Document informally made available to Members of the Court by the United States of America Information Office in The Hague

DOCUMENTINFORMALLYMADEAVAILABLE
TO MEMBERS OFTHECOURT
BYTHE UNITEDSTATESINFORMATION
OFFICEINTHEHAGUE

DOClJMENTMIS OFFICIEUSEMENT

ÀLADISPOSITION DESMEMBRESDELA COUR
PARLEBUREAU D'INFORMATION
DES ÉTATS-UNISD'AMERIQAELAHAYE "REVOLUTIONBEYOND OURBORDERS"

SANDINISTAINTERVENTION INCENTRAL
AMERICA* **

"This revolution goes beyond our borders." (Tomas Borge, July 19, 1981.)

1.WHAT THE CONTROVER ISSYBOUT

"1 am aware of the allea-tions made bv the eovernment of the United
Si;iic, that ni) gi>i.crnmc1:cnding ;irms. ;imniunition. cc>mmuniciii<>ni
equipnicnt and medicil supplie i<ircbcls c~induçtinga ci\il u;ir ;igainrt ihc
xovirnment ol'El Sal\:idor. Such allecaiions arc falsc.and conrtitutc nrlthinr
more than a pretext for the United States to continue ils unlawful milita6
and paramilitdry activities against Nicaragua intended to overthrow my
government. In truth, my government is no1 engaged, und has no1 heen

enea~ed. in the orovision of urms or other siio~lies ro eirher of tlre factions
~ni<i&iui lhc chilwur i,t il S<rli.ir1~m~h;,is adJcd.1 (~kuel i~si.,>i<i
Brin. I.orcign Mini~tcr or N~s~rngua, ,\tliJa\it filcd bcforc the
Inicrnati,~nal Court <~i'Ju\iics,d:iicd April 21. 1)84'

A striking feature of the public debate on the conflict in Central America is
the degree to which al1 parties concerned accept the principle that a nation
providing matériel, logisticssupport, training andPacilities to insurgent forces
fighting against the government of another State is engaged in a use of force
legally indistinguishable from conventional military operations by regular armed
forces. As with conventional uses of force, such military action is permissible
under international law if it is undertaken in the exercise of the right of individual
or collectiveselt'defense in response to an unlawful use of force2. But such
action is unlawful when it constitutes unprovoked aggression.
As Nicaragua has stated to the World Court:

". . .there isnow a substantially unanimous modern view concerning
indirect use of force througharmed groups of mercenaries or irregulars.
Whatever legal douhts may have existed prior to World War II they were

Fordciails regardingthis document andits informalsubmissionto the Counsee
ofAmerica),Merils. Judpment.I.C.J. Repo1986,p.44, para. 7/Nole by rheRegisrry]
** Maps and figurno1reproduced.[Noie hy theRcpi.s~ry.]
'Affidavitof Foreign Ministcr Migueld'Escoto Brockmann, NicaraguanExhibitII
submittcdIo the lntcrnationalCourafJusticeal ils publicsittingof A25-27,1984,
caseconcerningMilira~yand ParomiliroryAciiviriesin and agoinsrNicoroguo(Nicoroguo
v. UnitedStoresofAmerica),p. 1.Resubmiltedto the CourtasAnnex B to Nicaraguan
Mcmonal (Mcrits),Apri30, 1985.
20ther ldwrulbasesforthe uscof forceincludeactionstaken bya Statc pursuant Io
dccisionsofthe Unitcd Nations SccurityCouncilor al the invitation of another Statc
withinils territory460 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES

dispelled by the events of the post-war period. If the prohibition on the use
of force in Article 2 (4) [of the United Nations Charter] was to have any
meaning, it would have to cover this new and dangerous mode of military
activity. ..'."

The critical element of the debate, therefore, is not the identification of the
applicable legal standard, but the determination of the facts to be measured
against that undisputed legal standard. In determining the facts, it is important
to assess both the evidence of what has been done and the credibility of what
has been said.
Nicaragua charges that, since at least 1982, the United States bas used force
against Nicaragua in the form of assistancc to Nicaraguans fighting against the
Sandinista re-ime. Anv such actions. Nicaraeu- -reues. are illee-l and imor. .r
iince Kiiilragua ha, neter taken <inyaction againsi neighboring cuuntrier thai
irould givc ihcm or their sll) ihc Cnircil States the rigIO <iciagain\i Yicarigua
111\di-Jckn\c. 7 h~.li~htin,: in El Sdli;iJur. diid thr. \i.ilciiic in 1liinJur.t. dnd
Costa Rica, are, the S<ndinrstas say, entirely the work of home-grown movements
with which Nicaragua kas immense sympathy but to which it has provided no
material assistance.
Nicaraeua's case thus rests on statements bv Sandinista reoresentativcs. such
as thai q~uted dbiite Irom toreign Ministcr ~i'i<sïoto's:iltid';ivitiiied iriih the
\V<>rlJCouri. dcnying any iniolvement in inAurgcnclc\and suh\,crïion in neigh.
horinfi couniries'. But.as the IJniied States Cuncrcss. the I:~ec.itii.r.branch. ihr

~ati&al Bipartisan commission on Central America, and others who have
studied the facts have repeatedly found, the Sandinista leaders have, since at
least 1980,engaged in a carefully concerted use of force against its neighbors. A
leading critic of United StatesNicaragua policy, Congressman Edward P. Boland,
Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, stated in
March 1982:
"There is . . . persuasive evidence that the Sandinista government of
Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is transferring arms and financial
support from and through Nicaragua Io the insurgents. They are further
providing the insurgents bases of operations in Nicaragua . . .What this
says is that, contrary to the repeated denials of Nicaraguan officials, that
country is thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran insurgency.

'NicaraguanMcmorial(Mcrits), casccancerning Mililuryand PoramiliiaryAclivilies in
and quinsr Nicoropri (Nicuruguo v. UniiedStules of Amrrico), ICJ P1eading.r.. 126.
The Sandinistasespouscthesc principlcsto Westernaudiences,whilcinternallyextolling
theircommitmcntto "revolutionaryinternationalism";the asscncd right ta aid "national
liberalion"movements elsewhereN . everthelerilsccrnsappropriatetajudge thciractions
by the standards which thcy use IO judge othcrs and which they claim to apply to
th'The onlyconcessionthe Sandinistasmake Io thc argumcntthat thciractionsjustifya
responscagainstthemis thcirdaim that the UnitedStateswouldacl againsiihemin any
event.and hencchas farfciteàany rightto assis1in thedefenscof neighboringStates.This
argumcnt has nothingIo do withthe fÿctsof UnitcdStatespolicytowardNicarüguasince
1979. Italso kas no basisinlaw - a pcrson who wrcstlcs a gun from the hands of an
attackcr cannot himselfbe char& with arsault (nor can the gunman'saction itselfbe
cxcurcd)on thc basisof speculaiionthat he wUuld"no doubt" havestruck the gunman
alternativargumcntcanstitutesimplicitrecognitionby thc Sandinisitsthat thcy havenos
case onceil becomesapparent that thcy have engagedin acts ofagression against their
neighbars.In thesecircumstancer,the right of their neighbars and theUnitcd States to
respondcannot bcchallengcd. RI~VOI.UTIONBREYOND OUR BORDERS 461

That support is such as to greatly aid the insurgents in their struggle with
government forces in El Salvador '."

The full Congress has on repeated occasions made formal findings concerning
Sandinista aggression :
"by providing military support (including arms, training, and logistical,
command and control, and communications facilities) to groups seeking tu
overthrow the Government of El Salvador and other Central American

governments, the Government . . of Nicaragua kas violated Article 18 of
the Charter of the [OAS] which declares that no State has the right. to
intemene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the interna1
or external affairs ofany other State . . '."

That the Sandinistas have engaged and continue tu engage in aggression is not
in doubt to Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America. There is no need tu prove
tu these countries what they are experiencing on a daily basis. Nor are the
Contadora countries in doubtabout the nature of Nicaragua's behavior. Indeed,
as El Salvador informed the lnternational Court of Justice last year:

"Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto, when pressed at a meeting of the
Foreign Ministers of the Contadora ero-. in Julv 1983 . . on the issues of
~ica&uan material support for the subversion ln El ~alvador,shamelessl~
and openly admitted such support in front of his colleagues of the Con-

The purpose of this paper is tu address the reality and consequences of
Nicaragua's longstanding and continuing intervention against ils immediate
neighbors, and to do su by focussing on the factors that are relevant tu the
legality and morality of the use of force: aggression and self-defense.
The record is documented in this study. It demonstrates that:

- Almost precisely a year after the fall of Somoza in July 1979,the Sandinistas
begdn a major eRon to help guerrilla forces overthrow the Government of El
Salvador by rcpeating the strategy followed by the Sandinistas in their own final
oliensive against Somoza. As a direct result of support hy Nicaragua, and by
other States using Nicaraeua as a conduit. the Salvadoran euerrillas were ~ ~ ~
transformed from-terrorist factions that had been limited to ruhieries, kidnap-
pings and occasional Street violence into an organized armed force able tu mount
a coordinated nationwide offensive. inflicting sirnificant loss of life and economic
damage on El Salvador. Although this fir; in?ervention failed with the failure

of the guernllas in January 1981, the Sandinistas have continued tu ship and

'Prcssrelcascdÿted March4, 1982, by CongressmanEdward P. Boland,Dcmocrat,of
Massachusetts,p. I.On August8, 1985. asimilarviewbecamcUnitedStaicslaw.Section
722 (c)(2) (C) of the lnternational Secunty and DevclopmentCooperationAct of 1985
expressesthe findingof Congressthat
'ihe .Go\emnieiii of Y!i;ii;igua ha, flagr~nll)iiol~lîd ihc rKuriiy i>iih~.
nsiiai,in the rigiun.iiiih.iit . .h~s;oitiriliticdand rsr~rcJio ccase.iggr<is.ioiiin
ihr lrirmi>I'~ni.J\uhvcrrion xyainbt115ncl-hbvrr . ." (P 1, 99-83 i
Seealso PermanentSelectCommittee on IntelligenceRcpon on H.R.276û(Amendmcnt
to the IntelligenceAuthorizationAct for FiscalYear 1983),H.R. Rep.98-122,p. 5.
'IntelligenceAuthonration Actfor 1984 (P.L. 98-215) s. 109 (a).
'Sce App. 1,Clossary
4DDecrationof Interventionof the Rcpublic of El Salvador, caseconcerning Militory
and Poromilifory Activiries in and opinsr Nicoro.quo (hnicaroguo v. Uniied Siares OJ
Americo), submittedto the lnternational Courtof Justice,August 15,1984,pp. 10-11.462 MILITARYAhW PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTlES

store arms. and to orovide trainine. v,adouarters and coordination on Nica-
raguan territory for a new "prolonged war" strategy. As of early September
1985, Sandinista support continues to be an essential element in the trainin-,
communications andlogistics systems of the Salvadoran guerrillas.
- Sandinista security services have, both directly and indirectly, through
training, supply and support of subversive groups in Honduras and Costa Rica,
engaged in bombings, assassinations and other unlawful attacks against the

people and institutions of those nations. In Honduras, they supported "vanguard"
groups first to supply the attack on El Salvador, then to engage in kidnapping,
hijacking, and more recently in efforts to establish guerrilla fronts in the Hon-
duran Departments of Olancho (in 1983) and El Paraiso (in 1984 and 1985).
In Costa Rica, the Sandinistas redirected alliances established during the anti-
Somoza struggle to support the expanded insurgency in El Salvador, provided
covert support and training for the paramilitdry wings of far left groups, and

supported several terrorist actions.
- Finally, the Sandinistas' military buildup threatens Nicaragua's neighhors.
It has emboldened the Sandinistas to engage in military incursions into the
territories of Honduras and Costa Rica, incursions in which citizens ofthese and
other countries have died as a direct result of Nicaraguan military actions.

From the outset the United States has been aware of Nicaraguan aggression
and has sought to help end it peacefully, using diplomatic appeals and economic
and political measures. Notwithstanding the Sandinistas' claims that the United
States has consistentlv soueht for its own nurooses to ovcrthrow their réeime
and kas only recentl;"ma~ufactured" a c~lle~ive self-defense rationale f& its

actions, the diplomatic and public record clearly shows that after July 1979the
United Statesassisted the new eovernment in ~icaraeua and tried io develon
fricndly hilatcral relation5 Th~rc;ord shi>us ai ucIÏ that the Unitcd SI~I&
respondcd in a nieïsurtcl and graduatcd fashion when ihc Sandinistas rcfurcd IO
ceise their intervention aaainsi other States in Central America. And the record
shows that the ~~ndinist& thcmsclvcs. through persistent aggrcssion and rcfus:il
to particip-tc scriously in enortsIO iiddrer, thc regional conliiit through pc~ceiul
rneans, bear the primary responsibility for the distrust and resentment of the

Sandinistas that is found throughout Central America, and for the current strife
within Nicaragua itself.

II. THEPRAXI S FINTERVENTION

"The foreien oolicv of the Sandinista Peoole's Revolution is based on the
full exerciseof iational sovereignty and independence and on the principle
of revolutionary internationalism." (FSLN "72-hour" Document, Septemher

"This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always
internationalist from the moment Sandino fought [his first battle]." (Tomas
Borge, July 19, 1981'.)

'Anolüu Jc luC,!un!urd v Turci Jz~la Rzivlucii,n fiipulor .Sun<luiTcrtrPoliricdy
hfi1iriirprc.<rniii<l~rr lu D,re<-rii>nVucitinr>hll iirnic SdnildeLihi,r<ii.ion.\'d~.ton<il
cw lu ,ls~mhliu dr.Ci<<irlri>. KIGOHI-K7'0 I.OPl.~Z PPEXtZ ~~~~l~hr.e,l21 22 ,23 JC.
Seprlemhrede 1979) IMana~.al,.ctober1979(oftcnreîerredto as the "72-tlau; Docu-
ment"),p.24
'Al amiliiaryceremonybroadcast onManaguaDomesticService, as reponed by FBIS
on July21, 1981. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 463

"We cannot cease being internationalists unless we ccase being revolution-
aries." (Bayardo Arce, May 6.1984'.)
The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded in Tegu-
cigalpa, Honduras, in July 1961 at a meeting among Tomas Borge Maninez,
Carlos Fonseca Amador, and Silvio Mayorga. All had heen student activists in
Nicaragua; al1 had participated in preliminary meetings in Cuba; al1 identified
with the Cuban revolution and with armed conflict. The first armed FSLN

guerrillaunits entered Nicaragua from Honduras in 1962 carrying Cuban-
supplied weapons '.
By the time the FSLN was founded, internationalism and guerrilla warfare
had already been united in Sandinista praxis in the form of the "Rigoberto
Lopez Perez" Column. This guerrilla group had been organized in mid-1959
with advice from Ernesto "Che" Guevara and supplied by Cuba. The 55
Nicaraguans, Cubans and other internationalistswho belonged Io it were
dispersed by the Honduran army before they could enter Nicaragua3.
The FSLN suffered repeated defeats in its amed opposition to the Somoza
dynasty, which after 1967 was headed by Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Fif-
teen years after their opening attacks, Fonseca and Mayorga were dead and
FSLN forces had no more than 300 guerrillas belonging to three feuding fac-
tions4.
A new strategy to gain alliances beyond the borders of Nicaragua, especially

with non-Marxist States and organizations, gradually developed in the wake of
a failed October 1977 campaign against Somoza. Events soon gave the FSLN
the opportunity to develop alliances with moderate and democratic groups and
individuals who oreviouslv would have shunned the FSLN hecause of its Cubdn
tics and ior i,ioirnce In January 1978. Pcdro Jo~quin Chaniorro, the
r.diti>i>fl~ t>r~)i.<ii.icaragua's leading ncwspaper. was murderrd hy assailanis
iridclv bclic\cLltu bc ar\ociaied uiih Som<)!a. Chaniorro n~s Somsm'r leadinc
critic-and a strong democrat. His death set off the national revulsion that eve;
tually destroyed Somoza.
Throughout 1978, while Nicaraguan business, religious and civic leaders were
movina irrevocablv into o~oosition to Somoza. Armando Ulises Estrada. a hieh-
ranking member of the ~Kerica Department of the Communist Party if ~&a,
made numerous secret trips seeking to unify the three major factions of the

'"Comandante Bayardo Arcc'sSecret Speech before the Nicaragua" Sacialist Party
(PSN)", Dcpartment of Statc Publication9422,Inter-American Series118.Washington,
August23, 1984).,p.4 (translated from the tex1publishedin Lo Vonguordio,Barcclona,
'Clanbel Alcgna and D. J. P. Flakoll, "Nicaragua: la revolucionsandinista"Serie
Popular Ern,Mexico,1982,quole Borgeon the establirhmcnt ofthe FSLN and iis 1962
operation al pp. 166-168.nie organizationesiablishedin Honduras in July 1961 was
originallytobe namcd simplythe National Liberation Front. "Sandinista" was added
becÿuse of Ponseca'sbelid in the need for ahistone Nicaragua" symbol.In this way,
AugustoSandino, a nationalist,becamethe symbolof an intcrnatianalistmavcmcnt.
'The deleai broughta woundcdFonsecato Havanawherehe made penonal contacts
with ihe Cubanrevolutionaryleadershipthai contributedto the iounding of ihc FSLN.
InLeaders orthethrecfactionswcre:TomasBarge."ProlongedPo ularWar", flumberto
and DanielOrtega,"ThirdForce" or"lnsurrectionistand Jaime~~c~~~k ",roletarian".
Thc factionsaredescribedin GeorgeBlack, Triumphofrhc People: TheSondinistoRevol-
urioninNicora.ruo(London, Zed,1981). pp. 91-97.464 MILITARY AND PARI\MILITARY ACTIVITIES

FSLN. In March 1979, the three Sandinista factions entered into a fomalized
alliance with Fidel Castro's sup~ort '. Once unitv was achieved. Cuba increased
covert support operations, providing weapons, training and advisory personnel

to the FSLN. Estrada and Julian Lopez Diaz, later Cuba's first ambassador to
Sandinista Nicaragua, concentrated on building a supply network for channeling
ams and su~~lies to Sandinista guerrilla forces? Bv Mav 1979. these suoolv .. 3
and ~upport'6~erations reached ]evels that helped kutrafize thé conventional
military superiority of Somoza's National Guard and permitted the launchinr-of
a "final offensive"
Within weeks of Somoza's fall in July 1979, the FSLN was reaffiming its
"internationalism" and solidarity with guerrillas elsewhere in Central America.
Using their lies with Cuba, the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nations,
the FSLN beean-to develoo a mononol. ho,d on domestic oower and to con- ~ ~ ~ ~
vert Nicaragua into an ope;ational center of "revolutionary ~nternationa~ism"~.
FSLN leaders in Managua quickly confimed relationships of mutual support

with the leaders of vanousamed movements throuehout Central ~meiica.
Contacts were also established with organizations and ~olitiçal movements that
were no1 directly engaged in amed stmggle, but that could become, or were
already, part of a regional support network for amed revolutionary activities in
Central America.
In 1979,the FSLN's program, which declared that the "principle of revolution-
ary internationalism" was one of the keys to Sandinista foreign policy, had
been discussed and approved without publicity4. By 1981, the Sandinistas felt
confident enough to reissue their 1969 program, which was more specific. The
FSLN called for "authentic unity" of Central America to "lead the way to
coordinating the efforts to achieve national liberation"

'Cuban radio announced asearly asDymber 1978that the three factions hadagreed
to mergc.Also sec Richard L. Millett, HistoricalSetting". in Nicorapo; A Counlry
Sludy (Washington,1982), p.51. Black,op.cil.,pp. 142-148,discusses unificatiwithout
mentioningCuba.
'Cuba todayhas an extensiveintelligcnccand training apparatus. modem militarforces
lookamateurish,theCastrogovernmentisnowableto utilizeagents and contactsnurtured
over 20 to 25 ycars. Most of the coven operations in Nicaragua werc planned and
coordinated by the AmericaDepanment of the Cuban CommunistParty. Headcd by
ManuelPineiro Losada,thcAmericaDeparimentcmergedin 1974Iocentrÿlizcoperational
control of Cuba's covert activitiesin thc WestcrnHemisphere.The departmentbrings
togetherthe expertiseof the Cuban military and the GeneraD l imtoratc of Intelligence
inIoa far-Aungoperationthat includessecrettraining campsin Cuba,networksforcaven
movementof personneland matérieb letweenCuba andabroad, and sophisticatedpropa-
ganda suppan. See Cuba's RenewedSupporl for Violencein hiin Americo, Department
of StatcSpecialRepon No. 90, Deccmber14,1981.
Article12oftheCuban Constitution"espousestheprinciplcsthofbprolctarianinternationalism
and of thecombativesolidarityofthepeoples".Section (c) statcsthat "hclpto...peoples
that stniggle for their liberationconstitute. . .[an]intemationalistright and duty".
Betwecnmid-1979and mid-1981,thc periodin whichthe FSLNeffectivelydroveout the
othermemkrs of the national coalitionthat defeatedSomoza, Cubaninvolvementin the
daily allairr of the Nicaragua" govemmentbecamecomprehensivcand direct. Cuban
militari, securityand intelligenceadvisorsservedin manykcyrolcsin suchkeyministries
as Defenscand Interior.
'See footnote 1,p.462,abovc.
' From"TheHistaricProgramof the FSLN in Ressetand Vandemeer. The Nicarogua
DerenseHumteno Ortegadeclaralin83,p.aprivatemeetingwitharmyand militiachMofficcrthat: REVOI.UTION AEYOND OUR BORI>IIRS 465

'1'0coordinÿie "nation31 libcration" elToris.the Sandinistas Jeveloped by niid-

1980the apparatus to \urt<iin rcgitin-widc guerrill;~tipcraii<>nr.and tiigi\,c them
ri<~litiwa\ acll a\ militxr, s~pri<>rt.\Vith the asri\i<inccoi the Cuhans. So\ici>
ind Ihsi Curopaans. the ~and;nirias ireaicd iwo insiituiionr csiential io iuch
\~perdti.v~ï.the Drpariment Internaii<inal Kclarions (DRI) of the 17SLN,and
the Filih I>irciti>r;iic.ii Intelli~cnce ;~shc>ciatcdnlih the g~ivcrnntr.nt'>C;encr:il
Directorate of State Security (~GSE) '.
The Sandinistas'prdniΠof revolutionary intcmationalism is implementedlargcly

through thesctwo organizations.The DR!, whichisdoxly modeled;ifterthe Amenca
Depanment of the Cuban Communist Party, provides administrative support for
political trainees from Central America. Headed by Julio Lope Campos, it repons
diratly to the FSLN National Directorate and is responsible for establishing and
maintaining support nctworks forthe DGSE and the Fifth Directorateof Intelligence.
nie Fiftb Directorate has ben headed sinceits creation hv Renan Montero Corales
(former n:unc. AnJrcs 1hrahon.i Ixipcl). s Cuban-bom naturalv~d Si:;ir~gu;tn \,ho

\id, (lilh Che Gucrsra in B$)Iii.i:iI.l pr.i\idc>the <ipr.rati\crand the Iials<)n\iimr*iO
10 mainuin the d;inclcstinelinksanclsuup<>nnciw.irks ior aitiritie';iln hehalfoi the
guemlla orgÿnizations in the Centrdl ~mencan region.
Sandinista success in mediating differences among four Guatemalan guerrilla
groups in November 1980 made clear Nicaragua's new role. Unlike the similar
previous Nicaraguan (1979) and Salvadoran (1980) guerrilla unity agreemenls,
which were forged in Cuba, the statement of "revolutionary unity" among the

Guatemalan guerrilla organizations was signed and dated in Managua2.
Those attending the signing epitomvc the apparatus: members of the FSLN
National Directorate, dclegatesfrom the Cuhan Communist Party, includingAmerica
Department chierManuel Pinciro,and the Managua reprmtatives of the Salvadoran

'.Vlni~m-l.cnin!~m ihr wi.niilirJ<rinnr.rhxig~i<ln Rdiol~iit,n.ihcin>irumcni
of ;in:ily,trof our V:ingurdfor uiid:rst.in<liiiigis hi~ionçrole:ind.;irqii~oui the
Kc\oluiion: \Viihnui%tnilini.inlo\rcsdnnoik hlant<i-lrninisu. minJSdndlnirmo
without ~arxism-kninismûinnot be revolutionaw;that is whythe" arc indissolubly
Iinkùland ihsi 1.uh) 8)-rrn.>rdihrm i,S.iiidtnt%niiur pol.ii&lf.1;~ ~iS~ndtntrmc;.
~nilO-r <lwinnçir \l>nism-lrntnirm." Ilmm ihr ic\i pnnihl Ociohîr O.IOPI. in 1.1
.\'~ii.('leguogilpa)uiiigihcxiitionof therph .'t~-uhinon i\ug~ii25. 1981.b) tlit
P~liii.;;in*C'uliuri'l'ruinliSr*tluirifIliS~ndinirliPic~pl:',\mi) (IF6 I 1
'AccordingIo MiguelBolanosHunter, who servedin Nicaragua"counter-intelligence
1979-1983i,n 1983the 2,800 to 3,000 Nicaraguans in the Dcpanmcni of Slalc Securily
weresupplementedbyabout 400 Cubans, 70 Sovicts,40 to50 EastGcnndnsand 20 to 25
Bulgarians. He addcd that rnany OS thc Cuban militaryadvisorswcrcposingas civilian
teachcrs.DonOberdorScrand JoanneOmang. "Nicaragua"BarcsPlanIo Discredit Foes",
WashVigion Posr,June 19,1983,p.Al.
'Sec the uniiy statcment entitled, "Principios Generales y Acuerdos de la Unidad
de las Or~üniciicionesRcvolutionariasEGP, FAR.ORPA, KT", Managua, Nicardaus.

han wasto nécotiatcin ~anacua and thcnRvto llavana io sian'thcdocumentif unity
;n ihe pre<en:; oi ).idil C:i\iG. memherrcif'ihcC~h.inC<imhuni\i IB;x:iwi!n,eni.L.
iirsr froni ilie ISS :inJilteLnified K~voluiton:iryI>irwior:iie (I>KlJ) of lil &;:idor.
lluuc~~.r.a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~:i< ni.idiIiirlen ihc'duiun~cni iii\lanacu.i Io rrifimi "ihr. is-
ordination and unity ofCC~;&I ~Giica's revol"tionaryva&uGd forcer "nd 10 be ;hc
first revolutioniiryorganizations10unify on Central Americansoil.(Drawn fromo tapc-
recordrd account entiiled "lnforrne de Manolo" (Manolo's Reporl) and obtained by
GuatcrnalansecuntySorccsin March 1981.)466 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

Uniîied Revolutionary Directorate, the DRU. The featured speaker was Bayardo
Arce, who spokeon ixhalf of the FSLN andpromised "unconditional assistanceto
the revolutionaryprocessin Guatemala and El Salvador"'.
To ensure that they wouldbe inwlnerable to retaliation from th& neighbon for
their expandingintemationalistrole, theSandinistasundertook a substantialinmase
in Nicaragua'sconventionalmilitarypower2.Bythe end of 1980,Nicaragua'sarmed
forŒsweretwiŒaslargeasthe Somoza NationalGuard at itsheight.The Sandiista
People's Amy doubled in sizeagain by the end of I98z3.
The country studies that follow illustrate the practical content the Sandinistas
give ta "revolutionary intemationalism".

A.EL SALVADOR

"They say that we are sending weapons to El Salvador but they have not
oKered any real proof. But let us suppose that weapons have reached El
Salvador from here. This is oossible. More than that. it is ~ossible that
Nicaraguan combatants have gone ta El Salvador, but this cankt he hlamed
on any decision of ours." (Tomas Borge, April 1981 4.)

"One thing is evident, the members of the [Sandinista] Directorate and
al1 its working teams, some inside the country and others outside the
country, are steadfastly at work fully aware of the need to unite the internul
srruggleivirh internationalsolidorityand with the struggle of al1peoples for

the liberation of Central America and El Salvador .. the Central American
peoples' struggle is one single struggle." [Emphasis added.] (Salvadoran
Guerrilla Leader, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, Managua, April 9, 1983 '.)

'"lnîorme dc Manolo", pp. 18-22.
'Concemabout "counter-revolutionary" sctiviticsbyformer NationalCuardsmenand REVOLUTION BEYONDOUR BORDERS 467

"The Salvadoran revolutionaries do not have military bases here. If they

have bases outside of El Salvador, they are in Guatemala and Honduras."
(Daniel Ortega, June 1983 '.)

Before the Sandinista Directorate look power in Managua, there werc guerrillas
in El Salvador but no euerrilla war. Extremis1 forces of El Salvador's left were
vii>lcni but liagmcnteJ into competing itciiuns Thry had neiihcr a unitirci
organi/.iii<~n nor iltc Iic~vier. iiiore iIcstru~rivc m<idtrn \i,e.iponru,c C.irpiii'\
imagerv, the Sandinistas were decisive in unitinp. the interna1 Salvadoran S~NKEI~
witha broader international conflict. - --

Building on a base of solidarity in exile and armed opposition" Sandinista
support for violent warfare in El Salvador falls into two distinct periods:

- an attempt to repeat in El Salvador the pattern of the Sandinistas' own final
military offensive against Somoza; and
- "prolonged war" against El Salvador's economy, elections and institutions
after the first approach failed.

1. Mobilizing for a 'pnal offensive"

On July 21, 1979, four days after Somoza Red from Nicaragua. both Carpio's
Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) and Borge's GPP faction of the FSLN were
present at a meeting in Managua to discuss Sandinista support for armed struggle
in El Salvador. The mohilization of external support did not gel fully underway,

however, until a meeting held in Havana in December 1979 produced agreement
among the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), the Armed Forces of
National Resistance (FARN) and the FPL to form a trilateral coordinating
body '. During 1980, the original three were joined by two additional groups,

'Tirne,June6, 1983, p. 18.
During the war against Somoza,severalSalvadann group on the entremelefi pmvidd
support 10 the FSLN. but Carpio and his FPL and the Prolonged Popular WarFactionor
the FSLN(FSLNIGPP) headcd by Tomas Borgeprobably had thccloscsi links.Carpio and
Borge wcrecul to similar patterns: both lcft iheir respectivenational Communist Parties
and formed militant splinlcr groups: both wcre ripjdly panisan in their revolutiona
rcmained commiiicd "intcrnationalists" evcn after brcaking with thc local Cornmunisi
Parties. Pan af the nlimated $50-100million accumulatcdin 1977-1979by leftistexiremisi
groups in ransom and protstion payments was invested in the Sandinisia revolution ncnt
door. Salvadoran radicalsengagedin acts of "revolutionarysolidarity" suchas the February
14. 1978. People's Revolutionary Amy (ERP) attack on thc Nicaragua" Embassy in
San Salvador. proclaimed asan "aci of repudialion against Somoza". (FBIS, Febmary 15,
1918.)
'Detailed informalion on ihesemeetings, ihe subsequent trip of Salvadoran Cornmunisi
Party (PCES) Secretary Gencral Jorge Shafik Handal to the Soviet Bloc, the specificsof
the supply routes ihrough Nicaragua, was containcd in PCES documents abtained in
November 1980, and ERP documents callsted in January 1981.This information was
published in the State Dcpartment's Special Report No. 80, ContmunisrInrer/erencein El
Salvadorof February 23, 1981.Facsimiliesof 19documents wcre also rcleased that same
day :Depanment of State. CornmunisrInrederencein ElSolvndor:Dorumenrsdenzonsiraring
CornmunlrrSupporr qfrhe SolvndoronInsurgency, February 23, 1981 (cited horeafter as
Bocumenis).The authcnticiiy of thcsc documents and of the story they tcll has since been
corroborated by new intelligencesourcesand defectors. See also "Rcsponse 10 Storics
Published in the Wall Srreer Journal and the WmhinxronPosr About Special Report
No. 80, ,Department of Staie, Junc 17, 1981.which contains a 25-point responsc to the
factual criucismsof the February 23 rcport.468 MILITARYAND PAUMILITARY ACTIVITIES

the People's Revolutionary Amy (ERP) and the Central American Revolu-
tionary Workers' Party (PRTC) to fom the Farahundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN), which, with its political am, the Democratic Revolutionary
Front (FDR) has semed as the umhrella organization for the Salvadoran guer-

rilla movement.
Redireciin~ the Cosia Rican netwurks. The first step was to revitalize the
networks originally established in Costa Rica during the struggle against Somoza
to support armed struggle in El Salvador. Aided by a few Costa Rican oilicials,
the Cuhans arranged for the collection of excess Sandinista arms still in Costa
Rica. Modest amounts of arms were infiltratcd inIo El Salvador hy Costa Rican
and Panamanian pilots. On June 15, 1980, a twin engine Aero Commander

crashed in El Salvador. The weapons and ammunition on board were recovered
by the Salvadoran military. Arms from Costa Rican caches were also smuggled
overland assisted bv the FSLN and the Communist Partv in Honduras'. ~ ~ ~~
.\'i~.ur<rqhr,i.<inirhclrith Iluring thr. \e.oitJ Ih:iIf~f98ii.Nii3r;tgua hcc~me
the ccnter of the clandcstinc arms llow Ilnlikr Costa Rica and Honduras. Nia.
ragua provided a favorable environment, including secure communications and
transportation links to Cuba by both sea and air.

In late May 1980, after negotiations in Havana, the ERP joined the guerrilla
coalition. The new coalition, known as the Unified Revolutionary Directorate
(DRU), issued a press release in Havana announcing the broadened alliance.
During this visit, the DRU leaders met three limes with Fidel Castro and
discussed military plans with the Cuhan Directorate of Special Operations -
the same covert opcrations/special forces unit that had organized Cuba's inter-
vention in Angola2.

After the Havana meetings, DRU leaders went to Managua to meet with
Sandinista oilicials. One Salvadoran participant reported that, in the first
week of June, the FSLN Directorate oKered a headquarters ("sede") in Nicara-
gua for the DRU with "al1 measures of security", that it was "disposed to con-
tribute in material terms", and that it "assumes the cause of El Salvador as its
own"'.
Transshipping weapons from the Soviet Bloc. While the other DRU leaders
went to Managua, Salvadoran Communist Party leader Jorge Shafik Handal

had left Havana for Moscow. In earlv June. Shafik Handal met with Mikhail
Kudachkin. an oilici:il oi ihc Sovict ~bmmunist I>ariyCentral Comniittee. The
Si>victssuggcstcd that Shaiik Ilandal ira~cl IO Vir.inam io jcck arms. In Vieinant,
Shdlik IlanJal ii,ssrcieii,erl h1.r.I>wn. the Sc~rctarr C;ciicr.iloi'the Vir.tn.imew
Communist Partv. and othér hieh-rankune oartv a-. mili,arv oilicials.,~he ~ ~ ~ ~
Vietnsmzrc agrecd ai a "first contribuiion" IO provide 611tons of arm\ -
~i.cr\ihelmingl! of Unitcd St.~tcsnt;iii.ii,t~iurc. incluJing I.ti2O M- lh iuiont;itic

'A SpecialCommissionestablishedinJune1980bytheCostaRicanlcgislatureconfimed
that the clandestineams-supply link betweenCosta Rica and Nicaragua, establishedin
July 1979.AccordingIo the Comrnission'rrepart,ctw"amsosttraficking, originatininCosta
Rica or through Costa Rican icrritory, [began]toward El Salvador,directlyor using
Honduras as a bridgc". The quotalion is frarn the Commission's Repori, which was
exccrptcdMay 15, 1981,in La Nocion, San José, andreprintedby FBIS on June 12,1984.
'"lnfomc de Eduardo/Viaje de 5 de Mayoal 8 deJunio/80 (Rcpart of tripof Eduardo
from May 5Io June 8, 1980).Bocum~nis, D, pp.2-3.
'lhid., p. 3. RI!VOLUTION BEYONU om BORDERS 469

rifles with 1,500,000 rounds of ammunition, enough to equip an entire combat
infantry battalion '.
Managingrhe iveaponsjluw fflNicaragua. FSLN Directorate member Bayardo
Arce met with members of the DRU General Staff in July 1980 to review the
logistical infrastructure for the guerrilla war in El Salvador. Arce questioned the
DRU'S militaw and oolitical oreo. .tions. but aereed to furnish ammunition.
arrdngc mcctings uith ihc FS1.S miliiary commissioii tu dicuss niiliia? matteri.
and su~gcslcd1h;ilIlle) niight provicieu~csicm-manufaiturd uCdp<,nsfr<)rit1;SI.U
stock>- Hythai iime. the Nicdrdgu.iiiwcuriiy forces hdd Jredy bcgun to rwcivc

ucspons from the Soviet Hloc As Hlix ucapons ucrc ahrorbcd. the Sandinistar
t~insferrcd sinc U>.tcrn am> in thcir inicntories IOthe S.il\,adomn insurgeni\.
By mid-Scptctiibcr 1980.thc arnis prumi,cd ti~Shxlik IIdnJal d~ring his wrlicr
ir;i\cls ucre en route Io Cuha and Niisrsgua. In Septeniber and Octoher, aircrait
flight Ircquencics and intclltgenrc rcporting boih indicated iiiharp increare in
the lIii\i~ol'militar! cquipiiient inIo h'i~irdgliim Cuha. S.indin<iIntcrndiion;il
Airport was closed foi normal traffic betwëen 10pm and 4 am for several weeks
to accommodate cargo planes ferrying arms and other equipment from Cuba.
In late September, the United States made strong protests to the Nicaraguan
government about the arms flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Fearful that
éiscovery would jeopardiz the recently apGoved S75 million in economic
support funds from the United States, the Sandinistas held up transshipment of

the arms for one month - despite Salvadoran guerrilla appeals to move these
weanons onward. To the United States démarche. the Nicaraeuan eove-nmentu
rcskndcd thai uhile some Nii;ir;igiians. inçluding indi\idual i>tlici:tlr.mighhc
iii\,i>l\,cclin armr shipment>. the go\criiiiieni itselCwa>no1 rerpimrihlc'.
In mid-Octobcr. Hawna u.31the .ite oi a meeting al irhich rcDrcsenfaii\es of
the Communist Parties of Cent-a~ America. ~exic; and panam~-aereed to ~-~ ~ ~ ~
up a commission to oversee the provision of material aid to the Salvadoran
guerrillas.Originally scheduled for Managua, the meeting was shifted to Havana
it the requestof the Sandinistas so as toobscure their iivolvement.
At the end of October 1980,immediately aller the second tranche of a specially
enacted $75 million program of United States aid to Nicaragua was authorized
for disbursement, the Nicaraguans vrovided the Salvadoran guerrillas with a new
" -
dcl~veryscheclulcand rcwmed ucapons deli\.cr~csby rca nd air on an eten Ihrgcr
s~alc tlidiibcijrc the suspensiim Alw in Idte Oct<~kr. th~ Sdl\sJorun guerrillas
ilecidcd 10iiwraic a cl:indcstinc rsdio station uith the tcihnisal hclp of the Cubons
and Nicaraeuans4. On December 15. Radio Liberacion ~e~an to broadcast from
Nicaragua. -A second clandestine staiion, Rlidio ~encerem<;v ,ubsequently began
broadcasting in the vicinity of the Honduras-El Salvador border.

'See A~oendix 5.FromJunc 19 10 July3.ShafikHandalvisitcdtheGeman Democrotic
R~public.~Cicrhu~lu\.~ki.l\~Igarl::inci~tl~n~sr111.riqueri>pruduitrl rc\er;il pwmiser
ofarm, and miliiiryquipmrni. 'lhe CariGcm:ins iuld Hanilal ih~iihe! uould hr *illlng
IO diverirom? mcdi;ïl \unnltr\ihiv hlrlslrc:idv ;:nio Nic.ir;tcuaand ihaiihct xi,ulrl
train ~a~vadorancuer~llas"~cca"scthcvdid& riosses;s~itab~~w~sterÜ nislboth
Germany and HÜngaryraiscd the possibilityof enchangingcammunist forWcsiern-
manufacturcd ams with either Ethiopia or Angola. The Czechspromiscd Czech-made
arms. of twes alreadvavailablcin the Westso as Iomaintainnlausibledcnial.
'"lnfo&e Sabrefiaic" (T..o Re~o..). b&u&~nrs. G. o. 3.The meetin-.;/thArcc toak
placeon July 23, 1980.'
lo$irlicsproblernincDonrmenls,cJ,K. L.lM.iN Sand O.III. The guemllasdiscuss thcir
Bocumenrs ,,transmitsan "ollicialFMLN rcqucstforboth a permanent clandestine
station in Nicaragua anda mobileradia unit ta overcamcthe succcssDuoriewashaving
in "conf~sing"the people.470 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

On November 1, 1980, the DRU logistics coordinator in Managua informed
the guerrilla General Staff that approximately 120 tons of military equipment
were still in Nicaragua awaiting shipment to El Salvador. He added that

approximately 300-400 tons of weapons and matérielwould be in Cuba by mid-
November, ready for transfer Io Nicaragua and then to El Salvador. The DRU
coordinator urged the armed groups in El Salvador 10 work harder to absorb
more arms shipments, noting that some communist countries had doubled their
promised aid, and adding that "This is the first revolution in Latin America to
which they have committed themselves unconditionally with assistance before
the seizure of power" '.

Air roulesfrom Nicaragua. Existing land infiltration routes could not move
this growing volume of arms in time for the planned FMLN offensive of early
1981.Accordingly, Nicaragua - with Cuban support - assumed a more direct
role and began airlifting arms from aifields in Nicaragua. This airlift was
directed bv theCommander of the Nicaraeuan Ai" Force. Raul ~~nerio Gra~ ~a.~-~ ~.
and a cuban advisor.

The principal staging area came to be an airfield at Papalonal. The pattern
and s~eed of construction at Paoalonal. which is in an isolated area 23 nautical
miles'northwest of Managua, lacking adjacent commercial or economic activity,
made clear its military function. In late July 1980,this airfield was an agricultural
dirt airstrip approximately 800 meters long. By December, photographj revealed
a lengthened and graded runway with hard dispersal areas, and storage buildings
under construction. By January 1981, the strip had been lengthened to 1,200

meters. A turnaround had been added at each end. A dispersal parking area
with three hardstands had been constructed at the west end of the runway. Threc
parking aprons had been cleared, and three hangar or storage buildings, each
about 15-meters wide, had been constructed on the aprons2.
On January 2, 1981,a C-47 was observed at Papalonal for the first time. Two
C-47s were observed in February. These C-47s and DC-3s (the civilian version)
were used to ferry larger cargos of arms from Papalonal to areas of guerrilla

'"Informe #4" (Rep~t #4) addressedIo"Joaquin,Jacobo,Marcial, DRU dcl FMLN",
Dornmenis, K, p. 2.This hand-wnttenlettcr-reportfrom thePCESfilesadds that: "Ilis
impressivehowal1countriesin thc SocialistBlocfullycommittedthcmselvesto mect our
ciiry ri.qu:\i 2nd \<>meh3vc L.\L<do~hl:d Ihslrpr<>nil,r.Jld"
'h>llouing ~r an crirdrt <rom an iniclligcnïesummlry uriticn for the C~ncr Whit~.
Houic onJanuaryY.1981.theda>bcforc ihr."l-inalOtfinsivc"*JI Isunrhîd Thr an~l!ri*
appcarr uiipdpcr 2:$!id3ois ~lxsiliidnicmorÿndumcniiilcJ''Slc~r~g~a-CuhilInrrea,ing
Support Idr Crnirdl r\mrriwn Ins~rgcnl~" Il u.3,ç<>niirmrdh) i~bscq~cnic\enii and
infom~tiun in \~nu~llyrvrg. rnprvi alihuughihc v<>l~m cfump.>nr.eriimaiedhlou ai
iboui 60 ion, hy I><r.rmberp.rored I.irgrrihnn ihtrcriiiicnipuraqan~l?,isruggrricd.
"Nicaragua has takcn a morc dircct role in supplyingarms and matCrielta the
SolvadoranIcft,which is now receivinglarger quantnies of sophisticatcdweapans.
Multiplesourcespreviouslyhad reportedSandinista ams shipmcntrto ElSalvador -
by boat across the Gulf of Fonseca, by land via Honduras, or by air with thc
collaborationofPanornanianandCostaRicangunrunncrs.Reccntreponing,hawcvcr.
indicatesthat bylas1Novembcrthe FSLNhad begunairliftingwcaponsdirectlyfram
Nicaraguato ElSalvador.
Four scparate sources have reportcd on such flightsor related prcparations. In
November, a Costa Rican arms traficker made a 'papcr sale'of severalplanesIo a
Honduran aviationcomoanvto conccalacouirilionof thc aircraft bv the FSLN. A
secondsourceidentified'twoof the rame ~lancsmakine. clandestin^hiahts from the
i,,latcd Pdpalunalur.tnp tn N~;arsgu~ 1;)Lempi and Sxnta l'rrr.%i~riirip\tn b.1
Sal\aJi>r C<>,i*Rlun p1loi.lnihz p~yoi ihs \icar.ig~an po\ernm:ni. r.onductcd ,lr
fllcht.idunne Sc>rember.dcli\ennc an criim3ieJ 5UuU ouunils ul am>a - ~~~ ~ ~
~;~ilrifles.&mmunition,g'renadesand d>namile.he &nde&nc night flights wcrc REVOLUTlON BEYOND OUB RORDERS 471

infiltration in southeastern ElSalvadorSeveral pilots were identified in Nicaragua
who regularly flew the route into El Salvador. Radar tracking also indicated
flights from Papalonal to southeastern El Salvador.
On January 24, 1981, a C-47 dropped arms by parachute in the vicinity ofa
small sûip in southeastern El Salvador. On January 24, 1981, a Cessna from

Nicaragua crashed upon takeoiT after unloading passengers at an aifield in El
Salvador clox to where the C-47 airdrop occurred. A second plane, a Piper
Aztec, sent to recover the downed crew. was strafed on the rround hv the
Salvadoran Air Force. The oilot and numerous ~ea~ons .~~e-cmturcd:~~ ~.~~he~-
pilot staicd hc uas .in cmplo;ce of the Niairaguan National Airlincs (I.ANICA)
anJ thdi the flight originalcd from Sandino Inrcrn.itional Airport in hlanacua '
Landundsenshipm~nts/rorn Nicaraguu. Whilc air resupply was playing a key
role, infiltration was also taking plaby land and sea. Overland arms shipments

reached El Salvador through Honduras from Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Small
launches operating out of several Nicaraguan Pacific ports crossed the Gulf of
Fonseca at night carrying ams, ammunition and personnel2.

coordinated with Salvadoran leftists who secured and lit the airfields and unloaded
the aircraft in minutes. A Nicaraguan govemment aficial and a Cuban advisor
reportedly overseethe operations. By December, some 60 tons of wcapons had been
stockpiled in Nicaragua for transfer to El Salvador.
Follawing the crash of onc of the planesal Santa Teresaon 25 November, FSLN
autharities ordered a halt to further flights untilmid-Decembcr; a1the pilots'rcquest,
the stand-down wasexlendeduntil after the holiday reason. Planscal1for at least four
flightsperweck from both Papalonal and Rosario airstrips, with daily flightsonce the
Salviidoraninsurgentsbegin a gcneral olTcns...
In addition. a Nicaraguan govcrnmcnt C47 - piloted by a Sandinista Air Force
(FAS) officerand with a joint Nicaraguan-Cuban crew- was to begin ferryingarms
10El Salvador in mid-Decembcr,au'ording Io detailed information provided by two
separate sources. Thc flights, under the supervision of Colonel Carlos Rodriguez.
Cuban adviser ta thc FAS, were to originale from an unnamed airstnp in the rame
area as Papalonal.
Recent imagery[aerialphotography] substantiatcs this rcporting. Papalonal airstrip
was lcngthencd and new hangars and parking aprons were constructcd late Iast ycar.
Airport on dates whenournsources reported the plane'sacquisitionand the December
training Rights; imagcry also subsequently showcd a C47 at Papalonal in early
January a1 the same lime there was a rcturn to the normal inventory of C-47 planes
in Managua.. .
There are indications of more widnprcad Nicaraguan support operations in the
ofing. A camouflaged communications intercept site has bcen reported in cxtrcmc
northcrn Nicaragua across thc bay from El Salvador, and its presence appears
confirmed by imagery. Il will reportebeyaugmcnted with additional equipment in
the near luturc. This area was earlier reportcd to be the pldnncd staging ground for a
futurc Nicaraguan-supportcd assaull by Salvadoran insurgents against a coastal
Salvÿdaran target."
Nore: A March 12. 1981,photograph of Papalonal airstrip, showing ils development, in
includcd in this reoon.
'The FBIS for january 27 and 28, 1981,carries accounts of thir incident from ACAN,
ACAN-EFE, Latin, and LA PrensaGrrifico,San Salvador. January 26, 1981.
'Arquimedes Canadas, alias Alcjandro Montenegro. described these routes in detail
after his arrcst in Honduras in August 1982.Sec Appendix 3 and Hcndnck Smith, "A
Former SalvadoranRebelChiefTellsof Ams from Nicaragua". New,YorkTimes, July 12,
1984, p. A10. An individual account of this same period was provided by Salvadoran
guerrilla Santa Salome Morales, who defectcd in Honduras in Scptembcr 1981,repaned
chat he and 12othcrs went from El Salvador10 Nicaragua via a point near the Gulf01
Fonseca in May 1980. From Managua, thcy proceeded to Cuba wherc thcy received
extcnsivcmilitary training. togetherwith over 900othcr Salvadorans. Morales said he was
trained in undenvater dernolition. REVOLWION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 473

at 40 to 50 locations throughout El Salvador, downed two helicopters and

overran a National Guard post. Hit and run street actions were everywhere. In
the cities buses were burned; in the countryside, guerrillas hoarded buses and
exhorted surprised passengers to take up arms. The cities of San Salvador, Santa
Ana, Chalchuapa, Chalatenango and Zacdtecoluca came under especially heavy
fire.The governor of SantaAna descnbed the cityas "under siege". Both airports
were closed, their access roads cut '.

The guerrillas had hoped for a popular insurrection, which with their armed
attacks, would result in a total breakdown in the government and lead to an
immediate victory. This did not happen because a large majority of El Salvador's
population ignored the guerrillas' appeals. Although four army officersjoined
the guerrillas. the armv remained basicallv united and foueht back.
~ie costs of this ~icara~uan-based issault on El %&ador's society were

heavy. They were al1the more tragic in that by 1981,the Salvadoran Government
was heginning to address the serious political, social and economic problems
that most concerned the people of El Salvador. In its commitment to reform,
the Christian Democratic-armed forcesjunta of El Salvadorhad the full political
support of the United States. On January 16, 1981,President Carter reacted to
Sandinista arms supply activities by authorizing a modest resupply of ammu-
nition'. But for transportation and communication equipment and other non-

lethal items, the United States had provided no military aid, and no weapons or
ammunition, to El Salvador since 1977.

2. Prolu~rged war
The failure of the "final offensive" ~roduced a decision to carrv on a ~rolon~ed
-
war of attrition and economic sabotage while drawing on ~icata~ua io increase
the military strength of the guerrillas! Although the FMLN was generally
rejected hy the population at large, guerrilla numbers continued to incÏease f&
some time after the "final offensive". The sophistication of their military equip-
ment and strategy also improved.
Seeking to compensate for the failure of the "final offensive", the FMLN

launched a seriesof terrorist attacks starting in late Febniary 1981.The Amencan
Embassy in San Salvador was rocketed twice and strafcd five limes in March
and early April. Guerrilla attacks against the economic infrastructure reached
higher levels,as they increasingly targeted powcr towers, water pumping stations,
electrical generators, the highways and productive facilities such as farms and
busines~ - ~ -
In October 1981,in a sophisticated attack displaying hetter training than they

had previously shown, a large guernlla contingent succeeded in destroying the
-
'Sect.WLS'>uun ,ummAr)oi ~i~dciions.iiolIüou.iry I?.I.>SIrcpnnlcJinAppcndiii6
kluw Also rcï "Il Sahador'r CibiI War". .Vi,it.~,ie.~.IIIUAT26. 1981 Hy the lime
. :.ghiingbloued.rms icn da)s~itcrihc onéniiiekgin. aboui400 p'plc uere~lr.iJanJ
bW IflJUrcd.
'By mid-Januarv 1981. enouahinformationwas availableto makethe Nicaraeuan link
clcdrio ihc Cartci ,\dmin~riraii*n. Ian iniïniiw wiih eJiior\of the i~~<hinil,>nPOAI
publishcdJanuag. 30. IOSI. uutguingSe;rei~ryul Siaie 1:rlmunJMusLle ,iiid ih:ii armr
3n.15111)n11hi\ ~n. 5e.iin Il .i~I\dJdr'i hloirJ, ,i.isrcrïilauin2ihrou-~N~:~ ~~----i
"certaiiniywiththeknowledge and tosorne ~~&nt the helpof Niiaraiuan ~~tho"iics".
'The decision was probably joint. The Salvadoransneeded Nicarasuan help. The
S:indinirin, ih~.uar in III S;il,aJ3s ;imrm, olJi\crilng xiizntiunirom Siririig~~.
In ih.ti pcrind.1)sniil 0ric.g; 1iiI.I,\~>irtaiiiScir:tdr) diSi.iic I h<>rn~0> Incicri thdi the
1'\11.S wili"n~ciir~ ircudo" \t;arauu.i'<"4i1rld" "Huildin~th: Pe.icr.tn Crnirÿl
Amencas, UnitedStates Departmentof~taïe, Currenr PolicyNo. 41;.~uguit 20, 19821p3.474 MILITARVANU PARAMILITARVACTIVITIES

maior Puente de Oro hridee over the Rio Lemoa. Bv that time. the strateev of
attacks aimed at targets leading to a rapid pop;lar uprising, as hoped for inthe
"final offensive", had given way to the attrition and economicstarvation inherent
in the "prolonged war" concept.
The prolonged war concept was continued in 1982, with two noteworthy
exceptions - the highly sophisticated and successful attack on Salvadoran
military aircraft at the llopango Airhase early in the year and the nation-wide,
coordinated, guerrilla offensiveagainst the March 1982elections, which failed in
ils goal of preventing the vdst majority of voters from going to the polls. In the
countryside, the guerrillas were massing, operating in larger numbers, utilizing

more sophisticated communications equipment and weaponry and, in isolated
areas, conducting operations more typical of a conventional war than a guerrilla
conflict.These tactics continued through 1983, a year marked by an attack on
the military headquarters of the Fourth Brigade in El Paraiso, Chalatenango
Department, and destruction of the Cuscatlan Bridge on the Pan American
Highway in December and January 1984.
Damage caused hy the guerrillas.As of early 1983, some of the most fertile
land could not he cultivated hecause of euerrilla attacks. Guerrilla actions had
dcsiroyed 55of the couniry's 26Uhr~dgciïnd damïged mïny niore. The natiorial
u.dier ;iuthority hadIO rcb~ild II? uitter Fiicilitierd;imïgcd hy guïrrillï acticin;
239 aiiacks on the iele~hone .;\item iiiurcd millions ol'diillar$ in damace. In the
22-month period endkg ~Gernber 1982, the guerrillas caused oGr 5,000
interruptions of electrical power- an average of almost eight a day. The entire
eastern region of the country was blacked out for over a third of the year in

both 1981and 1982.The guerrillas destroyed over 200 buses in 1982alone. Less
than half the rolling stock of the railways remained operational by early 1983.
In short, unahle to win the free loyalty of El Salvador's people, the guerrillas
set out deliberately and systemiiticallyto deprive them of food, water, transpor-
talion. lieh~-.~~nita~io~ ~ ~ w-rk.
Continuingpatterns of Nicaraguansupport. Continued Sandinista backing for
the FMLN's military strateev consisted of three maior comDonents: arms and
other logistical suppiies, trakng and command andcontrol..Levels of material
support have Ructuated occasionally. The most notable declines took place
during 1981in the disorganization that hrieflyfollowed the defeat of the January
offensive and again in late 1983 after the United States-Caribbean action in
response to the collapse of the New Jewel government in Grenada. This

continuing Nicaraguan aid was what allowed the Salvadoran guerrillas to
continue their operations on a large scale.
Arms supplies.With Cuba as a main source ',Niçdraguan supplies of arms to
FMLN units were stepped up to make possible an offensiveto disrupt a peaceful
vote in the March 28, 1982,Constituent Assembly elections.
In the first three months of 1982,shipments of arms into El Salvador reached
the highest overall volume since the "final offensive" in 1981.The Nicaraguan-
based arms flow into El Salvador utilized both sea and overland routes through
Honduras. In February 1982, a large shipment of arms arrived hy sea from
Nicaragua to the Usulutan Coast. Early in March 1982, a guerrilla unit in El
Salvador received several thousand sticks of TNT and detonators (fivesticks of
TNT are sufficientto blow up an electrical pylon).

'In aBonn pressconferenceon Junc 19,1981, German SocialDemocratleadcr Hans-
JurgenWischncwskireportedthat whcnhe had personallyconfrontedCastro with State
Department contentions thaCt ubahad shippedweaponsto SalvadoranguerrillasC , astro
hadadmitted itwastnie. REVOLUTIO NEYOND OUR BORDERS 475

In addition to small arms and vitallv-needed ammunition. euerrilla suoolv
operïtionr in 1982 providcd greatcr quîntitiei ol heavicr u,eapuns. insluding. ,
57mm rccoillrr, rifles and M-72 sntitank weîpons, thus significrntly increîsing
g~crrilla firepouer. InJi\ idual unitr a1.o regularls re;ci\ed tcnh of ihous;iiids of

dollars for routine commercial ourchases oTsun<~ies
On March 15, 1982, the ~os;a Rican ~udiciil'~olice announced the discovery
of a house in San Jose with a sizeahle cache of arms, ex~losives, uniforms,
passports, documents, false immigration stamps from more'than 30 countries,
and vehicles with hidden compartments - al1connected with an ongoing arms
traffic through Costa Rican territory to Salvadoran guerrillas. Nine people were
arrested: Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, an Argentine, a Chilean and a Costa Rican.
Costa Rican police also seized 13 vehicles designed for arms smuggling. Police
confiscated some 150-175 weapons from Mausers to machine guns, TNT,
fragmentation grenades, a grenade launeher and ammunition and 500 combat
uniforms. One of the men captured told police that the arms and other goods
were to have heen delivered to the Salvadoran guerrillas before March 20, "for
the elections"'.
The flow of supplies from Nicaragua continued at high levels into 1983.
According to Napoleon Romero, formerly the third ranking member of the
larges1guerrilla faction in the FMLN who defected in April 1985,his group was

receiving up to 50 tons of material every three months from Nicaragua before
the reduction in deliveries alter United States-Canhhean action in Grenada.
Romero gave a detailed description of just how the logistics network operated.
The first "bridge" implemented for infiltration was an air delivery system.
Romero stated that arms would leave Nicaragua, from the area of the Cosiguina
Peninsula, for delivery to thecoast of San Vicente department in El Salvador.
He descrihed the first such delivery as consisting of 300 weapons infiltrated at
the end of 1980 in preparation for the January 1981 "final oîiensive". Romero
claimed that air routes were suspended when the Salvadoran armed forces
succeeded in capturing a large quantity of armsthat came by air from Nicaragua.
It was at this point in 1981, he continued, that seaborne delivery became, as it
continues to be, the primary method of infiltration.
Romero described the sea route as de arting from Nicaragua's Chinandega
department or islands (like La Concha P) off ils coast, crossing the Gulf of
Fonseca, and arriving at the coast of El Salvador's Usulutan department.

Thousands of rounds of ammunition translate into relatively small numhers of
boxes, easily transported by man, animal, or vehicle over multiple routes. The
lack of constant government presence, and the relatively short distances from
the coastline toal1major guerrilla fronts, reduce the difficulties of providing the
guerrillas with certain types of logistics support from Nicaragua3.

La Noeion, SanJoré,March 16-21,1982.
'In 1983.reportersvisitinLa Conchafound: "A radio-equippedwarehouseand boat
facility,disguisedsa fishingcooperativeon an island in northwestcrnNicaragua,has
served for threeyears as a transshipmen!point for smugglingams to El Salvador,
in Nicaragua",Wnshingloy.Pori,September21, 1983,p.A29.rmsto ElSalvadorFound
'Guerrillasdefectinor capturedaslatcas 1985statcdthat thedepartmentof Usulutan,
especiallythe area around Jucuaranand thecoastlinefromlsla el Arcoto PlayaelCuco,
continueto be essential for thedistributionand transshipmentof materialsarrivingin El
Salvador fromNicaragua. Whilcdeliveriesby land through Honduras andGuatemala
continue,and timc-sensitiveair deliveries(includingessentidldocuments,personnand
medicines)alsotakcplacesporadically,thelargcstvolumeofamn, munitions andmaterials
from Nicaragua arrivesby wayof the Usulutan coastlineand intcriortransitpointswhich
lead10 al1ihc major guerrillafrontsin ElSalvador.476 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITAR AYCTlVlTlES

Training:The Sandinistas also provided training to the Salvadoran insurgents,
and se~ed as a transit point to other external training locations. Nicaraguan

and Cuhan political and military training created the basic framework for the
use of the arms by the guerrillas within El Salvador. The two countries co-
ordinated the trainine eiïorts. with Cuha nrovidine most snecialized trainine for
sabotage and demolzion operations'. ~ke ~andkistas, fOr their part, trzned
Salvadoran guerrillas in military tactics, weapons use, communications, and
explosives ai temporary training schools scattëred around the country and on

Sandinista military hases.
Training in Cuha and Nicaragua included rehearsing for attacks on specific
targets in El Salvador - including the Puente de Oro Bridge in October 1981,
the llopango Air Base in January 1982, and the 4th Brigade Headquarters in
Decemher 1983. Adin lngles Alvarado. formerly a commander of the special

forces unit of the FPL and a guerrilla from 1977 to his defcction this year,
recently puhlicly acknowledged that he and 27 others rehearsed in Cuba the
December 30, 1983, attack on the 4th Brigade making simulated assaults using
a mock-up of the 4th Brigade garrison constructed from sketches. Ingles also
stated that the material used in the actual attack - explosives, machine guns
and ammunition -came in via Nicaragua.

Commandand conrrol: As noted ahove, Salvadoran guerrilla actions were
coordinated first by the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) then by the
FMLN, using a general star consisting of three memhers from each of the
guerrillÿ groups active in El Salvadorz.

The basic system which continues in10 1985is as follows: boats or large canoes deliver
the materialsalong the caastline whcrcthey are picked up and transporled by animper-
sonsor small vehiclesinto the Jucuaran rcgion of southern Usulutan to thc sevcraldozcn
guerrillalogisticsbasecamps. From Jucuaran, the suppliesare transponed dong four major
"corridors", within which there are dozens of routcs depending on the mcthod of
transporlation, the presence of Salvadoran security farces and thc weather. Thcse routcs
lead west out of Jiquilisco-TrcsCalles, nonhwest via Tapesquillo Alto, nonh to El Braro
and northcast to Ticrra Blanca-Bolivar.All major guerrilla fronts receivesuppliesthrough
the Urulutan logisticsnetwark.
Wiihin the Jucuaran arcaand along the four "corridors" and the dozcns of roads, trails
and rivers are locatcd a serics of storagc lacilities, usually cavesaor underground
bunkers that have been fortified and concealed. Once malerials are olf-loaded along the
coastline, thcy seldom remain in onelocation for more than 72 hours - reflecting boih
secunty precautions and the pressingneed to sustain FMLN operations.
NapolconRomero, the former FPL commander, estimaicdthat thissupplyinfrastructure
was able Io provide some 20,000-30,000rounds of ammunition pcr month for the FPL
alone. Some 3,000guerrillascould be provided 100rounds each (the usual load carricd by
a combatant). or 1,500gucrrillas could be provided with 200rounds for a major battle.
Such a delivcry would wcigh about 1,300pounds and packaged in about 34 mctal boxes
which could be easily transportcd by 15-20men. six pack animals or one small pickup
tmck. Given El Salvador's small six and the short distances involved, matcrial entering
under optimal conditions.inc could arrive at any of the guerrilla fronts in about one wcck
'Vice-PresidcntCarlos Rafael Rodnguezconfimed that Salvadoranguerrillasarc traincd
in Cuba in al lcast two interviews (Der Spiegel,Septcmber 28, 1981, and El Diario
de Caracos, October 29, 1981). The "Nidia Diaz" PRTC documents captured in April
1985 show that the Salvadoran guemllas continue to receivc training in Sovict Bloc
countncs in general. Sce "Captured Salvadaran Rebcl Papcrs List Training Classcs
Overscas", New York Times. May 21, 1985.
'Public indications of centralized control come from the guenillas themselveî. On
March 14, 1982,thc FMLN clandestine RodioYenceremos locatcd in El Salvador broadcast
a message to guerrillas in El Salvador urging thcm"10 maintain their Oghtingspirit 24
houn a day Io camy out the mlrsionsorderedby the FMLN generolcommd (emphasis
added)". RBVOLUIION BEYONO OUR BORDERS 477

Planning and operations were (and to a large extent continue to be) guided
from Managua where Cuban and Nicaraguan officers provide advice. The
guidance is radioed to guerrilla units throughout El Salvador. DRUIFMLN
officiaiscoordinate logistical support for the insurgents, including food, medicines,
clothing, money and, most importantly, weapons and ammunition. Although
some "free-lancing" takes place in the field as targets of opportunity appear,
decisions on locations to be attacked and supply deliveries have generally been
coordinated with Managua'.
The FMLN General Command was in Managua from 1981 until late 1983,
when the FMLN, in conjunction with Cuhan advisors and the Sandinistas,

decided that the FMLN military leadership should relocate to El Salvador, in
particular to Morazan and Chalatenango departrnents. The changes were appar-
ently due to Sandinisia desires to maintain a lower profile in iheir support for
the Salvadorans in the wake of the United States-Caribbean action in Grenada.
Komcro points .lut thdi dc\pitc thcsc ~hcingch.a ",c:ond.iry directorate"
remainr in Msndgua pr<~\,iding.via radio c<>mniunic~tions.al1the "suggestions"
of thr. Cubanj and Sandinistaj t<>the 1;MI.N Gcneral Command in El Saltador.
In addition to the "secondary directorate", the Sandinistas and the Cuhans have
created special logistics organizations in Managua to coordinate arms smuggling.

llolding on: 1984-1985
The increasine wolitical soohistication and militarv wrofessionalism of the
Salvadoran armcd'forces has inrced the guerrillas to forégomovement in large

numbers and kas impeded their massing for a major attack. In response, they
have maintaincd the assault on the economic infrastructure and have returned
to small-group tactics and urhan terrorism. Again, their weaponry has improved;
use of contact-detonated and command-detonated mines has made guerrilla
ambushes, even with relatively few personnel, more lethal and has increased
collateraldamage to civilians2.

'Notcs kept by Robcrlo Roca of the PRTC on meetingsin Managua in March 1983
with "Simon", an FMLN representativein Managua, refer to talks with the "Sandis"
tellingthcm of Salvadoranguenilla needs and making the Nicaraguans awarc of two
successfuloperationsin El Salvado- Calle Nueva and La Esperanza.He stdtesthat the
Sandinistas encouraged the FMLN to stay in Guazapa, and mentiancdthat he had
presenteda logisticsplan that wasapproved.Discussionswereheldwilhrepre$entativesof
the GencralCommand. He observesthat:
"aslong asthe GeneralCommandremainsinactivein thc interior, itis nccessaryto
participateinthis rcprcsentational the maximumIcvcl,otherwisewc would remain
ignorantof importantdecisionsand wewouldlackinformationofgrcat importance".
Ina letterfrom"Sion" ,e pseudonyn af theFMLNrepmlative inManap. ta Rob-no
Roca, leaderof the PRTC, the formerdixusses the need to communicatewith "Fidel"
(presumablyFidelCastro)concerninglogistimandoperationaproblms withthe"Sandinas".
'Economic damage is now estimated at well ovcr 1 billion dollars. RadioHavana
rcponed on Augvst 27,1985,that in 1985aloneguernllaactionhas inIlicicd$120million
on the ownersof thc transport industryand $20 millionon thc National Associationof
Private Industries.Inan interviewin Perquin, El Salvador,top guerrillaIcadcrJoaquin
Villalobostold the westernriresrthat the FMLN
'prupJsrs Jpollrï oiaiiÿskinbas~i<>rnmcrce el.~incsncr~y.ihcrosJ~.uiih fr~qucni
prir~ly,.it.~f irio\(un. railro~dItnri. telcphonc~.ornmuni::,i,onr.iprrupsIike
,ugar.idilun andmllce - aimd ilhreikingthc warmnomy and theré@mc"
QuotedbyDan Williams" ,SalvadoranWarWillWiden,RebelWarns", LosAnpeles Times,
July 7,1985.Guerrillaspokcsmenfrcquentlystate that 60,000pcrsans have becn killed
since1979.Whatevcrthe number, itis certainthat the guerrillawar continuesdirectlyto
claimmanyvictimsand to impedeconsolidationof politicaland econamicreform.478 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARV ACTlVlTlES

Although the FMLN probahly achieved its greatest military strength in late
1983,and thereafter increasingly lost the little popular support it had been able
to maintain until then, the guerrillas have continued to operate in 1984and 1985
as an effective fighting force. Guerrilla numhers may be down to about two-
thirds of their highest levels. The strategic focus increasingly shifted to acts of
terrorism and economic sabotage, as acknowledged hy senior guerrilla lcaders in
recent interviews with the western press.
Little has changed in the Nicaraguan support system. Although Romero noted
that the level of aid dropped after Grenada in October 1983, supplies have
continued to come in from the warehouses in Managua. Romero said that his
faction still receives about three-quarters of ils ammunition supplies from

Managua and virtually al1 its supply of explosives. The Sandinistas continue to
control the distribution of the supplies, approving or disapproving the requests
from individual guerrilla groups on the basis of the tactical soundness of their
planned operations. Weapons continue to be infiltrated by land and sea '.
The Sandinistasalsocontinue to provide training for the Salvadoran guemllas.
From March to Iune 1984, for example, 100 ERP members received a self-
defense course at Cerro Chiribisquira in Leon department al Kilometer 28 on
the Old Leon Highway'. Alfredo Fernandez Flores, an ERP member captured
in early August 1985, indicated during his debriefing that Nicaragua continues
to provide ERP with combat training. Fernandez said that he spent 15 days in
May 1985 in Nicaragua's Matagalpa department fighting with the Sandinista

People's Army (EPS) to gain combat experience. Eight other Salvadorans also
participated in this fighting'.

B. HONDURAS

"At no time has there kn any atmk on Hondurdn temtory from Nim.
ragua .. ."(Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry Communique, Iune 22, 1983 ".)
lmmediately after July 1979, the Sandinistas and the Cubans paid little
attention 10"solidaritv" activities in Honduras. Radical leftists in Honduras had
never ken particularG effective, and in 1979were not yet in a position 10carry

out senous subversive activities5. Honduran territory, however, was from the
start of primary importance as a transit routc for the flow of arms from
Nicaragua 10 the Salvadoran insurgency, and, to a lesser extent, to guerrillas
active in Guatemala. In 1980, the Sandinistas also began to provide logistical

Salr;iJdr fr<,mIlonduras ai lhrTI 1'0)chckpolni The iruck wd. rxr)..nguckdJnjll.round
box:, ol'ir>ortcdnlsiril~ndriflammuniiwnof CnliedStalir m.lnui'acturc inJ roncz.ilsJ
Cornparlrncnt.
'Santos Enrique Garcia, who was a rnernberof ERP in Nicaragua frorn 1981unlil
March 1985and traincdin Cuba, wdscapturcdby the NationalPolicein July 1985after
he had rcturned to El Salvador. During Garcia's stay in Nicaragua, the ERP had
approxirnately150 rnembersin Nicaragua. According to Garcia, as ol March 1985.
approxirnately75 of thosemernbershad leftthe ERP,cornpldiningof poor treatrncntand
a lack ofrnonctarycompensationfor theirwork.
' Debriefingof AlfredoFernandez Flores,August 1985.
'In th; \oi;mh:rnua7991cII.IL~C>~rlxl~ons thcJune tr.i.i~iimalpdri!c<rc;c1\cY6 pet-
ccni ofthc popullr %oiefrom a hiphIurnwi 01'80 Fr ceni ofcligiblcrotrri Sri"Lihrral
I'.invin Ilondur:ir hki, Bie I.cad in \'ulrM..\'+,i)id Tini~~. Sobr.nih.r30. 1981
dur dur a nictorin ~verlurëto Focs", New YorkTimes, ~ccernber1, 1981: RBVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 479

suouort. traininn and advicc for the ~roliferatine-Honduran factions seekine th-
i,i&nt ot,erihr.;u of the Hi>nJur.in~oi~ernmcnt.
Tru!tcj<.r /urnri IOEl Suladdordnd G,,otC~mulu I.Ionduran territor) 2nd raJiial
cJdrc\ hecanie part i>fthcloaliticï nsiuork for the transfcr oiarms IO S~lvaJoran
insurgents. ~he operations~ere done in ways to minirnize actions that might
provoke the Honduran Government into abandoning the passivity it had

previously displayed toward Sandinista operations against Somoza. Indeed, it
was some lime before the Honduran Government was able to move cffectively
against the supply routes operating through Honduras.
In January 1981, Honduran authorities made their first major interdiction of
supplies headed for the rehels in El Salvador when they discovered the arms
trafficking network in the town of Comayagua, near the El Salvador border'.
In April 1981,the Hondurans intercepted a second shipmcnt in a tractor-trailer.
This truck had entered Honduras al the Guasaule crossing from Nicaragua and

was apparently heading for Guatemala. Ammunition and propaganda materials
were hidden in the side walls of the trailer. The same arms traffickers operated
a storehouse in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, with a falsefloor and a special basement
for storing weapons2.
Honduran territory was also the likely conduit for the ams caches captured
by Guatemalan security fores at safehouses in Guatemala City in April and
July 1981.As with arms captured in January in Honduras, traces made on the
serial numbers of individual United States-manufactured weaoons seized in
Guatemala revealed that 17 M-I~/AR-ISS had originaÏly been shipped to, - -~~~~~~ ~ ~

American units in Vietnam. Several of the vehicles captured at the Guatemala
City safehouses bore recent customs markings from ~kara~ua'.
The discoveriespinted to the greatereiiectivnessof Honduran securityoperations
along the border with Nicaragua. Inrespnse, the leveland sizeof arms shipments
passingthrough Honduran territory began to fall off. They did not cedse,however.
A former guemlla commander of the Salvadoran People's Revolutionary &y
(ERP), Alejandro Montenegro, stated that guemlla units under his comrnand in
1981-1982received monthly shipments of arms frorn Nicaragua, mostlyvia the

overland route from Honduras4. More reentlv. another senior Salvddoraneuerrilla
leader.Sapoleon Romero,coniirmcJ aner hisdeicciioninApnl 198sihii 11;nduras
ioniinuci 1,bc nn impi~nanttransit routc for am. ïroni i\'icar.igua.tlis group. ihc
1'opul.u Likr'itii~n Ii~rcer (FPL) .nngs \upplics o\crland froni N1ursgu3 IO
Tegucigalpa uhcnce the). arc transferrcd IO Chalatcnango deparimrnt in norihcrn
El Salvador. He ha,,taled ihai moi1 shtpriicntsnou,, in ciinrrast 10czrlier ye3n.
are small so as to minimizethe danger ofdiscovery

:Sec icxiand louinuti 1.Swiion II A. p 172. iitpru
- Iniclllgn;r~n ihifir,major inicrJiciionruf:imr ,h~li!iisnb) ihrIlooJ~r.in\eiurir)
lorcc,w;,iJ"cI~~~i6e an.ipri\rnied b> ihcHunduran<lelr.gaiiu O ihr YIVihConfrrrncc
or ihc Amrricdn Amies in 1981 Sec al50 hruaJiaii hy Radio i\mcnca. Tc&uctg.!lpa.
i\pril9. 1981.a, rrpdricd in I.HIS.Apnl 10.19x1 In May dnd Junc 19R? ihi Securii)
ii)rcr.\ili,co\:rr.d ihrw nirîich<iu\cin Irguii#~lp.iincl~ding:~chcraiirm, bclie\ed
An h*\.",,.. .,.,-.ihi Sandiniciai Sec >[.ticIkparinieoi ~n;ld\\tiI~ïIc~tbli,yu<.,yolp<i
'The discovery or thesafchouses was reporiedby ACAN-EFE,July 21. 1981,Radio
Nuevo Mundo, Guatemala Cily,and Radio-televisionGuatemala,July21 and 22, 1981,
as reporicdin FBIS, July24. 1981.
''A Former SalvddoranRebelChierTellsof Arms From Nicaraeua". New,YorkTirnef.480 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES

Armedsirugg/e 1981-1983.Prospects for vanguard activism in Honduras itself
began to change in late 1981when the country's small Marxist parties fragmented.
The solits were often renerational in nature, and took the form of differences
over the road to poweF Almost invariably the new younger factions - inspired
by Sandinista success - favored armed struggle over the gradua1 methods
ïavored by the older generation.
Bv 1981 the Sandinistas were workine closelv with the new erouos. In an
0ciob:r 1981inicrview in rhc pro-g~~i,crnriicri icarïgu.in ncuyxipcr III .Vui,i.i~

Drurio, ihc !4ora/ani51 Front li~rthe I.ibçration of Ilondurlis (FMLH) founded
in 1979 was dcicribcd bv "O~~i;i\~io"o.nc of 11sleÿdcrs 4s a ~olitical miliiars
organization formed as part of the "increasing regionalizatioh of the central
American conflict". On November 17, 1981, the Honduran police raided a
safehouse in Tegucigalpa belonging to the Honduran Front for Popular Liber-
ation (FHLP)'. Police ultimatel. .aotured several members of this erouD.
including a ond dur a n,Uruguayan and several Nicaraguans. The caituréd
terrorists told Honduran authorities that the Nicaraman -overnment had
provided them with funds for travel expenses and explosives.
Documents captured in the raid and statements by the detained guerrillas
further indicated that:

- the group was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation of high-level San-
dinista leaders:
- the group's chief of operations resided in Managua; and
- members of the group received military training in Nicaragua and Cuba

The documents included classroom notes from a one-year training course held in
Cuba in 1980. Other documents revealed that guemI1.d~at one saîehouse were
responsiblefor transporting armsand munitions into Honduras from Esteli, Nica-
ragua.
During 1981 other "post-Nicaragua" groups made their presence felt. The
most formidable was the People's Revolutionary Union/Popular Liberation
Movement (URPJMLP). lt was more popularly known as the "Cinchoneros".
In March 1981 Cinchonero members hijacked a Honduran Airlines flight and
diverted itto Managua. Tellingly, they demanded the release of 10 Salvadoran
guerrillas who had been captured in Honduras while smuggling arms to the FPL
in El Salvador. Sandinista officiaisrefused to cooperate with Honduran authori-
ties- to the point of refusing them access to the control tower to communicate
directly with the hijackers. The Hondurans were forced to accede to the terrorist
demands, freeing the Salvadorans and flying them to Cuba2.
In September 1982, the Cinchoneros seized control of the Chamber of Com-
merce in San Pedro Sula, Honduras' second largest city, holding 107prominent

businessmen and three cabinet ministers hostage. The demand once again cen-
tered on the release of captured Salvadorans and other imprisoned guerrillas.
The Cinchonero attackers finally ended the hostage incident without achieving
any of their demands except safe passage to Cuba on September 28, 1982'.

'Officiel Infirme sobre la Coplura y Desmrinrelomienlodel Grupo Subversive
Aulodenorninodo "Frenle Ilondurenode Lib~rocionPopular",Tegucigalpa,December2,
19x1
'Sec."HonduranPlaneisHijackcdandLands LnManagua",March28,1981 ;"Hostages
FromHonduras",ondNewnJYork Times,March830, 1981. "PanamaPlane Will FlyCaptives
'Sce AgenceFrancePresse(AFP), El Tiernpo(Tegucigalpa)La Prensa(San Pcdro
Sula),El Ifer~ld(Tegucigalpa), CAN-EFE, as rcportedinFBIS,Scptember22-24,1982. REVOLUTION BEYONDOUR BORDERS 481

Another armed Honduran group, the Popular Revolutionary Forces (FPR),

carried out an airplane hijacking on April 28, 1982.They demanded the release
of over 50 prisoners but again settled for sale passage 10Cuba on May 1, 1982 '.
The FPR were also responsible for a number of bombings and attacks on the
offices inHonduras of United States companies in 198Z2. On July 4, 1982,they
sabotaged the main power station in Tegucigalpa3. In roughly the same time

period as the attacks, the FPR was also training cadres in Nicaragua and Cuba
for a future "invasion" of Honduras.
~lunc~ ~ 1983. E~ ~Poraiçn 1984-1985. The extent to which the Sandinistas back
iuhvcrsli,~mo\,cmentr inside Hondurai bççamr apparent when Hunduran gucr-

rlll;i\- tr;iineJ and rupplicd by N.:JrJgua anil Cubii - dttcniptcrl 10 e\iahlish
euerrilla h4scsin thc Olancho denariiiicnt iiiIlrinilurar in l9h3 anclin CIParaico
i'n1984 '.
The two Honduran groups involved in the attempted "invasions" were the
Honduran branch ofthe Central American Revolutionary WorkersParty (PRTC)

~n~~the~~-o~e~entio~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~e PRTC was then led bv Jose Maria Reves,
Mata, a radical activist since the 1960s who had accompanied "Che" ~uevarx
on his ill-fatedadventure in Bolivias. In April 1980,inthe month when Honduras
was holdine d-mocratic elections for a constituent coneress. Reve- Mata was
arrrstcd in ionncciion with a wave 01'prc.clection violcnccand the kidnkpping

,,ia Tc.\.<c,ci.w:iitii.c. Ic ah$ irccd alier by a gcner.11Jmncit! Jc~rccand mo~zd
to Nicaragua later the same year.
Once in Nicaragua, Reyes Mata began planning to open a front inside
Honduras with Sandinista support. In 1981he conducted an active recruitment
campaign inside Honduras, and the first recruits departed via Managua for

military training in Cuba. The trainees returned to Nicaragua in late 1982and
early 1983 and fought alongside Sandinisla army units against the Nicaraguan
resistance to gain combat experience.482 MlLlTARY AhD PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

In July 1983 Reyes Mata and his 96-man force, armed by the Sandinistas,
entered the isolated and underpopulated department of Olancho in eastern
Honduras. The operation was structured as a vanguard action for other groups.
The other forces werenever infiltrated, however. The "invasion" waseasily foiled
by Honduran security forcesand Reyes Mata was killed.Many of the participants
captured by the Honduran Army gave detailed descriptions of their training in

both Nicaragua and Cuba.
In July 1984 a similar effort was made to establish the base for a rural
insurgency with the attempted infiltration of 19 FPR guerrillas into the Paraiso
department along the border between the two countries. As was the case with
the Olancho group, the FPR cadre received training at Pinar del Rio in Cuba
and aftenvards trained in Nicaragua fighting the armed opposition to the

Sandinistas.
Again, the operation was contained by the Honduran army. ACterwards,
members of the group led Honduran authorities to several arms caches and
subversive groups in the Comayagua area.
In April 1985,the Sandinistas were again caught trying to provide support for
the Honduran guerrilla groups, but this time the operatives arrested were
Nicaraguans. Between April II and 14, seven Nicaraguans were arrested in

Paraiso derartment trvine to infiltrate arms to Cinchoneros based in Olancho
departmeni. One of thémwas a member of the Nicaraguan Directorate for State
Security (DGSE) who stated that he had coordinated similar arms infiltrations
since November 1984'.
The leadership of Honduran guerrilla groups continues to reside in Nicaragua
and United States intelligence reports current training of Honduran guernllas in
Managua.

Iniimidat~on.The Sandinista eovernment, in addition to su~~ortinr subversive
movements inside Honduras, bis engaged in a campaign apparentl; devised to
intimidate the Honduran Government and keep it from effectivelycontrolling ils
borders.
Border incursions by the Sandinistas have soured relations between the two
countries almost from the moment Somoza fell in July 1979.The first of nearly
300 border incidents through mid-1985 occurred on July 22, 1979 - three days

after the Sandinistas entered Managua'. Before the year was out there were at
least a dozen more incidents. While the early missions wereusually characterized
by small units operating with light weaponry, by 1985 the Sandinistas were
employing 120mmmortar rounds. Heavy shelling from Nicaraguan territory by
rockets and heavv artillerv has als~~occurred.
~he~andinistis in addhion have p~aced~anti~ersonnelland mines along both
sides of the HonduraniNifaraguan border. Although the mines are justified by

the Sandinistas as self-defenseigainst incursions by ~icara~uan resistance forces,
the net efiect is to endanger the resident rural population in the border areas. In
lune 1983, two American journalists were killed when their car hit a Czecho-
slovakian-manufactured mine on an Honduran road 3.

'State DepartmentunclassificdcableTeaucimI~a 6152. May 8, 1985
'In~id<ttle.i I'ri.!iiy<,npuri1.0 Rt,pi~blloiJe .S,<vr<ipen Pcr,uicii. <Ir,Ili.nrlunii.
nnnual rcpdrt,(rom 1982onwardi \Isu Ri,~w>~t ~t>IrisPrinripulcrAer8riduJe<d/.jrrcir<i
Punulur Sondmoiii en Io Frontcru cm ILinduro< dr..dphm, 1934 huiro 1 JiinioIr.>S.
EsiadoMayorConjuntode LasFuerrasArmadas.
'News Conferenco by ForeignMinisterEdgardoPaz Barnica,broadcast June 22, 1983,
as reportedby FBlS therameday. REVOLUTION BEYONDOUR BORDERS 483

C. COSTA RICA
"ln 40 years of Somocismo, we never had the threat that WC have in four
years of Sandinismo." (Luis Alberto Monge, President of Costa Rica,
Decemher 1983 '.)

Costa Rican support was essential ta the success of the struggle against
Somoza. In November 1978 the Costa Rican Government severed diplomatic
relations with the Somoza régime,and over the next eight months allowed Costa
Rican territory tohe used as a conduit for armsand supplies to the anti-Somoza
war ciïort on its northern border.
In the orocess of aidine the insurrection. however. Costa Rica's ooen and
btahlc de~i)ir;icy unwittinFly i)pr.ncd the door111futur; tr<)ublcsdirrctly rrlaicd
Io the S;indinistas 'l'hrS;indiniitar' dirdain for u,hat Dcfencc .Ministr.rIlumberto

Ortega referred to as a "bourpeois democracv in the hands of the rich". soon
made itself apparent? Costa Rican territory.was used to transfer weap6ns to
the Salvadoran rehels and groups inside Costa Rica were armed and given
military training. Terrorism became a persistent problem from 1981 on, and
Nicaraguan opponents of the Sandinistas became targets of assassination at-
tempts. Tensions with Nicaragua increased in generdl witb the growth of interna1
opposition to the Sandinistas and recurring border incidents.
Early lies to the Sandinistas. Costa Rica has long aceepted the democratic
oarticination of Socialist and Marxist oarties in its oolitical life3. With the advent
of the Sandinista régimein Managua in July 1979,iowever, the tactical allegiance
to democracy of some of the radical rroups in Costa Rica beaan to shift. For
some, peaceful participation in the p61iti&alprocess could nolonger be taken

for granted.
The orthodox Communist Party in Costa Rica, then called the Popular
Vanguard Party (PVP) and led by Manuel Mora Valverde, contrihuted cadres
to Sandinista units to fight against Somoza and to accelerate the PVP's military
preparedness in the event conflict broke out later in Costa Rica4. By early 1979,
the PVPhad several hundred combatants in Nicaragua.

'Georgie Anne Geyer,"Taking the Sandinistasat Their Word". ~all SlrecrJourniil,
August23, 1985, p. 15.
Octokr 10,1981.Arnongotherthings,he observedthaiLa Nacion,San José, CostaRica.

"the CostaRicans ...veryintelligcntlyhavemaintained[butsoftened]thccnploitation
of man by man with . . that is the kind ofdemocracy[our opposition]wants . . .
that wc the Sandinistask likc the lcft in Costa Ric- a group whichmobilizer
politicallyand puisout its ownnewspapcrbut wherethe bourgeoisiecontrolpowcr".
'The Costa Rican Marxistleftis made upof severalparties,foremoslof whichis the
Costa Rican Pcople'sPartyheadedby MordValverde.Until 1984hispartywasknown as
the Popular VanguardParty (PVP). In 1948,militarycadres of the PVP supportcd thc
unsuccess~ucllTorisby the incumbcntgavcrnmentto thwart the outcamc of democratic
pp.223-224.For the 1978and 1982clectiansthe radicalparties farmedcoalitionsin6),an
effortto cxpand theirrepresentatioatthe nationallevel.Theyreceived7.3percent of the
votein 1978and lessthan 4 percent in 1982.SeeIlarold D. Nelson(ed.),Costa Rico: A
Cyniry Sludy(Washington,1984).pp.216-218.
Many scattered reports confirm the brigade'spresenee in Nicaragua. In 1982 a
newspapcrarticlereferredto 700Costa Ricanlcftiststrainingin Nicaragua (LaRepublica,
Panama City,Febmary 7, 1982,as reported in FBIS, Febmary 9, 1982). A former
Nicaraguanoflicialwho defectedin July 1985reccntlygavedetailson a group or PVP
militantsbeing trained in Nicaragua acrosr 1983.One of the Hondurans captured in
conneciionwith thc infiltrationof El Paraisoin July 1984spokeof trainingwitha PVP484 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

The PVP maintained its force in Nicaragua after the Sandinistas came to
power. Major elements of it remain there today and provide permanent training
for paramilitary cadres who return to Costa Rica. The unit did not act in
isolation. From the start it maintained close contact with the Sandinista army
and over the years hecame an integral part of Sandinista defenses along the

border with Costa Rica. The Nicaraguan government supplies the unit with
training. uniforms, arms and food, and in return the unit carries out military
actions against Nicaraguan resistance forces operating along the Nicaragua-
Costa Rica border.
Armingjor therevoluiion. While Panama and Venezuela were providing aid to
the anti-Somoza opposition through Costa Rica in 1979, Cuba with the aid of
corrupt Costa Rican officiaiestahlished ils own clandestine arms supply network

for the Sandinistas. This network was later used to supvly th~. .lvadoran
insurgency and interna1 Costa Rican leftist groups.
The circumstances surrounding the shipments were estahlished by a Special
Commission created in June 1980by the Costa Rican legislature to investigate
charges then circulatina that after the Nicaraguan civil war a black market had
devzoped in connecticn with war matériel lefthehind in Costa Rica'. During
the course of its investigation, the commission discovered the shipments from
Cuba.

Then-President Rodrieo Carazo of Costa Rica first denied that the fliehts had
occurred when questioGd by the commission on November 4, 1980, but later
admitted them. On March 25, 1981, five Costa Rican pilots publicly admitted
their varticivation in the transshi~ment of arms from Cuba. and eave details of
the operations and the names of'the Cuban and Costa ~icin o$cias involved
in supervising the clandestine flights2. The commission established that a total
of at least 21 such flights were made, most of the shipments arriving at a
secondary airport, in Liberia, removed from public scrutiny.

Many of the weapons flown in by the Cuban airlift were diverted to the
insurgency in El Salvador. The pilots in their 25 March statement recalled that
in one of the trips to Cuba, Manuel Pineiro of the Cuban Communist Party's
America Department asked whether they would be willing to Ry amis to El

cadre in the "internationalirt"brigadin 1983.In March 1985, La Republicoin San Jose
ran a stary on 100Costa Ricanstrainine in Cuba and Nicaragua, andquoted Security
pr<>uphrsarbonng ruchd a,llne of dprdilon WCuxkilldo cicr)thlng,pdllihls10xncutraliïr
ihcm".SR. 1.1Rc~lihl,~~S.a8Ju~c .lilrch 14.IYR5.s r~.nt>rIdv FBIS \l:*rch25. 1985.
In May 1985,La'~ncio" in San oséquoted'~~~ leader~ergiiErik ~rdon that"there
arc presentlyCosta Ricansfightingat the rideof the Sandinistaforces,just as thercare in
the countcrrevolutionarygroups".
'Report on ams traffickingissuedby a specialCosta Rican legislativecommission on
May 14,1981. The report is the basis for the lallowingcomments.La Noelon, May 15,
1981,as rcportedby FBIS, June 12, 1981.Alsosec "Amis Scandalis Chargcdin Costa
Rica': New York Thes, May21, 1981.
'ACAN-EFE,March24, 1981,as repartedin FBIS, March 26, 1981.Duringthemonths
lcadingup to the ovcrthrowof Somozain July 1979, agroup of officersol the Amonca
Department ol the Cuban Communist Party playcd a major role in the Nicaraauan
rc<jlutiun ,\ inumhdr .>fAnirnii I>cp.iriincn.,fli;irr kirc :XW~!>111C.,N~ R~ç:i.:!nd
uer: rc\p.,nilbliiirnioiing arm, ;andrnsn inio Fii:amgu.ilrum C.,,i:Ki;d Th,< grri~p
u:i, hr.dril b\ Jul).in I.uih.I>w. a \cnl.>r ~nt:llicenceulliccr. irha bv.imr Cuba',
aiiib.o\~Jori~.~i;ara~u:iliirkhaniud uwk* ll~.r ~<>%o,a'P,dIII.ope/ :andhli.irro;i;iizr
mor,cJ frîel) thro~ghoutCoit~ Kncadunng this pmod ihanki 10 xi(: c<>nJurt p.is,r,
ir,urJ thenib) l~nirtrrui I'ublicSwuni) Juan Juri Ilchcv~.rrHrcalcy. RliVOLUTlON BIiYONO OUR BORDERS 485

Salvador'. The legislative commission traced three shipments to El Salvador
through Costa Rican territory hetween 1980 and 1981.
Importantly for the Costa Ricans, the commission confirmed that a substantial

numher of these weapons remained in Costa Rica after the fall of Somoza. The
minister of public security in 1979 was Juan José Echeverria Brealey - a man
with close lies to Cuba, and now the leader of the Radical Democratic Party.
The commission in ils Mav 1981 reoort held Echeverria resnons~.le for the fact ~~
that "there were no contrds over théwar maté& that entered the country" and

for the "disap~e~rance" of war material from State arsenals, including 2,018-
firearms.
The commission concluded that the imported weapons had heen widely
distrihuted inside Costa Rica. It reported that "weapons of war" had heen
confiscated from various private homes, including properties owned by
Echeverria. Nine months later, on March 25, 1982, another cache of arms was

found in the house of Mora Valverde, the leader of the PVP. At the time of the
seizures he claimed that the weapons were for "self-defense"'.
The supply network, once in place, continued to operate for some time after
the air shipments from Cuba had ceased. In March 1982 Costa Rican security
forces raided a safehouse in San Jose, arresting nine persons including two

Nicaraeuans in connection with an arms traffickine ooeration to El Salvador.
About'i75 weapons were seized including 70 ~-16<56 of which were traceahle
as rifles originally shipped to Vietnam3.
Terrorism: 1981-1985. The new orientation of Costa Rican radical ErouDs
helped set off a wave of violence inside the country over the next fewyea;s.
Many of the terrorist acts, however, were attributable to external forces. While

hiding behind a screen of legitimate international relations, Nicaragua took
actions which were clearly meant to intimidate the Costa Rican Government.
The initial te~ ~ri~t act l~ ~ olace in March 1981 : an attack on ~ ~ ~ ~~~ic~ ~
carrying a Costa Rican driver and three ~nited tat t eemsb&sy security guards.
It was followed in June 1981hy the killinas of three policemen and a taxi driver.
Both attacks were traced to a-radical sointer erouv [rom the Marxist Peoole's
-. .
Kcv<~lutionar).Mo\cment (now known a, thc Ncw Rcpubliç Ivl<)venient).whu5e
leader Sergio Erik Arden has cluse tics t<iCuba and .Nicaragua and who ai ihc
time of the attacks stated that the tcrrorism could bc cxnlatncd. if not iusiificd.
in terms of the injustices of Costa Rican society. ArdÔn wasthe oniy costa
Rican political leader no1 IO condemn the attacks as terrorism4.
Actions more clearly linked Io external support followed:

- Six armed pfrsons - including Nicaraguans affiliated with the Sandini-

'Il hr~~nic public Lri<,*lcdgc th:~.ulth Cuhao fin.incia1>upwrr 2nd guiJ>ricr.~nd
d\ririzn,,eirum I.crninJ~ Corn,,. an ~\!ileri;Dcp.irtmrni<>lli;er :irrignirJ,;iconwl;ir
c~ili:~tl C<I\I.XRica ihc Ch~lc:m Fe~nar,.loC.tvrd\:uI9 nwmhcr of Ch~ls',\lt>\m~cni 01'
the Revolutionary ~élt - MIR) bccamclhe icadinifigure in a s6ohirticatcdai~-suiiii&l
.,pir;ii.oIo pr~ciile:im\ and :~rnm..nitiunta ~n,ucgirz, inI:I S~l;;idsr Hy tirtuso? hi,
po\ilion .i,~hrhc:rd of \ricr~l;(grr.\prc,,<iornpmic,.~riiludin;on: b.1wi1in <:orta Hi;:i.
arc h1J 1st.l I l r 1 m -~~~~ C~rr~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ti.iIhd\r.ilhi*
operat& in Cosiü ÜiCi and lai; ;bangcd IL~ &nue ta Nicaragua. ~, -~~~~ ~-
'Costo Rico: A CountryStudy,op. cir.. p. 254.The policefound fircams, dynamitcand
lra,grneniationgrenadesin his possession.
La Nucion, San José, March 16-21, 1982 ,orsim.
'The activities of thegroup attracted considerablemediacoveragc in Costa Rica. For
detailson the policcinvcsligationof the graup seebroadcastsof Radio Reloj, San Jose,
as reportcd in FBIS, June-August 1981, passim. The terronsts had connections to
UruguayanTupamaros,Cinchoncrorand the FMLN.486 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

stas - were arrested in July 1981 crossing the Nicaraguan border into Costa
Rica on a mission to seize the Guatemalan embassy in San José and demand
the release by Guatemala of convicted terrorists '.
- On lanuary 19, 1982, Iwo Salvadoran PRTC rnembers, José Marroquin
and Jonathan Rodriguez, were arrested in Costa Rica in connection with an
attempted kidnapping of a Salvadoran businessman. They later told Costa Rican

police that they passed first through Nicaragua, where they and others were
provided with false identity documents to enter Costa Rica. Marroquin told a
Costa Rican court on Febmary 4, 1982, that he "received military and political
training" during the several montbs he spent in Nicaragua2.
- In November of the same year, the Costa Rican branch of the Central
Amencan Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC) seriously wounded a lapanese
businessman - who later died - in a botched kidnapping attempt. Two
Salvadorans, a Honduran and two Costa Ricans were arrested in connection

with the attempted kidnapping3.
Three Nicaraguan embassy officialswere expelled from Costa Rica on July 28,
1982, for their involvement in the July 4 hombing of the San losé ofices of
SAHSA, the Honduran national airline. Costa Rica's investigation of the case
implicated a Colombian terrorist recruited hy Nicaraguan embassy officials in
Costa Rica. One of the three Nicaraguan diplomats was arrested al a clandestine
meeting with the Colombian4.
Terrorist actions on Costa Rican soi1peaked in 1982 but did not end. Members

of the New Republic Movement were responsible for a major bank robbery in
Guanacaste province in February 1985. When they were arrested, they were
found to have collected information on the movements of United States embassy
personnel in Costa Rica as well as those of Costa Rican officials and other
foreien diolomats '.
~iÏuck.ion .VrciJru~r~<i mr Cosro RICO. Much of ihr. icrrorirm expcricnied by
Costa RIC~ulxs Jirectcd at elemcnts 01' ihe Nicaraguan oppoïiiion uho have
sourhi reiucc in Costa K~id. In kbruarv 1982an aitr.mr>twas rnadc to assarsinate

~eGando Ehamorro, formerly a prominent anti-~omocista, now an anti-
Sandinista6.The principal suspect in the case was the Nicaraguan consul in the
town of Liberia, but by the tirne police sought him out he had returned to
Nicaragua. On 6 October, 1982, an Argentine associated with the Nicaraguan
opposition was kidnapped OR the streets in Costa Rica. He later appeared
on Nicaraguan television for a public "confession". He was never heard from
again7.

-~ Aoril~ ~ ~~,a Ba~~~e ter~~ ~. ~ ~ infilt~~~ed f~om~ ~carae"~ ~ ~ arreste~ in
connection with a plot to kill Eden Pastora, a former Sandinista commandera.
On June 29. 1983,one FSLN member was killed and another Nicaraguan injured
when a bomb they intended for the opposition leaders exploded prematuÏely '.

'Radio Reloj. San José, July6,1981, as reponed in FBIS,July8, 1981.
StateDepartment unclassifiedcableSan José5710,Augusi23, 1982.
'Broadcast by Radia Reloj, San José, Novcmber 9, 1982, as repaned in FBIS,
November10.1982.Alsarce Statedepartmentcable Son José 7701,November12.1982.
Broadcast by Radia Rcloj, San José,July 28, 1982,asrcportedin FBIS,July29, 1982.
Also includedin Calendoriode IncidentesEmre elGohiernode Costa Rico vel Cobiernode
Nicaragua,Fcbruary 1985.
5Classifieddiplornaticcorrcspondence.
'State De~artmcntunclassifiedcableSm Jose4835.June 23. 1984
'"Cien EtarrasnenoNicaragua",Combiocto16,Madrid,October3, 1983, p.22.
'"Bomb KillsNicaraguan in Costa Rica", Wasl!ingronPoli,June 30, 1983,p. A-35. REVOLUTION BEYONU OUR BORUERS 487

In Novemher 1984, an attempt was made on the life of another opposition
leader, Alfonso Robelo, with a fragmentation grenade'.

Alrempied intimida~ion. Not surprisingly, Costa Rica's relations with Nica-
ragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union deteriorated after 1979. Consular relations
with Cuba were severed in May 1981. In November 1982 the Monge adminis-
tration asked Moscow to withdraw 17 of the 25 officiaisat its emhassy in San
José. The Soviets had heen active promoting lahor strife inside Costa Rica
since 1979'.
In the case of Nicaragua, approximately 90 incidents involving diplornatic
protests were recordcd before Costa Rica ordered Nicaragua on Fehruary 19,
1985,Io reduce ils Embassy personnel from 47 Io IO3.The Sandinista attempts
to intimidate the Costa Rican Government hegan as early as 1980, Iwo years
before former-Sandinista Eden Pastora beean his anned resistance to the réeime

<in II\southern borders. In Oitohcr 19~iÏ.'Sandinist;iforces lired un Co\ta kclin
\<.isr.liengaged in rncdii;il inission, on the San Juan Ri\cr tihich p~rii311)dividci
the t\io countrles In 1982. Nicdr.i-u;i', çh;ill-ncctiCCI.IJRiw's riehi\ on the
San Juan bewnie niorc susisincd dnd in Juiie dnd July 1982\c\r.ril 1ouri.t hiidi,
<,IIthc ri\cr wcrc iiitcrcepied In 1983.unit, the 13PShepan regul.ir incurhionr
into Costa Rican territory.
The seriousness of the incidents between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, if
anything, has deepened this year. On May 31, 1985,a Costa Rican Civil Guard
unit on border patrol was fired on by Sandinista amy troops. Two guards were
killed and nine were injured. Sandinista units continued Io hombard the area
well after their unprovoked attack, making it difficultto retrieve the bodies4.

The five Central American countries have agreed on the following objective:
"To promote national reconciliation efforts wherever deep divisions have

taken place within society. with a view to fostering participation in demo-
cratic political processes in accordance with the law." (The Contadora
Documenr of Objecrives, Panama City, September 9, 1983.)

July 1979
The July 19, 1979,assumption of power hy the Junta of the Government of
National Reconstruction (GRN) changed the Central Amencan scene. Several
neighhoring régimes wereconcerned a1 the collapse of Nicaraguan institutions
and the looming power struggle within the coalition which had led the uprising
that removed Somoza from power. The general attitude in the hemisphere,
however - particularly among those States which had contrihuted materially Io

-
'SecPresidentMongc'scondcmnationof theattack as recardcdby RadioImpacto,San
Jo'Farothe breakwiththe Savictsand theCubÿnsvemseeCosla Rico: A Country Studyo.p.
cil.pp.238-239.
'The downgrading ofrclaiionswiihthcSiindinistaswasprccipitatedhy theviolationof
the immuniiy aï Costa Rica'scmbassyin Managua on Deccmber24, 1984,when a
Nicaragua"citizenwas abductcd from embassygrounds. See Colendririode Incidentes,
op.ai.
'The incidentreceivedintcrndtionalmediacovcragcand wasconsideredseriousenough
hy theOAS Io ment an invcrtigdlion.488 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

the cffort to remove Somoza - was one of deep satisfaction at the replacement
of the Somoza dictatorship with a popularly supported coalition publicly

committed to a program of democratic reform.
Concerns about the role to be played by the Sandinistas in the new government
were largely set aside in the interesl of providing the support and assistance
needed to reconstruct Nicaragua from the civil war'. Both Latin American
countries and the United States were determined to cooperate in the rebuilding

of Nicaragua and the reintegration of that country - in accordance with 11s
promises to the OAS - into the inter-American system that had played an
essential role in the removal of the Somoza régime2.
Nicaragua's neighbors. Of Nicaragua's immediate neighbors only Costa Rica
reacted in a fully positive manner to the removal of Somoza. Costa Rican
territory had been available for the supply of weapons from Cuba, Panama,

Venezuela and other foreign sources Io the anti-Somoza rebels. Costa Ricans
honed that the advent of a oonul.=. democ,atic eovernment in Nicaraeua had
finally freed Costa Rica from a long-standing miÏitary threat to ils democratic,
unarmed status, and aiven it a new partne' in the protection and advancement
of democracy in central America.

The reactions of the Governments in Honduras and El Salvador were cautious.
Neither had opposed the OAS resolution which stripped the Somoza rCgimeof
ils legitimacy. But the strong position of the FSLN, which they saw as an agent
of "International Communis~n~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ce of real fear. The Government of
El Salvador, in particular, feared the influence and impact of the Sandinistas on
El Salvador's troubled interna1 situation.

The Unired Srares. Contrary to many popular misconceptions, the United
States had since mid-1978 directed ils efforts toward facilitating a peaceful
resolution to the conflict. Hoping to ensure that Somoza would not be followed
hy an equally repressive régime, the United States participated actively in an
OAS-endorsed mission that sought to avoid violence.
Consistent with this policy goal, the United States viewed with concern the

role of the Sandinista Front in the military events culminating in Somoza's
ouster. Nonetheless, the presence on the five-memher Junta of Violeta de
Chamorro (widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of LA Prensa) and

'The United Nations estimatcdihat 45,OWpeoplehad bccn killed. 160,000wounded
;tnJ 4U.ilillrphanmi in ihc lighiingin iir.ar~~u.i,.thegrcal m.ipni) ln thc 1L.nmonthl
priuiding S<imo~.i'fi.illIi criimiiir.a, u.r.th.!!one n~tlliunSii~r-iguin. trcrcin nccd 01'
iJud and 25O.,(~i ~f ~l~i~iir12irns,mlc~.,is:i ;ioor~uchzil52 hillion:xnd thc Yiiir~rdÎn
cconomywascornpletelydisrupted.Staternent b'iAssistant~ecretarj-of ~taic Vironqaky
before the Subcommiitecon Inter-AmeticanAnàirs of the Senatc Foreign Relations
Cummiiirc. Srpirmkr 11. 1979. A,ii.,ri6.~in I.;>rA>bri Uorii IJ,in<nwnÏsI'f77.lCIO.
pp. 1321. 1323IhcOAS Intcr.Amrnr.in<'ommirsion on llum~nKlghisprotidedc,iimdic<
uhiçh. ihuuph rllchil, louer. cunlimid ihe masslvcrciilr ui drdih and deriruciiun. Ii
estimatcd35T000 deatiis(80 Gr cent civilian),100,000woundcdand 40.000orphancd.By
iiri\iimdirY. 40 p.r ctni il ihr counlq's popul~tion u.i~ tiyinp al rianaiion In1r.r-
,\mrrican Comnilriisn un II~min Kighir. Rrp<irlbn rltr Si~uuiii,>/Ilunien Riglir<inlhr
Rl.<iuhLr<..Vt<dr<icu<i.Oh DSo<urneni.O~\SScrL V 1151.d~ 25. J~nr lu.IORI.n 155
'Thc ~GntacoGeyed its July 9 ~r&ram'io thé OAS on July 12,and includcdcom-
inihs poliitc.ilriruciurcri<r<>tfhe ndiisn$i. ''13imid e;onom).1 on2 non-alignrduniorctgn
o<>llcvf.ulobr:r\;iiicî<>ihum," r~~hir.anJ ihc hi,ldinaof frrr ~iiuniçio~alnd nalinna1
&lh-i&ns.That these undcriakinas-wek madc dircctly-to the OAS a; wcll as to the
S~r.,ir:ig~lpr.uplr*a. ispmiallfapprupri~iz in Iighiof ihc unprc~cJrnirdOAS:iction.
jainrd in b> the Ciniid Si~ir<.depriringihcSom<>zgao\crnmcniui'I:giiirn~r~ rrcn kforc
Somnfa hiil .*bandrint4ihr insiruinc.iiiïlilir01' mner Kesoluiion II 01 Sc\rntmnih
Mceiingof Consultationof Ministersof Foreign~kairs, June 23, 1979 REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 489

prominent businessman Alfonso Robelo, both of whom were unquestionably
committed to democracy, gave the United States and other countries of the

hemisphere reason to believe that the Junta's announced program and its
promises to the OAS would be honored.

1979-1980
The fall of Somoza increased the aonreciation in neiehborine countries of the
need for substantial reform. At the 'same lime, howeGer,actial and potenrial

guerrillas throughout Central America were encouraged by the Sandinista
exam~le to believe that thev too could. with sulficient extemai sunoort. succeed
in shooting their way into power. ~his was particularly the case in'El Salvador
and Guatemala. The United States, despite major misgivingsabout developments
in Nicaragua, embarked on a major program of economic assistance to
Nicaraeua'. The inter-American and international communitv as a whole look
a similCrapproach of large-scaleassistance to enable the new r&me to overcome

the civil war's destruction.
NicuruguuSneighbors.On October 15, 1979,a coup led hy reformist officers
overthrew the réeimeof General Carlos Humberto Romero~~n El Salvador. -~~
Three months laÏer a new Junta was formed, with the participation of the
Christian Democratic Party. By March 1980 a civil-militdry Junta headed by
JoséNaooleon Duarte had bemn a series ol maior social and nolitical relorms
designci tu addrcrs 111swhi& had providcd mich ol the appc:il <ii thc anii-

goverriment guerrillas. and ti,Jcmonriratc ihat serious anclcilccii\~erçform ci>uld
bc achicved wirhoui civil war I'how rciorms encomnasscd Landrcdisiribution.
basic changes in the banking and commercial sectois, and opening the politi:
cal system. The Junta committed itself to the holding of free elections for a
constituent assembly2. Disturbances by groups encouraged by the Sandinista
success peaked in the spring of 1980,but by summer, as the newlyunited guerrilla
forces began to prepare for their January offensive, the reforms began to take

hold and several strike calls received only limited support.
Honduran social and political tensions, while significant, were less polarized
than those in El Salvador or Nicaragua, and the militas. govemment did not
abuse civil rights. There had not yet developed a pattern of violent political
extremism or armed anti-government activity. The first step in the return to
democratic civilian rule announced by the Honduran militas. government was
the popular election of a constituent assemhly in April 1980.

Tlie UniredSrures Between July 1979 and January 1981, the United States
orovided more than $100 million in economic assistance to Nicaraeua. It
éncouraged other Western countries to provide major assistance as wzl, and
urged private banks to reach a rescheduling agreement with Nicaragua. It offered

iro;ided a total $4648illionin assistanccto~icaraaua bv theend of 19791As notcd

'On Ociobrr 15.IY~Ü i"<.)car:!fierinkinpoücr. ihcJuntd~nnouncrd'~ shrJulr fur
ionitiiurnia\,rmblyand pre,iJrntialrlrïlions Implcminiati~<>fihirchcdulciulminsied
wiih ihcclmiionoi PrtiiJrniDudnc in1984 fulloucdbyIcplilill~cnJ m~111c1p damIllon,
in Varch 1985490 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

to reinstate a Peace Corps program to assist in Nicaraguan reconstruction and
to helv meet that countrv's need for teachers and medical care' as well as a
military training program t<>ar\i\t in the profersi.inali/ation oiits armcd li~rsçs
following thc diisi>lution .iithe National CiudrJ. Both t11Ti.rwcrc rcl'uscd, a\
was a C<>>taKiiiln i>ilerof telichcrs 'lhe Sandinistas g>\c-. rior ritto obtaininc -
both teachers and militarv assistance frorn Cuba2.
In late 1979, the ~dministration proposed a special appropriation of $80
million in assistance for Central Amenca; $75 million - over 90 wr cent - of

this assistance was to be nrovided to Nicaraeua. Concerns in ~oneress about
Sandinista activities led to a requirement th;, before disbursing assistance to
Nicaragua, the President certify that Nicaragua was not "aiding, abetting, or
supporting acts of violence or terrorism in other countries"'.
In the middle of 1980,the United States began to receive reports of Sandinista
involvement in logistical support - including provision of arms - for guerrillas
in El Salvador. While these reports were at first fragmentary and difficult to
confirm, they gave rise to increasing concern about the role the Sandinistas
intended to play in Central America. The United StatesAmbassador to Nicaragua
was instructed to raise this issue with the government of Nicaragua and to urge
that any matenal support for the FMLN cease4. Nicaraguan officialsdenied any

"governmental" involvement, but asserted that the govcrnment of Nicaragua
could not he held responsihle for the activities of individual Nicaraguanss.
Despite the reports of involvement hy high-ranking and individual FSLN
memhers in furnishine arms and trainine to Salvadoran euerrilla erouns. on
September 12, 1980, tKe President made the certification required hyihe Spécial
assistance legislation. This decision was taken on the basis that the information
then available was not "conclusive" as to Nicaraguan government involvement
in terrorist activities6. While some officials believed that the~acc~ ~ ~~ion~ ~ ~
evidence was such as to preclude certification, the decision was made that the
overriding United States interest in attempting to retain a ~ositive relationship

with thenew government in Nicaragua Gourd be best seived hy viewing thé
evidence as inconclusive. The resulting certification made possible dishursement
of $75 million in economic assistance to Nicaragua.
The decision to certifv was accom~anied hv a decision to send the Denutv
Arsi*t<intScirrt<iry of ~kte for ~entr>l me ri toa hllinagua IO cnsurc thai thé
govcrnnicnt of Nicaragua wa, anarc thiitcontinuation ol'thr support for the
S~ivadoran gucrrillas would have a negative impact on United States-Ni~.aragulin

'Detailsaf diplomaticexchangesdescribedbelowaredrawninpart fromclassifiedcable
tra'The firstCuban militaryadvisorsarrivedf SinManagua in July 1979.Bythe end of the
year, there wercsome 1,400 Cuban tcachersand medicalpersonnel and over 200Cuban
military and political advisors in Nicaragua. By mid-1981,United States intelligence
indicated there were no lcsr than 5,000Cubans in Nicaragua,of whom600to 800were
military and securityadvisorsand thcrcsttcachen,doctorsand "internationalist" warkers.
'Sec. 536 (g) of the SpccialCentral AmericanAssistanccAct of 1979, P.L. 96-257,
approvedMay 31, 1980.Section536 (g) waslater redesignatedas section533 (/) of the
ForcignAssistanceAct of 1961. as amended.
4Classifieddiplomaticcorrapondene.
'Ibid.
6Theoperativeportionof the President'scenificationstatcdsimply
"1 hereby ... ccrtify,pursuant 10section536 (g) of the Actand on the basisof an
evaluation of the availableevidence,that the Governmcntof Nicaragua 'has no1
cooperated with or harbors any international terrorist organization or is aiding,
abetting, or supporting acts of violence or terrorism in other countries' . . ."
(PresidentialDetermination No. 80-26,September12,1980,45 FedernlRegisier 62779.) REVOLUTION BEYONDOUR BORDERS 491

relations. He cmphasized the United States' desire to preserve good relations
with Nicaragua, but made clear to his interlocutors that provision of support to
Salvadoran guerrillas could force the United States to terminate the assistance
program. The officiaiswith whom he met, including Daniel Ortega and other
memhers of the Junta, Foreign Minister d'Escoto, and Comandantes Bayardo
Arce, Humberto Ortega and Jaime Wheelock, promised that al1steps would be
taken to ensure that such activities did not occurt.

Thc "finïl r>ilr.iisi\r."olJ.iiiiiiir) 1981in ElSaliÿJor masprrml\rJ on ii\,rruhr.lm-
ing rhr,SaliiiJoran armcd l<orcr,;,t;itins uhcn the Cnmd Slarc,.< u2.<in trariiiion
ktu,ccn the Administraiions of Proidcnt C'srtcr and Presidcnt Keïcïn. tlndced.
on January 9 Radio Liberacion,an FMLN radio station operating out of~icara~ua;
boasted that the new United States president would come to officetoo laie to stop
the guemlla victory2.) On January 17, the Carter Administration announced a
package of $5million inmilitary assistance to El Salvador. The United States also
suspended assistance to Nicaragua because of intelligence information demonstra-
ting Nicaraguan supply to the Salvadoran guerrillas.
Nicaruguu's neighbors. Following the failure of the "final offensive", the
Salvadoran Junta continued political and social reforms along with the military
effort against the FMLN. The military assistancc provided by the United States

was suhject to severe restrictions and conditions designed to encourage the
security forces to professionalize themselves and to end human nghts abuses3.
Elections for a constituent assemhly were held in March 1982.Parties associated
with the FMLN refused to participate in the elections. The FMLN tried to
disrupt the elections hy destroying voting records, intimidating voters, mining
roads and burning buses.
Honduras held legislative and presidential elections in Novemher 1981. The
transition to democratic government culminated with the inauguration of an
elected, civilian president in January 1982. Honduran concerns focused on the
alarming Nicaraguan military huildup4 and continuing Sandinista army oper-

'Clasrilieddiplornaticcorrespondcncc.
'The clandestine RodioLiberocion broadcastfram Nicaraguailsattack on the "cowboy
president"of theUnitedStates on January 9,1981.See FElS, January 12, 1981.
'In fiscalycan 1981and 1982,United Statm cconornicand developmentassistancc
million.Sccurity assistance(Military AssistanceProgram, Foreign Military Sala and
LntcmationalMilitaryEdncationandTraining)tolaiied$117 millionforthesamctwoycars.
EconomicSupport Funds(ESF) areclassifiedin the budget assnurity assistancerathcr
than developmcntaid. The principalcriterionfor their use is the strategicimportanceof
the recipientto the United States.a criteriondiReringfrom the standards applicableto
distribution of dcvelopmentassistance. ESFir used almort exclusively for balance of
paynents supportand ather non-militaryeconomicsupportpurposes.
Byearly 1982.the SandinistaPcople'sAmy wasdominantin any directcompsrison
of Nicaraguan andHonduran forces; Honduras preserveden advantageonlyinair power.
By 1982,Nicaraguan activeduty militürypcrsonnclnumbcred21,500, withan additional
50,000border, militiaand reservepersonnel;theHanduranarmcd farcesnumbercd12,000,
152mmand 122mmlong-rangeartillcry,T-55tanks, amorcd personnelcarriers,and SA-quircd
7 anti-aircroftmissilnie Honduranamed forces had no long-rangeartillery,nomodem
tanks and no anti-aircraftmissiles.Thc Sandinistaadvantagchascontinuedto growsince
that lime,despitesubstantialUnitedStatesassistanccto Hondurasand an expansionof
Honduranmilitary forces to meetthe Nicaraguanthreat. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 493

Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez. He noted that evidence available to the

United States confirmed that su~olv to the FMLN was continuinr des~ite
previous clear promises by the ~andiiistas. He made clear -in viey a the iact
that Nicaragua's previous assurances that it would not support the FMLN had
proven false - the United States' intention to monitor the situation to ensure
that these actions were taken. He stated that the United States would exoect the
Nicaraguans to provide evidence that they had carried out their undeGakings.
He specifically identified a number of actions which the United States would
consider evidence of Nicaraeuan eood faith
ï'hc Si-aragudnh ucrc inickned-thdi ihc L'nitcdStaics h;iJ dc~iilcdto uiihhiild
new disbiinerneni of Cniir,J Siairr acrtolincc. uniitt>vassatirficd th;ii Shndtni..u
rupply t<the FMLS h;id h;tlted 'l'hisdecision ion\tituted. in clreit;i~rovisional
deienkination that the certification requirement of the assistance legiilation was
no longer met. The United States decision as to whether Nicaraguan actions
would permit the continuation of aid would be based on the situation in one
month's time; if the Nicararuan resoonse were not satisfactorv. a oublic
drterniination Irading 10a formal cut-ni1 of ar%thtancsu,<,ulJbc furihcorn'ing.
In rcply. Junta mcmhcrsOrtcga and Kamire, replicd that the FSLNDirciioraie
h.id ;i.ithori,cil IhçIO siaie thlit ihey underst<iod Cntisd Siaics conccrns d ho ut

El Salvador, would not "risk our ievolution for an uncertain victory in El
Salvador", and had tdken a firm decision not to permit Nicaraguÿn territory to
he used for transiting arms to El Salvador. Orders had been given to interdict
the arms Row. Ortega acknowledged that the credibility of the Nicaraguan
government was at stake, and that the Sandinista Front understood the conse-
quences of the commitments it had made. These promises were rcitcrated later
in February and in early March 1981 '.
In the immediate aftermath of these meetines. United States intellieence
indicated that arms trafic through established &tes, particularly by air,from
Nicaragua to El Salvador had slowed if no1stopped, but that other routes from
Nicaraé-a were beine -ouehtu The United Statescontinued to oress for concrete
and vcrifisble actions. Intelligence rcporiing and rvidrnic iontinued io mount
ihat thr FSL'I uas engagcd In continuing hupply~~~ITi>ria\s uell as accumul;iting
in Nicaragua arms for-the FMLN.
Faced with this additional evidence, the United States concluded that it could
no longer certify that Nicaragua was not engaged in support for terrorism
ahroad. On April 1, 1981, the President made a determination to that effect,

therebv formall. sus.endine disbursement of the final $15 million in assistance
maJc a\ailahlc the pre\i<iuryelir. l3vciithen. hou.ci,cr, in thç inicrrsi <~l'presentng
the bcst poissiblc rclattoni ~nJer th'. ;ircunisiart;~s. the Prejidçnt uaii,cJ the
provisionof law which would otherwise have required the immediate repayment
of al1economic support fund loans made to Nicaragua2.
With these events, United States/Nicaraguan relations entered a new stage.

thereafter,and acknowledgedthat theyhadnotherctoforebeen"vcryopermissive inallowing
the FMLN to mount operations in Nicaragua". He assened in early March that the
FMLN had beentold of thc FSLNdecisionIo end ils involvemeni.Whileacknowledging
that United States econornicassistancewould probably no1 continue, the Sandinirtas
expresseda desire to preservca cordial relationshipwith the United States. (Classificd
ditIomaticcorrespondince.)
On April 1,the Departmentof Siale releaseda starementannouncingthe Prcsident's
decisionto tenninatc EconomicSuppon Fund assistanceunder the law. Nicaraguawas
to Nicaraguansupport for the FMLN and theCitinimportanceof continuingassistancc tact494 MlLlTARY ANDPARAMILITAR ACTIVITIES

While Sandinista actions had forced the United States to cut off assistance to
Nicaragua, the United States continued efforts to reach an accommodation with
the Sandinista régime which would hall Nicaragua's supply of arms and other

support to the Salvadoran guerrillas.
In Auaust 1981. the United States Assistant Secretarv of State for Inter-
~niericai Atlÿirs pre\entcd Nicdrïgua with iiiive-point proposal for impro!eJ
rrlationr. This proposal uas designcd to meet Nicïragua's concerns with United

States polic,. includin): 11scxprrrred fear of a Linited Statcs invilitin 2nd rlesirc
that ~karaguan exile groups in the United States and elsewhere should be tightly
controlled, while also addressing the Nicaraguan actions most troubling to the
United States. The United States proposal, based upon an end to Sandinista

suooort for auerrilla ar-.os. called for hoth sides to make oublic declarations of
niin-inicr\c~ion in Central ,\mcriai: 3 Unit:d Sidtes stiit~mcnt <inthe cniorce-
nient of United Staics Iau, pcruining IO the astiviiics <~I'Kiraraguan exile groups
in the Cnited States' :an end to the Nicaraeuan militarv huilduri. rccstiiblishmeni

of United Stateseconomic assistance; andexpansion of culturàl'ties between the
two countries2. In Octoher, the Sandinistas rejected this proposal as "sterile",
at the same tirne renewing their assertions that the Nicaraguan government was
not suooortina the FMLN3.

At {hé urg& of the President of Mexico, the United States made a second
attempt in April 1982. The previous five points were expanded to cal1 for (1) an

modcratc forceswithin Nicaragua, the officia1Departmeni of State statcmcnt hcld out the
furthcr passibility of resumine P.L. 480 food assistance. develooment assistance and
t:cunomiz Suppoii I'unJ, \~OÜIJihr siluailon in \icar.<gua iniprore iArneri<.un Forr.iyn
1'ulit.yLiirrcni Dnninienrr 19.91,p 1298)The Prerldcnt'slurmi drirrmination was madc
on April 14 ~Prc~~~lentid ~cilicrminaiion No 81.5. Apnl 14. 1981. 46 t'ederol K~XL<I,V
24141 1A 1982Uniied Sta1r.soif:r ofsome 55million inarrtrtmce for non-covcrnrnmial
organ&aiions was rcjected by the zovernmenl of Nicaragua in Auaust of thai vear.
'Nicaragua had ciprr~wdiunc~rn ahoui anit-porr.rnnir.niactiviilrs of Niwr&uns uho
hridfledIo ihr Uniied Siaie*and counincr ncighbunng Sirarügua B) ihis date. 81ir cls:tr

th31ruch eroum. un\anine,v c-.racienrrd ar "S<>miii~\i~r"cesrdlcis of ihr.actm~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~
of thcir mëmbérs were eneae.. . . rireriarationsfor armed aczvitv Ga.ns- the Sandinista
rC inie rhr. prcpariiloni had noi );t Iid io rignifiwni ~ti~ck> in Ui;~r~gu.i.houe\er.
'1hi Jrscripiion Iaier giwn ol ,\srirt,i~iiSccrcia~ Tndcri. Jém.irihc b) Arturu Cnir,
thrn Slrardg*~'.idmb:irrxior IO ihc Unlied Siai:,. iiiniiruriisr
"ln Augurt of lYbl IEndcn] mci nilh my wpr.rior5inManagua. ;ilthe highrri
Ic\cl Ilis mesr;igc wwÿbcli.ar.in i\rhange lor non<xpnrt:iilon of in,urrrr.iion anJ a
reduïiion in N~cararua',armrJ li>rcri.ihc Cnlied Sintcsriledced IOsunain Slr~r~eu~
through mutual regional security arrangements as well'as &ntinuinp'economic ;id.

His government did not intend to interfere in out intemal aifairs. However, 'you
should realize that if you behave in a toialitarian fashion, yaur ncighbors might see
you as poiential aggressors'. My perception war that, despite its pcrcmptory nature,
the United States position vis-à-vis Nicaragua was defined by Mr. Enders with
frÿnkness, but alsa with respectfor Nicaragua's right to choosc ils own destiny . . .
Whcn thc conversations concluded, 1had thc feelingthat thc Unitcd States proposal
had na1 bccn rcceivedby the Sandinistas as an imperialist diktat. However, nothing
positivedcvcloped .. ."(Artura J. Cruz ,Nicaragua's lmperillcd Revolution", Foreign
Affairs(Summer, 1983),pp. 1031, 1041-1042.
'Barely one month earlier, however, Direciorale member Bayardo Arcc had stated to
the Uniied States chareéd'araires in Manarua that the United States "had betier redire
thai nothing you can siy or do willever star>us from givina our full suririor1to our fellow
gurrrilla,1" El S,11i~lor" At ihe snmc iin>c. ,\,cc ckirr~%-nlconiirn iboui the "llalrun

\'iri;icxercirz announdrd tn Sepicmber "tlalcdn V!>td'' ihiiiyiar in\ohcd W(iIUniicd
Staiîs I)L.ISJ~~a PnId WJS held OcioLwr7 tu 9. 1981.oil ihc Canbbran cotari~ ~f~ ~~ ~tirn
on duras I.was the latert in a seriesof manv'vears'siandine in which Uniicd States and
Latin American military forces cooperatcd inshall-scale ene6ises. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 495

end to Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in other countries; (2) a United
States pledge to enforce laws pertaining to exile activities in the United States;
(3) a joint pledge of non-interference in each other's affairs or in the affairs of
othcrs in the region; (4) a regional, reciprocal ban on imports of heavy offensive
weapons; (5) a reciprocal reduction of foreign advisors in the region; (6) in-
ternational verification of the foregoing points;7) exchange of cultural groups;
and (8) the reaffirmation of previous commitments by the Sandinistas to plura-
lism. free elections. non-alienment and a mixed economv. The United States
made clear that a halt to ~gndinista support for subversion beyond its horders
was the sine quo non for achieving results on the other elements of the propos'.
Nicaragua responded hy taking refuge in procedure, demanding that the talks
take place at a higher leveland that the Mexican Government be drawn into the
dialogue, but avoiding any comment on the substance of the proposals. Building
on continued denials by Nicaragua of involvement in El Salvador and assertions
that Nicaraeua wished to "fulfill its international oblirations". the United States
dso requested thxi Siclirag~ü denion\irxc iis dçlirç to cnpgc in *riou, etforis
IO rssolve rcgional prohlcmr h) ~Iosingdoun the cornmand and control ccnrcr
of the FMLN operating out of Nicaragua.
The United States response duriog this period was not confined to its con-
tinuation of diplomatic approaches to Nicaragua. Expanded economic assist-

ance and support for strengthened defense efforts were provided to hoth El Sal-
vador and Honduras. At the same time. the Sandinistas' reoeated reiect9~n ~f
United States diplomdtic efforts led to concern hy the United ta& that a policy
confined to diplomatic representations could not he effectivein modifyine Nica-
raguan behavfor, and forced consideration of alternative means of achievhg that
objective.
Resistance forces' began to take on importance for the broader effort to
counter Sandinista "internationalism". For those concerned with Nicaraeua'-
intervention in neighboring countries, the significance of the resistance groups
lay in the pressure that their operations could bnng on the Sandinistas to turn
their attention away from subversion heyond Nicaragua's horders and reduce
the availabilitv of material to he sent to the FMLN. The erowt- of armed
resiiian~.rhy i>rhrr Yicaraguans ui,ulJ m;ikr ilcar Io the San<linisiai ihat the?
could no longcr count un cunJuitin~ pîramilitary anJ rnihiary operations ouind~
Nicaragua Githout feeling the conséquenceswithin Nicaragua.
The San JoséDeclararion. In October 1982, under Costa Rican leadership. a
new, multilateral approach was undertaken hy seven democracies from the
region, including the United States3.The Declaration of San José reflectedthe
erowine conviction of these countries that the Central American conflict could
not beaddressed efiectively without dealing with the full range of underlying
problems which gave rise to the crisis. The declarafion set forth a seriesof simple
principles describing conditions necessary for an effective peace agreement~in
Central America: (1) Io free the area from East-West competition, foreign496 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

military advisors and trainers should he removed; (2) to frcc Central American
countries from fear of each other's aggression, the import of heavy weapons
should he banned, support for insurgency on neighhors' territory should be
prohibited, and frontiers should be suhject to international surveillance;
(3) democratic institutions open to opposition elements should he established.
President Reagan personally endorsed these proposals in San Joséin 1982 and
before a Joint Session of Congress on April 27, 1983.

The seven countries asked Costa Rica's foreign minister to present these
principles to Nicaragua as a hasis for dialogue, but the Sandinista government
insisted that it would receive the foreign minister only if the discussions were
confined "exclusively" to bilateral issues.

1983-1985
The polanzation of Central America hetween Nicaragua and ils three immedi-
ale neighbors grew more intense during the next three years. Armed opposition

within Nicaragua, generated by the policies of the Sandinistas, continued to
grow. Nicaragua's neighhors, by contrast, continued to open their political and
social systems, and succeeded in reducing the level of violence within their
respective borders.
Nicaragua'sneighbors. Despite the FDR refusal to participate in elections, and
guerrilla efforts to derail them, El Salvador carried out four national elections
resulting in an elected president and assemhly. The level of political violence
from both the extreme left and right declined significantly; death squad activities

from the right wereat the lowest levelsin many years. The newlyelected Duarte
government declared its readiness to conduct a dialogue with the FMLN. In
October 1984, consistent with the Contadora goal of encouraging national
reconciliation, President Duarte opened a dialogue with leaders of the FMLN-
FDR al La Palma; a follow-up meeting aimed al continuing the dialogue failed
due to FMLN-FDR insistence on unconstitutional power-sharing rather than
participation in the electoral process. The FMLN had launched an unsuccessful
Fall offensive in 1983 but did no1 even attempt one in 1984. As part of ils

openly-acknowledged policy of making it impossible to govern the country, the
FMLN strategy now focussed almost exclusively on destruction of democratic
institutions and economic targets. The Salvadoran Government has repeatedly
held Nicaragua responsible for sustaining the FMLN's ahility to continue its
attacks, in particular the attacks on dams and bridges '.
Honduras overcame two major Sandinista efforts to initiate guemlla activity
within iIs horders, as well asconstant cross-border attacks hy the Sandinista
military. To demonstrate United States resolve and willingness to support its
reeional allies. imorove the readiness of United States forces with contineencv
- ~ ~~ ~=~ ~~,
missionsin Latin Amcricaand elsewhcreand rcducc Hond~ran anxiety<)vertension
on the hi~rdcruiih Sicarag~a. the Cnited States and Ilonduras carrifil OUI Ihg
Pine 1.the first ofa SCTICSof loin1cxcriiscs in Il<~ndura\.in Febru~n. I9h3'. \\'ith
~nited States assistance, auRegional Military ~raini'ng Center ~RMTC) for

'l>eclarnt,onol Inicnrntion ol the Kcpubli; dl El S~Iv~dorl.nlcrvcntiun Pur,u.,ntIO
An8clc 63 of the Statute orihc Intcniaiiun~lCdun ol Ju,tvï. case concirning .\librur.v
und f<ir<imilirori. ArriviIondopiiutrr .Vimrozu<i(.Vii<ir<ipuUnirrdBa~i<),Ii Augurt
.--..Y". .-.11
'The UnitedStateshasconductedjoint excrciseswithHonduras fortwodecadesSince
the BigPine 1 exercisc,cight jointexcrciseshavebeenheldinvolvingUnitedStates,Hon-
duran and, on occasion,Salvadoranland and sea forces.The largcst of theseexercises,
BigPine IIin 1984,involvcd 5,000 UnitcdSLatesand severalthousandlionduran troops. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 497

Salvadoran and Honduran military personnel and Costa Ricsn civil guardsmen
was established in Honduras in 1983; the RMTC was closed in mid-1985. Costa
Rica was forced by Nicaraguan border incursions to expand and modernizc its
modest Rural and Civil Guard. It made clear, however, its expectation of assistance

under the Rio Treaty in the event of overt Sandinista attack '.
The Uniled Siales. With the steady political and military progress in El
Salvador, controversy sharply declined within the United States over providing
major support to the countries ofthe region '.The January 1984 recommendations
of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, chaired by former

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for adoption of a long-term program of
economic and security assistance for the region were accepted and largely enacted
into law by the United States Congress3.
Increasingly, United States policy attention concentrated on Nicaragua, which
appeared unwilling or unable either to address its interna1 problems or to cease

ils efforts to intervene in the afkairs of ils neiz..ors. While there kas be~n ~ ~
J~..igrc.~rnc.ntdvzr hdw IO tnducc Yic~ragua to riididif)its.tggr~%tvc pr>l~c>cst.hc
Congrcis 2nd ihc C.~ca~Iive haw li~r sc\cr.il )cars becn in agrccmeni thai
Nrc3ragwi( has made pos~ihk thc coniinu;ition oiihr FMLS's swreilort ihrough
provision of suhbtsnii~l suppori for ihc F41LN. and has fostercd and ci)nrluctcd

ierr,iri,t ~cti\,iiirIIIHonduras anJ Costa Ricd ds uel14.

'H. Nelson, cd.. Cosio Rico: A Couniry Siudy. discusscs Costa Rica's recurity con-
ccrns al pp. 244-257and 274.
'The Congrcssional findingscontained in scction 702 of the intemational Sccurity and
Developmeni Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83), demonsirate the change lrom the
lime when assistance to El Salvador was considercd by many to be support for a corrupt
and brutal military dictatorship. Section702 (a) (2), lor example,expresscdthc "sense of
Conaress" that -
.
"(A) President Duarle is ta be congraiulÿted for his outstanding leadership under
difficult circumstances and lor his cîlorts 10 loster democratic e-vernmeni and
institutions in his country.. .;and
(8) the armed services01 El Salvador are 10 be congratulated lor thcir improved
oerformancc and orofcssionalism in dcfcndine Salvadoran citircns and thcir demo-
craiically-clecte.iovernment from attack bv &cd insur-cnts . ."
'Almost the enlirety of the funds requcsted in support of thc Commission's recom-
mendations for 1984 and 1985 was approvcd by the Congress in the Supplemental
Apprapriations Act for 1984(P.L. 98.396). the Supplemental Appropriations Act for the
Deriartment of Arriculturc lor 1984(P.L. 98-322) and the Fiscal Year 1985Continuine
~eiolution (P.L.-98-473). Additional fundina is providcd in the rwnlly cnactcx
Internalional Sccunly and DcvclopmentCoopcrition Act of 1985(P.L. 99-83),.
'On March 4. 1982,Chairman Boland 01 the House Permanent Select Committee on
lntelligenccstatcd:

"The Committee hss rcceiveda briefing conceming the situation in El Salvador,
with particular emphasir on the question of forcign support lor the insurgency.The
insurgents are well trained, well equipped with modem weapons and supplics, and
rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua lor command and control and for logistical
suppprl: Thc intelligencesupporting these judgmcnts provided to the Committee is
convtnclne.
Thcrc i; further ~ersuosivecvidencethat the Sandinista cavcmment of Nicaraeua
1:hclping IrJiii ~n\urgc,ni>and tj trdnrrrrring :im\ :inJliR;inci.ilruppori 1rc.m;n~
tlirough S~cariigu~tu thc tn$Lrgcnls 'lhe) arc furthcc pruviding the insurgentr bsro
01occriion in Niiar~cza. Cuban io\ol~r.mr.nt ïmw~allr,in ,roviilin- am, ia
:ilco'c\>drnt
Whai th15 >i!\ I>that. criiitr.\r) io the rrpr.tiîd dcni;i\carag~.in <>fliîi~lthai
couritr) iith<>ri>ughli!nro1,r.J~iiriipporttng rhc SalrdJurdn inrLrgen;! Ihdi rupp.irt
irs~:li:i.ta crc~ilv id ihi in,urgcnis inihclr \tru"-li uiiliud~wcrnn,eniI;>r;c\ inEl
Salvador." (~Ïess ~cleasc, ~arch2, 1982.)498 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

While the United States repeatedly made clear that it would respond to
concrete and meaningful actions by the Sandinistas with similar action on ils
own part, United States policy also included a variety of pressures in response
to continuing Sandinista aggression. Some of these were economic in nature. In

May 1983, Nicaragua's sugar quota was sharply reduced in response to the

In the Committcc's May 13, 1983,report on H.R.2760 (the "Boland amcndment"), this
conclusion was reallirmed:
"At [this] lime, the Committee believesthat the intelligence available to it continuer
10support the followingjudgmcnts with cerlainty:

A major portion of the arms and other matcrial sent by Cuba and othcr
Communist countrics to the Salvadoran insurgents transits Nicaragua with the
permission and assistance of the Sandinistas.
The Salvadoran insurgents relyon the use of sites in Nicaragua. some of which
are locaied in Managua itself, for communications, command-and-control and for
the logistics ta conduci their Rnancial, material and propaganda activities.
Nicaragua provides a range of other suppon activities, includingsecure transit ol
activities in El Salvador.a, and assistance Io the insurgents in planning their
In addition, Nicaragua and Cuba have provided - and appear 10 continue
providing - training to the Salvadaran insurgents.

Cuban and Sandinista political support for the Salvadoran insurgcnts has bcen
uncquivocablc [,rit/,r years. The Committee concludes that similarly strong military
suppon has been t e hidden compliment /sic]of overt support .. .
Another arca of serious concern to the Committee is the significant military buildup
going on within Nicaragua ... Considenng the small population of Nicaragua - two
and one hall million people - and ils wcakened economic staius - such a buildup
cannot be explaincd away as solely defensivc. Within the Central American isthmus,
il poses a poiential threat to its neighbors. The substantial Nicaraguan support lor
thc Salvadoran insurgents ofers no assurance that thc Sandinistas will constrain
theirgrawing military might within Nicaragua's own borders." (Permanent Select
May 13, 1983). pp. 5, 6.). Rcpon 10 accompany H.R.2760 (H.R.Rcp. 98-122,Part 1,

Thc 1983findings areparticularly significant because thcy wcre made by the Committce
in the context ofrecommcnding approval ofa bill opposing the Executivebranch's palicy
toward Nicaraeua.
In ~onnrersiinal debate on the Fiscal Year 1985intellieenceauthorkation bill. Chairman
Hol~ndcjnfirmed thal ihï tindmgr rcninincd a\ "inr ;"&ay. as .tiihc iikr <>fihat
[\la) 19831rcpdri" Conqre.<,ir>n,~lriurilAu$u,l 2. 1954,pp 1182111-8269 Thc rei~liing
bill cr>niaincdih~.iollowinp Congrc,>lr>ndIlinilmg<
"(1) the government of. . .Nicaragua kas failed to kccp solcmn promises, made
10 the [OAS] in July 1979. 10 ertablish full respxt for human nghts and political
libenies. hold carlv electians. oreserverivat txctor. oermit oolitical oluralirm. and
pursue a Foreignpalicy of noiaggresrion' and noninte<ention :
(2) by providing military support (including arms, training, and logistical,cammand
and control and communications facilitics) ta groups seeking to overthraw the
govcmmcnt of El Salvador and other Central American governments, the govcrn-
ment .. .of Nicaragua has violated Article 18of the Chaner of the [OAS] which dc-
claresthai no swte hasthe nght to intervenc,directlyor indirecily,for any rcasanwhat-
soever, in the interna1or cxternal aiTairsof any othcr Sta..." (Intelligence Authan-
ration Act for 1984(P.L. 98-215), S. 109 (a).)
The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, in ils January 1984 rcport,
concluded:

"Whatever the s&al and economic conditions that invited insurgency in the region,
ouiside intervention is what gives the coniiict ils prescnt charac...
Propaganda support, moncy, sanctuary, ams, supplies, training, communications.
intelligence,logistics,al1arc important in both morale and operational tcrms. Without REVOLUTiON BEYONUOURBORDERS 499

Sandinistas' continued destahilization of their neighbors. In response to Nica-
ragua's continued aggressive hehavior, as well as Congressional desires that
no form of peaceful pressure be left untried before further assistance was provided
to the armed resistance, a trade embargo was imposed in May 1985. Bilateral
approaches to Nicaragua also continued, but within the context of the com-
prehensive approach to regional problcms proposed by the Contadora Croup
and expressly agreed to by Nicaragua and the other four countries of Central

America '.
While exercising the full range of non-forceful measures available to it,
however, the United States in addition continued to believe that more direct
pressures were crucial to stoppingNicaraguan aggression '. Congress established
limits on the provision of funds for the arnied resistance in late 1982'. In fiscal

such support from Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, neither in El Salvador nor
clsewhcrc in Central Amcrica would such an insurgency pose sa severc a threat ta the
govemmcnt . . With the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the levcls of violence
and counter-violence in Central America rapidly incrcased, engulfing the rcgion."
(Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, January 10, 1984,
. . 87-88.)
Most recently, in the 1985foreign assistance legislalion, Congresî round that, having
"fonnally acceptcd the Junc 23, 1979[OAS]. rcsolution as a basis for rcsolving the
Nicaraguan conflict in its [pl... submitted o the [OAS] on July 12, 1979, ... the
govcrnment of Nicaragua . . .has flagrant1 violated the provisions of the Junc 23,
1979.~soluiion, the rights of ihc Nicaraguan people, and ihe sccurity of the nations
in theregian. ..".(International Security and Developmcnt Coapcration Act of 1985
(P.L 9.9-83), s.722 (c)(2) (A) and (C).)

The lcgislation cils a variety of events in support of this Rnding, including that Nica-
ragua
"has committed and rcfuscs to ccase oggrcssion in the Tom of anned subversion
against ils neighbors in violation of thc ch~ner of the United Nations, the Charter
of the Organizalion of American States, the Inter-Amencan Trcaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, and the 1965 United Nations Genersl Assembly Declaralion on
intervention. . .". (S 722 (e)(2)(C) (vi).)
'Bilatcral diplornatic contacts with ranking Nicaraguan oficials wcre conducted by
Assistant Secretary Enders in August 1981; by Ambassador Quainton in April 1982; by
Presidential Special Envoy Richard Stone betwcen June 1983and January 1984;by Stone's
successor Ambassador Hamy Shlaudeman in Apnl 1984 and on repeated occasions
(including cight meetings in Manzanillo) latcr that year; by Enderr' successor Assistant
Secretary Langhornc Molley in December 1983,April 1984(with Shlaudeman) and October
1984; and by Secretary of Statc Shultz in June1984and Man'h 1985.
'Confirmation thai assistancc to the armed rcsistancc has been eiTectivcwas provided
by PresidcntDuanc of El Salvador in a lettcr supportingthe United States Administration's
April 1985proposal Io provide assislance 10 the Nicaragua" resirtance:
"We remain canccrned . . by the continuing flow of supplies and munitions from
Nicaragua ta gucrrilla forccs. . which arc fighting against my government and our
programs olrefonn, democracy, reconciliation and peace .. .[W]e dceply appreciatc
any elforts which your govemrneni can take to build a broad barrier io such
activities- eRons which a small country like El Salvador cannot lake in ils own
behalf." (Letter to PresidentReagan, April 4, 1985.)

'After lengthy dcbate, Congress approvcd carcfully-crafted legislalion prohibiting useof
lunds only
"10 lumirh military equipment, military training or advicc, or other support for
military activities.. .for the purpose of overthrowing the government ol Nicaragua
or provoking a military exchange betwecn Nicaragua and Honduras". (Funher
Continuing Appropriations Act of 1983 (P.L .7.377).S. 793.)500 MILITARY AND PARAMILITAR AYCTlVlTlES

year 1984 $24 million were provided to the resistance'. A desire to demonstrate
to Nicaragua that the United States was prepared to relieve the military pressure
should the Sandinistas modif~ their behavior. amone other factors. led to a
withholding of support for a year'. ~andinista support for the FMLN, ils
military buildup and ils refusal to respond to calls by the Catholic bishops and
by virtually every opposition group to enter into a dialogue contributed to a

resum~tion of humanitarian assistance to the democratic resistanc~~.
<i>n;udur<rSine 1983. Jiplomîtic acti~~ityaimai ai nwlving Central Amenm'\
pri>bknis har Ijcud on the mcdistion clTon kgun ginContadora Island in Janwn
1983 h, the forcien mini\tcn tiiColombi;i. \le\ico. Panama and Vcnc~iiclii'Io IIIJ~,
cxpre,&l ~andin~staiitn-rns that a iiiultil~tr.ritT<m in\ol\ing the I:nitzJ SUI;,

uould k unrairly u.ei&tcd againsi 'liw~gw. outsidc pani~? (including the United
Sutfi) u,eW cxcluilcd (rom thir htin Ameriwn mcdwtlun elTon AnnroJche<i ~nlalelv
hy Contadora Group countries to request ils understanding and ;ipport, thé unit&
States gave the mediation eîfon ils encouragement.
The thesis of the Contadora Group, like that underlying the earlier San Jose

initiative, is that any hope of rcaching a lasting and solid peace both among and
within the Central American countries requires that fundamental causes be
addressed4. The Contadora initiative kas therefore taken a comprehensive and

'Thc funding was cas1in terms of a ceilingon expenditurc of morc than 524 million

"for thc purpcheor uhlih uouU htri ihe elIlri <>f<upponiiig.rlirwil) or indirccily.
miliidr)or p.ir,imI.t;ir).uperaliunr lnSlcarJgda by any nation. group. org:ini,dtion.
miii,rmeni.or indliiJu.ilM tlnicll~gcnee ,\uth<,ri,îii<in AAir I:i,cali'c.ir198.1
(P.L. 98-215), S.108.) (Rclcvant congressional findings containcd in that act are
quoted above in note 4, pp. 497-499,supro.)
Ldcnticallanguage was containcd in the Department of Dcfense Appropriations Act of
1984(P.L. 98-212), S. 775.
'The Continuing Appropriations Act of 1985(P.L. 98-473), S.8066,and thc Intelligence
Authorization Act for FiscalYedr1985(P.L. 98.618). s. 801, contained absolutc prohi-
bitions phrascd in terms identical to the limitation quatcd in the preccding note. Those
laws permitted the Prcsident, after Febniary 1985,Io request rcnewcd funding for the
armed rcsistance of up to SI4 million fallowing submission of specific findings and
Congressional approval of the rcquest. Reflectingcontinucd concern about Nicarÿguan
subversion, the first of the required findingson the basis af which Congrcss indicaicd a
readiness Io consider renewal of funding was that

"the government of Nicarasua is providing matérielor monetary support to anti-
government farces engaged inmilitary or paramilitary opcrationr in El Salvador or
other Central Amcrican countries". (S. 8066 (b) (1) (A).)
The President made such a request on April 3.
'$27 millionwas approved for provision to the anti-Sandinista rcsistance of food,
clothing, medicine and other humanitarian assistance; a prohibition on provision of
weapons. weapons systcms,ammunition or other equipment, vehiclcsor material uscable
Io inflict injury or dcdth remaincd in eKect. International Security and Developmcnt
Cooperation Act of 1985(P.L. 99-83), S.722 (8); Supplemcntal Appropriations Act of
1985(P.L. 99-88), Tillc 1,Chap. V. The findingsrelating 10 Nicaragud made in P.L. 99-
83 are quoted in pan in note 4, pp. 497499, supra.
In the same statutes $2 million was made available Io hclp defray immediate expenses
of implemcntationof a Contadora agreement. S. 722 (h); Titlc 1,Chap. V.
'Although statcd more clearly on someoccasionsthan on others, this thesishas bec" at
the heart of every approach Io the Ccntral American crisis since the OAS first called for
Somoza's replacement by a pluralistic, democratic government. The Junta's program
reflecteda similar balancing of values, and United States policy in Ccntral America as a
whole and toward Nicaragua in particular has bccn bascd through both the Cartcr and
the RcagdnAdministrationson implementalionof a range of measuresdirccted at the root
problemsal the crisisin the region. Despiteilsostensible acceptanceof thc goal of national
reconciliation,in ils actions Nicaragua has consistentlyopposcd this appraach. REVOLUTION BBYOND OUR BORDERS 501

integrated approach toward the social, economic, political and security problems
underlying the conflicts in Central America.
Although meetings among the Contadora mediators and the five Central
American countries took place in April and May 1983, Nicaragua refused to
participate in formal multilateral discussions.Preferring Iodeal with its neighhors
and the United States on a bilateral basis, Nicaragua resisted the concept of
developing a single, all-encompassing peace trcaty dealing with al1aspects of the
regional crisis. On July 17, 1983, the Contadora chiefs of state called, in the

Cancun Declararion on Peace in Central America, for renewedefforts to continue
the peace process. This appeal, sent to the United States and Cuba as well as
the five Central American States, was responded to favorably by the United
States and the other four Central American States.
On July 19 Nicaragua also officiallyaccepted Contadora's multilareral frame-
work. On that date, however, Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega announced a
diplomatic proposal calling for cessation of al1 outside assistance to "the two
sides" in El Salvador (thus implicitly acknowledging the outside assistance it had
been providing) as well as external support to paramilitary forces in the region.
The plan nroposed a prohibition on foreign militarv hases and exercises in the
region. a ~ii;r;i~uan-l:Ion~urÿn non-aggrc\\i<inplici: non-interferense in internai
aifairs and an end to economii discriniinaiion The proposal ignored ihr issues

of foreign militarv ;~d\~isors'and ihs Nicararu;in military huildun.
Democratization, national reconciliation and e~ective~verificaiion,sll central
to the Contadora approach, were also ignored hy the Nicaraguan proposal. Two
days later, however, the other four Central American countries joined in
presenting a plan emphasizing the importance of democratization to the resto-
ration of neace and stabilitv in the reeion.
On ~e~Jtember9, 1983,'~ontado;a's most significant achievement to date
occurred when the Foreign Ministers of al16ve Central American States aoeed
to a 21-ooint Document of ~biectives. Thisdocument comnrehensivelv addresses
the root prohlems as well as the major specificconcerns of the countries of the
region. In the Document, the participants committed themselves to an agreed set
ofobiectives. including politi&l. ecinomic and securitv concerns. to bereflected

in a definitive treaty.-1; the security field, the Document OF objectives called,
inter alio,for verifiable steps to end support for external subversion, reductions
in the numhers of foreign military and security advisors, a ha11to illegal arms
trafiicki-e and controls on armaments and trooo levels. It em~hasi.ed~ ~e need
for grc;iter regiuriiil~.di)peratiiinin socia;ilidcconomic m.iticr, and assistance
10 rsfugecs. I)em<>irati/;iiion. n;tti.inal rcc<>niili;ition'inrespect ior humsn
riahis uere ceniral clenients of thc noliiic<iliibiccti~cs.wh~chcal1for cjiabli~hmcnt
throughout the region OF dem&ratic, repiesentative and pluralistic systems
ensuring fair and regular elections2.
Signature of the Document by the Foreign Ministers of the five Central

simibarUnitedStatespersonnelCuin Honduras,nElrSalvadorcandnCosta Ricarcombined.
'The tex1of the 21 objcciivesisas follows:

[II "To promotc détente andput an end to situationsof conflictin the area.
rcfraininefromtÿkineanvactionthat miehtieo~ardizcDolitica l onfidcnccororevent
thc121TAe:"%ccf 3ir~;iri!iipli.inuiihsIhc~i<~rcminlian~i[nl i pri~mhlrl prin;iplc>
of inirmiiiiin~lI;iu. uh.ic\iul;iio<riilIx.hcld~ccu.mible
\JI Io rc\nici and ïnwrc thrererosc 01'h~m~n.n~lliic.il.ci\tl. woliomir. .<>clal.
rchgiousand culturalrights;502 MlLlTARY ANDPARAMILITARA YCTIVITIES

American countries reRects their adoption of the view that al1 of the matters
addressed in the 21- oint Document of Obiectives mus1 be addressed in order to

resolve the problem; giving rise to conflicfin the region, and that they mus1 be
addressed in a framework of mutual, binding and verifiable reciprocal commit-

[4] to adopt measures conducivc to the establishment and, where appropnate, improve-
ment of democratic, represcntative and pluralistic systems that will guarantee eiiective
popular in the decision-making process and cnsurte hat the vdrious currents
of opinion have free access ta fair and regular clections bÿsed on the full observance of
citizëns' right;
[SI To promote national reconciliation eiiorts wherever deep divisions have taken place
within racietv. with a view to fosterine -articipation in democratic valitical procerses in
accordance with the law;
16)To crcate political conditions intended to ensurethe international security, integrity
and sovcreignty of the States of the region;
171To stoo thc arms race in al1its forms and beein nceotiations for the control and
redktion of'currcnt stocks weapons and on the nÜmbcrUf armed troops;
[8] To prevent the installation on their territory of foreign military bases or any other
type of Foreignmilitary interference;
[9] To conclude agreements to reduce the presence of foreign military advisors and other
foreign elcmentsinvolved in military and ~ccurityactivities,with a viewto thcir eliminalion;
[IO] To eslablish interna1 control machinery to prevcnt thc trafic in arms from the
territory of any country in thc region to the territory of another;
[Il] To eliminatc the traflic in arms. whether within the region or from outside il,
intended for oersons. oreanirations or a".uvs scekine -o destabilize the e.vcrnments of
Centrai ~mencan co~nt~es;
[IZ] To prevent the use of their own tcrritory by perrons, organizations or graups
sccking to dcstabilire the govcrnments al Central American countries and 10 refuse 10
provide them with or permit thcm to receivc military or logistical support;
[131To rcfrain from incitin- or su..orting acts of terrorism, subversion or sabatagc in
th= c&ntries in the area;
[14]To establish and CO-ordinatedirect communication systcmswith a view10prevenling
or, where appropriate, settling incidents betwecn States of the regian;
[IS] To continue humanitarian aid aimed al helping Central American rcfugces who
theevoluntary repatriation of such refugccs. in consultation with or with the CO-operation
of the United Nations High Commissioncr for Refugees(UNHCR) and othcr international
agencies decmed appropnate;
[16] To undcrtake econamic and social development programmes with the aim of
promoting wcll being and an cquitable distribution of wealth;
[17]To rcvitalizeand restorc cconomic intcgration machinery in order to attain sustaincd
dcvelopmcnt on the basis of solidarity and mulual advance;
[18]To ncgotiatethe provisionof extcrnalmonetary resourceswhichwillprovideadditional
means of financingthe resumption of intra-regionaltrade, mecl the [sicr/rious balance-of-
payments problems, attract funds for working ~pital. ruppon programmes to cxtend and
rntniaure production systemsand pmmote medium-and long-lem investmcnlprojects;
[19] To negoliate better and braader access to international markets in order10 increase
thc volumc al trade betwecn the countries of Central America and the rcst of the world.
particularly the industrializcd countries: by means of a revision of tradc practiccs, the
climination of tariii and othcr bsirriers, and the achievemcnt of the pncc siabiliiy ai a
profitable and fairevel for ihc products exparted by the countries of the rcgion;
[20] To establish technical CO-operationmachinery for thc planning, programming and
implementation of multi-scctorol investment and trade promotion projects.
The Ministcn for Foreign Alkirs of the Ccntral Amcrican countries, with the partici-
pation of the countries in theContadora Croup, have bcgun negotiations with thc aim of
prcparing for the conclusion of the agreements and [21] the establishment of machincry
nccessary to formalizc and develop the objectiva containcd in this document, and to bring
about the establishment of appropriate verification and monitoring systcms. To that cnd,
account will be taken of the initiatives put fonvard at thc meetings convened by the
Contadora Croup." (UN doc. S/16041**. October 18, 1983(UN translation) (numbers
have been inscrted for easier refercnce).) REVOLUTION BEYOPID OUR BORDERS 503

ments. The United States kas repeatedly made clear, hoth publicly and in private,
that the 21 objectives would, if implemented, meet al1United States policy goals
for the region'.
Although Nicaragua signed the document, its discomfort with many of the

objectives has led the Sandinistas to repeatedly undercut the process hypursuing
their own agenda in other fora. On several occasions, the Sandinistas have sought
to involve the organs of the United Nations in Central American issues,antici-
pating a friendlier hearing there than in Contadora or the OAS. For example, in
Octoher 1983,six weeks alter agreeing to the Document of Ohjectives, Nicaragua
introduced the Central American issue before the United Nations Security
Council, breaking an explicit commitment to the Contadora Croup that it would
not do so.
On October 20 Nicaragua elaborated its July 19 proposal by presenting four
draft peace treaties covering Honduran-Nicaraguan relations; United States-
Nicaraguan relations; relations among the five Central American States; and
the conflict in El Salvador. The treaties were revealing.They studiously ignored
the issues of national reconciliation on the basis of democratic principles which
the Sandinistas had earlier accepted in the Document of Objectives. They
disregarded the issue of restoring military balance in Central America and
deferred treatment of foreign military advisors and the Nicaraguan arms buildup.

They denied the legitimacy of the Govemment of El Salvador by treating it as
co-equal with the FMLN. They made no serious proposals for verification.
Finally - although the Sandinistas asserted that these treaties were a good faith
efiort to advance the Contadora Process - the proposals directly contradicted
Contadora by attempting to deal with Nicaragua's neighbors and the United
States through a series of hilateral, disconnected documents.
In the fall of 1983, resolutions of both the United Nations and the OAS,
confirmed hy unilateral statements of support from virtually every country of
the world, endorsed Contadora as the most promising hope of achieving peace
in the region. Slow but measurable progress was made in reducing the 21
Objectives Io concrete commitments. In January 1984 the parties agreed to a
timetahle and conceptual approach for the negotiations. Nonetheless, Nicaragua
continued to press its agenda outside the Contadora framework. In April 1984
it once again hrought hefore the United Nations specificcomplaints against the
United States. In that same month it brought before the International Court
of Justice identical complaints of United States support for the Nicaraguan
resistance.

The United States, however, continued Io support the regional peace effort.
In June 1984. at the renuest of the Contadora Grouo. the Secretarv of State
visited Managua and initiated hilateral discussions héldin Mexico &ring the
second half of that year. At the same time, the United States provided technical

'ln hisaffidavitAledwiththeInternationalCourt ofJusticeinAugust1984,theSecretaiy
of Statcstatedthat:
"The United States fully supports the ab'ectivesalready agrecd upon in the
ContadoraProccss as a basiafor asolution a/the conilictin CentralAmerica.The
objectivesof UnitedStatespolicytowardNicaragua are entirelyconsistentwiththose
broaderagreed objectivea snd full andverifioblcimplcmentationof the Contadora
DocumentofObjectives wouldfullymeclthegoalsof UnitcdStatespolicyin Ccntral
Arncricaas well as the cxpressedsecurityconcernsof Nicaragua."(ARidavitof
Secretaryof StateGeorgc P.ShultzdatedAugusi14,1984,Ann. I to UnitedStates
innndeagainsi Nicaragua(Nieorwaasev.nUniledSiares"JAmerica).)omiliiaryAcliviries504 MII.ITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES

suo..rt for ils friends in Central America as the"~e~a~,~e- w..h the comnlex
and dificult iihues, jush as effccti\r \,crificatiun. in\olved in a peace ircaty '.
In early June 1984. Ilte Conladora mediators presentsd a drait "Contsd<>r3
Act for Pease and Coopcration in Central i\msric;i". Thi.. clraft includcd
Contadora Group proposais in those areas where the "working commissions"
est;ihlished in Janudry had been unüble iu relich çonscn\us. Foll~iwingdisciissions.

a rcbiscd \crsi<inof that treat\, wlis issued on Senteniber 7, 1984.Sevcr;il Central
American governments oKered initial favorabk reactions, while making clear
that further negotiations would be neceçsary.
Nicaragua then announced, on September 21, its readiness to sign the draft
treatv - orovided that no substantive chanees were made in its text. This
une~~crc~ announccmrnt ailempicd tii free~i negoti~itions ai a moment of
adviiiiiagr for S1icaragu.i Cntry inio force oi the drdit presentcd in September
would hais rc,ol\ed the pr,ihlems hiph on the Sandini,ta agenda2 Kcsolutii~n
of iisucs ofconrern io 11sncighbors, hou,c\er. such as the Nicarliguan ams and

troop buildup and commitnienis relating Io naiional rci~inriliation. rrfugees xnJ
democratization, was left to negotiations and unilateral implementing actions
/ollowing entry into full force of the commitments in which Nicaragua was
interested. Nicaragua's neighbors were being asked to rely on Sandinista good
faith in subsequent actions.
The other Central American Statesproposed limited modifications to the text
to meet their own concerns more adequately. Amendments proposed jointly by
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras in Tegucigalpa on October 20 maintained

al1 of the substantive commitments of the September 7 draft, but amplified the
verification mechanisms in the security and political spheres and provided
protection for the other parties in the event Nicaragua failed to negotiate in
good faith on the key issues of military limits3.
The Contadora mediators acknowledeed the validitv of these concerns. Since
the fall of 1984, the negotiations have concentrated on completing negotiation
of these points on the basis of the September 7 and October 20 drafts. Nicara-
guan participation in thcse discussiois has been erratic, ranging from apparent
readiness to negotiate on some occasions 10, at the June 18-19, 1985, meeting,

'Despitc Nicaragua'sreadyacceptance of the Septembcr 7 dralt as it stands, thefact is
that verification ofthesecurilvand noliticalcommitmentsdcscribedin that draft would
br rxirrmely dilticuli ~entral.~mrr;ca i\a mouniainou,. wdmpy. undcrdcvelopcd arc:,
1jrgr.rihan Cab1and Wcri Girmany iogcihrr.Verilicaiionthaiam< arc nui king rmuggled
or ih~iccri.lin kindrof \ic:tpdnrarc nat biing a;quircJ rlii\rq~sriiun, <\hichc.inn<>t
rcdilv hcaiirucrrd or iredicdad hm
'~t~wouldhavc eliminatedthe United States presencein the region by prohibiting
internationalexcrcises,schoolsand bases,and "operationaltrainers" (i.e., the fcwdozen
United States traincrs in El Salvador) but left to Futurenegotiation thercduciion of
"technical advisors" such as the Cubans in Nicaragua. By eliminatingal1support Tor
groups fightingthe governmentin any Central Americancountry. it would haveas a
allowingNicaraguan-supparlcdgroupsState10ucontinueto recciveclandestinesupplies.awhilc
'The October 20 dran was substantiallythe same as the Septembcr 7 draft. Its
commitmentswouldenter into farce followinnratificationbv al1 fiveoarties. insteadof
providingTorimplementation 01 somc proviHonrberore raiification.it would regulate
raihcrihin pri)hlhliinirrnaiionalmiliidryï\rrï.,ciIiuuulil.b) pruriJing:ininicrniion;il
carpr 01in,pr..i<>r:.iin;ib~Jgci.rircngihcnihc \crini~lian;oniiiii,si<,nriferrd 1.) Iihi
Scnternbcr7 JriiiiIIuriuld~8molilb thc ~u\t-ilcnaiurcnïcnilaiionoi'acrh'mcni\ on drmr
and troopccilings.militaryinstailat~onandadvTsors~ . he%the~eptem&r 7draftrcquired
a freeze on arms acquisitionsthroughout the ncgotiaiingperiod, the Oçtobcr 20 draft
would limitthefreczeto 60 days(thc pcriodduringwhichthcScptember 7 drali envisagcd
the negotiationswould be concludcd). REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 505

complete refusal to discuss the draft treaty unlessNicaragua's current complaints
against the United States were first addressed and supported by the group1.

Manzanillo. In a mirror image of the concern that had led to exclusion of the
United States from the Contadora initiative, Nicaragua began to assert in 1983
and 1984that no truly effectivearrangements could he agreed on in Contadora
in the absence or the United States. At Contadora request, in lune 1984 the
United States initiated a series of bilateral negotiations with the agreed objective
of facilitating the Contadora Process. Over the next fivemonths nine rounds of
talks were held. al1but one in Manzanillo. Mexico2. The United States entered
the disc~ssions'pre~ared to reach bilateral understandings that, channeled into
the multilateral process, would facilitate conclusion of a comprehensive Con-
tadora regional agreement. The Sandinistas' purpose, it became clear, was to ne-
eotiate bilateral accords dealine exclusivelv with their own securitv concerns.
- Consistent with the ~ocumeit of ~bjeclves, the initial United &tes proposal

was to develop jointly a calendar of reciprocal actions addressing the key aspects
of the reeional crisis. In order to build confidence.the actions were to be carried
out in phases and to he independently verified. Nicaragua once again, as in
October 1983,proposed a series of bilateral and multilateral treaties that would
deal on a priority basis with United States support for what Nicaragua termed
"counter-revolutionarv.,m.rcenarv fo,ces"~ ~ ~ ~e United Sta~ ~ ~ ~ita~~ores- , .
ence and exercises in the region',
In late September, the United States oflèred to limit the size. frequency and
duration of iis militam exercisesto reflector.er-ssmade in other areas. it ~roü.se.
a sommon. Iaw reiling on ia>rcignad\isors in the repun 2nd a ,t;igcd proccsr for
ncgoti~tionson arms and fora. levclramung thc Centfiil Americïn Siaies i,>meet
Nicarama's contention that it could not reduce its militam establishment while
fdcingin internal insurgent).,the United Siairs sugcsird ihit ihr negoti;itionrnot

k~n until iieps uen. iaken iu end support for in\urgency. t\dju\iment d(1u.nto
agreed limits would, moreover, be taken in phases.
At the same round. Nicaraeua adooted the Contadora draft aereement of
September 7 as its négotiating propoSal. It consistently refused, however, to
contemplate any substantive modification to that draft. It also refused to discuss
the commitments relatinr Io reconciliation and democratization contained in its
text. This refusal Io consider modifications was maintained even after the
Contadora mediators accepted the need for changes to meet the concems reflected
in the October 20 Tegucigalpa draft.
At a subseauent meetingthe United States attemoted to ooen UD the Sÿndinista
pssjtion hy oifcnng to dGuü bihtrril awurancfi'that woild nikt their sp*lfic
cunwrnr ;ihuut mdifiwtion, oi the Jrafi. Itpnip<id. for example.that in exchlinge

'Nic.irag~an"rii~unablcni~~" in11sncguilaitngpvrture i,nui:iblyhlgh 21rcirianr -
tnrnnncinlc.-hcimnicdiairl,nreccdine,icoilirsniuh\oit\cinfthe UnlicdSPJIP\Conerc~~agrsIn
the'subs&quenM t aysessi&~icaragra Gneged an keyelnilent; of the procedur: agreed
iinnn .....,..
"1 he \wond round.tocjiihli,h ground rulcs.ni, hcld inAil.inia A, p:in ofihcground
nile, ofihr i~l!.r.hoth rtdeiagrd IO \urnmmzCihcconirni uf ihcJi\çuriion~uiih ihc
.Ucrlcan Sxrciarr oi I;ir:icnKrlationri~>llou.inrrch round.Onlvthe UnliedSt.~iz, :inJ

A/39/PV. 16.) the UnitedStateswouldinvadeNicaragua on Octobcr15,1984.(UN Doc.506 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACiIVITIES

fur Niwguan agwment IO thc mntinuaiion oi inicm~tionalmiliüry excrash ihc
Cnitcd Stain uould unilatcr<illvIiniitcxcrcim to I:\,elsworkcd oui with Niura~u.
After requesting time to consider the proposal, Nicaragua rejected it atthe
ninth and to date final Manzanillo round, reiterating its position that any
approach involving substantive changes to the September 7 draft was unaccep-
table. Nicara-ua did hint at a willine-ess to make concessions in the securitv
sphcrç. hut only in a bilairral agrccmcnt rcached outsidc the Coniadora fraine-
work - thcrrhy frccing11from any ~~bligaiionIo addrcs, the issuesof democrati-
zation, national reconciliation and regional anns reductions.
Given the Sandinista nosition. aereement would have been nossible onlv if the
United StaÏeSappr&dthe Septehber 7 draft without change. despite the im-
perfections acknowledaed by Contadora participants, or disregarded Conta-
dora entirelv and entëred into ou.elv .ilàteral neeotiations. ~ëither ~osition
wai arccptahle, and the I'nitcJ Statei dc~lined io schedulr. fi.rthçr discus\i<>ns
pcnding dcmonstratiiin that Nicaragua wa\ prcparcd to ncgoiiatr.scriourly u,iihin
the Contadorï frïmcwdrk. I'hc Uniled Si~ics mide clcar ihat IIduci not rule
out a resumption of bilateriil ialks. bu1ihat thry muri promote a c~imprchcnsive
Conladora agrecmeni and nattonol reconciliation in Yicarïgua1.

Seprember 1985
Sixyearsafter the overthrow of Somoza, earlier hopes for peace and democratic
development in Nicaragua have not been realized. The rulina Sandinista régime
has CO-ntinuedits aggrëssive hehavior toward its neighbors, Taken ever strGger
control over the State and - despite its OAS and Contadora commitments -
refused any dialogue with the Nicaraguan opposition as a wholc.
Costa Rica's initial favorable response to the 1979revolution and readiness to
develop close relations with Nicaragua have shifted. Costa Rica now faces a
country engaged in subversion and intimidating direct military attacks, creating
a pervasive climate of fear and uncertainty. In the Sandinistas, it sees a régime
which has betrayed the revolution for which Costa Rica had such high hopes,
and which is evenmore aggressivelyhostile to Costa Rican democracy than was
Somoza. In Honduras, democratic reforms have taken hold, but an increasing
proportion of that country's resources has had to be devoted to defense against
the conventional military threat of the Sandinista People'sAmy and the FSLN's
repeated attempts to initiate guerrilla war in Honduras. In El Salvador, political
and economic reforms are being carried out by a popular government now strong
enoueh to command the alleeia-ce of a nreviouslv an,th.tic nonu.a.ion in the
war :gainsi the FMLX. At ihc same tirne: hiiweicr, a weakcning gucrrilla movc-
rncni. increasingly dcpcndcnt on ihe I'SLK's coniinued suppori. hïs l'c>iuscd
itr ïitiicks iin ihe Jesiruciion of thc counirï's cconomiL.and ~oliiicülinïrasrruc-
turc - a strategy based on exhausting thégovernment and population to the
point that power could eventually bc seized by armed force.
The United Stateshas tried a variety of approaches to the Sandinistas. United
States ~olicv throuehout has been hased on im~lementation of the Sandinistas'
own 1979 Promis; of democratic pluralism and non-alignment - promises
which the Contadora Document of Objectives ratified as essential to achieving
peace in the region - and on a refusal to stand aside in the face of Sandinista
aggression against ils neighbors. Despite determined efforts, from 1979through
1981,to maintain and develop a positive relationship with the régime,Sandinista
-
'UnitedStatessupportof Contadora was authoritativelyreaffirmebythc Secretas.of
Statein MexicoCityon July 26,1985. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 507

support for the Salvadoran guerrillas and attacks on its other neighbors required
a termination of assistance. Subsequent efforts to reach a bilateral accommo-
dation, particularly in August 1981and April 1982,failed. United Statessupport
for the Contadora nepotiations. most notablv throueh the Manzanillo talks. has
been met only by eff&s to undercut that m;ltilateral process and to narro; the
issues to those of immediate interest to the Sandinistas. The United States has
provided assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance in an effort to make clear to
the Sandinistas that they cannot export their "internationalism" with impunity.

Termination of that assistance for a year not having resulted in any softening of
Sandinista intransigence, assistance in the form of non-lethal aid has heen
a. .oved and will beein in the immediate future.
Nicaragua's ncighbori, wiih Unitcd States ci~>noniic2nd sccurity <irsisiancc.
havc pcrsistcd inaddrçr~ingconditions thai iuntribdte io inicrnal iunflict ihruugh
programs of intemal reform and democratization. At the same time, they have
soueht. throueh a combination of collective defenre eff~ ~~ and oartici.atio~~r~ ~ ~ ~
tbe?ontadoranegotiations, to rispond to Nicaragua's continued military attacks,
support for subversion and destabilization and intimidating military buildup.
Despite the suhstantial progress made during this period, however, they remain

under a cloud created by a régime unyieldingto the needs of its neighbors, the
resistance of its own people, or the efforts of other States in the hemisphere to
assist it in addressing the problems it increasingly creates for itself.

IV.CONCLUSION

There is a vas1gulf between Sandinista claims and the reality of the situation
in Central America. Far from being innocent victims of outside forces seeking
to bring about their overthrow, the Sandinistas have engaged in a sustained

effort to overthrow or intimidate other governments through the threat and use
of force. And, the record shows, the pressures on the Sandinista régimeare not
the product of a conspiracy to prevent the peaceful development of Nicaragua,
but rather a collective resoonse to soecificacts of aeeression.
The arguments the ~andinistas have made are re;Faling. They have sought to
characterize their military expansion - with the Nicaraguan amed forces now
dwarfing in size, sophistication and firepower those of fheir neighbors - as a
necessary response to an enternally supported insurgency and threat of invasion '.
They have not even attempted, however, a similar effort to explain away their
own involvement in arming and supporting guerrillas in neighboring countries.

They have not alleged that their use of force against El Salvador, Honduras and
Costa Rica responds to any threat to Nicaragua from those countries. Rather,
they have denied, flatly and puhlicly, their own aggression, and questioned the
legitimacy of the collective response by speculating that that response would
have taken dace reeardless of their own interventions.
The ~aniinista sfrategy of diverting attention from their own illegal actions
by accusing others of abusing the noms they themselves have violated has been
reasonably successful as a proPaganda exercise. But for those who have scrutin-
ized the record, the facts speak for themselves.

'As noted,in the tex1and footnotes 2 and 3, p.466, supro 10 SectionII of this papcr,
the growthin amed forces and acquisitiono sf majorweaponssystemswereplannedand
for the mostpart implementedwcllbeforethe time theSandinistasallegeany significani
securityihreatexisted.508 MII.ITARYAND PARAMII.ITARYACTIVITIES

The Sandinistas can no longer deny that they have engaged and continue to
engage in intervention by

- Providing the arms, training areas, command and control facilities and
communications that transformed disorganized and factionalized insurgents
in El Salvador into a well organized and equipped military force of several
thousand responsible for many thousands of civilian casualties and direct
economic damaees of over $1 billion.
- Equipping, trailing, organizing and infiltrating Honduran guerrillas, as well
as clandestine Nicaraguan security personnel, into Honduras in an attempt

to foment insurgency, as well as engaging in shelling, mining and other
conventional military incursionsinto Honduran territory.
- Using ils diplomatic presence in Costa Rica to conduct hombings and
assassinations, financing, equipping and training Cost Rican citizens in
subversiveactivities, and using its overwhelming conventional militarymight
to conduct cross border incursions and to intimidate a nation that has been
without a military establishment for 35 years.
Yet the record showsthat al1of these patterns of aggression werewellestablished

long before the Sandinistas alleged any significant threat to Nicaragua's own
security from the United States or any other country.
Similarlv. desuite Nicaraeua's efforts Io characterize the United States role in
Centrdl ~iierii; .I,driicnUhy uiirtiiiipaieddnJ iJci>logi:~llynioti\..iieJ hoitiliiy
in ihr ber? exi\rcnie of thc S;indinivt<ircgirnc.the F~cts>hou that
- lrnmediately after July 1979, the United States became the single larges1
contributor of economic assistanceto the new government of Nicaragua.
- When the evidenceof Nicaraguan material and other support for insurgency

in El Salvador benan ta mount in 1980. the United States exnressed ils
concerns privatelyuin diplornatic channels and sought, while Eontinuing
economic assistance, to persuade the Sandinistas to cease such unlawful
hehavior.
- When Sandinista assurances to the United States weredemonstrably violated
at the tirneof the "final offensive"in El Salvador in January 1981,the United
States susixnded assistance to Nicaragua -nd renewed militarv assistance ta
El ~alvador to assist in its defense.
- In the spring of 1981, the United States offered to resume assistance to
Nicaragua on the condition that it cease its intervention against its neighbors
and discussedconcrete steps hy which Nicaragua could demonstrate its good
faith in this respect.
- Only when Nicaragua refused to take serious steps to end its intervention

was United States bilateral assistanceterminated - and then with indications
that it would he renewed if intervention ceased.
United States actions clearly are not the acts of one government determined to
destroy another. Nor are they the acts of a government seeking only to create a
pretext for intervention. They are actions concerted with allies in an effort ta
persuade an aggressor governrnent ta cease ils unlawful acts in the interest of
regional peace and security.
Most significantly,by the Sandinistas' own accounts, no military response hy

any of ils neighbors or by the United States was undertaken until well after the
pattern of Nicaraguan intervention was established and flourishing.
United Statesefforts to assist the nations of Central Amenca in theu defense
against Nicaragua'sactionshave involvedseveralinter-relatedelements,including :
- Bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to secure a peaceful resolution D VOL UT IONBI~YONDOUR BORDERS 509

based on objectivesagreed to by the Central American parties themselvesin
the Contadora Process.
- Economic and military assistance to Nicaragua's neighborsIo sustain their
economies and provide for national defense in the face of Sandinista inter-
vention
- Economic measures, including a reduction of Nicaragua's sugarquota and a
cessation of most hilateral trade, to demonstrate United States concern and
to give the Sandinistas an incentive to cease their unlawful acts and partici-
pate in comprehensive and stable arrangements for resolving the conflict in
the region.
- An increase in the size and frequency of joint military exercises with the
forces of neighbonng States to enhance the defense abilities of those armed
forces and to deter major conventional military assaults by the Sandinista
army against them.
- Assistance to Nicaraguans resisting the internally repressive and externally
interventionist policies of the Sandinista régime.

This latter element of the collective remonse to Nicaraeuan ageression has
been the principal focus of Sandinista ~o&~laints.The ~an;iinistashave sought
to imply that such assistance is unlawful - even as a response to aggression -
becaüse manv of the details concernina this Dr.ara- arei'covert". 9Üt the law-
ïulnesi oia u.5~of j<>rcchdjnothing i&o wiih the Jcgrce of sccrccyniainiaincd.
The 51niplrhci 1sihai SanJinisia intervention. incl~dingrupport for guerrill<i
forces in other countries, has induced a collective response. Anation engaged in
the unlawful use of armed force against another becomes the proper object of
necessary and proportionate action by the victim and ils allies in exercise of
their right of individual and collective selfdefense. An aggressor cannot evade
res~onsihilitvfor its unlawful useof force. nor can it denrive its victims of their
inhcrtnt righi of self-ûeknsc 'l'heSandinisia protest~ti~insof innocence cannot
alter ihc Paciof iheir continuing. unprovokcd aErersion against ihcir ncirhborj
Nicaraaua cannot claim the ~r6iection of the vëri orinci~lës of international law
it is itself violating. . .
The Sandinistas' relief from the collective response to their behavior lies not
in continued etiorts to present themselves as the victims of an international
conspiracy or in attempts to hide their continued intervention against Nicaragua's
neighbors. The other nations of Central America and the United States have
made clear that a serious effort on the part of the Sandinistas to implement the
agreed comprehensive framework for ending the conflict tbat they began will be

reciprocated. A genuine mechanism for ending aggression and bringing about
reconciliation is the only way to bring a jus1 and lasting peace to Central
America. This reconciliation remains whereit has been from the outset - in the
hands of the Sandinistas.

Ahuas Taro: The "Big Pine" series of joint United States-Honduran military
exercises begunin Febmary 1983.
America Department: A section of the Central Committee of the Cuban Com- munist Party which handles relations with leftist organizations throughout the
Western Hemisphere.

ARDE: Democratic Revolutionary Alliance,AlianzaRevolucionaria Democrarica,
a coalition of anti-FSLN organizations founded in 1982.
Cinchoneros: See URP.
ConradoraGroup: Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela met in January
1983 on the Panamanian island of Contadora and formed the Contadora
Group for the purpose of facilitating a peaceful settlement to the Central
American crisis.
Conradora Documeno t f Objectives:Adopted September 9, 1983. Document
agreed to by al1nine Contadora participants (the Contadora Group and the
fiveCentral American countries). Sets forth 21objectivesto resolvethe Central
American crisis. Has served as the basis of discussionfor al1subsequent nego-
tiations.
Coordinadora: Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Board, Coordinadora
Democrarica Nicaraguense, a coalition of political parties, labor confederations

and pnvate sector organizations opposed to radical FSLN policies.
Declaration of San José: Adopted October 4, 1982, by seven democratic
governments including the United States. Sets forth the conditions for a
regional peace settlement.
DGSE: The General Directorate of State SecuriDireccionGeneraldeSeguridad
del Esrado,of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior.
DR/: The FSLN's Department of International Relations, Departamenrode
Relaciones Inrernacionales,losely modeled after the America Department of
the Cuhan Communist Party.
DRU: The Unified Revolutionary Directorate, Direccion RevolucionariaUniji-
cada, was the coalition of Salvadoran guerrilla groups formed in May 1980in
Havana and which preceded the FMLN.
EGP: The Guerrilla Amy of the Poor, Ejerciro Guerrillerode los Pobresa

Guatemalan guerrilla group, became a member of the URNG, the umbrella
organization formcd in Managua on Novemher 2. 1980.
ERP: The People's Revolutionarv Armv. Eierciro Revolucionario dePluebla.is
a ~alvadoran'revolutionar~ and.&as formed after a split within the FPL
in 1972.It is led hy Joaquin Villalobos.
FAL: The Armed Forces of Liberation, Fuerzas Armadasde Liberacion, the
Salvadoran Communist Party's (PCES) guerrilla wing formedby Jorge Shafik
Handal ... ... .
FAO: The Broad Opposition Front, Frenre Amplio Oposiror, formed in mid-
1978 hv an alliance of 16 non-FSLN oreanizations. includine -oo..ition
politicd parties and labor confederationsFAO presented a 16-point plan in
August 1978for the democratization of Nicaragua - including the departure
of Somoza.
FAR: The Rehel Armed Forces, Fuerzas ArmadasRebeldes, is a Guatemalan

guerrilla organization and a member of the URNG.
FARN: Armed Forces of National Resistance, Fuerzas Armadasde Resisiencia
Nacional, Salvadoran revolutionary group that splintered from the ERP
in 1975.
FDN: Nicaraguan Democratic Force, Fuerza BemocraricoNicaraguense, the
larges1of the anti-FSLN resistance groups founded in 1982.
FDR: The Democratic Revolutionary Front, FrenreDemocraricuRevolucionario,
is the political wing of the FMLN. It was created on Apnl 1, 1980,by three
small Salvadoran political parties and urban organizations to serve as the
civilian arm of the guerrillas. REVOLUTION BEYONDOUR BORDERS 511

FMLH: The Morazanist Front for the Liberationof HonduraFrenreMorazanirra
para la Liberacionde Hondura, is a Honduran guerrilla organization.
FMLN: The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, Frenle Farabundo
Marri para /a Liberacion Nacional, is an umbrella organization formed in
November 1980. Consists of five Salvadoran guerrilla groups ERP, FAL,
FARN, FPL and PRTC.
FMLN-FDR: FMLN and the FDR - the Salvadoran guerrilla umbrella
organization and its political front.
FPL: Popular Liberation Forces,FuerzasPopularesde Liberacion, the largest of
the original Salvadoran guerrilla organizations that formed the FMLN. The
FPL, founded in 1970by Cayetano Carpio after he left the Communist Party
of El Salvador. has lone been linked to Cuba. The leadershio was taken over

hy Leonel ~onzales up& Carpio's death.
FPR: The Popular Revolutionary Forces, FuerrasPopularesRevolucionarios is
a Honduran guerrilla organization.
FSLN: The Sandinista National Liberation FronFrenreSandinisradeLiberacion
Nacional, was a politico-military organization in the anti-Somoza struggle,
now the officialparty of the revolution.
GRN: Government of National Reconstruction. Gobierno deReconsrruccion
Narionol.the revoluii<~nargo\ernnicnt of Nicaragua ïri>niJuly 1979until ihc
current "elccted" gnvernmeni look ollise in January 1985
Munzunill<~ . e~isancoastal ciivwhere bilatcral talks betwcen the Unitcd States
and Nicaragua were held in 1584.

National Direciorare: The nine-member directorate of the FSLN, formed in
March 1979, with three representatives (rom each of the three main factions
within the FSLN: Prolonged Popular War (Guerra Popular Prolongada -
GPP) is represented by Tomas Borge, Henry Ruiz, and Bayardo Arce;
Proletanan Tendency (Proletarios) by Jaime Wheelock, Carlos Nunez, and
Luis Carrion; and the Insurrectionalists (Terceristas), by Daniel Ortega,
Humberto Ortega, and Victor Tirado.
NBCCA : National Bipartisan Commission on Central America better known as
the Kissinger Commission. Formed in June 1983, the Commission issued a
report in January 1984 that led to increased United States economic and
military assistance for the promotion of democracy and development in

Central America.
New RepublicMovemenl: Costa Rican political party. Some of its memhers have
fought anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua.
Olanchn: The department, a political subdivision, in eastern Honduras where
Sandinista-supported guerrillas were defeated in July 1983.
OAS: Organization of American States.
ORPA: Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms, Orgonimion
Revolucionariadel Pueblaen Armas, a Guatemalan guerrilla group which is a
member of the URNG.
PCES: Communist Party of El Salvador, Parrido Comunisfude El Salvador, is
the oldest Marxist party in El Salvador. Its military wing is the FAL

guerrilla group.
PGT: Guatemalan Labor Party, PurridoGuaremalreco del Trabajothe Moscow-
line Communist Party of Guatemala.
PRTC: Central American Revolutionary Workers'Party, ParridoRevolucionario
de Trabajadoresde Cenlroumerica, organized and led by Roherto Roca who
formed the party in El Salvador in 1976. This Trotskyite oiïshoot of the
Communist Party has counterpart parties in Costa Rica, Honduras and
Guatemala.512 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES

El Paraiso: (1) The department, a political subdivision, in Honduras where
Sandinista-supported guerrillas weredefeated in 1984.
(2) Also the name of the location in El Salvador where the headquarters of
the Fourth Brigade wasattacked by guerrillas in Decemher 1983.
Pupulonal: Site of airfieldin Nicaragua used to fly weapons to Salvadoran
guerrillas during 1980-1981.
PVP: The Popular Vanguard Party, Parridodela Vanpardia Popular, is a Costa
Rican political party some of whose members fought alongside Sandinista
units prior to the overthrow of Somoza. It was a Moscow-line Communist

Party until it split in 1984;the faction now bearingthe name isthe more radical.
RMTC: Regional Military Training Center estahlished in Honduras in June
1983 for training of Honduran, Salvadoran and Costa Rican military and
security forces. (It closed in June 1985.)
UNO: Unified Nicaraguan Opposition, Unidad NicaraguenseOposirora, an
umbrella coalition of anti-FSLN resistance groups and exile political, lahor
and private sector organizations formed in June 1985.
URP: Popular Revolutionary Union, Union Revolucionariadel Pueblo, a
Honduran revolutionary organization also known as "Cinchoneros".
URNC: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, Unidad Revolucionaria
NacionulCuuremalteca ,s an umhrella organization, patterned after the FSLN

and the FMLN, the membership of which includes four Guatemalan guer-
rilla organizations: EGP, FAR, ORPA and PGT. Created in Managua on
Novemher 2, 1980.

Chronology

January 1978
10 Pedro Joaquin Chamorro assassinated in Managua.
August 1978
21 The non-FSLN Broad Oooosition Front (FAO). calline for Somoza's
departure, presents a 16-&;nt plan for democratizationof Nicaragua.
22 Eden Pastora, known as Commander Zero, leads successfulFSLN raid
on the National Palace in Managua.
Seotemher 1978
~~
i3 17th Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the Organization
of American States (OAS) considers the situation in Nicaragua.
October 1978
6 Under the auspices of the OAS, the United States, Guatemala and the
Dominican Republic begin a three-month-long attempt to resolve interna1
conflict in Nicaragua.
January 1979
17 OAS mediation effort ends without resolving the Nicaraguan conflict.
February 1979
8 United States formallv terminates militarv aid to Nicarama (alreadv

suspended for several months), suspends iew economic ai& wiihdrawi
military assistance gronp and Peace Corps volunteers and reduczs size of
embassy staff by one-hdf. RBVOLUTION UBYONU OUR BORDERS 513

June 1979
16 Provisional Junra of the Government of National Reconstruction (GRN)
fomed in Costa Rica.
21 At United States request, the 17th Meeting of Consultation of Foreign
Ministers of the OAS reconvenes toconsider situation in Nicaragua.
23 OAS approves a Venezuelan resolution calling for the immediate replace-
ment of the Somoza régimeby a democratic government.
July 1979
12 GRN Junta sends telex enclosing its program and promising free elections
to the Secretarv General of the OAS.
17 Somo,:i re,i&n\ and intzrim gi>vcriinicniannounccd
IY C<illapw<iiinterimgo\ernnicnt,i1,'SI.Nnillitag. iorcr.~:iiih1;inligu.i
and GRN assumes power.
21 Salvadoran -uerrilla leaders and Sandinista leaders meet in Manaeua to
Jisc~ss FSLN support for S~Ii,aJor;ln insurgcni organi~aiioni.
Cuhan ii\,iliiin and milirar) ad\,2rrii.clnManagua
27 I!nircJ Si,itc, announce> airlili of food and mediç.. ru~olier.
September 1979
21-23 FSLN party meeting approves "72-hour" document committing Sdn-
dinistas to revolutionary internationalism.
24 Nicaraguan government delegation headed by Daniel Ortega received al
White House by President Carter, who offers suhstantial aid, cautions
against interference in neighboring States.
October 1979
15 General Romero is overthrown in El Salvador by military coup promising
extensive political, social and economic reforms.
November 1979
9 President Carter asks Congress torovide an emergency $75 million "10
restore confidence, private initiative and popular well-heingin Nicaragua".
December 1979
16 Leaders of three Salvadoran oreanizations write to Fidel Castro thdt
"thanks to your help" they have signed in Havana a unity pact 10
"advance the fight" for peace and socialism.
March 1980
Junta member Alfonso Rohelo informs United States of GRN policy of
3 non-involvement in Salvadoran interna1 politics but warns that a "few

individuals" may be fighting with the Salvadoran guerrillas.
6 Aerarian reform heeins in El Salvador.
ciha makes large-Gale weapons deliveries to Managua, including anti-
aircraft and anti-tank guns and artillery.
April 1980
16 Council of State is expanded to ensure FSLN control.
19 Violeta de Chamorro resigns from GRN.
22 Alfonso Robelo resigns from GRN.
May 1980
Four Salvadoran guerrilla factions meet under Cuban sponsorship in
Havana, form Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU).
31 President Carter signsegislalion providing $75 million in assistance to
Nicaragua, requiring certification that Nicaragua is not supporting ter-
rorism.
June 1980
FSLN Directorateoffers DRU headquarters in Managua, alongwith advice,
matérieland a promiseto assume "the causeof El Salvadoras its own".514 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

Salvadoran Communist Party leader lorge Shafik Handal leavesCuba for
the Soviet Union and Vietnam seekingarms.
July 1980
23 FSLN Directorate member Bavardo Arce meets with delewtion of Salva-
doran guemllas,agreesto prode ammunition,trainingandother support.
August 1980
23 Sandinista Defense Minister Humberto Ortega announces postponement
of elections until 1985.
September 1980
United States warns that continued Sandinista support for Salvadoran
guerrillasjeopardizes United States aid. Nicaragua responds that govern-
ment not involved.
October 1980
Venue for meeting of Central American communist parties switched in
mid-October from Managua to Havana at request of Nicaragua.
October-November 1980
FSLN begins airlift of supplies for Salvadoran guerrillas from Papalonal
aifield northwest of Managua.
November 1980

? UR'IG. Guatenixlan gucrrtlliiumbrella i>rgani,xtion.L~rmedin Managua.
17 Privatc scctor leader J.rgc Salazar murdered by 'Iirarïguan Statr Sccuriiy
(DGSE) agents.
December 1980
15 Radio Liberacion,Salvadoran guerrilla clandestine radio, begins trans-
missions from Nicaragua.
January 1981
10 Salvadoran guerrillas announce beginning ol "Final OHensive" on clan-
destine broadcast from Nicaragua.
United States again warns Nicaragua that continued support for Salva-
doran guerrillas could result in termination of aid programs and possibly
even a demand for repayment of loans.
14 United States renews non-lethal military aid Io El Salvador.
17 United States provides El Salvador with ammunition for first time
since 1977.
March 1981
Il FSLN Directorate member and Minister of DefenseHumberto Ortega in
Hanoi publicly thanks Vietnam for its support of the Salvadoran revolu-
tionary movement.
Aoril 1981
I United States announces suspension of economic assistance to Nicaragua,
but does "not rule out" its "eventual resumption".
August 1981
Text circulates of secret speech byHumberto Ortega 10military cadres in
which the FSLN Directorate member asserts that Sandinista doctrine is
Marxist-Leninist.
August-October 1981
United States initiales diplornaticexchangeswith Nicaragua. United States
oHersbilateral non-aggressionagreement and renewedeconomic assistance
if Nicaragua stops aid to Salvadoran guerrillas and limits ils military
builduo. Nicaraeua labels United States offer "stenle".
March 1982 -
14 First major armed resistance actions in Nicaragua take place when the
Negro and Coco River Bridgesare seriously damaged with explosives.516 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES

Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador propose peace plan
21
drawing on Honduran plan of March 1982,and emphasizing relevanceof
democratization to peace and stability of region.
23 President Reagan supports Contadora principles in letter 10 Contadora
Groun Presidents.
ond dur PRan C guerrilla force trained in Nicaragua and Cuba infiltrates
into the eastern Honduran province of Olancho.
Seotember 1983
Y Convadora I>o~iimenti>iOhjr.cti\r.sappro\,cd b) thli\rCentral Anlericlin
St3tc.i.1,CI> EO~S 11>rrcgional negotiaiii>ns.i~icludingdcmocr.itii. plur;i-
lism, nationalreconciliation, cessaiion of support to paramilitary forces,
arms control. withdrawal of foreien advisors and verification.
u
Octobe; 1983 ~~ '
20 Nicaragua proposes four treaties to implement ils July six-point plan but
proposals do not address Contadora objectiver of democratic national
reconciliation, reductions in arms and foreign advisors.
25 United States and Caribbean nations land military forces on Grenada.
December 1983
24 Nicaraguan opposition Coordinadoraissuescommunique calling for dia-
logue leading to open elections.
March 1984
25 First round of presidential elections held inEl Salvador.
April 1984

9 Nicaragua filescomplaint against United States in the lnternational Court
of Justice.
22 Easter pastoral letter of the Nicaraguan bishops calls for dialogue, inclu-
ding with the armed resistance.
May 1984
6 JoséNapoleon Duarte elected President of El Salvador in run-off elec-
tien
June 1984.'
1 United States Secretary of State Sbultz visits Managua to launch
bilateral talks in support of reaching a comprehensive Contadora agree-
ment.
8-9 Contadora Group submits first draft Contadora agreemenl 10 Central

American eovernments for comment bv Julv.
25 ~irst ofni& round bilateral talks betweénthéUnited Statesand Nicaragua
held at Manzanillo, Mexico.
July 1984
A 19-membervanguard unit of the Honduran Popular Revolution Force
"Lorenzo Zelaya" enters from Nicaragua in an effort to establish a guer-
rilla network in the Honduran province of El Paraiso.
September 1984
7 Contadora Group submits, for Central American comment by mid-
Octoher, revised draft Contadora agreement.
21 Nicaragua states willingnessIo sign September 7 draft on condition that
it is approved without modification.

25 6th round of Manzanillo talks. Nicaragua adopts September 7 Contadora
draft as ils negotiating position but rules out any substantive modifica-
tion.
September-October 1984
lnternational and regional efforts to induce Sandinistas to allow open,
fair competition for November 4 elections fail. REVOL~ION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 517

October 1984
2 Daniel Ortega announces at the United Nations that United States will
invade Nicaragua on or after October 15.
Daniel Ortega, in Los Angeles, California, states that the only guarantee
for Nicaraguan security is to become a member of the Warsaw Pact.
October-November 1984
Salvadoran President Duarte at United Nations General Assembly calls
for dialogue with amed opposition ;meetings between government and
FMLN take place October 15at La Palma and November 30at Ayagualo.
November 1984
4 Nicaraguan elections held for president and national assembly without
participation of democratic Coordinadoro,the alliance of the political
opposition.
19 8th Round of Manzanillo talks. United States ofïers bilateral assurances
in return for Nicaraguan acceptance of modifications to September 7
Contadora draft.
December 1984
10 9th round of Manzanillo talks. Nicaragua definitivelyrejects UnitedStates
proposal; proposes bilateral accords in lieu of Contadora, addressing
security issues only.
January 1985
10 Daniel Ortega sworn in as President of Nicaragua.
18 United States suspends Manzanillo meetingspending further developments
in the Contadora Process.
February 1985
22 Statement calling for church-mediated dialogue issued in Managua by the
Cuurdinudoru.

March 1985
I In San José. Costa Rica. the Nicaraeuan-resistance issues document
calling for national dialogue.
22 Communiqué of the Nicamguan Episcopal Conference accepting media-
tion role in dialogue.
31 Legislativeand municipal elections in El Salvador, fourth free election in
Anril IO!?<e years.
'.F.......-
4 I'roidcni Kcagan salis on Siwr;igu.in goicrniiicnt i<i.i~icpt dialogue.
11-12Fir\t niccting of Cimisdora plrnipoicnii;iriei rcxhcs agreement in prin-
ciplci>iire\iseil \erilir'atpr0~1'durcs.
May 1985
I United States announces selectivetrade embareo of Nicaraeua-
14 Second meeting ofContadora plenipotentiarie<
Nicaragua renegs on international corps of inspectors for verification
which was agreed to in April.
31 Sandinista mortar fire into Costa Rica kills two Costa Rican CivilGuard
members. The OAS estxblishes a Special Commission to investigate.
June 1985
18 Third meeting of Contadora plenipotentiaries dismpted when Nicaragua
refuses to consider Contadora Group compromise proposal.
July 1985
22 ContadoraGroup ForeignMinistersannounceconsultationswitheach Central
Americangovemmentin lieuof negotiationsamong plenipotentiaries. MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARYACTlVlTlES

Former Guerrillas

This appendix sumarizes the careers of individual guemllas (representing
four different groups) and two officiais of Nicaragua's General Directorate of
State Security. Each has been involved directly with insurgency against the
Governments of El Salvadorand Honduras. Their histories eivea human nicture
of the secret involvement of Nicaragua and its allies in supporting revoluhon in
El Salvadorand Honduras. About half deserted; the others werecaptured. Most
were active into 1985

1. Guerrillas

A. Salvadorans
Marco Antonio GRANDE Rivera defected on May 25, 1985,Io Salvadoran
security forces in Jucuaran, Usulutan. Grande was a political leader and
propaganda officer in the "Francisco Sanchez Southeastern Front" of the

Communist Party of El Salvador (PCESIFAL). In 1980 the Party awarded
Grande a scholarship to study international relations in the Soviet Union. In
September 1982 he went from the USSR to Cuba for six months of military
training. In June 1983, he and four other Salvadorans were given Nicaraguan
documents and flown to Managua. There, they weretaken to a safehouse, which
Grande described as a way-station for Salvadoran guerrillas en route to and
from El Salvador. Before leaving Nicaragua for El Salvador, Grande and others
in the house were visited by various PCES leaders including Shafik Handal. In
late July 1983,Grande reentered El Salvador by way of Guatemala.
NopoleonROMERO Garcia, alias Commander "Miguel Castellanos", wasthe
third-ranking commander of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) until his
defection on April 11, 1985. He was responsible for organizing cadres and
reviewing political plans, ideological statements and proposals for military and
propaganda action. Since 1979 he had been a member of the FPL Central
Committee and Chief of the FPL's Metropolitan Front (San Salvador). He
participated in meetings of the Committee each year and in ils 1983congres,
which look place in Managua. In early October 1983 Romero traveled to
Manaeu-. Havana. Moscow and Vietnam. In Manaeua. he ment a week with
'Valeniin". thc FPL chicf In Managua Komero dcrinhcj in <<ciaitlhc logisiicill
nciu.ork for suppl>ingFhlLN guerrilla. Thc Ssiidinisiss hiore aar maicrial and
handlc rcqiic,i, ior.irms froni ihc S:il\iid<>r-naucrrillas Ilc hai ~-itc~ori/r.d
~icara~ua'as the FMLN's "strategic rear".
ArguimedesCANADAS, alias Commander "Alejandro Montenegro", was a
member of the People'sRevolutionary Amy (ERP). He was arrested in August
1982in Tegucigalpa whileen route to Managua. As commander of the Guazapa
Front, he twice met Joaquin Villalobos, the ERP Commander, at the FMLN
command post in Managua. He has described the logisticalsystem for delivering
weapons, ammunition and explosives from the Nicaraguan-Honduran border
area of Las Manos across the Honduran-El Salvadoran border area of Amatillo
Io his headquarters al Guazapa. He coordinated the special commando group
that attacked llopango military airbase in January 1982.In mid-September 1982
the Honduran guerrillas known as "Cinchoneros", demanded, among other
things, Canadas' release in exchange for three ministers and more than 100
civilians held hostage.

DomingoBARRERA Castro, alias "Victor", deserted the Popular Liberation REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 519

Forces(FPL) in Decemher 1982.He had beenactivein the Popular Revolutionary
Block(BPR) and, in January 1980,was sent from m FPL camp in Chalatenango
to Cuba for training. He secretly left El Salvador, taking a small boat at night
across the Gulf of Fonseca to Nicaragua. From Nicaragua, he Rew to Cuba.
There, he look a six-month basic military training course in tactics and the use
of weapons and explosives. Later, he attended a six-month leadership course.

After completing his training, he returned to Managua and flew to Guatemala
where he look a bus to El Salvador. In Chalatenango, he became an instructor
for the FPL and, in Decernher 1981,was named chief ofthe FPL's Northern
Front "Apolinario Serrano". During 1982, Barrera because disillusioned with
the war and with the FMLN's treatment of the population and deserted.
Jorge Eduardo PANlACUA Verguniuwas captured by Salvadoran authorities
on June 18, 1985.He had been recruited in10 the Amed Forces of Liberation
(FAL), the armed wing of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), in July
1982. He initially drove pickup trucks with secret compartments holding amis

and munitions for guerrilla units. The amis had heen transported overland from
Nicaragua through Honduras into El Salvador. When the Salvadoran security
forces hroke up this network in April 1983, Paniagua became inactive. He
resumed his work for the FAL in July 1984and Iwo months later was assigned
to the Metropolitan Front in San Salvador.
William Daly RAMOS Orellana, arrested by Salvadoran authorities on
August 9, 1984,was recruited for the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) in 1978.
In June 1982he traveled Io Costa Rica and then Io Nicaragua, where he stayed

for nearly Iwo weeks before Ayingto Cuha. In Cuba, he attended a three-month
course in recruiting techniques and methods for organizing "masses". He then
returned to El Salvador where he becarne a recruiter for the FPL's Clara
Elizabeth Ramirez Front (CERF).
Maria Elsy QUJABA Valle,alias "Delmy", wds captured by the Salvadoran
National Police inSeptember 1984.She hadjoined the Popular Liberation Forces
(FPL) in May 1979.In September 1980she traveled by bus to Guatemala and
then new to Nicaragua. After two weeks in Managua, she Rew to Cuba for a
military training course. In January 1981 she returned to Nicaragua and then

traveled overland through Honduras IO El Salvador.
Feliciru iCIENJIVARBriones, alias "Monico", surrendered to Salvadoran
authorities on Ianuarv 30. 1985.He was an activist in the Pooular Revoluti~~arv
I3lock(HPR) helhre Lemg re;ruitcJ iiitcthc Popular l.ibcr;tion i-orcea(FPI.;.
In Xlay 19811h.e uli\ .en1 from an l'PL camp in Chalaieniingo to Cubd Hc lefi
El S;iIi,ador for Nii;iraeii;i on the!.a Linion-Poinsi f~,rn..Frim Niraraeii:i. hc
Rewto Cuha for a six-month basic military course in ieapons, explosi;es and
tactics. He spent six months in Nicaragua working with some 300 Salvadorans
frorn al1fivefactions of the FMLN.In 1981 he flewfromManagua to Guatemala

and traveled bv bus to El Salvador. He became a sauad leader for an FPL-
phtuun, scrving tir\tnrar Jucuxr~nanJ latcr Chal>tenango. Ijiiring an oper:itiun
1,)disrapt tlic .Match 19x4r.lcrtiun~.hc u;,s rcrii>iisl)iv<,iinJcd.
R«nriti,Zmii<h ('IIICAS Cluroi.aliss "Tilu". Jefectedon Annl Y. 1Y93 He uaj
recmited into the People's~evoluti'onaryA~~~'(ERP)in ~a; 198i. He spent his
first year growingfood for guemlla units in Morazan. He made fivetrips to Santo
Domingo,Honduras, topick up supplies. In August1982 Chicas was transferredto
a guemlla camp al Guanimas. The camp was suppliedwith amis, munitions and
unifomis from Cuba by sea from Nicaragua. In Decembcr 1982 he became a

bodyguard for thecommanderof the Rafael ArceZablah Brigade(BRAZ).
Santos Enrique GARCIA Chilulu,alias "Quique", wasan ERP member from
1981until his capture by Salvadoran security forceson July 27, 1985.He joined520 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVI~ES

the ERP in August 1981 while he was living in Chinandega, Nicaragua. In
January 1982 he was sent to Cuba for a weapons-training course, which also
was attended by several dozen Salvadorans. In May 1982 he returned to
Nicaragua where in September he began six months' training in combat tactics
at Montelimar. When not in training overseas, Garcia lived in ERP safehouses
in Managua. According to Garcia, ERP units in Managua include a special
forces group and a propaganda team, which prints fliersand counterfeit docu-
ments and recruits from among the estimated 20,000 Salvadoran refugees now
living in Nicaragua.

JoséJuan MENJIVAR, was a member of the FPL from December 1982until
he defected inJanuar, 1985.In 1981 he snent several months in a ref..ee camo
in Hondurïs before cnicring Ni?ïrÿgua with Calscdocumeni\ in Augusi lJbl
tlc %,asarrested by Sandinista securii) forcer and held for Iwo nionths as a
susn.cted s.. ïur ihc tlondurdn Govr.rnrncnt On his rclease in Ociober 1981 hc
was sent to a refugee camp in ieon department where he lived for over a year.
In December 1982 he was recruited by a Salvadoran working for the FPL in
Nicaragua, and reinfiltrated into El Salvador.
Adin INGLES Alvarado, alias "Vidal", the second ranking member of the
special forces of the FPL, defected to the Salvadoran armed forces on May 19,
1985.The special forces group was formed in Fehruary 1983as an élitecombat
unit for special missions. Nicaragua provided explosives and other equipment.
The original 28 memhers were sent to Cuba to train and to develop operations
plans. While inCuba, they rehearsed an attack against the military headquarters
of the 4th Brigade at El Paraiso, in Chalatenango department. They successfully
carried out the attack in December 1983.When lngles defected, 12new recmits
were in training programs abroad.
Maria Marra ConcepciunValladaresde Lemus, alias "Nidia Diaz" or "Claudia
Novale". was a euerrilla commander of the Central American Workers Revo-
lutionar; Party (PRTc). During President Duarte's firstdiscussion withguerrillas
on October 15, 1984,in La Palma, Diaz was one of three FMLN commanders
oresent. Amone the documents caotured with her on Anril 18. 1985. were
archives of 1he-p~~~. including correspondence between ihe FMLN and the
FSLN, notes of meetings, and other PRTC and FMLN documents.

B. Hondurans

June 28, 1985, in the course of government elforts to solve the murder of 13

people in a sidewalkcaféin San Salvador on June 19, 1985.He wasan Honduran
member of the Salvadoran PRTC guerrilla organization. Galvez was born in
Tegucigalpa and graduated from the Honduran national university in 1983. In
late July 1983he flewto Managua where he worked with sevenother Hondurans
and Nicaraguans at the Center for Economic Studies of Honduras. In November
1984 a Salvadoran memher of the PRTC recruited Galvez to work inside El
Salvador. In December 1984,Galvez flew to El Salvador's international airport
at Comalapa and was taken to a PRTC camp in the Cerros de San Pedro.
Ilonduransinvolvedin the El Paraiso operution and capluredbetweenJuly and
Ocrober1984by theHonduranarmedforces: Arnulfo Montoya Maradiaga, alias
"Felipc" or "Elias"; Gregorio Pinto Arevalo, alias "Guilberto Lopez Abal-
Iero" or "José Maria Reconco Zuniga" or "Ruben Agapito"; Pedro Antonio
Ginon Reyes,alias "Rolando"; Ricardo de Jesus Ramirez Lemus, alias "Hector
Caballero Chavez" or "Mario"; and Ana Rosa Rivera Perla, alias "Betty". All
were members of the Popular Revolutionary Force "Lorenzo Zelaya" (FPR- RBVOLUTION BEYONDOUR BORDBRS 521

LZ). Operationally, they were part of a 19-memher Popular Revolutionary
Cornmittee "Camilo Torres", whichhegan infiltratin- into Honduras from Nicara-
gua in July 1984to estahlish a guerrilia network.
They have identifiedthe FSLN's Department of International Relations (DRI)
as essential in providing food, lodging, transportalion and training while in
Nicaragua. They also stated that they were memhers of an "International
Brigade" led hy Sandinista military (EPS) officersthat fought Nicaraguan armed
resistance forces in the Jalapa area of northern Nicaragua. They reported that
the same "Brigade" included some 50 Costa Ricdn members of the Popular
Vanguard Party.

II NicuruguunSecuriy Personnel
Miguel BOLANOS Hunier was a memher of the Nicaraguan General
Directorate of State Security (DGSE). A Sandinista since 1978, he defected in

May 1983.For four years, Bolanos worked in the F-7 [Mass Organizations] and
F-2 IForeinn Di~lomatsl Sections ofthe DGSE. He described the FMLN logistics
structure ëstablished b; the Sandinistas in Managua. According to ~oïanos,
members of the FSLN Directorate, the DRI, the Fifth Directorate. the Ministry
of lnterior and the armed forces oversee the deliveries to the FMLN
X~JIIUUUL A lUNOL /)ILIand sauthcr DGSC;lgr.nüucrc arrr\tul by llondunn
x~unty rniui inApril 1985 Whdea membïr ui'theNi~d~wdnGenernlDirwiornte
of Staic kuriry (DC,SII). hs comm;tnJrd amoue d KSC arcni, whore niisïcn
was Io smueele.w&wns io the "~inchoneros"in Wonduras.Be&nine in Novemher
1984, un; madé three trips to Honduras transporting-~yl6 "%s and ~other
weaponshy hiding them in corn-filledgunny sackscarrie bdmules.

"These willnot he elections to decide who is in power, hecause the people
hold power through their vanguard, the Frente Sundinisru." (Humberto
Ortega, August 1980,referring to the elections scheduled for 1985,actually
held in 1984'.)

"1am an internationalist because 1am a freeman and 1want to contrihute
tu ihcIihcrarion oi'rll mcn.. [But] in thir mumeni. Irxpre,s thc bcntimcnir
of the mqiiritr of Niirraguans uhcn I say that the hour has arrii,ed u,hcn
they [the internationalists] should leave us alone - those who are not
involved in activities that contrihute to health and education. As someone
who lovesmypeople 1take honor, likeSandino, incallingfor al1Nicaraguans
Io put themselves on a war footing as long as there is a foreign soldier on
the native soil." (Eden Pastora, April 15, 1982'.)

"1 joined the Revolutionary Government with . . the conviction that the
Revolution would begood,first undformost, for Nicaragua. My experience

'Quoted from "ThisWcekCentralAmericaand Panama",September 1, 1980,andcited
by ThomasA. Anderson, PolilicIn CeiiiralAmerico(NewYork,1982),p. 179.
reportcdinethe FBlSnSforApril 16, 1983.The translationused here isthatof Shirley
Christian,icaragua,Revolu~ivnin theFamily(NcwYork,RandomHousc,1985). p.321.522 MILITARY AND PAMMILITARY ACTLV~TIES

har dirillusii>nrd me: dogrnatim and iid\enturirrn seem IO ha\e uipcd out
the dernocr~tic and pluralistic idcals which. in 1979, uniicd al1 Sicîrîguan

advocates of freedom . . . Certain Sandinista revolutionaw leaders-.
[prtifesr] allegianse in an internliiionlilist idciilo. . al the cxpense uf thc
h.1.1~intercbts <II'thr. nation-state of Ki~iraguli." (F.mphaii> in i>riginal )
(Arturo Cruz, 1983 '.)

Sandinista internationalism has victimized Nicaraguans as well as Nicaragua's
neighbors. Part of the problem anses from the irony that the movement that
bears the name of Sandino, a nationalist who rejected communist tics, has
sacrificed Nicaraguan nationalism to internationalism'. This has intensified the
suffering of ordinary Nicaraguan citizens. In the political arena, many of those
who opposed Somoza and supported the Sandinistas in 1979 have been forced

into exile as the prospects of an open, democractic system of govemment emer-
ging in Nicaragua fade.
Fears that the new men with guns would be dominant were initially discounted
in the hope that the Sandinistas would understand that governing a country
required a different approach from that required to overthrow a dictator. In-
deed. the Drorrams and earlv lenislation of the new Government of National
~econstr~itio~ gavc the Nicaraguan - people. 11sneighhors and ihr international

cornmunity as î whole. reîson Io hope thai the dictatorial patterns of the pas1
had been broken '.
Within a year, however. Violeta de Chamorro4 and Alfonso Robelo5, two

'Arturo J. Cruz, "Nicaragua's lmpcriled Revolution", ForeignAmin (Vol. 61, No. 5,
Summcr, 1983).at pp. 1031-1032.
'"Ours is anc of the few revolutions,perhaps the only onethat achievedthe formation
of a vas1 alliance, intemal as well as extemal." (Comandante Victor Tirado Lapez,
Bnrricodo. Deccmber 17. 1984.front oaee of "Lunes Socio-Economico" section.)
'~mo& many othcr expliciiundekaCiings,thc Junta promised:
full resocct for enumerated human riehts includine freedom of the oress and of
thouphi. conscienceand worship:
thc Ünrr<inrtcdfunciioning afpi?liiicparlie, rcgardleqsof idcolrig.
;in indcpîndent and non.slignrd forcign polic:
a mixed manomv ~nd <unnon for Ccnirdl r\mrncan iniceraiion:
establishment oiunion rights and guarantee of the right6 strike; and
a "minimum" permanent military establishment.

These promiscs and many othcrs were set forth in the July 9 program provided to
Guarantees of Nicaraguans.mcntal Statute and the Septcmber 17 Law on Rights and
"'When aitcr a few months 1realized that the course promired did not correspond to
what was being done, 1left the Junta .. .nie principles for which we al1foughl until we
won the departure frompower ofAnastario Somoza Debaylehave beenflagrantlybetraycd
by the party in powcr, that is the Sandinist Front of National Liberat..n."(Violcta B.
de Chamorro, August 13. 1985.)Letter addressed Io nie Honorable Jaao Baena Soares,
Secretary Gcneral of the Organization of Amcrican States, Washington, DC.
'"1 withdmwfrom the govcmmentJunta on 22 April 1980alterveryseriousdisa-cnts
with the Sandinista NationalLihration Front ... [which]becaur iehad the am, impord
wime Marxist-Leninistdeviations. . .1knew that hem wereMarxisü within the Sandinista
Front. 1wasnot awarethat themwaswmplete Manist-Leninistwntrol ..."(AlfonsaRobelo,
Feb- 1981.In an interviewby Francisco Talaverain Managua,Nicaragua, arpublishedby
ABC Color. March 12, 1981,pp.8-9.) Otherprominent Nicaraguanswho have len official
positionsin thegovemmentinclude:JoséFranciscoCARDENAL. nameà VicePresidentof the
Council of Statc in 1980but rnigneà soon ancr his appointment; Edgard MACIAS, anti-
Somozamililant,head of the PopularSccialChristianPaRyand formerViceMinisterof Labr
in the GRN; Jaime MONTEALEGRE, former ViceResident of thc Councilof Statc; and
AlvaroTABOADA,formerSandinistaambassadorto ENador. REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS 523

non-Sandinista members of the Junta of the Government of National
Reconstruction. resigned in orotest at Sandinista actions. Nnnethel-~ ~ the
~~-,
Sandinistas retained a facade if pluralism by appointhg non-Sandinistas in their
place'. Nicaragua kept good relations with Western countries and received
substantial amounts of assistance for the reconstruction of Nicaraguan society.
Sandinista intentions regarding the future direction of Nicaragudn society
became more explicit in mid-1980 when Defense Minister Humberto Ortega
announced the postponement until 1985of the elections promised in the Junta's
program. Controls over the press and the private sector were expanded

suhstantially2. A "State of Economic and Social Ernergency" was declared
which, among other things, made it a crime to spread "false" economic news or
Io eneaee in strikes'. Sandinista Defense Committees. block oreanizations
follow~nia Cubïn modcl. rcrved as the "eyer and eïrs" ofihe FS1.N indetectiiig
anti.r6gime sentiment and orgdni~ing support for Sandinista activities4. After
rïtiiininii. bea.n. i.es ïjsumcd a ri~lein the Jirtrihutiiin of some hi<>d.fuel and
other go%dsto party members and non-members alike.

By 1982,the Sandinistas were openly abandoning the program on the basis of
which the Government of National Reconstruction had taken power in 1979.
Civil riehts were susnended in March 1982. whe. th~ GRN declared a state of ~ ~ ~
emrrgency whiçh ha\ \uhsequrnily heenexiended. The g<)\crnmcnimotcd again,t
independcnt 1rdJc union>. iniimidated husincbi Ikadcrs and hegan in Jdnudg.
1982 the well-~ubl1zi7cdrcloz3tion or ihc \li>kiio Indiïns fr<~mthcir lraJiii~>n~l
homelands on the Atlantic Coast. The Sandinistas were also by this time

encouraging the development of the "people's church" against the established
church hierarchy. The latter, including Archbishop (now Cardinal) Miguel
Obando Bravo, had initially been among the Sandinistas' most important allies
in the battle against Somoza.
By November 1984,when the Sandinistas held elections earlier than previously
announced, the prospects for peaceful opposition to their rule had been consider-
ably diminished. AI1the major communications outlets, with the exception of ïa

Prensa and a few private radio stations, were in the hands of the Sandinistas.
Al1 government bureaucracies and key ministries were in FSLN control. The
Sandinista Workers Central had undermined the strength of non-Sandinista trade
unions like the Confederation of Nicaraguan Workers. The party's youth and

'Among the factors precipilatingthe depanurc of Chamorro and Robelo was the
FSLN'sconsolidationof ils elleclivecontrol over the aovemmcntbv modifvinethe
compositionof the Councilof State to ensure a majorsy would repierenl Sandhista
arg;inlr.iiiJnOnl) thcn th?Council.4 rcprcrcni~t~~ "rcrolailon:ir)"bodyIniheory
coc.p,l ~i~riheJunid. coorenr<liitrrhcriri#imc Dc\p8ic<~c~v<incalll<,rrh) S.inJinr\id
~uihoniicrio diriineuirhbeiucrn ihcm. frsm ihlsdateihe l.SLS and ihc envrrnmini al

~~- -~ ,
~o~rensa, a svmbolof'res;stanceto Somozaandof the r6&ne3s"commitment"to
pl,rali,m.~n)digrer. 21 ~ndrpcndrn;e C~.n,<,rrhi"rc~.ird~ni;8ricr\ ikai rclalidihc
r.,>unip'\ dumz\iic scurii?ua. rirs in\iii~icbv DC~ILY 512. is>ur.in AL~UII lYbUII
ha, ken c\n'sndrdon icrïral orcasion, mcr ihai iimr The nntaie xvtur ha5 h~n
intimidatedand ils independencecunailedthrourh constant~oliiicalattacks.rer;lGion524 MILITARYAND PARAMILITARYACTIVITIES

women wings in conjunction with the Defense Cornmittees had effective control
over mass rnobilization. The State share of GNP had risen from roughly 15per
cent in 1978to over 40 percent, and Sandinista efforts to expand their economic
control were continuing '.
In this context, the November 1984elections were another step in the anti-
dcmocratic direction set by the FSLN. Although an Independent Liberal Party

(PLI) and a consemative group won substantial voter support, the main
o..osition CourdinadoraDemocratica refused to oarticinate in the elections when
it bcc;intc cler th~t the 1.SI.N u;ir dolng c\cr?thing possihle tu prekcnt thc
mounting of an ellrsti\c campaign hy the democr~ticopposition. Thojc nie;isurcs
includcd moh i,iolenc; against rallie\, part). candidates and hcadquartcrs; ration-
ing of campaign rcsourecs and media timc to cnsure that the wcll-cstabli~hcd
FS1.S orgaii~/;iiion~land media dont~nan~cwas prescr\ed. and. rcdiiction of
the votinr are to 16to expand the votinr-lists with persons educated onlv under
an di ni de2.
Not surprisingly, concern over the Sandinistas' progressive abandonment of
the originalprogram of the revolution led to disagreements among those in the
eovernment who had ioined in alliance with the FSLN and amone some members
of thc tS1.U iiscli. fhc dcp.irturc of Chaniorro and Kubclo frorn the Junta in
1980prcsr:igcd the I'Jhlrcrign3titDiiol'tlte I;!rrner Vice-\lini~ter orDcknrt and
Sandintsta uar hcro Eden Pastora uho in Avril 1982dcclciredthat the rci~oluiion
had betrayed ils ideals.
As the opportunities for effectiveand peaceful political opposition diminished,
armed resistance to the régimehegan to evolve to include a broader base of
leadership, recruitment and support. Both Pastora and Robelo began armed

opposition in 1982.The Sandinistas have maintained an unwavering policy of
refusing to enter into a dialogue with the resistance, a policy paralleling its
continued refusal to conduct serious political discussions with the interna1
opposition as well.

SELECTED BIOGRAPHIES

Arturn JoséCRUZ Porrris, a long-time member of the Conservative Party, is
an economist who holds graduate and undergraduate degrees from Georgetown
University. He has specialized in development banking and has worked for the
IADB. He was jailed twice by Somoza, once for 3 months and later for 1I
months. In 1977,Cruz was invited by the Sandinistas to be one of "The Group
of 12", prominent Nicaraguans who would serve as a bridge between the
Sandinistas and other groups in the civil opposition to Somoza. Following the
revolution, Mr. Cruz served as President of the Central Bank in 1979-1980,as a
member of the governing Junta from May 1980 to March 1981, and as Nica-
ragua's ambassador to the United States frorn June 1981 until his resignation
in December in protest over Sandinista policies. Cruz was the presidential

GrabendorIr,Krumwcidedeet ul., PoliricolCliangein CenrrolAmericn:lnrernalandExrernol
Dimensions (Boulderand London,1984),pp. 70-72.
'The formalcorrectnesr ofthe eleclionsthemselveswasreminiscentof Somoza's 1974
charadewhichNicaragua'sRoman Catholicbishopswereforccdto charactcrizeas "legal
war". Alsosee"SandinistasClaimBigElectionVictory". Ncir, York TimesNovember 6,
1984;"Nicaraguans Go to ihc Polls"Warhin~ionPosr,Novcmber 5,1984. REVOLUT~ONBEYOND OUR BORDERS 525

candidate of the unified opposition in the November 1984elections but refused
to register his candidacy in protest over the Sandinista government'srefusal to
permit a fair electoral contest. He helped found UN0 in 1985.

Alfredo CESAR Aguirre earned a BS degree in industrial relations from the
University of Texas and an MBA from Stanford University. After sewing as
general administrator of the Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, hejoined the Sandinistas

in 1978 and was tortured and imprisoned by the government during Somoza's
last year. After the Sandinista victory in 1979,Cesar became ExecutiveDirector
of the International Reconstruction Fund. In 1980-1981 he was Executive ~ ~

I)ircctor of thc flanking Superior Council. In 1981-19112 he u,as Prc,iJent of the
Ccnira1Bjnk Aftcr breaking trith the Sandinlst~jCeur went intii exilein Ci~tï
Rica and became an advisor to the Costa Rican Government, specializing in

external debt. In mid-1985 he became the most prominent of six founding
members of the Southern Opposition Block.
Adolfo CALER0 Purtucurrero, a lifelong opponent of Somoza, has been

President of the National Directorate and Commander-in-Chicf of~ ~~ armed~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
iorccs <if the 1-DN3ince Daunber 1983.Cdlcro grailwtcJ ir,im thc Ilnii.er.ir)
oi 'Ioirc Dame in 1953. Jid grddudtc uork in inJustrial ni.iniigeniental S)r~cujc

Cniverritv. and holds a lax deerce from the Cnit,ersitv of Ccntrïl Americï in
~icara~ua: He began his poli~cal career in the 1956sas an activist in the
Conservalive Party. In 1959 he helpedorganize managerial strikes in support of

an insurrection headed by Pedro Jodquin Chamorro, editor of the opposition
daily La Prensu. In 1978,Calero served as his party's representativein the Broad
Opposition Front (FAO), and was jailed for initiating a general strike against

Somoza. After attempting to cooperate with the Sandinistas, Calero went into
exile at the end of 1982.He helped found UN0 in 1985.
EnriqueBERMUDEZ Varela is the military commander of the FDN armed
forces. He served in the National Guard under Somoza and was assigned in

Washington as Defenx Attache in 1977. In December 1982 he was cleared of
"war crimes" bvth~,FSLN's chief nress s~okesman. He has described~ ~ ~ ~fas -~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~
s priilcrsiiinal soldicr and, undcr Son~um. apol~tic~l Ile 1sa grailuare of the

Ki'iiaragulinIrlilitar) Acddcrnyand rcceivxi trdining 31 the Un~tedSt.iies Army
Comm~nd and Gcneral Slatl'C'i~llcre2nd the United Stdter r\riiivSchool of the
Americas. He also receivedmilitaitraining in Brazil.

Aljonso ROBELO Cullejas, political coordinator of ARDE and head of the
MDN, wastrained as a chemicalengineer. He servedas director of the University
of Central America from 1970 to 1972 and was President of the Nicaraguan

Chamber of Commerce until 1975. He then headed the development institute
INDE. Followingthe assassination of La Prensa editor, PedroJoaquinChamorro,
Robelo founded the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), a moderate,

democratic oriented political party of bnsinessmen, industrialists, and pro-
fessionals opposed to the Somoza régime.After the revolution Robelo was one
or the five members of the original 1979Junta. He resigned in 1980because of

the Marxist tendencies in the FSLN-dominated government and the growing
Cuban influencein the country. Harassed by the FSLN after his resignation, he
was finallyforced into exile in 1982,at which time he and Eden Pastora founded

the Democratic Alliance. ARDE.
Eden PASTORA Cornez, the legendary Commander Zero and leader of the
FRS (Sandino Revolutionary Front), was the Sandinista's mostpopular hero
and a senior officialof their government until he distanced himselffrom them in

1981. In Aueust 1978Pastora led the unit that caotured the National Palace i~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~
Managua. fhat operation gained the release of i9 political prisoners, but its
lasting significancewasthat it captured the imagination of the Nicaraguan peopleand enahled the Sandinistas to become the symbol of resistance to Somoza.
After the fall of Somoza, Pastora became Vice Minister of Interior and then
Vice Minister of Defense. In April 1982 he announced his opposition to the

Sandinista régime.That same year he was co-founder of ARDE. In April 1983
he took up arms against the Sandinistas in southern Nicaragua.
WvcliffeDIEGO is a Miskito Indian leader from the Atlantic Coast town of
puerio Cabc7as He was a Moravian pastor and an active memher i>1'1he Mi\kito
organization ALPROMISU. He was jailcd hy Somola in 1571 for allegcdly
king a ci)mmunirt. When hllSUKASA'I'A uas formcd in 1979. Dicgo servcd as

:i mcmbcr of ils crecuti\,c boird. Reading to ihe Sandinista mi.tre.itment of
Ni'ic3raguii'\indigeni>uspi~pulation, Diego uent into exile and hclpcd found the
armed rcsistance aro-. MISUKA. Ile wa5 woundrd in a Sandinista-enrinrr,red
1982assassination attempt.

In June 1980, the Secretdry General of the Communist Party of El Salvador,
Jorge Shafik Handal, visited Vietnam in search of weapons. He was promised

60 tons of armsand ammunition, including 1,620 M-16s'.
The United States Government bas since early 1981traced the serial numbers
of almost 1,600 M-16s' captured from Salvadoran guerrillas, turned in by
defecting guerrillas' or, on the basis of captured guerrilla documents, still in
guerrilla hands.
The traces show that 66 per cent of these arms can be positively identified as
having been shipped directly to South Vietnam4, to depots involved in shipment

to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict, oras having been manufactured

'"Vieviam.From 9 to 15 Junc. Receivedby [high--king pany and militaryleaders] . . .
Theyagrccdto provideaid in weapons.the firstshipmentconsistin~of. . .1.620AR-15
6Ilrs . -.onr-and.r>nz.hdlm f illionhR.15 canridgc,. approximdieuciphi of thc eniirc
rhipmcni hi1iim, Th? -<hobr-mentioncd maieneluill bc rectdy fdr rhipnicniJ~ring
the 6ni tiie &a\s of S:otember" Ouotcd Ironi 'Ciira nur lu, mi\r< sii:iali~i,\\id v
Africa"(Trip tothc ~oc:alist~ounthes.Asia.and ~fricd. ~oeumenis. E. n. 1.
'Somc g&rnll~documcnii refcrIo M-16sas<\K-15s.Uoth nomcnclaiurrlu Jewrihî
th2 iïmc auiomaiic riflc Ihe onpinal manuLiciurer.the ArmaliicDnisi~nof Fairihtld
Jr*icn.iir.ithc nflr th,\K-15 'TheUnitedS~a~~ ~~ ~ir w,~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~,lr\ti.nair~ ~ ~ ~~~
16.'Coli Industriesmanulailured the definitiveM-16 model. currcntlv oric. .at $446
each.
'Under a Salvadorangavemmcntprogram.guerrillaswhotum in weapons,or provide
informationleadingta thecaptureofweapons,aregivenmonetaryrewardscommensurate
withthe typeand numberof weapons.
'The samplc bclow illustratcs this catcgory. Colt Industries, Hartford, Connecticut,
manuîacturersof M-16 riflesfurnishedthe followinginformation on the disposition of
weapons identified individuallyby theirrerial number:
WSN725668,shipped10May67,M/F USAsuppon CMD,Saigon,Vietnam.

IVSN1209738.>h/pp.J2 Oii. 68. M 1- Sx\.iI Suppon Art. S.\IGOS. Vietn~m
IVSN1237380.,liipp:J 29Oci. 68. I 1:?.il ORD SCPCO.CA\ 1110. \'iein;iin
\VSS 1396129.5h.h.d..9 1C.b63. . \I.f 250 ORD S\'C CIK. XII,\ 'I'KANCi.
Vietnam.
WSN 1207644s ,hipped 3 Oct. 68, MIT USNSupportAct. SAIGON,Vietnam. RSVOLUTIONBEYONDOUR BORDERS 527

by United States companies contracted only for matériel for the Vietnam war'.
The 34 per cent unrelated to Vietnam included 27 per cent made up of weapons
originally shipped to the Salvadoran Armed Forces' and 7 percent traceahle to
other destinations.

Lasrdelivery poinr in United Sro~esrecords

Vietnam 581

United States military units
during the 1960s with probable
delivery to Vietnam 237

Unknown, but probably Vietnam 236
El Salvador 433

Other 101
Taro1 1588

In March 1981, the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense, Sandinista Direc-
torate member Humherto Ortega, traveled to Hanoi. In a speech given there on
March II, Ortega said,

"we sincerely thank the Vietnamese people and highly value their support
for the heroic Salvadoran people . . the fierce and bloody struggle in El

Salvador requires the support ofal1progressive nations and forces through-
out the world ".

Also in 1981, William Shawcross traveled to Vietnam and asked:
"Had Vietnam been distributing any of the vast pile of weapons left by

the Americans? Colonel Bui Tin acknowledged, in effect that it had. In
Salvador? 'lt's not fair toay the United States can help the Junta but we
cannot help Our friends. We do Our best to support revolutionary movements
in the world. ..'.4"

\VSN 1181Rh6> . hipprIh Sep. 68. M,f 241ORD CO. CA\ l'Ii0. Vietnam
WSS 1217618.,hlppiJ 27Ut. 68. Mil: 241 ORO SIJI'CO. CAN I HO. Vicinarn.
WSN 1558102.,htp~~J 31 hta>69, hl1'220OKI>SVC CI'K III ,\LC. SAICiOS.
Vietnam.
WSN 961419.shippcd 19Mar. 68, M/F USA depot, CAM RANH BAY.Vietnam.
WSN 728973.shipped IOMay 67. M/F USA SPT CMD, SAIGON, Vietnam.
WSN 1498058,shipped 23 Apr. 69, M/F 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN THO,
Vietnam.
WSN 1208988,shipped 3 Oct. 68. M/F USN Support Act, SAIGON. Vietnam.

'General Molors rnanufacturedthe 3,000,000scricsin ihc 1960sand reonrweapons
havesincebeendesiroyed;however,themajorityofthesewcaponswereshippedto Vietnam.
'Thc Ers1 shiprnent of M-16s to El Salvador from the United States bcgano/ier
January 16, 1981,in responsc to the realization that the FMLN's "final ofîcwasve"
beingsupplieclihrough Nicaragua.
'HanoiVNAin EnglishMarch II, 198l.reportcdinFBI SV,Moarch 12,1981,pka.
4New York Rrview of Books,Seplember14, 1981.528 MlLlTARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTlVlTIES

Evaluarionby the CeneralCommandof the FMLN Uponihe Firsr Phaseof the
CeneralOfensive *

Farabundo Marti Front for National Liheration
to the Salvadorean People
to the People of Central Amenca and the World

The General Command of the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation
(FMLN) declares to al1ils sister peoples - those of Central America and of al1
the world - thdt the great operation comprised in the plan for the launching of
the general revolutionary offensive, begun on the 10th of January, was carried
out with success by the regular units, guerrilla and militia units of our popular
revolutionary army.

Since the 10th of January, when this General Command of the FMLN issued
the orders for the offensive 1 and 2, the revolutionary armed forces carried out
the following actions.

In thecentraljront - ModesroRamirez
- Siegeof the barracks of Chalatenango and the capture of the city during the
10, Il and 12th days of January.
- Siegeof the harracks of Paraiso and control of the access routes between this
point and the city of Chalatenango during the 10th. Ilth and 12th days
of January.

- Attacks at enemy garrisons in the towns of San Antonio La Cruz, Arcatao,
La Palma Patanera, San Francisco Mordzan, San Antonio Los Ranchos, al1
in the province of Chalatenango.
- Taking of Suchitoto and siege of the enemy garrison on January Il and 12.
- Canture of the citv of A~ooa on the 10th of Januarv.
- ~ontrol of the cornmuntcat;on routes between the ionc c dealNorte htghway
and the towns of Aguilares, Suchitoto and San JoséGuayabal.

In SanSalvador
- The capture of three radio stations on the Ilth of January.
- Attack on the Air Force.The Air Force wasunable to take offfor severaldays.

- The taking of Soyapango, Mejicanos, Cuscatancingo and fighting in Ciudad
Delgado, Tonacatepeque.
- Control of the highways of San Marcos, Santo Tomas and Comalapa.
- Harassment of the barracks of the National Guard and of the Rural Police.

WesternFronr-José FelicianoAmas
- Attack against the 2nd lnfantry Brigade in the city of Santa Ana, a unit in
which a Company of soldiers led by two officers rose up and went over to
fight with the people and the FMLN on the 10th of January, after hurning
the arsenal of the garrison.

Appendix12.pp. 84-88of the FMLN-FDRBooklet ElSolvodoron rheThresholo dfo
Demoeroiic RevolurianorV yiclory,dirtributed in the UnitedStats in Englishdunng
February-March 1981 (cornpletctcxt ain original). RBVOLWION BEYONVOUR BORDERS 529

- Attacks dgainst thc barr;icks oi tlic National Police,the Sational Guard and
the Rural Police. un the 10th. l Ith and 12th of Jaiiuarv in 'ianta Ana
- Attack on the enemy garrisons in Metapan, in the of Santa Ana,
and the capture of the city on the 12th and 13th of January.
- Attack on the enemy barracks and popular insurrection in the city of
Chalchuapa. the second Iarpest in the ~rovinccof Santa Ana: attacks on the
enemy garrisons in San ~uiian, Arminia, Acajutla, Sonsonate, Cara Sucia
and Bola de Monte.
- Attack on the Border Police, the 10th of January in Santa Ana.

In lhe NearcentralFronc - AnasiacioAquino
- Attack and harassment of the National Guard barracks of Villa Victoria.
- Capture and annihilation of enemymilitary units in Cinquera in the province
of Cahanas on January 12th.
- Harassment of enemy forces in Jutiapa on the 14th of January.
- Capture of Santa Clara, on January IIth.
- Continuous attacks in Tecoluca between the 10th and 15th ofJanuary.
- Harassing actions against the barracks of the city of San Vicente from the
1Ith of January on.
- Control of the Pan Americdn Highway, from San Rafael Cedros to Apas-
tepeque.
- Control of the coastal highway from Puente de Oro to Zacatecoluca.

EasrernFronl - Francisco Sanchez

- Occupation of the city of Perquin and assault on the enemy garrison on the
Ilth of January, in the province of Morazan.
- Occupation of the city of Osicala, Morazan, on January 13th.
- Occupation of the cities of El Rosario, Corinto, Nueva Esparta Santa Rosa
de Lima on the 12th of January (provinces of Morazan and La Union).
- Siege and assault on the harracks at Gotera during the 13th, 14th and 15th
of January.
- marching to Cotera from the Central Barracks of the lnfantry Brigade
stationed in San Mieuel. This column. which included armored vehiclesand
artillery, was stopPd and in large part disorganized.
- Amhush of reinforcements that were going from La Leona to the city of
Puerto de La Union. ~ ~
- Diversionary actions were carried out in the city of San Miguel.
- Control of the highways between San Miguel and Cotera, hetween San
Miguel and Usulutan and El Delirio.

The high degree ofcoordination of those actions in the four war fronts, the
strength of the attacks, the high moral of our f.ghtcr- dernonstrate clearlv the
hi-hmilitarv..a~acitv.of OurForces.
During sevcralday,, thcy mdnaged to annihilate numcrou, positions. la? stege
tu dnd cont'iin str,iicgic militar) unidi the gcniicidal J~nta. itop its coiiiniuni-
cations and supplies, intercept the reinforcements that weresent ln the maioritv
national territory.re the enemy high command was able to move troops fn thé
The impact of the initial phase of the general oiknsive on the ranks of the
Puppet and assassin army, managed 10draw from its ranks patriotic officersand
soldiers of our people who are today fighting with their brothers, directing their530 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARYACTIVLTIES

arms against the real enemies of our people, a valiant attitude that is a vibrant
cal1to those decent officersand soldiers who still remain within the structures of
the fascist command.
Today, the Salvadoran workers, the entire people, can have proof that their
vane- ,d. the FMLN. has known how to foree the-instruments that will brine -
about a total revolutionary victory.
In San Salvador, where the élite strategic forcesof the enemy are concentrated
and where the massacre that the fascist dictatorship has carried out for several
years reached its highest volume in 1980, the working masses most conscious
carried out with great valor the cal1for the strike. The FMLN recognizes that,
except for the attack on the central base of the Air Force, it did not manage to
strike the forceful military blows in the capital that were needed to sustain the

full development of the strike and to set off the popular insurrection.
The genociddl government kas tried to take advantage of this fact through its
delirious and lying propaganda. Other voices have also been heard making
superficialjudgments about the supposed refusal of the popular masses in the
capital to take the road of revolution. We are absolutely certain that the heroic
and combative people of San Salvador will give full lie to such speculations and
we cal1upon them to prepare for the coming battles, at the same lime that we
cal1 upon the ranks of our memher organizations of the FMLN and their
revolutionary armed forces to organize in al1details the coming great revolution-
arv actions in San Salvador.
'lhc Junt:i has hîd no recours but toseek the suppiin of mrrirnancs and ljunch
a lyiiigcampaign i)propaganda. hacking iiwli i\.iihth? muuling of the rneans of
communications, includingpennanently tying together al1the rad10stations.
But this will not permitit to make up for its losses, nor recover the initiative
in the war. Our forces, within the context of the general offensive, are now
carrying out a necessary and previously planned movement that guarantees the
continuation of the offensive to new and hieher Dhases.
The miliiary-Christian Demucraiic Junili ;nd iiimurderoui armed forces were
rockcil by thc cncrgctic initiaticin i>i our gencral olicnïivc I>csperately. thcy
seized upon the intensification of the repressive terror against an unarmed
population as other rotten dictatorships had done as their end approached. They
established the curfew and the Martial Law with this end to this end.
The Government of the United States rushed to facilitate and increase the
sending of military advisors, arms and ammunition to help the Juntd maintain
itself and extend the massacre against our people. At the same time, the
imperialistsare threatening the Nicaraguan people and, with the newintervention-
ist steps they have taken, are shaping up the serious danger of the extension of

the coniiict to al1of Central America, thus threatening the peace of the world.
The FMLN, at the head of the heroic Salvadoran people, will continue
advancing in ils stmggle to the final liberation of our people, without taking
fright before the stubborn imperialist intervention.
The people of Sandino, who opened the future of Central America, will not
kneel before the imperialists. The people of Central America, who are now living
in the most important hour of their history, will close ranks to prevent the sad
murderous designs of imperialism from coming to pass.
Nine of every ten United States made bullets that corne into the hands of the
Junta go directly to spill the blood of the unarmed population, and are designed
to kill children, women and the elderlv. Each new steDthat im~erialism takes in
ils military escalation against the ~alvadoran people, increasesihe threat against
the Nicaraguan revolution and against peace in Central America and the Carib-
bean, and threatens the peace of the world REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDBRS 531

We are sure that the ~eo~lesof the world and the aovernments that love Deace
and Jcfend the prin~ipies of rïif.deterniin~tion, wilrraise their pouerful i:oicer
anJ set in murion rheir ditiori> of solidarit). to h~lJ back rhe military cs:~lation
<ifLniteJ Sistcs imperialism againsi the SaIradoran peo~lt.

Fonvard fiehters. ionvard auërrillas and militias. foÏwa;d comoaneros. workers
and patrioticsoldiers, continue the battles that will bring peace, justice, liberty
and true independence to Our native country.
Unired in rhefight ro rhefinol vicrory!
Revolurion or death, we will win!

Salvador Cayetano CARPIO(Martial)
Schafik Jorge HANDAL
Roberto ROCA

In representation of Joaquin VILLALOBO - S Juan Ramon MEDRANO
Ferman CIENFUEGOS

January 21, 1981

APPENDIX 7

Sources

Many of the materials used in this study are readily available in major libraries.
In addition to magazines and newspapers, examples of such readily available
materials include the Daily Reporr (Volume VI, Latin America) of the Foreign
Broadcast information Service (cited herein as FBIS), which records in English
translation sienificant news items from throuehout the world. Also widelv
a\,dliahle arc the annu~l \,olumr$ of Amdrrc<i>fiiry,rKnPc>lr<:i.Ciurenr~i,rurn<.n;s
publirhed hy the Oltice of ihc Hisinrian, Ilcparimeni ol Siatc. \Vashingion. DC.
and oiher Uniied States Govcrnment l'uhliçation\'.
Unfortunately, many other primary sources for the study of contemporary

history are not as readily available. As the Central American conflict has con-
tinued, the number of people who have discussed their expenences and direct
participation in theconflict has increased. Two separate appendices to this study

'Examplesof rccentpublicationsrclatedto ihis one include:
"Sdrtdining .iConiirlcni I'olicinCcnlril ,\mrrira On< Ycdr <\ltr.rihc \dliun.il
Iltp:in8rnnCornmiriionKcporl". Keportin ihr I'r~sidcniircirihr Srvr~.inul Si~ii.
UniiedStalo I>ep.inmcntof S1;iic.Swial KcportNo 124.Apnl 1'185
"The Soviet-Cuban Conneclion in Central America and the Caribbean";
Departmentsof Statcand Defense,WashingtonD . C. March 1985.

"News Briefing on IntelligenceInformationon ExiernalSuppon of the Guerrillas
in El Salvador", AmbarsadorThomas R. Pickering,El Salvador, and General Paul
Department;Wedncsday. August 81nit,984;Washington.DC.Command at the Statc

"Background Paper: Nicaragua's Mililary Build-up and Support for Central
July 18,1984.ersion", Depanmenis of State and Defense. Washington, DC,532 MILITARY ANI> PARAMII.ITARY ACTIVITII~S

are dedicated to such people - frequently among the most valuable contributors
to the understanding of contemporary events (see Apps. 3 and 4).
Then there are written records. Between the day in November 1980 when
Salvadoran police round a cache of documents hidden in the walls of the home
of the brother of the Secretary General of the Salvadoran Communist Party,
and the day in April 1985 when Salvadoran Army units captured Commander
Nidia Diaz along with archives of the Central Committee of the PRTC after a
battle near a regional command post, literally thousands of Salvadoran guerrilla
documents - including letters, diaries, travel records, weapons inventories and
related papers - have been captured. These now include, in addition to the
PCES and PRTC files mentioned above, major records of the Peoples Revo-
lutionary Amy (ERP) captured in January 1981. Three of the five major
components of the FMLN may, therefore, be studied through their own words

and iccord,
'lhcsc t'M1.N \'ocunicnts constitute ;in invaliiitblc original source and willhe
iiiadc ara~lable 10 rihuldrs and uthcr interestcd an.il)st. in manncr hiniilar 1,)
that of the documents obtaincd in Grcnsda uhirh wcredepositcd in the National
Archives '.
Finally, some sources have been consulted but cannot yet be released to the
public for reasons of national secunty. They include:

- Telegrams, memoranda, reports and other records retained by the Foreign
Afiirs International Management Center (AIFAIM) and the Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs (ARA), Department of State.
- Telegrams to and from United States diplomatic posts in Central America,
especially Nicaragua, including NODIS and other captioned records, as
maintained in the Information Management Section of the Executive Sec-
retariat (SIS-[), Department of State.
- Records of the United States intelligencecommunity with both technical and
human source reporting, including information from Nicaraguans from al1
walks of life, members of the Nicaraguan intelligence and security organiza-
tions, as well as full debriefing by various security services in the region of

captured Salvadoran insurgents and defectors.
One final caveat. The fact that an open citation is given for a particular event
does not imply the absence of corroborating classified information. In some
cases, unclassified sources were sought out to protect classified ones.

'Copicsof 19documentslrom the PCES and ERP cachesweremadeavailableto the
pressby the Departmentof State,accompanicdby Englishtranslations, on February 23.
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[rom aiy bookseller. For information rcgarding the sale of the ~o~-~...-:icationsplease
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