Memorial of Nicaragua

MEMORIALOF NICARAGUA

MÉMOIREDU NICARAGUA PART ONE

THE EVID-NCE~OF COST--RICA-. LE~A~ - -

RESPONSIBII~II'YFOR MlLlTARY AND POI.II'ICAL
ACTIVITII.:SINTEKDEI) TO OVI<RTHROWTHE

GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA

INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 July 1986,Nicaragua filed its Application in the Court alleging that
Costa Rica, by organizing, assisting, fomenting, participating in and tolerating
acts of armed force in and against the territory of Nicaragua, committed by

armed bands of counter-revolutionaries hased in Costa Rican territory had
violated its obligations ta Nicaragua under international law. The Application
asked that the Court declare the conduct of Costa Rica to be in breach of inter-
national law and to order Costa Rica to cease and desist from such activities.
II rcquesied the Court IO declaie ihat Co\ta Rica is undrr a dut). IO make com-

pensation for al1injury caused ta Nicaragua hv ihr brca:he\ oi intcrnaiional la\\,
found by the Court.
2. On 17 October 1986, time-limits were set for the presentation of written
Memorials on the merits of the case, under which the Memorial of Nicaragua

was to be filed on 21 July 1987,and the Memorial of Costa Rica was to be filed
nine months later. On 16July 1987,the Court extended the date for the presen-
tation of Nicaragua's Memorial to 10 August 1987. CHAPTER 1. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OFTHE EVIDENCE

3. The Government of Costa Rica has permitted counter-revolutionary
organizations dedicated to the armed overthrow of the Government of
Nicaragua to use Costa Rican territory to conduct military and political
activities against Nicaragua, and has actively collaborated in these activities.
Costa Rica's actions constitute a blatant and ongoing intervention in
Nicaragua's intemal affairs, and a use of force against Nicaragua, in violation
of its legal obligations to Nicaragua under general international law. the
Charters of the Organization of American States and the United Nations, two
hilateral treaties of amity,the Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the
Event of Civil Strife, and other multilateral instruments.

A. The Useof Costa Rican Territory with the Knowledge and Approval of the

Costa Ricsn Government

4. There is overwhelming evidence that Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary (or
"confia'? organizations have used Costa Rican territory to conduct military and
political activities aimed ai overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua by
armed force. At least two of these politico-military organizations, ARDE'
(from 1982to mid-1986) and UNO' (from mid-1985 to 1987)were oermitted bv
Costa Riran aurhoritiesto estnblish headquartcrs fasilities in San Jose, and to
maintain nunierou\ miliiary camps in the northern part of the country. closc to
the border with Nicaraaua. The headouarters facilities were used to hold reaular
public assemblies of c~nrra leaders, where military and political strategieswere
developed for forcihly replacing the Government of Nicaragua, for organiza-
tional activities in connection with this effort. for issuine nublic declarations
calling for armed struggle against the Nicaraguan Government, and for co-
ordinatine, supply and logistical services in suooort of the military activities con-
. ~ ~ ~ ..
ducted from the camps Tnthe north.
5. The military camps themselves were used as staging points for armed
attacks in and against Nicaragua, as safe havens for contra forces after comple-
tion of their combat inissions inside Nicaragua, as training grounds for new
recruits, and as military supply depots. By 1985,ai least 27 of these camps were
in oneration. (Ann. C. Attachment 5. Table 1.) There were also at least nine
îirskips in ~~sta Rican tcrriiory that wcre used to airdrop supplies IO contra
forces during missions inside Nicaragua. (Ann. C, Attachmeni 5, Table 2.) Thc
evidence demonstrates that this was no small-scale oneration. but a full-fledaed
war effort. According to the United States ~mbassador to costa Rica, as many
as 2,800 contra combatants operated from the Costa Rican camps, spread al1
along the border with ~icaragua. (Ann. 1, Attachment 63.) They were heavily
armed with automatic weapons, mortars, grenade launchers and even a small
air force and navy. In five years of continuous fighting, they carried out more

' AlianzaRevolucionariaDcmacratica.or DemocraticRevolutianaryAlliance.
' United NicaraguanOpposition. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 13

than 350attacks inside Nicaragua, mostly by land but also by air and sea. There
have been hundreds of airdrops of supplies to contra forces inside Nicaragua
originating from Costa Rican airstrips. The consequences to Nicaragua, with a
oooulation of barelv 3 million and a ver c.oita-eross nationa. nrodufl of $770.
hate been staggering both in humanand economic terms'.
6. The evidence is equally overwhelming that these activities were conducted
with the knowledee and aooroval of the costa Rican Government at ils hiahest
levels. Costa ~i& could hardly he unaware of the existence of contra Gead-
quarters in its own capital city, of the much publicized presence of contra
military and poliii:al leader. or the frrquent public arsemblies and dcclaraiionr
calling for the armed overihrow of the Nicaraguan Govcrnmcnt. or thecounilcss
other dailv activities of these ornanizations aimed at that end. It iseauallv incon-
ceivableihat Costa Ricacould havebeenunaware of ihçexiensiveand soniinuous
military aciivitiesofthe contrar bascd in Costa Risan ierriiory. Like the conrras'

oolitical activities in San José.their militarv activities in the northern oart of the
country have always been matters of public knowledge in Costa Rica. The
existence of the camps, the training activities conducted there and the constant
cross-border attackson ~icaraeua-have been reoorted reeular-. in the Costa ,
Rican press, and in the newspapers that the contra organizations themselves are
permitted to oublish and distribute in Costa Rica. The contras' use of Costa
~ican territor; to waee war on Nicaraeua has been so o--~ th~~~~~~~~ recoenized
inofficial publicaiions oiihe United tat t Deparimîni of Starï, ~uchas ihe Dir-
rionary oflnternational Relations Ternis (1987). which defines the uord "Con-
tras" as followi:
"Shortened form of the word 'countrarevolucionarios' fcounter-revolu.
tionaries), the term the Sandinista regimein Nicaragua uses forthe guerrilla

forces fiehtine aeainst them. TheContras cornorise former members of the
~omozisÏh'at~on~lGuard. disideni righi-ringformer Sandinirias. and the
Miskito Indian minority: ea;h of ihcsc forccr operaie\ independenily. The
Contras ooerate from bases inHonduras and Costa Rica. and receivepoliti-
cal and maierial;uppori froni the United Siaics.Therc have bern rerurrent
armcd clashes berreen Sandinista government iroops and the rebels since
Marsh 1982." (Ann. F, Attïchment 1, p. 23 (emphasis suppliedj.)
7. Between 1982and 1987,Nicaraeua delivered to Costa Rica more than 150
diplomatic notes protesting the contras' activities in or emanating from Costa
Rica, in many cases providing detailed evidence of the use of Costa Rican ter-
ritorv and the-activecollaboration or oarticioation of Costa Rican officiais. (See.
e.g.,.~nn. A, Artachmenis 109. 125,'172,i07, 228, and 237 (Diplornatic Note;

of Nicaragua).) Nicaragua deliveied similar proicrts io the bilaieral hlixed Com-
mission thai functioned from 1982to 1984.and the Commission of Supervision
and Pre\.eniion, esiablished in 1984through the pood offices of the Coiitadora
Group. (Ann. R. Artachment\ 1and 2.) Both commissions were estahlihhed ai
~icaragua's urging in order to investigate and help resolvedisputes arising from
military activitiescontra forces based inCosta Rica. (SeealsoAnn. B,Attach-
ment 3.) Both directly and through these commissions, Nicaragua presented
Costa Rica with concrete proof of the existence and locations of the following
contra military camps inside Costa Rica, inter alia:
1. El Inferno - 5.5 km south-east of Penas Blancas.
2. Barrs de Colorado - 22.5 km south-west of San Juan del Norte.

InternationalBankfor Reconstructioand Development,WortdDevelopmenR r eporr
1987, Oxford UniversitPress (19871.14 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

3. El Valle - 9.5 km Westof Cardenas.
4. Los Vueltas - 7.5 km south of Pefias Blancas.

5. Quebrada de Agria - 17 km south-west of Peaas Blancas.
6. El Murci6lago - 35 km south-west of Peaas Blancas.
7. Los Andes - 5 km north-east of El Naranjo (Monte Plata)
8. La Liberlad - east of Peaas Blancas.
9. Sarupiqui - 28 km south-west of San Juan del Norte.
10. Luno Azul - ~ ~km~so~ ~-west of El Castillo.
II. Luno B1anc.a - south-ucsi of El Casiillo.
12. Tango Rojo 2 - 5W meters from Los Chiler. along ihc border.
13. Taneo 1 and 2 -- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~a~t~llo cecior.
14. 21 and 22 - 12.5 km south-west of the El Papaturro border post.

15. Hacienda Conventillo - 3 km east of El Naranjo.
16. San Dimas - 4 km south of Peaas Blancas.
17. El Amo (Hacienda) - 21 km south of Peiias Blancas.
18. Verdum - 11 km south-east of Cardenas.
19. Santa Cecilia (Hacienda) - 14 km south of Mexico, along the border.
21. El Refugio - 2 km south of the Fatima border post.
22. Los Angeles - 6 km south of Fatima. .
23. Berlin (Hacienda) - Il km from Fatima.
24. Santa Isabel (Hacienda) - 8 km south of Fatima.
25. Cerro Crucitas - 5 km south of Rio El Infiernito.

26. Fincas El Chivito and Escalera - 15 km south-west of El Castillo.
27. Laguna Garza - 8 km south of the San Juan delta. (Ann. C, Attachment
5, Table 1.)

8. As of the date of Nicaragua's Application to this Court, Costa Rica had
made no serious effort to curtail the military activities of the contras emanating
from these and other contra camps, or to restrict the other contra activities
addressed in the diplomatic correspondence. Indeed, Costa Rica's refusal to
acknowledge responsibility for the armed attacks against Nicaragua emanating
from its own territory, or to take appropriate remedial measures, resulted in the
failure of hoth the Mixed Commission and the Commission of Supervision and
Prevention.

B. The Active Collahoration of the Costa Rican Govemment in Military and
Poliiical Activities against Nicaragua

9. While Costa Rica's aonroval of the contras' militarv and oolitical efforts
..
to overthrow the Nicaraguan Covernment may be presumed from its undeniable
knowledze of these activities and its failure to take a~~..ori.te action to curtail
them, thëre is also abundant and irrefutable direct evidence that Costa Rican
Covernment officiais, at the highest level, actively collaborated with and
assisted the contras in these efforts. For example, if is now fully admitted on
the public record that Costa Rican President Luis Alberto Monge personally
and officially approved the construction of a major airbase in northern Costa
Rica for the purpose of resupplying the contra forces inside Nicaragua. He did
so at the request of the Ambassador of the United States, Lewis A. Tambs. In
his sworn testimony in the Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation of
the United States Congress, Ambassador Tambs confirmed that the airbase was

approved by Costa Rican authorities:16 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

that there are 'safehouses' in La Cruz which are used. amona other things,
to recruit combatants and send them to Honduras. The sime is tmeof
Liberia and Canas. We recommend an investigation and 'clean-up' of
those towns bv National Securitv.
Weconnot disregard rhe as.ïis;unce which rhe counrerrevolutionary and
non-counrerrevolurionary elemenls have received /rom persons whoform
part of this Government . .." (Ann. D, Attachments 6 and 7 (two
29 August 1983 memoranda from Lt. Col. Mario Araya to the Vice
Minister of Public Security).)

12. In May 1985, Col. Ricardo Rivera, a former chief of the Rural Guard,
stated at a press conference that officials of the Costa Rican Government main-
tained close ties with the contras, and that the contrasoperated from military

camps in Costa Rica with the complicity of ranking government and security
officials. (Ann. H, Attachment 58.) During the same month, in legal pro-
ceedings in the Costa Rican courts, foreign mercenaries who had served with the
contras in Costa Rica and Nicaragua testified that Rural Guard officers and
enlisted men assisted in the establishment of a contra training hase in northern
Costa Rica. (Ann. G, .Attachment 2, p. 23.) In subsequent public statements.
they provided details of the active collaboration of the Civil Guard in tbeir
military efforts against Nicaragua:

- The Civil Guard eave-them orecis7 information. includine maos a-.
diagrams of targeis inside Nicaragua.
- The Civil Guard îcrivcl. hel.ed [hem in an aitack on the Nicaraa-an border
post of La Esperanza.
- Civil Guard officers made frequent friendly visits to contra training camps
in northern Costa Rica and promised them protection. (See, e.g., Ann. H,
Attachment 59; Ann. 1, Attachment 18.)

13. The collaboration of the Costa Rican security forces with the contras was
not contrary to official Costa Rican policy, but in furtherance of it. Public
statements by senior government officials demonstrate that they shared the con-
tras' ultimate objective: to change the Government of Nicaragua by military
force. In June 1985, for example, Foreign Minister Carlos José Gutierrez
publicly stated that he would regard a change of Government in Nicaragua with
approval, and he called upon the United States Congress to enact legislation
approving millions of dollars of military assistance for the contras. (Ann. 1,
Attachment 16.)President Monge, too, appealed to the United States Congress
to approve President Ronald Reagan's request for an appropriation of $14

million for military assistance to the contras.(Ann. 1, Attachment 15.)
14. In the Military and Paramilitary Aclivities in and against Nicaragua, the
Court found that United States support for the contras. in "training, arming,
equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces", constituted unlawful
intervention in Nicaragua's interna1 affairs, and the illegai use of force against
Nicaragua. (Military and Paramilitary Activilies in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reporls 1986,
p. 146(hereinafter Nicaragua v. United Slales).) The Court found that United
States support for the contras was so pervasive that

"the contra force has, at least at one period, been so dependent on the
United States that it could not conduct ils crucial or most significant
military and paramilitary activities without the multi-faceted support of
the United States". (Id., p. 63.)Yet, as dependent as the contras were on the "multi-faceted" support of the
United States, they could not have operated at al1without the particular support
thev received from Costa Rica and Honduras. For without militarv bases in
costa Rican and Honduran territory, the contras would not have bein able to
carry out any armedattacks on Nicaragua. regardless of the amount of material
andother suno..t thev received from the United States. Thus. it was essential
to the United States, if its own support for the contras was to have any impact,
to secure the collaboration of Costa Rica and Honduras. It is hardly coinciden-
tal, then, that from 1982to 1985United States economic assistance to Costa
Rica rose from $7.1 million to $220 million; United States military assistance
to Costa Rica, which was only $0.5 million in 1982, roseto $11.2 million in
1985,a sum that exceeded United States military assistance to Panama for that
year '.
15. For whatever reason - monetary reward or shared ideoloeical conviction
- Costa Rica's collaboraiion wiih the-Uniied Siaie\ in supporring thc contras
was secured. As set forth in the detailed chronology that follow ihis introduc-
tory section. and as summarized below, Costa Rica's collaboration went
thr&ughihreedisiinci phases: the firsi. [rom iheend of 1981through themiddle
of 1985; the second, from the niiddlc of 1985through the filing of Niraragua'r
A~~lication in this case: and the third, from the lime of Nicar-gua's A..iica-
tiÔn to the present.

C. The First Phase: LaLe1981 to Mid-1985

16. The contras beean attackine Nicaraeua from Costa Rican territorv in the
final months of l98C however, Fhe firstphase,of Costa Rica's collaboration
with contras benan in earnest on 15Aoril 1982.when EdénPastora was permit-
ted to hold a press conference in an Josécalling for the armed overthrow of
the Nicaraguan Government and announcing the formation of a guerrilla force,
to be headed hv Pastora himself. to fight aaainst the Government. (Ann. H,
Attachmenrs 7:8. 9. 10.)~asiorawas Grmiiied to organize and irain hi5force
in Costa Rica and io begin mobilizing for armed aiiacks on Nicaraguan installa-
tioni and troon5. ~Ann. H. Artnchmeni II.) In September 1982. anoiher press
conference wa; heid in sa" Joséto announce the formation of ARDE, a coali-
tion of Pastora's guerrilla organization, the Sandino Revolutionary Front
(FRS); another guerrilla group headed by Fernando ("El Negro") Chamorro
(known as the UDN/FARN, and which had actually begun conducting raids
on Nicaraguan territory from Costa Rican hase camps in late 1981)l; the
Nicaraeuan Democratic Movement (MDN). a oolitical oreanization headed bv
/\lions; Robelo. a former member of the ~icara~uan Cioiernment Junta; and
Misurasata, an organizaiion of Miskito, Sumo and Rama lndians headed by
Brooklyn Rivera. (Sec Ann. E, Attachment 2, No,. 4. 5.) The leaders of the
neu,coalition callrd for the uniticaiion of miliiary and political group, \ecking
ihe overthrow of the (;oi,crnment of Nicaragua. (Id.; çee al50 Ann. E.
Attachment 2, Nos. 3, 6.)
17. From 1982until the middle of 1985, the United States and Costa Rica
provided vital support to ARDE. The United States provided financial
assistance and arms. Costa Rica permitted ARDE to maintain military bases

UnitedStatesAgencyfor internationDevelopment, US OverseasLoansandGrnts,
1987.
Nicaraguan Democratic Union - RevolutionaryArmed Forces ofNicaragua.18 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

throurhout the northern oart of the countrv and to use Costa Rican territory
to lainch armed attacks on Nicaragua. costa Rica also permitted ARDE to
maintain its political and military headquarters in San José,and to openly con-
duct the full~ranaeof oolitical and loeistical activities necessarv to suuoort the
war effort.(Seeinn. E,Attachment ;(pamphlet of the opposition ~ioc of the
South (BOS); Ann. H, Attachments 34, 47, 50;Ann. A, Attachment 106
(Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica); Ann. C, Attachments 1, 3,4.)) The Costa
Rican Government's collaboration with the contras and the United States was
so ooen and extensive that orotests arose from sectors of the Government and

populalion anxious io preserve Cosia Rirÿ's internaiional image and il\official
pnlicy of "neuirality". In response to these protcst\. the Governmeni insisied
that Pastora and Chamorro and their forces keeo a low profile, so that their
activities in or from Costa Rica could beplausibG denied: Occasionally, when
their activities became too open or notorious, the Government made a public
show of its efforts to restrainem. For internationalconsumption, the Govern-
ment "arrested" Pastora on various occasions and "expelled" him from the
country at least twice. However, he was always released from custody, or
allowed back into Costa Rica. where his militarv activities continued. within a
brief time.(Seeinfra, para. 35.) Occasionally, members of Pastora's force were
also detained, but again, they were generally released within a short time and
allowed to resume fighting. (See, e.g., Ann. H, Attachment 14.) Most impor-
tant, ARDE continued to maintain military camps in Costa Rica and its attacks
in and against Nicaragua did not abate. Nor was there any cessation of, or
limitation imoosed upon, ARDE's oolitical activities in San José.
18. ARDE'S military activities against Nicaragua hit full stride in 1983,and
over the next three years it carried outch-puhlicized aerial bombings of vital
economic installations in Nicaragua, including the international airport ai
Managua on 8 September 1983. (See infra, para. 54.) ARDE also launched
seaborne assaults on oil storage tanks, destroying more than 300,00g0 allons of
fuel at the port of Benjamin Zeledon on 2 October 1983. (See infra, para. 58.)

On the ground, there were scores of armed attacks on Nicaraguan villages.
customs houses and military posts. The forces of Pastora and Chamorro,
augmented by special units of the FDN (Fuerza Nicaraguense Democratica) -
the main contra army operating out of Honduras - constituted a veritable
"Southern Front" of the counter-revolution. threatened as much damaze to
Nicaragua as the conrra effort based in ond dura Ssome of the Costa Rica-
hased contra attacks involved large concentrations of forces. Most notorious
was ARDE's attack on the border town of San Juan del Norte. which com-
menced on 6 April 1984.Approximately 500contras, coming from Costa Rica,
stormed the town with mortars and machine guns. After six days of fierce
fighting, during which the contras wereregularly resupplied by boat from Costa
Rica, they succeeded in taking the town. Costa Rican authorities, including
officiais of the Rural Guard, facilitated the resupply operation, as well as the
transoort of iournalists from San Joséto San Juan del Norte to reoort on the
conrros' capture of Nicaraguan territory. (See infra, para. 68.)
19. While the Costa Rican-based contras continued to harass Nicaragua from
the south, and to cause considerable death and destruction in the process, they
proved unable to weaken, let alone overthrow, the Nicaraguan Government.
Their lack of successin this regard led to interna1dissension. Concerned about
this situation, in July 1984the United States Central IntelligenceAgency sent

Joe Fernandez (alias "Tomas Castillon) to San Joséto serve as CIA Station
Chief. (Ann. F, Attachment 3(Testimony of Mr. Fernandez, p. 16).)According
to Mr. Fernandez, in his sworn testimony in the Joint Hearings on the Iran- MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 19

Contra Investigation of the United States Congress, his instructions from
Washington were (i) to hring about a new, unified conlra political organization,
based in Costa Rica and (ii) to reoraanize the contra military forces in Costa
Kica, iurn [hem into 3 mo;c'cffe;ti~~;fightinp force. and ultimaiely move ihcm
i'romiheir camps In Cosia Rica ro forward bases in Nicaragua. (Id, pp. 18.19,
23-24 iMr. t'ernandrr ieriified ilisi United States sira..ay callcd for <:115taKica
to serve as the principal political base for contra efforts to overthrow the
Government of Nicaragua; Costa Rica was "where we felt - we, CIA, felt -
that the nrimarv value to the o.oer-m was the ~olitical side". (Id.. n. 23.) In
carrying out hi~dutie$, Mr. Fernandel ivorked inclose CO-operaiionuith icnior
Costa Rican officiak. As Ur. 1:ernaiider himselt dcscribcd his azti\irie\ during
this period :

"My view of my responsibility was to develop the southern political
organizations in concert with the efforts being made here in Washington
and in [deleted hy United States Government censors] and in Miami to
bring together the Nicaraguan resistance under one unified leader-
ship. . ..
Al1of us were pulling together with these people and out of that came
the obvious necessity that there was a military side to the resistance
effort. ...
We, in turn, encouraged the leadership to seek every means that they
could to put pressure on the Sandinista regime. . . ."(Id., pp. 18-19,)

He continued :
"If was really encouragernent to [deleted] go into Nicaragua, where if
they claimed they were fighters is where they should be. And so it came
about because of continuous larae n-mbers of ~rohlems that we were
experiencing with the [Costa Rican] government - hecause of the presence
of these ~eoule who were not very covert in their - in protecting the fact
of their oresince in lCosta Kical and there were a number of incidents on
a continuing basis that the [Costa Rican] officials would bring to my atten-
tion and to theattention of other [deletedl officials, and so whenever 1had
contact with them, for whatever reason [deleted] 1would encourage them
to seek some means to leave [Costa Rica] where we felt - we, CIA, felt
- that the primary value to the program was the political side.
In other words, [Costa Rica] presented a hetter environment for the
political declarations to be made, access to [San José] where there was
relative tranquility, modern conveniences, daily flights to the U.S. and so

forth, and that is what the political side needed." (Id., pp. 23-24.)

D. The Second Phase: Mid-1985 to 28 July 1986

20. By the middle of 1985, Mr. Fernandez and his CIA colleagues had suc-
ceeded in creating a new, unified contra political organization and in estab-
lishing Costa Rica as the political center of the counter-revolution. UNO,
the United Nicaraguan Opposition - which joined together the heretofore
senarate contra oreanizations ooeratine -n Costa Rica and Honduras - came
into existence in June 1985, with regional headquarters in San José. (Ann. E,
Attachment 2, No. 17. See Ann. E, Attachment 3, Nos. 4, 7; Attachment 4,
No. 7.) Thus began the second phase of Costa Rica's collaboration with the
United States in support of the conlras, a phase that was characterized by even20 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

more ooen and extensive Costa Rican assistance than in the oast. First. as
indicated, the President and Foreign Minister of Costa Rica opénlysuppo;ted
the contras' military and political objectives, puhlicly calling upon the United
States Coneress Io a.. .oriate additional fundine -or militarv and other
assistance to the contras. Second,the Costa Rican Government pepmitted UN0
- now the pre-eminent contra political and military organization- Io use San
JO&as ils own headquariers, holding periodic as&ernbliesand organizing
sessions. and issuing regular public pronuunccments ~.allinpfor the armed over-
throw of the Nirÿraguan Governmçnt. I'hird, Costa Rica'scollaboration in the
c,tablishment of a revitalized Southcrn Front signalled s new and higher level
of participation in the con1ra.s'rnilitary effort to uverthrow the Nicaraguan
Government.
21. In July 1985, Amhassador Tambs arrived in Costa Rica with explicit

instructions frorn the United States Government's "Restricted lnteragency
Croup", which oversaw al1United States efforts in support of the contras, "to
aid the Nicaragua Resistance Forces in setting up a 'Southern Front"'. (Ann.
F, Attachment 2, Report of the President's Special ReviewBoard, 26 February
1987("Tower Commission Report"), p. C-12. See also Ann. F, Attachment 3
(Testimony of Mr. Tambs, p. 2-I).) As Mr. Fernandez testified to the Tower
Commission :

"When Ambassador Tambs arrived in Costa Rica, he called together the
Deputy Chief of Mission, the Defense Attache and myself, and said that
he had really only one mission in Costa Rica, and that was to form a
Nicaraguan resistance southern front." (Ann. F, Attachment 2 (Tower
Commission Report), p. C-12.)

22. Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro, formerly of the UDN/FARN and
ARDE and now integrated into UNO, was chosen to comrnand the newly-
reorganized contra units based in Costa Rica. (Ann. 1,Attachment 33; Ann. H,
Attachment 60.) Ainbassador Tambs testified that his objective was to
"encourage them to fight" inside Nicaragua. (Ann. F, Attachment 2 (Tower
Commission Report. p. C-12).) In the Joint Congressional Hearings, he
explained :

"[Tlhe question was, how you were going to get the armed democratic
resistance out of Costa Rica, and, of course, that was something which
both the Costa Ricans and wewere interested in, and the only way that you
could get them out of Costa Rica was assure them that they would have
logistical support inside Nicaragua. . . ." (Ann. F, Attachment 3
(Testimony of Mr. Tambs, p. 29-l).)

23. Providinn lonistical SUDDOrtIo contra forces inside Nicaragua reauired
airstrips andsu~p1;depots i"~osta Rica. Thus, the Costa Rican Goverriment,
at its highest levels, permitted the United States to deposit war materiel and
other su~oliesintended for the contras in designated locations on Costa Rican
territori-for subsequent aerial delivery- froh airstrips inside Costa Rica -
Io contra units fighting in Nicaragua. As indicated above, it isa matter of public
record that PresidentMonne personallv aonroved construction of the maior air-
base at Santa Elena. It wasthat very ai;b& that Lt. Col. Oliver North, ~irector
of Political-Military Affairs for the United States National Security Council,
and a member of the Restricted lnteraeen-v G2ouo. dr.crihed in an interna1
mernorandum as "a vital element in supporting the resistance". (Ann. F,
Attachment 2 (Tower Commission Report, pp. C-Il to C-12).) The Presi- MEMORW OF NICARAGUA 21

dent of the United States was told by his National Security Adviser, Vice
Admiral John Poindexter. that the Santa Elena airbase "was a dramatic display
of cooperation and support for the President's policy by the country involved".
(Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony of Adm. Poindexter, p. 5).)
24. Contra forces inside Nicaragua were resupplied from Costa Rica not only
by air, but by sea as well. This "maritime" operation was personally approved
by the Costa Rican Minister of Public Security, Benjamin Piza. an ardent and
active suooorter of the contras. Mr. Piza aareed to the operation earlv in 1985
in a mee& wiih LI. Col. North. The meeting wasdescribed in a ~ebriar~ 1985

memorandum from Lt. Col. Norih IOAdolfo Calero. the direcror of the FDN:
"[Wle ought to look at a maritime capability and something on the

southern front. I had a very useful meeting with the Securiiy Minister of
theplace down south. He has agreed to meet with you verydiscreetly, 1will
let you know when this can be arranged. He is anxious to help, but only
ifit con be done without exposing him or making operations visiblein his
country." (Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Exhibits to Testimony of Oliver L.
North, Exhibit OLN 258, p. 3) (emphasis added).)

25. With Mr. Piza's assistance, as well as that of Costa Rican port autho-
rities, the maritime operation was in full swing by early 1986. As reported to
Lt. Col. North by his special representative, Robert W. Owen, in a memoran-
dum dated 7 April 1986:

"Southern Maritime Operations

On Friday [Le., 4 April 19861,the third successful trip in10 Nicaragua
was made by Our maritime group.
A cover operation has been established in [deletedl and we will soon be
able to send in several trips a week. One boat is fully operational, another
should be ready in 15 to 21 days and a third 21 days later.
The operational part is being run strictly without Nicaraguans. except
for the boat operators on each trip. The localporr officials are aware of

the operation and approve, providing they don't gel caught with arms and
there are nota number of Indians running around." (Ann. F. Attachment
3 (Exhibits to Testimony of Robert W. Owen, Exhibit RWO-15, p. 2)
(emphasis added).)

26. Whilesoine contra uniis did go io fight insidc Nicaragua. and were resup-
nlicd from theairbaseai Santa Elena and oihrr airfield\. and by sca. othcr units
iefused to abandon their Costa Rican base camps and conti-nuedconducting
cross-border raids into Nicaragua, always returning to Costa Rica afterwards.
As Mr. Fernandez testified:

,'Q: To summarize. it posed a political problem for you to bave these
Nicaraguans in [Costa Rica] didn't il?
"A: Most definitely.

"Q: And you tried to encourage them to gel to Nicaragua and to fight
to get them out of [Costa Rica]?
"A: Yes sir.
"Q: And there was a reluctance on the part of Negro Chamorro Io go

into Nicaragua and fight?
"A: Yes sir." (Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony of Mr. Fernandez,
P. 2%)22 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

27. At the end of 1985,there were 27 contra military encampments in Costa

Rica. (Ann. C. Attachment 5, Table 1.) During the second half of 1985and the
firsthalf of 1986,there were constant Atacks from these camps directed against
Nicaraguan villages, border posts, and troops. Most of the attacks were carried
out under the auspices of UNO, which included Chamorro's forces and the
FDN. However, Pastora and his forces, which refused to join UN0 (and were

therefore cut off from further assistance from the United States), continued to
carry out military activities from their own camps in northern Costa Rica. (See
infra, paras. 124-125.)

E. The Third Phase: Since 28 July 1986

28. The second phase of Costa Rica's collaboration with the United States
and the contras drew to an end when Nicaragua filed its Application with this
Court on 28 July 1986. Since then, the principal contra activity in Costa Rica
has been political. Costa Rica has indeed become, as the United Statesintended,

the political center of the counter revolution. UN0 and its successor organiza-
tion have been permitted to conduct their activities in San Joséopenly and with
imounitv. (See inf-a. ..ras. 123-135. 141.) No limits whatsoever have been
im;>osedon the contras' political actihes in support of their armed struggle.
In October 1986, for example, a three-day meeting of UNO's Consultative
Assembly was held in San José, an Assembly that constituted

"vi~ ~ -~~ex^t ~- in ever,sense of the word - for the directorate of UN0
and, by extension, for the combatants who are generously sacrificing them-

selves to oDen Our vath of return to Our country". (Ann. E, Attachment
3, No. 8.)'

I~ ~~~ ~~~ ,~~..the con~ra~ oublished and disseminated in San José. throueh
their ncu,spapcr in ihai siiy.'a '.Dosumcnt of Democraiic ~greemeni of ihc
Nicardruan Resi~ianc<",which uas signcd by leader, of UN0 and BOS(Bloque
opositor del Sur), another San Jos~based contra organization with its own
military units operating from northern Costa Rica. The document called for
"replacement of the totalitarian regime of the FSLN" with a "Provisional

Government of National Unity, the principal objective of which will be the
reordering of the structure of Our society". (Ann. E, Attachment 4, No. 8
(Nicaragua Hoy, 1/24/87).)
29. The third phase of Costa Rica's support for the contras, thus far, has
been characterized by a marked diminution in military activities against

Nicaragua from Costa Rican territory. In part, this has resulted from the final
defeat of Pastora and his forces by Nicaraguan Government troops. But it also
has been the product of a conscious decision by the Costa Rican Government.
To be sure, Costa Rica has continued to permit certain military activities in sup-
port of the contras in its territory. For example, it has allowed United States
planes delivering supplies to contra forces in southern Nicaragua regularly to

overfly Costa Rican territory, and it has permitted CO-ordinationof this
resupply operation by United States Government personnel in San José. (See
infra, paras. 136-140.)Although it closed down the notorious Santa Elena air-
base, it allowed contra supply flights to refuel at San José's commercialairport,
and allowed a network of contra airfields to remain in operation. (See infra,

paras. 135-138.) However, it is notable that, coincident with the filing of
Nicaragua's Application, Costa Rica suddenly discovered the means to restrict
the armed attacks emanating from the contras' military bases in the north - MEMORIAI OF NICARAGUA 23

and these activities have dropped off substantially, although no1 entirely. The
explanation for thisturn of events was givenby a captain in the CivilGuard who
was involved in closing down the Santa Elena airbase in September 1986. Ifhad
to be closed down, he explained, "because it could affect Costa Rica's image
in The Hague". (Ann. 1, Attachment 46.) CHAPTEH II. CtIRONOLOtiICAL ACCOUNT OF COSTA RICA'S
SllPYORT OF MII.ITARI' AND OTHER ACTlVlTlES AIMICDAT

30. Throughout the period from late 1981to the present, the contras have
used Costa Rica as a base for military activities against Nicaragua with the
objective of overthrowing the Government by armed force. They have used San

Jose as the political headquarters for their organizational and propaganda
activities. and for the orovision of combat sumor..services. Without the
military encampments, training facilities. command centers, intelligence posts
and airstri~s available Io them on Costa Rican soil, the contras would not have
been able io establish and maintain their critical "Southern Front". It is well
documented that the Government of Costa Rica, at the highest levels, has at al1
times knowingly tolerated these contra activities on ils territory. and has on
nomerous occasions actively assisted the contras in conducting their armed
attacks in and against Nicaragua.
31. These activities and Costa Rica's knowledge of and complicity in them
are demonstrated hy. inter alia, admissions of ofîïcials of the Costa Rican
Government; admissions, in sworn testimony before the United States Con-

- .ss. of ofîïcials of the Government of the United States who participated in
planning and implemeniing the conrros' '.Souihern Front". and officiai United
States Government reports on ihese events; diplornatic sorrespondence beiween
Nicaragua and Costa Rica throuah which Costa Rica was re~eatedly placed on
officiaïnotice of the contras' aitivities on its territory; ~karagua's routine,
contemporaneous documentation of contra attacks launched from Costa Rica
and logistical support operations conducted in Costa Rica; the publications and
proclamations of contra organizations and their leaders in Costa Rica; sworn
testimony before the Costa Rican courts of individuals involved in the contras'
military activities against Nicaragua; and other independent, corroborative
sources such as press accounts from Costa Rica and the United States.

A chronological account of these activities follows.

32. In IYXIand 1982.seteral organizations urre formed which had as their
ohier.ti\,eihc overihrou of the C;overnmeni ol Nicaragua through military and
plirlimiliiary operaiions against Nicaragua. ivaged wholly or in pari from the
ierritory of Coçta Rica. One of the iirsi ruch groups to form wasthe Nicaraguan
Democratic Union (UDN) and its armed wing, the Nicaraguan Revolutionary
Armed Forces (UDN/FARN). FARN, led by Jose Francisco Cardenal and Fer-
nando "El Negro" Chamorro Rapaccioli, was *active in southern Nicaragua in
1981" and was "believed com~rised of some 200 to 250 activists operating

largely out of Costa Rica and Honduras" in early 1982,according to 16 JUI~
1982report of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency. (Ann. F, Attach-
ment 6. at D. 22.)
33. ~ccoidingto the Costa Rican National Security Agency. contra forces
began using the zone along Costa Rica's northern border to train recruits in late26 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

and Alfonso Robelo, leader of a San José-based organization called the
Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN). (Ann. H, Attachment 17.) Paid
nolitical advertisements olaced bv Robelo and the MD~ ~t~~-d~in-~~~~~~~ ~r~~-~. -~~~
moment has arrived for open struggle ...". (Ann. E. Attachment 2, Nos. 1,2.)
39. On 24 July FDN leader JoséFrancisco Cardenal held a nress conference

in San José, at which he claimed responsibility for recent'attacks against
Nicaragua and declared that military means were necessary to establish a new
Government in Nicaraeua. (Ann. A. Attachment 16 (Diolomatic Note of
Nicaragua, 4 August 1982); ~nn. H, ~ttachments 18, 19.) '

40. On 25September a newalliance among the several Costa Rican-based con-
tra arouns was announced in San Jose. calline itself the Democratic Revolu-
tioniry Àlliance (Aliania Kevolucionaria Dekocraiisa). or AUDE. Among
ihosc included inthealliance were Eden Pa5tora (FRS). Alfonso Robelo (hlDN).
Fernando Chamorro IUDNIFARNI. and Brooklvn Ritera. head of an oreaniza-

tion of Miskito, sumo and Rama indians called~isuras~ta. (Ann. E, Attach-
ment 2. Nos. 4. 5.)
41. On 2 November contras Fernando Chamorro and Juan JoséZavala were
detained in Naranjo, Guanacaste in northern Costa Rica, with a cargo of arms,
maps, parachutes, aerial navigation charts and other equipment. (Ann. H.

Attachments 25. 26.1The two were freed on the same d~v. O~~,~~ovember th~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
weaponsand suppliei werereturned io them. (Ann. H. Atiachments 27,28.) The
mayor of Naranjo asserted ihat the arms wcre reiurned beiaure the Ministrv of
Public Securitvhad issued nermits to Chamorro and Zavala to carrv an unlimited
quanliiy of wéaponsof an) type. (Id..seeako Ann. 1,~tiachmeni 3.)Thr &r-

mirshad been rcnewedon 13Ociober 1982.by the Arms and ExplosivesConirols
Deparimeni of the llinistry of Public Security. (Ann. H. Artachmenr 28.)
42. The mobilizarion of ronrra groups in northern Cosia Kica continucd
rhrounh the end of 1982under the full viewof Costa Rican authoriiies. who did

little or nothing tu stop it. (Ann. H, Attachment 23.) For example, on 1
December a group of contras attacked the Nicaraguan border village of
Cardenas, supported by an aircraft that dro~oed flares over Cardenas near
Nicaraguan ~cfcnsive posiiions. Boih thc attàckers and the airsrsft reiurned
unhindered io Cosia Kicanterrirory. Thisocsurred in an arca 5 kilometcrs l'rom

the frontierand near the Pan American Hiehwav. where there are several Costa
Rican observarion poçts. The attack lasied>eariy'fivc hours and could noi have
escaped the airenrion of the Cosra Rican aurhoriiies. who look no action. More-
over. it occurred onlv one dav after a meeting. held under the ausoices of the
~ixed ~ommission,.between- Nicaragua's V~C M inister of the kterior and

Costa Rica's ViceMinister of Public Security, the purpose of which was to pre-
vent the occurrence of such incidents. (~nn. ~.~~ttachment 18 (~iolo~atic
Note of Nicaragua).) Two weeks later, a'~embe; of the Costa ~icàn National
Assembly stated that the attack on Cardenas was staged from Costa Rica and
specifically from bases known Io the Costa Rican Government:

"We have been able Io confirm that the lieht airolane which overflew the
village of Cardenas during the attack perpeïrated'against it took off from

Playa Blanca in the jurisdiction of Hacienda El Murcielaeo, Costa Rican
territorv.
The Government knows that there and in a nearby estate there is not one
small airplane, but two, plus a camouflaged helicopter.

Thegroup of counter-revolutionaries who attacked the town (Cardenas)
crossed the border having departed from Chapernon and Pefia Lonja, in
Costa Rica territory a few kilometers from the frontier. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 27

New acts of aggression are being prepared in encampments on several
estateson the border, one of which belongs to Hector Garcia, another in
Monte Plata belonging to a widow named-~edina, and also on estatesof

Rigoberto Gallegus and Ramiro Oregneda." (Ann. H, Attachment 64.)

43. At the sametime, contra organizations continued, with impunity, to make
San Josétheir headquarters for making public. .peal..in support of the..
military and political campaigii agaibn! Nicaragua. Sec. e.g.. the nurnerous paid
political ad\eriisements appcaring in San Jus; nçw,papçrs in December 1982.

(Ann. E, Attachment 2, Nos. 7-15.)

44. Contra activity in Costa Rica continued and expanded in 1983, and the
evidencemounted that CostaRican authorities ~rinci~ally the Rural Guard, were
openly assisting the mercenary forces. (Ann. 1; ~ttaihients 4, 8.) Throughout

1983and into 1984,Pastora's operations - al1on Costa Rican soi1- continued
unabated. (Ann. 1.Attachment 5.)While his activities wereshut down brieflv bv
Costa ~icàn authorities from the Io tirne, on each occasion they quickl;
resumed. (Ann. 1, Attachment 8.)

45. The oublic an.e.lsof Pastora andother contra leadersfor armed stru,e~le -.
apainst Nicaragua likewisecontinued to einanate from Costa Rica. For example.
on 7 January 1983a press conference was held in San Jose in which Alfonso
Robçlo. Brooklyii Rivera. EdénPaiiora and Francisco Fiallos. al1membcrs of

ARDE. called for the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Governmcni. (Ann. A.
Attachment 22 (Diplomatic Noir of Nicaragua) )On 9 February 1983,al a press
conference at the Hotel Amba\sador in San Jose. contra leader Adolfo Calero
assericdthat armrd struggle againsi the ~overnmînt of Nicaragua was growing

daily. "It is a siruggle which the people %III launch apainst the comandantes".
Calero assertçd. I,~n. H. ~~.achment 29.) Further. on 5 and 7 Januarv 1983. ,
Pasiora interiered uith broadcasis on a Nisaraguan Iclevision ehannel to cal1for
armed struggle againsi the Go\'einment of Nicaragua: the interlering hroadcdsts

' iveretraced to the Hacienda El Amo. Costa Rica.the lucatian of onçof Pastora's
military camps. (Ann. A. Aitachment 22 (Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua).)
46. Sloreovçr. eren uhen claiidesiine bruadcasrs by I'astora and othrrs wcre
investieated. the nernetrators were allowed to continue their activities. On or
~ 7~ 7~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~
aboi 23 February 1983. in the courre ol ati inrertigation of clande\tine radio
broadcasis. Maior Slario Jara C:i\troofthe Costa Rican Rural Guard conducied
a search of thé "Quinta Heroica" estate in the Department of San José.The
estate belonged to a Dutch national, one of whose local representatives was a

Nicaraguan, Carlos Maturana Marques, a member of ARDE. Major Jara's men
discovered and confiscated a pick-up truck which contained a mobile transmit-
ter. However, on 23 February Vice Minister of Governance Enrique Chacon

telephoned Major Jaraand instructed him to hand over the transmitter andtruck
to Maturana Marques. Major Jara did so, in the presenceof Col. JoséBenito
Zeledon GonzAlez. Director General of the Rural Guard. (Ann. A, Attachment
109 (Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua).)

47: contra attacks from costa Rica against Nicaraguan vessels,border posts,
and citizens continuedthroughout April and May 1983.A partial listing of such
attacks includes the following:

On 10 April a contra group attacked and seized a launch belonging to
the Nicaraguan Ministry of Transport near Tasbapauni. Nicaragua. The28 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

vasseneers and crew were kidna~oed and taken Io Barra del Colorado

and thence to Puerto Limon, coita Rica. One of the kidnap victims was
wounded and was being treated in a hospital in Limon. (Ann. A, Attach-
ment 26 (Diolomatic Note of Nicaraeua).)
On 15Àp;il a contra group comingfrom Costa Rica attacked theborder
post of Fatima de Sarapiqui, in the Department of Rio San Juan. (Ann.
A, Attachment 28 (~iplomatic Note of ~icaragua).)
On 1-4 May contras repeatedly attacked, from Costa Rican territory,
Nicaraguans who were guarding the ship Bremen at Machuca, El Castillo,
Rio San Juan. (Ann. C, Attachment 1; see Ann. A, Attachment 48 (Dip-
lomatic Note of Nicaragua).)

On 2 May IWO Nicaranuans were killed when a contra group coming
from ~osia~ica atiacked the border poït of La ~speranza-with mortari
and rine fire. (Ann. A. Attachmeni 38 (Viplornaric Note of Nicaragua).)
On 3May 50 contras atiacked the border posi of Papaiurro. Afier being
repcllcd by Nicaraguan troop\. they reireatcd Io Cosia Rica. Among ihe
aiiackers killed was a Cosia Rican national and former Major in the Rural
Guard. Francisco Kodriau-r. IAnn. A. Aiiachmeni 47 (D.vl.maiic Noie of
~icaragua).)
On 5 May two Nicaraguans were wounded at Boca de Sabalos, Rio San
Juan. when thev were ambushed bv mercenaries. The attackers retreated

to Co~ta Kican.ierriiory (Ann. ~,~~itachmînt I )
On 5 May conrras airackcd, from Cosia Rican icrritory. a civilian boat
which wascarrying provisions to one of the towns near San Juan del Norte.
They kidnapped four Nicaraguans, including a ten-year-old boy, and took
them to Costa Rica. (Ann. A, Attachment 44 (Diplomatic Note of
~i~ ~ ~"~ ~, ,
On 10May. an aircraft coming from Costa Rica overflewthe sector of
Barra Rio Maiz. where it dropped packages containing suvplies for contra
erouns. Theaircraft then retGed in thedirection of ~osta-~ica. (Ann. C.
Attaihment 1.)

On 25 May, a boat carrying three West German journalists and several
members of the Nicaraguan border patrol was attacked by contras from
the Costa Rican side of the San Juan River near El Castillo. Two
Nicaraguans were killed in the attack; four Nicaraguans and one of the
journalists were wounded. The attackers kidnapped al1three of the jour-
nalists and took them to Costa Rica. (Ann. C, Attachment 1; Ann. C,
Attachment 6; see also Ann. A, Attachment 4 (Diplomatic Note of
Nicaragua).)

48. During this period, Costa Rican officers admitted that the contras
operating on their territory receivedofficial Costa Rican support. In May, Lt.
Col. Nestor Mora Rodriguez, a local Rural Guard commander in Los Chiles,
admitted his support for the contra forces, and acknowledged that he had per-
sonally helped put Nicaraguan refugees in contact with contra organizers in
Costa Rica to facilitate their recruitment inIo the contra forces. And Col.
Gilberto Orozco, regional head of the Rural Guard for the province including

Los Chiles, adrnitted that Costa Ricans gave the contras logistical support,
includine food and shelter. (See Ann. 1. ~ttachment 4.)
49. 0; 24 hlay 1983,accuied hijacker'hliguel ~olai3os~untcr departed (rom
Costa Rica afier having becn frccd the prcvious day from Cosia Rican custody
on the orders of the rialCourt of ~ibekia, Costa Rica. Hunter, a United States
citizen, had been accused of hijacking anairplane belonging to "Alas", a private MEMORW Of NICAFL4GUA 29

Nicaraguan Company, and forcing the pilot to fly to Costa Rica. He was
released from Costa Rican custody without ever being tried for the hijacking.
(See Memorandum of 8 Auaust 1983. from Costa Rican Maior Rodolfo
Jimener Montero. Depuiy ~irëctor of 1n;elligenceand Security. IOCOI.Johnny
Campos. Vice-Minisierof Puhliz Securiiy. on "the freeing and dcparture from
Ourcountry of an accused hiiacker". and Costa Rican court records documen-
ting ~olaais Hunter's detention andrelease, attached to Annex A, Attachment
109 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
50. Contra attacks from Costa Rican territory continued throughout the

remainder of 1983. A partial listing of attacks in June and July includes the
following:
Between 28 June and 2 July 1983, a group of contras infiltrated
Nicaraguan territory from Costa Rica, attacking the border post of San

Juan del Norte witb heavy machine guns, mortars, rockets and rifle fire.
One Nicaraguan was killed and two were wounded. (Ann. C, Attachment
1:Ann. A. Attachment 53 (Dinlomatic Note of Nicaraeua).) - ,.
'on 6 JUI; contras armed iith'rifles kidnapped Nicaraguan citizen David
Abud near the border post of El Paoaturro and look him to Costa Rica.
(Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
On 7 July one Nicaraguan was killed and another wounded in the El
Toro sector, Rio San Juan. when their patrol was ambushed by contras.
The attackers retreated to Costa Rica. (Ann. C. Attachment 1.)

On 8 July contras ambushed a borde; patrol "ear San Juan del Norte,
killinn the officer in charne of the border oost there. After the attack the
contr& retreated towardCosta Rican territory. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
On 10 July contras on four boats armed with M-50 machine guns
hijacked a Nicaraguan fishing boat, Langostera 160, and took it intoCosta
~ ~ ~ ~ ~n. C.-.tt~ ~ ~ ~ ~.) ~,
On i9July the border post oi.El Papaturro waratiacked by 2010 30ron-
iras who had infiltrated from Cos13Rica. One Nicaraeuan \raiwounded.
(Ann. C, Attachment I .)
On 23 July one Nicaraguan was wounded in a battle at Comarca Pavon

II, near San Carlos, between a Nicaraguan border patrol unit and contras
who had crossed from Costa Rican territory. After the battle, the contras
retreated toward Costa Rica. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
51. On 31 July 1983,the Nicaraguan customs post at Penas Blancas was hit

by light arms fire from Costa Rican territory for about one-half hour. and the
Nicaraguan Army returned the fire. Costa Rican military reports dated 3 and
5 August 1983 confirm that the attack began "from Costa Rican territory".
(Ann. D, Attachment 1(Letter fromthe officer in charge of the Northern Com-
mand, Lt. Col. Rodrigo Rivera Saborio, to Costa Rican Minister of Public
Security, Angel Edmundo Solano Calderon, based on information provided by
Sub-lieutenant Sigifredo Medrano, officer in command of the Costa Rican post
at PeAas Blancas).) The report of Sub-lieutenant Medrano, officer in charge,
further stated:

"From the moment when 1 was first assigned to the post at PeAas
Blancas on June 5, 1983, 1have seen activities taking place here along the
border which 1do not believe to be proper. Persons come and go without
the documents which this department is supposed to require for entry into
and departure from the country, for example, passport, visa, etc." (Ann.
D, Attachment 4.)30 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER MD ACTIONS

52. Two additional official reports filed later in August. by Lt. Col. Mario
Araya, head of the Special Supervisory Unit, to Johnny Campos, ViceMinister
of Public Security, confirmed that the contras were operating throughout the
area without restriction. Following a 24 August search of the Medio Queso
Zone, Lt. Col. Araya, who commanded the search group, reported to Vice
Minister Campos on 29 August that:

"the subversives [i.e., contras] travel freely through the entire zone, with-
out encountering any opposition from the respective authorities. We
recommend at least three fixed positions by the Civil Guard in the follow-
inglocations: Cachito, La Trocha and Boca de Pocosol. as wellas intensive
patrolling of the entire zone. We recommend the closure of the airport in
the La Chalupa estate or the establishment of a monitoring post there."
(Ann. D, Attachment 6.)

And in a report to ViceMinister Campos on searches conducted a fewdays later
in Guanacaste, Lt. Col. Araya concluded:
". .. the immigrationcontrols are deficient andany foreigner isgiven legal
documentation in Liberia. . . .We have detected that there are 'safe
houses' in La Cruz which are used, among other things, to recruit com-
batants and send them to Honduras. The same is true of Liberia and
Canas. We recommend an investiaation and 'clean-UD'of those towns bv
-
National Security.
We connot disregard the assistance which the counter-revolutionary and
non-counter-revolutionary elements have receivedfrom persans whoform
part of this Government . . .(Ann. D, Attachment 7 (emphasis added).)
53. Still another report, from the Costa Rican Director of Intelligence and
Security to Minister of Public Securityngel Edmundo Solano Calderon,dated
30 August reported that:

"ln Los Chiles, there is much activity hy both sides; according to rumors,
it is feared that there will be an act of terrorism near Uoala. There is talk
of movements by members of the counter-revolution. and the Commander
of the Civil Guard does absolutely nothinp. ..." (Ann. D. Attachment 5
(emphasis added).)

54. Despite the fact that top officiais of the Costa Rican Government were
thus repeatedly alcrted. by ihiir own rubordinaies, to the contras'operniions
and the active sompliciiy of the local authoriiies, the contras'actii~iiies in Costa
Rica continued without interference. For example:
On 28 August an airplane flying from Costa Rica carried supplies to a
contra unit located on the banks of the Santa Cruz River, La Azucena.
Dept. of Rio San Juan. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
On 29 August speedboats from Costa Rica brought supplies to contras

at Barra Rio Maiz. (Ann. C. Attachment 1.)
On 3 September one ~icaraguan was killed and another wounded in an
ambush by contras near Cardenas. The contras kidnauped the wounded
man and look him across the border into Costa ~ica.-i~nn. C. Attach-
ment 1 .)
On 8 September two ARDE aircraft proceeding from Costa Rican
airspace entered Nicaragua. One attacked the Augusto C. Sandino Interna-
tional Airport in Managua. and was shot down. The other returned in the
direction of Costa Rica. (Ann. A, Attachment 58 (Diplomatic Note of
Nicaragua; see also Ann. H. Attachments 31, 33; Ann. 1.Attachment 6).) MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 3 1

CIA Station Chief Fernandez also confirmed that Pastora's forces were
responsible for this attack.(4nn. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony of Mr.
Fernandez al p. 160).)
On 9 September a Cessna 185airplane bearing the registration TI AGN
was shot down in the Bolillo sector near El Castillo while on a mission to
carry supplies to contra units. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)

55. On 13September 1983, a San Josénewspaper printed a full-page state-
ment by Edén Pastora filled with "promises" of military actions against
Nicaragua and threats to kill Nicaraguan leaders. "We are going 10 keep on
bomhing [Nicaraguan] military positions", the statementaid. "We are stronger
than ever . . .and you (Members of the Nicaraguan Government) will be
killed." (Ann. H, Attachment 32.) Ten days later, an airplane flying fromCosta
Rica usedrockets to attack the "Nicarao" electric plant and the "Induquinisa"
factory in Nicaragua. In a communiquéissued by ARDE military headquarters
in San José. Edén Pastora claimed responsibility for the attack. (Ann. H.
Attachment 34.) The Government of ~icaragua vigorously protested the use of
Costa Rican territory forARDE's continuing military and propaganda cam-
oaien aeainst il. (~"n. A. Attachment 63 (D~olomatic~ote~of ~icaraeua-.) .,
56 .n 28 ~epiember beginning at 5.10à.i., an ARDE force of approxi-
mately 80 to Iûû conlras invaded Nicaragua from Costa Rica, mounting simul-
taneousmortar and arenade attacks aeainst the customs office at Peaas~lancas
and the iowns of cardenas and 1.a &ca del Sapoa. The atiackers wiihilrçu to
positions one-half kilometer from the border. in the viciniiy of the Costa Rican
customs facilities. where thev had to have been observed bv Costa Rican
authorities.~romthere. they "sed moriars and oiher heavy weapons to erfeci
the almosr roial desirusiion of the Nicaraguan susioms posi ai PeRss Rlanca,.
Subseauentlv. attacks resumed aeainst the Nicaraauan oost. This time the con-
tras fiied mortars and other weapons from empl&em;nts in the Costa Rican
customs facilitiesthemselves. Two aircraft also invaded Nicaraguan airspace
from Costa Rica. bomhine Nicaraeuan oositions in the El Naranio sector-and
reireatlng inio ~bsta ~ic& terriio~). ~hrec Nisaraguanr were kiiled and nine
wcre wounded in ihese aitïcks (Ann. A. rltinchments 67, 68 (Diplomatic Noies
oi 'li~.a-aru..: Anil H. Atiachmenir 35. 36.) Costa Ri,.an hlini,icr of Puhlic
Security, Angel ~dmundo Solano, subsequently confirmed that "counter-
revolutionaries used Costa Rican territory to attack Nicaragua" in the 28
Sentember attack on Peiias Blancas. IAnn. 1. Attachment 7.)
i7.lnresponse 10 ~icara~uan proiesis incr the Pciiar ~lancas asrauli. Costa
Ricdn Foreign hlinister Fernando VolioJiménezdenird ihai the aitack on Peiias
Blancas wa; launched from Costa Rican territory. (Ann. A, Attachment 71
(Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica).) However, in the same note, Volio admitted
that Costa Rican forces were in the area where the attack occurred, but that,
rather than impede the conrras, they withdrew.

"The Costa Rican authorities (ten Civil Guards and nine Rural Guards),
in accordance with orders from their superiors, pulled back from the
border post at theoutbreak of the battle, because of [their] proximity to
the location of theconflict", Volio wrote. (Id.)
Maior Juan Rafael Guerara. second-in-command of the Costa Rican Northern
ohma and t,ld visiting mémbers~ofthe National Assembly that the~ural
Guard had given advance warning to the Civil Guard at Peiias Blancas that a
contra attaci would take place there. The Assembly members concluded that
ARDE forces had attacked Nicaragua from Costa Rican territory. (Ann. A,32 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARME0 ACTIONS

Attachments 67, 68 (Diplomatic Notes of Nicaragua); Attachments 69, 71
(Diplomatic Notes of Costa Rica). See also Ann. H, Attachments 35, 36.)
58. Additional attacks to the end of 1983included the following.

On 2October contracommandos operating fromCosta Rica used speed-
boats to reach the port of Beniamin Zeledon, where they destroyed two
large fuel tanks which suppied the entire Atlantic Coast region of
Nicaragua. One of the tanks had a capacity of 308,448gallons of dieselfuel
and the other a caoacitv of 71.253-allons of easoline. The attack oaralvzed
economiç activity'in the Depariment of ~elaya. Nicaragua. and'seri;usly
affected thc town of Puerto Cabezas. (Ann. A, Aitachment 74 (Diplomatic
Note of Nicaragua).)
On 5 October a group of 40 contras kidnapped a Nicaraguan civilian

from Aguas Claras, Rio San Juan, and took him to Costa Rica. (Ann. C,
Attachment 1.)
On 7 0ctohér the border post of El Naranjo was attacked from Costa
Rica with mortars. (..1.42)..Ann. A. Attachment 76 (Dio.om.tic Note of
Nicaragua).)
On 18 October contras coming from Costa Rica kidnapped 4 workers
from the La Flor farm near Peaas Blancas. taking them toward Costa
Rican territory. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
On 5 November. contras hased in Costa Rican territory attacked the
border post of Puehlo Nuevo. (Ann. A, Attachment 82.)
On 6 Novemher, approximately 60 contras coming from Costa Rica
attacked Orosi, Nicaragua, with rifles and mortars. One Nicaraguan was
wounded. (Ann. A. Attachment 84.)
On 18~ovemberthe town of cardenas was attacked with mortars from
civilians were wounded. On the same day. a
Costa Rican territory. Three
concentration of cohter-revolutionaries was reported in the vicinit; of
Peaas Blancas. (Ann. A, Attachment 85(Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 19 December contras crossed over from Costa Rica, burned the
Santa Ana farm near the Colon border post, and kidnapped the family
living there. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)

59. During 1984, at least 16contra base camps were in active operation in
Costa Rica. The precise locations of these camps are set out in Annex C,
Attachments 3, 4; see also Annex A, Attachment 109 (Diplomatic Note of
Nicaraeua). Several of these camns had communications facilities. as well as
landin~st;ips. In addition, numerbus contra collaborators operated in various
capacities throughout Costa Rica. They are specifically identified in Ann. C.
~ttachment 3: Annex A. Attachment 109 (Di~iom.ti. Note of Nicaragua) -.
60.In al!. ai least nine airstrips in5ideCosta Rica were beingused by the con-
{rus in 1984: El Murcielaga. I.iano Grande de Liberia. Upald. Mcdio Queso,
Los Chiles. Rocade San Carlos. Barra del Colorado. Barra del Tortueuero. and
Guapiles. (~nn. C, ~ttachment 5, Table 2.) An ~merican mercenary named.
Bruce Jones who enlisted in Pastora's campaign and operated with Pastora's

forces from mid-1982to Februarv 1985has stated that he was aware of aoorox-
imately 100 deliveries of supplie; for the contras- everything from b&ts to
anti-aircraft guns- provided by CIA-sponsored aircraft landing atCosta Rican
farms between May 1982and May 1984.(Ann. 1, Attachment 14.)Memhers of MEMORUL OF NICARAGUA 33

ARDE also openly uled the Tobias tlolarlos Airport in Pavas. and the I.as I.oras

Air~ort in Puniarenai, for diherse militarv-related actii,ities. ARDE leader Fer-
naido "El Negro" ~hamorro was found aiTobias Bolanos Airport on 3March
1984.before one of his periodic expulsions from Costa Rica. (Ann. H, Attach-
ment 40.)
61. One site of landing strips in northern Costa Rica used by aircraft making
deliveriesto thecontras was the farm of a United States-born, naturalized Costa
Rican citizen named John Hull. Hull. who has lived in Costa Rica for 20 ,ears.
owns the "La Chalupas" farm near the Nicaraguan border. Hull has îdmitted
helping the contras operating iinorihern Costa Rica hy allowing thcir supply
fliihtco land on airstrios onhis orooertv. He has also admitted diÏectine coniro
supply flights to land& sites on néighboringproperties; feeding and housing
contra forces after they have sustained military defeats; providing intelligenceIo

theconrros; and hclping to plan conrra attacks. including ARDE '~epiember
1983air aitack on Sandino Iniernational Airport in Managua. (See, cg., Ann.
1,Aitachmentr 65, 57. 43, 40.) In addition. C1A Station Chief Fernander hîs
testified that "Hull was veryactive in supporting thc resi<tancepeople 1i.c..con-
rras]". byallowing hispropcriy innorthern Co\ta Kicaio be used for ihedeli\,ery
ofsupplies. (Ann. F. Attachment 3('restimony of Mr. Fernandez. pp. 157, 164).)
Two former United States Ambassadors to Co~ta Rica. Curtin Windsor and
Francis McNeil. ha\e alro confirmed thai Hull's farmhaï hecn uacd regularly by
contras on the "Southern Front". (Ann. 1.Attachment 64.)
62. During 1984,contra organizations headquartered in San José continued
to issue appeals for military action against Nicaragua. On 9 January ARDE
oublished in San José a oaid advertisement containine its manifesto. which

'supports a political and military struggle to eradicatë the Marxist-Leninist
totalitarianism of the FSLN, to expel the interventionist forces and rescue the
Nicaraguan revolution". (Ann. E, Attachment 2. No. 16.)
63. Specific attacks waged by the contras against Nicaragua from Costa
Rican territory in early 1984included the following:
On 11January a Nicaraguan patrol fought with a group of conlras east

of El Castillo as thev attemoted to infiltrate inIo Nicaraguan territory.
(Ann. C, ~ttachmen; 3.) .
On 21 January a contro gr ou^which penetrated from Costa Rica in the
sector of ~oma ~uemada, R~O San ];an. kidnapped 14 Nicaraguans.
among them six surveyors and three campesinos. The kidnap victims were
taken Io Costa Rican territory. One managed to escape. (Ann. A, Altach-
ment 94 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 23January the town of El Castillo wasattacked with mortars by con-
tras based in Costa Rica. (Ann. C, Attachment 3.)
On 25 January one Nicaraguan was killed and Iwo were wounded by
contras in a battle at Portugal, Department of Rivas. The contras retreated
in the direction of Costa Rican territory. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)

On 29 January contras attacked Comarca La Concordia from Costa
Rican territory.(Ann. C, Attachment 3.)
64. In February, a Civil Guard official investigation determined that "from
Costa Rican territory, counter-revolutionary activists with emplacements of
machine-guns attacked Sandinista positions located very close to the border on
Nicaraguan soil". (Ann. D, Attachment 8 (Report from Col. Oscar Vidal

Quesada IO Minister of Public Security Solano); Attachments 97. 99
(Diplomatic Notes of Nicaragua); cf. Ann. A, Attachment 98(DiplomaticNote
of Costa Rica).)34 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

65. Costa Rican authorities no1 only knew of such activities, but aided and
abetted them. For example, on 28 January 1984. Edtn Pastora entered Costa
Rica with 192men. seekinp.refuge for them and for some 2.000 others who were
- -
to follow. (Ann. H, Attachment 37.) Pastora's entry was contrary to stated
Costa Rican policy at the time. (Ann. H, Attachments 37. 38.) Nevertheless, the
regional commander of the Rural Guard, Col. Cilberto Orozco, not only per-
mitted Pastora to enter the country, but met with him on Costa Rican soil.
(Ann. H, Attachment 37.) The co-ordinator of the State Security Council,
Armando Arauz. announced that the Council had ordered Col. Orozco to be
fired forallowing Pastora to enter Costa Rica. (Id.)
66. Col. Orozco wasstill regional Rural Guard commander twomonths later.
honever. whzn he na< reportid io have visiied the site where an ARDE cupply
plane had crashed on 23 or 24 hlarch 1984.(Ann. H. Aiinchmeni 43. Sec also
Ann. H, Aiiîchment 39.) The plane was loaded wiih 500.000 rounds of
ammunition and hundredsof articles of military clothing. It ciashed near the
town of Chamorrito, Costa Rica, 20 kilometers from the Nicaraguan border.
Lic. Mainor Calvo. director of Costa Rica's Bureauof Judicial Investigation,

later reported that the plane was carrying supplies for ARDE. According to
Calvo, the supplies were to be dropped by parachute on an ARDE camp inside
Nicaragua. (See Ann. H, Attachment 49.) Col. Orozco's visit to the area took
place three days after the crash and some ten days before Costa Rican officials
say that they learned about the crash. (Ann. H, Attachments 41, 42, 43, 49.)
A member of the National Assembly asserted that Col. Orozco had participated
in a cover-up of the incident. (Ann. H, Attachment 44.)
67. Additional attacks in early 1984included these:

On 9 February a group of contras attacked a Nicaraguan army patrol
from Cerro Las Mercedes, Costa Rica, with 81 mm mortars. (Ann. C,
Attachment 3.)
On 18 February a group of contras coming from Costa Rica attacked
Hill 169,near the border post of El Naranjo. (Ann. C, Attachment 3.)

On 20 February Iwo boats coming from Costa Rica attacked the border
post of San Juan del Norte with machine-gun fire. (Ann. C, Attachment
3.)
On 22 February a contra group coming from Conventillos in Costa Rica
again attacked the border post at Hill 169, 1 km south of the El Naranjo
border post. (Ann. C, Attachment 3.)
On 29 February a contra group coming from Costa Rican territory
attacked the border post of San Juan del Norte. (Ann. C, Attachment 3.)
On 8March Iwo "piranha" speedhoats coming fromCosta Rica attacked
the Port of San Juan del Sur. (Ann. C, Attachment 3.)
On 12 hlarch 20 contras attacked the town of Los Chiles, near San
Carlos. (Ann. C, Attachment 3.)
On 13March one Nicaraguan was wounded when contras attacked the
border post of Peaas Blancas from Costa Rican territory. Some of the
shots were fired from the Costa Rican command post there. (Ann. C,
Attachment 1.)

On 13March a contra group located 200meters from Peaas Blancas, in
Costa Rican territory, attacked the Nicaraguan border post there.Ann. C,
Attachment 3.)
On 15 March a group of 30 contras fought with Nicaraguan troops as
they attempted to infiltrate into Nicaragua from the sector opposite the
border post of Colon. (Ann. C, Attachment 3.)36 BORI>ER AND TRANSBORDER MD ACTIONS

On 29 April a group of contras coming from Costa Rican territory
attacked the town of Cardenas with 81 mm mortar lire. (Ann. C,
Attachment 3.)
On 30 Aoril a erou-.of aooroximatelv 300 contras foueht with
Nicaraguan iroops on Gavilan HI^ S.even ~i.caraguans were kill& and 12
wounded. The conlras withdrew into Costa Rica. (Ann. C, Attachment 3.)
On 1 May 150 ARDE combatants fought with Nicaraguan troops in
Quebrada La Flor, near El Castillo, killing four Nicaraguans and wound-
ing six. The conlras withdrew in the direction of Las Alturas in Costa
Rican territory.(Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
On 7 May a group of 80 to 100contras attacked the border post of Palo
de Arco, killing four Nicaraguan civilians, including two children, and
wounding four others. The El Cachito post of the Costa Rican Rural
Guard is located 500meters from the place of the attack. After the attack,
the contras withdrew to Costa Rica, where at least 26 were treated for their
wounds in Costa Rican hospitals. (Ann. H, Attachment 48; Ann. A,
Attachment II6 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua); Ann. C, Attachment 3.)

70. On 30 May 1984, Edén Pastora held a press conference at La Penca,
Costa Rica, during which a bomb exploded, injuring Pastora and others and
killing eight people.ARDE had organized the ill-fated press conference from
San José - the base for numerous foreign correspondents covering the
escalatina contra ooerations in Costa Rica- and transoorted the iournalists to
La enc c i.nn. 1;~ttachments 9, 10.) After the explosion at ~a-~enca, Edén
Pastora was transported Io the Clinica Biblica in San Jose for treatment of his
injuries. Pastora was not arrested by the Costa Rican authorities, despite a
deportation order of 29 March 1983, which still barred his entry into the coun-
try. Pastora announced in San José that he would resume his "war of lihera-
lion" within a month. (Ann. H. Attachments 51. 53. 54. 55. 56.)
71. Two lawsuits hs;e been biought as a result'of the bombingat La Penca.
One was a libelaction brought in the First Penal Court of SanJosébv John Hull
against Costa ~ican-based-journalists Tony Avirgan and Martha ~oney, for
statements they made linking Hull with the CIA and an alleged conspiracy to
kill Pastora at La Penca. (Aftertwo davs of testimonv in Mav 1986.Hull's com-
plaint was dismissed, and his appeals were unsuccess~ful.)(~ée~nn. G, Attach-
ment 2.) The other is a civil action brought by Avirgan (who was injured at the
La Penca bombing) and Honey against Hull and 29others, alleging a conspiracy
in violation of United States laws. It is pending in a United States federal court
in Florida.
72. The Costa Rican Government could hardlv have been unaware of contra
activities within ils territory during this period. indeed, on 6 September 1984,
Ricardo Rodriguez Solorzano, a Member of the Costa Rican Legislative
Assembly, wrote Io President Monge, with a copy to Benjamin Piza, ~inister
of Public Security, providing extensive details on contra operations, bases and

supplies in northern Costa Rica, and describing growing popular opposition to
the conlras'presence. His letter, and the transcript of a press conferencehe held
on "The Presence of Somocista Troops in Costa Rica", were reprinted in a paid
full-page announcement in La Nacion. (Ann. H, Attachment 57.) In this
announcement, Deputy Rodriguez provided the precise locations of recent con-
tra activities in northern Costa Rica that had been reportedto him by "distin-
guished businessmen from Guanacaste". In his letter to President Monge, he
requcstcd that the Go\,crnment put an end to ihere acti~iiies, uhich he desiribed
as the "mobilization of men in the FDN, who are armed and in Our national MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 37

territory in order to harass the government and territory of Nicaragua". (Ann.
H, Attachment 57.)
73. On 18December in the Trial Court of San Carlos, Alajuela, Costa Rica,
charges were filed against memhers of ARDE for the murder of a Costa Rican
citizen in June 1984.Witnesses testified that ARDE was o~eratina from Costa

Rican bases at the time. Fausto Rojas Cordero, head of Ïhe ranch Office of
the Bureau of Judicial Investigation for the canton of San Carlos, testified that
"the 'militan, zone' on Costa Üicanterritom where ARDE ooerated lwasl in the
border sect& of Los Chiles". He further kstified that a mimber of the Costa
Rican Rural Guard in Los Chiles, JorgeGarciaGarcia, fought with the conrras
against the Nicaraguan Army while off duty. (Ann. G. Attachment 4 (records
of trial).)

***

74. In mid-1984, the Reagan Administration reached a policy decision that
il would seek to ooen a more effective "southern front" in Costa Rica as Dart
of a CO-ordinatediffort to put pressure on ihc Govcrnment of Nicaragua simul.
tancously from Costa Rican tcrritory to thc south and Honduran territory to the
north. While Costa Rica was to continue to be used for military and
paramilitary operations, Costa Rica's primary role in this two-front strategy
was to serve as a base for organizational and propaganda activity in support of
the war effort.
75. In July 1984,Joe Fernandez (alias "Tomas Castillo") arrived in San Jose

as the Costa Rican Station Chief for the United States Central Intelligence
Agency. (Thomas Castillo is the pseudonym under which he has testified in the
United States Congress and isgenerally known; however, because his real name
has also been publicly disclosed, it is used here.) (Ann. F, Attachment 3
(Testimonv .f Mr~-~e-n~ ~ ~ ~~~..6).) As Fernandez later testified in the Joint
~earings on the Iran-Contra lnvest&ation of the United States Congress. the
contras in the south had to be brought under a unified leadership, based in
Costa Rica. Fernandez explained that his responsihility was:
"to develop the southern political organizations in concert with the efforts
being made here in Washington and in [deletedl and in Miami to bring

to-ether the Nicarae-an resistance under one unified leadership. . .. We,
in turn. cncouraged the leadership io seck evcry mcans that they could to
put pressure on ihc Sandinisia regime. So thcrc uasn'i military ad\,ice. per
se. but there was certainly encouragement on the part of al1CIA officers
to bring as much pressu.re as possible in the political area against the
regime. .. ." (Id., pp. 18-19.)
76. Militarily, Fernandez testified, the United States objective was to move
the contra forces out of Costa Rica and into Nicaragua to engage in battle there.
Allowing the military forces to continue to attack from Costa Rican bases, he
explained, was causing too rnuch embarrassment to Costa Rica and wuld

jeopardize the success of the organizational and propaganda activities - "the
politicalside" - conducted inside Costa Rica. Thus, Mr. Fernandez testified
that the contra forces in Costa Rica were encouraged to:
"go into Nicaragua, where if they claimed they were fighters is where they
should be. And so it came about hecause of continuous large numhers of
problems that wewere experiencing with the [Costa Rican] government -
because of the presence of these people who were not very covert in their38 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

- in protecting the fact of their presence in [Costa Rica] and there were
a numher of incidents on a continuing basis that the [Costa Rican] officials

would bring to my attention and to the attention of other [ ] officials, and
so wherever 1 had contact with them, for whatever reason [ 11 would
encourage them to seek some means to leave [Costa Rica] where we felt -
we, CIA, felt - that the primary value to the program was the political
side". (Id., p. 23.)'
77. Fernandez further described the efforts to move the contras from their
bases in Costa Rica:

"In explaining this to Negro (Fernando 'Negro' Chamorro) repeatedly
would come the suggestion that they should get out of [Costa Rica] and
into Nicaragua.
Q. To summarize, it posed a political problem for you to have these

Nicaraguans in [Costa Rica] didn't it?
A. Most definitely.
Q. And you tried to encourage them to get to Nicaragua and to fight to
get them out of [Costa Rica]?

A. Yes sir.
Q. And there was a reluctance on the part of Negro Chamorro 10go into
Nicaragua to fight?
A. Yes sir.
Q. In fact. you had to be constantly encouraging him to get in there and

fight, right?
A. Yes sir. . .." (Id., p. 25.)

78. Shortly after the arriva1 of Fernandez in Costa Rica, efforts to enhance
the conrra organizing and propaganda activities centered in Costa Rica began
to achieve results.
79. At the end of August, an unusual agreement was signed between the
United States Information Agency and a private group of Costa Rican business
leaders to permit Voice of America programs hostile to the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment to be relayed from a new 50,00w 0at radio station in Costa Rica. Voice
of America agreements are generally made between the United States and
foreign Governments. but Costa Rican law prohibits foreigners from broad-
casting in the country. To circumvent this constraint, the VOA agreement was
signed with a private business group formed for that purpose. A VOA
spokesman, Rogene Waite, stated that President Monge had requested the
establishment of the transmitter, and approved the final $3.2 million arrange-
ment, which was formalized at his home on 30August. (Ann. 1, Attachments
11, 13.) According to Waite, the contract "ha[d] the full approval of the Costa

Rican government". (Ann. 1,Attachment 12.)
80. While the contras' nolitical and oreanizational activities in San José
intensified, the conrras'military forces kept up their constant stream of military
attacks on Nicaragua from their bases in northern Costa Rica. On 20 October
the Nicaraguan cistoms post at Peiias Blancas was again attacked by conrra

' Inthetranscriptof thisporlionoMr. Fernandez'testimany,"classified"materialhas
beendcleted,but the contextmakes clearthat Costa Ricawasthe country,and San Jasé
the city,Io which hewasreferring.Wherethesereferencesare clear.theyare suppliedin
brackets: wherethey are not clear, theeletionof materialis indicatedin brackets. MEMORW OF NICARAGUA 39

forces from Costa Rican territory. (Ann. A, Attachment 151(Diplomatic Note
of Nicaraeua).)
81. 011-31october 1984, Costa Rican Foreign Minister Carlos José Gutier-
rez, in response to Nicaraauan denunciations of contra attacks from Costa Rica,
denied that the attack hadcome fromCosta Rica. Gutierrez admitted, however,
that "the control [i.e., by Costa Rican forces] that is exercised in this zone,
as in the whole frontier region. is absolute . . .".(Ann. A. Attachment 142
(Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica).) Thus, it can only be concluded that the con-
tras' use of Costa Rican territory to attack Nicaragua was permitted by the

Costa Rican forces who controlled that territory.
82. In November and Decemher 1984,a series of meetings weretaking place
in both Costa Rica and the United States among representatives of the United
States Government, contra leaders, John Hull, and others, to plan ways to
"help the remnants of the Southern Front". (Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony
of Mr. Owen, p. 22-4).) Robert W. Owen, a consultant to the United States
Department of State who served unofficially as an agent for Lt. Col. Oliver
North, Director of Political-Military Affairs for the United States National
Security Council, traveled to Costa Rica in October 1984, where he met with
Adolfo Calero of the FDN and John Hull. At that meetina. Hull aareed "to do
anything he could" to help the southern front. (Id.)~ub&~uentl< Owen and

Hull attended other meetings in the United States to discuss the location of
bases, farms and airstrips to be used in Costa Rica, and the manner in which
Hull would CO-ordinatethe war effort in northern Costa Rica from his farm
there. (Ann. G, Attachment 2. pp. 14-15,)

1985

83. These ef~ - ~ ~--- - ~ ~ ~the southern front intensified in earlv 1985. In
February, the tactical aspects of the war were further discussed inmeétingswith
Hull, Calero and others in Miami. At these sessions. plans were made to obtain
arms. move them to Hull in Costa Rica. and distribute them for use in the
attaL.k\on ~icara~ua from Costa Rican bîrer. (Id.. at p. 15.)ClA officer Fer-
nandel reported tliat hc too attcndcd a \cries of meetings "conccrning the future
of the Southcrii Front". held both "in thc South and in \\'aihineti>nn. I4nn.F.
Attachment 3, ~xhibit; to Testimony of Robert W. Owen (~xhihit RWO-7).
pp. 1-2.)
84. Meanwhile, the regular attacks from Costa Rican territory against
Nicaraguan targets continued in 1985:

On 26 January four health-care workers were kidnapped from Rama
Key, Zelaya, Nicaragua, by a group of 30 armed men, who later engaged
Nicaraguan forces in combat. The available information indicated that
they were being held in Costa Rica by forcescommanded by EdénPastora.
They were subsequently released in Costa Rica. (Ann. A, Attachment 174

(Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 18 February 1989.)
On 28 Janiiary the "La Flor" estate near Cardenas was attacked by con-
tra groups coming from Costa Rican territory. The attackers kidnapped
three Nicaraguan citizens and fled, taking the victims in the direction of
Costa Rica. (Ann. A, Attachment 170(Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)

85. On 7 February 1985, Nicaragua sent a Diplomatic Note Io Costa Rica,
attaching40 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

"a list of the camps, houses of operations, names, and addresses of the
mercenary terrorists belonaine to the counter-revolutionarv militan,
organizations which operate;n?osta Rica, so that [Costa ~icaj may pro-
ceed to dismantletheir support structures and capture,disarm, and remove
their members from the border, with a view to definitively expelling them
from Costa Rica". (Ann. A, Attachment 171(Diplomatic Note of Nicar-

agua).)
86. Nonetheless. the support structures were not dismantled, and there was
no lessening of the contra activities launched from Costa Rica, with official

Costa Rican knowledge, approval and assistance.
87. On 6 March a group of five foreign mercenaries, from the United States,
France and Great Britain. loaded a shinment of weaoons on a chartered aircraft
in FI. Lauderdale, lorid d aor eventuk delivery to contra forces in Costa Rica.
The plane was flown, with two of the mercenaries on board, to llopango Air
Base in El Salvador. (Ann. 1. Attachment 29.) The five mercen~ ~es t~ ~ ~lew ~
io San Joséon a commercial flighi. and lraveled by land IOnorthern Costa Rica.
The arms ucre then delivered IO John Hull's airsirio in Costa Rica, in faci.

Robert Owen testified that he was present at John ~ull's farm in Costa Rica
when the arms shipment arrived. (Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony of
Mr. Owen, p. 11-3).See also, Ann. F, Attachment 5, 'PNvateAssistance"and
the Contras, Report of Staff of Senator John Kerry, p. 9; Ann. G, Attachment
2, pp. 15, 24; Ann. 1,Attachments 18, 30.)
88. Additional attacks in early 1985included these:

On 13February 1985.a aroun of aooroximatelv 40 contras attacked the
"El Naranjo" border postfrom ~osia Rican ter;itory. (Ann. A, Attach-
ment 176 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 18 Fehruary approximately 60 contras attacked the border post at
Peaas Blancas with mortars, machine guns and rifle fire. Fifteen minutes

later. they launched four grenades, wounding a border guard. After the
attack, Nicaraauan Army Lieutenant Luis Timoteo Rocha sooke with
Costa Rican ~ieutenant ~amberto Ruiz, who confirmed that ihe attack
had been carried out from Costa Rican territory. (Ann. A, Attachment 175
(Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On I March approximately 15 contras attacked the post of Peiias
Blancas, this lime from positions located about 250 meters north-east of
the Costa Rican customs office.The contras used rifles. erenade launchers.
and machine guns. Nicaraguan Lieutenant Luis Timoteo Rocha again com-

municated with Costa Rican Lieutenant Mamberto Ruiz. who again
acknowledged that theattackhad come fromCosta Rica. (Ann. A, ~ttach-
ment 181 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 18 March one Nicaraguan was killed when a group of contras
operating from Costa Rican territory engaged Nicaraguan forces located at
San Juan del Norte. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
On 14 April a group of armed men carried out an attack from Costa
Rican territory on the Nicaraguan border post of La Esperanza. near San

Carlos. Rio San Juan, using rifle fire, 81 mm mortars and RPG-4 rocket
launchers. (Ann. A, Attachment 184 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 27April a group of armed men again attacked the border post of La
Esperanza from Costa Rican territory, using rifles and RPG-7 grenade
launchers. The weapons sent to John Hull's estate from Ft. Lauderdale bv
the Cireloreign mercenaries in Xlarch wcrc usrd in ihi$artack. in whichone
of ihe\c mcrccn~~rics participîted. (Ann. A. Aiiachmcni 186 (Diplomaiic MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 41

Note of Nicaragua); see also Ann. F, Attachment 5 (Report of Staff of
Senator John Kerry, p. 9).)
On 24 June an olive-green helicopter resupplied a group of conlras
located near Nueva Guinea, Zelaya Sur, and withdrew in the direction of
Costa Rican territory. (Anii. C, Attachment 1.)

89. First-hand reports of Costa Rican Government complicity in the conlras'
operations also continued to surface during this period. In May 1985, Col.
Ricardo Rivera. former Director of the Rural Guard. charaed at a Dresscon-
ference that government officials maintain close lies wih conÏru forces, and that
training camps were operating in Costa Rica with the complicity of ranking
police and government officials. (Ann. H, Aitachment 58.)
90. Two Cuban-American rnercenaries who joined the UDN/FARN forces

of Fernando "Negro" Chamorro. and were later captured and tried in
Nicaragua, declared that in early 1985they were actively assisted in Costa Rica
by a Costa Rican CivilGuard officer named Colonel Rodrigo Paniagua Salazar,
who helped them get through Costa Rican immigration and customs with suit-
cases full of militarv suo~lies in Februarv 1985. Thev also claimed to have
stayed in a San .José'"saie'house" and on john ~ull's'farm before moving to
a UDN/FARN camDnear the north-western Costa Rican border town of Uuala.
. ~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
91 In May. sereral wilnesce\ implisated thcCo?ta KicanGovernmcnt in con-

rra activities durine the trial of the Iibel:a\e hrourht in Costa Kiby John Hiil1
against journalist;~artha Honey and Tony ~virgan. For example,~cter Glib-
bery, the British mercenary who had come from Florida Io Costa Rica to join
the contros (and was arrested in April). testified that "Mr. Hull sent up a Cap-
tain Segura of the Costa Rican Rural Guard who drove us out Io the training
base we were setting up on Mr. Hull's farm. . . ."(Ann. G, Altachnient 2,
p. 23.) Carlos Rojas Chinchilla. another witness, testified that he was kidnap-
ped to Hull's farm because of information he had obtained concerning Hull's
activities, and that before he escaped he saw "people there wearing green
uniforms with the Costa Rican flag on the arm". (Ann. G, Attachment 2,

pp. 38-39.)
92. On 19June Costa Rican Foreign Minister Carlos José Gutierrezstated in
an interview that he would regard a change of government in Nicaragua with
approval and called on the United States Congress to give ifs support to the
mercenary forces which were committing armed attacks against Nicaragua.
(Ann. 1, Attachment 16. See Ann. A, Attachment 194 (Diplomatic Note of
Nicaragua, 21 June 1985).) President Monge had flown to Washington two
months earlier Io lend his public support to the Reagan Administration's request
for additional funding for the contras. (Ann. 1, Attachment 15.)
93. As of July, a number of airstrips on Costa Rican territory were in regular

use by the contras for transfer of weauons and ~ersonnel. Among these were
landi& areas on the estate of John ~uil; the ~as~oras Airport in ~untarenas;
the cstates of Climaco Salazar in the Los Chiles sector, also used for weapons
storane by the contras; and the estate known as El Chauernal, where planes
bringing arms from Panama IanJed in 1985. (See Ann. 6. ~tiaçhments3, 4 J
94. Among conrru iaiilitiec locîted in <:octa Rica a\ of July uere the "Tîller"
or "Corinto" base. on the Costa Rican side of the San Juan Ri\.er, 5 kilometers
from La Penca; offices and buildings located in Escazu and used by Pastora for
communications and political activities; a warehouse and communications

center in San José; and another communications base in the locality of El
Zarcero. (Id.)42 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

95. In June and July, attacks launched from such bases in Costa Rica
included the following:

Between 20June and 4 July over 20attacks were sustained at La Penca,
Nicaraeua. in a continuine series of rifle. cannon and mortar atta~~~~~~~~~-
undertaken fromCosta ~ican territory. ~hr& Nicaraguans were killed and
four were wounded. These attacks were carried out with impunity from
positions in Costa Rica close to the Civil Guard post at the mouthof the
San Carlos River. (Ann. A, Attachments 193, 194, 196, 204(Diplomatic
Notes of Nicaragua); Ann. 1, Attachment 17.)

At the beginning of July 1985. contra mobilizations were ohserved
across from the Nicaraguan army post at Papaturro. At the same time, an
FDN base was identified at La Lucha, 3 kilometers from the Nicaraguan
border on the Costa Rican side. (Ann. A, Attachment 196 (Diplomatic
Note of Nicaragua).)
On 7 July three Nicaraguans were wounded when a group of contras
attacked the Cano Machado sector from Costa Rican territory. (Ann. C,
Attachment 1.)
On 18 July a group of contras attacked the San Rafaei sector from
Costa Rican territory with rifle lire, heavy machine guns and mortars,
wounding four Nicaraguans. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
Seven Nicaraguans were wounded in attacks on the San Rafael sector by
contras hased in Costa Rica. The attacks, which lasted from 17to 22 July
were carried out with cannon, mortars and 50-caliber machineguns. (Ann.
A, Attachment 202 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)

96. In late July, an ARDE helicopter carrying EdénPastora - supposedly
ordered out of Costa Rica, but always turning up there - crashed inside Costa
Rican territory, near the Costa Rican villa& of Veracruz de Pital, about 25
miles south of the Nicaraguan border. Pastora and two companions were
injured. Pastora was treated for his injuries at a local hospita!, and then
allowed Io flv to Panama. (Ann. 1. Attachments 20. 21. 22.)

97. Also in July, the fore& mercenaries who had traveled and shipped arms
to Costa Rica from Florida in March made extensive public statements about
their activities in Costa Rica and the involvement ofCosta Rican authorities.
Steven Carr, a United States citizen, and Peter Glihbery, a Briton, told
reporters that the Costa Rican Civil and Rural Guards had provided exten-
sive intelligence and other assistance to contra groups operating along the
Nicaraguan border. They said that members of the Civil Guard had given them
urecise information, includina maps and diaarams of taraets inside Nicaraeua.
ànd that one of the guards had aicompanied them on Ge of their incurGons
into Nicaragua. Steven Carr said that Costa Rican neutrality was a farce, and
that the mercenaries had enjoyed "one hundred per cent support" from Costa
Rica. (Ann. H, Attachment 59.) In particular, they said that the Costa Rican
Civil Guard had actively helped them to carry out an attack on the Nicaraguan
border post of La Esperanza on II April. A colonel in the Civil Guard had

shown them access and resupply routes on a map and had put pick-up trucks
at their disposal. Carrsaid that one of the Civil Guards had in fact served as
a guide for the attack. Another of the mercenaries, Frenchman Claude Chaf-
ford. who said he had trained armed groups in camps inside Costa Rica a few
kilometers from the Nicaraguan border. stated that he traveled to one such
camp in the Company of a major in the Civil Guard, and that over a period of
nearly two months they received friendly visits almost every day from members
of the Guard in the region, who promised them protection. (Ann. A. Attach- MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 43

ment 197(Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua); seealso Ann. 1,Attachments 18, 19,
32.)
98. By July 1985, the political componeiit of the strategy that CIA Station
Chief Fernandez had sought to implement on his arriva1 in San José a year
earlier- that is, the unificatioii of the southern factions under one organiza-
tion, and the intensification of their propaganda activities centered in San José

- had begun to bear fruit.
99. On 12June 1985,the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) was formed,
joining together Arturo Cruz. an opponent of the Nicaraguan Government
residing in the United States; Alfonso Robelo of ARDE; and Adolfo Calero of
the FDN. (Ann. E. Attachment 2. No. 17.) Six weeks later on 26 Julv a new
umbrella organization called "~pposition Bloc of the South" (BOS) was
founded in San José. The "constitution" of BOS waspublished in an advertise-
ment in La Nacidn on 2 Aueust 1985.and reorinted in a rlossv oamohlet oub-
lished in San Josélater thaÏyear. ~he BOS ';constitution" explicitly'called for
military action to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, stating in part:

"We resolve
. ..
5) To legitimize the resistance that in the face of Managua's dictatorial
reoression is carried out with arms in hand bv thousands and thousands of
patriots in national territory." (Ann. E, ~ttachment I ("B.O.S.: Opposi-
tion Bloc of the South". San Jose, 1985 (English text quoted from
original)); Ann. E, Attachment 2, No. 18.)

100. In its 1985 pamphlet. BOS also printed a "Declaration of Principles"
which stated in part:
"We reaffirm . . .

That we declare as legitimate the struggle for defense that with arms in
hand, is carried out by thousands of patriots throughout the national ter-
ritory.
.. .
Finally, we make a cal1 to al1 Nicaraguans of good will so that with
patriotisrn and love to [sicli]berty, we may overcome al1 the obstacles
existing until today, and we may forge the great Unity that is to take us

to the definite liberation of Nicaragua." (Ann. E, Attachment I ("B.O.S. :
Opposition Bloc of the South". San José, 19851.)
101. On 19 July 1985, UN0 leaders Arturo Cruz. Alfonso Robelo and a
representative of Adolfo Calero addressed a public rally in San José com-
rnemorating the sixth anniversary of what they called the "betrayal of the
~icaraguan revolution" with a dramatic display of apparent uriity and yet
another cal1to unite their fight and oust the Sandinista régime.(Ann. 1,Attach-
ment 23.)
102. In addition, inearly 1985two new contra publications, produced in San
José, appeared as bi-weekly "siipplements" to Costa Rican newspapers. The

mastbead of one of them, Nicaragua Hoy, carried the names of several promi-
nent opponents of the Government of Nicaragua, including Arturo Cruz, a
member of the UN0 Directorate; his son ArturoCruz Sequeira; Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro, a member of the Permanent Advisory Committee of UNO; and
Fabio Gadea Mantilla. Vice-President of the MDN. (Ann. E, Attachment 4;
Ann. J.) The other, which carried the full title TowardOur Liberution: Official44 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTlONS

Orpan of the United Nicaraeuan Oooosifion. is eenerallv referred to bv its short
title, ~iberacion. Its editorGl boa;; included 0;ion ~istora, the longtirne San
José spokesman for the ~aramilitary organization ARDE. (Ann. E. Attach-
ment 3.) . .
103. ~iberacion and Nicaragua Hoy, which continued to be published in San

José asof mid-1987, offer blatant propaganda in support of the contra cause.
Articles affirming that military action is required to change the Nicaraguan
Government, and calls for support for organizations dedicated to the military
overthrow of the Nicaraauan Government. are intersoersed with interviews with
conrra military commanders and shrill and sensationalized stories purporting to
describe events in Nicaragua. The overwhelming message - that force or
violence should be used aaainst the Government of Nicaragua - is olain. For
example, under the headcne "The Resistance Reacts to the ~ecisi'on of the
[U.S.] Congress", Nicaragua Hoy published a declaration signed hy UN0
leaders Calero, Cruz and Robelo which stated in part,

"The Resistance restates its indissoluble covenant with the Nicaraguan
people to struggle to the ultimate consequences for the democratization of
the country and the rescue of Our national sovereignty."

The same issue carried an interview with the contras' supreme military com-
mander. Enriaue Bermudez. A former colonel in the Somoza National Guard.
Bermudez, "somewhere in Jinotega" (Nicaragua), was quoted as asserting that
the defeat in the United StatesCongress of a $14million contra aid package was
merely a temporary setback; accoÏding to Bermudez. this was

"only the first stepleading to Our victory .. .We have gotten aid from
elsewhere and now we have al1we need to begin Our military operations
anew, with greater intensitythan before." (Ann. E, Attachment 4, No. 1.)

104. With the political unification and propaganda components of the
Southern Front well under wav bv Julv 1985.the United States - with the suo-
port and collaboration of ~o&a Rica" goveinment officiais a1the highest level
- intensified its effort to improve the military situation in the south, and
soecificallv to move the contra~forces out of iheir bases in Costa Rica and into
~icarapu; Io fight there. Thus, when Lewis A. Tambs, appointed as the new
United States Ambassador to Costa Rica, departed in July for San José, hewas
exolicitlv instructed bv members of the "Restricted lnteraeencv Grouo"
(iicludi& LI. Col. 0livérNorth and Assistant Secretary of ~tateËlii~t brais)
that his mission was "Io aid the Nicaragua Resistance Forces in setting up a
'Southern Front"'. (Ann. F. Attachment 2 (Tower Commission ~enort.
p. C-12); Ann. F, ~itachmenl 3 (Testimony of Mr. Tambs, p. 2-l).) ~he"
asked what this mission meant to him, AmbassadorTambs responded that "the
idea was that we would encourage them Io fight". (Ann. F, Attachment 2

(Tower Commission Report, p. C-12).) As he further explained, his assignment
was to gel the contras out of Costa Rica and inIo Nicaragua. and assure them
of logistical support onceinside Nicaragua. As he testified Io the United States
Congress:
"AMB.TAMBSW : ell. the question was, how you were going Io get the
armed democratic resistance out of Costa Rica, and, of course, that was

something which both the Costa Ricans and we were interested in, and the
only way that you could aet them out of Costa Rica was assure them
tha; they would have logiszcal support inside Nicaragua. And, by inside
Nicaragua, we're talking about, yon know, 80Io 100kilometers, say 50 Io 60 miles, because there were some forces, particularly belonging to Mr.
Pastora. who were sitting in Nicaraguan territory on some islands in the
San Juan River, which wereabout 5 to 10 feet from the shore of Costa
Rica. So, obviously, that was not thesort of thing wewere thinking about.
So, the idea is that how do you get them to move? Well, you're goingto
have to feed them, supply them . . ."(Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony
of Mr. Tambs, p. 29-l).)

105. When Ambassador Tambs arrived in Costa Rica, heundertook Io carry
out this mission. As the Tower Commission reported, based on an interview
with an unnamed "CIA field officer", plainly CIA Station Chief Fernandez:

"When AmbassadorTambs arrived in Costa Rica, he called together the
Deputy Chief of Mission, the Defense Attache and myself, and said that
he had really only one mission in Costa Rica, and that was to form a
Nicaragua resistance southern front." (Ann. F, Attachment 2 (Tower
Commission Report), p. C.12.)

106. The message apparently reached contra forces right away, as contra
leaders announced at theendof August that they were "redoubling their efforts
along the Costa Rican border with~~icara~uaas pan of a new southern front
strategy . ..". (Ann. 1, Attachment 28.)
107. A critical element in sustaining the contemplated southern front- and
s~ecificallvin ensuri-a the necessa.v l-aistical.s.r>r>ortto the contra forces once
they entered Nicaragua - was the construction of a new airbase inside Costa
Rica, near the border, for the loading. fueling and repair of aircraft engaged in
supply drops fo confras inside ~Gara~ua: ~ccordin~ to Fernandez, "the
establishment of an airfield down in Costa Rica would be significant in order
to be able to supply whatever contras may enter into Nicaragua and fight inside
Nicaragua" (Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony of Mr. Fernandez, p. 101));
indeed. he testified,such an airfield was "an essential or integral part of any
supply effort". (Id.,pp. 33, 145.)Thus. the CIA field officer interviewed by the
Tower Commission - obviously Fernandez, although again he is not named -
stated that the construction of such an airfield was a "pet project" of
Ambassador Tambs. (Ann. F, Attachment 2 (Tower Commission Report),
p. c-12.)
108. Approval had to be obtained from the Costa Rican Government before
theairbase could be built. however. (Ann. F.Attachment 3(Testimony of Assis-
tant Secretary of State Abrams, p. 13-2).) Therefore, Lt. Col. North asked
Ambassador Tambs, shortly after he arrived in Costa Rica, whether the Costa
Rican Government would "go along" with the airbase. (Ann. F, Attachment 2
(Tower Commission Report), p. C-12.) Ambassador Tambs' response was Io

initiate "negotiations" with the Costa Rican Government to obtain such
aooroval. (Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimonv of Mr. Tambs. PD. 7-2 to 8-l).)
Hi; negotiations were successful, and ~residéntMonge appro;ed constructi6"
of the airbase. Ambassador Tambs testified:

"AMe. TAMUST :he negoiiaiions yielded an airiield which sould be uscd
for reinforcemeni and resui>r>lyi.f iherc weran invasion from Nicaragua.
At the same time. the air-field would be used for refuelina and for
emcrgency purposer [otl Dritate airrralt which would be uscd io;upply the
Nicaraguan Democratic kcairt~ncc. which obriou\ly uould have to move
inside Nicaragua Io be rcsupplied, then, right? MEMORlAL OF NICARAGUA 47

formed hy United States engineers with the assistance and CO-operationof the

Costa Rican Civil Guard. Employees of the neighboring Santa Rosa National
Park, and local residents, have coniïrmed that the Civil Guard Commander
based in the Guanacaste city of Liberia, Col. Ramon Montero, ohtained permis-
sion from park officiais to hring workers and equipment through park lands to
work on the project. Col. Montero has admitted that he was the project
administrator. After he ohtained permission to use ~ark land for access to the
site, Cid Guard vehislescarryiiig'uniied Siares engineers and uorkers ~hutiled
hack and forth o\er park roads. according IO eyewitnesses. A local contrasior.
Leon Victor Arrieta. ha\ further staied publicly that he was hired to do thecon-
struction work withthe advice of unitid state; personnel and the protection of
the local police commander. (Ann. 1. Attachments 46, 47. 49, 55.)
113. In December 1985.wheii United States National Security Adviser. Vice
Admiral John Poindexier viriied Costa Kicaio discuss the airhase and the Costa
Rican Governrnc~~t'< io-operaiion uiih rheconrras ingeneral. He iesiified tithe
United States Congress :

"llln Costa Rica we did discuss there for example. the private landing
siri; ihat ivasheing construçted in the northuerr co.rnerof ihc country..1
of Costa Rica. And wediscussed. in seneral. mea>ure\ ihai could be raken
to encourage the CO-operationbetween the government of the country
involved and the Democratic resistance forces." (Ann. F, Attachment 5
(Testimony of Adm. Poinclexter, p. 2-l).)

Admiral Poindexter then informed the President of the United States that the
Santa Elena airhase "was a dramatic display of CO-operationand support for the
President's policy hy the country involved". (Id., p. 4-2.)
114. On 23 April 1986, President Monge's Minister of Public Security,
Beniamin Piza. who had authoritv over the airbase at Santa Elena. attended a
privale meeting wiih Pre\idcni ~çi~an. Li Col. North. and CIA Siarion Chief

Frrnande~ in \Va\hingion. at ihe White House. The meeting uas kepi secret
at the time and has never been fully explained. According to some reports,
the United States arranged the meeting as a straiegy session to determine how
Io ensure continued operation of the Santa Elena airbase and the continued use
of Costa Rica as a base for contra operations in general; according to others, it
was to thank Piza for the pas1 CO-operationof the Costa Rican Government.
(Ann. 1, Attachments 58, 59. See also Ann. F. Attachment 4, Report of the
United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 February 1987,p. 42;
Ann. F, Attachment 6(Exhibits to Testimony of Oliver L. North) (Exhihit OLN
258).)
115. The Santa Elena airhase remained secret until Seotember 1986. even
though the Government of President Oscar Arias ~anchez,'inaugurated in May
1986. was well aware of ifs existence at least since June of that year. (Ann. 1,
Attachment 54.)In fact. after the inaueuration of the Arias Government. a Civil
Guard lieutenant was reported to have taken charge of the project. (Ann. 1,

Attachment 46.) In Sevtember 1986,however, the Arias Government finally
ordered the airhase "raided" hv the Civil Guard. and il was shut down. Public
Security Minister Hernan Garroii asserted at that time that the landing strip had
heen expanded during the Monge administration as part of a "tourism project".
/Id.) It iswelldocumented. however. that it wasintended - and wasinfact used
- {O serve as a base for the loading; fueling and servicing of aircraft supplying
the conrras. United States Ambassador Tambs and CIA officer Fernandez,
among others, have confirmedthat that was its purpose, as shown above. And48 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

the airfield was in fact used to serve that end. As LI. Col. North stated in a 30
September 1986memorandum:

"The airfield at Santa Elena has been a vital element in supporting the
resistance. Built by a Project Democracy proprietary (Udall Corporation
S.A. - a Panamanian Company), the field was initially used for direct
resuvvly efforts Ito the Contras1 IJuly 1985-Februarv 19861 . . .the field
has ;&ed as the primary abor; base.for aircraft damageiby Sandinista
anti-aircraftfire." (Ann. F, Attachment 2 (Tower Commission Report),
pp. C-II to C-12 (brackets and ellipses in original).)

Ambassador Tamhs also told the Tower Commission that "the airstrip was used
mainly for refueling before Contra resupply planes returned to 'wherever they
were coming from'". (Id., p. C-12. See also Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony
of Mr. Tambs, pp. 8.1, 41-2); Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony of Mr.
Fernandez, pp. 89, 101-IM).) While Mr. Fernandez maintained that the airfield
was never put into "regular use''. he too acknowledged that it was in fact used
to service planes "in neutral Costa Rica loaded with lethal supplies [i.e.,
weapons]" bound for contras in Nicaragua. (Id., p. 89.)
116. When the existence of the airbase was made public in Sevtember 1986.
itra\ di~lo5ed that the faciliiy had considcrable miliiary capaciiy. In addition
IO ihe 1.2 mile landing sirip. a modern miliiary harracks for 30 men had bcen
built. Morcover, 5,000.eaIIonsof fuel wercmainiained at ihesiie. Area residenis
reported they had seen 'large cargo planes circling the area" and a camouflaged
"Hercules" aircraft "coming down over the hills". Fresh tire ruts were also

found at the airstrip itself. (Ann. 1. Attachments 46, 47, 49.) And, according
to one area resident who was in the Santa Rosa National Park as the Civil
Guards came out after their raid with 300barrels of aviation gas and numerous
closed crates:
"One [Guard] captain told me that the stuff belonged to the con-
tras. ... He said, 'wehad to do this operation without saying anything to
the press because it could affect Costa Rica's image in The Hague'."
(Ann. 1, Attachment 46.)

117. Meanwhile, during the las1five months of 1985.while the airhase on the
Santa Elena peninsula was being built and put intooperation,the contra attacks
launched (rom Costa Rican territory continued. Indeed, in August, the head of
the Social Christian Unity Party in the Costa Rican Assembly, Deputy Danilo
Chaverri Soto, denounced the Costa Rican Government's tolerance of the

Nicaraguan rebels who use Costa Rican territory for their operations, and sug-
gested that an independent investigation would corroborate his assertions. He
stated thai he had personally sonkrmed thc5c farts and that hc had reported
thcm to the Minister of Public Securiiy. Former Cosia Rican Direcior of Puhlic
Security. Juan Joie Echci,crria. also charn-d thai "Monae -ets Iih. au-rrillasl
operate". (Ann. 1, Attachment 27.)
118. During August, interviews withNicaraguan "refugees" staying at a Red
Cross camp in northern Costa Rica revealed that manv were contra forces
regroupiniafter battles with the Nicaraguan Army. ~cc~rdin~to one member
of ARDE, approximately one-third of the 3,000 men in the camp had fought
with Pastora's forces. After numerous interviews. the interviewer concludedthat the camp had become "as much a way station for contras as it is a camp
for civilian refugees". (Anm. 1, Attachment 25.)

119. In August. ARDE forces operating from Costa Rica seized a group of
29 members of a United States organization called Witness for Peace, and 18
iournalists accomnanvine them. as thev traveled on a barae on the San Juan
River. The group'wa; held casive in Costa Rican territory for several days.
(Ann. 1, Attachment 24.) According to NBC television correspondent John
Basco. who was abducted with the erou~. the cavtors were ARDE forces. IAnn.
1, ~ttachment 26.) Pastora also admittédlater ihat it was his group that ieized
the barge; he revealed. in fact, that CIA Station Chief Fernandez radioed an
instruction to him from San José not to harm anyone because the CIA had
infiltrated an agent into the group. (Ann. 1, Attachment 61. See also Ann. K
(the report published by Witness for Peace on this incident).)
120. Specific attacks occurring from August to the end of 1985included the
following:

On 21-29Augusta series of attacks against the Nicaraguan border posts
at Boca de San Carlos, La I'enca, and Pefias Blancas was carried out from
Costa Rican territory. (Ann. A, Attachments 211, 213, 214 (Diplomatic
Notes of Nicaragua to Costa Rica).)
On 1 September a Cessna airplane proceeding from Costa Rican ter-
ritorv overflew the Lomas del Lobo sector, 30 km north-east of San
~.lig;elito. whereitdropped parachutes uith military çupplie\ to a group
of ronrras. (Ann. C. Attachment 1.)
On 30 Ociober the Nicaraaua- border vos1 at Roca de San Carlos uas
attacked from the customs post directly opposite it on Costa Rican ter-
ritory, and from the area immediately surrounding the Costa Rican post.

The attackers used rifles. mortars, machine guns, and 82 mm cannon.
Later on the same day. the Boca de San Carlos was again attacked from
Costa Rican territory. The attackers openly moved about in vehicles on
the Costa Rican side. (Ann. A, Attachment 233 (Diplomatic Note of
Nicaragua).)
BetweenSeptember and December 1985,armed attacks from Costa Rica
were also mounted against Nicaraguan positions at or near Peiias Blancas
(4 September); the Delta of the San Juan River (7September, 7 October);
La Penca (27 September, 7 October, 19 October, 22 October); Cano

Machado (27 September); and Boca de San Carlos (27 September, 30
October). Contras also attacked Nicaraguan territory from the Costa
Rican sector of Sarapiqui (7October). Movements of groups of armed men
on Costa Rican territory were detected in the vicinities of the Cano
Machado and El Venado sectors (18 October), Boca de San Carlos (30
October)..and La lsla La Culehra and Santa Isabel (4 December).
Nicaraguan aircraft flying over Nicaraguan territory were fied upon froh
Costa Rican territory on 8 September. 9 September. and 3 October 1985.
Nicaragua repeatedÏy protestcd rhew incideni, in diplornatic iorrespon-
dence with Costa Rica. (Ann. A. Attachmrnis 218, 219, 220.222,223. 224.
225, 226. 228. 229. 232. 233. 237 (Diplornaiic Notes of Nicaragua).)

121. At the end of 1985.at least 27 contro camps were established in Costa
Rica, despite the fact that Nicaragua had repeatedly informed the Costa Rican
~overnment of the nature and locations of contro bases and contra activities
on its territory. (See, Le., Ann. A, Attachment 171 (Diplomatic Note of Ni-
caragua).) The precise locations of these bases are stated in Ann. C, Attach-
ment 5, Table 1.50 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

122. Notwithstanding the inauguration of President Arias in May 1986,and
his renewed proclamations of Costa Rican "neutrality", both the coniro
political activities in San José and contro attacks against Nicaragua from bases
inside Costa Rica have continued. (See Ann. E, Attachment 2, Nos. 19, 20;
Ann. E, Attachment 4, No. 8; see also infro, paras. 127. 140.)
123. Alfonso Robelo and other leaders of UN0 and BOS continued to live
in San José. where theyconducted political and orranizational activities linked
to the armçd rirugglc ioovcrthrow ~he~overnmenr of Nicaragua. (Sce Ann. J.
Aitachment5 4 and 5.) For example, in February 1986. in an interview given ai
his residencc in San José. Robelo callcd for the a~~roval of subsianiial United
States military aid to armed groups fighting the~~overnment of Nicaragua.
(Ann. A, Attachment 253 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).) Following the
United States House of Representatives' rejection in March 1986of President
Reagan's request for $100 million for the conlros, Robelo and other San losé-
based confro leaders expressed optimism that the defeat was only temporary.
Fabio Gadea, UNO's representative in San José, claimed: "We have lost a
battle, but not the war." (Ann. 1, Attachment 31.)
124. In May 1986, military leaders of ARDE and FARN announced in San
Joséthatthey had agreed Io unite under UNO, whose forces also included those
of the Honduras-based Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). (Ann. H, Attach-

ment 60.) Aspart of the accord with UNO, the militarycommanders agreed that
Fernando "Negro" Chamorro, of the UDN/FARN. would lead the military
forces in thesouth of Nicaragua. (Ann. 1, Attachment 33.) EdénPastora did
not join UNO, but certain of his military commanders, reportedly lured by pro-
misesof a flow of cash and arms from the CIA, agreed to join UN0 and accept
Chamorro as their leader. (Ann. 1, Attachments 35, 39.)
125. Defeated bv the Nicaraauan Armv and abandoned bv his commanders.
Pastora announced through a ipokesman in San Jose thai he was lea\ing th;
armed strugglr againsi the Nicaraguan Government. (Ann. H. Aiiachmeni 61:
Ann. 1. Aitachment 34.1The Arias Govcrnmcnt ~uicklv rrn.t-d him oolitical
asylum in Costa Rica. (~nn. 1, Attachments 36, 37.)
126. In June, Robelo publicly proclaimed in San Jose that armed contro
groups could "win their war" if they received sufficient United States support.
(Ann. 1. Attachment 38.)
127. Later in June, UN0 and BOS - the two major Costa Rican-based con-
trogroups - announced in San José,at a ceremony al the Balmoral Hotel, that
they had concluded a formal CO-operationagreement. (Ann. 1,Attachment 41 ;
see also Ann. E, Attachment 2, No. 19.)
128. And in Aueust. BOS held its first "Con-ress". a n-therine-of 78
delegates in San JO;& to hammer out a constitution and a political agenda.
BOS' "foreifin relations secretary", Octaviano Cesar. claimed that $100million
of United States assistance "won't beenough to get rid of the Sandinistas, but
it should be enough for us to take a piece of territory and hold it". Octaviano
Cesar's brother Alfredo, a member of the BOSexecutivecommittee, agreed that
BOS' goal was Io take territory inside Nicaragua by early 1987, and also "to
develop a front in Nicaragua's urban areas". (Ann. 1, Attachment 44.)
129. In October 1986, UN0 held a three-day meeting of its Consultative

Assembly in San José. One representative at the conference, Jaime Martinez,
was quoted as saying,
"the Assembly constitutes vital support - in every sense of the word -
for the directorate of the UN0 and, by extension. for the combatants who MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 51

are generously sacrificing themselves to oeen our path of return to our
country". (Ann. E. Attachment 3, No. 7.)

130. On 24 November 1986,another session of the "Assembly" of UN0 was
he~ ~i~~~-~~J~ ~ ~ ~ ~he authorization of the Costa Rican Government. The
purposc ot'thij "Asscmbly" wa\ io makç plans for an armed offensi\e againsi
Nieararua and the subsequcnt in~iallaiion of "provisional govsrnment". 'l'hc
"~sse&bly" was widely publicized by "Radio ~&~acto", a radio station based

in Costa Rica which regularly broadcasts messages calling for the armed
overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government. (Ann. A, Attachments 267, 268
(Diplomatic Notes of Nicaragua); Ann. H, Attachment 63. See also Ann. 1,
Attachment 53.)
131. Interna1 UN0 documents reveal, further, the specific monthly expen-
ditures incurred by UN0 for "UNO/COSTA RICA" during a six-month period
in late 1985 and early 1986. Among the categories of activities for which

expenses are recorded are one for "Radio" (over $69,000in initial expenses and
$5,825 monthly) and others for various committees (e.g.. youth, labor, legal,
educational). (Ann. J. Attachment 1.) Another interna1 UN0 document, the
minutes of a meeting on 28 August 1985of UNO's directors and advisory coun-
cil, refers to specific projects in Costa Rica and reports that "the house in Costa
Rica and existing facilities werediscussed". (Ann. J, Attachment 4.)
132. The UN0 office in San Joséserved as a center for UNO's efforts to

destabilize Nicaragua from Costa Rica. For example, in June 1986,the San José
office of UN0 was the site of a meeting attended by Fabio Gadea, "Member
of the Regional Directorate of UNO-Costa Rica"; Reynaldo Hernhndez, "Co-
ordinator of the UN0 Regional Directorate"; UN0 Director Alfonso Robelo;
and Lewis Tambs. United States Ambassador to Costa Rica. At the meetinr!
Tambs .'reaffirmed ihc decision of ihe United States IO suppori the cause of thé
liberarion of Nicdragua". (Sec photograph at Ann. E, ,\ttachment 4. No. 6. Sec

also Ann. J, ~ttachments 4, 5, 6.)
133. In addition, throughout 1986 and 1987, publication of the two pro-
contra supplements to San Josénewspapers, Nicaragua Hoy and Liberacion.
and their appeals for military action against the Government of Nicaragua. con-
tinued. One article in Nicaragira Hoy in June 1986, for example, quoted
remarks bv FDN militarv commander Enrique Bermiidez delivered at a
cereniony" 10.1I1.0Kl"UNO-~~I\'iomniandos" u,hich u,ar sup-

posedly held "in thc mouniaini of Nicaragua". According to the ariiclc. I3cr-
mudc7.:"cmnhasizcd the imoortance oi the UNO-FDN allianec aï the only tvay
to achieve the liberation oî'~icaragua". (Ann. E, Attachment 4, No. 5.)
134. The military activities of contra forces operating from Costa Rican soi1
also continued through 1986 and into 1987. During 1986. at least 10 contra
camps remained in active operation in Costa Rica. They are identified in Ann.
C, Attachment 5. Table 1. As of February 1987, contra camps in Costa Rica

were located in Lomas del Valle. Buena Vista. La Union. Cerro El Hucha. Con-
ventillo, Upala, and Hacienda ÉIMurciélago.(Ann. C, Artachment 5.Table 1.)
Attacks waged against Nicaraguan territory from Costa Rica during 1986
included th; following:

On II January 1986,a group of armed men operating from Costa Rican
territory attacked the Nicaraguan border post of Sarapiqui from Costa
Rican territory, using mortars and rifle fire. (Ann. A, Attachment 240
(Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 16January two helicopters of the Nicaraguan Air Force overflying
the sectors of Sarapiqui and Boca de San Carlos in Nicaragua were52 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

attacked with rifle fire by mercenary forces located on Costa Rican
territory. Both helicopters were damaged. Pilot Lt. Enrique Lopez
Amador and CO-pilotNorman Paguaga Moncada were wounded. Both
helicopters landed on Nicaraguan territory. (Ann. A, Attachment 241
(Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 17January a group of armed men attacked theborder post of Sarapi-
qui from a-Costa Rican Rural Guard post. They used rifle fire, 50 mm
machine guns and 75 mm cannon. (Ann. A. Attachment 242 (Diplomatic

Note of Nicaragua).)
On 25 January a Nicaraguan Air Force helicopter which was on a
mission to resupply the Nicaraguan border post of La Penca was attacked
from Costa Rican territorv with rifle fire. The helicooter was damage-.
(Ann. A, Attachment 247(~iplomatic Note of ~icaragua).)
On 28 January an airplane coming from Costa Rica machine-gunned
Nicaraguan positions in the vicinity of a Nicaraguan border post in the San
Juan River Delta sector. (Ann. A, Attachment 249 (Diplomatic Note of

Nicaragua).)
On II February contras using a border post of the Costa Rican Rural
Guard fired on the Nicaraguan border post located in the sector of El
Sarampion, Rio San Juan. Rifles, machine guns, and 57 mm cannon were
used in the attack. (Ann. C, Attachment 1.)
On II February one Nicaraguan was wounded when a group of conlras
attacked, from Costa Rican territory, the Nicaraguan border post in the
sector of the San Juan River Delta. (Ann. C. Attachment 1.)
On 16April Nicaraguan troops located in the vicinity of Border Marker
No. 12. II kilometers south-east of San Carlos. were attacked by armed

men from Costa Rican territory using rifle fire, 81 mm mortars and
M-79 grenade launchers. (Ann. A, Attachment 255 (Diplomatic Note of
Nicaragua).)
On 21 April a group of individuals hijacked the Promar 36, a civilian
ship of Nicaraguan registry, near Monkey Point, on the Atlantic Coastof
Nicaragua. The ship and its crew were taken to Costa Rica. (Ann. A,
Attachment 257 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 22 April a group of armed men operating from Costa Rican territory
attacked a civilinn boat near "Sombrero de Cuero" Island, 37 kilometers

from San Carlos, Nicaragua. One woman was wounded and one person
was reported missing. (Ann. A, Attachment 258 (Diplomatic Note of
~i~ ~ ~"~ ~~,,
On 29May a group of armed men used mortars to attack the Nicaraguan
border town of San Juan del Norte from Costa Rican territory. (Ann. A.
Aitachment 260 (Uiplomaiic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 1 June a group oi some 15perrons nearing the uniform of the Costa
Rican Civil Guard attacked the Nicaraauan observation oost of Las

Conchitas. 10kilometers south-east of Pcilas Blancas. using FAL and AK
rifles. (Ann. A. Attachment 261 (Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua).)
On 19 Aueust armed men ooeratina from Costa Rican territorv used
75 mm mortirs io attack a ~iciraguan border posi located 23 kiloketerç
south-east 01 El Casiillo. (Ann. A. Aiiachment 265 (Diplomatic Note of
Nicaragua).)

135. Durina 1986.conlras who had entered Nicaraaua reau-.rlv received SUD-
plies throughairdrops from flighrs ovcr Costa ~ican-territory as well as flights
that had used airfields in Cosia Rica iiself. A Cl23K cargo plane shot down in
southern Nicaragua on 5Octobçr 1986had flown (rom Ilopango Air Basein El MEbIORW OF NICARAGUA 53

Salvador to southern Nicaragua, taking it over Costa Rica. The aircraft was
laden withmilitary supplies intended for UN0 forces inside Nicaragua. Thesur-

viving crew member, a United States citizen named Eugene Hasenfus, con-
firmed these facts in sworn testimony at his trial in Nicaragua on 16 October
1986. (Ann. G, Attachment 1. Seealso Ann. 1, Attachments 50, 52.) Hasenfus

also testified that he had vreviously . .ticivated in five similar flinhts. suc-
cessfully dropping arms, ammunition and other supplies to contra forces inside
Nicaragua. before the 5 October flight was shot down. (Id.)He also confirmed,
in interviews with the press, that earlier in 1986 hehad flown supply missions

using the airbase at Santa Elena peninsula. (Ann. 1, Attachment 52.)
136. CIA Station Chief Fernandez also confirmed that numerous supply
~~iehts for the contras in Nicaragua came from and/or flew over Costa Rica in
"~~~~ ~
1986. In his testimony io the unitcd States Congress. Fernandel described ninc
such supply drops occurring from April through Septembcr 1986. (Ann. F.
A~ ~~~ment 3 l~,stimonv of hlr. Fernandez. . ... 57-67. . Fernandez furiher
tehtified ihat aircrafi involi,ed in the contra 5upply operations landed for refuel-

ing at a commercial airpori ("[l>eleiedJ International Airport") in Co~a Rica
on ai leasi iwo occasions in May and June 1986.(Id.. pp. 78-80: seealso Ann.
F. Attachmcnt 3(Testimony of Mr. Tambs. p. 18-2).) hloreover, logs rccotercd

from the wreckaae of the C123K aircraft shoi down uver Nicaragua in October
~~.. ~.evealed t~ ~ ~~ -- Y~~~~n~ ~ ~ ~llace Blaine Sawver. who was killed on
thai flighi. had beenaboard IWO flights earlicr in 1986[hi< had useda commer-
cial airvort in San Jose.(Ann 1,Atiachmenis 51.60.) Ambassador Tambs con-

firmed'that such use of the commercial airport had to be cleared by airport
officials. (Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Testimony of Mr. Tambs, p. 18-2).)
137. Mr. Fernandez ~ersonallv assisted with these contra suvvly ov...tion.

and reportcd on [hem io his stiperiors in Washington. His role was Io relay
information beiween the souihern front commanders and the "pri\,aie bcncfac-
iors" working under the superi,irion of Li. Col. North who operaied ihe flights.
io pinpoint locations for ihe \uppl) drops and to help avoid encounters with

Nicaraguan forces. (Ann. F. Aitachmeni 3 (Tesiiman) of Mr. Fernandel.
on. 52.55. 67-68)) Thus. for examole. he cabled Li. <:ol. North ahout the Taie
2 "an ~1100 akcraft that deliverkd 20,000 pounds of lethal material Io the

southern front commanders on or about April Tenth", in a memorandum dated
12April 1986. (Id., p. 61.) In this memorandum, Fernandez reported on both
the April 10airdrop, and plans for future air and seadeliveries to the contras:

"Per UN0 South Force drop successfully completed in [illegiblel
minutes. .. .Our plans during next 2-3 weeks includes air drop [deletedl

maritime deliveries NHAO [Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office
of the United States Department of State] supplies to same, NHAO air
drop to UN0 South, but w/certified air worthy aircraft, lethal drop to

UN0 South, [deleted] visit Io UN0 South Force with photogs, UN0
newspapers, caps and shirts, and transfer of 80 UNO/FARN recruits
[deleted] carrying al1remaining cached lethal materiel tu join UN0 South
Force .. ." (Ann. F, Attachment 3 (Exhibit to Testimony of JosC Fer-

nandez identified only as TC "W 12 April 1986").)

138. Additional information on the maritime component of the resupply
operation was reported in a separate cable Io North dated 7 April 1986. In that
memorandum, Fernandez reportedthat "the local port officials are aware of the
operation and approve providing they don't get caught with arms . . .".(Ann.

F, Attachment 3 (Exhibit to Testimony of Robert W. Owen) (Exhibit
RWO-IS).)54 BORDERANDTRANSBORDEA RRME0ACTIONS

139. Fernandez made clear in his 12Anril cable to North that the obiective
, ~ ~~
of al1of thcseoperaiions wa5io hring ahoui ihe "creaiion of a 2.5OOman force
which can strike northwcst and link up wiih quiche io form solid souihern force.
Likewise. envisage formidable opposition on Ailantic Coasi resupplicd at or hy
sea." He concluded: "realize ihis may he overly ambiiious planning. bu1 wiih
your help. believe wc tan ~ull il off''. IAnF. Aiiachmeni 31Tesiimony of Mr.

~ernandez, p. 174).)
140. By late 1986, the contras' southern front had in fact been built up to a
force of between 1.600and 2.800 men. accordine to AmbassadorTambs. (Ann.
1.Attachment 63.)Some 56 separaie Conrra mobi~izations from Co\ia Rica and
encampmcnts on Cosia Ricdn terrirory had beenreporied beiween January 1985

and 21 Decemher 1986and, as notedearlier, ai l&st 10contra basesremained
active ai the end of 1986. (Ann. C, Attachment 5, Table 1.) As a result,
Ambassador Tambs testified that by the time he left his post in Costa Rica in
Januarv 1987. he had succeededin establishine an aeeres--ve southern front
againsi.~icaragua. (Ann. F.Aiiachment 3 (~esknony ofMr. Tamb5. pp. 7-1.

18-1.29-2). SeeaI\o. Ann. F.Atiachmeni 3 (Tesiimony of Mr. Owen. p. 24-3.)
141. The Costa Rican Governmeni's tolerance of conrra aciivities on ils ier-
riiory hascontinued. rven as ihis hlcmorial is being prcpared. On 14July 1987.
the Cosia Risan Direcior General of Civil Aviation. Carlos Viauez. belaiedlv
admitted the existence of a network of airstrips along the country's northerb
border with Nicaragua, claiming they had jus1 been "discovered". Director

General Viquez stated that the Government would investigate the possibility
that these airstrips were heing used hy counter-revolutionaries seeking to over-
throw the Government of Nicaragua. (Ann. 1, Attachments 66, 67.) Never-
theless, on 20 July 1987. an airolane comina from Costa Rica droooed a small
paratroop team and their weapons in chontales province of Nicaragua. approx-

imately 125 miles south-east of Managua. While the paratroopers themselves
escaped. the Nicaraauan armed forces caotured their weaoons. includine a
~niÏed States Cioveinment supplied Redeie anti-aircraft missile, with s&al
number M41A3. These advanced-technology, heat-seeking missiles are now
used by contra forces to shoot down Nicaraguan Covernment aircraft, and

represent a grave threat to civil aviation as well. Their use in Nicaragua
represents a serious escalation of the war effort to support the contras. (Ann.
1, Attachment 68.) PART TWO

BREACH OF THE DUTY OF NON-INTERVENTION

141A. The norm prohihiting intervention by one State in the interna1 or
external affairs of another is fundamental in contemporary international law.
It is a foundation stone secondin importance only to the prohibition against the

use of force. Like the principle of non-use of force, its power and validity rest
not only on positive expression in the United Nations Charter or on any other
singlc Murce of inierniiional Iau.. but on al1 combined. It is a prinLTipleof
general international law. Itisreiieraicd or rcflesied in counilesaseparateinier-
national agreements, declarations, resolutions and other acts. It is embodied in
the great constitutive charters of the United Nations and the Organization of

American States.
142. The non-intervention ~rinciole is implicit in the central structural
characteristic of the modern internaiional rysiem. the sovereign equality and
independence of Siateç. Judge Seiie-Camara, in his separaie opinion in
Niraraguo \. Unilcd Yoles. supgesicd thai it is a rulc of jus rogens:

"As far as non-intervention is concerned, in spite of the uncertainties
which still prevail in the matter of identifying norms of jus cogens, 1submit

that the prohibition of intervention would certainly qualify assuch, if the
test of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is
applied." (Nicaragua v. Uniled Srares, supra, p. 199. Seealso C. Chau-
mont, 55 Annuaire de I'Instiiut de droit inrernofional 580 (1973).)

143. The content of the norm also is derived no1 from any single source of
law. but bv a continuous interaction amone -hem. The Charter orovisions draw
on prior general law, and the practice and experience with the principle under

the Charter's feed back into the development of the customarv norm. These in
iurn are recapiiulaied. codified. and elaboraied in bilaieral ancÏmuliilateral con-
ventional in,trunicni\ - them\elvcs i\idcnce of Siaie practice - and solemn
declarations of international assemblies - themselves indications of ouinio
juris. This procesr ofconiinuing iteraiion beiweengeneral international law and
con\entional law is no noveliy iii the progressive develupmeni of principles of
contemoorary inicrnatiunal law. In Nirara~ua \,.Unired Slaresitself. the Court

iook the occasion io consider and elucidaicrhe \ubile and complex relationships
beiween gçneral internaiional Iaw and parallel Charter pro\isionr. in relation to
the verv norm of non-intervention heie under discussion. (Seeid.' . ... 93-97.)
This c&e presents another instance of such interaction.
144. It is the submission of Nicaragua that this norm, whatever its source and

however defined, prohibits intervention of any State in the affairs of another:
(a) directly by use of force against the second State,

lbl indirectl. hv..rovidinn -ssistanceand suripo. .to forces conductina mil.tary
or psramilitary asiiviiies againsi thr wond Staie. or
Ir, by ncquiescencein the use01'lis ierriiory by irregulars or armed bands as
a base for recruitment, training, logistical support or political backing for56 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

military or paramilitary activities against the second State seeking to coerce
or overthrow the government of that State.

Nicaragua submits that Costa Rica has violated its duty of non-intervention in
al1three of these main asDects.
145. Chapter III, immediately following, will demonstrate that the principle
of non-intervention as defined above, is to be found in the same essential

features in al1 sources of international law - general international law, the
Charters of the UN and the OAS, and bilateral and multilateral agreements in
force between the parties. Chapter IV will apply the law derived from this
analysis to the facts developed in Part One,hus establishing the pervasiveviola-
tions by Costa Rica asserted in the Application.CHAPTER III. THE DUTY 01: A STATE NOT TO INTERVENE IN THE
AFFAIRS OF ANOTHKR 1S A FUNI>AMENTAL PHIFICIPI.F. OF
IN'I'EWSA'I'IONALLAW

A. General International Law

146. It is no lon-.r ooen 10 auestion that the orinciple of non-intervention
is an element of general international law. ~he is established
authoritatively and categorically by the judgment of the Court in Nicaragua v.

United States:
"The prinsiple of non-intervention in\,olvesthe right of every soiereign
Siate 10 conduct ils affdirs iviihout outside interfercncc; though exampler
of tresoass aeainst this orinciole are not infreauent. the Court considers

that iiir ~art-and ~arcel'of cu;tomary iniernational law. As the Court has
observed: 'Betueen independent Siaies. respect for territorial so\creignty
is an essential foundation oi international rclations' (I.C.J. Kepori~ 1949.
p. 35). and international law requires political integrity also to be
resoected. Exoressions of an o~inio juris regarding the existence of the
principle of non-interventioii in customary intcrnational lau are numerous
and no! difficult to find. Of course, statements whcreby States avow thcir
recognition of ihe orincioles of intcrnational lar sel forih in the United

~ations Charter cannot strictly be interpreted as applying to the principle
of non-intervention by States in the interna1 or external affairs of other
States, since this principle is not, as such, spelt out in the Charter. But il
wa~-n~ ~ ~ ~t~nded that the Charter should embodv written confirmation
of every essential principle of international law in force. The existence in
the o~inio iuris of States of the orinci~le of non-intervention is backed by
estabiishedand substantial praciicc. 11ha, rnoreorer bcen prcsented as a
corollary of the sovereign equaliiy of States. A pnrticular instance of this
is General Asremblv resolution 2625 IXXVI. the Declaration on the Prin-

ciples of lnternati70nal Law conce;ning '~riendl~ Relations and Co-
operation among States." (Id., p. 106.)
147. The subsequent paragraphs of the Court's judgment set out the evidence
of both State practice and opinio juris supporting its conclusion. (Id.,

pp. 107-110.)Nevertheless a recapitulation of the history of the doctrineand the
evolution of its content is appropriate.
148. The rule originated on the American continent. Long ago, the Court
itself characterized it as "one of the most firmly established traditions of
Latin America, . . ." (Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment of
20 November 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 266. 285.) The opinions of the
authors agree: "The principle of non-intervention . .. had its origins in the
international law of the American States ..." (E. Jiménez de Arechaga,

"General Course in Public International Law", 159 Hague Recueil 111
(1978-1); see also, e.g., P. B. Potter, "L'intervention", 32 Hague Recueil,
pp. 634 ff. (1930-II); A. v. W. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Non-Inter-
vention - The Law and Ils Import in America, p. 55 (Dallas, 1956);58 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

C. Rousseau, Droit international public. Les relations internationales, Vol. IV,
p. 38 (Paris. 1980).
149. This provenance is, perhaps, of special signification in the present case

in which both of the parties are Latin American States and heirs to its legal
tradition. But whatever ifs origins, the principle is now universal and the most
eminent authorities unanimously acknowledge if as a self-evident customary
norm. (See, e.g., A. Rivier. Le droit inlernalional, Vol. 1, para. 108, Vol. 111,
para. 1298 (Paris, 1886); P. Fauchille, Traitéde droit international public,
pp. 538 et seq. (Paris, 1922);E. C. Stowell, Intervention in InternationalLaw,
p. 321 (Washington, 1921); and "La théorie et la pratique de l'intervention",
40Hague Recueil 123(1932.11);cf. A. v.W. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, supra,
pp. 216 ff.(Dallas, 1956); Ci.Fitzmaurice, "General Principles of International
Law", 92 Hague Reaieil 176(1957-11);D. P. O'Connell, 1International Law,
PP. 299-300(London, 1970);J. L. Brierly, TheLaw ofNations, p. 402 (6th ed.,
H. Waldock, Oxford, 1963); S. M. Schwebel, "Aggression, Intervention, and
Self-Defence", 136Hague Recueil, pp. 452-454(1972-11);G. 1.Tunkin, Theory
of International Law, pp. 115-116, 437-440 (Butler Translation, London,

1974); R. Ago, 56 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 154 (1975);
E. Jiménezde Aréchaga, supra, pp. 111-116; C. Rousseau, supra, pp. 37-39
(Paris, 1980); 0. Schachter, "General Course on Public lnternational Law",
178Hague Recueil 160ff. (1982-V); M. Virally, "Cours general de droit inter-
national public", 183Hague Recueil 110 (1983-V).)
150. Although he admitted exceptions, Oppenheim constantly referred to the
principle of non-intervention as a basic rule. (See International Law - A
Treatise, P. 305 (8th ed.. 195%)
151. ~hcrc is also substaniial agreement ab to the content of the norm. Ir i\
axiomaiic thai any unjustified use of armed force by one State against another
is an intervention. (Nicaragua v. United States, supra. p. 108.) lt is also estab-
iished that assistance by a State to armed bands operating from its territory
against anotherState isan intervention. (Id., pp. 118-119.)TheCourt's holding
in that case draws on and confirms the definition in the Declaration on "Prin-
ciples of lnternational Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation

among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" (GA res.
2625 (XXV) (1970). UNGAOR, Twenty-fiffh session, Supp. No. 18, A/8082,
p. 21, discussed infra, paras. 159, 160). Under "Theprinciple that States shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force", the
Declaration suhsuntes the following:
"Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the

organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for
incursion into the territory of another State.
Every State has the dutyto refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within ils territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, wben the acts referred Io in the present paragraph
invoive a threat or use of force."

152. In Part Three, infra, Nicaragua submits that the activitiesof Costa Rica
set forth in the Application and in Part One of this Memorial constitute a use
of force against Nicaragua in violation of these principles. Under the rule that
unlawful use of force is ipsofacto intervention, these same actions also violate
the customarv law ~rohibition aaainst intervention.
153. The court has held, however, that any assistance hy a State to armed
bands or irregulars present upon its territory and carrying out operations against MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 59

anothcr State. eben though iimay faIl ,hurr of a uw of force. i,rirverilieless
an intervention prohibiied by international Iaw. Thu~. in diicuising the a:ttvitieb
of the United States in support of the contras, the Court said:

"ln the view of the Court, while the arming and training of the contras
can certainlv be said to involve the threat or use of forceaeainst Nicaraeua.
thisis not nicessarily so in respect of al1the assistance gi%n by the ~nlted
StatesGovernment. In ~articular, the Court considers that the mere SUDD~Y
of funds to the contrai, while undoubtedly an art of interventiort i' Ïhé

internalaffirs of Nicaragua, as will be explained below, does not in itself
amount to a use of force." (Nicaragua v. Uniled Srales, supra, p. 119
(emphasis added).)

In its discussion of the violations of the duty of non-intervention by the United
States, the Court expanded on this conception:

"The Court considers that in international law. if one State. with a view
to the coercion of another State, supports and aisists armed bands in that
State whose purpose is to overthrow the govcrnment of that State, that
amountsto an intervention bv one State in the interna1affairs of the other.
whether or not the political objective of the State giving such support and
assistance is equally far-reiiching." (Id., p. 124.)

154. It -. eauallv clear that a State's failure to orevent the use of its territorv
as a base for hostile activities against ifs neighbor is an intervention. JudgeAgo,

as Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the responsibility of
States, describes as follows the obligation of a State not to tolerate on its ter-
ritory the organization and training of groups whose aim is the subversion of
a neighboring State:

"Here the direct object of the obligation is not to prevent the occurrence
of an attack or other event iniurious to the Government from occurring in
the territory of that State. ~he obligation requires, within the framework
of mutual respect between independent sovereign entities, that the State
should not allow an oreanization hostile to a foreien eovernment to be
estahlihed within its own frontiers and to engage thire rn action aimed at
overthrowing the latter Government by violence. .. . It is thus clear that,

in this case. there is a breach of the obliration, solelv bv reason of the fact
that the authorities tolerated the establishment of théo&anization in ques-
tion inthe territory of the State and did not dissolve it as soon as they knew
of its existence and its aims. It is thus ~ossible to conclude that this breach
exi~t\and io hring out in ionscquencer rithoui depending. ar a \ub\cquent
condition, on the fact nt'ihc \uh!cr\i\.c orgaiiizstion's habing ~uïcceded in
~ ~rvine out attacks in a foreien territorv. Drovokine subversion there and
, - . . ~ -~
so forth." (t'earhook of the Internollonal Iak. C'i~rnmr~.~ro1 n.78, 1'01 11.
l'art One. para. 15. p. 36; iee al\o, e.g.. H. Lautcrpacht, "Revolutionary
Acrivities by I'ri\ate I'crrons againsl Foreign Siaie\". 22 .lm. J. Int'l law
126 (1928); G. Fitzmauricr. supra. ai 177; D Schindlcr. Annlrarrr de
1'ln.srrrutde dro~rrnurnorit>nol 171 (I973).)

There is no need to burden the Court with repetitive quotations from the
authorities. But perhaps an exception can be made for the analysis of Thomas
~ ~ ~ho~ ~. w~,se comorehensive work. Non-intervention ~ ~ - The Law and Ils
Import in the Americas, supra, has special weight in the Western Hemisphere
context and deals at some length with the question of a State's failure to prevent60 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

incursions from its territory against another. The authors begin their discussion
with a restatement of the general position that:

"al1 nations owe other nations the duty Io prevent their territory from
being usedas a base for hostile activities against the legitimate government
of a third nation". (Id.. p. 217.)

The authors directly address the question whether mere passive toleration, even
though admittedly an international delict. can:

"be said to be an intervention, in viewof the fact that intervention requires
an intent on the part of the intervenina state to impose its willon the other
state, and failure to use due diligence might mekely be an indication of

complete disinterestedness and not of an intent to intervene?" (Id.)
Their answer is in the affirmative:

"Where there is a duty on the part of a state to act and that state omits
to do the act with knowledee ofwhat the conseouences o.~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~on~ ~ ~ ~ ~~
willbe, it intends the consequences jus1as truli-as it intended to omit what

it should have done. Its inaction or failure to use due diliaence did oermit
its territory to be used by persons to foment civil strife in another staie. this
con\iituies an aci ofintcrvenrion in the affairi of that state, and the motive
for its inaction is unimooriani." (Id. Sec also A. J. Thomas. "Thc
Organization of ~merican States and Subversive Intervention", in Pro-
ceedings of the American Society of International Law, 55th Meeting. 19

(1961) icharacterizina as intervention cases in which "the eovernment of
one s'ta'tehas tolerated, instigated or encouraged seditiois movements
against the government of another state, such movements generally being
led by political exiles opposed to the latter governrnent").)

155. Beainnina with the Leaaue of Nations in 1934.international ornaniza-
tions have-reguLrly and consistently endorsed this principle in instriments
defining and clarifying its content. In that year, the League Council declared:

"that it is the duty of every State neither Io encourage nor tolerate on its
territory any terrorist activity with a political purpose; that every State
must do al1in its power to prevent and repress acts of this nature and must
for this purpose lend ils assistance to Governrnents which request it . . .".

(12 League of Nations Officia1 Journal, p. 1759, Part II (July-December
1934).)

156. The early work of the International Law Commission, reflecting the
state of customary international law at the time of the adoption of the United
Nations and OAS Charters also addressed the principle of non-intervention.
The draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, formulated by the Com-
mission in 1949, provides:

"Article 3

Every State has the duty Io refrain from intervention in the interna1and
external affairs of any other State.

Article 4
Every State has the duty Io refrain from fomenting civil strife in the ter-

ritory of another State, and to prevent the organization within its territory
of activities calculated to foment such civil strife." (GA res. 375(IV)
(6 December 1949).) MEMORIAL OP NICARAGUA 61

The Commission in its Report notes that the tex1has a Latin American prov-
enance. having been derived from Articles 5 and 22 of the Panamanian draft
on which the work of the Commission was based. and that "the orinciolels have1
heen enunciated in various international agreementsn. (~epori of tie interna:
tional Law Commission covering its First Session 12 April-9 June 1949, Year-
book of the ILC, p. 287 (1949).)

157. Likewise, the 1954ILC Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Security of Mankind included:
"The undertaking or encouraaement hv the authorities of a State of
activiiies calculatedÏo fomeni civilsiriie in.anoiher Siate, or the roleration
by the authorities of a Siate of organized acritities calcularcd io fomeni
civilstrife in nnorher State "tDrafr Code oi Offence, Againsr the Pcace
and Security of Mankind, ILC Report, Article 2 (6), UI'%~AOR Supp. 9
(Ninth Session, 1954).)

158. The Report of the Special Rapporteur, M. 1.Spiropoulos, makes it clear
that :

"if ... the fomentinp.be due to orivate activities. the reswnsihilitv of the
Stare offisials of the kate from hhich ihesc private activities emafiate will
rouli from rheir failure io prevenr or repres, ,ush fomenting by privaie
acriviiics". IDocumeni A, CN.4/25. II Yearbook of ~he Iniernarional Law
~ommission (l950), pp. 253, 262. (~eealso ~rticlé II of the new draft of
Doudou Thiam including among the acts constituting crimes against the
peace, "Interference by the authorities of a State in thenterna1and exter-
na1affairs of another State". Report of the ILC on its 38th Session, 1986,
A/4l/IO).)

159. In recent years the Uniteil Nations General Assembly has recognized the
principle of non-intervention with increasingemphasis in a succession of resolu-
tions and declarations. Foremost among these is the "Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". (GA res. 2625
(XXV) (1970).) The Court has already remarked on the special weight to be
accorded this resolution in defining the general international law norm of non-
intervention. (Nicaragua v. United States, supra, p. 106.)The principle of non-
intervention contained in the body of the resolution is described as "the duty
not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in
accordance with the Charter". (CiAres. 2625 (XXV) (1970).)In elaborating that
duty the resolution States:

"armed intervention and al1 other forms of interference or attempted
threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic
and cultural elements are iii violation of international law.
.. .no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate
subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violentover-
throw of the regime of another State ..." (ld..)

160. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the "Declaration on the lnadmissihility of Inter-
vention in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of Their Inde-
pendence and Sovereignty" (GA res. 2131 (XX) (21 December 1965)), are the
sources of the language in resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970). quoted ahove. The
relevant texts of the two resolutions are almost identical.
161. The other United Nations resolutions on this subject use identical or
very similar language:62 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

Non-Interference in the Interna1 Affairs of States, GA res. 31/91 (12 January
1977), UN doc. A/Res./31/9L (1977):

"3. Denounces any form of interference, overt or covert, direct or
indirect, including recruiting and sending mercenaries, by one State or
group of States and any act of military, ~olitical, economic or other form
of intervention in the internal or external affairsof other States,egardless
of the character of their mutual relations or their social and economic
systems;
.. .

5. Calls upon al1States, in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations, to undertake necessary measures in
order to prevent any hostile act or activity taking place within their ter-
ritory and directed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of another State."

Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Inter-
na1Affairs of States, GA res. 36/103 (1981):
"Reajjirming, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
that no Statehas the right to intervene directly or indirectly for any reason

whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
...
2. The principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal
and external affairs of other States comprehends the following rights and
duties:
...

11

(O, Theduty of States 10 refrain in their international relation5 from the
threat or use of for~ein any form uhatroever 10 violate the existing inter-
nationalls recognired boundarie, of anothcr Srarc, to divupt the political.
social O; economic order of other States, to overthrow-or change the
political system of another State or its Government, to cause tension
between or among States or to deprive peoples of their national identity
and cultural heritage;
(b) The duty of a State to ensure that its territory is not used in any man-
ner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial
integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social
stability of another State; .. ."

Resolution 2625 (XXV) was adopted by consensus. There can be no doubt that
it reflects opinio juris of the participating Governments. Resolution 2131 (XX)
was adopted unanimously (with one abstention). In 1966,the Special Commit-
tee on Principles of lnternational Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States said that the Declaration:

"hy virtue of the number of States which voted in its favor, the scope and
profundity of its contents and, in particular, the absence of opposition,
reflects a universal leeal conviction which aualifies it to be reearded as
an authentic and definite principle of international la@. (U~AOR,
Annexes, v. 11174 (XXI) (1966).)

162. As already noted, in ils judgment of 27 June 1986,the Court recognized
the special significance ofthese resolutions in that they "set out principles which MEMORUL OF NICARAGUA 63

the General Assembly declared to be 'basic principles of international law"'.
(Nicaragua v. United States, supra, p. 107.)The teachings of jurists also affirm

that these resolutions represent codifications of existing customary law. (See.
e.g., L. B. Sohn, "The Development of the Charter of the United Nations", in
M. Bos (ed.), The Present State of International Law, pp. 50 ff. (Deventer,
1973); S. M. Schwebel, "Wars of Liberation as Fought in UN Organs", in
J. N. Moore (ed.), Law and Ci'vilWar in the Modern World, p. 452 (Balti-
more. 1974); E. Jiménezde Aréchaga,supra, pp. 12, 32.)
163. There can be no doubt that these resolutions constitute authoritative
formulations of the general international law now in force.

B. The Charten of the Organization of American States
and the United Nalions

1. The Charter of the Organizalion of American States
164. The Charter of the Organization of American States represents the
culmination of more than a century of effort by international lawyers and

statesmen of the American States to curb intervention by one State in theaffairs
of another. According to J. M. Yepes. the principle of non-intervention "est
comme l'épine dorsale du droit international au Nouveau Monde". (J. M.
Yepes, "La contribution de l'Amérique latineau développementdu droit inter-
national public et privé", 32 Hague Recueil 745 (1930).)
165. In this respect, the Charter is deeply marked by the special historic
experience of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. To quote Dr. Yepes
again, speaking in the ILC debate on the non-intervention provision of the draft
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States:

"The Latin American position with regard to intervention was the result
of events which had taken place during the nineteenth century and the first
three decades of the twentieth century. During that period, the Latin
American countries had been the victims of a series of unilateral interven-
tions bv a la-ee number of Euro~ean nations and by the United States
Ali thosc events had created \,erysrrong opposition to unilateral inter\,en-
lion in Latin America which had consistenlly affirmedthe prinsipleof non-
intervention; it was one of the maindeas underlying Latin-American legal
thought." (International Law Commission, 1st session, 12th meeting, 28
April 1949, A/CN.4/SR.12, pp. 6-7.)

Article 18 (originally Article 15) of the Charter provides:

"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly. for any reason whatever, in the interna1 or external affairs of
any other State. The foregoing principle prevents not only armed force but
also any other form of inferference or attempted threat against the per-
sonality of the State or aga-nst its volitical. economic, and cultural
elements."

Article 19 (originally Article 16) elaborates the non-intervention principle as
follows :

"No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind."&I BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTtONS

166. The drafters of these Articles were working in the context of a long

iuridical history. especially rich in the Western Hemisphere, of efforts to curb
intervention by one.~tatein the affairs of another, both through the develop-
ment of norms of general international lawand through a sericsof conventional
instruments in the American svstem specifically directed to the problem. The
non-intervention provisions of the OAS charter are a codification of the
customary norms and an integrated and comprehensivestatement of the provi-

sions of the earlier Western Hemisphere conventional law. As Judge Fabela
says:

"These provirionr. which are complementary. clcarly define, as the basis
of peaceful pan.American coexistence. the principlc of non-intcrvcntion
for~which ~atin America has always struggled, most especially since the
Havana Conference (1928)'." (1. Fabela, Inlervencion, p. 250 (Mexico,
1959).)

167. Thus, for exaniple, the Charter text undertakes to resolve a number of
issues of controversv and debate amona iuris-.. In every case. the text comes
down in faror of the more inclu5iveconception of intervention. Ildoes not con-

fine"intervention" to the use ofarmrd force. but includer also "any other form
.~ int~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ Article 19~e~ r~~slv .ondemns "co~rci~e measures of an
economic or political character .. .". Intervention in the external as well as the
internal affairs of another State is prohibited. And multilateral as well as
unilateral intervention is covered.
168. It is widely recognized that these Articles comprise the broadest and

most comprehensive formulation of the principle of non-intervention in any
multilateral charter or instrument, certainly as of the time of the formation of
the OAS in 1948.Therefore they should not be given a restrictive or grudging
construction.
169. Since the OAS Charter in effect declares and codifies the customary

international law norm, the discussion of the scope and content of that norm
of non-intervention in section A above is eauallv relevant to the construction
of Articles 18 and 19of the OAS Charter. ihe identical conclusion as to the
scope and content of the norm is derived from an analysis of the prior conven-
tional law in the Western Hemisphere and subsequent applications and inter-
pretations of the Charter by competent organs of the OAS.

170. The history of the evolution of the non-intervention provisions of the
OAS Charter thro&h a seriesof hemispheric instruments beginning in 1928has
often bçen told. (See. e.g.. F. V. Gariia-Amador. The 1nrer.Amer~conSyslem
- 11sDevelonmenr ondSlrenarheninn. xxv-xxii(New York. 1966): C. Ci. Fen-
wick. The ~;~anization of me ri co Slales - The Inter-American Regional

Syslem. pp. 54-87(1963); A. v. W. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, The Organiza-
lion of American Srores (Dallas, Southern Methodist University Press, 1963).
7.. 158-161.It need onlv be summarized brieflv here. The first effort to secure
a forma1agreement on non-intervention among al1the American States occur-
red at the Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana in
1928. The newly formed Commission of Jurists presented a draft treaty on

Rights and Duties of Statescontaining a non-intervention provision: "No state
has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another." (See Thomas and

' Original Spanishtert: En tales preceptos, quese complementanentre si, queda
definido.como base de la convivenciapan-americana.el principiode la no intervention
por el que la AméricaLatina vino luchando desdc siempre. pero de manera muy
rignificativadesde laCanferenciade La Habana(1928).Thomas. The Organizalion of American States, supro, p. 59.) The proposal
was defeated after long and acrimonious debate due to the opposition of the
United States. As part of the same enterprise, however, the Commission of
Jurists proposed a Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event
of Civil Strife, which was adopted by the Conference. (See The International

Conferences of Americon Stores 1889-1928,p. 435 (New York, 1931).)
171. This Convention proclaimed the fundamental obligation of the contrac-
tins States:

"To use al1means at their disposal to prevent the inhabitants of their
territory, nationals or aliens, from participating in, gathering elements,
crossing the houndary or sailing from their territory for the purpose of
starting or promoting civil strife." (Id.)

172. This provision embodies the general international law norm discussed
above. The Convention has remained a permanent part of the array of Inter-
American treaties giving conventional form to the principle of non-inter-

vention.
~7-. I~ ~~ ~ - ~ ~ ~~-ideo. the Latin American States aained the success
that eluded them in Havana. ~he Seventh Conference adopte; a Convention on
Rights and Duties of States. Article 8 closely trÿcked the formula rejccted (ive
years earlier: "No state has the right to intervene in the intemal or external
affairs of another." (The Inlernolional Conferences of Americon States, First
Supplement. 1933-1940, p. 122 (Washington, 1940).) This time, the United

States signed, although subject to a long and somewhat opaque reservation.
Nicaragua signed the Convention al Montevideo, and both Nicaragua and
Costa Rica ratified soon thereafter. (International Conferences of the Ameri-
con Stores. 1st Supp., 1933-1940, pp. 123, 121, n. 1.) In 1936, at the Inter-
American Conference for the Maintenance of the Peace at Buenos Aires, an
Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention was presented and adopted
without reservation by al1participants. It provides:

"The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of
any one of them. directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the
internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties." (Id., p. 191.)

The Declaration of American Principles adopted by the Eighth Conference at
Lima proclaims that "The intervention of any ~tatë in the internal or external

affairs of another is inadmissible". (Id., p. 309.) And the Act of Chapultepec,
adopted al Mexico City in 1945, recited that:

"The American States have heen incorporating in their international
law. since 1890, by means of conventions, resolutions and declarations,
the following principles :
...

(b) The condemnation of intervention by one State in the affairs of
another." (The Internotional Conferences of the American Stoles, 2nd
Supp. 1942-1954,p. 66 (Washington, L958).)

174..Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter of the Oraanization of American
States signed al Bogoti in 1948(now Articles 18and 19)mark the culmination
and intenration of this long development of Western Hemisphere non-
intervention law. We can see the development and refinement of the text from
the simple 13word sentence at Havana through Montevideo and Buenos Aires
to the final version at BogotA.66 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

175. The non-intervention Articles are included in Chapter II1of rhe Charter
cntitled Fundamental Rightsand Duties of States. This Chapter as uell as those
on Purnoses and Princioles were introduced into the Charter over the oooosi-
tion oi the United ~taies. Mexico took the lead in urging a "comprehe"sive
document incorporating principles and standards of conduct and policies
previously proclaimed in inter-American documents". (C. G. Fenwick, The
Orgonizotionof Americon Sfofes, p. 81 (Washington, 1963).)The principle of
non-intervention, including its corollaries embodied in the Convention on the
Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, were prominent among
those "principles, policies and standards of conduct previously proclaimed in
inter-American documents". (Id.,p. 85; see also Thomas and Thomas, The
Orgonizotion of American States, supro, p. 63, Thomas and Thomas, Non-

Intervention, supro, p. IlS.) Garcia-Amador says:
"Outstanding in this declaratory part of theCharter is ChapterII1which
defines the 'fundamental rights and duties of States' with a scope and
precision unparalleled in any other conventional instrument." (Garcia-
Amador, supra, p. xxxii.)

176. The applications and interpretations of the Charter by competent organs
of the OAS can be regarded as authoritative statements of the meaning of these
provisions. All of these concur in defining the failure of a State to prevent the
use of its territory as a base for attacks against a neighbor as impermissible
intervention.
177. Soon aftertheChartercame into force, the OAS Council was faced with
a dispute between these same two parties. Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Then,
Costa Rica initiated the complaint. The Costa Rican Ambassador:

"accuse[d] the Government of Nicaragua of having violated the territorial
intearity of Costa Rica, and threatened its sovereianty and oolitical
indeiendence bv tolerotinz. encouro~-n~-.nd aidine> cons~ir&. con*
coctédin ~icorogua in ord; to overthrow the Costa Gcan Government by
force of arms, and finally hymokinaovoilobleIo the cons~irotorsthe ter-
ritory ondmoteriol meons that enabled them to cross the bDrderand invade
Costa Rican soil". I Applicorionsof rhe Inter-Americon Treotyof Reci-
procolAssisfonce,1948.1956, p. 21 (Washington, 1957)(emphasis added)
(hereinafter"Applications").)

The Committee of Information reported to the Council that:

"I. .ere is not the sliehtest doubt of the failure of the Nicaraeu-n
Government to take adequate measures to prevent the revolutionary
activities directed aaainst a n-iahbor-na and friendlv countrv from bein-
carried out." (Id.,P. 26.)

Accordingly the Council resolved:
"That the Nicaraguan Government could and should have taken ade-
quate measures at the proper time for the purpose of preventing (a) the
development, in Nicaraguan territory. of activities intended to overthrow
the present regime in Costa Rica, and (b) the departure from Nicaraguan

territory of revolutionary elements."(Id., p. 28.)
Meanwhile. Nicaragua had entered a similar counter-complaint ageinst Costa
Rica, as to which the Council made a similar finding.(Id.)The Council Resolu-
tion continued hy requesting: MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 67

"that both governments, by every available means, faithfully observe the
principles and rules of non-intervention and solidarity contained in the
various inter-American instruments signed by them". (Id.)

178. A Commission of Militarv Experts was aooointed to assist in the effec-
tive fulfillment of the ~esolution (rd., p. 30.) ~;a result of this incident and
pursuant to the recommendation of the Commission and a Council Resolution,
Nicaragua and Costa Rica, in 1949,concluded a bilateral Treaty of Amity look-
ing toward "the constant application by both governments of the principles of
non-intervention and continental solidarity". (Id,)
179. Again in Jannary 1955, Costa Rica brought a complaint against
Nicaragua to the OAS Council. In the initial letter to the Chairman of the Coun-
cil, Costa Rica listed as its most serious concern:

"the facilities that are being granted in Nicaragua to interna1 and external
enemies of Costa Rica to organize military units and to plot against the
stability of Costa Rican democratic institutions and the peace and security
of the nation". (Id., p. 160.)

180. The OAS appointed an lnvestigating Committee, which through on the
scene investigations was able to establish that the rebels, mostly of Costa Rican
nationality and supported by several light aircraft, were attacking points in
northern Costa Rica. Ultimately, the rebels weredriven hack to Nicaraguan ter-
rifory, where they were interned. The Committee reported to the OAS that "A
substantial number of the rebel forces and the war materials used by them,
whatever their origin, entered by way of the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan irontier".
(Id., p. 187.)It did not make any finding that the Government of Nicaragua had
participated actively inthesupply organization of the rebel forces. Nevertheless,
the OAS Council adopted a resolution:
"condemn[ing] the acts of intervention of which Costa Rica is victim and
call[ing] attention Io the grave presumption that there exist violations of

international treaties in force".(Id., p. 168.)
181. In a case brought before it by Haiti, the OAS Council passed a resolu-
tion requesting:

"the Government of the Dominican Republic to take immediate and effec-
tive measures to prevent government officials from tolerating, instigating,
encouraging, aiding or fomenting subversive or sedifious movements
against other governments". (Id., p. 125.)
With respect to the Dominican Republic's counter-complaint against Cuba and
Guatemala, the Council resolved:

"To request the Governrnents of Cuba and Guatemala to adopt ade-
ouate measures so that thev will not permit the existence in their territories
of groups of nationals or foreigners organized on a rnilifary basis with the
deliberate purpose of conspiring against the security of other countries and
to reouest also theGovernnients of Cuba. Guatemala. and the Dominican
~e~ublicto take adequate measures to ensure ahsolut; respect for the prin-
ciple of non-intervention ..." (Id., p. 127.)

182. In al1of these cases the (JAS Council and its subordinate bodies acted
on the basis that "intervention" did not reauire active particivation bv the
accused State in the hostile actions directed against the complaining tat te.
Failure to prevent or suppress such actions on the territory of the accused State
was cnough to violate the principle of non-intervention68 BORDER AND TRANSBORDERARMED ACTIONS

183. The Inter-American Juridical Committee has taken a sirnilar viewof the
content of the principle of non-intervention embodied in the OAS Charter. In
1959, the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,

seekine to enhance "ltlhe strict observance. by the American republics, of the
contr&tual obligations not to intervene in the interna1 or exteÏnal affairs of
other states", charged the Commission with preparing: "A draft instrument
listing the greatest possible number of cases that constitute violations of the
principle of non-intervention." (Inter-Arnerican Juridical Committee, Instru-
ment Relating to Violations of the Principle of Nonintervention, CIJ-51, p. I
(General Secretariat. Organization of American States, February 1959).) The
list prepared by the Commission in response to this request included:

"Permitting, in the areas subject to ils jurisdiction, any person, national
or alien. to oarticioate in the .re.aration. orp.nization, or carrying out of
a military enterprise that has as ils purpose the starting, promoting, or sup-
porting of rebellion or sedition in an American state, even though its

;overiment is not recognized. The aforesaid participation includes the
following acts:
(1) The contributing, supplying, or providing of armsand war material;
(2) The equipment, training. collecting, or transporting of members of
a military expedition;
(3) The provision or receipt of money, by any method, intended for the
military enterprise." (Id., pp. 16-17.)

Note that although subparagraphs (l), (2), and (3) define "participation", the
act condemned bv the Commission is not "participation" but "Iplermit~-~~ - . ..
any person .. . to participate".
184. Finally, the OAS General Assembly adopted the same view of interven-
tion as proscrihed in the OAS Charter in its Resolution on Strengthening of the
Principles of Non-Intervention and the Self-Determination of Peoples and
Measures to Guarantee Their Observance. (AG/res. 78 (11-0/72) (21 April
1972).)The preambular clause statesthat acts of direct and indirect intervention
"constitute a flagrant violation of the principles of non-intervention and self-
determination of peoples established in the Charter of the Organization of
American States". And the operative portion:

3. To reaffirm the obliaa-ion of lmemberl states to refrain from
organizing, supporting. promoting, financing, instigating, or tolerating
subversive, terrorist. or armed activities against another state .. ."

185. 11follows that. even aoart from its intervention bv use of force aeainst
Nicaragua or by iis ac~iveass;siance IO the contras. costa Rica has violaïid ils
obligation under Article 18of the OAS Charter by failing IO preveni and sup-
the operation of those forces from bases within ils territory

2. The United Nations Charler

186. Unlike ihe OAS Charter. the Charter of the United Nations conrain, no
exprcr< prohibition against inier\ention in the affairh of another State. The
court itself has remarked that "this principle is not. as such, spelt out in the
Charter". (Nicaragua v. United States, supra, p. 106.)70 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

"theoracticeof onvform of interventionno1onlv violoresthe Charter. but
also ieads to the cieition of situations which thieaten international ieace
and security, . . ." (emphasis added).

The principle of non-intervention contained in the body of the resolution is des-
cribed as "the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction
of any State, in accordancewith theCharter" (emphasis added).
192. The other United Nations resolutions on this subiect follow the same
pattern. (In each case, we have underscored the pertineni language indicating

the foundation in the United Nations Charter of the non-intervention
principle) :
Declaration on the lnadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of

States and Protection of Their lndependence and Sovereignty, GA res. 2131
(XX) (1965):
"Preamble:

full observance of the principle of the non-intervention of States in the
internal affairs of other States is essential to the fulfillment of the
principles and our~oses of the United Nations.

direct intervention. subtersion and al1forms of indireci intcrveniion . . .
consiitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations
Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, GA res. 2734(XXV)

(1970) :
"Calls upon al1States Io adhere strictly . . . to the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter, including . . .
the duty not to intervene in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the
Charter; . . ."
Non-interference in the Interna1 Affairs of States, GA res. 31/91 (1977):

"5. Calls upon al1States. in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations, to undertake nesessary measures in
order to prevent any hostile act or activity takinc!place within their ter-

ritory and directcd again\[ the sovereigniy, territorial iniegrity and poliiical
independence of another Staie "
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Interi,cniion and Interference in ihe Inter-

na1Affairs of States. GA res. 36/103 (Annex) (1981).
"Preamble:

Reafjiming, in accordance with theCharter of the United Nations, that
no State has the right to intervene directly or indirectly for any reason
whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
. . .
Considering that full observance of the principle of non-intervention and

non-interference in the internal and external affairs of States is of the
greatest importance . . .for the fulfillment of the purposes and princi~les
of the Charter lof the United Nationsl."

193. It thus appearsthat the United Nations has consistently treated the prin-
cioleof non-intervention as embodied in theCharter and a violati~n o~ th~ n~ ~7~
ciplc as a brcach of the Charter. It has regarded the content of the principle as
having the same latitude as the OAS and as identisal with that of the customarv
nom. It includes not only use of force or assistance Io others in the use of force MEMORIALOF NICARAGUA 71

aeainst a State. but the failure of a State to orevent ifs territorv from beinr used
for asis of intirvention againsr another. li'follows that acis bt inter\eitiion in

violation of aeneral iniernational lau in brcaih of the OAS Charter are cqually
in violation of the United Nations Charter

C. Multilateral and Bilateral Conventions in Force between the Parties

194. Conventional instruments in force between the parties specifically
address the question of intervention in facts and circumstances like those
revealed in this case. The oldest of these is the Convention on the Duties and
Rights of States in the Event of Civil-Strife, supra.
195. As noted above, paragraph 170, this Convention was part of a two-
pronged effort to enact into positive law the principles of non-intervention

espoused bv the Latin American States. The general condemnation of interven-
tion. whichwas in ersense directed ai the ~niLcdStates. failed hecïuse of United
States opposition. But the provisions of the Convention on the Duties and
Richts of States in the Eveni of Civil Strife uould apply. as a practical matter.
IO-the relations of the Latin American States a&ng them;elves. Thus the
United States did not oppose if, and it was adopted by the Conference.
Nicaranua and Costa Rica are both parties to the Convention'.
196,~he 1928 Con\ention is sprc;irisally direstcd Io the types of activiiie5
revealed by the evidence in this case. The basic prohibitions of the Con\,ention
listed in Article I cover the very actions of Costa Rica of which Nicaragua com-
plains in this case. The partie; bind themselves:

"First : To use al1means at their disposal to prevent the inhabitants of
their territory, nationals or aliens, from participating in, gathering
elements, crossing the boundary or sailing from their territory for the pur-
pose of starting or promoting civil strife.
Second: To disarm and intern every rebel force crossing their hounda-
ries, . . .
Third: To forbid the traffic in arms and war material, except when

intended for the Government ...
. . ."(International Conferences of American States 1889-1928, pp. 435-
436 (New York, 1931).)
197. As the facts show, and as will be developed more fully in Chapter IV,
infra, the actions of Costa Rica have flouted al1 three of these solemn treaty
obligations. Especially important in the context of this case is the first obliga-

tion: "to prevent" the inhabitantsof the State from participating in or prepar-
ing for civil strife in another State.
198. Although the title of the Convention refers Io civil strife, it is not a pre-
requisite for the application of the Convention that a condition of civil strife
(whatever that may mean) must he shown. The obligations are absolute in
accordance with their terms. The provision requires the parties to prevent cer-
tain activities when undertaken for the purpose of "slarting or promoting civil
strife".Thus, it is clear that the obligations of the Convention attach before any
civil strife is under way.

O A Proiocol io the Conventionwasopenedfor signatureat the Pan American Union
an 1 May 1957.F. V. Garcia-Amadar, The Inter-AmericonSyslern - Ils Development
ond Slrengrhening, supro. pp.404-406. Ithar been ratified by Costa Rica butno1 by
Nicaragua.72 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

199. The 1928Convention played a central role in OAS consideration of the
disoutes between Nicaragua and Costa Rica in 1949and 1956, discussedsuDra,

pa;agraphs 177.180. In the first incident, the OAS Council treaied the charges
and couniçrcharges of the dibputes as implicaiing the provision> of the Con-
vention. In his invitation to members of the Inter-American Commission of
Military Experts, established by the Council Io help resolve the crisis, the Chair-
man of the Council specifically invoked the Convention. (Applications, supra.

o. 29.) In enumeratine the acts that the Council feared nÏ&ht occur and in
anticiiation of which-the Commission was established, he;epeated in haec
verba the lanauaae of oarts First to Fourth of Article I of the Convention. (Id..
F ~~.
200. The two bilateral treatieï of friendship now in force between the parties

derive from the 1949and 1956disoutes. They were negotiated at the instance
of the OAS in response to OAS ~ouncil ~esolutions-enacted to resolve the
crises. Both agreements are based explicitly on the 1928 Convention and are
desianedto orovide for the imolementation of its orovisions betweenthe oarties.
201. ~he' 1949 bilateral tréaty refers in its beamble to the OAS ~ouncil

Resolution of 24 December 1948 (annexing the text) which requested:
"that both governments by every available means, faithfully observe the

principles and rules of non-intervention and solidarity contained in the
various inter-American instruments signed by them". (Id., p. 28.)

The core of the Treaty of Amity is found in Article IV, which provides:
"The Go\,ernnients of Costa Rica and Nicaragua likewise underiake io

reachan agreementas 10 the best manner of putiing inro practice the provi-
sions of ihç Convention on the Dulies and Rights of States in the Eveni of
Civil Strife. in casescontcmplaied by thai Convention. su that itmay bc
applied immediately whcnever asituation of ihis kind arises, in the manner
orovided for in the said agreement. esoeciallv with resoect to measuresfor

;he conirol and supcr\,isioi of fronticr;. a, wkll as wiihrespect io any other
measure intended to prevrnt the organization or ehiqience of any revolu-
tionary movement against the Government of either of the two Parties in
the territory of the other." (Pact of Amity betweenthe Governments of the
Republic of Costa Rica and Nicaragua. signed at Pan-American Union,

21 February 1949, Applications, supra. pp. 48, 49 (hereinafter 1949Pact
of Amity).)

202. By this bilateral agreement, the parties translated their obligationsnder
the multilateral Convention into bilateral obliaations inter sese. The soecial
agreement contemplaied by Article IV was noi;mmediately concluded by the
IWO çounirics. \Vhen a similar dispute aro,e in 1955.Costa Rica appealed ngain
to the OAS Council. An Investieatine. Committee was aooointed which recom-
- -
mendcd. inrer alra. thai thc Iwo Governmenis should '"prepare and sign the
Rilateral Agreement mentioned in Article IV of the 119591Pact". (Id.. p. 188.)
The Council adooied this recommendaiion in paraa.aoh -.of itsResoluiion of
24 February 195i. (Id., p. 196.)
203. Pursuant to this resolution, the two countries, on 9 January 1956, con-
cluded the "Agreement betweenthe Governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica

in Compliance with Article IV of the Pact of Amity Signed on Fehruary 21,
1949". (Applicolions, supra, p. 205 (hereinafter 1956Agreement).) This instru-
ment lists the measuresthe parties must take to "put into practice" the provi-
sions of the 1928Convention. Detailedundertakings of the parties elaborate the
obligations of the Convention. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 73

204. Article III is the basic provision. Again, it is especially relevant to the
facts of this case:

"Each Party undertakes to take the necessary measures to prevent
revolutionary movements against the other Party from being initiated or
carried out in its territory.
Each Party undertakes to take measures of every kind to prevent any

person, national or alien, from any place within its jurisdiction, from par-
ticipating or aiding in any subversive enterprise, terrorist act, or attempt
against the Chief of State of the other Party, . . ."(Id., p. 207.)

The Article imposes an affirmative obligation "to take measures to prevent" the
enumerated a&. It is not enough to ;est passively on lack of knowledge or
information, although in the present case, there isnodoubt that the Costa Rican
authorities were well aware of the character and scope of the contra activities.
The 1956Agreement mandates an active, aggressive-policy to search out such
activities and put a stop to theni.
205. The remainder of the Agreement spells out this basic obligation in addi-

tional detail. Article II calls for "surveillance of their common boundary as a
means of preventing either arms or armed parties from crossing illegally from
the territory of one of the Parties to that of the other . . ." and for exchange
of information ta that end. (Id.) Article IV defines "participation" as including
the provision of funds, arms, training, recruitment, organization or transporta-
tion of persons. (Id.)
206. Article V is especially interesting. It incorporates the most important

provisions of the Convention on Territorial Asylum (signed at Tenth Inter-
American Conference. Caracas. 28 March 1954. Treatv Series No. 19 (Pan-
American Union 1961))into the1956 ~greement,'thus making them applicable
between the parties, although Nicaragua has not ratified the Convention. The
1956Agreement reoeats veFbatim thetext of the incoroorated Articles. Incor-
porated'~rticles VI~and VI11have special relevance to the political activities of
the contra organizations in San José. Theyprovide:

"Article VII. Freedom of expression of thought, recognized by domestic
law for al1inhabitants, may no1 be ground of camplaint by a third state
on the basis of opinions expressed publicly anainst it or its government by

asylees or refuge&, except when fhese conbepÏsconstitute sysfematicprop-
agenda through which they incite fo the use offorce or violenceagainst the
government of fhe complaining sfate.
Article VII~ ~ ~ -ta~ ~ ~ ~ ~e rieht to reouest that another state restrict
- ~- ~----
for the political arylees or refugccs the freedom of asembly or a,sociaiion
uhish rhr Iaticr \rate'\ interna1legislaiion granis IO a11al~enrwithin itr ier-
riiory. unless such asscmhly or ussocrurronhas us rrspurposr/om~~nrrngrhe
use offorce or violeficeagarnsr rhe governrnpnr 0/ rhe solicirifzgsrare. "
(Id., p. 208 (emphasis added).)

A third Article of the Convention on Territorial Asylum, also incorporated in
the 1956 Agreement, is of equal importance in connection with Costa Rica's
failure to clear the contras out of the border zone:

"Article lx. At the request of the interested state, the state that has
granted refuge or asylum shall take steps to keep watch over, or ta intern
at a reasonable distance frorn its border, those political refugees or asylees
who are notorious leaders of a subversive movement, as well as those
against whom there is evidence that they are disposed to join il." (Id.)74 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

207. As will be shown in the next Chanter. the acts and omissions of Costa
Rica shown by the evidence are manifestfy contrary to the stipulations in these
bilateral treaties. Nicaragua also considers that by the repeated and pervasive

character of these violations Costa Rica has denatured the fundamental
significancç of iheçs bilaicral ireaties. The preambles of both rreaiies recite thai
iheir purposc 1s"to mainiain the closest friçnd\hip and 10sirçngthen the fratcr-
na1bonds which have historicallv characterized their relations T. ."(1949 Pact
of Amity) and "to maintain the closest friendship between them, as befits two
kindred and neiahboring neonles . . ."(1956 Ag-eement). In its judament in
Nicaragua v. ~&ed Stites, the Court said:
"There must be a distinction, even in the case of a treaty of Friendship,
between the broad category of unfriendly acts and the narrower category

of actstendine ta defeat the obiect and DuIoose of the Treatv. That obiect
and purpose ; the effective i~plemen~ati& of friendship in the spekfic
fields nrovided for in the Treatv, not friendshin in the va.ue and aeneral
sense." (I.C.J. Reporls 1986, 6. 137.)
However, the Court went on to hold that:

"there are certain acts of the United States which aresuch as to undermine
the whole spirit of the bilateral agreement directed to sponsoring the
friendship between the two States parties to it". (Id., p. 138.)

The direct attacks perpetrated against Nicaragua by the United States, the min-
ing of the ports, and the trade embargo were acts of this character.
208. In this case, "the specific fields provided for in the [tlreaty" are in-
tervention and the various acts and omissions that are instances of intervention,
under the detailed stipulations of the treaties themselves and the more general
conventional and customary norms. Thus, the overall pattern of Costa Rican
assistance, complicity and acquiescence in the political and military activities of
the contras must a fortiori be taken as "underminine the whole soirit of the
bilateral agreement8'. Inthis connection, the public agpeal of ~oreign Minister
Gutierrez (seesupra, para. 19, and of President Monge himself, to the United
States Coneress to renew aid IO the conlras /id.l take on soecial sienificance.
They are certainly not calculated to "maintai'n the closést frienkhip and
strengthen the fraternal bonds" between the two countries.

209. It is ironic in a sense that the disputes between these two States three
decades ago should play an important role in defining the law applicable to the
current case. In 1948, Costa Rica accused the Government of Nicaragua:
"of having violated the territorial integrity of Costa Rica, and threatening

its sovereignty and political independence by tolerating, encouraging. and
aiding a conspiracy concocted in Nicaragua to overthrow the Costa Rican
Government by force of arms, and finally by making available to the
conspirators the territory and the material means that enabled them Io
cross the border and invade Costa Rican soil". (Applications, supra,
pp. 20-21.)
210. In its 1955 complaint, Costa Rica stated:

"The succession of acts that may be called aggressive include the closing
of the San Juan River to navigation by Costa Rican merchant vessels; MEMORlhL OF NICARAGUA 75

defamation camnai..s by t.e press, circulation of new items and tenden-
tious official staiemenis prophcsying internal struggles in Cos13Rica; . . .
and slill more serious. the facilities thai are being granted in Nicaragua 10
internal and external enemies of Costa Rica to organize military units and
to plot against the stability of Costa Rican democratic institutions and the

peace and security of the Nation." (Id., p. 160.)
211. Today the roles are reversed. Nicaragua could adopt practically word
for word the cornplaints of Costa Rica against the Somoza dictatorship in 1948

and 1955. It was preciselyto avoid a repetition of those incidents that the OAS
Council reproved Nicaragua for ils actions and that the 1949Pact of Amity and
the 1956Agreement were concluded.
212. Costa Rica. by the general course of conduct disclosed in the evidence
has defeated the object and purpose of those treaties. The next Chapter will
demonstrate by a detailed review of the evidence, that Costa Rica, at the same
time and by the same acts, has also violated the specific stipulations of the
treaties. as well as the principles of non-intervention embodied in the Charters
of the United Nations and the OAS and of general international law. CHAPTKR IV. THE FACTS KSTAULISHED IN PARI' ONE
AUO\'K CONS'I'ITUTE MASSIVE AND PKRSISTKNT YIOLATIONS
UY COSTA RICA 01; ITS DUTY SOT TO INTERVFSK

IN THE AFFAIRS OF NICARAGUA

213. The facts recited in Part One of this Memorial. taken as a whole, add
un to a classic case of wilful intervention by Costa Rica in the affairs of
Nicaragua in violation of the norms of generîl international law, Charter pro-
vision\ and treaty obligations dissusred in Chapter Ill.wpru. The evidensç dir-
closes a oersistent oattern of extensive militarv attacks. beriinninri in 1982,
dong the'border beiwren Nlsaragua and Costa Rica by armedbandsof conlras
seeking the o\çrthrow oi the Nicaraguan Government The groups conducting
these ittacks are based in Costa Rica. thev are trained and su~oiied there, ~.ey
launch their attacks from Costa ~ican ter;itory, and, alter being repulsed, they
retreat to that country, where they are given sanctuary to recuperate and repeat
the process. Meanwhile, in San José, the political leaders of this subversive
enterprise, maintain their headquarters, freely conduct political activities and
disseminate ~ro~aaaiida in supnort of the rnilitary operations, and cal1
rïpeaiedly Torilieoverrhrow of th; Nicaraguan (;o\ernmeit by iorceand arms.
Thcre acti\itiei are sarried out uiih the full knowledge and somrtimes the actii'c

assistance of the Costa Rican Government.
214. It would be sufficient simply to refer to these facts at large Io establish
that Costa Rica has violated its international legal obligation of non-in-
tervention, as alleged in Nicaragua's Application. For the convenience of the
Court, however, Nicaragua, in this Chapter organizes the factual material in
relation to major elenients or aspects of the non-intervention obligation and Io
specific treaty obligations subsisting between the two countries.
215. The facts' establish that Costa Rica has:

(1) breached the duty of non-intervention by providing activeassistance to the
contras;
(2) breached the duty of non-intervention by encouraging, tolerating and
acquiescing in conlru rnilitary activities based on and emanating from the
territory of Costa Rica, with the full knowledge of the Costa Rican
Government :
(3) biolated Arti~le1,Second of the Convention on Duties and Rights of Staics
in the E\ent of Civil Strife. and Article IX of the Convention on Terrttorial
Asylum (made applicable between the parties by the 1956Agreement) by
failing to disarm and intern the contras known to be in its territory;
(4) violated Articles VI1 and Vlll of the Convention on Territorial Asylum
(made aoo..cable bv the 1956 Aereementl bv fai.inr. to suv-ress th..
systemaiic propaganda and other political activities of Nicaraguan refugees
and asslecs in Costa Rica inciting to the overthrow of the Government of
~icaragua by force and violence:

'Citations are to the relevant paragraphs in Part One of the Memorial, where
referencestothe original sourceare given. MEMORW OF NICARAGUA

A. Costa Rica Violated the Duty of Non-Intervention
by Providlng Active Assistance Io Contra MiliIaryOperations

216. The most blatant example of direct Costa Rican assistance to the conlras
is the establishment and operation of the airbase on the Santa Elena oeninsula.
20 kilometers~s~uth of the border with Nicaraeua- This airfield beca-~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
element in the secret network established by the United States administration to
supply contras operating within Nicaraguan territory during the period when

official aid was cut off by congressional action. The information about this
operation is fully documented in evidence given to the President's Special
Review Board (Tower Commission) and the Joint Congressional Hearings on
the Iran-Contra Affair.
217. From this evidence, it appears that United States Ambassador Lewis
H. Tambs was a key actor in the affair. His basic mission in Costa Rica. as he
saw it, "was to form a Nicaraguan resistance southern front". (Seesupra, para.
21.) The airbase was "an essential or integral part" of any such effort. (See
supra, para. 107.)It was designed to ensure logistical support of the conlras not
just in the border areas, but insicleNicaragua. "And, by inside Nicaragua, we're

talking about, you know, 80 Io 100kilometers, say 50 Io 60 miles, ...". (See
supra, para. 104.) The construction and operation of the base required the
forma1 approval of the Costa Rican Government. (See supra, para. 108.)
Ambassador Tambs personally conducted the negotiations leading to the grant
of approval. (Id.) On the Costa Rican side, President Monge gave his personal
authorization. (Seesupra, para. 109.)
218. The record also shows continuous and intimate involvement by Costa
Kisan personnel in ihc location. consiruciion and opcraiion of ihç airbaie. (See
supra, paras. 110.112.)Ir was a iiiajor installaiion. wirha modern runu.ag morc

than two kilometers in lenath and facilities for handlina large i,olumes of fuel
and cargo. (Seesupra, parai. 112. 116.)The plan was to turn % over to the Costa
Rican Government when it was no longer needed to supply the contras. (See
suora. oara. 108.) It remained in operation until Se~tember 1986 (see supra,
para. 1.15). and u,asan essential linkin the supply andsupport sysiem for mntru
deprcdations throughout souihcrn Nicaragua. Eugene Hasenfus. the rolc sur-
viving crew-member of a contra supply plane shot down over Nicaragua, con-
firmed that he had participated in a number of previous supply flights, including
some that used the Santa Elena airbase. (See supra, para. 135.)
219. The imoortance of the facilitv was fullv recognized bv the United States

National ~ecurity Council officials résponsiblefor i&establishment and opera-
lion. LI. Col. Oliver North testified at the Iran-Contra hearings that:
"The airfield al Santa Eiena has been a vital element in supporting the
resistance. Built bv a Proiect Democracy proprietarv (Udall Corooration

S.A. - a Panamanian c&npany), the field kas initially used fir direct
resupply efforts [to the co~trras][July 1985-February 19861 ... the field
has served as the primary abort base for aircraft damaged by Sandinista
anti-aircraft fire." (Supra, para. 115.)
ViceAdmiral Poindexter, the President's National Security Adviser, testified al

the same hearing that the Santa Elena airbase:
"was a dramatic display of cooperation and support for the President's
policy by the country involved". (Supra. para. 113.)

220. Costa Rican assistance to contra supply activities was not confined to
the Santa Elena base. Supply flights proceeding from llopango Airport in El78 BORUER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

Salvador frequenily stopped for refucling ai the Juan Saniamaria Internaiional
Airport, San José'smain commercialairpori. Thc log books capiured from the
supply flight shot down over Nicaragua showed that the pilot had made two
flights by this route, and testimony before the Iran-Contra hearings described
others. (See supra, para. 136.) Ambassador Tambs said that such landings
required special clearance by airport officials. (Id.) Su..l. fl-nhts also used
some of the smaller airports (see supra, para. 60). and contra air strips located
on Costa Rican territory (seesupra, para. 136).(Moreover, whether or not they
landed. many if not most of the suooly flirhts traversed Costa Rican air soace
without hindrance for a large part-offhe Ïoute.)
221. Costa Rica provided direct assistance for supply of the contras in
Nicaragua by sea as wellas by air. In his Iran-Contra testimonv. Lt. Col. North
described the establishment -of a "maritime capability" to t&nsport military

supplies from a port in Costa Rica to contras operating in Nicaragua. (See
supra, para. 24.) The arrangements were worked out in a oersonal meetine.
betwee" Lt. COI: North and the Costa Rican Minister of ~ubiic Security, en-
jamin Piza. (Id.) Three supplytrips were made in the first three months of 1986.
and North looked forward to a schedule of "several trios a week". (Seesuora.
para. 25.) Reports and communications between Lt. 601 . orth a1;d the held
show that the local port authorities approved of the operation as long as it did
not become public. 50 the voyages weie carried out under "a cover operation".
"The operational part [was] run strictly without Nicaraguans. except for the
boat operators on each trip." (Id.)
222. On numerous occasions, Costa Rican officials avowed publicly, some in
disapproval and some in support, that the Government was extending direct
assistance to the contras. In his report on contra activities in the border areas,
Lt. Col. Mario Araya of the Costa Rican Civil Guard reminded Johnny
Campos, Vice Minister for Public Security:

"We cannot disregard the assistance which the counter-revolutionary
and non-counter-revolutionary elements have received from persons who
form part of this government . .." (Supra, para. II.)
223. In Mav 1985.Col. Ricardo Rivera. a former Chief of the Rural Guard.
told reporters al a press conference that officials of the Costa Rican Govern-
ment maintained close lies with the contras. and that the contras ooerated from
military camps in Costa Rica with the complicity of ranking government and
security officials. (See supra, para. 12.) Col. Nestor Mora Rodrigues, a local
Rural Guard commander in Los Chiles. the scene of manv reoorted attacks.

admitted that he personally put Nicaraguan refugees in costa ~iia in touch with
contra recruiters. (See supra, para. 48.) Col. Gilberto Orozco, head of the
Guard for the same province and a notorious contra collaborator. said that the
Costa Ricans gave the contras logistical support, including food and shelter.
(Id.)
224. Foreign mercenaries who came to Costa Rica to ioin the contras have
alsu restificdTnsouri proceedings and io ihc pres about ;hc uhiquity of contra
tics wirh ihc Cosla Rican authoriiics. Peier Glibbery, an Englishman who serbed
uiih the contras in Costa Kica, tesiified in couri that officer, and men of the
Rural Guard helped with the construction of a contra training base in northern
Costa Rica. (Seesupra, para. 12.) On his arriva1 in Costa Rica, he was met by
a Rural Guard captain, who drove him to the assigned training base. (Seesupra,
para. 91.) Glibbery and his associate, Steven Carr, a US citizen, later made
detailed public statements about the involvement of the Costa Rican military
with the contras. The Civil Guard gave them maps showing target locations MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 79

inside Nicaragua and assisted in a contra attack on the border post of La
Esperanza. A Guard colonel put pick-up trucks al the disposal of the contras
and showed them access and resupply routes. Carr said that the idea of Costa
Rican neutrality was a farce; the mercenaries had "100 percent support" from
Costa Rica. (See supra, para. 97.) Claude Chafford, a French mercenary, said
that he, like Glibbery, had been escorted to his camp hy a Civil Guard officer.
The camp was visited almost every day by local Guardsmen who assured the
contras that th~-, wo~ld be orotected. f1d.i ,~o ca~ ~ ~d Cuban-American
mercenaries who served und& Fernandochamorro iold how they had heen
assisted by a Civil Guard colonel in clearine Costa Rican customs with suitcases
filled with militarv suonlies. (See suora. vara. 90.)
225. The siZay attack on San Juan del Norte ~ (sec supra,para. 68) alsoowed
much to the assistance of Costa Rican officials. Officials in the Rural Guard

facilitated the operations to resupply the contras while they temporarily
occupied the town. (See supra, para. 18.) Equally important, Costa Rican
authorities, including Rural Giiard officials, acquiesced in the transport of
foreignjournalists to the scene to report on the supposed contra "success". (Id.)

B. Since 1982, Costa Rica Has Encouraged, Tolerated and Acquiesced
in the Preparation and Launching of Hundreds of Armed Attacks
from Its Soi1against Nicaragua, with Full Knowledge of the Facts
and Without Making Serious Efforts to Prevent Such Activities

226. As developed in Chapter 111,supra, the international law rules against

intervention prohihit no1 only the use of force against another State or active
assistance to those seeking ifs armed overthrow, but also encouragement and
even passive toleration or acquiescence by one State when ils territory is used
as a base or launching pad for attacks against another hy irregular forces or
armed bands. A State does no1 discharge its duty under international law by
remainine ~assive towards irreeular forces oreanized and ooeratina in its ter-
ritory againsi the Go\ernmcnt O? a neighhorin~~tiitr. or hy aioptingan attitude
ot "ncutrdlity" a, bciurcn them. States are required to "use al1mean, ai rheir
disposal" to prevent and suppress such activities. (SeeConvention on the Duties
and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, supra, Article 1, First.)
227. The presentation of the evidence in Part One is replete with reports of
contra trainine and suoolv oo::rations in Costa Rica culminatine in contra
-~~~ ... . -
attacks un Nicariiguan territory I'he Chronological Account, Chapter II.
supra, lists more than 350 scparütc ~rmïd enpapcments initialcd by thr contrus
in less than five years. ln theface of contra act.yvitieson this scale over such an
extended period, the failure of the Costa Rican authorities to make any effec-
tive response is more than a technical violation of Costa Rica's duty not to
"tolerate" such activities on its territory. It can only be described as complicity
by encouragement and acquiescence.
228. This conclusion, moreover, is not a mere negative inference from the
absence of effectiveCosta Rican action. Desoite its rote stationsof neutralit..
the Costa Rizan C;o\crnment ar the highest lirels a~iivelyenîouraged and sup-
ported the rrJtlrr0.s.Prcrident Monge made a ,pecial trip to Washington in April
of 1985 Io lohbv for the aooroval of militarv aid IO the ron1ro.Y.lSee sunru.
para. 92.) Foreign ~iniste; 'Gutierrez said in-a press interview thai he would
look on a change in the Government of Nicaragua with approval. He also

publicly called on Congress to pass the bill providing aid to the contras. (Id.)
The Minister of Public Safety, Benjamin Piza, well known as a conrra col-80 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

laborator, even met with President Reagan at the White House. (See supra,
para. 114.)
229. The international responsibility of Costa Rica for the continuous use of

its territory by theontras over a five-year period for training, supply and safe
haven and to launch attacks against Nicaragua, as wellas the assistance and col-
laboration provided by lower level civiland military officers, must be evaluated
in the light of these endorsements of contra goals and objectives by senior
officialc.
230. It would serve no purpose to repeat al1the incidents already set forth
above in Part One. To illustrate the extent of the activities involved and the
dee-ee of Costa Rican comoli.itv...his section of the Memorial adoots three
approaches :

Firsf, we summarize the evidence showing the number of contra military
installationspresent at various times during the relevant period;
Second, we bring together al1the evidence concerning some major objectives
of contra attacks - San Juan del Norte, the subject of a sustained attack in
April 1984; Pefias Blancas, an important border post that was attacked more
than a dozen times during the four-year period; and Cardenas, also the target
of a number of separate attacks;
Third,weassemble the evidenceshowing that the Costa Rican authorities had
prompt and detailed knowledge of the contra presence and attacks.

1. Military Strengfh and Installations

231. For most of the period in issuethecontra forces operating in Costa Rica
numbered in the tbousands. The Costa Rican National Securitv .een-y --ut the
figure at 2,000 in June 1982. (See supra, para. 38.) Pastora's groups alone
claimed 1,000men at this time. (Seesupra, para. 34.) Bylate 1986,Ambassador
Tambs estimated the force at 1,MM-2,800men. (See supra, para. 140.)
232. The principal conlra military establishments during the period were
camps (used for training, supply, safe haven and rehabilitation), and air
strips (primarily for supply but sometimes providing air support for contra en-
gagements).
233. Paragraph 7, supra, lists 27 camps as to which Nicaragua provided
detailed information, including precise locations, to Costa Rica. At least

16camps were operational in 1984(see supra, para. 59), and 27 at the end of
1985. (Seesupra, para. 121.) At least 10 remained active in 1986. (See supra,
para. 36.) At least nine named air strips were in use bythecontras in 1984.(See
supra, para. 60.) Five such landing strips, in use in luly 1985, are listed in
paragraph 93, supra.

2. Aftacks on Major Targefs
234 The bas,: pattern of ihc aiidskv reporied in Pari One. wpra. 15roughly
,irnilîr.Cunrru~, ofien ha\cd at differeni camps. rcndczvous in Co<ta Rican ier-
ritorv near the obiective of the attack. The assault forces mav range from

rrve'al icns io seseral hundrcd men. The iarget uould bç a bord& farm.
tillage or iownin N~caragua.They arc invariably pushcd back and wiihdraw to
the other side of the border, whence they often continue to attack Nicaraguan
positions or forces with longer range weapons. The decisive point is that 21 of
these attacks originated in and returned to Costa Rica. Indeed, often thcontras
confined themselves to firing across the border at Nicaraguan posts near the MEMORIAL OF NICARAOUA 81

frontier without ever leaving Costa Rican territory. The Costa Rican authorities

did not attemptto prevent these groups of heavily armed men from assembling,
crossing the border or retreating again into Costa Rican territory and returning
to their camps.
235. The following examples are illustrative of attacks on a relatively large
scale or against particularly important targets or both.
236. The oJJensive against Son Juan delNorte - The most massive attack-
launched by the contras operating out of Costa Rica was against San Juan
del Norte, a port on the Atlantic Coast about 2 kilometers from the border.
There had been smaller attacks against the town in June and July of 1983
(supra, para. 50), but the major assault came in April 1984,at the very moment
when Nicaragua initiated proceedings against the United States in this

Court.
237. The attack began with a rnortar barrage from Costa Rican territory on
6 April, followed by further rnortar bombardment from the sea on 9 April. On
the 12th, a force of more than 500 contras attacked the town, with sea and air
support. The attackers ultimately overwhelmed the 71 defending militiamen.
Twenty-one were killed; the rest, wounded and captured, were taken to Costa
Rican territory. On 17 April, arter five days in contra bands, the town was
recaotured bv Nicaraauan forces. who drove the contras back across the
border. A (ci days lïLcr. thc uoundcd and kidnappcd Nicaraguanr *ho hitd
been iaken in the as,auli wrrr returncdIO Niçaritpu~through its cmbîssy in San
José. (See suora. oaras. 18. 68.)
238.' ~urin~ theeniire 11da).; of the engagement. the r.onrr<iriicrc rupplicd
by boai frorn Costa Rica. Ar noted ahovc, Co\ia Kisïn officiais acquicsccd in

ihcsc supplv operaiions and made ilpossible for forçign journalisr\ to lravcl io
San Juan del Norie io reporr on the supposcd "vicior)". (Seesupra, para. 18.)
239. The iown uas atia~ked hsa band of conrrar (rom Cosra Ri;a again on
18March 1985(seesupra, para. 88), and there was a further episode on 29 May
1986. (See supra, para. 134.)
240. Attacks ngainst Penas Blancas - This border crossing point on the
Pan-American highway has been perhaps the most frequent target of contra
attack. The first reported engagement is as early as April 1982. The contras
fired on the customs post from their positions in a Costa Rican government
building, without crossing into Nicaraguan territory. Contra leaders Fernando
and Edmundo Chamorro claimed responsibility for the attack. (See supra,
para. 134.)
241. On 31 July 1983, the contras again opened fire from the Costa Rican

side of the border, and shots were exchanged for some time. (See supra,
Dara. 51.)
242. OII 28 September, the post was one of the main targets of a large scale
ARDE offensive, which also included Cardenas and Sapoa.After a first assault
was repnlsed, the attackers withdrew behind the Costa Rican border and
bombarded the post with mortars and heavy weapons. A second assault was
supported by mortar fire from emplacements inside the Costa Rican customs
facilities. The Nicaraguan custorns post was destroyed. Three Nicaraguan
soldiers were killed and nine woiinded. That evening, Nicaraguan positions in
the El Naranjo sector came under air bombardment. (See supra, para. 56.)
243. The local Costa Rican authorities knew in advance when and where the
attack would take place. (See supra, para. 57.) lnstead of opposing it, Costa

Rican civil and military personnel withdrew from their positions before the
attack began. The buildings they abandoned were used by the contras in their
attack. (Id.)82 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

244. Subsequent attacks on Pefias Blancas occurred:

- 18October 1983; four workers from the La Flor farm were kidnapped. (See
.~~r.~,nr ~ ~ - -~~
- 13 March 1984; one Nicaraguan wounded; the contra positions were 200

meters within Costa Rican territorv: some of the shots were fired from the
Costa Rican command post. (SeeS"pra. para. 67.)
- 17 March 1984. (Id.)
- 20 October 1984. (See supra, para. 80.)
- 18 February 1985; 60 contras supported by mortars, machine guns and
grenade launchers. (See supra, para. 88.)

- 4 September 1985. (See supra. para. 120.)
245. Allacks a~ainstCardenas- The reoeated attacks aeainst the Nicara-

gnan town of ~Gdenas are prime examples of the patiernudescribcd above.
Onrhcei,eningof I Desember 1982.abandofconrrasaitackedis hupporwtdn
by ai least one aircraft. Alter a five-hour Tirefight they withdrcw. (See supra.
para. 42 )Although ihee\,enis look place inviewof severalCosta Kicanobserva-
iion nosththe Costa Rican authorities did nothing to stop the aiiack. (Id.,How-
ever;~rnoldo Ferreto, amember of theCosta ~icanchamber of ~epuiiesitated:

"We have been able to confirm that the lieht-airolane which overfle~ ~ ~ ~~~~
villagi of cardenasduring the attack perpetrated'against if took off from

Playa Blanca in the iurisdiction of the Hacienda El Murciklago. on.Co.ta
~ican territory.
The Government knows that there and in a nearby estate there is not one
small airplane, but two, plus a camouflaged helicopter.
The group of counter-revolutionaries who attacked the town [Cardenas]

crossed the border having departed from Chapernon and Pefia Lonja, in
Costa Rican territory a few kilometers from the border." (Id.)
246. Another large-scale assault against Cardenas look place on 28 Sep-

tember 1983 (in which Peiias Blancas and Sapoa were also targets) (see supra,
para. 56), and again on 18 November. (See supra. para. 58.) In 1984,attacks
occurred on 30 March (see supra, para. 67), and on 29 April, with 81 mm.
mortar fire. (See supra, para. 69.)
247. On 28 January 1985, the contras attacked a farm two kilometers from

Cardenas kidnapping three Nicaraguans and taking them to Costa Rica. (See
supra, para. 84.)
248. OIher attacks - On 8 September 1983, two ARDE planes entered
~i~ ~ ~-~ ~rom Costa Rican airsuace. One of them was shot down in an atta~ ~~ ~~~~ ~
on Managua's principal commercial airport, the Augusto C. Sandino Interna-
tional Airport. The other was driven off in the direction of Costa Rica. (See

supra, para. 55.)
249. On 2 October 1983, contras based in Costa Rica made a speedboat
attack that destroyed two fuel tanks at Benjamin Zeledon on the Atlantic Coast
of Nicaragua. Almost 400,000 gallons of diesel fuel and gasoline were
destroyed, paralyzing economic activity in the entire Department of Zelaya for

a considerable period. (See supra, para. 58.)
250. On 7 Aueust 1985.a erouo of contras fromCosta Rica ambushed a boat
iravelling on thesan Juan Gverand removed ii\47 pas\engers 10 Costa Rica
Amonn [hem werc29 Unircd Sinies c1ti7en\who werememberc of the oraanizri-
tion "~itnesses for Peace". There were also a number of American jourialists.
John Dasco, an NBC television correspondent, confirmed that the terrorists

belonged to ARDE. When the passengers were freed by their kidnappers the MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 83

next day, they were arrested hy the Costa Rican Civil Guard. (See supra,
para. 119.)The record shows a numher of other conrra attacks fromCosta Rica

againstNicaraguan traffic on the Sari Juan River. (Seesupra, paras. 47,50; also
see Ann. C, Attachment 1.)

3. Costa Rica's Knowledge and Complici/y

251. From 1982on, the contras carried on a major military campaign against
Nicarae-a based onand launched from Costa Rican territorv. Several thousand
men, armed with heavy weapons and with air and sea support, conducted
hundreds of attacks on Nicaragua in that period. An extensive air and seaborne
supply operation used Costa Rican air strips, air space and ports Io provide
arms and other military supplies to the contras for contra operations deep in
Nicaragua. At the same lime, political organizations supporting this military

effort operated freely in the Costa Rican capital. (Seesupra, paras. 17, 39, 40,
43,45,62,99, LOI,102, 103, 124. 126, 127, 128, 133.) All this was reported fully
in the regular Costa Rican press and in propaganda disseminated by thecontras
and their supporters.
252. What is involved here is not simply a few sporadic border raids by
outlaws that might no1 he noticed by the authorities. Activities on the scale
shown bv the evidence could not escane the observation of anv Government in
control of its own territory, even without the assistance of outside sources of
information. The Costa Rican aiithorities must have been aware of this pattern
of conduct, just as any Governrnent is aware of massive activities carried out
openly and notoriously within its territory and directly affecting ils national

interest and interriational relations.
253. In this case, however, the Court need not rely on inferences about what
"must have been known". Costa Rica was informed explicitly and in detail
about the contra activities from many sources, inside and outside the country.
In fact. ihc c\idenrc çhoui 3 numbcr~oiadmissions by respon5ible Costa ~iL.an
otficials that the Ciobernmcnr wa, wrll auare of the r.otzlraopcrations. As early
a, January 1982. the Cmta Rican Xliniirer oi Public Securiiy and Admini\ira-
tion, ~rndfo Carmona Benavides, confirmed "the existence of Nicaraguan
anti-Sandinista camps at the Northern border". (Supra, para. 33.) The Costa
Rican National Securitv Arencv estimated that there were 2,000 contras
operîting in the countrv in Junc 1982.(Seçsul>ra. para. 38.) In August oi 1983.
Lt. Col. Mario Araya. hcad ottltc Spccial Intervention Unit of ihr hlinisiry of
Public Security, uarned the \'i:c Xlinirter that "the iuhveriiicc 1i.e.. onrrus]

tra\el frcely throueh thc cntirc zone, uithour en;ouniering any oppoçiiion irom
the respesiive auihoriiie\". (Sec srrpra, para. II.) When the Minister of Publi;
Securitv and Minister of Governance travelled to the northern rerion. they
received a large number of protests about the complicity of Costa ~icai officiais
in contra military activities in the area. (Ann. H, Attachment 65.)
254. Nicaraeua itself continuouslv nlaced Costa Rica on notice of what
ua, going t)n. The Nicriraguan ~orcign hlinistry dispai~hcd more than 150dip.
lomatis note* protestirtg ipecific conrra actions and ofteii providing rlah~ratcls
detailcd inforinaiii)n about theni. (Scc Ann. A.) The merring* of the hlihed
Commission and the Commih\ion on Supervi\ion and Prevcntion uere also u.>ed
35 a forum for the rran\misïion ot information from Nicaragua 10Cu\ia Rica
about contra actions. (Ann. B, Attachments 1and 2. See alsoAnn. B, Attach-

ment 3.)
255. In addition, the Costa Rican authorities were informed and alerted hy
many outside sources. Members of the Costa Rican legislature protested against84 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

the nassive attitude of the government and provided detailed information in an
effo.rtto spur action against the contras. AsLe sawahove, Deputy Arnoldo Fer-
reto, in December 1982, pinpointed the origins of the attack against Cardenas
in Costa Rican territory. He warned that:
"New acts of aggression are being prepared inencampments situated on
several estates on the border, one of which belongs to Héctor Garcia;

another, in Monte Plata, is the property of a widow named Medina; and
also on the estates of Roberto Gallegos and Ramiro Osegueda." (See
supra, para. 42.)
256. In thesummer of 1984,Deputy Ricardo Rodrfguez Solbrzano protested
against the presence of contra forces on Costa Rican territory. (See supra,
oara. 72.) In a statement at a nress conference h- gave details of the establish-
ment and equipment of anti-Sandinista groups on Costa Rican territory. (Id.)
In August 1985, the parliamentary head of the Social Christian Unity Party,
~eoutv Danilo Chaverri Soto. said he oersonallv had confirmed that thecontras
we;e ;sing Costa Rican territory for tlieir operations and had reported the facts
to the Minister of Public Security.(See supra, para. 117.)
257. Thecontra activities were eventhe subiect of iudicial ~roceedinas in the
Costa Rican courts. A murder trial of memlyersof ARDE in ~ecember 1984
nroduced extensive testimony about ARDE operations in the border zone. (See
Suoro. oara. 73.)
258. Contra aciitities were widely reported boih in the regular Costa Rican
nress and in the jpe~ial c.onira publi~ations thai were cirsulated u.ith the per-
mission of the G&ernment. (~eeinfra, paras. 277-280. Also see supro, paras.
102, 103.)
259. Finally, as appears from the Tower Commission Report and the Iran-

Contra hearings, Costa Rica's relations with the United States for much of this
period were dominated by discussions of the contra "southern front" in Costa
Rica and how to improve it and make it more effective. Salient examples are
the negotiations with Ambassador Tambs about the Santa Elena airbase (see
supra, paras. 108, 109), the discussions between Lt. Col. North and the Costa
Rican Minister of PublicSecurity, Benjamin Piza, concerning the maritime sup-
p~yi>peration(seesupra. para. 23) a.d another meeting of <linisicr Piza in the
White Houic wiih k'resident Reagan. h'orih and ihç CIA station chier for San
José. (See supra, para. 114.)
260. International law does not permit a State to remain passive in the face
of such evidence. Every one of the legal sources and authorities analyzed
and discussed in Cha~ter 111.supra. nrohibits a State from "toleratina" or
"acquiescing in" actiGities othe son-show by this evidence. The tat toen
whose territory such activities take place is under a positive duty to take affir-
mative action to eliminate the threats to its neighbor. As noted (supra,
paras. 171.173,. this afiirmati\e obligation ir spe~~edoutexpressly in ihc Con-
\enrion on the Dutics and Rightsof States in the Eveni of Civil Strife. The par-
ties agree:
"To useal1means at their disnosal to Dreventtheinhabitants of their ter-
rirory. naiionals or aliens, from participaring in, gathering elcmenis, cross-

ing the boundary or sailing from iheir ierritory t'orthe purpose of starting
~r-~romotin~ civil strife." (Article 1, First.)
261. This Convention, to which hoth States before the Court are parties, is
made specifically applicable to them bilaterally in the 1956Agreement under
which : MEMONAL OF NICARAGUA 85

"each Party undertakes to take the necessary measures to prevent revolu-

tionary movements against the other Party from being initiated or carried
out in itsterritory". (Seesupra, para. 204.)

The facts show that Costa Rica has failed egregiously to discharge ils affir-
mative duties in this respect.

C. Costa Rica Failed Repeatedly to Carry Out Its Duty to
lntern and Disarm Contras Within Ils Territory

262. Certain aspects of the affirmative duty implicit in the general norm
against intervention are elaborated and given more specific content in conven-

tions and treaties to which Costa Rica and Nicaragua are parties. Under the
Convention on Duties and Riglits of States in the Event of Civil Strife, the
parties agree "To disarm and intern every rebel force crossing their boun-
daries .. .". (Art. 1, Second.) Article IX of the Convention on Territorial
Asylum, incorporated textually in the 1956Agreement, between the two coun-
tries, provides:

"At the request of the inierested state, the statethat has granted refuge
or asylum shall take steps to keep watch over, or to intern at a reasonable
distance from its border, those political refugees or asylees who are
notorious leaders of a subversive movement, as wellas those against whom
there is evidence that they are disposed to join it."

263. The whole five-vear historv of inaction bv the Costa Rican Government
testifies toitseglect oithese specific duties. ~ui~icaragua's case goes further.

On a number of occasions Costa Rican authorities actually arrested notorious
confrn leaders, sometimes along with their arms and equipment. Not even these
prisoners were interned or permanently disarmed. In every such case, in
deliberate violation of the treaty obligation, Costa Rica released them after a
short time and returned their weaDons.
264. EdénPasiora. the openlv ~cknouledged and noiorious miliiary leader
of the ARDF forces uas se\zral rime\ taken inio ciistody. On 22 hlay 1982. he
u,as expelled froni the sounlry. hui was readmitied les, than four monihs later.
(Sce Aupra, para. 35.) A nionih afier his return hc uas captured uiih a large
quantiiy ot arms. Upon the personal intcr\eniion of Prerideiit Ilongr, he \$,as
prompdy released and the weapons were returned. (Id.) In November, contra
leader Fernando Chamorro was detained with a cargo of weapons, maps,
parachutes and other eauipment. He was released on the same day. Two days
iater the Minisiry of ~uhlic Securiiy ordered the ueapon, rïiurncd: (Sec supru,
para. 41. Secalro ~upro, para. 60 (conserning the pattern oCrepeaied eniricb and

expulsions of Chamorro).)
265. Pastora was expelled from Costa Rica again in April 1983, but in
January 1984 he crossed the border at the head of a 192-man force, seeking
refuge. The regional commander of the Rural Guard, Col. Gilberto Orozco,
permitted Pastora and his men to enter and met with him on Costa Rican soil.
(See supra, para. 65.) Although Col. Orozco acted directly contrary to stated
Costa Rican ~olicv at the time, he was not effectively disciplined. nor was
Pastora expelied. (Id.; see alsosupra, para. 66.)
266. When Pastora's helicopter crashed inside Costa Rica in July 1985, he
was treated at a localhospital and then permitted to fly to Panama, whence he MEMORIAI OF NICARAGUA 87

1. Major Contra Political Organizations in San José

272. In the period since 1982, two major contra organizations and a number
of their subsidiaries operated from headquarters in San José. The first was
ARDE, established in September 1982 and operating continuously until mid-
1986. The ~e~ ~ ~ ~ UNO. ore.ni-ed in mid-1985 at the instance of the United
States. and siill ihc chief umbrclla organizaiion for al1groups uorking for the
\.ioleni overihro* of rhc Nicara):uan Goiernmcni. Alihough in thi, Mernorial

ihese organiration\ are referred to ar "poliiisal". ihey were no1in any ben%par-
ticipants in the Ni-araguan domt5tic polilisal process. Ni-aragua condurrrd an
eleciion ior I'rr~idsni and Con\iiiueni Acsernbl, in Ki>\ernber 1984. prcccded
by several months of campaigning. (See ~icarigua v. United ~fatei, supra,
p. 90.) ARDE and its subsidiary organizations took no part in this process.
Instead, they actively boycotted the elections and sought to discredit them.
273. The function of the contra organizations headquartered in San José is
ta provide political support for the military operations being conducted hy the

contras not onlv on theCosta Rican border but elsewhere. Some of the activities
are public: conferences, meetings, rallies, manifestos, press relations and the
like. The leit-motif of al1these events and publications is the need for armed
action to oust the Dresent Government of ~<caraeua.-In addition. the or~ani-a-
tional hradquariers have providcd a ~onvenicnt place for contra Icaders ro meet
10 dc.rclo~ rnilitar) sirategy and plans and to co-ordinale supply and logisiical
services for the armed contra bands. Abundant detailed evidence supports these
conclusions.

274. ARDE was essentially a union of a number of smaller organizations
~ ~ ~~~~ ~ ~n - -- in 1981and 1982. Oneof these was headed bv Edén Pastora.
In his initial press conference in SanJoséin April 1982,~astoradefined the goal
of his oraanization as thearmed overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government. (See
suora. naras. 16. 34.) Within a few months Pastora formed an alliance with
~ifo&i ~ohelo's MDN, which marked the occasion hy placing paid adver-
tisements in the San Josépress announcing that "The moment has arrived for
open struggle ..." (Seesupra, para. 39.) 6 July, José Francisco Cardenal, the
leader of another group known as UDN/FARN, declared at a San José press

conferencethat a new Government in Nicaragua would have to be established
by military means. (See supra, para. 38.)
275. These three groups, al1 of which had already declared themselves in
favor of armed overthrow of the Nicaraeuan Government (toaether with an
organization of Miskito Indians known as-~isurasata), joined 6 form ARDE
in September of 1982. (Seesupra, para. 40.) At the press conference announcing
the merger, the leaders avowed tliat the abject of the new organization was the

overthrow of the Government of Nicaragua. (See supra, para. 16.)
276. At the heginning of the new year, the ARDE leaders repeated their
oublic cal1for armed struaale aeainst Nicaragua. (See supra,~para~ 45.) Again
at the turn of 1984, in a manifest published as a paid advertisement in San
José, ARDE proclaimed itself an organization that :

"supports a political and miliiary struggle io eradicaie ihe Marxisi-Leniiiist
toialitarianisni of the FS1.N. io evpel the intcri,cniionist forces and Io
rescue the Nicaraguan revolution". (~ee supra, para. 62.)

After the middle of 1985, ARDE began ta go into eclipse as Pastora's military
fortunes and relations with the Uriited States Government worsened. (Seesupra,
para. 125.)A new organization, UN0 (the United Nicaraguan Opposition), was

formed under the auspices of the United States in an effort to unify and88 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

rehabilitate the political arm of the contras. Alfonso Robelo of ARDE was one
of the original founders.(Seesupro. para. 99.) Shortly thereafter, BOS(Opposi-
tion Bloc of the South) was formed in San José, concentrating on political
support for the southern front. According to its constitution, published widely
in Costa Rica, one of its purposes was to "legitimize" the armed struggle against
the Government in Managua. (Id.) At a public rally in San Joséat about the
same time, the UN0 leaders again issued an appeal for unity in the fight Io oust
the Nicaraguan Government. (See supra, para. 101.)

2. Costa Ricon Media

277. In early 1985,two avowedly contra papers made their appearance on the
San José scene. They were called Nicaragua Hoy and Liberacidn and were
issued bi-weekly, as supplements to regular Costa Rican daily papers. Leading
members of UN0 and ARDE were on the editorial board of each paper. (See
supra, para. 102.)
278. These two r>ar>ers are nothina less than vehicles for "systematic r>ror>-
aganda" inciting "io ihe use of forcéand violence against the government" of
Nicaragua. The material takes many forms, including editorials, explicit calls
for support for contra military groups, interviews with contra military com-
mander~, and sensationalized and distorted accounts of contra "victories" and
events in Nicaragua. (See supra. para. 103.)
279. In addition. the contras ~laced uaid advertisements in the regular .
newspapers in San .Joséadvocating the use of violence to overthrow the
Nicaraguan Government. References Io a sampling of these advertisements
follow I
- MDN in La Nacidn of 20 June 1982and in La Re~ublica the followina dav.
(Ann. E, Attachnient 2, Nos. 1, 2.) -.

- FDN in La Nacidn on 6 October 1982. (Ann. E, Attachment 2, No. 6.)
- the Nicaraguan Conservative Party in exile, in La Nacidn on 4 December
1982. (Ann. E. Attachment 2. No. 8.)
- ARDE in La Prensa Libre on 9 January 1984. (Ann. E, Attachment 2,
No. 16.)
- BOS in La Nacion on 2 August 1985. (Ann. E, Attachment 2, No. 18.)
280. Contra propaganda is no1 confined Io the press. Radio Impacto. a sta-
tion based in Costa Rica, regularly broadcasts newsof contra activities together
with messae-s incitine to theoverthrow of the Nicar-euan Government bv force
of arms. (Seesupra, para. 130.)And on at least one occasion, Pastora was able
to bootlea a message from a covert transmitter in Costa Rica on to a Nicaraguan
televisionchannel; again calling for armed struggle against the Government.
(See supra, para. 45.)

281. As described in Chapter 1,supra. paragraphs 19-26, basic United States
strategy in recent years calls for the Costa Rican groups Io carry the main
political burden for the contras. As the CIA station chief put it, Costa Rica:
"presented a hetter environment for the political declarations to be made,
access to [San José]where there was relative tranquility, modern conve-
niences. daily îlights to the U.S. and so forth, and that is what the political
side needed". (Supra, para. 19.) MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 89

282. In order to accommodate Costa Rican sensibilities and ensure its con-

tinued permission to operate on "the political side", the contras even moderated
the levelof military activity emanating from Costa Rica from 1986on. (But see
supra, paras. 134, 135.) Political action in support of the military effort, how-
ever. remained undiminished.
283. The leaders of UN0 and BOS maintained their residences in San José

with full and continuous access to the local media. They mobilized support for
United States military aid for the contras. (Seesupra, para. 123.) In June, for
example, Robelo said in an interview that the contras would "win their war" if
they got enough United States support. (See supra, para. 126.)
284. The amaleamation of ~~ ~and ARDE was announced in San José~ ~ ~
along with the~~appointmentof Fernando Chamorro as commander of the

unified military forces in the south. (Seesupra..para..124.)UN0 and BOS also
comhined in San Joséin June. (See supra, para. 127.) ~t the first BOS "con-
gres~", held in San Joséin August 1986, leaders asserted that the contra goal
was "to take a piece of [Nicaraguanl territory and hold it" and "Io develop a
front in Nicaragua's urhan areas". (See supra, para. 128.)
285. UN0 too held its major conferences in San José.The purpose of one

such "assembly", held in November, was to plan a military offensive against
Nicaragua, to culminate in the installation of a "provisional government". (See
supra, para. 130.)
286. The publication of Nicaragua Hoy and Liberncion and the broadcasts
from Radio Impacto continued ihroughout this period along the same lines as

earlier described. (See, e.g., supra, paras. 130, 133.) Nicaragua protested these
activities frequently and in detail. (Seesupra, para. 130.)If Costa Rica's obliga-
tion Io take action under Articles VI1and Vlll of the Convention on Territorial
Asylum is contingent on a request from the aggrieved Party, Nicaragua has
amply fulfilled the requirement.
287. The foregoing account is only illustrative of the multi-faceted political

and propaganda barrage conducted by the contra "political" organizations
based in San José~~~ev had one end in view: the ~romotion and incitement of
violence and armed fr>;rc>gaini ihc ~otrrnrnen; of Nicaragua. Cosla Ri~.a'r
failure IO iakc dny srcps IO siop iliis aciiviiyira. in effsrr. a grani of permission
and approval. ~ssuch, it violated the general norm of non-intervention and the
specificobligations of Articles VILand VI11of the Convention on Territorial

Asylum, as incorporated into the 1956Agreement between Nicaragua and Costa
Rica.

13. Conclusion

288. This Chapter has marshaled detailed evidenceshowing some of the ways
in which Costa Rica has violated its duty not to intervene in the affairs of
Nicaragua. But concentration on the specific details - a particular raid or
attack or supply operation or publication or press conference or broadcast -
runs the risk of not seeing the forest for the trees.

289. Nicaragua's case does no1 depend on any particular incursion or overt
act. It isbased on the entire oattern of activitv. militan, and ~olitical. conducted
openly and notoriously hy ihe contras in ~'sta Rica ;ver Chefive-year period.
290. The evidence establishes that, from 1982to the present, large numbers
of armed contras - as manv as several thousand in most Deriods - o~eratina

from numerour bases in CO;IU Him. ronducled repeared rnidj and att;iL.k% inri
Nicaragua. Co\ta Kiian ierriior) and air-space was an cs<cniialclcmeni in rhe90 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER M D ACTIONS

efforts mounted by the United States to provide arms, munitions and supplies
to contra bands operating well within Nicaragua. The overall political leader-
shi~of the conrras was headauartered in San José.11sfunction was to eenerate
material and financial suppo;t for the military effort and to orchestraïe prop-
aganda inciting to the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government by force of
arms
291. The evidence establishing this pattern is voluminous. If includes
accounts of eye-witnesses. admissions bv Costa Rican officials and militarv
i>fficer\, publir ataiements of the conrra ieaders ihemsel%es.contemporaneou;
records rnsintained by thc Nicsraguan vcuriiy forces. more than 150diplomatic
notes and other formal communications from the Foreian Ministrv of
Nicaragua. documents exchanged between the menibers of ihe~ixed ~o~mih-
rion and the Commission of Supcrvision and Prevention. testimony before the
Joint Conaressional Hearinns Bcfore the Iran.Conira Affair and in Court oro-
ceedings, the Report of the Tower Commission and large numbers of cor-
roborating press accounts.
292. The eeneral nattern of conlra activitv in the border reeion and in the
capital over Ïhe past'five years is unmis1akat;le and undeniable. Indeed, Costa
Rica has made little effort to deny it. Given the volume of diplomatic cor-
resoondence. oress coveraee and other channels of information. f is clear that

coita Rica 4;s fully awariof thesituation,and in great detail. Given the extent
and duration of this activity, the conclusion is inescapable that it was carried
out with the vermission and aoo..val of the Government of Costa Rica - at
the very minimum, with its knowledge, acquiescence and toleration. Costa Rica
is therefore res~onsibleto Nicaragua under the governina international law bath
on the basis of its positive actio& and its orn~ssions. -
293. Nicaragua submits that the pattern of Costa Rican conduct established
by the evidence, including:
- its active assistance, encouiàgement and approval of the military and
oolitical efforts of the contras in that count,..
- its continued acquiescence in and tolerance of such activities, and
- its failure to take stem to suooress the armed attacks and hosti.e n.-oaeanda
proceeding from iis-terri~~;; against the Government of Nicaragua.

constitutes intervention in the affairs of Nicaragua in violation of the interna-
tional norms prohibiting such intervention and of the conventional obligations
subsisting between the two States. PART THREE

USE OF FORCE

CHAPTER V. BREACHES OFTHE OBLIGATION NOT TO USE FORCE
AGAINST ANOTHER STATE

A. Introduction

294. The purpose of this part of the Memorial is to develop the issues
presented in paragraphs 15 and 20 of Nicaragua's Application, namely:

"15. The facts on which Nicaragua relies disclose serious and persistent
violations of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, Article 2,
paragraph 4, according to which al1Members of the United Nations shall

refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. In
particular the assistance provided by Costa Rica to the counterrevolu-
tionary armed bands in their attacks on the territory of Nicaragua and its
civilian population (as descrihedbove) constitute the use of force against
the territory of Nicaragua."
"20. The policy of assistance to the conlras adopted hy Costa Rica
involves breaches of the obligation of customary international law not to
use force against another State; and so also the direct attacks against
Nicaragua by the armed forces of Costa Rica constitute serious breaches

of thissame obligation."

B. Assistance tu Contras Operating Against Nicaragua

295. The evidence presented by Nicaragua estahlishes the existence of a long-
estahlished pattern of activities by contras operating from the territory of Costa
Rica with the assistance ofofficiais of the Government both at the local and at
the ministeriallevel. The legal responsibility of the respondent State for the
harmful consequences of the operations of the contras based in Costa Rica has
three independent bases, as follows:

(a) direct responsibility for hreaches of the obligation not to use force;
(b) responsibility hy way of assistance to the contras and complicity in their
activities: and
(cJ responsibilityconsequent upon breaches of the duty toexercise due diligence
in the control of activities within the national territory.

296. The material relating to these three cumulative hases of responsibility
will now be examined. A brief exposition of the pertinent legal principles will
be followed by the application of the law to the facts of the case.92 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

1. Breaches of the Obligation Nor to Use Force

(a) The law

297. The general norm of customary law was affirmed by the Court in its
Judgment in Nicaragua v. United States in the following passages:

"188. The Court thus iinds that both I'arties take the viewthat the prin-
ciplesas to the use oi force incorporaird in the tinirrd Narion\ Charter cor-
resoond. in essentials. to those found in customarv international law. The
~aities ihus both take the view that the fundamenial principle in this ar&
is expressed inthe terms employed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United
~ -
~ations Charter. Thev theÏefore acceot a treatv-law oblieation to refrain -~
in their international ielations from the threat or use of Forceagainst the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the ourooses of the United Nations. The Court
has however to be satisfied th& th'ereexists incustomary international la&
an ouinio iuris as to the binding character of such abstention. This ouinio
jurr; iiiay; though uith al1due-caution. hc deduccd from. inrer al;;, the
attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States towards certain General

Asicmblv resolutions. and ~articularlv rcsolution 2625 tXXV1 cntitled
'~eclarakon on Principle, oi lniernatia>nalLaw concernin~ ~riendl~Rela-
tions and Co-opcration aniong States in Accordance nith the Charter of
thc [Jnired Nations'. The cffect of consent to the text of such resolutions
innnot be under\tood ac mcrely that oia 'reiteration or elucidation' of the
treatycomniitnient underraken in the Chartcr. On the cunrrdry. it may be
understood as-an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rnles
declared by the resolution hy themselves. The principle of non-use of force,

for example, may thus be regarded as a principle of customary interna-
tional law. not as such conditioned bv orovisions relatine to collective
security, 0.1to the facilities or armed ;Ontingents to be Govided unde;
Article 43 of the Charter. It would therefore seem apparent that the
attitude referred to exoresses an ooinio iuris resoectine s&h rule (or set of~~
rules). to hc thcnccfo;th trcatcd separakly (roi the provisions, èspecially
tho$eoi an institutional kind. to uhi;h it i, aubiect on the trcaty-law plane
of the Charter.

190. A further confirmation of the validitv as customarv international
law of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force exiressed in Arti-
cle 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations may be found in
the fact that it is freauentlv referred to in statements hv ~iate renresen-

tativcr as bcing no1only a principlc oicustomary international law but also
a fundamcntal or cardinal principle of sush law. Thc International Laiv
Commission, in the courseof itswork on the codification of the law of
treaties, expressed the viewthat 'the law of the Charter concerning thepro-
hibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a consoicuous examole of
a rulc in international law having the characier of juscogens9 (paragraph
(1)oi the commentary of the Commission to Article 50of ils draft Ariicles
on the Law of Treaties. ILC Yearbook. 1966.11, P. 2471.Nicaranua in its

Mcmorial on ihc Mcrits submitted in the presentcase ctates ihat tic princi-
ple prohibiiing the use of force embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter of the United Nations 'has come to be recoenized -s jus coaens'.
The Unitcd States. in its Counter-Memorial on the questions of jurisdistion
and admis,ibility, found itmaterial to quotc ihc viewsof scholars thai this principle is a 'universal norm', a 'universal international law', a 'univer-
sally recognized principle of international law', and a 'principle of jus

cogens'." (I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 99-101 .)
298. These Dassagesrelate to ihe position of Nicaraeua and the United States
but iherc i\ nogrouid for thinkingihai thr position bctween Ni~.araguaand
Costa Rica isesseniially dificrent; and thus iiis noi necessary io elaboraie fur-
ther unon the leeal hasis of the norm urohibitine the use of force. However. the
signifccance attiched to the pririciple by the Governments of Costa ~ica'and

Nicaragua is demonstrated in resolutions of a declaratory nature adopted at
intergovernmental conferences. Thus the Eiahth International Conference of
~meiican States at Lima in 1938adopted a ~iclaration of American Principles,
of which the third principle provided that:
"The use of force as an instrument of national or international policy is
proscribed." (Declaration CX, Infernofional Conferences of Americon

Sfutes, 1st Supp. 1933-1940,p. 309 (Washington, 1940).)
299. In the sanie connection the following provisions of the Charter of the
Organization of American States (amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in
1967)are declaratory in character and appear in a Chapter headed "Fundamen-
ta1 rights and dnties of States":

"Article 18

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the interna1 or external affairs of
anyother State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but
also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the per-
sonality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural
elements.

Article 19

No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind."

In fact. both Costa Rica and Nicaraaua are oarties to this instrument.
300. In iiï Judgmrni in ~icoro~uov. lJnr;ed Slure.~,thc Court adveried to
certain aspects ofthe principle relatingIO the non-use of force which are of par-
ticular relevance to the facts on which Nicarag-. nresentlv relies. The relevant
passages are as follo&s:

"191. As regards certain particular aspects of the principle in question,
it will be necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force
(those constituting an armed attack)from other less grave forms. In deter-
mining the legal rule which applies to these latter forms, the Court can
again draw on the formulations contained in the Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), referred to above). As already
observed. the ado~tion bv States of this text affords an indication of their
opinio juris as to Fustomiry international law on the question. Alongside

certain descriptions which may refer to aegression, this text includes others
which refer 6nly to less gra;e forms oFfhe use of force. In particular,
according to this resolution:94 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARME0 ACTIONS

'Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to

violate the existing international boundaries of another State or as a
means of solving Tnternational disputes, including territorial disputes
and prohlems concerning frontiers of States.
...........................
States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisa1involving the use of
force.
...........................

Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcihle action which
deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of that right to self-determination and
freedom and independence.
Every Statehas the duty to refrainfrom organizing or encouraging the
organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries,
for incursion into the territory of another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed

towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.'
192. Moreover, in the part of this same resolution devoted Io the princi-
ple of non-intervention in matters within the national jurisdiction of
States, a very similar rule is found:

'Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the
violent overthrow of the régimeof another State, or interfere in civil
strife in another State.'

In the context of the inter-American system, this approach can be traced
back at least to 1928(Convention on the Rights and Duties of Statesin the
Event of CivilStrife, Art. I(1)); it was confirmed by resolution 78adopted
by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States on 21
April 1972. The operative part of this resolution reads as follows:

'The Generol Assembly Resolves:

1. To reiterate solemnly the need for the memher states of the
Organization to observe strictly the principles of non-intervention and
self-determination of peoples as a means of ensuring peaceful coex-
istence among them and to refrain from committing any direct or
indirect act that might constitute a violation of those principles.
2. To reaffirm the obligation of those states to refrain from applying
economic, political, or any other type of measures to coerce another
state and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
3. Similarly, to reaffirm the obligation of these states to refrain from
organizing, supporting, promoting, financing, instigating, or tolerating
subversive, terrorist, or armed activities against another state and from

intervening in a civil war in another state or in its interna1 struggles'."
(I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 101-102.)
301. In the submission of the Government of Nicaragua the toleration of or
acquiescence in the organization of contras for their hostile operations against
a neighhoring State involves a simple or direct responsibility for breach of the MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 95

nrinci~le of the nrohihition of the use of force. As the Court noints out in the
passagesjust rquoted,such activities constitute a "use of forcen-and it is submit-
ted that this is so both in terms of customary international law and in terms of
Article 2. oaranraoh 4. of the United Nations Charter,
302. Thé prkci&e involved here is not concerned with a negligent inability
to exercise "due diligence" in the contrnl of activities on the territory of the
State. The standard to be an..ied relates to a oositive attitude of toleration of
and acquiescencc in rh~a~ri~iiicssniouniing io an adopiion and approbation oi
rhe operaiions concerned. As ihc Dcclaration on I'rinciples of lnrcrnational

Law concerning Friendly Relations expresses the matter:
"Everv State has the duty to refrain from oraanizing or encouragina the
organization of irregular firces or armed band< including mercenaries, for
incursion into the territory of another State.
Everv State has the dutv to refrain from oraanizinn, instigating, assistina

or par&ipating in acts ;f civil strife or terririst a& in aiothér State or
acquiescina in organized activities within itsterritory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when the actsreferred to in-thepresent paragraph
involve a threat or use of force." (UN General Assemhly resolution
2625 (XX) (24 October 1970).)

(b) Thefacts

303. Nicaragua submits that the evidence estahlishes that the Government
of Costa Rica has tolerated and acquiesced in the hostile activities of contras
(usually ARDE) against Nicaragua, such operations being mounted and sus-
tained from bases and other fricilitieson the territory of Costa Rica.
304. The evidence supporting this submission will be presented according to
an informal and convenient cliissification. The general narrative of the covert
war, as conducted through the agency of groups on Costa Rican territory with
the complicity of the Government of Costa Rica, has been set forth in Part One
of the Memnrial.

(i) Public slafemenls, press conferences and press adverlisements concerning
contra activities and goals

305. It was common in the vears 1982 to 1986 inclusive for the contra
organizations based in Costa ~ica to puhlicize their policiesand plans tn mount
armed actions against Nicaraaiia. In 1982the Government of Nicaragua twice
nrotested~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ aboutouhlic statements bvcontra leaders. A Note dated
16April 1982complaincd of \r:iicrnrnis bg EdenPnsiora in svhichhcp;ivcrlrar
indisarion, oi hir plans and cupcciations involving the u,e OCCosta Rlçan icr-

ritory for the organization of conlras to be used for hostile operations against
Nicaragua. (Ann. A, Attachment 1.) Similarly, in a Note dated 4 August 1982
the Government of Nicaragua protested as a result of a press conference given
by JoséFrancisco Cardenal in which he claimed responsihility for criminal acts
by conlras based in Honduras involving the killing of fourteen civilians in the
Nicaraguan towii of San Francisco del Norte. (Ann. A, Attachment 16.)
306. The constant use of Costa Rican territory for incitement to the use of
violence against Nicaragua was the subject of a further Note dated 8 January
1983in which the Government of Nicaragua described the developing pattern
of activity in Costa Rica by ARDE. (Ann. A, Attachment 22.) A further Note
dated 6 Octoher 1983 complained of the public campaigns inciting violence

against the Nicaraguan Goveriiment which were being conducted by Pastora
and Robelo. (Ann. A, Attachment 75.)96 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

307. On 23 September 1983 an airplane coming from Costa Rican territory
attacked the "Nicarao" electric plant and the "Induquinisa" factory and
returned to Costa Rica. Responsibility for this operation was claimed by the
contra leader Edén Pastora in a communiqué issued by ARDE military head-
quarters in San José. In a Note dated 23 September 1983,Nicaragua protested

both the attack and the repeated use of Costa Rican territory for contra
propaganda and military activities. (Ann. A, Attachment 63. ~lsasee Ann. H,
Attachments 32, 34.)

(ii) A continuing pattern of armed attacks across the border
308. In the period 1982to 1986inclusive, there has heen a continuing pattern
of armed attacks against Nicaraguan targets from within Costa Rica, after

which the contras responsible withdrew to positions or bases within Costa Rica.
This pattern forms evidence of a concerted campaign and a sustainedphenome-
non well known to the Costa Rican Government.
309. The persistence and scale of the activity is evident from the succession
of Notes from the Government of Nicaragua protesting about specific armed
attacks. The pertinent Notes of protest include the following:

2 December 1982 (armedattack on town of Cardenas) (Ann. A, Attachment
18).
12 April 1983 (hijacking of boat and kidnappings at Tasbapanni) (Ann.
A, Attachment 26).
16 April 1983 (attack on border post of Fatima de Sarapiqui) (Ann. A,
Attachment 28).
3 May 1983 (attacks on border posts of La Esperanza and Flitima)
(Ann. A, Attachment 38).
10 May 1983 (boat hijacking, kidnappings, and attack on border post
of Puehlo Nuevo) (Ann. A, Attachment 44).
12 May 1983 (attack on border post of El Papaturro) (Ann. A, Attach-
ment 47).
25 May 1983 (ambush on Rio San Juan) (Ann. A, Attachment 48).
3 July 1983 (armed attacks on San Juan del Norte) (Ann. A, Attach-

ment 53).
8 September 1983 (air attack on SandinoAiroort) (Ann. A. Attachment 58).
23 September 1983 (air attacks on power piant 'and a factory) (Ann. A,
Attachment 63).
27 September 1983 (attack in sectors of El Naranio and Las Florcita,).(Ann.
A, Attachment 65).
28 September 1983 (attack on customs post at Pefias Blancas) (Ann. A,
Attachment 67).
28 September 1983 (attacks on towns of Cardenas and Sapoa and customs
post of Peaas Blancas) (Ann. A, Attachment 68).
4 October 1983 (attack on the port of Benjamin Zeledon) (Ann. A,
Attachment 74).
7 October 1983 (attack on border post of El Naranjo) (Ann. A, Attach-
ment 76).
6 November 1983
(attack on border post of Puehlo Nuevo) (Ann. A,
Attachment 82).
8 November 1983 (attack on Orosi) (Ann. A, Attachment 84).
18 November 1983 (attack on town of Cardenas) (Ann. A, Attachment 85).
24 January 1984 (armed attack on town of El Castille) (Ann. A, Attach-
ment 95). MEMORU OF NICARAGUA 97

28 February 1984 (attacks on border zone of El Naranjo) (Ann. A,Attach-
ment 98).

10April 1984 (armed attacks on border post of San Juan del Norte)
(Ann. A, Attachment 100).
II April 1984 (continuing attacks on San Juan del Norte) (Ann. A,
Attachment 102).
16 April 1984 (further attacks on San Juan del Norte) (Ann. A, Attach-
ment 104).
28 April 1984 (invasion of San Juan del Norte) (Ann. A, Attachment
109) (see alsoinfra,paras. 318, 319).
30 April 1984 (attacks on El Castillo and Cardenas) (Ann. A,
Attachments Il0 and 111).
7 May 1984 (attack on border post of Palo de Arco)Ann. A, Attach-
ment 116).
12 June 1984 (attacks on Machuca and Agua Fresca sector) (Ann. A,
Attachment 124)(seealso telegram of same date; Ann. A,

Attachment 125).
30 September 1984 (attack on border post of Peiïas Blancas) (Ann. A,
Attachment 140).
18 October 1984 (attack on border post of San Pancho) (Ann. A, Attach-
ment 149).
20 October 1984 (attack on border post of Perlas Blancas) (Ann. A,
Attachment 151).
31 January 1985 (attack on "La Flor" estate) (Ann. A, Attachment 170).
18 February 1985 (attack on border ~ost of Peiïas Blancas) (.nn. A,
Àttachment 175).
19 Fehruary 1985 (attack on border post of El Naranjo) (Ann. A, Attach-
ment 176).
1 March 1985 (attack on customs post of Peiïas Blancas) (Ann. A,
Attachment 181).
(attack on border oost of La Esoeranza) (Ann. A. Attach-
16 April 1985 . .
ment 184).
30 April 1985 (further attack on border post of Lasperanza) (Ann. A,
Aitachment 186).
21 June 1985 (attacks on La Penca sector) (Ann. A, Attachments 193
and 195).
2 July 1985 (continuing attacks on La Penca) (Ann. A, Attachment
196).
4 July 1985 (furtheractack on La Penca) (Ann. A, Attachment 198).
22 July 1985 (attacks on San Rafael sector) (Ann. A, Attachment
LUL).
31 July 1985 (attacks on Cano Machado and La Penca) (Ann. A,
~ttachmeiit 204).
13 August 1985 (attacks oii Colon sector and vicinity of Delta of San Juan
River) (Arin. A. Attachment 207).
(atta&'on border post at Boca de San Carlos, Rio San
23 August 1985
Juan) (Ann. A, Attachment 211).
26 August 1985 (further attack on border post at Boca de San Carlos;
attack on La Penca sector) (Ann. A. Attachment 212).
29 August 1985 (attack on border post of PeÏias Blancas) (Ann. A,
Attachment 214).
6 September 1985 (attack on Nicaraguan post in thePimienta sector) (Ann.
A, Attachment 218).98 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

9 September 1985 (various armed attacks on Nicaraguan forces, including
attacks on an air force plane and two helicopters) (Ann.

A. Attachment 219).
17 September 1985 (attack on border post of Pueblo Nuevo) (Ann. A,
Attachment 220).
28 September 1985 (attacks on three borde~osts)(Ann. A, Attachment 222).
3 October 1985 (attacks on La Penca sector)'(~nn. ~i~ttachment 223).
7 October 1985 (attack on border post in San Carlos sector) (Ann. A,
Attachment 224).
7 October 1985 (attack on Sarapiqui sector) (Ann. A, Attachment 225).
8 October 1985 (attack on Nicaragua from Delta sector, Rio San Juan
(C.R.)) (Ann. A, Attachment 226).
19 October 1985 (attack on border post of La Penca) (Ann. A, Attachment
229).

24 October 1985 (attack on La Penca sector) (Ann. A, Attachment 232).
1November 1985 (two attacks (on the same day) on border post of Boca de
San Carlos) (Ann. A, Attachment 233).
15 January 1986 (attack on border post of Sarapiqui)(Ann. A, Attachment
-.-,.
17 January 1986 (attack on Nicaraguan helicopters overflying Sarapiqui
and Boca de San Carlos sector) (Ann. A, Attachment
241).
20 January 1986 (attack on border post of Sarapiqui) (Ann. A, Attachment
242).
26 January 1986 (attack on Nicaraguan helicopter at La Penca border post)

(Ann. A, Attachment 247).
31 January 1986 (attack on Nicaraguan positions in vicinity of Delta del
Rio San Juan sector by an aircraft coming from Costa
Rica) (Ann. A. Attachment 249).
19 April 1986 (attack on Nicaraguan forces in border area near San
Carlos) (Ann. A. Attachment 255).
31 May 1986 (attack on border post of San Juan del Norte) (Ann. A,
Attachment 260).
6 June 1986 (attack on observation post of Las Conchitas) (Ann. A,
Attachment 261).
26 August 1986 (attack on border post near Elastille)(Ann. A, Attach-
ment 265).

310. Indeed, in the period between December 1982and August 1986there
were hundreds of separate attacks involving the use of assault weapons. (See
supra, para. 5.) The repeated armed attacks reveal a pattern and, especially in
the years 1984and 1985,a constant campaign with a high incidence of attacks.
In the circumstances the only proper inference is that the Costa Rican
authorities tolerated and acquiesced in the operations of the contras.

(iii) The charocter of the forces and weapons used
311. Theaiiackr dexribcd abo\e \,aried in inren<iry,hut ihcy alnays look the
iorm of operations by personnel irained in miliiary skills and able io deploy and
use a variety of heavy weavons. Those who executed theattacks were. insimvle
terms, armed forces of fhe contra organirations based in Costa Rica. ~he

weapons regularly used included mortars, rocket launchers and automatic
weapons. (See, for example, the Nicaraguan protest Notes dated IOApril 1984.
22 July 1985, and 7 October 1985. Ann. A, Attachments 101, 202, 225.) MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 99

312. On a number of occasions the attackers received sumort from aircraft
and helicopters based in Costa Rica. (See the Nicaraguan protest Notes dated
2 December 1982, 28 September 1983, (telegram) 16 April 1984, 12 June 1984.

Ann. A, Attachments 18, 67, 104, 124.)

(iv) Relaled episodes

313. The repeated armed attacks were accompanied by related episodes
of a kind inevitably associated with the type of operations mounted against
Nicaragua. Thus from time to time ARDE infiltrators were captured on Nica-
raguan territory. (Seethe Nicaraguan protest Notes dated9 May 1983,and4 July
1983. Ann. A, Attachments 41, 55.) Similarly, illegal trespass by unidentified
aircraft was a common phenomenon. (See the Nicaraguan protest Notes

dated 9 September 1983, 18October 1984, 26 July 1985. Ann. A, Attachments
59, 203, 211.) Kidnapping episodes also formed a natural part of the pattern.
(See the Nicaraguan protest Notes dated 25 May 1983, 23 January 1984,
13 September 1984,31 January 1985, 18February 1985and26April 1986.Ann.
A, Attachments 48, 94, 133, 170, 174, 257.)

(v) The receipt by Costa Rica of repeated complainls concerning contra
operations and preparations for allacks
314. The Government of Nicaragua has repeatedly protested to the Govern-

ment of Costa Rica about the hostile activities of contras based in and operating
from the territory of Costa Rica and the relevant Diplomatic Notes aie ~isted
paragraph 309. If was sometimas possible to give the Costa Rican authorities
precise information of preparations for attack against targets within Nicaragua.
(See the Nicaraguan Diplomatic Notes dated 21 October 1983, 22 November
1983, 30 April 1984, 5 October 1984, 15October 1984, 19October 1985. Ann.
A, Attachments 80, 87, 110, 146, 148, 228.) Representations were also made on

this score in meetings of the OAS, the Mixed Commission and the Commission
of Supervision and Prevention. (See supra, para. 7.)
315. On a number of occasions urgent warnines from Nicaragua were fol-
lowed by the attack the imminence or which had-been the subjeg of the par-
ticular warning. This depressing seauence is visible in the following Diplomatic
Notes :

19 October 1985 (information on mobilization of Iwo groups of mercenaries
in particular areas) (Ann. A, Attachment 228).
24 October 1985 (protest at the attack which resulted from the mobilization
referred to in the previous Note) (Ann. A, Attachment 232).

316. On this occasion and eenerallv in the months of Julv. Auaust.
Septcmhcr and Ociober of 1YX5. Fherewa.sa closely knii strier oiîr"ied atiack;
reliiitdIO ~rotests by Nirararus and rcaucsts ihiti the Costa R1i3<;ovcrnmcni
LakeeffecGvemeasures to o~~vent furth& attac~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~no evidence that anv

steps were taken and the constant renewal of the contra attacks points clearly
toward a long-maintained policy of CO-operationon the part of the responsible
organs of the Governmeni of Costa ~ica.

(vi) Evidence of aclive CO-opsraiion by Costa Rican officiais

317. There is a substantial body of evidenceof active CO-operationby Costa
Rican officials in the camoaien of areression oreanized and executed bv the
contras. This evidence will'be-fully recounted in the section on assistance and100 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

complicity. (Seeinfra, paras. 326-338.)This evidence is referred to here because
it is relevant to the submission that the Respondent State bears direct respon-
sibility for breach of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force.

(vii) The assault on San Juan del Norte in April 1984
318. If it were not clear to the Costa Rican authorities already, the situation

re\uliing from plîying hosr io large groupr oi cotitras vas iitidÏy portraved hv
the rvenis of April 1984,which culminaird in the occupation of the Nicaraguan
town of San Juan del Norte by more than 500 armed mercenaries from their
bases in Costa Rica. The various stages of this episode were chronicled in a
series of Nicaraguan Diplomatic Notes dated IO April 1984, 11 April 1984,
16April 1984, and 28 April 1984. (Ann. A, Attachments 101, 102, 104, 109.)

319. The scale of this operation and the general circumstances in which it
took place provide strong indications of the approbation of the Costa Rican
authorities. The situation developed over a oeriod of manv davr.and clearly
involved an operation aimed at the capture 0.fSan Juan def~orte: There is no
evidence that the Costa Rican authorities took any measures, much less any

effective measures, to prevent the development of this major aggression against
Nicaragua. When the occupying force was expelled by Nicaraguan forces the
contras retreated into Costa Rica. The official response of the Costa Rican
Government in face of vigorous Nicaraguan protests (see supra, paras. 18, 68)
provided no adequate explanation of Costa Rican passivity in face of the inva-

sion and occupation of San Juan del Norte, and none was forthcoming either
then or later. (Ann. A. Attachment 106(Diolomatic Note of Costa Rica).) Costa
Rira', \wceping dcniiil of al1 resp~nribili;~ for the inbasion of San Juan del
Norie ir irnpo\riblc IO rcconcile with ihc faci\ of thc carc. (Seesupra, para. 68.)

(viii) Submission on the facts

~-0. On the basis of the evidence set fnrth~ ~ ~--the Gov~rn~en~ ~ ~-~~ ~ ~
Nicaragua submits that it is established that the Costa Rican Government and
its agents had tolerated or acquiesced in the organization of ARDE within the
territory of Costa Rica and it; hostile operations against targets in Nicaragua.
In the circumstances, such adoption and approbation of the operations con-

cerned must engage a simple or direct responsibility for breach of the principle
of the prohibition of the use of force, as elaborated supra, paragraphs 297-302.

2. Responsibiliry Consequent upon Assistance Io Contras Operating ogainst
Nicaragua and Complicity in Their Activities

(a) The law

321. The submission of Nicaragua in the alternative is that the policy of the
Costa Rican Government in orovidine activ- co-oneration and assistance to the
contrasoperating from its territory results in the existenceof State responsibility
on the basis of complicity in the acts of persons no1 formally acting on the

State's behalf. The resoonsibilitv thus arisine would be for breaches of the orin-
ciple of the prohibition of the use of force,lbut the precise axis or generathr of
responsibility is the element of complici~. in the acts of persons outside the
apparatus of the State.
322. It has long heen recognized both in the doctrine and in practice that a

State may be made responsible for the acts of persons who are not attached to
the organs of the State. (See, for example, Répertoiresuisse, Vol. 111,supra, MEMORW. OF NICARAOUA 101

pp. 1724-1743; Kiss, III Répertoire de la pratique française (Paris. 1965).
pp. 579-636; H. Accioly, "Principes générauxde la responsabilité interna-
tionale d'après la doctrine et la jurisprudence", 96 Hague Recueil (1959-l),
pp. 404-407; E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, "International Responsibility",
pp. 558-562, in M. Ssrensen, Manual of Public International Law. supra;

Whiteman, 8 Digest of International Law, pp. 815-819, 830-835; 1. Brownlie,
System of the Law of Nations. State Responsibility. Part 1 (Oxford. 1983),
o. 159.
323. Th15principle wasadopted by Judge Ago. then Rapporteur oc the Inter-
national Law Commission, in hi, fourth report. See Yearbook of the Inter-
nationalLaw Commüsron. 1972. Vol. II. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1972/Ad do.I95-
126. Article II of the draft proposed by Judge Ago was as follows:

"Article II. Conduct of privare individuals
1. The conduct of a private individual or group of individuals, acting in
that capacity, is no1 considered to be an act of the State in international
law.
2. However, the rule enunciated in the preceding paragraph is without
prejudice to the attribution to the State of any omission on the part of its
organs, where the latter ought to have acted 10 prevent or punish the
conduct of the individual or group of individuals and failed to do so." (Id.,

at 126.)
324. The final version of this Article, as adopted by the Commission in 1975,
is as follows:

"Article II. Conduct of persons not acting on behalf of the State

1.The conduct of a person or a group of persons not acting on behalf
of the Stateshall not be considered as an act of the State under interna-
tional Law.
2. Paragraph 1 iswithout prejudice to the attributionto the State of any
other conduct which is related to that of the persons or groups of persons
referred to in that Daragra~hand which isto he considered as an act of the
State by virtue of-articler5 to 10." (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission. 1975, Vol. II, A/CN.4/Ser.A/1975/Ad pd..l0-83.)
325. The alteration in the drafting does no1appear to indicate any important

chanae in the substance. The essence of the matter is the existence of acts or
omissions on the part of the organs of the State which, given the nature of the
particular obligation of international law in question, results in a responsibility
for a failure to exercise adequare control over the actions of privapersans.
(See id., p. 71.) In the case of mob violence, the activities of terrorists or the
operations of contras based within the territory of the State, it has for long been
recognized that the territorial sovereign will beresponsible for the consequences
of activities of which il had either actual knowledge or the means of knowledge.
The existence of this type of responsibility will be easier to establish inr-
cumstances in which the territorial sovereign extends co-operation and assis-
tance to the persons or groups in question.

(b) Thefacts
326. To establish the complicity of the Costa Rican Governmenr in the opera-
tions of the contras against the southern territories of Nicaragua. on grounds
of ordinary legal logic, four indicia are relevant:102 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

(i) the existence of control in the relevant zones or an ahility to exercise
control:
(ii) knowledge of the presence of conrros and of their aims and methods;
. .i) knowleda- of the ooerations of the conrros and the consesuences of such
operations; and
(iv) the giving of CO-operationand active assistance to the contras in the execu-
tion of their policy of violence directed against Nicaragua.

327. In anoroachinn the evidence of Costa Rican comolicity .he.attention of
the Court is'r;specifulry drawn IO the siaiemeni of the Court in the Corfi Chon-
ne1case (Meriis) on ihe role of indirect evidcncc in cases in which key lacis in
issueinvolveactivitieswithin the territory of the resoondent State. The pertinent
passage in the Judgment is as follows:

"lt is clear that knowledge of the minelaying cannot he imputed to
the Albanian Government by reason merely of the fact that a minefield
discovered in Albanian territorial waters caused the exolosions of which
the British warships were the victims. It is true. as intirnational practice
shows, that a State on whose territory or in whose waters an act contrary
to international law has occurred. m.v be.called uDon to aive an ex~lana-
tion. It is also true that that Statecannot evade such a reiuest hy limiting
itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the circumstances of the act and of
its authors. The State mav; uo to a certain ooint. be bound to sun~lv ..r-..
ticulars of the use made b; iiof the means'of information and inquiry at
its disposal. But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control

exercised hy a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily
knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein,
nor yet that it necessarily knew. or should have known, the authors. This
fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neither involvesprimo
focie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.
On the other hand, the fact of this exclusiveterritorial control exercised
by a State within its frontiers has a hearing upon the methods of proof
available to estahlish the knowledge of that State as to such events. By
reason of this exclusive control. the other State, the victim of a breach of
international law, isoficn unable to furnish direct proof of facis gi\ing rire
to responsibiliiy. Such a Siaie should be allowed a more Iibcrül recoursc

to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is
admiticd in al1systems of law. and ils use is recognized by international
decisionc. Ii musi be regarded as of special wcight when iiis bascd on a
series of facts linked tonether and leadinn --nically.o a sinnleconclusion."
(I.C.J. Reports 1949. para. 4, p. 18.)

(i) The existence OJ'control
328. There is a presumption that a sovereign State exercisescontrol within ils
frontiers with certain well-known exceotions. such as the suhiection of a nart
of its ierritory io belligereni occupation, such exceptions having no relevance in
the preseni case In any case in face of frequent proteQs from Nicaragua in face
of contra actions, the~overnment of costa ~ica has expressly asserted that it

is exercising "absolute" and "effective" control over the frontier zones. (See,
for example, Diplomatic Notes of Costa Rica dated 18April 1984, 24 August
1984, 17September 1984,21 September 1984, 1October 1984,4 October 1984,
15 October 1985, and 23 January 1986(Ann. A, Attachments 106, 131, 137,
138, 142, 144, 148, 245).) MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 103

(ii) Knowledge of the presence of the organizations in quesfion
329. The nresence of the contras within Costa Rica and their nolicies towards
the (;ovcrnmeni of Niiaragua urre maitcrs of public knowledgr ihruughoui the
maicrial period: and rciercnce niay be made io the puhlic siaiemenis and press
conferences of contra leaders, together with press advertisements concerning
contra activities and goals. (See Ann. E, Attachments 2, 3, 4.)

(iii) Knowledge of the operations of the contras
330. There is a vast range of evidence to the effect that the Government of
Cosia Rica had extenhive k~u\i.lcdgcoi ihcoperaiions carricd oui by the confras
hascd in Cosia Ri:a again\[ targets in Nicaragua and the preiisr consequenccs
ofrhuw opcrations. Theeridence oi ihar knouledge iakcr the l'ollouing forms.

(A) The long series of diplomatic protests received from Nicaragua
331. Costa Rica received a long series of nrotests from the Nicaraman

Foreign Ministry relating to particilar attacks'(see supra, para. 309) and on
many occasions the Nicaraguan Government gave the Costa Rican authorities
~reciseinformation about ~renarations for attacks. (Seesuura. Dara. 7. Also see
~nn. B.)

(B) Statements of Costa Rican Ministers

332. In diplomatic correspondence the Foreign Minister of Costa Rica did
not seek to deny the presence of ARDE and its leaders in Costa Rica and,
indeed, it was asserted that their status was that of political asylees.ee the
Costa Rican Notes dated 10January 1983, 18April 1984,Ann. A, Attachments
23, 106.)

(C) Reports and statements of Costa Rican administrative officials
333. In a number of nublic statements Costa Rican officials have made
significant admissions againstinterest. Theevidential weight of such admissions
was recognized bv the Court in Nicaraaua v. United States, suura. DD. 41. 143.
Thus, in-~anuar; 1982, the Minister of Public Security and-~dministration,
Arnulfo Carmona Benavides, made statements reported in the Costa Rican

Dress in which he confirmed the existence of contra camDs on the northern
border. (See Ann. H, Attachment 2.) The existence and nature of contra opera-
tions was acknowledged in reports of the Ministry of Public Security of Costa
Rica. (See, for example, Ann. D, Attachments 6, 7.)

(D) Public statements by contra leaders

334. On several occasions conrra leaders have made public statements claim-
ing responsibility for particular operation(See, e.g., supra, paras. 36,39, 55.)

(E) Meetings of the Mixed Commission and the Commission of Supervision
and Prevention

335. Durine meetines"of the OAS lnvestiea- -e Committee the Mixed Com-
mission and, subsequently, of the Commission of Supervision and Prevention,
the Nicaraguan re~resentatives gave detailed information concerning contra
attacks and organitation. (See ~-nn. B. Attachments 1-3.)lo‘l BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

(iv) The general pattern of connecfed incidents
336. An important aspect of the evidence is the existence of a coherent pat-
tern of connected incidents, statements of intention by contra leaders, and the
repeated protests of the Nicaraguan Government over a period of five years.

(v) Co-operation and assistance given Io the contras by Costa Rica

337. Whilst the policies and conduct of particular Costa Rican officials in
face of the covert war against Nicaragua were not alwavs verv consistent. there
is a significant body ofeiidence of acts of direct CO-opeiationand assistance on
the part of members of the Costa Rican administration. Such acts of positive
CO-operation went beyond the acquiescence and passivity which were also
familiar features of Costa Rican official attitudes.
338. The evidence of direct CO-operationand assistance includes the follow-
ing items:

(A1 In a Note dated 28Avril 1984(Ann. A. Attachment 1091.Nicaragua eave
~ubrt~niial dctails of ihe complicityof senior Costa Rican o'ifiiialc in chrra
military opcraiions. In pariiculnr, the Go\ernmcni of Nicaragua pointrd out
thai ihe invasion of San Juan del Norte u,ould no1have heen possible had iino1
been for the long-term collahoraiion of sectors of ihc Costa Rican administra-
tion. (Id.) Thc Iinncx r~ithe Noie refcrs. inter ulra, to the role of Vice-Minister
Chacon of Costa Rica in providing assistance to the contras. (Id.)
(B) The readiness of Costa Rican officials in the frontier region to prepare

the way for conlraattacks by evacuating customs and immigration posts on the
frontier is pointed out in the Nicaraguan Note dated 3 May 1984. (Ann. A,
Attachment 113.) The complicity in these circumstances was that of the Rural
Guard. In a further Note dated 7 May 1984 (Ann. A, Attachment 116), the
acquiescence of the Rural Guard in face of contra operations was again the sub-
ject of complaint hy Nicaragua.
(C) In April 1985 five foreign mercenaries were captured in Costa Rica. In
a series of statements, these mercenaries described the active collaboration
received from the security forces of Costa Rica. The details have been set forth
supra, paragraph 97. The revelations formed the subject of a Nicaraguan pro-
test dated 3 July 1985. (Ann. A, Attachment 197.)
(D) It was not unusual for armed attacks from Costa Rica to take place in
the actual vicinitv of frontier uosts manned by the Costa Rican Civil Guard.

See. ior exaniple;the ~icaraguan Notes daied 80ctobcr IVX5.and I Novemhcr
1985. (Ann. A. Atia~hments 226, 233.)
(E) Thc cvidcnic vrovidcd bv the Joint Conrrrs,ional Hearinrs on the Iran-
Conira AIfair iniludes iinequivisal indi:ationsÏhat ihe ~rcsidcnÏof Costa Rica
(I'rerideni Monge) atid oiher senior oificials actiicls collaboratcd in the crea-
tion of an airbase and related facilities to be used by United States agents for
logistical operations in support of contra operations within the territory of
Nicaragua. (See supra, paras. 9, 23, 24, 108, 109, 113, 115.)
(F) The willingness of the Costa Rican authorities to set contra personnel at
liberty without investigation of their criminal activities when, exceptionally,
such persans had been detained by Costa Rican security agents. (See, e.g.,
suora. vara. 17.1

>G) The evidence of interna1documents of the Ministry of Public Security of
Costa Rica to the effectthat the existennce of contra encamoments and concen-
trations were well known ta the security agencies of the resbondent State. (See
supra, paras. 10, 11, 48.) MEMORIAL Of NICARAGUA 105

(vi) Submission on the farts

339. The evidence set forth ahove amply justifies the submission that the
Government of Costa Rica is responsible on the basis of complicity in the acts
of the contras established in its territory, as a consequence of the active co-
operation and assistance provided by its officials. The existence of such com-
plicity is the foundation of responsibility for breaches of the principle of the
vrohibition of the use of force.
340. The precise indicia or elements of Costa Rican complicity relevant 10
responsibility for such breaches and sustained by the evidence are:

(i) the existence of control - or at the least the means of control - within
the relevant areas:
(ii) knowledgr oiihr pre\çnre and purpi)ïçs of the rotilras tvithin Coriî Rica;
(iii) knowledge of ihe operaiions of the mnrra.s dircsied again\i rarger, in
Nicaragua; and
(iv) the giving of assistance to the contras in the execution of their policy of
violence directed against Nicaragua.

3. Responsibility Consequent upon Breaches of the Duty Io Exercise Due
Diligence in the Control of .4ctivities within the Terrirory of rhe Srale

(a) The law
341. In the submission of Nicaragua, general international law contains a
vrincivle accordinn to which a State has a duty to use due diligence in order to

contr6l sources ofinjury to other States existfng within ils territory, and must
bear legal responsibility if another State suffers injury as a consequence of
breaches of that duty. The duty is dependent upon the existence of knowledge
or the means of knowledge of the source of harm.
342. The existenceof this duty has been recognized by international tribunals
in the decisions in the Trail Smelter Arbitrafion, Reports of Inlernolional
ArbitralA wards, Vol. III (194l), p. 1905;and the Corfu ChonneICase (Merits),
supra, p. 22. In the latter case the Court referred to "every State's obligation
not to allow knowingly its territory to he used for acts contrary to the rights of
other States".
343. No doubt the duty to exercise due diligence is in some respects similar
to the t..e of resoonsibilitv which arises from assistance and comvli.itv i. rela-
lion to armed bands. (Seesupra. Chaper III.) Huwever, the principles arc resog-
nizedas having a disiinci idrntiiy in the authoritier; and rhrre arc ccriain signifi-
cant differencës. A difference which is relevant for oresent ourvoses lies in the
fact that theduty to exercisedue diligencedoes not involveshcha high standard
as in the case of assistance and complicity for, after all. a failure to control,
however grievous the consequences, cannot be equated with the higher degree
of advertence associated with active CO-operationand complicity.

(b) Thefacrs
344. The criteria which are oertinent in establishinu-the existence of a failure
to exercisedue diligence are to some extent the same as those relevant to respon-
sibility by way of compli.it.. However, the relevant criteria are restricted to
two, as follo~s:

A. the existence of control in the relevant zones or at least an ability to exercise
control; and106 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

B. knowledge of the presence of the contras and of their aims and methods.

345. Indeed. the first of these criteria is essenti..lv p.o forma since control
ir assumed IOeuisi over national terriiory and in any case the duiy IOexercise
due diligence isnot conditioned by the/act of control but hy the dutyto excrcise
effective control in the particular circumstances.It is also to be noted that the
third "complicity" criterion namely, knowledge of the operations of the con-
tras, is not strictly speaking a condition of responsibility for failure to exercise
due dili-ence. However. such knowledee-.av have a sienificant evidential role
as providing corroboration of the failure to exercise due diligence.
346. From these considerations it must follow that the references to the rele-
vant evidence may be found in the preceding section as follows:

(i) Knowledge of the presence of the contras and of their aims and methods.
(See supra, paras. 10. 11, 48.)
(ii) (As corroboration) knowledge of the operations of the contras. (Id.)

347. The existence of serious and persistent breaches of the duty to exercise
due diligence is confirmed hy the fact that the many diplomatic protests
addressed to Costa Rica by Nicaragua contained requests that the Costa Rican
Government should improve the methods of control and vigilance within the
border zones. The need for appropriate means of communication and control
in the border zone was stressed in a Note dated 2 December 1982. (Ann. A,
Attachment 18.)Similar requests were made at freqbent intervals in the follow-
ing four years. (See, for &ample, the Note dated 3 July 1983, 6 Novembef
1983, 5 December 1983, 16 April 1984. 28 April 1984, 20 October 1984,
18February 1985,21 June 1985.3 July 1985,3 October 1985,20 January 1986,
31 May 1986and 26 August 1986, Ann. A, Attachments 53, 82, 88, 104. 109,
151, 175, 193, 197, 223, 242, 260, 265.)

(i) Submission on the facts

348. On the basis of the foregoing. Nicaragua submits that there is over-
whelming proof of persistent breaches of the duty to exercise due diligence
hcginning in 1982and coniinuing since ihen. ~here was a duiy incumbcii on
Costa Rica to exçrcije a lcvelof control and \upcr\i<ion of the national terriiory
appropriate in the circumstances. The incidenceand s~ecificcontent of the duty
Gs determined by the actual incidence of attacks against Nicaragua, and b;
knowledge of the presence of contras and of their aims and methods. The
existence of the breaches of the duty for which Costa Rica is responsible ison-
firmed by the pattern of attacks repeated over a long period, by major episodes
like the attack on San Juan del Norte, and by the frequent requests from
Nicaragua for the im~rovement of methods of control and ~revention. The
breachés receive further confirmation, if such confirmation 'were necessary,
from the evidence of actual knowledge of the operations of the contras. (See

supra, paras. IO, 11, 48.)

C. Conclusion on the Use of Force

349. On the basis of the evidence available, the respondent State bears legal
responsibility in the respect of its toleration of and assistance to those activities
of the contras based in Costa Rica and operating against Nicaragua (and in
some cases operating within ils territory) which involved the use of force in the
form of armed attacks directed against Nicaraguan targets. MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 107

350. These activities constitute serious and persistent breaches of the follow-
ing legal obligations:

A. the obligation of States under general international law to refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political
independence of any State,
B. the same obligation as expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the

United Nations Charter,
C. the provisions of Articles 18and 19 of the Charter of the Organiza-
lion of American States. which orovisions may be reaarded both as
drclaraiory of the relet,aai principies of gcneral international laiv and as
constiiuting independently valid rnultilaieral treîi)' obligations. PART FOUR

HHI.:ACHESOF OTHER OBLIGATIONS
OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

CHAVTEH VI. BREACHES OF TIII.1OHI.ICATION NO'I''KOVIOLATE
THE SOVI;.WEIC,NI'Y 01; AS0THEH STATE

A. Introduction

A. The Application (para. 21) States that "the policy of assistance to the
armed bands of somocistas adopted by Costa Rica ... constituted breaches of
the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of another State". The issues of
responsibility evoked by this formulation will be explored forthwith.

B. The Legal Principle

B. The obligation not to violate the sovereigntyof another State iswellrecog-
nized and it willsuffice. hv wav of memorandum only. to set out the relevant
passage from the ~udgment of ihe Court in ~icaragui v. United States:
"212. The Court should now mention the principleof respect for State
sovereignty, which ininternational law is of course closely linked with the
principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of non-intervention.
The basic legal concept of State sovereignty in customary international
law, expressed in, inter alia, Article 2, paragraph 1, of the United Nations
Charter, extends to the interna1waters and territorial sea of every State and
to the air space above its territory. As to superjacent air space, the 1944

Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation (Art. 1)reproduces the established
principle of the complete and exclusivesovereignty of a State over the air
space above its territory. That convention, in conjunction with the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, further specifies that the
sovereignty of the coastal State extends to the territorial sea and to the air
space above it, as does the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea adopted on 10 December 1982. The Court has no doubt that these
prescriptions of treaty-taw merely respond to firmly established and long-
standing tenets of customary international law." (I.C.J. Reports 1986,
p. III.)

C. The Application of the Legal Principle

C. According IOthe normal opcration of the prinçipler of State responsibiliiy,
the res~ondcntSiatc uiIIbrar rcsponsibilityfor the hreashesof the obligation not
to violate the sovereignty of ~icaragua on three separate bases, thatis Io Say: MEMORTAI OF NICARAGUA 109

(a) direct responsibility for breaches of the obligation;
(bj responsibility by way of assistance to the contras and complicity in their
activities; and

(c) responsibility consequent upon breaches of a duty to exercisedue diligence
in the control of activities within the national territory.
D. As the Court had occasion to observe in its Judgment in Nicaragua v.
United States:

"251. The effects of the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty
inevitablv overlat, with those of the ~rinci~lesof the prohibition of the use
of force ind of non-intervention. ~hus ih;arsi\ranceio the contras, as well
as ihr diresi attacks on Nicdrîguan ports, oil in\tallations, etc., refcrred io
in nara~ranhs 81 to 86 above. not onlv amount to an unlawful use of
forCe, but 'a~soconsiiiute infringcmenii of ihe territorial sovereigniy of
Nicaragua. and incursions inio ils terriiorial and iniernal u,aters. Similarly,

the mining operationsin the Nicaraguan ports not only constitute breaches
of the principle of the non-use of force, but also affect Nicaragua's
sovereignty over certain maritime expanses. The Court has in fact found
that these ooerations were carried on in Nicaraeua's territorial or interna1
waters or both (paragraph 80). and accordingly ihey constiiuie a violaiion
of Nicaragua's sovereignry. The principle of respect for territorial
sovereientv is also direstlv infrin-.d bv the unauihdrized oserflirhi of a
~tate'sïerhtor~ byaircrafi belonging to or under the controlof thegovern-
ment of another State." (Id., p. 128.)

E. It follows that. in terms of the vresentation of evidence relating to the
ihree barn of rc\pon\ibility indicaied-abo\,e, the convenirnt meihodof pro-
ceeding isto rcfer io the marerials ri forih in Pari Onc and also in the previous
Chapter of this fernorial, relaiing io the obligaiii)n not io use force. The
spesific breaches of that obligaiion ihere elaborared al\o consiiiuie violaiions of
the sovereigniy of Nicaragua for whirh the respondeni Siaie bears respon-
sibility. CHAPTER VII. BREACHES OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO KILL,
WOUND, OR KIDNAP THE CITIZENS OF OTHER STATES

A. Introduction

A. In paragraph 22 of the Application Nicaragua formulates the claim that
the conduct of Costa Rica "constitutes serious and persistent breaches of the
obligation under customary international law not to kill, wound or kidnap the
citizens of other States". and this claim will receive the necessary elaboration
in the present section of the Memorial.

B. The Legal Principle

R. The relevant cause of action can be expressed as the killing. uounding or
kidnannine. of the citilens of Nicaragua withoui lawful iusiification. The legal
bases%such a claim consist of a wealth of jurisprudence-of claims commissi~ns
and instances of State practice. The Court's attention is respectfully drawn to
the following materials:

(ai On the extensive practice of claims commissions. see. ex., Feller, The
Mexican Claims ~&tvnissions 1923-1934,Chapter 7 (1935);~. H. W. Ver-
zijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, Vol. VI, pp. 6, 7 ff.

(b) For the practice of States, see Whiteman, 8 Digest of International Law,
pp. 850-906(1967); Rdpertoire suissede droit internalionalpublic, Vol. III,
pp. 1710-1722(1975).
(c) The views of qualified publicists, including Jimenez de Aréchaga, 159
Hague Recueil (1978-l), pp. 267 ff.; Oppenheim, International Law
(H. Lauterpacht, ed.), Vol. 1, 357-364. Vol. 11,941-952, 8th ed. (1955);
D. P. O'Connell, Internarional Law, 2nd ed. (1970); Jiménez de Aréchaga,

in Sorensen (ed.), Manual of Public Inrernational Law, supra, pp. 531,
544-547(1968); Guggenheim, Traite'de droir international public, Vol. II,
pp. 1-11 (1954); American Law Institute, Restatement (Second): Foreign
Relations Law of the United Stores, paras. 164-168(1956).
C. There can be little doubt that the obligation of customary law not to kill,
wound. or kidnao the nationals of other Statesaoolies to such nersons not onlv
when they are within the territory of thespondentStite but also whea
they are outside the territom. This assumotion lies behind the claim presented
to Ïhe British Government bv the unitedgtates in the Caroline incident. tSee

R. Y. Jennings, "The ~aroline and McLeod Cases", 32 American a oui naof
Inrernational Law 82 (1938).) The application of the duty in respect of aliens
outside the territorial jurisdiction is recognized hy O'Connell, Inrernational
Law, supra, Vol. II, p. 950.
D. The broad application of the duty is evident in the cases relating to the
destruction of civilaircraft. may he that the location of the aircraft at the rele-
vant lime is relevant to an issue of excusable error, but there can be no doubt
that the duty not to use force against foreign aircraft is not conditioned by the SUBMISSIONS

J. The Republic of Nicaragua respectfully requests the Court Io grant the
following relief:
Firsf: the Court is requested to adjudge and declare that Costa Rica has
violated the obligations of international law indicated in this Memorial, namely :

(a) the obligation of general international law not to intervene in the affairs of
other States, which obligation is also expressed in theaw and practice of
the United Nations;
(b) the obligations of non-intervention set forth in Article 18of the Charter of
the Organization of American States;
(c) the obligation of non-intervention embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations;
(d) the obligations set forth in the Treaty of Amity concluded between the Par-

ties on 21 February 1948and the Agreement implementing Article IV of the
aforesaid instrument. concluded on 9 January 1956;
(e) the obligations set forth in the Convention on Rights and Dulies of States
in the Event of Civil Strife, concluded on 20 February 1928;
lfl the obliaation of aeneral international law to refrain from the threat or use
of force-against the territorial integrity and political independence of any
State, which obligation is also expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
United Nations charter;
(g) the provisions of Articles 18and 20 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States, which'provisions may be regarded as declaratory of
the principles of general international law. and which include obligations
relating to the use of force;
(h) the obligation of general international law no1 to violate the sovereignty of
other States; and

(i) the obligation of general international law not to kill, wound or kidnap the
citizens of other States.
Second: the Court is requested to state the duty of the Government of Costa
Rica to bring the aforesaid violations of international law to an end.

Third: the Court is requested to adjudge and declare that, in consequence of
the violations of international law indicated in this Memorial, compensation is
due to Nicaragua, both on its own behalf and in respect of wrongs inîlicted
upon ifs nationals; and the Court is requested further to receive evidence and
to determine. in a subsequent phase of the present proceedings, the quantum of
damages to be assessed as the compensation due to the Republic of Nicaragua.

K. Accordingly, this copy of the Memorial is certified as original and
presented on behalf of the Republic of Nicaragua.

Respectfully submitted,
Carlos ARGUELLG OOMEZ,
Agent of the Republic of Nicaragua

10 August 1987. LIST OF ANNEXES' TO THE MEMORIAL
OF NICARAGUA

Annex A. DLPLOMATC IORR~~SPONDEN BCTWEEN NICARAGU AND COSTA
RICA L'

Attachrnents
1. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 16April 1982
2. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 10 May 1982

3. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 21 May 1982
4. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 22 May 1982
5. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 7 June 1982
6. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 8 June 1982
7. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 8 June 1982
8. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 9 June 1982
9. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 14 June 1982
10. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 16 July 1982
II. Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica, 20 luly 1982
12. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 27 July 1982
13. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 27 July 1982
14. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 28 July 1982
15. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 2 August 1982

16. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 4 August 1982
17. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 19August 1982
18. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 2 Decernber 1982
19. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. 2 Decernber 1982
20. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 14 Decernber 1982
21. Diulornatic Note of Costa Rica. 14 Decernber 1982
22. ~iblornatic Note of ~icaragua,~ January 1983
23. Diplornatic Note ofosta Rica, 10 January 1983
24. Diolornatic Note of Costn Rica. 8 March 1983
25.~Glornatic Note of Costa ~ica; 30 March 1983
26. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 12 April 1983

27. Diolornatic Note of Nicaraeua. 15 Anril 1983
28.~&lornatic Note of ~icaragua; 16~pril 1983
29. Diulornatic Note of Costa Rica. 18il 1983
30.~hlornatic Note of Costa ~ica; 19~$1 1983
31. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 19April 1983
32. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 22 April 1983
33. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. 22 April 1983
34. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 25 April 1983
35. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 25 April 1983
36. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 27 April 1983
37. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 2 May 1983
38. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 3 May 1983
39. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 4 May 1983114 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

40. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 4 May 1983
41. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 9 May 1983
42. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 10May 1983
43. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 10 May 1983

44. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 10 May 1983
45. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, II May 1983
46. Diolornatic Note of Costa Rica. II Mav 1983
47. ~iblornatic Note of Nicaragua.12 ~a; 1983
48. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 25 May 1983

49. Diplornaiic Nore of Cosia Kica. 25 May 1983
50. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. 26 June 1983
SI. Diplornatic Noie of Costa Rica. 8 June 1983
52. Viploniaiic Noie of Costa Kica. 9 June 1983
53. Viplornatic Noie oi Nicaragua. 3 Julv 1983

54. Diplornatic Noie of Cosia Rica, 4 July 1983
55. Diplornaiic Notr of Nicaragua, 4 July 1983
56. Diplornatic Note of Co<ra Rica. 5 July 1983
57. Diplornatic Nore of Costa Rica. 8 July 1983

58. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, IISepternber 1983
59. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 9 Sepiember 1983
60. Diplornatic Notc of Costa Rica, 17 Sepiernber 1983
61. Diplornaiic Noie of Nicaragua. 19 Sepiernbcr 1983
62. Diplornaiic Note of Costa Rica, 22 Scptcmbcr 1983

63. Diplornaiic Nore of Nicaragua. 23 Sepiernber 1983
64. Diplornatic Notc of Costa Rica. 26 Sepiernber 1983
65. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 27 Sepiernber 1983
66. Diplornatic Noie of Costa Rica. 27 Sepiernbcr 1983
67. Diplornatic Noie of Nicaragua. 28 Sepiernber 1983

68. Diplornatk Note of Nicaragua. 28 Scptcrnber 1983
69. Diplornatic Notc of Coçta Rica. 28 September 1983
70. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. 30 Septembcr 1983
71. Diplumatic Nute of Costa Rica. 2 Ociober 1983
72. Di~lornatic Note of Costa Kica. 3 October 1983

73. ~iilornatic Note of Costa ~ica; 3 October 1983
74. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 4 October 1983
75. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 6 October 1983
76. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 7 October 1983
77. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. II October 1983

78. Diplornatic Note of Costa Kica. II October 1983
79. Diplornatic Noie of Cosia Rica. I I Octobcr 1983
80. Diplornaiic Note of Nicaragua. 21 Ociober 1983
81. Diplornatic Notc of Costa Kica. 26 Octobcr 1983

82. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. h Novernber 1983
83. Diplornaiic Note of Cosia Rica. 6 Novernber 1983
84. Diplornatic Noie of Nicaragua. 8 Novernber 1983
85. Diplornatic Notc of Nicaragua. 18 Novernber 1983
86. Diplornaiic Noie of Costa Rira. 19 Novernber 1983

87. Diplornatic Notc of Nicaragua, 22 Novembcr 1983
88. Diplornaiic Noie of Nicaragua, 5 Dccernber 1983
89. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. 6 Decernbcr 1983
90. Diplornatic Wote of Nicaragua. 7 Dscernbcr 1983
91. Diplornatic Note 01'Nicaragua. 13 Decernber 1983

92. Diplornatic Notc of Costa Rica. 13 January 1984 LISTOF ANNEXES T0 MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 115

93. Divlornatic Note of Costa Rica. 13 Januarv 1984
94. ~iplornaiic Noie oi Nicaragua. 23 .lanuar; 1984
95. Diplornaiic Note of Nicaragiia, 24 January 1384
96. Diplornaiis Noir of Cobili Rica. 31 January 1984
97. Diplornîiic Note of h'iidragua. 28 tcbruary 1984
98. Diplornîiic Note of Co\ta Kisa. 28 February 1984
99. Diplornaiic Noie of Nicaragua, 28 Slarch 1984
100. Diplornîirc Note of Nicîrîgua, 10 April 1984
101. Diplornaiic Noie of h'ir~ragua. IO.April 1984

102. Diolornaiic Note of h'isîrarua. II Anril 1984
103. ~hlornatic Note of Costa Rici, 13 ~pril 1984
104. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 16 April 1984
105. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 16 April 1984
106. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 18 April 1984
107. Di~lornatic Note of Costa Rica. 23 A~ril 1984
108. Di~lornatic 'lote oi Niairagus. 2J riPril 1981
109. L>iplornaiisNoie of Niciiragua. 28 April 1984
110. Di~lomatic Noie of Nisararua. 30 Anril 1986
111. ~iplornatic Note of ~ic:tragua; 30 A& 1984

112. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 2 May 1984
113. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 3 May 1984
114. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 3 May 1984
115. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 5 May 1984
116. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 7 May 1984
117. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 8 May 1984
118. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 8 May 1984
119. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 8 May 1984
120. Diplornatic Note of Nicsiragua, 9 May 1984
121. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 9 May 1984
122. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 9 May 1984

123. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 28 May 1984
124. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 12 June 1984
125. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 12 June 1984
126. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 13 June 1984
127. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 13 June 1984
128. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 21 June 1984
129. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 5 July 1984
130. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 11 July 1984
131. Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica. 24 August 1984
132. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 7 Septernber 1984
133. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 13 Septernber 1984

134. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 13 Septernber 1984
135. Diplornatic Note of Cosla Rica, 14 Septernber 1984
136. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 14 Septernber 1984
137. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 17 Septernber 1984
138. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 21 Septernber 1984
139. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 25 September 1984
140. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 30 Septernber 1984
141. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, I October 1984
142. Diulornatic Note of Costa Rica. I October 1984
143 ~ipiornairc Note of ('o*ia Rica. 2 0:tober 1984

144. Diploniati: Norc <ifCo\ta Rica. 4 Ociober 1984
145. Dipli>rnaii; Noie of Nizaragua, 4 Osiobrr 19x4116 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

146. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 5 October 1984
147. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 11 October 1984
148. Di~iornatic Note of Nicaraaua. 15 October 1984

149 ~iplornattc Note of ~tcaragua. 18 October 1984
150 Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 18 October 1984
151. Diulornatic Note of Nicaranua, 20 October 1984
152. Diplornatic Note of ~icarapua, 22 October 1984
153. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. 26 Octobcr 1984
154. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rtca. 3 Decernber 1984
155. Diplornatic Notc of Nicaragua, 5 Dccernber 1984
156. Diplornatic Notc of Costa Rica. 17 Dccernbcr 1984
157. Dinlornatic Note of Costa Rica. 19 Decernber 1984
158. ~iplornatic Note of Costa ~ica; 21 Decernber 1984
159. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 26 Decernber 1984
160. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 27 Decernber 1984
161. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 27 Decernber 1984

162. Di~lornatic Note of Nicaraeua. 2 Januarv 1985
163. ~iplomatic Note of Costa ktca, 5 ~anuaky 1985
164. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 8 January 1985
165. Diplornatic Notc of Nicaragua, 9 January 1985
166. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 14 January 1985
167. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 14 January 1985
168. Diplornatic Note of Costa Risd. 17 January 1985
169. Diplornatic Notc of Costa Rica. 22 January 1985
170. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 31 January 1985
171. Diplornatic Note of Nirdragua. 7 February 1985
172. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rtca, 7 February 1985
173. Diplornatic Notc of Nicaragua. 9 February 1985
174. Di~lornatic Notc of Nicaraeua. 18 tebruarv 1985
175. ~hlornatic Note of ~icaragua; 18 ~ebruar; 1985
176. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 19February 1985

177. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 20 February 1985
178. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 20 February 1985
179. Diolornatic Note of Costa Rica. 20 Februarv 1985
180. ~i~lornatic Note of Nicaragua, 25 ~ebruar; 1985
181. Diplornatic Notc of Nicaragua, I March 1985
182. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 27 March 1985
183. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 12 April 1985
184. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 16 April 1985
185 Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 29 April 1985
186. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 30 April 1985
187. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 31 May 1985
188. Diplornatic Niire of Costa Rica, 3 lune 1985
189. Diplornaiic Note of Nicaragua. 7 June 1985
190. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 13 June 1985

191. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 19 June 1985
192. Diplornatic Notc of Costa Rica. 20 June 1985
193. Diplornatic Notc of Nicaragua, 21 June 1985
194. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 21 June 1985
195. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 21 June 1985
196. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 2 July 1985
197. Viplornstic Note of Nicaragua. 3 July 1985
198. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 4 July 1985 LISTOF ANNEXES TO MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA

199. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 8 July 1985
200. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 16 July 1985

201. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 19 July 1985
202. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 22 July 1985
203. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 26 July 1985
204. Di~lomatic Note of Nicaraaua. 31 Julv 1985
205. Di~lomatic Note of ~icaragua, 2 Augkt 1985
206. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 5 August 1985
207. Diolornatic Note of Nicaraeua. 13Aueusi 1985
208. D&lornatic Note of Costa iiica, 14~ugust 1985
209. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 16August 1985
210. Diolomatic Note of Nicaraeua. 22 Aueust 1985
211. ~iplornatic Noie of ~icaragua; 23 August 1985
212. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 26 August 1985

213. Diplornatic Note of Cosra Rica, 26 August 1985
214. Diplornatic Notc of Nicaragua. 29 Augusi 1985
215. Diplornatic Noie of Cosia Rica. 30 Augusi 1985
216. Diplornaiic Note of Nicaragua. 2 Septernber 1985
217. Diplornaiic Note of Nicaragua, 3 September 1985
218. Diplornatic Notc of Nicaragua. 6 Septernbcr 1985
219. Diplornatic Noie of Nicaragua. 9 Scpternber 1985
220. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 17Septernber 1985
221. Diploinatic Note of Nicaragua, 17 Sepiember 1985
222. Diploinatic Note of Nicaragua. 28 Septernber 1985
223. Diploinatic Note of Nicaragua. 3 October 1985
224. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 7 October 1985

225. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 7 October 1985
226. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 8 October 1985
227. Diolomatic Note of Costa Rica. 15October 1985
228. Diplornaiic Note of ~icara~ua,l9 October 1985
229. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 19October 1985
230. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 21 October 1985
231. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. 22 October 1985
232. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 24 October 1985
233. Diolornatic Note of Nicaraeua. I Novernber 1985
234. Diplornatic Note of Co,ta iica. 23 Novernber 1985
235. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 25 November 1985
236. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua. 29 No\ernber 1985

237. Diplornatic Noie of Nicaragua, 5 Decernber 1985
238. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. 13 December 1985
239. Diplomaiic Note of Nicaragua. Ib Drcernhcr 1985
240. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua, 15 January 1986
241. Diplomatic Noie of Nicaragua, 17 January 1986
242. Diplornaiic Note of Nicïragua. 20 January 1986
243. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 22 January IV86
244. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica. 23 January 1986
245. Diplornatic Note of Costa Rica, 23 January 1986
246. Diplornatic Notc of Costa Rica. 23 January 1986
247. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 26 January 1986
248. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 28 January 1986

249. Diplornatic Noie of Nicaragua. 31 January 1986
250. Diplornatic Note of Nicaragua. 1February 1986
251. Diplornatic Notc of Costa Rica. 17 February 1986II8 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

252. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 21 February 1986
253. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 27 February 1986
254. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua. 19 March 1986
255. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua. 19 April 1986
256. Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica, 23 April 1986
257. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 26 April 1986
258. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 26 April 1986-A

259. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 3 May 1986
260. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 31 May 1986
261. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua. 6 June 1986
262. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 23 June 1986
263. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 26 July 1986
264. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 6 August 1986
265. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 26 August 1986
266. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 3 September 1986
267. Diolomatic Note of Nicaraaua. 24 November 1986

268. ~iplomatic Note of ~icaragua; 27 November 1986
269. Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica. 18 February 1987
270. Di~lomatic Note of Nicaragua. 21 Februarv 1987
271. ~&lomatic Note of Costa Rica, 25 ~ebruaiy 1987
272. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 2 March 1987
273. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, Il March 1987
274. Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica, 16 March 1987
275. Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica. 14April 1987
276. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua. 3 June 1987
277. Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica, 22 June 1987

278. Diplomatic Note of Costa Rica, 24 June 1987
279. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 29 June 1987
280. Diplomatic Note of Nicaragua, 2 July 1987.

AnnexB. MATERIAL SF THE OAS ~NVEST~GAT~NO COMMITTEE THE MIXED
COMMISSIO AND COMMISS~O OFNSUPERVISIO NND PREVENTION

Attachment 1. Documents of Mixed Commission
Attachment 2. Documents of Commission of Sunervision and Prevention
Attachment 3. Annex Y to Report of the ~act-~iidin~ Committee Establishcd
by the OAS Permanent Council to Investigale the Complaint Filed by the
hlinister of Foreign Affain of Costa Rica.

Annex C. RECORD SF THE GOVERNMEN OTFNICARAGUA

Attachment 1. Chronology of Selected Acts of Aggression against Nicaragua
from Costa Rican Territory, 1982-1986
Attacbment 2. Chronology of Acts of Aggression against Nicaragua from
Costa Rican Territory, April-September 1983
Attachment 3. Chronology of Acts of Aggression against Nicaragua from
Costa Rican Territory, January-April 1984
Attachment 4. Records of Ministry of lnterior on Contra Bases, Command
Centers, and Support in Costa Rica
Attachment 5. TablesSummarizing Contra Activity on Costa Rican Territory

1. Conlra Camps in Costa Rica, 1984-1987
2. Conrra Airfields in Costa Rica, 1984
3. Locations of Contra Forces on Costa Rican Territory, 1985-1986
Attachment 6. Ministry of Foreign Affairsterna1 Telex, 26 May 1983. LIST OF ANNEXES TO MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 119

Annex D. RECORD SF MINISTRY OF PUBLICSECURITY OF COSTARICA
Attachment 1. Letter from Lt. Col. Rodrigo Rivera Sahorio to Minister of
Public SecurityAngel Edmundo Solano Calderon, 3 August 1983
Attachment 2. Report from Capt. Antonio Castrillo Medina to Lt. Col. Rivera
Saborio, 6 August 1983
Attachment 3. Letter from LI. Col. Rivera Saborio to Vice-Minister Johnny

Cam~os. 5 Auaust 1983
~ttachment 4. ~ëport from Sub-Lieutenant Medrano to Lt. Col. Rivera
Saborio. 5 August 1983
Attachment 5. Memorandum from LI. Col. Carlos Monee Oue.ada to Minister
of Public Security Solano Calderon, 30 August1983-
Attachment 6. Memorandum [Il from Lt. Col. Mario Araya to Vice-Minister
Johnny Cam~os. 29 August 1983
~ttachmënt 7. ~emorandüm 121from Lt. Col. Mario Araya Io Vice-Minister
Johnny Campos, 29 August 1983
Attachment 8. Memorandum from Lt. Col. Carlos Monge Quesada to hlinister
of Public Security Solano Calderon, 24 February 1984.

Annex E. PUBL~CA~ON OSCONTRA ORGANIZATIOB NSSED IN COSTARICA
Attachment 1. "B.O.S. - Opposition Bloc of the South", San José 1985

Attachment 2. Paid Advertisements in Costa Rican Periodicals
1.La Nacidn, 20 lune 1982
2. La Rep~iblica,21 June 1982
3. La Nacion, 23 September 1982
4.La PrensoLibre, 25 Septemher 1982 .
5.La Nacion, 25 September 1982
6.La Nacion, 6 October 1982

7.La Nacion, I December 1982
8.La Nacion, 5 December 1982
9. La Nacidn. 13 December 1982
10.La Nacidn. 17 December 1982
II.La PrensaLibre, 17 December 1982
12.La Republica, 17 December 1982
13.La Nacidn, 19 December 1982
14.La Nacidn, 23 December 1982
15.La Nacidn, 24 December 1982
16.La PrensaLibre, 9 January 1984
17. La Republica, 13 June 1985

18. La Nacidn, 2 August 1985
19. La Republica, 26 July 1986
20. La Nacidn, 9 October 1986
21. La Republica, 3 lune 1986
22. La Nacidn, 28 Fehruary 1985
23. La Nacidn. 14October 1983
24. La PrensoLibre, 15 September 1983

Attachment 3. Liberacidn
1. "'Negro' Chamorro Declares: Unity Has Been Consolidated", 10
July 1986
2. "UN0 and BOS Sien Accord". 10 Julv 1986
3. "19 of July ~epudited", 25 ~"ly 1986
4. "War is the Fault of the Sandinistas", 25 Julv 1986120 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

5. "UNO-FDN Wage 32 Battles in 15 Days". 25July 1986
6. "UNO-FDN Graduates 1,200 New Combatants", 25 July 1986
7. "Third Meeting of UN0 Assembly". 25October 1986
8. "We Will Continue to Support Our Fighters", 25 October 1986
Attachment 4. Nicaragua Hoy

1. "Resistance Responds to the Decision of Congress", II May 1985
2. "Members of the Military: Don't Fight; Surrender or Join Us, says
Enrique Bermudez", II May 1985
3. "Chronology of Activities of the Nicaragua Resistance Regarding the
National Dialogue", II May 1985

4. "Opposition Unity 1sStrengthened". 14 June 1986
5. "Bermudez Emphasizes the Importance of UN0 before 1,000 New
Graduates of UNO-FDN", 14June 1986
6. "Ambassador Tambs Visits UN0 Offices", 14 June 1986
7. 29 November 1986, pp. 1-3
8. "Document of Democratic Agreement of the Nicaraguan Resistance",
24 January 1987.

Annex F. OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE UNITEDSTATES GOVERNMENT

Attachment 1. Dictionary of Internolional Relations Terms, Department of
State (3rd ed., 1987)
Attachment 2. Report of the President's Special Review Board (Tower Com-
mission Report), 26 February 1987
Attachment 3. Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation, Senate Select
Committee on Secret ~ilitar~ Assistance to lran and thë~icaraguan Opposi-
tion and House Select Committee to lnvestigate Covert Arms Transactions
with lran

1. Testimony of Lewis A. Tambs
2. Testimony of Joe Fernandez ("TomAs Castillo")
(a) Exhibit to Testimony of Joe Fernandel ("TomAs Castillo") (Exhi-
bit TC)

3. Testimony ofElliot Abrams
4. Testimony of Robert W. Owen
(a) Exhibits to Testimony of Robert W. Owen (Exhibit RWO)
5. Testimony of Vice Admiral John Poindexter

6. Exhibits Io Testimony of Oliver L. North (Exhibit OLN)
Attachment 4. "Preliminary lnquiry into the Sales of Arms to lran and Possi-
ble Diversion ofFunds to the Nicaraguan Resistance", a Report of the Senate
Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, 2 February 1987
Attachment 5. "'Private Assistance' and the Contras.: A Staff Report", Staff

of Senator John Kerry, 14October 1987
Attachment 6. Weekly Intelligence Summary, Defense Intelligence Agency,
16July 1982.

Annex C. RECORD SF COURTPROCEEDINCS
Attachment 1. Criminal Proceeding against Eugene Hasenfus, Popular Anti-
Somoza Tribunal of the First Instance, 16 October 1986 (Testimony of
Eugene Hasenfus)
Attachment 2. John Hullv.Anthony Avirgan and Marrha Honey, First Penal

Court of San José, Costa Rica, 3 October 1985(Record of Testimony and
Judgment of the Court) LISTOF ANNEXES TO MEMORIAL OF NICARAGUA 121

Attachment 3. Proceedings for rhe Extradition of Francisco Lopez Arce and
Camilo Martin Walter Hurtado, Criminal Court of Limon, Costa Rica, 7
October 1982; affirmed, Supreme Court of Costa Rica, 15 October 1982
(Judgment of the Court)
Attachment 4. Proceedings againsr Rafael Leon Blanddn for the Homicide of
Denis Javier Sandoval M., Trial Court of San Carlos, Costa Rica, 7 Decem-
ber 1984(Report of Fausto Rojas Cordero (Supervisor) and Carlos L. Cana-

bria Porras (Investigator) of the Judicial Investigation Agency of San Carlos;
Sworn Statement of Jorge Garcia Garcia; and Statement of Rafael Leon
Blandon).

Annex H. COSTARICANPRESSREPORTS

Attachments
1.La Prensa Libre, 12January 1982
2. La Republica, 12 January 1982

3. La Nacidn. 15 January 1982
4. La Prensa Libre, 15 February 1982
5. La Republico, 8 April 1982
6. La Nacidn, 8 April 1982
7. La Republica, 16 April 1982
8. La Prensa Libre, 16April 1982
9. La Nacidn. 17April 1982
10. La Prensa Libre, 17April 1982
I1. La Prensa Libre, 13 May 1982

12. La Nacidn. 14 May 1982
13. La Prensa Libre, 14 May 1982
14. La Nacidn, 15May 1982
15. La Republico, 23 May 1982
16. La Nacion, 1 June 1982
17. La Nacidn, 18 June 1982
18. La Republica, 25 July 1982
19. La Nacion, 25 July 1982
20. La Republica, 9 September 1982

21. La Nacidn, 19 Septemher 1982
22. La Repdblica, 7 October 1982
23. La Prensa Libre, 3 November 1982
24. La Prensa Libre, 3 November 1982
25. La Republica, 4 November 1982
26. La Prensa Libre, 4 November 1982
27. La Prensa Libre, 5 November 1982
28. La Republica, 5 November 1982
29. La Nacidn, 10 February 1983

30. La Republica, 5 April 1983
31. La Republica. 9 September 1983
32. La Prensa Libre, 13 Septemher 1983
33. La Repdblica, 15 September 1983
34. La Nacidn, 24 September 1983
35. La Prensa Libre, 4 October 1983
36. La Repdblica. 5 October 1983
37. La Nacidn, 31 Ianuary 1984
38. La Repdblica, 31 January 1984

39. La Nacidn, 2 February 1984122 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

40. La Prensa Libre. 3 March 1984
41. La Prensa Libre, 7 April 1984
42. La Rep~iblica,8 April 1984
43. La Nacion, 9 April 1984
44. La Republica, IL April 1984
45. La Prensa Libre, 13 April 1984
46. La Nacion, 16 April 1984
47. La Prensa Libre, 18 April 1984
48. La Nacidn, 8 May 1984
49. La Prensa Libre, 17 May 1984
50. El Debate, 30 May 1984
51. La Nacidn, 31 May 1984

52. La Nacion, 31 May 1984
53. La Prensu Libre, 31 May 1984
54. La Republica, I June 1984
55. La Nacion, 1 June 1984
56. El Debate, 1June 1984
57. La Nacion, 9 September 1984
58. La Republica, 8 May 1985
59. La Republica, 1 July 1985
60. La Prensa Libre, 13 May 1986
61. La Nacion, 15 May 1986
62. La Nacion, 4 June 1986
63. La Republica, 23 November 1986

64. La Republica, 16 December 1982
65. La Nacion, 3 November 1984.

Annex I. UNITEDSTATES AND OTHERFOREIGN PRESSREPORTS
Attachments

1. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 5 January 1982
2. The Tico Times, 4 June 1982
3. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 9 November 1982
4. The Christian Science Monitor, 25 May 1983
5. The Philadelphia Inquirer, 26 August 1983
6. The New York Times. 9 September 1983

7. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 7 November 1983
8.Newsweek, 28 May 1984
9. The New York Times. 1 June 1984
10. The Washington Posr, I June 1984
II. The Washingron Posr, II September 1984
12. The New York Times, 12 Se~tember 1984
The Nation, 3 November 1984
Life, February 1985
The Associated Press, 16 April 1985
The Washington Times, 19 June 1985
The Washington Times, 3 July 1985
The New York Times, 8 July 1985

NBC Morning News (Transcript), 17 July 1985
NBC Nightly News (Transcript), 25 July 1985
The New York Times. 25 July 1985
The Tico Times, 26 July 1985
The Tico Times, 26 July 1985 LISTOF ANNEXES 10 MEMORlAL OF NICARAGUA 123

24. The New York Times, 8 August 1985
25. The Philadelphia Inquirer, 15August 1985
26. The Tico Times, 16 August 1985
27. The Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 August 1985
28. The Tico Times, 30 August 1985
29. The Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 September 1985
30.Common Cause, September/October 1985
31. The Tico Times, 26 Marcb 1986
32. The Tico Times. 25 April 1986
33. The Bosron Sunday Glohe, II May 1986

34. The Los Angeles Times, 17 May 1986
35. The New York Times, 30 May 1986
36. The Associated Press,4 June 1986
37. The Tico Times, 6 June 1986
38. The Tico Times. 6 June 1986
39. The Miami ~erhld. 17 lune 1986
40. West 57th Street (Transcript), CBS Television Network, 25 June 1986
41. The Tico Times. 27 June 1986
42. The Miami ~erild, 29 June 1986
43. The Boslon Sunday Globe, 20 July 1986
44. The Washington Times, 18 August 1986

45. The New York Times, 25 September 1986
46. The Tico Times. 26 September 1986
47. The Miami Herald, 27 September 1986
48. The Dallas Morning News, 29 September 1986
49. The New York Times. 29 September 1986
50. The Miami Herald, 8 October 1986
51. The Washington Posr, 17 October 1986
52. The New York Times, 24 October 1986
53. The Dallas Morning News, 24 November 1986
54. The Miami Herald, 7 December 1986

55. The New York Times, 26 December 1986
56. The Tico Times. 16 January 1987
57. The Sun (Baltimore), 18 January 1987
58. The Times (London), 7 February 1987
59. The Boston Sunday Glotve,22 February 1987
60. The Miami Herald, 22 February 1987
61. The Miami Herald, 1 March 1987
62. Foreign BroadcastInformation Service, 13 March 1987
63. The New York Times, 3 May 1987
64. Newsday. 17 May 1987

65. The Wall Street Journal, 21 May 1987
66. Reuters, 14 July 1987
67. The Boston Globe, 15 July 1987
68. The Washingron Post, 23 July 1987.

Annex J.DOCUMENT OSF UNIDADNIC~GUENSE OPOSITORA/UNITEN DICA-

RAGUAN OPPOSITION (UNO): MINUTES OF MEETINGS AND BUDGETARY

Attachment 1. Budgetary Documents of UNO/Costa Rica

Attachment 2. Letter from Evenor Valdivia, UN0 Co-ordinator, to Sr. Carlos
Abarca, 25 February 1986124 BORDER AND TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

Attachment 3. Minutes of Meetine of UN0 Directors. 10and 11Julv 1985
~iiachment 4. Minutes of ~eeiing of UN0 ~irector~; 28 August 1905

Aitachmeni 5. Minutes of Meeting of UN0 Directors. 14-16Ociober 1985
Aitachment 6. Minutes of Meeting of UN0 Direciors. 27 December 1985.

Annex K. REPORTOF WITNES SORPEACE ON"THEPEACE FLOTILLON THERIO
SANJUAN",AUGUST 1985.