the West Bank and to 7.5 in Gaza.96
51. The occupied Palestinian territory started 2003 with foreign investment down
by 90 per cent, from about $1.45 billion in 1999, to some $150 million in 2002.97
When the gap between actual investment and that projected in the absence of
conflict was calculated, the loss came to $3.2 billion.98 The foreign investment lost,
combined with the raw physical damage and deterioration of infrastructure, resulted
in a $1 billion (or 19 per cent in real per capita terms) decline in productive capital
stock at the beginning of 2003.99
52. Commercial banking in the occupied Palestinian territory has been relatively
new, emerging only in the past nine years with the Oslo process. On 25 February
2004, the Israeli army raided four bank branches in Ramallah, seizing cash worth
between $8.6 million and $9 million, equivalent to what Israel security sources
claimed were the holdings of “suspect accounts”. Observers recognized that these
actions “risk destabilizing the Palestinian banking system”.100
53. Under occupation, the economy of the occupied territory largely depends upon
Israel, to such an extent that 96 per cent of Palestinian exports and some 25 per cent
of labour were destined for Israel.101 With Palestinian domestic demand at about 150
per cent of GDP, the excessive leakage of economic resources indicates that
approximately 71 per cent of the overall Palestinian trade deficit lies currently with
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Israel. Of foreign borrowing by Palestine (mostly donor support funds) to finance
trade, 70 per cent goes to pay for Israeli imports. With the deficit at 45 per cent of
GDP through 2002, the current period began with 45 cents of each domestically
produced dollar channelled into the Israeli economy.102 That trend appeared to
continue; for example, the second quarter 2003 trade figures indicated a 17 per cent
increase in imports from Israel and a decrease of 3.4 per cent in exports to Israel as
compared with second quarter 2002.103
54. Most Palestinian enterprises (90 per cent) are microscale units (having less
than five employees) with limited capacity to withstand the present adversity, but
they employ 56 per cent of domestic labour. Medium-scale enterprises (20-50
employees) constitute only 1 per cent of firms.104 Employment and compensation
levels fell in all sectors, except for medium-scale firms producing food and
beverages. Their 13 per cent increase in employment and 36 per cent rise in
compensation are attributable to increased demand for local products that replaced
Israeli imports. Larger firms’ ability to withstand the crisis did not compensate for
the loss in employment across the sector. In 2003, 75 per cent of Palestinian firms
operated at one-third capacity, and 43 per cent of industrial enterprises have shut
down since September 2000.105
55. The occupation and resulting conflict have also altered the very structure of the
economy. The number of microenterprises has increased significantly (28 per cent as
of 2002), while the number of small enterprises has decreased in similar proportion.
Likewise, the numbers of medium-sized and large enterprises also have decreased
significantly (49 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively).106 Firms have tried to adjust
by decreasing working hours and productive capacity, or by using Israeli-registered
vehicles for transport; but these strategies have also increased already inflated
production costs.107
56. Israel continues to withhold clearance to revenues belonging to the Palestinian
Authority. Israel’s timely transfer of these revenues is one economic measure set out
in the Quartet’s road map. At end-2003, Israel continued to hold $299.47 million
belonging to the Palestinian Authority.108 The ministries and other assets of the
Palestinian Authority also have been targets of Israeli military strikes, impeding
public services. The damage of Israeli forces to Palestinian public infrastructure,
including the “widespread ransacking of Palestinian Authority ministry buildings
and municipal offices”, approximates $251 million.109
Status of women
57. Gender inequality and inequity typically become more pronounced under crisis
conditions. Women’s family and social roles expand, while economic hardships
mount and supportive resources shrink, or become inaccessible. The result includes
additional stress and crushing psychological burden on women.110
58. The death, imprisonment and unemployment of adult male members of the
community — approaching 80 per cent in some areas of the occupied territory —
have increased poverty and social burdens that contribute to increased domestic
violence and stress. Violence in the environment exacerbates the occurrence of
abuse at home: children’s and parents’ exposure to political violence is the strongest
predictor of violence in the family, whether between spouses, against the children or
among siblings.111
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Access to humanitarian assistance
59. The August 2002 visit of the Secretary-General’s Personal Humanitarian
Envoy was intended to secure commitments from the Israeli Government to
facilitate access to humanitarian aid. Although some improvements resulted, the
commitments are still far from being fully respected.112 Israeli forces and authorities
frequently impeded humanitarian organizations or denied their access through
checkpoints and closures, and subjected them to the “back-to-back” cargo system.
60. The obstruction of ambulances at checkpoints remains a serious problem. In
the past year, the Israeli army detained some 60 ambulances per month at
checkpoints, of which a quarter were denied passage. In March 2003 alone, Israeli
forces fired on 15 ambulances.113 In June 2003, UNRWA reported 231 instances of
excessive delay or denial of passage at checkpoints.114 UNRWA medical personnel
operated under dangerous conditions during military operations and movement
restrictions. From mid-2002 to mid-2003, UNRWA lost 7,881 health staff hours in
the West Bank alone.115 During the full closure on Gaza, from 16 to 27 April 2003,
Israeli forces denied access for the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNRWA.
Israel’s Ashdod Port and army also imposed dilatory procedures for humanitarian
and development material, exacerbating financial costs and delays for most
operations.116
61. The barrier promises to further prevent access to internationally supported
humanitarian aid and other social services, including denial of refugee access to
UNRWA-contracted health services in Jerusalem hospitals and the prevention of
pupils’ access to UNRWA schools, as in the case of the UNRWA school in Sur Bahir
(Jerusalem), lying in the barrier’s intended path.117
62. Israeli restrictions on UNRWA movement created a cumulative cost of some
$24 million from October 2000 to November 2003. During most of 2003, the Israeli
military government in the occupied territory denied permits to enter Jerusalem118 to
47 per cent of UNRWA staff.
63. Israel completely bans the movement of humanitarian goods through the main
Erez crossing into Gaza, leaving the Karni crossing as the sole transit point, where
Israeli authorities operate the back-to-back haulage system. Israel has also imposed
transport fees on humanitarian goods, costing UNRWA $260,000 annually.119 On
30 March 2004, UNRWA announced that Israeli-imposed obstructions and
unacceptable security risks, coupled with underfunding, had forced it to stop food
aid to Gaza.120 UNRWA recommenced the distribution of emergency food aid to the
some 600,000 refugees that it serves in the Gaza Strip on 21 April 2004.
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
64. Israel now maintains some 40 settlements on the Golan Heights, housing
15,700 Israelis.121
65. Israeli authorities have appropriated most of the Syrian Golan land for military
use and settlement. According to local sources, the remaining 18,000 indigenous
Syrian Arabs maintain control over only about 6 per cent of the original territory
under occupation.122
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66. In 2004, Israel’s Ministerial Committee on Settlement Affairs decided to
double the Israeli Government’s investment in the Golan, in addition to longstanding
funding from various organizations.123 In 2004, Israeli occupation forces
confiscated 354 dunums of village land, and announced the construction of 9 new
settlements, and 900 settler-housing units, and the intention of doubling Israel’s
settler population.124
67. Golan is primarily an agricultural region. However, Syrians are unable to
cultivate their land to capacity while Israel prohibits them from building needed
water infrastructure and levies heavy taxes on their water use, land and
transportation.125 Israeli forces incrementally confiscate land and uproot trees, as
attested, for example, by the March 2004 uprooting of 50 apples trees in Arab
villages by the “Israel Land Circle”.126
68. As vestiges of previous wars, landmines with no military purpose today remain
a hazard for the local population that occasionally claims life and limb.127 Of the
victims, 50 per cent have been under age 17.128 Landmines are a life-threatening
feature in 19 agriculture and grazing areas in the occupied Golan.129 Whereas
landmine clearance was a priority two years ago, other security concerns have
intervened, prolonging the risks to the Syrian population in the Golan.130 On
22 February 2003, heavy rains caused the erosion of a minefield in the town of
Majdal Shams, where landmines slid downhill to the back of houses, forcing
inhabitants to seek refuge elsewhere.131
69. As has been the case for the occupation of Palestinian territory, occupation of
the Syrian Golan has resulted in the dismemberment of families in the Golan. Young
Syrian graduates from the Golan and from Syrian universities have only limited
access to job opportunities back home. If they visit their families once a year in the
Syrian Golan during their studies, Israel refuses them re-entry.132
70. School facilities remain inadequate to cover the needs of all Syrian children of
school age. A rapidly rising school dropout rate has been responsible for the entry of
children into the labour market in Israel, where they receive a lower salary than
others doing the same job. There remains also a shortage of health centres and
services.133
IV. Conclusion
71. The present review period demonstrates mounting economic and social
damage under military occupation. Most social and economic data show marked
deterioration of living conditions for the Palestinian people, including new forms of
dispossession and destruction of private and public assets of all kinds. The
accumulated consequences have newly brought the occupied Palestinian territory to
“war-torn economy” status. Humanitarian assistance is not sufficient to ensure a
sustainable life with dignity and rights for the Palestinian civilians under
occupation. The sustainable option for addressing the current economic and social
deprivation lies in lifting the occupation of the Palestinian territory, as well as the
Syrian Golan.
Notes
1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
2 Contribution to the report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
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Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 15 February 2004.
3 Contribution to the report of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 26 March 2004.
4 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the
situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, submitted
in accordance with Commission resolution 1993/2 A (E/CN.4/2004/6), p. 11, paras. 24-25 (over
230 victims up until April 2003), updated at Palestine Monitor, available from http://www.
palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/Palestinian_intifada_fact_sheet.htm; and Palestinian Centre for
Human Rights (PCHR), “Statistics of Al Aqsa intifada: September 29, 2000-April 07, 2004”,
available from http://www.pchrgaza.org/special/statistics_intifada.htm.
5 Press release SG/SM/9210 of 22 March 2004.
6 United States Department of State (“Israel and the occupied territories”, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C., United States Department of State, 25 February
2003); sect. 1.d) places this number at 8,400.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Back to a Routine of Torture: Torture and Ill-Treatment of Palestinian Detainees during Arrest,
Detention and Interrogation, September 2001-April 2003 (Jerusalem, Public Committee against
Torture in Israel (PCATI), 2003), p. 11.
10 “Israel and the occupied territories,” ..., sect. I.a; 2.d; and sect. II.c.
11 “Israel and the occupied territories” ..., sect. 1.c; and Ha’aretz, 6 April 2004.
12 “Israel and the occupied territories” ..., sect. II.d.
13 Ibid.
14 The number displaced by the barrier construction was 6,000-8,000 (UNFPA contribution to
report, 4 February 2004); plus 6,875-8,214 from at least 1,369 house demolitions (“Statistics of
Al Aqsa intifada ...”).
15 UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004; also UNFPA, “Input to the Secretary-General’s
note” (2003), pp. 6-7, citing Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (2001) and
University of Geneva study.
16 UN-Habitat, “Housing situation and the establishment of a human settlements fund for the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories” (HSP/GC/19/2/Add.3), 17 March
2003, p. 8, table 2.
17 “Israel and the occupied territories” ..., sect. 4; BBC, 17 March 2003, available from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2856433.stm.
18 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.
19 “Statistics of Al Aqsa intifada ...”.
20 OCHA, “Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Humanitarian Appeal 2004 for the occupied
Palestinian territory”, 18 November 2003, p. 16, table: “Evolution of Israeli security measures”.
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21 See Roubina Ghattas, Nader Hrimat and Jad Isaac, Forests in Palestine (Jerusalem, Applied
Research Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ), 2004), available from http://www.arij.org/pub/Forests
per cent20in per cent20Palestine/index-1.htm#Abstract. See also Palestinian National
Information Centre (PNIC), “Palestinian economic losses due the Israeli siege, closures and
aggressions (Sept. 29, 2000 to May 31, 2003)”, available from http://www.ipc.gov.ps/ipc_e/
ipc_e-1/e_News Reports/2003/reports-012.html.
22 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months — Intifada, Closures and the Palestinian Economic Crisis:
An Assessment (Jerusalem, World Bank, May 2003), p. 46.
23 UNCTAD, “Report on UNCTAD’s assistance to the Palestinian people” (TD/B/50/4) of 28 July
2003 (hereinafter referred to as “UNCTAD report”), p. 6.
24 Dugard, loc. cit., para. 18.
25 World Food Programme contribution to report, 5 February 2004.
26 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.
27 Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), “Settlement Database”, web site at http://www.fmep.
org/database/westbank.html.
28 “New report on illegal outposts prompts calls for probe of WZO”, Forward (2 January 2004);
and Ha’aretz, 3 April 2004.
29 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics figures, in James Reynolds, “New building in Jewish
settlements on occupied land grew substantially in 2003”, BBC News (2 March 2004), available
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3526791.stm.
30 Ha’aretz, 26 December 2003.
31 Tikva Honig-Parnass, “All’s clear for full-scale war against the Palestinians”, Between the
Lines, June 2003, p. 6.
32 Israel Defense Forces Radio (30 December 2003), cited in Peace Now, Middle East Report,
vol. 5, Issue 23 (5 January 2004).
33 Yehezkel Lein with Eyal Weizman, Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank
(Jerusalem, B’Tselem, May 2002), p. 93, table 9.
34 Ha’aretz, 16 April 2004.
35 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Jean Ziegler, on the right to food: mission to the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2), para. 47 (31 October 2004).
36 Ha’aretz, 23 July 2003, on Peace Now web site: http://www.peacenow.org/PNintheN/
haaretz29.html.
37 According to Israeli military plans submitted to the Israeli High Court. Cited in Humanitarian
and Emergency Policy Group of the Local Aid Coordination Committee, “The impact of Israel’s
separation barrier on affected West Bank communities” (4 May 2003), available from
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/29F7516E5E08750385256D1D00699A70, p. 2.
38 OCHA, “Humanitarian implications of the new barrier projections”, available from http://
www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/UN/OCHA/Barrierprojections_Jan04%20_25Feb04_eng.pdf.
39 Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/13
(A/ES-10/248) of 24 November 2003, p. 3, para. 8.
40 Ibid., p. 3, para. 7.
41 OCHA, “Analysis of Humanitarian Impact”, January 2004.
42 Ziegler, loc. cit., para. 51.
43 See report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution
ES-10/13 ..., p. 6, para. 24.
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44 The Palestinian National Information Center (PNIC) reported that, between 29 September 2000
and 31 May 2003, the occupying forces uprooted hundreds of thousands of olive, citrus and
other fruit trees, cited in Ziegler, loc. cit., para. 45.
45 In Jerusalem, the legal instrument used is the Land Seizure Act in Emergency Time (1949).
46 Dugard, loc. cit., para. 9.
47 See report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution
ES-10/13 ..., p. 5, paras. 19-21; Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International
Cooperation and International Organizations, “Israeli separation wall activity since United
Nations General Assembly request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice”, 24 February 2004, p. 2; and OCHA contribution to this report, 3 June 2004.
48 B’Tselem, “Not even a drop: the water crisis in Palestinian villages without a water network”
(July 2001), p. 4.
49 OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report on the ‘Bertini Commitments’” (June 2003).
50 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months ..., p. 47.
51 Ali Sha`ar, Patrick Kelley and Eckhard Kleinau, “Environmental Health Assessment: Phase II
(USAID Village Water and Sanitation Program, West Bank)” (Washington, D.C., USAID, June
2003), cited in “Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP) ...”, p. 19.
52 ARIJ, Wall and Water in Palestine (Powerpoint presentation), available from http://www.arij.
org/pub/Water per cent20in per cent20Palestine/Wall per cent20and per cent20Water per
cent20in per cent20Palestine.zip.
53 OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report ...”.
54 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months ..., p. 46.
55 WFP contribution to report, 5 February 2004.
56 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months ..., p. 36; Riccardo Bocco and others, Palestinian Public
Perceptions on their Living Conditions (Geneva, December 2002), p. 51.
57 FAO, “Summary of the Executive Report of the Food Security Assessment West Bank and Gaza
Strip” (Rome, FAO and WFP, 2003), pp. 1 and 3.
58 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.
59 FAO, “Summary of the Executive Report ...”, p. 3.
60 Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an
adequate standard of living, Mr. Miloon Kothari: addendum: visit to the occupied Palestinian
territories (5-10 January 2002) (E/CN.4/2003/5/Add.1), 12 June 2002.
61 UN-Habitat, “Housing situation ...”, p. 4, and p. 5, table 1. Projections are based on an average
35 annual population growth, with 2.6 per cent growth projected for the West Bank and 3.75 per
cent for the Gaza Strip.
62 See World Health Organization, Health Principles of Housing (Geneva, WHO, 1989).
63 Cited in UN-Habitat, “Housing situation ...”, p. 2, para. 11.
64 Ibid., p. 3, para. 15.
65 WFP contribution to report, 5 February 2004; and Dugard, loc. cit, para. 21.
66 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.
67 Ibid.
68 UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004.
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69 UNICEF contribution to report, 26 March 2004; OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report ...”;
also Ziegler, loc. cit., para. 14.
70 UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004.
71 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.
72 PCBS and UNFPA, “The impact of the separation wall on the socio-economic conditions of
Palestinian households in the localities in which the separation wall passes through”, cited in
UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004.
73 UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004; and http://www.ecwbg.info/
BudgetGovType.asp.
74 UNICEF contribution to report, 26 March 2004.
75 Findings of PCBS, Canaan Institute and Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs, cited in UNFPA
contribution to report, 4 February 2004.
76 UNICEF contribution to report, 26 March 2004.
77 UNRWA figure. Palestinian Ministry of Education (MoE) cites 282 schools damaged by rocket
and tank shelling since the breakout of the crisis (“The effect of the Israeli occupation on
education from 28 September 2000 to 16 January 2004”, assessment 8 (Gaza, MoE, 2004), p. 3).
78 UNRWA, Department of Education West Bank, “Emergency appeal, 6 June-December 2003”,
(December 2003), table 24; cited in UNICEF contribution to report, 26 March 2004.
79 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months ..., chap. 2, p. 8, para. 2.5.
80 For elaboration of these factors, see UNCTAD report, p. 4.
81 On the basis of the UNCTAD Palestinian integrated database, estimated 2002 real GDP in 1997
US dollars was 2,514 million, and 2,390 million in 1986 (UNCTAD report, p. 4, note 6).
82 UNSCO contribution to this report, 27 February 2004.
83 Ibid.
84 Preliminary data on the Palestinian Ministry of Finance web site: http://www.mof.gov.ps/.
85 World Bank, “Closure/curfew and economic/fiscal monitoring indicators”, Report No. 11,
31 January 2004, p. 4, table: “Summary of economic indicators”.
86 UNCTAD report, p. 9.
87 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months ..., pp. xi and 31.
88 Consisting of 54 per cent in the West Bank and 84 per cent in Gaza (“Israel and the occupied
territories” ..., sect. II). The World Bank has issued the 2002 figure of 60 per cent living below
the poverty line, defined as those living on less than $2.1 per day. The 2003 figure of 63 per cent
is calculated as income of $390 per month for a six-person household (circa $2.16/day)
(Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), “Impact of the Israeli measures on the
economic conditions of Palestinian households: 5th round: April-May 2003” (Ramallah, PCBS,
2003), cited in UNCTAD report, p. 9).
89 WFP contribution to the report, 5 February 2004.
90 Including discouraged workers, the rate was 20 per cent. UNSCO contribution to present report,
27 February 2004, para. 3.
91 ILO contribution to present report, 16 February 2004, p. 1, para. 1.
92 Reflecting the March 2000-March 2003 period (PCBS, “Impact of the Israeli measures ...”,
p. 9).
93 Ibid.
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94 UNCTAD report, p. 10.
95 Institute for Palestinian Studies (IPS) and Palestine News Agency (WAFA), “Bad economy”,
(6 April 2004), available from http://www.ipc.gov.ps/ipc_e/ipc_e-1/e_News/news2004/2004_04/
038.html.
96 OCHA, “Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP) ...”, p. 17, table: “Economic indicators”, and
pp. 23-24.
97 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months ..., p. xi.
98 Ibid., p. 8.
99 Ibid., p. xi.
100 United States Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher quoted in “Israel seizes
Palestinian cash”, CBS News (25 February 2004), available from http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/02/22/world/printable601538.shtml; “Israeli raids threaten stability of Palestinian
banks: US”, Sydney Morning Herald (27 February 2004), available from http://www.smh.com.
au/articles/2004/02/26/1077676900789.html.
101 World Bank, Long-term Policy Options for the Palestinian Economy (Jerusalem, World Bank,
July 2002).
102 UNCTAD report, p. 8, para. 14.
103 World Bank, “Closure/curfew and economic/fiscal monitoring indicators”, Report No. 11, p. 12,
Economic appendix table 5a: Indicators: Palestinian imports from, and exports to, Israel
($ million).
104 PCBS, “Number of establishments and employees by employment size category in the
Palestinian Territory” (unpublished), cited in UNCTAD report, p. 11.
105 Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and International
Organizations, “Briefing on the current economic situation”, 25 February 2004.
106 UNCTAD report, p. 11.
107 Ibid., pp. 9-13.
108 Ibid., p. 9, para. 16
109 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months ..., p. 19.
110 Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), “Focus Group Study” (Jerusalem,
WCLAC, 2002), cited in UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004, p. 2, para 5.
111 Ha’aretz, 1 December 2003, cited in UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004.
112 Ziegler, loc. cit., para. 20. See also OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report”...
113 Dugard, loc. cit., para. 20.
114 One hundred eighty-six incidents of delay, 41 incidents where access was denied and 4 incidents
in which staff members were detained (OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report” ...).
115 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.; and “UNRWA suspends emergency food aid in Gaza”, (UNRWA press release
(HQG/06/2004), 1 April 2004), available from http://www.un.org/unrwa/news/releases/pr-
2004/hqg06-04.pdf.
120 Agence France Presse, 30 March 2004.
21
A/59/89
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121 FMEP, “Settlement database” ...
122 Jawlan Development Organization, “Facts and figures” (Arabic), available from http://www.
jawlan.org/golan/facts.htm.
123 Ha’aretz, 3 April 2004.
124 Ayman Abu Jabal, “Syria Asks the Security Council to Stop Assaults”, al-Safir (20 March
2004), available from http://www.jawlan.org/news/news.asp?sn=64.
125 ILO contribution to report, 16 February 2004.
126 Ibid.
127 “Mine laying in the Israel Defense Forces”, Israeli State Comptroller’s Report No. 50 A, for the
year 1999 (Jerusalem, Israel Government Printing Office, 1999).
128 Al-Ahram Weekly, 20-26 April 2000, available from http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/
2000/478/re7.htm.
129 According to al-Haq: Law in the Service of Man, cited in Landmine Monitor Report: Israel
(2003), available from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/syria.html.
130 Interview with Maavarim President Ben Steinberg and staffer Dror Schimmel, Jerusalem,
5 January 2003, in Landmine Monitor Report: Israel (2003), available from http://www.icbl.org/
lm/2003/israel.html - fn4899.
131 “Israel”, Landmine Monitor (2003), available from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/israel.html.
132 Note by the Secretary-General of 22 August 2003 transmitting the report of the Special
Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People
and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/58/311), para. 83.
133 Document A/58/75-E/2003/21, p. 15, para. 78.
United Nations A/60/65–E/2005/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
24 May 2005
Original: English
05-36585 (E) 210605
*0536585*
General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Item 41 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian
Golan over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2005
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General***
In its resolution 2004/59 of 23 July 2004, the Economic and Social Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixtieth
session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 59/251 of 22 December 2004, also requested the
Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its sixtieth session. The annexed report,
which has been prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
(ESCWA), is submitted in response to the two resolutions.
* A/60/50 and Corr.1.
** E/2005/100.
*** A longer period for clearance was required for extensive consultations within the various United
Nations entities at Headquarters and in the field. The report annexed to the present note was
therefore delayed 12 days for processing.
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Annex
Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people
in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan*
Summary
The occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel continues to deepen the
economic and social hardship for Palestinians. In response to real or perceived
attacks by Palestinian armed elements, the Israeli army continues to resort to
arbitrary detention, home demolition, severe mobility restrictions and closure
policies.
Economic indicators continue to show negative trends: high unemployment;
greater dependency on food aid; and untold losses from physical destruction of
Palestinian homes, public buildings, agricultural assets, infrastructure and private
property. That state of affairs has exacerbated poverty, rendering more than 2.2
million Palestinians poor.
Israel’s confiscation of Palestinian land and water resources for settlements and
the erection of the West Bank barrier accelerated during 2004. Refugees, women and
children bear a significant brunt of those measures. Malnutrition and other health
problems afflict a growing number of Palestinians at a time of curtailed access to
needed services. Over 60 per cent of children below 2 years of age, 36 per cent of
pregnant women, and over 43 per cent of nursing mothers in the Gaza Strip are
anaemic. An estimated 38 per cent of the Palestinian population is food insecure.
Israeli restrictions regularly impede humanitarian services to the occupied
Palestinian territory.
Israeli settlements, land confiscation and the construction of a barrier in the
occupied Palestinian territory, contrary to the Geneva Convention and other norms of
international law, isolate occupied East Jerusalem, bisect the West Bank, curtail
normal economic and social life, and continue to fuel the conflict. In 2004, the
number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip grew to 250,179, which is
a 6 per cent increase from 2003.
Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, housing an estimated
20,000 Israeli settlers, continue to expand unabated. Access to natural resources and
social services remain inadequate for the Arab population in the Syrian Golan
Heights.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge with
appreciation the substantive contributions of the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Population Fund, the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme, the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization and
the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2004/54 of 23 July 2004, the Economic and Social Council
stressed the importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions, including 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338
(1973) of 22 October 1973, 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March
2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004, and the
principle of land for peace as well as compliance with the agreements reached
between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the
representative of the Palestinian people. In the same resolution, the Economic and
Social Council reaffirmed the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,1 to the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by
Israel since 1967; stressed the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial
integrity of the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and to
guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods in the Territory, including
the removal of restrictions on going to and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of
movement to and from the outside world; reaffirmed the inalienable right of the
Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan to all their
natural and economic resources, and called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to
exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources; also reaffirmed that
Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem,
and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and an obstacle to economic and social
development; and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General
Assembly, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution.
2. In its resolution 59/251 of 22 December 2004, the General Assembly
reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including land and water; and
called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, damage, cause loss or
depletion of or endanger the natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan. In the resolution, the Assembly
recalled the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of
Justice on the “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory” (see A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1), and recalled also its resolution
ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004. The Assembly noted the detrimental impact on
Palestinian natural resources being caused by the unlawful construction of the wall
by Israel inside the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, and of its grave effect on the economic and social conditions of the
Palestinian people. The Assembly recognized the right of the Palestinian people to
claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, damage, loss or depletion of, or
endangerment of their natural resources, and expressed the hope that the issue
would be dealt with in the framework of the final status negotiations between the
Palestinian and Israeli sides. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to
submit a report to it at its sixtieth session.
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II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem
Death and injuries
3. Between 1 January and 29 December 2004, 869 Palestinian fatalities and 3,975
injuries were recorded. The cumulative total of Palestinian fatalities and injuries
since September 2000 were 3,497 and 28,321 respectively.2 Since September 2000,
70 per cent of Palestinian victims have been civilians. Apart from Palestinian
fighters killed and injured, civilian casualties are mainly caused by the Israeli
army’s disproportionate use of force.3
4. Between March and December 2004, 41 of the fatalities and 32 of the injured
were UNRWA pupils. Two of the deaths occurred while the pupils were inside their
classrooms.4 The cumulative total of Palestinian child fatalities from September
2000 through November 2004 reached 775. More than 12,000 Palestinian children
have been injured since October 2000.5
5. While the purpose of the present report is to describe the effects of the Israeli
occupation on the Palestinian people, it is important to point out that, between
September 2000 and December 2004, 1,030 Israelis have been killed and 6,964
injured as a result of the conflict. From September 2000 to September 2004, there
were 104 Israeli child fatalities.2
6. The Secretary-General has repeatedly emphasized that violence cannot provide
a solution to the conflict, and that only through negotiations can peace be achieved.
On numerous occasions, the Secretary-General had called on both parties to exercise
maximum restraint and responsibility, and reiterated his long-standing and adamant
opposition to all terrorist attacks, from whatever quarter.6
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
7. An estimated 7,600 Palestinians remain in Israeli prisons and detention
centres.7 By 6 January 2005, 848 Palestinians remained in administrative detention,
without charge or judicial procedure.8
8. As of 6 January 2005, at least 259 Palestinian children were under Israeli
detention.9 Israeli authorities have arrested some 2,500 Palestinian children since
September 2000,10 holding them for long periods and denying them contact with a
lawyer or relatives during interrogation.11 Some 30 imprisoned Palestinian children
in Israel have fallen ill and have been inadequately treated; 41.6 per cent of their
ailments directly or indirectly resulting from their incarceration.12
Property destruction
9. Home demolition is among the most destructive Israeli practices in socioeconomic
terms. Such demolitions have predominantly taken place at night, and
inhabitants receive only a few minutes’ notice to remove their possessions.13
10. Between 1 March and 21 December 2004, the Israeli army destroyed at least
630 Palestinian homes in the West Bank, of which 29 were refugee shelters.
Throughout 2004, Israeli authorities in occupied East Jerusalem destroyed 115
Palestinian residential buildings, including over 170 residential units.14 In 2004, the
Israeli army destroyed 1,443 homes, affecting about 14,481 persons in the Gaza
Strip.4 During the first nine months of 2004, the Israeli army demolished an average
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of 120 residential buildings per month in the West Bank, and 77 homes per month in
Rafah, in southern Gaza Strip.2
11. Since September 2000, the Israeli army destroyed over 2,990 shelters in the
Gaza Strip that were home to 28,500 people,4 and demolished or damaged more than
12,000 homes in the West Bank.2
12. From September 2000 to 31 January 2005, the Israeli army uprooted over
1,325,000 fruit-bearing trees.15 Those huge losses will take years to recover, as any
fruit tree requires five to seven years of steady cultivation before yielding any
income.16
13. Throughout the Gaza Strip, land levelling increased in 2004. Over 50 per cent
of the Gaza Strip’s Beit Hanoun’s agricultural land, mainly comprising of citrus fruit
and olive trees has been destroyed in the last four years. In July 2004, the Israeli
army cleared 289 hectares of land in the same area during a military operation.17
14. Israeli military ordnance, equipment and soldiers have damaged or destroyed
both private and public Palestinian infrastructure. The destruction in both Tel al-
Sultan and Brazil Camp demonstrates Israel’s use of bulldozers to tear up roads,
along with their water and sewage networks, thereby also producing a significant
public health risk in already vulnerable communities. The Israeli army destroyed
51.2 per cent of Rafah’s roads in that manner.18
15. The total cost of accumulated physical damage to housing, factories,
infrastructure and land from October 2000 to September 2004 is conservatively
estimated at $2.2 billion, or almost 19 per cent of the estimated Palestinian capital
stock. With subsequent incursions, the occupied territory’s war-torn economy has
lost about one fifth of its economic base.19
16. During its military operations in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army targeted
Palestinian factories and workshops, with the declared aim of destroying local
rocket-making capabilities. However, that has resulted in the destruction of and
severe damage to civil and private enterprises essential to the community’s
economic life. Operation “Forward Shield” exemplified that pattern, where the army
damaged or destroyed 22 industrial facilities.20
Mobility restrictions and closure policies
17. Restricting movement of goods and persons exacerbates the humanitarian
crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory by deepening unemployment and poverty,
preventing health care, interrupting education and generally humiliating the
Palestinian people individually and collectively. Restrictions on the movement of
people and goods continued in 2004 and became more severe in the Gaza Strip. The
Gaza Strip remained severed into three segments, where new pass restrictions have
especially affected isolated communities, including Siafa, al-Ma’ani and the al-
Mawasi areas (Khan Yunis and Rafah).21
18. In 2004, the Erez checkpoint in north Gaza was fully closed to Palestinians for
179 days; Erez industrial zone for 190 days, Karni checkpoint (the main commercial
crossing between Gaza and Israel) for 47 full days and 188 partial days, Netzarim
junction for 41 days and the Sofa crossing south of Gaza for 56 full days. During the
same period, the Rafah Terminal (the only border crossing between the Gaza Strip
and Egypt) was closed for 66 full days and partially closed for 182 days (from
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16 April to 21 October 2004 it was completely closed to males aged between 16 and
35). Gaza International Airport remained closed for the entire period. Within the
Gaza Strip, the Gush Qatif checkpoint, on the main north-south road, was fully
closed for 27 days and partially closed on all remaining days.4
19. The monthly average number of Gazan workers who entered Israel and Erez
industrial zone was 2,960, representing a 69 per cent decline from the 2003 monthly
average of 9,670 workers.22
20. In 2004, exports from the Gaza Strip through Karni crossing decreased by 30
per cent from the previous year. Exported truckloads fell from 934 trucks per month
in 2003 to 655 in 2004. Imported truckloads rose by 5 per cent from 3,429 per
month in 2003 to 3,589 in 2004. In March, Israel imposed new restrictions on the
volume of goods passing through Karni crossing by reducing the height of goods
placed on the conveyor belt at the security check from 1.7 metres to 70 centimetres.
That has significantly slowed the passage of goods through the crossing.22
21. In the West Bank, over 700 physical obstacles, including checkpoints, military
observation towers, concrete blocks, road gates and earth mounds, obstruct internal
movement. At the beginning of 2004, the Israeli army announced that it would ease
the West Bank closure regime. Subsequently, about 50 roadblocks were removed,
making vehicular movement between districts easier in the northern and southern
West Bank, but erratically constructed “flying checkpoints”, were still used.22
22. Curfews continue to be imposed on West Bank cities. Between 18 June 2002
and 6 March 2005, Hebron came under 5,828 hours (243 days) of curfew, while
Nablus and Jenin came under 4,808 hours (200 days) and 3,766 hours (157 days) of
curfew, respectively.23
Israeli settlements
23. Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, deemed illegal by the
international community, continue to exacerbate the conflict, with detrimental
repercussions on the living conditions of the Palestinian people.
24. The number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip increased by
6 per cent, growing from 236,381 in 2003 to 250,179 in 2004.24 Israeli settlers in
occupied East Jerusalem total about 180,000. In the Gaza Strip, 17 Israeli
settlements house 8,693 settlers, representing an 11 per cent increase from 2003.24
25. In 2004, Israel established two new settlements in the occupied East Jerusalem
area: Kidmat Zion (400 units) and Nof Zahav (550 units). Thereafter, in June 2004,
the Israeli Government revealed plans for Givat Yael, west of Bayt Jala (West
Bank), entailing the confiscation of 411 hectares of Palestinian land. That new
settlement is planned to accommodate 55,000 settlers in 13,500 housing units.25 The
World Zionist Organization is also supporting new settlement construction in the
Jordan Valley.26
26. The Israeli Ministry of Housing and Construction revived the 4,000-unit “E–1”
expansion plan in 2004, which links Ma’ale Adumim with other Jerusalem-area
settlements, bisecting the West Bank. Intensive road construction is already under
way in that area. Israel’s Finance Ministry has allocated $4.4 million for the
project.27 In late August, the Israeli Lands Authority approved another 767 units for
Jerusalem-area settlements.28 In January 2005, Israeli authorities approved 3,500
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housing units in the area between Ma’aleh Adumim and Jerusalem. The construction
of those units aims to reinforce Israel’s hold on settlement blocs, “filling in” the
closed areas between the Green Line and the barrier.29
27. The four West Bank settlements included in Israel’s “disengagement plan” also
grew in 2004. The residents of Sa-Nur nearly tripled.30 The larger West Bank
settlements also increased in population: Modi’in Ilit by 14 per cent, totalling
27,301; Ma’aleh Adumim by 6 per cent, adding 1,800 newcomers to total 28,546.
28. Two settlements are expanding around Alfei Manashe: Nof Sharon, implanting
50 settler houses on Palestinian lands near Habla village; and Givat Tal, with 400
new units. Extensive construction since mid-2004 is nearly doubling the size of
Alfei Manashe itself.25
29. The Ari’el settlement already has expanded westward with 2,000 new housing
units. In May 2004, Israel’s Attorney General granted the Housing and Construction
Ministry permission to resume funding for settlement construction. In August, the
same ministry published tenders for building 1,001 new units in the West Bank, plus
600 housing units that were approved for Ma’ale Adumim.28 The Israeli Lands
Administration marketed 1,783 new housing units in the West Bank in 2004,
announcing plans for 2005 to support the construction of over 6,391 new settler
homes and retroactively approved 120 settler outposts.31 The latter decision was
modified on 13 March 2005 when the Israeli cabinet decided to set up a committee
to dismantle 24 of the outposts following the findings of the Sasson report.32
30. In the Gaza Strip, land-seizure orders increased throughout 2004, where at
least 350 settlement development projects awaited approval. On 26 July 2004, the
Gaza Regional Council won approval for 26 residential buildings in Gush Katif and
new schoolrooms for Kfar Darom, Netzarim and Neve Dekalim.33
31. In August 2004, the Israeli Government announced exceptional financial
incentives to Israeli settlers in the West Bank.34 It also announced new incentives for
Gaza Strip settlers redeploying to the West Bank, as well as a $30,000 bonus for
settlers moving to the Negev or the Galilee.35 Settlements in the Gaza Strip should
be evacuated over a period of 12 weeks beginning mid-August 2005 as part of the
$680 million disengagement procedure.36
Barrier
32. General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 acknowledged the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that the construction of the
barrier in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
is contrary to international law. Nevertheless, Israel continues to construct the
barrier in the West Bank. The barrier is approximately 209 kilometres long, with
some 105 kilometres actively under construction,37 and forms a complex of fences,
ditches, razor wire, groomed trace sands, electronic monitoring system and patrol
roads. A total of 22 kilometres consist of an average width of 60 metres, with 8- to
9-metre-high concrete slabs, forming a wall (mostly in urban areas such as in
occupied Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Qalqiliya, and Tulkarm).38
33. Based on the map of the planned route of the barrier that the Government of
Israel published on 20 February 2005, the barrier includes sections around the
Ma’ale Adumim and Ari’el/Emmanuel settlements that constitute 108 kilometres, or
16 per cent of the whole barrier route. If the aforementioned sections are to be
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included, the barrier’s ultimate length will be 670 kilometres, which equals about
twice that of the Green Line. Accordingly, 57,726 hectares, or 10.1 per cent of the
West Bank land, including East Jerusalem, will lie between the barrier and the
Green Line.37
34. The damage caused by the destruction of land and property for the barrier
construction is long lasting and undermines Palestinians’ ability to recover should a
political situation allow it. In that regard, and as requested by the General Assembly
in resolution ES-10/15, the Secretary-General intends to establish a register of
barrier-related damages, which is expected to begin later in 2005. Some 1,323
hectares of land have recently been cleared or damaged owing to the construction of
the barrier.2 It is estimated that once the construction of the barrier is complete,
access to 8,500 hectares of olive trees (approximately one million trees) will be
either impossible or severely restricted.21 Among other consequences resulting from
the construction of the barrier are the following:
• Confiscation of land, particularly for those living east of the barrier, where
agricultural land comprises the major source of income for its inhabitants
• Seizure, destruction and isolation of water sources
• Loss of and defaults on investments, which will have longer-term financial
consequences
• Environmental degradation affecting flora, fauna and geology of Palestinian
habitat
• Negative impact on social relations and family ties due to movement
restrictions39
• Sharp decline in commercial activity (including loss of access to the Arab-
Israeli market), employment and economic viability, especially along the
barrier route itself
• Emergence of additional categories of “new poor”, especially among farmers
and farm labourers
• Greater dependency upon labour and commercial markets in Israel for those
living in the “closed” areas.
35. Excluding the population of occupied East Jerusalem, the barrier is expected
directly to affect 49,400 Palestinians living in 38 villages and towns. More than
500,000 Palestinians live within a 1-kilometre strip of the barrier, including
occupied East Jerusalem. The planned Ma’ale Adumim section will cut 14 km east
across the West Bank, or 45 per cent of its width. That would restrict movement for
Palestinians between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank, as well as
for those residing in and around occupied East Jerusalem.40
36. The area between the barrier and the Green Line, excluding occupied East
Jerusalem, will include 56 Israeli settlements with approximately 170,123 Israeli
settlers, which is an estimated 76 per cent of the West Bank settler population.37
37. In February 2005, 63 gates in the constructed barrier were observed, of which
only 25 were accessible to Palestinians with the correct permits.37 However, the
permit system severely limits passage for Palestinians and has proven inadequate to
ensure normal daily life.41
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38. Palestinians residing in “closed areas” between the Green Line and the barrier
face an uncertain future in terms of both their personal and lands’ status.
Approximately 5,000 Palestinian residents in Jenin, Qalqilya and Tulkarm districts
are required to apply for permits to remain living in their homes.21
39. The barrier will further restrict farmers living outside “closed areas” between
the Green Line and the barrier from getting to their land located in those areas.
Medical staff, business people and international humanitarian organizations also
have to apply for special permits. If the military orders that restrict entry into
“closed areas” are to be applied to new parts of the barrier, then many thousands of
Palestinians are likely to face difficulty continuing to live in their homes or access
their land.21
40. By most estimates, approximately 220,000 persons in 60 communities are
being affected in the completed first phase of the barrier in the Qalqilya, Tulkarm
and western Jenin areas, of whom as many as 40 per cent are refugees. Outside of
Tulkarm and Qalqilya towns, these communities have not figured prominently on
UNRWA’s agenda to date because the area was relatively well-off before September
2000. Land-owning refugees were the least in need of assistance, and with few
facilities in the area, they were not strongly relying on UNRWA health and
education services. However, it is possible that a “new poor” category will emerge,
particularly among landless labourers. Outside of the “Jerusalem Envelope”,
approximately 120 such communities will be affected in the Salfit, Ramallah,
Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron areas. UNRWA has projected that the
disadvantaged socio-economic conditions of refugees, as compared to the nonrefugee
population, will make them particularly vulnerable to further declines in
their living standards.4
41. Problems of access to educational and health services are part of the
detrimental impact of the barrier on refugee livelihoods. This is particularly relevant
to UNRWA operations in the Jerusalem surroundings, given the high number of
UNRWA installations (schools and health centres) in the area. The UNRWA
Jerusalem Health Centre epitomizes difficulties in refugees’ access to Agency
services. Whereas about 10,000 visits per month were completed between August
and October 2003, mostly of patients coming from outside town, visits have dropped
considerably by more than half in July 2004. In January 2005, this number
continued to drop, falling to 4,112 visits, with a marked decrease in visits from
patients with non-communicable diseases and registering infants for vaccinations.
Furthermore, over 6,600 refugees in three UNRWA-conventioned Jerusalem
hospitals had received secondary health care in 2003. Most such patients will no
longer be able to access the city when the barrier is completed.4
Natural resources, water and environment
42. Mekorot, the Israeli public corporation that supplies about 80 per cent of
Israel’s water,42 has consolidated control over most surface and underground water
in the occupied Palestinian territory since 1967.43 Palestinians under Israeli
occupation are increasingly growing dependent on water purchased from Mekorot,
especially in areas affected by the barrier and other land confiscations, as in the case
of the town of Nabi Elyas, where Israeli authorities refuse to connect a well to the
local network.44
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43. Palestinian water networks in the occupied Palestinian territory sustained
significant damage due to the Israeli army’s military activities. In the Gaza Strip,
Bayt Hanun sustained damage to water infrastructure worth $250,000,45 while 120
private rooftop water tanks and 17 private water wells used for drinking water and
irrigation were also destroyed.46 In Rafah, the Israeli army destroyed 17 out of 30
kilometres of water pipes, and 15 out of 20 kilometres of sewage pipes, valued at
$713,900.47 The consequent mixing of water and sewerage has spawned waterborne
diseases. Some 70 per cent of common illnesses in the area stem from water
pollution,48 and traces of polio have been detected in the Gaza Strip water supply.49
44. The Israeli army has buried rubble in sites risking pollution, especially in sand
dune areas, which are natural infiltration for the Gaza aquifer.50
45. Poor and deteriorated waste disposal infrastructure also threatens
environmental health. Hebron’s raw sewage flows cause both immediate health
problems and potential long-term contamination of the western aquifer.51 In Salfit,
liquid, gas, and solid wastes left by the 17 settlements in the district are causing
pollution to the environment, agriculture and water. Industrial waste is often
discharged into Palestinian land without treatment. Untreated wastewater may
contain many pollutants, especially heavy metals, which increase the risk of
intoxication and epidemics such as hepatitis A or infectious diarrhoea.52
Public health
46. The destruction of water and sanitation infrastructure has resulted in decreased
average per capita availability of water, as well as in contaminated drinking water
causing increased gastrointestinal infections, especially among children.53
47. Power and water cuts during prolonged curfews, which curtail access to clean
water, have increased the number of diarrhoea cases. Overcrowding in schools
during incursions in Rafah led to an outbreak of chickenpox among young
children.53 A severe outbreak of mumps afflicted Nablus-area camps and villages
from autumn 2003 until August 2004, affecting 2,190 children, 73 per cent of whom
had previously been vaccinated.4
48. UNRWA is also seeing an epidemiological shift characterized by increased
incidences of non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular
diseases and cancers, which place an additional burden on UNRWA’s scarce human
and financial resources.4 Moreover, 45.3 per cent of households have had difficulty
accessing health services for financial reasons, 40.1 per cent owing to Israeli
closures, 38.3 per cent because of military checkpoints, and 8.9 per cent because of
the barrier.54 In barrier-affected areas, 73.7 per cent of Palestinians living in “closed
areas” reported difficulty accessing health facilities and services.55 Over the last
four years, access to physical therapy services for the 322,000 residents in the Gaza
Strip’s middle area has become nearly impossible.56
49. There has been a decrease in immunization coverage in some pocket areas of
the occupied Palestinian territory, while less than two thirds of children vaccinated
against measles have acquired immunity.53 Israeli restrictions on Palestinian
Ministry of Health vehicles and staff have limited outreach services, i.e.,
immunization in remote areas is now being provided only on an exceptional basis
with United Nations logistical and material support.57
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50. One per thousand birth deliveries of women in the occupied Palestinian
territory took place at Israeli checkpoints and 4.1 per cent of deliveries were at
home. Since September 2000, nearly 70 births at Israeli military checkpoints have
resulted in the death of mother and/or child. Even when the maternal and infant
outcomes are positive, the resulting humiliation and trauma inflicted on women in
distress during labour have potentially longer-term psychological consequences.4
51. Increasing psychological distress among the population is reflected in the
growing number of patients seeking care for mental health problems.53
52. The nutritional status of the population has deteriorated. About 15 per cent of
children suffer goitre or present signs of iodine deficiency, thus exposing a large
number of children to mental retardation.57 Seventy per cent of children have
vitamin A deficiencies or are “borderline” cases.57 Stunting (low height for age)
reached 9.0 per cent and wasting (low weight for height) 2.5 per cent among
Palestinian children due to poor nutrition.58
53. Food insecurity also has affected women’s and children’s health adversely.
Preliminary results of a study conducted by UNRWA revealed that over 60 per cent
of children below 2 years of age, 36 per cent of pregnant women, and over 43 per
cent of nursing mothers in the Gaza Strip are anaemic.4
Food
54. Overall food consumption of Palestinian households has fallen by 25 to 30 per
cent since September 2000.2 Approximately 1.3 million people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, or 38 per cent of the population, are food insecure, while a
further 26 per cent of the population is at risk of becoming food insecure.59 A
quarter of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip are unable to feed themselves
adequately, even with food aid.55 Sixteen per cent of the Palestinian population is
affected by subsistence poverty; with monthly consumption of less than $48, they
cannot afford to consume the minimum caloric intake as established by FAO and
WHO.60
55. The coping strategies adopted by the most vulnerable and affected groups of
the population, including the chronic poor and the “new poor”, have been exhausted
and become unsustainable. Palestinian households have resorted to purchasing food
through credit with shopkeepers and neighbours, forgoing payment of utilities, and
selling assets. Others cope through receiving assistance from relatives. In some
instances, Palestinians have used extreme coping mechanisms such as withdrawing
children from schools.59
Youth and education
56. Children are the most affected by the conflict, showing critical signs of
distress. Thirty-six per cent of parents reported aggressive behaviour among their
children, 31 per cent noticed low achievement in school, 25 per cent reported that
their children are bedwetting, and 28 per cent reported regular nightmares. All four
signs of distress are most prevalent in refugee camps and among poorer households
in the Gaza Strip.57
57. Family life and health is being threatened in far-reaching ways. There is
growing evidence that chronic anxiety, low self-esteem and feeling a loss of control
have overcome the population in the occupied Palestinian territory, negatively
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affecting family relationships and life: 30.8 per cent of children are reported to have
been exposed to some type of violence, 68 per cent had experienced physical and/or
verbal violence in the home environment and 30 per cent coming from teachers.
Given the implications for later adult behaviour by people who were abused as
children, these findings could bode ill for future family and social stability.61
58. According to a study of Palestinian public perceptions of their living
conditions, 54 per cent of economic hardship-case households, compared to 23 per
cent above the poverty line, were reported to be experiencing chronic low school
achievement among their children.61
59. Owing to ongoing closures and curfews, more than 226,000 children in 580
schools find attending school impossible, irregular or very risky. In the West Bank
and Gaza 272 UNRWA schools were closed for a collective total of 391 school days
in the 2003/04 academic year. Teachers lost over 56,000 teaching days. The
disruptions in schooling in the West Bank in three consecutive academic years have
led to a further deterioration in students’ achievement. In UNRWA schools, exam
pass rates declined dramatically between 2000/01 and 2003/04. The mathematics
pass rate for sixth grade dropped from 68.7 per cent to 33.6 per cent, while the
science pass rate for fourth grade dropped from 71.5 per cent to 38 per cent.
Movement restrictions also affect quality of learning, since education authorities are
pressured to recruit teachers who live close to schools rather than those who are best
qualified for the teaching posts.62
60. During the past three years, Palestinian universities have lost an estimated
$4.85 million worth of infrastructure, teaching and learning facilities, equipment
and library books. The overall university dropout rate has increased by 7 per cent in
2004 because families were unable to afford university fees.2
Economic indicators
61. Geographic fragmentation, including the isolation of occupied East Jerusalem,
has separated economic actors from each other, and deteriorated the economic status
of Palestinians and the general economy of the occupied Palestinian territory. Land
scarcity (where 40 per cent of the population living in the Gaza Strip live on 6 per
cent of the land), a high population growth rate of at least 3.4 per cent and a young
population (of which 45.8 per cent are under 15 years old) pose further challenges to
social and economic development efforts.63
62. Israeli movement restrictions continue to play a major role in the ongoing
socio-economic deterioration in the occupied Palestinian territory. World Bank
estimates for the overall economic performance show that in 2004, Palestinian gross
domestic product (GDP) was lower by 20 per cent compared to 1999 while GDP per
capita was lower by 37 per cent. In dollar terms, GDP estimates dropped from $4.1
billion in 1999 to $3.3 billion in 2004, while GDP per capita fell from $1,493 to
$934 over the same period.64 According to the World Bank, this contraction in the
economy has continued despite unprecedented per capita levels of international aid
disbursed to the occupied Palestinian territory in the past four years.65
63. The labour market is still in crisis. Despite a period of employment growth in
2003, the number of unemployed remained three times higher in the third quarter of
2004 than in September 2000. According to the data of the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics, the number of Palestinians employed in Israel and Israeli
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settlements has declined by 97,000 since late 2000.66 Taking into account
discouraged workers who have given up looking for work,67 the adjusted
unemployment rate in the third quarter of 2004 stood at 32.6 per cent, which is a
3 per cent rise compared to the third quarter of the previous year.68 About one in
three employed persons works for the Palestinian Authority, UNRWA or nongovernmental
organizations.69
64. Rural communities have adapted to making a living by engaging in agriculture
and trade activities close to home.70 However, this is limited to short-term coping
and cannot recuperate economic conditions prior to September 2000. Agriculture is
largely for subsistence, and trade activity will not be sustained if local customers
lose their outside incomes or if access to urban centres fails to improve. The shift
from waged labour to informal, unpaid family labour and self-employment provides
poor-quality work and does not contribute to stabilization or expansion of
employment.22
65. The fragmentation of economic life has taken its toll on the Palestinian
population. Every working individual supports 6.4 non-employed persons.
Furthermore, poor households amounted to 58.1 per cent in the occupied Palestinian
territory. There are more than 2.2 million poor Palestinians; approximately 1.27
million in the West Bank and 945,000 in the Gaza Strip.2
66. After plummeting in the first two years of the intifada as a result of depleted
private savings and political instability,71 private investment grew by 5 per cent in
2003 owing to economic stabilization observed towards the end of 2002.72 This
moderate recovery was again stalled in 2004.73
67. Reliance on Israel has not stopped despite strict movement restrictions and the
completion of the barrier in the northern West Bank. On the contrary, the West Bank
rural economy continues to depend on Israel for access to export and labour markets
albeit at a reduced level.74 In January 2004, the ratio of imports to exports through
Karni crossing was 3:1. By June 2004 it rose to 12:1, significantly increasing in the
transfer of income from the Gaza Strip to Israel.21
68. The Palestinian loss of agricultural outputs due to land confiscations and
access impediments reached $320 million.75 With 45 per cent of Palestinian
agricultural land (89,826 hectares) cultivated with olive trees, Israeli closures and
Israeli settler harassment of olive harvesting and transport cost untold millions in
harvest and product sales.76
69. Of the estimated 1.3 million people living in the Gaza Strip, an estimated
40,000 live from fishing. The Israeli authorities have hampered the Gaza fishing
industry by closing 40 per cent of Gaza’s coastline to its fishermen, and restricting
fishing to six nautical miles of the coast, despite the 20-mile limit set out in the Oslo
Accords.21 As a result, most of the fishermen have seen their incomes drop by 70
per cent. Over-fishing also has resulted from coping strategies, as Palestinians
resorted to exploiting the sea after losing jobs in Israel.77
70. The Israeli planned route for the barrier effectively removes Rachel’s Tomb
and the surrounding neighbourhood from Bethlehem into Jerusalem’s expanded
boundaries. This has spelled the demise of once thriving Palestinian commercial and
tourism areas. In addition, intense closure, barrier construction and consequent
depression in tourism and the general economy, has prompted 9.3 per cent of
Bethlehem’s Christian community to emigrate in the last four years.78
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Status of women
71. Female-headed households display an incidence of poverty 1.3 times higher
than households headed by men. Community and family disapproval of women’s
work in the absence of male breadwinners is a major obstacle to women seeking
wage employment.79
72. In spite of high-level educational attainment, women remained marginalized in
the labour market. The generally positive correlation between female education and
labour force participation was not applicable to the occupied Palestinian territory.
Those factors, coupled with the large numbers of male Palestinian prisoners, the
high number of persons killed in conflict and the destruction of homes, placed
increased pressure on the care economy, and specifically on women, the primary
providers of care.80
Access to humanitarian assistance
73. UNRWA incurred approximately $31 million in losses and additional costs
between October 2000 and September 2004 in the occupied Palestinian territory as a
result of Israeli measures, including restrictions on the movement of people and
goods, which were imposed on the grounds of security.
74. UNRWA incurred over $500,000 in extra costs owing to the relocation of
international staff to Jerusalem and Amman from August to December 2004. In the
Gaza Strip, UNRWA was forced to suspend food distribution twice in 2004 owing to
heightened security measures, affecting approximately two thirds of the refugee
population.4
75. Damage to UNRWA facilities in the occupied Palestinian territory caused by
the Israeli army in 2004 amounted to approximately $141,000. Facilities that have
been damaged include schools, clinics, and food distribution centres.4
76. The number of Jerusalem entry permits issued by the Israeli authorities to
UNRWA staff members has decreased. At the end of 2004, 262 of 478 employees, or
55 per cent of employees, held valid entry permits compared to 83 per cent at the
end of 2003. Moreover, 93 staff members continue to be denied permits for
“security” reasons. The short validity of permits, which are valid only for either one
or three months, combined with delays in reissuing valid permits, resulted in serious
disruptions to Agency operations.4 The total cost of lost working hours in the Gaza
Strip in 2004 was $1.83 million.4
77. The Israeli authorities banned the movement of humanitarian goods from
Israel into Gaza through Erez crossing. Karni crossing was then designated the sole
crossing point for humanitarian goods coming into the Gaza Strip. The Israeliimposed
“back-to-back” haulage system on vehicles transporting goods impedes the
delivery of humanitarian assistance. Costs have increased considerably following a
suicide attack at Ashdod port in mid-March 2004. Additional costs to UNRWA due
to port operations and Karni crossing fees, for the period between October 2000 and
the end of December 2004 alone, are almost $8 million.4
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III. Occupied Syrian Golan
78. There are currently about 20,000 Israeli settlers in 44 settlements in the
occupied Syrian Golan. Following a decision by the Israeli authorities, this
population is expected to increase by 15,000 over the next three years. Israeli
authorities already have authorized nine new settlements and the expansion of
existing ones, requiring the expropriation of 35 hectares of land and the uprooting of
1,800 apple and cherry trees in Mas’adah village, which has been declared a
military zone.81
79. The Israeli Mekorot company pumps 400-500 million cubic metres of water
annually from the occupied Golan, supplying Israeli water networks to the south and
serving local settlers with seven times more water than that allocated to Syrian
citizens.82 Discrimination against the Arab population continues in the form of taxes
at higher rates than Israeli settlers on water use, television licences, housing, income
and property, health insurance, local council and national insurance taxes and valueadded
taxes. Israel also taxes the harvests of Syrian farmers.83
80. The Israeli authorities have continued to lay anti-personnel landmines on 100
hectares of land along the Golan border strip, banning farmers from cultivating their
lands, and uprooting trees.84
81. The occupied Syrian villages do not have hospitals and suffer from a chronic
shortage of health centres and clinics, particularly affecting women and children.85
Syrian Arabs have to pay for all health services, including primary health care,
which was free of charge prior to the occupation.85
82. Israeli authorities continued to impose the Hebrew-language requirements on
Syrian pupils and teach exclusively Jewish history and Hebrew literature.86
83. Israel is the only market accessible to Syrian Arab farmers, and the closure of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip has eliminated 30 per cent of the consumer market for
their produce.87 Apple production declined from 25,000 tons in 2002, to 15,000 tons
in 2003, with a reduction of cultivated land from 5,000 to 2,000 hectares. Land
appropriation and institutional discrimination, including prohibiting Syrian Arabs
from digging wells or collecting snow for irrigation, are forcing Syrian farmers to
abandon their livelihoods.83
84. Syrian workers in the occupied Syrian Golan continue to suffer from
unemployment and job insecurity. Those in temporary work are under constant
threat of dismissal. Governmental and public institutions hire Israeli settlers
exclusively and reject employment of Syrian citizens on the pretext of Hebrew
language criteria or for security reasons.88
85. Students visiting their families in the occupied Syrian Golan during holidays
endured weekly police interrogations.85 Israeli authorities have raided Syrian Arab
homes at night and arrested young people on charges of resisting the occupation by
writing slogans, organizing demonstrations, commemorating national events or
distributing publications. In 2004, Israel arrested 19 Syrian Arabs, holding them
under poor conditions in distant Israeli prisons.89 Five were sentenced to 27 years of
imprisonment, and one to 15 years.90
86. At least 11 Syrian Arabs remain in Israeli prisons for resisting the
occupation.91 Their visitors cannot have direct contact with them, and when visiting
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their relatives in prison, Syrian Arab women undergo invasive personal searches
and/or are made to stand for long hours before being allowed in the prison.85
87. Israel has reportedly buried nuclear waste in insecure containers close to the
Syrian border in the Golan, leading to fears of depleted uranium leakage and future
ecological catastrophe. To date, Israel has refused to comply with relevant
international conventions or allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to
monitor its nuclear reactors or waste-storage sites.92
IV. Conclusion
88. Investment in the occupied Palestinian territory is projected to remain flat
according to the World Bank’s recently developed “status quo scenario”, which
assumes no significant change in closures, the completion of the barrier, continuing
decline in the number of workers in Israel and a reduction of donor assistance. Thus,
unemployment would increase to 37 per cent by 2008 as the domestic economy
cannot replace jobs lost in Israel and the growing labour force. Real GDP and GDI
(gross domestic income) per capita would decline by a further 17 per cent and 20
per cent, respectively, by 2008, with poverty afflicting 62 per cent of the
population.93 The World Bank has estimated that even a further increase of
international assistance to the occupied Palestinian territory would do little to arrest
the current process of overall economic decline.94
89. The deterioration in the economic situation, poverty, a worsening health and
nutritional status of women and children, difficult access to health services and
educational facilities will render the attainment of the Millennium Development
Goals by 2015 extremely difficult.
90. The sustainable option for creating better conditions to address the current
economic and social deprivation, as well as to ensure a life of dignity and rights for
the Palestinian and Syrian civilians under occupation, lies in ending the occupation
of the Palestinian territory, as well as the Syrian Golan. This highlights the urgent
need to accelerate the peace process to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting
solution to the Middle East problem.
Notes
1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
2 OCHA, Humanitarian Information Fact Sheet, January 2005.
3 Razing Rafah: Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza Strip (New York, Human Rights Watch,
October 2004), p. 76.
4 UNRWA contribution to report, 3 March 2005.
5 Idem, December 2004; citing DCI-PS November, 2004, B’Tselem sources.
6 SG/SM/9857, 5 May 2005; SG/SM/9569, 1 November 2004 and SG/SM/9571,
1 November 2004.
7 Palestinian National Information Center, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/
VBOL-6A4KEC?Open Document&rc=3&emid=ACOS-635PFR.
8 http://www.btselem.org/english/Administrative_Detention/Statistics.asp.
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9 http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Minors_in_IDF_Detention.asp.
10 UNICEF contribution to report, December 2004.
11 Report of the Palestinian Ministry of Prison Affairs, as reported in “300 Palestinian Children in Israeli
Prisons”, WAFA (7 November 2004), http://english.wafa.ps/body.asp?field=tech_news&id=1839.
12 Instead of receiving the proper medical treatment, these children are prescribed paracetamol for
every disease. Report of the Palestinian Ministry of Prison Affairs, as reported in “300
Palestinian Children in Israeli Prisons”, WAFA (7 November 2004), http://english.wafa.ps/
body.asp?field=tech_news&id=1839.
13 Through No Fault of Their Own: Punitive House Demolitions during the al-Aqsa Intifada
(Jerusalem, B’Tselem, November 2004), p. 15.
14 OCHA, Humanitarian Update — December 2004, p. 4, according to the Jerusalem Center for
Social and Economic Rights.
15 Palestinian National Information Center, http://www.pnic.gov.ps/arabic/quds/arabic/viol/
quds_viol_01-2005.html.
16 “Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories”, note by the Secretary-
General, A/59/381, 23 September 2004, p. 18.
17 OCHA contribution to report, 3 March 2005.
18 Including claims that such destruction clears the path of improvised explosive devices; however,
the army has used rear-mounted “rippers” that afforded no frontal protection for the bulldozers
or their drivers. Tearing up paved roads also creates loose debris that could facilitate the
concealment of explosives and booby-traps. Razing Rafah: Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza
Strip, p. 11, 93 (Rafah Municipality Assessment, 9 June 2004).
19 UNCTAD, “UNCTAD Report on Palestinian Economy Calls for Intensified Donor
Commitment to Development”, 29 September 2004, at http://www.unctad.org/palestine and
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/16a51bf9fefed2d28
5256f1f004cf535!OpenDocument.
20 OCHA, “Preliminary Humanitarian Situation Report: Operation ‘Forward Shield’”
(August 2004).
21 OCHA contribution to report, 21 December 2004.
22 UNSCO contribution to report, 23 December 2004.
23 Palestinian Red Crescent Society, http://www.palestinercs.org/
Presentation%20PowerPoint%20Curfew%20Tracking%20July%202002_files/frame.htm.
24 Statistics published by the Israeli Interior Ministry’s Population Registry on 9 January 2005,
cited in Ha’aretz, 10 January 2005, at http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/524998.html;
also in Geoffrey Aronson, “Settlers Losing the Battle for Gaza Settlements”, Report on Israeli
Settlements in the Occupied Territories, vol. 15, No. 1, at http://www.fmep.org/reports/2005/
Jan-Feb/v15n1.html.
25 Negotiations Support Unit, Negotiations Affairs Department, “Update on Recent Israeli
Settlement Activity June 15-August 24 2004”, 24 August 2004, p. 2.
26 Americans for Peace Now, Yediot Ahronot, 28 July 2004, cited in Middle East Peace Report,
vol. 6, Issue 3, 2 August 2004.
27 Negotiations Support Unit, Negotiations Affairs Department, “Update on Recent Israeli
Settlement Activity June 15-August 24 2004”, 24 August 2004, pp. 1-2. It should be noted that
the E-1 plan aims at linking the West Bank settlements with those of occupied East Jerusalem as
well as with Israel.
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28 Negotiations Support Unit, Negotiations Affairs Department, “Update on Recent Israeli
Settlement Activity June 15-August 24 2004”, 24 August 2004, p. 1.
29 Ha’aretz, 22 March 2005. Following the Israeli Government’s approval, this plan was referred
to the West Bank’s Supreme Planning Council in February. Final approval from the Council is
needed for the implementation of the plan.
30 Ha’aretz, 10 January 2005.
31 “Israel plans 6,000 West Bank settlement homes-report”, Reuters, 25 February 2005, at
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L25597642.htm; “APN Attacks Plan for 6,000+ New
Settlement Houses, Authorization for 120 Illegal Outposts”, Americans for Peace Now, at
http://www.peacenow.org/updates.asp?rid=0&cid=337 (accessed on 1 March 2005).
32 Ha’aretz, 14 March 2005. This Israeli-commissioned report by attorney Talia Sasson concludes
that all settler outposts are illegal and that the Israeli Government supported and budgeted these
outposts, which — according to the Sasson report — amount to 105.
33 “ARIJ Christmas Message”, at http://www.arij.org/Christmas%202004/index.htm.
34 Negotiations Support Unit, Negotiations Affairs Department, “Update on Recent Israeli
Settlement Activity June 15-August 24 2004”, 24 August 2004, p. 3.
35 Conal Urquhart, “Gaza Strip settlers may go to West Bank”, The Guardian (17 November 2004),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,1352889,00.html.
36 Geoffrey Aronson, “Settlers Losing the Battle for Gaza Settlements”, op. cit.
37 OCHA, Preliminary Analysis of the Humanitarian Implications of February 2005 Barrier
Projections, 8 March 2005.
38 Humanitarian Emergency Policy Group, OCHA, UNRWA, The Humanitarian Impact of the West
Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities Update No. 4 (Jerusalem, OCHA, 1 September 2004),
p. 3, and OCHA contribution to report, 21 December 2004.
39 A 2004 survey indicated that 64.2 per cent of families object to a family member marrying a
spouse living on the other side of the barrier, “‘State’ inside the ‘Wall’” (Bethlehem, Ma`an
Development Centre, 2004), p. 2.
40 OCHA, Preliminary Analysis of the Humanitarian Implications of February 2005 Barrier
Projections, 8 March 2005. There are approximately 230,000 Palestinians with East Jerusalem
residency permits.
41 Humanitarian Emergency Policy Group, OCHA, UNRWA, The Humanitarian Impact of the West
Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities Update No. 4 (Jerusalem, OCHA, 1 September 2004),
p. 28, and OCHA contribution to report, 21 December 2004.
42 Humanitarian Emergency Policy Group, OCHA, UNRWA, The Humanitarian Impact of the West
Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities Update No. 4 (Jerusalem, OCHA, 1 September 2004),
at note 16, p. 35.
43 Report of Special Rapporteur Giorgio Giacomelli on the human rights situation in the occupied
Palestinian Arab territories since 1967, E/CN.4/2000/25 [Arabic], 15 March 2000, p. 11, paras.
24-25. In the Bethlehem area, some additional agricultural land is now included in the barriercreated
enclaves, but separates farmers from much of their surrounding agricultural land and
water sources for agriculture, which serve as back-up during the dry season and when the
Israeli-owned Mekorot pipelines are not functioning. Humanitarian Emergency Policy Group,
OCHA, UNRWA, The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian
Communities Update No. 4 (Jerusalem, OCHA, 1 September 2004), p. 23.
44 UNRWA, UNRWA Case Study: Reports on the West Bank Barrier, 31 July 2004 at
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/9c463d6eff83545885256ee700513b91?OpenDocument.
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45 International Management Group (IMG) estimates, in OCHA, “Preliminary Humanitarian
Situation Report: Operation ‘Forward Shield’”, at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/
5e4e866e111a903085256f01004f6bae?OpenDocument.
46 Palestinian Hydrology Group, in coordination with Palestinian Water Authority, “Water and
Sanitation, Hygiene (WaSH) Monitoring Project: Impact of the Current Crisis in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip” Survey Report #12, August 2004, p. 2, available at
http://www.phg.org/campaign.
47 Rafah Municipality, Damage Assessment, 9 June 2004, in Razing Rafah: Mass Home
Demolitions in the Gaza Strip (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 2004), p. 76.
48 Razing Rafah: Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza Strip (New York: Human Rights Watch,
October 2004), p. 92. UNRWA and OCHA, Rafah Humanitarian Needs Assessment, 6 June
2004.
49 Razing Rafah, op. cit., p. 92. Human Rights Watch interview with Joachim Paul, UNICEF, Gaza
City, 12 July 2004.
50 “Technical Paper IV — Settlements”, in Stagnation or Revival? Israeli Disengagement and
Palestinian Economic Prospects (Jerusalem, World Bank, 1 December 2004), p. 1, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/ps and http://web.worldbank.org /WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/WESTBANKGAZAEXTN/0,contentMDK:20209926~pagePK:
141137~piPK:217854~theSitePK:294365,00.html., note 22, p. 6.
51 “USAID constructs wastewater plant”, United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) press release, 14 January 2005, p. 1, at http://www.notes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/
77f1a2148ac3497f49256f8a0017bfab?OpenDocument.
52 Médecins du Monde, The Ultimate Barrier, February 2005, p. 19.
53 WHO contribution to report, 24 December 2004.
54 Caritas Jerusalem, “Main Findings of the Survey on the Impact of Israeli Measures on the
Economic Conditions of the Palestinian Households”, press release, 1 October 2004; “The
Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities”, at Holy Land
Christian Ecumenical Foundation, http://www.hcef.org/hcef/index.cfm/mod/news/ID/16/
SubMod/NewsView/NewsID/1175.cfm, p. 2.
55 UNFPA contribution to report, January 2005.
56 Robyn Long, “OPT: Caring for Gaza’s Disabled”, American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA),
11 January 2005, at http://www.notes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/01d024a0c141360549256
f87001c109d?OpenDocument.
57 UNICEF contribution to report, December 2004.
58 UNICEF, “Early Years”, at http://www.unicef.org/oPt/children.html.
59 WFP contribution to report, 21 December 2004.
60 World Bank, 2004, Poverty in West Bank and Gaza after three years of economic crisis.
61 UNICEF contribution to report, December 2004; citing “Study on Palestinian Public Perceptions
on Their Living Conditions”, Institut Universitaire des Études du Développement, Geneva,
Report 7 (July 2004).
62 UNRWA contribution report, 3 March 2005; also, UNICEF contribution to report, December
2004.
63 UNFPA contribution to report, January 2005. UNICEF cites a 3.9 per cent growth rate in “At a
Glance: occupied Palestinian territory”, at www.unicef.org/infobycountry/opt_statisdtics.html.
64 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories UNSCO
contribution to report, 23 December 2004, citing: World Bank, Disengagement, the Palestinian
economy and the settlements, 23 June 2004 (table 1, p. 30).
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65 Ibid., citing: World Bank, Stagnation or Revival?, p. 42.
66 UNSCO contribution to report, 23 December 2004, citing: World Bank, Four Years — Intifada,
Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment. October 2004, p. 14.
67 UNSCO contribution to report, 23 December 2004. This definition includes discouraged workers
who are not actively looking for work.
68 Ibid. The standard unemployment rate, standing at 26.8 per cent, also increased by 3 percentage
points compared with the same period the previous year. This standard definition includes
unemployed persons 15 years and over who did not work at all during the reference week and
who were available for work and actively seeking a job during the reference week. Persons who
work in Israel and were absent from work owing to closure are considered unemployed as are
those people who are waiting to return back to their work in Israel and settlements.
69 Ibid. According to PCBS labour force data, this represents an increase in the proportion of
people employed in the public sector compared with 2003 (29 per cent) and with pre-intifada
(23 per cent).
70 UNSCO contribution to report, 23 December 2004. According to a recent study, in 18 of the 30
sample communities, agriculture which was not the main activity in any of the communities
before September 2000, became the main economic activity in 2004. About 56 per cent of the
household in these communities engaged in agriculture for subsistence only. Economic
Adaptation and Fragmentation in the Rural West Bank (unpublished).
71 UNSCO contribution to report, 23 December 2004. In 2000, private investments dropped by
more than 30 per cent and another 40 per cent in 2001 (see World Bank, Four years — Intifada,
Closure and Palestinian Economic Crisis, An Assessment, October 2004, p. 24).
72 This “fragile recovery” in 2003 was insufficient to bring the capital base to its pre-intifada
levels (ibid., p. 24).
73 UNSCO contribution to report, 23 December 2004, citing: World Bank, Stagnation or Revival?,
p. 6.
74 UNSCO field research found that the only rural enterprises that continue to employ relatively
large numbers of workers are those that still have access to formal Israel markets. These include
cucumber farms, textile workshops and stonecutting factories (UNSCO, Economic Adaptation
and Fragmentation).
75 World Bank, Stagnation or Revival? Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects
(December 2004), cited in UNSCO contribution, 23 December 2005, p. 2.
76 In 2003, 10,000 metric tons of Palestinian olive oil, valued at $35 million went unsold. OCHA
contribution to the report.
77 OCHA, “OCHA Humanitarian Update Occupied Palestinian Territories Oct 2004”, 30 October
2004, p. 3, at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MHII-6V3TX?OpenDocument.
78 OCHA contribution to report, 21 December 2004; and UNSCO/OCHA, Costs of Conflict: The
Changing Face of Bethlehem (Jerusalem, United Nations, December 2004), p. 11.
79 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of and assistance to Palestinian women
(E/CN.6/2005/4) of 10 December 2004, para. 13.
80 Ibid., para. 14.
81 “Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories”, note by the Secretary-
General (A/59/381) of 23 September 2004, para. 91.
82 Ibid., para. 92.
83 Ibid., para. 97.
84 Ibid., para. 94.
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85 Ibid., para. 99.
86 Ibid., para. 96.
87 Shahada Nasr Allah (in Arabic) “Report on the 2004 Apple Season in the Golan” (Majdal
Shams: Agricultural Services Center, Golan Development, 2005), at Golan for Development
Organization website, http://www.jawlan.org/reports/applereport2004.htm.
88 Ibid., para. 98.
89 “Prison Administration Continues Its Arbitrary Measures” (in Arabic), 2 March 2005, at Golan
for Development Organization website, http://www.jawlan.org/news/news.asp?sn=644.
90 See A/59/381, para. 93.
91 Golan for Development Organization website, http://www.jawlan.org/prisoners/prisoners.htm.
92 Ibid, para. 95. See also General Assembly resolution 59/106 of 16 December 2004, “The risk of
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, and United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No.
10485.
93 UNSCO contribution to report, 23 December 2004, citing: World Bank, Stagnation or Revival?,
p. 7.
94 Idem, pp. 31-36.
United Nations A/61/67–E/2006/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
3 May 2006
Original: English
06-33843 (E) 250506
*0633843*
General Assembly Economic and Social Council
Sixty-first session Substantive session of 2006
Item 39 of the preliminary list* Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 2005/51 of 27 July 2005, the Economic and Social Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixtieth
session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 60/183 of 22 December 2005, also requested the
Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its sixty-first session. The annexed
report, which has been prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia, is submitted in response to the two resolutions.
* A/61/50.
** E/2006/100.
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Annex
Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan*
Summary
The occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel continues to deepen the
economic and social hardship of Palestinians. Citing the right to self-defence, the
Israeli army continues to mount military operations in the occupied Palestinian
territory, frequently employing arbitrary detention, the disproportionate use of force,
home demolition, severe mobility restrictions and closure policies.
The Israeli closure system remains a primary cause of poverty and
humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory, and restricts Palestinian
access to health and education services, employment, markets and social and
religious networks. Israeli restrictions also impede humanitarian services to the
occupied territory. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East alone incurred over $10 million in losses in 2005.
While the Palestinian gross domestic product grew in 2005 by some 6 per cent,
economic indicators continue to show negative trends. Unemployment and poverty
rates remained high, estimated at 23 per cent and 62 per cent respectively.
Israel’s confiscation of Palestinian land and water resources for settlements and
the construction of the West Bank barrier accelerated during 2005. Israeli
settlements, land confiscation and the construction of a barrier in the occupied
Palestinian territory, contrary to the Geneva Convention and other norms of
international law, isolate occupied East Jerusalem, bisect the West Bank and curtail
normal economic and social life.
Refugees, women and children bear a significant brunt of these measures.
Malnutrition and other health problems afflict a growing number of Palestinians at a
time of curtailed access to needed services. There are 350,000 children under the age
of five who suffer from chronic malnutrition.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge with
appreciation the substantive contributions of the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Population Fund, the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme, the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, the International Labour
Organization and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace
Process.
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2005/51 of 27 July 2005, the Economic and Social Council
stressed the importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of
Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425
(1978), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003) and 1544 (2004), and the principle of land for
peace, as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government
of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the representative of the
Palestinian people. In the same resolution, the Economic and Social Council
reaffirmed the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,1 to the occupied Palestinian
territory, including Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since
1967; stressed the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of
the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the
freedom of movement of persons and goods in the Territory, including the removal
of restrictions going to and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to
and from the outside world; also stressed that the wall being constructed by Israel in
the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is
contrary to international law and is seriously debilitating to the economic and social
development of the Palestinian people, and called in this regard for full compliance
with legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice (see A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1) and in General
Assembly resolution ES-10/15. The resolution reaffirmed the inalienable right of the
Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan to all their
natural and economic resources, and called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to
exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of these resources; it also reaffirmed
that Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and an obstacle to economic
and social development; and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the
General Assembly, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the
resolution.
2. In its resolution 60/183 of 22 December 2005, the General Assembly
reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including land and water, and
called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, damage, cause loss or
depletion of or endanger the natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan; affirming the right of the
Palestinian people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, damage, loss
or depletion, or endangerment of their natural resources resulting from illegal
measures taken by Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupying Palestinian
territory, including East Jerusalem. The Assembly stressed that the wall being
constructed by Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and deprives
the Palestinian people of their natural resources, and called in this regard for full
compliance with the legal obligations stipulated in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice and General Assembly resolution ES-10/15.
The Assembly called on Israel, the occupying Power, to cease the dumping of all
kinds of waste materials in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East
__________________
1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
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Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural
resources, namely the water and land resources, and pose an environmental hazard
and health threat to the civilian populations. The Assembly requested the Secretary-
General to submit a report to it at its sixty-first session on the implementation of the
resolution.
II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem
Death and injuries
3. In 2005, 180 Palestinian fatalities and 1,554 injuries were recorded in the West
Bank. In the Gaza Strip, 99 Palestinian fatalities and 266 injuries were recorded.
Four of those killed, and nine of the wounded, were pupils of the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). One
of the deaths occurred while the pupil was inside the classroom.2 Since January
2006, some 50 Palestinian children were injured and 11 died owing to the conflict.3
Civilian casualties are mainly caused by the disproportionate use of force by the
Israeli army.
4. Israeli forces continued to conduct extrajudicial killings of Palestinians
suspected of involvement in armed attacks against Israelis. According to the
Palestinian Human Rights Group, between 1 January 2005 and 1 January 2006 such
attacks resulted in the killing of 34 suspected militants and 13 bystanders. The
Palestinian Human Rights Group further reports that during the same period, Israeli
settlers killed nine Palestinians, without recourse for victims or judicial
consequence for perpetrators. Israelis recorded eight fatalities caused by Palestinian
militants.4
5. The Secretary-General has repeatedly called on all parties to the conflict to
abide by their obligations under international law, in particular to ensure the
protection of the civilian population, both Palestinian and Israeli (see
SG/SM/10358).
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
6. Over 9,000 Palestinian political prisoners currently remain in Israeli prisons,
including approximately 129 Palestinian women prisoners. In its annual summary,
the Palestinian Human Rights Group reports that, without any charge or judicial
process, 741 Palestinians, including 11 women, are in administrative detention. Of
those, 74 are being held pending trial and 44 have been sentenced. Of the women
prisoners, 12 are under the age of 18.5 According to the Israeli-based Women’s
Organization for Political Prisoners, most women political prisoners are held in
Hasharon (Tel Mond) Prison, but some remain in Neve Tirza Prison and other
__________________
2 UNRWA contribution to the report (9 February 2006); Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian update — emerging humanitarian risks” (January 2006)
(www.ochaopt.org).
3 UNICEF Humanitarian Action, Occupied Palestinian Territory donor update, 8 March 2005.
4 The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, “Annual summary” (www.phrmg.org/
pressrelease/2005/January%,%202006.htm); PHRMG is a Palestinian NGO.
5 Report of the Palestinian Ministry of Prisoner Affairs, “Palestinian women prisoners in Israeli
prisons” (2005) (see www.btselem.org/english/Administrative_Detention/Statistics.asp).
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detention centres. Daily life of women prisoners and the general conditions in the
prisons are very harsh.6 Israeli detention centres hold some 344 children.3
7. On 14 March 2006, Israeli forces attacked a Palestine Authority-controlled
prison compound in Jericho and took into custody, among many others, Ahmed
Sa’dat, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who had been
accused of involvement in 2001 murder of an Israeli minister.
Population displacement
8. Registered refugees form 29 per cent of the West Bank’s Palestinian
population and 70 per cent of the total Gaza Strip population.7
9. At least 60,000 Palestinian residents of occupied East Jerusalem with Israeli
identity cards, including 3,600 school-age children, will be closed outside the
“Jerusalem envelope,” as the barrier prevents them from reaching the municipal
centre.8 This phenomenon also affects 11,000 persons already separated from their
livelihood in the “closed zone” (west of the barrier) (see A/60/271, para. 20). The
most impoverished are those who have been historically displaced and are again
made destitute. The typically landless, labouring refugees, especially those losing
their agricultural jobs, now form the bulk of new “deep poverty” cases.
10. In April 2005, Israeli forces expelled 300 Palestinian families (1,500 persons)
and confiscated 10,000 dunums of land east of Tubas.9 South-east of Bethlehem
they expelled six families, requisitioned 20 water wells and destroyed 20 shelters for
about 22,000 sheep and 500 camels. Subsequently, Israeli forces ordered hundreds
of Bedouins in Sawahra al-Sharkiyya, in the central valley, to surrender 25,000
dunums of land.10
Property destruction and confiscation
11. No United Nations entity systematically monitors house demolitions, land
confiscations or the destruction of agricultural land in the West Bank. However,
through the course of its work in 2005, UNRWA recorded a total of 224 Palestinian
structures11 demolished by the Israeli army in the West Bank, 39 of which belonged
to Palestine refugees. Other sources place the number at 251 structures destroyed
through September 2005.12 Reasons for the demolition orders, as given by the
Israeli army, were lack of construction permit, being close to the constructed
sections of the barrier, or being the house of a Palestinian detainee.
__________________
6 Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, Newsletter January 2006, “Female political
prisoners in Israeli prisons” (see www.kibush.co.il/show_file.asp?num=11943).
7 Refugee population according to UNRWA statistics as of 31 March 2005 (www.un.org/unrwa/
publications/pdf/rr_countryandarea.pdf); West Bank general population according to The World
Factbook, as of 2005 estimates (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/we.html#People).
8 UNRWA contributions; Ha’aretz (7 November 2005) (www.haaretz.com).
9 One dunum equals 1/10 hectare.
10 Jamal Juma, “The eastern wall: closing the circle of our ghettoization”, Znet (24 December
2005) (www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=107&ItemID=9398.
11 Residential houses, agricultural houses, tents, commercial shacks and livestock barracks are
included under the denomination of structure.
12 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Consolidated Appeals Process (December
2005) (www.ochaopt.org).
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12. According to UNRWA, among particularly affected locations were Bardala
village in the Nablus area, where Israeli security forces demolished 10 agricultural
structures reportedly belonging to 210 Palestinians, among them 35 registered
refugee families. Additionally, a number of demolition orders were delivered to
refugees families of Arab Hathalin in the Hebron area.
13. Also significant was a confiscation order for five hectares issued in February
2005 in Shu’fat Camp, reportedly for expansion of the checkpoint at the camp
entrance and the deployment of a gate in the barrier. Confiscation orders continued
being delivered throughout 2005, according to the projected route of the barrier,
affecting refugee households living outside of camps.
14. On 10 October 2005, Israeli contractors removed large quantities of topsoil
from `Ayn al-Baydha’ lands, transporting it to nearby settlements. Other actions in
2005 included Israeli soldiers confiscating and selling local Palestinians’ sheep
herds.13
15. Israeli authorities destroyed at least 114 Palestinian homes in occupied
Jerusalem through 2005.14 In July 2005, the Jerusalem municipality announced its
intentions to demolish 88 homes in the Palestinian Silwan neighbourhood of
occupied East Jerusalem, amid 1,000 demolitions currently planned.15
16. The construction of military observation towers, new road barriers and the
West Bank barrier have resulted in the requisition of 7,884 dunums (788 hectares) of
land in the West Bank between August 2005 and January 2006.16
17. In the Gaza Strip, no refugee shelters were destroyed or damaged by the Israeli
army in 2005. This is a major change from 2004, which saw major destruction in
Rafah and Jabalia owing to Israeli incursions. According to UNRWA statistics, since
the start of the crisis in September 2000, over 2,990 shelters, home to 28,500 people
from the Gaza Strip, have been destroyed or damaged beyond repair.
18. The Gaza Strip also saw a reduction in land-levelling operations. In total, 180
hectares of agricultural land were bulldozed in the Gaza Strip. Bulldozing
operations ceased in April 2005. The destruction of orchards has contributed
significantly to food insecurity in the Gaza Strip. For example, over 50 per cent of
Beit Hanoun orchards have been destroyed in the past four years.
19. Israeli forces have razed 28,882 dunums of agricultural land, uprooting trees
and destroying crops belonging to Palestinians and impoverishing 60,101
Palestinians.17 Of that land, Israeli forces razed 8,000 dunums more than once and
razed approximately 26 cultivated dunums in 2005. Since 2000, Israeli forces have
destroyed 244 wells in the Gaza Strip, including two drinking-water sources, and
one in 2005. In October 2005, Israeli forces reoccupied and transformed a swath of
agricultural land 2,100-2,700 m wide and 6,350 m long along the northern Gaza
__________________
13 Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ), “The ongoing Israeli violations in the Jordan
Valley” (14 January 2006) (www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=745).
14 Land Research Center, “Forced eviction of Palestinian citizens and demolition of their houses in
occupied Jerusalem is growing Israeli policy” (29 November 2005).
15 BBC News (1 June 2005) (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4597401.stm).
16 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “West Bank closure count and analysis”
(January 2006) (www.ochaopt.org).
17 A dunum equals 1,000 m2.
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Strip border into an Israeli military launching and shelling position, extending from
the sea eastward to the former industrial zone.18
20. Physical capital loss in the occupied Palestinian territory is estimated at
$3.5 billion, as a result of destruction of private and public infrastructure and capital
stock and overuse of surviving physical capital. This estimated loss is equivalent to
30 per cent of pre-2000 Palestinian capital stock. In addition, the cumulative
economic opportunity cost of potential income lost over the period 2000-2004 is
estimated at $6.4 billion (1997 dollars), or a value equal to 140 per cent of the
Palestinian gross domestic product (GDP) before 2000. Thus, the Palestinian
economy operated with a much smaller capital base in 2005 than that of 1999.19
Mobility restrictions and closure policies, including access to
humanitarian assistance
21. The Israeli closure system is a primary cause of poverty and humanitarian
crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory, and restricts Palestinian access to health
and education services, employment, markets and social and religious networks.16
22. The West Bank closure system comprises a series of blockages placed by the
Israeli army to control and restrict Palestinian movement within the West Bank and
between the West Bank and Israel. The Government of Israel has stated that the
closure regime and restrictions of movement are part of Israeli security policies
designed to prevent attacks on Israeli citizens.
23. The north-south barrier and the simultaneous east-west bisection of the West
Bank at its heart has effectively surrounded towns such as Qalqiliya, Bethlehem and
occupied Jerusalem. Israel’s closures and land confiscations in the Jordan Valley
increasingly isolate Jericho.20 Completing the encirclement of all major Palestinian
population centres, Israel has established putative borderlines that enclose most of
the Palestinian population.21
24. Despite some easing of closure, Palestinian movement in the West Bank
remains problematic. Access by some villagers to nearby urban centres improved
temporarily when the number of closure obstacles decreased to 376 between
February and August 2005; however, by March 2006 there were 471 obstacles.
Movement between the southern, middle and northern parts of the West Bank
remained problematic. Important obstacles to movement remained in place in areas
considered by the Israeli authorities to be subject to security threats, including
__________________
18 Habitat International Coalition, Housing and Land Rights Network, and Al Mezan Center for
Human Rights, “Israel’s violations of Palestinian civilians’ rights to housing and land in the
occupied Palestinian territory”.
19 UNCTAD, “Report on UNCTAD’s assistance to the Palestinian people” (TD/B/52/2) (21 July
2005).
20 Aluf Been, “Israel begins construction of police station in E-1 area”, Ha’aretz (14 March 2006)
(www.haaretz.com).
21 Chris McGreal, “Israel unveils plan to encircle Palestinian state”, The Guardian (8 February
2006) (www.guardian.co.uk/israel/story/0,,1705021.00.html).
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settlements, junctions between Palestinian roads and Israeli bypass roads and certain
major urban centres such as Nablus and Hebron.22
25. Israeli forces have surrounded Jericho governorate with seven permanent
checkpoints, foreclosing regular Palestinian access and, on 11 February 2006,
sealing the entire governorate for the first time.23
26. For Palestinian workers and traders, access to and from the Gaza Strip eased in
the first part of 2005, progressively allowing a low daily average of 66 crossings in
January to a peak daily average of 3,950 crossings in June. Workers’ access to Israel
was virtually shut down just prior to and following disengagement, with only 1,304
Gazans able to exit the Strip daily by November 2005.24 By the end of November,
however, that figure had climbed to approximately 4,000. According to a recent
study by the World Health Organization (WHO), the Israeli authorities granted
special exit permits for humanitarian (medical) passage to Israel and Egypt to 84 per
cent of applicants in the three months following disengagement.25
27. Access by health and humanitarian workers to different areas in the West Bank
continued to be impeded in the form of denials, delays and obstructions. There were
720 access incidents reported by humanitarian agencies and 278 reported by
ambulance providers in the first 10 months of 2005.24 UNRWA incurred over $42
million in losses and additional costs between October 2000 and October 2005 as a
result of movement restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities on grounds of
security. Over $10 million in losses were incurred through 2005 alone. The bulk of
those losses were in lost labour and port charges. The total cost incurred to UNRWA
in lost working hours in 2005 was $154,830, compared to $1.83 million in 2004.
28. In the light of the July 2004 International Court of Justice advisory opinion,
the United Nations is not to seek permits for access to areas within the West Bank
that are located to west of the barrier. United Nations agencies have agreed not to
seek such permits and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), in cooperation with the United Nations and
the Task Force on Project Implementation, has initiated a working level dialogue
with the Israeli Government to attempt to resolve this issue.
29. Convoy arrangements between the West Bank and Gaza Strip were agreed in
principle under the Quartet-facilitated Access and Movement Agreement of
November 2005. Implementation of the agreement, which was to commence on
15 December 2005, has been delayed as a result of security threats cited by Israel.25
__________________
22 Some checkpoints and crossings through the barrier have been upgraded, suggesting a more
permanent presence. Israel is also constructing underpasses and bridges that link Palestinian
areas separated from each other by Israeli settlements and bypass roads. OCHA has noted that
28 underpasses and bridges have been constructed and 16 are planned; see Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian update — closure count and analysis”
(August 2005) (www.ochaopt.org).
23 ARIJ, “Under the slogan of security, the Israeli Occupation Forces imprisons Jericho residents”
(14 February 2006) (www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=769).
24 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian update — the Jordan
Valley” (October 2005) (www.ochaopt.org).
25 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO)
contribution to the report (29 December 2005) (UNSCO contribution).
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30. Restriction on movement to and from the Gaza Strip for humanitarian goods
and personnel generally improved in comparison to 2004, but remained closely
linked to security incidents or alerts at the main crossing points of Karni (goods)
and Erez (personnel). Improved dialogue between the Israeli authorities and the
donor Task Force on Project Implementation led to the clearance of a large backlog
of United Nations humanitarian containers early in the year, and to swifter passage
of humanitarian personnel at the Erez crossing. A clear, predictable humanitarian
access regime, as set out in the minimum standards for access document of the Task
Force, did not materialize.25
31. During 2005, the Erez checkpoint north of the Gaza Strip was fully closed to
Palestinians for 156 days;26 Israeli authorities closed the Erez industrial zone for
256 days and the Sofa crossing south of the Gaza Strip for 27 full days. During the
same period, they closed the Rafah terminal (the only border crossing between the
Gaza Strip and Egypt) for 118 full days and 11 partial days. The Gaza airport
remained closed for the entire period. The Karni checkpoint (the main commercial
crossing between the Gaza Strip and Israel) was closed for 55 full days and 305
partial days in 2005.2
32. UNRWA has reported that within the Gaza Strip, the Gush Qatif checkpoint on
the main north-south road was fully closed for 4 days and partially closed on 96
days. During the same period, Netzarim junction was closed for 254 days. All
internal closures were lifted on 12 September 2005, following the completion of the
Israeli withdrawal, allowing free Palestinian movement across the Gaza Strip. These
positive events are unlikely to arrest the deepening crisis in the Gaza Strip unless
they are soon followed by further measures to secure commercial export outlets and
to ensure a land link to the West Bank.25 The Rafah terminal was handed over to the
Palestinian Authority on 12 September 2005. It remained closed from 18 September
to 26 November 2005, until an agreement on border-crossing procedures was
reached between the parties. By the end of December, the terminal was functioning
for up to eight hours per day.2
33. In addition, throughout 2005 the Israeli authorities banned the movement of
humanitarian goods from Israel into the Gaza Strip through the Erez crossing, the
main transportation hub. The Karni crossing was then designated the sole crossing
point for humanitarian goods coming into the Gaza Strip. The Israeli-imposed
“back-to-back” haulage system on vehicles transporting goods violates the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations by impeding the
delivery of humanitarian assistance. Import/export levels at Karni remained at
approximately 2004 levels, although during the period of July to August 2005 the
Israeli authorities permitted increased movement of containers in order to preposition
supplies in preparation for the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
Agreement was reached in November 2005 between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority to extend the opening hours at the crossing and to regularize passage of
traffic.2 However, between 1 January and 19 March 2006, the Karni crossing was
closed for 46 days. On 19 March 2006, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs issued a warning that most bakeries in the Gaza Strip were
closed on that day because wheat flour stocks were exhausted. UNRWA was unable
to start its emergency food distribution on 19 March because of insufficient wheat
__________________
26 Approximately 1,000 Palestinian labourers crossed into Israel each day. Prior to September
2000, the figure was approximately 30,000.
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flour supplies. The World Food Programme reported that 3,594 metric tons (mt) of
wheat flour contracted to local mills were unable to enter the Gaza Strip during the
brief period Karni was opened.27
34. Ongoing construction of the barrier, the completion of new passage points and
the introduction of new identity technologies have made Palestinian access to
occupied East Jerusalem from the West Bank increasingly complicated.
Barrier
35. Israel continues construction of the barrier as per the new route approved by
the Israeli cabinet in February 2005, contrary to General Assembly resolution
ES-10/15 of July 2004, which acknowledged the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice that the construction of the barrier in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including in and around occupied East Jerusalem, is contrary to
international law. According to the revised route, an additional 40-kilometre
segment is expected to surround the Ma’ale Adumim settlement, the settlements
near it (Kfar Adumim, Antut, Nofei Prat and Kedar) and the separate
Ari’el/Emmanuel “fingers”. These two sections comprise 16 per cent of the barrier’s
total 670-kilometre (km) length. Further changes involved the Gush Etzion sections
of the barrier and an extension to the barrier route along the southern Hebron hills.2
36. As of October 2005, approximately 243 km (36.3 per cent) of the barrier have
been completed, while 166 km (24.8 per cent) are under construction.28 The barrier
route places approximately 10 per cent of West Bank territory on its west side.29
Approximately 75 per cent of settlers will be located on the west side of the
barrier,30 where, contrastingly, their movement and access is de facto unrestricted.
Some 70,000 settlers currently remain east of the barrier.31
37. According to UNRWA, 10.1 per cent of some of the most fertile Palestinian
land, home to approximately 50,000 Palestinians living in 38 communities, is
expected to be isolated between the barrier and the Green Line, severely limiting the
Palestinian potential for urban and agricultural development. The barrier and its
population control/transfer regime, integrated with Israeli confiscation, settlement
and separation policies, stand as the most visually obvious factors affecting
Palestinian life. The cumulative impact of the barrier on Palestinian livelihoods
makes subsistence untenable, owing to the constant bulldozing and confiscation of
large Palestinian land areas and the incremental eviction orders, as well as
demolition of Palestinian property in both rural and urban areas. Seemingly arbitrary
passage restrictions hinder those eligible to apply for permits from reaching lands
west of the barrier (see A/60/271, para. 17), effectively rendering idle,
impoverishing and dispossessing Palestinian landowners. Typically, only titled
__________________
27 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gaza Strip situation report — the
humanitarian impact of the Karni crossing closure: bread running out in Gaza” (19 March 2006)
(www.ochaopt.org).
28 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian impact of the West Bank
Barrier”, Update No. 6, January 2006 (www.ochaopt.org).
29 This includes East Jerusalem, the Ariel finger and Ma’ale Adumim settlement expansion plan.
30 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Preliminary analysis — the humanitarian
implications of the February 2005 projected West Bank barrier route”, Update No. 4, April 2005
(www.ochaopt.org).
31 Peace Now, “The West Bank — facts and figures” (August 2005) (www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/
peace.asp?pi+195&docid=1430).
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owners are allowed access to their lands, forsaking all other needed farm hands.
Permitting only singular — especially elderly — landowners to tend their fields
alone immobilizes social capital and drives titleholders to physical exhaustion and
despair.32
38. A further deterioration in the living standards of UNRWA-registered Palestine
refugees is also expected by the increasing eligibility and passage restrictions,
hindering the ability of those applying for permits to reach land located west of the
completed barrier in the northern West Bank areas. Furthermore, once constructed,
the Ma’ale Adumim bloc of the barrier is expected to severely impede movement
between the northern and southern areas of the West Bank, adding to the complex
system of terminal-like checkpoints and the pedestrian and/or vehicle gates planned
to regulate persons and goods access into and from the city. The completion of the
planned barrier around Jerusalem will have a significant impact upon the ability of
UNRWA to provide assistance to the refugee community in the West Bank. Notably,
60 per cent of the Agency’s West Bank field office staff and staff from occupied
East Jerusalem are expected to face access problems travelling to their duty stations
in occupied East Jerusalem. Similar restrictions involve the Agency’s programmes
providing social, relief, education and health services.
39. Through September 2005, Israeli land-levelling and confiscation continued,
with more than 4,100 hectares taken for construction of the barrier.33 No official
party has undertaken to quantify the consequent costs and losses consistent with the
General Assembly’s call in 2004 for a register of damages arising from the barrier
(see A/ES-10/L.18/Rev.1).
Israeli settlements
40. Israel transferred some 7,200 former Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip to
Israeli settlements in the West Bank and occupied Jerusalem. The Israeli
Government has also provided special incentives to increase Israeli presence inside
Israel, where sizeable communities of Palestinian citizens remain.34
41. After the dismantling of four northern West Bank settlements (Ganim, Kadim,
Homesh and Sanur), Israel maintains 121 settlements in the West Bank, plus 14
Israeli settlements in occupied Jerusalem.34 As of 31 August 2005, there are an
estimated 100 unofficial settlements or “outposts” in the West Bank.35
42. Between January and June 2005, 1,097 new settlement-housing starts showed a
28 per cent increase over the 860 in early 2004.36 Correspondingly, ongoing
construction of settlements at the end of June 2004 totalled 3,984 housing units,
which grew at 6 per cent at the end of June 2005, with 4,207 units under
__________________
32 Do-it-yourself Apartheid (http://stopthewall.org/activistresources/983.shtml).
33 UNSCO contribution; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Consolidated
Appeals Process (December 2005).
34 Dror Etkes and Lara Friedman, “Taking inventory of the West Bank”, Settlements in Focus,
vol. 1, issue 9 (9 September 2005) (www.peacenow.org/briefs.asp?rid=&cid=1393).
35 Ibid, “The West Bank — facts and figures” (August 2005) (www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/
peace.asp?pi=195&docid=1430).
36 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics; Dror Etkes and Lara Friedman, “Current trends in settlement
construction and growth”, Peace Now (December 2005) (www.peacenow.org/
briefs.asp?rid=&cid=1393).
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construction.37 At the end of 2005 there were 3,696 new West Bank settlement
housing units being built, in addition to 1,654 in occupied Jerusalem. Large-scale
housing construction (hundreds of units) is under way in seven settlements within
the barrier. Medium-scale housing construction (tens of units) is proceeding in
another 17 settlements, all but three of which fall inside the barrier route.37
43. The Israeli Government initiated around 57 per cent of settlement construction
projects during 2005, funding around 40 per cent of the total investment. Israeli
Government construction investment was greater in the occupied territory than
inside Israel, where the government initiated around 27 per cent of construction
projects and funded 16 per cent of total investment.38 While Israel built twice as
many new settler homes in the occupied Palestinian territory in the first quarter of
2005 as in the first quarter of 2004, housing starts inside Israel fell 6 per cent from
the first quarter of 2004 (see A/60/271, para. 23).
44. Conservative calculations estimate Israel’s annual non-military spending for
the settlements in recent years at NIS 2.5 billion.39
45. Since 2001, Israel’s annual settler population growth rate in the West Bank has
exceeded 5 per cent, compared to the general Israeli rate of growth, which is
estimated at 1.8 per cent.34 The rates of the 12 settlements west of the barrier route
(Israeli side) with the highest growth rates range from 5.3 per cent (Immanuel, in
Ariel bloc) to 16.1 per cent (Mevo Horon, near the Green Line). East of the barrier
route, the annual population growth rates of 15 expanding settlements range from
7.7 per cent, in Ma’ale Michmash, north of occupied Jerusalem, to 35 per cent in
Gittit, in the Jordan Valley, with the highest current population transfer rate.34 The
number of West Bank Israeli settlers exceeded 243,000 at the end of 2005, with
190,000 additional settlers in occupied Jerusalem (see E/CN.4/2006/29).40
46. Most Israeli settlers in the West Bank are now situated between the Green Line
and the barrier (Jordan Valley settlements notwithstanding). Settlements in that
“closed zone” are expanding and new settlements are being developed. The Israeli
civil and military authorities indulge the settlers with assured lenient treatment.
Settlers have become more aggressive towards Palestinians. Settler violence and
theft have increased, especially in the Hebron area, with 68 incidents reported in
May 2005 and 67 in June 2005 (see A/60/271, para. 27; E/CN.4/2006/29).
Natural resources, water and the environment
47. Israel uses 73 per cent of the water available from West Bank aquifers,
Palestinians in the West Bank use 17 per cent and Israeli settlers use 10 per cent.
While 10 to 14 per cent of Palestine’s GDP is related to agriculture, 90 per cent of
Palestinian farms have to rely on rain-fed methods. Agriculture accounts for only
3 per cent of Israeli GDP, but Israel irrigates more than 50 per cent of its
__________________
37 Dror Etkes and Lara Friedman, “Current trends in settlement construction and growth”, Peace
Now (December 2005) (www.peacenow.org/briefs.asp?rid=&cid=1393).
38 Gadi Golan, “Adva — Settlements in territories still get bigger budgets” (12 February 2006)
(http://globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000060578&fid=942).
39 Moti Bassok, “The extra civilian price tag — at least NIS 2.5 billion a year”, Ha’aretz
(www.haaretz.com); Dror Etkes and Lara Friedman, “Current trends in settlement construction
and growth”, Peace Now (December 2005) (www.peacenow.org/briefs.asp?rid=&cid=1393).
40 Associated Press, “Jewish settler population seen growing 4.3 per cent in 2005”, Ha’aretz
(2 December 2005).
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landholdings.41 Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley alone, for example, consume
an equivalent of 75 per cent of the water that the entire West Bank Palestinian
population of approximately two million consumes for domestic and urban uses.42
48. The Israeli occupation has negatively affected the environment and natural
resources of the occupied Palestinian territory. At least 14 settlements drain liquid
waste onto Palestinian lands.43 In addition to direct pollution created by Israeli
forces and settlements, the occupation has annulled Palestinian plans to establish
dumping sites. Israeli military closure of landfills has complicated solid-waste
management in the West Bank. Pollution from dismantled settlements now poses a
potential hazard in the Gaza Strip. Disproportionately to their respective
populations, Palestinians in the West Bank produce some 500,000 tons of solid
waste annually (1,370 tons daily), while Israeli settlements produce an average
224,000 tons yearly (614 tons daily).44
49. In April 2005, Israeli authorities began to transfer a planned 10,000 tons of
garbage monthly from the Dan and Sharon regions across the Green Line to dump it
in the West Bank at Abu Shusha quarry. Four water wells serving Nablus and nearby
villages are located very near the dumping site.
50. Israeli movement restrictions impede Palestinians from assessing
contamination risks and managing nature reserves, all of which are located in areas
that Israel controls. While an essential tool of environmental management is an
inventory of national hazardous waste substances, no such inventory exists in the
occupied Palestinian territory.45
Public health and food insecurity
51. The rate of chronic malnutrition (stunting) in children under five has
increased, reaching almost 10 per cent. Children in the Gaza Strip are the most
affected. In the occupied Palestinian territory, some 350,000 children are stunted,
with malnutrition mostly afflicting children 12 to 23 months old. More than 15 per
cent of them are malnourished at this period critical to their future development.3
52. Newborn mortality accounts for about three quarters of all infant deaths.
Notably in the Gaza Strip, the under-one-year and under-five year mortality figures
have increased by about 30 per cent, mainly owing to an increase in the mortality of
children under 12 months. This is the consequence of poor newborn care in
hospitals. Currently, in major hospitals of the Gaza Strip about one in three
newborns admitted to newborn care units dies. About 8 per cent of children have
low birth weight (below 2,500 grams), contributing to infant and newborn mortality
and severe morbidity. These are severe constraints for child development outcomes.3
53. Mental health is an increasing concern in the occupied Palestinian territory.
Recent studies have shown that stressors such as the severe restriction of movement
__________________
41 Palestine Monitor, “Water in Palestine”, fact sheet (www.palestinemonitor.org/new_web/
factsheet_water.htm).
42 B’Teselem, “Land grab: Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank” (May 2002).
43 Palestinian National Information Center, “Israeli violations of the Palestinian environment”
(www.pnic.gov.ps/english/Environment_Israeli%20Violations.html).
44 ARIJ, “Israel escalates its violations against the Palestinian environment: the new Israeli
dumping site” (5 April 2005) (www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=548).
45 See www.grid.unep.ch/product/map/index.php?region=west_asia.
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and lack of access to education and health care are present in everyday life. One
study46 showed that 52 per cent of those surveyed had thought of ending their life,
92 per cent felt no hope for the future, 100 per cent reported feeling stressed and
84 per cent expressed feelings of constant anger because of circumstances beyond
their control.
54. Non-communicable diseases present important public health problems. Among
the eight leading causes of death, seven are non-communicable diseases. In 2004,
3,481 persons died from cardiovascular diseases (1,781 males and 1,700 females),
with a rate of 99.7 per 100,000 population.47
55. Food insecurity is adversely affecting the health of women and children. The
results of a study conducted by UNRWA revealed that 54.7 per cent and 34.3 per
cent of children of ages 6-36 months are anaemic, as are 40.2 per cent and 29.9 per
cent of pregnant women and 45.7 per cent and 23 per cent of nursing mothers in the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, respectively. Other micronutrient deficiencies of
concern are subclinical vitamin A deficiency,48 rickets and iodine deficiency. The
incidence of obesity and diet related chronic diseases appears to be increasing,
particularly among the older age group, presenting a major challenge in the area of
nutrition.49
56. Israel’s construction of the barrier has impeded access to health care. Access to
primary health-care services and UNRWA-contracted hospitals in occupied East
Jerusalem decreased 18 per cent in 2005 and is likely to deteriorate further with the
continuing barrier construction. In order to mitigate effects on health, UNRWA has
been running five mobile units since 2003, treating more than 12,000 patients in
2005.
Youth and education
57. Fewer Palestinian children start school each year. The quality of their
education is deteriorating. The student drop-out rate is increasing dramatically and
few children have the opportunity to experience a child-friendly learning
environment, with safe spaces and opportunities for sports and recreation. In
addition, children lack educational materials and schools lack adequate teaching
aids.3
58. Live-fire from Israeli positions, air attacks and sporadic sonic booms
particularly affect children, instilling constant fear and keeping them awake at night.
With half of the Gaza Strip’s 1.3 million residents under the age of 18 years, and
three quarters of all households having at least one child in school, daily events
impede educational efforts and erode past achievements. One third of families
indicate that their child suffers from at least one symptom of psychosocial distress,
impeding concentration at school.3
__________________
46 Palestinian Counseling Center, “The psychological implications of Israel’s separation wall on
Palestinians” (2004).
47 World Health Organization contribution to the report (WHO contribution).
48 The Maram Project, “Prevalence of vitamin A deficiency among children 12 to 59 months of age
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (2004).
49 Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Health and WHO, “The state of nutrition, West Bank
and Gaza Strip, 2005”, cited in WHO contribution.
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59. Israeli military operations forced UNRWA schools in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip to close for a total of 272 days in the 2004/2005 scholastic year (compared to
391 days in 2003/2004).
60. In the West Bank, UNRWA schools lost 29 school days and teachers lost over
705 working days during the 2004/2005 school year. In addition, instructors lost 23
working days during the same period at three training centres.
61. Before the redeployment of Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip, internal
closures prevented Gaza Strip teachers from reaching their duty station. During the
2004/2005 school year, UNRWA teachers recorded a collective loss of 29,399
teaching days. Since October 2000 more than 264,000 school days have been lost.
62. UNRWA has also reported that in the 2004/2005 academic year, no Gaza Strip
students (277 applied) were able to attend technical training centres in the West
Bank for lack of a passage permit. Moreover, closures continued to prevent students
in higher education from reaching their institutions, barring Gaza Strip students in
particular from reaching West Bank universities.
63. Although examination scores of the 2004/2005 period were slightly higher
than those of the 2003/2004 period, overall educational achievement continues to
decline. Since the 1999/2000 school year, Arabic scores in the Gaza Strip declined
by 6.1 per cent, math scores by 8.5 per cent and science scores by 12 per cent. In the
West Bank, only 44 per cent of eighth-graders passed their Arabic examination and
49.6 per cent passed science. However, these figures represent a major improvement
(10 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively) over the previous year.
Economic indicators
64. World Bank estimates for overall economic performance point to the
continuation of GDP growth over the past three years (GDP growth is estimated at
6 per cent for 2005). However, this growth does not reflect the economic potential
of the occupied Palestinian territory, as the current GDP is approximately 25 per
cent lower than it was in 1999.50
65. Demographic growth, which outran average growth in GDP during the period
2000-2005, contributed to negative growth in annual GDP per capita. Demographic
growth also generated a labour force involving some 40,000 new entrants each year,
outpacing demand in the labour market, and thereby swelling the number of the
unemployed and adding pressure on existing household incomes.51
66. Despite persistently high rates of unemployment during 2005, estimated by the
World Bank at 23.4 per cent,52 the labour market improved, with the unemployment
rate dropping some 3 per cent from 2004. Job creation in the Gaza Strip, largely a
result of Israel’s disengagement, increased 14 per cent, while the West Bank saw an
8 per cent increase.53
__________________
50 International Monetary Fund, “Macroeconomic developments and outlook in the West Bank and
Gaza” (December 2005), as cited in the UNSCO contribution.
51 World Bank, “West Bank and Gaza update” (June 2005).
52 World Bank, “Economic update and potential outlook” (15 March 2006).
53 World Bank, “The Palestinian economy and the prospects for its recovery” (December 2005), as
cited in the UNSCO contribution.
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67. The financial sector remains sound, due to the expansion of the private sector
and increase in credit; yet a rapidly growing public sector wage bill has widened the
budget deficit significantly. According to the World Bank, the fiscal situation is now
unsustainable. Employment by the Palestinian Authority, however, continues to rise,
with some 4,000 militants being integrated into the security forces. According to
Palestinian Authority security organizations, some 8,000 to 10,000 employees were
identified as “non-performing”. The projected fiscal deficit, driven primarily by
wage cost increases, was calculated by the International Monetary Fund to exceed
$900 million for 2006.50
68. Despite GDP growth, both the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and the
World Bank reported persistently high levels of poverty. Although available
statistics vary, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated
poverty at 62 per cent of the population.54 Poverty in the occupied Palestinian
territory evolved in 2005 in significant ways. First, geographical concentration of
poverty is increasing, with higher levels registered in the Gaza Strip, in the southern
areas of the West Bank (Hebron area) and in the northern areas of the West Bank
(Jenin area). Second, the gap between rich and poor is increasing, which
demonstrates the inability of the market to ensure equitable distribution of wealth.
Third, the number of Palestinians living in “deep poverty” (that is, a daily
consumption level below $1.6/day) increased during 2005.25
69. Steady economic growth with persistent and possibly rising poverty rates
suggests that growth alone has not been sufficient to alleviate or reverse the
cumulative impact of the conflict. Several factors appear responsible for eroding the
positive effects of growth over the 2003-2005 period. These include the immediate
and cumulative effects of intensified closures, which continued to restrict
commercial and individual movement, thereby fragmenting established economic
linkages in the occupied Palestinian territory and complicating access to
employment, markets and services.25
70. An overall decline in income levels, in particular but not exclusively among
those who have moved from employment in Israel to lower paying activities in the
occupied Palestinian territory, shows declining levels of household consumption.
Also contributing to poverty is the exhaustion of assets and borrowing options since
September 2000 by large numbers of households seeking to cope with declining
incomes, rising job insecurity or outright loss of jobs and incomes.55 The effects of
those losses were largely offset through the provision of emergency assistance.
71. The private sector continued to expand. Private sector credit expanded by
30 per cent in 2005, but remained lower than in other countries of the region.50 In a
climate of fiscal crisis, growth in private sector activities injected the economy with
significant liquidity.53
72. Closures remain a significant hindrance to economic recovery. Yet, according
to the World Bank, the situation has become increasingly predictable, allowing for
adaptation. Economic growth in Israel has increased demand for Palestinian exports.
The number of Palestinians working in Israel also increased remittances by 25 per
__________________
54 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian update — emerging
humanitarian risks” (January 2006) (www.ochaopt.org).
55 World Bank and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Deep Palestinian Poverty in the Midst
of Economic Crisis (October 2004).
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cent in comparison to 2004.53 Nevertheless, the pace of economic growth witnessed
since 2003 suggests that pre-September 2000 per capita income levels might not
return before 2012.56
Status of women
73. Palestinian women historically have had low participation in the workforce.
However, women traditionally have played a major role in agricultural production.
With the loss of land to Israel, Palestinian women are doubly affected, by the loss of
both a vital source of income and their role as economic producers. Affected by the
barrier, women’s mobility has decreased to about 85.7 per cent in the western part of
the barrier, and to 63.3 per cent in the eastern part of the barrier.57 Before the
September 2000 crisis, their participation rate was 15.8 per cent, but with the Israeli
closures and barriers, the rate of women in the job force declined to 10.5 per cent.58
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
74. In 2005, the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan was estimated at
18,400. The Arab population is fully incorporated into the Israeli legal,
administrative and social service delivery systems. Some 14 per cent have opted for
Israeli citizenship.25
75. The total area of the Syrian Golan under Israeli occupation is 1.15 million
dunums (1,150 square km). About 1 million dunums are considered suitable for
grazing land. At the moment, Israel utilizes about 500,000 dunums for cattle, while
100,000 dunums were declared as natural reservations. The remainder (400,000
dunums) are closed military areas. Cultivated land is divided between the Syrian
Arab population and the 20,000 Israeli settlers and Syrian Arabs can access about
20,000 dunums, while Israeli settlers have access to about 80,000 dunums.59
Although Arab and Israeli populations in the Golan are roughly equivalent in
number, Israeli settlements are reported to use a disproportionate quantity of water
resources for domestic and agricultural purposes.
76. As of 2005, Israeli settlers occupy 33 settlements, of which 27 are primarily
agricultural. Israeli settlers trade their produce of wine, beef, apples, cherries and
mineral water in Israel’s domestic and export markets.60 The other settlements are
focused on industry and tourism (including two tourist facilities on the eastern coast
of Lake Tiberias). Additionally, Qatzrin and Bnei Yehuda settlements maintain
industrial areas.25
77. The Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan is generally unable to travel
to the Syrian Arab Republic to visit family members on the other side of the line of
separation and have, over time, experienced increasing limitations on land use
owing to military and environmental zoning restrictions imposed by Israel. A large
__________________
56 World Bank, “The Palestinian economy and the PA’s fiscal situation” (1 February 2006).
57 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Impact of the Israeli measures on the economic
conditions of Palestinian households” (April-June 2004).
58 Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Territories — conflicts, occupation and
patriarchy — women carry the burden” (31 March 2005).
59 UNSCO contribution (see http://english.golan.org.il/vaad/efacts.asp).
60 See http://golan-marsad.org/default.asp?sn=9#a28.
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number of the Syrian Arab population has lost significant acreage traditionally used
for pasture. This has resulted in changing production, commercial and land-use
patterns within a traditionally rural/pastoral society.
78. The Arab population labour force in the occupied Golan is made up of some
6,500 workers, of which some 750 work in local services. Another 3,200 work in
Israel in agriculture and construction. Nearly 40 per cent of the total labour force is
unemployed.61
79. Trade in agricultural products, particularly apples, olive oil, honey and other
horticultural goods, relies mainly on Israeli markets, with a small percentage of
surplus apple production exported to the Syrian Arab Republic each year with
facilitation by the International Committee of the Red Cross.62 The export of the
2006 apple harvest began on 19 March 2006. Over a period of four weeks some
400 mt will cross the line of control.25
80. The Arab population has become dependent on Israeli agricultural products
and partially on products of the settlements (especially dairy-related products).
Production and trade in livestock have decreased markedly since 1967. Local
opportunities in the construction sector remain limited owing to housing
restrictions.25
81. Israel has applied its educational system in the occupied Syrian territory since
1967, replacing the Syrian curriculum. Six elementary schools, three junior high
schools and two high schools operate for the Syrian Arab community. Since 1987,
delegations of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Damascus and
Tel Aviv have facilitated the passage of an average of 400 students each year across
the line of separation to attend Syrian universities.25 During 2005, the International
Committee of the Red Cross handled the administrative details for between 400 and
500 pilgrims (religious men only) wishing to make an annual visit to holy sites in
the Syrian Arab Republic. The International Committee of the Red Cross has also
facilitated several weddings for couples from either side of the line of separation,
including five such weddings in 2005.63
82. The Arab community funds and operates five health clinics in the occupied
Golan, providing basic maternal-newborn health services, including vaccinations. In
addition, the Israeli Ministry of Health funds one basic health clinic that the Syrian
Arab community operates. The nearest referral hospital is a 30-minute drive from
the Arab communities in the occupied Golan into Israel. Specialized services are
within a 70-minute drive inside Israel. There are three fully equipped Israeli
ambulances in the occupied Golan area, two in Majdal Shams and one in Bqa’atha.
Where necessary, patients are treated at clinics inside the Israeli settlements of the
occupied Golan.25 The International Committee of the Red Cross, with the
participation of local non-governmental organizations, is developing plans to
construct a 30-bed hospital facility for the community.25
83. Landmines remain a hazard for Arab communities in the occupied Golan. A
field research study shows that 66 Arab residents have suffered landmine incidents
__________________
61 Interview with Al Marsad in Majdal Shams; cited in the UNSCO contribution.
62 Interview with International Committee of the Red Cross in Majdal Shams; cited in the UNSCO
contribution.
63 Interview with International Committee of the Red Cross in Jerusalem; cited in the UNSCO
contribution.
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since 1967, of which 16 were fatal. The data indicate that among the 50 surviving
victims, 86 per cent (43 victims) were under the age of 18. Eight of the 16 fatally
wounded were under the age of 18.25
IV. Conclusions
84. Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank raised
the possibility of new movement towards social and economic recovery.
85. Disengagement occurred in a rapid and peaceful manner. The economy grew in
2005 by 6 per cent for the second year running. Unemployment fell by 3 per cent
over the previous year. The parties signed the Access and Movement Agreement of
November 2005, securing a passage regime from the Gaza Strip to Egypt and
ensuring a minimum level of commodity exports from the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless,
these gains were insufficient to arrest or reverse the decline in social and economic
indicators which showed the ongoing, and in some cases deepening, distress among
large numbers of Palestinians. During the first quarter of 2006, crossings for the
transfer of goods between the Gaza Strip and Israel were closed over 50 per cent of
the time.64 Poverty rates remained high as result of declining income levels, rising
food and transport prices, high demographic growth and increasingly inequitable
distribution of wealth.
86. While internal closures in the Gaza Strip were removed, West Bank closures,
after several months of easing, were tightened again towards the end of the year. A
severe fiscal crisis loomed at the end of 2005, raising serious doubts about the
ability of the Palestinian Authority to meet public sector wage commitments for the
first months of the new year.
87. Planned elections in both Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory meant
that neither side was in a position to make meaningful policy commitments into
2006. For its part, the international community also signalled its intention to delay
additional funding commitments to the occupied Palestinian territory until a new
cabinet could be formed in the first half of 2006. A major pledging conference,
aiming to raise up to $3 billion in international funds for Palestinian social
economic recovery, was nonetheless tentatively scheduled for May 2006, testifying
to the ongoing hope of donors that an enabling environment for accelerated social,
economic and institutional recovery can be established over the next year.
__________________
64 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gaza Strip situation report (23 March
2006) (www.ochaopt.org).
United Nations A/62/75–E/2007/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
3 May 2007
Original: English
07-33068 (E) 310507
*0733068*
General Assembly Economic and Social Council
Sixty-second session Substantive session of 2007
Item 43 of the preliminary list* Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian
Golan over their natural resources
Economic and social repercussions of
the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in
the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including
Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 2006/43, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 61/184, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a
report to it at its sixty-second session. The present report, which has been prepared
by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in response
to the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council.
* A/62/50.
** E/2007/100.
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Report prepared by the Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia on the economic and
social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan*
Summary
The occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel continues to deepen the
economic and social hardship for Palestinians. Citing the right to self-defence from
such actions as the continuation of attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli
civilians, the launching of rockets into Israeli cities from the Gaza Strip and the
capture of an Israeli corporal, the Israeli army continues to mount military operations
in the occupied Palestinian territory, employing arbitrary detention, disproportionate
use of force, house demolitions, severe mobility restrictions and closure policies.
However, there has been a marked decline in Palestinian-Israeli violence in Gaza
since the ceasefire of 26 November 2006.
The Israeli closure system remains a primary cause of poverty and
humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory, and restricts Palestinian
access to health and education services, employment, markets and social and
religious networks.
The fiscal situation deteriorated significantly following the legislative elections
of January 2006. In line with the principles set by the Quartet on 30 January 2006,
the election results led donors to reconsider their aid to the Palestinian Authority.
Palestinian GDP declined by approximately 8 per cent in the third quarter of 2006
compared to the same period in 2005. Economic indicators continue to show
negative trends. Unemployment and poverty rates remained high, estimated at 30 and
64 per cent respectively, while 65 per cent of households rely on informal borrowing
to subsist.
Israeli settlements, land confiscation and the construction of a barrier in the
occupied Palestinian territory, contrary to the Geneva Convention and other norms of
international law, isolate occupied East Jerusalem, bisect the West Bank and curtail
normal economic and social life.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge its
appreciation for the substantive contributions of the Department for Political Affairs, the United
Nations Development Programme (Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People), the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Population Fund, the
United Nations Development Fund for Women, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, the World Food Programme, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health
Organization, the International Labour Organization and the Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.
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Refugees, women and children bear the brunt of these measures. Malnutrition
and other health problems afflict a growing number of Palestinians at a time of
curtailed access to needed services. In the Gaza Strip alone, 57.5 per cent of children
from 6 to 36 months old and 44.9 per cent of pregnant women are anaemic.
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2006/43, the Economic and Social Council stressed the
importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of Security
Council resolutions, including 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002),
1515 (2003) and 1544 (2004), and the principle of land for peace as well as
compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people. In
the same resolution, the Economic and Social Council urged all parties to respect
the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence against the
civilian population in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.1 The Council,
convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded efforts to achieve
sustainable development and a sound economic environment in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
and concerned by the formidable impact on the economic and social conditions of
the Palestinian people caused by the construction of the wall and its associated
regime inside the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including
the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of living,
recalled in this regard the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2 and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child,3 and affirmed that these human rights
instruments must be respected in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East
Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan. The Council stressed the need to preserve
the national unity and the territorial integrity of the occupied Palestinian territory,
including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and
goods in the territory, including the removal of restrictions on going to and from
East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world. It also
stressed that the wall being constructed at an accelerated pace by Israel in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to
international law and is isolating East Jerusalem and dividing up the West Bank and
is seriously debilitating to the economic and social development of the Palestinian
people, and calls in this regard for full compliance with legal obligations laid out in
the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered on 9 July 2004
(see A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1) and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15. In that
resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people
and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and
economic resources, and called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit,
endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources; it also reaffirmed that Israeli
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem and the
occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and an obstacle to economic and social
development and called for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council
resolutions and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly, through
the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution.
__________________
1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
2 See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
3 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
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2. In its resolution 61/184, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources, including land and water, and called upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, damage, cause loss or depletion of, or endanger the
natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem and in
the occupied Syrian Golan. The Assembly recognized the right of the Palestinian
people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, damage, loss or depletion,
or endangerment of their natural resources resulting from illegal measures and
actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including East Jerusalem. The Assembly stressed that the wall being constructed by
Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
is contrary to international law and is seriously depriving the Palestinian people of
their natural resources, and called in this regard for full compliance with the legal
obligations stipulated in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice and in resolution ES-10/15. The Assembly called on Israel, the occupying
Power, to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely the water and land resources,
and poses an environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian populations. The
Assembly further called upon Israel to cease its destruction of vital infrastructure,
including water pipelines and sewage networks, which, inter alia, has a negative
impact on the natural resources of the Palestinian people. The Assembly requested
the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its sixty-second session on the
implementation of the resolution.
II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem
Death and injuries
3. Citing the right to self-defence from such actions as the continuation of attacks
by Palestinian militants on Israeli civilians, the launching of rockets into Israeli
cities from the Gaza Strip and the capture of an Israeli corporal, the Israeli army
continues to mount military operations in the occupied Palestinian territory.
However, there has been a marked decline in Palestinian-Israeli violence in Gaza
since the ceasefire of 26 November 2006. From January 2006 to February 2007, the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded 697 Palestinian
fatalities and 3,558 injuries as a direct result of the conflict. A total of 132
Palestinian children were killed and 515 injured.4 No fewer than 28 of those killed
and 120 of those wounded attended schools run by the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). One of the deaths
in the West Bank and two of the injuries in the Gaza Strip occurred while the pupils
were inside their classroom.
4. In the 15 unmarked Israeli minefields in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley,5
at least 21 casualties related to mines or explosive remnants of war were recorded
from January to May 2006 (6 killed, 15 injured), mostly children.6 In addition,
Israel has introduced the use of dense inert metal explosive missiles in Bayt Hanun
__________________
4 www.ochaopt.org/documents/PoC_tables_Feb07.xls.
5 See Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2006, at www.mineaction.org.
6 Landmine Monitor 2006, at www.icbl.org/lm/2006/palestine.html#fnB75.
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and elsewhere in the Gaza Strip, causing an increasing number of injuries that
necessitate amputations.7
5. From January 2006 to February 2007, internal Palestinian violence,
characterized by tensions between the main Palestinian factions, armed
confrontations between established security organs, the creation of new security
bodies, the proliferation of weapons in the Gaza Strip and the hardening of political
positions, caused 248 fatalities, of which 20 were children; 1,350 injuries were
recorded.8 It should be noted that the most significant increase in Palestinian deaths
and injuries was a result of intra-Palestinian violence. The Office of the United
Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process calculated a tenfold
increase in 2006 over 2005.
6. From January 2006 to February 2007, attacks by Palestinian armed elements
reportedly killed 29 Israelis and injured 524.8
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
7. As at March 2006, over 9,400 Palestinian political prisoners remained in
Israeli prisons, 421 of whom had been imprisoned for over 10 years. Since January
2006, Israeli authorities have arrested an average of 500 Palestinians per month in
serial raids on towns, particularly Bayt Hanun, Nablus and Jenin.9
8. About 120 Palestinian women political prisoners remain in Israeli jails,
including two under 18 years of age.10 According to the United Nations
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 8 female detainees have given birth in
prison; 3 are imprisoned with their babies; 31 are not allowed to care for their
children; 6 have been deprived of family visits; and 8 have been diagnosed with
chronic psychological problems.
9. As at 30 September 2006, the Israeli army was detaining 389 Palestinian
children, including two 12-year-old boys. It is reported that Israeli authorities have
used physical coercion on 60 per cent of the children.11
10. At the end of December 2006, Israeli authorities were detaining 20 United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) West Bank staff members and denying UNRWA access to them.
Population displacement
11. The ongoing construction of the barrier in the West Bank has contributed to
population displacement throughout the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem.
__________________
7 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967, John Dugard (A/HRC/4/17), para. 10.
8 www.ochaopt.org/documents/PoC_tables_Feb07.xls.
9 A/HRC/4/17, paras. 10 and 43.
10 See website of the Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, www.wofpp.org/english/
december.html.
11 Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/61/529-S/2006/826),
para. 65.
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Of the 32.9 per cent of Palestinians living in Jerusalem who recently changed their
place of residence, 17.3 per cent did so because of the barrier.12
12. Although population data will not be updated until the census is conducted
later in 2007, the closures of the towns and villages of the West Bank, the
circumvention of occupied East Jerusalem, the construction of the barrier, physical
isolation and the closures imposed on the Gaza Strip have most likely led to internal
migration patterns.
Property destruction and confiscation
13. In 2006, UNRWA recorded a total of 233 Palestinian structures demolished by
the Israeli army in the West Bank. Of those, 115 were residential homes, 74
agricultural sites, 35 commercial stores and 9 public facilities. According to the
Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, 29,314 households currently live in Israeli-damaged
homes, 28,997 in Gaza Strip and 317 in the West Bank.13
14. Nablus was the most affected area. On 26 August 2006, 19 houses were
demolished by the Israeli authorities in Nablus city. A total of 23 commercial
roadside structures, used by farmers to market their produce, were demolished in
Bardala village and in Marj Na`ja in the Jordan Valley for alleged lack of permits.
For the same reason, the Israeli army demolished 14 livestock barracks in Zbeidat,
Khibat Atuf, Frush Beit Dajan, Jiftlik and Ash Shuna.
15. Confiscation orders continued to be issued by the Israeli authorities throughout
2006. According to UNRWA, land confiscation orders were issued for 3,845 dunums
in the southern West Bank (in Al Khadr, Um Salmuna, Halhoul, Yatta, Ad Dahiriyah
and Beit Ummar), 1,768 dunums in the northern West Bank (in Deir Ballut, Burgin,
Hajjah, Faroun, Asira and Kufur Laqef) and 1,337 in the central West Bank (mostly
in Anata and Bir Nabala).
16. During 2006, the Israeli Jerusalem municipality used its home-demolition
budget of 4 million new Israeli sheqalim (NIS) to flatten 68 Palestinian homes.
According to a report issued by the Land Research Center in February 2007, the
Jerusalem municipality conducted 10 more forced evictions of Palestinian
inhabitants predicated on the state of disrepair of their homes.14 In 2006, Palestinian
inhabitants of occupied East Jerusalem lost 6,000 m2 of residential space. The Israeli
Committee against House Demolitions reported that the municipality had also
confiscated building machinery, especially cement mixers, forcing higher prices for
building cement, and increased the rate of financial guarantees required for courts to
suspend demolitions. Israeli authorities have given forewarnings of more
demolitions of Palestinian homes in 2007.
17. From March 2006 to the end of January 2007, in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli
army damaged 3,077 refugee shelters and demolished 210, affecting 3,356 families.
__________________
12 Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights and the Norwegian
Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Displaced by the Wall: Pilot Study
on Forced Displacement caused by the Construction of the West Bank Wall and its Associated
Regime in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Bethlehem and Geneva, 2006). Also available
from www.badil.org/publications/Books/Wall-Report.pdf.
13 “A Report about Housing Conditions in the Palestinian Territory, 2006”, Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics.
14 Land Research Center report, 19 February 2007.
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This is a major deterioration from 2005, when 116 shelters were damaged and 37
were demolished.
18. The Gaza Strip also saw a vast increase in land levelling and excavating
operations. At least 6,516 dunums of agricultural land were bulldozed in the Gaza
Strip.
19. On 27 June 2006, the Israeli Air Force destroyed six transformers of the Gaza
Strip’s only domestic power plant, which supplied 43 per cent of Gaza’s daily needs.
Full electrical capacity has since been restored to Gaza by means of technical
assistance from Egypt and financial support from Sweden.15
20. No quantification of the demolition and confiscation losses in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including occupied East Jerusalem, currently exists. However,
the direct damages from the military offensive by Israel from 26 June to 28 August
2006 were estimated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at
US$ 46 million in the Gaza Strip alone.
21. In April 2006, the Israeli army narrowed the “safety zone” for artillery
shelling, allowing targeting much closer to Palestinian homes and populated areas,
which contributed substantially to the increase in the loss of life and property. The
assault on Bayt Hanun confined 40,000 residents to their homes under curfew, as
Israeli military operations resulted in the destruction of 279 homes, an 800-year-old
mosque, public buildings, electricity networks, schools and hospitals, orchards,
water and sanitation networks; paved roads were ripped up with specially designed
back-hoes.16 UNDP estimated infrastructure damages at $2,372,970.
Mobility restrictions and closure policies, including access to
humanitarian assistance
22. The Agreement on Movement and Access signed by the Palestinian Authority
and the Government of Israel under the auspices of the Quartet contains specific
provisions for the movement of people and goods within the occupied Palestinian
territory and outside it.
23. The first of the six points of the Agreement was the re-opening of the Rafah
border crossing with Egypt, which opened on 15 November 2005. It was the first
historical instance of Palestinian Authority control over an international land border
crossing. From 26 November 2005 to 25 June 2006, Rafah was continuously open
for passengers travelling in both directions.
24. Following an attack by Palestinians on an Israeli military post at Kerem
Shalom and the capture of an Israeli soldier on 25 June 2006, the crossing was
closed and access by the Border Assistance Mission of the European Union to the
Rafah terminal was restricted by the Israeli authorities on security grounds. Since
then, the crossing has been opened on an exceptional basis, such as during peak
periods of movement by students or pilgrims. Overall, Rafah was open for an
average of 14 per cent of scheduled days between 25 June and 15 December 2006.
Infrequent and sporadic openings of the crossing have led to large crowds gathering
__________________
15 See A/HRC/4/17, para. 19. See also “Act of Vengeance: Israel’s Bombing of the Gaza
Power Plant and its Effects”, in B’Tselem (September 2006), available from
www.btselem.org/English/Summaries/200609_Act_of_Vengeance.asp.
16 A/HRC/4/17, para. 10.
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at the terminal on designated days, leading to public insecurity. Although the
mandate of the mission was renewed in November 2006, its access to the terminal
remains restricted because of Israeli security concerns.
25. The Karni crossing remained closed for over 50 per cent of the scheduled time.
Openings were often only partial, owing to perceived security threats by Israel. Both
imports into Gaza and exports from the Strip to Israel, the West Bank and beyond
suffered as a result. However, in the period from November 2006 to March 2007,
exports through Karni increased by 115 per cent, which was an improvement,
though still short of the targets of the Agreement on Movement and Access. Food
imports plummeted in April and May, resulting in a drastic fall in Gaza’s strategic
reserves of wheat flour and the closure of main bakery outlets along the Strip.
Import restrictions were eased in May under heavy international pressure. Gaza
exports, however, experienced the deepest and most sustained restrictions during
2006. Only 12 export truckloads, on average, were able to leave Gaza from January
to November 2006, a mere fraction of the 400 trucks per day envisaged for the end
of 2006 under the Agreement. The effect of export restrictions on Gaza producers
was severe, with some millions in lost revenues for the period.
26. The Sufa crossing is the main passage point for the import of aggregates used
for construction into the Gaza Strip, and is covered by the Agreement on Movement
and Access. The crossing was closed on 14 February. Since then it has not opened
regularly. Overall, the crossing remained open for 60 per cent of scheduled days
during the first year of implementation of the Agreement, restricting the importation
of aggregates into the Gaza Strip. One effect of the restriction has been to raise the
price of aggregate building materials in the Gaza Strip.
27. The Agreement provided for measures to ease the movement of Palestinians
and commercial goods within the West Bank. The decrease in West Bank
checkpoints, which had been verified at the end of 2005, was reversed in 2006.
According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the number of
physical obstacles in the West Bank grew from 475 in January 2006 to 550 in
February 2007. The main impact of these measures has been the fragmentation of
the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and serious disruptions to normal links
between communities and public services, employment and land.
28. The target date for establishing bus convoys to link the West Bank with the
Gaza Strip, in accordance with the Agreement, was 15 December 2005; for
establishing truck convoys, the date was 15 January 2006. Neither deadline was met
and there has been no movement towards implementation of this provision of the
Agreement.
29. The construction of a seaport has not started, and no discussions on security
arrangements, reconstruction and operation of the airport have been held. The Israeli
army occupied the Gaza airport for five months up to the week of 22 November
2006. Airport damages as a result of the Israeli military operation amount to an
estimated $16 million.
30. The access of holders of West Bank identification cards to occupied East
Jerusalem has deteriorated further since the introduction of new, elaborate terminal
systems restricting access from both the Bethlehem (south) and Ramallah (north)
directions. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
since January 2006, the Israeli army has barred Palestinian pedestrians and vehicles
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from using 8 of the 12 routes to occupied East Jerusalem. Increasingly restricted
access to occupied East Jerusalem impedes the ability of UNRWA to deliver refugee
services to the West Bank, as 65 per cent of its West Bank field office staff are West
Bank identification card holders.
31. In the West Bank, among the thousands of incidents of delayed and denied
access reported by UNRWA staff, a good number affected the delivery of emergency
humanitarian assistance, in particular through the hindrance of the movement of
Agency or contracted vehicles transporting food aid, medicines, mobile health teams
or food distribution teams. Regular programmes were affected by the impeded
movement of teachers, social workers and field office staff, and the imposition of
curfews on West Bank camps, villages and towns further added to the disruption of
Agency services. The West Bank field office has lost an estimated 832 man-days
since March 2006.
Barrier
32. Israel continues construction of the barrier, contrary to General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15, in which the Assembly acknowledged the advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice that the construction of the barrier in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including in and around occupied East Jerusalem, was contrary
to international law.
33. The construction of the barrier is having a major humanitarian impact on
Palestinian communities living in the West Bank. On 30 April 2006, the Israeli
Cabinet approved a second revision of the barrier route. Accordingly, the barrier
will be 703 km long, an increase of 33 km compared to the previous plan.17 The
Emmanuel and Ari’el settlement groups will be split into separate fingers
surrounding more than 25,500 Palestinians on three sides, with one access route on
the east side of the barrier. As a result, 10,771 Palestinians from Deir Ballut, Rafat
and Az Zawiyah villages will remain on the west side of the barrier, between the
Green Line and the barrier. Though this will leave three Palestinian villages east of
the barrier, the environmental impact on their lands will be considerable. According
to the new revised route, the barrier will move approximately one and a half
kilometres northwards from road 465 and incorporate olive groves and land from
Rantis village. Beit Iksa village and surrounding lands will become part of the
Biddu/Beit Surik enclave (about 46,321 people), currently surrounded by the barrier
on three sides and closed by road 443 northwards. Al Walaja village will be
encircled by the barrier and isolated from its farmland. Many sections of the barrier
in the south, originally planned to be built on the Green Line, will be moved inside
the West Bank.18
34. As at February 2007, 58 per cent of the barrier had been completed (408 km)
and 9 per cent was still under construction. Construction advanced in occupied East
Jerusalem, where about 55 per cent of the plans had been completed and 10 per cent
were under construction. As a result, about 3,000 Bedouins living in the Ma’ale
Adumin area, most of whom are refugees, are likely to be forcibly displaced. Once
completed, 80 per cent of the barrier will lie within the occupied Palestinian
territory and only 20 per cent on the Green Line. Furthermore, 575 km2 (about
__________________
17 See the website of the Israeli Ministry of Defense at www.seamzone.mod.gov.il.
18 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, preliminary analysis of the humanitarian
implications of the April 2006 barrier projections.
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10 per cent of the West Bank area) will be isolated between the barrier and the
Green Line in the “seam zone”. On the basis of the current route, 60,500
Palestinians living in that area will be severely affected in their access to the West
Bank and main sources of livelihoods, and 31,400 will be completely encircled by
the barrier.19
35. Palestinian communities located east of the barrier are facing increasing
difficulties in reaching their farm and grazing land in the closed areas. Although the
Government of Israel maintained that the barrier would not affect ownership of land
and residents’ access to their sources of livelihoods,20 the Israeli permit regime and
the erratic operation of gates are severely hindering Palestinian farming practices.
Over 230 km2 of the West Bank’s most fertile land (some 15 per cent of all West
Bank agricultural land) has already been confiscated in connection to the
construction of the barrier21 and the risk of further dispossession is very high owing
to the inability of Palestinian farmers to secure continuous access to their land.
Israeli settlements
36. According to military sources, Israel’s Civil Administration (the military
administration in the occupied Palestinian territory) has handed over thousands of
dunums of Palestinian lands in the Jordan Valley for illegal settlement construction
and army bases.22 Meanwhile, Israel authorized the establishment of a new
settlement, Maskiot, in the Jordan Valley issuing a permit for the first 30 of 100
residential units. Construction of the units has not yet started.23
37. In March 2006, the Israeli settler population in the West Bank totalled
246,100. Their growth rate remains high, at 5.1 per cent, in contrast with the 1.8 per
cent general population growth rate in Israel.24 According to the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics as at January 2007, settlers numbered 260,000, in addition to
some 200,000 living in occupied East Jerusalem.
38. Israeli military orders confirmed the confiscation of 1,328 dunums in occupied
East Jerusalem, reportedly for the expansion of the Almon settlement near Ma’ale
Adumim, which bisects the West Bank. In mid-2006, the Government of Israel
authorized the near doubling of the Ramat Shlomo settlement (with about 2,000
units) in occupied East Jerusalem.25 Some 2,700 to 3,000 Jahalin Bedouin now face
further displacement by the end of 2007 to make room for the expansion of the
Ma’ale Adumim E1 Block and the construction of the barrier.26
__________________
19 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, West Bank barrier route projections,
July 2006.
20 Summary legal position of the Government of Israel (A/ES-10/248, annex I).
21 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report on UNCTAD’s Assistance to the
Palestinian People, July 2006 (TD/B./53/2).
22 Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Jordan Valley Short Takes”, Settlement Report, vol. 17,
No. 1 (January-February 2007).
23 European Union Presidency statement on the Israeli-Palestinian relations (press release
544/2006, 27 December 2006; available from www.eu2006.fi/en_GB.
24 “Population in Israel and West Bank settlements, 1995-2005”, Report on Israeli Settlement in
the Occupied Territories, vol. 16, No. 5 (September-October 2006).
25 Kol Ha’Zeman (26 May 2006).
26 Report of the Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 7 March
2007.
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39. More than 3,500 housing units were under construction in West Bank
settlements in October 2006, compared to 4,144 in October 2005.27 Formerly
temporary West Bank outposts have become permanent, as in the notable cases of
Neve Erez, Nofei Prat, Palgei Mayim and Zayit Raanan in the Ramallah area.28
Natural resources, water and environment
40. The construction of the barrier has closed off the access of Palestinians to
95 per cent of their own water resources (630 million m3 of 670 million m3
annually) by destroying 403 wells and 1,327 cisterns.29 It has cut off access of
owners to 136 wells providing 44.1 million m3 of water annually. The barrier has
closed 46 springs (23 million m3/year) and 906 dunums of underground water (99
per cent of underground West Bank water).30 Consequently, over 7,000 Palestinian
agriculture-dependent families have lost their livelihood29 in a region where water
resources are scarce and increasingly costly to develop.31 The latest barrier route
will isolate another 62 springs and 134 wells in the “seam zone”.32
41. The quantity and quality of water supply and sanitation services for
Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory are insufficient, inefficient and
unreliable. The overall daily average of water consumption per capita in the
occupied Palestinian territory is 85 litres (75 in the West Bank and 95 in the Gaza
Strip), far below the minimum standard recommended by the World Health
Organization (WHO) of 150 litres. Only 45 per cent of domestic water services meet
WHO quality standards in the Gaza Strip, where high chloride and nitrate
concentrations abound. In the West Bank, 87 per cent of the population accesses
piped water, where 220 unserved communities rely on rainwater harvesting and
costly water purchases, subjecting them to waterborne diseases and deeper
impoverishment.
42. Israeli settlements and the behaviour of settlers put strain on the environment,
as seen in the destruction of hundreds of fruit-bearing trees in 2006 by burning,
felling and uprooting. Settlements occasionally direct their sewage flow on to
agricultural lands of Palestinian farmers, affecting the West Bank villages of Yatta,
Wadi Fukin and Nahhalin.33
43. While Israel’s settlement practices are the primary cause of environmental
degradation, weak and fragmented wastewater and waste management also play a
role. The lack of solid waste disposal services leads to increased burning. Smoke
from waste burning was the principal air pollutant for 48.4 per cent of exposed
households in 2006 in the occupied Palestinian territory.29
__________________
27 Peace Now report in Ha’aretz (3 October 2006).
28 Yediot Aharonot (16 November 2006).
29 Data supplied by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
30 See Palestinian Agricultural Association, “Impact of occupation and globalization on the
agricultural sector in the Occupied Palestinian Territories”, presentation at World Social Forum
2007, Nairobi (20–25 January 2007).
31 UNDP, “Water rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, Human Development Report (New
York: UNDP, 2006).
32 See Applied Research Institute — Jerusalem, “The Effect of the Israeli Segregation Wall on the
Palestinian Natural Resources”, October 2006. Available from www.poica.org/editor/
case_studies/view.php?recordID=929.
33 See “Foundation for Middle East Peace Settlement Timeline”, Settlement Report, vol. 16, No. 4
(July-August 2006) and vol. 17, No. 1 (January-February 2007).
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Palestinian fiscal crisis
44. The fiscal situation of the Palestinian Authority was already considered
unsustainable by the end of 2005. The fiscal situation further deteriorated following
the victory of Hamas in the legislative elections in January 2006. Those electoral
results led to a significant review of donor policies towards the Palestinian
Authority. In March 2006, a number of key donors started rechannelling their
financial support to Palestinians away from the Palestinian Authority pending its
commitment to the three principles laid down by the Quartet on 30 January 2006,
namely, the renunciation of violence, the recognition of Israel, and the acceptance of
previous agreements and obligations, including the road map. For its part, Israel
withheld Customs and Value Added Tax (VAT) revenues from the Palestinian
Authority amounting to roughly $60 million per month plus interest, or
approximately 50 per cent of the Palestinian Authority’s monthly budget. Through
the Quartet and other channels, the United Nations worked to facilitate the release
of Palestinian Customs and tax revenues through agreed mechanisms; following the
meeting of Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert in December 2006, Israel authorized
a transfer of $100 million. The transfer was made in January 2007. The United
Nations views that as a first positive step, and encourages a return to regular
transfers as agreed between the parties.
45. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the financial resources
of the Palestinian Authority shrank by 60 per cent, from $1.2 billion in the third
quarter of 2005 to $0.5 billion by the same quarter of 2006.34 This decline put
significant strain on Palestinian institutions, particularly those providing basic
public services and security, and all but halted salary payments to approximately
165,000 Palestinian Authority employees (supporting an estimated one quarter of
the Palestinian population).
46. Loss of public salaries was partially compensated by the distribution of cash
allowances to public sector workers and social hardship cases. Overall, the
equivalent of 40 per cent of salaries was paid through the temporary international
mechanism of the European Commission and Presidential accounts in 2006.35 In
addition, the international community channelled some $450 million, equivalent to
15 per cent of GDP and 90 per cent of Government revenues for the year, in direct
humanitarian assistance to Palestinians through United Nations agencies and nongovernmental
organizations. Together, these measures helped to mitigate the full
effect of the fiscal crisis of the Palestinian Authority in 2006.
Public health and food insecurity
47. Under the temporary international mechanism, which supported the payment
of allowances and non-salary costs for the health sector, health workers received, on
average, up to 60 per cent of their normal wages from April 2006 to January 2007.
Nevertheless, the financial crisis has left the public health system unable to sustain
care levels, especially as 2006 was a non-investment year. Hospitals lack adequate
supplies, equipment maintenance, cleaning agents and the hygienic environments
necessary to control infections.
__________________
34 IMF, West Bank and Gaza; Recent Fiscal and Financial Developments, October 2006.
35 IMF, Mission Statement: 17 December 2006.
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48. The 15-week public workers strike over unpaid wages further crippled health
services and put more pressure on clinics run by international and non-governmental
organizations. Meanwhile, the Augusta Victoria Hospital in occupied East
Jerusalem, which serves West Bank Palestinians, actually saw a 30 per cent decrease
in in-patient numbers, due to the barrier and associated movement restrictions.36
49. Access to reproductive health care, including antenatal, delivery and post-natal
care has been jeopardized by the long closures, the financial crisis of the Ministry of
Health and the ongoing Israeli military incursions. Both primary and secondary
services have declined, especially as the large majority of delivery and newborn
care services (80 per cent of the deliveries in six Health Ministry hospitals in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip) are unable to perform regular maintenance. Pregnant
women with post-natal complications may also be at greater risk when discharged
too early from hospital owing to lack of staff and space. Emergency obstetrics has
become a priority.
50. Five UNRWA mobile clinics in the “seam zone” and frontier villages are
increasingly becoming the only accessible health-care services for residents of
remote localities, seeing 11,200 patients monthly in 2006. Logistical constraints
foiled plans to facilitate access to primary health-care services in isolated rural areas
through five additional health points.
51. Food insecurity disproportionately affects women and children. A study
conducted by UNRWA in September 2006 revealed that 57.5 per cent of children
from 6 to 36 months and 44.9 per cent of pregnant women in the Gaza Strip were
anaemic. Of children under 5, 22 per cent were vitamin A-deficient;37 20 per cent
showed signs of iodine deficiency (32 per cent in the West Bank and 3 per cent in
the Gaza Strip); and 4.1 per cent suffered from clinical vitamin D-deficiency
(rickets) in the Gaza Strip. The increased incidence of non-communicable diseases,
such as diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular diseases and cancer represents an
epidemiological shift that imposes additional burdens on the scarce human and
financial resources.
52. Significantly, 65 per cent of households rely on informal borrowing to
subsist.38 Data indicate that the majority endures a lower quality of life, including
reduced caloric intake and greater economic dependency and aid reliance. The lower
per capita GDP led to a decline in food consumption of 8 per cent. Palestinian
households also reuse wastewater at a rate of 45.3 per cent, up from 44.7 per cent in
2005 and 39.3 per cent in 1999.29
53. Mental health is an increasing concern in the occupied Palestinian territory.
Comprehensive data are lacking, but localized studies have shown that stressors
such as severe movement restriction and lack of access to education and health care
are present in everyday life. About one in four people reports suffering from some
sort of psychological strain.
__________________
36 Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/61/529-S/2006/826),
para. 67.
37 WHO considers a major public health problem a prevalence above 20 per cent.
38 UNCTAD, op. cit., para. 8.
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Youth and education
54. The public workers’ strike disrupted education services. The majority of public
schools were totally or partially closed, affecting some 70 per cent of students.39
55. In the 2006/07 academic year, no student in Gaza was able to attend technical
training centres in the West Bank because none received permits to travel there.
Only 10 students applied, down from the 277 who had been rejected in the previous
school year.
56. Although 2005/06 examination scores improved over the previous year,
educational achievement continues to wane. Only 50 per cent of West Bank eighthgrade
students passed their mathematics examinations, and only 56 per cent passed
their science examinations.
57. Internal closures forced teachers in the Gaza Strip away from their duty
stations. Since October 2000, UNRWA schools have lost 277,973 days at a cost of
over $5,559,460. During the 2005/06 scholastic year, UNRWA teachers, including
those at the Gaza training centre, recorded a total loss of 13,674 teaching days. This
represented an improvement over the 56,000 recorded lost during the previous
reporting period.
Economic indicators
58. The unemployment rate rose to 30 per cent in the third quarter of 2006 from
29.4 per cent at the end of 2005, affecting 265,000 Palestinians and their
dependants.40 Although this rate might appear to be relatively stable under the crisis
circumstances, further analysis reveals discrepancies between the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, the latter showing an increase of 2.2 per cent.41 The refugee population
is affected by a higher unemployment rate (32.7 per cent in November 2006) that is
rapidly rising.42 In the first half of 2006, refugee unemployment rose 5.7 per cent
over the rate for the same period in 2005.29 Young people (20-24 years) had the
highest unemployment rate: 32.3 per cent in the West Bank and 53.7 per cent in
Gaza Strip. Around 44,000 young people are expected to enter the labour force
annually.42 It should be noted that, while the 2005/06 employment rate appears to
have remained relatively stable, the rate is now about twice that of 1999. Moreover,
income derived from formal employment is likely to have fallen, thus explaining the
sharp rise in poverty.
59. The number of Palestinians living in poverty in the occupied Palestinian
territory is estimated at 64 per cent.41 The most pronounced increase was seen in the
Gaza Strip, where 87.7 per cent of households live below the official poverty line.43
__________________
39 UNICEF, “Six months without pay spark teachers’ strike in Gaza and West Bank”, New York,
5 September 2006.
40 In a context of protracted crisis, the standard unemployment definition might be somehow
deficient, since a considerable number of people simply no longer seek employment. A “relaxed
definition” of unemployment is here applied, by adding to the total number of unemployed
people (according to International Labour Organization standards) the number of people
currently not engaged in active job hunting (commonly defined as “inactive”).
41 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Monitor (November 2006).
42 UNRWA, Prolonged crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: socio-economic impacts of
the new phase on refugees and non-refugees (November 2006).
43 UNRWA, Prolonged crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories: recent socio-economic trends
(November 2006).
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The number of Palestinians living in deep poverty throughout the occupied
Palestinian territory rose by 64.3 per cent to affect some 1,069,200 people.43 At the
end of the second quarter of 2006, the number of poor Palestinians increased to
2.1 million, compared with 1.3 million at the end of 2005.29
60. Palestinian GDP declined by approximately 8 per cent in the third quarter of
2006, compared to the same period in 2005. That decline was considerably less than
was initially expected, mainly on account of both official and private inflows,
including increased humanitarian assistance. Effects were felt the hardest in the
Gaza Strip, where closures and poverty rates have been most prevalent.
61. Poverty, unemployment, closures and land loss are all causes of the current
Palestinian housing shortage. However, a bigger crisis is looming: 401,867 of the
households in the occupied Palestinian territory will need to build new housing units
during the next 10 years. Official statistics, however, reveal that only 117,909
households will be able to do so.13
62. According to IMF, the banking sector in the occupied Palestinian territory
remains sound, despite the depressed economy. Private sector deposits continued to
expand slowly in 2006, and banks have continued to extend credit.35
63. Two aspects of Israeli controls over the Palestinian economy have been
discussed above: intensifying closures within and around the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank, and the withholding of Customs and VAT revenues since the first quarter
of 2006. In addition to these, a new set of external financial controls has been
introduced with the implementation of the temporary international mechanism of the
European Commission. These controls are designed to ensure that Palestinian
Authority government channels are bypassed while still allowing for public
institutions to function and aid to be transferred to social hardship cases.
Status of women
64. A large majority of women in households (83 per cent) are not at all involved
in economic activities. Younger females mostly assume the domestic work and are
least involved in economic activities.44
65. In occupied East Jerusalem, as elsewhere in the West Bank affected by
closures and the barrier, many families are reluctant to let their daughters go through
the degrading experience of waiting at checkpoints or barrier crossing points, to be
searched and subjected to harassment by Israeli soldiers, or have to walk long
distances to avoid such experiences. Consequently, families are now much more
likely to pressure young women to drop out of school and not pursue a higher level
of education.
66. The general fragmentation of Palestinian communities has exacerbated the
isolation of women; rural women constitute a particularly vulnerable group.
Attendance at rural girls’ schools declines further at each education level. While
women account for 44.8 per cent of public sector workers in rural communities, the
public sector strike and the withholding of wages have had a devastating effect on
the overall poverty rate, which in rural areas has reached an alarming 59.4 per cent.
__________________
44 Report of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, available at
www.unige.ch/iued/new/information/ publications/pdf/ReportVIII_ES-EN.pdf.
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67. Since family coping mechanisms are exhausted, children and women
(especially pregnant women) are most vulnerable to domestic and gender-based
violence.
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
68. The Syrian Golan remains under the Israeli occupation that began in 1967.
Israel prevents the return of the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan
expelled in 1967. As at March 2005, 27 of the 33 Israeli settlements, developed as
agricultural colonies, produce wine, beef, fruit and mineral water for Israeli
domestic and export markets at preferential terms, to the detriment of the produce of
the Syrian Arabs.45
69. In April 2006, Israel began the construction of three new tourist settlements on
the occupied Lake Tiberias lowlands.45 Matzok Orvim is a new neighbourhood that
expands the settlement of Qela, where tenders for 300 dunums of settlement
construction were published in 2006. Another 100 families are expected to join the
settlement by summer 2007.46 Katzrin, the largest settlement in the occupied Syrian
Golan, grows by 100 residents annually.47 On 2 July, the Avne Eitan settlement in
the southern Golan announced the arrival of 20 former Gaza settler families with a
plan to build them 60 homes, plus 40 homes for more newcomers. Their settlers
receive a 35-dunum land allotment.45 In December 2006, the Interior Minister
announced the intention to facilitate accelerated settlement construction near the
border with the Syrian Arab Republic.48 Israel officially seeks to double its Golan
Heights settler population in the next 10 years.49
70. The Ministry of Health of Israel funds one basic health clinic operated by the
Golan Arab community. The community operates and funds five health clinics by
itself, providing basic maternal and newborn health services, including vaccinations.
When necessary, Syrian Arab patients seek treatment in clinics inside the Israeli
settlements, or at distant referral hospitals in Israel. In June 2006, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) opened an emergency and diagnostic medical
centre in Majdal Shams and provided two ambulances, addressing long-assessed
needs.50
71. Israel replaced the Syrian curriculum with its own educational system in 1967.
Israel now operates six elementary schools, three junior high schools and two high
schools for Syrian Arabs.
72. The destruction by Israel of fruit trees belonging to Syrian Arabs has
continued. Israel is harvesting all the Banyas River’s estimated 121 million m3 of
water per year.51 The Golan Heights supply one third of Israel’s water consumption,
__________________
45 Data contributed by the Syrian Arab Republic, Prime Ministry, State Planning Commission.
46 Ma’ariv (11 October 2006).
47 Washington Post (30 October 2006).
48 Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Golan Update”, Settlement Report, vol. 17, No. 1 (January-
February 2007).
49 Washington Post (30 October 2006).
50 “Majdal Shams Hospital” project, occupied Golan: ICRC statement (20 June 2006) available at
www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/conference29-statement-200606.
51 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/61/500), para. 84.
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while Israel sells water to Syrian Arabs at prices higher than those charged to Israeli
settlers.45 Israel has confiscated Arab-owned acreage traditionally used for pasture,
and that has transformed production, commercial and land-use patterns and
eliminated traditional rural and pastoral occupations. Indigenous Syrian livestock
production and trade have decreased. Trade in Syrian Arab-produced apples, olive
oil and honey are dependent on Israeli markets. This year, ICRC helped to transport
10,000 tons of Arab-produced Golani apples to the Syrian market.52 Israel helped to
facilitate this transport and subsidized the farmers.
73. The Syrian Arab labour force in the occupied Syrian Golan numbers
approximately 6,500 workers, of whom some 750 work in local services. Another
3,200 work in Israel in agriculture and construction. Local opportunities in the
construction sector remain limited due to planning criteria, particularly those
restricting Syrian Arab housing.
IV. Conclusions
74. A combination of intensified external and internal closures, the withholding of
vital financial assistance from the Palestinian Authority and intensified conflict in
2006 have led to a measurable deepening of the socio-economic crisis in the
occupied Palestinian territory. All social and public health indicators reveal
declining standards in living conditions, social and spatial dismemberment, growing
despair and violence. This crisis on the ground was accompanied by a weakening
capacity of Palestinian institutions to independently provide for the essential
services and welfare of the Palestinian population.
75. The crisis has been partly offset by increased international investment through
alternative funding channels. The situation prompted the United Nations country
team to launch a common appeal in December 2006 which, at $453 million, was
double the amount requested in 2005. Increasing proportions of international
assistance were shifted from long-term development support to immediate
emergency response. While these temporary measures served to stabilize the
situation to a significant degree, they were not expected to contribute to the longterm
improvement of socio-economic conditions in the occupied Palestinian
territory. Nor were they expected to be a substitute for the direct responsibility of
local parties, or for a rejuvenated political process that could address the underlying
issues of the conflict.
__________________
52 “Occupied Golan: ICRC supports local communities by transporting apples” (2 March 2007), at
www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/220224/191cfd29ce6b306bf05478513bcdf60e.htm.
United Nations A/63/74–E/2008/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
6 May 2008
Original: English
08-32931 (E) 050608
*0832931*
General Assembly Economic and Social Council
Sixty-third session Substantive session of 2008
Item 41 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian
Golan over their natural resources
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 2007/26, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 62/181, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a
report to it at its sixty-third session. The present report, which has been prepared by
the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in response to
the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council.
* A/63/50.
** E/2008/100.
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Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan*
Summary
The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory and Syrian Golan continues
to intensify the economic and social hardship of the Palestinian and Syrian people.
Attacks by Palestinian militants and the launching of rockets into Israeli cities
from the Gaza Strip continue, as do Israeli military operations, together with
measures of arbitrary detention, the disproportionate use of force, house demolitions,
severe mobility restrictions and closure policies in the occupied Palestinian territory.
However, there was a decline in Palestinian-Israeli violence in 2007 and an increase
in intra-Palestinian violence, culminating in the takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas
in June 2007.
Internal conflict in the occupied Palestinian territory has compounded existing
hardships. After the Hamas takeover of Gaza, Israel imposed additional restrictions
on the movement of goods and people into the Gaza Strip, which led to deteriorating
conditions and shortages of basic commodities, including food, electricity and fuel.
Increased restrictions on the operations of humanitarian agencies hindered the
delivery of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
The Israeli closure system, which restricts Palestinian access to health and
education services, employment, markets and social and religious networks, led to
increased poverty and humanitarian need in the occupied Palestinian territory. Israeli
settlements, land confiscation and the construction of the barrier in the West Bank,
contrary to the Geneva Convention and other norms of international law, isolate
occupied East Jerusalem, bisect the West Bank and curtail normal economic and
social life.
The ongoing occupation and expansion of settlements by Israel in the occupied
Syrian Golan and the restrictions imposed on the Syrian citizens living there also
continue, in violation of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge its
appreciation for the substantive contributions of the Department of Political Affairs, the United
Nations Development Programme (Programme Assistance to the Palestinian People), the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Population Fund, the United
Nations Development Fund for Women, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, the World Food Programme, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization,
the International Labour Organization and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator
for the Middle East Peace Process to the present report.
A/63/74
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2007/26, the Economic and Social Council stressed the
importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of Security
Council resolutions, including 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002),
1515 (2003) and 1544 (2004), and the principle of land for peace as well as
compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people. In
the same resolution, the Economic and Social Council urged all parties to respect
the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence against the
civilian population in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949. The Council
stressed the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of the
occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the
freedom of movement of persons and goods in the territory, including the removal
of restrictions on going to and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement
to and from the outside world. It also stressed that the wall being constructed by
Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem and dividing up the
West Bank and is seriously debilitating to the economic and social development of
the Palestinian people, and called in this regard for full compliance with legal
obligations laid out in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
rendered on 9 July 2004 (see A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1) and in General Assembly
resolution ES-10/15. In that resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and called upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those
resources; it also reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian
territory, including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and an
obstacle to economic and social development and called for the full implementation
of the relevant Security Council resolutions and requested the Secretary-General to
submit to the Assembly, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the
resolution.
2. In its resolution 62/181, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources, including land and water, and called upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, damage, cause loss or depletion of, or endanger the
natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and
in the occupied Syrian Golan. The Assembly recognized the right of the Palestinian
people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, damage, loss or depletion,
or endangerment of their natural resources resulting from illegal measures and
actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including East Jerusalem. The Assembly stressed that the wall being constructed by
Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
is contrary to international law and is seriously depriving the Palestinian people of
their natural resources, and called in this regard for full compliance with the legal
obligations stipulated in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice and in resolution ES-10/15. The Assembly called on Israel, the occupying
Power, to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,
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which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely the water and land resources,
and pose an environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian populations. The
Assembly further called upon Israel to cease its destruction of vital infrastructure,
including water pipelines and sewage networks, which, inter alia, has a negative
impact on the natural resources of the Palestinian people. The Assembly requested
the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its sixty-third session on the
implementation of the resolution.
II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem
Deaths and injuries
3. Israeli military operations in the West Bank and Gaza and attacks by
Palestinian militants continued throughout 2007. The number of Palestinians killed
as a result of the conflict declined from 678 in 2006 to 396 in 2007.1 The majority
(76 per cent) were killed in the Gaza Strip, with more than 40 per cent of those
fatalities the result of targeted killings.
4. The total number of Palestinians injured in the conflict with Israel in 2007 was
1,843, down from 3,194 in 2006.1 The majority (64 per cent) were injured in the
West Bank, predominantly by the Israeli army. In the Gaza Strip, more than 70 per
cent were injured during targeted killing or ground operations.
5. While the number of casualties of Israeli-Palestinian violence decreased by
almost half from 2006 to 2007, internal Palestinian violence increased, owing to
political discord between the two main Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah. The
total number of Palestinian deaths due to internal violence in 2007 was 490, as
compared with 146 in 2006 and 12 in 2005. Of those 490 fatalities, 454 occurred in
the Gaza Strip. The number of injuries resulting from internal fighting increased
from 130 in 2005 to 871 in 2006 and to 2,726 in 2007.1
6. While the purpose of the present report is to describe the effects of the Israeli
occupation on the Palestinian people, it is important to note that in 2007 13 Israelis
were killed in direct conflict-related incidents with Palestinian armed elements.
During the same period, 322 Israelis were injured, some of them, in the West Bank,
by other Israelis.
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
7. Administrative detention is legal under Israeli law, and military commanders
in the West Bank are empowered to detain an individual for up to six months,
extendable for unlimited additional six-month periods. Between 1999 and October
2001, the average number of Palestinians held in Israeli administrative detention
was less than 20. After October 2001, the use of administrative detention began to
increase. As at 31 December 2007, the total number of Palestinians held in Israeli
prison facilities was 8,378. Of those, 842 were being held in administrative
detention without charge or trial, as opposed to 34 Palestinians held in 2001.2
__________________
1 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Monitor, No. 20
(December 2007).
2 B’Tselem (see http://www.btselem.org/english/Administrative_Detention/Statistics.asp).
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8. A monthly average of 445 Israeli army search operations and
409 detentions/arrests in the West Bank and 4 Israeli army search operations and
99 detentions/arrests in the Gaza Strip were reported by the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
9. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA) reported that as at the end of December 2007, six West Bank
staff members were being held by the Israeli authorities. In spite of repeated written
requests, access to the detained staff has been denied. The Agency has not been
provided with full records of the Israeli military court proceedings, nor has it been
permitted to interview any of the detainees.
10. In the Gaza Strip, an UNRWA staff member was arrested by the Israeli forces
on 23 August 2007 and remains in administrative detention. One additional staff
member remained in custody following his arrest in August 2002.
Population displacement and the destruction and confiscation of property
11. Palestinians were displaced as a result of the destruction of property, the
confiscation of land and the revocation of residency permits, as well as occasional
deportation. Over the past 10 years, the Israeli authorities have demolished more
than 2,200 residences, leaving more than 13,000 Palestinians homeless.3 Between
1967 and 2006, 8,269 Palestinians had their residency rights revoked in occupied
East Jerusalem. In 2006, 1,363 Palestinian residents of occupied East Jerusalem had
their residency rights revoked, as compared with 222 in 2005 and 16 in 2004.4
12. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that
83 inhabited residential structures were demolished between February and
December 2007. Those demolitions resulted in the displacement of more than
611 Palestinians, including 235 children. In all, 39 per cent of homes were
demolished owing to the lack of building permits issued by the Israeli authorities in
the West Bank.
13. Between February and December 2007, Israeli authorities demolished
114 other structures, primarily greenhouses, animal pens and uninhabited or partly
built houses and water network facilities, mainly because of the lack of building
permits; 85 per cent of those demolitions took place in the West Bank.
14. The ongoing construction of the barrier has contributed to population
displacement throughout the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem. On
29 October 2007, the entire community of Qassa, which is in the Hebron
governorate and is located between the barrier and the Green Line, was displaced by
the Israeli army. In all, 25 families, consisting of more than 180 people, including
47 children, were forcibly removed and deposited at Tarqumiya commercial
checkpoint.5
15. In the Gaza Strip, there were 11 instances of damage caused by Israeli forces
to UNRWA facilities and property in 2007, including to seven schools. On one
occasion, Israeli soldiers entered an UNRWA school with two tanks, blindfolded and
handcuffed two UNRWA guards and proceeded to vandalize the school, including by
__________________
3 B’Tselem (see http://www.btselem.org/english/Planning_and_Building).
4 B’Tselem (see http://www.btselem.org/english/Jerusalem/Revocation_Statistics.asp).
5 Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (see A/HRC/6/NGO/54).
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urinating and defecating in the classrooms. In a separate incident, a school was hit
by an Israeli shell, which broke through the outer wall and continued through an
adjacent wall.
Barrier
16. Israel is continuing with the construction of the barrier, contrary to General
Assembly resolution ES-10/15, in which the Assembly acknowledged the advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice that the route of the barrier in the
occupied Palestinian territory was contrary to international law.
17. The current planned length of the barrier, as approved by the Israeli Cabinet in
April 2006, is 723 km — more than twice the length of the 320-km Green Line, the
internationally recognized boundary between the West Bank and Israel. The planned
length of the barrier has gradually increased: it was 670 km in 2005 and 703 km in
2006.6 As of November 2007, some 56 per cent had been constructed and 9 per cent
was under construction. Only approximately 20 per cent of the route follows the
Green Line; most of it deviates from it, in some places by as much as 22 km, into
the West Bank.
18. The route of the barrier follows Israeli settlements, dissecting the West Bank
into dozens of enclaves. This fragmentation has had a negative effect on social and
economic life for the vast proportion of Palestinian residents, who must compete
with Israeli settlers for limited resources such as land and water, while their freedom
of access and movement is restricted.
19. The western area between the barrier and the Green Line was declared a
“closed zone” by military order in October 2003. The almost 10,000 Palestinians
living in the closed area now require permanent resident permits in order to continue
to live in their own homes and may leave their communities only through a gate in
the barrier.7 These Palestinians are cut off from familial and social networks as well
as essential health and education services located on the eastern side of the barrier.
20. Non-resident Palestinians living east of the barrier who want to enter the
closed zone to gain access to agricultural land and water resources must apply for
visitor permits. Only approximately 20 per cent of the people who formerly worked
the land in the closed area now hold permits. For those granted permits, the irregular
placement and limited opening times of the gates further restrict access: of the
67 gates, only approximately 19 are open on a daily basis. Another 19 are open
seasonally (usually for the olive harvest), and 29 are never open to Palestinians.
21. Israel has largely completed the construction of a 168-km segment of the
barrier separating East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank.8 Approximately
25 per cent of Palestinians living in occupied East Jerusalem are separated by the
barrier from the city and from essential services to which they are entitled as
residents. More than 30,000 Palestinians living in villages within the municipal
boundaries are now outside the barrier. Neighbouring West Bank villages that were
__________________
6 See A/62/75-E/2007/13, para. 33, and A/61/67-E/2006/13, para. 35.
7 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Special Focus: The Barrier Gate
and Permit Regime Four Years on — Humanitarian Impact in the Northern West Bank
(November 2007).
8 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank
Barrier on Palestinian Communities: East Jerusalem, Update No. 7 (June 2007).
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once closely connected to occupied East Jerusalem, with populations of over
84,000, are also excluded by the barrier.
22. These Palestinians depend for treatment on the six non-government hospitals
in occupied East Jerusalem, which receive over 3,000 referrals annually. Tightened
restrictions have resulted in a 50 per cent drop in patient caseloads and are
preventing essential staff from reaching medical facilities. The restrictions are also
hampering the ability of 6,000 pupils and 650 teachers to reach their schools and
hundreds of thousands of people in neighbouring towns and villages to gain access
to their places of worship.
Mobility restrictions and closure policies, including access to
humanitarian assistance
23. The closure regime, which covers both internal and external closure, impedes
normal economic activity and is a main cause of the deteriorating humanitarian
situation. External closure, in the form of control of crossings out of the West Bank,
has become intimately linked with the construction of the barrier and is
progressively sealing off the West Bank from Israel. Internal closure is controlled by
Israel through the use of physical obstacles: earth mounds, trenches, roadblocks,
gates, restricted and fenced-off roads and checkpoints.
24. The Palestinian export trade in particular is affected by the closure system.
Goods must first pass through the internal closure system around the urban centres
where they are produced and then exit the West Bank via a barrier terminal. The
number of internal physical obstacles in the West Bank increased from 528 in
January 2007 to 563 in December 2007. The number of fixed physical obstacles is
augmented by flying checkpoints, of which there were on average an estimated
488 per month in 2007.
25. The closure system increases the cost of transporting basic commodities
because of the long detours necessitated by roadblocks and the back-to-back system.
In Nablus, the main commercial centre in the West Bank, only 120 trucks have
permits allowing them to be driven outside the city. The majority of trucks must
pass through the Awarta commercial crossing, currently the only back-to-back
crossing inside the West Bank. There, goods are unloaded from one truck, searched,
ferried through a barrier of concrete blocks, and loaded onto another truck on the
other side of the barrier. Israel announced in 2007 that it intended to introduce a
compulsory back-to-back system for goods throughout the West Bank.
26. Following the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in mid-June 2007, Israel
increased border closures and restrictions on the access of goods and people to and
from the Gaza Strip. This near-total isolation resulted in shortages of food and
medical and relief items, spare parts for critical health-care and water-sanitation
installations and raw materials for commerce and industry in Gaza.
27. The Agreement on Movement and Access between the Palestinian Authority
and the Government of Israel contains specific provisions for the movement of
people and goods within the occupied Palestinian territory and outside it.
28. The first of the six points of the Agreement was the reopening of the Rafah
border crossing with Egypt. From 1 January to 9 June 2007, Rafah was open for
passengers travelling in both directions only 33 per cent of scheduled days and
24.4 per cent of scheduled hours. The Rafah crossing was closed completely on
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10 June and has remained so, except for 3, 4 and 7 December, when it was opened
for the departure of Palestinian pilgrims.9 In January 2008, sections of the Rafah
border crossing were blown open by Palestinian armed elements attempting to break
the blockade. It was estimated that half of the 1.5 million residents of Gaza took the
opportunity to cross into Egypt to buy supplies.10 After talks between Hamas
representatives and Egyptian officials, on 3 February 2008 Egyptian soldiers closed
the gap, stopping any further crossing of the border into Egypt.
29. Since 12 June 2007, the Erez crossing has been closed to virtually all
Palestinians wishing to leave Gaza other than a limited number of traders, aid
workers and medical cases.9 With the closure of the Erez and Rafah crossings,
patients have been prevented from or delayed in gaining access to health care that is
not available in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, hundreds of students with places at
universities abroad, and Gazans with foreign residency, were delayed in leaving
Gaza.
30. Karni, the principal crossing for goods, was open for only about 40 per cent of
scheduled days in 2007. Imports into Gaza were increasingly restricted throughout
the year, with a 67 per cent decrease between January and December 2007. Since
12 June 2007, the crossing has been closed, except for a single-lane conveyor belt,
which functioned an average of two days per week for wheat and animal feed.
31. The Sufa crossing used to be the main passage point into Gaza for the import
of aggregates used for construction. After mid-June 2007, Sufa was also used for
importing humanitarian and commercial goods. However, no aggregates were
allowed into Gaza in 2007, halting nearly all public infrastructure and maintenance
projects. On 28 October 2007, Israel officially announced the closure of the Sufa
crossing. Overall, the crossing remained open for approximately 60 per cent of
scheduled days in 2007.
32. After the end of October 2007, Kerem Shalom became the only goods crossing
in operation. On 2 December, Israel began to allow Palestinians with foreign
residency or visas to exit Gaza through Kerem Shalom. As at 11 December,
920 persons had crossed, although 198 were refused entry to Egypt and sent back to
Gaza.11
33. The target date for establishing bus convoys to link the West Bank with the
Gaza Strip, in accordance with the Agreement on Movement and Access, was
15 December 2005. The target date for establishing truck convoys was 15 January
2006. As at the end of January 2007, neither target had been met.
34. On 28 October 2007, Israel began to limit the supply of fuel and spare parts
entering Gaza. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported
that in November 2007 there was a 40 per cent decrease in the supply of petrol, a
49 per cent decrease in the supply of diesel and a 14 per cent decrease in the supply
of industrial gasoline, which is necessary for the operation of the Gaza power plant
and the water and sewerage systems.11
__________________
9 United Nations Report No. 54, Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access
(28 November-11 December 2007).
10 BBC News, “Egypt reseals Gaza border breach”, 3 February 2008
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7224734.stm).
11 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Special Focus: The closure of the
Gaza Strip — the economic and humanitarian consequences (December 2007).
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35. The Gaza Strip requires about 240 megawatts of electrical power, of which
120 are supplied by Israel and 17 by Egypt. On 5 January 2008, the Gaza Power
Generating Company, which has the capacity to produce 80 megawatts, reduced its
power supply to the Gaza Strip by 23 megawatts, and on 20 January, it stopped
producing electricity altogether when its fuel supplies became too low for it to
continue operating. This resulted in daily power cuts of up to 8 hours — in some
areas up to 12 hours. Fuel supplies were resumed on 22 January, allowing the power
plant to produce 65 megawatts. As from that date, there were power cuts of 8 hours
per day in central Gaza, 10 hours every two days in northern Gaza and 8 hours every
two days in Gaza City.12
36. Humanitarian organizations have also faced further restrictions on the
movement of people and goods through and into the occupied Palestinian territory.
Owing to the closure of the Karni crossing, UNRWA has been forced to palletize its
goods, including food commodities, and bring them into Gaza through the
secondary crossings of Sufa and Kerem Shalom.
37. Prohibitions on the importation of building materials have resulted in the
cessation of work on $213 million worth of United Nations building projects as well
as on other, non-United Nations, projects, including the rehousing of refugees and
Gazans living in dilapidated housing and the repair and construction of public
infrastructure such as sewerage and drainage systems.
38. In the West Bank, UNRWA staff reported thousands of incidents of access
being delayed or denied, a good many of which hindered the delivery of emergency
humanitarian assistance in the form of food aid and medicines and the work of
mobile health-care and food distribution teams. Regular programmes were affected
because the movement of teachers, social workers and field office staff was
impeded, and the imposition of curfews on West Bank camps, villages and towns
further added to the disruption of agency services.
39. United Nations staff continue to face difficulties and lengthy delays crossing
into Israel at the Erez checkpoint. The hours of operation of the checkpoint were
significantly reduced in 2007, including complete closure between 2 p.m. on Fridays
and 8 a.m. on Sundays.
Israeli settlements
40. More than 38 per cent of the West Bank consists of settlements, closed military
areas or other related structures that are off-limits to Palestinians, or at least tightly
restricted.13 The settlements are linked to each other and to Israel by an extensive
road network and encircled by the barrier, which encloses approximately
69 settlements, containing 83 per cent of settlers. Palestinians for the most part are
either prevented from using those roads or have only restricted access to them. The
roads have also fragmented the West Bank, breaking it up into a series of isolated
enclaves to which Palestinians can gain access only via a network of alternative
roads, checkpoints and bridges over or tunnels under roads reserved primarily for
settlers.
__________________
12 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gaza closure: situation report”,
18-24 January 2008.
13 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The humanitarian impact on Palestinians
of Israeli settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank (July 2007).
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41. There are currently 473,000 settlers living in the West Bank and occupied East
Jerusalem (282,000 in the West Bank and 191,000 in East Jerusalem) in
132 settlements.14 In addition, there are about 100 “outposts” — settlements that
have not been authorized by the Government of Israel — populated by 3,000 Israeli
settlers. In 2001, Israel promised to evacuate all outposts established after March
2001. To date, no outposts have been fully dismantled. The settler population
continues to grow at a rate of 5.5 per cent a year, three times that of the population
of Israel itself. The majority of new arrivals settle in the large settlement blocs west
of the barrier. On the basis of the current growth rate, the settler population will
double to nearly 900,000 in just 12 years.
42. As of December 2007, there were more than 4,000 dwelling units under
construction in the West Bank.15 A new settlement outpost, comprising 27 trailers,
was under construction in February 2008 near the settlement of Eli, north of
Ramallah, reportedly on land privately owned by Palestinians. In addition, in
February 2008, it was reported that construction had been renewed without
authorization in Maskiot in the Jordan valley and that 10 settler families had moved
in.16
43. Israel planned significant settlement expansion in occupied East Jerusalem in
2007 in an attempt to establish an unbroken belt of settlement along the northern
perimeter of East Jerusalem. A plan to expand the Giva Binyamin/Adam settlement
by constructing 1,200 units for 7,000 people was reported. The new development
will be linked with the settlement of Neve Ya’acov17 in occupied East Jerusalem. A
new settlement of between 11,000 and 13,000 units — accommodation for more
than 60,000 people — was in the initial planning stages for the site of the Atarot
airport, adjacent to the barrier and the Qalandiya checkpoint. If approved, it would
be the largest settlement project in occupied East Jerusalem since June 1967. In
addition, in February 2008 Israel announced that tenders would be issued for the
construction of more than 1,000 new homes in the settlements of Har Homa and
Pisgat Ze’ev.18
Natural resources, water and environment
44. The water supply and sanitation services for Palestinians in the occupied
Palestinian territory are insufficient and unreliable in terms of quality. The overall
daily average of water consumption per capita in the West Bank in 2007 was
60 litres, down from 65.3 litres in 2006. In the Gaza Strip, overall daily
consumption in 2007 was 57.8 litres, down from 80.5 litres in 2006. This is far
below the minimum standard recommended by the World Health Organization
(WHO) of 150 litres per day. In 2007, on average 35.2 per cent of households in the
West Bank and 36.3 per cent of households in Gaza had piped water.1
__________________
14 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories,
vol. 18, No. 1 (January-February 2008).
15 Ibid., vol. 17, No. 6 (November-December 2007).
16 Ha’aretz, “Construction continuing in West Bank settlements despite PM’s pledge”, 21 February
2008.
17 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories,
vol. 17, No. 2 (March-April 2007).
18 BBC News, “Israel plans new settlement homes”, 12 February 2008
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7240557.stm).
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45. Owing to the lack of electrical power in Gaza as a result of the cuts in the fuel
supply since October 2007 and the ban on the importation of spare parts, water
wells and pumping stations throughout the Gaza Strip have been falling into
disrepair or standing idle, with the result that 15 per cent of the population has been
receiving water for only 1 or 2 hours, per day.11 As at 21 January 2008, the water
authority had only enough fuel to pump water from 40 of its 130 wells and sewage
at 21 of its 33 pumping stations. As a result, as at 23 January, about 30 per cent of
Gazans had limited access to running water12 and about 35 million litres of sewage
were entering the sea per day.19
46. In 2007, an average of 318 trees in the West Bank and 2,883 trees in the Gaza
Strip were uprooted, burned or cut down by Israeli authorities or settlers per month.
In the Gaza Strip, Israel levelled an average of 1,623 dunums of arable land per
month. In the West Bank, an average of 131 dunums of land per month were
requisitioned and an average of 126 dunums per month were levelled.1
Palestinian fiscal crisis
47. The Palestinian Authority is beginning to recover from the liquidity crisis that
followed the formation of the Hamas-led Government early in 2006. The fiscal
deficit for 2006 reached $1.2 billion, or 26 per cent of gross domestic product
(GDP). About $0.9 billion in expenditure arrears were accumulated, owed to
Government employees, who received only 60 per cent of their regular salaries in
2006, as well as to the pension fund and private sector suppliers. The accumulation
continued to rise to $1.3 billion (27 per cent of GDP) by the end of June 2007.20
48. Following the appointment of a caretaker Government in June 2007, the fiscal
situation of the Palestinian Authority started to improve, particularly after the
resumption of clearance revenues transfers by Israel in July, allowing monthly
salary payments to be resumed and back payments to Palestinian Authority
employees to be made.
Socio-economic indicators
49. Gross domestic product contracted by nearly 8 per cent in 2006. In 2007,
rebounding economic activity in the West Bank offset the decline in private sector
activity in Gaza, leading to a projected real growth in GDP of zero for 2007.
Preliminary results show a slight rise in GDP to $4.2 billion in 2007 from
$4.1 billion in 2006. On the other hand, GDP per capita is estimated to have
declined by 5 per cent in 2007 compared with 2006, and almost by 40 per cent
compared with 1999. Inflation for 2007 remains low, at about 3 per cent, as the
indicator is tied to the shekel, which has gained against the dollar since 2006.20
50. Between January 2006 and June 2007, business productivity in Gaza fell to
46 per cent of capacity. With the tightening of the closure regime in June, there was
a further drop in productivity to an average of 11 per cent of capacity.21 Nearly
95 per cent of all industrial establishments (3,705 of 3,900) have closed down since
__________________
19 Crisis Action, The Gaza Strip: A Humanitarian Implosion.
20 International Monetary Fund, “Medium-term macroeconomic and fiscal framework for the West
Bank and Gaza: report for the donors’ conference”, Paris, 17 December 2007.
21 United Nations Development Programme, “The Gaza Strip: a private sector in decline”,
December 2007.
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mid-June 2007.19 The trade deficit has reached unprecedented proportions and
stands at 73 per cent of GDP — 30 per cent higher than the 30-year average.
51. In the fourth quarter of 2007, the unemployment rate was 22.2 per cent, as
compared with 10 per cent in the third quarter of 2000. The fourth-quarter
unemployment rate was 29 per cent in Gaza and 19.2 per cent in the West Bank.
According to the relaxed definition of unemployment, which includes discouraged
workers, the overall rate of unemployment in the fourth quarter of 2007 was
28.8 per cent: 25.9 per cent in the West Bank and 35.3 per cent in Gaza.22
52. Poverty was estimated at 36.9 per cent in the second quarter of 2006, down
slightly from 38.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2005, but up from 27.7 per cent in
the first quarter of 2004.1 The decrease in 2007 as compared with 2006 was due
mainly to the resumption of Palestinian Authority salaries payments and
international donor assistance, as well as to the fact that the local economy of the
West Bank was able to generate enough private jobs to compensate slightly for those
lost in Gaza. According to the income-based definition of poverty, poverty rates
increased from 45 per cent in 2001 to 56.8 per cent in 2006: from 35.5 per cent to
49.1 per cent in the West Bank and from 64.7 per cent to 79.3 per cent in the Gaza
Strip.
Public health and food insecurity
53. Given that only basic food goods are entering Gaza and that imports and
exports have been shut down, dependency on agencies such as UNRWA and the
World Food Programme for humanitarian aid in Gaza now stands at over 80 per
cent, as compared with 63 per cent in 2006.11 In 2007, about 60 per cent of the
refugee population received emergency food aid. In addition, more than
25,000 families in the West Bank and approximately 3,000 families in the Gaza
Strip received emergency cash assistance from UNRWA in 2007.
54. While some essential food items remain available, shortages of other items
have caused drastic price increases. During 2007, the price of wheat flour increased
by 97 per cent in the West Bank and 51 per cent in the Gaza Strip.1 The price of
other basic commodities in Gaza increased sharply during May and June 2007: baby
milk by 30 per cent and rice by 20.5 per cent.19 The rise in the consumer price
index, which was relatively gentle given the sharp reduction in the supply of food to
Gaza, is attributable to a decline in both supply and demand.23 As poverty levels
increase, families have fewer funds to spend on food items.
55. In the absence of regular fuel and electricity, supplies, the ability to provide
essential and emergency health-care services rapidly diminished in the Gaza Strip in
the latter part of 2007. After the cuts in electricity and fuel supplies at the beginning
of December 2007, 11 of the hospitals operated by the Ministry of Health and most
of the primary health-care centres shut down their emergency generators. Hospitals
reported shortages of about 60 to 70 per cent in the diesel supplies required for
generating electricity.19 WHO reported that the average number of hours of daily
__________________
22 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, labour force survey for the fourth quarter of 2007,
March 2008.
23 United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Socio-economic
report”, December 2007.
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electricity in Gaza health-care facilities was 10 in North Gaza and Gaza City
districts, 4 in Mid Zone and Khan Younis districts and 2 in Rafah district.
56. 2007 was marked by a shortage of drugs, with about 40 per cent of the items
on the essential drug list at critical levels for most of the year. In the Gaza Strip, by
December 2007, 100 of 416 items on the essential drug list were at level zero. The
number of medical supply items at level zero was 203 in December 2007.1
57. In March 2007, a sewage infiltration pond in the Gaza Strip breached its banks
and tens of thousands of cubic metres of raw sewage flooded a small village in
northern Gaza, killing 5 people, injuring 25 and displacing about 2,000. The
inability of municipalities to continue to remove solid waste resulted in additional
illness and an infestation by vermin. UNRWA has been forced to support
municipalities with over 100,000 litres of diesel each month for the fleets of
vehicles required to collect solid waste.
58. As a result of strict closures and curfews in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
women trying to gain access to health care during pregnancy and childbirth were
delayed in — and in some cases completely prevented from — obtaining the care
they needed. An estimated 2,500 women per year give birth while attempting to
reach a delivery facility. Food insecurity is also adversely affecting the health of
women and children. According to the results of a study undertaken by UNRWA in
September 2006, 57.5 per cent of children aged between 6 and 36 months and
44.9 per cent of pregnant women in Gaza are anaemic.
Youth and education
59. Overall enrolment in basic education has fallen from a peak of 96.8 per cent in
2000 to 91.2 per cent in the 2006-2007 school year.24
60. Over the years, chronic violence, underfunding, and disruptions have led to a
near-collapse of the education sector in the Gaza Strip. UNRWA operates
214 schools for nearly 200,000 students in the Gaza Strip. Violence in 2007 led to
14,730 lost teaching days in UNRWA schools. The number of children who dropped
out of school in Gaza is estimated to have reached 2,000 during the second half of
2007.19 For the 2005-2006 school year, between 66 and 90 per cent of children in
the Gaza Strip failed mathematics examinations, while between 28 and 61 per cent
failed Arabic examinations.
61. In the West Bank, UNRWA schools lost 35 days during the 2006-2007 school
year. Although examination scores showed an upward trend in the 2006-2007 school
year, educational achievement continues to flag in the West Bank. For example, of
students in the eighth grade, only 45 per cent passed mathematics examinations,
56 per cent passed science examinations and 69 per cent passed Arabic
examinations.
62. As part of its strict embargo on products entering the Gaza Strip, Israel has
prohibited the importation of paper, which is required for printing textbooks for
children. Children did not receive textbooks on time in either the first or the second
semester of the 2007-2008 school year, as paper entered Gaza only after the start of
__________________
24 United Nations Children’s Fund media release, “Schools re-open to darker, colder classrooms”,
1 February 2008.
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each semester. Furthermore, as many as 40 per cent of children in Gaza are suffering
from insomnia and 34 per cent are suffering from anxiety.25
Status of women
63. The literacy rate for women was 89.8 per cent in 2006, an increase of 7 per
cent from 2000. The literacy rate for men was 97.1 per cent, an increase of 2.9 per
cent from 2000.26
64. The enrolment rate in basic education is higher for women than it is for men,
but decreased from 98 per cent in 2000-2001 to 90 per cent in 2006-2007. Fewer
women than men attain a higher degree: the percentage of women with bachelors
degrees was 6.2 per cent in 2006, compared with 9.6 per cent for men.
65. The participation rate for women in the labour force was only 16.6 per cent in
the second quarter of 2007, as compared with 67.8 per cent for men. The
employment rate for women has increased, however, from 10.3 per cent in 2001.
66. Worsening socio-economic conditions in the Gaza Strip seem to be causing
increased levels of violence against women. According to the United Nations
Children’s Fund, two in five women reported being victims of violence in Gaza in
2007, up from one in five in 2006. There were 12 honour killings in Gaza, up from
4 in 2004.25
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
67. The Syrian Golan, which measures about 1,250 km2, has been under Israeli
occupation since 1967. The decision of the Government of Israel to annex the
occupied Syrian Golan was deemed illegal by the Security Council in its resolution
497 (1981). Israel prevents the return of the Arab population of the occupied Syrian
Golan expelled in 1967, which at that time comprised approximately 130,000 Syrian
citizens living in about 200 villages and farms. As of March 2007, the population of
Syrian Arabs was down to an estimated 21,000 persons living in five main towns.
The Golan also has about 20,000 Israeli settlers.27
68. In August 2007, the Syrian Arab Republic reported that the number of Israeli
settlements in the Golan had increased to 45. As part of a new settlement campaign,
plans were announced for the construction of 300 new housing units in the occupied
Golan, and the land department of Israel put 2,500 dunums of land up for sale to
settlers. In mid-April 2007, the Alonei Habashan settlement announced the sale of
housing units built on the ruins of the Arab village of Juwayza, at a cost of
$27,000 each.28
__________________
25 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Humanitarian Action Update: Occupied Palestinian Territory”,
17 December 2007.
26 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Women and Men in Palestine: Issues and Statistics
(August 2007).
27 International Committee of the Red Cross operational update, “ICRC activities in the occupied
Golan”, 22 March 2007.
28 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/62/360), para. 74.
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69. As of August 2007, 15 Syrian citizens of the Golan were held in Israeli
prisons, accused of resisting the occupation. A further two were arrested by the
Israeli authorities at the end of July 2007, after a police raid on the villages of
Majdal Shams and Buq’ata. The Israeli authorities have repeatedly refused requests
from international institutions, including the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to visit Syrian Arab prisoners.29
70. Landmines continue to pose a threat to Syrian Arab villagers of the occupied
Golan. On 27 November 2006, in the unoccupied part of Quneitra, a mine in the
form of a child’s toy exploded, and two children from the village of Al-Jarran
received injuries to the chest and eyes. In an area between Khan Arnbah village and
Baath City, four children were injured on 23 December 2006 by the explosion of a
mine that looked like a cube-shaped child’s toy.30
71. According to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel has
embarked on a project to dispose of nuclear waste in the Golan, in an underground
facility close to Mount Hermon. This claim has not been verified by any
independent source.
72. According to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian citizens of
the occupied Golan have restricted access to water. Farmers receive only 25 per cent
of the amount of water they need to grow apples, which has a negative effect on the
agricultural output of Arab land.31 They are reportedly not permitted to dig wells or
to build cisterns for the storage of rainwater or snow water. The Syrian residents are
also prohibited from using the waters of Lake Mas’adah, which is diverted for the
use of Israeli settlements.32 According to information provided by the Government
of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Israeli authorities impose disproportionately high
taxes on Syrian Arab farmers in the Golan, sometimes equal to 50 per cent of the
value of the crops being taxed. Through their assistance efforts, the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and ICRC facilitated the transfer of about
10,000 tons of apples to Syrian markets through a system of back-to-back
trucking.31
73. For the Syrian residents of the occupied Golan, travel to the Syrian Arab
Republic for religious, educational or family purposes is severely restricted by the
Israeli authorities. UNDOF and the ICRC provide assistance and coordination,
working with both the Israeli and the Syrian authorities, to facilitate the passage of
persons through the area of separation. During 2007, UNDOF assisted in the
crossing of 670 students, 500 pilgrims, 2 brides and 5 other civilians. UNDOF also
provided health-care services to 243 villagers and medical treatment to
116 civilians. In addition, UNDOF assisted in the handover from Israeli forces to the
__________________
29 Ibid., para. 76.
30 Ibid., para. 77.
31 The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories (Geneva, International Labour Office,
2007). Appendix to the report of the Director-General, International Labour Conference,
96th session, 2007.
32 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/62/360), para. 75.
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Syrian authorities of one Syrian civilian who had crossed into the Israeli-occupied
Golan.33
74. The five Syrian Arab towns in the Golan have 12 schools that are overcrowded
and ill-equipped such that they provide an unhealthy environment for children. The
Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reports that Syrian Arab professionals,
including medical doctors and pharmacists, are denied licences to work in the
Golan, prompting many of them to migrate. Arab residents in the Golan are
reportedly required to accept Israeli nationality if they wish to seek employment.
Furthermore, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic asserts that Syrian Arab
labourers in the Golan suffer from discrimination in favour of their Israeli
counterparts, with comparatively poor working conditions and lower wages.
75. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has also reported that the Israeli
authorities have prohibited the establishment of any Arab print press in the Golan
and impose strict censorship on books and other printed materials. That claim has
not been verified by any independent source.
IV. Conclusions
76. While the number of casualties of Israeli-Palestinian violence decreased by
almost half compared with 2006-2007, a combination of intensified closures and
sanctions imposed by Israel and increased Palestinian internal conflict led to the
measurable deepening of the socio-economic crisis in the occupied Palestinian
territory in 2007. All economic, social and public health indicators reveal that
standards in living conditions are declining and that there is social and spatial
dismemberment, growing despair and increased violence against fellow Palestinians.
Residents of the Gaza Strip have become almost completely isolated from the
outside world, with access to only basic commodities and humanitarian items.
77. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have declared that the
Israeli decision to annex the Golan is null and void.34 Nevertheless, in 2007 Israel
continued its expansion of settlements and violation of the rights of the Syrian
residents of the occupied Syrian Golan.
78. The situation in the occupied Palestinian territory prompted the United Nations
country team to launch the 2008 consolidated appeal, which, at $454 million,
represents an 8.51 per cent increase from the level of the 2007 appeal. The
2008 consolidated appeal focuses on four main issues with a view to sustaining
livelihoods and preventing further deterioration: (a) humanitarian aid; (b) the
protection of civilians and the implementation of international humanitarian law;
(c) humanitarian monitoring and reporting; and (d) the strengthening of United
Nations humanitarian coordination. While those measures are aimed at stabilizing
socio-economic conditions, they are not expected to contribute to the long-term
improvement of such conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory.
__________________
33 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (for the
period from 2 December 2006 to 6 June 2007) (S/2007/331), paras. 3 and 4; report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (for the period from
7 June to 31 December 2007) (S/2007/698), paras. 3 and 4.
34 Security Council resolution 497 (1981); General Assembly resolution 61/27.
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79. In his message of 19 February 2008 to the United Nations Seminar on
Assistance to the Palestinian People, the Secretary-General reiterated the United
Nations position that only a permanent political settlement which ends the
occupation and gives Palestinians their independence can fundamentally alter the
economic and humanitarian problems of the Palestinian people. He stressed that the
key ingredients for a breakthrough existed, pointing to bilateral negotiations and the
support of donors. Finally, he expressed his belief that with the right mixture of
wisdom, realism and political courage, historic progress towards the vision of two
States, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, could be made.
United Nations A/64/77–E/2009/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
7 May 2009
Original: English
09-33040 (E) 020609
*0933040*
General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Item 41 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2009
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 2008/31, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 63/201, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a
report to it at its sixty-fourth session. The present report, which has been prepared
by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in response
to the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council.
* A/64/50.
** E/2009/100.
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2 09-33040
Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan*
Summary
The occupation of Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, the use of
arbitrary detention, the disproportionate use of force, house demolitions, severe
mobility restrictions, lack of building permits and closure policies continue to
intensify the economic and social hardship of the Palestinian residents of the occupied
Palestinian territory. Internal Palestinian conflict has also continued to cause
casualties and disrupted the delivery of essential services to the population.
Attacks by Palestinian militants and the launching of rockets into Israeli cities
from the Gaza Strip continued in 2008, as did Israeli military operations. In December
2008, the Israeli army launched a 22-day military operation in the Gaza Strip that
killed a reported 1,440 people and injured 5,380, and gravely deepened the existing
humanitarian and economic crisis caused by the ongoing blockade imposed by Israel
on the Gaza Strip, which has remained isolated since June 2007, with rapidly
deteriorating conditions, a near collapse of the private sector and shortages of
essentials such as food, electricity and fuel.
The Israeli closure system remains a primary cause of poverty and humanitarian
crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory, and restricts Palestinian access to natural
resources, including land, basic social services, employment, markets and social and
religious networks. However, despite those constraints, the Palestinian Authority
managed to make some progress in areas such as security, public financial
management, local public infrastructure and health and education services, not least
because it was able to fully pay civil servants every month.
Israeli settlement and outpost expansion, land confiscation and the construction
of a barrier in the occupied Palestinian territory, contrary to the road map and the
Geneva Convention and other norms of international law, isolate occupied East
Jerusalem, severely intrude into the West Bank and curtail economic and social life.
The ongoing occupation and expansion of settlements by Israel in the occupied
Syrian Golan since 1967, in violation of Security Council resolution 497 (1981), and
the restrictions imposed on the Syrian citizens living there also continue to create
economic and social hardship for the Syrian Arab residents.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge its
appreciation for the substantive contributions to the present report of the Department for Political
Affairs, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations
Population Fund, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Labour
Organization and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace
Process.
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2008/31, the Economic and Social Council stressed the
importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of Security
Council resolutions, including 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002),
1515 (2003) and 1544 (2004), and the principle of land for peace, as well as
compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people. The
Economic and Social Council called for the lifting of the severe restrictions imposed
on the Palestinian people, including those arising from ongoing Israeli military
operations, and for other urgent measures to be taken to alleviate the humanitarian
situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, especially the Gaza Strip. The Council
stressed the need to preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of the
occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the
freedom of movement of persons and goods in the territory, including the removal
of restrictions on going to and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement
to and from the outside world. In the same resolution, the Economic and Social
Council called upon all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law
and to refrain from violence against the civilian population, in accordance with the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949.
2. The Council called upon Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction
of homes and properties, economic institutions and agricultural lands and orchards
in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the
occupied Syrian Golan. It reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan, are
illegal and an obstacle to economic and social development, and called for full
implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and compliance by
Israel, the occupying Power, with international law, including the Fourth Geneva
Convention. It also stressed that the wall being constructed by Israel in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to
international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank and
seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian
people, and called in this regard for full compliance with legal obligations laid out
in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered on 9 July 2004
(see A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1) and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15. It
requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly at its sixty-third session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution.
3. In its resolution 63/201, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources, including land and water, and called upon Israel, the
occupying Power, not to exploit, damage, cause loss or depletion of, or endanger the
natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and
in the occupied Syrian Golan. The Assembly recognized the right of the Palestinian
people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, damage, loss or depletion,
or endangerment of their natural resources resulting from illegal measures and
actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including East Jerusalem. The Assembly stressed that the wall being constructed by
Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem,
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is contrary to international law and is seriously depriving the Palestinian people of
access to their natural resources, and called in this regard for full compliance with
the legal obligations stipulated in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice and in resolution ES-10/15. The Assembly called on
Israel, the occupying Power, to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in
the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their water and land resources, and pose an
environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian populations. The Assembly
further called upon Israel to cease its destruction of vital infrastructure, including
water pipelines and sewerage networks, which, inter alia, has a negative impact on
the natural resources of the Palestinian people. The Assembly requested the
Secretary-General to submit a report at its sixty-fourth session on the
implementation of the resolution.
II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem
Deaths and injuries
4. The Israeli army continued to launch military operations in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip. Attacks by Palestinian militants and the launching of rockets into
Israeli cities from the Gaza Strip continued in 2008. The number of casualties
caused by the conflict has risen dramatically, mainly as a result of a series of Israeli
military operations in the Gaza Strip, culminating in “Operation Cast Lead”, which
began on 27 December 2008. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs reported that casualties in the West Bank were related to settler-related
violence, anti-barrier demonstrations, search and arrest operations, military patrols
and Israeli army undercover operations. Between January 2008 and 19 January
2009, at least 1,766 Palestinians were killed as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, as compared with 396 in 2007. The majority, 1,715 — of whom 469 were
children — were killed in the Gaza Strip. The number of Palestinians injured during
the same period was 7,164, as compared with 1,843 in 2007. The majority, 5,814 —
of whom at least 1,886 were children — were injured in the Gaza Strip.
5. During the 22 days of the Israeli military operation “Cast Lead”, the
population of Gaza endured intensive and almost uninterrupted aerial
bombardments, artillery shelling and ground operations, resulting in the deaths of
1,440 people and injury to 5,380, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health in
Gaza. Of those killed, 431 were children and 114 were women; 1,872 of those
injured were children and 800 were women.
6. While not directly a result of occupation, Palestinian internal conflict has also
caused casualties. From January to October 2008, 106 Palestinians were killed and
573 injured as a result of internal violence.1
7. While the purpose of the present report is to describe the effects of the Israeli
occupation on the Palestinian people, it is important to note that between September
2000 and December 2008, a reported 580 Israelis — 490 civilians and 90 security
force personnel — were killed by Palestinians.2 In 2008, 12 Israelis were killed and
__________________
1 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, protection of civilians database (figures to
the end of 2008 are not yet available).
2 B’Tselem (see http://www.btselem.org/english).
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23 injured between 1 January and 26 December, the date of the initiation of
Operation Cast Lead. During Operation Cast Lead, the lives of approximately
1 million Israeli citizens living within 40 km of the border of the Gaza Strip were
threatened by Palestinian rocket and mortar fire. Three Israeli civilians were killed
and 182 injured. Ten Israeli military personnel were killed.3
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
8. On 3 February 2009, 7,951 Palestinians were reported to be detained in Israeli
prisons, of whom 374 were minors, 50 of them under the age of 16. Of those,
564 Palestinian prisoners, including 5 children, are “administrative detainees”
(detention without charge or trial).4 As at the end of November 2008, more than
60 Palestinian women and more than 300 Palestinian children were reportedly being
held in custody in Israeli prisons. In the West Bank, the Israeli authorities carried
out at least 4,878 search operations and 3,896 detentions between 1 February and
31 December 2008. In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army carried out 51 search
operations and made 684 arrests.
Population displacement and property destruction and confiscation
9. Palestinians are displaced as a result of property destruction, land confiscation
and the revocation of residency permits, as well as occasional deportation. During
the first quarter of 2008, Israeli authorities demolished 124 structures in the West
Bank because of a lack of permits. As 61 of the structures were residential, their
demolition led to the displacement of 435 Palestinians, including at least
135 children. Most of the demolitions were carried out in January. The Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded the demolition of
204 Palestinian-owned structures, including 108 residential structures, between
February and December 2008. Those demolitions led to the displacement of more
than 400 Palestinians. A total of 95 per cent of those demolitions were carried out
because of the lack of a building permit, which is required by the Israeli authorities.
Permits are seldom issued and very difficult for Palestinians to obtain, forcing many
to build without them. During the first half of 2008, Israeli authorities demolished
37 homes in the Gaza Strip for military purposes, rendering 141 Palestinians,
including 67 children, homeless.5
10. Displacement in the West Bank is also a result of the construction of the
barrier. A survey conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics found
that by June 2008, 27,841 people had been displaced since the beginning of the
construction of the barrier, as compared with the 2005 figure of 14,364.
11. In the first 10 months of 2008, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs recorded 290 settler-related incidents targeting Palestinians
and their property. It should be noted that, while not comprehensive, that total
__________________
3 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Protection of Civilians Weekly Report”,
16-20 January 2009, p.1; The Humanitarian Monitor, No. 33 (January 2009).
4 Palestinian Authority contribution; B’Tselem (see http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/
Minors_in_Custody.asp and http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Detainees_and_Prisoners.asp).
5 Palestinian Authority contribution; B’Tselem (see http://www.btselem.org/english/
planning_and_building.
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surpasses the number recorded by the Office in each of the previous two years
(182 and 243 in 2006 and 2007, respectively).6
12. During the course of the Israeli operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, tens of
thousands of Palestinians were internally displaced. The human rights
non-governmental organization Al Mezan estimated that, as at 15 January, at least
200,000 people had been displaced. Surveys conducted immediately after the
ceasefire indicated that between 37 and 38 per cent of Gazans — over half a million
people — had fled their homes at some point during the conflict for at least a short
period of time. A survey led by the United Nations Development Programme of
damaged and destroyed housing throughout Gaza conducted immediately following
the ceasefire there, found that 3,354 houses had been completely destroyed and
11,112 houses were partially damaged. While the vast majority of the displaced
stayed with relatives or friends, many were housed in schools and facilities of the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA). By 17 January, just prior to the commencement of the ceasefire,
UNRWA was hosting close to 51,000 displaced persons in 50 emergency shelters.
13. During Operation Cast Lead, 52 UNRWA installations in Gaza were damaged
by Israeli fire. On 15 January, the main UNRWA compound in Gaza City was
directly hit by several Israeli shells. Hundreds of tons of food and medicine were
destroyed. Approximately 700 Palestinians taking refuge in the building had to be
evacuated. According to UNRWA, the shell that struck the building contained white
phosphorus.7 Preliminary estimates indicate that the cost of repairs to damaged
Agency installations will exceed $3 million, not including the cost of replacement
supplies and equipment. Losses in supplies are estimated at $3.6 million. It should
be noted that other United Nations agencies, namely the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Food Programme (WFP), reported damage to
their offices and warehouses as a result of Operation Cast Lead.
Barrier
14. The total length of the barrier, as approved by the Israeli Cabinet in April
2006, is 723 km, more than twice as long as the 320 km Armistice Line of 1949
(Green Line). The majority of the route, approximately 87 per cent, runs inside the
West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem, rather than along the Green Line. General
Assembly resolution ES-10/15 acknowledged the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice to the effect that the route of the barrier in the
occupied Palestinian territory is contrary to international law.
15. The barrier intrudes significantly into the West Bank, looping around
settlements and fragmenting the West Bank into non-contiguous enclaves of
Palestinian territory, isolated from the rest of the West Bank. By September 2008,
57 per cent of the barrier had been constructed, passing through 171 Palestinian
communities and displacing 27,841 people in 3,880 families. The Israeli authorities
have confiscated 49,291 dunums8 of land for the construction of the barrier, most of
__________________
6 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Special Focus: Unprotected —
Israeli settler violence against Palestinian civilians and their property (December 2008).
7 United Nations News Centre, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29558&Cr=gaza&Cr1=
unrwa#.
8 One dunum = 1,000 m2.
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which lie in the northern West Bank, which contains the most fertile lands. The
barrier has also segregated 274,607 dunums from their owners.9
16. In the northern West Bank, the area between the barrier and the Green Line
was declared a closed zone by military order in October 2003. Approximately
10,000 Palestinians residing in these areas have become physically separated from
the rest of the West Bank. The majority require “permanent resident” permits from
the Israeli military to continue to live in their own homes. Health and education
services are generally located on the other side of the barrier, so children, patients
and workers have to pass through gates in order to reach schools, medical facilities
and workplaces and to maintain family and social relations. When complete,
approximately 35,000 West Bank Palestinians will be located in between the barrier
and the Green Line, as will the majority of the approximately 250,000 Palestinian
residents of occupied East Jerusalem. The percentage of Palestinian households
displaced by the barrier has increased by 58 per cent since 2005, and the areas
completely closed increased by 50 per cent.10
17. The barrier also isolates the land and water resources of an ever larger number
of Palestinians, in particular farmers, who now require “visitor” permits to access
their lands through designated gates. In the northern West Bank, permit
requirements have become more stringent over the years. Fewer than 20 per cent of
those who used to farm their lands in the closed area are now granted permits.11 For
the minority who are granted permits, access is through one of the approximately
70 designated barrier gates and checkpoints which open on a daily, weekly or
seasonal basis. There are also restrictions on the passage of vehicles, agricultural
equipment and materials. The restrictions resulting from the permit and gate regime
severely curtail opportunities for cultivation, which has a negative impact on
agricultural practice and rural livelihoods.
18. The barrier isolates densely populated Palestinian localities currently inside
the Jerusalem municipal boundary from the city, while physically separating
neighbouring West Bank villages that were once closely connected to occupied East
Jerusalem. The completion of the barrier around the Ma’ale Adumim settlement bloc
will physically separate occupied East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and
will further restrict access by Palestinians to workplaces, health, education and other
services and places of worship.
19. Further south, the barrier already separates Bethlehem from occupied East
Jerusalem. Construction of the barrier around the Gush Etzion settlement bloc will
sever the territorial contiguity of Bethlehem and curtail its potential for natural
growth. It will also separate the city from its agricultural hinterland, which
comprises nine Palestinian communities of approximately 22,000 residents, who
will face restricted access to services in Bethlehem, including markets, health
services and higher education.
__________________
9 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
10 Ibid.
11 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Special Focus: The Barrier Gate
and Permit Regime Four Years On — Humanitarian Impact in the Northern West Bank
(November 2007).
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Mobility restrictions and closure policies, including access to
humanitarian assistance
West Bank access in 2008
20. Palestinian restrictions on movement have remained severely constrained. In
its latest survey, completed on 11 September 2008, the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs documented 630 closure obstacles blocking internal
Palestinian movement, including 93 staffed checkpoints and 537 unstaffed obstacles
(roadblocks, earth mounds, road barriers and so forth).12 The weekly average
number of “flying” (random) checkpoints in 2008 stood at 73. The survey also
found that almost three quarters of the main routes leading into the 18 most
populated Palestinian cities and towns in the West Bank and almost half of the
alternate routes were either blocked or controlled by an Israeli army checkpoint.
21. The closure obstacles constitute only one of several layers of a complex
system of movement restrictions. The barrier also plays a major role in that system.
Approximately 21 per cent of the West Bank has been declared “closed military
zone” over the years, and an additional 3 per cent lies within the outer limits of
149 Israeli settlements and industrial zones, largely inaccessible to Palestinians.
22. Access by Palestinians to occupied East Jerusalem is prohibited by Israeli law,
except for those Palestinians who hold an Israeli identity card or a special permit,
which is rarely granted. In the Ramallah district, Israeli authorities have constructed
a road system which effectively diverts Palestinian traffic away from primary roads
in the occupied territory, which are now reserved for the exclusive use of Israelis.
That exclusion is reinforced by hundreds of physical obstacles restricting access by
Palestinians to primary roads.
23. The Israeli authorities have reduced from 12 to 4 the number of crossings
through which the United Nations is authorized to import goods from Israel to the
West Bank. Israeli security staff at checkpoints cause United Nations staff to
experience delays, most of which are due to requests that go against the agreed
privileges and immunities of the United Nations. A peak in the number of incidents
occurred in April 2008 (181 incidents).
24. In the West Bank, a considerable number of the 918 incidents of delayed or
denied access reported by UNRWA staff in 2008 affected the delivery of emergency
humanitarian assistance, including the transportation of food aid, medicine, mobile
health teams and food distribution teams. The number of access incidents reported
in 2008 (918) was nearly four times as high as in 2007 (231). Those affected
included teachers, doctors and nurses, social workers and field office staff, this had
a negative impact on the delivery of education and health services and relief
operations. UNRWA reported that its West Bank field office lost an estimated
2,199 workdays in 2008 as a result of access restrictions.
Restrictions on access to and from the Gaza Strip
25. The blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip following the forceful Hamas
takeover of Gaza in June 2007 continued throughout 2008. The Government of
__________________
12 This figure does not include 8 checkpoints located on the Green Line, 69 obstacles located in the
Israeli-controlled section of Hebron City (H-2) and 56 gates along the West Bank barrier.
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Israel has expressed concern that arms were being smuggled through the borders of
the Gaza Strip and that rocket and mortar fire continued from the Gaza Strip into
Israel during the reporting period. The main components of the blockade are the
closure of Karni, the largest commercial crossing; the suspension of all exports and
most industrial/non-humanitarian imports; a severe reduction in the amount of fuel
allowed to enter; an almost total ban on the movement of Palestinians through Erez,
the sole passenger crossing with Israel and the West Bank; and a partial closure of
the Rafah crossing point, the only passenger crossing point with Egypt. This
blockade has created a deep humanitarian crisis leading to the widespread erosion of
livelihoods and a significant deterioration in infrastructure and essential services.
26. The daily average of truckloads allowed into the Gaza Strip during 2008
through official crossings stood at approximately 100, about one fifth of the number
allowed in May 2007, immediately before the beginning of the blockade
(475 truckloads a day). Throughout the year, Israel also continued to place
restrictions on the type of commodities allowed to enter, damaging the Gaza Strip’s
already depressed private sector and compromising the provision of basic services.
27. The Erez crossing — the only passage for movement of people between the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank via Israel — remained inaccessible for the large
majority of the Palestinian population, with the exception of a small number of
businessmen and emergency medical cases holding special permits. United Nations
staff continued to face difficulties crossing at the Erez checkpoint from Gaza into
Israel.
28. The Rafah crossing, which connects the Gaza Strip with Egypt, has remained
officially closed since June 2007. However, the crossing has been opened by the
Egyptian authorities for a few days every month to allow the movement of limited
numbers of medical patients, pilgrims, students and political delegations.
29. As a result of the Israeli military operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, on
8 January 2009 the Security Council adopted resolution 1860 (2009), calling for an
immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza and for unimpeded
provision of humanitarian assistance, and condemning all violence directed against
civilians. The Council also called for efforts to prevent illicit trafficking in arms and
to ensure sustained reopening of crossing points on the basis of the 2005 Agreement
on Movement and Access between the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
30. Since the cessation of Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli authorities have
allowed only selected international aid workers into the Gaza Strip. According to the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, of the 178 requests to enter the
Gaza Strip submitted by international non-governmental organizations during
January 2009, only 18 requests for medical staff were approved.
The humanitarian and socio-economic impact of the Israeli military operation
Cast Lead
31. By April 2009, the closure had not been lifted, and the flow of goods and cash
into the Gaza Strip continue to be severely restricted. An alternative tunnel
economy, largely regulated by Hamas, has developed in Rafah along the Egypt-Gaza
border, with estimates of the number of active tunnels ranging from 200 to 600.
These were targeted by Israeli air strikes starting in December 2008 because of
suspicions that arms were being smuggled through the tunnels. Following the
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ceasefire, operations are reported to have resumed in many of the tunnels, supplying
the market with a range of goods, including fuel.
32. During Operation Cast Lead, the limited supply of fuel allowed into the Gaza
Strip from Israel, combined with damage incurred to main power lines and
transformers, the limited access for technical teams to damaged areas and the
closure of the power plant, rendered more than 60 per cent of the population of the
Gaza Strip without electricity during the three-week period of military operations.
33. The power outages, coupled with the severe shortage of fuel and spare parts
for backup generators, have disabled parts of the water and sanitation system. On
27 December, about 80 per cent of the Gaza Strip’s water wells were partially
functioning and the rest were non-functional. The lack of fuel and spare parts forced
the Gaza water utility to discharge millions of litres of raw sewage into the sea
every day, resulting in significant environmental damage, including to marine life.
34. At the height of Operation Cast Lead, approximately 500,000 Palestinians in
the Gaza Strip did not have access to running water, as the Coastal Municipalities
Water Utility was unable to repair damage to water and wastewater networks. A
further 500,000 people received water for only a few hours a week, and the
remaining population received water for between 4 and 6 hours every 2 or 3 days.
35. Damage to sewerage networks and pumping stations affected thousands of
people, with raw sewage flooding some streets. On 10 January 2009, the Gaza City
wastewater treatment plant was hit during military operations. As a result, one pond
treatment embankment was severely damaged, causing the leakage of 200,000 m3 of
wastewater into the nearby agricultural fields. Moreover, one of the plant’s sewage
pipelines was also hit and damaged on the same day. The damage resulted in the
leakage of an estimated 20,000 m3 per day until 23 January.
36. Preliminary findings of the Palestinian Hydrology Group initial rapid needs
assessment of households showed that some 5,700 rooftop tanks were completely
destroyed and 2,900 damaged. in a couple of areas, 50 per cent of the water
networks were destroyed, while other areas sustained damage to 30 to 35 per cent of
their water networks.
37. The Gaza Strip health-care system faced serious challenges during Operation
Cast Lead. Medical facilities were repeatedly struck during bombardments, and
medical staff were themselves victims of some attacks. In the course of the threeweek
military operation, 16 medical personnel were killed and 26 were injured
while on duty. The Israeli bombardment damaged or destroyed 29 ambulances and
hit medical facilities. Of the 122 health facilities in the Gaza Strip, 48 per cent were
either damaged or destroyed by direct or indirect shelling. On 20 March 2009, all
Gaza Strip patient referrals for treatment outside of the Gaza Strip were halted
owing to the refusal of the Palestinian Ministry of Health to approve applications
issued by the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health Referral Department in the Gaza
Strip.13
38. The three weeks of continuous bombardment by air, land and sea has also had
a serious detrimental psychosocial impact on residents of the Gaza Strip,
particularly on children.
__________________
13 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs/World Health Organization, joint statement
of concern over the halting of Gaza medical patient referrals (30 March 2009).
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39. Of particular concern is the impact of the conflict on chronically ill patients. It
is estimated that the treatment of 40 per cent of such patients was interrupted as a
result of the fact that life-threatening injuries were accorded higher priority in the
overwhelmed system. The referral of chronically ill patients to Israeli and West
Bank hospitals came to an almost complete halt during the course of the military
operations.
40. The United Nations issued a flash appeal on 5 February 2009 amounting to
$613 million. The appeal incorporates 106 non-governmental organizations and 82
United Nations projects to respond to the emergency humanitarian and early
recovery needs of 1.4 million people in Gaza over a period of nine months in the
areas of education, agriculture, health and food security, among others. Despite the
assurances by the Government of Israel that humanitarian goods would be allowed
into the Gaza Strip, by April 2009 the United Nations was still unable to implement
large parts of the flash appeal owing to the refusal to permit the entry of necessary
goods and personnel.
Israeli settlements
41. From 1967 to the end of 2007, Israel established 120 settlements in the West
Bank, excluding occupied East Jerusalem, which were recognized by the Ministry of
the Interior of Israel as Israeli “communities” within the occupied territory. Twelve
other settlements are located on land annexed by Israel in 1967 and made part of the
Israeli municipality of Jerusalem. In addition, there are approximately 100
“outposts”, which are settlements unauthorized and unrecognized by the Israeli
authorities. As a result, almost 40 per cent of the West Bank is currently taken up by
Israeli infrastructure associated with the settlements, including roads, barriers,
buffer zones and military bases.
42. At the end of 2008, an estimated 193,700 Israeli settlers were living in
occupied East Jerusalem,14 while approximately 289,600 Israeli settlers were living
in the West Bank.15 A study by Ariel University Centre of Samaria revealed that
over a period of 12 years, the settler population in the West Bank grew by 107 per
cent, from 130,000 in 1995 to 270,000 at the end of 2007. In 2008, the number of
tenders issued in occupied East Jerusalem increased by a factor of nearly 40 as
compared with 2007.16
43. During 2008, 1,518 new Israeli structures were constructed in the West Bank,
61 per cent of them west of the barrier and 39 per cent east of it. Those structures
include 748 permanent buildings in Israeli settlements, as compared with 800 in
2007, marking a 60 per cent increase.17
44. In March 2009, Peace Now, an Israeli non-governmental organizations,
revealed that the Government of Israel had already approved the construction of at
least 15,000 housing units in the occupied Palestinian territory, while approval was
pending for plans for an additional 58,000 housing units. Of those housing units,
5,722 are planned for occupied East Jerusalem. If those plans materialize, the
__________________
14 B’Tselem (see http://www.btselem.org/english/Settlements/Statistics.asp).
15 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (see http://www.cbs.gov.il/population/new_2009/table1.pdf).
16 European Union heads of mission report on East Jerusalem.
17 Peace Now, “Summary of Construction in the West Bank 2008”, available at
http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=61&docid=3508&pos=1.
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number of settlers in the occupied territory will be doubled (an addition of
approximately 300,000 settlers, based on an average of 4 people in each housing
unit).18
Natural resources, water and environment
45. The water supply and sanitation services for Palestinians in the occupied
Palestinian territory continue to be insufficient and unreliable in terms of quality
and quantity. The Israeli authorities and water utility companies withdraw water
from sources within the occupied Palestinian territory to supply Israeli cities, and
then sell the surplus back to Palestinians. Preliminary data from the Palestinian
Water Authority indicates that water purchased by Palestinians in the West Bank for
domestic use from the Israeli water company Mekorot amounted to 47.8 million m3
in 2008.19 Israel prevents Palestinians from drawing water from the Jordan River,
while itself using 86 per cent of renewable underground water sources in Palestinian
areas. In addition, 35 Palestinian wells have become isolated by the barrier and thus
unavailable to Palestinians.
46. According to the Israeli non-governmental organizations Yesh Din, 11 Israeli
corporations are illegally operating quarries in the West Bank. Yesh Din alleges that
75 per cent of the output from the quarries is for the use of the Israeli construction
industry, in violation of the obligations of Israel under international law to protect
and preserve the national resources of the West Bank.20
Socio-economic indicators
47. The occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continues to cause
socio-economic hardship for the Palestinian population. Poverty levels in the Gaza
Strip for 2007 are estimated at 80 per cent of households, as compared with 45 per
cent in the West Bank.21 While data on 2008 poverty levels are not yet available, the
humanitarian crisis, severe restrictions on the entry of goods and humanitarian aid
and cash shortages in the Gaza Strip suggest that poverty levels for 2008 will
increase even further. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,
unemployment (relaxed definition, which includes those not actively seeking work)
rose from 32.7 per cent in the third quarter of 2008 to 33.4 per cent in the fourth
quarter, with 48.8 per cent unemployed in the Gaza Strip, as compared with 26 per
cent in the West Bank.22 Inflation has risen dramatically, from about 1 per cent in
2007 to about 7 per cent in December 2008, which has further strained the coping
strategies of the poor.21
48. The reduction in the number of imports and the ban on exports have had a
destructive impact on the livelihoods of the population of the Gaza Strip. According
to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, about 95 per cent of
__________________
18 Peace Now, “Ministry of Housing’s Plans for the West Bank — March 2009”, available at
http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=61&docid=3566.
19 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release on the occasion of World Water Day,
22 March 2009.
20 See www.yesh-din.org/site/index.php?lang=en.
21 International Monetary Fund, Macroeconomic and fiscal framework for the West Bank and
Gaza: third review of progress (February 2009), p. 2.
22 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, labour force survey for the fourth quarter of 2008
(February 2009).
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industrial operations had already been suspended by the end of 2007. On the eve of
the military operation of December 2008, an estimated 23 out of 3,900 industries
were operating and an estimated 34,000 workers in the industrial sector had lost
their jobs. The blockade paralysed large parts of the agricultural sector. Repeated
Israeli incursions into the Gaza Strip have damaged land, crops and equipment and
rendered large agricultural areas located in the so-called buffer zone off-limits to
Palestinians. The lack of cash flow into the Gaza Strip has rendered Palestinian
Authority employees, pensioners and social hardship cases unable to collect their
salaries, pensions and welfare payments in cash.
49. Initial estimates by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics put direct
economic losses resulting from infrastructure and property destruction from
Operation Cast Lead at approximately $1.4 billion by 13 January 2008 for the first
17 days of the operation. Income losses are estimated at $24 million per day. For the
17-day period, the cumulative loss is estimated to be approximately $408 million.
This represents 80 per cent of the annual gross domestic product (GDP) of the Gaza
Strip in recent years.
Palestinian fiscal situation
50. Despite continued restrictions on mobility and access to natural and financial
resources, the Palestinian Authority has continued with institution-building and
fiscal policy reforms. Government employment policy has been curtailed, wage
rates have been reduced by 11 per cent in real terms and measures have been
implemented to improve utility bill payments. The public finance management
system has been strengthened by prioritizing and improving the quality of spending.
Non-wage expenditure was about 1 per cent higher than budgeted. The draft 2009
budget includes further reforms and deficit-reduction measures, with the continued
diversion of spending away from wages and subsidies and towards public
investment. A supplementary budget is currently being prepared to include the cost
of reconstruction and rehabilitation in the wake of the destruction in the Gaza Strip
resulting from Operation Cast Lead.23 Palestinian Authority total revenue fluctuated
sharply, dropping from $1.1 billion in 1999 to $300 million in 2002, rising to
$1.2 billion in 2005, and falling back down to $360 million in 2006 before
increasing to $1.2 billion in 2007. Consequently, despite austerity measures, the
Palestinian fiscal deficit jumped from 17 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 27 per cent in
2007. In 2008, the Palestinian Authority continued its implementation of fiscal
policy reforms, with the result that the recurrent fiscal deficit is estimated to have
declined to 19 per cent of GDP, reflecting a wage bill reduction of 11 per cent in real
terms and reduced utility subsidies.21
Public health and food insecurity
51. Despite large inflows of aid, a joint rapid food survey conducted by WFP, the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and UNRWA in April 2008
estimated that 38 per cent of the Palestinian population of the occupied territory is
food insecure. Food insecurity is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank:
__________________
23 International Monetary Fund, Macroeconomic and fiscal framework for the West Bank and
Gaza: third review of progress (February 2009), pp. 4-6; World Bank, West Bank and Gaza
Financial Sector Review (December 2008).
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56 per cent, as compared with 25 per cent.24 High unemployment and
underemployment in the Gaza Strip, compounded by the global inflation in food
prices, has had a significant impact on the food security and nutrition level of the
population. The survey also reveals that there has been a gradual shift in the diet of
Gazans from high-cost, protein-rich fruits, vegetables and animal products to lowcost,
high-energy cereals, sugar and oil. That change is likely to be reflected in
increased rates of micronutrient deficiency, with children and women of
childbearing age being the worst affected.
52. Because of frequent power cuts, most hospitals and health facilities in the
Gaza Strip have had to rely extensively on backup generators to ensure the provision
of medical services. Medical equipment has been damaged as a result of power cuts
and water impurities. The situation is further compounded by the lack of
maintenance and spare parts due to the blockade.
53. Health indicators in the Gaza Strip continued to compare unfavourably with
those in the West Bank, with consistently higher infant and maternal mortality rates
(infant mortality rates: 25.2 per 1,000 in the Gaza Strip and 15.3 per 1,000 in West
Bank; maternal mortality rates: 37.5 per 100,000 births in the Gaza Strip and 8.2 per
100,000 births in West Bank, according to UNRWA data), a lower life expectancy
and higher levels of undernutrition and micronutrient deficiency.
Youth and education
54. The Israeli occupation continues to have a negative impact on access to
education by young people in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Restrictions
on movement and the construction of the barrier in the West Bank and military
operations in the Gaza Strip impede access to schools and other educational
activities by students and teachers. As a consequence, the quality of education is
reportedly declining. The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Education reported a
decline in enrolment rates and test scores in mathematics, Arabic and English,
according to the results of national tests conducted for the school year 2007/08.25
55. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), violence against
children in the occupied Palestinian territory rose between late 2006 and early 2008,
reflecting growing tensions in schools and households caused by worsening
socio-economic and humanitarian conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
UNICEF has also reported that children are manifesting high levels of psychological
distress such as withdrawal, sleeplessness, nightmares, aggressiveness and poor
concentration.26
56. With 56 per cent of the population of the Gaza Strip under the age of 18,
children and young people bore a disproportionate share of the impact of Operation
Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip. Current reports show that 7 schools in the northern part
of the Gaza Strip were badly damaged and over 150 primary schools were partially
damaged. The movement of teachers, young people and, in particular, children, to
and from schools remains dangerous, owing to unexploded ordnance. In the days
immediately following the ceasefire, two Palestinian children were killed by
__________________
24 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian territory: 2009
Consolidated Appeal, p. 34.
25 Ibid., pp. 27 and 42.
26 Ibid., pp. 27 and 28.
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unexploded ordnance in Al-Zaitoun. Schools, 60 per cent of which were already
running double shifts prior to the recent conflict, may now have to run triple shifts.
They are not designed to accommodate such an additional student load.
Status of women
57. The participation rate for women in the labour force was only 15.2 per cent in
2008, as compared with 66.8 per cent for men. The unemployment rate for women
in 2008 was 23.8 per cent. The poverty rate among households headed by females
was 61.2 per cent, compared with 56.9 per cent for households headed by males in
the occupied Palestinian territory in 2007. The poverty rate among female-headed
households with seven or more children is 79.7 per cent, compared with 68.6 per
cent for households with five or six children.
58. According to UNICEF and the United Nations Development Fund for Women,
an estimated 2,500 pregnant women per year face difficulties in obtaining access to
a delivery facility owing to the Israeli closure system. In addition, the United
Nations Population Fund highlighted the risks for more than 40,000 pregnant
women in the Gaza Strip who were denied proper medical treatment during the
military operation of December 2008 and January 2009.
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
59. The Syrian Golan, which measures approximately 1,250 km2, has been under
Israeli occupation since 1967. The decision of the Israeli Government to impose its
law, jurisdiction and administration over the occupied Syrian Golan was deemed
null and void by the Security Council in its resolution 497 (1981).
60. Israel prevents the return of those members of the Arab population of the
occupied Syrian Golan expelled in 1967. By 2008, the remaining 18,000 Syrian
citizens were living in five main towns in the occupied Syrian Golan.27 At the same
time, an estimated 18,000 Israeli settlers live in 32 settlements in the occupied
Syrian Golan.28
61. Construction of infrastructure and housing by Israel was actively pursued in
2007 and early 2008.29 The Israeli Land Department put up 2,500 dunums of land in
the occupied Golan for sale to settlers. According to a recent decision by the
Regional Settlements Council in the occupied Syrian Golan, a new settlement
tourism village will be built by 2010, on 40 dunums of land close to the destroyed
village of Amudiyah, with an earmarked amount of $30 million.30
62. The Israeli occupation continues to have a negative impact on the livelihoods
of the Syrian population in the occupied Golan as a result of measures imposed by
the Israeli authorities, particularly the restrictions on land cultivation and farming,
alleged land confiscation, the uprooting and destruction of trees and seedlings and
discrimination with regard to access to water and construction. Land left
__________________
27 Al Marsad, Changing the Landscape: Israel’s Gross Violations of International Law in the
Occupied Syrian Golan (November 2008), p. 21.
28 A/63/519, para. 42.
29 Ibid.
30 A/63/273, para. 102.
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uncultivated is subject to confiscation by the Israeli authorities.31 It should be noted
that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with the support of the
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), assisted in transporting
almost 8,000 tons of apples in 2009 from the occupied Golan to markets in the
Syrian Arab Republic. There were no apple transfers in 2008 because of poor
harvests.32
63. As a result of discrimination with regard to access to water and subsidies
granted to Israeli producers, combined with a high dependency on the Israeli
market, cultivation is more difficult for the Syrian citizens of the Golan.33 The
Israeli water authority imposes discriminatory water quotas on Syrian farmers: the
quota for Israeli settlers is 450 m3 of water per dunum of land, and the quota for
Arab farmers is 90 m3 per dunum. In addition, Syrian citizens pay more for water as
a result of an indirectly discriminatory tariff system. Syrian citizens are therefore
unable to produce the same quantity of high-quality produce per dunum of land as
Israeli settlers in the region.34
64. Employment prospects for the Syrian population in the occupied Syrian Golan
remain bleak. Students benefiting from university education find few employment
prospects in the occupied Syrian Golan. Employment opportunities in the Israeli
administration are limited and Syrian citizens reportedly face discrimination in
access to such jobs because of their political opinions and refusal to take up Israeli
citizenship.35
65. Syrian community leaders have launched an appeal to end restrictions on
travel from the occupied Syrian Golan to other parts of the Syrian Arab Republic
and to maintain their Syrian Arab identity.36 During the first six months of 2008,
19 students and 7 civilians crossed between the occupied Golan Heights and the
Syrian Arab Republic with the assistance of UNDOF and ICRC.37 However, it has
been reported that on 18 April 2008, Israeli authorities confiscated the Syrian
identity cards of 19 students from the occupied Golan who were returning home
after having completed their studies at Syrian universities. The Syrian authorities
reported that students from the occupied Golan Heights are prevented from
completing their university education or gaining entry to particular faculties in
Israeli institutions unless they accept Israeli nationality.38
66. The five occupied Syrian villages in the Golan suffer from a shortage of health
centres and clinics. The villages have no access to a nearby hospital and citizens
must go elsewhere for simple surgical procedures. Increased costs are incurred and
there is resultant hardship because of the lack of doctors, specialist clinics,
__________________
31 The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories (Geneva, International Labour Office,
2008); appendix to the report of the Director-General, International Labour Conference,
97th session, 2008, para. 83.
32 International Committee of the Red Cross, press release, 17 February 2009, available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/israel-syria-news-170209!OpenDocument.
33 The Situation of workers in the occupied Arab territories (Geneva, International Labour Office,
2008); appendix to the report of the Director-General, International Labour Conference,
97th session, 2008, para. 88.
34 Ibid., para. 84.
35 Ibid., para. 86.
36 Ibid., para. 88.
37 S/2008/390, para. 3.
38 A/63/273, para. 108.
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including gynaecological and obstetrics departments, X-ray services and emergency
rooms.39
67. There are an estimated 2 million mines and 76 minefields in the occupied
Syrian Golan.40 The long-term presence of the mines and the deterioration of their
detonation systems continue to pose a threat to local inhabitants.41 The total number of
victims of Israeli mines in the occupied Syrian Golan is reported to be 531. Of those,
202 were fatalities. Children in particular are vulnerable to this threat. A total of 329
people have sustained permanent disabilities since the beginning of the occupation.40
68. The Syrian authorities have reported that as at 1 July 2008, 16 citizens from
the occupied Syrian Golan were being detained in Israeli prisons.42
IV. Conclusions
69. A combination of closures and sanctions imposed by Israel in the occupied
Palestinian territory and the recent military operation in the Gaza Strip led to a
deepening of the humanitarian and socio-economic crisis in the occupied Palestinian
territory in 2008.
70. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have declared that the
Israeli decision to annex the Golan is null and void.43 Nevertheless, in 2007, Israel
continued its expansion of settlements and its curtailment of the rights of the Syrian
residents of the occupied Syrian Golan.
71. In his message of 10 March 2009 to the United Nations Seminar on Assistance to
the Palestinian People, the Secretary-General called for a proper and durable ceasefire
as soon as possible to allow for a return of calm in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel.
He added that the situation at the crossings was intolerable, and that it was crucial that
Israel take meaningful steps to ease the closure, without which Palestinian economic
recovery cannot take place. He underscored that a ceasefire should pave the way for
the reopening of all Gaza crossings based on the 2005 Agreement on Movement and
Access, stating that Security Council resolution 1860 (2009) embodied those basic
parameters. He pointed out that, in the West Bank, the efforts of Prime Minister Fayyad
to improve security arrangements — an obligation under the road map — have borne
fruit. However, he noted that Israeli raids had continued; checkpoints and curfews were
still present; and settlement activity had accelerated. The latter contravened the road
map obligations of Israel, as reaffirmed by both parties before the Quartet at Sharm
el-Sheikh in November 2008. In closing, the Secretary-General observed that only a
permanent negotiated political settlement, which would end the occupation, could
provide a sustainable solution to the economic and humanitarian problems of the
Palestinian people and lasting security for Israel. The United Nations would continue
to do its part towards realizing the vision of two States, Israel and Palestine, living side
by side in peace and security.
__________________
39 Ibid., para. 110.
40 Ibid., para. 107.
41 S/2008/390, para. 4.
42 A/63/273, para. 106.
43 Security Council resolution 497 (1981), General Assembly resolution 61/27.
United Nations A/65/72–E/2010/13*
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
20 April 2010
Original: English
10-32196* (E) 060810
*1032196*
General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Item 61 of the preliminary list**
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2010
Item 11 of the provisional agenda***
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 2009/34, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 64/185, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a
report to it at its sixty-fifth session. The present report, which has been prepared by
the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in response to
the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council.
* Reissued for technical reasons on 6 August 2010.
** A/65/50.
*** E/2010/100.
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Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan*
Summary
The Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, the use
of arbitrary detention, disproportionate use of force, property destruction, home
demolitions, mobility restrictions, lack of building permits and closure policies
continue to intensify the economic and social hardships of the Palestinian residents
in the occupied Palestinian territory. Despite the constraints posed by the occupation,
the Palestinian Authority continued to make progress in implementing its reform
agenda and security plan and in building its institution.
Between February 2009 and February 2010, 67 Palestinians were killed and
145 injured by Israeli military operations. At the same time, attacks by Palestinian
militants and the launching of rockets into Israel from the Gaza Strip continued,
although at a diminished rate over that of previous years.
Between February 2009 and February 2010, Israeli authorities demolished 220
Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem). As a
result of those demolitions, over 400 Palestinians were displaced. In occupied East
Jerusalem, the Israeli authorities demolished approximately 80 Palestinian-owned
structures between February 2009 and March 2010, thereby displacing approximately
260 Palestinians.
The blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip following the forceful
takeover of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007 entered its third year as of August 2009.
The blockade detrimentally affects reconstruction and economic recovery in the Strip
in addition to exacerbating humanitarian conditions. In the West Bank, there has
been a general relaxation of the crossing procedures at most checkpoints to the east
of the barrier. However, since November 2009 there has been a steady increase in the
number of “flying” (ad hoc) checkpoints erected for short periods.
Contrary to its obligations under the road map, Israel continued illegal
settlement activity in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. On 26 November
2009 Israel announced a 10-month settlement “freeze order” in the West Bank, but it
does not apply to the East Jerusalem area.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge its
appreciation for the substantive contributions to the present report of the Department for Political
Affairs, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Labour Organization (ILO),
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme
(WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.
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The Syrian Golan has been under Israeli occupation since 1967. The decision of
the Government of Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the
occupied Syrian Golan was deemed null and void and without international legal
effect by Security Council resolution 497 (1981). That annexation continues to affect
the lives and human rights of the Syrian citizens living in the occupied Syrian Golan.
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2009/34, the Economic and Social Council stressed the
importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of Security
Council resolutions, including 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 252 (1968), 425 (1978), 465
(1980), 497 (1981), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003), 1544 (2004) and 1850 (2008); the
principle of land for peace; the Arab Peace Initiative,1 as affirmed at the Arab
League Summit in Doha on 31 March 2009; and compliance with the agreements
reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people. The Economic and Social
Council called for the lifting of the severe restrictions imposed on the Palestinian
people, including those arising from ongoing Israeli military operations and the
multilayered closure system, and for other urgent measures to be taken to alleviate
the desperate humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, especially
the Gaza Strip. The Council called upon all parties to respect the rules of
international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence against the civilian
population in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.2 The Council called upon
Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its destruction of homes and property,
economic institutions, agricultural lands and orchards in the occupied Palestinian
territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan. The
Economic and Social Council reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan, are
illegal and an obstacle to economic and social development, and called for full
implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and compliance by
Israel, the occupying Power, with international law, including the Fourth Geneva
Convention.2 It also reaffirmed that the wall being constructed by Israel in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to
international law and is isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West Bank and
seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the Palestinian
people, and in this regard called for full compliance with the legal obligations laid
out in the advisory opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of
Justice3 and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15. It requested the Secretary-
General to submit to the Assembly at its sixty-fourth session, through the Council, a
report on the implementation of the resolution.
2. In its resolution 64/185, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources, including land and water, and demanded that Israel, the
occupying Power, cease its exploitation, damage, loss or depletion, or endangerment
of the natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East
Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. The Assembly recognized the right of
the Palestinian people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, damage,
loss or depletion, or endangerment of their natural resources resulting from illegal
measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupied
__________________
1 Adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its fourteenth session, held in Beirut on
27 and 28 March 2002 (A/56/1026-S/2002/932, annex II, resolution 14/221).
2 United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
3 See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.
A/65/72
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Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. The Assembly stressed that the wall
being constructed by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is seriously depriving the
Palestinian people of access to their natural resources, and in this regard called for
full compliance with the legal obligations stipulated in the 9 July 2004 advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice and in resolution ES-10/15. The
Assembly called upon Israel, the occupying Power, to comply strictly with its
obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, with
respect to the alteration of the character and status of the occupied Palestinian
territory, including East Jerusalem. The Assembly also called upon Israel, the
occupying Power, to cease all actions harming the environment, including the
dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the occupied Palestinian territory,
including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten
their natural resources, including water and land resources, and which pose
environmental, sanitation and health threats to the civilian populations. The
Assembly further called upon Israel to cease its destruction of vital infrastructure,
including water pipelines and sewerage networks, which, inter alia, has a negative
impact on the natural resources of the Palestinian people. The Assembly requested
the Secretary-General to submit a report at its sixty-fifth session on the
implementation of the resolution.
II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem
Death and injuries
3. Between 1 February 2009 and 9 February 2010, a total of 85 Palestinians were
killed and 845 injured as a result of Israeli military operations. Most of the casualties
occurred in the context of Israeli air strikes inside the Gaza Strip.4 Furthermore, the
Palestinian Ministry of Health attributed the death of 242 Palestinian citizens in
Gaza to the Israeli blockade on the Strip, and the impediments it caused in the
provision of adequate medical care in Gaza (see paras. 58-60).5
4. Since the imposition of the blockade against the Gaza Strip, tunnels under the
border with Egypt have proliferated, with their operation employing thousands of
people whose lives are endangered daily. Indeed, 74 Palestinians lost their lives and
129 others were injured working inside tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border. Of
those, 10 were killed and 35 injured due to Israeli air strikes. Without the relaxation
of the blockade, further loss of life and injury remain likely.4
5. In the West Bank, Israeli military operations resulted in the death of
18 Palestinians and at least 700 injuries, some of which occurred in the context of
anti-barrier demonstrations in the villages of Ni’lin and Bil’in. Settler-related
incidents also resulted in 144 Palestinian injuries in 2009.4
6. At the same time, attacks by Palestinian militants and the launching of rockets
into Israel continued in 2009, although at a diminished rate compared with that of
previous years. Between 1 February 2009 and 10 March 2010, there were 5 fatalities
__________________
4 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs contribution.
5 Palestinian Authority Ministry of Health (see www.moh.gov.ps/newsite/ar/
index.php?page=siegevictims&archive=true&pagenum=I).
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and 114 injuries recorded among Israelis due to attacks and clashes with
Palestinians.6
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
7. Citing security concerns, Israeli forces carried out at least 5,631 search
operations in the West Bank and arrested 3,538 Palestinians between 1 February
2009 and 9 February 2010. The majority of the search operations took place in the
northern West Bank.4 According to official Palestinian sources, 7,415 Palestinians
were being detained in Israeli prisons at the end of 2009. As of the end of January
2010, over 300 Palestinian children were reportedly being held in custody in Israeli
prisons.7
8. Some 650 Palestinians were being held as administrative detainees (in
detention without charge or trial), including 5 children. There have been reports of
numerous denials of basic due-process rights.4
Population displacement and property destruction and confiscation
9. Between 1 February 2009 and 9 February 2010, Israeli authorities demolished
220 Palestinian-owned structures, including 92 residential structures, in the West
Bank (excluding East Jerusalem). Over 400 Palestinians were displaced as a result
of those demolitions, the justification for almost all of which was the lack of a
building permit, as required by the Israeli authorities. However, it is virtually
impossible for Palestinians to obtain such permits, a situation forcing many
Palestinians to build without them. Most of the demolitions occurred in the Jordan
River valley, where over 100 demolitions occurred in June 2009. In one incident
there on 10 January 2010, Israeli authorities demolished 34 Palestinian-owned
structures in the Khirbet Tana Bedouin community. The demolition led to the
displacement of 100 Palestinians, including 34 children. It should be noted that
information provided by the Israeli Ministry of Defense in 2007 indicated that there
are over 3,000 outstanding demolition orders for Area C structures.4
10. Over 80 per cent of the Area C demolitions in 2009 occurred in areas declared
as “firing zones” by the Israeli military authorities. Many of these areas, which
account for some 18 per cent of the West Bank, have been “closed” for a number of
years, although numerous residents reported that they had never seen the Israeli
military training in the vicinity. Many of the communities in those areas have been
residing there prior to 1967. They are some of the poorest communities in the West
Bank, relying on small-scale agriculture and herding for their livelihood.4
11. In occupied East Jerusalem, the Israeli authorities demolished approximately
80 Palestinian-owned structures between February 2009 and March 2010.
Approximately 260 Palestinians were reportedly displaced as a result of those
demolitions.4 That figure can be added to the 1,495 Palestinian Jerusalemites who
had been evicted by the Israeli authorities between 2004 and 2009. Furthermore,
according to the Palestinian Authority, during 2009 the Israeli authorities revoked
__________________
6 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, online casualty database.
7 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Palestinian Authority contributions.
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the identification papers of 4,570 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, thereby
denying their right to reside in the city.8
12. On 2 August 2009, Israeli forces forcibly evicted nine families comprising
53 people, including 20 children, in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood in occupied
East Jerusalem. The evicted families, all of whom were refugees, had been living in
the area since 1956, following the construction of the homes by the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on land
granted by the Government of Jordan. A group of Israeli settlers, authorized by
Israeli courts and protected by Israeli security forces, subsequently took over the
evicted families’ homes. The neighbourhood has since become a scene of regular
tension between the Israeli settlers and the Palestinians.4
13. Between 1 February 2009 and 9 February 2010, there were 129 recorded
incidents of Israeli settlers damaging Palestinian property, including razing, uprooting
and burning 1,400 fruit-bearing trees and 2,000 dunams9 of cropland, in addition to
damage to houses and vehicles. The value of settler-related property damage is
significant and has a direct impact on the livelihoods of Palestinians through direct
damage of, or access denied to, Palestinian agricultural or grazing land. In certain
cases, such damage affects the ability of Palestinians to access basic services. In a
number of areas, systematic settler violence has led to displacement of Palestinians.7
Barrier
14. The total length of the barrier, as approved by the Israeli cabinet in April 2006,
is 723 km, which is more than twice as long as the 320 km Armistice Line of 1949
(Green Line). The major portion of the barrier, approximately 87 per cent of it, runs
inside the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem, rather than along the Green
Line.10
15. The barrier cuts deep into the West Bank, looping around settlements and
fragmenting the West Bank into non-contiguous enclaves of Palestinian territory,
isolated from the rest of the West Bank. As of February 2010, some 58 per cent of
the barrier had been constructed and an additional 10 per cent was under
construction. If further constructed as currently planned, the barrier will isolate
approximately 9.5 per cent of Palestinian territory, including occupied East
Jerusalem and some of the West Bank’s most agriculturally productive lands.4
16. As of March 2009, the barrier had 66 gates; only half of them are open to
Palestinian use, and then only for holders of a special permit from the Israeli
military. The gates available for Palestinian use are open only part of the day.11
17. The barrier also continues to isolate the land and water resources of a large
number of Palestinians, in particular farmers who, while residing to the east of the
barrier, are now required to possess “visitor” permits in order to access their lands
through designated gates. In the northern West Bank, permit requirements have
become more stringent over the years. Fewer than 20 per cent of those who used to
__________________
8 Palestinian Authority contribution.
9 1 dunam = 1,000 square metres.
10 A/64/77-E/2009/13, para. 14.
11 A/HRC/12/37, p. 25.
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farm their lands in the closed area before completion of the barrier are now granted
permits.12
18. These measures have caused an average annual loss of 53.8 per cent in the
production of olives in the area.13 Some farmers have abandoned their lands owing
to the lack of access and high cost of needed agricultural inputs, including fuel, and
thus are unable to sustain their livelihood. Furthermore, small-scale breeders of
ruminants are restricted from accessing rich pasture land behind the barrier, causing
overgrazing on the limited lands available. They are forced to feed their animals
fodder throughout most of the year; most such breeders cannot afford to do so which
causes them to rely on humanitarian assistance in order to sustain their livelihood.14
19. The barrier isolates densely populated Palestinian localities currently inside
the municipal boundary of Jerusalem, while physically separating neighbouring
West Bank villages that were once closely connected to East Jerusalem. Completion
of the barrier around the Ma’ale Adumim settlement bloc will physically separate
East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and will further restrict access by
Palestinians to workplaces, services such as health and education, among others, and
places of worship.15 Further south, the barrier already separates Bethlehem from
Jerusalem. Construction of the barrier around the Gush Etzion settlement bloc will
sever the territorial contiguity of Bethlehem and curtail its potential for natural
growth. It will also separate the city from its agricultural hinterland, which
comprises nine Palestinian communities of approximately 22,000 residents that will
face restricted access to services in Bethlehem, including markets, health services
and higher education.
20. It should be noted however that, after ruling that the current route of the
barrier caused disproportionate harm to Palestinians, the Israeli High Court of
Justice, in September 2009, ordered the State to relocate three sections of the barrier
in the Qalqilya and Tulkarem governorates. The new route approved by the Court
should improve the access of farmers to some areas.
__________________
12 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Special Focus: The Barrier Gate
and Permit Regime Four Years On: Humanitarian Impact in the Northern West Bank (November
2007) (www.ochaopt.org/documents/OCHA_SpecialFocus_BarrierGates_2007_11.pdf). This
figure was replicated in a follow-up survey of the same communities in the period May-June
2008. See also A/64/77-E/2009/13, p. 7.
13 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, Olive production losses by the wall (survey), 2009, as cited in the FAO
contribution.
14 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations contribution.
15 For an assessment of the barrier’s impact on the access of Palestinians to health, education,
religious and economic services and facilities in Jerusalem, see Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs: The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian
Communities: East Jerusalem, Update No. 7 (June 2007)
(www.ochaopt.org/documents/Jerusalem-30July2007.pdf). See also A/64/77-E/2009/13,
paras. 14-19.
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Mobility restrictions and closure policies, including access to
humanitarian assistance
Movement of persons and goods in the West Bank
21. As of February 2010 there were approximately 550 closure obstacles inside the
West Bank territory, 80 fewer than in the preceding year. These include
69 permanently staffed checkpoints, of which more than half are located along the
barrier and are used to enable Israelis to commute between Israel and the
settlements, to control access to East Jerusalem and to Israel of limited numbers of
Palestinians holding special permits and to control access to and from small
Palestinian communities isolated by the barrier. All of these checkpoints restrict
Palestinian access to West Bank areas on the other side of the barrier.4
22. There has been a general relaxation in the crossing procedures at most
checkpoints to the east of the barrier, following the removal of military staff at some
of them, the lifting of permit requirements and the performance of searches and
documentation checks on a random basis only. In addition, the Israeli authorities
have also eased restrictions directly affecting economic development, including the
extension by three working hours per day of the Tarkumiya commercial goods
crossing and the movement of tourist buses through the Jalameh crossing into the
West Bank. In the specific locations where the changes have been implemented,
these measures have improved mobility, commerce and access to goods.16
23. However, since November 2009 there has also been a steady increase in the
number of “flying” (ad hoc) checkpoints erected for short periods throughout the
West Bank.4 These checkpoints have an adverse impact on the economy and on the
movement of Palestinians.
24. The closure obstacles constitute only one of several layers of a complex
system of movement restrictions. Therefore, their total number and geographical
distribution at a given time, although indicative, do not capture the entire scope of
the system. The barrier plays a major role in this system, as previously described. In
addition, approximately 18 per cent of the area comprising the West Bank has over
the years been declared “closed military zones”.4
25. An additional 3 per cent of the West Bank lies within the outer limits of 149
Israeli settlements and industrial zones, largely inaccessible to Palestinians.4 This
situation was institutionalized by the Government of Israel in 2002 through the
“special security area” framework, whereby closed areas 300 metres wide (later
expanded to 400 metres) were established around a number of settlements.17
26. In January 2009, the Israeli authorities issued a military order declaring the
area between the barrier and the Green Line in the Hebron Governorate a closed
military area. In the same month, three similar military orders were issued
concerning the land between the barrier and the Green Line in parts of the districts
of Salfit, Ramallah, Jerusalem and northern Bethlehem. These were the first such
orders to be issued since October 2003, when all of the land between the barrier and
the Green Line in the governorates of Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqiliya was designated
as a closed area. Based on the experience of barrier-affected communities in the
__________________
16 United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories contribution.
17 A/64/516, para. 16.
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northern West Bank since 2003, the new military orders give rise to serious
humanitarian concerns regarding the access of Palestinians to lands, livelihoods and
services.4
27. Access of Palestinians to East Jerusalem, which is also surrounded by the
barrier, is prohibited by Israeli law, except for those Palestinians who hold an Israeli
Jerusalem identity card or difficult-to-obtain special permits. Since July 2008,
medical staff (except doctors) and patients holding valid permits have also been
barred from accessing East Jerusalem through two of the vehicular checkpoints
located at main routes into the city: Hizma and Az-Zayyem checkpoints. This
restriction has had a negative impact on the provision of health-care services to the
Palestinian population.4
28. Recurrent demands by Israeli security staff to search United Nations vehicles
(buses in particular) at checkpoints continued to cause United Nations staff to
experience delays as a consequence of either engaging in protracted negotiations or
spending time rerouting through alternative checkpoints. During 2009, UNRWA
faced continued restrictions in accessing refugee communities in the West Bank,
which had major implications on its ability to meet the humanitarian needs of
Palestinian refugees. A total of 567 access incidents were reported in 2009, resulting
in a loss to UNRWA of an estimated 625 work days or 4,688 hours.18
29. There was no significant improvement in the levels of import/export activity,
and obstacles faced by traders at the West Bank commercial crossings continued.
The enforced procedures place additional costs on import/export processes.
Restrictions on the size of trucks, inspection procedures and the enforcement of
back-to-back transfer of goods caused damage to the products, thus adding to the
cost of this process.19
Restrictions on access to and from the Gaza Strip and the impact of the blockade
30. The blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip following the forceful
takeover of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007 entered its third year in August 2009. As
noted by senior United Nations human rights and humanitarian officials, the
blockade of Gaza amounts to collective punishment, which is prohibited under
international humanitarian law.20 The Israeli authorities cite security concerns and
the absence of a ceasefire as the rationale for maintaining restrictions on access to
and from the Gaza Strip.
31. The Karni commercial crossing between Israel and the Gaza Strip has
remained closed since June 2007, other than for the transfer of wheat and animal
feed via conveyor belt. Another secondary crossing at Sufa was previously available
as an alternative to the one at Karni, but it has not operated since September 2008.
As a result, prices for transporting food commodities from the Israeli port of Ashdod
to Gaza have increased dramatically.18 The total number of truckloads imported into
Gaza during 2009 increased by about 16 per cent compared with that of 2008, that
is, 31,110 truckloads compared with 26,838. These shipments constituted 18 per
cent of the volume of imports during the first five months of 2007, before the
__________________
18 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East contribution.
19 United Nations Development Programme contribution, citing a semi-annual report on West Bank
crossings movement (March-September 2009).
20 A/64/517, para. 18.
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imposition of the blockade. Moreover, 85 per cent of goods brought in, both by the
humanitarian and commercial sectors during 2009, consisted of food and
cleaning/hygiene items, compared with 17 per cent of the goods before the
blockade. The process for the clearance of import requests remains long (several
weeks), unpredictable and lacking in transparency.4
32. In citing concerns over tunnelling and the risk of attack, the Israeli authorities
on 1 January closed the Nahal Oz crossing, which had been used for the transfer of
fuel from Israel to Gaza. Imports of those goods have been diverted to the southern
Kerem Shalom crossing. This change has led to a significant reduction in the supply
of cooking gas to Gaza, due to the smaller capacity of the pipeline at Kerem
Shalom, which is less than half that of Nahal Oz.4 However, work is under way to
expand capacity at Kerem Shalom.
33. The insufficient and irregular supply of industrial fuel needed to operate
Gaza’s sole power plant has exacerbated the chronic shortage of electricity affecting
Gaza and the situation has negative humanitarian implications. Under the Israeli
restrictive import regime (2.2 million litres of fuel a week), the Gaza power plant
can produce only a quarter of the average electricity demand. Half the demand is
met through the purchase of electricity from Israel and 5-10 per cent is purchased
from Egypt, creating a permanent deficit of 15-20 per cent. As a result, Gaza’s
electricity company is forced to implement power cuts ranging from four to eight
hours a day in some parts of the Gaza Strip. In addition, in several instances, also
citing security concerns, Israel closed the crossing for fuels for several consecutive
days; as a result, the Gaza power plant ran out of fuel and had to shut down
completely, triggering power cuts lasting up to 16 hours a day in Gaza City. If
enough fuel is provided (3.15 million litres a week), the Gaza power plant currently
could produce up to one third of the electricity demand, although that level is still
below the capacity that had existed before June 2006, when Israel bombed the
power plant.4
34. The ban on the import of building materials has prevented the reconstruction
of most of the 3,500 homes destroyed, the 2,900 homes severely damaged and those
lightly damaged during the Israeli military offensive of December 2008 and January
2009. The ban on importing building material has also prevented the construction of
7,500 planned housing units intended to cater to the Gaza Strip’s rapidly expanding
population. More than 3,500 families are still displaced. While most of those
families live in rented apartments or in the houses of relatives, about 200 families
continue living in tents or makeshift shelters without proper roofing, windows or
doors.4
35. In December 2009, Israel exceptionally approved the import of 100 truckloads
of glass (almost all of which had already entered Gaza)4 and an additional 100
truckloads started entering Gaza on 3 March 2010. In addition, during the week of
23 February, the Palestinian Energy Authority coordinated the crossing of four
truckloads of materiel for the electricity distribution company. However,
construction projects worth an estimated $76 million that had been under way
before the imposition of the blockade remain on hold, including re-housing refugees
living in dilapidated housing and repairing and constructing public infrastructure,
such as for water, sewerage and solid waste removal.18
36. The Israeli blockade also includes restrictions on shipment of cash from West
Bank financial institutions to the Gaza Strip. Cash shortages and the halting of
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private sector investment in the Gaza Strip have led to a precipitous decline in real
private sector credit.21
37. The Israeli authorities have also prohibited exports from Gaza, which is one of
the main factors preventing its economic reactivation. Since December 2009,
however, Israel has allowed the export of a few dozen truckloads of cut flowers and
strawberries.4
38. In May 2009, the Israeli military extended its self-declared “buffer zone”22 to
300 metres, representing 30 per cent of Gaza’s arable land. The Israeli army
enforces the “buffer zone” through open fire, as well as land levelling. Palestinian
farmers indicate that their access is often restricted on an ad hoc basis in agricultural
areas beyond 300 metres, at times as far as 1,000 metres from the border. In 2009,
four Palestinians were killed and 11 injured in incidents when the Israeli army
opened fire on farmers in the vicinity of the border. In addition to restrictions on
access and threats to personal safety, agricultural land, water wells and water
networks have been damaged due to repeated Israeli incursions into the border areas
for the purpose of levelling land. The measures imposed by the Israeli military in
the “buffer zone” contribute (along with the blockade and adverse weather
conditions) to the difficulties facing Gaza’s agriculture sector.4
39. Furthermore, the area in which fishermen are allowed to fish has been
progressively reduced to 3 nautical miles in 2009. As a result, employment in
fishing fell by 66 per cent since 2000, with only 3,400 fishermen currently being
active and only 0.3 per cent of Gaza’s population having their dietary needs for fish
met.21
40. During the reporting period, the Gaza economy has been sustained largely by
the smuggling of goods from Egypt through tunnels. There are an estimated 1,000
such tunnels, which employ thousands of people. The tunnels allow for the supply
of a wide range of goods otherwise unavailable, including food, livestock, electric
appliances, furniture, clothes and fuel, mostly at lower prices (and quality) than
those previously imported from Israel. There are also concerns regarding reports
that weapons are smuggled through the tunnels. Nonetheless, the Israeli blockade
has greatly contributed to the viability and sustainability of the tunnels, where the
smuggling of goods has further damaged the private sector and legitimate
commerce.
Israeli settlement activity
41. Settlement activity in the West Bank amounts to violation of the provisions of
numerous humanitarian laws including Article 55 of the Hague Regulations23 and
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,2 which stipulates that “the Occupying
Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the
__________________
21 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development contribution.
22 Following Israel’s “disengagement” from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, the Israeli military
declared a “buffer zone” on a strip of land 150 metres wide along the border with Israel, where
access by Palestinians is prohibited.
23 For the Regulations annexed to The Hague Convention IV of 1907, see Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York,
Oxford University Press, 1915).
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territory it occupies”. Israel’s continued settlement activity is in flagrant violation of
this provision.24
42. The number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank, excluding occupied East
Jerusalem, was estimated at 301,200 in September 2009, constituting an annual
growth rate of 4.9 per cent throughout 2009. This growth rate is considerably higher
than the average rate of growth of the Israeli population, which was recorded at 1.8
per cent per annum.25 The settlers reside in 120 settlements and 99 “outposts”,26 all
of which are deemed illegal under international law. By the end of 2008 another
195,000 Israeli settlers were living in 12 settlements in occupied East Jerusalem.27
In June 2009, about 900 and 800 housing units were under construction in Ma’ale
Adumim and Giv’at Zeev Illit (near East Jerusalem), respectively. Hundreds of other
housing units are being constructed in Beitar Illit, Modin Illit and more than 22
other settlements in the West Bank.28
43. In addition to existing settlements in East Jerusalem, Israeli authorities have
been planning to construct a new settlement between Ma’ale Adumim and East
Jerusalem. That settlement, which is commonly known as the E1 or “East 1” plan,
would consist of about 3,500 housing units for approximately 15,000 settlers, in
addition to commercial and tourist areas.29
44. On 26 November 2009, the Government of Israel announced a 10-month
settlement “freeze order” which prohibited any new construction in West Bank
settlements, but allowed the continuation of construction where foundation work
had already been started. There have been a number of measures on the ground to
enforce the settlement freeze and remove outposts. However, Israeli authorities have
also reported various violations of the freeze order, which furthermore does not
apply to Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem.30
45. According to the Foundation for Middle East Peace, close to 4,000 housing
units were under construction in West Bank settlements in January and February
2010. The Foundation reported that, by 15 January 2010, only 140 “stop-work
orders” had been issued to construction sites in violation of the moratorium.31
Natural resources, water and the environment
46. The water supply and sanitation services for Palestinians in the occupied
Palestinian territory continue to be insufficient and unreliable in terms of quality
and quantity. Israeli authorities and companies withdraw water from the occupied
__________________
24 See A/HRC/12/37, para. 57, p. 21, as cited in the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights contribution.
25 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (www1.cbs.gov.il/population/new_2010/table1.pdf). The
average annual population growth rate was calculated to include Israeli settlers in the West
Bank, excluding East Jerusalem.
26 Peace Now (www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=61&docid=4372&pos=4).
27 A/64/516, para. 13.
28 A/64/516, para. 14.
29 A/64/516, paras. 23 and 25.
30 Peace Now (www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=61&docid=4564).
31 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied territories,
vol. 20, No. 1, January-February 2010, p. 4.
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Palestinian territory in order to supply Israeli cities, and then sell the surplus back to
Palestinians.
47. More than 200 Palestinian communities, with a total of 215,000 inhabitants,
are reportedly not connected to a running water network and are forced to buy water
from private suppliers, using up to 20 per cent of their income for this purpose.
According to the World Bank, the Palestinian population has access to only about a
quarter of the water ration per capita of Israelis: 123 litres a person daily for West
Bank Palestinians in contrast to 544 litres for Israelis. Some Palestinians are
surviving on as little as 10 to 15 litres of water a day.32 The Israeli national water
company reportedly reduces the supply of water to Palestinian communities
substantially during the summer months, causing considerable water shortages, in
order to meet increased consumption needs in Israel and in Israeli settlements in the
West Bank.33
48. The current water crisis for Palestinians in the West Bank is coupled with the
problem of wastewater flowing into much needed natural reservoirs, aquifers and
streams. Some of the settlements are not connected to wastewater treatment
facilities; hence, their untreated wastewater flows into nearby Palestinian
communities. A Palestinian study showed that crops and water sources in 70
Palestinian villages with nearby settlements were contaminated.33
Socio-economic indicators
49. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the cumulative losses to
the economy for the year following “Operation Cast Lead” to be in the range of
$800 million.34 Nevertheless, estimates at constant prices for the fourth quarter of
2009 revealed that GDP in the Palestinian Territory increased by 1.6 per cent
compared with that of the third quarter of 2009, and that GDP increased by 10.3 per
cent compared with that of the fourth quarter of 2008, also at constant prices with
the base year being 2004.35
50. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, there was an increase
in the main economic activities that contributed considerably to GDP. Short-term
economic indicators showed growth in agriculture and fishing, mining,
manufacturing, electricity and water, wholesale and retail trade, transportation,
financial intermediation, public administration and defence, thus raising GDP.
51. The partial destruction of Palestinian productive capacity, the loss of land and
natural resources to settlements and the barrier, the restrictions on access and
movement, high political risk and layers of other institutional and administrative
obstacles have undermined investment to a certain extent. As a result, the private
sector’s ability to create employment opportunities has been declining in the face of
a growing labour force. The decimation of the private sector has resulted in more
__________________
32 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights contribution cited in
A/64/516, para. 43.
33 A/64/516, para. 46.
34 United Nations Development Programme contribution citing www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/
PressReleases/Gaza_lost_e.pdf.
35 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (www.pcbs.gov.ps/desktopmodules/newsscrollEnglish/
newsscrollView.aspx?ItemID=1122&mID=11170).
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dependence on the public sector to provide employment and social transfers. The
Palestinian Authority has reached the limit of its ability to act as “employer of last
resort” and has had to embark on fiscal reforms that include a hiring and wage
freeze and the elimination of utility subsidies.21
52. According to a relaxed definition of unemployment as the percentage of
persons who do not work but nevertheless are seeking work, unemployment in the
occupied Palestinian territory decreased to 31.4 per cent of the working age
population in the third quarter of 2009 compared with 32.7 per cent in the third
quarter of 2008. Women face systematic discrimination in the labour market: their
share of wage employment in the non-agricultural sector stood at 18 per cent in
2008 compared with 12.3 per cent in 1999.36 It should be noted that 67 per cent of
the unemployed are young people: in the male population aged 15-29, half are
employed, whereas for females in that age group just 1 in 7 is working.37
53. Economic indicators generally disguise the variations between the different
parts of the territory (East Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza Strip). The Gaza Strip
presents the least favourable indicators as the combined impact of the blockade, the
destruction of property in the last Israeli military operation and the inability to
reconstruct continues to have an adverse impact on economic conditions. A recent
survey by the Palestinian Private Sector Coordinating Council found that only 258
industrial establishments in Gaza were operational compared with over 2,400 in
2006.38 As a result, unemployment rates soared to 42 per cent compared with 32 per
cent before the blockade.4 The expansion of the public sector by Hamas authorities
and the growth of the tunnel economy have partially compensated for the massive
loss of jobs.4
54. The most recent poverty data available are unpublished 2007 data which
indicate that absolute poverty rates had reached 57.3 per cent in the occupied
Palestinian territory. In Gaza, 76.9 per cent of households were under the national
poverty line, and in the West Bank 47.2 per cent of them were under the national
poverty line.36
55. The inflation rates in 2009 reached 4.34 per cent. The main drivers of the price
increases causing inflation were the prices of food and beverages, clothing, shoes,
educational services and housing.39
Fiscal situation
56. On 25 August 2009, the Palestinian Authority announced a programme entitled
“Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, which highlighted the
__________________
36 United Nations Development Programme contribution.
37 See http://imeu.net/news/printer0014747.shtml, which is cited in the United Nations
Development Programme contribution.
38 United Nations Development Programme contribution citing http://www.pscc.ps/down/
PSCC%20-%20Gaza%20Private%20Sector%20(Post%20War%20Status%20%20Needs)%20-
250209.pdf.
39 United Nations Development Programme contribution citing http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/
_pcbs/PressRelease/CPI_1209_A.pdf.
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importance of enhancing public sector institutions and building on the Authority’s
reform and development plan for the period 2008-2010.40
57. The Palestinian Authority continued to make progress in implementing its
reform agenda. According to the World Bank, in spite of unfavourable
circumstances, namely the blockade of Gaza, mobility restrictions in the West Bank
and political uncertainty, the institution-building efforts of the Palestinian Authority
demonstrated competence in the provision of basic services. The Bank also
maintained that, despite the difficult fiscal position that the Palestinian Authority
faced in the second quarter of 2009, it had carried on implementing structural
reforms, including holding the line on public employment and improving public
financial management.41 In that regard, the establishment of a single window-single
file system in collaboration with the World Customs Organization was also
significant, in streamlining the management of various forms of taxation and
improving the standards and packaging of goods produced by the Palestinian private
sector for the purpose of increasing market share. Structural reforms also included
new microfinance regulations, which entrench microfinance as an integral part of
the financial sector. Moreover, a new law on comprehensive company registration
facilitates the registration of various types of companies.16
58. The Palestinian Authority has also largely succeeded in containing public
spending by controlling public wages and phasing out utility subsidies. However,
the destruction of Gaza’s local economy and its infrastructure has had serious
consequences on the Palestinian Authority’s fiscal position, structural reform efforts
and the economy of the occupied territory as a whole owing to the consequent
elimination of tax and customs revenue from Gaza, and having to bear the financial
burden of providing relief and reconstruction funds in the aftermath of the military
attack.21
59. The Israeli military offensive against Gaza has directly contributed to
increasing the recurrent budget deficit to 23 per cent of GDP, which is 5 percentage
points above the level envisaged in the original budget for 2009. The Palestinian
Authority was forced to resort to borrowing from banks, accumulating arrears and
amending the 2009 budget to take into account the emergency spending and fiscal
implications of the offensive against Gaza.21
60. In 2008, the total value of imports amounted to almost $3.8 billion, 72 per cent
of which was from Israel. These data show the dependence of the Palestinian
economy on Israel. Israel transforms the Palestinian market into a secondary market
for its products while significantly restricting imports from the occupied territory.42
61. For the Palestinian Authority, the average rate of clearance for monthly
revenues (on an accrual basis) during 2009 was about 354 million New Israeli
Shekels. One third of those revenues were illegally retained in order to cover the
cost of electricity, water and other services provided by Israel. The average size of
such monthly deductions was about 124 million New Israeli Shekels.36
__________________
40 See Palestinian Authority, Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, August
2009, and the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (2008-2010).
41 World Bank, A Palestinian State in Two Years: Institutions for Economic Revival, 22 September
2009; and see http://web.worldbank.org.
42 United Nations Development Programme contribution citing www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/
PressRelease/tejara_E_08.pdf.
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Public health and food insecurity
62. The quality of functioning medical services in the Gaza Strip is in decline due
to the blockade and the internal divide between Gaza and Ramallah. The inability to
expand the health facilities that are available as a result of the lack of building
materials has been further compounded by recurring power cuts. The functionality
of medical equipment is deteriorating for lack of maintenance capacity and spare
parts.43 The blockade has also reduced the availability of medicines. As of
December 2009, 24 per cent of the items on the list of essential drugs and 18 per
cent of those on the list of essential medical disposables were out of stock in the
Gaza Strip.4
63. In the West Bank, the fragmentation of the health system as a result of the
occupation and the restrictions on the movement of people and goods in the West
Bank seriously impedes the provision of efficient and effective health care,
especially to those in need of tertiary care services in East Jerusalem hospitals.43
64. Demand for UNRWA primary health services continues to rise. In the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank, the total number of patient consultations during 2009 was
5.7 and 5 per cent higher, respectively, than in 2008.18
65. Infant deaths occur mostly within the neonatal period, with many of them
being concentrated within the first week of life. The neonatal mortality rate could
still be substantially reduced, especially in Gaza Strip where it is 30 per cent higher
than in the West Bank. The main causes of neonatal mortality are asphyxia,
infections and low birth weight. With regard to maternal mortality, the main causes
of death are haemorrhage during and after delivery, infection, eclampsia, anaemia
and obstructed labour.43
66. Israeli restrictions on Gazan fishermen have reduced the quantity, quality and
type of fish available to Gazans, a situation which has aggravated the already acute
problems of malnutrition, poverty and food insecurity.4
67. Based on a 2009 socio-economic and food security report,44 it is estimated that
almost 1.6 million persons are “food insecure” in the occupied Palestinian territory,
that is, 38 per cent of the population. These include 625,200 food insecure persons
in the West Bank (25 per cent of the West Bank population) and 973,600 persons in
the Gaza Strip (61 per cent). In addition, 269,300 persons in the West Bank (11 per
cent) and 218,950 persons in the Gaza Strip (16 per cent) are vulnerable to food
insecurity.45
68. The main cause of the high levels of food insecurity is poverty: 71 per cent of
the population receive at least one form of assistance, mostly food assistance. Food
insecurity is translated into reduced consumption of animal products, particularly
fresh meat and dairy products, as well as some vegetables. The destruction of
livelihoods inflicted by the “Cast Lead” offensive also caused about 14 per cent of
households to decrease their expenditures, mostly on food. More than half of those
__________________
43 World Health Organization contribution.
44 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Food Programme,
Socio-Economic and Food Security (SEFSEC) Survey Report 2 — Gaza Strip, November 2009:
Data collected by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (April-June 2009) (www.apis.ps/
documents/Socio-Economic%20November%202009.pdf).
45 World Food Programme contribution.
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households reduced the quantity of food consumed and the vast majority decreased
the quality of that food. Household diet changes may have negative consequences
on the intake of micronutrients. While the energy intake has been preserved due to
the shift towards staples and energy-dense food (wheat/bread, beans, oil and sugar),
mineral and vitamin deficiencies can occur and cause delayed growth in young
children, reduced resistance to infections and pregnancy-related problems.
Micronutrient deficiencies have led to high levels of anaemia (57 per cent) among
children 6-36 months of age.4
69. Since the end of March 2009 UNRWA reduced its emergency food aid
caseload in Gaza to about 650,000. UNRWA estimated the financial cost of meeting
the emergency needs of refugees at $456.7 million between January and September
2009. By the end of that year, total confirmed pledges to the Agency’s emergency
appeal stood at $324 million, or 71 per cent of total needs.18
Youth and education
70. The Israeli occupation continues to have a negative impact on access to
education by youth in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Restrictions on
movement, the construction of the barrier in the West Bank and military operations
in the Gaza Strip impede access by students and teachers to schools and other
educational activities. As a consequence, the quality of education is reportedly
declining.
71. In the Gaza Strip, due to underfunding and high population growth rates,
89 per cent of UNRWA schools operate on a double shift basis. Recent years have
witnessed a collapse in education standards at Agency schools in the Gaza Strip, as
the effects of underfunding have been compounded by the ongoing blockade and
other restrictions and periodic violence.18
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
72. The Syrian Golan, which encompasses an area of about 1,250 square km, has
been under Israeli occupation since 1967. The decision of the Government of Israel
to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan was
deemed null and void and without international legal effect by Security Council
resolution 497 (1981). This annexation continues to affect on a daily basis the lives
and human rights of the Syrian citizens living in the occupied Syrian Golan.46
73. The Syrian Arab population, estimated to be 21,100, lives in five main towns,
while 19,000 Israeli inhabitants live in 33 settlements.47 Since 1967, the
Government of Israel has continued its settlement expansion, despite renewed
United Nations resolutions calling upon Israel to desist from doing so.
__________________
46 International Labour Office, The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories, report of
the Director-General, International Labour Conference, ninety-seventh session, Geneva, 2008,
appendix, para. 94.
47 International Committee of the Red Cross (www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/israelgolan-
update-291009?opendocument).
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74. In past years, investments in tourist infrastructure in the occupied Syrian
Golan reportedly increased. In 2009, the Ministry of Housing embarked on a plan to
increase the population of Katzrin settlement from 6,500 to 20,000 over the ensuing
20 years. The Israel Land Administration issued 14 tenders for the construction of
apartment buildings in the settlements.48 On 10 February 2010, the Israeli Knesset
passed preliminary reading of a bill that would grant tax benefits to Israeli residents
of the Golan Heights.49
75. ILO reports that no significant changes have been recorded between 2008 and
2009 regarding employment conditions and opportunities for Syrian citizens in the
occupied Syrian Golan. Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan suffer from a
lack of employment opportunities in their communities, and there are no prospects
for economic development in that region. Employment in the Israeli construction
sector remains the only option for many. However, dependence on subcontractors
for access to the Israeli labour market makes Syrian labourers vulnerable to
exploitative practices and violations of their labour rights. Syrian women are
particularly affected by the lack of employment opportunities in the occupied Syrian
Golan, especially since their occupational and regional mobility is restricted.50
76. Israeli policies and measures, including discriminatory water quotas and tariff
schemes, favour Israeli settlers and restrict the access of Syrian citizens to land and
water, which severely constrains the agricultural activities of Syrian citizens, who
have traditionally relied on such activities for their livelihood.50
77. By October 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported 18
registered Syrian detainees in Israeli prisons.51 The Government of Syria maintains
that at least one detainee suffers from a life-threatening health condition which is
being disregarded by the Israeli authorities.52
IV. Conclusion
78. In his message to the United Nations International Meeting in Support of
Israeli-Palestinian Peace on 12 February 2010, the United Nations Secretary-
General welcomed the reform efforts of the Palestinian Authority, which seek to
establish the economic, social and institutional basis of Palestinian statehood. He
said that it was vital that the Palestinian Authority continue to advance this statebuilding
agenda while striving to meet its other road map obligations in full. He also
expressed profound concern regarding the protracted suffering of civilians in the
Gaza Strip, maintaining that “the continued blockade is unacceptable and
counterproductive, destroying legitimate commerce and denying aid organizations
and the United Nations itself the means to begin civilian reconstruction”. He
condemned the continued rocket fire from Gaza, which indiscriminately targets
Israeli civilians. In closing, the Secretary-General concluded that the clear
__________________
48 A/64/516, para. 48.
49 Haaretz (www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1148860.html).
50 International Labour Office, The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories, report of
the Director-General, International Labour Conference, 97th session, Geneva, 2008, appendix,
paras. 95-98.
51 International Committee of the Red Cross, www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/israelgolan-
update-291009?opendocument.
52 See A/64/343, chap. II, entry of Cuba.
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parameters to end the occupation that began in 1967 and create the State of Palestine
living side-by-side with Israel in peace and security are contained in Security
Council resolutions, the road map and the Arab Peace Initiative, emphasizing that
political will is required by the leadership of both sides, along with creative support
by third parties.53
__________________
53 Statement of United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon for the United Nations
International Meeting in Support of Israeli-Palestinian Peace, Qawra, Malta, 12 February 2010.
United Nations A/66/78–E/2011/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
9 May 2011
Original: English
11-32807 (E) 180511
*1132807*
General Assembly Economic and Social Council
Sixty-sixth session
Item 62 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian
Golan over their natural resources
Substantive session of 2011
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and the Arab
population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 2010/31, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 65/179, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a
report to it at its sixty-sixth session. The present report, which has been prepared by
the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in response to
the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council.
* A/66/50.
** E/2011/100.
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Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan*
Summary
The occupation of Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, by Israel
continues to constrain the existence and successful functioning of institutions of the
Palestinian Authority and contribute to the economic and social hardship of
Palestinians. This includes the Israeli army’s continued resort to arbitrary detention,
disproportionate use of force, settlement expansion, property destruction, home
demolitions, mobility restrictions, restriction of building permits and closure
policies.
Between 1 February 2010 and 29 March 2011, 98 Palestinians were killed and
1,871 were injured by Israeli security forces and settlers. During the same period,
5 Israeli fatalities and 82 injuries were recorded as a result of the conflict.
By the end of 2010, an estimated 6,000 Palestinians were detained in Israeli
prisons, including 213 Palestinian children and 210 administrative detainees who are
held without charge or trial.
In 2010, more demolitions were recorded than in any other year since 2005. At
least 431 Palestinian structures were demolished in occupied East Jerusalem and
Area C in the West Bank, including 137 residential structures, displacing 594 people
and affecting 14,136 others.
The Government of Israel announced its decision to ease the blockade on the
Gaza Strip on 20 June 2010. This decision resulted in an increase in imports of
consumer goods. Yet, most of the fundamental parameters of Israel’s blockade,
namely restrictions on the movement of people, the import of only those raw
materials and basic construction materials that are used in projects under
international supervision and the export of only limited categories of products,
remain in place. In the West Bank, Palestinian access to occupied East Jerusalem and
their land, mainly located in the Jordan Valley, in areas behind the Wall and in areas
in the vicinity of Israeli settlements, remain difficult.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge its
appreciation for the substantive contributions of the Department for Political Affairs, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Development Programme, the
United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Labour Organization, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme, the World Health
Organization and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace
Process.
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As at mid-2010, 517,774 Israeli settlers lived in 144 settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including about 200,000 settlers in occupied East
Jerusalem. This population has more than doubled since the beginning of the Oslo
Peace Process in 1992.
Occupation and the tightly closed crossing into the Syrian Arab Republic
constitute the most important barriers to economic development and the
normalization of the social fabric in the occupied Syrian Golan. Syrian citizens who
wish to maintain their Syrian Arab identity face hardship and severely restricted
prospects with regard to income generation.
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2010/31, the Economic and Social Council called for the full
opening of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip, in line with Security Council
resolution 1860 (2009), to ensure humanitarian access as well as the sustained and
regular flow of persons and goods and the lifting of all movement restrictions
imposed on the Palestinian people. The Council also called upon all parties to
respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence
against the civilian population. It further called upon Israel, the occupying Power, to
cease its destruction of homes and properties, economic institutions and agricultural
lands and orchards in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan. The Council reaffirmed that Israeli
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and the
occupied Syrian Golan, were illegal and constituted a major obstacle to economic
and social development. It also reaffirmed that the ongoing construction of the wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, was
contrary to international law and was isolating East Jerusalem, fragmenting the West
Bank and seriously debilitating the economic and social development of the
Palestinian people.
2. In its resolution 65/179, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources, including land and water, and demanded that Israel
cease the exploitation, damage, cause of loss or depletion of, and endangerment of
natural resources. The Assembly stressed that the wall and settlements being
constructed in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, were contrary to international law and were seriously depriving the
Palestinian people of access to their natural resources. The Assembly called upon
Israel, the occupying Power, to comply strictly with its obligations under
international law, including international humanitarian law with respect to the
alteration of the character and status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem. The Assembly also called upon Israel to cease all actions harming
the environment and its destruction of vital infrastructure.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem
Deaths and injuries
3. Between 1 February 2010 and 29 March 2011, 98 Palestinians were killed and
1,871 were injured by Israeli security forces and settlers. The majority of the deaths
were recorded in the Gaza Strip, largely as a result of Israeli air strikes and
shootings in restricted areas in the vicinity of the buffer zone near the fence
separating the Strip from Israel. Most of the injuries, which increased by 60 per cent
in 2010 compared with the previous year,1 occurred in the West Bank and resulted
__________________
1 Information contributed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the
Secretariat.
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from clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian demonstrators, particularly in
occupied East Jerusalem.2
4. Eleven children were killed and 360 were injured as a result of the clashes. In
September and October 2010 alone, 26 Palestinian children were injured and one
15-month-old baby died after inhaling tear gas in occupied East Jerusalem; most
cases involved private armed guards hired by the Ministry of Construction and
Housing of Israel to protect Israeli settlers in the neighbourhood of Silwan.3
5. Three separate cases of Palestinian children being used by Israeli security
forces as human shields were documented in the West Bank in 2010 compared with
seven such cases during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza.3
6. During the same period, 5 Israeli fatalities and 82 injuries were recorded as a
result of the conflict.2
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
7. Citing security concerns, during 2010 Israeli forces conducted over 4,200
search and arrest operations throughout the West Bank, including occupied East
Jerusalem, arresting around 2,940 Palestinians.1 Since the occupation of the
Palestinian territory in 1967, Israeli authorities have detained an estimated 760,000
Palestinians for various periods, including 13,000 women and 15,000 children. At
the end of 2010, an estimated 6,000 Palestinians were being detained in Israeli
prisons, including 210 administrative detainees held without charge or trial.4 Since
25 June 2006, the Gaza-based Palestinian armed faction has held one Israeli soldier.
8. In the same period, 213 Palestinian children between the ages of 12 and 17
were reported to be detained in Israeli prisons.5 According to Israeli police figures,
1,267 criminal files were opened against children accused of throwing stones in
occupied East Jerusalem between October 2009 and October 2010. Ninety cases of
torture and ill treatment of detained children were documented in 2010, in 24 of
which the children were under the age of 15, compared with 101 such cases in 2009.
In addition, 13 cases of threatened and 1 case of actual sexual violence against
detained children aged between 13 and 17 were reported in 2010, compared with
nine such cases in 2009.3
9. Between January 2010 and the end of 2010, 645 complaints were filed against
Israeli security agency interrogators for alleged ill treatment and torture of
Palestinian detainees. The Israeli Police Investigation Department of the Ministry of
Justice, which is the relevant authority charged with investigating these complaints,
did not conduct any criminal investigation.3
__________________
2 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilians: Casualties
Database. Available from www.ochaopt.org/poc.aspx?id=1010002.
3 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and others, “Children Affected by Armed Conflict:
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2010 Annual Review)”. Available from
www.unicef.org/oPt/CAAC_2010_annual_bulletin.pdf.
4 Information contributed by the Palestinian Authority.
5 Defence of Children International-Palestine Section, “In their own words: a report on the
situation facing Palestinian children detained in the Israeli military court system” (January
2011). Available from www.dci-pal.org/English/Doc/Press/JANUARY2011.pdf.
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Population displacement, property destruction and confiscation
10. Master plans for Palestinian communities in Area C of the West Bank, which is
under Israeli jurisdiction, are either non-existent or have been prepared by the
Israeli Civil Administration without the participation of and without consulting with
local Palestinian communities.6 As a consequence, housing and infrastructure needs
remain largely unmet, resulting in overdensification and displacement to Areas A
and B, which are administratively controlled by the Palestinian Authority.
11. Palestinian land and structures continue to be at risk of confiscation for Israeli
purposes, such as the construction of the wall and the roads serving Israeli
settlements.7 In addition to the displacement resulting from home demolitions, the
destruction of Palestinian livelihood-related structures often have a devastating
impact on the socio-economic status of affected families.8
12. The incidence of demolitions rose in 2010, up 59 per cent from 2009, a rate
higher than in any year since 2005. At least 431 Palestinian structures were
demolished in occupied East Jerusalem and Area C9 in the West Bank, including
137 residential structures, displacing 594 people and affecting the livelihood of
14,136 others.10 At least 20,194 Palestinians have been left homeless as a result of
home demolitions since 2004.11
13. On 8 December 2010, Israeli military forces demolished 29 structures in the
village of Khirbet Tana, including homes and the town school. It was the third wave
of demolitions endured by the community in just over five years. One week later,
the Israeli authorities issued eviction orders targeting most of the remaining
structures in the village.10
14. Israeli policies, which the facts on the ground have shown to be aimed at the
annexation of East Jerusalem, include home demolitions, the revocation of
residency permits, undermining constructions by and confiscating the land of
__________________
6 Binkom, The Prohibited Zone (2008), available from http://eng.bimkom.org/_Uploads/
23ProhibitedZone.pdf); World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: The Economic Effects of Restricted
Access to Land in the West Bank (2008), available from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/EconomicEffectsofRestrictedAccesstoLandintheWestBankO
ct.20,08.pdf.
7 According to the World Bank, in the period 2000-2007 33 per cent of demolition orders were
issued against Palestinian structures and only 91 building permits were issued to Palestinians,
while 7 per cent of demolition orders were issued against Israeli structures and 18,472 building
permits were issued to Israelis (see footnote 6).
8 Information contributed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East.
9 Area C, which constitutes the vast majority of the West Bank, is under full control of the Israeli
military, even with regard to civilian affairs.
10 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Monitor (December
2010), available from www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2011_
01_19_english.pdf.
11 See www.btselem.org. Data on house demolitions as a punitive measure are available until 2004;
data on house demolitions for alleged military purposes are available for the period 2004-2010
(and exclude Operation Cast Lead); and data on the demolition of houses built without a permit
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are available only for the periods 2006-2010 and 2004-
2010, respectively.
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Palestinians, have resulted in the expropriation of 23,378 dunams12 of land in
occupied East Jerusalem since 1968.13
15. Only 13 per cent of occupied East Jerusalem is zoned by the Israeli authorities
for Palestinian construction. However, most of this area is already heavily built-up.
Moreover, Israel’s policy for granting building permits to Palestinians is restrictive
and involves a process that is often complicated and expensive.1
16. As a result, the number of building permits granted annually does not meet the
existing demand for housing. The gap between housing needs based on population
growth and legally permitted construction is estimated to be of at least 1,100
housing units per year. Thus, 28 per cent of all Palestinian homes in occupied East
Jerusalem have been built without permits, a situation that could be used, at any
time, as a pretext by the Israeli authorities to demolish the homes, potentially
rendering 60,000 Palestinians homeless.14 Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have
demolished thousands of Palestinian-owned structures in East Jerusalem, including
an estimated 2,000 homes.15 Consequently, housing is becoming increasingly
unaffordable, overdensification is becoming a problem and some families have no
choice but to move out of occupied East Jerusalem.
17. In the first half of 2010, 46 residency permits for Palestinians in Jerusalem
were revoked, adding to the 13,115 permits that had been revoked between 1967 and
November 2009.16
18. During 2010, Israeli authorities confiscated about 8,407.5 dunams of land and
razed another 1,532 dunams for the purpose of constructing the West Bank wall and
for expanding settlements.4
19. In the Gaza Strip, the blockade continues to impede the construction,
reconstruction and restoration of Palestinian homes. The Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that 26,500 new housing units are needed to
accommodate the natural growth that occurred between June 2007 and December
2010. Additional units are needed to replace the 6,300 units that were destroyed or
severely damaged during Operation Cast Lead and the 2,900 units that were
destroyed or damaged in previous military operations; 5,500 additional units are
needed to replace substandard and unsanitary homes in refugee camps. The
(conservative) total estimate is 41,200 housing units needed.17
__________________
12 1 dunam = 1,000 m2.
13 See www.btselem.org/english/Jerusalem/Land_Expropriation_Statistics.asp.
14 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “West Bank Movement and Access
Update” (June 2010), available from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/
4694C27BF640414685257744004ACE17.
15 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian
Concerns” (March 2011), available from www.ochaopt.org/documents/
ocha_opt_jerusalem_report_2011_03_23_web_english.pdf.
16 See www.btselem.org/english/Jerusalem/Revocation_Statistics.asp.
17 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Easing the Blockade (March 2011),
available from www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_special_easing_the_blockade_
2011_03_english.pdf.
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Israeli settlements and settler violence
20. As at mid-2010, more than half a million Israeli settlers were estimated to be
living in 144 settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including around
200,000 settlers in occupied East Jerusalem.4 This population has more than doubled
since the beginning of the Oslo Peace Process in 1992.
21. The Israeli settler population in the West Bank, including occupied East
Jerusalem, increased by 68 per cent between 1997 and 2010 (equal to a growth rate
of about 4 per cent a year, which is more than double the overall natural
demographic growth of Israel during the same period), while the Palestinian
population in the area increased by 41 per cent during the same period, as shown in
table 1.
Table 1
Growth in the Israeli settler and Palestinian populations in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem
Year 1992 1997 2002 2007 2010
Israeli settlers 241 500 308 689 383 275 461 169 517 774
Palestinians — 1 787 562 2 042 306 2 323 469 2 513 283
Sources: www.btselem.org/English/Settlements/Settlement_population.xls; Human Rights
Watch, Separate and Unequal: Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories (December 2010); information contributed by the Palestinian
Authority’s Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (see www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/
populati/GOVER1997-2010E.htm).
22. In addition to settlements, there are currently about 100 settlement outposts in
the West Bank that were built without official Israeli authorization and have
therefore been deemed illegal by the Government of Israel, but that are often
tolerated by governmental ministries and protected by the Israeli army. As with the
settlements, the outposts are illegal under international humanitarian law.18 The
outposts control some 16,000 dunams of land, of which 7,000 consist of private,
Palestinian-owned land (see A/65/365, para. 15).
23. A 10-month partial moratorium on settlement construction in the West Bank
ended on 26 September 2010. Construction continued during the 10 months on units
authorized and commenced before the partial restraint. In addition, the Israeli
non-governmental organization Peace Now has reported a number of violations of
the partial restraint (see A/HRC/16/72, para. 14).
24. In the six weeks following the end of the moratorium, the rate of settlement
construction increased compared to what it had been before the moratorium (see
A/HRC/16/72, para. 14). In fact, the number of housing units built in settlements
was about four times higher in 2010 (6,764) than in 2009 (1,703); 2,107 units were
constructed in 2008, 1,471 in 2007 and 1,518 in 2006.19
__________________
18 A 2005 report (the Sasson Report) commissioned by the then Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel
Sharon, concluded that the outposts were illegal even under Israeli law.
19 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release on the occasion of Land Day, available
from www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/land_day_E30032011.pdf.
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25. Israel has drawn plans to construct a new settlement between Ma’ale Adumim
and East Jerusalem, the implementation of which would connect the two areas and
cut off East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. Israel already built the new
Police District Headquarters in this area some years ago, in the course of which it
paved roads and built infrastructure to serve the planned settlement, thereby
splitting the West Bank in two (see A/65/365, para. 23).
26. Israeli settlements are linked to each other and to Israel by an extensive road
network. Palestinians are either prevented from using these roads or have only
restricted access to them. As a result, the roads have fragmented the West Bank into
isolated enclaves that Palestinians must access via alternative roads, checkpoints,
bridges and tunnels that circumvent the roads reserved for settlers.
27. In December 2009, the High Court of Justice of Israel cancelled the ban on the
movement of Palestinians along that section of route 443 to and from Jerusalem that
lies beyond the Green Line. In response, the Israeli army proposed new traffic
arrangements resulting in the continued exclusion of Palestinians from utilizing the
route, in contravention of the High Court’s rulings.20
28. Israeli settlements, their infrastructure and the territory zoned for their
expansion, have been identified as the single largest factor shaping the system of
access restrictions applied to the Palestinian population in the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem. While in some cases the restricted areas have been unilaterally
established and enforced by Israeli settlers, in other cases the Israeli military erects
fences around settlements and declares the area behind the fence a special security
area (see A/65/365, para. 16).
29. In 2010, settler attacks more than doubled compared with 2009. Between
February 2010 and February 2011, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs recorded a total of 304 settler-related incidents, of which 101 were
perpetrated by settlers against Palestinians and their properties. In 2010, a
Palestinian boy was killed by settlers. Moreover, settlers took over at least
10 Palestinian housing units in occupied East Jerusalem, leading to the eviction of at
least 70 Palestinians.1
30. Israeli settlers burned down a Palestinian church in occupied East Jerusalem
and three mosques in the West Bank. Six mosques were vandalized, set on fire or
both by Israeli settlers during 2010, the fifth such occurrence that year.21
31. During the 2010 olive harvest season, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs recorded more than 30 incidents resulting either in injury to
Palestinians or in damage to olive trees, compared with 20 incidents in each of the
2008 and 2009 olive harvest seasons. In addition, Israeli settlers caused dozens of
other incidents, including intimidation, trespassing and preventing access. These
attacks resulted in 17 injuries to Palestinians and the destruction of roughly 4,000
olive trees.1
__________________
20 See www.btselem.org/english/freedom_of_movement/road_443.asp.
21 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Monitor (October 2010),
available from www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_
2010_11_12_english.pdf.
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32. In one incident, 3,000 dunams of cultivated land were set on fire by Israeli
settlers in August 2010, thus undermining the livelihoods of some 100 Palestinian
families from the Beit Furik village (Nablus).22
33. No indictment was filed after 97 investigations were launched by Israeli
security forces into the vandalization of Palestinian trees between 2005 and 2010.23
On 27 March, a settler was sentenced to one and a half years in prison and had to
pay compensation after a Jerusalem court convicted him for kidnapping a
Palestinian minor in 2007.
The wall
34. Israel continues to construct the wall initiated in 2002, with approximately
85 per cent of its planned route running within the West Bank, including occupied
East Jerusalem. Should the wall be completed as planned, approximately 33,000
Palestinians in the West Bank, as well as the majority of Palestinian residents of
occupied East Jerusalem, will reside between the wall and the Green Line.1
35. By the end of 2010, approximately 61.4 per cent of the 707-kilometre-long
wall had been completed. A further 8.4 per cent was under construction and
30.1 per cent was planned but had not yet been constructed.1
36. The wall has already severely affected social and economic life; it restricts the
freedom of access and movement of Palestinians in the West Bank, affecting around
855,000 Palestinians in 206 communities. The impact of the wall will continue to
increase as construction progresses.4
37. The wall separates occupied East Jerusalem from the remainder of the West
Bank. Only holders of West Bank identification documents with valid permits can
access occupied East Jerusalem, through 3 of 14 checkpoints, in order to reach their
jobs or health-care facilities.4 Around 50,000 holders of Jerusalem identification
documents live within the municipal boundaries but have been left on the West Bank
side of the wall. Moreover, 140,000 people living in the Jerusalem governorate in
communities historically connected to Jerusalem are now physically separated by
the wall.14
38. The area between the wall and the Green Line has been designated a “closed
military area” that is also referred to as the “Seam Zone”. It covers almost 733 km2,
which represents about 13 per cent of the area of the West Bank. These isolated and
confiscated areas include 348 km2 of agricultural land, 110 km2 of land utilized for
Israeli settlements and military bases, 250 km2 of forests and open areas and 25 km2
of land that has been built up by Palestinians.19 Approximately 7,800 Palestinians
currently reside in this closed area. Furthermore, Palestinians are obliged to obtain
“visitor” permits to access their farming land and water resources that are located in
the Seam Zone. Access is channelled via specific gates erected in the wall.1
Restricted allocation of these permits and the limited number and opening times of
__________________
22 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Monitor (August 2010),
available from www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_
2010_09_16_english.pdf.
23 Yesh Din, “Police investigation of vandalization of Palestinian trees in the West Bank” (October
2010). Available from www.yesh-din.org/userfiles/file/datasheets/YESH%20DIN_Eng.pdf.
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the wall gates have severely curtailed agricultural practice and undermined rural
livelihoods.1
39. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA) has reported that its access to the Seam Zone — for the
provision of mobile health services, food assistance and mental health services, as
well as for social work teams — remains difficult due to Israeli demands that
vehicles and staff be searched. Israeli authorities continue to require that UNRWA
goods be transferred “back-to-back” at one of the five commercial crossings along
the wall.8
Mobility restrictions and closure policies, including access
to humanitarian assistance
40. Israel’s adoption, citing security concerns, of a closed regime with regard to
the Occupied Palestinian Territory makes it complicated for Palestinian households
to conduct normal lives (to reach school, health-care facilities, the local market, the
workplace and agricultural land). Restricting movement in the occupied territory is
in contradiction with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,24 (Fourth Geneva Convention) and
creates a shattered socio-economic space where, on any given day, the ability of an
ordinary Palestinian household to conduct a normal life is continuously subject to
non-transparent decisions and delays. Such a system of movement restrictions
induces people to live under a continuous sense of uncertainty and vulnerability.
41. Israel continued to control the export and import of Palestinian goods. The
Occupied Palestinian Territory has no seaport, airport or railway, and suffers from
constraints to road transportation, as a result of which its trade has been
concentrated with and through Israel.
Restrictions on access to and from the Gaza Strip
42. The blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip since June 2007 remained in
effect, constituting a clear, systematic and sustained case of collective punishment
imposed on an entire civilian population in direct violation of article 33 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention (see A/HRC/16/72, para. 23).
43. It remains difficult for Gaza’s population to move in and out of the Strip, with
exceptional access granted in humanitarian cases. This means that a limited number
of people requiring urgent medical care and those accompanying them, with
permits, can enter Israel.1 Moreover, national staff of humanitarian organizations
were less able to travel in and out of Gaza after June 2010, when only half as many
applications for such staff to access Gaza were approved.25
44. Until June 2010, limited quantities of only 76 items were allowed compared
with the approximately 4,000 items that were traded before the blockade.10 In June
2010, Israel announced an easing of the blockade, moving from a positive to a
__________________
24 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
25 See http://ochadms.unog.ch/quickplace/cap/main.nsf/h_Index/CAP_2011_Humanitarian_Appeal/
$FILE/CAP_2011_Humanitarian_Appeal_SCREEN.pdf?openElement.
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negative list of goods that resulted in a slight increase in the importation of
consumer goods and a corresponding decline in the illegal trade in such items
through tunnels. Yet, the fundamental restrictions on the movement of people and on
the importation of raw materials and basic construction materials, as well as the ban
on the export of goods beyond a limited selection of agricultural products, remained,
in spite of limited progress in the entry of construction materials.26 It should be
noted that, according to an announcement made by Israel on 8 December 2010,
permissible exports are to include agricultural produce, furniture and textile
products, which will be subject to security and logistical preparations at the Kerem
Shalom crossing.27
45. These incremental improvements can easily be withdrawn or amended and, as
such, are unlikely to give people the certainty they need to carry out their ordinary
businesses. Currently, approval procedures remain burdensome and limited capacity
at crossing points delays the flow of essential goods and the implementation of
international projects under the recovery and reconstruction plan for Gaza. To date,
United Nations projects valued at $155.5 million have been approved by the
Government of Israel. It is now important to ensure timely implementation of these
projects and a steady flow of approvals. For instance, the arbitrary closure of the
Nahal Oz crossing at the beginning of 2010 negatively affected the importation of
cooking gas, just as capacity limitations at Karni and Kerem Shalom crossings have
failed to accommodate the need for construction supplies.1
46. Between January 2010 and February 2011, 3,407 truckloads of goods entered
the Gaza Strip.27 While this figure marks an increase from 2009, it remains well
below the monthly average of 12,350 truckloads in the months preceding the
imposition of the blockade in 2007.10 Despite an overall increase in the volume of
non-food items, including new raw materials, food items continue to make up the
majority, or 58 per cent, of imported goods; the share of food items prior to June
2007 was of about 20 per cent.17 At the time of writing this report, the
announcement by Israeli authorities of an easing of export restrictions, which was
made in December 2010, remains mostly unimplemented.1 In fact, 99 truckloads of
goods were exported in December 2010, 107 in January 2011 and 52 in February
2011, compared to 4 in November 2010 and zero in the preceding six months.
Exports in December 2010 and February 2011 were all agricultural.27
47. The importation of basic construction materials remains heavily restricted.
Materials that are designated by Israel as “dual-use” items are restricted for projects
approved by the Palestinian Authority and supervised by international
organizations,1 thereby imposing delays and extra costs on project implementation.
The unilateral designation of construction materials as “dual-use items for projects”
undermines recovery and reconstruction efforts and renders inconsequential the
commitment by international donors to alleviate the plight of the civilian
population.
48. In addition, a very cumbersome coordination and monitoring system needs to
be adhered to, often resulting in the interruption of imports and projects. The unmet
need for 41,200 housing units,17 (including as a result of natural growth) is causing
__________________
26 Information contributed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Process.
27 Information contributed by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle
East Process.
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an increasingly severe housing crisis, with a negative impact on the housing stock,
hygiene and the social stability of families.
49. While the Israeli authorities continue to make efforts to expand the capacity of
Kerem Shalom crossing, the fact that the conveyor belt at Karni Crossing currently
operates only twice weekly, to transfer grain and gravel, has been a significant
constraint in the implementation of construction projects authorized by the Israeli
authorities,28 as well as in the maintenance of adequate reserves of wheat.1 During
the first half of March 2011, the conveyor belt was closed.
50. Since late 2008, Palestinians have been totally or partially prevented from
accessing land located between 1,000 and 1,500 metres from the Green Line and sea
areas beyond 3 nautical miles from shore. At sea, fishermen are prevented from
accessing their exclusive economic zone. It should be noted that in all Member
States exclusive economic zones are designated at 200 nautical miles, as stipulated
by article 57 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.29 Overall, it
is estimated that 17 per cent of the total land mass of the Gaza Strip and 35 per cent
of its agricultural land is restricted. An estimated 178,000 people (12 per cent of the
population of the Gaza Strip) are directly affected by the access regime implemented
by the Israeli military. This includes approximately 113,000 people affected by
restrictions on access to land and 65,000 people affected by restrictions on access to
maritime areas.30
Movement of persons and goods in the West Bank
51. While movement between urban centres throughout the West Bank, excluding
occupied East Jerusalem, has marginally improved, Palestinian access to their land
located in the Jordan Valley, in areas behind the wall and in areas in the vicinity of
Israeli settlements, continues to be difficult.1 Crossing procedures at gates that
provide access to East Jerusalem or to other parts of the West Bank through Area C
are managed arbitrarily by Israeli authorities. Crossing permits are normally only
valid at certain gates and alternative passages are not allowed.
52. The mobility of Palestinians throughout the West Bank continues to be
controlled through Israeli military checkpoints and obstacles to movement. As at
4 January 2011, there were over 500 obstacles in the West Bank — compared to the
571 that were in place at the end of 2009 and the average of 518 that existed in
2006 — including approximately 64 permanently staffed checkpoints, some 24
partially staffed checkpoints and over 420 unstaffed obstacles (roadblocks, earth
mounds, earth walls, road barriers, road gates and trenches). These obstacles to
movement were augmented by ad hoc or “flying” checkpoints; throughout 2010, an
average of 92 such checkpoints was erected each week.1 There was no improvement
in East Jerusalem and Area C. Israel granted tourist access to Bethlehem and more
__________________
28 Once approved, a strict monitoring and verification procedure is implemented by the Israeli
authorities for each imported truckload used in the project. This procedure has resulted in a
significant increase in administrative and operational costs and has slowed down project
implementation.
29 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1833, No. 31363.
30 Office for the Cooridination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Food Programme, “Between
the Fence and a Hard Place: the Humanitarian Impact of Israeli-imposed Restrictions on Access
to Land and Sea in the Gaza Strip” (August 2010). Available from www.ochaopt.org/documents/
ocha_opt_special_focus_2010_08_19_english.pdf.
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predictable access for meat and dairy products into East Jerusalem from the rest of
the West Bank.
53. Palestinians are prohibited from crossing checkpoints to the Jordan River areas
of the West Bank (an area with very high potential in terms of agriculture, trade
logistics, and religious and health-related tourism) with their private vehicles, unless
they have obtained a special permit that is usually difficult to secure.14
54. During 2010, UNRWA faced continued restrictions in accessing refugee
communities in the West Bank, with major implications on its ability to meet the
humanitarian needs of Palestinian refugees. A total of 339 access-related incidents
were reported in 2010, resulting in a loss to UNRWA of an estimated 293 workdays
or 2,200 work-hours. Those affected included teachers, medical doctors and nurses,
social workers and field office staff. The incidents negatively affected the delivery
of education and health services and relief operations. The overwhelming majority
of the incidents (337) were due to Israeli restrictions.8
Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestinian natural
resources and the environment
55. The expansion of Israeli settlements, the wall and the Israeli military
operations have severely restricted the ability of Palestinians to access their natural
resources, namely water, land and energy, as well as adversely affected the
environment, for example through the depletion of water resources and the
deterioration of the quality of those resources. The land has been degraded and both
the land and the air have been polluted. This will have long-term ecological and
health effects, further undermining the development and welfare of the Palestinian
population.
56. Palestinians have very limited access to surface water resources such as the
Jordan River. Israel extracts 80 per cent of the estimated potential of the aquifers
under the West Bank. In addition, Israel overdraws more than half of the potential
by means of deep wells without any regular consultation mechanism with the
Palestine Authority; this has led to a drop in water tables and in the drying up of half
of Palestinians’ wells over the last two decades. Current Israeli restrictions mean
that over the past decade Palestinians have had access to between 113 million and
138 million m3 of water compared with the approximately 75 million m3 supplied to
the settler population. In 2007, West Bank Palestinians had access to 123 litres
per capita per day while Israelis had access to 544 litres per capita per day.31
57. Palestinians have extremely limited access to domestic fresh water, averaging
73 litres per capita per day in the West Bank (in parts of Hebron, the average is as
low as 10 litres per person per day) and 52 in the Gaza Strip. This is well below the
World Health Organization’s recommendation of 100 litres per day.4 Moreover, it is
estimated that 313,000 people in the West Bank are not connected to a water
network and therefore pay between 4 and 5 times as much for water than those who
__________________
31 World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector
Development (2009) (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/
WaterRestrictionsReport18Apr2009.pdf).
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are connected to the network.32 Those not connected to the water network rely
mainly on water cisterns to collect rainwater or tanker water whose quality can vary.
Those purchasing tanker water in the West Bank pay on average five times more
per cubic metre than those getting water from the network (19.4 versus 3.8 new
sheqalim per cubic metre).33 The poor in the Gaza Strip end up paying up to
10 times the standard household expenditure benchmark set by UNICEF and the
World Health Organization.32
58. In Gaza, the ban on importing spare parts and construction material has led to
the deterioration of the water quality and a decrease in its quantity. Approximately
85 per cent of water in wells in the Gaza Strip is not suitable for drinking because of
increasing levels of alkalinity and a heightened concentration of salts and
nitrates.4,34 According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics the water in the
Gaza Strip suffers from a high percentage of salinity since the costal aquifer had a
concentration of 1,000 mg of chloride per litre compared with the 300 mg per litre
recommended by international standards.33
59. As a result of limited capacity and the continual breakdown of sanitation
facilities in Gaza, which serve only two thirds of the population, approximately
60 million litres of untreated or partly treated sewage are reaching agricultural
lands, the sea and sources of drinking water on a daily basis.25,35
60. Most of the wastewater produced in the West Bank (40-50 million m3 per year)
is dumped into the environment as untreated sewage, polluting agricultural lands
and underground aquifers.25 Approximately 40 million m3 of wastewater and solid
waste produced by Israeli settlements are estimated to be dumped on Palestinian
land annually.4
61. These Israeli practices are resulting in land degradation and a loss of
agricultural productivity. The wall in the West Bank was constructed on
approximately 19,000 dunams of agricultural land,4 isolating about 170,000 dunams
of fertile land with an estimated economic value of $38 million, thereby depriving
Palestinian farmers of the right to use this resource for their livelihood.
62. Palestinians continue to face difficulties in accessing energy supplies because
of the instability of the electric power supply controlled by Israel and the severe
restrictions placed on supplies of bottled gas. Despite the fact that natural gas fields
suitable for commercial production were discovered on Gaza’s shores, the
development of those fields was halted owing to the failure of negotiations with
Israel and other concerned stakeholders.36
__________________
32 UNICEF/Palestinian Hydrology Group, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Household Survey: Gaza
(2010), available from www.ewash.org/files/library/FINAL_WASH_REPORT.pdf.
33 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release on the occasion of World Water Day
(22 March 2011), available from www.pcbs.gov.ps/DesktopModules/Articles/
ArticlesView.aspx?tabID=0&lang=en&ItemID=1664&mid=12235.
34 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release on the occasion of World Environment
Day, available from www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Envirm-DayE.pdf.
35 United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Assessment of the Gaza Strip (2009),
available from http://oneresponse.info/crosscutting/environment/publicdocuments/
UNEP_Gaza_EA.pdf.
36 Palestine Monetary Authority and others, Quarterly Economic and Social Monitor, vol. 22
(November 2010).
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Socio-economic indicators
63. The Palestinian economy has been heavily affected by Israeli occupation since
1967 and continuously suffers from very limited access to sources of growth and
welfare such as land, natural resources, tourist and cultural sites,
telecommunications frequencies and uninterrupted access to both domestic and
international markets. After the September 2000 crisis, the occupying power
imposed additional restrictive policies. As a result, the Palestinian economy has
been characterized by volatile trends over the last 10 years. Indeed, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimates that the per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2010 was 30 per cent less than it was in 2000 (see
TD/B/57/4). Recently, the GDP growth rates have been relatively high, as the
Palestinian economy recovers from the depletion of its capital stock and a slowdown
in economic activity. This can be seen in the Gaza Strip’s real GDP growth rate of
15 per cent in the first quarter of 2010 relative to the corresponding period in 2009,
a figure higher than that for the West Bank (10 per cent).37
64. The occupation regime confined Palestinian-controlled cities and towns with
tight temporary borders. As a consequence, urban growth has been heavily
constrained, inflating land prices, making housing increasingly unaffordable for
Palestinian families and negatively affecting the overall economic status.38
65. The collapse of the Palestinian economy and its subsequent recovery can be
seen in significant changes in both labour force participation and employment
trends. While the rate of labour force participation was already low by international
standards in the year 2000 (43.5 per cent in the third quarter of that year), its
subsequent decline in the face of policies pursued by the Israeli authorities never
fully reversed, not even a decade later (the rate of labour participation was 40.5 per
cent for the whole territory but only 36 per cent in Gaza in the third quarter of
2010).39 Despite very high levels of human capital across the territory relative to the
rest of the region and beyond, trends in employment, underemployment and
unemployment rates, together with overall decreasing real wages, highlight not just
the precarious employment situation in Palestine since the September 2000 crisis
but also the existence of an economy that is increasingly bifurcated between the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as indicated in table 2.39 The overall unemployment
rate has more than doubled since 2000.
__________________
37 World Bank, The Underpinnings of the Future Palestinian State: Sustainable Growth and
Institutions (2010). Available from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/
Resources/WorldBankSep2010AHLCReport.pdf.
38 Information contributed by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat).
39 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, labour force surveys.
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Table 2
Employment statistics in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the third quarter
of 2000 and 2010
(Percentage)
Full employment Underemployment Unemployment
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
West Bank 84.8 73.0 7.7 6.9 7.5 20.1
Gaza Strip 81.0 54.1 3.5 5.4 15.5 40.5
66. There are differences in the duration of unemployment depending on location:
people in the Gaza Strip are unemployed for an average of 24.1 months while
people in the West Bank are unemployed for an average of 7.8 months. The highest
rate of unemployment is 70.6 per cent, which relates to youth aged between 15 and
19 years in the Gaza Strip; 33.5 per cent of their peers in the West Bank are
unemployed.39 With a labour force expanding by 3 per cent each year, in part
because of a youth bulge that is still growing, only sustained economic growth that
includes the tradable goods sector can keep the increasing level of frustration among
youths under control.
67. Although labour market access to the Israeli economy is unavailable to those
from the Gaza Strip, it remains open, albeit with tight restrictions, to Palestinians
residing in the West Bank. In fact, 78,800 West Bank Palestinians were employed in
the Israeli economy in the fourth quarter of 2010, forming 13.82 per cent of those
employed from the West Bank. This is a slight increase from the corresponding
period in 2009, when approximately 72,079 (13.40 per cent) of employed West Bank
residents worked in the Israeli economy.39
68. The industrial sector in the Gaza Strip is still suffering from the damage
caused by Operation Cast Lead and the June 2007 closure. Records show that 1,365
establishments were operational during June and July 2010, compared with 3,900
prior to the closure. Of those establishments, 15 per cent were working at a capacity
of between 30 and 60 per cent, a fifth at a capacity of 20 per cent and 65 per cent
remained out of commission. There has also been a fall in employment at these
establishments, from 35,000 to 6,000 workers. The construction sector was in a
similar predicament: 50 working establishments were hiring 1,500 workers in 2010,
while prior to the closures 125 establishments were employing 50,000 workers.37
Nevertheless, the construction sector is witnessing improvements in the West Bank,
where 11.8 per cent more building licences were issued in the third quarter of 2010
compared with the corresponding period in 2009.40
69. Damage also continues to be done to the agricultural sector. Of the agricultural
land in the Gaza Strip, 35 per cent is located in restricted zones; lack of access to
that land is estimated to result in the loss of approximately 75,000 tons of potential
produce annually, whose market value is conservatively estimated at $50.2 million.
In the fishing sector, it is estimated that access restrictions have resulted in the loss
__________________
40 See www.pcbs.gov.ps/desktopDefault.aspx?tabID=3491&lang=en.
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of approximately 7,000 tons of potential fishing catch, with a related income loss of
some $26.5 million over a period of five years.41
70. Movement restrictions dramatically reduce enterprise competitiveness by
raising transportation costs and inducing low levels of capacity utilization, which in
turn results in high fixed costs. In addition, the very limited working hours at Israeli
crossing points, combined with inadequate infrastructure, such as the lack of cold
storage facilities and large scanners, and the use of a slow and inefficient back-toback
system at commercial crossings instead of containers, make it impossible for
Palestinian enterprises to make cost-effective shipments, thereby preventing them
from entering international markets that require rigorous delivery times and limiting
their ability to achieve economies of scale.
71. Poverty measurements were recently revised by the Palestinian Central Bureau
of Statistics. Overall, poverty rates remain extremely low in occupied East
Jerusalem and are declining in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, poverty
rates in the Gaza Strip are almost twice as high as those in the West Bank. The
population remains highly vulnerable to poverty and a significant proportion of
households live close to the poverty line. Poverty is more prevalent among
households headed by women.
72. By dedicating more than half of their total cash expenditures to food,
Palestinian households are particularly sensitive to variations in food prices and
income levels. As food prices rise — in part as a result of Israeli restrictions on
movement, which inflate the cost of transport — and as income levels decline,
Palestinians resort to coping mechanisms that involve deferring the payment of
utility bills, purchasing food on credit and consuming lower-quality and smaller
quantities of food. Most of these coping strategies, even if they are reversible, can
exact a permanent cost on people’s lives and livelihoods by leading to poorer health
and a poorer nutritional status, excessive indebtedness and the loss of future
opportunities for higher qualifications, better skills and better paid jobs.
73. Economic deterioration and increasing vulnerability have made the Occupied
Palestinian Territory one of the most aid-dependent economies in the world. The
stifling of the Palestinian productive sector substantially reduces the multiplier
effects of aid.
Public health and food insecurity
74. Food insecurity remains a pressing issue for 1.43 million Palestinians,
although those in the West Bank fare better than those in the Gaza Strip, with
22 per cent of the former experiencing food insecurity compared with 52 per cent of
the latter.41,42
75. In the Gaza Strip, the blockade, recurrent power cuts and unstable power
supply have had a significant impact on medical care. Moreover, shortages of
essential medicines and supplies are evident. By the end of January 2011, there were
no stocks of 38 per cent of essential drugs in Gaza’s central drug store.17
__________________
41 Information contributed by the World Food Programme.
42 The indicators used to define food insecurity in the Occupied Palestinian Territory combined
information on income and/or consumption levels (dollars per capita) and trends in food and
non-food expenditures (decrease/no change).
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76. Refugees are particularly financially vulnerable, and thus increase the burden
on the health services provided by UNRWA in the Gaza Strip. Psychosocial health
care throughout the Gaza Strip has also suffered due to conflicts and economic
isolation. In particular, 56.6 per cent of children have reported a moderate reaction
to trauma and 10.6 per cent have reported severe reactions. The prevalence of posttraumatic
stress among families is estimated at 45 per cent.43
77. Palestinians within the Seam Zone face severe restrictions to health care,
having to cross Israeli checkpoints in order to seek basic health services located in
Palestinian cities in the West Bank.44 The health-care system in both the West Bank
and occupied East Jerusalem continues to fragment as a result of the occupation and
the restrictions placed on the movement of people (not only of patients but also of
health staff) and goods.45 In addition, providers of specialized care are often located
in occupied East Jerusalem, requiring residents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
to obtain permits to visit those centres;46 this, in turn, leads to a substantial drain in
already scarce public and household financial resources.
Youth and education
78. Forty incidents in which students were prevented from accessing schools,
learning was disrupted or the safety of students was compromised were documented
in 2010. Of those cases, 38 per cent involved the closure of roads and checkpoints,
searches and the harassment or assault of students at checkpoints by Israeli
authorities. In 33 per cent of cases, children missed school hours and were exposed
to violence by settlers because the Israeli authorities did not provide military escorts
to protect children passing near settlements and outposts prone to violence in the
West Bank.3
79. The situation in the Gaza Strip is particularly pressing given the rate of
population growth, that the average class size is of between 38 and 40 students and
that 79 per cent of Ministry of Education schools and 90 per cent of UNRWA
schools are running double or triple shifts. In mid-2010 it was estimated that the
Ministry of Education needed 160 new schools to alleviate the problem of double or
triple shifts.17
80. In the West Bank some 10 schools are threatened with demolition due to the
lack of permits, another 22 have been declared unsafe or have unhygienic facilities
and 5 more face ongoing intimidation by Israeli settlers.47 In Area C, new schools
and repairs cannot be undertaken without running the risk of becoming subject to
long and uncertain procedures that may end up in demolition or sealing orders.
__________________
43 UNRWA, Emergency Appeal 2011 (December 2010). Available from www.unrwa.org/userfiles/
2010121464938.pdf.
44 World Health Organization and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Impact
of the Barrier on Health (July 2010). Available from www.ochaopt.org/documents/
ocha_opt_special_focus_july_2010_english.pdf.
45 Rita Giacaman and others, “Health status and health services in the occupied Palestinian
territory”, The Lancet, vol. 373, No. 9666 (March 2009), pp. 837-849.
46 Information contributed by the World Health Organization.
47 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Monitor (September
2010). Available from www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_
2010_10_19_english.pdf).
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81. In spite of the limited territory under its control and other constraints, the
Palestinian Authority has accelerated progress in improving its government
functions. In the areas where the United Nations is engaged the most (governance,
rule of law and human rights; livelihoods and productive sectors; education and
culture; health; social protection; infrastructure; and water), the Authority’s
governmental functions are now sufficiently developed to allow for a functioning
State government.48
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
82. The Syrian Golan was occupied by Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.
In 1981, Israel passed the Golan Heights Law, which extended Israeli law and
administration and thus annexed the entire Israeli-controlled territory of Golan (see
A/65/327, para. 81). The Security Council, in its resolution 497 (1981), declared
that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the
Syrian Golan was null and void.
83. The occupied area of the Golan covers about 1,200 km2. An estimated 22,000
Syrians still reside there, in five towns. The occupied Syrian Golan also has about
19,000 Israeli settlers, who live in some 33 settlements.49
84. Occupation and the closed crossing into the Syrian Arab Republic constitute
the most important barriers to economic development and the normalization of the
social fabric in the occupied Syrian Golan. Syrian citizens who wish to maintain
their Syrian Arab identity face hardship and severely restricted prospects of earning
a decent living.50
85. Agriculture remains the main source of income for most Syrian families.
According to the Syrian Government, there is discrimination against Syrian workers
and landowners in the occupied Syrian Golan. This discrimination takes the form of
denial of jobs as a result of not having served in the Israeli army, as well as
restrictions on the use of water, especially for irrigation, and high taxation. Taxation
on the agricultural produce of the occupied population can be as high as 50 per cent.
Another impediment to agricultural production was reportedly the uprooting of trees
and destruction of crops. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab
Republic and witnesses reported several instances of uprooting of trees and burning
of land in May 2010. 50
86. A dispute broke out in the town of Majdal Shams when land was said to have
been confiscated to allow for the expansion of the Nimrod settlement in the summer
of 2009. Another incident occurred in 2010, when farmers reported that between
70 and 80 trees per dunam had been uprooted on an area of 25 dunams.50
__________________
48 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Process, “Palestinian
State-building: a decisive period” (13 April 2011). Available from http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/
AHLC-Apr2011_UNSCOrpt.pdf.
49 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Occupied Golan: nurturing ties with the rest of
Syria”, 15 February 2011. Available from www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/
2011/golan-update-2011-02-15.htm.
50 International Labour Organization, “The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories”
(2010). Available from www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/
meetingdocument/wcms_130550.pdf.
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87. Israeli settlers farm 80 km2 of land, including large patches of agricultural
land. Syrians farm about 20 km2 of land. The water allocated for use by Arabs is
subject to strict controls, with disparities between the water allotted to Israeli
settlers and Syrian residents. The diversion of water resources to Israeli settlements
has resulted in the drying up of springs supplying water to Arab villages in the
occupied Golan, adversely affecting crops and livelihoods.51
88. Late in 2009, the Syrian Arab Republic expressed concern at the solicitation by
Israel of competitive bids in relation to the sale of 11 residential buildings in the
village of Ain Qunyah in the occupied Syrian Golan (see A/65/327, para. 86). Israeli
authorities continue to encourage settler population growth. For example, on
10 February 2010, the Knesset voted in favour of a bill to grant tax breaks to settlers
living in the Golan Heights.52
89. In 2010, the International Labour Organization noted few local employment
opportunities, particularly for university graduates and other young people seeking
professional posts (see A/65/327, para. 90).
90. As at 27 August 2010, approximately seven prisoners from the occupied
Syrian Golan were detained in Israeli prisons, one of whom had spent some 25 years
in detention. Detainees were reported to be suffering from inadequate medical care
in conditions that may not meet the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners (see A/65/327, para. 91).
91. United Nations human rights mechanisms and agencies, as well as other
relevant organizations, lack access to the occupied Syrian Golan. Furthermore, local
non-governmental organizations and individuals operating in the occupied Golan
have expressed difficulties with access to information, for example obtaining
official figures on water consumption, due to a lack of cooperation by Israel and
Israeli settlers (see A/65/327, para. 94).
92. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), however, remains
active in the occupied Syrian Golan. In 2010, ICRC arranged for the passage of 262
students and 666 pilgrims from the occupied Golan to the Syrian Arab Republic and
transferred more than 8,000 tons of apples across the demarcation line separating
the occupied Syrian Golan from the rest of the Republic.49
93. To support its citizens in the occupied Golan, the Syrian Government has
enacted new legislation granting the continued payment of wages to Syrian citizens
who have been dismissed from employment by the Israeli authorities. The
legislation is to assist nationals in retaining their Syrian national identity and ties to
the homeland (Legislative Decree No. 17 of 14 February 2010).50
__________________
51 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food on his mission to Syria
from 29 August to 7 September 2010. Available from www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/
docs/SyriaMissionPreliminaryConclusions_07092010.pdf.
52 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories,
vol. 20, No. 4 (July-August), p. 4. Available from www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-20/
no.-4/PDF.
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IV. Conclusion
94. The Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and the Syrian Golan continued
to exacerbate economic and social hardship among the populations under occupation
during 2010.
95. Illegal settlements and outposts continue to expand, the issues of settler
violence against Palestinians and of adequately enforcing the law on settlers remain
a very serious concern, Palestinian access to water remains inadequate, the
environment continues to become degraded, poverty levels remain high,
unemployment continues to be endemic despite some growth in GDP and health
indicators continue to deteriorate.
96. There has been a limited easing of the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip, but
essential supplies for reconstruction remain prohibited, truck traffic remains at a
fraction of its pre-blockade levels and the movement of people remains tightly
restricted.
97. Attacks by Palestinian factions on Israeli cities and towns have continued to
inflict civilian casualties. Israel continues to violate international law, including by
causing the death of and injury to Palestinian civilians, detaining thousands of
Palestinians, including children, continuing to construct settlements and the wall
and imposing a blockade on the Gaza Strip.
98. In his message to the United Nations Latin American and Caribbean Meeting
in Support of Israeli-Palestinian Peace on 29 March 2011, the Secretary-General
said that all expressions of violence must stop, and their perpetrators brought to
justice. He also said that the occupation that began in 1967 must end. He stressed
that the Palestinians have a legitimate right to the establishment of an independent
and viable State of their own, and that Israel has the right to live in peace and
security within internationally recognized and secure borders. Pointing to the
urgency of realizing a two-State solution, he said that serious efforts should be
exerted to bring the parties back to the negotiating table as soon as possible, based
on existing agreements between the parties, the relevant Security Council
resolutions, the Road Map and the Arab Peace Initiative.53
99. The United Nations will continue to work towards the realization of a just,
lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on international law and
all relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, to put an end to the
occupation that began in 1967 and to establish a sovereign, democratic, viable and
contiguous Palestinian State existing peacefully side-by-side with a secure Israel.
__________________
53 The full text of the message of the Secretary-General is available from www.un.org/apps/sg/
sgstats.asp?nid=5173.
United Nations A/67/91–E/2012/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
17 May 2012
Original: English
12-34397 (E) 120612
*1234397*
General Assembly Economic and Social Council
Sixty-seventh session
Item 62 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources
Substantive session of 2012
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
In its resolution 2011/41, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 66/225, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a
report to it at its sixty-seventh session. The present report, which has been prepared
by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in response
to the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council.
* A/67/50.
** E/2012/100.
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Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions
of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan, covering the period 30 March 2011-
29 March 2012*
Summary
The occupation of Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, by Israel and
the use of policies and measures that violate a number of provisions of international
humanitarian laws have had adverse social and economic ramifications on the
Palestinian people in the occupied territory.
During the reporting period, 122 Palestinians were killed, including 12
children, and 2,077 were injured, including 362 children. By February 2012, 4,411
Palestinians remained in Israeli prisons, with reports of violations of their rights.
Israeli authorities destroyed over 620 Palestinian-owned structures in 2011, a 42 per
cent increase compared to 2010. A total of 1,100 Palestinians were displaced as a
result of home demolitions and another 140 were displaced following settler
violence.
Around 519,000 Israeli settlers live in 144 illegal settlements and around 100
outposts across the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 2011 marked an increase in
settlement activity, compared to the previous year, jeopardizing the contiguity of the
Palestinian territory. Settler violence also continued to increase, along with a
continued takeover of Palestinian property.
Israel continued the construction of the 708-kilometre-long wall, 85 per cent of
which lies within the West Bank. The wall isolates communities and natural
resources while severing East Jerusalem from the rest of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory.
Israel’s blockade, imposed on the Gaza Strip since the takeover by Hamas in
June 2007, continued to collectively punish the civilian population.
Over the course of 2011, Israeli obstacles, which impede the movement of
Palestinians within the West Bank, increased to a total of 520 different types of
obstacles.
* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge its
appreciation for the substantive contributions of the Department of Political Affairs, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the
International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
the World Health Organization, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process, the United Nations Environment Programme, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the League of Arab States.
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Israel persisted in exploiting and endangering natural resources in the occupied
territories. In addition, Palestinians and Syrians living under occupation continue to
suffer from discrimination with respect to water allotment.
Economic growth in the Occupied Palestinian Territory continues to be
unsustainable and reflects an economy recovering from a low base, driven mainly by
the non-tradable sector. Unemployment remained high and poverty and food
insecurity, especially in Gaza, continue to be alarming.
Israel continued its settlement expansion in the occupied Syrian Golan, while
the Syrian Arab population continued to suffer from discrimination and restrictions
to access, including the expropriation of resources for the exclusive use of Israeli
settlers.
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I. Introduction
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2011/41, and the General
Assembly, in its resolution 66/225, expressed concerns over those practices of
Israel, the occupying Power in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied
Syrian Golan, which violate international humanitarian law. Those practices include
causing deaths of and injuries to civilians, including children and women, all of
whom must be protected in accordance with international humanitarian law. The
Council expressed its deep concern about “the rising incidence of violence […] by
illegal armed Israeli settlers […] against Palestinian civilians […] and their
properties”, in addition to its concern about the continued detention of thousands of
Palestinians, including children and women, under harsh conditions. Of concern also
to the Council and the Assembly are the accelerated construction by Israel of
settlements; the construction of the wall inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
the exploitation of natural resources; the increased demolition of homes, economic
institutions, agricultural lands and infrastructure; the revocation of residency rights
of Palestinians in and around occupied East Jerusalem; and the continuing Israeli
policy of closures and severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods,
including the blockade on the Gaza Strip. The Council and the Assembly, through
their respective resolutions 2011/41 and 66/225, also highlighted the detrimental
impact of Israeli practices on the natural resources and the social and economic
conditions of the Palestinian people and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian
Golan.
2. The Council and the Assembly requested that the Secretary-General submit
reports on the implementation of their respective resolutions 2011/41 and 66/225,
examining the practices of Israel, the occupying Power, that are contrary to those
resolutions.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem
Deaths and injuries
3. Between 30 March 2011 and 29 March 2012, 122 Palestinians were killed and
2,077 others were injured as a result of direct conflict. While the majority of
casualties were inflicted by Israeli security forces, 1 fatality and 205 injuries were
the result of settler attacks. Among the casualties, 12 children were killed and 362
were injured. During the same period, 6 Israelis were killed, including 2 children,
and 66 were injured, including 2 children.1
4. Approximately two thirds of the Palestinian casualties in the West Bank were
related to settler violence or settlement activities, including casualties incurred
during clashes in demonstrations protesting settler attacks, the takeover of land and
access restrictions aimed at protecting settlements and their expansion.2 In
accordance with Israeli Military Order No. 101 (1967), Israeli authorities define
rallies and demonstrations in the occupied territory, which did not receive a permit
__________________
1 Information contributed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the
Secretariat, from its Protection of Civilians: Casualties Database, available from
www.ochaopt.org/poc.aspx?id=1010002.
2 Information contributed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012.
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from the Israeli military commander, as illegal assemblies, even if they are
non-violent, and most are forcibly dispersed.3
5. In the Gaza Strip, Palestinian casualties were mainly caused by Israeli
airstrikes, military incursions and extrajudicial assassinations. Among the casualties
were 21 Palestinians, including 7 children and 2 women, who were shot and killed
in areas of restricted access within the Strip.2
Arrests and detentions
6. During 2011, Israeli forces conducted approximately 4,200 search-and-arrest
operations throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, during which they
arrested over 3,150 Palestinians.2 By February 2012, 4,411 Palestinians remained in
Israeli prisons, among them 183 minors.4
7. Administrative detentions are authorized by military commanders and the
detainees are held, without trial or charges, for a period of six months that may be
renewed an unlimited number of times. While detainees may appeal the detention
order before a military court, their lawyers do not have access to the information on
which the detention is based.5 By February 2012, there were 320 Palestinian
administrative detainees in Israeli prisons.6
8. Furthermore, the Israeli policy of transferring Palestinian prisoners to Israeli
territory violates the obligations of Israel as the occupying Power under Article 76
of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, of 12 August 19497 (Fourth Geneva Convention). The policy inflicts hardships
not only on prisoners but also on family members who have almost no visitation
rights, and those rights that are formally available are made essentially redundant
due to the onerous permit and permission system imposed by Israel, as reported by
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967 (see A/66/358, para. 18).
9. Palestinian children detained by Israel also continue to be “systematically illtreated
during their arrest, transfer and interrogation”, including physical and verbal
abuse, as well as threats, intimidation and solitary confinement, which in some cases
may amount to torture.8
10. Palestinian children, unlike Israeli children, are subject to Israeli military law,
which offers far fewer protections for minors than Israeli criminal law (see
A/66/358, para. 35). On average, 192 Palestinian children were detained in Israeli
prisons throughout 2011.9 Since 2000, around 7,500 Palestinian children have been
__________________
3 Association for Civil Rights in Israel, The State of Human Rights in Israel and the OPT,
December 2011, p. 50, available from www.acri.org.il.
4 Figures recorded by Btselem, available from: www.btselem.org/statistics/minors_in_custody and
www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners.
5 The State of Human Rights in Israel and the OPT, pp. 14-15.
6 See www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners.
7 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
8 For details, see Defence for Children International — Palestine Section, “In their own words: a
report on the situation facing Palestinian children detained in the Israeli military court system”
(January 2012), p. 3.
9 Ibid., p. 7.
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detained and prosecuted by the Israeli authorities.10 It is estimated that 99.74 per
cent of cases brought against minors in the West Bank ended in conviction, with
custodial sentences being imposed on children in 98 per cent of cases. This contrasts
with a custodial sentence rate of around 6.5 per cent for Israeli children.11
Israeli administrative and legislative measures
11. Violence by Israeli civilians against Palestinians is exacerbated by the
existence of a dual legal system, namely, civil courts for Israeli civilians and a less
protective military justice system for Palestinians.12 Filing a complaint against
settlers or the Israeli military is often a complicated and intimidating process for
many Palestinians. Many refrain from this process.
12. Israel promotes a land development model that excludes, discriminates against
and displaces Palestinian and Bedouin communities.13 The zoning and planning
regime enforced by Israel in Area C14 and East Jerusalem restricts Palestinian
growth and development, while providing preferential treatment for Israeli
settlements. This treatment includes the approval of master plans and the provision
of essential infrastructure, participation in the planning process, and the allocation
of land and water resources.2
13. The aforementioned restrictions prevent the establishment of Palestinian social
and economic activities in 70 per cent of Area C.15 In occupied East Jerusalem,
35 per cent of the city’s land has been confiscated for the development of Israeli
settlements and 22 per cent is zoned for green areas and public infrastructure,
whereas only 13 per cent of the annexed area is zoned for Palestinian construction,
which is insufficient for the natural growth of the Palestinian population.16
Property destruction and confiscation
14. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of
property belonging to “private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities,
or to social or cooperative organizations”.
__________________
10 Ibid., p. 4.
11 Ibid., p. 5.
12 Information contributed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR), 2012.
13 Information reported by the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right
to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, on her
mission to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, available from www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11815&LangID=E.
14 Area C, which constitutes the vast majority of the West Bank, is under full control of the Israeli
military, even with regard to civilian affairs.
15 International Labour Organization, “The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories”
(2011), p. 3, available from www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/
documents/meetingdocument/wcms_155419.pdf.
16 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian
Concerns” (December 2011), p. 2, available from www.ochaopt.org/documents/
ocha_opt_Jerusalem_FactSheet_December_2011_english.pdf.
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15. In total, Israeli authorities destroyed over 620 Palestinian-owned structures in
2011, a 42 per cent increase compared to 2010. This included 222 homes, 170
animal shelters, 43 rainwater cisterns or pools, two classrooms and two mosques.
Some 4,200 people were affected by these demolitions.2
16. The above-mentioned figures are in addition to approximately 24,800
Palestinian structures that were demolished in the occupied Palestinian territory
between 1967 and 2010.17 According to Israeli authorities, demolitions in 2011
were carried out against structures that lack Israeli building permits. It should be
noted that it is extremely difficult for Palestinian residents to obtain such permits.
Over 60 per cent of the Palestinian-owned structures demolished in 2011 were
located in areas allocated by Israeli authorities to settlements.2
17. In occupied East Jerusalem, at least 32 per cent of all Palestinian homes lack
building permits, which are difficult to obtain, thus potentially placing at least
86,500 residents at risk of displacement, especially since the number of outstanding
demolition orders against Palestinian homes is estimated at up to 20,000.18
18. Israeli authorities demolished the Shepherd Hotel in East Jerusalem, which is a
historical Palestinian landmark in the city, to make way for new settler housing
units.19
19. The Palestinian Authority reported that Israeli authorities confiscated around
896,000 m2 of agricultural land in the West Bank during 2011.19
Displacement and deportation
20. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the forcible transfer of
civilians of an occupied territory, except when necessary to ensure the security of
the civilians involved or for imperative military reasons.
21. Almost 1,100 Palestinians, more than half of them children, were forcibly
displaced as a result of home demolitions in the West Bank in 2011. This is twice
the number of people displaced in 2010. In addition, 140 Palestinians were forcibly
displaced as a result of Israeli settler violence in 2011.2
22. Conditions for the 155 herding communities remaining in Area C have
deteriorated since 2000, with half their population having been forced out of the
West Bank grazing areas, losing their herds and being involuntarily relocated to
small towns and villages, thus forcing a sedentary lifestyle on them. This has partly
been the result of an Israeli policy of systematic demolition of the traditional
cistern-based water infrastructure essential for maintaining the Bedouin people’s
nomadic and agricultural way of life (see A/66/358, para. 42). Up to 2,300 Bedouin
living in the Jerusalem periphery, the majority of whom are refugees, could also be
forcibly displaced in 2012 if Israeli authorities follow through with their reported
__________________
17 Information reported by the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, available from
www.icahd.org/?page_id=5508.
18 Information reported by the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, available from
www.icahd.org/?page_id=5374.
19 Information contributed by the Palestinian Authority, 2012.
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settlement plans. Rural communities in the Jordan Valley are also facing the
prospect of further demolitions as settlements continue to expand.20
23. Palestinians who were physically present in occupied East Jerusalem upon its
occupation in 1967 were designated permanent residents. Under Israeli law,
permanent residents are considered foreign citizens who wish to live in Israel but do
not immigrate to the country under the Law of Return. Israel therefore treats
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem as immigrants (see A/66/356, para. 34).21
Palestinian East Jerusalemites can and do lose their permanent residency status if
they reside outside Israel or occupied East Jerusalem for a period of seven years, or
if they obtain permanent residency or citizenship in another country. Lack of
“loyalty to the State of Israel”, can be, and has been, used as pretext for the
revocation of residency of Palestinian East Jerusalemites. This is prohibited by the
Regulations annexed to The Hague Convention IV of 190722 and could potentially
pose a risk to many Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem of revocation of their
permanent residency status, if they exercise their right to freedom of expression and
opinion (see A/66/356, paras. 35-37).
24. Furthermore, the constitutionality of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law
was upheld by the Supreme Court in January 2012. This law bars family
reunification for Israelis married to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. It
specifically affects Palestinian Jerusalemites marrying spouses from the rest of the
occupied territories. Such Palestinian families are thus forced to move abroad, live
together illegally or live apart. This law violates the absolute prohibition of
discrimination contained in international human rights law, notably in several
treaties that Israel has ratified and is obliged to uphold, including the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,23 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,24 the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights24 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,25 as recalled by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process.26
25. Between 1967 and the end of December 2011, around 14,000 Palestinians had
their Jerusalem residency revoked by Israeli authorities.27
26. In addition, it continues to be difficult to obtain permanent residency status
permits, especially in cases of family unification, when East Jerusalemites are
married to Palestinians from other parts of the West Bank or Gaza and wish to live
together in East Jerusalem. Since 2003, a freeze on family reunification has
obstructed “mixed residency” marriages. The registration of the children of such
__________________
20 Information reported by Amnesty International, available from www.amnesty.org/en/news/
record-number-palestinians-displaced-demolitions-quartet-continues-talk-2011-12-13.
21 The policy is based on the Mubarak Awad case of the High Court of Justice, which decided that
the status of Palestinian residents should be regulated in accordance with the Entry in Israel Law
(5712-1952), which is immigration legislation.
22 See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of
1899 and 1907 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).
23 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.
24 See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
25 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531.
26 Information contributed by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle
East Peace Process, 2012.
27 “East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns”, p. 1.
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couples as residents of East Jerusalem remains a long and arduous process (see
A/66/356, para. 38).
27. Settlement activities, which at times entail eviction of Palestinians from their
homes, continue to threaten residents of East Jerusalem, placing them at risk of
forced displacement. Particularly affected are the Old City of Jerusalem and Silwan,
and 500 people in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood.27
Settlements and settler violence
28. Security Council resolution 446 (1979) considers Israeli settlements illegal and
a serious obstruction to achieving peace. The illegality of Israeli settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory is based on article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which stipulates that the “Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” The settlements
are also viewed as part of the “new frontiers of dispossession of the traditional
inhabitants … and control of the Palestinian territory”.13
29. Around 519,000 Israeli settlers live in 144 illegal settlements28 and 100
outposts across the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The outposts are typically
smaller settlements that are often tolerated and supported by the Government,
sometimes in defiance of Israeli court rulings, but are illegal under Israeli law.29
30. Around 40 per cent of the West Bank has been seized by the Israeli authorities
for the purpose of settling its civilian population in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, in violation of international humanitarian law.30
31. Furthermore, the Palestinian population continues to suffer from
institutionalized discrimination between Palestinian residents and Israeli settlers,
which privileges the interests of the settlers over those of Palestinians. This regime
is characterized, among other things, by two separate judiciary systems, one for
Palestinians and another for Israeli settlers.31 Israeli settlers are also provided with
benefits by the Israeli Government as incentives to encourage migration into illegal
settlements. These incentives include financial benefits, low housing costs and high
standards of living.32
Settlement activity
32. 2011 marked a year of increased settlement activity, with a 20 per cent rise in
new construction in the settlements, compared to 2010. A number of planned
__________________
28 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release dated 3 August 2011, available from:
www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Sett_E2011.pdf.
29 Information recorded by Btselem, available from: www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics.
30 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, fact sheet, “How Dispossession Happens:
The Humanitarian Impact of the Takeover of Palestinian Water Springs by Israeli Settlers”,
March 2012, p. 4, available from: www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_springs_
report_march_2012_english.pdf.
31 The State of Human Rights in Israel and the OPT, p. 12.
32 Israel defines most settlements in the West Bank as priority areas. See Btselem,
www.btselem.org/settlements/migration.
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settlement units are located in areas that are vital to the contiguity of the Palestinian
territory.33
33. In addition, during 2011, the Israeli cabinet announced its intention to
officially legalize 11 outposts where 2,300 settlers reside to become fully
recognized settlements, and to legalize hundreds of units of illegal construction in
existing settlements.33
34. In occupied East Jerusalem, 4,000 new settler housing units were approved
during 2011. This figure is the highest since at least 2006.20 The Israeli Government
also began the construction of 55 new settlement units in three locations at the heart
of Palestinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem.33
35. The Palestinian Authority has reported that over the past three years, the Israeli
authorities expanded settlements in the occupied territory with 28,000 new housing
units that would house around 103,000 settlers.34
Settler violence
36. The failure of the Israeli authorities in law enforcement vis-à-vis settler
violence and takeover of Palestinian property continues to perpetuate a state of
impunity in the occupied West Bank, encouraging further violence.2 It also
constitutes an ongoing violation of its most fundamental obligation under
international humanitarian law to protect a civilian population living under
occupation, and to accord particular protection to children as specified in article 77
of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
(see also A/66/358, para. 27).35
37. A 30 per cent increase in the number of settler attacks resulting in either
Palestinian casualties or damage to their property was recorded in 2011, as
compared with 2010.2 The figure for 2011 is more than 165 per cent higher than that
recorded in 2009. Around 10,000 Palestinian-owned trees, mainly olive trees, were
damaged or uprooted by Israeli settlers, severely affecting the livelihood of
hundreds of Palestinian families.12
38. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Israeli settlers vandalized and set
fire to seven mosques and one church.36
39. A further manifestation of these attacks is the frequent settler harassment of
Palestinian children on their way to school, which has reportedly discouraged many
children and their families from attending school, thereby violating their right to
education (see A/66/358, para. 27).
40. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
documented several cases where the Israeli army appeared to provide direct support
to settlers when they attacked Palestinian communities. Israeli troops focused their
__________________
33 Information recorded by Peace Now, available from peacenow.org.il/eng/2011Summary.
34 Palestinian Liberation Organization, Negotiations Affairs Department, Report on Israeli
activities in 2011 (January 2012), p. 3.
35 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512.
36 See the monthly reports of the Palestinian Monitoring Group (Palestinian Liberation
Organization, Negotiations Affairs Department), available from: www.nadplo.
org/monthlyreports.php.
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efforts in dispersing Palestinians or removing them from their lands rather than
protecting them and their private properties from Israeli settlers.12
The wall
41. Contrary to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, Israel
continues the construction of the 708-kilometre-long wall in the West Bank, which
is more than twice the length of the 320-kilometre-long 1949 Armistice Line (Green
Line) between the West Bank and Israel, and runs inside the West Bank and East
Jerusalem for approximately 85 per cent of its route. By end of 2011, 61.8 per cent
of it was complete, while a further 8.2 per cent was under construction and another
30 per cent was planned but not yet constructed.2
42. Upon completion, the wall will isolate around 11.9 per cent of the West Bank
lands and 27,500 Palestinians, in the “Seam Zone”37 while directly affecting
247,800 others.38 Additionally, it will isolate East Jerusalem and its 270,000
Palestinian residents from the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and
physically separate approximately 55,000 residents of the East Jerusalem
Governorate from its urban centre.27
43. Approximately 6,500 Palestinians currently reside in the closed area between
the wall and the Green Line.2
44. Access for Palestinians to lands in the Seam Zone is channelled through 66
designated gates erected in the wall, most of which are only open during the olive
harvest season and usually only for a limited period during the day. Such access is
also dependent on obtaining a permit from the Israeli authorities. To apply for, or to
renew such a permit, applicants must satisfy Israeli security considerations and also
submit documents to prove a “connection to the land”.2 In April 2011, the Israeli
Supreme Court ruled against petitions submitted by Israeli organizations against this
permit regime.39
Mobility restrictions and closure policies
The Gaza Strip blockade
45. The blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip continues to collectively
punish the civilian population, in violation of Israel’s international legal obligations
(see A/66/370, para. 12), with a disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups and
the aid agencies trying to help them.40
46. In June 2010, Israel moved away from a “positive” list of goods allowed into
Gaza to a “negative” list of goods whose entry is prohibited. Israeli authorities
issued a list of “dual-use” items restricted for import, which is still in force. The list
includes items, which are not considered as to allow for dual usage by Israeli
__________________
37 The Seam Zone is the West Bank area located between the wall and the Green Line and
completely isolated from the rest of the West Bank.
38 Information recorded by Btselem, available from: www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/statistics.
39 The State of Human Rights in Israel and the OPT, p. 36.
40 Information contributed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East, 2012.
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legislation or by any other international standard. It also lacks specificity and is
therefore extensive, including most construction material and equipment for water
and sanitation projects. Consequently, while imports to the Gaza Strip have
increased through official channels, they remain at less than 40 per cent of the
pre-2007 levels.2
47. Between 2010 and 2011, imports of raw agricultural materials and animal feed
into the Gaza Strip decreased, indicating that the policy decision of the relaxation of
trade in June 2010 did not improve the availability of agricultural inputs in the Gaza
Strip.41
48. Private sector manufacturing companies surveyed in June 2011 reported that
21 per cent of the raw materials essential to production were not available at all in
Gaza.2
49. The need for specific approvals for importing material has resulted in
prolonged delays in essential projects addressing humanitarian needs. This, in
addition to delays in acquiring Israeli approval for infrastructure projects, has
deepened the decline in key areas, for such essential international projects as
housing, water and sanitation. As time passes, funds pledged by donors to specific
projects may become unavailable in the future.2
50. By the end of the 2010 and 2011 seasons, the total cash crop exports of
carnations and strawberries to Europe did not surpass 25 per cent of pre-blockade
levels, while vegetable exports amount to 0.4 per cent of those levels.41
“Access restricted areas” within the Gaza Strip
51. In addition to the blockade, Israel imposes land and maritime “access
restricted areas” in the Gaza Strip and along its coast. As a result of this measure,
35 per cent of Gaza’s cultivable land and 85 per cent of its maritime area have
become totally or partially inaccessible to Palestinians.42
52. The lowest fishing catch of the past 12 years was recorded in 2011. In
addition, fishermen remain vulnerable to various forms of violence at sea, including
the use of live ammunition against fishing boats and arbitrary detention. In 2011, 72
incidents targeting fishermen were recorded.2
Mobility in the West Bank
53. By the end of 2011, there were approximately 520 obstacles hindering
Palestinian movement within the West Bank, a 4 per cent increase from the
equivalent figure by the end of 2010. These include permanently staffed and partial
(staffed on an ad hoc basis) checkpoints, as well as unstaffed physical obstacles,
including roadblocks, earth mounds, road gates, barriers and trenches.2
54. The regime of restrictions is often related to Israeli settlements, securing areas
for their expansion, or improving the connectivity between settlements and Israel
itself. This regime continues to hinder the access of the Palestinian population to
livelihoods and basic services. Overall, 200,000 people from 70 villages are forced
__________________
41 Information contributed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2012.
42 “The Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip: update for January-December 2011”, p. 1,
available from: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
ARA%20Update%202011.pdf.
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to use detours between two and five times longer than the direct route to their
closest city, owing to movement restrictions. To date, 9 of the 10 governorates’ main
cities continue to have one or more of their historical entrances blocked. Access to
the main traffic arteries leading from the villages to the cities also continues to be
limited to select junctions.2
55. The Old City of Hebron is separated from the rest of the city by 122 closure
obstacles, while Palestinian movement by car, and in some cases also by foot,
remained banned along certain streets. In June 2011 the Israeli Supreme Court43
approved the travel restrictions that have been in place for more than a decade,
banning Palestinians from traversing the centre of Hebron, essentially marking it for
Israeli use only.43
56. The Jordan Valley and Dead Sea area covers around 30 per cent of the West
Bank, and is home to nearly 60,000 Palestinians. Eighty-seven per cent of the land
is designated as Area C, virtually all of which is earmarked for the use of the Israeli
military or settlements. An additional 7 per cent, formally part of Area B, was
designated a nature reserve. Palestinian access to and from the area is severely
restricted by Israeli checkpoints. These restrictions severely harm Palestinians living
there and who are completely dependent on services available outside the Jordan
Valley, including hospitals and most educational institutions. The restrictions on
movement also apply to ambulances, which are not permitted to enter the Jordan
Valley.44
57. During 2011, Israel prevented more than 4,000 Palestinians from travelling to
Jordan by the Al-Karamah border crossing, citing security considerations, without
giving further details, according to the Euro-Mediterranean Observatory for Human
Rights.
Access to occupied East Jerusalem
58. Palestinians holding West Bank identification documents continued to require
special entry permits to access occupied East Jerusalem. Overcrowding, along with
the multiple layers of checks and security procedures at the four designated
checkpoints, have made entry into occupied East Jerusalem a long and difficult
experience. Restricted access to occupied East Jerusalem has had a particularly
negative impact on access to Palestinian hospitals located in the city, as well as on
Muslims and Christians wishing to access Jerusalem’s holy sites.2
59. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA) reported a total of 280 access incidents involving its staff in
2011, affecting teachers, medical doctors and nurses, social and relief workers and
field office staff. These included demands for searches of United Nations vehicles
entering occupied East Jerusalem, in contravention of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,45 to which Israel is a party.
Moreover, access to Seam Zone areas for mobile health, food assistance, mental
health services and social work teams was further restricted with the majority of
staff from the Agency unable to reach communities in the Seam Zone.40
__________________
43 The State of Human Rights in Israel and the OPT, pp. 34-35.
44 Btselem, “Dispossession and Exploitation: Israel’s policy in the Jordan Valley and Northern
Dead Sea”, May 2011, p. 29.
45 Resolution 22 A (I).
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Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestinian
natural resources
60. Israeli policies regarding natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory violate The Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva
Convention, of 1949, which stipulate that the occupying Power is obliged to
safeguard the natural resources of the occupied country and to provide the original
citizens with their needs from these resources.
61. Palestinians live under conditions of significant water stress. Water shortage is
a serious problem facing most districts in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, not only
due to climatic conditions but also due to Israeli access restrictions. The water
allocated to the Palestinians translates to 83 cubic metres of water per Palestinian
per year, compared to 333 cubic metres per Israeli per year. In other words, a
Palestinian is allocated one quarter of the amount of water allocated to an Israeli.46
62. Since 1967, Palestinian drilling for new wells in the occupied territory has
been banned and quotas have been imposed on existing ones. Water that was
allocated to the Palestinians was capped at 1967 levels, despite the growth in
population. Israel uses 73 per cent of the West Bank’s water, diverting an additional
10 per cent of it to its settlements and selling the remaining 17 per cent to the
Palestinians.46
63. The Jordan Valley area is considered one of the richest natural water sources in
the West Bank. Israel has taken control of most of the water sources in the area and
has earmarked the use of most of the resources exclusively for Israeli settlers.47
64. Thirty of the water springs in the West Bank have been taken over completely
by Israeli settlers, while the other 26 are at risk of settler takeover, due to regular
settler “tours” and patrolling. At least 84 per cent of springs affected by settler
activities are located on land recognized by the Israeli Civil Administration as
privately owned by Palestinians.48
65. Wastewater from Israeli settlements is collected and discharged to the nearby
Palestinian valleys without treatment, thereby affecting water quality in the West
Bank. In addition, the wall has isolated 58 different water sources within the “Seam
Zone”. As a result, many farming families and communities are unable to survive
and to maintain their lands. Another negative impact is the wall’s interference with
the natural drainage systems. In times of high rainfall, both flooding and substantial
environmental and agricultural damage are being caused.46
66. Furthermore, to make way for the construction of the wall, Israel has uprooted
more than 100,000 trees and destroyed 36,000 m of irrigation works, affecting some
170 km2 or 10 per cent of the fertile agricultural land in the West Bank.46
67. On 26 December 2011, Israel’s High Court of Justice issued a ruling that
enables the Israeli State and private enterprises to continue using quarries in the
West Bank. While such practices started in the mid-1970s, currently there are 10
__________________
46 Information contributed by the United Nations Environment Programme, 2012.
47 “Dispossession and Exploitation: Israel’s policy in the Jordan Valley and Northern Dead Sea”,
p. 19.
48 “How Dispossession Happens: The Humanitarian Impact of the Takeover of Palestinian Water
Springs by Israeli Settlers”, p. 2.
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Israeli-owned quarries in the West Bank, eight of which are active and produce
some 12 million tons of mined material per year, 94 per cent of which is taken to
Israel.49
68. Israeli businesses continue to build and run industrial zones in the occupied
territory, especially since the Israeli Government offers tax reductions for such
activity, with more than 18 Israeli industrial zones and 160 industrial facilities
currently located in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Israeli Government
itself constructed at least seven industrial zones in the West Bank, located mainly on
hilltops, which often result in the flow of industrial wastewater into adjacent
Palestinian lands. The industrial solid waste generated by factories is often collected
and dumped in areas near Palestinian villages. Such waste can cause damage to
agricultural crops and orchards as well as polluting the soil and the potential damage
to groundwater.46
69. The United Nations Environment Programme cites concerns that Israel
illegally transfers hazardous and toxic wastes generated inside Israel into the West
Bank, thereby violating the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.50
70. In the Gaza Strip, the population relies predominantly on ground wells, where
water is increasingly infiltrated by salty seawater because of the overpumping of
groundwater by Israel between 1967 and 2005. As a result, Gaza is facing a severe
water crisis and warnings that Gaza will have no potable water within 15 years.46
71. Farmers in the Gaza Strip are thus forced to use salty and polluted water from
agricultural wells for irrigation, which subsequently restricts both agricultural
productivity and the quality of the produce, reducing its export potential in addition
to presenting health risks owing to the resulting degradation in food quality.41
Socioeconomic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Economic conditions
72. Economic growth in the Occupied Palestinian Territory continues to be
unsustainable and reflects an economy recovering from a low base, mainly driven
by the non-tradable sector, especially the economy of the Gaza Strip. This highlights
the importance of donor aid in sustaining the Palestinian economy, rather than the
private sector, which remains stifled by Israeli restrictions on access to natural
resources and markets. Unemployment remains high, and poverty and food
insecurity, especially in Gaza, continue to be alarming.51
73. In the first half of 2011, GDP in the Occupied Palestinian Territory grew at a
rate of 10 per cent. The strong performance was driven by an exceptionally high rate
of growth of 28 per cent in Gaza, owing mainly to the revitalization of construction
works following the loosening in 2010 of the Israeli blockade and an increase in the
__________________
49 Btselem, “High Court sanctions looting: Israeli quarries in the West Bank”, 16 January 2012,
available from www.btselem.org/printpdf/127713.
50 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1673, No. 28911.
51 World Bank, “Sustaining Achievements in Palestinian Institution-building and Economic
Growth”, Economic Monitoring Report to the ad hoc liaison committee, 18 September 2011,
p. 6.
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supply of materials through the tunnels. In the West Bank, over the same period,
growth was only 4 per cent, compared to 8 per cent in 2010. Output in the West
Bank actually fell by nearly 5 per cent between the fourth quarter of 2010 and the
first quarter of 2011.52 This slowdown was caused by continued fiscal retrenchment,
declining aid and a resulting liquidity crisis, as well as continued Israeli restrictions
during 2011.
74. Long-term development prospects remain grim. Israeli restrictions not only
increase prices of basic staples such as vegetables, fruits and sugar, but also
continue to obstruct wider agricultural development and more rational urban and
regional economic and spatial planning. A large trade deficit and dependence on the
Israeli economy persisted.53
75. Israel’s different forms of restrictions, as mentioned in the present report,
combined with the shortfall in external financing, high Palestinian Authority wage
bills and other expenditures, and low rates of tax collection,26 have led to a fiscal
crisis for the Palestinian Authority, weakened the private sector and caused a decline
in business confidence.54
76. While Gaza’s growth in 2010 may appear impressive, much of it represents a
recovery of real GDP following its contraction by a cumulative 30 per cent during
the period from 2006 to 2009, as a result of trade restrictions. Even after its surge in
2010-2011, Gaza’s real GDP was projected to be 6 per cent below its 2005 level by
the end of 2011.55
77. The ongoing blockade of the Gaza Strip, in particular, resulted in increasing
reliance on the illicit “tunnel economy”, which expanded during 2011. Imports of
basic construction materials and other productive inputs through tunnels vastly
outpaced those through Israeli-controlled crossings, despite a relative easing in the
movement of goods through the latter.40 The tunnel economy has thus become the
main driver of economic activity. Its role is so overwhelming that established
legitimate businesses have had to adapt to it to some extent.56
78. Despite some improvement, unemployment remained alarmingly high, and
labour force participation low, in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The labour
force participation rate stood at 44.4 per cent. The unemployment rate in the 4th
quarter of 2011 among labour force participants was 21 per cent, for the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 30.3 per cent in the Gaza Strip and 16.6 per cent in the West
Bank. The most affected are youths aged 20-24, whose labour participation rate
stood at 45.3 per cent, while the rate of unemployment among them was at 38 per
cent, and unemployment among refugees was at 27.5 per cent.57 The divergence in
employment indicators between the West Bank and Gaza Strip reflects tighter
restrictions in Gaza on external trade and on the employment of workers in Israel,
the higher sensitivity of its output to such restrictions given its small domestic
__________________
52 “Sustaining Achievements in Palestinian Institution-building and Economic Growth”, pp. 7-8.
53 Information contributed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2012.
54 “Sustaining Achievements in Palestinian Institution-building and Economic Growth”, p. 7.
55 International Monetary Fund, “Recent Experience and Prospects of the Economy of the West
Bank and Gaza” staff report prepared for the meeting of the ad hoc liaison committee, New
York, 18 September 2011, p. 21.
56 “The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories”, p. 5.
57 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Labour Force Survey (October-December 2011)”
(February 2012).
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market, and higher uncertainty faced by the private sector as a result of more
frequent hostilities and the degradation of public institutions and infrastructure since
2006. Despite limited gains in employment, real wages continued to deteriorate with
the purchasing power of the average monthly wage declining some 2.8 per cent in
2011.40
79. Eighty per cent of the Gazan population is currently dependent on international
assistance for subsistence (see A/66/358, para. 41). And in the light of the trend for
declining international aid, there is a risk that, should Gazan families’ average
income decline by 20 per cent, the proportion living in poverty would immediately
increase from 33 per cent to a staggering 49 per cent.58
80. Since June 2010, Israel has prohibited any pharmaceutical, dairy or meat
products from the West Bank from entering into East Jerusalem, which is estimated
to entail up to $48 million in losses annually for the Palestinian economy. Even
when goods are allowed into East Jerusalem, they pass through commercial crossing
points where they undergo a process called “back to back” transfer, which adds to
the high transaction costs of Palestinian trade.53
81. According to the International Monetary Fund, even with a significant easing
of movement and access restrictions, combined with sufficient donor funding to
finance recurrent and development spending, Gaza’s real GDP per capita by 2013
would remain at 10 per cent below its 1994 level.59
Food security
82. Food insecurity levels for Palestinian families across the Occupied Palestinian
Territory in 2011 were recorded at 27 per cent, 18 per cent in the West Bank and
44 per cent in the Gaza Strip.41 Nutrition indicators also remain of concern,
including the prevalence of underweight children increasing from 3.2 per cent in
2010 to 3.9 per cent in 2011.40 The fact that 95 per cent of Gaza’s water is unfit for
human consumption also leads to a disproportionately high number of cases of
methaemoglobinaemia (“blue-baby syndrome”) among babies in Gaza (see
A/66/370, paras. 14 and 15).
83. Food insecurity in the West Bank is largely determined by the socioeconomic
conditions of Palestinian households and the physical and economic barriers to food
access, production and trade.60 Some geographical areas have shown particularly
high levels of food insecurity, such as the Israeli-controlled administrative Area C,
the Seam Zone and refugee camps.40
Public health
84. According to UNRWA, as a result of Operation Cast Lead and the blockade,
approximately one third of the population of Gaza lives in overcrowded and
dilapidated camps, with inadequate environmental, health, commercial, social and
recreational infrastructure.40
__________________
58 World Bank, “Coping with Conflict: Poverty and Inclusion in the West Bank and Gaza”, October
2011.
59 “Recent Experience and Prospects of the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza”, p. 36.
60 World Food Programme and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
“Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey: West Bank and Gaza Strip, Occupied Palestinian
Territory” (February 2011).
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85. The blockade on the Gaza Strip has adversely affected the quality of medical
services in the Gaza Strip by hindering national health planning efforts, limiting the
access of health personnel to professional development training outside of Gaza and
the movement of health professionals into Gaza, restricting the construction and
rehabilitation of the health infrastructure, and disrupting power and fuel supplies.61
86. In 2011, electricity cuts lasting up to 10 hours per day strained back-up power
sources and affected medical equipment, causing interruption or postponement of
medical treatment.61 Electricity cuts reportedly worsened during the first months of
2012.
87. The blockade also exacerbates the chronic shortages of essential medicines, of
which between 32 and 36 per cent were at zero stock throughout 2011, and of
required medical disposables, of which only 260 of the 900 needed were
available.62 For instance, a cancer patient in Gaza can only expect to find half of the
drugs required for effective chemotherapy.63
88. These chronic shortages forced patients to be referred abroad, in spite of the
difficulties in obtaining a permit to exit the Gaza Strip. In this regard, five patients
died, after being referred for treatment outside of Gaza, while waiting either for
Israeli permits to cross Erez checkpoint or for appointments to an appropriate
referral hospital.61
89. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East estimates that 45 per cent of poor and food insecure refugee households in
refugee camps and 51 per cent of such households in cities have at least one member
with a chronic disease.
90. In the West Bank, difficulties in obtaining building permits hinder appropriate
maintenance and expansion of necessary health infrastructure such as primary health
clinics. In Area C, 22 per cent of the 271 communities face difficulties in accessing
health services, owing to road detours, road barriers and the cost of transportation.61
91. Despite reported improvements, movement restrictions prevent Palestinians
from accessing six Palestinian hospitals run by non-governmental organizations in
East Jerusalem, which are the main providers of specialized care for the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. The World Health Organization estimates that 95 per cent of
all patient ambulance transfers into Jerusalem are restricted from direct entry into
the city and are conducted by “back to back” ambulances.61
92. In the West Bank, UNRWA reported a threefold increase in demand for mental
health services during 2011, in connection with stress-related disorders. This rise in
demand can be directly linked to protection concerns related to the occupation,
including violence, the wall, forced displacement and subsequent socioeconomic
hardship.40
93. Gazans continue to live under an intense degree of psychological trauma.
Fifty-four per cent of pregnant women experience depression, and 33 per cent were
__________________
61 Information contributed by the World Health Organization, 2012.
62 Médecins Sans Frontières, press release dated 17 November 2011, available from: www.msfme.
org/en/news/news-media/news-press-releases/gaza-chronic-shortages-of-drugs-and-medicalsupplies.
html.
63 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Israel and the occupied territories: another year
without change”, 6 February 2012.
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suffering from anaemia (see A/66/370, paras. 14 and 15). Almost a quarter of the
patients assisted through UNRWA community mental health services in Gaza in
2011 were children with problems including bedwetting, which is a frequent
symptom of psychological trauma. Depression, anxiety, fear and anger were also
common reasons for seeking care.40
Education
94. In Area C in the West Bank, children have to overcome daily obstacles on their
way to school such as mobility restrictions and facing harassment and violence from
settlers and the military.64 According to a recent survey, 26 out of 101 surveyed
Palestinian communities in the West Bank reported that schoolchildren, youths and
teachers experienced harassment and/or violence by Israeli military or security
forces while going to and from school, while 28 communities reported settler
violence along the same lines.65
95. Since building permits are very difficult to obtain for Palestinians in Area C,
many schools fall short of basic safety and hygiene standards, while facing
demolition and stop-work orders.64
96. Between January and November 2011, 32 attacks by Israeli settlers and
security forces against Palestinian schools were reported, 21 in the West Bank and
11 in Gaza.66 Thirteen schools serving 4,497 girls and boys are located in the access
restricted areas.65
97. The Palestinian Authority also reported that Israeli authorities had issued
directives to the effect that the exclusive source of textbooks for public schools in
occupied East Jerusalem is the Israeli administered municipality, consequently
banning schools from acquiring books from Palestinian sources.19
98. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East needs to construct 100 schools in order to meet the needs of all eligible
refugee children across the Gaza Strip over a three-year period. Currently, due to
chronic underfunding and the inability to build new schools under Israeli-imposed
restrictions, more than 94 per cent of UNRWA schools in Gaza operate on a doubleshift
basis. In some cases, shipping containers have been utilized as classrooms.40
99. In occupied East Jerusalem, 1,000 additional classrooms are required to
accommodate Palestinian children in schools, while many existing facilities are
substandard or unsuitable.27 In the West Bank, at least 10,000 students have to study
in tents, caravans or tin shacks.64
III. The occupied Syrian Golan
100. The occupation of the Syrian Golan in 1967 and its purported annexation in
1981 by the passing of the Golan Heights Law continue. The Security Council, in its
__________________
64 Information recorded by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), available from:
www.unicef.org/infobycountry/media_59706.html.
65 Save the Children, fact sheet “Children’s Right to Education in Armed Conflict” (October 2011).
66 UNICEF, Children Affected by Armed Conflict bulletins for September 2011 and November
2011.
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resolution 497 (1981), declared that the Israeli decision to impose its laws,
jurisdiction and administration in the Syrian Golan was null and void.
101. In 2011 Israel continued its settlement expansion, while the Syrian Arab
population continues to suffer from discrimination and access restrictions, including
the expropriation of resources for the exclusive use of settlers in the occupied
Syrian Golan. Approximately 19,000 Israeli settlers live in 33 settlements in the
occupied Syrian Golan (see A/66/364, para. 34).
102. Land continues to be expropriated from Syrian citizens, for military or security
pretexts. Permits for the expansion of the Syrian villages in the occupied Syrian
Golan are not granted by the Israeli authorities. The Syrian population thus
continues to build without Israeli permits. Although standing demolition orders have
not been implemented, fines have been imposed for building without permits.67
103. Israel is building a 2-kilometre-long, 8-metre-high wall, which would reinforce
an existing fence and also cut off the “valley of screams” (see A/66/370, para. 59).
104. On 15 May 2011, after firing warning shots, Israeli forces opened fire on
hundreds of demonstrators commemorating Nakba Day, who tried to cross the
ceasefire line into the occupied Syrian Golan (see S/2011/359). As a result, 44
civilian casualties, including four fatalities, were recorded.
105. Syrian citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan are not allowed to exploit the
available lake waters, drill artesian wells or build water tanks to collect rainwater
and melted snow.68 Hence they are forced to pay high prices for water extracted
from occupied Syrian territory. Israeli settlers, who had access to significantly more
water, reportedly paid lower rates (see A/66/370, para. 58).
106. Moreover, Syrian farmers may be subjected to rationing, which prematurely
cuts off their water supply, preventing them from using the full amount of water
allocated to them. Such rationing is not applied to the settlers. In addition, the high
taxes levied on agricultural products reduce the earnings obtained by producers, in
particular for apples, which are their main crop.67
107. There continue to be few employment opportunities, particularly for Syrian
university graduates and other young people seeking professional posts. In practice,
they are deprived of adequate work in line with their academic and professional
qualifications. Syrian workers hired to work for Israeli employers often do not
benefit from social security arrangements. They do not accept Israeli citizenship,
and do not wish to join the Israeli labour unions. They cannot form their own trade
unions. Young people in particular are under pressure to leave the area, thus
affecting its already precarious demographic balance.69
108. Meanwhile, the Syrian population of the occupied Syrian Golan continues to
be banned from visiting family members in the Syrian Arab Republic (see A/66/364,
para. 34). A number of Syrian residents were reportedly arrested for attempting to
make a connection with their home country.67
109. There are concerns regarding the conditions and treatment of Syrians detained
by Israel, namely limited family visits, degrading treatment and denial of
__________________
67 “The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories”, p. 31.
68 “The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories”, pp. 31-32.
69 “The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories”, p. 32.
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educational opportunities. Dozens of Syrians are also reportedly detained without
having had any formal charges brought against them (see A/66/370, para. 60).
110. Landmines continue to pose a serious threat to civilians in the occupied Syrian
Golan. To date, 532 casualties have been recorded, including 202 fatalities.67 Owing
to the long-term presence of the mines and the deterioration of their detonation
systems, the threat has increased (see S/2011/748, para. 6).
IV. Conclusion
111. Despite some welcome measures aimed at supporting the economy in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the occupation continues to have grave
socioeconomic consequences for the Palestinian population.
112. Israeli violations including violence, settlements, restrictions and
discrimination towards Palestinians, and Syrians in the occupied Syrian Golan, and
their ensuing grave social and economic consequences, do not serve peace nor
inspire confidence. The occupation is politically, economically and morally not
sustainable and must end, as part of a negotiated solution and peace agreement that
ends the conflict and addresses all final status issues. The international community
should persist in its efforts to achieve this goal through a comprehensive, just and
lasting peace in the Middle East, in line with international law and relevant
resolutions of the United Nations.
United Nations A/68/77–E/2013/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
8 May 2013
Original: English
13-32665 (E) 110613
*1332665*
General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Item 61 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2013
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of
the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and the Arab population
in the occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
Summary
In its resolution 2012/23, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 67/229, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a
report to it at its sixty-eighth session. The present report, which has been prepared by
the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in compliance
with the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council.
In the forty-sixth year of its occupation of Palestinian territory, Israel continued
in its practices and policies that violate the occupying Power’s obligations under
international law. These discriminatory policies, which “amount to de facto
segregation”, adversely affect the living conditions of the Palestinian population,
with a dire impact on various Palestinian social and economic sectors, as well as on
the Palestinian natural resources and environment.
__________________
* A/68/50.
** E/2013/100.
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Excessive and disproportionate use of force by Israeli security forces continued.
The ill-treatment of Palestinian child detainees appears to be widespread, systematic
and institutionalized. Israel’s frequent use of administrative detention amounts to a
policy of widespread and systematic arbitrary detention. Israeli authorities and
settlers commit transgressions against Palestinians and their property with impunity.
Since 1967, Israel has revoked the residency status of more than 260,000
Palestinians from the Occupied Palestinian Territory, while Israeli policies and
practices, including home demolitions, lead to the forced displacement of Palestinians.
Settler violence also is aimed mainly to force Palestinians to move from their lands.
The scale of Israel’s settlement project in the occupied territories, as well as the
construction of the West Bank wall, are not only illegal but also appear to confirm
Israel’s intention to retain control over large parts of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, thus violating a core principle of the Charter of the United Nations, which
prohibits the acquisition of territory by the use or threat of force.
Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory face daily obstacles
and humiliation to travel both inside and outside the territory, while the Gaza
blockade amounts to collective punishment, also illegal under international law.
The continued Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan similarly includes policies
and practices that discriminate against its Syrian citizens and encourage illegal
Israeli settlement therein.
The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to
acknowledge its appreciation for the substantive contributions and inputs of the
Department for Political Affairs, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the
International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, the World Health Organization, the Office of the United Nations
Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, the United Nations
Environment Programme, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, the United Nations Population Fund and the League of Arab States.
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I. Introduction
1. Economic and Social Council resolution 2012/23 and General Assembly
resolution 67/229 expressed the concerns of the two bodies about the practices of
Israel, the occupying Power in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied
Syrian Golan, which violate international humanitarian law. These practices included
actions that caused death and injuries to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, all of whom must be protected in accordance with
international humanitarian law, as well as the rising incidence of violence by illegal,
armed Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians and their properties, in addition to
the continued detention of thousands of Palestinians, including children and women,
under harsh conditions. Of concern also to the Council and the Assembly are the
accelerated construction by Israel of settlements, the construction of the wall inside
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the exploitation of Palestinian natural resources,
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, agricultural lands and
infrastructure, the revocation of residency rights of Palestinians in and around
occupied East Jerusalem, and the continuing Israeli policy of closures and severe
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, including what amounts to a
blockade of the Gaza Strip. The Council and Assembly, through their aforementioned
resolutions, also highlighted the detrimental impact of Israeli practices on the
natural resources and the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian people
and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan.
2. The present note highlights the practices by Israel, the occupying Power, that
are of concern to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly and
that persisted over the reporting period. Although Israel cites security concerns to
justify most of its policies and practices, the note indicates that many of these
practices as well as the occupation regime constitute continuous violations of
international law.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory
Israeli policies affecting Palestinians
3. Israel implements policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
that “amount to de facto segregation”, including the establishment of two entirely
separate Israeli legal systems and sets of institutions for Jewish communities
grouped in illegal settlements, on the one hand, and Palestinian populations living
under Israeli military occupation in towns and villages, on the other. Furthermore,
Palestinians do not enjoy either equal use of roads and infrastructure or equal access
to basic services and water resources. Such separation is concretized by the
implementation of a complex combination of restrictions on movement, the
existence of separate roads and a permit regime that only impacts the Palestinian
population.1 Moreover, a matrix of military orders applies, by law or by practice,
only to Palestinians to regulate and control most aspects of daily life, including by
restricting an extensive range of rights (A/HRC/22/63, para. 40).
__________________
1 CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 24.
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4. In June 1967 Israel formally, yet illegally, annexed 70 km2 of land incorporating
East Jerusalem and a number of nearby Palestinian villages into the expanded
boundaries of the Jerusalem municipality of Israel (ibid., para. 25).
5. For decades Israel has pursued a strategy that has led to the debilitation of East
Jerusalem in every respect, including socioeconomic.2 Furthermore, Israel has
employed the following policies and practices: physically isolating East Jerusalem
from the rest of the West Bank in part by building the wall; discrimination in
planning and building; land expropriation and demolition of houses; revoking
residency and social benefits of Palestinians; and inequitably disbursing the
municipal budget between the two parts of the city (A/67/379, para. 16). The
cumulative effects of these methods have led to the deterioration in the conditions of
Palestinian East Jerusalemites.3
6. According to human rights organizations, since 2001, Israeli authorities have
closed down at least 28 Palestinian organizations operating in Jerusalem that had
been involved in educational, cultural and social activities for Palestinians in East
Jerusalem.4
Planning and zoning
7. Area C constitutes over 60 per cent of the West Bank, excluding East
Jerusalem. As the only contiguous territory, it is the key to economic cohesion and
is the most resource abundant space in the West Bank as it holds the majority of the
territory’s water, agricultural lands, natural resources and land reserves. Israel
maintains full security control and control over building and planning in Area C.
About 150,000 Palestinians live in 270 communities that are totally or partially in
Area C.5
8. In Area C the zoning regime applied by Israel benefits the establishment and
growth of settlements, while denying the development of Palestinian communities.
This regime effectively allows Palestinian construction on 1 per cent of Area C. As a
result, many Palestinians are left with no choice but to build without a permit, which
leads to “inhumane Israeli responses involving demolition and displacement”
(A/67/379, para. 15).
9. From 2005 to 2009, only 13 per cent of the Israeli building permits issued for
housing units in East Jerusalem were granted to Palestinian neighbourhoods. In
Jewish neighbourhoods, there is an average of 20 square metres of housing per
resident, compared to 11 square metres in Palestinian neighbourhoods.6
Residency status
10. Since 1967, Israel has retained control over the residency status of the
Palestinian population of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, implementing
discriminatory policies that often lead to the displacement of Palestinians.7
__________________
2 ACRI, Policies of Neglect in East Jerusalem, May 2012, p. 2.
3 Ibid.; see paras. 86-95 below.
4 A/67/372, para. 41; and The Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, submission to
the United Nations.
5 Information received from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
6 ACRI, East Jerusalem in Numbers, http://www.acri.org.il/en/2012/05/16/east-jerusalem-in-numbers/.
7 Information received from OCHA.
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11. Up until the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, Israel revoked
the residency status of 250,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
in addition to 14,188 Palestinian East Jerusalemites whose residency permits were
revoked from 1967 to 2011.8
12. Israel regulates the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem almost as if they
were foreign nationals living in Israel, with little regard for their status as protected
persons under international humanitarian law (A/67/372, para. 38). If they reside
outside Israel or East Jerusalem for a period of seven years, Palestinian residents
lose their permanent residency status, as stipulated in the Entry into Israel
Regulations of 2003.9
13. Policies that apply only to Palestinian residents of Jerusalem include the Entry
into Israel Law, which stipulates that a permanent resident who marries a non-resident
must submit, on behalf of the spouse, a request for “family unification” in order for
the partner to reside in East Jerusalem, a process that has frozen for almost 10 years
the entry of those spouses from the West Bank and Gaza.10
Disproportionate use of force
14. Excessive and disproportionate use of force by Israeli security forces,
including the Israeli military and border police, continued in the West Bank. Most
injuries occurred during demonstrations, where Israeli Military Order 101 outlaws
“assemblies”, and Israeli troops use excessive force to disperse them, thereby
violating Palestinians’ right to peaceful protest. Civilians were also injured and
killed as a result of the excessive use of force during other forms of military
operations, including search and arrest raids (see A/67/372, paras. 15-24).
15. Apart from air strikes and military operations, methods used by the Israeli
military to enforce the access-restricted areas in the Gaza Strip, including the use of
live ammunition, violate the international humanitarian law principle of distinction,
which establishes that civilians are not to be targeted (see A/67/372, paras. 8-10).
16. From 30 March 2012 to 29 March 2013, 268 Palestinians were killed and
4,483 others were injured. The vast majority of casualties involved civilians and
were inflicted by Israeli security forces. A total of 132 Palestinian injuries were the
result of settler attacks. Among the casualties, 42 Palestinian children were killed
and 615 were injured. During the same period, 3 Israeli civilians were killed and
279 were injured, including 3 injured children.11
17. On 14 November 2012, Israel launched a military offensive against the Gaza
Strip that went on until 21 November, during which Palestinian militants also
shelled Israeli towns and army posts in Israel. At least 165 Palestinians were killed
by Israeli military action, of whom 99 were civilians, including 13 women and
33 children. An additional 1,399 Palestinians were injured, the majority of whom
__________________
8 See Ceased Residency, http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Updates1175; information
received from OCHA.
9 Information received from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR); see also A/67/372, para. 38.
10 Information received from OCHA.
11 OCHA, Protection of Civilians: Casualties Database, http://www.ochaopt.org/poc.aspx?id=
1010002; and OCHA Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, 19-25 March 2013; casualties include
those who were injured or killed during the November 2012 offensive (see para. 17 below).
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are believed to be civilians. During the offensive, 3 Israeli civilians were killed and
224 Israelis, most of whom were also civilians, were injured by Palestinian shelling.
An additional six Palestinian civilians were killed by stray shells from Palestinian
militants.12
18. A common denominator affecting all victims of unlawful acts of violence
against Palestinians is the absence of effective investigations and redress for
victims, leaving Israeli security apparatuses to enjoy significant impunity vis-à-vis
such acts of violence against Palestinians.13
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
19. According to official Israeli figures, at the end of February 2013, about
4,713 Palestinian security detainees and prisoners were held in Israeli prisons,
including 253 children.14
20. In addition to the denial of due process rights during trial and the conviction of
Palestinian detainees in the Israeli military court system,15 it has been reported that
considerable physical and psychological pressure to sign confessions is placed on
defendants during interrogations. Practices in this regard include beatings and
threats, sleep deprivation, position abuse, prolonged cuffing, having family
members threatened and, in some cases, arrested.16 Some of such cases amount to
torture (see A/67/550, para. 17).
21. On 24 February 2013, a Palestinian prisoner, Arafat Jaradat, lost his life during
his incarceration in an Israeli prison, sparking wide protests across the West Bank
amidst allegations that torture and ill-treatment caused his death. On 2 April 2013,
another Palestinian prisoner, Maysara Abu Hamdiyeh, died while incarcerated in an
Israeli prison from cancer amidst accusations of medical negligence and illtreatment.
17 The Palestinian Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association
(ADDAMEER) maintains that since 1967, a total of 72 Palestinian prisoners have
died under torture and 53 have died owing to medical neglect.18
22. Although the Israeli military issued an order raising the age of majority for
Palestinians to 18 for security-related matters, children are not treated in a manner
that takes into account their age, needs and special circumstances.19 To the contrary,
the ill-treatment of Palestinian children who are arrested, detained or prosecuted by
the Israeli military system appears to be widespread, systematic and
institutionalized.20
23. Sixty per cent of all detentions of Palestinian children by Israeli security forces
occur between midnight and 5 a.m. Eighty-seven per cent of Palestinian children in
__________________
12 Information provided by OCHA.
13 Information provided by OCHA.
14 Btselem, http://www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners, and http://www.btselem.org/
statistics/minors_in_custody.
15 Information provided by OCHA; see also the concerns raised in the report of the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers (A/HRC/14/26/Add.1).
16 Information provided by OCHA.
17 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/02/palestinian-prisoners-israel-hunger-strike.
18 ADDAMEER, http://www.addameer.org/etemplate.php?id=578.
19 Information provided by OCHA.
20 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Children in Israeli Military Detention, February
2013, p. 1.
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detention are denied bail and thus remain detained until the conclusion of a legal
process. Ninety per cent plead guilty in order to avoid extended pretrial detention.
Israel uses solitary confinement for 12 per cent of Palestinian child detainees (see
A/67/550, paras. 10-12).
24. Israel’s treatment of Palestinian child detainees is grossly inconsistent with the
treatment it affords the children of Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory. This discrimination includes the minimum age of the child to receive a
custodial sentence or an adult sentence; the right to have a parent present during
interrogation; having interrogations recorded audiovisually; the time limit for being
held in custody before being brought before a judge; having access to a lawyer and
without charges being brought; and the maximum period of time between charges
and a trial (see A/67/550, para. 16). UNICEF reports that: “In no other country are
children systematically tried by juvenile military courts that, by definition, fall short
of providing the necessary guarantees to ensure respect for their rights”.21
Administrative detention
25. Israel’s frequent use of administrative detention amounts to a policy of
widespread and systematic arbitrary detention (A/67/550, para. 20). One of the most
problematic issues with such detention is that in most cases, evidence on which the
detention order is based is kept secret and neither the detainee nor his or her counsel
has access to it (see A/67/372, paras. 26-27). By the end of February 2013,
169 Palestinians remained under administrative detention, which constitutes a decline
from the number of administrative detainees in 2012.22
26. Throughout 2012, more than 1,200 Palestinian prisoners reportedly participated
in a series of hunger strikes to protest their conditions of detention and treatment by
Israeli authorities, including the widespread use of administrative detention.23
Population displacement, property destruction and confiscation
27. Israeli military operations have been the main cause of forced displacement in
the Gaza Strip. The November 2012 offensive led to the displacement of an additional
3,000 Palestinians whose homes had been destroyed or severely damaged.24
28. In 2012 the Israeli authorities demolished 540 Palestinian structures in Area C in
the West Bank, including 165 homes. This resulted in the displacement of 815 people,
including 474 children.25 In January 2013 alone at least 139 structures, including
59 homes and other residential structures, were destroyed in 20 separate incidents.26
29. In a number of cases, emergency shelters and other items provided as a form
of emergency response have similarly been demolished and/or confiscated by Israeli
authorities.27
__________________
21 UNICEF, Children in Israeli Military Detention, February 2013, p. 1.
22 Btselem, http://www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners.
23 A/HRC/21/33/AUV, para. 19.
24 Information received from OCHA.
25 Information received from OCHA.
26 OCHA, Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report, January 2013, p. 14.
27 Information received from OCHA.
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30. During 2012, the Israeli authorities demolished 64 Palestinian structures in
East Jerusalem comprising 24 residential structures and 40 others, including livelihood
and animal structures, and 15 “self-demolitions” imposed by these authorities.28
31. Overall, there are at least 93,100 residents of East Jerusalem who live in
structures built without permits and are therefore at potential risk of displacement.29
32. The forced eviction of Palestinians from their homes by settlers, backed by the
Government, is in itself incompatible with international human rights law (see
A/67/372, para. 31) and has contributed to changing the demography of East
Jerusalem. The Government of Israel supports the settlers’ actions by sending
security forces to accompany the takeover of Palestinian homes (A/67/379, para. 16).
33. In July 2011 Israeli authorities indicated their intention to “relocate”
approximately 27,000 Bedouin and herding Palestinians living in Area C. Should
this plan be implemented, it would amount to individual and mass forcible transfers
and forced evictions contrary to Israel’s obligations under international law
(A/67/372, para. 37).
34. Since the beginning of the occupation, Israel has seized over 1 million dunums30
of Palestinian land (approximately 40 per cent of the West Bank) and placed it
within the jurisdictional boundaries of local and regional settlement councils,
prohibiting Palestinian access to that land (A/HRC/22/63, paras. 63-64).
Settlements and settler violence
35. The establishment of the settlements on occupied territories is a violation of
the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention IV of 1907. In building
settlements and associated infrastructure, Israel further violates international law
through the appropriation of Palestinian property not justified by military necessity
(see A/67/379, paras. 11-12).
36. Israel defined settlements as “national priority areas”, whose residents benefit
from housing and education subsidies and direct incentives (A/HRC/22/63, para. 22).
This amounts to the transfer by Israel of its population into the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (see A/67/375, para. 10), which is prohibited under international law.31
37. The scale of Israel’s settlement project and the massive financial investment in
it appear to confirm Israel’s intention to retain control over these areas, thus
violating a core principle of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the
acquisition of territory by the use or threat of force (see A/67/379, para. 12).
38. At present there are about 150 settlements together with approximately
100 unauthorized outposts.32 The number of settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory stood at 536,932 in 2011, including 267,643 in East Jerusalem.33 The
__________________
28 http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_Jerusalem_FactSheet_December_2012_english.pdf.
29 See paras. 7-9 above; see also OCHA Fact Sheet, East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns
Update, December 2012, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_Jerusalem_FactSheet_
December_2012_english.pdf.
30 1 dunum = 1,000 m2.
31 A/HRC/22/63, para. 38; Fourth Geneva Convention, article 49.
32 Information provided by OCHA.
33 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/
settlmt2011E.pdf.
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settler population (excluding that of East Jerusalem) has grown over the past decade
at an average yearly rate of 5.3 per cent, compared with 1.8 per cent for the Israeli
population as a whole. Israeli settlers now represent approximately 19 per cent of
the overall population of the West Bank (see A/67/375, paras. 7 and 12).
39. On 30 November 2012, the day after the General Assembly accorded Palestine
non-member Observer State status in the United Nations, the Government of Israel
announced the advancement of the E1 settlement plan, comprising several thousand
housing units.34 This plan, if implemented, would completely sever East Jerusalem
from the rest of the West Bank and compromise the territorial contiguity between
the northern and southern parts thereof.35
Settler violence
40. As the occupying Power, Israel has the obligation to protect the right to life
and physical integrity of Palestinians.36 Yet, various aspects of Palestinian life are
significantly affected by a minority of settlers who are engaged in violence and
intimidation with the aim of forcing Palestinians off their land (see A/HRC/22/63,
para. 50).
41. There has been an increase in “racist violence and acts of vandalism on the
part of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory targeting non-Jews,
including Muslims and Christians and their holy places”, with impunity.37
42. Since 2008, Israeli settlers committed at least nine arson attacks against
Palestinian mosques and 21 incidents where graffiti was used to desecrate mosques,
churches and burial grounds (see A/HRC/22/63, para. 60).
43. In 2012 355 settler violence incidents were recorded, resulting in injuries to
169 Palestinians, in addition to 240 incidents resulting in damage to Palestinian
private property.38 Israeli security forces have, in numerous instances, failed to
protect Palestinians from acts of violence committed by Israeli settlers, even when
those acts occurred in their presence. Instead, in a number of documented cases, the
Israeli military focused on dispersing Palestinians (see A/67/375, para. 19).
44. From March 2012 to January 2013, a total of 5,832 trees were destroyed or
uprooted by settlers.39
45. Settler violence continues with a culture of impunity.40 Of 162 Israelimonitored
police investigations of cases of vandalism of Palestinian-owned trees in
the West Bank since 2005, only 1 resulted in an indictment.41
__________________
34 Information provided by OCHA.
35 Btselem, http://www.btselem.org/settlements/20121202_e1_human_rights_ramifications.
36 See A/67/375, paras. 30-35; see also article 43 of the Hague Regulations annexed to the Fourth
Geneva Convention, respecting the laws and customs of war on land, of 18 October 1907.
37 See CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 28.
38 Information provided by OCHA.
39 Information received from United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA).
40 Information received from OCHA.
41 Yesh Din, Police investigations of Palestinian tree vandalization in the West Bank, October 2012.
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West Bank wall
46. In combination with the gate and permit regimes, the wall continues to be the
single largest obstacle to Palestinian movement within the occupied West Bank.42
The International Court of Justice concluded in its advisory opinion of 9 July 2004,
that “the wall and its associated regime are contrary to international law” and that
Israel is obligated to cease construction of and dismantle the wall and to make
reparations for damages caused by the construction of this 708 km wall (see
A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1). Israel has yet to comply with the advisory opinion.
47. Israel cites security reasons for the construction of the wall, even though most
of its planned route runs within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, not along the
Green Line. In addition, the wall’s route shows that its aim was to encircle as many
Israeli settlements as possible, so as to enable de facto annexation to Israel of lands
that lie to the Israeli side of the wall.43
48. These lands constitute 9.4 per cent of the territory of the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem and some of the most fertile land (238 km2 of agricultural land)44 of
the West Bank.45 About 21 per cent, 31 per cent and 13.1 per cent of the grasslands,
forests and shrub lands, respectively, will also be annexed behind the wall upon its
completion under the planned route.46
49. Palestinians aged 16 and above require “permanent resident” permits from the
Israeli authorities to continue to live in their homes if located in the seam zone,47
while Israelis and foreign visitors have unrestricted access (see A/HRC/22/63,
para. 40).
50. To enable the construction of the wall, the Israeli army issued military orders
for the expropriation of 30,261 dunums of land, 88 per cent of which (i.e.
26,622 dunums) are “private lands belonging to Palestinian residents”.48 In
addition, the wall has resulted in the uprooting of 8.4 km2 of olive groves and
orchards.49
51. Thousands of Palestinian farmers whose lands lie in this zone also need to
obtain hard to get permits from the Israeli authorities to have access to and work
their own land. Farmers also may not be able to obtain permits for workers to carry
out agricultural work and are not allowed to store equipment on their land in the
seam zone.50
52. Herders in most cases are not allowed to bring livestock across the wall for
grazing, thus about 90 per cent of the directly affected communities report that the
wall had led to a decrease in their livestock numbers.51
__________________
42 Information received from OHCHR; see A/67/372, para. 44.
43 Btselem, Arrested development: the long-term impact of the separation barrier, October 2012, p. 4.
44 Information provided by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
45 Btselem, Arrested development: the long-term impact of the separation barrier, October 2012, p. 13.
46 Information provided by UNEP.
47 Information received from OCHA; the seam zone is the West Bank area that lies between the
wall and the 1967 armistice Green Line.
48 Btselem, Arrested development: the long-term impact of the separation barrier, October 2012, p. 14.
49 Information received from UNEP.
50 See UNCTAD document TD/B/59/2.
51 Information provided by UNRWA.
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Closure policies and mobility restrictions
53. Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory face daily obstacles
and humiliation to travel both inside and outside the territory as a result of the wall,
military checkpoints permit requirements and travel bans by Israel (see
A/HRC/20/17/Add.2, paras. 61-63).
Blockade of the Gaza Strip
54. Israel continues to maintain the blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip since June
2007.52 However, despite cited Israeli security concerns and relaxations introduced
in its provisions in 2010 and 2012, this blockade amounts to collective
punishment53 and has “locked in” over 1.6 million people in what is one of the most
densely populated areas on Earth. It has also led to the “de-development” of Gaza,
with degrading living conditions.54
55. The movement of people from Gaza through the Beit Hanoun (Erez) Crossing
is prohibited, apart from exceptional situations. In 2012 there was an improvement
in the transfer of patients from Gaza via the crossing. During the same period, an
average of fewer than 200 permitted Palestinians and international persons passed
through the crossing each day, compared to an average of 26,000 per day in 2000.55
At the same time, Israel generally prohibited entry into Gaza of Arab Christian
clergy, including bishops and other senior clergy, to visit congregations or ministries
under their pastoral authority.56
56. The Israeli military has gradually expanded restrictions on access to farmland
on the Gaza side of the 1949 Green Line, and to fishing areas along the Gaza Strip
coast. Overall, the restricted land area was estimated to encompass 17 per cent of
the total land mass of the Gaza Strip and 35 per cent of its agricultural land. At sea,
fishermen have been prevented from accessing some 85 per cent of the maritime
areas to which they were entitled in accordance with the Oslo Agreements,57
resulting in an 80 per cent decline in the overall catch.58
57. Since the end of the November 2012 military offensive, improved access to
fishing and farming areas was recorded, without any significant easing of restrictions
on the movement of people and goods through the Israeli-controlled crossings.59
Mobility restrictions within the West Bank
58. The application of access restrictions is discriminatory, targeting mostly
Palestinian residents, for the benefit of the Israeli settler population.60
__________________
52 A partial blockade was imposed on Gaza Strip in June 2006.
53 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, 13 June 2012, at
http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/USG%20Valerie%20Amos%20Statement%20on%20Gaza
%2013Jun12.pdf.
54 Information received from OCHA.
55 Information received from OCHA.
56 United States Department of State, International religious freedom report for 2011, at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=192889#wrapper.
57 Information provided by OCHA.
58 See A/HRC/21/33/AUV, para. 16.
59 Information provided by OCHA.
60 Information provided by OCHA; see also A/HRC/22/63, paras. 72-76.
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59. In 2012 the number of obstacles (e.g. checkpoints, flying checkpoints, earth
mounds, concrete blocks and ditches), witnessed a slight increase, from 529 to 542.
In spite of a number of measures to ease access, 180,000 Palestinians in
55 communities are still compelled to use detours that are two to five times longer
than the direct route to the closest city.61
60. Movement within the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron City, H2, also remained
severely restricted, with Palestinian traffic banned from using most of the roads
leading to the Israeli settlements and pedestrian movement also prohibited in other
areas, including parts of what was once the main commercial artery.62
61. The Jordan Valley and Dead Sea area covers about 30 per cent of the West
Bank and is home to nearly 60,000 Palestinians and about 9,500 Israeli settlers.
Although there was improvement in Palestinian access to the Jordan Valley during
2012, it remains one of the areas most severely affected by the access restrictions
imposed since 2000 and continues to be separated from the rest of the West Bank by
dozens of physical obstacles.63
62. On 12 November 2012, the Israeli military issued “closed military zone”
orders prohibiting anyone apart from residents from entering or approaching the
villages of Bil’in, Ni’lin, Nabi Salah and Kafr Quddum on Fridays until March 2013.
These are all villages in which weekly demonstrations have been held — and violently
dispersed by security forces — regularly on Fridays for the past several years.64
63. About 40 per cent of the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, has been
allocated to 135 settlements, with their municipal boundaries being designated as
closed military zones into which the entry of Palestinians is restricted. In other cases,
access by Palestinians to agricultural land in the vicinity of settlements has been
limited by means of systematic intimidation by Israeli settlers. For the last few years,
access to Palestinian private land within the settlements’ outer limits has been subject
to “prior coordination” with the Israeli authorities, even in cases where the fencingoff
of Palestinian private land was carried out independently by Israeli settlers.65
64. Approximately 18 per cent of the West Bank has been designated by Israel as a
closed military zone for training, or a “firing zone”. The presence of Palestinians is
formally prohibited in these zones without permission from the Israeli authorities,
which is rarely granted. Many residents report that there is in practice little or no
military training in their areas.66
65. Palestinians, who reside within firing zones, are mainly those who did so prior
to the designation of the area as “closed”. They face a range of other difficulties,
including the confiscation and demolition of property, settler violence, harassment
by soldiers, access and movement restrictions, and/or water scarcity. This is in
contrast to Israeli settlement outposts established in the firing zones that do not
normally face such measures.67
__________________
61 Information received from OCHA.
62 Information received from OCHA.
63 Information received from OCHA.
64 ACRI, http://www.acri.org.il/en/2012/11/13/closed-military-zone-orders-delivered-to-activists/.
65 Information received from OCHA.
66 Information received from OCHA.
67 Information received from OCHA.
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66. Humanitarian organizations reported around 535 access incidents in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2012.68 UNRWA alone reported a total of 235
such incidents involving its staff in 2012, affecting teachers, medical doctors and
nurses, social and relief workers and field office staff. Moreover, access to seam
zone areas for mobile health, food assistance, mental health services and social work
teams was further restricted.69
67. Israeli restrictions hinder the ability of Palestinian Muslims and Christians to
reach some places of worship and to practice their religious rites, particularly in
Jerusalem. The wall also significantly impeded Bethlehem-area Christians from
reaching the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and made visits to Christian
sites in Bethany and Bethlehem difficult for Palestinian Christians who live on the
Jerusalem side of the wall. Furthermore, foreign pilgrims and religious aid workers
occasionally experienced difficulty obtaining access to Christian holy sites in the
West Bank because of Israeli restrictions on movement in the West Bank. Israel’s
permitting regime also generally restricted most West Bank Muslims from accessing
the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.70
Access to East Jerusalem
68. Despite an easing of access restrictions for West Bank Palestinians to East
Jerusalem, particularly during the month of Ramadan in 2012, such access continued
to be restricted to permit holders who could only cross on foot using 4 of the
16 checkpoints functioning along the wall. The remaining 12 checkpoints are used
by Israelis, international persons and Palestinians holding Jerusalem identification
cards.71
69. Approximately 55,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites who reside on the West Bank
side of the wall need to cross checkpoints to have access to health, education and
other services in the heart of the city, to which they are entitled as residents of
Jerusalem.72
Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestinian natural resources
70. Israel controls almost all Palestinian water resources and exploits around
89 per cent of the available water, leaving only 11 per cent to the Palestinians.73
Recent figures indicate a per capita consumption at below 70 litres per day for
Palestinians in the West Bank, while Israelis living in illegal settlements enjoy
access of up to 450 litres per day.74
71. Wells and springs that are available to Palestinians are generally degraded, as
the Israeli authorities deny Palestinians permits for installing, upgrading or protecting
__________________
68 OCHA, Access incidents of humanitarian organizations database, http://www.ochaopt.org/dbs/
acis/index.aspx?id=1010005.
69 Information provided by UNRWA.
70 United States Department of State, International religious freedom report for 2011, at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=192889#wrapper.
71 Information provided by OCHA.
72 Information provided by OCHA.
73 Information provided by UNEP.
74 Information provided by UNEP.
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their water sources to provide sufficient quantities, while they simultaneously
continue to drill deeper and more efficient wells for Israeli use.75
72. Furthermore, the construction of the West Bank wall has damaged, destroyed or
made inaccessible vital sources of water, such as wells, cisterns and springs, which,
once damaged, can rarely be repaired or replaced owing to planning restrictions.76
73. In addition, Palestinians are denied access to what are supposed to be shared
water resources, such as the Jordan River.77
74. The targeting of water sanitation and hygiene facilities by the Israeli
authorities, including basic systems and facilities funded by international donors,
was increased in 2012. In the first nine months of 2012, 33 water infrastructure
facilities and 16 sanitation infrastructure facilities were demolished, affecting over
1,500 persons.78
75. The increased pressure on available water resources, combined with the
blockade and continued Israeli military strikes, has damaged water resources,
exacerbating the water crisis in the Gaza Strip.79
76. Palestinians in Gaza have resorted to overextraction from the coastal aquifer.80
This has caused the water table to drop below sea level and saline water and other
pollutants to intrude, rendering 90 to 95 per cent of the water unfit for human
consumption.81
77. The four wastewater treatment plants in the Gaza Strip have limited treatment
capacity and efficiency.82 As a result, about 89 million litres of untreated or
partially treated sewage are discharged directly into the sea every day, posing a
potentially serious health and sanitation hazard.83
78. The sanitation crisis is further compounded by approximately 40,000 cesspits
in use in Gaza, of which 84 per cent are manually emptied by household members
owing to the lack of connections to the sewage network.84 In 2012 alone, three
children drowned in pools of open sewage that cannot be adequately addressed as
long as the blockade hinders sanitation development.85
79. In the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, only 31 per cent of Palestinians
are connected to the sewage network. Only one wastewater treatment plant is
operational owing to the Israeli authorities’ refusal to grant the necessary permits for
the development of sanitation and wastewater treatment infrastructure. As a result,
almost 40 to 50 million cubic metres of sewage each year reach natural drainages as
untreated sewage.86
__________________
75 Information provided by OCHA.
76 Information provided by UNEP.
77 Information provided by UNEP.
78 Information provided by OCHA.
79 Information provided by UNEP.
80 Information provided by UNEP.
81 Information provided by UNEP.
82 Information provided by UNEP.
83 Information provided by OCHA.
84 Information provided by OCHA.
85 See Save the Children-Medical Aid for Palestinians, Gaza’s children: falling behind, 2012, p. 3.
86 Information provided by OCHA.
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80. Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, generate
54 million cubic metres of domestic wastewater annually, with much of it entering
the environment untreated.87
81. Apart from wastewater, solid waste from the settlements is dumped without
restriction on Palestinian lands, fields and side roads, or is burned. Several polluting
industries were relocated from Israel to the West Bank, including aluminium,
tanning, plastics and electroplating, and do not abide by any environmental laws.
The industrial waste produced by these industries and other Israeli industries located
in the West Bank is disposed of on the nearby Palestinian agricultural lands, thereby
constituting a threat to the environment.88
82. The wall also obstructs the flow of surface water, with trapped water causing
flooding and the degradation of adjacent agricultural lands,89 especially since
Palestinians are not permitted to approach and clear the blockages in drainage pipes
under the wall.90
83. The construction of the wall has caused physical separation as well as
compaction of the soil, uprooting of trees and loss of agricultural land. The
uprooting of trees leaves soils exposed and exacerbates land degradation.91
84. Farmers have been compelled to leave their lands barren because of the wall,
losing a valuable source of reliable income and exposing the soil to erosion. Access
difficulties also resulted in the overexploitation of remaining community lands,
which also led to increased degradation.92
85. The construction of the wall has also altered and destroyed the natural habitats
of a number of species, threatening biodiversity and depleting ecosystems. Common
floral and faunal species are under serious threat of becoming rare, with some very
rare species potentially disappearing altogether. About 22 terrestrial animal species
are also under the threat of extinction, as the wall negatively impacted habitat
fragmentation and prevented the movement of mammals for food and mating.93
Economic and social conditions
Economy
86. The economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continues to be
unsustainable and restrained by the policies of the Israeli occupation, namely
persistent restrictions on movement and access.
87. Reflecting the slowdown in economic activity, unemployment in the West Bank
and Gaza remained stubbornly high and rose to 22.9 per cent in the fourth quarter of
2012 from 21 per cent during the same period in 2011.94 This indicates that labour-
__________________
87 Information provided by UNEP.
88 Information provided by UNEP.
89 Information provided by UNEP.
90 UNRWA-Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), Barrier impacts on the environment and
rural livelihoods, 2012, at http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2012062812240.pdf.
91 UNRWA-ARIJ, Barrier impacts on the environment and rural livelihoods, 2012, at
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2012062812240.pdf.
92 UNRWA-ARIJ, Barrier impacts on the environment and rural livelihoods, 2012, at
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2012062812240.pdf.
93 Information provided by UNEP.
94 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Labour Force Survey, February 2013, p. 36.
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intensive tradable sectors are excessively and disproportionately impacted by Israeli
occupation policies.95 One issue of concern is the duration of unemployment with
adverse effects, including diminished employability and significant forgone income.
The average duration of unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza is 11 months
(6.6 months in the West Bank and 16.1 months in the Gaza Strip in 2012.96
88. Unemployment has been much higher in Gaza (averaging 33.5 per cent in
2010 and 2011) than in the West Bank (17 per cent in 2010 and 2011). By the end of
2012 (fourth quarter), this pattern persisted: the West Bank unemployment rate was
18.3 per cent, while it stood at 32.2 per cent in Gaza.97
89. The persistence of high unemployment in the West Bank can be attributed,
among other things, to low levels of private sector investment, particularly in Area C,
which covers 60 per cent of the West Bank, where investment is highly restricted.98
90. Overall wage growth lagged behind inflation, leaving 2011 average real wages
8.4 per cent lower than their level five years earlier.99 Real wages have fallen over
the past decade at all education levels. For example, among those with five years of
schooling, real wages were about 30 per cent lower in 2009 compared to 1999 and
among those with 16 to 18 years of schooling, wages in 2009 were lower by 10 per
cent.100
91. In 2011 slightly more than one of four (25.8 per cent) individuals in the West
Bank and Gaza were living below the poverty line (17.8 per cent in the West Bank
and 38.8 per cent in the Gaza Strip). Similarly, about 12.9 per cent of individuals
were living below the deep poverty line in 2011 (7.8 per cent in the West Bank and
21.1 per cent in the Gaza Strip).101
92. One significant feature of poverty in the West Bank and Gaza is that many
Palestinians have consumption levels that are just above the poverty line, implying
that in the event of an economic shock they could easily fall below the poverty
line.102
93. Seventy-eight per cent of Palestinians living in the Jerusalem district and
84 per cent of children live below the poverty line — the worst rates on record.103
In addition, 2011 data indicates that 40 per cent of the male Arab population and
85 per cent of Palestinian women in Jerusalem do not participate in the labour
market, and more than 5,000 Palestinian businesses in Jerusalem have closed their
doors since 1999.104
__________________
95 See International Monetary Fund (IMF), Recent experience and prospects of the economy of the
West Bank and Gaza, 19 March 2013.
96 PCBS, Labour Force Survey, February 2013, p. 20.
97 PCBS, Labour Force Survey, February 2013, pp. 37-38.
98 See IMF, Recent experience and prospects of the economy of the West Bank and Gaza,
23 September 2012.
99 See UNCTAD, TD/B/59/20.
100 See World Bank, Towards Economic Sustainability of a Future Palestinian State: Promoting
Private Sector-Lead Growth, April 2012.
101 See PCBS, Levels of living and poverty in the Palestinian territory, June 2012.
102 See World Bank, Coping with Conflict? Poverty and Inclusion in the West Bank and Gaza, 2011.
103 See ACRI, East Jerusalem in Numbers, at http://www.acri.org.il/en/2012/05/16/east-jerusalemin-
numbers/.
104 See ACRI, Policies of Neglect in East Jerusalem, May 2012.
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94. The withholding and redirection by Israel of tax revenues it collects on behalf
of the Government of Palestine, and the decline in donor support observed in 2011
and 2012 had a negative impact on growth and exacerbated a deep fiscal crisis. In
November and December 2012 Israel temporarily withheld Palestinian tax revenues
as a punitive step in light of the November vote admitting Palestine as a
non-member Observer State to the General Assembly. This led to the delay of the
payment of salaries to civil servants, who have embarked on strikes in protest since
mid-December 2012.105
95. The key long-term constraints blocking the emergence of a strong economy are
the loss of Palestinian natural resources, land and water to occupation and
settlements, and the isolation of Palestinian producers from regional and global
markets, leading to their limited ability to procure production inputs and to export
their goods and services.106
Food security
96. FAO maintains that while food security levels have improved throughout the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, these gains are uneven and temporary in nature.107
97. More than 40 per cent of Palestinian households are classified as food insecure
or vulnerable to food insecurity. After assistance, 1.3 million Palestinians (27 per
cent of Palestinian households) are food insecure and unable to meet their basic
food and household expenses.108
98. In the West Bank, post-assistance food insecurity still reaches 17 per cent,
while these rates in the Gaza Strip reach up to 44 per cent.109
99. In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA distributes food to over 700,000 refugees. Without
improvements in the economy, which can only come about with the lifting of the
blockade, that figure could rise to over 900,000.110 The World Food Programme
distributes food aid to an additional 300,000 persons.111 Even so, about 44 per cent
of recipients of food assistance remain food insecure.112
Public health
100. The continuing occupation of Palestinian territory hinders national health
planning and the ability to implement health programmes. It leads many highly
qualified doctors and other health personnel to leave the country, causing shortages
in many specialties.113
__________________
105 See Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
(UNSCO), Briefing to the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East, 23 January 2013.
106 See UNCTAD, TD/B/59/2, para. 5.
107 Information received from FAO.
108 Information received from FAO.
109 Information received from FAO.
110 Information received from UNRWA.
111 Information received from UNSCO.
112 See United Nations country team in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Gaza in 2020: a liveable
place?, August 2012, p. 6.
113 Information received from WHO.
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101. In addition, the blockade of the Gaza Strip has adversely affected the training
and movement of health professionals into Gaza, and restricted the construction and
rehabilitation of health infrastructure.114
102. Patients from Gaza have to apply for Israeli permits in order to access hospital
treatment outside Gaza. In spite of some easing of the restriction, two female
patients died in 2012 after being delayed in accessing medical treatment. Other
patients and/or patient-companions were detained at the Beit Hanoun border
between Gaza and Israel while crossing with a valid permit.115
103. Before and during the November 2012 offensive, more than 40 per cent of the
drug items in the essential drug list and more than 50 per cent of medical
consumables were out of stock. Hospitals had difficulty coping with the shortages.
Some hospitals reported reuse of single use supplies, as well as the use of alternative
and less effective antibiotics when the drug of choice was not available.116
104. Also during the November 2012 offensive, 13 primary health care centres and
2 hospitals were partially damaged, whereas a field hospital sustained serious
damage after being directly hit. In addition, three ambulance drivers were injured
and six ambulances were damaged owing to the shelling.117
105. After the November offensive, high rates of psychosocial trauma were reported
in Gaza, particularly among children and young people. The number of people
receiving assistance in UNRWA health centres related to psychological trauma
doubled from November to December, with 42 per cent of those being children
under the age of nine.118 As a conservative estimate, it is reasonable to assume that
25,000 to 50,000 people will need some form of psychological intervention to
address the long-term effects of the offensive.119
106. In the West Bank, UNRWA reported a continued demand for mental health
services during 2012, in connection with stress-related disorders. The demand can
be directly linked to protection concerns related to the occupation, including
violence, the wall, forced displacement and subsequent socioeconomic hardship.120
Psychological studies of Palestinian children 12 years of age and under show a
disturbingly high correlation between witnessing a parent beaten or humiliated by
Israeli soldiers and the loss by the child of the will to live (see A/HRC/20/32,
para. 8).
107. Moreover, 58.6 per cent of school children, 68.1 per cent of children (between
9 and 12 months of age) and 36.8 per cent of pregnant women suffer from anaemia.
Stunting, or long-term exposure to chronic malnutrition, affects 10 per cent of
children under five years of age in the Gaza Strip.121 It is also estimated that 50 per
cent of infants and young children under two years of age in the West Bank and the
__________________
114 Information received from WHO.
115 Information received from WHO.
116 See WHO, Initial health assessment report — Gaza Strip, December 2012.
117 See WHO, Initial health assessment report — Gaza Strip, December 2012.
118 Information received from UNRWA.
119 See WHO, Initial health assessment report — Gaza Strip, December 2012.
120 Information received from UNRWA.
121 See Save the Children-Medical Aid for Palestinians, Gaza’s children: falling behind, 2012, p. 2.
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Gaza Strip suffer from iron deficiency anaemia, which is associated with
inappropriate feeding practices.122
Education
108. In the Gaza Strip, it is estimated that 250 new schools are now needed,
including 100 UNRWA schools, and an additional 190 schools will be needed by
2020, to accommodate the increase in the student population.123 Currently, more
than 87 per cent of UNRWA schools in Gaza operate on a double shift basis. In
some cases, shipping containers have been utilized as classrooms.124
109. During the November offensive, 286 educational facilities, including schools,
kindergartens and tertiary education institutions, suffered damage or destruction,
affecting at least 249,067 students.125
110. In the West Bank, the restrictive planning regime results in inadequate or a
significant shortage of school infrastructure and exposes schools to the threat of
demolition. Currently, at least 38 schools serving approximately 3,000 children in
Area C of the West Bank and in East Jerusalem have been issued verbal and written
stop-work or demolition orders by the Israeli authorities, meaning they are under
constant threat of demolition. Access to school can be hindered by physical
obstacles, threats and harassment by the Israeli army and settlers.126
111. The East Jerusalem school system, which operates under the Israel Ministry of
Education and the municipality’s Jerusalem Education Administration, suffers from
severe neglect, disproportionately low budget allocations, overcrowding, the lack of
available classrooms and many other woes.127
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
112. Israel continues to occupy the Syrian Golan Heights in its resolution 497
(1981) the Security Council decided that the Israeli decision to impose its laws,
jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and
void and without international legal effect (A/67/375, para. 45).
113. Approximately 19,000 Israelis have settled in 33 Israeli settlements in the
occupied Syrian Golan. That figure nearly equals the number of Syrians who live in
the occupied Syrian Golan (ibid.).
114. Israel persists in implementing legal and administrative measures to provide
socioeconomic incentives, security, infrastructure and social services to settlers
residing in the occupied Syrian Golan, which amounts to the illegal transfer of its
population into occupied territory (ibid.), whereas the five remaining Syrian villages
of the occupied Syrian Golan are deprived of physical space for organic growth. In
the village of Majdal Shams, approximately 11,000 Syrian citizens live in
1,200 houses. As new construction is not authorized, houses are either renovated or
__________________
122 WHO, A/65/27/Rev.1, para. 4.
123 See United Nations country team, Gaza in 2020: a liveable place?, August 2012.
124 Information provided by UNRWA.
125 Information provided by OCHA.
126 Information provided by OCHA.
127 See ACRI, Policies of Neglect in East Jerusalem, May 2012.
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new floors are added, without the requisite permits, to accommodate the growth of
these households.128
115. Syrian residents of the occupied Syrian Golan suffer from inequality regarding
access to land, housing and basic services. The Citizenship Law continues to impact
family ties for Syrians in the occupied Golan, which continue to be disrupted as a
consequence of the territory’s illegal annexation in 1981.129
116. High levels of taxes and restrictions on the use of water put a significant
burden on Syrian farmers, who are thus in an unequal and disadvantaged position.
Israeli settlements continued to receive the allotted share of 750 cubic metres of
water per dunum of land, while the Syrian producers received 200 cubic metres. The
cost of the water supply for agriculture to the Syrian farmers is approximately four
times more than to the settlers. Water shortages usually result in the diversion of
water resources to the settlements and, consequently, in some reduction of water
provision to the Syrian farmers.130
117. In February 2013 Israeli media reported the intention of the Israel authorities
to authorize drilling for oil in the occupied Golan Heights by issuing a license to
prospect to a United States-Israeli energy company.131
IV. Conclusion
118. The prolonged Israeli occupation, its discriminatory regime and practices
violate United Nations resolutions and international law, and should not be allowed
to persist with impunity. The practices and regime, and their socioeconomic
ramifications for the Palestinian people and Syrian citizens, will only result in
increased suffering and, consequently, contribute to undermine peace and justice,
which can only be achieved upon the realization of the right to self-determination
for peoples under occupation.
119. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied
Syrian Golan not only are illegal but also constitute an obstacle to peace. The
international community should exert all possible efforts to ensure the
implementation of international law and relevant United Nations resolutions. These
efforts should include providing support for initiatives that seek to end the Israeli
violations of international law in the occupied territories, especially Israeli
settlement activities, as a first step towards a final and just resolution to the conflict
that ends the occupation and allows the attainment of the inalienable rights of the
Palestinian people, as guaranteed by international law.
__________________
128 International Labour Organization (ILO), ILC.101/DG/APP, para. 137.
129 CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 29.
130 ILO, ILC.101/DG/APP, paras. 131-132; and information received from UNSCO.
131 Yediot Ahronoth, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4347549,00.html.
United Nations A/69/81–E/2014/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
2 May 2014
Original: English
14-03886 (E) 200514
*1403886*
General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Item 61 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
2014 session
Item 14 of the provisional agenda**
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
Summary
In its resolution 2013/8, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution. The Assembly,
in its resolution 68/235, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it
at its sixty-eighth session. The present report, which has been prepared by the
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in response to the
resolutions of the Assembly and the Council.
At its eightieth session, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
censured Israel in connection with its general recommendation 19 (1995) concerning
segregation and apartheid, as prohibited by article 3 of the International Convention
for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Continued disproportionate use of force by Israeli security forces amounts to
unlawful killings, and may amount to wilful killings in some cases. During the
reporting period, 40 Palestinians were killed (including 5 children), and 3,654
injured (including 1,001 children).
A/69/81
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A total of 4,881 Palestinians (including 183 minors) had been detained or
imprisoned by Israeli security forces by January 2014, with reported torture,
ill-treatment and denial of rights.
In 2013, 663 Palestinian structures, including homes, were demolished,
displacing 1,103 people. Over 1 billion square metres of Palestinian land has been
seized by Israel since the onset of the occupation.
Government-supported illegal settlement expansion and the construction of the
wall, which have led to “a creeping annexa tion”, continue in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, with 40 per cent of the West Bank land transferred to the
jurisdiction of settlement-related councils. In 2013 there was a 123.7 per cent
increase in the construction of settlement housing units.
Violence and attacks by settlers continued, with impunity. In 2013, 93 attacks
were recorded against Palestinians (including children), their property and holy
places.
Israeli mobility restrictions, which constitute illegal collective punishment, also
persist, affecting almost all aspects of Palestinian life. These restrictions amount to a
blockade in the Gaza Strip, with severe consequences on the social, economic and
humanitarian conditions of its population.
Israeli measures continue to have a detrimental impact on the environment and
natural resources and curtail Palestinian development and livelihood through
discriminatory policies, including in access to land and water allocation; Israeli
settlers consume six times more water than Palestinians in the Wes t Bank. Ninety per
cent of the water from the Gaza aquifer is not safe for drinking without prior
treatment, further exacerbating the living conditions of the Palestinians living there.
The economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory continued its negat ive trend
during 2013. Unemployment was recorded at 38.5 per cent in Gaza, compared to
18.2 per cent in the West Bank.
The level of food insecurity rose dramatically, affecting over 1.5 million
Palestinians (34 per cent of the population), with a rate of 57 per cent in the Gaza
Strip.
Almost 15,000 patients had to leave Gaza in 2013 in order to access life -saving
medical care owing to the serious shortage of drugs and medical supplies. In the
West Bank, Palestinian patients and their companions need special Israeli-issued
permits to access hospitals in East Jerusalem.
The educational system in the Occupied Palestinian Territory requires
additional facilities. The expansion of the system is restricted in Gaza because of the
blockade, and in the West Bank owing to Israeli permit requirements. Palestinian
students and their schools are often exposed to settler violence.
Israel continues to occupy the Syrian Golan, and is illegally expanding its
settlement activities and exploiting natural resources there. Syrian residents of the
occupied Syrian Golan continue to suffer from discrimination in terms of access to
land, housing and basic services and water allocation.
The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to
acknowledge its appreciation for the substantive contributions of the Department of
Political Affairs, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the
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United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the
Office for the Coordination of Humanit arian Affairs, the United Nations Children’s
Fund, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, the
United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the United Nations Development
Programme, the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the United
Nations Environment Programme, the Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and the League of Arab States.
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I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 2013/8, the Economic and Social Council expressed concerns
over the practices of Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan, which violate international humanitarian
law. These concerns were echoed by the General Assembly in its resolution 68/235.
The practices included causing deaths and injuries to civilians, including children,
women and peaceful demonstrators, all of whom must be protected in accordance
with international humanitarian law; the rising incidence of violence by illegal,
armed Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians and thei r properties; and the
continued detention of thousands of Palestinians, including children and women,
under harsh conditions. Of concern also to the Council and the Assembly were the
accelerated construction by Israel of settlements; the construction of the wall inside
the Occupied Palestinian Territory; the exploitation of Palestinian natural resources;
the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions, agricultural lands and
infrastructure; the revocation of residency rights of Palestinians in and around
occupied East Jerusalem; and the ongoing Israeli military operations and policies of
closures and severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, including
what in effect amounts to a blockade on the Gaza Strip. The Council and Assembly
in their respective resolutions also highlighted the detrimental impact of Israeli
practices on the natural resources and the social and economic conditions of the
Palestinian people and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan.
2. The present note highlights the practices by Israel, the occupying Power, that
are of concern to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly as
reflected in the aforementioned resolutions, and that have persisted over the
reporting period, 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory
3. Eighteen Security Council resolutions1 reaffirm the applicability of the Geneva
Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) to territories occupied by Israel since 1967 (see
A/HRC/22/63, para. 14).
Israeli policies affecting Palestinians
4. At its eightieth session, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination reiterated previous concerns about the general segregation of
communities under Israeli jurisdiction. The Committee censured Israel in connection
with its general recommendation 19 (1995) concerning segregation and apartheid, as
prohibited by article 3 of the International Convention for the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, and urged Israel to prohibit and eradicate policies
or practices of racial segregation and apartheid, which “severely and disproportionately
affect the Palestinian population”.2
__________________
1 Resolutions 237 (1967), 271 (1969), 446 (1979), 465 (1980), 471 (1980), 476 (1980),
484 (1980), 592 (1986), 605 (1987), 636 (1989), 641 (1989), 672 (1990), 673 (1990),
681 (1990), 726 (1992), 799 (1992), 1322 (2000), 1544 (2004).
2 John Dugard and John Reynolds, “Apartheid, international law, and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 24, No. 3 (2013) pp. 867-913;
CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 24; see also A/HRC/25/67.
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Discrimination and segregation
5. Many of Israel’s policies related to settlements activity in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory amount to “de facto segregation”. This includes cases of
inequality and separation between Palestinians and Israeli settlers related to the use
of roads and infrastructure or access to basic services and water resources. Such
separation is concretized by the implementation of a complex combination of
movement restrictions consisting of the wall, roadblocks, the obligation to use
separate roads and a permit regime that only impacts the Palestinian population (see
CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 24).
6. A legal regime of segregation is operating in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, enabling the establishment and the consolidation of settlements, whereby
Israeli laws applied personally to Israelis in the West Bank give them preferential
legal status over Palestinians. This violates Palestinians’ rights to non -discrimination,
equality before the law and equal protection of the law (see A/HRC/22/63, paras. 40
and 49). This is particularly disconcerting since recent years have witnessed racist
and xenophobic acts, manifestations and discourse, especially by Israeli settlers
against Palestinians (see CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 23) (see the section on
settler violence below).
Zoning and planning
7. The restrictive regime for Palestinian construction in the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem, constitutes another example of discrimination against Palestinians
(see A/68/513, para. 12). This regime and its associated planning policies render i t
“virtually impossible” for the Palestinian residents of Area C, 3 as well as East
Jerusalem, to meet their basic housing, livelihood and development needs and
rights.4
8. Area C, constituting over 60 per cent of the West Bank, is the only contiguous
territory, owing to the fragmented nature of Areas A and B.5 The Israeli authorities
have in practice permitted Palestinian construction on lands comprising only 0.5 per
cent of Area C; in contrast, construction related to Israeli settlements is allowed on
8.5 per cent of the land in Area C, while an additional 61 per cent of Area C land
comes under the jurisdictional areas of the settlements’ local and regional councils
and can be made available for settlement planning and development in the future. 6
9. Furthermore, Israeli authorities prevent Palestinians from developing most
private lands in Area C on the grounds that they were zoned for agricultural use,
whereas extensive areas of Area C have been reclassified from “agricultural” to
“residential” to allow for the establishment of settlements.7 Hence, more than
__________________
3 Area C is the area that lies under full Israeli security and administrative control, according to the
Oslo Accords.
4 Information from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, citing World Bank,
“West Bank and Gaza: Area C and the Future of the Palestinian economy”, report No. AUS2922,
2 October 2013.
5 Area A is the area where the Palestinian government is granted security and administrative
control, while Area B is the area where Israel exercises security control while the Palestinian
government controls administrative aspects.
6 Information provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
7 Ibid.
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94 per cent of Palestinian construction permit applications in Area C were rejected
by the Israeli authorities between 2000 and 2012.8
10. In June 1967, Israel illegally annexed 70 square kilometres (km2) of land,
incorporating East Jerusalem and a number of nearby Palestinian villages into the
expanded boundaries of the Israeli-defined municipality of Jerusalem (see Security
Council resolution 478 (1980)). It promptly built 12 Israeli settlements that virtually
enveloped nearby Palestinian quarters and villages. Another outer layer of
settlements beyond the municipal boundaries was also built, compromising the
geographical continuity of the city — traditionally the economic, cultural and
spiritual centre of Palestine — from the rest of the West Bank (see A/HRC/22/63,
para. 25).
11. In addition, since the 1970s, the Jerusalem municipality of Israel has openly
pursued a policy known as “demographic balance”, most recently seen in the city
master plan also known as “Jerusalem 2000”, which calls for a 60/40 demographic
balance in favour of Jewish residents (ibid.).
12. Over 35 per cent of Palestinian land in the Israeli -defined municipal area of
East Jerusalem has been confiscated since 1967 for settlement use, and only 13 per
cent is available for Palestinian construction. However, much of this land is already
built up and the permitted construction density is limited. The difficulty and high
cost of the permit application process, as well as a range of issues related to land
registration, make it extremely difficult for Palestinians to obtain building permits
from the Israeli authorities.9
13. As a result, it is estimated that at least 33 per cent of all Palestinian homes in
East Jerusalem lack Israeli-issued building permits and are hence vulnerable to
demolitions and stop-work orders, placing over 93,000 Palestinians at risk of
displacement.10
Other East Jerusalem policies
14. In Jerusalem, displays of Palestinian political symbols have been punishable
by fines or imprisonment. Israeli security forces regularly prohibit and shut down
meetings or conferences held in Jerusalem that are affiliated with official Palestinian
institutions or with Palestinian officials in attendance. 11
15. Although Israeli law entitles Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to full and
equal municipal and other services, the municipality of J erusalem has failed to
provide sufficient social services, infrastructure, emergency planning and postal
service for Palestinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem. In addition, bus services in
Jerusalem have been largely segregated between Israelis and Palestinians.12
__________________
8 B’tselem, Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C, the West Bank , June 2013, p. 19.
9 Information from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
10 Information from the United Nations Human Settlements Programme.
11 United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Israel
and The Occupied Territories — The Occupied Territories, available from www.state.gov/j/drl/
rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=220358&year=2013#wrapper.
12 Ibid.
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Residency status
16. The right to reside in East Jerusalem was restricted to those Palestinians who
were recorded as living within this expanded municipal boundary at the time of its
occupation by Israel in 1967. These Palestinians were defined as permanent
residents of Israel, with strict rules governing their residency status and a number of
provisions allowing the revocation of this status.13 Based on these rules, in addition
to other regulations it has invoked, Israel has de facto expelled about 15,000
Palestinians from East Jerusalem so far (see A/68/77-E/2013/13).
17. The ban on granting Israeli citizenship to children born of an Israeli parent and
a parent from the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israeli decision to stop
processing residency applications for Palestinian children since 2000 and the
revocation of residency of those living in East Jerusalem have resulted in an
estimated 10,000 unregistered Palestinian children14 being excluded from access to
health services, education and any other type of social benefits. In addition, these
restrictions prevent thousands of Palestinian children from living with their parents
(see CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, para. 29), while others live with the fear of being
separated because of the severe restrictions on family reunification under the
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law as amended in 2005 and 2007. These laws and
measures can also prevent children who have lost one of their parents from reuniting
with their surviving parent (ibid., para. 49).
Excessive use of force
18. During the reporting period, 40 Palestinian civilians were killed and another
3,654 were injured by Israeli security forces and settlers throughout the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. The casualties included at least 5 Palestinian children killed
and another 1,001 injured.
19. The year 2013 witnessed more than double the number of child casualties
compared to 2012;15 children account for approximately 32 per cent of those injured
in violence by Israeli forces in the West Bank.16
20. Also during the reporting period, 2 Israeli civilians were killed in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and another 134 were injured, including 2 children. 17
21. According to Amnesty International, which investigated the shooting deaths of
25 Palestinians in the West Bank in 2013, the circumstances point to those killed
having been the victims of unlawful killings and, in some cases, wilful killings; “if
so, such killings would amount to war crimes”.18
22. Amnesty International also concluded that the patterns of excessive use of
force by Israeli forces have taken place with virtual impunity. 19 Approximately 94 per
cent of criminal investigations launched by the Israeli army against soldiers
__________________
13 Information from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
14 Defence for Children International Palestine, “Israeli law tears Palestinian families apart”,
available from www.dci-palestine.org/documents/israeli-law-tears-palestinian-families-apart.
15 Information provided by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
16 Information provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
17 Ibid.
18 Amnesty International, “Trigger-happy: Israel’s use of excessive force in the West Bank”
(London, 2014), pp. 10, 12, 60.
19 Ibid., p. 10.
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suspected of criminal violent activity against Palestinians and their property are
closed without any indictments. In the rare cases that indictments are served,
conviction leads to very light sentencing.20
Arbitrary arrests and detentions
23. Israeli forces, claiming security concerns, conducted 3,844 search and arrest
operations in the West Bank in 2013, during which 8 Palestinian civilians were
killed and another 239 were injured; 4,652 Palestinian civilians were arrested durin g
these operations.21 In the Gaza Strip, 11 patients and patient companions en route to
medical facilities were detained at the Erez checkpoint during 2013. 22
24. Some 800,000 Palestinians have been detained in Israel since 1967. 23 At the
end of January 2014, according to B’tselem, 4,881 Palestinian so -called security
detainees and prisoners were held in Israeli prisons,24 including 183 children.25
25. Although Israeli law provides safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention,
key safeguards do not apply to Palestinian “security detainees”, who are subject to
the jurisdiction of Israeli military law; Israeli military courts had a conviction rate
of more than 99 per cent for Palestinians.26
26. Throughout 2013, a monthly average of 198 children were in Israeli military
custody.27 Notwithstanding Israel’s announcements that it would take steps to
address the concerns of United Nations and other entities,28 Palestinian children
continue to be routinely arrested in the middle of the night, taken hand-tied and
blindfolded to unknown destinations; their parents rarely know where their children
have been taken. They are systematically subjected to physical and verbal violence,
humiliation, painful restraints, threats of death and other forms of violence, and
restricted access to toilet, food and water. “These crimes” are perpetrated from the
time of arrest, during transfer and interrogation, to obtain a confession but also on
an arbitrary basis. In addition, Palestinian children are subjected to solitary
confinement, sometimes for months (see CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, para. 35).
27. During 2013, UNICEF and partners documented 107 cases of ill -treatment of
children by the Israeli security forces, including 11 cases under the age o f 14.29
28. Arrested Palestinian children can be detained for four days before being
brought before a judge. They are not always informed of their rights and confessions
obtained from them under duress are used as the main evidence. Most of the
__________________
20 Yesh Din, “Criminal accountability of Israeli security forces”, available from
www.yesh-din.org/cat.asp?catid=2, accessed on 27 March 2014.
21 Information from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
22 Information from the World Health Organization (WHO).
23 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Special statistical bulletin on the 65th anniversary of
the Palestinian nakba”, available from www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/
Press_En_nakba65E.pdf.
24 B’tselem, “Statistics on Palestinians in the custody of the Israeli security forces” , available from
www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners, accessed on 24 March 2014.
25 Information provided by UNICEF.
26 United States Department of State.
27 B’tselem, “Statistics on Palestinian minors in the custody of the Israeli security forces”,
available from www.btselem.org/statistics/minors_in_custody.
28 Information provided by UNICEF.
29 Ibid.
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Palestinian children are accused of stone throwing, which is considered a security
offence that can carry a maximum penalty of 20 years of imprisonment (ibid.,
para. 73).
29. At least 215 Palestinian children detained since 2009 have been transferred out
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory to serve their detention and sentences inside
Israel, in breach of article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. A large number of
them are detained in overcrowded cells together with adults in poor conditions, with
poor ventilation and no access to natural light. Poor-quality and inadequate amounts
of food, harsh treatment by prison officials and deprivation of any form of education
add to their plight (ibid., para. 73).
30. The Addameer organization reported that female prisoners were also subjected
to the same psychological and physical abuse as their male counterparts, such as
beatings, intrusive body searches, threats and sexual harassment. 30
31. The Public Committee against Torture in Israel reported in July 2013 that,
despite having filed more than 776 complaints since 1999, no complaint of torture
resulted in a criminal investigation, prosecution or conviction. 31
32. Of continuing concern was the ongoing practice of administrative detention,
which permits detainees to be held for indefinite renewable periods.32 Citing
security concerns, Israeli authorities do not afford administrative detainees an
opportunity to refute allegations or access the evidentiary material presented against
them in court.33 According to B’tselem, by the end of January 2014, there were
175 Palestinian administrative detainees in Israeli prisons. 34
Displacement, property destruction and confiscation
33. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a whole, Israeli authorities demolished
663 Palestinian structures in 2013 (98 in East Jerusalem), compared with 604 in
2012, thereby displacing 1,103 people, compared with 886 in the previous year, 35
with refugees accounting for 34 per cent of those displaced. 36
34. In a number of instances, the Government of Israel charges demolition fees to
demolish a home. That, at times, caused Palestinians to destroy their own homes to
avoid the higher costs associated with Israeli demolitions. 37
35. Since the beginning of the occupation in 1967, Palestinians have seen over
1 billion square metres (m2) of their land seized and placed within the jurisdictional
boundaries of local and regional settlement councils (see A/HRC/22/63, paras. 63-64);
__________________
30 Information provided by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment
of Women.
31 United States Department of State.
32 Information provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
33 United States Department of State.
34 B’tselem, “Statistics on Palestinians in the custody of the Israeli security forces”, available from
www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners, accessed on 11 March 2014.
35 Input provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
36 Information provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA).
37 United States Department of State.
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this includes approximately 40 per cent of the total area of the West Bank38 (see
sections above for East Jerusalem).
36. In Gaza, it is estimated that there is a shortfall of over 70,000 housing units,
while 12,500 people remain displaced.39
37. The situation in Gaza is compounded by substandard housing; overcrowding
results in the deterioration of health and hygiene conditions, in turn leading to
heightened public health risks.40
Settlements and settler violence
38. In addition to violating international humanitarian law, the establishment of
Israeli settlements, along with their infrastructure, in the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem, is leading to “a creeping annexation that prevents the establishment of a
contiguous and viable Palestinian State and undermines the right of the Palestinian
people to self-determination” (see A/HRC/22/63, paras. 101 and 102).
39. These settlements are established for the exclusive benefit of Israeli Jews, and
are being maintained and developed through a system of total segregation between
the settlers and the rest of the population living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(ibid., para. 103).
40. Since 1967, consecutive Governments of Israel have directly promoted
settlements, and their expansion, by means of planning policies, legalizing outposts,
controlling land on which settlements are subsequently built, providing them with
infrastructure and public services, granting benefits and incentives to settlers and
sponsoring economic activities (see A/68/513, para. 15).
41. In 2013, the Government of Israel added nine new settlements, including three
former outposts, legalized in 2012, to the 91 settlements on the list of national
priority area level A, which receive the maximum benefits in all fields (ibid.,
paras. 24-26).
42. These policies amount to the transfer of Israeli citizens into the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law and
international criminal law (see A/HRC/22/63, para. 38).
43. Data indicate that there were 563,546 settlers in the West Bank in 201241
living in 250 Israeli settlements across the occupied West Bank territory, including
occupied East Jerusalem (ibid., para. 28).
44. During 2013, Israel started construction on 2,534 housing units in settlements
in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, comprising an increase of 123.7 per cent
over 2012.42
__________________
38 Input provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
39 Information provided by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR), citing Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilian
Weekly Report, 14-21 December 2013.
40 Information provided by UNRWA.
41 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release, 13 August 2013.
42 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, “Construction begun and construction completed in 2013”,
available from www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/tables_template_eng.html?hodaa=
201404052.
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Settler violence
45. Recent years have witnessed an increase in racist violence and acts of
vandalism on the part of Israeli settlers targeting Palestinians (see CERD/C/ISR/CO/
14-16, para. 28).
46. With few exceptions, Israeli settlers who are responsible for attacking
Palestinians and their property enjoy a high degree of impunity. 43 This occurs
despite the fact that settler attacks and intimidation regularly take place during
daylight hours; the identities of perpetrators are well known, or could easily b e
identified; there is usually video and photographic footage of the incident; and the
frequent presence of Israeli security forces at the scene during such incidents.
However, when acts of violence are committed by Palestinians against settlers, they
are swiftly and effectively addressed (see A/HRC/22/63, paras. 43 and 50).
47. Thus, another form of institutionalized discrimination is noted in addressing
the issue of violence. Between 90 and 95 per cent of cases of Palestinian violence
are investigated and go to court (ibid.), while 84 per cent of investigations into
settler attacks against Palestinians and their property (97.4 per cent of cases of
vandalism of trees) are closed without indictments.44
48. In 2013, 93 settler attacks were recorded that resulted in injuries to
146 Palestinians, in addition to 306 attacks that resulted in damage to Palestinian
private property. Another 201 Palestinians were injured by Israeli forces who
intervened during clashes between settlers and Palestinians.45 Among the casualties,
40 Palestinian boys and 9 girls were injured in settler attacks in the West Bank and
East Jerusalem. Most of these incidents took place when children were going to or
returning from school.46 In some cases, attacks are followed by settlers taking over
land in the area of the incident and starting to cultivate it. 47
49. During 2013, settlers uprooted 13,097 trees48 and burned over 280,000 m2 of
agricultural and grazing land.49
50. Since 2008, mosques and churches have been targeted in settler attacks,
including at least nine arson attacks against Palestinian mosques and 21 incidents in
which graffiti were used to desecrate mosques, churches and burial grounds with
provocative slogans of a racist or sacrilegious nature (see A/HRC/22/63, para. 60).
West Bank wall
51. In spite of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
legal consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, of 9 July 2004, Israel continued the construction of the wall in 2013.
Approximately 62.3 per cent of the wall has been completed and a further 9.1 per
__________________
43 Amnesty International, “Trigger-happy”, p. 60.
44 Yesh Din, “97.4 percent of investigative files relating to damage to Palestinians’ olive trees are
closed due to police failings”, available from www.yesh-din.org/infoitem.asp?infocatid=473,
accessed on 27 March 2014.
45 Information provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
46 Information provided by UNICEF.
47 Information provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
48 Input from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
49 Information provided by UNRWA.
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cent is under construction, with at least 85 per cent of the route intruding into th e
West Bank.50
52. Once the wall is complete, 80 per cent of the settler population in the West
Bank and East Jerusalem will live on the Israel side, in effect rendering it
“a de facto annexation wall”51 that seriously impairs the contiguity and, thus, the
viability, of a future Palestinian State.52 It would also isolate 680 km2 of Palestinian
land between the wall and the Green Line, comprising approximately 12 per cent of
the West Bank, including 454 km2 of agricultural land, pastures and open areas. The
wall also isolates 37 localities and deprives more than 50,000 Palestinian
Jerusalemites from the right to reside in Jerusalem. Moreover, the wall surrounds
173 localities with a population of more than 850,000 inhabitants. 53
53. The wall obliges farmers in approximately 150 communities who have land
isolated between the wall and the Green Line to use a “prior coordination”
mechanism or to obtain “visitor” permits from the Israeli authorities to access their
farmland and water resources, with access restricted to a designated gate.54
Closure policies and mobility restrictions
54. B’tselem attests that Israel’s policy pertaining to the mobility restrictions is
“based on the assumption that every Palestinian is a security threat ...”. This “racist
assumption” brings with it the violation of the human rights of an entire population
based on national origin.55 Such restrictions amount to gross violations of the
economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people (ibid., para. 76).
Blockade on the Gaza Strip
55. The Israeli-imposed blockade on persons and goods imposed on the Gaza Strip
since 200756 is considered by the International Committee of the Red Cross to be a
collective punishment, in clear violation of Israel’s obligations under international
humanitarian law (see CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, para. 25), and having a disproportionate
impact on vulnerable groups and the aid agencies trying to help them. 57
56. Categories of individuals permitted to enter or exit the Gaza Strip at the Erez
crossing with Israel were largely confined to humanitarian cases and a limited
number of businesspersons.58
57. The import of essential goods and materials for public use in Gaza remains
very limited. Despite announced Israeli measures towards easing the import of
construction material, only very limited volumes and types of materials are allowed
__________________
50 Information provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
51 Information provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
52 Information provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
53 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Special statistical bulletin”.
54 Information provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
55 B’tselem, “Checkpoints, physical obstructions, and forbidden roads”, available from
www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_roads, accessed on
10 March 2014.
56 The partial blockade had started in June 2006.
57 Information provided by UNRWA.
58 United States Department of State.
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into Gaza,59 which still falls significantly short of meeting the needs of the Gaza
population.60
58. In addition to the blockade, the failure of internal Palestinian negotiations on
fuel prices led to the shutdown of the only power station in Gaza, 61 and since then
the power supply has been restricted to eight hours a day. 62
59. International aid organizations, particularly UNRWA and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), continued to report challenges related to the
implementation of humanitarian projects in Gaza owing to significant delays and
costs associated with the Israeli project-approval process and the import of
materials.63
60. On 13 October 2013, Israeli authorities abruptly halted coordination and entry
of construction material. In December 2013, coordination was made conditional
upon additional measures for the control of construction material being
implemented by UNRWA, which caused extra administrative and construction
project costs.64
61. The fishing limit imposed by Israel remains at 6 nautical miles, though the
most profitable fishing areas start at 8 nautical miles from shore. Fishermen
continued to be subjected to shooting with live ammunition, detention, and
confiscation and damaging of fishing boats and equipment by Israeli forces even
while fishing in the permitted fishing zones.65
62. Citing militant activity, Israel also continues to impose “access restricted
areas” along the Gaza borders of up to 300 m from the border fence, most of which
are agricultural areas, which Palestinians are barred from entering. 66
Movement of persons and goods within the West Bank
63. Prolonged checks and searches at some of the checkpoints, humiliating
treatment by soldiers and long lines deter Palestinian drivers from using some of the
roads, while some of the main roads are used almost exclusively by settlers. 67
64. The fear of physical threats, ranging from settler violence to fe ar of
harassment and humiliation at checkpoints, compounds the exclusion of women and
girls, confining their movement and, in consequence, their access to basic services,
public spaces and economic and education opportunities.68
__________________
59 Information provided by OHCHR.
60 Ibid., citing Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilian Weekly
Report, 1-7 October 2013.
61 Information provided by OHCHR.
62 Information provided by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle
East Peace Process (UNSCO).
63 Information provided by UNRWA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
64 Information provided by UNRWA.
65 Information provided by OHCHR, citing information from the Union of Agricultural Work
Committees.
66 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report,
November 2013, p. 8.
67 B’tselem, “Checkpoints, physical obstructions, and forbidden roads”.
68 Ibid.
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65. By September 2013, 65.12 km of roads in the West Bank were classified by
Israel for the sole, or virtually sole, use of Israelis. In addition, Palestinian motor
traffic is prohibited on 6.72 km of internal roads in downtown Hebron, where some
sections are off-limits to Palestinian pedestrian traffic as well.69 The prohibition,
which began in 2000, resulted in the closure of 1,829 businesses and 1,014
Palestinian housing units, according to B’tselem.70
66. During 2013, UNRWA faced continued restrictions by Israeli authorities in
accessing refugee communities in the West Bank, with major implications for its
ability to meet the humanitarian needs of Palestine refugees. 71
Access to East Jerusalem
67. Restrictions on movement affected virtually all aspects of life, including access
by Palestinians to places of worship, employment, agricultural lands, schools and
hospitals, as well as the conduct of journalistic, humanitarian and non-governmental
organization activities.72
68. Patients referred for treatment to the East Jerusalem hospitals, as well as
parents accompanying ill children and hospital staff from Gaza and the West Bank,
must obtain a permit from the Israeli authorities in order to access their health care
or work. Twenty per cent of applicants are routinely denied, and permit holders are
restricted to travel by foot across designated checkpoints. Checkpoints that are
crowded and can be closed without warning also halt the direct entry of 90 per cent
of Palestinian Red Crescent ambulances from the West Bank into Jerusalem. 73
Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestinian natural resources
Water
69. The Western Aquifer Basin is among the most productive water basins in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory. Israel currently controls 100 per cent of the aquifer
and abstracts 94 per cent of its water, while Palestinians abstract only 6 per cent. 74
70. Discriminatory allocation of water resources persists. Approximately 1 million
Palestinians in the West Bank consume 60 litres of water per capita per day or less,
significantly below the WHO recommendation of 100 litres per day, while Israeli
settlers consume six times that amount. In addition, an estimated 313,000
Palestinians are not connected to a water network, which translates into enormous
costs related to water purchase.75 Settlements benefit from enough water to run
farms and orchards, and for swimming pools and spas, while Palestinians struggle to
satisfy their minimum water requirements (see A/HRC/22/63, para. 85).
71. The capacity of the Palestinian Water Authority to develop new water
resources is hampered by the water management arrangements governed by the Joint
__________________
69 Ibid.
70 United States Department of State.
71 Information provided by UNRWA.
72 United States Department of State.
73 Information provided by WHO.
74 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and Federal Institute for Geosciences and
Natural Resources (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffel), Inventory of Shared
Water Resources in Western Asia (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.13.II.L.4).
75 Information provided by UNICEF.
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Water Committee set up in the context of the Oslo Accords, where Israel has
predominance in terms of the allocation of West Bank water resources, of which it
withdraws 90 per cent. A large number of Palestinian projects are rejected by the
Committee. In Area C, additional approval is required from the Israeli civil
administration, even for such small-scale projects as wells and rainwater collection
cisterns (ibid., para. 81). As a result, wells and springs that are available to
Palestinians are generally degraded, while Israel simultaneously continues to drill
deeper and more efficient wells for its own use. In addition, when Palestinians do
have piped water, it is often siphoned off from water points for Israeli settlements,
albeit with lesser volume. The diversion points are usually placed within
settlements, making them vulnerable to settlers disconnecting or shutting down the
water flowing to the Palestinian villages.76 Furthermore, in the event of a water
shortage, valves supplying Palestinian communities are closed. This does not
happen for settlements (ibid., paras. 83 and 84).
72. As a result, over 300,000 people are at risk of acute water scarcity, receiving
supply through unreliable connections.77 Palestinian communities in Area C have
come to depend on purchasing water from Israeli private suppliers.
73. Between 2009 and 2012, 92 cisterns, 62 wells, 30 pools and 19 water tanks,
5 springs, 1 pipeline and 20 sanitation structures were demolished by Israel, and
27 water and sanitation structures were confiscated. Furthermore, of 56 water
springs in the West Bank in the vicinity of Israeli settlements, 30 have been taken
over completely by Israeli settlers, while the other 26 are at risk of takeover. 78
74. The denial of water is used to trigger displacement, particularly in areas slated
for settlement expansion, since these communities are comprised mostly of fa rmers
and herders who depend on water for their livelihoods (ibid., para. 88).
75. In East Jerusalem, residency permits compound the difficulty for Palestinian
Jerusalemites to connect legally to the water network because of a lack of building
permits, which are almost impossible to obtain.79
76. Gaza relies almost completely on the underlying coastal aquifer in which
salinity levels have risen well beyond guidelines set by WHO for safe drinking
water. Today, 90 per cent of the water from the aquifer is not safe for drinking
without prior treatment. Households in Gaza are spending up to one third of their
income on drinking water. In addition, bacteriological contamination has been
detected in the purchased water, putting 1,145,941 people at risk. 80
__________________
76 Information provided by UNICEF, citing Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Group and
Al-Haq, “Israel’s violations of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights with regard to the human rights to water and sanitation in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory”, September 2011.
77 Information provided by UNICEF, citing Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Group,
Advocacy Task Force Briefing.
78 Information provided by UNICEF, citing the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, 2012.
79 Information provided by UNICEF, citing Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Group,
Advocacy Task Force Briefing.
80 Information provided by UNICEF, citing August 2011 statistics.
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Waste management and sanitation
77. In Gaza, huge investment in treatment facilities and associated infrastructure is
urgently needed to cope with the existing demand. Operation of the systems is also
currently subjected to electricity fluctuations. Some 90 mill ion litres of raw or partly
treated sewage have to be released daily into the Mediterranean Sea, creating
pollution, health hazards and problems for the fishing industry. 81
78. In the West Bank, a restrictive permit regime has prevented the development of
wastewater networks. About 68 per cent of the West Bank population (1.6 million
people) are not connected to the wastewater network. In the rural area, there are
almost no sewer networks and the communities depend on haphazardly constructed
septic tanks or cesspits that leach into the groundwater.82
79. An additional risk to Palestinians is the 5.5 million cubic metres (m3) of
wastewater generated every year by settlements and released into the West Bank. 83
80. In 2013, Israeli security forces closed the disposal site of Al Bireh
municipality, creating a huge environmental problem in the governorate. The Israeli
authorities informed the relevant parties that the Al Minya sanitary landfill, a project
funded by the World Bank and other donors, could not be opened unless it also
received waste from the Israeli settlements in the vicinity. 84
Access to land
81. In the West Bank, Palestinian farmers whose agricultural lands are located
inside or near settlements face regular restrictions on access and settler attac ks
against them and their properties. Access by Palestinians to such land is subject to
“prior coordination” with the Israeli authorities, even in cases where the land was
fenced off by settlers without authorization from the Israeli authorities (A/68/513,
para. 49).
82. Overall, the restricted land area was estimated to encompass 17 per cent of the
total land mass of the Gaza Strip and 35 per cent of its agricultural land (see
A/68/77-E/2013/13, para. 56).
Economic and social conditions
83. In a context of continued deterioration of socioeconomic conditions, the gap
between increasing humanitarian needs and available funding has grown sharply
during the reporting period, particularly regarding UNRWA and the Gaza Strip.85
The economy
84. The economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, directly and indirectly
afflicted by the Israeli occupation, continued its negative trend during 2013.
__________________
81 Information provided by UNICEF, citing the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, 2012.
82 Information provided by UNICEF.
83 Information provided by UNICEF, citing B’tselem, 2009.
84 Information provided by UNEP.
85 Information provided by UNRWA.
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85. The real gross domestic product (GDP) of the West Bank and Gaza increased
by only 1.5 per cent in 2013, according to estimates by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).86 This continues the marked slowdown from growth rates of 12.2 per
cent in 2011 and 5.9 per cent in 2012.87
86. The destruction of the productive base in the West Bank and Gaza as a result
of recurrent Israeli military actions, restriction of movement of Palestinian workers,
limitations on transport and telecommunication infrastructure, loss of sovereignty
over domestic natural resources, severe constraints on international trade and use of
the relatively strong Israeli currency, among other factors, have weakened the
Palestinian economy. As a result, the productivity of the economy has fallen sharply,
leading to a loss of competitiveness of the exporting sector. Indeed, by 2012 the
exports of goods and services accounted for only 16 per cent of GDP. 88
87. A direct consequence of the slowing economic growth is the high
unemployment rate in the West Bank and Gaza, which stood at 25.2 per cent of the
labour force in the fourth quarter of 2013, significantly above the rate of 22.9 per
cent observed during the same period of 2012.89,90
88. Unemployment particularly affected specific groups of the Palestinian
population: those living in Gaza (38.5 per cent, compared to 18.2 per cent in the
West Bank), women (33.5 per cent), the refugee population (32.3 per cent) and
youth (39.0 per cent for the population aged 15-29).91
89. Prolonged episodes of high unemployment and unstable working conditions
will inevitably exact a high socioeconomic toll into the foreseeable future because
of the resulting large-scale deskilling of workers, discouraging investment and
rendering some of the workers not just unemployed, but unemployable. 92
90. The latest poverty statistics indicate that 26 per cent of Palestinians lived
below the poverty line in 2011 (18 per cent in the West Bank and 30 per cent in
Gaza). The poverty rate in Gaza is much higher and the poverty gap is deeper and
more severe there. This is a direct consequence of the occupation policies, which
__________________
86 IMF, “Statement at the conclusion of an IMF mi ssion to the West Bank and Gaza”, press release
No. 14/44, 6 February 2014, available from www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr1444.htm,
accessed 8 April 2014.
87 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Gross domestic product by expenditure for the yea rs
1994-2011 at constant prices, available from www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/
EXPconstant%2094-11E.htm; and Value added by economic activity and region during the year
2012 at constant prices, available from www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/GDP-
%20ValueAdded2012E.htm.
88 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Gross domestic product by expenditure and region for
the quarters of the years 2011-2013 at constant prices, available from www.pcbs.gov.ps/
Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/GDP-EXPCon2011-2012E.htm.
89 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey (October-December 2013) Round
(Q4/2013), press report on the Labour Force Survey Results, available from
www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_LFSQ42013E.pdf .
90 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey (October-December 2012) Round
(Q4/2012), press report on the Labour Force Survey Results, available from
www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_LFSQ42012E.pdf.
91 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey (October-December 2013) Round
(Q4/2013), press report on the Labour Force Survey Results, available from
www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_LFSQ42013E.pdf.
92 Ibid.
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have been particularly damaging in Gaza as a result of the blockade. In fact, GDP
per capita in Gaza fell from 76 per cent of the West Bank GDP per capita in 2004 to
only 51 per cent in 2012.93 The fiscal crisis of the government of Palestine is
exacerbated by Israel’s control over the tax and customs clearance revenue
(60-70 per cent of total public revenue), which it collects on behalf of the
government of Palestine in accordance with the Protocol on Economic Relations
between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (Paris
Protocol). Israel has repeatedly withheld this revenue, thereby creating severe
difficulties with fiscal planning and leading to instability and reduced economic
growth.94
91. The Israeli restriction on the economic activity in Area C is one of the
occupation policies that most severely limit the development potential of the
economy, given its territorial extension and the richness of the natural reso urces.
92. According to the World Bank, potential value added from easing current
restrictions on access to, and activity and production in, Area C would likely have
amounted to 35 per cent of Palestinian GDP in 2011. Such potential, if realized,
would significantly reduce the budget deficit and would also be expected to lead to a
large decrease in poverty, as a result of a 35 per cent increase in employment. 95
Food security
93. The improvement of food security in the Occupied Palestinian Territory from
2009 to 2011 was reversed in 2012. Food insecurity levels rose dramatically, to
reach 1,570,000 Palestinians (34 per cent of the population). 96 Overall, the
deterioration in household food security reflects the worsening of socioeconomic
conditions in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,97 with an anticipated
significant increase in food insecurity levels in 2014.98
94. In the West Bank, the “marginally secure” and “vulnerable” groups expanded,
thus limiting the increase of the “food insecure” group. By 2012 , an estimated
19 per cent of households were assessed as food insecure in the West Bank,
indicating a lower resilience status of households.99
95. In the Gaza Strip, the combination of soaring unemployment, falling
purchasing power and recurrent shocks has pushed the majority of the population
into food insecurity. An estimated 57 per cent of households are food insecure, with
food insecurity growing faster among refugees and in refugee camps. 100
__________________
93 Ibid.
94 Information provided by UNCTAD, 2013.
95 World Bank, “West Bank and Gaza”.
96 Information provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
97 Ibid.
98 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Repor t,
February 2014, p. 3.
99 Information provided by FAO.
100 Information provided by UNRWA, citing Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, FAO, World
Food Programme and UNRWA, “Socio-economic & food security survey: West Bank and Gaza
Strip, Palestine” (2012).
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96. Food insecurity, affecting 23 per cent of the population, is also particularly
high in refugee camps in the West Bank, compared with a food insecurity level of
18 per cent of non-refugee households in 2012.101
97. A fully fledged food insecurity crisis has been prevented only by the large -
scale humanitarian assistance provided. Since 2000, UNRWA has spent more than
$900 million in food and cash assistance benefiting the poorest refugees in Gaza,
where more than 800,000 refugees now depend on the Agency’s food assistance
programme.102
Health
98. The poor quality and insufficient quantity of available water and inadequate
wastewater treatment pose a major public health problem, particularly for children
in the Gaza Strip.103
99. The public health system in Gaza remains fragile, dependent on donor aid and
vulnerable to the closure of borders, restrictions on the movement of people and
goods and Israeli military operations. These conditions are exacerbated by power
cuts of up to 16 hours a day owing to a shortage of fuel entering Gaza. 104
100. Almost 15,000 patients had to leave Gaza in 2013 in order to access lifesaving
medical care in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Israel and Egypt. The volume
of permit applications through the Erez crossing increased by 48 per cent in 2013
compared with 2012, reflecting more demand owing to drug shortages and reduced
access via Rafah to Egypt. Twelve per cent of applicants were either denied permits
or did not receive timely replies and missed their hospital appointments. Physical
and bureaucratic delays in accessing treatment and the di fficulty of passage present
health risks, while the serious shortage of drugs and supplies in Gaza has made
referrals to medical treatment outside the Strip even more necessary. 105
101. Gaza health authorities estimate that by 2020 there will be a need for
800 additional doctors, 700 nurses and 900 administrative staff for optimal functioning
of the Gaza public health network.106 However, permits for travel to the West Bank
and East Jerusalem for training have been restricted for many Gaza health staff. 107
102. In the West Bank, Palestinian patients and their companions also need special
Israeli-issued permits to access outside hospitals. In 2013 about 20 per cent of those
requesting permits were denied or delayed in accessing referral health facilities in
East Jerusalem and Israel.108
__________________
101 Information provided by UNRWA.
102 Ibid.
103 Information provided by OHCHR, citing Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Protection of Civilian Weekly Report, 14-21 December 2013.
104 Information provided by the Office for the Coordinat ion of Humanitarian Affairs.
105 Information provided by WHO.
106 See www.unsco.org/Documents/Special/Gaza%20in%202020%20a%20liveable%20
place%20English.pdf.
107 Information provided by WHO.
108 Ibid.
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103. Restrictions prohibiting East Jerusalem health-care institutions from procuring
pharmaceuticals from suppliers in the West Bank have increased costs for hospitals
in East Jerusalem.109
104. While Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are entitled to the health services
provided by the Israeli authorities, by virtue of their monthly payments to the Israeli
National Health Insurance, there are inequalities in the number of facilities available
to Palestinians compared with Israeli residents of Jerusalem, especially with regard
to specialized services such as prenatal and paediatric clinics. 110
Education
105. Gaza had a high literacy rate of 96 per cent in 2011.111 Some 463,567
children, half of them girls, were attending school during the 2012/13 school year.
Notwithstanding high attendance rates, sustaining the quality of education
constitutes a significant challenge, owing partly to a shortage of schools — 67 per
cent of government schools and 85 per cent of UNRWA schools run double
shifts112 — and as education staff cannot receive training abroad.113
106. The blockade has led to the stalling of investments in educational
infrastructure in Gaza, resulting in the inability to build new schools. It is estimated
that 250 new schools were needed in 2012, and an additional 190 schools would be
needed by 2020, in order to accommodate the increase in the student population. 114
107. In the West Bank, particularly Area C, the seam zone, East Jerusalem and other
vulnerable areas such as Hebron, students and teachers are vulnerable to
harassment, threats and violence on their way to and returning from school, and at
times while at school, by Israeli settlers and Israeli security forces. A 2012
assessment of 116 communities in the West Bank showed that 33 per cent of
children had to travel more than 5 km to school.115
108. In 2013, 36 boys and 9 girls were injured, mostly in Palestinian communities
near Israeli settlements and when the children were going to or returning from
school.116
109. During the same period, there were four instances of settlers attacking schools.
Another 164 incidents, attacks or threats of attacks by settlers on schoolchildren
were documented, resulting in disruption of classes or delays in going to school.
This included instances of physical assault on schoolchildren by settlers, evacuation
__________________
109 Ibid.
110 Information provided by UNICEF.
111 Information provided by UNICEF, citing the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
112 Information provided by UNICEF, citing the Ministry of Education and Higher Education,
2012/13.
113 Information provided by OHCHR, citing Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Protection of Civilian Weekly Report, 14-21 December 2013.
114 Information provided by UNICEF, citing United Nations, Gaza and 2020: A liveable place?,
August 2012.
115 Information provided by UNICEF, citing Protection Cluster and Education Cluster, “Protection
issues affecting access to education in the West Bank”, March 2012.
116 Information provided by UNICEF.
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of schools owing to the threat of settler attacks and sewage from Israeli settlements
flooding into school grounds.117
110. An estimated 10,000 Palestinian students in the West Bank attend classes in
tents, caravans or tin shacks, with minimal protection from the heat or cold. Area C
schools have poor sanitation. Inadequate water and sanitation facilities can
contribute to school dropout rates.118 The Palestinian government has been unable
to obtain permits to build necessary classrooms or upgrade severely dilapidated
buildings. In addition, there are 25 active demolition orders and 20 stop-work and
one sealing orders for education facilities,119 including two schools and one
kindergarten.120
111. It is also estimated that, among other obstacles to movement into East
Jerusalem, over 5,000 students face daily delays at checkpoint crossings because of
permit checks on their way to school or ad hoc “flying” checkpoints being
established. Children face harassment, threats and, in some cases, violence at these
checkpoints. The resulting fear of harm and humiliation creates stress and fear
among children and their families.121
112. It is estimated that there is a shortage in East Jerusalem of 2,200 classrooms .122
As many as 90,000 school-age children in East Jerusalem do not have access to free
public education. An estimated 4,329-5,300 children are not enrolled in any
education institution in East Jerusalem, and the estimated secondary dropout rate is
as high as 50 per cent in municipality schools.123
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
113. Israel continues to occupy the Syrian Golan, after it illegally announced its
annexation in 1981. It is estimated that approximately 20,000 Israeli settlers live in
33 settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan. Israel continues to encourage the
growth of the settler population in the Golan through socioeconomic incentives, in
violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel also controls scarce water
resources in the Golan and distributes a disproportionate share to Israeli settlements
while a private Israeli company supplies water directly to Israeli settlers at
preferential rates (see A/68/513, para. 53).
114. Syrian residents of the occupied Syrian Golan continue to suffer from
discrimination in terms of access to land, housing and basic services, while the
Citizenship Law continues to negatively impact on family ties (see
CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 29). Furthermore, Israel also violates its human rights
obligations, including the right of Syrian citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan to
__________________
117 Ibid.
118 Information provided by UNICEF, citing UNICEF, “Bedouin schools fighting for survival in
Area ‘C’”, September 2011.
119 Education Cluster, Vulnerable School Matrix, 25 April 2013.
120 Information provided by UNICEF.
121 Information provided by UNICEF, citing Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Failed Grade:
The Education System in East Jerusalem 2010, August 2010.
122 Information provided by OHCHR, citing Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Protection of Civilian Weekly Report, 14-21 December 2013.
123 Information provided by UNICEF.
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freedom of movement and the right to an adequate standard of living (see A/68/379,
para. 61).
115. Agriculture was the main source of income prior to the 1967 occupation, and
is still the most important single source. However, it currently cannot sustain the
population owing to discrimination in access to water as well as land, rendering
farming uncompetitive and revenues from agricultural work insufficient.
Employment has to be sought elsewhere, noting that prospects for the Syrian
citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan remain constrained. 124
116. Syrian farmers have access to only 200 m3 of water per dunam of land, a mere
30 per cent of the water allocated to Israeli settlements. Hence, Syrian farmers have
to pay considerably more than settlers for water owing to a discriminatory pricing
system. Furthermore, the settlements have privileged access to markets as they can
benefit from a range of distribution and retail networks. 125
117. Israel also continues to exploit natural resources in the occupied Syrian Golan
for its own benefit. In February 2013, the Israeli Ministry of Energy and Water
exclusive petroleum exploration licence in the occupied Syrian Golan (see
A/68/513, para. 54).
118. There have been reports that dispute Israeli claims that it lacked the resources
to remove all landmines around the occupied Syrian Golan, including in agricultural
land and in areas in close proximity to schools. Arab villagers in the Golan were
being exposed as human shields to clear the landmines. It has also been reported
that negligence by the Israeli forces in maintaining and repairing barbed wire around
mined areas continued to claim the lives of children and villagers (A/68/379, para. 63).
119. Although there have been incidents over the ceasefire line in relation to the
conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, they have not had longer -term consequences
for the area so far. However, the ongoing conflict in Syria can have a further
negative impact on the situation of workers and their families. 126
IV. Conclusion
120. The Israeli occupation has entailed institutionalized discriminatory measures,
including laws, policies and military orders. A number of Israeli practices, including
the settlement activities, which are illegal under international law, cont inue to
constitute an obstacle to peace and a violation of the rights of the Palestinians and
Syrians living under occupation.
121. The goal remains comprehensive peace and the resolution of all pertinent issues.
This can only be achieved by ending the occupation, attaining the rights of the
Palestinian and Syrian populations living under occupation, the implementation of
relevant United Nations resolutions and adherence to international law and norms.
__________________
124 International Labour Office, The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Terri tories,
ILC.102/DG/APP (Geneva, 2013), para. 130.
125 Ibid., para. 131.
126 Ibid., para. 128.
United Nations A/70/82*–E/2015/13*
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
8 May 2015
Original: English
15-07348* (E) 180915
*1507348*
General Assembly
Seventieth session
Item 65 of the preliminary list**
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
2015 session
21 July 2014-22 July 2015
Agenda item 16
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
Summary
In its resolution 2014/26, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 69/241, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a
report to it at its seventieth session. The present report, which was prepared by the
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in compliance with
the resolutions of the Council and the Assembly.
* Reissued for technical reasons on 18 September 2015.
** A/70/50.
A/70/82
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Israel continues employing practices and policies in violation of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law. In 2014 the Palestinian civilian
death toll was the highest recorded since 1967, and the level of destruction was
unprecedented, owing in particular to the Gaza conflict in July and August 2014.
Israeli discriminatory policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and
the occupied Syrian Golan include excessive use of force, settlement expansion,
property destruction and exploitation of natural resources. Impunity is afforded to
Israeli security and military personnel and settlers. The cumulative impact of these
policies and practices not only violates the rights of the population, but also
exacerbates their social and economic conditions.
The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia wishes to acknowledge
its appreciation for the substantive contributions of the United Nations Conferenc e
on Trade and Development, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary -
General for Children and Armed Conflict, the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, the International Labour Organization, the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the
World Food Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United
Nations Human Settlements Programme, the United Nations Entity for Gender
Equality and the Empowerment of Women, the United Nations Population Fund, the
Department for Political Affairs and the League of Arab States.
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I. Introduction
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2014/26, and the General
Assembly, in its resolution 69/241, expressed concerns over the practices of Israel,
the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian
Golan that were in violation of international humanitarian law. These practices have
included causing the deaths and injuries of civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, all of whom must be protected in accordance with
international humanitarian law. They have also included increasing acts of violence
by illegal armed Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians and their properties, as
well as the continued detention of thousands of Palestinians, including children and
women, under harsh conditions. The Council and the Assembly also expressed their
concern about the accelerated construction by Israel of settlements, the construction
of the wall inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the exploitation of Palestinian
natural resources, the increased demolition of homes, economic institutions,
agricultural lands and infrastructure, the revocation of residency rights of
Palestinians in and around occupied East Jerusalem, Israeli military operations and
policies of closures and severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods,
including what in effect amounts to a blockade of the Gaza Strip. The Council and
the Assembly requested that the Secretary-General submit a report on the
implementation of Economic and Social Council resolution 2014/26 and General
Assembly resolution 69/241 examining the aforementioned practices of Israel and
their socioeconomic impact.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory
2. In spite of the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on
the Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (see
A/ES-10/273 and Corr. 1), among other assertions, Israel continues to deny the
established fact that international human rights law and international humanitarian
law are applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (see A/69/347).
3. A number of Israeli policies and practices continue to undermine the right of
the Palestinian people to self-determination. These include the transfer of Israeli
citizens into occupied territory; the revocation of residency rights of Palestinians in
East Jerusalem; Israel’s blockade of Gaza; the closure regime in the West Bank,
including the continued construction of the wall; restricted access in Gaza;
demolition and/or confiscation of Palestinian structures, including residential, and
the eviction of their inhabitants; control of the population registry; and the use of
Palestinian natural resources (see A/69/347, para. 15).
4. Violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights
law have been further entrenched through Israeli policies and practices (see
A/69/347, para. 8).1 In this context, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination had censured Israel under the rubric of apartheid and segregation
(see CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 24).
5. On 7 July 2014, Israel launched a 51-day military offensive against the Gaza
Strip, causing unprecedented loss of life and destruction. Concerns over the
__________________
1 See also CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, para. 7 and CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3, para. 16.
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possibility that international crimes were committed during the offensive prompted
the establishment and dispatch of an independent, international commission of
inquiry into relevant violations (see Human Right Council resolution S-21/1,
para. 13).
Segregation and discrimination
6. Since the onset of the occupation in 1967, Israel has gradually created two
different regimes in the West Bank that discriminate against residents according to
their religion. A regime for Jewish residents, who are usually Israeli citizens and
whose presence in settlements in occupied territory in itself contravenes
international law,2 ensures that they enjoy all the rights granted to Israeli citizens.
Another regime has been created for Palestinians, under which the occupied people
live under harsh military rule that primarily serves the interests of Israel and the
settlers.3
7. Jewish Israeli citizens, Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinian residents
of East Jerusalem are treated differently in terms of civil status, rights and legal
protection, in the Israeli domestic legal framework that maintains a three -tiered
system (see CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 7). A fourth tier governs Palestinians living in
the rest of the West Bank who are subject to the Israeli military legal system.4
Legal system
8. The application of the two legal systems in the West Bank — the Israeli
domestic legal system for Israeli settlers and the military system for Palestinians —
has been enshrined in rulings of the Israeli High Court of Justice, where Israeli
courts regard settlements in the occupied territory as Israeli enclaves.5 Thus, in
criminal cases, the national identity of a person in the West Bank determines which
law will apply to that person in every stage of the legal proceedings, including the
trial, the sentencing and the conditions of imprisonment. In all the stages,
Palestinians adults and minors are discriminated against when compared to Israelis.5
9. Furthermore, while an Israeli “minor” under Israeli criminal law is a person
who has not yet turned 18, the age of majority for Palestinians is still 16 for the
purpose of arrest, detention and interrogation. While Israeli law prohibits the
imprisonment of persons who are not yet 14 years old, Israeli military legislation
allows for the issuance of prison sentences of up to six months to Palestinian
children who are over the age of 12 but not yet 14, and up to one year to children
over the age of 14 but not yet 16.5
__________________
2 See Association for Civil Rights in Israel, (ACRI), One Rule, Two Legal Systems: Israel’s
Regime of Laws in the West Bank, October 2014.
3 See B’tselem, 47 Years of Temporary Occupation. Available at www.btselem.org/publications/
47_year_long_temporary_occupation.
4 ACRI, The Status of the Right to Demonstrate in the Occupied Territories.
5 ACRI, One Rule, Two Legal Systems: Israel ’s Regime of Laws in the West Bank, October 2014,
citing High Court of Justice 10104/04, Peace Now S.A.L. Educational Enterprises v. Supervisor
of the Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria, 61(2) 93 (2006), p. 14 of the judgement.
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Freedom of movement
10. Israeli authorities impose movement restrictions on Palestinians in the
occupied West Bank, while there are almost no restrictions on the movement of
Israelis therein, except in Area A, which constitutes 18 per cent of the West Bank.5
11. The free and safe movement of settlers is secured at the expense of
Palestinians (see A/HRC/22/63, para. 75). By February 2014, Israel had designated
65 kilometres of West Bank roads for the exclusive, or almost exclusive, use of
Israelis.2
12. In 1997, the commander of the Israeli army in the West Bank published an
order declaring all municipal areas of settlements as military zones closed to
Palestinians. The order, which was expanded in 2002 to include additional areas,
stipulated that it does not apply to Israelis.2
Residency
13. Between 1967 and 1993, Israeli authorities de facto exiled more than quarter
of a million Palestinians from the Occupied Palestinian Territory by means of
revocation of their residency permits (see A/69/81-E/2014/13, para. 16). In East
Jerusalem, 14,416 Palestinians have had their residency permits revoked until the
end of 2014.6
14. Since 2007, Israel has treated Palestinians originating from Gaza and living in
the West Bank as “illegal stayers”, unless they hold a permit issued by the military.
In April 2010 the Israeli army issued an order that deemed any person found in the
West Bank without an Israeli permit to be an infiltrator who would face
imprisonment, even if the person permanently resided in the West Bank. That
automatically turned tens of thousands of Palestinians living in the West Bank,
including students, into offenders. The Israeli army spokespersons clarified that the
order would not be used against Israelis. To the contrary, an I sraeli who chooses to
move into the Occupied Palestinian Territory receives economic and other
incentives.2
15. In occupied East Jerusalem, Palestinian residents are treated as “aliens”,
thereby exacerbating the insecurity of their permanent residency status (see
CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 18). Israeli laws and the Government’s “demographic
balance” policy7 governing residency of Palestinians do not allow family
reunification permits in cases of marriages involving Palestinians outside East
Jerusalem. Such policies force Palestinians to reside outside East Jerusalem with
their spouses in order to maintain family life, resulting in the revocation of their
East Jerusalem residencies (see A/69/81-E/2014/13, paras. 11-17).
Zoning, planning and construction
16. Area C, where Israel retains nearly exclusive control, including over law
enforcement, planning and construction, encompasses 62 per cent of the West Bank.
__________________
6 Hamoked, http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Updates1285, and
http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Documents2654 accessed on 6 May 2015.
7 The Jerusalem municipality of Israel has openly pursued a policy known as “demographic
balance”, which calls for a 60/40 demographic balance in favour of Jewish residents, see
A/69/81-E/2014/13.
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The Israeli Government has designated 39 per cent of Area C for settlements and
their future expansion, 20 per cent for closed Israeli military areas (including “firing
zones”) and 13 per cent for natural reserves.8
17. The discriminatory zoning and planning regime regulating the construction of
housing and structures by Palestinians in Area C of the West Bank and the East
Jerusalem periphery makes it almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain building
permits, while facilitating the growth of Israeli settlements in those areas (see
CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 9).
18. The combined area in which Palestinians can undertake construction is
approximately 0.5 per cent of Area C (see A/69/81-E/2014/13, para. 8), compared to
26 per cent for Israeli settlements.2 As such, more than 94 per cent of the Palestinian
construction permit applications in Area C between 2000 and 2012 were reject ed by
the Israeli authorities.9
19. Similarly in East Jerusalem, the Israeli construction permit system and plans
authorization process makes it very difficult for Palestinians to undertake formal
and legal construction.10 By August 2014, Israel had demolished at least
2,000 Palestinians homes in East Jerusalem. Today, at least an additional 33 per cent
of Palestinian homes lack Israeli-issued building permits, leaving at least
93,100 residents at risk of eviction, home demolition and displacement.11
20. The widespread practice of building without Israeli permits in East Jerusalem
is largely attributed to the extremely limited opportunities for authorized
construction. Over 35 per cent of the land in the Israeli -defined municipal area of
East Jerusalem has been confiscated since 1967 for settlement use. Much of 13 per
cent of the total East Jerusalem area available for Palestinian construction is already
built up.11
21. The Palestinian population of East Jerusalem also suffers from neglect in terms
of municipal services and availability of public buildings and facilities, industrial
and commercial zones, and social and cultural institutions. There has also been
increasing evidence of problematic and even criminal action by police officers from
various units when dealing with Palestinians in East Jerusalem.12
Excessive use of force, arbitrary detention and population displacement
22. The Palestinian death toll during the reporting period was unprecedented since
the onset of the occupation. A total of 2,306 Palestinians were killed and 17,186
were injured between 31 March 2014 and 28 February 2015.13
23. Citing rocket attacks launched in June 2014 into Israel from Gaza, in July
Israel launched its deadliest offensive against the Gaza Strip since its occupation in
1967. During the 51-day offensive the Israeli military carried out 4,028 air raids,
__________________
8 Information received from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).
9 B’tselem, Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C, June 2013, p. 19.
10 Information received from the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat).
11 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian
Concerns Update, August 2014.
12 ACRI, The State of Human Rights in Israel and the OPT 2014, December 2014.
13 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report,
February 2015.
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firing 5,830 missiles, 16,507 artillery and tank projectiles and 3,494 naval shells
(see A/HRC/28/80/Add.1, para. 24) into one of the most densely populated areas in
the world. As a result, 2,220 Palestinians were killed, of whom at least 1,492 were
civilians, including 551 children.14
24. During the offensive, Palestinian militant groups also launched approximately
4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars towards Israel. During the offensive a total of
6 Israeli civilians and 66 soldiers were killed (see A/HRC/28/80/Add.1, para. 25).
25. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, 11,231 Palestinians were also
injured (see A/HRC/28/80/Add.1, para. 24). Around 10 per cent of them may
acquire long-term or permanent disability, almost a third of them children.15
26. On seven separate occasions during the offensive, Israeli ordnance struck
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) schools designated as emergency shelters, whose exact positions had
been reported to the Israeli army by the Agency. United Nations premise s are
inviolable under the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations. Among those killed were 11 UNRWA personnel, while others were
seriously wounded.16
27. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch and other international and Israeli
non-governmental organizations report to have documented cases of Israeli troops
using Palestinian civilians as human shields.17 Israeli forces also reportedly fired at
ambulances, preventing them from reaching the wounded, and shot and killed
fleeing civilians.18
28. According to the United Nations Mine Action Service, an estimated
7,000 explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards remain in Gaza,
placing the lives of Palestinians in Gaza at risk.19
29. The West Bank also witnessed a rise in the number of Palestinian casualties,
particularly during the period between May and August 2014. The fatal shooting of
two Palestinians boys20 in May preceded the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli
youths in June and the kidnapping and the burning of a Palestinian child in July.
Following the disappearance of the three Israeli teenage settlers, the Israeli army
launched a military operation in the West Bank that resulted in the death of 32
Palestinians, including 5 children, and the injury of more than 3,137 others,
including 560 children, between 1 June and 31 August 2014 alone.13
30. Another issue of concern is Israel’s continued failure to meet its obligations
under international law to promptly, thoroughly, effectively, independently,
__________________
14 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Fragmented lives: Humanitarian Overview
2014, March 2015.
15 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015 Strategic Response Plan OPT.
16 Information received from UNRWA.
17 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015; Defence of Children International, http://www.dci -
palestine.org/documents/israeli-forces-use-palestinian-child-human-shield-gaza; Physicians for
Human Rights-Israel, Gaza 2014: Findings of an Independent Medical Fact-Finding Mission.
18 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015.
19 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report,
September 2014.
20 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of civilians weekly report,
13-19 May 2014.
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impartially and transparently investigate incidents of killings and serious injury by
its security and armed forces.21
Detention, torture and ill-treatment
31. Israeli forces conducted 4,956 search and arrest operations in 2014, marking a
31 per cent increase (weekly average) compared with 2013.13
32. By the end of February 2015, 6,670 Palestinians, including 182 children, were
detained in Israeli prisons.22
33. Israeli authorities’ practice of administrative detention of Palestinians
continues. Concerns over this practice stem from detention orders being based on
secret evidence and the denial of access to counsel, independent doctors and family
contacts (see CCPR/C/ISR/COH/4, para. 10). As at the end of March 2015,
412 Palestinians were held as administrative detainees, compared to 186 held in
January 2014.22
34. The use of torture and other ill treatment in Israeli detention facilities
continues to be reported, including widespread, systematic and institutionalized ill
treatment of Palestinian children (see CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 15).
35. Palestinian children in the West Bank continued to be detained and prosecuted
through the military court system, mostly in relation to allegations of stone
throwing. On average, throughout 2014, almost 185 Palestinian children were held
in Israeli prisons.13
36. In relation to the cases of military detention, from January to September 2014,
the United Nations gathered 74 sworn testimonies of children between the ages of
13 and 17 who reported ill treatment by the Israeli military and security forces while
in detention in the West Bank; 54 of the testimonies included reports of having been
subjected to at least 10 different types of violations of their rights.23
37. Since 2001 more than 800 complaints of torture during interrogations by
Israeli security services have been filed. No criminal investigations have been
initiated as a result of the complaints.24 Along the same lines, at least
133 complaints were filed by the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel,
between 2007 and 2013, regarding soldier violence against detainees in the
Palestinian occupied territory; 73 per cent of the complaint files were closed and
only 2 complaints resulted in an indictment against a soldier, on assault charges.24
Population displacement, property destruction and confiscation25
38. During the Gaza conflict in 2014, some 19,000 housing units were severely
damaged or totally destroyed. Another 98,421 units sustained partial or minor
__________________
21 See A/HRC/28/45, para. 31; A/69/347, paras. 52-69; CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 13.
22 B’tselem, http://www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners, accessed on 6 May 2015.
23 Information received from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict.
24 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, Prosecutorial Indifference: Systematic Failures
in the Investigation of Soldier Violence against Detainees in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
June 2014.
25 Information on destruction of and damage to businesses and agricultural property during the
2014 summer offensive.
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damage.14 As such, approximately 44 per cent of all housing units in Gaza were
affected. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Public Works and Housing
estimates, prior to the offensive, the Gaza Strip lacked 122,669 housing units to
meet the needs of the population.26
39. Also during the offensive, over 290,000 out of 500,000 internally displaced
Palestinians were sheltered in 90 UNRWA school buildings.16 In the aftermath,
approximately 100,000 Palestinians were rendered homeless and were either renting
or still in collective centres or with host families.14
40. In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, Palestinians continue to suffer
from forced displacement, mainly as a result of destruction of property, forced
evictions, settler violence and movement and access restrictions. In East Jerusalem,
these factors are coupled with lack of civil documentation and revocation of
residency rights, as mentioned above.14
41. During 2014, Israeli authorities demolished 601 structures, including homes,
in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, displacing 1,215 Palestinians, the
highest scale of such displacement since 2009.13 It included the complete
displacement of four Palestinian communities (see A/69/347, para. 26).
42. Israeli authorities resumed punitive home demolitions in 2014 in the West
Bank. Four houses were entirely destroyed in this context and another was sealed.14
Punitive house demolitions constitute collective punishment, and thus violate
international law and Israeli law.27
43. Israeli authorities have recently increased pressure on 7,000 Bedouins and
herders in 46 communities in Area C to leave their places of residence by issuing
and enforcing more demolition orders and stop-work and seizure orders against
residential and agricultural structures (see A/69/348, para. 13). The overwhelming
majority of Bedouins targeted for transfer are Palestine refugees. 16 Furthermore, it is
reported that the Israeli military is using military firing zones as a way to push
Palestinians out of certain areas (see A/69/348, para. 15).
44. By 2013, Israel had officially confiscated more than 1,000 km2 of Palestinianowned
land comprising 20 per cent of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem),
(see A/HRC/22/63, paras. 63-64), mostly for the use of settlements. During 2014,
Israeli authorities confiscated an additional 7.3 km2 of Palestinian privately owned
lands, including 4 km2 that were confiscated in a single confiscation order, the
biggest such order since 1967.28
Settlements and settler violence
45. Israeli settlements continue to be at the centre of multiple violations of the
human rights of Palestinians, their right to development and their right to self -
determination. The settlement enterprise, including Israel ’s continued transfer of its
population into the Occupied Palestinian Territory, also violates international
__________________
26 Ministry of Public Works and Housing, http://www.mpwh.ps/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=223%3A2013-09-24-08-29-25&catid=35&lang=en, accessed on
25 March 2015.
27 See Hamoked, Punitive House Demolitions, http://www.hamoked.org/timeline.aspx?pageID=
timelinehousedemolitions.
28 Information received from the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment
of Women (UN-Women).
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humanitarian law (see A/69/348, para. 11), and may have already “killed” the
prospects for the two-State solution.29
46. Yet, successive Israeli Government administrations pursued the expansion of
those illegal settlements, “even as that very exercise fuels tension and conflict in the
city and across the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (see A/HRC/28/45, para. 47). By
March 2015, there were approximately 250 Israeli settlements and an estimated
580,000 settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.30 Since May 2011, 25 of the
100 settlements that had not been officially authorized by the Israeli Government
have been either “retroactively approved, or in the process following government -
level instructions to advance their retroactive approval ”.31
47. In at least the past decade 2014 was a record year regarding the publication of
tenders for construction in Israeli settlements. In addition, on 30 January 2015,
tenders for another 450 units in the West Bank were issued; 2014 also saw a 40 per
cent increase in construction starts compared to 2013.32
48. In September and October 2014, the Israeli Government announced plans to
construct some 1,000 settlement units in occupied East Jerusalem. This
announcement came directly after the Israeli decision at the end of September to
accelerate the process of constructing another 2,600 residential units also in
settlements in East Jerusalem.33
Settler violence
49. Violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinians and their property in the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem, continued with impunity, despite the fact that
measures have been implemented by Israeli authorities to curb settler violence.
UNRWA recorded 719 incidents of Israeli settler violence, harassment or other
transgressions in the West Bank in 2014; 203 of the incidents occurred in and
around the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in East Jerusalem.16 Of those incidents,
331 resulted in Palestinian casualties or damage to property in 2014. Another
62 such attacks were recorded in the first three months of 2015.34
50. Israeli settlers also target fruit trees, mostly olive trees. During 2014,
10,596 trees were uprooted, burned or sprayed with toxic chemicals, leading to loss
of production and exposure over soils to degradation.35
51. Israeli authorities continue to take inadequate action against Israeli settlers
who commit violent acts against Palestinians. This includes the failure to effectively
and impartially investigate crimes committed by Israeli settlers and to hold the
perpetrators accountable, thereby propagating a culture of impunity. Between 2005
__________________
29 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Process, Briefing to the
Security Council on the Situation in the Middle East, 26 March 2015.
30 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Press Release on Israeli Settlements in Palestine,
September 2014.
31 Yesh Din, Under the Radar, Israel’s silent policy of transforming unauthorized outposts into
official settlements.
32 See Peace Now, available at peacenow.org.il/eng/Construction2014, accessed: 9 March 2015.
33 UN-Habitat input citing the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat:
29 October 2014 briefing on the situation in Jerusalem.
34 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report,
March 2015.
35 Information received from United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
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and 2014, 91.4 per cent of monitored cases were closed without any indictments of
Israeli settlers (see A/HRC/28/44, para. 51).
The West Bank barrier wall
52. In 2004, the International Court of Justice considered the construction of a
wall in the West Bank illegal and “de facto annexation” (see A/ES-10/273 and
Corr.1). The Court also affirmed Israel’s obligation to cease its construction and
dismantle constructed parts thereof, in addition to provide reparations, including
restitution and compensation, to victims. Israel has so far failed to comply with the
various components of the Court decision, and continues with the construction of
the wall, with negative consequences for the Palestinian population (see A/69/347,
para. 27).
53. Approximately 445 km of the 712-km wall have been either completed or are
currently under construction (28 km are under construction),35 mostly inside the
West Bank, along with related fences, ditches, razor wire, groomed sand paths, an
electronic monitoring system, patrol roads and a buffer zone. Land for construction
of the wall is requisitioned from Palestinian landowners by the Israeli Ministry of
Defence through military orders.36
54. The wall with its current planned route would isolate 9.4 per cent of the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem, along with entire communities comprising
approximately 11,000 Palestinians between the wall and the Green Line, an area
labelled as the “seam zone”.36
55. Palestinian farmers are obliged to obtain special permits to access their
farming “seam zone”, which has been declared a “closed area”. In the past four
years only half of such permit applications in the northern West Bank have been
approved.36
Mobility restrictions and closure policies
Gaza blockade and access-restricted areas
56. Israel has continued a blockade on the Gaza Strip imposed since 2007,
“locking-in” over 1.8 million people in an area of land already recognized as one of
the most densely populated in the world, which is experiencing worsening physical,
economic and social living conditions.10 The blockade amounts to collective
punishment of the civilian population, in violation of international law (see
A/69/347, para 30). The closure of the Rafah crossing with Egypt and the illegal
smuggling tunnels further exacerbated these conditions.
57. The blockade restricts the access of people, including patients referred for
medical treatment. The blockade also creates security-related delays and additional
costs of transportation for imports of medical goods and equipment into Gaza.37
58. In addition to overall restrictions on the movement of goods, the Israeli
authorities define construction materials as “dual use items”, and consequently have
severely restricted their import into the Gaza Strip since the imposition of the
blockade. This has severely curtailed reconstruction and development efforts in
__________________
36 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 Years since the International Court of
Justice Advisory Opinion, 2014.
37 Information received from the World Health Organization (WHO).
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Gaza, since imports of construction materials by United Nations agencies into Gaza
remain subject to a lengthy and cumbersome approval process imposed by Israeli
authorities.16
59. Although the temporary Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism38 allowed
approximately 71,000 families to purchase restricted building materials, those cases
involved repairs of homes rather than reconstruction of destroyed ones. Delays in
the clearance of projects through the Mechanism and other delays by the Palestinian
Government compounded the slow pace of disbursement of pledges by donors,
resulting in no housing reconstruction projects having been implemented as at the
end of February 2015.13
60. After the Israeli 2014 summer offensive, the Israeli Government announced a
relaxation on transfers of agricultural and fishery products from the Gaza Strip to
the West Bank for the first time since 2007. Nevertheless, such a measure responds
only partially to actual needs. (Non-agricultural commodities are still banned for
transfer to the West Bank.)39
61. In addition to the blockade, Israel continues to impose land and maritime
access-restricted areas in the Gaza Strip. Following the end the summer offensive,
the fishing zone was briefly expanded to six nautical miles from the coast and the
“buffer zone” along the border was reduced from 300 to 100 metres.40
62. However, in October 2014 Israel reverted to enforcing the access -restricted
areas in the same manner as it had before the summer offensive, by using lethal
force (see A/HRC/28/45, para. 20).
Mobility restrictions in the West Bank
63. Obstacles facing Palestinian movement in the West Bank include physical and
administrative restrictions.
64. In recent years, the Israeli authorities have gradually relaxed some of the
movement restrictions within the West Bank. However, remaining restrictions
continue to undermine livelihoods and access to basic services, hinder the ability of
humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance and disrupt family and social life. 14
65. “Barrier zones” surrounding the external boundaries of some of the settlements
cover approximately 5,000 dunams,41 half of which encompass agricultural land
privately owned by Palestinians. Palestinian farmers seeking to access their land
need to have permits and coordinate their time of entry with the Israeli authorities. 2
66. In general, access of Palestinians to East Jerusalem from other areas of the
West Bank also remains subject to acquiring an Israeli permit.42 However, on
__________________
38 The temporary mechanism is an agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian Governments,
brokered by the United Nations in the aftermath of the Israeli offensive to enable reconstruction
efforts in the Gaza Strip.
39 Information received from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
40 Gisha, The Gaza Cheat Sheet, January 2015.
41 1 dunam = 1,000 m2.
42 Information received from WHO citing Palestinian General Authority for Civilian Affairs office
communication to WHO, 27 January 2015; WHO, “Crossing barriers to access health in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory,” available at http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/
documents/WHORTH_crossing_barriers_to_access_health.pdf?ua=1, accessed 29 December
2014.
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12 March 2015, the Israeli authorities announced that the entry of Palestinian men
over the age of 55 and women over the age of 50 with West Bank identification
cards would be allowed without a permit into East Jerusalem and Israel on a daily
basis through two main checkpoints.34
67. Israel also retains control over crossings from the West Bank into Jordan and,
by extension, the outside world. Between 13 June and 13 August 2014, at least
3,393 Palestinians who tried to cross the Allenby Bridge into Jordan were turned
away by the Israeli authorities on security grounds. This is compared to
1,266 Palestinians who were turned away at the bridge throughout 2013.43
68. During 2014, UNRWA reported a total of 142 access-related incidents
resulting in a loss to UNRWA of an estimated 240 workdays or 1,799 work-hours.
For six months in 2014 (June to November), the Israeli authorities further restricted
the movement of UNRWA staff members into the “seam zone”. From
mid-September 2014, Israeli authorities changed access routes of United Nations
and international organization trucks, further restricting and delaying the movement
of humanitarian goods within the West Bank and to Gaza.16
Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestinian natural resources
Impact of the 2014 summer offensive on Gaza
69. The summer Gaza conflict exacerbated already precarious environmental
conditions. Insufficient investment for reconstruction and rehabilitation following
the different military offensives that occurred in 2008, 2012 and 2014 has had a
cumulative environmental impact, much of which poses direct risks to public
health.35
70. The water situation in Gaza was already alarming before the offensive. Over
abstraction of Gaza’s only natural water source (the Coastal Aquifer Basin)44 has led
to, among other things, seawater infiltration. This, compounded with nitrate
contamination and seepage of sewage, has left only 6.5 per cent of the water
pumped from wells drinkable.14
71. During the Gaza conflict, 20 to 30 per cent of water and wastewater networks
were damaged, affecting approximately 450,000 and 1 million people, respectively,
whose access to related water and sanitation services was reduced as a result.45
72. In addition, 202 wells, 57 km of main irrigation water carrier lines, 55 water
reservoirs and 325 water collection ponds were destroyed along with 3,000 hectares
of irrigation networks.39
73. The Gaza conflict caused serious damage to Gaza’s main sewage treatment
plant. This threatens to introduce diseases caused by poor sanitation, as well as an
environmental disaster linked with the discharge of raw sewage into the
environment. The entire sewerage and sewage system are on the verge of collapse,
__________________
43 Hamoked, Report on Human Rights Violations Perpetrated by Israel in the Summer of 2014,
January 2015.
44 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA); Bundesanstalt für
Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe). 2013. Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia.
Beirut.
45 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), State of Palestine Humanitarian Situation Report,
25 September 2015.
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posing a severe threat to Gaza’s groundwater resources. FAO has indicated that such
damage will also make drinking water, which is already in short supply in Gaza,
even more scarce.35
74. Air pollution from fires resulting from the bombing and the remnants of
explosive materials has a negative impact on health, alongside increased risks of
contamination of water, air and soil. Children, older adults and those with heart or
lung disease are most likely to be affected by this type of air pollution. 35
75. The heavy bombardment during the summer Gaza conflict resulted in the
complete destruction of 1,035 hectares of fruit trees, 2,415 hectares of harvestable
open field vegetables and 185 hectares of greenhouse vegetables. An additional
1,043 hectares of fruit trees, 447 hectares of harvestable open field vegetables and
390 hectares of harvestable protected vegetables were partially damaged. In
addition, heavy soil damage was found in 3,450 hectares. 39
76. Forty per cent of poultry stock and 36 per cent of total productive livestock
were destroyed. It is estimated that between 2010 and 2014, the number of sheep
and goat herders fell by 22 per cent.39
77. The tons of rubble, debris and pulverized building materials have potential
adverse implications linked to the heavy metal impurities found in concrete, in
addition to carcinogenic substances and other hazardous substances. It is estimated
that 4 million tons of rubble were generated by the offensive and must be handled as
hazardous waste.35
Exploitation and endangerment in the West Bank
78. Palestinian public and private investments are forbidden in Area C in the West
Bank, while Israeli settlers and corporations freely exploit natural resources in Area C,
including marble, stone, building materials and Dead Sea minerals and salts. 8
79. Israel retains nearly full control over water resources in the West Bank and
utilizes discriminatory policies like the planning and zoning polices mentioned
above. As an example, the daily share per capita of water consumption for Israelis
reaches seven times that for Palestinians.46 More than 70 Palestinian communities in
Area C are not connected to the water network, and their residents rely on purchased
water at vastly increased cost. The dire situation leads to water consumption rates in
some of these communities as low as 20 litres per capita per day, one fifth of the
100 litres per capita per day recommended by the World Health Organization.47
80. Since March 2014, tens of thousands of homes in Palestinian East Jerusalem
neighbourhoods and refugee camps that are separated from the city by the wall have
suffered from decreased water supply.48
81. Mobility restrictions in the West Bank render an estimated 50 per cent of
agricultural land therein inaccessible, hindering household and commercial
production and decreasing jobs in this sector.28
__________________
46 See Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, available at www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/
PressRelease/Press_En_WWD2015E.pdf.
47 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Area C of the West Bank: Key
Humanitarian Concerns Update August 2014.
48 ACRI, Situation of Human Rights.
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82. The Al-Minya landfill, a World Bank project built to meet 34 per cent of the
West Bank’s total Palestinian needs, has become a de facto landfill for waste
generated by Israeli settlers, while Palestinians are prevented from using it.35
83. The Gishori plant and other Israeli industrial installations in the Tulkarm area
of the West Bank have raised environmental concerns, owing to the possibility that
they may generate hazardous industrial pollution through the r elease of gas, liquid
and solid emissions directly into the environment.35
Socioeconomic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Economic conditions
84. Even before the Gaza conflict last summer, the Palestinian economy was
decelerating because of political uncertainty, continued fiscal problems of the
Palestinian Government and the effects of the tunnel closure between Egypt and
Gaza.49
85. The pre-conflict situation in Gaza was particularly dire, with a humanitarian
crisis gradually unfolding owing to the combined effects of recurring Israeli
conflicts on top of the accumulated impact of an eight -year-long blockade. The
closure of the Rafah crossing into Egypt, as well as the closing of the smuggling
tunnels between Gaza and Egypt, exacerbated these dire conditions. Gaza’s
economy has been hollowed out not only by severe restrictions on exports and
imports of raw materials and intermediate inputs, but also by the restrictions on cash
transfers, which paralyze its banking sector.50
86. As a result, real gross domestic product (GDP) in Gaza reached 2005 levels
only in 2012, real GDP per capita remained below the 2005 levels even in 2014 and
unemployment never fell below 25 per cent. 49
87. Fuel also became scarce, owing to insufficient storage capacity and the tunnel
closures; the sole power plant in Gaza operates at half capacity. This has had an
impact on the delivery of basic services, since many critical installations face powe r
cuts of up to 18 hours daily.51 Along with the aforementioned deterioration in the
water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure and housing, living conditions in Gaza
were at their worst since Israel occupied Gaza in 1967, which is why the impact of
the military offensive was far more severe on the economy and the population in
Gaza compared to all previous military developments.
88. As for the direct damage incurred during the Gaza conflict by economic
institutions, the Palestinian Government reported that more than 20 per cent of
Gaza’s industrial enterprises and over 4,000 commercial and trade enterprises were
destroyed or damaged.52 The total effect of the offensive on the agriculture sector
was estimated at between $450 million and $550 million.53
__________________
49 International Monetary Fund, West Bank and Gaza: report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee,
12 September 2014.
50 United Nations Centre for Trade and Development Trade and Development Board, Report on
UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the economy of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. 7 July 2014.
51 See www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2014_02_25_english.pdf.
52 See The State of Palestine, The National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza.
53 Information received from FAO citing the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture.
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89. The international community pledged $5.4 billion at a donor conference in
October 2014 for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Gaza. However,
30 international aid agencies issued a statement on 26 February 2015 warning that
“little of the $5.4 billion pledged in Cairo has reached Gaza”.54 For example, in
January 2015, UNRWA was forced to suspend its cash assistance programme in
Gaza for repairs to 100,000 damaged and destroyed homes of Palestine refugees and
for rental subsidies to the homeless.16
90. In the West Bank, economic development remains constrained by a
multilayered system of movement and access restrictions,55 including restricted
access to Area C (see above).
91. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts that uncertainty will
continue to restrain economic recovery in 2015, caused in particular b y the stifling
blockade, the slower than expected reconstruction of Gaza and the Israeli tax
revenues freeze,56 which represents around two thirds of net revenues and is
essential to the budget of the Palestinian Government and the Palestinian
economy.57
92. The unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2014 stood at 42.8 per cent in
the Gaza Strip and at 17.4 per cent in the West Bank (20.5 per cent among refugees),
reflecting the unfolding recession and the impact of the Israeli offensive on Gaza.58
93. The employment situation in Gaza can be described as
“hyper-unemployment”, or consistently higher rates relative to neighbouring
countries with similar cultural and demographic characteristics.59
94. To make things worse, an estimated 17,200 persons lost their jobs because of
the physical destruction of productive assets during the summer offensive against
Gaza. That is equal to about 6.4 per cent of all employed persons and about 11.6 per
cent of the private and non-governmental sectors’ employed workforce in 2013.59
95. While the latest available data on poverty date back to 2011 (39 per cent in
Gaza and 18 per cent in the West Bank), it is almost certain that stunted economic
performance coupled with the summer Israeli offensive in Gaza has exacerbated the
poverty situation and pushed additional Palestinian families into poverty,
particularly in Gaza.60
96. Israeli constraints in general and mobility restrictions in particular have had a
disproportionately high impact on Palestinian women because women are more
vulnerable to Israeli measures enforced at checkpoints, settler violence and
prolonged commutes to work locations. Consequently, Palestinian women suffer
higher unemployment rates, and their participation in the labour force is very low.
Despite significant female educational achievements, the majority of employable
__________________
54 Joint statement by 30 international aid agencies: “We must not fail in Gaza”, 26 February 2015.
55 International Labour Organization, International Labour Conference, 103rd session, 2014,
Report of the Director-General, Appendix, The situation of workers of the occupied Arab
territories (Geneva, International Labour Office).
56 Revenues collected by Israel on goods imported into the occupied West Bank and Gaza.
57 IMF contribution, available at www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr1524.htm.
58 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release on the results of the Labour Force Survey,
(October-December, 2014).
59 Information received from International Labour Organization (ILO).
60 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 22 September 2014.
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Palestinian women (nearly 1.1 million) are outside the labour force. The situation of
women in Gaza is particularly problematic, with women suffering from an
unemployment rate of 59.3 per cent, reaching as high as 83.3 per cent among
women between the ages of 15 and 29.61 In order to augment household income,
many women have been forced to take unprotected, low-paying jobs close to home
in the informal and unprotected sectors.8
Food security
97. Given the deteriorating economic situation, food insecurity in Palestine
remained at very high levels in 2013, with one third of households
(1.6 million people) considered food insecure and 16 per cent of households
vulnerable to food insecurity.62
98. Based on 2013 data, one year before the 2014 summer offensive, 57 per cent
of Gazan households were food insecure, while 14 per cent of households
(188,397 people) were vulnerable to food insecurity. In the West Bank, 19 per cent
of households were food insecure; and in the refugee camps the level of food
insecurity reached 29 per cent.62
99. During the 2014 summer offensive, up to 71 per cent of the population in Gaza
became food insecure, as prices of basic foodstuffs soared 40 and 179 per cent. In
seven weeks, most Palestinians in Gaza could no longer meet their most basic
needs.28 Thus, UNRWA had to effectively support the entire population of the Gaza
Strip.16
100. Almost 868,000 Palestine refugees depend on food aid from UNRWA. In 2000,
less than 10 per cent (72,000 people) of the Gaza population relied on food
assistance. The situation deteriorated rapidly with the inception of the blockade. 16
Public health
101. Before the Gaza conflict, the health sector in Gaza was already in a dire
situation. During the conflict itself, 17 hospitals and 56 clinics incurred damage;63
23 health workers were killed (16 while on duty); 83 were injured, the majority of
whom were ambulance drivers; and 32 Palestinian Red Crescent Society ambulances
were damaged or destroyed.64 By March 2015, health services had only regained
about two thirds of their functionality compared to the pre-offensive level.65
102. On the eve of the Gaza conflict, drug and medical consumable shortages in
Gaza reached over 28 per cent in essential drugs and 54 per cent of medical
consumables were at zero stock.66 A tracer study of 48 critical drugs showed that
__________________
61 Economic and Social Council for Western Asia, Social and Economic Situation of Palestinian
Women and Girls, July 2012-June 2014, (2015).
62 See UNRWA, www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/food-insecurity-palestine-remains-high.
63 Information received from WHO citing Health Cluster, Gaza Strip: Joint Health Sector Assessment
Report, available at www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/documents/Joint_Health_Sector_
Assessment_Report_Gaza_Sept_2014-final.pdf?ua=1.
64 International Committee of the Red Cross, Disaster Relief Emergency Fund operation: Final
Report, Occupied Palestinian Territory: Complex Emergency.
65 Information received from the United Nations Population Fund.
66 See WHO, www.emro.who.int/images/stories/WHO_Gaza_donor_alert.pdf.
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40 per cent were at zero stock at the district level and 46 per cent were at zero stock
at the clinic level in June 2014.37
103. Access to reproductive health services has also deteriorated as a result of the
protracted blockade and the summer offensive on Gaza; 17 cases of maternal deaths
have been recorded since July 2014, compared to 12 such cases throughout 2013.65
104. The destruction of private homes, coupled with the inability to reconstruct
some 5,000 housing units destroyed in previous military operations, has aggravated
the severe shelter crisis in Gaza: some 100,000 people are currently displaced, with
12,000 of them hosted in UNRWA collective centres. Private shelters in the Gaza
Strip are becoming increasingly overcrowded, particularly in refugee camps, where
the highest population densities are reported. Compounded with substandard
housing conditions and power cuts of up to 16 hours a day, overcrowding results in
the deterioration of health and hygiene, which, in turn, heightens public health
risks.16
105. Overall, the psychosocial stress caused by violence left 425,000 children in
need of psychosocial support, including focused counselling in many cases. 67 An
additional 60,000 children are in need of child protection services. 68
106. UNRWA school-based counsellors reported that refugee children in Gaza,
especially boys, exhibit emotional and behavioural problems and academic
underperformance, primarily as a result of psychosocial distress.16
107. In the West Bank, particularly in Area C, the ability of Palestinian institutions
and their development partners suffer from the inability to construct basic health
clinics. This forces communities to rely on expensive mobile clinic services for
basic primary health care. Restrictions on the rehabilitation, repair and construction
of basic water and sanitation infrastructure severely impede access to adequate
water, sanitation and hygiene services in many communities, reducing their
resilience and increasing their risk of displacement.3
108. The wall, checkpoints and settlement road networks hinder access to he alth
care for the population in Area C, especially those in isolated communities. The
entry of ambulances, mobile units and health personnel into restricted or
marginalized areas is often obstructed or subject to permits and delays, jeopardizing
patient health.42
109. Refugee camps in the West Bank suffer from overcrowdedness and lack of
adequate infrastructure. Out of 19 refugee camps in the West Bank, 5 camps show
population densities of over 100,000 persons per km2, and 6 camps have between
50,000 and 100,000 persons per square kilometre. Only half of them have an
adequate sewerage network.16
__________________
67 United Nations Children’s Fund, Humanitarian Action for Children: State of Palestine, 2015,
available at www.unicef.org/appeals/files/Final_2015_HAC_State_of_Palestine.pdf.
68 UNICEF State of Palestine situation report, 21 August 2014.
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Education
110. During the 51-day Gaza conflict, 26 schools were completely destroyed and
122 damaged,69 83 of which were UNRWA schools.16
111. UNRWA school buildings are being used as shelters and the continuously
growing student population, about 87 per cent of the 252 UNRWA schools in the
Gaza Strip, are operating on double or triple shifts (an increase from 71 per cent in
2013). As a result, refugee children in Gaza receive a severely truncated education
and have little or no opportunity to engage in recreational or creative pursuits.16
112. In the West Bank restrictions on construction and rehabilitation permits have
left the already insufficient number of Palestinian schools in a precarious state (see
A/69/81-E/2014/13, paras. 105-111).
113. Palestinians students continue to suffer from practices of the Israeli military
and settler attacks. Incidents involving schools almost tripled in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, from 2013 to 2014, affecting nearly 25,000 Palestinian
children.70
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
114. Since 1967, Israel has continued to occupy the Syrian Golan, despite numerous
resolutions of various United Nations bodies, including Security Council resolution
497 (1981), in which the Council deemed Israel ’s decision to impose its laws,
jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan null and void, and
called upon Israel to desist from the establishment of settlements and altering the
demographic composition of occupied territory. Nevertheless, by 2014 there were
approximately 21,000 Israeli inhabitants in 33 settlements and 20,000 Syrian
citizens in 6 villages (see A/HRC/28/44, para. 54).
115. The role of the Israeli Government in supporting illegal settlement expansion
in the occupied Syrian Golan is reflected in the funding from the State treasury of
Israel through the Settlements Division of the World Zionist Organization.
Approximately $6.4 million of those funds were reportedly allocated to the northern
district, which includes the occupied Syrian Golan (see A/69/355, para. 93), at a
time when Syrian construction in Syrian villages continues without permits, despite
restrictions. Syrians are forced to construct vertically, instead of horizontally, as
they are not able to acquire additional land.55
116. Israeli settlers enjoy disproportionate benefits in terms of water and
agricultural resources (see A/69/355, para. 92), while Syrian residents continue to
suffer from Israeli-imposed restrictions on access to such resources (see
CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 17).
117. Syrian farmers have been allowed 200 cubic metres of water for every dunam,
a quantity that is considerably lower than the minimum 600 cubic metres needed.
Syrian farmers usually receive one fourth of the allocation granted to Israeli settlers.
Furthermore, although Israeli settlements in the Golan do not suffer from lack of
__________________
69 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Rapid Assessment of Higher
Education Institutions in Gaza, citing the Multi -Cluster/Agency Initial Rapid Assessment.
70 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, press release, 26 February 2015.
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water, the Israeli authorities informed Syrian farmers that there would be a 50 per
cent reduction in their water allocation.55
118. In 2014 Israel reportedly approved the development of 30,000 dunums of land
in the occupied Syrian Golan, including the establishment of farming estates and
investment in agricultural training, upgrades of water systems and landmine
clearance, to the benefit of Israeli settlers (see A/69/355, para. 92).
119. Israel’s tight control of the labour force and entrepreneurial activity continues
to frustrate any search for healthy economic and social interaction for Syrian
workers. Neither workers nor entrepreneurs can engage in decent work, and full
respect for fundamental principles and r ights at work remains elusive.55
120. In addition to land and water, Israel continues to exploit natural resources in
the occupied Syrian Golan, including gas and oil (see A/HRC/25/38, para. 48).
Israel granted the United States-based company Genie Energy a licence early in
2013 to explore for oil and gas in a 153-square-mile radius in the southern part of
the occupied Syrian Golan. The company continues prospecting for oil through a
local subsidiary in the occupied territory (see A/69/355, para. 94).
IV. Conclusion
121. Israel continues to employ measures and practices that entail violations of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Concerns have
been mounting regarding some of these measures and policies, particularly
regarding the violations of the principle of non-discrimination and the right to
self-determination.
122. Such policies include the illegal settlement enterpr ise, collective punishment
and disregard for human life and dignity, which affect all aspects of Palestinian
society and economy. They also undermine the prospects for peace and entail
violations of international law.
123. Israel must end its occupation and comply with international law and
legitimacy. There are no prospects for peace unless this happens. The failure of the
international community to expedite this outcome will only increase the suffering.
United Nations A/71/86–E/2016/13
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
10 May 2016
Original: English
16-07590 (E) 190516
*1607590*
General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Item 60 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in
the occupied Syrian Golan over their
natural resources
Economic and Social Council
2016 session
24 July 2015-27 July 2016
Agenda item 16
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli
occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian territory, including
East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
Summary
In its resolution 2015/17, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventieth session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 70/225, also requested the Secretary -General to submit a
report to it at its seventy-first session. The present report, which was prepared by the
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, has been submitted in
compliance with the resolutions of the Council and the Assembly.
The report covers persistent Israeli practices and policies, particularly those
that are in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights
law and that affect the social and economic conditions of the people living under its
military occupation. Israel employs discriminatory policies and practices, excessive
use of force and mobility restrictions, including the blockade on Gaza, settlement
expansion, property destruction and exploitation of natural resources in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan. Impunity is afforded to Israeli
security and military personnel and settlers. The cumulative impact of these policies
and practices not only violates the rights of the population, but also exacerbates their
social and economic conditions.
* A/71/50.
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The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to express
its appreciation for the substantive contributions of the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the International Labour Organization
(ILO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the League of Arab
States (LAS), the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations
Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.
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I. Introduction
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2015/17, and the General
Assembly, in its resolution 70/225, expressed concerns over the practices of Israel,
the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian
Golan that were in violation of international humanitarian law. Those practices have
ranged from causing death and injury to civilians, including children, women and
peaceful demonstrators, all of whom must be protected in accordance with
international humanitarian law, to violence by illegal armed Israeli settlers against
Palestinian civilians and their properties, to the continued detention of thousands of
Palestinians, including children and women, under harsh conditions . The Council
and Assembly also expressed their concern regarding the continued expansion by
Israel of settlements, the construction of the wall inside the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, the exploitation of Palestinian natural resources, the increased dem olition
of homes, the state of economic institutions, agricultural lands and infrastructure,
the revocation of residency rights of Palestinians in and around occupied East
Jerusalem and the ongoing Israeli military operations throughout the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as policies of closure and
severe restrictions on the movement of persons and goods, including what in effect
amounts to a blockade on the Gaza Strip. In the above -mentioned resolutions, the
Council and Assembly also highlighted the detrimental impact of Israeli practices.
II. The Occupied Palestinian Territory
2. In spite of the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the O ccupied Palestinian
Territory (A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1), as well as other assertions (see General
Assembly resolution 70/88 and A/69/711-S/2015/1), Israel continues to challenge
the established fact that international humanitarian law, particularly the Fourth
Geneva Convention, is applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 1 The
recurrent violations by Israel of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law have become entrenched through Israeli policies and practices,
and the lack of accountability for the violations further deepens the Palestinians ’
sense of injustice (see A/70/392, paras. 14-15).
3. Israeli policies and practices undermine the right of the Palestinian people to
self-determination and, since 1967, their cumulative effects have had a debilitating
effect on the Palestinians (see A/HRC/31/43, para. 6, A/70/351, para. 79 and A/70/392,
para. 86).
4. Tensions and violence erupted in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
particularly in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in October 2015, in the
context of prolonged occupation, settlement expansion and settler violence 2 and in
the aftermath of clashes at the Al -Aqsa Mosque, with Palestinians perceiving Israel
as trying to change the status quo at the holy sites. On 26 January 2016, in his
remarks to the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East, the Secretary -
__________________
1 See resolution 70/88 and Alan Baker, “International humanitarian law, ICRC and Israel’s status
in the Territories”, International Review of the Red Cross , vol. 94, No. 888 (Winter 2012).
2 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2016 Humanitarian needs overview”.
Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno_december29_final.pdf.
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General highlighted the growing frustration felt by Palestinians, linked to Israeli
actions that were chipping away the viability of a Palestinian State and the ability of
the Palestinian people to live in dignity; in a briefing to the Council on 22 October
2015, his deputy referred to the stifling and humiliating occupation that ha d lasted
almost half a century.
Segregation and discrimination
5. The existence and expansion of illegal Israeli settlements on occupied
Palestinian land lie at the heart of discriminatory Israeli policies and human rights
violations, which include home demolitions and the resulting displacement,
discriminatory allocation of water and provision of access to land, movement
restrictions, and the discriminatory legal system (see A/HRC/31/73, para. 32).
6. The settlers’ presence increases tension, and the Israeli security forces and
army are deployed to defend the settlements. Consequently, the security of Israeli
settlers outplays that of Palestinians, undermining the equal application of the law
(see A/70/351, para. 80).
7. The dual justice system in the occupied territory appears to be pitted against
the protected population (see A/70/392, para. 85). While Palestinians lack access to
civil justice, it is rare for Israeli settlers to be held ac countable for acts of violence
they commit against Palestinians, and Israeli army and security forces are also
seldom held accountable for the violations they commit against Palestinians (see
A/70/82-E/2015/13, paras. 8, 9, 30 and 51).
8. The Israeli zoning and planning regime in the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem, is restrictive and discriminatory and is incompatible with international
law. The regime caters to the interests of Israeli settlements at the ex pense of the
needs of the Palestinians. It makes it practically impossible for Palestinians living in
Area C, which constitutes 62 per cent of the West Bank (see A/70/82-E/2015/13,
para. 16), to obtain building permits (see A/HRC/31/43, para. 45). Palestinians in
East Jerusalem suffer from the same difficulties. Even if they manage to find land
on which to build, which is limited in the city, they often cannot afford the high
prices of building permits (see A/70/392, para. 65).
9. Discrimination in planning and zoning is reflected in the land available for
construction in Area C, where Israeli authorities have permitted Palestini an
construction on what amounts to approximately 0.4 per cent of Area C, compared to
20 per cent of the same area with approved plans for illegal Israeli settlements. 3
Only 1.5 per cent of Palestinian permit applications are approved. 4 Similarly in East
Jerusalem, Palestinian construction is only allowed on 13 per cent of the municipal
area of the city that is already built up, while 35 per cent of city area has been
expropriated for Israeli settlements. 5
__________________
3 See “‘One UN’ approach to spatial planning in ‘Area C’ of the occupied West Bank” (United
Nations, September 2015).
4 Press release, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (17 February 2016). Available
from http://reliefweb.int/report/occupied -palestinian-territory/humanitarian-coordinator-callsisrael-
halt-demolitions.
5 See “2016 Humanitarian needs overview: Occupied Palestinian Territory ” (Office for the
Coordination of Humanitaria n Affairs).
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10. As of May 2015, an estimated 13,000 Palestinian structures in Area C6 and
20,000 homes in East Jerusalem7 lacked Israeli permits and were under threat of
pending demolition orders. Little legal protection is afforded to Palestinians facing
demolition orders, creating a coercive environment that eventual ly drives
communities off the land they had inhabited for generations ( A/HRC/31/43,
para. 46, and A/70/392, para. 39).
11. Since 1967, the Government of Israel has sou ght to secure a Jewish majority
and attain full control over East Jerusalem, through the construction of Israeli
settlements, outposts, bypass roads and the wall. Those measures have been coupled
with a set of discriminatory policies targeting Palestinians , including freezing the
registration of land ownership in Jerusalem and its environs. 8
12. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian
territories occupied since 1967 expressed grave concern about Israeli policies that
aim to achieve a particular demographic balance in East Jerusalem. Those policies
work to stifle the natural growth of the Palestinian population in the city, preventing
Palestinians from moving there and pressuring Palestinians to leave. The policies
violate the rights of Palestinians to freedom of movement, adequate housing, access
to education and health services, respect for family life and freedom from
discrimination (see A/70/392, para. 68). The Special Rapporteur was also troubled
by the fact the Israeli Local Outline Plan — Jerusalem 2000 does not mention
Palestinians or East Jerusalem, but instead refers to “Arab residents in the eastern
part of the city” (see A/70/392, paras. 62 and 68).
13. The above-mentioned policies and restrictions, coupled with the construction
of the wall in the West Bank, have exacerbated the socioeconomic situation of the
Palestinians of East Jerusalem. More than 75 per cent of them live under the poverty
line, compared to 30.8 per cent of the residents of Israel (2013). 7
14. In addition to the severe lack of services for and neglect of Palestinian
neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem,7 and discriminatory budget allocation (see
A/70/406 and Corr.1, para. 37), Palestinian residents of Jerusalem must contend
with Israeli residency policies. Under one Israeli law, residencies of Palestinians
who fail to continuously prove their residency in the city are withdrawn. Another
law denies the children and spouses of Palestinian permanent residents automatic
residency status in the city. As a result, several thousand Palestinian children are
without residency status (see A/70/392, para. 63).
15. Israeli policies in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, apparently have
the common objective of forcible displacement and the fostering of a hostile
environment that contributed to the expansion of settlements (see A/70/406 and
Corr.1, para. 34).
Excessive use of force and arbitrary detention
16. The eruption of violence in October throughout the West Bank led to a sharp
rise in casualties. Overall, during the reporting period, 212 Palestinians were killed
__________________
6 Ibid.
7 See Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “East Jerusalem 2015: facts and figures” (May 2015).
8 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN -Habitat), Right to Develop: Planning
Palestinian Communities in East Jerusalem (East Jerusalem, 2015), p. 1.
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by the Israeli army, security forces or settlers including 40 children. Another 16,333
were injured, including more than 2,600 children. 9
17. Of the Palestinian casualties, 188 were killed and approximately 15,000
injured after October 2015, many of whom were kille d while allegedly carrying out
attacks against Israelis.10
18. During the reporting period, 29 Israelis were also killed, including 26
civilians, and 272 were injured, including 169 civilians.
19. In the West Bank, accountability is generally lacking in cas es of excessive use
of force by Israeli security forces (see A/70/392, paras. 76-85). Serious concerns
exist over the excessive use of force by Israeli security forces in the context of
attacks and alleged attacks by Palestinians and during clashes, and ongoing settler
violence (see A/HRC/31/73, para. 5), including cases, some of which have been
captured on video, strongly suggesting unlawful killings (see A/HRC/31/40,
para. 10, and A/HRC/31/73, paras. 19 and 23) in some instances appearing to
amount to extrajudicial killings and summary executions. One such example is the
shooting of Abed al-Fatah al-Sharif on 24 March 2016, in Hebron, West Bank, by an
Israeli soldier as he lay incapacitated following his al leged role in a knife attack.11
20. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
expressed concern about reports of deaths attributed to a delay in the provision of
medical assistance to wounded suspects, or owing to the intentional blocking of
ambulances and first responders by Israeli security forces (see A/HRC/31/40,
para. 16).
21. Israeli security forces have continued to use live ammunition in law
enforcement operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly since
September 2015, reportedly in an extensive and often unwarranted manner. This
includes the use of firearms against demonstrators and persons attempting to
evacuate the wounded (see A/HRC/31/40, paras. 18-25).
22. In his report to the Human Rights Council on 11 January 2016, the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied
since 1967 recalled the well-documented violations related to the Israeli occupation
policies and saw a critical need for the international community to increase its
protection of the Palestinian population (see A/HRC/31/73, para. 67).
Detention and ill-treatment
23. According to Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association,
since 1967, up to 20 per cent of the Palestinian population had at some point been
detained by Israeli authorities (see A/70/392, para. 73). By the end of January 2016,
__________________
9 ESCWA calculations, based on information obtained from “Humanitarian bulletin” (Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2016) and “Protection of civilians” (Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 22-28 March 2015).
10 Ibid.
11 Press releases, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: 16 November 2015,
available from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
16759&LangID=E; and 30 March 2016, available fro m http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=18544&LangID=E#sthash.L0WRsNrv.dpuf.
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6,945 Palestinians were being held in Israeli prisons, including 568 administrative
detainees.12
24. The number of Palestinian children in detention jumped from 193 in
September 2015 to 415 in January 2016. 13 This sharp increase raises concerns about
meeting international law requirements that children be arrested and detained only
as a last resort.14 In East Jerusalem, 860 Palestinian children were arrested, 136 of
them between the ages of 7 and 11.15
25. A development of concern is the reinstatement of the administrative detention
of children, which had not been in practice in East Jerusalem since 2000 and in the
rest of the West Bank since 2011. Between October and December 2015, six
children were placed in administrative detention by Israeli authorities.15
26. International humanitarian law16 prohibits the transfer of detainees outside the
occupied territory. However, the majority of Palestinian detainees, including children,
are held in Israeli prisons inside Israel ( A/70/392, para. 73). This constitutes a grave
breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention (A/HRC/31/40, para. 43).
27. The utilization of administrative detention by Israel is inconsistent with the
exceptional nature of detention permitted under article 78 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. During the reporting period, a number of Palestinian administrative
detainees resorted to hunger strikes to protest their detention without charges (see
A/HRC/31/40, paras. 42 and 44).
28. On 30 July 2015 the Israeli Knesset passed a law that allows force -feeding
detainees on hunger strike, in a move that does not comply with human rights
standards and is tantamount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, even if
intended for their benefit.17 The Israeli Medical Association considers that forced
feeding is equivalent to torture.18
29. According to B’tselem, ill-treatment, abuse and torture of Palestinian p risoners
and detainees, particularly during interrogations, have continued with the backing of
all State authorities.19 B’tselem and Hamoked concluded in 2015 that cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment of Palestinian detainees was inherent,
institutionalized and implemented with full immunity .20
30. The United Nations and partners continued to document cases of ill -treatment
of children by Israeli security forces during their arrest and detention in the West
Bank and East Jerusalem.15
__________________
12 B’tselem, http://www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners (accessed 29 March 2016) .
13 Ibid.
14 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2016 Humanitarian needs overview”.
Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno_december29_final.pdf.
15 Information received from the United Nations Children ’s Fund.
16 Articles 47 and 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
17 Press release, World Health Organization (WHO) (8 August 2015). Available from
http://www.emro.who.int/pse/palestine -news/un-joint-statement-on-new-israeli-law-on-forcefeeding-
of-detainees.html.
18 Israeli Medical Association, “The physician’s guide to treating the detainee/prisoner on a hunger
strike” (June 2014).
19 B’tselem, “Abuse and torture of detainees are immoral and illegal measures ” (15 December
2015).
20 B’tselem and Hamoked, Backed by the System: Abuse and Torture at the Shikma Interrogation
Facility (December 2015).
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31. Medical negligence and lack of adequate medical care in the treatment of
Palestinians in Israeli detention centres continue to be reported ( A/70/406, para. 56).
32. On 20 July 2015, Israel amended its Penal Code regar ding throwing stones,
stipulating that anyone throwing stones or any other object at moving vehicles could
be sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. This has raised concerns since most of
those charged with stone-throwing are Palestinian children (A/70/392, para. 71), and
as of October 2015 the conviction rate for Palestinians arrested by Israeli security
forces stood at a worrisome 99 per cent (see A/70/406, para. 53).
33. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel flagged a series of legislative
changes and guidelines indicating that the central — and perhaps even the sole —
consideration the authorities take into account is the deterrence of minors, and not
their rehabilitation and return to normative conduct, which is contrary to the
principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 21
Population displacement, property destruction and land confiscation
34. In the Gaza Strip, over 76,000 people remain displaced a s a consequence of
the 2014 Israeli summer offensive.22
35. In the West Bank, the destruction of homes and livelihoods, forced evictions and
relocation plans, settler violence, movement and access restrictions and, particularly
in East Jerusalem, settler takeover of homes as well as laws regarding residency (see
para. 14) have all contributed to the continued force d displacement of Palestinians.2
36. Home demolitions in the West Bank and East Jerusalem continue at an
alarming rate, in violation of internatio nal humanitarian law, which prohibits the
destruction of property in an occupied territory. 23
37. During 2015, mostly citing the lack of building permits, Israeli authorities
demolished 544 structures in the West Bank, including 79 in East Jerusalem,
displacing 757 Palestinians.24 In the first two months of 2016, more than 321
structures, including 88 homes, were demolished. 23 In addition to demolitions,
Palestinians also face the threat of settlers taking over their homes (see A/70/392,
para. 66). Among the structures destroyed in the West Bank, one third (108) had
been provided as humanitarian assistance by aid organizations. 22
38. In 2014, Israel resumed the practice of punitive home demolitions, whereby
homes of the families of attackers or suspected attackers are demolished (see
A/70/82-E/2015/13, para. 42). On 14 October 2015, the Government of Israel
officially reinstated this policy, which includes sealing houses to render them
uninhabitable.25 Israeli authorities demolished or rendered uninhabitable 25 homes
during 2015, and 4 during the first two months of 2016. 26
__________________
21 Nisreen Alyan and Maytal Russo, “Arrested childhood: the ramifications of Israel’s new strict
policy toward minors suspected of involvement in stone throwing, security offenses, and
disturbances” (Association for Civil Rights in Israel, February 2016).
22 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian bulletin” (February 2016).
23 Press Release, Humanitarian Coordinator calls on Israel to halt demol itions in the occupied West
Bank immediately and to respect international law, 17 February 2016 .
24 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian bulletin” (January 2016).
25 Information received from UNRWA.
26 See B’tselem, http://www.btselem.org/punitive_demolitions/statistics (accessed 29 March 2016).
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39. Proposals by the Israeli Government to revoke the residency rights of family
members of suspected attackers (see A/HRC/31/40, para. 31) or to allow their
deportation to Gaza are other causes for concern. 27 Such practices constitute a form
of illegal collective punishment and violate the right of Palestinians to adequate
housing, despite prohibitions of forced evictions. 28
40. In 2015, the Government of Israel took significant procedural and legal steps
towards relocating some 50 Palestinian Bedouin communities in Area C. The
relocation may amount to individual and mass forcible transfers, which are a breach
of the Fourth Geneva Convention (see A/HRC/31/43, para. 49). Such forcible
transfers, which are apparently linked to Israeli settlement expansion (see A/70/351,
para. 20), threaten the culture, social fabric and livelihoods of Bedouin
communities. This was the case with approximately 150 Bedoui n families that were
relocated in the 1990s to make way for settlement expansion.29
41. Israel continues to confiscate and expropriate Palestinian land in the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem. Those measures also appear to be linked to the
expansion of illegal settlements, the construction of the wall in the West Bank and
the establishment of bypass roads mainly for the sole use of settlers.30
42. According to the Applied Research Institute — Jerusalem, in 2015 Israel
confiscated 3,670.6 dunums31 of land in the West Bank and 615.2 dunums in East
Jerusalem.30 In the first three months of 2016, Israel also confiscated a total of
3,842 dunums in the West Bank.32 This is in addition to more than 1,010,000
dunums, which represents more than 20 per cent of the West Bank area, including
East Jerusalem, that have been confiscated since 1967. 33
43. On 15 April 2015, the Supreme Court of Israel reaffirmed the application of
the Absentees’ Property Law, which allows the continued confiscation of property
and assets in East Jerusalem whose owners reside in other parts of the West Bank or
in Gaza (see A/70/406, para. 48).
44. The Government of Israel continues to support and promote settler takeovers
of land, through methods including building housing units, allocating agricultural
lands for settlements, declaring sites as archaeological or national parks, and
developing infrastructure on Palestinian land (see A/HRC/31/43, para. 13).
Settlements and settler violence
45. Israeli settlements and their expansion lie at the root of a broad spectrum of
human rights violations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (see
__________________
27 Lahav Harkov, Jerusalem Post, “Broad support in Knesset for bill to deport terrorists’ families to
Gaza” (9 March 2016). Available from http://www.jpost.com/Israel -News/Broad-support-for-billto-
deport-terrorists-families-to-Gaza-447367.
28 A/HRC/31/40, paras. 29 and 31; see also article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.
29 Press release, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (19 January 2016), available
from https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/hc_unrwa_joint_statement_abu_nuwar_final.pdf; and
information received from UNRWA.
30 Information received from UNEP.
31 1 dunum = 1,000 square metres.
32 Peace Now, “The Government declares 2,342 dunums south of Jericho as State Land” (15 March
2016). Available from http://peacenow.org.il/eng/JerichoDeclaration100316 .
33 Ibid.
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A/HRC/31/43, para. 5). Israeli settlement policies also violate international
humanitarian law and a number of Security Council resolutions (see A/70/351,
paras. 83 and 84). The policies of the Government of Israel towards t he settlements,
including retroactive legalization of unauthorized outposts (25 since 2011), 34
amount to the unlawful transfer of its own population into occupied territory (see
A/70/351, para. 83).
46. The settlements have led to the fragmentation of the West Bank, restricted
Palestinian access to natural resources in the occupied territory and to the
subsequent impediment to the Palestinian people ’s right to self-determination (see
A/HRC/31/43, paras. 5 and 6).
47. By the end of 2014, there were approximately 570,700 Israeli settlers in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (370,700 in the West Bank and 200,000 in East
Jerusalem),35 living in more than 150 settlement s36 and approximately
100 outposts.37 The United Nations Environment Programme reported that the
settler population in the West Bank may have reached 750,000. 30
Settler violence
48. Palestinians continue to suffer from settler violence, while settlers ha ve been
perceived as enjoying significant impunity for the attacks they perpetrate against
Palestinians and their properties, notwithstanding a number of s ettler arrests in this
context.38
49. In 2015, 898 Israeli settler attacks on Palestinians and their p roperty, fields
and religious sites were reported, 30 and in the first three months of 2016,
30 incidents of settler attacks resulted in injuries to Palestinians or damage to
property.39
50. On 31 July 2015, settlers burned the Dawabsha family home in Duma, killing
a toddler and his parents and badly injuring his four -year-old brother (see A/70/392,
para. 47). In January 2016, an Israeli settler and a minor were indicted for this
murder. On 20 March 2016, the home of Ibrahim Dawabsheh, who was the sole
witness to the first arson attack, was also the target of an arson attack. 25
Mobility restrictions and closure policies
51. Israel continues to impose disproportionate and discriminatory mobility
restrictions on the Palestinian people, invoking security considerations, inconsistent
with its obligations to ensure the right of Palestinians to freedom of movement and
to public life (see A/HRC/31/40, para. 35).
__________________
34 The Rights Forum and Yesh Din, “Under the radar” (March 2015).
35 Peace Now, “Settlement development data ”. Available from http://peacenow.org.il/eng/sites/
default/files/Settlement_Development%20Data_241215.xls (accessed 10 March 2016).
36 Press release, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (17 September 2015). Available from
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_IsrSettlments2014E.pdf .
37 Yesh Din, “From occupation to annexation: the silent adoption of the Levy report on retroactive
authorization of illegal construction in the West Bank”, position paper (Tel Aviv, February 2016).
38 Information received from the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle
East Peace Process, and A/70/351, paras. 22 and 23.
39 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Protection of civilians” (29 March-4 April
2016). Available from http://www.ochaopt.org/poc29march -4april-2016.aspx.
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Gaza blockade, including access-restricted areas)
52. The ongoing Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip amounts to collective
punishment and is unlawful. Since its inception in 2007, the policy has deprived
Palestinians of their economic, social and cultural rights (see A/HRC/31/40,
para. 36), including the rights to education, health, work, housing and freedom of
movement (see A/70/392, para. 21).
53. The infrastructure in the Gaza Strip has been devastated as a result of the
blockade and three major military offensives in six years. Compounded with a
chronic power deficit, the status of the infrastructure exacerbates the already
vulnerable living conditions in Gaza. 2
54. In 2015, the relative improvement in the entry of certain materials through the
Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism was a positive development. However, those
remained insufficient to respond to the overwhelming needs of the people of Gaza
(see A/HRC/31/40, para. 36), who continue to suffer and have become even more
reliant on aid.25 In addition, Israel continues to impose restrictions on the entry of
materials that it identifies as having a dual use, through the non -transparent manner
in which items are added and the broad nature of their description. 40
55. Those restrictions, coupled with the lack of donor funding, constitute key
factors41 that hamper the reconstruction of the 18,000 homes destroyed during the
2014 summer offensive and the rehabilitation of infrastructure. The ban on the
import of 23 items needed for water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) projects also
obstructs the delivery of services to the population. 2
56. Prior to the 2014 Israeli summer offensive, the bloc kade had caused a shortage
of over 75,000 housing units, which resulted in overcrowding, an increase in rental
prices, inadequate accommodation and associated health and protection concerns. 2
57. UNRWA reported that the lengthy period of time and complica ted procedures
required to import some of the dual use items had led to considerable delays and
additional costs for construction projects. 25
58. The closure of the Rafah crossing by Egypt since October 2014 has
exacerbated the humanitarian situation (see A/HRC/31/40, para. 36).
59. The Israeli ban on exports from Gaza was relatively eased in 2015. However,
the volume of exports amounts to only 10 per cent of their volume in the months
preceding the blockade.2
60. As part of the blockade, Israel restricts access to land and maritime areas. The
300 to 1,000 metre-wide buffer zone along the border of the Gaza Strip has
effectively prohibited farmers from using their agricultural land. 42 Israel has also
limited the fishing zone for Palestinians to three to six nautical miles, compared
__________________
40 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process , “Report to
the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee” (30 September 2015).
41 Information received from Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process.
42 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “The besieged Palestin ian agricultural
sector (UNCTAD/GDS/APP/2015/1). Available from http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
gdsapp2015d1_en.pdf.
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with 20 nautical miles allowed under the Oslo Accords. 43 On 3 April 2015, Israel
expanded the Palestinian fishing zone off the southern portion of the Gaza coast
from six to nine nautical miles.44
Mobility restrictions in the West Bank
61. A complex and multilayered system of administrative, bureaucratic and
physical constraints impedes the movement of Palestinians within the West Bank,
and is mainly linked to the settlements. The constraints are particularly severe for
Palestinians who live in close proximity to Israeli settlements ( A/HRC/31/44,
paras. 12 and 22-23).
62. Since October 2015, Israel has further tightened mobility restric tions on
Palestinians. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that
by the end of December 2015, 91 new physical obstacles, including checkpoints,
roadblocks and earth mounds, had been deployed, adding to the hundreds of such
existing obstacles that were already deployed across the West Bank. 24
63. The wall in the West Bank is the primary obstacle to the movement of
Palestinians.45 Israel continues its construction, even after the International Court of
Justice ruled that all parts of the wall that were built inside the West Bank, rather
than along the 1949 armistice line (the Green Line), were illegal (see A/ES-10/273
and Corr. 1). Of the current 712-kilometre planned route, 85 per cent lies wi thin the
West Bank. Consequently, the wall would de facto annex 9.4 per cent of the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem, along with entire communities comprising
approximately 11,000 Palestinians (see A/70/82-E/2015/13, paras. 52-54).
64. Access of Palestinian farmers to their land and water resources that lie in the
“seam zone”46 is restricted to specific gates and is subject to obtaining special
permits.47 East Jerusalem is largely cut off from the other parts of t he West Bank.
Permits to enter East Jerusalem, which are required for Palestinians residing in other
parts of the West Bank, are very difficult to obtain. 48
65. According to UNRWA reports, Israeli restrictions impede access to Palestine
refugee communities in the West Bank. Between March and December 2015, a total
of 118 UNRWA access-related incidents were reported, resulting in a loss of an
estimated 63 individual workdays or 472 work -hours, which negatively affected the
delivery of education and health services as well as relief operations. 25
Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestinian natural resources
66. In Gaza, the repercussions of the 2014 Israeli military offensive are still
evident and are compounded by the blockade. More than 120,000 people are still
__________________
43 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “The Gaza Strip: the humanitarian impact
of the blockade”, July 2015.
44 Press release by the Secretary-General (SG/SM/17682-SC/12328).
45 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report to
the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee” (30 September 2015).
46 The area that lies between the wall and the Green Line, declared by Israeli authorities as a closed
area.
47 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report to
the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee” (30 September 2015).
48 Information received from ILO.
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disconnected from public water networks, and 23 per cent of Gaza is not connected
to the sewage network.30
67. Damage to the electricity gridlines and fuel and electricity shortages have
resulted in a chronic electricity and fuel deficit affecting Gaza over the past nine
years. The deficit has disrupted the delivery of basic water, sanitation and hygiene
services, including more than 280 water and wastewater facilities in Gaza. 15
68. As a result, there has been widespread sewage i nfiltration into the coastal
aquifer. Owing to the deteriorated state of the infrastructure, up to 95 million litres
of untreated or partially treated sewage are released into the Mediterranean every
day or discharged into the environment. 2
69. As of January 2016, Israel continued to designate over 70 per cent of the
materials needed for water, sanitation and hygiene projects as dual use items,
placing at least 30 water and wastewater projects in Gaza at risk of being suspended
or cancelled.49
70. The daily average water consumption in Gaza is 79 litres per capita per day,
well below the rate of 100 litres per capita per day recommended by the World
Health Organization. However, Gaza’s coastal aquifer is contaminated, and 96 per
cent of the water in the Gaza Strip is unsuitable for human consumption.
Households must thus purchase drinking water from private companies at 10 times
the price of public water.50
71. In the West Bank, Israel allocates water discriminatorily and prevents
Palestinians from developing water infrastructure. The resulting average domestic
consumption rate among Palestinians is approximately 40 litres per capita per day
and drops to 20 litres per capita per day in several communities in Area C, 51
compared with 183 litres per capita per da y for Israeli settlers.30 Of the Palestinian
communities in Area C, 70 per cent are not connected to a water network. 2
72. Palestinians have to spend an average of 8 per cent of their monthly
expenditure on purchasing water, compared to the world average of 3.5 per cent,
and 0.9 per cent for Israelis living in illegal settlements. Families who have to rely
on expensive tankered water spend as much as half of their monthly expenditure. 15
This has a particularly crippling impact on Palestinian farmers. 52
73. In the West Bank, Israeli authorities continue to confiscate and demolish
Palestinian water infrastructure. During 2015, 24 water supply units, 12 wells, two
artesian wells, three pools, one water grid and six water tanks and trucks were
demolished.30
74. In East Jerusalem, only 64 per cent of Palestinian households are officially
connected to the water infrastructure. 7
75. Israeli restrictions prevent Palestinians from cultivating almost half a million
dunums of land suitable for agriculture in Area C. 2
__________________
49 Emergency, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Group (EWASH), “Thirsting for justice: 2015 in
review” (January 2016).
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Human Rights Watch, “Occupation Inc.: how settlement businesses contribute to Israel’s
violations of Palestinian rights” (January 2016). Available from https://www.hrw.org/report/
2016/01/19/occupation-inc/how-settlement-businesses-contribute-israels-violations-palestinian.
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76. The Jordan Valley is among the most fertile areas in the West Bank and
comprises 30 per cent thereof. Israel continues to expand its settlements there and to
allocate agricultural lands to the 9,500 Israeli settlers while preventing 60,000 to
80,000 Palestinians from cultivating or herding on around 87 per cent of the land. 52
77. In 2015, the Israeli army destroyed 8,242 dunums of agricultural land by
torching, spraying chemicals or dumping waste. 30 In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army
also damaged 420 acres of agricultural land by aerial herbicide in December 2015. 53
78. Around 1,000 Israeli factories operate in 16 to 20 Israeli industrial zones in the
West Bank, which reportedly have become a pollution haven. 54 For example, the
Ariel settlement and its associated industries dump chemical waste through its sewer
system, contaminating nearby Palestinian agricultural land. 55 The Applied Research
Institute – Jerusalem reports that sewage from Israeli settlements was pumped into
131 dunums of Palestinian land in 2015.30
79. The 2014 Israeli offensive on Gaza has had a number of delayed environmental
repercussions. Some areas may have sustained extensive soil damage, including the
removal and destruction of topsoil, rendering much of the land infertile or
significantly reducing the quantity and quality of yields. Air quality has also
deteriorated in some areas, including particulate matter and lead air pollution
significantly above acceptable WHO levels. 30
80. According to UNEP, the 2014 offensive may also have resulted in loss of
wildlife and native plants.30
81. As of 2015, Israeli stone quarries and crushers were expanding beyond the
3,522 dunums of Palestinian private lands they occupied in the West Bank. 30
82. Israel continues to prevent Palestinians from developing their natural gas
resources off the coast of Gaza.30
Socioeconomic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
83. The humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unique and
directly tied to the impact of almo st 50 years of occupation; one in two Palestinians
(2.3 million people) will need some form of humanitarian assistance in 2016. 2
Economic conditions
84. The Palestinian economy exists under prolonged occupation. Owing to long -
standing Israeli restrictions on movement, access and trade, private sector activity
has been severely constrained in the West Bank. Conditions are worse in Gaza,
assailed by recurrent conflict and with an economy devastated by nine years of
blockade that have significantly eroded the productive base and competitiveness of
the private sector. The aid-driven growth of the Palestinian economy between 2007
and 2011 started to slow down in 2012, primarily as a result of a sharp drop in
donor budget support. Although aid levels rose ag ain in 2013, growth rates
continued to decline, providing further evidence that the present growth model has
__________________
53 Information received from UNEP; see also http://972mag.com/idf -admits-spraying-herbicidesinside-
the-gaza-strip/115290/.
54 Human Rights Watch, “Occupation Inc.: how settlement businesses contribute to Israel’s
violations of Palestinian rights” (January 2016).
55 Ibid.; and information received from UNEP.
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exhausted its potential.56 The Palestinian economy cannot be put on a development
path that is sustainable under the current paradigm and under cond itions of recurrent
major military operations, deliberate destruction of infrastructure and services,
confiscation of land, expansion of illegal settlements and prolonged restrictions on
movement and trade, including the Gaza blockade.
85. The Palestinian economy contracted by 0.2 per cent in 2014 and by 2.1 per
cent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2015 before showing signs of recovery.
Overall real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 0.9 per cent year -on-year in the
second quarter of 2015 and 9.6 per cent in the third quarter, owing to a rebound
from a low base in Gaza in the third quarter of 2015 and a steady growth rate in
West Bank.57
86. The unemployment rate stood at 25.8 per cent in the third quarter of 2015
(38 per cent in Gaza and 18.7 per cent in the West Bank). Significantly, the rates
were high among vulnerable groups: 41.7 per cent among youth aged 20 to 24 years;
29.8 per cent among Palestinians with 13 or more years of schooling; 39.9 per cent
and 19.3 per cent, respectively, among refu gees in Gaza and the West Bank; and
60.5 per cent and 30.5 per cent, respectively, among women in Gaza and the West
Bank.58
87. Severe import/export restrictions have been a major disincentive to private
sector investment, forcing the economy to restructur e inwards towards non-tradable
goods and the service sector. Public administration and services account for the
largest share of Gaza’s GDP (32.6 per cent and 24.1 per cent, respectively). 59 The
easing of export restrictions in 2015 had little tangible impa ct on the local
economy.60
88. Slow economic recovery is underway in Gaza. Real GDP increased from a low
base by 33.3 per cent in the third quarter of 2015 when compared to the same
quarter of 2014, after six quarters of yearly decline. The upturn was led mainly by a
limited rebound in the construction sector, along with strong performance in the
wholesale and retail trade sector in the aftermath of the 2014 Israeli offensive.
89. On the expenditure side, the recovery is mostly explained by positive trends in
investment and private consumption. In spite of that, the consequences of the 2014
offensive linger: the level of real GDP per capita in Gaza in the first three quarters
of 2015 (equal to less than half of the GDP per capita in the West Bank) was below
its level for the same period in 2010, implying an important loss in the development
indicators.61
90. After a slowdown in 2014-2015 caused by a four-month suspension in
clearance revenue transfers by Israel, West Bank growth returned to an upward trend
__________________
56 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”, 30 September
2015 (99646 V2).
57 All figures are based on official quarterly national accounts published by the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics (accessed 9 March 2016). Note that figures for 2015 are preli minary.
58 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Labour force survey (October -December 2014) Round
(Q4/2015).
59 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Estimates of National Accounts” (Q3 2015).
60 Information received from UNRWA; and Palestine Trade Center (PalTrade). See also Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Gaza Crossings
database. Available from http://www.ochaopt.org/.
61 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Estimates of National Ac counts” (Q3 2015).
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and registered growth of 3.2 per cent and 4.0 per cent in the second and third
quarters of 2015 compared to the same quarters of the previous year. This was
mostly attributed to private consumption and investment, in spite of a deceleration
in consumption by the public sector. In terms of economic sectors, the recovery is
mostly attributed to trade and private services, while public services, manufacturing
and the primary sector reported declines during the first quarter of 2015 with respect
to the same period of 2014.
91. Palestinians working in illegal settlements in the West Bank suffer from abuse,
exploitation and work environments that pose risks to their health and safety. They
do not receive the Israeli minimum wage, and child labour continues to be a serious
problem, particularly in the Jordan Valley. 62
Food security
92. A total of 1.6 million Palestinians (28 per cent of households) suffer from
severe food insecurity, while another 37 per cent of the population suffers from
marginal or moderate food insecurity.22 Approximately half of the Palestinian
population suffers from more than one micronutrient deficiency. Alarmingly, 72 per
cent of female adolescents in Gaza suffer from a vitamin D deficiency, and 64 per
cent suffer from a deficiency of vitamin A.2
93. In 2014, an estimated 47 per cent of households in Gaza were food insecure. A
food security crisis has been averted only as a result of the large -scale provision of
humanitarian assistance.25 The situation has deteriorated in Gaza in 2015. According
to a household survey on living conditions conducted by the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics, 51.5 per cent of households reported that they ate less food
than needed because of unavailability, 40.2 per cent reported that they had fewer
meals owing to insufficient food, and 64.5 per cent of households had to purchase
food products on credit.63
94. In the West Bank, 16 per cent of households are considered moderately or
severely food insecure, with low purchasing power and limited resilienc e.2 The rate
is particularly high in West Bank refugee camps, at 29 per cent. 25
Public health
95. Almost half a century of Israeli occupation and practices, entailing humiliation
and loss of control over daily life activities, has had a detrimental impact on the
mental health and well-being of the Palestinian population (see A/70/392, para. 60).
96. In Gaza, the repercussions of the 2014 conflict continue to unfold, with around
225,000 children requiring psychosocial support and child protection services. 2
97. According to a 2015 household survey, 64 approximately one in three
respondents reported a negative mental health status and more than a quarter of
__________________
62 International Labour Office, The Situation of Workers in the Occupied Arab Territories ,
International Labour Conference, 104th Session, 2015 (ILC.104/DG/APP).
63 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia calculations based on Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics data.
64 Press release, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (October 2015). Available from
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_GazaWar2014E.pdf.
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respondents reported moderate to high levels of distress. 65 Of the persons surveyed,
56 per cent reported that they felt deprived, with the majority citing the Israeli
occupation, including the blockade, as the main cause of their deprivation. A total of
84 per cent considered suffering to be a part of their lives. In addition, 12 per cent
of the respondents aged 30 years and over reported having from one to thre e chronic
diseases (hypertension, diabetes mellitus and cardiovascular disease) diagnosed by a
doctor.66
98. The closures and aforementioned conflict have led to the severe deterioration
of the health sector in Gaza in terms of availability and quality of services. The
situation has further deteriorated as a result of the closure of the Rafah crossing
since July 2013.2
99. The infant mortality rate in Gaza has risen for the first time in five decades, as
hospitals continue to lack adequate physical infrast ructure, drugs and supplies.67
100. Overcrowded substandard houses have heightened the public health risks
associated with improper disposal of solid waste at dumping sites and standing
wastewater near refugee camps, where the average population density is nearly
40,000 persons per square kilometre. 25
101. In the West Bank, Israeli restrictions on movement and construction impede
Palestinian access to health-care services (see A/70/392, para. 56), including
medical referral services.15 The permit regime, checkpoints and the wall impede
access to the six East Jerusalem hospitals that provide specialized health services
unavailable elsewhere in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Among the most
affected are Palestinians residing in Area C, areas affected by the wall and East
Jerusalem peripheries. The access of those communities to basic health services is
also restricted by the actions of Israeli security forces and settler violence. 2
102. In 2015, 10 incidents of interference with health care were documented in the
West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Incidents include the forced closure of clinics,
undercover search and arrest operations and Israeli security forces entering hospitals
to obtain files and interrogate medical staff. In addition, the Palestine Red Crescent
Society reported that more than 131 paramedics and volunteers were wounded and
76 ambulances were damaged while undertaking their duties in the West Bank;
access by medical teams to sick and wounded p ersons was denied or delayed by
Israeli security forces on 70 different occasions. 15
Education
103. UNRWA reports that 86 per cent of the schools operated in double shifts in
2015. Refugee children attending those schools thus had fewer opportunities to
engage in recreational and creative pursuits than students who attended single shift
schools.25
104. In the West Bank, the education sector suffers from the discriminatory zoning
and planning regime, settler violence and measures by the Israeli army, as well as an
__________________
65 Using the 12-item General Health Questionnaire which is an international screening tool for the
assessment of general mental health status and well -being.
66 ESCWA and Birzeit University, “A people in danger: effects on health of the 2014 Israeli
offensive on the Gaza Strip” (May 2016).
67 Information received from UNRWA; see http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/increasing -
neonatal-mortality-among-palestine-refugees-gaza-strip.
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insufficient number of schools. In Area C, 50,000 students incur risks on their way
to school. More than 1,700 children in 37 localities have to walk 5 kilometres or
more to reach their schools. Around 2,500 children are forced to cross Israe li
military checkpoints on a daily basis to reach school. A total of 10,000 children
attend makeshift schools, in such structures as tents, caravans and tin shacks, that
provide no protection against heat or cold. 68
105. In 2015, attacks on schools and protected personnel in the West Bank and a
pervasive environment of violence, harassment and intimidation continued to have
an impact upon children’s access to education. Schools are subjected to shootings
during law enforcement operations and clashes. Studen ts and teachers are subjected
to attacks and threats of violence by Israeli security forces and settlers. Closure of
schools or arrest and detention of staff and students interfere with education. 15
106. In Gaza, of the 262 schools and 274 kindergartens d amaged or destroyed
during the 2014 hostilities, 96 per cent of non -United Nations schools, all United
Nations schools and 65 per cent of kindergartens have been repaired or rebuilt
through the assistance of humanitarian organizations and donors. 15
107. Israeli law stipulates that children who are residents of East Jerusalem are
entitled to free education. However, Palestinian -run schools are overcrowded and
have substandard facilities. Several of them, along with such facilities as
playgrounds, are threatened with demolition. Restrictions on construction impede
the construction of new schools (see A/70/392, para. 67). Checkpoints and the wall
hinder the access of Palestinian students and teachers to educational fa cilities in
East Jerusalem.2 Those conditions result in high dropout rates that reach 33 per cent
in grade 12.69
III. The occupied Syrian Golan
108. Since 1967, Israel has continued to occupy the Syrian Golan despite numerous
resolutions adopted by various United Nations bodies, including the Security
Council, which in its resolution 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981 decided that the
decision by Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied
Syrian Golan Heights was null and void, and demanded that Israel, the occupying
Power, should rescind forthwith its decision.
109. By 2015, 24,200 Syrian citizens lived in five villages, compared with 19,400
Israelis in 32 settlements.62 In October 2015, it was reported that Israel intended to
add an additional 100,000 settlers to the occupied Golan over the next five years
(see A/HRC/31/43, para. 64).
110. The Government of Israel has promoted settlements in the Golan by providing
financial incentives (see A/HRC/31/43, para. 6). It has been reported that financial
incentives of up to $12,000 were offered to Israe li families that settled in Golan
settlements for a minimum of five years (see A/70/406, para. 12).
__________________
68 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/
Press_En_IntChildDy2015E.pdf.
69 See Association for Civil Rights in Israel, http://www.acri.org.il/en/2016/02/01/5 -year-graceperiod-
for-education-in-east-jerusalem-has-ended/.
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111. About 20 per cent of the structures in the Syrian villages were built within the
villages municipal boundaries without building permits on Israeli-declared “State
land”. Annual fines are imposed by the Israeli authorities on such construction.
Recent considerable increases in the amount of the fines, from approximately
$2,594 to as much as approximately $51,882, seriously threaten the livelihoods of
many Syrian citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan. 62
112. While there had been no recent reported cases of major demolition of property
in the occupied Syrian Golan, civil society representatives indicated that demo lition
orders for Syrian properties issued in the past were still in place (see A/70/406,
para. 12).
113. There are also reports that additional Israeli efforts to populate the occupied
Syrian Golan involve the establishment of 750 new farms and the transfer of
150 families per year. Ninety Israeli families had already been transferred to settle
on those farms in 2015. It was also reported that as part of the farms project, Israel
had illegally diverted water to i rrigate the farms, thereby depleting water resources
and depriving Syrians of their use (see A/70/406, para. 12).
114. Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan suffer from discriminatory
policies, particularly related to land and water allocation. According to the
Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel has restricted Syrian
residents’ access to only 45,000 acres for farming in the occupied Syrian Golan,
compared with 350,000 acres for Israeli settlers. Furthermore, the Government of
the Syrian Arab Republic reported that Israeli authorities have prohibited Syrian
farmers from shepherding and restricted their access to land for farming (see
A/HRC/31/41, para. 12).
115. Over the years, expanding settlements and their activity have reduced Syrian
farmers’ access to water, while purchasing water has become more expensive.
Discriminatory policies are also applicable for prices and fees. A Syrian has to pay
one dollar per cubic metre of water, while a settler pays 30 cents for the same
quantity. In addition, settlers are granted subsidized access to flood water, whereas
Syrian farmers have been prevented from building new water reservoirs for nearly
30 years. Syrian farmers are allocated 200 cubic metres per dunum of land, which
constitutes only a third of their farming needs. This is compared with 800 cubic
metres per dunum allocated to settlers. Syrian farmers can thus produce 2.5 tons of
apples per dunum while settlers produce an average of 6 to 8 tonnes. 62
116. Israeli and foreign-owned companies, such as Genie Energy and Afek, have
continued to explore and exploit natural resources, including water, gas and oil
resources, after receiving licences from th e Israeli authorities.70
117. The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic reports that Syrians in the
occupied Syrian Golan continued to be subjected to house arrest, arbitrary arrest,
ill-treatment, unlawful detention and denial of family visits in Israeli prisons (see
A/HRC/31/41, para. 9).
__________________
70 See Afek — Israel Oil and Gas, http://afekoil.co.il/en/and A/HRC/31/41, para. 9.
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IV. Conclusion
118. The inadmissibility of acquiring land by force is one of the main
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. This principle was
reasserted in numerous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions
that address the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territories. Israel,
nevertheless, continues, undeterred, to implement practices and policies that
violate this principle, including the illegal annexation of East Jerusalem and
the occupied Syrian Golan, and the de facto annexation of West Bank lands by
means of the wall and settlements.
119. Another principle enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations is
non-discrimination. The present report and other United Nations reports clearly
point to the discriminatory nature of many Israeli policies and practices.
120. Israeli practices and policies in the territories it occupies involve
violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights
law. Some of those practices may even amount to forcible displacement of the
protected population, which would constitute a grave violation of the Fourth
Geneva Convention.
121. The Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territories has entered its
fiftieth year. Policies by the occupying Power highlighted in this report seem to
be geared towards consolidating control over those territories and can be
viewed as part of a three-tiered strategy: population displacement, land grab
and suppression of any form of resistance thereto. The impact of the policies on
the Palestinian people, society and economy is multilayered and has
accumulated over decades of occupation to reach unimaginable levels.
122. The Israeli occupation and its practices have obstructed Palestinian social
and economic development and at times reversed it, undermining the right of
the Palestinian people to development and self-determination and the prospects
of peace. In a statement to the Security Council on 26 January 2016, the
Secretary-General asserted that it is human nature to react to occupation,
which often serves as a potent incubator of hate and extremism.
123. The impunity Israel has enjoyed so far has only rendered the attainment
of peace more difficult. International law in all its elements must be respected
and enforced without exception, to ensure a just and lasting peace. It is the
duty of the international community to work towards the attainment of such a
peace.
United Nations A/72/90*–E/2017/71*
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
23 May 2017
Original: English
17-08346* (E) 160817
*1708346*
General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Item 64 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
2017 session
28 July 2016-27 July 2017
Agenda item 16
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
Summary
In its resolution 2016/14, the Economic and Social Council requested the
Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy -first session,
through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 71/247, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a
report to it at its seventy-second session. The present report, which was prepared by
the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), h as been
submitted in compliance with the resolutions of the Council and the Assembly.
The report covers Israeli practices and policies, in particular those that are in
violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and
that affect the social and economic conditions of the people living under its military
occupation. Israel has employed discriminatory policies and practices, use of force
that has at times been deemed excessive and restrictions on the freedom of
movement, including the closures in Gaza, settlement expansion, destruction of
property and the exploitation of natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan. The cumulative impact of such policies and
practices is not confined to violations of international law, including the rights of the
population under occupation; it also exacerbates the social and economic conditions
of that population.
* Reissued for technical reasons on 15 August 2017.
** A/72/50.
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ESCWA would like to express its appreciation for the contributions of the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the
United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the
International Labour Organization, the World Health Organization, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Human
Settlements Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner fo r
Human Rights, the League of Arab States, the Office of the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Office of the United
Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Population
Fund, the World Food Programme and the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat.
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I. Introduction
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2016/14, and the General
Assembly, in its resolution 71/247, expressed concern about the economic and
social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the l iving conditions of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as well as the exploitation,
destruction and degradation of natural resources in the Occupi ed Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel
since 1967.
2. In particular, the Council, in its resolution, calls for, inter alia, the full opening
of the border crossings of the Gaza Strip and the full i mplementation of the
Agreement on Movement and Access of 15 November 2005; stresses the need to
preserve the territorial contiguity, unity and integrity of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of moveme nt of
persons and goods; demands compliance with the Protocol on Economic Relations
between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (the
“Paris Protocol”); and calls upon Israel to respect the rules of international
humanitarian law, refrain from violence against the civilian population, cease the
destruction of homes and properties, economic institutions and agricultural lands
and orchards, immediately end the exploitation of natural resources, cease
settlement and settlement-related activity, account for the illegal actions perpetrated
by Israeli settlers, pay urgent attention to the plight and the rights of Palestinian
prisoners and detainees, comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and facilitate visits of
the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan whose family members reside in
their mother homeland, the Syrian Arab Republic.
3. The present note provides information on relevant developments with reg ard
to the foregoing.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory
Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
4. Palestinians in the occupied territory are subject to a complex combination of
Israeli and Palestinian legal systems. Lower human rights standards are applied to
Palestinian suspects and defendants compared to Israeli suspects and defendants.
Differences include the maximum period of detention before being brought before a
judge, the duration for which a suspect can be prevented from meeting an attorney,
protections for defendants during trial, maximum punishment and release before
sentence completion. Furthermore, Israeli military law provides for additional
offences that are not part of Israeli criminal law ( A/HRC/34/38, paras. 38-39).
5. Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have implemented what have been deemed
discriminatory planning policies with regard to Palestinian residents of East
Jerusalem. Those policies include large-scale allocations of land for settlement
building and the lack of adequate planning and investment in infrastructure for
Palestinian neighbourhoods.1
__________________
1 Bimkom, “Trapped by planning: Israeli policy, planning and development in the Palestinian
neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem”, 2014. Available from http://bimkom.org/eng/wp -content/
uploads/TrappedbyPlanning.pdf.
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6. Planning and zoning policy in Area C of the West Bank (which constitutes
60 per cent of the West Bank and where 5-10 per cent of the Palestinians in the West
Bank reside), under full Israeli control, has been deemed restrictive, discriminatory
and incompatible with international law (A/HRC.34/38, para. 25; see also para. 55
below). Palestinians living there are often faced with insurmountable Israeli
obstacles when seeking to obtain construction permits, including high application
fees and requirements that new housing be connected to often unavailable municipal
works.2 In East Jerusalem, although hundreds of small -scale plans were approved
for Palestinians in recent years,1 there is inadequate planning for future
improvement on a large scale that is necessary to address public needs.
7. According to Israeli Civil Administration data, during the first six months of
2016, 391 of 428 (91 per cent) applications for building permits in Palestinian
communities in Area C were rejected. The majority of applications approved were
reportedly issued by the Israeli authorities for “ relocation” sites planned for
Bedouin communities.3
Violence and use of force
8. Serious concerns remain about the use of force and unlawful killings by Israeli
security forces, including some cases which may have amounted to extrajudicial
executions (A/HRC/34/38, para. 47). Several documented cases have raised the
question as to whether those killed posed the level of threat that, according to
international standards, would merit the use of deadly force (i bid., paras. 28 and 44).
9. Overall, 63 Palestinians, including 19 children, were killed from 1 April 2016
to 31 March 2017 by Israeli army and security forces in the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Approximately 2,276 others were injured,
including 562 children. At least 37 of the Palestinians killed were carrying out or
suspected of carrying out attacks against Israelis.
10. During the reporting period, 12 Israelis, including 7 civilians, were killed in
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory; 162 Israelis were injured in attacks by
Palestinians.4 Twelve rockets were fired into Israel by Hamas and extremist groups
in Gaza, causing no casualties, to which Israel retaliated with over 50 airstrikes,
resulting in at least one Palestinian civilian fatality and a number of injuries.
11. Palestinians who commit attacks against Israelis have been glorified, including
by representatives of ruling parties. Continued terrorism and incitement violate
Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2334 (2016), concerning the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, in which the Council called for immediate steps to
prevent all acts of violence against civilians, including acts of terror.
12. There were no Palestinian fatalities from unexploded ordnance during the
reporting period, a fact that reflects a decline in recent years from 10 such fatalities
in 2014, to 6 in 2015, to 1 in 2016.
__________________
2 United States of America, Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2016: Israel and The Occupied Territories , available from https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=265502&year=2016#wrapper ; Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Under threat: demolition orders in area C of the West
Bank”, 2015; see A/70/82, para. 16.
3 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Record number of demolitions a nd
displacements in the West Bank during 2016”, in Humanitarian Bulletin: Occupied Palestinian
Territory, January 2017. Available from https://www.ochaopt.org/content/record -numberdemolitions-
and-displacements-west-bank-during-2016.
4 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) calculations based on information
obtained from the Humanitarian Bulletins of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs from April 2016 to January 2017.
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Settler-related violence
13. Palestinians continued to suffer from settler violence and harassment during
the reporting period, despite a significant drop in the recorded number of such
incidents during the past three years, which was due, in part, to preventive measures
implemented by Israeli authorities ( A/HRC/34/39, paras. 19 and 20).
14. From 4 April 2016 to 20 March 2017, there were 39 violent settler -related
incidents that resulted in Palestinian casualties in the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem. During the same period, 73 Israeli settler attacks resulted in damages to
Palestinian properties.4
Withholding of bodies of Palestinians suspects
15. During the reporting period, the Israeli authorities continued the practice of
delaying the return of the bodies of Palestinians who carried out, or were alleged to
have carried out, attacks. Such practice could amount to a collective penalty against
the families of the deceased and may be contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention
(A/71/364, para. 25).
Detention and-ill treatment
16. By January 2017, approximately 6,500 Palestinians were being held in Israeli
prisons, including 300 children. A total of 536 Palestinians remain under
administrative detention.5
17. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Detainees and Ex -Detainees Affairs,
more than 15,000 Palestinian women have at some point been detained by Israeli
authorities since 1967.6 The number of children in detention, including children
under the age of 12, declined from 440 children in February 2016 7 to 335 in
February 2017.8
18. The United Nations Committee against Torture expressed concern about a
number of Israeli practices towards Palestinian detainees, including minors. Such
practices include deprivation of basic legal safeguards for administrative detainees,
isolation and solitary confinement of detainees, including minors, punishment and
ill-treatment of hunger strikers, torture or ill -treatment of Palestinian children and
the hindering of visits of relatives for child prisoners. The Committee also
expressed concern about information it received to the effect that there is no proper
accountability for torture and ill-treatment (CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, paras. 22, 24, 26, 28
and 30). No criminal investigation was opened into more than 1,000 complaints of
torture or ill-treatment filed since 2001.9
19. The resort to administrative detention by Israel must be consistent with human
rights guarantees10 and with the exceptional nature of internment permitted under
article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. During the reporting period, a number
of Palestinian administrative detainees resorted to hunger strikes to protest their
detention without charge (see A/HRC/31/40, paras. 42 and 44).
__________________
5 Addameer, January 2017 database. Available from www.addameer.org/statistics (accessed
26 March 2017).
6 See http://mod.gov.ps/wordpress/?p=1053.
7 Defense for Children International -Palestine, Number of Palestinian Children (12 -17) in Israeli
military detention database. Available from www.dci-palestine.org/children_in_israeli _detention.
8 Information provided to the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process by the Israeli authorities in March 2017.
9 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of the World’s Human
Rights (London, 2017).
10 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9.
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20. Israeli security forces continue to arrest fishermen, including some who claim
to have remained within the military-permitted fishing zone in Gaza. Throughout
2016, Israeli security forces reportedly detained over 100 fishermen, the highest
annual figure since the United Nations started to track such detentions in 2009. 11
Israel has reported that militant groups in Gaza make continuous efforts to smuggle
weapons and materials for weapons production through the sea, including by using
fishing boats.
Destruction and confiscation of property and infrastructure
21. During the reporting period, from April 2016 to March 2017, Israeli authorities
demolished 726 Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem. That number is slightly lower than the one in the previous reporting
period (810 structures). However, both figures are high compared to previous years.
From 2011 to 2015, the number of structures demolished each ye ar was below 650,
for an average of 590 structures each year.
22. During the reporting period, Israel intensified punitive demolitions of
Palestinian family homes, a measure that may amount to collective punishment
(A/HRC/34/36, para. 31, and A/71/364, para. 23). That policy, which targets the
family homes of Palestinians convicted or suspected of carrying out attacks against
Israelis, resumed in mid-2014 (A/70/82, para. 42). Under its provisions, Israeli
authorities demolished or rendered uninhabitable 21 homes during the reporting
period, displacing 103 Palestinians, including 38 children. Overall, from 2014 to
mid-January 2017, Israel punitively demolished or sealed 42 homes in the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem. 12
23. The so-called Regularization Law was passed by the Israeli Knesset in
February 2017. If implemented, it could enable the continued use of private
Palestinian land in the West Bank for between 2,000 and 4,000 housing units,
according to some estimates.13 Several petitions against the law are currently
pending with Israel’s High Court of Justice, and its implementation is likely to
remain on hold until the Court rules on its legality.
24. Over one third of Area C is formally designated as public land (referred to as
“State land” by Israel). The vast majority of “State land” declarations took place
before the start of the Oslo peace process in the early 1990s. I t is estimated that
between 750 km2 and 900 km2 were declared “State land” by Israel from 1979 to
1992.14 “State land” has been allocated exclusively for use by Israel and its citizens,
rather than for the benefit of the local population, as required under international
law. In late March 2017, the Israeli authorities declared nearly 1 km2 in the West
Bank as “State land”.
25. Archaeological excavations, the creation of national parks and the
development of tourist activities are other methods employed by Is rael to entrench
its presence in the West Bank (see A/HRC/34/39, paras. 21-22).
__________________
11 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report to
the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”, September 2016.
12 Hamoked, “Updated summary on punitive home demolitions from July 2014 to January 18,
2017”, available from www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Updates1828 .
13 Peace Now, “The grand land robbery: the land implications of the regulation bill on the reality on
the ground”, 29 November 2016. Available from http://peacenow.org.il/en/grand-land-robberyimplications-
regulation-bill-reality-ground.
14 Kerem Navot, “Blue and white make black: the work of the Blue Line Team in the West Bank”,
December 2016; and Nir Shalev and Alon Cohen -Lifshitz, “The prohibited zone: Israeli planning
policy in the Palestinian villages in Area C” (Bimkom, 2008).
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Population displacement
26. There is concern that the combination of State -sanctioned land seizures,
retroactive legalization of outposts, demolition of Palestinian homes and livelihood
structures, denial of Palestinian building permits, restrictions of movement and
access to livelihoods, settler violence and a lack of accountability contribute to the
creation of a coercive environment in areas under full Israeli control, propelling
Palestinians to move out of certain parts of Area C and East Jerusalem (ibid., para. 41).
27. Involuntary displacement and relocation to alternative residential areas, as a
result of such policies, may amount to forcible transfer if it is carried out without
the free and informed consent of the individuals who relocate, in violation of
Israel’s obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law
(A/HRC/34/38, paras. 27-28).
28. During the reporting period, 1,122 Palestinians were displaced as result of
home demolitions. While that number is similar to the one of the previous reporting
period (1,144), it still reflects a high rate of demolitions compared to previous years. 15
29. Residents of Palestinian communities located in Area C face the risk of land
confiscation, home demolitions and forced displ acement.16 Hundreds of Palestinian
families are at risk of forced eviction in East Jerusalem owing to the seizure of
buildings by Israeli settlers in Silwan and the Old City, as well as to various parks
and tourism sites being developed by the Israeli autho rities. Bedouin communities
in Area C are also at high risk of displacement owing to the policy of demolition of
structures that Israel deems as “illegal”. 17
30. In Gaza, there has been significant progress in the reconstruction effort during
the reporting period. The majority of the nearly 18,000 homes rendered
uninhabitable during the conflict have been reconstructed or are in the process of
being reconstructed. However, 39,000 persons continue to live in temporary
shelters, given the funding gap of $115 million required for the rebuilding of nearly
2,900 totally destroyed homes.
Israeli settlement activity
31. Israeli settlement policies violate Security Council resolutions, including
resolution 2334 (2016), in which the Council reaffirmed that the establishment by
Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East
Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under
international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of a lasting and
comprehensive peace. The presence and continued expansion of Israeli settlements
lie at the root of a broad spectrum of human rights violations in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem (see A/HRC/31/43, para. 5).
32. The Government of Israel continues to support population growth in the
settlements by providing State-led public services, opening new economic activities,
advancing housing plans and providing tax benefits to some of the settlements
(A/71/355, para. 4).
__________________
15 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Demolitions system database, available
from http://data.ochaopt.org/demolition -sys.aspx.
16 United Nations Country Team, Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Common country analysis 2016:
leave no one behind — a perspective on vulnerability and structural disadvantage in Palestine”
(2016).
17 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian needs overview 2017:
Occupied Palestinian Territory” (2016).
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33. The settler population in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has doubled
since the Oslo Accords, reaching over 594,000 persons (including an esti mated
208,000 persons in East Jerusalem) by the end of 2015, who live in some 130
settlements and 100 outposts (A/HRC/34/39, para. 11).
34. If implemented, the Regularization Law could retroactively legalize u p to
4,000 settler residences in the West Bank that were built on land privately owned by
Palestinians.18
35. According to data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016 saw
2,630 housing construction starts in West Bank settlements, a 40 per cent increase
compared to 2015 (1,901). The second quarter of 2016 saw construction starts for
1,102 housing units in Area C settlements, the highest quarterly figure in over seven
years.19
36. Since the beginning of 2017, the Israeli authorities promoted some 6,000
housing units in the West Bank, all in Area C. Within a three -week period, plans for
some 3,000 units were promoted in the planning process and plans for over 240
units reached the final approval stage. In addition, during the first three months of
2017, tenders for around 2,800 housing units were published. By comparison,
during the whole of 2016, plans for about 3,000 units were advanced, 700 reached
the final stage of approval and tenders were issued for only 42 units in Area C. The
reporting period saw advancements of plans for around 1,600 housing units in East
Jerusalem settlements, with none reaching the final stage of approval. In addition,
tenders for 323 units were issued in July 2016.
Movement and access restrictions
Gaza closure, including access-restricted areas
37. The closures in Gaza, significantly tightened after Hamas took over the area in
2007, together with successive military confrontations since then, have exacerbated
the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, which severely undermine s any effort at development
and results in recurrent violations of human rights ( A/HRC/34/38, para. 66).
38. The closures have a negative impact on basic human rights and economic
prospects, as well as the ava ilability of essential services, which exacerbates poverty
and aid dependency. Access to health, education and broader economic and social
rights is restricted.
39. Throughout 2016, the Rafah crossing remained closed, with the exception of
44 days (compared to 33 days in 2015).20
40. When rejecting requests by Palestinians from Gaza for permits to enter Israel,
Israeli authorities tend to provide only general explanations, usually claiming that
the request falls outside the criteria defined in the closure po licy or that it was
denied on security grounds. The approval rate for patients seeking to leave Gaza for
medical treatment through Erez dropped from 77.5 per cent in 2015 to 62.1 per cent
in 2016, the lowest since 2009.21 At the same time, the absolute numb er of patients
__________________
18 Knesset, “Knesset passes settlement regulation law”, press release, 7 February 2017. Available
from https://www.knesset.gov.il/spokesman/eng/PR_eng.asp?PRID=13341 .
19 See www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2017n/04_17_083t3.pdf .
20 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin: Occupied
Palestinian Territory, January 2017. Available from https:// www.ochaopt.org/content/recordnumber-
demolitions-and-displacements-west-bank-during-2016.
21 Information received from the World Health Organization (WHO).
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from Gaza allowed to enter Israel has seen a steady and significant increase year by
year, from 5,130 patients in 2009 to 17,665 patients in 2016 .22
41. From 3 April to 22 May 2016, Israel temporarily froze the entry of cement into
Gaza, citing that significant portions of it were diverted, including for military use
by Hamas. Despite the freeze, 2016 saw a 56 per cent increase in the import of
cement over 2015. That trend continued during the first three months of 2017, when
about 245,000 tons of cement entered Gaza, more than the total amounts for 2012,
2013 and 2014 combined.23
42. The amounts and value of exports from Gaza remain low compared to their
pre-2007 levels. The number of truckloads of goods that exited Gaza in March 2017
remained at only 36 per cent of the figure for 2007, despite a significant increase
compared to previous years.24
43. As part of its closure policy, Israel imposes restrictions on access to land and
maritime areas, citing security concerns, including smuggling o f weapons and
digging of tunnels by Hamas and extremist groups in Gaza. The official access -
restricted area extends 100 m from the fence between Israel and Gaza. In addition,
for several hundred metres further from the fence, civilians face high risks of b eing
shot by Israeli security forces.25
44. In March 2016, Israel reportedly expanded the range in which Palestinians can
fish from 6 to 9 nautical miles off the Gaza coast, before reducing it back to 6 miles
in June that year.
Movement restrictions in the West Bank
45. Forty-four per cent of West Bank land is off-limits to Palestinian construction
and development. The land is used for Israeli settlements, military zones, natural
reserves and Israel’s “barrier” in the West Bank, built in 2003 for the sta ted purpose
of preventing Palestinians from carrying out attacks in Israel. Although not yet
completed, the “barrier” effectively creates a reality in which access by most
Palestinians to about 4 per cent of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, can be
achieved only with a permit from the Israeli authorities. 16 The two main areas in the
West Bank that most Palestinians cannot access without a permit are the area west of
the “barrier”, known as the “seam zone”,26 and East Jerusalem (see A/HRC/31/44).
46. The West Bank is divided into three categories. Areas A and B are under the
civil control of the Palestinian Authority, cover 40 per cent of the West Bank and are
home to about 90 per cent of its Palestinian population. Area C covers the rest of the
area and includes all Israeli settlements. Area C separates Areas A and B into over
__________________
22 For 2009 figure, see, WHO, “Right to health: crossing barriers to access health in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory 2014-2015” (2016). Available from www.emro.who.int/images/stories/
palestine/documents/WHO_-_Access_Report_2014-15_-Final.pdf. For 2016 figure, see WHO,
“Health access for referral patients from the Gaza Strip”, monthly report, December 2016.
Available from www.emro.who.int/images/stories/palestine/WHO_monthly_Gaza_access_report -
Dec_2016-Final.pdf.
23 See grm.report.
24 In March 2017, 372 truckloads of goods exited Ga za, 36 per cent of the monthly average during
the first half of 2007 (1,040 truckloads), according to the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs. During this reporting period, a total of 2,540 truckloads of goods exited
Gaza, marking a significant increase compared to the previous reporting period (1,712
truckloads) and the one preceding it (388 truckloads). Information available from
http://data.ochaopt.org/gazacrossing/index .aspx?id=4.
25 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gaza strip: access and movement fact
sheet 2016”, March 2017.
26 The area that lies between the wall and the Armistice Line of 1949.
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150 distinct areas of varying sizes, many of them separated by settlements and their
related infrastructure.
47. By mid-December 2016, there were 472 obstacles to movement in the West
Bank, including permanently and partially staffed checkpoints, earth mounds,
roadblocks and road gates. Compared to a similar survey conducted in 2015, the
cumulative number of obstacles rose by 5 per cent, although the number of
permanently staffed checkpoints decreased by 25 per cent compared to 2015. In
Hebron, by March 2017, 100 obstacles were deployed within the Israeli -controlled
area of the city.27
48. As noted in previous reports of the Secretary-General, following attacks
against Israelis, the Israeli authorities have often employed measures that may
amount to a collective penalty, which affect the members of the family or the
community of the attackers or alleged attackers ( A/HRC/34/38, para. 31). For
example, on 1 July 2016, after a shooting attack in which one Israeli was killed, the
Palestinian town of Yata, with a population of over 60,000 persons, was cordoned off.
Severe restrictions remained in place through most of July ( A/HRC/34/36, para. 34).
49. Israel continues to construct the “barrier” in the West Bank, contrary to the
2004 International Court of Justice advisory opinion, which states that “the
construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated
regime, [were] contrary to international law” (see A/ES-10/273 and Corr. 1). Of the
current planned 712 km route, 85 per cent lies within the West Bank. In addition, if
the construction of the “barrier” is completed, up to 25,000 Palestinians could be
added to the 11,000 Palestinians already isolated in the “seam zone”. 16
Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestinian natural resources
50. The population of Gaza still suffers from the repercussions of the 2014
military conflict, in terms of access to water and sanitation inf rastructure.17
Constraints on the rehabilitation of infrastructure have left 23 per cent of Gazans
disconnected from the sewage network. 16
51. Damage to electricity gridlines and fuel and electricity shortages have
contributed to a chronic electricity and fuel deficit in Gaza over the past 10 years. 17
During January 2017, in the middle of winter, the electricity crisis reached its peak,
in large part owing to a dispute over payments between the Palestinian Authority in
Ramallah and Hamas in Gaza. About 2 mi llion Palestinians were left with three
hours of electricity per day, as opposed to six and eight hours of electricity per day
at other times.28
52. The chronic electricity deficit further exacerbates the water crisis in Gaza, as it
affects more than 300 water and wastewater facilities, which results in an
inadequate and irregular water supply and in untreated sewage that overflows into
the streets or into the sea.28
53. The coastal aquifer remains the primary water source for the people of Gaza,
yet 95 per cent of its water is no longer considered fit for human consumption.
Forty per cent of Gaza’s population receives just five to eight hours of water supply
every three days. An estimated 85 per cent of Gaza’s residents rely on drinking
water from public or private producers, whose production, supply chain and
household storage results in potential contamination. 28 The daily average water
__________________
27 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin: Occupied
Palestinian Territory, March 2017.
28 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA),
Gaza situation report, No. 178 (January 2017).
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consumption in Gaza is thus 79 l per capita per day, well below the rate of 100 l
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO). As a result, 95 per cent of
the population may now be at risk of water -borne diseases.16
54. In the West Bank, difficulties in obtaining Israeli permits fo r activities related
to constructing or rehabilitating Palestinian water infrastructure 29 contribute to
denying Palestinians their right to access water. 30
55. A total of 620,000 persons either are not connected to a water network or
receive water only once a week or less. A total of 150,000 of them live in Area C,
where Israel has full responsibility over water. Certain Area C communities face
other restrictions regarding physical access to water supplies, in addition to
continued demolitions of water, sanit ation and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure.17
56. By June 2016, average water consumption by Palestinians in the West Bank
stood at 73 l of water per capita per day, again well below the consumption of 100 l
recommended by WHO and drastically lower than the 2 40 l to which Israelis have
access.29 In some areas, Palestinian water consumption was as low as 20 l per
person per day, in particular in communities without water infrastructure. 31
57. Palestinians are prevented from accessing the Jordan River and are onl y
allocated 13 per cent of the mountain aquifer water. The rest is absorbed by Israel,
which also has access to a wide range of other water resources. The scarcity of
water resources for Palestinians in the West Bank leaves them dependent on the
Israeli water company Mekorot for 18.5 per cent of their water needs (2014 data). 29
On average, 8 per cent of Palestinian monthly expenditure is for purchasing water,
compared to the world average of 3.5 per cent. 17
58. In East Jerusalem, decades of insufficient inv estment in infrastructure and the
lack of building permits result in about 36 per cent of the population with
vulnerable illegal connections to water networks and up to a third of the population
lacking sewage connections.17
59. In the West Bank, farmers suffer from difficulties in accessing their lands.
Those with farmland in the “seam zone” or in the vicinity of settlements require
special Israeli permits or prior coordination arrangements in order to access them. 17
Along similar lines, Israeli restrictio ns prevent Palestinians from benefiting from
most land resources located in Area C.16
60. Israeli-imposed restrictions on fishing areas off Gaza have resulted in the
deterioration of the Strip’s fishing sector. The shrinking fishing zone has led to
overfishing in a small area, resulting in a decreased fish population and depletion of
their breeding grounds.32
61. Official Palestinian sources have claimed that practices by Israeli authorities
and settlers, including the illegal transfer of hazardous waste to the West Bank and
the allocation of parts of the Jordan Valley to an Israeli dumpsite devoted to
industrial waste, have gravely damaged Palestinian agricultural land, health, animals
and biodiversity.33
__________________
29 “EWASH concerned by water restrictions in the West Bank resulting from Israeli discriminatory
policies”, press release, 21 June 2016. Available from http://reliefweb.int/report/occupiedpalestinian-
territory/ewash-concerned-water-restrictions-west-bank-resulting-israeli.
30 See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/risk -settler-takeover-ein-fera-water-spring-hebron#_ftn5.
31 World Bank, “Water situation alarming in Gaza”, 22 November 2016.
32 See Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report
to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”, September 2016.
33 See http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx?tabID=512&lang=en&ItemID=1627&mid=
3171&wversion=Staging#.
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Socioeconomic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
62. The impact of the occupation ranges from humanitarian crises to obstruction
of social and economic development, at times reversing the development trajectory.
Economic conditions34
63. The economy of Palestine contracted sharply during t he second half of 2014
and the beginning of 2015, in the aftermath of the last Gaza military conflict. Since
then, the economy has continued to recover, with stable growth and subdued
inflation. Constant-price gross domestic product increased by 5.1 per ce nt in the
first three quarters of 2016 relative to the same period in 2015. The increase
originated mainly in Gaza, where an average growth of 9.8 per cent was registered.
Growth in the West Bank, while more moderate, remained stable at 3.7 per cent.
64. The growth in the West Bank was attributed mostly to robust performance in
the manufacturing sector and some services activities, such as financial services and
education. However, growth was restrained by modest declines in agriculture,
construction and trade. On the expenditure side, the positive economic performance
of the West Bank during 2016 can be attributed mainly to private consumption,
while investment and, to a lesser extent, government expenditure, registered
negative rates of growth. The high ra tes of growth in the Gaza Strip during the first
three quarters of 2016 are due mainly to the continued improvement in the
construction sector and public administration services. In terms of expenditure,
growth in the Gaza Strip was led solely by gross cap ital formation, mirroring the
positive performance of the construction sector described above, since both private
consumption and the external sector contributed negatively to growth.
65. There are sharp differences in living conditions between Gaza and the rest of
the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In spite of recent high growth rates in Gaza, the
2014 conflict exacerbated the divergence between that area and the West Bank. This
fact can be explained by the cumulative impact of conflicts, closures and t he Hamas
takeover of Gaza, which have endured over the last years.
66. The unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2016 was 25.7 per cent
(16.9 per cent in the West Bank and 40.6 per cent in the Gaza Strip), a slight decline
of 0.4 per cent compared to the same period in 2015. At the same time, labour
participation declined by 2.2 per cent, suggesting that many workers are leaving the
labour force (the “discouraged worker” effect). Although unemployment among
young Palestinians (from 15 to 29 years of age) showed modest improvement in the
last quarter of the 2016, it increased by 1.5 per cent during all of 2016. This rate
reached 45.4 per cent in the third quarter of 2016, its highest level since 2014.
Unemployment among Palestine refugees also remained high at 31.6 per cent.
67. The persistently high unemployment rate in Gaza (the average for 2016 was
41.7 per cent) remained above its pre-2014 level, showing that the labour market is
still struggling to recover from the fallout of the 2014 escalation.
68. The rate of female unemployment not only is higher than that of men (43.9 per
cent compared to 21 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2016), but it has also increased
for almost 10 consecutive years. Despite an encouraging recent increase in the
female labour force participation rate, this figure stood at 18.9 per cent for ages 15
__________________
34 Unless stated otherwise, this section is based on the analysis by ESCWA of figures from official
national accounts, labour statistics and consumer price indices published by the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics, as well as from the quarterly bulletins of the Palestinian Monetary
Authority. All data were accessed on 23 March 2017. Figures for 2016 are preliminary.
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and above in the fourth quarter of 2016, still considerably below that for men
(71.4 per cent).
69. National fiscal revenue saw some encouraging developments. Gross domestic
revenue grew by 27.8 per cent in 2016, continuing an upward trend that has led to a
more-than-doubling (208.7 per cent) since 2006 and achieving a record high in the
third quarter of 2016. In 2016, earmarked tax collection increased by 48.6 per cent
from its 2015 level. Such positive developments are combined with a strong
dependency on clearance revenue (customs revenue directed and controlled by
Israel), which still represents approximately two thirds of total domestic revenue.
Israel deducted about $120 million per month until May 2016 to cover electricity,
water and wastewater bills due by the Palestinian Authority, as agreed by the parties
to the Oslo agreements. That amount was 34 per cent less than the same one for
2015.35 Public debt decreased slightly in the last quarter of 2016, which could lead
to a welcome change to the long-standing upward trend, as the total public debt has
already increased by 127.5 per cent since 2006.
Food security stop
70. Although improvements have been registered in rec ent years, food insecurity
remains high in Palestine, with 26.8 per cent of households classified as food
insecure in 2014.36 Improvements originate only in the West Bank, where food
insecurity fell from 22.1 per cent of households in 2013 to 16.3 per cent in 2014.
The situation in Gaza remains dire, with food insecurity at a high level (46.7 per
cent of households in 2014) and deteriorating (up from 44.5 per cent in 2013). In the
West Bank, food insecurity is particularly high in refugee camps, at 29 per ce nt.37
71. Food insecurity in the Occupied Palestinian Territory derives primarily from
the lack of economic access to food that is intrinsically correlated with poverty.
Food security is further hampered by the insufficient or unstable food supply, both
in the Gaza Strip, where the decade-long closures and recurrent conflicts with Israel
have affected productive capacity, and in the West Bank, where restrictions on the
movement of persons and goods heavily impede livelihoods and economic activity. 38
72. Approximately half of the Palestinian population suffers from more than one
micronutrient deficiency.17 A food security crisis in Gaza has only been averted
owing to large-scale humanitarian assistance.39 More than 70 per cent of Gaza’s
residents receive some form of international aid, the bulk of which is food
assistance.40 The population that receives UNRWA food aid has grown more than
tenfold from 2000 to 2016, rising from fewer than 80,000 to over 960,000 persons.
In the West Bank, food insecurity in refugee h ouseholds reached 22 per cent
compared to 14 per cent for non-refugee households.
__________________
35 Data from the Palestinian Ministry of Finance.
36 Food insecure households are those classified as “severely food insecure” or “moderately food
insecure” under the Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey methodology. For more
information, see Palestine Food Security Sector and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,
“Socioeconomic and food security survey 2014: State of Palestine” (2016).
37 Palestine Food Security Sector and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Socioeconomic and
food security survey 2014: State of Palestine” (2016).
38 Ibid.
39 Information received from UNRWA.
40 Available from https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza -strip-humanitarian-impact-blockadenovember-
2016.
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Education
73. In 2016, education-related grave violations continued to restrict the right of
children to access education safely in the West Bank, including East Jerusale m.41
74. The planning and zoning regime applied by the Israeli authorities in Area C
and East Jerusalem has created a shortage of school buildings. A total of 50,000
Palestinian children are enrolled in 183 schools in Area C. Over 1,700 children from
37 West Bank communities commute to schools more than 5 km away. Harassment
and violence have also been reported as causes that complicate journeys to and from
school.16
75. UNRWA reports that 75 per cent of schools in Gaza continued to operate on a
double-shift basis in 2016. Refugee children have fewer opportunities to engage in
recreational and creative pursuits than students attending single -shift schools.39
76. In Gaza, all 252 schools that were damaged or destroyed during the 2014
hostilities have been repaired and are fully operational, the completely destroyed
UNRWA school has been reconstructed and work is under way on the six remaining
destroyed schools. Of the 14 higher education institutions affected by the hostilities,
4 have been repaired and work is ongoing on another 7 institutions. A total of 180 of
the 274 damaged kindergartens have been repaired. 42
77. In Gaza, children’s learning experiences are negatively affected by the short
school days owing to double shifts and chronic overcrowding. Security -related
incidents have also affected school infrastructure in Area C and areas close to
settlements.43
Public health
78. Gaza is one of the most densely populated areas in the world, with over 5,000
persons per km2.44 The situation is particularly challenging for 43 per cent of the
refugees who live in camps where the average population density is nearly 40,000
persons per km2.45 Overcrowded living conditions and substandard housing have
heightened public health risks associated with improper solid waste disposal at
dumping sites and standing wastewater, especially near refugee camps. 16
79. In Gaza, closures, the political divide46 and recurrent conflict have severely
affected the availability and quality of health servic es. Many patients are suffering
from frustration, unnecessary pain and health risks associated with delayed care
caused by, inter alia, shortages in skilled personnel, drugs and disposables, and
electricity supply.42
80. In the West Bank, Palestinians must obtain permits for each health
appointment that requires travel to Jerusalem or neighbouring countries and are
often delayed or denied such permits, often without being given a reason. Israeli
restrictions on movement require ambulances that transport pat ients from the West
Bank to Jerusalem hospitals to use a “back-to-back” procedure, where two vehicles
meet and the patient is moved between them across the checkpoint or the wall. 16
__________________
41 See http://www.dci-palestine.org/raids_tear_gas_and_a_burned_house_three_west_bank_school_
days. See also United Nations Children’s Fun d (UNICEF), Humanitarian situation report: State
of Palestine, January-March 2017.
42 See United Nations Country Team in the State of Palestine, “Gaza: two y ears after” (2016).
43 UNICEF, Humanitarian situation report: State of Palestine, October -December 2016.
44 Information received from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) citing data from
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and the National Population Committee.
45 UNRWA, Gaza situation report No. 191, April 2017.
46 Robert Piper, “The humanitarian impact of a divided government”, 12 July 2016. Available from
https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-impact-divided-government.
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III. Occupied Syrian Golan
81. In its resolution 497 (1981), the Security Council decided that the Israeli
decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian
Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal ef fect, and demanded
that Israel, the occupying Power, should rescind forthwith its decision.
82. On 7 September 2016, Israeli authorities reportedly undertook the first home
demolition in Majdal Shams, citing the lack of a necessary building permit
(A/HRC/34/39, para. 59).47 Land, housing and development policies established by
Israel have made it difficult for Syrians to obtain building permits, which results in
the reported overcrowded Syrian villages. 48 According to the Syrian Arab Republic,
Israeli authorities restrict Syrian usage of land to 18,000 hectares, while Israeli
settlers are allowed to utilize 140,000 hectares ( A/HRC/34/37, para. 24).
83. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human
Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories cited
allegations by civil society organizations that Israeli authorities seek to expropriate
lands owned by the Syrian population by declaring them “green areas” in order to
prevent their use by the Syrian population for construction, farming, grazing or
other purposes. It was further alleged that such policies inhibited the improvement
of road and sewage systems, the building of industrial infrastructure and the
construction of educational, health and cultural institutions for the benefit of the
Syrian population (A/71/352, para. 91).
84. The International Labour Organization (I LO) maintains that the allocation of
water for Syrian farmers is limited to 200 m3 per 1,000 m2, which is liable to be
reduced owing to drought, while settlers receive between 600 and 800 m3 and in
practice as much as they require. This has undermined agri cultural work, rendering
it a secondary activity for many Syrian farmers. 49
85. Meanwhile, settlement expansion by Israeli authorities in the occupied Syrian
Golan continued during the reporting period in violation of international law
(A/HRC/34/39, para. 58). In October 2016, the Government of Israel reportedly
approved plans for the construction of 1,600 new homes in the settlement of Katzrin
(A/HRC/34/39, para. 59) and according to ILO, the Government is offering young
married Israeli couples the opportunity to rent the land of Syrians who left the area
in 1967.50
86. According to the Special Committee, Israeli and foreign -owned companies
have continued to explore and exploit natural resources, including water, gas and oil
resources, after receiving licences from the Israeli authorities ( A/70/406, para. 25).
87. In recent years there has been increased in vestment by the Government of
Israel in the development of the Syrian communities in the Golan, including through
the adoption of a three-year plan for the period 2014-2017 that allocated nearly
$60 million, mainly for education and infrastructure development.
__________________
47 See also http://golan-marsad.org/press-release-israeli-authorities-demolish-home-in-majdalshams-
in-the-occupied-syrian-golan/.
48 See http://golan-marsad.org/press-release-israeli-authorities-demolish-home-in-majdal-shams-inthe-
occupied-syrian-golan/.
49 International Labour Organization (ILO), The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab
Territories (Geneva, International Labour Office, 2016), para. 116.
50 ILO, The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories (Geneva, International Labour
Office, 2016), para. 118.
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88. On 17 April 2016, the Israeli Cabinet held its first meeting ever in the
occupied Syrian Golan.51 At the opening of the meeting, the Prime Minister of Israel
stated that “the Golan Heights will forever remain in Israel’s hands”, vowing that
his Government will “continue to strengthen the residents, the communities, the
industry and the agriculture however we can”. He further called upon the
international community to “finally recognize that the Golan Heights will remain
under Israel’s sovereignty permanently”.52
IV. Conclusion
89. Fifty years of occupation of Palestinian and Syrian lands have created
severe limitations on social and economic development in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan. The impact of Israeli
policies and practices on the Palestinian people, society and economy, in
particular, is multilayered and has accumulated over the decades of occupation.
90. Israeli practices and policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the
occupied Syrian Golan violate international humanitarian and human rights
law, and some of them may be considered discriminatory. Certain Israeli
practices may amount to a forcible transfer of protected persons, which could
be a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
91. Adherence to international law is imperative, ensuring that no party
enjoys impunity and securing justice and peace for all the peoples in the region,
including the Palestinian and Syrian populations under occupation.
92. The United Nations maintains its long-standing position that lasting and
comprehensive peace can only be achieved through a negotiated two -State
solution. The Secretary-General will continue to ensure that the United Nations
works towards the establishment of an independent, democratic, con tiguous
and viable Palestinian State living side by side in peace with a secure Israel in
the framework of a comprehensive regional settlement, consistent with relevant
Security Council resolutions.
__________________
51 Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, communiqué, 17 April 2016. Available from http://mfa.gov.il/
MFA/PressRoom/2016/Pages/Cabinet-communique-17-April-2016.aspx.
52 See http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/mediacenter/secretaryannouncements/pages/govmes
170416.aspx.
United Nations A/73/87–E/2018/69
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
25 May 2018
Original: English
18-08037 (E) 080618
*1808037*
General Assembly
Seventy-third session
Item 65 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2018
Agenda item 16
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
Summary
In its resolution 2017/30, entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan”, the Economic and Social Council requested th e Secretary-
General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy -second session, through the
Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The Assembly, in resolution
72/240 entitled “Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources ”, also requested the Secretary-
General to submit a report to it at its seventy-third session. The present report, which
was prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, has been
submitted in compliance with the above -mentioned resolutions of the Council and the
Assembly.
The report covers persistent Israeli practices and policies, particularly those
which are in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights
law and which affect the social and economic conditions of people living under its
military occupation.
* A/73/50.
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The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to express its
appreciation for the contributions from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, the International Labour Organization, the Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Population Fund, the United
Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,
the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace
Process, the World Food Programme, the Off ice for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs and the World Health Organization.
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I. Introduction
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2017/30, and the General
Assembly, in its resolution 72/240, expressed concerns about the economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Ea st Jerusalem, and of the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, as well as the exploitation, damage,
loss or depletion or endangerment of natural resources by Israel in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupie d Syrian Golan.
2. The present note provides information on relevant developments with regard to
the foregoing.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory
Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
3. Palestinians in the occupied territory ar e subject to a complex combination of
Israeli and Palestinian legal systems. In the West Bank, Israeli domestic law is applied
extraterritorially to Israeli settlers, while Palestinians are subject to Israeli military
law in addition to the Palestinian legal system. The resulting differentiation is
particularly problematic as regards criminal matters. Lower human rights standards
are applied to Palestinian suspects and defendants compared with Israeli suspects and
defendants. The application of two differen t legal systems in the same territory, on
the sole basis of nationality or origin, is inherently discriminatory and also violates
the principle of equality before the law, which is central to the right to fair trial. The
application of Israeli domestic law to settlers and of Israeli military law to
Palestinians in the West Bank also raises concerns as to the obligation of the
occupying Power to respect the laws in force in the territory it occupies, unless it is
absolutely prevented from doing so.
4. Israeli planning and zoning policies, especially in East Jerusalem and Area C,
which constitutes 60 per cent of the West Bank and in which 5 to 10 per cent of
Palestinians reside, under full Israeli control, has been deemed restrictive,
discriminatory and incomp atible with international law. 1 Palestinians can plan and
build legally on only 13 per cent of East Jerusalem. After the allocation of land for
settlements, the demarcation of closed military zones and the takeover of land for the
“barrier”, only 30 per cent of Area C remains available for Palestinians. The Israeli
Civil Administration permits construction by Palestinians on 0.4 per cent of Area C
(see A/72/564, para. 32). Palestinians living there are often faced with nearly
insurmountable Israeli obstacles to obtaining construction permits. The rate of
approval of building permit applications for Palestinians in Area C during the period
2007–2016 was less than 4 per cent.2
Excessive use of force and settler violence
5. Concerns persist regarding international standards, in particular for civilian
demonstrators and stone throwers in the West Bank, and in access -restricted areas in
the Gaza Strip. A general lack of accountability for violations by security and military
__________________
1 See A/HRC/34/38, paras. 24, 39 and 40; A/72/90-E/2017/71, para. 4; A/72/564, para. 32; and
State of Palestine, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Preliminary results of the
population, housing and establishments census 2017” (Ramallah, 2018), available from
www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2364 -1.pdf.
2 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview:
Occupied Palestinian Territory” (November 2017), endnote 22.
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personnel exacerbates the situation, especially given that several incidents strongly
suggest unlawful killing.3 On 30 March 2018, 18 Palestinians were killed and more
than 1,400 injured by the Israeli army, the majority during demonstrations clo se to
the fence separating Gaza from Israel;4 approximately 800 of the injuries reportedly
resulted from live ammunition.5
6. Between 1 April 2017 and 31 March 2018, 80 Palestinian civilians, including
3 women and 17 children, were killed by the Israeli a rmy, the security apparatus or
settlers, while 12,188 Palestinian civilians were injured, including 419 women and
girls and 2,095 children.6 A number of the casualties had been involved or allegedly
involved in attacks against Israelis. During the same per iod, 16 Israelis were killed
and 119 were injured.
7. On 7 March 2018, the Israeli Knesset passed an amendment to the Counter -
Terrorism Law granting police commanders the authority to withhold the bodies of
Palestinians killed while committing an attack a gainst Israelis, or suspected of doing
so, and to set conditions for returning bodies for burial if it is determined that there
is reason to fear that, as a result of the funeral, a terrorist attack might be committed,
lives might be at risk or the funeral would be used as a platform to praise terror
attacks.7
Settler-related violence
8. Palestinians continued to suffer from settler violence and harassment during the
reporting period. Settler violence continued to impede the ability of Palestinian
population affected to exercise numerous human rights (see A/HRC/37/43, para. 23).
After steadily declining since 2013, violent incidents between Israeli settlers in the
West Bank and Palestinians sharply increased in 2017 compared with 2016. There
were 180 attacks by settlers reported between 1 April 2017 and 31 March 2018. 6
9. An increase was recorded in the indictment rate in files opened regarding settler
violence between 2014 and 2017,8 driven at least in part by increased law enforcement
and prosecution efforts. Nevertheless, Israel continued to fail to do its utmost to
investigate cases of settler violence and prosecute perpetrators (see A/HRC/37/43,
para. 23).
10. Palestinians victims of crimes perpetrated by Israelis in the West Bank often
choose not to file complaints with the Israeli Police; such offences are usually not
investigated.9 Cases in which settlers attacked Palestinians and their property in the
presence of, or even accompanied by, Israeli security forces continued to be
documented (see A/72/564, paras. 17–22).
__________________
3 See A/72/565, paras. 6–16 and 51; see also Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report
2017/18: The State of the World’s Human Rights (London, 2018), p. 207.
4 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian bulletin: Occupied
Palestinian Territory” (March 2018).
5 International Committee of the Red Cross, “The troubling (and rising) human toll in Gaza ”
(5 April 2018). Available from www.icrc.org/en/document/gaza -troubling-human-toll.
6 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, monthly figures database, available from
www.ochaopt.org/content/monthly-figures (accessed on 17 March 2018).
7 Knesset, “Knesset passes law granting police the authority to hold terrorists ’ bodies”, press release
(8 March 2018). Available from www.knesset.gov.il/spokesman/eng/PR_eng.asp?PRID=13804.
8 Yesh Din, “Data sheet, December 2017: law enforcement on Israeli civilians in th e West Bank–
Yesh Din monitoring update 2005–2017”, p. 4. Available from www.yesh-din.org/en/data-sheetdecember-
2017-law-enforcement-israeli-civilians-west-bank; and “Increase in settler violence
during the first half of 2017” in Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
“Humanitarian bulletin: Occupied Palestinian Territory ” (July 2017), available from
www.ochaopt.org/content/increase-settler-violence-during-first-half-2017.
9 Ibid, p. 2.
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Detention and ill-treatment
11. As of the end of February 2018, at least 5,890 Palestinians were being held as
“security detainees” or serving a sentence in Israeli prisons,10 including 356 children11
and 61 women.12 Grave concerns over the detention of Palestinian children remain,
since such detention must be used as a last resort and for the short est period possible.13
12. As of the end of February 2018, 427 Palestinians were being held in
administrative detention, including 4 children. 14 Between 1967 and 2014, the Israeli
authorities issued more than 50,000 administrative detention orders. As of Ju ly 2017,
there were at least 449 administrative detainees in Israeli prisons who were being held
without charge or trial for an indefinite period of time. 15 Resort to administrative
detention must be consistent with the obligations of Israel under internati onal human
rights law and with the exceptional nature of internment permitted under article 78 of
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
13. Most Palestinian prisoners and detainees are held in facilities outsi de the
Occupied Palestinian Territory. International humanitarian law forbids the transfer of
protected persons, including those accused of offences, to the territory of the
occupying Power. This practice makes it difficult or impossible for families to vi sit
the detainees (see A/72/565, para. 38).
14. As stated last year in a note by the Secretary-General, the Committee against
Torture expressed concern about a number of Israeli practices towards Palestinian
detainees, including minors. Such practices include deprivation of basic legal
safeguards for administrative detainees, isolation and solitary confinement of
detainees, including minors, punishment and ill -treatment of hunger strikers, torture
or ill-treatment of Palestinian children and the hindering of visits of relatives for child
prisoners. The Committee also expressed concern about information it had received
to the effect that there was no proper accountability for torture and ill -treatment (see
A/72/90-E/2017/71, para. 18; see also CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, paras. 22, 24, 26, 28 and
30). No criminal investigations have been opened into the more than 1,000 complaints
of torture and ill-treatment filed since 2001.16 Complaints of torture or ill-treatment
involve the Israel Security Agency in particular. Although the number of complaints
involving the Agency has quadrupled since June 2013, none has led to a criminal
investigation (see A/HRC/WG.6/29/ISR/2, para. 23; see also A/HRC/31/40, paras. 47
and 48; A/HRC/34/38, paras. 48–50; and A/71/364, paras. 58–60). Nevertheless, five
indictments were issued against Israeli soldiers suspected of having harmed
Palestinian detainees while they were handcuffed and in custody. 17
__________________
10 Excluding those held in military prisons.
11 B’Tselem, statistics on Palestinians in the custody of the Israeli security forces database,
available from www.btselem.org/index.php/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners (accessed on
3 April 2018).
12 Addameer, Statistics database, a vailable from www.addameer.org/statistics (accessed on 8 March
2018).
13 Information received from the United Nations Children ’s Fund (UNICEF).
14 B’Tselem, statistics on administrative detention database, available from
www.btselem.org/index.php/administrative_detention/statistics (accessed on 3 April 2018).
15 Addameer, “Ten facts on administrative detention” (12 February 2014). Available from
www.addameer.org/publications/ten-facts-administrative-detention.
16 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2017/18, p. 209; see also A/HRC/37/42.
17 Yesh Din, “Data sheet, January 2017: law enforcement on Israeli sol diers suspected of harming
Palestinians — figures for 2015”, p.11. Available from https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/
files.yesh-din.org/2016+ דף+נתונים+מצח+דצמבר /YeshDin+-+Data+1.17++-+English.pdf.
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Destruction and confiscation of property and infrastructure
15. Continued demolitions by Israel and the resulting forced evictions of
Palestinians are key factors contributing to a coercive environment in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, in which specific circumstan ces may leave no other choice
to individuals or communities but to leave. 18 Demolitions and the resulting forced
evictions often constitute grave violations of human rights law (see A/72/564,
para. 49) and international humanitarian law, which prohibits the destruction or
confiscation of private property (see A/HRC/37/43, para. 33).
16. Between April 2017 and March 2018, the Israeli authorities demolished more
than 310 Palestinian structures, a decline from the previous reporting period. The total
number of demolished structures is 5,413 since 2009, including 2,009 residential and
917 donor-funded structures.19 2017 witnessed the second largest number of Israeli
demolitions of Palestinian structures in East Jerusalem since 2000, although lower
than in 2016, when 190 demolitions were recorded. 20
17. Israeli authorities cite the lack of building permits, which are nearly impossible
to obtain, to justify the demolition of Palestinian homes (see A/72/564, paras. 23–25).
By the end of 2017, there were more than 13,000 demolition orders pending against
Palestinian property in Area C.21
18. During the reporting period, Israeli authoriti es carried out nine punitive
demolitions19 of family homes of Palestinians suspected of having carried out attacks,
a measure that may amount to collective punishment prohibited under international
humanitarian law and international human rights law (see A/72/565, paras. 18–27).
19. Furthermore, as of September 2017, 66 cases of demolitions and confiscation
related to agricultural structures or assets, and 39 cases related to food assistance, had
been recorded for 2017.22
20. Confiscation of property by Israel as a punitive measure against neighbours of
Palestinians suspected of having attacked Israelis may also amount to collective
punishment (see A/72/565, paras. 23–27). Over one third of Area C is formally
designated as public land (referred to as “State land” by Israel). The vast majority of
“State land” declarations took place before the start of the Oslo peace process in the
early 1990s. It is estimated that between 750 km2 and 900 km2 were declared “State
land” by Israel between 1979 and 1992. “State land” has been allocated exclusively
for use by Israel and its citizens, rather than for the benefit of the local population.
Population displacement
21. There is continued concern that the combination of State -sanctioned land
seizures, retroactive legalization of settler outposts, demolition of Palestinian homes
and livelihood structures, denial of Palestinian building permits, restrictions on
movement and access to livelihoods, and settler violence and a lack of accountability
for such violence to contribute to the creation of a coercive environment in areas
under full Israeli control, propelling Palestinians to move out of certain parts of
Area C and East Jerusalem. Involuntary displacement and relocation to alternative
__________________
18 See A/72/564, para. 27; see also Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018
humanitarian needs overview”, annex I (protection).
19 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, demolitions and displacement database. See
www.ochaopt.org/page/demolition-system (accessed on 12 March 2018).
20 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian bulletin: Occupied
Palestinian Territory” (December 2017).
21 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”,
endnote 22.
22 Ibid, p. 11.
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residential areas, as a result of such policies, may amount to forcible transfer if it is
carried out without the free and informed consent of the individuals who relocate, in
violation of the obligations of Israel under international humanitarian and human
rights law. Forcible transfer is a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
amounts to a war crime.23
22. During the reporting period, 448 Palestinians were displaced after home
demolitions in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, marking a sharp decline
compared to 1,263 and 1,162 people displaced during the two previous reporting
periods, respectively. The total number of Palestinians displaced as a result of home
demolitions since 2009 amounts to 8,681 people, including 4,528 children. 19
23. As a result of the planning regime, at least one third of all Palestinian households
in East Jerusalem lack a building permit issued by Israel, which places 100,000
residents at risk of displacement.20
24. This and the strict residency regime for East Jerusalem and restrictions on
family reunification involving residents of East Jerusalem and other parts of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory contribute to the displacement of Jerusalemite
Palestinians (see A/HRC/37/43, paras. 55 and 63).
25. Between 1967 and May 2017, Israel revoked the Jerusalem residency status of
14,595 Palestinians.24 On 7 March 2018, the Israeli Knesset passed an amendment to
the Entry into Israel Law that allows the Interior Minister to revoke the permanent
residency of Palestinians in East Jerusalem who have committed terrorist activities,
treason or espionage, as defined under Israeli law, or “acts that constitute breach of
trust against the State of Israel”.25
26. Lawsuits based on a claim of previous Jewish ownership have also been a
frequent strategy for settler organizations to acquire property in East Jerusalem. Since
2004, there has been an increase in settler takeover in neig hbourhoods surrounding
the Old City, through purchase and claims of prior ownership before 1948 (see
A/HRC/37/43, para. 40). With proceedings under way, 180 Palestinian families were
at risk of eviction from their homes in East Jerusalem in 2017 as a result of legal
action by settlers.26
27. Displacement of Jerusalemite Palestinians is evidenced by the growing
population of East Jerusalem neighbourhoods behind the “barrier” in the West Bank,
where rent is lower and restrictions on housing expansion fewer. It is the only place
where Palestinians with residency status in Jerusalem can live with spouses from the
West Bank without losing their status. These neighbourhoods suffer from lack of
essential services and basic infrastructure, however (see A/HRC/37/43, para. 56).
Palestinians living in those neighbourhoods also have to pass through Israeli
checkpoints to enter Jerusalem.
28. An additional factor contributing to the creation of a coercive environment in
Area C is the plan to evict and relocate Bedouin and herder communities, including
approximately 7,500 persons belonging to 46 Bedouin communities, most of them
__________________
23 See A/72/564, paras. 27 and 36; see also A/HRC/34/38, paras. 27–28; A/HRC/31/43, paras. 44,
46 and 50–60; A/HRC/24/30, paras. 28–29; A/68/513, paras. 30–34; A/HRC/25/38, paras. 11–20;
A/HRC/28/80, para. 24; and A/69/348, para. 13.
24 Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “East Jerusalem: facts and figures 2017” (21 May 2017).
25 Knesset, “Knesset passes legislation authorizing interior minister to revoke permanent residency
status over involvement in terrorism”, press release (7 March 2018). Available from
www.knesset.gov.il/spokesman/eng/PR_eng.asp?PRID=13803.
26 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, pp. 9
and 10.
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refugees, who are at particular risk (ibid., paras. 2 4 and 25; see also A/72/564,
para. 36).
29. In Gaza, by November 2017, approximately 23,500 Palestinians remained
displaced as a result of the 2014 conflict owing to Israeli restrictions on the entry of
reconstruction materials and limited reconstruction funding. 27
Israeli settlement activity
30. Israeli settlement activity in the Occupied Palestinian Territory violates a
number of Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2334 (2016), in which
the Council reaffirmed that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the
Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, had no legal
validity and constituted a flagrant violation unde r international law and a major
obstacle to the achievement of the two -State solution and a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace. Such settlements also have a serious impact on the human
rights of the Palestinian people (see A/72/564, para. 4).
31. The Israeli settler population has more than doubled since the Oslo Accords in
1993: by the end of 2016, there were almost 600,000 persons living in more than 227
settlements, 97 of which had been established without formal authorization by the
Government of Israel and labelled as “outposts”. 28 Israeli settlements and areas
associated with them cover 40 per cent of the total area of the West Bank. 29
32. In recent years, the growth rate of the Israeli settler population has surpassed
that of both the overall population of Israel and the Palestinian population in the West
Bank. 30 Policies of the Government of Israel support population growth in the
settlements through State-led public services, incentives and preferential treatment
(see A/72/90-E/2017/71 and A/71/86-E/2016/13). The United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights indicated that Israeli policies regarding the
settlements amounted to the “transfer by Israel of its population into the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law ”.31
33. Israeli settlements remain one of the drivers of displacement and forced
evictions. Measures that accompany the construction of settlements often can hinder
the mobility of Palestinians, including access to their own agricultural lands.
Palestinians living in the vicinity of settlements are subjected to an increase in
tensions and violence in view of the presence of not only settlers, but also Israeli
soldiers and security forces to ensure the safety of settlers. They may also suffer from
the collective punishment imposed on them in response to any attack against Israelis
(see A/HRC/37/43, paras. 15 and 45–54).
34. In May 2017, Israeli authorities formally approved the establishment of a new
settlement in Area C for the first time since 1992, notwithstanding the establishment
of other settlements through the retroactive legalization of outposts. The new
settlement in Area C was established for settlers evicted from outposts. 32
__________________
27 Ibid., p. 7.
28 B’Tselem, “Settlements” (11 November 2017), available from www.btselem.org/settlements; and
Peace Now, “Settlement watch” database, available from http://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements -
watch/settlements-data (accessed on 14 March 2018).
29 B’Tselem, “Settlements”.
30 Information received from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; and
B’Tselem, “Settlements”.
31 See A/HRC/37/43, para. 69; and Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 49 (6).
32 See A/72/564, para. 6; see also Peace Now, “Jurisdiction of the new settlement ‘Amihai’
approved” (30 May 2017), available from http://peacenow.org.il/en/jurisdiction -new-settlementamihai-
approved; and A/HRC/37/43, paras. 8 and 15–17.
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35. On 8 February 2017, the Knesset adopted the Law for the Regularization of
Settlement in Judea and Samaria, authorizing the continu ed use of privately owned
Palestinian land previously confiscated for settlement purposes. It was the first time
that the Knesset had extended its jurisdiction to matters concerning the private
property of Palestinians living under Israeli military occupat ion (see A/72/564,
paras. 14 and 15).
Movement and access restrictions
Gaza closure
36. Nearly 2 million Palestinians in Gaza continue to suffer from the impact of
successive military escalations, compou nded by tightened closures following the
takeover by Hamas of the Gaza Strip in 2007. The blockade may amount to collective
punishment, which is prohibited by international law (see A/72/565, para. 28). It
continues to undermine the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of
Palestinians in Gaza (see A/HRC/34/38, para. 29; A/71/364, paras. 28–29; A/70/421,
paras. 15–22; and A/HRC/31/44, paras. 40 and 43).
37. Following the 2014 hostilities, Israel introduced measures that eased the
movement of people and goods into and o ut of the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, the
requirement by Israel to coordinate and monitor the entry of crucial raw materials
deemed as “dual-use” items, the temporary restrictions on the entry of cement and
other materials needed for reconstruction, and the recurring interrogations and
confiscations or withdrawals of permits for traders and merchants continue to have a
detrimental effect on the economic, social and humanitarian situation in the Gaza
Strip (ibid.).
38. In 2017, the number of exits through the Israeli-controlled Erez crossing
dropped by almost 50 per cent compared with the previous year, reaching the lowest
rate since 2014. Israeli authorities also required Gaza residents travelling abroad to
sign a waiver pledging not to return using the same route for a year, i.e. they would
therefore be able to return earlier only through the Rafah crossing. In some cases,
travellers were detained at the crossing until they signed the commitment.
39. Moreover, the number of valid permits issued for traders a s of December 2017
was 551, compared with between 3,500 and 3,700 in late 2015. 30,33
40. The approval rate for medical patients allowed through the Erez crossing
declined to 54 per cent in 2017, compared with 93 per cent in 2012. 34 In some
instances, patients who had been granted permits to cross at Erez for medical
treatment outside Gaza were reportedly stopped at the crossing if they did not
cooperate when being stopped by Israeli security forces and asked to provide
information about armed groups or relat ives allegedly affiliated with armed groups in
Gaza (see A/72/565, para. 32).
41. The Rafah border crossing largely remained closed by the Egyptian authorities
in 2017, except on limited occasions (ibid., para. 29).
__________________
33 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gaza crossings: movement of people and
goods” database, available from www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza -crossings-movement-people-andgoods;
see also Gisha: Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, “2017: tightening of the
closure — a round-up of 10 recent measures imposed by Israel further limiting movement of
people to and from Gaza”, available from www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/2017Tightening_
of_the_closure.pdf; and Amira Hass, “Israel to let Gazans leave via West Bank — as long they
don’t return for at least 12 months”, Haaretz, 10 March 2016, available from www.haaretz.com/
israel-news/.premium-gaza-residents-allowed-to-travel-as-long-as-they-stay-away-1.5415467.
34 Information received from the World Health Organization (WHO).
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42. The Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism has played a crucial role in facilitating the
import of construction materials into the Gaza Strip but has been less successful in
facilitating the import of “dual-use” materials critical for public works projects.35
Nevertheless, approvals of large projects and the import of dual -use items have
increased in 2018.36
43. Citing security concerns, the Israeli army has also enforced “access-restricted
areas” along the border fence with Israel and at sea, significantly undermining the
right of Palestinian fishermen and farmers to a livelihood (see A/HRC/34/38,
para. 29; A/70/421, paras. 30–38; and A/HRC/31/44, para. 43). Officially, the Israeli
authorities impose a “no go” area of up to 100 m from the perimeter fence and up to
200 m for heavy machinery. Nevertheless, humanitarian organizations have reported
that in practice up to 300 m from the perimeter fence is considered by most farmers
as a “no go” area and up to 1,000 m is considered a “high risk” area.37
44. While sea restrictions have varied, Israel, citing security concerns and attempts
to smuggle weapons by sea and conduct attac ks using boats,38 imposes a fishing limit
at 6 nautical miles, less than one third of the 20 nautical miles allocated for fishing
under the Oslo Accords. The limit is expanded to 9 nautical miles during the sardine
season.39
Movement restrictions in the West Bank
45. Administrative, bureaucratic and physical constraints hamper the movement of
Palestinians in the West Bank and undermine economic activity, access to basic
services and the delivery of aid and relief, and undermine freedom of movement (see
A/HRC/31/44, paras. 12–21).
46. Israel continues to construct the “barrier” in the West Bank. About 65 per cent
of its route has been completed. Approximately 85 per cent of the current 712 km
planned route lies within the West Bank rather than along the 1949 Armistice Line
(the Green Line),40 contrary to the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice, which states that “the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the
occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law ” (see A/ES-
10/273 and A/ES-10/273/Corr.1). Another 53 km (7.5 per cent) of the “barrier” is
under construction. If construction is completed along the entire planned route, about
9.4 per cent of the West Bank would be isolated between the wall and the Green Line
and up to 25,000 Palestinians could be added to the 11,000 Palestinians already
isolated in the seam zone41 as of November 2017, many of whom are consequently
encountering difficulties in accessing the rest of the West Bank. 42
47. According to an Israeli local government audit, 140,000 P alestinians live in the
eight neighbourhoods within the borders of the Jerusalem municipality as defined by
__________________
35 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 7.
36 Information received from the Office of the Special Coordinator for the Mi ddle East Peace
Process.
37 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 5.
38 Judah Ari Gross, “Shin Bet, IDF thwart Islamic Jihad attack on navy boats off Gaza coast ”,
Times of Israel, 4 April 2018. Available from www.timesofisrael.com/shin-bet-idf-thwartislamic-
jihad-attack-on-navy-boats-off-gaza-coast.
39 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian bulletin: Occupied
Palestinian Territory”, special edition, May–June 2017.
40 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Occupied Palestinian Territory:
humanitarian facts and figures ” (December 2017), p. 10.
41 The area that lies between the wall and the Armistice Line of 1949.
42 B’Tselem, “The separation barrier” (11 November 2017). Available from www.btselem.org/
separation_barrier.
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the Israeli authorities but are separated from the rest of East Jerusalem by the
“barrier”. These neighbourhoods suffer from a lack of basic infrast ructure, municipal
services and law enforcement, and from poor living conditions, although the
communities themselves are under the authority of the municipality of Jerusalem and
pay municipal taxes. The “barrier” also impedes freedom of movement and acces s to
education and municipal services in these neighbourhoods (see A/HRC/37/43,
paras. 38 and 58).
48. Regarding the impact of the “barrier” on the health situation, in 2017, 12 per
cent of patient applications and 18 per cent of patient companion applications from
the West Bank to access East Jerusalem or Israel were denied. Direct access for
ambulances remains problematic, with ambulances delayed for security checks.
About 90 per cent of the 2,125 Palestinia n Red Crescent Society ambulances entering
Jerusalem from other parts of the West Bank every year are forced to transfer patients
to another ambulance at checkpoints, which delays transit. 43
49. Moreover, by the end of January 2017 in a number of regions i n the West Bank,
about 60 km of West Bank roads were designated for exclusive, or near -exclusive,
use by Israeli citizens and off limits to Palestinians. 44 Firing zones for military
training purposes in the West Bank cover approximately 17.5 per cent of its total area
and 29 per cent of Area C, also putting constraints on movement (see A/72/564,
para. 41).
50. Farmers in 90 Palestinian communities own land within or in close proximity to
56 Israeli settlements. Those farmers can access their land only by means of “prior
coordination” with the Israeli authorities, which usually grant access for only a
limited number of days during the harvest and ploughing seasons. During the 2017
olive harvest season, as in previous years, many Palestinian farmers reported that the
time allocated was insufficient, or that the Israeli army did not arrive at the designated
time to allow them to access their land, leaving farmers insecure and vulnerable to
attacks by settlers.45
51. Special permits or “prior coordination” is also required for Palestinian farmers
to access farm land designated as “closed” in the seam zone. If they are granted
approval, farmers must cross designated gates along the “barrier” or checkpoints in
order to reach their land. During the 2017 olive harvest, 76 gates were designated for
agricultural access, down from 84 gates the previous year (see paras. 68 –72 below).46
52. According to a 1997 agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization, the Israeli army maintains control of more than 20 per cent of Hebron
city, an area referred to as the H2 zone, which is home to approximately 40,000
Palestinians and a few hundred Israeli settlers living in five settlement compounds.
Israelis cannot access H1 areas of Hebron.47
53. Israel has implemented severe movement restrictions in the H2 zone and
surrounding areas, citing security concerns and attacks by Palestinians. It has erected
more than 100 obstacles, including 20 staffed checkpoints, and segregated the
settlement area and its surroundings from the rest of the city. This has had an impact
on the freedom of movement of the entire Palestinian population of the H2 zone, as
well as of other residents of Hebron city. The resulting extraordinary economic, social
__________________
43 Information received from WHO.
44 Yesh Din, “Through the lens of Israel’s interests: the civil administration in the West Bank ”,
position paper (December 2017), p. 14; and A/71/86-E/2016/13, para. 5.
45 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian bulletin: Occupied
Palestinian Territory” (November 2017).
46 Ibid.
47 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “The humanitarian impact of Israeli
settlements in Hebron city” (February 2018).
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and humanitarian challenges have created displacement pressures for Palestinians
living there.48 Movement restrictions, attacks and intimidation by Israeli settlers, and
a lack of adequate law enforcement concerning violent settlers, have resulted in the
displacement of Palestinians from their homes in Hebron city. 47 Between April 2017
and January 2018, 252 access-related incidents in the West Bank were reported by the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA). Those incidents resulted in the loss of an estimated 1,222 individual
workdays or 9,175 work-hours. This affects the delivery of education, health and
relief services to the Palestine refugees. 49
Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestin ian natural resources
Water
54. Water shortages continue to disrupt daily life and impede development
interventions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. About 1.8 million Palestinians are in
need of humanitarian water, sanitation and hygiene assistance. 50
55. Owing to the restrictive planning regime, communities in Area C have limited
ability to repair, rehabilitate or construct basic water and sanitation infrastructure at
the community or household level, resulting in insufficient water for drinking,
domestic use and livestock consumption in many communities. Altogether, in Israeli -
controlled Area C and Palestinian-controlled Areas A and B, and also as a result of
the poor state of the pipelines linking Palestinian communities in the West Bank and
of the water grids within Palestinian cities and villages, one third of all water supplied
through the grid to the Palestinians is lost through leakage. 51
56. Twenty-two per cent of the West Bank Palestinian population — 649,000
people — suffer from either lack of access to water or poor quality of water. Around
156,000 people are either not connected to a water network or receive water less than
once a week.52
57. In Area C, around 95,000 people receive less than 50 litres of water per capita
per day, half of the minimum recommended by the World Health Organization
(WHO). 53 Those include around 20,000 people living in Bedouin or herding
communities in dwellings that the Israeli authorities consider “illegal” and who have
access to only about 30 litres per day at a cost 10 times higher than through the
network.54
58. Palestinians are also forced to rely on pumping and storing water at exorbitant
cost, as they are not allowed to use the water pipes that run in close proximity to their
villages that supply the settlements.55
59. Between January and November 2017, Israeli authorities demolished or seized
19 structures related to water, sanitation and hygiene in Area C of the West Bank,
__________________
48 Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report to the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee” (20 March 2018).
49 Information received from UNRWA.
50 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 27.
51 Ibid., pp. 11 and 27.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 29.
54 Information received from UNICEF.
55 Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “Between the green line and the red line”, in “50 years: a
State without borders — people without human rights”, available from www.acri.org.il/
campaigns/50yearsen.
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including cisterns, water pipes and mobile latrines, claiming that they had been
installed without permits.56
60. In East Jerusalem, only 59 per cent of Palestinian residents are connected legally
to the water grid. Palestinians suffer from substandard water and sewage connections
owing to the ongoing lack of proper planning and allocation of resources for their
neighbourhoods.57
61. Ongoing deficits in the water, sanitation and hygiene sector affect all 2 million
people in the Gaza Strip.56,58 About 40 per cent of water supplied for domestic use is
lost on the way to consumers owing to the p oor condition of the infrastructure. 59
62. Wastewater contamination and overpumping has rendered more than 95 per cent
of the water extracted from the Gaza coastal aquifer unfit for human consumption. At
its present rate of deterioration, the damage to the aquifer is expected to be
“irreversible” by 2020. Increased electricity cuts have exacerbated the situation.
About 90 per cent of people in Gaza rely on purchasing desalinated water from private
companies, which entails heavy financial burdens on already impoverished families
and increases health risks owing to potential contamination. 60
63. Merely 10.4 per cent of the population in Gaza has access to improved drinking
water sources,61 with less than 50 litres of water available per person per day, half the
minimum international standard.62 No single person obtains the WHO recommended
amount of water of 100 litres per capita per day.
64. According to 2016 figures from the Palestinian Water Authority, 98 million
cubic metres of water were supplied for domestic use in Gaza, from different sources.
Only 18 per cent of the water supplied from those sources was safe for drinking. 63
65. Recent efforts are being made to address some of the water challenges, notably
the resumption of the meetings of the Joint Water Co mmittee and the start of the North
Gaza Emergency Sewage Treatment project for the West Bank and Gaza. Some
progress has also been made on the Red Sea -Dead Sea Canal project.
Pollution
66. The deterioration in infrastructure and electricity supply to G aza has had severe
consequences for the operation of water treatment facilities, wastewater pumping
stations and drinkable/piped water.64 A quarter of the population is not connected to
the sewage network and pollution levels are now four times higher than the
__________________
56 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”,
pp. 28 and 29. Water, sanitation and hygiene vulnerability is based on community needs
assessment conducted by Action Against Hunger and Gruppo di Volontariato Civile, in
cooperation with the Palestinian Water Authority and the Palestinian Hydrology Group .
57 Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “East Jerusalem: facts and figures 2017”, pp. 4–5.
58 United Nations, “Gaza ten years later: United Nations country team in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory” (July 2017).
59 B’Tselem, “Water crisis” (11 November 2017). Available from www.btselem.org/water.
60 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, pp. 8
and 27.
61 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), based on the 2014 multiple
indicator cluster survey.
62 Information received from UNICEF.
63 Information received from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
64 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 28,
based on Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gaza crisis: early warning
indicators — June 2017, available from www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/gaza_indicators_
final.pdf.
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environmental health standard.65 About 108 million litres of raw or poorly treated
wastewater are discharged into the Mediterranean Sea from Gaza every day and
73 per cent of the shoreline is contaminated by sewage. 58
67. Official Palestinian sources have claimed that practices by Israeli authorities
and settlers, including the illegal transfer of hazardous waste to the West Bank and
the allocation of parts of the Jordan Valley to an Israeli dumpsite devoted to industrial
waste, have gravely damaged Palestinian agricultural land, health, animals and
biodiversity.66
Access to agricultural land
68. The ability of Palestinians to access and utilize agricultural land is compromised
by various factors, including movement restrictions, land confiscations an d settler
violence.
69. Restrictions hamper access by Palestinians to lands in the seam zone and in the
vicinity of settlements, impeding essential year-round agricultural activities and
affecting productivity and value in the olive sector. For example, t he yield of olive
trees in the seam zone was reduced by between 55 and 65 per cent over the past four
years, compared with similar trees in areas that can be accessed all year round. 45
70. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Deve lopment
damage database, the uprooting, burning and destruction of trees and other crops, the
demolition of the structures and the implementation of stop orders in 2017 resulted in
almost $2 million worth of damage.67
71. During the 2017 olive harvest season alone (from mid-September until mid-
November), a total of 5,582 Palestinian -owned olive trees were damaged by settlers,
compared with 1,652 trees during the 2016 season. In one instance, Palestinian
farmers reported that, when they were granted permissi on to visit their land, they
found that the produce of 3,200 olive trees had been harvested and stolen. 45
72. The agricultural sector in Gaza, including farmers, herders, breeders and
fishermen, continued to suffer in 2017 from reduced productive capacity and
instability of income despite the slow increase in exports since the end of the 2014
hostilities.68 The restoration of land, irrigation systems, greenhouses, soil fertility and
fruit orchards has been slow, resulting in dependency on short -term assistance. Delays
in and limitations on the import of products such as pipes and timber imposed under
the dual-use regime also have a negative effect on agriculture. 69
Exploitation of mineral resources
73. Since the 1970s, Israeli companies and corporations h ave been granted permits
to quarry natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. According to official
Israeli data from 2010, eight Israeli-owned and eight Palestinian-owned quarries were
__________________
65 Abeer Abu Shawish and Catherine Weibel, “Gaza children face acute water and sanitation crisis ”
(UNICEF, 1 September 2017). Available from www.unicef.org/wash/oPt_100684.html.
66 See A/72/90-E/2017/71, para. 61; and Adam Aloni, Made in Israel: Exploiting Palestinian Land
for Treatment of Israeli Waste (B’Tselem, 2017), conclusions, available from www.btselem.org/
publications/summaries/201712_made_in_israel.
67 Information received from FAO based on data obtained Januar y 2018 from the Palestinian
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.
68 According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in 2017 a total of 2,621
truckloads of goods were transferred out of Gaza compared with 2,132 truckloads in 2016. See
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gaza crossings: movement of people and
goods” database.
69 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”,
pp. 35 and 36.
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then active in Area C of the West Bank, transferring 94 per cent and 80 per cent of
their production to Israel, respectively. 70
74. According to the Union of Stone and Marble Producers in the West Bank, no
new permits have been issued to Palestinian companies to open quarries in Area C
since 1994, even though the Oslo Accords provided for this. Moreover, many previous
permits have expired. Consequently, only a very small number of quarries are still
operating in Area C. Quarry closures have been accompanied by equipment
confiscation and fines.71
Socioeconomic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
75. Ending the occupation is the single most important factor in enabling
Palestinians to chart a successful course to achieving the Sustainable Development
Goals. Around 2.5 million Palestinians, half the population, need humanitarian
assistance.72
76. The United Nations country team in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has
estimated that, owing to the closure, recurrent military operations and internal
Palestinian divisions, Gaza will become unliveable by 2020. The team has also
estimated that, without international aid and services provided by the United Nations,
the Gaza Strip would have been deemed unliveable years ago. In any event, the
downward trend remains clear.58
77. About 80 per cent of Palestinians in Gaza receive aid, including food assistance
that enables scarce cash resources to be spent on other essentials, preventing a further
deterioration of food security and livelihood status and reducing the impact of
negative coping mechanisms.73
Economic performance
78. The economic situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory deteriorated
during 2017. The economy has long suffered from restrictions on movement, access
and trade that have kept investment levels extremely low and resulted in an erosion
of the productive base. Substantial amounts of financial assistance from the
international community have helped mitigate the impact of the restrictions on growth
by fuelling public and private consumption. The most recent data revealed growth of
2.4 per cent in 2017, led by the West Bank; in Gaza, it was a mere 0.5 per cent. 74
79. Estimates of constant-price GDP and GDP per capita for the West Bank in the
fourth quarter of 2017 stood at 8.4 per cent and 6. 0 per cent, respectively, higher than
in the fourth quarter of 2016. For Gaza, however, they were 2.9 per cen t and 6.9 per
cent lower, respectively.75 Deterioration of infrastructure, cuts in expenditure by the
__________________
70 Yesh Din, “The great drain: Israeli quarries in the West Bank — high court sanctioned
institutionalized theft”, position paper (September 2017), introduction.
71 World Bank, “Area C and the future of the Palestinian economy ” (2 October 2013), paras. 30 and
31. Available from openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16686/
AUS29220REPLAC0EVISION0January02014.pdf .
72 United Nations and State of Palestine, “United Nations Development Assistance Framework
State of Palestine 2018–2022”, situation analysis; and Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 17.
73 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aff airs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 8.
74 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee: 19 March 2018”,
chap. I.A.
75 Information based on ESCWA calculations, based on Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
data, available from www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_29 -3-2018-qnaen.
pdf.
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Palestinian Authority, the continuing closure and internal Palestinian division have
affected the growth performance of Gaza.76
80. The rates of economic growth in the Occupied Palestinian Territory will be
insufficient to remedy economic imbalances and meaningfully improve living
standards in the coming years.77 Post-2014 growth represents a reconstruction boom
and catch-up rather than expansion into new economic sectors. The situation is
worsened by low public and private investment.
81. Projections by the International Monetary Fund indicate that growth will be
3 per cent in 2018 (2.7 per cent for the West Bank and 4.0 per cent for Gaza), 78 as
Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods, labour and persons affect the economy
and the financial sector, and as aid inflows remain low. Liquidity constraints and
fewer economic buffers are holding back consumption and investment, most acutely
in Gaza.58
82. Regarding fiscal performance, net revenues were up by 7.3 per cent in the first
half of 2017 compared with the same period in 2016. Yet, a budget deficit of 8.4 per
cent of GDP is still anticipated for 2017, with falling donor transfers putting further
pressure on government finances.79 Inflation is projected to be 1.2 per cent in 2017,
following the deflation of 2016. Macroeconomic indicators are vulnerable to
restrictive measures imposed by Israel and other risk factors.
83. Labour market conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory remain poor,
reflecting demographic pressures, economic stagnation and barriers imposed in
connection with the occupation. Across the four quarters of 2017, unemp loyment rose
by 0.4 per cent, 2.1 per cent and 0.8 per cent, and then fell by 1.2 per cent, 80 compared
with the same quarters in 2016, peaking at 29.2 per cent in the third quarter. As of the
fourth quarter of 2017, the unemployment rate was 19.5 per cent f or men, 43 per cent
for women and 40.7 per cent for those aged 20 –24 years.81 Unemployment in the West
Bank stood at 13.7 per cent, compared with a staggering 42.7 per cent in Gaza. This
figure reflects the severe conditions in Gaza and persistent limited o pportunities there.
Furthermore, workers from Gaza have continued to be prevented from accessing work
in Israel since 2007.
84. The poverty rate measured by the national poverty line increased from 26 per
cent in 2011 to 29 per cent in 2017 in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In Gaza, the
rate was very high, at 54 per cent.82
85. According to the multidimensional child poverty analysis developed by the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 65.7 per cent of children are counted as
deprived with regard to two or more indicators in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
with all children in Gaza deprived with regard to at least two dimensions (see
E/ESCWA/EDID/2017/2).
__________________
76 International Monetary Fund, “West Bank and Gaza: report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee ”
(31 August 2017).
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Information based on ESCWA calculations, based on Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
data.
81 State of Palestine, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Labour force survey results fourth
quarter (October–December, 2017) round main results”, press release (13 February 2018).
Available from www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=3050.
82 Preliminary data provided by Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
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Food security
86. Common drivers of food vulnerability in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
include restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of goods and people; a stunted
economy that results in a persistently high unemployment rate, especially in the Gaza
Strip; restrictions on accessing available natural resources; and the inability of the
Palestinian Authority to play a regulatory role in locations outside Areas A and B,
which constitute the majority of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 83 Poor food
utilization as a result of the poor quality of water, sanitation and hygiene, limited
access to health care and the declining quality of diets also contribute to food
insecurity.
87. Approximately 1.6 million Palestinians (31.5 per cent of the population) are
considered food insecure. The prevalence is particularly high in the Gaza Strip, with
40 per cent of households found to be food insecure, more than three times the rate in
the West Bank (13 per cent).84 A food security crisis in the Gaza Strip has been averted
only by large-scale humanitarian assistance. More than 70 per cent of residents
received international aid in 2016, the bulk of which was food assistance. Yet,
approximately half of the Palestinian population suffered from more than one
micronutrient deficiency.85
88. Palestinian refugees have higher levels of severe and moderate food insecurity
than non-refugees. Refugee camps have the highest prevalence of food insecurity.
Two in every five households (35.9 per cent) in refugee camps were food insecure in
2016.86 The food insecurity rate for refugees in the West Bank stood at 15.1 per cent,
and 41.3 per cent in the Gaza Strip. 87
89. The population receiving UNRWA food aid increased from approximately
80,000 people in 2000 to more than 993,000 in 2017. Since March 2017, monthly
salaries of Palestinian public employees based in Gaza have been cut by between 30
and 40 per cent, forcing additional families to apply for already stretched UNRWA
relief services.88
90. The prevalence of food insecurity among female -headed households is higher
than among male-headed households. In the Gaza Strip, 46 per cent of female -headed
households are severely and moderately insecure, while for male headed households
the rate stands at 39 per cent. In the West Bank, these figures are 31 per cent and 11
per cent, respectively.89
91. The food insecurity level among Bedouins and herding communities in Area C
worsened between 2012 and 2016, with the rate increasing to 61 per cent from 55 per
cent. The percentage of food secure households dropped from 20 per cent to 6 per
cent during the same period.90
__________________
83 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 37.
84 Information received from FAO; and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018
humanitarian needs overview”, p. 3.
85 Information received from the World Food Programme (WFP). See also WFP, “Nutrition
awareness sessions in Palestine” (November 2016). Available from http://documents.wfp.org/
stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp288670.pdf.
86 Information received from FAO.
87 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 34;
and information received from WFP.
88 Information received from UNRWA.
89 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”,
pp. 34–35; and information received from FAO.
90 Information received from WFP.
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Education
92. An estimated 490,145 schoolchildren (of which 249,147 were girls) across the
Occupied Palestinian Territory face challenges in accessing quality education in a
safe, child-friendly environment.91
93. A coercive environment prevails for students in the West Bank, caused by
violence and harassment and intimidation by Israeli military and security forces, as
well as settlers, including attacks and threats against schools, students and teach ers.92
Families resort to leaving their homes to ensure safe access to education for their
children elsewhere.93
94. In the first half of 2017, there were incidents reported in which Israeli forces
fired tear gas and rubber bullets at students and made incu rsions onto school grounds.
An increased number of attacks on schools was recorded in the first half of 2017 in
Area C, the Hebron H2 area and East Jerusalem. In the West Bank, children are often
subjected to bag and body searches, and at times harassment and detention, notably
as they pass through checkpoints. In particular, in some areas students also faced risks
of intimidation and violence from settlers while walking past settlements. Students
often must walk up to 10 km to get to and from school, putti ng their safety at risk.
Girls in particular have been reported to face a high risk of school dropout owing to
the fear of parents for their safety during the school commute. The lack of
accountability for the perpetrators of such violations exacerbates th ese conditions,
and the trend of attacks against education is increasing across the West Bank. 94
95. In East Jerusalem, nearly 2,000 new classrooms are needed to address the needs
of the Palestinian population, according to official Israeli data. Local edu cation is
impaired by inadequate infrastructure owing to the discriminatory and restrictive
planning and zoning regime and by a lack of qualified teachers and other staff, owing
to the difficulty for those living in the West Bank of obtaining a permit to a ccess East
Jerusalem. Palestinian children attending schools in East Jerusalem have to study a
version of the Palestinian curriculum modified by Israel with the reported aim of
censoring “incitement”.95
96. Forty-four Palestinian schools (36 in Area C and 8 in East Jerusalem) serving
about 5,000 children are at risk of demolition or seizure because of a lack of Israeli
building permits.96
97. In the Gaza Strip, two thirds of schools currently operate on double or triple
shifts in order to accommodate the nu mber of students. Consequently, the number of
learning hours per school day has been reduced to 4.5 (compared with 5.5 in the West
Bank).97
98. Owing to funding shortfalls and a lack of suitable land to build schools, UNRWA
reports that 70.2 per cent of its schools, and their 271,000 students, continue to
operate on a double-shift basis, which deprives refugee children of opportunities to
engage in the recreational and creative pursuits enjoyed by students of single -shift
schools.98
__________________
91 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 38.
92 Information received from UNICEF; and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
“2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 39.
93 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 39.
94 Ibid., pp. 38–39.
95 Information received from UNICEF.
96 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian bulletin: Occupied
Palestinian Territory” (February 2018).
97 Information received from UNICEF.
98 Information received from UNRWA.
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99. The unprecedented financial shortfall of UNRWA could have a severe impact
on its ability to deliver primary education and schooling services to Palestine refugee
students in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Shrinking funding also limits the
capacity of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) to support quality education in Gaza. 99
Public health
100. The closure in Gaza coupled with intra -Palestinian division continues to present
major challenges to the availability and quality of he alth care in the Gaza Strip, and
to access to health care for patients and health workers residing outside Gaza. Living
conditions in Gaza, especially overcrowded and substandard housing, further
heighten public health risks associated with the deteriorati ng water, sanitation and
hygiene conditions. The situation is particularly precarious for refugees in camps
where the average population density is nearly 40,000 persons per km2.100 Nearly
300,000 Palestinian children in Gaza require some form of mental heal th support or
psychosocial intervention.101
101. Shortages of medical supplies, machines, drugs and disposables owing to
funding shortages, as well as a lack of staff, place 10,000 newborns at risk and
contribute to the stagnant 14 per 1,000 neonatal mortal ity rate. An estimated 140,000
children under the age of 5 in Gaza are suffering from chronic malnutrition and
stunting.102
102. The energy crisis in Gaza has undermined basic services and compounded
serious public health concerns. Hospitals have had to pos tpone surgeries, discharge
patients prematurely and reduce the cleaning of medical facilities. 103 The Beit Hanoun
hospital, which normally serves more than 300,000 people in northern Gaza, halted
medical services at the end of January 2018 beca use of a lack of fuel reserves.96
103. During 2017, a monthly average of 38 per cent of items on the list of essential
medicines and 31 per cent of items of the list of essential medical disposables were
reported to be at less than a month’s supply in Gaza. Lack of facilities for essential
treatments and of adequate investigation technologies drive a reliance on medical
referral outside Gaza, especially for oncology. Patients referred out of Gaza are
dependent on access via the Erez crossing to facilities in East Jerusa lem (53 per cent),
Israel (22 per cent) and the West Bank (17 per cent). 104
104. Health workers are eligible to apply for permits to enter and leave Gaza. In
practice, staff face substantial access barriers; and only 61 per cent of those applying
for permits to exit or enter Gaza for humanitarian purposes through WHO obtained
access in 2017.105
105. The fragmentation of the West Bank undermines the right of Palestinians to
health. Over 260,000 Palestinians living in Area C, the Hebron H2 area and the seam
zone are dependent on humanitarian health care, including approximately 64,000
women of reproductive age, more than 34,000 children under the age of 5 and more
__________________
99 Information received from UNESCO.
100 Information received from UNRWA.
101 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 7.
102 Ibid., p. 31.
103 Information received from UNICEF.
104 Information received from WHO.
105 Ibid., citing its monthly report on referral of patients from the Gaza Strip for December 2017,
available from www.emro.who.int/pse/publications -who/monthly-referral-reports.html.
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than 85,000 children aged 5–19 years. Other vulnerable groups include disabled and
elderly people.106
106. Approximately 17 per cent of Palestinians in Area C are served by mobile
clinics,107 whose services are affected by road closures and adverse weather events.
About 12 per cent of residents in Area C live in communities situated more than 30 km
from a primary health-care clinic and without access to any mobile health clinic. 108
107. About 30 per cent of refugees living in West Bank camps, where the average
population density is around 40,000 persons per km2, but can reach 130,000-180,000
per km2 in some camps, face health risks as a result of severe overcrowding and
inadequate sewage and water networks.109
108. West Bank health facilities also face shortages of medical supplies, notably as a
result of funding shortages, with an average of 23 per cent of es sential medicines and
19 per cent of essential medical disposables out of stock in West Bank central drug
facilities in 2017.110
109. Areas of East Jerusalem beyond the “barrier” suffer in view of the unwillingness
of Israeli ambulances to service them with out police escort, citing security incidents,
while Palestinian ambulances are not allowed to cross the “barrier” (see
A/HRC/37/43, para. 58). There are pockets of acutely vulnerable communities in East
Jerusalem, with approximately 119,000 people suffering from mental health
conditions and a lack of essential health and emergency care. 111
110. A recently published study by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), in
cooperation with the Palestinian Ministry of Health, found that around 60 per cent
(643 women) of the breast cancer patients who died in 2016 died prematurely owing
to various factors, including delayed diagnosis and treatment in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. The study found that in such cas es restrictions on access to the
West Bank and Israel were a major factor for Palestinian patients, including patients
in Gaza.112
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
111. In its resolution 497 (1981), the Security Council decided that the Israeli
decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian
Golan was null and void and without international legal effect, and demanded that
Israel, the occupying Power, should rescind forthwit h its decision. It determined that
all the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention continued to apply to the Syrian
territory occupied by Israel since June 1967.
112. An estimated 23,000 Israeli settlers live in 34 illegal settlements in the occupied
Syrian Golan. The Government of Israel supports settlement activity through financial
incentives (see A/72/564, para. 60). According to the Syrian Arab Republic, 150
Israeli families settle in the Golan each year (see A/HRC/37/40, para. 11), as part of
__________________
106 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 32,
based on its health cluster data for 2017 and Vulnerability Profile of Palestinian Communities in
Area C project.
107 See https://public.tableau.com/profile/ocha.opt#!/vizhome/Health -VPP/Dashhealth; and
information received from WHO.
108 Information received from WHO.
109 Information received from UNRWA.
110 Information received from WHO.
111 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018 humanitarian needs overview”, p. 30.
112 UNFPA, Pathway to Survival: The Story of Breast Cancer in Palestine (January 2018), available from
http://palestine.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Breast%20Cancer%20Report%20Final_0.pdf.
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attempts to foster the overall integration of the occupied Syrian Golan into Israel and
delink it from the Syrian Arab Republic. 113
113. An estimated 25,000 Syrians resid e in five villages and face significant
challenges in terms of growth and development, owing in part to restricted access to
land and resources (see A/72/564, para. 60). The majority of the native Syrian
population reportedly reject Israeli citizenship, hold a form of permanent residency
and are considered by the Israeli authorities as having an “undefined” nationality.
They are provided with only an Israeli “laissez-passer” if they wish to travel.114
114. Permanent residents can apply for full Israeli citizenship but they can also have
their permanent residency status revoked following travel and residency abroad for
study or work. Around 100 Syrian residents of the occupied Syrian Golan have had
their permanent residency status revoked since 1982.115
115. Israeli settlers and the army control 95 per cent of the land in the occupied
Syrian Golan, leaving only 5 per cent to the Syrian population. 116 The Syrian Arab
Republic has reported confiscation by Israel of approxi mately 28 per cent of the
agricultural lands (see A/HRC/37/40, para. 17).
116. Syrians in the occupied Syrian Golan face land, housing and development
policies established by the Israeli authorities that rend er it nearly impossible for them
to obtain building permits, resulting in overcrowded Syrian villages with strained
infrastructure and limited resources (see A/72/564, para. 61). These conditions
reportedly force Syrians to build homes without building permits and place them at
risk of full or partial demolition and large fines ($55 -$85 per m2).117
117. The Syrian Arab Republic reports that Israeli authorities impose
disproportionately high taxes on Syrians for req uests for utility services (see
A/HRC/37/40, para. 14). Furthermore, obstacles to construction hinder the ability of
Syrian citizens to benefit from tourism. 118
118. Israeli settlers also benefit from a disprop ortionately larger allocation of natural
resources, such as clean water (see A/72/564, para. 60; see also A/HRC/28/44,
para. 54; and A/HRC/31/43, para. 64).
119. Discriminatory water allocation policies exacerbate the challenges faced by
Syrian farmers, including competition from Israeli settlers. 119 Access to the water
supply is limited for Syrian farmers owing to the Isr aeli prohibition on building new
wells. Half of the water needed for farming therefore has to be purchased from the
Israeli water company.113
120. Syrians tend to avoid abandoning agriculture, as there is reportedly a risk that
the authorities would confiscate their unused land.120 Furthermore, according to the
Syrian Arab Republic, Israeli authorities restrict Syrian usage of land for farming to
45,000 acres of land, while Israeli settlers are allowed to utilize 350,000 acres of land.
__________________
113 International Labour Office, The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories (Geneva,
2017), paras. 121–127.
114 Al-Marsad, the Arab Centre for Human Rights in t he Golan Heights, “Human rights violations
committed by the State of Israel in the Occupied Syrian Golan ”, submission to the United
Nations universal periodic review of Israel, June 2017, para. 21.
115 Ibid., para. 22.
116 Al-Marsad, the Arab Centre for Human Rights in the Golan Heights, “50 years of the occupation
of the Syrian Golan”, press release (8 June 2017).
117 Al-Marsad, the Arab Centre for Human Rights in the Golan Heights, “Human rights violations
committed by the State of Israel in the Occupied Syrian Golan”, para. 7.
118 Information received from the International Labour Organization (ILO).
119 Information received from ILO.
120 Ibid.
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The Syrian Arab Republic further stated that the right of Syrians to work was
restricted in the occupied Syrian Golan (see A/HRC/34/37, para. 24).
121. Israeli efforts to clear mines are reported to prioritize areas around Israeli
settlements and agricultural land over Syrian residential and agricultural zones,
despite the concentration of landmines in the latter. 121
122. In July 2017, the Ministry of the Interior of Israel announced that, for the first
time since 1967, elections would be held on 30 October 2018 in four towns: Buq ‘ata,
Mas‘adah, Majdal Shams and Ayn Quniyah.122
IV. Conclusion
123. The 51-year Israeli occupation has had a detrimental effect on the social and
economic development of the people in the Occupied Pale stinian Territory and the
occupied Syrian Golan. The impact of the prolonged occupation and the policies and
practices of Israel on the Palestinian people, society and economy is multilayered and
has accumulated negative effects over the years. The funding crisis that UNRWA is
facing is another factor that only exacerbates the conditions of hundreds of thousands
of Palestinians who already live in harsh conditions.
124. A number of Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
and the occupied Syrian Golan are contrary to the relevant Security Council
resolutions, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Some
of them may be considered discriminatory. Certain practices may amount to forcible
transfer of protected persons, which could amount to a grave breach of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, and others could amount to collective punishment.
125. Adherence to international law is an absolute imperative, ensuring that no party
enjoys impunity and securing justice and peace for all those living in the region,
including those Palestinians and Syrians living under occupation.
126. Humanitarian and development efforts are key to alleviating the suffering of the
Palestinians and Syrians under occupation. Nevertheless, cycles of violence will not
end until the roots of such violence are addressed. The United Nations maintains its
long-standing position that a lasting and comprehensive peace can be achieved only
through a negotiated two-State solution. The Secretary-General will continue to work
towards the attainment of this just and lasting peace. It is only by realizing the vision
of two States living side-by-side in peace, security and mutual recognition, with
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and Palestine, and all f inal status issues resolved
permanently through negotiations, that the legitimate aspirations of both peoples will
be achieved.
__________________
121 Al-Marsad, the Arab Centre for Human Rights in the Golan Heights, “Human rights violations
committed by the State of Israel in the Occupied Syrian Golan ”, para. 13.
122 Noa Shpigel, “In first since 1967, Druze villages in Israeli Golan Heights to hold democratic
elections”, Haaretz, 8 July 2017. Available from www.haaretz.com/israel -news/.premium-infirst-
since-1967-israeli-druze-to-hold-democratic-elections-1.5492306.
United Nations A/74/88–E/2019/72
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
13 May 2019
Original: English
19-07835 (E) 060619
*1907835*
General Assembly
Seventy-fourth session
Item 62 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2019
Agenda item 16
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of
the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
Summary
In its resolution 2018/20, entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan”, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-
General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy -third session, through the
Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The Assembly, in its
resolution 73/255, entitled “Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population
in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources ”, also requested the
Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its seventy-fourth session. The present
report, which was prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
(ESCWA), has been submitted in compliance with these resolutions of the Council and
the Assembly.
The report covers persistent Israeli practices and policies, in particular those that
may be in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights
law and that affect the social and economic conditions of people living under its
military occupation.
* A/74/50.
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ESCWA would like to express its appreciation for the contributions of the Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, the International
Monetary Fund, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment
of Women, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, the World Food Programme, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, the Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the World Health Organization.
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I. Introduction
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2018/20, expressed concerns
about the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan. The General
Assembly, in its resolution 73/255, demanded that Israel, the occupying power, cease
the exploitation, damage, cause of loss or depletion and endangerment of natural
resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the
occupied Syrian Golan. The present note provides information on relevant
developments with regard to the foregoing.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory
Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Israeli legislation affecting the Occupied Palestinian Territory
2. In the past two years, members of the Knesset, the main legislative body of
Israel, have proposed several legislative initiatives aimed at advancing the retroactive
legalization of settlements. This was coupled with an expansion in illegal Israeli
settlement (see A/73/410, para. 58),1 following decades of practices on the ground
that entrenched the occupation and Israeli control over lands in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, in particular in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. 2
3. The Regulation Law, which was adopted in February 2017, remains
unimplemented pending the ruling of the High Court of Justice on its legality (see
ibid., para. 12). If implemented, it could enable the continued use of private
Palestinian land in the West Bank for between 2,000 and 4,000 housing units,
according to some estimates (see A/73/87-E/2018/69, para. 35, and A/72/90-E/2017/71,
para. 23).
4. An amendment to the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, adopted in
January 2018, requires a super majority of 80 votes in the Knesset for the approval of
territorial concessions in Jerusalem to “a foreign entity”, while lowering the threshold
required to change the municipal boundaries of the city (see A/73/410, para.9).3
5. An amendment to the Council for Higher Education Law, adopted on
12 February 2018, applies the jurisdiction of the Council for Higher Education of
Israel to Israeli settlers in the West Bank and retroactively recognizes higher
education institutions in settlements previously recognized by the military authorities
(see ibid., para. 10).
6. An amendment to the Administrative Courts Law, adopted in July 2018,
provided that petitions relating to the West Bank in four areas, namely, planning and
construction, the Freedom of Information Law, entry to and exit from the West Bank,
and military restraining and supervision orders, will be referred to the Administrative
Affairs Court of Jerusalem instead of the High Court of Justice. The law would further
limit access to justice for Palestinians and, in extending the competence of an Israeli
__________________
1 See also Peace Now, “Construction starts in settlements by year”, Construction database,
available at http://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/construction; and
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release, 28 March 20 19, available at
www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_28 -3-2019-land-en.pdf.
2 See previous reports and TD/B/65(2)/3, paras. 22–25.
3 See also Knesset, “Knesset passes law requiring 8-MK majority for giving up Israeli sovereignty
over any part of Jerusalem”, 2 January 2018.
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administrative court to the West Bank, would also constitu te an additional step
towards a blurring of the distinction between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (ibid.).4
7. Palestinians in the occupied territory continue to be subject to a complex
combination of Israeli and Palestinian legal systems. In the West Bank, Israeli
domestic law is applied extraterritorially to Israeli settlers, while Palestinians are
subject to Israeli military law in addition to the Palestinian legal system. As a result,
lower human rights standards are applied to Palestini an suspects and defendants
compared with Israeli suspects and defendants. The application of two different legal
systems in the same territory on the sole basis of nationality or origin is inherently
discriminatory and violates the principle of equality be fore the law, which is central
to the right to fair trial. The application of Israeli domestic law to settlers and of Israeli
military law to Palestinians in the West Bank also raises concerns as to the obligation
of the occupying Power to respect the laws in force in the territory it occupies, unless
it is absolutely prevented from doing so (see A/73/87-E/2018/69, para. 3; A/72/90-
E/2017/71, para. 4; and A/71/86-E/2016/13, para.7).
Access to services and justice
8. As a result of Israeli restrictions and other administrative and security measures,
Palestinians living in different areas of the Occupied Palestinian Territory have
differential access to health-care services and different levels of freedom of
movement. Since the annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel in 1967, Palestinians
living there are given a “permanent residency” which grants them, inter alia, access
to Israeli social benefits and health-care services but is revocable and dependent on
them continuing to reside or work in Jerusalem.
9. The Knesset has adopted several laws over the years exempting Israel from civil
liabilities for any wrongful act committed by the Israeli military towards Palestinians
in Gaza, which it defines as an “enemy territory” (see A/73/420, para. 63), thereby
impeding the right of Gazan victims to equal access to reparation (see A/HRC/40/74,
para. 112).
10. The independent international commission of inquiry on the protests in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory 5 reports that it is not aware of any alternative
mechanism employed by Israel to compensate Gazan victims for damage caused
unlawfully by the security forces (ibid.).
Discriminatory zoning and planning policies
11. As noted previously, the Israeli zoning and planning policies in Area C and East
Jerusalem are discriminatory and considered incompatible with requirements under
international law (see A/73/410, para. 32).
12. The Israeli Civil Administration permits construction by Palestinians within
approved outline plans covering only 0.4 per cent of Area C (see A/73/87-E/2018/64,
para. 4). For Palestinians to obtain a building permit outside those plans, Israeli
authorities must approve a local outline plan for the area, after which a permit must
be requested through a lengthy and costly process that often results in rejection. This
makes it almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain building permits, leaving them
__________________
4 See also Association of Civil Rights in Israel, “2018: A bad year for democracy – human rights
in Israel”, 2018 situation report.
5 Established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-28/1 to “investigate all alleged
violations and abuses of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, […] particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, in the context of the
military assaults on the large-scale civilian protests that began on 30 March 2018”.
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no choice but to build without permits and expose themselves to the risk of
demolitions and displacement. To enhance the ability of Palestinians to obtain
building permits, since 2011, Palestinian and international stakeholders have
submitted 102 local outline plans to the Israeli Civil Administration for communities
in the entirety of Area C. Only five plans were approved (see ibid., para. 31).
Violence and the use of force
13. As the occupying Power, Israel has the obligation to take all the measures in its
power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and life in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and to protect the Palestinian population from all act s of
violence, in all circumstances (see ibid., para. 17). 6 Practices of the Israeli security
and military forces continue to raise concerns. Of particular concern was the response
of the Israeli military to the weekly Great March of Return protests along the Gaza
border fence.
14. In its report, the independent international commission of inquiry on the protests
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory found reasonable grounds to believe that some
violations by the Israeli security forces constituted serious international crimes,
including possible war crimes and crimes against humanity (see A/HRC/40/74, paras.
94, 97, 101, 102, 114 and 115), in particular through unlawful, excessive and
disproportionate use of force (see ibid., paras. 99 and 101) and the intentional
targeting of civilian demonstrators in Gaza by Israeli snipers, including children and
persons with disabilities, as well as health workers and journalists (see ibid., paras.
68, 71, 74, 76 and 94).
15. Between 1 April 2018 and 31 March 2019, 299 Palestinians, including 60
children and 4 women, were killed and another 32,696, including 6,713 children and
1,812 women, were injured by Israeli military and security forces or settlers. At least
199 of the fatalities and 30,200 of the injuries were incurred during the Great March
of Return in Gaza as at 31 March. A quarter of the injuries resulted from live
ammunition.7
16. The year 2018 was the deadliest single year for Palestinians since the 2014
conflict in Gaza, with the highest number of injuries since 2005. The massive rise in
Palestinian casualties has been one of the key factors behind the deterioration of the
humanitarian situation in 2018. There were 14 Israeli fatalities and 137 injured in
2018.8
17. Despite the relatively low proportion of injuries among females compared with
males during events related to the Great March of Return, the consequences of injury
can have specific negative side effects for women, in particularly when the injured
person is a mother.9
18. During 2018, 363 verified incidents of attacks by Israeli security forces against
Palestinian health-care workers and facilities were recorded in Gaza. As a result, three
__________________
6 See also Hague Regulations, arts. 43 and 46; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 27.
7 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Casualties database,
available at www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties (accessed on 31 March 2019); and “Humanitarian
coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Mr. Jaime McGoldrick, calls for action to
prevent further loss of life and injury in the Gaza Strip ”, 29 March 2019; and Humanitarian
Bulletin: Occupied Palestinian Territory, March 2019.
8 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin:
Occupied Palestinian Territory, December 2018; see also the Casualties database.
9 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN -Women) input
and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), “Impact of the ‘Great March of Return’ on
gender-based violence”, 8 June 2018.
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health-care workers were killed and 565 injured, with 85 ambulan ces and five other
forms of health transport as well as three health -care facilities sustaining damage. In
the West Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO) verified 60 incidents of attacks
on health-care workers and facilities, in which 16 health-care staff were injured, 17
ambulances were attacked and 12 clinics and one hospital were affected. There were
35 incidents that involved the prevention or delay of ambulance access. In addition,
a number of incidents monitored by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) indicate neglect by soldiers to provide or
facilitate the provision of medical aid to Palestinians critically or fatally injured in
the wake of alleged attacks.10
19. More than four years after the most recent escalation of hostilities in Gaza,
serious concerns persist about the lack of accountability for alleged violations of
international humanitarian law committed by all parties to the conflict. It also persists
in the context of Israel’s control over and policing of Palestinians in the West Bank.
In the past seven years, during which reportedly 114 criminal investigations were
opened across the Occupied Palestinian Territory and almost 700 Palestinian civilians
were killed by Israeli security forces, only four i ndictments have been issued against
soldiers for the killing of unarmed Palestinians: three for killings in the West Bank
and one for a killing in Gaza (see A/HRC/40/43, paras. 14–18).
Settler violence
20. Palestinians continued to suffer from settler violence and harassment during the
reporting period. Settler violence resulting in Palestinian casualties or damage to
property increased during 2018: more than 280 incidents in which Israeli settlers
killed or injured Palestinians or damaged Palestinian property were recorded, marking
a 77 per cent increase compared with 2017. As a result, one Palestinian woman was
killed and 115 Palestinians were injured. Another two Palestinian suspected
perpetrators of attacks were killed by Israeli settlers. Palestinian property vandalized
by settlers includes some 8,000 trees and about 620 vehicles. Seven Israelis were
killed by Palestinians in these incidents in 2018, compared with four in 2017. There
were at least 181 incidents in which Palestinians killed or injured settlers and other
Israeli civilians in the West Bank or damaged Israeli property, a 28 per cent decline
compared with the previous year.11
21. Settler attacks included stone-throwing, vandalism and physical attacks and
occurred largely in Palestinian communities close to settlements (see A/73/499,
para. 18). A total of 350,000 Palestinians live in 67 such communities. 12
22. While efforts by the authorities to prevent and investigate settler-related
violence are being made, further measures need to be taken to prevent or investigate
cases of settler violence and prosecute perpetrators.
23. The Government of Israel decided not to renew the mandate of the Temporary
International Presence in Hebron beyond 31 January 2019. Combined with intensified
harassment and restrictions against residents and the remaining protective presence
actors in the area, the non-renewal of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron
increases the protection risks faced by the population, in particular schoolchildren. 13
__________________
10 WHO input.
11 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018: More casualties and
food insecurity, less funding for humanitarian aid”, 27 December 2018.
12 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Occupied Palestinian
Territory: 2019 Humanitarian needs overview”, December 2018. All data in the overview are up
to November 2018.)
13 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin:
Occupied Palestinian Territory, February 2019.
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24. Israeli settler violence and the ongoing occupation also affect the lives of
Palestinian women. Settler violence, which takes place in the streets and
communities, has an impact on the safety of women in their own communities,
resulting in curbs to their day-to-day rights, and reinforces the stereotype that women
are in constant need of protection and supervision. 14
Detention and ill-treatment
25. As at the end of February 2019, 5,248 Palestinians security detainees and
prisoners were being held in Israeli prisons, including 205 children, 48 women 15 and
7 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council.16
26. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecti ng the Human
Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories noted
that a wide range of serious concerns had been raised with the Committee, including
the continued use of administrative detention, arrest and the detention of c hildren and
lack of access to proper medical care. Palestinian officials and civil society
organizations drew attention to the detention of thousands of Palestinians, including
children, and raised concern about the number of Palestinian detainees held in 22
prisons, military camps and detention centres inside Israel, in violation of
international humanitarian law (see ibid., paras. 64–65).
27. Concerns had also been expressed about Israel’s continued policy of ad hoc and
arbitrary administrative detention, whereby detainees are held without trial or charge
on indefinitely renewable six-month administrative detention orders, often on the
basis of secret information to which the detainee was neither given access nor the
opportunity to challenge (see ibid., para. 65). At the end of February 2019, 495
Palestinians, including 2 children, were being held under administrative detention. 17
28. Also of concern are the continuous reports documenting cases of ill -treatment
and torture of Palestinian detainees, including children.18 The Special Committee was
informed that 75 per cent of children arrested reported having been exposed to
physical or psychological ill-treatment (see ibid., para. 70).
29. Since 2000, at least 8,000 Palestinian children have reportedl y been arrested and
prosecuted in the Israeli military justice system. 19 The arrest of children is often
conducted during night raids, with security forces entering the home and waking up
the family in order to arrest the children. This practice has been co ndemned by human
rights groups, given the fear and anxiety that it causes both to the children and to the
families. In many cases, families are not told why the children are being arrested.
Children report being subjected to violence and humiliation during transport to the
detention facility. In many cases, children are reportedly interrogated without a parent
or guardian present, and there are serious concerns about the possibility of forced
confessions. The Special Committee noted with great concern repor ts about the
practice of plea-bargaining, in which detained children plead guilty in exchange for a
reduced sentence. There are concerns that this practice pressures children to plead
__________________
14 UN-Women input.
15 Data from B’tselem, Detainees and prisoners database, available at www.btselem.org/
statistics/detainees_and_prisoners and www.btselem.org/statistics/minors_in_custody (accessed
on 31 March 2019). See also data from Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights
Association, available at www.addameer.org/statistics (accessed on 24 April 2019).
16 Data from Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, www.addameer.org/
statistics (accessed on 20 March 2019).
17 Data from B’tselem, Detainees and prisoners database (accessed on 31 March 2019).
18 Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “I’ve been there: a study of torture
and inhumane treatment in Al-Moscobiyeh Interrogation Centre”, 2018. Available at
www.addameer.org/sites/default/files/publications/al_moscabiyeh_report_0.pdf.
19 See www.dci-palestine.org/issues_military_detention.
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guilty in cases in which they may be innocent, in particular when they a re interrogated
without the presence of a parent or guardian (see ibid., paras. 64, 65 and 70).
30. In 2018, Defense for Children International – Palestine documented 120 child
detention cases from the West Bank, the majority of which included verbal abuse ,
threats, humiliation or intimidation and up to 30 days of isolation, in addition to
physical abuse.20
31. Palestinian mothers detained in the Al-Moscobiyeh Interrogation Centre are
reportedly subjected to threats of harm to their children in order to obtain a
confession. Women detainees also suffer from sexual harassment, through sexual
suggestions and gestures, or close-range interrogation.21
Population displacement
32. There is continued concern that the combination of State -sanctioned land
seizures, retroactive legalization of settler outposts, demolition of Palestinian homes
and livelihood structures, denial of Palestinian building permits, restrictions on
movement and access to livelihoods, and settler violence and a lack of accountability
for such violence contributes to the creation of a coercive environment in areas under
full Israeli control, propelling Palestinians to move out of certain parts of Area C and
East Jerusalem. Involuntary displacement and relocation to alternative residential
areas as a result of such policies may amount to forcible transfer if it is carried out
without the free and informed consent of the individuals who relocate, in violation of
the obligations of Israel under international humanitarian and human rights law.
Forcible transfer is a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and amounts to
a war crime (see A/73/410, paras. 2, 57, 58 and 64; and A/73/87-E/2018/69, para. 21).
33. Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, Area C and the H2 zone of Hebron are
most affected by the coercive environment and face the risk of displacement and
forcible transfer (see A/73/410, para. 66).22 More than 10,000 people, 62 per cent of
whom are refugees, live in 63 communities in Area C of the West Bank at a heightened
risk of forcible transfer. Dozens of Palestinian Bedouin communities, the majority of
whom are refugees, are also at risk of forcible transfer in the central West Bank; 18
of these communities are located in or near the area designated by Israel for the E1
settlement plan that seeks to connect the Ma`ale Adummim settlement bloc with East
Jerusalem.23
34. Since 2009, approximately 9,260 Palestinians, including 1,972 women and
4,853 children, have been displaced owing to demolitions, including 593 who were
displaced between 1 April 2018 and 31 March 2019. 24
35. Israel also resorts to administrative and legal measures to revoke the residency
status of Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Residency status was revoked in cases in
which Palestinians were considered by Israeli authorities to have “transferred their
centre of life” from the West Bank abroad for seven or more years. 25
__________________
20 Defense for Children – Palestine, “Year-in-review: 2018 rained deadly force on Palestinian
children”, 31 December 2018.
21 Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “I’ve been there”.
22 See also United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019
Humanitarian needs overview”.
23 Ibid.
24 See United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Demolition and
displacement in the West Bank database, available at www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition
(accessed on 31 March 2019).
25 See Al-Haq, “Engineering community: family unification, entry restrictions and other Israeli
policies of fragmenting Palestinians”, February 2019.
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36. In December 2018, the Knesset passed the preliminary reading of a bill that
would allow the Israeli army to expel family members of a terrorist from their home
by removing them from their town or city or demarcating an area that they are not
allowed to enter.26
37. The fear of living under constant threat of displacement has increased the
insecurity of women and girls. This is in addition to the increase in caregiving
responsibilities of children, who often face psychological trauma because of
demolitions and the loss of their homes. When displaced, Palestinian women find
themselves further constrained in their access to public spaces and livelihood
opportunities against a backdrop of increasing food insecurity and vulnerability.
There is also the possibility of increases in domestic violence and the use of early
marriage as a negative coping mechanism. Furthermore, displaced girls lose time in
school, which has a severe impact on their psycholog ical well-being, resulting in
emotional and behavioural problems that have a negative impact on their educational
achievement and retention.27
38. By November 2018, 14,600 Palestinians remained internally displaced in Gaza
as a result of the 2014 conflict, owing to lack of funding for reconstruction. Some
19,700 Palestinians currently inhabit housing units that are beyond repair, and another
24,000 need urgent shelter assistance.28
Destruction and confiscation of property and infrastructure
39. Overall, 2018 witnessed a 10 per cent increase in the demolition or seizure of
Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank compared with 2017. 29
40. Between 1 April 2018 and 31 March 2019, 500 Palestinian -owned structures
were demolished, including 132 inhabited homes and 65 donor-funded structures,
affecting more than 32,000 people. The total number of structures demolished by the
Israeli authorities since 2009 reached 5,942, including 1,704 inhabited homes and 981
donor-funded structures.30
41. Israel continued punitive demolitions of the family homes of Palestinians
suspected of killing Israelis, a measure that may amount to collective punishment.
Between 1 April 2018 and 31 March 2019, the Israeli authorities carried out seven
such demolitions.31
42. There are currently more than 13,000 Palestinian-owned structures for which
demolition orders have been issued in Area C of the West Bank. 32 At least one third
of Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem lacked building permits, potentially placing
100,000 residents at risk of demolition-induced displacement.33
__________________
26 Knesset, “Bill to deport families of terrorists approved in preliminary reading ”, 19 December
2018.
27 UN-Women input; UN-Women, “Gender alert: needs of women and girls in humanitarian action
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (2018).
28 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”. Based on Shelter Cluster Palestine, “Inter-agency shelter survey on substandard
housing conditions in Gaza”, June 2018.
29 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “West Bank demolitions
and displacement: an overview”, December 2018.
30 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Demolition and
displacement in the West Bank database (accessed on 31 March 2019).
31 Ibid.
32 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”.
33 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin:
Occupied Palestinian Territory, December 2017.
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43. Over one third of Area C is formally designated as public land, referred to as
“State land” by Israel. The vast majority of “State land” declarations took place before
the start of the Oslo peace process in the early 1990s. It is estimated that between
750 km2 and 900 km2 were declared “State land” by Israel between 1979 and 1992.
“State land” has been allocated exclusively for use by Israel and its citizens, rather
than for the benefit of the local population (see A/73/87-E/2018/69, para. 20). A recent
report by Kerem Navot revealed that, using military orders, Israel seized more than
101,380 dunams in the West Bank between 1967 and 2014, 67 per cent of which are
privately owned by Palestinian residents of the West Bank.34
44. During 2018 and the first two months of 2019, the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) recorded 39 Israeli military orders
confiscating 2.8 dunams of land owned by Palestinians in the West Bank.
Israeli settlement activity
45. The General Assembly, in its resolution 73/255, stressed that the wall and the
settlements being constructed by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, are contrary to international law. This is
confirmed in other resolutions, such as Security Council reso lution 2334 (2016), in
which the Council reaffirmed that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the
Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal
validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major
obstacle to the achievement of a lasting and comprehensive peace.
46. Settlement expansion, involving expropriation, evictions and demolitions,
together with a planning and zoning regime, impedes the development, employment
and livelihoods of Palestinians, as well as their full enjoyment of their socioeconomic
rights.35
47. Successive Israeli governments have supported population growth in the
settlements by providing State-led public services, opening new economic activities,
advancing housing plans and providing tax benefits to some of the settlements (see
A/71/355, para. 4). Areas surrounding the settlements are usually declared off -limits
to Palestinians, citing “security reasons”; they are defined officially as part of the
jurisdictional areas of the settlements and are eventually annexed to them (see
A/71/86-E/2016/13, para. 5). 36 Combined with the settlements themselves, these
areas comprise 9.6 per cent of the West Bank.37
48. There are currently approximately 215,000 Israelis living in East Jerusalem, and
the settler population in Area C in the occupied West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem,
is some 413,000. This brings the settler population to approximately 630,000 Israeli
settlers in 143 settlement locations in the West Bank (132), including East Jerusalem
(11), and 106 outposts.38
49. From January to September 2018, actual construction of 1,456 housing units
began in West Bank settlements, excluding East Jerusalem, compared with 1,213
__________________
34 See Kerem Navot, Seize the Moral Low Ground: Land Seizures for “Security Needs” in the West
Bank (2018).
35 International Labour Organization (ILO) input.
36 See also Din, “Through the lens of Israel’s interests: the civil administration in the West Bank ”,
position paper, December 2017).
37 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release, 28 March 2019.
38 Office of the European Union Representative, “Six-month report on Israeli settlements in the
occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem (reporting period July–December 2018)”,
4 February 2019.
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construction starts from January to September 2017, which represents a 20 per cent
increase.39
Movement and access restrictions
50. As freedom of movement is a prerequisite to the exercise of other human rights,
such as the rights to family, health and education, the closures and related practices
imposed by the Israeli authorities, in particular restrictions on movement, have had a
devastating impact on the lives of Palestinians, in particular on families. About a third
of Gaza residents have relatives in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. As
family visits are not one of the criteria for travel, many families remain separated for
years (see A/73/420, para. 25).
Gaza closures
51. Imposed on Gaza since June 2007, following the takeover by Hamas, the
closures in Gaza, which entail severe restrictions on the movement of goods and
people, continue to undermine the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights
of Palestinians in Gaza (see A/HRC/34/38, para. 29; A/71/364, paras. 28–29;
A/70/421, paras. 15–22; and A/HRC/31/44, paras. 40 and 43). The blockade may
amount to collective punishment, which is prohibited under international law (see
A/73/420, paras. 7, 9 and 65, and A/72/565, para. 28).
52. The closures continue to severely erode the productive base of the economy of
Gaza, and restrictions on the entry of raw materials, essential equipme nt and spare
parts have consistently delayed efforts to reconstruct Gaza and to strengthen basic
public services (see A/73/420, paras. 32 and 64).
53. As a general rule, every Palestinian in Gaza who needs to travel through Israel
through Beit Hanoun (Erez) crossing can do so only with an Israeli -issued permit.
54. Permit approval rates for patients seeking medical treatment that is unavailable
in Gaza continue to decline, from 92.5 per cent in 2012 to 62.1 per cent in 2016 and
59 per cent in the first half of 2018. Between 30 March and 27 August, only 23 per
cent of 270 people injured in the mass demonstrations during the Great March of
Return who applied for permits for Erez were approved, with 37 per cent denied and
the remaining pending.40
55. According to data collected by WHO, 15 per cent of applications on behalf of
health partners in Gaza were approved for exit in 2018. The World Food Programme
(WFP) reports that 27 per cent of permits requested in 2018 for its national staff from
Gaza were rejected for undefined “security reasons”.
56. In practice, the permit regime is characterized by lack of transparency.
Countless Palestinians, including terminally ill patients, wait with continued
uncertainty about the status of their applications. Furthermore, there is generally little
or no communication by the Israeli authorities to inform or advise the affected
population when new measures are introduced and existing procedures amended (see
ibid., paras. 15 and 24).
57. Israeli authorities regularly request that Palestinians go through a security
interview at the Beit Hanoun crossing as a precondition to obtaining a permit.
Palestinians have reported being subjected to degrading treatment and intimidation
__________________
39 Ibid.
40 World Health Organization (WHO), Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Monthly report: December
2018”, 29 January 2019; and United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs overview”.
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during such interviews. There have also been reports of pressure on applicants to
provide security-related information about Gaza (see ibid., para. 18).
58. In 2018, the Rafah crossing was open for 198 days d uring daytime, compared
with 36 days in 2017.41
59. The import into Gaza of goods deemed by Israel to have dual civilian and
military use is prohibited unless an Israeli-issued licence to import can be acquired
(see ibid., para. 29). Traders have reported that the Israeli authorities may deem nearly
any item dual-use, even if it was previously allowed in with no special controls. 42
60. Although the volume of imports to Gaza gradually increased over the years, it
declined to 106,171 truckloads in 2018, includi ng in view of the dire economic
situation and the security context, compared with 118,509 in 2017, 43 and is still not
sufficient for the needs of the population of Gaza (see E/ESCWA/30/5).
61. The severe restrictions on exports from Gaza remain in place, albeit with some
easing as at 2014. In 2018, 693 truckloads44 were allowed to exit, compared with 651
in 2017; however, this is still a fraction of the pre -closures levels, with 9,324
truckloads having exited the Gaza Strip in 2005 alone (ibid.).
62. The temporary Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism, established in 2014, has
facilitated the entry of large quantities of construction material, otherwise restricted
by Israel, into Gaza. Nearly 100,000 people were displ aced owing to the destruction
or severe damage of their homes during the 2014 conflict. More than 85 per cent of
these homes were rebuilt by the end of 2018. There was a decline in cement imports
in 2018, however, owing to the general economic decline in Gaza, reduced donor
funding and the fact that the reconstruction process is drawing to an end. 45 Israel and
the Palestinian Authority, together with the United Nations, conducted a joint review
of the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism towards the end of 2018 and agreed on a
number of measures to increase its functionality, transparency and predictability.
63. In addition to the access restrictions, Israeli security forces enforce buffer zones
by land and sea as “access- restricted areas”. While Israeli authorities have declared
that up to 100 metres from the perimeter fence is a “no-go” area for individuals and
up to 200 metres there is no access for heavy machinery, humanitarian partners in the
field have reported that in practice, up to 300 metres from the perimeter fence is
considered by most farmers as a no-go area and up to 1,000 metres a “high-risk” area.
By sea, while varying and at times increased to 12 to15 nautical miles, the restricted
area is generally 6 nautical miles, less than a third of the 20 nautical miles agreed
under the Oslo Accords.46
__________________
41 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gaza crossings’ operations
status: monthly update – December 2018”, 14 January 2019.
42 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”, 18 September
2017.
43 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gaza crossing s: movement
of people and goods database, available at www.ochaopt.org/data/crossings (accessed on
24 March 2019).
44 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gaza crossings: movement
of people and goods database (accessed on 24 March 2019).
45 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin:
Occupied Palestinian Territory, February 2019; and Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”,
27 September 2018.
46 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”.
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Movement restrictions in the West Bank
64. The movement of Palestinians within the West Bank, including to and from East
Jerusalem, is subject to physical and administrative obstacles, impeding access to
services as well as economic and social activity. In this regard, as at 2018, there had
been a total of 705 road closures47 and physical obstacles that exacerbate the ability
of Palestinians to move freely in the West Bank.
65. Palestinians living in Area C, in particular, have to contend with the restrictions
on movement and access as well as harassment from the Israeli military and settler
violence.48
66. Israel continues to construct the “barrier” in the West Bank, of which at least
465 km have been completed. Some 85 per cent of its 712 km-long planned route runs
inside the West Bank rather than along the 1949 Armistice Line (Green Line), 49 even
after the International Court of Justice concluded that the wall built by Israel, the
occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, and its associated regime, were contrary to international law. 50 Once
construction is completed along the planned route, about 9.4 per cent of the West
Bank will be severed from the rest of the West Bank.51
67. As at November 2017, some 11,000 Palestinians were living in the seam zone,
the area located between the wall and the Green Line, which was declared a closed
military area. Many of them are unable to gain access to the rest of the West Bank .52
They, as well as other Palestinians who need to enter the seam zone, must apply for a
special permit from the Israeli military authorities. By November 2018, the approval
rates for permits for landowners and agricultural workers had decreased from 76 pe r
cent in 2014 to 28 per cent and from 70 per cent to 50 per cent, respectively. 53
68. In East Jerusalem, access by communities to health care is also challenged by
the route of the “barrier”, given that certain communities find themselves on the West
Bank side and need to cross checkpoints to access the health -care services to which
they are entitled as residents of Jerusalem.54 The majority of other West Bank patients
must apply for permits to access East Jerusalem hospitals. 55
69. Access to East Jerusalem also remains problematic for Palestinian ambulances,
which are stopped and delayed for security checks. In 2018, according to the
Palestinian Red Crescent Society, 84 per cent of the 1,462 recorded journeys by
ambulances requiring entry to Jerusalem from other parts of the West Bank had to
transfer patients to another ambulance at checkpoints, which delayed transit. 56
70. Israeli restrictions continue to hinder access by UNRWA to refugee communities
in the West Bank. Between April 2018 and January 2019, UNRWA reported 59 access-
__________________
47 Ibid.
48 UN-Women input.
49 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Occupied Palestinian
Territory: humanitarian facts and figures”, December 2017.
50 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004.
51 B’Tselem, “The separation barrier”, 11 November 2017.
52 Ibid.
53 According to data obtained from Israeli authorities by the non -governmental organization,
HaMoked, on the basis of the Freedom of Information Act. See United Nations, Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Bulletin: Occupied Palestinian Territory,
February 2019”.
54 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”.
55 WHO input.
56 Ibid.
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related incidents, which negatively affected the delivery of services. UNRWA also
recorded another 33 access incidents at East Jerusalem checkpoints.
Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestinian natural resources
71. Area C of the West Bank continues to be almost entirely off -limits for the
Government of Palestine, producers and investors, even though it contains the most
valuable natural resources (see TD/B/65(2)/3, para. 25).
Water
72. Israeli restrictions on the drilling and rehabilitation of wells in the West Bank
exacerbate water shortages and continue to disrupt daily life and impede development
interventions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The resulting shortage in water
supplies for the Palestinian population of the West Bank prompts the Government of
Palestine to regularly purchase water from Israel,57 in particular from the Israeli water
company Mekorot.58 Israeli settlements and discriminatory policies in the West Bank
regarding water allocation further exacerbate the situation (see A/HRC/40/73).59
73. Approximately 22 per cent of the estimated total population suffers from lack
of access to water and poor water quality. Owing to Israeli restrictions, some 294,000
people are either not connected to a water network or receive water only once a week
or less, mainly through unsecure water resources and/or tankered water. About 95,000
Palestinians in Area C receive less than 50 litres of water per capita per da y and more
than 83,000 people receive bad-quality drinking water. 60 According to a recent
estimate, residents of Israel and Israeli settlers consume approximately three times as
much water per person per day (250 litres) as West Bank Palestinians (84 litres ) (see
A/HRC/40/73, para. 51).61
74. Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem also suffer from inadequate water,
sanitation and hygiene services, with only 59 per cent of residents connected legally
and properly to the water grid.62
75. The Israeli Civil Administration has built seven dams in the West Bank, which
will reportedly allow Israel to control a significant amount of surface water and to
divert an estimated 260,000 to 1 million m3 of surface water annually to settlement
agricultural areas.63
76. In Gaza, the coastal aquifer, which is the sole natural water source, has been
virtually depleted by over-extraction and the intrusion of seawater, rendering more
than 97 per cent of its water unfit for human consumption.64 Only 10.5 per cent of
Palestinians in Gaza have access to safe drinking water through the public water
__________________
57 Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “Water provision and drillings in the West Bank 2010–
2016”, 5 June 2018.
58 See data in Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release, 21 March 2019, available at
www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_21 -3-2019-water-en.pdf.
59 B’tselem, “Water crisis”, 11 November 2017; and European Parliamentary Research Service,
“Water in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, briefing, January 2016.
60 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”, according to Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics census.
61 B’tselem, “Water crisis”; and European Parliamentary Research Service, “Water in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict”.
62 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”, according to Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics nat ional census in 2018.
63 According to information received by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices
Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied
Territories. See A/73/499, para. 34.
64 See data in Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release, 21 March 2019.
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network, down from 98.3 per cent in 2000. Reliance on the much more expensive,
unregulated and unreliable water tanks, containers and bottle d water rose from 1.4
per cent to 89.6 per cent during the same period. 65
77. By 2018, the whole population of Gaza had been negatively affected by ongoing
deficits and needs in the water, sanitation and hygiene sector. This includes 983,623
women and 991,428 children who are exposed to public health risks associated with
poor water quality, poor wastewater collection and treatment, lack of storm water
infrastructure and lack of proper hygiene practices. 66
78. A failure to continue programmes supported by the United Nations in Gaza, such
as the emergency fuel programme for generators, would reduce the average water
quota from 80 litres per capita per day to 45 litres per capita per day; water production
from 280 domestic water wells and 30 water reservoirs wou ld be reduced from
220,000 m3 to 40,000 m3 a day; and drinking water from 48 public desalination plants
would be reduced by 80 per cent, generating only 4,000 m3 per day of the plants ’
nominal capacities of 20,000 m3 per day. In addition, 55 sewage lifting and collection
pumping stations in heavily populated areas would be at risk of flooding, with raw
sewage overflowing in the streets during cut-off hours. The performance of the five
existing wastewater treatment plants would decrease by 50 per cent, addin g to the
more than 116 million litres of raw untreated sewage that enters the Mediterranean
Sea every day.67
Pollution
79. In addition to the pollution caused by inadequate infrastructure, the reduction in
the income of municipalities owing to the inability of Gaza residents to pay the
monthly cost of services has led to further deterioration in municipal services. This is
exemplified by the announcement by the head of the Gaza City municipality that large
areas along the beach have been closed because, owing to the lack of fuel and
electricity, most of the treatment plants have stopped working and untreated sewage
is being pumped directly into the sea, thereby contaminating these areas. 68
80. There are 15 waste treatment facilities or waste dumps in the West Bank which
are, in some cases, close to Palestinian towns or villages and in which proper
precautions to protect the land and nearby residents from pollution and possible
hazardous materials are not taken. These facilities or dumps are managed by Israe l
and at least six of them handle hazardous waste (see A/73/499, para. 31).
Agricultural resources
81. Area C in the West Bank contains the majority of its agricultural lands. Access
and mobility restrictions, in particular in the seam zone and areas close to settlements,
as well as discriminatory water allocation policies, curtail the ability of Palestinians
to farm and cultivate their lands. For example, data collected over the past four years
__________________
65 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”, according to the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply,
Sanitation and Hygiene in 2018. See https://washdata.org.
66 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”.
67 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”, according to the Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene Cluster and the Coastal
Municipalities Water Utility; and January sewage dump data in United Nations, Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gaza Strip: early warning indicators – January 2019”,
February 2019.
68 Norwegian Refugee Council, “Assessment report: Gaza internally displaced persons –
assessment of the vulnerability situation for IDPs in Gaza, three years after the 2014 conflict ”,
June 2018.
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show that, as at November 2017, olive tree yields in the seam zone had reduced by
55 per cent to -65 per cent compared with yields in areas that can be accessed all year
round.69
82. Furthermore, since 1967, more than two thirds of grazing land and more than
2.5 million productive trees have been destroyed under the occupation (see A/73/201,
para. 6, and TD/B/63/3, para. 42 (d)).
83. In Gaza, land and maritime access-restricted areas imposed by Israel render 85
per cent of fishery resources inaccessible to Palestinian fishermen, and half of the
cultivable area remains unreachable for producers (see A/73/201, para. 7).
84. The Israeli practice of spraying herbicides along the border fence areas,
allegedly for a better sight line into Gaza, is also reportedly responsible for damaging
agricultural production. This affects crops up to at least 1,000 metres from the border
fence (see A/73/420, para. 44).
Exploitation of mineral resources
85. Ten Israeli-owned quarries (the number of quarries fluctuated between 7 and 11
over the years) are active in Area C of the West Bank, locate d for the most part in
Israeli-declared State land. Israeli firms do not face the limitations placed on their
Palestinian counterparts and continue to acquire permits to quarry and extract in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (see A/73/87-E/2018/69, para. 73).70
86. The Israeli authorities have not issued new permits for Palestinian companies to
quarry in Area C since 1994, even though the Oslo agreements provided for this.
Area C has an estimated 20,000 dunums of quarriable land and potential mineral
reserves worth an estimated $30 billion (see E/ESCWA/30/5).71 According to the
Palestinian Union of Stone and Marble, existing licences have not been renewed. This
has caused several Palestinian quarries in Area C to cease operations or shut down.
Quarry closures have been accompanied by equipment confiscation and fines. 72
Social and economic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
87. The physical fragmentation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory caused by a
system of complex restrictions on movement and access imposed by the Israeli
military has resulted in the emergence of different economies in the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This not only significantly damages peace
and development prospects, but has led to the deterioration of the living conditions
of the Palestinians.
88. The deterioration is exacerbated by significant shortfalls in donor support for
the Government of Palestine, UNRWA and humanitarian operations in general and by
intra-Palestinian division. This is undermining the ability of the international
community to effectively respond to increasing needs, with some 2.5 million
__________________
69 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin:
Occupied Palestinian Territory, November 2017.
70 See also Yesh Din, “The great drain: Israeli quarries in the West Bank — High Court sanctioned
institutionalized theft”, position paper, September 2017.
71 See also World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy ,
report No. AUS2922 (2013).
72 Yesh Din, “The great drain”; Human Rights Watch, Occupation, Inc.: How Settlement Businesses
Contribute to Israel’s Violations of Palestinian Rights (2016); and World Bank, West Bank and
Gaza: Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Eco nomy.
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Palestinians across the Occupied Palestinian Territory, or nearly half of the
population, identified as in need of humanitarian assistance and protection. 73
Economic conditions
89. The economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory continues to suffer from
occupation-related measures, including restrictions on movement and access to
resources and trade combined with almost 12 years of closures in the Gaza Strip. As
a result, investment in the Palestinian economy has remained low, leading to a process
of de-industrialization. According to preliminary data by the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics, real growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory slowed to 0.9 per cent in 2018, significantly down from 3.1 per
cent in 2017.
90. The overall decline in growth for the Occupied Palestinian Territory is weighed
down by a slower growth rate in the West Bank and declining activity in Gaza, the
latter mainly owing to Israeli policies and practices and the closures. This is
exacerbated by internal Palestinian divisions, which have resulted in a decline in
transfers from the budget of the Government of Palestine, among other measures, and
decreased funding for UNRWA.
91. In this context, Gaza continues its trajectory of de-development. Its GDP further
contracted by 6.5 per cent in 2018 after contracting by 12.5 per cent in 2017.
Significantly, the contribution by Gaza to the Palestinian economy declined to
19.6 per cent in 2018 from nearly 31 per cent in 2000. 74
92. On 17 February, the Government of Israel began implementing the law adopted
by the Knesset in July 2018 obliging the Government of Israel to freeze, from the
clearance revenues it collects on behalf of and transfers to the Palestinian Authority,
an amount equal to the sums paid by the Palestinian Authority “directly or indirectly”
to Palestinians or to the families of Palestinians convicted by Israeli courts of
involvement in alleged “terrorist activities” or other security-related offences, as
defined by Israeli law, or who were killed while carrying out s uch activities (see
S/2019/251, paras. 42–43).75 Accordingly, on 17 February, Israel announced that it
would freeze approximately $139 million from the clearance revenues of the
Palestinian Authority over the course of 2019, amounting to a little over 6 per cent of
the total amount of revenue transfers in 2018. On 21 February, the Palestinian
Authority informed the Government of Israel of its rejection of this unilateral
decision, stating that under the Protocol on Economic Relations between the
Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization ( Paris
Protocol), no amount may be deducted without the consent of both parties, and that it
will not cease its social welfare payments to the families of prisoners. The Palestinian
Authority has since refused to accept any clearance revenue transfers from Israel,
noting that it will accept the revenue only if the full amount payable is transferred.
Clearance revenues from Israel constitute up to 65 per cent of the total revenues of
the Government of Palestine. This decision has prompted the Government of Palestine
to take severe austerity measures (see S/2019/251, para. 42). The situation is expected
to result in a further increase in financing gaps and to lower growth prospects and
employment opportunities.
__________________
73 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”.
74 ESCWA calculations based on data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Growth
rates are calculated as the year-on-year percentage change for each quarter.
75 See also Noa Landau and Jack Khoury, “Israel freezes transfer of 500 million shekels of
Palestinian Authority taxes”, Haaretz, 17 February 2019.
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93. Even before February 2019, the Palestinian Ministry of Finance had reported
that at least $350 million per year was being lost in fiscal l eakages owing to Israeli
policies regarding the implementation of the Paris Protocol arrangements. According
to the Government of Palestine, some sources of fiscal leakage include handling fees
(3 per cent deduction from the clearance revenue); taxes and f ees on fuel purchases;
the value-added tax clearance mechanism; indirect imports; passenger exit fees; and
taxes on Israeli commercial activity in Area C and the rest of the West Bank. 76
94. In Gaza, if transfers through the budget of the Government of Pale stine continue
to decline and the financial gap of UNRWA is not offset, there will be serious negative
consequences for economic activity and social conditions and a further deepening of
the humanitarian crisis.
95. Given that economic opportunities remain scarce, labour force participation in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2018 was 46 per cent; 21 per cent for women
and 72 per cent for men. The unemployment rate in the Territory remained high and
continued to increase, reaching 31 per cent in 2018 c ompared with 28 per cent in
2017. Unemployment was much worse in Gaza, registering 52 per cent in 2018
compared with 44 per cent in 2017.77 Almost 7 out of 10 young Gazans, and 49.6 per
cent of Gazans with 13 or more years of schooling, were unemployed.
96. Living conditions have worsened in recent years, driven by a significantly
deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza. Poverty remains severe and is becoming
more entrenched. The 2017 household survey by the Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics revealed that 53 per cent of Gazans were living below the national poverty
line (the poverty line translates to an expenditure of $692 per month for a family of
two adults and three children), compared with 38.8 per cent in 2011. Moreover, the
incidence of deep poverty increased in Gaza from 21.1 per cent in 2011 to a high of
33.8 per cent in 2017 (deep poverty is defined as being unable to meet the minimum
required for food, clothing and housing).78
Food security
97. Food insecurity affects nearly a third of the population, or some 1.56 million
people, and is driven by high poverty and unemployment rates. Food prices are driven
by Israeli markets, in which the average purchasing power per capita is six times
higher than in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Food is thus unaffordable for poor
Palestinian families.79
98. According to a 2018 food security survey, food insecurity in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory remains at very high levels, with a third of households (32.7 per
cent) being food insecure. In the Gaza Strip, food insecurity levels in 2018 reached
the highest rate in the past 20 years, at 68.5 per cent. 80
99. The deterioration in food security in Gaza is caused by many factors, including
the continuously deteriorating economic situation, the clos ures, continued
intra-Palestinian divisions, the shortage of UNRWA funding and salary cuts and late
pay for government employees.
__________________
76 For details, see State of Palestine, “Stopping fiscal leakages: the Government of Palestine’s
report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meeting ”, September 2018.
77 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, press release, 30 April 2019, available at
www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_30 -4-2019-labour-en.pdf.
78 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data, available at www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/
_Rainbow/Documents/Levels%20of%20living_pov_2017_02e.htm.
79 World Food Programme (WFP), “WFP Palestine Country Brief”, January 2019.
80 WFP and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data.
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100. The level of food insecurity reached 61 per cent among Bedouin and herding
communities in Area C, where 40 per cent have poor to borderline food dietary intake.
This increases their reliance on WFP and UNRWA assistance to meet their basic food
needs.81
Education
101. Approximately 505,285 children (249,327 boys and 255,958 girls) across the
Occupied Palestinian Territory face challenges in accessing quality education in a
safe, child-friendly environment. Some 13,973 teachers (5,942 men and 8,031
women) are in need of support.82
102. In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, access to education is heavily
compromised, affecting 39,245 students and teachers. This includes 26,387 in Area C,
11,481 in East Jerusalem and 1,377 in other areas of the West Bank. 83
103. In addition, 46 schools are under threat of full or partial demolition in East
Jerusalem and Area C, following the issuance of demolition orders. This is likely to
affect more than 5,000 children.84
104. Palestinian children in East Jerusalem face obstacles in accessing inclusive,
quality education in the city. For example, children living on the West Bank side of
the wall face long and, at times, insecure commutes to schools located on the other
side of the wall. They also face the threat of arrest and detention by Israeli
authorities.85
105. Compared with the previous school year, the student population in the UNRWA
schools in Gaza increased by some 7,000 children. The average class size has
increased from 39 to 41 students per class.86 The shortage of schools, unpaid teacher
salaries and lack of school budgets in Gaza has led 70 per cent of UNRWA schools
and 63 per cent of Ministry of Education schools to operate on double - or triple-shift
systems.87
106. The ability of university students from Gaza to attend universities in the West
Bank has been severely curtailed owing to Israeli restrictions since the outbreak of
the second Intifada, in 2000. While they represented 35 per cent of the West Bank
student population at one point, they are currently almost absent from its universities
(see A/73/420, para. 26).
Health
107. Approximately 1,163,618 people in the West Bank and Gaza need assistance in
accessing quality and affordable essential health -care services. 88 There are also
pockets of acutely vulnerable people in East Jerusalem, who are isolated from
__________________
81 WFP input.
82 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”, Education Cluster estimate.
83 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”.
84 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”, Education Cluster estimate.
85 UNICEF, State of Palestine: Country Report on Out-of-School Children (East Jerusalem, 2018).
86 UNRWA input.
87 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”.
88 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2018–2020 Humanitarian
response strategy – January–December 2019 humanitarian response plan”, December 2018.
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services in Jerusalem and the West Bank, with approximately 140,000 people,
including some 40,000 refugees, in need of health assistance. 89
108. The health-care system in Gaza is on the verge of collapse following years of
closures and de-development and is now overburdened with massive casualties from
the ongoing Great March of Return demonstrations. 90
109. The prevalence of stunting was estimated at 10 per cent during 2018 in Gaza
and was highest among children from refugee and low-income families; 92,430
children under the age of five are particularly vulnerable, with 10,000 cases of rickets,
and approximately 36,000 suffer from watery or bloody diarrhoea owing to the
sewage crisis and deteriorating access to safe drinking water. 91
110. The limited and unpredictable electricity supply to the Gaza Strip has severe
implications for the health sector, putting the lives of patients in hospitals and clinics
at risk. This includes patients on life support machines in intensive care units,
vulnerable newborn babies in incubators and patients requiring emergency life-saving
surgeries.92
111. The mass influx of casualties during the Great March of Return has further
strained an already fragile health-care system and has had an impact on the capacity
of the wider health sector to deliver services to the population. In the hospitals, trauma
patients are prematurely discharged to make room for new patients. 93
112. In addition to the estimated 210,000 people who are already acutely vulnerable
and who suffer from severe or moderate mental health disorders, developments in
Gaza have had mental health and psychosocial consequences, with approximately
52,098 people, including 26,049 children, in need of mental health and psychosocial
support.94
113. The legislative and physical fragmentation of the West Bank creates barriers to
the right to health for Palestinians, in particular those living in vulnerable
communities such as Area C, the seam zone and H2 in Hebron. One third of the
population of these areas has limited access to primary health care. A t otal of 135
communities are served by mobile clinics. Efforts to establish more permanent
facilities for some communities are hampered by restrictive planning policies. 95
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
114. The Secretary-General continues to reaffirm the validity of Security Council
resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council decided that the Israeli decision to impose
its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights was
null and void and without international legal effect.
115. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2018/20, reaffirmed that the
construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related in frastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian
Golan, were illegal and constituted a major obstacle to economic and social
__________________
89 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”.
90 Ibid.
91 WHO input.
92 WHO input.
93 WHO input; and WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, “Gaza: waiting for
treatment”, 21 November 2018.
94 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2019 Humanitarian needs
overview”.
95 WHO input.
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development. The continued establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan amount to the transfer
by Israel of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, which is
prohibited under international humanitarian law (see A/73/410, para.63).
116. Ninety-five per cent of the Syrian population of the Golan was displaced or
expelled and 340 communities were razed following the occupation by Israel of the
1,159 km2 territory in 1967.96 There are currently almost as many Israelis as Syrians
in the occupied Syrian Golan, yet the Syrian population is restricted to a very small
portion of the land. As at April 2018, 26,261 Israeli settlers lived in 34 Israeli
settlements throughout the occupied Syrian Golan and contr olled, together with the
army, 95 per cent of the land, whereas 26,600 Syrians lived in five villages (see
A/73/499, para. 83). Israeli settlers are supported by the Government of Israel through
financial incentives that reach up to $12,000 per family as well as by the development
of residential and industrial areas.97
117. Concern persists regarding the situation in the occupied Syrian Golan, with
Syrian residents facing ongoing problems owing to discriminatory land, housing and
development policies established by the Israeli authorities (see A/73/410, para. 60).
118. Israeli zoning and planning policies make it almost impossible for Syrians to
obtain building permits. This has resulted in increasingly overcrowded villages and
limited opportunities for development, as well as constraints to the expansion of the
villages to accommodate the growing population. 98 In this context, the Israeli
authorities have issued more than 1,570 demolition orders for Syrian structures since
1983.99
119. Israeli law allows settlements comprised of 400 houses or less to discriminate
against Syrian Arabs through the 2011 Amendment to the Cooperative Societies
Ordinance, which authorizes admission committees to decide on an applicant ’s
eligibility to reside in the community based on “compatibility with the social-cultural
fabric” or the “[u]nique characteristics of the community town”.100
120. With severely limited access to job opportunities in their country, young Syrians
in the Golan are increasingly seeking work in Israel or abroad, which further pressures
them into obtaining Israeli citizenship. There are concerns that this will lea d to further
intensification and entrenchment of the occupation. 101
121. Only 43 per cent of working-age persons were employed in 2016. Regardless of
the strong attachment that the Syrians have to the land, the agriculture sector has been
in decline owing to discriminatory policies relating to water and land access rights.
Such policies have led to a deterioration in the quality of crops and, consequently, in
their marketability.
__________________
96 Al-Marsad, “Parallel report to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel”, 14 January 2019.
97 Al-Marsad, “Observations and topics to be included in the list of issues: on the occasion of the
Human Rights Committee’s 2018 review of the State of Israel’s implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ”, 11 April 2018; see also Israel, Law to
Amend the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 8), 5771–2011.
98 ILO input.
99 Al-Marsad, “Parallel report to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel”, 14 January 2019.
100 Al-Marsad, “Observations and topics to be included in the list of issues: on the occasion of the
Human Rights Committee’s 2018 review of the State of Israel’s implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ”, 11 April 2018; see also Israel, Law to
Amend the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 8), 5771–2011.
101 ILO input.
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122. When Syrians do find work, they tend to settle for low-paying jobs for which
they are massively overqualified, owing to the lack of prospects for other
employment. 102 Settlements in the Golan tend to use contractors who hire Syrian
workers because they do not have to secure full employee privileges for their workers.
Many of these contracting companies do not provide proper benefits for workers and
pay extremely low wages. Syrians in the Golan are offered few alternatives to this
structure (see A/73/499).103
IV. Conclusion
123. The protracted Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory and the Syrian
Golan continues to have a detrimental effect on the living conditions of the Palestinian
and Syrian populations, as well as on social and economic development in the
occupied territories. The negative impact of the occupation and the Israeli policies
and practices is multilayered, and their cumulative repercussions affect the future of
the populations living under occupation.
124. Current social and economic trends in the Occupied Pale stinian Territory
indicate that the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals will be almost
impossible if there are no drastic positive changes to the existing conditions. Israeli -
imposed restrictions, expansion of the illegal settlements and other practices not only
prevent development in the occupied territories, but also cause humanitarian crises
that necessitate the diversion of national and international efforts from development
to immediate relief.
125. The funding crisis facing UNRWA is another factor that only exacerbates the
conditions of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who already live in harsh
conditions. The Secretary-General reiterates his appeal to the international
community to guarantee that the vital support for the rights of t he Palestinian refugees
is upheld and to maintain the same level of financing for UNRWA in 2019.
126. The closures imposed on Gaza, other restrictive Israeli measures, recurrent
escalations and declining donor funding have created a severe situation in Gaz a that
requires further and immediate action by the international community.
127. Israel continues to employ policies and practices that are contrary to relevant
Security Council resolutions, international humanitarian law and international human
rights law. Some of these practices may be considered discriminatory and others may
amount to the forcible transfer or collective punishment of protected persons, which
would be a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and is prohibited under
international law.
128. Adherence to international law is imperative, ensuring that no party enjoys
impunity and securing justice and peace for all the people living in the region,
including Palestinians and Syrians living under occupation.
129. The United Nations maintains its long-standing position that lasting and
comprehensive peace can be achieved only through a negotiated two -State solution.
The Secretary-General will continue to ensure that the United Nations works towards
the establishment of an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian
State, living side by side in peace with a secure Israel, with Jerusalem as the capital
of both States, consistent with relevant Security Council resolutions and international
law.
__________________
102 Al-Marsad, “Parallel report to the United Nations Committee o n Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel”, 14 January 2019, para. 22.
103 Ibid., para. 25.
United Nations A/75/86–E/2020/62
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
27 May 2020
Original: English
20-07010 (E) 250620
*2007010*
General Assembly
Seventy-fifth session
Item 62 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2020
Agenda item 16
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of
the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
Summary
In its resolution 2019/29, entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan”, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary -
General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy -fourth session, through the
Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The Assembly, in its
resolution 74/243 entitled “Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population
in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources”, requested the Secretary -
General to report to it at its seventy -fifth session on the implementation of that
resolution. The present report, which was prepared by the Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia, has been submitted in compliance with the resolutions
of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.
The report covers persistent Israeli practices and policies, particularly those that
are in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law
and that affect the social and economic conditions of the people living under its
military occupation.
* A/75/50.
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I. Introduction
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2019/29, expressed concern
about the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan. The General
Assembly, in its resolution 74/243, demanded that Israel, the occupying Power, cease
the exploitation, damage, cause of loss or depletion and endangerment of the natural
resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the
occupied Syrian Golan. The present note provides information on relevant
developments with regard to the foregoing.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory
Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
2. As previously reported, the Israeli zoning and planning policies in Area C,
which constitutes 60 per cent of the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, are
discriminatory and are considered incompatible with requirements under inter national
law. While allocating land almost exclusively to Israeli settlements or to the military
and facilitating the growth of Israeli settlements, these policies make it almost
impossible for Palestinians to obtain building permits. 1 The average rate of approval
of Palestinian applications for building permits in Area C during the 2010s stood at 3
to 4 per cent.2 As a result, many Palestinians are compelled to build without a permit,
risking eviction, house demolition and displacement .3
3. The operational environment in Gaza and the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem, continues to be characterized by territorial fragmentation and systematic
limitation to the future expansion and connectivity of Palestinian communities,
particularly in Area C.4
4. Israeli policies and practices also entail discrimination in service provision. For
example, Palestinians constitute 30 per cent of the population in Jerusalem. They pay
40 per cent of the total value in taxes that the Israeli m unicipality collects, yet, the
municipality only allocates 8 per cent of tax revenues to the services provided to the
Palestinians.5
5. Palestinians in the occupied territory continue to be subject to a complex
combination of Israeli and Palestinian legal systems. In the West Bank, Israeli
domestic law is applied extraterritorially to Israeli settlers, while Palestinians are
subject to Israeli military law in addition to the Palestinian legal system. As a result,
lower human rights standards are applied to Palestinian suspects and defendants
compared with Israeli suspects and defendants. The application of two different legal
systems in the same territory on the sole basis of nationality or origin is inherently
discriminatory and violates the principle of eq uality before the law, which is central
to the right to a fair trial. The application of Israeli domestic law to settlers and of
Israeli military law to Palestinians in the West Bank also raises concerns as to the
__________________
1 See A/HRC/43/67, para. 30.
2 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “West Bank:
Area C – key humanitarian concerns”, fact sheet, 21 December 2017.
3 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) input.
4 UN-Habitat input.
5 State of Palestine, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “H.E. Dr. Awad, highlights the forty
four annual commemoration of Land Day in statistical figures”, 29 March 2020.
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obligation of the occupying Power to respe ct the laws in force in the territory it
occupies, unless it is absolutely prevented from doing so. 6
6. In September 2019, settlers established a new outpost, Keidar East, east of
Jerusalem. In protest, Palestinians set up a tent a dozen metres from the ou tpost. In a
seemingly discriminatory enforcement of Israeli law, Israeli authorities demolished
the tent two days later, but did not dismantle the outpost. Even when demolition orders
targeting Palestinian and settler populations are comparable in percenta ges,
Palestinians seem to be disproportionally affected given the discrepancy in the
amount of land allocated to Palestinian and settlement construction .7
Violence and the use of force
7. As the occupying Power, Israel has the obligation to take all the measures in its
power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and life in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and to protect the Palestinian population from all acts of
violence, in all circumstances (see A/74/357, para. 26).8
8. Practices of the military and security forces of Israel continue to raise concerns,
especially with respect to the excessive use of force and, in some cases, unwarranted
force amounting to arbitrary deprivation of li fe.9
9. Of particular and grave concern is the recurrent use by Israeli security forces of
crowd control means against children inside and near schools close to settlements.
Documented cases reveal the unwarranted use of force and violations of the right t o
physical and mental integrity of Palestinian children. 10
10. Between 1 April 2019 and 31 March 2020, 113 Palestinians, including
21 children (20 boys and 1 girl) and 7 women, were killed, while another 10,764
Palestinians, including 413 women and 4,247 ch ildren (4,106 boy and 141 girls) were
injured by the Israeli military, by Israeli security forces or by Israeli settlers. During
the previous reporting period, 299 people were killed and 32,696 were injured. At
least 18 of the fatalities, including 6 child ren, and 7,605 injuries, including 2,784
children (2,714 boys and 70 girls), occurred during demonstrations, mostly related to
the Great March of Return protests in Gaza. 11 The high incidence of severe injuries
during demonstrations continues to put a strai n on an already overburdened health
sector.12
11. Since the start of the Great March of Return protests in Gaza on 30 March 2018,
the World Health Organization (WHO) has recorded 565 incidents involving health -
care workers, transportation and facilities in Gaza. Three health-care workers wearing
clear markings were killed and 844 were injured. A total of 118 ambulances, 10 other
forms of medical transport were damaged, as were 1 hospital and 6 other health -care
facilities. A total of 68 incidents involving health-care workers in the West Bank were
recorded in 2019, including 33 physical attacks against health -care staff and
9 incidents of obstruction of medical teams. A 17 -year-old first responder was shot
__________________
6 See A/71/86-E/2016/13, para.7; A/72/90-E/2017/71, para. 4; and A/73/87-E/2018/69, para. 3;
see also A/HRC/43/67, para. 29.
7 See A/HRC/43/67, paras. 11 and 12.
8 See the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907, arts. 43 and 46; and the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 27.
9 See A/74/468, para. 10. See also the Hague Regulations, arts. 43 and 46; Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 27.
10 See A/74/357, para. 68.
11 OCHA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Data on casualties”. Available at
www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties (accessed on 31 March 2020).
12 World Health Organization (WHO) input.
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and killed in Dheisheh refugee camp while providing medical assistance during an
Israeli army raid.13
12. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human
Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories has
expressed serious concern over the prevailing c ulture of impunity, in particular in
cases pertaining to the apparent excessive use of force by Israeli security forces in
both the West Bank and Gaza.14
13. Israel had announced the launching of investigations into the killings of
Palestinians, including of two children. However, out of 226 cases, only 55 were
examined and 10 criminal investigations were launched by the military, in addition to
another 3 launched by the police. Media reports indicate that a number of
investigations previously opened have be en closed with no indictments. Only one
soldier was sentenced to one month in prison, to be served through military -related
labour, for unlawfully shooting a 15-year-old teenage protester. Similarly, the
Military Advocate General has stated that out of 360 cases of possible violations of
international humanitarian law along the Gaza border fence, 189 had been closed as
at August 2018 without criminal charges being brought or any further action taken,
except in relation to three soldiers who were convicted o n theft and looting charges. 15
Settler violence
14. Settler violence adversely affects the rights of Palestinian people, including the
rights to security of person, freedom of movement, privacy, family life, an adequate
standard of living, work and education.16 Combined with the failure of the Israeli
authorities to protect the Palestinian population and to hold perpetrators of violence
accountable, settler violence is an important factor of the coercive environment that
may leave some Palestinians no other choice than to leave their places of residence.
Involuntary moves of that nature could amount to forcible transfer. 17
15. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded 340
attacks resulting in Palestinian casualties or dama ge to their property, up 21 per cent
compared with 2018 and 116 per cent compared with 2017. Seven Palestinian girls
and 54 boys were injured in such attacks between 1 April 2019 and 31 March 2020. 18
16. While efforts by the authorities to prevent and inve stigate settler-related
violence are being made, further measures need to be taken to prevent or investigate
cases of settler violence and prosecute perpetrators. In a report issued in August 2019,
the Ministry of Justice of Israel listed 118 investigation s into alleged crimes by
settlers against Palestinians for the period from January 2017 to June 2019. While 11
indictments were filed, including for cases opened in previous years, and two cases
reached trial, none resulted in a conviction. 19
17. It also remains common, as previously documented, for the Israeli security
forces not to prevent attacks or to fail to react to attacks occurring in their presence.
Moreover, in some cases, Israeli security forces appeared to aid settlers in carrying
out attacks and appeared to have used force against the protected population instead
of protecting it. Several incidents in the H2 zone of Hebron occurred in the presence
__________________
13 WHO input.
14 See A/74/356, para. 46.
15 See A/74/468, paras. 12 and13; Israel Defense Forces, “Operation Protective Edge legal
updates”, available at www.idf.il; Judah Ari Gross, “In first, soldier convicted over killing of
Gaza rioter, gets one-month sentence”, Times of Israel, 29 October 2019.
16 See A/HRC/40/42, para. 24.
17 See A/74/357, para. 38.
18 OCHA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Data on casualties” (accessed on 31 March 2020).
19 See A/HRC/43/67, para. 27.
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of Israeli security forces, at times with their direct participation, or were followed by
measures and operations against Palestinians.20
18. In the weeks following the outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID -19) in
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, between 1 March and 13 April, there
were 53 settler attacks resulting in injuries or proper ty damage, an 80 per cent increase
when compared with January and February 2020. 21
Detention and ill-treatment
19. By 31 March 2020, 4,488 Palestinian “security detainees” and prisoners were
being held in Israeli prisons, including 194 children, 43 women and 7 members of the
Palestinian Legislative Council. A total of 424 Palestinians, including 3 women and
at least 2 minors, were being held in administrative detention. 22
20. Most Palestinian prisoners continued to be held in Israel, which, in many cases,
restricted their right to family visits from the West Bank and Gaza. 23
21. Concerns about possible arbitrary detention by Israeli authorities, including
administrative detention without charge, persisted. Administrative detainees are held
without trial or charge, often on the basis of secret information that is not shared with
the suspects or their lawyers. It is a renewable six -month detention that is usually
renewed. It is governed by orders signed by a military authority (i.e., a non -judicial
authority).24
22. Also of concern are the continuous reports of ill -treatment and torture of
Palestinian detainees, including women and children, older persons, and persons with
disabilities, which persist. Women and girls are reportedly subject to sexual
harassment, verbal abuse and physical assault. They are incarcerated in prisons with
facilities that do not meet gender-specific needs or provide gender-sensitive social
services.25
23. In November 2018, the High Court of Justice of Israel issued a ruling upholding
the legality of “special interrogation methods” in particular circumstances, potentially
setting a precedent for other cases in which the Israeli security agenc ies can resort to
physical and psychological coercion.26
24. Children have reported ill-treatment during arrest, transfer and detention,
including breaches of due process, by Israeli military, police and security apparatuses,
as well as the Israel Prison Service.27 This reinforces serious concerns about such
practices with regard to Palestinian children ’s rights, particularly during the phase of
arrest, including practices aimed at extracting confessions. 28
__________________
20 See A/74/357, paras. 50, 54, 55 and 75; see also see B’Tselem – Israeli Information Center for
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Playing the Security Card: Israeli Policy in Hebron
as a Means to Effect Forcible Transfer of Local Palestinians (Jerusalem, 2019).
21 OCHA, “Protection of civilians, Occupied Palestinian Territory”, 17 –30 March 2020. Available
at www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civili ans_17_30_march_2020.pdf.
22 B’Tselem, “Statistics on Palestinians in the custody of the Israeli security forces” (accessed on
11 May 2020); Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Statistics” (accessed
on 11 May 2020).
23 See A/74/468, para. 16.
24 See A/74/356, para. 32 and A/74/468, para. 16.
25 E/ESCWA/ECW/2019/TP.2.
26 See A/74/468, para. 16.
27 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) input.
28 See A/74/468, para. 18.
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25. Since 2000, at least 8,000 Palestinian children have reportedly b een arrested and
prosecuted in the Israeli military justice system. 29
26. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA) has documented a number of arrests of children occurring during the
night, in addition to a number of cases in which the parents or guardians were unable
to accompany the arrested child following their detention. 30
27. Testimonies of 641 Palestinian children detained and prosecuted by the Israeli
military between 2015 and 2019 showed that 72 per cent had experienced physical
violence; 94 per cent had been hand -tied; 85 per cent had been blindfolded; 54 per
cent had been arrested from their homes in the middle of the night; 61 per cent had
suffered verbal abuse, humiliation, or intimidation; 97 per cent had been interrogated
without the presence of a family member; 22 per cent had been subjected to stress
positions; and 56 per cent had signed documents in Hebrew, which most Palestinian
children do not understand.31
28. Arrest operations, particularly in East Jerusalem, have continued, even after the
COVID-19 pandemic had broken out in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
Such arrests included volunteer health -care workers distributing communication
materials about pandemic-related risks.32
Population displacement
29. There is continued concern that a combination of Israeli policies and practices
in Area C, East Jerusalem and the city of Hebron, including the demolition of homes
and schools and the destruction of livelihoods, or threat thereof; the denial of service
infrastructure; the restriction of access to farming and grazing land; settler violence
and poor law enforcement in response thereto ; and the revocation of residency rights
have created a coercive environment.33
30. Involuntary displacement and relocation to alternative residential areas as a
result of such policies may amount to forcible transfer if it is carried out without the
free and informed consent of the individuals who relocate, in violation of the
obligations of Israel under international humanitarian and human rights law. Forcible
transfer is a grave breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and amounts to a war crime. 34
31. The increase in the number of demolitions and settler attacks in 2019 intensified
the coercive environment.35 Between 1 April 2019 and 31 March 2020, demolitions
of structures by Israel resulted in the displacement of 849 Palestinians, the majority
of whom were women (221) and children (435, including189 girls), and negatively
affected the livelihoods and service provision for thousands of others. 36
32. Israel has facilitated the takeover by settlers of properties in the heart of
Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem and Hebron, which h as often resulted
__________________
29 See A/73/499, para. 69.
30 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
input.
31 Defense for Children International – Palestine and American Friends Service Committee,
“Palestinian children in the Israeli military detention system”, 5 March 2020. Available at
https://nowaytotreatachild.org.
32 WHO input.
33 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020: Occupied Palestinian Territ ory, December 2019,
available at https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/hno_2020 -final.pdf.
34 See A/74/88-E/2019/72 para 32.
35 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020 .
36 OCHA, “Occupied Palestinian Territory: Data on demolition and displacement in the West
Bank”. Available at www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition (accessed on 31 March 2020).
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in the eviction of Palestinian families. By the end of 2019, some 877 Palestinians in
East Jerusalem were at risk of eviction as settler organizations sought to gain control
of their properties.37
33. The publicly stated intention of the Government of Israel to relocate thousands
of Palestinians residing in Area C remains a key concern. Some 18 communities in
and around East Jerusalem are at particular risk of forced eviction. 38
Destruction and confiscation of property and infrastructure
34. In 2019, demolitions and the resulting displacement were at their highest levels
since the peak year of 2016 (which, in turn, was the highest year on record since the
United Nations had started to systematically collect data). 39 April 2019 had the
highest number of demolitions in East Jerusalem in a single month since OCHA had
begun the systematic recording of such data in 2009. 40 That month also had the highest
single-day total of demolitions in East Jerusalem since 2009, with 31 structures
demolished in one day.41
35. Between 1 April 2019 and 31 March 2020, Israeli authorities demolished 608
structures owned by Palestinians, including 257 homes. 42 In three instances, the
owners were not allowed an opportunity to evacuate their bel ongings from their
homes before the demolitions were carried out. 43
36. Between the declaration of the state of emergency in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory owing to COVID-19, on 5 March, and 31 March, Israeli authorities enforced
the demolition, self-demolition or seizure of 40 structures, displacing 26 Palestinians
and otherwise affecting over 260 others. 44
37. Between 2006 and 2019, Israel demolished at least 1,537 Palestinian residential
units in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), rendering 6, 732 people homeless,
including at least 3,382 children.45 Moreover, since the onset of the occupation, Israel
has completely demolished around 50,000 residential units and partially destroyed
more than 100,000.46
38. For the vast majority of demolitions, Isr aeli authorities cite a lack of building
permits, which are virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain in Area C and East
Jerusalem. As a result, over 12,500 demolition orders against Palestinian properties
for lacking such permits have been issued an d are pending. At least a third of all
Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem lack building permits issued by Israel. 47
__________________
37 See A/HRC/43/67, para. 33.
38 Ibid.; see also OCHA, “Occupied Palestinian Territory, Protection of civilians report, 7 –20
January 2020”, available at https://www.ochaopt.org/poc/7 -20-january-2020; and Marya Farah,
Occupying Jerusalem’s Old City: Israeli Policies of Isolation, Intimidation and Transformation
(Ramallah, Al-Haq, 2019).
39 UNRWA input.
40 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020.
41 Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Report to the Ad H oc
Liaison Committee, 26 September 2019.
42 OCHA, “Occupied Palestinian Territory: Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank”
(accessed on 31 March 2020).
43 Al-Haq, “Al-Haq field report on human rights violations in October 2019”, 16 December 2019.
44 OCHA, “Protection of civilians, Occupied Palestinian Territory”, 17 –30 March 2020.
45 B’Tselem, “Statistics on demolition of houses built without permits in the West Bank (not
including East Jerusalem)” (accessed on 15 March 2020).
46 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “H.E. Dr. Awad, highlights the forty four annual
commemoration of Land Day in statistical figures”.
47 OCHA input.
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39. In April 2019, the High Court of Israel upheld military order 1797, which allows
the demolition or seizure of unlicensed structures deem ed new within 96 hours after
the issuance of a removal notice.48 Moreover, an amendment to the planning and
building law came into effect in October 2019, enabling expedited demolitions in East
Jerusalem. These measures raise serious concern about accelerat ed demolitions on the
basis of the discriminatory Israeli zoning and planning regime, and further limit
opportunities for legal recourse for Palestinians. 49
40. Israeli authorities continued punitive demolitions of the family homes of
Palestinians suspected of killing Israelis at a measure that may amount to collective
punishment.50 Between 1 April 2019 and 31 March 2020, Israel carried out eight such
demolitions in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and destroyed 15 structures. 51
41. Israeli authorities seized and destroyed 127 structures provided to vulnerable
communities in Area C and East Jerusalem as humanitarian assistance, claiming a
lack of coordination.52 It was reported that Israel has intended to auction goods seized
from Palestinian communities, incl uding seven donor-funded humanitarian
structures, in particular school structures, tents and metal sheds. 53
42. In 2019, UNRWA recorded the issuance of 51 orders to confiscate 17,494
dunums54 of land owned by Palestinians in the West Bank.55
43. As a result of military operations against Gaza, between 1 April 2019 and
31 December 2019, around 144 shelters were totally demolished and around 1,482
shelters were partially damaged, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Public
Works and Housing.56
Israeli settlement activity
44. In its resolution 73/255, the General Assembly stressed that the wall and the
settlements being constructed by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, were contrary to international law. This has
been confirmed in other resolutions, such as Security Council resolution 2334 (2016),
in which the Council reaffirmed that the establi shment by Israel of settlements in the
Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, had no legal
validity and constituted a flagrant violation under international law and a major
obstacle to the achievement of a lasting and comprehe nsive peace.
45. The establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory amounts to the transfer by Israel of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies, which is prohibited under international humanita rian
law.57
__________________
48 See European Union, Office of the European Union Representative (West Bank and Gaza Strip,
UNRWA), “Six-month report on demolitions and seizures in the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem, reporting period: 1 January –30 June 2019”; see also A/74/468, para. 4.
49 See A/HRC/43/67, para. 32.
50 See A/74/468, para. 22.
51 OCHA, “Occupied Palestinian Territory: Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank”
(accessed on 31 March 2020).
52 OCHA input.
53 See A/74/356, para. 28.
54 One dunum equals 1,000 m2.
55 UNRWA input.
56 UNRWA input.
57 See A/74/357, para. 74.
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46. Settlements obstruct the ability of Palestinians to exercise their rights, and
impede development, employment and livelihoods. 58
47. By the end of 2018, approximately 671,007 Israeli settlers resided in the West
Bank (228,614 in East Jerusalem) in 150 settlements (including 13 in East Jerusalem)
and 26 inhabited outposts designated as settlement neighbourhoods, in addition to
128 settlement outposts.59
48. In 2019, there was a significant increase in the pace of construction and
expansion of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Israeli settlement expansion
more than doubled in Area C of the occupied West Bank during the reporting period.
The Israeli authorities advanced plans for 13,700 settlement units, 4,000 of which
reached the final stage of approval, and announced tenders for 2,400 units. In the
previous reporting period, 5,500 units were advanced and 3,300 tenders were
announced. In occupied East Jerusalem settlements, 1,300 units were advanced,
compared with 2,100 in the previous r eporting period. Tenders for 2,100 housing units
were announced, including 1,077 units in the Giv ’at Homa settlement located between
the Palestinian neighbourhood of Bayt Safafa in East Jerusalem and Bethlehem,
impeding the former ’s connection with a future Palestinian State. Moreover, the
announcement made by Israel on 25 February that it would advance two plans (3,500
units) in the E1 area, if implemented, would expand the settlement of Ma ’ale
Adummim towards Jerusalem, severing the connection between the northern and
southern West Bank, and severely undermining the possibility of a viable and
contiguous Palestinian State. Overall, about 30 per cent of the units advanced,
approved or tendered are to be built in outlying locations, deep inside the occupied
West Bank.60
49. Eleven new outposts were established, while at least another 35 were in the
process of being legalized.61 The establishment of outposts appears to be part of an
official policy whereby the Israeli authorities encourage the takeover of land by
settlers through agricultural projects. 62
Movement and access restrictions
50. As freedom of movement is a prerequisite to the exercise of other human rights,
such as the rights to family, health and education, the closures and related practices
imposed by the Israeli authorities, in particular the restrictions on movement, have
had a devastating impact on the lives of Palestinians, in particular on families, 63,64 and
have a compounded effect on women and girls. 65
51. The restrictions have fragmented the Palestinian landscape, including the
separation of Gaza from the West Bank. They have created isolated communities,
undermined social cohesion, ruptured a common identity and reduced economic
activity within and among the fractured Palestin ian population.66 About a third of
Gaza residents have relatives in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. As family
visits are not one of the criteria for travel, many families remain separated for years.
__________________
58 International Labour Organization (ILO) input; see also A/74/357.
59 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “H.E. Dr. Awad, highlights the forty four annual
commemoration of Land Day in statistical figures ”.
60 See A/75/84-E/2020/61.
61 Peace Now, “Population”. Available at https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlementsdata/
population (accessed on 31 March 2020).
62 See A/HRC/43/67, para. 10.
63 See A/74/468, para. 26.
64 See A/74/88-E/2019/72, para. 50.
65 UN-Women input.
66 UNICEF input.
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Gaza closure
52. Imposed since June 2007, following the takeover by Hamas, the closures in
Gaza, which affect the movement of goods and people, continue to undermine the
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of Palestinians in Gaza and
continue to affect all areas of Palestinian life. The blockade may amount to collective
punishment, which is prohibited under international law. The closure 67 remains a
major impediment to combating the COVID-19 epidemic.
53. Israel intermittently changes the measures comprising the closure, cit ing, as it
has on several occasions, violence and rocket fire towards civilian populations
launched from Gaza as a reason for these steps. In view of their punitive aspect with
regard to persons who have not committed the violence referred to, in particula r the
severe human rights impact on the entire population of Gaza, those measures may
amount to collective punishment.68
54. Only certain categories of people, mainly patients, merchants and staff of
international organizations, are eligible to apply for ex it permits through Israel. In
February, an additional 2,000 permits for traders were approved, many of whom were
reported to be labourers employed in Israel. 69 The rate of approval of permit
applications lodged by patients in Gaza in 2019 reached 65 per cen t, with 9 per cent
being denied and 26 per cent delayed with their application unanswered by the time
of the medical appointment for which the permit had been requested . WHO has found
that patients whose applications were initially delayed or denied betwee n 2015 and
2017 were 1.45 times less likely to survive than those initially approved permits to
exit.70
55. Only 38 per cent of the permit applications lodged by parents to accompany
their children travelling from Gaza to receive medical treatment were appr oved.
Children are thus forced to travel with a more distant relative or an appointed
guardian. The approval rate for permits for those injured during demonstrations is, on
average, significantly lower than the overall approval rate for patient application s to
exit Gaza, at only 18 per cent in May 2019. 71
56. The Rafah pedestrian crossing with Egypt has been regularly open since May
2018.
57. In 2019, approximately 103,161 truckloads of goods (excluding fuel) entered
Gaza through Israel, a decline from 2018 (106,171 truckloads). The entry of a wide
range of goods defined by Israel as dual-use items, i.e., items that could be used for
either civilian or military purposes (including basic construction materials, equipment
and electronics), has remained either prohibited or subject to a complex approval
procedure.72
58. Restrictions on exports from Gaza remain in place, albeit with some easing.
During 2019, a total of 3,146 truckloads were permitted to exit Gaza through Kerem
Shalom, the largest such figure in a decade. Nevertheless, that volume is only one
quarter of that recorded in the first half of 2007, before the imposition of the closure. 73
__________________
67 See A/74/356, para. 38, and A/74/88-E/2019/72.
68 See A/74/468, para. 22.
69 OCHA input.
70 WHO input.
71 WHO input.
72 OCHA input.
73 OCHA, “Gaza blockade: Restrictions eased but most people still ‘locked in’”, 12 February 2020;
OCHA input.
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59. In addition to the access restrictions, Israeli security forces enforce buffer zones
by land and sea as access-restricted areas. Israeli authorities have declared that up to
100 metres from the perimeter fence is a “no-go” area for individuals and up to 200
metres there is no access for heavy machinery, although humanitarian partners in the
field have reported that, in practice, up to 300 metres from the perimeter fence is
considered by most farmers as a no-go area and up to 1,000 metres a high -risk area.
At sea, the restricted area is generally 6 nautical miles, although that distance varies
and is at times increased to 12 to 15 nautical miles, less than a third of the 20 nautical
miles agreed under the Oslo Accords. Israel enforces the restrictions through regular
military incursions, the levelling of land and causing of damage to property, shootings
along the fence and at sea, and arrests and detentions.74
60. Restrictions imposed by Israel have had an impact on humanitarian personnel
in Gaza. Until October 2019, most national staff working for the United Nations and
international non-governmental organizations were not permitted to exit Gaza for the
West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Following intensive advocacy by the United
Nations, international non-governmental organizations and Member States, the Israeli
authorities eased that restriction in October 2019, giving a pproximately 50 per cent
of affected staff to access permits again. However, more than 160 staff members of
the United Nations and international non -governmental organizations are still not
permitted to travel to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. 75
Movement restrictions in the West Bank
61. The movement of Palestinians within the West Bank, including to and from East
Jerusalem, is subject to physical and administrative obstacles impeding economic and
social activity, and access to services. The mo vement of Palestinians is restricted
through a complex system of checkpoints, permits, military roadblocks, settlements
and the West Bank barrier.76
62. Over 700 physical obstacles, including checkpoints and iron gates at the entrances
to the cities and villages, have fragmented the West Bank into more than 100 cantons
and hinder interaction between Palestinian communities. In addition, Israel has allocated
more than 40 km of roads for the exclusive use of Israeli citizens, imposing partial
restrictions on Palestinian use of another 20 km of roads within the West Bank. 77
63. The municipal boundaries of settlements enclose more than 10 per cent of the West
Bank,78 while another 18 per cent has been designated for military purposes by Israel.
All those areas are off limits to Palestinians.79 Once completed, the barrier being
constructed in the West Bank by Israel will isolate around 9.4 per cent of the West Bank,
further obstructing the movement of 11,000 Palestinians living in the area between the
wall and the Green Line already isolated in the seam zone since November 2017. 80
__________________
74 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020; OCHA, “Occupied Palestinian Territory, Protection
of civilians report”, 16 March –8 April 2019, available at www.ochaopt.org/content/protectioncivilians-
report-26-march-8-april-2019.
75 Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report to the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee”, 26 September 2019; OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020, p. 14.
76 See A/74/468, para. 26.
77 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “H.E. Dr. Awad, highlights the forty four annual
commemoration of Land Day in statistical figures”.
78 OCHA input.
79 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “H.E. Dr. Awad, highlights the forty four annual
commemoration of Land Day in statistical figures”.
80 See A/74/88-E/2019/72, para. 66–67.
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64. Palestinian farming access remains severely restrictive around and within
settlements, and in the seam zone, where p rior coordination or special permits are
required.81
65. In the H2 zone in Hebron, as of February 2020, there were 120 physical
obstacles and 21 permanently staffed checkpoints in an area of approximately 4 km 2.
Approximately 6,200 Palestinians cannot reach their home by vehicle and 5,600 must
cross one of the checkpoints on foot to reach their homes. 82
66. The World Food programme, UNRWA and WHO report facing Israeli
restrictions that hinder the movements of their staff, as well as access to vulnerable
communities and the delivery of services to them, including education, health and
relief services.83
Exploitation, endangerment and depletion of Palestinian natural resources
67. Area C continues to be almost entirely off limits for the Government of
Palestine, as well as for producers and investors, even thou gh it contains the most
valuable natural resources.84 Palestinian institutions must seek permission from
Israeli authorities before constructing new infrastructure in Area C. Closures,
particularly in Gaza, limit Palestinian access to materials and technolo gies.85
68. Approximately 3.7 million Palestinians are negatively affected by a lack of
access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene services. Almost the whole population in
Gaza is exposed to public health risks associated with poor water quality, poor
wastewater collection and treatment, a lack of storm water infrastructure and lack of
proper hygiene practices.86
69. There is continuity in the landscape of humanitarian needs, due to the continuing
Israeli control and exploitation of Palestinian natural fr eshwater resources, as well as
severe restrictions on access to water for Palestinians. Around 300,000 Palestinians in
Area C are directly affected by Israeli restrictions and practices, including demolition of
water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure, such as water and sanitation networks.87
70. Palestinians suffer from inadequate access to water from the mountain aquifers,
even though 85 per cent of those lie within the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 88 While
all Israeli settlements in the West Bank ar e linked to the water system of Israel and
receive high-quality water for all purposes, at least 180 Palestinian communities in
the area have no connection to a water network and rely on low -quality, high-cost
alternatives.89 Similarly, only 44 per cent of residents in Palestinian communities in
East Jerusalem are connected legally and properly to the water grid. 90
71. One alternative is purchasing water from the Israeli water company Mekorot. In
2018, a total of 83 million m3 was purchased, which represented 22 per cent of the
__________________
81 ILO input.
82 OCHA, “Occupied Palestinian Territory: Dignity denied: Life in the settlement area of Hebron
City”, 20 February 2020; A/HRC/43/67, para. 50.
83 World Food Programme (WFP), UNRWA and WHO input.
84 See TD/B/65(2)/3, para. 25.
85 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) input.
86 UNICEF input.
87 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020 , p. 43; UNICEF input.
88 WFP input.
89 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) input.
90 Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “East Jerusalem: facts and figures 2019 – May 2019”.
Available at https://fef8066e-8343-457a-8902-ae89f366476d.filesusr.com/ugd/
01368b_20dc66c3a088465286ce4c6d5a87c56c.pdf .
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total amount of water available for Palestinian consumption. 91 The cost of water is
also a concern for the approximately 130,000 Palestinians living in Areas A, B and C,
with a price of up to 60 new Israeli shekels per m 3 for unsafe tankered water.92
72. The average Palestinian in the West Bank consumes only 87 litres of water per
day, which is less than the minimum 100 litres per person per day recommended by
WHO. Around 95,000 people in Area C receive less than 50 litres per person per day,
while over 83,000 people consume bad-quality drinking water, as they are mainly
dependent on tankered water from unsecured sources, harvested rainwater or good -
quality water stored in contaminated storage facilities, or they may follow unsafe
hygiene practices at the household level, given the lack of sanitation and/or
handwashing facilities.93
73. The coastal aquifer in Gaza has become contaminated by saline intrusion,
agricultural pesticides and sewage. This contamination presents particular risks t o
children and pregnant women.94
74. As 96 per cent of water resources are unfit for use by Gaza’s 2 million inhabitants,
only 1 per cent of households have access to an improved drinking water source. 95
75. The greater provision of electricity improved th e operation of water facilities.
Yet, the average volume of piped water supplied during the first half of 2019 was
77.5 litres per person per day, compared with the recommendations of WHO and the
UNICEF Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for All (WASH) initiati ve.96 Furthermore,
piped water is unfit for human consumption and has an average loss of 36 per cent
due to network leaks.97
76. Sanitation remains a primary concern in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
Only 73 per cent of households in Gaza and only 32 p er cent of households in the
West Bank have access to a sewerage network and a large fraction of sewage is
disposed of with only partial treatment or no treatment at all. 98
77. Sewage pollution and water shortage are causing a serious emergency in Gaza
and pose a threat to 2 million people, their health and the environment. 99 The
improved power supply in Gaza has enhanced the operation of the five wastewater
treatment plants. This has, in turn, reduced the pollution levels in the approximately
179 million litres of wastewater discharged into the Mediterranean every day during
the first six months of 2019 by 23 and 32.5 per cent compared with 2018 and 2017,
respectively. The reduction has enabled the rehabilitation of some additional beaches
__________________
91 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the Palestinian
Water Authority and the Palestinian Meteorological Department issue a press release on the occasion
of World Water Day and World Meteorological Day, March 22th –23th, 2020”. Available in Arabic at
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_Ar_19 -3-2020-water.pdf and, in a slightly
abridged form, in English at http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=3690# .
92 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020 , p. 43.
93 UNICEF input; OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020, p.24.
94 UNEP input.
95 World Bank, “Assistance strategy FY 18-21 for the West Bank and Gaza”, report No. 115201 -
GZ, 6 November 2017.
96 UN-Water Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication, “The human right to water and
sanitation”, media brief, n.d.
97 UNICEF input; OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020.
98 World Bank, “Assistance strategy FY 18-21 for the West Bank and Gaza”.
99 World Bank, “Wastewater management project mitigates health and environmental threats in the
West Bank and Gaza”, 9 October 2019.
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for swimming and a reduction of the health risks associated with untreated or partially
treated wastewater effluent entering the Mediterranean. 100
78. In the West Bank, untreated waste continues to issue from both Palestinian
towns and Israeli settlements. It pollutes agricu ltural land and infiltrates the
groundwater of the mountain aquifer, affecting its quality. 101
79. The total area of land classified as being of high or medium agricultural value
in the West Bank is 2,072,000 dunums, which constitutes about 37 per cent of t he
West Bank. Palestinians can only use less than half of that area, mainly owing to land
confiscation and the restriction of Palestinian farmers’ access to water and land. 102
Palestinians farmers, for example can cultivate only 4 per cent of the land in the
Jordan Valley.103 Furthermore, they have to buy either water from Israel or desalinated
water from private suppliers at a high cost, thereby reducing their competitiveness in
the market.104
80. The agricultural potential of Gaza has been undermined by the cl osure, as some
35 per cent of farmland falls within restricted areas enforced by Israel. Furthermore,
Israel has damaged Palestinian farmland in Gaza by aerially spraying the land with
herbicides.105
81. The strict limitations on fishable waters, which have been reduced at certain times
to as little as 3 nautical miles, have severely hampered the livelihoods of Gaza’s
fishermen. Although the maritime restrictions have recently been relaxed to 12 nautical
miles, they remain subject to frequent changes, which causes uncertainty. 106
82. The exploiting of mineral resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory remains
limited. Israeli firms do not face the limitations placed on their Palestinian
counterparts.107
Social and economic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
83. The COVID-19 crisis emerged at a time when the social and economic
conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory were precarious, particularly in Gaza.
The United Nations country team had previously projected that by 2020, Gaza would
become an unlivable place.108 In addition to the health implications of the pandemic,
the negative shock to the Israeli and Palestinian economies will have profound
socioeconomic implications. Coupled with the effects of the protracted occupation
and the matrix of Israeli policies and practices, the social outlook in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory seems bleak.
84. The physical fragmentation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, cau sed by a
system of complex restrictions on movement and access imposed by the Israeli
military, has resulted in the emergence of different economies in Gaza and the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem. This is exacerbated by intra -Palestinian divisions.
__________________
100 UNCTAD input; Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020 , p. 42; Office of the United Nations
Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee”, 26 September 2019.
101 UNEP input.
102 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “H.E. Ms. Awad highlights the 43rd annual
commemoration of Land Day in statistical figures”, 28 March 2019.
103 ILO input.
104 WFP input.
105 See A/HRC/40/73 para. 12.
106 Ibid., para 11.
107 See A/74/88-E/2019/72, paras. 85 and 86.
108 United Nations country team in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Gaza ten years later”, July 2017.
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85. The severe financial crisis facing the Palestinian Government has exacerbated the
humanitarian situation. The Government’s ability to continue to provide basic services
remains at risk and serious concerns endure over upholding governance functions. 109
86. Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis, half the Palestinian population
(2.4 million) were in need of humanitarian assistance and protection, including some
1.1 million children and 600,000 women. Funding continues its downward trend,
adding constraints for humanitarian agencies.110
87. Economic and political uncertainty increase domestic strain and the risk of
social unrest. Youth are the most detrimentally affected and experience very high
unemployment rates. They may undergo a psychological impact t hat later contributes
to heightened levels of violence.111 The COVID-19 pandemic is expected to
exacerbate these conditions.
Economic conditions
88. The long-term economic repercussions of practices, policies and measures
applied by Israel have entailed low investments in the Palestinian economy, which
has led to a process of de-industrialization, the erosion of the Palestinian productive
sectors and to de-development, specifically in Gaza.112 This has entrenched the
dependency of the Palestinian economy on Israel and on foreign aid.
89. In 2019, the Palestinian economy continued to encounter numerous challenges
that restrained its ability to improve the sluggish performance of 2018. Estimates in
constant prices showed an increase of 2.6 per cent in gross domestic product (GDP)
during the fourth quarter of 2019 compared with the third quarter of 2019. This
increase was driven mainly by the release by Israel of Palestinian clearance revenues
in August 2019, otherwise the economy would have fallen into recessio n.113
90. However, at constant 2015 prices, real GDP contracted by 1.8 per cent in the
fourth quarter of 2019 compared with the fourth quarter of 2018, and by 0.6 per cent
in the third quarter of 2019 compared with the third quarter of 2018. Decreases were
noted in household consumption, government spending and fixed investment. On the
other hand, exports grew by 0.9 per cent in the fourth quarter, while imports decreased
by 8 per cent.114
91. The decline in GDP per capita further highlights th e precarious situation of the
Palestinian economy, whose growth in 2019 was insufficient to keep pace with the
population growth rate of 2.5 per cent. 115 As a result, GDP per capita saw a 5.5 per
cent decrease, from $898.6 in constant prices in the fourth qu arter of 2018 to $848.8
in the fourth quarter of 2019.116
92. In March 2019, the Palestinian Government started to implement emergency
financial measures to address the loss of nearly two thirds of its revenue resulting from
the standoff with Israel over the unilateral deductions by Israel from Palestinian
__________________
109 UNICEF, “State of Palestine, humanitarian situation report”, July–September 2019.
110 OCHA input.
111 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) input.
112 The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation for the Palestinian People: The Unrealized Oil
and Natural Gas Potential (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.19.II.D.10).
113 Portland Trust. “Palestinian economic bulletin”, No. 160, January 2020.
114 Data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
115 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Indicators: Household budget”. Ava ilable at
www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/881/default.aspx.
116 Data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
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clearance revenues. The release by Israel of some clearance revenues enabled the
Palestinian Government to cope with the financial strain for a few additional months. 117
93. The lack of economic prospects, particularly in Gaza, strains people’s livelihoods
and limits their access to decent work. This is reflected in the anaemic labour market,
whose labour force participation declined by the fourth quarter of 2019, with a mere
44.4 per cent of working-age Palestinians participating in the labour market.118
94. The unemployment rate in the Occupied Palestinian Territory stood at 24 per
cent119 among labour force participants of 15 years and older in the fourth quarter of
2019. Total labour underutilization stood at 33 per cent. Unemployment in Gaza
remained alarmingly high, at 45 per cent. Notable discrepancies remained in
unemployment figures between males (21 per cent) and females (41 per cent), and in
labour force participation for males (7 out of 10) and females (2 out 10). Also
alarming was the unemployment rate of 52 per cent among youth graduates (19 –29
years of age) who held an associate diploma and above (68 per cent for females;
35 per cent for males).120
95. According to the World Bank, the latest available poverty data are for 2016/17.
Therefore, they do not reflect the current conditions or the impact of the ongoing
fiscal crisis.121 The 2017 data revealed that 53 per cent of Gazans were living below
the national poverty line122 (the poverty line translates to an expenditure of $692 per
month for a family of two adults and three children), while the incidence of deep
poverty stood at 33.8 per cent (deep poverty is defined as being unable to meet the
minimum required for food, clothing and housing).
96. Following the fiscal crisis of 2019, the Palestinian economy was projected to
slowly recover in 2020. However, the COVID-19 outbreak seems to be largely
weighing on economic activity. Living conditions are difficult, with a quarter of the
labour force unemployed and 24 per cent of Palestinians living with less than $5.5 a
day (2011 purchasing power parity), even prior to the outbreak. A larger than expected
decline in aid and a further spread of the virus causing COVID -19 pose significant
downside risks.
97. Measures put in place by the Government since early March 2020 to halt the
spread of COVID-19, while effective in limiting the spread of the virus, seem to have
resulted in disruptions in economic activity, especially in the West Bank. As a result,
the economy is expected to contract by 2.5 per cent in 2020. 123 Private sector
representatives have also announced plans to cut pay by 50 per cent.
98. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the measures to combat it, the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics projects that a shutdown would lead to a
contraction in GDP of 5.1 per cent if it lasts three months and 7.1 per cent if it lasts
six months, with a significant attendant rise in poverty. The capacity of the Palestinian
Government to address this crisis remains constrained, as Israel controls the
conventional fiscal and monetary tools needed. 124
__________________
117 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”, 26 September 2019.
118 ILO input.
119 Based on the latest revised ILO standards adopted at the nineteenth International Conference of
Labour Statisticians.
120 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “The labour force survey results 2019”, n. d.
121 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”, 26 September 2019.
122 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”, 27 September 2018.
123 World Bank, “Palestinian Territories”, economic update, April 2020. Available at
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/394981554825501362/mpo -pse.pdf.
124 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Statement
by United Nations Special Coordinator Nickolay Mladenov on the socioeconomic impact of the
COVID-19 impact in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, 12 April 2020.
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99. The negative outlook was present before the COVID -19 pandemic came to pose
dire challenges to the whole world. Its economic fallout remains uncertain, yet it can
be expected that the direct economic, social and humanitarian impact in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory will only be multiplied because of an anticipated further
decrease in foreign aid. This would entail further deterioration in the social, economic
and living conditions of Palestinians who are already suffering from
hyperunemployment and poverty, with a disproportionate impact on vulnerable
groups, including women and children.
Food security
100. Poverty resulting from the high levels of unemployme nt is the root cause behind
food insecurity. A total of 1.7 million Palestinians, including approximately 900,000
refugees, equivalent to 33 per cent of the population, are considered food -insecure.
During 2019, a total of 76 per cent of the beneficiaries receiving World Food
Programme food assistance supplemented their food purchases by taking on debt. 125
101. Food insecurity is higher in households headed by females than in those headed
by males. The prevalence of food-insecure households in Area C is thre e times higher
than in the West Bank overall, despite the food assistance and other forms of social
transfers from Palestinian governmental bodies or international organizations. In
Gaza, food insecurity remains alarmingly high and is increasing, with an estimated
62 per cent of households being severely or moderately food -insecure.126
102. During the first half of 2019, 18 per cent of pregnant women and 14 per cent of
lactating mothers were malnourished, and only 14 per cent of children under five years
of age had a minimum acceptable diet. Among 3,000 children under five, 82 had to be
treated for severe acute malnutrition and 237 for moderate acute malnutrition. 127
Health
103. The most vulnerable populations in the face of the COVID -19 crisis are those
that have been suffering the consequences of violence and conflict. 128 The protracted
occupation and the policies and measures associated with it have significantly
impaired Palestinian institutions, particularly in Gaza. 129
104. As at 5 May 2020, there were 532 confirmed cases of COVID-19 among
Palestinians (345 in the West Bank, 170 in East Jerusalem and 17 in Gaza), and 4
associated deaths.130 Palestinians in refugee camps and other poor, densely populated
areas across the Occupied Palestinian Territory face a higher risk of contagion due to
overcrowding and inadequate sanitation. The capacity of the Palestinian health -care
system to cope with the expected increase in COVID -19 patients remains severely
impaired by long-standing challenges and critical sh ortages, particularly in the Gaza
Strip.131
105. Since the onset of the outbreak, the Palestinian Authority and Israel have
coordinated efforts and taken far-reaching measures to try and contain the pandemic.
Technical cooperation between the parties has be en effective. However, areas of
__________________
125 WFP input.
126 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020 .
127 UNICEF, “State of Palestine, humanitarian situation report”, January –June 2019.
128 See United Nations, “Shared responsibility, global solidarity: Responding to the socioeconomic
impacts of COVID-19”, March 2020, p. 5.
129 WHO input.
130 OCHA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “COVID-19 emergency situation report”, No. 7,
28 April–4 May 2020.
131 OCHA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “COVID-19 emergency situation report”, No. 2,
24–31 March 2020.
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tension remain, including in East Jerusalem and Hebron, that could undermine efforts
to combat the spread of the virus. The number of Palestinian patients with COVID -19
in East Jerusalem remains unconfirmed. Israeli authorit ies did not open testing
stations in the city until the end of March 2020. 132
106. In addition, factors restricting hygiene measures, including inadequate water
and sanitation, overcrowding, and limitations on accessing health information,
contribute to increased susceptibility of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and
hamper effective emergency preparedness and response. 133
107. Gaza’s health infrastructure has been eroded. It is overstretched and on the verge
of collapse owing to the Israeli closure and the d amage sustained during recurrent
military operations.134 There were only 2,500 available beds,135 and in February 2020,
less than a month’s supply (“zero stock”) remained for 39 per cent of essential
medicines in Gaza. Health officials repeatedly announced sho rtages and the depletion
of COVID-19 testing kits, as well as shortages of other medical supplies. 136
108. Throughout the reporting period, the movement of essential medical equipment
and supplies to Gaza remained restricted. Owing to the lack of specialize d medical
care and chronic shortages of medicines, doctors have often referred patients to
hospitals located primarily in the West Bank, Israel and, to a lesser extent, Egypt. 137
Israeli authorities have delayed or refused applications for exit permits to Pa lestinian
patients with referrals for treatment abroad, which has resulted in premature deaths
on several occasions.138
109. In 2019, a total of 124 laboratory -confirmed cases of measles, including two
deaths, were reported in Gaza. Of those, 46 per cent ha d not been vaccinated.
Previously, between 2009 and 2018, Gaza had recorded a vaccination coverage of
97 per cent for measles, but the socioeconomic decline, the closure, the conflict and
other constraints have disrupted that coverage. 139
110. Access reproductive services is a special constraint facing Palestinian women
and girls. It is estimated that in Gaza, 150,000 women, out of a total of 500,000, are
“acutely vulnerable owing to critical challenges in delivering health care”. 140 The
maternal mortality ratio has more than doubled in Gaza, from 8.6 per 100,000 in 2017
to 19.1 per 100,000 live births in 2019. 141
111. In the West Bank, health-care services continue to face major challenges,
especially as access to some of the most vulnerable communities is hamp ered by
discriminatory zoning and increased protection concerns. Some 165 communities,
with a total population of 162,663, have limited or no access to basic primary health -
care services, while 33,000 people are in critical need of emergency care. 142
112. In areas such as the H2 zone of Hebron, the seam zone and Area C, health
services, if available, are of poor quality and often limited to basic care. For all
facilities in the West Bank outside East Jerusalem, there is a critical shortage of
certain treatment and diagnostic options, and patients in need of advanced care are
__________________
132 Ibid.
133 WHO input.
134 WHO input.
135 International Crisis Group, “The Gaza Strip and COVID -19: Preparing for the worst”, Crisis
Group Middle East briefing No. 75, 1 April 2020.
136 WHO input.
137 See A/74/468, para. 28.
138 See E/ESCWA/ECW/2019/TP.2.
139 WHO, “Measles – Gaza Strip”, disease outbreak news, 9 January 2020.
140 UN-Women, September 2019.
141 UNFPA input.
142 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020.
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thus dependent on referrals to East Jerusalem or Israel, and therefore require security
permits from the Israeli authorities. 143
113. Approximately 50,000 Palestinian workers returning to the West Bank from
Israel, where the prevalence of COVID-19 has been higher, present a major risk of
increasing the transfer of COVID-19 and of overwhelming the testing and quarantine
capacities of the Palestinian Government. Incidents of symptomatic worke rs being
left at checkpoints after being returned by Israel to Palestinian -controlled areas,
without coordination with Palestinian authorities, are of concern. 144
Education
114. Israeli policies and practices continue to render access to education in a safe
learning environment a critical and long-standing challenge. In Area C, over one third
of residential communities lack primary schools. Children are forced to travel long
distances, sometimes on foot, to reach the nearest school, for which they often have
to cross one or two checkpoints. Most children (88 per cent) living in the H2 zone of
Hebron must cross a military checkpoint and/or are exposed to harassment by Israeli
settlers on their way to school.145
115. In 2019, a total of 328 education-related incidents affecting approximately 20,000
students were documented. While the shortage of classrooms in the West Bank persist,
51 schools in Area C and East Jerusalem face demolition orders, and others are subjected
to stop-work orders. In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, access to education is
heavily compromised by education-related violations facing students and teachers.
Children are exposed to conflict-related violence and movement restrictions, which can
lead to increased school dropout rates. Access to safe education is compromised by
violence and armed search operations in schools; harassment, intimidation and violence
towards students and teachers on the way to and from school; a severe shortage of
classrooms; and demolition or stop-work orders on school buildings. In East Jerusalem,
the increase in security operations in the city and, particularly, the almost daily clashes
in Isawiyah have led to several arrests, including of children. 146
116. In Gaza, the closure and the multiple military escalations have resulted in
repeated damage and destruction to an already fragile education infrastructure. Severe
electricity shortages, increased poverty, and protection concerns only exacerbate the
situation.147
117. Other factors are compounding the situation, forcing around 70 per cent of
UNRWA schools and 63 per cent of those run by the Palestinian Ministry of Education
to operate on a double- or triple-shift system, which results in crowded classrooms. 148
118. An estimated 4.9 per cent of 10- to 15-year-olds and 25 per cent of 16- to 17-
year-olds in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are out of school. Girls who drop out
are at high risk of early marriage, while boys are at high risk of child labour or life -
threatening activities.149
The gendered impact of the occupation on women and girls
119. Laws, policies and practices imposed by the Israeli authorities affect Palestinian
women and girls in specific ways. Women are often the first to be affected by curbs
__________________
143 UN-Women, September 2019.
144 WHO input.
145 UNICEF input.
146 UNICEF, “State of Palestine, humanitarian situation report”, July –September 2019.
147 UNICEF input.
148 UNRWA input; OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020 .
149 OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020 .
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on residency and family unification because they traditionally move away from their
own families and communities, upon marriage, and, at times, find themselves
stranded and without resources.150
120. Palestinian women and girls continue to be exposed to violence by Israeli
settlers and Israeli security forces.151 Women’s organizations have found that the fear
of not knowing when the Israeli occupying forces will raid houses makes them wear
the hijab at all times, even when sleeping. 152 Some women report that the frequent or
permanent presence of settlers, soldiers or male residents around the house affected
their privacy and freedom of movement. 153
121. House demolitions and forced evictions adversely affect women’s right to
adequate housing and the quality of their family life, and hav e a serious impact on
Palestinian women and girls’ emotional welfare. Women, particularly mothers, must
deal with the burden of ensuring the well-being of the family, including by securing
a new place to live and providing physical and emotional support to loved ones.154
Living with extended family may result in tensions within families and increases
vulnerability to domestic violence or child abuse. 155 That situation has been
exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the measures taken to contain it.
122. Service providers report an increasing demand for psychosocial assistance due
to domestic violence against women and children amid a chronic lack of safe places
and recreational areas. The rise in domestic violence is attributed to fear and anxiety
stemming from the situation, which includes economic stress and overcrowded
households.156
123. Some reports of violence and sexual harassment at checkpoints mean that
parents are hesitant to allow their daughters to cross the checkpoints to attend school,
thus impeding their access to education.157
124. Of the women who were injured during the Great March of Return protests,
12.5 per cent were unable to return to their work. They also suffered from increased
exposure to physical and sexual abuse. Women and girls were al so subjected to forced
or early marriage to men who were injured or maimed. 158
125. Women employed in Area C are often unremunerated or receive low wages.
They work mainly in agriculture (primarily performing unpaid family labour) or in
Israeli settlements. This further increases the poverty for households headed by
women in Area C.159
126. Multiple factors, including the occupation, Israeli practices and the COVID -19
pandemic, disproportionately affect Palestinian women and girls in several areas.
__________________
150 UN-Women input.
151 See A/74/357, para. 42.
152 Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), “WCLAC’s shadow report for the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cult ural Rights, 66th session – Israel review”, 2019.
153 See A/74/357, para. 53.
154 WCLAC, “Punitive Measures: the gendered impact on Palestinian women”, submission to the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since
1967, December 2019.
155 E/ESCWA/ECW/2019/TP.2.
156 OCHA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “COVID-19 emergency situation report”, No. 4,
7–13 April 2020.
157 WCLAC, “WCLAC’s shadow report”.
158 UN-Women input.
159 Rema Hammami and others, “Addressing the needs of Palestinian households in Area C of the
West Bank: A summary of the findings of the first comprehensive household survey” (Oxfam,
Birzeit University, Nairobi/Bi’r Zayt, State of Palestine, January 2019).
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Those impacts risk reversing the women’s rights gains made in past decades and can
exacerbate pre-existing inequalities.160
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
127. The Secretary-General continues to reaffirm the validity of Security Council
resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council decided that the Israeli decision to impose
its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights was
null and void and without international legal effect.
128. Approximately 50,000 people live in the occupied Syrian Golan, about half of
whom are Israeli settlers living in 34 illegal settlements. The Syrian po pulation of
nearly 27,000 lives in five villages that form approximately 5 per cent of the territory
of the occupied Syrian Golan.161
129. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2018/20, reaffirmed that the
construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian
Golan, were illegal and constituted a major obstacle to economic and social
development. The continued establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan amount to the transfer
by Israel of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, which is
prohibited under international humanitarian law. 162
130. An Israeli media outlet reported on a government plan to expand settlements in
the occupied Syrian Golan and to increase the settler population in the area to 250,000
by 2048. The plan reportedly envisions the construction of 30,000 new housing units
and two new settlements.
131. The Syrian population of the occupied Syrian Golan faces significant
discriminatory building restrictions imposed by Israel, which leads to strained
infrastructure and overcrowded conditions.
132. Israel continues to maintain extremely restrictive zoning and building policies,
which has an impact on the Syrian population. Those include the issuance of
demolition orders and a recent process aimed at zoning some of the rare land usable
for the expansion of Syrian villages as a national park. 163
133. Israel is changing its land registration system. The change carries the risk of
disadvantaging Syrian citizens who have insufficient proof of ownership, and could
provide a basis for Israeli appropriation.164
134. The Syrian Arab Republic has stressed that Israel has been consolidating its
control over land and natural resources, including water. Israel has done so through,
among other things, the recent confiscation of land in the Syrian village of Jubbata
al-Khashab, which lies within the demilitarized zone established by the United
Nations in 1974, with the aim of building trenches close to Syrian territory, a step that
had led to the isolation of tens of dunums of land belonging to the village.165
135. The Israeli company Energix Renewable Energies Ltd. has a project through which
it seeks to build 31 wind turbines in close proximity to Syrian population centres. It is
estimated that the project as a whole will occupy about 4,300 dunums of land, almost a
__________________
160 UN-Women input.
161 See A/74/357, para. 71.
162 Ibid., para. 74.
163 See A/HRC/43/67, para. 61.
164 ILO input.
165 See A/HRC/43/69, para. 20.
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quarter of the limited agricultural land remaining in the possession of Syrians. In
addition to the environmental aspects and the impact on their health, Syrians are also
concerned about the risk the project poses to their cultural life i n the Golan.166
136. At the same time, Syrians in the Golan are unable to develop their own gas and
oil industries.167
137. Information has been received on continued discriminatory policies, particularly
with regard to access to land and water, to the benef it of settlers who already enjoy
tax incentives and subsidies granted by the Israeli Government. 168
138. Discriminatory pricing and distribution of utilities in the occupied Golan has
subsidized illegal Israeli settlement businesses while suffocating Syrian industries,
particularly in the agricultural sector. 169 While the majority of Syrian households in
the Golan have agricultural roots, only a small number of workers are primarily
employed in farming. It has been difficult for small -scale Syrian farmers to compete
with the often more industrial agriculture of the settlements, forcing many farmers to
turn to other occupations.170
139. The Syrian Arab Republic has reported that Israel continues its attempts to
impose Israeli citizenship on the Syrian residents o f the occupied Syrian Golan.
IV. Conclusion
140. The protracted Israeli occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the
occupied Syrian Golan continues to have a detrimental effect on the living conditions
of the Palestinian and Syrian popul ations, as well as on social and economic
development in the occupied territories. The negative impact of the occupation and
the Israeli policies and practices is multilayered and the cumulative repercussions
affect the future of the populations living und er occupation.
141. The unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis heightens the
vulnerability of Palestinians, in particular the population of Gaza, and exposes them
to more risk. Palestine refugees and youth, whose social and economic conditions
were already precarious, stand to suffer disproportionately both from the pandemic
and its aftermath. Measures that limit testing and treatment in the context of the
pandemic should be halted immediately and more resources should be provided to aid
the Palestinians in facing the COVID-19 crisis.
142. Current social and economic trends in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
indicate that the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals will be out of reach
if there are no drastic positive change s to the existing conditions. Israeli-imposed
restrictions, the expansion of the illegal settlements and other practices not only
prevent development in the occupied territories, but also cause humanitarian crises
that necessitate the diversion of national and international efforts from development
to immediate relief.
143. The funding crisis facing UNRWA and the decline in donor aid are other factors
that only exacerbate the already precarious conditions of hundreds of thousands of
__________________
166 Al-Haq, “Joint parallel report on Israel’s violations of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights on the occasion of the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights’ review of the fourth periodic report of Israel”, 6 September 2019.
167 Ibid.
168 ILO, “The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories” (document No. ILC.108/DG/APP,
2019), para. 147.
169 Al-Haq, “Joint parallel report”, para 9.
170 ILO, “The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories”, para 146.
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Palestinians. The Secretary-General reiterates his appeal to the international
community to guarantee that the vital support for the rights of the Palestine refugees
is upheld and to ensure adequate financing for UNRWA. The unfolding COVID -19
pandemic and its economic fallout is likely to further compound the economic
difficulties and could result in more adverse living conditions for Palestinians.
144. The closure imposed on Gaza, other restrictive Israeli measures, recurrent
escalations and declining donor funding have created a severe situation in Gaza that
requires immediate action by the international community. This is particularly
alarming in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, with the health-care system in
Gaza on the verge of collapse as that crisis unfolds.
145. Israel continues to employ policies and practices that are contrary to relevant
Security Council resolutions, international humanitarian law and international human
rights law. Some of these practices may be considered discriminatory and others may
amount to the forcible transfer or collective punishment of protected persons, which
would be a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and is prohibited under
international law.
146. Adherence to international law is imperative, ensuring that no party enjoys
impunity and securing justice and peace for all those living in the region, including
Palestinians and Syrians living under occupation. The United Nations maintains its
long-standing position that lasting and comprehensive peace can be achieved only
through a negotiated two-State solution. The Secretary-General will continue to
ensure that the United Nations works towards the establishment of an independent,
democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State, living side by side in peace with
a secure Israel, with Jerusalem as the capital of both States, consistent with relevant
Security Council resolutions and international law.
United Nations A/76/94–E/2021/73
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
24 June 2021
Original: English
21-08462 (E) 130721
*2108462*
General Assembly Economic and Social Council
Seventy-sixth session Substantive session of 2021
Item 65 of the preliminary list* Agenda item 16
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan over their natural resources
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of
the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General**
Summary
In its resolution 2021/4, entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan”, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary -
General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy -fifth session, through the
Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The
Assembly, in its resolution 75/236, entitled “Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources”, requ ested
the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its seventy -sixth session. The present
report, which was prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
(ESCWA), has been submitted in compliance with these resolutions.
The report covers persistent Israeli practices and policies, particularly those that
are in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law
and that affect the social and economic conditions of the people living under its
military occupation.
* A/76/50.
** The present report was submitted after the deadline so as to include the most recent information.
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ESCWA would like to express its appreciation for the contributions of the
International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the
Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, the United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Human
Settlements Programme, the Office of the Sp ecial Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the United Nations Educatio nal, Scientific and
Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization.
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I. Introduction
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2021/4, expressed concerns
about the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan. The General
Assembly, in its resolution 75/236, demanded that Israel, the occupying Power, cease
the exploitation, damage, cause of loss or depletion and endangerment of natural
resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the
occupied Syrian Golan.
2. The present report provides information on relevant developments in this regard
during the period from 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory
Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
3. The reporting period was characterized by the coronavirus disease (COVID -19)
pandemic and efforts to combat it. During the period, Israel continued such policies
and practices as settlement expansion, the demolition of Palestinian structures and
homes, closures, access and movement restrictions, and other aspects of its protracted
occupation that have had a severe humanitarian, economic, social and political impact
on Palestinians and their ability to exercise their fundamental human rights. 1
4. As previously reported, the Israeli zoning and planning policies in Area C,
which constitutes 60 per cent of the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, are
discriminatory and are considered incompatible with requirements under international
law. Policies that allocate land almost exclusively to Israeli settlements or to the
military and that facilitate the growth of Israeli settlements make it almost impossible
for Palestinians to obtain building permits. The average rate of approval of Palestinian
applications for building permits in Area C during the 2010s stood at 3 to 4 per cent.
As a result, many Palestinians are compelled to build without a permit, risking
eviction, house demolition and displacement.2
5. Palestinians in the occupied territory continue to be subject to a complex
combination of Israeli and Palestinian legal systems. In the West Bank, Israeli
domestic law is applied extraterritorially to Israeli settlers, while Pale stinians are
subject to Israeli military law in addition to the Palestinian legal system. As a result,
lower human rights standards are applied to Palestinian suspects and defendants
compared with Israeli suspects and defendants. The application of two dif ferent legal
systems in the same territory on the sole basis of nationality or origin is inherently
discriminatory and violates the principle of equality before the law, which is central
to the right to a fair trial. The application of Israeli domestic law to settlers and of
Israeli military law to Palestinians in the West Bank also raises concerns as to the
obligation of the occupying Power to respect the laws in force in the territory it
occupies, unless it is absolutely prevented from doing so. 3
6. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed its
concern “at the consequences of policies and practices that amount to segregation”. 4
__________________
1 A/75/84-E/2020/61, para. 152.
2 See A/75/86-E/2020/62, para. 2; and United Nations, Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021: OPT (2020), p. 39.
3 See A/75/86-E/2020/62, para. 5; A/71/86-E/2016/13, para. 7; A/72/90-E/2017/71, para. 4; and
A/73/87-E/2018/69, para. 3; see also A/HRC/43/67, para. 29.
4 CERD/C/ISR/CO/17-19, para. 22.
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The Committee cited in this regard the two separate legal systems and the unequal
use of roads and infrastructure or access to basic services, lands and water resources.
The Committee also pointed to several laws that discriminate against Palestinians in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and that create differences among them, with
regard to their civil status, legal protection, access to social and economic benefits,
or right to land and property.5
Violence and the use of force
7. As the occupying Power, Israel has the obligation to take all the measures in its
power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and life in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, and to protect the Palestinian population from all acts of
violence in all circumstances.6
8. Israeli security forces and military continued to employ measures and practices
that raise serious concerns about excessive use of force, in some cases possibly
amounting to arbitrary deprivation of life, including extrajudicial execution. 7
9. Of particular and grave concern is the recurrent use by Israeli security forces of
crowd control measures against children inside and near schools close to settlements.
Documented cases reveal the unwarranted use of force and violations of the right to
physical and mental integrity of Palestinian children. 8
10. During the reporting period, Israel i military and security forces killed 21
Palestinians, including 6 boys, and injured another 1,662 Palestinians, including
185 children (7 girls and 178 boys) and 21 women. 9
11. Lack of accountability for excessive use of force and other violations by Is raeli
security forces remained pervasive.10 An Israeli non-governmental organization
(NGO), Yesh Din, concluded that permissive rules of engagement with regard to firing
at unarmed protestors, coupled with a law enforcement system that does not allow
genuine and effective investigations, results in the loss of many lives. 11 The Special
Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the
Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories has expressed serious
concern over the prevailing culture of impunity, in particular in cases alleging
excessive use of force by Israeli security forces in both the West Bank and Gaza. 12
12. In March 2021, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court confirmed
the initiation by her Office of an investigation regarding the situation in Palestine.
The investigation will cover crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that are
alleged to have been committed since 13 June 2014, the date to which reference was
made in the referral of the situation to her Office.13
__________________
5 Ibid., para. 13.
6 A/74/357, para. 26.
7 A/75/336, para. 4.
8 A/74/357, para. 68.
9 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Data on Casualties database. Available at www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties (accessed
on 31 March 2021).
10 A/75/336, paras. 4–9.
11 Yesh Din, “Killing time: the slow processing of complaints regarding Gaza Great March of
Return casualties and the use of the fact -finding assessment mechanism to thwart prosecution of
soldiers”, 22 November 2020.
12 A/75/199, para. 22.
13 International Criminal Court, Prosecution Request Pursuant to Article 19(3) for a Ruling on the
Court’s Territorial Jurisdiction in Pales tine, Case No. ICC-01/18-12, 22 January 2020; and Fatou
Bensouda, Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, statement respecting an investigation of the
Situation in Palestine, 3 March 2021.
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Detention and ill-treatment
13. Israel has continued the use of administrative detention for inordinately lengthy
periods, which contributes to perpetuating the arbitrary detention of Palestinians. The
Committee against Torture has expressed concern that administrative detention does
not conform to article 16 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment because, among other reasons, it is used for
“inordinately lengthy periods”. Administrative detention thus deprives detainees of
basic safeguards, including the right to challenge the evidence that is the basis for the
detention.14 The practice by Israel of administrative detention against journalists and
human rights defenders, as well as children, continued. Israeli authorities intensified
the arrest and detention of Palestinian political figures in Jerusalem. 15
14. By 31 March 2021, 4,450 Palestinians were held as “security prisoners” in
Israeli prisons, including 140 children, 37 women and 10 members of the Palestinian
Legislative Council, while by 30 September 2020, 376 Palestinians, including
2 children, were held in administrative detention. 16 The Israeli Prison Service has
stopped releasing monthly comprehensive and disaggregated figures on Palestinian
“security detainees”, previously released in response to freedom of information
requests from Israeli NGOs.17
15. Israeli authorities continue to hold most Palestinian detainees inside Israel, in
violation of international humanitarian law. This has a negative impact on the right of
detainees to receive visitors and family members who reside in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.18 As of September 2020, nearly two thirds of detained children
had been transferred from the West Bank and were held in facilities inside Israel. 19
16. It has been reported that Palestinians were systematically subjected to ill -
treatment in detention. “Special interrogation methods” were reportedly used by the
Internal Security Agency, based on internal guidelines previously approved by the
Attorney General and upheld by the High Court of Justice. In many cases, detainees
were kept in incommunicado detention and not allowed to meet with their lawyers.
The Palestinian Prisoners’ Commission and the Palestinian Prisoners’ Club raised
concerns about medical negligence by the Israeli authorities and reported that punitive
measures were enforced by the Israel Prison Service to pressure detainees who were
protesting their detention through a hunger strike.20 Female Palestinian detainees have
been reportedly subjected to intrusive body searches, beatings, insults, threats and
sexual harassment, sometimes as punitive measures. 21
17. Israeli authorities have reportedly arrested and detain ed family members of
Palestinian detainees, including women, as a form of pressure or punitive measure. 22
18. Patterns of ill-treatment of children in detention also have been indicated by
testimonies from 81 children held in Israeli detention, 23 including beatings and harsh
__________________
14 CAT/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 17; and CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, paras. 22 and 23.
15 A/75/336, para. 48.
16 Addameer, Statistics database, available at www.addameer.org/statistics; and B’Tselem, Statistics
on Administrative Detention database. Available at www.btselem.org/administrative_detention
/statistics (accessed on 1 April 2021).
17 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights input.
18 A/75/336, para. 10.
19 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) input citing Israel Prison Services d ata.
20 A/75/336, paras. 12–14.
21 A/75/199, para. 51.
22 A/75/336, para. 19.
23 Ibid., para. 20.
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disciplinary measures that included solitary confinement and the deprivation of
family visits when the children protested against being moved. 24
19. The inadequate conditions under which children have been detained in Israeli
prisons are reported to include lack of access to proper food, hygiene and ventilation,
and exposure to cold weather and humidity. Those who complained reportedly faced
a severe response by the prison administration, including night raids in cells, beatings ,
subjection to stress positions, solitary confinement and the denial of family visits for
prolonged periods of time.25
20. Interrogation techniques used against detained children are often mentally and
physically coercive and incorporate intimidation, th reats, verbal abuse and physical
violence to obtain confessions. In addition, cases in which Israeli authorities attempt
to recruit Palestinian children as informants during interrogations have been
documented.26
21. Of some 1,300 complaints of torture in volving the Israel Security Agency that
have been submitted to the Israeli Ministry of Justice since 2001, only 1 has resulted
in a criminal investigation, with no indictments. 27
Destruction and confiscation of property and infrastructure
22. The demolition of structures and related forced evictions by Israel of
Palestinians entail numerous human rights violations, exacerbate the coercive
environment and raise concerns about the risk of forcible transfer. 28 The extensive
destruction of property, as well as the forcible transfer of protected people, are
considered grave breaches of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and may amount to war crimes. 29 In addition,
confiscations under the Absentee Property Law and the Legal and Administrative
Matters Law in East Jerusalem are carried out solely on the basis of the nationality or
origin of the owner, rendering them inherently discriminatory. 30
23. The year 2020 witnessed the highest number of demolitions and people
displaced by the Israeli authorities in recent years. 31 Israel mainly cites the lack of
building permits in this regard, which are nearly impossible for Palestinians to obtain,
as the Israeli authorities continued its ordered moratorium on the appr oval of master
plans prepared and submitted by the Palestinian communities in Area C of the West
Bank.32
24. During the first two months of 2021 alone, the Israeli authorities had demolished
or seized at least 227 Palestinian-owned structures, including 93 donor-funded
structures. This represents an increase of almost 185 per cent in structures targeted
__________________
24 UNICEF input.
25 UNICEF input and A/75/336, paras. 20 and 21.
26 Defence for Children International Palestine, Isolated and Alone: Palestinian Children Held in
Solitary Confinement by Israeli Authorities for Interrogation (2020), p. 12.
27 Public Committee against Torture in Israel, Torture in Israel 2020: Situation Report, p.1.
Available at https://stoptorture.org.il/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/%D7%90%D7%A0%D7%92%
D7%9C%D7%99%D7%AA.pdf.
28 A/75/376, para. 34.
29 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, arts. 53 and
147; see also A/73/410.
30 A/75/376, para. 54.
31 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palesti nian
Territory, “Peak in demolitions and confiscations amidst increasing denial of the right to justice”,
Humanitarian Bulletin, October –December 2020.
32 United Nations Human Settlements Programme input.
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and a nearly 450 per cent increase in donor-funded structures targeted, compared with
the equivalent period in 2020.33
25. Recent years have seen a steady increase in the seizure of structures targeted as
a result of a lack of building permits in Area C. The percentage of structures seized,
out of all structures targeted (demolished and seized), increased from 8 per cent in
2016 to 30 per cent in 2020.34 During the first two months of 2021, it increased to
59.5 per cent.35
26. Since 2009, Israeli authorities have demolished 1,343 donor-funded structures.36
Since 2016, international donors have requested that the Israeli authorities return
more than 210 seized humanitarian aid structures to Palestinian beneficiaries. None
of these structures have so far been recovered. 37
27. During the reporting period, Israeli authorities demolished 1,015 Palestinian -
owned structures, including 223 homes, 38 and 233 structures owned by Palestine
refugees. Demolitions more than tripled during Ramadan in 2020, compared with the
same period in 2019.39
28. Demolitions in East Jerusalem can be seen in the context of expanding
settlements in the E1 area, which when completed w ould disrupt the geographical
contiguity with the West Bank and divide it into two disconnected enclaves. 40 Israeli
authorities had announced or advanced the expansion of the settlements ring around
East Jerusalem in areas that continue to witness high rat es of demolitions, particularly
in East Jerusalem and Bethlehem.41
29. The acceleration in the number of demolitions was coupled with the increased
use of legislation and measures that limited the ability of Palestinians to challenge the
targeting of their homes and sources of livelihood in Israeli courts, including military
orders permitting expedited demolitions and confiscations in Area C. 42
30. The introduction of greater punitive measures against unauthorized construction
in East Jerusalem has led to an increase in self-demolitions. In addition to fines that
may reach up to 300,000 new Israeli shekels, the owners of an illegal structure may
be charged extra fines for any additional day’s use of such a structure, as well as the
cost of the demolition itself, if it was carried out by the municipality. The proportion
of self-demolitions in 2020 reached 47 per cent, up from an average of 21 per cent
from 2016 to 2019.43 In East Jerusalem, in addition to those living in homes at risk of
__________________
33 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “Humsa-Al Bqai’a”, Flash Update, No. 5, 25 February 2021.
34 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “Peak in demolitions and confiscations”.
35 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “COVID-19 emergency situation report, No. 28”, February 2021.
36 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “The confiscation of l and is the reason for Land Day”,
30 March 2021.
37 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “Peak in demolitions and confiscations”.
38 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, West Bank Demolition and Displacement database. Available at www.ochaopt.org/data
/demolition (accessed on 31 March 2021).
39 A/75/376, para. 35.
40 A/75/199, para. 27.
41 A/75/376, para. 47.
42 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 26.
43 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “Peak in demolitions and confiscations”.
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demolition, some 218 Palestinian households were at risk of eviction, primarily as a
result of court cases filed mainly by Israeli settler organizations. 44
31. Israeli authorities continued to target the relatives of Palestinians suspected of
attacks against Israelis. Israeli authorities also continued punitive demolitions of the
family homes of Palestinians suspected of killing Israelis in a measure that may
amount to collective punishment.45
32. Between July 2014 and May 2020, at least 68 Palestinian homes were
demolished or sealed, while only eight orders were revoked by the High Court of
Justice. Punitive demolitions have never been used against Israeli Jewish civilians
who have committed “nationalist” crimes similar to those for which Palestinian
homes have been destroyed.46
Israeli settlement activity and settler violence
33. In its resolution 75/236, the General Assembly stressed that the wall and the
settlements being constructed by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem, were contrary to international law. This has
been confirmed in other resolutions, such as Security Council resolution 2334 (2016),
in which the Council reaffirmed that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the
Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, had no legal
validity and constituted a flagrant violation under international law and a major
obstacle to the achievement of a lasting and comprehensive peace.
34. The establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory amounts to the transfer by Israel of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies, which is prohibited under international humanitarian
law.
35. By the end of 2020, more than 630,000 Israeli settlers lived in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, in some 250 settlements and settlement outposts that
directly control approximately 10 per cent of the West Bank. 47
36. Settlement expansion projects currently under way threaten to further encroach
onto Palestinian land, increase fragmentation and heighten the risk of displacement. 48
The advancement of the E1 settlement project to the east of East Jerusalem, if
implemented, would intensify the coercive environment for 18 Palestinian Bedouin
communities located in the area,49 further separate East Jerusalem from the remainder
of the West Bank, and effectively divide the West Bank into two disconnected
enclaves.50
37. Israeli authorities continue to encourage Israelis to move to settlements and
develop financial ventures in and around them. Benefits and incentives are provided
to settlers and settlements in this regard, through both official and unofficial channels,
including housing benefits, significant tax benefits, discounted land fees and
employment subsidies for industrial zones. These drive consistent growth in the
__________________
44 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 39; and United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Palestinian family evicted from its home in East
Jerusalem”, Humanitarian Bulletin, October –December 2020.
45 A/75/336, para. 33.
46 A/HRC/44/60, paras. 50 and 51.
47 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 17.
48 Ibid., p. 26.
49 Ibid., p. 17.
50 A/75/199, paras. 16 and 27.
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number of settlers and factories there. Israel also encourages Israelis to set up new
outposts, which operate as agricultural farms and enable extensive takeovers of
Palestinian farmland and pastureland. Forty such farms have been established in the
past decade, effectively taking over tens of thousands of dunams. 51
38. During 2020, according to Israeli NGO Peace Now, four outposts were
regularized retroactively and plans to similarly regularize three others east of
Jerusalem were deposited.52 It should be noted that between 2007 and 2017 an average
of 1.7 outposts were established each year. 53
Settler violence
39. Settler violence against Palestinians and damage to their property remained high
during the reporting period, as 2 Palestinians were killed and 138 were injured by
Israeli settlers.54 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palesti ne Refugees
in the Near East (UNRWA) recorded at least 960 incidents involving Israeli settlers
in which over 10,000 productive trees were destroyed. 55
40. Despite efforts made by the Israeli authorities in recent years, accountability for
settler violence against Palestinians remained an issue. 56 The resulting distrust in the
Israeli legal system and fears of reprisal prompted Palestinians to submit fewer
complaints.57
41. Settler violence has facilitated the takeover of Palestinian land and the
establishment of settlement outposts, many of which are subsequently “legalized”
(regularized) under Israeli legislation. 58 Repeated and apparently organized settler
violence, coupled with other coercive factors, has forced Palestinian families to leave
their homes in a number of areas.59 Such violence includes, most notably, shooting at
Palestinians, burning and uprooting trees, and physical attacks. 60
42. There were reported cases of settlers spitting on Palestinians during attacks,
causing fear of exposure to the COVID-19 virus and prompting victims to go into
quarantine or self-isolation. In several incidents, settlers appeared to attempt to take
over Palestinian land, taking advantage of the restricted movement of Palestinians
owing to the state of emergency.61
43. On numerous occasions, Israeli security forces did not prevent such attacks and
instead accompanied and protected settlers even at times when movement restrictions
applied to all in the context of the pandemic. 62 Attempts by settlers to enter and/or
attack Palestinian communities continued to cause friction between Israeli security
forces and Palestinians. Israeli security forces killed 1 Palestinian and injured 230 in
such contexts. Settlers also attacked Palestini ans and their property in response to
__________________
51 Eyal Hareuveni and Dror Etkes, This Is Ours: And This, Too – Israel’s Settlement Policy in the
West Bank (B’Tselem and Kerem Navot, 2021).
52 A/75/376, para. 16.
53 Ibid., para. 10.
54 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Data on Casualties database. Available at www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties (accessed
on 15 May 2021).
55 UNRWA West Bank Protection and Neutra lity Department.
56 A/75/376, para. 63.
57 Ibid., para. 33.
58 A/HRC/43/67, paras. 10 and 15.
59 A/75/376, paras. 18 and 23.
60 A/75/199, para. 23.
61 A/75/376, para. 24.
62 A/75/199, para. 13.
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measures taken by the Israeli authorities against them, leaving messages suggesting
that those attacks were acts of retribution. 63
Coercive environment and population displacement
44. There is continued concern that a combination of Israeli policies and practices
in Area C, East Jerusalem and the city of Hebron, such as the demolition and threat
of demolition of homes and schools and the destruction of livelihoods; the denial of
service infrastructure; the restriction of access to farming and grazing land; settler
violence and poor law enforcement in response thereto; and the revocation of
residency rights, among other things, have created a coercive environment, 64 which
may force Palestinians to leave the ir places of residence.
45. Involuntary displacement and relocation to alternative residential areas as a
result of such policies may amount to forcible transfer if it is carried out without the
free and informed consent of the individuals who relocate, i n violation of the
obligations of Israel under international humanitarian and human rights law. Forcible
transfer is a grave breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War and amounts to a war crime.
46. Forced evictions and demolitions are a key factor in the creation of a coercive
environment and increase the risk of forcible transfer. The transfer of property
pursuant to utilizing legal means in East Jerusalem also facilitates the transfer of its
population into the occupied territory.65
47. During the reporting period, demolition and confiscation of structures by Israel
resulted in the displacement of 1,255 Palestinians, the majority of whom were women
(296) and children (666, including 305 girls). Demolit ions also negatively affected
another 6,055 Palestinians.66
48. The stated intention of the Government of Israel to relocate thousands of
Palestinians residing in Area C remains a key concern and contributes to a coercive
environment. Some 18 communities in and around East Jerusalem, including the
Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood, are at particular risk of forced eviction. 67
49. Israel continued to use its control over the movement of people to maintain the
separation between Gaza and the West Bank. The policy effectively prevents most
Palestinians from Gaza from reaching the West Bank, with dramatic consequences for
families, given that around a third of Gaza residents have relatives in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, and that family visits do not rep resent an accepted criterion
for obtaining an exit permit from Gaza. 68 Some 2.1 million Palestinians are estimated
to be affected by problems related to displacement and a lack of protection. 69
50. The implementation of the policy has also increased press ure on West Bank
residents to move to Gaza. West Bank residents requesting to temporarily relocate to
__________________
63 A/75/376, paras. 17–22.
64 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 16.
65 A/75/376, para. 64.
66 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, West Bank Demolition and Displacement database. Available at www.ochaopt.org/data
/demolition (accessed on 31 March 2021).
67 A/75/376, para. 39. See also United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, “Protection of civilians: Occupied Palestinian Territory”, 7 –20 January 2020; and Marya
Farah, Occupying Jerusalem’s Old City: Israeli Policies of Isolation, Intimidation and
Transformation (Ramallah, Al-Haq, 2019).
68 A/75/336, para. 27.
69 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 19.
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Gaza for family purposes have been required to waive their right to return to the West
Bank. Refusing to allow West Bank residents living in Gaza to retur n to their homes
may amount to their forcible transfer. 70
51. Palestinians in the West Bank are constantly vulnerable to arbitrary invasion of
their homes by Israeli security forces and the harm that may result. Home invasions
deprive individuals, families and communities of the fundamental security of their
own homes. Military law in the West Bank does not require a judicial warrant to
invade the private domain. Of all invasions documented by Yesh Din, 88 per cent took
place between midnight and 5 a.m.71
52. There are also concerns that Israeli security forces occupy the rooftops of
private Palestinian homes in Hebron, forcing families to leave their front doors open
for soldiers to enter.72
53. Another major factor contributing to the coercive environment is the progressive
deterioration of the living conditions of Palestinians, namely in Area C and East
Jerusalem. Depriving communities of essential services or sources of livelihoods is
another tool employed in escalating the coercive environmen t in specific areas.
Frequent and prolonged security operations have caused such a deterioration among
the entire population of the neighbourhood of Isawiyah, East Jerusalem. The
recurrence, scale and modalities of Israeli operations raise concerns that th ey may
amount to a form of collective punishment of the population. 73
54. The Palestinian herding community of Humsa Al Bqai’a is one such example. It
is located in Area C in the northern Jordan Valley, mostly in an area designated as a
“firing zone” for Israeli military training, where Palestinian residency or access is
prohibited. Designated firing zones, which cover nearly 30 per cent of Area C, are
home to 38 Palestinian Bedouin and herding communities with a population of 6,200.
On 22 February 2021, Israeli authorities confiscated 18 residential and animal
structures, food parcels, unassembled structures and all the water tanks. Most of the
structures had been provided as a humanitarian response following incidents on 3 and
8 February 2021, in which 37 structures were demolished or confiscated. Ten
households, comprising more than 60 people, including 36 children, were again
displaced and are at heightened risk of forcible transfer. 74 The first demolition of the
community was in November 2020, when 76 structures were demolished, more than
in any other single demolition in the past decade. 75
55. Bedouin communities are among the most economically vulnerable. The
repeated destruction and confiscation of their homes and property, including
structures and other forms of assistance provided by the humanitarian community, is
having a devastating economic, social and traumatic impact. 76 A recent assessment
identified at least 3,200 residential shelters in Palestinian Bedouin and herding
__________________
70 A/75/336, para. 28.
71 Miryam Wijler and others, A Life Exposed: Military Invasions of Palestinian Homes in the West
Bank (Yesh Din and Physicians for Human Rights Israel and Breaking the Silence, 2020), p. 17.
72 United States, Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rig hts Practices for 2020
(2021), p. 88.
73 A/75/336, para. 32.
74 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “Humsa-Al Bqai’a”.
75 United Nations, “Dozens displaced in largest demolition in years in the West Bank, reports UN
relief office”, 5 November 2020.
76 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “Humsa-Al Bqai’a”.
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communities in Area C, including tents, metal shacks and caves, as being substandard
and in need of urgent rehabilitation. 77
56. An estimated 11,000 Palestinians who hold West Bank identification cards are
stranded in the “seam zone”. Most of these communities lack health centr es, schools
and shops, obliging residents to pass through checkpoints in order to reach
workplaces and essential education and medical services and maintain family and
social relations in the remainder of the West Bank. 78
57. In Gaza, as of April 2020, approximately 350 families had yet to start rebuilding
their destroyed shelters. Due to funding gaps, UNRWA was unable to resume
transitional shelter cash assistance payments for those in need, owing to a suspension
of the programme in June 2018.79
58. A 2020 assessment found that 28,500 existing housing units across Gaza were
substandard and did not meet the minimum requirements of living space per person,
weather protection, hygiene facilities and privacy. Of these, 7,000 were assessed as
being beyond repair, thus requiring complete reconstruction, while the other 21,500
required different degrees of rehabilitation. In addition, it is estimated that some 9,500
families in Gaza living in rented accommodation were at risk of eviction owing to
their inability to pay rental costs. This figure is expected to increase over the coming
year as a result of the increase in unemployment, poverty and the spread of
COVID-19.80
Movement and access restrictions
59. Israeli authorities continued to restrict the freedom of movement of Palestinians
across the Occupied Palestinian Territory, primarily through the permit regime
regulating passage between Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and
abroad.81 As freedom of movement is a prerequisite to the exercise of other human
rights, such as the rights to family, health and education, the closures and related
practices imposed by the Israeli authorities, in particular the restrictions on
movement, have had a devastating impact on the lives of Palestinians, in par ticular
on families, and have a compounded effect on women and girls. During the
COVID-19 pandemic in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israel continued the
implementation of its permit regime, with patients, their companions and health -care
workers comprising categories of persons eligible to apply for Israeli -issued permits
to travel.82
Gaza closure
60. Imposed since June 2007, following the takeover by Hamas, the closures in
Gaza, which affect the movement of goods and people, continue to undermine the
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of Palestinians in Gaza and
continue to affect all areas of Palestinian life. The blockade may amount to collective
punishment, which is prohibited under international law. The closure re mains a major
impediment to combating the COVID-19 epidemic.
__________________
77 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, pp. 39–40.
78 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “16 years after the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, some 11,000
Palestinians are still isolated by the Barrier”, Humanitarian Bulletin, August –September 2020.
79 UNRWA input.
80 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 39.
81 A/75/336, paras. 36–38.
82 World Health Organization (WHO) input.
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61. The closure imposed on Gaza continues to severely restrict the movement of
persons and goods to and from Gaza, and has affected every aspect of Palestinians’
rights, including freedom of movement, the right to life, the right to health, the right
to an adequate standard of living and the right to food. 83
62. Israeli authorities continued to adopt measures that aggravated the suffering of
civilians, including intermittently reducing or entirel y closing the fishing zone and
closing the crossings, which severely limited the movement of people, fuel, gas and
other essential supplies into and out of Gaza. 84
63. In response to escalations in hostilities, the Israeli authorities reduced the
permissible fishing zone and halted the entry of most goods to Gaza, including fuel,
leading to the shutdown of the Gaza power plant and triggering power cuts for up to
20 hours a day.85 On several occasions, Israeli officials expressly cited violence
emanating from Gaza as a reason for imposing such measures. In view of their
punitive effect on persons who did not commit violence, and the severe human rights
impact on the entire population of Gaza, these measures may amount to collective
punishment.86
64. The prolonged closure of Gaza and the ensuing severe restrictions have virtually
eliminated its export sector. The volume of exports from Gaza witnessed a slight
increase in 2020 compared with 2019, yet remained at only a quarter of the level seen
in the first half of 2007, before the imposition of the closure. The sector is also
constrained by lack of access to raw materials and agricultural inputs and technology,
power shortages and uncertainty. Conservative estimates suggest that without Israeli
restrictions, Palestinian exports could be twice their current levels, given the
Occupied Palestinian Territory’s proximity to large regional markets. 87
65. Along the Gaza coast, the Israeli navy continued to enforce unilaterally imposed
access restrictions, aiming live ammunition, rubber-coated bullets and water cannons
towards Gaza fishers while conducting arrest and seizure operations, often within the
authorized fishing zones. In several cases monitored by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, fishers were subjected to excessive
force and degrading treatment during arrest operations, such as being handcuffed,
blindfolded and forced to undress and jump into the water. 88
66. Israel also unilaterally declared a restricted area inside th e territory of Gaza
along the perimeter fence. Though Israel has officially designated up to 200 m from
the fence as “no go” area for heavy machinery, most Palestinian farmers report that,
in practice, up to 300 m from the perimeter fence is a “no go” area and up to 1,000 m
is designated a “high risk” area.
Movement restrictions in the West Bank
67. The movement of Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, is
restricted through a complex system of checkpoints, permits, military roadblock s,
settlements, a bypass road system, parallel legal regimes and the West Bank barrier.
__________________
83 A/75/199, para. 31.
84 A/75/336, para. 24.
85 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “Gaza strip: snapshot”, August 2020.
86 A/75/336, paras. 25 and 26.
87 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) input and United Nations,
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Gaza
crossings: movement of people and goods database. Available at www.ochaopt.org/data/crossings .
88 A/75/336, para. 38.
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Such measures disrupt Palestinians’ daily life, with an impact on a range of rights,
such as access to education and health care, work and an adequate standard of livin g.89
68. Within the West Bank, Israeli authorities manage or obstruct the movements of
Palestinians by employing more than 590 fixed permanent obstacles, such as
checkpoints, earth mounds and road gates, as well as the frequent use of flying or
temporary checkpoints. Current restrictions remain particularly obtrusive in Hebron
and in regions affected by the barrier. 90
69. The area controlled by the regional council of Israeli settlements in the West
Bank (including closed areas allocated for expanding tho se settlements) was about
542 km2 by the end of 2020, representing about 10 per cent of the total area of the
West Bank. The confiscated areas for the purposes of military bases and military
training locations represent about 18 per cent of the West Bank a rea. All those areas
are off limits to Palestinians.91
70. The principal obstacle to movement within the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem, is the wall that has been deemed illegal by the International Court of
Justice, 85 per cent of which is located within the occupied territory,92 isolating 10 per
cent of the West Bank.
71. Palestinians in the seam zone are obliged to pass through checkpoints to reach
other parts of the West Bank. In turn, the entry of goods such as dairy products, meat
and eggs, as well as the entry of service providers, is restricted and requires Israeli -
issued permits or verbal approval from the Israeli authorities. Family members and
friends face similar restrictions on entering, with the result that social and religious
functions must be held on the “West Bank side” of the barrier. 93
72. Palestinian access to and within the central part of the H2 zone, physically
segregated from the rest of the city of Hebron by multiple checkpoints and barriers,
is still permitted only to those registered as residents of that area. 94
73. During the reporting period, UNRWA continued to report access -related
incidents in the West Bank which negatively affected the delivery of education, health
and relief services to Palestine refugees. 95
Deprivation of access to natural resources
74. Area C continues to be almost entirely off limits to the Government of Palestine,
as well as to producers and investors, even though it contains the most valuable
natural resources. Closures, particularly in Gaza, limit Palestinian access to materials
and technologies that could promote the efficient use of energy, water and other
natural resources.96
75. Water resources in the region continue to be extremely limited and are projected
to decrease further as climate change drives temperature rise and precipitation
declines. In the West Bank, severe water shortages continue to be reported as Israel
retains full control of the distribution and extraction of most water resources,
including aquifers. More than 77 per cent of the water resources used by Palestinians
__________________
89 A/74/468, para. 26.
90 A/HRC/44/60, para. 78.
91 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “The confiscation of land is the reason for Land Day”.
92 A/HRC/44/60, para. 79.
93 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “16 years after the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion”.
94 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 17.
95 UNRWA input.
96 United Nations Environment Programme input.
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are extracted from the ground. Palestinians continue to be prevented by Israel from
accessing and extracting water from the Jordan River. 97
76. In Gaza, more than 97 per cent of the water pumped from the coastal aquifer
does not meet the water quality standards of WHO, leading to the depletion of
groundwater reserves.98
77. More than 43 per cent of the land in the West Bank is not available to
Palestinians for agricultural use as a result of Israeli settlements. In addition, and
because of the regulatory framework applied to land tenure, idle and/or unused lands
can be seized from farmers who are unable to bring the land to production. 99
78. In September 2019, Israeli authorities tightened the access permit regulations,
restricting the number of days that farmers are allowed to enter the seam zone. The
new regulation seems to redefine the purpose of an agricultural permit and to modify
the entire purpose of the permit regime in relation to landowners, denying the right
of landowners to freely reach their plots of land. 100
79. The restricted access area that Israel imposes along the perimeter fence
surrounding Gaza comprises approximately 35 per cent of its agricultural lands. 101
The Israeli military’s use of warning fire, land levelling and the spraying of herbicides
has inhibited agricultural development in that area. 102
80. The ability of 4,000 families to access their fishing livelihoods continues to be
disrupted by Israeli restrictions on access to t he sea off the Gaza coast.103 The Oslo
Accords entitled Palestinians to fish within 20 nautical miles of the shore, but the
reality over much of the past 10 years has been a constricted fishing zone of 3 to
6 nautical miles.104
81. In addition to exploiting mineral resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
while simultaneously preventing Palestinians from doing so, Israel has prevented
Palestinians from developing their natural gas fields. Natural gas fields in Palestinian
waters off-shore of Gaza are estimated to encompass reserves of 1 trillion cubic feet
of good quality natural gas. With the closure imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip
since 2007, any access to the gas fields, and the billions of dollars they represent, has
become even more difficult.105
Social and economic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
82. Israeli policies and practices have led to the physical fragmentation of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory and stifled social and economic activity, resulting in
the emergence of different economies in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has damaged development
prospects and led to the further deterioration of the living conditions of the
__________________
97 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Palestinian Water Authority, “Joint press release on
the occasion of World Water Day”, 22 March 2021.
98 Ibid.
99 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) input.
100 A/75/336, para. 39.
101 A/HRC/44/60, para. 64.
102 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 33.
103 Ibid., p. 15.
104 A/HRC/44/60, para. 63.
105 The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation for the Palestinian People: T he Unrealized Oil
and Natural Gas Potential (United Nations publication, 2019), p. 18.
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Palestinians. There is little doubt that the events of 2020 will negatively shape
Palestinian development trajectories for many years to come.106
83. Approximately 2.45 million Palestinians will require some form of humanitarian
assistance (1.57 million in Gaza and 880,000 in the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem). Among them, more than 1.5 million Palestinians are affected by problems
related to their limited access to basic services. 107
Economic conditions
84. COVID-19 struck a weakened Palestinian economy and compounded the dire
economic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. After three years o f
economic slowdown and decline in real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita,
2020 was one of the worst years for the Palestinian economy since the recession of
2002, with persistent fiscal deficits, high poverty and unemployment.
85. Customs tax, value added tax and excise tax collected by Israel for the
Palestinian Authority represent 65 to 75 per cent of the Palestinian Authority’s
revenues.108 The fiscal standoff with Israel over clearance revenues weighed heavily
on the Palestinian economy. The impac t of this fiscal loss was compounded by the
continuously declining levels of international support and the increasing funding
needs stemming from the pandemic.
86. Economic activity and livelihoods in Gaza have been further slowed by, among
other things, the blockade, internal quarantines and safety measures, aid shortages, a
lack of demand for goods and services and a liquidity crunch. The situation was
compounded by military escalations in August and September 2020, and by periodic
restrictions on the entry of critical materials, including donor-purchased fuel
necessary for the operation of Gaza’s only power plant. 109
87. In this context, the Palestinian economy witnessed a sharp decline in activity
and contracted by 11.5 per cent in 2020 (11.3 per cent i n the West Bank and 12.3 per
cent in the Gaza Strip).110 This drop in GDP, coupled with the increasing population,
yielded a 13.7 per cent decline in per capita GDP (13.4 per cent in the West Bank and
14.8 per cent in the Gaza Strip) compared with 2019, in 2015 prices.111
88. The World Bank estimates a growth in the GDP of the Palestinian economy of
3.5 per cent in 2021, reflecting in part the effect from the sharp contraction in 2020
and the uncertainty about the roll-out of COVID-19 vaccinations.112
89. As a result of the pandemic, compared with the second quarter of 2019,
estimates in constant prices showed a 19.5 per cent decline in GDP (20.4 per cent in
the West Bank and 15.4 per cent in Gaza), a 21.6 per cent decline in GDP per ca pita
(22.3 per cent in the West Bank and 17.8 per cent in Gaza), a decline in private
__________________
106 Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report to the Ad -Hoc
Liaison Committee”, 23 February 2021, p. 4.
107 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs , Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 20.
108 Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Report to the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee”, p. 6.
109 Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Socioeconomic report”,
10 November 2020, p. 9.
110 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) calculations from the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics.
111 Ibid.
112 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”, 23 February,
2021, para. 23.
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consumption of 19.8 per cent and in capital investment of 37.1 per cent, and a decline
in the trade deficit of 33.2 per cent. 113
90. GDP rebounded in the third quarter bu t declined again in the fourth quarter of
2020 by 12.2 per cent compared with the fourth quarter of 2019 (11.8 per cent in the
West Bank and 14.1 per cent in Gaza).114
91. The labour force participation rate decreased to 41 per cent in 2020 compared
with 44 per cent in 2019 (from 46 to 44 per cent in the West Bank and from 41 to
35 per cent in Gaza), which explains why unemployment rates did not increase
significantly during 2020 during the same period. In this context, unemployment
increased in 2020 to 26 per cent (16 per cent in the West Bank and 47 per cent in
Gaza) from 25 per cent in 2019. Of the total number employed in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, some 14 per cent were absent from their jobs in 2020 as a result
of the pandemic.115 Despite the partial easing of pandemic-related restrictions in the
third quarter, unemployment continued to rise until it began to decline in the fourth
quarter.116
92. Throughout 2020, unemployment was highest among youth (19 to 29 years) who
held an associate diploma and above (54 per cent: 69 per cent for women; 39 per cent
for men). Around half of wage employees, who comprised 72 per cent of total
employment in 2020, were classified under informal employment.
93. Projections by the World Bank based on GDP per capi ta growth suggest that the
poverty rate has been steadily increasing since 2016, reaching 28.9 per cent in 2020,
representing approximately 1.4 million Palestinians. 117
94. In the West Bank, limited market transactions disrupted food value chains
during the first wave of the pandemic. In the Gaza Strip, the lack of agricultural inputs
for farmers, herders and fishers have been a major constraint for food production. 118
The decline in output prices owing to low demand, coupled with the increase in the
price of inputs for agricultural production, prompted farmers and traders to limit
production.119
Food security
95. A total of 1.4 million Palestinians in Gaza and another 560,000 in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, suffer from food insecurity, primar ily as a result of high
unemployment and poverty.120 The erosion of resilience and the capacity to cope with
shocks resulted in a net increase of approximately 300,000 newly food -insecure
people since 2019. Furthermore, more than 217,000 people, previously considered
moderately food-insecure, have become severely food-insecure.121
96. During the reporting period, UNRWA played a critical role in ensuring that a
food security crisis was averted through the provision of in -kind food and cash
assistance to over 1.1 million Palestinians, most of whom are refugees in Gaza. 122
__________________
113 ESCWA calculations from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
114 Ibid.
115 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “The Labour Force Survey results 2020”, Februa ry 2021.
116 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “The Labour Force Survey: (October –December 2020)
round (Q4/2020), February 2021.
117 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report”, para. 21.
118 Palestine Food Security Sector, “FSS COVID-19 Crisis Sitrep-05”, 19 April 2020.
119 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, Food Security Bulletin, Issue 22–23 (Winter 2021).
120 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, pp. 32–33.
121 Ibid., p. 21.
122 UNRWA input.
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97. As a coping mechanism to ensure basic needs, 67 per cent of families in Gaza
and 31 per cent in the West Bank consumed food of less quality or that was less
preferred, whereas 57 per cent of families in Gaza and 36 per cent in the West Bank
purchased food on credit.123
Water, sanitation and hygiene
98. The water, sanitation and hygiene sector has suffered from chronic vulnerability,
mainly as a result of Israeli restrictions on developing the sector’s infrastructure,
compounded by climate change, and limitations facing the Palestinian Government
and local authorities.124
99. It is estimated that more than 1.6 million Palestinians are suffering from
insufficient access to water, sanitation and hygiene services and will need related
humanitarian assistance in 2021.125 Some one third of household members in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (excluding East Jerusalem) have access to safely
managed water (66.2 per cent access in the West Bank and 4.3 per cent in Gaza). 126
100. Israeli authorities have prevented Palestinian communities in Area C from
connecting to water and sewage networks, and from deploying rain -harvesting
cisterns; water, sanitation and hygiene facilities in i nstitutions; and mobile latrines.
Increased demolition and confiscation targeting water, sanitation and hygiene
structures compounds the vulnerability of affected communities and the coercive
environment for their residents.127
101. Restrictions on access to water and the depletion of the coastal aquifer make the
Palestinian population among the most water-stressed in the world, and the situation
is exacerbated by climate change.128 Palestinian water consumption per capita doesn’t
meet the minimum standard of WHO of 100 litres per day.
102. Palestinians must purchase water from the Israeli water company Mekorot,
which is allowed to extract water from the West Bank, 129 and prioritizes its delivery
to Israeli settlements.130
103. Intensive Israeli monitoring of the Palestinian communities in Area C prevents
them from rehabilitating or developing the public and household structures and assets
needed to ensure the basic services that satisfy their humanitarian needs. 131
104. Poor water quality further undermines th e ability of families to meet basic
hygiene needs, which are critical to preventing the transmission of COVID -19.132
105. In Gaza, most water management and desalination systems are non -functioning
owing to a lack of equipment and spare parts, since as par t of the closure of Gaza
imposed by Israel, materials considered as falling under the category of “dual use”
__________________
123 World Food Programme (WFP), “WFP Palestine country brief”, January 2021, p. 2.
124 WASH Cluster-State of Palestine, “The West Bank WASH contingency plan: the West Bank -State
of Palestine”, February 2021, p. 4.
125 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 37.
126 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Palestinian Water Authority, “Joint press release on
the occasion of World Water Day”, 22 March 2021.
127 WASH Cluster-State of Palestine, “The West Bank WASH contingency plan”, pp. 9 –10.
128 IFAD input.
129 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Palestinian Water Authority, “Joint press release on
the occasion of World Water Day”.
130 WASH Cluster-State of Palestine, “The West Bank WASH contingency plan”, p. 11.
131 Ibid., p. 9.
132 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 37.
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have been banned from entering Gaza. Such materials include cement and iron, which
are essential to repairing water and sanitation infrastructure. As a result, the water
infrastructure in Gaza is on the brink of collapse. Moreover, over 96 per cent of the
water from the coastal aquifer – the only natural source of drinking water – is unfit
for human consumption because of seawater and sewage contamin ation.133 As a result,
only 10 per cent of Gazans have access to safe drinking water through the public
network (down from 98 per cent in 2000). 134
106. Allocation of water for domestic purposes averages 81.9 litres per person per
day in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (85.6 litres in the West Bank and 77.0 litres
in Gaza), with a decrease of about 6.0 litres compared with 2019. It is estimated that
the per capita share of fresh water is only 22.4 litres per day. 135
107. Regarding access to sanitation ser vices, nearly 440,000 households in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory are not connected to any sewerage system.
Approximately 3,700 households therefore discharge untreated sewage into adjacent
streams and open areas, creating health and environmental haz ards for downstream
communities. About 90 per cent of these households are in the West Bank. 136
108. As a result of power shortages and poor infrastructure, the quality of the treated
wastewater produced in the Gaza Strip, and discharged into the Mediterranean Sea, is
well below international standards. As a result, more than three quarters of Gaza’s
beaches are polluted and swimming there is prohibited, while the coastal aquifer is
further polluted by poorly treated sewage percolation. 137
109. Almost 29,000 households across the Occupied Palestinian Territory lack
adequate solid waste collection services or are located near unregulated dumping
sites. This exposes people to health and environmental hazards, including the mixing
of dangerous medical and electronic waste and ordinary household trash.
Accumulated trash also attracts animals that are possible vectors of disease and
contaminates groundwater resources and agricultural land. 138
110. At least 144 schools in the West Bank and 34 in Gaza lack sufficient water,
sanitation and hygiene facilities (primarily toilets, drinking and handwashing
stations) to meet official standards. The same applies to 132 health -care units in the
West Bank and 140 in Gaza. The consequent overcrowding of existing facil ities has
undermined the hygiene practices required to combat the pandemic. In this context,
at least seven quarantine centres in Gaza have poor access to potable water and
sewage disposal systems.139
Health
111. Palestinians living under occupation are exposed to high levels of violence and
insecurity, affecting physical and mental health and well -being. Large numbers of
injuries resulting from the use of force by Israel against participants in the Great
March of Return demonstrations in Gaza during previous years have had a cumulative
impact on the health system. This has created long -term needs and disabilities, while
__________________
133 A/75/199, para. 30.
134 A/HRC/44/60, para. 68.
135 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Palestinian Water Authority, “Joint press release on
the occasion of World Water Day”.
136 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 38.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
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the lack of control and the unpredictability of many aspects of life under occupation
contribute to stress and anxiety.140
112. The first confirmed cases of COVID-19 emerged in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory in March 2020. The Palestinian Authority imposed severe lockdown
restriction and slowed the spread of the virus. It eased the restrictions i n June 2020.
Consequently, the number of confirmed cases jumped from 19,594 in August 2020 to
270,878 in March 2021, with 2,881 deaths. 141
113. Even as the number of infections exceeded the capacity of Palestinians hospitals
in March 2021, and though Israel is ranked first globally in per capita vaccinations,
Palestinians’ access to COVID-19 vaccines has remained limited. Only 8,687 out of
3 million adults were fully vaccinated by the end of March 2021 and 78,379 had had
their first shots. Israel has vaccin ated Palestinians in East Jerusalem and 120,000
Palestinians working in Israel.142
114. In February 2021, a number of international humanitarian organizations stated:
The Palestinian health system has been undermined to such an extent that it
lacks the necessary financial or material resources to independently sustain an
effective COVID-19 response. Gaza’s health system, in particular, is on the
brink of collapse. Over 53 years of Israeli military occupation of Palestinian
territory, including Israel’s pro hibitive land closure and blockade of the Gaza
Strip, severing the coastal enclave from the West Bank, have all helped produce
the Palestinian health system’s current ailing condition .143
115. The drain of medical staff leaving Gaza to seek better living c onditions also
compromised the health-care system well before the arrival of the COVID -19
pandemic.144 Limited health-care resources in Gaza are mainly deployed to sustain
basic, but critical, health services. Essential maternal and reproductive health care are
underprioritized and inadequately funded, which increases the risk of morbidity and
mortality. Compounded stressors, including the blockade, the COVID -19 pandemic
and loss of income, led to further deterioration in the humanitarian situation, resultin g
in a dire psychological impact145 in which some 198,000 children suffer from severe
and moderate mental health conditions. 146
116. Discriminatory planning and zoning policies deter Palestinian communities in
East Jerusalem, the H2 zone of Hebron and Area C from establishing health facilities.
High-standard East Jerusalem hospitals are isolated from the rest of the West Bank,
and patients face unpredictable access and arbitrary restrictions as a result of permit
delays and denials.147
__________________
140 WHO input.
141 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “COVID-19 emergency situation report, No. 28”; and WHO, Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory database, available at
https://app.powerbi.com
/view?r=eyJrIjoiODJlYWM1YTEtNDAxZS00OTFlLThkZjktNDA1ODY2OGQ3NGJkIiwidCI6I
mY2MTBjMGI3LWJkMjQtNGIzOS04MTBiLTNkYzI4MGFmYjU5MCIsImMiOjh9 .
142 Our World in Data, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations database, available at
https://ourworldindata.org/covid -vaccinations?country=PSE.
143 Oxfam and others, “Free and equitable access and distr ibution of COVID-19 vaccine in OPT”,
joint letter on vaccine roll-out for Palestinians, 18 February 2021.
144 UNCTAD input.
145 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) input.
146 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 27.
147 WHO input.
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117. The fragile state of the health system has necessitated the transfer of patients to
Israel, Jordan and Egypt. Such transfers were repeatedly suspended for various
reasons during the reporting period, including the outbreak of COVID -19 and the
suspension of coordination between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. 148
118. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Israel continued to impose its permits regime
on Palestinian patients, their companions and health -care workers. During the fourth
quarter of 2020, 71 per cent of patients who applied for Gaza permits were approved,
27 per cent of applications were approved after the date of hospital appointment and
2 per cent of permit requests were denied. Only 44 per cent of patient companion
permit applications were approved.149
119. Attacks against health care continued in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
WHO recorded 59 such attacks in 2020. These attacks included obstruction of the
delivery of health-care services, including 12 incidents of obstruction of access of
ambulance crews to persons who had been fatally wounded. Thirty -six incidents
involved physical violence against health workers, ambulances and health facilities,
and six incidents involved the detention and/or arrest of health -care workers,
ambulance crews, patients and patient companions, including the arrest of paramedics
for distributing COVID-19 awareness materials.150
120. On 15 April 2020, Israeli security forces raided and closed a testing clinic in the
densely populated neighbourhood of Silwan under the pr etext that testing kits were
provided by the Palestinian Authority. The delay in ensuring an adequate response to
the spread of the pandemic suggests discriminatory treatment of Palestinian
communities in East Jerusalem.151
Education
121. Education in the Occupied Palestinian Territory had been in a critical state prior
to the pandemic, largely as a result of occupation -related policies and practices,
including restrictions on access to education, attacks on students and staff and the
destruction of education infrastructure.152 The COVID-19 pandemic further
exacerbated this situation, increasing the number of children in need of education
assistance from 416,000 at the end of 2019 to 504,000 at the end of 2020. 153
122. As the pandemic prompted the closures of schools and universities, the
Palestinian Ministry of Education launched an e -learning portal, while universities
independently developed their own portals and resources for e -learning. Obstacles to
e-learning mainly involve infrastructure, weak Internet networks, power outages
(especially in Gaza) and insufficient awareness among students and their families of
the importance of e-learning,154 as well as a lack of 3G mobile data service access in
Gaza.
123. Moreover, online material and equ ipment for students, especially those in Gaza,
East Jerusalem and Area C, are inaccessible to students in these areas. Only 30 per
cent of households in Gaza have a computer. 155 These challenges are further
__________________
148 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report”, para. 9.
149 ESCWA calculation based on data from WHO, Health Cluster Bulletin: Occupied Palestinian
Territory, December 2020.
150 WHO input.
151 A/75/199, para. 14.
152 UNICEF input.
153 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 34.
154 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org anization (UNESCO), “COVID-19 in
Palestine: how distance learning will help student continue education”, 12 April 2020.
155 Gisha, “Remote learning”, 13 October 2020.
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exacerbated by the need to reach students with spe cial needs and to provide
psychosocial support to students affected by COVID -19.156
124. In 2020, the United Nations Children’s Fund’s Education Cluster recorded 119
education-related incidents affecting some 7,000 students, including the firing of tear
gas canisters on school premises and/or students while commuting to schools in Area
C and the H2 zone. Children most affected are those who must walk long distances to
reach their schools, and often have to cross one or two checkpoints. 157
125. During the reporting period, UNRWA documented six separate incidents in
which live ammunition, plastic-coated metal bullets, tear gas canisters or other
weapons landed in its schools in the West Bank. One of these incidents occurred at
the girls’ school in the Jalazone camp during the school day, affecting 300 students. 158
The gendered impact of the occupation on women and girls
126. The 54-year occupation and 14-year closure in Gaza have specifically gendered
impacts, resulting in unique harms. The vulnerabilities of and gender-specific risks
and harms to women and girls are augmented by sociocultural norms and practices
and exacerbated by overlapping factors stemming from the COVID -19 pandemic and
its ensuing lockdowns.159
127. The pervasive protection crisis created by the prolonged occupation for
Palestinian women and girls is coupled with and compounded by gender inequality
and gender-based violence, including child and forced marriage, 160 intimate partner
violence, curbs on accessing the public sp here, limitations on decision-making power
and an inability to access basic social services. 161 For example, early marriage is
commonly used by families as a coping mechanism to reduce expenses, and is the
most significant cause of school dropout among girl s, followed by concerns related
to incidents with Israeli forces and settlers. 162
128. The COVID-19 pandemic has increased these protection concerns, as violence
against women and girls in the private and online spheres has increased but access to
protective or supportive services remains limited. 163 Notably, while the Palestinian
authorities reported a decrease in cases related to domestic violence, civil society
organizations confirm that incidents increased throughout the Occupied Palestinian
Territory.164 This may be attributed to the limited ability of women to report abuse
owing to lockdown-related movement restrictions.165
129. Palestinian women and girls suffer from use of force and abuse, including
physical, verbal and psychological violen ce and harassment, by Israeli security forces
__________________
156 UNESCO input.
157 UNICEF input.
158 UNRWA input.
159 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) input.
160 UNFPA, “Child marriage in the occupied Palestinian territory”, November 2016.
161 Eileen Kuttab and Brian Heilman, Understanding Masculinities: Results from the Men and Gender
Equality Survey (IMAGES)-Middle East and North Africa – Palestine (Institute of Women’s
Studies, UN-Women and Promundo, 2017).
162 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 35.
163 UN-Women input.
164 Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, “COVID -19 and women’s rights in Palestine”,
2020; Zeudi Liew, COVID-19 Protection Needs Identification and Analysis in the State of
Palestine (UNICEF, 2020); and United Nations, Office for the Coordination of H umanitarian
Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “A crisis within a crisis: fighting gender -based
violence during COVID-19”, Humanitarian Bulletin, March –May 2020.
165 UN-Women input.
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and settlers.166 A number of cases illustrate that Palestinian women are particularly
targeted by settler violence in their homes during the day, when men are usually
absent. Pregnant women and women who have re cently given birth may suffer
additional injury or other consequences from such attacks. 167
130. Night raids and arrests by Israeli soldiers have continued during the pandemic,
causing added stress for women. Women are reported as spending a significant
amount of time sanitizing their homes after raids, and worrying about the health and
risk of exposure of family members to COVID-19, owing to a lack of hygiene
protocols by the Israeli soldiers.168
131. Women’s employment had been severely affected amid the pandemic. This has
been especially true for the agriculture sector, where Palestinian women are
disproportionately represented.169 However, women with disabilities are the most
affected, in both the formal and informal sectors, owing to the rising rate of
unemployment, which hinders their ability to meet their basic needs. 170
132. The pandemic, combined with existing gender norms, increased demands on
women and girls to care for the sick and the elderly, increased housework obligations
and added the increased burden of having to homeschool children. 171 The pandemic
has also exacerbated risks for pregnant and lactating women, who are now less likely
to attend routine appointments owing to the lockdowns and fear of infection. 172
133. Women’s access to life-saving health care has been negatively affected by Israeli
policies during the pandemic. Access to medical care was restricted to Jerusalemites,
and commuting to the West Bank was not allowed. 173
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
134. The Secretary-General continues to reaffirm the validity of Security Council
resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council decided that the Israeli decision to impose
its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights was
null and void and without international legal effect.
135. Approximately 50,000 people live in the occupi ed Syrian Golan, about half of
whom are Israeli settlers living in 34 illegal settlements. The Syrian population of
nearly 27,000 lives in five villages that form approximately 5 per cent of the territory
of the occupied Syrian Golan. Moreover, they face s ignificant discriminatory building
restrictions imposed by Israel, which leads to strained infrastructure and overcrowded
conditions.174
136. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2021/4, reaffirmed that the
construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and related infrastructure in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian
__________________
166 A/75/199, para. 42.
167 A/75/376, para. 21.
168 Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, “COVID -19 and women’s rights in Palestine”,
p. 18.
169 Ibid., “The culture of impunity: Israel’s ongoing violations against Palestinian women during
COVID-19”, May 2020, p. 9.
170 UN-Women input.
171 UNFPA and others, “Impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and lockdown on family dynamics and
domestic violence in Palestine”, June 2020, p. 6.
172 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, p. 28.
173 Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, “The culture of impunity”, p. 2.
174 A/74/357, para. 71.
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Golan, were illegal and constituted a major obstacle to economic and socia l
development. The continued establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan amount to the transfer
by Israel of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, which is
prohibited under international humanitarian law.
137. On 14 June 2020, Israel approved the building of a new settlement in the
occupied Syrian Golan, which, once built, will accommodate 300 families. Earlier
reports by an Israeli media outlet noted that the Government of Israel was planning
to settle 250,000 Israeli settlers in the occupied Syrian Golan over the next 30 years
by building thousands of housing units, along with transport and tourism projects. 175
138. Israel continued to employ discriminatory pr actices against Syrians in the
occupied Syrian Golan, particularly in terms of access to land and water. Financial
incentives are provided to Israeli settlers to facilitate access to housing, while the
Syrians face increasing difficulties in obtaining buil ding permits. The new Israeli land
registration system imposed new regulations that require specific documentation to
prove ownership. Most Syrians have old ownership documents that do not conform
to the new system and face the prospect of not being able t o prove ownership of their
land.176
139. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reported that residents had been
threatened with the expropriation of their land if they did not accept property
documents issued by the Israeli Land Registry. 177
140. Serious concerns are arising from a wind turbine project that will be
implemented by an Israeli energy company on farming land in three Syrian villages.
According to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, the project will be built
on 6,000 dunums of agricultural land belonging to Syrian citizens. The project would
physically surround Syrian villages, limiting their ability to expand, and would have
a serious detrimental effect on the environment and health of those living nearby. 178
The Syrian Arab Republic also noted that Israeli authorities had arrested individuals
who had protested the installation of the wind turbines and that some had been
targeted with legal action.179
141. Changes to the curricula currently taught in schools in the occupied Syrian
Golan are perceived to aim at influencing young students and detaching them from
their Syrian identity, and imposing a new ideology that is inconsistent with their local
culture. It is also meant to facilitate their integration into Israeli society, including
serving in the Israeli army.180
142. The importance of agricultural employment has been declining over the last
decade, constrained by the loss of the Syrian market, which can no longer buy apples
and other produce from the occupied Syrian Golan. Most hou seholds, however, have
kept a foothold in small-scale farming, often as a secondary activity. The cultural
attachment to land and agriculture reportedly remains high. One in five Syrian
citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan now works in construction. Many are employed
in Israeli settlements and in Israel, sometimes on a seasonal basis. 181
__________________
175 A/75/199, para. 70.
176 Ibid., para. 71.
177 A/75/328, para. 11.
178 A/75/199, para. 72.
179 A/75/328, para. 16.
180 A/75/199, para. 73.
181 International Labour Office, document ILC.109 /DG/APP, paras. 148 and 149.
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IV. Conclusion
143. The protracted Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory and the occupied
Syrian Golan continues to have a detrimental effect on the living conditions of the
Palestinian and Syrian populations, as well as on social and economic development
in the occupied territories. The negative impact of the occupation and the Israeli
policies and practices is multilayered, and their cumulative repercussions affect the
future of the populations living under occupation.
144. Current social and economic trends in th e Occupied Palestinian Territory
indicate that the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals will be out of reach
if there are no drastic positive changes to the existing conditions. Israeli -imposed
restrictions, the expansion of the illegal settleme nts and other practices not only
prevent development in the occupied territories and hamper efforts to combat the
COVID-19 pandemic, but also cause humanitarian crises that necessitate the
diversion of scarce national and international resources from devel opment to
immediate relief. The Palestinian financial crisis and the fragmentation of the
Palestinian territory have resulted in a fragmented economy that is dependent on
Israel and foreign aid.
145. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout have compounded
the social and economic situation and resulted in more adverse living conditions for
Palestinians. Its effects on the Palestinian people are multiplied as a result of long -
standing Israeli policies and practices. The Palestinian health system had already been
on the brink of collapse, particularly in Gaza, before the pandemic.
146. The closure imposed on Gaza, other restrictive Israeli measures, recurrent
escalations and declining donor funding have created a severe situatio n in Gaza that
requires immediate action by the international community.
147. Prospects for the Palestinian economy are negative, should the current status
quo persist. The funding crisis facing UNRWA and the decline in donor aid is another
factor that only exacerbates the already precarious conditions of hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians.
148. Israel continues to employ policies and practices that are contrary to relevant
Security Council resolutions, international humanitarian law and international human
rights law. Some of these practices may be considered discriminatory and others may
amount to the forcible transfer or collective punishment of protected persons, which
would be a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and is prohibited under
international law.
149. Adherence to international law is imperative, ensuring that no party enjoys
impunity and securing justice and peace for all those living in the region, including
Palestinians and Syrians living under occupation. The United Nations ma intains its
long-standing position that lasting and comprehensive peace can be achieved only
through a negotiated two-State solution. The Secretary-General will continue to
ensure that the United Nations works towards the establishment of an independent,
democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State, living side by side in peace with
a secure Israel, with Jerusalem as the capital of both States, consistent with relevant
Security Council resolutions and international law.
United Nations A/77/90–E/2022/66
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Distr.: General
8 June 2022
Original: English
22-08721 (E) 150622
*2208721*
General Assembly
Seventy-seventh session
Item 58 of the preliminary list*
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources
Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2022
Agenda item 16
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of
the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
Note by the Secretary-General
Summary
In its resolution 2021/4, entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan”, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary -
General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy -fifth session, through the
Economic and Social Council, a report on the implementation of that resolu tion. In
addition, through its resolution 2021/5 entitled “Situation of and assistance to
Palestinian women”, the Council requested the Secretary -General to include
information on the gender-specific impact of the occupation and the progress made in
the implementation of that resolution in that report. The Assembly, in its resolution
76/225 entitled “Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Oc cupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources”, also requested the Secretary -
General to submit a report to it, through the Council, at its seventy -sixth and seventyseventh
sessions. The present report, which was prepared by the Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), has been submitted in compliance with these
resolutions.
* A/77/50.
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The report covers persistent Israeli practices and policies, particularly those that
are in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law
and that affect the social and economic conditions of the people living under its
military occupation, including the gendered impact of the occupa tion.
ESCWA would like to express its appreciation for the contributions from the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Labour
Organization, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Environment
Programme, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
the United Nations Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Office of the Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the
Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the World Food Programme and the World
Health Organization.
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I. Introduction
1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2021/4, expressed concerns
about the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living
conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan. The
Council’s resolution 2021/5 highlighted the gender-specific repercussions in this
regard. The General Assembly, in its resolution 76/225, demanded that Israel, the
occupying Power, cease the exploitation, damage, cause of loss or depletion and
endangerment of natural resources in the Occup ied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan.
2. The present note provides information on relevant developments in this regard
during the reporting period from 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2022.
II. Occupied Palestinian Territory
Israeli practices and policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
3. During the reporting period, Israel continued policies and practices such as
settlement expansion, the demolition of Palestinian structures and homes, closures,
access and movement restrictions, actions that have raised concerns over the possible
disproportionate use of force, and other aspects of its protracted occupation that have
had a severe humanitarian, economic, social and political impact on Pale stinians and
their ability to exercise their fundamental human rights.
4. There continue to be concerns with regard to the compliance of these policies
and practices with obligations of Israel under international humanitarian law and
international human rights law.1
5. Throughout 2021, Israel intensified its repression of Palestinians expressing
dissent against the occupation and settlement expansion in particular, raising concerns
with regard to respect for Palestinians’ right to life and physical integrity as well as
their other civil and political rights. Civil society actors and organizations
documenting and seeking accountability for Israeli violations of international law,
accusing Israel of apartheid and advocating for international s anctions continued to
be targeted by Israeli authorities with arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as
movement and other restrictions.2
6. Israeli military orders in the West Bank allow the army authorities to declare as
“unlawful”, “hostile” or “terro rist” virtually any association and to detain for
incitement anyone showing “sympathy” or “support” for such “unlawful” entities,
including the singing of slogans. These broad restrictions carry a significant risk of
criminalizing the lawful exercise of fr eedom of expression, peaceful assembly and
association. As of March 2020, Israel had banned as “unlawful” 430 organizations,
including all major political parties, such as the ruling group Fatah. 3
7. In a concerning development, in July 2021, two organiza tions learned that the
Israeli military commander for the West Bank had declared them as “unlawful
associations”. On 19 October 2021, the Minister for Defense of Israel designated six
Palestinian human rights and humanitarian organizations, namely the Adda meer
Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, Al -Haq, the Bisan Center for
Research and Development, Defense for Children International – Palestine Section,
__________________
1 See E/2021/73, A/76/333, A/76/336 and A/HRC/49/85.
2 A/76/333, paras. 5 and 22.
3 Ibid., para. 18.
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the Union of Agricultural Work Committees and the Union of Palestinian Women’s
Committees, as “terrorist organizations” under the Counter-Terrorism Law of 2016.
The organizations have worked for decades to promote human rights and provide
critical humanitarian assistance in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and are key
partners of the United Nations. Some reasonings for the designations referred to
entirely peaceful and legitimate human rights activities. The decisions, which were
amended after some weeks, state that the organizations are linked to the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine and that they had obtained financial resources that
reached the latter. As of the end of the reporting period, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was not aware of any
credible evidence to support these accusations. 4
8. On 27 May 2021, the Human Rights Council decided to establish an ongoing
independent international commission of inquiry mandated to investigate in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in Israel all alleged
violations of international humanitarian law and all alleged violations and abuses of
international human rights law leading up to and since 13 April 2021, and all
underlying root causes of recurrent tensions, instability and protraction of conflict,
including systematic discrimination and repression based on national, ethnic, racial
or religious identity.5
Use of force
9. Despite its obligations under international law to protect Palestinian civilians,
Israeli security forces6 continued to employ measures and practices that raised serious
concerns about excessive use of force, in some cases possibly amounting to arbitrary
deprivation of life, including extrajudicial execution. International human rights law
and international humanitarian law are concurrently applicable in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, namely, Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and
the occupied Syrian Golan. This includes the application of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva
Convention), which is binding upon Israel as the occupying Power. 7
10. During the reporting period, Israeli military and security forces killed 351
Palestinians, including 22 girls, 64 boys and 46 women, and i njured another 20,772
Palestinians, including 519 women and 3,432 children (312 of them girls). 8
11. A three-fold increase in fatalities in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, a
five-fold increase in injuries and a seven -fold increase in live ammunition injuries
were recorded in 2021 compared with 2020. 9
12. The reporting period also witnessed a sharp increase in apparent excessive use
of force by Israeli security forces in the context of demonstrations, especially during
the escalation of hostilities in May 2021. Israeli security forces used live ammunition
to suppress mass demonstrations held across the West Bank in solidarity with
Palestinians in East Jerusalem and Gaza. 10 OHCHR documented numerous instances
of possible unwarranted or disproportio nate use of force against Palestinian men,
__________________
4 A/HRC/49/25, para. 36.
5 A/HRC/RES/S-30/1.
6 The term “Israeli security forces” encompasses all security and military institutions of Israel.
7 A/75/336, para. 4, and A/76/333, para. 11.
8 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Data on Casualties database, available at www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties (accessed
31 March 2022).
9 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
input; UNRWA, Protection and Neutrality Department Database, 2021.
10 A/76/333, para. 13.
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women and children gathering to pray or protest or chant, or who merely raised the
Palestinian flag in different areas of East Jerusalem, and against journalists covering
the events.11
13. In many cases, the use of force by the Israeli security forces in response to
attacks or alleged attacks by Palestinians against Israelis did not appear to comply
with the requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality, resulting in unlawful
killings, including possible extrajudicial executions.12 In at least three instances in
which Israeli security forces alleged that they had shot and killed Palestinians in
response to an attack or an alleged attack, OHCHR reported that there was no
indication that an attack had been c arried out or even attempted, and available
evidence pointed to an unwarranted use of lethal force resulting in killing. 13
14. Lack of accountability for the unlawful use of force remained pervasive. Amid
a lack of transparency on the opening, status and c losure of investigations concerning
the killings of Palestinians, according to the Human Rights Committee, investigations
have appeared not to meet the minimum standards of transparency, independence,
promptness, thoroughness and credibility. 14
15. The period from 10 to 21 May 2021 saw the gravest escalation of armed
hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza since 2014, during
which 281 Palestinians were killed, including 71 children, and 10,000 Palestinians
were injured, including 548 children and 491 women. As in previous escalations,
many of the injuries may lead to permanent or long -term disabilities. Nine Israelis,
including two children, four women and one soldier, and three foreign nationals, were
killed, and hundreds of Israelis were injured during the hostilities. 15
16. Although the Israeli security forces stated that they had targeted members of
armed groups and their military infrastructure, and at times had adopted precautions,
including warnings, Israeli attacks resulted in extensive civilian deaths and injuries
as well as large-scale destruction and damage to civilian objects and civilian
infrastructure. While Israel claims that many of the structures were hosting armed
groups or being used for military purposes, OHCHR repor ted that no evidence in that
regard was seen.16 This raises concerns about compliance by Israel with the principles
of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law. 17
Detention and ill-treatment
17. Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have detained more than 800,000 Palestinians,
bringing many of them before military courts where the vast majority of cases end in
conviction.18
18. Most Palestinian detainees and prisoners continue to be held inside Israel. The
transfer of protected persons, including those accused of offences, to the territory of
the occupying Power is prohibited by international humanitarian law. 19
__________________
11 Ibid., para. 15.
12 Ibid., para. 11.
13 Ibid.
14 A/76/333, para. 16.
15 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022: OPT (2021), p. 13; and United Nations, Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Data on Casualties database,
available at www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties (accessed 31 March 2022).
16 A/76/333, para. 7.
17 A/76/299-S/2021/749, para. 41.
18 A/76/94-E/2021/73.
19 A/76/333, para. 26.
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19. According to UNRWA, in 2021, the number of Palestinian detentions (5,648)
increased by 23 per cent from 2020 (4,582), marking the third-highest year on
record.20
20. On 10 March 2022, 4,400 Palestinians were held as “security prisoners” in
Israeli prisons, including 160 children and 33 women. Included among them were 490
Palestinians held under administr ative detention by Israeli authorities without charge
or trial.21
21. The practice of administrative detention by Israeli authorities remains of serious
concern. According to the Committee against Torture, administrative detention for
inordinately long periods may amount to a form of ill-treatment.22
22. There are also serious concerns that there has not been genuine accountability
regarding reported cases of possible torture and ill -treatment of Palestinians in Israeli
detention.23 According to the Public Committee against Torture in Israel, of the more
than 1,300 torture complaints submitted to the Ministry of Justice of Israel since 2001,
only two criminal investigations have been opened. Both were closed during the
reporting period. Furthermore, the validation by the Attorney General of Israel of
methods of interrogation used by the Israel Security Agency raises concerns about its
disregard for the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture under international
human rights law.24
23. Documented cases of arbitrary arrest and ill -treatment in detention, as well as
the administrative detention of children, remain of serious concern. Testimonies from
64 children held in Israeli military detention indicated the persistence of pat terns of
ill-treatment during initial arrest, transfer, interrogation and detention, and that most
children were denied access to a lawyer or parent before and during their
interrogation, were compelled to sign documents in Hebrew (a language many do not
understand), and were not adequately informed about their rights. 25
24. Palestinian women were subjected to various forms of physical and
psychological ill-treatment throughout the detention process, including humiliating
interrogation techniques, prolonged stress positions and sleep deprivation, and/or
were held under severe conditions.26
Destruction and confiscation of property and infrastructure
25. Demolitions and forced evictions as referred to below entail numerous human
rights violations, exacerbate the coercive environment and raise concerns about the
risk of forcible transfer. They also continue to raise concern about compliance with
international humanitarian law provisions that are binding on the occupying Power,
including the prohibition of th e destruction of property and institutions dedicated to
education.
26. Israeli zoning and planning policies in East Jerusalem and Area C, which
constitute 60 per cent of the West Bank, are restrictive, discriminatory and considered
incompatible with requirements under international law. Policies that allocate land
almost exclusively to Israeli settlements or to the military and that facilitate the
growth of Israeli settlements make it virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain
__________________
20 UNRWA input; UNRWA Protection and Neutrality Department Database, 2021.
21 Addameer, Statistics database, available at www.addameer.org/index.php/statistics/2022/03
(accessed on 31 March 2022).
22 CAT/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 17, and CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, paras. 22–23.
23 A/76/333, para. 30.
24 A/HRC/49/25, para. 30.
25 A/76/333, paras. 32–33.
26 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN -Women) input.
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building permits, compelling many to build without them, thereby risking eviction,
house demolition and displacement.
27. On 28 October and 1 November 2021, Israeli authorities advanced plans for some
6,000 housing units for Palestinians in the occupied East Jerusalem neighbourhood of
Isawiyah and some 1,300 housing units for Palestinians in Area C. 27
28. In Area C alone, there are over 15,500 pending demolition orders against
Palestinian structures.28 In occupied East Jerusalem, at least a third of all Palestinian
homes lack Israeli-issued building permits, potentially placing more than 100,000
residents at risk of displacement.29
29. During the reporting period, Israeli authorities demolished 813 structures,
including 273 homes and 145 donor-funded structures, and confiscated 222 structures,
including 48 donor-funded structures.30
30. In 2021, a total of 140 donor-funded structures, including residential and
livelihood structures, were demolished or seized, marking a 30 per cent increase
compared with 2020.31 A total of 673 structures funded by the European Union were
demolished or seized by Israeli authorities between 2016 and 2021. 32
31. Amendment 116 to the Planning and Building Law of Israel resulted in forcing
homeowners to demolish their own property to avoid paying fines of NIS 300,000
(roughly $95,000) if they failed to do so, a sum far be yond the means of a typical
Palestinian household. 33 The number of structures that were demolished by their
owners in East Jerusalem in 2021 constituted 55 per cent of the total demolitions,
compared with 23 per cent in 2017.34
32. Furthermore, 53 per cent of structures were demolished or seized without prior
warning compared with an average of 30 per cent during the period 2018 –2020, and
10 per cent during the period 2016–2017.35
33. Some 16,250 housing and commercial units sustained some degree of damage
in Gaza during the May 2021 escalation of hostilities. 36 This included the destruction
of 1,663 housing units, which aggravated the chronic and increasing shortage in
housing units to meet population growth in one of the most densely populated areas
in the world.37
__________________
27 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, “Secur ity
Council briefing on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question (as
delivered by UN Special Coordinator Wennesland)”, 30 November 2021.
28 See A/75/86-E/2020/62, para. 2; and United Nations, Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, p. 51.
29 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “High numbers of demolitions: the ongoin g threats of demolition for Palestinian
residents of East Jerusalem”, Humanitarian Bulletin, December 2017.
30 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Data on Demolition and Displacement in the West Bank database, available at
www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition (accessed on 31 March 2021).
31 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affai rs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, p. 14.
32 Ibid.; and European Union, “One year report on demolitions and seizures in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem”, 14 February 2021, pp. 6 –7.
33 UNRWA input.
34 European Union, “One year report on demoli tions and seizures”, p. 8.
35 Ibid., p. 9.
36 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) estimations; and United Nations,
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
“Response to the escalation in the oPt: situation report, No. 2”, 28 May –3 June 2021.
37 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, pp. 13 and 55.
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34. In October, Israeli bulldozers and tanks entered Gaza and levelled at least 13
dunums of land, resulting in the destruction of crops and agricultural infrastructure. 38
Settlement activities and settler violence
35. The establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory have a severe impact on the rights of Palestinians and amount to
the transfer by Israel of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, which
is prohibited under international humanitarian law. 39
36. It is estimated that there are 678,800 Israeli settlers in the West Bank living in
170 settlements and 146 outposts, of which 227,100 are in East Jerusalem. 40
37. Israel continues to unlawfully consolidate se ttlement blocs with networks of
bypass roads and the wall, endangering the viability of a two -State solution and
resulting in a severe impact on the rights of Palestinians. 41
Settler violence
38. Continuing attacks and intimidation by Israeli settlers, carried out with
impunity, are concerning components of the coercive environment that places
Palestinians at further risk of forced displacement. 42
39. During the reporting period, settler violence reached its highest level since 2017.
There were 502 incidents of settler violence in the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem, compared with 339 incidents in the previous period. The severity of
attacks also intensified: of particular concern were incidents of armed settlers
carrying out attacks inside Palestinian communities, sometimes in the proximity of
Israeli security forces, and of security forces attacking Palestinians alongside
settlers.43 Concern has also been expressed by human rights organizations that there
is a “policy of tacit support” for settler v iolence against Palestinians.44
40. During the reporting period, 4 Palestinians were killed and 1,722 were injured
as a result of settler violence. Between 2008 and March 2022, settler attacks resulted
in the deaths of 226 Palestinians and the injury of 5, 252.45
41. By September 2021, settlers had burned 338 olive trees and had cut, uprooted
or vandalized another 149.46
__________________
38 A/76/333, para. 46.
39 A/76/94, para. 34.
40 European Union, “Six-month report on Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including
East Jerusalem”, 22 November 2021.
41 A/HRC/49/85.
42 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, p. 14
43 A/HRC/49/85.
44 Yesh Din, “The impact of Israeli settlements in the West Bank o n the human rights of
Palestinians”, April 2021, pp. 8 –9.
45 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Database, available at www.ochaopt.org/data (accessed on 31 March 2022).
46 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) input; and Premiere Urgence,
“How settler violence and access restrictions jeopardize the Palestinian olive harvest in 2021”,
21 December 2021.
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Coercive environment and population displacement
42. There is continued concern that a combination of Israeli policies and practices
in Area C, East Jerusalem and the city of Hebron, such as the demolition and threat
of demolition of homes and schools and the destruction of livelihoods, the denial of
service infrastructure, the restriction of access to farming and grazing land , settler
violence and poor law enforcement in response thereto and the revocation of
residency rights, among other things, have created a coercive environment, which
may force Palestinians to leave their places of residence, placing them at risk of
forcible transfer.47
43. During the reporting period, 728 Palestinians were displaced in the West Bank,
including 365 children and 182 women, due to demolitions. 48
44. Revoking residency is another measure used by the Government of Israel to
reduce the Palestinian population in the city. Specifically, since 1967, more than
14,500 Palestinians have had their Jerusalem residency revoked by the Israeli
authorities.49
45. Approximately 18 per cent of the West Bank has been designated by Israel as
closed “military firing zones” for the purpose of military training. Palestinian
communities in such areas are among the most vulnerable, their rights gravely
restricted, and continue to face frequent demolitions and confiscation of their property
and livestock. Documented cases of transfers of land from firing zones to settlements
exacerbate these concerns.50
Movement and access restrictions and closures
46. Israel continued to restrict freedom of movement across the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, primarily through the p ermit regime regulating passage between
Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and abroad, in addition to
movement within the West Bank itself. Such restrictions continued to disrupt the daily
life of Palestinians, profoundly affecting other rig hts, including the rights to work, to
an adequate standard of living, to education and to health. 51
Gaza closures
47. Since June 2007, the closures in Gaza, which affect the movement of goods and
people, have continued to undermine the civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights of Palestinians in Gaza and affect all areas of Palestinian life, and have further
exacerbated the dire humanitarian situation and collapsing infrastructure. 52
48. Israeli officials have expressly cited hosti le acts from Gaza as grounds for
imposing such measures. In view of their punitive nature in respect of persons who
have not committed any offence, the blockade, which has entered its fifteenth year,
may amount to collective punishment, 53 which is prohibited under international law 54
__________________
47 A/76/336, para. 37.
48 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Database, available at www.ochaopt.org/data.
49 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) input; and United Nations, Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “High
numbers of demolitions”.
50 A/76/336, paras. 38 and 57.
51 A/76/333, para. 43.
52 A/76/360, para. 16.
53 See, for example, A/76/333, para. 38.
54 A/75/199, para. 31.
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and has continued to have an extremely harmful impact on the rights of the entire
civilian population.
49. Until late summer and fall 2021, apart from humanitarian and medical cases,
virtually no Palestinians were allowed through Bayt Hanun (Erez) crossing. However,
restrictions were eased during the last part of the year and the number of transits
increased dramatically. The Rafah crossing has remained open since the most recent
ceasefire, barring three days in late August.55
50. Inside Gaza, Israeli authorities continued to unilaterally enforce a restricted area
along the fence. Common practices used by the Israeli security forces to enforce the
restrictions include the use of live ammunition against Palestini an farmers, the
levelling of farmland and damage to property with bulldozers. 56
51. Along the coast, the Israeli Navy continued to enforce unilaterally imposed
access restrictions, including through the use of live ammunition against Gaza fishers,
while conducting patrol operations, often within authorized fishing zones. Boats have
been confiscated and a number of boats and fishing equipment have been damaged. 57
Movement restrictions in the West Bank
52. The complex system of movement restrictions appli ed by Israeli authorities has
effectively fragmented the West Bank and turned it into an archipelago of isolated
islands. It has increased the travel time between all major Palestinian population
centres by a median of 51 per cent.58 The movement of Palestinians in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, is restricted through a complex system of checkpoints,
permits, military roadblocks, settlements, a bypass road system, parallel legal regimes
and the West Bank “barrier”. Approximately 85 per cent of the current 712 km
planned route of the barrier lies within the West Bank rather than along the 1949
Armistice Line (the Green Line), isolating 10 per cent of the West Bank, contrary to
the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which sta tes that “the
construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated
regime, are contrary to international law”. 59
53. This route, which separates some Palestinian communities and farming land
from the rest of the West Bank, contributes to the fragmentation of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and adds a layer of distress to the livelihoods of farmers, fishers,
small business owners and daily wo rkers.
54. Movement restrictions are often imposed on Palestinians living nearby in
connection with settlements. The area controlled by the regional council of Israeli
settlements in the West Bank (including closed areas allocated for expanding those
settlements) was about 542 km2 by the end of 2020, representing about 10 per cent of
the total area of the West Bank. The confiscated areas for the purposes of military
bases and military training locations represent about 18 per cent of the West Bank
area. All those areas are off limits to Palestinians. 60 The barrier and the attendant
permit regime also restrict Palestinians who hold West Bank identification cards from
__________________
55 UNRWA input.
56 A/76/333, para. 46.
57 Ibid., para. 47.
58 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) input.
59 See A/ES-10/273 and A/ES-10/273/Corr.1.
60 Yesh Din, “The impact of Israeli settlements in the West Bank”, p. 24.
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accessing specialized services at the main Palestinian referral hospitals in East
Jerusalem.61
55. UNRWA reported 31 access-related incidents between April and December 2021
owing to Israeli restrictions on access to Palestine refugee communities in the West
Bank.62
Depletion, endangerment and exploitation of natural resources
56. Area C constitutes more than 60 per cent of the area of the West Bank and is the
richest in terms of the availability of natural resources. However, Palestinians face
severe restrictions on planning, building and access to natural resources in this area
and any investment or economic activity requires Israeli permits. The Gaza blockade
and closures limit Palestinian access to materials and technologies that could promote
the efficient use of energy, water and other natural resources.
Water
57. Palestinians face an acute water problem, which has become more intensified as
a result of population growth and restrictions imposed by Israel on Palestinians’
access to water resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
58. Since 1967, Israel has placed all water r esources in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory under its military control and prohibited Palestinians from constructing new
water installations or maintaining existing installations without a military permit. 63
59. Water resources in the region continue to be extremely limited and are projected
to decrease further as climate change drives increases in temperature and precipitation
declines. In the West Bank, severe water shortages continue to be reported, as Israel
retains full control of the distribution a nd extraction of most water resources,
including aquifers. More than 77 per cent of the water resources used by Palestinians
are extracted from the ground. Palestinians continue to be prevented by Israel from
accessing and extracting water from the Jordan River.
60. In addition, Israeli authorities treat Israeli settlers and Palestinians residing in
the West Bank unequally with regard to their access to water. Israeli settlements have
had a significant impact on Palestinians’ access to their natural resourc es, especially
as a result of the diversion of water resources, including the seizure of water wells by
Israeli settlers. Israeli settlements have taken over, destroyed or blocked Palestinian
access to natural water resources. Israeli settlements have also appropriated dozens
of Palestinian water springs, assisted by the Israeli military. 64
61. The coastal aquifer remains the only source of ground water in Gaza. Its yearly
sustainable yield is estimated to be up to 450 million m 3 in Israel and a mere
55 million m3 in Gaza. The aquifer has been depleted by overextraction and
contaminated by sewage and seawater infiltration.
Agriculture
62. Agriculture has been an integral driver of the Palestinian economy, and Area C
has been considered the West Bank’s green basket. Nevertheless, land confiscation;
the demolition of homes and productive assets; restrictions on the movement,
__________________
61 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs Overview
2022, p. 17; and World Health Organization (WHO), “Right to health barriers 2021”, 2021.
62 UNRWA input.
63 A/HRC/48/43; and Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, Israeli Military Orders in the
Occupied Palestinian West Bank: 1967–1992, 2nd ed. (1993).
64 A/HRC/48/43, para. 31.
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maintenance and rehabilitation of productive assets; and Israeli control over water
resources have undermined this sector. 65
63. Access by Palestinians to over two thirds of their agricultural resources in the
West Bank remains severely restricted. The construction of the barrier has caused the
destruction of a large part of Palestinian fertile agricultural land and has limited
access to about 170,000 dunums of that land (i.e. about 10 per cent of the total
cultivated area in the West Bank).66
64. Israeli military orders have rendered approximately 40 km 2 of land used for
olive cultivation in the “seam zone” between the barrier and t he Green Line as closed
areas, and another 18 km2 adjacent to settlements and outposts as “prior coordination
areas”.67
65. On average, olive farmers are granted access to their groves during the harvest
and ploughing season for a period lasting from 1 to 7 days, whereas it is estimated
that 133 days of work per year are necessary to adequately maintain an olive grove.
This undermines olive and olive oil production, and negatively affects both the quality
and quantity of harvests.68
66. Palestinians are only allowed to use 621,000 out of 2.02 million dunums of
pasture areas in the West Bank for the grazing of ruminants, increasing pressure and
overgrazing in accessible areas.69
67. The Israeli-imposed “buffer zone” in Gaza renders 35 per cent of agricultural
land off-limits to Palestinians. Moreover, more than 27,000 dunums of orchards,
vegetable crops and greenhouses, and more than 450 livestock and poultry farms,
were fully or partially destroyed during the escalation of hostilities in May 2021, 70 at
an estimated cost of $40 million to $45 million. 71
Minerals
68. Israel continues to exploit the mineral resources of the West Bank and has not
issued quarrying permits for Palestinian companies in Area C, where mineral reserves
are estimated to be worth $30 billion, since 1994.72
69. Around 86 per cent of the mineral-rich Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea lies
under the de facto jurisdiction of the regional councils of 37 Israeli settlements, of
which 6 are allowed to exploit Palestinian fertile lands and ex tract minerals for
agriculture and tourism in that area. 73
Energy
70. Israel severely limits the access of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory to energy reserves located within their land and coastal waters. This includes
__________________
65 FAO input; information provided to ESCWA.
66 Information provided to ESCWA; and the Palestinian agricultural sectoral strategy, available at
https://www.moa.pna.ps/uploads/STRATEGIES/16326559770.pdf (in Arabic).
67 FAO input.
68 FAO input; Premiere Urgence, “How settler violence and access restrictions” .
69 FAO input citing the Palestinian agricultural sectoral strategy.
70 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022.
71 FAO input; and World Bank, Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: June 2021
(Washington, D.C., 2021).
72 Orhan Niksic, Nur Nasser Eddin and Massimiliano Cali, Area C and the Future of the
Palestinian Economy (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2014), p. 13.
73 A/HRC/22/63, para. 36.
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oil reserves in Area C of the West Bank estimated at about 1.525 billion barrels and
natural gas off the Gaza coast worth an estimated $2.57 billion. 74
Fisheries
71. The Gaza fisheries sector has been suffering from access restrictions and
depleted fish stocks. In addition, the sector has suffered from water pollution due to
the release of untreated sewage water into the sea from the facilities damaged during
the recent escalation and due to a lack of electricity for treatment plants, though
improvement has been reported in this regard.75
72. In 2021, the total fish catch decreased by 7 per cent compared with 2020, as
Israel prevented all maritime access for a total of 20 days in April and May, after
which it allowed limited access. Fish farming, which had improved over the past six
years, was also negatively affected by the shortage of fish feed stemming from the
closure of all Gaza crossings during the military escalation in May 2021. 76
Social and economic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territo ry
73. In 2022, an estimated 2.1 million Palestinians, including 933,994 children, in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory are in need of humanitarian assistance; 2.4 per cent
are people with disabilities. The situation remains one of a protracted protectio n
crisis, exacerbated by the May 2021 escalation, the closures imposed on Gaza, the
coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and a deepening financial and fiscal crisis
within the Palestinian economy.77
Economic situation
74. The Palestinian economy has been suffering from the cumulative effects of the
occupation, and witnessed a steep decline in 2020 as a result of COVID -19 pandemic
and other global economic turbulence.
75. The system of restrictive policies imposed by Israel on Palestinian economic
activity, resources and land since 1967 has systematically stripped the Palestinian
economy of many elements that are vital for its healthy operation, rendering it highly
vulnerable to internal and external shocks. The multilayered restrictive system
continues to deny Palestinian control over natural resources and egress, which
constrains access to regional and international markets and limits policy space. The
Palestinian economy thus continued to operate well below its full potential during the
reporting period, with high dependence on Israel and external transfers.
76. The productive base of the Palestinian economy continues to shrink. The
combined size of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors fell from 24.1 per cent of
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 to 18.6 per cent in 2021. 78 Aid and remittances
have become almost the exclusive source of foreign exchange inflows that stimulate
consumption in Gaza, particularly in the light of limited exports and weak investment
activity. It can be safely assumed that the Palestinian Government and the
expenditures of UNRWA in Gaza, in addition to informal flows to the de facto
__________________
74 The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation for the Palestinian People: The Unrealized Oil
and Natural Gas Potential (United Nations publication, 2019).
75 FAO input. Damage is estimated as the replacement value of totally or partially damaged
physical assets.
76 FAO input; and Department of Fisheries in Ministry of Agriculture, Gaza.
77 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, pp. 6 and 12; and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “Humanitarian
action for children: State of Palestine”, 2022, p. 1.
78 ESCWA calculations taken from State of Palestine, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Press
report: preliminary estimates of quarterly national accounts (fourth quarter 2021)”, March 2022.
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authorities, amounted to almost 100 per cent of Gaza’s GDP at certain points, which
kept its economy relatively afloat despite restrictions. 79
77. The Palestinian economy witnessed a rebound, but did not recover fully, after
the relaxation of COVID-19-related measures. The economy grew by 7 per cent in
2021, but remained below its pre-pandemic level in 2019.80
78. While this partial rebound reflected in part the sharp contraction in 2020 (11.3
per cent), it was mainly driven by the West Bank’s economy (7.8 per cent) while
Gaza’s economy increased by 3.4 per cent i n 2021 following a contraction of 12.6 per
cent in the preceding year. Gaza’s contribution to the overall Palestinian economy fell
from 23 per cent in 2005 to 17 per cent in 2021. Its GDP per capita remained 52 per
cent lower than it had been in 2005.81
79. The relative growth was driven by an increase in total consumption by 77.3 per
cent, a 14.2 per cent increase in investments, 82 and an increase in the number of
Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements from 125,000 in 2020 to 146,000
in second quarter of 2021.83
80. The construction sector recorded the highest value -added growth at 8 per cent.
Industry activity grew by 7 per cent and services activity by 4 per cent during 2021.
In contrast, agricultural activity witnessed a decrease of 3 per cen t.84
81. The May 2021 escalation resulted in the destruction of about 2 per cent of Gaza’s
capital stock,85 an estimated $290 million to $380 million in direct damages, and $105
million to $190 million in economic losses. 86 A rapid damage needs assessment
indicated that approximately 8,000 households would fall into poverty in the ensuing
months.87
82. Unemployment rates among labour force participants in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory remained high at 26 per cent in 202 1, and total labour
underutilization reached 34 per cent. The unemployment rate for women reached 43
per cent compared with 22 per cent for men. The disparity in unemployment rates
between the West Bank (16 per cent) and Gaza (47 per cent) reflects the par ticularly
difficult economic situation in the latter due to the 15 -year closure of Gaza and
recurrent Israeli military escalations. 88
83. It should be noted that, without employment in Israel and the settlements,
unemployment in the West Bank would increase by about 16 percentage points, closer
to current levels in Gaza.89
84. Projections based on GDP per capita growth suggest that the poverty rate has
been constantly increasing since 2016, reaching 28.9 per cent in 2020. This represents
approximately 1.4 million people living in poverty in 2020. The World Bank estimates
__________________
79 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee ”, 17 November
2021, p. 17.
80 State of Palestine, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Press report: preliminary estimates
of quarterly national accounts”.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 State of Palestine, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics , “Press report on economic forecasts
for 2022”, 29 December 2021, p. 2.
85 World Bank, “Palestinian territories economic update”, October 2021.
86 World Bank, Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment.
87 UNICEF, “Humanitarian action for children”, p. 2.
88 State of Palestine, Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, “Press release on the results of the Labor
Force Survey 2021”, 2021, p. 1.
89 TD/B/EX (71)/2, para. 7.
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that the May 2021 escalation pushed poverty in Gaza to 59.3 per cent in 2021, 2.3 per
cent higher than the COVID-19-induced peak in 2020 and 16.3 per cent higher than
in 2016–2017.90
Food security
85. Poverty and unemployment are two key drivers of food insecurity in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory. 91 Some 1.75 million Palestinians need food
assistance, 1.3 million of whom are in Gaza. 92 The closure of Gaza, as well as the
increase in unemployment and poverty, have had a negative impact on the status of
food security in Gaza.93
86. Prior to the May 2021 escalation, the number of food-insecure people had
increased from 1.7 million in 2018 to 2.0 million people across the Occupied
Palestinian Territory in early 2021. 94 Some 62 per cent of the population of Gaza (or
1.4 million people) were food insecure in May 2021 following the escalation. 95
87. Despite the divergence between the West Bank and Gaza, where 40 per cent and
60 per cent, respectively, were moderately or severely food insecure in 2020, 96 food
security in both regions has been deteriorating, with nearly 2 in 10 people suffering
from severe food insecurity in 2020. 97
88. The war in Ukraine has had an impact on commodity prices and the food supply
chain in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and will result in the further deteriorati on
of an already difficult situation. The scale and scope of this impact will depend greatly
on further developments in the crisis. 98
Water, sanitation and hygiene
89. More than 1.35 million Palestinians across the Occupied Palestinian Territory
face public health risks associated with insufficient access to water, sanitation and
hygiene services and are in immediate need of humanitarian assistance. During the
reporting period, Israeli authorities demolished 42 water, sanitation and hygiene
structures in the West Bank.99
90. The average consumption of water by Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory is around 70 litres a day per person. Approximately 420,000 Palestinians in
the West Bank consume 50 litres a day, less than a quarter of the average Israeli
consumption of about 300 litres per person. 100 Some 42.3 per cent of households rely
__________________
90 World Bank, “Economic monitoring report”, p. 8.
91 World Food Programme (WFP) input.
92 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, p. 39.
93 WFP, “Gaza emergency food security assessment: following the esc alation of hostilities and
unrest in the State of Palestine in May 2021”, June 2021, p. 6.
94 Ibid.
95 World Bank, Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, p. 50.
96 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, “Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey 2020:
State of Palestine”, 2020.
97 WFP input; and Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, “Socioeconomic and Food
Security Survey 2020”.
98 WFP input.
99 West Bank Protection Consortium, “Palestinian access to water and attacks on wash str uctures in
Area C”, April 2021; and United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Data on Demolition and Displacement in the West Bank
database, available at www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition .
100 A/HRC/48/43.
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on previously stored drinking water and 10.7 per cent of households receive water on
credit or borrow funds to afford water. 101
91. In Gaza, recurrent military escalations, the closure of Gaza and restrictions of
the imports of water, sanitation and hygiene items have had negative effects on
infrastructure and delivery. Moreover, the coastal aquifer, which is the main water
source in Gaza, is virtually deplete d, with more than 97 per cent of its water unfit for
human consumption.102
92. Around 90 per cent of households in Gaza have to buy water from purification
or desalination plants, which costs between 10 to 30 times more than piped water.
Some 40 per cent rely on previously stored drinking water and 34 per cent receive
water on credit or borrow funds.103 Less than 4.3 per cent of households in Gaza have
improved drinking water on the premises that is free of E. coli and available when
needed. 104 During the May escalation, 400,000 people were affected by irregular
access to piped water.105
93. A total of 28.4 per cent of households in the West Bank reported waste
accumulation for more than three days in their area, compared with 10.2 per cent in
Gaza.106
94. In addition, 79.1 per cent of households in the West Bank and 90.6 per cent of
households in Gaza reported that their daily activities had been affected by flooding,
resulting in damages to their shelters. Most of the Palestine refugee camps have
dilapidated sewage and water networks and poor storm water drainage that pose
public health risks for camp residents. 107
Health
95. Approximately 1.5 million Palestinians, including some 1.0 million in Gaza,
require health-related humanitarian assistance in 2022. 108
96. When the COVID-19 epidemic broke out, the Palestinian health -care system
was already fragile, disconnected, undergoing de -development and lacking human,
financial and material resources as a result of the occupation, fragmentation and the
closure.109 The diversion of resources in response to the pandemic and the number of
__________________
101 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2021 Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment database, available at www.ochaopt.org/data/
2021/msna.
102 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, p. 47.
103 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2021 Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment database, available at www.ochaopt.org/data/
2021/msna.
104 UNICEF, “State of Palestine 2019/2020”, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey database. Available
at https://mics.unicef.org/surveys.
105 ESCWA estimations; and United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Response to the escalation in the oPt: situation report, No. 2”.
106 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2021 Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment database, available at www.ochaopt.org/data/
2021/msna.
107 Ibid.
108 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, p. 35.
109 WHO, document A74/22Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.; Medical Aid for Palestinians,
“Dealing with death and distress: the impact of COVID-19 on the mental health of Palestinian
healthcare workers”, July 2021, pp. 1–3.
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injuries requiring treatment in the West Bank and Gaza in May 2021 further increased
strained scarce health-care resources.110
97. Moreover, in 2021, WHO recorded 233 attacks on the hea lth-care sector across
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including during the May escalation of hostilities.
A total of 106 health-care workers were injured, and 57 ambulances and 123 facilities
were damaged.
98. During the May 2021 escalation, one primary care facility was destroyed and
12 per cent of primary care facilities and 30 per cent of hospitals sustained
damages.111
99. Gaza continues to suffer from a lack of essential medical technology such as
radiotherapy facilities and nuclear medicine scan ning (e.g. PET scanning), in addition
to a long-standing shortage of drugs and supplies. Over the course of 2021, 41 per
cent of essential medicines and 27 per cent of essential medical disposables had less
than a month of supplies remaining.112
100. In terms of human resources, insufficiencies exist for several medical
specialties, whereas the density of nurses and midwives, 2.4 per 1,000 people, falls
below the WHO suggested threshold of 3.0. 113
101. This forces thousands of Gazans to seek essential health -care outside the Strip,
which is hindered by the Israeli permit regime. During 2021, 36 per cent of applicants
for permits experienced delays, and had received no definitive response by the date
of their appointments. Of these permits, 27 per cent were for children under the age
of 18 years and 47 per cent were for female patients. With regard to patient
companions, only 40.4 per cent of applications were approved. 114
102. Palestinians in the rest of the West Bank are also subjected to a permit regime
to access health services in East Jerusalem. In 2021, more than 10 per cent of total
patient applications and 16 per cent of total companion applications were denied. 115
103. Resources in the West Bank are depleted as a result of the need to duplicate
services, which have to be scattered across as wide a geographical distribution as
possible to provide health care to as many Palestinians as possible, owing to
restrictions on freedom of movement. 116
104. Stunting among Palestinian children under the age of 5 has been increasing. In
2019/20, 8.7 per cent were significantly below average height for their age, compared
with 7.4 per cent in 2014. The level of severe acute malnutrition rose from 1.8 per
cent of children under 5 in 2014 to 2.4 per cent in 2019/20. Simil arly, global acute
malnutrition has increased among children aged 1 to 2 years old. For children aged
12 to 17 months, the rate increased from 7.8 per cent in 2014 to 10.5 per cent in
2019/20, whereas the rates for children aged 18 to 23 months rose from 8 .2 per cent
to 12.4 per cent. Of children aged 2 to 17, 12.3 per cent (14.6 per cent of boys and
9.8 per cent of girls) have at least one functional challenge. 117
__________________
110 WHO input.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 WHO input citing information provided by the Palestinian Ministry of Health and the Palestinian
National Institute of Public Health (2020).
114 WHO input.
115 Ibid.
116 Yotam Rosner and Ghada Majadli, Responsibility Shirked: Israel and the Right to Health in the
Occupied West Bank during COVID-19 (Physicians for Human Rights, 2021), p. 27.
117 UNICEF, “State of Palestine 2019/2020”, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey database, p. 16.
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105. High levels of exposure to violence and insecurity for Palestinians living under
occupation affects their physical and mental health and well -being. Severe injuries
have a cumulative impact on long-term needs and disabilities, while the lack of
control and the unpredictability of many aspects of life under occupation contribute
to increasing stress and anxiety.118
106. In this context, children are particularly vulnerable to experiencing high rates
of mental distress, and have significant risks of post -traumatic stress disorder,
depression, anxiety, behavioural problems and attention deficit hyp eractivity
disorder, as well as functional impairment. Notably, 82 per cent of adolescents aged
13 to 19 in Gaza reported overall poor to very poor levels of mental well -being,119
and 63 per cent of persons with disabilities lacked accessibility to mental health and
psychosocial support services.120
Education
107. In 2022, 600,000 Palestinians might miss access to education and need
humanitarian assistance. Of those, 74 per cent live in Gaza, 56 per cent are women
and some 13,400 are children with disabilities. 121
108. Households in the West Bank reported safety concerns in relation to their
children’s education, such as travelling to or studying in education facilities.
Concerns include the firing of tear gas on schools and students, the detention of
students at school by Israeli security forces, delays at checkpoints and military
presences around schools, in addition to violence and harassment while travelling to
school.122
109. Between 1 April and 31 December 2021, UNRWA documented five separate
incidents in which live ammunition, plastic -coated metal bullets, tear gas canisters or
other weapons landed in its schools in the West Bank. 123
110. More than 50 schools in the West Bank face the risk of demolition, which, if
such a risk materialized, would jeopardize the learning process for more than 5,000
Palestinian children attending these institutions. 124
111. In Gaza, 331 educational facilities were damaged during the May 2021
escalation with an estimated cost of $3.5 million. 125
112. School closures due to COVID-19 and the May 2021 escalation resulted in an
early end to the school year for 1.3 million children, who ended up losing at least
three months of education.126
113. The frequent and long electricity outages also have a major impact on the school
performance of children, who are enrolled in both online and in -person learning
__________________
118 WHO input.
119 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, p. 30.
120 WHO input.
121 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, p. 18.
122 UNRWA input.
123 UNRWA input.
124 Save the Children, “Number of displaced Palestinian children at a four-year high as demolitions
in West Bank continue”, 3 February 2021.
125 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, p. 13.
126 Ibid., p. 18.
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systems in Gaza.127 This is compounded by Internet outages and damage to streets
and school infrastructures.128
114. In the 2020/21 academic year, the student per class rate was 41.20, 39.56 and
21.65 at UNRWA, public and private schools, respectively. This high -density rate (in
view of the overcrowded classes) affected the efficiency and quality of education i n
Gaza. The digital gap between Gaza and the world, particularly with the adoption of
the online learning modality in schools, was increased by Israeli restrictions on the
import of technological devices to Gaza, limiting the ability of Palestinians to shi ft to
online learning.129
115. In Gaza, the non-attendance rate for basic education is 2.8 per cent and increases
to 21.5 per cent in secondary classes. 130 Economic conditions constitute the main
obstacle for children to attending school, followed by the educational environment
and reasons related to security.131
Impact of the occupation on women and girls
116. Women and girls across the Occupied Palestin ian Territory continued to
disproportionately suffer during the reporting period. During 2021, 48 Palestinian
women were killed by Israeli forces across the Territory. 132
117. Women and girls in Gaza experienced several forms of harm and deprivation
during the May 2021 escalation, increasing their vulnerabilities. Shelters and
UNRWA schools were not well equipped to serve as shelters and receive those who
were displaced or to address the unique needs of women and girls. 133
118. Instances of gender-based violence and violence against children were
exacerbated by increasing family/household tensions, the limited availability of basic
necessities, forced displacement and a lack of safe shelter. Local service providers
faced several obstacles in providing necessary services and placed their own lives at
risk.134 Three gender-related killings were reported within the month following the
end of the escalation.135
119. During the May escalation, elderly women and those with disabilities, as well
as prisoners, those with serious illnesses and pregnant and lactating women were at
particularly high risk and they did not have access to emergency shelters or services.
120. In the aftermath of the escalation, a minority of women reported to ESCWA that
they had access to humanitarian assistance (food parcels, dignity kits and hygiene
supplies, financial assistance and in-kind aid), and many stated that aid agencies had
not consulted with them about their needs. 136
121. During the reporting period, house demolitions in the West Bank resulted in the
displacement of 302 girls, 275 women, 275 men and 353 boys. 137 House demolitions
__________________
127 Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, “Fact sheet on obstacles to accessing education in the Gaza
Strip”, 2021, p. 6.
128 Occupied Palestinian Territory Education Cluster, “Report on damage in educational facilities:
Gaza Strip”, July 2021, p. 4.
129 Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, “Fact sheet on obstacles”, p. 7.
130 UNICEF, “State of Palestine 2019/2020”, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey database, p. 9.
131 Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, “Fact sheet on obstacles”, p. 8.
132 State of Palestine, Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, “H.E. Dr. Awad, highlights the reality of the
Palestinian women on the eve of International Women’s Day”, 7 March 2022.
133 Gendered Needs during the May 2021 Conflict in the Gaza Strip (E/ESCWA/CL2.GPID/2021/TP.6).
134 Ibid.
135 Global Protection Cluster, “Occupied Palestinian Territory protection analysis update”, August 2021.
136 Gendered Needs during the May 2021 Conflict in the Gaza Strip (E/ESCWA/CL2.GPID/2021/TP.6).
137 European Union, “One year report on demolitions and seizures”, p. 6.
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further burden women and girls who have traditional gender norms by exacerbating
their role as caretakers and persons in charge of domest ic responsibilities. Internal
data collected by UNRWA in the West Bank show that home incursions and
demolitions have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, with female - and
child-headed households experiencing greater protection risks, and families with
pregnant women, infants and young children, elderly persons, and persons with
disabilities are in need of greater mental health and psychosocial support as a result
of exposure to violence and trauma.138
122. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics, in 2021, 184
women139 were detained or arrested by Israeli forces, including prominent activists
and human rights defenders. 140 The occupation continues to hamper the work of
Palestinian civil society, including women’s rights organization s, some of which were
raided or labelled as “terrorist organizations” during the reporting period. 141
123. Increasing insecurity has had a negative impact on the rights of Palestinian
women and girls to freedom of movement and security of the person. For e xample,
some 7,500 nuclear families across the Occupied Palestinian Territory (12 per cent
and 47 per cent of women and girls in Gaza and the West Bank, respectively), reported
that they intentionally avoided areas near settlements, checkpoints and restric ted
areas because they felt unsafe.142
III. Occupied Syrian Golan
124. The Secretary-General continues to reaffirm the validity of Security Council
resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council decided that the Israeli decision to impose
its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights was
null and void and without international lega l effect.
125. In 2020, 26,300 Syrian citizens lived in five villages comprising approximately
5 per cent of the territory of the occupied Syrian Golan, while the same number of
Israeli settlers are spread over 35 settlements. 143 The Syrian population, of which
more than 80 per cent have refused to accept Israeli citizenship, continue to suffer its
discriminatory policies and practices. 144
126. Consecutive Israeli Governments have sought to significantly increase the
number of settlers living in the occupied Syrian Golan by offering incentives for
Israelis to reside there, including granting tracts of land for housing and commercial
agricultural development and offering financial incentives that may reach $12,000.
The settler population has thus steadily incre ased in recent years.145
__________________
138 UNRWA input.
139 State of Palestine, Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, “H.E. Dr. Awad, highlights the forty -sixth
annual commemoration of Land Day in statistical figures”, 30 March 2022.
140 Global Protection Cluster, “Occupied Palestinian Territory protection analysis update” Error!
Hyperlink reference not valid.; A/76/333, paras. 21 and 28; and OHCHR, “Israel must
safeguard human rights defenders in Occupied Palestinian Territory and within its borders – UN
expert”, 11 August 2021.
141 A/76/333, para. 25, and A/HRC/49/25, para. 36.
142 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, “OPT MSNA key analysis findings”. Available at https://docs.google.com/presentation/
d/18fuv35AMjhtliZpAQkUZBNCBb56d5N8D/edit#slide=id.p26 .
143 International Labour Organization (ILO), document ILC.109/DG/APP/2021, para. 135
144 Al-Marsad, “Report on Israel’s violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights”, 31 January 2022, p. 3
145 Ibid., p. 4.
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127. A plan to add 7,000 housing units to the town of Katzrin by 2026 is reportedly
currently being prepared as part of a programme seeking to double the settler
population by the end of the decade. The plan also calls for the creat ion of two new
settlements in current open spaces, new solar energy projects and industrial,
commercial and tourism zones.146
128. Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan are illegal under international
law. Furthermore, settlement expansion and Israeli commercial activity have negative
impacts on the health, environment and agriculture of Syrian citizens in the area. 147
129. A total of 95 per cent of the land is occupied by Israeli settlers, military and the
authorities, leaving only 5 per cent for the Syrian population.148
130. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reports that Israel employs several
methods to confiscate land and natural resources in the occupied Syrian Golan,
including the expropriation of land owned by Syrian Arabs who have b een displaced;
the expropriation of land in close proximity to the ceasefire line for the laying of
landmines; the confiscation of land for military purposes; the expropriation of land
for the building of settlements and agricultural and industrial facilit ies; and the
fencing off of areas, under the pretext of placing them at the disposal of the Israel
Nature and Parks Authority.149
131. For example, by 2021, Israel had declared approximately 370,000 dunams in the
occupied Syrian Golan as nature reserves an d national parks. The ratio of nature
reserves in the occupied Syrian Golan is double (0.04) that inside Israel (0.02).
Furthermore, most nature reserves in the occupied Syrian Golan have been
established atop the ruins of 145 Syrian villages that were des troyed during and after
the 1967 war. In addition, the approximately 11,000 dunams of these natural reserves
are part of the 58,000 dunams that comprise the municipal boundaries of the five
Syrian villages in the occupied Syrian Golan, effectively removing this area from the
control of the Syrian municipalities. 150
132. Israel continues to implement a multi-year plan to develop and strengthen
agriculture in Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan, including those under
development. In this context, Israeli settlers have seized and exploited large areas for
agricultural purposes, imposing a further economic burden on the Syrian
population.151
133. Israel has continued to take steps to implement a wind turbine project during the
reporting period. The 45 turbines are being erected over an area of 6,000 acres of
agricultural land adjacent to Syrian villages and belonging to Syrians. This project
would limit the expansion of villages, have an impact on the livelihoods of the Syrian
population and expose them to health and environmental risks. 152
134. Syrians in the occupied Syrian Golan continue to suffer from discriminatory
practices with regard to access to land and water and from restrictive zoning and
building policies.153 It is almost impossible for Syrians to obtain building permits in
the occupied Syrian Golan. This restricts the expansion of their towns and villages
__________________
146 Zafrir Rinat, “Bennett advances Golan Heights construction plan in bid to double population”,
11 December 2021.
147 A/76/336, para. 58.
148 Al-Marsad, “Report on Israel’s violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights”, p. 10.
149 A/HRC/49/84, para. 34.
150 Al-Marsad, “Nature reserves in the Occupied Golan”, November 2021, pp. 1, 6 and 10.
151 A/76/360, para. 64.
152 Ibid., para. 63.
153 ILO, document ILC.109/DG/APP/2021, para. 139.
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despite population growth, forcing many Syrians to build without permits, thereby
risking demolitions, displacement, the incurring of heavy fines or even imprisonment.
The Israeli authorities have issued more than 1,500 demolition orders since 1973,
along with steep fines and prison sentences for unpermitted construction. 154
135. In 1973, the number of livestock in the five villages of the occupied Syrian
Golan reached 20,820 heads. Today, the numbe r of livestock does not exceed a few
hundred, due to the confiscation of grazing lands for the benefit of nature reserves
and for the purposes of military activities conducted by the occupying army. In
addition, these reserves deprive inhabitants from acce ss to wild plants that form an
important part of Golani cuisine culture. 155
136. Discriminatory practices with regard to access to water and land reportedly
continue to impede the efforts of Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian Golan to keep
a foothold in agriculture.156
137. Labour force participation rates of the Syrian citizens of the occupied Syrian
Golan steadily increased until 2017, when they reached a peak of 51 per cent;
however, they declined thereafter, dropping to 40 per cent in 2020. About one quarter
(25.4 per cent) of Syrian women of working age took part in the labour force in
2000.157
138. The Syrian Arab Republic has expressed concerns about the imposition of fees
and taxes by Israel, in particular on Syrian Arab workers, especially in agri culture.
These include taxes on the output of daily or regular work, ranging from 15 to 35 per
cent; income taxes at 25 per cent; general taxes of up to 60 per cent of wages; and a
30 per cent tax on storage refrigerators for apples. In addition, Israel re fused to pay
for the hospitalization of Syrian Arab workers with permanent or partial injuries
sustained during work, given that they were not covered by the compensation law,
and have undertaken measures to force them to join Israeli syndicates. 158
IV. Conclusions and observations
139. The protracted Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory and the occupied
Syrian Golan continues to have a detrimental effect on the living conditions of the
Palestinian and Syrian populations, as well as on social and economic development
in the occupied territories. These effects have had a different and disproportionate
impact on women and girls. The negative impact of the occupation and the Israeli
policies and practices is multilayered, and their cumulative rep ercussions affect the
future of the populations living under occupation.
140. Israeli-imposed restrictions, the expansion of the illegal settlements and other
practices not only prevent development in the occupied territories and hamper efforts
to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, but also cause humanitarian crises that
necessitate the diversion of scarce national and international resources from
development to immediate relief. The Palestinian financial crisis and the
fragmentation of the Palestinian Territory have also resulted in a fragmented economy
that is dependent on Israel and foreign aid.
141. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout have compounded
the social and economic situation and have resulted in more adverse living conditions
__________________
154 Al-Marsad, “Report on Israel’s violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights”, pp. 11–12.
155 Al-Marsad, “Nature reserves in the Occupied Golan”, p. 7 .
156 ILO, document ILC.109/DG/APP/2021, para. 146.
157 Ibid., para. 136.
158 A/HRC/49/84, para. 38.
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for Palestinians. Its effects on the Palestinian people are multiplied as a result of long -
standing Israeli policies and practices. The Palestinian health system had already been
on the brink of collapse, particularly in Gaza, before the pandemic.
142. The May 2021 escalation in hostilities between Israel and armed groups in Gaza
compounded the severe situation in Gaza, which was created by the closures imposed
on Gaza, other restrictive Israeli measures and recurrent escalations, in addition to
declining donor funding. This requires the urgent attention of the international
community.
143. Prospects for the Palestinian economy are negative, should the current status
quo persist. The funding crisis facing UNRWA and the decline in donor aid is another
factor that only exacerbates the already precarious conditions of hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians.
144. Israel continues to employ policies and practices that are contrary to relevant
Security Council resolutions, international humanitarian law and internat ional human
rights law. Some of these practices may be considered discriminatory and others may
amount to the forcible transfer or collective punishment of protected persons, which
would be a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and is prohibited u nder
international law.
145. Adherence to international law is imperative, ensuring that no party enjoys
impunity and securing justice and peace for all those living in the region, including
Palestinians and Syrians living under occupation. The United Nat ions maintains its
long-standing position that lasting and comprehensive peace can be achieved only
through a negotiated two-State solution. The Secretary-General will continue to
ensure that the United Nations works towards the establishment of an indepen dent,
democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State, living side by side in peace with
a secure Israel, with Jerusalem as the capital of both States, consistent with relevant
Security Council resolutions and international law.
Part II (A) 2 - Living Conditions of the Palestinian People