Public sitting held on Wednesday 16 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nucl

Document Number
160-20160316-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2016/9
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Corrigé
Corrected

CR 2016/9

International Court Cour internationale

of Justice de Justice

THE HAGUE LA HAYE

YEAR 2016

Public sitting

held on Wednesday 16 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Abraham presiding,

in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation
of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament
(Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)

Preliminary Objections

____________________

VERBATIM RECORD
____________________

ANNÉE 2016

Audience publique

tenue le mercredi 16 mars 2016, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,

en l’affaire des Obligations relatives à des négociations concernant la cessation
de la course aux armes nucléaires et le désarmement nucléaire
(Iles Marshall c. Royaume-Uni)

Exceptions préliminaires

________________

COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -

Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf

Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue

Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian
Judge ad hoc Bedjaoui

Registrar Couvreur

 - 3 -

Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président

MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue

M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian, juges
M. Bedjaoui, juge ad hoc

M. Couvreur, greffier

 - 4 -

The Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Tony deBrum,
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, van den Biesen Kloostra Advocaten, Amsterdam,

as Co-Agents;

Ms Deborah Barker-Manase, Chargé d’affaires a.i. and Deputy Permanent Representative of the
Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, New York,
as Member of the Delegation;

Ms Laurie B. Ashton, Attorney, Seattle, United States of America,
Mr. Nicholas Grief, Professor of Law, University of Kent, member of the English Bar,

United Kingdom,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor of International Law, University of Florence, Italy, Honorary
Professor of International Law, University of Geneva,

Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Professor of International Law, University of Macerata, Italy,

Mr. John Burroughs, New York, United States of America,
Ms Christine Chinkin, Emerita Professor of International Law, London School of Economics,

member of the English Bar, United Kingdom,
Mr. Roger S. Clark, Board of Governors Professor, Rutgers Law School, New Jersey, United States
of America,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. David Krieger, Santa Barbara, United States of America,

Mr. Peter Weiss, New York, United States of America,
Mr. Lynn Sarko, Attorney, Seattle, United States of America,

as Counsel;

Ms Amanda Richter, member of the English Bar,
Ms Sophie Elizabeth Bones, LL.B., LL.M., United Kingdom,

Mr. J. Dylan van Houke, LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D. Candidate, Birkbeck, University of London,
United Kingdom,

Mr. Loris Marotti, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Macerata, Italy,

Mr. Lucas Lima, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Macerata, Italy,
Mr. Rob van Riet, London, United Kingdom,

Ms Alison E. Chase, Attorney, Santa Barbara, United States of America,

as Assistants;

Mr. Nick Ritchie, Lecturer in International Security, University of York, United Kingdom,

as Technical Adviser. - 5 -

Le Gouvernement de la République des Iles Marshall est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Tony deBrum,
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, van den Biesen Kloostra Advocaten, Amsterdam,

comme coagents ;

Mme Deborah Barker-Manase, chargé d’affaires a.i. et représentant permanent adjoint de la
République des Iles Marshall auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies à New York,

comme membre de la délégation ;

Mme Laurie B. Ashton, avocat, Seattle, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,

M. Nicholas Grief, professeur de droit à l’Université du Kent, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
Royaume-Uni,

M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Florence, Italie, professeur
honoraire de droit international à l’Université de Genève,

M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Macerata, Italie,
M. John Burroughs, New York, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,

Mme Christine Chinkin, professeur émérite de droit international à la London School of
Economics, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, Royaume-Uni,

M. Roger S. Clark, Board of Governors Professor à la faculté de droit de l’Université Rutgers,
New Jersey, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,

comme conseils et avocats ;

M. David Krieger, Santa Barbara, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,

M. Peter Weiss, New York, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,

M. Lynn Sarko, avocat, Seattle, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,

comme conseils ;

Mme Amanda Richter, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,

Mme Sophie Elizabeth Bones, LL.B., LL.M, Royaume-Uni,

M. J. Dylan van Houcke, LL.B., LL.M, doctorant au Birkbeck College, Université de Londres,
Royaume-Uni,
M. Loris Marotti, doctorant à l’Université de Macerata, Italie,

M. Lucas Lima, doctorant à l’Université de Macerata, Italie,

M. Rob van Riet, Londres, Royaume-Uni,
Mme Alison E. Chase, avocat, Santa Barbara, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,

comme assistants ;

M. Nick Ritchie, chargé de cours en sécurité internationale à l’Université d’York, Royaume-Uni,

comme conseiller technique. - 6 -

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is represented
by:

H.E. Sir Geoffrey Adams, K.C.M.G., Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Mr. Iain Macleod, Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

as Agent;

Mr. Shehzad Charania, Legal Adviser, Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, The Hague,

as Deputy Agent;

Mr. Christopher Stephen, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

as Adviser;

Sir Daniel Bethlehem, Q.C., member of the English Bar,

Mr. Guglielmo Verdirame, Professor of International Law, King’s College London, member of the
English Bar,

Mrs. Jessica Wells, member of the English Bar,

as Counsel and Advocates. - 7 -

Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord est représenté
par :

S. Exc. sir Geoffrey Adams, K.C.M.G., ambassadeur du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;

M. Iain Macleod, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth,

comme agent ;

M. Shehzad Charania, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et

d’Irlande du Nord au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme agent adjoint ;

M. Christopher Stephen, conseiller juridique adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères et du
Commonwealth,

comme conseiller ;

sir Daniel Bethlehem, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre,

M. Guglielmo Verdirame, professeur de droit international au King’s College, Londres, membre du
barreau d’Angleterre,

Mme Jessica Wells, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,

comme conseils et avocats. - 8 -

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit cet

après-midi pour entendre le second tour de plaidoiries des Iles Marshall en l’affaire des

Obligations relatives à des négociations concernant la cessation de la course aux armes nucléaires

et le désarmement nucléaire (Iles Marshall c. Royaume-Uni).

Je donne la parole à M. Phon van den Biesen, coagent des Iles Marshall.

Mr. van den BIESEN: Thank you, Mr. President.

G ENERAL OBSERVATIONS

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I shall start out with the Marshall Islands’ response

to Judge Bennouna’s question.

2. At the time of filing its Application on 24 April 2014, the Marshall Islands understood the

interpretation of Article VI of the NPT to be that set out in this Court’s Advisory Opinion of

8 July 1996, holding that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a

conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective

international control”. So far as the application of Article VI of the NPT is concerned, the Marshall

Islands believed that each one of the nuclear-weapon States, including the United Kingdom, were

and, indeed, continued to be in breach of those obligations. At the same time, all States possessing

nuclear weapons were in breach of the parallel rule of international customary law. The Marshall

Islands explicitly or implicitly adopted this position at the following instances (all texts are public

and readily available; many are in the annexes of earlier written pleadings, indicated in the

footnotes):

(1) On 22 November 2012, the RMI President Christopher J. Loeak sent a message to the

Hiroshima Youth Committee saying: “I stand with you, through your project, to reinforce the

views that have been expressed by representatives of over 140 countries in support of

concluding a nuclear-weapons convention . . . The [RMI] pledges its full support for this - 9 -

important cause in further advancing this message as a signatory party to the Nuclear

[Non-]Proliferation Treaty .”1

(2) At the first-ever United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Nuclear

Disarmament, on 26 September 2013, the RMI’s Minister for Foreign Affairs stated: “It should

be our collective goal as the United Nations to not only stop the spread of nuclear weapons, but

also to pursue the peace and security of a world without [nuclear weapons] . . . [T]he Marshall

Islands urges all NPT members to achieve the treaty’s obligations . . . We urge all nuclear

weapons states to intensify efforts to address their responsibilities in moving towards an

effective and secure disarmament.” 2

(3) In the First Committee later that fall, the Marshall Islands joined 124 other States in a “Joint

Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons” saying: “The only way to

guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is through their total elimination. All

States share the responsibility to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical

and horizontal proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament, including through fulfilling

3
the objectives of the NPT and achieving its universality.”

(4) On 5 December 2013, the Marshall Islands voted for the General Assembly resolution 4

following up on that high-level meeting. The resolution “[c]alls for the urgent commencement

of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive

convention”.

1Message by H.E. Mr. Christopher J. Loeak, President of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, to the Hiroshima
Youth Committee of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 22 Nov. 2012, www.es.icanw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Response-PaperCranes-MarshallIslands.pdf; http://www.icanw.org/projects/paper-crane-
project/letter-from-the-president-of-the-marshall-islands; judges’ folder, tab 1.1.

2Statement by Hon. Mr. Phillip Muller, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
UN High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament, 26 Sept. 2013, http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/
nucleardisarmament/pdf/MH_en.pdf, cited in WSMI, p. 15, para. 32.; judges’ folder, tab 1.2.

3Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, delivered by Ambassador Dell Higgie, New
Zealand, 21 Oct. 2013 (on behalf of 125 States), http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703026/joint-new-zealand.pdf;
judges’ folder, tab 1.3.

4A/RES/68/32, Follow-up to the 2013 High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament,
5 Dec. 2013 (137-28-20); Application of the Marshall Islands (AMI), para. 80; Memorial of the Marshall
Islands (MMI), para. 30, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/32; judges’ folder, tab 1.4. - 10 -

(5) On the same date, the Marshall Islands voted for the General Assembly resolution following up

to this Court’s 1996 Advisory Opinion . Its first operative paragraph cites and welcomes the

Court’s unanimous conclusion. Its second operative paragraph “[c]alls once again upon all

States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to

an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention”.

(6) Also on that date, the Marshall Islands voted for the General Assembly resolution, “Nuclear

6
Disarmament” . The resolution recalls the Advisory Opinion and refers to the NPT as a

cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It calls for the Conference

on Disarmament “to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament

leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time”, and

calls “for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its

aspects” .7

(7) At the Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Nayarit,

Mexico, on 13 and 14 February 2014, the Marshall Islands made a statement that said:

“the Marshall Islands is convinced that multilateral negotiations on achieving and

sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons are long overdue. Indeed we believe that
states possessing nuclear arsenals are failing to fulfil their legal obligations in this
regard. Immediate commencement and conclusion of such negotiations is required by

legal obligation of nuclear disarmament resting upon each and every state under
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and customary international law. It would
also achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament long and consistently set by the

United Nations, and fulfil o8r responsibilities to present and future generations while
honouring the past ones.”

3. Mr. President, there can be no doubt that on 24 April 2014 the Marshall Islands’ position

was that the United Kingdom, one of the States possessing nuclear weapons failed, and continued

to fail, to fulfil the obligations of Article VI of the NPT as analysed and spelled out in

5
A/RES/68/42, Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat
or use of nuclear weapons, 5 Dec. 2013 (133-24-25); AMI, para. 71; MMI, para. 200, fn. 323;
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/42; judges’ folder, tab 1.5.
6
A/RES/68/47, Nuclear disarmament, 5 December 2013 (122-44-17); MMI, para. 201,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/47; judges’ folder, tab 1.6.
7Ibid., paras. 21, 22; judge’s folder, tab 1.7.

8Marshall Islands Statement, Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,
Nayarit, Mexico, 13-14 Feb. 2014; MMI, para. 99 ; WSMI, para. 45; judges’ folder, tab 1.8.
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nayar…. - 11 -

paragraph 105 (2) F of the Court’s Advisory Opinion. This, Mr. President, is our response to

Judge Bennouna’s question.

4. Then, I have some additional comments to make. The introductory observations of our

colleague Sir Daniel Bethlehem during last Monday’s pleadings were not short of opinion, not

short of characterizations, not short of qualifications of the Marshall Islands’ position. Just some

9 10
examples, he mentioned, “collusive actions” , and “playing fast and loose” , the Marshall Islands

“rewriting the law” , “artificial” , and the like. Mr. President, all of this may be evidence of the

United Kingdom’s being unhappy about its being put on the spot by the Marshall Islands for its

failure to live up to its crucial obligations, but it certainly does not provide any evidence that the

Marshall Islands is wrong in any of its allegations.

5. Because this unfriendly fire does not relate to questions of jurisdiction or admissibility we

will leave all these qualifications aside, except for one. Mr. President, after shedding some tears to

the enormously moving and impressive statement by Mrs. Lijon Eknilang during the 1995 advisory

proceedings, counsel for the United Kingdom did not waste a second before referring to the moving

introduction to this case by my colleague Tony deBrum last Friday, but now he was stating that

“[t]he relief that they would wish from the Court does not become more consonant with the judicial

13
function simply because it comes with an appeal to sentiment” .

6. This was not really a show of respect for Mr. Tony deBrum and, for that matter, for the

judges of this Court, since clearly anyone who heard Tony deBrum’s introduction must have

understood that he was not arguing why the Marshall Islands has standing before this Court, but

was merely providing an insight into certain elements of the Marshall Islands’ motivation for filing

these cases. From the litigating perspective the Marshall Islands simply brings this case because it

has good reasons to believe it is entitled to the fulfilment by the United Kingdom of a long

promised endeavour that is of existential importance. Nothing else, nothing more, nothing less.

9
CR 2016/7, p. 11, para. 10.
10Ibid., p. 11, para. 10.

11Ibid., p. 18, para. 33.
12
Ibid., p. 20, para. 39.
13Ibid., p. 10, para. 5. - 12 -

7. Mr. President, I now turn to another matter. On 31 December 2014 the United Kingdom

deposited at the office of the United Nations Secretary-General an amendment to its declaration

under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute. The amendment adds a new exception to Article 1 of

the declaration and excludes “any dispute which is substantially the same as a dispute previously

submitted to the Court by the same or another party”. It appears from the UK’s pleadings of last

Wednesday that the amendment is directly inspired by the current case. The purpose of the

amendment was, as Sir Daniel stated, to prevent the Marshall Islands from filing “abusive

resubmissions” of its Application, presumably, in case the Marshall Islands would want to repair

some alleged defect in the previous one . Mr. President, no such thing has been considered by the

Marshall Islands, but it is remarkable that the United Kingdom readily changed its declaration in

order to prevent the Marshall Islands from ever going back to this Court with respect to the current

dispute.

8. We note that the amendment does two things: first, it prevents the Marshall Islands from

reintroducing a revised Application, but it also blocks any other State that would find itself in

substantially the same dispute with the United Kingdom from considering to follow the

Marshall Islands’ example and to submit its own application. The amendment is revealing since it

is designed to only have effect when the initial application is based on an existing dispute, which

confirms what the Marshall Islands’ Application is about. This amendment, Mr. President, has

ensured that this case against the United Kingdom is  and will be  totally unique, which also

means that we find ourselves in a “now or never” situation.

9. The amendment not only reveals that the United Kingdom from day one onwards

considered this case to involve a dispute, but it also puts the discussion as to the presumed

necessity of a  in the words of the United Kingdom  “hardly onerous” prior notification in a

completely different light. Given the flexibility demonstrated by the United Kingdom in modifying

its declaration under Article 36 (2) as to prevent certain cases being brought against it, any future

prior notification by any State in any dispute, will  implicitly  trigger a “hardly onerous”

modification of the standing offer expressed by a 36 (2) declaration.

1CR 2016/3, p. 18, para. 19.

1CR/2016/7, p. 13, para. 18. - 13 -

10. Mr. President, before I reach my final points I will briefly revisit the Respondent’s

position with respect to the central question in this case, which  obviously  will be discussed at

length at the merits stage of these proceedings but which has also substantial relevance to questions

at stake in this preliminary stage.

11. Not at any point in time since 8 July 1996 has the United Kingdom expressed that it

accepts the advisory opinion as the law, let alone as the focal point of its conduct in realizing the

result required by the obligation spelled out in paragraph 105 (2) F. The contrary is the case, as we

have demonstrated in the Application, in our Memorial and in our Statement of 15 October 2015.

A summary of the relevant documents reads as follows:

(1) On 19 October 2010, Prime Minister Cameron, in Parliament, answered a question on whether

the replacement of the Trident system was to be regarded as illegal under the terms of the NPT;

he said: “Our proposals are within the spirit and the letter of the non-proliferation treaty.” 16

(2) In December 2012, the General Assembly established the Open-ended Working Group to

develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the

achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons . The United Kingdom

18 19
voted against and did not attend any of its meetings . The UK, with France and the

United States, had declared in the First Committee in November 2012 that it was “unable to

20
support this resolution . . . and any outcome [the Open-ended Working Group] may produce” .

(3) On 26 September 2013, at the United Nations High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament,

the UK welcomed “the increased energy and enthusiasm around the nuclear disarmament

debate” but, the quote goes on, the UK “regrets that this energy is being directed toward

initiatives such as this High-Level Meeting, the humanitarian consequences campaign, the

16HC Deb 16 Oct. 2010, cl 814 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101019/
debtext/101019-0001.htm), cited in WSMI, para. 30.
17
A/RES/67/56, “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and
maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons”, 3 Dec. 2012 (147-4-31), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/56, cited in MMI, para. 76.
18
UN doc. A/67/PV.48, pp. 20-21, cited MMI, para. 76.
19Hansard, HL Deb, 15 July 2013, col. WA93, cited in MMI, para. 76.

20Available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1…
France-UK-US.pdf, cited in MMI, para. 77; emphasis added. - 14 -

Open-Ended Working Group and the push for a Nuclear Weapons Convention” . So, the 21

position is: No! No! No! and No! The UK subsequently voted No! against the follow-up

High-Level General Assembly resolution calling for commencement of negotiations on a

22
nuclear weapons convention .

(4) On 27 September 2013, the UK Ministry of Defence stated that “[t]he renewal of our nuclear

23
deterrent is fully consistent with our obligations under [the NPT]” .

Besides this, the UK voted against the Unites Nations resolutions that I just discussed when I

listed the Marshall Islands position.

In two rounds of oral pleadings the United Kingdom has failed to put forward any evidence that

would undo these public statements.

12. Mr. President, permit me one observation with respect to the evidence that the UK

presented in support of its response to Judge Bennouna’s question. The United Kingdom included

references to several statements that are post-dated 24 April 2014. That is remarkable for several

reasons, but it also, and again, places the expanded discussion on the alleged necessity of prior

notification in a new perspective. The documents show that, obviously not unexpectedly, the UK’s

position after 24 April 2014 is in no way different than its position before that date. The

United Kingdom has not given any reasons to believe that this would have been different if only

the Marshall Islands would have sent the UK a prior notification of the existence of a dispute.

13. This, Mr. President, brings us to my final observation. The Marshall Islands argued

emphatically in its presentation last Friday that the Court does not have some residual discretion

to decline to address the issues raised in contentious proceedings because of a fear of the potential

political implications of its judgments. Nor should it decline to answer because of speculation that

the optional clause system might be undermined. Participation in the optional clause system has

always been numerically disappointing. Withdrawals from the system or a reduction of the number

2Http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/HLM/26Se…,
Ann. 69 to Memorial, cited in MMI, para. 90; emphasis added.

2UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/32, 5 December 2013, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=A/RES/68/32, cited in MMI, para. 91.
23
Letter sent by the Minister for State for the Armed Forces, Andrew Robathan, 27 Sep. 2013
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mod-response-about-the-uks-n…), cited in WSMI, para. 39.
2CR/2016/5, p. 49, para. 15 (Grief). - 15 -

of those joining in the future would be unfortunate, but so would be the alternative, an

understanding of the optional clause that means that no politically significant cases will ever be

decided by this Court. That, too, might be a disincentive for States to join the system. Major

powers like the United Kingdom, as well as small States like the Marshall Islands, all have an

investment in the rule of law and the possibility that the law can be applied even in the most

politically fraught situations. As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the Court has

its own opportunity to contribute to the lofty purposes of the Charter, including the peaceful

settlement of disputes and the maintenance of international peace and security.

14. I should add, Mr. President, that, contrary to what the United Kingdom suggests , the 25

Marshall Islands is, in this case, not involved in an attempt to obtain a “new” advisory opinion. On

the contrary, it takes the 1996 Advisory Opinion as a given and seeks to give effect to the

obligations under Article VI of the NPT and customary international law that are explained therein.

There is a radical difference between the kind of abstract questions that may be asked in advisory

proceedings and the very concrete questions of fact and law which the Marshall Islands asserts in

its plea for relief on the merits. Answering those questions is a matter for the merits stage of these

proceedings, so the Marshall Islands will withstand the temptation to deal with these issues right

away.

15. The Marshall Islands notes that since 8 July 1996 the Advisory Opinion has been at the

centre of efforts by the majority of States to get the States possessing nuclear weapons to the

negotiating table to negotiate the conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The request of the

majority of States in the resolution calling for the “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the

International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” has not been

honoured by the Respondent or any other of the States possessing nuclear weapons. It is only

natural for a State to bring a case before this Court if certain conduct and certain acts to which it is

legally entitled are not provided on a voluntary basis.

2CR 2016/7, p. 21, para. 43 (Bethlehem). - 16 -

16. That, Mr. President, Members of the Court, ends my presentation. I sincerely thank the

Court for the attention it is giving to the views of both Parties to this case and I kindly request you,

Mr. President, to give the floor to Professor Condorelli.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne la parole à M. le professeur Condorelli.

M. CONDORELLI :

L’EXISTENCE DU DIFFÉREND ENTRE LA R ÉPUBLIQUE DES ILES M ARSHALL
ET LER OYAUME -U NI

1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, la charge qui m’incombe est de

revenir sur la question de l’existence du différend qui oppose les Iles Marshall au Royaume-Uni

dans la présente affaire en répondant aux critiques et objections qui nous ont été adressées lundi

dernier par sir Daniel Bethlehem. L’existence du différend est  nous le savons bien  la

condition première de l’exercice de la fonction judiciaire de la Cour. Or, d’après nos

contradicteurs on ne saurait alléguer dans notre cas l’existence du différend (qui doit «en principe»

se manifester «au moment où la requête est soumise à la Cour») pour deux raisons : primo, parce

que les éléments constitutifs du différend doivent être tous réunis justement «au moment où la

requête est soumise à la Cour», ce qui comporterait qu’on ne saurait prendre en considération rien

de postérieur audit moment afin de vérifier que le différend existe ; et, secundo, parce que le

différend ne saurait exister tant que l’Etat qui entend le soumettre au juge n’a pas porté

préalablement son grief à l’encontre d’un autre Etat à la connaissance de celui-ci en le lui notifiant.

2. Monsieur le président, il est à vrai dire quelque peu paradoxal de devoir discuter de la

question de savoir s’il existe ou non un différend entre les Iles Marshall et le Royaume-Uni au sujet

du respect de l’obligation de poursuivre de bonne foi et de mener à terme des négociations sur des

mesures efficaces conduisant au désarmement nucléaire dans tous ses aspects, sous un contrôle

strict et efficace. C’est paradoxal parce que le différend en question est là, indéniablement là, sous

les yeux de la Cour. Il s’agit d’une réalité  comment dirais-je  parfaitement visible, sauf

peut-être si l’on porte de trop épaisses lunettes de juriste. Vous voyez, de ce côté-ci, les Iles

Marshall soutenant que le Royaume-Uni a violé et viole les obligations qui lui incombent en vertu

de l’article VI du traité de non-prolifération (TNP). De l’autre côté de la barre, vous entendez le - 17 -

Royaume-Uni déclarer «the United Kingdom considers the allegations to be manifestly unfounded

on the merits». Il est difficile de nier qu’un différend existe bel et bien ! Qu’existe bel et bien la

réclamation d’une partie se heurtant à l’opposition manifeste de l’autre ! Qu’existe

indiscutablement un désaccord sur un point de droit ou de fait, une opposition de thèses juridiques

ou d’intérêt entre deux personnes !

3. De toute façon, le différend dont nous discutons n’est pas du tout une apparition soudaine

et inattendue, dont rien ne pouvait laisser prévoir qu’elle pourrait se manifester. Ses racines sont

parfaitement perceptibles dans les relations internationales et dans les relations entre les deux Etats

en particulier.

4. Tant les Iles Marshall que le Royaume-Uni sont liés par le TNP, en en étant parties. Tant

le Royaume-Uni que les Iles Marshall se considèrent, en particulier, liés par les obligations établies

en son article VI. Le Royaume-Uni a tenu à confirmer solennellement cela au cours de la présente

procédure. Ainsi, par exemple, lundi dernier vous avez pu entendre sir Daniel Bethlehem affirmer :

«the UK has repeatedly, without hesitation, without caveat, expressly reaffirmed our obligation and

special responsibility pursuant to and under Article VI» ; un peu plus tôt il avait dit : «the United

Kingdom has always explicitly acknowledged the imperative of Article VI of the NPT and has

acted and continues to act towards the end that it mandates».

5. Toutefois, l’interprétation que le Royaume-Uni a donnée et donne de ses obligations

découlant de l’article VI est bien particulière. En effet, en s’opposant à des allégations répétées,

venant de sources diverses, d’après lesquelles sa conduite violerait l’article VI du TNP, le

Royaume-Uni a incessamment fait valoir que non, qu’il agissait et qu’il agit en pleine conformité

avec celui-ci. Les écritures marshallaises ont offert de nombreux exemples de positions officielles

prises par le Royaume-Uni à ce sujet, et le coagent des Iles Marshall, M. van den Biesen vient lui

aussi de les rappeler à la Cour.

6. Ainsi en est-il des débats concernant le remplacement et la modernisation du programme

d’armement nucléaire britannique Trident, au sujet duquel des avis juridiques de haut niveau ont

fait valoir qu’il constituerait une violation du droit international coutumier et de l’article VI du

TNP. En réponse à ces allégations, de hautes autorités gouvernementales du Royaume-Uni ont

assuré que non, que «la dissuasion nucléaire actuelle est conforme aux obligations juridiques du - 18 -

gouvernement». Vous avez entendu que le premier ministre Cameron dira, au sujet du

renouvellement de la dissuasion nucléaire britannique, que «nos propositions sont conformes à

l’esprit et à la lettre du traité de non-prolifération» .

7. Mais c’est surtout le rejet constant et radical par le Royaume-Uni (et par d’autres

puissances nucléaires d’ailleurs) de toute proposition ou demande visant à initier des négociations

multilatérales pour le désarmement nucléaire, ainsi que le refus renouvelé de participer à de telles

négociations dans quelque enceinte que ce soit, qui a engendré des réactions, notamment de la part

des Iles Marshall. Ceci en particulier suite au vote négatif du Royaume-Uni aux trois résolutions

de l’Assemblée générale du 5 décembre 2013 en faveur desquelles les Iles Marshall s’étaient en

revanche prononcées : M. van den Biesen les a énumérées, y compris celle concernant la suite

donnée à l’avis consultatif. Par ces votes négatifs le Royaume-Uni confirmait qu’il donnait de

l’article VI une interprétation contredisant en substance ce que l’article VI prescrit (aux yeux bien

sûr des Iles Marshall, mais sans doute aussi aux yeux d’autres), à savoir l’obligation de poursuivre

de bonne foi et de mener à terme des négociations sur des mesures efficaces conduisant au

27
désarmement nucléaire dans tous ses aspects, sous un contrôle international strict et efficace .

8. La réaction des Iles Marshall, n’intervenant que quelques semaines après les votes

contraires du Royaume-Uni à l’Assemblée générale, c’est la déclaration de Nayarit de février 2014.

La Cour la connaît bien. Par cette déclaration (à laquelle les Iles Marshall ont toujours accordé et

continuent d’accorder une importance considérable, n’en déplaise à sir Daniel Bethlehem qui n’en

a pas parlé du tout dans sa dernière intervention) les Iles Marshall ont entendu s’adresser à tous les

Etats possédant des arsenaux nucléaires, y compris le Royaume-Uni bien évidemment, en les

accusant de manquement à leurs obligations relatives aux négociations devant aboutir à la cessation

de la course aux armements nucléaires et au désarmement nucléaire.

9. Il est vrai que le Royaume-Uni n’a pas participé à la conférence de Nayarit, mais ceci

n’exclut certes pas qu’il ait eu connaissance des débats et des propos qui s’y sont tenus, d’autant

plus que la conférence a eu une large couverture médiatique qui en a répandu les résultats à

26Pour les références, voir les notes figurant dans le compte rendu de la précédente intervention du coagent des
Iles Marshall, M. Phon van den Biesen.

27Voir la note précédente. - 19 -

l’échelle mondiale. Sir Daniel Bethlehem a vigoureusement assuré qu’il n’existe pas dans les

archives britanniques une quelconque trace de contacts bilatéraux directs entre le Royaume-Uni et

les Iles Marshall au cours desquels la question aurait été soulevée, et on se gardera bien-sûr de

douter de la véracité de ses dires. Mais les Iles Marshall ne prétendent d’ailleurs nullement que des

échanges diplomatiques bilatéraux aient eu lieu. Nous pensons seulement, de ce côté-ci de la barre,

qu’il est hautement improbable qu’au Royaume-Uni on n’ait rien su des accusations graves

adressées publiquement et officiellement par les Iles Marshall au Royaume-Uni dans un cadre

multilatéral important. Des accusations qu’on a sans doute préféré ignorer en décidant de ne pas y

réagir. Comment ne pas songer à ce propos à la remarque de votre Cour en l’arrêt de 2011 Géorgie

c. Fédération de Russie : «l’existence d’un différend peut être déduite de l’absence de réaction d’un

Etat à une accusation dans des circonstances où une telle réaction s’imposait».

10. Il vaut la peine d’ailleurs de réfléchir dans ce contexte à l’enseignement de

Georges Abi-Saab, dont on fait grand cas du côté britannique, et qu’on nous demande de prendre

en considération. Voilà qui est fait. Abi-Saab explique comment un différend naît à son avis et

soutient que cela ne peut arriver qu’au moyen d’un échange d’une quelconque sorte, voire d’une

forme de négociation amenant à la cristallisation du litige. Toutefois, aucun formalisme, aucune

«notification» n’est exigée. Ce qui importe pour lui est que les parties «however they

communicate, put forward contradictory contentions and claims they reciprocally reject … They

don’t have to negociate directly. They can make their position publicly known through the media

or in the General Assembly of the United Nations…» Et encore : «some kind of exchange or

negotiation between the contenders, be they within a multilateral forum or even by proxy, is a

necessary prelude to adjudication».

11. Monsieur le président, si l’on est d’accord, ainsi que Georges Abi-Saab le suggère, que

tout formalisme est à bannir s’agissant de vérifier qu’il y a bien un différend du fait même d’une

réclamation qui se heurte à une opposition, il apparaît alors indéniable que la déclaration de Nayarit

a joué le rôle de catalyseur du présent différend. En effet, au moyen de la déclaration de Nayarit

les Iles Marshall ont ouvertement protesté contre la conduite des puissances nucléaires (dont le

Royaume-Uni), faisant valoir qu’une telle conduite se prolongeant dans le temps constitue la

violation des obligations internationales qui leur incombent en vertu de l’article VI du TNP (et du - 20 -

droit international coutumier). Un différend peut alors être défini comme déjà existant dans une

situation où l’on est confronté, en premier lieu, à une conduite attribuable à une partie dont, ensuite,

une autre partie conteste la légalité. C’est le point de vue qu’avait exprimé, comme on le sait, le

juge Morelli dans son opinion dissidente jointe à l’arrêt de la Cour de 1962 en l’affaire du

Sud-Ouest Africain ; et le juge Fitzmaurice l’avait par la suite partagé en faisant valoir que, pour

qu’un différend mettant en jeu la fonction judiciaire de la Cour existe,

«peu importe … que la demande vienne d’abord et le rejet (exprès ou résultant d’un
certain comportement) ensuite, ou que le comportement soit le premier à apparaître et

soit suivi 29une plainte, d’une protestation ou d’une prétention à laquelle il n’est pas
fait droit» .

12. Monsieur le président, j’ai parlé jusqu’ici de la prise en compte du passé par rapport à la

saisine de la Cour afin de vérifier l’existence du différend. Qu’en est-il de la possibilité de prendre

en considération, toujours afin de vérifier l’existence du différend, les échanges de vues entre les

parties ayant lieu au cours de la procédure (donc après la date de la requête) ? Impossible !,

s’insurge sir Daniel Bethlehem, puisque  nous dit-il  tous les éléments constitutifs de cette

existence doivent être réunis à la date de l’introduction de l’instance. Soutenir le contraire serait

ignorer l’enseignement de votre jurisprudence, qui est net et précis, les conditions nécessaires à la

compétence de la Cour devant être remplies à la date à laquelle l’instance est introduite.

13. Monsieur le président, le précédent Croatie c. Serbie, auquel mon contradicteur se réfère,

n’est pas ignoré. Il n’est pas pertinent, et ce pour une simple raison : la question que la Cour avait

à aborder ne concernait pas l’existence du différend entre les parties. La question était autre, à

savoir celle concernant la réalisation des conditions prévues à l’article 35 du Statut, qui doivent

sans aucun doute être présentes lors de la saisine de la Cour. Mais il y a davantage. Aucun des

précédents cités par la Cour au paragraphe 79 de l’arrêt ne se réfère à la question de l’existence du

différend. L’affaire Bosnie c. Yougoslavie concernait encore une fois la question de la compétence

de la Cour rationae personae. Dans les affaires de Lockerbie la question à décider portait sur

l’exception d’irrecevabilité tirée de deux résolutions du Conseil de sécurité tombées après la date

28Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud ; Libéria c. Afrique du Sud), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, opinion dissidente du juge Morelli, p. 567.
29
Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaume-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963,
opinion individuelle du juge Fitzmaurice, p. 110. - 21 -

de la requête. Par rapport à ce genre de questions, les échanges de vues entre les parties sous les

yeux de la Cour n’ont rien à apporter afin d’évaluer la compétence de la Cour ou la recevabilité de

la requête. Mais il en va tout autrement s’agissant d’apprécier l’existence du différend. Dans ce

cas, en effet, les échanges entre les parties peuvent jouer un rôle important, puisqu’ils peuvent

permettre d’inférer ou de confirmer qu’à la date de la requête un différend entre les parties existait

effectivement.

14. Il me reste, Monsieur le président, à dire un mot concernant la question de savoir s’il est

vrai que le différend ne saurait exister tant que l’Etat qui entend le soumettre au juge n’a pas porté

préalablement son grief à l’encontre de l’autre Etat à la connaissance de celui-ci en le lui

«notifiant». En fait, ainsi que je l’ai signalé, rien n’interdit de concevoir que la saisine de la Cour

puisse être un mode approprié et parfaitement légitime par lequel l’Etat lésé «notifie sa demande» à

l’Etat dont la responsabilité internationale est invoquée. L’important est que la saisine de la Cour

se fasse dans des conditions idoines à faire apparaître, de la part de l’Etat attaqué en justice, une

opposition manifeste clairement étayée, axée à l’encontre de la réclamation du demandeur, une

telle opposition de thèses juridiques étant à qualifier alors comme un différend suffisamment

cristallisé. Ni les Articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat, ni le commentaire de la Commission du

droit international y relatif ne s’y opposent, contrairement à ce que prétendent nos contradicteurs.

La «notification par l’Etat lésé» ne saurait de toute façon être conçue comme une condition

supplémentaire de recevabilité des instances à introduire devant la Cour ou de compétence de

celle-ci : une condition que ni le Statut, ni le Règlement de la Cour ne prévoient. Le commentaire

des Articles, j’y insiste, est explicite à ce sujet lorsqu’il indique que : «Les présents articles ne

traitent pas des problèmes de compétence des cours et tribunaux internationaux, ni en général des

30
conditions de recevabilité des instances introduites devant eux.» Autrement dit, les Articles en

question ne concernent pas l’accès au règlement judiciaire des différends internationaux en matière

de responsabilité internationale, ni ne prescrivent de condition spéciale à laquelle un tel accès serait

subordonné. Il est absolument vrai que la phrase du commentaire que je viens de citer encore une

fois figure en tant que commentaire à l’Article 44, et non pas à l’Article 43, mais il est indéniable

30Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 2001, vol. II, 2 partie, p. 327. - 22 -

au vu de sa formulation au pluriel (les articles, et non pas l’article) qu’elle doit être référée à

l’ensemble des Articles en question.

15. Il s’agit là d’une possibilité qu’on ne peut certes pas considérer comme courante, étant

donné que normalement des communications et des contacts entre les parties précèdent la saisine

du juge, qui peut alors s’y référer afin d’identifier précisément les éléments constitutifs du

différend. On ne saurait pas exclure cependant qu’il y ait des situations dans lesquelles le différend

peut être identifié sans besoin d’étudier les événements antérieurs à la saisine du juge, ceci lorsque

la réclamation d’une partie et l’opposition de l’autre partie se révèlent précisément au même

moment où la requête est soumise à la Cour. D’ailleurs cette possibilité est admise par nos

contradicteurs, quoique pour des cas exceptionnels par rapport auxquels il serait admis qu’aucune

notification préalable n’est requise.

16. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie beaucoup de

votre attention et de votre patience et je voudrais vous prier, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir

donner la parole à mon collègue et ami le professeur Nick Grief.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci. La parole est à M. le professeur Grief.

Mr. GRIEF:

“O NLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ”AND RATIONE TEMPORIS

1. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court: I will begin by addressing briefly the

United Kingdom’s preliminary objection based on the words “only for the purpose of” in

reservation 1 (III). On Monday the United Kingdom maintained its allegation that this reservation

precludes jurisdiction because, according to the United Kingdom, the Marshall Islands accepted

jurisdiction only in relation to or for the purpose of this particular dispute. The United Kingdom

remains mistaken, for all the reasons stated by Ms Ashton in our first round pleadings.

2. The United Kingdom simply did not engage the Court on the meaning of the word “only”

in the reservation, or on the fact that the United Kingdom’s position in these proceedings is

contradicted by its only cited history as to the intent of the reservation .

31CR 2016/3, p. 42, para. 39 (Verdirame). - 23 -

3. Instead, the United Kingdom is guilty of double standards when it argues that the intent

behind its own reservation is demonstrated by the breadth of the language, but that the breadth of

the identical language in the Marshall Islands’ reservation does not demonstrate the

Marshall Islands’ intent. That cannot be right.

4. Finally, the United Kingdom took time to re-argue that “in relation to” has a different

meaning than “for the purpose of” — but, again, that argument misses the point. What the

Marshall Islands demonstrated last Friday was that, in the present circumstances, the two phrases

represent a distinction without a difference.

5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn now to the ratione temporis limitation. The

subject-matter of this dispute is the United Kingdom’s conduct (acts and omissions) after

30 January 1995 when the Marshall Islands became a party to the NPT. A little over 18 months

later, on 8 July 1996, this Court through its Advisory Opinion clarified what Article VI requires of

States parties and unanimously recognized an equivalent rule of customary international law.

6. This dispute is not about situations or facts prior to 17 September 1991, the date on which

the Marshall Islands became a Member of the United Nations, a party to the Statute of this Court

and fully integrated into the international community. On Monday it was telling that the

United Kingdom did not challenge our assertion that 17 September 1991 was when, for the

purposes of the Marshall Islands’ temporal limitation, the clock started ticking and a “new

situation” was created. Nor did the United Kingdom dispute our contention that the Marshall

Islands’ accession to the NPT in 1995 constituted another “new situation”. Members of the Court,

this goes directly to the question of the source or real cause of this dispute because it contradicts the

United Kingdom’s characterization of the situation as inseparable and indivisible.

7. In that regard, let me make an observation in response to the United Kingdom’s remarks

about the Jurisdictional Immunities case. The Court’s Order in the counter-claim makes it clear

that the 1947 Peace Treaty was part of the “legal régime” which “determined the status of Italian

property in Germany and dealt with the restoration and restitution of property of Italy and its

nationals”. Other agreements and measures after that date did not constitute a “new situation” . In

3Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010,
I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 320, paras. 27-30. - 24 -

our case, however, upon its entry into force for the Marshall Islands in January 1995, the NPT

became the controlling “legal régime”. There was nothing before it; it constituted a “new

situation”, so only conduct after that date can be relevant as the source or real cause of this dispute.

8. 17 September this year, 2016, will mark the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Islands’

membership of the United Nations. It is a young State  it has not yet existed long enough to need

to consider advancing its critical date. The United Kingdom has updated the critical date in its own

optional clause declaration three times. In 2004, when it amended the date from 24 October 1945

to 1 January 1974, a government minister told Parliament that this was to update “the cut-off date

for the acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction, thus excluding stale claims” . And that statement is

in tab 3, Members of the Court.

9. Mr. President, this is not a stale claim. It is a claim in respect of a breach that has

persisted from 30 January 1995, when the Marshall Islands became a party to the NPT, to the

present day. On Monday, on behalf of the United Kingdom, Professor Verdirame conceded that, if

there is a dispute, “the entry into force of the NPT between the UK and the Marshall Islands might

offer the legal basis for such a dispute” . He went on to repeat what he had said in the first round:

that the source of the dispute is inextricably linked to pre-1995 situations; that the case is based on

35
“a whole continuing situation dating back to 1970 and, in some cases, beyond” .

10. But the Marshall Islands has never framed the case in such terms. Those five words

“and, in some cases, beyond” are revealing. How could there possibly be continuing breaches of

the NPT going back beyond 1970  before the NPT entered into force, including for the

United Kingdom, and even before the Treaty was signed in 1968? There cannot be. In its

Application, the Marshall Islands traced the history of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons

policy and practice, not just back to 1970 but right back to its origins in the early 1950s  nearly

20 years before the NPT came into force. The chronology did not stop, or should I say start,

at 1970. The “back story” is not all or only about NPT-related conduct. This demonstrates that the

33
Hansard, House of Lords, 7 July 2004, Column WS35 (tab 3).
3CR 2016/7, p. 26, para. 19 (Verdirame).

3CR 2016/7, p. 26, para. 16 (Verdirame).
36
Application of the Marshall Islands (AMI), para. 24. - 25 -

United Kingdom’s pre-1995 conduct is documented solely in order to provide historical

background, and thus dispels the myth that the source or real cause of this dispute between the

Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom concerning the United Kingdom’s conduct under

Article VI and the equivalent customary rule lies in situations or facts prior to 1991.

11. Professor Verdirame made much of the Marshall Islands’ claim that, 45 (now 46) years

after the NPT’s entry into force, the United Kingdom’s delay in fulfilling its obligations under

Article VI is manifestly unreasonable . He stated that this demonstrated the Court’s lack of

temporal jurisdiction. But again, Mr. President, Members of the Court, this misconstrues the

subject-matter of the dispute and ignores the fact that the Marshall Islands’ accession to the NPT in

January 1995 constituted a “new situation”. The Marshall Islands is not basing its case on a

continuing situation going back to 1970.

12. The two specific instances which Professor Verdirame cited to try and substantiate his

contention that the Marshall Islands is thwarted by the ratione temporis reservation also illustrate

this point. The Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) dates back to 1958 and continuous-at-sea

38
nuclear-armed patrols date back to 1968  both prior to the NPT’s entry into force. Without

them, however, the chronology would have been incomplete and situations or facts which the

dispute presupposes would have been missing. They are not part of the source or real cause of the

dispute. There is a continuing situation but, for the reasons already given, it runs from 1995 to the

present day: 21 years and counting.

13. The United Kingdom said that the Marshall Islands must show that the complaint relates

39
to a post-1995 situation . The Application and the Memorial do show this. They document that

since 1995 the United Kingdom has taken and continues to take steps to qualitatively improve its

nuclear arsenal; has consistently opposed the commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapons

convention in the Conference on Disarmament; has refused to participate in the Open-ended

Working Group and pre-emptively declared that it will not support any outcome the Working

Group may produce; and has given the clearest possible indications that it intends to go on relying

3CR 2016/7, p. 25, para. 13 (Verdirame).

3Ibid., para. 15 (Verdirame).
39
Ibid., pp. 24-25, para. 12 (Verdirame). - 26 -

40
on its nuclear arsenal for decades to come . These are all specific instances of post-1995 conduct,

indeed, post-Advisory Opinion conduct  and these are the facts and situations that constitute the

source or real cause of this dispute.

14. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there is another reason why Professor Verdirame

has insisted that your frame of reference should be the last 45 years or so rather than the last

21 years. He said: “It may . . . well be that crucial factors demonstrating the reasonableness of the

41
United Kingdom’s conduct can only be appreciated over that period of time.” What

Professor Verdirame seems to be suggesting is that conduct that is unreasonable and thus a breach

of Article VI, when viewed in the context of the last 21 years, may not be unreasonable and a

breach if placed in the context of the last 45 years. He is obviously hedging his bets, Members of

the Court. But in any event, that is an issue for the merits, not for this stage of the proceedings.

15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes my submissions. I thank you for

your kind attention and ask you, Mr. President, to invite Professor Palchetti to the podium.

Thank you.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne la parole à M. le professeur Palchetti.

Mr. PALCHETTI:

A BSENT THIRD PARTIES

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, after last Monday’s hearings it is clear that there is

still one fundamental issue that divides the Parties with regard to the absent third parties objection.

This central issue concerns the test to be used in order to determine the applicability of the

Monetary Gold principle. According to the United Kingdom the principle applies whenever a

judgment of the Court may lead by implication to an evaluation of the conduct of a third State. The

Marshall Islands has a much more restrictive view. According to the Marshall Islands, it applies

only when the Court, in order to determine the responsibility of the respondent, has necessarily to

determine, as a preliminary matter, the responsibility of a third State.

4AMI, Part IV; Memorial of the Marshall Islands (MMI), Part 7.

4CR 2016/7, p. 27, para. 20 (Verdirame). - 27 -

2. On Monday, Ms. Wells said that the United Kingdom’s view is taken directly from the

Court’s Judgment in the East Timor case and noted that I had forgotten to refer to that Judgment . 42

43
In fact the Marshall Islands had referred to that Judgment in its Written Observations . But since

the United Kingdom gives so much weight to that Judgment, it is convenient that I come back to it

again.

3. I will first examine the Judgment in East Timor. Then I will briefly respond to some other

points made by the United Kingdom on Monday.

I. The Judgment in the East Timor case

4. Mr. President, the Court’s reasoning in East Timor is structured as follows. In

paragraphs 23 to 28, the Court addresses Australia’s objection relating to the Monetary Gold

principle. In paragraphs 29 to 33 the Court addresses some additional arguments advanced by

Portugal. Finally, in paragraphs 34 and 35 the Court makes some final observations.

5. Paragraph 28 is of central importance in the Court’s reasoning. It provides the rationale

on which the Court relies for justifying the application of the Monetary Gold principle. There the

Court said: “in the view of the Court, Australia’s behaviour cannot be assessed without first

entering into the question why it is that Indonesia could not lawfully have concluded the
44
1989 Treaty, while Portugal allegedly could have done so” . “Without first entering”: the test

applied by the Court is clear. The Monetary Gold principle applies because the determination of

the lawfulness of Indonesia’s conduct is a prerequisite for the determination of the responsibility of

Australia. This is precisely the test which the Marshall Islands asks the Court to apply in the

present case.

6. The United Kingdom does not rely on paragraph 28 but on paragraph 29. In paragraph 29

the Court does not address the question whether Indonesia was to be considered as an indispensable

party. It addresses an additional argument advanced by Portugal, which is based on the erga omnes

character of the obligation allegedly breached. In this context the Court observes that it “could not

rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its judgment would imply an evaluation of the

42
CR 2016/7, p. 28, para. 3 (Wells).
4Written Statement of Observations and Submissions of the Marshall Islands (WSMI), p. 19.
44
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 28. - 28 -

45
lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party to the case” . This sentence must

be read in context. In particular, it must be interpreted in the light of what the Court had just said

in the previous paragraph. It simply makes no sense to see in paragraphs 28 and 29 two different

tests. There can only be one, single test. It is the one on which the Court relied for finding that

Indonesia was an indispensable party.

7. If there are still any possible doubts, I invite the Members of the Court to read the

conclusive part of the Judgment. In summing up its position the Court stated:

“The Court concludes that it cannot, in this case, exercise the jurisdiction it has
by virtue of the declarations made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its
Statute because, in order to decide the claims of Portugal, it would have to rule, as a
prerequisite, on the lawfulness of Indonesia's conduct in the absence of that State's
46
consent.”

8. I am pretty sure that at this stage the last thing you would like to hear is me repeating the

relevant passages in the Nauru Judgment and I can understand you and will not inflict upon you

these passages once again. Let me simply emphasize that the test applied in East Timor is the same

test as in Nauru. It is not the test identified by the United Kingdom. It is the test that the

Marshall Islands asks the Court to apply in the present case.

9. Once it is clarified that the Monetary Gold principle only applies when the determination

of the responsibility of the respondent State requires the prior determination of the responsibility of

a third State, the entire edifice carefully built up by the United Kingdom comes down. It cannot

seriously be argued that the determination of the responsibility of the Marshall Islands requires a

prior determination of the responsibility of the other States possessing nuclear weapons. What can

be said, at most, is that the Court’s determination of the responsibility of the United Kingdom may

have some implication for the legal position of these States. If one applies to the present case the

test used by the Court in East Timor, it becomes immediately apparent that there are no

indispensable third parties. They have all disappeared, like in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, they
47
“were all spirits, and are melted into air, into thin air” .

45
I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29.
46Ibid., p. 105, para. 35.
47
W. Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act. IV, scene 1, 149-150. - 29 -

II. The case law of the Court supports the Marshall Islands’ position

10. Mr. President, I will now briefly address some other points made by the United Kingdom

on Monday.

11. The United Kingdom argued that the Judgment in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the

Pacific Ocean is not relevant because it is not an “essential parties” case . It is hard to understand

why this circumstance should matter at all. The Court has to rely on something in order to

determine the subject-matter of a dispute. This can only be the application, as well as the written

and oral pleadings of the parties, as the Court indicated in Bolivia v. Chile . Obviously, it is

substance, not only form, that counts. But in the present case, substance and form coincide. The

subject-matter is, in form and in substance, whether the United Kingdom, through the conduct of its

organs, has breached its obligation to negotiate in good faith nuclear disarmament.

12. My colleague on the other side also argued that the Judgment in the Pulp Mills case is

50
not relevant, once again because it is not an “essential parties” case . In particular she noted that

this Judgment has nothing to say on the application or scope of the Monetary Gold principle . But 51

the Marshall Islands does not argue that the Pulp Mills case is relevant for determining the scope of

the Monetary Gold principle. The importance of this Judgment lies elsewhere. It shows that this

Court can determine whether a State has breached its obligation to negotiate by focusing

exclusively on the unilateral conduct of that State.

13. The United Kingdom also distinguished the present case from the Application of the

Interim Accord case on the argument that, unlike in the present case, neither NATO nor its member

States were bound by the obligation incumbent upon Greece. This, however, was not the reason

relied upon by the Court. The reason was that there was no need for a prior determination of the

responsibility of absent parties: “the Court does not need to determine the responsibility of NATO

48CR 2016/7, p. 29, para. 7 (Wells).

49Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of
24 September 2015, para. 26.
50
CR 2016/7, p. 29, para. 9 (Wells).
51Ibid., p. 30, para. 10 (Wells). - 30 -

52
or of its member States in order to assess the conduct of the Respondent” . This test is the same as

in Nauru and in East Timor. It also controls the present case.

14. My last point concerns the possibility for the Court to separate the allegations made by a

party and to apply the Monetary Gold principle only to certain allegations. Last week I noted that

the United Kingdom made reference only to a limited set of specific acts in order to support its

argument concerning absent third States. I also noted that eventually the Court does not need to

rely on such acts in order to determine the United Kingdom’s responsibility. The United Kingdom

took issue with this statement. It argued that the Court cannot decide a case by focusing only on

53
certain allegations .

15. This view is mistaken. The Court can separate out a specific claim or a specific aspect of

a claim and refuse to exercise its jurisdiction only on that claim or part of a claim. At this stage,

however, this issue is only theoretical. The United Kingdom has not been able to refer to a single

act the assessment of which justifies the application of the Monetary Gold principle. There are

none.

16. This, Mr. President, concludes my presentation. I thank the Members of the Court for

their kind attention and would ask the Court to give the floor to the Co-Agent of the Marshall

Islands, Mr. Tony deBrum, for his concluding remarks.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci. Je donne la parole à M. Tony deBrum, coagent des Iles Marshall.

Mr. deBRUM:

C ONCLUDING REMARKS

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as I stated last week, the Marshall Islands has come

before this Court because of its belief in, and reliance upon, the rule of law.

2. Since 2013, the Marshall Islands has voted in favour of resolutions:

5Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v.
Greece), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), pp. 660-661, para. 43.
53
CR 2016/7, p. 31, para. 18 (Wells). - 31 -

(a) calling for immediate commencement of negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention ; 54

and

(b) calling for “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” . 55

The UK, on the other hand, has opposed these resolutions and voted “no”.

The latter resolution  the Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion resolution  provides that

the United Nations General Assembly:

“1. Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court

of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict
and effective international control; and

2. Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by
commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear
weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment,
stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their

elimination.”

3. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as we stated in our official Statement to this Court

back in 1995, we joined the NPT for very serious reasons. Those reasons include NPT Article VI,

on which this case against the UK is based, and also the Preamble of the NPT, which we quoted in

our 1995 Statement . The Preamble provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

“The States concluding this Treaty . . .

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear

war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war
and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples;

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of
the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear

disarmament . . .

Desiring to . . . facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons,
the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national

arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control . . .

54E.g., UNGA res. A/RES/68/32, 5 Dec. 2013, 137-28-20.
55
E.g., UNGA res. A/RES/70/56, 7 Dec. 2015, 137-24-25.
56
Letter dated 22 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations,
together with Written Statement of the Government of the Marshall Islands, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/8720.pdf. - 32 -

57
Have agreed as follows . . .”

4. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the States possessing nuclear weapons that joined

the NPT made a legally binding promise, in accordance with the goals they expressly adopted in

the NPT Preamble, to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament and

cessation of the nuclear arms race, pursuant to Article VI. The dispute in this case is over whether

the UK is in breach of that bargained-for, legal obligation.

5. Put simply, it has been over 21 years since the Marshall Islands became a party to the NPT

and entered into that legal relationship with the United Kingdom. In spite of the United Kingdom’s

solemn promise in NPT Article VI, little or no progress has been made toward nuclear disarmament

since the RMI joined the NPT. Indeed, reverse progress is occurring, with the UK modernizing,

upgrading and enhancing its nuclear arsenal to last for many decades. At the end of the day, the

UK position boils down to an assertion that the RMI has no legally enforceable rights under NPT

Article VI. If that were true, the strategic bargain of the NPT is illusory.

6. In its Advisory Opinion, this Court acknowledged “the unique characteristics of nuclear

weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human

suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come” . 58

7. The Court also observed that nuclear weapons “have the potential to destroy all
59
civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet” . In making that observation, the Court was

certainly not expressing a political statement. So once again, the observation of this Court in its

1996 Advisory opinion was that nuclear weapons “have the potential to destroy all civilization and

the entire ecosystem of the planet” (emphasis added).

8. Mr. President, Members of the Court, our goal in this proceeding is to obtain the UK’s

pursuit in good faith of the required, promised and bargained-for negotiations for nuclear

disarmament in all its aspects. The Marshall Islands’ commitment to seek judicial settlement of

this very real dispute is unqualified.

9. Before reading our final submissions, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for

the Court’s time, attention and expertise on these critically important matters of international law.

57
Preamble, 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 United Nations, Treaty Series, 161.
5Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 226, para. 36.
59
Ibid., para. 35. - 33 -

10. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will now present the Marshall Islands’ final

submissions.

SUBMISSIONS

“The Marshall Islands respectfully requests the Court:

(a) to reject the preliminary objections to its jurisdiction and to the admissibility of the
Marshall Islands’ claims, as submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland in its Preliminary Objections of 15 June 2015; and

(b) to adjudge and declare that the Court has jurisdiction over the claims of the
Marshall Islands submitted in its Application of 24 April 2014; and

(c) to adjudge and declare that the Marshall Islands’ claims are admissible.”

With great respect and gratefulness, thank you, Mr. President and Members of the Court.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Excellence. La Cour prend acte des conclusions finales

dont vous venez de donner lecture au nom de la République des Iles Marshall, comme elle l’a fait

lundi pour les conclusions finales présentées par le Royaume-Uni.

Deux juges souhaitent poser des questions. La première s’adresse aux deux Parties. Je

donne la parole à cette fin à M. le juge Cançado Trindade.

Judge CANÇADO TRINDADE: Merci, Monsieur le président. I have questions to put to

both contending Parties, the Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom. My questions are the

following:

The Marshall Islands, in the course of the written submissions and oral arguments, and the

United Kingdom, in its document on Preliminary Objections (of 15 June 2015), have both referred

to U.N. General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament. Parallel to the resolutions on the

matter which go back to the early 70’s (First Disarmament Decade), there have been two more

recent series of General Assembly resolutions, namely: those condemning nuclear weapons,

extending from 1982 to date, and those adopted as a follow-up to the 1996 I.C.J. Advisory Opinion

on Nuclear Weapons, extending so far from 1997 to 2015. In relation to this last series of

General Assembly resolutions, — referred to by the contending Parties, — I would like to ask both

the Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom whether, in their understanding, such - 34 -

General Assembly resolutions are constitutive of an expression of opinio juris, and, if so, what in

their view is their relevance to the formation of a customary international law obligation to pursue

negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, and what is their incidence upon the question of the

existence of a dispute between the Parties.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Le texte de la question sera communiqué aux Parties sous forme

écrite dès que possible. Les Parties sont invitées à fournir leur réponse par écrit. Ces réponses

devront être communiquées le mercredi 23 mars à 18 heures au plus tard. Des observations écrites

sur les réponses de l’autre Partie pourront être présentées le 30 mars à 18 heures au plus tard. La

seconde question s’adresse au Royaume-Uni, je donne la parole à cet effet à M. le juge Greenwood.

Judge GREENWOOD: Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, during the course of its response this afternoon to Judge Bennouna’s question,

the Marshall Islands referred to certain documents not previously put before the Court. Does the

United Kingdom consider that these documents bear upon the existence of a dispute, in the sense in

which that term is used in the jurisprudence of the Court?

Thank you.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Le texte de la question sera communiqué aux Parties sous forme

écrite dès que possible. Le Royaume-Uni est invité à fournir sa réponse par écrit au plus tard le

mercredi 23 mars à 18 heures. Les Iles Marshall pourront présenter des observations écrites sur la

réponse du Royaume-Uni le 30 mars à 18 heures au plus tard.

Cela nous amène à la fin des audiences consacrées aux plaidoiries des Parties sur les

exceptions préliminaires soulevées par le Royaume-Uni en l’affaire des Obligations relatives à des

négociations concernant la cessation de la course aux armes nucléaires et le désarmement

nucléaire (Iles Marshall c. Royaume-Uni). Je tiens à remercier les agents, conseils et avocats des

deux Parties pour l’assistance qu’ils ont apportée à la Cour par leurs exposés oraux. Je demande

aux agents de rester à la disposition de la Cour pour toutes informations ou renseignements dont la

Cour pourrait avoir besoin. - 35 -

Sous cette réserve, je déclare close la procédure orale sur les exceptions préliminaires

soulevées par le Royaume-Uni en la présente affaire. La Cour se retirera à présent pour délibérer.

Les Parties seront informées en temps utile par le greffier de la date à laquelle la Cour rendra son

arrêt en séance publique.

Je vous remercie. L’audience est levée.

L’audience est levée à 16 h 40.

___________

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Wednesday 16 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)

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