Written Statements

,COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
-

MVIÉMOIREP,LAIDOIRIES ET DOCUMENTS

RÉPARATION DES DOMMAGES
SUBIS AU SERVICE

DES NATIONS UNIES

AVICONSULTATDU II AVRI1949. 'L'ABLEDES MATIÈRES - CONTENTS.

PIZEMIERE PARTIE. - REQUETE

POUR AVIS CONSUCrATIF ET PIECES
nE LA PROCEDURE ÉCIZITE

PART 1.-REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION

AND DOCUMENSS OF THE WRITTEN PIZOCEEDIWGS.

SECTION A. - REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF

SECTION A.-REQUEST FOR ADVISORIJ OPINlON.
Pa es
1. - Lettre du SecrCtaire généraldes Nations Unies nu Pié-
sident (4XII 48). - Letter from the Secretary-General
of the United Natiorîs to the President (4 xrI 48) . . 8
II. - Résolution adoptéepar 13Assemblkegénéraledes Nations
Unies le 3 décembre1948. - Fiesolution adopted by the .
General Assernblyof the United Nations on December 3rd,
1948. .................. 9

SECTION B. - DQCLIMEN'CÇ TRANSTI'IIS AVEC LA REQUÊTE

SECTION B.-DOCUMENTS TRANSMITTED WITH THE REQUES'I'.

Bordereau des documents soumis à la Cour.- List of ctoçumentç
submitted to the Court ............... TO

SECTION C-WLXI"'KJ'F,N STATE511ENTS.

1. - Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government
of India to the Registrar.(28 xrr48) ....... 12
II. - Letter frorn the Chinese Ambassador to the Registrar
(26 1 49) ................. 13

ILI.- Observations écritesdu Gouvernement français (12 II49) 14
IV. - Letter from the Secretary of State of theUnited States
of Arnerica to the Registrar (14 II 49) ...... I9

V. - Written statement presented by the Gavernment of the
United Kingdorn vnder Article 66 of tlieStatute of the
Court and the Order of the Court datcd 71th December,
rg4S(14 II493 ............... 23
IL 1)EUXIGME PARTIE. - SÉANCES PURT,IQUES
ET PLAIDOIRIES

PART 17.-I'UBLIC SITTINGS AND PLEADINGS.

7 III4g [m.). . . . . 45 91114g(m.) . . . . 48
M )) II (a.-m.) . . . . 47 1) I) I) a.-m.) . . . 48
8 )) 1) (m.). , . . . 48 II Lv )) {m.) . . . . 49
II M M (a.-m.) . . . . 48

ANNEXES AUX YROC~~S-\~ERBALFX
-4NNE'IES TO TI-IE 3tINUTBÇ.
i"~,ige%
r. - Esyosé du Dr Ivan ICerno (Nations Unics)
Séancc du y TII qg (m.) . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Sitting of 7 III 49 (aft.) . . .. ' . . . . . . . 63
2. - Statement by Mr. FeLEer(Unitcd Natioiis) :
Sitting of 7 III 49 (aft.) . . . . . . . . . . . 70
,, ,, 8 ,, ,, (m.) . . . . , . . . . . . So
3. - Exposé de M. Kaeckenbeeck (Belgique), 8 Irr49 (a.-m.) 94
4. - Exposé de M. Chaumont (France), 8 III qg (a.-m.) . . 102
5. - Staternent by nlr. Fitzrnaurice (United Eli~igdnm) :
Sitting of g 111 49 (m.) , . . . . . . . . . . IIO
,, , , , , a. . . . . . . . . . . . 122

TROISI&ME PARTIE. - CORKEÇPO-JJ2ANC.L
PART III.-COKRESPONDENi3E.

r. The Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President
(4 XII 48). [Ses 9. 8.1
z. Le Greffier au Secrétairegénéral clesNations Uriies (10 xrI48)
3." D n ministre ,des Relations extérieures du Vene-
zuela (IO xrr 48) . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .

4. (TI xrrff49) a. . .istre. .es.Aff.ir.sé.ran.èr.sd.lJA.g1. .iist.n . .

5. The Registrar to the Secretary-Gcneral of the United Nations
(13 xrr 48) (telegr.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Le Greffier au ministre des Affaires étrangeres cleI'ALghanistaii
(14 XII:48) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Thc Assistant Secretary-General in charge cif the Legal
Ilepartrnent of the United Nations to the Registr'ar (16 XII 48)
8. Le ministre des Affaires 6trangères du Grand-Duchi: de
Luxembourg au Greffier (21 XII 48) . . . . . . . . .
g. Le chef des Sections internationales du rninistCredes Affaires
étrangéresde 1'Afghanistan au Greffier (3 1 49) (télégr.) . .
ro. Le ministre des Affaires étrangèresdes Pays-Bas au Greffier
(3 14g). . . . .. . - . . - . . . . . . - . COWTENTS r5.5
Pages
II. The Deputy Secretary to the Go~rertirneiltof Iiidia to the
Registrür (28 xrr 48). [Sm 9. 12.1
12. Le ministrc des Relatiorîs extérieures de la RApubEique
d'l?quateur au Greffier (23 XII 48) ......... 136
rg. La Secrétaireried'ktat des Relations extkrieures dela Répu-
blique d'Haiti au Greffier (zo XII 48) ........
136
'4. The Sccaetary-General of the United Nations to the President
(ro I 49) .................. 136
rg. The Ministry for Foreign Affairsof Iceland to the Registrar
(14 1 49) .................. =37
16. Le premicr ministre, ministre des Affaires Etrangkres de
Belgique, au Greffier(24 r 49) ..........- 137
17. The Chineçe Arnbassador ta the Registrar(26 r49).[SM fi.13.1

18. The Acting Minister of External Affairs of New Zealand to
the Registrar (14 149) .............. 138
19. The Registrar to the Assistant Secretary-General in charge
of the Legal Department of the United Nations (2s r 4g) 138
20. 'l'lie Secretarof Çtate of the United States of America to
the Registrar (14II 49). [Se# $p. 19-22.1
zr. The Ambassador of the United Kingdom, The Hague, to
the Registrar (14 II 49} ............. 139
22. Le ministre des Affairesétrangbrcsde la République française
au Greffier(rz II 49) .............. 139

23. Le Greffierau secrétaire d'État des Relations extérieures de
la République d'Hai't3 (sans date)(télégr.)....... 140
24. Le Greffier au ministrdes Affaires étrangheç del'r-lfghanistan
(s7 11 49) .................. 140
25. The Registrar to the Arnbassador of China, Thc Hague
(17 1149) .................. 140
26. The Registrar to the Representative of thc Secretary-General
of the United Nations (17 II qg) ........... 141
27. Le ministre CSRelations extérieures du Venezuela au Greffier
(12 1149) .................. 141

28. Le ministre de Danemark h La Haye au Greffier (24 II49) 142
29. 1) ii des Affairesétrangercs de la République française
au Greffier (23 rr 49).............. 142
30. The Arnbassador of the United Kingdom at The Hague to
the Kegistrar (26 Ir 49) ... ......... 142
31. L'ambassadeur de Belgique h La Raye au Greffier (28 Er49) 143
32. The Registrar to the Representative of the Çecsetary-Generd
of the United Nations (zIII49) ...........
143
33. Le représentant du Gouvernement de la Rkpublique franqaise
au Greffier (r III49) .............. 144
34. Le seprkentant du Secrktaire génQal des Nations Unies au
. Président (extrait) (25 II 49) ........... 144
35. The Repreçsentative of the Government of the United King-
dom to the Regisfrar (3 Irr49) .......... 144156 TABLE DES MATIERES
Pages
36. Tlze Registrar to the Representative of tlie Seci-etary-GeneraZ
of the United Nations (7 11149) .......... 145
37. 'l'hc Permanent Sccretary of Forcign AClairs of Ijurrna to
tlie Registrar (I III49) ............. rqCi
38. l'hc Kegistrar to the Permanent Sccretary of ITorcigil Affnirs
of Burrna (12 rrr49) ..............
346
39. The Registrar to the Representative of the Secrctay-Gcnerd
of tlie Uniteci Nations (15 11149) ........... 147
40. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela to the Registrar
(15 II7 49) .................. 147
41. Lc rninistEre des Affaires etrangères d~i Luxcrnbourg au
Greffier (29 III49) ............... 147
42. Tlic Kegistrar to thc Secretary-General of tlie Uriitcd Nations .
(4 IV 49) (telegr................. 14s'

43. Le Grcffier a~r.représentant de la Belgiqiie (6 rv 49) . 148
G. The Mir-iistryofForeign Affairsof Guatemala to lie Registrar
{ZI III 49) .................. 14s
4j. 'I'heRegistrar to the Secrctary-Gencral of the United Nations
(II IV 49) (telegr,)............... 148
46. Le Greffier au Secrétairegénéral des Nations Unies (IIzv 49) r4g
47. Le rninistèrc des Affaires etrangeres du Brésil au Greffier
(17 1149) ..................
149
48. The Foreign Officeof Burrna to the Kegistrar (5 v 49) , . 150
Anmex to No. 48 :Statement of the Goverilment of the
Union of Burrna (22 Ir 49) .......... 150
49. Tlie Registrar to the Foreign Office olBurma (2~ v 49) . . IjI SECTION C. - EXPOSES ÉCRITS
SECTION C.- WRITTEN STATEMENTS.

1.-LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO. THE REGIÇTRAR
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

New Delhi 3.
Dated the 28th December 1948.
NO. D. 6693-UN. 11/48.

Sir,
With refercnce tyour telegram No. 6677 dated the 11th Decem-
ber 1948, notifyingthe dates fixed for ~ubmission of written and
oral staternents by the States entitled appear before the Court
on the question of reparation fordamage suffered in theservice
of theUnitcd Nations, 1have the honour to givebelow a statement
of the views of the Government of India :

"If itis establiçlied that United Nations, as an Organization,
is competcnt legally to bsing an internationaI clairn against the
responsible S-tate for reparatiof damage caused tothe victirn,
tlzeGovernment of India conçidcrthat theonly way todeal satiç-
factorilwith the rights of the State of which the viisa national
and of the United Nations of which he was agent is to niake the
State as well as the United Nations parties to the proceedings in
order that the rightçboth may bc worked out in the same praceed-
irigs."
Governrnent of India would, however, recluest that they be
allowed to reserve their rightobe heard on the specified date.

1 have the honour to be, etc.
(Signed) LEILAMAN NIAIDU,
Officeron Special Duty,
for Depiity Secretary to the Government of India.13 OBSERVATIONS SOUMISES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS

II.-LETTER FROM THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR
TU THE REGISTIIAR OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE,

hé Hague, 26th January, 1949.
No. 38J8~04g/zoA,
Sir,
1 beg to refer to your Ietter OS December ~oth, 1948, ref.
HHWlEAA 6667, endosing a copy of a Ietter (togetherwith an
Annex), certified as a true copy and dated Deçernber 4tk, 1948,

in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted
to the Court a Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on
December 3rd, 1948 ,equesting an Adviçov Opinion on the ques-
tion of reparation fer damage suffered in the service of the United
Nations, and also to your letter of Decernber r~th, 1948, ref.
GÇIHWIMES 6677, stating that the Court has decided; pursuant
to paragraph z of Article66 of its Statute, to notifyal1 States
entitled to appear before it that it wjll be prepared to receive
written statements up to Monday, the 14th February, 1949, and
that itwilIhold public sittingç on and afteMonday, the 7thMarch,
1949, for the purpose of hearing oral statements.
Now, in conformity with the above-mentioned communications,
1 am instzucted by the Chinese Governrnent to transmit to you
the folIowingçtatementin respect ofthe two legal questions on~Yhich
an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice bas been
requested by the Resolution of thc General Assernbly ofthe United
Nations of December 3rd, 1948 :-
"(A). Qasstion I.
The United Nations, as a legal entity, should in ncase be inca-
pacitated from engaging itself in any juristic act ~vhich is not
inconsistent witli the principles and express provisions of the
Charter: of the United Nations. It naturally fcillowthat, in the
event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of his

duties sufferinginjuryin circumstances involving the responsibility
of a State, the United Nations should have the capacity to bring
an international daim against the responsiblc de jar& or de facto
govemment with aYiewto obtaining thereparation due in respect
of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the yictim
or to persons entitled through him.
(B). Quas!.iu?II.
However, suc11 capacity of the United Nations should not
prcclude the State ofbvhich thevictim is a national£rom exercising
such rigllts as it may possesç, eçpecially ivhen that State is not a
Member of the Unitcd Nations. In order to seconcilethe position
of the United Nations tvith that of sucli a,State, some special OBSERVATIONS SUBMITTED BY GOVERNMENTS I4

arrangements will have to bemade between them. niese arrange-
ments may in respect of States Members of the United Nations
taise the form of a convention along the lines of the Convention
on the Privileges and Imrnunities of the United Nations."
1 shall be obIiged if you will lay the abovestatement of my
Governmerit before the Internatioi~ai Court of Justice.
1 avail myself of thiç occasion to assure you of rny high con-
sicleration.
(Szg.izcdHENRYKUNGHUC XHANG,
Ckinesc Ambassadot.

IIT. - OBSERTrATIONS CRIT TES
DU GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIÇ
SUR L'AVIS CONSULTATIFDEMANDI? A LA COUR

INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1. - De l'avis du Gouvernement français, la demande d'avis
à la Cour présente, dans sonprincipe, deux gçpectç fondamentaux.
Un premier aspect concerne lcfond du droit et un deuxième aspect
concerne la procédure, la solution sur le fond du droit devant
aider à la solution sur la procédure.
II.- Sur le fond du droit, la jurisprudence de la Cous per-

maliente de Justice internationale a reconnu qu'un don~rnage
subi par un individu peut engager la responçabilitt internationale
d'un État lorsque ce dernier a manqué, &son égard, aux obligations
qu'impose le droit international.
Normalement, l'obligation de réparer existe au profit de l'État
national de la victime. C'est pour ce dernier, suivant les termes
employés par la Cour dans l'affaire des concessions Mavromrnatis
en Palestine, un I(droit propre, le droit qu'il a de faire respecter
dans la personne de ses ressortissants le droit international i).
Vis-Q-vis de certaines personnes, le droit international peut
prescrire aux Etats des obligations particulikres: il est certain,
par exemple, que s'agissant d'agents diploinatiqycs, le devoir
d'assurer leur sécuriten cas de troubiesest, pour 1'Etat de sejour,
plus strict que side simples particulierssont en cause.
11paraît raisonnable de penser que le droit internationalimpose
aux Etats une obligation particullérede protection dans le cas
d'agents charges d'une mission par les Nations Unies. Et, à vrai
dire, la question posée par l'Assemblée i la Cour implique ça
conviction qu'ilen est bien ainsi.
Cette obligation particditire ne peut existerA 1"égard de I'Etat
national de l'agent, puisque le principe m&me de la fonction
internationale implique l'independance de l'agent par rapport à
2I5 OBSERVATIONS SOUMISES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS

cet Gtat. La Charte, dans sonarticle 100, précise que Ics fonc-
tionnaires de l'Organisation ((ne sont responsables qu'envers
elle n,que chaque a Membre de l'Organisation s'engage A respecter
le caract&re exclusivement international des fonctions ir des
agents interriationaux.
Donc, l'État national qui reste étranger à la mission confiée
par les Nations Unies à son ressortissant n'a pas de titre pour
faire respecter dans 1s personne de celui-ci les obligations naissant
pour un Etat tiers de la présence et de l'activité d'un titulaire
d'une fonction internationale.
Sans doute lui serait-il loisible d'exercer ça protection diploma-
tique, comme pour tout autre de ses nationaux, afin dedemander
le bénéficed'une attention spécialede l'État dont Iaresponsabilité
est en cause, mais sans pouvoir exciper de la mission remplie
qui lui est extérieure.
Par contre, l'organisation des Nations Unies qui a défini le
but et les conditions de la mission de l'agent, parait en situation
de consid6rer qu'elle a droit, de la part des États Membres, des
États non membres par application de I'article2, paragraphe 6,
de la Charte, et mêmedes groupes organisés qui ont sollicité ou
accepté son action, à un certain traitement pour cet agent.
En prenant fait et'cause pour lui, elle ne le défend pas per-
sonnellement, elle fait respecter le service public international
que les Etats signataires de la Charte ont donné mission à ses
organes de constituer.

Son intervention est tout 3.fait comparable à celle d'unÉtat
intervenant pour protégcr un de ses consuls qui ne serait pas de
sa nationalité.
III. - Si la Cour, sur Ie fond du droit, reconnajt que des obli-
gations spéciales existent pour permettre aux agents des Nations

Unies d'exercer pleinement leurs fonctions, la responsabilité qui
en résulte pour les Etats ilît6ressés peut-elle étre mise en jen par
l'organisation elle-meme 7 Telle est la question fondamentale qui
se pose sur le:plan de la procedure.
Dans une large mesure, la réponse à cette seconde question
dépcnd de lasolution donnée à la premiére, car il est légitimeque
l'orgzanisation des Nations Unies, si elIeposç&cle un droit à répa-
ration, puiçsc disposer des moyens juridiques propres àfaire valoir
ce droit.
Les moyens habituellement reconnus aux fitats sont la négo-
ciation diplomatique et le recours aux procé(lures d'entente ou
aux procédures juridictiunnelles.
Le texte de l'article 34; paragraphe I, du Statut de la Cour
internationale de Justice empêclie a firiori toute organisation
intanationale de se présenter au contentieux devant la Cour,
rgservant cette faculté aux États. Mais c'est1Aun moyen dont
les ztats eux-mêmes ne peuvent pas toujours user. Subsisterit en OBSERVATIONS SWBBIITTED BY GOPERNRIENSS 16
tout cas la négociation diplomatique, les procédures d'entente,
voire l'arbitrage, sans exclure la demande d'avis A la Cour qui
dans un cas donné peut mettre à la disposition de l'Organisation
une opinion autorisée sur la question de droit.

IV. - Il existe sans doute des exemples d'une organisation
internationale agissant spontanément pour assurer le respect du
droit dans la personne de ceux qui, placés sous ses ordres,exécu-
taient une mission d'intérêtcollectif.
Ces affaires concernent en réalité deux situations différentes :
ou bien l'Organisation internationale a la responsabilité du
maintien de l'ordre li où ses agents subissent un dommage,
ou bien c'estune autre autorit4 qui poçç&deen droit ou en fait
la compétence territoriale.
Dans le dernier cas seulement se pose le probléme de Ia procé-
dure A employer pour obtenir réparation de l'autorité locale.
Tandis que dans l'une etl'autre hypothèses se présente la question
de la protection spéciale due A l'agent international.
Le Gouvernement fran~ais se permet d'attirer l'a-ttention de
la Cour sur certains de ces precédents.

V. - L'article 88 du Traité de Versailles avait prévu qu'un
plébiscite déciderait du sort de la Haute-Silésie pur son ratta-
chement eventuel Cbl'Allemagne ou à la Pologne, et que, A cet
effet,la zone du plébiscite serait placée sous l'autorité d'une
Commission internationale qui u jouirait de tous les pouvoirs
exercés par le Gouvernement allemand ou le Gouvernement
prussien 11,
Pendant l'occupation alliée de cette zone, divers troubles se
produisirent et, novamment, un officier français, le commandant
Montalègre, en service commandé pour le maintien de l'ordre,
fut tué au cours d'une émeute.
Une indemnité fut attribuée par la Commission et pxelevée
sur les foncis pour dbpenses de fonctionnement et d'administration
qui avaient étémises à la charge du territoire du plébiscite, par
le paragraphe 6 de l'anncxe à l'article88 du Traite de Versailles.
Cette affaire ne met pas en jeu la responsabilité d'un gouverne-
ment vis-&vis d'une organisation internationale, puisque c'est
précisément cette organisation qui remplit provisoirement les
t%ches gouvernementales et A laquelleincombe en conséquence la
responsabilit&.
Mais, du moins, étant donne qu'une responsabilité de ce genre
se fonde sur les pouvoirs de police détenus par la Commission
- telle étaitlath& à laquelle se rangeait lministre des Affaires
étrangèresfrançais dans une lettre du 25 juilletrg21 au président
de la Commission -, la solution intervenue danscette affaire
appuyait la conviction du Gouvernement franqais, conviction
partagée pas la Commission, que des obligations spécinlesexistent
pour l'autorité qui exerce la compétence territoriale, à l'égard OBSERVATIONS SOUXISES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS
r7
d'agents d'une organisation internationale dans l'exercicede Ievrs
fonctions.

VI. - L'article 352 du Traité de Versailles disposait que
ccl'Allemagne 1 sera .tenue,vis-à-vis de la Commission européenne
du Danube, à toutes restitutions, réparations et indemnités pour
les dommages subis pendant la guerre par cette Commission M.
Après discussion, l'application de cet article fut prescrite par
la Conférence des hbaçsndeurs et la Commission du Danube
entra en n&gociatioiisdirectes avec lesÉtats intereçsés,l'Allenzagne,

l'Autriche et la Hongrie. Ces nkgociations aboutirent aux Accords
des 16 mai et 14 octobre 1924.
Les réclamations de la Commissionont porté noil seulement sur
les dommages matkrielç qu'elle avait dle-méme subis, mais, malgr6
les psotcstations des plénipotentiaires des Puissances ennemies,
attachés à une interprétation restrictive de l'article 352 du Traité
de VcrsaiZles,sur les dommages causés à son personnel,
La Commission obtint une indemnité forfaitaire assortie d'urze
majoration, la somme verséereps6sentan-t l'ensemble des dommages
réclamés par la Commission quelle qii'en fûtl'origine. L'on setrouve
donc ici en présence de l'application par analogie du principe de
droit positif traditionnel,d'apréslequel l'autorite rdclamante fait
valoir un ds0i.t propre, qui se rapporte non seulcmci~t aux dom-
inages qu'elle a directernci~t subis, mais aussi à ceux qui l'oiit

indirecteincnt atteinte en Iripersonne de ses ressortiss;intç.
VIX. - Le 27 aoùt 1923, plusieurs membres italiens de Sa

Cornrnissio~i de délimitation des frontikres entre l'Albanie ct la
Grgce, parmi lcsc~uels,le general Tellinï,furcnt assassines sur le
territoire hclléaiquc.Etant donne que cette Commission avait bté
envoÿEe en Épire par la Conférence des Ambassadeurs, les victimes
pouvaient 2ti-econçidi.rées comme des agents de la Coi-iférenccen
mission.
Le Gouvernement italien exigea des réparations, ln punition dcs
coup:ibIcs, la présentation d'excuses et le salut jrson pavillon. 11
se lima en outre à un acte de force sous la forme d'une occupation
militaire de Corfou, le septembre 1923.
De son chté, la Confércnçe des Ambassadeurs entreprit des
négociations avec le Gouvernement grec pour la réparatioii des
dommages subis.
33anssa lcttre au Gouvernement grec du 7 septembre, la ConfS-
rente soulignait que u les pcrsoi~nes qui ont (Stévictinicç [de
I'attentat] étaient chargées [par elle] d'me mission officielle,

d'accord avec le Gouvernement helléniquequi avait à en assurer
la s&çuri.téii.Elle demandait en conséquence et notamment au
Goriverriement grec : dcs cxcuçes :d l'adresse des rcprésentantç de
1 Des dispasitionana1ogiics existaient daLesTraités de Saint-Germin
(art3071,de Ueurlly (acjj)dc Trianon(art2g1),deSèvres (ar235,a1iii.2). la Commission de delimitation, le salut de la flotte helléniqueaux
pavillons des Puissances ali2es et la réparation des dommages
subis par les oficiers italiens.
Dans sa réponsedu IO septembre, le Gouvernement grec, aprés
avoir constate que les victimes u faisaient partie d'une mission
officiellerelevant de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs e, (Is'em-

pressa de déclarer qu'il admettait intépalement les chefs de
demande 1)énonces par la Conférence.
Simultanément, le Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations avait été
saisi par le Gouvernement helléniquede son conflit avec l'Italie.
Dans ses dklibérations, le Conseil ne mit pas en doute la com-
pétence internationale de la Conférence. 11 reconnut également,
ainsi que l'attestent les déclarations faites au cours de sa séance
du 6 septembre, que (la Conférence des Arnbaçsadeurç avait
étéelle-mhne atteinte par le meurtre des officiers italiens par
elle chargés d'une mission internationale e.
Le Gouvernement italien n'a pas dénié la légitimitéde l'inter-
vention de la Lonféreilce. Le 31 aoùt, à la fois dans unc note
au Goiivcrnement grec, dans une çommunicntion aux grandes
Puissances et dans un télegramme aux seprkentants diploma-
tiques de l'Italià l'ktranger,il a affirméque ses propres démarches

rrn'excluaient pas les sanctions i prendre par la Conférence des
Ambassadeurs pour le fait que la délégation italienne assassiiike
faisait partie de la mission de délimitation des frontiéres, qui,
présidée par legénéral Tellinietait mandataire de la Conférence ii.
Mais, de l'avis du Gouvernemerît italien, 1'Etat italien restait
le trprincipal offensé il.
Le délégué italicn au Conseil de la Sociétedes Nations, dans la.
séance du 8 septembre, a exprimé cette idée sous deux formes :
d'abord l'Italie (<affirme son droit de discuter la question des
réparations qui lui sont dues pour le crime dont ses officiers ont
été victimes )>: ensuite et en coriséq~ience,cr le Gouvernement
italien ne peut pas admettre que la question de la meçure des
réparations soit résolue par la Confkrcnce des Arnhas';adears sans
intervention du Gouvernement itaIiei 1).
Ayant égard A la revendication juridique du Gouvcrnerncnt
italien, la Conference, dans sa note déjà citée du 7 septembre,
demandait au Gouvernement hellénique de (Is'engager à payer

l'indemnité au Gouvernement italien, pour le rneurkre de ses dele-
gués 2,se contentant, pour elle, de rdpasatians d'ardre moral.
C'est ce qui fut fait enfin de compte.

VLII. - Le Gouvernement français a tenu 2 formuler les
observations qui précèdcnt, sans préjudice de l'argumentation
qu'il se réserve de fournis sur l'ensemble du prablkme.
II9 OBSERVATIONS SOUMISES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS

IV.-LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REGISTRAR
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,

DEPARTMEN OFT STATE W,ASHINGTO DN.,., Febmary 14, r949.

Sir :

1 acknowledge the receipt ofyour communication dated Decem-
ber 10,x948, transmitting a certified çopy oletterdated Decem-
ber 4,"91, in which the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations
transmitted to thePresident of theInternational Court of Justice
certifiecopies of the KesoIution adopted by the GeneraAssembly
on December 3, 1948, requeçting an Advisory Opinion on the
following Iegal question:

"1. In the event of an agent ofthe Unite d ations inthe
performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances
involving the reçponsibilitof aState,hasthe United Nations,
as an Organization, the capacity to bring an internationa1
claim againstthe responsible deAjuroer de factogovemment
with a view toobtainïng the reparationdue in respectof the
damage caused (a)to the United Nations, (b)to the victirn
or to persons entitled through him?

II. In the event of an affirmative reply on point 1 (b),
how is action by the United Nations to be reconciIed with
such rights as rnay be possessed by the State of wliich the
victim is a national?"
The seceipt is alçackno~vIeclgedof your fusther communication
dated Dccember 14,1948, trançrnittiila cestifred copy of the
Order of the Ii~ternational Court of Justice, dated December11,
1948, by \vliich the Court fixed February14,1949, as the date of
expiry of the tirne-limit within which States entitledto appear
before the Court may file witten statements with regard to the
above request for an Advisory Opinion, and March 7, 1949, as
the date of the opening of the piiMic sittings for the hearing of
oral statements. You statethat in regardto the oral statements,

you would be gratefu l,case thisGovernment desires to present
such a statement, if it would inforrn you of tfactnot later than
Monday, February zS, 1949.
This communication may be regarded as the written statement
of this Government. The Department shall infom you subse-
quently, and prior toFebmasy 28, 1949,should this Govemment
desire to make an oral statement. OBSERVATIONS ÇUBMITTET) BY GOVERNMENTS 20

1.

"Inthe event of an agent of fhe United Nations in the per-
formance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances
involving the responsibdity of a State, has the United Nations,
as an Organization, the capacity to bring an international
claim againçt the responsible de iu~e or de facto govemment
with a view to obtaining the reparation due in respect of the
darnage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim
or to perçons entitIed through him ?"

Two major problems are posed in the first paragraph of the
request for an Advisory Opinion : (1)has the United Nations, as
an Organization, the capacity to bring an international daim
against a government, de jwe or de fucto; and, (2) has the United
Nations the capacity to seelr reparation for damage caused (a) to
the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to the perçons entitled
thrciugh him ? It ison these aspects ofthe request for an Advisory
Opinion that this Government desires to addresç itself.

(1) Has the United Nations, as an Organization, the capacity
to bring an international claim against a government, de jwe or
de facto ?

In the traditional sense an "international claim" is a daim by
the government of one State against that of another seeking
reparation for damage either to the interests of the clairnantState
or to that of a private citizw or a legal entity whose interest the +
clairnant State is entitled to espouse and to represent : whether
the emergence of public international organizations of sovereign
States requires a redefinition of -he concept of "internationaI
claim" to include clsims by the United Nations and çimilar inter-
national organizations is a question which need not be decided .
at this time and as to which the United States reserves itsviews
for the purposes of the question befose the Court, It is sufficient
to point out the established principle O£ international lam that
any legaI entity having legal capacity bvhether it be a State, an
individual, or a public or private entity may present clairns againçt
the government of the responsible State for repaatian for lasses
or damages suffered by them as a consequence of acts deemed
violative of principles of international law. Thc United Nations
as a public international organization having legal capacity may
therefore present claims against the government of a State for
reparation for losses or damages sustained by it as a reçult of such
violations nor is there any reason why, as frequcntly occurç in the
case of claims asserted by one State against another, the matter
of the settlement of clairns on behalf of the United Nations as an
organization should not be the subject of direct negotiation between
itand the government of the State against whlch the organization's21 OBSERVATIONS SOUMISES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS

daim is asserted. Of course there may exist certain local rernedies
in the tribunals of a respondent State which it may be necessary
to exhaust to obtain reparation. AZso there is no reason why
if the claim is aot settled the United Nations might not agcee
to submit the claim to arbitration under an agreement concluded
by the United Nations with the government concerned.
Article 104 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that-
"The Or-nisation shall enjoy in the territory of eaçh of

itsMernbers such legs1 capacity as may be necessary for the
exercise of Its functions and the fuZfilmentof its purposes."
While the enjoyment of legal capacity under this Article is
limited tothe territory ofMemberç of the United Nations, it results
that although Mernber States are under a legal duty to recognize
the legal capacity of the United Nations, the United Nations rnay
enjoy legal capacity innon-MernberStates recognizlng such capacity
in lrrhole or in part. \&%etfier in a particular case, the United
Nations has "legal capacity" to bring suit in a particular State
will depend upon the law of the State and the ciscumstances of
thc case.
Whether the government responsible for the loss or injury has

been recognized a5 de jure or dfacto inchar acte^by certain States
is immaterial as the United Nations, as such, does not recognize
States.
1%is accosdingly the view of this Government that the United
Nations, as an Organization, has the capacity to bring a clairn
againçt a government. The United Nations, in the view of the
United States, cannot "as an Organization" çubmit a clairn to
the International Court of Justice for judgrrient. The Court,
under Article 35, is only open to "%tes", and the United Nations
is not, under the Chartcr, a State, although it rnay passess certain
attributeç of a State, as for example "legal capacity" under
Article 104.
Has the United Nations the capacity to seek reparation for
damagc caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victiin or to
the' perçons entitled through hirn ?

(a) In the view of the Government of the United States the
United Nations could present a daim for and recover reparation
for direct pecuniary loss sustained by it on account of the act of
which con~plaint is made, responsibilityotherwise obtaining.
For the information ofthe Court, it rnay be stated tbat the GOY-
ernment of the United States does not make claim for the loss of
officiais or employeeç, as such. Ktis understood that the same
practice obtains in otlzercountries. A clairn of the Government
of the United States on behdf of an oflicial or employee, or ofhis
dependents, is limited so iar asthe claim of the Governrnent itself
is concerned-as disiinguished from any claim preçented by iton OBSERVATIONS SUBMlTL'ED 'BY GOVER-ÉBIENTS 22

behalf of thc victirn or his dependents-to itsactual losses orextra-.
ordinary expenses arising as a direct result of the wrongful act.
Reimburscrnenf: for annuities paid by the Governmcnt of the
United States under sections 831,ancl 832 of the Foreign Service
Act of 1946 (60Statutcs at Large qgg,1021-rozz ;22 United States
Code scctions IOSI, 10821, for example, wouid not be regarded as
such a direct resulf.

(Zi)In suck a situation as envisaged under (6)of paragraph 1
of the question subrnitted to the Court, the United Nations, as an
Organization, is without capacity, under ordinary circumstances,
to bring an interilational claim against a government with a view
to obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage cnused
to the victim or to the persons entitled through him. The basis
of an international claim is, in theory, an injury to,or losssuffered
by, thc State of which the claimarit iç a national. For that reason
it tvould be appropriate forthe govcrriment of the State of which
the clairnant is a national to present .the daim to the government
of the State causing the injury orloss, and that failing, In an appro-
priate case, to present it to a proper international forum.
Ho~rrevet, Article roo of the Charter of the United Nations
contemplates that o-fficialsof theOrganization shaIl be "interna-
tional officiais responsible only to the Organization". Occasion-
aIly, such individiials, or thoçe entitled through them, may be
çtateless and have rio governinent to makv claims on their behalf.
Uzidcr such circumstances, no reason is perceived why the United
sliould not have capnçity tciintervene to support the claim
of the stateless ii~dividual.

II.

"ln the event of an affirmative reply on point 1 (b), how
is action by the United Nations to be recoriciled with such
rlghts as may bc possessed by the State of ~vhich the victim
is a national 7"

En view of the character of the answer properly to be given to
question I (b), comment on paragraph II of the question subrnitted
to the Court becomes unnecessary.
Very truly yours,
For the Secretary of State,

(Signed) JACK B. TATE,
Acting Legal Adviser.23 OBSERVATIONS SOU&lIÇES PAR T-ES GOUVERNEMENTS

V.-WRITTEN STATEMENT PFCESENTEDBY
TRE GOVERNMENT 01; THE UNITED KINGDOM UNDER

ARTICLE 66 OF THE STATUTE OF THE COURTAND THE
ORDEK OF THE COURT DATED 11th 'DECERfBER, 1948.

By a Resoliltion dated Decernber3rd, 1948,the GeneralAssembly
of the United Nations decided to request the International Court
of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on certain questions relative
to the right ofthe United Nations to claim teparation from States
or governments responçible for injuries done to United Nations
servants In the course of the performance of their duties. The
specific questions put to the Court were the following :

"1. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in
theperformance of his dutieç suffering injurin circumstances
involving the responsibility oa State,has tlze United Nations,
as an Organization, the capacity to bring an international
claim against the responsible de jwrs or d~factogovernment l
with a vierv to obtaining the reparation due in respect of
the dam-dgecaused (a) to the United Nations, (b)to the victim
OF to persons entitled through him ?

TI. In the event of an affirmative reply on point 1 (b),
how is action by the United Nations to I>ereconciled with
such rightç as may be possessed by the State of which the
victir in a national 2''
2. The matter arose out of a Memorandurn by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations dated the 7th October, 1948, and
subrnitted to the Assembly as Document A/674. In this Mem-
orandum the Secretary-General drew attention to a number of
cases which had occurred durhg the previous year, rnainly with
reference to Palestine, in which rnernbers of the United N at'ons
Secretariat or other persons discharging duties as rnernbers of
United Nations Commissions had been kilIed or injured while

performing their officia1duties, one of the most recent and prom-
inent cases being tkat of the murder of Count Bernadotte, the
United Nations Mediator in Palestine, and his cornpanion Colonel
Sérot, a United Nations Observer. The Seçretary-General's
Memorandurn went on to record the fact that under various
domestic arrangements the Secretary-General had paid out consider-
able sums to theinjured persons themçelves orto their dependehts
by way of indemnities, compensation, and medical and other
expençes.

l So Far astheGovernment af clie United Kingdom is aware, tberenos
differencofprinciple betiveen the cascs. OI3SERVATJONS SUBMITTGD BY GOVERNMENTS 24

3. In the light of these facts, the Secretary-General raised
the question whether it was desirable and possible for the United
Nations, as an Organization, to clairn reparation for these injuries
(or alternatively reirnbursement for the payments which it had
itçelfmade) from the States or governments in whose territories
or by whose action the injuries had occurred, in al1 those cases
where the çircurnstances wese such as would normally, under
the general principles ofinternational law, entail theinternational
responsibility of that State or government. On this question,
the genwal line taken in the Seçretary-General's hlernorandum
was that it was both desirable and legally possible for such a daim
to be made by the United Nations. On the legal issues, the
Memorandum, while admitting that no case had previously
- prescnted itçelfwhich was precisely analogous to those undes
consideration, and that no case had becn found in which an inter-
national organization had presented a daim against a State for
injury to, or death of, one ofits officiaior agents, pointed out that
there was a very large body of legal precedent, and of accepted
mles of hiternational law, relating to the responsibility of States
fox injuries to the natioi~als of other States, and for the right
' of States to make international çlaims in these cases. The view
put fonirard by the Memorandurn was in efiectthat, by analogy,
the United Nations, as an Organization, coilld be regarded as
having rights in this respect similar to that of States. This view
was expreçsed in the two following passages :

'"Itis the viktv of the Secretary-General that the same
principles on which this Iegal doctrine is based lead to the
conclusion that an injury to an agent of the United Nations
in the course of his officia1mission, committed by a State in
violation of international law, is an injury to the United
Nations, and that the United Nations is entitled to daim
~eparations for such an Injury.
The Secretary-General has no doubt that the United Nations,
whiçh has capacity to enter into international agreements
with States, possesses the legal capacity to present a clairn
undcr international law against a State, whethes a Mernber
or non-Member of the United Nations."
It will be appreciated that the sole question at issue here is that
ofthe cafiacityof the United Nations, as an Organization, to make
claims of this kind, on the assumption that grounds for such a
claim othenviçe exist. Moreover, the question is essentially
directed to the capacity of t11eOrganization under ifiterrtatioml
law to make a clairn on the ircte~fiationnllane, and not to itç

capacity under the donlestic laws of the different Member States
to bring claims and proceedingç to their courts, thislaçt question
not being in any real doubt for reasons to be given later. The
Secretary-General's Memorandum clcarly raises the international z.5 OBSERVATIONS SOUMJSES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS

issue, but it alço expressly disclaimed any interition, at that stage,
of putting the question whether the injuries to United Nations.
servants which liad actually givcn rise to this problem hacl occuned
in circurnstances involving the international rt:çponsibility of any
State or government 2.

4. Itwill be seen that the first of thetwo qucçtions put to the
Coud distinguishes, urider its heads (a) an3 (b)liettvceri the damage
which the United Nations, as an Organization, has itself suffcred
by the dcath of or injury to one of its servants, and, on the otl~er
hand, the damage suffered by the victini or his dependents. 111
the firstcategory would conie damage resultirigto the Organizntion
from thc fact e.g. that it fiad loçt a valuable servant alid that this
might result in loss to or expenditure by thc Organization, e.g.
,
arising from the necesçity of havirig to send sorneoilc to replace
him, or train soineone else to do the work. In this catcgory
might also coine the expense to which the United Nations was
put by reason of yayiilg indemnities to the irijured party or his
dcpendents (see further below, paragraph 16).

5. The second of the two questions put to the Court arises out
of the fact that, exept wherc the United Nations employee çon-
cerned happens to be stateless, the gcncral principles of interna-
tional law ~vould allow of a claiin being put fonvard by his own
national State in reçpcct O£ the injur done tohim or to his depend-
ents. The question arises, therefore, in such a case, wlxich is the
proper party to müke the claim, assuming that the United Nations
has the necesçary capaçity to makc an iilteniational c1:iim at all.
The formal riglzt of the national State to put forrvard a claim
cannot, in any event, be deniecl, although 'die measare of the
darnages due to that Statc may be affected by the fact that the
victirn is alreüdy in rcceipt of adcquate compensation under the
arrangements made by the United Nations.

6. In the opinion of the United Kingdoni Government the
questions put to the Court involve four main issues, which can be
stated as folIows :
l
(i) Dues the United Nations, as an Organization, posscss inter-
national personality and if so what is the general character
of this personality ?
Does such international personality as the United Nations.
{ii) may possess include the capacity to bring an international

daim in the circurnstances contemplatecl by the questions
put to the Court ?

the applicability of al1 the ordirales governing internatioclaims-such
asthe nileabout the exliaustion of municipal remedies-tssumthat capacity
ta bring theclaimçexists. OBÇEKVATIOUS SUR-iTITTED Br GOVERNMENTS 26
If so, does this capacity relate only to the damage caused
(iii)
to the United Nations itself, as an Organization, or does
it also extend to eriabling the United Nations to clairn
compensation for the victim or his dependents ?
(iv) If the capacity of the United Nations doeç extend so a5
to çover a clairn on the latter basiç also, what is to be the
zctationship between Lin? United Nations right of claim
on this basis, andthe right of thc State of which the victim

is a national to make a similar claim 7

7. On the first question, the international personality of the
'United Nations as an Organixation, the United Kingdom Govern-
ment considers that it would be difficult to deny the existence of
some forrn of international personality. even though this may not
be stated in terrns in the Charter. 1t is important not to confuse
tlzisquestion, in eitl~erthe positivc or the negative sense, with that

of statehood. The United Nations Organization is i~ota Çtate and
has virtually none of the esscntial characteristics of a State. On
the other hand, wliile al1 sovereigil independent States are inter-
national persans, itdoes not Iollow that there are no international
perçons other than sovereign indepcndent States. On the contrary
it is now uidely adrnitted that such personality, in a greatcr or
iesser degree (anci if not for all, at any ratc for some, puryoscs),

may be poççessed by other cntitieç or organisms sucl~as (a)pro tectcd
States or other çemi-dependent territories not fully sovereig~zand
independent ; (b) entities which are not States atall, such as the
Vatican betwcen 1870 and rgzg, thc International Labour Offce
1 and thc lrzteLeaguc of Nations ; (c) composite international yersons
such as Real Unions, and Fedcratioiis of thc Irind ivl~erethe consti-
tuent members themselves rctüir~a measure of international person-

ality side by side with tliat posçessed by the Fedesation as a whole ;
and (d) miscellaneouç entities or authorities such as parties to a
civil zvar where thesc have received international recognition as
bclligcrents or insurgcnts. Of course not al1 these organisn~s os
entities have in evcry case been universally recognized as possessing
interiîational personality ;neverthelcss there do seem to bc grounds
for tlie general proposition that tlic possession of international

personality isnot neçeçsarily dependent on statehood, and conver-
seIy that the poççeçsion of statehond is not a simequa laowof Piaving
flie status of an international perçon ". If, therefore, statehood

Ttwould be out ofplace inthis Brer~lorialto discuss thc possiblecasesin
full, butreference rnay be made to Oppenheim, Vol. I, Sectioris 63-70, 75a,
85-89, 90-93,104-ro7 and 167c : and the fnlloivingpoints rnay be noted (the
quotations are taken from Lauterpacht's 7th cditionj.

(a) Of not fiillysovereign States, Oppenheim (5 65) sxys: "That they
cannot bBut it.1srivrongtonmaintainb]that they cnn haveano international
pe~onality whatever ....They oftcne~ijoy in many points the rigkirsandz7 OBSERVATIONS SOUMISES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS

is not the test, then what is 7 The answer seems to be the posses-
sion of international rights and obligations, for-since only persons,
natural or juridical, can have rights and obligations (for present

fulfrl in other points the duties of international persans.... No other explan-
ation of these and similar factç can be given except that these not fully
sovereign Statcs are in some way or another international persons and
subjects of international law.
(b) Çpeaking of certain other entities, Oppenheim (6 63) says : "there
are also apparcnt ... international persons-suclz as Confederations of States

and insi~rgents recognized as a belligercnt Power in a civil ivar. These are
not ....real subjects of international Iaw, but in soine points are treated as
though they rvere international persons." As regards parties to a civil war,
to whom recognition of bclligerency (or the more limited recognition of
insurgcncy) is extended, thcrc is no doubt tiîat they tliereby becorne invcstcd
with certain rights and obligations vis-8vis othu States rvhich are thc
subject of and governed by international law; yet there is no question of
these entitics bcing States or even, in the true sensr., governments. Never-
theless, according to the doctrine set out in this &I~:morial,they do acquire
some form of intcrnationai personality, ùecause only intcrnatioaal persons
of some kind can have international rights and duties.

(6) Of a Real Union Oppenheim says (f87) that it "is not itself a.State
but ...â union of two fully sovereign States ~vhichtogether make onc single
but composite international person". The Gcrman Federation frorn 1866
to 1918is an exzmple of an entity which posseçsed intcrnational personality
over and above that of its constituent mernbers, since the individual Cerman
States wcrc by no means cleprived of al1 sucli personality, and rctained tlie
right tu receive and accredit diplornatic missions, and, within a Lirnitedspherc,
to conclude treatieç with States outside the Pederation.

(cl) The position of the Vatican betureen 1870 ivhcn Italy annexed the
PapalStates, and ~gzg,rvhen, by the conclusion of the Latcran Twaty, the
Holy Sea once more acquired .adegree of territorial sovercignty, affords a
good illustration of international personality possessed in aomc scnse by an
entity rvhich was not a State at all. Of this pericid in thc history of the
Vatican, Oppenheim (5 705) says : "Several forcign States sent, side by side
with their diplornatic cnvoys accreditcd to Ihly, special cnvoys to tl~e Pope,
and die latter sent envoyx to foreign States. Thcy concluded with the Holy
See agreements, usually called concordats, whicli they treated in most respects
as analogous to treaties. The question of the position of tlie Holy Sec was
~~idelydiscussed in thc literature of intcrnational law and many writers,
including the author of this treatise, were uf the view that although the
Holy Scc was not an intcrnational person, it tiad by cu.stom and tacit consent
01 most States acquired a qua4 internatiorzal position." Another intcr-
esting, if lirnited, eirample cited is that othe Maltest Oi-der. In 1884Italy
recognizcd the Order's right of legation and in rgzg its right to be described
as sowercign. In 1935 the Itnlian Coiirt of Cassation held that the Urder
was an intcrnatioml perr;on (Gzurispracd~nsa.itnEèa~t1 a,935I (i), p. 415). At

this tirne also reprcscritatives of the Order formed part of tlie dipIornatic
corps nt Vienna and Budapest. For an account of other wses in ~vhrch'
municipal courts havc held international organizdtions to be international
persoa?, sce Oppenhtlm, p. 776, note 5, in the 7th edition of Vol: 1.
Oppcnheim also seems to suggest ($5 107 and 340 gg) that the Inter-
national Labour Omce rnay for certain purposes rank as an international
person. Of the League of Nations ('die striictural rcscmblance to which of
the Uniteil Nations isvery rnarked), Oppenheim says (5 167 6):"The prom-

iuent opinion was that the League, rvh~leusing a jiiristic persosui geaeris,
\=as a subjcct of international law and an international person side by side OBSERVATIONS SUBBIITTED BY GOVERNMENTS 28
purposes the class of rights and obligations i9zrem, relating to

specific pieces of property can be ignored) then any entity which
has riglits and obligations is a person, and, if the rights and obliga-
tions concerned are essentially international in character, the
personality must be international also. This point can be put in
another way. Most authorities postulate that States are subjects
of international law. But States are admittedly international

perçons. It seems to follow that any entity which is, in a greater
or lesser degree, a subject of international law must, to that extent,
be an international person. Now any entity which is, qua entity;
possessed of international rights and duties must be a subject of
international law. Hence, if the United Nations is possessed of
such rights and duties, it has, as an Organization, international

personality.

8. If this reasoning is correct, it follows that to ask whether
the United Nations, qua Organization, has (in what precise degree
remains to be considered) soine form.of international personality,
is equivalent to asking whether it has international rights and
duties. The most up to date pronouncement on the position of
the United Nations iii this respect from the standpoint of general

international law is that contained in Professor Lauterpacht's
7th edition of Oppenheim's Interfintional Law, which it wili be
convenient to quote in extenso :-

"The United Nations is the legal organization of the interna-
tional community. It has a legal personality distinct from that
of its members. That fact is to some extent brought out by
Article 104 of the Charter which provides that. 'The Organization
shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such legal capa-

with.the several State.... Not being a State, and néither owning territory
nor ruling over citizens, the League did not possess sovereignty in the sense
of State sovereignty. Howcver, bcing an inter&-tional person stfigmcris,
the Lcague \vas the subject of many riglits which. as a rule, can only be
exercised by sovereign States. For instance, the Leaguc possessed thc
so-callcd right of legation;was able to exercise sovereign rights over such
territories as were not under the sovereignty of any State (as it did for a time
in thc Saar Basin) ;was able to intervcnc bctween two disputing member-
able to exercisc a protectorate over a weak Statc (Danzi;)and \vas, perhaps,
able to declare \var and make peace." The analogy bctwcen much (though
not all) of tliis and the position of the United Nations Organizatis striking.

(f) The divorce of international personality from the conception of
not be an iintcrnationalperson, or a subject of internationaltlaw, if it has
not received recognition as part of theamily of nations. The extreme view
on this subject is expressed by Oppenheim ($ 71) as follows : "Through
recognition only and exclusively a State becomcs an international person
and a subject of international law." Al1 this suggests that if an entity is
in fact recognized as having international rightsand obligations, subject to
and govcrned by internationallaw, it must be an international person, whether
it is a State or something else.29 OBSERVATIONS SOUMJSES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS

city as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
fulfilment of its purposes.' There was apparently sonle apprehen-
sion-for which there was no basis in fact-lest the express confer-
ment of 'international personality' upon the United Nations be
interpreted as creating a super-State 4. In the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the ~nited Nations, approved by the
First General Assembly in 1946A ,rticle 1 provided expressly that
'The United Nations shall possess juridical personality' and that it
shall have the capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of
immovable and movable property, and to institute legal proceed-
ings. . That juridical personality is not limited to capacity for
action in the sphere of private law 6. The Charter itself recognizes
the contractual capacity of the organs of the United Nations in
what is in effect the wide sphere of treaties. 'ThusArticle 43 of
the Charter provides for agreements between the Security Council
and the Membersor groups of Membersofthe Organization concern-
ingthe armed forcesand other forms of assistance to be contributed

by them for the maintenance of international peace and security ;
it is laid down that these agreements shall be subject to ratification
by the signatory States in accordance with tlieir constitutional
processes. Article 62provides for agreements to be made by the
Economic and Social Councilwith various specialized international
organizations brought into relationship witli the United Nations.
A number of such agreements have been concluded. The First
Assembly .adopted, for the guidance of the Secretary-General, a
draft Convention between the United Nations and the United
States of America in connexion with the establishment of the seat
of the United Nations in that country. .The United Nations as
sucli may also exercise direct jurisdictional and legislative powers,
as, forinstance,with regard to its seat or such trust areas as, accord-
ing to Article 81of the Charter, may be placed under the'admin-
istrative authority of the United Nat'ions.
The United Nations, thus endowed with an international person-
ality of its own in its capacity as the legal organization of the
international community, is a juristic person sui gegzeris. The
question of the legal nature of the potentially universal association
of States constituting the political organization of mankind trans-
cends that of any accepted classification of composite States ...."

Footnote by the U.K. Government.
This is probably true, but, for the reasons gin footnote 6 below, should
not be given undue weight.
Footîtotc by the U.K. Gor~ernnzent.
In so far as this is intended to suggest that the Convention on Privilcges and
Immunities directly confers internatpersonality, as such, on the Organization,
for thereasons given in paragra12below.eeThe arguments which, in the opinion it,
of the United Kingdom Governrnent. an, in tlie present connexion, legitimately
be based on this Convention are set out in theame partigraph. OBSERVATIONS SUBMITTED BY GOVEKNMENTS 30

Thuç it wilEbe seeti that the view taken by Professor Lauterpaclit
rif the iritemational pcrsonali ty of the United Nations Organiza-
tion iç broadly similnr to thrtttaken in respect of the former League
of Nations as set out in paragrapl~ {B)of footnote 3 above.
A number of points rnay be noticed in addition to those
g.
made by Professor Lautcrpacht. It might theosetically be possible
to regard the United Nations as a mere assemblage, as a sort of
association, of States, and the rights and duties of the United
Nations under the Charter as vesting in the individual Rlembers
jointly and severally. This however would be inconsistent with
the language of the Charter (and, as with al1 other international
organizations, itiç of course the Charter as the constitutive instru-
ment whick must primariiy govem all questions affecting the state
of the Organization). The Charter continually uses such phrases
as : "The Organization shall ensure.. .., "The Organizaticy shaIl
make recon~mendationç.. ." "The Organiza tion shall initiate
ncgotiations.. .", "The ~niied Nations shall establish....","The
Organization shall enjay. ..."(seefor instance Article 2,paragraph 6,
and Articles 58, 59, 75, 104 and roj). Other Articles (e.g.60, 83
and 85) speak of "The functions of the O~gafiixatZo.n"" T,he func-
tions of .theUnited Nations". Al1this is the more striking in that
where the sightç or obligations of the individual Mcrnbers, in con-
tradistinction to those of the Organization itself, are intended, the
appropriate wording is empIoyed (see for instance Article 2, para-
graphs 2-5, and Articles 25, 35, 43, 4.5,49, 54, 73 and 74). The
antithesis is very striking in certain ArticIes which provide for
cluties clearly to be owed, not by the individual Members to each
other, but by each of them to the Organization as a whole, and

as such. For instance Article z, paragraph 5, says that "Al1
Members shall give the Unhd Nations every assistance in any
action ittakes in accordance with the Charter and hall refrain
from giving assistance to any State against which the U~ited
Natiorts is taking preventive orenforcemen.t action" (italics added).
Again there are provisions, such as those of Article 56, which state
tl~at "Al1 Members pledge fk~emselves to take joint and separate
action in GU-operaiionwifh ths Oyga~izatio~ [no t "in co-operation
with each other" or "with other Mernbers"] for the achievernent
of...", etc. (italics added). Such language is difficult to reconcile
with any other view but that the framers of the Charter t-egarded
the Organization as posseçsing an international corporate capacity
of itç own,separate and distinct Irom that of itindividual Mernbers
or of the plurality of its members It being clear therefore that,

6 Too much importance should not, therefore, be athched to therefcrred
to in the passage from Oppenhcim above quoted. 'chat the f~arnersof the Charter,
for reasonof a political çharacter, refrained from doing wbat basbeen donein
iiieconstitutions of certaother international osganizati(see for instance
Article&y of the Havana Charter of tlie1 T.O.)drafted in the Iighoflater
3 under the Charter, many dutieç are owed by the Mernbers of the
Organizatiori, not to orle another, but to the 0rganizatiol-i as siicf,
it must folIow tliat, if these d~ztiesare not carried out, it iç the
Oi-ganixation wliiçfi hüs a right to cornplain and to claial tl~eir
fulfdmcnt-or, where appropriate, reparation for tIreir non-
frmlfilment. This is not ta Say that individual Members may not
have an independent and concurrent right of cornplaint, or tliat

they are precluded from making it directly to the Mernber whose
conduct is in question ; but in general, and according tc,what has
becorne tlie established practice in the Orgariization, cornpIaints
of breaches of the Charter, or non-fuliilrnent of prescribed duties,
are made in, and dealt with by the Organization itself, as an organ-
izational matter and according .tothe forrns and procedures of
the Organization as psovided in the Charter. Certairdy, as handed
by and witl-iin the Organization, allegations of a breach of the
Charter do not, or at any rate do not exclusively, have the character
of disputes between h'iernbers: rather do they have the character
af issues between the Organization as o,wEioleand the offending

Member.
Io. Broadly similar conclusions emerge from a consideration
of the agreements entered into by the Orgsnization or its constl-
. tuent organç. 'Forinstance the so-called Headquarters Agreement
with the United States, as the country in which the Organization

haç its site, is concluded between the Government of the United
States and the Orgai~ization. This might not be conclusive in
itselfsiilce private persons and juristic entities do often entes into
agreements with foreign governments, and çuch agreements in
no way rank as i~ztemational agreements. But where an agree-
ment is made by aiid in tlie name of an Organization çonsisting
of, and representing, some half a hundred or more fully sovereign
independent States, and the other party to it is another such
State, it becornes very difficult to regard the agreement ather than
an international agreement. But only international perçons can
be parties to international agreements strictoseam. Hence tlie
United Nations Organization is an international pers011 '. In
just the same way, and perhaps even more clearly, must any

military agreements made under Article 43 of the Charter, between
Mernbers, or gtoups of Members of the Organisation, and the

expericnce, namely to providin tsfmt1iat the Organization shall possess inter-
nationallegal personali'cy, as wclthesdo~ncstic or milnicipal juridical pcrson-
ality rvhich clearly results from Articofthe Charter and Article 1.Sect1,n
cf the General Corivention un the Privileges and 1mmunitit.s cifthe United Nations.
situated broketheagreement, rvith rcsulting loss or damato United Natiaus
property or funds, there canno doubt eitherthatit woulrl be the Organizatian
as suchwliicb would be pr~jucliced thebrcach of the agreement made with it,
and whicEi would be ent~tied to cla;or that the claim would be international
in charitcter. OBSERVATIONS SU$MIl?T"TED BY GOVERNMENTS 32

Security Coiincil,rank as international agreements, governed by
internatioilal law ; and thc entity müking them (for the Security
Council would elearly act as the agent of the Organization in
inaking these agreements) rank equally as an international person.
Witliout such personality the Organization cannot have the status
repuisite to enter into agreements of this eharacter, and therefore
the existence of such personality is a logical dedtiction from the
çapacity of the Organization, under the Charter, to entes into
these agreements.

II." Attention should aIso be drawn to the position of the
United Nations tdth reference to the International Court of Justice
itself. There is no doubt that the Court isan international court.
It is also, according to Article gz of the Charter, "the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations". It would be a strange
anornaly if an international court were the "principal judicial
organ" of an entity whick was not itselfan internationd person.
Article gz aIso states that the Statute of the Court "forms an
integral part of the present Charter". Article 96 of the Charter
gives the Organization the power, through the Generai Asçernbly
or the Security Council to request an Advisory Opinion from the
Court, and Article 66 of the Statute enables the Organization in
sucli a case to present written and oral arguments to the Court.
None of this can easiIybe reconciled with the view that the United
Nations is not an international person.

12. The foregoing argument is based on the vietv that if thc
United Nations can be shown to have international rights and
obligations, it must be an international perçon. The matter can
also be approached in a slightly different way. 1s the United
Nations, qua Organization, a juristic person at al], international
or other ? The answer to thisis nat in doubf. Article 104 of
the Charter stateç that "tlze Organization shall enjoy in the territory
of each of its Mernbers such legal capacity as may be necessary
for the exercisc.ofits functions and the fulfilinentof itspurposes".
The detailed application of this provision iç contained in the
General Convention on Privileges and Immunities, Article 1,
Section I of which provides that the United Nations shall possess
juridical personality and çkall, inter alla,have the capacity to
institute legal proceedings. Noiv, in view of the Preamble to the
Convention, which recites Articles104and 105of the Charter and
indicates that the substantive provisions of the Convention are
directed trigiving effect ta those Articles, itwould, in the opinion
of the United Kingdom Governrnent, be difficult targue that the
Convention, purely in itself, goes furtherthan Articles 104 and 105
go, Le. that it goes further than to corder on the United Nations

certain personality and capacity "in the territory of each of [the]
Members [of the Organization]". In brief it does not, of itself,
go further than to give the United Nations a rightto be regarded, 35 OESERVGTLONS SOUM~SES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS

in the territory of each of its Mernbers, as being a juristic entity
and a juridical person under and for the purposeç of thc laws
of that territory, i.e.persoilality in thc domestic and municipal
çphere, arîalogous to that posçessed by âny private cornpaily
corporation 8. Nevertheless, although the scope of the Convention

is thus limited,since it is entirely governed by Articles 104 and 105
of the Chartes, and thcy are limited to the position of the Organiza-
tion "in the territory of each of its Mernbers", it does, in combina-
tion with those Articles produce at leaçt this result, that the Organ-
ization is a juristicperson, even ifonly, ço far ns these provisions
are concerned, a juristic person under domestic and municipal
'law. But it haç (it is hoped) been shoxrrnabove that the Orgsniza-
tion is invested ivith rights and duties essentially international
in character. The combination iç therefore that of an entity
which is, on any view, a juristic person and whch also has inter-
.~zationalnghts and obiigations. The result is an international

person, possessed of international personality and (to an extent
still to be discuçsed) international capacity, since only interna-
tional perçons can have international rights and obligations.

13. En conclusion on thispart of the argument, it may be noticed
that even if, contrary to the view suggested above, the Organiza-
tion, as such, were not regarded as having a distinct international
personality, and were çimply regarded as a union or association of
States, analogous on the international plane to an association or
partnership of individuals in private law, it ~vould still not foIlow
that it was devoid of al1 international personality, or at any rate
of al1international capacity. A private firm or partnership under
private law, nlthough it may have no actual juridical personality
separate and distinct from that af the individual partners (such as
is the position under English, though not, it is thought, under al1
çystems of law), is nevertheless not \rholIy devoid of something

analogous to personality. It can for instance sue and be sued in
the firm's name and can, as a firm, makc pecuiziay claims.
Assurning for the purposeç of the present argument that
the Organixation haç international personality, the next question

which ariçes is the second of those set out in paragraph 6 above,
namely what is the exact content and extent of such personality
and ~hat preciçe rights and capacities does it cover. For reasons
alrcady given it clearly need nat-and, in the opinion of the United
Kingdorn Governrnent it equally clearly doeç not-follow that

@ As a consequence ofthe position wliîch thc United Nations isentitlto
enjoy under tlie1aiv.of its several ~Memberthcrectinbe no doubt as to its
çapacity to malcchillison thedarnestiç or municipal plane agairist any ofe
conçerned, under its domestic lar'îhat is aoin doubt, and tlie question here
in issue is essentially of thecapacityof the Organization to brinaiii&r-
nirlzmal claim uilder ant#rnalzInn,. OBSERVATIONS SUBMITTED BY GOVERNMENTS 3 4

the international personality of the Organization gives it the same
status as a sovereign State. IVhile it may, by analogy, enjoy
certain rights analogous to those possessed by a sovereign State,
itis by no means entitled to exercise al1suc11rights, and only brief
reflection is necessary to indicate that a hvholly impracticable
situation would arise if the Organization as such were deemed to
have the position and status of a sovereign State,and to be entitled
to exercise al1 the rights and functions of such a State. The ques-
tion here at issue, therefore, resolves itself into one of determining
what is the precise content and extent of the international person-

ality enjoyed by the Organization, and what exact rights and
capacities it covers, or rather, more particularly, whether this
personality and these capacities extend to the bringing of claims on
tlie international plane in respect of injuries done to employees
of the Organization in circumstances entailing the responsibility
of some State or government. As there are virtually no applicable
precedents or rules of law, the matter becomes one of drawing a
series of necessary or reasonable inferences from the premise that
some degree of international personality is possessed by the Organ-
ization, and of the construction of the relevant texts such as the
Charter and the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities.

On this basis, the governing factors appear to bc, first, that
15.
any entity possessed of juridical personality must be deemed, as
an inherent and necessary attribute of its personality, to possess
the capacity to protect its interests and, up to a point at any rate,
those of its servants in the exercise of their functions, and that
this must includc the capacity to make claims for reparation in
respect of injuries, and further that if the personality is an inter-
national one the capacity in question inust cxist on the interna-
tional as well as on the domestic planc ; sccondly, that Articles 104
and 105 of the Charter andthe provision5 gencrally of the Conven-
tion on Privileges and Immunities, limitcd though they may be
in form by the words "in the territory of each of its Members",

are evidence of an intention that the Organization should have
al1such capacities as arc "necessary for the exercise of its functions
and the fulfilmcnt of its purposes", and it seems clcar that the
Organization is liable to be prejudiced in exercising its functions
and fulfilling its purposes if it has not the capacity to claim in
respect ofinjuries to itself andits servants and to protect its servants
in the performance of their duties ; and thirdly that Article IOO
of the Charter (more fully discussed below) and Scctions 18 and
22 of the Privileges and Immunities Convention "how a clear

officiais of the Organization and of cxperts on Missions for the Orgainzation,y of
the territories of Members;and this is of course irrespeof thc nationality
of the person concerned, or of the fact that it may be that of the country hc is
operating in. OBSERVATIONS SOUMISES PAR LES GOUVEHNERTENTS
35
intention to create for the Organization, its officials and experts
on' United Nations Missions a status of independence, especially
independence of al1 national or nationality coiisiderations.

16. Passing on to the third of the issues set out in paragrap6,
it would seem to follow from what has just been stated that there
can be no doubt as to the capacity of the Organization to bring a
claim on the international level in respect ofirect loss or dainage
suffered by itself as an Organization in consequence of the death
of or injury to its servant-arising for instance from the necessity
of replacing him. Next, there is the question whether, in this
category, there can properly be included the reimbursement to
the United Nations of sums which it may have paid out to the
victim or his dependents by way of compensation or otherwise.
In so far as the Organization has, under its contracts or agreements
with the employees concerned, an obligation to make these pay-
ments, it would seem reasonable to hold that the United Nations
has a claim which could properly be classed as one of loss suffered

by itself. This might not be the case where the arrangements
for compensation did not result from any contractun1 obligations
already entered intoby the Organization, but consisted of payments
made on a voluntary or ex gratinbasis. Furthermore, questions
of the proper measure of damages recoverable by the United
Nations, and payable by the State responsible for the injury, may
arise where the scales of compensation paid hy the United Nations
exceed those which \vould be paid in comparable circumstances
by a State or government. On the whole, it wduld seemathat the
recovery of these sums under the head and in the guise of repara-
tion for loss suffered by tlie Organization itself, inust be confined
to cases in which the Organization is contractually obliged to make
the payments concerned, a.nd within the limits to which such
payments are reasonable in amount having regard to al1 the
circun~stances.

17. There remains the case of the right of the United Nations
to make an international claim directly on behalf of the victim
or his dependents (i.e. not by way of reimbursement to the Organ-
ization itself). Here, it may be somewvhatless clear that the inter-
national personality of the Organization covers the right to make
such a claim. Indeed, if it be admitted that, whatever interna-
tional personality the Organization may have, it is not a sovereign
independent State, and does not possess more than certain partic-
ular rights and capacities analogous to those of a sovereign State,
it might be argued that such a claim should be ruled out at once,
because the basis upon which States put forward claims in conse-
quence of injuries done to in'dividuals, and in respect of the loss
or damage suffered by those individuals or their dependents, is

normally the nationality of the injured party and the fact that
he is a national of the State making the clairn. The State hasaccordingly suffered an international wrong in the person of its
national, forwhicli itis cntitled to clairn ; the lneasure of damageç
(aparî £rom any direct losses 50 the State itself) being thc Joçs
suffcred by the injured party or his dependents. New, as the
United Nations is not a Çtate and there is no United Nations
nationality, itis clear that aclaim for compensation to the victim
or his depcndents could not be made by the United Nations on the
süme büsi5as is done by a State. Furtherrnorc, itmight be argved
that there is no recognized basis, other than nationality, upon
which such a clah could be made. It is true that States do make
claimç arising out of injuries done to persons in foreign cauntries
where these persons, although not their nationals, are connected
in some other way with the cllaimant State, e.g. are in its service.
But in that case the basis of the daim is the international wang

done to the State itself,arising from the direct loss or damagc
suffered by it owing to the disabIement or loss of a person in its
service. Indireçtly, insuch acase, thc clairnmight covw compen-
sation to the victim or his dependents where the State concerned
had itself, under a contractual liability, paid such compensation
on a reasonable scale, and \vasthesefore entitled to reimbursement
on the ground that theaction of the defendent State had involved
the claimant State iri loss to that extent. Ifthese conçiderations
are correct, and if they werc the sole considerations applicable,
it rnight seem that, unIess a clairn covering compensation for the
victim or his dependents çould be brought under the head of
reimbursernent to the United Nations Organisatio~i itseIf of such
reasonable sums by way of ccrrnpensatjon as it may have paid out,
and conscqucntly under the head of reparation for an actual loçs
suffered by the Organization as çuch, there would be no otl~er baçis
for a clairn than that of nationality ; and this would mle out thc
possibility of such a claim being made by the United Nations.

18. It appears to the Govcrnment of the United Kingdom,
liowcvcr, that other consiclerations arc applicable, and that groundç
exist for irnplying, from such international personality as the
Orgünization may be assumed to possess, and from the relevant
texts, a right to intervene directly on behalf of the Organixation's
injured ernployees and to daim compensation for thcm or thcis
dependeiits. Thus, \hile it must be granted that the analogy
with a Çtate is imperfect, yet just as aState is entitled to protect
its nationals, so the 01-ganization being assumed to have inter-
national personality, a sirnilarright of protection on behülf of its
servants might be predicated if, for instance, some ~elationship
bettvcen the Organization and its servants, analogous in thecircum-

stances to that of nationality, were found to exist. On enquiry
it would seem that some such relationslzip docs exist, at any rate
as regards the regular and permanent staffof the United Nations
Secretariat. While.these perscrnshave not lost.their own ordinary37 ORSERVRTIONÇ ÇOUkIISBS PAR LES GOUVERNEhIENTS
nationality upon joining the United Nations Organizstionm, it
would seem that their allegiance to, and connexion with, their
own country is for the time being in abeyance as regards al1matters
connected 1vitl-itheir work, and is, in those respects, superseded

by an overriding allegiance to, and connexion with, the United
Nations Organization. The primairy duty of such persons in al1
matters affecting the work of the Organisation isto the Osgariiza-
tion itself, and not to their own iiational Sta.tes. This principle
is enshrined in Article ~ooof the Charter wlzich in terms rcfers
to members of the Secretariat as being "responsible only to thc
Organization", and it says that in the performance oftheIr duties
the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any governrnent
or from any othe~ authority external to the Organization, and
that they are to xefrain fron~ any action whicb rnight reflect on
their position as internationai officiais "responsiblc only to the
Organization". This last phrase must mean thatthere is a duty
upon the staffto refrain hm any action of ais kind (even where
it might be favourable to their countriesj if it would conflict with

their position as being solely responsible to the Organization.
Correspondingly, by the second paragraph cifArticle ~oo eüch
of tlie Rlember States of the United Nations "undertakes to ~espect
the exclusively internation31 character of the responsibili fies of
the Secretary-General and the staff, and not to seek to influence
them in the discharge of their responsibilities". In conçequence,
when a member of the regular staff of the United Nations is injured
in the course of the performance of his duties, and in circumstanccç
entailing the responsibility of a State or government, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom considers that itwould he a reason-
able inference to draw irom the special nature of the connexion
between the staff and the Organization, as ençhriiied in Article 100,
and the effect ofthis special connexion on the norrnaI allegiance
awed by every individual to his own national Statc, that the
Organization sliould have the rigIit ta daim compensation on
behalf of thc individual concerned. The individual concerned is
indecd in a position analognus to that of a person having dual

nationality and possesçing a double allcgiance. But, by the same
token, and applying the doctrine of master nationality or allegiance,
it nligkt wel be considered that, where a case of this kind ariseç
(i.e. one of injury suffered in the course of the performance of
United Nations duties by a person owing prirnary responsibility
to the Organization rathcr than to his own national State), the
party having the prior right to make a claim for compensation on
the individual's behalf is the Orgsnizatian rather than the national
State concerned, given the circumstances out of which the claim

, '0The case isof course even stsonger ivhen tlie ernpluyee concerned happens
tion might be saitocbe as it werc Zoc+arenfis from a nationality standpoint. OBSERVATIONS SUHMITTED BY COVERNMlrPjTS 38
arose and the predominant allegiancc to the Organization owed
at the tirne, and in respect of his work, by the injured person.

xg. These consideraticins apply with less force to the case of
perçons not mernbers of the regular staff ofthe Organixation but
employed temporarily or ad hoc for some spccial purpose, e.g. tu
act asmediators in a dispute or to serve as mernbers of a comrnis-
sion. In some cases it is clear that members of a commission,
although their expenses and emolurnents may be paid out of United
Nations fundç, and although they may be bound by the terms of
reference of the commission, are nevertheless acting primarily as
representatives of their own govemments, rather than In their
personal capacity andlor as representatives of the Organization as
a whole. In such cases itis dirficult tsee any reason for depart-
ing from the normal rule that any claiins for compensation for
injuries done to those çoncemed, should be made hy their own
national States rather than by the Organization. In ather cases
it rnay be clear that, although the employment içonly temporary,
the person concerned is empIoyed in his personal capacity andlor
as sepresenting the Organization, and is in no sense a delegate or
representative of his own country as such. These cases might,
by analogy, be treated as similar to thoçeof mernbers of the pesm-
anent staff. Some of these appointments, though temporary, are
extrernely important, and they entail, no Iess than in the case of
the permanent staff, the necessity that, while they last, the primary

allegiance of the person concerned, in al1 rnatters concerning the
workhe is doing, should be to the Osganization rather than to his
own country. Consequently, there is in principIe no reason for
differentiating these cases from that of mernbers of the permanent
staff.
20. To sum up the views of the Government of the United
Kingdom on this part of the srrbject, while therernay be reasons,
ariçing mairily from the principle of nationality, for doubting
ivhether the international personality ofthe United Nations Organ-
ization covcrs the right to daim compensation on behalf of the
victim or his dependents (except in cases where the United Nations,
having itself paid such compensation within a reasonable figure,
rnaybe able to claim it undes the kad of damage resulting to itself),
there are, nevertheless, grounds, based (cc)on the special nature of
the relationship between the Organization and its servants, (b) on
the necessity for the Organization to enjoy al1 such capacities as
are neçessary to exercise its functions and to fulfil its purposes, and .
(c) on the importance of the Organization and its servants being
free from any limitations deriving from considerations of nation-
ality, for concluding that the Organization is possessed of the
neceçsary capacity to make claims directly on bchalf of its servants
or their dependents ORSEKVATIONS SURBlITTED BY GOVIZHNBIENTÇ il0

considerations apply. A State certainly has a right to claiin on the
. ground of the international wong suffered by it through the illegal
action of anether Çtate towards its national. But it is gencrally
acceptcd that the rncasure of the damages which such a State
may bc entitled to recover in such a case, apart from any direct '
loss or injusy wlucli it magr itself have suffered, is the damage
suffered by the individual or by hiç dependents. Now in many
cases, the injured party, althougli he may have itlore than one
nationality, will be residing and will be connected with, and will
have his dependents irz one or other of fhcse two countries, in
which case that country wilEbe entitled to recovcr al1 os ncarly
al1the damages properly due, and the other country will be held
not to have sufferéd more than a<syecies of notional or token
damage. In other cases it rnight be found that the victii was
connected by residence or othenvise, as wellas by nationality, with
both ccountries, or that he hrid dependelits, xvho would rrorrnally
rank for the rcceipt of some compensation, resident in both caun-
tries, in whicfcasc there would be clcar ground for the apportion-

ment of thedamage within whatever lirastlic proper total. Tliese
cases may givc rise to difficultiesof detail or of the application of
the principles involved, but there is not much room for doubt as
to the principles themselves and, theoretic.ally, no difficultexists.

zz. Applying these coiiçiderations to the case of a dual right
of claim on the part hoth of the United Nations Organizatiori and
of the national State ofthe victim, and taking first the nioseusual
case, namely whese the iiljury has bcen suffered at the hands of a
country of which the victirn is not a national, the circumstances
as to the nature of the victim'ç employment, whcther he is statelcss
or not, what is the nationality and residence of hiç dependei~ts,
will probably indicate whether the national State or the United
Nations skould rnost appropriately make the clairn-or it may
be a matter of arrangement. In many cases the national State
might wcll prefer to leave the claim to be made entirely by the
United Nations, since, where the injury is incurred on United
Nations service, the çpeçial relatianship of thevictirnto the Organ-
ization and his independence of natioliality considerations in
relation to his service appear to make the Organization the naturd
claimant and to give it the predorninant right (see paragraph 18
above). Also, where the Urganization has already paid com-
pensation to the dependents of the victim under contractual
obligations, thedamages due to the national State under this liead
would in fact have been discharged, and it would be clear that it
IV= the United Nations which was entitled to recovcr. Thc

Government of the United Kingdom does not consider it necessary
to indicate here how ab1the permutations and combinations of
any duality of çlaimç might be worked out in the circumstances.
It suggests that the foregoiligconsiderations indicate broadly how 4I OBSEIIVATLDNS SOUMISES PAR LES GOUVEKNERIEXTS

the rights of the United Natiocs rnight he reconciled witk those
of the national State, and that ifthe Court cornes to tlie conclusion
that these rights are reconcilable on some sucli basis, the details
of the procedurc to be folloivedin the variouç possible cases might
- be worked out çubsequently by the United Nations Secretariat for
submission to the Asçembly, and in this con~zexionthe Çovernrnent:
of the Ijvited Kingdom draws attention to the final paragrapli of
the Assembly Resolution of the 3rd Deçember, 1948, instructing
the Secretary-General, when the Court has given its opinion, to
prepare proposais in the light of that opinion and to submit them
to the General Assernbly at its next rcgular session.

23. There rernains the case (not at al1 i~nlllcelyto occur with
United Nations servants on foreign missions) where thc injured
partyisanationaloftheStatereçpoi~sibleforW thkereasj,ury.
in such a case, and according to the dactrine of the master nation-
tility, no claim could be made by any other State of which the
injured party was also a national, except in respect of aily direct
loss os damage sustained by that State itçelf, there are grounds
for thinking that this limitation cloesnot, or ought not to apply

to claims by the United Nations. The need for the United Nations
and its servants, if itis adequately to exercise itsfunctioriç and
fulfil its purposes, to be independent of al considerations of
nationality, and the implications in this respect of Articles ioo,
104 and zo~ of the Charter and of the Convention on Privileges
and Immunities, make it al1 the more necessary for the United
Nations to be able to protect its servants even as against their
own governments and in their own countries, and for the latter
to feel that they can carry out their tasks in the knuwlcdge that
such protection wili be afforded. Now it seems to be a necessary
consequence and implication of Articles xoo, 104 and xog of the
Charter and ofthe Convention on Privilegcs and Immunities and
also of such provisions aç Artide 2, paragraph 5, ofthc Charter by
which Members undertake to "give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present
Charter" that the obligation of Menlbers (owd to the Organiza-
tion) to afford assistance and protection and to extend irnmunity
to United Nations h!iissionsoperating in their territory, aizd to tlie
pcrsonnel of such Missions, relates equally to any member of the
Mission who is one of their oivn nationais, and that it is not in any
way diminished or cancelled by reason of the fact of such nation-
ality. The duty is one owed to the Orgailization as siich, independ-
ently of any consideration as to the nationality of the individnal
memkers of the Mission or, iri othecaçcs, of the nationalityof the
particular United Nations servant emglciyed. If so, however,
then clearly the State concerned calmot, or ought not to be per-

mitted to plead the nationality of the iured party as a defence to
any international claim which may be brought on his behalf bythe Organizatioii. Whereas, if the issue is between two States,
one State does riot (apart from special cases created by treaty)
owe a duty to ariother State in respect of its own nationals (i.e.
the nationals of the former State even if they are also nationals
of the latter), the contention here advanced is that Members of
the Organization do owe duties to the Organization even in respect
of their own nationals if these are servants of the Organization,
and that this fact takes the case out ofthe operation ofthe ordinary
rule.

(Siggzed)PHILIP NICHOLS.