Corrigé
..Corrected
CR 2016/13
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2016
Public sitting
held on Friday 23 September 2016, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Abraham presiding,
in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean
(Somalia v. Kenya)
Preliminary Objections
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2016
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 23 septembre 2016, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,
en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien
(Somalie c. Kenya)
Exceptions préliminaires
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -
Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf
Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian
Registrar Couvreur
- 3 -
Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président
MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian, juges
M. Couvreur, greffier
- 4 -
The Government of Somalia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Ali Said Faqi, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the Kingdom of
Belgium,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Mona Al-Sharmani, Attorney-at-Law, Senior Legal Adviser to the President of the Federal
Republic of Somalia,
as Deputy-Agent;
Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United States
Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former Member
and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of International Law at University College London, Barrister
at Matrix Chambers, London,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United
States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Ms Alina Miron, Professor of International Law at the University of Angers,
Mr. Edward Craven, Barrister at Matrix Chambers, London,
Mr. Nicholas M. Renzler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the State of New York,
as Counsel;
Ms Lea Main-Klingst, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Junior Counsel;
Mr. Mohamed Omar, Senior Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia,
Mr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Somalia,
H.E. Mr. Yusuf Garaad Omar, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic
of Somalia to the United Nations, New York,
Admiral Farah Ahmed Omar, former Admiral of the Somali Navy and the Chairman of Research
Institute for Ocean Affairs, Mogadishu, - 5 -
Mr. Daud Awes, Spokesperson of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia,
Mr. Abubakar Mohamed Abubakar, Director, Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Ms Kathryn Kalinowski, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC,
Ms Nancy Lopez, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC,
as Assistants. - 6 -
Le Gouvernement de la Somalie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Ali Said Faqi, ambassadeur de la République fédérale de Somalie auprès du Royaume
de Belgique,
comme coagent ;
Mme Mona Al-Sharmani, avocate, conseillère juridique principale auprès du président de la
République fédérale de Somalie,
comme agent adjoint ;
M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême
des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit international au University College de Londres,
avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour
suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du district de Columbia et du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,
Mme Alina Miron, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Angers,
M. Edward Craven, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),
M. Nicholas M. Renzler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’Etat de New York,
comme conseils ;
Mme Lea Main-Klingst, Matrix Chambers (Londres),
comme conseil auxiliaire ;
M. Mohamed Omar, conseiller principal auprès du président de la République fédérale de Somalie,
M. Ahmed Ali Dahir, Attorney-General de la République fédérale de Somalie,
S. Exc. M. l’ambassadeur Yusuf Garaad Omar, représentant permanent de la République fédérale
de Somalie auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (New York),
Amiral Farah Ahmed Omar, ancien amiral de la marine somalienne et président de l’Institut de
recherche sur les affaires maritimes de Mogadiscio, - 7 -
M. Daud Awes, porte-parole du président de la République fédérale de Somalie,
M. Abubakar Mohamed Abubakar, directeur des affaires maritimes au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Kathryn Kalinowski, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington,
Mme Nancy Lopez, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington,
comme assistants. - 8 -
The Government of Kenya is represented by:
Professor Githu Muigai, E.G.H., S.C., Attorney-General of the Republic of Kenya,
as Agent;
H.E. Ms Rose Makena Muchiri, Ambassador of the Republic of Kenya to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
University of Oxford, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M. S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, McGill University,
member of the State Bar of New York and of the Law Society of Upper Canada, member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr. Mathias Forteau, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Alan Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, member of the
English Bar,
Mr. Karim A. A. Khan, Q.C., member of the English Bar,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,
Ms Philippa Webb, Reader in Public International Law, King’s College, London, member of the
English Bar and of the New York Bar,
Mr. Eirik Bjorge, Junior Research Fellow in Law at the University of Oxford,
as Counsel;
Hon. Senator Amos Wako, Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights,
Hon. Samuel Chepkonga, Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs,
Ms Juster Nkoroi, E.B.S., Head, Kenya International Boundaries Office,
Mr. Michael Guchayo Gikuhi, Director, Kenya International Boundaries Office,
Ms Njeri Wachira, Head, International Law Division, Office of the Attorney-General and
Department of Justice,
Ms Stella Munyi, Director, Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Stella Orina, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Rotiken Kaitikei, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, - 9 -
Le Gouvernement du Kenya est représenté par :
M. Githu Muigai, professeur, E.G.H., S.C., Attorney General de la République du Kenya,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. Mme Rose Makena Muchiri, ambassadeur de la République du Kenya auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international à l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D (Harvard), professeur de droit international à
l’Université McGill, membre du barreau de l’Etat de New York et du barreau du Haut-Canada,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Mathias Forteau, professeur à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Alan Boyle, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Edimbourg, membre du barreau
d’Angleterre,
M. Karim A. A. Khan, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
Mme Philippa Webb, maître de conférences en droit international public au King’s College
(Londres), membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du barreau de New York,
M. Eirik Bjorge, assistant de recherche en droit à l’Université d’Oxford,
comme conseils ;
M. Amos Wako, sénateur, président de la commission permanente du Sénat chargée des affaires
juridiques et des droits de l’homme,
M. Samuel Chepkonga, président de la commission parlementaire de la justice et des affaires
juridiques,
Mme Juster Nkoroi, E.B.S., chef du service des frontières internationales du Kenya,
M. Michael Guchayo Gikuhi, directeur au service des frontières internationales du Kenya,
Mme Njeri Wachira, directrice de la division du droit international, bureau de l’Attorney General et
ministère de la justice,
Mme Stella Munyi, directrice de la division juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Stella Orina, directrice ajointe, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Rotiken Kaitikei, diplomate, ministère des affaires étrangères, - 10 -
Ms Pauline Mcharo, Senior Principal State Counsel, Office of the Attorney-General and
Department of Justice,
Ms Wanjiku Wakogi, Governance Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of
Justice,
Mr. Samuel Kaumba, State Counsel, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of Justice,
Mr. Hudson Andambi, Minstry of Energy,
as Advisers. - 11 -
Mme Pauline Mcharo, Senior Principal State Counsel, bureau de l’Attorney General et ministère
de la justice,
Mme Wanjiku Wakogi, conseillère en gouvernance, bureau de l’Attorney General et ministère de
la justice,
M. Samuel Kaumba, State Counsel, bureau de l’Attorney General et ministère de la justice,
M. Hudson Andambi, ministère de l’énergie,
comme conseillers. - 12 -
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit
aujourd’hui pour entendre le second tour de plaidoiries de la Somalie. Je voudrais indiquer tout
d’abord que, comme c’était déjà le cas mercredi après-midi, M. le juge ad hoc Guillaume n’est pas
en mesure de siéger aujourd’hui pour des raisons dont il m’a dûment fait part. Je donne à présent la
parole à M. le professeur Alain Pellet.
M. PELLET : Et je vous en remercie vivement, Monsieur le président.
L A PORTÉE DU M O U
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, quelle est la question ? Elle est
de savoir si vous êtes compétents pour connaître de la requête que la Somalie vous a soumise sur la
base des déclarations facultatives qu’ont faites les deux Etats, sachant que celle du Kenya exclut
«[l]es différends au sujet desquels les parties en cause auraient convenu ou conviendraient d’avoir
recours à un autre mode ou à d’autres modes de règlement». En sont-elles convenues dans le
1
MoU ? That is the question ! (J’aime Racine et Baudelaire, mais je suis large d’esprit, j’aime
aussi Shakespeare !) Les longs développements du Kenya sur la sécurité maritime , sur le prétendu
3 4
contrôle qu’il exercerait sur la zone litigieuse , sur les propositions d’arrangements provisoires , sur
la loi somalienne de 1972 sur la mer territoriale , n’ont rien à voir avec cette question et n’appellent
aucun commentaire de notre part.
2. Pour répondre à notre question, Monsieur le président, toujours le même refrain que
Mathias Forteau s’est enfin résigné à entonner (bien qu’il le chante un peu faux...) : il faut (et il
suffit d’) interpréter le paragraphe 6 du MoU dans son contexte et à la lumière du but et de l’objet
de cet instrument considéré dans son ensemble, étant entendu, cela va de soi, que cette
interprétation doit donner un effet utile à cette disposition.
3. Des quatre éléments indissociables énumérés dans l’article 31 de la convention de Vienne
sur le droit des traités, les deux sur lesquels les Parties s’opposent principalement sont, d’une part,
1
William Shakespeare, Hamlet, acte III, scène 1.
2CR 2016/12, p. 14-15, par. 10 (Akhavan).
3CR 2016/12, p. 15, par. 11 (Akhavan).
4
CR 2016/12, p. 15, par. 11 (Akhavan).
5CR 2016/12, p. 18-19, par. 7-8 (Forteau). - 13 -
le texte du paragraphe 6, et, d’autre part, plus globalement, l’objet et le but du MoU. Quelques
mots sur ces points de désaccord majeur avant de revenir sur l’interprétation en résultant
puisque aussi bien l’opération d’interprétation doit être intégrée.
4. Le texte d’abord. Et surtout pour insister sur ce qu’il ne dit pas car nos amis de l’autre
côté de la barre lui font dire des choses qui n’y figurent point c’est comme la langue turque dont
on faisait croire au Bourgeois gentilhomme de Molière qu’«elle dit beaucoup en peu de paroles» . 6
Mais vous n’êtes pas des bourgeois gentilshommes, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, et le
Kenya ne peut vous abuser aussi facilement.
o
Projection n 1 : paragraphe 6 du MoU
5. Le premier «élément manquant» : l’absence de la moindre référence à la négociation
7
comme mode de règlement du différend et d’ailleurs à quelque mode de règlement que ce soit .
Même si vous devez probablement connaître cette disposition à peu près par cœur, je vous suggère
de la relire ingénument, en oubliant tout ce qui en a été dit par les Parties. Vous n’y trouverez ni le
mot «différend» ; ni le mot «règlement» ; pas davantage le mot «négociations».
o o
Fin de la projection n 1 Projection n 2 : paragraphe 6 du MoU/paragraphe 1 de
l’article 83 de la CNUDM
Tout ce que vous lisez dans la première partie de cette disposition est, à peu de choses près,
ce que vous pouvez lire dans l’article 83, paragraphe 1, (ou 74, paragraphe 1, également) de la
convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Or personne n’a jamais prétendu que ces
dispositions bien connues soient des clauses de règlement des différends. Le paragraphe 6 de notre
MoU ne l’est pas davantage. Comme dans le reste du texte d’ailleurs, sa rédaction est tellement
alignée sur celle de la CNUDM qu’au lieu de mentionner «les Parties» comme l’eût fait tout
accord de règlement des différends «normal», il fait référence aux deux «Etats côtiers» to the
«two coastal States».
6
Molière, Le Bourgeois gentilhomme, scène XVI.
7
Voir notamment CR 2016/10, p. 13, par. 3 ; p. 15-16, par. 11-13 (Muigai) ; p. 17-18, par. 8 ; p. 19 (titre) ;
p. 19-22, par. 14-22 ; p. 26, par. 39 (Akhavan) ; p. 30, par. 16 (Khan) ; CR 2016/12, p. 10, par. 20 ; p. 12, par. 6
(Akhavan) ; p. 36, par. 32 (Lowe). - 14 -
6. Du reste, durant la présentation des demandes du Kenya devant la Commission des limites
du plateau continental (CLPC) du 3 septembre 2009, Mme Nkoroi, présidente de la Task Force sur
la délinéation du plateau continental étendu du Kenya, a déclaré que, conformément au MoU, par
lequel «the parties undertake not to object to the examination of their respective submissions, … at
an appropriate time, a mechanism will be established to finalize the maritime boundary
8
negotiations with Somalia» . Le professeur Akhavan (comme le professeur Forteau durant le
premier tour ) fait grand cas de cette déclaration , qui n’est pourtant guère compatible avec sa
propre thèse puisque, d’une part, elle confirme que l’objet du MoU est bien la non-objection et,
d’autre part, elle indique qu’un mécanisme de règlement sera établi «will be established» , ce
qui veut clairement dire qu’il ne l’avait pas été par le MoU signé cinq mois plus tôt. Et
Mme Nkoroi, qui fait partie de la délégation kényane dans la présente instance, savait de quoi elle
parlait : elle avait été étroitement associée à la préparation de cet instrument et était la principale
11
correspondante kényane de l’ambassadeur Longva durant son élaboration et un membre de poids
de l’équipe kényane qui a mené les négociations de 2014 avec la Somalie sur la délimitation de la
frontière .2
7. Les formules utilisées par Mme Nkoroi devant la CLPC sont reprises dans la note verbale
de la mission permanente du Kenya auprès des Nations Unies au Secrétaire général en date du
24 octobre 2014, qui précise que le MoU énonçait des «arrangements provisoires de caractère
pratique» conformément aux dispositions de l’article 83, paragraphe 3, de la CNUDM, dont la note
13
reprend également la terminologie . Et, pas plus tard que lundi dernier, Mathias Forteau
8 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to
H.E. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 586/14 (24 October 2014) (Memorial of Somalia (MS),
Vol. III, Annex 50).
9 CR 2016/10, p. 43, par. 28 (Forteau).
10CR 2016/12, p. 13, par. 8 (Akhavan).
11
Voir E-mail from Mr. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Ms Juster Nkoroi (March 2009) (Preliminary Objections of
Kenya (POK), Annex 6) et E-mail exchange between Ms Rina Kristmoen, Professor Abdirahman Ibbi, Mr. Hans
Wilhelm Longva, and Ms Juster Nkoroi (10-22 March 2009) (POK, Annex 7) ; E-mail exchange between Mr. Hans
Wilhelm Longva, Professor Abdirahman Ibbi and Ms Juster Nkoroi (27 March 2009) (POK, annexe 8).
12
Dr. Karanja Kibicho, Confidential Note to Ms Juster Nkoroi regarding «Proposal for the Cabinet Secretary
MFA and Other Senior Government Official to Visit Mogadishu to Discuss Maritime Boundary Including Lifting of
Objection by Somalia on MOU Granting No Objection to Consideration of Kenya’s Submission», MFA.INT.8/15A
(23 August 2014) (POK, Annex 40).
13 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations to
H.E. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 586/14 (24 October 2014) (MS, Vol. III, Annex 50). - 15 -
proclamait que le MoU supposait «nécessairement d’établir, au moment opportun, un mécanisme
pour finaliser les négociations» . Un mécanisme de règlement ne peut pas à la fois avoir été établi
et devoir l’être !
8. Il n’est pas possible non plus d’analyser l’avant-dernier paragraphe du MoU comme une
disposition «procédurale» impliquant de recourir à des négociations . Elle se borne à dire que la
délimitation se fera par voie d’accord comme le fait le premier paragraphe des articles 74 et 83.
Ni par ces dispositions de la CNUDM, ni par le paragraphe 6 du MoU «the Parties have agreed to
settle the maritime boundary dispute not by adjudication, but by negotiation» as suggested by
16 17
Professor Lowe . This is [NOT] what they agreed in the MOU .
Fin de la projection n 2 Projection n 3 : paragraphe 6 du MoU
18
9. L’élément temporel maintenant, qui tient tellement à cœur à nos contradicteurs .
Assurément, le paragraphe 6 inclut un tel élément puisque l’accord sur la délimitation des
frontières maritimes dans la zone (ou «les zones») en litige fera l’objet de l’accord envisagé après
que la CLPC aura fait ses recommandations sur les demandes des deux Etats côtiers. Mais un
accord sur quoi ? Sur la délimitation des frontières maritimes dans la zone en litige dans son
ensemble, in full, «y compris la délimitation du plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles marins».
Et pour cause : ceci ne saurait être fait plus tôt puisque ce n’est qu’après l’intervention de la CLPC
que l’on pourra finaliser complètement cette délimitation, la finaliser in full.
10. Je comprends, Monsieur le président, que Mathias Forteau soit passé pudiquement et
rapidement sur ce point embarrassant . Mais je rappelle tout de même que c’est ce que le Kenya
lui-même avait reconnu dans ses observations écrites et dans ses plaidoiries de lundi et ses
avocats n’ont pas pu éviter, avant-hier, de le redire je cite le professeur Akhavan :
14 CR 2016/10, p. 43, par. 28 (Forteau).
15
CR 2016/12, p. 23, par. 25-26 (Forteau) ; p. 31, par. 12 (Lowe).
16
Ibid.
17 Cf. ibid.
18 Voir CR 2016/12, p. 11, par. 4 (Akhavan) ; p. 22, par. 21 (Forteau) ; p. 32, par. 13, 16 (Lowe).
19 CR 2016/12, p. 24, par. 28 (Forteau). - 16 -
«The MoU sets out a coherent three-step method of settlement: first, “no
objection” to CLCS submissions; second, CLCS review; and, third, a final agreement
covering all maritime areas in dispute» .20
Oui, Monsieur le président, c’est cela qui devra être conclu après l’intervention de la CLPC : un
accord final a final agreement s’étendant à l’ensemble des zones maritimes respectives des
Parties.
11. Il était tout à fait utile de le préciser et cela dans la perspective même de la procédure
en trois temps chère à nos contradicteurs : d’abord les demandes de la CLPC ; ensuite, on n’objecte
pas conformément à l’objet même du MoU, ensuite on finalise la délimitation. Et c’est cette
opération de finalisation, qui n’apparaît nulle part ailleurs dans ce document, qui rend l’inclusion
du paragraphe 6 non seulement utile, mais nécessaire. Sans doute, cette disposition ne fait-elle que
rappeler ce qui est expressément prévu dans les articles 74, paragraphe 1, et 83, paragraphe 1, de la
convention sur le droit de la mer. Mais, outre que ce ne serait pas la seule disposition du MoU qui
aurait une fonction «pédagogique» ou descriptive , ce rappel était d’autant plus indispensable dans
ce cas-ci que la Somalie avait tout intérêt à se prémunir contre tout effet absolu des
recommandations de la Commission.
o o
Fin de la projection n 3 -- Projection n 4 : paragraphe 6 du MoU/paragraphe 8 de
l’article 76 de la CNUDM
12. En effet, aux termes du paragraphe 8 de l’article 76 de la CNUDM : «La Commission
adresse aux Etats côtiers des recommandations sur les questions concernant la fixation des limites
extérieures de leur plateau continental. Les limites fixées par un Etat côtier sur la base de ces
recommandations sont définitives et de caractère obligatoire». Or, il était déjà tout à fait clair à
l’époque de l’adoption du MoU que le Kenya serait en mesure d’obtenir les recommandations de la
CLPC bien avant la Somalie. Il était donc de première importance de rappeler que tout acte
unilatéral du Kenya fixant les limites de sa marge continentale extérieure ne serait pas opposable à
la Somalie et que la frontière commune dans cet espace maritime devait, elle aussi, faire l’objet
d’un accord. Cette précaution, prise dans le paragraphe 6, est du reste conforme à l’esprit général
du texte dans lequel l’ambassadeur Longva, excellent spécialiste du droit de la mer, s’est montré
20CR 2016/12, p. 10-11, par. 4 (Akhavan) – les italiques sont de nous.
21
CR 2016/11, p. 22-23, par. 15, p. 24, par. 18 (Pellet). - 17 -
soucieux de préserver les intérêts de la Somalie ce qui est particulièrement apparent également
22
dans le paragraphe 4 et au début du paragraphe 5 du MoU .
Fin de la projection.
13. Comme la chambre de la Cour l’a souligné dans l’affaire du Golfe du Maine,
«87. Le principe de droit international [de la délimitation par voie d’accord] est
simple, mais il ne faut pas pour autant en sous-estimer l’importance. Il ne faut pas y
voir une pure «vérité allant de soi». Ce principe entend surtout prescrire par
implication qu’une délimitation du plateau continental qu’un Etat établirait par voie
unilatérale, sans se soucier des vues de l’autre ou des autres Etats concernés par la
23
délimitation, est inopposable à ces derniers en droit international.»
14. C’est cette vérité «n’allant pas forcément de soi» que rappelle le paragraphe 6 du MoU.
Ce rappel était d’autant plus indispensable ici que l’accent mis sur le fait que la délinéation était
sans préjudice de la délimitation pouvait faire douter des relations entre l’une et l’autre de ces
opérations. Mais ceci ne concerne que le plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles et encore,
24
comme le montrent de nombreux précédents , ceci n’empêche pas les Etats concernés d’adopter
une direction de la frontière même si son point d’aboutissement demeure suspendu à sa conformité
avec les recommandations de la CLPC.
15. Monsieur le président, pas plus qu’Anzilotti, le professeur Lowe n’a toujours tort, et nous
n’avons aucun mal à le suivre lorsqu’il explique : «Somalia made no suggestion that paragraph 6 is
25
superfluous, or alien to the purpose of the MoU, or carries anything other than its plain meaning» .
Le MoU insiste sur le fait que la délimitation et la délinéation sont sans préjudice l’une de
26
l’autre : on peut délimiter, sans que la délinéation ait été effectuée ; on peut délinéer en l’absence
de délimitation ; mais la délimitation finale, in full, «y compris la délimitation du plateau
continental au-delà de 200 milles marins», ne peut, elle, intervenir qu’une fois la délinéation
réalisée suite à la procédure devant la CLPC. Tel est le sens évident, ordinaire, the plain meaning,
du paragraphe 6.
22Voir CR 2016/11, p. 24-25, par. 18-20 (Pellet).
23 Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 292, par. 87.
24Voir CR 2016/11, p. 27, par. 25 et note de bas de page n 43 (Pellet).
25
CR 2016/12, p. 32, par. 13 (Lowe).
26Voir les paragraphes 3, 4 et 5 du MoU. - 18 -
16. Et, bien sûr, cette délimitation finale ne peut venir que «plus tard», à la fin du processus
de délinéation. A cet égard, je m’étonne que le professeur Forteau semble avoir découvert avec
ravissement dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi que cette fixation complète des limites extérieures du
plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles marins ne pourrait intervenir que dans le futur... 27 Au
demeurant, le reste de la délimitation est elle aussi couverte par l’expression «future délimitation» :
le «futur» par rapport au MoU c’est ce qui suit la date de sa signature, le 7 avril 2009. On ne peut
pas tirer grand-chose de cette vérité d’évidence.
17. Et j’ai du mal à me passionner pour le pluriel, fût-il double, qui galvanise le
professeur Forteau. «Zone(s) maritime(s)» au singulier ou au pluriel... area ou areas... On utilise
décidément sans beaucoup d’états d’âme l’un pour l’autre. Comme je l’ai relevé mardi dernier, le
MoU lui-même se réfère neuf fois à l’area under dispute et seulement deux fois aux areas au
pluriel . Et les représentants du Kenya n’ont pas manqué à la tradition durant leurs plaidoiries de
cette semaine en parlant alternativement et sans aucun critère distinctif d’area au singulier ou
d’areas au pluriel : si on laisse de côté les citations du paragraphe 6, nous avons relevé
six singuliers et six pluriels match nul (je me permets de vous renvoyer au document figurant à
o
l’onglet n 24 de vos dossiers). Mathias Forteau s’est montré plus attentif à n’utiliser que le pluriel
c’est normal : il lui fallait tenter de sauver son argument mais l’indifférence insouciante de
ses collègues montre que, décidément, pluriel ou singulier c’est «blanc bonnet ou bonnet blanc» !
Et c’est sans doute également ainsi que s’explique le passage du singulier au pluriel dans les
différentes versions du projet de mémorandum . 29
18. Monsieur le président, le MoU n’est pas un pactum de non contrahendo, pas davantage
qu’un pactum de non judicando. Il n’est pas non plus un pactum de negociando. Il est un accord
de non-objection un pactum de non recusando. Ceci est attesté :
par son titre qui embarrasse si fort nos contradicteurs ;
par le texte du paragraphe 6 lui-même, qui ne contient pas la moindre allusion à un mode
quelconque de règlement des différends, et n’évoque pas les négociations entre les Parties ;
27CR 2016/12, p. 22, par. 21-23 (Forteau). Voir les paragraphes 3, 4 et 5 du MoU.
28CR 2016/11, p. 24, par. 18 (Pellet).
29
Voir CR 2016/12, p. 17, par. 3 (Forteau). - 19 -
par le contexte de cette disposition, qui s’inscrit dans une séquence montrant, sans l’ombre
d’un doute, qu’il s’agissait dans l’esprit des auteurs du MoU non pas de repousser aux calendes
grecques la délimitation de la zone en litige, mais d’en permettre la délinéation ; et, à cet égard,
la curieuse idée du professeur Lowe selon laquelle un traité pourrait avoir plusieurs objets et
buts qui ne me paraît pas aller de soi est inopérante ; notre MoU n’en n’a qu’un : éviter
que la CLPC refuse de délinéer en l’absence de délimitation et sans préjudice de celle-ci
«sans préjudice», c’est-à-dire que la délimitation soit décidée ou non tout en assurant du
même coup que la Somalie ne sera pas placée devant le fait accompli d’une délimitation
unilatérale ;
ceci est également confirmé par les travaux préparatoires de cet instrument et par les
circonstances de sa conclusion,
ainsi que par la pratique ultérieurement suivie par les deux Etats, sur lesquels mon ami Paul
Reichler va revenir dans un instant.
19. Monsieur le président, le professeur Lowe nous a fait bénéficier d’un brillant exposé sur
la liberté souveraine des Etats de choisir le mode de règlement de leurs différends cet exposé
mériterait, je pense, d’être annexé aux actes du séminaire pour le soixante-dixième anniversaire de
30
la Cour ou de celui à venir en l’honneur du vingtième anniversaire du TIDM . Dans cette
conférence, l’orateur a évoqué en une jolie formule le «pacte solennel entre les Etats et la Cour»
(the «solemn pact between States and the Court» ). Le fondement de ce pacte, c’est le respect de
la mise en œuvre du principe consensuel. Et le consentement est aussi le fondement de cet autre
pacte qui se noue entre les Etats parties au Statut eux-mêmes lorsqu’ils adhèrent à la clause
facultative de l’article 36, paragraphe 2 : «les déclarations», avez-vous dit, «bien qu’étant des actes
unilatéraux, établissent une série de liens bilatéraux avec les autres Etats qui acceptent la même
obligation par rapport à la juridiction obligatoire, en prenant en considération les conditions,
réserves et stipulations de durée. Dans l’établissement de ce réseau d’engagements qui constitue le
30CR 2016/12, p. 34-37, par. 25-36 (Lowe).
31Ibid., p. 37, par. 35 (Lowe). - 20 -
32
système de la clause facultative, le principe de bonne foi joue un rôle essentiel» . Dans notre
espèce, les réserves de la Somalie et du Kenya sont sans pertinence puisque le MoU ne constitue en
aucune manière un accord en vue de recourir à un mode de règlement du différend maritime entre
les Parties en dehors de la Cour. Et ce n’est évidemment pas davantage le cas de la partie XV de la
CNUDM. Le professeur Sands reviendra tout à l’heure sur cette trouvaille tardive, et un peu
dérisoire, de nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre.
20. Dans l’immédiat, Monsieur le président, auriez-vous l’obligeance de donner la parole à
M Reichler. Je vous remercie vivement, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, de m’avoir à nouveau
subi avec bienveillance.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne à présent la parole à
M. Reichler.
Mr. REICHLER:
T HE EVIDENCE
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, today I will be uncharacteristically brief. It’s not
because I don’t enjoy making long speeches to you. It’s just that, after hearing my good friends on
the other side on Wednesday, there is not much more that needs to be said about the evidence. The
fact is, the Parties are in agreement on almost all of it. There are very few points of disagreement.
2. So my task today will be to call your attention to the evidence that now can be considered
undisputed, to identify the factual issues that are still contested, and to offer some observations on
those issues. I will follow the same pattern as in the first round. First I will address the evidence
regarding the Parties’ understanding of the MOU at the time it was executed. Then I will turn to
their subsequent conduct.
3. The following facts, which I discussed in the first round, are now either agreed by Kenya,
or have not been disputed and can therefore be taken as agreed.
32
Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 418, par. 60 ; voir aussi Droit de passage sur territoire indien
(Portugal c. Inde), exceptions prélominaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1957, p. 146 ; Compagnie d’électricité de Sofia et de
Bulgarie, arrêt, 1939, C.P.J.I. série A/B n 77, p. 81. - 21 -
i. The MOU was conceived and drafted by Norway . 33
ii. Norway’s purpose was to secure the Parties’ non-objection to each other’s outer
continental shelf submission to the CLCS . 34
iii. Norway had no interest in the delimitation of the Parties’ maritime boundary, nor in the
35
resolution of their boundary dispute . In Norway’s own words in regard to this MOU:
“Norway takes no position on these issues other than laying as a premise for its assistance
that such issues of maritime delimitation with other States not be prejudiced.” 36
iv. In describing the MOU, Norway referred to it only as a non-objection agreement. It never
referred to the MOU as an agreement on dispute resolution . 37
v. In regard to issues of delimitation, Norway’s object was, first, to assure that the boundary
dispute did not give rise to an objection by either Party to the outer continental shelf
submission of the other; and, second, to ensure that neither the MOU nor the Parties’
submissions to the CLCS prejudiced their respective positions on the boundary in any
38
way .
vi There is not a single reference, in any of the contemporaneous correspondence concerning
the MOU, from Norway, from Kenya or from Somalia, to settlement of the maritime
33CR 2016/11, pp. 35-36, paras. 5, 9 (Reichler). See Federal Republic of Somalia, Preliminary Information
Indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf and Description of the status of preparation of making a submission
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for Somalia (14 Apr. 2009), p. 4; Memorial of Somalia (MS),
Vol. III, Ann. 66.
34CR 2016/11, pp. 37-38, paras. 15-16 (Reichler). See Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Norway to
the United Nations to the Secretariat of the United Nations (17 Aug. 2011); Preliminary Objections of Kenya (POK),
Vol. II, Ann. 4.
35CR 2016/11, pp. 37-38, paras. 15-16 (Reichler). See Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Norway to
the United Nations to the Secretariat of the United Nations (17 Aug. 2011); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 4; Prepared Remarks by
Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva at Pan African Conference on Maritime Boundary Delimitation and the Continental Shelf,
Accra (9– 10 Nov. 2009); POK, Ann. 25, p. 1
36
Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations to the Secretariat of the
United Nations (17 Aug. 2011); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 4.
37
CR 2016/11, pp. 36-39, paras. 10, 12, 14, 16-19 (Reichler); Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of
Norway to the United Nations to the Secretariat of the United Nations (17 Aug. 2011); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 4.
38
CR 2016/11, p. 36, para. 10 (Reichler); Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Norway to the
United Nations to the Secretariat of the United Nations (17 Aug. 2011); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 4. - 22 -
boundary, or to the establishment of a method for resolving that dispute, or to the
39
substance of paragraph 6 .
vii None of the correspondence between Ambassador Longva of Norway and Kenya makes
any reference to dispute settlement or to paragraph 6 . 40
viii None of the correspondence between Ambassador Longva and Somalia makes any
41
reference to dispute settlement or to paragraph 6 .
ix. Kenya referred to the MOU in its internal reporting , its presentation to the CLCS , and 43
its Executive Summary , and in all cases described the MOU solely as a non-objection
agreement. It did not describe the MOU as an agreement on dispute settlement. It did not
describe paragraph 6 as establishing a means of settlement of the boundary dispute.
39
CR 2016/11, p. 36, para. 12 (Reichler). See e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Ms Juster Nkoroi
(Mar. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 6; e-mail exchange between Ms Rina Kristmoen, Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi,
Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, and Ms Juster Nkoroi (10–22 Mar. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 8; e-mail exchange between
Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi and Ms Juster Nkoroi (27 Mar. 2009); POK, Vol, II, Ann. 8;
e-mail exchange between Ms Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30 Mar. 2009), p. 44; POK, Vol. II,
Ann.9; e-mail exchange between Ms Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30-31 Mar. 2009), p. 47; POK,
Vol. II, Ann. 10; e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Mr. James Kihwaga (undated), p. 58; POK, Vol. II,
Ann. 14; e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi (3 Apr. 2009), p. 1;
Written Statement of Somalia (WSS), Vol. II, Ann. 20.
40
CR 2016/11, p. 36, para. 12 (Reichler). See e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Ms Juster Nkoroi
(Mar. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 6; e-mail exchange between Ms Rina Kristmoen, Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi, Amb. Hans
Wilhelm Longva, and Ms Juster Nkoroi (10–22 Mar. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 8; e-mail exchange between Amb. Hans
Wilhelm Longva, Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi and Ms Juster Nkoroi (27 Mar. 2009); POK, Vol, II, Ann. 8; e-mail exchange
between Ms Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30 Mar. 2009), p. 44; POK, Vol. II, Ann. 9; e-mail
exchange between Ms Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30-31 Mar. 2009), p.47; POK, Vol. II,
Ann. 10; e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Mr. James Kihwaga (undated), p. 58; POK, Vol. II, Ann. 14.
41
CR 2016/11, p. 36, para. 12 (Reichler). See e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Ms Juster Nkoroi
(Mar. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 6; e-mail exchange between Ms Rina Kristmoen, Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi, Amb. Hans
Wilhelm Longva, and Ms. Juster Nkoroi (10–22 Mar. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 8; e-mail exchange between
Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi and Ms Juster Nkoroi (27 Mar. 2009); POK, Vol, II, Ann. 8;
e-mail exchange between Ms Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30 Mar. 2009), p. 44; POK, Vol. II,
Ann. 9; e-mail exchange between Ms Edith K. Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30-31 Mar. 2009), p.47; POK,
Vol. II, Ann. 10; e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Mr. James Kihwaga (undated), p. 58; POK, Vol. II,
Ann. 14; e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi (3 Apr. 2009), p. 1; WSS,
Vol. II, Ann. 20.
42
CR 2016/11, p. 39, para. 20 (Reichler); Message from Jacqueline K. Moseti to the Legal Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs regarding “Registration of Memorandum of Understanding between GOK and the Transitional Federal
Government of the Somali Republic” (20 Aug. 2009) attaching Note Verbale from the United Nations Secretariat
(14 Aug. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 17.
43CR 2016/11, p. 39, para. 21 (Reichler); United Nations, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Statement by the Chairman of the CLCS on the progress of work of the Commission, United Nations doc. CLCS/64
(1 Oct. 2009), para. 95; MS, Vol. III, Ann. 61.
44CR 2016/11, p. 39, para. 22 (Reichler); Republic of Kenya, Submission on the Continental Shelf Submission
beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Executive Summary (Apr. 2009),
para. 7-3; MS, Vol. III, Ann. 59. - 23 -
x. Somalia, too, understood the MOU as a non-objection agreement, and nothing more . Its 45
46
only proposed change was to the title . It relied entirely on Norway, and executed the
document in the belief that this was necessary in order to be able to submit its outer
continental shelf claim to the CLCS . 47
xi. There is no evidence that either Party gave any particular attention to paragraph 6, or held
or expressed the view that the MOU was (or could be treated as) an agreement on
settlement of the maritime boundary dispute . 48
4. None of this is disputed. I covered all of these points in the first round. Kenya had its
chance to respond. They disputed none of it.
5. The only point of dispute concerns what my friend Professor Forteau has called, rather
euphemistically, the “travaux preparatoires” . He said I paid scant attention to it . That is 50
because it is scant, but it is a fair point and I will address it now.
6. The record includes two drafts of the MOU, and the correspondence about the MOU
between Ambassador Longva and Kenya on the one hand , and between him and Somalia on the
45
CR 2016/11, pp. 40-41, para. 25 (Reichler). See e-mail exchange between Ms Rina Kristmoen,
Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi, Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva and Ms Juster Nkoroi (10–22 Mar. 2009), pp. 1-2;
POK, Vol. II, Ann. 7; Network Al-Shahid, Press Release issued by former Somali Minister of National Planning and
International Cooperation, Dr. Abdirahman Abdishakur (7 July 2012), p. 2; POK, Vol. II, Ann. 13.
4CR 2016/11, p. 22, para. 14 (Pellet); CR 2016/11, p. 37, para. 13 (Reichler); e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm
Longva to Mr. James Kihwaga; POK, Vol. II, Ann. 14.
4CR 2016/11, pp. 40-41, para. 25 (Reichler); Federal Republic of Somalia, Preliminary Information Indicative
of the outer limits of the continental shelf and Description of the status of preparation of making a submission to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for Somalia (“Somalia, Preliminary Information to the CLCS”)
(14 Apr. 2009), p. 4, MS, Vol. III, Ann. 66; POK, Ann. 13, p. 2 (Somali Minister of Planning and International
Cooperation indicating that the Somali Government had “to sign the MOU with Kenya” in order to proceed with its
submission); POK, Ann. 7, pp. 1-2 (recording the Somali Deputy Prime Minister expressing his gratitude to Norway
with regard to the CLCS submission and expressing his understanding that “we must have the mem[o]random of
understanding that [Norway] ha[s] prepared”).
4CR 2016/11, pp. 40, 48, paras. 23, 35, 47 (Reichler).
4CR 2016/12, pp. 16-17, paras. 2-4 (Forteau).
50
CR 2016/12, p. 17, para. 4 (Forteau).
51
See e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to Ms Juster Nkoroi (Mar. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 6; e-mail
exchange between Ms Rina Kristmoen, Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi, Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, and Ms Juster Nkoroi
(10 - 22 Mar. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 7; e-mail exchange between Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, Prof. Abdirahman
Ibbi and Ms Juster Nkoroi (27 Mar. 2009); POK, Vol, II, Ann. 8; e-mail exchange between Ms Edith K. Ngungu and
Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30 Mar. 2009), p. 44; POK, Vol. II, Ann. 9; e-mail exchange between Ms Edith K.
Ngungu and Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (30-31 Mar. 2009), p. 47; POK, Vol. II, Ann. 10; e-mail from Amb. Hans
Wilhelm Longva to Mr. James Kihwaga (undated), p. 58; POK, Vol. II, Ann. 14. - 24 -
52
other . I covered all of the correspondence in the first round, pointing out that there is nothing in
any of it suggesting, explicitly or implicitly, that the MOU was regarded as a dispute settlement
agreement, or that it might have such an object and purpose . Kenya has not disputed that.
7. So I will turn to the two drafts of the MOU. The first was transmitted to the Parties in
March 2009 , and the other is the final version of the agreement. Both were sent by Norway.
There is no evidence that either Party made any comments on paragraph 6 in either version. In the
final version, the word “area,” which appeared in the text ten times, was changed to “areas” in just
two places, once in paragraph 4 and once in paragraph 6 . This is what Professor Lowe was
referring to when he attempted to make something out of the fact that the paragraph “was the
subject of amendments during the drafting process” . This was the sole change to paragraph 6.
There is no evidence that it was made at the request of either Party. There is no evidence as to why
it was made, or whether it was considered to be necessary or even substantive.
8. Professor Lowe suggests that “[i]t cannot be claimed that the Parties were ignorant of”
57
paragraph 6 . But that is not Somalia’s point. We assume each Party read it before they signed it.
Our point is that there is no evidence that, and no reason to believe that, the Parties intended or
understood it to be a binding agreement on dispute settlement, or anything other than a
non-objection agreement in respect of their submissions to the CLCS.
9. That is all there is to the so-called travaux. There is nothing else. There is nothing there
to support Kenya’s current interpretation of the MOU, an interpretation that Kenya expressed for
52
See e-mail exchange between Ms Rina Kristmoen, Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi, Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva, and
Ms Juster Nkoroi (10–22 Mar. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 7; e-mail exchange between Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva,
Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi and Ms Juster Nkoroi (27 Mar. 2009); POK. Vol, II, Ann. 8; e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm
Longva to Prof. Abdirahman Ibbi (2 Apr. 2009); POK, Vol. II, Ann. 12; e-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva to
Hon. Prof. Abdirahman Haji Adan Ibbi (3 Apr. 2009), p. 1; WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 20.
53CR 2016/11, p. 36, para. 12 (Reichler).
54
E-mail from Amb. Hans Wilhelm Longva (27 Mar. 2009), in Letter from Registrar (23 Mar. 2016), annexing
Letter from Royal Norwegian Embassy (21 Mar. 2016).
55
Compare Draft Memorandum of Understanding 2, in Letter from Registrar (23 Mar. 2016), annexing Letter
from Royal Norwegian Embassy (21 Mar. 2016), para. 6, with Memorandum of Understanding between the Government
of the Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to Grant to Each Other
No-Objection in Respect of Submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2599 United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS) 35 (7 Apr. 2009),
para. 6; MS, Vol. III, Ann. 6.
56CR 2016/12, p. 32, para. 17 (Lowe).
57CR 2016/12, p. 32, para. 17 (Lowe). - 25 -
the first time only after Somalia commenced these proceedings. Professor Forteau conceded this
58
on Monday .
10. I turn to the Parties’ conduct. Almost all of that evidence is now undisputed, as well.
Here is what is now agreed, or may be considered to be undisputed as a result of Kenya’s failure to
challenge it.
i. Kenya invited Somalia to engage in negotiations to agree on a maritime boundary in May
59
2013 , before the CLCS had even begun to consider either of their submissions, and
before Somalia objected to consideration of Kenya’s submission. Kenya at that time did
not consider it necessary to await CLCS action before negotiating a boundary agreement.
Nor did Kenya initiate negotiations to address Somalia’s objection, which was not even
made until nine months after Kenya’s invitation to negotiate.
ii. Boundary negotiations took place in 2014 . 60 They were serious and substantive
negotiations at which each side fully presented and defended its views. Detailed technical
and legal presentations were made . On Wednesday, Kenya abandoned its contention
that the negotiations were about withdrawal of Somalia’s objection. It now accepts that
62
these were highly substantive and technical negotiations on the maritime boundary .
iii. The delegations to the talks, both in March 2014 and in July 2014, were headed by the
63
Foreign Ministers . Both Ministers were present during the entirety of the talks in July,
64
and expressed their views .
58
See CR 2016/10, pp. 42, 45, paras. 26, 34 (Forteau).
59CR 2016/11, p. 11, para. 27 (Reichler); F. Yusuf H. Adam, Minister of Foreign Affairs & International
Cooperation, Federal Republic of Somalia, & A. Mohamed, Cabinet Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kenya,
Kenya-Somalia Joint Press Release (31 May 2013), p. 2; POK, Vol. II, Ann. 31.
60See WSS, paras. 2.41-2.74; CR 2016/11, page 11, para. 28 (Reichler); Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on
Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (1 Apr. 2014). MS, Vol. III, Ann. 31; Government of Somalia and
Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia Maritime Boundary Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014).
MS, Vol. III, Ann. 32.
61
See Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (1 Apr. 2014).
MS, Vol. III, Ann. 31; Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia Maritime
Boundary Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014). MS, Vol. III, Ann. 32.
62
CR 2016/12, pages 33-34, paras. 21-23 (Lowe).
63
See Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014, p. 1; MS, Vol. III,
Ann. 31; Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia Maritime Boundary
Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014), para. 1; MS, Vol. III, Ann. 32.
64
M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On
Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July 2014 (5 Aug. 2014); WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 4. - 26 -
iv. No agreement was reached. No progress toward an agreement was made. The Parties
65
disagreed sharply, even over the appropriate method for the delimitation . Kenya insisted
that the boundary follow a parallel of latitude . 66 Somalia insisted that it follow an
equidistance line, consistent with ICJ jurisprudence . 67 There was no narrowing of
68
positions, or indication of flexibility by either Party on this matter of principle . The
discussions were heated.
v. At the conclusion of the July negotiations, the Foreign Minister of Somalia suggested that
it was pointless to continue such heated discussions where the Parties were so far apart,
and there were no signs that an agreement would be possible. The Kenyan Foreign
Minister agreed that they were far apart, but proposed that there be one more meeting to
69
“attempt one final time to find an amicable solution” .
vi. Somalia’s Foreign Minister agreed to that request, and a third and final meeting was
scheduled for 25-26 August in Mogadishu . 70
65Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014, p. 6; MS, Vol. III,
Ann. 31.
66Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014, p. 5; MS, Vol. III,
Ann. 31; Memorandum from S. Mokaya-Orina, Head/Legal & Host Country Affairs Directorate, to Cabinet Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, Republic of Kenya (8 Aug. 2014), p. 2.
67Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014, p. 6; MS, Vol. III,
Ann. 31; Memorandum from S. Mokaya-Orina, Head/Legal & Host Country Affairs Directorate, to Cabinet Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, Republic of Kenya (8 Aug. 2014), p. 1.
68See Somalia and Kenya, Joint Report on Maritime Boundary Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014, p. 6; MS, Vol. III,
Ann. 31; Memorandum from S. Mokaya-Orina, Head/Legal & Host Country Affairs Directorate, to Cabinet Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, Republic of Kenya (8 Aug. 2014); Government of Somalia and
Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somalia Maritime Boundary Meeting, 28-29 July 2014 (July 2014);
MS, Vol. III, Ann. 32.
69
M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On
Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July 2014 (5 Aug. 2014), p. 2; WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 4.
70See Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion of the
Federal Republic of Somalia, to H.E. Ms Amina Mohamed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya,
No. 2231 (26 Aug. 2014), p. 1; MS, Vol. III, Ann. 47. See also M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, Representatives of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal
Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July 2014
(5 Aug. 2014), pp. 3-4; WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 4. - 27 -
vii. The Kenyan delegation failed to show up for the meeting. No advance notice was given.
No subsequent explanation was provided . 71 Kenya’s non-appearance took Somalia
completely by surprise. Somalia urgently communicated with Kenya to find out what
happened. Kenya never responded . 72
11. All of these facts are now agreed, or at least undisputed. It remains for me to address a
few points raised for the first time on Wednesday by my friend Professor Lowe.
12. Professor Lowe concedes that the Foreign Ministers were present during the
negotiations — he has no choice since this is recorded in the Joint Reports — but he attempts to
minimize this by suggesting that this was merely “in order to build confidence” . There is no73
evidence to support this statement, which is pure unsubstantiated assertion on his part, and no
evidence is cited in his speech. The Reports show that the Ministers headed the delegations to both
74
talks, and were full and active participants in the July talks .
13. Professor Lowe further attempts to dismiss the Foreign Ministers’ role in the negotiations
by suggesting that there is no evidence that “either Minister took the matter back to her
Government in order to decide the Government’s position . . . or that either Government
communicated on the matter with the other at the political level” . With respect, my good friend
could not have been serious. In the first place, the Foreign Ministers are the political level. Their
communication with one another, as at the July negotiations, is communication between the two
governments at the political level. Second, it can safely be presumed that, in the matter of
negotiating a maritime boundary agreement, the Foreign Ministers reported, or took the matter
71See Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion of the
Federal Republic of Somalia, to H.E. Ms Amina Mohamed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya,
No. 2231 (26 Aug. 2014); MS, Vol. III, Ann. 47.
72CR 2016/11, p. 45, para. 45 (Reichler); Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Investment Promotion of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to H.E. Ms Amina Mohamed, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Kenya, No. 2231 (26 Aug. 2014), p. 1; MS, Vol. III, Ann. 47; M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar,
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting
between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya,
28-29 July 2014 (5 Aug. 2014), pp. 3-4; WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 4.
73CR 2016/12, page 33, para. 20 (Lowe).
74See Government of Somalia and Government of Kenya, Joint Report on the Kenya-Somali Maritime Boundary
Meeting, 26-27 Mar. 2014 (1 Apr. 2014), p. 1; MS, Vol. III, Ann. 31; and M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar,
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting
between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya,
28-29 July 2014 (5 Aug. 2014), pp. 3-4; WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 4.
75CR 2016/12, p. 33, para. 20 (Lowe). - 28 -
back to, the highest governmental authorities. That is their duty. And they had ample opportunity
to consult and receive instructions, before the March 2014 talks, between March and July of 2014,
and during the month that elapsed between the July talks and those that were scheduled for late
August. Is Professor Lowe seriously suggesting that the distinguished Foreign Ministers of
Somalis and Kenya were off on a frolic of their own? There is certainly no evidence before you for
that.
14. Professor’s Lowe’s final assertion is that Somalia did not wait long enough before
coming to the Court; that gaps between the two Parties’ positions were still somehow
“bridgeable”, and that if Somalia considered that a negotiated solution was impossible, its “view of
the hopelessness of the position was not communicated to Kenya” . 76
15. Kenya has offered no explanation as to why it believes the differences were
“bridgeable”. Professor Lowe cites only to Kenya’s internal report on the July negotiations . At 77
the time of that report, which is dated 8 August 2014, the Parties were anticipating, and preparing
for a final round of meetings later that month, which had been requested by Kenya’s Foreign
Minister. In that context, the report spoke of an agreed need for the meetings to be structured, and
to develop guiding principles for them. It is not disputed that Kenya wanted to make one more try
at reaching an agreement. That is why Somalia agreed to the request and the August meetings were
scheduled. Kenya’s report in preparation for those meetings is consistent with this.
16. More significant is what Professor Lowe did not say. He made no mention of Somalia’s
78 79
internal report , or of the Somali Foreign Minister’s letter of 26 August to his Kenyan
counterpart, which was to the same effect. Professor Lowe made no effort to dispute that evidence.
Nor did Kenya’s Foreign Minister in the declaration she submitted earlier this year challenge that
evidence.
7CR 2016/12, p. 34, para. 21 (Lowe).
7CR 2016/12, p. 33, para. 21 (Lowe).
78
M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On
Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July 2014 (5 Aug. 2014), pp. 3-4; WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 4.
7Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion of the Federal
Republic of Somalia, to Ms Amina Mohamed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, No. 2231
(26 Aug 2014); MS, Vol. III, Ann. 47. - 29 -
17. As a result, it is undisputed that the Parties recognized, and acknowledged to one
another, at the conclusion of the July negotiations, that they were very far apart, and that there was
little hope of reaching a solution. And it is undisputed that the August talks were scheduled, at the
request of Kenya’s Foreign Minister, in her recorded words, as a “final” attempt to find an
80
amicable solution . The Court is aware of this report, which we provided at tab 18 of your folders
on Tuesday. I will not impose another reading of it on you, but you know where to find it.
Professor Lowe is simply wrong in asserting that Somalia did not communicate to Kenya its sense
of “hopelessness” in regard to the negotiations . To the contrary, the Somali Foreign Minister
clearly expressed this to his Kenyan counterpart at the conclusion of the July negotiations, which is
what prompted Kenya’s Foreign Minister to request the one final meeting to attempt to find an
82
amicable solution .
18. Professor Lowe calls it “regrettable” that the Kenyan delegation failed to show up for
83
that meeting, and then it failed to explain its absence . That is putting it mildly. In the
circumstances, with the Parties as far apart as they were, with each of them fastened tightly to its
own position on widely divergent delimitation methodologies, and with Kenya failing to appear for
what was considered to be the final attempt to reach an agreement, and failing to give advance
notice or subsequent explanation for its non-appearance, it was entirely reasonable for Somalia to
conclude that there would be no further negotiations, and that they would be pointless in any event.
Professor Sands will have more to say on this point.
19. My point is that Kenya’s conduct, especially its engagement in serious and substantive
negotiations to reach a boundary agreement, is inconsistent with its current interpretation of
paragraph 6 of the MOU as a binding agreement on dispute settlement. Even in the course of these
hearings, Kenya’s interpretation has changed, and changed again. There have been a number of
notable tactical retreats.
80See M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic
of Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On
Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July 2014 (5 Aug. 2014), p. 2; WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 4.
81CR 2016/12, p. 34, para. 21 (Lowe).
82
M. Al-Sharmani and M. Omar, Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Somalia, Report to the File of the Meeting between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Kenya On
Maritime Boundary Dispute, Nairobi, Kenya, 28-29 July 2014 (5 Aug. 2014), p. 2; WSS, Vol. II, Annex 4.
83
CR 2016/12, p. 34, para. 22 (Lowe). - 30 -
20. Kenya began by taking the position that paragraph 6 required the Parties to negotiate an
agreement to the boundary dispute only after the CLCS had issued its recommendations on both of
their submissions . But they soon found this interpretation impossible to reconcile with the
evidence that they themselves proposed boundary negotiations in 2013, and that they engaged in
them in 2014 notwithstanding the fact that the CLCS had not even begun to consider either Party’s
submission, let alone issued recommendations.
21. The first retreat was signalled by my friend Professor Akhavan on Monday. The new
interpretation that day was that paragraph 6 merely prevents the Parties from reaching a boundary
agreement before the CLCS issues its recommendations, but it does not prevent them from
negotiating before then. In other words, they can negotiate for ten or 20 years, or for whatever time
it takes for the CLCS to act, as long as they do not reach an agreement. Professor Akhavan even
called it “absurd” to suggest, as Kenya had in fact previously suggested, that paragraph 6 prevented
85
the Parties from negotiating before the CLCS completed its process .
22. That was Monday’s interpretation. After we chided them on interpreting paragraph 6 as
86
an “agreement not to agree” , they came up with a second new interpretation on Wednesday.
Again it fell to Professor Akhavan to present it. That new interpretation was that “the Parties are
87
free to conclude a boundary agreement whenever they want, based on mutual consent” .
23. This might have been intended as another tactical retreat, but I think it is more like
raising a white flag. It is a concession that completely undermines Professor Forteau’s courageous,
if ill-founded, argument that “[t]he temporal condition [of paragraph 6] is a legal condition, which
88
must equally be given effect” . Professor Forteau himself has not retreated from this position.
Ignoring Kenya’s own conduct, and its changing arguments, he has gamely clung to the position
that delimitation can only come about after the CLCS has completed its process. He is now the
lone defender of that fortress — the last of the Mohicans. Not even his own colleagues are willing
to stand beside him.
84
CR 2016/10, p. 63, para. 12 (Lowe).
85CR 2016/10, p. 20, para. 18 (Akhavan).
86CR 2016/11, p. 48, para. 48 (Reichler).
87
CR 2016/12, p. 13, para. 7 (Akhavan).
88CR 2016/12, p. 24, para. 27 (Forteau). - 31 -
24. More importantly, nor does the evidence support him. It shows that, prior to this case,
Kenya did not consider paragraph 6 of the MOU to be a binding agreement on dispute settlement.
Kenya did not consider itself bound to await delineation by the CLCS before embarking with
Somalia on delimitation of the maritime boundary. In 2014 Kenya and Somalia attempted to
delimit the boundary through bilateral negotiations. The attempt failed. Surely the MOU does not,
and was never intended to, deny recourse to judicial settlement in such circumstances, or to delay it
for ten or 20 years or for however long it takes the CLCS to issue recommendations that are in any
event entirely without prejudice to boundary delimitation.
25. Mr. President, there is no evidence that this is what the Parties intended or understood the
MOU to require. The evidence all points in the opposite direction, and decisively so.
26. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you once again for your kind courtesy and
patient attention, and I ask you to call Professor Sands to the podium.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, je donne la parole à présent au professeur Philippe Sands.
Mr. SANDS:
NEITHER THE MOU NOR PART XV OFUNCLOS FALLS WITHIN
K ENYA S OPTIONAL C LAUSE RESERVATION
I. Introduction
1. Monsieur le Président, Members of the Court, I will be relatively brief in responding to
two remaining points that might be on your minds. Given Kenya’s silence as to its written
argument that Somalia’s Application is inadmissible, we assume that claim is now dropped and I
will say no more about it. As to all else, we maintain the position as set out in our written
pleadings and in our first round on Tuesday.
II. Even if the MOU had created an obligation to negotiate,
Somalia amply fulfilled that obligation
2. Somalia’s primary case is that the MOU does not constitute an agreement that the Parties
would delimit the entire maritime boundary exclusively by negotiations and we believe that our
submission on that point is compelling, and that it disposes of Kenya’s objection. If you find that
we are wrong about that, and conclude contra textum that the MOU did somehow impose some sort - 32 -
of obligation to negotiate, then we say that the evidence clearly establishes that Somalia amply
fulfilled any such obligation.
3. In the first round, I referred you to several Judgments of this Court that address the
meaning of the word “negotiation” . As we listened to counsel for Kenya, we were struck as
you must have been also that, although Kenya takes issue with Somalia’s assessment of the
facts, it does not challenge the applicable legal standards or principles that we identified. And that
much at least is common ground between the Parties. In particular, Kenya did not dispute this
Court’s description of negotiation as “a genuine attempt . . . to engage in discussions with the other
disputing party, with a view to resolving the dispute” . 90
4. Did Somalia engage in such a “genuine attempt” with Kenya before it instituted these
proceedings? It seems very difficult to see how you could possibly conclude that Somalia did not.
As Mr. Reichler has shown, the evidence unambiguously establishes that Somalia engaged in
discussions with Kenya, that it made a serious and sincere attempt to determine whether an
amicable solution of the boundary dispute was possible. You will have noted that Kenya has
abandoned its first round claim that the discussions between the Parties in 2014 somehow did not
constitute “negotiations”. Equally, Kenya does not claim that the negotiations were a charade, or
that Somalia did not engage in the negotiations in good faith and with a genuine desire to reach a
settlement.
5. What Kenya does say is that the negotiations should have gone on. And on. And on.
And on. And on. In fact, they say they should continue for years and even for decades, until after
the CLCS has made its final recommendation. Yet the evidence before you establishes that the
negotiations had reached a point at which it was reasonable for Somalia to conclude that they were
unlikely to bear fruit. As this Court confirmed in Cameroon v. Nigeria: “Neither in the Charter
nor otherwise in international law is any general rule to be found to the effect that the exhaustion of
diplomatic negotiations constitutes a precondition for a matter to be referred to the Court.” 91
8CR 2016/11, pp. 57-58, paras 18-20 (Sands).
9Application of the Convention on the Elimination Of All Forms Of Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian
Federation), I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), pp.132-133, paras. 157-159.
91
Land and Maritime Dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 303, para. 56. - 33 -
6. Under UNCLOS, we say, the standard is not more onerous, as a unanimous Annex VII
Arbitral Tribunal made clear in Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, where it said that the fact that “a
further round of negotiations had been fixed” did not preclude Barbados from “reasonably taking
the view that negotiations to delimit the Parties’ common maritime boundaries had already lasted
long enough . . . and that it was now appropriate to move to the initiation of the procedures of
Part XV”. That Tribunal confirmed that the obligation to resort to Part XV procedures applied
once negotiations had been conducted for “a reasonable period of time”, and that either party was
free to make a determination that such time had been reached . 92
7. In that case, the negotiations lasted but three years. And, as you will recall, the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases the three parties agreed that there was no point in proceeding with
93
negotiations after just six months of tripartite talks . And in Mauritius v. United Kingdom, another
Annex VII Tribunal ruled unanimously again not in a case relating to delimitation that:
“States themselves are in the best position to determine where substantive negotiations can
productively be continued.” 94
8. Somalia was entitled to conclude that negotiations could not productively be continued. It
has met the standard under general international law; it has met the standard under UNCLOS; and
it has met the standard in the MOU assuming it to impose an obligation to negotiate at all, which
we say it does not.
9. The failure of the negotiations is hardly surprising. The Parties’ starting positions could
scarcely be further apart. Somalia considers that established principles of international law call for
an equitable delimitation. Kenya used to agree with that position, but then, in 2005, it abruptly
changed its view in favour of a new parallel, unsupported, line on the basis of alleged State practice
and “inequity”. By the time the Parties began to negotiate in early 2014, Kenya had stuck
intractably to that position for almost a decade, and of course Kenya had been and continued to
be engaged in various unilateral activities in the waters claimed by Somalia. That was the
92Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, Decision of 11 April 2006, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral
Awards (RIAA), Vol. XVII, pp. 147-251, para. 199.
93
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 9.
94
Mauritius v. United Kingdom, Award, PCA Case No. 2011-13, para. 379. - 34 -
reality of the situation. By insisting that the boundary followed a parallel of latitude for its entire
course, Kenya was stubbornly adhering to a method of delimitation that has never been adopted by
this Court or by any other tribunal, and it was doing so to justify claims to a disputed area in which
it had been unilaterally exploring for oil for many years, under licensing agreements with major
international oil companies that it had no intention of cancelling. No surprise then that the Parties
were unable to agree on the applicable principles, let alone their practical application. In light of
the vast gulf between the Parties, there was no realistic prospect of a negotiated settlement or even
of further productive negotiations within the foreseeable future, as at August 2014.
10. As Mr. Reichler pointed out, the negotiations ended because Kenya failed to appear for
what the Parties agreed would be the final attempt to bridge the gap that separated them. Kenya
does not dispute that the Parties agreed to meet one final time, or that it failed to appear for the
final meeting, or that it failed to offer any advance warning of its non-appearance or any
subsequent explanation for that non-appearance. In the circumstances, any responsible State
any reasonable State in Somalia’s position was entitled to conclude that the prospects of an
amicable solution were non-existent.
11. In short, assuming it had any obligation to negotiate under the MOU, which we say it did
not, Somalia satisfied that obligation.
III. Part XV of UNCLOS
12. So I turn to Kenya’s arguments concerning Part XV of UNCLOS. It is striking that an
argument that occupied all of one measly sentence in Kenya’s 70 page written pleadings now
represents half of Kenya’s entire case at these oral hearings. The Court may indeed consider that
this reflects the loss of faith on the part of Kenya in its primary case.
13. The question for the Court is simple. Does Part XV of UNCLOS constitute an
agreement between Kenya and Somalia “to have recourse to some other method or methods of
settlement” within the meaning of Kenya’s Article 36 (2) declaration such as to oust the
jurisdiction of this Court? We say the answer is clearly “No”.
14. It is helpful, we suggest, to take this in stages. The Parties agree that you only get to the
Part XV/Article 282 argument if you find that the MOU does not impose “some other method or - 35 -
methods of settlement” or, if it does, that it has been fulfilled . We say that, since the MOU
argument fails on either alternative, you will have to deal with the Article 282 point. To resolve
this, we suggest you ask yourselves a number of questions.
15. First, is UNCLOS an agreement binding on Kenya and Somalia? The answer is “yes”, of
course.
16. Second, is it an agreement to have recourse to some other method of settlement in
other words a method of settlement other than determination by the Court under the Optional
Clause? The answer to that is “No”, and the reason is simple. By signing up to UNCLOS, Kenya
and Somalia agreed to be bound by the full package of rights and obligations contained in Part XV,
and that package included Article 282. Professor Akhavan stated rather boldly that “Article 282
does not apply” “Article 282 does not apply” but why? He offered no explanation. He
castigates us, as he put it, for deleting paragraph 6 of the MOU, because he says we find it
inconvenient. Professor Pellet has answered that point, but he sees no difficulty in deleting
Article 282 entirely from the Convention.
17. Yet the purpose of Article 282 is to include certain categories of disputes from the
settlement procedures in Part XV, and you heard Professor Boyle confirm that it is, and I use his
words, “not disputed” that Article 282 gives the choice of ICJ jurisdiction “clearly accepted” a
“priority over all other procedures in Section 2 of Part XV” 97. That is confirmed by the academic
98
and other commentary I cited in the first round . And Kenya agrees that the drafters of UNCLOS
specifically and explicitly intended Optional Clause jurisdiction to have precedence over Part XV . 99
Not in dispute.
18. But Kenya says that such priority does not apply when a State has entered a reservation
of the kind that it and 34 other States have made. Kenya’s logic appears to be this: the
Article 36 (2) reservation operates as a renvoi to UNCLOS, but it says there is no renvoi back
95
CR 2016/12, pp. 11-12, paras. 4-5 (Akhavan); CR 2016/12, pp. 25-26, para. 4 (Boyle); CR 2016/12, p. 30,
para. 7; pp. 33-34, paras. 19-24 (Lowe).
96CR 2016/12, p. 12, para. 5 (Akhavan).
97CR 2016/12, p. 26, para. 5 (Boyle).
98
CR 2016/11, pp. 61-62, paras. 33-37 (Sands).
99CR 2016/10, p. 54, para. 7 (Sands). - 36 -
because . . . Article 282 does not apply! But Article 282 does apply, and its effect is to send the
matter back to the Optional Clause and to the ICJ. On Kenya’s approach, the renvoi is continuous,
it is indeed an endless game of ping pong between two players, one called 36 (2), the other
called 282.
19. To put it another way, a State which is a party to UNCLOS and the Optional Clause
might be said to be bound by two parallel régimes of dispute settlement. Is Part XV to take priority
over the Optional Clause, or is the Optional Clause to take priority over Part XV? As Kenya
accepts, in those moments of lucidity where it recognizes Article 282 to be applicable, that
provision does indeed establish a default prioritization: the Optional Clause trumps Part XV. Can
an Optional Clause reservation that excludes disputes which the parties have agreed to as an
alternative settlement procedure reverse that default rule? That is the question for you. Plainly it
cannot. Ratifying a treaty that explicitly gives priority to Optional Clause jurisdiction over
Part XV procedures cannot logically have the effect of giving priority to Part XV procedures over
the Optional Clause. Such an outcome would be “absurd”, to take the word used in Article 32 (b)
of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
20. Of course, the point about circularity is not a new one, as many in this room are aware.
Professor Boyle referred yesterday to the Southern Bluefin Tuna case , and will no doubt be
aware that counsel in that case made the point in hearings that the interplay between Article 36 (2)
of the Optional Clause and Article 282 means that “the reservations excluding from the jurisdiction
of the ICJ disputes in regard to which the Parties have agreed to some other means of settlement
101
leads us into a circular argument” . Now, counsel in that case noted that the applicant States in
that case Australia and New Zealand did not explain why in the circumstances of that case,
and I quote the words of counsel, “it is the ICJ, rather than the UNCLOS Tribunal, which should
lose its jurisdiction” .2
21. We say the circularity is broken, and the renvoi does not lead to an endless loop. This is
because the effect of Article 282 is to make clear that Part XV of UNCLOS is not in these
10CR 2016,12, p. 29, para. 14 (Boyle).
10Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan) ICSID, Volume III, Wednesday
10 May 2000, p. 53.
102
Ibid., p. 54. - 37 -
circumstances to be treated as an agreement on “some other method or methods of settlement”.
The agreement constituted by Part XV is one that deliberately carves out and gives explicit and
intended priority to ICJ adjudication under the Optional Clause. It would turn logic on its head
if an instrument that expressly excludes cases covered by the Optional Clause could constitute an
alternative method of settlement for cases covered by the Optional Clause.
22. Article 282 sends you back to the Great Hall and to the International Court of Justice,
precisely because in cases covered by the Optional Clause there is no agreement to have recourse to
Part XV dispute settlement. If Article 282 did not exist, then arguably perhaps Kenya would have
such an argument for an agreement. But the problem for Kenya the fatal flaw in its argument
and in its logic is that Article 282 exists and it applies.
23. Kenya is plainly conscious of the difficulty of its argument, so it has made a further leap
into the dark; it invokes the lex specialis principle to break the endless loop, a sort of legal
Groundhog Day. That is not, however, a persuasive point. In making it, Professor Lowe cited
various authorities, and we have examined each of them with very great care: not one of them
supports the proposition for which he argues, namely that one procedure for judicial or arbitral
settlement will trump another because it is to be found in a treaty that is more particular and less
general. He cited to Passage over Indian Territory, for example, but in that case the Court was
concerned with “practice” on matters of substance, ruling that, “a particular practice must prevail
103
over any general rules” . And he cited to the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, yet that, too,
directs to matters of substance, not procedure, in determining that the test of what is an arbitrary
deprivation of life will be determined by “the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
104
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities” . He cited to no authority
to support the proposition that one rule on dispute settlement procedure will trump another simply
because it forms part of a more specialized rule or régime.
10Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 44.
104
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 25;
emphasis added. - 38 -
24. Indeed, we are not aware of any such authority. A similar argument did not find favour
105
with this Court in Nicaragua v. Colombia . The Court rejected an attempt by Colombia to invoke
the lex specialis principle in order to persuade the Court that it lacked jurisdiction under the
Optional Clause, holding that “the provisions of the Pact of Bogotá and the declarations made
under the Optional Clause represent two distinct bases of the Court’s jurisdiction which are not
mutually exclusive”. As a result, “the scope of its jurisdiction could be wider under the optional
106
clause” than under the regional treaty . But there was no question of one extinguishing the other.
25. As to the applicable law, we of course agree with the proposition that the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention is more specialis than general international law. But the problem for Kenya is
that it includes Article 282. Professor Akhavan and his colleagues may like to wish away that
provision, they offer no basis to do so. Proclaiming “lex specialis, lex specialis, lex specialis”
loudly and repeatedly cannot make Article 282 simply disappear.
26. One might address the matter in a different way, by posing the question thus the
function of counsel is to assist judges in dealing with difficult questions: is it really imaginable that
the drafters of UNCLOS intended dispute settlement under Part XV to extinguish the Court’s
jurisdiction over law of the sea matters in respect of all those States that have entered a reservation
to Article 36 (2) of the kind made by Kenya? That is the question. There is nothing in the record
of UNCLOS to suggest that. Indeed, the evidence and commentary points decisively in the other
direction. Yet, that is the consequence of the argument that Kenya seeks to impose upon you.
27. In addition to the materials I cited on Tuesday, the Virginia Commentary on UNCLOS
stresses that Part XV settlement procedures are subsidiary to any other agreed procedure:
“Article 282 reflects the prevailing view that parties would normally prefer to have the dispute
settled in accordance with a procedure previously agreed upon by them” . The IMLI Manual on
International Maritime Law explains that Article 282 establishes “an order of priority among the
different mechanisms which may exist for the settlement of disputes”, but one in which “the system
10Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 832.
106
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 873, paras. 136-137.
107
M. H. Nordquist, S. Nandan & S. Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A
Commentary, Vol. 5, 1989, pp. 25-26. - 39 -
108
instituted by UNCLOS plays a residual role vis-à-vis other mechanisms” . Part XV procedures
are subsidiary, secondary, residual. This is hardly the stuff of overriding lex specialis that Kenya
would have you digest and apply in its effort to make this Court write Article 282 out of UNCLOS.
28. In short, Kenya is inviting you to disregard your jurisprudence on the interpretation of
Optional Clause declarations and reservations, and it offers no case law and no commentary in
support of its approach. Nor has it been able to show why the consequences for this Court’s role on
matters of the law of the sea, as I explained on Tuesday, would not come to pass. We invite you,
Monsieur le Président, to maintain your consistent jurisprudence; we invite you to give effect to
the intention of the drafters of UNCLOS, both elements point decisively to the jurisdiction of this
Court.
29. In summary, this case does not fall within the ambit of Kenya’s reservation. Neither
the MOU nor UNCLOS constitute an agreement to have recourse to some other method of
settlement. This Court has jurisdiction to hear Somalia’s Application and there are no grounds for
you not to exercise that jurisdiction.
30. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes my response. Once again I thank
you and your colleagues for your attention, and invite you to call to the Bar the Deputy-Agent of
Somalia.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne maintenant la parole à
Mme Al-Sharmani, agent adjoint de la Somalie. Madame, vous avez la parole.
Ms AL-SHARMANI:
C ONCLUDING R EMARKS
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, my task today is to conclude
Somalia’s presentations at these hearings.
2. As you heard, Mr. President, Kenya continues to insist that the 2009 MOU constitutes an
agreed method and an exclusive one at that for the settlement of the maritime boundary
10Attard, Fitzmaurice and Guitierrez (eds.), The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law, Volume 1: The
Law of the Sea, First Edition, 2014, p. 539. - 40 -
dispute between our countries. Our counsel has explained the reasons why that argument is
unsustainable as a matter of fact and law.
3. From Somalia’s perspective, there is an even larger level at which the argument simply
makes no sense. On Wednesday, the Honourable Agent of Kenya said that the “dispute arises in a
delicate political context. Somalia has only recently begun to emerge from a long period of
109
instability caused by civil war, humanitarian disaster and widespread terrorism.” That may be
true. But, in our view, it only underscores why the MOU could not possibly bear the weight that
Kenya that seeks to place on it.
4. When the MOU was signed in 2009, it was an even more delicate moment in Somalia’s
rebirth. At that precarious juncture, the Transitional Federal Government had only recently
assumed office. Somalia could have had no interest in binding itself to reach a negotiated
settlement, and forever precluding itself from seeking judicial recourse. Nor could it have had an
interest in committing to reach a negotiated settlement only after the CLCS issued its
recommendations many, many years hence.
5. Why would Somalia have an interest in entrenching uncertainty and instability in relation
to its borders for long years, perhaps decades, to come? Having relied heavily on the assistance of
the international community, Somalia could have had no reason to prevent itself from seeking this
Court’s assistance in resolving an issue of such great national importance. On the contrary,
Somalia had every reason for keeping all of its options open, particularly those that would result in
a fair, independent and expeditious appraisal of the merits of its maritime claims.
6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in its arguments before you, Kenya also continues to
110
insist that we somehow rushed to the Court in a circumstance where there was no urgency . In
that connection, it is quick to tell you that it voluntarily suspended its unilateral activities in the
disputed area. Somalia, it says, should have no fears . Well, this is news to Somalia. We had
never previously been informed that that was the case.
109
CR 2016/12, p. 38, para. 3 (Muigai).
11CR 2016/12, pp. 33-34, paras. 21-22 (Boyle).
111
CR 2016/12, p. 15, para. 11 (Akhavan); p. 38, para. 5 (Muigai). - 41 -
7. In considering Kenya’s change in behaviour, I would respectfully remind the Court that
less than a month before Kenya filed its Preliminary Objections in October 2015, it was soliciting
tenders for seismic surveys to be carried out in the disputed area, with a view to issuing licences in
2017.
8. In particular, in September 2015 the National Oil Corporation of Kenya published an
“Expression of Interest for Provision of a 3D multi-client broadband seismic offshore survey in the
Shallow waters of the Lamu offshore basin”. The tender document officially announced that the
company and Kenya’s Ministry of Energy and Petroleum were preparing for “an open licensing
round tentatively scheduled for the year 2017”, and that “[a] formal announcement on the date from
the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum is expected soon” . The document included a map which
shows the shallow offshore area to be surveyed extending all the way up to the parallel boundary
that is claimed by Kenya, contrary to international law . 113
9. And just the year before, in 2014, before we filed our Application, 2D seismic surveys
114
authorized by Kenya were carried out in a number of blocks that encompass the disputed area ,
and one of its licensees even conducted sea-core drilling operations in one of the disputed blocks . 115
10. It was exactly this pattern of behaviour that was of such concern to Somalia since 2014,
and ever since, and has heightened our sense of urgency to secure a fair and objective
determination of what is ours.
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Kenya also returned again to its contention that it
116
has exercised undisputed sovereignty in the area in dispute since 1979 . This is an issue that is of
no relevance to the jurisdictional issue before you. It goes to the merits. But it helps explain why
the negotiations between both countries failed. Kenya was unwilling to budge from its
long-standing position that the boundary had to follow the parallel of latitude. Only that boundary
11National Oil Corporation of Kenya, “Expression of Interest for Provision of a 3D Multi-Client Broadband
Seismic Offshore Survey in the Shallow Waters of the Lamu Offshore Basin,” NOCK/PRC/03 (1057) (25 Sept. 2015);
WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 5.
113
National Oil Corporation of Kenya, “Expression of Interest for Provision of a 3D Multi-Client Broadband
Seismic Offshore Survey in the Shallow Waters of the Lamu Offshore Basin,” NOCK/PRC/03 (1057) (25 Sept. 2015)
p. 1; WSS, Vol. II, Ann. 5.
114
MS, para. 8.26,
115
MS, para. 8.23.
11CR 2016/12, p. 15, para. 11 (Akhavan). - 42 -
would justify its activities in the maritime areas it regarded as most promising for economic
development. This is a position that no Somali government could ever accept.
12. Ironically, Kenya may have unwittingly contradicted its own argument on Wednesday
afternoon. In his opening remarks, Professor Akhavan said that “the Kenyan navy has patrolled
these waters for several years now as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia, endorsed by
117
the United Nations Security Council” . So, accepting Kenya’s word as true which Somalia
denies as no AMISOM forces had in the past or is currently patrolling the Somali seas, it
appears that Kenya now claims to have patrolled the waters in dispute, not in the exercise of its
own sovereignty but as a member of a broader African Union mission “in Somalia”.
13. In any event, it is exactly this situation of confusion and conflicting claims that makes
the early resolution of the maritime boundary dispute between our two countries necessary and
urgent.
14. As I said on Tuesday, we place great value on our deep and close ties with Kenya. We
also recognize the significant contributions that they and others have made to the rebuilding effort
of Somalia. That said, Kenya’s security concerns are shared by Somalia and, indeed, the entire
world. Somali soldiers too are paying the ultimate price defending their own country, sometimes
doing it with their own bare hands. We have all made sacrifices and we will continue to do so until
Somalia and the whole region are secure.
15. Kenya’s sacrifices, like those of other countries including Uganda, Djibouti, Burundi and
many others, do not constitute a reason to deny Somalia the rights to which international law
entitles it. Kenya cannot, as it seems to suggest, expect compensation in the form of maritime areas
that would otherwise appertain to Somalia. Kenya’s political arguments have no bearing on the
legal task before this Court.
16. Mr. President, Members of the Court, our maritime boundary dispute with our Kenyan
brothers and sisters is just one element of the overall relationship with our Kenyan friends. But it is
real. It is also intractable, which is why we had to come to this Court.
11CR 2016/12, p. 15, para. 10 (Akhavan); emphasis added. - 43 -
118
17. Mr. Reichler reviewed the history of negotiations on Tuesday and again this morning .
After successive rounds of talks, we were at loggerheads. Further negotiations showed every sign
of being pointless. We saw no reasonable prospect of success. It was as if we were speaking
different languages. It was even worse than a conversation between civil law and common law
lawyers!
18. We could not even get past basic questions of methodology. They wanted a parallel of
latitude, and refused to budge. We insisted on equidistance, in accordance with the Court’s
jurisprudence. They rejected it out of hand.
19. Nevertheless, Somalia agreed to one final round of talks at Kenya’s insistence. Both
Parties understood that this was to be a final attempt to reach an amicable solution. Kenya has not
disputed this. To our great surprise, they did not show up. Nor did they tell us why they did not
show up. They have not disputed this either. Now they claim that they had security concerns. Yet,
they fail to mention to this Court that we had offered to hold the last round of talks in Djibouti if
they had so desired . They never responded to that offer either.
20. In a circumstance where we perceived an acute threat to our rights, where Kenya was
unilaterally exercising control over our maritime areas and resources, and where the Court could be
stripped of its jurisdiction literally any day by a modification of Kenya’s Optional Clause
declaration, it was not only reasonable for Somalia to come before this Court, it was fully justified
in doing so.
21. In your wise hands, this thorn in the side of our otherwise strong relations can be
removed in good time, we can move forward together in an era of greater peace and stability, with
both sides secure in the knowledge of its rights and able to finally utilize its resources for the
benefit of its own people.
22. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, I will end as I began on Tuesday:
with an expression of thanks. I wish to echo the remarks of the Honourable Agent of Kenya on
Wednesday when he thanked the able Registrar and the personnel of the Registry for their diligent
11CR 2016/11, pp. 41-49, paras. 27-51 (Reichler); CR 2016/13, pp. 23-27, paras. 10-19 (Reichler).
119
Letter from H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion of the Federal
Republic of Somalia, to H.E. Ms. Amina Mohamed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, No. 2231
(26 Aug. 2014), p. 2; MS, Vol. III, Ann. 47. - 44 -
assistance that has made these hearings run so smoothly. We also wish to thank the Court’s
interpreters for their typically exceptional work, as well as the others members of the Court’s staff.
23. Finally, Mr. President, we wish to thank you and all the Members of the Court for your
very courteous attention throughout these hearings. Somalia confidently entrusts the matter of
Kenya’s Preliminary Objections to your wise judgment.
24. I will now read Somalia’s Submissions:
“On the basis of its Written Statement of 5 February 2016, and its oral
pleadings, Somalia respectfully requests the Court:
1. To reject the Preliminary Objections raised by the Republic of Kenya; and
2. To find that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Federal
Republic of Somalia.”
25. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, thank you for your time and good
morning.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Madame.
La Cour prend acte des conclusions finales dont vous venez de donner lecture au nom de la
Somalie, comme elle l’a fait mercredi dernier pour les conclusions finales présentées par le Kenya.
Un juge a des questions à poser aux Parties, questions auxquelles les Parties sont priées de
répondre par écrit. Je vais à présent donner la parole à cet effet à M. le juge Crawford.
Judge CRAWFORD: Thank you, Sir.
During 2014, the Parties conducted negotiations over maritime delimitation. They did so
without making any express reservation as to the timeliness of such negotiations in terms of the
penultimate paragraph of the Memorandum of Understanding.
At the time, the recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
in relation to the submissions of Kenya and Somalia were years away.
I have two questions:
(1) Which maritime zones (territorial sea, EEZ, continental shelf within or beyond 200 miles) did
those negotiations cover? - 45 -
(2) In the circumstances, could such delimitation negotiations, conducted in good faith, be
understood as waiving any rights either party may have had to a prior recommendation of the
Commission?
Thank you, Mr. President.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le juge Crawford. Le texte des questions sera
communiqué aux Parties, sous forme écrite, dès que possible. Les Parties sont invitées à soumettre
leurs réponses écrites le mercredi 28 septembre à 13 heures au plus tard. Toutes observations
qu’une Partie pourrait souhaiter présenter sur les réponses de l’autre devront être communiquées le
vendredi 30 à 13 heures au plus tard.
Ceci nous amène au terme des audiences consacrées aux exceptions préliminaires présentées
par le Kenya en la présente affaire. Je tiens à remercier les agents, conseils et avocats des deux
Parties pour leurs interventions. Conformément à la pratique, je prierai les agents de rester à la
disposition de la Cour pour tous renseignements complémentaires dont elle pourrait avoir besoin.
Sous cette réserve, je déclare close la procédure orale en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation
maritime dans l’océan Indien (Somalie c. Kenya). La Cour va maintenant se retirer pour délibérer.
Les agents des Parties seront avisés en temps utile de la date à laquelle la Cour rendra son arrêt. La
Cour n’étant saisie d’aucune autre question aujourd’hui, l’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 11 h 35.
___________
Public sitting held on Friday 23 September 2016, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya) - Preliminary Objections