INTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE
GABC~KOVO-NAGYMA PROJECT
-GARY ISLOVAKIA)
COUNTER-MEMURIAL
SUBMATZD BYTHE
SLOVAKREPUBLIC
VOLUMEI
5DECEMBER 1994 SECTION 2. Evenîs Occurringbetween the StartofProjectConstruction and
! Hungary'sUnilatemlSuspensionofWork atNagymaros (1977 tu
May 1989) ...................................................
....76..................
i
A. On-GoingEnvironmenta RlesearchandAssessment; Mounting
Economic Worries forHungary Lead to anAgreedSlowdownof
theProject....................................................
.77.................
FurtherEnGironment Raesearch :eneralOveMew ................7...
l
Hungary'Esconomic Prob.................................................................
Slowdown oftheProject. -78
TheEconomic Concerna Reflectedinthe HungarianPosition
Paperof Decemher 1983........................................1.............
TheEconomic,NuiEnWonmentaI,Concerns ofthe Mafiai
LetterofMarch 1984..........................................8..........
....
B. TheEnvironmentaiandEconomichsessments of theProject in
1985 ....................................................
.....84.................
TheHungarian Environmenta IlmpactAssessment ofJune
1985 ....................................................
...4.................
The Hungarian Academy' s pinioof June 1985..................89....
TheImpact onthe GINProjectoftheOn-GoingEnvironmental
Research.....................................................89...........
C- AccelerationoftheProjecî (986-May 2989) ........................2........
TheHiinguianParliament'sStrongSupportof theProject in
EariyOctuber1988 ...........................................93.......
.......
HungarykRefusaltu EnterTnto anAgreementonWater
QuaIityProtection(3 May7989) .............................................
CHAPTERV. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TREATY:A FACTUAL ACCOUNT
OFHUNGARY'SBREACEtESOFTHE 1977 TREATYFROMMAY
1989 TO MAY 1992 ................................................97.
....................
SECTION 1. Hungary's UnilateralDecision to Suspend ConstructionWork at
Nagymaros(13 May 1989)..........................................98............
.
A. The HungarîanGovernerit's Resolutionof 13May
1989...................................................
.....I..0.............
B. Hungq's Fdure toAdvance Any Vdid ScientificBasisforits
Decision of13 May1989 ..........................................3.............
SECTION 2, Hungary'sExtensionofSuspensionofWork toDunakiIitiandits
Terminationaf theConstructionofthe NagymarasSection of the
Project....................................................
.......................
A. Hungary's Resolutionof20 July 1989..............................05.................. Illustrations Index
Aaaearin~ at
-ara.
Illus.No.CM-1 AenalPhotographsofthelargelycompleted Para.4.47
(Aand B) GabEikovoSectionoftheG/NProject-
PriotoMay 1989
IlluNo. CM-2 ChronologyofDecisionand Actions Para.5.112
(May 1989-May1992)
IIIus.No. CM-3 GMtphicPortraydofEventsSurroundmg Para.6.18
the DammingoftheDanube
(Octuber-December1992)
MainDrinkng WaterSuppIiesin Para.7.65
Bratisla-aBudapest Sectorof
Danube
Illus.No. CM-5 DecreaseinGround WaterLevels Para.7.81
Between 1960and 1990
Illus.No. CM-6 . PhotographsfiomHungdan "White Para.7.82
(A,B and C) Book" (Pre-1990):MosoniDanube;
HungarianSidehs; SlovakSideArms
SideArmsIntakes:DobrohogfIntake; Para.7.84
Dunakiliintake
ActiveAiIuviaiFIoodPlain Para.7.86
G/N Project(GeneraILayuut) Para.8.01
IlIus.No. CM-IO Varian"Cu Para.8.01
IiIus.No. CM-1 ActualStatofImpIementationof Para. 8.01
GabCikov oectionofG/NProject
ProposedUndenirater eirtoRestore Para. 8.11
HungananSide Amis
Change ofGroun Wd aterLevels: Para.8.25
Spnng 1993;July-Septembe1993IiIrr.o.CM-14 PhotographsofNavigationonthe Para.8.42
(A and 3) Danube:GabEikovo NavigationLocks
Today;The Danube atBratisIava
(r985-I986)
Illus.No. CM-15 çunovo Cornplex;CloseUpView Para.8.51
(A andB)
IIlusNo.CM-16 Cbronologyof DecisionsandActions Para.10.03
(May 1989-Ma1 y992)
IlluNo. CM-17 NavigationChannelUnder Original Para.11.17
G/NProject;UnderVariant "CM
IllusNo.CM-18 flIurationfiomNew Scientist Mer
(September1994):G/NProject -Part Para.11.79
ofEuropeanNavigationNetwork-
~hotograph of~ypass Canaand Cunovo
CornplexLookingDownstreamhm
CunovoReservoir;RecentPhutograph
ofSIovaS kidehsCHAPTER1.
1.01 Thedisputesubmitted to theCourtbymeans of theSpecialAgreement
bearsiûndamentallyi,not exclusiveIy,ontheapplicatiandthe possiblebreachof the 1977
TreatyconcludedbetweenCzechoslovaki andHungary.
2.02 This instrumentisand will remah the basisforthe solutionofthe
present disputasSection1 ofthis introductionshows. Hungaryafiemptstu escapefiom the
probIernsposedby thiscentral,unavoidabea& It trietu&t the tasofthe Court andfdIs
back ona contortedIegalstratem.ThisisdiscussedinSection2.
SECTION 1. Summarv ofthe Caseas SlovakiaSea It
The Case isa "Treatv Casettand the 1977 Treatv is the Central
Element oftheDispute and of itsResolution
1.03 Article2oftheSpecialAgreemenp t rovides:
The Court isrequestedto decidt onthebasisof the Treaty andrules
md1principlesofgenerd internationalIaw,asweIIassuchother treaties asthe
Court mayfindapplicabie,
(a) whether the Repriblicof Hungarywas entitled to suspena dnd
subsequentIyabandon ,n1989,theworksontheNagpms Projectandonthe
partofthe GabEfkovo Projecfor whichthe Treatyattnbutedresponsibilito
theRepublicofHungary;
(b) whether the Czech and SlovakFederal Republicwas entitledto
proceed, in November 1991, to the 'provisionasolution'and to put into
operationfrom October 1992 thissystem, describedin the Reportof the
WorkingGroup ofIndependenEt xpertsof the Commission ofthe European
Communities, the Republicof Hungaryand the Czech and Slovak Federal
RepubIic dated23 November 1992 (dammingup ofthe Danube at river
kilometer1851-7 on CzechosIovak territorand resdting consequences on
waterandnavigationcourse);
(c) what arethe Iegdeffectsofthe notificatioonMay t9, 1992,of
theterminationofthe Treatybythe RepublicofHungarjr.
(2) The Court is dso requested to determine the legd consequences,
incIudintherightsandobligationsfothe Parties,xisinhm its Judgmenton
thequestionsinparagraph(1)ofthisArticle."
1.04 The1977Treaty isthusthecentraielementofthedisputewhichdivides
theParties.The Courtis requesteto determinwhetherHungarywas entitleto suspendandsubsequentlyabandon itsobligationsarisingfromthe 1977 Treaty and then uniiaterallto
decide on its "termination". The Court idso asked tu determine whetherCzechodovakia
was, forits parlegallyeritidedtu secuan approximateapplicationby resortto aprovisional
solution, Varian"C". And, finally,the Court askedtu decidewhat the IegaIconseqrrences
areofitsfindings.
1.O5 Not only does theapplicatio- ornon-application- of the 1977 Treaty
constitutthe veryobjectof thedisputesubdtted to theCourt butf ,iirther,thePartieshave
agreed that the Treaty forms the essentialbasis of the applicablelaw. Certaidy, the
introductoryclauseto Articl2(1) oftheSpecialAgreement quotedabove does not make the
Treatytheexclusivebasisfortheresolution ofthatdisputesince italso mentions"nilesand
principlesof generalinternationalaw as weilas such other treaties asthe Courtmay find
applicable"B. utthisismerelybecause,astheCourt haspointed out:
"..a mIe ofinternationallaw, whether customq orconventional, does not
operateina vacuum; itoperatesinrelationtufactandin the contextofa wider
framewark of~ega~miesofwfrichit foms ody a part."
Inthisparticularcase,the 1977Treaty,whichforms one elementof a complexof interrelated
obligations2,anonly be appliedandinterpretedin thelightofthe lawof treaties,therulesof
which have, for the mainpart,beencodifiedin the 1969 ViennaConvention on the Lawof
Treaties.
1.06 Ttis nonetheIess tme that,through the agreementofthe Parties inthe
SpeciaIAgreement, the 1977 Treaty constitues both the principd object ofthe dispute
betweenthe Parties andthe verybais ofitsresolutionwtiichthe Courthas been requestedtu
provide.
The Main Elementsof the Dis~ute
1.O7 Slovakiahasset out in itsMernoriailts anaiysisof thisdisputeandthe
meansbywhichit shouldbe resolved. However giventheambiguities and contradictionof
Hungary's treatment3S, Iovakiconsidersitusefulto rernintheCourt in broadoutline ofthe
essentialelementsof its owncaselesttheybelost sightofirefutingHungarytspositions.
1 InterpretatoftheAgreementof 22 5ch 1951 ktweentheWHO and Ea~pt,AdvisonOpinion,
I.CJ. Repor1980,p.76.
2
Sec .IovaMkernoria,aras6066.54,andpara2.25;get.,below.
3
Seeforexample,para..45,ga.. below. 1.08 Forthe reasonssetout above,the point ofdeparturerequired forany
andysisof the caseis the 1977 Treaty,on whichHungq hasendeavoured to cast acertain
suspicion,inparticulbymeansof its constantallusionsto pressuresallegedlyappIiedbythe
SovietUnion at thetirneofitconclusion.Leavingasidethefactthatthese allegedpressures
are entirelytheoretical,juas the Courthas hdd inrelationto anotherpartyin a recent
dispute,Hungary "hasnothowevertakentbisargument sofaras tosuggestitasa groundfor
invalidityof the Treatyitseinor basHungary "suggestedthata new peremptorynom of
general internationallawhas emergedwhich couldhaverendered the Treav void4. To the
contrary,Hungary accusesCzechosIovakioafha* breachedthe Treatyandbasarrogated tu
itselfthpower todeciderinilaterdlonitstemination.
1.O9 ThisTreaty,thevalidityofwhichhasnotbeencontestedbyeither ofthe
Parties,imposespreciseobligationofresult,theprincipalof whicharecontainedinArticle 1
(describinthem)andArticle5 (allocatingthembetweenthe Treatyparties). Intheiressence,
these obligationsconsistof the constructionof tG/N Projectwhich "shallcomprisethe
GabEikovo system of Iocks and the Nagymarossysternof locksand shallconstitutea single
andinvisibleoperationalsysteof works"(Article1).
1IO Concerns inreIatioto theenvironmentdo not fum the object ofthe
Treaty even ifas Hungary recognises,such concems were by no means overlookedby the
draftersof the Treaty,who -a rarethingfor the era-accordedthem a placein the Treaty
(ChapterVIIthereof andArticle15). Furthemore,oneof the most important objectivesof
the Treaty was protectionagainst floods- an essentid factor in terms of the hurnan
environmentin the light of the history of catastrophicfloods inthe area before the
construction of theGN Project. The Treatyparties alsointended to improve navigation
conditions- the Project areabeing oneof the remairing bottlenecks Endering the smoofh
functioningof the Rhine-Main-Danubenetwork (then under consideration) - and tu draw
additional benefit hm their naturalresources by developmofta renewabIeand pollution-
freesourceofenergy(the GIN Projectbeingeonceivedtosupplythe particularlyvaluablepeak
production electricity).
1.11 Thesepreoccupation sere of coursesharedbythe two Treatyparties.
But it is interesttognotethatit wasHungarythatinitiatedthe negotiationsthatledtothe
conclusionof the~reaty';thatit wasHungary thatwasthemostenthusiasticpartyintermsof
1 CaseConcernintheTemtorialDis~utnibvanArablamahirivv.Chad).Judment.I.C.J. Rewrtç
1994 ,.20.
J See,Hungariai ernorial,pa3.02-3.84.the actuaiconclusionof the Reaty6; and that it was Hungary dso who, in spiteof
Czechoslovakia'reticence, pushedfor andachievedthe acceieratofthe Project pruvided
forinthe Protocalo6 February1989.
1-12 ThisIasteventisof particrilarimportanceinthatshows that,atthat
date,Hungaryentertainedno doubts at alas to theuse,viabilityand sustainabilof the
Project:if Hungaryhadhad even thefaintestof doubtsitwould have abstainedfroman
accelerationof the Project'sschedule.must thereforbe concludedthat, on 6 February
1989,Hungaryformallyrenewedits 1977commitrnentw sithoutpressureofany sort.Infact,
Hungarymade this decisionata time when the means of investigationand evduation of
ecoIogicairiskwereweil known and &er the Frujecthadbeenthe object ofnumerous,
preciseimpactstrrdiesconductedbotbyHurigaryandCzechosIovakia.
1-13 Yet thisdidnot hinderHungarfiom reconsiderinitsobIigatiounder
theProjecton 13May 1989,thatisody threemonthslater.For on thatdate,it suspended
work atNagymaros -neverto be continued-whifston 20JuIyof thesameyear itextended
thissuspensionto theuppersectionoftheProject,refusito proceedwithfinalworkon the
Dunakilitiweir, whichconcernedthedammingof theDanubeand, hence,preventedputting
intooperationtheGabEikovo section. Thesedecisionswere the preliminq stepsIeadirigtu
thepurported"terminationofthe 1977Treaty,natifietuCzechosIovakiaon 19May 1992.
1.14 It isabundantlyCI-r fhat no hndamentd change ofcircurnstarices
couI daveintervenedordidinterventbetween thestwo keydates -6 Febmary 7989, when
Hungaryreafimed its cornmitment to the ProjectandobtainedCzechoslovakiasonsentto
the acceleratioof the scheduleand13 May 1989,whenHungary began to deprivethat
cornmitment of anysubstance. It is thunecessary toseek thereason for this complete
turnaround.
1.15 DoubtIess"ecoIogicaconsiderations"play4alargeroIe-butnot inthe
sense meant by Hrrngary.No new ecoIogicaI facfors were diswvereirt ththree month
periodbetweenFebmary and May1989; nor, indeedhadany new developmentsbrought the
Project into question sin1977. Hungaryfailed toproducesuch key evidence beforeits
suspensionand subsequentabandonment ofworks andhas not remediedtbis failurein its
Mernorial.
6
SeeSlovakMernorial, para.6.08. 1.16 Hungaq'spositionderivesnut fiom a "scientific"ecology buhm a
"politicalecology. TheHungarianGovemment,overwhelmed with seriouseconomic and
financialdifficulties,had decitodblarneits inabilito meet itsobligationson supposed
environmentaolbstacles. It didnot hesitto put pressureon scient& bodies,in particular
theHungarian Academyof Sciences, toprovidea veneeroftmth to itspositionwhich,infact,
was inspiredbypoliticalandeconomicfactors7.
2.27 This gavethe Hungarian Governefit the opportunitytu "bringon
board" the ecologicrnovement, tu attributetuCzechosIovakithe reasonsfor the prevailing
discontent, anto lightenitundeniablyheavyfinanciaiburdens(dthough, inrelatioto the
Project,thesewereburdens sharedbetween thetwo Treatyparties).Once thismuvernentwas
set in action(andevenencouraged)t,heHungarian Goverment was unableandunwillingto
resistthefurthepressuresof the environmentaalctivists,whetherHungarianor foreign. No
oneis unaware oftherole playedby theenvironmenta ml ovementsinthedemocratic protests
againstthecomrnunistregimesin Centraland EasternEuropeand,in particulari ,nHungary.
Put forward- quite wrongiy-as theemanationof the regirnethein power,the G/N Project
became a symbol tu bedestruyed. And,dthough the HungariatiGovernent knew that the
clairnsagainstthe Praject hadno scientificbasis,it neither muld norwishedtooppose the
rnountingdernagogic pressurestu which it haddetivereditself byagreeingtosuspendthe
works at Nagymaros,then at Dunakiliti, and then by abaridondIgworks,andfindIy by
purportingto termina tnilateralthe Treaty. Not one of the stephada credible basis-
eitherinfact, orinlaw.
1.18 Oneexampleof particularsignificanceshowsthatthe so-calledmotives
tied tothe defenceofthe naturd environmenw t ereno morethan asimplepretextwithno
content. InI-fungarjrtemorid' it is affrrmthat n Octuber 1989, its PrimeMinister,W.
Németh,propoaed tu CzechodovakiathatNamaros be abandonedand an agreement be
reached on environmental guaranteesinreturnfor the continuation of worksatDunakiliti
(which hadbeen intempted sinceJuIy)andthedammingofthe Danube. This"bargain" was
efFectivelyproposedonceagain in ~ovembe? - thus showing thatHungarysaw no real
"environmental" obstacle to the constructionof the GabEikovosection of the Project.
Nonetheless,when Czechoslovakiaindicated that it would be preparedto enter into an
agreementon environmentalguaranteesandpostponework onNagymaroswhile its alleged
7 Seethe"MarjalîetteSIovaMkernorip,ara3.37-3.5andAnnex56.
B HungariaMernorial.ua.3.96.
9
SecthedraAfrearprojesubmittebyHungaxy.m., Vol.4, Amex 30.environmental effectwere being studied, Hungary immediatdywent back un its offer,
showingcIearIyitsrefustubeboundby an)lofthe1977 Treatyobligations.
1-19 Facedby thi saiaccompli, CzechosIovaki(then Slovakia)devoted
ifseltominimisingthedamagessu&red asa resultoHungws unlawfu l ositionThiswas
itsIegaldutyinvirtueof thegeneranilerelatingtointernationlesponsibility.It atried
toexecutethe 1977Treatyin amarner as"approximatea"s possibto the originaThiswas
itslegalrightinvirtueofthegeneralprinciofthe lawoftreaties.
1.20 Variant "Cu respondsin di respect tsthese requirements:itisa
provisional.solutionleaWig entirelyopen the possibiaifullreturto the 1977Treaty.
Moreover, without affecting imy way Hungary'sterritorial sovereigriVariant "C"
representsthe partialexecutiun of theTreaty>for it improvesnavigonioone important
sectoroftheDanube, it permitstheproducti(dthough notpeakproduction)ofelectriciat
GabEkovoand itenhancesthe preservationofthe environment - notablyby positively
infiuencinthegroundwaterof theregionandbyfacilitatintherechargeof thesidearms of
the Danube which,beforeimplementationw, ere slowlydryingup. Moreover,Variant "CM
allowsthepartialimplementatioofalreadwelladvanced workswhichcouldcertainlynot be
lefas theystoodifanecologicalcatastropwas tobeprwented.
1.21 RegardIessoftheseadvantages(which,in spiteofHungary'sdaims to
the coritrary,arenot caunter-baladyearinegatlvefactors),theimplementatiof Variant
"C" caa ody presentapartiaIrealisationofthe TreaIr-tarticuIar,the non-constructionof
the Nagymarosweirmeansthattherecanbe no peakproduction at GabEikovo ,o electricity
productionatal1atNagymaros, no improvemen n navigatiobeiow Sap(F'alkoviCovo a)nd
no completionof theplannedamelioratiinfloodprotectiondownstreamof thebypasscanal.
Moreover,Variant "Cu hasdemanded fromCzechoslovakia (andSlovakia)a furtherfinancial
undertakingi,nadditiontthatalreadyborne,byhavingtocompletethoseof Hungary'sworks
relatinto the GabCkovosection thatHungq hadsnmmarilyabandoned. Nor can Variant
"C" remedy SIovakialsinalosreflecîingIargeIyfiuitIessworksintheNagparos section.
1.22 Slovakia'IosseswiIaisobe aggravateas aresuIof recentsstetaken
by HungarysinceHungary duesnot denythatitispreparinto demolishthecofferdambuilt
on the Nagymarossite, wbichconstitutesaround20% of the constructionworks for the
Nagymarosstep for which Hungarywas respon~ible'~I.f Hungaryexecutesthi sernolition
project,itwill preseboth Slovakiaandthe Courtwith a M accompliand will render the
10
a SiavaMernoriXi,para.61andHungariaMernoria,ara.11-14. 1.26 Hungary'sattitudeduringthe SpecialAgreement'snegotiation is no
more than one of the manifestationof its Iitigatistrategy which,in essence, aimsto
convince the Court of the iIlegaIiof Variant "Ct whilst disregarding th1977 Treat).,
Hungarykunilaterd "termination"ofwhichwould not ody haveerasedits existencebut dso
a11ofitsconsequences .u meet thisobjective,Hungarmissfatesthe taskoftheCourt under
the SpecidAgreement.
A, TheTaskof theCourt
Hun~ary'sAttempts toSetAside the 1977 Treatv
1.27 Inconformity withtheprovisionsof Articl40(1) of theStatuteof the
Court,theSpecialAgreement indicate thesubjectofthedisputeand,at thesame time,defines
thetaskoftheCourt.AsAmbassadoR rosenne has recalled:
"Wherethe case is instituteby specid agreement, that indication will be
perernptorin the sensthatthedecisionofthe Court willformaII replto the
specificreferentu theCourt containedinthespecidagreement 11.,
Nonetheless,both initsMernoriai andbyits generd approach tuthe dispute,Hungary has
attemptedtu bringintoquestiontheSpecid Agreement'tsems:
- Ithasintroducedthe notionofthecriticadate;
- It has developed an untenableline of argumentrelating to State
succession;
-
Ithas negtectedtheprovisionsof ArticIe4 of the SpeciaIAgreement
relatingtutheTemporaryWater Managemen tegime (-1.
The "CriticalDate" Proausedbv Hun~arv
1.28 The conceptofthe "criticaldateq3ia familia one, although itsutility is
14
S.RosenneTheLaw andPracticeotheInternationlourt,MartinNijhofDordrecht1985,p.
509. -9 -
ofien questionable's. Imost commun use istoidentXythe date atwhich atitI- usuallyto
territor- has passed, or beenacquired16 ;raltematively, the datatwhich adisputehas
1
"~r~stalised""so thata courtcanfixapointin timeatwhjch therightsand obligationcm be
assessed.
1.29 Hungary seeks toderivefiom Article2(l)(a)ofthe Specid Agreement
1 a criticaldateofMay 198918,indicatingina footnotel- albeitsomewhat obscurely- thatits
use oftks dateistoexchde priercondiictbutnotsubsequec nonduct.This ,fcourse is,the
exact opposinofthenormalfunciionof the "critica latew. Ttsuseistu exdude evidenceof
conduct aft aeparticulardate,but here Hungary seeh to use it tuexdudeevidence of
conduci beforeMay 1989.
1.30 It is clearthat Art2coftheSpeciaI Agreement indicateno suchdate.
The Court is askedto decideon thebasisof the Treaty and otherrulea snd principleof
generalorconventionai lnternationla#, on:
- The legalityofHungNs suspensi ondlaterabandonmeno tfitswork
on theProject(para.(a));
-
The fegality of Czechos~ovakia'p sroceedirig with Variant"C" in
November 1991 andoperatingit fromOctuber 1992 @ara. @});
- The legdity ofHungary's fuma1 termination ofthe Treaty on19 May
1992(para.(c)).
l5 Sec heAmntine-ChileFrontieCase38,InternatioLlaRewrts (1969p. 10atp.80:theCourt
of Arbitratsaid i"considerthenotionof thcriticdatetobe oflittlevalin thepresent
litigationandhexamineciithe evidenŒsubmitttoit..."IntheTabaAward(ArbitralAward
intheDimuteConceminaCertaiBoundar,PillaBetweentheArabRevublicoEmt andtheState
criticdatebu1acritifal pî(thperidaothemandate). (19891p.226,the Courchosenota
'' AsintheIsIandofPaImasCase.~,Reportsof92$(VoI.
II,p829,whereHukr 1.tmkthedateonwhichsovereig patysefom SpairotheU.S.A.
I7
a theextensive&-ion byG.Fitunauricin"TheLstwand ProceduroftheI.C.J."32 British
Yhk of InternationalL(1955-56pp.2044.Aç CounsefIortheU.K.in ihe Mnauieret
EcrehosCase.Sudment.I.C.J.RemriI9SL p.47 Pleadin~ç,VoII ,p.6748).Fitvnarrrice
~finedtheconcepMer thantheCourthavebeeprepar togo.
18
HungarianMernorial.am8.08.
l9 m., p. 24fn ..
20 & paras1.O-1.06above.CIearlyt,hese eventstookplaceatdiffertimes,sothatherecanbeno one "critical"dain
the dassicd seriofthete- and hwtceonefindsHungaryk suggeztionthatMay 1989marks
simplythe beginninofacriticdperiodAnd thishighlightsthe essentid purpofHungary's
submission:iistu excludeevidenceof conduct~nor tu May1989, includin.he wnclusion
and the applicatiofthe1977 Treav- Even on ifface te suggestionisunworkable.How
wouId itbepossibletojudgewhetherHungary was jusaed insuspendmg workinMay 1989
withoutexamining the prioreventswhichledup to -andin Hungary'sviewjustified- the
suspension?
1.31 Thi sxtraordmarsyuggestiois simpIa ploydesignedto excludevitd
evidenceof the conductofthe Partiesprioto May 1989. Therecm be no surpristhat
HungarywouIdwish to excludesuch evidence,for iishighiydarnagingto Hungary. As
ChapterIU ofSlovakia'sMernoriaal ndChapterIV ofthisCoiinter-Mernorialmakeclear, it
was duringthisearIierperiodthat Hungary soughttu delaythe Project, pIeaecoriomic
dificuhies and IaoftechnicdskiI Isdthensought tospeedupthe Projectin theinterests
of envirumentai protection. Czechoslovakiasoutoaccommodatethesechangingdemands
overthese early years. The agreedPrutocotuspeed up completionwas signedonly on 6
February 1989,sothatwithinaperiodofjustoverthree month s ungaryusedenvironmentai
argumentsfist to speedupandthentosuspendtheProject.
1.32 The inconsisto eftiysbehaviouisobvious,and itis srnaIwonder
thatHungarw youldwish toexcludeitfromtheCourt'sconsideration.Paaduxicdty, whilse
Hungary isaruüoustoexcludeevidenceofits own condttctpre-May1489,iha no hesitation
in invoking,in Chapte4 ofitsMwnorid, treatieof 1954,1956 and 1976 inanattempt tu
prove ~hatthePartieshadentered into commitmentscontrollingthe way in wfiichthe 1977
Treatymust be interpreted aapplied.
1.33 Slovakiaisconfidentthatthe Courtwill not acceptHungary'slinof
argument. Thisis a caseinwhichthe"criticl ate"conceptreallyhasno role. Thisis a case
inwhicha speciaiagreement-a com~romis -existsandtheroleof thatcompromiswillserve
forwhateverpurpose a "criticdate" isneeded. The CourtwiIIneed tolook atthe whole
recordof theconductof thePartiesinordeto answerthe questionsposedinArticle2ofthe
SpecialAgreement.There canbeno basisforanarbitraryexclusionof evidenceofcondiict
priortua certaidate,the pnm~ objectofwhichexclusioniswithorrquestiontu "neutralise"
the 1977Treaty,whichis,aspresentedintheSpecidAgreement,not ody the principalobject
ofthe disputebut theprincipIasisof theapplicalawas well. 1.34 On readingHungary'sMernorialS, lovakiwasstruckwith astonishment
andperplexityby theargument - tosay theleastunexpected - thatHungary hmfashioned
fromthelaw of Statesuccession. Hungaryseems to attachaveryspecialimportanceto this
argumentsince:
- Itappearsas wly asthe fourthparagraphofitsMemorial;
- ItisdeveIopedatgreatIengthand appearsthoughout itspleading;and
- Hurigav evengoes sofar astu make thisnew argumentpart ofits
fonnd Submissionsi,nvitingthCourtto adjudgeand declare:
"thathe Treatyof 16 September 1977 has never beeninforce betweenthe
RepublicofHungaryandthe Slova ~e~ubiic'."
1.35 Slovak iall not addressthis argument indetaat thisstageofits
Counter-MernorialA. carefulrefutatiofHungary'speculiarargumen appearsinChapter III
below. ItissuEcientheretu indicatethoutlmeofHungary's argument:
(i) OnlyCzechosIovaki(a notSlovakia)was partytuthe1977 Treaty;
(ii) The dissolutiof CxechosIovakiagaveriseto two new Statesneither
ofwhichwas thecontinuationofthepre-existingtate;
(iii) The Treaties concluded by Czechoslovakiawith Hungaryhave
disappearedalong with Czechoslovakisave in a situationwhere an
agreementhasintervenedbetweenSlovakiaandHungary;
Thisis notthecaseforthe 1977 Treatywhich thusceased toexiston
(iv)
31 December 1992independentlyof Hungary'searIier gurporled
"termination";
(v) Therefure,the 197Treatyhasneverbeen inforcebetweenthe Parties
tothecment disputbeforetheCourt.
21
HungariaMernorial,. 339. 1.36 This reasoning,whichcariin no way be sustained"does not prevent
Hungaryfrom argiiingthat Slovakia isnonetheiess responsiblethrough its adoptioof
violationsof th1977TreatyallegedlycommittedbyCzechosIovakia. Furit icontendedthat
SIovakiaisobEgedtu rernedysuch breaches by way of damages eventhou& conversely,
Slovakiahasno rîght tuany remedyfor damages SUR& byCzechoslovakia. Ir rrder tu
jus@ these truly exfrayagantcontentions,Hungary relieson a confused andcornplex
interpretationofthe Specid Agreementt,essenceofwhichisto piaceinoppositionthe first
two paragrapho sf thepreambefon theone hand,and thetwo paragraphosf Article2 othe
Treaty,on theotherhand.
1.37 Theresultis hardlconvincing.Inparticulari,t is diactotsee how
Hungarycan affirmthat Slovakiais "thesole successorState in respect of rights and
obligationsrelatintothe GabCikovo-Nagym Projost",butnot inrespectof the Treaty
itself, given that suchrighand obIigations necessarilyhave their origin in the Treaty.
Similariyi,t extraordinarythat Hungashouldmean tu denythe Courtc 'ornpetenctu nile
on thevdidityofthe 1977Treatybetween the Partito the disputewhen:
- Article2<1)(invitethe CourttodecidewhetherHungarywasentitled
to suspendand subsequentlyabandon works "forwhich the Treaty
attributresponsibiliyo thRepublicof Hungary";
- Articl2(1)(crefersto "thelegd effecofthenotificatioon May 19,
1992, of thterminatioof the Treatvbythe Republicof FIungaryw";
and
Article 2(2) requeststheCourt "determinethe Iegd consequences,
includingtherightandobligatiansfor the Parties"derivinfrom the
answerstothequestionsmkedh paragraph 1.
It is absurdto contenthattheCourtcanonlyacquit itseiofits task in the way desiredby
Hungary ,hatis bydecidinthattheTreathyasneverbeenbinding on theseParties. Themost
to besaidisthatina balancedand equitablmanner ,hePreamble hasbeen drafteso thatthe
SpecialAgreement inno waypre-judgestheresponsesthattheCourtis calleupon togive.
1.38 Hungary'sinterpretatiofthe Specid Agreementgoesagainst itckar
tems andwouId deny its hahg anyusefuIeffect;foritpresrrmesthat the central question
12
Bec. hapleII IndX,kIaw.
23 EmphaçisaddedtoArtic2(1)faandZ(l)(c).beforetheCourt ,hichrelatteusthe obiigationsarisunder the 1977Treatyand tu the
consequericeof Hungary'spurporîed, unilaterd"termination",already answered. B y
excludi onge (and, SIuvakia'spiniothe sole)pwsibleresponse&, thatthe 1977Treaîy
isstiUinforcebetweenthe Parties,Hungary undrrlIimi thstask oftheCourt. Thus,it
attemptstoachievewhatithadhoped forby themi ofitsApplicatiowith the Cour-that
theCourt determinethevaliditof Variant"CM inisolationandon thebasisthatthe 1977
Treatyhadceasedto exisbeforetheprovisionalolutionwaeven putintooperation.
1.39 ThewholeHungarian Mernoriairelieonthi sypothesis.Furtheproof
ofthisis Hungaryinsistenceonthegenerailawoftheenvironmentastheapplicablelaweven
though,as Slovakiademonstratein ChapterlX below, the basicapplicablestandaisthe
1977 Treaty (acompletedby theJointContractua llan}.Thi sonns alex specialis,which
reflects the standardsof generd international Iaw while contairing its own detailed
reqrtirements. Article2 of theSpecialAgreementmakesthisIexspeciaIistheprilasisof
the decisito berenderedbytheCourt.
The Tem~orarvWater Management Revime
1.40 The veryreverseofitsrestrictive attitude totheconsideratioof
the1977 TreatyisHungary'emphasisontheW. Wst payingIipservictuArticl4 of
theSpecialAgreement ,hichexcludestheTWMR fromtheCourt jussdiction,Hungarytries
to introductheTWMR intthe caseinahighiydubiousmanner.
1.41 As Slovak miadeclearinits~ernorial~,heconclusi oofatemporary
watermanagement regime,to beappliedpendingthejudgmentof theCourt,isamatterto be
agreedbetweentheParties,and theresolutionoproblemswhichmay be encounteredon the
way toreachinganagreement,orwhich may arisepursuanto suchan agreement ,rematters
tu beresulvedbythe Paies- with recoirtoethe CommissionoftheEuropean.Communities
-and bytheCourt.
1.42 Evidently suchmatters arenot refenedto the Court for decision.
NowhereinArticle2 of theSpeciaIAgreementistherariywordingwhichwouldsuggestthat
the Court hadcornpetencoversuch rnatters. Indeed,Arti4(2)cunfirmsthat,pendinthe
conctuzionof an agreement on a managementregme, if eitherpwty feeIits rightare
endangered t,hremedy Lesinconsultatioandreferenceto theCommissionof theEuropeari
Communities and not,in applicationto thiCourt for an orderof interimmasures of
24
SlovaMernoria,ara6.protectionunderArticle 41 of the Statute.Inthese circumstances ,tis surprishgto read in
theHungarian Memoriat lhefollowingpassage:
"..the Court iserititIetutakehto account the conduct ofthe Partiesunder
ArîicIe4 of the SpeciaIAgreement in assessin heir goodfaith in reIatiotu
theresohtion ofthe disputesubmittedtu ~t5.n
Moreover, initsChapter 3,Hungq givesa hi@y tendentiuusZaccount of thenegotiations
su farwith regardtuthe concItrsioofa temporarywatermanagemen reghe.
1.43 But, cIeariy,thpositionadoptedby the two Partieswithregard to the
EC proposalsfora temporarywatermanagemenr tegimeareirreievantto theissues putbefore
the Courtin Article2. Whatever the meritsor demeritsof eitherHungary'sposition,or
Slovakia'sposition,asregardsEC proposals inDecember 1993, thesemust betotallyirreIevant
to thequestionswhetherHungarywas in breach ofthe 1977 Treatyin 1989-1990 (suspension
andabandonment)o ,r whether a breach arosefromHungary's puïportedterminationof the
TreatyinMay 1992,orCzechoslovakia'csonstruction ofVariant "CMin 1991-1992.
1.44 Inshort,Hungary's view of the taskofthe Courtis simplya devicetu
introduce extranwus and , rrngarwouIdwish, prejudicidrnateird inthe hopethat it might
coIourtheCourt's approach to theissuesactuaIIbefore it.Assuch, itshouIdbe rejected.
25 Hungdan Mernorialp,ara2.12.
26 Theword"tendentious"eem appropriaeorseverrl m. TheMinutesoftheLondon meetingon
28 October1992areportrayeas"theLondo n greement(Kungana Mnemorial,ara.3.191).The
purelytemporaq naturof Czchoslovakia'sundertak(explainainthe Slova k emorial,para.
4.97,gtses.)signoredSo isthefacthattheAgreedMinutes(SlovaMemorial,Annex128) were
expressteodbe withoutprejudtoethe legal rightsof thepartia.soisthe facthatthe EC
Group ofExpertsaw itta& asmaking recomrnendatiotsthePartiea notionquitincompatible
withtheideathatheyhadalreadentereintobindingcommitmentatthetondon meeting:secE.C
WorkingGroupreport of2 Novemkr 1993 (Slov Maernoria, nna 19). TheEC "compromise"
proposaisof December1993werebasai on discharfigureli.e.averagedischargintotheOld
Danubeof 800m3/s)whichwerepurecompromisebetweentheSlovakandHunganan proposais, nd
quiteunrelattoany scientijustijïcatiWhen thebvemembersof thEC WorkingGraupcoiild
not corneta cornmonreuimmendationwuse of a ffaitoapee on thepartoftheSlovakand
Hungarianrepentatives),thethreeEC appoinrememkrs offie Groupsirnp lyk theSIovak
proposaifo400 m3hand theHlutgariaproposiifor 120m3fsand,in aquite arbitrmramer,
spltthedifferenceMoreover,heHungarianmunt faitosdisclothatHungaqhas notactuaIIy
takenfie measmes mmmended by theEC Expertsso that thbranchesonthe Hungarianside
mot hefit f?omtheexîstirflow. Itwas necessat ryimpund the watersbymeans cf an
underwat weir,thusraisingtheirIsotha watercodd fiowintthebrarrchesotheHungarian
side.Hm- &viousIydecîdtnottodo x,bernusewiththerecharg-stem workîngeffectivelyin
thebranchesH, ungqwodd IostheÊvidenŒ ofthedIegedecoiogiddwastatianit ndedforthe
purposeclifcase -, para8.11g S., khw. A Curious Conception ofChronoIom
B.
i 1.45 hother characteristic ofthe Hungarian litigationstrgythe tutd
indifferenceshowto the chrunuIogof the facof thedisputeofwhich, atbesta scramblsd
imageisgiven.
1.46 Themost strikingexampleof thismethod isHungary's presentatioof
theeventssurroundingtheso-called"unilateralrrnination"f the Treatyon 19 May 1992.
Not daringtoadvanceanargument too conspicuouslyfaIsein pretendithat itdecisionto
"terminatewas theconsequence ofthe so-cal leiversioof theDanube" (forthedamming
took placemorethanfivemonthslater),Hungaryattempts to jus@ itspurportedtermination
by the supposedthreat posedby the preparationfor Vanant "c"*'. But Hungary has
"forgottenit that duruip this peno~zechoslod5a canstantly gave its agreement to
undenaking joint environmentalstudies2'. Most importantly,Hungary fds to linkthe
preparatioforVariant"C" tuthepreceding events.Itwas ody as amost reluctantresponse
fothe hardwringofHungws position thatCzechosIovakiaresolvedtuput Variari"Cu into
operation-a soIutionthawas morecostIyand Iessbeneficiinternisofelectricdproduction
than the origind ProjecInother words,thechronologyisofessentialimportancefor it was
the successivemaures ofHungws suspension and abandonment of works atNagymaros
andthen atDunakilitthatledCzechosIovaki ao envisagthe impIemenltationfa provisionai
solutio- asisshown bythe chronolo seyoutinalus.No. CM-2. To presenttheprovisiond
solutioninisolationconstituagravedistortioof thefacts.
1.47 This particdar example of distortedpresentationis not unique.
Elsewherein itsMemorial, Hungar y5rms thatCzechoslovakia'dsecisiontofa11back on
Variant"C" "cannothavebeen theappropriateesponseto thecautiousprovisiondand partial
suspensionof worksdecidedby Hungar dyuringthe Springof1989"". This too takesno
account ofthechronology.The simplefactisthatthedecisiontu proceedwith Viant "C"
was not madeuntil 12December 1991. Intheintervenintwoanda hdfyearperiod,Hungary
had decidedon the totdabandonment of worksinbath theNagymarossectio (n7 Octuber
1989) andtheGabEfkovo sectio(6 March1990) and hadresolvedtu terminatetheTreaty on
12 December 1990.
27 HungariaMemorial,aras3.154,3.1and10.31.
28 Sec.lovakMemorial,ara4.75,a., andpara.5.75,m., belwv.
29
HungariaMemorid,para.7.91.1sthifirssuspenSiunilateratakenon 13May 1989tobe
considerd"cautiou, rovisil ndpartiabecaus itelaste. oafew monthsbeforit was
wnvertedinaoterrnination? 1.48 Hungaryattemptsto reason as if the folIowingwas the sequenof
relevantfacts:
- First,Hungary'scautious,provisional,andpartialsuspeofion
wurh ...";
- Nex th.implementatioof Varian"CH byCl;echodovakia;
- FinaIIy,teminatiof the Treaty.
This sequencirseriouslwrongin ntleasttwo respects. -Ist, theterminaoftheTreaty
preceded,notfollowed,theimplementatioofVariant"C" -a stepwhichSlovakiahasalways
stresseasbeingprovisionailnnature,andwhichitistoday. Seconitis essentialto focuson
theprogressivehardeningof Hungary'positionwhich,by rnid-1990,hadleto thede facto
abandonment of the whole Project.This ,ntum, led to the studyof variousalternative
solutionsbyCzechoslovakia,neofwhich was eventuallimplementedb,eingVarian"CM.
1.49 Such indifferencto chronology ia constant throughout Hungary's
Mernorial.To givejusone otherexample,it quiteremarkablthatinits tableof"theTreaty
of 1977 andReIated~greernents"~'Hringarytakesno accountof the dateof the diserefit
treatieand agreementtshat it Iashavingbeen concIuded.This Ieadsito findsupportin
variousagreementshaving absoIutdynorelevancetu thecurrentdisputeandto faitu t&e
accountofthe modificationsmade byaspecific,subsequentagreemenru apreviousgenerd
agreement,thusignohg the principofIexposteriorprioridero~at.
SEC~ION 3. The Structureofthe Counter-Memorial
1.50 ThisCounter-Memona il dividedintofiveParts.Part1,SIovakiare-
examinesthe 1977Treatyinthelight ofHungary'sanalyses-both interrnsofthe individual
provisionsof the Treatyanditoverallsignificance(ChapteII)andin tems of Hungaryk
clairnthat SIovakidid notsucceed toCzechoslovakia'rsightsand obligationsthereunder
(Chapterm). ThisPartestablishesthe1977 Treatyasthe basisofthe curreritdispuand
analysestheParties'obligatitheremder,
1.51 Ln PartIIS,lovakiaexaminesinsome detaiHungary'srenditionof the
backgroundandfactuaI historjrthisdispute(ChapterIV-VI), wfriIstPaID isdevoted tu an analysisofHungarfs contentions as to anticipatedandactualenvironmental impacts
1 (Chapters VII andVm).
1.52 PartIV consistsofadetaileanalysisof Hungary'lsegalarguments.In
Chapter K, SlovakiaconsidersHunges misguide ed phasison environmentallaw; in
Chapter X theattemptsinHungary'sMernona lojustifyHungws breachesareanalysed; and
inChapterXI,the lawfuhessofVariant"C" isreexarnined.
1.53 Findly, inPartV, the defectsin Hungary'sconsideratiof thelegal
conscquencesofthedisputeareexplained.
1.54 SIovakia'sfonnal Siibmissioto the Courtare then repeated ithe
sametems as thosesetout inSlovakiasemurid. THE 1977 IXEATY AND OTHERAGREEMENTS RELEVANT
CHAPTER IL
I TO THE G/N PROJECT
2.01 It appearsfrom the Parties'respectiveanalysesthat there is much
comrnonground between themonthesubjectof the 1977~reaty'.Bothacceptthatwhilethe
1977 Treatyis offundamenta lmportancetothe solutionofthisdispute,the Treaty, as the
Hungarian Mernoriaeixplains,"wasnot concludedina vacuumbut was partof a matrixof
bilateralandrnultilattleatiesM2.hisdescriptiois echoedinthe SlovakMemorial,which
entitlitsrelevantsection"ACIweiyInterrelatedCornpleof Agreements".
2.02 Nonetheless, the Partanalysesdiir greatlin certaininstances and,
inparticular,withrega10:
- The naturof the1977 TreaQ;
- The natureandthe signîficanceoftheJointContractuaiPlanand the
otherrelevanagreements,aswellas theIin ketweentheseagreements
andthe 1977Treaty.
SECTIO N. The Natureof the 1977Treatv
2.03 Slovak ionsidersinsub-sectionA below,the Hungarian Mernorial's
discussioofthegeneralcharacteristisfthe 1977 ~reaty. Itwillbe show thatoncertain
keypoints,Hungary' snalysiishighlydebatable.Evenmore dubious isHungary's denialof
the teniturial naofrthe1977 Treaty.Thisinstrumenctreatedrightinremandnot merely
rights in personas,isdiscusseinsub-sectionB below.
A, Hun~ary'sAnahsis ofthe 1977Treaty
2.04 Hungary presentsthe 197Treaty as:
- avehiclefor "socialintegration";
.
1 CompareH, ungariMemorial. hapt4;SlwakMemorialC,hapterVSectio1.
2 HungariaMemorialpara4.56.
3 m., paras.4.10-4.13,4.21and10.73. - a cooperativprojectcreatingajoint investment;
- aframework treaty;
- an hernationd agreement that is consistent with environmental
protecfion.
With the exceptionof thhst point, whichofferody abiasedand incornpIetepicturofthe
Projecl, SIovakagreeswiththisgenerd descriptionNonetheless,certaiofthejustifications
ofered byHungary arecuntestedby SIovakiqasarethecondusiunsit drawsfium itsanalysis.
A "Vehide forSociatistTnte~rsition"?
2.05 Hungarychooses to find in the G/N Project a representationof
communistideology and in the 1977 Treaty"a vehiclefor 'socialistintegration'through
CO MEC ON" ^h.iis a reflectioof Hungary'slitigationstrategy,which is aimed at
portrayingSlovakiaastheold-fashioneddefenderofan outmodedvision,stillafflictedbythe
mentalityofthe Ancien~égirne'.It istme thatthesecond paragraphof the 1977 Treaty's
preamblerecognisedthat"thejoint utilizatioftheHungarian-Czechoslovak sectionofthe
Danubewill further ..contribute tu bnnging about the socidist integraofothe States
members ofthe Corrnd forMumaiEconomicCouperation", but thisrehnce issurelynot
suficient tuturn the Treatyi"aCOMECQN ~reaty"'.
2.06 in actudity,such a referenceis no more thm the sort of stylistic
formalitytobe fmnd inmany treaties that invoIvedsomekm of ecunomic cooperation
between the member States of the fonner CounciIfor Mutual Economic Assistance
("CMEA"). Thissort of languageappearinthe preamblesof many bifateralCzechoslovak-
Hungarianagreements oneconomic,scientific,cultuorltechnicalcooperation7.
2.07 In anyevent,the 1977 Treatyis not significa niflyrefromother
agreementsbetween non-socialistStateswhichprovideforthecommondevelopment of rivers
forminginternationaloundaries. Generallyspeaking,suchotheragreementsalso relateto
integrateprojects (thintegratiofienmanifestinitselfbythecreatioof anentiiy,invested
4
M.. para.10.73.
m., para4.21.
7 Se.CE, thagrwmentof5 Febrrta1973onCmperationitheSpherofTourismof 22 Decemkr
1981on CmperarionintheSphereofHeaIthandScience,o22 Octokr 1985on Culnirand
ScitntiCooperauon.with operationa1bnctions); they involve a close and continuous cooperation between the
partieswhose Enancialand teckcd obligationsareusuallyshared equally,asarethe irghtsto
use andtu profits;and,as agwierairule, these agreementsconsistof fiamework instruments,
the cornpletion andirnplementationofwhich are envisagedby means of suppIementq
agreement .ss
2.08 It mustalsobe stressedthat Czechoslovakia'asndHungary'sdesire to
developtheirhydrodectricresourcesand,inparticulart,hepotentialofthe Danubepredates
the arrivaof cornmunism there9. Theidea of suchdevelopment dates back to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire andbearsno Linkto anyspecificideo~og ~'~
2.09 The Soviet Union didfollow the bilateranegotiationsthatled to the
1977 Treaty (directlyorthroughthe intermediq of the CMEA), but only in the same
systematicmanner asitfoIIow edquestio ofrelationsbetweenthe Easternbloc countries.
It did not attach anyparticular significancto those negotiations. In fhis respect i,is
significanttharin1955 the Central Cornmitteof the Soviet Communist Party expressedits
complete neutrdity inrelatiotothe ~rojec" .TheUSSR'S reticenceinenteringinto financing
agreementswith Hungary demonstrates, if anything, its relative disintere.t1The above
8 b, forexample,theconventionbetwenranceandSwitzerlandmncerninghydroelectutilisation
oftheEmosson,23 August1963,Recueidestraitéset accordslaFranceP,aris1,65Tome 1p.
44; thconventiobetweenFranceandtheFederaRepublicofGermany concer~ngutilisatofthe
RhinebetweenStrashurgiKehlndLautenhurgNeuburg wJuln,969,m., 1969,p.110;and
theTreatybetweenBraziandParaguayconcerninthehydroelectrctilisationofthewaresources
oftheParaniRiver26 Apri1973,UnitedNatioTnrseatSerieNo. 13164p.92. Inpassing,it may
benotedthatthesepartidar examples,admittedlydatedtothe 1977Treaty.reved leconcem
overenvironmentalprotection.
9
Sec .orexample,interviewwithProf.EmilMoçyiMaavar Tudomhv, No. 1194,SlovakMernoriai,
Annex 22.
IO
Knnex 1,atp.23.Thisdocrrmtnt,nom astheHungarian"WhiteBwkm, idiscusseat pars5.47,
klow. Ifisnoreworihythaatfiesame rimeasthedtimate parti10the 1977Treaîycommenced
discussiononjoint development,~hoslovakiashodd havedso enteredintonegotiationswith
Th- negotiationsidnot, athaMirneratthinmyiagreementduefrifinancial concernAda.sIava.
Butlheyaredence. ianyisneeded,ofthe*ideolo@dneriixaiity"khitheGM Projea.
11 % theReport of Cornde VosaIrIion thedixirssicat theCentralCammitte of the Soviet
Communia Partymcerning thewaterworksontheDmuh, 25 Octokr1955, Annex2htreto:"In
îhs stagofpreparatiooftheprojecctheSoviesideisnotinapositiotufornulatelits] adviwry
opinion..it waimportantostartfirstbilaterdtalksbetCzechosIovakandHungarjrandody
after achievianagreement,the (SovietoEcg for economicrelations with popdar demxratic
countriescouldbeinvolved."
IL HungarianMernorial,ara s33-3.34.remarksserve to put intoperspectivethe aileged "Soviet pressure"which Hungary
emphasises1.3
2.10 Asfor theCME4 dthough it rnanifcstda generd Hiteresiri the
Danube'sdevelopmentandwaskeptinfomed ofthe bilaterdnegotiations,nnothhgIeadstu the
conclusiothatit exerciseany"pressure"n eitheof the parties,andespecidlyon Hungaty.
Even though the HungarianMemurid makesthis allegationon severaloccasions, it offers
absolutelyno Ttis not plausiblto interpr tetCMEAkrecommendationsas
obligati imnsosed un the parties fiumthe outside:5as Hungaq itseladmitq thse
recommendation(swhich inanyeventwereunafiunouslaydoptedi.e w.i.Hungary'csonsent)
had noobligaturnaturerrntiiadoptedbythGovernmentsofthe Statesconcerned.
2.11 In essence,Hungary'persistentattempto categoristhe 1977 Treaty
as a "COMECON" Treatyis no more thana stratagernto taintthe G/N Projectwith the
widesprea odprobriumwith which communistideology is viewed today. To this end,
Hungary does not hesitateto relyon themostquestionaevidence. Forexample,it alludes
to the factthatin 1951 the Presidtf theDanubeCommission (to whoma letterhadbeen
addressedin1951 bythe Commissio nusngariarepresentativ)as fromthe US SR'^ .et
this fact was no more than purecoincidencethe presidencyof the Commission rotates
arnongstitsmember Statesandhappened atthat momenttu behddbythe USSR Sdarly,
Hungav refers tu a 1958 Protoc01of Tripartite Joint Negotiatiu@etween Hungarîan,
Czechosluvakand Sovietrepresentatives)'?omitstomentionthat:
"Themeeting was cdled gn the initiative and invitation of the Hungxian
side'.ll -
2.12 HunMs attemptscmt be takenseriousIy. The 1977 Treatyis not
the resuIofSoviet pressurenodoesitreflectanoutdatedideology. It simplyimplemethe
legitimatdesuesof twoStatesborderingona greatinternatioliver-a stretcofwhichwas
not developed- tomakeuse of theirnaturalresourcestoavoidthepotentiallycatastrophic
13 M., atparas1.03,3.02-3.03,3.07,3.10-3.22,3.27,3.29,3.32-3.37,3.40and10.73-, 4.21
10.74.
14
M., paras3.1and3.40forexample.
15
W., para.3.21.
16
m., para.3.03.
17
W., para3.15.efïects ofurmmaged watermurses, tu improvenavigationon the Danube both in theiown
interestsand inthe interestsof otherripar(aswellasother rhird Statesand tureinforce
theirneighbourlrelations. It is theseaithatareset outinthevery firstparagraphof the
1977 Treaty'prearnblew,hichHungary faiito cite:
"Consideringtheir mutualinterestin the broad utiiizationof the natural
resources of the Bratislava-Budapestection of the Danube river for the
development ofwater resources,mer@, transport, agricultureandother
sectorsofthe nationeconomy of theContractkgParties.*
2.13 At variouspoints in its Mernorial,Hungarystresses the "integrated"
natureoftheProjectwhich,asArticle(1) ofthe1977 Treatyprovides:
"..shallcomprisetheGabEikovo systemof locksandtheNagymarossystemof
locksand shdlconstitute a singleaindivisibloperationalsvsterofworks"
(emphasisadded);
or,astheHungwianMemurid describes iîasystern:
"combininbgothupstrearnand downstrem elemens ina systemof peakpower
production19"
2.14 Thisemphasisisjustified.Certainlntechnica lermstheProjectcould
be dividedintotwo distincparts- beingthe GabEikovo and Nagymarossections. It is this
divisionthatisreflectediArticlesl(2)andl(3) of theTreaty. But in legalandeconomic
termnthese two sectionswere not divisible. inparticiilar, the essentnature ofthe
cornpletion of Namarus tu the Projectmust be stressed: on theone hand to enable the
productionof peakelectriciat ~Eikovu, which was impossiblewithoua downstream weir
to regdateflows and, on theother hand,to enablethe improvement of thesole remaining
sectoroftheDanubedifficultfornavigation.
2.15 Hungary,moreover,recognisesthevitalimportance of theconstruction
ofNagymarosto the Project:
"In particular tNagymarosBarrage was essentidtu the Original Project,
which was,as demonstratedinChapter 4,conceivedas 'asingland indivisible
operational systernof worh'. Inconcept,in operation and in tems ofany
possibilityoan economic returnhm this 'jointinvestrnetnet'agynaros
Barragewas akey element. Withoutit,peak powerproductionwould not be
19
m.,Vol. 1,para10.73&al=, para.4.10or 4.21. possible, ana principalecanomic advantage ofthe OriginalProjectwodd
disappdo "
This puts inits tme light whatHungarynow cdls "the cautious provisionai and partial
suspensionof worksn atNagymaros in May 1989''andrenders absurdHungary's subsequent
prciposdthat Czech~slovakiagiveup theNagymaros sectionof thProjectwhilstcontinuhg
withthe GabEFkov soctionZ2.
2.16 It isto saythevery leastparadoxica lhatHungary goes so faras to
include,as oneof thefundamenta lhangesof circumstanceitenurneratest,he dissolutiof
"the single and indivisibIioperationsysternas a resultof the suspension ofworks at
~agymarop. Nemoauditurpropriam himitudinernallepan?.
A CouperativePraiect Creafine aJointInvestmenf
2.17 Hungary'scharacterisationfthe1977 Treatyas beingatthe onginof a
"cooperativeproect,onewhichrequiredclose partnershipc,ontinuednegotiation. ,merits
a similarobservation:the "cooperative"elementsin the Treaty are indeed of special
importance,yet ithasbeenHungary not Czechoslovakia(orSlovakia)that has faiIetotake
accountofthem.
Inthisrespect,Article10 of the Treatydeserv pesrticularattention.
2.18
Paragraph 1ofthis Articleprovides:
"Works of the System of Locks constiîutingthe joint propertyof the
ContractingPartiesshaiibe operated,as a CO-ordinatesd ingleunitand in
accordancewiththejointly-agreeoperatingandoperationapi roceduresby the
authorized operating agencofthe ContractingParty in whose temtory the
workswerebuilt .
As Hungary correctly points outB, the paragraphsaf ArticleIthat follow(togetherwith
Articles3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11@, 12, in particuI a2(,) and 25) set outthe detaas ofthis
2\., para -0.75.
21
W., para7.91.
22
Seee.g,para.5.35,m., below.
" HungariaMernoriap,ara.10.74.
24 &g para.10.73klow.
2s Hung&an Mernoriai,ara. 4.11. dm, M., pams ..I,7.0 7nd10.73.
26
u. ,ara4.11-4.12.cooperation wih respectto the sharingofcostsand responsibiIities,the dectricity produced
andtheprofits. And, iitis correcthat"the1977 Treatydid not allowforunilateraoiperation
ofthe BarrageSystembyeither ~arty"~',ifollowsa fortiorthatonepartyacting done hasno
rightto reshapethe systemin responseto factorsnotacceptedby the otherparty,or togive
intothedemandsof itsownpublicopinion.Asonewellknowncommentator hasexpressed it,
Article39 oftheViema Conventiononthe Lawof Treaties"layduwn thegenerd mle thata
treaty maybe amended byagreement behvee the parties. ClearIyinthe caseof a bilaterd
treq, the agreement ofboth partieisrquireda.
2.19 In thiscontext,Article27 of the Treatyis particularlsignificant.In
spiteof the self-contradictonterpretatiocontainedinHungary's ~emoriap, thisprovision
makesno reference atal1tothe "revisionof the Treaty.Instead,itsetsout inunambiguous
termsthe means for the settlementof disputes,wbich issolely throughnegotiationsto be
carriedout betweenthe partiesina spiritofcooperatioa. The multigIeunilateraldecisions
takenbyHungarqfsinceMay 1989 conform neiher tuthe Ietterofthis Article (or the other
"cooperativeprovisions"ofthe Treaty)nor toitsspiritThis isin sharpcontrast with the fat
thatCzechoslovakia and,su bsequentyl, Sluvaki- contraryto what theHungananMernorial
contends - have alwaysbeenmore than ready to pursuethe settlementof the dispute that
Hungary hasclaimedto seek.
A FramtworkTreaîy
2.20 On severaloccasions,the HiirigarianMemurid depictsthe1977 Treaty
as "a Hrreprintand nut a rigidlypre-determinedschernee3'.But thiissinaccurate if8s the
Hungarian Mernoriaf irequentlysuggestsi,tisintendedtu deny theobIigatorynature of the
Treaty. Dulyconcluded in accordancewith theprerequisitesofinternationallaw, the Treaty
bindsthe Partiesto it in al1respects. As recalledbyArticle26 ofthe ViennaConvention:
"everytreatyinforceisbindingupontheparties toitandmustbe performed bythemingood
faith."
2-21 The 1977 Treatymaybeseen as a "framework treatynbut inthesense
that "manymatters had 10beresolved by other agreementsorarrangementsw , hethein the
" m., para7.07.
'* 1.Sinclair,TheViennaConventiontheLawof TreatieManchesterUniversityPreManchester,
1984p.107.
2P
HungarianMernoriap,ara..92secal=,paras.2.22-2.2kIow,
30
HungarianMernoriai,par4.13~ee,also,pa4.21.JointContrachal Plan.,orinregdations laiddom by the plenipotentiariesl or in accordance
with the national Iawsand procedures ofone of the . The 1977Treaty may,
accordingtu some pointsof view,be considereda preliminary But itisnot an
empv sheIthatitssignatoriecould,contrarytuthe principIof pactasuntservanda,consider
as of noeffect,or couldmodify, orcoulddemandthe amendmentof, or could suspend,or
couldterminateunilaterally.
2.22 Hungaryis correctin extendig the relativeflexibilityof the Trtuty
the sefilemeritofdisputesunder Artide 27,prescribnegotiationas"the exciusivemeansof
settlingdisputes"andin concIudingfiom this that "thehaIImarwas flexibi~ity"". But, of
course,thi slexibiliody existedwithinthe framework ofthe Treaty:neitherArticl27 nor
anyother provisiongavethepartiestheright tocampe1theTreaty'srevision. Revisionmight
bethe eventualconcIusionof negotiations;nd in agreeinto revis teeTreaty atHungary's
instigationin 1983 and later in discussingHungary' fsrtherdemandsfor amendment,
Czechoslovakia showedthat itdidnotexcludethispossibility.But itwas ody a possibili-y
not a rightof oneof thepartiesoranobIigatioof theother. The fact that the Treatyhadan
elementofflexibilitydidnot meanthat thewas no obIigatioto filfi1itsprovisions.
2.23 lt is therefareincomecforthe HungarianMernoria o assertthat the
obIigatioto negotiatin good %th uuder theTreatyin relationto questioof its appIication,
or incaseof adispute,"acquireesvenmoreweight ..for Article27of the 1977Treatyrefers
preciselv to revision by joint agreement,either arnong the [Plenipotentiaries]or the
Govemmentsof theContracting parties...'14Article27 neithercallsfor,norevenmentions,
any such revision. Further,Hungatycuntradicts itself in fhe sme paragraphwhen it
recugnisesthat"the1977 Treatycontainedno mechanisrnfsuritsrevision".
2.24
The red nature of this "framewurk treaty" isproperly seen quite
diffwently:the essentimies are formuIated ,ilesthatthe partiesmustin al1cases respect
exceptinthe caseofan agreed amendmen tnaccordancewiththegeneralprinciples ofthelaw
of treaties(as soutinArticle69 oftheViema Convention).Interrnsof its implementation,
theTreatyhas recourseto rdated agreements.But, the Treatyis no less bindingupon the
parties.Inotherwords,the"outcorne"is fomidly prescribedintheTreaty itseI-the parties
32
RY. lenningandA. Watts,Opxnheirn's InternaLaw,a9thed.Lon- hndrin,1492,
p.1224.
33 HungaianMernorial,am 4.13.
34
M., para.7.9(emphasiaddd).arebound turealisethejoint investmentasit isdescribedin the Treawhilst thmeans of
implementationareflexibleandadaptableTheconsequencesofthis aretwofoId.
2.25 Firs the.partiesare bound to comply with the obligationthat the
Treatyitselfprescribein spiteof Hungary's egations tothe contrary,thisis especiathe
case for provisio relatingto the timeschedule. No doubtthe time schedulecould be
amendedbyjoini agreement:the constructionperiodslaiddom in Articl4(4) were infact
modifiedon two occasions(in1983 and 1989) andeven adjristeon theverydayof the 1977
Treatytssignature in the MutualAssistance~greernent.'But it does notfollowthat "the
tirnetabllaiddom for workon theProjecthadnever beentreatedas a matterofstrictIegal
The very facthatthe schedulewas modifiedby formalagreements shows that,
to the contrarythepartiesclearlyintendea "strictlegal obligatio;ndifitiscorrectthat
the "problemscausedby thedelaycourdbe cornpensatedfor",thisnecessarilyenvisagesthe
existenceof a treatyobligationthathas beenviolated. Moreover, thisconsequence was
expressiypmvided forby Articl26(2)(c)oftheTreaty. Hungaryi,nassertingthat
"...thewas never the slightestpossibilirythat the BatrageSystemwould corne
onIineduringthat quinquennium,and thiwsasnot becauseof fauItattributable
toone or otherpartybut simplybecauseneithercoiild aurd to do so,given
theirofherprîorities,andthe failureofthe promisedSovieteeonomicassistance
3781
merelytics to placeCzechoslovakiainHungaq's own particulasituationandto attributto
Czechoslovakia itsown attitudesButthe CzechoslovakGovernent at no stagereiiedon a
SovietIoan and ,dike Hurigary,neverinvokeditseconomic difficultto shirkitobligations
orturequest alterationinthe tirnetablFurther, the "promiseSovieteconomic assistance"
never wnstitutedaconditiontothe conclusionor applicatiofthe1977 Treaty.
2.26 Second, the referenceinthe Treaty tu other agreementsdready
concludedor to beconcluded inno way signifiethaton thepointsinquestiontheTreatydid
not createlegalobligations.Forthe pre-existingagreements,hisis self-evident:the Treaty
limitsitseto recordingtheseand theyremaininfullforceand effect theextenttheyare not
inconsistenwiththe 1977Treaty. Butthisis nolessso forsubsequentlyexecutedagreements
contemplatedby the Treatyandnecessq to itimplementation.Itcannotbearguedthatas to
35 Ineach-, theamendmentwasmadeatHungds request,demomtingCzechosIovaki'sdent
flexibiIity.
37
m., pm. 4.15.To thecontrar, zecboslovigreedtoMer financiaobligatioonthedatof
thesignatuofthe 197Treatbymeansofthe1977MuhialAssistanceAgreement.such agreements theobligation wasrnerelytucoasult or to negotiatein goodfaith;theparties
were boundtu reachagreement -by a padm dec~ntrahendo~~.Thuq for example,ArticIes
1(4),I2(2), 14(2),15{Ia )nd19, whichrefertuthe morepreciseprovisio tnbe contained in
theJoint Contractual Plan,bindthe partiesnotody tonegotiatethis agreementbut toensure
itsconcIusioninthe Iighof themore generd provisionsofthe 1977 ~reafl. .
A TremityConsistentwith EnvironmentalProtection
2.27 In spiteof its attemptsto depict the Treaty asthe end result of
irresponsibleambitionslinkedtu anoutmodedideology,Hungaryconcedes thatthisagreement
"wasconsistent with the maintenanceofwater quditj. and with envirorunep nrotection
generally"" andthat, "[n]onMthstandingthe noturiousenvironmentaidificriltiesafthe region,
its member States,HungaryandCzechosIovakiaincludeda , dheredto arange ofcommitments
seeking toensureenvironmenta lrotectionofshared res~urce~'~.'
2.28 Itis similarimpossibleto denythatenvironmenta loncern were taken
into accountdunng the pre-Treatyphase -Hungaryis unable to do so in spitof itswishto
show the indifferenceof the Treatypartiesto thissubje~t~~- or todeny that the relevant
provisionsof the Treaty(in parîicuIr rticle5(5)(a)(5and 5(5)@)( I3),15, 19 arid20) meet
or indeedexceed the requirementsunderthe generd mIesofinternationalIaw.
2.29 As Hungq accepts:"[a]lthough the protectionofthe envirument was
not themainpurposeoftheoriginaldraftersn , onethelesprovisions insertedinthe 1977
Treatyto protect waterqualityandto ensurenahrrepreservation4 .3 It follows thatthese
provisionsformanintegraipart oftheTreaty and subjectthepartiestotheseobligations.
2.30
It isnecessarto evaluatecorrectlytheextentofthese obligations.
38
Marr yxamplesofsimiIarobligatiohavecornMore theCourt. NorthSa Continental
1951berneeetheWHOandEmt,ts. AdvîsorOpinion.T.C.R.eports. 19p.73,a1p.95.NoreM.m,
theobligationscontaiinfie 1977Treata, Artides6and 12.
39 Sec Sdon 2, Mow, forthrelationshpetweenthe1977Treatand theJoinContractuPilanOn
thedistinctionbetwetheobligationto negotiateapactumde contrahendo,ecP. Reuter,"De
l'obligationde nég~ier",MélanMorelIiCommunicazion i mdi, Vol. XIV, Milan1975,pp.
711-733;andRY. JenningsandA. Watts,ODwnheim'Internationlaw,OJ&., p. 1224.
40
HungarianMernorial,ara4.21.Seea.h, paras6.28and10.73.
HungarianMernorial,ara.4.56.
42 m.. para3.31,forexamplesecal=,SIova Mkernoria, ara..60or2.14.
43 HungarianMemonai,para.10.88. - First.as Hungaryrecognises,the 1977 Tre;lty aa frarnework treaty
fixes the generaiguidelinesandcreatesthstructurfor thepartiesto
implement theobligationseithby furthejointagreementsb, ynational
legislatioorby theactudexecution oftheworks;
- Second, the envimimental provisions,the Iegdiy bindingnature of
which SIovakiafuly accepts, are general,on-going and continuous
obligations.
2.31 Hungary iscorrectinsayingthatthe protectionofthe environment is
notthe essentialobjectof the 1977Treaty.PiototheTreaty'sconclusion,thepartiessirnply
took care to reassurethemselvethatthe Projectwas compatiblewith the requirementsof
environmental protection. This is an important point or it was evident that the
impIemenfatioonf theTreatywouldnecessarilyaffecttheenvironment.Infullknowledge of
thisthe partiesassurnedthe resuItarisks*considerinthatthebenefitsof theGN Systern
clearlouhveighed the potentidrisks. But,at thesame tirne,the precautiowas taken to
indude the obligatitu ensure vigilantattentiontu the envirument. For exampIe,the word
"monitoring"("contrôle" inthFrenchtext)and"appropriatme aures" appearing inArticles
15 and 20, clearlyillustratethat the partieshad to ensurethe irnplementatiof these
1 provisionsby reachingcommonagreement asto anynecessarymeasures while at thesame
timemaintainingthe essentialobjeof theTreaty:theconstructionand operationof thGM
Project.
2.32 Hungary presupposesthe directoppusite of this. It proceeds to
substitute the preservationofthe environmtstheessentialobjectotheTreatyand, whatis
more, arrogatesto itselfthe rigtodecreeuniiaterdlywhat suchpreservationrequiresand
how itistobe achieved- eventhoughthe partiesdeliberatelydecidtomaktthis a matterof
cornmon concern, to be resolved by on-going consultationand, where necessary, by
adjustmentisntheimplernentatiooftheProject.
2.33 To summariset,he1977Treatyisthegoveminglaw between theparties
andconstitutesthegenerd fiameworkoftheircooperativeefforttcachievetheTreaty obsect
and purpose ddescribedin MicIe 1. It imposeson the parties reIativeIygeneral Iegd
obIigations, hiIat thesame time maintainingtheTreaty'scentra1objectyetprovidi the
possibiIiof adjustintheTreaty'simpIementatioans,for example,inregardto protection of
theenvironment. 2.34 HungarytsTreaty interpretation, bcontrast,isdistorteddue tu the
stressplacecon the Treatypreambleandthe ihreeshortarticleArticles15,19 and 20. From
the preambleit isarguedthat the mainaims ofthe Treatywere economicandpoIiticaI(the
boosting of socidist integratiwhile fromthe three articles mentionedabove it argued
thatthe overridingoalswere theprotectionofwaterquaIityand thenatura lnvironment.No
attentioispaidto theinconsistencbetweenthese two interpretations.
The 1977 TreatvCreatedRiehts InRem
2.35 Hungary goes tu greatIengthsto establisthat the"1977 Treatywa
not a bourldary treaty, deIiberanotH since,accordingtu Hungary,"the partiescouIdnot
agree on the originalHungariademand that the boundarylinebeshiftedsuas tofoHowthe
mainnavigationchamelthrough theGabEfkovo power canalandlocks"". This is obviousIy
wrong. The parties hadagreedtu rejectthisdernanas is quitecIeafiom theTreatyitself,in
particular,Articl22(1). The originofthe problem isattributedto Czechodovakiawho,
allegedly,"wasadamant in itsrefusalto contemplateashiftintheborderline. But even the
Hungarian Mernor aishowsthat inrealititwasHungarywhorefusedto modifytheborderline
"because therewas no suitableHungarianterritorythatcouldbe offerd"incompensationfor
the loss that CzechoslovakiawuuldhavesuEered asa resultofthe boundary beingshiftedtu
thecentreofthe bypasscana14j.
2.36 The reasons for Hungqis inaistence on this point are uncIear,
particularlsince itwould appearevident that,althoughit did not, of itself, establiah
boundary,the 1977 Treatyestablishedobligations and rightsrelatingto theregime of the
boundary and tothe use of thconcemed territory.Thishasthesame legd consequences,as
Slovakiaestabiishesbelow.
2.37 Mungws insistence ispresurnably a tactic deztineto introduce its
most surprising arsment regardingState succession, under which the 1977Treaîy is
artificidlyctassifiedamongthose treatiescreatingrightsexcIus&vpersonamandnot rights
in rem. By thiç, Hungary hopesto "neutralise"thdes relatingtuState successionand to
support thehypothesis,advancd as earlyas paragraph1.O4 ofits Mernoriaalndfiequently
repeatedthereafler,hatSlovakiawas "neveritselfapartyto that~reaty"~. Indeed,thispoint
m., para4.39. Sk, dm,para.7.30: "was inlendeto estabiishtPdu' obligationswith
respe ota BarrageSystewiuchwas separatehm theboundary."See ,lsa, par10.78and
10.111.
45
M., para.3.37secalsoSIovaMkemonalp.ara.7.5%.
46 HmgarianMemarialp, aras.3.115,6.03,50.6,%and11.20.appearssoimportanttuHungary thatit fums oneofitsSubmissions.Thesedegations playa
fundamenta1roleinHungary'sIitigationstrategyfor they constitute thesoie Ie-difany
exists-forthe foIIowing argumentsfir thtt,the1977 Treaty isrroIonger inforcequite
iridependentlyofHungds putported tedation of 19May 1992;andsecond, thatSIovakia
while succeedingtono righîand benefitsunder the Treaty, essentidlybearsthe Treaty's
burdensandobligationshrough "adopting"zechoslovakiaa'llegedbreachesthereop.
2.38 As Slovakiashows below, theseattemptsaredoomed tofailurin the
lighof themles on Statesuccess iorelationto treatieInanyevent,Hungaryrelies on a
thesithatistotallywrong- forthe 1977Treatycreatesrightsh remandnot simplyrightsh
personam.It mustinfactbe defineasa "dispositiv"r "temtorialor"objectivet+eatyand,
as has been noted:"Territoriatlreatiesshouldbe regardedas includial1treatieswhich
affectea temtoryinone way or anothernotonlytreatieswhichestablishefrontier$."The
1977Treaty ina certaisens "estabIisheo"rinmy case*anfima the boundarybetweenthe
Treatypartiesand,takenasawhole, affectwithoutmy doribttheirespectiveterritories.
The BoundarvProvisionsofthe 1977Treafv
2.39 Article22 ofthe Treaty is erititled"Determinationof the boundq line
ofthe Statefiontier".Ifirsparagraphprovides:
"The ContractingParties have, inconnection with the constructionand
operatioof theSystemof Locks,agreed onrninorrevisionsofandchangesin
thecharacteoftheStatefiontierbetweentheHungarian People'sRepublicand
theCzechosIovakSocialistRepubli,sfollows...."
This isfollowedin sub-paragrap a) by confirmatioof the existingboundaryand insub-
paragraphs@) to (d) bycertaclarificatiosnd"rninorrevisions".
2.40 Asidehm these provisionsconcerningconfirmationor revision,this
a typicd boundaryclause. Thereisno need for the fixingafboundary tube the principal
object ofa treaty for the relevantprovisitnbe qudifiedas border provisions.This is
evidenced,for example,by theCourt'srecentjudgment inTerritorialDispute &byan Arab
Jamahiiry a.Chad)inwhich:
- On theonehmd,the Court relied soleIyon ArticI3 oftheTreaîy of
Friendshiand Good NeighbourlinesbsetweenLibya andFrance of 10
47
m.,paraç.6.04,-et.8.04sa. and 10.11etsea.
48
R Ago,Ywhook oftheInternatiLlawCornmissio1970Vol.I.p.169. August 1955 (andits AnnexI),which was nota boundary treatyas
such,in&ng theboundary betweenLibyaand~had~;~ and
- On the other hand,it dsoeventhough bythe relevantprovisionthe
two partie "recognised"that the buundariesbetween the French
coio~es and Libyawerethose thatresultedfiom previousinternational
instrumentsinforcethu sheCourt expIained:
"Turecupke a frontieisesse dy tu 'accept'thatfiontier,thistu draw
legaiconsequeri fioesitsexistencetrespec itand tu senounccthenghtto
contestitinthe future."
Thesameis evident in thepresentcase:by "agreeing"thatthe segmentoftheborder"shall
remainunchanged"t,hepartiesirnplicitbutnecessarilyrefenedbacktothe relevanttreaties,
andthisconstitutesone of thepossiblewaysof delimitiaboundd1 . Thesamefollows a
fortiorfiomtherevisionofothersegmentsoftheboundary.
2.41 Hungaryinsiststhat"[tlhefunctionof Articl22 was todissociatethe
Barragesystem fromthe agreedboundq, whilerecognisingthat thenavigationcharmewouId
no iongerhUow orbe identifid withthe boundq inthislocdityn".in realitiftheparties
had notfaken theprecautiontu inserArticIe22 inttheTreaty,anuncertaintywouId have
existedastu theboundarySinewhich wasfixed by theProtucol of II October1948 atthe
thalweg ofthe river'smain navigablebeat thelowest 1eve1'~ In otherwords, a tribunal
caIIe tdsettIeahypotheticd boundatydisputebetweenSlovakiaandHungarycould not base
itsdecisionsoIeIyon thepre-existingagreemebtstwouId necessarilyappiyth1977 Treaty,
the boundary treatynaturof which would be beyond doubtin the sensethatit essentialiy
maintainsthe existingboundarylineby modifymgitscharacteand,subsidiady,providesfor
itsrevisioninArticle22(l)(d). mustbe kept inmindthatif"thepartiescouldnot agreeon
the originalHungariademand thattheboundary linbeshifiedso asto folIow"thenewmain
navigation~hannel~~t,eyneverthelessagreedonsomeminorrevisions.
49
Territorl ispulLibvanAraJarnahiriva.ChIaJlemrts1994.Judmenf 3Febniar1994,p.
3.
52 HungariaMernaria,m. 4.39.& pam. 1I.II-1 I.Mow, foaMIerdscussion.
" % Hmgarian Mernoria,ol.3,Amex 6, SupplementPrataolNa 1totheClosingProtocof
thMeetingoftheHungarim-C~hosIovaBarderDraftingCommision,I1Octo1948.
14
m., Vol,1pam. 4.39. 2.42 Ofcourse,dthough therevisionis providefor inthe 1977Treaty, it is
not actuallycarriedoutinthatTreatysince thiswas leR to be accomplishedby a separate
treatyto be concludedbetweenthe parties(Articl22(2)).Hungary rightlpointsthis out-
butits explanationsarewrong.It arguesthatthiswayof proceedingarisesfrom thedesireto
separate"the 1977 Treaty from the boundaryregirne .H5This is wrong for atleasttwo
reasons.
2.43 Firs as, iingayseemstu ape,the 1977 TreaQis afiamework treaty
thatthe partiessystematicarefrain&hm weightingdom with excessivdetd. ItfulIows
that,whereasthe new character othefiontieconstitutean importantelment oftheTreaty,
the minorrevisionsofthe boundaryline -whichrelatedonly to anareaof around IO by 10
hectares-did not.Second,andmost important,itwas notpossiblto tracewithprecisionthe
newboundaqlinein 1977 -contraryto Hungary'saffirmations. herninoradjustmenrtelated
to thereservoito be createdupstreamof theDunakilitiweir andwas totake theformof a
straight line. Texactconfigurationof the reservoirwas nfixedbythe 1977 (fiarnework)
Treaty,which Ieftthis detato the Joint ContractuaiFlan (Arti4(2}(a)).Itwas thus not
merely logicd but inevitabtu postpone fora frrrtheragreement the definitivefiofnthe
boundq line.
2.44 Thus,the essentiaboundarycharacter ofArticle22,even ifnot of the
Treaty asawhole,is clear.The attitudeofthepartieshowsthattheywerewellawareofthis.
The 1977 TreatvEstablishes aSpecificTerritoriaIRe~ime
2.45 However anxiousHungq isto minimisethe territorial nature of the
1977Treaty, it has heeobIigedtuconcede thatthe parties "specifiedpreciselythe extent of
change that was permissibleinthe character ofthe Danubeas a boundary river" and that
"Iwlhat the 1977Treaty did was tu reIocatt the main navigational channe1through the
GabCikovo canaland ~ock~" .~~
2.46 Thisfactdone is sufficieto make the Treatya "dispositive,r an
rem ,r a "territoritreaty,thais (inthe wordsof thestandarddefinitionwhichO'Connel1
tracesback tuVattel)a treaty"whichimpresses apermanentand indefeasible statuson a
55 -bid..ara3.42and4.39.
'"id.,- paras.7.3and4.4'1.temtory"". It is obviousthat both thichange in thecharacter ofthe boundq and the
cunfrmation ofitsIayoutattachtu the tenitory itselfandquireindependentof thepersons
ofthe Treatyparties. TheTreatycreatesrîghtinrem. opposabIetu diandinvocableby d~".
Hencefortk,asthe resuItoftheTreaty,the boirndaryremainsthethdweg ofthe previousmain
navigablecharnelofthe Danube.
2.47 Moreover,Hungary's reluctantadmissionas tothe change incharacter
of theboundary failstotallyto recognisetheoverailtemtoridnatureoftheTreaty,whichis in
nowaylirnited toArticle22or toChapter IX. Inparticulari, is sirikingthatHungarywholly
ignoresthe fact thattheveryobjectofthe Treaty isthe realisatiof a Project, one ofthe
essentid characteristiofwfiichis toimposea heavyterritoriaburdenon Czechoslovakia
(and now Slovakia).For it on SIovakterritoy that thebypascana1has,initsentirety, been
cunstmcied, and it wasSIova tkmitoryfhat was forthe Iargerparttobe submerged by the
DunakiEit-hsov reservoi(Articles@)(aand (cl).
2.48 The1977Treatyprovidesfortheconstruction andsubsequent operation
of amultipurposeprojectaimedto ensurejointmanagementand utilisatiof the Danubefor
bothnavigationalandnon navigational purposesin the sector whereit formsthe boundary
between two States and in adjacent areas. The concepts of "joint investment", ')oint
ownership","joint operation"and"joint utilisaticharacteristhe treav relations between
Czechoslovakiaand Hungarybased on the 1977 Treaty. These enwmpass a number of
obligationsrelatintothe useofthe tenitoryofeach Treatyparty orrestrictionsuponituse
furthe benefitothe teritorjofone Treatypar&andcarresponding rightsof theother Treaty
Party-
2.49 The rightsand obligations concerninuse and restriction ouse are
closelyinterrelated.Evenif notidenticain bothsidesor strictlyreciprocd,theyarestrictly
attachedtotheterritorieconcerned.
2.50 The territorialcharacofrthe1977 Treatywas dso recogriisedbyboth
successorStatesof CzechosIovakia-theCzechRepubIicandSlovakia. As aconseqrrencethe
CzechRepubIicforma1 1acknowledgedthat SIovakia was the sole successoStatein respect
of the 1977 Treaty, fomally rmunced d property titlerelatedto the jointinvestment
resultingfromthe1977Treaty andaccordinglyconfirmedthat:
57 D.P. O'Connell,InternatiLaw, Cambridge,1970, p. 373. S-, by the saauthor,
SuccessioninMunicipalLawandInternatilaw,Cambridge,967,ïï, 231.
5s
D.P.O'Comdl, SfateSucc;esinMunicimiandInternationalLop.d., p.15. "..al1assetsanddebts relatinto realisationofobligationderîvinghm the
1977 Treaty conceni SIova~e~rtblic."
2.51 Thus,andindependently of theimbdmce bmen the partieinternis
of theirburdensarisingfrom the Treatyitis clearthatthevery purpose of theTreatywas
conspicuouslyand, even exclusively,territorinlthatthe Treaty itself instaalterritorid
regimewithinthewholeoftheregioncovered bythe GM Project.
2.52 Treatiesof the generic type of the 1977 Treaty,that is, "treaties
concerningwaterrights or navigationon rivers"are"commody regarded ascandidates fur
inclusion in thecategoryof territorial treatiesand are considered asbeing "objective
treaties" sincethareopposable tuthirdParties.
2.53 The characterofthe 7977 Treaty asa treaty establistian"objective
regime" asfaras theinternationalavigationisconcernedis anywayevident. The re-routirig
of internationalavigatiofrom theoldriverbed(foming the borderbetween two States)into
the bypas sanalsituatedentirelywithinthe SIovakterritory,as envisagedby the Treaty,
constituteachangeintheregimeofinternationa nlavigation.TheoperationoftheProjectand
openingof the bypasscanalto internationnlavigatioimpfiednewobligations,on the sideof
Slovakia,towards thirStatesandcorrespondinr gightsoftheseStatesto usethebypasscanal
for navigationunderthetennsofthe 1948 DanubeConvention.
2.54 The 1977 Treatyistherefuredispositivinmother sense. As O'ConneII
has explained,"[a]cIear distinction existsberwetreatiewhich convey benefits for single
neighbouring States,andmay be insisted upon bythem done, and treaties which creatt
regimesintheinternationa ilnteresf.The1977 Treatycleariyfal lntothissecondcategory:
itaims towardsthe improvemeno tf the conditionsfor navigationia sectorofthe Danube
particularldangerousanddifficulto maintaid2.
J9
AffairofSlovaki3M,arch1993Amex3.ignMairsoftheCzechRepublitotheMinistryofForeign
Y&k oftheIntemationLawComissio~ 1972V ,oIIIp,56. a dm, G.FitunaUric"The
JurisdiaionCIauseof thePeaeeTrmties*RecueildeCorn, 1948,Vol.IIp,p. 293-29Lord
McNair,Law ofTreatieOJdard ,961pp.658659;D.P . 'Come11,TntemationaiLaz. &t, p.
373, an~e mjarity opiniexpmai during&e debarnattheLL.C.duing &-ions of~e
Viema Conventioof 1969and theConventiono1978onthe SuccessioofStatesin Respeof
Treaiies.
61
D.P.O'ConnelSiateSuccessiinMunicipaandInternationLaw,OJa. atp.233.
62 The sectodownstreaof thebypasscanalsttemainsin suca statduetoHungary'sfailuto
canyouttheTreatintheinter esotherripariStatand,beyondthat,aEuropeanStates. 2.55 The Treatypartiewere fullyawareof thisa,swas particularstressed
itintheJointContractilal lan:
"ThebarragesjistemtobebuiItasthe common hvestmentof thetwocountries,
Ettingweii into the comprehensiverogramme ofMEAC ECouncilfor Mutual
EconomicAssistance]and into thecomprehensive utktion ofthe Danube
serves significant internationalinîereinsaddition tu direct Hungarian-
Czechodovakunes- With thiconstructionthe obstaclto thedevelopment of
an internationwater transportwiflbe removed and theconditionsfor the
creationofanEast-Westtrans-continentw aterwaywilIbeprovided6 3"
"Thesebenefitswiilbe sharedbythedifferenDanubian countriesandby other
countrieslinkiwiththe Danub eavigation. ."
And the debatesinthe DanubeCommission,wheremarked intere inthe Projecf wasshown
by Statesdongside the organisationsandenterpriofWesternEuropeancountries,iIIustrate
th& thissentimenwaq and is,enerallsharedG5.
2.56 For mrrltipIereasons,therefore,thcme be no doubt thateven ifthe
1977 Treatycannotitseifbedescribed asa boundary treaty-although Article22 is without
doubt a boundaryprovision -itisat theleasta dispositivetreaty,thobjectof whichis to
institutea temitorhlregime. Thelegalnaturofthe Treaty,thusdefined,hasimportantlegal
consequencesthat will be examined inthe followingChapters,notablyas to whetherthe
doctrineof fundamentaclhangeofcircumstancem s aybe invoked (ChapterX) and as tuthe
meansandeffects of Statsuccession(Chapterm).
SE~ION~, The Joint Centractual Plan andOther A~reements Related to the
1977 Treatv
2.57 Hiingarydevotespages I21tu 134 of itsMemoridtuanandysisofthe
"Relationshipfthe 1977 TreatytoUtherAgreementsB etweenthePartiesn,whileatthe sarne
time speciSlingthatthereexist manyother "multilaterireatiesandotherinstrumentsof a
generalcharacterrelevantto the disputewMT. herecanbe no doubt asta theimportanceof
these agreements. However, HungaryincorrectIy Statesthe relationshipbetween these
63 -
HungariaMernoriaVlol3,Annex24 (ap.289).
64
-id.(ap.301).
55
Sm.e.~ Siova kernoria,aras.1.48-1.49,2and6.145I?a.
66 HmgarianMernoriapara. 4.5fn.6.Sec .Iw,SIovakMernorip,am 5.24ef=.agreementsandthe 1977 Treaty (aside hm other errursinits andysis). The distortion of the
Iegd realitiisparticularrnarkedinthe caseoftheJointContramal Plan.
A. Huneam'sErroneousAnmilvsio sf theJointContractualPian
2.58 Hungaryrepeatedlystressesthe importance of the JointContractual
Plan,"thebasisfor a greatdeal ofthe substanceof the Projectand "theprincipaltool for
implementint ghe obligatioforeseen"inthe 1977~reaty~'. Thisis correct:the1977Treaty
isa Cameworkinstrument, imposhg generd obligationson the parties,withimplementation
beiriIefttucornplernentq and derivativeinstruments.The principainstrumentis theJoint
ContractualPIq whichaccordhgtuthe 1977Treaty itospec*:
- "The technicd specificatirelatingtu the SysternofLocks" (Pirticle
1(4));
- the "regulationsgoveming the organkation and activities"of the
"permanentand joint agencies for the performance " of the
Plenipotentiaris'nctions(Articl3(2));
- the "preparationof the joint investment"thatis to say,"the main
dimensionsof the works of the System of Locks, the technical
specificationoftechnicdequipment,the finalprojectwork schedule
and responsibia;for thewsts referreto inarticle12, paragraph2"
(Article4(2)(a));
- the basicdatafor "(1) Orderingthetechnicd equipment,construction
materids,machineryand steelworkforthe Systemof Locks"and "(2)
Drawirtgupthe constnrctionplansandspecificationsArtide 2(2)@));
- "thecostsof canyhg out thejoint investmet (Artide5(6));
- thedischargeinthe waterbalance(Article14);
- themeansin ordertoensure"thatthequalityofthe waterintheDanube
is notimpaired as a resultofthe constructionandoperationof the
SystemofLocks"(Article1 S(1));
- the means inorderto "ensurecornpliancewith the obligationsfor the
protection of naturaerisinginconnection with the constructionand
operafionoftheSystem of Locks"(kick 19).
2.59 At the same the as it rewgnises the importance of the Joint
ContractualPlan, Hungaxyatternpts to Iimiits IegaeIffect, in anatternptu escape its
respunsibility.And indeed,if the Treaty itçelis ody a nonself-executing5amework
67 HungariaMernoral.paras..14and6.72.
68 See,also,Arti5(a).instrumenatndif theJointContractuaP1lanis devoidof anylegaleffect,the remitwould be
thatthe Treaty partieacccptednoIegd obligationfor the breach for whichthey wouIdbe
respunsiMe.Thisis cIearIanindefensibIpeosition.
2.60 Hungq contends thattheJoht ContractualPlanissubordinatedto the
7977Treaty (and the 1976 Buund- WatersManagementAgreement), which iscorrect,
although notin thesenre intendecl yHungary. Further,Hungary contendsthatthe Joint
ContractuaPl lanisnoa conventionailnstrumentr treaty. This,bycontrast,isincorrect.
2.61 Accordhg to Hungar :y
"The JointContractudPlanwas not concludedin the formof an interstate
treaty, and was notas such ariinstrument governed by iriternationd law,
whatevermayhavebeenthe statusofthe 1976Agreementfor the drawingup
ofthePlan. Itwas subjectmerelytu'approval'nconfomity with nationdIaws
andregdations (Article4(3)), rather thsignaturandratification,asinthe
caseofthe 1977Treatyitse1P9."
But thinisto overlookArticle11 ofthe Viema Convention (whichonthis point,Iikemany
others,iindeed acodificatioofexistingcustomaryinternationllw):
"The consentofa Stateto beboundto atreatymay be expressedbysignature,
exchange of instrumentsconstitutinga treaty, acceptance, a~proval or
accession,rbyanyothermeansif soagreed7'."
2.62 TheJointContractuaP l lantherefore appearstobea treatyinthe fuii
senseofthe tem, and,even,inthe narrow senseofArticle2(l)(aof the Viema Convention,
thePlan is:
"... internationalagreementgovernedby internationallaw and concluded in
writtenfum:
beîween ..Stateswhether thatagreementisembadied inasingieor intwo or
murereIatedinstrumentsandwhateveritsparticularesignation."
2.63 Aithough iwas not subrnitteforratificationt,heJointContractullan
cannot evenbe classifiedasan"accord enforme simplifiéesi,nceaselaboratedin French
doctrine,by very definitiosuchan agreement takeseffect uponsignature,whereasinthe
69 HungarimMernoriap,ara4.15.
70
Vie= ConventionofieLawofTreaties,Artic1.ErnpRasisdded.presentcase,the partiesadded the requiremenof a fuma1 approval,thus making the Joint
Contractua llan,a factoa "traitéenformp .
2.64 As Su RobertJeMingsandSirArthur Wattshavewrîtten:
"p]t issuggestsd that the decisivefactoris ..whether the instrumentis
intendedtocreateiritemationlegalrightsandobligationsetweentheparties -
anelernent which the InternationalLaw Commissionregardcd as embraced
withinthephrase'govemed by internationallaw. s
And,asthe Court iselfobservedin itsrecenJudgmen tf fJuly1994,
"..inthefirstplace,..internationaalgreementms aytake anumber of forms
andbe given adiversityof names. Articl2, paragraph(1) (a),of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treatiesof 23 May 1969 provides thatfor the
purposesof thatConvention,
'treatymeans an internationaagreement concluded between
States in witten fom and governed by internationallaw,
whether ernbodiedin a singieinstrumentor in two ormore
relatedinstrumentsandwhateveritsparticuIardesignation..
Inordertu ascertainwhetheranagreement ofthatkind hasbeenconcIuded,'the
Court must have regardabove al1to itsamai lems and tu the pariicular
circurnstaricinwhichitwasdm up' ."
2.65 Inthe presentcasetherecanbe nodoubtthattheserequirementa sre
met :
- As providedfor inArticle 1 of the 1976 Joint ContrachialPlan
Agreement, thi nstrument"shaiIbethe basisfor the redizatioof the
constmctionu" ;
- Articlel(4) ofthe 1977 Treatyprovides:"The techical specifications
relatingto the SysternofLoch shdI be incIudedYser- hées"
according to the UN translationin French]in thejoint contractual
plan...,
71
"Where acceptan orapprwal follow signaturethfunctiois cloçely analogotothatof
Ngqen Qm Dinh,.P.MIIier,andA.PelletDroitinternatilublicL.G.D.J,aris,199p.6135.
n RY. leruiinandA. Watts. .&.,p.I202.
73 MaritimeDeiimitafioandTerrilclr1ausiionsktw~en Qatarand Bahrain.Juridiction and
Admissihili.rtdment. T.C.J.Rew1994p.112.atpp.121-122. -
Of particuIarimportance,Artides 25(I)(a) and26(I)(a) of the Treaty
expresslyprovide forthepartie rssponsibilitj,intlyor separatelj"in
respectofthe contentoftheapproved joint contrachal plan";
- Finally,hisinstrumenw t asitselfnegotiatedIikea treaty7'and drafted
and concluded intreatyformT6.
2.66 Inaddition,the two Treatypartieshaveconsistently shared the sarne
view as tothelegallybindingnatureofthe JointContractuaP llan. On severaioccasionst the
Hungarian PIenipotentiarycornplained tu hisCzechosIovakcounterpart of violationsofthe
Joint Contrachialplann. And,charaîteristicallyt,eHungaian Mernoriai doee not hesitateto
reproach CzechosIovaki or vioIationsoftheJointContractual PI#, a document which
quite correctly,Hungaryhasincluded inVolume 3 ofHungws annexes devotedtu "Treaties
andIntemationaiAgreements".
2.67 Hungaryis quiteright to describethePlan as"a managementtool"and
"theprincipal toolfor implementing the obligationsforeseen"in the ~reat~~, as weII as "a
meansofhandling thelargeamountof detaiinvaivie ndthe Original~rojd"'. SimiIariyi,is
entireIycorrectrhat "priori~was given to the Treaty ..over the JointContractual ~larr"".
But this prioridoes nat havetheimplicationsHungarynowclaims.
2.68 The 1977 Treaty is the bais of diverse obligationsirnposed on the
parties:tuexecute obligations,to consult,tonegotiate,andalso to concludeagreementsfor
75
Agreementofa1976.rt",reproduceds anannex atm. (atp. 37); alsoArticle5(3)of the
76 m. (ap. 34)"Done in SlovakandHungarianfanguage bshrextsbeingequallyauthenticand
ooncludedbetweenth"partiamW., atp.37).
77 See.cg, Iefierof29 Octokr 1991,in=]auon tothe pumping ofwater intthe bypm canal,
Hmgarian Memanal,Vol. 4,Annex66 (atp.120): thereforbId ~e continuatiofthi iIiingto
k a departuhm the J.C.P." SimilarinaIetterdatd19Deoernkr 1991,theHmgarianPrime
Unister mmplained?othe CtechosIovaPrimeMinîsrerof5everafaiIur esdingthar: "Thialço
incIudemnstmctionwhich dwiatefrom thef.C.P.m., Annex77 {ap.129).
78
m., Vol. 1,para..79.
79
m., para.6.72.
80
W., para6.21;see,dm,para.4.21(5).
81
ManagementAgreementhadtheo,sameaprioritoverthe JoinContractuPilanasthe 1977Treaty:
whilstthe Treat-lexsDeciaiin relatitothe 1976BaundzayWaters Management Agr~ment -
constihiw ~e legai bisof theJointContracmi Pian,tnwhichit continuallyrefethe 1976
Agreementmakesnomention ofitatAI. thehrther irnpIernentatioof obligationsIn thirespect,it contains elemenrsofapactum de
contrahcndoB2and obliges the partie not mereIy tu negotiate but actually to conclude
i
implementationagreements within thefiameworkofthe basic Treaty, thusIegaIIycomecting
the two instrumentsp3.The most important,thoughnot the sole, of these irnplementing
agreements was theJointContractuaP llan.
2.69 This is not an exceptionallegal situation.As Professor Reuter has
explained:
"Comme lesengagementsinternationaux se muItipiienten s'étendanAt des
objetsdeplusenplus vastes,mettaritencause desaspectstechniquesardus et
déIicatsiIdevientdifficilede conclurcestraitésen uneseuleopération et les
Etats signendes accords de principe[here:the Treatyof 19771 en renvoyant
les mesuresd'applir;afioà des accords ultkieurs qu'ilss'obligenta négocier
[here,aboveal[,the Joint ContractualpIdg4."
Translation:
"Asinternationaclornmitmentm s ultiplandextend to an everwiderrange of
objects, touching oncomplexandtechnicailydemandingaspects,it becomes
difficulto condude treatiesin one sole operationand States thus sign
agreements of principleleavingthe measuresof implementationto subsequent
agreementswhichtheyareobIigedto negotiate."
Hecontinues,citingJudgeCharles De Visscher:
"...the object othe negotiations...isonly to ap ly in practice principles
formingpart ofa pre-establisheinternationaregimeB "
"Indeed the mainreasonbehind many treatieis anothertreatyin respectof
whichthey havean ancillaryor supplementarc yharacter;such is thecaseof
agreementsclarifying, complementingor performing a basic treaty ...in
principltheseagreements aresubordinated to thebasicagreementu , nlessthe
partiesintendthemtube autonomouss6 -"
gZ & RY. JenningsandA. WattsOD.cil,,1224,andA. Miajade IaMuel* "Pactadewntrahendo
enderechointernacip onalm*,RevistesrranoaederechointernacionI96%,p.392.
83
On thipoint P.Reuter,m cit.,pp720.726.
85
Ch.De Visscher,issentingopinion,Internatilîatuof SouthWestPLfiicaAdvisorvOpiriio~
I.C.JReport1950,p.128,atp.188.
86 P.Reuter,IntroducttotheLawofTreaties,inter,London1989p.100.Thiswas indeed so in thecaseof theJoint ContractualPlan, whose obIigatonature stems
hm the1977 Treaty,whichit makesmoreprecise,completes andexecutes.
2.71 Yet, atthe same time, the conclusionofthe Joint Contractual Plan
constitutethe partiecamfinaout oftheobligationscontainedintheTreaty. It is herthat
Hungq commitsa senous enor: for,accordm tgHungary ,heody Iegaiobligationbiiding
uponthepartiesarethoseappeaïinginthe 1977Treatyitseif,andthe JointContractuaP l lan
onlyiiiustratthe ways inwhichtheseobligationsmightbe caniedout -so, it aiwaysrernains
possibleto modifysuchmethods, evenunilaterally.tisherethatHungary'serrorliesbecause
the Treatyboundthe partiesto concludethe related agreement thatconstitutesthe Joint
ContractuaPllan,establishiitsgeneralapproach.Butonce theprecise provisionsf thePlan
have beenagreed intherelatedagreement,the partiareborrndtu carrythemout.
2.72 Certaidy, Iike the 1977 Treafy, or any other treaty, the Joint
ContractuaiPlancouIdbe modied (andin a mannereasierthan for the TreatyitseIf). But in
theabsence ofa mutuaiagreement betweenthe partieto the contrary,the Plconstitutethe
Iawfumed between the parties, and any breacheswould beinternationallywrongful acts
entailininternationarlesponsibi.yt
B. Hun~arv'sErroneousAnaiysis of the Other Related A~reements
and their Relationshito the1977 Treatv
2.73 Like Slovakia, Hungary accepts that "the 1977 Treaty was not
concluded in a vacuumbut wa~ part of a mat& of bilaterd and muiilateraltreati..."8'.
However,udikeHungq, SIovakiaconsidersthat th"matrix"incIrrdesagreementconcluded
both before and after the1977 Treaty(although these comprise two distinctcategories).
SIovakiadso hds Hungarjt's analysisofthe reIevanceof these agreements tobe odd and
seIective.
AgreementsPrior tothe 1977 Treaty
2.74 In linewithits utterindifferetoethechronology of events,Hungary
presentsthe 1977 Treatyandwhatit calfthe "relateagreements" not in orderof execution
but interrnsoftheirobject(asperceivedbyHungary).This approach allowsittojuxtapose
obligationsof verydiRere kinds, ofwhichcertain are cunent anandalidwhIst othersare
obsoleteor without the effectcIaimbyHungary.
87
HungariaMemarial ,ara4.55and6.50. 2.75 A Spicd exampleof thisisHungary'streatmentof the Agreement
Concerning the Setîlement ofTechnicaland Economic Questions Relating tu Frontier
Watercoursesof 16 April1954%'. As Hungary rwgnises, thiswas repIacedby the 1976
Boundary WatersManagementAgreement which enteredintoforcein 1978; thereforethis
instrumenhtasabsolutelnorelevancetothecurrentdispute.
2.76 Thismay be anextrerneexarnple,utitisnotthe onlyone. In arather
looseway, Hungary compilesreferen toesrovisionoftreatiesandagreementsthatithds
usehl toitsbasichypothes wihcornpleteindifferenctowhether theyarestil inforceh
particula, oattentioispaidtuthefactthat the1977Treaty hasmodi-fi(or darifiedmmy
provisionsofthesearIieagreements.
2.77 Thisisthe casewiththe1947 PeaceTreaty. Inthe 5rsplace,it fdse
to saythatthistreaty gave "Czechoslovakaandnow the SIovakRepublic) tenitoryon the
rightsidof theDanubeforthe firstirnefgB.heBratislavaboroughofPetGdka, on the nght
bankof theDanube,hasfomed part of Czechoslovaki ainceindependenceatthe endof the
FirstWorldWar. More importantlyH , ungaryrefersto thedemarcation agreementof 11
October1948 pursuantto the Protocol of22 December1947, accordingto which, "...the
borda is definedbythethalwegoftheRiver'smainnavigablebedatthelowest waterleve~"~.
But itoverlooksthe factthatthisprovisioqwhichdefinesthe natureor"characteruof the
frontier, was rnodifandrenderedobsoleteconceniingthissectioby the 1977Treaty,one
ofthe consequenc ofs hichisthatthemain navigablchanne1 hasbeen moved towards the
northintothebypas caridandrhusis nolongerassociatedwiththefrontie?.
2.78 The same rernztrmay be madefor the bilaterdAgreementonCertain
IssuesofWaterManagementandCessionofTerritoriesPursuant tuArticleI, Paragraph4,
subparagraph (a)of thePeace Treaty of Parisof9 Octuber 1948=, accordingto which
Czechoslovakiaagreednot to alterunilateratheflow in the Mosoni~anube~ . Here, the
88
-iùid.,V3,Annex12.
89
m., Vol.1para.4.25.
w m., para.4.25.
91 a para2.39, m., abve.
92
HungariaMemarialVol. 3, An5.x
93
-bid.,Vol. 1.4.27. -44 - I
1
I
1977 Treaty does not derogatefiom the previousagreement;rather,it constitutes an
irnplementationsincbyvirtueof itsArtic3:
"The Confracting Partieswill determiinwncord what kindof work can
iduence thewaterflowof theMosonisectionoftheDanube."
Thisisexactlywhatthe partieshavdune inthe1977 Treae andthe Joint Confractullan.
2.79 SiMrlarIyt,e Treatyof Prague of f3 October 1956 Conceniingthe
Regimeof StateFrontiersisonlyrelevantinsofaas itprovisionshavenotbeenmodifiedby
the 1977Treaty. Infact,itarticles2(3),3(2), and19are al1modifiedby the 1977 Treaty,
with respecttothejointIysharedDanubesection. Contrary to Hungary's assertion ^he^,
1956 Treatyrelatessolelyto boundarissueist thushasabsolutelyno relevanceto Variant
"CM , hichlieentirelon Slovakterritory.
2.80 But the 1977TreaQ isnot Iimitemerely to modîng or repIacing
prioragreements.Incertaincasesitimpiernentasndcariesout their provisions:
2.81 For example,Arîicle 20 ofthe 1977 Treaty referto the Danube
FisheriesAgreementconcIudedat Buchareston29 January1958. But thisagreementsetsout
for the partiody the generalobjectivesP;ndArticle20 ofthe 1977 Treatyis limitedto
remindingthepartiestotake"appropriatmeeasuresto achievtheseobjectives.
2.82 Similady,Articles15 and 19 of the 1977 Treaty constitutethe
irnplementationf provisionsin the 1976 BoundaryWatersManagementAgreement. As
Hungary recalls,Artic3eofthe1976 Agreementprovides:
"1.The ContracthgParties do herebyundertathatthey:
a) shaIInot cany out my water management activitieswithout murua1
agreement,whichwoiildadverselyaffecthejointlydefinedwater conditions;
d) shaIIennape in pnor ne~utiationson the eE&s of water management
Article2.hichdter the waterconditionsinthesectionsdefinedjointlyunder
94 -.id. par4.29-4.32.
95
m., paras.4.4and6.28.beenIeR untouchedbythe Treaty'conclusion:incertaiasesit cianfiinothers imodifies,
the prior undertaking§.
2.86 The mod5cations to the "conventional mats have important
wnsequence si:rtth,hinderpartiesEumrdying on the priur agreementotheextentthat
theyareincompatiblewiththe Treatyseco ntdannot seriouslybe maintaine,sHungary
attemptstodo,thatthe1977Treatywas terminat ieorderto reestablishtstatusauo ante.
Even ifmerelyforthesake ofargumenti,twereadmittedthatsucha clairneterrninationwas
valid,auodnon,itwould benoless tmethattheprioragreementswouldnet be "resuscitated"
asa resultInspiteoftheambiguous formulatioinHiingay's~ernorial'~',they nevertheless
have rernained"iforcafter25May 1992'Iso ol@ totheextentthat theywerenot modified
or repIaceby the 1977Treaty. Foas SIovakh ias show above'"3,ttùs Treatjr Iaysdoa
specifictenïtorial regime;hence,adispositivetreatywith nody IegaIconsequencesbut
dso,on the gruund, irreverseffectsthat onPart- actingunilatera-can cIearIyhaveno
righto gobackon.
TnstrumentsPost-Datin~the 1977 Treatv
2.87 The instrumentsagreed toder the 1977 Treatyeither make more
cancrete and implementthtreaty'provisionsormodifythem.
2.88
The second hypothesispresentnogreat problem.It suficestu recall
that the Treatywas modifiedon two occasions: fir sytthe 1977Mumal Assistance
AgreementconcIudedthe me dayas theTreaty,whichalteredtheparties'equalsharingof
the workloadand, fora limitetirneof profitunder theTreata y;d second,bythe 1983
Protocol,amendingArticl4(4)ofthe Treatytoprovidethat"thepower generation plantswiii
be put intooperatiduringtheperiod1990 1994" (insteaof1986-t990). AsfortheMutual
Assistance Agreement, thitoo was modified twice -by the 1983 and 1989 Protocoh,
respectively,dowing downandthenacceleratintheProjecatHungq's request.
2.89 Hungarycontendsirtcorrectlythat dtothe secondmodificationof the
MutuaI &sistance Agreement, sincit was unaccompmîedby a paralleamendmentofthe
Treaty,there exis"aninconsistencconcenitngtheIegaiobligatiotocornpletetheProject"
101 &, inparticul, ungariMernoria,ara4.54.
102
W.
'O3 See,para.2.3f,aseq.,abve.and that"[tlhecontradictionwasneverresol~ed"'~~.Infact, therisno "inconsiste orcy"
"contradiction"tailT.he1989Protocolwas lirniteto providig thattheconstructioworks
were to be finishedi1994, whileatthe sametime moding the dates of the puttininto
operationof thevariouselementsof theG/N System. Thismodication conformedexactly
withtherequirement osfArticl4 ofthe 1977 Treaty,asmodiied bythe 1983ProtocoI,and
hencetherewas noneed offurther amendment'".
2.90 The "discretion"employed inthe HungarianMernoriai inde&g with
the2983 and 1989 Prutocolstu whichit devuteody a few passagesisquiteremarkable.It
is especiallysignificthatit is onlyinthe most roundabou t arnerthatthe Hungarian
Mernorialacceptsthatiwas Hungar y hoinitiatethe 1989rotoc col (andthatof 1983,of
cour~e)'~'. Nevertheless,thîs episodeisofextreme importance:itshows thatjust three
months beforethesuspensionof works atNagymaros,Hungarywas pressingCzechoslovakia
(who had IittIe choice but tu agree)for anacceleratioThis hardlyfis withHungary's
contentionsthattheNagymaros suspensionwas decidedonly&es long and interisistudy.
Hadthis beenthe casethesestudieswouldhavebeengreatIy advanced byFebruary1989and,
hence, Hungary would sure1y have abçtainedfiom signing the Protucol, for which
Czechoslovakiahadnoenthusiasm,anyway.
2.91 Of course,thereareobviousreasonsfor Hungary's"discretion" in its
discussioof these Protocols. Theynulliitscontentionasto the non-obligatornatureof
the 7977Treaty's the schedule; forifthe Treaty had containedno more than heIphI
guidelines,therwudd havebeen no needforthesefomd amendments.
2.92 Ln other respects,thereare many agreements pst-dating the 1977
Treatythat implementthe Treat yo:tablythe Joint ContractualPlan,the 1977 Mutual
AssistanceAgreement andtheAgreementof 1979 asto the CommonOperationaR l egulations
ofPlenipotentiarieThe provisionsoftheseagreementswerenecessarydue totheframework
nature ofthe ~reaty"~. For the reasons already meritionai in the discussionof the Joint
Contractual Pian, they are subordhatothe Treatyandody implementitsprovisions. In
104 HungarianMernori.ara3.72.
10s Hungaryis mistakwhenitcontendsththe1989 ProtocolwasnopubiisheM., para.3.73.
Thefact thaitwaswidelydiççerninaateomrnenteudponinthHungarianandCzechoslovak
pressSec .orexample,MamarHi~la~14 Febniar1989MagvarNemzet 22 March 1989and
Vhama~iHirek,26March1989,Annex4.
106
HungarimMernoria,ara.3.72.
IOt
-iidpara..43.concltrdingsuchagreements,fhe parties dno morethantu fulfi tIeiobIigations ththey
acceptedinthebasictreaty,th1977 Treatyat thesametirneallowingthenecessasflexibility
fur their possibleadaptat-oit aiwaysbeing understouthat çuchadaptationscould onIy
intemenebymutualaccord.
SECTIO N. Conclusions
2.93 Severalconclusionmaybedrawnfiomthe analysiofthe 1977Treaty,
which fms the coreof thecurrentdisputeand oftheinstrumentsthatare in variouways
Iinkedtoit, whetherbecausethey werernodifiedby tTreaty,darÎfieby it,orimplemented
by itorbecause,tuthe contrary,theareagreementsth& amended,cornpIeted orappliedthe
Treaty. It appearsinparticuhat:
2.94 The Treaty,which containsboundaryprovisions and lays down a
specificterritonalregimeintheinterestnotonlyof theTreaty partiesbut also ofal1Danube
ripariansand even al1European States,isa dispositivetreaty, creating rights=m.
independentlof the IegaIpersondityof itsongind signatones;
2.95 The Treaty cmot be consideredindependeritly of the cIoseIy
intemelated cornpleof agreemen fosmedby the instmmentsthat pre and post-date its
signature;
2.96 It abrogatescertainprovisionsof anterioragreementsand is for the
partiesthemeansoffulfillingthe obligationsof ceiherprovisions;
2.97 h-
aframawurk treaiy, it imposIegd obligations on theparties;of
thesecertai(notablyinrelatiotothetirneschedule)areseIf-suficient,whilstothersEndtheir
implernentatioinIateragreementsconcludedbythepartiestodefinthemeans of meetingthe
generalobjectivesonwhichtheywereagreed (notablyasto environmentaplrotection);
2.98 One of such implementinginstruments,the Joint ContractualPla~
withoutdoubt a conventionalagreementwas the choseninstrumentof the partiesindefining
themethodswhichtheyintendedto usetoattainthe goalsdefinedinthe 19Treaty;
2.99 The network of obligationscreatedbythis ensembIe orcornplexof
agreementsf,orms aninsevera wblole,andtheTreatypartieshavenottherightunilaterally
to refusatwilltoperfonn anyparticulapartofwhatconstitutestheintegratG/N Project. 3.O1 There isno disagreemenbtetweenthePartiesasfar asSlovakia'sstatus
as one of thetwo successorStatesof the formerCzechand Slovak FederalRepublic is
concerned.However,thePartiesdo disagreasto thequestionof whetherthe 1977Treatyby
virtueof applicabldes oflaw of Statesuccessiondevolvedor not upon Slovakiawhen it
assumedresponsibilitforits internationrlelatio(ifnotlawfullyterminatedearlier,which
SIovakiadenies).
Hungary is no dorrbaware of theweakness ofits argumentsjustifying
3.02
theprrrportedterminationofthe1977Treaty. Tttherefurtrietu escapeits treatyobligations
in relatiotu SIovakiabydenying the ipso iure continuityof the Treatyfur SIovakiaaa
succesçorStateofthe formerCzechandSIovakFederd Republic,arguing that:
"Evenif...the1977 Treatyremainedinforce despiteHungary'stemination of
it andtheunilaterailmplementatiofVariant C,itcaed tobe in forceas a
treatonthedisappearanco efCzechoslovaki an 31December1 992l."
3.03 Hungary'spositioninthisrespectsuffersfromtwo majorweaknesses.
m. Hungary providesanincorrect interpretationofthe generrulesof the law ofState
successionto be appliedincasesof dissolutionoa State;andsecon Hd .garyignoresthe
specificnatureofthe1977 Treatyasa treatofa localisedorterritoricharacterwhich,inall
casesof territorial change,fdl intocategoryoftreatierernainininforceby operationof
oneof theweIIestabIishemles ofIawof Statesuccession.
3.04 The continued vdiditjr of the 1977 Treaty can be suEcientiy
demonstratedonthis secondbasis. However,the 1977 Treaty ione ofa cornplexofbilateral
agreementsconcIudedeariierbetween theformer CzechoslovakiaandHungary, the continued
validitofwhichis equaIIyimportant. Tview ofthisSlovakiawiIIdso addressthearguments
ofHungaryconcerningthe gencral des of Iawof Statesuccession. Thetwoquestionswi11be
dealtwith separately.
1
HungariaMemonal,para.10.107 .SECTION 1. The Law Relatin~ toSuccessionin Res~ectofTreaties in thEvent
ofDissolutionofa State
3.05 The legd positionofSlovakia based on the principleof ipso iure
succession- in respectof ailtreaiies concludeby formerCzechoslovakia aridha-
applicationtthe territoof whatis now Sloakia -has beenstatedan severd occasionin
the mostunequivocaltmno andhas receivedthe broadest acceptace on the panofother
Statesconcernedand intemationaiorganisationAs firther demonstratbelow,there isno
basisfor Hungary'allegationofinconsisteinthepracticeofSlovakiainthisespect2.
3.06 Infact, therean evidentIackofcoherenceinHungary's legalposition
as farasthe Iaw ofState successioniconcemed. Fir sherearemanifestcontradictions
betweenHungary's previousstatements(at the UnitedNationsConferenceon Successionof
StatesinRespect ofTreatiesand its currentpositionas presentedin its Mernorial.Second,
theHungarian Memorialis highlyselectivein its analyOns.the one handitpromotesan
obsoletedoctrindenyingthe possibilityof aipsoiuresuccessioninthecaseof dissolution
of a State and, on the other handitadvocatesthe i~so iure successionby Slovakiato
obligationsarisingfronzechosIova!ciatsged 'responsibilot~un~ad, which isa preiy
speculativedoctrinehavingnbasisincontemporaryinternationallaw.
3.O7 Hungary' s ew thain theeventofthedissolutioofa Statethefatoef
treatie-in pariiculbiIaterd treat-isgovmed by the "cleansIatprinciple4icontrary
tuArticIe34of theViema Conventionon SuccessionofStatesinRespectofTreatiesof1978.
Thisprovidesthat:
"1. When a parior partsofthe territory a Stateseparatestoformone or more
StateswhetherornotthepredecessorStatecontinuesto exist:
a) anytreatyinforceatthedateofthe successionoStatesinrespectof theentire
tenitoorfythepredecessorStatecontinuesinforceinrespectof eacsuccessorState
soforrned;
b) anytreatyinforceatthedateofthe successioof Statein respectonly
ofthat partof the territoryof the predecessStatewhichhas become a
successoStatecontinuesinforceinrespectofthatsuccessorStatealone.
2. Paragraph1 doesnotapplyif:
a) theStatesconcemed otherwiseagreeor
2 M., para.10.119.
3 -., para8-03.
4
m., paraIO112. iappearshm thetreaty or is otherwi estabIishethatthe application
b)
ofthetreatyinrespectof the successo Sratewould be incompatiblewith the
objectandpurposeof thetreatyor would radicallchangethe conditionsforits
operation."
The Viema Conventionis not a treatyinforce and, assuch, is not applicablein relations
between SIovakiaaridHrrngaty,except when the mIes set outintheConvention aremies of
general internationtaw. In fact,the Convention codZed, tu a largeexterit, the existing
custornaq law. Hungq, nonetheless,sçerts:
"Not ody is theConventionitseifwidelyregardedaslegislativeincharactand
not as a statementof existinggeneralinternationallaw,butthereis littleor no
supportforArticle34 asbeingdeclaratoryofgeneralinternationaaw6 ."
But,thisassertionisnot accornpaniebyanysubstantive analysis.Therearesound reasonsfor
Siovakia to takjust the oppositeview,inparticulaasfaras theapplicationofArticle34 in
concerned.
3.08 inits commentary to the 1974 dr& ofthis provision (at that time
Article331,theInternationaLlawCommissio cnncludedthat:
"..althoughsomediscrepanciesrnightbe found in State practice, still that
practicewas suEcientlyconsistentto supporttheformulationof a mle which,
wirhthe necessaryqualification,ouIdprovide thattreatiesinforcat thedate
of thedissoIutionshuuldremaininforce iwsoiure with respecttu eachState
emergingfiom thedissoIutiun.The factthat thesituatiomay be regarded as
one of 'separationofpartor partsof a Statetratherthan one of 'dissoIutionl
doesnot dter thisbasicconclusion."
The key tothe Commissian's adoptionof this positionlay in what, in 1972, hadbeenwo
differentarticles (Artic27 and28) whichdealtseparatelywithdissolutionof a Statewhen
the continuity principshould apply, and sefiaratiof part of a Statein which event the
"cleanslate"doctrineoperated(becausea new Stateemerging hm sucha separationhadbeen
consideredasbeingin the same positionasanewfyindependent State).
3.09 Ln the2writtencommentson the 1972 draftsome Statesraiseddoubts
as to thesoundnessofthisdistinction.Iwas pointedoutthatthe"cIean slate"doctfinin the
5 Forthetexof thViennaConvention,eeU.nitedNationsConferenontheSuccessionoStatein
RespectofTreaties,OfficiaiRecords,VDw.INCONF. 80/31.
I 6
Sec .ungariaMernorial,ara.10.116.
7
Farthetextofthe1974drafarticles, UnitedNationConferenceontheSuccessionof Stains
RwpectofTreatieVd. IIIDoc,AICONF.8014. 1
- 52-
!
eventof separarionof partof a Statehad been IargeIbasedonoIdprecedentsandthat there
was IittIerecentSîatepracticetu jnstiSfit. TheCommissionacceptedthia sndamdgamated
the mu situations, opting for a continuity principleasthe uriiform nrle for both cases
(dissolutioas weIIasseparation).
3.10 The Commissie onvisaged onIy one exceptionfiom the continuity
principleinthe event of separation.Thiswas reflected inparagraph 3 of the iinai drafof
Article33 whichprovided that:
"..i fpart ofthe temtory ofa Stateseparates hm it andbecomes a Statein
circurnstancewhichareesseniidly of the same characterasthose existingin
thecase oftheformation ofa newIy independen Sttatethesuccessor Stateshall
be regarded..inal1respectsas anewiyindependen ttate"
Inotherwords, ody inthatsituationwould the"cleanslate"mleapplyandnotthe principle of
continuity.As SirFrancisVallat,theexpertconsultante, xplaineto theConference:
"...fromthewording ofArticle33 andthe commentq tu it, it was cIearthat
paragraph 3 was not intendedtu apply tothe case where a predecessor Statt
ceased tuexist. ConsequentIyit wouldnot appIyto thecaseofdissoIutionofa
%teg ."
3.11 The InternationalLaw Commission's approach was in principle
approvedbythe ViennaConference held in 1977-1978. The proposais to alterthe basic
principleof this articlewererejectedby the conferences. In defending the Commission's
approach and inagreemenw t iththeprevailingview,the ddegate of theUnited Statesstated
that:
B Sec.United Nationanference on theSuccessionoStatein @t ofTr~ties, VolFI, oc.
AICONF80~1SlAdId ,48thmeeting,pam1.
9 An amendment to Article33was submittedatheConferenceby SwitzerlanandFrance @oc.
NCONF.80tC. lL.4 l/Rw. 1).Aceordingto thedelegatof Swiwrland,the InternationLaw
Commissionin itsdrafiofArti33departefromexistinginternationallawwhiie:
"..the'cleaslatde ..wasthebasicp~ciple of clsic internationallawconcetheng
successioofstateinrespecoftreati...generallyappiiininternatiolelationlong
beforedecolonizat...mhe Swissdelegati..miated the'dan date'mie withthe
principIresintediosam and no1withthe principofseifde~ennirrat[which]was
indd apolitid maxim....Seg. UnitNationsConferencon theSuccessinfStatesin
-t dTreati~, VolI.I,0thmeeting,am 27-30.
Fmce, neverrheIesstatd differenwiitsandtheBwisspositiocrincerning ~plaa ofthe
"cleansIatprincipIinclassicinternationatlawir mgnid:
"..thaincustomaryinternatiolawthe'cleaslate'pnncipco+xistedwiththprincipIe
ofcontinuitandthatbothwere foundinpracticeFrancehad optedforamixed system
applyingthe'cl= date'principltreaticoncludedinluituDersonandtheprinciplof
wntinuittoothertreatieM., 40thmeeting,para.44.
The Swiss-Frencproposawasrejectby theConference. .48thmeeting,para38. "...Artic33 accorded withthebuik of internationpractic...Plights Eeely
accordedunder a treaty shouIdnot becut off hecause one§taie unitedwith
another..orseparatedinto twoormore parts....The centralquestionfor the
Conference'sconsideration therefurwas why the ri& ofreIiance shouId
disappearJ".
3.12 The view that the continuityprinciplewasjustfied,irrespectivof
whether thedissolutioofa Stateorthe separatioof partof aStatewasinvolved,was shared
by the majoritof delegations. Andtherewas anear consensusamongstdelegationsthatin
the case of dissolutionand, in particular,in the case whwe the constitutivepartswhich
separatedhad to someextentparticipatedinthe formulationofinternationalelationsorhad
been given limitedinternationalersonaiit,he continuityprinciplewas basedon sufficient
Statepractic ell
3.13 The meritaofthe contiriiiityprinccmIebeseen hm thepresentcase.
Ifafterthe dissoIutioof Czechoslovakia ithadben the new SIovakRepubIiewhich had
wished tu disownthe 1977Treaty,findirigit tubeaneconomic burdeq and ifit hadbeen
Hungary thatwas anxioustu see the entirG/N Projectcompleted,the continuiîyprincipIe
would havequiteprtiperlyprotectedHrrngaqtspositio In.orrtrasthe"cleanslate"doctnne
now advocatedbyHungarywouIdhavepIacedHungq in an impossibIeposition,unable to
enforceits rightseventhough,in Hungary,nothin gadchanged. It is due tosimple good
senseandfairnessthatStatepracticehasfavouredcontinuity.
3.14 It isalsoin clearcontradictionwith the prevailingState practiceand
doctrinethattheHungariaM nemorialdeclares:
"Inrespectofbilateraireaties(othethanboundary treaties),theisnomle of
internationalIawhich provides for automaticsuccessionif...a predecessor
State dissolve sdseveral successoStatesemerge initsplace . hether rhere
is a successionto biIateratreatiesin such cases depends essentia12Jin
agreementbetweenthe successorStateandrheother paty tothetreaty... .
3-15 Further,with ttiiasserti oungary contradictsitsown statements
made atthe Vienna Conference. There,an amendment was submiffedby Germany which
aimed atIimitingthe applicationof theprinciple ofinsu iure continuity in thevent of
10 W., 41stmeeting,par16.
11 m., sec hedebateathe40th-42ndand48thmeetings.
1L
SecH.ungariaMernorial,ara10.112.dissolutionor separationto multilateraltreatiesI3. The effect woutoIeavebilateral
treatiesinforconlyifthe successorStateandtheotherStatepartyexpresssoagree or,by
reasonof theirconduct,were tobe consideredas havingso agreed. Hungq was among
those delegationswho raid objectionstuthisamendment and who snpportedwifhoiit any
reservation the d& ofthe InternationaLaw Cornmission. Accordmg tu the Hungarîan
deIegate:
I[The] pnriciple[ofioso iurecontint]asinycunformitwiththe iritereofs
the Statesconcemecl,as weiias thoseof the internationlommunity. He
remindecithe Conmittee of thecase ofhisown country which,on the
terminatioof the Austro-Hurigarinmpirein1918, hadcontinuedtoconsider
itselfboundby thetraies oftheDuaIMonarchy. He was thereforeinfavour
of Articl33 asproposedbytheTnternation alw Commissio n...
At anothermeetingHungary underlinedhat:
"...inconsideringthepossibledissofuofStatesthe continuiof inter-state
relationshadtobe de-guarded and the stabilityof treatyrelationsmaintained
intheinterestofthecommunity of statesl."
3.6 In generd,theprincipleofcuntinuitincasesof separatioof partor
parisofthe territoof aStatereceivedstrongsupportatthe onf fer en . ceeroleof this
principlwasfurtherstrengthenebythe Coderence'sdecisiotu deIeteparagrap3 ofArticle
33 (estabfishg the "cleanslatede for casesofseparationincircurnstancessimil aor
decoionisation)AsProfessorCrawfbrd haspointai out:
"Theprocessof evolutiotowardsa germa!regirneoftreatcuntinuitin non-
colonid cuntextwas, remarkably,compIeted at the Second Session ofthe
Viema ~o~iference"."
3.17 The HungarianMernorialrefers to the position containedin the
13
Amendmenstubmiflby Germany,m. MCUNF.80K.IL.52,wasrejectedbthConferenceSee,
para39.NatiConferencentheSudon ofStateinRw ofTraies,Vol.II,8thmeeting,
14 ' I 40thmeetin,m 54arid4Ist-th& 48.
15
1Crawford,TheContributionofessoDr.PO'Cbnne ltheDiscipIiofInternationalLa1*,5
BritishY&k ofInternatioLaw(1%O),p.40.Restatement (Third) of the Foreign RelationsLaw of the United states17. TheRestaternent
favorrredgiving aIInew States(regardles of whether or not they were dependentcolunies)
freedurnto stariafreshT.8But theRestatement becme a target ofcriticisminthisrespectand
was consideredinaccurately torefiectthepracticeoftheUnited States,includimgthatof recent
years. Thus, E. Wiliiamson fl-egalAdvisor tuthe U.S. StateDepartment, 1990-1 993) andJ.
Osbornfindthat:
"As a matter ofpractice,thereare equallydivergentapproache thathavebeen
employedwithrespectto treatysuccessioninthiscentury. For purposesof our
analysis,however, the Department viewed State practice as fallingdonga
continuum.Atoneendof thiscontinuumw , herea portionof the Statebreaks
awayfrom theprimaryp ,redecessorState,thepracticetends to supporta 'clean
slate'approach.Attheother extreme,where aStatedivides intoits constituent
pans, the gractice suppons the continuityof existing treaty rights and
obligations1."
3.18 A criticd view ofthe Restatementconclusionswas aIsoexpressedby
Professor Schachterwhoobserved that:
"[Iltseems probable thata generdpresumptionofcontinuityofthe obIigations
of apredecessor StatewiIIbeacceptedfor new statethat havewme intobeing
bysecessionorby dissoIution of existingStates...Thus,it is udikelythat the
Restatement' suleof a cleandate for dl new stateswiIIprevaiIinpracticeor
theog ."
In fact,ina review of the recentcasesof dissolution of Statesin EasternEurope,the same
author cornesto theoppositeconciusion tothat now voicedbyHungary:
"The experiencethus farwithrespectto [these] cases ...supports a general
presumption of continuity." .IL
If HungarianMernoriai,ara. 10.i13.
18 RestatementIThirdlotheForeignRelationsLaoftheUnitedStaresSec.2IO#ment f(1987)-
19
E.D. WiIIiamsonandJ.E.Osbm, *AU.S.Perspectiven Tm Sumion andReIatedIssueinthe
Wake of theBreakupoftheUSSRandYugosIaviaU 33 VirejniJournaol InttrnationaILa(993,
p. 263. Hungq makes referertothi srticand,in partinrl,oitsfsndininfavouof a *casey
thattheauthorssupportianalysiwhiIstquitetheoppositeistme.g.Hungary givtheimpression
20 O. Schachter,StatSuccessio: ieOnce andFutureLaw" ,3 ViraniaJournalofInternatiol aw
253 (1993)atp. 258.
21 m., pp.257 and259. 3.19 The case ofthe extinctionof Czechoslovakifalls,undoubtedly, within
thecategoryof thedissolutionofa Statewherethe predecessorStatehasceased to exist,and
not withinthe categoryof the separationof partof a State where the predecessor State
survives.
3.20 Czechoslovakiawas not a union of States,each of which enjoyed
distinct international personaiityBut its constituent repubIics did enjoy within the
CzechosIovakfederation a broad rigtit ofparticipatiinthe establishmenot finternational
obIigations,therighofienquotedin support ofthe thesisofipso iure continuiryoftraies in
the event of dissolutio .n^Earh international treaty, the implementationof which would
requiremeasuresnomallygovemedbythelegislationof the Slovak Republic,was subjecto
theapprovalof thecompetentSlovakauthoritiesi ,ncludingas the case maybe, approvalby
the SlovakNationalCouncil (Parliament).
3.21 Thus, Article 137 of ConstitutionalAct No. 143/1968 on the
Czechoslovak ~ederation~p~rovided,intealia,that:
"TheGovernmentofthe[Slovak]Republicshdldecide,as a bodyi,nparticu ln:r
d) theapprovdofinternational treatiewhose irnplementationiswithin the
jurisdictionofthe Repirb...."
And, accordingro Article107of thesame ConstitutionalAct:
"(1) The [SIovak]NationalCounciIshdlinparticularhavethe [cornpetence]:
b) to apprclveinternationatreatiewhose implernentationrequiresan Act of
theNationalCounciL .."
3.22 Theserigbtswerefullyexercisedbythe SlovakRepublicinthe process
of elaborationandapprovalof the 1977 Treaty. The SlovakGovernmentgave itsconsent,
priorto thesignatureof the1977Treatyonbehalf of theFederationb,yitsdecision36/197o 6f
4 February 1976 andagain,afterthe signatureof theTreaty,by its decision36211977of 26
October1977~~.Similarly,priorto theapprova l fthe1977 Treatybythe FederalParliament
and subsequentratification by the Presidentof Czechoslovakia,the Slovak Parliament
approvedthe1977Treaty by itsResoliitionNo35 of 19December 1977~'.
23 For EngIishmlation ofthe ConstitutionActNo. 14311968and theConstitutional ANo.
12511970amendirig and supplementingthe fmentiond ConstitutionaIAct, Bulletiof
CztzhosIo~akLaw, Vol. Prague,I9l,pp.101-148.
24
Sec .nnexes5and6, reqxstively. 3.23 The cumpetent SIovakauthorîtiesgave their prioconsentdso tu the
concIusionofaI Ither agreementsreIatetuthe 1977Treaty concliided&er I Januaq 1969,
the dateoftransformationofCzechosIovakia ntaofederation.
3.24 Thus,thecase of dissoIutiofCzechoslovakia mets d thecriteriof
a typeofsuccessioninwhichtheapplicationoftheprincipleofipsoiurecontinuitisbasedon
anexistingcustomarylaw. The practicaapplicatioof thisprincipleis discusatparagraph
3.40 below.
sECï10~2. The Law Relating to Succession as Re~ards Treaties Affecting
Temtorv and itsUse
3.25 It wouldbe sufficientfor Slovakiatbase its daim for thi~so iure
successionin respecofthe 1977Treatyon the generalrule ofcontinuiwhichappliesin the
case ofdissolution. Neverthelesqthe ipso iusuccessianin respect ofthe 7977Treaty is
srrpportedstiIIbyanother,weII-establisdrincipleofthe laafStatesuccession. This is the
pnncipleofipsoiurecontinuityoftreatiesoatenitorid oriocdisedcharacter.
3.26 Zn its Memonal, Htingary porîraysthe 1977Treaty as a commun
bilaterdtreat(exceptasto its"COMECON attributes):
"nt is cleathatthe 1977Treatyisnot aboundary treaty..Nor didthe 1977
Treatycreate'obligationandrights ..relatinto the regimeof a boundary'
withinthemeaning ofArticle11ofthe Vienna Conventionon StateSuccession
withrespectto Treatie...[and]thereis accordinglyno basisfor arguing that
theSlovakRepublicsucceededto the 1977 Treatyunderthe ruleo sf generai
internationll wrelatingtoboundartreatiesZ"
3.27 Hungaryignoresthe specificcharacteristisf the 1977 Treatywhich
place it inthecategoryof treatiesoa localisedor territorialcharacand,in part,among
those creating an "objectiveregime". Hrrngarydsoignorestexistenceofa specificmleof
internationalIawprovidinfor ipsoiurecontinuitoftreatieof tks character,irrespectiveof
thetype ofterritorialchange.
A. The 1977Treafv is a TreatvConternina the Territom and ifs Use
and Estabnshingan "ObiectiveReeime" 3.28 The Iocalisedor territorialcharacterof th1977 Treaty is beyond
questionandhas beenfdiy discussedat paragraph2.35 etseq.above. The characterof the
1977 Treatyasa treatyestablishian"objectivreegime" asfaras internationalavigationis
concernedhasalso ben disciissedthere.
B. The Princi~ie oflm fure Continuitv of Treaties Affecfin~ the
Temtorv and itsUse Affims SIovakialsSuccession to the 1977
Treaty
3.29 The existenceofthe ruleof gentrd internationalawestabIishirithe
QSO iurecontinuityof treatieof a temtorid character,includingthose providmgfor an
objectiveregime,wwa sonhned by the UnitedNationsConferenceon State Successionin
respectofTreaties. Accordhg toArticle12oftheViennaConvention:
"1. A successionof Statedoes notas suchaffect:
a) obiigationsrelatingto tuseof any territor,r torestrictioupon its
use,estabIishebya treatyforthebenefitof anytenitorofa foreignStateand
consideredasattachingto the territorof aforeignState and consideredas
attachinto theterritoneinquestion;
b) rightsestablishebya treatyforthebenefitofanytemtory andrelating
totheuse,or torestrictiospon theuse, ofanyterirtorof aforeignStateand
consideredasattachingtutheterritoriinquestion.
2. A successionof Statesdoes~loassuch affect:
a) obligationrelafingtuthe useofany ~erritoror turestrictionsupoits
use,establisheby atreap for the benefitoa group ofStatesorofal1 States
andconsideredas attachinto that temitory;
rightsestablishebya treatyforthebenefiof agroupof Stateorof all
%tes and relathgto theuse of anyterritory, oturestrictionsuponitsuse,
andconsiderd asattachintu hatterritor..."
3.30 Article12canbeconsidered to beone ofthoseprovisionsof theVienna
Convention thatrepresenthecodificationofcustomaryinternationallaw. AstheInternational
LawCommissio statedinrelationto itsworkon Statesuccession:
"Both inthewritingsofjunstsand in Statepracticfrequentreferenceismade
to certain categories of treaties variously describedas of 'territorial',
'dispositive',al'r'localized'haracters bindinguponthe territoraffected
notwithstandingany successi ofnStates. ..The question...touches such
major matters asinternationaboiindaries, nightof transion international !
judgment inthe second stageofthe casd' . The case is, therefure,generallyacceptai as a
precedent in favour of theprincipIethat certain treaties aftenitorid character are binding
ipsoiureupona successor state3'.
3.33 Thedoctrine that certaintreatiesof a territoricharacter constitutea
specialcategoryforpurposesofsuccessionof States aisoappears to be thedominantpractice
of tat tes^^.
3.34 Treatiesconcerning water rightsor navigationon riversare commdy
regarded ascandidates forinclusionin the categoryofterritoriatlreatieasbrieflydiscussed at
paragraph 2-52 above .mong modern precedents citedby theInternationalLawCommission
3I FreeZones dUpwr Savw and theDiçtriof Gex.Sudment. 1932,P.C.I.JSenes AIB.No. 46,p.
95,atp. 145.
32 UnitedNationsConferenceontheSuccessioof StateinRespectofTreatieVol.LIID,oc.AICûNF.
80/4,wrnmentarytoArlicIe12para.3.
33 In British practitherearenumerous staternenevidencingtheUnited Kingdom'skIief that
customarylawrecognisesthexistenceofsuchanexceptiotothecleanslateprincipleaals oothe
movingtreaty-frontirie. One such is the replyof the ForeignCommonwealth =ce 10the
InternationLlawhswiation:
areinheritedaubmaticallybaanewwcSi&tformerIypartoflthetenitorifforwhich thce
existing Stawasinternaticdy repmibIe. Such righrand obligauonsaregenerally
deçcriM asthosewhichrelatedirdy m territowithinthe new Stat[forexampIeth-
reIatiIOhnriers andnavigatioon riversbutintemationa1awon thesubjecisnatweII
settleand iisimpossibletostatweithprecisionwhkh rights andobligationswoddbe
inheri~edaummatidland whichwould notbe."See.Internationlaw Association,Report
oftheFifty-thConferenceB,uenosAires1968,p.619.
Afurther statementof a sikindrwasmadeby theUnitedKingdomat theoccasioof discussions
withthe Spw Governent regardingthe interpretaofoArticl8 ofthe Treatymncerningthe
Establishmen tftheRepubliof Spnis,MateriaionSuccessi ooSntate1%7,üN Doc.STLEG.
TheFrenchGovernmen appearsto takeasimilaview. Thus,in a note addresstoltheGerman
Governmen tn 1935, afterspeakiofwhat was,in effa thernovingwfy-frontier principtht
FrenchGovernent wntinued:
"Thidse issubjeato animportantexceptioninthçaseofconventionswkicharena of a
plitid chacier, that is tosay,which were not mncluded in relauantothe
pemnalig cfthe Statebutare ofterritoriand Id applicatioandarebased on a
geographid siîmrion;thsu-r Staieinespectiofrhemn forwhichitsucceed iss,
bruidtoassumethe burdensarisinghm treatiofthis kinjusasitenjoystheadvantages
pified inthern."See,UnitedNationsConferenceontheSuccessi ofStatesinRespectof
Treaties,Voi.Icommentar o Article12,par22.
Canada,againin thwntextofthe rnwingtreaty-frontre, hasalsoshow that it sharestheview
thaterritorilreatieswnstituteanexcepttoit.Mer Newfoundlandhad becorna new province
ofcana& theLegaiDivisionofthe Departmen tfExternatAiTaiexplainedtheattituofCanada
asfollows:
"...Newfoundandkane part of Canada by a form ofcession and ccinsequentl,n
accordana wib the appropriatedes cf intemationalaw, agreementsbinding upon
Newfoundlandpriw todon laps&,exqt for those&Iigations arisfiom agreements
Idly crimgtd which hadestablishedproprie- orquasi-proprie- rights..* See,
UnitedNationsConferenceon the SuccessionofSutesinRespectof Treaties, Vol. III,
commenfarj.oArticIt12,para.22 annote200.is Thailand'rights of navigatioon the River Mekong, granted by earlier treaties and
confirmedina Franco-SiameseTreaty of1926. In connectionwiththe arrangementsfor the
independenceof CarnbodiaL, aos andVietnam it wasrecognisedby these countnesandby
Francethat Thailandnavigationalightswouldremaininforceu.
3-35 Severaiothercasesoftreaiesconcetningutilisatiofriversarequoted
bjrD.P. O'ComeU:the case oftheNie River whereder init ioul tSudan acceptedtu be
bound by the AngIo-EgyptianTreaty of 1929;the case ofthe Chatt-al-Arabinwhichthe
successionofIraqinrespecttuthe1847 Treatybetween PersiaandTurkeydid not giveristu
anydispute;thecaseof ArnawaiKhwar inwhichPakistanrecogniseditselftbethe successor
Stateof l3ritiIndiaandthe caseof PakchanwhereThailand (ingeneralhostilto automatic
succession) acceptedthe devolutionto Burma ofthe 1934 Treatyconcludedwith British
hdia3'.
"..leTanganyika,n affinnanen 1961qu'ine seconsidérapitascommeliépar
le traianglo-belgde 1921 quiavaitconcédé alaBelgiquecertainsdroitsau
trafiet àl'utilisatidespointsde Kigomaet de Dar-es-Salamn , 'apaseu
recoursàl'argume dela'cleanslate'maisa allégle défauitnitiaidevalidité
dutraitél,equeauraitétéconcluparI'Angieterrueltravires.parrapportaux
termes du mandat:l'intentionest nette d'évider placerla discussiondu
probléms euleterraindelasuccess diotats~~"
Translation:
"Tanganyikai,nafrning in1961 thatitdidnot consideritseIfboundby the
Anglo-Belgîantreatyof 1921 which wnceded tu BeIgiurncertain rîghtof
commerce and usageof theplacesKigomaandDar-es-Salam,did notfa11back
onthe 'cleanslate'argumenbutdIeged aninitialdefectintheTreaty'svalidity
intentionas clearlyto avoidplacingthediscussioftheproblemonthe levele
ofStatesuccession.''
3-37 hng treatieofa territorial characsespecid category embraces
treaties providiforobjectiveregirnesAccordhg tutheIntemationaiLawCommission,the
characteristicof thetreatiesinquestisthatthey attachobIigationsaoparticulaterritury,
river,canal,etc. forthebenefiteitherof a grouStates(e_a.ripariaStatesof aparîicuIar
34 Sec.UnitedNationsConferenceontheSuccessioofStatesin Respect of Treaties,VoI. IIi,
CommentartyoArtic12,para26.
35 Sec. .P.'Comell"IndependencendSuccessiooTreatia"38BritiYedmk ofInternational
(1962)pp.84-180atpp.151-154.
36
See,A.GPereimof!&.,p.127.river)or ofaiStatesgenerdly. They indude treaties fthe neutrdiçatioor demilitarisation
ofa particulaemtory, treatiesaccordingfieedomofnavigaifononinternationalwaterwaysor
rivers,treatiforthe tquitableuseof the waterresciurceofanintemationd riverbasinand
thelike3'.
3.38 Initsworkon thelaw oftreaties thInternationLlaw Commissiondid
notconsiderthata treatyofthischarmer had theeffectofestablishinb,yitsownforcealone,
anobjectiveregimebindingupontheterritorialsovereignandcorifenhg contractual righton
Statesnot partiestoit. It tuok the viewthat thobjectiveregime resultedratherfiom the
executionofthe treatyandthe graftmguponthetreaty ofan internationalcustom. The same
view of thematter was faken by the UN Conference onthe Law ofTreaties. Furthes, the
Vienna Convention does not exempttteatiesintended to createobjectiveregimesfiom the
generalniles which it lays down concerning the effects of treaties on third States.
Neverthelessin thecontextof StatesuccessiontheInternationaLlawCommission recognised
that:
"[I]a succession ofStatesoccnrs inrespectofthe territoryaffectedbythe
treatintendedto createanobjectiveregirnethesuccessorStateisnot pruperiy
speakinga thirdstateinrelationtu the treaty. Owintuthe Ieganexu shich
existedbetween the treatand thetemtory pior tothe dateof successionof
Statesitis notopentu the successurState sirnplto invokearticle35 ofthe
ViennaConventionunderwhich a Treatycan not impose obligationsupon a
thirdstatewithoutitsconsent. The rulesconcerning successioninrespectof
treatiesalso cornintoplay. But underthese rulesthereare caseswhere the
treatyintendedto establishan objectiveregimewouldnot be bindingon a
successorStateudess such atreatywereconsidered tofd under a specid mle
tuthat effect. EquaIlifthesuccessionof Statesoccursin relatioto a State
which isthebeneficiaryofa treaty establishianobjectiveregirne,under the
generaIlawoftreatiesand the Iawofsuccessionthe successorStatewuuld not
necessarily beentitled tu daim the rights enjoyedby its predecessState,
udess the treatwyereconsideredtufaIIundtr sucha specidmie. That such a
speciaImie existsis.intheo~inionoftheCommission.establishedbv anumber
ofconvincingprecedents3 8"
3.39 As the 1977Treaty isa treatofa localiseor territonacharacter,and,
in certainrespectsatreatyprovidingfor anobjective regimeitsipso iurecontinuitder 31
December 1992 (the dateof dissolutiofCzechoslovakia)isbasedon a generdly recognised
principiof custornaryinternationallaw. Hungary'daim thatthe 1977 Treaty, iitremained
37 See.UnitedNationsConferenceon theSu-ion of Statein RespectofTmties, Vol.m,
wmmentary toArticle12,para.30.
38
-d. (emphasiadded).in forceaftethe ptrrporteterminationinMay 1992, ceasedtobeinforca es aresnltofthe
disappearanceofuneof itstreatyparties(namely,CzechosIovakiai)s not supported by existing
custornarylaw.
SE~ION~. The DiplornaticErchanees between Slovakia and Hun~arv Since
the Inde~endence of Slovakia Do Not Sur~r~ort the Hun~iirian
-hesis
3.40 Slovakia'MinistryofForeign Mairs has actedinfullaccordance with
theview thattheprincipleof ipso iurecontinuityof treaties,bilateralas asimultilaterai,
wouId appIyin the case of dissolution of Czechoslovakia. It sent diplornaticnotes to
internationalorganisati andsforeignStatesas edy asDecember 1992 (the eve of the
dissolution ofCzechoslovakia)in order toensure the unintempted application oftreaties
previouslyconcIudedwiththembyCzechoslovakia.
3.41 In these notea nearlystandardwordingwas used. Ttcontairiethree
main elements, namely:
- that the Slovak Republic, as one of the successor States of
Czechoslovakiaw, ouldconsideritself tbe bound by multilateraind
bilaeraltreatietowhich Czechoslovakiawas a Party;
-
thatthe successionwouldoccur inaccordance withandto the extent
determinedby theexistingmIesof internationallaw;
- that thesuccessionwoiildbe effectivehm Z January 1993,the date
when SIovakia was to assume responsibility forits international
relations.
Al1 these elementsarecontainedintheNote of the Ministrof Foreignairs ofthe
SlovakRepublicaddressed totheHungariaE nmbassyin Prague, dated18 December 1992".
3.42 In itanswer to thinote,Hungarydid not objectasto thesubstanceof
anyofthethree elementscontainedintheSIovakNote. Itmerelyexpresseditsreadiness:
"...to enter,within the shortest possible time, into negotiationswith the
Governent ofthe SIovakReptlbiiconquestionsrelatingtu Statesuccessionin
respectoftreatiep ."
40
m., VoI1,para IO118. 3.43 In acceptingthe idea of negotiations on the questionof State
successi tuonilaterd treaties,SIovakiadidnot contitposition accordiugwhichthe
devolutionoccurredautomaticaoyn1 January1993.The presumptionof anautomatic&
& successiotubilaterdtreatdoes notexdude thepossibityofnegotiationsbetweenthe
partiesconcemed, for the tStatemaysee theoccasioas ausefiropportunitytu review
theù treatyreIations.
3-44 Automatic successiodoesnotnecessanlmean successionto eacand
everytreatyinstmmentpreviousin forcebetweenthe predecessorStateandthe otherparty.
Article34 providesforcertainexceptfiorntheprincipof ipsoiursuccessi whn:rethe
Statesconcernedagree otherwis ehere the applicationof the treaty in the new situation
resultinfromthe dissolutwould beincompati wblehtheobjectandpurposeof thetreaty;
wherethetreaty'applicatiwaslimitedtothetemtorywhichbecme partofthe teetory of
anothersuccessortateemergingfromdissolution.
3.45 Iisobviousthat, inenteriintnegotiations,partarenot Iimitetu
the discussioofquestions of successionstricto sensu. Startirig fiom the presumption of
continuity,thecm expIicitagreeonthetemirnationof a riiimboftreatiethatthey End
ubsoIete,but whichwuuldothenvise nme tu exisautomaticallybythe mereoperatiof
theruIeofStatesuccessi on.isasthe mainpurposebehindSlovakia'readinesto proceed
with a generalreviewof thebilateraitreatyrelationsbetween Slovakiaand Hungaras
inheritefromtheformerfederation.Suchanattitudcan,innoway,be interpreteasbeing:
"inconsistewiththe concepof automaticsuccessionto bilattreatiescontaininArticle
34 ofthe 1978onv vent io .n"^'
3.46 Inthe samespirit,SIovakiahdd negotiationswatnumber ofStates.
During thesenegotiations the presumpofcontinuitywas takenasabasis. WhiIefor the
maintenanceof treaties in force no extra prwasdfoundnecessaryby the parties,inthe
--
41 m., para.10.119.case ofthuse treatieswhere thpartiesagreeduntheir terminatioq aI1fomalitiesrequiredfor
such astepby municipalIawwere acc~rn~fished~~.
3.47 The needfornegotiationson issuesrelatedto Statesuccessionhasbeen
generallyrecognised and stressedon severaloccasionsby dierent internationaal uthorhies,
whoseviewsarequotedbyHungary in it~ernoria~~ .~But manyof thesestatementsrelateto
Statesuccessionproblemsingeneralandnotto successionin respect oftreatiesandbilateral
treatieinparticulm. Thus these staternentcanin no way beinterpre at nvalidatingeither
the materialruIcof Iawof Statesuccess irovidingforaniuso iure continuity of treaties in
the event ofdissolution of a State,or the mle cornon to di types of State successiun
providingforautomaticdevolution oftreatiesccincemingterritorand its use.
3.48 In thisregard, Hrrrtgary rsferencetu the opinionsof the Arbitrafion
Commissionestablished by the InternationalConference on the Former YugosIavia is
particularlsurprising.It quotestheseopinionsinsupportof itsthesisthatthereis no mle of
internationaawprovidingforautomatic succession inrespectofbilaterdtreatiesandasto the
purelyconsensualcharacter of anyarrangemenftortheirremaining inforcebetweensuccessor
State and the other treaty Thereference inparagraph10.114 of the Hungarian
Memurial totheOpinion of the ArbitratiCommissi isnhighIymideadingandinvites the
foIIowing commen t^"^
* F&t, the statementof the kbitrationCommtssion conceming questions
of State successioningeneral, incIrrdingsuccession in respect of
treaties,is containedin Opinion No. 9 jwhich Hungary overlooks),
where the Arbitration Commission confirmedits view (already
expressedin Opinio n o. 1) that:"...the successionof States is
42 Thishasken thepositionwiththtemiinatiooftreatiesonabolitiovisain relatitoFsderal
Republicof YugosIavia(SerbiaandMontenegm).Bosniand Herzegwina,the FonnerYugoslav
RcpubIicfMacedania Armenia,AzeroaijaG,eorgiaKazachçtan.Kirgistan,Moldov* Tadjikistan
andTurkmtnistan.
43
HmgarianMernorialparas1..I13andIO.1I7.
44
m., para.IO114.
45 Para.10.14oftheHiingarîaMernoriaieadasfoIIows:
"Alongsimilalines,theArbitraCommission&estatiIisectheInternatioConferen=
ontheFormerYugoslavi(theBadinterCommissioreferreinitOpinionNo. Ilro..'thc
fewwelkstablishedpnnciplesof internatiolaw applicabto Statsuccession. The
agreement.'TheCommissionwentontopointoutthatagreementasto successionbetween
twosuccesçoStatecoulnotbindthirdStatwitho heiragreement."
Infactthe quotaliisfmm OpinioNo. 12,Paris16July1993, 32 Internatiolep.alMaterials
1586(1993)para.1,atp.1590. i
governedby principlesof internationallaw embodiedin the Viema
Conventionsof 23 Aupst 1978 and 8 Apri1,2983,which aI epublics
haveagreedshouldbe thefuundationfor discussionsbetweenthem."
-
SecondO ,pinionsNos. II and 13of the &bitration Commission tu
which Hungary does refer relateto problems concerning State
successioninrespectof Stateproperty, rchiveanddebts and notState
successioninrespectoftreaties;
- Third,and mostimportantt ,he AïbitratioCommission initsseriesof
Opinions onlypronounced on therelationsofsuccessorStatesinterse;
itis in thacontext that it insiston the necessity ofagreements in
ordertu reachan equitablresultwhich,for therest,correspondstuthe
processfoIIowedbySIovakia andtheCzechRepubIic.
Furthemore, Hungarysirnplyoverlooksthose eIemerrtsofthe Opinionswhich do not fitits
hypothesis.In OpinionNo. 1I,thatHungaryignores,itis statedinteraliathat:
"...9The Commission wouldpointout,however,thattheprinciplesand mles
ofinternationalwin generareIatingto Statesuccessionaresupplemental,nd
thatStates are at libertyto resolve the difficultiesthat might ensfrom
applyingthemby entering into agreements thatwould permit an equitable
outcome4 ."
3.49 Thus, in sharp contrat tu Hungary'sassertions, the Arbitration
Comrriissionnot ody recognised theexistencof "principleand des ofinternationalaw in
generalrelatingtoStatesuccession" ,ut sawthem"embodied"in the ViennaConventions of
1978and 1983.
3.50 Hungaryalso makes referenceto the conditionsset up by member
Statesof theEuropean Comrnunity fortherecognition oftheRepublicsof formerYugoslavia
and the Soviet Union, requiringthat those States "settleby agreement,inchding where
appropriatebyrecourse to arbitraiio,llquestionsconcemingState successionandregionai
disputes"47T. hitoo is of noassistanto Hungary.The requirementwas a mereexpression
of politicalcuncemand was not theexpressioof aview on the contenof the reIevanmle of
Iaw.
46
OpinionNo.I1,Paris,1Idy1993,32Inttmationd Le~Material1585(1993)para9, al I89.
41
HungarîanMernoria,ara 10.117. 3.51 Final$, Hungary* ~ference to theCouncil of Europe's practice,
whereby the rightof participationin treaties concIudedunder the CounciI'sauspicin is,
principle,restrictoditrnember snd thusfds witb the exceptionshm the principlof
i~soiurecontinuityspelledoutinpmagraph2@) of Articl34 of the Viema Convention of
1978,isaisoinappropriate.
SECTIO N. TheImplicationsof the SpecialApreement
3.52 Inparagaph2 oftheSpecialAgreement thePartiesrecognised:
"...thattSlova Rkepublici...thesolesuccessorState in respecofrights
andobligationsrelatitotheGabEikovo-Nagyr Projecs."
3.53 It isobviousthatthiformuIq neutrd astu the questio of continued
vdidityor terminationof the 19Treatywas the onIyway tu describjointly thesituatinn
wtzichthe viewsofthe Partiesdiametricadi&. WhiIeinHungary's view the1977 Treaty
was teminated priortu the dateofdissolutionof Czechoslovakia,inSlovakia'sview the
piirportedterminatiofthe 1977 TreatybyHiingay waswithout anylegd effectThus, the
1977 Treaty was, on the date Statesuccessiora treav inforce.As suchit survived,by
virtueofthe rulesofcustornarjrIaw,the disappearmcof Czechoslovakiaandcontinues to
governtherelationsbetweenSlovakiaandHungary.
3.54 The conclusionsthat Hungaryseeksto draw from the formulachosen
by the Partiesin the prearnof the SpeciaAgreement areinvalida. Itwas evidento the
Partiesthat thedraftingofprearnburaragraph2 oftheSpecialAgreement had to be without
prejudiceto the questionssubmittedbythemto the Court. The failureto mention specifically
that Slovakiahadsucceededto the 1977Treaty cannote interpreteasan agreement that it
was not thesuccessor.
3.55 Whether the rightand obligations relating to tGm Project, in
respect ofwhich Slovakiabecamethe soie snccessor tu CzechosIovakiaare ri&& and
obligationsbasedonthe 1977Treaty or on anothergrounddepend slely onhow theCourt
wilIariswerthe questionconcemin tge IawfrrInessi Hungqas temirnation ofthe 1977
Treaty in May 1992.If the 1977 Treaty rernained inforcedespiteHungary' purported
termination,then, in the Iight of the argumentsaboveconcemingthe rules of ofwState
succession,it continutube inforcebetweenSlovakiaandHurigary.
48 m., para.6.06. SECTION 5. The IilopicatNature of Separatine Primaw and Secondarv Rivhts
and Obligations
3.56 WhiIo enthe one hmd Hungq contests thepossibiIitofm bso iure
successionofSIovakiatu the1977 Treatyandthe prirnarriata andobligationsit estdished,
on theother hand it doesnothesitatetu asserthatSIovakiaassrrmedsecondatyobligations
resuIringfrom allegedbreache ofthe 1977Treaty andother internationaiobtgafions of
CzechosIovakia. This isaneclecticapproach,whichcomists ofthe seledion ofdifferent
doctrinalconceptsfordsereriaims.This rnake sungary'spositionasfaras the lawofState
successionisconcemed, hi@@ iriconsistent.
3.57 InChapter 8ofitsMernorial,Hungaryw, hileacknowledgingthat:
"..Slovakiacannotbe deemedresponsible forbreachesof treatyobligations
attributabeniyto Czechoslovakiaw, hichno longerexists"
immediatelycontinuesbysaying:
"NeverthelessC, zechoslovakiasreachesof the 1977 Treaty,other bilateral
treatiesvarious multilateralconventions andcustomary international Iaw
createda serieof secondary obligations;namelyxthe obligationtu repair the
damage caused bythe wrongfuIacts.Thesesecondary obligationswereneither
exthguishedby the terminatioofthe 1977 Treatynorby the disappearanceof
~zechos~ovakia ."~
3.58 CzechosIovakiadid not commit any "breach oftreaty obligations"or
any other internation* wrungfiilactwhich would haveentded its responsibiliq towards
Hungary. This aside,hm a purelydoctnnaipointof viewitisastonishingthatHungq does
not consider secundarobIigationas beingthecorollaryof primarobligation,butratherasa
relativelyautonomousbodyof obligations. Inthis, Huagarydisagreeswiththe Internationai
Law Commission, according to whjch the secondaq obligations are deemed to be
consequentialonthe breach ofprimaryobligations50.Hungaryfailsto explainhow itis that
there is succession to secondaq obligations but apparentlyno succession to prîmary
obligations.
50
See he Reporof the TriternatLawaCommissiononthewcrb ofits thirty-session1983,
SupplNo IO (A138101Commenmy onarticle ofthe partof fie SopSuter-nsibility,in
Yearbookof theInternationd LawCommis1983,Vol.II,Part Two,p.42.I 3.59 The purpose of thisarti6cial separationofptirnq andsecondq
obligationsis self-evidtnt. Hungq simplyatîernptstu evathewideiykepted thesis of
non-succession tu delictud responsibiand,inthe fina rlsulttu advocate the opposite.
Hungq isfurced by its singuIarviewonsumssion tu treatiesto hd ways to place
obligationsupon Slovakia. It aserts thState responsiviliof Slovakiaby referencetu
"adoption"of anallegediIIegictofCzechusIovakia.Ifthis isright,sedno% Hungary does
not ne& itsseparate,artifiargument relatito seconda raty obligations.
1 3.60 Itis turad herethepracticdy unanimo usew ofthe doctrine,
accordmtg uwhiiich:
"I I'existpas endroit degens derègIt coutumikreou deprincipegénéral
postulanle-transfertautomatiqàe successe desobligatid oncoulant
dela responsabilinternaiton& deI'Etaprédécesseu ....~~homo~eneitque
présenteijurisprudenceinternaonde encettematièrene seretrouveen effet
dans aucun des autresdomainesoù se poseIe problèmede Ia succession
dEtatg1."
Translation:
"Thereexinitsin law no custornaryruIeor generd principlesupposingthe
automaticttansfertu thStatesuccessurofthe obligationsresultinghm the
intemationairesponsibilof a predecessorStat....The homogeneityofthe
internationaljurisprudeonthispointis not tubefaundin any otherareain
whichprubIemo sistatesuccessioarise.*
The andogousconcIusionappIies ((anSIovakiadoea not denythis )sconcernsthe rightof
the predecessorStattderivinghm the wun@I act ofariotherState.As thesame author
says:
"...Ie'bsencedeconventi conntrair,'Efatouvea uereprendpasles droits
appartenanàt~~tatantérieudufait$un acteillicitedona étélavicimdZ .'
"..inthe absenceofagreementtuthe contraryIthe neStattdoes nottakeup
the rights belongingtu the predecessStattasa resultofan illegaact of
whichit wasthevictirn."
3.62 Inthi sespect,itisnecessarytorxd1 thatSlovakia'sri& tu obtain
compensationforthelossescausedbytheddays inconstructionworkontheHungatian sideis
J.P.Monnie"h sumion d'EU& enmatièree-wbiIit& iritematio~eAririuafrancaisdu
droitinternationai,.86.
" Ibid.notbasedon successiontuCzechosIovakiaperse,it is a right bastheTreaty. Accordmg
tuArticle26(2)of th1977 Treaty:
"In consequence oftheir liabili~undeparagaph 1,the ContractirigPartieshd
separate$andexclusiveI:
c) Cornpensatethe other ContraningParty or a third parryfor damage
resultinfrom theIattor improperperformanc efwork anddeliveriecarried
out by them,fium the deterioratiofthe plan tndequipmentofthe works
referred tuinparagaph I, andhm operationsnotin cunfurmitywith the
approvedoperatkg and operationalprocedures.*
3.62 Hungary'osbligatiotocompensatefor the damagcaused by iprier tu
31 December 1992 was createdipsofacto, dueto the existencofdelays,by virtueof a
specificprovisiointhe 1977Treaty. h such hesefinancialobLgationsdreadyexisredas
treatobIigationatthe moment of State successioCompensationfor the damagecausedby
Hungaty'sbehaviour was not a mere"entitlernent". Hungaryhaddreadyacquireadefinite
financialobIigatibasedon a treaty stipuIationand,sinceSIovakiahadbecampam tu the
Treaty,thisobligatiwas owed toS~ovakia.
3.63 In addition, Hungary's condu~t did cunstitutan internationally
wrongfuI actand aninternationalIywungfulact ofa continuingcharacterwhichextended
beyondthe dateofthedissuIutioofCzecho~lovakiaC . onsequently,Slovakia,as1January
1993,was entitIedto dl rernedsdable tu theinjureStatebythe ruleosfinternationalLaw
governingStateresponsibiIity(cessation, restitution,compensation,satisfaction).
3.64 Thus, as assuccessurStateon whichthe 1977Treatyautomaricdy
devolved by virtueofrrrlwof generd internationallaw, SIovakhm the rightto obtain
compensationbathfor thedamage caused by Hungarjlsnonperformance prioto,asweII as
after3 7 December 1992 (the date of CzechosIovakidissolution).he provisions of the
1977 Treatyconcerningpaymenr of damagesare indivisibfromthose introducing the "joint
investrnent" and "joint property"concepts, baçed on the assumption of an integral
irnplementationofthe Treatjr. Separaartificidone elment fiumanotherwouli?aamount
tu unjuste~chmerrt ofthpartyinbreachof theTreat. SECTIO N. Conclusions
l
3.65 Thedisappemce of a Statepartytoa treatassuch doesnot resulin
the terminatioof a treaty,unlessthis evefds withinone of those categorieofState
successionwhereinternationllw doesnotprovideforthetraty'scontinuation.
3.66 Suchis not thecase for the dissolutionCzechosIovakioar for the
1977Treatywhich aboved,is of a territooraIocalisecharacter-
3.67 The 1977 Treatyremainedinforcedespiteits purpcirterminationby
Hungary inMay 1992a ;nd&er the dissolutionofCzechoslovakon 31 Dccember 1992 the
Treatydevolved,byGrtue ofnilesofcustomarjlinternationalIaw,onSIovakia.
3.68 The 1977 Treaq continuestu govem the present relationsbetween
SlovakiaandHurigaryandrepreserrtthemain sourceoflawtu beappliedbytheCourtinthe
presentcase.
3.69 There is no needto rebutthe Hungarianthesisconcerningthe legal
ground foripsoiuresuccessionto thesecondaryobligationsderivingfiorn aninternationally
wrongful act,because there was no breachof the 1977 Treatyor other international
obligationsbyCzechoslovakia. CHAPTERIV, THE PERFOkWCE OF 'ïEE TREGTY: THE PRINCIPAL
EVENTSFROM 1977 UP TU TEE SUSPENSION OF WORKS
AT NAGYMAROS
4.01 Theaimof thiChapteris to revealtheerroneousanalysisinHungafYs
Mernoriaiof theventsup to May 1989 and,inparticulart,o show: thatenvironrnental
issueswerecarefullystudiedbothpriorto andthroughoutthe periodbyboth partiestothe
1977 Treatysecond,that the environmentasitudiesutoMay 1989 showed thattheGM
Projectwasenvkonmentallysustainabla;ndm, thattherealandwell-documented causeof
Hiingary's suspension of work under the GM Projecf was Hungary's attentionto
considerationsof antconomic andpolitical nature, notitsconcem as tu the Project's
environmentleffects.
SECTION 1. The Environmerifa1Research Alreadv Conducted At the Time of
the 1977Treatv
4.02 InitsMemurid, Htrngaryhas admittedthat the7977 Treatywas "a
treaty whichwas consistentwith the maintenanof waterqudity and Ath environmental
protectiongenerally"l.Slovakiaacceptsthisassessmewhkh shows thatatthe timeofthe
Treaty'sconclusionthe partieswerehlly awareof environrnenilsuesand concerns. The
purposeof this Sectionis simplyto review brieflyhowin the light of Hungaryfurther
comrnentsinits Memorial,these concernswere manifested. For, althoughHungary now
concedesthat"environmentailssuewsereraised"inthepre-1977Treatyperiod2,at the same
1 timeitcontends thattherewas an indifFerenctosuch matters- "forpoliticalreasonand
becauseoftheiow prions.giventaecologicavaluesatthetimeinEastern~uro~e"~.
Such cIaimedindEerence isrefutedeven by the few documents that
4.03
Hungaryitseiannexes relatingtthepre-1977period. For example,itwasagreedatthejoint
negotiatiuns o13-14November 1967 that: "EffortsshouIdbemadesothat in the involved
1
HungariaMemorialpara.4.21.
2
W., para3.40.ThisconfliwiththecfaiinHungary'Dseclaratof16 May 1992(the "1992
Declaratioihaî intheProjdesigphase"fundamentlçearcandinvestigationsneglected
andnotcarrieout*. Vol4, Annex82(ap.168):
3
-bid .,l. 1,pan. 6.47.
itemtories natural biologicalconditionsaredisturbedas littleas possib."The substantial
natureof these "efforts"was subsequentlypointed out inHungary's 1985 Environmental
Impact~ssessrnent', inwhichthefoiiowingcommentsconcemin tge enviromentai impact
studiescarrieout priortuthe Project'sadoptioarefound:
"The preparatoryworks for the cornpie ut'htion of the Hungarian-
Czechoslovakreach of the Danube startedin 1951. The scientific*dies
covered the agricultural,laridscape-aesthete,oIogicaIand widely meant
technical-economiaspectsof the Barragesystemfou, exceedinctherrptu date
as~irationlevel.Mreadv at thattime therewere -with the ~resentlyused
definition- Envirumental Impact Assewmenfs under way. which were
continued in the 70s. with the involvementof other scientificfields and
institution.*
Thereis just no basis for Hungary'sinconsistent assertiin itsMemorial that duringthe
Projectdevelopment phase, "noenvironmentd impactassessrnenwt as madeu .7And,even as
to the pre-1977Treatyperiod,Hungary's own Mernoriail nits Appendix3 providesa list of
Hungarian studiesrelatinto groundwaterand carriedoutthens.
4.04 As to thosestudiescatriedout priortu 1977byCzechoslovakia hese
arecontainedin thedetded listpreparedbyboth partiestu the1977 Treatythat foms hex
23 to the SlovakMernorial. Not ody does thia lisumarise thecontents and findingsof
each studybut itaIsoshowsthe degree tuwhichsuchfindingsweretakeninto accountin the
Projectdesign,onthefullowing =de:
- A = applicatiotofiIlextent
- 33= partialapplication
- C = applicatioaftersupplementation
- D = applicatioassubsidiarymaterial
4
m., Vol.4, Annex5 (p.11).
5
Seep.ara4.24eJa., below.
6
HungariaMemorial,Vol.5 (Pa0, Annex4 (ap. 15)(emphasisadded).TheHungariMernorial
ignoresthefathaoneof thmain purposeofthestudicarriai ointhIate1960 relatitoan
alternatscheme)wastoexplorewhethea systethaIeftheDanube initsriveM tthegreatest
degrepossibIemighthava 1-f impaconthe environment.'Ioberne was,astheHungaian
Mernorialccepts,introdubydCzechosIovaki,lthuugHmgary ne@& to mentionHun~ary's
negaiiverespontothnewproposal*The HungarianparsticUonsidetheG&BEovo-Na~os
by-pascanaiversioastheoptid solutionforritiIisingtheHungarian-C=hosIo~aDanube
sectionm.".,Vol.1,para3.26andVol.4Annex 5(atp.1
7 m., Vol.1,para3.40.
8 m., pp.396-398.15studiearereferrto. 4.05 Thenumberofstudiesrelatingtowaterqualityandenvironmentailssues
containedinthislistareasfollow:9
HydroIogy 14
RiverbedIoad 7
Ice phenornena 13
16
Waterqudity, biologynatureprotection
Groundwater 21
Geologyandseismicity 9
Oldriverbed 12
Channeldredgingdownstreamof Naparus 7
4.06 Itissignificathatboth partiesalscanie outextensiveenvironmental
impactresearchirnrnediatelviriortoenterhg into the 1977 Treaty. Hungary'sMernorial
ignoresCzechoslovakia'csompilatioin 1975-1976 of the "Biologicalprojoftthetemtory
affectedbytheconstructionoftheGM Project(the"~io~roject" )twould be dacult to
envisage a more complex or completeexaminationof the eEect of the Project on the
environment. Thepurposeof theBioprojectwas to collecresearcdatainrelationtosurface
andground water,floraandfauna,hydrobiologyi,chthyology,hygieneandepidemiology. A
synthesisof sucdata was produced,and a seriofproposaistu optimiseProject *mpactwas
fumulated" . As noted intheSIovak Memaid, theBioprojectconsistaiof some 15 closing
reports21published volumes,72 pubfishearticlesand17non-publishedworks,andcovered,
inparticuIart,he fulluwingregiofsimpact:
- TheDunakiliti-HruZoreservoirarea
- Theold riverbearea
- Theheadwater sectionofthebypasscanaland theGabEikovo step
- The tailwatesectionofthe bypasscanal andthe area downstreamof
Sap(PalkoviEovo)
-
The areaupstrearofNagymaros (onthe Slovakside).
9
Itmustk rememtierethathes ereminimiufigures.TheIistdyrefertothoçestudiwehich
werero çomedegreeakeninto amuntinthePmj- design.It shoddk notd thatheIidwas
jointly compiin1973thatislongbefarthe@es me intdisputinthiasreaThe SRtdies
compiIehm 1973to 1990areIistinAnnex24 tothSIwakMernorial.
IO Sec .iovakMernoril,ar2.17,ga.
I m., paxa.2.20.As 15 thefavoriracornpariso&hueen the Bioprojectaenvironmental
assessrnecarrieoutdurinthesameperioinNofiAmeriq seebid.,para.2.30. 4.07 The HungarianMernorial dso ignores the existenceoasîudy ofthe
waterqualityimpactsoftheProjectonHunganan tenitoryJso carriedoutin1976, withinthe
IargerconterrtoaUnitedNations DevelupmentProgram - WorldHedth Organisatioreport.
Accordm tgotheHungarianAcademy ofSciencereportof23 hne 1989, th"mostimpo~ant
water quaiityproblems"concemirtgthe G/N Project hadbeendiscussedwithin this1976
project12.And,afkerthecompletioofthisprojectandoftheBioproject,bothpartiespursued
on-goingenvironmenta stud yrogramsa,swdibe discussedbelow.
SECTIO N. Events Occurrinvbetween the Start of Proiect Construction and
Hun~arv'sUnilateralSus~ension of Work atNammaros 11977to
May 1989)
4.08 The subheadingschosenbyHungaryforits discussionof thisperiodin
its Mernorialare"SearchforAlternativeand Improvements" for the year1977-1986 and
"Constructionunder Criticisfor theyears1986-1988. These titlesare vemisleadiI ng.
the firstperiud,thewas nosearch foralternativethe discussionofalternativeshadtaken
pIace beforethe 1977Treatytook eFect, and theTreaty had Iega~IestabIishedthe basic
designcriterioftheGIN Pioject. Ofcourse,continualimprovementwerebehg madein the
lightofthe on-goingenvironmentastudy prograns.These Project improvementsrefleciad
built-infeaturofthe G/N Project,whichwasa "blueprÎnratherthan a rigidlydetermined
scheme", asthe HungarianMemonal explainr1'.The Prujectwas conceived ascapable of
beingupdatedin the lightof scientifiand technologicaadvances and the environmentai
studiesconductedbybothsidesduringthisperiod. A moreaccurate titleforthe1977-1986
periodwould focus not merelyon the Project'son-goingenvironmentaltudies and related
improvements,but moreespecially onthe slowdownof the Projec dunngthis perioddue
solelyto Hungary' esonomicdifficulties.By contrathetitle forthe secondperiodshould
reflecthe acceleratioof theProjecthatfollowed the executionof Hungary'construction
agreements withAustnanandYugoslavcontractors andthe highlyfavourablEnvironmental
ImpactAssessrnentof 1985.
12 HungariaMemorial, ol. 5 (0,rAnnex7(atp. 134)Foradixussionof tstudyof23June
1989,oneof two HungarianpapepresentetoCzechoslovakon26 June1989,sec.Slwak
Memorial, ar4.12etm.
13
& however, ara.2.abwe,wherethidescriptibyHungarisgivenonlyqualifiedapprbyl
Slovakia. A. On-Go in^ Environmental Research and Assessrnent; Mounfing
EconornicWorries for Hunearv Lead toan Avreed SIowdown of
the Proiect
FurtherEnvironmen tmil esearch:GeneralOverview
4.09 The Slovak Mernoria providesadetaiIedlisofthenew studiesched
outby Czechoslovakiaaft ehrsignatureof theTreaty and uptu199014. An independent
review ofthesestudiesappearinthe detailereporpreparedby Hydro-Québe Intemtiond
(the "HQIreport"):
"Entre1976 et 1986,Hydroconsulét tamandaté pourintégreles propositions
foumies parURBION et l'Académi ees Sciences. Plus d'unetrentaine
d'organismeson tusscollaboréà des mandatssectorielsA titred'exemple,
l'Institude recherchesur la fertilitédusol s'occupait de l'aspectde
I'exploitatiagricole,inclualaproblématiqu dee drainageetd'imgatiodes
sob; l'Instiderecherche enforesterieétudiailta problématde'exploitation
foresti&re,optimisationdla production de boietI'étade santtdesforêts;
I'AcadGmiedes sciencestraitait particulièteesaspectsd'ordrebiologique;
YInstitutde rechercheen hydrauliq&taichargédecaractériseir%couIement
des eaux du Danube et de sesprincipauxtributaires. D'autrorganismes
s'occupaientdemoriitorirrcomme entre autrerhstitird'Hydrométéorologie
chargé dusuivide Iaquditédeseauxde surfaceetdelanappephrgatique,ainsi
que desdonnée climatiques.
En 1986, une autreétudea été réalisé eansle cadre du bioproje.. La
rechercheet i'optimisatidesmesuresd'atténuatiose poursuiventencoreen
1990...."
TransIafion:
"Between 1976 and 1986,HydroconsuIt was charged with integrating the
proposaismade by URBTON and theAcademy ofSciences. More thanthirty
bodies also worked on the individud mandates. By way of example,the
hstitute for research intosoi1 fertileitymined impacts on agricuIturd
exploitationincludingthe probiernsofdrainage and irrigation ofsoiis; the
Institutefor researcintoforestrystudiedthe problem areaof siIvicultural
exploitation,heoptimisatioofwoodproductionand thestateofhealthofthe
forests;heAcademyof Scienceslookedinparticular atbiologicaaspectsthe
Instituteforhydrauliresearcwas chargedwithcharacterisingheflowof the
waters of theDanube anditsprincipatributaries.Otherbodies wereinvolved
in monitoring,asini f=r the HydrometeorologicaIlnstitutewhich was
charged with followingsurfaceand ground water quality, and also climatic
criteria.
I4
SIovaMkemaria,ara2.21andAnnex24.
1s
HungarianMernoria, ol5 (ParI)hex 9 (app. 278-279URBlON wastheCzechosIovak
InstitforUrbanandRegionaiPlanninultimateresponsibforthe compilatofnthe1976
Bioproj~t. In1986, anotherstudywas campletedwithinthe Bioprojectframework ... The
$1searchand optimisafioof mitigationrneasurearestiU continuingin1990 ...
4.20 Theimpressiongiven inKungary's1992Declaration thaffew, ifanys
studies were condrrcted duringthis period - arid that they ali sufferedfiom "serious
in~ufficiencies"~is diectly mntradictebythisevidenceprovided withHungary's Memorial.
Furthermorea ,ccordingto Appendix 3 tothe HungatianMernorialw , hichdeals solelywith
groundwaterissues, therewereupwardsof 25 Hunganian studiesdevoted to groundwater
aloneched outinthisperiod17 . othinginthereview ofthesestudiesimpliesthattheywere
inany sensesub-standard o,rsubjacttuanjrfom ofpoliticalinfluence". And, as wiIIbeseen
below,Hrrngarydso cmied out detded, envirumental examina iinsof the Project in 191,
1982a ,rid1983-1985.
Hungarv's Ronomit Problems Induce it to Seek an Aereed
Slowdownof the Proiect
4.11 Hungaryadmitsthattheinitialperiod of the Projectwas characterised
byits difficultiesin meetingthemajor financiaundertaking involvedin the GM I'rojectl9.
Hence, itwas essentialto HungarythatCzechoslovakia be willingtodday the scheduIe in
recognitionofthese di£iïcuIties.was the consenttu such adelaythat was theobject ofthe
198 1-1983 negotiations.
4.12 Nonethdess, the HungarîanMemuridattempts to explainHungary's
"vitalneedfor postponement" as theresultnotonlyof Hungws econornicsituationbutalso
of the need toconduct a "furtherexamination of [theProject'senvironmentaiimpacts". It
alIegesthata formal proposaito thateffectwas made by Hungary' s eputyPrime Minister
16 M., Vol.4, Annex82(atpp. 15159 and168).
17 m., VoI. 1pp.39943.
'' Sec .ara4.21below.
'' Sec. Hmgarian Mernoriai,para ..42. where it is dleged that justHungary,but
Czechoslovakiaswell, çiifferedha lacof investmeresourceçIn terrnofinvestmeninto
energyproductioH,ungaryfailhowevertoalludetothefactthaits mcultieswereto alarge
degreeself-imposei byitsdeMsionto investmajorsumsin the productioof electricityby
wnstnictingthe lafossiifuelburningpowplantsatDunamentiandthelargenucIeapressured
waterreactostPaks 115km southofBu- ontheDanube. Sec .IovaMkemorial, ara1.15.
The decisionto expenditsbudindevelopielectricbyyothemeanswuldM y havejustified
withHungary'sMemorialshowsthatatitheiime oits abandonmentfeworksind1989,Hmgqitteà
ansiderd tha ttno Iongerhadany nd of the eleetriciry theProjeewodd supply.
HungarianMemoriaI.VoI.5(Far0,-ex 8 (ap.15Q.
20 See.ibid.,Vol. 1,pasas.3JO.-3Majai dunng a meeting ofthe ESTC Cornmitteeun 21September1981~'. But Slovakiais
not aware ofanysuch meeting of the Conmittee on thatday, and Hunjgq provides nu
evidence to supportitsassertion. There was a meeting that day of the Chaimen of the
Cornmitteet,he recordof whichwas annexed to the Slovak~ernorial~ . But thereis no
mentioninthisdocumentof aformalproposal fordelaybeingmadebyMr. Majai dueinpart
totheneed foranenvironmenta il pactassessrnent.
4.13 Infact,Slovakiaproducesevidencein itsMernorial -in theformof a
letterwriîîen bythe same Mr. Majai - showing that in the early 1980s the Hungarian
Governent soughtto hd environmentalargumentstoboIster iitefforttu delaythe Projec-
a delay sought for entirdy hancial reasons- andwas un& tocorne up with any vdid
reasonsfordeIay onenvironmentalgru~nds~~. ThisIeads Slovakiatomake two observations:
- Firs_ t.ungay's contention that in 1981 considerationsastu the
Project'senvironmentaleffectsinducedHungary to seek to delaythe
Projectis not onlyunprovenbyHungary,but is also not tme onthe
basisofthe evidencebeforetheCourt;
- Second t.is untrueassertionof Hungaryis totally at odds with its
ailegatioas- equaIIyhmnect - that the environment was virtually
igrioredunti&r thepoliticidchangeisHrrngaryduring 1989-T990.
4.14 Furthemore, the environmenta alssessmentcarriedout inHungary in
the early1980s provideabsoiiitelnobasis for supposedenvironmentalconcerns. Of grai
interestarethethree Projectassessmentsked out by Hungarjrinthe years1981, 1982 and
21
M., para.3.43.
M., para3.32 ,tm., refming inpartidartothe "Majai letteof19 March 1984. IRthe
Hunwan Mcmorid, pam 3.43itisal= dIeged thatinmater 19%t tuoHungarianMie5
rwponsiblforSrateinvestmedecideinparaII telII~ al1bjea ansvuctiononHungarian
territotheirnplîmtionkinthathq did~oforenvironmenidreaçorrs. agee nowidenceis
given.ReferenΠimade thereto alettof 19 &tok 1981 inwhichthe C=hwlovak Prime
Ministerejectheideaofa completeinterruptof workontheGIN Projeaalthou&suggdg
thaa schedulslowàownofthreyearsmightbeaoceptabl. hIettermaybefond atM., Vol.4,
Annex 10. Theimpressiongivenis thatthe CzechoslovakGovernenrejet34theBungarian
proposatointermptthe G/NProjetoallowitenvironmenil£€ecttsbe studieThisisa falçe
impression.Thereisno evidencethaanyenvironmentaqiuestiwas thenat issueHungary's
conternporayifliculwete,andwereseentobeentireleconornandfinanciaiincharacter.1983-1985~~. Whilstthe 1992 Declarationmadereferenceto the "re-examination "f the
Projectin 1981, itdues not mentionthe factthat thisre-examinationc,ompiIed aRera six
month reviewby aworkingcornmitteeappoint4 by the Hringarian Academy of Sciences,
praisedthe standardofpreviousresearchworkunthe Project and concludedthatthe Project
was environmentdly sustainable. This 1981smdy noted thatthe Project's"planningand
researchwork hadbeen orgmisedin a uniformand co-ordhated rnannern andit esubhshed
that&IIusewas made ofsuch research:
"The research,ithough notshowing thesarne depthon severaloccasions,met
thepoliciesnecessaryfortheimplementatio onfthe[GN Project].The results
ofthe preparatorywork and researchcarrieâout for severayears duringthe
preparationsnot only servedthe developmentof the plansof the Barrage
Systwn,butprovidedresuftsthatcould be usedalsobyscholarsofotherfields
ofscienceand provideda basisfortheplansofother facrtitiesaswe1'"
This study dso reveded Hungary'sdesire tu furîher itstudy into possibleimpacts:itis
recommendedthat Prujectworkcontinue and that the resuofnew research be integrat iend
the form ofdesign development. But, this dues not detract from the favourableuverali
conc~usion:
"Thepreparation forthe GabEkovo Nagyrnaros BarrageSystemtookplace at
suchlevel thatitcan be unambiguousIa yscertainetihatthereareno reasons
fiom agricultura lnd environmentaa lspects precludingor questioningits
implementation 26
4.15 The Hungarian Mernoria dso mis-chatacterisehe eventsof thiperiod
inits ernphasison the negotiationsbetweenthe PlenipotentiariinOctober andNovember
1982, during which CzechosIovakiais cIairned to have indicated that it was
24
See bid.,Vol.5 (PariAnnexes1 (ap.1) an4 (atp.14), fsumrnarioftwo ofthesstudies.
Hungaq hasmbrnittenoclmunentinrelatiotothe1982study,thougitappeartohaveken an
importanwork,forthe summaryofthe1983 positionpapwannexeto theHungxianMernorial
asserttba he 1982studywnstitutethe"consideratinidetai[ofttiewlogicalimpactand
consequmceso"theGM ProjecM., Vol.5(Parl),hex 2(atp.5).
25 W., Vol5 PartI),Annex1(ap. 2).
26 M. (atp.4). AccardiuiHungary,wer, -0th =chers oftheAmdernycriticidthereport
foritIackofcomprehensivenessm. .,VOL 1.pas. 3.47-3.48No widenceisprovided. This
criticiaIIegedIId fotheformationca seçonad hw cornmittee,whiissu& a repron 28
ApriI1982. HungarhasfaiIedplacethiseporinwidenceorfoproducan evenIargemdy that
dlegdiy foI1owit.SIovak iat therefoinvitetCoiutto&ducethat itheraremch a report
andmdy, lhq donotsupportheassertionsccrntaindiHun@an Mernorial. -82 -
of 1981and 1982referred tuabove,as corifirmingdoubtswncerning the environmentaleEects
of the project3'. This isincorrect. The position paperconsideied political, technical,
economic and environmentalissues (inthat order) andrecommended that a comprehensive,
twoyear environmentalimpact studybe c&ed out. But it did notfind thatthe Projecî
cngendered my irremediable riskstu the environment. To the contrary,in this paperthe
HungarianAcademyexpressedthe view that "therealor supposedenvironmentaidamage
coming from the [G/NProject]constructioncan be decreasw eitha greatprobabity or can
beavoided ..."12The focusofthepositionpaper,however, was onthe costofsuchavoidance.
4.19 In factthe central concenof the positionpaperwas simpIythat the
Project might not be cost effectiveparticularfwhen the additionalcost of necessary
protection masures outsideoftheProjectwastaken intoaccount:
"The 30 biIIionForintstu beborneby theHungarianparty ..doesnot contain
theunmentioned butunavoidable installatcosts(such astheregulationofthe
Old-Danubep , urificatofnthewastewaterof theregion, etc.whichhavethe
sarneorder ofmagnitude.It isdoubtedthatsuchanamount,considering the
tight investmentresources,cm be spent on a barragesystem which dl
optimallyprovideelectricionlyin 199333.n
Thus, whileit istme thathe positionpaperrecome~ded the suspensionor abandonment of
theProject, thiwas oneconomic,not environmentai,grounds. Thepaperconclnded:
"It is doubt...thataIongtem invesfrnw enhichonIy consumesandfreezes
considerableproductiveforces and financialresourcesover one and a half
decades,is alIowabI".
4.20 Hungary hascIaimed thatthispaper"was completelyneglected by the
governmentandbypartyofficiaisanditspublication wassimplyprohibited"34 .hisis untrue.
The 1985Environmentai Impact&sessrnent shows that the papefs recommendationqinsofar
as theyreIated to the envirument aot the economy, were adopted in the fom of a
guvernmentd resolufion. The &sessrnent states:"The Econodc Conunittee of the
Governent in its resoIutionin May2984 ..imposeilthe executiciofthe tasksfomulated in
the OKTT mational Environmentaland Nature Protection CounciI)resolutio~ in the
31 HungariaMemoriaip, ar3.48,anVol.5 (Par0,Annex2 (atp. 3).
32 m., Vol. 5 (Parti), Annex(atp.5). The sentencecontinu'..with thehelpof further
invesLmenthatarenuoroniy@y intheointinvestmenudget."
33 m. (ap.47).
34 1992Declaratioa., VoI.4,Annex82 @.158).t standpoints oftheHunnarian Academv of Sciences...and as such the preparationofthe
Efivironmentd Impact Assesment accordingto themrrtudIyagreed programme "5This was
clearlya referenctothe Academy's1983 positionpaper,showingthat itwas foIIowedup by
governmentaa lctionwhich,inturn ,d tothecarnmissioningofthe 1985Assessment.
The Economic,Not Environmental,Concenis ofthe Mariai Letter
of March 1984
4.21 TheHungarian Memoria l epictstheperiodin the early1980sas one
duringwhich Hungaryincreasinglyscmtiriisedthe environmentd impactof theGM Project
and disagreementovertheextentof suchimpactempted. The evidencepruvided inthe SIovak
Memorial, in the furm of theMajai lette?, shows sornethingquitediferent This letter
expressestheviewthatthe HungarîartGu~emment,interndly, was generatlysatisfiethatthe
environmentaleEecîshad been catefrrllyconsiderand provided no additionalhasisfor the
postponementof the Project, which Wungarysought because of Hungary'seconomic
diffic~lties~~.
4.22 Thisletterhasspecialimportance becauseit shows thattheHungarian
study of198 1, whichofferedno environrnentr alasonsfor are-examinatioonf the Project,
was carriecioutwithout politicabiasin that it cameto the opposite concIusionto that
apparentlysought bythe Goverment. For theletter describesagovermentairequesttu the
Hungarian Academy of Sciencesin1981 for evidencetu supportHungaryin itsnegotiations
fora Project pustponement Mr.Majaiexplainedthethen Govement's motivations:
"The reasonswere ÉirsofaIIofeconomic character,buwe wanted tu referas
weIItu the need of further researchof environmentalimpacts. Therefore
comrade Borbhdi addressedyou already inMarch1981 and demaaded such a
help of the HungarianAcademy of Scienceswhich would strengthen our
positionsduringthenegotiations.
The Commissionofthe Academy of Sciences, establisheon thedemandof
comradeBorbbdi, did not providesuch ahelp."
36 SIovakMernoria, am 3-37,etW., andpara ..13, hve. Lener of19March 1984 fromthe
Hungarian DepufPeme Miser Majai to thPresideof the HungarianAcademof Sciences,
SIovaMkernoria, nne56.
37 Thisviewwas supportebythe 1981studyconductebythead hm mmminm meatedundcrthe
auspiceofthHungrîan AcademyofScienw refend 10inpara4.14,above. Wbaiknom from
theevidenŒoftheMajailetterisththeHungariaAcademy didcommissiostudie-prwumably
the1981, 198and1983studiereferrtoinpara.4.14above-atMr.Majai'squest, inordeto
trtoformulatenvironmentalrgumentsosupporthimin his negotiatodelaytheProjeet,but
thathesestudiefailetoprovidpersuasienvironmentalns tosupportHungaSseconomic
argumentsordelay. -84 -
This"Commission" e,stablishat Mr.Borbandi'srequest,was the 7981ad hoc cornmittee,
whose studyprovided no ammunitiontu the Governent for re-examiningthe Projecon
environmentalgrounds.
i 4.23 The Majai letteris dso relevariinreIationto Hunges current
I allegationthat CzechosIovaIaahad greater obligationthan Hungary in relation to
environmenta lesearch3'.Not onlywas Czechoslovakia atno stage pnor to thisdispute
considereas havingagreaterresponsibiliorenvironmentaiassessmentn;otonlyatno time
priorto this disputdid Hungary seek to accuse Czechoslovakiaof failingto meet its
obligationinrelatiotothe studyoftheenvironmen tut,to thcontrary,inhisletteof 19
March 1984, Vice-PrimeMinisterMajai statedthaitcould be "assertewithcertitudthat
we have no substantiated daims againstCzechoslovakia".Thus, in1984, there was no
evidencethatCzechoslovakiahadbreachedobligationsinrelatiotoenvironmentalresearch,
there wa no evidence thatenvironmentalresearchwas being negiectedby Hungary, nor,
indeed,was there evidenceththe Projecî was in anyway enWomentd1y disastrous. The
ody evideuce pointed tu Hungary'sconsistenconcem over the economic aspectsof the
Project.
B. The Environmentaland Economic Assessments of the Proiect in
-985
TheHunesrian EnvironmentalIrn~act Assessment ofJune 1985
4.24 Thetangibleresulof the Academfs 1983 position papwas the 1985
EnvironmentalImpact kssmsfl. In consideringthe hdings ofthiçhssment, and
bearinginmina Hungary'sarguments thatPrcijectstudiesdght bepoliticdly iduenced,it
must berememberedthat the Assessrnentcameaboutpdy as theresuIoftheinstructionof
the Acadtmy, which opedy opposed the Project on economic ~rounds. IfHungary's
argumentsas toinfluenceare tbe believeda biasagainsttheProjectwouldcertaidy have
manifesteitselfitheAssessmen thi sas notthecase.
4.25 The overalltasof theAssessmentwas "thecompletediscoveryof the
environmentailmpacts[of the G/N ~roject]"'.Howevert ,heAssessment m'srespecific
termsof referencwereto explorthe scientifbasisofthefindingsoftheAcademy's 1983
38 See,Hmgaian Memarial,para.6.31;dso,para.10.9gts.,below.
39
HungariaMemariaiV,ol.(FarQ,Annex 4 (p.14).
40
-id.(alp.16).position paperand, inparticular, udiscoverwhether the Prajectcould satis@ a striigent
resolutionpassedby the Hungarian NationalEnvironmentaa l ndNatureProtection Council
(the"OKTT").Thisresolution (No. 311983)prescribed,intera& that the Projectmust not
"imposedangeronthewatersupply of Budapest".Furtheri,tstated:
"It is necessarytu avoidthedeterioratofthebiologicd stateofthe water in
theOIdDmube and itstribumiesand tuprovideitsworihy stateasa boundary
river*.
The waterresourcesstored undertheKisaIfdId12tnj5OstrovlSzigetküz]inthe
grave1layer[have]to beprotected4'"
4.26 Inorder to verifywhethertheProjectcouldcomplywiththisresolution,
58 papersrelatingto previousresearchwere re-examinedand 33 new researchpapers
complet&. Thefindings were srrmmarisedunder nineseparatesub-heading s fol~ows~:~
- Water quaIity:a centrai focus was the impact of the Project on dnnkingwater
resources. With regard tu the bank filteresupply wells,it was fouridthatwater
qualityproblemswere "mainiydue to the gowing pollrrtion coming hm the
background areas".The Assessrnenctontinued:
"TheBarrage Systemhas no effectuponthe filterlayerof the
BudapestWaterworks w'aterresourcesattheSzentendre Island.
The changes in the filteIayer are iduenced by factors
independent hm the [G/N Project."
On a more general level,itwas found that "theBarrage System will not cause
significanchangesinthe generd watw qudity relationsof the Danube". It was dso
noted thattheProjectwouldsecure a waterquaIityim~rovemenitntheSzigetkdz side
amis andtheMosoni Danube.
-
Nature conservation areas:itwas concluded thatthe GN Project did not threaten
existingconservationareas(inHungary).
- Peakoperation: itwas accepted thatthe floraunthe Danuberiverbanksthemselves
wouldbeaffectedbut,thataside,no seriouenvironmentar liskensued.
41
-bid(ap.17).
41
M. (app.1S-24).- Amiculture:nosubstantidchangesin soiproductivitywere anticipated.It was noted
that around 1,000 acresof land in Szigetkuz worrIbecorne productiveas this
waterlogged landwouldbecorne weII-drained. The disappearanceof uncontruiied
floodingwasalsofoun ube a bene&.
-
Groundwater1eveIs and thesidearm system :heAssessrnentreviewedthe plansfor
maintainhgwaterlevelsin theHungariansideatms andin Szigetkazby means ofan
artsciai rechargsystem,with an intakeat the DunakZti weir.Ttnoted thatthis
sjlstem"wasdweloped an thebasisofdetaiIedexaminafiononthe spot,hydrologicd
and hydrauricresear..electronianalogousmode1 testandfieldresearch tuprovide
data". As a resultofthis system,"the distributionof water resuurcesand the
determinatioofthewaterIeveiscm be carried outtakinginto accountthe soi1data
and morphologicalcharacteristicsofthe region while consideringthe up-to-date
hydrologicalandrneteorologicalircumstances".Ttconcluded:"Thusthe infdtration
syste imagood solutionwhichfitstothenaturalsurrounding."
-
The floodpIainforests:the channelofgflood watersinto the oId iiverbedafier the
flow intothe by-pacanawas found to"respondtothe characteristsftheprocesses
in natrrralcircurnstances". Apfiom a 300 m banddongside the Danubewhere
specieschangewouIdbainevitable,theforestswoulbe sustainedunchanged.
- Regional: oniy minordevelopmentswere anticipated-these
beingmainlyimprovement n termsofinfrastructuendtourism.
- Protectionof water resuurces:contrarytothe allegationscontainein Hungaryls
Memurid,the Assessrnentdid not fUidsuppofor theview that deterioratofnthe
quifer underlyingSzigetküz corrld resuhm the Project. To the contray,it
predicted an improvementinthe aquifsfwaterquality,whileonce againunderlining
the importance of reducingthe pollutionof water supplies by background,
unrelated, an-made contamination:
"Thewatertreasure in thegrave1layerof the SZrgetkodz
receivefieshwatersupplyiiom the infiItrationystern being
fiIter modrecIearwaterwhich bringsitintobeffestatehm
the waterquditpoint.
The Szigetkljzwater treasure inot hampered by the iocd
sedimentationotheDunakiliti eservoirInthewaterquantity
sensethewatertreasurewiinotchangesignificantly.However
itis very importato reduce,stop oas an immediatetask to
reducethegrowingtendencyof thepollutionthroughthediffuse
pollutionfromthe comrnundandagricultsu ouaresprobably increasingand hm the shatteredareas (grave1 mining).
Silariy importanthm the pointofview of the Szentendre
Idand bank fiIterwaterresourcesthebackgrounpollutionon
thesurfaceoftheidand."
-
The sustaininrbilitvofthrekon: fiaiiythe hsessment predidedthat the Project
wouId Ieadtusome economic growthintheregionand tuimproved opportunitifor
the cornercial fishofcertainspecies,
4.27 Theoverd conclusionoftheAssessrnentwasunambipous:
"There willbe nosignZcant[hard done tothe biologicastatof thewater
andno change inducingecological"catastroph"illoccura."
Thus,therewerenoenvironment-relatedeasonwhy theProjectcouldnotcontinue:
"The final conclusion of the Impact Assessrnentthatthe GabEikovo-
Nagymaros Barrage System,fittingintothe naturd-economsurroundingof
the region in harrnonycan be accomplishedaccordingto the system of
requirementsset forward by the resolutionNo. 311983 of [the National
Environmentd and NatureProtectionCouncil]the intemalresolutionof the
mungarian Academy of Sciences]andthe plenary sessioof theNational
CornmitteeforTechnica~evduprnent~~.*
TheHunnarian Academy's O~inionof June 1985
4.28 WhiIethe compilersofthe Assessrnenstressethe uniquenatureof
their achievernentandassertedthinHungarytherh ead "neverbeen sucha mukifoIdand
cornplexpreliminq investigaticarrieout", thHurigarîanMemonai isdismissivofthiswork. Itclaimsthatthe Assessment"becamesubject to stringentcriti~isr.~~Yet the1985
Opinionof theHungarian Academyof Sciencesreferredto inthefollowîng'paraPaph of the
Hungarian Mernoria(lthe"Opinion" d)escribetheAssessmentas "apioneerundertaking"&.
4.29 It is correcthatthe Opinionrecommended that further researchbe
canied out,butthisreflectea condusioncontaitiedinthe Assessrnenirsep7. The Opinion's
reaI si&cance isthat it showedthe Hungarîan Acaderny ofSciences respondiig tu the
EnvironmentalImpacthsessment by approvingthe gentrd concept of a barragesysterna.
Mthough analternative implementationof theGIN System was diacud and recummended
bythe Opinioqthiswas on ecunomicnet enviromnenial gounds. For, asthe Opinionnoted,
the Systernasdesi@ eritailnot odythe costofthe curtstnrctioofNagymarosbut dso
tbecos1 oftreatingsewageat Gyürand at other Hungariantowns,asweII asthefuturecost of
dredgingdeposited sediment upstream ofNagymaros. h alternativscheme, in which the
constructionofNagyrnaros was delad, was thereforepreferred. The bene% ofthis scherne
wereverycandidIycxpressedinthe Opinion:
"- thetreatment ofthe sewageeffluentinthecityof wr andon boththe
lefiandtherightriversidesrnaybe implemented ata "normal"rate
burdenon the nationaleconomvof this investment.payin~for itself
slowludecreases);
-
theconstructionof theNagyrnarosBarragemay be rescheduleda,ndthe
navigationin theareaof the comrnunityof Gnyü may be resolveda
lowercosts;
- the plants and additionalfacilities and projects necessaryfor the
subsequentpeak-operationmay be im lemented accordinato the
canyinpcapacitvofthenationaleconomy B,.,
Thisis a dear statementbjrtheHungarianAcademy of Sciencesof the prioritofeconomic
lnteresbover environmentalconcems. The environmentalconcernsaddressedintheOpinion
m., VoI.1para.3.52.Two lineî ofcritiofthîAsssessrneartrnenUond. it isnokd
that thewas nolegisIationin forccondudng suchanAssessrne -an irreIwantcomment
havingnuthinto dowiththme& ofthefindingstheHungariançtientisSecond.itisnoted
thapublic participatitheanductofthePssessmenhad kn omined. Bu1 thishowstha rn
efforthad&en madtokep thestudystrictscientioneand tuensurthatheçcientificfindings
werenotinfinendbyoutsideplitidifluences.
46 -bid.,par3.53andVoI.5.Annex3 (ap.IO).
47 M., AM- 4 (atp26).
48
m., Annex3 (ap. 9).
49
-bid(emphasiadded).1
didnot arisefromthe G/N Projectitselfbutfiompollutioncausedbysewage effluentatcities
alongtheDanubesuchas Gyor,whichrequired immediate attentioiftheProjectwas to go
1
1 forwardonschedule(evenasalreadyextended bythe 1983 Protocols).
4.30 inthe Academy's 1983 positionpaper,anzuYrietwas expresseclin
the Opinionasto thecostofmasuresnecessarjt roprotecthe environment. Buttherewas no
question raisedwhether such measureswouIdbeeffective. Tu the contrary, the Opinion
predicted thatthe implementatioriof the Project dongside the additionalenvironmentd
protection measurereferredto mighweiiIeadto apositiveirnurovementintheecologyofthe
Projectregion:
"..a possiblefailureto implementheadditionalacilitidue tomisconceived
austerityaspectsmay havefatalconsequences. A development of the area
accommodatin~the channedendowmentsma! resuit in a more favourable
situationthan themesent one,whilefailingto implementthe "extraprojects
maycauseirreversibleprocessesianecologicaisenses0."
The Impact on the G/N Proiect of the On-Goinp Environmental
Research
4.31 Hungarycontendsthat thedesignof the GM Project datesback to the
1960sand ihatody minormodificationsrincehavebeen incorporated3'.The implicationis
that in the 1977Treatyartalready archaic designwas institutionalised.Asihm being
factuaIIywrong, this contention confIiwith Hungary'sown Treaty analpis. For the
HungarianMemonalconectlypoints outthatthe finalProjecdesignwas not laiddown bythe
1977Treaty, buwas containedinthe JointConfractuaPI=. As Hungarynotes:
"TheJoint Contractua Pilanhad not beenconcluded when the 1977 Treaty
enteredinto force,asArticle3(2) reveals.The Plan was not even a single
document, butmore afilingsystemof specificatio,nd was ofenormoussize.
Even &er the conclusion of the Plan, it was subiect to numerous
amendmentss2 ".
4.32 Hungarfs own evidenceestablisbesthe evolutionarynatureof the
Project. The1981 study ofthe ad hoc cornmitteeapprovedby the HungarianAcademyof
Hun&aryTdaim thathe"failttoadjustheplans constituandanticipatb~h ofthe197'1
Treat(lhgarianMemarialp, am10.88isdysed hm aIegastandpint iyam 10.93el se^-,
below.
52 Hmg&anMemolid, para4.1(emphasiadded).Sciences, alreadyreferreto,envisagedthe adjustment of theGm SysternpIms tu take
accorrntof the latesresearch into agricuIturaIand environmental impacts, which wouId
becorne"anintegrat pertoffheplanningd~cumentation"'~. Similarlythe compilersofthe
1985 EriWonmentImpact Assessrnentnoted that its cancliisions were being taken into
accountwen dunngtheon-goingpreparation ofitsreport:
"Duringthe up-to-dateexamination ,i thefindingsofthe researchfor the
Environmentai Impact Assessment were continuousyl taken into
considerations."
4.33 The variousmodificationto theProjecthavebeensurnmarise n the
Slovak~ernorial~'.Butthereis independene tvidencethatestablishthatvariousimportant
modificationwere made. For example, theHQIreportnotes thatafter1976,theyear of the
completionof theBioprujec,tHydroconsult was specificaIIychargewith WrpIementintghe
propos& in the Bioprojectand dso those submitted by theCzechosIovakAcademyof
cie en ce AsEstofthe designandoperationmodificationsncorporatedinrelatiotu theold
riverbed@y 1990) isalso giveninthe HQI report. These constituted the constructiof
underwater weirstomaintainwatwlevels, and theincreasofthe minimum fiow intothe oId
hhed hm 50-200 m3isuptu350 dis, witha periodicincreauseto 1,300rn3isS7.
4.34 Thedetaileddesignsforthe revitaiisatnfthe Shvak sidearm systern
were laiddown in 1985 and,in 1986,theplanfor theintakeintotheHungarian side arms at
Dunakiliti asformulated. Aisoaround thistime,theplannedflowintothe Old Danubewas
increasedand the means of increasingriverand groundwater level throughthe use of
undergrounw deirswas formulated.Thus,at a meetingoftheESTC CornmitteeinMay1986,
Czechoslovakiaproposedthe "updating of [thetechnicasolutionforthebed of the Danube
riverinaccordance withenvironmentariequirements"s8T.hetechnicaisolutiochosen was a
seriesof underwaterweirs and,prior tu Hungary'ssuspensionof works in the GabEikovo
sectio~ this solutiwas formallvado~tedby the PIeniporenti&esoftheTreaty partieas is
recarded inthe protoc01ofthe meetingof8-June 1989:
53 m., Vol.5(Par0tAnnexI .
54 m., hex 4 (ap.16).
35 SlovaMernoriai, ar2.69gm.
56 HungananMemanal Vol.5 (PaI),nnex 9, (p. 278)Seealso,SfovaMernoria,ara2.27,
a., regardithereporofHydroaébecInternationlHQI").
57 m., (atpp295-297).
58
Protocofthe21stSasionotheESTCCornmittee19May1986, SlwakMernoriaAnnex49. "Governent Plenipoteniariesgree thatas partof adjustmentwithinthe old
rivehed of the Danube, the fortificaof fordsin the oId riverbedwiIbe
carriedoutunderjoiritinvestment5'."
The Projeciwas dso updatedintermsof monitoringthevariousimpacts A.s Appendix3 to
the HungarianMernorialnotes:
"In accordance with the prupods for environmenid impactassessrnent
VIZITERVpreparedi ,n 2985,a planfurtheenvironmenta ionitoringsystem,
which,with respecttu subsurEacweaters, meant the operationof the existing
gruundwateI reveand qudity observatiosystemof welIsandtheexpansionof
thenetwork(VEITERVI 1986 ; antuano ,988).
Zn thenineteen-miesapproximateI2 y00 observati wons were in operation
dong theDanube reachofconcem,most of whichformedpart ofthe nationd
hydrographieneîwork. Enthepeirod 1980-86additiondweHs were estabIished
intheSzigetkBz ariIaterdownstream of G6nyB. Some 600 wellswere driIIed
andthisprovedIaterto bemore thanwas nededa ."
4.35 Hungary'sMemuridreveds that,IikeCzechosIovakia, ungaryhad its
own govermental bodies that reviewed the Projeci and,at times, insisted on design
modificationsTo take oneexampledreadydiscussedabove'', in1983 the HungarianOKTT
('National nvironmentalandNatureProtectionCouncil)passea resolutionrequirithatthe
ProjectcompIywith certai environmentalstandards.Thiswas incorporated(dongside the
recommendation sftheHungarian Academy ofScience nto a resolutioof theHungarian
Government'sEconumi~ CornmitteethatfomuIated arevisedworkplanfor the~ruje8. Une
of the immediateresultofthis reviseworkplanwas the compilationof theEnvirumental
Impact Assessment. Thus,the claim inHungary's 2992 Declarationthatin tems of the
compilationof environmentdassessmenfs"officialdernanhadnever been expressedtu this
goalbeforethe endof the 80s"is sirnplywrong5'.Thercm be noquestionthat theTreaty
partieshad the administrativeindependenceand fIeXrbiIotexamine and re-examine the
Project, andthattiq didsp. The ProjeciWZISthoroughiy siudiedbyboth partiespriwtu
MeetinoftheCxhoslovak andHungariPIenipoienria8-9June 198, .hex 58.
61 para4.25abve-
53
m.. Vol4, hex 82,(ap.168).
64
centraIly-pl1undnedcraticpoIiticaIsinwKchhihaddmdy*wkneddecidafromabveothat1989 and,whereconsiderednecessary, itwasupdated bycommun agreementto takeaccount
ofthe Iatesresearchandanytechologic developrnents.
436 It hajustbeen show that none ofthe scientifreports,includingthe
hl-scale EnvironmentallmpactAssesment, pruvidedenvironmentai reasonstosupport the
HungarianGovetnment'sattempt tu ddaytheProject. Tt was inthesecircumstances thata
contractfor buildingthe Naparos sectionof the Project was awarded tu an Austrian
Companyunder particularlyattractivterms" ,and Hungary switched itspoIic).hm ddayta
the acceleration of the GN Project. Thus, ody three years after it had obtained
CzechosIovakiaf sonsentto delaythe Project,Hungaryset aboutconvincingCzechoslovakia
to agreetuthespeedingupof the Project,kcludingthe Nagymarossection.
4.37 Hungary'm s otivationsfosuch anacceleration-just as for the earIier
scheduIeprolongation - were no more than economic and hancial considerati~ns~. The
Austrianpup retainedfor the wu& atNa~aros was able tu suppIyboth the immediate
funding and the technid mwns that Hungaq lacked a;ndtheaooner the work couIdbe
cornpleted,the lessir wouIcost overd1andthe sooner the investmentwouId yieldbenefits.
As eariy asMay 1986, Hungary had modified its own investment pIan to reflectthe
acceleraîionwhichCzechosIovakiadidnot fomally agreetuuntiIFebnrary 1989'~.
4.38 The HungarianMemorid obsemes that duringthisperiod the Projeci
itserfwas proceeding without dificulty: "construction gàrned momentum"; the Joint
ContractualPlanwasworbngsmoothly;nomajordisagreementswerenoted inthe minutesof
the Joint Operating~rou~''. The mainchallenge,according to Hungary,came fiom the
"guwing environmentdrnovementsn.DemonstrationsoccurredinSeptember andOctober of
1988;and slogans"identifiedthe Projectwith~talinisrn"~. ut this developmentwas ino
ofabarragesysternkdturnedinlohe di9lofthe1977Treaty.Hadaedecisiordy kni ctakent
inttiemannerdescribeby Hungay, theagreementwodd have beenreachedand the Projm
uinJtnrctinthelat1950s.
63 Long-lermcredit was pmvideberefundein thefbîurebyfumishielgaricity genermder
theGN Projed.
See,SIovaMernorial,ara. 3.11.vaguereferenŒto environmenmiderations wasmade by
Hungaryat thetirnein total contradiction IoHungment argumentrhatenvirumentai
corisidcrathadhn a factorproion- thePmjea'xhedde.
67
HungariaMernoriai,ara3.56-
58 m.. para ..57.
69 ïbid.
-way based on anynewly discoveredevidence concerningthe Project'simpact on the
environment or on water quality,or on somesuddedy uncoveredthreatof an ecological
disaster;andHungaryhasproducedno evidencethat itwas. Allthat it showewas that,for
bettworfor worse, the Prujecthad becornepatfthepoliticalplatfumsof the thenemerging
Hungarianpoliticalparties.
The Hunparian Parliament'sStronp Sunport of the Proiect in
EarivOctaber 1988
4.39 On 6-7 Octuber 1988,theHungarian Parliament,ollowinga motion tu
suspenc donstructioat Nagymaros and possibIytocancel thatpartof the Project,voted to
wpport theentiretyof theGM Project,includingits 15 monthacceleration,by anenormous
majority(317 for, 19 againswith 31abstentions)". Fromanenvironmentasltandpoint,this
vote was notintheleastsurprising.It wasmadeinthe lightof the favourablEnvironmental
ImpactAssessrnent of 1985 and the fact thanot a sin&lestudyconductedby Hungary's
environmenta and waterqualityexpertshadopposedthe Projecton environmenta glrounds.
4.40 The Hungarian Mernorialnow attempts to explain away this
overwhelmingendarsement ofthe Projeci on the groundthat ndy al1the Parliament's
mernber sere at that timenomore than political appointees. Buthisisnonsense. For
exactIythesameParliamentwasfree inthe sphg of1989, thatisbefure'Hungary'cshangeof
regime(which didnot occur unfi1the sprîngof 1930), to vote to stowork on the GIN
~roject". Hungq alsorefers initsMernorial to supposed "important new eiements",
establisheon thatoccasio bnytheParliament:thatecuIogicaIriskbe reduced to aminimum
withecoIogicalintere stng givenprioritover economicones;thatthe waterquality ofthe
Danube not be dIowed tu deteriorateand that peak operationcommence oniy fier the
requiredwatertreatmentplantsonbothsidesofthe rivehad beenestablishd.
4.41 But the emphasisplacedby the Parliamenon environmentalprotection
andmaintenance ofwater qualitywas hardly"new".Theseprincipleshadbeenincorporated
70
SecretaqandcurrentlythePrimeMinisofHungarystronglcriticisedtheargumadvanŒdbye
somethatthe1977Treatmuid besuspendedduetochange. ciranmances, asserthatuchan
actiowouldgiveritothelegitimatedaibyCïxhoslovakiofbreachotheTreav wîth demands
for~rnpensatiinfhe"biHiomnhex 8,hereto.
71 HungarydscrdIegesthatheParliamenwas sîmplyfoIIowinthedecisianaireatakenby the
Goverment andwasnothm& inthfm ofa statuora formamiIution.W., pam 3.61.But
idw no1explainwhyitwastuid nat10adoptastatutgivenhi ParliamenthadIongkfore
formaIIapprovedtheProj-; infacca formald~isionwas takeon 7 Ocratie1988,by the
enormausmajoriymentioriaboveapprovingtheeightpoints specbyithe Governt inits
incIudinNa~osf wkandpeakpwerthoperation. Parlliameye.drrtic7Octokra1989,m.,ed,
Vol4, Annex145(ap.344).into Artide15 and 19of the1977 Treav,andwaterqudity hadben thesubjectofcontinrrd
monitoring and remdial masures undertakenbythe Joint Bour-dxy WatersCommission
underthe 1975 ~greernent~. As tothe linkinof peakoperation tothe cornpletionofthe
programmedsewageplants,the rd si@cance ofthiswas thatitinvoIveo largeinvestment
for bothTreatypartieto bepaidforout ofnationd budgetsratherthantheProject budgetn.
It wasthisfinancil urdennotprotectionoftheenvironmeno trofwaterqudity,thatwm the
addedreasonthat thenled theHungarian Govemment toturn againsttheNagymarossection
ofthe Project.
Hunvarv'sRefusa1 to Enter Into an A~reement on Water Quolitv
Protection 13Mav 19891
4.42 The Parliament'secisionof6-7 October 1988 is saito haveled to
dernonstrationsinBudapestanda numberof majorcitiesaround the w~rid'~. 1maybe that
theProject suddtdybecame unpopular;butthisdid notmeanthatithadbecorneunsustainable
fro mnenvironmentalstandpoint.TheProject didbecorneasyrnboIandrdIyingpointagainst
an increasingiyunpopularpoliticdregime;but the mtheG/N Projectbecme caughtup ina
weII-orchestratepoliticalcampaign,the Iess attention wpaidtu whetherttherewas my
scieritificbaforclaimsthattheProjecwould have adamaging environmentalimpact7'.
4.43 Zn its discussioof the increasedattentiongivento water qtrality
followingtheParliamentarydebatesof 6-7 October1988,theHungarian Memonalgives the
impressionthat the importance of protectingthe water quaiityof the Danube and the
importanceof the buildingofsewage disposalplantsonlybecameapparent at the end of
1988'~B.ut as Slovak haasshow measuresof protectionhadbeentakenthroughout the
rr SecB.ovakMernoid, para. 3,1a.
73 Secparas4.19and4.29,hve.
74 HungariaMemorial,ua.3.64.
75
Ofcourre,iHungaryenvironmentdlernonstrathadben ocauringfrothestarotthe1980s,
thoughnotdirectpartinilaagainsttheG/NProjecmtil thendof thedecade.See .iovak
Mernoria, ar3.51eta.
76
3.13-3-24. Compa, ungariMernorialaras.3.65-3.69.theSlovakMemorial.m., paras.1980sn.Thus, by 1985, 620 sewage planthadbeen builton the Czechoslovalrideof the
joint Danubesection;by1984,213 sewagetreatrnenthadbeenbuit onthe Hungxîarisiden.
Further,plansexistein1985 forCzechodovakiatu buiIdanothe120 plants,andHungary an
additional83 plants. The 1989 updated report of the Joint Commission showed
Czechoslovakiato beaheadof schedu1ew,ndSlovakiahas annexedtothisCounter-MemoriaI
a reportbringingthe informatioconcerninwastewatertreatmentplants inSIovakiaup to
date". Theimpactof thisconstructioprogram isbeyonddoubt:amajor improvemenitnthe
qualityof the waterhasoccumed in the Slovak/Hungariaectorof the Danubesince the
1970s.
4.44 The Huriguîan Mernoid takes no account of this construction
program, And its anaIysofthe meetingsthat took place hm Iate1988iiptu May 7989
containsafurther gIzing omissioT.hemeetingsof the Jointottndary WatersCommission
duringthisperiod,attendedso byeachMinisterresponsiblefor environmentalprotection and
waterquality,ledto theformulationof ajoinagreedsetof recommendation sora program
to be adoptedby each Govemment8'. Theserecommendation were presentienda report
dated 8April1989to the Chairmen of theESTC Cornmittee,and consideredby thernata
meetingon 3 May 1989'~ Itwas contemplatedthata specialgovemmentalagreemenwt ould
beenteredintoto irnplernetheserecommendations.
4.45 But the HungarianCo-Chaimari ofthe ESTC Cornmitteerefis& tu
sianthe rirotocol of the meeting. The HiingaianMernorialis completelysilent these
hi th1 discussiothatwere tuleadtua dr& agreement onwaterquaIityprotection. Nobas
Hungarygivenanyexplanationwhy, byrefusingtusigntheprotoc01of the3Maymeeting, it
abortedtheproposed agreemen tn waterqudityprotection. Butthe reasonmayliinthefact
thatonly10 dayslaterHungary announceditssuspensi oownorkatNagymaros.Ali that can
besaid isthaHungws actionreveals ablatantdisregarfortheprotectioof waterqualit-
a disregardalreadymanifestedin the HungarianAcademy'sresistanceto proceedingwith
Nagymaros on schedulebecause that would involve substantialexpendituresoutside the
ProjectforwastetreatmentatGyorandotherplacesdongtheDanube.
17
SI& Mernoridpara3.13,gm.
IbJ.,paras.3.18-3.19.
" m., para.3.21.
" Oex 9,hereto.
81
SlovakMernori,aras3.22-3.24. 4.46 ThatHungaryshouldblock an agreementon water quaiityprotection
scarcelyreflecta geniik concern for the environment. AndnoIess embarrassingtu its
interpretatiofthisperiod is the PrototuacceleratethGIN Projecton 6Februaty 7989.
Thisevent is passed over EghtintheHungarianMernorial,which bareIyevenattempts tu
explainwhy aGovernent withgenuine(men ifincorrect)enWomentd concernsin relation
to the Project wmld have given sucha clearendorsement to itscontinuation.hstead,
attentioisnow focused byHungary onthe mounting publicpressuresto re-evaluatethe
Project. But thispublianxietwas misplacedand reflectedanignoran ocfthe decadesof
detailescientifresearchintotheProject.Infactby 1989,theGINProjectmusthavebeen
one ofthemostover-reevaluatedungarianprograms onrecord.
4.47 InbringingthisChapterto aclose-and inordertohave a bettersense
of the situatanthegruundprior toMay1989w ,hen Hungarjrbegm itsserieofunriaterd
actsleadingtoitsabandonment ofthe GN Project (the subjoftthe next Chapter-Illus.
Nos. CM-IA and B, two aerid viewsof the GabElkovosectio of the Prciject,havebeen
placedhere. These pictrrres,whicshow the dmost completebypas anal and GabZkovo
step-botb entireIonCzecho Jovak territo-yhelptoexpIainthe rudeshockexperiencedby
CzechoslovakiawhenHungary'a simtu aborttheGfN Projectstartetounfold,startinon 13
May 1989withitsunilaterlcttosuspend work atNagymaros.BYPM CANALAND GAB~~ovo
?TiEPPRlORTOMAY19881 5.01 The aimof tbiCshapteristo examinethestrikjncontrastbetweenthe
account of events 191-992containedinChapterTV of theSlovakMemonal andthatto be
fond in Chapter 3 ofHungaty's ~emorial'. Such a cornparisonshows that Hungary's
contentionthat -butnot Czechoslovaki awasat dI timesreadytoconsuItand negotiatin
ordertoresolvethe disputecannotbe sustained.To the contrary,the evidenceshows that
Hungaryb, y1990,had resoivedtoabandon theG/N Projectandto terminatetheTreatyfor
economic and politicd reasons, and tbat the Hungarian Goveflvnent proceedto take
unilaterd actionstowardsthend. Theevidencereveds that Hringarywasneverpreparedtu
enterintomeaninmi negofiafionto resoIvethedisputeunderthe Treaty,except tu achieve
thatend, whilstCzechoslovakiaremainedopen to compromiseand sought to resolve the
disputethathadarisenunderthe1977Treaty.
5.02 This Chapter alsoladto theco~clusioh takenupinChapter VI, that
Variant"C"was implementedonlyas akt resorafterHungaryhad succeed edilateraIi,n
delayingthedarnmingoftheDanube forthreeyearsina rowand had goneso farastopurport
toterminatthe 1977Treaty.
5.03 In reading this ChapterthCourt is inviteturemember that, inits
Mernorial, Hungaryhas suggestedthe gerierd standardby which its own conduct of
consultationand negotiatioshouldbe judged. Mer pointingout thatthe 1977 Treaty
containedno "mechanismforitsrevision, ungaryaddsthat:
"...the criterianfor assessingthe legaliîyofthe Hungarianconduct must be
whether HungaryintendedandclearlyrnanifesteitswiIItoachieveanagreed
solutionbasedon good faithnegotiations. Thisgeneralrulstems hm the
"good faith"principle,as well as common sense and general custornary
internationllw2."
Tu thisgeneraIcriteriun,Hungaryaddsthe foIIowing:
1 SeeH. ungariMemonal,paras3.74-3.223PartsofChaptes, 78, 9and10of theHungarian
Mernorialelatitothe-rd ofconsultatandnegotiatduringthiseriodaralsreferrto:
i.ep a.5.70,gtM., paras.7.92-para,s.11-8.2paras9.01-9.andparas10.71-10.106.
f
m., para.7.92. - 98 -
"The pretence of negotiating while at the sa!ne time the object of the
negotiationsidestroyed byunilateralctionsshowalackofgoodfaith3 ."
5.04 Slovakiaacceptsthisasa generalstatemen5ofthestandard of conduct
tu be appiied. However, it is noted that,as hasbeen discussedabove in Chapter Il,the
HungarianMemurid attemptstomodî thisstatementby a completemisreading of ArticI27
ofthe ~reaty~;andit seekstu frn idthegeneralinternationalaw oftheenvironmen t special
setof mles thatshouldbe appliedinthiscase toexonerate Hungary fram itsconductin breach
of the 1977 Treaty,anattempt thatis firliydiscussedbelowiChapter IX andshow there to
Be invalid.The presentChapter isdevoted tu anandysis of the evenfsthatoccurred and the
evidenceconcerningtheseevents produced bybothParties.
SE~ION 1. Hun~arv'sUniIateralDecision toSusaend ConstructionWork at
Nawmaros (13 Mav1989)
5.05 The HungarianMernoriailndicatesthat aprimecataljrstofthe unilaterd
decisionof Hurigarytu suspendwork at Naparos was the reIeaseinMatch 1989 of the
preliminaryreportofa study conductedundertheauspicesofEcologiq identifieinthereport
as an"environmenta clonsultingfirmcenteredattheUniversityof ~assachusetts' . Ecologia
had been approached by INFORT (theHungarian Research - DevelopmentProductCompany
forMonnation SpaceTechnique) inJune 1988'.
5.06 According to Hungaryf,ollowingthe firs"preliminaryE"coIogiaStudy,
a reconsiderationof theProject was begun. Thisculminated in a meeting on 3 May 1989
betweenthePrimeMinisterandhis"Advisory Committee ofindependene txperts",allegedltu
3 m., para. 6.80.
4 See .ara. 2.22=., above.
5 Hunganan Mernorial,ara3.74Thisreportandthesecond"interreportissuedinMay1989 have
ken examinedintheSlovakMernorialbeingreferrtotherasthe"Massachusettstucif)Slovak
Mernorial, ara.2.23,a. See .lso.para7.05et W.,below. Apparenllytherwas m repart
describeas "final", o"preIirninaorl"interimuSincepreparingits Mernorial,SIovahas
customary datboutmfor thesEeortof&environmentalmudieorore~ordeinrthedirectorieof
environmentareftrmŒservices.Ttseem rhattheserewrtarethe =le publicationsEaIogia,
givingonethediçtinctimpressthathesereportwerepnncipalIyintendasproposaiforfollow-
on contractthathe group(onanad hoc basishoped tobeawardsd intheareaof region-wide
landçcapplanningwhichwouldexplainthpresenŒofa laver ithegroup.
6 INFORT wasformedtheyear&foreas a pioneeorganisationthefieldofçpacinformatioand
monitoring, havingacquiredoomideracornputetechnologhm abrd However,ithadno
speciascirntifortechnid backgroundor wmpetenm inrvt dther tothe GM Projecor to
enviromenM matten. YctINFORTapprs as-author ofthewnd EcoIogiareport.heexpert
outsidoenvironmentlhrdyotherthan thHungarianAcademyof SciencesitsewereVIZïTJZRV,s
the HungarianConsultingCompanyforWaterEngineeringor WTüU, theHungarianResearch
Centrefor WaterResourcesDevelopmentor OVIBER theHungananorganisationin chargeof
engineeringandconstniction.INFOcease tdexisasanentitin1992. examine a cost-benefitanalysispreparedbythe Government and to hearthe views of the
Hungarianenvironmenta glroupthathadbeenthemostvigorousin opposingproceedingwith
theGfN Project,thegroup known asthe Danube ~ircld. The Governrnent'costanalysishad
apparentlconciuded thattheProjecwouId not beprofitahlfor~un~my'.
5.O7 The Hungarian Memoria l eges that at th3 Maymeeting fhe Prime
Minister'AdvisoryCornmittee recommended the abandonmeno tfNagymaros inthelightof
environmentaalndeconomicfactors9. Itiscuriousindeedthatsuch a recornmendatio nould
havebeen basedin partonenvironmentdfactorswhen its onlsupportappearstuhavebeen a
preIiminaryreport relmein March1989 byEcologiqwhich hadrecommendedthtee typesof
action:
- Fir snd.oremost,proceedingwithsewagetreatmentupstreamof and
withintheProjectarea;
- Second, deIivering more water to the existing Danube than
contempIatedunder theProject and reducingpeak power production;
and
- Third,as onlya "most radical"alternative,the total abandonmeof
Nagymarus and peakpoweroperation'".
5.08 h fact, iappearsfhatby earlyMay 1989 the HungarimGovernent
wishedto abandon Nagymaros and peakpoweroperationoneconomicgrounds,and it sought
environmentaalrguments tosupportsuch a decision". Havingbeenunable -throughoutthe
entireperiodhm 1977 tu1989 - tuobtainsupporton scientificgroundsfioitsown experts,
frrsttodelay the Project and, Iattodiminate~agyrnaros", Hungary hadbroughtinthe
t Ecologia group through INFORT; and on the basisody of itsprelimhq report w,hich
considered abandoningNagymaros as a "most radical"path 10 t&e, the Hungarim
7
HungarianMernori,ara. 3.74. SIova k emoriapara3.54astotheDanubeCircle.
8
Hung&anMernorial,ara3.73.
10 m., Vol.5 (PartI),Anne(ap.60).
II Thesituationclosresembletheattemptintheearl1980sbytheHungarianGovernmentt,hen
uosuccessfùt, cornup withenvironmentarleasthatwouidbolsttheeconomicmns for
delayingtheProjeSecSlovakMernoria,ara3.37,gw, sec.lsopam 4.11, a., above.
II
SeediscussidnHmgaryts1983-198EnvironmenidImpacStudyatpara4.24g m., hve. i
i
I
Governent decided ithad adequateenviromenta1supportfor thedecision itwished totake
for ecanomicandpoliticalreasunsandinthe Iightof Hungary'senergyneeds at thetimeI3. lt
is of particularinterest to note that the Ecologia studies were not provided to
~zechoslovakia' ~
A. Tht HunvarianGovemrnerit'sResuIution of13 May 1989
5.09 Themumentous decisionleadhg tuthe preseritdisputewastake n n13
May 1989 when the Hungarian Council of Ministersadopteda Resolution"Regardmg the
Suspension of workat ~a~~tnaro s"Th~eHungarianMemonal Statesthatthe Resolution
"onlyenvisagedthesus~ensionof theworks attheNagymarossiteu andthat constructionat
Dunakilitianddsewherewasnot affectai.The attempt itu givethe impressionthatthiswas
ody atemporary act. However, an examination ofthe Reçolutionshows that theHungatian
Governent actudly envisagedtheabandanmen otNagymaros - ashad beenrecornrnendea dt
the3 Maymeetingof thePrimeMiniste?~ AdvisoryCornmittee. Thus:
No lengthof time for the periodof suspension was specifiedin the
(i)
Resolution,LE. itwas ofindefiniteduration*';
(ii) TheMinisters wereordered to commission furthestudies-
"..inorder to placetheCounciiof Ministerin apositionwhere
it can make weii-foundedsuaestions to the Parliament in
connectiunwiththe amendment ofthe internationaltreaon the
hvestment";
(ii) These studies were to inchde an examination of the various
consequences "of the eventual stoming of the Namaros
investrnen"', includinghow to replacethe energylost and minimise
cfaimsforcompensation;
'3
knowqwho wasonthins&i~ry Commineedorwhoothe=cillai"independenexpertswereorwhat
werethespecfi environmentleasonthatsupposedledtheCornmittetoconcludeththe"most
reasonabIchoicewastheabandonmenofNagymaros.Butitisinteresttonotethatthefavoured
the Project'sabandonme,ot merelyits suspensduringthe studyofenvironmentaiimpact,
confirmingththeadverscost-beneftnalyswasthereasobehindtherammendation.
15
Hurrgarian ernoriparri3.75andVoI.4,Annex 147. ThetitIofthiseso1uùoismisstatain
para3.75tohaveken *Un thesuspnsioofarieratiatNa-s* (emphaçbadded).
la &, pas. 5.32and5.73below.
'' Emphasisadded. (iv) Parliamentwas requestedto authonsethe Governmentto enterinto
preliminarnegutiationswith Czechosiovakregarditn he amendment
oftheTreaty;
(v) Itwas proposedthat Parliamenaisoauthonse theGovernment "notto
fuW its duties asdehed in October 1988 with relationto the
continuat ofoheinvatment";
Discussionswere to be opened with the Austrîancumpanies and
(vi)
institutionsconcemedregardingthepossibilityof redirectingother
Hungarian investmentshe"resourcews hichmay befreedasa resultof
theeventualstopphgoftheinvestment".
5.10 There can beIittle doubtfiom both the text and thetone of this
Resolutionthatthedecisionof13May was seenbytheHungarian Governmen tsthefirsstep
toward aplannedterminationoftheNagymaros sectionoftheGM Project. The studiestbe
cornrnissionedereairnedatamending theTreaty;andin thelighof item(v) aboveiisclear
that the sole reasforamendingthe Treaty was tu terminateNagymaros. Item fv)was a
referace backtuthe PwlîamentaryResolutionof7 Octuber 1988 andto the eighpointsset
out inthe Goverrunent'reporf(appruvedbythe Parliament).Point 1inthe Goverment's
reportwas thefollowing:
"Thebarrage system must beconstrticteas itstandsin the initialconcept,
includingthe NagymatosBarrage;namely,to enablepeakcapacityoperation.
Without fuIIimplementation of the Project the techriicd-economicand
developmentgoalsformingthe basisofthe decisioon the investmentcannot
be attained. The modificationof the concept wouId cause considerable
damage1 "
Thus, item fv) ofthe Resolutionwas ine£îecta request to Parliamenttu approve the
efiminatioof Naparos hm theProject. ThisinWrn, cdIedhto questionthe viabilityof
the Prujecas a wholehm the Hungarianstandpoint, fur asstatedindem (v), withoiit the
"fullimplementation"f theProject, the purposebehindthisenonnouinvestmentcouldno
longerbe achieved. TheHungarianMemorialexplicitly concedes that iwas the view of
Hungq that Nagymaroswas akey elementintermsof"my possibiliofaneconomicreturn"
18 HungariaMemorial, o4,Annex 14(atp. 344Sec .ara4.39in71,above.from the ~roject". Ths, in adoptingthe 13May Remlution,the HungarianGuvemment
hew itwasnuIIiQin gheProject.
5.11 There was nothing inthe Resolutionof 13 May that indicated,as
Hungary'sMmorid seernstu suaest, thatthealternativofsuspendhgworkpendirigfuriher
investigationwas beingconsiderd inthesensethatthe work atNagymarosmi@ beresumed
if theseinvestigatioledtosuch aconcIusion.Everything pointto thefact thatthefist step
to the terminatioof Nagymaros hadbeen taken bytheHungarian ~ovemment~ . Thereis
alsono evidence to supportthe statementintheHungarîan Mernoriale,ithein the 13 May
Resolutionorelsewhere, thattheHungwim Governent had atthe the "expressedthe firm
intentiontorefrainfiom anyixreversibl enilateralstepf'2By its13 MayResolution, the
HrrngarianGovernent hadunilaterdljractd to rakttheiniti selUi itsplannedtemination
of ~agymaros~. And it had done so without the slightestattempt to consult with
Czechoslovakiabefore takingthisaction.
5.12 The HungarianParIiamenfar Ryesuliifiof 2 June 1989 co&ms this
interpretation. It granted theGovernent anexemptionunder Point 1of is decisionof 7
October 1988, thus permittinthe Governmen to eliminatNagymarofs rom the ~roject~~.
Further, the Parliamentar yesolutionmadeno mention of the study and evaiuationof
ecologicalor seishc risksiwas entirelyfocussedon theamendmen tfthe 1977 Treatyand
its international, legai, economicand technicd conseqtlenceq and it authorised the
20 Tbisapparentlwas howthe SlovakenvironmentgroupmentionedbyHungaq interpxtedthe
decisionsoftheHungargovemment. SecH.ungariaMernoria,am 3.77.
21 m.. para.3.76AccordingtoHungaq:
"PrimeMînisterN&rneannound on 8 March1989thatno imyo~bIe stepswodd be
takeninconneaionwiththe Na-os barrageMore Parliamenrwiewedthe entire
projecfinMay1989@"am.3.70)
ButtIiidleged announcemetfMr.Nbmethwould ern tohaverelatedto theProjectacceleration
ofFebq 1989, ratherthanthesubsequedecisiontostopthconstructwork atNagymaros.
to theParfiamentyeviewifsuchwasindeed&ed Néout.NoruiirexplainewhyitheHiingarian
PrimeMinistershoulbearinouncîthatfiershouIdk no imoeabe sepsjusone month&r
siang afod agreementhatamleratetheProjecbyI5 month anddireFtiyaEectthpaΠof
workatNagymros.
22 ThesecundreparofEmIogia(thitmean*interimreportissueinMay 1989(andapparentfier
the 13Maydecisionrecomrnendesuspensionof tentirProiec"duringthisenod ofnational
dispute,evding apoliticalraîhan ascientipersptive. hardlyseernpsssibleththibit
ofpoliticadvicehm a grouinMassachmm shoulhaveinfluenadthHungarianGovernment.
But,sec. .para.3.77.
23 Ibidpara 3.80,ndVol.4,Annex148.
-
24 Sec .ara5.10,hve.commencement of prelirninaqnegotiationsregardinthe "conditionsforthe amendment" of
theTreaty. Herice,the evident purposeothesuspensionatNagymaros was tu allowtime tu
induceCzechusIovakiatu amendtheTrearytu terminatethe Naparos sectionoftheProject,
notto conductnewecologicalor seismicevaluations.
5.13 Theextraordiiaryway inwhich thisradicalchange ofpositionof the
HungariariGovernment was made knowntu Czechoslovakia , ndthe ensukg developments,
are describaiin the Slovak~emorid~. The Hungariari Resolutionof 13 May was not
furnishedto the CzechoslovakGovernment atthat time. Nor was it fimished at the
subsequentmeetin getweenPrime Minister sn24 May.
B. Hun~aru's Failrirto Advance Anv VaIid §cienfifit Basis forifs
Decisionof 13Mav 1989
5.14 Thereis no agreed record ofthe meetingof 24 May 1989 between
Prime Ministers,a meeting th& has added significancebecauseHungary now impliesthat
Czechoslovakiain someway assented tuthe suspensionof Nagymaros at this time.The
Hungarian Memurid bases itsdaims on a report ofthe Hungarian Prime Ministertu his
Govemmentand a 26JuneStatement oftheCzechoslovak ~~eni~otentid. The reporthas
not been furnishedby Hungary and the Statement (datednot 26 June but 13 July)by the
Czechoslovak Ple~potenfiq does notcontainanything tuconfimiHungary's accuuntof the
meeting. It rnerelshows thatthe fisttime CzechosIovakiareceived anindicationuf the
allegedreasons for Hungarfs 13 Maydecision was whenit received two documentshm
Hungary atthe26Junemeetingof~leni~atentiaries~~.
5.15 The HungarianMernoria alço daims thatthe "agreementreached" at
the24 Maymeeting was refIectein the protocoofthe 9Iune meeting of~~eni~otentiarîes~'.
Thisdocument,whichHungary hasnot furnishein supportofsuch acontention,was annexed
IS
SIovaMemorîalpara.4.07g m.
26
ReportwasnotannexeorfurnishbydHungarHtbeotimeoffilitheMernoriai.rimeMiriiaes
27 & SlovakMemoria,ara.4.12eta., forafuiarcountof this meetandthe donimentsthen
andsubçequentexchanged.TheCzechoslovaStatemenof13July(Slwak Memorial,Anne64)
made icIearthaCtze~hoslovakId ken striving,mxcwfdyr wer sincHungaryts13May
dsisiotoobtainçpecifrc,dmentescientidataonwhishHungarybasedthidwision. It foirnd
thenvoHimgananpapersfimy hded overon26 Im asprovidingnothing ninthe wayof
scientidatatojusw mch adecisionU lheEcoIagiarepowerean idgating fxmrIeadinto
ihc13 May decisioconcerningNa#mros, itisçttangindeedthattheywere not giveto
suspensioSecu.aras5.05-5.0above.yrequestedscientificjustificationfor unilateral
28 HungariaMernoriapara ..79.bySIovakia toits~emorid~ . fiindicatetha ttthe24 Maymeetîmg ithsdbeen agreedto
establisha joint grouof expertsto assessthe ecologicaseis~n anicother aspectsof
Nagymaros,andthatupto thenCzechoslovakia hadbeen shownno scientifbasifor the13
Maydecisiontususpen wdork.
5.16 CzechoslovakivaigorouslyprotestedHungarysnilateraluspensi of n
workatNaparos as aviolationofthe1977Traty. Thisprotestwas setout ina "position
paper"readandgiven to theHungarianAmbassaduM r Prague bythe CzechosIovakMinider
of ForeignAEairs on 15 May 1989, inwhich ifwas pointedout, inter diafir that,the
decisionhadbeen takenby Hurigary"withoutanydiscussionsvrittheCzechosiovak side";
second, that thiaction"infringethe provisionsof the[1977] Treaty";and thir tda.
Czechoslovakiaconsideredthatthe actof suspensionputthewholeProjectinjeopardyand
insistedon itscompletion inaccordance with the Treaty,resentingthe righttu claim
compensation3? Thisevent isconfirmedin detaby anaccountappearinginthenewspaper
Rudé P&o the following dd' . ThisarticIealsoindicatesthaton 15Maythe "Government
of [Slovakia]discussedals[atits extraordinayessiononMay 15 the situationwhihas
arisenas [a)consequenceof the decisionof theGovernent of mungary]", expressing
surprisatsuch adecisionbeingtakenjust&er thedecisionfospeedripthe Project hadbeen
mutuaIIyageed md in the Iightof the more thanyearsofstudy andworkthat hadbeen
devotedto theProject. Nevertheless,in its "positionpaper",the CzechosGovernment
statedthatitwas "prepared to open talkwith [Hungq] with the aim to find common
grounds fothe successfulcompletiofthe EGfNProject].
5.17 CzechosIovakipaersistd inits requestbe informedofthe scientiiic
basisofthe 13May dscisionof Hungary.Ttwas notuntilreceivingthtwo papersfiirnished
by Hungary atthe26 Junemeeting- 44 daysder itsunilateraldecisionhadbetaken -that
CzechosIovakiareceivedHungary'sresponse.Curioudy,the preriminaryreport ofEcologia,
completedinMarch 1989andhence readiIavaiIabIeubegiven toCzechoslovakia,was not
furnished. Inits 13 JulyStatement,the CzechoslovakGovernmentcomrnented on these
29 SlovakMernori,nnex558.
30 hex IO,here~ci.
31
Annex11,hereto.l
26Junepapers,andduring17-19Julyexpertsonbothsides met to considerthese documents
andexchangevie~s~~.
S~crxorv2. Hungrtrv'sExtension of Suspensionof Worktu Dunakiliti and ifs
Proiect
5.18 By Remlution dated 20 luIy 1989 -thatis the dayfoIIowingthe I7-19
I
JulymeetingandbeforeeitherGovernent couldhaveeven startedto digesttheresultsof the
discussion- Hungary actedto extenditiinitiulnilaterl ecisionof13M~P :
-
The Nagymarussuspension was said to have been "extended tu 31
Octuber 198934;
- Thesuspension of work by Hungary at Dunakiliti ntil31October 1989
was ordered, which had the eEectofpastponingthe ddg of the
Danube for one year (directlyaffeding the schedule of the entire
Project,includinthe worktu be performedby~zechoslovakia)~ ~
Thus,themeetingof 17-19 Julywas shown tohave been amere charade ;ndonceagain there
hadbeen noconsultationwith Czechodovakia priortuthe thg oftheseactions.
5.19 The HungarianMernoriaiattempts tu camouflage the unilaterd
characterof these actionsbysuggestingthat Hungary' dsecisionaccorded with the "tenorof
32 Theseeverrt, ndthcontentofthedments, whichwerefdly did in theSlovaMkernoriai,
areody brie£idedtwith byIIungaq. Comvare:SloyakWmond, paras4.12434; IIungarian
MemoriaI,paras3.83-3.84Bothwmîs brinout thetotddisagreemeniknveentheexpertsof
bothsidesith= disx~ssions,whiemb& theenvironmenteffectsnujusof theNavos
timewasrequiretodstudtheseeEectsMore proceedingwiththe Projezt;Czechoslovo,nthee
otheban4 pinted outthattheseffecthadbeen carefdy studiebefor1977 andhadben the
subjectocontinuaTwiewandjoint studisincethen,andthatHungaryhadnot corneupwith a
singleadvem environmenlionsideratithahadnotbeenknown and takeintoacuiununderthe
Praje.t
33 Hungariari ernori,ara3.86,andVol.4,Annex149.
34
This,ofcourswas notamte since,asseeninpar5-09,a&, theinitiNamos suspension
ofworkwas ofindehite duration.
35
TheHungarianMernorialnevermentionthefactthatthedamming oftheDanuixcouidonlytake
plaeduringa shorpriai., nodly in IateOctokreariNoverribew,henoptimumhydrological
conditionsfthioperatioprwaiIed-tha s,whenthe probabilofyahighffowwasas iiIowesf.
1989-1992, indrrdthedecisi10prit Varim*CWintoperation.fkctoinandyçingtheeventofthe negotiarions" betweePrime Ministersat theirmeefing on thatday -that is,on 20 JuIy.
This is untrue, and no evidencehas been producedby Hungaryin supportofsuch an
inferen~e~~.At the meeting,theHungarian PrimeMinistermadetwo aiternativeproposals,
andthe CzechoslovakPrime Mnister undertooktu give themcarefuIstudy . But the so-
caIIedextensionofthe Nag)marossuspensiontu3 1 Octuberandthenew decisiontosuspend
work atDunakiIitiwerenot among the mattersproposedby Hungaryfor discussion atthe
meeting. Czechoslovakia was sirnplyinformed of these decisions, which had been
incorporatedintheHungarian Government'R s esolutionadoptedthatveryday. Thisis clear
evidenceoftheunilaterdcharacteo rfthesedecisions3'.
5.20 In retruspecf,the Hungarian Goverment - and now Hungary's
Mernoria i havemade an attempt toexplainawayHungwy'sunilatera icts asto Nagymaros
by clairningCzechoslovakia'sacquiescence. This is entirelycontrary to the facts;and it
indicateshow wlnerable Hungary redises itscase tu be inrespect tu Nagparos. The
CzechosIovak Governent atoncevehementlyprotestedin the most fumd way thedecisiuns
as steps taken lrniIare raIdinviolationof the 1977 ~reafl. The Hungarian Mernorial
quotes extensivelyfromthe HungarianNa Verbaleof 1 September1989 to show that
HungarydisputedCzechoslovakia' smmediat eccusationthatthe20 July decisionwere taken
unilaterdlyM. The Note Verbaleargued that at the20 Jiily"negotiations"the CzechusIovak
party "acknowIedge[d the extensionofthe suspensiodl andmade no objectionspecificdita
the suspensionofthe pregaratoryoperationaforciosureoftheDanube atDunakiliti".
5.21 ButtheCzechoslovak Governmenthadmadeits positionunmistakably
clear on 15 May, two days afterHungay's uniIateral decision; if the CzechoslovakPrime
Mnister didnet repeatthe officiaCzechoslovak positionpreçented tuHungaryon 15May
rejectingHungary'ssuspensionof work atNagymaros, whenhe was infomed at themeeting
36 Therewas no agreedrecorofthemeeting,andthereportof22 July advancedin supportof this
conclusionbytheHungariMernoriahlasnokn amexed orfumistredThisdocumentwas oneof
thosceiteditheSIovakAgent'sIentotheRegistrarof3June1994InthereçponsoftheAgentof
Hungarj, iissaid lhat the damnent refe10was an "oral repor;uth. 115,p.52, ofthe
HungarianMemariaiindiatethaitwasa wrinendocument*(inirngarianda1e22 JuIy 1989.
37
Sec .lwak Mernoria.aras4.35-4.39.
38
HungarianMernorial, ol.4, Ann149.TheResolutionof 2July1989 refeto areporttha&y
by theHungarianPrimeMinisteofhismeetingwithCzechoslovakiand setontthealternatives
suspendworkwerenotepartofthpmpdng. alttmarivbuthadaIreadykn decidedunilartdlyby
Hungaq.
39 Sec .ara.5.16ahm.
40 HungarianMemonal,para.3.88.andVol4,Annex24.1
ofits "extensionto 31 October,this couldnot magicallytransformthe avowedly unilateral
suspensionofwork atNagymarosintu an agreedone. Czechosluvakia'psrotestwas fomally
un record. As to the extensionofthe suspensionofwork tuDunakilitithe Czechodovak
Governmentimmediately, vehementiy and repeatedIydenied any agreement tu Hungq's
takingthisunilaterstep42.
5.22 Inanyment, the20July meetingcmot be descrîbedas"negotiationsu.
What HungaqfsPrime Mnister had to say about the Project was presented ina speech
formallysettingforthHungws officiposition. Iwas hardlypossiblefortheCzechoslovak
PrimeMinister to have given his officiresponse on the "spurof the moment" l,t alone
negoliatein anyrneanirigfirlsense. However,therewas nothing"spurofthemoment"about
theHungarian Govement's adoption ofa ResoIutionconfairiingthnew decisionsonthe very
same dav. Clearfy,the HungarianGoverment wasnot atdi concerned over whether these
decisionsmet with the approvaoftheCzechodovakGovernment.Theywere as unilaterdas
the initialdecisionto suspend work at Nagymaros,and they were taken without prior
consuItation.
5.23 Evenhadtherebeen a misunderstan odithe partofthe Hungarian
Government atthe20 Julymeeting,Czechoslovakia' seriesof repeateddeniais,tartingwith
the &-Mkmoire presentedbytheCzechoslovak Ambassador inBudapestfive days afterthe
meeting4 'wouldhavecompelledthe Hungarian Govenunent -ifit hadgenuinelyintendenot
tu acturiilateralyto rescindthesedecisionspendingfirrtherdiscussionbetweenthe Treaty
parties.
5.24 Thereis oneotherpointtu make here. Hungary'sargument proceedson
the faIsassumption that the Naparos sectionofthe Projectwas uniqudy Ilungaian. But
tks sectionconsisteof muchmorethan theNaparos step;it extended dong an areaof the
Danube ofsome 100km inlength,where asubstantial artof theworkwas tobe perfomed
byCzechoslovakia on its own territoras shown by IllusNo. 31 appearingin the Slovak
~ernofia?. 13s wiII be discussed again below4', there is no better evideace that
42
atkmpteddeceptionbytheHungariGovernmentconceminthe20Julymeeting.hosIovaktothe
I 43 SlovaMernorial,ara4.36andAnnex 66.Thisdocumentindicatthat ath20 Jdy meetinthe
Cze;cho$IovPhe Ministerrequ& that Hungaryaltemativepropos6esputinwritinsr>he
muidmby them.
44
Si. SIovakMernorial, ar3.25,andTIIm.No. 31. S-, al=, Illus. NCM-9, appearina?
pata.b.Ofi.2,below.Thegreenlinesshowwhereprotectrneasures ertobetakenaspariof
theNagymarossectiontheProject.
45
& para 5.53below.Czechoslovakia (and now Siovakia)neveraccepte Hdungary'sabandonmentof Nagymaros
than the factthat Czechostovakiacontinuedto perform its obligationsin respecto the
Nagymaros sectioafterHungary had abandonec ihissectioand,indeed, thewholeProject.
This work invoIved protcctive rneasurdong theVah and Hron Riversnecessq tothe
completion of Nagymaros and, thus, the continuationof this work presupposedthe
constructionoftheNagymarosstep. Czechoslovakic aontinuectihisworinspiteofHungary's
abandonment.
5.25 The HungarîmMernorialgives the firIsimpressionthat duringthe
summerof 1989 therewerenegotiationsover Nagymarua snd Dunakititiand thedammingof
the Danubethat year. The documentary evidence shows that,as far as Hungarywas
concerned, the decisions had been taken; the oniy mattersfor discussion were their
consequence It.as inthesecircumstancesthat CzechosIovakifirst mentionedthe possible
need tutake"ternporarymeasrrres"ecaus oeftheadvance statusofconstructionwork4.
5.26 Insteadofrescindinitsdecisionsof 13Mayand 20 July,intheIightof
theheated protestsfromCzechoslovakiat,he HungarianGovernent continued tu inçisthat
f zechodovakiahadacquiesced inthesedecisiunatthe 20JuIymeeting47.
5.27 The EIungariaMnemoria mlentiona meetingofDeputyPrimeMinisters
on9 september4'.According tothe agreedrecord ofthismeeting,Hungaryfidy shutthe
door toan)tseconsiderationofitsunilaterdsuspensionofworatDunakilitiupto 31 Octuber,
thereby preventing the damming of the Danube for a whale yarI an action which
Czechoslovakia rejected".Hungary's Deputy PrimeMinisteraisodeniedthat Hungarybore
anyobligationtopaydamagesasa resultof itactions,contendingthatecologicalriskswera
shareddanger,andthe enforcementofecological requirementswas ajointtask. Inresponse,
the Czechoslovak Deputy Prime Ministerinsistedthat Hungq had acted uniIateraTlyn
violationof the Treat)., andhe elaborated on the kind of provisional soiutionthat
Czechoslovakia mïghtbe forcedto takeifHungarydidnot agree to continuethe construction
oftheG/NProjectinaccordancewiththeTreaty.
a ThisposibiliwasfirsraisinformaIa1aymeetind represenlatistheMinimiesof lndustry
(Hungarian)ndFuelandEnergy(Czechoslova)n21-22August1989.Sec. ungariaMemorial,
para3$8,and Vol.4Annex 21.Inaletterdat31August1989,theCzechodovaPrimeMinister
thenmoreformal lentionesucapossibiiitSlovakMemorial ar4.3and Annex71.
47
SecH.rrngarin& Verbakof tSepfemkr 1989;IovaMernoriai,ara4.3andAmex 72.
48
HungananMernoriapara.3.90,ndVol.4, Amex25.
49 Secp.araS18andfn.35,above,anSlovaMernorial,ara4.02. 5.28 As partofits"acquiescence"argumentH, ungaryhas attemptedto stress
areasof agreementbetweentheparties'scientificexperts.Forexample,Hungaryhasplacedin
evidencethe recordof the meeting ofscientificexpertsin late Septemb1989 atwhichthe
water qudty and ecologicd implicationsof flhg the Dunati-Hriigov resemoirwere
considered5'. The meeting hvoIved tssentidy an exchang oefviews. Hungary'sMemurid
emphasise fsivrelativelrninorpointsofagreemenr tatherthanthemain conclusionsternming
fiom the meeting - thattherewas a fimdamenta lisagrsemen tetweenthe partiesover
wheiherenou& was hum aboutpossibleecologicaleffectto proceedwiththe~roject" .
B. TheHardiRe~ort
5.29 In anyevent, itis whollyincorrectto emphasisethe closeness ofthe
partiespositionsinSeptember 1989 when, asis cleafrom theevidencethatHungary hasnow
pIacedbeforetheCourtinthe form ofthe Hardireport,atttiisverytimeHungarywas deciding
not ody on theabandonmentofcentraleIements of theProject butdso planninga stepbystep
strategyforhandlingtheIikeiydisputewith~zechuslovaki$~.The Hardi report was not atal1
anenvironmentasltudyconductedby what Hungary callan"expert co~nmittee"~~ M.r.Hardi
heldthe positionof Vice-Presidentof theHungarian Society forPoliticalSciences,andthe
composition of the othercornmitteemembers revealsthat the cornmitteewas a hi&-levd
policygroupappointed forthe purposeof advisinthe Governmenthow toproceed inordertu
minimise the consequencestu Hungaryof abandonirigthe GM Project-with or without the
consentof ~zechoslovakia~~ .nd thatisjustwhatthe Hardi reportdid:it setoutablueprint
$D HmgarianMernorial,ara3.92and Vol4, bex 26.
51
Ofcourse,thwsasthewry samequestioshrdiand restudibyHungaytsçcientistswer sithe
early1980s,culrninatingin t1983-1985EnvironmentaiImpact -meni, which mon&
supportegoingaheadwittheProjet.
52
HungariaMernorial,ara.3.95anVol.5(Par0, Annex8.
53 IfwilberdIed thaat ttitirnagenuineenWonmenta ItudwyasSeingunderiakeonkhall of
Hmgaty bytheweiie~tablishAmerian mdtitingGroup.BechteIEnvironmeniaiIncorporaofd
Wornia. a SIovaMkemoriaI,ara2.27,gS., andpara7.16,g a.,bzlow.In JdyI9%9t,ht
Hungariancodting mmpq forWaterEngineering, WLTERV,furnishedBshtewiîhek-tensive
Projecdocumentatifor bis studThecommiççioningofthistu*isadditionalwidenŒthathe
Ecologiareporfurnish edMarchandMay of 1989 wernotregardedbytheHungarianexperas
adequatea conclusioMer wnfimed bythe faathat these reportswenwer furnishedto
Czechoçlovakatthetimeinsupporofitabandonmen otfworkAsnoted inpara7.09below,the
Hungarianexperthadalreadymadea devastaticritiquof thfirsEcologireport.See,also,
argumentsadvanceby2Hungaqtosupportihe*pping dFthePrcjectHungarynwer providdthe
BechteIrepotoCzechoslovakiButinthemeantirnerwng on theEooIagiaanYheHardireports*
theHungariaGovernent wentdieadwithits dxisiobsstowork ontheProjectwithoutawaiting
thedts oftheWy independenatndexpertscientmdy conduad byBahtei.
54 Sec .am 7.10below,former detailswncemingtheHardiuimmittereport.far the HungarianGoverment in unilaterattemrinatingtheProject,which was faithfirlly
ioIIowed.
5.30 The Hardireport'sconclusionspoint to a Iack of good faithon
Hungq's part and show thatthesubseqrrenntegotiatiowere,for Hungarjra charade-The
foIIowingstrate gjlriddom inthereportforHungary'sharrdlingfthedispute:
"ShouldtheHungarian Government optforthelattersolution[thecanceiiation
ofNagymaros], icouldinitiatenegotiationsabouttheamendmenotf theinter-
govemmentalagreements ... . It couId indicatethe cancellationof the
NagymarosBarrageand thepostponement ofthe change ofcourse [oflthe
PunakiIiti-HruSovreservoias the objectivofthenegotiations.Shorildthe
othernegotiatinpartybtunwiIIintu acceptsuchamendrnents,the Hun~arian
Government could nass a unilarerddecision about the temination of
constructioo~erationattheNagymaros Banage and thepostponementof the
changeof course,whilereferrintothemutua liolatioofcertaincontractual
obfigationsandtheemergenceofanenvironmenta elmergend5 ."
In tems ofthe resnltalegaldispute,the reporl considersthatCzechosIuvakiawould bea"in
situation where it isboundto make a compromisen. Fiirther, "the Iengthy le@ dispute
[woutd]releasemungary]6om any 'mediate-or short-termpaymentobligation";nddue to
the parties'membershiin theCMEA Hungarywould be "obligeto honourobligationsto
pay damages ody to theextentandin theformacknowledged" by it.Accordiig.lytheHardi
reportconcludesthat:
"As regardsthe firiancialconseqiiencesofdrappingthe Nagymaroshydro-
electric stati..the HungarianGovemment wil be straddledbyfinancial
obIigationsonlyto the extentit acknowledgesthem. No-oncancorn~elthe
Governmentto satisfifCzechostovademand stdoes not recognisasjustified.
With respecto internationlelationstateswith finariciaiobligatarein a
betternegotiatingpositionthanthosewith c~aim*'.
5.3I Thisfocuson economicissues in theHardi report'srecornmendations
reflectsthe earlierfindingof the PrimeMinister'sAdvisoCornmittee referredtoabove,
55 HungarianMernori, ol.PartI)&ex 8 (atpp.165-16-ernphasadded).
"
M. fap.166-emphasiadded).whichhadconc~uded inMay 1989 thattheabandonmeno t fNagymaroswould be themost
reasonablechoice,Iargehm an economic pointofviewS7.
5.32 One furtherinteresthgfactrevded inthe Hardireport was thatthe
contractwiththeAustrianCompany perfomiingthework atNagymaros ,dess the susliension
was liftedexpired sixmonthsder the 13 May suspension(on 13 November),with al1
consequentterminatiocharges.There was,thus,nooptionto extendthe sustiensiofwork,
andthe HardiReportrecommended thatthicsontract btenninatedinNovember1989rather
thanreactivated.
C. The Ne~otiationsofSeptember-October 1989
5.33 ItisintheIightoftheHardireportfhatw toabenpopeah1ed
move towards asettIemenotfthedisputeintheautumn of 1989 mustbejudged. Now thatit
hasseentheHardireport, SfovakiaredisethatCzechoslovakia'esxpectationsatthetirhad
been entireone-sidedf,orHungaryhadhadnointention ofreachinga compromise.It is not
possiblto acceptHungaqts statementthatinOctober 1989 the Treatyparties"madeserious
effortstusetiIthe dispute beforetscheduleddatefor theclusure ofthe~anube"'~. Such
effortsweremadebyCzechoslovakia ,utcertainfnotby Hungary.
5.34 Asidefiom theHardi reporttheletterofHungq's Prime Mister of4
UctDber1989'~ showsthat the HungarianGovernent hadtw~Objecti Mves in mind(il
thepostponement of thedarrimin gfthe Danube;and(ii) theabandonment ofpeakpower
operationsand ,hus,theNagymaros sectionof theProject, objectitobe imposedby the
Hungaria Governent throughits unilateralcts-notthroughconsultationand negotiation
withCzechoslovakia.
5.35 Sodunng the SeptemberandOctobernegotiationsHungary attempted
to misleadCzechoslovakiaintoagreeingtothe abandonment ofNagymaros by offeringthat,
57
concludes:"Dtothecompositiof herfieeHungary'intereinit is negligiInternioft
productiofelectriitcoy,ludeshattheProjectisalsbeneficial:"ibecornevidentthat
thereiabdntelynoneed foincreas insurrgq'senergneîwork uptil1995kause ofthe
resewealreaàavailable."TadjsisIeadsintthemostsuManiid&ons of thereport,whîch
areniiued"Economiamlysisand"IntemationalIegd impiicatHungariaMernoriai,Vol. 5
(Part, Annex%(app.157-158).
58
m., Vol. 1,para.3.96.
59 m., para3.93andVol.4,Annex27.inretum, HungarywouIdresumework at~unakiliti~. Two thingsmustbe notedabout thjs
offer.Fir t t.s nota proposaito discusswhetheornotto abandoN nagymaros:thatstep
was madea precondition.Second, thesuggestionof thePrimeMinisterof Hungary that,if
thispreconditionwere notmet,Hungary's suspensionofconstruction wouIdcontulueuntiI
"environmentalreqniremtntwere met",isshown bjttheHardireporttuhavebeen deceptive:
the crintractreIattogthe ~onstnictiofNagymaros , iiowedforno extensionbeyond13
November 1989,onlyreactivatioortermination6'. hebizarrenatureofthisproposd must
be noted.In effectit wasthisifCzechoslovaki agreedto accept Hungarqtbsreach of the
TreatyinrespectofNagymarosH , ungq wouId agreenottu breachtheTreatyasto itother
obligations.
5.36 Thesenegotiationsculminateina meetingbetween Prim e inisterson
26 October 1989 during wkch the respectivepositions of each party were stated6'.
CzechosIovakiakrsactiontuHurigarp y"~iti oas accommodati rnigflexib lne,it was
conveyed ody fourdays Iateria Note of 30 October198ga . Czechoslovakiawas
willinto agreetodelaywork atNagymaros @y cancellatioofthe1989Protocolaccelerating
thework thereby 15months)in orderto allowtimeforfurtherstudyof theeffectsof p&
power operationp; itaccepred theideaofan intergovementd agreement containinthe
requestedenvironmentalguarmteeson conditionthat worktu dam the Danube during 2989
(which atthatlatedaterequireverypromptsteps tobe taken)waspromptly resumed;and it
proposedthatirnmediate agreementbe reachedonthe principlestobeincorporatedin the
inergovernmenta agreement.
D. Hun~arv's Prevention of the Damminrt of the Danube bv
continu in^ to Susaend Work at Dunakiliti: its Termination of
Work atNammaros
5.37 Asjust noted, the 30 Octuber Note Verbalof CzechosIovakiawas
submittedjustfour daysder themeetingofPrime Ministers (on 26 Octuber)and was a
responsetu Hungary'spositionsetforthatthemeeting. However, ody one day afkerthat
60
thisropasawasdmade,accorditrHungaq ad,orrVol. 1para3.96)l,snotben pIaceidn
widencebyHunpy.
61 Sec.ara.5.3above.
62
SecSlovakMernoria,ara4.464.4forthdetailofHungarysosition.
a
Seeibid.,par4.484.49.
59
Czechmlovakwaasnul pritthetem othecontrat ith Ada andwasunawarethaafurther
extensiontheNagymaros nsion wasnotpossible.meeting and without prior consultationor notificatito Czechoslovakia, theHungarian
Governent byResoluti dated27 October took thefollowingunillteraldecision'6
- To abandon constructiowork atNagymaros;
- Tu impose asa andition of mng the Dunakiliti-Hnr3ovreservoirthe
concbsi~n of sn htergovernmental agreement tu minimise the
environmentarliskandtheestablishmen otfa systemofguarantees.
5.38 The Hungafian Memurid fail s mention a forrrthdement of this
Resolrrtion:"Itheevent ofa Czechoslovakstatementtu be WiIIingtu condude sucan inter-
govemmentai agreemen tte,preparatorywork of the damming up of theriver-bedat the
reservoircan be ~ontinued~ .~ This conditionwas more than met by the 30 October
CzechodovakNote But Hringaryfailed to observe its own Resolutionand
continuedtu suspendwork at Dunakiliti,Iettingthetime pabyduringwhichthe damming
uperafionwas possibleh 1989ascuntemplated under the agreedscheduIeofthe GM Project.
It wouldbe dficult tocategorisethisas"good faitv6? and it revealsthatHungarydidnot
take seriouslyCzechoslovakia'statementsatthetimethat it mightbe requiredto resortto
provisionamesures ifHurigaypersistedinitsbreachesoftheTreaty.
5.39 The HungarianMemorid refers tu the CzechoslovakNote of 30
October as containhg "new elements" and as expressinga wiilingness to conclude an
agreement onenvironmenta gluaranteesNonetheless,itmakesthefollowingcomment:
"Butit was cofiditionon Hungarypreparingforthwithfor the dosure ofthe
Danube andgave nohintof the eventualcontentof the guarantees.It also
faileto addresstwo of themostimportanH t ungariangoals:theabandonment
oftheNagymaros Barrage and thesuspensionofthe closureoftheDanubefor
65 HungarianMernorial,Vol.Annex 150.TheResolutionconfimthe Gwernment's"preliminaq
standpoinsetoutiaResolutioof22 Septembe,documen totplacedievidencbyHungaq.
56 Re Hrurgariafmmlatioin10Engiisofthipassagein îAnnex 150isflawd.The quoutionin
theabve fexis on anawmte EngIishUamIaîonappearinintheHtingarianNoteVerbofe
3NovernberS. IcvakMernorlnnex77. Seealso,HunMarrMernorial, o4, Amex 29.
67
Seep,ara..36ahve.
68
& gara 5.03above. at Ieastone year,while investigatioof the environmentalissues couIdbe
made69 ."
Thisexplanationis, atbesconfusing The HungarianGovemment had, byitsResoliitioof
27 Ocîober 1989, fomdly appruvd its earlier offer continuethe dammingoperation if
Czechosiovakia was wihg to accept enviromentai guarantees. On 30 October,
Czechoslovakiacornmitteditseto suchguaranteesl,inkingthemto Hungary'cornmitmentto
continueworkondamming theDanube .sto theclaimthattheCzechoslovak Na failedto
"address"theissue ofNagymaros and suspensionofthe dosure oftheDanube, theNote did
indeedaddressthem: it rejectedthe abandonmeofNagyrnaros and acceptedRungary'soEer
tu proceedwifh dammin ghe Danubeby agreeingtoacceptenvironmentag iuarante tebe
negotiated.
5.40 The Hungarian Mernorialassertsthatthwe thenoccurreafaiIureofthe
negotiations,blamingit onCzechoslovakiasiEere nerceptionfiumHrrngay of the historic
changestakingplacein CentralEurope,withthe "ancienréwrne in Czechoslovaki...deeply
rootedinthementalityandprioritysystemoftheCMEA peri~d"~.
5.41 Thisis nomorethanrhetoric.It ianowapparent hat onceHurigq h3d
achievedits objectivof posfponingthe ddng of teeDanubefor a year - forthe time
during 1989whenthedamming couldhave beenaccomplished hadpassed -Hungar lostdi
interestin pursuingits offerrestartwork at Dunakiiiti.Hungaes otherprimeobjective
naturdIy reiatedtu Nagymaros: tu obtain Czechoslovakiaagreementtu amendthe 1977
Treatysu asto convert the decisiotuterminateNagynaroscontain& in the 27 October
Resolution (andhpiemented in Novemberby terminatingthe Austriancontract) 6om a
unilateralcttoan agreedamendmen tftheTreaty.Thus,by Note Verbaleof 30November
1989,Hungarypresenteda dr& ofproposed Treatyamendments7 .'
5.42 The Hurrgarian Mernorial, intenton demonstrating a failure of
negotiationsforwhichtheCzechoslovak Govemrnent shouldbe blamed,assertthattherewas
no replyfromCzechoslovakia tothe30 NovemberNote VerbalefomardingproposedTreaty
amendmen t. This isseriouslymisleading. It overlooksthe factthat Czechoslovakia's
responçetu Hungw position stateatthe26 Octubermeeting was aIreadycontained iniîs
30 Octuber Verbale. ItoverIooksthe fact that on 27 October,without waitingfor
69 HungarianMemonal,para.3.99.Of coursethe abandoment of Nagynwos wano langera
Hungaria"god";ihadkendsîded byfieHmgarianGovermenton 27Oaokr.
M
-id.para3.IOO.
7s
m., para3.103.SecSlovakMemorial,ara.4.50. SECrION 3. Huneaw's UnilateralTerminationofAl1 ConstructionWork on the
Proiectbv 30 June 1990
5.45 The Hungariar i emuridmisinte'prets zechosIovakjaresponsedated
15 Febmary sent by CzechoJovakialsew PrimeWster, clainiinthathe didnot takeissue
withthe statementsin Mr. Németh'letterT6.But, Czechoslovakia'otaldisagreementwith
Mr.Németh's suggestionto postponethenegotiationof Hungary's30 Novemberproposais
was clear. The 15 Febmaryletterpolitelyigtioredthe suggestionand,instead,iirgedthe
immediaterenewd of negotiafionso thatGabEkovo couId be put intooperationin 1991,
which mem dammingthe DanubeduringOctuber of1990 and the resumptionofwork by
HungaryatDunakiliti.
5.46 Mr. Némethresponded on 6 March199p. The HungarianMernoria1
omîtsthe main messagesconveye inthisIetterfithat Hungaryhaddecidednot tu proceed
with anyfifurthwork on the GabEikovo sectionof the Projec(exceptwherenecessaryfor
conservationandflood protectionandunlessHungarysubsequently electeta do so aftaran
examinationof the scientificstudies which it proposed be undertaken);and ci t)e
"recommendation" tohdt negotiationsmadein his10JanuaryIetterhadbecorne aHurtgarian
decisionnot tocontinuethe negotiafions.in other words, in th6 MarchIetter,Hungary
informedCzechoslovakia thatithad, foran indefiniteperioputa stop to al1construction
workontheProjectandto thenegotiationsthathadstarted in 1989.Onceagain,these were
unilateral ecisionsofthe HungarianGovement, afactillustratebyMr. Nkmeth'i snvitation
inthe 6MarchIetterto Czechoslovakito do likewise.
5.47 Itmustbestressedthat,atthetime ofthisunilaterl ecisiotostopail
work on theProject,Hungary had justreceived(inFebruary1990)theBechtelreport,which
undemined the mainenvironmentaiargument asainstthe Project,suchas theenvironmental
nsks describedinthe Hardi report. It mabe for that reasthat inhis6 March letfeMr.
Némethdescribedthe Projectas a"gigantiinvestmentfiasco"rathethan as aseriousthreat
to the environment. TherecentlycornpiledHungarian"White~ook"'' - composed of the
opinions ofa number ofHungarian expertsformerly dose@ associatedwiîh the Project-
indicatethat thiviewoftheProject wasbyno meansurùversdjysharedininfomredcircIesin
'6 HungananMernorial,ar3.107.Forthtextofth15FebniarlertesecSlovakMemorialAnnex
80.
''
A copyoftheHungarian"WhitBmk" hasken furnishtotheCourt. Extractsrefetointhis
Counter-MernoraleannexaiintransIaashnex 1, hereto. Hungary,for itwas consideredto bebasedon anincomplete,one-sidedeconomicanalysism .
Moreover, Hungarylsactionsshowthat,asidehm supressingthe Bechtel reportit hadno
intere intommissioningfurtherstudiesinto enviromentdaspectsoftheProject;itdecision
to stop workon the Project was based on economic - hancial wnsiderations. The
environmentaalrgumentswere, ashad been the case al1thraughthe 1980s, thrownin to
supportthisdecision;bufearsof environmentail pactwerenotthereasonbehindHungary's
decision.
5.48 The &ai episodein thecessationbyHungaryof work on the Project
took placeinJune1990. For itwasthen thattheremainde r the contractwithAustrian and
Yugoslaviancompanies forconstructionatDunuti and elsewherewere terminatedp, utting
intoeffecttheintention expressedbyHurigarinMr. Németh's 6 March letter (anindeedin
his10 Januarylettertubringtoan endal1constructionworkunder theGlN~roject" .
5.49 Not one of these acts,startingwith the suspension of work at
Nagymarosun 23May 1989,was agreedtubyCzechoslovakia .ach one oftheseactswas
takenbyHungarywithout ~riorconsultation withCzechoslovakia letdune agreement, and,
hence,wastakenunilaterallinviolationofthe 1977Treaty.
5.50 Takirigits argumentthat Czechoslovakia had acquiesced in the
abaidonment of Nagynaros a step further, the HungariMemoriaI goes on tu clah that
Czechoslovakiaofficiallyxcepted terminatiofthe Nagymarossection of theProject. The
sole supportforthis contentioisa document dated 10January 1990". It isa unilateral
report of the Hungarian StateSecretary of the Ministry for Environment and Water
Management concerninga meetingsaidtuhave been hddonIO Januarj1990 withthe newly
appoint4 SIovak Mtiister for Forest Management, Water Management and Tirnber
hdustrya . The document furnishedby Hungary as an hex tu itMernorialis an EngIish
translationof thisaccouofthe meetingdescribedasa "frontiemeeting"onIO January1990
79 m. (app.15-22).
i 80 Thedatementinpara9.06of theHungariMernoriaiha"thfornialdecisionto abawork at
1 GabEkm wastakeninkhkr 1991andkame effectiveatthe endof isrnisleadinThe
dimnçtnietiaworkontheProjea. Hunga~Eativelyabandofai1stichworkwhenitemiinated
thwntractwithAustriaindYugoslaviacompaniespriorîoJ1990.
SI HungariaMernoriai.am3.IW,and VoI.4, Annex15fnothex 32,asreferr10infn.137,p.
63).
82
TheSlovakMrnisterwasnota Ministerothecentral(federGovernrnenbtut othe regional
Governentbetween the two Ministersduringa visitu Czechodovakiabythe HungailanEnvironmental
Ministers.
5.51 ThisHungdan account of themeetingshowsthat :
- The mainprtrpose ofthemeetingwas for thetwo Ministersto become
acquaintedt:heSlovakMinistErhadheld hispostfor onlyone month;
- It wasan informaltaIkinstigatby theSlova k iriister;
- A number of aspects offiontierwater relationsbetween the two
countrieswere surveyed,leading to a discussionof the GINProject,
which issummarised inthisway intheHungarian report:
"The latter [theSIovak inister]announce tde SIovap osition accepting the
HungarianParliament'dsecisionnot tobuildthe Nagyrnaros Y3arrage,therey
elirninatinpeak power load operations. He also declareda readiness to
concludetheagreement onenvironmenta protection."
5.52 Itis remarkabI ehattheHungarianMernoriaishouIdadvancesuch an
important contention- that CzechosIovakia had fumdly acceptedthe termination of the
Nagyrnarossection of the Project(anargument not even advance id Hungary's 1992
Declaration)-on thebasisofsuchflimsyevidence. Itisperfectlyclearfiom theevidencenow
before the Court that, neither then nlater,didHtingarybelievethat Czechoslovakiahad
agreed tutheterminationoftheNagymarossectionof theProject. Nowhere inthe recordof
diplomatieexchangesbetweentheTreatypartiescananyreferencebefound tosuchanaIIeged
agreement by Czechoslovakiaon 10 January1990. That Hungaryclearlyunderstood
Czechoslovakia'spositionis reflecteinHungaq's Mémoire of 30 Octuber 1989 and
Notes Verbales of 3 November 1989 and 30 November1989, in which the Hungarian
Goverment sought CzechosIovakiala sgreementtomend the Treaty so as tu tenninate
~a~~maros~~.Not onlydidHungary's 1992 Declarationnowhere mention Czechoslovakia's
allegedacceptanceof the teminationof the Nagymarossectionof the Project,but also the
s3 Conw fotheRulesofCD- no copyoftheoriginaldamnenhasbeen furnishby Hungarysa
theaccuracof thdocumentand itstranslatcannotbecheckd. Thus,initpresentfom this
evidencisinadmissible.Butsetthipointtoonesidefothemoment,iisevidenthatthreport
isnotanagreerecordofthemeetinbutaunilaterlecorbytheHungariaparticipaand thuof
verylimite.evidentiaqvalue. Slohasnot&enableIofinary retarof tm~ting.
84 The Hunman Aide-Mémoireof30 Oa&r 1989,which is not referredroithe Hungarian
MernoriaiappearsasAmex 75 fothe SlovaMkemariai(whereitisinorre~tiy dIea
VchalQ. The of3 and30 November1989 appeaas Annexes29 and30 tothe Hungarian
Mernoria(lVol.4). Applicationfiledwith the CourtbyHungaryon 22 October 1992 is totally silent on the
matter'.
5.53 fingay's argumentbased on thisdocument of10 Janrraty 1990isas
I weak as the documentitsetf. It is not possible to acceptthatthe clear decision of
I Czechoslovakiar,ejectinthesuspensioof work atNagymaros on 13 May 1989andinsisting
thatthe Project becmied out inaccordancewith the Treatyw,formaIIymade known to
Hungq on 15 May 19%9, couidbe reverseinauch amariner.Asidefiom the widencejust
discussed,showingthatHungarydidnotatthetime beIievthatCzechosiovakiahadfomdly
accepted theabandonment of Naparos, Czechoslovakia' own conductin continuhgto
perfonn the workassigned toit concerninthe NagymarosSectionof the Projectworks is
cIearevidencethat Czechoslovakicontinuaitoinsistonthe compIetioofthe entireProject,
including~agymaro#' . Workcontimed on protectionmeasriresduringthe yea1990-1994,
involvingasubstantialnvestmentbyCzechoslovaki(aand Slovaki a )i sorkwasrequired
whentheNagymarossection would beputintooperationand was entirelyunrelatto Variant
"C".
SECTION4. Events FoIlowin~ Hungarv's Temination of AH Construction
Work onthe Proiect(mid-1990to the endof1992)
5.54 The Hungarian Mernoria lrgues fiom the premisethat negotiations
betweenthetwo Treaty partiestu resolvethedisputebegaoniyafterthe new Governments
were fumed inboth countries; andit dividesthenegotiationsatthe "intergovermental
level"intthrephases:(i)the22 April1991discussions(ii)thmeetingof 15July1991;and
(iii)themeetiof 2December 1991'" Hungarytpsremiseis bafningandincorrect.
5.55 As show inthe previousSectiointergovernm negttiationbegm
atthemeetingofPrime Ministeron20 Ju1yf989. These negotiationscontiniiatthe highest
level oboth Governmentsinto October 1989,and were thenterminatedbyHungary inits
PrimeMinisteisletteo rs10Januaryand 6 March1990. Between thattimeandthe end of
June 1990, when the remairing constmction contracts were temirnated,the Hungarîan
Goverment udateraIIy actedto teminate dl constructionactivitiesunthe GN Project.
Thereforethe next phaseof negotiationsconcemedwhetherCzechoslovakiawas wiIlingto
absolveHungaro yf faultforthefaitaccomplisinviolationofthe1977Treary.
'' HungariaMemorid,VoI.4,Annex83andhex 102.
85 See,pm.5.16,~ve.
81
Seep,ara5.24above.
a3
HungariaMeinofidparas.3.121-3.145. At thisstageintheaccount of events,itiimportant toobserve thatthe
5.56
changes in the Governments of both countrieshad little materid eKect on the 1991
negotiations oron the deveiopmentofthe disputeC .zechoslovakiamaintaincd the same
position regardit he GN Project both bdure and afterthe chmge in its Governent in
December 1989 andtheelectionsof 8-9June 1990; and aithe unilateraactionsofHungaryin
violatioof the1977 Treatyweredecidedandhadbeen takenbeforetheNémethGoverment
wasreplaced inMay1 990'~.
A. Huneam Faib tuPartici~afein the EC PHAREPro~rarnStudv on
WaterOuaiitv
Dunngthe rest of 1990, whilepoliticaichangeswere takingplace in
5.57
both cuuntrieq bilaterdtalkscancerningthe GIN Projectwere not resumed. However, one
eventto benoted tookplaceinOctober-Novmber 1990;itconcemedHungarfs failure to job
inthe ECs PHAREProject forajointshidy ofthe surfaceandgroundwaterof theDanubian
lowlandsdiectly afYectedbytheProject. This failureis mentionedinboth~emorials~. Itis
ofparticularimportancebecause Hungary'psaperspresent enSune1 989 andthe Hardi report
of September1989made muchof the supposedthreatof theProjecttu thequalityof surface
and ground water; yet when it came tu enteringinto a seriousjointstudyof the question,
Hungary backed away. This reflectedHungary's consistentindifferenceto any serious,
independens ttudyofwat erqualityandtheenvironment.
5.58 The HungarianMemurial'e sxplmationforthir sefusaltriparticipatis
that the ady wasody Brmed at the SIovakpart ofthisregioJ1. Thisis patentlyincorrect.
The study was narroweddown to Slovakterritoryonly & Hungq had declinedto
participate;the invitation extentoHungary was clearlyaimedat coveringbothsides of the
~anube~~ .
89 Ttisimportano notthatiwas thesameHungarianGovermentunder PrimeMinisterNémeththat
particip ntaithekeydecisi donsinthiperiodthePrcjm'sacceIeratin Feb- 1989t;he
suspensionof Na-os in May1989 andils subçeqrtenatbandoninOaober 1989. iwas the
NemethGovernent bat participalaithSeptemkr -Ocloixr I9%negotiatioandthenreversai
its position,piranend torheçnegotiatioinMr. Nemeth'sIeltersofI5Ianuaryand6 March
1990,thussignaIingthabandonmenotfthe GiN Projeby theendof June 1990whenthe final
constructicontracwereterminatabyHungriry.
90
SlovakMernorialaras4.02and4.63,andAnna 57;HungarianMernorial,ara3.13.
91 HungarianMernoria,ara 3.13.
92 ne invitattoparticiparefersfathe"Danubinowland, lb inHungariaandSlava tertory".
SlovakMernorial.nnex82. - 121-
B. Huneaw Preventsthe dam min^ ofthe Danube for a SecondYear
JOctober 1990)
5.59 Themosi importanteventof1990affecthg theProject isnot mentioned
in theHungkan Memurid. For thesecond yearin a row,the damming of theDanube at
Dunakilitwas notcarriedoutduringtheshor ime in1990when thiswas possible. Hungary
controiiethework atDunakilit;nd bythe endof June1990, withoutconsultatio(lealone
agreementbyCzechoslovakia) H, ungarhadcancelledal1privatcontractcoveringthiswork.
Thedefinitivenatureofthisterminationactioniseen fromSirsSatement inHunges 1992
Declaration:
"Asto thework done byAustrianandYugoslav companiest,herelatedprivate
contractsweretemiinateinNovember1989 andJune 1990,respectivelyThe
partieagreedinthefinancialconsequenceoftheterrninatiof."
The scheduleofotherworkonthe GabEfkovs oectioonftheProjectwasnecessar diependent
onthe daminhg of theDanube. Thus, the wholeProject was againseriouslysetback by
Hungary'sunilateralct.
C. Eun~arv'sMoves toTerminatethe 1977 Tremity
5.60 Asboth Mernorialosbservew,there wereindicatioof progressinlate
1990 towardsbruadening the biIatethI mong experts tua trilaterd formto includethe
EC. Althoughthe Hungarian Prime Minister'slettof 14 December 1990 containedthe
proposalto conductnegotiationenlargedto includetheEC,thiswas coupledwithproposais
tu amendthe 1977 ~reaq. Further heHungarian Memoriao i ffersevidenceintheformof 1
an unpublishedResoluti ofntheHungaiian Governent of 20 Decernber 1990that shows
I
there wasno new hupaofresolvingthe dispute,withorwithout EC involvement excepton
Hungary'stcrms, that is byterminatingthe 1977 ~reat?. The Resofution directethe
1
responsibleMinistersandthePlenipotentiao: !
I
"..startnegotiations with [Czechos!ovakion the terminationof the 1977
Treatyby mutuai consent andon the conclusioof a treaty addressingthe
consequencesofthetemination." @mphasisdded). !
93
HungariaMemoriai.Vo4,Annex 82(ap. 162).
94 SlovakMemoria,ara s664.67;HungariaMemorial,ol. paras3.114-3.116.
95 HungariaMemorial,ara3.118See .lovaMemorialA, nne86.
!
?% HungariaMernoria,ara3.115andVol.4, ARnexU3. IisimportanIonotthat tsuggestion
inthRmgarianPrimeMinisterIemrof 14Decemkr 1990W., Vol. I, para.3.114kendto I
preparanamendment10theTreattheRemlutioof20Decernkrwas aimedat thterminatiof !
thTreatyamajorshifinernphasis.
! 5.61 The oficid positionofthenewCzechoslovalc Governrnenw t asetout
in itPrime Minister'letterof15 January1991, replyingto the HungaianPrime Ministefs
letteof 14December 1990". Czechoslovaki nterpretethisletteasa good faithproposal
torenewthe negofiafionsbegrrnattheendof 1989but abniptlycaricelledbyHungaryunJO
Janiiary1990.The Czechoslovak Prime Mutister'sreptywas: (i) tagreeto talk "on the
comprehensivesolutionof problemsof the[Gw sjrsteofloch atthe levelofgovernent
detegations", nd(ii)to appoiatdelegatetoorganise"internationaissistanceinconsiderhg
theecologicalproblemsposedbythe [G/N ~roject]"~.
5.62 But abasicdiifferencexistai betweenthe Treaty partieasemerges
clearlyfrom a statement ofpnriciplesthat the HungarianPleriipotentiproposed tu his
coünterparton IS Febmary 1991to "serveas a basisfortheinternationalreatywhichwe
propo~ed"~~ ,f wu a totally uncompromising proposal that took no account of
Czechoslovakia'csonciliatoapproach.The two partiesweretoagree:
- That constructionand operationsof the GIN Projeet would "initiate
keversible ecologicd process" with gave consequencf eor the
environmentt,hedrinkinwater,etc.;
- Accordingly,thatthe G/N Project shouldnot be constnictedand a
treat)rtthieEectshould be concIudedthatdm settledthe hvestment
todate;and
- Finally,that the 1977 Treatyand al1refatedagreementsshould be
terminated.
Thesepruposals didnot apped tuthenewGovernent inCzechosIovakiaany more rhm they
had tuthe fumer Govement. Thq were propods thatfaithfuIIjrfoUuwedthe blireprintlaid
dom infheHardireport inSeptember1989 and adoptaibythe Hungarian Govenunent atthe
time,and theirimplementatiowas nottobe negotiatedbutimposed.
91 InitsIenero14 December1990Hrutgaryropod natody tocanduanegritiatio,-pded tc
hclrrdethEC.onproposaitoamendlhe1977TmQ. butdçotomwe thediscussiotoahgher
Ievetha hePlenipotentiasyappintingajoiintergovernmentornmittee.
98
SlovakMernoria, nnex85and86.
99
ofduslettiimiçdescrîbedi:tindeasetouthepropsedprîncipIes., para. 3.thcontent D. AmrovaI by Czechoslovakia of Initial Tnvestmentand Lo~istical
Planninp forVariant "Cpt125July 1991);Hun~arv is Informed of
the EIerntntofVariant "C"
5.63 Thesevd meetingsand exchang ehst look placeuntApd 199 Iare
presentedintheHungarian Memonaiin such a way asto givethefalseimpression ,irsttat
there had been new environmentai studiessupportingHungary'sview, and second, that
Czechoslovakia çeemedto be mowig towardsscceptance of terminatioofthe Projectas
inevtable1#. The reportsfurnisheby Hungary werethe same prepared iistof articles that
hadbeenfurnished before,offeringnothingnew. The ody new, independentstudy, dso
commissionedby Hungary,the Bechtel report, once again passes unmentionedin the
Hrrngarian~emorial"',justasit nevewas mentioned intheexchanga ensmeetingsbetween
theTreatjrparties.
5.64 FromApril 1991 up to the end of that year,theretook place the
discussionshatHungary hasportrayedinitsMemorialasthreeseriesof negotiations.How
theseeventsaregrouped togetheris, ifseIfofrioconsequence;what doesmatteris whatthe
negotiationswereabout.
5.65 The negotiations,highleveastheywere, did not concem temiinating
Nagymaros,orwhetheror not todamtheDanube in1991,orwhether Hungar houldresume
theconstructionactivitieon theGlN Project. Thusemattershad alreadybeen unilaterdy
decided by Hungary. Nor were the negotiationsaboutwhetherHungary'saction cosuIdbe
justifiedby the threof heparableenvironmenta im: that positiontoo,hadbeentaken
unilateralbyHungary (intotaldisregarof thescientzc evidenceThe onlypossiblesubject
of negotiationwas onwhatterms toterminatethe1977 Treatyand, withitthe GLN Project.
But herean obstacleexisteforHungary :forCzechodovakia hadmade it plainthatwas not
prepared toabandontheG/N Projectand had mentiunecithatit might beforced toseek a
provisionasolutionifHungary persisteinitscourseinviolationofthe 1977Treaty. Such a
provisionalolutionwouldenabletheProjectto bepartiallyimplernentewithoutthe needfor
Hungarîan participationand, hence, outside %opeof Hungary'suniIaterd decisionand
acts.
I# m., VcI. Iparas3.111-3-12ThehpIicaiion fhtheCzp;chosIovPleniptentiarnighthave
beenreadytdi- thTreaiyPterminatiiamment wasreacbeoncompensation,uggestein
theIasentenccfpara3.117hasno suppointtierecaofthemeetingseouinhex QIwhicis
dms norevd any%ch sribjcrshavînken raisubytheCzechosiovklenip~enriq.
IO1
A studpreparedatHungaq'srquest btheFldplain lnstitundertheauspicoeftheWorld
WildIiFund foNature(WWF)r. eferrten thHungarianMemoriaatpara.3.17,has noken
plad inwidenΠbyHungary,ndSlovakihasnocopyofit. 5.66 As theHungari anemuridacknowledgesb, itsResolutiunof16April
1991, theHungarian Parliamentgave the Governmentthe authorityonlytoproceed with
negotiationsto terminathe 1977Treat an,dtoconcludea new treataimed atsettlinthe
consequenc ofstheabandonmentofthe GM ~roject'".Thuqthe Hungarianûovemment
had no mandate tonegotiateto settle the existinisputebetween the Treaty parties;
negotiationswere restrictatenninatingtheTreatyandendiigtheProject.The Resolution
alsoendedinvestmentin theProject,includingrelatednatioinvestmentssuchas reducing
the pouutiofrom suchsources asthe industrilastesbeingpoilrd intoa tributarofthe
Danube atGyor.
5.67 HungaIy'sMemoria ltatesthat it wasthis staginthe disputethat
Hungary"learnedthattheSIovakGovernent had approvedtheplans"forVariant"CM;and it
goes on tucontend thatrequestsfor informationhm the HungariaGovernent were not
answered. Hungw Memurid referstu variousindicationsthat the ofworkonVariant
"C" hadbeen approvedbytheCzechoslovak Government on2 Febmary1 991'O. Thisis not
so;theevidenceestablishethateventheapprovalofinitihancing and planningforVariant
"CM did not occur until25 July 11lW. By then,a great dealof studyint oltemative
provisionalsolutionand theieEect snthe environmentand on waterqudity had been
undertakenlo.5
5.68 These studiewere not conductedby Czechoslovakiain secret. The
HungarianMemuridreferstu a meeting between EnvironmentalMiriisteras exly as 5
September 1930,where thevariousdtwnativesbeingstudiedwere presented tu ~un~ary'~,
But theHungarîanGovment dreadywas weiiaware ofthese alternativariationsfor, in
July 1990,its Plenipotentiyommissionedan evaluationothesevariantstobe carriel ut
with the followingsixrn~nths'~~TheHungarianMemorial dm producesevidence that,at
the discussionsbetweenthe AcademiesofSciencesof thetwo countrieon 13-14 Febmary
1991, the CzechosIovadelegaiioninfomed thHrtngariadeIegat" ionthetechnicd detds
M.. Vol. para.3.12andVol.4,Annex154.
Io4 SIovaMkemoria, nnexe91and92:EngiistranslatisfResoiutNo. 384ofthGovernment
ofthSlovaRepubliandofResoIutino.4M oftheCzechoslovkovernrnent
LOS m., para s14-5.25.
m HungariaMemarial,para.3.andVol.4, Anne1M.
107
rtirepodated9Octokr 199ofaninterviewintheHungarnewspaper amarHirlapwith
Ms.AdriannHlijos,ounsellofthHungananMinistqforEnvironment.Annex1hereto.I
and ecologicalaspects"ofVariant "c"'~~ I nthesummerof 1991,Hungarian officiavisited
thesite "tuseewhat was happening"' .0g
5.69 In describingthe alternative provisionals0Iutionq the Hungark
Memorial gives the impressionthat what becameVariant "Cu (then called Variant"Bu)
contemplatedthe abandonmentof~ag~rnaros"~. This is not true. Variant "Cu only
cuncerned a provisiundsoIutionwithout Nagymaros aridpeakpower operation since, as a
practicd matter, thawas the situatiothat Czechoslovakiafaced &er construction workat
Nagymaros had been stopped by Hungary . CzechosIovakia never abandoned Nagymaros;
nevertheless t hadto take intoaccount itsabandonmen btyHungar yn orderto devisethe
rnitigating measures reflectedin a provisionalvariant"'. Hungary'scontention that
Czechoslovakiafailedtu giveseriousstudy torhe other provisionaisobtionsn2 ialsountrue;
asshownintheSIovakMemurid,theywerethoroughIyst~died"~.
5.70 At boththe intergovemmentam l eetingsof22 Apriland 15 July1991,
the questionofproceedingwithVariant "C" or some other alternativwas discussedby the
Treaty partiesasconcededbyHungary initsaccountofthese No compIaintwas
registeredatthe timeby Hungar hat itwasbeing inadequateiyinfumed. Hungary'ssingIa
minded purposewas totry to stop anvsort of work on the Projectfromgoing forward,
includingtheprovisionalolution.
5.77 Htrngaryplacesgreat emphasisonthe meetingof22 Apil 1991 in its
Memorial. But neither at thismeeting,nor inthepaperspresentedthere, didHungaryoffer
anythingnewto Czechoslovakia - foritnowhadliteraIly nothing to oEer asa resultof the
Pariiamentary Resolurionof 16 ApriI 1991 that Iimited the mandate of its negotiators.
Hungaryhadtaken mattersintoitsawn hds andhadeffectivelyput astop tutheProject.
- -
a HungarianMernoriai, o4,Annex 43.
&, Mawar Nemzet. 8Octokr 1942, interviewwith Ferenc MM, HiuigarianMiniderwithout
Portfolio,whatthtimewastheresponsi MbinisterftheG/N PrajecArmex 13,hereto.
110
HungarianMernorial.ara..123.
II 1
Sm, e.~ para5.16.5.22-5.and 5.50-5.53.hve.
113
k para5.67,aboveandfn.105.
114
"preparamywork"onVarian"Cuhed.13outbyCzechoslovaiuaonsistonlyofstudies..125the 5.72 At the22 ApriImeeting,Hungarypresented atotalof four papersl':'.
Three ofthepaperswereproposaist,hefourthwas a statementofthe viewsof theHungarian
Academy ofSciences,essentialayrepetitioofitsearlierpaperof 26 June1989'16 T.hereis
noagreedrecordofthe 22 Aprilmeetin&but Hurrgary has referredta unilaterd accotlntby
HungairanMiristerMidl,dthorigh notproduckgthe reIevantdocument. Wi~h itMernorial,
SIovakiahasfurnisheditsownaccount of themeeting,togetherwiththeshortjointdeclaration
issuedbythepartiesatitsconcl~sion"~.
5-73 The HungarianMemord describesthe secon d ungaian paper as
proposingthatboth parties"suspendconstmctionund 30September 1993, andrefrainhm
unilateraltepsuntiafterthatdate"'",whichwould entaiHungary'asgreement notto "begin
restorationofthe Nagymarosarea". Thisdescriptionis whalIy atodds with thepaper's
translationannexedtutheHungarim Memurid. Infact,thepaperproposedthe suspension of
work "stillin progresscommencedonthebais of the11977Treaty]". Thiswouldhave hadno
applicatioat dito Hungary,forHungaryhadaireadysuspended aiconstructionworkonthe
Project. Restorationat Nagymaros,in effectinvolvingthe dernolitofnpreparatorworks,
wouldnot, inany event,havefallenwithinthe proposaisince itwas not work inprogres
pursuanttu the Treaty. Any notion that Hungq offeredtuhdt the restorafion work at
NagymarosifCzechoslovakia stoppedconstnrctionwurk on Variant"CHis wrongfor arrother
reason -noconstruction work on Variant"Cuhad yetbeen startecin Apd 1991. Butit is
interestinto notethatthepaperrevealsthatwhenHungarysuspended workatNagymarosby
itsunilateraldecisionof 13 May 1989 it "simultmeouslybegm the reingalement of the
region",corifirminthefactthatthe 13 Maydecisionwas intended byHungay asthe initial
stepinthe uItimatetemination of~agymaros"' .
5.74 Followingthe meeting of 22 Apnl 1991,Czechoslovakia senta Note
VerbaletuHungarydated 18June proposiria secondround of meetingsTm.ThisNote made
absoIuteIclearPrague'spositionthat everyactiontaken byHungq sinc e3 May 1989was
incontraventionofthe 1977Treatyand relatedagreements.Itofferedto"debateanydefinite
suggestionssubmittedby [Hungary]whichmayleadto a resolutionof the situatiat"their
115 -bid.,Vo4, Annexes48,4and50;andVoI.5(PartI), AnnIO.
Ilfi Sec .lovaMkernoria,aras.14-4.34.
"' i.idAnnex87.
Ilg Hmgmian Mernorial,ara..127.
119
Secp.as. 5.09gtsesa,dpara ..32hve.
HungarianMemonai,Vol4, Annex51. next meeting12' On 10 July1991 the Plenipotentiariagainmet'" . Czechoslovakia
infomed Hungar thait was planninto fiIlthe headwatcanalby pumpingwaterfiom the
Danubeinorder tu preservethe structuresand inaccordawith theprocedur of sheJoint
Contrachal Plan. This actionwhich began on 27 July,was not a part ofany Seps tu
implementVariant"C",aswas madeclearbyCzechoslovakiaI .tssolpeurposewasto prevent
the deterioratiofthe headwatersectionof the bypasscanalduc to the delaycaused by
Hungary. Sucha masure had baen stronglyrecommendeb dytheHQIreport1",and itwould
have been necessarinmy eventas partofthe responsib'rloyfthe Treaty partieinthe
preservatioofthe works.
E. Czechoslovakia Proposes that the Alternative Solutions for
Com~letin~Gab51kovobe Studied by a TrilateralCommission 115
Julv1991)
5.75 The nextintergovenuneritalmeetinheIdon 15 Juy 199I,shows once
morethat theonly partywilling- and able- to enter into constructivenegotiatiwas
~zechoslovakia 'p~~.posedthata trilaterlommission(composedof representativesf
Czechoslova Huiagq and the EC) be appointcdto studyail variantofthe Project
submittedtuthecommission by31 JulyI991. Thecodssion was ta givespecidattentito
any ecuIogicaIproblemand tosubmititsviewsto theheadsofthe guvernmentddelegations,
whowouIdthen decideon how to proceedfurtherThe Communiqu éfthemeetingindicates
thatHungary'psroposalwas purelynegative-to "droptheworkson GabEikovo projectand
teminate the 1977Treaty. Hungaryproposed a bilaterdcornmissiotu examine eco1ogicd
risksbutody ifdl worksweresuspend4 by Czechoslovakia.Inother wordq Hungarjrha8
notadvanced ormodifieditsnegotiatinpositioninanway.
1
5.76 Themeetingof 15July1991 is crucialevidencebecauseitshowsthis
strikingcontrat:inspiteofdIthe unilateractsof Hungary and itsdogged insistencon
tenninating the Treatan8 inspiteof the fact thatwork ontheGatï5kovo sectionof the
12' Followingthat, Czechoslrepliaindetatothe 22 Aprilpaperof theHungarianAcaofmy
Sciencm. Vol.5(Parï)hex 10)Sec,ibid.,Vol.4, A52.
I"
SIovakMernoria&ex 89. Thismeetinisnot rnentionedtheHungarianMernorial,which
erroneousstattshathe lameetingofPlenipcrentiawasheidon 15Febniary199L Sec.
HungariaMernoriapara3.10.
' SlovaMkemotidAnnex28(atp.83).
l
124 HungariaMernoriapuas. 3.134-3.13Hungary'saccountis bason areporof Hungarian
l MinistMM], whichisannexeidtranslatnutnotprducedinitoriginversioasrequireby
thRdesof Coiutm., Vol4,ARnex 165.Thisreportindimrhatarecordiwas madeofthe
meeting,butheHmgarianrepordoesnof purprtok a mription of it.Howevera Joint
t Comuniquk wasissueadthend othemeeting,ndlhîdamnentwasannexai iWansIationnd
1 fmished iitorigintexbySlovaki SI.vakMernoriARnexW.Projectwas 90% complete, Czechoslovakianevertheless remained opentu enter againUlto
negotiationsoverthecornpletionoftheG/NProject, and any alternativevarianto do so. At
the meeting,Czechoslovakia formally offeredto turn over to a trilateralcommissionfour
diKere aiternatives:
- Proceedingwiththe Projectaccord& tu theoriginaph;
- PostponingNagymaros,andoperatingGabEikovo asonginallyplanned
(Variantlt"1;
-
PostponingNagynarus, and operathg GabiSikovowith a "so-called
canaisolution",which the Hungananreportindicateswas not exactly
the sameas Variant"C"had beendescribedinthe pastIz;
- Restoringthe sittu itsoriginalcondition.
5.77 The HungarianMernorialsidestepsthe importanceof this offer and
misdescribesthesealternatives,by impIyinthat the "abandonmen otfNagymaroshadbeen
accepted,ratherthanits"postponementi n,two ofthese variant^' ^h^s isanotherexample
ofthe persistent attempt in the HungarianMernoriai to try tu estabIish Czechoslovakia's
acqrriescenceithe uRrIaterdterminationbyHungay of theNagymarossecfionof the Pruject.
Zt isof no avd. Both before and&er the governmentalchangesin Czechoslovakiat ,he
Czechoslovak Governent refused to considertheterminatioofNagymaros inthe absence of
furthersîudies showingthat heretofore unperceivedrisksexistedthatwould wmant such
action.Hungarynevershowedthe sIighteinterestinpursuingsuch stirdies.
5.78 This formal offerof Czechoslovakia,andthe discussionsprecedingit,
bring out anessentialpoint- theeventualapprovalandcommencementof work on Variant
"CH wereprovisional,unlikeHungary'psrecedingdefinitivacts. At thetimeofthemeetingof
15July 1991,CzechasIovakiahadstarted nomorerhm pIarining-diesonVariant "C", soif
issenselessfor Hungaryto accusethe CzechosIovak Goverment ofhavingbeen "unwiIIingtu
suspend work" on Variant"c"' .~~
5.79 TheHungarianMernorian lonetheles Statethatit was informeda few
weeksafterthemeeting that consfructionworkonVariant"Cuhaddready commenced.But
'2~ ThisisafurtheindicatiofHungafy'snowledgofthedetaioftheVariantunderstudy.
12' HungarjanMernoria,ara3.135.
12' Ibidm. 3.137.nosuchwork hadcommenced. The protestin Hungary'sletterof24 July 1991,reliedonin
supportof this contention,could only have concernedthe conservationmesures takenin
accordancewith the Projecttu fiIlpartiallytheheadwatercanal,whichbegan on 27 July and
was not apart ofVariant "Cuat dl,as Hungq weII kriew,ha* been spec5calIyinfurmed
inadvanc of thi~~tration'~~.Ttwas innoway whatHungq mw cdlsa "firrtherunilaterd
stepHLZ9 I. factas wiiibe shownindetailbeIow, thefirc stnstnictionworkunder Variant
"C" did not beginuntil November 1991, foiiowingthe thirdyear in which Hungaryhad
preventedthedamming of the~anube'~'.
5.80 On 30 July 1991, the Slovak Prime Ministerinformed the Prime
Ministeraf Hungarythat both the SIovakGovernent and the Czech and SIovak FederaI
Governent hadfinallyreachedthe decision "tocontinuework so as to putthe GabEkovo
system of locks into operationon the basisof a provisionalsolutionon theterritoryof
[~zechoslovakia] H"ow~ever,whatwasapproved was onlyinitialfinancingandplanning
for Variant"C" - noconstruction workhadbeenauthorisedl". Thus, Czechodovakiahad
waited for ovehv~ years sinceHungary'sinitialunilaterd decisiontu preventthe dammingai
the Danube before taking this decision, andit was takenonly dier it hecame clethat its
initiatiat the15 Julymeeting -to subrnithealternativeariantsto atrilatercornmitteefor
In its Memoriai,para.3.141, Husaysthaina lettdated9August 1991 HungariaMinisfer
MM had"expressedoutrageatCzechoslova kiciisn"tocontinwork on"Variant"Cm.Once
againHungar is irnplyingttheoperatiotofdipartialthebypascanalwascarriedoutunder
Varian"CM. Thisis nosoasWster MM andother Hungarianofficiwaiewell aware,having
visitethesite in summerof 1991.Sec .ara5.68,almve. inthe SpeciAgreement(Article
2(I)@))H,mgarycrin&& ttiaCzechosIovakiaidnotprd withVariant"Cu mtil November
1991.
"' Ctach~slovaRewlutionso23 and25aJuiy1991.Hrrngaryt'rsanslacftkismentheSof30 JuIy
1991 is faulandtendsonce againtogivethe mng impresçiothat thdecisioinvolve hd
continuatiof workontheprovisionlolutionCornuare, ungananMernoria, ol4, Annex56
and SlovaMemoriai,Annex 93:Hungarianîranslation:"thedecis..to continueworkon the
Gabcikovopowerplantas aprovisiod solutioSlovaktranslation:"thedecis..tocontinue
worksoastoputtheGabcikovosysteofld intoperatioonthebasisoaprovisiodsolution".
132 a para5.67, aimyeReçaIutiNo. 484 date25 Jdy 1991oflisezechosIovaGovernent fi)
approvegoingahd with the"invesimentndsupplpreparationorpuningtheGabcikovo&on
inm operationunderthproviçiowimlulios(ii) dleforthe c~ntinuatiof negritiatiwith
Hmgq, and(iii) imaed tbat Hungq k infornidthat CmhosIovaki"insison theoriginal
technicsolutioinaccordan withtheIloinContra& Plan]inforcefortIGN Project]". The
CommissionfortheEnvironment,herelevanauthorit.otlowina detailstudy.It impose19k
conditio onsthe Slovakorganisationchargwithcanyingout Variant"Cm. Sec.Hungarian
Memoriai,Vol. 4,Annex 168. On 3 October1991,the CïxchoslwakParliamentapprovethe
Governent positiosetoui in ResolutNo.484 andestabliçhguidelinetobefoilowedin the
continriingnegotiawithHungary.HungarianMernoriai,VoI.Anna 169.examinationandin thiway toopenupthe question ofprovisiond rneasurestu negotiation
withthe participatoftheEC -hadben rejectedbyHungary.
5.81 Bothbeforeand der this30JuIyletter,therwasa flurryofactivity,
includingthefoiiowing:
- A Joint Press Release of 15 Juiy 1391 conceming the 15 Juiy
negutiations;3
- A second letterof30 July199 1fiomthe Slova k rimeMinisterto
HungarianMinisterMadl infomiinghimthatCzechodovakia proposed
that the proposedtriIatercornmitteeshouIdexaminethe original
technicalsoIutiofthe GlN Projecas setout itheJoint Contractual
Pi- givingspeciattentiontecologicalprob~ems';4
- A HungariN ana Verbal oef30July1991 protestingthe operatito
fil partiathebypasscanalandrequestingthatCzechoslovakihdt dl
work undenva untheG/N System13 'andfinalIy,
- A CzechosIovak Not e erbaleof 27 August 1991 respondingto
Hungaq's 30 Julyote'~~.
5.82 ThislastNote Verbale(of27 August},whichthe WungarianMernorial
annexesbut otherwiseignores,deservesparticulsattentforit showsthatCzechosIovakia
didnot mshinîo startitoconstnrctVariant"Cu.ThisNotemakesthe foIIowingpoints:
-
At the 22 Apriland 15 Julymeeting so "constructivconclusions"
werereached,inpartbecausethe Hungariandelegationhadonly a
"limitemandate"13;'
"' HungariaMernorialol.4Anna 53.ThereleasebringsoutthelimitedmaoftheHungarian
delegatiand theconditiHungaryimposedon theestablishmentofammittee (whicit
theconditoosumensioofdl worontheProiectvCzechoslovakia.ornmittwassubiecto
1'4 m., Annex55.
135 M.. Annex57.
36 SIovakMernori,nnex96.
13' See.para.5.66,~ve;see.also.~.I33,above. "...guidedby the efforts to minimizedamage caused by the
unilaterl oursoef the Hungarianside, approvedinvestments
andsupplieswithithepreparationfur putthgintooperatiothe
GabEfkovosystemofIucks on thebasisofa provisionalsoIution
antheterritoryo[~zechoslovak ia]~~~
Thisbroughtoutclearlythefact thatthedecisionreachedbyCzechoslovakia concernedody
financiaandlogisticalplanniand was entirelyreversible.
-
The explainethereasons forthefiIIinofthe bypasscanal:soas
to protect the headwatercanal,a stepthat had been scheduIed for
December1 989butpreventedbyHungary;
The decision regarding the "provisiololiitionwas no obstacleto
further negotiationsifHungary should preserit "specific technical
solutionsonthe basisof thevdid Treaty of977 andits reIated treaty
documents"conceniingthe GabEikovosection, Czechosiovakia was
preparedto proceedwithanysubsequentlyagresd method of resolution.
5.83 Two things standout fiom tks Note Verbale. & the decisionof
CzechoslovakiaconcemingVariant "Cmhad sofarody concernai preparatory easures-such
as its financingandmangementsfortransportationofmaterialsunCzechodovak territory-
and no decisionasto constructionworkhad yet beentaken. Second, inspite of Hungary's
unilateralprevention of the constructionof the Nagymaros section of the Project,
CzechosIovakiaremained fullyprepareto negotiatwiîh Hungart yhedetailsofhuw toput
the GabEfkovosectionintooperation.
F. For the Third Year In a Row Hun~aw Preventsthe Dammin9 of
the Danube [October 1991)
5.84 There was, ofcourse,a more immediateobjective for Hungary during
the summerandautumn of1991,otherthanrnereIjfuttingastop tuanyprovisionalsolution.
For once again, the shortperiinthe Iat rtttrmrwhen theDanube could be dammedwas
fast approaching.But, becausenoconstmctionhadbegun onVariant"Cn, Hungary stillhad
the upper hand: the only possibledarnmingoperationwas near to Dunakilitiata joint
CzechosIovak-Hungaria pnarof theDanubea, ndtheweirto beoperatedwasto beentirelyon
13' SeeHungariaMernoriaVi, 4,hnex SI,foraçornewhadtiffetranslationinto EngIish,whîch
rra&in parias foIIow"apprd preparaiioforinvwent and transpointhe territoof
[Cz~chodovakif]rthpurposeofkginning temporaoperatiooftheGabEücov oydrwlectric
plant.",Hungarian territoq.Itwas here thatHurigq hadabandoned work in mid-1989 and had
canceIIedl contractinJune 1990.
5.85 At the timeof what Hungary has calledthe thirdintergovemmental
meeting, whichtookplace on 2December 1991,Hungaryhad succeeded inputtkg oE the
damming of the Danubefor thethiryar inarow. Tiiibsoughttu a hdt thework on the
GabEkovosection oftheProjectforwhich CzechosIovakia asresponsibleL3In anticipation
of the meetingt,e SlovakPrime Ministerhad written to HungariaMinisterMadl on 21
October1991 strtssinhowimportan it wasfortheHungarian delegatioto haveabroader
mandate thanithadbeen givenintheearEermeetingsofApd and~uly'~. As heexp1aine-idn
the letter:
"...apreconditionofsuccessfunegotiationsis thewideniofthemandate of
the Hungariandelegationin sucha way that the Hungaria delegationmay
negotiateregardingal1thealternativconcerningthe completionof th[GM
Project.lm
He aiso queriedwhether it was contemplafedthatthe expecornmitteewmld includeEC
participants;anhe noted thatHungary had failedto foIIowupthe 15 Iulymeeting by
submittingits Projectvariantstbe consideredby such a groupin orderto resolvethe
problemsunder theProject.TheHungarian responseof 7 November1991 tothisletterMed
toanswereitherquestion'41.
5.86 The 2 December meeting didarriveatan agreement in principltu
appointa Join txpertCommitteeandto acceptCzechoslovakia' psroposalthattherebe the
participatioof EC experts. But to this agreementHungary interposeda conditionthat
blocked even theappointment of theCommittee, letalone its operation. Hungarygave
Czechoslovakiaa IO-dayultimatum:the appointmeof theConmittee couidbemade,andits
workbeguq ody if withinthat periodCzechoslovaageedtu stopdl workonputringthe
GabCikovo sectionoftheProjectint operationuntiJune 1992'~~ A.sthe HungarianPrime
Ministerexpressedthisconditiinhisletterof 1December 1991,Czechoslovakiamust:
139
The EnvironmentaiornmittesftheCzechos1ovand theHungarian Pariiamhadsissu& a
Joink1don onII Oaober1991ding forthappointmentfan experammitteeto çarry
farwarthenegotîarims,andtwsastheprincippuestiotobead&& atthemeting of2
ofc2Dexmkr911991,but,onŒagaintheHungariaMemariagivesanammt-rofwhatîtranspirai
citia documenthatasnotbeeannexaiorfiledwithtCourt.
Id2
SeeSIovaMk ernoria, nne99,a Iettdatd 18 Dexmkr 1941 inwhichtheSIovak Prime
Mirristerretthe2 Decernkmeeting. "...refrainfrornworkwhichiinconsistenwiththe11977 Treaty]and which(in
contraventionofInternationalLawaimn ataunilaterddecision4.it
5.87 TheHungarian Memoria lefendsthepositiontakenbyHungaryon the
basithat:
"..ifCzechosIovakiacontinueditwork towards the implementatioofVairant
''Cltt,hCornmittee's orkwwId be meaningless'"."
But thisargumentis withoutsubstance;such acornmitmen ty Czechoslovakiawould have
hadno effecton theCornmittee'wsork,one way or another. The Cornmittee's orkwas to
havebeen compIetedby the endofJune 1992. Andthe CzechosIovakPime Minister pIedged
in his8 DecemberIetter notu "cq outanjlworkinthe riverbedof the Danubeup toJuIy
1992"14' .heaudacityof presentingsuchan ultimatum, asif the successionof HungaIian
unilaterlctspreventing,interalia,the dammingof the Danubeforthreeyearsin arowhad
nevertakenplace,is stunriing.
5.88 AIthough CzechosIovakihaad startethefirst constructiwork under
Variant"C" in November 1991, preparatorto narrowingthe size of the reservoiitwas
l camed out solelyonCzechoslovak territorand involvedonly its funds.Thisworkhad no
practicd eEect whatsoeveon thefiow ofthe riverand,likeal1theother workto the end of
June 1992,it ino wayprejudiced anyfindingsthat thCornmitteemight make by theend of
June 1992 or anydecisionsofthe Treatypartiebased onsuchfindings. Atworst, it might
ultimatelhaveresultedinawaste ofmoney and workby~zechoslovakia'~ .
5.89 The Hungarian Memoird seems to hpiy thatcontinuing work on
Variant"C" inalimitedway wodd have had a psychoIogicaeffecon the Cornmitteeand the
HungarianPrime Ministefsletterof 19December1991 assertedthat:
i
"...[thePartiesshouIdbeopentu the concIusians of the experts,instead of
puttingirnproperpressureuponthembyacceleratingtheworkand implyhg the
'43
HungarianMemorial,ol.4, Anna 70.
144 m., Vol. 1pam 3.144.inhis19 Decemkr letter,tHungariaPrimeMrnistersugestethat
mch a crinditwodd"aid theeqiranimiofthejoinrrçearchxwriinglasortofpychoçhoIogiml
argument.
145 SlovakMemorial,nnex99 (ap.274-emphasiadded).
'46
Even tcdathswsorkperformeinNovember1991tonarrowthereservodoesnotexcludareturn
ta thoriginProject. irreversibilyftheconstruction1."
But therewas no such acceleratioof workandno irreversiblceonstruction. Further,if the
notionis tube acceptaithatthe Cornmittee wouldhave been under"improperpressure" if
workcontinued onVariant"CH,it is nu Iesstrue thatit wasunder evengreate arndmore
improperpressure inthelightofHungary'usnilateraictionstohaltaiiworkand itsrefusalto
acceptanythingotherthanthe end oftheProjectandthe teminationoftheTraty.
5.90 CzechosIovaki naaturallrefusaiHungary'sIO-dayultimatum. On 12
Decernber 1991,the CzechosIovak Governent decided"to putthe GabEkovo part [ofthe
Project] into operation and to complete its construction on the temitory of
[~zechoslovakia]"'". But thisdecision did not meanthatCzechoslovakiawas no longer
"open to the conclusionsofthe experts"of a ftilatercornmittee. This isclearhm the
Czechoslovak PrimeMiriister'etteraf18 DecernberI991 '49.
5.91 As Hungary's Memorial points out, this letter expressed
Czechoslovakia'sintentionto put Gabèkovo into operation- but only "to preservethe
substanceandgoalsofthe interstate Treatyof1977""'. Mureuver,it containedthree other
elementsof importarice. Firs itcontainedthe undertakingjustmentiuneci,toreeain hm
workon the Danube'sriverbed untilJuly 1992'~'.Second i,added the cornmitment "to
participatin the formulatingofa conceptfor ..solvingpossibleecologicalproblems" on
CzechosIovak oron Hungarianterritory.Thirdas the letterexplaithe roleofthe trilaterd
commission wouldbe tu :
"..consider and evaluate aItemate solutions and scientific and technical
questionsconcemin tge[GM Project]whichwillbe presentedbytheHeadsof
government delegationsbeforeDecember 31,1991lS2."
14'
HiingaianMernoriaVol.4Annex 70.
Hungay.tSIovakMcmorid,Annex102.e Cz~zhosIo vakmaMiniste10 thePrimeMînisterof
149 m., Annex99.
150 -bid.
151 Para 3.14oftheHungarianMernoid wrongldescrikstheoffeashaving beenmadeody mtiI
JuneratherthaJdy1992.
Is2
SlovakMemorial,Anne99.Emphasisadded.! Inthelightof these considerationtis difficto seehow Czechodovakiacould possiblybe
accused -as itwas byHungary - of havingrendered"theestablishmentndaimof thejoint
specialiscommitteeimpoçsi~e"'53.
5.92 The Hungarian Mernoria sidestepsthis evidence of Czechoslovakia's
flexibilitInstead,it emphasisethereferenceinthe18 December letterto Czechoslovakia's
righttobe compensated fordamages"resultingfrom a failure,bytheHungarianside,tofulfïi
theobligationsunder theinterstateTreatyTtis allegedthatthiwas interpretebyHungary
tumem that the CzechoslovakGuv~tnt "noIonger considerd the completion ofthe
works atNagparos as a reqrrirernentHfi4tis nothard to see thatthisisjust another
illustratioof the Hungaria Mnernoriah obsessionwith tryingto establiaha degree of
acquiescenco en Czechoslovakia's part. But this was anything but a waiver of
Czechoslovakia'slaimsconcerningNagymaros. Theletter statetheexistenceof abreach in
1 the cIearespossibletems andsimplypoints tu a possibIeremedy. Firrther, at the time
Hungary interpretedthis statement asanacquiescence,asits Mernorialcontends,suchan
important concessionbyCzechoslovakiawouIdcertaidy havebeen prominentlymentionedin
Hungary's 1992 Declaration. But in the Declarationo hint can be foundof any such
interpretatieven thoughthe18Decemberletteritselfisreferredto therel.s
G. HunearvPreparestu Announce its Pumorted Termination ofthe
1977 Treatv[Decernber 1991 -May 1992)
5.93 Zn a very short letter o23December 1991 to the Slovak Prime
Minister,theheadoftheHungarian delegation,Mr. Madl,bluntlyputanendto thepossibility
of appointina trilatercornmitteeofexperts'56.In the negotiationduringthe course of
1991,Hungaryhad oEerednothing to Czechoslovakiexceptan ultimatumthatwas certaito
ensur teefdure tu appointa trilatercornmittee.Hungary'aprofessedwillingnesat the 2
December meetingto appoint such a committee, which seemed to suggest a broader
negotiatinmandate thanjustseekingthe terminatioof the 1977 Treaty,turneout to bea
sharn.
15' lettero23December 1991 fromthe HungarianMinisteMr.MMi, to the SlovakPrime
Minister.HungaziMemoria lol.4,Annex71.
ISS Sec .nthisegarpam 5.50, m.,h~e.
156
HungananMernorial, ol4,Annex71.Theconuastingpositioof thiwoGovemmcntsas 1991
l cametoan endaredsed inthSlova k emoria, ar4.75. 5.94 NonetheIess,CzechosIovakicaontinuaitodemonstrateitswiIIingnestso
meet headon Hungay's expressedenvironmentalconcernsoverthe implementation of the
GabCkovosection of theProject. The Czechoslovak Prime Minister'fetteof 23 January
1992again urged theappointmen tfthetrilateralornmitteand gavethefollowingexpanded
undertaking:
"Providedthese concIusions[othe Cornmittee]andresuItsof monitori heg
test operationofthe GabEkovo part coh thatnegativeecologicaleffects
exceedits bene6tslSthe Czechoslovaksideis preparedto stopworkon the
provisional soIutionand continue the construction [only]upon mutual
agreement15.II
CzechosIovakia'sposition could not have been cleater or more cooperative. The
irnplementationofGabCkovo was to be madesubiect to an independentassDssrnentofthe
ecological effects. It cannot bargued that Czechoslovakiawas not fully "opento the
conclusionsoftheexperts".
5.95 Butthe offewasrejectedbyHungaryf anditsMernorialnowoffersthis
interpretationotheletterof23January1992:
"Inotherwords, Czechoslovakiawas unding to suspendconstructionof
Varian Ctand would putintooperationtheGabEkovoBarrs9uby al1means,
independentlofthework ofth eointExper Ctonmittee .
Thisis a most perversereadingof the letter. Czechoslovakihaddready promisednot to
touch the riverbeduntil&er the Cornmittee'sorkhad beencompleted atthe end ofJune
1992. Thefinaldamming operatiowuId nothavebeen undertakenforanotherfour months
aflerthatdatebecause ofhydrologicd conditi~ns'~. CzechoslovakialundertakingshouId
havebeen entireIysafisfactohadHungarybeen negotiatingigood faih.
5.96 At thiscriticalmoment,the President of the CzechoslovakFederal
Assembly,W. DubCeiqaddedhisweightandprestigeto theseeking of ajoint solution.Inhis
letter of 27 January1992 to the Presidenofthe Hungarian NationaiAssembly, he rrrged
furthernegotiationatboththePariiamerrtarand GovemmentdIevels,saying:
15?
TheHungarianmmIationofthephras*ex& itsbenefiissIanteçoastoread"argreattehan
itexpecteprofitHungariaMernoriaVlol.4Annex73.
SlovaMkemoridAnna 102(emphasiadded).
159
HiingaianMernoidpara .151.
1- See,para.5.(seconitem)andb.35,hve; secd.w,SIova kemod, pam 4.02. "Itis myjudgment ...thattheimmediateresumption of negotiationon joint
soItttionsof prubIerelat edthe [GIN Projtctl, without preconditioand
on the estabrislunentof [the] Ioint Commissionwhich wouId invuive
independentexperts,is the ody w162 nu arrive at soIutionsbmefithg oiir
countrieaswell astheenvironment .
5.97 But, the remahhg exchangesbetween the Treaty partiesup to
Hungary'shd announcemeno t itspurportai terminatiof the 1977Treatyon 19May 1992
indicatedthat Hungarjrhado& thedoor tu hrthernegotiationsturesolvethedisputeunder
theTreaty andto theappointmen tfatrilaterlommitteeiS2 .he formalendof negotiatiom
occurred with the HungarianParIiarnent' sesolutionNo. 12/1992 of 24 March 1992
authorisingtheHungarianGuvemmentto terminatethe1977Treatyanddl relateagreements
ifCzechoslovakiadid not canceIdl workon the Projeci "beirdone incontravention[ofthe
Treaty]" by30ApriI1992. It ispreposterous to suggest,as the HungarianMemonal does,
thatbythisResolution"a newdeadline fornegotiationshadbeen setbased on"suspensionof
Variant
5.98 Nonetheless, as is cIear even fiom the Hungkm Memorid,
Czechaslovakiaremained willingtoenterinto negotiation asnd64nparticular,tu estdisar
tdaterai cornmittee.In his letterof 23 Apd 1992'~~ t,e CzechoslovakPrimeMinister
informed hisHungarian counterparthat"the Goverment of theCSFR... isinterestein the
creationof thi trilateracommittee withoittpreconditian "6. Hungq's interpre attion of
thisstatementisinwmprehensible:
"The words 'withoutpreconditions 'eant that Cze167nlovakiawould not
comply eithewiththeHungarian ortheEC conditions .
startiatpara3.152whichtrietojus*ftheHungarianGoverment'spro@HuthartsParliament,
adopa Resolutioncallingtheterminatiof the 1977TreatySec. ungarianMemorial.pam
3.155Furthemore,con- totheimpressiongivbyHungary,approacheotheECweremade by
sides.SecSlova k emoria, ar4.92a se^.
IO3 Hmgarian Mernorim. . 3.157.
t 164
I AstheCzechosIo~akrimeMinisterpinteoutinhisIenerof23 April 199"thefif stiIIt...
untithedammingoftheDanube(..untiOctober31,1992)forresolvidrsputequestionanththe
basisotheagreementfbothsides".SlovakMemoriA,nnex108.
I '65 ibid.
-
'56 @od aHungarianMernorialara3.159.
163 -bid.,para.3.160.This is dearIynonsenseandHungaryrnakesno attempttojustifysucan interpretation.
5.99 Three points must be made. First H,ungary misquotes the
CzechoslovakPrimeMinister, for hisststement continued: "...withont anypreIiminary
preconditions isreadytutake into consideratio[the tdateracornmittee's]oncIusions
and recommendations within firrther decision-makirigconceming the problem of the
constructionof th[G/N ~roject]"'~"Second,therewas nolinkbetweentheHungarian and
the EC conditions. Hungary'sultimatumrelated to Czechoslovakiaceasing work on
Czechosfovaktenitory inrelationtoifsimplementationoftheGabCikov soction.The EC
conditions,containeina IetteofI3 Apd 1992,requiredthat "tacgovernent would not
takeany steps, whiItheConmittee isatwork,whichwouIdprejudicepossibleactions tobe
undertakenonthebais ofthereport'sfindings69.
5.100 Third,it mustbestressedthaCzechoslovakiawas both wiIIingandable
to meet thisEC condition. Hungary'sMemurial negIectstupoint out that attachetuthe
Czechoslovak PrimeMirristw'Iettero23 Apd was adr& invitationto theECrequestinthe
formationofthetrilateriornmittee.Thi snvitation,whichCzechoslovakiwasreadyto sign,
containedthe undertakingthateach sidewould "nottakeany stepswhichcould hinderthe
irnplementationfmeasuresrecommendedby the PC] Cornmittee ofexpertsand joint&
agreedupon". This,in f.,went furtherthan the EC'sconditionas it proviforthe actud
impIementation of the EC recommendations. This reflected Czechoslovakia'seder
commitment, by Ietterof 23January 1992, "tostop work on the provisionaisolutionand
continuethe constmction[only]uponagreement" itheresultsof thetnlateralcommitteeand
testmonitoringshouIdsodemand'" .
5.101 As to the commitment not to "prejudicepossible actionsto be
undertakenon the basiof the reportfindings", zechoslovakicommitteditselfinthedraR
invitationot to dam the Danubebefore 31 October 1992,Ieavingample time for the
Cornmitteetuissueitsfindings1' And the undertakingnottcommence work intheriverbed
before July1992 stiIIheIgood. By contrat,Hungq had resoIved to terminatethe1977
Treaty.This actioncldy prejudicedactionsto betakenunderthereport,whichwas entirely
m., hex 1017.
I?O
Seepara.5.94above.
17'
IfwiIberernemkrethatheEC reporof31 Octobe1992and23Nwemkr 1992werepreparein
amatteofdaysandweks,wpxtively. -139-
I
likelto findthat the1977 Treatyand the GM Project,far from being environmentdy
disastrwq offeredreaecologicalbenefits.
5.102 The decision of the HungarianGovernmentto terminatethe 1977
Treatywas made on 7 May 1992by ResolutionNo. 3190/1992~", albeithatit was to take
eEecton 25 May 1992.It stateduncunditionalin its6rstparagaphthatthe Hurigarian
Government"unilaterdy terminatestheTreatyeffecti25 May1992.
5.103 The Resolution,whichwas not made publicat the time but which
irnmediatelyameto theattentioof the CzechoslovakGovernment,did not offer "onlast
chme for reachinga compromisetu avuid termination", as the Hungaian Memurial
suggests". The ResoIutionpurportai tu terminatthe Treaty but,at the same tirne,it
instnicteMinisterMal to hoIdnegotiationswithoutdeIaywith his wunterpart atthe
intergovernrnentallks,the SlovakPrimeMinister, with the participationof theEC
representativenPrague andBudapest.Thesenegotiationswere tobe directe.soleat:
"...[Czechoslovakia's]cceptanceof a ternporary soIution farsix month
suspensionof work on theC variatioforthe purposeofbeghhg trilaterd
examinationsduringwhichtheparties,onthe bais ofrecommendationm s,ay
rendera decisioninjointagreement ithregartotheInterstatdispute."
TheResolutionstipulatedexpresy1thatifthesenegotiationswerefiu"successful"t,heMr.
Mid1was tu "discIosbyNote Verbale,not Iaterthan20May,Hungary's tennuiafroof the
~reaty"'".
5.104 ItisclearfromtheResolutionwhat therealsituatiwas. Hungary had
purportedtu arminate thTreaty.But thiwsouldnot be"discIosedmmediatelybecausethen
there wouIdbe nohope at al1ofstoppingwork onVariant "Cn. Thus,fumai notzcation tu
Czechoslovakiaof the temination wastobe withheldwhiIethese negotiations(whosetime
limiwas setat20 May, fivedaysbeforethedatethepurportedterminatiownasto takeeffect)
wereunderway,unlesstheyfailedbeforethatthe.
HungariaMernorialol.4Annex157.
m., Vol. 1pam 3.161.Thequotatiohm theResofutiodm notmatchatal1thetexof the
dment faundat Vol4,Annex157(nothex 15,ain.194wronglindicatw). 5.105 It was not exactIa forthright procedure for negotiationsinany
eventtheywereto be directedonly atgettingCzechoslovakiatoagreeto suspendworkon
Variant"Cu forsixmonths- ifthawas agreed,henegotiationwouldbe "successful".hisis
becausea sixmonthdelaywouIdeffectivelybe a delayforafurtherfuUyear;fora six month
suspensionby Czechoslovakiaof Variant"C" would have lasteduntiat Ieas7 November
1992,makingit taoIatetucarr outthe preparatorwork tudam theDanubein 1992.
5.106 The ResolutionlefunstatedwhenCzechoslovakia was to be informed
officiallyof theterminatof theTreaty,butit mustbe presurneitwould havebeenon or
about 25 May,when this partof theResoIutiontuokeEect. Since it was auniIateract,
officialnotificatofnCzechodovakiawas not a prereqirisitetu its effectivenesscIearis
thatthiswas notinthelem a lastchanceoffetoavoidterminationoftheTreaty.Notification
of terminatiowas to be withheldwhileHungaryattempted to succeedin delaying,for the
fourthyear ina row, the damming of the Danube. Hungary obviouslybelievedthatifit
notifiedCzechodovakiaof its 7 May RemIution, this wou1d hardenCzechoslovakia's
detemination to proceed with Variarit "Cu. There is nuthing tu srrggestthat, had
Czechoslovakiaagreed tosucha postponementH, ungarywouldhaverevokedits purported
termination.
5.107 h the event,the Hungarian stratagemfaiIedfor the Czechos~ovak
Goverrimen IearnedimmediateI yftheDeclarationand askedfor,andreceived,acopy of its
text. The SlovakGovernmentrespondedin a Declarationof 11 May 1992"' . But, in
forwardingthisPeclarationto HungariaMinisterMidl, theSlovakPrimeMinisterindicated
his continueddesiretonegotiate,e. He
stated:
"I wouIdIiketo stressrnreadin osdsiscuswithyou apossiblechangein
115 ReçolutiNo.329,SlwakMernorialnna 111. ThisDeciaratshowstbatthinterpretatnet
outaboveiexactlwhattheCzechoslovGovernmentunderstd HungaryDeclaratiof7 May
tomean. -141 -
thedateof damming theDanub eiverbeby theCzecho-Slovak sidelY6"
5.108 Nevertheles, Hungaryevidentlyfelt it had whitneeded tojustiQ the
announcement of itsunilaterdecisionpurportedlytoteminate the 1977 Treaty, madebythe
Hungarian Prime Ministeron19 May 1992. With thiIastactintheseriesof undateraactsof
Hungary t,e storyofconsultationandnegotiationto attempttoresolvethedisputebetween
theTreatypartiesunderthe Treaty ends. What remainsto be dealtwithconcernstheputting
oftheGabEikovosectionofthe Projectintooperationtu whichthe nextChapter now tums.
5.109 However, it is necessartomentionhereone finalevent:the meeting
proposed bythe EC to be heldin Viennaon 18 May, the day beforeHungary's 19 May
ann~üncement'~ . Thiswas to havebeen animportantl,ast-minute,trilaterlttempttofinda
bais for resolvingthedisputebeforitwas too lateBut Hrrngatyfaiietu artendthe meeting.
5.110 TheHungarian Memoial assertsthat Hungary faileto appearbecause
it neverreceivedaninvitation17'.hisis demonstrablyuntme:theECinvitedbothpartiesby
telephone,andthe forthcomingevent waswidelycoveredinthe Hungarian mass-media at the
time. On 16 May, aSatrrrdayt,he HungarianAmbasadorwas irifomed at a meetingat the
CzechoslovakForeignMinistryofthe bruad mandateofCzechoslovakia'd selegationtoattend
theViennameetingon 18 ~ay"~. ThisfinalepisodeagainillustratHungary'u snwillingness
to negotiata settlementofthedisputeexcept on itsown terms -theterminationof the 1977
Treaty. Comingjust one day befbreHungq's plannedannouncement of its purported
temination ofthe Treafy,dready decidedin its MayResoIufion,the Viema meetingmust
have beenseen asan embarrassrnenfor Hiingay.
5.111 The account inthe press of the 15 May meeting statedthat the
CzechosIovakMinistry of Foreign Mairs issued a staternenthat day saying thatat the
176
leneofI1May 1992,Hm- hasinuoducea unïIateraIstatemeMr. Mkiiallegngthat
HungariaMernoriai. ar3.16andVol.4,Annexr158.AccordintotherecoravailabgSle,vakia.
understanthatthe SlovakPrimeMinister,durantelephonconversatiwith Mr. Wdl,
&y, declinedto accepttproposalthatalk isçcheduiedfor13 May;dueto the intervening
holidaon 9and 10May,it wasnotpossiblefhimtomake theneceççaprypamtionsHowever,
in hi1I May Ienejrrst referremnmq toHirn&arylcontentiotheSlova krime Minisrtr
specinca IIvtadMr MadI Iomeetagaintodi- "dithetopid questionswncerningthe
wnshction andoperationothe GM Projea,butinsistithatiwas "inappropriao Iimithe
subjecof thnegotiatiinadvancebysenîn greIiminamnditions*.Inthiletteheindicated
thatthCzechoslovaPlenipoteniyasken giveninstnictitpreparematerîane- fothe
proposetrilat erpelttalks.
177 SeeS. lovMkernoria,ar4.93.
"' HruigariMemonai, para3.17.
179 SecM.amar Hirla~18May 1392reprtinonthi s5May meetingAnnexl3,hereto.forthcoming Vienna meeting "theCzechosIovakside wodd be preparedtu discuss di
questions";and itindicatedthatthe foiiowing day (Sunday a)HungarianGoverment
Communiqué was issued statingHungary'readinesto participain the meetinglgO.The
same press accountgoes on toindicatethattheHungatian Govermerit was unwilIingto
accepttobe borrndbythe resulofthetdateralcommission.
5.112 Theprincipaelventscoveredbythis Chapterareset outinnlus. No.
CM-2,allowing acornparisono bemadebetween Hungws decisions and actionto abandon
theProjectandthoseofCzechoslovaki anregardtuVariant"C".Such acornpairsonconfimis
the condusions reachedinthisChapterandrevds how unrelatedHungary'sunilateraacts
were tuthe decisiuand actionofCzechosIovakiaasto Vairan"C* duringthipseriodupto
Hungary'spurportedterrninatiofthe1977 Treaty. CHRQNOLOGY OFDECISIONS AND ACTIONS
(MAY 1989-MAY 1992)
HUNGARY CZECHOSLOVAKIA HUNGARY CZECHOSLOVAK AI
(Variant"CM) (Variant"C")
1989 13May. Workunilaterally 13-14Feb. DetoilsofVarinntdsiscusseal
suspended at Nagyrnaros meetingofHutzgariaanndCzechoslovak
Academiesa/Sciences
20July. Workunilaterally
suspended atDunakiliti 16 April.Parliament Resolution
expresslylirnitsnegotiatingauthority
21-2a2nd 31 Aug. Posslbiliofprovisional ofGovernment to theobjectiveof
solutionfirst mentioasdarecourses;twdies terminakingtheTreaty
ofalterntiuevriant bsgun
25 july. GovernmentResolutiaapproves
15 July. Rejectionof CzechosIovak startoffinancialandlogistillanningfor
Sept. Hardi report Iaysdown proposal thatalternative Variants ' Variant"C"
strategy for terminationof be submitted toa trilateralcommission
C/N Project
27 Aug. Refusalof Czechosiovak
invitation to submit Hungary'sVariant
27Oct. Nagymarosunilaterally
abandoned proposals toatrilatera!commission
0ct.-Nov. Damrningof Danube art.-Nov, Damrningof Danube unilarerally
unilaterallyprevented prevented forthicd year
Nav. Firstconstuctionbeguntoreduce
1990 10Jan. Negotiationsunilaterally reservoisize-doeçnot affecftlowDanube
halted;Czechoslovakia inforrned
thatalconstruction workon 2 Dec. IO-day ultimatumto 12 Dec. Decisiontoproceedtoput Variant
Projecttobestopped Czechoslovakiato stop al1work "C "initesntiretyitoopertion
on Projectas a pre-conditionof
6 March. Unilateraldecisioto appointment of a trilateral commission
stop foan indefinitperiod
al1Projectconstructionwork and 18 Dec, OjCJ erttoaffect auofDanube
beforeendof/une1992,when proposed
terminateailcontracts trilateraicommissi'5workwas scheduled
toend
End ofJurie, Alcontract.5 23 Dec. Prospectsof appointing a
terminated and Projecteffectively trilateralcommissionabruptlyended
unilateraliyabandoned
5Sept. HutigaricrEnuironmentaMrrlinister 23 Jan.Callsagaiilfornppoz'ntmeotf
briefeondifferenlVariub beingcotisidered trilaternicommissro;xtetzdindertakin-
by Cz~clioslovnkn;lingntbeginsto stridy wiIIstopworkon Vnria~itCuifstudy and
testoperr~tiozbsequetiyconfirmalleged
theseVariants. 7 May. Government Resolutionto nrgativeecologicatlficts
Oct.-Nova Damrningof Danube terminate 1977Treaty
unilaterally preventedfora second year
18 May. Failureby Hungary to
20Dec.GovernrnentResolutionto attendtrilatera! meeting with
startego tiationsto terminate ECin Brussels
1977Treaty
19 May. Annauncernent of purported
termination of1977Treaty
I
ipeciaprepamdfoprpsentatotheXntemaiianalcolustice. ILLUSTRATION NO. CM-2CHAPTER VI. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TREATY: TELE PUTTING
G/N PROJECTTHROUGHVARIANT "C"
SECTION 1. Introduction;Variant "C" Onk Began tu AfTectthe Flow of the
DanubeFiveMonths AfterHun~arv'sTerminationNotice
6.01
ThisChapter tums tutheeventsfdowing Hungary's seriesofbreachez
of the 1977 Treaty,andits purported terminationof theTreaty,up untiithe startof the
damrning oftheDanube on 24 October 1992.
6.02 The 19 May 1992 letter ofthe Prime MinisterofHungary,one ofthe
group ofdocuments on that day announcingand attempting tujustify Hungary'snotice of
termination othe Treaty,bIamedthis actionprincipallon CzechosIovakiaissupposed "fait
aecornpIiduringthe negutiations"by coritinuirigwork on Variant "c" ' Similarly, the
Hungarian Memord contends that this was "the main reaçonfor temirnating the 1977
~reat~"~. In so doing, Hungary paradoxicallyturns the sole means availabieto
Czechoslovaki to implement the1977 Treatyinto anexcuse forits purporteterminationof
theTreaty.
6.03 But surelyVariant"Cu isnot tubIame for thiattempt by Hungary to
terminatethe Treaty any more than it could have pruvided a reasonablejustificatifor
Hungary's serieof uniIateractsculminatii ntge 19Mayannouncement. As has justbbeen
shownin ChapterV, andbythe ChronoIogica lablefattheendof thatChapter),iongbeforea
decisionhadbeentaken toproceedwithVariant "C" - on 25 July 1991 -al1of Hungary's
unilateral ctsinbreacof theTreatyhadalready occurred.AndtheinitialapprovalofVariant
"CH on 25 July1991 was directedto financinandlogisticsasHungar y as informedon30
The remai~ng evencoverein Chapte3of thHungarianMernoriauptomly 1994,eoncera
numberof subjectsddt witelsewhereith1Counter-MernoriaA.lthougSlwakia hasmany
enterageneradenialherastothimsateria,nakingicleathatitfailuto addreçaparticular
argumenotrcontentiora particuiactorpieceofallegedevidendoesnotconnoteSlovakia's
acceptan-eitwifocu sttentionneonVarian"CM ,incethforrnpartothestorofHungary's
breacheofthe1977TreatwhichforceCzechoslovakintotakingprovisiomeasures.
Sinc ewigarJrcantentionsrepdinVarian"C"arespreadwideIythrougatherChapte-se&
-bidpara s.73,6.7and6.81;Ixge portiofChaprer7;para8s.11and%.Idandlargeportions
ofChapter9and10 -beywiIIk dealtwittogethhere,JuIyand againon27 August1991 . The decisiontuimpIementVariant "C" hadnot yet been
taken,andtheIimitedactionsthathad beentakew nereobviouslyreversible.
6.04 ChapterY also demonstratesthatpreparatoryonstructionworkonthe
GabEkovo sectionhad notbeenstartedbeforeNovember1991. As discusseéthere,thiswork
innoway affectetheflow of theDanube,norindeedwith theimplementation ofthe Treaty
project4; anon 18December 1991,Czechoslovaki afferednotto proceedwithany work on
theriverbedof theDanubeuntilJuly 1992, &er thescheduled completionof the propos4
trilatercornmittee'swork - anunderiaking that CzechosIovaki adarged on 23 January
1992' .
6.05 Throughout the HungaitanMernorialthese facts are incorrectly
reported,givingtheerroneousimpression thatconstructiowork under Variant "C"began in
Aprîl 1991andthatthe decisioto proceedwithVariant "Cn hadbeen takenalmost 10years
earliep.As Czechoslovakia made clearduringtheexchanges and themeetingsof 1991-1992
(and aswaswellknown byal1 theHungatimscientistsandengineers),it was only when the
actrradammingofthe Danube began thatany red eEecton the flow ofthe Danubewould
occur. Thiswuuldhave been sohadthe damming takenplaceai DnnakiIias envisagedunder
theTreaty.
6.06 The ddg work actuaiiycornmenced on 24 October 1992, after
threeyears'delayin thisoperatiancausedby Hungary's unilateralcts.This was morethan
five monthsafterHungaryannounced its purportetenninatioof the 1977 Treaty,which it
then blamed - andnow continues tu blme - on Variant "CH. But inMay 1992, the
implementationofVariant "C" hadnot yet startetu haveany impactonHungarian territor-,
andin anyevent rernained HadHungary agreedat the time, inlieu ofadopting
itstermination resolutioturesume its TreatyobIigationa,provisionalsolution would have
beenunn tcessa ry
4
Sec .ara5.88above.
5
See,pans5.90-5.9and5.94,above.
5 Sec .oexampIe,Hrrngarin ernoria,aras7.64-7.andpas. 8.15and9.40. Atpara7.119,
Hungaq wrongilassertht "the kisiontodiverthadkenenvisaguand preparewen kfore
1989,aIeasatmly as 1982"% inthiregard,puas. 4.154.16, above.
7 ThatVarian"C" wasnotthereatreasafoHungaqlsde~isiototerminateiMer evidenceby
thefactthauptotheveryend,Varian"Cmwaspubliclyreferto asa"papetiger"bHungarian
officiaiThe HungarianpeoplwerenottoIdLhatVariant"Cwas considerdbythe Hungarian
Govemment tobesocritithatitsimplementatnooulIeadtoterminatioftheTreat-ratheit
level,Varia"Cawasawnvenientexplanatiforatenninationdeciaireadtaken.international SEtX10N 2. The Availabilitv to Huneam of Adequate Information Conceming
Variant "C"
6.07 Both Memonais provideevidence thatthe Hungarîan Governent was
weII infomd concerning the essentiai elementsof Variant "C" long befure Hungds
terminationannouncemeno tf 19May 1992, let alonebeforethestartof the dammingof the
Danubeon 24 October1992'. Onlywhenthedisputehad entere idspost-negotiatiophase,
followingHungary'sactions of 19 May 1992, didHungarymake anissue over the alleged
absence ofinformationconceming Variant "c" . The daternent inthe Hungarian Memord
that "Czechoslovaki ..persistentirefused tu crimmuriicataeppropriatetechnicd data" on
Variant"c"" is showntu beuntme by theevidence.
6.08 FortheHungarian Governmen tadbeen kept informedof Variant"C"
and was wellaware of its essentidetailsandCzechoslovakia was ready to give fulldetails
concerning dI vatianîsunder stiidytu the trilatercornmitteeproposed by CzechosIovakia
during the1991 negotiations,asthe evidencediscussedabove inChapterY shows1 '. Inthis
regard, itshould be noted that&er Hungws uniIaterdnotice of terminationof the 7977
Treaty, the HungarianGoverninentalso acted officidlyto abolishthe post of Hungarian
8
Sm, e-g.para.5.68aime. whereit ishow îhatas eadyas5 September1990,theHungarian
Environmental inisthad ken givena fulbriefinandthatevenbeforethen,in Jdy1990,the
HungarianGovernmenthaddirect tedtthaiternativariantbeingconsiderebyCzechoslovakia
beevaluateddurithefoiiowinsixrnonths.
9 ShortIyfieking nutineof~hoslavakia's derisioofIZDecernkr 1991toprd withpuîiîng
Variant"C" into operatifieHungarïaaPrimeMiriistedidstattha iltq had"yetto reive
informationwith regtetheredts andaimscfttiisc0~etionu.Secletterof19Deçemkr 1941;
HungarianMernoriaï,Vd.4, heu 70. But theinforniaiiHungaiy sou@ was intendai by
Czechoslwakiatoixaven tothetrilateralcornmwhoseappointmenHt ungaiyhajustthwarted.
Czechoslwakia'rqonçe tothislettwastourgethatthepreconditiosreventitheappointment
ofthe cornmittbe droppedby Rungaryçoas toallowVariant"C" andotheralternativto ix
examine bythecornmittee.
Io
widenŒcitedinanyaofthespata&rspghssupporfis.staemcnt18-9.4in support.Bulhexisno
See ,ara.5-68andfn. 109,&ver referrintoa pressinlerviewitbMr.Md, theresp~mible
HungarîanMinistefortheProjm atlhtirne.Drrrinibisnterviehementionedhje3 silvisits
madeduringthesummer of1991byhimseifandotherHunganan officiaandinthesame interview
heisquoredasçaying:
".whentheHungarian GovernmenltearnedabouttheVariantit underçtd immediately
[asto1whatwasking prepareandriiuidertmal1step..toprwentmit"(MamargNemi,g
8Ocsakr 1992,Tnre~ewwiihFmnc Mdl, bex 13hereto.)~lerri~otentiuy'~andhadput astop tu alparticipatiointhe Joint OperatingGroup, the key
mechaniçmsestablished tumn theProjectunder the 1977 Treaty. So the normalchannels of
exchange ofinformationatthetechnica evelceased toexist.
6.09 FoflowingHungar$sannouncemeno tf 19 May 1992, therewas rio
constmctivepurpose tu be servedbysupplementintg he adquate Yrfomation ather alre8dy
providedtuHungaq concerningVariant "C" orotherwise avdabIetu it. Hungary'sreqrrests
wereoniyintended toserv ts interas inIitigatiratherthan settiingthesissues,a move
Hungaryinfact commenced on 22 October 1992,withthe 6iing ofHungary'A s pplicatioto
theCourt.
6 1 The Hungarian Mernorialrepas over andover again fdse accusations
concerriingtheprovisioof irifomatioon Variant"Cm -supplementingthesf aIseaccusations
withother misleadingcomments.Thus:
-
"Czechoslovaki .. persistentlrefusedto communica et appropriate
technicadataon Variant ;
- "When the Czecbodovak Guvernment proceeded with Variant C it
GIed ..to transmidetailedinformationforeseenbythe law, let alone
to consultwith the HungarianGovernment and affectecHungarian
residents"";
- "When theCzechoslovak Governent decidcd toorderthe executionof
VariantC, the ody notificationit gato the HungarianGovment
was an announcemer miade by itrepresentativdeuing ..themeeting
ofthe[JointBoundary WatersCornmissio~iin] March 1991"15;
- "Czechoslovakia ws ...uriwillinto communicate the detaiIsof its
unihteraiplans. For exampleatmeetings oftheJoint OperatinGroup,
kI & hnex 14,herem ,HungariaNoleVerbaieafI5September1992infoming Cze~hosIovaaf
HungaSs abiition thepoa Butiti&dent thatlonglxfore,thatisafthappointmenofthe
newHungarianPlenipotentiaollowinthechangein Gwernment inHungaryin May 1990the
HungariaPlenipotentiaqnolongerfulfthefunctiopreviousperformed.% ManvarHlrlaa
9October1991Annex12,hereto.
'' HungarianMemonal,para 7.12(andfn. 12)refeiringihim fo otheparagrap tat neithcr
containnosrefetoevidencto supporthemntention. NordoHun~ deiinewhatwouidhave
tieenmnsider"approprîate".
14
M., para. 7.51.
l5
m., pam 7.64. Butaalma pointedout,Czechoslovakaadmade nomchdecisionathattime.
See.para.6.0,bove. evenaslate asJune 1991,Czechoslovakia stillopposedHungary'swish
for preciseinformationon the technicalcharacteristiof VariantC,
which was alreadybeingbuilt6.
FinaIIy,in Chapte8 oftheHungarianMernorialw , heretheperiodfiom thestartof ddg
ofthe Danube in24 Octuber to 31Dmmber 1992 isdd with, CzechosIovo3U s similarly
accused of refusingto provideHungary - andeven theEC -with "appropriat erifomation
aboutVariant "c"" ,againcitingno evidentiarproof.By thattime thedetailaf Variant"CH
were known to the whole world - but not to Hungary,it is contended in Hungary's
~emorid'~.
6.11 Thisis cleariynatso. Hungary knewal1the technicd detailsthathad
beeninthe originalplan ofthe GM Prujectandwere now, because ofitsowti faiIuretu
perform, tobe putinto operationby means of Variant"CH. It thus had completetechnical
informationon:
- The GabEkovo step(althoughnolonger ableto operateatpeak flow);
I
- Thebypass canal;
- The reservoir(althougitknew thaitsproportionswouldbe smalle ar
ithad tobe limitedtoCzechoslovak tenitorysincethe damrningof the
Danube was forced tumuveupstrearn fiom Dunakiliti;nd
-
The maures forrestoringthesidearms onboth sidesofthe Danube.
6.12 The questionthereforeariseas to whatinformation Hungarylacked.
As to the reservoir,it couwitnessthe construction-and the evidenceshows thatMinister
'' HmgarianMernorial,ara. 7.10.utVarian"Cmwasfarfiom*al& king built*:wen the initiai
appravdofnnarrcingandlogîstîd planhadnotyettieengiveSec .aras5.78-5.8ab%
TnattemptîntosupportheaboveccinknriotheHungarianMernoril aka across-referen~ao
fmtnote thatcontainsthefollowingstaiernent:"yepeatdyrequestthedetaiieddeçfription
ofthemrtrcfiofVariantEat varionegotiaiïonitgoesontosayihatata meetinoftheJoint
providethex descriptio;ut no dmentaqk or otherevidentiarypmf is supbyiHungary,
ody arenvoitothe paragracontainingtheoriginalcontention.It n&rdltobepointeout
tbatheoriginalcontenthasnovalidity.
TheonlyotherexamplegiveninthsamefwtnotconcernrequestsyHungaqin Deamber 1993yo
aidiinvrevarinitMernorial.
18
See.ibid.,Vol.5(pI)h,ex 12,areporiwd inSeptemkr 1992byEquipeCo-u indicating
detaiofVariant"Cubeanngonqudonspowncemingtheenvironment.tagoup hadhn gîvenli~eI
- 148-
Mkdl andother HungarîanoEciaIs divisithe site". Thus Hungarwas hardlyunaware as
tutheexact reduceddimensioo nsthereservuir.With regardtuthe ~iinovo weir,Hungq
dso knewthat thiswouldhave althefunctionsof Dunakilitiandthitwouldbe locatedon
CzechoslovakterritoclosetotheHungarian border.Thi sad beenmade clearearliewhen
Hungaryhad beeninfbrmed oftheseveralvarianunderconsideratioby~ungag. Hence,
itwas ody the exacttechnicadetaiiof the cunovo weirand the precise location the
dammingthat were not apparefiom a walk dongtheHung&an borderorfiom theorighd
GiN Projectdesign. However, the latteinformatio-had been disclosetu the Danube
Commission un5 Aupst 1992p ,riato thestarofthedammin ogperation.'Inaddition,he
evidenceshowsthatinJuly1990,theHungdan Governent ordered a studtyo be conducted
of the differentvariantsbeingconsidby~zechoslovakia~,indicatinthattheyrnusthave
known the detailsof these variants. Andbeforethe dammingoperatiocommenceci,the
brochures appearinathex 37 tu the SIovakMemoriaIwere inwide circriIation. They
containeddetàrlinfurnation aboutVarian"Cn nclrrdinatechnicaldrawinof theCunovo
weir;and these brochuredso describedin detailthediFerenc beeween thisprovisionai
solutionandtheoriginProject.
6.13 Hungaryhad beenofferedthechanceto discussalvariants,including
whatwas eventudIytu beknown asVariant"Cu-but Hgngq repeatedly refuseto proceed
with thappointmentof thetriparticornminsionroposedbyCzechodovakia.The work of
thiscommissionwas tohave been focusedon Variant "Cm,and itwas iritersdthat the
Czechoslovakrepresentativstthatmeetingwoufd furtheaddressthetechnicalaspects. But
Hungar yreventedthismeetingfiom takinplace,thus ensurinthatitdidnot receiveany
informatioaboutVariant"CM thatit feitdidnothave. Later,thethreeEC expertgroups,
assigneto studyCzechoslov&iatasctionsinddng theDanube ,nwhich eachPartyhad a
representative, were provided with very detailedinformation concerriVariant "C*
19
Si, para5.68abve.
20 m.
21 See .lwakMemorial.ara.4.84.
22 See .ara5.68,above.I
l and ireffect?. And theEC nevercompiairredofa Iackofinfornation concerningVanant
"C"
6.14 Quitesimply,Hungaryhasinvented a pointof dispute. Itwas informed
I aboutthetechnicd detds of Variant"Cu. By fiustratinthe appointmentof the proposed
1 trilateralcommission,Hungarydeliberatedepnved itselfof theopportunito participain
I technicd discussioofdi aspectof Variant"Cu nterafiawhichthiswmrnissionwas tu have
S~crrorv 3. The Final Sta~esof Damminn the DanubefStartinv an 24 October
1992)
6.15 The eventsfollowingthetotalcollapseofbilateralnegotiatito settle
the disput- when Hungar announced its purportedtemination of the 1977 Treatyon19
May 1992- were focusedto a largedegreeon theimminentprospectof the dammingof the
Danube atthe end ofOctober. An urgent changeinapproachinits hithertouncompromising
negotiatingtactiwas requireby Hungary tupreventthishappening.Thus,forthe est the,
initsPrime Mirister'sletteof28 September 1992,the HungarianGovernent agreed,in
response tu a propod by the CzechosIovakPrime Miristerof 23 September, tu the
establishment fa tripartiteexpecommission (the third par&beingtheEC) withno pre-
conditionsimposedZ. AlthoughHungary's Memorialquotes fromthis letter,it ignoresthis
keycornmitmen tyHungary'PsrimeMinister:
"1 accept thereforeyourrscornmendatiot nhat the specialistsof our governments
prepare,assoon as possibleajointrequestto be senttotheEuropeanComrnunities
Commission and reach an understanding conceming the mandate of the planned
tnIateraIommittee~ ."
Thisapparentstepforwardled tuameetingbeîweenthe two partieson13 ~dobe?'.
24
See .lovakMemoria, nnex12and20,thereports,respect,fthEC WorkingGroupissueon
23November 1992andoftheEC FactFindingMissionissdn31October1992.Sec.lw,Slovak
Memorial,para4.98.
25 SIovakMernoria,ara4.94and Annexes11and 123.Inthe23 SeptemkrletteCzechoslovakia
urgedpursuingtrilatneg~tiatisathetran stoppith- effortsandammptintonegotiaae
speciaIagreemeforefetheisput10thCortrtInthireg&, thede quwtion Hruigproposed
submirtintnthCourtcan~rned Varia"Cu.& SIovaMernorialp,ar4.854.89.
26
t m., Annex 123.Itwas, howeveirripIiinîhîIem that ytripartcommission'mandate
! wodd lxrestndedtoVariant"CandwmidnotinvolvanexplanafinftheentireGIProjea.
27
recorofthi4seetinandSlovahaknowsofnone.p, am3.11. NeitherParthassubmiffedany 6.16 But thisseemirigflexibilinyHungary'sposition soon pruvd to be
illusory. At the 13 October meeting, as both Parties accept, Hrngary reimposed ia
preconditions tu the appointmentofthe tripartite commissionthat Czechoslovakiamust
suspendat oncedl work on theGabEfkovs oectionoftheProject. CzechosIovakionce again
rejectethiscondition. Idso became evidenthatwhatHungarywasattempting to dowas to
narrow thedisputetothequestionofVariant"CH.
6.17 Justasthe HungarianMemoria lailto mentionthe seeminglypositive
steptowards a resofutioof thedisputetakenin theHungarian Prime Minister'letteof 28
September 1992, soit fds tucommentonthis reversalinposition. However,itdeges that
theCzechoslovakDeputy ForeignMinisterstatedathemeetin tgatthe conditionsestab1ishe.d
ForEC mId nolonger be appliedsince"the work on VariantC hadbeen
cornp~etedU".Tbere isno endenceofSerd tu supportthiscontention, and is diEculttu
beIievethat sucan incorrectstatemenwas made by Czechoslovakia.Work on Variant"Cu
couldby no meanshavebeencomplete,giventhatthefinaloperation to dam theDanube had
not by thenbeen started. Furthermore t was Czechoslovakia'vsiewthat procedimgwith
Variant "Cmdid not confiictwith the conditionsofEC participationand, in particular,
Czechoslovakiainsisted that the EC report'sfindingswould not be prejudicedby so
proceeding30. Czechoslovakiahadgiven a concrete cummitmenttu thi eRect as &y as
January 1992:
"Providai these [the triiaterd co~ssion's] conclusions and resuIts of
monitoringthe testoperationof the GabEfkuvu partcodrrn that negative
ecologicalefFecexceeditsbenefitstheCzechoslovak sideis prepareto stop
work on the provisionalsohtion andcontinue theconstniction[only]upon
mutualagreement3 '"
Furthermore,Variant "Cu hadalwaysbeen regardedbyCzechoslovakia to be a reversible
measure3',preventi neitherthe irnplementationtheEC findingsnuithe completionofthe
Treaiy ProjectSo SIovakiarejectsHungary'sunsupporfedaccuuntofthe meeting.
28
Seepara.5.99,~e.
29 HungariaMemorial,ara3.181.
'O && paras. 5.99-1,above.CzxhoslovakirejccfHedngary'isnferprethatsuchacondition
vilaprerequistofEC participatassetoutinMr.Andriessen'lseofe13April1992,andço
informeHungaryon23April1992.A copofthe23Aprillettwu çentcMr. Andriesseandno
disagreementwitCzechoslova kitrpsetatiwas everreceiv rorntheEC. Sec.Slwak
Memorial,ara4.80.
32
Annex20.fimedbythe EC FactFindingMinion'npn of31 Octobe1r 92.SlovakMernorial, Il) Octaber 22, -TrrlateralmeetinatBmsseIs
(2)Ockabe24-27.199 -Darnrning ofthe Danube
(3)Uctokr 27,199- ArrivaofFaciFindr~rgMission EC
(4October28,f992-First repotoEC
(5)October 27-23, 1-TrilateraI negotiaiioLondon A,greed Minute
Officia1establishment of Fact Finding Mission
(6)October 29,19-2First Meeting of OfficialFact Finding Mission
According to Agreed Minutcs in Gyor
(7)October 31,19-2Report of the Fact Finding Mission
(8)November 9-23,199-Working Group ofIndependent Experts
(9)Novernber25,1992-PeakofFlood
7000
6000
3 5000
--.
"V6
w
4000
Ln
6
3000 Flood crodrng downstream
areanfinundat~on wrir
2000
1000
O ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ , ~ , ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ! ~ , t 1 l ! ~ ~ i ~ I ~ I I ~ I I I I I I I I I ~ ~ ~ I ~ I I ~ I ~ , ~ ~ ~ i ~ I ~ I ~ I I ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
1 1 1 31
Ocfober November December
1982 6.18 Accordmg tothe HungarianMernorial,work on Variant"Cu was
acceleratedthereafter,andit descriactivitiinvolvedinthedammingof theDanube in
suchaway as tosuggestsudden,ianticactivity,mentionhgnimoursof 60 armouvehicles
beingmovedbythe Czechoslovak militato thevidty of thewob3 . Iftherewere such
rurnourosfdtary activity,thwere untrue.Thi sramaticaccountbyHungaryleavesout
the essentfactthat Morder tdam theDanube onIya fewdays intheyearwere available.
Thus, starting24 October19923a veryintensiveeffwas requireto compIetethe work
intime withoutsubsequenrisktothe facilitiesdtohydroIo~caIwamhgs thathad ben
receivedofappruachingfloodmnditions. IilusNo. CM-3 shows graphicalltheevents
occumng duringthemonthsof Octoberthrough Deamberinrelationto the floodthat had
starteand wasto peakon 25 November1992. Czechoslovakiacompletedtheworkin four
days;but the work activitythattook plwas for the largpartwhatwouldhave been
requuedhadthe damming oftheDanub eakenplaceatDunakilitisoriginallyagreedby the
Tr&y partiedthough mademoreurgent bytheapproachingfloodconditions.
6.19 The criticalperiforthe dammingoperationin1992 was duringthe
end ofOctuber.The work ofthetripartite commissintendedtobt appoint& atthe 13
OctobermeetingcouIdhave been cornpIetebythe end of Uctober. Had Hungarynat
preventedthe appointmentof the tripartcommissio tn,which it had initiaI-yand
unconditionai-yagreedon 28 September,the work of thecommissi oould have been
completed before the start of thdamming operationwas technicallynecessary; and
CzechosIovakiamade the firm cornmitmein the Aide-Mémoirtabledat the subsequent
meetin inBruaseIon 22 October,thithe withEC participati-when afinalattempwas
made tureachagreementontheappointmen tfthe commissio-tha:
"...untiI the completioof the work of the Tripartite Commissiori
[Czechuslovakia] ill not diverttheofthe DanubeRiverfiom its present
main riverûe, ndalthemaures whïcharenow underway ontheterritoyof
[Czechoslovakia] ill ensurethatthe whonaturaflow ofthe Danubewiil
passthroughtheoldriverbed."
6.20 TheHungarian Memorial failto mentioor annexthe Aide-Mémoire,
33 HungafianMernori,ar3.182.
34
SlwakMemorial, nne126.and it then confilseit with anotherdocument, Czechoslovakia'sNote Verbale of 21
~ctober" . Thus, Hungw acwunt of what happenedatthe 22 Octubermeefing omitsthe
threekeypoints:fIr Cste.hosIovakiasttempt tureaca compromiseby itscornmitmentnot
todiverttheflowoftheDanubeunfiIthe commission'wsorkhad been cornpIetewas rejected
byHungary; second,Hungaq refirsedtuproceed with the appointmenotf the commission
unlessthesame preconditioithadinsisteonsinc 1e990-to stopaiwork ontheGabEikovo
sectionoftheProject-wasmet byCzechoslovakia a;ndthi rud.garycontinuedtoattempt
to shiftnegotiationsfromconsiderial1works underthe Projecto merelythe questionof
proceediigwithVariant"C".
6.21 Slovakiarejedsthe inaccuraaccountoftheseeventsinthe Hungarian
Memurid, which obscuresHungarfs refusai toconsiderany compromisesolution such as
CzechosIovakiahad advance h,usonce againhstrating the appointment ofa tnpattite
commission. It was inthesecircumstancethat Czechoslovakiproceeded totakethe first
stepunderVariant"C"to alterthflow oftheDanubebydamming theDanube.
SECTION 4. Conclusions
6.22 The facîs recountedinthis Chapter,andinChapter V, leadtu the
foIIowingconcIusionconcemingVariant"C":
-
Czechoslovaki aas preparedtonegotiatethe choicofVariantfor the
GabEkovo sectioofthe Projectinspitof Hungarytsunilaterrefusal
to proceedwith theProjectandhadproposedthatthenegotiations be
undertakenbyatripartitcommission;
-
Hungaryhadampleinformation regardingVariant"CM;
- By blocking the appointment ofthe pruposed tripartite commission,
Hungary rejectedthe opportunityoRered by Czechodovakia tu
negotiateissuesrelatintu Variant"C" ortu oFer some altemative
soIution;
- Untiltheveryend,untilhydrologicaiwarningsmadeanyfurtherdelay
impossiblewithoutlosing anotheryear,Czechoslovakiacontinuedto
35 HungaianMemariaiparas3.184-3.1andVol.4,Amex 101.ne offsrofCzec:hoslovakthe
21-ber Note VerbaietohouptheclosuretheDanuk unri12 Noverncodd nolxmrid
out&use of thhydrologidwarningtha qttirefie damminoperatio, matteofextrerne
urgene. Sec.ara6.18abve postpone the hd ddg of the Danube in order tu reach a
compromise solution, but Hungarjf adamantly insistai on its
preconditiothatd workbe stoppedonthe Gabtkovo sectionbefore
anytripartitenegotiaticouldtakeplace;
- Variant"CM didnotstartohaveanyimpactonHungaIy's interesuntir
theddg operationstartedon 2Octuber1992 - aneventthattook
pIacesixmonths&er Hungarjfsterminationannouncement of 19May
1992 andoverthree yearsafter Hungarbegan ifu nilaterlctionstu
stopworkon theG/N Project.CHAPTERVII. HüNGARY'S ALLEGATIONS AS TU WATER OUALlTY,
ENVIRONMENTAL AM) OTHERRISKS RELATING TU TBE
Grn PROJECT
7.01 Beforeexamining Hungary'vsariousallegationsrelatito risksarising
hm the irnplernerrtatofnthe G/N ~roject',itis importantto focus on one keypoint:
Hungary'sdecisiontu suspen is performanceat Nagyrnaros ust asitsIaterabandonmentof
works and purportedterminationofthe1977 Treatyxwas intiatedbythediçcoveryofnew
researchdata. Nor was either thsecision,or thosethat followed, inspibydanexperrand
scientScre-examinatioonf pre-existidata. AsHungary hasadmitted initsown Memorial,
itsaiiegedconcernaboutwaterquality,environmenta olrotherriskswas accompanied by
Hungarian researchintothepossibleimpacts.Thus, ina reviewof Hungarian studiesrelating
ruthe G/N Project,it werted:
"Between 7989 and the summerof 1992there were no investigationsof
appropriatedetd into the problemsrelatedto the hydropowerschemeand
neithewere jointprojectscarriout2,
7.02 This admission is in directcontradictionto the Hungarian 1992
Declarationwhichpurported to showthat Hungary' dsecisiotu terminatewas basedon rrew
scientiiresearchand analysis.In the iigof thicontradic tiovak,iexamines cloîelin
Section 1belowthe bais on whichHungarfsevocationsofenvironmentalrisk areaIIegedto
have beenfounded, takinginto accountthenewlyadrnittedlack ofdetailedstudy. It wiiibe
shownthat,whereasHungary's breachesof the1977 Treaty caused Czechoslovakiaspecific
and imrnediateharm,the onlyjustificatioadvancedfor such breacheswere unsubstantiated
opinionsofthe possibilityoffirture hm thatevenHungary did not serioudy believein.
1
TheseaIIegatisnreontainedin ChapteofHungq's Mernoriai,nthethn appendicehereto
andinthetwovoIumescf"Scientinc&porttha tnstituteVolume5ofHungaSs annexes.Itis
obviouçn- tode.withthesallegatioasomelength.
2
SecA.pp.3tntheHungariaMemorial,Vol. 1,408.Apps.1-3to thHungariaMemorialappear
tobe studispecialclmyrnissionduringthe preparaof thicasewhich havebeen given a
specistatubybeingappendeto thmaintexofHungary's ernorial.
3 a.d Vol. 4, hex 82(atp.168).Mer dIeging"theiackof investigatthat wodd haken
fundamental drrrthepianninaand earIy #nçtnrctionçaisclaimai:*Inthe rant past,
admirtedIwi& a longtimeIosttheHungarianPartystartetheassessrnenofenvironmenui
conditio.." Asto thfirstctaiW. ChapreIV,above.The mnd ispatentunme as J~OWTI
inpara7.01above.Further,it isshown that dthough Hungary did, in the sumer of 1989, commission an
independentreviewoffheProject andofthemass of scientificdatacoliatbythatdate,it has
wholly ignoredthe findingsof thatreview -the Bechtelreport - both atthe time of its
completionandin its currenMernorial. The only logicalexplanationfor thiis thatthe
Bechtel report did not supportHungarfs claims that the Project is environrnentally
unsustainable4.
7.03 InSeaion 2, SIovakia willexamine the all-iimportantissue ofwater
quaIity-hm the pointofview ofsurface and ground water,the allegedthreatof risksto
drinkingwatersuppliesand, finallytheissueowaterpolution. Hungary'saIIegationof risk
to the environment,griculturendforestrywillbeconsideredin Section3. Theanalysis of
theevidencecarriedoutinthisSectionshowsthatthereisno supportforHungaq's daims that
first Nawarosf and then DrtnakiKti,couldnui be madeoperablbecauseof the threat posed
to theenvrument. Sections4 and 5 wilexamine respectively,heissue osseismicstability
andnavigation.
7.04 lnSection6,Slovakiamrns toHungary'a spproachtothebenefitsof the
Projectintermsof floodprotectionItisnotedthatnotonly doesHungary wholiyignore such
benefits iitsMemonal, but dso ittakesno accountof theProjec rtgion'ssusceptibilityto
floodingandthefact thatone ofthe keyàrms ofthe Prujectas refiectedin Article 13 of the
1977 Treaty, was to ensuresafeandeEectiveflood contrulfur the Ersttirne. Firidlin
Section7,the basisand relevanceofHungary's clairthattheProject was not economicai1y
viablewiIlbeexamined.
SECTION 1. The AbsenceofProaerScientifrcEvidence Su~died Bv Hun~arv
A. Bunearv's SwCaIItd Evidence is an ArnaI~arnof ScientificaIIv
§Y~erficiaand PoliticaIIvOriented Assertion
7.05 Ithasalreadybeen seeninChapter IV abovethatthe mass ofscientific
datacollectedand the studiescarriecout byHungaryprior to 1989 supportedthe overall
validityoftheProjectintermsof itsenvironmentailmpact. Nonetheless,it is nowallegby
Hungaryin its Mernoriaihat"a re-considerationf theProjtct" was Hispirbiythe "well-
docrrmeniedconcerns overthe IikeIyenviromentai impacof theBarrag Sysfemncontained
in the Ecologia repoitof March 1989'. In itr justiiicationits decisiontu suspend
4
Neitherthefact ofthewmrnissioninof thisreportnor thereporitseif, weknown to
Czechoslovakatthtime.
5
Hringariar emuriVol. 1para. 3.7ThireporisrefendIOasthe"Masschusetttsstuy"the
SiovaMkernoriaSecd.so,para. 5.8S., aime. performance,Hungarydso reliesonthe subsequentEcologiareportof May 1989 andthe
Hardireportof Septembe19~9~.
7.06 Thesethree reports shar ecornmo nundamenta llaw:regardlesof
Hungary'scIaimq theywere notscientifrcreportspreparedbyexpert- atIeast insofas
expertiseinthe consideratof environmentaspectsis wncerned. Thisiclear,fir Eom ,
thecontentsof eachreport.Noone is supporteiyscienac data. ThefustEcologiareport
hasonlyone referencandno annexe -sinotherwords,itis anon-scientSpapercomprised
largeIofa serieofassertions.Iissimpiyincorrecttustatthatthisreporicontains"weU-
documentedconcerns',The sameistmeof thesecond Ecolo~areportand the Hardreport.
7.07 Second, aspointedout inChaprerV above, EcoIogiaiseeminglyan
unknownorganisationand thepersonnelidentifias havingdrawnup itsreportshavenot
beenshown tohavea realexpertiseinthe fielof environmentailmpactassessment. The
authorsof the first Ecologia report deçcribedits compiIasian"tremendoüs leaming
experience"'Thi s tantamounttoan acknowledgemen btythe authorsoftheidefi~iencin
thefielofenvironmentastudy.In fact,theI-n authorsidentifinthe reportcompfisea
lawyer,expertinthe fieldofeconomicdevelopmentl,andscapearchitecturandurban and
regional planninand only two persons with credentialsrelating speczcaito the
environmentg Y et,the HungarianMernoriallaimsthatHungws re-consideration of the
ProjectreIiedheavionthe findirigsofthnon-experpup (sufarasscientzc questionof
environmentdimpactwerecuncerned).
7.08 The secondEcologiareportdoesnotevenappearto have aimedatal1at
establishiareliablassessmenotfenvironmentalmpactt:heody sectio ontheenvironment
isanexcerpthm the March report.The newmatenal islargeIinthefom ofan engineering
evaIuatio(that factpraisesthe excellenceof constmctionwonkthe Projecand sections
oneconomicissues and visuaimpact, together wiahproposalforaDanubeBend national
heritage ThereportconcIudeçwith a section entitled"NeededLegal Documents and
EconomicData",whichshowstheapparent focusofthereport:
6 IIungariMernorial,am 3.95.&, al=,parz..29,g ses .vee Intemtsufthe dieged
environmentimpactcfVarian"Cs,Hmgq reli@nrIarly on variausreports pregbyed
environmentl raups:EquîpeCousanduthWorIdWiIdIifeFund(i@dar its Statemoft
December1993)ThesereporarewnsidereiChapteVm, klw.
7
Sec .lovakMernori,ara2.23n.12.
1 8
HungariaMernorialol.5parti), Anne(ap.34). "Inorder to completea quantitativeeconomicevduation ofprogram options,
we need access tothedataonproject costs andben&tspreviouslyrequested
on several occasions. Furthermore,no meaningfullegai anaiysiscan be
perforrnedin the absenceof complete officiacopies of aIirelevanttreaties,
internationalgreements ,ndcontractsi."
Thecompilersofthe reportappearedtuhave had nointerestinevduating scientifidata;their
avowed aims were "to compIetea quantitativeeconomicevalrration "tu carry out a "Iegd
analysis",otto conductanimpartiar leviewof environmenta isues.
7.09 And, itmustbenoted,Hungarydidnot atthetirneattempttojust* its
actionsbythesereports,k., atno stagewerethey madeavaiIabIe tu CzechosIovakia(and ody
tuSIovakia,wiîh Hurigarjl'sMernoria. This issiflcant: ifthe studies had contained
compeIIingscientifrcjustificatiofor srispendingthe worh, it is inconceivabiethat their
findingswould not have been communicated to Czechoslovakia in support of Hungary's
actions. Thisdid not happen, for itwas immediately apparentthatthe reports lacked real
substance.As earlyasMarch1989, aseriesofcommentsprepared by Hurigary' swn National
HydraulicCompany(OWBER) showedthat the firstreporcuntained"misunderstano drings
misinterpretationsandthat its centrd recommendations had dready been taken into
accountl'.
7.10 The Hardi report ismore overtly a documentprepared for entirely
internaipurposes,aithough itpurportstu be "an expertreview conceming the ecuIogical,
environmental,tectinologicai,economic,internationalandlegd issues"of thG/N ~roject".
The stresshereappearstu be on ecoIogicd and environmentalissues;)letthis isswceIy
refiectedinthe makeup ofthe IO mancornmittee thatproduced thereport. Theheadofthe
team, Mr. Hardi,was a professorin politicalsciences. Thcommittee membersincludedthe
then managingdirectorof theHungaianNational BN togetherwithrepresentativesromthe
World Economic ResearchInstitute, the HrrrigarîanUniversityof Economics arid the
'O
HungananMernorial. ol. 5 (PartI), An(ap.133).
11
Hungaryhaschosentoignorethisfact:thinthesamemonth as itpreparatithefirstEootogia
reporwas show byHruigariaxientisatODER 10beseriouslyfiaw-a facthat,it mayaIw
bepresumd, wasconve~entl.pored bytheGovernent ofthetirneSee,SI& Memarial,pam
2.24gtS. An extrachm thid swument preparedbODER fomed Annex 2550 theSIovak
MernorialBmuse theHungarianMernorialaîwholIigntiretkiimgrtantdocument ,t inow
annexedinfuIasAmex 15.
12 HungaianMemonal. Vol. 5(FartI), Anne8. Thecoverpageof theEnglistranslatiof the
reportannexedwnîainsthdescription.internationallaw departmenof Budapest~niversit~l~. Cleariythiswas not a group of
"independenHt ungariascientistas claimedintheHungarian ~ernorial'~.hther,itwas a
seniorporicypup fornecifor the purposeofguidingtheHungarianGovernmentinreaching
politicaldecisionsregardtheGINProject.
7.11 Appendix3 tothe HungarianMemurid Statesthatthe report"didnot
prove,in termsof detaileresearchresults,the magnitudeorprobabiiitof the mentioned
potentiahazard and damages"". A redig of thereport,as annexed in translatiby
Hungary,revds thatit couidnot havebeen furtherhm a scientifstudy. Althoughthe
wholIyunsubstatitiatdnddramaticassertioncontainedinthe reporare offerebyHungary
asa reIiabIerefereninChapterV dits Memurial thereport'principalreoafconcernis the
economic viabilityof tProjec- fiomthepointof view, solelofd un^^'* h.d, Iikethe
two Ecologiareports(andtheODER criticisrn of thefirstEcologiareport),thisreportwas
neverfurnishedtoCzechoslovaki nsupport ofHungary'csontentions.
7.12 Hungary'streatment of the economic viabiIitof the Projeci is
consideredbrie@ inSection7beIow. At thipoint,Slovak oiay notesthateconomicswouId
not occupy acentraiplaceina scientifenvironmenta studyand thatHungaryconsistently
mischaracteristhe=di report.The reportconcludestha"thecomplete cancellatiof the
Nagymaros Projectwouldbecomeeconomicallm y orefavourableinthe longmn". Thiswas
therealbasisforHungary'sdecisiuto abandonNagymaros,commuriicated tuCzechoslovakia
justonemonth aRe he report'c~mpletion'~.
B. 8
Commissioned By Huneaw After Mavf 989
7.13 In spitof the above,inits1992Declaration,Hungaryassertedthat it
hadsuppliedcopiousexpertevidenceofenvironmentdrisk:
l3 Theremaindecomprisstwoengineera,geophysicandtwo biologisOf.thestwobiologiçts,
onewasa mernkroffieDanu& Circleapup that in1989was overtmmter toihe Pmject's
completionThe =nt& ML Vida, wasnaw asking Hd oftheDevent ofGeneticat
BudapestUniversiiy.
l5
HungariaMernoria, pp3,p406. "The Hungarian Party presentednumeruus expert opinions onthe serious
envirorimentdrîsksandirreversibeamages arisingfromthe operationofthe
GabCikovN oagymaroç Barrage~~stern'"
Thisis simplyuntr~e'~ GiventhatHungary hasnow admitted initMemorial thatbetween
1989 andthesummer of1992 ifdd to carrout "investigatiosfappropriateetd kto he
problemçrelatedtothe hydropower schernefiathe questio&ses astu whatstudieswere
completedby Hungary(aparihm thosebrieflyconsideredabove).
7.14 The HungarianMemonal ,nitsAppendii3,centreson andquotesfrom
two assessrnens fthethenexistingstudiespreparedinear1992. The firstwas preparby
an hoc cormnitteofthe Hungaian Academy of Sciencesand the second bytheme
Academy's Cornmitteeof WaterManagementSciences. What is stnkingisthat thetwo
separatecornmitteeaIIegedIcameturadicalldifferertonclusion- accordintu the adhoc
cornmitteethe Projectwouldresultin the pollutionof tZtng Ostrov/Szigetkozaquifer,
whilethe view of thmore obviouslyspecialisComrnitteeof WaterManagementSciences
was whollytothecontrary.
Neither ofthese ssessmeritsfums part of the "numerous expert
7.15
opinions"said tu haveben furnishedtuCzechosIovakia ;or iseithernow annexai to
Hungary'Ms ernorialOnce againalfegedlyscientificreportshaveben keptsecand, intbis
case, it appearsthat Hungary has taken some Gare to hjde the existenceof serious
disagreementsbetweenits differenexpertbodies. This is very importanintems ofan
evdrratioofHungarfsmultipledIegationsofenvirumental risk.
7.16 The same must bt said ofthe independentreport thatHungary
commissionedBechtel EnvironmentaiIncorporatedtopreparein JuIy1989~'. The Bechtel
reportappearstohavebeen thesole scientific.objectiverewortcommissbyHungary der
itssuspensionof works atNagymarosand was presumablycommissionedsothat Hungary
couIdben& &urnanimpartiaalndexpertassessrnentferivironmentalrisks. Yet neither inits
18
m., Vol.4,Anae82 (alp.157).
19
EvenonthefolIowinpagof ifDeclaratioit admirtathat th"niuneroisexpeopinionsn
amornitnomore thanhte"eurnmarieafenvironmenriskm. (ap. 168).
21
HungariaMernoria, pp.3, 409-413.1992 Declarationnorin its Mernoriai doesHungarydiscuss thisreportn, and it wasnever
officiailycommunicated to Czechoslovakia. It seems fair to concludethatHungaryhas
ignoredthe Bechtel report becauitsfindingsdidnotat al1supportthe ailegationsof a threat
of seriousenvironmentdriskon which Hungary publicIybase tsunilaterd decisiontu stop
workonthe Projea.
7.17 The hdings of Bechtelhave already been examined inthe Slovak
~emonal'3. The purposehere issimplyto underlinthefact thatat thedateof the Bechtel
report's issuanceinFebruary 1990, that isjust befurethe Hungarian Prime Ministefs
notificationofthe unilatelecisiontupostponeindefinitelalwork onthe Project (6 March
IWO), the best evidence availabledid not support any such postponement - at lest on
environmenta grounds.
7.18 IftheBechtelreportiscompared , tems ofevidentiaryvalue,withthe
Ecologiastudy ofMarch1989 ,he fullowingmustbenoted: whiIethe Ecologiastudywas not
cornpiledby a teamexpertinthe fielof environmentalassesment, Bechtel,atthetime ofits
report, hadproducedapproxirnately sixty environmentaimpact reports and assessments,a
detded list beingannexetd o its reporta; the Bechtelreportis famore detailedthan the
Ecologia study;and whdetheEcologia studymakes referencto ody one scientificreport,
Bechtelannexes athree-pageEstof itreferencesU.
7.19 Moreover,the brief ofthe compilersofthe BechteIreport was most
specific. Udike theEcoIogiastudieq theBechtel reportwas not concemedwith ecoriomtc~
legaland politicalissues.As statedin its introductiBechtel'sterms of referencewere
limitedto environmentaimpact assessment:
"BechtelhasindependentlyreviewedtheGabEikovo @us) -Namarus (GNB)
Project in terms of poterrtial envirumental impacts, operational
22 The Bechtereporisgiveody akief deren= inlheKungariaMernoriaath. 60 tagam 5.57
andatApp.3,p.407.
23
SlovaMernorial,ua.2.84etsep.
" Annex 16hereto.
"
fiid. FruthtrderofB~htel'senvironmerilalexperwirhspecinreferento IOhydroeIect~ic
projm arealwainrained thrAsnnex. considerations,andcurrentlyplannemitigationrnemuresx."
To thisend, not onlydidBechtelreviewthe previousstudiesofVIZITERV(theHungarian
ConsultancyCompanyfor WaterEngineering) ,utitexamined new dataand analysesfirst
hand - forexample,in relatioto Projectimpactonbiologicalresources:"Thereforea , more
detaiiedimpactandysiswas made forbiologythan thatpruvidtby VIZITERV'' ."
7.20 Put simply, the Bechtel report was a detded, professionaistudy
preparedbyindependens tcientiswhowere expertsintherelevantfieldsIt is afactofmajor
significancein this cathat,bothat the thne of itscornpletioin 1990 andin thecurrent
Hungarian Memorialt ,hisreporthasbeenignorsd byHungaryw , hocornmissioneidt- justas
the criticalcommentof OVIBER onthefirstEcoIogiareportwere ignored20.
7.21 In the Sections thatfullow,Slovakia examinesin greate detail the
allegationsof environmentaiandothernsks made by Hungaryaiongsidethe evidencethatis
offeredinsupport. In doing so,it is harnperebythe fact that, evenfive yearsaiterthe
originalsuspensionofworks at NagymarosH , urigarisnot suEcienf1y sureof its positionin
reIationtu the dIegedamage andrisksassociatedwith theProjectto provideanythingother
than "an interimreport"inits~emori8. As itwill not bt rintii theHungariaCouriter-
MernorialthatSlovakiareceivesthe"more detaiIereporton thescientifissues",theanalysis
belowwiilnecessarilyhaveto beupdateâ ata laterstage.
7.22 The first ofHungaSs claims to be addressedis the dlegationofan
immediatedeterioration of water qualitas a resultof Projsctoperation,for itis on this
allegationthatHungary has placedthegreatestemphasisw, hetherinthe 1992Declaration or
26 SIDvakMemorid,Amex 27(atp.199).Itcontinus:*Our approachtfieenvironmentafew
wasa muitidisciplieEortwhichfrxvs en:
- Definhg signifiant impacassocia iaih theprojectthat-t wduation and
mitigation
- Determininadditionlaselinedatanded fimpacdt efinition
Rwiewingplannexi itigatitoreduŒimpacttoinsignificlevelsotoenhanceproject
- knefits
- Aingtify&&vents of vrhemonitorinprograbyd&finingprmpemtionatinvir~nmenfai
andilionandoperationinditions."
28
Sec .ara.7.0above.
29
Hunganan Memorial. ar5.09. - 163-
I
in it~ernorial~O.Inits consideratiof Slovakia'comrnentsbelow,itwillbe recallethat
the statusof thisectorof the Danube(anditsrelatedecosystemspriorto the damrningin
Octuber 1992 had greatly changedhm that of the original meanderingriverwith its
associatedbranch systernandfloodpla-due,principallyt,uthecmdisationoftheriver&.,
the reinforcementofitbanks anditsisulatiofium the hranchsystemandfloodplain31. As
pointedoutin Slovakia'Memorialt,hecorrectimplementationf theGM Project was toIead
(andthroughthelimitedirnplementationfVaria nCtis leading)ta positiveimprovement
in thisituatioparticulariyrespecttowater quali$2.
A. Hun~am's"GeneraI"Alleeations as toWaterOuaIitv
7.23 Hungaryintroducesthe allegationsin its Memorialrelatinto water
qudity deterioratiowith a seriesof general remarks,which are both confusing and
misleadir~g~~I.nthefir of hese remarks ,reatemphasisis placedonthe Projectregion's
waterreçentes.Such emphasisisnot misplace-thewaterreservesareof greatimportance.
7.24 Butitisimportanttolocatethereservesprecisely,not simplreferto
"the largestbank filtered water resource in Europe", which confuses the ztng
OstrovlSzigetkoaquifeand theBudapestsupplywellsdownstream ofNagymaros.The two
areinno way connected,asisabundmtlycIearfromfilus.No. CM-4appearing atparagaph
7,65below. It isonIythe secondofthese thatistriila bank-filteredresourcwithweUs
Iocateonlya few rnetresawayhm theDanube, and tmly ofimportancetoHungaryin ternis
of drinkiwatersupply.
7.25 Theupstream wellsarewhollydifferentnnaturebecausetheytapwater
inthe aqrtifer,not waterdifiom theriverThey arettiereforeIocateatagreaterdistance
hm the Danube anditstributarisnd tapwaterfrom agreaterdepthas alsoshown byTiius.
No.CM-4. Moreover,the upstreamaquiferis chiefiyexploitaibySlovakia,not Hungaand
its waters are suppltothe inhabitanof Bratislava,notBudapest. Insofaras the Project
couldhave animpacton the two separatesupplies,sucimpactsarewholly differentandare
thereforeconsideredseparatelybeIow.
30
See bid.,paras.5.11and5.31,gt.
l
3z
The 1985Opinion theHungarianAademy ofScienm aIsçame toasimilarcancIuçioSee,
pam 4.30,hve. 7.26 Hungary'ssecondcontentionisthatthwe arenobarragesystemsdar
tofhe GtN System,whichisportrayecaisa uniqueexperimen t Thisis confiising,fjust two
paragraphsIateHungarymakes a referencto "simila~chernes"~~I.nfact,thGB? Projectis
onlyuniqueinsofaras dihydroelectricrojectshaveanindividuaclharacter,respondintothe
width,flowrateand geotogicaconditionsof the riverinquestion. But theconstnrctiof a
bypass canalisquitertsud. The10 FrenchandFranco-Gemmschemes on the Urie areal1
canaischemes,four ofthese beinon theGrandCanald'AI- which is52km Lorii.i twice
theIengthofthe G/N Projectcanal3.
7.27 Inrelationtothiscontention- and alsoin relatiotoHungq's third
contentionthatthe desigofthe Gm Systernisantiquate- itigradudly beingaccepted that
theGM Project has evolvetoprovideappropriatec,ontemporarysoIutionto theedogicd
probiernsarisinfrom waterimpoundmeritU . me otfier olderprojectsonthe Rhina endthe
Danube,thefloodplain andbranch systemof theriveris ~reserveandrestored. Inupstream
projectson theDanube, theriverhasbeencanalised,inevitablyIeadinto thegradua1 drying
up oftheoIdfloodplainandsomelocd deterioration ingroundwater qudifl. But, withthe
GN Project, the bypascanal has beenbuiitoutside of the floodplain (illNo. CM-8
appearing at paragaph 7.86 belowf3'. It has therefore destruyedless of the onginal
environmena tndhas playedakeyrole inthecurrentrevitalisatnothe sidearm .
7.28 As partof theG/N Projectdesign(on both sidesof theDanube)and
equaIIyasput of Variari"C" (su faron the Slovak sideody due tuHung* failurtu
participate), thefloodplissuppliawith eeshwater continuouslyandcan aisobeinundated
hm time tu time. The process of dryingup, therefore,habeen reversed. As discussedin
34
Cornwe,m., paras5.3and5.35.
36 & also H,ungaryexamplerelatitotheimpoundmenoftheMoselle,HungariMernorialp,ara.
5.36.
37 IlluNo.CM-8isbased onMap No. 1totheHungariaMernorialndshowshow thefldplainis
limitby inundatidykw,bnihdrrrithelast centuorrisofwhîchlhebp ad wasbdt.
AgricdturaIland,notfidpIawastakentnbiiîldthebpsd. Iisacceptethathecreation
ofthereservoir meatherernovaof anan- ofcdtivatedfor&. Bu1 suchdefarestatwas
compIeteontiotHungarianandSlovaktenîtow&foreHungmy qnded woks onthe Project.
Momver, thefor& inquestionwodd, inany=nt,havehad iobe remwed asa n v step
towardspreventfloodwaterbackuiuptoBratislava.
38 A furtherMerence dtinghm thediversioofthe-Danuhiswatersbetwetheoldchel and
thebypasscanaiis that morwateris devotetoprotectithe riveecosyskms andlessto
hydroeIectr picitction.Curren,dy 72.5%ofthdishargtatBratislaisd forelectrîcify
prductiun, whiiiss tharrfotherprojeastheDanubeortheRhine.ChapterVIIi below,this centraifahasbeen noted bycriticsof the originalProject. For
example,ina recentarticin New Scientist,FredPearce,authorof"TheDarnmed" (abook
criticalof Iatge dams),reviewedthe latestdevelopmentsin Hungaclaim,"withsupport
hm theWWF andothers"that"GabEfkovo wouIddry out alargforest wedtlanbeside
thisstretcofthe Danubeandeitheremptyorpoliute importantundergroundwater sources
fedbythenverU3'. Mr,Pace notes,however:
"The projectseems tobe havingthe oppositeeffecttothatclaimedby the
WWFas recentlasIastmonth[June 19941.It isrevivinganalmostdesiccated
wetIandand rechargingundergruundwatersnppes."
Ina fu~lowuparticlMr. Pace summarise Hdungary'scatastroptheonesand concluded:
"Yet,the ecologicaldisasthasn'thappened. Theforestisstiliflooded,the
treeshealthirhanforyears,andthewellsmostlycleanandfullw."
Further, thorigindbraided nature othe rivercan now be recreatedby interconnection
between the sidarms andthe oldDanube channel.This was proposedaspari of theGLN
Projectand is currently projecasdpartof the irnplementatiofVariant"C", asis the
additionof riverbemateriaiOnce theseareachieved,the Projecwill havecornecloseto
reproducingtheoriginalloodplaibalanceb., asitwas inthe1950s,not asitwas in1992.
As theEC WorkingGroupreportof 23November1992 explained,the transfeof navigation
intothebrpas canalcreatts"aunique situati...[ijnitiabydtechnicamesures the river
and the floodplacm deyelopmorenaturallya."
7.29 Hungary's contentionisthatthe disadvantao feimpounding
water,such aspotentialeutrophicatiandadverseimpactsonground water, outweigto a
large extent the advantagesIn otherwords, itsuggests,dams are generallynot to be
favoured. But the Courtdl be awarethat hundredsof new damsare commissioned each
year,andthatits roIethiscasecmot be tuweighthe generaladvaragesanddisadvantages
ofwaterimpoundment. Inaddressintheparticulacircumstanceofthiscase,the simplfa&
is thathereino evidencethattheProjectwillhaveadverseimpactsongroun wdaterquality,
eitherimmediatelorinthefuture.
39
New Scienti16Juiy1994AnnexIS.TheDammedis publishbyBodleyHeadLondon 992.
40
17 Septemb1994,Anna 19. See.llusNo.CM-18appeminM gerpara.11.79,
blow. 7.30 Hungary'sfinalgenerai remarkrelatesto the poIIution in the Danube
which,it iargued,wilIinevitabIyIeadaupoIIrrtedreservoThi ssnowconsideredbelow.
B. Surfaceand Ground WaterQuality:
Risksof Eutro~hication and Colmatadon
7.31 Accordhg tuHungw's Memurid :"The organic contenoftheDanube
waterand itsnutrientstatrenderitdt forretention ia re~ervuir.* This wiUno doubt
corneas a shockto Germany andAustria,which have,respectivdy,26 and10 hydrodectric
powerplantsontheDanube, each with itsownre~ervoir'~.
7.32 Hungary's approach tonskassessrnentreveds a Iackof balanceand
scientificappreciation.Moreover,ingiWigthe impressionthat the waterqudity inthe Danube
isunequivocalIy"veq bad", Hungarycontradictthe datagivenby itsown representativto
theEC WorkingGroup ofIndependenEtxperts.The reportof2 November 1993notes:
"The Danube water qualitycan accordinn to Hun~arianclassificationbe
categorizeas 1stclassregardingthe majoriofthecomponents,as2nd class
regarding Ph, orthophosphatenitrateBOD and 3rd class with regardtu
bacteriandsome heaviIydegradablsubstancesuchas e.g.hydrocarbons4.4
Althoughin termsof itsbacterid contentthequalityofwaterinthe Danube has improved
considerablysincethe 1970s- due,inparticularto the constructioof treatmentplantsat
Vienna andBratisIava- thecontentof nutrientremainshigh. This does nut mean thatthe
water qualityibadoverd1and, infact, thEC WorkingGroupreport of2 November1993
noted thattheDanubewater here is"weII-suitefor river bank infiltration"touits high
oxygericontent".
7.33 However, because the water isrichin nutrients, there isaIwaya
42 HungariaMernoriai,ax5.41.
43
SlovaMkernoria,an.2.13.
44
EC WorkingGrouprepoof2 Nwember 1993SlovaMernoriaA,nnexI9 (ernphasdded).
45 ïbid.potentialfor "eutr~phication"a,phenomenon whichHungarytreatsin its Mernorialasifit
was unknown to the Project'sdesignersandas if itvery mentionspelt the doom of the
Dunakiliti-Hdov reservoir. Only in certainconditions does eutrophicationbecome
problematic- thisiswherean excess of nutrientsdevelopsIeading taa jack of dissolved
oxygen inthe waterand tuunfavorirablceonditionforundemater 1%. But theexistenceof
nutrientsinthe waterand the growthof dg= in shalluwsectionsof a reservoirarenot in
themselvesnecessarilharmfu~~~.
7.34 Where nutrientrichwateris retain ina reservoir,theriskofharmful
eutrophicationis potentidfyincreasedby reducedwatevelocityBut thisfactis wellknowq
as arethe means of Iimitinganyhcrd risk:fier dl,the riskof handu1eutrophication
existsatanygiven moment for theGM Projectasitdoes foran)tother dam projecton the
Danube, the Rhine ,r on any other river for thamatter. Thus, eutrophication,Iike
colrnatatio(discusse delow),is aphenomeno thathas beenextensivelystudiedthroughout
the world and in relationto thisparticuProject. It is an*ont to the scientisof both
TreatypartiesthattheHungarian Mernoriaslhouldnow writeaboutthesetextbooksubjects as
iftheyhad previoiislybeenignoreby the expertofbothcounifies.
7-35 For example, Hungary's 1985 Environmental Impact Assessrnent
specificallconsiderd eutrophicatioissues. It foundtha- dueto thelarge surfaceareaof
theDunakiliti-HniSorveservoir,the wave movernentof the water,andthe aerationeEectof
passingthroughthe turbines - theimpactof the rsduced velocityin thereservoirand the
resultantpoteritfor eutrophicationwouIdbecounteracted:
"TheretentiontirneintheDunakiliti-Hmkv reservoiand inthe power channe1
wifIgrow (idi passthissectionina longerperÎod),suthe sedimeritaticm
speedupatcertainplaces. Both effectreducethe oxygen demand. The larger
surfaceare% thewaviness,the production of the biomassof the waterbody
increasetheoxygen uptake,theslowervelocityreduceitatthe sametime. The
45 "Errtrophi~tnothegraduaincreasintheoonoentratofnphosphhons,ïtrogand o&erplant
nrrtrienîsinagingaquaîkmqstem suchasa lake.The prductivirorfertiIiofsuch an
ecosysteincreasesasîheamoruioforgmic materiathatmn lx brcikedom into nutrients
inc-. Thismaterid entethe ecosyçtprimarilbyrunofFhm landthacarriedebrisand
productofthe reproductanddeathofterrestrlrganisms.Blwms,or greatconcentratiofs
algaeandrnicroscoorganismsoftedeveloponthesurface,preventthetighpenetratiand
oxygenabsorptin v foundemer Fie.Culhiraeutrophicatnccurswhenmanspeedsup
fheagingprm byallwlingexcasivarnountsf nutrieinsuchfom assewage,detergent,nd
fertilizttnkr theemiysternEncudomdiaBrifannica,Vol.4511, 15ted.Chimgo,1987.
47 The impactofeutrophicatarenot dely negative. infestatiothemnm places andat
fiemmectIweIcanIeadto waterpurincationandanincreainprimar productionWaterin a
reservoshouldnotk &rilebymeansofmonitorinandwefuI managemeno tferifrophimtthe
equilibribetweenaquaticprducersandconsumecanbeoptirnid. decomposition processes of the organic materials increasethe oxygen
consumption. Lettinthewaterthrough the turbinescontributto the oxygen
uptake andaeration. Thus the effects in the reçervo cornpensateeach
otheq8.n
7.36 Insupportof its currentportrayalf anunambiguous deterioratioof
water qualitydue to eutrophicatio%Hungary cites thEC WurkingGraupreport of 23
November 199249. It is deged thai threportpredictedeutrophicationinthe downstream
partofthe reservoir,threatenirigthe watersuppiyfor BratiIocatedat~amorh,the threat
becomingseriouswiththefoliowinggrowth season(of 1993). But the report'swordshave
been takenout ofcontext.The reportpredictsthattheproblemof eutrophicatiomight arise
if95% oftheDanube'swater (as demande.byHungary)were channeledbackinto the old
riverbed. Thismight resultfrom the factthatthe velocityin the downstreampart ofthe
reservoirwouIdbe radicallyreducedbecausevirhdiy dl the flow wouIdbe passingoverthe
Cunovo weir - inevitablyleadintu a largebody of nearlycdm water, inwhich hdl
eutrophicationcourdindeedaccu? -'
7.37 But iwas notreasonabletoenvisage sucha situatioas arisinunder
the GM Project. It was plannethatthemain partof thefiow woufdbethroughthebypass
canalandthus a sufficientvelocitywouldbt rnaintainsuthatharmftrleutrophicationwould
nui occur. Thishasbeenshow bytheactuaipractice.Thesumer of1993 was reIativedry
and hot-hence ,was wel-suitedto the commencement ofeutruphication.Butconditionsdid
not evoIveso astu adverselyaffecthequaiityofthewaterinthereservoir.Indeed,the EC
WorkingGroupreport of2 Novernber 1993 specificallyconfirrnthat therehadbeen no
significantchangesinsurfacewaterquality5' Thisis particularsignificantbecause,asthe
reportnotes,surfacewaterqualityis carefu1lmonitoredby theParties4, since 1993,the
reservoihas beencontinudlymoriitoredfor thedevelopmerrtofeutrophication conditions:
"The amount of surfacewaterqualie datain the areais comprehençive...The
routine progamme has been cded out in SIovaki far 10 - 30 years
(dependingon parameter) and inHungaryfor 10 -30years (dependingon
parame tr.
HmgrianMemoriaI,VaI.5partIIhnex 4.See ,l=,thBechteIrep% para7.15, m., abve.
49 HungarianMernoripara .44.
50
Hungaryusestheutrophifatriskargumentdy whenitisconvenietodo so.Ithaken more
&hanhappytoforgeteutrophicniskandtoarguethataleas1200m3/sshouibechanneIeinto
the olDanubein thTWMRnegoîiations,whîchwouldinevitabId toharmfüieutrophiation
conditionsinthedmmstreetion otheresew~û.
& SIova Mkernori.ara. 5.53. Inadditiototheabove network a programofsurfacewater qualitymonitoring
inthereservoirhasbeeninitiatedin1993. This monitoringcomprisesthekey
parameterfsorassessrnentof eutrophicanonditionss2."
7.38 It mustdso bestressed thatthe issue ofwaterqudityinthe reservoir
was studiedwith careby theTreaty partiesprioto the commencementofthis disput and
thatthe resultof such studieswere inturnreviewedtechnicdy in the Bechtel andHQI
reports. The BechteI reportpredictedthat "the water qualityin the HniSov-DunakiLti
reservoiwillbeimproved "whiletheHQIreport wncluded thattherisksofa deterioratioin
waterqrraiiqwerevery lod3.
7.39 Hungaq atm assumes that, due tu Project impIementation,
eutrophicationconditionwould arisein thesidearm systern,which wouIdno longerbe
"frequentlyflushed"asunder"naturac londitions"". Thismakesno sense. The "naturai
conditions"consistedof a neariyconstantdroughtintsidearms. Thus,eutrophicatiownas
a seriouprobIeminthe sideam systembeforeProjectimpleme~ltation snoted ,teraliaby
theHungean EnvironmentaiImpactAssessrnent of1985:
"In the present state the system of the tributariesin Szigetkoz receives
continuousfreshwatersupplyonly in case of water dischargesexceeding
2500m3/s (55-70 days annudy). In case the dischargeis less thathis-
annudy ndy 300day - thereare ermanentlystagnantwaterbodies,where
eutrophication,sedimentatoccursP,.,
In stagnanareas,thepourqiialw itayerinfrltr iattpartsoftheunderlyingaquifer,leadirig
to adeterioratiointhe-ter quaiityof thisimportantresource.The plannedimpactof the
Projectwas to solvethisproblem. As wilibeseenbelow,the limitedimplementationof the
Projectto datfiasshow howthisproblem can besuccessfullreversed.
52 W., Annex19 (ap.347).It shouidbenotedthatofthe goalsof tPHAREprojectin which
Hungaq declintoparticipa,s t-te acornputemade1toforecaandcontroleutrophication
conditiointhmrvou. Sec,pmu. 5.57-53hve.
53 SlovaMkernoril,ara2.95iS.
54 HungariaMernorial.ar5.52.
s5 m., Vol. (Par0, Annex4. &, alsotheEC WorkingGroupreportof23 November 1992,
recurdinthsituatiinthesidearmspriototheimplementationf Varia"Cum, .,(ParII),
Amex 14. "Thewatequdityofthesidebranchdaers hm thatofthmainDanubechanneldue
tothemuchIowervelûcitiandperi& andplacewsitstagnanwater.Lndneryear snegative
trendbabn ob~rvedwîttiighpHhi& organit matandIowogen conmfs." Colmatation
7.40 The qualityof the water downstreamofthe Dunakiliti weir would
naturaIlbe relateto thequalityinthereservoir.Hungary argueshowever thattherewould
be additionaiaterqualityproblemsinthe oldDanube caused bysedirnentatioproblemsand
the cIoggingoftheriverbottom (colmatatio-)both due intumto the IowerveIocityof flow,
which,itisdleged,wouIdbe aggravated bytheplannedconstructionofunderwaterweirs.
7.41 Colmatationis indeedan important phenomenon because it could
theoreticalcreateanimpermeabl barrier etweentheriverwaterandtheunderlying aquifer,
which relieonwaterinfiltratinghroughtheDanube Rvwbed andits sidearms for recharging
(and, as plannedwater irifiltrathmg partsof there~ervoir)'. Ifthe riverbedwere to
becornecIogged with fine sedimenandclayparficlesthi sechargewouIdbe impeded. But,
again,thisphenomenonhadbeengivencareh1study by theTreatypartiesandbyindependent
experts. In terms ofrecent studies,theEC WorkingGroupreport of 1 December 1993
predictedforthe oldDanubethat"during someeventssedimentation of finematerialwiiitake
place",butdso that "finmeateridmaybe washedawaydurhgflood everitsnS7.The impact
woiildbean equilibrillmand,hence: "No major net erosionand sedimentationinthe Old
Danube." Thisconclusionwas, ofcourse,made inrelatiotu Variant "Cu. It is nonetheiess
validfortheG/'NProject,forthepotentiaproblem isthesame.
7.42 A bnef reviewof theactualsituationintheSIova kidearms explains
the bais for theWorkingGroup'sstaternent. Due tothe construction oa water intakeat
~obroho~f~~f,iowinto theSlovaksideamt systeh rnsbeengreatlyincreased,andtheresuItof
thisincreasedfiowisa,sthe EC Working Gmup reporof 2 November 1993 noted, that "the
ninningwater has removed the fine materiapreviously dogging the bed ofthese river
mSa59 . This is particularimportantbecause,as Hungary points out in itMernorial,
"[a]lluvialloodplains,andespeciallyalluvialforests,craemost efficientsystemofwater
purificationandrecyclingof orpic matterua. PriertotheirnpIementationofthe recharge,
tfisnaturdpurificationsystewas riotfunctionirigandthsidms, characterisebyareasof
56 SlwakiausetheaquifeasthemainsupplforBratislavs ater.Thewaterpumpedoui is replaced
naturaIbymeamof water infiltrahm the reswvoir,sidarmsan4 asplanned,from the
Danuk.
57 HungariaMernonalV,ol.PariIQ,hex 19(app.782-7833.
5s
SeeIIlus.No.CM-7,appearingatp7.84kieI5w.
M
HungananMernoriaV.ol.5(PaII)Annex 18.
-bid.,Vo1,para. 5.19. - 171-
1
stagnantwater,wereactuaiiydamaginggroundwaterquality. Thi situationhasbeenreversed
in the Slovasidems dueto the implementatioofthe artificiarlechargesyst.m6'
7.43 The EC WorkingGroupreport of I December 1993 predictedthat
goodinfiltratioconditionswouldcontinueon theSIova sidedue tothe recharge.But,atthe
sametime, itpredictedthat if the rechargeof Hungariansidms was not assured, poor
conditionsouldcontinue dueto the lackowater flow;
"The riverbedin the mainbrancheson the SlovakiansidewilI continutube
freferum mud, so thatgood mtration mtiditionsex&. The riverbed inthe
main branches on the Hurigarianside w2l continutu beclogged wiîh frne
materiallmudandpreventsignificant ifiltrato thegroundwater system6'.
Thus,where adequate water 80w is assured-in thiscase,in the range of 30-70 m3/-no
cciimatatiprubIernswiIaise.
7.44 Thereis no evidencetusupportHungary'c slah that undenvaterweus
would leadto colmatationproblems. The underwateweirsforthe old Danube rivehed were
designedunderthe Projectto raisethwater leveso that watercouldflow ho anupstream
riverbranchand atthesame time raispund water leveiin theimmediate terraid. They
wouIddso slow down erosionof theriverbed.But velocitywouldnot be soreduced as to
Ieadto colmatationproblerns,specidlyas theGN Prujectenvisagedthat flow inthe old
Danube would be increasedperiodicdyto 1,300m3/s,with the specificaimofensuringthat
the riverbewaskept cleanoffinesedimentthatmightimpede atration. It willbe notedthat
Hungary points tu thbeneficiaimpact of "thecontrolledadditionofnverbed material"".
But, the undenvaterweiris verjt simiboth insubstanceand in eEectto anaturdford or
sandbanlr that wouId be created by the addition of riverbed materid. The weirs
61 m., Vol. (PartTI), Annex 18 p.70'1":BycompariçorfFig.5.5and5.5, whichrepent
wndttionsMore andaftputhg watertthesidechannelontheSlovakifanplain, it is wident
thatagmi hydrauiicorindon betweenthe si& channandthe groundwatesylem hasbeen
establishedThusasubstanîlund waterechargetakeplachm the sidchannelsresulting
up to1.rnincrd pund =ter 14s."
m., bex 19(atpp.782-783).
64
HungarianMernoria,ara.5.35.are buiIt upfrom stone andriver grave- the ody differenceithat theyare not snbjectto
erosion6.
C. Drinkine Water: the Non-Existent "Threat" to the litni
OstrovlSzi~e t6zAquifer
7.45 Accordiig to the HungwianMemurid,the eventual contamination of
the vasraquiferunderlying&tri$Oçtrov and Szigetkozconstitutes"one of the mostserious
risksofthe impoundment"66 I.t latw assertedthatthedeterioratioofthe aquiferis one of
the "unavoidablreesultsofthe~roject~. Itwas always a majorconcern ofCzechoslovakia -
and now SIovakia - to ensure thaone ofits essentidwater suppliesisnot damaged. The
water of theaquiferis ofenormous importanceto SIovakia- farIessso tu Hungq. It is
necessarythatthe Parties'respectivinterestsithedrinking watersuppIiescontainedin the
aquiferbe placedin theproperperspectivebefore reviewingthe exhaustiveresearchintothe
possibiliof any threato suchsupplies.
The Trnporiance oftheAquifer
7.46 In ordertoboost itclaim thatanecologicalstatofnecessityexistedin
1992, Hungary hm, in publicexaggerated theimportanceto itof the2tn9 OstrovlSzigetkliz
aquifer.To takeoneexample,inits 1992Dechration,Hungary describetheimportance ofits
&areofthe aquferwithds "capacitj rf? miIlionrn3tdaypermanentdrinkingwater suppIy -
the averageneed of the Hu@an ~apital"~'.Infact,thecapacityis0.3rniiiiurnqday, none
ofwhich isused tu supply~uda~est'~. And,inanintemalpaperproducedinApril 1992,that
is just one monthbeforethe Dechration was issued,theCornmitteeforWaterManagement
Sciencesof the Hungarian AcademyofSciences dismissedthe importance of the aquifer,
particularlintermsof it beinapossiblesupplytoBudapest.It noted:
65
FurtherasthEC WorkingGroup hasnote4 the divisionofthe Slwak sidearmsintoeightseparate
regionsepamedby msades hasnot ledtowlmatatioproblems. infkf velxitiehaveken
sacient tcleantherivebottoand eme gmi infIltrriasnofedapara.7.42,Ave. Thereis
noreasonwhyundemaferweirswhichsimilatholdupwaterfïawshouIdhaveadiffereeffm.
a Hungkan Mernoriai,ara5.43.
67 -bidpara.10.22.
68 m., Vol.4,Annex 82(ap.171).
59 1.Nagy,ProfessorEmeriofBu- Univesi@, "EEeoftheSystemof theHydropwerProjecfs
GaMIkovo-Nagmuos onSubçurfaceWaterSupplieof the KisaBld Araand theInfIuenŒof
Resp3ive €&ades*,TnfinierseStavbkol42. 1994No.I,Annex20. "Inthisarealessthan1%of thepopulationofthecountryreceiveswatersupply
fiom these resources[theaquifer]. TheNationalWaterManagementMaster
Plan did not make a& proDosalfor the long termutilizatiofthis water
resource, since exhaustiof the Nation's drinkingwater resourceisnot
expectable. The aeonrapbicd locatioof the ana renders.as a matter of
course. the convevano cfewater via water mains over Iona distances
uneconomicd7 " -
Hungaryisconcer thatthisresourcshouldnot becontaminatedis legitirnate.totlinthis
concerntu animminentthrat to Budapest'srînhg watersuppliesis scient5callyuntenable
anddeIiberately isIeadigfpubIicoPiniodl.
7.47 By contrast,the aquiðemajor sourceofBratislava'satersupply;
waterworks arelocateatSihof,SamorinK, alinkovo, usovcand GabEikovo thattaparound
7 m3/sofgood quditywaterfrom theaquifer.Itis scarcelylikelythatSlovakiawouldignore
any possiblethretuthepurityofthiswaterresource.
7.48 Hungary nonethelesaccusesthe pIannerofthe GlN System ofhaving
faileto considerthethreatto thisresouposedby theProjectand deges thatSlovakiahas
more recentiyignoredwaniingsas to the existenofthisthreatn. The evidencedoes not
supportsuch allegations. From thveryinceptionofthe Projectthegroundwatersof this
regionwere carefullmonitoredwiîhthe aimof examining the inter-relationspetween
surfaceandgroundwater on theonehmd andthe underlyingaquifeonthe other.Variousof
thestudiescarriedoutbyHungaryare evenlisteinAppendix3 ofitsMernoriai.By way of
rebuttalof Hungary'accusations,imust be notedthat asearlyas the1950s the Project's
plamerswereexamining the hydrologyofSzigetkoqas notedintheGeologicalMapSeries of
theHungarianGeologicd Inditute:
"Thisregioncm be referretoas themost accu rat etdied areainHun~aq
fromthe angleof hydrogeology. Inthe early1950seightseriesof ground-
waterobservatiowellswerecompleted dong theDanubebetweenRajka and
Gyor
Proiect andobservedpemanently up tothe presentdayby VITUKI(Water
ManagementandResearch Instituteandby the Regional WaterManagement
OfEcesn,"
70
HungariaMernoriai,pp3p.411(emphasiaddsd).
See.pam7.65,t~.,beiow,andIIIus.N0.~4.
" HungariaMernoriaparas10.37-10.38.
"
Annex21,hereto(ernphadded).The commentcontinues (furtheundeminhg Hungarian daims thatenvironmentalissueswere
efectively ignoreinthe politicaiclimateprevdentprito 1989):
"Resumption of the constructioof the dam in the1980s promptedagain to
launchwide-rangingstudiesinszigetkoz7 "
7.49 The impact of theProject on waterresourceswas noIess extensively
researchedinCzechosIovakia and , n1990,HQIwascommissioned witha specificmandateto
reviewthe existingdataand to examinepublic fearsasto theimpact of theProjecton the
aquifer7'.In a çynthesiofits report(issuecln Dmber 1990, iikethemain report),HQI
dividedthese fear int ohe subjectareas:contamination by heavy metds; an excessive
accumulation oforgmîc matter(hydrocarbons) at thebottom ofthe reservoir;change inthe
chernicalbaianceof the waterinthe aquifer.But thi syrithesisconcluded thathe riskwas
exaggerated:
"Enfonction des considerationsuivantes:qualitéde l'eaudu Danube,qualité
de l'eapotable qi alimentelavilledeBratislava,qualide Seauactuelledela
plaine Zitn* Ostrov a mesuresde corrections proposéespour eviter le
colmatage compIet du réservoirI,es craintesfumulkes nous semblent peu
fondée stlesrisquesduprojetparaissentlinit&s7"
Translation:
"Due to the followingconsiderations :he water qualityof the Danube, the
qualie of the drinkingwatersupplyingBratisIava,the cumnt qudiîy of the
watw ofthe Ztn$ Ostrov plainandthe correctivemasuresproposedtu avoid
thetotaIcoImatationofthe reservoirt,he fearsfomulatedseem tu uswithout
red foundationandthe risksofthe Projectseemlimited.
74
IbidAspartofsuchstudies.2I8m d~ptioreholes erdrillinfheregion,togethwith 440m
dee p7 boreholesIt-ot bc deniedthathProjeaengenderda vtry caresnidyofgound
waterconditionsandpotenProjecitmpaa.
75
TheHQIreportnotesthat"decrainteswifiques ontéformuléeaceauprojet.Translation:
"SpeMficearshadbeenformulatinffacof tProject."
mireoduiprojeet c'eawirdansdcecontextquescertains objddemIamission dWQi visenà
donnerme opinionedrîeuretimpartiasur1s rhdtatsdeétudesetsurIweffetsappréhendhu
proje,'
Translation:
"It is ordeto rqmnd & wh feat rsaçeverashidieçave beenheû outwithitheProject
framewor knditis alwithinthicontexthaŒminobjectivesofHQI'smissionhaveka aimed
atgivinan extemalandimp-liai opiniontheresultsofstudand ontheanticipateffecton
thePmject.HungarianMernoriai,ol5 (PartiAnnex9 (ap.209).
76 HQI,RapportSpthk. Dmmber 1990. hex 22, heretafpp.8-9. al=, themainrepr~,
HungarianMernoriaV.ol.5par0. Amex 9(atp.242).I 7.50 TheevidentiaryvalueoftheexternalandimpartialpiniongivenbyHQI
hasbeen recugnisedintheHungarianMemorial o whichtheHQI reportwai annexedinfull.
But HQlls assessrnent dues not support Hungws daim that the aquifer wouId be
contaminated. Nor indeeddoes theassessrnenir iungarjl'own cummissionedreport,the
Bechtelreport.Thi sredictean improvemenitn the qualitof thewaterimpounded inthe
reservoiandthat "thereshouldbe no simcant impactto ..downstreampotable water
wurksdue to theGNBproject"n.
The Alle~ed Rish
7.51 Thestridenttoneadopted inthelegalsectionsof Hungary'Ms emorial,
wherethe "seriouthreat"to theaquiferisinvoked,togetherwiththe "highprobabilityof
riskingthequdiîyof thedririkinwattrn,mnflictswith theactlrddescriptioofthe dIeged
risksinits factud chapter. Thereit isacceptedthat, farhm being imminent,any risk
would take "some decades" to manifestitseIffarfiom an assertionof a high, scientifr~
probabilitof riskitiscautiouslyarguedthatthe result"couldbe"thatthe aquifer"might
become" b nus able I'w.ouldbe hardto depictsomethingfurtherremovedfiom the grave
and imminentperd thatwouIdbe requiredfora statof necessieor for the invocationof the
"precauticinagrinciple(accordt mgHungary'slakrinterpretatiofthe reIevantaw).
7.52 Hungary'd segationofriskisbased on theassumptionthatrechargeof
theaqniferwouldno longerbe fromtheDanubebut would solelybe6omthereservoir andthe
sideam systernwhich,it iassumedin hip wouIdbecomecontaminated.It is me, andhas
alwaysbeenknown, that the pressureofwater inthe reservair,togethw with its iricreased
surfacearea,wouldinmease infiltratintotheaquifer£iomthissource.It is undeniabthat,
followingtheimplementatio nf Variant"CMa, more pronounced rechargenow occurs from
thecunovo reservoir. But it is equaundeniablthat thireservoirhas hadno impact on
surfacewaterqualityandwiI1continuetu bagoad sourceofquifer rechargem.
7.53 Thisis signific benause, dthoughthe bnovo reservoir issrnalier
thantheProjectreservoir,henatureof theris o theaquiferalIegedbyHungaryremainsthe
same. And,with regardto the Cunovoreservoù,thereis absolutelyno evidence(and no
t
I
n
See .lovakMernoria, nne27(app.209and213).
78
l HungarîanMernoria,ara10.21. ComparChapte5.evidence offered}to supportHungay*~daim that "direct impacts ofcontamination ftom
[reservoir] rechargewater have been notedM8'. Indeed,this extraordinaryassertion is
contradictedeven in Appendix3 to Hungary's Memorial: "Noqualitativechanges have yet
beendetecteduponthe effectofthewateredtratirig fiom thereservoirand idtrating fium
thewater rechargeqstem, or due tothedtered grouadwater flowdiieciion~~."
7.54 Hungary allegesthat suchcontamination would arîse due to the
accumulation of "toxicmateriaisandheavy metals"in the sediment atthe bottom of the
reservoir.This isvoiced byHungary both as a certaintyand acertaincause ofirsk to the
aqrrifer. utas notedatparagaph8.21beIow, theIatestdatacoIIectedshowsthat thedIuviaI
grave1and sandy diment brought dom by theDanubeis polluted or,at Ieast,notin
cornparisontoEurope's othermajor rivers.3
7.55 Naturally, the possible impact of heavy mdd accumuIation was
carefullystudiedpior tothi sisputeand theresultsofsuchstudieswere, inhm, reviewedin
the BechteIandHQI reports. The Bechtd report did not anticipate anypund water
contamination by heavymetalsu. The HQIreport consideredthat theonly senous threatof
contaminationwas posedbyiron and manganese sinceoniy thesewere~usceptibl eo chernical
conversion intoasolublestate.Butitcuncluded îhattheriskwasinsignificant".
7.56 Therecharge Hrtothe quifer wouldnot inmy eventbe soIeIyfiom the
reservoir. Rechargtehroughtheofd Danube riverbewouldcontinue once waterlevelswere
83
Inanyment, heavymetalsareinsolubandthuscannotentertheaquif-unlesstherisa lackof
dissdvedoxygenk., reducticonditioninthewater.Innormalconditions,heavymetado not
kme soIuble.And,asnoteatpara.7.36 abovthethreof eutrophicatintheresewoiwoiild
onlyaaxrmpmy qxcificaIIynon-Project,non-noperaticonhtion~.
s4 SIwak Memurid, Anriex27. The irnpartan~ofcar& monitorinand remediaidredgingof
undesirabmetaiconcentratiat 3-5y- intervaisncnetheIessnored.
85 HungarianMemorial.Vol. 5(Par1).hex 9. The HQI reporfoundthat:"Leseulphénoméne
susceptibdedétdriorlrqualitserailamobiIisatidufer emanganéseetcettéventualideut
n'êtrqeulointaineeraisondel'apportrapd'eauaufonddesfouillesd'infiltrD.ansla pire
dw hentuaIit&s,lefetle manganèsesofaciles8retideSeauetneposentpasderive pur la
ml&."
"Theody phenornenon susoeptibletoIeadlo deterioratinnthewaterqdity wodd bethe
mobiIisatiofironart danganeseandthÎpsossibilityody be distantdutotherapidflowof
waterat theimttornof theinfiltchannels.Intheworspossiblecasironand manganeseare
easytorecovefromwateranddonotposearisktothhealthu.
Thepresenceofmanganeseand ironingmund water1swmmonin manycountrieseg.,Denmark
and thNetherIandasndissimptotreat. raisedin the mannerintendedby thGM Project,that is btheconstructionof underwater
weirs.As notedatparagraph7.43 above,thereis nreasonto concludethattheriverbottom
wouIdinthe meanthe becornecloggedbysediment(colmatation). CertainIhe Cornmittee
for Water Management Sciences of the Rungarian Academy of Sciencesdid not see
colmatatioasa probleminitsApril1992paperS .
7.57 Under the G/N Project,furtherrecharge would have taken place
throughthesidem system,ona theHungariatlandtheSIova sidems. The Hurtgarian
Mernorialnotesthatthe"tiequentlflush&side branches"area major sourc of Wtration
under"naturaclonditionsn"Thi iscorrectbuttheconditionsinthe sidm systempior tu
thedarnrninwgereveryfarfiomnaturalb,einmost oftheyearwithoutdirecinflow.
7.58 Hungary addressethe impactofthe creatioofthe reservoiraifthis
urinaturdsimationwereinfendetu continueder thedamming:
"Eutrophicatiooccurringinthesidebrancheandtheincreasedorganicloadin
the water leaving the resewoir will furtaffecthe qualityof the water
enteringthe subsurfaqstems8."
But insofaaseutrophicatioconditionscontinuetodaintheHungarianbranch systeqthisis
due toHungary'scontinuedrefusalto implementherechargeofitssidearmsW .This refusal
maylead to poorqualitwaterenterinthe aquifewhichwould, inturnconstituta breachof
Hurigws obligationstu protecttheenvironmentunderArtide 19 ofthe 1977 Treaty. In
t contrasr,the conditionthe SIovaksideam have beenradicallytnpruvd md demonstrate
theoverall,beneficidimpacthattheProjectmuid have on the aquife. Where beforethe
Slovaksidebranchriverbedwerecloggedup andno rechargeoftheaquiferwas takingplace,
now good idltration occurs through the newly cleaned river branch bottoms.
86
=, Vol. 1,App.341t.
87
W., para.5.52.
88
HungariaMernorialara.5.53.
89
Si, para8-11,m., tieIow.
W
See,SlovaMkemonalIllus.Nos.35A-D.Thishas beenconkned bythe EC WorkingGroupreportof2November 1993" .
7.59 As tothe possibiliof the waterenteringthe sidearmsystembeing
contaminateddue to theconditionsintheresewoir,this wasexmhed intheHQIrepoff.
The specififea rddressedreIateto fhea~cumulationofhydrocdons insediment thawouId
bewashedinto thesidems duringfloodconditions.Butit was caIcuIa thedthe riswas
minimal.Putsimply,toxichydro~arbon arenotfound intheDanube's sedimentssavefornear
the Slovnaftrefinwy(close'to Bratislavawhichis isolatedfromthe Danubeby pumping
stationwhich directthegroundwater flowtowardstherehery (thi ishown as a"hydrautic
blanket").
7.60 Once again, these comments can be tested against the actual
implementatioonf Variant"Cu.Thereisnothingto suggestthattherehas beena deterioration
inthequalityof thesurfacewater enterinthe sideami system,nûrindeedof thewater that
infiltratintotheaquifer,whetherhm the sideamis,the oIdDanube,orthereservoir. The
EC WorkingGruupreport of2November 1993 notedthe longtm highquaiityof thegro~~nd
water idltratingfrom theDanubeintothe aquifer priortothe darnming. It alsonotedthe
"excellentt'uaiityof thiswateonce extractedfromtheaquifer,thatisder undergoingthe
naturdfltrationprocessintheflowthroughitslayersofpvel and s311d.'~
7.61 It isstress hat this appraisdreflecfsthe long teqpre-dam status.
BeforeconsideringtheEC's findingonthe impact ofdarnming itis importanto notetint the
EC'sassessrnentis basedona vast mount ofdata. As thesarnereportnotes,the"amount of
groundwaterquality dataintheareaiscomprehensivenI.t cuntinues:
"InSIovakiaa systernatimoriitonnghas beenc&ed out since I9%3on a
bionthly bais. Mer the damming ofthe Danube anextendedmonitoring
programmewith fortnightly sarnplinhas been made in a numberof wells
located close to thDanub ... Underthe extendedmonitoringanalysesare
made for more than 100 parametersincludingheavy metals and organic
micropollutants.The SlovakianDataReport (re124 showsplotsofdl data
PI
ne reportstater:mer, aftedixhargingwatw intthesidechanndsinthe Slwakiafi&
plainhm May 1993on& thegroundwaterlwels haveincreaabdvethosewrrespondinto
pre-damconditioT nssdemonstratsbaîa considerarbchargnow @es placehm theside
channels.Thishasbecornepossibhause theninningwakr hasremovedthe finematerial,
previouslycloggingbdeof th= riveam." EC Workîng Grouprepord 2 Navemk 1993,
HungariaMernofiai,Vol.5 (II)A,nrie18.
92 -'i7Partl) ,nnex9(atpp236-237).
" Thereparstate"ThegroundwatequalitintheareadominatbytheinfiltratfromtheDanubc
isgeneralina gd stateThus,thequalityof the pund waabstrachted the watewoiks
locateclostothDanube igenedly excellenM., (FarIl)A,nnex18(ap.711). hm theordinay monitoringprogrammeplus asummq of datahm a single
wellundertheextendedmoriitorîrigprogramme.
ZnHungary a Iargeamount ofdataisbeingcolIectedona fortnightlybasi23
parame etrsarmeasured."
I
I Inotherwords, a comprehensivme onitorisystem wasin placepriorto thedamming of the
Danube andthiswas upgradedaftethedamming.
7.62 The questionthereforeiwhat thisdiligentmonitorihas, asamatter
of factrevealesincethe damrningofthe Danube. The responseis thatthegood qualitof
theground waterhas not beenimpair&. Thesame EC Working Groupreportconcludesthat
"nogroundwaterquaIitychangesan beideritifiedafterthe damminoftheDanube" and that
"riosimcant changesinsurfacewaterqualitfarameterasscornparedtu pre-damconditions
carbe detecteditr damming the~anube"~ . Furthe:
"Accordingtu theHunnarianData Report (reff3f)nusipificanchanges have
beendetectedintheground waterqualie ."
Thereis simplno evidenceto supportHungaq'sreferencetothe 'toxicqualityhf thewater
enteringthe aiquifer%Thereis no evidenceof pollutioproblems in thereservoiandno
evidenceofpollutionofsediments.And,sincethere hasbeen nochange inthequalityofthe
waterenteringtheaquifertherecanbe nochangeinthe qualityofthewaterbeingextracted.
And,of course,çuch achang emld becomeknown immediately,orthe extractedwateris
extremeiycarefullymonitored,beiused tosupplythe inhabitanofBratidava.
7.63 A fiirther positibene& ofthe Project- tu Hungary - was to be
güaranteedinthe supplyof additionawatertu theMusuni Danube. Whereas priorto the
implementationofthe Project this mainbranwas without input flofrom the Danube for
300 daysa year(asshowninaius. No. CM-6A)appearing atparagaph 7.82below},theGlN
Projectwouldensure aconstantflowof 20 mg/$.Thiswould clearlyhavea beneficidimpact
on thewaterenteringthewatertablefiomwhatwas once a fiequentlystagnanttributary.As
theHungarianEnvironmenta IlmpactAssessrnentf 1985noted:
m. (atpp596and 713).
"
Ibid(atp.713-emphasisadded).
%
-Ibid.,VoIpara5.53. "Inthefutureasa resultofthconstructionofthedesignedhdïitrationsystem
fortheregulatioofthe subsurfacwater resourcesthemajoritofthestagnant
watersurfaceswiiibediminatedg."
7.64 In 1992,thwe was no reIiablscientifevidence tusuggestthat the
quifer wouldbecorne contambtedas a resulof theGIN froject. The actud operatioof
Variant"Cu hasprovided hrther evidencethat&e Project'impactwould not be harmful.
Vafiant"Cm ,sdiscussedingrater dd in ChapterYID below, has not led tsurfaceor
groun daterquaIitdeterioratio. oreover, oeutrophicatiproblem hasdevelopedinthe
Cunovo resmou and thereisno evidenceto suggesthatmy contaminationof theaquiferis
to be anticipatedThe impactsof the impoundmen htavebeenvery carefuiiystudiedand
monitored - throughoutthe developmentand constructionphase ofthe GN Projectand
Variant"Cu.Hence,Hungary'a sllegationastotheriskofcontaminationofdrinkingwaterin
thisregioare demonstrablynfounded.
D. DrinkinnWater:the Non-Existent"Threat" tuthe Budapest Bank-
FilteredWeIIs
7.65 Asshown inXius.No. CM-4,the bank-filterewater weiisthatsuppIy
dirnkingwatertu BudapestareIocateddownstrramofNagyrnaros.lnsofarasthese we1Ishave
bten undtr threat, thnot duetu thequdity of thwaterIeavingtheGabEfkovo sectiobut
duetu unrelatecipuIlutifrom backgroundsourcesinHungary f,om directpoiiutionof the
Danube due tountreatedsewagefiomBudapest,andtheextensivecommerciddredging ofthe
Danube foritsgrave1resources;no "threatnis now orhas mer been posed by the G/N
project9.
7.66 The existenceof the"threattothesesuppliesalIegedlcaused bythe
ProjectisasadmittedbvHunnary b,asedonno more thansimpIespecuIationr,estion mere
possibilitiesthatmighthavelto adetericlratinthe waterfrom the bank-filtercdwelIn.
Appendix 3 tu itsMernorial,Hrrngsryreviewsthree riofsdamagetu the BudapestsuppIy
weIIs,eachof which isdescribeas nomore than a vague possibility:istatedthat water
qualiryupstream of Nagymaros "corrldhave" deteriorated(thus leadmg tu a possible
deterioratioin the quditjof water atering into thweIls)that thereIeaseof sediment
through the Nagymarosweir "couIdhavecreatedratheruncertainconditions";that there
97
m., Vol. (PartI, nnex4. Thiimprovemenitsparticuymportanastherisaconspimous
riçin sulphatecontentin theMosoniLowregionleadintoadeterioratingroundwater
qualitespeciallyarRah andmg.
98
"Backgrounpollutiiscontaminatinm murcesonthelandsideofthewelb.,pollutithat
is nrelateto thrivewaterIt rnightcompriseindustrialeffluentfromorprmsuigs
plants,sewaseepaoragriniltufertiliser."couldhave"beenerosionproblerns downstream of thewei?. Thisuncel-taintyis in stnking
contrasttu Hungaty's contedon in its1992 DecIarationof the certain* "that irreversible
damageafflictsthe..drînking waterreservesofmiIlionsof .
7.67 As theHungarian Appendi 3 makesclear,thereis no scientificbasisfor
thiiastassertion:
"Withrespectto theabov e entiond risks
havesuantified Nevehadema deihssrwereresults
of investigatioavailablto provetheinsignitïcancofthe abovehazardsl0.'
Zn other words, certainassertionswithout sciedfbasishavebeen made and, asa resrrltof
insufficieresearch,theseassertionshaveneitherbeenprovednor disproved. ThisCarnot be
regardedascornpellingevidenceof anything,exceptpossiblyindifference.Nonethelessinthe
main body of its Mernorial,Hungary revertsto the positive, certain tone of the 1992
Declarafion. Once again,adverseimpact on the Budapest weilsbecornes "expected"and "a
significanandnon-replaceabl uss inwaterproduction"is predicted ' 02no explmationis
givenforthe discrepanc yetween suchpositive assertiosnd thelackofevidence suppliedin
support.
7.68 Ifthethreat badanyreaIbasiq iseemsextraordinq thano suficiently
detailedinvestigatiowere carriedout. And itmust be stressethat,insofarasresearchwas
insufficient,thisrepresentbreachby Hungaryof its Treaty-relateobligations.(Obviously,
Czechodovakia hadnoresearchobligationsrelating tu Budapest'swatersupplies.) Hungary
was obiiged,inparticularbythe 1976Joint Contractuai Plan Agreement,tu firther "the
hydrologîcalandhydraulic examination ...of the new condition between Budapestand
Nagyrnaros ."Afurthertaskwas:
"Thecornplementationandevduation oftheexaminationsrelatingtu theeffecf
99
HungariaMemoriaIA, pp3,p.432.
100
Secits1992Dechrationm., Vol.4, Anna82 (ap.154).
101
m., Vol. 1, App3,p.432 (emphasisadded).By wntrast, fhereiscuncrewidenceof the
dekioraiiooftheBudapestwatesuppliduetootherhazardssucasbackgroundollution. of the dredging in the downstream warer at Nagymaros taking into
consideratithewellsof thewaterworks inBudapest10.it
And, ofcourse, Artide 15ofthe 1977 Treatyrequired Hungarytu ensure the protection of
water qudity.
7.69 Thus, Hungaryhas assertedthe 'wristenceofa risk- which ithad a
Treaty-basedobligationtover@ and which it is practidly impossibfor Czechodovakia
eithertuverifor disprove-butonthebasisof whichHungq haspurported tu terminatthe
2977 Treaty. Slovakican do nomore than tu relon Hungws Mernorial tojudgewhether
Hungary'asssessrnenofitsownnon-cornplianc weithsuchimportantobligationis vaiid.
7-70 According tu Appendii 3 ofHungaxy'sMemurial,a fivevearresearch
and develuriment program was carried out, starting in 7980by Budapest Waterworks
specXcallydirected at "the protectionand developmentof bank filtereddrinkingwater
res~urces"'~.The resultofthisprogram havenotbeenannexedbyHungaiy toitMemorid.
Huwever,shortextracts are provided,hm which the fulIowingtwo points areof cruciai
importance:
- &g, the Danube riverbedintheNagymaros-Budapesstector hasbeen
lowered by up tu 1.5 rn "due to theeffects ofcommercial grad
dredging (20millionm3)".Suchdredging, carri eut byHungaryand
exceeding by 3 timestheexcavationsenvisagedunderthe Project,has
decreasethedepthofthegravelaquiferbelowtheriverbed from4-7 m
to 1-4m, apparentlyleadingtoa lossincapacityof200,00 0300,000
m3per dayof watersuppIy.
- Second, the resultsof five yeofsresearchand developmentby the
principabodyresponsiblefor the exploitationof this water supplyin
103
m., Vol.3,Annex 18(at p. 226Therewas afocus'onthimpactofdredgingbecauseiwas
importanthathe naturaifiltrationprwhichtakesplacthroughathinlayeof graveand
sedimennot dishirbed.
IO4
-bid.,VoIApp. 3p.428. no way suggested that theplannedconstruction ofNagymaros should
bemodified,letalone abortedsoasto protectthe we~ls'~~.
7.71 With regard to Hurigary'sdredghg of this sector of the Danube,
Appendix 3 to the HungarianMemorialnow Statesthatfurîher"rivertrainingor regulation
works along the Danubereachofconcem"mustbe avoidedlq. This may or may not be
correct, dthough thisew-found concem forthe riverbaiater layeriincontrat tu the large-
scale dredgingworks c&ed out inthe 1960s and1970s. hd it mustbe stressedthat the
dredging todatehasfarexceededthat whichwasanticipated for theconstructionofthe GM
System. It is truethattheProjectorîguiallyenvisagedthatthere shouldbe dredgingbelow
Nagymaros to the extent of6.5 millionm3 ofgrave1 fiom theDanube riverbed. But the
dredgingthat hasaIreadybeen carriedoutby Hungq - for reaçonsIargelyunconnected4th
theProject -is accordingtuthe HungarianMernorial2 ,0 millionm3'" . Ir is fur this reason
thatthe Bechtelreportnotedin 1990 that the dredgingwork "hasbeen teniiinatedsothat is
nolongerafactor"'08.
7.72 No evidence isgiven to suppor turrgary'csontention that thwater
qudityin theimpounded sectionupstreamofNagymaros mightdeterioratei,tum ladin8 tu a
deterioratioin the qudityofthewaterWtering intotheBudapestsupplywells. TheBechtel
report predicte td,the contrarythatfor theDanubein theNagymarosregion "theproject
operation might resuIt ian improved water quaIityexcept for a few months during the
summert tm. As to the water supply wells looated upstream of Nagymaros, a gaieral
improvementwas predicted by Bechtd, not Ieastbecause more water would be filtering
throughhm the Danube andless"fiomadjacena treaswhich arethe presentsourcesof poor
qualitywater"'". As tuthe downstreamsector, it saw noIikeIihoafdeterioration:
'O5 Itwas notcd that the "channelreguiationdofNagymarosmustbc pl-& wiîhduecuncern
forthe aboveLproktionof the riverbezone]".Thisis selfevidentanditnoway suggests
tha he corndon of Navos was incumpdbIe wiLhcontinued exploitation of the water
mppiies,letdonthart creaa pve andimminentperii.
107
TheHun@an Memorial daimstha"tlargmie dredgingin t1960sand1970slwas]donepartly
topreparefor the Nams Barrageandpady for othecommercialreasons"m., para.5.59.
ThisiuntnreaccordintoiîAppendix3,whichstatesfhtheoniydrdgingopatiorrsbed out
inconnatiowiththe~nstructioofNagpuros werein1985.
II)% SlovaMkernoria, mex 27(ap. 2Id).
1ID Seca.h,M., para2.105g,W. "Theplannedoperation of the project wilI not significantIy aIter tflow
characteristiorhydrologyoftheriverdownstrearn ofNagymaros."
No problemsof erosionor sedimentationwere predicted.PutWly, thepossiblensks tuthe
Budapest suppIyweIIs were thoroughly researched, erefound to be minimaland havenow
been gussIy exaggeratedby Hungarjr.
E. The Non-Existence of "Threats" to Drinkin~ Water Was
Confirmeci by the Findinps of the 1985 Environmental Im~act
Assessmenf
7.73 Priorto Hungary's abandonmeno tf worksatNagymarosinMay 1989,
one of the mostimportantassessmentsof theProject'simpacton waterquantityandquality
was Hungary's 1985 EnvironmentaIlmpact ~ssessment"' . It may be noted that thiswas
concIuded atthe sametime asthe 1980-198 researchprogram camed out bythe Budapest
Waterworks.
7.74 Before reviewingthe Assessment'sconclusions, two points must be
made. m, the Remlution reqrriringitspreparatidso laiddown a serieofenvironmental
prerequisitesthe firsofwhichwas thatthe Project should not "imposedangeron thewater
supply of ~uda~est""~. The compilersof the Assessrnenttherefore accorded primary
importanceto the issues of drinkingwater re~ources"~. Second t.e findingsof the
Assessrnentinrelationtodnnking waterwerenotchallenged untilitwas politicallyconvenient
to do su,that isnot untii1989. The 1985 Opinionofthe HrrngarianAcademyof Sciences
may have criticisecerlainaspectsofthe ~ssessrnent"~, butitfullyacceptedthe findingsin
relationto drinkinwatersupplies.
7.75 With regardto both thewater in the aqriiferandthattaken hm the
hank-fdteredwells, the ksessment foundthatthe Projen wouldhave no negative cffcand
that the red threatto such resources was 6om wholIyunreiattdsources of background
pollution.FortheSzigetkozaquifer, apositiveimprovemeni tnthequalityof theresourcewas
infactpredicted:
apara4.24,get..above.
112 HungarianMemorial,Vol5(Partl)Annexes3and 4(atp.17).
113 Ibid.Thustheintrductory paragraptbefrrstctioofîhe-ment statas"Theirnpaof the
Gge Sysfemupn the water mpplof theregiowas examinai mahlj fim thearpectfthe
binkingwaterresourcsflherrçeDanulxdon." (At p18.)
114
See .ara.4.2et seqabove. "Thewatertreasureinthegrave1 layerofthe Szigetkozwillreceivefreshwater
stipplfrumthe idltration systembeingfiltered,morecIearwater,whichbnngs
it into betstatefiom thewaterqiiditypoint[of view]."
Nor was sedimentation in the Dunakiliti-HnrSoeservoirseen asa prubiem. However the
threatto theaquiferfiom "communa andagriculturalp"ollutionwashighlighted.And itwas
noted thatasimilarpollutionthreaexistedforthewellsof SzentendreIsland(downstream of
Nagjmaros)that supplyBudapest:
"The Szigetkoz watertreasurisnot hmperedbythe1ocdsediieritationofthe
Dunakiliti eservoi....However itiveryimportant to reduce,stop oras an
immediate taskto reduce the growingtendencyofthe pollutionthroughthe
difise pollutionfiom the communal and agriculturalsource...Sirnilarly
importanthm the point of vieof theSzentendreIsland bank flteredwater
resourcesris]the backgrounpollutiononthe sufaceofthe island".
7.76 No Project-relateddeteriorationwas predicted forthe bank-filtered
wells upstreamof Nagyrnaros. Again,the threat to these wells was seen to be fiom
background pollution,a threat that would be decreasedasa direct resultof Project
operation"' :
"The research dealing &th the circumstancesofthe bank filteredwater
resourcesshowed thatthedeterioratioof itwaterqualityismauily due tothe
growing pollutioncorningfromthe background areas. It is expectedas a
clearlyfavourableffectof theBarrageSysternthattheheightof raised water
IeveI- due tuthe growingpuriion ofthe discharge Ulto the wellshm the
Danubeside - wiI1reducethebackgrou nollutionprocess."
Finally,the41-importantBudapestsupplyweIIswereconsidered:
"TheBarrage System has no effect upon the filter layof the Budapest
Waterworksl waterresourcesatthe SzentendreIdand. The changesinthe filter
layerareinfIuencedbyFactorsindependenthm the [GM ProjecJ."
7.77 Thus,the Assessment'soverdl conclusionwas that"the[GN Project]
will notdeterioratethe watertreasure'spresentsocial-economicusefulness". Thereis no
evidence thateven suggestthatthisparticulaconclusionwaseverchallenged. To challenge
II5 Exactithe sameconclusionwawhed inrelatiotothekarsticwakr@und waters in
undergroundollowsfaultetc.usuallyin limestoneformat)hastungarynowciaimstohave
beenunderht (HungariaMernorial,sr5.58)"Thequalityofthekarsticwaterisalsofarmore
influtnŒbythepollutiowaçhedin(especiallyGIS ofconcenmed pollutisourcesandopen
karstregiom)fiomtheMiddle-Transdan rubintnhanhewaterreachintheselayewithlow
probabilandfilterdbylheaIIwiaIayesfromthDanuk mer. On thebais othi hepremm
patteraIreredbythe [Gm Project] winot hampertIie qiralofthe Mid&-Tlzuisdanubian
Mauntains'akrweasweexitnow -onthe basisofnonew studieor informatio-isentirelunwarranted.Itischar hm
the Assessrnentthat, insofaswater resourceswere threatenedthiswas due to unrelated
pollutionproblems.Thisanalysishasbeenrecentlyconfirmedby1.Nagy,ProfessorEmeritus
at BudapestUniversity. He reviewed the claimsthat theGM Projectposed a threattu
d*g watersuppliesinHungary and foundthem tu be "incomprehensiblandscientificalIy
una~thorised"A "~c. rdingto hisscienti5cdlysubstantiatedpaper, the daims are "a
consequence ofthe misunderstandm gf factand realitiewhich ...represen'adanger of
directinattentionÇom actual and topicaproblems ofwater supplyforthe population,of
wastewatertreatmentandvitaiproblemsoftheenvironment".
SEC~ION~. The Pri?iectSImmct on Soirs. A~ricuIture,Forestrv,Hors and
Fauna
-
A. IntroductorvComments
7.78 AithoughHungarydivides the Projectimpactareainto threregions-
Szigetkoz,the DanubeValley,andthe Namaros bend- it onlythe poteritidenvirumental
impactonthe firsofthesethatis considerebyHungary in anydetail.Slovak diaduceshm
this thateven Hungary does not take itsallegationsas toenvironmentalimpact in the
downstream areaseriouslyAccordingly ,hefolIowinganalysifocuseslargefyontheProject's
aliegedenvironmenaiimpact ontheGabCfkovs oectiorthatison Szigetkozand&nji Ostrov.
7.79 Hungary allegesthatthe G/N Project"would have wiped out the
floodplainwhich, togetherwith itsbranchsystems,constitutetheproductivebasis ofthe
region""'. Thisextreme contentionisfoundedon a descriptionofthe Danubeand its
fIoodpIaithatpresumes thatheProjectdesignerswereapproachinga vire lmdscapeandon
a descriptioofthe G/N Systemthat ignores dl those elements ofthe Prudesign thathe
Treaty parties incorporateso as to mitigateenvironmentaiimpact. Furthermore,the
impressionis giventhatthe environmeritailmpactwato befeltbyHungard yone. A more
misleadingstartingpointfoanexaminationoftheexpectedimpacts oftheGIN Projectonthe
environment ihardtuimagine.
7.80 Hungary' sentralprerniis thattheProject'impactwouldhave been
feltmost intenselyinSigetkoz, whose environment "would havesignifica deterorated
116 oftheSysiemotheHydmpwerRojeEts-ove-Namos on Submke WaterSupplia
of thKisalfoAreaandtheIniluenceoWve Cascades-. Vol.42, 1994,
No.1,Annex20.
117
HungananMernorial,ar5.90.-= - . -- - -- - - - - - - - -
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UUSTRATIONNO. a-68 . .
I
- -Ir. because ofthe diversionofthe Danube into a by-passcanaifor 31 kmnH8. Tkis dearly
conrradictthefindingsoftheEC Wurking Group and,inparticulaitsreportof23 November
7992, which notedthat due tothe transfer ofnavigation into the bypcanal:"a unique
situation has ansen. Iriitbytechnicalmasures thefiver andthe floodplain cm develop
morenaturally19.t
7.81 It is importanttu focus on the reasun for the contrast inthese
assessments.The EC Working Gsoupappraised theenvironment ofthissectooftheDanube
in itactualconditionin1992, notas itwasa centuryor more ago. The Danubehas been
radicallaheredove; the pasthundredyears. First,withtheaim ofimprovingnavigation,a
main channe l ascreatedfrom theformerlybraidedriver.Thisinvolvedthe isolatioof the
currentriverbefrom thesidearrnsandthefortifjinof itsbankswithconcrete. Asthe same
EC reportpoints outtheeffect of this "embankmentndendikement" was thatthe original
l vegetation"waslargelydikedout ofthesystern".Second,theimpact of thiscanalisatihas
been aggravatedbytheaccompanying erosionofthe Danuberiverbec iy upto 2 metresover
thepast30 years,leadingtoa correspondingdropinlocalgroundwater levelsasdepictedin
Illus.No. CM-5.
7.82 As a resuItof thesefactors,the Danube was in recent decadesfully
connectecltothesideam systemandthe MosoniDanubeody at timesofhi& floodthat is
around 20 days each The impactofthii ssshown most ddy inIiIris.NosCM-6A
and B,which show thestateof theMosoniDanube and theHungariansidearms tu the
damMrn gfthe Danubeand cd1into questionthe reIevanceofthe photogaphs of dried up
sidems containedinVolume2 to theHungarianMernorial.ExtraordinariIy,HungarywhoIIy
ignoresthe fact thatthe side am system WB, priortu the damming hro~ghout much
118
m., para 5.75.
119
-bid.Vol.5(ParIQ,Annex14(ap.418).
120
&, IheECWorkingGmupreportof1Dmmber 1993,m., Annex19.of the year either stagnantor completely withoutwater121. The Project offered the
opportunitytoreversethishannfiilsituation.It enabtheoriginalinter-relationsetween
theDanubeanditsfloodplain to bere-establishnot "wipedout".
7.83 The corollaryto Hungary'sheadinthesand" descriptioofthe Danube
is its deliberatefailuretake hto accountthe Project'sstepsto irnprovethe floodpIain
ecologythrough thedirectinputoflargeamountsofwater intotheDanube sidexhs.To tiike
an exampie,the HungarianMemurid sates:"If theside arms of the floodpIaiwere tu
disappearcompIeteIywithconstmctionof the BarrageSystem,it hasbeenpredicîd the total
ichthyomass -Id decrease by57%n'P. This isbmedon a whullyfalseprernisebecause
therewas no prospectofthe disappearmceofthe sideatms asa resultoftheProjea. Quite
the oppusiteacentrd featutof the Projecwas the reversof the progressivedisappearance
ofthe floodpiainI.
7.84 The G/N Project envisage tat the branch system of bath
CzechoslovakiaandHungarywould be revitalised.Themeasuresplannedforthe Slovakside
arms, dong with the successof such measures,have alreadybeen detailedin Slovakia's
~ernoriall~~.But equivalat measureswere plannedand,in part,repli4 fortheHungarian
sidearms. Thus,an orne with a capacityof 200m3/s was buihinto the Dunakilitiweir
complexto supply waterto theHungariansidearms. The locationofthisofftakeisshownin
IllusNo. CM-7. Itwould haveserved to ensuresufficientflintothe Hungarianside arms
to preventthe thenusualstagnanor driedupconditions.showninIllus.Nos.CM-6A andB.
See,inthisregard,Iilus.No. CM-6C.
7.85 No lesmisIeadingistheimpressiongiventhatthe envimmentaI impact
of the GN Project was on$ tu be feIt on theright bank of theDanube, k., in
l
121 M., Vol. 1parst. 5.ForexampIe,Hunw blithel&tes thathe"mainknan~ofconnections
betweenthevariouMes ofwater isnecessarykause iftharetm idafedand infFequentIly
fldd, theu biomaspmduaiviiykm= Iaw*. SucisregardaibyHungarjasthe inevitabIe
r&t ofthehjd. ButasthtEeCWorkîngGrouppinmi out.theprchlemoftheisolatiothe
Danuk hm iîs fIDDdparidtherendfant disappaaofthenaturaI msystemsIongpredated
theincepiiofthProject. 1
122
W., para5.83.
123
SeetheEC WorkingGroupreporo2 November1993m., Vol.5 @arcïI), AM18.
124
SlovaMkernoria,ara2.87,m., andpara5.38etsea.~pnpmdk~bRh~~abl~ UUJSIRATXQN NO.CM49~un~ar~"'. The prime areainwhichenvironmentailmpactwas tobefel wtasin theupper
partof theDanube Lowlan dnbathbanks of theriver,thatis &tnqOstrovon thelefibank
andSzigetküzonthe rightbank. There aretwo centrd pointstobe madeinreiation tothe
Project'santicipatandameed impactonthesetwo regiona
7.86 Fir sot.regionsare primariiyagriculturdin nature. Thisis quite
clearfiomMap No. 1 toHungary'M s emonal andis thedeiiberatresulof stepstaken over
thecenturietu confinetheDanubefloodplain,toconstnrctdrainagandirrigationcanaland,
thus,tucultivatetheland. HungarynonethelesscIHims :Theactiveduvid floodpIaininthe
GabEkovosectorcovers approximatel6 y,000 hectareson the Hungarianside and 23,000
hectaresonthe Slova sidelm." Thisis nonsenseThe activealluvialoodplainismaintained
withindykesbuiltaround acenturyago at adistanceof afew hundredmetresto oneor two
kilometresfiomthe mainchanne1and coversa far srnaIIrrea. This is dso quite dearfium
Map No. 1tu HungaMs Mernorialand has beenemphasisedin the mapbasedthereon which
foms Illus.No. CM-~'~.
7.87 Thq theProject'potentialimpactontheactivealluviafloodplaiwas
Iimitedto anarruwstretchdom eachside ofthe Danube,as I l l shows,and its
intended impactwas tu safeguarthat stretchFor,unlikemostbarrageprojectqthe bpas
canalwas constmcted outsidethe floodplainares, enablingthe floodplain'ssurvivd and
eventualrevitali~atio.'~
7.88 Insofaras there isany interesin thestatementfrum the Hungaim
MemorïaI quoted above,itisthat accordirtu Hungaryt,heimmediat enviromenta1impact
of theProjecwas to befel itSlovakiaoveranareafour timesthesizeofthe respectivearea
of Hungariantetritory.If theexpectedimpacwas suchas Hungary now describes,andif the
125
Hungaydrnost whdly ignoreçPmjm impaonkhoslovakia intheregionof&tn$ûsmv. h
evegoessofarastousethterm "LitdHungariaPlaintodescribetentirDanubianLowland
(the plain occubyetheDanubeon @ sida oftheriverfiom downstreof Bratislato
Nagymaros).
125
HungarianMemonai,para5.20.
rn
TheactivdIwiaifloodpIainies ktween theZnundationD(SIova sde)andtheInundation
Dyke (Hungariansidshow onIiiuNo. CM-8 bythetworedlinesdrawnoneithesideofthe
Danube.Sec.lso,thEC WorkingGroupqmrt o23 November1992whichnotaithathorigiuai
vegetatiandforestrbaslargebeen"dykeoutofthesystem"m., Vol.5 (PartIl), A14(at
p-435).
IZS Thecc)nstructofthresrvoir dhoweverre~uïrethdeforcshtiorde aretobe inundafe-
dthough thwasanyway sequirdinparf asa fid proidon mcamre.bymeans of ststopping
floodwatbackinguptoBratislava.Project had been as ber& of benefits as Hungary now daims, itwouId have been
Czechoslovakiathawouidhavepressed to havetheGM Project reevaluated.
7.89 -the 1977TreatyprovidedthatbyfarthelargerpartoftheG~
SystemcondructionsworkswouId becarriedout on CzechosIovakterrito-yduetu thefact
that thgreater paofthereswvoîr,the bypasscanalandthe~kovo stepwere allocated
on Slovak sog. Furthermorei,n relatioto the Nagyrnarossection, substantialprotection
measures(dykesand pumpingstations)were required on Slovakterritorybutless so on
Hungariamterritorywherelocalmountainsprovideda naturdmeansofretaining impounded
water.
7.90 The ramificatioofthisdierence in cornmitmentoflandresourcesis
thatquitesimply,in1989,whenHungary abandoned works,ithadfarless tolose.By 1989
Czechoslovakihaadfulfillaround 90% of itconstrucfionobligationThe indelibIeimpact
thatttiihadon fhe SIovakwunfrysideasof 1989 isshown inIllusNo. CM-1 appearing
above attheend ofChapterIV. Hungary,whichfuIfi11e.nIyaround 40% of itconstruction
activitiesbeforeabandoningworks,hasnot sufferedthisenvironmentaiimpacto the same
degree.
7.91 This is not tsaythatifa reaIenWumental emergency had existed,
CzechosIovakia would not have ben prepared tu considerthe abandonment of the
construction. But it was very much simpler in 1989 for Hungaryto manufacture
environmentalargumenta sgainst the Projectand move to abandonmentbecause its
cornmitmenotf resoiirc-sbothin temsoflandand money -wasfar Iess.And itifutk for
Hrrngarytoargue nowas iftheconstmctionshad notbeenbirilorasifthe Dmubian IowIand
was todaywhat itwas100yearsago.
B. Soils,A~ricultureandForestrv
7.92 Ont ofthe manyfactorsthatcontributtu aparticrrlarsoiIregimeis the
local levelof groundwater. This factormustbeweigheddongsidtheguidingeEecton sods
of mineralcontent,retef andge.gmorphologiprocesses,ciimate,wellasplant,animaland
humana~tivit~'~~I.tis acceptedthatdeclinigroundwatelrevelsmayhave animpact onthe
soi1regime. Once again,howwer, in tems ofthe Danubian Lowimd rhisparticulimpact
was expwiencedpriurtu theddng oftheDanube: theGN Projectwasaimed ataddressing
129 Thisis explainea studontheProjecl'ismponmilsandagricultu.ecenflyprepabydS.
Rehlikg d. of the Slovak RGsearlnstit ftIrrigation Management,epartmentof
Hydropedolog,nnex23.Thisstudyal%showthe&pressivelwel ofrewSIova rsearçinto
thPmject'impacintti-areas. thisimpactby increasingwaterlevelsinthereservoirregionandthesidearm system,thatis in
the areaswhere the greatestdraps in ground watw levelshadhistoricallbeen felt. Such
increasewouIdnot inanyevent be raridorn:water IeveIs dose to the reservoirwere tu be
regutatedby theseepage cands;and waterieveIsinthe sidearm regionswere tu be reguIated
bytheintakesintothebranchsystemat Dobrohosf (Czechoslovakia ) ndtheDunakilitiweir
(~un~ary)'~O.
7.93 Hungary argues that ifthe water tabIefdIsbeIow the soi1Iayerthe
ground wateris eKectivelylostanditimptesthatthe GIN Projectwould inevitablyhaveledtu
thisproblem13 .1Iticorrectthatifthewater tableremainsintheunderlyinggrave1layers,iis
not broughtup to thesurfacebycapillaryaction.But thiswas thecase to thedamming
of the DanubeinIargepartsofztnji Ostrov and Szigetküz. AndHungary'scIaimasro aioss
ofcapillq actionin "morethan 50% ofthesrea previorislreceivingsubsurfaeewater",asa
resultoftheProject,isnotsupported byany evidence. Nor isitsupportedbywhattranspired
fier theimplementation ofVariant"CM , hichshows exactlythereverseeffecthappening on
theSIovak sideof the~anube'~~.
7.94 Similarly,the operationof Variant "C" hasshown that carbonate
accumulationin soils(dueto increasedevaporationof subsurfacewater where a waterlevel
rise was experienced)has no#occurred, inspite of Hungary'sexpress& fears to the
contraW1". Hungary ignoresthefan that wheie the Project wastu raise subsuifacewater
IeveIs-thatis upstreamofDunakilit indinthe sideam sysfem- thiswastu be inaccordance
with the natural&., 1950s levels.The impactof the sinkingnverbed over the previous
decades hadbeen to decreasegroun daterlevelsthe Projeclwas thebestmeans of reversing
this process134.
7.95 As tu the pwsibility of carbonateaccumuIatiinthe topsoi1Iajredue
to peak paweroperation andthe resultanwaterfluctuationintheDanubedownstream ofSap
130
a para.4.3abve.
I
131 HungarîaMernorial, ara.5.62.
l
l 132 para8.29klow andAnnex 23hereto.
133 Cabnate accumdationhasa negativimpactonsoi1quaIitybews îtIeadstoanexcessivsoi1
densitandaIackof0-n.
134 Sec,thECWorking Groupreporof1Decemhr 1993,a. &.,describintheimpacoftheCunwo
resewoir"Thegroun datelevelinareasclosttheresewoirhavincreasebyupto2% m. This
hasd intheareawshichweremoçtnegativelaffectbythelongtermtrendof decreasing
goundmter IeveIofupto2 mdrtrinthepst48years-"& dm, hex 23.(~alkovi~ovu )wo~~ointsmustbe made. First,thefluctuation inthe gruuwater related
to peakproductionwould only be feltwitbina few hundredmetresof the mainchannel.
Second, theproblem ofcarbonate accumulatiapresupposesthe evaporationofground water
causing additionalcalcitobe depusitecind an absenceofprecipitationwhkh mightdidute
the depositions. SimpIy,the appropriconditionsarenottobe fouad inthestretchaffected
bypeakproduction flows.
7.96 The G/N Projecthasevolvedso asto ensurean optimisatioofthe soiI
regimein thesurruundimgareas.
7.97 And there is an obviouslinkbetween soi1quaiityand crop growth.
With the necessaq measuressuch as flow into the sidearms and the constructionof
underwater weirs,the impact ofthe Project on agricultureandfurest rouIdclearIy be
henefcid overail. Indeed,Hungary'sown commissionedreport,the BechteIreporconduded
that the "ProjectwilI provideseverd benefits tu agicultandlforestryproductioninthe
Szigetkozwith installatiof the artzcialrecharge~~stern"'~N.evertheless,Hungarynow
claimswithout a shed of scientfic evidencethat 107,000ectaresi.e ',orethan 1,000
squareMometres of agriculturallanwouldsuEer a reductionin$dd dut to the Project's
implementation.Thisissirnplabsurd.
7.98 Inconsideringthe impactof the Projecton the region'sforests, it is
essentialto remember thattheoriginalalIuvialoodplainforesthad 1argeIbeen destroyed
longbefurethe concIirsioofthe 1977Treaty andthatthe cultivateforesthattook itsplace
had been adverselyaffectaforseveraldecadesby the sinkingriverbed. Conditionsfoboth
cultivateand originalspeciesshouldimprove asa resultof Projecimplementation.This is
demonstrated by the actualresultsofthe implementationof Variant "C",as discussed in
ChapterVlII bel~w'~ ~
136 SecS.lovakMemori,para2.117
137 Hungaryclaimtha @ pwer f fctmtion..woddinundaiethsurroundhgfidpIainskiliing
offrhefornu, HmgarianMemarial,pam. 5.74.Thisisclmly unpossibleThewaterIweI
fluctuatiotheirnpoundesectionupstrofNa-s was10b maintainewithinthexîsting
inundationdykesItcouldnotpossiblyinundateandkiitheforestsin theplainbehthese
dykes. C Hors and Fauna
7.99 As noted atparagraph7.81 above, thefactors thaHungary posits as
responsiblefotheProject'negativeeEectson floraandfauna -"thedecreas inwaterflow,
followedby adrop ofwater levels,andthe absenceof reguf aaterlevel -
existelong beforethe planneddamming of theDanube in 1989. By 1989,the rivebranch
systemof Szigetkozandthe MosoniDanubewas receivingits ful later capacityfiom the
Danubefor ody 20days peryear,andregularwaterfluctuationssimplydidnot occurdue to
the region'sisolation5orn the river.
7.100 To dlege thatdue to the Projxt "nolonger wouId the water Ievel
supporting theecosystemsin the Szigetkozhavefluctuated nattrrawith each season"is
simplytooveriook this historîcd fact asweIl astuignorethe pianned artificid recharge
program,providingforflowsup to 200m31s intothe Szigetkozhm theDunakiliti offta~ce'~~
andsirnilaflowsintothe Slovaksidarms fromDobrohogf. Dueto thisprogram asignificant
water level fluctuatiwould be achievedin the sideami system on both sidesofthe
~anube'~ . It makesno sense for Hungary to quotea 1981 study as evidencethat,&er
Project implementation,the stretchof tDanube affect4 could have "minimabl iologicd
for it windirectresponsetosuch assessmentshat mitigatimeasures were
incorporateintothedesign.
7.101 Thus,insofar asthe HungarianMernorial'dsiscussioofthe Projeci's
impactson dora andfauna isbased on anassumption of "disappeatancoefwater"in the
~zi~etkoz'", it is meaningless,because this would not be the resultof the Pruject1s
implementationT. heProjectwas modifiedto provideforwater rechargeintothesidearms,
andthe actuasuccessofthismodificationannow bejudged from theSlovaksideami system
which hasbenefitedfromthe artificrechargesystemsinceMay 1993. There,to Slovakia's
knowledge,not a singlesweciefromthe presentlknownplant cornmunitiesofthefloodpIain
'39
a para7.84,aboveand111us.o.CM-?. The maximum200m3#s fiowwoirlk impIemented
only whenil wasdesifoinundatthesidam ana The miai rangcffloww5uIdk much lesç
i 440-7m3fs.Carewodd inanymentbebken fofluctutheBow.
140 As theEC WorkingGrouphas noted: variationofthewaterIewîthin2m willxenough 10
ensurethdynamiccharactincludinthfioodingsaccordtothepatterinpredamconditions."
ECWorking Groupreporof1December1993,s.&.
14' HungarianMernoria,ara5.90.
I 14' m., para5.79.ecosystems hasbeentbreatenedor, muchless, has disappeareddueto the implementatioof
Variant"Cm. Theimpact oftheG/NProject on Szigetküzwoiildhavefullowedthisexample if
thespecisc mitigationmeasurehad notbeenahandonaibyHungary.
7.102 As tu theeEect ofthe Projecton the region'sfish cummunitieq it is
pointlesto make acornparisonbetweenthe GM Project'simpactandthe impactof0th dam
projectson the Danube, the Rhine,or the Rtione. inthe &man andAustrianDanubeand
elsewhere,projectshaveresultedin the canalisatioof,theriverand itsisolationfiorn the
associatedinundatioarea,where old brancheshave beenreducedto polders(isolatedlakes)
with stagnantwater.The G/NProjectis quitedifirenforit ahs toturn tholdDanube fkom
a partiaicanalisedriveintoanapproximation of theoriginabraidedriver:theattemptis to
recreateamore naturalsidearrnsystem,notto decreasehabitatdivers* asHungaryseems to
irnply'.3
!
7.103Onceagain,Hungary ha ignoraithe statuofthe Danubeat thetime of
the 1977Treaty'sconclusioriandthe problemsthatthe parties were trying tuaddress. The
waterqudity of the Danubeinthe 1970s was adverselyaffect&by pollutiona situatiothat
hasimprovedinpartdueto wastewatertreatment associatedwiththeProject.Thi sashad a
beneficiaiimpacton somefishspecies. Nonetheless,overallfishnumberscontinuedto dwindle
dueto the lossof habitatinthe side armsandtheerosionof the Danuberiverbed,problems
thatcouldonly besolvedbyProjectimplementation.
7.104 A brieexpositionofthePtoject'expectedimpact on theregion'fishis
setout inAnnex25 tuthi sleadingTtsmainfindingsaregsfolIows:
m, the gradud canalisatiofthe ~anubk fiumthe 1950sandthe progressive
fortificatiof its riverbanhasled tu aIossof habitat., This, dongside the chaninthe
sedimentcontent of the fiver water dto upstream dam projects,hasfed toa progressive
reductioninfishnurnber thatpre-datestheProject. Thusthe totalfiscatchinthe Slovak-
HunganansectoroftheDanubeshows a steadydeclinesincethe 1960s.
Second, the main Danube charnel, as opposed to the side arms, was
charactensedbya lowichthyornas(sfishdensiSdue tol&h fiowvelocityhigh turbidity,nd
fortifiai, strengthenedriverbariks. I
1
!
143 I
diEerwcektween thisojectandthosontheRhine(forexample).chexplainsome ofthekey
I
l Third,the implementationof theProject would notbe expected to leadto a
reductionin the nurnbeoffish speciesinthe bypassedsectionof the Danube. Riverbanks
would develop more natrirdIy, fortificationswould graduaIIybe destroyedandlateralerosion
wouidstart oncemore.
Fm no greatchangeswouldbeexpected inthefishtypesinthereservoiras
opposed tothemain riverflow. Somerelucationof speciesandsome betterspawninggrounds
would be created.
Fiftk the seepage cands andthe tailwatercanalwould providegood living
conditionsforfi&.
Sixt hh,changesinwaterregirne and rivertopographypior tu 1989 had not
ody ledto adecrease infishnumbers inthesidems butdso to aprevalenceoffishof a low
economicvalue. Thissituationwasto be reversedbymeansoftheProject's artificrecharge
program.
SECTION4. The Myth of SeisrnicInstabiIitvInventrdbvHunearv
l
7.105 It is interestito note thatthe sectionin theHungarianMemorial
entitled"Geologicaland Geophysicai Risks s simpiy a copy ofthe section containalin
Hungary's 1992 Declarationand writtenexactlytwo years dier'" . Bearing thisinminci,
paragraph 5.99 of HungaryrM s ernoriai(alsoparagraphI of Part Il of Hungary's 1992
Declaration)isnowquotedinfull:
"From the point ofview of geology, the-test rîskis the Iackofdetailed
kmwledge ofthe area. Without such knowIedge, technicalplanningand
environmental risk assessrnencamot amive at suund results. A reIiabIe
prognosiscanonlybe madebased on systernaticstudiesrevealinggeoIogicaI
conditions."
If therehad beenany merittu the diegationof lackofdetailedknowledge,if Hungaryhad
been seriousinits desire to arrive at suund resuits fhrough systernatisîudies,it is
inconceivabiethatHungarywould havefaîled torectifythe allegedignorancof theregion's
seismicconditionsinthe two yearbsetween theMay 1992Declarationandsubmissionof its
Memorial.Itwould nothavecontenteditseIfwith simplyrepeatina serieofunsubstantiated
andeasilycontradictedallegations.
1 144
CompareH, ungariMemoriapl,ara5.99-5.1and the1992Declaratiatm., Vol.4,Annex82
(app.169-170). isnotedthatthe 19Declaratiis pifidly citeasthesourceofoneofthe
manyuntede statementscontainetheHun@an Mernoria ltpara5.f00.sfmcturesare safeinthe caseofan earthquakeof 7.5-8.0MSK intensitjr". Furthemore,
GabEikovois situatedona Iayeof grave1up to50011thickwhichis whollywithout tectonic
disturbanceandwouldabsorbthe shockof evenan earthquakefarexceedingany recordedin
thehistoricaperiod.
7.113 It shoulddso be noted that the GM Projectzone is monitored bya
whoIe serieofseismicstationsnoneofwhich has registeranearthquake ofany vdue inthe
immediate vic*hitof anyofthe majorconstructionsites. Theris strongevidencethatthe
Projectdesigners--estimateclthelikeliioodofanearthquakientheProjectregi~n'~' And,
once again,thereino evidenceofferedinsupportofHungary'cslairnthatthev&s dlowed
for in designs arenot relevantbecause "thecornpuIsoxybuiiding codes have not been
applied"l'z. Ino independentnpon have the Projecttsstructuresever beensubjecteto
adversecriticisrn:nointhe Bechtelreport,nor in the HQI report,nor in any of the EC
reports. EventheEcologiareportspraisethe qualityof theconstructionworkandthe HQI
report, which was specificallymandatedto examine the works, records that these
"correspondentengénéra lux standardappliqué s.1S3.
7.114 Inconclusion,Hurigary'sallegatiinsrelationtu seismifiskarei11-
research ens,bstantiateand,inany event,withoutfoundation.Thensk of earthquakeis
dramaticallyvoked asifareaidisas tearawaited.But theris kasbeenthoroughlystudied,
by bothpartiesandhas beenfdly takenintaaccount.
SECTION S. TheProiect'sImpactonNavi~ation
7.115 Perhapsthe mostextraordm afrhe claimsinHungary 'semorialis
thatthe G/NProjectwouldentail certainsks to navigationOne of theprimaryaimsofthe
Projectwas tu improvenavigation;itimpactwouId be tu render the Danube navigableday
and nightfor330 daysper yeatinsteadofjusc120dayspet year;andthe safetyofnavigation
wouIdbe greatIyirnprovedduetotheincreasein navigabledepth. Hungary's claimsthatthe
"largewaves" accompanyingpeak productionwould have impairecinavigatiois simply
-
150
SecS. IovMkernori,ara2.50, B.
151
SecA.nnex26.
152 HungariaMemorialpara5.104.
153 HQIReportSIwak Maorial, Artr28 (ap.78). Seedw,theHQt RapportSyn*, Amex 12,
hereto,whinatesthathseismicvdueorigidy aIIoweforweradqate. incorrect. Peakoperation woulleadto fluctuatioinwaterlevels,but notwavesthatcould
impedea ship'sprogressupstrearordownstream.
7.I16 Infact, the navigableroute providedbyProjecthas beenspeciEcdy
approved by the Danube Commission,whichconsidered the Projecttobe the sole meansof
obtairiintherquirednavigationpossibilitsnthissector:
"Surle secteur tchécoslovaco-hongrois, secteurentreRajka et GiinyUy
compris, l'uniqueet rationnel moyen d'obtenirles gabarits de c*al
recommandé pour cesecteurestlaconstructiodecentraleshydrauliques ."
Translation:
I
"inthe CzechosIovak-Hungarianectus,includingthsectorbetweenRajka and
GnyC, the soleand logical means of obtainingthe recommended channef
dimensionsforthisectoris throughtheconstructioofthehydraulicworks."
Thishasbeenconfirmed bythetechnicaiexpertsof theDanubeCommissionw , hichmeton 7-
15 December1992 and foundthat:
"...lsatisfactiondeexigencesdes Recommandatione snvigueur relativeà
l'établissementsgabaritsdu chenal,des ouvrageshydrotechniquesetautres
surleDanube,constituela garantiepourque les conditionsnécessairesa la
navigatiosoientassurée15.st
Translation:
I
"...the satisfactionofthe reqiiirementsrecommendatiuns inforce for the
establishmentofnavigationchannedimensionshydrotechnicaand otherworks
on the Danube constirrrtes the guarmtee that the necessary navigation
conditionsmaybe assured."
! 7.117 The gravitof theproblemmaybe seen fromthe factthattheDanube
Commi~sion' recommended depthof23m was availablin theProjectsector fjust46% of
1990 and 40% of1992. It ifor thireason thatas noted in Slovakia'sMemorid, Hungary's
interruption ofthe works hasgiven rise tu numerom protests. Thus, the Union Ouest-
Européenne des Chambresde Commerce et d'Industrdes régionsrhénane ,onadienneet
danubienneb, y its resolution16 February 1990, demanded "...la reprisedes travaude
constructionduprojetcommuntchécoslovaco-hongro iabEkovo-Nagymaro s"'56
154 SIovAMernorial,ex 137[ap.245).
156
m., Annex 31.TranslatiT:heWestEuropeaUnionofChamber sfCommerceandIndu* for
thRhin¢,Rhoneand DanubeRegionsdemanda*..thermmmenoemeniof constructiworkson
thjoinf CzhosIovak-HiuigarianGaMlkmNagyrnarosRojeetSee.dm, M., paras6.147,g SEC~IUN~. Htln~arv's Amurnent Neelecfs the SoIutions Provided BY the
Proiecttu theRisk sfFIooding
7.118 Initsinterpretatiof the 1977 Treaty,Hungaryignorestheimportance
accorded to flood protectionbythe Treatyparties. But the fksof the statedaims ofthe
Treaty inthe preamble isthe developmentof water resourcesnot energirproduction. The
stressison navigationand,importantIyfloodcontroI. Thi sastispruvîdedforinArticle 13,
which precedesthe articlesrdating tuwater protection,navigationand protectionof the
naturalenvironment and is the fnst articin Chaptw V - "Water-Resource Management
Functions". Hungary's currenternphasisaway fiom the importance of Article13 must be
contrastedwiththeernphasip slacedinthe HurigariaAcademy ofSciences'Opinion of 1985.
There a general approvd tothe damming ofthe Danubeis given inorder, first, develop
navigation,second,toactiieveflood controlanthirdtu generateenergyIJ7
7.119 In fact, a main impetus forthe conclusionof the Treatywas the
experienceof disastrouffooding,in particulain thyears 1954 and1965'~'T .hismaybe
seen clearifiom Goverment resolutionspasse dntheaftemath ofthe I965 flood. Thuq for
example, on28 May1966t, he Presidencofthe SIovakNationaiCorincilconsidereda detded
report onthe 1965floodandadoptedtheposition that"themost Unportanttask [is] tu ensure
thefloodprotectionofthe territorincomection withthe [GN ~rojectj~'~~
7.120 Nonethelessat nostageinitsMemorial does Hungaryevenmentionthe
enormous benefit pruvîdedbythe Pruject interms ofhding a Iong term soIutionto the
Danube'stendency to severefl~odin~'.
g. See .lso, Fleischhacker,AnalysistheEffect of the GabiYkw~NagymarosSystem on
InternatioNavigatio1993,Annex27.
157
HungariaMemorial ,ol.5(ParT)Annex3.
1sg nieimpactsofthe pastfloodofam$ Ostroand Szigetkad,in partidar,thefi& of1954
and1965havealreabdeyediscrrssdnSlovakiMsemarial,tpara1.30g çea.
159 Remlutionofthe Pmidency otheSlwak NationaCouncii28 May 1966,Annex28. Sec.also
bution of theCzechoslwakGwemmen? ,0April 1%7,Arine 29,andpropsai ofthSIovak
Government,March 1972,whichfoundthat thG/N Projecwouldachievethe necessarflood
protectiand *thatthe constructofntheProjectcansubstantialower the oostsfor flood
protection. nne30.
150
Itmm k strd tha theria vasdinerenŒkfween theinundatiafthesidarm systeand its
fldpiainasa remitofthd mer andwinfefi& oflheDanub and thediW11s flh
thaMtt whena rivewEch haskn ~11ntroIbdyaserieoffld dykesbreaksthosdykes tiç
theseconrisktowhichtheDanubearawas expd atthetimeoftheinceptionof theGN Project;
forit wasfastflowing singlechannelwhose reguiarhighwatewerewntained,xoeptwhen
flooddykesburstwithdisast&cc. 7.121In tems offloodprotection,the Projectin its upstreamsectorwould
aIIowfor the dispersaiof floodwaters between the oid Danube, the side armsand the
sumunding floodplain,andwouIddso enable up to 5,200 m3fstu be channelai int he
bypass canai.The 10,00 0earflood,thatisa floodthe likelihoodof whichis1in 10,000,
couldthus be safelyhandled by dividig the floodwaters. In the downstreamsector,
floodwaterscouldbe controlîedwithinspecidy strengtheneinundationdykesreflectingthe
latestechology. AsHQIhasnoted:"iI y a iieude njamaisperdrede vue Iegainde sécurité
ainsiacquis."' ."But Hungaryignoresthesebenefits.
SECTION 7. Hunemirv'sAlle~ations Relatinv To the Financial Risks of the
Proiect
7.122The economics of the Projectifthey are tu be andysed, must be
analysechm thepointof viewof both partiesandasatthe dateofthe particrilubreach by
Hungarywhich itis tryito justify:questioas towhethertheProjectwas economic asof
1977, i.e .,iortothe commencement ofworksthatwere actuallyconstructed,are entirely
irrelevaIn tcannotbefor theCourtto evaluateorsecondguess theeconomicanalysesof the
Treaty parSreis1977.
7.123 The purposeof this Section isnot to providean after the event
assessrnenoftheProject'seconomicviabilitySlovakiadoeshoweverwishto point outthata
balancedanalysisofthe situatiin 1989-1992would necessarilshow thathe abandonment
of IargeIycornpletestmctures suasthebps canal,theDunakiiitweir,and theGabEikovo
power plant representedthe cornmitmeofa vastcapitaIoutIayfono returnthattheProject
offeredeconomic benefitsin additionto energyproductioni.e n tems of reliabIflood
control, better conditiofor agiculture, theend to riverbed erosion, vastly improved
navigabili~and a revitalissidearmssystem, eachofwhich had a realandhigh value;that,
therefore, by any standards, the cancelhtion ofthe Prcijectwmake nosense hm the
standpointofeconomics.
7.124 Thepurpose ofthisSectionis rathetoexamineHungary't sreatmentof
the Project's economicsl". For, the repetitivtheme, ntnningthroughthe Hungarian
Memurid andits annexes,isthattheconstructionofthe G/N Systemwas not economidy
161 HQIRapportSynthk, Anne22.Translatio:Thegaininsdty thuaqa mustnevebelost
sighof."
'" IRtbirespzttheCoruisal=inviteîothansideraiionofHungarysnomic analysintheso-
diai "Whik Book" ornpiidby variousHungariscientists. para ..47hve. There,
Hungarydyss arestrongIyrefrrted.See,Annepp.15-22).viable-for Hungaq. Hungq is cautious using thiasa specifireasonfor itsuspension,
abandonmentofworksand subsequen terminationof the 1977 Treaty. It is no doubtaware
thatthe factthattheProject involveda considerablinvestment,whichHungarydecidedin
1989-1992 thatitdidnotwant to make,offersnolegaljustificatiforitactions.
7.125 NonethelesqHungaryaccepts dso that,imediately priorto the
suspensio fnNagymaros, the Hungarian PrimeMinisterparticipatedina review ofa cost-
benefitanalysisofthe Project,which "concludedthatthe abandonmeno tfthe Nagymaros
barragewould be the mostreasonablechoice ..from theeconornicpointof vie^"'^^ .hus,
Hringaryadmits that i1989 decisiontususpendthe Nagymarossectionofthe Project was,at
leastin part, financidy motivataIla. It isusefiltu trace how this economic concern
developed.
7.126 Hungary'p slansto developtheDanubewerealwayscertain toinvolveit
in a significancammitment of resources. This was tme inthe early 1950s when, alune*
Hungq consideredplans tu constructoneor twobmages at Nagymam. It was noless tme
when, later, Xungary initiatednegotiationsin relationto a joint developmentwith
Czechoslovakia,or in1958 when apreliminarydecisiontodevelopwas reached,or in1977
whentheTreaty was ~i~ned'~~.
7.127 Hungary argues that,in1980, it commenced a review of its hancial
undertakings asa resuitof"thechangingworId economy andthe deterioratingeconomic
position ofthe Socialistbloc countries"and as a resultsoughta postponement of the
~roject" . Butthisisundermin eyitsassertionthatasfrom theperspectiveof1977, "there
was never thesIightestpossibiilhat theProjectwouIdbe completai inaccordance withthe
1977Treaîy tirnetable'".Thusthere wasno fundamentalchangeafterthe 1977 Treaty -the
circurnstanceisnquestionexistedprito thecreationofthetreatyobligations.
164
InChapterV ahve, it habeendemonstratethateconornconsideratiosereHungary'sgn&
motiveothethanplitical consideratiom.
165 Withregardtothjoint dwelopmentfarfromking pushediobadbargaisHungay negotid a
50% shareodielhcity pr&u&, whereasintermsofhydroeIectitentîaoftheDanukrswater
utilisiedhareshculody havekn 45%.
166 HungariaMernoria lara.3.42.
167 m., para.4.I5ThelegalramincatioosfHungaq'sargumensrewnsidereinChapteX. 7.128 In its 1983 position paper,the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
estimated thecosof Hungarys 'saroefthe Projecconstructionat30 billionForints. It noted
thatsuchdid not reflect the "unawidabinstaIIaticosts (suc hs the replation of theOld
Danube, purificationof the wastewaterof theregion,etc.)whichhavethe same orderof
rnagnit~de . Ifsdirecconclusionwas as fuiiows:
"ltis doubtedthatsuchanarnount ..canbe spenton a barragesystemwbich
willoptimallprovideelectriciody in 1993."
7.129 In theHungarianAcademy ofSciencesOpinionof 1985, thisposition
developedinto a recomrnendatiothatconstructionof Nagymarosbeputto onesideto avoid
"asignificantburdento the nationalec~norn~"' I~sp.articulaconcernwas to delaythe
heay investrnentrequiredto buildthe sewage constructionfacilitiesnecessaatGyorand
other toms that purnpedrawsewageinto fie ~anubel". This was clearlyfor national,
economic motives,not for enWumental rasons. The necessaryinvestmentswouid, of
course, have hadto be made at some stage,but if construction workmuid be carriedout
gradually,the burdenontheeconomyworrld be leçs.
7.130A more detaiIedarrdysis of the economicpros and cons of continuing
with Nagymaros was camed out inthe Hardi report. Ifoun dhat,takinginto account the
necessarysewage treatment andother environmenrtelatedworks, canceuationwas the most
satisfactoroutcornefor Hungaryin the shorttermalthough,long term, therewas littleto
choosebetweencancellation andcontinuationof construction.However,it was noted thatif
peak operationwere dropped, continuation immediatelybecame economically unviable
because thevalueof the electricishareto be takenbyHungarywould fa1sub~tantiall~"~.
Theeconornicconsiderationtshereforebegan totakeonalife oftheirown, thatledinevitably
to cancellation.Hungary was aware(in the 1983 positionpaper) thatthe construction
necessitateadditionaenrironment-relateexpenditures.To avoidsuchexpenditurest,hebest
means was tudefer peak production(the remmmendation ofthe 1985 HungarianAcademy of
SciencesOpinion). Once peak productionwas noIonger envisageil,fiom Hungary'spoinof
view, the Project lost its economic attractivenessdtogeth(theconcIusionofthe Hardi
report)In.
168 m., Vol. partg, Annex2.
169 'bi1Anna 3.
170 Secp.. 4.29,above.
171 HungariaMernoria lol.5(Part1Annex8 (ap.161).
in Thisisadmittby HungarySee . ungariMernorial,ara10.75. 7.131 As to Hungary'sargumentthatnoaccount was takenof the additional
costsofensuringtherequisitwaterqualityintheDanube atthetime ofthe allocationofjoint
investmentfundsinthe 1977Treaty,it mustbenoted thatthe partieindividualresponsibility
for the constructiof watertreatrnenplant wsas esîablishedpritu the signatureofthat
Treaty, rhaisbyArticle1l(1)of the 1976Boundary Waters Management Agreement. This
provisionwas reflecteinMick 2 ofthe 1977Treaty, whichrelatedtu thecaqîng out of
national investmerithd such spec5cdly nationalinvestmenthad dways been envisaged.
Thus, forexample,intheProtoc01 ofthe negotiatioof18-20 April 1963itwasagreed that
"investmentswhich...serveforamelioratioof presenstate,wiIbeguaranteed by eachside
units own tenitor withlit4 own means"In. Thisprinciple was maintained inthe 1977
Treatyalthoughmodifiedto theextentthathejointinvestmentwould coverthefollowing:the
restoratioof vegetationin Czechoslovakand Hungarianterritor- Aïticle5(5)(a)(5)and
(b)(13);and, in addition,the improvemenof the old riverbedon both Czechoslovakand
Hungarian territory,suchworbeingthesoleresponsibiliofHungar -yArticl5(5)@)(6).
7.132 As noted in the Slovak Memonal,Czechoslovakiadid take the
necessarysteps 4th itsnationalinvestmentprogram and was ahead of schedirlin its
planneù construction of sewage treatmenf plants by 1989"'. But Czech&vakia1s
expenditures,whetherin terms of itnationalinvestmentsor its fuIfiImeofconstruction
obIigations,haveneverhad my relevanceto Hungws ecunomic analyseswhich have ben
carried out solefrom the Hungananpoint ofview. Neitherhasany accountbeen taken of
the fact thatby May 1989CzechosIovakiafs shareofthe construction work had been
cornpleiedtu around90% (asopposed toaruund 40% for Hungary). The abandonmentofthe
Projectfor CzechusIovakiaodd dearythereforehavebeen economicaiyl disastrous.
7.133 Itis Iiterdlythecasethat Hungary's econornicanalysesignorethe
existenceof the1977 Treatyand ofCzechoslovakia as a partthereto. Thus,in theHardi
report,iis baldlstated:
"Each and every item includesthe vaiuescalculat onedthe basis of the
technologicalrequirementand~xcludes, estimatesfor damages 115ne wilI
requestamendment o theagreementssignaibetweengovernments .
173 Annex31,he~to. This mxtiisrefendtatpara3.23riHungaq'sMernorial.
174 SIovaMkernoripara3.21.Secai=,para4.42elses .,ve, anAnnex9,hereto.
1711 HmgarianMernoriaVol.5partI),ex 8 (ap.I6I-emphasiadded),in thecalculationthe lossesthatCzechusIuvakiwa iIIinevitabIysuEer are simply put toone
side. AIso îgnored iç a valideconomicevaluation of the Project'sbenefitstermsof flood
control, for example).In essence,the anaIysisis whollyone-sided and tiIted towards the
inevitabIeconcIusion of the Project'sabandonment. The sameapproachis foIIowed in
Hungary'sMemurid whichfaiIsto provide a bdanced andysis,renderingvaluelessHungary's
discussionofeconomic issuesreIaiintutheProjea.
SECTION 8. Condusions
7.134 Hungarylsallegationsas to environmentalriskand damagethreaiened
bythe onginalProjectwere not supportecblyimpartialandscientificevidenc- not aithe fime
of Hiingary's suspension of works, nor at thetirne of its subsequent abandonment of
constmctionwork on theNagyrnaros andGabEikovo sections,norat the dateofitsprrrported
terminationof the2977 Treaty. AndHungary has nowfailedto suppIysuch evidence in its
Mernorial.
7.135 The bestevidence availableincludingtheactualimplementation of the
Projectin partialand approximate form by rneansof Variant"C",showsthe Project to be
environmentall yustainable.It showsthatHungary has greatlyexaggerated f not invented,
risksto watersuppIies and has,inorderto strengthenits arguments,detberatelyignoredal1
thosemeasurestakenduringtheProject's evolutionto optimiseitsimpactonfioraand fauna,
forestryandagriculture.
7.136Furthemore,Hungaryhas totallyignoredthe reaIandvery necessary
benefitsthatthe Projectwas to offerintermsof improvednavigation andflood protection.
And initstreatment of seismicissues,ihasnot even attempted toupdate itsassessrnentas
containedin the 1992Declaratioq an assessrnent of riskthatwas in any event wild inits
assertionsand that SIovakihaseasiIyand definitivelyrebutted.Finally,Hungary'sanalysisof
the Project'seconomicshas beenshown to be one-sidedand whoIIyuncertain intems of its
Iegitrelevance. The simplefact is that,asSbvakia has dernonstratedthrough putting the
GabCikovosectionof the Froject into operation through Varian"Cu ,he Project wasand is
sustainableborh inenvironmentaandeconomic tems. 8.O1 The Hungatian Mernoriah expositionofthe actud orpotentid
environmentaldamage arisingfromVariant"Cm-asopposed to theorigindProjeci-is
noticeablyuncertaiintone. ItisfiststatedthattheimpactsofVariant "CM"may be
lessthanthe 1977BarrageSystemwouldhave beenu. However, itis claimedafew
lines Iatthatthis impactis, fact,nlikelto bemore severt?*. Inorder to avoid
such confusion,it essentid tfocusonthe key differencesbetweenVariant"C"and
theG/Nproject2.
8.02 Firç Vt,nant"CH isan approxhateimplementation ofonlyone
partofthe G/NProject,theGabCIkovs oectionThismeans thatVariant"C" cm have
noneof the adverseimpacts that Hungaryalleges would have resultedfiom the
construction ofNagymaros, &., no adverse impact on either water IeveIq water
quaIityor theenvirument generaIIdownstrm ofSap (FdkoviEovo)and,of course,
no adverseimpacton theBudapestdrinkingwatersupplywe11s 3
8.03 Second, the impIcmentationof Variant"C" means that the
bypassedstretch ofthe Danube cannow deveIop more namrdiY4. This ha been
confirrnenotonlybythe EC workinggroups butdso inarecentpaperby anexpert
on riverrestoration,Dr.MartinJaeggiof the SwissFederalInstituteof Technology.
Dr. Jaeggisupports the idethatrestorationoftheold Danubeis made possibleby
1
HungariaMemonal,paras5.108and5.109Sec .lso,thefavouraepinionconiaiind
App.3totheHungariaMernona(alp.422)Sec,para8.04bdow.
2
IIIns.NoCM4 and -10prtray tmsineIementso=ch;andIlIriso.CM-1Ishowsthe
presestatofcompletiooftheGaMikow don ofthePro& includurtheDuraakiliti
weirwhichwasvirtuacompletdwhenHungaryabandonedthProjeçt.
3 However,Varian"Camajhavea positiimpactonwaterqualitdownstreaduetothe
aeratidect awaterpassingthroughtGabEkovohydroeI&c powerplant.
4 EC WorkingGroupreporof 23 November1992,ungarianMernoriaV,ol. (Fart
Annex14.Vafiant"CH (asirwould havebeen bythe original G/N ~roject)'. He proposethat
some of the"traininworks" - ripraand gropes -thathadbeeninstalledto confuie
theriverwitbinthemainchannelfornavigationpurposes,butthatarenowof Littluse,
be rernoved. AccordingtoDr. Jaeggit&s could"induceIateralerosionandwidening
ofthe existingchanneoftheOldDanube".Thus:
"A wider channelcm thenbe expectedto bifurcateand braid. With
time, achannel systemcomparabtl otheone existinbeforethemain
regdation maydevelup...
On fhewhole,the newriverWU becorne sorof amode1of fheoriginal
river andthus not be identicato it. But the expected natural
developmentofa channelsystemcomparabl eo theoriginawillfavour
thereformi ongnaturalmorphologicaielementswherepioneerplants
cansettleandthecycleof formatioof analluvidforestmay startagain
... In ~eneraltems.a hinherhabitatvarietycornparedtuthe ~resent
situatiocanbe ex~ected."
SIovakiais infull agreementwiththe viewsexpress4 in Dr. Jaeggi'spaper,which
showswhatwoufd bepossiblewithHungary'c sooperation.
8.04 ThÎrd, the dammingof the Danube 10 km upsfream of
Dunakifti, atthe Slovak village of bnovo, meansthat the actual reservoir is
considerablysmallerhanthatoriginal1envisaged.TheHungarian Memonaltakesthe
vicw thatthi seductionin siz"edecrease he riskof eutrophication"'. Appendix3
also notes: "Fromtheview pointofsubsiirfaweatersthe "VarianC" strategy,thais
the impoundment at $unovo], is more favourable, ta some extent, than the
impoundment a tunaki~it."
8.05 Hungary nonetheless,offersthree mainreasonswhy Variant
5
MariinN.R Jaeggi,SwisFederalInstihofTechnologyZ, urich PossibioftRiver
RemrationontheDanuixinrelatitotheGaMlkovoScheme.Octokr1993Amex 32.
5 HrrngxianMcrnoria,am 5.108.The ensuincIaimthataccordintotheEC Working
Gmup ofExperts,ariskofhamifuleutrophimtnemainsis misldng.Theriskwodd
onlyarisif Vari"Cm wereoperatina mannesdirectcontratoSIovakia'ntentions
andwishesSec .ara7.36ahm."Cu'simpact shId be seen asbeing moreseved. Eachof thesereasonsiswithout
substance. Ttis degd that"Hungq did not pIanshort term technicd fixes tu
compensate for the wateIossn,thatHungary"receivesabsolutelynobene&" fiom
Variant"C" and thatit"ha nocontroIoverthesupply ofwater". Slovakiawntests
each ofthese degations. Furtherit considersthat insofassevere envirumental
damagetu Szigetkozhasbeen suEered by Hungq, this isentirelydue tu Hungary's
wiIfuIintransigencandisnot theinevitabresulofthe damming oftheDanube.
8-06 With regardtuthe ~st degatioriitiscnrcidtu remernbethat
Hungary had plannedforand builtthnecessa fryilittosensurethe waterrecharge
andrevitdisatioof the Szigetküzsidarms within the GfN Project. Thesefacuies
remàrned availabla#thethe of the implementatioofVariant"CH. Thesewere no1
short term fixesfor none were neces-;they were concretestepsto ensure a
revitalisedsidami systemhm the instant ofthe dammingof the Danube. Thus,
Hungary providedfor:
-Constmction ofa watersupplystructurinthe Dunakilitiweir
fordischargeup tu 200m3/sintu the Szigetküzsidms, which was
readyatthe timeofcompletionof the DunaJuIiweir,i.e I.ngbefore
the putportedtermination ofthe 1977 Treaty(the locationof the
Dunakilitiiritisshown in Illus.NoCM-?);
-The necessq connectionin theSrigetk~zsidearmsyste rn
enablewatedow tu be distributtoal liverbranches;
- Projectioof maures to ensurehigher water IeveIinthe
Danube,&., underwaterweirs.
Further,dthough Hungary hassubsequentlbyeenun*g tomakc useof theintsike
at Dunakilitiit did plan fur and pdycarriedout the works toensurethe water
rechargeofitssidearmsjustupstreamof Dunakiliîi. Thuit providefor:
8 m., para,5.109.ut-^ al=,m., para10.29 :VariaCtwas IiabItmate smar
damageto..thoriginRoject* Hm&aryis extremelyinwnsistethisointAtm..
pam 5.109Hugary infacenmerates fivasons,theIasIwoofwhich,bmr, Irave
nord ~levanŒ. ThefourthreasoreIatwde1ytowmmic chang~~ inIIungarysin=
1988- 1989.Hen~, iisinnowq a -II particultotheimpactofVarian"C" as
opposxitothoriginPmjd As tcthe reason,theiaîefothchangiensiw othe
resewoirk Assisseenasa beneficimpaa inthep&g paragraophHungary's
Mernorial,ndasnoMer explanaiiis given, isdiniculto precixlywhat
Hungay'spint is. - A projectto constnrct anundenvaterweir upstrearn Dunakiliti
(atrh 1843)" ;
-
Openingofthe fortifiedbanksofthe Dmube main channe1 at
thre peointsupstreamofDrinakiiitanddredgingofconnecting
canaisfro he channe]tutheade ms.
8-07 Internisofbenefithm Variant "CH, Hungasr now receivesa
regularand assuredsupply inruthe Mosoni Danube of 20 m3/s and a fIow of
approxhately 3 m3h îrom the reservoih ri& side seepagecanal 1. But, ofeven
geater importance,forthe£ksttime Szigetküzisnow safeguardedCornthethreat of
devastatingfloods suchas thatof 1954 which cause Hdungq lossand damage in
mess of HbiIIiodollars1ZT.histhreaof a "bigfloodcatastrophe",vividlydescribed
by theHungarianhydroIogistDr.Vagz in 1991,hasdisappcared (intheupperpartof
theProjectarea)becausefloodwaters cm now bechanntIIe nto thebypasscand13.
8.08 Thus,Hungq's contentionthatit hm no controI over flood
waters, which may inundate Szigetkoz "ina matter of hours", iswhoIiy without
sense14. Pior to thehplementation of Varia nCt",Hungary did nothavecontroI
over themeterologicd changes thatcreatefifloodThis hm not changed. The oniy
dflerence is thadut tuthe implementationofVariari"Cm uch floodwaterscan be
divertedintothebypasscanal,authatmen ifiisnot possiblejusasbeforetuprevent
IO
ThiswasprohibitbytheHungarianParliamenSec .ars8.I1,betow.Theundemater
weirworb byraisinlhe wateImeIintheriveupsweamof theweirandaIIowinilow
throughIowersectionsitheDanuh rivehnh inbthesidm. Sec1.1111s.CM-
12,appeariatpara8.II, kiow.
Il
An increaoftheflowdiverid inuheMosoniDanube to 30-4m21siscurrendyking
engineered.
IZ SlovakMernoria.axas.31and5.06.
13 g., Annex 34. Dr.Vaga sfated:"Tho=who&servedlheami ofAu@ 1991,were
strucby the fathat .the wateIeveIatDunarerneie[oîheHungariansideoffie
Danuk, oppsite GaWRroa waof30cm higherthanhemaximum Iwels rneasuinthe
1954fid. Thetimebmb is[ticking..inthefoIIowingEn yeaaIowerbackwafeof
theDanuk cancawc a-bigfi& catastrophA hwdwakr canaiwascomdeted..which
wiimotm SzipetkCz~ainstfi&. CzxzhwSIovakiaiII nwedismanîlethseadwater
cd forthi su. ifHungaq dw motallowthaapaR ofthDanuk wateisdrainato
thiFanainiheeventoa fi thusi,an thebreakofthprowon dyke becauçeif
gatheresrtspendId wiIIreacitpeakIan saoniyGd saveSzigetktizwoddsay
that isthe opinioof expert-hydmiogists.ButîhïsisaIsothe opinion lhe
Conunissi ofwatermanagemeno tftheHungarianAdemy ofScien~w."(Emphasis
addd.) It muak nulaithaSllovalkmtorydownstreamofthebypss anai rernains
exposefoa reaflmi dangedue toHrrngarytbandonmenottheNagymaros&OH of
theFroject.suddenincreasesin surfacewater levelatleastthe level of these increacan be
reducedandcontrolled.
8.09 Hungary is by no mas powerlessin tenns ofifscuntroI of
watersupplies. Ihastheabilitytuensuretherevitalisationitssidms; but it has
madethe decisionnot to takethe necessarysteps inordertopresewe evidenceof
ecologicahm andthus furtheitIegaldaimsagainstSlovakia.
8-10 Inthis respect,Hungq has placedbefure the Courta false
picturof theimpact ofVariant"CH onitstektory- afdsificationthrnanifesttseif
on theactud terraiofSzigetkoz.It itruethatsame Hunguîan river brancheshave
driedup,thatfishhavedied,thatflorhas beenadverselyaffecîedBut noneof these
impactsisthe inevitableresultof the implementatof Variant"CM. Rather,these
impactsare the directresuof a ddiberateand cdculatedrefusaltuirnplementthe
waterrechargewhichisnecessaT totheregion, whichwouId besimple taimpIernent
and which would in any casehave been necessaryhad Hungarycomplied with its
Treatyobligations.
8.1 m. Hiingary has refusedto putthe Dunakilitioffkakinto
operationk., todiow forthe revitalisatiofthe sidearmsas originalplanned by
the ~rojec". Second,regardlessof thirefusaithe EC WorkingGroupfound tbat
adequateflow intothHungarian sidearmscouldstilbe securedian underwaterweir
werebuiltupstreamof Dunakiliti.Asnotedinthefinairecommendationo sftheECin
the TemporaryWater ManagementRegime report of 1 December 1993: "This
underwater weiis tu ensurethe watersupplytothe
Hungarian f~ood~lain.~ Approvdwas given for sucha proje.by the Hungarian
Government,and the Danube's rivebarikswere kwered at threepointsto dlow
interconnectiowith the sidems onHungarian territory.The functioningof the
underwaterweirisshowninIllus.No. CM- 12. Buttheweir remainsunbuiidue tothe
intervention of the HungarianPariiamenf,frasons thatconcern onlyHungary's
victory in the current disputenot the presentationofits environment. Thuaç
recorded intheHungarîannewspaper-1
15 This~efus ianexpiimblkause the watewharge inttheSIova aidam basken
extremelysuccesarndthiseportpr&& thesamekneficiai impafor Hun@an
terrifory if rechargisimplernentdn asimilade asis cmenliythe on
SIovatrritorm.. Vol.5parta, Annex19 (ap.790).
16
m., (ap.816,emphasisadded). "At the extraordina sssion of parIiamentary council for the
environment on Monday ..it was said that the constructioof a
temporary weircouldunfavourablivduence the decisionof theICJin
The Hame ..LajosZsebok,the deputy of theHungarian Democratic
Forum drew attentionto the dangerof a solution consistingin
underwater weirs17.
But this "danger*doesnot relatetu environmedamage. Mr.Zçebük's concernwas
quitedierent :
"Wecould conhn with thissolutionthat iis possiblto eliminate
unfavourableffectsoftheDanubediversionthrough technicamaure
andthus we would give up theideaof the rehrn ofthe riverand a
decisionothe Hase favorrrabIerus .
It is theparliamentsinterventithathasdowed the presentadverseenvironmental
impact. And, as afollowup articleinMagvarXrla~ makesclear,this intervention
went against local and Governent support for the underwaterwek and the
acceptancedits eficacy:
"Weare inan emergwrcy situatiowe must actimmediately.We must
hish withhesitationsItwillnomore bepossibleto repaial1whatwe
don'tdo today in two years-Mr. Boross expressechisview when
visitingSzigetkoz. 'NaturalifParliamenrtejectsthe projecofthe
inhabitantsfSzigetküzsupportalbythe goverment, the undenvater
weirwiilnot be constmcted. Then, itwiIIbe necessarytu facethe
pubIicand teIIwhythe enviromnentis dyinout4- thePrime Minister
highlightedthwaterappropriationuestionasa nationai atter."
The reasonfortheParliament'sstanceisthenexplained:
"Accordingtu the expertsof the Department forthe Environment,
some rnembersof theDanube Circleandthe Parliamentarj.ound for
Envirumen1 aiProtection, the realisaofthe guvernmentd proposal
would negativelyMuence the long-terminterestsof Hungary. We
wouldadmit,withthis solutionthat iis ~ossiblto Dreventnegative
sidesoftheDanubediversion , ewouldgiveuptheretur onfthe river
anda favourabldecisionofthecourtlg."
17
Mamar Hirlaa1March1994,hnex 33(ernpbassdded).
18
Mam HirIa,7March1994,Annex34.
19 Ibid.{emphaadded).
- 8-12 The ody masure Hungary has taken is the recent actionof
purnpingwater fiom theold Danubeintothesideams at vhs points. Thisproject
makesnosense. It iselaboratdexpensive,particuiarincornparisowith thecostof
construcrinanunderwater wei?. Aiso,as pointedoutinthe Hungariannewspaper,
Kisalfdd,the"resulofhundred miliioninvestmentithe waterIeveIincrase ofsome
centimetresinthenid of Szigetkozandthenegativeimpactsfailedtu bestoppedn2'.
The relevantparagaphofthearticleconcludes:
"But the gravitationalwater supply would have diminishedthe
Szigetkozdarnagemuchmoreeffectively andwithlower costs."
8.13 Thisis entkelycorrect. Theconstructiof anunderwaterweir
(referredtointhearticleas"gravitationwlatersupply")would raiswaterlevefsin
theDanubekrbd andenabIe theSPgetkGz sidems tobe suppliedby waterflow
throughthe gaps opened in the Danube'sbanksby a simple graviîy flow. This
operation, which is show in IlNo..CM-12, wouM costjust30 miIIioForintsand
have practicaInorunriingcosts. It wouIdsobe farmoreeficient. Not ody would
the flow into tsideamis be farhigher,butdso thequalityof thewaterin the side
ams wouldrapidly improve. The currentmesures, bycontrast, wiaImost ceriaidy
Ieadtu eutrophicatioconditionin theHungarian sideam asa resultofthe srnaII
amount ofwaterbeingpumpedand anegativeimpacton groundwaterquality.
C. TheEvidenceRelied on bv Hun~arv: Overview
8.14 It wouId be impossible to glean the importantfacts just
discussedabove eitherfromthe HungarianMernorial or fiom the non-govermental
organisatioreportsonwhichHungaryrelies soheavily,thais thevariousstudiesof
EquipeCousteau and the WorldWildlife Fund ("WWF"). Before examiningthe
actual, recorded impacts ofVanian"Cuthat have heen detaiIedinteraliq inthe
variousEC WorkingGroup reports, Slovakia wishesbrieflytu comment on the
evidentid valuof thereportsof thesetwo non-governmentalorganisations.WhrIe
therecm be no doubt thattheEquipeCoustesu and WWForganisationsplay a vitai
roIc both in raisingpublicawareneof environmentalissues andin takingconcrete
stepstu addresssuch issues,nonethelesSlovakiaconsiderthat the contributiof
20
Thecosofpurchasinthepumpingequipmentasapparentl120 millionForandsthe
Septembe1994thebudgetforthisFasarhausteyHungarianewçpaperK, isalf10d
September994.Annex35.both tothis particulcase has notbeen based on a vaIidor impartiascientific
evaluation.
8.15 Tu takeoneexample,theHungarianMemonai quotesfrom the
report prepareby theAustrim armof WWFin Januar 2994 asauthorîtyfor the
contentionfhaVaiarit"CH"inevitablw2l rault idetrimentaalterationand that
"even though mmy impactsarenut jrevisibletuthe publicthey caridready Ise
moniroredby experWP. But the expertbestplad tornonitorand analysVanant
"Cri'impactsare those tmlfamiliawith theProjeeti.e .h,members ofthe EC
WorkingGroup of Independent Expertsthe scientistsworkinon thePHARE
program and those Hungkan and Slovakscientistswhohavestudiedthe Projectin
depth. Aii thesexpertshave corneto a differeconclusionasto the impactsof
Variant"C" fiomthatputforwardbytheWWF. TheEC WorkingGrouphas found
no significantchangesisudaceor groundwaterquality- hdings acceptedby the
Hungarianrepresentationthe Workin g roupZ. The WWF's portrayaof invisible
dangersknowrionlytounidentifidxpertsisthereforeextrememisleading.
8.16 Unfortunately,he WWFpublicationsin relationtothe GlN
ProjectarecharacterisedbaIackof indepthscient& studyand aprejiidiceagainst
the Project. WWF AustriapuMishedin January1994 acritiquof the workofthe
variousEC Wurkng Gtoups,a wpy ofwhichwas annexedtoffrrngds ~emorifl.
A carefuland detailed rebutof thicritiquhas been preparedby ProfessorIgor
Mucha, theSIovakrepresentativtu thvariousEC Working Groups. This rebuttai
foms hex 24 tothispleading.
8.17 ProfessoMucha's rebuttalwasalsosentfor reviewtoWWF
Internation(distinfiomWWF Austria).ThereplyofDr. Magnus Sylven,Director
ofWWF'sEuropeandMiddleEastRegionalProgamme,is important toananaiysisof
the meritsof the respectiveanalyThi.setter,whichappeartoexpressa personal
view, constitutesanembarrassdejectiofWWF's involvemento date:
"Thankyou verymuchfor yourkindreceptionatthetimeof WWF's
visittoGabEikov onJune3.
1apologisefornothavingwrîtteearlie..thisdelayhm enabledme tu
havetheopportuniqto carefirreadyourstudyentitled"GabEikov o
-.
a HrrngariMnemaria, ar5.107.
23 Sec .am 8.21kiow.
24 HmgarianMernoria. ol.partIlA,mex20. -215-
Wu. 1 wouIdIike totelyou how impressedI am bv vour workand
knowIedge onthissubiectandhow embarrassecI!personaIiyTeelabout
W's pastinvolvement.
..*
I havetodayhadan opportunity to assessthecase with the Director
Generalof WWF - International,Dr. ClaudeMartin. We haveboth
ameedto immediatelystop aii firther involvement fiom WWF -
Austria. Dr. Martiwillbe sending apersonallettertoIng. Dominik
Kocinger assuringhim thattherewiilbe no futureinvolvementfrom
WWFunless a fod re95estisreceivedÇom the Slovaksidewhich,of
course,we donotexpect ."
AithoughW has sincedecidedto standby its reporofJan~~ar y93426,SIovakia
believesthatit isfuIjistified inconsiderithe pubIicationof in relationtu
the GlN Projet tu beofIiftIeevidentiavalue.What at leastis clear is that there has
been greatinfernaldivisionwithinthat organisat.7nZ
8.18 The publicationsofEquipe Cousteau are aiso consideredto
havebeenprepared withoutdemonstratint ghenecessaryresearchintothecomplexities
of thisparticulacase. The 1993 publication, TheDanube ..For WhomandFor
What?" extensivelyciteintheHungarian Mernoriali,sverybroadin its coveragand
extremein itsconclusion.Oneof itkey recornmendationfso,r example,isthatthe
production ofnucIearenergyfor al lheDanubianStates be ended28. This shows a
focusofctlncernfarremoved fium thisProjeci.
8.19 Hungary aIsocitesasan authoriîative murce the March7993
pubIicationofa grorrpcdIed theSlova UknionofNaArreandLmdscape Protectors
Lettedated14June1994, Anne36(emphasisadded)This-ex alsocomprisesaIetter
fromDr.ClaudeMartintatheSlova klenipotentifortheG/N Projectconfirrningthe
suspension'anyMer involvemenotfWWF intheGabMcwo issue".
26
LetferdateOa&r 1994,Amex 37.
27
Inthis respecf opinionofT.PaEeJ,one of tscieatiskbd theWWP report of
Januar1994,isimportantBy lettof5 Seplemkr1994 herwîewedProfeçsorMucha'J
rapusc (Annex24), irrsistiProfesçPaEw' mbmissiontnWWF hadnofkn based
on"fieIdor labrafoadies and thahti"apiniomhavekn bad onthe dmmenrs
offd .byWWF".Furthemore,ProfessorPa- praiçwtheqdityofr-ch bySIovak
scientistsconiinuing *Nbave1founany mm whytodoubtMucha'sstatemethat
the grounwaterqualitbasnot signrficanyhgd &r one year oftheGmovo
opration."Heconcludehisletter:"1haafeelinthatgroundwaterandmufe wa&r
quaiitywillaminorproblemwithitheGaMlkow)issue."Anne38. L
2g HungariaMernoriaV,ol.5 (PattA,nnex16(atp571). I
I
f("suNLP")~~.This dso is no realauthority,althoughit is cassuch inHungary's
~ernorid". It cornpisesno morethan a senesofwhollyunsubstanti alleedtions,
based on the fiadings of unspecifred"independent experts". It is repIetMth
misleadingstatementq materidmors andinconsistencieandis fahm *mpartia1 3'
8.20 In conclusion, Slovakia cunsidersthat Hungary has reIied
heady onpublicationsthat arefar fiom impartial.EnWumental gïoups approacha
pre-existingdevelopmentfrom a pre-determi pnintof view. Hence,impartialitis
difficulttoachieve,especidly when a party likeHungaryis avowedlyabandoning
constructionwork on claimedenvironmenta lrounds.
SECTIO N. The Actual, RecordedImaactsof Variant "C"
A. Surfaceand GroundWaters
8.21 The commentq contained inChapter 5 of the Hungarian
MemuridunVariant"Cu'i smpactansurface and pund watersis Iimitedtutheissues
ofchangingwaterleve12~. Inother words,nodaim ismade as to achangeinwater
qudity. This is significant,foritreflectsthe confirmationof the Hungarian
representativto theEC WorkingGroupof Expert tsattherehad been no detectable
change inwater qualitas aresultofthe dammingof the~anube~ ~ Infact,thelatest
ECWorkingGroupreportnotedasto Variant"Cn :
"The impacts on the surface water qualie are expected to be
insign5carit."
39 Secforexamplem., VoI.1,para5.134.
31
Forexample,wbdeit is claimedbySUNLP thatthe1977Tmty "was hastiratifiin
1977",afewlineslaterisaotethattheTreatwassigned"aftpqmtion worklasting
dmost 20years".It alsoallegedthatth1973oil crisisto aradicalchangeinthe
ProjecdesignincludingtheextensionofGabëkandthecreatiofthebypascana atd
theDunakiliti-Hmbreservoi. hiscompletelwrong ,sisclear,notIeastfChapter
3oftheHungarianMernoria,aras3.02-3.40.
33
% pam 7-62above-% alsotheadmissionmntaineinApp.3toHm&s Mernorial
(atp.422):"No qudîlaticharigahaveyetbeen deta& up theeffectothe water
edItratinhm the reservaoniridiltratfrom thwaferrechargsystemordue?Othe
alterafiodirecti011~.* "Theimpacts on the pund waterqualiv areingenerai expectedtu be
in~i~nifican~~
Thusneithershorttermnorlong termdeteriorationis expsted. Nor has therbeen
anychangein qualitor contaminationoftheDanube's alluvialrave1and sedinent-
as demonstrated by sarnplestaken (under supewision fiorn the Netherlands'
independentscientists) and anaiyse (n the Netherlands) within the PHARE
program3 ' Fearsof heavymetalaccumulation inthesediment settleinthereservoir
or the presence there of toxic hydrocarbonshave been proved to be greatly
exaggerated.
8.22 As to water Ievels, Slovakia contests both Hungaryïs
presentarionoftheimpactof thedamming and thestatist putconvardin support. It
is rnisfeadintheextreme tustatethatan "inmediateconsequence" ofthe diversion
was that "sidebrancheswere cut off from the main~hannel"~ ~,hen itis wefi
establishethatpriorto thediversioa fullconnectionbetweenthe sideams andthe
mainchannelwas achievedoniy attimesof floodingthatis forno morethanaround
20 daysper yea?7.
8.23 SimiIarIt,he figuresgivetu show thedecreasein theground
waterlevelsinSzigetkfizareexaggerated.Itisclaimedthatthese were"up to3m in
the floodplaiandup to 1.5m onthe protectedsiden3'. However, Appendix 3 to
Hungary's Mernorialshows a decreaseof 2-3minthe territordongside theDanube
but adecreaseofjust0.5m inthemiddIe regionof ~zi~etküz~~And insome areasan
increasehasbeenrecorded:"thegroundwaterleveb [inIfungay] have dso increased
closeto the [Cunovo] reservoir",sthe EC WorkingGroupreport of2 November
1993 recorded4'.
34
EC WorkingGroupReportof 1Decemhr 1993HungarianMernorial,Vol5 (PartII),
Annex19(atpp.783-784).
35 "PreparatiofInpuParameterforMdeI ofGmund WaterRow, Danubianbwland -
Mode1Smx, PHAREProje ECfwATf 1,Dtzmkr 1993, Anne39.
37 SeeforexampletheECWorkîngGroupreportof23November1992, .,VoI.5partQ,
Anna 14(atpp.435-436).
38 m., Vol. para ..112.
39 Ibidp. 422.
40 m., Vol.5 (Partil), An18. 8.24 Furthmore the decrease that hasbeen recorded isnot an
inevitabieresuofVariant"c"~ .'
8.25 StartinginAugustf 993, Hungq begantudivert 10 & of
the flow it receivesin MosoniDanube hto thesideami vstem. The impactof
even this smd amount of water (smallcomparec lo the flowthatcould easily be
divertedbymeans of theunderwaterweirrecornmende dythe EC butdeniedby the
HungarianParliament) is impressive. The decrease in groundwater level in
cornparisowith thepre-diversiolevelhasbeen reducedtozeroin averysubstantial
areaof Szigetkozandtheareainwhich a decreasof morethan 0.5mwas expenenced
wasmorethan halved. Thisis depictedinlllus.No.CM-13.Essentiallytheimpact of
the 10m3is@lus water idiltrationthe Slova sideof the Danubeand undergruund
seepage fiom thereservoir)hasbeen tu restrictpund water IeveIchangestu a
relativelynmw comdor alongsidetheDanube inUpperSzigetküz.
8.26 Hunguy'sdepiction of the "longerterm consequericesofthe
diversion- "thedropinwater level,thedisappearancefseasonalfluctuatiandthe
lackof waterenteringthesidebranches"-isonce againveryrni~leadin~~ ~ach one
of these effectswildisappearwith the implementationof the rechargeprogram
plannedfor the Hungariansidearm~~~. This hasbeen verifidby theEC Working
Group of Experts.In itsreporof 1December1993,the scenariowas consideredby
whichthe currmtrechargeofIO m3fs wasincreased "tothesamelevel asthe one
presemljrexistinon the Slovakiansidenu. The predictedimpact ofthis was as
follows:
"GroundwaferIeveIsonthe Hungariantemtory areexpectedto benot
Iowerthan ithe pre-damconditions.
43 interms othe mi- oftherechargeprogram inthSIovaside armssec.SI&
Mernoria.ara5.38gtm.
4 SeeHiuigariaMernorial,Vol. 5 parthex 19(at p.787). wi11 noted thaz,
acwrdingtthesame~prt (ap.771)theHungarîasidamiareais sirnlotheSlovak
area.II --
I I .
1 II - . Reestablishingthe dynamicsof groundwater IeveIfluctuationswilto
largeextentbepossibIedownstream thereservoird."
Moreover, once accumulatedmudhasbeenclearedoff,this flowwouldbe sufficieto
maintaintheHungaian sidems freefromexcessmudandsedimentand toreestablish
a good connectionwiththeunderlyingaquifer:
"The nverbed inthemainbranches on theHungarian sidewilIbecorne
sufficientfree fiom mud, so that good idtration conditionswiII
exist"."
B. Soi1andApriculture
8.27 The HungarianMernorialpredicts a "prirnariIIong tem
impact" ontheSzigetkoz soi1regmedue to Variant"CM. It supportthisassertioby
a seriesof statisticsreIattareducedwater IeveIandreducedsoi1 moistureIevels,
measurements taken inMarch 1993. But, as isclearfrom fllus.No. CM-13, these
rneasurernentswere no longer valid der August 1993 (afterwhich datea limited
dischargeintotheHungarian sidems wasachieved).Thus,Hungaryhaspredicted a
long terrneffect onthe basisofa shortpend of measurements thatare no longer
vdid. And,if the rechargeinto the Szigetkazsideamis is increaseto the redistic
levelof 40-50 m31s by means of increasinthewaterIevel inthe oldDanube by the
constructionof underwater weirs4'in combinationwith theincreased flowinto the
45 Ibid(ap.790)T.hisialsome forthesidarmsbetween~unovoandDunakilitithatwere
=ed tobe ilded undetheG/N Project.
47
Sec.&ex 24(atpp.98-10. This gves twhnid deWs ofthe propoçedundenvater
weirs,explaitheifunctioniandpurpose,anddço explainthedissimilarwiththe
wem- bges usedontheRhinenver.&g al=, IllNo. CM-12.appearinatpara
8.I1.ItwiII notedW theconcepoftheundenvatereirhaskn specifrdlyapproved
bytheEC WoricinGroupofExpertsSec .x.,itreporof 2Novemkr 1992.Hmgarian
Mernoriai, o5@art Il),nnex14(atp.418).Mosoni Danubet ,hemeasuremen wtiIchange once more to approxirnateoreven
improveonthepre-dam position48.
8.28 As tothe d1eged short termchanges,eventhese areuncertain
becaus e, to theputtingintooperation ofVariant"Cmt ,hewatertableinlarge
partsof Szigetkozdidnot reach above thegrave1layer and thusariydecreaseinwater
IevelcouId nothaveanyimpact on capiIIardevation(which didnotexistanyway)or
on cropyield. It is notedthatno statistiare aven to supportHungary's daim of a
dropincrop yield4'.
*' This-ment isalsosupportedyAnna 23 heretaswellasby thefoIIowin-dies (a
copyofeachofwhtchortheirsynapsehasken subrnitttotheCourt):
1. J.FMko, E.Fdajtar,BSuriw The~romosisofmi1dwelovrnentonfimg Ostrov
influenwby waierworksvstemGaWfkova-Namnaros-.ch reportWVPR
Bratislav1980.
2. M.Wog, 2.Bedrna,Changesofmound wateIweldueto infîuenofwaterwofk
wstemGaMkov~Namaros andtheir eoolonicalinterprebtion.hGaMkovo.
UEBE CBEVSAV,Bratislava,1989.
3. M. Lehotsi$.J.Otahe, . GrdkovA,Landscaptwesof suwplyin~oa~cuinuaI
crom witb ~ound water inam of waterwork GabElkovaGeogr. cas., c2,
BratisIav,990.
4. P.Jambor, d., &os in
ruraIandsaw. ResearchreporWU BratisIam,1990.
5. M. Rd!iEka,gtal, EcoIoio~timizaiioofuseofareaof waterworkGabEkovo.
StudyUKESAV,Bratislava,19W.
6. J. Aiena,SReMk, Determinationofovtimizede~ihsof mund water Ieveon
future ahculturd activitiethepmwsal ofhydro-ameliorationprovisioin
influencarea.Researcreport.WM Bratislava1993.
7.
S.Rem gtal.Theimpact of wformanceof Danubiawaterworkonchangeof
waterrenmeofmilsand theproposalforiis aptirnifiorn theminofview of
afieuIturaIproducti. mh report WZH BratisIav,993.
8. K.Nwakovh, J. TakaEE. Blaskova,Theevaluatioof retentitransI>aand
çelectedchemicai~ropertiessuilirnvacteonwaterrearne of çoiIs aon
groundwatercontaminafio.-h report.WZH Bratislava,1993.
9. 1. S. ReW J. TW, Theduation of soiI*lopjd conditionofthe
areawtentiailv infIuencedperformancof waterwork on Danube.Research
report. ZH Bratislav1993.
49 Whereground waterh =ch thesoillayerthemeayindeek an influen oncropyieId
where the water tabIevesubçequentidrops.But such aninfluencis bynomeans
straightfonvadorindirecdattiontothedropinground water.Cropyieldisobviorisly
also dependenton climatieffectsas theHungarian Mernorialadmits. Huriganan
Mernorial, ar5.121.See,also.Anne23 hereto. 8.29 Certaidy, the correct response to tcurrentsituatiowould
not be togrow "deeperrooting crops" as Hungary asseri$'. The most effective
response would betoconstmct the undemater weirs inthe oIdDanube that wouId
enableamplewater to ffowdirectlintotheHungarian sideamis. This wouldrestore
waterlevelsandcapillaryelevationasoriginallyenvisagei y the GINProject. The
successofsimilarmeasuresonSlova tkrritorcarmotbedoubted:
"Due tutheincrase of ground watertabIesonthe SIova territoran
increaseinthe capiIIarwater suppIyfor the SIovakianagricultrird
areashastakenplace51"
Withanequivalentwaterrecharge(40-50 m3/s)intotheSzigetkdzside arms,thesarne
beneficialimpactwas predictedfur Hungq bytheEC Working Group:
"Due totheincreaseof groun wdatertableon boththe Slovakianand
Hungarian temtory an increase in the capillarywater supply for
agriculturalswelas forestryareacanbeexpected5'."
8.30 Finally,as the Hungarian Mernorial emphasiseq the
documentationand monitoringof Variant"C"'simpact on soiI and groundwater
pollutionisoneof the 19 environmentclonditionsissuedbySlovak naJune199lS3.
The necessaryfunctionsare fulfillby the SlovakHydrometeorologicaIlnstitute,
whichhas input hm three expertbodiesspecidisinginsoi1monitoring(the Research
Institutof Soii FertiIity, Bratislava),water in the aezoneo(the HydroIogicaI
Instituteof the Slovak Academy of Sciences),and water quaiity (Siovak
HydrometeorologicaI lnstitute). Systematicmonitorinhas been canie dut on a
continuousbasissinc1 e989andal1resultsareevaluatedannually.Theseresultsshow
thai, in SIovakia,there hasbeno decrease inthe qudity of soorgroundwatertu
date.
50 HungariaMernorialara.5.120.
' EC WorkingGroupreporof1Decembe r993m., Vol.5(ParII)A,nnex19(ap. 785).
'* Ibid.[p.791).
s3 hid.Vol.1,para5.135hd, seepara8.45, m.,below. 8.31 Slovakiarecognis tescurrentunfavourable situationin the
Hungarian side armsfor the floodplaiforests. Hungary quotts theEC Working
Group report of 1 December 1993 as authorîtytu substarrtiate ifs cIaims of
deterioratincondition?'; butthîsreport nuton thevery ne* pagetothai quoted
byHungary thatconditionfor forestryhaveimprovedin Slovakia-due soleIyto the
impactof Slovakia'sechargeprograrn5.'Accordingtothe EC Working Group, ifjust
40-50 m3/s ischanneiiedintotheHungarian sideanns , ungq willenjoya similsr
improvtrnent'?
8.32 This flow dl bnng to the sidearms not only water but
nutrients.Prior to thedamming,the nutrientinputinto the floodplainhadbeen
dramaticallreduceddueto theisolationof the Danube main charnel fiom the side
arms,which Iedtua Iackoffiow anda Iack of inundatiointhe fioodplain. Direct
input intothe sidearmbythe rechargeprogramcorrectsthe Iackofflow andenables
inundationt,husallowinforan increa sedrientinput.'
8.33 Hungaryclaimsthat asignificaptercentageofits alluvfurest
has died". But thedyingbackoftreeson Hungarian temitorpre-datesthedamMng
of theDanube by atIeasttenyearsand has beencaused bythesinkingwatw Ievelof
theDanube. Thisunfavourabls eituatiohasnowimproved on theSlovak side dueto
the irnplementatioofthe artificiairecharprogr- and suchan improvement has
been avaitabltoHungary. Intheabsenc ofthisrechargeprogram,Hungary'srecord
of decreasedtimber growihis entirelas expected. But, inthe areaswherewater
54 HungarianMemonalpara5.122.
55 M., Vol.5Pari IIAnn¢x 19{ap.785):"Asa rdtofthechax~gisgroundwkr IweI
thefor- ismaidy psitivel&&ed inGIovsrOa andrnairùynegativelyin Hungary."
ThisreparpredictferdHmgarythesame beficiaimpacfasthaî now experienbyd
Slovakiiatherechargtinto Szigetkozam is increaseto aratquivalent to the
rechargintothSlovasidearms . .(atp. 790).
Undernon-floownditionnutrieinpuintoUiesidannsisaIsoredticby2040% due
tosedement inthe Cuncvoresemoir.However,bemw theamount ofmr tobe
channelieinfthesidearmsisgreatin excesofpre- oonditîonhetotanutrient
inpuhto thesidam wiUalsobesuperior.Inflwdconditithenutrieconcentration
isnotraduŒdbysettiementinthercsemoirandththenutrieinpuintothefiwiplain
wiiibequivaletothatofth1950s.rechargeis implemented in Slovakia),an increasein annualtimbergrowthhas
been recordedS.
8.34 It is thereforeincorrectto clah that "deterioratioof the
alluvialforest..is a direnegativeeffectof VariantC's~peration"~'.Variant "C"
Ieadstu an improvernentin forestryconditionwherethe plaruiedrechargeintothe
sideatmsis impIemented- buttua continuhg deterioratiifsuchplansareshelved.
D, Flora andFauna
8.35 InitsMernorial ,ungaxy focuseson the adverseimpacton the
Danube's fishofirnprementinVgariant"C". It pointto the disappeara ofcaIarge
arnount of spawninggroundsandof bothadult and immaturefish. Hungaryalso
impliesthatthe silting ofthe olriverbedhas renderedit art unsuitable habitatfor
certainfishspecies.
8.36 The EC Working Group reportof 1 December1993 does not
predictsuchsilting. Icomment onthecunent positionisasfollows:
"No major neterosionand sedimentatioin the OIdDanube. During
some events sedimentationofhe materialwilltake place. Thisfine
materiamlay bewashedaway duringfloodevents6'."
The reportspecifies thatexcess sedimentcm becleaned away by a kce yearly
dischargeof 3,500 m3/s into theoldDanube. In otherwords, sedimentation is no
morethan a temporaryphenomenon62T . hesame habitatforfishspeciesas existed
pnor to the damming inthe old Danube rnay therefurebe maintained and even
improved. For, as pointedout &oveM,the conditions for Esh in thisectur ofthe
59
TXs iacrw haskn: Dfmm for Popda Aiba {whitpaplar)and SaliAlba(white
wiuaw)and Q.2m forFraxinuAugustXoI(ash).
60
HungariaMemorid, para.f25.
61
W., Vol.5(PariIIA,nnex19(atp782).
62
It mayk notedherethathesame EC WorkingGrortpreportbas record1993 fiow
veIocilintheDanuk at 1-08mlsatRajkaand 0.87mlsat Dunararnet(wita water
fiowrateo400m3/s). m. (ap. 765).Ii aInotestha tvelocigof0.1-0.3ds is
sufficitoprevencoltnatatio. d(atp. 779Thus,oncetheriverbhasbencleaned
bythefiowaf3,50m3is,itwilremaifreeofsiltationwîththemnt averaflowo400
m3fs. -224 -
mainDantrbecharnel pior tu the dammingwerenotgood dueto thehighvelocity of
flowandhighturbidity.
8.37 A distinctionmusdso be madebeîweenfish conditionsin the
oldDanube d inthe sidam system. The conditioninthe sidearmsph to the
darnmingwere verydaerent, characteriseby lowflows and evenstagnantwaters.
The positionwas worsenedbythe lackofa fulinterconnectionbetweenthe Danube
andits sidatms savefor appruximately0 dayseach year.Such interconnection is
important becausthe inundationqcle- undernaturai,i.e .r,1950s conditions-
coincideswith the spawningperiodof most fishspecies,thus allowingfoa vast
spawningarea. As the inundatiodeclinestheyoung fisfloatinto the side armq
passingprogressivelhm temporq inundationwaterstu mainbranchesandtu the
maincharnel.
8.38 It inow possibltu re-establithisintercomection orin the
terniinologythEC WorkingGroup report of23November1992 or thefIoodpIaitu
deveIopmore naturalljl. Thisis preciselywhatSIovakiadesires. ECe Warking
Groupreport of1December t993 stated:
"To ensure ecologÎcal conditiowhich are as good as pre-dam
conditionsmigratioofwetlandspeciesbetweenthe mainrivermd the
sidebranchesshouldbepossiblealtvertheyearinbothdirections.
Migrationcan be made possibleeitherthroughfispassesor through
direct flowsbetweenthemainriverandtheside branchesduring some
perîodsa."
Full reconnectionwill requirethe raisofwater level in the old Danubby the
construction of underwaterweirs. ln other wordq it will require Hungary's
couperation. But SIovakistaking whatstepitcarand iscurrentlyconstructithe
necessatyfishpassesmentionedin the above quotatitoenabiemigration. Ita1sa
proposesremoving orloweringthefortifiebank sf themainchannelof theDanube
atcertainpointstoenableaninterconnecfioat highflows.But the recomection is
1 cinlvnow a ~ossibIoption-aa result ofthe diversionof navigationinto the bvpass
I -anal. Prim tu thistherewas simplyno scope for re-estabbshinthe connection
between theDanube andthesideam systemforthiswouldhave made iimpossibIeto
i
have asuitabldepthinthenavigatiochannel.
I
i
I
i w HungariaMernorial, ol(ParIl),ex 19fap.780).
i
i 8.39 Thus, Slovak considersthatVariant"CM can,when coupled
withthe revitalisatofthesidems andthenecessarymeasuresin the oId riverbed,
benefitvariouspeciesof fish. The areaof spawninggrorrndson SIovak.territory
decreasedfiomthe 1%0s, buthave now Hicre~tswdiththeavailabiliofmoregoud
spawning areainthe sidems. Itisnodoubt tme for Szigetkoztha"ifhesurface
waterandgroundwater levelstabilisesatitspresentIevelthcreino changeinthe
dischargeregime,the mosaicityofthe Iaridscendthe presencof a highlydiverse
andwide range ofhabitatsis likelytu fosY6'. But boththe originalProjeand
Variant"C"envisageclthe supplyofa fargreaterwater rechargetothia sra than
Hungary isnow dowing for.Slovakiurgentlywishestobringabouta changeinthis
dischargeregime.A constanflow of40-50m3/s togetherwitseverailnundationser
year issuficiento obtain similifnot superior,conditions ffiosaandfaun an
Szigetküztuthose priotothe damming.
8.40 It was dways planned by the 1977 Treaty partiesthat
intemationd navigatiwouldbediverted tuthebypass canai.Thishas beenthecase
withVariant"Ctt.Thereisthereforeno sensto Hungary'csornplaintthat"thetransit
of internationlhippinginthe Danube between rkrn1852-1811 [is]impossible"66.
Moreover,thishas engenderedno cornplainfrom theDanubeCommission norfiom
otherinternationalorganisationTu thecontrary, organisatioand usersof the
Danube haveexpress theircontentmentwith the bypass canalfor it hahadan
obviouslybeneficiaimpacton the navigationin this~ector~~.Further,with the
completionofthe shiplockatthebnovo weir, navigationof smalland,inecessary,
IargecraftwiIbe possibldong theold~ariube~.
8.41 Certaidy the mere14 daysof inoperabilityofthe GabEIkovo
shiplocksintheirfirstyearof operation(November1992-November19c 9om)pareci
65 n&, ,ol. 1,pa5.130.
66 M., para.5.132.
68 Hungarytcornpia inteYack ofanernergenqnavigatroutewilthus disappear.
may anywayb noted thato emergenqroufeexid for tdarnprojeasiip- in
Germany andAda. Whereshiplockareinopembk,navigatiismspnded - an
undesirabehougunavoidabsituation.favourablywifhthe 60% th.,220 days) non-availabilofthe requisite navigation
conditionsithe Bratislavsectoin 199 . This iconfirmedbythepraise accorded
to the bypascanalbyits users. TheGerman representativofthe FederalUnion of
RiverTransportContractorswelcomed the implementationf thcd andnoted that
"transportimuchmoreregzil marmq prublematicriverpointshm the pstwere
eliminaied". Similarlyt,heRommian Statenavigaifon cumpanyhasuceriauiedthat
"navigationconditionsimprovedsipificantldue to the fact that, with navigation
throughthe canaione of themostdicult sectionsoftheDanube (km 1811-1856)is
avoided"'l.
8.42 TilusNo. CM-14A portraysthe GabEkovo navigation loch.
filusNo. CM-14B isa photographofthe DanubeatBratislava(1985-1986) showing
thepoor navigationconditionthatcouldnot be preventedtherepriorto the putting
into operationof Varia"CM. Infactthe resuItofimplementatiooifVafiant"C"is
that seven fordsection(shallows)havebeen bypassedasweU as the dangerously
narruw Bagomersection. Aiso the watervelociin thebypas cariaisIower thanin
the old Danube,increasingsafetand decreasingfuelcosts. Lowervelocitiesand
increasedwaterdepthsin theBratislavregionareofgreatbenefitbothto safetyand
to the general functioningand economic well-beingof the Bratislava
Moreover,the beneficiaimpactof GabEikovoisnot merelyfeIton the bpss cmal
section. ForGabEkovo cm dso be usedtu buiIdiipandthen re1ese Iarger£iowof
water so as to enable shipsto navigate diffrcultand shalow sections further
downstream.This is ofa cleareconomicbenefitbecause itenablesamore reliable
navigationontheDanube.It is dso beneficidfur the regionfor it enablesshipyards
such asat Komho to construct Iargships,whichthey wouldothemîse have ben
unableto de1iver.
69
EC WorkîngGroupreporto23 Novemkr 1992,HungarianMernorial,V5l(Parm,
Amex 14.
Interviewith thRegionalRep-ntativeof theFederaiUnion of&ver Transport
ContractoandheadofthenavigaticompanyBayerischLloydAG VA AG),Mr.
Ott,mex 40.And,sec .. 7.I18,ses .,ove-
'II
Letterfiom CornpdeNavigafîeFiwiaiaRomanatheSIovaEmbassyinBuchares,7
M r 1994.hex 41.
72
Sec.E.Fleischhacker,AnalysitheEffectof theGaWkovo-NawmrosSvstern on
Internatiolavigati!,ex 27. 8.43 However, the Court isremindedthat Hungary'sfailure to
constmct Nagymaros is thcause oftheremainingshallowsectionsinthissector. For
example,in Iune1993, the DanubewaterIevelmund Nagymarosdropped to 68cm,
making cumercid navigationquite Zn the Iightof this, Hungary's
contentionthatVariant"Cu hashad an adverseeffecon navigationis nonsense. It is
Hungary'sunilateralnon-implernentatiaof the G/N Projectthat has createdthe
continuingnavigational roblemon the BratislatuBudapeststretchoftheDanube.
F. SeismicandGeoloeicalConsiderations
8.44 Variant"C" was, Iike the original Project, supportedba
comprehensive evduaiionof the region'sgeoIugicaand seisrnicrisis. Not only did
Variant "C"benefitfrom the impressiveresearchdata,strrdieand explanatorydata
previouslycarriedout in relatitotheG/N Projectbut, from 1991, a new seriesof
exploratoryand researchworks was carriedout with a particulaemphasison the
çunovo weirregiun. The eventriallocationoftheweirwas thusbased onthe Iatest
geologicalresearchX.
G. EnvironmentalProtection
8.45 TheHungarianMemuriac ioncludesitssectioon the impactsof
Variant "CH with a review of the 19 environmentaclonditionswhich the SIovak
Commission for the Environmentdevelopedpriorto the implementationofVanant
11~76
. Hungary makesno comment asto the sufficiencyof these conditions. It is
therefure supposed that theyare accepted to be adequate prerequisitesfor the
implementationofVariant "C".
8.46 Hungarydoes not citethe conditions;it merely summarises
them in iîs Mernoriai. Referencein suppoismade tu theWWF Ausrrian Report of
January 1994,which does not cite the conditions,eithercontentsitseIfby notirig
that ofthe conditionshadnot beenfulfilled.Slovakiahasthereforeprovided a
copyoftheconditionsn. ',
74
-bid.
75 Secp.ara..105,çea.above.
HungariaMernoriapam 5.135.gm.
" hex 43.hereto. 8.47 In spite of the evidencein the WWF Austriareportto the
contrary, Hungaryasserts,on the bais ofaninformationreleaseof the Slovak
Environmental Commission of Mach 1993, that asof thatdatejust 7 of the 19
conditionshadbeenfuIErI (conddition9,10, 12,14, 5, 16 and 19)7. h fa&,this
document, whichiaactudy annexed toHungary'M s ernorial,howsthat,inadditionto
thesevenconditionsthatHungaryaccepts asfulfiüed:onditio2 "mavbe considered
satisfied",ondition6and 7 "weresatisfiedcundition8"was resolved",condition13
"hasbeen satisfiedandcondition17 "ibeine !atisfiedoa continualbasis".Thus,at
least13and lo7, ofthe19 conditionhadbeenfuEüedaccording tothisdocument.
8.48 Furthemore, the same document predicts the idfilment of
conditions1,3,4 and 5befuretheend of 1993. Thus,ody 2 conditionsweredeerned
problematic- conditions11 and 18. The firstof these(condition11) requires the
linkingof thebranch systernwith the Danube. This isthe ha1 step necessaryto
recreatethe originalbraideiiver. SIovak iontinuesto seek this interconnection.
Improvement ofcornmunicationbetweenthe branch sjrstemand the Daube inboth
ways isnow projectedusingundeniraterweirswithadepfhofapproximately 2 m and
artificialfords whichwiIIcreata risein thewater level in suchaway that inter-
communicationis possible.But for the expectedbeneficialimpactto be realised,
Hungary's cooperation(intermsof thenecessarymeasures onthe Danube rightbank
and theconstructionof undenvater weirsinthedd rivehed) is essentid. Thus, the
HungarianMemufia1 bImes SIovakiafur a mndition whose fuIfiimentHungary is
blocking.
8.49 ConditionNo. 18 is aimed atsecrtringthe flow Ievel in the
bypasse sdction ofthe Danube necessq toenablegrriund water tu reachthe soi1
IeveIand topreventthedrainage effect of the river.terms ofthe Danube's water
level, thiswouldhave tocorrespond tothe level oa dischargeof 1300-1500 m3/s.
Buttherequestedgroundwaterlevel was reachedand, infaciexceeded by alternative
means:the fiverbranchsysternwas suppliedduectl withan averag 30-50 m31s with
dischargeho theoId Danube beingappruximately400 rn3ls.
79 Therelevandocumen samaed atm., Vol.4, Annex172. EmphasisadàdintextIn
iad,conditio9requiretheproposaloa solutionfdeaimgwithnavigationproblems
downstreaofthebypascanal. Itmube streçshatit Hungary'bsreachofthe1977
Tmty thathavecmtd theneedforthiWntlar andition. I
VSZ-tY3 'ON NOU 8.50 Thus, SIovakiahas,exceptwhereknderedbyHungary'srefud
to cooperatefuIfiIIthe 19environmentaconditions.Itpusitiveattitude mube
cornparedtuHungary'srecentdecisionsinreIatitutheenvironment(ofSBgetküz),
which displaynot a concern toprotectand improve theregion'secuIugy,but a
preoccupatiowiîhpoliticalconsideratiandtheavoidanceofany actionthatmight
adverselaffecHungds casebeforetheCourt.
SEC~IUN 3. Hunvary*~AIIe~ationsas tuthe Poor Constnictirin Qualitv
of Varian"CF?
8.51 Mthough Hungaryconildentiyciaimsthat Variant"CR wa
"hastiIand iricompetenfIexecutednn,it isunabIeto providemore than a few
instancein supportof this statemerit.Befureconsiderhgtheexamplesprovided by
Hungq, itis worthwhiItoremindtheCourt of thmainfeaturesof the Varian"C"
structures. Fust andforemost,Varia"C" hasbeen designedfor implemmtationin
two phases. The variouscomponentsof thetwo phasesaredepictedin IIlus.Nos.
CM- 1SAand B.
8.52 The frrstphasfacatiewere putinto operationfiom Ociober
1992. Thesecconsistfthenew righsideresewoirdykeIeding fiom thebypascanal
to thedamacrosstheoriginabedof theDanube. Tuthelefiofthedm, a bypassweir
divertsfiow backintotheold riverbeand,to therighîaninundationweir diverts
floodwaters. Thefinaleiementisthe intakintothe Muorii Danube. The second
phas acilitieswcume int oeNicein1996. Thesearecurrentlybeingconsînrctedin
the spacebetweenthe damandtheinundatioweu. Theyconsistofashiplocka third
"spiliway"weir whichwiIItake over the finction ofdirecting water into the old
Danubeon adaiIybais, ana hydroelectricpowwplant.
8.53 Hungqts principalallegatiothatthe bypassweir doea no1
fundion properlyandthat itsdesigncapacityhas bereducedtu 600m3is. In fa&
theweiritseIfoperatescorrectljr,asHungaaware.It issimplyit"dayiq dayoutn
capacitythatisrimiteto600 m3h bythebouldersectiondumstreamof the weir,
which wouIdsuEerundue erusion ifthe weir throughputcontinualexceeded 600
d1ç. Thishasno safetramificationwhataotver.Attimesof flood, thebypassweir
capacitycm beincreas tod1,200m3/sTwithoutcrearinganyerosiun problem, since
79
m., Vol. para1.04-
I I
the downstrearnwaterIeve isthenhigher.Furthemore, infloocdonditions SIovakia
simpIyoperatestheinundationweirs,
8.54 The overd dischargecapacityof thePhase I structuresis
12, 75 dis" - Hungary 'egation fhat thestructures pro~idhadequate flood
controland thatafloodof 10,000m3iscm ody behbdIed ifeverypartofthe system
isoperatingperfectlyaissimplywrung.
!
8.55 Furthemores thiscapacityWU ' eincreasedaspart ofPhase 2.
A newspillwayweirwith acapacityof5,30m 03fswilltak everthedischargeof the
ddy fiowintri tholdDanube and willdso enablethe emptyingofthe reçervoirand
the flushingofsediment. Thuq Hungws cornplaint that "thereçervoircannotbe
flushed"wiIIbemeta3.
8.56 The maximum dischargecapacitiesder the compIetion of
Phase 2 wilbeasfoiiows:
Bypasspowercanal (atleveI
131.1m althi sischarge a
ithruughtuhimes and , f
necessarjl,though shipbcks)
Dischargeint he MosoniDariube
(20-44m3h) i
!
DischargeintotheMd?Danube I
(50 m3!smaximum150 m3fs)
I
Phase2 -spiIIwayweir I
Dischargeviabypassweir(600 m%s, a
in floodconditio-s7,200rn31s) I
I
Dischargetfiroughinundationweir by I
waterIeveI I
130.0m as1 2400
80
Thishasaptentiacapaciof4,800m31sundernomaloperaticonditioni.twh ethe
reser~oiçatadepthof131.ImêsIfWe ~eaIwel)and acapacityofsom5,003m31s
whenthete~ewoiheighiat131.5m SI,duringthe.summrId
" M.. para ..16.Sedirnenbtionisinanwent oniyoflonglem concem. Thnituas
abçoIutenoneedtok abItoflushcent m prlofthePhaçe1constnraioasit takes
weraiya-s fosedimentobdd up. 4800
6000 (a during summer flood) 6,000
DischargeviaDobrohuZiofftakestmcture 243
Totai 18,137m31s
8.57 The flood harrdlirgpacityof theVariant"CM structureswill
thereforcomfortableyxceedthecap& of theDunaMifi wcircornpl&. Hungary's
allegationsrewithoutmerit.Itscornplainttatthecunovoweirhas no shiplockwül
alsobe resolv beytheimplementatio nfPhase 2. HungarynevertheIesismpliethat
the future existenof thisship10ckisody theoretid. But this shipIockisunder
constnrction, ascIeartoHungq andascmbe verifiefrom a sitinspectiog.
8.58 Findy itisentirelyinaccuratto statethat the Variant"C"
nmaures "didnot prm Theinundatio n eirhaspassedflood waterson
mmyoccasionsand atnotimehave eitherthestabiliofits structurorthe safeotfy
downstream habitationbeen endangerai. It istotdly faIs eu statethat"metai
sectionsof thefloodplainweirsbrokeoff and were washed awayUg7. Weir gates
awaitingassemblywhen the floodofNovember1992 arriveddidfloatdownstreams.8
There was notimetu firîhersecurethesgatesasthe floodhved with iittw-g
- a factevidencedbysimiIaroccurrencesat Freudenau,in Austria,whichwas also
underconstructionatthetime.
8.59 If Variant"Cu hadbeen insome way unsafeor implemented
hastily, some criticismwuuld havben raisedin une ofthe EC WorkirigGruup
& SlovaMkemorialAnna 29 (p.253).
s5 Hrur&arycommentsin dationto "iŒfiwu wiII aIwbe renderaiimleyanby the
qmtion ofPhas2.
86 HungariaMemorial, ar3.198.SIovakiaacceptsta flmiinNwember 1992 leto
substantlrosionograveYsad elowthinundatiweir.Thishoweverhadnoimpaa
onthesafetofthe Variant*Cstnictum.Nor,infact,was than-ly negative
effktA.tvariouspointsitMemorial, unpy ahocatestheadditionograve1tthe
Danuk RveM and thisi,nfacfws exaciiwhat happene- themer of alarge
quantiofgravehm thinundaiioara inthe oIdrive- thuraisintaerkM
Iwel. theEC WorkingGrouprrprt 1 Dember 1993. .Vol.5(PartIlA,nnex
19(ap.761).
87
M., Vol. 1,par3.198.
8%
Secpara6.18,hve, andIlluNo.-3. -232 -
!
reports. Suchisnot thecase.The EC WorkingGroupreportof 1 December 1993
providesabief descriptiof theriverdam:"Aliworksincludingprotectionworksa
verticaclay-cernentprotectiowall (for preventingseepage)and a system for
technicalmonitorin(ofseepageare now c~rn~~etedT ~'er~isno seferencto an).
defecta.Hungqk referencetu *flawand cracksinthedam wallandcanal"cannotbt
substantiatedgO
8.60 By way ofconcludon to thi shapter,SIovakiaturn su an
independentassessmentofthe currentstatuof the,Projecfiom the perspectivof
Hungaria scientists. A recenteditionof the speciaiistjournalof the Hungarian
HydrologicalSociety,'HdrologiaK6ziünyW(HydrologicaBi ulletin)was dedicaind
its entirtoyquestionofthewaterregdationof the UppeDanube,therestorationof
Szigetküz and the completioof the GIN Project, Slovakia presentsbeIow the
synopses of thevariouspapersthatformthe specialeditiongl. Theseprovidethe
clearestevidencethatthvariouaiiegationintheHungariaMn ernorialrecounterto
abalancedscient& assessment.
Environment a1ConsiderationsinEn~ineeriri~for the DanubRiver DamProiect
"TheengineersoftheBos-Nagymaros RiverDam Projechave displayefrom thevery
beginninginterest,open-mindednesandreadinesstoreasonablemodificationwhen
cofionted with the new reqrrîrementsf environmentaprotectionand ecologid
interests. Ursortunateladverse political objectives,change of the poIiticaI
regime,hostilittotectinologhave invadedpubliclifeinHungaryunder the green
flag of environmentalism. Professiondy highly qualifiedbiologists, ecologists,
Iimnologists,orestersandlandscapearchitectsare, however,fullyawareof the
possibilityof reachinga balancebetweman andhisbiologicasurroundingsinnew
ways taiIoredto his needs and requirements. The Bos-Nagymarosriver dams
89 m., Vol.5(PartIA,nnex19(at. 757).
90
-isid.,Vol. 1,para5.134.
'' HidrdIoaaiK~zl61(HydroIogidBuIIeti1494 74.EVFNo. 5.SZAM, Annex 44.
Cemin ofthsynopsearequotdinthetext aboinabridgdform."Bos"isthename
persisteusBdbyHungarforGabXwo; see.lovakMemonmi,ara.20.arealsodesignedtoservehumanneedswithoutanydetriment totheenvironment* .Ot
TheEunearian U~perDanube - A HistoricafReview
"ThePratisIaval-Komkom riversection,refendtodso asthe Hungarian[sic]Upper
Danube,had been anunstahleirreguiarmeanderhg extensivelbraidedrivesection,
onwhichnavigation , asextremelyâif6cultandoftenimpossible...Riverregdation
..andprovidig floodcontra1by Ieveesremained butpartlysuccessful. A complete
solution was expected &om the Bos-Nagymarosriver dam project but the
abandoment therd has hadgrave msequences tu thSzitgetk~zarea. The country
mst reIyuntheprofessionalkd lfthehydmlic engineersforavertindisaste? ."
The Present State of the Bos-Nammaros Proiect and the Economic
Conseauences
"Riverdams, asfacilhiesproducing renedle, nonpoliutin&environmentally=und
energjthavebeenbuiltdlovertheworId. ..The politicaiattitineHungaryvis-à-vis
the Bus-Nawarus Project, the most recent decrees,deciions were absurd,
unfounde add dettimentd inthe economicd andenvironmental aense dike. The
mistake msadeso farmust be correctedurgentiyby involvingclear-heade, roperly
qufied professionalobserving highethicalstandardsin theprocess of decision
makingW."
UnconfinedandConfinedGoundwaters inthe KisalfoIReeion
". Thedropinthe groundwate rablewasIes thananticipatew,hichisbeiîeveto be
due tothefactthattheroleoftheDanube inwntroiiingthegroundwate is
a smallerone, whilethat of percolatingprecipitataogreaterone that presented
earlieq.-
The Forest~in KisaIfüIRe~ion
"..Soi1fertiliinthe Szigetktiareais determinebythe variationineIevationand
the depth to the grave1layer. Prior to commissioningthe "C" Alternativthe
proportionofthesitesatmedium-highand medium-l omationswas higher.
The floodplaiforestscomprise65% poplarstands. These arethe poplarstandsof
highestyieIdandvdue inHungarjr.
Thefurestsonthe protect partof the floodplainshoa widerdiversitof species
witha higherproportioof deciduoushardwoods.
Theforestobservationssince1986 haverevededthatthe mainfactorcontrollhgtree
growthis not the climate,butthe Danuband the changesof thegroundwater table
inducedbytheRiver. ...
92
Annex44.nVUonmcntaCIonsideratinEngineetinfoîheDanulxRiveDamProjecr".
93 L.Fejér.al."TheHungariaUpperDanub- AHistoricMewu, M.
* T. D6ra"IheAeçent StaofthBOS-Na-= Proje andtheEconornComquences",
-bid.
53
1.VCHgye"UnccinfinandConfineGoundwaterintheKîsaiBIdRegiom.,The reversehvdrolueicalchangesmube cumpensatedbvcompIetinnanduperatinnin
etcontroIIedmannerthe networkofrecharkncanals.Iearnialsothe lessonsgained
onthe Slovakside%.'
TheHveienicOualitvof DanubeWater
"Regularrnonito~g oftheqdty of Danube waterwas starteat theNationalPublic
HeaIthInstitutin 1951and cunhued sirice... Thorganicscontent expressiend
tem ofthe COD haschanged butlittleoverthpast15 years.Increasehavebeen
registeredithe nitrateconteandin theconcentrationof chlorophyiregarded a
measureof eutrophication.Bacteripollution(intermsof fad indicaiorshas
increasedperceptibin theeady partsoftheperiod. The dataof the recenyears
show some improvementb, utthe eEectofthe IargvoIumesof untreatesewage
(Gy&, Budapest)arepronounced. Diversioof theDanubein October.1992has not
resultedianv deterioratiofrnicrobiologjcqualitv.whichaccordintotheresuhs
for1993 wasap~reciabl~etterthaninthepreviouvefl."
Canalizationof the RiveinEuropeDevelotimentof theNetwork ofWaferwavs
"Canakation wasintroducedfor reguIatthnrives inEuropeandthen intheUnited
Statesusingthemethod tothesedays. Mure thanonehundredriverdamswere buiit
inEurope. Constructioworkis inprogressonfive andengineerinwork on several
othersis under way, The experiencesgained over the past closto 70 years
demonstratethatthis methodMers solutiontothemajorproblems encounteredin
regdatingthe low- mm- and highwaterbeds. By complemerrtarrivertraining
measures naturecompatibleand enviromentaily sounddesignsare possible. The
environmental protectionmaures associated withriver candization provide
aestheticdipleasinghigh-diversilandscapeseven inthe most demanding river
vdeys. Untreateddischargerepresenthegravesthazardtothestreamsand thelife
in them andmust be discontinueregardieswhetherthe riveris canalizeornot.
Canalizatioof river incloseto naturai conditiotendsto improve,ratherthan
deterioratetheir quality. Experiencesgainai over centuries of attempts have
dernonstrateregulatiooftheDanube asaninternationalwatenvaytu beimpossible
withoutcandizationdong the UpperDanube anddownstreamof Paks if cornpliance
withinternationdlacceptedstandardidesired9'"
96 LWupa, g a.,The ForesuiKidRildRegion, .(emphasadded).
97
M. Wdy, & a'"TheHygieniQuaiityofDanuWater", .(emphis added).
98
J.J&q "Canalktion thRiverinEmpe DmetopmentotheNetworkoWatenvays",
-ibid.CEAPTIER IX. THE APPLICABLE LAW IS THE 1977 TREATY;
HUNGARY'S MISGUIDED EMPELASIS ON TBE
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
ENVIRONMENT
9-01 In itsMernorial,Hungary relies heaviry uponthegenerd
intemationd Iaoftheenvironmenttuexcuseitsown breacheofthe 1977 Treatarid
to supportitsclaimsconcerningthe conduct of Czechoslovakiaand SIovakiain
relationto theG/N ProjecThere aretwo fundamentapirobIemswithHungary'suse
ofinternationlnvironmentalaw:fir sitnorestheagreementHungaryenteredinto
with Czechoslovakiaconcemîngthe Gm Project itself,the 1977Treaty. It isthat
agreementthatcontaintheappIicabIsfandardsconcefiwzenvirumentai protection.
Second, itmisunderstandand misappfiecontemporaryinternationalenvironmental
law.
9.02 In this Chapter, Bovakia wiii firsunderscore that the
obligationsofthTrea~ partieconcerningtheenvironmentarethosesetforthinthe
1977 Treaty,nothoseundergenerdinternationallaw. SlovaIwiIIthen demonstrate
that the Treatyisconsistentwith phciples of internationlnvironmenta law,
properlystated,andconstitutesanexpressiofthemutual nghts andobligationof
thetwo Statewith regartu theprotectiouseand developmentoftheDanube. The
Chapternext tums toHuhgary'rsesorttuprocedurd obligationshavingttisource
outsidethe1977 Treaty,inthegeneralinternationalIawreIatingtu enWument,
and showsthatthis is simplyanotherattempby Hungary to evade itsobligations
underthe 1977Treaw. Finally,SfovakiawidemonstratehowHungary misconceives
the substantivenoms of internationlnvironmentaIlaw,and that the conductof
CzechosIovakiaandQovakia hasbeeninconfomiitywiththosenoms. SECTION 1. TheAa~licableStandard is the 1977 Treatv
A. The 1977 Treatv Contains the A~plicable Standards and
OblipationsRelatin~ to the Protectionof the Environment;
These Are Not Modifitd bv Other Rules of International.
-
-aw 1
9.03 The &st problem with Hungary'esmphasisuponenvironmental
noms is thatHungaryinvokesgeneralprinciples ofhternationdenvitonmentallawas
ifthe1977 Treaty didnotexist,orasifthoseprincipleswwe somehowcontrary to,or
superseded,the TreatyT, At the same time , ungq often Iays stress uponthe
environmentrelatedprovisions ofthe Treaty and concedesthat the Treatyis sound
frum an enviromentai point ofview2. As showti in Slovakia'Memorialandin
ChapterI ofthe presentCounter-Mernori ahe,applicablestandardto measurethe
rightsand obligationsfthePartiesinthiscase isthe1977 Treatyitselftogetherwith
the instrumentsrdated tuitThi isas tme oftheTreatyparties'obligationsreIatitu
the environmentas itiçoftheirother obligations. Hirngaryhas never suggestedthat
the envirumental noms it citindefmsedits breaches arenoms ofjusconensthat
would invalidatethe 1977 Treatf. The Treaty isa'lexs~ecialithatisbindingupon
the Parties,whichhas not been terminated4a,nd whose provisionsrelatingto the
environmen tavenotbeen modified byrulesof gmed internationallad.
I
I &, forexampie,Hmg- Medal, pam 6.09et&..disntssingArliclts 19and20
ofthe1977Treaty.
I
2
1977TreatydidMernoin Chapte10ofHungaq'sMemorialdo notincludanyallegationf the
thathe1977Trearyienvironmentaiynsound. i
3
SlwakMernorial.ua 8.107.Hungasydm hduwer.clah thagrnerdintemational
IawobligatioreIatitotheenvironment robligatioergsomnesandxmns to mggm
that the?thereautomatidlymipersedpriortreatobligatio Hnç.garianMernorial,
para .0-95SIovak ciaody saythai kds thi*sment puzzling;sems tu rab
obligatioma ornes wiihnom of ju#gens. 1
4
& Sld Mernoriai,hapteVm, andChaptcrX 4thi Counter-Mernoriai.
5 The pwnt Chaptewilldealchiefwiththee£fec!ofnom of gerieralintemiional law
thatanteda tee 1977Treat;v.he eEéaof thepossib lmergenE, subseque!O the
concIusioofthTreaïyofnom ofgeneralinternatibnalenvironmIawis~~& in
para9.47. H., beIow,andin ChaptX. I B. The 1977 Treatv is Consistent with Principles of
International Environmental Law and Ari~lies Those
PrincipIesto theUtilisation of the ShareWater Resources
ofthe Danube
9.04 In its DecIaratiandelsewhere,Hungaryhasarguedthat the
1977 Treatyis incompatiblwith generalprinciplesof internatiinvironmentaliaw,
wasproduced by aprocessthatis inimicto thoseprinciple,nd does notallowany
enVitomentaI prublernthat mayarisetobeaddressed ina cooperativemannerwithin
itaprovisionsand mechanisms.Nothing couIdbe further from thrmh. In fact,
Hüngary initsMemonal befatedlrecopises thattheTreaty"was cunsistentwith the
maintenance of waterqualityand with environmenta plrotectiongenerall~"~.The
Treaty constitutea patientlynegotiatedand thoroughlyconsideredagreementin
which the parties applieda nurnberof general principlesof what we now cal1
intemationaienvirumeritai Iatuthespecificcaseof the constmction andoperation
of a mrrItipurposprojectonone of the worid'smajorintemaiionai watercourses.
These principlenotody were enshrinedintheTreatyitself,butajsowereappIiedin
theperiodleadingupto itsconclusion.
9.05 ThustheTreaty containsprovisionon theProtectionofWater
Qtidity (Artic15) andthe Protectioof theNaturaIEnvironment (Artide191,and -
as currently rmmmended for internationwatercourçeJ -establishesa joint
cooperativemechanism theGovernmenP tlenipotentiariArticle3). In theperiod
pior to the Treaty'sconclusion,the partiein effectappliegeneralprinciplesof
environmentalimpactassessrnentwhich, eveniftheymayhavesomenormativeforce
today,hadnot acquiredthat characterinthe 1970s- by condrrctingthenumeruus
strrdiethat leto thdecisiontoapprovetheProject in 1974and to its findesign%.
AndduringtheProject's constmctionphase,environmentail pactassessrn ehedç
6
HungananMernoria,ara4.1.
7
Sec.foaampIe, Anide24,"ManagementΠan,relataicommenmy,ofthe Lawofthe
Non-Navigati ors ofInternational Watercoutses,aonpwnd readingbythe
InlernationaILawCommissio1994.
A149110,p.3#.
8
Alia ofthebasicstudiwundertnriotogmrnmentalapprovaoftheProject1974is
containeinAnnex 23 tothe SlovaMkemorial. Studîerelatingspaificato the
environmen,nd surfaand groundwateraredid inparas.2.14and2.15ofthe
SiovaMernorial.The"Biopmject",hoseplirpwewas tstudythe effeof thGiN
Syskron thecosystemsfthsurroundîngrea,aswrnmissionein1975andcompIeted
in1975byURBION, Bratislawiththeecipatiw ofthteIovaAkademy ofSciences.
para 4-06above,and SIovaMernorial,par2.17,et çesThe "Bioprojecwas
updatdin1986sec .IcvaMkemaria,am 2.22.out byHungary itseif in 1981, 1982 and especi~ly in 1985, when a particularly
thorough studywss eompletedthat"gcnerallaffimèd theProji?ctH9.
I
l
9.06 Further,environmentap i roblemsthat may arise duringthe
operationofthe Projeccm bemetwithin the T&S provisionsandmechanisms. In
pariicular,the Treaty'sprovisioonnsmonitoring(kc~e 15, para. 2) are directcd
pnciselyat ensurintbatany environmenta plrublem~that maaise aredetectedstan
earlystage so they maybe ddt witheffectively. !Andthe actualoperatioof the
monitoringsystemdevelopedpursuant to these pro$visio-sa system thatcovers a
wide arrayof environmentaplarameters- hasbeen'evaluated favousablyboth inthe
BechtelReport andin theEC workingGmupreport & 2 November1 993".
I
I
9.07 The Treatylikewise establishejoint cooperativemechanisms
and provides forthe creationof sub-agenciesto ?sure ongoingcoordination and
communicationbetween the parties with regard/to the Project, including its
environmentalaspects. As noted inSlovakia's~emorial, the 1977Treaty and its
associatedagreementsIay dom a mechaniam furtoi tnuingcouperationbetwem the
partiesinrelationtothe realisatiof the joint investrne' TheJoint Contractual
Plan stateexplicitlythat"thewholer&tion of [theGM Project]wouldrequire a
close interstatecooperatio..."12.The 1979 Joini StatuteAgreementdefmesthe
powers and functionsof theGovernmenP t lenipotentiaresstablishunderArtide 3
ofthe 1977Treaty,providing forongokg #operation betweenthe partiesthroughthe
Plerzipotentiari,uringboththe canstnrctioand th&operationofthe Project. Isets
forthindetaithe ways inwhichtheactivitiesofthe two partiesto the 1977Treatyare
to be coordinatedby the flenipotentiaries and, in general, states that the
"~]lenipotentiariesshaiibe in permanentcontacGd dircussqu~erly fulfilmenof
tasks statedintheTreat~'''~ ThisAgreement dso !cdlsforthe Plenipotentiarito
establish"permanentandtemporaryjoint aagncies,"Frovidesthatthe functionoffhe
permanentjoint agencies isthe "coordinationand control of the constnraion and
operaiion of the System of Locks",and specifiesthat the "JointGroup"shallbe
createdasa permanenjtointagency"consisting oftherepresentativesfthe ministries
9
HiingananMernorip,ara3-52Thesestudiaeedikd inparas4144.27,above.
Wovak Memanai.Anna 27 (atpp.1-8)andhex'I9 {atpp.20and 23 -surfacwater
Iweisandqrrali;ndatpp.34and40- grounwaterI-weand qualie).
11
m., para.6.153.
12 !
W., hex 3, par10,"ReaIizati(tp.40).concernedandcentralagencies,or otheragencie~"'~. urthermore,t shoulnot be
forgottenthatthePIenipotentiarisere entrustedwiththe importafunctionof the
setîlement ofdisputesunder Artide 2f1)ofthe 1977 Treaty,which can itself be
regard& asa formof cooperation.As withtheotherfums of cooperationunderthe
7977 Treatyregime,ttiisfundion wasrejectedbyHungaryl*.
9.08 AU of theseprovisionspointo a systemof closecooperation
establishedby HungaryandCzechoslovakia underthe 1977 Treatyand itsrelated
agreements. It is ironic that Hungq cornplainaf a lsckof cooperationby
Czechoslovakiaw, heniwas Hutigq thatrefuscdtuenterintodialogue,rejectthe
proceduresforconsultationundethe1977 Treaty anrefuseciufollowtheprocedure
for disputesettlernenunder that agreement,despite Czechos~ovakia' sepeated
requeststhatidoso, asdemonstratedaboveinChaptersV and VI.
9.09 Zn snq the 1977 Treaty constitutesan expressionof the
concretefums ofcouperation agreedtu by the Treaty partieswith regardtu the
Project, induding mechariismsfor communicating information, as weIIas for
consultatioandnegotiation.Inmany ways,the Treatyrepresentwhatmay todaybe
regardedas atranslatioofgeneralprincipleof internationlnvironmentallaw and
theIaw ofinternationwlatercowsesintoa blueprintforthe sustainadevelopment
oftheir sharedfieshwaterresoiircThe Treatydso representthe fuEihent ofthe
partiesefforts tuconsult cuncemiaProjecton ashared waterwurse,aswell asto
assessthe environmentalimpact of thatProject and avoid or minimiseadverse
environmentaeiffects.
9.10 Furthermore,implementation of the Treaty would actually
irnproveanumberof environmentaiconditions". The Treatyestablishesmechanisms
for monitorinenvironmeritaimpactsduring the Projtct's operationand for making
adjustrnentsntheProjecto avoidorminimisemy unforeseenadverseimpactsit may
haveontheenvironmenti,ncludig not ody impactson bothfloraandfaunq but also
impactson thequantityandqualityof groundwater.Itthusrepresentanexampleof
thekindof enviromentallysound inîegrat rverbasindwelopmentprojectthathas
been recommended by expertsin the field and endorsed by the international
14 M., Artic6,paras.1,and3.
15 See para6.08above.
Thispinthas&&y bee-ri upin ChaptVIIabove. -240 -
community1'. The Project madegoodsensein 1977becartseitwas in the commun
interest of Hungq andCzechoslovakia asfriendlyneighbourîngStateswho share a
valuablenaturalresource-the Danube -to protecianddevelop that resource in a
sustainablway for theirmutualbenefit. Itmakesgood sens eoday for the same
reasons.
9.11 Thus,the environmentalrightsandobIigationsofthe partiesin
relatiotu the GM Project arethose laiddown inthe 1977 Treaty. That agreement
conforms to thestandard sf internationalvironmenta llw and appliesthem tothe
useandprotectionbythepartiesofthe importantinternationwlatercoursetheyshare.
However, if andtu theextent thatnoms ofgenerd internationIaw reIatingtuthe
environmentare consideredasapplicableinthiscase,the conduct ofCzechosIovakîa
andSlovakiahasbeeain confomity withthose noms.
SECTIO2 N. Hunpary's C~ntention that CzechoslovakiaBreached the
Obli~ationunder General International Law to Cooaerate
on EnvironmentalMattersIs anAttem~t to Evade the 1977
-
9.12 At variousplaceisnitMernofiil,inpatticiilarinChapters6 and
Tg, Hungary clahs that Czechodovakiarefusedto enter into consultationsand
negotiationsand generaiiyfaileto Gooperatewith Hungary. These degations are
factuallyincorrectas hasbeen demonstratedinChapters IV,V andVI above. m,
theytotallyignorethelong historyofmnsultationsand negoriationseadingup tu the
conclusion ofthe 1977 Treatjr. Second,the 1977 Treaty and rdatedagreements
estabtshed a frameworkfor ongoing cooperation, whichboth parties utZsed untd
Hungary'swithdrawai,and which Czechoslovakia ,then Slovaki a,monstrated a
continuhg preparedness to utiiisethereafter. And Czechoslovakia,and now
Slovakia,have demonstrated a dingness to consultand negotiate,anddid in fact
enter into consdtationsand negotiafionswith Huhgay. As has beenshown in
ChaptersV andVI, itwas infactHungarythat spurnedthemechanismsoftheTreaty
11
Sm.e-g,UnitedNations.integrRiverBzin Dwelopment,ReportoaPanelofExperts,
U.N.DM. El30661R 1wNewYork,1970);UniteNations,ExperiencntheDevelopment
andManagemeno tfInternatioRliverandme BasinsNaturaReçourwNater Series
No. 10,U.N Doc.STESA1120(New York,1983);RiverandLake BasinDwdopment,
NatumiResouf-ater SerieNo. 20,U.N.Da. STflCDII3@ew Yoi 19Wk and,
DevelopmeRfRiodeJaneiro, une,992,hap#ra18"RoteFtioofthequaIityandsupply
of frwhwater resources: applicacfointegrat+ apprwhesto the deveiopmenf
managemenatnduseof-ter resoufmxU.N.Doc.AICONF1 .51/26(VoIE)p. 167.
''
Secinpartidar,HungariaMernoriai,ar6.70,~k~.,andpara.7.06etseq.regirneandthatrejectedinvitationsto enterinto tripartitediscussionsoutsidethat
regirne. Andit wasHungary thatactedcontrary tothe dutyto negotiateingood faith
byconditioning itswilIingnessnotody tuengage infurthernegotiations,butalso to
conduct furtherresearehand to appointa tripartitcommission ,nCzechoslovakia's
haltingalwIorkonthe Project.
9.13 Hungary clah that despitethe substantialperformance,in
good faith,byCzechoslovakia of itsobtigationunderthe 1977Treaty,itwas ineffect
under anobligationtonegotiatefundamenta clhange isand u1thateIythe termination
of, that agreement,indudi the dismantlingor abandonmentofthe extensive and
costly works constructed pursuant to itstenns". Hungarjr bases this asserted
obligationlargelyuponsourcesoutsidethe 1977 Treaty itselsource tsatgenerally
requireStates to cooperatein theirrelationswithregardto sharedwatercoursesand
the envirumentm.
9.14 However,it isnot dwaysclearEumfingary's Memurid how
initsview these obligationsundergeneralintemationaIiawrelateto the 1977 Treaty.
To the extent that Hungaryviews them as prior iules of internationalaw, that
somehuwcontinue tobebindingdespitethesubsequenc tonclusionof the1977 Treaty,
Slovakiawould make the foIIowingobservations:pria des of generai international
Iaw wodd continue tobe bindingontheTreatypartiesudy as ttrnattersnot covered
bytheTreaty.Procedurai rulesof internationelnvironmentallaw,tu the extentthey
existedat alplriorto1977' , were ofa highlygeneralnature;theirrelationshito the
1$
m., gara s714.73and6.79480.
Hrulgary'daim that itwaentidedtoteminatethe 1977Treatybuse ofsubspquent
oblî&ationsunderthgeneraliniemationlawoftheenvironmentisdaii withklow in
Section4, dng apam 9.47andinChapteX.
21
Itis doubtfthatmanyinternationlnvironmentalbligatioofaprocedumlnaturehad
developedsign5cantlypriar1977.Forexample,thePreparatoComminee forthe1972
UnitedNations(StockholmConferencon theHuman Environmen tropsed inclusiin
theSt~kholm Declamion on theHuman Environmendt a principIerequiriStateto
provideidumtion onadvitieswithinthejuriçdiaiorcontraifthe ylievedthamch
information wwoukd needed îoavoid the ri&of ssignifimtdverse&e~ts on the
environmenin areabqtontdheirnationjuriçdiction. ThisprincwashotIydisputed;
consequently,iwas notincludedinthe StockholmDalaration.Sec.L. Sohn,"The
StockholmDeclaratioontheHuman Environment,14 HarvardInternatioLawJournal
423,(1973)atpp.496-502.Commentator saveobservethatthearticulatofprinciples
ofcooperatioconcerainsharednatufaresourcabeganwitbthe adoptiin 1978bythe
GovernirtCounciiof ihe UnitedNationsEnWonmentProgram of the "Principlof
CDnduc tn befieldotheEnviromnenftor theGuidancofSiateintheConçe~ationand
Hamonious UtiIizatiof NatruaIRwm SM byTwo or More States1U.N.Doc.
UNEPAGIuZ (1978);17InteniationdLendMaterial(19781 ,.1097. A. Kiss 8rD.
Shelton,Intemationi nvimnrnenfaiLaw.TransnationAtblisherNew Yorkhndon,
1991,p. 131. EventheseprinciplwerehighlycontroversiilntheGeneralAssembly,TreatywouIdtherefure bccontroiIedbythe maxim, Ie xostenor deronafkgi priori.
-exspecialisderoaatIe~=nerali. Thus,to theextentthatsuchrulesexistedprior to
1977, theyweresuperseded bytherelevantprovisionsofthe 1977 Treaty.
9.15 Hungary definesthe obligationto caoperatebroadly to cover
not ody cooperation but dso good faith performanceofthe 1977 Tr~ty and the
obligationtuconsultandnegotiate. Hunges invocationofeachofthese purported
obligationsd be addresd sepsratdy in thisection. To Say,as Hungary does, that
the Treaty partiescontinuedto be under thesegeneral proceduralobligations, in
additionto or even in placeof thosecontainedin the 1977 Treaty,is tuignore and
rendernugatov the long historjf of negotiationsthat ledto the conclusion ofthe
Treaty and tu ignore aridrendermemhgiess theterms ofthe Treatyitself. For the
1977 Treaîylaiddown, inthecieuest of terms,anunequivocao l bligationuponthe
partiesto cooperateand consult,and providedfor the mechanism s ithinwhichthat
cooperationandconsultation was to takepIace22. The jointcommitteesandgroups
establishedtu accomplish the Prujectincltrdedenvirumental problemsamong the
kinds ofprubierntshey wereintended to resoIveonthe bais of consJtationand joint
agreementU. It was Hiingay, not Czechoslovakia that spurnedthesemechanismb sy
abolishingthepositionofPlenipotentiaruyndertheTreatyand otherwi attempting to
withdraw fiom theTreatyand itmecha.ismsz4.
"indict hgthatthedes containedithe 197Principlescannecessar belrgardedas
setiielawnoras enjoyingthsupporofAIstaw ..."P.Bimie gtA. BuyIe,Intemationai
Law andtheEnvironment, IarendPr=, Odord, 1992,pp.115-16.
22
a espsiallArticl3 ofth1977Trearywwhicht~citeodyafew exampl=,providesfor:
de directionandmpeMsion of"task rsIatinto theoperatiooftheIprojecb i]"he
"govemmend telegateorPlenipotentiari;rtheestablishmbtythePlenipotentiarieosf
"appropriateermanentndtemporaryoinagenciesfotheperformanceftheifunctions";
forthe Pleniptentiartos"ensurthatconstructiof theSystemof kks is pmperly
coordinated;orapprovaby thPlenipotentiarsf"pmposalfsorthemdification of the
tahical prdures adopkd in thejoint mntrmd plan"; fothePlenipofentiaRso
"providefor and approvethe cecor&and =Riement ofdinérenw selating tthe
apportionmentoflhur and supplies";for tsupeMsion by thePlenipotentiariesof
"ampIiance withthewaterWanΠapprovein thejoincontracml pIanuand forthe
PIeniptentiarito"superviendcciordinaeheactiiitofnationaopratingagenciein
timesoffld oricediJposal"fiinciiah prwidedforinArticle13.
23 Sec .aras4.434.46above.
24 Sec .ara5.08,abvee TheObli~ation toCoorierate
9 6 Hungary'sargumentmisunderstandtshe purposeofthe general
obligatiotucooperateinrelationto sharefiereshwaresources.Thepurposeof that
obIigationistoencouragethe Stateswncemed towork together in relationtu the
internationalwatercoursesin question and, ultimately,to establisha spai5c
framework withinwhichto interactonan ongoingbais in relationtthe protection,
use anddevelopmentof their sharedwaterresources. The 1977 Treatywas sucha
fiamework. A spe&c hework isne~essaryprecisefbecaus of thegeneralnature
ofthe obligatiotocooperate-As onecornmentatarobserves:
"Thecontentof the obligatioto cooperateis dificuit todescriin
abstractterms.Ttdependsverymuchonthe greatvarietyof concrete
situations;whatis requiofda Stateinanyparticulasituationcanbe
determinecinlyby examiningthe relevanfactsandcircumstance sf
thatsituatio."S
The "relevantfactsand circumstancesinnthe presentsituationconsisofthe 1977
Treata nd theworksconstructedthereunderi,ncludinthosethatwerenecessitateby
Hungary'usnlawfu lbandonmen oftheProject.
9.17 The purpose ofthe gened obligatiotu cooperateisnot,and
emt be, tu tehate the very arrangements which the obligation enwurages
estabbsking.Suchaninterpretationoftheobligatiowould desihidisetreatreiations
ingeneral,and fluviarelationsin particul,atherthanstrengthenincooperationin
relationtoshared waterresources. A State would never be ableto refyupon an
agreemententered intoin good faith,afterlong negotiations,and could neverfeel
secure about undertakingsubstantid projas andexpending significantfinancial
resourcesin fuIfiIIiobligationin reIianceona treaty,ifHungws theary were
correct.
9.18 As shownbelow,HungaryandCzechoslovakiacompliedwith
thegeneralobligatioto cooperatebytheverynegotiationand conclusionofthe 1977
Treaty, whichsetsfurthindetd the specificfomsthatthe couperationbetweenthe
twocountnes isto takeinrelationtu theDariube. Hungary agreeson this pointzb.
P.M.Dupy, -0vecviewoftheExistinCustornarLegalRegime,in D.Magraw,ai.,
InternatiLlawandPollutio. niversofPennsylvanaress,Philadelp,991.p61,
ap.72.The conciusionof the Trmy was thus the fulfiIImeofthe generd obligationto
cooperatein relation tu sharkshwaterresuurcesl To say,asHungaq does,that
the obligationof cooperationundergened internirtionalw requirespartiesto a
treaty to negotiatenot only its revisior terminationbut also the reversalof
performanceunderit makes amockeryofthe principleofpactasuntservanda.These
clairnofHungaryare inrealitysimpIariotheratternto underminethe 1977 Treaty
andtucompensateforthe fact that itscIaibasedupon treaty IawIackmerit. Iwas
in fact Hungarythat breachethedufiesofcooperationarisinfiornthe 1977 Treaty
by demanding thatCzechoslovakia agreeto terminatthe Treatyandthat itshouId
demolishtheworksithad constructeii goodfaitas theTrestyrequired.
9.19 Therd purpose of Hungary'asttempttodefineaspeciaimIeof
cooperation relatingtu environmentconcems, wkch wuuIdsupersedethe specific
proGsions ofthe 1977Treaty,istwofold:to distanceitsfrom thenad to negotiate
ingood faiththeTreatydisputethathad arisen;andto imposeon Czechoslovakiathe
specialobligatioofnegotiatintheterminationoftheTreatyitselfandhencethe GM
Projea. A closeexmination reveaIsthatthe generdobIigationsdefinedbyHungary,
which areadditionaltuthoseimposaiby theTreatyand have theirsource outsidthe
Treaty, arenot defined intems of a duty ofjoint consriItafionand good&th
negotiation.Rather,theyaredefineûinternisoa righofoneStateto imposeitsview
onanotherState iftheformerallegesitsenvironmenitstbreatened.
9.20 Thismaybe seeninterdis.inHungq's Memorid where, &er
refemng to theJoint ContractuPlq and toArticle15(concerningtheprotectionof
waterquality)and ArticIe 19 (concemingthe protectionofnature)of the Treaty,
Hungary states:
"These instmments represent an implementationof the general
internationaldu& to cooperate. But when'doubts concerning the
ecoIogicaIconsequencesoftheconstrucfionofthe [GfN Projeet] couId
be express&foIIowingthepoliticalchanges,~zschodovakiarefuseto
amend the 1977TreatyIor tuengage inmeaningfunlegotiationaimeci
atdleviatingthelegitimaconcernsof theRepubhc ofHunga$'."
The factualinaccuraciesontaineintiis statemenhavebeendealtwithinChapters V
and VI,above. What iof interestherconcems~un~ay's legalarguments:fi-rt,at
the relevant provisioof the1977 Treaty were,inéffect,anUnpIementationof the
internationd duîtucooperate,butthatthisgenerdduty continuedtoexist,separatelyfromthe 1977 Treaty;and,second,thatthisdutytranscendedthe obligationof joint
cooperationand consultatiset outinthe Treatyand hadthe effectofrquiring
Czechosiovakiatoacceptat facevaluethe unsubstantiatenvironmentacioncerns
expressedby Hungaryd, therefortu agreetu amend the 1977Treaq soas to
deviate theseconcerns. This wouldfoIlowfaccordingtoHungq, eventhough
CzechosIovakimight as idid,disagretoMy withHungsry'sexpressedconcerns-
concernswhich,imight beadded,were alsorefutedbHungws own environmental
impactassessrnent,he most recentandthoroughof which hadbeen completedin
1985.
9.21 Thus, accurdingtoHungary'srgument,it makesnodifference
whethera treaty containsa provisionon revisiornot: ineither caseHungq
contends,thereiadutyto negotiatetherevisionof thetreaty. aview ofthelaw
wouldrendertreatiesephemerali,f notentirdypointless. It woulddiscourageStates
frum enterinho agreements,especidy those ding forthe expenditurof large
sumsin reliancon thegood faithperformancoef thotherparty,asinthe present
case. ItwouIdnot mereIjdestabilisit woulddestroy,the foundatioof treaty
relations.
9.22 Slovakiawould makethe foUowingpointsin this connection.
m, the 1977Treaty containsno revisionclause. This the partagreedupon.
Second, Articl27 ofthe Treaty#vers, by its termq disputereIatingtu "the
redizatioand operatioof the SystemofLocks"- that ithewbject matterofthe
Treaty,notits revisioAnd thi rec.useArticl27 doesnotcoveramendment or
revision,wheone partyseekconsultationandnegotiatioon theamendmeno tf the
Treaty*orgoesevenfurtherandseeksitsterminatiot,hatpartymusmake at leasa
prima faciecasetu show the existenceof grounds thatwouId justifi unilaterd
terminatioinIaw.Ifthat pq failorrefusestushowsuchgounds, as Hungary has,
thatends the matter. CzechosIovakiawasthereforunder no dutyto consult or
negotiatconcerningtheamendmeno trterminatiof the1977Treaty.
9.23 Hungq's invocation of its own version of the substantive
noms ofinternationaelnvironmentallawwiIIbeexamininSectio4 ofthisChapttr.
The point tu bemadhere,in the conteofdiscussingthedutof couperationunder
the1977 Treaty,ithatHungaryatternpttoescapehm thespecifrprovisionofthe
1977 Treatyrequirinjoint actioandcooperation,whichwere unlimiteas to the
matters in disputethatthey covered, andfrom the generaldispute-settlement
provisio ofsrticl27 (&r distortitheplainmervrinofthatArticleby invoking -246 -
itsown version ofgenerd principIesofintemationaienvironmentallaw. Hungq is
arguing that,because ofenvironmentaieEects that itdone perceived,the duty to
consultandnegotiateingood faithto whichtheparties were subjectunderthe Treaty
was modiiïed,imposinga specialdutyon Czechoslovakia. Thus, Hungarycontends
the negotiations had to involve either the furnisbg of dekitive proof by
CzechosIuvakia that Hungarjrsconcems were misp1ace.û or the acceptane by
Czechosiovakiaofthe arrangement or the hdting of the GIN Project. This is
iIIustrattby Hungary's discussi ofnthe importance of a concept that wiii be
addresse daterinthisChaptert,he"precautionarpyrinciple":
"Oneof the implicationsofthe 'precaution'apprincipli'sthatthe
causalIinkZmaaybe assumed incertainsituatioeven inthe absenceof
scientSc certainry. Cumbmedwiih thegeneraIobligationnot tucause
damage toanother count@s envirument, this means rhatthe State
whoseactivitiesareIikelto damagethe environmeno tf anotherState
must show thatthe proposed actionwiilnothavesucheffects. Ifthis
cannot be done, the proposedactivity must be modifiedor wen
abandon&. "
9.24 Thiv siewof the"precautiun& principlcx,ccardingtuwfüchit
wouId appIy tu situationsin which there i-a iikeIihoodof transbouridary
environmenta hlm is,to saythe1- a novelone. Plutthepointto bemade here
is that Hungary uses this non-Treatyprinciplein supportof its compIaintsabout
CzechosIovakiae 'ffortsto implementheTreaty,and'inattemptingtajustjfjtheseks
ofunilaterd actsHungary tuok Ieadingup to itdeclarationofpurported temination
of the 1977 Treaty. At the same tirne, Hungary attempts to charadense
28 The expressi"causalinkis takenibmArticl2,para5(a)oftheU.N. ECE'sHelsinki
Conventioon theProtectionandUse of TransbouiidWatemm and international
Lakesof17March 1992whichisreferretoipara 6.66ofthHungarianMernoriaï.The
HelsinkiConventiisnotyeinforceandcannotbe'regard4generdas a&mion of
genemlintemtionaIaw. Paragrap5ofArtide2oftheConvention-testha he @es
shaIbe*guide by"=tain enumerateprineipIes,inciuthe*precautiorrprincipIeX,
intakingmeasiirspecifieinparagrap 1hsnd2 offitarticle. fomuIaW insub
paragmph{a)paragaph5,ihe"preautionaprinciple*isquiterestrickd, applytogody
"aaiontoavoidthepottntitransboundaiypî ofthereleaseofhazardosubstances."
Itstatthatactiotoavoidsucimpact"shanotbepstpned on thegroundlhascientific
-ch hasnotfuîlvpwedacausallinbetwee nhose1i.e..bdous]substance,n the
onehand,andthepotentitransboundaiynm on theothehand ....(Emphasiadded)
ThustheConventiock notrefetoa "muai linkaktween conduorinslallatimore
globallyanda mmbundaxy impact. Hungq isanemptingto take ~eHelsinki
Convenrionkfornidationthe"premutionarjrprincioutof its context and give it a
muchbroadcrcoveragthanthImgrrag efthConventioppenaits.
w
HungarimMemond, para.6.68.
Foramore detaildisfussiosec.ara9.80gta., Flow.Czechoslovakia'sconduct as a refusaito consult andto negotiate in good faith
concerningtheamendmena tndterminationoftheTreaty.
9.25 Hungary's charges concemhg the dleged failure uf
CzechosIovakia toconsultandnegotiate arein fac tomore thm a remarkablyboId
attempt toachieveits goals throughinvocationof the generd internationalaw of
cooperationwhen thereisnoground underthegeneralinternationa aw oftreatiesfor
temination ofthe 1977 Treaty. Hungws need to tesortto sucha double standard
arisesfiom itsinabilitojustifyeitherits conducunderthe provisionsofthe 1977
Treaty,orits dedarationoftedation under treatylaw. Thus ithas castabout for
someother internationstandardunder whch it would tryto rationalisitsconduct.
But thisisnomorethanatransparena tttemptto underminethe 1977Treatyand avoid
theapplicatiooftheprincipleofpactasuntservanda.
9.26 Hungary is correctthat the duty tu cooperate had been
specificdlyfifuifiiythe partiesthroughthek negotiationanconclusionof the1977
Treatf". The Treatywas the culminationof long andintensiveeffortsto reach a
cooperativesolutionto serious problems of fiooding,navigation, energy needs,
agriculhrddevelopment and environmenta plrotection.Indeedtheconclusion of an
agreement cuncerninganinternationalwatercourse isa manifestatioof cooperation
betweenthe Statessharingthat wattrcourse.Iisinfac oftenregarded astheuIt*mate
form ofcooperationwithregard to shad water resources".Thisis particularltnre
when, as in the presentcase, theagreement establishesafiamework forongoing
cooperationbetween theStatesconcernecl.
32 Sece.& theawardin thMe Lanoux Arbitration,di& belowstatinthat"theonly
nay to arrivçuchcornpromi=of [confiicting]intertoconclu&agreemen onsan
increasin omyprehensieasis.Internatiolracticereflectsthe convictiStates
ortgIOstrivtoconcludesucagreemens... Lakehoux Mitration firancev. Spain),
24InfernationaiLawRewrt119572p.IOI, aipp. 129-130The piîq ofenwmging
mperation Meen riparianStatesthrougthenegritiatiofagreementsgovenring
internationalwatemurisrecognis indrticl3, "Watercriüegreementsespecially
paragrap3,andthemmmeritarytheretoftheInfernatioLawCommission'asrtickon
theLawofthe Non-Navigati UsnaofInternationl atemw, adoptedonsecond
readinin 1994andin Articl8, "Generalbligatito cwperate,and accompanying
ArlrcleW (1oftheResolutihonthePollutoifRniversandLakeandInternationlaw
adapteby theInstitutInternatioLIawatitsAhem Session12Seprembe1979:"In
anyhg out their duto m~rate,StateBorderintheme hydrogrnphicasinhailas
farapraaicabIefspidlythroughagreementfe50rtothefaIIowingwayofmprafroa
...."buaire deI'lnstitutde droitinte-on58-1,AthenSessioqSeptemkr 1979
(BaslelMunic,9801,.197, a. (intrairslation). Good FaithPedumanct of the 1977Treatv
9.27 Hungarycontendsthatinrefusingto subrnitto itsprecondition
for substantivenegotiatio-s& cessationof d workon the Project- Slovakia
breachedobligationofcouperationand good faithpecfonnanceoftreaties:
"Therefird [ofCzechoslovakiato cooperatebyacceptingrneariingful
negotiationsinvolvedIack of good faithin the performance of a
bilateraltrear... . ThusCzechoslovakia violat ehe generally
recognisedprincipIof good fait..in the contexof its performance
ofthe1977 TreaW3 .
9.28 Hungary'sdaim is that the generddu@ tu performa treatyin
good faithrequires,in fhcase,thatthe1977 Treaty be performedb ,utthatit be
continuouslyopento re-negotiatiandamendmentT . heHungarîan positionseemsto
be thatCzechoslovakia acted inbadfaithby continuhgto performits obligations
under the 1977 Treaty andby expecthg Hungary to continue performingits
obligationsThis moiints tuanargumentfhatthegoodfaifhobligationofArticIe26
of the Viema Conventiononthe Law of Treatiesentds anaMigationtonegatiatethe
amendmenta ,ndultirnatethetdnation, of theverytreatythatthe sarnearticleof
the Conventionrequirebe "performe bdy[thepartiesingood faith."Thisis nothing
morethan yet anotherrepackaging fthe"revision"rgument ,ealtwithabove34.
9.29 Such anargumenttums thegoodfaith obligation on itshead.
Hungay cites noauthorityfor thisiew based on thetextof the ViennaConvention
andconfirmedbyits travaux or elsewhere. Indeed,a straightforwarapplicationof
the dutyto performtreatiesingood fait(pacta sunt servanda)would indicate that it
was Hungary,not Czechodovakia hat breached the obligatiof Article26 ofthe
Yiema Conventionby suspending,then terrrrinatig,e performance fits obligations
under the 1977Treaty. UniIaterdcessationofperformanceoftreaty obligationcm
hardlyquaiifyas good faitperformance ofthose obligationsSuch conductcannot
butbe heId to bea violatioof thebasicprincipleof pactasuntservandawhich the
International awCommissiondescribed as"thefundamentap lrinciplof the law of
33 HungariaMernoriaparas6486.49.
" paras.91-9-2above.Sec .l=,para2.22ea., abwe. foa Mer discussionof
thispoint.treatiesM3and is widely regarded as "perhapsthe most important principlof
internationllawW x
9.30 This is clear fiam the internationalLaw Commission's
comment- tu whatbecame Article26,stresskgfhattheobligationtu "abstaifiom
actscalculatetohstrate theobjectandpurpose ofthetreaty..[isclearlyimpbcitin
the obligationtperform thetreat iygood faith..."".h fact,Hungary'sunilateral
suspensiona,ndsubsequenatbandonmentofwurkunder the 1977 Treatybreached&
good faith obligatioaottu engagein "actscalculatd tu frustrate tobjectand
purposeof thetreatyand ledtuCzechusIovakia1efforttuensur teat theobjm and
purposewasrealisedas nearlas possible.
9.31 Hungary's condud contrasts sharply with that of
Czechus~ovakia andSlovakia. The factI seaveno doubt that Czechoslovakiaand
SIovakiaactedingood faitvis-à- vuisgaryunderthe 1977 Traty. h detaiIedin
Chapters V and VI, above, and furtherdiscussedbeIow in Chapter X and Xf,
Czechoslovakiawent outofitswayto accommodate Hungary 'speateddemandsfor
changes inthe ProjectimetableB ;ostponedthe damming of the Danubefor three
yearswhiIetrying tuget Hungary tu enterititdiscussionconcerningwhether the
Project couId be modifiaitu meet Hungqk crincerns;oEered, thruughout the
dispute,thepossibiityof revisingtechnid elementsto meet objectivelyverifiabIe
environmenta needs;proposeci eetingof expertsfiomboth countrieswithimpartial
experts;decidedto participatin aPHARE projectto studygroundwater dong the
Dmube;stressed Czechoslovakis'sadines5to negotiatwithHungaryconcerning"al1
aspectsconnectedwiththe implementatioonthe 1977 TreatyN3';ndeventhoroughly
35 Y 1966,VolIIA,ICN. USER p. 211.
36 -of RelatioLawof theUniteStatesSec321,commenta
(1987)The InternatioLaw Commissio n,itrximmentartoArticl23("Pactsunt
semanda*)ofîts drarticl enfietaw oftreatienotedthathe importancofthe
prîncip"iunderiinby thfa thatisenstuineinttimbIe to ~eChmer ofthe
UnirdNationsu. Yaimk of theIntemational hw Commissi1966,VoI.IIM,CN.
USER & p.211.TheCharter referto thedeterminationtheParti es &abIish
conditionsunderwhi..the obligationsarhmingtreati..canbe maintaine...".
CharteoftheUnitNations,thipreambuiararagraph.
37 Y-k oftheIntematioLiawCommission,1966,VoEIA,ICN.4/SER p. 211.
3%
TheddaysintheProjeduetoHungarjl'escxindifndtieîktId fothe 198Protocol,
andtheaçcelemtionothehjectfrom 1985-1989aHungarf6requesared-ribed in
Chap&r slandN ofSIovakias ernoid,aninChapteIV,above.
39
Mer oftheCzechoslovPrimeMinisieof23Apri1992,SlwakMemonal,Annex 108.examined the optioput funvardby fIungarythat theProject be abandonedandthe
areabecompleteiyrestoredtothe statuquo antem.These cannotbe interPret&other
thanas sincereeffortsbyCzechoslovakiaoworkwithHungary toimplement the 1977
Treatyingood faith- preciselywhatis requireby thegood faithcomponent ofthe
principIofpactasuntservanda.
9.32 Hungary,incontrast, unreasonablyandrepeatedlydernanded -
as a non-negotiablepreconditioto its dngness to negotiate,to conductfurther
research,ortoestablisa triparticommissi onzechoslovakiah'saltingoai lork
ontheProject,and lateron,Variant"Cm.
The ObIi~ation tuConsuItandNegofiate
9.33 Turning to Hungary'sargumentconcerning the dutyto
negotiate,onceagainit seemstboiidownto atheorythattheobligatioto co'operate
undergeneralinternationd law requiredCzechoslovakiau, , to agree tu stop al1
workontheProject asa non-negotiableprecondititoenteringintonegotiations,and
to agrsetuthedemoiitionand abandonmen oftheworksdready constructed
by Czechoslovakiaingoodfaith,infulfillmetfitsobligationunderthe 1977Treaty.
Like Hungary's othereffor o use obligationsundergeneralinternationallaw to
circrrmventthe1977Treatyregime,thisismisconceivd ariiII-founded.
9.34 The argumentis misconceivebecause, likthe goodfaithand
cooperationclaimsdiscussedabove,it wouldif foiiowedmeanthata validtreatyin
forcewould be constantlsubjecttobeingre-openedandre-negotiatedo,rteminated,
at theoptionof one ofthe parties,eveifithadbeensubstantidiyperfurmedbythe
other pmy. ThiswouIdnegatetheprincipleofpacta suntsentanda.
9.35 Hungaryargues that "[olne of the most evident tools of
cooperationis the dutyto negotiatewhendifficultyappearsin themanagementof a
sharedresource orintheimplementatioonfa cornmon project". Hungary Statethat
it"repeatedlproposed tobeginnegotiationsinordertureachan ecologicdgiiarantee
agreement,withoutsuc ces^"'a^, dthat "Czechoslovakiaefirsetu negofiateexcept
on thebais thatthe GabEikovobarragewouIdbeputintooperation irrespectivofthe
40
SecS.fwakMernorialaras.5.14-5.25.
41 HungarianMernoripara5.75.
41
-bid. resultsofindependent scientzcst~dies"~~.These allegationhave been shown to be
untruein ChaptersV andVI above,andwillbedealtwith againinChapter X,below4 .
9.36 Hungarycites, assupportfor its argumentthat Czechoslovakia
was 0bIige-dto re-negotiatttteh1977 Treatjr, precedentsthat do not appIytu the
present case. Hungaryreiies principaliyuponthe award in the Lake Lanoux
arbitration4'ndthe decisionintheFisheriesJurisdictiocase*. Those cases arenot
appositetu the faas othe presentcaseand ,ven iftheywereapposite,they support
the 1977Tteaty regimerather than Hungws efforts tu rninimiztehe importance of
thatsystemofagreements.
9.37 It wilbe recalledthattheLakeLanouxarbitrationd , ecidedin
1957, irivolvea disputebetweenSpainandFranceover aFrenchplan toutilisethe
waters of Lake Lanouq which eventudly flowed into Spain,tu produce elecîricity.
There, ashere, therexisteda setof treati betweentheparties. Lnthat caseitwas
theTreatyofBayonneof26 May 1866 andtheAdditionalAct ofthe me date. The
questionput tothetribunabl ythepartieswaswhetherFrance was correctinclairning
1 "that,incanyingout,without a preliminaragreemenb tetweenthe two Governments,
works forthe use ofthe watersofLake Lanoux on thetems laiddom in the project
..., it woulnot commita violationofthe provisionoftheTreaty ofBapnne of 26
May 1866 andof theAdditionaiAct ofthesame date"" ?
9.38 In Lake Lanoux, the French project was not specifically
foreseen bythe applicableagreementsw , hichhadbeen concluded nearly a century
43 m., para ..79.
44
the lettefromthe SlovakPrime Ministerofe19HSeptember1991.ttInrthat letter,
Czechoslwakia actuailyproDthaamrnrnitteofexpertsfromCmhoslovakiqHungary
andthe EC wlve the problemspertainingtheconstructionand opration of[GMe
Aoject]and"worrexaminealvariatioofpossiblsolutioinacomprehensive anner".
The Ielterdwstatunderçtandablyttha&and stagethat"C=halov&a wiIIody
lkd acceptabla variantwtùch wodd make theoperatioof the~ovo &nage
pssibie," bayç nothinabut refusintntak ento accou"tthresuI ofindependent
çcitntistudies"In factthentire tenoftheletteistnthemn-: it propoçthe
indicabaawillingnessto "examinevariatioonsossiblesolutionaiwmprehensive
manneru.
para.6.78(refemnto the asthe*Fishericaçe).FisheriesJuridiction CUnited
Kin~dorv.IceIandM,eris.Judment.LCJ. Reoor1974,p.3.
47 Rwue généraidee droit internatipublicVol.Lm, p.80; EngIishtransiatiin
PR 1974,Vol.IPart2, p194,atp.195.eariier. Thicontrastsshqly with the presentcase,wherethe entire abject and
purposeofthe1977Treatywastheconstmcîionbythe twopartiesoftheGLNProject.
Thus,whentheLake Lanoux tribunalpeaksof "anobligatiofor Stateto agreein
good faithto allnegotiationandcontactswhichshould ..placethemin the best
circumstancestuconcludeagreementsnq ,isrefehg tu negofiationsconcerninga
possibIeagreementonFrance'shydroelaric project,whichhadnot theretofurbeen
the subjectofanagreementbetweenFr- andSpain. In thepresentcase,Hungary
andCzechoslovakiahad alreadynegotiated,ovarperiodof manyyears,anagreement
concemhg the projectin questiothe 1977 Treaty. Thus,negotiationof the kind
referredtoby theLake Lanouxtribunalhad long siricbeen heIdby Hungaryand
Czechoslovakia ;othinginthataward suggesta thatifan agreementresiiltehm
negotiationfhatagreementwould itseIfhavtobe re-negotiated.
9.39 Infact,theLake Lanoux tribunaapplyinggeneraiprinciplesof
internationlaw, heldthattherewas no obligationtoreach an agreement@riortu
utiIisithe hydroelectricpowerpoteritofan internationaiwatercourse. Thris,even
if the TribunaI'statementsconceming negotiationsmuld be taken tu appIy tu
Hungary'sdemands foran "ecdogicalguaranteeagreement"or fortheamendmeno tr
terminatioof the 1977Treatytherewould havebeen no obligatioto actuallreach
such anagreement.
9.40 The LakeLanoux tribunal,therefure, went oso far asto
emphasise the importance of negotiations concerning projects on international
watercoursesplannedby ane StatethatmightaffecanotherState.In thecaseof the
G/N Project,such negotiationswereheld between Hungaryand Czechoslovafüa,
concerninga projectplannedby bath States,andresultedinthe 1977Treaty. En
addition,Cmhoslovakia and SlovakihavecunsistentlybeenwiIIintrnegotiatewith
Hungary,andhave in fact wnmltedaridnegotiatedwith Hungq, as showrilater in
thisChapter. Hungary i,wntrast,madeimpossibleanyrneaningn fglotiatioby
insistinthatCzechoslovakiasuspendworkon the Projectasa pre-conditiotoany
rneaningfunlegotiatioto settlethedispute.
9.41 Hungary dso dtes the FisheritsJttrisdiccaseinsupportof
itsargument cuncenirngthe dutyto negotiate. %le thatcase alsoinvolvedan
agreement -the1961ExchangeofNotes - andwhilethe Courididorderthepartiesto
4a a;p.197,quoteinthHwgarian Mernoriltpara..77.
4Q HmgarianMernoria,am 5.78.negotiate,the Courtdid not questionthe vaiidityof the agreementand ordered
negotiationson rnatterthat laywhdly ontside thepurview ofthe agreement.Thus,
thecase supportsSIovakialposition anddamages Hungary's.
9.42 The FisheriesJurisdictioncase involved a dispute between
Iceland and the UnitedKingdomoverwhether Iceland couldunilaterallextend its
fisheriesjurisdicti(andwith it itexclusivefishg right to)50 nauticalmilesfrom
itshaselines.TheCourt mledthat it-Id net. It furtherheldinteraliathat IceIand
andthe UK were under mutual obligationto undertakenegotiationsingood faittu
reachanequitablesolutionof theidifferencesoncerningtheirrespectivefishingrias
in theareabetween a 12-milefisheryzone recognisedin the 1961 agreementby an
agreemen bttween them and the 50-nile Iimitproclairl yIceland.
9.43 One ofthe ironieinHungary's use of thiscaseliesin thefact
that,likeHungaryinthepresent case,Icelandhadin 1971repudiatedan agreement
with the UK governing the subject matter of the dispute and containing a
compromissory ciause:thiwas the ExchangeofNotes between thetwo #unthes of
1I March 1961. IceIand,whichdidnot participatin thecase,infomed the Court by
ietterthattregarded theExchange ofNotes ashakg been terminated.The UK, for
its part, had stressedthat "the Exchange of Notes was not open to unilateral
denunciatio nrterminati~n"~. As already indicated,he Courtheld thatIcelandwas
borind by the 1961 agreement, which dso providedthe basis for the Court's
jurisdiction.'
9.44 The caseis dso of littlehelptoHungarywith regard to the
Court'sstatementsconcemingnegotiations.TheCourtordered no negotiationswith
regard tuareascovered bythe Thus Hungq's reliace onthe case asa
source ofan obiigationtonegotiate wirhregardtumatterscovered by an agreement
betweenthe partiesis misplaced. The Courtdid orderthe partiesto enter into
negotiations,butonlywith regardto the areabetweenthe 12-mile IcelandicEshery
zonecoveredbythe1961agreementa , ndthe50-mile limitproclaimedintheIcelandic
Govermerifs Regulations. That is, the Court ordered the partiestonegotiateoniy
with regard turnattersnot coveredby the 1961agreement. SimiIarlyi,t wouIdseem
50 FisheriJurisdictilLJniteKingdomv. Iceland).Merits.Jude;I.C.JReuons1974,
p.3,atp.14.
'' inthe1961 ExchangeofNotestheUK had agrd thatî"wodd no longer&je to a 12-
milefisheyzonearoundIdand...". W..atp.13.inappropriatin thepresencaseforCzechoslovakia(andnow SIovakia)andHungary
tobe requiredtonegotiatemattersthahadalreadybeenresoIvedinthe 1977Treaty
and related agreements,or whose resolutionwas entmsted by the Treaty to
rnechanismds estabfished.The negotiationinFisheriesJurisdictionwere believed
necessaryfortwo reasons:Iceland'preferentid fishingrigasa coastaState ina
situatioof specid dependenceon matal Esheriesand the UK's specid interestin
fishininthosewaters,byvirtueofitslong historyof fishingtheretheimportance
ofthefisheryto itseconomyT.herewasnoagreemen tetweenthepartiesconceniing
that area. The "riegotiationsought by&npy wouId in reaIity constitre-
neautiationoan existingagreemen-the 1977Treaty.ThuatheCourt's statementin
the FisheriesJurisdirtcase concerningnegotiationsweremade in a contextthat
bearsnosimilaritwhatsoevertothepresentcase.
9.45 That havirigbeen said, however, itbas repeating that
CzechosIovakia,then Slovakia,was dways preparedtu discrrssand agree with
Hungary ways inwhich toimprovetheenvironmentdsoundness of theG/N Project.
Thispointhasbeendeveloped atlengthinChapterIsV-VI above.
9.46 This secti oas shown hat Hungary'sinvocaionofpurported
obIigationshavingtheisourc eutsidthe 1977Treatywnstiîutes nothinmore thm
anotherattemptto made itsobligatiounderthe Treaty.Whether the obligationin
questionarestyledasgeneraldutiesofcooperation,r asmore specifionesof good
faithperformancec,onsultationandnegotiation,iisclearfirs tt,tthe applicable
obligationarethose underthe1977Treaty, andsecondthatevenwhen testedagainst
theseobligationsunder generdintemationallaw,it is Hungarsonduct, not thof
CzechosIuvakiaorSIovakia,thatinot incornplianceThe foiiowingsectiowillturn
fiomtheselargelyproceduradl utiesto Hungarymisuse of the substantnoms of
internationenvironment aw.
SECTION 3. Hun~arvMischaracterises and Misap~Iiesthe Substantive
Numa ofInternationalEnvironmenta1 Law
9.47 The secon dundamentap lroblemwithHungws argumentis
thateven ifandto theextentthat the generdinternationallofthe environmentis
applicablin thepresentcase independentof theTreaty,thatlaw ismisundtrstood
and misagpIiebyHungary. A. Eungary's CharacterisationofTntemational EnvironmentaI
Law Wouid Thwart the Levitimate Efforts of States tu
Develori
9.48 Hungary properly stresses the importance of preventing
environmentaihd3 but interpretthe principIof prwention insuch anabsolute
fashionas tu vhdy forecloseanydevelopmentofinternational water resources.
Hungary goes su faras tusuggest that "changesininternationalenvironmentalIaw,
and equdy importantly in internationaenWumentaI awateness" qualii as
fundamentac lhanges ofcircumstmcesthatconstitutea groundfor terminating the
1977 Treav. Hungary goes on toimply thatthese"changes"lefiitwith"no choice
but to reconsiderthe Project,especiaiin itsscientific,environmentlnd energy-
relatedaspects"". In reconsideringthe Project, Hungarywas, according to its
Memurid, ody "seekingtucomplywithinternationalstandard...ltM.
9.49 But what are the appIicabIeinternationalstandards? Has
internationaelnvironmentll wchangedsubstantiaiIyince1977 (or, moreaccurately,
since February1989, whenHungaryafErmed the 1977 Treatyin al1'itssubstantive
elements),andif so,hasthechange been as fundamentaals Hungaryimplies? It is
certainlynot the policyofthe internationalommunity to discourageStates from
deveIopingtheir waterresourcesespecidy wheneveryreasonable effortismade to
protectthe environment. ThisSectionwiIIatternpttu throw some Iightuponthese
questions,md wilicuncludethat theGINProject isin fsc tnfiIl conformitywith the
currentstandards ,oliciesandattitudeof theinternationalommunityinrespect of
theenvironment.
9.50 The general principles of contemporary international
enWumental lawdo not operate in isolatiofrom other noms of internationaaw
includingtheprincipiofpaaasunt sewanda ,rfrom nthervaluesof theinternational
communiry. In particulart,hose principles,properiyunderstood,inform but donot
thwart the effortsof cuuntriestu deveIopfor the ben& of present and frrhxre
53 HungariaMernoriap,am 6.63.
54
HungariaMaoriai, para10.76Hungary'sseof rebussic stantibusinthrsregardis dealt
within ChaptVlI lf thSlwakMemona lpara. 8.andin ChapteX ofthisCounter-
Mernoriai,par10-61,m.
53
HungariaMernorial.ua 10.76 .ungaryiçpecifcIaimsmncemingalIege"dcientinc,
envircinmenand enera-relatd prohIewith theProjjecthakn deaiwith ithe
presenConfer-MernoriilChapteW.
HungariaMernorial,ara10.76. -256 -
;
generations. Yet ifHungarylview of thegenerd internationlaw oftheenvironment
were foIIowed tu its Iogicai conclusion it wou-mean that no dams or other
developmentprojectscouIdbeconstmctedoninternationalwatercourses becausethey
would aiterthe naturaienvironment. Evenif it were conceivablethatsuch a result
could attractsupport insome quarters of industrialisdountriesthat had already
extensivelydevelopedth& fieshwaterrerourcapotential,it is highlyunlikelythait
would be endorsedbyanygovernment. Inanyevent, sucha theoryshouldnot operate
tu prevent a strugghg new democraq hm developirigits fieshwaterresourceq
particnhly when they canstitutethe cciuntsts phcipal potentid sourceof clean
energy. Nor shouIdsuch a view bedowed tonegate a State'effortstuprotect its
citizemy from the ravage sf naturd disastersuchas floods. The international
community neverintended theprincipleofinternationaelnvironmentallwto operate
insuch away. !
B. The Cumt A~proarh uf the InteniationaI Cornmunitv ta
Environmentand Develorimen t:SustainabIeDeveIopmen t
9.51 Before addressing the curent appruachof the international
community tu environmentaiprotectionit must be emphasised that contraryto the
impressionHungary seeksto create,internationelnvironmentallaw didnot develop
overnight.InitsMernorialH , ungaryitselfcitasnumber of instrumenttshatpre-date
the 1977 TreaV7,incfudingt :he 1975Helsink i ina'Ac?; the 1973 EC Progrme
ofAction on theEnvironmentS9 a;ndthe 1972 StockholmDeclaraiionontheHumari
Envitomenta. Hungary dso citesthe1935 awardui,thecase thatmmy regard asthe
fountainhead of internationalenviromentd law, the TraiI SrneIter Artiitratio.l
Indeed, Hungary statesthat"Jslincethe end of the 1960s environmentai Iaw has
developedwith an unprecedentedintensityand~peed,"~.Whetherthe "intensityand
!
57
Cwîously,Hungaqalsociteasnumberof authori'batpostdatenotonlythTm but
Hungaqisultimatrepudiatiofit i1992.These&lude the inçtnrmenadoptedat the
UnitedNationsbnfemw on Environmenand DweIopment(June,19921,suchas the
ConventionunCrimateChangandtheRioDeclaration. HungarMemurialpara6-64.
5%
the1977TreatywereawareofandgiduenŒd]by"theFinaiActandrelawadeveIopmenrs,
whîch.inHungary's ord"gavlegitimacytoenvironmenmncem inmern Europe]".
-bid.para5-60.
59 m., para6.61.
61 M., para6.70.
62 M., para5.57.speed"of itsdevelopmenhtavebeen"unprecedented"rna bedebatablet;he important
point hereisthat Hungary acknowledgesthatthedevelopmentbegm welibefore the
Iate1970s. It cm thereforehardlyclah to have been surprissithat international
environmenta ll wwasintheprocessofdeveloping when it concludedthe 1977Treaty
with Czechoslovakia or thereafternor cm it daim thata qualitativelynew and
dia:eren"tinternationalvironmenta al areness"hassuddenly sprung forthsoasto
work a fundamentalchange osfcirmrnsfanws. The awareness was presentin the
intemationalcommutiityatleasthm the 1972 Stocktioh Conferencea.
9.52 Itisthusclearfromthe historicalecord,much ofwhichis cited
by Hungary itself, that wu there have been devdopments in international
environmentallaw and awarenessoverthe pasttwo decades ,heybegm weIIbefore
the conclusionof the 1977Treaty. Moreover,they have not beencatacIysrnicb,ut
haveprogressed graduallyinresponseto increas keodwledgeof theproblem and the
needs of States,as in otherfielof internationllw. Current law in thefieldmay
thusbeseen as a naturaand Iogicd outgrowthof a proess thatbegm many years
ago.
9.53 The key to understandingthe current approach of the
internationacommurritytu theintegrationofenvironmen aiprotectionand economic
development is the concept of "sustainabldweiopment".According tu thiaid-
which was advanced inthe 1987 Reportofthe World CommissiononEnvironment
and Development(the Brundtlandcommission)^h ,umanityshould "ensurethat it
meets theneeds ofthepresentwithoutcomprornisin theabilityof futuregenerations
- ..
63 a genedy, L. Sohn,"TheStockholmDeçlmtion on the Hunan Enhnmen~" 14
HarvardIntemationiawlod (1973)p.423. Thef0110winobservatiby Proksçor
Sohnis illuminahg thiregard"Onemightalsoconside-asdidthedelegateoKenya
intheGeneraihmbly -thathe26principloftheStockhoh Declaratiwere'cornmon
convictionwhich'reinfor tcePrincipland Purposesof the Charterof the United
Nation$.andtha ogetherwifhthe UniversalDechration Human Rightsand the
InternatioiaîragyfortheSecùn dweIopmentDemde, they'colIectiv-te a new
atmospkieforintedonal cospemtion....Havingaccepmirbe respomibilforthe
prwewationandimpmvemenotfthehuman environment, heinternatiiommuniiywin
finintheStockhoimDecIaratiasourceofstrengforlater,morespeciaction.Nd,
atp.515.Thus,therwasalreadconsidera "blerenesoftheproblemontheparofthe
internatiolommunit yn1972.
M "Ourcommon future"istnbut aehe forty-sxonmion of theGeneralAssemblyas
documentA(421427- August1987,publishas OutCornon FutureOdord University
Press, 1987.The Ckned Assembiy,ininlution 38f15Iof 19Decemkr 1983,had
welcomedtheestablishmetfaspeciacommissiothatwould"report nenvironmetnd
giobalprobldmatiato the year2000and bond, includingproposedstrategiefor
sustainabeevelopmentTheCommission latadoptedthename"World Commissionon
EnvironmenandDevelopment"D. onimenN421427,p. 1.tumeet thek orm needsH a WhiIetheconceptimp~i<ssorne Iimstonhumanactivities,
the Commissio explainedthat "sustainabldevelo~mentrequiresmeetingthe basic
needsof aiiandextendingto d theopportunityto theiraspirationfora better
Iife'. Thus ,ulerenitnthe mncept ofsustainab ~eeve~o~men istheprutciplethat
developmentd needs are to be takm hto account in interpretinand applyhg
environmenta obligations.Thi srinciplwasweii kown andmdslyacceptedasthe
keystone ofeffortstointegrateenvironment parotectioandeconornic development
weiiinadvance ofHunds milaterd suspensionofwork ontheProject in1989.
!
9.54 The mostrecentprunouricemei oiftheinternationaçlommunity
on thesubjectof integratinenvironmentaclonsideratioasnddeveloprnentanleedsis
theRioDeclaration on Environmena tnd~evelo~ment,adoptedat theUnitedNations
Coderence onEnvironmena t ndDevelupment (UNCED or"Earth Summit")in Riode
JaneiroinIunt 1992#, Ofpdcular interestinthe iresencontextare PrincipIe1,3
and 4 ofthe RioDeclaration, hichprovideasfollows:
I
"Princi~le I
Humari beings are at the centri of cuncems for sustainable
developmerit.Theyare entitIedtu k heaIthy and productivelifein
harrnonw yithnature. I
i
[
Principle3 I
The righttu deveIopmentmust be fuifiIl&suas tu equi&bIymeet
de~eloprnental and environmentai :needs of present and future
generations. !
I
!
I
I
67 P.Sands ,he +GreeninofInkmationaLaw:EmergingPxinciplwanRulesu,1
End.Jod ofGIaM hnalStudies(,199293,ap.302.
a RioDeclaratioonEnvironmenatndDevelopment, .N.DocMCONF1 .1/5/Re1,June
13, 1992,reprintin 31Internationl eml Materia(1992)atp. 874 (adoptedby
w~l~ennis)As stateintheHmgarianMemoriQp , ar6-57:"17Staa (outofthe17%
whîch thenexisted)werrepresentby approxim&y I0,MH)delegatcs,incIud116
headsofStatorcf ggvemmenL AUthe~Iwant HitémtionaJor&aniçatwserpresent."
SoitisnotanexaggeiatitospeakofthRioDecIqon asrefiecttheapproachofthe
internationaclommunity. !
I Princide4
In orderto acbievesustainabldevelopment,enviromentai protection
shallconstituteanintegralpartofthe developmentprocessandcannot
beconsidered inisolatiofiomit."
9.55 Theseprinciplesleave no doubtthatthe fundamentaplolicyof
the intemationalcommunity isnot ihe singie-mindedpursuit of environmental
protectionor the non-alterationoftstatusW. Rather,as iidicatein Principl1,
theover 170StatesparticipatinintheEarth Snmmit took ahuman-centeredapproach
tu the inteption of environmenîd concerns and devefopmentd needs. They
emphasised that fumrnent of the "rightto deveIopmentnB must meet both the
"developmenta and environmenta leeds"ofpresentandfuturegenerationsof humans.
And, importantlyfor the presentcase, theystressedthat environmentaplrotection
t'constitute[]nintegrapartofthe development processand cannotbe consideredin
isolationhm it". There çould not be a clearer confirmationof the idea that
envirumental protectionmot be pursuedinisolation,withoutregarto otherneeds
andvalues,but rathemiid beapproachedin thecontext ofthe developmentprocess.
9.56 It iclearhm both theIetteandthe spiritoftheseprinciples
that the overarchingpoiicy of the internationalommunityis that environmentai
concerns are not directecto fistrate efforts to achieve social and econornic
developmentb , utthatdevelopment shodd proceedin a way thatisenvironrnentalfy
sustainable.Slovakiasubmitsthatthesehavebeen, andare today,theverypolicieson
whichthe GIN Projet is based. The consistenq of theProjectwiththe prevailing
approachof Statestu environmentand dwelapment iscon6rmedandfuriherclarified
bythe approach takenby internationaforaandinstitutions tuthe developmentand
protectionofinternationy1sharedfieshwaterresources.
9.57 As notedin Slovakia'Ms e~norial'~,ungaryrefersto several
instmments thatatmostrepresent "softlaw"initsefforttojustifysuspensionof work
atNagyrnaros,thenatDunakiliti n 1989. Yet ifHungary wished to relyupon non-
# EventtiUniteStatM,whicbdoesnoacceptheideaofa"righttdevelopmentj,oinîhe
WRÇ~RSUSontheRioDeclamiionThe US explaintha hisdidnot reprana changein
itslong-standopposititosucha"right*bid, irtnderstdPrincïp3eIOmeanîhat
"economideveIopmengds and&jedues mustbepursudin suc hwaythat development
andenvironmentne ofpmnt andfuturgeneratiosrtakeninto accoun"e.porof
theUnitedNationsEonferenwon Environmentand Dwelopment, U.N.GAOS 47th
SessiohU.N.Dg. MCONF .5II26Rw. I (VoIlatp.17 (1992)'Ibiisconsistentwiîh
thepositionofSlovaw,hicisno1dependenm theexistencea"rightodeveIopment*.
70 SlovakMernoria,ara.8.111.bindinginstruments,themost pertinent one isAgend21. Aisoadopted at theRio
conference''Agenda 21 elaboratein greatdetd iupunthe implementation ofthe
pinciples containedinthRio Declaration. Agend21 is,inessence,aplanof action
for the 1st Cenruryinthe fieldofenvkonment Gd development. Chapter 18 of
Agenda2 1 concemsfrerhwaterresources.Itis entitled,"~rotectoftheQualityand
Supply of FreshwaterResources:Application of, IntegratedApproaches to the
Development,Managementand Use of Water~esources"'~. The introductionto
Chapter 18States:
"Themultisectoralnature of water resources developrnentinthe
cantextofsocio-econumicdeveloprnenmt ust.berecoed, as weIIas
the multi-interestutiIizaofwater resourcesforwater supplyand
smitation, agriculture, Hidusfruhm development, hydropower
generationdand fisheries,transportafq :recreaton,Iow and flat
Iandsmanagement and other activities. Rational water rrtilization
scherneforthe deveIopmentof surfaceandundergrou water-supply
sourcesandotherpotentiasourceshaveto be supportedby concurrent
water conservationand wastage minimizationmeasures. Prioritv,
however.mustbeaccorded to floodpreventionandcontrolmeasures,
asweiiassedimentationcontrol,whererequired."
9.58 Chapter18 containsreven "~ro~ramme Areas." Programme
Ara A isentitled, "Integratewater resuurcesdeveiopmentandmanagement." In
establishingthe "basisforaction"underthisprograra, thefoIiowingobservatiois
made:"The extent tu which water resources developmentcontributeto economic
prodiictivimi?social weII-beingis not usuaIIyappreciata,ithoughal1social and
economicactivitiesrelyheady onthesupplyandqualityof freshwater." Underthe
subsectionof Programme AreaA entitled"Objectives"t,he followingstatementsare
made:
"18.7.Theoverallobiectiveis to satisfi,th&fieshwaterneeds ofdl
couritriesftheirsustainabdevelo~rnent. :
"18.8. Integrat e dterresources managementisbased an the
perceptionof water asan integraipari of theecusystem,a naturd
resource andasocid andeconomic good,whose qnantitandquaIity
determirithe natureof its rrtilktiaTothis end, water resources
have tobe ~rotected,takinginto accountthe functioninof aquatic
" Agenda21, adoptedathUnitedNationsConferenon EnvironmentandDevelopment,
RiodeJaneirol,un1992U.N.Doc.AICONF.151/26.
T2 Agenda21,m., Chapttr8,"Protectinthemi& andSuppIofFmhwaterResou~m:
ApplimtioofhtegrateAppmachato theDeveIopmerrMLanagemenandUse ofWater
ResPm", U.N.Doc.iVCONF.151 12oIII)p,167. ecosystemsandtheperennialityof theresource,in ordertsatiseand
reconcilneeds forwaterinhumanactivities.
18.9..Fourprincipalobjectivesshoiildbe pursuasffoHows:
(b) To planfor the sustainabland rationalutilization,protection,
conservat indmanagement ofwaterresourcesbasedon community
needs and prioritieswithinthe frmework of national economic
deveiopmtntpoIiq ...""
9.59 Thus ,genda 21,Iik he BnindtlandCommissio Rneportand
theRioDeclaration ,oesnotcounselblindpursuitof environmentvlaluesinisolation
hm humas needs,includhgthe needtûdevelopeconomically.Indeed,itemphasises
the importance of"satisSf[ingthe fieshwater needs of di countriesfor their
sustainabledeveIopmentUA. pplyinthe critercontainedinAgenda21 tu the G/N
Project revedsthat the Project,bothas originallydesignedand asprovisionaily
implemented throughVaria" nt" ,n effectanticipatandfollowedthe guidelinesin
Chapter18.
9.60 SpecificaIIyt,hGiN Projectconstiîutan "integratedapproach
to thedevelopmentm, anagemen tnduse ofwaterresources"asded for byAgenda
21. The Projectrepresentsan "integrateapproach ,.."becauseit was carefuliy
designedto servea numberofpurposes atthesame time:improvemeno tf navigation;
production ofhydroelectrpower;protectionagainstfloods; restoratof previous
groundwaterlevels;preventiooffurîhererosionoftherivertied;ehabiiitatof the
riverbranchesand other purposesdiscuçsedintheMernoriolfSlovakia7'.Approvai
ofthe Projectwas precededby numerousscientificstudieofthe Project'spotential
impactupon terrestrialandaquatecosystems;fiirtherstudihavebeen conducted
since the incepiionafwork on the Projecand since the implementatioof the
provisionasolution36Flood controlandproblemsofsedimentationareaddresseda,s
cded for by Agenda 21. Agenda 21recognisesthat "waterresources development
contributesoeconomicproductivityandsocid weII-beingtwo oftheProject'sbroad
objectives. TheProjectin its originalform,aasprovisionallimplemented,treats
74 M., pp.168-69(emphasaddd).
15 SecChapteLIS,eaion3oftheSIovaMemariai.
76 -eeChapteIV,abe.''wateasan inte@ partofthepanubian] ecosystem,a nattrrIesourceanda socid
andeconomic good ..."Itrecognisesthat"waterresourceshavto beprotected..in
orderto satisfyandreconcilneeds forwaterin humanactivitiesn.Some of those
activiti-navigation,griculture,ndforestr-werethreatenedbytheerosion ofthe
bed oftheDanube and consequentIoweringoftheIeve ofgroundwater.The Projcct
was designed,interalito stoperosionoftherivehd, whichoccurred in the upper
partof itreach,andtu amelioratenavigationconditioand restoregroundwaterto
levels that would reducethe necessityfor irrigatiand assuresufficientwater
supplies. This would alsoenable the revitalisingotheriver branchesand the
enhancingofrecreationdopportunitis thoseareas.Insum, theG/N Project reDects
carefulpIanning"for the sustainaandrationaluthtion, protectioq consemaion
andmanagementofwaterresources baseodn communityneedaandpriorities within
the frarneworkofnationaleconomicdevelopmentpolicy" of the Treatyparties,as
calledfoby Agenda21.
9-61 Furthereuidencethat Hungarysnti-damapproachisout ofIine
with curent expertthinkinissuppliedby 'The Dublin Statement",adoptedatthe
InternationClonferenceon Waterand theEnvironment:DeveIopment Issuesforthe
21st Centuq" . TheConference was heldinDublin inJanuary,1992,in preparation
fortheEarthSummit. Conference participancommended The DublinStatementto
world leadersthatwould assemblein Riode Janeiro3'.The Erstoffour "Grridimg
PrinciplesnsefortintheStatementisasfoIIows:
"Principe o.1 - Freshwateris a finiteandvulnerableresource,
essentialto sustainlife,developtndtheenvironment.
Sincewater sustainsme, effective managementof water rtmrces
demaridsahofisticapproachlinkingsocidandeconomic development
with protectionofnaturd ecosystems. EEectivemanagemeIinkland
andwater usesacrossthewholeof a catchent areaor groundwater
quifer7."
9.62 The DublinStatementalsocontainsan "ActionAgenda" which,
under itsseconditem, stressestheimportancofprotectionagainsnaturd disasters
çuch as floods: "Economiclusses from naturd disasters,includingfloods and
17
Internatiol onfereenWater andtheEnWonmentD: evelopmentssuesfort21st
Century,26-Januar1992,Dublin,Irela, he Dubh Statemen"eproducen U.N.
DocAICONF.lSlIPU ln2ex1p.7.
79
W., PrincipNo.1,ap.9.droughts, increased three-fobleween the 1960sand the 1980s." Itfurther
emphasisesthatclimatechangecouldfurtherexacerbateflood problems: "Projected
climatechange andrisingseIeveIswiIIintensifythe riskforso.."."
9.63 The coinridenceoftheDubIinSfatemtnt'sPinciples andA~tion
Agenda, onthe one hand,and the G/N Projecton the other,demonstrateagainthat
evenwhenmeasured bythestandard ofthemostrecentthinkingt,hedesignofthe GN
Prujectisenviromentallysound. It is not,asHungatywouldhave the Courtbelieve,
out of he withcunent internationalenvironmentlawor "awareness"F.or example,
as rmmmendedbyPnncipIeI oftheDublinSfatement'sGuidingPrincipleqthe GM
Projecttakes what amount to "a holistic approach,linkinsocialand economic
development withprotectioofnaturalecosystems".Indeed,theProjectis designedat
onceto promote socialandeconomicdevelopmentandto protectandrestorenatural
ecosysterns.ExperiencewiththeProject'sprovisionalirnplementationtkough Variant
"Cu indicateitisackeving these objectivIn.particular,theProjectpromotessocial
and eunomic devdopment bypruvidiingsubstaritil avigationbeneftusdl countnes
and individualsusing the Danube-Rhi wneterway; by improving agricuItural
conditionsby raisingthe water table;and by providing clean, sustainabland
inexpensivehydroelectrpowerforthe economicand socialwell-beinof the citizens
ofHungaryandSlovakia.TheProjectprotects andredores naturd ecusysterby, as
already indicated,reversierusionof the bed ofthe Danube, hdting concomitant
loweringof groundwaterlevels;restorinwatertothebranch systernand revitdising
the riparianenvironment.In additionas recommended in the ActionAgenda, the
Projectprovidesmuchneededprotectionagainstthe most serious kindof natural
disasterintheregion,flood- phenornentahat couldbecorneiricreasinglyintensewith
projected climatt change.
9.64 In the Iight of the position of the internatiocommunity
revealedintheforegoingsurveiy tis surpnsingthatHungarywouldtaketheabsolute
positionthat environmentaclonsiderationforeclosedevelopmentof the freshwater
resourcesit sharewîthSlovakis. Hungary'spositioisparticularlysurprisiinIigtit
of the environmentalenefits the Project brtugtheareag. By purportingtu play
the environmentaclard,Hungaryis actudly deprivingitscîtizens ofenvironmentai
benefits.Thesebenefitwouldbe enhance ifHungarywereto observeits obligations
underthe 1977Treatyandshow agreaterwillingnesto cooperatewithSlovak ifor
80 m., atp. IO.
81 SeeSIovakMernoriaprrra209-2II.See,dm, par4.30andChapieVin,abve.example,byplacingundemater weirsinthebed oftheDanubesu thatwaterwil flow
into river branchon theHungafianside. Instead,Hungarystoppedwork on the
Projectata moment whenthe majoralteratioto the environment i.e ',aringof
landandconstructionof works on agriculturlnd forestrland -hadalreadybeen
irrwocablyaccomplished,utbefor teeexpectedenvironmentabienets -the increase
inpund water levelsandthewaterinofthe branchsystem-couIdbe rd&.
9.65 The environmentablenefitsoftheProjectresultlargelyfiom
correctionitenvisagesof the adverseenvironmentacionsequenceinSlovak ind
Hungaryof upstreamworks ontheDanube inothercountrie- consequenf chasdi
not correcthemselvesbutwiIIonlybecorne worse ifnoactionist&errsZ. Nor, for
thatmatter,wilthe0th problemstheG/N Projectwas designaito addresssuchas
floodingandobstmctednavigationd, isappewithouthumanintervention.Butrather
thanrecognisingthatthese conditionswillinevitworsen unlessremediaiactionis
taken,Hungaryignoresthem,in effectakinthe positiothatnothingshouldbedone.
Hungq's unwiiiirignestuaddressthe deterioratiofthe riparienWument in the
DanubianIowIands demonstrateshatitinot prepd toobserveone oftheprinciples
itinvokes with suchforce: that thenvironment shouIdbe "passed on tu future
generationsinnoworsecondition thanitwss re~eived"~~F.urthe, ungary'refusa1
to aIIowcompletioof theentirProject,includimeasuresaimed atthemitigationof
certainadverseeffectsof theoperation,andeliminationof a numberof national
investments,solelbecausethesewereIinkedwith theProject,has resulteddiredy in
thecontinuhg degradatioof the envifonmentonHungariantemtofl. Inaddition,it
is cleu that Hungary recognised that its suspensionof work would cause
environmenta lamage,sinceitrefend tothisresuwhen it sougha shorteningofthe
constmctionschdule before 19898'. Thus, Hungary'sposition is not only anti-
dwelopment;it isalsoinfactanti-environment.
9.66 Slovakia has shown that Hungary misunderstands the
conternporar nternationallwofthe environmenatnd hasindicat hedfundamental
approachoftheintemationaciommunity to theintegratiof environmentalrotection
and econornicdevelopmen .t Against the background ofthis generd discussion,
" The pr&lemsreqrruingremeartioiatheSIwak-Hun@andon oftheDanulxare
dexribeinChapterSectio2,ofthSIova kernoriai.
See.e-gHungariaMernorial,am10.38.
84 See.paras.4.19,4.29and4.41,etgg.,See.also,para.8.11,et~.,hve.
" SIavBkMemotidAnnex49:Profocof21sSessiondESTC Commiiie(ap.420).Slovakianow turnsto specificclaimsof Hungaryimplicatingthe internationalawof
theenvironment.As indicated atthe outsetofthisChapterH, ungary'cslairnsmisappIy
thatlaw. inaddition,aswillappearbeIow,they are unsrrpported ythe facts.
C. Hun~arv Disturfs the Princi~Ie of Prevention and the
"Preca~tionaryPrincioie"
ThePrinci~leofPrevention
9.67 HrrngaSs argumentsreIating tu internationalnvironmentallaw
restontheproposition that "ftlhmainprinciple ofinternationalnvironmental Iaw is
thatenvironmenta legradationmust bep~evented"~.Hungare yven goesso far as to
declare that the "principleof prevention...mustbe considered an erga ornnes
obligationua7W, hiIethe latterpropositihas no bearinguponthepresent case, itis
noted because ibeîrays theextreme view of internationalenvironmentaLaw adupted
by Hungary": if the principlofprevention were in facatn er&aornes obligation,
moderatetransfiontierairpollutionmovingfiomStateA to State B could theoretidy
bechailengedbyStateC,evenifState C weretotdlyunaffected and locatedinanother
hemisphere -a patentlabsurd consequence.
9.68 The prhcipIt of preventing envimnmentd hm must be
properlyunderstoodand appliedsp.Hungaq, however,iqIies thattheobIigation to
prevent suchhm is absolutem. As the foregoing discussionof the concept of
sustainabledevelopmenh tasshown, thisisnotthecase. Ifitwere,development would
cornetu a standstiII.
86 Hungarian~emorid, para.6.63.
88 It maal= beIraconfusionSec .n3,hve.
89 ProfesçorChristopherStoaenotedauthoritinthefieldofnationnland intemtîonal
environmentaaw. hasarguedbat preventiomay notalwaysbethebest approach"an
ounceofpreventionmaybewortha poundofw, butbythesame quainttoke~topaya
paundinpreventioto geonlyanounceofcureisadistinctiybbuy.... mhe question
whethertoIea nowardpmntion orcureisnotonethatmn be answed generallyC.
Stone,TheGnat 1sOIderThanMan: GlobalEnvimmtnt and Human ApiendaP.rincelm
UniversityPrePriDcetoq1993pp.xv-xvi.
90 See. e.2.para6.63 of thHunganan MernoriaiThe main principlofinremationai
environmentaawis thaenvironmentdiegradatin uabe~revented.Emphasisadded. 9.69 What rnariyregard asthe seminal authorityin the fieldof
internationeriwonmentd Iaw,theTrailSmeltercase,placedsignificatonditionson
theobligationto preventtrmsfiontiairpollutioninitsfamoustatementofthelaw:
"Underphciples ofinternationafaw,... no stathas therightto use
orpermitthe useofitsterritoryinsucharnaruieastu Fauseinjuq -by
fumes inor to the t&tor)lof artutheor the propertiesorpersuns
therein,when the caseisof seriousconsequenceand the iniuryis
establishb~ clearandconvincinnevidencgl."
Hungary has provided nq scientificevidence of adverse envirumental
consequenc oftheG/N Project, other than the unesthad beendisdosed bythe
preparatory studies planntubemitigatedbyappropriatemeasuresenvisagedby the
Treaty andtowhichHungaryagreedg2 .hus n,eitheconditionlaidom bythe Trail
Smeltertribunal satisfied.
9.70 Similadyindicativeoa realisntoicabsoIutistapproachtu the
preventionofharm are thedra articleontheLaw of the Non-NavigationalUses of
International atercorrmsadopted by the Internationl awCommissiononsecond
readingatits1994 sessionOf particulanterestforpresenpurposesaredraftarticles
7 and21. Article 7, entitled"Obligatinot to causesignificaharm,' providesin
relevantpartasfollows:
"1. Watercourse Statesshd exercise dut diliaence tu utiIizan
internationalwatercourinsuch away as nottocausesignificanharm
tootherwatercourseStateP."
9.71
TheCommissionexplainsin itscommentsry tvparagaph I of
hicle 7 thata State cmbedeerned to havebreachedits obligatioto exercisedue
diligencetu avoid caüsing signïficant har"ody when it has intentionalljor
negligentlycaused the event which had to be preventedor has intentionallyor
negligentlynot preventedothersin its territorhm causing that event or has
abstainedfromabating itMH. Leavingasidethe factthatHungaryconsented to the
91 3 UnitedNation&mm ofInlemfional ArbitraiAwar1935,p. 1911,atp.1965
(emphasisaddedi.
92 ObviousltheIandsEapeadtoixdisrupt indrdetoconstmctthereçewoitheby-pass
canaand thmajotstnictumThese"environmentalects werunderstocndaccepted
bythepartiealthougasindicatatpara9.73beloweventheywereminimisethrough
theselectoftheleasdisruptvariants.
93 1994Rem* of theTntemationdLawCommissio. 149iip,235.Projectand its effec-bothpositiveandnegative- inthe 1977 Treatynone of the
numerousstudiesconductedpnorro 1977 or sincethatyear hasindicated thatthe
Project wouldcause sigrilficantenWumentalhm to Nungary or Slovakia. And,
once againHungaryhasitselffded toofferascintiUof scientzcevidencetu support
itsclaimsofimpendingenviromentalhm.
9.72 TheLC's cornmentar gyoeson toprovidespecificexamplesof
treatyprovisionsthatreflectduediligenceobligati.5Itstressessuchstandardsas
thefollowing:Statesshd use the "bestpracticabmeans attheirdisposaland[shall
act]in accordancewith their capab'iti(1982 UnitedNations Convention on the
Law ofthe Sa); Statesareobiiged"tutakd eipwiical stepsntu preventpoIIution
(1972 London Dumping Convention);andStatesshd "takedl appropriatrneasures"
(1985 ViennaConventi fortheProtectionoftheOzone Layer).
9.73 CtrtainIat thetime the Projewas beingpiannui,the-parties
look "d appropriatemaures" tuguardagainstenvitomenta1 hq usingthe"best
practicabiemeans [then]at their disposaland acting"in accordance with their
capabilitiesFor example,as recognis eydHungary96a, numberof variantsof the
proposed projectwere consideredby the two countries. However, contrary to
Hungary'sassertiothat"noneof these plansconsiderethe environmentailmpactof
the projectnw,he environm m pnctof dierent variantswas,infact, expressly
takenint accountinvariousstudiesandmeetingsduringtheprocessofdecidingupun
theopthai alternativew. The variantthatwere eliminatewere chiefly ones that
wouId have requirsdextensiveconstructionin naturalareain thefloodplain,thus
sparîngthefloodplaifrommassive constructioworks, Instead,themajorstructures,
i.e t..bypas canalandtheWkovo step,were situateoutsidethefloodplain.
%
HungariaMernoria, ara3.16teferrito "34mainand severaisubvariatiothef
projecttechnid plan."
97
-Wid.
rn
Sec. oexample.Reporoflhe JoirC=hoslwak-~rrrrgarimSub-Commîssi4 April
1958,ikm TV,impaaon the regimofgromd watersandon a@cdture,for- and
fisheriAnnex 45; Rotml on NegotiatiombetweetheRepresentativofWater
ManagementAgenciesof CzxchosIov andiaungary{mncerningtheChoice othe
OptimaVariant,3-31August1966Annex 46, examinitheimpactonthewunmside
andbiology;antheReporonComprison andEstimatioof DiversiandCornpetitive
Varian, çubmitteat theNegotiatioof Representatisfothe Czechoslovakand
HungananMinistriesof Forof 19-2June1969,Annex47,consideringtheimpoft
th"mrnpetitivariantonttenvironment. 9.74 Furthemure, sincethe Project'splaruiistage,Czectioslovakia
and Slovakiahaveconducted studies,havecommissioned a majorstudy , andhave
conductedmonitori ofgtheeffectsof theProjectaccordingto theterms ofthe 1977
Treaty.Hungary itselfconducteanenvironmenta ii pactassessrnentftheProjectin
1985 and alsocommissioned a major shd y'''. None of the evidenceproducedby
these studiesorby the tmty independentstudiesthat havbeen conducted under EC
auspice^'^,as indicatedthatenvironmentai hm ofthe kirsdHungq daims wilI
occnr hasin factoccurred,orwüI occur. Indeed,the studiesshowthattheProjectis
havingthebeneficiaieffectson the environmentthatwereanticipated inits planning
stages - at least to the extentthais possiblewithoutHungarianparticipation'".
Finallyas Hungaq recognises initsMemurid, the SlovakMinîstry of EnWument
attached 19 conditionstu the authorisatiof the irnplementatioof the Systernby
mems of Variant"Cu , rtditionsthat Hungq describesasbeing "prirnariayimedat
assuring the protectionof undergroundwater n'M. This demonstratesSlovakia's
concemwiththeprotectionofwaterquaiity.Infact,evenaccordingto Hungaq'sown
Memorial ,l1oftheseconditionssavetwo have beenmetlw .
9.75 ArficIe 21 of the LC's dr& artides on international
waterwurses is enfitled"Prevention,redrrctand controlofpollution" Of particnIar
relevancehere iparagraph 2,whichprovides asfollows:
"2. Watercourse Statesshaii,individuaior jointly,prevent,reduce
and controlpollutionof aninternationai watercoursethat may cause
significanhami tu otherwatercourse Statesor to their environment,
includinghm to humanhdth or safetytu theuse of thewatersfor
any beneficialpurposeor tu the livingresourcesofthe watercourse.
99 - .-
TheHQIreporf Deamber 1990Slova MkernoriA,nnex28.
100
As tothe1985EnvironmentailmpacStudy, para.4.24g m., abwe,asto Hungq's
commissionaistudthekhtel repc çee.SIovaMkernririd,ARn27.
rnj See,ChapterVIIandWI, hve.
O' HungarianMemorial,para6.35. The conditioare summariseat para.5.135ofthe
HungarianMemorial,nddisnissedinpar8.45g m., above.
IW AithoughtheHwigaian MemoialStatetha tsofDeçemkr 1993 fewoflhese cunditions
hadkn ampIied with (IlunMan Mernoriapara .-35),it in fact mntradicts irself.
Slwakiahasinfacc~rnpIiewiththe19conditionsUrsorsiiswithiî$spwer todom.
Thefaa tha heCompany operatinVariant"Cuwas finedbSIova authoritiesfor non-
curnpIiaw nitone of theeonditionsdernomtestheseriousnesswithwhichSlwakia
regardsmatteofenvironmentalrotectiandshowsit is makingefftoensurethathe
conditioaremet. WatercourseStatesshalltakestepsto harmonizetheirpoliciein this
c~nnection'~.
This provision representsa flexible approachtu the problem of poiiurion of
internationalwatercourses.The Commissionsommentaryexplainsthat:
"theobligatioto'prevent.. pollution. .thatmay causesignificant
hm' includestheduty to exerciseduediligentopreventthethreatof
suchhm. . . . ThrequirementthatwatercourseStates'reduceand
control'exiatingpollutirefiectthe practicof Statesin particular
those in whoseterritoriepolluted watercourseare skuatid. This
practice indicatasgenerd willuignesstutolera tveensi@cant
pollutionha- providedthatthewatermurst Stateoforiginis making
itsbesteffortsto reducethepoliutionamutudy acceptablelevel. A
requirementthat existing ~ollutioncausingsuch h&m be abated
immediatelycouid,insame cases,resultin unduehardshipe,specially
where the detrimento the watercourseState of originwas grossly
disprriportiontuethe btnefithatwauId accruetu thewatercourse
StateexperienchgthehamiT .'
As explainalinthe commentary to Article7, this meansthatwatercourseStatesare
requiredto use thebest practicablmeans at theirdisposaltoreduceand control
pollutionoftheintemationai atercourseinquestion.
9.76 AsindicatedinChapterTV above,itisckar thatinplannitnhe
GINProjecttheparties took "diappropriatemeasures"to guardagainstpouution of
the Danubeandrelatedgroundwater thatmightresult fiomthe Project,providinga
sophisticatedsystemof monitorinintheProjectdesig o allowfor andcorrectany
unmticipated adverseefîects. IIIaddition,in taking such measures the parties
ernpIoyedthe bestpracticabmeans thenat theidisposal.SIovakiacontinuestotake
such measuresandemploysuchmeans inrespectofitseffortstureduce andcontrul
pollutionfiom landbasedsourcesandto preventpollutionof groundwateras a result
ofwaterbeingimpounded inthereservoir.Hungary doesnot.
9.77 Insum, it is difficutu imaginewhat more Czechoslovakia
could reasonablyhavedunetu ensurethattheGM Projectdidnot resultinsignificant
environmentah larm,beyondthe planned landuse alterationcausai by theamai
constructionof theProjectandknowinglyacceptedby Hungaryin the 1977 Treaty.
Certaidythe hundredsof studiesleadingup to thedecisionto proceedwith the
1OS 1994RewrtsoftheInfernatiIawCommission,PJ49110p.289.
1s m., commenmy tArticle21para(4),p291-292.Projcct, coupledwith the Bioproject, its continua1update,the report, and the
ongoingmonitoringofenvironmentac ionditions,mustqualifyasthe exercisof"due
diligence"to preventenvironmentaswellas otherkindsofhm.
9.78 Hungws argument not only exaggerates the principIeof
prevention,ifds tu findsupporinthe fiicts.Hungararguesthat "theCzechoslovak
Governent failedinits obIigatiotu prwent enWumentai harmbyrefushg tu take
the necessarymeasuresfor thispurpose,startingwiththerefusato investigateia
satisfactoway theenvironmenta effectof thePro&*'O' .This claimhasnobasis in
fact. Firs ittinoresthe numeroua sndextensivestudies conductedpriorto the
concIusionofthe 1977Treaty'". Second,it ignoresthe "Bioproject", hose two
phaseswere completed in 1976 and 1984,respectivelyand whose purpose was
precisdytu smdy the eEectofthe Gm System on the ecosystemsof the surrounding
arealm.Third, itignorestheindependensttudiescornmissionebythe parties,which
found noevidenceof environmentapl roblemsof thekindHungaryclaimedto e~ist"~.
And finallit ignores the systemestablispursuanttuthe 1977 Treaty tu munitor
environmental factors,which has disclosed nothing remotely suggesting an
"environmentalernergenv" andwhose finaionhg has been eduated favourabtby
outsidestudies".
9.79 What does have a basis in fact is thatwas Hungary that
rejectedCzechoslovakrequeststujuinin discussionand meetingsofexpertsof buth
countries wiîh impartialoutside expertsTiit was Hungary that condiicted,an
envirumental impact asessrnent in 1985 which, according to the Hungarian
Memorial,"generallya5med the Pr~ject""~ anditwas Hungarythatconductedno
studiesofappropriatedetaiafter 198when it firraiseditsenvironmentacilaims"'.
This suggeststhattheor@ studiesthat wouldhavebeen "satisfactorytuHungary
Seeibid.,par2.17efm. andpara2.22astoth1986updateotheBioproject.
SectheBehtelFebmaq 1990)andHQI Wmkr 1990)report=, Annexes27and
28.% dm, Annex22hereto.
Sec .hapterVandVI,above.
HungariaMemorial,ara.3.52.
Sec .ara..01abve.wouldbe ones that cobed the resultthatHungaryhadpoliticallypre-ordained,
namely,thatthe G/N Projectwouldcauseanenvironmenta clatastrophe.
The "PretatrtionarvPrineitile"
9.80 In arguing that Czechoslovakia breached obhgations of
preventionunderinternationaelnvironmentalaw,Hungary invokesthe precautionary
princip1e"lls.tmust fistbe recognisedthatleadingstudieshaveconcludedthatthe
"precautionar yrinciplenasyetturipenintua nom ofgenerd internationallaw:
"Despiteitsattractionthegreat varietof hterpretationgiven tu the
precautionq pnriciple,nd thenovd and far-reachingeffectofsome
applicationsuggestthat itis notyeta principleof internationallaw.
DiEcult questionsconcerningthe pointatwhichit becornesapplicable
to anygiven activityremainunansweredandseriouslyundermineits
nomative charaderandpracticau l til..Il."
However, even as a non-bindhg, guidmgprecept,the "precautionq principIen
containsnothingthatis inconsistewith thecondrrc t fCzechosluv~aand Slovakia
inthiscase.
9.81 The "precautionaqprinciptewas stateinthe followhg wayin
PrincipIe15 oftheRioDecIarafiunbythe more than 170States participatiin the
Eh Sud:
"Principl15
In ordertoprotecttheenvironmentt ,he precautionaryapproachshall
bewideIyappIiedby Statesaccordingtu theircapabilitieWhere there
arethrats of serious orirreversibledamage, Iack ofhl1 scientific
certain@shdI not beused sisa rason for postpokrig cost-effective
measuresto preventenvironrnentddegradation'."
11*
P.Bimie & A. BoyleIntemiional Laand the EnvirommenC.larendohr #dord
1492 ,.98.% da, P.Sm&, The 'Greenin%ofIntemationLaw:EmergîngPriaciples
andRules"1 IndSourd ofGlobakaal Stirdi179942p. 293,ai p300:Thex isno
uniformunderçtandigfthmeaningof thprecauuonaryrincipamong Stateandother
memh oftheinternationaclommuniiy."
117
RioDeclaratioonEnvironmen tndDwelopmeni,U.N. Doc.MCONF 151RIRev1.June
13, 1992reprintin31 TnternatioaegalMaterial(1992),p. 8.4Itisinteresttog
comparefie formulatoftheyrcauiicnaiprincipIetheMinisteridDeeimtioofihe
Secon WdorIdCIimatConferencNovember7, 1990,hich ad&:*Themeaçuresadopted 9.82 Ir isreadilyapparentthatthis phcipie, asformulated by the
internationaclornmunityis not absolute. hdeed, it couldnotbe, giventhediEerent
needs,capabilitieand circumstanceosf States.Fir sht".precautionaraypproach"is
to be appliedby States"according totheircapabilities".This phraseindicatesthat
Statesare to exercisedue diiigencetu preventhm tu the environmentin the?
deveIopmenta1 andother a~tivitieT stcm ~hardIybe deniedthat Czechoslovakia and
SIovakia did everythingwithin reasonto study possiblealternativesand investigate
potentialimpactsonthe environmeno tftheProjectand ofVariant C""9.
9.83 Second, the fomi~~lation ofthe precaufionag principle in
Principle15,as inmost other instnrments,appliesnot tuaitenvirumentaI harm, but
ody tothreatsof "seriousorirreversibledamage". Thus, for the principIetu appla,
Statemust haveidmtified a threatofseriousorirrwersibledamage. Ifithasidentified
such a threat,the Stateisto take cost effectivemeasuresto preventenvironmental
degradation eve',where itis not scientificacertainthatdegradation willinfact
occiir. Theprincipjewas firstdeveIopedinthe contextof agreements toprotectthe
siratosphericozone layer,and thus to preventcatastrophicdamage tu al liologicd
organiamsun Earthl". Tthas been appIiedin Statepracticectiieflinthose casesin
which "serious or irreversibledamage"may result fiom "the most dangerous
--
shouldtakeintoaccoundifferentsocimnomic ante&.* Repnntedin 1 Yak cf
TnremtionaElnvironmentaLaw(I940)p.473.
ll8 The tribumiinthe Alabamadaim arbitratistatethat "duediligence""adiligence
' proportionetothe magnitudeothesubjecandto the dignityandstrengofthepwer
whichisexercisiit."TheGenwaArbitration(TheAiam case)reportelnJ.B.Mme,
Digest of Internatil rbitratitoswhichthe UnitedStatehm beena Pm, vol. 1
(1898)pp.572-73.
119
Sec.thediscussioofthe=dies relatintothe GIN ProjecinChapteriEof theSIovak
MemoriaI.
lm
Thiswouldpresumablryequira cosbenefitanalytodeterminwhetherthefinancialand
humancoso tfme- takenwwld yiela correspondmkgnefiintermsofenvironmental
protectionInthepresencasetheplicy ofCzechoslovakandSlovakh aasbeentodoal1
they cuuidto anticipatand avoid harmfd impactsof the Projecfruidto restore
environmentaqttaIi-y inthebranth gstem- ratherthato takodymmes that
wereoosteffective,S.
& the ViennaConventionfortheProtdon ofrhebne byer of22 h.Zarch1985,
PmmbIe, reprintedin26 Internationleml Materials1520(1987);and theMontreal
Protml on Substancesthat DepletethOzone Layerof16 Sept. 1987articlI(A)(l),
reprintmn 26InternationlgaiMateriai1541(1987).~ubstances"'~s,uchas radi~active'andotherformsof hazardous ast te'^'.ungary,
incontrast,seeksto give the principlesweepingapplicatio,othatit wouldapply to
anyalterationofthenaturd environment.
9.84 But it iclearfromthe foregohg examination of its tems that
Principle15 inno way suggeststhatlack offullscientzc certaintypreventsa State
fiom going forwardwith aproject;orthata projectcannotgo foward ifitmayentail
someenvirumentalhm; or even thatthereisan absoluteprohibitioof engagingin
activitiesthatmayproduce"seriousorirreversibleamage". FIexibilityis buintothe
pnncipletu îke into accountthe differinckcumstances and capabilitiofcountnes
aswell sstheneed to avoidmeasms that would entaicostsout ofproportion totheu
benefit. Theaimof theprincipleisto encourageStatesto studycarefullthe possible
impacts ofnew activitiesand,if suchstudy producesevidence - even ifitdoesnot
amount tofuIIscientificcertain-ysuggestingthatan activitymay cause seriousor
irreversibledamage,tu takeprecwtionary measurestu avoidsuch damage. Such a
processwas followedwith regardto theG/N Projea.
9.85 The hundredo sfshidiesconductedby thepartiesinplanningthe
GM Project, and those complet&during itsconstm~ionand partialimplernentation,
did not IeadtutheconcIusiorithat theProjecposed a riskof "seriousorirreversible
enviromentai da~nage"'~~ N,or didthe independent studiescommissionedby the
partiesdisclosesuchariskIa6N. or, foitpart,hasHungaryprovidedCzechoslovakia
andSlovakiawithscientificdatashowingthat theProjectpose sven the "ecological
risks"itdaims tuexist,letalonescient &videncethattheProjectposes a "threatof
122 Thisis theIanguageusai inrhe MinisterialDtxlaratoftheSeand Intemationai
Conferencen thProteaionoftheNorth-EaStq hndon, 25November 1987p,ara.VII,
27Internationi edMaterial835(1988),ap. 838.
lu Se.ex.,theCDnventiofortheProtectionoftheMarineEnvironmentoftheNorthAtlantic
of22 September1992("OSPAR Convention")etweenFranc end theUnited Kingdom,
Cmnd,2255,Amex I(qxïn~ in 32 Infemticndkm1 Materia1069(1993).
Se.e.g,rheConventiononthBan ofhpart intAfriaand thControIofTmnsboundary
Movementand Managemeno tfHazzdousW& withiMa of29Jan. 191 "Bamako
Convention",rt4(3)(f(,eprintein 30 Internatile& Materials.7(1991), ap.
781.
125 Sec .hapteIVand W, m. A summaq ofshidieisalscontaineintheCzechoslwak
Statemenrf12Juiy1989,SIovaMernoria lex 64,did intheMemuid at p.
4.26gï S., pp.142,f seq. The Statemereviewsthehistoroythescienîifstudies
ancerningtheenvironmentconducthth Moreand &et theProjmwas initiatedunder
the1977Treafy.
126 See,SlovaMkernoria,ara2.23,
a.seriousor irreversibldamage"'n. In fact, Hungq conductedno new scientific
studiesinthe three-yeaperiod,1989-1991, duringwhich itdelayedthe damrningof
the Danube. If Hungaryseriously believedthat the Projectposedrisksofgrave
environmenta larm,surelyitwould haveconductedtherequired studiesandprovideci
Czechoslovakiawith scientifevidencetu supportitscIaims.itwould aisonot have
rehsed tosign the draftprotocu o fnegotiationshetween the headsof the ESTC
Cornmitteeun 3 May 1989'". That draft protucolcontainel lisoffourprinciples
intendedto formthe bais of anagreementon environmenta lrotectioin theareaof
theG/N ProjectThe agreemenw t astohavewmplemented the1977 Treaty.
9.86 Thus,not ody hasHungary fded tuprovideariy convhcing
scientificdatathat the Projectpoaethreatof"seriousor irreversibenvironmental
damagen,al1 availableevidencepoints preciselin the opposite direction. That
evidenceindicatethattheProjectishavingbeneficiaeffectsupongroundwater tables
and forestryin Slovakia,andcouldhaveinHungarywithHungary'c sooperation.The
evidencefurtherindicaiesthatheProjeetiahaving no adverseimpacton surfaceand
groundwateq rrralit,ndthattheProjectcauld,withHungary'p sarticipatio,d tu a
restoratioofriverconditionsapproximatingthosethatexistedbeforetheintroduction
ofmajorriverregulationschemes inthemiddle of theiastcentury.Thereforehe first
requiremenftortheapplicationofthe precautionaryrinciple,ndeedthe requirement
that triggersthat princi,snot~isfied.
9.87 Yet, despiteHungws faiIuretu provide credibleevidenceto
substantiateitecologicaldaims,it canhardlybesaidthatCzechoslovakia adopteda
passive,disinterestattitudewithregardto thoseclaims. Slovakihas demonstrated
that Czechoslovakiaactivelysoughi not ody scitntifdata 'wncemingHungq's
dlegations of envirumental hm but dso discussionscuncerning waysof meeting
Hungary'sconcems in the contexof implernentingthe1977 TreatyIW. This shows
thatCzchodovakia wss attemptingin good faithto implementtheTreaty,andin a
way thattook environmentaclonsiderationisnto accounashad indeeûbeentrue ai1
along.
-
127 % thediscussiofstudiin ChapterM andthedimion of Varian"CminChapter
W, hve. dm, SIovaMemonaip ,ara4.03.Hm= goesmenmer, claiming
thexws "imminentperil"to suppiftsateofnmsiq* jdcatiw forifaaempted
teminatioofthe 1977TreatyHungarianMernoriam,. 10.26, seq.Thisclah is
discussidChapterX, below.
1ZB Secp.ara4.44gm., abwe.
lx See.e-& SIovakMernoriai.para4.03and rheIetterof23 ApiI 1992sent bythe
Cmhoslovak PrimeMuiiste10 theHtuigarianPrimMniskr, Jbid An,ex 108,and
excerptd aipa4.79.Sec .a,ChaptersVandVI,ave. 9.88 It is perhapbecauseHungaryis unablt:to furnishconvincing
scientific data supporthg its daims concerning envitonmhmtalthat iineffect
arguesthatits mereunsiibstaritiatedcIaimthat the Prmaychm itsenWument
requiresSIodia tupruvethatnohm will ensue'=.Hungarythereforecontendsthat
Slovakiashould be requiredto do what is nearlyimpossible,narnelyto prove a
negative:thattheProjecWU notcause damage to theenvironrnent.
9.89 Thus ,urigaryon the onehand reliesuponthe precautionq
principle, hichmunseIscautioninthefaceof scientZc~certainty, buonthe other
hand claimsthatCzechoslovakia -a State,~cordmg toHungar)i "whoseactivities
[were] likelto damagethe environrnen tf [Hungary ..,[had to]show thatthe
project] [would] not have [environmentallyharmful]effe~ts" '~i'.e .hat
Czechodovakia hadtu demonstrateWrthscientificcertaithattheProjectwouldnet
causehm inorder tu bdlowed tugofornard. Thisargument isnot ody illogicd, it
has riofoundatiointhe factand isadistortioof internationlfivirorunenIawin
generaiandoftheprecautionarpyrhcipleinparticular.
9.90 The most recentagreementsandotherinstrumentinthe fieldof
internationalenvironmentalIatak e more reasonabIapproach tothe avoidanceof
hm hm propoaedactivitied". Accordingtu thisappruach,where aproject may
causehm to theenvironrnenS,tateshouldstudythepossibittythoroughIytoavuid
significahm to otherStateand toprotecttheenvironment forfuturegenerations.
Adecision toproceedwiththeprojectshouldbebasedontheresultsof such studies;a
meretinsubstantiateassertionthat theprojemightbehdl shorrlriot prevenit
hm goirigfonvardI.rte presentcaseHungary'sown studiesindicatednuthreatof
the kindof environmentaihm that Hungarn yow clairWUen~ue'~~.
l3
IbidThe relevantpassreadsinMI:"thetatwh- activîtareiikeIydamagethe
environmetfanotheStatmustshowthatthepmpçedactiowilnothavemcheffets."
'"
Se.e.9 Principles15@recautioyrinciple)(environmentlmpacassessrnen)nd
19 (priornotifiation);andthe Conventionon EnviroImpactAssessrnentia
Tmnsbmday Contextof25Feb.1991("EspoCoonve.ntior).prinin30International
LemlMaferia800 (I99f).
'33
&, inpmdar, the1985Hungariaenvironmentaiimpactassessrt nfie Bechtel
reportwhiaredisr& inChplersIVandVn, he. 9.91 Mureover, Hungary'argument isurifoundedon the factsIt
relieon anassertionofaIikeIihoothattheactivitiesoone State-here,Slovakia,
accordingto Hungary-willdamage the environmentf another.Entirelyasidefiom
the factthatHungaryaccept edysuchlikelihoodinthe1977 Treaty,Hungaryhas
failetoadduceconWlcing evidencethatanyiikelihuoofdamage to its envirurunent
exists. Insttad,Hurtgq seemtobelievethaitamereincantationofa"likelihoodof
environmentalhm" wiIibring sucha likeliioodinthein& or will at Ieast force
SIovakiatoshow thatsuchalikelihoodoesnotexist. Sucadoctri notonlymakes
a mockeryof theprecautionaryrincipl;twuld havethedangerous consequenceof
thwarting,n thebuis of absolutelno evidence,thelegifimaeffortof Statestu
deveIop.
9.92 In additionHungaws argumentdistorts the precautionary
principle. As explainedabove,the precautionpincipiedoesnot opwate to halt
developmentwhenthereappearsthe slightesthintthat a projectmightcause any
envirumental ham; it provides that where serious or irreversibledamageis
thratend, Statesshouldnot awaitfun scientificcertaine beforetaking seasonable
precautionaryasures. SlovakiawouIdmakeseveralobservationsithisconnection.
9.93 Fir sft.e vastbodyof datacoliectedbybothparties,none
suggeststhatheProjectthreat enrousorirreversibeamage. Thisconclusiowas
corrfimreinthe two independent-dies completin 1990TU ,ndhasbeen borne out
by theenvirumentai monitoringofthe Prujintoperationcortductpursuaritothe
1977 Treaty.As indicateabove,theprecautionaryrinciplistriggere"when there
are threatsof seriousor irreversibledamage". Here, no suthreatshave been
scientificallydernonstrtoexist.On the contrary,of al1of theinvestigationsand
monitoringthat have beenundertaken,none suggeststhatthe Project wiIcause
anythinkapproachinthe kindofenviromentd hm refemedtobyHungq. Ir tark
contmt tu thisbodyofevidenceiHungary'smereassertionthat theProje41 cause
an "ecologicalernergency".An unsubstantiate.asserticannot be permittedto
overcome years of studyand investigatio- in much of which Hungaryinfact
participat-dwhoseresultsdiametncalopposethe assertion.
9.94 Second,the monitoringsysternthaisUtpIaceisdesigriedtu
disclosariyenvironmentalproblemthatmay arise.Anysuchproblems canthen be
responded toina timelfashion.And thi rheo.perationof Varia"C" hasshown
TheBtxhteIandHQIreports,SIaMernorih,exes 27and28, rrespectively. obIigedundtrgenerdinternationalIawnot to cmy out activitiesoits
territorthatwouldcauseseriousor substantia im to Hungary,then
Hungarywas entitled totake actionto remove any pretextfor such
conduct. Hungary't senninatiowas forced by the ither-ar-y'refusal
tosuspend woik on Variant C. Hungary'c soiduct wasa necessaryand
proportionateresponsetothisrefusai...l".
9.97 As wilI be demonstrated in the foiiowing discussionand in
Chapter X, thisargumenm t isunderstandboththe effectofsubsequentrulesof generd
internationallaw andthenature ofthe principlesofinternationaelnvironmentallaw
thatarereliedirpon.
9.98 It is weii establishedthat an obligationarising from an
internationaalgreementsupersedesforthe parties apriorinconsistentmle of generd
internationallw,udess the partiesintendthecontraryor unlessthecustomaryruIe is
a nom of jus o~ens"~. A nom of ju~ eugensthat emerged subsequenttu the
conclusionof atreaty would,underArticle ofthe MennaConvention,invalidate the
treaty if inconsistentwith its provisions. However, Hungarymakes no clairn
concerning noms ofjus cogens , hethersubsequeno tr prioto a treaty'. Intheory
at leastnilesof generai internationlalw otherthan jusconens noms thatdevdop
subsequent to the conctusion of a treatyand that are more specific than the
correspondingmies inthe treatymaytakeprecedenceover inconsistentprovisions of
thetreaty, butthi s U occuronlywhereit is establishedthatthepartiesto thetreaty
so intendedId5.The lattersituation has occurredrarelyin pra~tice'~~. This is
understandablf ei,rst,becauof theweil-known difficultof provingtheexistenceof a
HmgarianMemurid, paras.10.95-10.96-
'43 The PermanenCtourtapplietreatprovisio tnatwere iconfiicwith des ofgenerai
internationlawinAcciuisitionof Polish NatiodiAdvisorOpinion.1923.P.C.I.J.,
SerieB. No.7. p16;h r
Swh intheDanzi~Terrirom. &sorv Opinion 193. X.I.J.. SeAB.sNo. 44,p.4 at
pp.23-24;andtbeLizhthorrsescaetween Fmce andGm- Sudment. 1931P.C.I.J.,
SeriesAIB,No.52, p4, ap.25. Sec .isokaal SiatuofEasterGreenland Judpment,
1933.P.C.1-.eris&B. No. 53p.22,at y. 75{SudM~rîi, dissentinand NorthSea
entinentai ShelJudment I.C.3.Rewrt1969,pp.3,ap.24.
'" Thispint isdiscmd inpara..IO7oftheStovakMemonal.
'"
M. Akehm me HierarchoftheSourcesof IntentatiLaw,*47 BritisY-k of
InternationalLaw974-73,p.273,atp. 275;ReçtatemenThrrdof thForeignRelations
Law oftheUnitedState8,102Commen jtandReporier' ot4 (1987)Iftheintentioniis
indicatebypractic"odysuchpmdm asshm an agreementfthe&es mayintroduŒ
a changeina treat...."G.I.Tunkin.,heon ofInternationl aw,HarvardUniversity
PressBosto~ 1974,p146.
146
RestaternenThird)ODcit.Sec.102,ReporteN'ote4.new rule ofgeneralinternationallaw atthe momentit was created,and second,
because modificatioof treatiesonthe bais ofallegednew customarynoms could
IeadtuinstabiliintreatyreiationsLnfa&,whilethe InternationalLaw Commission's
FinaiDr& ofthe articleon theLaw of TreatieswouIdhavepermittedmodificationof
a treaty"bysubsequentpracticein the application of the treaty estabiishingthe
agreementof the partiestomodii its provisions"',ven thisform ofestablishing
agreement was rejecteby theWema Conferenceitself,preciseonthe groundthat
sucha mIe wouIddestabilistreatyrelations.
9.99 The foregoing discussi den onstratesthe following with
regardto Hungaryc 'simsconcerni ugbsequenmlesof internationallaAny mles
ofgeneralinternationaienvironmentaiIawthdeveIoped subsequenttuthe condusion
of the 1977Treatyand that wereboth(a)more specificthaand @) inconsistentwith
theprovisionsoftheTreaty wuld ody dispIacethoseprovisionsiit were estaidished
thatbothpartiestothe Treaty-Hungary, on theonehand,andCzechoslovakia,then
Slovakia,on the other- sointended. Not odyhaveCzechoslovakia and Slovakia
neverhad such an interition, buHungary, far fiom seeking toestabiissuch an
intentioon itsown parthas soughtunilaterdlytuteminatethetreaty. Furthemore,
themies ofgeneralinternationllwthatare saidtohavedevelopedsubsequeri tu the
1977 Treatyare bothconsistentwiththatagreement -as demonstratedearlieinthis
Chapter -andof ahighlygeneralnatureWungary refersto anobligationto prevent
substantidenviromentai damage). Inaddition,ihas dso been shom thatfar from
beinginconsistenwith generd principlsf internationalenvirumentailaw,the 1977
Treaty infactrepresentsaspecificimplementationofthosepinciples ina concrete
case.
9,100 Therefure,Hungary'csIaimconcemhg the effectof subsequent
obligations underthe generinternationlawoftheenvironment isunsuund intheory
andis notsustainablon thefacts.
9.IO1 Hungary'sinsistencon the generai internationallaw ofthe
environmenitsmisplacedforthreereasons:
--. ...
147 Yearhk oftheTntemriondLawCornmissio1956Vol.II,ar2,p.236,art38.
14% UnitedNatioConferenceonthhw offreatieOfFicidRecclr.im Session,p207-
215. -
Fir sht .ppiicablstandardasrethose contained in the 1977
Treaty,notin the prindplesof generalinternatioaw. The
Treatyisconsistentwiththeseprincipl-sinfactitconstitutes
a specificapplicationofthem.
-
Second,even ifthegenerdinternationallawofthe environment
were applicabIe,Hungary misunderstandsthat law and
misappliesitto the factsofthe case. Hungaq'sabsolutist
appruachtu environmentaiprotection worild frustrate the
Iegitimateeffortof Statestu develup.
Further,Hungary
mischaractensetae principIsf preventioandprecaution and
misappliethemto thefactsofthiscase.
- Fin& ariperhapsmosttellingly,Hungaryprovidesabsolutely
no convincingscientificevidentu supportits allegationsand
ignoresthefactthatthebestevidenceavailablsupportsnot its
darmistclaimsbutthepositionofSlovakia.
9.102 Hungary rnakesmuchoftheprinciple that environmentaiharm
shouIdbeprevented.SIovakia does notquarre l itthisidea,but has shownin this
Chapterthefouowing.
9.103 Preveniionofenvironmenta lm has neverbeenunderstoodby
the internationcornmunityinthe absoIuteaens enwhich itiaused by Hungq tu
requireaStatetu foregoerrtiryhedevdopment ofis naîuraresources.Instead,the
principleofpreventionmustbe understoodasbeingpartandparcelofthe concept of
sustainabldevelopment.
9.104 The GN Project constitutes anexamplof an effort by co-
ripairaStatestudeveIopthe?sharedwaterresuurcesin asustainahlmarner. Ir dso
permitsthe partieto allowtheOldDanubeto returngradually to its naturstate-
somethingthat would have been impossiblewithout the Project- thus actually
improvingtheriverineenvironment.
9.105 Through such activitiesmonitoringthe eEectsoftheProject
and participatingin the PHAREproject, Slovakiacontinues to do itsutmost to
anticipatandpreventanyadverseefTeco tftheProjectupontheenvironment. 9.106 Preventionisbest achievedbythoroughlystudyingthe possible
impacts of a project beforitis begun, by buildinginmeasures to mitigate any
patentidhm that strtdireveal,andby monitoringthe project's eff&ers ithas
been put into operationsu thatunanticipatedadverseeEects cm be dedt with.
Nothing inthe principlofenvironmenta awrelieduponbyHungaryis inconsistent
withthisproposition.
9.707Each of theçestepswas takenby CzschosIovakiaandHungary
befure enterinintthe 1977Treaiy. Numeruus studiesconcemingtheenvirumental
impact of the GM Projectwere conducted before Hungary and Czechosfovakia
decided upon its hai form; furtherstudieswere conductedduringthe Projectts
irnplernentation.
9.I08 Mer Variant"C" commencedoperatkg, mitigation meastrres
were taken, and Slovakiacontinuesto monitor the effects of the Project on the
environmentandmakeneededadjustments.ThusCzechoslovakiaandSlovakiahave
observednot onlytheletter,buaisothespirioftheprincipleofprevention.CHAPTER X, HTJNGARY'S 3üSTLFICATXONFOR XTS BREACHES
OF TEE 1977TREATY
10.1. Thejust5cationsofferedbyHungaryinits1992Declaraifonfor
the suspensionand subsequentabandonment ofworks, and then the purported
terminatioofthe Treaty,areefaborated,ndsometimesreformulated, Chapters 9
and IO of its Memurid. Hungary mostIy ignores the requiremersfthe Vienna
Conventionon theLawof Treatiesonsuspensionandtemination', and oEers own
singulaversionoffactsandIaw.
SECTION 1. The Susaensionand SubseauentAbandonment ofWorks
10.02.Befure arrivingat itIegd justifications, Hungasetsout
"preciselthe chainof events with respetu the suspensioand abandoment of
worksH2. Slovakh das thisfarfrom preciseIndeed,the allegedchainofevents
deployedinparagraph9s.01-9.1oftheHungarianMernoriailsrnisleadin. seeksto
show thefollowingkeyeIements:
Therewereserious andenvironmenta liskIikeIto be
(a)
causedby theconstructioofthebarrageatNagymaros,
and indeedby the implementatioofthe Projectas a
whole.
(b) Czechoslovakiawas undhg todiscuss theseortu
enter into arrangementsfor adequate ecological
guarantees.
{c) Czechoslovakiawas threatening unilaterdactifrom
August1989andbyApriI 1991hadfullydeterminedtu
proceedwith Variant"C". The decisiontoconstruct
Variant"Cuis saito precedetheabandonmen otfwork
atGabEikovo.
Eachoftheseis wrong.
1 Slovakia,wiuleacceptibreacoftreaincurStatrespnsibiity, inçiçiisthe
Vienna Conventionwbich identifiesthepermittedgmundsfoandtennination.
Sec. IovMkemuria,ara ..9-8.25.
2 HungariaMernoria,ara.9.03. 10.03. Slovakihas explainedthesequenceof eventsinitsMemoria1 .3
This sequenceis aisoshowngraphicdyin Iilus.No. CM-16. However, it rnaybe
convenienttoofferitown 'precisechahofevents"inbief fum atthijuncture.
- 6 February1989: Protocolto shortenthe Projectb15 months,
reachedatHungary'rsequest.
-
13May 1989:Hungaryw * ithouadvance noticeor consultation,
suspends with immediateeEect its work at Namaos;
CzechosIovakia protests,and asks forthe technid data on
whichthedecision tosuspend wasbased,
- 8-9June 1989: Hungary firms that iwiflcontinue itwork
obIigatiointhe GabEfkovs oemr.
- 26 June 1989: Hungary provides Czechoslovakia with
documents statedto be the technicaldata nscessitatingthe
suspension.
- 13 July 1989:Czechoslovakiaconftrmsits Wrllingnessto
participatinexpertdiscussionsto be heldon 17-19JuIy on
issuerelatintoNagymaros (havingsoughtanearlierdateI.
- 20 July 1989: Hungq "extendn"suspensionof itswork
obIigationsat Naparos tu 31 Octuberandsuspends also
work at DunakiIitiuntil theme date. Czechoslovakiais
notifiedoraily.
-
Hungq proposesthat the entire Project shouIdbe delayfor
I-5years5.
- 31 August 1989:Czechoslovakia statesthatifsuchproposais
areprocded with, itwould have tu protect itseIf wita
3 SIovaMernoria,aras41243% and 6.626.71.
4 m., Annex64 (ap.6).
5 m., para4.35. temporarysolution;andthaitwould expectcompensationfor
thedarnagecaused6.
- End Octuber 1989:Hungary has udaterally preventedthe
d&g oftheDanube asprovidedinthe Project.
- 27 October 1989: Hungaryadopts Resolution abandoning
Nagymaros7.
- 30 Octuber 1989: Czechoslovakiaresponds tu Hungary's
proposaiatthemeetingof PrimeWsters on26 October(se,
paragaph5.36 above) by statingits willingntoscancelthe
acceleratiprovisionsoftheFebniary 1989Protocol to dlow
strtdof any adverse consequenc of peak production; by
statinthati5esh studiesoindicateda,newagreementwouId
dso limior exdudepeakproduction;and thaan agreementon
furtheecologicaguaranteeseconcluded byMarch 1990.
-
30November 1989:Hungaq statethatonlyifandwhen
- ecoIogicaluaranteearenegotiatedandconcIuded
- peak power iseliminatedandNagymms' indefinite
suspensiois accepted
woulditresum eorkfordamming atDunakiliti.
- IOJariuar1990: Hungarymakes CI=:
- thatNagymarusishmdoned and is not wbject tu
negotiation
- the HungariancontractsconcerningNagymarosare to
beterminated
dl work on the Prujectis tu be suspendedpendirrg
discussionsonmodiwng the Treaty
such "modifications" eEectiveIy envisaged
Czechoslovakianegotiatingthe terminationof 1977
Treaty.
6
m., para4.38.
7 Sec .ara5.37sa., abve.with "oneway or mther as partofthe continuhg systemofadjiistrnentpractisedby
theparties".
10.07 Slovakiatakesaverydierent view: the essentiaobligatioof
thepartiesunderthe 1977Treat isto implementitstems. Dficultieswere notto be
rnanufacturedfor non-scient& reasons. Any reaiproblems must be scientifically
show jointlystudied andjointladdressed . heTreatycontainedthernechanismfsor
ongoing provisionof ecologicalguarantees. Neithersuspensionnor abandonment
wuIdbejustifid where nord rishad beendemonstratecw i,herdata evidencinthe
purported probIemhad not beenshared,wheretheTreatymechariisms for ensuring
ecologicdstandardh sadnot benengaged in. The Projecthetable wasa contractual
cornmitment. AndudawfuIsuspension andabandoment wasa breach ofthe Treaty
wfüchdid indeedentail,inter dia,the dtomakefinanciaicompensation.
10.08 Slovakia makes the following observationin regard to the
above. WhereCzechoslovakia hsistedupon Treat pyerformanc eas, athe endof the
day ithad to,in relationtthekey elementsof the integratedProjec-itistermed
unyielding and unwiiiing to cooperate by Hungary. Where Czechoslovakia
endeavoured to accommodate Hungarian thnetablviolations, y re-allocatiwork
programmes and sIowiridownand then speedingup tirnetablestumeet Hungary's
requirements,iissaidtoacceptthatthe Treatyobligationeed notbe taken seriousiy.
The Court issimplyHifomedthat '((thetimetabklaiddom for work on thePruject
had neverbeentreated asa matter ofstrictIegd obligatio...Ddays ..had been
negotiatedbefureand couldbenegotiatedagain,asnecessary".'
10.09 Thiscavalierattitudetowardtreatyobligationsignoresthefact
that,intryingto movetheProjectforward asbest itrnightin the facof previous
Hungarian prevarications,Czechslovakia had reserved itslegal nghts as to
compen~ation'~.Thestrongimplication ofHungaq'scomment is thaticouldsimply
cal1delaysas itchose,withoutpenalty,regardlessof the temsof theTreaty andits
associatedagreements ,ndregardltsof theinterestofitsTreat)parner.
10.10 The rdity isthatHungary arrogantyassumed that itpattern
of non-compIiancecould continuforever,and wasmorfsed tu Iem thattberwasa
point atwhich CzechosIovakiacould bepuahednohrther, but would insistuponits
9 HungariaMernoriapara.9.18(2).
10 SlwakMernoriai,ara4.37-4.3and4.48-4.49. -288 - 1
1
i
Treatyrights. Thatpointwas reached withtheeffectiveabandonmenb tyHungaty of
itsworkobligationsunthe GabEikovs oection. .
IO .1 As tuthe"essentialobligationonthepartiesunderthe Treaty"
being the resolutioof dificultieby negotiation",not oniy isthat anincorrect
statementofthe essentidobligationundertheTreaty, but Slovakiahadso shom in
detail the mnsuItationand negotiationsthat Czechoslovakiaengagedhl2. That
detailedanaiysismay be summarised thus: a Statehas no duty to setaside its
entitlementto relyon the principlof pacta servanda,to negotiatefor the
abandonment of a treatyin which it hasmade a huge investment,in order to
accommodate apparenteconornicandpoliticalneedsoftheotherParty.Insofar asthe
Treatyitself providedfor the possibilityof technicdchangesin its implementation,
Czechodovakia (therSlovakia) has alwaysbeen wiIIingtu participateinobjective
stridiesofHungary'sexpressedanxietieswhetheraboutthe originalTreaw projector
Variant"Clt. It hasdso agreed to abidebysuch findingd3. WhatCz&hosIovakia
(then Slovakia)has not beenprepared tu accept issuspension of performanceby
Hungaryprior tosuch studiesorsuspensionof itsown provisionavarianpriortu ariy
such negaiiveindependentreport.For Slovakiatherecan be no suspensionofTreaty
performance withoutjointobjectiveascertainmentf factsthatrequiresuchanaction.
Hungary has preferredsuspensionon thebais ofunsupported ailegations. It hasnot
conductedits own studiesto supporitsclaim,and ithasavoidedobjectivestudiesof
theseallegations.
10.12 Thus theremay be sec{ in the section of the Hungarian
Menioridjiisti@ngthe suspensionofwork atNagymaros clairnthat"tuconstnrctthe
magymaros] Barrage might cause irreparabieenvironmeritadamage, induding a
serions ristothedrinkingwattr supplieofB~dapest"' ;~referenceto an"ecoIogicaI
state of emergenq and... serious environmentai damage ... envkonmentd
11 HungariaMernoriapara.9.18(4).
13 & ChapterV,aime.
I3 See,para. 5-,ve, andSIovakMernorial, as4.484.49.Sec .l%gara. 5.9gtW.,
ahve.
14 ~ruigaIîanMUlI~fm., 9.04.catastrophen1';the "depriv[atiooflthe people of itsmajor civ of de water
IO .3 Such excessiveand imprecise allegationshave not been
substantiateby suchimpartiaauthoribtivestudieas existsuchas the Bechteland
HQIreports".
10.14 Hungarytakes theviewthat mererecitationof "fearssuffices
and thatit wasfor Czechoslovakao disprovethem: "No evidencewas producedby
Czechoslovakiatu show tha the fear isnrelationtu drhhg water suppiiesof
Budapest wereunfounded" ." Aliofthis-thefears,thefdure of CzechosIovakiatu
disprovethem - issaid tu entifle suspensiund Czechoslovakiahas agreed tu
modificationof the Treaty, or befftrstiU,tu abandomenof the Treaq. Thisis
describedasbeing"on thebasisofnecesity".
10.15 As to the legd basis of necessity for suspension and
abandonmen atNagymaros H,ungarysatisfiesitselfwsayingthatifnecessitwasa
sufficieground fortemination(onwhich itIatedeploysmoredetailed argumentsof
Iaw),thenitiscertahIya sufficientgrounforw: "AStateentitledto take
the greattstep may est takea Iesserstep"Iand"once itbecme clear thatfuhire
workonthe Nagymarosbarrage was subjecttothe mostseriousdotlbts..thesame
principleofnecessitythwodd justifterminationoftheTreatjust5e.dinvestigation
andnegotiation.%."
10.16 Forreasonsof mvenience, SlovakiawiII replytuHungary's
argumentson necessityin the contextof its claito entitlemento terminatethe
Treaty.But thismuchcanbesaid atthisjunctureitcannotbe righttosaythatifata
certainmomentHungary was entitledbyreferencto necessitytoterminatthe 1977
Treaty,it was thus entitleat anearlierstageto suspend the Treatybecauseof
necessity. It not a caseof the largeencompassing the smaiier.ungaryhas to
show thaton 13May 1989, a date ofnecessis existedwhichjustifiedimmediate
15 -id,para9.05.
l5 m., pam 9-14.
17
SIovaMkemariaAnnexes27and28.
'' Hung- Memorîd,para929.
19 m.,pm.9.2I.
20 m., para.9.23.unilateraluspensionwithoutconsultationor prierjointstrrd, rindependenatnalysis
to thateffectby expertssuchas those avaiIabIeifrumthEC. Even ifHurigarywas
enGtledby reaoonofnecessity tu tenninatthe $rea~ on 19 May 1992(which it was
not),thatcm have no eEect on theconditionsfur necessitybeingmetforpurposes of
suspension of work obligations some three y- earlier.The le@ and factud
situationinMay 1992 cauIdnut retrospectivefYvaIidatea suspensionofwork at
Nagymaros innüanceonnecessity in May 1989, noran abandonmen tfwork at
Nagymaros inreliancon necessitinOctober 1989.
I
10.17 Slovakiahasin fact showninitsMemorialbaththatno stateof
necessityexist ndtheNagymaros sectorinMay 1989,nor inOctober of thatyed' .
In thepresentCounter-Mernona Sllovakiashowsindetailthatthe sîudiescarriedout
byHungaryprior to 1989didnot suggestthattheNaparos barrage presentedmajor
enWumental dangersP. And thetwoEcoiogiaReports on whichHungary reIiedfor
its May 1989 suspension are shown by SIovakia to Iack scientifïc weight and
credibiv . I
i
10.18 Nor did Hungaty seek to avertany alleged imminent ped:
having expressedfearsaboutwater qualityitreh'sedinMay 1989 tosigntheprotocol
proposedbytheJointBoundary Waterscommission to &end rnonitorin&'.
10.19 Fidly, Hungary daimsan ,enthlemento movekom suspension
to abandonmeno tfitswork atNagymarosforvariousreasonss . First,Czechoslovakia
responded too quicltltothetwo alternativero~osalrputto it byMr Nemeth''. But
one month wao ce~aidy long enough for seriousshidy of these short and simple !
proposais,and to determinethat they were unacceptable.Second, &tr suspenaon .
Czechoslovakia issaidtubaveengaged oriiinprogrammes of directinteresttoitself,
suchasthe PHARE progrme on the GabElkov oarrage. Noconcern is saitu have
beea show about the problemsof peak poweroperationor aboutthe Nagymaros
barrage. But it was for Hungary to sharewith Czechoslovakiaany studiesmade
between6 Febniary 1989 (signature of the Protocolto shortenthe constmction
I
21 SlovakMemorial, ara838-8.4and 8.456.48.:
1
z! &g, ChapteIV,above. !
23 ~ee ,ara7.05, m., me. i
24 !
& para4.42& above.% di0SloML ~:moripl, pz8.40.
ZS Hmgâriari Memofia,ara9.29. I
24 I
-bidm. 9.27and3.85. I
i
itirnetable) a13 May 1989(decisiontususpend work atNagymaros) thatHungary
claimed tu show the need tu suspenidmmediatelywithbut anyfurther study and
without consultation. Further, Czechoslovakiadid endeavoutr respond tu the
expressedanxietieofHungaryontheeffectof peak poweroperationsn .Andit was
Hungq who refused tu participain thePHARE proje evidentIybecausethey
feared impartiaassessrnentoftheu motives insuspendmN gagymaros and Iater
GahEikovo. It itherefore absurdforHungq toclah thatthe limitatiofPHARE
to Czechoslovaktemtorywas becauseCzechoslovakia had noconcern for Hungatian
interests.
10.20 NeitherreasonoEeredby Hungaryforthe abandonmen t fits
work obligationsat Nagymarosis anymorepersuasivethanthe reasonsofferedfor
ttsuspension".On 6 March 1990, the HungarianPrime Ministerannounced the
suspensionof al1works. By thenthe Bechtelreporthadmadeclearthat scientific
analysisdid not supportthe allegationsoseriousenvironmental risk. Hungq's
"suspension"couldnotthereforhavebeen prompted byenvironmenta loncems.
B. Sus~ensionand LaterAbandonmentof Works at Dunakiliti
10.21 The originalsuspensionof worksat Naparos did notaffect
works atDunakiliti.However,when justmer two monthsIaterHungary"extended"
the suspensioof works atNagymarus,it aIsosuspendedworkon preparationfor the
damming oftheDanube atDunakiliti.
10.22Hungary's Mernoriar lefers tu"the water resourcesof the
Szigetkozaquifer""-thoughthere inuSzigetkiSzquifer, asthequiferuriderlithe
whde regionof the Danube IuwIandsin bothSIovakia@ifni Ostruv)and inHungary
(Szigetkoz).The secondreferenceisto "the environmentofthe Szigetküzregion,
whch was likelyto be significantlyhmed (in effect destroyed)by the discharge
regime providedforinthe 1977 Treaty,evenas subsequentlamendeci". Both these
aspectsaredealtwithindetaiinChapter VIIof SlovakiaCounter-Mern~rial~~.
10.23 But Hungary does not suggest that these anxietieswere not
present in May 1989, allowingwork to continue at Dunakiliti,but manifested
27 Secm. .5.36am., hve. See .lso,SIwakMemona plar..48-4.49.
a HungariaMernoria,ara9.30.
Z9 ¶s.7.45,gm..and7.78,gseq.,above. 1
themselvesforthe firstimewithn thenext twoimonths,necessitatinandentitlina
suspension.Indeed,inHungaq'sviewthesuspension of worksat Dunakiliti asofa
"minoc rharacterW Mmaking,itwould seem,th? necessityorjustificationevemore
problematic. In fact, the suspension at Dunakiiitihad immenselydamaging
consequenc ass,tbecameentirelyimpossibld to put the Project intooperation.
Slovakiareturnto thimatterbelow, at 10.128to 10.135.
10.24 The rd r-n furthe l=ly 1989suspensiondid not ieston
scientificconsiderations.wu, quitesimply8 mesure designedtobring pressure
uponCzechosIovakia to accedetu Hungar)tq semands over Nagymaros. And, as
alreadyshown (Chapter V),a progressiontow&dstotal terminatiowas under way.
Thatrediîy iborne outbythe preconditionsthati~ungaryp1acedponthe resumption
ofwork onthe riverbeatthe Dunakilitireservo$. Thehad fht tobe consludedan
inter-govemmentd agreement'"tu minimise the; environmentariskspresentin the
normal operationoftheDrrnakiti teserroirandthe GabEkovo hydroelkctripower
plant". A suggestionof bindingarbitratioto settledisputesunderthe new treaty
proposedby Hungarypresupposed thatCzechdslovakiw a ouldsimply agreeto the
abandonment of Nagymaros,without men dy pior studies showing the need
therefo?!. But Czechoslovakiawas prepared to accept an early agreementon
parantees, providedthaHungary resumed work:atDunakilititonce3'.
10.25 The only "newsituation"that Hungaryrefers to,byway of
explanationofa hardeningof itpositionfromsuspension to effectiveabandonment,
was theindicatioinAugust 1989 of intereby ~zechoslovakiainalternativvariants
to theblockedProject.Hungar incorrectldesqhesthis as"action beingtaken"on
Variant "C",whereas no decirionon Vahant "_" was taken until nearlhua years
later,afteacarcfulreviewofal he options-0th ofwhichmi& havebeen çhosen
ifHungarywouldhave cooperated. Hungaryr&kingly mnhns that it"refust ed
rake partinanyauthoritativeshdy tusettlethe fi;ofrtheGabEikovoprujtctunless
workonVariant C was firsthalted"33.o decisionastuVariant "Cu hadbeentaken
prior to25 July 1991 - butHungary still refüscto participatinthe envisaged
triiaterl egotiatioatthattirne.
therwosides,becaefthediedtod"VelvetRmlution",andthendfortheformatiofn
anew Gwernmentandtheelectionanewbideni.
I
32 & paras5.36gtg.,above.Sec .lso~lova~kmorial,para4.484.49.
33 HungariaMernorial,ar9.37. C. The Sus~ension and Later Abandonment of Works at
GabEikovo
10.26 Hungarydoesnotwen suggesthattherewas a legal necessity
(stillless ajustificundertheViennaConventiononthe Law of Treatieswhich
justzedthe suspensioand abandonmeno tf worhat GaMlkovo. Rather"thelarger
scalewinding-downofHungarian worksatGabCikovo a,ndtheirfinalabandonmentt
the endof 1991 was anintegralpartof the overd disputewhichled Hungary to
termina the1977Treaty inMay 199TY. Moreover by mid-1990, Hungary had
dreadystopped diworksav eormaintenance3'.
10.27Contrq tu Hungary's assertions,the preparationfor Variant
"Cm,dways provisiond, did not prccluanagreed solution. Czechoslovakiawas
entirelywiiiito involvethirdparties,andindetuparticip istfin thetrilateral
expertgroup, andto have allaspects, includhgVarian"CH,studiedscientifically.
Hungary, as has been shown above,andas itacceptsitself6, insisted upon the
preconditioofwork on Varian"C" beingstopped.
10.28 The situationmay be summarised as follows: Hungary
suspended work atNaparos withoutnotificatiand on thebasisof no serious
scientifindicators.Orhesuspensions ithinthe Treaty SystemfoIIowdirecteat
getting Czechodovakitu accep the Fullabandunmen tfthe Nagymarosand peak
powerprovisionsofthe Treaîy. ButwhenCzechoslovakiatook actio-whichit had
tu do,intheabsenceofthe dammingatDunakiIitweir- tobnng whatwas reîrievabIe
of theTreatyinto operatio~ HungarywouIdnot even discrrVariant "C"- which
exactlyconsisteofputtingintooperationtheGabEikovpartwithoutNagymarosand
without peak operation. There was, in reality,no pleasinHungary w,hose
suspensionsand abandonmentswere simply an integralpart of itscampaign to
terminatetheTreatyand notthemselvesustifiedon scientorlegalgrounds.
10.29Hiingary appearsto thirikthatd hano need tu offer tu the
Court my properIegaIandysis ofthe righttosuspena dnd renege on its Treaîy
obligations. Hungary offers no Iegd grounds whatever for suspension and
abandonment at Dunakilitiandat GabEikovu. "Necessityis somewhat casuaIIy
34 -bidpara9.40.
35 Sec.aras..43-5.aboveSec .lso,pa5.55aimve.
36 Sec.ara5.75efm.,above,anHungariaMernoria,ara.9.37offeredastheground forsuspensionandabandobent of work atNawaros, un the
&ous reasoning thatifa later terminafiwa justifiecibyreason onecessityan
earlier suspensionwouIdtherebybt retrospectiveIydIowed byreasonofnecessity.
Thereis absolutelno attempttushowthat the Iégdgtoundsit identifiesfor necessity
appIiedtu thesuspensionandabandonmeno tf ubligatioat Nagymaros,DunakiIiti
andGabEikuvo.
10.30 Thus,sofar as suspensionand abandonment is concerned,
Hungarymakes no realatternat alegaljustificateven onthebasisofitsownmain
legalargument("necessity").Thereis noteven thepretenceof ajustification the
basisoftherealapplicablelaw -namely,the provisionsintheVienna Conventionon
theLawof Treaties. AsSlovak hiaselaborateindetailinitMernorialA, rtic57 of
theViennaConventionprondes the indispensablhresholdfora Iegaljustificationfor
suspensionofthoseworksforwfiichHungq wg responsibleundethe 1977Treaty.
I
10.13 Article57 proGdes: I
I
"Articl57 -Suspensionofthe operation'oa treatunder its~rovisionsor by
consentoftheparties I
I
besuspended:of atreatyinregardtoaithI partieorto a particulrartymay
(a) inconfonnitywiththeprovisionsdfthetreaty;or
!
@) at any timeby cunsent ofal1 thépartiesfier consultation with the
contradingStatesand contracthgprganisations.
!
Hungary cIearldoes not meet the requirements oeitherparagraph{a) or0). Zt
ignoresaI Ieferencetothimost fundamentalapflicablelaw,and treatsuspensionas
ifno Iegd jusfication needboff& atdl, or (the caseofNagymaros)unriprous
referencetua gtoundofnecessitysufice andcaxisetasidetheoperationof Articl57
initsentirety. Simplbecausea treaty, whoseoperationhasbeeniliegallysuspended,
is latedeclaredterminated,oesnot causethelegalwrongsof the earliesuspensions
to evaporate;nordoes itobviatetheneed to presentto theCourt inorder for it to
answer the questionputto itinArticle2(l)(a)ofthe SpecialAgreement of7 April
1993,legaarguments inrelatiotothosesuspensions. SECïION2. Bungarv's Justifications for the Pumorted Termination of
the 1977Treaty
10.32 In Chapter10 of its MernorialHungaryoEers a seriesof
justificationfsortlegalitandeffectivenessfitsnoticeofterminationof theTreaty
on 16 May 1992. Hungaryfurtherclaimsthat,even ithe Treatywas notterminaetd
withIegaleffecton 16May 1992,ithasben tenninatedbyCzechoslovak repudiation
inOctuber 1992,or bythe disappaance ofCzechosIovaki oan31 December 1992.
The Pumorted Terminationon 16 May 1992: Hungarv's
Justifications
10.34 Hungary listatparagraph10.03 a senesofjustificationswhich
itsays were relieduponin the Dedarationof 16 May 1992 as legal grounds for
termination.Slovakia makestwo preliminaryobservations.m, it notes that one
identifiedgouridno longerappears onthe list.There isno furtherreferencetoor
eIaboratioof the contentioatparagraph5,page 26of heDedarationtoVariant "Cu
entitlingHungaty"tutake IawfuIcounter-maures jrepressdia). The terminationof
Liaterd treatieseffective betweentwo parties may constitutsuch a measure".
Accordingly ,lovakiadocsnot forthemoment returnto thesubmisçionist advanced
atparagraph s.98-8.10of itMemorial.
10.35 Second S lovakiainsistsagainthatterminatimustbejustified
by referencto thecriteriintheVienna ConventioonntheLawofTreaties. Slovakia
ha explainedindetd in itsMemurid why thisisso".
10.36 Where two partieshave eetered intoa treaty,the issue of
terminationofthe treatisddt with bythe Iaw oftreatiesrathethanby the law of
State responsibility;andArticle56 and60-62 ofthe Viema Convention govern.
Further,asSlovakiahaselaborated initMemorial,therulesthereincontainedreflect
well understoodprinciplesof generalinternatillw,leavingwithoutlegalrelevance
thedatesuponwhichtheTreatypartiesratifiedthe ViennaConventionw.It is crystal
clearthatthe 1977Treaty,asshown inChapter II above,createsajointandintegrated
irivestmefiIargelycomplet& 3t the tirne ofthe purportec ierminationand also
createsrîghtinrem. Itisnot atreatytowhich arightofuniiateraerminationmaybe
37 SIovaMernoriap.aras.09-8.25.
38 m., paras5926.98and 8.09%.2.irnplieby the nature of the treatasrquired by Article 56(I)@). Inmy case,
Hungary had tu brhg itseIfwithinthe groundspermittbyreferencetoArticles60-
62.
10.37Zhngary offers no reasoned argument as to why the law of
treatiesgoverningentitlemeto terminateshouldnot be dispositiin thiscase.It
merely conhes itseif to the brief observationthat there shouldnoe artificial
separatiobetween the lawof Stateresponsibiliandthe lawof treaties3'.Slovakia
had readilyaccepted,tooinitsMemorial ,hatthereshouldbe norigidseparationof
thelaw oftreatiesandthtaw ofStateresponsibityw,butagainoEersthe important
reasonswhythe Iegalitoftheterminationofthe£977 Treaty filtubt determinedby
referenctu theViennaConvention ontheLawof Treaties:
-
Article54, and ArticIes 56, 60, 62 and 62 are carehlly
formulatedwiththe objectiveof underpinninghe principlof
pactasuntservanda.Article54 indeedassumet shatin certain
categoriesof treaty there is simply no rightof unilateral
temination". And evenwherethereis, thekey conditionsare
to bemet,and a StatewisIiintoterminatesimpIymust beable
tu bringitsewithinthe provisioof Article60or 61,or52.
- The ideaof "Statenecessitywas deliberatdynotselscteas a
grounp demiittingtermination. Materidbreach, impossibity of
performancef,iindamentaclhangeof circumstancal1touch on
some of theelementsof"necessitto terminateW.
-
A separategroundof"necessity"isto move fromthe precise
groundsin Articles 60-62,and to introduce more irnprecîse
grounds.Indeed,inte'pre teHungary interpreti(onwhich
see beIow)necessiq canmean anything atd. To infroduce
necessityasagound for terminatiowould renderriugatorthe
precisecconstraitfMicles 60-62. It mustdso againbe said
that the pfinciplof necessitypulls inan entirelydifïerent
directionfromArticle60-62oftheLawof Treaties. TheIaw
39 HungariaMemorial, . 9.19.
40 SlovaMernorial,ar8.23. ofStateresponsibiliduesnot purport tu provaneadditional
ground for IawfiteIirnation(effectively revisingthe Viema
Convention). The principle ofnecessity (Iike the principieof
countemeasures)excuses anotherwi udeawful act.This is
acknowiedgedbyHurigW2. By contrast, ArticIes60ofthe
ViennaConvention make terminatioentirelylawfirHlungary
cannot,inlogic,saythat ithasa terminatedthe1977
Treaty by reference to impossibijity ofperformance,
fundamenta lhangeof circumstancesnd materialbreachand
thatthisi&p& isexcusedbecauseit is a statofnecessity.
Hungary speaks of its grounds for terminationas being
"cumulative""B. uintmth,theyarealternatives.
A. Necessitvasa JustificationforTermination
10.38 Nevertheless,Hungaryrnakes"necessityhe centrepiecof its
justification for termination. It has pride ofplace 2ofdanyjustification by
referencetothe Viema Convention(nodoiibt reflectingthediculty Hungahas of
comingwithintheprovisionsoftheIawoftreaties).
10.39 Hungary draws attentioto draftArticle33 adoptedby the
InternationLlawCommissi onit32nd sessionandto thediscussiothatpreceded
it andtotheInternationLlawCommission' Rseport. Hungaryseekstodraw comfort
fromthe requiremen hat "anessentialinterest"theStatebe involvedand thatan
examplegivenin theReportis "toensurethe survivalofthfauna or vegetationof
certainareason landor at seato maintaithe normaluse of those areaor, more
generdly,to ensurethe ecologicabalanceof a region". Slovakianotes that the
InternationaLaw Commission'osbservationsonnecessityandthe protection ofthe
envirument bothassumai agrave and imminentdangertheretoand were notat al1
addressedtuthecircurnstancesofthcase. An imminen tndindeed acîuaecological
disasts erc,as theTorrevÇanvon incident*mightindeed dow the UnitedKingdom
in that casetuexcusewhat wouldofhenvib eeuriIawfrpIrotecliveactionthat it
was taken beyond the watersover which ihad juridiction.The exampleof the
RussianFur SeaIs Case givenby HungqU isanalogous. But thtse areentirely
42 HungarîaMernorip.ara10.06.
43 m., para10.04.
44 m., paras.I.2-10.14.removedfiom the circumstances in thiscase-wherethe partiesconcernedare in a
treatyrelationshi, heretheTreatyhasitsownprovisions toensurethatthereareno
ecological catastrophes4'nd where it has itsown dispute resolution provisions.
Thereis nothhg inthe InternationalLawCornmissioneportthat suggeststhatastate
ofnecessiq cm be invokedinthese circarnstancew,ithout objectiveverificattun,
dIow onepartjttoignor both iraty procedureand treatyobligations.
10.40 Hungq sumarises the law of Stak resporisibilasrequiring
the foIIowing"(1)the absoIutelyexceptiondnatureofthe allegedsituation;(2)the
imminentcharacterof thedangerthreateningamajorinterestofthe State,and(3) the
impossibilitofavertingsuchadanger byothermeansne.
10.41 Hungarycites"a majoreconomicthreat ...tothep~pulation"~'
asoneof theessentialintereststhatjustifytheinvocatiofnecessity. It is absolutely
clearfromtheRussianIndemnitv Case" that"economic threat"is notwhatis rneant
bya state of necessity. A Statethathas enterd atreatythe fulfilmenof which
requireseconomicburdens to be shoulderedcannotclaimto terminateon grounds of
state of necessity.Stateof necessityenfaiIsrather imminent threatto the very
existen ofea Stateorthe seriousimperilmentofits internor extemai situation49.
(Hungq fiam the totime seekstu meetthat more rigurousstandardby cIaims of
danger to the fdé ofmiilionsof its citizenswhich,as hm been seen,are totaIIy
unsubstantiated.)
10.42 Hungary'ssummary of the Iawof nmssity simplyignores, as
inconvenient,ofhercruciaiconditionsstipulate.inArti33eof theInternationalaw
Commissiondrafi articlesArticle33(1)@)predudesrelianceon a stateof necessityif
the act "seriouslyimpair[s]an essentialinterestof the Statetowardswhich the
obligationexists". It cannot be doubtedthat the repeated refusalto putwork
obligationsintoplace, andthe purportedterminationof the Treatyin the face of
Czechoslovakia' nvestment andwork record,seriouslyimpair4anessentialinterest
of CzechoslovakiaI.tsessentiaintereshasbeento preventrepeatedflooding,andto
65 SiovakMernoria,as-8.53-8.50.
*6 HmgmianMemariai ,am IO.6.
47 m., para.IO1s.
4a UnitedNationsRepoonsTnternatirArbitraiAwardsX443.
49
-bid.pursueits developmentina sustainahand envirumentally responsibway, and to
obtainCI-n encra. And aIoJfthesinterestwereiricorporateintthe 1977Treaty.
10.43 Further, rticle33(1)@)preciudtheinvocationofnecessitin
the context of"atreatywhich, explicitlyor irnplicitly,excludesthe possioflity
invokingthe stateofnecessitywith respectto that obligation". The 1977 Treaty
provisionsformonitoring,djustmentto meetenvironmentarlisk,ongoingmeetings,
reliancon scientifdata,theuse ofexpertadvice,aiievidencethatthepartieswere
neverintendeso invokestatesofecologicalnecessiasgroundsfortemination.
10.44 That beingsaidSlovakiawiIInow proceed tuanalysewhether
thesituatioatNagymaros,DunakiEtiandGabEikov o May1992 met thstatedtests
fora pIeaofnecessiW.
The Pleaaf Necessitvin RelatiotoNawmaros
10.45 Relyingon itsown definitionofnecessity,Hungaryneeds to
show thatin May 1992 therewas at Nagymaros(1) a situationof an "absolutely
exceptionalnature(H2)the dangerhadan "imminen characternwhichthreateneda
major interestof Hungary,(3)thatitwas impossibleto averthe dangerby other
means
10.46 Hungaq isunableto show thatanystateofemergenq existed
inrespectof Na#matos whichwouldjuste temination of the Treaty. Thedaims
andthe evidencehaveben firllyaddresbydSlovakiainboththeMernohl and inthe
CounterMemuriaI5 ' It sufices heretu makethefoIIowingbriefpoints.
10.47 Therehadbeennogruundsofnecessity or imminent disaster
thatjustifiedsuspensior abandonmen tfworks at Nagymarosin 1989. Hungary
SD Hurrgarinemonal,para.O.6.
51 GlovaMkernori,aras420,4.3#4.33,4.38,4and4.58; dm, ChapleW, ab%.speaks ofthe need "todefendthelivesof millionsof humanbeing~"'~andofsevere
damage being"foreseen"to the"drinkingwater for millionsof peopIds3. Butno
evidence existofan imminentriskof deteriorated water quditinthe impounded
section upstreamofNaparus, which mightin turnleadto a deterioratioof the
quaIityofthewaterfiIteriintotheBudapestsupply wellsu.
10.48 Ariy problems asmciated with dredgkg were in the pasts5.
Dredging inthe Naparos-Budapest sectorhadben done by Hungarylargelyfor
commercia leasons,umelatedtothe Nagymaros barrage.The fiveyearresear~h and
developmentprogramof BudapestWateworks did not suggestthatthere was any
imminent riskthatrequiredthe constructionat Nagymaroto be terminate(or even
modifiedIJ6.
10.49 The stridentclaims of the need tu protect millioof Iives,
creatinga necessitto tedate thetreaty, fineifherwith thescientiffacts, nor
with theacknowiedgment at mmy pointsin Hungary'sMemurid thatdamage "could
have"occrrrred"; or thatnu detded investigationstuquant@the riskshadbeen
made5';or withthe assertiothatthe resultswouldshowupin the longtem.
10.50The was thusa# Nagymaros no situatioof "an absoluteiy
essentid character";stIes one presentingdangerof animminent characte As.to
the finaconditioncited by Hungary forthe invocationofnecessity,therewas no
imminentdangerof anexceptionac lharacterthatitwas impossibletoavertbyother
means. Inthefirstplace,alobjectiveappraisaolfany problemsat Nagymaroswas
carefullyavoided. Hungaryadmitsthat itfailedtocarry outadequatestudies after
1989 (exceptthe Bechtelreport,whichrefutedHungary's contentiorisand was duly
suppressed). No attempt was made at Nagymarustu avertdleged dangersby gny
meansother thanabandonmena tndterrnination.Thiwas, quite simply,becauseno
stateofnecessityhas ever existaat Nagymaros. Hungary'sarguments have reaIIy
52
HungariaMemarial, ar10.21.
53
m., pam 10.19.
w
209and213)., M., above.Sec .lsBechtelrepoSlova Mkernoril,nnex27(app.
55 Seegara7.71,above.
56 HungariaMernoria, pp.3p.428.
57 m., p.432.
sa
m.beeneconomicand politid,dressedintheconvenientIegalhguage ofnecessity. But
Czechoslovakia(thenSlovakia),wkchdsohad itshareof economi hardshiptubeaq
sought to carry out its obligationsundethe 1977 Treaty, for its lonterm
developrnentnd theeculogicainterestoftheregion. Slovakiais entitledto require
Hungaryto dothesame.
ThePleaof Necessitvin Relationtu Dunakiliti
10.51 Nothinginariyoftheexpert-dies indicatesththedammirig
nearDunakilitweir in1992wouldrepresent a situatioof anabsolutelyexceptional
nature,whichpresenteanimminent threaotfdisastewhich muid onlybe averted by
terminatiooftheTreaty.
10.52 The initialsuspensatNagymaros was saidbyHungarynot to
affecworkinthe GabEikovo sector. TheimminentperiatDunakilitseemsto have
beendiscoveredsnbsequenttt1989.
10.53 Hungary asserts ththe impoundig of watw in the reservoir
willcause deterioratioofsurface water qualityand willincrw filtrationof
pollutewaterintothe quifer.DetaiIereplietothesedlegedrisks,includmgthatof
deged post-dammingeutrophicationa,reofferedby Slovakin ChapterVII above,
where theanalysisofthCommittee forWaterManagement ScienceoftheHungarian
Academy of ScienceoftheHQIreport,andtheBechtelreportaregathwedS9.These
assessmentsare a5med by theEC experthdmgs, ex vost factoon the effect of
damming.Such damage asHungw identifiesasa resulofVariant"C" beingputinto
operationiscauseb dyitsrejectiooftwhriicd rneasuresnthe furm ofunderwater
weirs,exactlydesipedtumitigatany adverseeEect oftheoperation.
10.54 As for seismicitHurigaryamrnissioned no scieritifstudy
whatever,wen up to themomentof purportedlyterminatingtheTreaty. They failed
to meet theirduty ofcare inthefaceof aperceivedrisk- and,in reality,thereby
evidencedthatitwasa risktheydidnotreallybelieveto exist.
10.55 We may concludethat no conditionsremotelypresenting a
"necessitfortemination"existein1992 inrespecof DunakiIiti.
59 paras7.31-7.44and7.as.. above. The Plesof Necessitv in ReIattoGabeikovo
10.56 At thetime the purporiedterminationof the Tr-fy was
announcedtherewere nofactors refatingtu woron Wikovo that conceivably
trîggeredthdoctrineofnecessity.Workwas suspendalonthi sectionIaterthaat
Nagymaros. suspensionitseif cannas has beenshown, bejust%ed byany
referenctonecessityStiulesshadnegativfacto sosdevelopedatGabEikovointhe
ensuingmonthsthat by May 1992 termination was forced,as a necessityupon
Hungary.
10.57In itsaybief don on the "Imminent aturof thePerPm
the constructionat GabCfkuvoarenowhere listai. The suspension ofwork a#
GabEikovo hadbeenusedHS aheavyhmded negotiatingtactiA.ndthe terminationof
the Treatywas equaly motivatedby factors whoUyunreIatedtu the doctrine of
necessit.
10.58 At the timeof suspensioof workat Nagymaros,Hungary
indicatedthatworkwouldcontinueat GaMkovo. Butnewwork ceasedinmid-1990
(althougmaintenancwe orkcontinueuntilthe enof1991). Nothing itheest five
months of1992 hadturne Wdfkovo into animminentped ofan exceptionalnature
thatcouIdbeavertedody bytermination.
10.59 The dty isthat the *imminentperil"perceivedby Hungsry
was the successfurealisatiof Variant"Cu. But Varian"C" is just the reduced
versionof theGabEikovo sectorofthe TreatyProject. If nothingrelatingthis
sectionundertheTreatycouldbedescribeasanimminentcatastrophe hen afortiori
the reduced versiondd not be so described. Hungarysuggests6'that the
commencement of operationson Variant "Cu meant that "immediateand very
sribstaritiaidamagewsustained".lovakihasalreadyshowninChapter Vm &ove
fhat theexpertsmonitori nogrkon Variant"C"have found no suchsrrbstantial
damage. Hungaryadds tuthisunsubstantiatdssertio"substantiriskofmedium
and Iorigterm detrimentlffecetspecialto groundwater ,rinkirwater,foresis,
fisherie,gricultI urndscape,nd [the]recreationlalues".Hungaryacceptsthat
so faras express4 fearsaboutgroundwateranddrinkingwaterare concerneci,the
originalProjecatGabEikovo and Variant"CHareinterchangeablebzS.lovakihas
HungariaMemorial, aras.26-101.
61 m., pam 10.27.
51 -Ibidpam 10.28.~hown~t hat eachoneofthesedIegations arenot scientificailysupporbydthemost
expertstudies,whetherfor GabEfkovo rfortheIimitedversianrepresentbyVariarit
"CU.
10.60 It may bt concludedthat no stateofnecessity existe at
GabEikovo norwas onecreatedby thecornparabe butmore limitai Varia"CUM.
B. FundmmentalChan~e of Circumstances as a Justification
for Termination
10.61 Hungary and Slovakiaareagreedthatinorderfor anychange of
circumstancesto givense to a groundfor termination"itis also necessarythait
shouldhaveresultedKi aradicatransformationof thextentof the obligatiostd to
be performed":FisheriesJurisdictionCase65. In thatcase the obligationwas a
jurisdictionlne imposedbythe 1961Exchange ofNotes,and the Courtfound it to
have been undtered by anychmged circurnstances.The series ofpropositions
advanced by Hungq inparagraph 10.7 s0eem tu Slovakianotatdl to advanceits
case,even ifSIovakiacouldaccept(whichitdoesnot) that iisnotdso requirethat
changeshouIdbe "extraordinary orof a singuIa~haracter"~. The requirementsof
Article62 arenotan àlacartemenu. Ody ifone canmeetdiof theprovisionsmight
itbe possiblefor the principItofpacta semandafo be stoodaside.
10.62 Even iffundamentalchange can refer to the burdenof
obligationand notjusttophysicaolbligationst,heisstillcriticfactortobeborne
inmind. Performance hasthereby tobe notonlymoreonerousthanbefore,butalso
"somethingessentialdieren tromthatoriginallundertaken"#.Adverseeconomic
circumstancesf,inancingdifIicultipoliticaldislocatimay make a treatyburden
somewhat heavier-buttheydon'tchangetheobligations under the 1977 Treatyinto
somethingessentidldifferenfiomthoseundertaken , hetheby referencto burden
or tuobligationofperformance.
63 SeeEhapterW and VEi,&ve.
M
Hungaq dlegdy wntinud withwork atûab3Iovofor five monthsbefpurportdy
temiinatiîheTreatyfo*netessitAs.amatteof lawa me of nmiiy inanyment
exdudesme'sownoonduct.
65 HungarianMemeal, pam 10.6andSIovakMernoria,am 8.77.
56 HungariaMemoial,para. IO.'IO(IC1).
67 FisheriJurisdictionWnitKinndom v.IcelandlurisdictiontheCourt. Judment,
LC.1Rewrtç 1973p.3, p.21. 10.63Hungary citesthFishenesJurisdictiCasefortheproposition
thata changeinthe lawcan constitutafundamentac lhangeof cùcumstances. The
Courtacknowledgediherethat "change snthe law may under certainconditions
constitutvalidgroundsfur invukinachange ofcirmstances affecthgthe duration
of a treatyn6%.But the object andpurpuseofthe Treaty would havehadtu have
disappeared-and that objeand purposewas tu beddud bothfrom thetextand
entirhisto rfnegofiations.Therearno relevant"changeinthe Iaw".The duy of
environmentaiconcernwasdreadjracornpunentelementofthe 1977Treatjr. Further,
the develophg law of the environmeritcertaiddoes not cause theobject and
purposesof the Treat-floodcontrol,cIeaandimpruved energy,bettenavigation-
tuhave "disappeare."
10.64 Try as it may todraw what itcan from the very cautious
jurisprudenceonthe Court on rebug sicstanti tbersi.simplynothingin the
FisheriesJurisdictioCase or elsewhere that sustains the proposition that "a
perceptibleincreaseinris kfgreat damage"constitutesa fundamentalchangeof
circum~tance~~F.undamenta clhangeis concernwithprovenrealitiesandnotwith
so-called"perceptionsf increasin risk- andin anyevent,no scientifevidence
existtu supportthihypothesiofincreasedrisk.
10.65 Hungary cIaimstohd support forits entitlementtu terminate
the 1977 Treatyon groumisof rebtisiqstantibuin thecaseconcerriuigRiahtsof
Passa= overIndianTeritoq7'. The Court feltnoneedtoaddressthequestion. The
citatioofferedby Hungq whichis saidtoconcedethatIndiacouIdin thefuture rely
on fundamentalchangeisinfaa directtcudadifferentpoint, tofthe criticdate.
And,contrathe assertionthat IudNaestad criticisedtCourtfor"ratheartificiaily
avoidingdealingwith[fundamenta clhange]"his shortcommentalsoconcernedthe
criticaidate. JudgeArmand-Ugoni,n hisdissentingopiniostatedthatthe righof
passagewas "incapablof exerciseinthepresentsituati(whichwouldcertaidynot
describeSlovakia'sightunder theTreaty).JudgeQuintana,itistrue,inhisdissent
invokedintems theprhcipleof rebussistantibu-because,on theparticulfactsas
he saw them,Portugalno longerclaimedthe rightwhich underlaythe Treatyof
68 Ibid.,pp.6162.
€8 HimgsuiaMernorial.amII}.70(?).
70 RiphtofPxsae oveIndianTemîtontMeriJudment LC.1Repom 1960,.5.
31 HmgarianMernorialara10.66.Punem. Su"[tlheTreatyofPunernwas no more". It hardlyneedtobe saidthathere
is no relevantandogy- thereis no suggestionthatthe 1977Treaty"is no more"
becauseof afdure ofCzechoslovakia(thenSlovakiato claimtheunderlyingrightIn
anyevent,thereisnothingintheJudgment of theCourtintheRightsofPassageCase
thatupholdsHungary'asrguments.
10.66Hunws applicatioofthe law ofchangedcircumstances to
the presentcasrequirescomment.Hungq Iists asthepurposesofthe Treaty':
"socialittegration"
*asinglemd indivisibeperationaiqstem*
'ajointinvestment
"afiameworktreaty,requirinrevision"
"atreatyconsistenwithenvironmentapirotection"
and Endsthatnone oftheseexistandthattherehasthus beena fundamenta clhangof
circumstanceerititlingHurigtoterminatetheTreaty.
10.67 In itsMernoriai Slovakiamade the important pointthatthe
essentialdementsoftheTreatyare tubeascertainenotjustfrom iîstexbut hm the
historyofnegotiations.
"Socialistintepration"
10.68 Afthough there isa referenceto "socialistintegration"in
preambulap raragaph2, thiwsasde=@ not the essentiaipurposeofthe Treaty. The
ideaof abarragesysternfor that poftthe Danubeevenpredatedthe commurtistera,
evenif during that pend some rituai referencetosocidisand COMECONofken
becme ne~essarjr?~. In anyevent, the1977 Treaty ismanifesîlynotabout either
MarxistpoliticsorMarxisteconomics. Theendof socidism and theintroduction of
democracyunfortunatelymot ofthemselveseliminatetheproblemsthatthe Treaty
was designedto recti.yThisaspecthasbeen elaborateabove atparagaph2.12.
10.69 Hungary statesthat the Projechas not becornea force for
integration,buthasbeenthemostserioussourceofconfIictbetweentheparties.The
72 m., para10.73.
33 para2.05.am., above. difficultiesbetweenthe partcaused by Hurigaes refusalovertheyms toperform
itobligations,donutconstitttae"changedcircumstance"within the senseofArticle
62ofthe ViennaConvention. Nor isthe unavaiIabilinrecentyears ofCOMECON-
based loans. Even graver "economic disIocationscasrsedby chmghg political
circumstmcesdo notreleaçeapar& fiom itcontractobligations.*
10.70 In orderto createtheimpressionthattherewas a fundamental
change subsequentto 1977, Hungaryportrays an image of social and political
upheaval,butactudlyreliesonnomore than two concreteevents;thenon realisation
ofa Soviet "loanfor100 millionroubleand thechangetu a freemarketeconomy7'.
No doubt Soviet assistance,whichwas tu be directedtothe constructionofthe
- Nagymarosbarrage,wouIdhaveIighteriedHungary's burdensunderthe Treaty. But it
isveryevidentthatifthi"Ioan"hadbeen vitatuHungarjrs participationtheTreaty,
it would have beenfindised pnortothe signatureofthe Treaty,iristeaof several
monthsIater. Duringnegotiations, ungarynevermadethe availabilioyftheloan a
preconditionfor concludinthe1977 Treaty. Inanyevent, the "loanw"as in fact in
thefom of assistanceondesign,thedeliveryofequipmentt ,heprovisionof experts
forconsultation,uchseMces tobe providedon redit'^. he"loan"could therefore
haveserve litdepurposeuntilthebasicstmctureoftheNagymaros stepwas mmplete
-an eventwhich,of course,neveroccurred.The basisofHungary'sargumentappas
asweak on the factasitisinlaw.
10.71 As tuthe change intothefiee marketsystem,Hungary coriveys
theimpressioninthe textofitsMernoria hatthishappenedinandaround 1989, that
is alongsideHungary's ithdrawdfrom theProject". However,Hungaryadmits ina
footnote tha"thechange canbe dated..to 1 January1991 ",that i18 monthsafter
Hungary'sunilaterdsuspensionofworks7'. A fundamentac lhangethat post-datesa
breachcm hardlybea legitimisatiofthatbreach.
74
SerbiL anansJ.dment No.14, 1929P.C.I.J..SeA No. 20. ForSIovakiaviewof
thi sîn~çee.SIovaMkemurid.par8.69.
75 HungarianMernorialam 10.74.
16 See . greemenbetweeHungarianPeopleRepubliandtheGovernmenotfthUSSR, 30
November1977,HungariaMernoriaV,ol.3, Ann23,p.296. 10.72Hungq seekstu implythat a generaladversechange in its
economiccircumstances cansomehowbetrans1at in.tanentitIement tu tenninate
for reasons ofreus sicstantibus. At various pointsitisirnpliedtiiatchanging
investmentprioritieseffectively amounttafiindamenb lhangeofcircurnstance s rl
the internationallasmse ofthe tenn. ThusHungarystates thatnew methodsof
powerproduction had becorne"available, hichcouIdproducepower atconsiderably
Iower co~t"'~. Furthermore H,ungary now argues thatthe politicaand economic
changes ofthelate 1980s "ledtosimcant reductions indemand inelectricpower".
Asidefiom the factthaHungarsy tiimportslargeamounts of electrici,tcannotbe
said that a State may clah findamental change of circumstances whenever it
miscalculateitsbng ternienerm requirernento,r findalternativeenergy sources
10.73 "A sinnle and indivisibIoperationalscheme" is saidtu have
disappearedwith the suspension of the barrage atNagymaros,thus providing a
changedcircumstance allowingtermination.The self-seniinnatureofthis argument
hardlyneeds pointingout.Slovakianotesfist ofailhatwhat causesthe fdure ofthe
intendedsingle and indivisiblescheme seems for Hungary to Vary accordingto
convenience. For purposesof itrebus sicstantibusargumen t,is its owactionin
abandoning Nagymaros. And Article 62(2)@) is explicitthata fundamentachange
canin any eventnot beinvoked if it is theresultof a breachbythe partyinvokit.
Nemo auditurpropriam turpitudinemallegans. But elsewheritis said-even when
Nagymarushaddready been suspend4 - to be the planningfor Variari"C" that
wouldprevent an infegratedscfieme.l
10.74 The intentionwas indeed that the objectiveof the Treaty,
includingirnportantly optimumenergy output, couid best be redisedby a siri&
integratedSystemin which Wikovo and Nawaros wuuld each playitspari. But
other Treaty purposes - an improving energy situation,flood control and better
79 M., para10.74.Sec.dso, theHard ieportwhichcornmentein 1989:"..thereis
absolutenoneedforincm inenergygeneraticapacitiiHsungaryenergynetwork
upunti1995kause oftherme.6 availabI me..,Vol.5(Par0,Annex8 (ap. 158).
Hungaryalsformulatethpositiotbaa "fundamentallyewsituationwoariçeifthe
1977Twty1s ArtieIes relatoproetionof waterqualityandthe nanenvironment
uneconomicnm.,edVol. 1,para.4.20.thougcHhungaqisnotdcientIy2nueof thisy
argumentnoEeritinChapier10asoneoftheIegilimamm foriîsemination otIie
1977Treaty,idoesreflemostclosetherd anxieriofHrtngarinitvsariousProj-
assessments.
SI m., para. 9.09.navigation-couldstillbeachievedin reducedscalethroughputtinginto effect,as
nearlyaspossible,theGabCnEovsoectionplans.ThisiswhatVariant"C" ha done. It
is not correthai,with Nagymarosabanduned ,he entirobject andpurposeof the
Treatyislost.
10.75Hungaryoffered, in Octuber1989, to implementits Treaty
obIigationifNagymaros was druppeds .t Butifitreallregardai Nagymaros asan
esseritidintegralpaoftheTreaty,withoutwhichtheProjectlostd itspurpose,why
was thisoffeevermadea?
10.76 The "joi ntvestment"issaidbyHungary to havebecome a
"giganticinvestmentfiasco- which intum is saidto be a fundamentallychanged
circurnstancallowing termination.Slovakiaagain observesthat heavy financial
burdens- andindeed,changingeconomic condition- are dearly noagound for the
invocationof rebus s& stantibus.Furthemore, one of the Treaty partners,
CzechosIovakia , aswiIIingto shuuldtrundoubted economic brrrden snorder to
achievelongertenn developmentaa lndenvirumental benefits. ThessacScesare
not to be thrown away, nor Czechodovakia'asssumption of burdens ignored,by
Hungary'slososf intereishtomuring itsTreatyobligationMoremer, inSlovakia's
Mew,the Project remainseconomicalIyviableandabandonmeno tf the worksat this
stagewould beboth economicaliand environmentaIdlisastrous.
10.77 "Aframework treatvreauiringr:evisionintlihtof 'research,
explorationandplanningo~erations-'thiissaidfirstofaltobean essentialpurpose
of the Treatya conceptnot easyto understand.Further,"requirerevision"ofthe
Treaty issaidtobe found inArtides S(3)5(4) and S(5).These articlesdonet so
provide.They simplyrefer tu research,explorationand planningoperations being
requirsdfor the drawingupofthejointcontractuaplm(Article5(3)and 5(4)).The
joint contractul lawasto dIow theTreatytu beimplemented,not foritstermsto
berevised.Thesearticlesfd withinChapterIII",ealisatioofthe Systemoflocks".
Whathasoccrrrred fiomthe outsetisfurongoingtechnid adjustmentstobt madein
the Onanneof implementingthesuccess siaeesof thePIq so that thebestcurrent
standardswiII alwaysobtainandanyproblems cm be resolved. Slovakiahasshown
how thisrollmgsystemof adjustmenw t orksin practice- responsiblyreaiisingthe
83 Hungaryof courresiledimmediatwhenitwmed thaCzechoslovakrnighagreeto
itoffer.
84 forexampIe,ara4.1,ga., above.Treaîy, not revishg its essentid elements.he Treaty scheme was thus not an
"immutabln eom" forCzechosIovakiainthesenseofanunwilIingrieçsdways to adapt
themeans ofirnplementatioanndto deaIwithscientificdlyevidencedprublems.But it
is truethatCzechoslovakiathenSlovakiahave, &e Hungary,takenseriouslythe
principlofpactasuntservanda and therealisatiofthe treatyprovisions.
10.78 "Atreatyconsistentwithenvironmenta~ lrotection- thibasic
purposeis saidto befoundinArticles5(5)(a)(54(5)(b 3)( 5 and 19. Certainlthe
preservatioriandirideed improvement uf water quality, and the general quality
protectionof the envirument have dways been importantelements ofthe Project,
wfiichcontainsitown mecharirsrnfurattainmentandmoriitonrig.Hungarjtrelies,as
a fundamentdIy changed circiimstance,on the observationthat the Treaty "had
becorne,accordinnto Htlnnaq, a prescript fironnvironmentaldisaste fr"phasis
added). This assessrnent was indeed "according to Hungqtt, as the daims of
unacceptableriskto thedrinkinwater ofBudapestaresimply notobjectivelyverified
byanyofthe responsibleodies.
10.79 Hungaryalso refers to the Treaty forcing it toaccept the
environmentaldegradation of itswetlands. AU developmententails a certain
environmenid impact.These improvemtntswerewhat Hungaryhad agreedto, though
throughout ita Memonal there are scatterd referencestu a rightto its "original
envirument". The fact of a certainhevitat,Iimpactupon thewetIarids(though
certaidynot "destructionas a resulofmaures knowinglyentereduponfor bruader
comn objectives(includingenvirumental ones) isnot a chmged circurnstance
authorisintermination.
10.80It is significant that Hungary does not include the
implementation of Variant "CM as a fundamentallychanged circurnstan~e~~. It
implicitlacknowledges thatVariant"C"simply representsa partialapplicatiofthe
agreedTreatyterms. What isevenmorerevealingisthat Hungary admitsintems that
therea reasonfor temination wasVariant"C":
"ThislVariantCI was thetriggtrforthe Hungarianactionterminating
the Treaty,inthe sensethat it was thessenhl reasonwhyHungary
took thatsteprather rhm continuintu negotiatewithCzechosIovakia
on an agreed temination or modificationof the Treaty. As Prime
85 Hungary thus- by referrito the abandonmentof Nagymaros - referçnot to
Czechoslovakiasonductasconstitutinggmunds of resicstantibus,btoitsown
conduct. Thisstranglegal argumentin any evenignorestherequirementthaa
fundamentalhangeofcimunstandceesnotrelatothewnductofeitheParty.examplesgivenbyHiingay - an agreementfora nuciearreactorinthe mistakebeIief
thatthetechnoIo tgybeuçedis de -clearlyha nothingtu dowithimpossibiliqasa
ground forterminationIfthi isHungary'sdaim itisgovernedbyArticle 48f 1of the
Viem Conventiononthe Lawof Treaties:
"AStatemay ..invokean errorinatreatyasinvalidatinitconsent to
be boundby thetreatyif the errorrelatto afactor situatiowhich
was assumai by thatStateto existat thetime whenthe treatywas
wnc1udedand formedanessentiaibuis oftheconsent of thatState...
to beboundbythe treaty."
Hungaryappas tu be sayingthatit wasmistakeninitsbefiefi1977 that, aamatter
ofscientificfact, the Projecimuid be sdely constnrcted withgreat dmage and
catastrophicristu itdrinkinwaterandenvironmeritalsafety.
10.85 One may wonder why Hungary has constructectiheanificial
arguments relatingto impossibilr,aththanrelyonArticle48. Theansweris surely
thatthegroundof error goesto InvaIidieandnot toa rightto terminate.Article48
fds withinsection2 oftheViennaConvention "InvalidiyfTreaties".Andtheerror
hastu beoneassumed tuexistatthetimeof conclusioofthe treaty.ForHungary the
dilemmais that it&ed its willingneto be bound - and therefore,alIits
assumptionsabout thefamal situationobtainin-asIata esFebruq 1989,when it
asked forconstmaionof the Projecttobe acceierated.And itdoes not suilicefor
Hungq ta avoiddiof these inwnve~ent issuesof Iaw bysaying that if "new
scientificknowledgeor undersfandim that]renders aproject unçafeJdangerouaor
unsustainabliserrorrathethan impossibilit, enHungaryshoddbe equdlyentitled
to rely on error...Internationaiaw is not a system of hed form~1a.s"~. But
internationalwis nota systemof ruleswhichareinterchangeablaendwhose content
isidenticai.Anderrorisnota groundfortermination.
10.86That issueven if-wfiichSlovak duaesnosatdl accept- there
existedatthetime ofthec0ncIuçionoftheTraty factswhichhavebeenshow to be
enuneous aiidwhichfomed anessentiabl asisHungary'c sonsenttobe boundw .
10.87 The only basifsor invoking impossibilitas a ground for
terminationistobefound in Artic61 ofthe Vima Convention. Its tems present
90 Thelonglisofpre-197çudiesSlwakMemorial ,nnex23,rwd thaal1aspectofthe
Projewerestudiethoroughandthatnosuch"emr"existedSee,al=,para4.06-4.07,
abm. -312 -
enornous problemsfor Hungary. Article 6)(l) requires the llnpossibilifi of
performance turesulfiom ".,the permanentdisabpeara orcdestructioofanobject
1
indispensa fbltee executionof the treaty". ;ThInternational LawCommission
cldy had in mindphysicd disappearmce ordesiructiong' Hungary can but contend
that the lirtofexamplesit orerd was ne texhaustive of the categories of
impossibrlity*At thesame time,ifHu~fgarryejdctsthe physicdconnotationof "the
permanent disappearancoer destruction"andrefé srinsteadto the disappearanceof
theobjectand purposeofthe Treap ,itsclah didesintothatof fundamenta change
ofcircumstances.Thisis ineffectadmittebyHunM.
I
10.88 Article 61(2) also preseAts pprblernsfor Hungary, as it
1
stipulateshat: i
I
"ImpoçsibiIitof performancemay not be hvoked by a paty as a
ground forterminating..a treatyiftheimpossibilitisthe resuoàf a
breachby that par&..ofan obligatiounder thetreaty..."
I
Hungarycouriters thiawkwwdnes symakinggènerdallusion tothe factthatnot aii
ofthe Vienna Convention iscustomary internitionallaw, andthatHungary and
Czechoslovakia werenot partyto it in 1977. utno analysisfollowsto persuadethe
Court that Article61(2)was a new concept, iniroducedfor thekt time intothe
ViennaConvention, and theclaimcould bemade onthebasisof customary law.
l
10.89Hungarythen appearstu kcept that it may have engage. in
wrongful actP ,but defensivyluisistthatthesemusrhavecaused theimpossibilitof
performance forit tobe deprivedof a nght tu teminate. MystiQmgIy , then teiis
Czechoslovakia tha& can relyonirnpossibiIiofIperformanceeven ifVariant"C"is a
breachof the Treap .
I
10.90 Thismarnerof arguing is extraordinaqthatSIovskia wishes
ody to observe thatthe grounds of Article61(lj arenotmet (andnor cm they be
sirnplyignoredby oflering instead comments on force majeure and necessity).
Thereforelegallyone sirnplydoes notarriveathicle 61(2). But in anyevent,any
91 1
Yek ofth1ntemational aCommissio~ 1963Vol.II,p.206-207.permanentdestruction ordisappearance for example,if the existmgstructuats
Nagymaroswere damaged* -would cIearhavebeen causedby Hungq.
D. Hunearv's Misconceation Relatine to Su bsequent
Obli~ationunder Internationallaw
10.91 SlovakiahasinitsMemorialoEereditsviewson the Hungarian
argumentsin its Declaratiof1992 relyingonlexoosteriorlegdero~attiriori,lex
speciaIisderogat le@neneraWi
10.92 Hungary'fomulation ofthese argumentinitsMernoriacldIs
ody forthreehrtherbriefcomments.Fir sti.ariotherexampieofHungaryorering
the samearguments for drnost ariyhead of intemationai Iaw. Here Hungary
acknowledgesthat developmen tninternationalenvironmenlawi arepartof the
fundamentaclhange argument; but they are alsothe buis for the posterior
argument. Second,neitherin the Declaratinor in its Memoriadoes Hungary
sugges hat thedevelopmentsconstitujuscogensthatoveridetheTreaty -stillless
thattheyconstitutjuscogensthathasemergedsinceFebruary 1989,whenHungary
asked foracceIeratioofthe tirnetablefor construction. Thirthe remarks at
paragaph 10.96oftheHungarianMernoria l
"IfCzechoslovakiawas obligedundergenerdiriternationd law not tu
cq out activitieon its territory tbat woucause serious or
substantidham tu Hrrngq thenHungary was enritleto take action
tu removemy pretexfursuchconduct"-
arethelanguageof self-heorreprisais,otofgroundsforterminationnderthelaw
oftreaties.
E. The Fictioof "Breaches"bv Czechoslovakiaand Slovakia
10.93 Hungary conEms inits Mernoriaithatit relieon material
breachby CzechosIovakiaasa basisfor theterminat oionhe 1977Treaty. In its
7992 DecIaration,materid breach was said tu ariseout of the fidure of
CzechosIovakiatufirI teiobligationinArticle15 and 19of the Treaty, whereby
thequaIityofwaterwas not tu beimpairaby theconstrucfionandoperationofthe
barragesystem ,ndobligationsortheprotectioofnatureweretobecompliedwith.
%
above.yplantodernolithecofferdaprotectitheNagymarositeSec .ara1.22,
97 Slova kernoria,ara8.106-8.122.The provisionalsolutioof Variant"CM war besc~ibedasan "even more severe
breachMsg.IntheMernorial,however,IIungarh& nowfound a new"materiablreach"
- namely, breach of~ntracîual obligationsunder the 1976Joint Contractual Plan
Agreement. These aresaidtu be"anticipatoyiraches* thatwereof "a continuhg
characterand arerepresen tytde Wure tu hake the adjustrnensu thebarrage
I
systernthat Hungarnuw ~aysarenecessary. 1
I
10.94 Slovakiahasaddressedboththelaw and the factinrelationto
material reacinitsMernoriaal,ndatparagaphi8.81-8.97dealtspecificaiwiththe
fulfilrneofCzechoslovakia'asndSlovakia'sdiiesforthe protectionof natureand
waterqualityandtheabsenceof anybreachof $e Treatythroughtheirnplementation
ofVariant"Cu. Accordingly,lovakiarestnns itbelfafewbriefobservationarising
outof Hungq's Mernorial. i
10.95 The re~entlydiscoveredereachof the Joint Contractuai Plan
Agreementisanother example ofHungq searphingamund fur anyand everyle&
argument,ex mst fatAu,tojuste itsterminati-iwwhenithasfiankly~nceded that
its teminationhadnothingwhatever to do any suchailegedviolation.niis
attitudeevidencealackof confidencthattheshed reaso norterminatio-Variant
"C" -isjustifiaininternationllw.
10.96 Thecentralfocusof~undaq's interpretatiuofthe 1975Joint
ContractuaiPlanAgreementis CzechoshaIua's!obiigatii10cany out "thecompIex
exuninationof the effecof thebarge on th4 environment"=. Itis alle& that
Czechoslovakiabreachedthiobligatioandtha It
"Potentiaienvironmentalimpactsof the etructiowere arsessedby
Czechoslovakiady between 14September and12 November 1990."
This is quiteincorrect. Two points rnust4 made. an assessrnentof
environmenta mpactwas carriedoutby bothsidesirnmediatelyrioto thesignature
l
P% Hungary1991Ddaratiort, Hiing~emorid.Vol. 4,Amex82 (p.179).
1
W Seeibid.,Volpara6.31.of the 1977TreatyIo o The practice fier thisdatecIeatIy shows thateach party
considered itself responsiblefor the studof envitomentd impacts in its own
teritory". M. at no stagepriorto itcurrent Mernorial, noeven inits1992
Declaratiunhas Hungary dieged thatCzechoslovakia had agreaterrespoasibilityin
relatioto enWumenta1 research. Hungary's argument istrulyastonishirgot ody
becauseit mns counterto theconduct ofthepartiesafter1977 butdso because itis
inconsistentwith the emphasisHungq placeson thejoint naturof the 1977Treaty,
andtheneed forcooperation.
10.97 Inany event,Hungarypresents a mideadinginterpretationof
the 1976 Agreement's provisions. In its attemptto showthatCzechoslovakiawas
prirnarilresponsiblfortheexamination oftheProject'simpacton waterqualityand
theenvironmentn, o mentionismadeofHungary'c sorrespondhgobligations.Whileit
istme, forexample,thatCzechoslovakiawas given responsibiliyorhydrologicaalnd
hydraulicexaminationofthesectionbetweenBratislavaandRajka(the firsvillageon
Hungariantemitory downstream of Bratislava),Hungary had exactly the same
responsibilitfor the section between Rajka and Budapest. In other words,
responsibiliwas often allocateaccordhgto territoriownership.In otherareas,
theJoint ContractualPlanAgreementprovided thathe responsibilitjlshobedshared
as,for example,the responsibiIiynternisof researchinto the Project'simpacon
drinkingwater reçources. Unsurprisingly,however, the impact of the planned
dredgingdownstreamofNagymarosonBudapest's dnnking watersuppIiescame soiely
withintheambitofHungary's re-ch teandm.
10.98Further, the1976 Agreement,by Articles 5 and 6,establishes
thejoint responsibiIityofbuthpartiesfor the drafiing ofthe Joint Contractuai Plan,
whichis furtber confimed inAppendii 2 tu this Agreement whereby:"Ifneceswys
furtherresearchandstudiesmaybeperformed withmutuaiconsent"'03.
10.99 Itmust alsoberecalledthathe 1976 Agreement wasaninterim
agreement, supersededby the 1977 Treaty,which makes no distinctionbetweenthe
partiesastotheirresponsibiiiyegardmgtheprotectionoftheenvironment.
lm Seepara s.024.07above.
101 Seeparas4.094.10,4.1and4.24eta., he.
102 Seepara.7.68above.
143
HungariaMernorial,oi.3Annex18(atp.226). -316 -
10.100 Detailedfurtherresponsefto the chargesof materialbreach
regardingtheobligatioto protectwaterqualityahdnatureareto befound inChapters
IV andW above. Slovakiahas furtherdemonstiatedi,nitsMernoriaalt ChapterW
and initsCounter-Mernora itlChapteXI belod, thatVariant"C" is noinbreachof
the 1977 Treatybutratheris thebatpossibleap*roxùnateapplicatioofthe Treaty.
10.101 Although Hungary does,not utdude this in itsmion on
materid breach as a justificatifor terminafion,there are Eequent references
throughout the Mernorial oSlovakiafallcgedhngdoing infding to negotiateor
"woperate",baxd uponthe erronemsassumptidn I thata treatyputy isunder a legal
obIigatiuntu couperatein negutiatingan amendmenttu a treaty - or indeai, in
negotiatingtheveryterminationoftherreaty. aspectis dealt *th ut ChapterIX
above.
10.102 Continuhg the =ch. ifor new grounds to justify its
termination, ungarynowclaimsthat~rechoslovakia hasrepudiatedthe 1977 Treaty,
within the rneaningof Article60(3)(a)of th1 Vienna Convention,throughthe
implementation and operationof Variant "Cu.1Hungary does not offer any legal
analysisas towhy Variant "Cn shouldbe regaridecls arepudiationof the Treaty,
satisijhg itself with teUingthCourt:"varianiC amountedto a repudiationby
Czechoslovakio aftheTreaty..asclear arepudialions onemight wish."
I
10.103 But Hungary must do dore than shply allege repudiation.
Repudiationisto bedistinguishefiombothte-nation anda rejectionofthe binding
natureof atreaty.Termination isthelawfulendïngbyone panyofthe tieatyand its
applicatioto bothparfiesongro-oundasndinac*dance with proceduresspecifiedin
Articles60-62 ofthe ViennaConvention. By bnfrast,Statessometimes insisttbat
they arenot boundby a treatai dl,for reasonkxtraneousto any entitlementunder
Articles60-62IW. Repudiationisdifferenagain-:tistherejectioneitheexplicitlor
through action,of the entûetyof the obligati*ns oa treatythat isin force and
applicable,ndis necessariludawNl unlesitCG beothenvisejustiiïeundertheIaw
of traies:
I
"Statesstiifrom timeto time repudiatejheir traies, but therenos
doubt thatsuchrepudiafionisa vioIaiion:ofinternationallaw urists
can bejustifieon oneor anotherofthe&cepte. grounds forsecuring
releasefiom theobligationto complywit1thetreaty. Statesaccept
I
'O4 ThusSouthAfncainsist-inwrrectl-thaidas notbund bythepst-warMandateover
SouthWestMica. I thisby invariablattemptingtojustiQtheirrepudiatioby referenceto
oneormoreofthoseacceptedgroundslm ."
IO .04 C~hosIovakia (thenSlovrJcia) has neverof course, refend
tu anyof thegroundsinArticles 60-62 tocIaim that it isreleased hm iîs own
obligationstucornplywitthe 1977Treaty.
10.105 A repudiationbyconductwill requirethe demonstratioof a
determination"to terminatea relationshipicase of a deliberateand persistent
violationof obligati wohsch destroys the very object and purpose of that
~elafionship"'~. zechoslovakididnot engage indeliberateandpersistentMation
of obligationdesign& tuterminateitrelationshipwithHungq. On thecontrary,it
soughtto keepHungar eyngage intheTreaty relationship.
10.106 The Court has madeclearthat a claimof repudiationmust
consistofmorethansweepinggenerai clairnsIn theICA0 Council Case itsaid:
"Even ifthe dlegation, becauof its generdity, tobe regarded as
one of wnduct on the part of Pakistanarnountingto a complete
'repudiatioof the treat(see para.3(a)of Article60 of the Vienna
Convention)i,twouldstillbenecessarto examinethe treatieinorder
to seewhether, in relationtotheirprovisions as a whole, and in
particularthose relattuthe 'safetof airtravel'whichIndiaherseIf
invoke d..Pakistariconduct must be heldtu constitrtte sucha
repudiati~n'~
10.107 Hungary hasmadeno atternpt hatsoeverto demonstratthat,
in relationto theprovisionsof the 1977 Treatyas a whole,or to the clauseson
enviromenta1protectionin particular,SIovakisonduc îust beheId tuconstituta
repudiation.
10.108 And itcannot. hdeed, Hungary'scornplaintn thecontextof
its argumenton changedcircumstames isexactlythat "thefiameworktreaty ..had
become, according to Czechoslovakia,an immutable It seems that
'" RY. JenningandA. WattsODmnheimS IstemationaiLaw,9tai.hngmans, Londo~
VoI.I,p1249-50.
ta
a
I.C.J.Rewm1971,p.16.ap.47.
'O7 AppealRelatitotheJuriçdictoftheICA0 Council.JudmentI.C.J.Repor1972,p.
46,ap.57.
la HungariaMernorial,ara10.7414).CzechosIovakiaisatone andthe same tirntoolwedded to the Treaîy,and rejecit
entire.y i
10.109 AU of Czechoslovakia1adnd Slovakia'sefforts havebeen
directedto securingHungariancornpliartceith theTreaîy, and putring it into
operation-andnot intumingtheiback on theTieatyandw&hg awayfrumit. That
is exactlywhyVarian"C" cannotberegardedas arepudiatioofthe 1977Treaty. As
was made amply clear to Hungary fiom the outset, Czechoslovakia was both
determinedto andentitledtseekto puttheTreatyintoeEectto themaximum extent
possible. The manner inwhichVariant "C" dcomplishedthis has been described
elsewhere.
!
!
F. Hun~arv'sCIaim that the Treatv has been Terminafed
throuvhthe Disati~earanIeof oneofthe Parties
10.110 Thisextraordi naamyappearsforthe firtimein Hungay's
Mernorial. I
!
IO.Ill Slovakia'setailedreçponsetube foundinChapter IDabove.
G. The Ina~~ro~riatenessof Hunparv'sCiaims on Human
Rirrhts
10.112 AithougbHungary does net clah tube abl eo teminate the
1977 Treatjonground ofhuman rias violatiorbyCzechoslovakiat,herare many
dlegations thmghout theMemolid of such vioiations. Thenoronly havenolegai
rdevance,but theyareinappropriatunwarranteIandoffensive.
10.113 At paragraph 10.24 ~u&ar~justifiesitssuspension on the
ground that "a statmustprote&the lifenof AspopuIation. It then continues by
suggestingthat the protectoflif*shouIddso be interpretedtuindude t'nghttu
enWument' as providedbynumeruu extsn. There no threat tu thIifeofthe
populationofHungary.Nor is the righttolife,simplareworking ofthe "righto
environment". For Hungary any arguments,can be deployed, regardless of
substantiatioand any legalconceptcan be cqled anyotherlegalconcept,if itis
thought to serverome purpose. Su impossibiIicanbe interchangedwith force
rngeure,rebussicstantibuswiterror,theri@ & Iifwith devdopingenWonmentd
Iaw. 10.114 h is+cd -indeedgrotesque -tu invoke Artide25 of the
InternationCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsforthepropositiothatit requires
a "responsiblgovernment"and"developingdemocracy" to considerthesafetof its
population and the qualityof itwater and the cost-effectiveneof itsenergy
poli~y'~. Of course,governmentsshould dothat -but ithas nothingto do with
Articl25 oftheCovenantn , ohastheCornmitte enHuman Rightssuggeste t has.
IOT.15 Hungarytao makes greaplayof the factthitisa democracjl
andapparentlythereby seeksto planthe ideathat the invocatiof environmental
argument isnecesdy correctifemployai bydemocraticgovemment~ and that
Hungarianinternaistmchtresaretobe contrasted with those ofCzechosIovEtand
thenSIovakiaw, ith impiicatsorthe valueoftherespectiveIegd argumentofeach
side. Thus inparagraph 10.39we findreferencestoHungar ays a"wellgoverned
state",and in paragraph10.76 to its dutieas a "responsiblegovernment"and
"developingdemocracy". The positionisthat both Hungary and Slovakiaare
democraciesthat have emerged from a long periodof one partyrule; both are
responsiblegovernmentswho seekto protectpresentandfuturegenerationswithin
their countriesPartof democraticresponsibilityisfor govementstuensurt ehat
dataon whichthey reIyisobjective,eveifitiunpdatabletu certaininterestpups
withinthecountry,andtueschew prupagarida.
10.116 Slovakia share sithHungary the beIiethat the emerging
humanrightto theenvironmenr tequireseachgenerationtupreserveand psss onits
environmentapiatrirnonto thenextgeneration'I0.But thatis not an environmentai
patrimonythat necessarileschewsJI change,or rejectal1development,or insists
uponpastoralidyllisattheexpenseof otherimportantnvironmenta clonsiderations.
SEmIoN 3. Hunearv'sBreachesConfirmed
10.117 Hungsry's Memurid offersthe fullowing tnrisrn: "In
internationalIaw thingsdunincornpliancewitha treaty arelad as betweenthe
'O9 m., para10.76.
"O bid para10.38.partiesto thetreatll. To itmightbeaddedthe,following:thatnon-cornpliancwith
a treaq isuniawfuIandcanstitutesankiernationdy wrongful act which entailsthe
reîponsibilityof the authofthe act. inthe iresentcase,Hungary has constantly
violated the1977 Treat)since 1989, its breqchesbecomin grogressivelmore
pronouncedas itarrivaiatthe Treaty'purportkd terminationand therecan be no
legaljustification,eitforthe suspensioand &bsequentabandoment of works or
fortheunilatera"temination"oftheTreaty,as S$ctîon1 and 2abovehaveshown.
i
10.118 In factHungary itsel+gnises thi act -but inthe context
of wronglyequatingitsattitudto thatof Czechoslovakiaandthen of Slovakia.For
example,the HungarianMemonal contendsithat: "[iJmmediatelyprior to the
succession[19921neitherHungary norCzechoslovakiawerecornplyiri~with the1977
Treaty,andsincethe succession,neitherHuma& nor the SIovakRepubIichas dune
su""' . hisisadirectadmissi ofnresponsibili&. However,it coversonlypartial@
the verynumerous breachesof intemationalaw affributabItu Hungarywhich,as
Slovalllhas shown initsMernorialw,mmencd weli before1992andreIated to a
verylarg aenddiversifieserieoflegd obligatio$s'"The Hungarian Mernoria loes
not contradictthe SlovakMernorial' semonstrationof Hungarian breaches in a
convincingmanner. Hence,it does not appearusefulto repeatthisdemonstration,
exceptto cl* certaimatterswhweHungary gves anincorrectorfalseaccount.In
so doing,despite the integratedcharacterof the Project, which Hungary has
compromised byitsnumerou bsreaches,tisusefulifSlovAa didinguishesbetween
braches tiedtuNagparus (A) and breachestieftoGabEikovo @).
1
A. Breachesin Relationto Nawrnaros
10.119 By suspendingandthenabLdoning work atNagymaros,andin
even foreseeingthe dismantlingof what had $rady beenbuilt, Hungaryclearly
breachedthe fundamentao lbiigationimposedon it bythe 1977 Treatyandunder
I
generalinternationllw. 1
10.120 By virtue ofArticle 5(5) of the Treaty,whose detailed
provisionswere made mare concrett in the Joint ContractualPlan, Hungaryis
I
responsibie for the whoIe ofthe Nagymaros fweir system, al1 the domstream
II3 SlovakMernoria,ara6.556.165. !
1installatisndthernajoritof thoseupstream.Thesecomprise obligationsessentiai
to therealisatofthejointinvestrnen,sHungaryitseihascorrectlyrecognised:
"..,the NagymarosBarragewas essentidtu tOrighaiProject, which
was,as demonstrateinChapter4,mnceived as'asindeandindivisible
operationalystemofworks'.In conceptin operationandintms of
any possibiityof aeconomic returnhm thisjoint investmefit',the
NagymarosBarragewas a key element. Withoutit, peak power
producti would notbe possibland a principeconomicadvantage
ofthe Originalrojecwould disappear""
10.11 Thus insuspendm andthenstoppingthewark atN~~JITIBTOS~
Hurigaq ha, by even ifs ownadmission,mthlessly andunilateralheIdup the
bringingintobeingof the "singlandindivisibloperationaisystemthat the two
partieshadagreedupon. ItisridiculoforHungarytodav toinvokethe"seriousand
sustain eoubts as to the environmentaland other risks associateciwith the
NagymarosBmageltI1' and have reproachedCzechoslovakiin 1989fur not ha-
ched outthesupposedlynecessq studiestwhen, asprovidedforin Artide5 of
the Treatyand Appendix 2 of the1976Joint Contractual.Plan Agreement,it was
Hungary - andHungary alone- who hadthe dutyto cary out the relevantstudies
concerningtheNagymarossiteandrelatedprotectivestructurThisdutyincluded:
- "Theexaminatioonfthechange ofthebedas a mnsequence of
peak-flowofthe powerplant,Wg int oonsideratiopoints
of view of criera? navigation,water management and
constructi...attheNagymaro Bsarrage"and
- "The complementation and evaluationof the examinations
relatito theeEectofthe dredginginthe downstreamwateat
Nagjrrnarostaking into consideration theweIIs of the
watenvorksinBudapestI1.
Hungarycanhardly hidebehindthetardydiscoveryofitsownshortcornings.And,if
they areestablishtd,thconsfitutafirrthexampleofHungary'sfailuretu comply
114
HungariaMernorîdm. 10.75.
115
W.
116 m., para9.28.
*" M., VcI3,Annex18(app.224and225). 1
withitsTreaty obligations. cannotbeaccepted for Hungarytutry tu imputthe
bIameforthistuSIovakiawhu wasnat thecauseofit.
10.122 And here again,the motivesadvanced by Hungary forits
suspensionandthenterminationofthe Nagp&s wurksare a merepretext. Inits
Memurid,Hungary datesthatatthe heginnioc October1988:
"...neeven thecunst~ctionpitwss completalatNagymaros. Oniy
the coffer dam surroundmg the future,constructisitewas being
prepare d118 1
!
This iinterenhg andrevealingfioa dualstandboi:t
-
Firs ita.mounfs tua ~un~airan admission ofthe &lay in
carryingout itsobligations,for in the circumstanit was
impossiblefor the fist unit of the Nagymaroshydroelectric
plantto corneon limein,1993 as providedfor inthe 1983
Protom1 (and3,fortiorforthi suhappen in1392 asprovide.
foratHungary'srequest,inthe 198ProtocuI);andasSlovakia
hm shown inChapter D above, the parties'respecof the
Projectimescalwasobligatory;
I
Second. Hungq cannotjustifthese delayson the basisof
çupposeddoubts astothe:ecologÎcalimpacofthe Project. At
thetime Hungaryhadno Suchdoiibts. Iwas indeedinsisting
on an acceIeratioof work that was finallyacceptedby t
Czechoslovakiainthe1989 Protocol. Thconclusionfiomthis
is selevidentthe alleged"doubtsatothe environmentaalnd
otherrisksassociated wifh the Nagparos Barrage"arean
exnise inventea and inno way justiQ Hungary's
own breaches. !
10.123 Furthemore , ungarywahwellaware oftheobligatioitwas
under,whichitsMemonal hasnotsucceede dncompletelyhiding,forthereHungary:
Il8 m., Vol.1,para3.63. - Statesthat in 1989 itched out studies on "theamount of
compensation to be paid to Czechoslovakia"incase of the
abandonment ofNagymar~s"~ ;
- fis that i"wasalwayspreparedto compensatefor costs
caused by the alteratioof theBarrageSystem"'20e ,venifin
reality, andcuntrary to what appears at paragraph7.48,
Hungarynever dowed negofiationsofany kindtu take pIace
conceming compensation for the absndonment ofwork at
Nagymaros;
-
Highlights-not withoutexaggeration- havingmade successive
proposaisasto c~rnpensation'~'
- Recognises (ratheriincomfortablythatthe termination of the
1977 Treatyreqrrires "anaccount of work properljdune in
accordance with its ternis", which appears to imply an
indemification,dthough itisingenuoudyclaimedthat "thishad
nothingtu do with my issueof Stateresponsibilityonthe part
ofHungary"' "
10.124 Both Czechoslovakia and Slovakiahaveconsistentlyrejected
the suspension'= and abandonmeno tf Nagymaro~'~'a ,nd the compensationit has
sought therefor, certaidydues not implycontrary tu what Hungary wouldlike to
concIude,that'4heCzecfioslovak [thenthe Slovak]Governmenn to longer considerd
the compIetionof theworks atNagpuos asa requirementvTt5 . ndeedit was, and
remains,anindisputableTreatyobligationto be filfilledBoth Czechoslovakia fthen
Slovakia)demandedthat, in theevent of the non-execution ofsuch a requirement,
Il9 M., para3.73.
lm Ibid.,pa7.97;sec.lso,para.IB(7).
'2' m., para.9.24.
IP -bidpara .1.09.
Thiswasmade veryclearbythekhoslovak Governent asmn as 15May 1989;Sec.
para. 5.abvt.Hungary rnrisrespecthe fundamemal"principIe internationlawthatthebreachof
an international enEavernentinvolvesanobligattomakt reparationinanadequate
fomttl2. Farnom exoneratingHungaryfiom lia<ility,thesedemandare bas& onthe
convictionthat Hungarkas fded tomeetifsobligations.
i
10.125 Thesebreachesdidnot cdPcernmerelythe constructioof the
Nagymarosweir and relatedinstallations.T$eu was oniythe meansto attainthe
objectivesof the Treatytheproductionof hydioelectr (icNitgyrnaroabut also
peak power at GabCkovo which abandonhg ;~agyrnarormade impossible),the
improvement d navigation(partieulardicult thicsccMr ofthe Danubedueto
Hungaryk faiIuretu cq out itobIigation ~)e~ightagainstfloods and,more
generally, the piesemationand irnpmvernentbf the mvkonment. In unilateral1
stoppingthe construçtioatNagymams,Hunga j breached atone and theme the
aloifthe fundamentaolbiigationsrelattoachiepg thoseobjectives.
10.126 Thesame istrucof~un~&s plan todestroythecoffcrdam at
Nagyrnaroi'", which hadbeenbuilt to preservethe smallamountof work already
canied out, and whichHungarymongly claimknot have beenpari of the joinfly
omed propeny of the Project". Hungary iseng because thecoEer dam is an
integral partof the Nagymarosworks; ita $srnantIing hvoIveq in tum, the
disappearanee of the construction pitIa,nd konstitutea serious threatto the
10.127 Aside f?om these breachesof many of its primaryTreaty
obligations, ungaryhasbreached itsecondaryobligationunder boththe Treatyand
generalinternationalaw in unilateraproceeding tothe suspensionofNagymaros,
then to its abandonmenw t ithout any consultaiiwih ithisreatypartner,and in
refusingtoenter into rnemingfiilnegotiationieven astu thecompensationdueto
126 FactoratChonowXJuridictionJudmenf NO.8.1927.P.C.I.J.. SeriNo.k9.p.21
(emphasisadded).
!
127 Seem. 7.115,m., &ve andAnna 48,h&to.
'"
AccordintoHungafiannewspapertshedashohldbebreachinNovember 1994andthe
workingsitetNagymaroshouidbeflded bythaîtirnSec . agvaHirIa~19October
1994,Annex49.
129 HungariaMernorial,am 11.14. 1
Hmgaq 5h0d a d la& ofgmd faithinPippsing negoùaùomthre&g thcm
evertîmeitdised C7xchosIov aksrady tpenterinto meanin@ negotiati&ns.
aparas.5.35,5.41-5.44,and5.93,above.I
ICzechoslovakia(andnow to Slovakia)underArticle26oftheTreaty and even though
Hungaryhm,intemiittentlyr,ecogniseditsliabilit~l~~.
B. Breaches inRdation faGabEikuvuand the Reservtlir
10.128 Although the constructionof GabEkovo was principdy
Czechoslovakia's responsibilitHungary nevertheless was responsible for the
constructionof thDunakiliti-Hmh veadwaterinstaliationt,eDunakilitweir,part
of the tailwaterccadof the bypw cand, the deepening ofthe bed of the Danube
below Sap ~alkovirSovo),the iqrovement ofthe oId bd of the Danube andfor
pruvîdiig certainoperationalequipmeof theWfkovo systerof
10.129 As opposed to whathappenedregardingtheNagymarosworks,
Hungaryfulfilledto a largedegree its obligationshereuptothe time itsuspended
work atDunakilitiinJuly1989:
lt.t]he Dunakilitweir itself wasafreadyWtudly complete by this
stage.ThissuspensionrelatedtothefiIIinoftheDunakiIitidam,tuthe
collectionof materiandto otherpreparationfsorthe actualdiversion
oftheDan~be"'~.
Hungaq attempts to use theprogress ofthese constructionworks tu disguisthe
importanceof itsbreachesin relatioto GabEikov~'~~. Thisis completelywrong:
Hungary's breachespreventedthefillingofthe reservoir andthen the bypasscd;
hence,theputting intooperationoftheentireGabCkovooperation was preventedat
the same time. The joint investmentwas paralysed,and Czschoslovakia'sown
enornous investmentfacedtheprospectofbeingtotallylost.
10.130 As atNagymams, Hungws breaches did not ody mean that
the constmctionswere notcompleted;for Hungar). atthe same time preventedthe
objectives of the Treaty from being attained:productionof electricity, the
improvementof navigation,the figtit against floods and the protection of the
environment.Eiungary'sfiiilutu fulfitsobligationsrelatitotheenvironmenw t ere
particuIarlserioushere. The ufifil1edeservuirand canai ttireatenetubecorne a
133 Artic5(5)@)ofthe1977TreatandArticI2oftheAgreemen tnMutualAssistance.
' Hungman Memonal,para.9.06.
135
-bidpara9.31. - 326-
1
!
!
gant, unsaRrtarycesspooI,wfiilethe Danube rirjerbd continutu sink,leavingno
reguIarflowintu the ridarm system inthete&oires ofboth States.This in turn,
complicatedtheproblem ofirrigatio;ndflood p'rotectin asby no meansdealtwith
satisfactorilyl".Otherspecifmeasuresof environmentaplrotection,constitutian
integralpartof thProject,werealsoabandorid ,sa resultofHungq's decisiontu
suspendandthen terminatework atGabCfkovol".
I
10.1 13 Hun&s fdure tome& itsown environmentapl rotection
obligationunderthe Treaty and under internationailaw contrastswith its
ecologicastanc fistadopted in1985 relyinon ;theHungarianAcademy ofSciences'
1985 Opinion. But the Academy dso express eoncern that "thenon-buildinof
additional nvirorimentally-n inscdIt-ons:.cottIdhave fatd consequenc aesd
generate ineversiblecoIogicaIprocesses"'". In atoppingwork on the Pruject,
Hungary dso put a stoptothesesupplernentarmyeasuresto whichthe Treatyparties
1
had agreed.
I
10.132 Hungari'smglm of itsenvirumental obIigationdidnot end
uith itspuiportedterminatioof theTre8tytY~Gn~xycornplains of thedryingup of
the river branchesinits territo~y'~, ut this probIeis easily remedied by the
constructionofsubmerged weirsUi theoldriverbed and thediversionof watersinto
the rightbank branches. This isnot a mere estio of iioprovernentmade by
Czechoslovakia(thenSlovakia);intheJointContractuaPllan,asdraftedin 1917,d is
statedunderthe sectiondevotedtuthe "Replati#nofthe old Danubebed"that:
"I nhe evenofneed bottomsi1Iscan beionstructedin the old Danube
bed. By meansofthis solutiononthebasisof the expenenceof the
barrageoperation,suchwaterlevelscm tjeproducedequaito the low
waterspriortothecon~truction'~." I
I
And, duringthe8-9 June 1989meeting of~leni~&entiaries,both Treaty paraesreed
tu the proposal madeby theJoint ExpertGroup u includethissolution aa precise
matter in theJoinContracrualPlan'". ~herefo1-Hungary's refusato proceedwith
137 Sg,parar.7.83-7.84,and7.100-7.1 1Ol,above.
HungariaMernoriaVol.5,Annex3. I
I
139 M., VOI .,para..22. 1
140 m., Vol. 3Annex24 (atp. 326).The referenŒto"bottomsillsmasreferencto
undenvatereirs. I
141 SlovaMernoriaA,nnex58. 1
1such relativelyinexpensivemeasuresis cleadya breachof its obligationsconcerning
environmentalprotection and reveals a willingness by Hungary to allow the
degradationofrrencoIogicdlimportantaresin avain attempttoconvince thCourt
of the dangerof the Project anof Variant"CM. Moreover,the dryingupofthe
branch eassnothingtudo vJiththem.In facttheProject(andVariant"Cm) provide
forthe revitalisatiofthe side arrns,not th& dryingup, contraryto Hungary's
contention^"^.
10.133 More generdy, ibis apparentSiatHungary'ssuspensionand
then terminatioof works inthe GabEfkovo sectorwas pure blackmd intendedto
induceCzechoslovakia to agree to renounce Napus and the reIated peak
productionof electricias a bt step to the completeabandonmeno tf theGM
Proje~t'.~Hungary'asilegedconcernfortheenvironment a,mere pretexinthe case
of Nagymaros,was inreIationtu GabEikovo entirelnon-existent. Hungq openly
recognisesthi@cd tactic:
"On 11 October1989, PrimeMinisterNémeth proposedthat the two
PartiesabandontheNagymaros Barrageby way ofanagreementwhich
wouldincorporatecornplexenvironmentalw, aterqualityandtechnical
parantees fordi themajor installatis hichwould be maintainedin
nonpeak-Ioad productionmode. IfCzechodavakia adopted this
srraeestio~ Hungq would continue tu preparethe cIosureof the
Danube and would actudly close it after thecoficlilsionofthe
agreementt".
The "deal"-which was reallanultimatum1' 'was simple:thecontinuatioofworks
in the GabEkovo sector(includingDunakilitin exchangefor the abandunmentof
144
Memorial ishouldhave[Artic50ofthRdesofaCourt)- Ernpkadded.pais toits
r45 HereagaiHungarygavenopriornotî~oftheintetosuspendorkrminateGaMkovo;
nora fortiori,denteintooomtltation wC~hosIovakiin thiesped I-,partis.
5.18-5.d~ve).Nagymarosandof peakpower production (wiih Czechoçlovakia dso agreeingto
Hungq's environmental gusantees). In the event,Cwhodovakia agreedto the
guaranteesto be negotiatedbunot tothe abandonmen t fNagymarosI4. The draft
treatyproectofNovember 1989subrnitted y~"n~ar~ was based onthissimple&
pro quo' " I
1
10.134 Thus,Hungws breaches the GaMfkovo-or donot even
havethe mificialexcuseof concernover environmentalprotection. Theyamount to
an ill-disguisedattempt to force Czechoslo~a's hand into abandoning the
Nagyrnaros partoftheTreaty.
10.135 h this dispute, ~ufgary has continudly presented
CzechosIovakiwaith aseriesoffai accom~iis ,by itsmanifol un,laterdecisions
andultimatums anditstotal disrespectof tcooperativenatureofthe Projectwhose
integratedcharacteHungarynghtlyemphasises .DespiteCzechoslovakia'gsoodfaith
andits genuineconcern to ensure workablemekures for environmental protection,
Hungary fiasacted ina high-handedway, refusiirtuproceed to perfom the works
which theTreaq partieshadjointIagreedwasinjtheirmrrtlrdinterest.
i
SE~ION 4. Conclusions !
!
10.136Hungmfs rd grounds foisuspension,clearIMdenced by the
vagariesofitsown conduct,werefinancial. !
10.137 A major stateground fol-terminatiowas Variant "C". But
the realdecisioto terminateoccurredlong befokeeventhe planningofVariant "Cu,
and the publicannouncementoftemination was/some fivernonths before the aîtual
startofitsoperation.
10.138No legalgroundsare offejedfor suspension,savebyreference
to the lattermination. I
I
IO .39Thepunds off& forteenation ofthe Treatyeither require
Variant"C" to beshown as afundamentaibreach!oftheTreaty, makingimpossiblethe
14' HungariaMemorialV, o4,Annex 30. ~oreohr,asexplaineinChapteV aboveIsee.
paras5.35-5.3and 5.38)îhisofferbyHungaxywas a mereployin ordertocajole
Czechoslovakiinto agreeitodropNa-s asa stepdong the pathtowards
abandamentoftheGINProje whichhad,infaI dm$ ken decidedbyHmgary.realisatioof its objects andpurposes,or requira plethoraof other $rounds,
irrelevant tu the decituterminateto be acceptedinlaw and in referento the
faas. Somegrounds aremutrrdy inconsisterit.
10.140 Hungary hasshownno justificationin internatiIawfor
suspendingandtekathg theTreaty.
10.141 The suspensioandpurported terminationconstitute violations
of Iegd obligations,dong wiîh otherviolatioHungary" egd obIigatiorsowards
CzechoslovakiaandSlovakia.
10.142 By suspendkg andthen abandoring work at Nagymaros,
Hungaryis inbreachofthe1977 Treaty andgenerdinternationd law.
10.143 Hungaryis alsoLibreachof its obligationsthe GaMikovo
sectionand ispreventintheobjectiveofthe1977 Treatyfrombeingrealised.
10.144 Initsabandonmentof construction, Hungais tu meet
envirumentd requirementswithin the Treaty aridits obligationsundergenerd
internationallaw.CHAPTERXI. VARIANT "C": ITSRATIONALEAND EFFECTS
11-01 InChapterVil of itsMemurid,SIovakiaaddressedthe questionofthe
IawfiilnessofVarian"Cu. This discussiowas diected atthe Aegations andcontentions
concerningVariant"CHsetoutbyHungary atthetirneofitpurportedtenninatioofthe 1977
Treaty,on 19May 1992,inthedetailsfactudand legalexphnationof itactioncontainedin
theso caiie"1992 DecIarafionlt.
11.02 Hungary's Mernorial has now supplementedthe 1992Declamion.
Before consideringthe latepresentatioof Hungary'slegal argument,Slovakiawishesto
remindtheCourtof theerroneousnatureof many ofthe majorfactuaiassertionsonwhichthe
HungariarMemurial basesthe contentiothatVariant"Cu isunlawful.This hasbeen shown
inChapters Y,VI and ViiI above.The presentChapterwilI respontu Hungary'sargument
(setoutinitsChapter7)that Varian"C"wasa violatioofthe 1977 Treaty andother reIated
treatieaswellasabreach of generainternationli w.
SECTION 1. Variant "C" Does Not Conflictwith the 1977Treatv or anv Other
ReliitedTreatv
I1-03Hungary'sMernoriac 1ontends thatVarian"Cm entaileda "diversioof
theDanube "arriedout on 24October 1992,which was inbreach ofthe 1977 Treaty,the
1976 JointContractuaPllanAgreement ,he 1976 BoundaryWatersManagemenA t greement
and the 1976 Agreement on Cooperation andMutual Assistancedong the Czechoslovak-
HungarianBorder. PLSapreIiminarypoint,it mustbnotedthatthe internatioagreementto
which Hrrngaryaccords thegreatestemphasis(inits Chapter77)isthe 1977Treaty. Yet,
accordingto itanalysis,theTreaty hadbeenIegitimateIyteminatec5ve months befure the
diversionoftheDanube. This,at bestmanifestsa lack ofconfidencin the validiof the
purportedtermination.
A. *
Obligationtu Couperate
11.O4 The Hungarian Memorial advances the argument that Varian" tC"
involves theunilateraoperationof the G/N Projectand, thus, violates the joint system
estaHished under the 1977 ~reaty'. It dso asserts that th1976 Boundary Waters
Management Agreement'"laidyprohibitsunirateraioperation"af irivariousprovisions of
1 HungananMernoria,aras.7.06-7.07.thisAgreement insupportz. Hungary argues that thereievantpronsions of these freatieset
out procedures tobe foIIowed inthemanagemeno t fconimonlysharedwaters,namely, supply
of prior information, mnsultation, negotiations and joint agreement3. The relative
performance ofthe partiesisthen~mparedand ifisasseked:
l
"Hungaryhas continue upheldits due to consult and negotiate, especidy
from 1989 onward,asshow throughoutthis ~emoIial' ."
Theanaiysisof the events and evidenceinChaptersV 6d VI abovehasestabfished thetotal
faisi ofythisassertions. I
I
11.05 The HungarianMemord dso corjtendsthat, withparticularregard to
Variant "C",CzechosIovaki daidnot compfywiththetreatyobligations to couperate,citing as
1
an example: I
i
"[Czechoslovakia'su ]nwiliingnessto interrupt:the works on Variant "C"
pending a negotiatedsettlement,despire theinvitationsmadebyHungq hm
1989 onwards..'."
i
But the reference to "1989 onwards"is wholly misleàdig. Therewere no works to be
intemir>ted and oreenththenhe &vity did not affectthe flow of the
Danube.Nor wasthereprogress on anegotiatedsettlement. On 10 Januq 1990, Hungaty's
PrimeMrnisterabnrptIy terminated negotiafionç,andit was not untiI20Dmber 1990 that
theBungarianGuvernmentauthorisedthe resumption of negofiations,andthen ody for the
I
Iimitedpurposeofterminahg the1977 Treaty.
11.06 Thus,the oniy settlement inprospect was not to be "negotiated" but
irnposed. The Hungarian Mernorialnonetheless makes,refererice tu "successiveHungarian
I
I
2 M., para.7.08.
3 ïhe diepationoa failuto supplinformatioisconsid& indetaiatpan 6.07g,s-, a-.
4 Hmgarian Mernoriaip,ara7.1.
5 No genuineseps weretaken byHungary towardsoodtatioa or negatiahn priortoanyof the
foilowinofHungary'sunilateractions(ito suspenwork at Nagymros, (ito suspendworkat
Dunakiliti,(itoterminatealconstructiowork atNagymarosand al1 relatecontracts(iv) to
terminatal1constructworù on theProjeand airelatemntracts,(vtopreventthedarnrningf
the Danulxfoiiueeyearsin arow,and(vi)announcingtheterminatioof the1977Treaty- ina
Remlutionthat iattemptedtokmp =ret hm Cmh8slov;ikiawhifeitmade a final, desperate
attemptoprevenfiedamming oftheDanuk for afourth;yeat.
6
HungarianMemorîd,para .-12.concessions,fromthe sprinof 1989 throughMay 1992"'. Thisisso farremovedfiom the
actud facîsas to belong in a world of make-believe. The position ofthe Hungarian
Governmeritbecme mure, not les%intransigentasthe disputedeveloped. Simpas,shown
inChapter V above,itfded tumeet theapplicableinternatiostandardsofgoodfaith inits
dealingswith Czechoslovak&r thisdisputdeveloped.
11.07 The Hungarian Mernorial'finaargument in supportof itcontention
that Variant "Cu violatedCzechoslovakia'osbligatioto cooperate is that there were
"sigifirantdierences" betweentheUri@ Projectand Variant'c" . Itmentionsthe ndy
two technicd ditrences: threduce id ofthe reservoir,anthechmgai Iocation of the
damrnino gftheDanube. But thesewere minorin termsof theoperationofVariant "C"and
thefunctionsiwasto performw, hicwere basicailidenticlo theGabEikovs oectionofthe
TreatyProject.Hungaryresents thecontrolbyCzechoslovaki ahatVariant"C" represented.
But,through Varian "t",the compIetionandputtkgintooperationofthe GabEikovo section
of the Project couno longerbe blocked unihteralljr ainbreach ofthe 1977Treatyby
Hungary.
B. Variant "C''Does Not Violate Czechos1ovakia'Treatv Oblieations
to Protect the Environment
11.O8 In its sub-sectionentitIed "Obligattu Protea the Environment",
Hungarycontendsthat Variant "C* "blataritmntradicted the provisionsof the 1977
~reat~"~.Itpointsto Articl15 oftheTreatywhichprovides thatthequaiityofwater inthe
Danube shd notbe impaired, ddingthatthiArticle"requireasa minimum theprohibition
of pollution". The validityof thisinterpretaneed not even be consideredfor present
purpuses:ithasbeendefinitiveyrovedthatVariant"C" isnotasourceofpo11ution'~.
11.09 It is aise dIeged that the suppwed obligation imposed on
CzechoslovakiaunderArticle19ofthe TreatyandAppendii 2 oftheJointContractuaPlan to
"establisthe impactofthe Original rojecton the environmentwas nevercarriedoutand
that rhisfaiI&es uvertu Variant'c" -"Again,thisiswrong bothasto thefactsand as
7 ibid.
g m., paras7.15-7.16.
3 M., para7.17.
IO & para7.62above.
II
HungariaMernoria,an.7.18.tu the lawlZ. Both Trea~ partiesconducted detailedstudiesinto potentid envkonmentd
impact inthe 1970sand 1980s. Hungary'scontentionignorescompletelysuchmajorstudies as
Czechoslovakia'BsioprojectandHungary's 1983 1985 FnvironmentaIlmpact~ssessrnent' ~
Andtheconsideration of Variant"Cuwas accompanied bbawholenewseries ofstudies14.
11.10 Variant "Cm is dso blamed for :"actudand patentid envirorunentd
damagen15. ChapterVm above has respondedto: thiscontention showing thatany
deterioratioof environmenta clondition&, the "achi$" damage onHungarian temitory,is
self-imposed.On Slova temtory, Variant "CH hasledjto realbenefitto the environment.
Thosebenefits areavdable toHungary, too, 1
!
SE~~IUN~. Huneam'sMisconee~tion as to!the Effect ofVariant "C" on the
Buundan Between SIovakiaand Bunearv
1I.Il In its 1992 Declaration,Hungary made the argument that the
provisionaslolutioncontravenetheDanubeConvention of 1948 andinfringesthe inviolability
of Hungary'sfi~ntiers'~. Slovakia addressai these &sertionsin its ~emorial'~. The
Hungarian Memurid dds wiîhthisissuebut fai oscarrjthe matterf~ward'~.
!
11.12 TheParties are agreedthat the19,77Treatywas not aboundary treaty
eventhoughit includesa boundaryclause (Article2~)'~. Itdeaitwith the boundaryissue
insofaras thatbecamenecessarybecauseof theintendèd system ofweirs aridbypass canal
envisaged bythe Treaty. Beyund rkm 1842 in the DunakiIiti-HnrZoheadwater ara there
were to be minoradjustrnent to allowa straightlinet;be drawn. Thiswould be effected,
rubsequen o theconstmction oftheGM Systern,bya séparattereat. Thishas yettooccur.
ne ina-g ofthiruiterpretathasben demonst&ted atparas .0.93-10.100.aboveIlir
di&cultIOfdInwtheIogiocfHmgary*asrment atpam 7.18tIiathgeneraproteaionofname
obligation irnpoçed@n partiebyArticIe18of the 1977Treaîyis"partinrlarelatedto
Appendix2 totRe19% Agr-rnentintheJoinContra+ Pb. This lasaccordinuiHungaryls
interpretati, poseenvironmentarlemh obligatiInsononCzechoslovaiua
See .hapteIV,above. I
I
See .E.SlovakMernorial, nna 36. l
!
m., para7.20.
[
m., Vol.4Annex82 (atpp.179and131). uI
I
SlovakMernoriapara s.48-7.62. I
Hungaxian emoriaiparas4.374.3and 7.28-7.43.1
Sec .ara2.35.0m., above- 11.13 Other than that, althoughthe fiontiewas now characterisedin
somewhatdifférenttermsfrom thoseprevioiislyemployeinthePeace Treatyof Trianonof
1920, thePace Treaty ofParis of 1947 andthe TreaiyConcemhg the Regime of State
Frontiers of 195it remaine.thesame. In particula, rticle22(l)(of the 1977 Treaty
providedthatthefrontiebetweenrkm 1840and rkrn1811 wouldremain unchanged ,nd be
dehed by the centreiinofthepresentmain navigatiochanneloftheDanube. This was to
be su"subsquent tutheconstructionofthe System ofLocks". That Systemenvisaged a
bypasscaridon CzechosIovakterritory.
11.14 The bypasscanalputintoeffectbyVarian"CH inthefaceofHungarian
non-cooperationt,husclearlylaves thefrontunaffected,ocatedstiolnthe centrehe of
what hadbeenthe mainnavigatiochanne1whentheTreatywas agreedin1977. Thisrealitis
stubbomlyignoredbyHungarywhenit campIains thathm 1920onwardstheborder Iinehad
Iainwith thmain navigabkchannelO.Hungary cornplainthatVariant"CH substitutsnew
artificimain navigablechannelfortheDanube ,n Slova kemtory. But thisis merelyto
cornplaiabout whawt asagreedtobyHungary in 1977-and hasnothingwhateverto dowith
thequestionoffiontierbecause Article22 dearlstatethattheÇontierstayewhereit had
previouçlbeen.
11.15 Itseemsthat Hungar yilfullseeksto manufactureIegd controversy,
when thereisnone,in ordertoclaimthatVariant"C" failtorespectandprotectthe agreed
boundary line.Hungaryrefersto"[tjhsbtementinArticle 22(1)(aof the 1977Treat that
'thepositionof that fiontshdlbedefinedby thecentre-liof themainnavi~ationchanne!
ofthe rivefa.'But Articl22(I)(adoes suprovide.Itprovidethatthe"fiontieshdlbe
definedbythecentrelineofthepresentmainnavigationchan ne ^ "ndevenwhen a bypass
canalwouldhavebeenbuilton Czechoslovak territory.Andthatis whahas happenedand it
ism,jrstifymgl,dy Hungary thadoubtsit.
11.16 Nor can Hungary manufactura Iegalproblernthrough seekitu find
inArticle22 distinctibetweenrninorchangesand changesto thecharactoftheDanubeas
a borderriv3. HungarycontendsthatCzechoslovakiaactedinconsistentwith Article22
of the1977Treatybecause:
20
HungariaMemonal,par7.40.
21
m., para.7.37.
Emphis added.
'3 Se-ibidpara7.3I. i
"Firstitsactionontheborderhe was unilatera;secondV, ariaCtstiiftethe
main navigationroutehm the oldbedof the Danube to a new channel,ten
kilometrelsong oc,ateexclusivelon itsterritog."
I
And that,say s ungary,changedthe characterof thedarde ina way unauthorid by the
11.17 As shown inlilusNo. CM-17, ~&ant "Cu shiftethemainnavigation
1
routenotto "anew channel,enkilometre song,locatedexclusivelonitstemtoryn,but to a
newchmntt, dways envisagedundertheTreaty asbeingkxclusivelynCzechoslovaktedory,
commencingten kîiometresupstream. The Treatyparti# had,in~Eect, mutuallyagreedtu
dissociate henceforththe boundarandthe nnv main ;Channel.If thiissa change in the
characterofthefrontier,itone thathad beenmutuallydecidedbythe parties-Article22(1)
ofthe 1977Treaîyspecificallyprovidingtintthe"~onfractin~Partieshave...agreed on ...
changesin thecharacteof theStatefionfie..", !
I
11.18 It foIIowthatHungary has Los right tcumpt?in thatVariant'C"
implementsthe agreed dissociation.Buthe borderlineitsehas not been changed atalp.
Hungary's assertiothat Czechoslovakia 'actionon tljeborderline as unilaberais hus
devoid ofanysensiblemeg. In theht place,a brpass canalwas an agreedprovision
under the 1977Trea~, not ausdateraiinvention.~he originaProjectenvisagedthat the
navigationchme1 wouldremah on CzechosIovaktemtory even whenit leftheby-passand
went into the reservoir. More particularl,hough,!therehas no "actionon the
borderline".It is impossibletunderstand how leavinga border exactlywhereit was, in
accordance withatreaty provisioisunilateralactionthfailto protecM agreedboundq
he2'. i
!
I
I
25
Thedaim is alsthaCzechoslmakibyVariant"Cmbkched Articl4(3)ofthe1976 Boundary
managemenntctiviwhichwoddwremitinachangei..thecharactrftheStatborder"Quotedr
atu, para7.35. Butmichcoflsentwasgibytbe1977Treaîyinte- oftheshifafihemain
navigationl.bel hm thWmdaq fivertthe+ #mi. Variant"C"merel. impImenthis
shifî
!
26 The sdl changerenviragedbyArticle2wcreneverbroughtinta operatiSec,para11.12,
above.
27 i
HungariaMernoria, ara7.28etM. S~Cfl0N3, Variant C Dues Not Contravene the Princi~Ies Governinv the
Equitable Use oInternationaIWatercourses
11.19 Hungaryin itsMernorialadvances certain argumentbsased on the
principleof equitauseofinternational aterco~rses~.heprincipleof equitabuseissaid
to go to auantiandto &; Slovakiissaidtobe inviolatioofbothaspectsinregardto
thediversionoftheDanube underVariant"CM.
11.20 SIovakiahas inChapter IX ofîhis Cuunter-Memurid addressed
considerationof enviromentai Iawgenerally.But the way inwhich Hrtngq fumuIates
theseargumentsinrespectofVariant"Cnisremarkabl endmeritsfurtherattention.
11.21 Firstan8foremost,asSIovak ias pointeout in its~emorip, the
lawfiilneof Variant"Cufallsto betesteby referencto the 1977Treaty. Udess the law
relatinto watercoursesrepresentsa peremptorynom with which the 1977 Treatyis
incompatible,he principlofpactasuntsmanda requiresthe rightsand obligationof the
partietobetestedbyreferenceto the1977Treaty.
11.22 The principlof equitableuse of sharedresources is not a later
peremptorynom thatovenidesthe 1977Treaty. Iisaprinciplthat iwhoIIyrefleciedinthe
Treaty.The equitabIuse oftheDanube was detemUned wntractudly bythe parties;anthe
agreedquantitieof water thatthepartiwouId receive&er the construcbionofthe Project,
and themechanisms forensuringwaterqualityareal intepl dementsof theTreatyregime.
Hungary ha dishonoued the Treaty obligation- obligationhlly compatiblewith the
contemporary principleof equitabuse of share resources- and then inwikesthesame
principlofequitabluse ofsharedresourcestodeclarunlawfulSlovakia'attemptto putthe
Treatyintooperationsofaraspossible.
11.23 Nonetheless,Slovakia,respondintoHungary's1992 Declaratioinits
Memaid, oEered a systematic reviewof the customary internationalaw on shared
watercoursestoshow tbatVariant"C*was infactinconfonnitwith suchidQ. Hungq, by
contras,carefuliyignoresthefactthat law ofshd wateraurses isanintegrd whole.It
28
m., paras7.59-7.82.
Slw&Memorial,~7.41,~~.
30 ïbidparas7.72-7.86.treatsthequestion of notification and consultation, and of asr-ifthey are topics of
internationlawseparatefromthe topicoftheequitabluse ofinternationalwatercourseç.
11.24 ButequitabIcuse,hmn, and cunçultatioarenot dispar atesfniles.
They are component,bdancing dements of theurtitartopicofthe internationailaw ofthe
non-navigationalse of internationaiwatercourses.Hungary,however, ignoresthe uniof
the law. By reciting odd phascarefbIlpicke or thepurpose,noms relatinto damage
arededt with in one parof its argumenn;oms relathgto consultationandcooperationin
anotherpart;andnoms onequitable usein yetanotherpart. The essenceof thecustomary
rulesisthat these elementform an integratedwhole. Violationof the law of shared
watercoursesisnottobefound by therecitatioofsnippetsof resolutioundereach ofthese
three headings,avoidingthe implicatiof the relationshof eachofthe legaielementsto
each other.
11.25 InsofarasHungary is wiIliatdl tu perceivethe lawofinternational
watercoursesasother than a aeriesof separate,undated rules i,seeks to avoid the
consequentid dificultiesbasserthgthat th"no appreciablehm" principlehas aprimacy.
The standardformulatedby the InternationalLaCommission inits draftarticladoptedin
1994 on2ndreadingis thatof "nosignificantm". But in anyevent,itisclearfiom the
accompanying comrnentarythatthiargumeni ts nocorrect.
11.26 The extractcited of ProfessorMcCaffrey'vsiews does not support
Hungary'isnterpretation.ProfessorMcCaRrey' csomment thathe
".prirnacyof the'no hm principle'meansthat the fimdame~td righand
obligationofState wsithregardtotheirusesof aniritemationd watercourse
are moredefinitethan thewouldbe ifgoverned inthe fistinstanceby the
moreflexible(andcunsequentlIessclearnrIeofquitaHe utiiisation"
ratheraffIms whatisrepeated intheCommentary tothe adoptedArticles,namelythatit was
fdr no1suscient fothe questionsohm and damage tobe addresso enlyindirectthrough
the provisionson equitableuse. A specificandclearformulationwas required32.But the
formulationarrivedatinArticle7 is netanabsoluteprohibitiof appreciable m. It ia
due diligenceobligationinrelattosimcant ham.
31
HungarîaMernoria,am 7.79.
32 I994Rem of theInternatioLawCommision,Ai49f10p.236. B. The Dutv Reeardinp Environmental Damape in the Context of
InternaiionaWatercourses
17-27 Hungarycontendsthat"oneof thebasicnoms ofinternational.law"is
thatStatesmust:
"..ensurethatactivitwithintheirjuridictionorcontroldoncause damage
totheenvironmenot fothestate~~~*
Thisphnhpleis saitube fomulatedas a de ofintmatioriaiaw inPrimiple21of the 1972
StockholmConference DeclaratioontheHumanEnvironment. The same principlis sato
befound intheLake LanouxCase of 1957,intheHelsinkRuleson theUsesoftheWatersof
InternationRiversof1966,in theresolutiof the InstidetDroit Internatioof1972, in
the HelsinkiConventionon the Protection anUse of Transboundary Watercourseand
lntemationdhiken of 17March1992, andin the Internationl aw Commission'sDr&
ArticleontheLawoftheNon-Navigationa UlsesofInternationl atercourses.
11.28 Theprincipliathusstatedtubean obligationot tucausedamage tu
the environmentofuther Statestobe deducedas a "basicnom of internationallaw"by
seiectedsnippetofdiverseinsîrument(many ofihemaddressing awide varie@ of issues).
Thisisnot aseriousdeployrn&of the legdc~nsidwntionrselevantforthe determinatonf
theissue beforetheCourtI n particulat suggesttheexistenceof anabsolutprohibition
ofal1damage it ignoretheexistencof the1977~rea$', andthe tnrcharacterofVariant
"C" as a Iimitedimplemeritatof thatTreaty,andthe relationshiofthe allegerule of
customary Iawto the Treaty enteredÎntoby the parties;andits*mplypresupposesthe
existenceodarnagecausedby Variant"C".
11-29 But themere assertioofdamage andthe procIamationofan aIIeged
obligationnot tcausedamage tothe environmentofotheStatesdonot assisthe Courina
seriousanalysof thelegaliofVariant"C".
11.30 So faras damageis concerned,Hungary mereIyproclaimsthat "it is
evident that the diversioof the Danube liascausai, and risks causing, substantid
environmentaldamageto ~un~ary~" .Severeadversechanges inthemer re@e arecited,
34
fheTreaty&,pas.ft2.27.amseF1.,and9.67,g=..&c.gisineumbenupn thepartiesunderalthoiighas SIovakia hasshowri thisisnot supported by any of the expertfindingg6.
Reference is madeto "theintroductionof pollutisubstances"though these are riowhere
specified3'.And- ina techniquefiequentlyresorttobyHungary -itis thesuggestedthat
the"extentofthedamagemaybemanifest onlyinthefuture".
11-31 Butthereis, apparently,nabsolutedutyto preventthi-unproyenand
hypotheticaidamage. Itkt needsto besaid - asis readiiyscknowledgedby serious
environmentasltudie-thatthevariousresolutionandprincipleemergingfromthemyriad of
meetingsand forumsconcerneû withtheenvironmen tomprisewhatis forthemomentlargely
"sofilaw".Ina passagethatreferspecificdytoseverd oftheinstrumentsaidbyHurigaq to
evidencea "nodamage fundamenta lom", BirnieandBoyleprudent& =y:
"The 'softladapproachaIlows Statesto tackla problemcollectivelywhen
they do not want too stnctly toshackletheir freedom of action. On
envirurimentaimatters this mbeheithebecauseof scient& evidenceisrrot
conclusiveor compIettbut none theless scautionaryattitudeis requiror,
becausethe economic costsaruncertainorovertiurdensome ."'
11.32 Principle21 of the StockholmConference is an importantprinciple
directedatremindingStatesof the importancofrespectfortheenvironmeno tfotherStates.
ItsapplicatiotoparticuIarircurnstarices tobemdeiedsin the spesc case.
11.33 Muchmorerelevantthanthis abstractstatementofprincipleis the
specificlawon damage thahas beendevelopedin thecontextofinternationwlatercourse(a
realityrecognisedinRecommendatio5 n1 ofthe ActionPlan ofthe Stockholm Conference).
And ofcourse theworkofthe InternationaLl.awCommissio bnildingonandelaboratingthe
resoIutionsof the InternationalLawAssociationandthe Institude Droit International,
representthemost detailedandthoroughanaiysiofthe issues.
11-34 Itisclearthatsofar asinternationlattrcourseare concerned,there
isno absoluteprohibitioofdamage ,orevwi atotalprohibitioof"seriousmnsequencc"".
Theobligationismorecornplex:
36
¶s. 7.51,Gm.. and8.21,tm.,abwe.
I7
TheHungaîanMernoria1fersbactopara6.16forananmerbutnoneistbefoundthe=.
3%
atp. 28. and A.Boyle.InternatilwaandtheEnvîronmenLClarendon%r.ss,ford1992,
39 TAI SmelteAward(1935),3UnitedNatioReportofInternatiAlrbitrlwards,p. 191ap.
1965. "Watercourse statesshallexercise due diligencto utilise an international
watercourseinsuch away asnot to caussignificahm tootherwatercourse
states4."
11.35 In the mntext ofinternaonaiwatercoursesthe issueofdamagedues
not exisinisolation. Iis one ofthe elemeritsinanÎntegrateappruach,wherethereare
multipleand sometimeswdicfing kpjtimate uses by the waterwurse States. As the
Commentary of theInternationLlawCommissi o ntes:
"...the fact that an activity involves simcahm would not of itself
necessady conditutea basifor barringitin certaicircurnstmces'eqiiitable
andreasonable utilkationof an internationawatercoursemay stilI hvoIve
sigrrificahamito anathetwatwcourse state.Gnerdy, insuchinstancesthe
principlof quitde and reas0nabI etilbation remainstheguidincriterin
balancingtheinterestatstake."
11.36 Slovakiamakes the followingobservations. FA, Hungary and
CzechosIovakiahad achievedagreement on quitable and reasonableutilisation,intse,
through the provisionsofth1977 Treaty. Secund,notwithstan hemimportanceof those
quitableusesto CzechosIovaki(aandtuHungary) -tuprovideenergy,to cofitrd floodinto
improvenavigation-andnotwithstandin ghemassiveexpendituredirecteto theirattrtinment,
Hungary hadmade theirattainmentmpossible.ThÎrd,thepartialzittainmentfsomeof the
benefitsthroughVarian"CM remainsanequitableuseofthewatercourse bySlovakia.Fourth,
thatfactor woulbe takenintoconsiderationeveifVariant"C"causesdigdicant hm.
11.37 But there & no significantharmcaused by Variant "CR. On the
contrary,ithasproduced benefitsasdesctibedi,nterdia,inChapterVm, above. Further,
Slovakiainany eventalsomeets th"duediligencetestinrelationto ansuchhm because:
"It is nointtndedtoguaranteethat inutilizinaninternational atercourse
sigrrificanthmwouldnot occur. Itisan obligationofconduct and not of
result. Whatheobligatioentailsis tha watercoursestatwhose use causes
significanthm cm be deemed to havebreachedits obligatitu exertisedue
diligencso asnot to causesignificaham onlywhen ithasintentiondyor
negligentlcausedtheevent whîchhad to bepreventedorhas intentiondyor
negligentlynot preventedothein its territoryfiom causingthe event or has
abstaiaefiom abatinit.. .*
InternatiolawCommissionA,149110,236.atWl atercour.rtic7(1)in1994Remrtofthe
'' Ibid..Pa4aoCommentarytnArtice, circumstancthatSIovakîa,havîngfuIfiIits contractuaiobIigationsfur the sharedthe of
Danube,findsitselfprecludfrom benefitbecauseofHungary'sconduct, ascircumstancto
betakeninto accountinany assessrneofVariant "CMby referencto conceptsofequitable
~ use.
l 11.41 The Commentary also describeas"in~tructive"'he hding inthe
Donauversinkun g asethat:
"Theinterestof theStateinquestionmustbe weighed inanquitablemanner
oneagainstanother. One mustconsidernotody the absolutinjurycausaito
theneighbottrinStatebutaIsotherelationoftheadvanrag eainedbyone tu
theinjurycausedtotheother*."
Slovakiabelievesthis tbe a fortioriwhen any "advantageis infac mterelythe partial
irnplementatiof whatthepartiehad previouslagree thebenefitsof whichareavailabto
Hungary alsoifit choostoavailitseifthem.
11.42 The no significahm obiigatioisfumulatd in Articl7 ofthe
ZnternationLIawCommissio n r& articleasadmdiligence obligatioandSlovakia wouid
ody bt in breachof itifitsuseof the waterswas notquitable and ifit intentiondor
negiigentlcaused significantharto Hungaryin that use. Variant "Cu,being a partiai
implernentationfwhathadbeen agreedbythepartiesinthe1977 Treaty,is definitionanly
equitabluse. Therehas ben no intentionalor negligentcausingof simcant harm to
Hungary.There hasbeenno intentiononCzechoslovakia(shenSlovakia's)artto harmthe
interesof Hungary -theintentiohasbeento mitigatethhamidoneby Hungary' sailurto
implementits treaty obligations. Insteadit isHirigarythatcaused hm to itseif by
refusinto permitthe rechargofthe branchsysteon itssideoftheDanube. Nor has there
beena negIigencausiriof signifiant ham.The scientifare takeninthepreparationand
implementationofVariant"Cuhasbeendemonstratedby Slovakeilsewhe~e~.~
11.43 Nor isit trueas HungaryclaimsSO thatCzechoslovakiaignoredthe
environmentalimpact ofVariant "Cuon Hungary even if consideratiwas given to the
impactuponCzechoslovakia.No discriminatihnasoccurredin thisregardThe problemis
48
p.128,ap.131.hsia v.Bada 3 AnnzrDiÎE&of PubliIntematioiaw Caçes(1923-192%),
49 &, ChplersW andVm, hve, andSIwakMernorial, hapV.r
50 HungananMernorial,aras66-7.68.not discriminationagainstHungary in the implemerrtatiVariant"C". Infact the entire
areaof the Mosoni Danubehas dready benefited. The probIisrather Kungqis refusatu
proceedwith necessary investrnentsfor optimuseof waterfluw, becauseitwouldrather
suffercertaidamage than beseentorelyontheG/N~roiect or eventhe more limitedVariant
"C"
11.44 Any obligationofconductarethusmet. But in any event,evenif the
obligatiowas oneof result,therehbeenno sidcant harm done toHungary.
C. Variant "C" DoesNot Violate Lwd Princi~lesRelatin~tuShared
Resources
11.45 Hungay statethat the quaIofytheshare waterresourcemustnot be
irnpaired.hWig asidethe factthat this is anoversirnplsaternent ofthe iriterlocking
rightand obIigatiorofwatercourseStatestoparticipatin,developandprotecttheirshared
resource, by referencespeciallto draftArticles5-8 adoptedbythe International aw
Commiission i,t must once morbe saidthatHungary hasfded to show such impairment.
Hungarysatisfiesitseif with statingthat water resourceis notto be "pollutedor its
char8cteristichanged in sucha way thatuserscannotbenefit frornhW" -but does not
provideany evidencthat eitherotheseeventhaveoccud. As sooftenHungarythen faIIs
back onspeculatingaboutthefutur -the hm wiIIapparentlyody becorneapparentatsome
timeinthe future:
"Thereisnodoubt thatthediversiooftheDanube causedsubstantiinjuryto
Hungary, the longerterm dimensionsofwhichwiii manifestthernselveonly
overanumberof yearss "
Hungary'stechniquehereisto coupleunsubstantiatdssertionaboutthepresentwithequaily
unsubstantiateexplanationtshattheevidenof damage wiiiberevded inthe future.
11.46 Hungarydso claims violationothe principofequitableuseofshared
resources through whatit terma "dramatic decreaseinthe quanti@ofDanubewaterit
receivessincthe cofistructiofVariant"CH.But thisissimplytu givefalsifteimpression
of the situationDownstreamof the Variant"Cu dam, structures,heDanubebecomesa
boundaryriver,itdoesnot flowsolelintoHungary.It isnotsudddy the casethatSlovakia
hasthe lion'ssharof theDanube's waterandHungaryanunjusttriclde. The partietothe
1977Treatyagreedthatthemajor paroftheDanube'f slowwouldgo intothebypass canafor
51 m., para. 7.72.a limiteddistance. Thwas theirdecisionon how to use equitablythe Danube'sresources.
Theyagreedthat 50 m3/s(subsequentlincreasedta 50-200 m3/s)shouldflow downthe old
channel. Slovakianow directsa greaterflow into the old channei.e gr,aterthan the
mutuallyagrd ailocationofthe sharresourceHungary'sCI& isill-fu~nded~
D. The Dutv toConsult and Coo~eratein the Context of International
Watercourses
11.47 Thisduty undergenerd internationallahasbeen examinecalbovein
ChapterK. Evenwere adu@ tuconsultandcooperateto existotherthanbyreferenctothe
duties specifiedunderth1977 Treaty, no issue arishere. As fdy disciissedabovein
ChapterVI, thisibecauseHungary bassimplyrefusaituparticipainthosetdks concerning
Variant"Cuinwhich adetailedexaminatiocouldhavetakenplace. A dutyupononeStatetu
consultandcooperatecanonlybe breacheditheotherStatedoes not itselfreftehow.
SEC~IUN 4. Hun~arv'sMisconce~tianConcrrninp Permanent Sovereientvover
NaturaIResources
11.48 Hungq invokesthe notion of permanent sovereigntyover naturd
resourcestosupportitdaim thatVariant"Cuisunlawf'uulndeinternationlwS4.
11.49 Hungarynever explainshow the Danubeconstitutessiultaneoudy a
sharednaturairesourc(inrespectofwhichone corpusof internationaIlawmiesapply)ana
naturai resourcOVH which Hungaryhas sovereignty(andin respectofwhich a separate
corpusofruies would apply). Nor cm the pde be explainedby referenceto''intenid
renewablewaterreso~rces"~~ stheonlysuchintemalwaterresourcesinissueinthicase are
thosethatconstitutepaof theinternationwlatercoursysteo mftheDanube. Quitesimply,
theconcept ofpermanentsovereigntyover naturdsesourceshasnoiisefulrelevanceinthis
case:insofarasmatterare notinanyeventMIy detemiinedbyreferencetu the1977Treaty,
itisthe principreiatingtu sharresourcesthatapply.
53 Httrigarydm daimthatkhoslwakia hasMged ex- amountsofgrave1hm theDanube
rîv- (inCzechosIoMkiandtha thisasherselyaffaed rheDanube'hydradisystemin
Hungary.Zn fact,isIIungaytex-ivt ddghg ofgrave1nearBudapethaIiahad &e rd
negatioonsequencontheDanubeasawatem. Sec .ara7.70-7.7above.
54 HungafiaMernoriapl,ar..83-7.87.
" W., pafa7.85. 11.50 Hungary refertothe greatimportance for ofboth theqnantityand
qrralityofthe water. Theseare indeedimportantrnatters'forboth Parties. Huwever, Hungary
apparentlyseekstodraw some superiorentitlerntnrelationto water,partlybecauseoits
"economicdependence and long-terrrelianceon water, andpartlythroughthe doctrineof
permanentsovereigntyovernaturalesources.
:
11.51 As to the fumer, Hungary hvokes 'rights resuItingand "kgal
consequences"arisinghm thi sconomid cependence and long-tem reliance,citing the
FisheriesJurisdictCases.It isuncertaijust whatthese"rightsand"legalconsequences"
aresaidto be. IntheFishenesJurisdictiCases theCour tpokeof preferentilightsofa
coastalstatebeina non-staticconcepasa functioof exceptionadependencyj6 .ny such
daim byHungary(insofaras thatisbeingmade forpref&tntialwaterrights)is unacceptable,
for severalrasonsm, Hungq andSlovakia arenot inanandogous positiotuthe United
KingdomandIceIand - SIovakiainot a "longdistanceStatebut an Vnmediat eeighbour.
Second,Hungary hasnot show atal the"exceptionai dependencein,contradistinctton
Slovaki oa,the resource. Third,atheCourtitselfpointedout"preferentirights..are
lirnitedaccordito theextentof itspeciadependen cuethefisherieandbyits obligation
totakeaccount offie nghtsofothersuites..."FinalIythePartiehave agreedby treatas
tu whatthearrangementa sretu bebetween them. Thosearrangements containo traceof
preferentiwlateri@ s furHungary.
11.52 Thereferen coesrticle1(2) ofthetwo International ovenantson
HumanRights and to GeneralAssembly RemluSron3281 carr myatternofurtkerfornard.
The reaIity is that theresolutknswere direct& tu problms that hadarisenregardkg
resourceswithinthesolejuridictioofone StatewhereoverseascapitalandMuence had
playeda roIeintheirexpjoitation.neral AssemblyResolution1803fl) -thelandmark
pointof departurefortheconcepof permanenstovereigntyovernaturalresourc-mairesno
referenceatal1to sharednaturalresources.or inde4 does GeneraiAssemblyResolution
320 (S-YI),theDeclaralioon theEstablishmenofa New InternationalEconomiOrder. Tts
paragraph sn permanentsovereigntyspeakofitsfreand fullexerciof theindienablrîght
to exerciseffedivecontrolovertheresourceandtoexpioitiwith meanssuiîablto itom
situatio(paragaph 4 (e))Itisclearnot concked withshare watercourseightsatal.
11.53 The first referenceta sharednatural resource in themies of
resoIutionson permanent sovereigntyin factappears in General AssembIyResoIution328l(XXIX), the CharterofEconomicRights andDuties ofStates. And the mentionof
sharednaturalresourcesis immediatelyfollowby referenn et tothe detailedmlesthat
comprisethe conceptofpermanentsovereigntyovernaturalresourcebuttotheir own,very
difirent provisionArticle3):
"lnthe exploitationnatur resourcessharedbytwo ormorecountries,each
statemust cooperate on the basis ofa system of information and ph
consultationsto achieve optimumuse ofsuch resourceswithout causing
damageto thelegitimateintereofothers."
This iexactIywhatthe 1977Treaty provide.forandVariant"CM at least partiaiiyrealised.
And, whenitspeaksofshare rdsourcesGenerdhembly Remlution3281 doesnot
usethe Ianguagof sovereigntor prefererrtidriatdl, but thelangiiageofagreementand
regardfortheinteresofothers.
SECTION 5. The Lawfulness ofVariant "C" Does Not Denend on its Bein~ a
Countermeasur Eeven Thouph Variant "C" Would Qualifv As
-uch
11.54 initMemurid, Hungary states"Theunilateraliversiofthe Danube
by Czechoslovakicannotbejustifidas acountermeasurep, recludingthe wrun&Iness ofa
breachof internationallaw." But the constructiofVariant"Cu entailsno "breachof
internationallaw" and Slovakiahas noneed to preclude wrongfulnessby relianceon
countermeasuresandbasneverdone so.
11-55 Asisdear fromSIovakia'semurid, thetemporq solutionadoptedby
Slovakiawasto givesucheffectawas possibltothe 1977Treatyon itown territorinthe
faceof Hungary'asbandonmen of itstreatobligatioinviolationof thprinciplof pacta
suntservanda.Far fiomthi seingameasurewhose wrongfulnesshasto beprecludedbythe
-
invocatioof countermeasrrreqirepresentthe minimumachievemertotf what SIovakiais
entitletu undethe 1977Treaty;andcodicts with nonoms of intemationaiIaw. Th1977
Treaty stiIIbeing in effect, Slovakiaisetoperfom itstipulations. AndVarian"CM
also servesto mitigatetheenormouslossesfahg uponSlovakiadto Hungary'bsreachesof
the 1977Treaty.
11.56 Variant"C" achieves,asbest ican intheface ofHungary'sTreaty
violations,whathadbeenagteedby bothpartiein1977. Itdoesso byactionwithinSIovak
territory(i) which proteas the righof buth partiesunder the Treaty,(ii) whichisclearlymanifest..will to acbieveanagreedsolutionbasongood faithnegotiations1It
hasbeendemonstratedindetaiinChaptersV and VIabove -confirminthe,sameconclusions
set out in the Slovdi Memuridbut in the Iight of the additionai evidence pwithced
Hungary's Mernoria- how Hungary's condm der the dispute deveIopedwas direct$
contrarto thistmdard ofconductpruposedbyHungq initMernorial,andthaHungaryk
singlemindedpurposealmostfromthe startwas the abandonment ofthe GLN Projectfor
econornic(andsubsequentlpoliticreasons.
11.61 Inassertbgtheabsenceof 8prk degai actthat wouidhavejustxed
countemeasures,Hungq a#empts tureIyon Mide 27 of the 1977 Treaty,distorting
completelytheclearmeaningof thetextofthisArticle,ashasben fulldiscussedabovein
Chapterp2.
11.62 Hungary*~refusato dIow a tripmiteamrnission (to inchde EC
experts)toexamine environmentalprublemsthat Hungarycontended wouldbe create by
Variant"C",hasbeen describeaboveand inthe SlovaMemorial. Nor was itthecase,as
Hungary'sMemorial contends, thatHungary was undertakingrepeatedlyto "arrange
rnearirngfregotiationwhileCzechodovakis aoughtrathetu pro& withfhe GabCkuvo
works"as rapidlaspossiblein5th~ wordstu reachapointofno ret~rn"~~.Czechoduvakia
proceededwithits workundertheTreatyinaccurdanw cith thethetable estabiïshedfor the
Project,nomoreand noless. Ina rapidsuccessioofunilaterlct sungarysuspended and
thenterminatedal1work ontheProjectand thenlimitedthescope of anynegotiationwith
Czechoslovakitu theterminatiooftheTreav.
11-63 Hungary'sactsstarfiingMay 1989 were cIearipriorillicactsthat
could havejustifiedcounterrneasur. articulainits Chapte7, theHungarianMernorial
gives an astonishiaccountofHungary 'ctions,beginniwith its unilateralsuspensionof
work atNagymaros on 13 May 1939. The 13 May suspensionwasnot afai atcomnlisays
Hungary,butody oneofthe "selectiinterimeasures oversomeoftheworks takinplace
underitsauthon@,fora penodof afewmonthsna .These 'dectivemeasuresiarecIaimedtu
have been"limiteinbothscopeandtime",andtheHungarian Memorialgoes on tomakethis
trulyremarkabletatement: "Provisionalin character,rhey were aiatavoidin agnyirreversibdamage
to drinking-waferresourcesor the environment, while,at the same tirne,
facilitatingconditionsfornegotiatingrevisions1977e~reaty~'"
Therewasnothingprovisionaa ibouttheHungarianResolutionof 27 Octobw 1989 unilaterally
abandoningconstmction work at Nagymarus - orthe ridaterai abandonmentofdi workon
the Projeci by mid-Jun1990 andthe canceIIationofdicontraas. The letteofHungary's
PrimeMinister ofIOJanuar y390tehting thenegotiationthathad starteinJuly1989
concerningenvironmentaiguarantees and possibe Treaty revisionswas hardlyan act
"facilitaticonditionsfor negotiatingrevisionof the 1977 Treaty". And Hungary had
providedabsolutelyno evidenceof "heversibledamage tu drhkhgwater resources or the
en~urnent"~ .
11.64 Aflthe unilateraacts of Hungary that successivelysuspendedand
terminatedthecarryingout of Hungary'sobligationsunderthe 1977Treatywereillicitacts.
Theyoccurred priortumen theappruvao ifkancial andIogisticaIlanninfor Variant"Cuby
the CzechoslovakGovemment on 25 JuIy 1992.Hunjprf's finalaicit act- its purported
udateral terminatioof theTreaty itselfo19 May 1992 -occurredfive monthsbeforethe
damming oftheDanube by CzechosIovakiaw,hichwas thefirstactitaken underVariant"Cu
thataffectatheflow of theDanuba endwhich Hungarycontendsatthebeginning of Chapter
3 constiîutetherrdawfulnes sfVariant"Cm.
11.65 Hungary insisithatthe financiaidarnagedone toSlovakia does not
constituta priorilliact,becauseit"wasalwaysprepared to compensateformsts causedby
thealteratioof theBarrage~~stern"~'T. hediplornaticistorytelasdifferentstorAt one
momentHungary statesthat thtenninationofthe1977 Treatyrequiresan"accountof work
properIy donen6' - but quickly adds that thi sas nothingto do with any issue of
wrongfu~ness'~. In 1989, Hungary had offered that ifCzechoslovakîawould agree to
abandoning Nagymaros(notwitbstandintgheprovisionsofthe 1977Treaty),thentherecould
61 bid.Theaccoruit%outinpam 7.9mnmming thehîerventiwoECCommissionerAndri-n is
*lY inac~lvaasshowninChapteVI,aboveSee,para..17gtm., above.
66 inFebruar1990Hungaryreceiv îeBechterepor, hicfailetohd anythreatothequaliof
drinkingwat-a facthatHungarkepiwreL Sureltocontinutomaintaitheirpositthathe
Projecpçeda senousthmt todrinkingwateandnottodixIostoCzechoslovakahecontrary
thaHungagdaimsetohavemetinthe mgotiations.lyinconsistentwih the sofgoodfaith
57 HungariaMernoriai,ar7.97.
69
m., para.11.09.be agreement"upon ailocatingthe losses ofthe Proje".7Thisis hardlycompensationby
Hungaryfor itown defaultsas envisagedinthe 1977 Treaty. And on 1 September1989
Hungaryrefusedcompensationfor suspensionudess Czechoslovakiaengage dnnegotiations
for treaty revisio.7'In October 1989, Phe MinisterNémeth was hsistingthat the
suspensionwas "strictlylawfirand thatCzechoslovakiac'Iaimsfor compensatio n adno
basisn.
Z1.66 It wiübe noticedalsothatheHungxiatiParliameniarRyesolutioof 16
April1991,restrictithe mandateof theGovernent initsnegotiatiomwithCzshoslovakia
to the temiinalionofthe 1977 'irae., makesno mentionwhateverof the payment of
compensationm.Theevidenceshowsthatthe moa thatHungaryever hadinview wasa
mutualbearingof "lossesfiomterminationoftheProject,nota payment of compensatioby
itselforIossand damagecaused byits non-performanceandpurportaitermination.Indeed,
the drafitreaty it propone22 ApriI1991to replacethe 797Treatyspecified:
"Lostprofitsdonot constitutdamages. Lossesshallbe borneby the State
partiesequdy. The StateParty whoselosses exceed one haifof thetotal
amountisentitledto reimbursemeotfthedifferen~e'~
Thus t istotaIImisleadmgtu speak ofCzechosIov&a implementingVariarit "Cs "while
negotiationsovercompensationwere continuing". Therewere no urch negotiationstaking
place.
11-67 Ail ofthese reasons - the faiIurescient3cdy tu substantiatethe
environmentaiallegations;the rejectiunofimpartscientifartalysof the degafions; the
preferenceformedia mariipulatiou reliancon scientifanalysisthefdure to addressthe
possibilityofamelioratiowithithe mechanism ofArticl27 of theTreattyhe insistenon
suspensionof works andthenterminationof theTreat aysapreconditionto anysubstantive
taIkon envirumental issue-dl ofthem attestatu the rditythatHungar).neitfierhtended
nor "manifestcditswilltu achievan agreed solution baseon good faith negotiations"76.
70
m., para.3.96.
71 Ibidpara3.89.
-
?3 m., para3.121.
74
-bidpara.3.126. Itis pwhapsnotmirprishgthai Hungawas not wfig to cumtenance
compensatio,iveitscornplaisfeeonomichardsh(beforeitbecameçefuo relyinsteon
allegedenvironmeclonsiderations).
75 W. para.7.98.
'6 m., para7.32.Taken togethw with trefusaltcorrntenanccornpensafiotherecIear1exisfedprior ilIegaI
actsbyHungarythat wouIdhaveentitledCzechosIovakitorecoursetocountemeasures,had
it needeto excusanotheMriseillegaact.
11-68 Hungarysrrggestthat, quiteaparthm thabsenc oea piorillicact,
Variant"C" would havefded asa couritemmre. Varian"Cm ,nHungary' siew,"caruiot
havebeen the appropriateresponsetu thecautiousprovisionaand partialsuspensioof
worksdecidedbyHungaryduringthespnngof1989"~. Butsettingasideforthemoment this
misrepresentationf theeventofthespringof 1989,Variant"Cuwas onlybeing studieby
Czechoslovakiadong withothe rariantstartirinJuly1989. No decisionwastaken asto
Variant"C"untd 25July1991 -andfhenody to pro4 with hanciaand logisticaiplanning.
By then Hungar)lactionsin respectothe Projecwere hardly"cautious, provisionao,r
"partial". ungaryhadabandoned theProject. Variant*Cuwasnotputintooperationuntil
24 October1992 -sixmonths afteHungary'tserminatioannouncemen atndaftethreeyears
ofpostponement of thedamming ofthe Danube. This actbyCzechoslovakia was surely
"appropriate",It was thody mas ofutilisingthe GabCikovstep andthe by-pascand
whichit hadconstruc ttgdeatcust.
11.69 Moreover, Variant"CM by definitionalsomet the wuntemeasures
requirementof proportional-tbecaus iewas nomore than anattempttubringthe Treaty
intopartidoperationAs Hungarjfitsenotesinit~ernorîd~~,CzechosIovakidaescribethe
intendcdmasures asthetakingof"suc actionsonthesovereignterritoof theCSFRwhich
will ensurethe amountofwater for thGabElkovo Barrageaccordiigto theTreaty of16
September1977". To try to puta treatyat leastpartiaintoeffectcannotseriouslybe
describedasa disproportionateresponsetu thevioIationthat preventedthe treatyobjectives
hm beingeffsctedinth5rstplace.
11.70 Variant"Cm ,hichisnothingmorethana partialeaiisatiofwhathad
beenagreed tobythe partiescouldnotconceivablviolatethe princiofeproportionaliniy
the NaulilaaCase and affIrmedin the InternationLaw Commission Reports on State
Responsibity andinthe CaseConcerninn MiIitaryandParamilitaryAdivitiinand againsi
~icaramp. In noneofthesewas it suggestthata countermeasurpexactl~tailorto $ve
79 Militamand ParamilimActivitiin and a&nsiNicaram INicaramav. Unitedtateof
America. erits.Sudme1.C.. ewrt1986,p. 14.partiaeffect ta violated treaobligationwouldbe a disproportionaeesponseto a breach
of suchanobligation.
11.71 Nor is the Hungafian argument for disproportiondityadvancd by
asserting that Varia"Cu"has andwiUproduce a veryseriousimpactinthe short, medium
andIongterm, tutheaquiferand groundwater, surfacwater,soi1andthe mire environment
balanceof the Szigetkozregion"".Slovakiahas shownin itsMemoria lhatsuch imprecise
andsweepingclaimsarebasedon noobjectivescient& studiessl;and inthepresentCounter-
Mernoria l lovak shows to the Courtthatexpertmonitoring hasreveal nedsuch serious
impacttu datenorpredictedsuch seriousimpactsforfhefuturen.
11.72Thus tu invoke"therightoflifeitseVt,andthe "seriousdegradatiof
waterresources"as "anattackon themost fiindamentalumanrightWa i3simplyto abusethe
vocabularyofhuman nghtsandto debasethesignificanceftherighttolife.
11-73Hungary finally concludesthat Variant"C"failsas a cuuntermeasure
becaus telrniIaterdmodifiesthe agreed characteofthe borderline. SIovakiahasfully
addressedthismatteratparagraph s.51-7.62ofitMemuria ind atparagraph2.39above.
11.74 Slovakia reiteratthatVariant"C" isnot an otherwi slegalactthe
wrongfirInesof which it mustseekto preclude. Buteven ifitfeuto be characteriseisa
countemeasure, itmeetsthetestthaHungary advances.
SECTION 6. Conclusions
11.75 Variant"CM was Czechoslovakia'lsegitimateresponseto Hungary's
udawfu1actqnut viceversa:
- Czechoslovakia'snitiaconsiderationofVariant *Cm (togetherwîth
otheralternativevariants)didnot occuruntiiafterHungarunilateral
suspensioof work atNagymarosandat Dunakiliti; hencetheseinitial
breachesofthe1977 TreatybyHungarycouldin no sensehavebeenin
responsetuVariant"Cs;
%O HungaianMernorialarr7.113.
*' SlovaMkernoriiara.5.5etçea.
82 See.fiar;is.7.62and8.21,a=.,We.
83 HruiManMemoial,para.7.I14. - 354 -
I
i
- By the timethe firsconstruction activîty began on Var"C"tfin
. November 1991),the Hungarian~ovemmenthadterminated allworks
ontheProject@ymid-1990),had r~solvedtoterminatthe1977Treaty
(20Decernber1990) h,adlimitethenegotiationswithCzechoslovakia
I
tu the subjecofthe temination[ofthe Treaty*andhad unilaterdy
preventedthed&g ofthe ~anibe underthe agreedTreatyschedule
I
forathiry ear;
i
- When on 19 May 1992 Hungary fnadeits terminatiannouncement,
theflowoftheDanube had notyetbeenaEected ;heactualdamming of
theDanube,affectirigiflow for the fitirne,occurredfivemonths
Iateron24 October 1992;
i
- The dammingof the Danube on 24 October 1992 permitte. the
GabEikovosection of the ~rojectto go into operationwithoutthe
Nagyrnarossection,thefunnions &miedout underVariant"C" being
thoseagreed under theTraty ~iojoject.The channehg ofDanube
watersinto thebypass canal was not illegd, havingaiwaysbeen
I
envisagedundertheTreatyand, in anyevent,theDanubecontinuesto
flowalsoinitold riverbed.
I
11.76 Variant"Cm hw absolutelno impad on the position of the boundary
bewn SIovaki and Hungaryand, insofarasite~e& a change Uithe charmer ofthe
boundary,thihad beenspecincdlyagreedtointhe 1977!rq.
I
11.77The 1977TreatyconstitutethepracticdappiicatibyCzechoslovakia
and Hungary of the principleof equitableuse ofshbed resources. The agproximate
applicatiooftheTreatyby meansof Variant"CHrem&$ anquitableuse ofthe Danubeand,
moreover,there inosignficanhm causedby Vanian"C".
1
11.78 Hungary'sarguments derived iorn the concept of permanent
sovereigntyover naturalresourcesare not relevantto thiscase,which reIatesto the
developmen tf a sharedresource.
1
11-79BecauseVariant "Cnisno* a breaihunderinternationlaw,Slovakia
did notin ifs Mernorianeekto prxlude the wrongfu$essofany breachby referacc to
countermeasuresH. owever,by applicatiof thecriteriof acountermeasur esenunciatedby Hungaryin itsMernorial,Varian"Cl could bepresentedasa justifredcountermeaçuretu
Hungary'sillegaacts.CEfAPTERXIL TEE LEGAL CONSEOUENCESOF TErECONDUCT OF
PARTIES
12.10 Thewidely-dive rgeestf thePartiesastu the Iegcorisequences
of their conduct stfiom theitotdy dfirent analysesofwents and, inparticulatheir
opinionsonwhether Slovak saa success Strtein relationto the 1977 Treaty. Hungary's
rejectionof SlovakasasuccessorStathas forceditintasortof"acrobatielegaargument
in placeofstraightfumarstatementsoflegalprincipleandrelianceonthe legal obligations
normaIIyassumed by asuccessorState. Thuq insteadofsimplyarguingthat Slovakiahas
assumed theobligationsofCzechoslovakianderthe 1977Treaty,Hungaryis compelledto
arguethatSlovakia"adopted"the breach(Varian"CH)by Czechoslovakiahat Slovak hias
secondary-but not primar- obligationsandthatitle propertypassesunderthe rulesof
inheritancof Statepropew ratherthansuccession to treaty rightsFor this rason,a
cornparisonofthe viewsofthetwo Parties, pointbypointbecornesaIrnostimpossible. A
ciearepicturewiIernergeifthtwo viewsaresetoutseparately.
SECTION 1. TheRe~ublicofHunearv'sView of Those Conseauences
12.02Hungary' sholeperceptioofwents isbasedupon fourpremises.
(i) Thatthe 1977 Treatywas lawfullterminateby Hungaryon 19 May
1992.
fii) That until December 1992 -thedateofCzechuslovakia'dissoIution
-anyresponabiq restedentirylwithCzechoslovakia.
(iii) ThatSlovakiawasneithera-Parttothe1977 Treaty,norasuccessoto
CzechosIuvakiain respectofany rights and obligationsunderthe
Treaq.
That,accordingly,the liabiitiesof Slovarisnot fiomthe Treaty
(iv)
butfromthefactthatSlovakichoseto "adoptHandcontinuethebreach
of internationallawperpetratd by Czechoslovakia- that is the
constructioand operationofVariant "C" - andffringarytherefure seeks rernediesagainSIovakiain!respe ocrthis quite separact of
"adoption".
i
12.03 It wiibe imrnediatelobviousthatHungary'sprimaryaimis to isolate
Slovakiafrom the 1977Treaty. For ifSInvakiahasneither righnor obligationsunder the
Treaty,itfoHows- atIeastiHungary' vsiew-thatSlovakiaismt entitlto chargeHurigary
with any breachof the Treaty, Iiotoju* VariantTC* as the best availabmeansof
implernentinthe Treatyintheface of afundamenta blrkh byHungary. The reasoningis
fundamentaiiyflawed. As Chapter X has demonstratedthe purportedterminationof the
Treaq byHungary was illegal,andwithout eEeonthe &hts ofCzechoslovdia. Moreover,
as ChapterD has shown,SIovakiais inlawthesuccessutu Czechosiovakiainrespectofthe
1977 Treaty,andfuiIyentitletu invokewhateverrightqdaims or remediesCzechoslovakia
coulditselhaveinvokedhadthefederation oftheCzech Md Slova kepubliccontinued.
A. ClaimsConseauent Upon Terminationof the Treaty
!
12-05 Proceedingfrom its assumptionthatitterminationofthe Treatywas
IawfuI,Hungarynotes thatterminafiondoesnot affecri'ghtcreatedpnortu thnation by
reasunofthe executionofthe Treaty.Articl71)(1) oftheViennaConvention on theLaw
ofTreatiesprovidesthattheterminatioofa tresty:
I
4
"duesnot affectanyright,obligation or IegaIsituation ofthe parties created
through the exsution ofttreatypriortuitterminaiion."
Tt ison this baçis that Hungaridentifiesthree headsof claimswhichmay have suMved
12.06 Under thihead Hungar yoncedesthatthe Cour candecide "whether
eitherpartytothe 1977 Treaty was in breachof thatTreaty,to the extentnecessaryto
detennineany of the issues specifiinArticle2 of fie Special~greement"~. It is an
extraordinaconcession.How canthe Courtdecideissueof breachasbetweenHungaryand
1 4
HungatiaMernoriaparas.11.û6-11.07.
2 m., para.11.07. Czechoslovakiain a case to which Slovakinot Czechoslovakia,isa partyif,asHungary
assumes,SIovakiainot aParty,orasuccessor,orabeneficiarundertheTreaty? Thishighly
. questionablassertiosimplyreflectsthelackofrealisminHungarypremises.
12.07 Thenwe aretoIdthe Courtcan determintwhether Slovakia"adopteci"
the illegaconductof Czechoslovakiainconstmcthg Variant "c"~. Tliirequiresa hdiig
that theconductofCzechoslovakiian constructinVariant"CMwas iiiegal. Buthowcanthe
Courtmake a findinofillegaliagainsa Statenotpartytotheseprocedtngs4?
12.08And,thirdly, we aretoIdthattheCourt candetermineand takeaccount
of SIovakia'swn breach inrelationtuthedegd Mure tuimplement awatermanagement
regirneunder Article4ofthe SpeciaiAgreement. What thishas tu dowith rightaccnred
underthe 1977 Treatyprioto itsterminatiisnot cleato SlovakiaBut, inanyevent,thisis
not partoftheCourt'staskunderArticl2 oftheSpecial~greement'.
CIaimsforWorkDoneUnderthe Tre~iT6
1
12.09 Hungaryapparenflyreferstudaims bu CzechosIovakiaandgoes on tu
say thatHungary hasnoinformation on the interna1rrangementbsetweenthe Czechand
SlovakRepubBcsb :utHungarywillreturntotheissueattheCounter-Mernori alage.
12.10 On Hungar)rsown premisethat Slovakicmot irivoktheTreaty this
isanastoIiishirheadofclaim, foran)lclaimby Czechoslovaki againsHungary underthe
Treatycanhavenothingwhatever to dowiththis case.Indeed,ifneitherthe CzechRepublic
nor theSlova kepublicare"successors"inrelatiototheTreaty,why shouldHungarynow
contemplatepayingeitherin relatioto work done underthe Treaty? There is a clear
t contradictionbetweenthipartof Htingarjrs emon4and Hungarjr'treafmentofsuccession.
It wouId seem tiImosasthoug hhe draftersofHurigarys ernorial ere compeIIeto react
againsthe compIeteartiiicidiofthat premise. They recognisethatHringarywould face
claims,undertheTreaty,bySlovakiaandthatiwas impossibletoignoretheseclaims.
4
Czechoçlovakarforthepuqnmsofthicaseoneandthesamem.thesitha5inlawSiovakjand
5 S¢epara.1.40, ~eaabove.
6 HungariaMernorial- 11.08-11.11. 12.11 Hungaryquitecorrectlyrefeto tqeprovisionofArticl8 ofthe 1977
Treatyas providingforjointownershipof certainpropertiesformingpartoftheoverallGLN
project7. Moreover,Hungary concedesthat Slovakiahas a legal interestin such joint
propertiesbutnot assuaessor tutheTreaty! The basof Slovakia'interestis gresrrtud
lie either inthe biiateralmgernents madebetweenthe CzechandSIovak RepubIicson
dissoIuitoofthe federation(arrangementsfwhichHungarycI&s tobt unaware) orthe
nilesof Statesuccessionwithrespectto publior Statepropertyg. Thesejoint properties
existedatNagymaros andGabElkovo. I
12-12 As tu theprupertiesinquestion,,Hungarydes a ckar distinction.
Nagymaros is saitoraisenoproblem,sinceitwasneverbuilt.As tothe"cofferdam"t,hisis
regardedas atemporarystmcture,formingpart of the "preparatoyonstructiostage"and
thereforenotsubjecttjointownershipunderArticle8(l)(doftheTreaty,butwvered der
by Articl8(?)P. k the Courtis awaresSIovakiahasfprmaIIryejected ihiç argumeinits
Note Verbaleof13 July1993 -
!
12.13 The Hungarian argumentisfaiIaciouand couldjustas weUapply to
GabCikovo which was notcampleted on the datof ~un~ary'spurportedterminatioof the
Treaty. Articl8(3) refersto "othwworks",meaning works other thanthoseidentifiein
Article 8(1),ndthese incltiasitem cd),"TheNagymarus seriesofIocks".Su theissueis
simplywhetherthe coEer dam isto beregard& as par,of"theNagymaros serieoflocks".
There isinfactnobasisfor corifin"joinownership "othefinishedconstructio,xcluding
preparatoryworks. The purposeoftheschemeforjoint 'ownershiwasto idente themajor
partsoftheG/NProject, to asseand broadlyequalistheiconstructiocostsasbetweenthe
two parties, andthen tu placthese major componeSts under joint ownership.If the
constructioof thewEer damis apartof thecost ofcohstnrctionothe Project, thereis no
reasonwhyit shouIdnotbe underjoint umership. 1 GabEikovo .unakiljtiandtheBvpassCanal
12.14 Hungaq has no hesitation in claimingjoint omership of these
componentsof theProjectand seesthedispositiof thesepropertiasbeinga taskforthe
Court,intheabsenceof agreemenbtetweentheParties. FHungar theonly complicatiois
the conversioof two of thesejoinfly-uwnepropertieint use as partof the"unlawful
diversionofVariari"c" . "
12.15 Hungary'psositiolacknothinginaudacity.As toGabEikovo andthe
bypasscanalthesewere constructeatthecostofCzechoslovakia nSlovatkerrîtorandare
nuw operatedandrnairitainedentireatSlovakia'cost. The "inputofHungq has been
modest asregards GabEkovoitself,being Iargconfinedtuthe tailrace carid andworkon
therighbank oftheriver.
12.16 On whatbasis,onemay askdues Hungarynow assert a righofjoint
ornerslipagainstSlovakia?IIcannothe the1977TreatysinceHungaryviewsSIovakiaas a
strarigeto thaTreaty,hahg neitherrightsnur obIigations. The enigmaillustronce,
again,thediBcultiefacingHungaryinpleadingacoherentcasenowthatHungaryrefuses to
acceptSlovakiaasa successotothe 1977Treaty.Slovakiaisfulipreparedtoadhereto the
ideaofjoint ownershiofthosepropertieidentsedinthe Treaty,buonlyonthebais offull
implementationofthe1977 Treaty.Unhappilyt,hatisnotthe presentsituatioThe Court
w31thereforehaveto determinetherespectivownershiprightsof thePartiesin its overd1
consideratioof remedies,takinintoaccountthe actualinvestmentofthe Partiesin such
propertieq therelativeperformanby thePartiesin respeof suchproperties,the relative
performancebythe Parties ofthtreatobligation,nd ndyrightof set-offorwunterclairn.
B. Claims Conseauent Upon Slovakia's"Adoption" of the AlIe~ed
Variant"C"iversionof the Danubebv Czechoslovakiabv Means of
12.71 Inwhatappears-superficidiasa ratherorthudoxclahbmedon State
"
Varian"CmissimplperversOnrthcoatrarVarian"Cmwasdesignaedtheonlyfaibwaytof
bringinGabEikovintuse.responsibiiityn,Huiungrlaimscessation", restitutiiittepm, damagesI4,andmarantees
againstnon-repetition.S i
!
12.18 In fa, however,thedaim isnui what it mightat fiaptpear. It rests
on two assumptions:(i)that Czectiodovdiaco&tted aj udawfulact inwnstnrcting Variant
"C" and(i that Sluvakiasince independencehas "adepted"and wntinuedthis udawful
diversioof theDanube. I
12.19 As regardsthesecondof theseassumptioris,SIovakiawould notdeny
itsresponsibilifor Variar"CH ,lthoughthisaisesnotus mouchfiom an "adoption"of the
actsofCzechosfovakia as fromthefact that,aspartof Czechoslovakia ,lovakiawas atall
timesa partyto,andresponsibleor,notonlythe 1977 Treatybutactsperfonnedinpursuance
of thatTreaty. Slovakiais contenttohave the construction and operation ofVaria"Cm
treated asiiown actsas apaty tu the 1977 Treaty. were SIovakiacmot agreeisat the
pointat which Hrrngary would treat the construction o'fVari"C"as unlawfuI,and its
operationbySlovakiaas theadoptionofthisunlawfd acththout referenceto theTreat.
12.20 Asregardsthe&st of theseassumpiionsitisofthegreate ispofiance
toreahsethatHungary'd slegatioofan internationwlrongbyCzechosIovakia isfundamental
toHrrngary 'ase.The dlegationirepeated,Iikearefrain,hroughouHt ungary'p~eadings'~.
And,clearly,itherewas no"wrong byCzechodovakia butonly aiawfiiactof approximate
performance ofthe 1977Treaty,it wouldbeimpossible forHungary toargue thatSlovakia's
continuationof a lad act had somehow becurne~nlawful'~. So the assumption of an
udawful actbyCzechosIovakia isfundamentaltuHung@s case.
12.21 The diculty for the Court iniproceeding on the basis of that
assumption lies in the factors. FA, according tu Hungq the J'wrorigdoer",
I
14
-.idpara8.43-8.50Hungarymakesnoattemptoddte w wen identifya"damages",erely
makingthepointhaenvironmentaIamagewiU. ovetirneinthefuture ., pam 8.26,
w.1.
15
M., para s514.52. 1
17 Hun&ary 4spent d~esnotventursofarsinu Htuigafargutha t=chosIovakiactswerein
anywenf unlawfuundertheTreaty.ut,dearly,Hungarysirinn"isoia!iSIwakiaficmîhe
Tmty isIOpermitHrrngao arguthamn ifCzgchosIovakiaaaaedIawf* undertheTreaty,
&a;wauId nafavd Slwakia,sinw Slovakimpmibi#iy Us fobe determinedexclusivbyy
generaIinternatiaw.
iCzechoslovakia,nolonger exists andnoStatehas succeededtothe 1977 Treatyso as tobe
ableto assumethe rightsof Czechoslovakiawhich formed itsiustificatifor Variant"C".
Second, theCzechRepublicis not asuccessortuthe Treaty, noa Partytuthiscase. Third,
the SIovakRepubIicisa Partytuthiscase,but, not beina successor Statinrelatioto the
1977 Treaty,cannotinvokeits provisionby way of justikation for tori@nd "wrongful"
act, or its "adoptioby Slovakia. Tfius,in Hungary'sview, the Court must accept the
allegationbyHungarythat Variant"Cuwas a breach of the Treaty, sinceSlovakiais not
entitletoinvoketheTreaty andHungarjrsbreachesofthatTreae tujustifyVariant "Cu.
12.22 The conclusionis higidyunsatisfactoryfor itinvites thCourt tu
assumethewrongful actbyCzechoslovakiaand deniesto Slovakiaeventherightto argueon
the basisof the1977 TreatythatCzechoslovakia committed no unlawfulad8. Slovakia
therefurehasnohesitatioinrejectingtheentirepremison whichit isfounded i. showriin
ChapterEi, thesolutionconsistentwithbotjusticand lawisto acceptSlovakiaassuccessur
Stateinrelatioto the1977 Treaty-and todlow Slovakito justifyVarian"CM unitsmerits
byreferencetothatTreaty.
SE~ION 2. The SIovakReriubIic'sView of Those Consesuences
12.23 The view of SIovakiisbased upon premises quitedifferenttu those
advanced byHungary. In essentialSlovakia'sremisesarethefollowing:
(i) That Hungary's suspension and subsequent abandonment of
performanceof its obligations under the 1977 Treaty were a
fundamenta blreachofthatTreaty.
(ii) That Hungary's purportedterminationofthe Treatyon 19May 1992
was withoutlegaijustificatandinvdid.
(iii) ThatHungary thereforviolatethe rightofCzechoslovakia.
(iv) That, facedwithHungary'bsreach,Czechoslovakiawas fullyentitleto
constructandoperateVariant "C" asthe best availablemeanstufila
(atlmt partially)he1977 Treaty.
18
Internatiol rbitAwards(1923}VolVI,p.120 wheran allegatiofdeliwas madeagainst
theSouthAfrimn RepubliandthatRepublicŒasedtoexist aa Statethe UniteStatesas
daiman&madeno attemp!OdenyttiaGreatBritawasa su-r Stateor coddnotjudfythe
wnductoflheSouthecan RepublicInfact,GreatBritwasheIdIobethesumr, butsuch
siicces sidon#ver delid or*btiiotd liabiliiy. (v) That, inrespecofrightsandobligationswisingfrom th1977Treaty,
the Slovak Republicis the legal successto Czechoslovakiaand,
awrdingly, isMy entitleto co?tinuewiththe operationof Variant
"CH and toseekdi appropriatremdies for thBreachesbyHungarjr,
includiian orderforperfomanceibyH~ngary ofitstrearobligations
andcompensationfornon-perfomke in thepastorinthefuture.
I
12.24 As explaincdinChapterIX ofslo&dciagMsernoria, consequenceof
these breacheSlovalUaisentitletoseek fromthe CO a^declaratithatthesebreaches
haveindeedbeen committeda;nd,urthero seekrestitut!bboth thesenseof anorderthat
thebreachesshouldcease inthesenseofanorderthad~un~aryrnustresurneandcomplete
performanceofitsobligatioundertheTreaty.
1
12.25Moreover,inconsequen ofthe+@ and extensivedamagecaused tu
SiovakiabythebreachesSlovakiaisentIedtodaim combensation.Inthiconnection,whilst
Siovakiaagreeswith ~un~ar~'~ thatit is prematutd invitetheCourt toembark upon
quantificatiofthesedarnages,Slovak -ianlikeEIung&y- hasalreadyillustrate.some
detailmthedamages Slovakiahasalreadyincunedasw$LI asthedamages which areclearly
fureseeabIinconsequenceofHungarfsbreaches.
i
12.26 Slovakiawouldwish toplace 04 recordits rejectionof Hungarfs
positioon damageswhich HungaryStatethus: I
l
"Duetuthe dicultiesof evaluatithemsts oftfieenvironmentdamage,the
Court shoulddetermine,sprccinelaspossiblet;hecategoriofdamage and
the rnethodoiogand criteria for whichcumpen&on shd be estaldishby
both Partiesandperformeby~lovakia~.' 1
I
It inthe taskofthe Claimanot theCoud, tuprovethedamage it claims,anifHungaryis
unabletu identisrirealdamage ishouldsayso. i
I
19 Sec .ungaîan Mernoril,a8-47.
20
Sec.lwakMernoria,ara9.34-9.47.
21
HungariMernorial,ar8.48. On the basis of the evidencearid legd arguments presentedin the
SIovakMernorialand inthisounter-Mernoria andreservingthe rigto supplement
or amenditscIaimsintheIightoffirrtwritten pleadmgs,thSlova Republic
I. That theTreatybetween Hungary andCzechosIovHk if 16 Seplember1977
conceming the constructionand operationof the GabEikovoINagymaros
System ofLocks, andrelatedinstrument, ndto whichthe SlovakRepubliis
the acknowledgedsuccessor,ia treatinforceandhasbeen sofromthe date
of itsconclusion;andthat the notificaofoterminationbythe Repubficof
Hungary on 19May1992 waswithoufIegaleffect.
2. Thatthe RepubIic ofHungary was not entitledto suspenand subsequentIy
abandonthe works on the NagymarosProject and on that part of the i
GabEikovo Projectfor whichthe 1977Traty attributedresponsibito the
Republo fHungq.
3. Thatthe actofproceedingwith andputtingintu operationVarian"C", the
provisionasolutionw,asIawfiiI.
4. That theRepubIicofHungary mustthereforceasefforthwithlconduct which
impedes the full andbonafideimplementatioof the1977Treaty andmust
take al1necessarysteptufulfiiitown obligationsundertheTreatywithout
furtherdelayinorderto restorecornpliawiththeTreaty.
5. That, in consequenceof its breacheof the 1977 Treaty,the Republicof
Hungary is IiabItopay, andthe SlovakRepublic isentitled toreceivfulI
compensationforthe lossanddamage causedtu the SlovaRkepubiicbythose
breaches ,lusinteresandlossofprofits,intheamountstu be determincdby
the Courtina subsequenthaseof theproceedings thiscase.
(Signed).,.,........t........
Dr.PeterTomka
Agentofthe SlovakRepublic LISTOFANNEXES
Volume II
Paee
The Hungarian "WhiteBook". ................................................5..
...............
ReportofComrade VoM on thediscussions
concerningthewaterworksontheSovDanube,uOctobera1955........................75........
NoteVerbaleofthe MinistryofForeignMairs
of theCzechRepubIic tuthehhisfw of Foreign
AffairsofSlovaki% 3March 1993..............................................77...
...........
MaffVar 14 Febniary1989, M-, 22 March1989,and
Vasarna~H i irek,26 March1989...................................................
............
Resolutionof theSIovakGoverment No. 36of 4Febmary1976 .................85......
ResoIutionof theSIovakGoverment No. 362of26 Octuber1977 ................8.......
ResolutionNo. 35 oftheSlovakNationalCouncil of 19December 1977.............89....
Speechdelivered to theHungariaPnarliamen tn
6 Octuber198% byM. GyuIa Hum. ...........................................9.......
........
Listofrecentlycompleted sewage treatmtnt planon theSlovak side
of thejointSlovak-HungaD raiaubesection(includirtributarisf
theDanube) ...................................................
...............................
"Positionpaper"handed totheHungarian
Ambassaduir n Pragueby theCzechoslovak finister
of ForeignMairs on 15May 2989....................................................
.......
II. Ru déPravq 16 May 1989.....................................................05...................
12. MamarNrlap, 9 October 1991(interviewwith
Mrs.Adrianne Hajossy)...............:.....................................1..................
13, MaeyarHirian 18 May1992 andMae;rar 8 Octuber 1992 115
(int&ew withFerencMal) ...................................................
....................
14. Hungaria n oteVerbaleof 16 September1992...................................125.................... ...
-Il-
PossibilitiesRiverRestoration otheDanube in relatito
theGabEkovoScherne ,artinN.R. Jaeggi,Swiss
FederalInstituteofTechnology,Zuric8,October 1993...........................1.................43
MawarHirlap, 1March 1994 ..................................................
.....................
Msar Hirlap,7 March 1994 .................................................................
LetterfiomDr. M. SyIvénD, irectofWs
EuropeandMiddleEast RegionalProgramme, to
Prof.1.Mucha, 14Iune 1994 ;LetterfromDr.C. Martin,
DirectorGened of WWF, tohg. D. Kocinger2*1June 1994 .....................5........
Letter fromDr.C. MartintoIng.D. Kocinger,
3 October1994 ..................................................
.........1................
LetterfiomProf.T.PaEes to WWFEuropeandMiddle
EastRegionalProgramm 6eSeptember 1994..................................4.7............
Preparation ofInput ParametefurMode1 ofGround
WaterFlow,Danubiariïuwiand -Mode1 SHE,
PHARE Proje ECfWAT1 f,December 1993 .................................-.67.............
TelephoneinterviewwiththeRegionalRepresentativof the
Federd Union ofRiverTransportConstructors,
Mr.Ott, 29 September1994 .................................................1
..................
Letterfrom Companie deNavigatieFluvialRomana to the
SlovakEmbassy inBucharest,17October1994 .................................7............
Komho (EffectsoProjectonlocalshipbuildingS,lovakia,Jun1993.............75..
TheSIovak Cornmissioo nftheEnvironmerit19EnvironmentalConditions
fortheImpIementaifonof Variant"CH........................................4.9..........
Na 5,Septanber-Octube 1994 (questionof the water
regdationof theUpperDanube, therestorationofSzigetkoand compIetion
of theGINProject);synopsesof:1.Volgjtesi,*Unco&ed andCodned
GroundwatersintheKisaiMldRegion"; L. Halupa,"TheForestsinKisaEdd
Region";L. Féjera,al.,"TheHungarianUpperDanube-AHistorical
Review"; M. Csanidy, A, "TheHygienicQuality ofDanubeWater";
J.Juhk, "Canaikatioo nftheRiverinEuropeDevelopmentofthe
Network ofWaterways"F ;.Papp,"Environmenta Clonsiderations
inEngineeri fnrtheDanubeRiver DamProj ect"T.Dora,
"ThePresentSt.................................................
........................
Conaeqtlences"
Report oftheJointCzechosIovak-Hun Subr-iomtmission,
4 Apd 195%...................................................
.........4.7....................46. Protucol on Negutiationsbetweenthe ~epresentativesofWater
ManagementAgenciesofCzechoslovakia andHungary,
23-3 1August 1966 .......................................................
.....4..................
47. Report onCornparison andEstimation ofthe~ivefsion and
CornpetitiveVariant,submined aithe Negotiations ofRepresentatives
of rheCzechosIovak and Hun&arian Ministriesof Forestry,
28 June 1969 ...................................j...................................7......
48. DanubeCommission5 , 2nd Session , D/SES52/24 P,landeTravail ..................15.
49. MamarHirlau, 19October 1994..................................................-5.1......
50. CertificationofDocumentation, Dr. PeterTomka, Agent ofthe
SIovak RepubIi c...............................i.......................
......................
Counter-Memorial submitted by the Slovak Republic