MEMORIAL ON JURISDICTION
SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OP
THEUNITED KINGDOMOFGREATBRITAZN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND PART A
INTRODUCTION
1. This Memorial is subrnitted to the Court in Dursuanceof the Order made
by the Court on 18 August 1972, which Order iequired the Governrnent of
the United Kingdom tosubmit before 13October 1972a Memoria1"addressed
to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute".
2. The Court, in making its Order of 18 Augiist 1972. referred to "the
letter dated 29 May 1972 from the Minister for Forgein ARairs of Iceland.
received in the Registry on 31 May 1972; the telegram from the said Minister
dated 28 July 1972, reccived in the Registry on 29 July 1972; the telegram
from the said Minister dated II August 1972, received in the Registry the
same dav. and reoeated and confirmed bv letter from the said Minister of
I I ,\ugii.t 1972. in c~ch of trhich .'oiiiiii.tni<~tii>n, ii \rl; ai,crteJ thiir thsre
\\x, nu b3s15~.nJcr tnc St;~totc di the ("Our1 for cxcr..~~ng~ur~~d,ct~~l 111the
i4,c". lhe <;,>\crniiiciit of the I niicJ KtnaJuiii thercl'orc iinJr.r\t.ind th31
in the present Memorial they are required to expand and develop their
subrnissions relating to the jurisdiction of the Court. and to answer any
doubts concerning the Court's jurisdiction raised by these various Lcelandic
letters and telegrains.
3. The principles which the Coiirt applies in a casewhere it has to consider
whether it has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings have been stated in the
following terms:
"lt has beenareued reneatcdlv in the course of the Dresent~roceedinas
~ ~ ~
that in caseof doubt thkourt rhould decline jurisdiction. liis true that
the Court's iurisdiction is always a limited one. existina only in .o far.as
States havexceoted it: cnnseauentlv. the Court will. in the event of an
. ~ ~ . ~-~~ .. ~ ~
objection-or when it hès aut&natically to consider the question-onlY
affirm ils iurisdiction ~rovided that the force of the arguments militating
in faveur-o if is oren.onderant. The fact that weiehtiareuments can be
. Y - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -.
advanced to support the contention that it has no jurisdiction cannot of
itself create a doubt calculated to upset its iurisdiction. When considering
whether it has iurisdicti~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~e co;rt2s -i~n is alwavs to ascertain
whether anintention on the part of the parties exists to conFcrjurisdiction
upon it. The question as to the existence of a doubt nullifying ils juris-
diction need nit be consid~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~as in the oresent case.thisintention
can be denionstrated in a nianner convincing to the Court." (Facrory at
Cliorzdw, Jitrirrlictioii, Ji~dgrncnt No. 8, 1927, Series A, No. 9, p. 32.)
4. As reauired bv Article 32 of the Rules of Court. the Governinent of the
the Exchange of ~otes between the Governinent of the United Kingdom and
the Governnient of Iceland of II March 1961(Annex A to the Application).
Article 36 (1) provides that "the jiirisdiction of the Court comprises al1cases
which the parties refer to it and al1 matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force". The
Penultimate paragraph of the Exchange of Notes provides that "the IcelandicGovernment will continue to work for the im~lementation of the Althine
Resolution of May 5, 1959, regarding the extension of fisheries jurisdiction
around Iceland. but shall rive to the United Kinrdom Government six
months' notice of such extension and, in case of a dispute in relation to such
extension, the matter shall, at the request of either Party, be referred to the
International Court of Justice".
5. The Government of the United Kingdom accordingly must satisfy the
Court on the following points:
(i) that the Exchange of Notes of 1961 was a treaty or convention in
force between the parties on 14 April 1972 conferringjurisdiction
on the Court in a dispute relating to the extension of fisheries juris-
diction around Iceland;
(ii) that on that date there was a dispute betweenthe parties; and
(iii) that the dispute related to the extension of fisheries jurisdiction
around Iceland.
The Government of the United Kingdom submit, however, that, if the force
of their arguments militating in favour of the Court's jurisdiction is "prepon-
derant", the Court will affirm its jurisdiction; and that, for the Court to
decline jurisdiction, it would be necessary for the Government of lceland
to show-or for the Court to ascertain propriomotu-not merely that weight~
arguments can be advanced to support the contention that the Court has no
jurisdiction but also that there was no intention on the part of the Govern-
ment of Iceland and the Government of the United Kingdom to confer juris-
diction won the Court.
6. ~he'Government of the United Kingdom have carefully studied the
Larious communications made by the Government of lceland'that are referred
to in paragraph 2 above, and indeed al1 other relevant communications and
statements that might throw light on the basis for the contention by the
Government of lceland that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain these
oroceedinrs. It does not auoear from these communications and statements
ihx an) of~hcob~cctionr to ihc Couri's jdriiJi;ii~n rai>eJ b) the Go\ernmcni
of IiclanJ arc Jirc~icd io the \c;ond snJ tliird of rlic ihrce prspi>r!riiins (.is
set out in Dard. 5 above) which the Government of the United Kinndom must
cstabliçh if thcy .irIO sîtisf) ihc Couri rh.itiih:i<ji.riidiiti~iin the prcwnr
case: ic., ihsi <in 14April 1972there iixr a Jispiite bci\rccn the <io\crni~ieiit
of Iccland .ind ihe Go\ernnient of the C'riiicil Kinadoiir: and ihdr tliis Jisuiitc
related to the extension of fisheries jurisdiction around Iceland. lndeed; the
Goveinment of the United Kingdom submit that there can be no possible
controversy about these questions. Tney siniply remind the Court of the
history of relations between the two Governments as described in the Appli-
cation instituting proceedings and amplified in the opening part of the
Attorney-General's speech before the Court on 1 August 1972. They siibmit
that, as regards the second of those propositions, this history demonstrates
beyond doubt that, by 14 April 1972, there was a dispute between the two
Governments in the sense,as defined by the Court, of "a disagreement on a
point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two
persons" (Mavrommatis PalestineConcessionsJ ,sdgmentNo. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J.
SeriesNo. 2, P. II); and that. in so far asil might be argued that, for a dispute
to exist, it mus1 be shown that negotiations have failed, the negotiations be-
tween the two Governments concerning the threatened extension of Iceland's
fisheries jurisdictionhad, by 14 April 1972, in the words of the Court in the
Right of Passagecase (I.C.J. Reports 1957, pp. 125, 149), "reached a dead- lock". As regards the third proposition, it does not seem to be denied, and
it could, indeed, scarcely be denied, that the dispute related tu the extension
of fisheries jurisdiction aroundLceland.
7. Conseauentlv. it onlv remains tu consider the obiections raised bv the
~overnmeni of lcland against the first of the three p;opositions which the
Government of the United Kingdom must establish, i.e., that the Exchange of
Notes of 1961 wasa treaty or coiivention in force between the Government of
the United Kingdom and the Government of lceland on 14 April 1972,
. conferring jurisdiction on the Court in relation 10 such a dispute. Açain il
must be said that none of these objections appears tu question that the
provisions of the Exchange of Notes of 1961.if in force on 14April 1972, did
confer jurisdiction on the Coort (and the later sections of this Memorial will
seek tu show that the confernient of such jurisdiction was at al1 limes
accepted by both parties as the object and piirpose of the relevant provision).
The objections appear rather tu be directed tu asserting that, for one reason
or another, the Exchange of Notes of 1961was in fact no1in force at that date.
8. Accordingly, in Part Bof this Memorial the Government of the United
Kingdom will analyse the terms of the relevant provisions of the Exhange of
Notes of 1961in order tu elicit what those orovisions mean and were intended
tu niean, with particular reference to the duration of the agreement tu submit
disputes tu the jurisdiction of the Court, and will then examine the origins of
the Exchanze of Notes of 1961(that is to sav. ..e hi~ ~rv .nd backeroind of
ils conclusi&) in order tu see ;,ha1 light these throw on questions of inter:
pretation. In Part C of this Memorial the Government of the United Kingdom
will examine in turn each of the various objections tu the jurisdiction of the
Court that are referred to in paragraph 7 above. Finally, Part D of this
Memorial summarizes the contentions put forward in Parts B and C and sets
out the formal submissions which the Government of the United Kingdom
make tu the Court on the question of thejurisdiction of the Court tu entertain
the dispute. PART B
MEANING AND INTENTION OF THE EXCHANGE OF
NOTES OF 1961
1. The Tprms of the Exchange of Notes of 1961
9. The Exchange of Notes of 1961 (see Annex A to the Ao~l. .tion
insiituiing proiccJing,~ conidin,. in ilic pciiultirii:ip.ir.~gr.%phid iiie Si)ls
frmn the Foretgn \11n.s1croi I.~l.~nd. .;~!ni~r.>tii~$sar!:I.IJ.C in tlic îdlloIII~
terms:
"The lcelandic Government will continue to work for the implemen.
talion of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959, regarding the entension
of fisheries jurisdiction around Iceland. but shall give to the United
Kingdom Government six months' notice of such extension and. in the
case-of a dispute in relation to such extension, the iiiatter shall, at the
request of either Party, be referred to the InternationalCourt of Justice."
The Althing Resolution of 5 May 1959 (see Annex IV to the letter from the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of lceland to the Registrar of the Court, dated
29 May 1972). contained the assertion:
". . .rhar lceland has an indisputable right to fishery limits of 12miles,
rhar recognition should be obtained of Iceland's right to the entire
continental shelf area in conforniity with the policy adopted by the Law
of 1948, concerning the Scientific Conservation of the Continental Shelf
Fisheries and rhar fishery limits of less than 12 miles froni baselines
around the country are out of the question".
In fact the Exchanee-of Notes of 1961 disoosed of the first and third of ihese
contentions, at least once the threc-yedr transitional period which it provided
for had ended. Al1 that remained of the Althing Resolution was the statenient
of Iceland's policy ro seek reco,qrritioi~ofIcelai~<l'sri,qhrro rlie eiirire co~iriiieiifal
shelforea, hasedr<pon opolicy ofcon.seri.arioi>. The Exchange of Notes of 1961
recorded that this was Iceland's policy and, although it was not a policy which
at that point of time was consistent with international law-the 1958 United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea had rejected the arguiiient that a
coastal State's rights to its continental shelf include the fishery resources of
the high seasabove the shelf-it remained possible that, in the future, such a
policy rnight be consistent with a changed international law.
10. Thus, the parties to the Excünhge of Notes of 1961 did envisage that,
al sonie time in the future. that Enchanee of Notes mieht be overtaken by
niiii1tcriiiiii.itcd:.ind.ir.rt.ii1il).tncC~~~~rrn~iicnt .>iihe [.ri1c.l Kin-J.)iii
\*crc put on ni,t.<c ih~i 1;cl.iii.l i1i1cri1.)n.>rk ior 3 :li~ngc iiiiiitern.ii <ni.iI
11~ .i>ilS~~IUJ .II 1061. llcnic\er, ira!! thc terftu?,,Vihc ,\~th.~~cRc>~>l.n~.m
itselî. it was evident that this would require "recognition" by the international
coniinunity and, in addition. evidence of a need for "scientific conservation".
II. The coinproiiiissorv clause in the Exchanee of Notes of 1961. having ..) that six months' notice should be given to the United Kingdom-of
any extension of Iceland's fisheries-jurisdiction; and
(ii)that, if the United Kingdom should dispute the extension. and the
rirht which was then vested in either oartv tu refer the disDute IO
the International Court of Justice wai exircised, the coukt then
upheld the legality of the extension.
The Government of the United Kingdom do not contest that the first con-
dition has been mct: the statement of intention contained in the policy
statement issued bv the Government of lceland on 14Julr 1971(seeDara. 10
of the ~~plication~instituting proceedings), was repeated in the aide-iiénioire
of 31 August 1971(seeAnnex C tu the Application), and the firm intention tu
issue new reaulations ~rovidins for fisherv limits of 50 miles was notified in
the aide-mémoire of 24 ~ebriiary 1972 &ee Annex H Io the Application).
more than six months before the intended date of operation of the proposcd
new regulations on I Se~tember 1972. The second condition Drecedent tu
termination has not been met. That condition provided for refircnce tu the
Court in the event ofa dispute regarding any extension of Iceland's fisheries
jurisdiction and it is this condition which lceland now claims is no longer
operative.
12. The purpose of the condition is clear. The questions whether a coastal
State's riahts in international law to the hirh seasfisheriesaboveitscontinental
shelf had-become "recognized" and whether a casefor scientific conservation
truly existed were regarded by both parties as questions which. in the absence
of agreement. called for obiective. iudicial determination. The oarties would
not iave been prepared to illow siich questions to be unilaterally anclsuhjec-
tively determined, either by Iceland or the United Kingdom; and il was
therefore agreed that, if they were in dispute, it would be for the International
Court Io decide these questions. Then, and only then. on the bais of a
judgment by the Court upholding the legality of the Icelandic extension,
would the 1961 agreement teriiiinate and lceland be able Io implcinent the
Althing Resolution by extending its fisheries jurisdiction.
13. This interpretation of the Exchange of Notes of 1961 is not only the
one which emergesfrom the plain meaning of the words used by the parties
but il is also the one which is consistent with the presumption of international
law against any right of unilateral deniinciation. In this respect Article 56 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is purely declaratory of
existing customary law in providing that:
"1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and
which dues not provide for denunciation or withdrzwal is no1
subject tu denunciation or withdrawal unless:
(a) it is established that the parties intended tu admit the possibility
of denunciation or withdrawal; or
fh) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied hy the
nature of the treaty.
2. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ."
14. Nothing in the terms of the agreement embodied in the Exchange of
Notesof 1961or (as Section 2 of this Part of this Memorial will show) in the
historv of the negotiations between the oarties leadina tu that aereement
indicaies (far less-establishes) that the pairies intended'to admit the possi-
bility of unilateral denunciation or withdrawal. Nor can a right of unilateraldenunciation or withdrawal be implied from the nature of the agreement.
Such an implied unilateral right of denunciation or withdrawal would be
plainly inconsistent with the fdct that there is a procedure for termination
of the agreement (on the initiative of Iceland, the Party which alone would
have an interest in terminatina it- which was exoressly provided for by the
Iigrcenicnr. namïly. the r.iiisiyinc of the tu,) conditiiin, inai xrc <CI1111i1n the
coiiiproriti,rory clause a, de,:ribed in paraçrdph II oi this 3leoiarial.
15. Ir ktll bc aDnarcni that theGo\srnnient oiihc Un.iecl KingJoiii arc not
advancing any contention to the etïect that fishery agreernenis in general
should be construed as enduring in perpetuity or that this particular fishery
agreement should be construed as endurinp. or was intended to endure. in
perpetuiiy. iior are ihey adiancing xny c~>nieni#i)n.ihoul the Juratii)n .)r modc
of lcrtiiin1liùilof coiiiprum:\sury ilau,e, in gener~l. 'Their ;onlcntii>ii ir the
Iimitcd one that,;is rcgdrds thi\ particuldr C\ih3ngt,of Notes. uh,le the parties
did nor envisage ihat if aould endure in pcrpeiuiiy. rhey did cnv.sage thsi II
iaould endure eithcr unttl terni~naicd bj niuiu~l coriscnr or unit1 ierr1itn;iicd
in accordance with the orocedure described in oaragraph II of this Memorial.
Thc Go\,crniiieni airth; Ilnitcd Kingdom subnilt Ïhst the terni, In vhi.'h the
particsenibodied their 3grcenient çïn have nu othcr cun,tru~t,on pui on thrm
Thc Governnient of the Ilnitcd KineJi~m fiirrher subniit iliai bs thui provi-
ding (in and by means of the compromissory clause) an agréed made of
termination, the parties intended to exclude any implied right of unilateral
denunciation or withdrawal from either the aere-ment as a whole or the
cuniproni.ssor)r'laiiscin particular. Thc\crycl.tu~e which provided rli~.~grcsd
mode ,)f tr'rniinatiùn c.innot be rcgardcd as irscli subjeit t<iAn iiiiplcd right
of denunciation.
16. This construction of the agreement between the parties. which the
Government of the United Kingdom contend is the properconstruction on a
.urely.textual analysis. is also entirely in accord with the situation facing the
partici in 1961. 'They u,crc in .isitu;iiioiiin uhich 1-elaiid conieniplxred the
posribiliiy of a f.iture extension oifirlicry Iiniiis biii anhi;h ihr. pariiei .ic:ep-
ted theneed to test thequestion whether, at the point in time when lcelandgave
noticeof such proposed extension, the extension would be inconformity with
international law. The whole purpose of the compromissory clause was to
allow'that question to be tested by the Court and therefore to make the
agreement terminable only upon the two conditions specified above.
17. Thus the compromissory clause was fundamental to the whole agree-
ment. As will be seen. it was in fact a sine ouo non of the consent of the
Uiiired KingJoiii iu the agrcciiient ln thcsc c~rc.tm>t~n:ei the l'\cli.firwe of
Note.; cannot have beeii inleiidcd to he ,u.cepiinlc IO iinil.iter.il Jeiiunci.irii~n.
so as to render the compromissory clause ineffective, on the argument that,
though the situation with which the compromissory clause was intended to
deal had not previously arisen, the object and purpose of the agreement had
been achieved. The object and purpose of the agreement embodied in the
Exchanae-of Notes was not onlv to set.le the disDute over the lcelandic
ildini Io li$lieriei jiirisdiciiup lu I? niilcr h!,r <ilru.*ince b? the rcrtiis of ilie
Aliliing R~suluri~in.inil ils inc<irpuratioii in the ~greciiiciit I~cl~cidga\c noticc
of oossiblefurtherclaims in the future. to Drovidea meanswherebvthe ~arties
.
might resolve the question of the legilit; of such further claims. ~he'object
and purpose of the compromissory clause would take effect only at the time
when lceland sought a further extension of its fisheries jurisdiclion, though
Iceland now seeksto be entitled to regard it as terminated at the very point in
time at which it was intended to take effect. 18. This construction of the Exchange of Notes derives no1 only froni the
plain meaning of the words used by the parties, reflectingwhat most have
been their common intention ifthe agreement was to haveany real eflicacy as
iisetilcnient of the \\hole diipuic. huÏiil,ofrom ihe hi$i.>r).oi;hc nçgotiatiun,
leading up to rhc txchangc of N,nrcs. Ir iiihercfure prdposed. in thr,loll~i<ing
se;iian of ihij Pari of ih~i Meiii~iri-<l1,)euniine the origin, of the t\chiiigc
of Sotes and, in pariicular, the ua) in uhiih the pariici arrired ai 3con,cnsu>
on the comproiiiisjor) (laure and 11spl:ice in the agrecmçni as 3 \\hole.
2. The Origins of the Exchange of Notes of 1961
19. The background to the disvute asa whole has alreadv beensummarized
-
in the App1,catiJn Insiiruttng I'rocceding,. ('i>ncsnlraling on the iiiiiiicdidie
b~ckground io ilie tnchangei~fN<~tcssf IYhI. il ms) hc rc~alledthai. dfier the
firrt UiiitcJ Nstions <:oiifcrcnce on the Lam of ihe Sca in 1958 hsd Iiilcd 1,)
reach agreement on the question of fishing limits, the Government of Iceland
on 30 June 1958 issued a decree (Decree No. 70) which came into effect on
1 September 1958, purportingto extend Iceland's fisheries limits from 4 miles
to a distance of 12 miles from baselines specified in the decree. The validity of
this action was disputed by the United Kingdom and British fishing vessels
continued to fish up to the four-mile limit.
20. In the period from June 1958 to the convening of the second' United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea on 21 March 1930, a number of
informal discussions were held between the varties. However, no direct
negoliaiions uerc held and the propoial hy the ilnitcd Kingdoni t<>refcr the
disp.iic ts ihc Internationll Coiirt of Justice, mxdc on 25 Scpicmhcr 1958.in
the General Assembly 1 and repeated in a memorandum submitted to the
United Nationsz, was rejected by the Government of Iceland. The reason for
thisrejection, as stated in a Note dated 18 December 1958 (the full text of
which is set out in Annex C to this Memorial), was that the Government of
Iceland did not consider it practicable or desirable to refer the matter to the
Court at the same time as the second United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, which would be convened in the near future, was dealing
with the disputed question of the extent of fishery limits aswell as the breadth
of the territorial sea.
21. The second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea ended on 28
,\pril 1960 trithoui rca;hing agreenicnr on tihhery Iimiis. Ili>uever. a Wh.
rianiial hod) ufSt~tc,>pini,in errierge,l durln2 the (',>rifcren;e to the r,!Tc~.tthat
a ca)a.iialStaie rhould hs entiilcd ti~claiiii e~clu,i\e Iishericr viihin a 12-niilc
limit, subject to the retention ofcertain fishing rightsbyother Stateswhich had
acquired "historic rights" ta fish in the "outer six" miles. Believing that this
new evidence of a general consensus among States might form the basis for a
settlement of the dispute with Iceland, the United Kingdom proposed new
1 SeeAnnex A tothis Memorial which setsout the text of the relevantpassageof
thespeech madeto the GeneralAssemblyof theUnited Nations on25Scptember1958
by Mr. SelwynLloyd, Secretaryof Siate forForeignAmairsof theGovernment ofthe
United Kingdom. (Ofiiol Records of rhe Geileral Assembly, Thirteenth Session,
758th Plenary Meeting. para.85.)
SeeAnnexBtothis Mernorial.Thissetsout ihetext of therelevantparagraphofthe
Memorandum which wassubmitted 10the GeneralAssemblyof the United Nations
by theGovernmentof the United Kingdom in Novernber1958.A copyof thecornplete
Memorandumwill becommunicated 10 theRegistrar inaccordancewith Article43 (1)
of the Rulesof Court. 130 FISHERIES 1URlSDlCTlON
negotiations with lceland on several occasions during the months May to
August 1960. Ultimately, on 10 August 1960. the Government of lceland
decided to enter into direct negotiations with the United Kingdom 1.
22. The discussions began in Reykjavik on I October 1960. At the third
meeting. on 5 October, it had become apparent that, in principle, the United
Kingdom would accept Iceland's right to exclusive fisheries within 12 miles
after the end of a transitional period (during which certain gritish fishing
would continue within the 12-mile limit). The crucial question posed by
lceland was whether the United Kingdom would agree 10 lceland imposing
restrictionson fishingoutside the 12-mile limit. The United Kingdom reply was
that. whilst restrictionsscientifically proven to be justifiable on conservation
groiinds or because of high density line fishing and static net fishing might
need to be examined, the United Kingdom sought a guarantee that, after
the transitional period, the Government of lceland would not seek to exclude
British vesselsfrom any of the waters outside 12 miles unless there were to be
some change in the general rule of international law agreed under United
Nations auspices. So fundamental was this issue that Sir Patrick Reilly
.De~7~v *nd~r-Secretarv of*State at the Foreien - Office and leader of the
United Kingdom delegation) made an express statement in the meeting
which look place on 8October 1960,to the efect that, should the Government
of lceland insist on restrictions outside 12 miles, there was no possibility of
an agreement. In his words, "some assurance about further extensions beyond
12 niiles was an essential point . ..".
23. Formal negotiations were discontinued until late in October. However,
on 28 October 1960 a Memorandum by the Government of Iceland which
included the following proposal was handed to Sir Patrick Reilly:
"The SiIrrotion ofrerthe Terminatio~t O/ the Agreement
The lcelandic Government reserves ils right to extend fisheries juris-
diction in lcelandic waters in conformitv with international law. Such
extension would. however, be based eith& on an agreement (bilateral or
multilateral) or decisions of the lcelandic Government which would be
subject to arbitration at the request of appropriate parties.''
24. At a subsequent meeting. on 1 November, the United Kingdom,
wishing ta avoid unilateral action by lceland in accordance with its own
concept of international law, proposed the following draft to the IceJandic
representatives:
"Except in accordance with the terms of any subsequent agreement
between the United Kingdom and Iceland, or subsequent multilateral
agreement which embodies a generally acceptetl rule of law in relation to
fishing limits, the lcelandic Government will not take any action to
exclude vessels registered in the territory of the United Kingdom from
fishing in any area outside the 12-mile limit."
In commentine on that text at the same meeting. the lcelandic reoresentative
said that the draft should allow for the poss;bility of applyinç customary
international law so that lcelandcould take advantaae of Channing customary
international law.
1 A copy or the fullset of contcmporary records of the consequent discussions
(which lasted,with intervalsfroni 1 October 19M) 104 Dccenlber 1960). preparcdby
the United Kingdom delegation,will be communicatedto the Registrar inaccordance
with Article 43(1)of the Rulesof Court. [Secpp. 178-237, iiifi0.1 132 FISHERIES JURISDICTION
If these three ooints could be met ihen Her Maiestv's Government would do
al1they couldio help the lcelahdic Governmenionihe form and presentation
of the assurance. In particular, if a reference Io the Althing's Resolution of
Mav+ ~. 1959.was imDortant. t.ev .ould have no obiection Io includine one-.
In reply the Foreign Minister of lceland said that. while the tex1 proposed in
London was not acceptable lo his Government. "there did no1 seem to be
any real differences of opinion between the two sides. The lcelandic Govern-
ment mus1 state that their aini wds the Continental Shelf. They were, how-
ever, ready to state their intention Io basetheir action on rules of international
law and also'their willingness 10 submif any dispute Io the lnternational
Court."
28. At a subsequent meeting on the same day, the Foreign Minister of
lceland acknowledged "that the most difficult feature of the problem of the
assurance was how to deal with the point to which Her Majesty's Govern-
ment evidently attached so much importance that, if there was a dispute, no
measure 10 apply an extension of fishery limits would be taken pending
reference Io the lnternational Court". The Minister for Justice of Iceland, ,
Mr. Benedicktsson, agreed with this comment and admitted "lhat Her
Majesty's Government's attitude on this point was reasonable". He suggesred
that it should be possible to find some form of words which would imply an
obligation no1 Io apply the extension until the Court had decided. The
"assurance formula" was then referred to a further meeting of the Iwo dele-
galions later the same day, meeting without the Ministers.
29. At this third meeting on 2 December 1960. the following formula was
agreed between both sides for subinission to the Icelandic Ministers:
"The lcelandic Government will continue to work for the implemen-
talion of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959, but agrees that any
extension of fishery jurisdiction around lceland will be in accordance
lwith the terms of a subseauenl bilateral agreement between the Govern-
"lent of the United ~ingdom and the Government of Iceland] or with
the terms of any international agreement embodyinga generally accepted
rule of law in relation to fishery limits, or in conformity with a rule of
international law, established hy general consent, which would permit
such an extension of fishery jurisdiction. If the Icelandic Government
intend Io apply a measore adopted in pursuance of such a rule to vessels
reeistered in the United Kinedom. anv di,oute.hetw-e~ the Contractine -
parties as to the existence or applicability of the rule shall be referred, at
the request of other 1 Contractinp Party, Io the lnternational Court of
30. This draft was rejected by the Icelandic Cabinet on 3 Deceniber 1960,
and al a further meeting on that day the lcelandic delegation proposed the
following alternative:
"The Icelaridic Government will continue Io work for the implementa-
lion of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding the extension of
fisheries jurisdiction around Iceland. Six months notice will be given of
the application of any such extension and in cdseof dispute the measures
will be referred Io the lnternational Court of Justice."
Sir Patrick Reilly pointed ouf that the formula did not ensure that any further
extension of fisheries jurisdiction must be in accordance with international
1 Sic.?"either" intended. MEMOR~AL ON JUR~SDICTION 133
Iaa but he undcrtook thït the United Kingdom Jelegaiion uould ci~niidcr
it ionrr. Siihwquently on !hi >.inleLI:]) hc PLI thc Tolloiiiiig reviscd fi>rinul~
to the Icelandic delegation:
"The lcelandic Government will continue 10 work for the implemen-
tation of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding the extension
of fisheries jurisdiction aroiind lceland in conformity with international
law. Six months' notice will begiven of the applicaton ofany such exten-
sion. and any dispute as to whether the measures 10 be applied are in
accordance with international law will be referred, al the request of
either party, to the lnternational Court of Justice."
The lcelandic delegation promised that this would be considered by
lcelandic Ministers with a view 10 a further nieeting between officiais the
following niorning.
31. This nieeting duly look place on 4 December 1960. The lcelandic
re~resentatives reoorted that their Ministers still obiected to the words "in
co'nforniity with international law" becausethey carhed the implication that
lcelandic action hithcrto had not been in conforniity with international law.
Thev .eearded the words as unnecessarvin view of the orovision for reference
to the lnternational Court, since the Court would,of course, baseits decision
on international law. The United Kingdom delegation pointed out that the
phrase had first been used by the lcelandic de~legationthemselves in the
formula which they had ptit forward on 28 October (see para. 23 above).
They said that they found it diflicult tocomprehend theobjection to the phrase
but. after a break for consultation and in an efl'ort to assis1 in finding a
suitable formula, they suggested three drafts, as follows:
"1. (a)
The lcelandic Government will continue to work for the implenien-
tation of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959.Six months notice will
be given of the application i~fany such extension. and any dispute as to
whether there is in existence a rule of international law which would
permit siich an extension of fishery jurisdiction will be referred. at the
requcst of either party to the International Court of Justice.
1. (b)
The lcelandic Govcrnnient will continoe to work for the implemcn-
tation of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding the extension
of fisheries jurisdiction around Iceland. Six nionths notice will be given
of the application of any such extension and in case of dispute the
nieasores in question will be refcrred to the lnternational Court of
Justice. ai the requcst of either party, for decision as 10 whether there is
in existence a riile of international Iaw which would permit such an
extension of fishery jurisdiction.
2.
The Lcclandic Governiiieiit will continue to work for the recogniti-n
iinder .ntvrn;iti<in:il 1:ia ofsn c\tcnsioii of the I:shericsji.risd c,tionari).ind
Iccl;inilii;i~.corJ;inccniih the tcriiis of the t\lthing I<e\ul.iti~~n>la) 5.
1959. Six nionths notice will hc given of the a~~lica..on of anv such
extension. and any dispute in respect of such extension will be reterred.
at the requcst of either party, to the lnternational Court of Justice."
The lcelandic delegation tinder(ook to put these drefts to their Ministers.
32. At this same meeting there was also sonie discussion of the foriii of the 134 FISHERIES JURISDICTION
aeveement. It was common eround-that the "assurance" shoul~~becontained ~~
in an Exchange of Notes: the United Kingdom delegation pointed out that it
was essential that this should state that il constituted an agreement between
the t\ro <.;si\crn~iic~iiz Ins\ ~oiitcnipl:~ied th;it thcrc \r«i.IJ in i.l~lii.oiiahc
forni.iI t~bher! ,\grcc1iicnt (dc;tl~ng\51thri,hcr> lir116lj1ti>gcthct%~tlj rc.rlhcr
separate Exchange of Notes about baselines.
33. At this stage the United Kingdom delegation returned to London to
report on the negotiations to their Government. Subsequently. on 9 December,
the Coi,ernnient of the United Kingdom submilted Io the Government of
Iceland, through their Ambassador nn Reykjavik. a draft Exchange of Notes
containing the proposed "assurance" and referring (as envisaged in the
discussions on 4 December: seevara. 32 above) Io a Fishery Agreement Io be
signed on the rame day. The relevant part of the draft (th; full text of which
is set out in Annex D Io this Memorial) was in the following terms:
". . .the lcelandic Government will continue to work for the imvlemen-
tation of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding the extension
of fisheries jurisdiction around Iceland. I am, nevertheless, Io propose:
'i) that six months' notice shall be eiven bv the lcelandic Government
to the United Kingdom of any sich extinsion; and
(ii) that in caseof a dis~ute between the Icelandic Coverniiienl and the
United Kingdom Government in relation to any such extension
the niatter shall be referred, at the request of either Party, Io the
Lnternational Court of Justice."
34. The Government of lceland were unable to agree to this draft and on
10 Decenlber 1960. proposed, through the British Ambassador in Reykjavik,
an alternative tent for an Exchange of Notes with the assurance cast in the
following terms:
"lcelandic Government will continue to work for the implementation
of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959.regarding extension of fisheries
jurisdiction around Iceland. Six months' notice will be given of appli-
cation of any extension and in case of dispute the measures will, at the
request of the several parties be referred Io the Lnternational Court of
Justice."
The fiill text of this proposed Exchange of Notes, which was apparently
designed to cover al1 questions in dispute and therefore Io replace, as well,
the proposed Fishery Agreement and the proposed separate Exchange
concerning baselines, is set out in Annex E to this Meniorial.
35. Lnreply to this the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United
Kingdoni sent a personal iriessageto the Foreign Ministerof Iceland, through
the British Ambassador in Reykjavik, on 14 Deceiiiber 1960. The full text is
set out in Annex F to this Meniorial. He expressedthe disappointnient of the
Governiiienl of the United Kingdoni at the attitude, and specifically at the
latest proposais, of the Government of Iceland. He pointed out that the
lcelandic draft Exchange of Notes would not constitute an agreement
between the two Governments and he repeated the United Kingdom's basic
requirenients which, as regards the "assurance", hedescribed as follows:
". . .the assurance should be set out in an Exchange of Notes expressly
stated Io constitute an Agreement which would, in Her Majesty's
Government's view, be the only way of binding both parties to accept
thejurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the event of any MEMORIAL ON JURISDICTION 135
dispute arising over extensions of fishery jurisdiction. We regard this as
essential if we are going to achieve stability in Our future fishery relations
as we earnestly desire;".
36. On 16 December 1960, the Government of the United Kingdom
transrnitted to the Government of Lceland. through the British Eiiibassy in
Reykjavik, a further draft Exchange of Notes. The full tex1of the draft is set
out in Annex G to this Memorial. Lnrelation 10 the controversial "assurance"
the proposed text was as follows:
"The lcelandic Government. while continuinc IO work for the iiiiple-
mentation of the Althing Re;olution of May-5, 1959, regardinsthe
extension of fisheries jurisdiction around Iceland. will give IO the United
Kingdoiii Government six months' notice of any such extension. and in
case of a dispute in relation to siich extension the niatter shall. al the
request of either party, be referred to the International Court of Jiistice."
37. It niay be noted that the differences between the Icelandic proposal of
10 December 1960 (Annex E) and the United Kingdoiii propos;il of 16
December 1960 (Annex G) were, first, thar the United Kingdoni draft iiinde
it clear that the dispute in conteniplation was a dispiite in relation to an?
extension of the lcelandic fisheries jiirisdiction and, second, that itiiiade il
clear ihat reference to the Court could be by iinilateral applic;ition.
38. Further discussions between the Foreign Secretziry and the Foreign
Minister of lceland took place in Paris and London on 17, 18. 19 ;ind 20
Deceiiiber 19601. In the courseof the discussions in Paris on 17 Deceniber
1960, the Foreign Minister of lceland is recorded as sayiiig that ". . .the
lcelandic Government would be able to give a firni assurance that they ivui~ld
no1 attenipt to extend beyond 12 niiles calcrilated fro!ii prescnt basclines
otherwise than with the agreement ofthe International Court". This stnteiiieiit
was repeated at meetings on 18 Deceiiiber 1960, and 20 Dcceriiber 1960.As
ügreed at the last iiieeting on 20 Dcceiiiber 1960,the Foreigii Sccretary wrotc
to the Foreign Minister of Icelaiid (throiigh the British Enib:issy iii Keyk-
javik) on 21 December 1960, transiiiitting the drafts of two Exchiingcs of
Notes; the first of thesedealt with the "assurance" in the followiiigs teriiis:
"The lcelandic Governiiient will continue ro work for the iiiipleiiicn-
talion of the Althing Resolution of the 5th May, 1959, rcgarding the
extension of fisheries jurisdiction around Lccland. but shall give tu the
United Kingdoiii Governi?ient six iiionths' notice of any siich exrension,
and in caseof a dispute in relation to such extension, the cniactcrshnll, at
the request of either party, be referred to the International Court of
Jiistice."
It \vil1 be noted that, save for the eventiial deletion of the word "any" bcfore
the uords "such extension", this \\,as to be the test iiltiiiiately incorpor:ited
in the Eschange of Notcs of 1961. The only rciiiaining points of dilierence
rclated to the foriii thesettleiiient should take. that is tosay, \rhetlicritslioiild
be called an "aerceiiient". \vhether itshould be ciiibodied in one or 1,r.o
Esch;in~es of Notes and \\,hether it should be rcgistered wiih the Uniicd
Nations Secretariai. The insistence of the United Kiiiedoiii iipoii rcgistr;ition
i~nder Article 102 of the Charter \vas based upon Fhc view 1li;it-tliis was
1 ,\ cupy of ihe fi11selof cantemporaryrecords of ihesedisciissions.prcparcd by
the Uniicd Kinçdoiii delcgation.will be coiiiniiinicatcIOihc Regisirarin accordance
with Article43 (1) of thc Rules ofCottrt. [Secpp. 175-228. ;ri/;-o.] 136 FISHERIES JURISDICTION
essential to make the compromissory clause, the "assurance", effective since,
without registration, the agreement could not be invoked before the Inter-
national Court of Justice. That the compromissory clause was fundamental
to the settlement was abundantly clear to both parties, as appears from the
letter of 21 December 1960. The text of that letter and the drafts enclosed
with it are set out in Annex H to this Memorial.
39. Owing to certain domestic problems, the Government of lceland were
unable to niake an early response to the United Kingdom proposal, but on
13 Februarv 1961 the Foreian Minister of lceland communicated to the
Briiish'~nih;issid.rr in ~e)k,;rik his Gn\ernii!ent's ügrsenient 10 the drafts
suhniiiicJ by the Unitcd KingJorri <in 21 Dwcmher 1960. subjrcr Io t~o
"condii un," and certain "pro\isos". 'The "<,indit.on," \isre. first. that the
timing of the presentation of the Note to the Althing mus1be at the discretion
of the Government of lceland and, second, that meanwhile the terms of the
agreement inust be kept secret. The "provisos" were: first, that there might be
subsequent discussions with a view to revising the Landings Agreement (a
non-governmental agreement between the lcelandic and British fishing
industries about the landing of fish in the United Kingdom from lcelandic
vessels); second, that the two drafts should be combined into one Exchange
of Notes; third, that British warships should not recommence patrolling
within the lcelandic 12-mile limit (as they had not done for many months);
and, last, that the United Kingdom should not seek to extend beyond the
agreed three years the transitional arrangements allowing British'vessels to
fish in the outer six-mile zone. (At the same tirne, the Government of lceland
piii iorrr:irJd drnft of the propo\ed single I:xchangc of Notei. For 311ni;iteri;il
purposes 1111.\\al iJenti:al \iith the Lxih;ingr. ss fiii:illyc<iii.'liiJed anxi \et
out in Annex A to the Application instituting proceedings.) It may be noted
that nothing in these "conditions" or "provisos" affected the terms of the
"assurance" or its status within the agreement. On 22 February 1961 the
Government of theUnited Kingdom communicated their general concurrence
with the~~ "conditio~ ~ ~nd "orovisos". s~~far as concerned them. and their
. ~ ~
acceptance of the Icelandic draft.
40. On 28February 1961theGovernment of Iceland placed thetermsof the
orooosed Exchanee of Notes before the Althine. These were aooroved'bv the
~lthing on 9 ~arch 1961 1and the formal ~xrhange of ~ote; iook plaie on
II March 1961.
41. It is sienificant to note the written observations of the Government
of lceland in ;ubmitting the proposed agreement to the Althing. A translation
of the full tex1 of the memorandum submitted to the Althing is set out in
Annex l to this Meniorial. The passage relating specifically to the "assurance"
reads as follows:
"fiwiher Exteirsioti of Ilie Fisheri~sJl,risdicrion
Ai the ciid uf the naitr.iliere ;iret\r<iienis of :onieqiien.'e. 'The(i.>i.crii-
iiir.nt ,Ir.;lorcs thII uill contin~ie tu aork for tlir iii~~~lenir.ntaiioof the
arises in connection with these measures, this shall be referred to the
1 An Opposition amendmentto dclete the undertaking to refer any dispute about
further extensionsof ihe lcclandic fisherylirniisto the International Court ofJustice
and to replaceil with a staternentthat suchextensionswo@d be made "in accordance
with lcelandic and international law" wasdefeated. International Court of Justice. should either one of the oarties reauest it.
Tliesc pro\i<ion.; are in hdriiiony aith the pruporsl, and 3ttitiiile of Ice-
land 31 hoth Genev;r Confercn:es iln the Laiv of the Ses At bi~th thcse
conferences it was moved on Iceland's behalf that where a nation bases its
e\isience on fishcries :ilone the ~'5351..pc:irll ionJilions sh:ill pre\.til for
the co.i,tsl cciiilitr)axer 2nd ahme the gcneral fishers Iiniit~tionç. an).
dispute being referred ta a court of arbitration. These motions were
overruled.
At the former Geneva Conference there was agreement on a treaty for
the protection of fishing banks on the high seas which lceland signed 1.
There it is provided that under special circumstances and when nego-
tiations with other States iiivolved have not led to results, a coastal
country can determine unilateral measures for protection. Such steps
shall be based on scientific necessity and the same rules shall apply to
foreign subjects as to citizens of the country itself. A court of arbitration
decides the issue in case of dispute. At this Conference there was also
passed a resolution2 reconimending that nations concerned should co-
operate in ensuring the priority of a coastal Satate, when it was necessary
to take measures against over-fishing and it was decided that a court of
arbitration should settle disputes.
In thc note which accompanies this Althing resolution there is no
obligation implied to adherc to the material limits decided in Geneva.
On the other hand, those means which were agreed upon in Geneva are,
of course, still open.
Finally, it is provided in the note that it, together with the reply of the
British Government, where tlie British Government confirms its contents,
be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In
Article 102 of the United Nations Charter it is stated that onlv agree-
ments that are so registered can be handled by the ~nternationil Court
of Justice, should a dispute arise concerning their implementation. This
provision is a direct consequence of what has been said about reference
of the matter to the International Court of Justice."
42. Thew ci>iiiiiicnii in.1 :;rie tie).>nd an). di>.ibr ihrlt tnc Goveriiriient of
Icel:iiid kncrr th.it thectTect ,if the igreeiiicn\rrl, to iii;ii.e;tf.iiiirec~teiision
ofit, fi~her~cs,.iris;l.:iionrcicr;ihle ti>tlie Intcrn.itii>nil('<>urr of Jii>ii;eihdt
the G<i\ernmciir of I:cl~nd .i:iepted thit i.nilxtersl :iction e~tcnding II,
jl.r.~dl~tion i5.1,tnc~~nip:lt.ble !\ltIlth< prlnciple of c~~r~~pil~~oard~ji.d.c.!t.on.
be it by arbitration or judicial settlement 3; and that the wholepurposeof
1 The refercnce is presiimably Io thïConventian on Fishingand Conservationof the
Living Resourccsof the High Seas(A/CONF.13/L.54), adapted at the 18th Plcnary
A4eelinç of the Conference. The Convention !vas ratified by the United Kingdom on
14 March 1960. II entered into farce an 20 March 1966. It has not bcen ratified by
Tceland. .
The reference is presumably to the resolrition on Special Sitriations rclating to
Coastal Fisheries, adopted ai the 16th Plenary Meeting on the report of the Third
Coniniittec: sce Anncx E to the Application instituting procecdings.
The reference to lcelandic policy diiring the Ceneva Confcrenccs on thc Law of
the Sea niay be taken to refer to the lcclandic aniendnicnt, introduced in the Third
Cammittce in 1958,A/CONF.I3/C.3/L.79 1/wReih., in relation toacoastal State's
claims Io prcfcrential rights, permitted any interestedStateopposing suchclaims Io sub-
mit the dispute Io the arbitration cornmisqionevisagedin the draft of the International
Law Commission. A sirnilar amendment was introduced in the First Cornmittee as
A/CONF.l3/C.I/L. 131.Neither amendment, in fact, survived in the plenary session.138 FISHERIES lURlSDlCTlON
registration under Article 102 was Io ensure that the International Court
would haveeffective jurisdiction 1.
3. Submissions on the Meaning and Intention
of the Exchange of Notes of 1961
43. It is the siibnlission of the Governnient of the United Kingdom that the
Exchange of Notes of 1961 wds intended Io have effect, and wds so drafted
that it did have effect, as an agreement which would remain valid until such
tinie as either the United Kincdom consented to an extension of fisheries
jurisdiction by lceland beyond the liniits fixed in the agreement or the Inter-
national Court of Justice should decide that such an extension was consistent
with international Iaw. This is the cledr meanine and intent of the acreenlent
which emerges not only from the words of the agreement but also from the
history of the negotiations bctween the parties.
Further evidcnce that this wasthe intention of both parties isprovidçd ba state-
iiient ciiadeby Mr. Thuroddsen. the Finance Fylinisterof iceland. spcaking in Copen-
hagenon 13 April 1961.Having rcfcrrcd to Iceland's iiltiiiiatc intention to seekfishcry
liiiiits cu-extensivewitilscontinental shelf.hc conclridcd that "al thc right tiiiie the
tniatter *.il1 be placed befurc the International Corart at The Hague". Sce Annen J to
tliis Meniorial which setsout thr tçxt oa Keritcr report publishcd in 7hr Ti,,re.snewi-
papcr on 13 April 1961.and a translation of a siiiiilar report published in the Danish
newspapçr iIloi'.i~iil>l<r</r</April 1961. PART C
THE ICELANDIC ASSERTIONS THAT THE EXCHANCE OF NOTES
OF 1961 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS TERMINATED
1. lntroduetory
44. In the Paceof the clear meaning of the language used and in the face of
the overwhelniing evidence of the intention of the ilarties when thev concluded
the Exchange of~otes of 1961, the Governmeni of lceland have sought to
argue that the agreenient which il embodies is either void or has tertiiinated
by reference to grounds of invalidity or terinination which derive not from
its own ternis or the orginal intention of the parties but froni genernl inter-
national law. The Government of the United Kingdoni mus1deal with these
arguments, notwithstanding the fact thbt the Government of Icelarid have
failed to appear before the Court to substantiate their assertion that the
Court does not have jurisdiction. The Government of the United Kingdoni
are. however. in sonie dilliculty in attempting to deal with arguiiients which
so far. haveno1 been put by the Government of lceland in clear legal terms
but which the Government of the United Kingdoni are forced to deduce
from the resoliitions of the lcclandic legislature, statements by lcelandic
Ministers and statements in lcelandic documents and communications 10 the
Court. particitlarlythose referred 10 in pdragraph 2 of this Memorial.
45. Sonie of the various reasons that are a~parently given by the C'overn-
men1of Icel;ind 1,)jui1.l)thç terininatiix i>fthî ~\chan~e of kote; of 1961
are no! rca\<>nstihich <.in he reconclcd wiih the groiindh for thc ieriiiiii;ttion
of agreenients which international law recognizes as valid groiinds. For
exaniple. in his statement introdiicing the resolution on fisheries jurisdiction
before the Althing on 9 November 1971the Prime Minister of lceland spoke
of the decision 10 terminale the agreements with the United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic of Gerniany in these terms:
"That dccision is based on the o~inion that these Arreem-nts have
already attaiiied their niain objective asthese nations have fully benefited
by the period of adjusttnent which they were given by the Agreements.
Secondlv. itis Our oninion that the orovision in the Aareement concern-
. . -
ing six iiionths' notice of an extension and that any dispute over such an
extension be referred Io the International Court of Justice in perpetuity,
are unnatural restrictions which the lcelanders need to gel rid of. In our
opinion. dispules of this nature cannot properly be judged by the Inter-
nationiil Court of Justice 1."
In the submission of the Government of the United Kingdom. such argu~iients
are no1accentable leeal areuiiients. (Thev are also inconsistent with the facts.
It is not trilethat "se tiiain object/ve"of the agreement constituted by the
Exchange of Notes of 1961\vas to accord Io the United Kingdom a "period of
Seep. 8 of "Background Information No. 4. lccland.Le.. FishericsJiirisdiction",
publishcd by the Sccretaryfor Press and Infornialion.Prinic ~Ministcr'sOficc,
Reykjavik. A capy ofthefull textwill becommunicated 10 theRegistrarin accordancc
with Article 43 (1) of the RiiofCourt.adjustnient". As will be seen from the history of the negotiations and as is
evident from the very terms of the Exchange of Notes, the provision of a
"period of adjustment" was the purpose of the three-year transitional period
but not the purpose of the agreement as a whole.) In the submission of the
Government of the United Kingdom, the proposition that a compromissory
clause providing for reference to the lnternational Court of Justice is an
"unnatural restriction which the Icelanders need to get rid of" is not an
admissible proposition to be placed before the Court. It strikes at the very
heart of the system of jurisdiction bdsed upon binding agreements which is
embodied in Article 36 (1) of the Statute of the Court. and the Government
of the United ~ingdom;ibmit that it is unrecognizabl: and unacceptable as
a valid legal ground for the termination of an international agreement. For
similar reasons the Governnient of the United Kingdom must emphatically
oppose thesuggestion that a dispute regarding the vakdity under international
law of Iceland's extension of fisheriesjurisdiction "cannot properly bejudged
by the International Court of Justice".
46. A further suggestion that has been made by the Government of
Iceland, for example in the Althing Resolution of 15 February 1972 1, is that
the Exchanee of Notes of 1961 is no longer aml.cable..because of the vital
interests of the nation". This, too, is an argument which, in the submission of
the Government of the United Kingdom, is unacceptableas a valid ground
in law for terminating an international agreement: if it were ever accepted as
\.,ch, ihe tre.itys, :tf.>rni ol'hindinl: ohlig;iii~n \i,iuld .'cise16, ç\i\i.This is
not IO Jcn) tliiiti\her.ct. for I:cl.ind. reprcsent d vii.rintcrc\i; and the ternis
of the Exch3nxe oi Nc>ie, <iiIYfil ilelrlv rellect ihe vic\i of the Ci~l\ernmïnt
of lceland thaÏ lceland has such an interest. But that is a totally difierent
niatter from the sugestion that, where a State has entered into a binding
agreenient (and, in doing so, has doubtless taken into account its vital
interests), it is free to terminate that agreement iinilaterally merely by in-
voking its "vital interests".
47. There reniain. however. certain arguments contained in or implied by
the various docunients and statements issued by the Governnient of lceland
which might be assimilated to grounds of termination recognizable in inter-
national law. In essence. theseseemto be three in number. The first is that the
agreement embodied in the Exchange of Notes of 1961is void for duress; the
second is that the agreement has lapsed owing to a fundamental change of
circiiiiistances; and the third is that the agreement has lapsed owing to the
de~el~ ~ ~nt of a new neremotorv norm of international law. ~ermittine
7 . . -
coastal States to assertexclusive fishingrights in the seasabove their continen-
tal shelves (or. despite its ternis and the intention of the parties, has been
validly terminated in reliance on such a new norm). All three arguments are
discernible in the lcelandic sources referred to, and the Government of the
United Kingdoni will deal with theiii in turn.
2. The Argument that the Exchange of Notes of 1961 is Void for Duress
48. Thc letter dated 29 May 1972 addressed by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of lceland to the Registrar of the Court contains the statenient: "The
1961 Enchange of Notes took place under extreniely dificult circumstances,
when the British Royal Navy had been using force to oppose the 12-mile
fishery liniit established by the lcelandic Government in 1958."
1 Annex Ci to theApplication inslituting proceedings. 49. The Government of the United Kingdom wish to state the following
facts. The Royal Navy ai no tinie interfered with lcelandic fishing vessels.
Protection was afforded by fishery protection vessels of the Royal Navy to
British fishing vessels,which, from I September 1958, lceland was seeking to
exclude from the area within 12 niiles of her shores.
50. The measures taken by the United Kingdom were solely such as were
necessaryto protect British vesselsexercising the right of fishing from unlawful
seizure and molestation on the high seas.The minimum of force was used in
alïording such protection. During theentire period from I September 1958Io
the conclusion of the Exchange of Notes of 1961 not a single shot was fired
from any British naval vessel other than one star shell for illumination pur-
poses. This was in marked contrast with the occasions on which lcelandic
vesselsopened fire on British vessels.The mission of British naval units was to
,
prevent unlawful arrest on the high seas.When the British naval vesselswere
no1 satisfied that a British fishing vessel wasoutside the Icelandic 4-mile limit,
as in the caseof the vessel Valof~llon I February 1959,the vesselwas instruc-
tcd 16 pro<ewI IO an 1~cI:inJ.r.port i.i:c trtal it~rillc+~l lishtng.
51. The ft,llo\ririg :tironi>l<>~y(if evenii duririg the rr.lc\:ini period rcbcals
the em~tiness of anv su.aest--n that the activities of British naval vessels
amounted 10 dures~ upon the Government of lceland in the negotiation and
conclusion of the Exchange of Notes of 1961.
2 June 1958
1 heCiobernnient <>fliel.in,l .inn.>.iii<ed that neu regul;iiioni purporling
t~ c~tcn~lti\hr.ry litiiits iri3niICII? niilr.3 iroiii hs\elinesa<iuId he i.;<uerl
on 30 June andcome into effect on I September of that year.
4 Jltne 1958
The Go~ ~n~ent of th~ ~ni~ed~Kinedom announced thal such reaula-
lions could not be accepted as havingany effect in law and that il would
be their duty to prevent unlawful attempts to interferewith Britishvessels
on the high~seas.
1 SepIemher 1958
On the date on which the Government of lceland purported 10 bring
their regulations into force the Royal Navy commenced providing
protection for British trawlers inside havens of about 30 miles in length
between 4 and 12 miles fronr the baselines. The number of havens was
either three or two according to the season of the year. The number of
fishery protection frigates of the Royal Navy of Iceland at no time
exceeded four. Usually there was only one frigate for edch haven. A
numher of -~t~ ~ ~ .ere made bv lcelandic eunboats -o arrest British
trawlers, but al1 were unsuccessful. Shotted rounds were fired by Ice-
landic ~unboats on a number of occasions. On one occasion only did
one of ~er Maiestv's shios fire and then onlv a star shell to illuminate a
trawler threatened with'arrest. Towards &e latter half of 1959 the
lcelandic gunboats made fewer serious attempts to arrest British trawlers
and contented themselves with "burzing", i:e., steaming close past the
trawler and informing her that she was being reported for illegal fishing.
22 Febrrrarv 1960
British trli\rler oirncri ann0iincr.d that thc) \i<iuld >rithJraw al1 their
irawlcr\ from the \rhoIr. scli arc., .irsiind I~cl;itir 3ge\ture of goodrrill
ocnJingthe \eronJ Ilnited N;itl<ins Lawoi1hcSraCi~n~cren:cin Cieneba.142 FISHERIES JURISDICTION
14 March 1960
Royal Navy vessels were also withdrawn froni the area around
Iceland.
17 March-25 April 1960
The second United Nations Conference on the Lawof the Seanarrowly
failed to reach agreeiiient on a proposal for a territorial sea of 6 iiiiles
with a further 6-mile exclusive fishery zone in which the vessels of
countries which had habitually fished there would have the right 10
continue fishing for a period of 10years.
28 April1960
British trawler owners instructed their vessels10return to the sea area
around lceland but to remain outside the 12-mile zone. British naval
vessels also returned to the waters off lceland primarily to provide
normal technical and medical assistance to British fishing vessels. They
patrolled outside the [?-mile zone and were prepared Io intervene ifthey
saw any attempt by lcelandic gunboats forcibly to arrest British fishing
vesselswhich were alleged to have been fishing within the 12-iiiile zone.
.
29 April 1960
The Governnient of lceland announced an amnesty for al1 foreign
fishina vesselswhich had fished within the 12-mile line in contravention of
lcelandic law. British trawler owners then periiiitted their trawlers to go
inside the 12-mile zone for shelter, repairs, etc., provided that their gear
was stowed. so fhat itwas clear thnt they were not fishing.
52.Il will thus be seen thüt the Royal Navy established havens for British
trawlers within the 12-mile zone froni the period 1 Septeniber 1958 to 14
March 1960 only. For a period of approximately one year imniediately
preceding the Exchange of Notes of 1961 British trawler owners ai~thorized
their vesselsto fish only outside the 12-mile zone. The activities of the Royal
Navy were confined in the main to providing technical and medical support
for British trawlers, warning theni when they seenied in danger of trans-
gressing their owners' instructions to keep clear of the 12-niile zone and
reoortine-.nv such transe-essions to the ownersfor disci~linarv action ae-inst
the skippers. They did, however. on occasion intervene to prevent the forcible
arrest of British fishingvessels which werealleped to have beenfishing between
the 4-mile and 12-mile lines. since the Governnient of the ~nitedi<inedoni
had not accepted the extensi'on to 12 niiles and considered that any infFinge-
ment of the British trÿwler owners' declaration that they would no1 üllow
their vesselsto fish within 12 miles should be for the owners 10 deal with by
disciplinary action against the skippers and not for the Icelnndic coiirts.
Severe disciplinary action was iiideed taken when iiecessary by thc owncrs
and everything was donc to redilce the risk of incidents to a niiniiiiiiriiThe
occasions on which a British naval vesse1had to take action Io prevent the
forcible arrest of a trawler by lcelandic coastguard vessels becaiiie rare and
there was no such occasion alter July 1960.
53. The activities of British naval vessels were conducive to a negotihted
settlement rather than the reverse. To the estent that they involved interven-
tion in casesof threatened arrest thev were ourelv defensive in character and
the Government of the United ~ingdom have ai al1 times been prepared 10
justify them as being in accordance with international law. The Governiiient
of Iceland, howeverlat no lime sought to put the matter to the test by raisinsit before an appropriate international forum, and indeed declined the oKer
by the Government of the United Kingdom to refer the substantive dispute
to the International Court of Justice. A very material point is that if it were
true to say, as the Government of Iceland do, that the activities of British
naval vessels created "extremely .difficult circumstances". those circum-
stances would have ceased to exist more than a year before the conclusion of
the Exchange of Notes of 1961. since in February 1960 the British trawler
owners voluntarily withdrew their vessels entirely froni the Icelandic area
and subsequently authorized them to fish only outside the 12-mile line.
54. Moreover il can be seen from the history of the negotiations leading
uo to the Exchanee of Notes of 1961that at no time did the Government of
lieland conducl 6emselves as if they were a Government not fully free to
consider where their own best interests lay. It has been seenfrom the analysis
o~~the orieins of the comoromissorv cla.se that the Government of lceland
resolutely opposed successive proposais by the Government of the United
Kingdoni. Exactly the same impression emerges from a study of the nego-
tiations over the other controversial issuessuch as baselines, duration of Ïhe
transitional period, and the definition of the areas within the outer 6 miles in
which British fishing would be allowed to continue during the transitional
peribd. That the negotiütions were longand arduous is no1to be denied. Such
is frequently the case when both or al1the Governments in negotiation have
important interests to protect. The record is, however, quite inconsistent with
any suggestion that the Exchange of Notes of 1961 did no1 reflect decisions
freely taken by the Government of Iceland. There is, tao, a clear inconsistency
between the argument of duress and the action of the Prinie Minister of
Iceland in sending to the Prinie Minister of the United Kingdom on I I March
1961 a letter in which he said: "1 should like to extend 10 you my sincere
thanks for your mort valuable personal contribution towards a fortunate
solution of the matter, which 1welcome wholeheartedly'". He would scarcely
have ivritten in these terms if he had thought that the agreement which
lceland had just concluded had been negotiated under duress.
3. The Argument that the Exchange of Notes of 1961Has Lapsed Owing
to a Fundamental Change of Circumstances
55. The resolution adopted by the Althing on 15 February 1972 contains
the statement that "because of the vital interests of the nation and owing to -
chxngc<l circiinist.incc\ ihc Uotcs conxrning ti\hcr) Iiiiiiis cxch:ingcd in 1961
arc no li~ngcrappli:ahlr .. .".Tlic lcttcr dxted 2')\lay 1972xddre~se~lto the
Ke$i,tr.ir of the Couri by lhe Ministcr for I:,\rcign Affirs of Iceland, cont3im
3 siniililrcfcrcncc IO "the chdngcd circuni\lancr\ rr'siilliiig froni lhc evcr-
incrîÿsing c~ploiiation of the lishery rcsi>iirces in the ,cas surround~ng
Iceland".
56 'The Cio\erniiient ofihc Uiiiicd Kingdoni do no1 dijpuie the principlc.
soiiiniunly spolcii of3q ilic doctrine ofrr.hrrr sic .s~ti,~~ihiIihi.at. under dclined
conditions. a treatv-.av be terminated because of a fundamental chdnae of -
circunistiinccs This priririple is recogn~lcd by alnios1 al1modern wriicrs and is
siicanoly descr~hedhy Housseau 2s "une ihCr>ricd'apres Iaqiielle un change-
ment essentiel dans les circonstances de fait en vue ou en considération des-
quelles un traite a étéconclu peut entraîner la caducité de ce traité ou tout
1 For thelent of ihis letterand Mr. Macmillan'sreplyseeAnnex K to this Memorial.144 FlSHERlE IURISDICTION
au moins affecter sa force obligatoireMi. The principle has been invoked by
Statesbefore the Permanent Court of International Justice and although in
the ~ree Zones case 2 the Court did no1 expressly recognize the princi~le,
neither did it reject il. The same principle kas been invoked in State practice
and in decisions of municipal courts based upon the application of inter-
national law 3. Thus, the Rapporteur of thelnternational Law Commission
felt confident in treating the principle asone of established customary law 3
and this view was accepted in the Vienna Conference which restated the
principle in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of
May 1969in the following terms:
"Ftrndamerttol chutige ofcircsmsrances
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with
regard to those existing at the tinie of the conclusion of a treaty, and
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground
for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis
of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the efiect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations still to be.performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing (rom a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is fhe result of a breach by the party
invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any
other international obligation owed to any other party to the
treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a funda-
mental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or with-
drawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty."
57. The conditions defined in oaraara~h I of Article 62 are essentiallv
five-fold and may be summarized in th; form used by the International ~a&
Comntission in its Commentary on theDraft Articles submitted to the Vienna
Conference 4.
"(1) rhe change musr be of circiimsrances exisring ar the rime of the conclii-
sion of rhe treaty."
58. The circumstances to which the Government of lceland refer are,
essentially, the increased exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas
Rousseau, Droit inrernaitonolpubl(1953).p.60. SeealsoOppenheim, Inreriiationni
Law, 8thed., Val.1, pp. 938-944; McNair,Lar of Trearies(1961).pp. 681-691;Hill,
The Doctrine of RebusSic Sranribusin Iirlernational Law (1934); Sepulveda, Derecho
InrernacionolPublico (1968). pp. 129-130;Harvard Law Schoal, Reseorchin Inrer-
narionaiLaw III,Law of Treaties (1935).pp. 1096-1126,
P.C.I.J., SerieAiB. No. 46, pp, 156-158.
3 For a detailed summary ofthis practiceand referencesto the relevant municipal
decisions,see SerondReport on theLaw of Treaties(A/CN.4/156 and Add. 1-3)in 1963
Yearbook ofrheInternarionalLaw Corninimion, Vol. II,pp. 80-85.
4 United Nations Conferenceon the Law of Treaties. First and Second Session.
Documents ofthe Conference,Drart Articles of the I.L.C.p. 79. surroundinr! Iceland and the danger of still further exuloitation because of an
incrcase In Thecatcliing cxpscit) ;flishing fiecrs ~he'refercnce i~made niorc
explicil in the IccldnJic Menior~ndum of tehri.ary 1972 (cnclosurc ? tu
Annex H IO the Applicïtion institdting procccdings) iihich. al pü~c 8, siarcs:
"Fishing techniqucr xnd catch capîcity are rapidl) bcing developed
and about hall of the cïtcli of deniersal fi\h in the lcelandic area h3s
been taken by foreign trawlers (Fig. 2). The danger of intensified foreign
fishing in Icelandic waters is now imminent. The catch capacity of the
distant water fleet of nations fishing in lcelandic waters has reached
ominous proportions."
In fact the graph given at Figure 2 of the Icelandic Memorandum shows the
total demersal catch after 1960 as varying to no great extent from the 1960
level. The more specific figures given in the tables annexed to the United
Kingdom's Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection
(dated 19 July 1972) show that in 1960 the total catch of demersal species in
lcelandic waters by al1 States was 758.9 thousand metric tons. There was
thereafter some variation vear bv vear both uowards and downwards with a
fins1 lotdl calch figure in 1971c~iiriiatcd at 7x37thoii5and nietric ti>n\.only 3.?
per cent grcïtcr thsn in 1960. Of thi. total ciit~h I~eldnd taiok 52.4 pçr ccnr.
in IYhOand 52.4 nurcent. iiiI97I.and the Icclandic sh~rcir~~onrl~lcntI~about
half thetotal. ~~reover, scientifi; reports (ofthe lnternational ~ounciifor the
Exploration of the Sea to the North East Atlantic Fishery Commission
meeting in 1972 1 and the LCES/ICNAF Working GrouponCod Stocks in the
North Atlantic reporting to the lnternational Commission for the North
West Fisheries in June 1972) 1 give no evidence that the stocks of demersal
fisharound lceland are in an unsatisfactory condition, apart fromthe relatively
small stock of haddock, which is fished primarily by Iceland. The report of
the ICESIICNAF Working'Group referred to above does indeed give
evidence (table 12. Estimates of Pooulation Biomass) of a stablecod stock at
Iceland inthe decade 1960-1970 (c8d forming 55 pe'rcent. of the total catch
of al1 demersal species at Iceland). As regards the capacity of fishing fleets,
increases in the efficiency of individual trawlers have been counterbalanced bv
the rcductiun in total n;inibcrs of \,cssclj in nxtionxl flcetj under m(idcrni~x1
lion prograiiimcb. 'Thei:ip:~~ityOCthe intcrnxti,ii~al ficet îiihing for caid ,n the
North Ailantic as n \rholc hd\ ch~nged very Iittle In the dccade 1960-197tjand
the s!iiouni of ;i)d firhiiig h) fi>regn trd\\Icr> ai IceliinJ iilonc has de<rr.ased.
The Ii~ng-ter111 stsbility tirdenicrjdl cstchcs thcre rcnccts ï fundanient:il
soundness in the stocks. Increases in fishine caoacitv which are believed to
-. .
hsvc occurred in wnie flecti hilw been ainicd ai ~pec~cs,~tller th3n ii~d and
tlicsc do not occur in rignificsni quantilie, cl,i>c IO I~eland.
59. It appears, therefore, that though there has been some change of the
circumstances as they existed in 1960, the change has been of a very minor
order.
(2) "!ha/ change mrrsr he o findamenral one"
60. This condition has clearly not been met. From the information given
in paragraph 58 above it is clear that whatever change in the circum-
' A copy of this Report willbe communicated to the Registrar in accordance with
Article43 (1)of the Rules of Court.146 FISHERIES JURISDICTION
stanceshas occurred, it falls very farshort of what may be regarded as "funda-
mental".
61. The reluctance which at one time existed towards admitting the prin-
ciple of rchi~ssic sro,rribeswas based upon the risk that States would invoke
it owing "no1 to essential changes of circumstances, but to a change in a
State's pnlicy or attitude towards the treaty" 1. This is precisely what has
happened in the present case in which the Government of lceland seeks to
conceal u'hat is no more than a change of policy towards the Exchange of
Notes of 1961 in the guise of the legal doctrine of rehrtssicsraritibits.Though
he was there dealine with a somewhat difïerent situation. the words of Judne
JÏ ('35110 in hi%sep;!rste i,pinion iinthc A/i/><,oH/il<iri!i10 II!<.J~~ii.,<l;r#ial'
lhc ICA0 Col,!,c,/~ .irr nzr,1<!1i>iid<itr<l~.qhlv rr.lr.\>nt: "The .l.reci con,c-
quence of thedoctrine which lndia advrinces~beforeus is to confer on rne~iiber
States the possibility of freeing theniselves al will from their oblipations as
members of the Organisation vis-&-vis another member State. It affords a
convenient cover for a izoirvoli,mi,s.It is enough to accuse thc other party
of breach of an obligation, and to treat the breach as an appropriate ground
for putting an end to the trcaty." See also paragrnph 16 lb) of the Judgtnent
of the Court in the same case 3where theCourt said: "If a niere allegaiion,
yet unestablished, that a treaty was no longer operative could be used to
defeat its jurisdictional clauses, al1 such clauses would becorne potentially
a dead letter. . .. The result would be that means of defeating jurisdictional
clauses would never be wanting."
62. The rigorous standards which tribunals have applied to the concept of
"fundamental" change cannot be over-emphasized. Lndeed. the history of
international adjudication does not coniain one exaniple in which the plea of
rebus sic stantibus has been successful. In the Caseof tlie FreeZoi~esof Upper
SavoyandGex4 thePermanent Court of International Justice refused to accept
that, on the facts, there had been such changes, since the original treaties of
1815 and 1816, as would merit being resarded as "fundamental" for this
purpose. The Permanent Court accepted that sonie changes had occurred,
for example in the food supply req~iirements of Geneva and in communica-
tions, but did not regard these changes as sufficiently fundamental 5 or as
affecting what the Court described as "the whole body of circunistances"6.
There is nothing to suggest that such changes as may have occtirred in the
demersal fisheries off Iceland's coasts are fundamental, and certainly they
cannot be said to be changes in "the whole body of circumstances".
(31 "ir musraiso be one notforeseenby theparties"
63. Nothing in the history of the negotiations leading up to the Exchange of
Notes of 1961 suggests that the parties did not foresee any increase in fishing
catchor any develo~ment in fishine technisues. On the contrarv. both oarties
were of sufficient eiperience in fish;ng techniques to have kno& that further
development of these techniques was inevitable.
1 Second Report on the Law of Treaties, in 1963 Yearboo kf //ce I.L.C.Vol. II.
para. 15.
2 I.C.J.Reporfs 1972, p. 46 at p. 133.
Ibid., p. 54Sec alro para. 32of the ludgment at pp. 64-65.
4 P.C.I.J., SeriesAIB, No. 46,pp. 156-158.
5 The sarne point is made in thedecisionof the Swiss~ederal Court in Tliurgoitv.
Sr. GoIlen,Annual DigestofInternational LawCases, 1927-1928c ,aseNo. 289.
6 LOC. cir.p. 158. (4) "the existenceof rhosecirrumsrancesmrrsrhave consrirrrredan essenrial
hasir of the cotiseirrof the parties Io be boimd by the rreary"
64. The strictness of this condition can again be illustrated by reference to
the Free Zones case, for the Permanent Court of International Justice there
refused to accept the French argument that the absence of any customs
régime for Geneva in 1815 wasthe basis of the consent by the parties to the
agreement of 1815 1.
65. Nothing in the history of the negotiations leading up to the Exchangeof
Notes of 1961 suggests th111it was negotiated on the basis that there would
be no increase in the fishing catch or further development of fishing tech-
niques.
(5) "the efecr of rhe change mrrsr he radically ro rra~rsformthe scopeof
obligarionssri11ro he performed rtrrderrhe rreaty"
66. In the submission of the Government of the United Kingdom, this
condition is wholly unsatisfied in the present case. The change of circum-
stances which is alleged by the Government of lceland not only cannot be
said "radicallv to transform the scooe of" the varticular obligations which are
iiiiposcd h) the Lhchsngc. <if ~<>tcs'of lYhl and uhiih the) \cck io ercape h)
re1)ing on 11.II1s not cven rclch.irit to tliose iihl~g:<tion'l'hrC;o~crniilent of
the C nttcd Knciloiii reinc;iî.~lls renii11.lthe ('ourt thdt\<h.11irin i\s.te in the
present caseis kt whether lceland should. by virtueof the Exchangc of Notes
of 1961 and as agÿinst the United Kingdom, be restricted from extending ils
exclusive fisheries limits to the full extent permitted by current international
law but whether current international law does indeed permit such an exten-
sion as lceland now seeks to make (in which case the United Kingdom can
make no obiection to it) and. more immediately, whether lceland is bound.
by the Finchange of f oies of 1961 and às agakst the'united Kingdom, Io
accept the Court's decision on that question. Whatever niight be the relevance
of "chanaed circumstances resultine from the ever-increasing exploitation of
- - . ~
the fishery resources in the seas surrounding Iceland" to the continuing
validity of an agreement holding lceland to a particular. fixed fisheries limit,
they ch have no relevance tom agreement to abide within the limits of
general international law and to submit any relevant dispute about that law
to the International Court of Justice.
67. It is thus clear that none of the conditions essential Io the proper
application of the doctrine of rrhrrs sic stantihiis are fulfilled in the present
case. There is, moreover, a final and fatal flaw in the lcelandic contention.
That flaw is that the doctrine iiever ooerates sn as to extinauish a treatv
aiiioiii:ii~~slly or io ;ill,>\r dn ~nchallenge>blc unilateral rlcnunci~ti<~nby aie
pari).; 11<1pcr3tcsonly so :is ln confer :i right to cal1 for terminsiion and, if
rhat cal1 is disputed, ro place the dispute before some organ or body with
power to deterniine whether the conditions for the operation of the doc-
trine are present. As the Rapporteur of the International Law Commission
put if:
". . .a State niay only terminate or withdraw from a treaty on the basis
of the rcbits sicstanrihrrsdoctrine either by agreement or by following a proccdiircuhich offCrcd 3n objectinç psriy the p,isrib:liiy of iotiic forin i~f
indcpcndcnt deterniinaiion of the cl.tiiit t~ in\dkc the Jocirine 1".
68. This principle is of longstanding. In the Free zone^ case France
c- - ~ ~ that the d~ ~~~~e~~ ~ no1 allow unilateral denunciation but would
cause a lapse of a treaty only "lorsque le changement des circonstances aura
étéreconnu par un acte faisant droit entre les deux Etats intéressésH;.and it
continued: "cet acte faisant droit entre les deux Etats intéresséspeut étre soit
un accord, lequel accord sera une reconnaissance du changement des circons-
tances et de son effet sur le traité, soit une sentence du juge international
cnmoétent s'il v en a un 2". .
..~~. , -~~~ ~ ~ ~
69. The same principle was stated by Belgium in the case concerning The
Detfi,r~ciarioi~ofrhe Sitro-Belpimi Trearv of 1865,in which the Belgian Govern-
ment emphasiied that ". . .ilne peu<é&e question de dénonce; unilatérale-
ment un traité pour cause de circonstances nouvelles, sans avoirtout au moins
tenté d'obtenir la revision du traité par la voie indiquée à i'article 19du Pacte.
. . Si telle est la procédure ouverte à tous les Membres de la Société des
Nations, c'est à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale que doit étre
soumise, en dernier ressort. une contestation qui surgirait relativenient à
l'application du principe rehi~ssic sra,rribr!s entre deux Etats signataires tous
deux de la clause facultative de conipétence 3".
70. During the detailed discussion in the Committee of the Whole at
Vienna, when it was considering the draft Article 59 on rehfis sic sratzrihr~s,
numerous delegations made il clear that they could support the adoption of
the texionly on condition that il provided a forni of compulsory international
adjudication of any claim to invoke the doctrine 4. It is now provided in
Articles 65 and 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that, in
relation to any invocation of rehiis sir sra,irihr,s, where the parties to a Treaty
have failed within 12 months to achieve a settlenient of a dispute by the nieans
indicated in Article 22 of the United Nations Charter (which means include
reference to judicial settlement) any one of the parties lnay submit the dispute
to the procidure for conciliation provided in the ~nneito the convention.
Conceding that lceland is not bound by this provision p<'rse, it is nevertheless
clear that the obligation upon a State invoking rebns sir s!a~rribt/s to refer the
matter, if disputed, to independent adjudication arises froni general inter-
national law and is part and parcel of the principle of rehris sic sroirrihris.
1SecondReport on the Law ofTreaties,ioc. cir., para. 18;and see Rousseau,op.dr.,
p. 60 who statcs"il cst généralement reconnu en pratique que la clause rebur . ..
n'autorise pas une rupture unilalérale destraités, niais qu'elle requiert un accord des
Parties contractantes pourconstater lechangement des circonstances oo-à defaut de
cet accord-unedécision,arbitrale ou judiciaire". Tothe sanie effect seeSibert, Tmiré
de droir ii~ler»ario~ral ublic (1951). Vol. II, Section 1,000.And seealso the Harvard
Law Schaol, Resmrch in I~~reriiorioirolLni/,c. cil.p. 1096,which provided in Article
28 that "A treaty entered into with reference to the existcncc of a state of facts. the
cantinued existence of which was envisaged by the parties as a determining factor
rnoving them to undcrtake the obligations stipulatcd, niay be declared by a competent
international tribunal or authority to have ceasedto be binding, inthe sense of calling
for further performance, when that state of facts has beenezsentiallychanged".
2 Loc. cil., SeriesC, No. 58, pp. 578-579, 109.132and 405-415.
3 Ibid., Seri- C, No. 16; 1, p. 22.
4 For exaniple, Switzerland (63rd Meeting, paras. 27-28); United Kingdom (63rd
Meeting, para. 35); Australia (64th Meeting, para. 26); Turkey (64th Meeting, para.
73); France(64th Meeting. para. 92); Greece (65th Meeting, para. 3); Deninark
(65th Meeting, para. Il); ltaly (65th Meeting, para. 23). lceland cannot. therefore. relv on this orinciole unless it is willina to submit
its clairn to do'so to adj;dication by the apiropriate means. LnThe present
case, where the claim is advanced in answer to a primafarie valid invocation
of a treatv before the Interiiational Court of ~u~tice.the a~oro..iat. means
is to submit it to thnt Court. Lndeed, Lcelandcan scarcely be entitled to claim
that the Court's iurisdiction. validly conferred by agreement in the first place,
is now ousted on this ground in acase where itreruses to address argument
to the Court on that very issue.
4. The Argument (hat the Exchange of Notes of 1961 Has Lapsed or Been
Validly Terminated by Reason of the.Development of a New Rule Permitting
Coastal States to Assert Exclusive Fishing Rights over the Waters Above
their Continental Shelves
71. lmplicit in the claim of the Government of lceland to be entitled to
extend their exclusivefishery liniits is the proposition that offshore fisheries are
resources to which lceland hasa sovereign right by virtueof the concept of the
continental shelf. Reference to this concept was made in the resolution
ado~ted bv the Althine on-15 Februarv 1972 1, in the lcelandic Memoründum
ü~i"t'slieriei Juri,,licii.,nin I~cl.inJ" of tebriiar) 1072 ', iiiihc ritcnicni hy
the Iini\icr i,ir I<ireign A1t:iirs i>CI;el.inil ,I.iring ihe dch~lc in lhe (ieiieral
,\>wiiihly ,ii [lie L niied Vdtiiin. 01129Septciiiber 1971 3.4ii.iin ihs >iüicnient
a ~the hliiii<icr for Fi$h:r:e. of Icrl.ind di ihc. \lin:,ier.31 \leetiiig of the
\ürt11 f.t,t Ail~nti.' Fiihcric\ (.i>iiiiiii.;<itIn h l O 15 Ue~cmber
1971 4.
72. It is evident that the Convention on the Continental Shelf, concluded
at Geneva in 1958,does not support that proposition since, by the very terms
of Article 2. the "natural resources" to which that Article refers do not
extend to frek-swimming fish. Lt may also be recalled that, as recently as 1969,
in the North Sra Co,~titretital Sheifcases, the International Court of Justice
acce~ted that this Article was rerrarded as "reflectine. or as crvstallizin~.
- - -.
received or at least emergent rules of custornary international Iaw . .." 5.
73. This being so, the Icelandic claim is tenable only if the Government
Of Iceland cdnshow that. contrarv to the Convention andto~ ~ ~viewex~ressed
by the Court in 1969. a new rule of international law embodying the propo-
sition referred to above has emerged before the inception of theseproceedings
and that, moreover. it is a rule of such a character as to entitle Iceland to
regard the Exchange of Notes of 1961as having lapsed or as being capable,
despite irs own terms, of being unilaterally terminated. The Minister for
Foreign Affairs of lceland in his statement on 29 September 1971,did indeed
refer to a "new system [which] already has the support of the international
community"6. It may also be recalledthat in the dissentingopinion on the
United Kingdom's Request for Interim Measures of Protection in this case
the lcelandic claim was regardecl as one based upon the continental shelf
' SeeEnclosure2 IoAnnex H to theApplication institutingproceedings, P.39. s~pra.
Ibid.. p. 27, srpro.
' Ibid., p.52, sopra.
4 Ihid..,p.55, supro.
I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 39.concept and there was a reference to the "progressive development of inter-
national law" and the "recognition of the concept of the patrimonial sea" 1.
74. Such a claim by Iceland presupposes, first, that a new general rule of
international law has emerged since 1961 by virtue of which a coastal State
may claim exclusive fishing rights in the seas superjacent to its continental
shelf; and, second, that the rule is part of the jus coge!~s and constitutes a
peremptory norm by virtue of which the Exchange of Notes of 1961 becomes
void and is terminated (or mav be unilaterallv terminated des~ite its own
terms). The first part of this probosition is dispu2ted by the Cioveriment of the
United Kingdom. However. this is a matter which pertains more to merits
than to jurisdiction and, since the Court has required this Memorial to be
confined to "the question ofjurisdiclion", it is sufficient for the Government
of the United Kingdom to meet the whole of the lcelandic argument on this
point by contesting the second part of the proposition. For, whatever be the
contemporary rule of international law on exclusive fisheries jurisdiction, it
is clear (hat this rule does not have the character of jus cosens so as to ter-
minate, or override the provisions of, a valid treaty. Accordingly, it is sub-
mitted thal, as a ground for contesting the Court's jurisdiction based upon
the Exchange of Notes of 1961, this Lcelandic argument isuntenable. Lt may
be noted that it has not been repeated in the lcelandic comniunications to the
Court.
75. The concept of termination of existing treaties by reference to an
emerging peremptory norm of international law has always been treated
with great caution and, although finally embodied in Article 64 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. it was intended to be confined to a verr
liniited category of rules having thecharacter ofjits cogens. As i?evident from
the rravairx priparatoires, the International Law Commission had in mind
only "certain rules from Ghich States are not competent to derogate at al1 by
a treaty arrangement" 2.It is not possible that a ruleon exclusive fisheries can
fall into this category. Exclusive fishery limits have always been conceived as
limils within which lhe coastal State mav. not niust. ~rohibit fishing by
foreign vessels. There never has been a ru~e'~reventing acoastal State from
permitting, by custom or treaty arrangement. foreign vessels to fish within its
territorial sea or other exclusive fishërv limits. les on exclusive fisheries
therefore lack the peremptory charactér required for the operation of this
principle. They also lack the generality of application required by the concept
of iilscofenr. Indeed. even those who SUD..'~ the conceDt of a "Datrimoniai
>CA" J.1n,>t en\is.igc ii int.xislirila riile i>fgener~l~pplic.it~<~n;ind I<r.l&nd
itrelf Ii;ii hi~~tcdqLire ehpl~ctl) tnat .The C;overnment of Ice.~nJ dots nd
maintain that the same rule should necessarilv a~*lv .. .l1countries"3. There
can, therefore, be no possibility of the jus cosens doctrine applying to rules
of this kind. It niust also be said that, as with the doctrine rebirssic srunrihiis,
' Order of 17August 1972,pp. 6, 11.
Commentary Io the Dran Articles, etc.. toc.rit.p. 67. Indeed, al an earlier stage,
the Rapporteur hadenviragcd suchpercrnptory norms ascovering only threecategories:
(il rules prohibiting the threat or useof force contrary to the United Nations Charter;
(ii) rules constituting international crimes and (iii) rules req~iiring States to punish or
suppressacts of omissions. See SecoridReport O>rbcLnw ofTmiries, A/CN.4/156 and
Add. 1-3, 1963.Ymrbonkof rhe1.L.C.. Vol. II, p. 52.
Staterncnt by Arnbassador Andersen on 16 March 1971before the Comrnittee on
the Peaceful Usesof the Sea-bedand the Ocean Flaor beyond the lirnits of National
Jurisdiction. repraduced in the Application inrtituting proceedings, Enclosure 2 Io
Annex H, Appendix VI. so too the doctrine ofjris coge~ls demands reference to impartial international
adjudication 1 and does not permit unilateral denunciation of valid treaties.
76. But. just as in the caseof an objection to the Court's jurisdiction based
on rebtts sic .sio,rrih,is (see para. 66 above). an even more fundamental flaw
in an obiection based on iris coeens is that such an obiection can have no
relevancéto the particularobligaÏions which are imposed by the Exchange of
Notes of 1961. Even if there could be a new peremptory rule of international
law ai~thorizinrr coaslal States ti~extend their exclusive fisheries iurisdiction
to the edge of the continental shelf adjacent to them, there could be no conflict
between such a rule and :i treaty obliçütion by which a particular coastal
State has a~reed. first. not to extend its exclusive fisheries limits at any ~iven
tiiiie beyon; what is periiiitted by international law in force at that tirneand,
secondly (and this is what is in issueat the present stageof theseproccedings),
that a disnute concernin~ the lecalitv of anv narticiilar extension should be
referred 10 and deterrilinid by t6e lnternatio~al Court of Justice. The same
would bc truc if the alleged new pereniptory rule were to the eiïect that coastal
States niav extcnd their exclusive fisherv liinits to whatever reasonable
distance they themselves consider expedient (though the Government of
Iceland do not theniselves appear to have put their case in these terms):
there could be no conliict between that rule and the particular obligations
which are imposed by IheExchange of Notes of 1961.(The Governmentof
the United Kingdoii? do not. of course, concede that such a new peremptory
rule has enierged, in either of these forms.)
77. The position is basically that the Government of Iceland, which have
put forward the topic of exclusive fishery zones as oneof thesubjects and
issues that should be considered at the forthcoming Law of the Sea Confe-
rence2, no1only seekta anticipate. by unilateral action. the result which they
would wish to see emerge from that Conference; they also seek ta avoid
independent adjudication on the question whether that action is lawful.
Whatever might be thought of the validity of such a course in the absence of
any relevant treaty provision. ifs invalidity is patent when il takes place in
violation of auiie soecific bilateral treaties such as the Exchanae of Notes of
1961. The atiemptc'd resort to the jus coce,is doctrine fails toiatisfy any of
the conditions required by that doctrine and is in any event entirely irrelevÿnt
to the issues before the Court in this casenot only (as the Governiiient of the
United Kingdom will in due course be prepared ta submit to the Court)
on the riierits but also. and more iiiimediately, on the question of the Court's
jurisdiction. Accordingly it cannot be accepted as a ground for invalidating
or overriding the provisions of the Exchange of Notes of 1961that confer that
jurisdiction.
i ViennaConventionon the Law of Treaties.Articles 64and66.
A/AC.138/51, 13Augusi 1971.The topic is headed"Zones of swcial jurisdiction:
fisheriesand oiher niarine resoilrces;exclusivelirniis and prcferential rights, conser-
vation and nianagementof rcsourccs". PART D
FINAL SUBMISSIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM
1. Summary of Contentions Put Forward in this Memorial
78. The Government of the United Kingdom contend that the considera-
tions of fact and law set out in the foregoing paragraphs of this Memorial
establish the following:
(a) that the Exchange of Notes of 11 March, 1961,always has been and
remains now a valid agreement;
(b) that, for the purposes of Article 36(1) of the Statute of the Court, the
Exchange of Notes of II March, 1961, constitutes a treaty or
convention in force and a submission by both parties to the juris-
diction of the Court in case of a dispute in relation to a claim by
Iceland to extend its fisheriesjurisdiction beyond the limits agreed
in that Exchange of Notes;
(cj that, given the refusal by.the United Kingdom to accept the validity
of unilateral action by Iceland purporting to extend its fisheries
limits (asmanifested in the Aide-Mémoires of the Government of
Iceland of 31 Aueust. 1971. and 24 Februarv. 1972. the Resolution
of theAlthing oiTs Gbruliry. lY7?. xnd the ~egul3tions of 14Jiily.
1972. issued pursuxnt 10 th21 Kcsolution). 3 dispute cxists bctu,een
lccldnd and the I.nitcd Kincdoni \\hich c<institutes ai~-~-r~c~it~in
the terms of the compromis&ry clau; of the Exchange of Notes of
11 March, 1961; and
(dj that the purported termination by Iceland of the Exchange of Notes
of II March, 1961, so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Court is
without legal effect.
2. Submissions of the Government of the United Kingdom
79. Accordingly, the Government of the United Kingdom submit to the
Court that they are entitled to a declaration and iudament that the Court has
full jurisdiciion to proceed to cnieriain the ~~~iic.t~on by the United King-
dom on the merit, of the di\pute
(Signed) H. STEEL,
Agent for the Government of the
United Kingdom.
13 October 1972. MEMORIAL ON JURlSDlCTlON
ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL ON JURISDICTION
Annex A
EXTRACT FROM SPEECHMADE BY MR. SELWYNLLOYD,SECRETARY OFSTATE
FOR FOREIGNAFFAIRS ,O THE GENERAL ASSEMBL YF THE UNITEDNATIONS
ON 25 SEPTEMBE1 R958
"85. The topic of territorial waters and fishing rights will be raised in the
Sixth Committee during the session. This is an even more striking example of
a subject where the principle of interdependence should be recognized. Our
attitude is that this is aatter which must be settled by international
agreement, that unilateral seizure ofs of the high seas under the pretext of
sonie unilateral national decision is quite out of tune with the spirit of the
day. We regret verymuch Our present dispute with Iceland. We have a long
history of mort cordial relations which we wish to restore as quickly as
possible. Our difference is essentially a difference of opinion as tof
lceland is legally entitled to do. The United Kingdom, with other countries,
believes that Iceland is actinglegally. Iceland maintains that it is acting
legally. So1 have this proposition to make. If the lcelandic Governmeis
prepared to agree, let us submit the issue to the InternationaCourt of
Justice. If the law is onland's side, then it has nothing to fear from such a
course:' FISNERIES JURlSOlCTlON
AnnexB
EXTRACT FROM MEMORANOUS MUBMITTED TO THEGENERAL ASSEMBL YF THE
UNITEDNATIONS BY THEGOVERNMEN OF THEUNITEDKINGDOM IN
NovEMBER1958
"THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
In view of thenwillingness of the Governmenof lceland to adopt the
economic amroach and make a fisherv aereement. the Governmeof the
United ~ingdom has suggested that if ihecovernmeof lceland wishes to
base its case upon its rights under international law the two parties should
agree together to seekecision from the International court of Justice: It
is open to the Government of Iceland, which has not accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the InternatiCourt, to indicate at any time that it is
prepared to accept the jurisdiction oftheCourt in this case." Annex C
NOTE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND DATED 18 DECEMBE R958
"No. 32
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the British
Enibassy and has the honour to refer Io the Ernbassy's Note Verbale of
November 10, 1958protesting against actions of lcelandic Coast Guardvessels.
As regards the incidents on September 29 and October 6, dealt with in the
Embassy's Note Verbale, attention is called to the following:
(a) The Coast Guard vesse1Argir observed on September 29 the British
trawler Afridi off Grimsey 5.7 nautical miles withinthe lcelandic fishery
limits. The trawlerwas suspected of having previously violated lcelandic
laws and regulations. For two hours the trawler ignored al1 stop signals
from the Aegir including three blank shots, Iwo of which were fired
within the 12miles fishery liniit. It might be mentioned in this connection
that during this pursuit the Commanding Officer of the British warship
Decoy was overheard to send a message to the A/ridi with 'al1 his
encouragements'.
(b) On October 6 the Coast Guard vesselMaria Jiiliu approached the British
trawler KNigsru,rErneraldengaged in illegal fishing off Glettinganes 1.5
nautical miles within the fishery limits. The trawler ignored ail stop
signals from the patrol boat including five blank shots. The skipper of
the trawler replied to the signals from the MariaJltlia with rude language
and even attempted to ram the patrol boat. The trawler's crew was
armed with long knives.
The lcelandic Government rejects the assertions in the Embassy's Note
Verbale of unwarranted actions on behalf of the lcelandic Coast Guard patrol
againsl the above British trawlers sailing or fishing outside the 12-mile
fisherv limit.
. -
the following should be noted:
As repeatedly pointed out, it is the view ofthelcelandic Government that
the Regiilations issued on June 30, 1958, extending the lcelandic fishery
liiiiits Io 12 nautical iniles, are in conformity international law and were
essential Io safegiiard vital Icelandic interests.
The Governnient of lceland considers that the lcelandic authorities are
legally entitled to take steps to ürrest vessels violatinlcelandic laws and
regiilations. It de~ends on the circumstances whether the arrest is effected
wiÏhin the prescribed limits, whether it has Io be made outside the limits in
conforniity with the princi~les of droif declrasse,or whether legal proceedings
in connection with such violations have to be instituted later in caseswhere
lcelandic authorities have been prevented by foreign military force from
arresting the violators.
As regards the hoif <lechassethe lcelandic Government considers that ilis
sufficient that the required steps be taken before the vesselin question leavesthe 12-mile limit. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas has not been
ratified by the lcelandic Government. In any case that Convention does not
contain any provision concerning the breadth of the territorial sea or the
extent of fishery limits. It is generally agreed, as shown by the recent debate
in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, that
sinc~-these au.stions were left unsetrled as Far as the Geneva Conventions
uereconcerned therornerstoneoftheedihseconsiructed dlGenev:i is Ixchiny.
This tact must be kepi in mind uhen the applization of the Cieneu Conven-
tions is beine considered
The Icelandic Government ~isher to u\e this i,cc&icin to reiterate once iniaire
iis protesi.; againsi British \r,arshipsinierfcringsithIawf~Icnfor:ei~~cni actions
by lcelandicauthorities in lcelandic waters, and reserves al1ils rights in this
connection. At the same time the earnest hope is expressedthat the warships
be withdrawn without further delay.
The Icelandic Government takes note of the statement niade in the Em-
bassy's Note Verbale regarding the readiness of the British Government to
negotiate a reasoiiable interim agreement or nrodt,st'ii'etr<lipending the out-
come of the next United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.althoush
the activities of British warships in lcelandic waters certainly complicate the
whole matter.
As the second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea will be
convened in the near future for the specific purpose of dealing with the
disputed question of the extent of fishery limits as well asthe breadth of the
territorial sea. the lcelandic Government does not consider il practical or
desirable to reîer the matter at the same time to the International Court of
Justice.
The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the
assurance of ils highest consideration.
Ministry for Foreign ARairs,
Reykjavik, December 18, 1958.'' MEMORIALONJURlSOlCTlON
Annex D
DRAFT EXCHANGE OF NOTES PIJT FORWARD BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM ON Y DECEMBER 1960
No. 1
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour to refer to the Fishery Agreement between lceland and
the United Kingdorn signed todiiy. I am to state that the lcelandic Govern-
ment will continue to work for the iniplernentation of the Althing Resolution
of May 5, 1959. regardin3 the extension of fisheries jurisdiction around
Iceland. 1am, nevertheless, to propose:
(i) that six months notice shall be gjven by the lcelandic Governnient Io the
United Kingdom Governrnent of any such extension; and
(ii)that in case of a dispute between the lcelandic Governnient and the
United Kingdom Governnient in relation Io any such extension the
matter shall be referred, at the request of either Party, Io the International
Court of Justice.
2. 1 have the honour Io suggest that this Note and Your Excellency's
reply thereto confirming that the proposals set out inub-paragraphs (iland
(ii) of the first paragraph of this Note are acceptable to the United Kingdom
Government shall be regarded as constitutingan Agreement between Our Iwo
Governments in regard to these proposals.
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of
today's date reading a$follows:
[As in No. Il
2. 1have the honour to state that whilst the United Kingdom Governiiient
affirms that it cannot recognize any extension of fisheries jurisdiwhich is
not in accordance with international law, the proposals set out inub-para-
graphs (i) and(ii)of the first paragraph of Your Note are acceptable Io the
United Kingdorn Government, and Io confirm that Your Excellency's Note
and my present reply thereto will be regarded as constituting an Agreement
between Our Iwo Governments in regard to these proposals. Annex E
Your Excellency,
The discussions which have taken place between representatives of Our
respective Governnients concernirig the fisheries dispute have now been
concluded. It is the understanding of rny Government that this dispute con be
settled on the following basis:
1. United Kingdom Government no longer oppose the Itmile fisheries
liinit around Iceland.
2. Following base lines enter in10 force inimediately:
1-5
12-16
51-42
35-39
3(LI). For a period of three years British irawlers niay engage in trawling
within the zone from 6 to 12 miles as follows:
(1) Horn-Langanes (with the exception of area between Sormsey and the
mainland, delirnited by the lines drdwn from the southernmost tip of
the mainland to the base poiiits of 6 and 8).
Jiine-September.
(2) Langanes-Glettinganes.
May-Deceinber.
(3) Glettingünes-Setusker (20).
January-April and July-August.
(4) Setusker-Myrnatbhui (30).
March-July.
(5) Myiiiatbhui-20" W. longitude.
April-August.
(6) 20" W. longitude-Geirfugladrÿngur (51).
March-May.
(7) Geirfugladrangur-Bjargtangar (43).
March-May.
(8) Bjargtangar-Straumnes (46).
June-October.
(9) Strduinnes-Horn.
March-June.
3 (hl. Proiccted areos hrl,v<,ri6<i~rd12 nzi1c.s.
In following sreas. however, there will bc no tlrilislitrowliiig:
(1) Between 63'37' N. Iatit~idc and 64' 13'N. latitude (south Fanafloi). MEMURIAL ON JURISDICTION 159
(4) Between 14" 15' W. longitiide and 15' 32' W. longitiide (Myrabugt).
(5) Between 16' 12' W. longitiide and 16'46' W. longitude (Ingolfshofdi).
4. Prorecredareosoiirsic/~r.ire12-niilelimir.
There will be no British trdwling during the next three years inside the
following areas between 12and 18 miles:
(1) Bjargtangar-Bardi (45).
January-April.
(2) Bardi-Horn.
Noveniber-Februÿry.
Icelandic Governiiient will continue to work for inipleiiientation of the
Althing resolution of May 5, 1959, regarding extension of fishericsjurisdic-
lion around Iceland. Six months' notice will be given of application of any
such extension and in case of dispiite the measures will ai the rcquest ofthe
several parties, be referred tu the International Court of Justice.
1would propose that in your reply tu this Note you will confirni the above
understanding.
Your Excellency,
Ihavethe honour tu acknowledgethe receipt of the draft Note of today as
follows:
[Assuming No. Il
On behalf of the United Kingdoiii Government I wish tu coiifiriii the
understanding contained in your Note. FISHERIEJ SURISDICTION
Annex F
TEXI OF MESSAGE BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRSD ,ELIVERED
14 DECEMBER 1960
Her Majesty's Ambassador has reported to me the lcelandic Government's
latest proposals for a settlement of the fishery dispute, as set out in the draft
Exchanae of Notes which vou handed to him on December 10. 1am afraid 1
mu4 tell you tliat thew prop<isal\ h3vc coilie16)my G~ivernnicnt as a iesers
\h<ick and d.v,ipp,iininientI iiecd hardly ssy thai uisli fur noili!n% niore
than to strengthëri relations between Our two countries as traditionalfriends
and as fellow-members of NATO. To that end we have striven hard to reach
a settlement of the dispute. You have told us that your Government also-
sincerely desire a settlement. This had encouraged us to hope that despite the
difficulties on both sides it would be possible to find a compromise be-
tween Our respective positions. It was in the spirit of compromise and in
an earnest attempt to reach an agreement that we put forward the proposals
which theAmbassador conveyed to you on 9 December.
2. These went a very long way to meet you in recognition of Iceland's
special situation in regard to fisheries. Not only were we willing to accept a
transitional period much shorter than that envisaged in the United States/
Canadian proposal, but in recognition of your Government's interna1 diffi-
culties we were ready to go much further. We were willing to agree to a severe
curtailment of Our industry's freedom to fish within the 6-12 mile zone, to
accept the immediate introduction of four new baselines for the purpose of
delimiting that zone. and even to consider the exclusion of Our vessels from
an area outside 12 miles during a reasonable transitional period. The cumu-
lative effect ofthese further concessions by us would have been to deprive
Our industry of most of the benefit which transitional arrangements were
intended toprovide. Finally, we were prepared to accept a leCssatisfactory
form of assurance in regard to future action by the lcelandic Government
than that which we considered desirable.
3. Your Government's present position appears, if I may say so,to take
little account of Our proposals, andyour draftExchange of Notes does not, as
we would wish, constitute an Agreement between the two Governments. Nor
do the lcelandic proposals meet our three basic requirements for the terms of
an Agreement which were made clear in the Ambassador's communication of
December 9. These are:
(1) lhr. assiirsnre \hoiild be rei oui in dn E\:hdnge 3f N<itci eiprcssly statcd
ios~initit~ic an ,\çreeinen\rIii~h noiildinller Msjer~)'~ Gavcrnnieni',
view, be the onlv wav of binding both oarties to acceit the iurisdiction
of the internation coalrt of ~uitice in'the event of any dispute arising
over extensions of fishery jurisdictionWe regard this as cssential if we
aregoing to achieve stability in Our futurefishery relations as weearnestly
desire;
(ii) the transitional period should befive years, although in order to meet you
we have offered to consider a shorter period if you are ready to eliminate
the outside area in return for additional restrictions on Our vessels in
the 6 to 12-mile zone off the north-west Coast; MEMORIAL ON IURISDICTION 161
(iii) it should be expressly stated as part of the Agreement that the proposed
baseline changes, to be introduced on the entry into force of the
Agreement, are solely for the purpose of the delimitation of the fishery
zone around Iceland.
1; addition the proposals envisaged for restrictions on Our vessels in the 6 to
12-milezone go beyond what we had been led to believe in London would be
acceptable Io you.
4. 1was glad ta hear that you had informed Mr. Stewart that your Govern-
ment. might be prepared to meet us ta some extent over the forniula on
baselines as set out in paragraph 3 (iii) above.1much regret, however, that
even if this point were satisfactorily settled yourovernment's proposals in
their present form would be wholly unacceptable to us.
5. 1 am sure you realize as well as 1 do the serious consequences which
would result if wefailed to reach agreement and, in particular, the harm which
would be caused to Anglo-Icelandic relations. 1sincerely trust, therefore, that
your Government will be prepared to reconsider their position. Annex G
DRAFT EXCHANCE OF NOTESPUT FORWARO BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITEDKINGDOM ON I~I)ECEMBER 1960
(No. I)
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour to refer to the discussions which have taken place in
Revkiavik and London this autumn betweenreoresentatives of our resoective
GGLrnments concerning the fisheries dispute'between our two coun'tries. 1
now have the honour to make the following pro-o~als for the settlement of
the dispute:
(1) The United Kingdom Governnient will no longer object to a 12 mile
fishery rone around lceland nieasured from the baselines specified in
paragraph 2 below which relate solely to the deliniitation of that zone.
(2) The baselines which will be usedfor the purpose referred to in paragraph 1
above will be those set out in the lcelandic Regulation No. 70 of July 1,
1958, as modified by the use of baselines drawn between the following
points:
A. Point 1 (Horn) to Point 5 (Asbutharif)
B. Point 12 (Langanes) Io Point 16 (Glettinganes)
C. Point 51 (Geirfugladrangur) to Point 42 (Skalasnagi)
D. Point 36 (Einidrangar) to Point 51 (Geirfugladrangur)
These modifications will enter into force immediately.
3. For a period of three years frorn the acceptance of these proposals, the
lcelandic Government will not obiect to vessels reeistered in the United
Kingdorn fishing within the outer 6 miles of the fishery rone referred Io in
paragraph I above within the following areas during the periods specified:
(i) Horn (Point 48)-Laganes (Point 12) (June to September)
(ii) Lûnganes (Point 12)-Glettinganes (Point 16) (May Io Deceniber)
(iii) Glettinganes (Point 16)-Setusker (Point 20) (January to April and July
to Augiist)
(iv) Setusker (Point 20)-(Point 30) (March to July)
(v) Point 30.20' West Ionai-ude (Aoril Io Auaust)
t\ii20 \\'ci[ longii~dr.-C;cirfii~I~~Jrkng~tPoint 51) t\lari11 to \I.iyi
(VIII Cicirfugl~dran~ur (1',11nt51~.Bj,~rglan~ar (l'o1111431 (>Iar,~ll Io 3l~lyl.
4. There will, however, be no fishing by vessels registered in the United
Kingdoni in the outer 6 miles of the fishery zone referred to in paragraph I
during aforesaid period of three years in the following areas:
(i) Between 63'50' north latitude and 64' 13' north latitude south of
Faxafloi
(ii) Between 64' 40' north latitude and 64" 52' north latitude (Snaefellanes)
(iii) Between 65Onorth latitude and 65" 20' north latitude
(iv) Between Bjargtangar (Point 43) and Horn (Point 48)
(v) Off the mainland between 18' 30'east longitude and Point 8 (the precise
area to be determined) (vi) Between 14O58' Westlongitude and 15" 32' west longitude (Myrabugt)
(vii) Between 16" 12' Westlongitude and 16' 46' Westlongitude (Ingolfshofdi).
5. The lcelandic Government while continuing to work for the iniplemen-
talion of the Althing Resolution of 5 May. 1959. regarding the extension of
fisheries iurisdiction around Iceland, will give to the United Kingdom
Goi,crniiient si.: ni6lnth\' n<>iiceoiany ~;h e.yierisioii. anJ inia.eoi~Jiip.iie
in rcldt.on Io su;h e\ieiis.on. !ne iil.itier \h;Iihe reqiic*t oieitlieplrry. hc
referred to the International Court of Justice.
I have the honour 10 suggest that this Note and your Excellency's reply
thereto confirming that the proposais set out in this Note are acceptable to
the United Kingdom Governnicnt shall be regarded as constituting an
agreement between our two Governiiients on this matter which shall enter
into force immediaiely.
(No. 2)
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of
today's date reading as follows:
[As in No. Il
I have the honour to state that in view of the exceptional dependence of the
lcelandic nation upon coasliil fisheries for their livelihood and econoiiiic
develooment. and without ~rciudice to the rights of the United Kingdoiii
under international law, theproposals set out in Your Note are acceptable to
the United Kingdom Government. and I confirm that Your Note iind iiiy
present reply thereto shall be regürded asconstituting an Agreement between
our two Governments on these iiiatters which shall enter in10 force iiiime-
diately.164 FISHERIES JURISDICTION
Annex H
LETTERFROMSECRETARY OFSTATE FOR FOREIGNAFFAIRS TO FOREIGN
MINISTER OF ICELANO,DATED21 DECEMBER 1960, AND
ENCLOSINCTWO DRAFTEXCHANCES OF NOTES
TEXT OF LETTER
December 21, 1960.
As I lold you yesterday, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
would be prepared to accept a settlement of the Fisheries dispute on the terms
which are, asexplained below, embodied in the two draft Exchanges of Notes
which 1am sending you herewith. It is my understanding that the substance of
these ternis, al which we have arrived after such lengthy discussions, is also
acceptable to your Governiiient and that theonly point of difierence remaining
between us is the forni which rhe settlement should take.
You explained to me that the lcelandic Government see difficulty in calling
the settlenient an agreement and in accepting the registration with the Secre-
tariat of the United Nations of a document which embodies the proposed
arrangenients for continued fishing inside 12 miles during the transitional
period. i explÿined to you that Her Majesty's Government consider it essential
that the terms of the Assurance that any dispute on future extensions of
fishery jurisdictiobeyond 12 miles would be referred to the International
Court of Justice, should be embodied in a form which is an Agreement
registered with the Secretariat of the United Nationin accordance with the
provisions of the Charter. Article 102of the Charter specifically provides that
unless so registered the Agreement cannot be invoked before any organ of
the United Nations.
In order to assis1the Icelaiidic Government in overcoming the dificultyto
which you referred, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to accept
an arrangement divided into two halves, namely:
fi) an agreement in the terms of the draft Exchanges of Notes Nos. 1 and 2
attached dealing with the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in any future dispute. which would be registered with the Secre-
tariat of the United Nationsunder Article 102 of the Charter. and
(ii) an Exchange of Notes as set out in the draft notes Nos. 3 a4daltached
which would not be registered with the Secretariat of the UnitedNations
but which would state the terms on which the fisheries dispute had been
settled.
1 am niaking this suggestion in the earnest hope that it will eoable us to
reach a settlement of a dispute whose continuance might have such dangerous
consequences for al1 of us. 1 greatly hope that it will be acceptable to your
Government. TEXT OF DRAFT EXCHANGES OF NOTES
A. First Exchange
No. I
Draft Nore /rom llle Foreign Mii~dfer of Icrla~lri
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour to refer to the discussionswhich have taken place in
Reykjavik and London this autuinn between representatives of Our respective
Governments concerning the fisheries dispute between Our two countries,
and to the settlenient of that dimute the terms of which are set out in Notes
c\cli:#iiged ihis.i.ijhstvecn iiioii hcli.ili,iour re\pecii\c <io~erriiiicni~.
1 fi.riher hx\e ihe Iic~ndi~rIO III.~!.~!lie i,3llo!\.rig proposI<:
Ille I-r.3iidic Goveriiiiieiir\riIlisiiiinuç id uork idr ille iiiiplçrnen-
isti,!n c>ltlic Alihinà Re~olui~,~iii5th h1.i~. 1959. replirdingtlice~lcnr~~n
df fislierici i~rij,l.ii.on:irdiinJ I~claiid. but sti:tll rire Io ihc Uniied
Kingdom ~overnment six months' notice of any such extension, and in
case of a dispute in relation to such extension, the matter shall, at the
request of either Party, be referred to the International Court of Justice.
1 have the honour to sucee-- rhat this Note and Your Excellencv's re~lv . .
thereto accepting the above proposal shall constitute an agreement on this
matier between Our two Governments which shall have effect from today's
date.
I have the honour to be, etc.
No. 2
Drafr Ul~iiedKil~gdomReply ro No. 1
Your Excellency,
I have the honour to acknowledae rec-iot of Your Excellencv's Note of
today's date reading as follows:
[As in No. 11
1have the Honour to confirrn that the proposals made in Your Excellency's
Note is acceptable to the Government of the United Kingdoni and that that
Note, together with this reply, shall constitute an agreement on this niatter
between Our two Governnients which shall have effect from today's date.
1 have the honour, etc. B. Second Exchange
No. 3
Drafr Norefrom the Foreigti Mitrisfer of Iceland
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour to refer to the discussions which have taken place in
Reykjavikand London this autunin between representatives of our respective
Governrnents concerning the fisheries dispute between Our two countries. In
view of thesediscussions, my Governnient is willing 10 settle the dispute on
the following terms:
1. The United Kingdoni Governnient will no longer object to a 12-mile
fishery zone aroond lceland nieasured from the baselines specified in para-
graph 2 below which relate solely to the delimitation of that zone.
2. The baselines which will be usedfor the purpose referred to in paragraph
I above will be those set out in the lcelandic Regulation No. 70 of 1st July
1958,as modified by the useof baselinesdrawn between the following points:
A. Point I (Horn) to Point 5 (Asbutharif).
B. Point 12(Lançanes) to Point 16 (Glettinganes).
C. Point 51 (Geirfugladrangur) to Point 32 (Skalasnagi).
D. Point 35 (Geirfugladrangur) to Point 39 (Eldeyjadrangur).
These niodifications will enter into force immediately.
3. For a period of three years from the date of Your Excellency's reply to
this Note, the lcelandic Government will no1object to vesselsregistered in the
United Kingdoni fishing within the outer 6 miles of the fishery zone referred
to in püragraph 1 above within the following areas during the periods
specified:
(i) Horn (Point 48)-Langanes (Point 12) (June-September).
(ii) Lansanes (Point 12)-Glettinganes (Point 16) (May-December).
(iiiGlettinganes (Point 16)-Setusker (Point 20) (January-April and July-
Augiist).
(iv) Sctiisker (Point 20)-(Point 30) (March-July).
(v) Point 30-20" W. longiti~de (April-August).
(vil 20"W. longitude-Geirfiiglad (rÿinguSI) (March-May).
(vii) Geirfugladrangur (Point 51)-Bjargtangar (Point 43) (March-May).
4. There will, however, be no fishing by vessels registered in the United
Kingdolii in the outer 6 niiles of the fishery zone referred to in paragraph I
during the aforesaid period of three years in the following areas:
(i)Between 63'37 N. latitude and 64" 13' N. kalitude south of Faxafloi.
(ii) Between 64'40' N. latitude and 64" 13. N. Latitude (Snaefellanes).
(iii) Between 65'N. latitiideand 65" 20'N. latitude.
(iv) Between Bjarçtangar (Point 43) and Horn (Point 48).
(v) Off the iiiainland between 18'30' W. longitude and Point 8 (the precise
ared to be deterniined).
(vi) Between 14' 58' W. longitude and 15' 32' W. longitude (Myrabugt).
(vii) Between 16" 12'W. longitude and 16' 46' W. longitude (Inçolfshofdi).
1 have the honour to suggest that this Note and Your Excellency's reply
thereto will confirni that ils contents are acceptable to the United KingdomGovernment, and that the settlement of the dispute has been accomplished
on the terins stated therein. The settlement will become eiïective forthwith.
No. 4
Drafr Unired Kit~gdomReply ro h'o.3
Your Excellency.
1 have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of
today's date reading as follows:
[As in No. 3.1
1 have the honour to confirm that in viewof theexceptional dependenceof
the lcelandic nation upon coastal fisheries for their livelihood and econo~nic
developiiient, and without prejudice to the rights of the United Kingdoiii
under international Iriw. the contents of Your Excellency's Note are accep-
table to the United Kingdom, and the settlement of the dispute has been
accoiiiplished on the terins stated therein. 1 also confiriii that the United
Kingdom Governiiient agrees that the settlement will beconie efictive forth-
with. Annex 1
TRANSLATION OF MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO ALTHING ON 28 FEBRUARY 1961
TOGETHER WlTH DRAFT EXCHANGE OF NOTES
Bill on Parliatnentary Resolution for the'Settlement of the
Fishery Dispute with Britain.
(Ii~rrod~~ce~Nli the Alrlring al Ils 81sr Legirlorive Convention, 1961)
The Althine resolves Io oermit the Gove-nm~nt to settl-~the fisherv disoute
- ~ , ~.
with tlriiain in harniùny wiih the Note which is prinied ir,iih this Resoluiion.
1l'here follo\rs the iehi ofihe draft Soie from the Foreig- Miniiier of Iceland.
in English and Icelandic.]
Commenrs on rhis Resolrtrion
The Darlianientarv resolution which is under debate vermils the Govern-
nicni. ilIIir pasicd. io sciile ihe fi\hery dispute \\,iih Llritun in h;irliiony \rith
ihe Soie iihi~h is prinieu ii:ih ihc resoluii~iiiiibang considered ceriain ihnt
the British Governilient will agree to this solution,
This solution implies four main points:
(1) Britain recognizes immediately the 12-mile fishery zone of Iceland.
(2) Britain recognizes important changes in the baselines in four places
around the couniry, which entends the fishery zone by 5,065 square
kilomeires.
(3) British ships will be permitted Io fish within specified areas between the
6 and 12-mile limits for a limited period each year during the next three
yearj.
(41 The Governiiieni i~f leeland declares thai il will continue Io irork for the
iiiiplenicniaiion ofihç parlmiiieni:iry rcioluiion of 5 May. 1959.regarding
the cxlen~.oii uf the lisherie, iurisdictii~n aroiind Iceland and thai any
dispute on actions that may betaken, will be referred to the ~nternational
Court of Jiistice.
Before these four points are explained fhrther. it is necessary to retrace
briefly Iceland's actions in the fishing limits question.
Icela~rd'sAcrioi~ in rlie Fishing Limirs Qvcsrio~i
Needless to sav. ilhas for a lone time eiven rise to ~is~~.e amone States.
how territorial rGhts should be deïermined.
When Iceland's position is considered, where there are rich fishing banks
al1 around the country and the nation basesils survival in large measure on
the utilization of the fish stock in these banks, it is obvious what importance
mus1 be attached to further developments in this field.
The treatv which Denmark made withBritain in 1901.orovidine. for a 3-mile
territorial lcmit around Iceland, had a fateful eflect on ihe preser;ation of fish
stocks around this country by reducing immensely the protection which they enjoyed as long as the fishing by foreigners was not allowed within 4 miles,
counting from straight baselines.
Long before the Iast war, il had become clear that the existing territorial
limits 'did not give the fish stock sufficient protection and that the Icelandic
fisheries.were in daneer owing to-over-fishine. A-ter the war. stem were taken
t<>prepsrc mcs*urcj ti>proteLi ihc ti4i it<i:lr\ OITI:e14nJ. Iii the sesr 1948. a
I;iarr.ir pasicd on ihe S~.ieniiiic Proic~tii,n of risliin~ Banks on ilir Ci~ritt-
nental ~helf, where the Minister of Fisheries was permitted to makerules on
fishing within the limits of the Continental Shelf.
In the year 1950, the first regulation was issued on the basis of the law on
the Continental Shelf, but it affected only the North of Iceland. The treaty
with Brilain from 1901 was then still in force. With this regulation was ini-
tiated the policy which has subscquently been followed as far as baselines
are concerned. Straight baselines were then determined in that area and al the
same lime fishery liniits were set at 4 nautical miles froni baselines.
The treaty with Britain could be terminated by 2 years' notice and such
notice had been served in October 1949, so that the treaty expired in October
1951. About that time the case between Britain and Norway on baselines off
Norway had been taken for judgment before the lnternational Court of
Justice in The Hague and judgment was pdssed in December 1951. The
Nonvegians won the case in al1 ils main features and thereby obtained
recognition of the straight baselines, from which they had medsured their
territorial waters. This judgment of the lnternational Court of Justice was of
great general importance in determining baselines and formulating rules on
this niatter.
On 19 March 1952,the Government of Iceland issued a regulation effective
for the whole country, where straight baselines weredrawn and fishery limits
determined 4 nautical miles from these lines.
The British Government and the Governments of three other coiintries
protested against these actions of lceland but did not take further steps. On
the other hand, the Federation of British Trawler Owners imposed a landing
ban on lcelandic iced fish al British vorts.
Segi>iisiionr vcrc sc,nJiicted hcinecri ttie lccland~can~i Hr~t~sl iIL~~~~>~IIICS,
\ilicrc' hoth p.artici c~prc\scJ ihcir i'icrr5 citnccrning ihe c\icniton si the
lijher! it.r.~di~iioii ,ind ihc I.in<linr h.in lii ihc iir\t hl<ii1953.for iiisiaiice.
the possibility of referring the disPute on the regulation of 19 March 1952th
the lnternational Court of Justice was discussed, and on 24 April 1953 the
Minister of lceland in London informed the British Foreign Office that the
1~cl.indic Ci<i\crniiicnt -3% prepïred IO rckr tlii<Jispiitc to ihe Inirrri~iion~l
<:t)~ri ofJ~rticc .ind ll>.xiilu;isrc.id) io Jii<ii\\ niih tliçHritihh Gi>\crnmcnt,
in u,h;,i iii.inncr iliijhoiild bc Jonc. on ilic coniliiion tIi~ithe 1.indiiig h~n
would be immediately lifted, as soon as agreement had been reached &n the
way ofdealing wilh the case.
This did not materialize, asthe British Government did no1consider itself in
a position to ensure that the condition of the Icelandic Government of lifting
the landing ban before the casewas referred to the Court would be fulfilled.
The landing ban was not lifted until November 1956. after agreement had
been reached, through the intervention of the OEEC, between Icelandic and
British trawler owners, where rules were set out for the landing of Icelandic
fish on ice at British ports, and this agreement is still in force.
The next action of the lcelanders in the fishery limits matter was regulation
No. 70 of 30 June 1958, where the fishing limits were extended to 12 miles. It
was, however, not considered possible 10 change the baselines. About that time, the British Government asked the lcelandic Government
for talks regarding the solution of the fishery dispute. The Government
acceded to this request, according to the following Press report from the
Foreign Ministry on 10August 1960:
"The British Government hits requested the Government of lceland
that talks be taken up between theiii on the present dispute regarding
the position of British fishing vessels on lcelandic fish banks. As the
lcelandic Government considers it a niatter of course 10 investigale
tho~o~rhlv al1 exnedients which niirht orevent further clashes on the
-, ~~7 -.
Icelandic fishing grounds, besides the necessity for promoting the iniple-
mentation of the Althins Resolution of May 5th. 1959, il has declared
iiself prepared 10 start iuch talks, at the same time as it has again
emphasised to the British Government that itconsiders that 1cel;tnd has
an indisputable right according 10 international Iaw 10 the fisheries
jurisdiction which has already been decided."
The talks with the British began in Reykjavik on I October 1960. Now that
they are finished, the Governiiient considers that il is possible 10 solve the
fishery dispiite on the basis of thç Note which accompanies this draft resolu-
lion. The niatter is thus introduced in the Althingfor making a decision on il,
' the Priine Minister having declared \r,hen the Althing convened that Althing
would be consulted before a final decision was niade.
It will now be explained closer. what is involved in the solution of ihe dis-
pute in detail:
Brilui~r Recop~iize.~ 12 Miles uird New Baseli~frs
According to item I in the Note, it is provided that the British Government
will no longer object to a 12-iiiile fisheries jiirisdiction round Iceland and
this jiirisdictionis reckoned froni ncw baselines, as will be mentioned later.
With this agreement, lceland obtsins Britain's recognition of the 12-iiiile
liniit and itis obvious. of how great an iinportance this is, no1 least with
regard to the Tact that up to now Britain has neither recognized fornially
the 4-iiiile fisheries jurisdiction froiii1952 nor the 12-iiiile jurisdiction froiii
1958.
In iteiii 2 of the Note there is provision for the drawing of new baselines.
niore favourable to us than thosc which have applied hitherto. The changes
which there will be ai four important places around the country will now be
explained.
The first change is on the Hiinafloi. Ils eiTectis 10 decreasethe nuiiiber of
baseline points. The line will be drawn straight across the bay, between the
outeriiiost points, Horn and Asbiidarrif. I3y this change. the area inside the
12-iiiile liiiiit is extended by 972 sqit;ire kiloriietres. This area is no1 oiily of
iiiiport;iiice to those who fish there, but also to fishing east and west of'this
area, owingto the fish-runs in theseparts and bcsidcs it gives added protection
to siiiall fish which live there.
The second change is south of Langanes and this also eliiiiinates three base-
line points. The baseline will be drawn straight across the moiiths of three
bays, Bakkafloi, Vopnafjordur and Heradsfloi, besides Borgarfjordur. froiii
Langanes io Glettinganes. The increase in the area inside the 12-mile limit
here anioiints to 1033square kilonietres. This srea holds iriiportant breediiig
places for young fish which \vil1 now have added protection asainsi trawl-
fishing. This protection, therefore, is of Tÿr-reaching importance. the area
being freqiiented by fishing boats froiii iiiiiny parts of the East Coast Firths. The third baseline change is in the Faxafloi and leads Io an elimination of
two baseooints. but in addition Geirfual-dranaur.is now absorbed in the base-
Iine ,),icrl;ir.i.ind the cù.intry anJ ihe <i>iiihsrn end of the F.iuaHoi Iine 1e:iJs
IO ihi5 p<>ini.c;eiri.igl-iJrdiigii\\a. ftrrriierlan indepenileni h~,el:iie plx~.c.
The nt~riticrn enii of ihc ~.isel iic lcüIO SLalasnag: ai Snaefcllsnes u hich h.1~
heen ihe ii~iriherniiiu~i i>fthree ha,cline points on ihe pen:nrulü. Thii change
in ilie haseline hrings sn iiiireùse i11860 .qu-ire kiloiiieires in the are- wiihin
the 12-mile limii. ~he iiiiportance of this increase is obvious.
Finally there is the fourth baseline change and the greatest one, i.e., on
Selvogsbanki. Three baseline points are eliminated there and the line will be
drawn from Geirfuglasker, south of Vestmannaeyjar, to Eldeyjardrangur west
of Reykjanes. Thereby the fishery jurisdiction increases by 2,200 square
kiloiiietres. Here are the iiiost important spawning-grounds of white-fish of
Iceland. More ships fish in this area than elsewhere around Iceland. It is
difficult to evaluate the greiit iniportance of this change of baseline for al1
fishing off Iceland in the futiire.
The four baseline chanees which are ~lanned will altogether lead to an
increase in the fisheries jurysdiciion by 5,065 square kilometres.
These changes in baselines take eRect as soon as the dispute is settled and
will not be repealed
Limirrd Fishiiig Pcrmissioii for ilrilaiil for ThreeYrars
In Articles 3 and 4 of the Note are provisions for British ships being
permitted 10 fish between 6 and 12miles in areasand at tinies of the year more
closely defined, and this shall apply for the next three years. At the sanie tinie
it is provided that there will be specially defined areas between the 6 and 12
niiles which will be coinpletely closed to fishing by British trawlers.
When the provision for the permission for the British to fish between 6 and
12 miles is studied, regard must be taken to three items which are of the
utmost importance. In the first place. the baseline changes which have been
mentioned, and in the second place the areas which are entirely exempted
where British ships may never fish and in the third place. the limited lengih
of time each year when the fishing is permitted.
In the area froni Horn 10 Lançanes there has been made an important
change in the baseline OR Hunafloi. Furtherniore the area between Grimscy
and land iientirely closed. The same applies to the areü around Kolbeinsey.
where there is often niuch stiiall fry. For a period of three years. British ships
will, however, be allowcd Io fish in other places in this area between the 6 and
12 iiiiles. but only 4 iiionths a year in the period Jiine-Septeiiiber, so that
their total fishing iinie wiihin the 12-mile liniit will be one year.
In the fishing area of the East Coast boats, froiii Langanes to Myrnatangi,
the baseline change soiiih of Langanes is of niuch iiiiportance. OR the East
Coast and the Souih East Coast, fishing by British ships is perniitted for
varying lengths of time each year. To the north. where a baseline change is
niade. the fishing titiie is the longest, 8 monihs. in the period from May-
December. Altogethcr this time will be two years, and owing to the change
of the baseline. a considerable portion of the srea will be outside the present
12-niile liniit.
In the central area. beiween Glettinganes and Setusker of Reydarfjordur,
fishing by British ships betu,een6 and 12iiiiles is pcrniitted for 6 months each
year, during the tiionths January/April and July and August. Altogether the
fishing titne here in the three-year period will be one year and a half. In the southernmost area, whichextends fromSetuskerto Myrnatangi in the
Medalland Bay, British ships are permitted to fish between 6 and 12miles for
five months, March-July. The important exception is made, however, ihat
there are two places off Hornafjordur and Ingolfshofdi, where this fishing is
prohibited, these areas having been lately of much importance to cod
fishing by motor boats.'When these areas are excepted, British ships are
allowed to fish for 15 months altogether during the three-year period.
From Myrnatangi to 20' W. longitude.which is somewhat east of Vest-
mannaeyjar, British are allowed to fish between the 6 and 12 miles for 5
months, April-August. Their tot;il lime for fishing in the three-year period
will also here be 15 months.
Then we have arrived at the area from 20" W. longitude to Geirfugla- .
drangur, i.e., the fishing grounds around Vestmannaeyjar and on the Selvogs-
banki. The great change in baselines on Selvogsbanki will of course be
effective here. A very large area which is now outside the 12-mile limit will
through this change came within the 12-mile limit and the main part of that
area where British ships will be allowed to fish in the months March-May
each year for three years will be outside the present 12-mile limit.
From Geirfugladrangur to Bjargtangar, off Faxafloiand Breidafjordur, the
baseline changes will be of great importance to Faxafloi. Here are also three
areas which will be entirely closed, for the protection of cod net-fishing.
Outside these closed areas British ships will be allowed to fish between the 6
and 12-mile lines for three years in the months March-May, or for a total of
nine months.
Finally there is the area off the Vestfirdir, from Bjargtangar Io Horn. It is
not provided that British ships will be permitted any fishing inside the 12-mile
limit there.
Permar~entIncreasein the FisheriesJ!rrisdiclionby
5,065 SqrroreKilometres
On considering these items as a whole and viewing those areas and the
periods during which British ships will be permitted to fish between 6 and 12
miles. the folÏowine is clear:
l~cixndic ships fiih. ro be rurc. riiost of thc lime in al1thcjc lire3. The tish
c.it;liciArc. hoitcier, very tluctu.iiinr: in quantity and arc dependent oii the
fi\h-riin fr<omycar ti>yeÿr In dctcriiiiniiig fisliing pcrmiti for the nriiiihthe
ekperience <ifpa\t )cars has becn taken intu :iccount. ainiing 10causethe least
po<sible danilige 10 thc fi\licr). uf the Icel~nderr theniscl\eï.
In this connection ilis interestine to note the auantitv of fish broug-t on
\h<ire in thc JilTereiit partdi the r.o.intry. The folli~\ring suiiiniary shoiii the
qiiantity of the c.~t;h of thc lïsh~n!:ho~ts ohi~h \$lis landcd in the gear 1959,
hein%the I.ist )e>r for irhich final iiii,orni:itiuis ai,ailahle. Il is slso show.
whit pcrcentlige carh area prodiiies of the 10131 catch of thç boat tleet. This
sunitiiary is conipiled I'roiii the reliortr of the I<cl.indic Fishery Society:
tons %
Vestfirdir (North-West area) , . . 27,271 12.0
North Coast, West (~jupavik-~renivik) . . 19,955 8.9
North Coast, East (Grimsey-Thorshofn) . . 5,540 2.5
East Coast (Bakkafjordur-Hornafjordur) . . 13,722 6.1
South-West Coast (Vestmannaeyjar-
Stykkisholmur) . . , . . . 157,111 70.3 As a whole, the area between 6 and 12 miles where it is provided that the
British will be permitted to fish is 14,487 square kilometres. Here.it must,
however, be considered that the fishing is only to be permitted for three
years and secondly the length of lime each year is limited 10 three to eight
months. When this is taken into consideration, the areas mentioned would
equal to a permission for the British to fish on 5,500 square kilometres for
three years. This is about 435 square kilometres more than the total area of
5,065 square kilometres which the increase within the 12-mile limit atnounts
to owing to changes in baselines. But the diference is that the area which is
acquired owing to the change in baselines leads to an irrevocable increase in
.........ries iurisdiction.
The following suiniiiary shows thearea of the lcelandic fisheriesjurisdiction
froiii the tiiiie stem were first taken to incerase it up to the changes in baselines
which arc provided for in the Note:
SC,.hm
3 iiiile fishery liniit .:..... 24,530
4 iiiile (1952) ......... 42,905
12 iiiile (1958) ...... 69.809
12 niile (changed baselines 1961) ..... 74,874
At the end of the Note there are Iwo items of consequence. The Govern-
ment declares that it will continue to work for the in~plementation of the
Althine resolution of 5 Mav 1959 rerardins the extensions of the fisheries
jurisdirtion around Iceland. such an entcnsiln would. however. be notilied to
the British Governnient six nionths in advance, and if a dispute arises in
connection with these measures, this shall bc referred to the International
Court of Justice, should either one of the parties request it. These provisioiis
are in harmony with the proposais andattitude of lceland at both Geneva
Conferences on the Law of the Sea. At both these conferences it was nioved
on Iceland's behalf that where a nation bases its existence on fisheries along
the Coast, special conditions shall prevail for the coastal country over and
above the general fishery liniitations, anydispute being referred to a court of
arbitration. These motions were overruled.
At the former Geneva Conference there was agreement on a treaty for the
protection of fishing banks on the high seaswhich lceland signed. There it is
provided that under special circumstances and when negotiations with other
States involved have not led to results, a coastal country can deterinine
unilateral measures for protection. Such steps shall bc based on scientific
necessity and the same rules shall apply to foreign subjects as to citirens of'
the country itself. A court of arbitration deciiles the issue in case of dispute.
At this Conference there was also passed a resolution reconimending that
nations concerned should CO-operate in ensuring the priority of a coastal
State, when it was necessaryto take measures against over-fishing and it was
decided that a court of arhitration should settle disputes.
In theNote whichaccompatiies this Althing resolution there is no obligation
implied Io adhere to the material limits decided in Geneva. On the other hand,
those means which were agreed upon in Geneva are of course still open.
Finally if is provided in the Note that it,together with the reply of the
British Government, where the British Governnient confirms ils contents, be
registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. ln Article 102of the United Nations Charter it is stated that only agreements that are so
registered can be handled bv the International Court of Justice. should a
dispute arise concerning th& implementation. This provision h a direct
consequence of what has been said about reference of the matter to the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
A Favourable.Solution
Attempts at establishing general rules for the extent of fisheries jurisdiction
have failed.
The lcelanders have already won a great deal, but the fisheries dispute with
Britain still prevails and it is certain that it will flame up again, if nothing is
done about it.
Iceland is not the only State which has came into conflict with others ovet
the extent of its fisheries jurisdiction. Different kinds of disputes over these
matters have been settled with agreements between States. Examples close at
hand are the Russian, Danish and Norwegian agreements with Britain. In
1956 Britain made an agreement with the Soviet Union on the rights of
British fishing vessels to fish within the Ibmile limits off the North Coast of
the Soviet Union. Accordine to this agreement. British shios are nermitted to
fish up to a three-mile limitin specified areas.~he agreement ;as made for
five years and will he automatically renewed. if not terminated hy one year's
notice by either Party. The agreement was not terminated and therefore
remains in force for the next five years.
In 1955 Britain made an agreement with Denmark on fishery limits off the
Faroe Islands. It was a auestion of some chances -n baselines but the fishins .
Iimiis iiere sfier hef.>rï deteriiiined al3 iiiiles. This agreement u.ir niade
l'or 10?cars. In 1959 3 iisa .igreeiiiena;i, iiilde hclaeen the ,>me pdrlici on
the territorial waters at the Faroe Islands. According ta this agreement,
Britain recognised a 6-mile fisheries jurisdiction around the isles, which
should be measured from the low-water line. Between 6 and 12 miles there
were also specified three comparatively small areas where only line and hand-
linefishing is permitted at specified times, and this is valid only for British
ships. The agreement is in force for three years, but can be terminated after
thaf with one year's notice. From the time this agreement was made, other
nations have heen excluded from fishing between the 6 and 12-mile limits
around the Faroe Islands on the grounds that they had not formerly been
fishing regularly in that area.
Last Autumn Britain made an agreement with Norway. According to it,
Britain recognizes a I2-mile fishing limit off Norway, which shall however not
came into force until after 10 years. During this period, British ships are
permitted to fish in the outer 6-mile zone, with the exception of four specified
areas which are entirely closed ta trawl-fishing, and this applies also to
Norwegian ships.
From these exam~les it ~~sclear that other nationshave been willine.-o make
conridc~iblc c~)~i~e~~ior Ii\ bc xble io ehicnd their li>heries~urisdiciion \sith-
out iimiing !ni<>c<>nfli;iuirh oilicrs. hlo IILII,I~IS~iioredependeni on firhing
than Icelanders, nor more in need to keep the peace on the fishing hanks
around their country. We now have two choices, to continue the dispute, or
to settle ithy an agreement which is in the long run more favourable than
those fishing limits which were set by the regulation of 1958. Annex J
1. "The Times", 13 April 1961
ICELAND TO DEMAND WlDER FISHERY LIMITS
Copenhagen, April 12-Professor Gunnar Thoroddsen, the lcelandic
Finance Minister, said here today lceland would not be permanently satisfied
with its new 12-milefishing limitl
Iceland aims at having the limit extended to cover the adjacent continental
shelf, he said. This would give fishery limits of between 20 and 25 nautical
miles.
"We will demand the whole shelf area down to 400 metres (about 1,312
feet) declared free. We consider the shelf belongs to the country", he said.
"At the right time the matter will be placed before the International Court
at The Hague."-Reuter.
2. "Morgunbladid", 13 April 1961
WE ARE WORKING TO GETTHE WHOLE CONTINENTAL SHELF
Copenhagen, 12 April.
The lcelandic Finance Minister, Gunnar Thoroddsen said in an interview
with reporters on his arriva1 at Copenhagen today that the Icelanders would
work to get the whole of the continental shelf off Iceland recognized as being
within Icelandic fishing limits-that is to Say that the fishing limits should
reach upto 20-25 miles from the Coast.
He said that the Icelanders would never be satisfied with a 12-milelimit as
had been agreed with the British. The Icelanders were pleased with the
aareement but a 12-mile limit would not suffice for lona. The aim is that the
c;ntinent<il shelFbhi>uIdbc reîognii.ed :is the Iiniitil~irii\riIhe put berore
the Intcrnation~l Court ai Thc ll~giic to thlit elTc:ilthe iippropriate tiiiie. MEMORIAL ON IURlSDlCTlON
Annex K
TEXT OF EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRIMEMINISTER SF ICELAND
AND THE UNITEDKINGDOM,II MARCH1961 AND 23 MARCH1961
(No. 1)
Reykjavik,
11 March, 1961.
My dear Prime Minister,
As the lcelandicAlthing has now approved the resolution submitted by the
Icelandic Government for settlement in the fisheries dispute between Great
Britain and Iceland,should like to extend to you my sincere thanks for your
most valuable versonal contribution towards a fortunate solution of the
matter, which l'welcome wholeheartedly.
1 trust that the traditional friendship between our two nations, which has
now been restored, may be maintained and developed forever.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) Olafur THORS.
23 March, 1961.
My dear Prime Minister,
Thank you for your letter of II March, which 1 received through your
Ambassador on 20 March. 1 much appreciate your kind words, and 1 send
you my thanks for al1that you did personally to bring about a settlement of
the fisheries dispute.
1 need hardly say how happy 1 am that this obstacle to better relations
between our two countries has been removed. 1 share most sincerely your
hope that the old association between Iceland and the Unitedingdom will
be maintained and developed, and 1 assure you that my Government will do
al1thev can to strennthen the lies which bind our two countries. together as
friends and allies.-
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) Harold MACMILLAN. RECORDS OF ANGLO-ICELANDIC DISCUSSIONS,
1 OCTOBER 1960 TO 4 DECEMBER 1960
Item (i)
(a) First Series, Firsf Meeting,Ocrober 1960: (b) Opening Remarks by
Sir Patrick Reilly
ANGLO-ICELANDIC DlSCWSSlONS
The first meeting in Reykjavik began at 11.15 a.m. on Saturday,
I October 1960
Present:
Mr. Hans Andersen Sir PatrickReilly
Mr. Henrik Bjornsson Mr. Charles Stewart
Mr. David Olafsson Mr. Basil Engholm
Mr. Jan Jonsson Miss Joyce Gutteridge
Mr. Gunnlaugur Briem Mr. R. H. Mason
Mr. Tomas Tomasson MF. T. F. S. Hetherington
Mr. A. Savage
Mr. R. Beverton
The Head of the Icelandic Delegation opened the meeting by raising some
procedural points.It was agreed between the two Delegations:
(a) that while wecould not, at this point, say how long the discussions should
last, we should probably need a week at least;
(b) we should not make an agreed record of the discussions, but each
Delegation should prepare their own record;
(c) Sir Patrick Reilly suggested that Mr. Hans Andersen should he the
Chairman throughout the discussions;
(d) no statement should be made to the Press until some agreement had been
reached;
(e) Working Groups should be formed as necessary.
The Icelandic Case
2. Mr. Andersen then stated the views of the Icelandic Government. He
said that these were well known and had been stated before at the United
Nations and at bath Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea. The following
were the principal points he made:
(a]Iceland, is in a unique position in that its people are dependent
entirely upon the coastal fisheries: this is universally recognized;
(b) it is therefore essential for the Icelandic Government to safeguard
its coastal fishery resources: conservation measures applicable to al1
alike were not sufficient for this. It is therefore the policy of the lcelandic Government to secure exclusive fishery jurisdiction "in
accordance with international law". The International Law Com-
mission of the United Nations had. in 1956, drawn attention to
countries which foiind themselves in this special position;
(c) for this reason the lcelandic Government had-adopted a 12-mile
fishery lirnit on 1 September 1958. This lirnit wss respected by al1
Iceland's friends with one exception;
(d) a 6 + 6 solution, with an adjustment period of 10 years had nearly
been reached at second Geneva Conference. Nevertheless two
proposals tabled by the lcelandic DelegaLion had received con-
siderable support:
(i)that countries in special situations should receive preferential
treatnient even beyond 12 miles;
(ii) that a transitional pcriod should not apply Io special situation
countries.
3. Mr. Andersen eniphasized that although these latter proposals had no1
been adooted bv the Conf~ren~ ~ ~ Plenarv Sessions. the. had.nevertheless
received widespread support. It was true that no universally agreed rule of
law had been adopted at C;enev;i but. he said, a majority of those partici-
~atine thoueht that nereenients in re-ard to soecial situation countries should
be co~cluded bilaterally.
4. He reiterated the view of the lcelandic Government that a 12-mile
fishery limit is not contrary to internationailaw and recalled that historically,
lceland had enjoyed much wider liniits. He added that under Article 4 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea.concloded at the first Geneva Conference,
lceland woold bejustified in recoiisidering and extending some of her present
baselines.
5. Mr. Andersen said that the Althing was unanimous that Iceland's
12-iiiile fishery jurisdictionshould no1 be reduced. However, the AIthing
recognized the danger of incidents and were prepared to explore with us.
means of avoiding theni. Our task, he concluded, was to find a way out of the
present dilemma.
The British Case
6. Sir Patrick Reillythanked Mr. Andersen for the clear statement that he
had made and then spoke in accordance with the attachedprepared statement.
7. Mr. Andersen said that the talks had begun in a congenial atmosphere.
He wished to ask one or two questions:
(a) How many yesrs did the British Delegation have in mind for the
transitional period? Sir Patrick Reilly replied that, as Lord Home
had suggested in his personal message to Mr. Gudmundssen on
5 August, we thought that five years would be fair 10 both sides.
(b) Did Sir Patrick Reilly's statement contain the whole of the British
proposal? Did we have in mind co-operation in other fields of a
nature which would make it easier for the lcelandic Government to
accepr the British proposals? Sir Patrick Reilly replied that we
would consider any suggestion that the lcelandic Government might
put forward and, in repÏy to a further question, that we had nothkg
more concrete to suggest. 180 FlSHERlES JURISDICTION
8. MI. Andersen said that.we should Derhaos start bv considerine the
areisbetween 6 and 12 miles in which, as Sir Pairick ~eill; had suggescd in
his statement, we might be prepared to consider excluding British trawlers
inf~ ~-~~of lcelandic inshore fisheries. We should oerhaos consider first such
areas inside 12 and then~those outside 12 miles. He said that the lcelandic
Deleeation would like to know to which areas we attached primarv im.or- .
tanceand during which periods of the year. This, he said, was necessary to
clarify the British proposal.
9. Sir Patrick Reilly re~lied that we should of course like access to the
whole area and went on ti suggest that we should approach this matter from
the other direction: we should like to hear the lcelandic case for withholding
Dermission to fish in certain areas within 12 miles. To this Mr. Andersen
ieplied that it would be necessary to go thoroughly into every angle and then
put forward concrete proposals. There might, he said, be alternative sets of
proposals. Again it might prove possible, or4 examination, to reconcile
conflicting interests: for example there might be times of the year in which
the lcelanders wish to fish and the British did not and vice verso.
10. Mr. Engholm then said that the whole area round the lcelandic coast
was of course-of fundamental importance Io our fishermen. We had some
idea of the areas which were important from the point of view of the lcelandic
inshore fishermen but, since we were considering a five-year transition oeriod.
it would help us to know which are the difficultareüs, for enample, on which
parts of the coast there are major concentratibns of line fishermen and what
areas lceland regards as particularly important from the conservation point
of vi~~.
11. Mr. Andersen thought this was reasonable and suggested that we
should explorethe position together. He remarked that it was not the intention
of the Icelandic Delegation to listen to our proposals one after the other and
Say "No" to each. He proposed that a Working Groupshould be established
to consider this matter and gave an assurance that the Lcelandic side under-
took to CO-operatefully.
12. Sir Patrick Reilly said that the sooner we could get down to practical
problems the better and added that the examination suggested by MI.
Andersen should be conducted on the basis that as far as the British side were
concerned, we had in mind a five-year transition period.
13. It was agreed that the Working Group should begin on the afternoon
of I October and that we should aim to have another full meeting of the
Delegations on Monday, 3 October, at 10 a.m. if possible.
FISHERY TALKS WITH 'ICELAND
Opening Remorks 1
1should like to say first of al1 how very glad 1am to be in Reykjavik, a
capital of which 1have heard a areat deal but have never before visited.
2. Her Majesty's ~overnmenï were very glad that the lcelandic Govern-
ment were able to announce on IOAugust their agreement to enter into talks
By Sir Patrick Reilly. about the dispute between us over the extent of fishery limits off the Icelandic
Coast. My Government and the whole British people have deeply regretted
this dispute between Our two countries and they niost earnestly desire a
settlement which will enable us to return to the friendly and happy relations
which we feel, and, we hope, you do too, is the natural and proper state of
things between our two peoples who have so much in common and who are
bound in the defensive alliance of NATO on the unity of which so much
depends for the peace of the world. They greatly hope that it will now be
possible for Our dilïerences to be brought to a settlement satisfactory to both
sides as soon as possible. For this reason Mr. Macmillan was most grateful
Io Mr. Olafur Thors for his suggestion that he should stop at Kefiavik on
his way to New York and to have the opportunity of an exchange of ideas
on this question. 1 know that he very much valued this talk with your
Prinle Minister. 1am sure that both sides are equally anxious to see an
end of this dispute and given the will 1 am sure that we shall be able to find
a way.
3. Of course the most satisfaçtori solution to the question of fishery
limits, as1am sure you will agree, is that there should be a universally agreed
rule of law and that is what we had hoped would emerge from the second
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. lt proved impossible, by the
narrowest possible margin, to reach a solution accepted by the necessary
majority and mv Government. althourh disa~~oin..d. are verv conscious of
ihenecd to in:ihe sonie xrrangemcnr, Tiue :ire 10avod L.ha&in <)~rlishcry
rcl3tioni.The iomprii~iii~c prdpus~l put forudrJ at Gcnci~ b) the United
States and Canadian Fovernments envisazed t-at after a transitional ~eriod
<ifIO )car> the ci>unirier rrhichaJ iiixde a prsciize oi'fishing airhin 12miles
oi the ciriit of the countrtcs cüncerned uould thcre~frcr bc e\cluded.
4. As you are aware the Norwegian Government, shortly after the con-
clusion of the Geneva Conference, announced their intention of extending
their fishery limits to 12 miles. Inmaking this announcement Mr. Halvard
Lange observed that this would cause some difficulty for countries iizhoare
now fishing up to the present limits. The Norwegian Government agreed to
enter into bilateral talks with Her Majesty's Government: these talks have
now concluded and the Norwezians have azreed on a IO-vear transitional
period after which we have agreed to raise no objection to:the exclusion of
vessels from the 12-mile area. 1 mention this to bring to your attention that
my Government are not takinz their stand on a rizid inter~retation of
iniernational law as it stands atpresent, but, on the cintrary, are prepared
to make important concessions in order to achieve a satisfactory regulation
of Our fishery relations with our friends and neighbours.
5. My Government also recognize Iceland's special situation as a country
whose economy depends mainly upon its fisheries and it was in recognition
of this fact that the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, in his message to the
Icelandic Foreign Secretary, of 5 August, expressed the view that atransitional
period of five years in Icelandic waters would be fair Io both sides.
6. Lord Home said in the same communication to Mr. Gudmundsson that
Her Majesty's Government were under heavy pressure from the British
fishing industry. That remainsso and I feel that 1should ask you to remember
in thisconnection that the voluntary ban on fishing within 12miles, which our
industry have imposed upon themselves, expires on the 12th of this month.
7. We understand. of course, that just as my Government is under pressure
from the British fishing industry, so your Government is also under pressure
on this issue. Inthese talks 1 very much hope that, as Mr. Macmillan said toyour Prime Minister, we shall be able to find a way of helping each other. My
Government have already conveyed to your Government an idea of what we
should regard as an equitable and satisfactory basis for a settlement.
8. ~urstarting point, as it was in the recent AngloINorwegian discussions,
is the United StatesICanadian formula to which 1have already referred. This
seems to us a reasonable compromise between the direring points of view of
the coastal States on the one hand and the distant-water fishing States on the
other. The IO-year transitional period is, as we said at Geneva, ail too short
a period to enable the distant-water fishing industries to make the very
considerable adjustments which will be required to enable them to exist under
the new conditions. But nevertlieless we were prepared to accept this period
in order to try and gel a solution. Moreover, as L have said earlier, we recog-
nize that lceland is a "special situation" country and that the United States/
Canadian formula would, for this reason. necd to be modified in Lceland's
favour to take account of this factor. This modification would ~resuniablv
npply prini.ir,l)ICJthe Icngth (if ihr 1ninri1ion:il ~)r'iio.l;s.a>>oiiLii.>w. Src
have suggcitcJ ihii 3 rea,.>nahlç per~odfor rhc irin>iiidti tr,>ulJ hc fi\c ).cari,
which would give lceland treatment twice as good as that under the United
StatesICanadian formula.
9. It may perhaps be helpful if, at this stage,L were to state in broad terms
the principles which we thinkshould provide the framework within which a
settlement acceptable to bath our countries could be reached. These principles
are:
(i) We are prepared to accept immediately that our vessels should he
excluded from fishing within 6 miles from the baselines from which the
territorial waters are measured. This in itself is a major step forward and
would immediately provide to your inshore fishermen a substantial
additional area of sea for their fishingactivities.
(ii) We are also prepared to accept that after a reasonable transitional period
Our vessels should be excluded from iishing within 12 miles. This means
that after that period, which, after all, is a very short one in the lifetime
of a nation, or even in the lifetime of the fishing industry,your fishermen
would have the whole area within 12 miles to themselves.
(iii) We also recognize that within the 6-12-mile field there might well be
areas of particular importance to your inshore net and line fishermen,
and we would he perfectly prepared to consider with you whether there
are special areas which could be reserved for net and line fi~hing only,
perhaps at special times of the year, in order to avoid collisions between
the fishing vessels ofour two countries.
(iv) In addition we recognize that ilis very desirable to try and make sure
that where our fishing vessels are fishing side by side, the danger of
damage to gear should be avoided as far as possible and relations
between fishing vessels should be regulated. We are therefore quite ready
to agree with your rules of conduct which would govern the relations
between Our fishing vessels both in the 6-12-mile zone during the tran-
sitional period and outside 12 miles indefinitely. This, 1am sure, would
be a verv considerable hel~ in avoidinn oossible friction.
(v) ~inally,we are prepared tb recognize ;bat there may be areas both inside
the 6-12-mile zone, and indeed outside. which on the scientific principles
of conservation should be reserved from trawlinc and seininc. ~ere
again we would be perfectly prepared to sit down and consider $th you
whether there are such areas and where they are located. 10. The proposal which Lord Home put forward on 5 August of a tran-
sitional period of five years during which Our vesselsshould be able to con-
tinue to fish within the 6-12-mile zone is within the framework of these
principles, and we would be prepared to look al this to seewhether il requires
any modification on prüctical grounds in the light of the points 1 have just
ma~e.~1 would suee--t to vou that it is essentiallv a verv moderate ~ro.osa.
and it involves very substantial concessions from the traditionally and
stronglv held views of my Government on this whole subject. Youwill forgive
me ifl;emind vou that ihe livelihood of manv thousands of ordinarv British
people is also involved in this issue.
II. 1 believe that if we can look at this problem in a realistic and practical
way, there is no reason why we should not be able to adjust Our diferences,
as 1am glad to say we have already done with Norway. We are anxious to be
reasonahle, and we are anxious to help you, but 1 am sure you, for yoiir part,
will recognize our problems and difficulties and be ready to discuss this
problem with us in the spirit which I have suggested.
Item (ii)
Firsr Series,SecondMeeting, 3 Ocrober 1960
ANGLO-LCELANDIC DISCUSSIONS
The second meeting began at 3 p.m. on Monday, 3 October
Present :
Mr. Hans Andersen Sir Patrick Reilly
Mr. Henrik Bjornsson Mr. Charles Stewart
Mr. David Olafsson Mr. Basil Engholm
Mr. Ion Jonsson Miss Joyce Gutteridge
Mr. Gunnlaugur Briem Mr. R. H. Mason
Mr. Tomas Tomasson Mr. T. F. S. Hetherington
Mr. A. Savage
Mr. R. Beverton '
The Chairman. Mr. Hans Aiidersen. invited the British Deleaation to
report on the meeting of e\pcrt\ a hich had taken place i>nSundsy. 2-0cioher.
2. hlr. 1l;is.l Engh,>l!ii i.iiJ thxi there hdJ hecn an ehih:ingc of inli>rni.ition
as to where the maior interests of both sides lav and which-were the ~eriods
of the most intense-activity for each side. Each side recognized that the other
was interested in fishing, not only during peak periods, but at other times as
well. Havine exchan~ed this information~ ~ ~ the exoerts endeavoured to Diece
it together inorder todetermine where, and at what periods of the year. ihere
were major conflicts of interest. The resulting information was set oiit on a
chart of the lcelandic caast.
3. This information Showed that for most of the areas around the Coast,
there would not necessarily be nny major conflict of interest, but that in
certain areas in the West and soiith-west there were periods when the peak
activities coincided.
4. Mr. Engholm went on to say that it was extremely difficult, both from
the ~olitical ooint of view. and from that of Our industrv. to acceDt the
proposai puiforward on 2'0ctober by the lcelandic side thai Our fishérmen
should not fish within substantial areas of sea outside 12 miles diiring the184 FISHERIES IURISDICTION
period of lcelandic peak fishing activity and he had hoped that the proposals
put forward by us for solving the problem by agreed rules of conduct, both
inside arid outside 12 miles, with joint Anglo-Icelandic policing, on the lines
of the arrangements that we had been able to reach with the Norwegians,
wo-~d -e-satisfactorv. He believed that such an arrangement would minimize
the risk of incidents ind the risk of dîniage to fishing ;car.
5. hlr. David OIîTsson agreed that hlr Engholm had gir'cn un ïccurste
and impartial accouni <if the discuision of 2 O~tober. He sïid that the crux
of the pioblem uas that in certain arcas we both wanted the sïme firh ït the
sanie tinie and in ihc samc place. Ile confirmed that the I~.cl~ndic\,ieu, uith
wh~~..~~ ~ ~itish ~eleea-ion didnot agree.-,as that it was essential to solve
this problem by rescrving certain areas outside 12miles as well as inside.
6. Mr. Hans Andersen said that the purpose of the meeting of the technical
experts was to clarify the British proposal. lt was clear that the British wanted
rights for their trawlers which the Icelanders did not give to their own
trawlers. If the lcelandic Government were to present this to their Parliament,
~~~. would need to be able to out forward a countervailine advantage which
, -~
the British side had been able iq give. The position, as he now ~nde~stood it,
was that the British proposal for rules of conduct was intended to provide
~~~~--~~~~cine element. ~anv lcelanders would sav that the rules of conduct
proposed by us were nothing more than a restatement of customary rules
which would be followed in any case. He believed that the crucial element,
from their point of view, was to ensure that in areas where there is line and
net fishing, there should be no trawling at the same lime. He suggested that
this should be explored further by the Working Croup in order 10determine
which were the areas for fixed line and net fishing.
7. Mr. Engholm agreed that there was no set of rules to which we both
subscribe but that many rules'are observed in practice. Nevértheless there
would be many advantages in a set of agreed rules, for example those
governing trawling in line fishing areas; rules for proving allegations of
damage, etc. Thcse would, he felt, give confidence10 both sides, particularly
ifjoint policing to enforce !hem were introduced.
8. Mr. Andersen then referred to Article 9 of the Rules of Conduct which
had been discussed and agreed with the Norwegians and a copy of which had
been handed to the Icelandic Delegation on I October. Article 9, he thought
should be spelled out in more detail. He referred to the discussion which had
taken place in 1958 under the auspices of NATO, at which a drzft providing
for the prohibition of trawling in a wide area-up to the 200-metre line both
in the north-west and south-west-had been discussed. This, he thought,
was a reasonable approach and should be kept in mind.
9. Mr. Engholm replied that the purpose of Article 9 in the draft Conven-
tion of 1943 had been to give long-term advance notice to other fishing
interests as to where they could expect major concentrations of nets and lines.
It was intended as a long-term method of giving warning as to the presence
of concentrations of nets and lines and for this reason ifprovided that such
notice was to be given through the diplomatic channel. [t was not intended to
deal with day-to-day warning. This point had been covered in Article 15.
Mr. Engholm added that these rules have worked in a manner satisfactory to
al1 the six signatories of the Convention. A similar problem had arisen with
the Norwegians, who had agreed that such rules, propcrly policed, would be
of great use in regulating fishery relations and would make a valuable
contribution Io minimizing the risk of conflict between difierent types of
fishery operations in the same areas. MEMORIAL ON IURISOICTION 185
10. Referring to the 1958discussions under NATO auspices, Mr. Engholm
recalled that two limited areas outside 12 miles had been suggested for
reservation for Icelandic net and line fishing, one off the north-west, the
other off the south-west. But the circumstances had then been very different
since we should have been free in other areas to fish up to 4 miles.
II. Mr. Hans Andersen thought that al1 possibilities should be explored,
but that any proposals which seemed to go back on the principle of the
12-mile limit, would be extremely difficult for the Icelandic Government to
justify to their public opinion. He thought there would be advantage in
defining the areas once and for al1 rather than to accept a procedure under
which they would have to be redefined periodically.
12. Mr. Andersen then said that there were other factors to be taken into
account and he listed them as follows:
(a) Progressive Phasing-orrr. Under this arrangement our vessels would be
excluded first from the area between 6 and 8 miles, then from 8-10and
then from 10-12;
(6) Limitation on the size of trawlers fishing inside 12 miles;
(c) The Londings Agreement. This could perhaps be revised in favour of
Iceland;
(dl EFTA. The implications for lceland of becoming a member:
(e) Joitzr Projects.Some reference had been made to co-operation in joint
industrial projects. The lcelandic side would like to know more about
thi~.
If) Boselines. Revision of baselines in Iceland's favour after the transitional
period would help the Icelandic Governmenl to present an agreement to
their Parliament and public opinion.
13. MI. Andersen observed that the main thing was to consider whether we
could make any progress with the "zig-zag" idea: this was of primary
importance and the other points he had outlined were ancillary to it.
14. Sir Patrick Reilly replied, after the British Delegation had considered
the oints inade bv Mr. Andersen. that he aereed that the Workina Party
sho"ld consider the areas outside 12 miles in an attempt to determiné which
were the areas either inside or outside 12 miles where really dense concentra-
tions of line and netfishine would make trawline imoossible at the same time.
He pointed out that in 1978 the discussion of this sbbject had taken place in
different circumstances from those prevailing now: for example, we hnd then
been able to look forward to a relativelv sh&t neriod before the beainning of
the second Genevn Conference. He e;phasized the difficulty for the ~rzish
side in acce~ting-any restrictions outside 12 miles and hoped that we could
find other wavs of helbi.~~t-e l~el~ ~ic Government. . .ssiblv within the
framework ofthe six points which MI. Andersen had outlinei and which
Sir Patrick Reilly then proceeded to comment upon in detail as follows:
(a) Progressive Phase-oiit. This might be discussed by the Working Party.
He thought that restrictions of this sort should be in place of and not
supplementary to the restrictions suggested by the lcelanders in connec-
tion with the British proposals for a straight phase-out. Furthermore we
would expect, under a progressive phase-out that there would be no
restrictions in any area around the lcelandic Coast, either in place or in
time, within the remaining area. Since we should be giving up a "block"
of sea sooner thari we would under a straight phase-out, we should
want a longer transitional period than five years.(b) Size Limir on Trowlers. Sir Patrick Reilly did not think that this would
help. Mr. Engholm elaborated on this by saying that the problem of
adjustment applied to the whole of Our distant water fleet and not just
to smaller or older trawlers.
(c) Boselines(see para. 12(f)). The British Delegation would be willing to
exchange views on this, but the validity of revised baselines will depend
upon whether modifications to the existing ones were in line with the
general principles of international law, and in particular, whether they
were in line with Article 4 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial
' Sea.
(d) Lariditrgs Agreement. The British Delegation could not commit the
British fishing industry, who were solely responsible for the agreement
on Iandings of Icelandic-caught fish reached in 1958 under the auspices
of OEEC. However, we would be glad to know what the Icelandic
Delegation had in mind. Our industry would be able to consider any
such concessions only in the light of the arrangements likely to emerge
on the question of fishery limits as a whole.
(e) EFTA. Sir Patrick Reilly asked what exactly Mr. Andersen had in mind
when speaking of lceland's membership of EFTA. If he meant the
application to lceland of the tariff arrangements which formed part of
the EFTA Agreementconcerning theimports of frozen fish fillets into
the United Kingdom, we should be glad to have more details.
f Joinr Projects. Sir Patrick Reilly said that he would be glad if Mr.
Andersen could clarify this suggestion.
15. Sir Patrick Reilly then said that the British Delegation now needed
further expert advice. This would be given in a personal capacity and we had
it in mind to ask Mr. Cobley to come to Reykjavik. Mr. Aildersen later
acquiesced in this proposal.
16. Mr. Hans Andersen said that further study of the areasoutside 12miles
was a basic factor and he welcomed the suggestion that the Workine. Giou~
should consider this question further. It waragreed that they shouldmeet at
10am. on 4 October.
17. Cornmentina -n the other oints made bv Sir Patrick Reill. .Mr.
Andersen sdid :
(u) ProgressivePhase-out. The Lcelandic Delegation had not made any
suggestions in this regard. He said that if we were considering an
equivalent to a five-year straight phase-out, which they for their side
were no! necessarily doing, then it would be reasonable to expect a
longer transitional period than five years.
(b) Sire of Trowlers.Mr. Andersen did not fully understand Our objections,
but thought the point could be discussed later.
(cl Boselines. Ifwas agreed that Miss Gutteridge and he should discuss this
question at 10 a.m. on 4 October.
(d) Lairdi~rgsAgreemenr.Mr. Andersen raid that the 1958Agreement in Paris
had provided for a limitation of the total of fish to be landed during
each quarter, for a limitation on the different types of fish to be landed
in each quarterly period, and for an overall limit on the total of fish
which could be landed each year. The Lcelandic Government would
liketo seethese limitations removed, or at any rate amended in Lceland's
favour.
(el EFTA. The Icelandic Government had been considering whether they
should seek to join the Six or the Seven. They would like to know what Iceland's position would be if she joined EFTA. The lcelandic experts
had suggested that this point be raised:.they were away at present but
were exoected back within a dav or two.
(f) Joijtr p;ojecrs. Mr. Andersen thought that the British Delegation might
have some r>roposalsto makç in this regard. He admitted that he did not
have anv.hine-concrete in mind himself. but had heard vacue.y th.t we
were thinking along the lines of financial assistance for some industrial
enterprise.
18. Sir Patrick Reilly said that it was still not clear to us what the Icelandic
Deleçation had in niind, but that we should be glad to have more details of
this.
5 October 1960.
Ifcm (iii)
(O) Firsr Series, Titird iCIeerii5g0ctober 1960: (6) Sraremen! hy
Sir Parrick Reilly
(0)
ANGLO-ICELANDIC DISCUSSIONS
The third meeting began at 4.00 p.m. on Wednesday. 5 October
Present:
Mr. Hans Andersen Sir Patrick Reilly
Mr. Henrik Bjorn~son Mr. Charles Stewart
hlr. David Olafsson Mr. Basil Engholm
Mr. Jon Jonsson Miss Joyce Cutteridge
Mr. Gunnlaugur Briem Mr. R. H. Mason
Mr. Tomas Tomasson Mr. T. F. S. Hetherington
Mr. A. Savage
Mr. R. Beverton
The Chairman, Mr. Hans Andersen, said that Our experts had determined
the factual situation. The lcelandic Delegation felt that the tiiiie had come for
them to consult their Government and he thought that it would be valuable,
before doing sa, to have the views of the British Delegation as to the stage
which Our discussions had now reached.
2. Sir Patrick Reillv acreed that now was a aood moment for the two
Delegations to take stock: the British Delegation-would also wish to inform
their Government. Sir Patrick Reilly then sooke from the attached statement
which had been prepared in advance.
3. Mr. Hanr Andersen thanked Sir Patrick Reilly for his statement and
said that it would be useful to the Icelandic Delegation when meeting their
Cabinet. While reserving comment on the points raised by Sir Patrick Reilly
he noted with pleasure that the British Delegation thought that it would be
possible to reach an agreement on restrictionswithin 12 miles, and he ex-
pressed his gratitude for the information about possible forms of eçonoiriicaid, and added that the latter would require further study. There were,
however. one or two ooints on which he would be xlad of clarification.
4. ~eStrictionsoitts>de12 miles. This waa of crucial importance for Iceland
and it was therefore essential to ensure that he had correctly understood the
British ooint of view. Did we see anv oossibilitv of anv reserved areas outside
12 mile; or did we envisage agreed Rules of conduit as the only means of
reconciling the Icelandic line and static net fishermen to our trawlers being
oermittedto fish hetween 12 and 6 miles durinr! the transitional oeriod. If we
Saw no possibility of restrictions outside 12, tien his Governmént would be
as diffident about the prospects of rçaching agreement as the British Delega-
fion appeared to be.
5. Sir Patrick Reilly replied thathe did not altogether exclude the possibility
that our trawlers might be excluded from some areas outside 12 miles on
conservation grounds and because of high density of line and static net
fishing; this would need to be examined.
6. Sir Patrick Reilly then asked what would he the position outside 12
miles after the transitional period. Would the Icelandic Government he
able to give an assurance that they would not seek ta retain for their exclusive
use the areas outside 12 from which our trawlers had been excluded during
the transitional period. Mr. Andersen made no reply to this question.
7. Mr. Hans Andersen noted that the British Delegation had referred
throughout to a fransirionalperiod of five years and said that the Icelandic
Delegation had not accepted five years since the length of the transitional
period would depend upon the agreement as a whole. Sir Patrick Reilly said
that he recognized that the Icelandic Delegation had not committed them-
selves to five years, but saidthat it was most important from our point of
view and expressed the hope that the Icelandicside would be able to confirm
their agreement ta five years.
8. MI. Hans Andersen ~-~~~t.~~ he would like~ ~ k~ow~w~ ~ t~ ~reactions ~~
of the British Delegation were to the Icelandic suggestions about straighfening
out buselines. Sir Patrick Reilly reolied that this was verv difficult from Our
point of view: their effect wodd be to extend tcelandii fishery limits and
therefore to increase Our difficulties. Nevertheless, we should not wish to
exclude further discussion. When would the Icelanders plan to introduce the
modifications they had in mind? MI. Andersen replied that this might he
after the transitional period.
9. Ltwas then agreed that both Delegations should meet again at 11.30a.m.
on 6 October 1.
LINE FOR THIRD PLENARY MEETING 2
We have covered a lot of ground and have clarified the issues, so that we
now have a picture of the kind of hasis on which it might be possible to reach
an agreement satisfactory to both sides. 11is time to take stock.
This mrrting diJ na! t~kr plxe biit tlicruai nn ~nresorJr.Jcun\r.r<iti<r beiueen
hlr. Anderr-n .ind Sir Patrick Reill) ai the Ilritish Cnibarr, on 6 Octohcr 1960aCwr
the lir.Loilicdr.lr.gati<hail c.ln<iiltr.Jthcir hliiiiçicri. (Sec pfsof ireni(18)J
2 Preparcd$iatenteni h) Sir 12dtri;kKeilly. MEMORIAL ON JURlSDlCTION 189
2. The kind of agreement of which a picture has emerged is one which
would fall intotwo main parts:
(O) arrangements dealing directly with fishery problems;
(b) other arrangements, mainly of an economic character, not directly
concerned with fishery problems, but nevertheless possibly of con-
siderable henefit to Lcelandicfishing interests.
3. The ideas which we have heen discussing under (a) seem to fall under
main headings:
(i) First al1 our discussions have proceeded on the assumption that there
will be a transitional or "phase-out" period during which British
trawlers will continue to fish inside 12miles, but oiitside 6.
(ii) Secondly we have discussedthe idea that itmay be possible to agree on
restrictions, mainly seasonal, on fishing by British trawlers within the
12-mile limit, in thenterest of Lcelandic line and net fisherrnen.
(iii) Then we have discussed the idea of Rules of Conduct, applying both
inside and outside the 12-mi1.elimit and both during and after the
transitional period.
(iv) We on Our side have also mentioned the possibility of devising some
means of ensuring quick compensation in casesof damage, etc.
(v) There has been much discussion of the possibility of certain restrictions
outside the 12-mile limit.
(vi) You have indicated that you are interested in suhstantial modifications
of your baselines.
(vii) We have looked at the possibility of a progressive phase-out but, as
Mr. Engholm has explained, this does not seem to be a likely basis for
a solution.
(viii) We have considered the possibility of limiting the size of British
trawlers within the 12-mile limit; but as 1told you, this would not really
help Our Industry's problem.
4. Under (b) we have said that w? would be glad to consider any sugçes-
tions which you may like to make and you have indicated interest in:
(i) a revision of the "Landings Agreement" between Our two fishing
industries;
(ii) the possibility of assistanceto Iceland in the field of EFTA;
(iii) the possibility of assistance in the form of CO-operation in projects in
Iceland, possibly of a financial nature.
5. Now 1 am sure that if we can reach a satisfactory agreement on the
purely fishery points, my Government would want to help you, as far as it
can, on matters of the kind to which 1 havejust referred. But of course these
are points which require consultation with various interests and therefore a
little time: and in considering them my Government is bound to want to
know what are likely Io he the purely fishing terms of any agreement. They
and others concerned, especially ouf Industry, can hardly consider such
issuesin isolation from the fishery issues.
6. It seemsto me, therefore, that it is not too soon, and indeed that it is
now desirable, for us to tellOur Government where we have got to, and what
is the basis of any arrangements on the purely fishery points which your
Government is contemplating.
7. To take first, the first of the elements which 1 listed under the heading
"Fishery Arrangements". It is clear that the length of the transitional period is a cardinal point in the whole matter. Everythingthat we on our side have
said froiii the first has been on the basis that we are discussing a suggested
transitional period of five years. 1would like to be able to tell my Gove~nment
that this is also the period of which you are thinking. 11 would be very
helpful, therefore, if you could confirm that this is so.
8. 1should, if 1may, now like to try and analyse the situation that we seem
to have reached on the other main headings on fishery limits. From the
discussions that have been taking place in the Working Party, it seenis to me
that both sides are agreed that in the 6-12 mile bel! around the island it ought,
with good will and a certain amount of give and take on both sides, to be
possible to find a practical accommodation of our difiering interests. Round
niost of the coast from the north-west, round the north coast, down the east
coast, and along the south coast to the Westmann Islands, il so happens that
our peak periods of fishing do not coincide with vour Peak periods of fishinz.
although there are soiiie &verlaps invarious placés.A; regards the south and
south-west coasts, the problem is somewhat different. There unfortunately
our respective peak periods of fishing directly coincide and it would not, for
that reason seem possible for us to reach a comprotnise between our differing
interests on a seasonal basis. Nevertheless 1 should have thought that here
again. with good will on both sides. it should have been possible for us to
linJ .Ia.i) ui rc;i~n:iling i>ur Jtll'ercni iiilcrr.\i<. perhap, h! sùiiie ,Icni~r;.iii.~n
<>i.iredi or possibly Li) ig>liic Iinii1:iti~u%>ilthe nut~ihcr. ni $essel, \rt,i.+i
\io.ilJ he .thle12 ri41 in iIie 0-12 iii.le hcliciiltIic,e paris uftlie sxsi Iilo ii\>i
believe-and 1think that vo.r side-~ould aeree with this view-tha ~t~ ~~iffiul~.
as they may be, the practical problems of reconciling our different interests
in the 6-12 inile bel1cannot be overconie. It will clcarly mean sacrifice for our
industry, since they would inevitably lose quite a large proportion of fish.
Nevertheless we would be prepared to ask our industry to accept this sacrifice
as evidence of our genuine desire to find a way through our mutual problems.
9. Unfortunately, this practical inethod of resolving our differences does
no1 appear to be enough from your point of view. You have, L understand,
suggested that if British vessels are to be permitted to fish in the 6-12 mile
belt at restricted times of the ycar or in restricted areas during the five-year
transitional period, you must ask for areas outside 12 niiles to be entirely
reserved for lcelandic fishinr. at other times of the vear. I would remind vou
ih.11in iiiyopeliiii,: reiii.irkI <:iid 11131uc n~i.#ldhe preprcd i.,.g>n<.derihc
po\~~h.Idi! d x~iiie rehcr\:~iion of :ire:xj fr<anlir4uI~i~gou151del? ni;lcs dthehc
could be shown to be necessary on scientific grounds of conservation. 1
understand that in the Working Party discussionsthere is a general agreement
that the main area where sniall fish are most abundant is off the north-east
coast, and even here, a reserved area on conservation grounds is, according
to the scientists, a doiibtful starter on present evidence.
10. The other practical argument wliich was advanced from your side for
the reservation of areas outside 12 miles was that it was difficult for your line
and net fishermen to operate in the same waters where trawling by our vessels
was taking place. You said that your fishermen were frightened of their gear
being damaged, and you also araued that the densitv of fishine. at anv rate
. -.
111 iotiie 3rc.S. tiilghi ni.ikc Ir \.ers dirti~iilr for the tir.,indii,tr,cr io fisti
P~JL~C:IIJI\S:<le hy ,:Je 0.1r \,ic!t ha, hcc11 ll1.1Kh~lcsc~iC,~~i~i,~ch i,.iikcJ ~p
by joint ptiliiing hl h~iihouriouniric~i xnJ pcrIi.ip, .i$,sicd h\ .OIIIC :lrran<c-
nient iindcr !r.li.~li coiiil>cti\3r!i,n tr.i.ilJ hc re.iJiIy .,nd bpredil);i~.iil.~hlc to
li~liernien \%h~~re ge.tr ,IJS ~~r~l'oriu~i.itcly.is~i~i;)gc~dn.oi~ld ~Jcq.~:t~ely\.IF<-
~ii3rJ ihç inrcrcki> <if ht11liour firhing inJu.;iric.; 2nJ cii.ihlc ilieni IO Iive in the same waters harmoniously side by side. 1 would reniind you that this is
something that they will have to do in any event afterthe transitional period,
and in many waters during the transitional period. You for your part said
that although you thought that the Rules of Conduct would be useful, you
felt that in some areas the density of your vessels was such that Rules of
Conduct alone would not, at any rate at the start, give the necessary confi-
dence to your fishermen. We agreed therefore that the Working Party should
examine the areas outside 12 to see whether there were any areas which, on
density grounds, could be justified for reservation during the transitional
period for line and net fishing. This examination has taken place and you
have been good enough Io supply us with the numbers of your vessels
operating in different waters round your coasts, together ivith the figures of
catch at diFeren1 times of the year. From this analysis 1 am bound to say
that we cannot see how it would be possible, except perhaps in one or two
very limited areas, to justify the reservation of grounds outside 12 niiles,
because of the density of thefishitrg.And 1think that, looking at this from a
practical point of view, your side would not really dispute this.
II. Nevertheless you have suggested that in compensation for our being
able to fish in the 6-12 mile belt during the transitional period, il would bc
essential for you to have reserved outside 12 miles a more or less continuous
belt of water round the Lcelandic Coast, and 1 believe that you have even
suceested that this mieht amount to a further belt of 12 miles and that
Urttiih Itncrss* iielldr tr.i!ilr.rs \h~,ihr~ck.Id.icJ. A, I hate iuJ. IIii;.riilJ
ni11;orice.i~bl. ne ~i.\rilie<leithcr <ingroiinJ\ uf idnwr\.iiion tiron ~~ra<i.;-il
grounds of the density of fishing, and as 1 understand it, your argument in
favour of reservation of such an area is frankly based on political con-
siderations.
12. The fact that this is so is perhaps reinforced by the point that even if
British vessels were to be excluded from such waters outside 12 miles, this
would not exclude trawlers from other countries, and the practical problem
of trawling and net and line fishing going on side by side would therefore
still exist. It seems to me therefore that even if il were justifiable to think in
terms of such a reserved area, it would have no practical effect unless it were
10 be considered on a multilateral basis, and this would be bound to give rise
to grave international complications.
13. Moreover, what would be the position at the end of the traiisitional
wriod? At that stane. as 1 understand it. vou would conternolate that not
bnly would our fishFng inside 12 miles ce&, but the reserved areas for your
fishermen outside 12 miles would also cease. Surely this would lace you with
-rave Dolitical oroblems also. Moreover. we should need to have some
guarantee in any agreement that after the transitional period the Lcelandic
Government would not seek to exclude our vessels from any of the waters
outside 12miles, ~inlessof coursethere were Io be some change in the general
rule of international law agreed under United Nations auspices. Would your
Government be prepared to givc us such a guarantee in any agreement?
14. You will see from thisanalysis that your ideas about restrictions outside
the 12-mile limit involve for us very great difficulties indeed. My Government
could never seIl them to our Industry or to Parliament or the public. With
great regret, 1 mus1 in honesty say that 1 see no basis for an agreement in
these ideas as they now stand: and 1 would only be wasting your time if 1
offered to submit them to my Government for consideration.
15. We have been thinking very carefully over the position now reached.
As we have said from the first, we recognize your political problem. Webelieve that the practical problems can be fairly early (sic) met by the sort of
means we have been discussing-Rules of Conduct, etc. The political problem
remains. WC have been thinking whether as an alternative to meeting it by
restrictions outside 12 miles which cause us grave practical and political
problems and which we really cannot contempÏate. we could help you with
some form of economic arrangements. especially such as might bs ofspecial
value to your line and net fishermen.
16. Ir seemsto us that the most helpful thing for you in this respect would
be something which would help you to increase your sales of frozen fillets in
the United Kingdom.
17~ In t~~~~.onnec~~on we w~~. naturallv much interested in your reference
to EFTA. Ifeel sure nty Governrnent will have been much inteiested toknow
that vou are considering this whole question of the Six and the Seven. But 1
am 601 sure quite how the question of [celand's membership of EFTA,
wliich is obviously a matter for multilateral discussion and would take some
time, lits into the context of the sort of bilateral arrangements which we are
now discussing. 1 think, therefore, that for Our immediate problem it would
be more helpful if we considered some bilateral arrangements of the kind
which might be niade if lceland entered EFTA. What 1 have in mind is a
reduction of the 10 per cent. tarif on imports into the United Kingdom of
frozen fish fillets, along the lines of the arrangement we have made under the
EFTA Agreement and subject to the same conditions. This would be of direct
substantial and permanent benefit Io your in-shore fishermen who are those
mainly concerned with frozen fillets markets.
18. This is a tentative suggestion: and you will understand that before my
Government could make yours any definite ofer of this kind, they would
have to consult their EFTA partners, especially Norway.
19. In addition. orovided always that the "fishery" arrangements in a
.o~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~.ment~were ~atis~~~-~kv. 1.t.ink that mv Government would be
prepared to discuss with the lndustry a possible revision of the Landings
Ag-eement and 1would not be without hope that the lndustry niight b. rea~y
to Co-operate.
20. Finally, you have mentioned CO-operation, financial or other, in
projects in Iceland. 1cannot really say anything useful about this without a
clearer idea of what projects or what assistance you might be interested in.
But we here will certainly consider sympathetically anything yob care to
suggest to us
21. To sum up. Lbclieve we can reach agreement on a basis of:
(i) five-year transitional period;
.i,)restrictions inside 12 miles on a seasonal basis and in some daces
perhaps on an area basis;
(iii)"Rules of Conduct" and Joint Policing;
(iv) some other assistance to help with your political difficulties
22. If, however. your Government insists on restrictions outside I? miles
such as vou havesunnested. that is restrictions which no far bevond anvthine
that couid beju~tifi~con the grounds of conservationor densi&, then,to mi
great regret, 1 do no1 seeany basis of agreement.
23. 1 believe that we could give you very effectivehelp Io meet your political
problem in the ways 1 have indicated: that is instead of restrictions outside
12 miles, economic measures of special interest to your line and net fisher-
men. 24. 1do most earnestly hope that you will now consider a solution on those
lines.1 know that al1of us he-, and Our two Governments, sincerely desire
an agreement. 1 know that al1 of us have in Our minds the gravity of the
situation which would at once arise if we can reach no agreement. We are met
here to prevent that happening. With al1 niy heart 1 hope we can siicceed.
Irem (iv)
First Series, Foitrth (Itformal) Meeting, 8 October 1960
ANGLO-ICELANDIC FISHERY TALKS
Informal Meeting at 2.30 p.m. on 8 October
Present:
Mr. Hans Andersen Sir Patrick Reilly
Mr. Henrik Bjornsson Her Mdjcsty's Ambassador
Mr. David Olafsson Mr. Basil Engholm
Mt. R. H. Mason
Sir Patrick Reilly began by saying that he was greatly disappointed that no
agreement had been reached in spite of the hard work that had been put in
bythe experts on bath sides, and in spite of the real possibilities, as they had
ao..ared to us. of reaching-an ag-eement. Her Maiesty.s G.vernment had
bcen \ers iniich iIi\e 10 the diifi~.iltir.i of ihc Ir.r.l.indicC;~i\ern~iiciha.1id
ihcrefurc iiiirru;ieJ thc .lcleg.iii<inro iridkJcrcrni.nc<l clTariIc)nice1ilicrii.
We of course also had Our difficulties and had been hopin to find a similar
attitude on the part of the Icelandic Delegation. We had firmed the impres-
sion, however, that the lcelandic Government had not recognized British
difficulties and SirPatrick Reilly regretted that he would not be able to report
to Her Majesty's Governnient that Our efforts had met with an equivalent
response.
2. Sir Patrick Reilly reviewed thevarious propositions which the Icelandic
Government had asked us to accept: ,
[i) The immediate exclusion of our vessels from within 6 miles;
(ii) restrictions within the 6-12iile area for a period the length of which was
still quite uncertain since the lcelandic Government had not yet accepted
Our proposal for a 5-year transitional period;
(iii) changes in the baselines;
(iv) restrictionsoutside 12 miles corresponding with these areas which would
be open inside 12 miles, and which could not be justified on grounds of
conservation orof density of static net and line fishing;
(v) no guarantee that after the transitional period had ended the lcelandic
Government would not seek to maintain the areas outside 12 for their
exclusive fishing.
3. We had hoped that our oKers of economic assistance would help the
Icelandic Government with their political difficulties, butthese seemed to have
been of no interest whatever to the lcelandic Government. Sir Patrick Reilly could hardlv brina himself to believe that an increase of their market for fish
in the unitid ~ingdorn would be of no interest to Iceland. He asked whether
there was anything further that the lcelandic Delesation could say to help us.
4. Mr. ans Andersen reolied that the lcelandic Deleeati-n were ea.allv.
disappointed. However, his Government looked at the various elements
which compose this problern in a different lipht. The lcelandic Cabinet would
have great-difficulty with their Parliament and public opinion if they gave
way on 12 miles: they firmly believed that a 12-mile fishery jurisdictioii was
now a generally accepted principle throughout the world, and that the
concept of a transitional period should not apply to countries like Iceland,
which are in a special situation. The 12-mile limit was not, in their view,
illegal, and this view had been reinforced by the fact that al1countries except
Great Britain had observed it for the last two years. The lcelandic Govern-
ment could not makespecial arrangements with any country which had
ocinosed this view, especiallv with a country which had o~posed it with
miiitary might. The ;nly possible approach; therefore, was to present an
agreement in such a way that the lcelandic Government could not he accused
of backing down. It wasfor this reason that they had suggested examining the
fishing areas to see where interests could be reconciled.
5. In view of the lcelandic people's firm conviction that the 12-mile limit
was iiist. it would serve no Durpose for his Government to make concessions
. .
inside 12 miles simply in return for economic concessions. It was a question
of balance: concessions inside 12 should be balanced partly by restrictcd
areas outside (not necessarily exactly equivalent) and partly by economic
assistance.
6. Mr. Andersen thought that their suggestion about modifying the base-
lines would be hel~ful to us in oresentina the agreement .to our own public
opinion. Sir P.rtri;k Rcillyid.J ih:ir.asihings rio.id ,LIprc\cni, 11ci>ulJ onl)
nidkc ihcni ii6>r.e. He ilicii rci311ctlhij c<invcrs;xii.,n\r.ihJlr AnJcrwri ai
rhc Hriiih Ci>ih;iss.on 6 O.,ii>bcr:sfit.rihc I:el:in,lic Ueley.iii,iri had c<rn\ulled
tlieir Go\criiiiicni. As hc under\ro.>d ii.ilic I.yl.indic Ci<>\:rniiieni's pssitidn
thcn iids ihar ior c~ch .ire4 tnudc I? iiiilcs. rhcreIIIU,Ihc .trarc., OUISIJ~ oi
correspondins fishinp value and broadlv in the sarne oarts of the island. This
ofitself would, how&er, not be sufficient to balance the scales, and we should
have to put in OUF economicconcessions as well. Did Mr. Andersen now
niean that theecononiic concessions would enable the lcelandic Government
to reduce the number of areas outside 12 miles from which our trawlers
would beexcludedduringthe transitional period? Mr. Andersen replied that
this indeed was what he meant and that he thought he had made it clear on
5 October. Sir Patrick Reilly said that he had certainly not understood, either
afterthat discussion or after the one with the Foreign Minister on 6 October.
7. Mr. Andersen said that he did not think it was fair to say that the
Icelandic Government had shown no interest in the economic offers made
by the British Delegation. They were in fact very interested.
8. Sir Patrick Reilly asked whether we could say that the lcelandic Govern-
ment would accept a substantial reduction of areas outside 12 in return for
econornic concessions. Mr. Andersen replied that this would be pushing if
too far and asked what we rneant by substantial reductions. Sir Patrick Reilly
replied that he meant areas which we could justify to our fishing industry as
being excluded on grounds of conservation or on density of static net and
line fishing. Sir Patrick Reilly added that some assurance about further
extensions beyond 12 miles wa; an essential point forus: Our fisbermen were
worried about a possible extension to the Continental Shelf and we could196 FISHERIES IURISDICTION
15. ~r: Andersen said that he would do what he could at once to consult
Ministers and let us know the same evening. He thought that it would be a
great pity to break off the discussions and that it would be well worthwhile to
continue to thrash the auestion out over the next three or four davs.
16. It was agreed that if the whole delegation now returned, wéshould no1
say to the Pressthat there had been a break, but Our line should he that after
a thorough review, the British Delegation had returned to ond do tn report.
Item (v)
Seco~rdseries, Icelandic Mcmorandrrm of 28 Octoher 1960
ICELANDIC MEMORANDUM HANDED BY Mr. HANS ANDERSEN
TO SIR PATRICK RElLLY ON 28 OCTOBER 1960
Durine the discussions which took dace betweenreoresentatives of lceland
and the Ünited Kingdom early in ~ciober, both partiés explained their views
and interests and explored possibilities forolvinz the present dis~ute. Since
then the problems have been further studied hy the lceland Gover"men1 and
the Government is prepared to recommend the following points to its
supporters as a reasonable settlement:
1. The 12-mile limit is no longer opposed.
LI.Baselines.
The present lcelandic baselines were drawn up in 1952. The Hague judg-
ment of 1951 in the Ariglo-Norivegia~i Fisheries case was then, of course,
carefully studied and the lcelandic Governinent considered that the baselines
could have been drawn more liberallv in conformitv with the orinci~les of
thiit judgmcnl In iidd~tion. furthcr developnicnis ha\c tïken place in this
firld.notably ihrough the concliision of the Genets Conference oii the
Terr,ti>riiSeawhere 3solid blisis is fiund for the drilk.ng of direci blisclines.
Consequently. iihiis for ioiiitiiiihcen the policy of the Iceliindic Govern-
iiient10 revise the prcscnt bawlines so th31 direct basel.nes aould be drawn
between the following basepoints:
Between I and 5
Between 12 and 16
Between 25 and 28
Between 28 and 30
Between 35 and 51
Between 51 and 42
Also the elimination of pockets created by the present baselines around
Grirnsey and Hvalsbakur is considered appropriate.
III. Areas wirhin rhe 6-12 mile zone ro he avoilable for Briiish traivlers for
rhe nexr rhreeyeors.
1. Area A (Westmann Islands-Basepoint 51) March-May.
2. Area B (Basepoint 51-Basepoint I Horn)
In the area between basepoints 51 and 43 March-May. In the area betucen b;isepuiiit, 43 and 46 July-Ociuber.
In the Lrcd hei\,cen b~\epo nls 46 ~nd I hldrch-J~ne
3. Area C (Horn-Langanes) Juiie-September.
4. Area D (Langanes-Basepoint 30).
In the area between basepoirits 12and 16June-December.
In the area between basepoints 16 and 10 January-March, and July-
August.
ln the area between basepoints 20 and 30 March-July.
IV. ProrecredSmall BoorAreas wirhi,ithe 6-12 mile zoile.
(i) Area B
Between latitudes 63" 37'N. and 64" 13' N.
Betu,een latitudes 64' 40N. and 64" 52' N.
Between latitudes 65'00' N. and 65" 20' N.
(ii) Area D
. Between longitudes 14' 38' W. and 15" 32' W.
Betu,cen longitudes 16' 12' W. ana 16'46' W.
V. Prorecrrd Sniall Boar Areas ortrsidcthe 12-mile litnir
(i) Area B
Ln the area between basepoints 43 and 45 January-April.
In the area between basepoints 45 and 1 November-February.
(ii) Arca C
In the area between basepoints 5 and 10 15 September-December.
(iii) Area D
In the area between basepoints 16 and 20 Septeniber-December.
Ln the area between basepoints 20 and 25 September-February.
In the area between basepoints 25 and 30 January-February.
VI. "R~ilesof Coird~ict"
The drafi rulei for ihc rcgiilatiun of fisheries uhirh aerc ruhmittcd by the
British reprcsenisii\eiwould foriii a ureful part of ihc agrernieni.
1. The landings agreement now in force should be reviscd to the effect that
the quota would be increased :ind limitations as to species and carry-overs
between periods would be abolished.
2. Econoniic co-operation in other fields would include tariff reductions on
imported fish and fish products.
VIII. TlzeSirrioriorrofrer the Terniirratioirof the Agreement
The lcelandic Government reserves ils right to entend fisheries jurisdiction
in Lcelandic waters in conformity with international law. Such extension
would, however. be based either on an agreement (bilateral or multilnteral) or
decisions of the lcelandic Government which would be subject to arbitration
at the request ofappropriziteparties. Ircni (i,i)
Srrotrd Scrirs, Firsr ,\lecriirg, 10.30 o.n78,Ocroher 1960
ANGLO-ICELANDLC FISHERY TALKS
Record O/ Firsr Aleerii~ghclrlnr No. 12 C<ii.lroiiHor!re Tcrroceal 10.30 a.m.
oir 28 Ocroher 1960
Present :
Uiiircd Ki~r.&rn Iceloird
Sir Patrick Reilly Mr. Hans Andersen
Mr. C. B. Engholiii, MAFF Mr. David Olafsson
Mr. L. F. Scott-Hetherington, Scottish
officc
Miss J. A. Giitteridçe. Foreisn Office
Mr. R. D. C. McAlpinc, Foreign Oflice
Mr. A. Savaçe, MAFF
Coniiii;indcr K. H. Kennedy. Adiiiiralty
Mr. M. S. Bcrthoud. Foreign Oiiicc
Sir Patrick Keilly opened by saying that il had been Our hope that the next
stage should bc a furthcr foriiial roiind oftalks in Reykjavik. Nevertheless he
\vas gI:id to \\,elcoiiie Messrs. Andersen and Olafsson 10 this country, and if
Ilieir visit provcd to be a iisefiil filrther stage in oiirdiscussions with the
Icelandic Governnient, we slioiild bc very pleased.
Mr. Andersen said that his Governnient h;id had full consultations with
thcir p;irliaiiienrarysupporters and hsd nrrived al a sincere view on the
possible ternis of an asreeiiient which iiiight be acceptable to lceland. His
Governiiient, however, did not think it dcsirable to rcsonie formal talks
withotit first reaching a basic ~inders1;inding; this was why they had sent hiin
and Mr. Olafsson to London for preliminary discussions. Mr. Andersen then
read out the attached Meiiiorandiiiii~. which he Iater handed 10 Sir Patrick
Reilly. containinç the lcelandic Governiiient's proposals.
Lnanswer 10questions, Mr. Andersen elaborated the proposals as follows:
(i) LoirdiirgsAgreemnir
The Lcelandic fishing industry would like the present annual ceiling to be
doubled, i.e., increased iip to f3,600,000; they would also like the.
liinitations on species and quarter cdrry-over to be abolished. He
explained thnt the present ceiling in practice anioiinted to only f900.000
because the quotas for the sin suninier iiionths were of no value.
(ii) Turi' Conmiissioir
The lcelanders would like to seetarifi reduced or eliminated on al1fish
iiiiported to this country froiii lceland.
(iii) Prol>o.scIdccl<,iidicroi<l<~rr~or~exrei~.sioiosJfislzeryjririsdicfibeyond
12 mi/e.s
Lnview of piiblic opinionit wascrucial for the lcelandic Government that
their hands should not be tied for the future. The las1 phrase in the
1 See item(v). Icelandic draft was intended tu enable lceland tu extend her fishery limits
unilaterally, but il would be open tu the United Kingdom ta request
arbitration.
Mr. Engholm said that al first glance il appeared that the proposals for
restricted areas and baselines would exclude our fishermen al1the year round
from the area off the "Hoof"; in some places the combined effect of the
proposed baseline changes and outside areas would be virtually tu exclude us
from the continental shelf.
Mr. Olafsson said there were two very important areas where there was a
clash of interests between lcelandic and British fishermen. namely the "Hoof"
and the area off the Westmann Islands.
Sir Patrick Reilly asked why, in spite of theconsiderable benefits within 12
miles and of the economic concessions which we were oîiering il was still
necessarv for lceland tu demand areas outside 12 miles. If such claims could
be justi&d on conservation or other grounds, they might be easier for us to
consider. But if the claims were mefely being made for political reasons they
would be very dificult for us Io look al favourably.
Mr. Olafsson said that his Government were under very heavy pressure
from their fishing industry tu introduce restricted areas outside 12 miles in
order tu compensate (hem for the areas within 12iniles where British trawlers
would be allowed to fish during the transitional period. The areas outside
12 miles had been reduced from those which were discussed in Reykjavik.
Sir Patrick Reilly emphasized that the whole principle of areas outside
12 miles was basically unacceptable tu us; he did no1 wish tu waste the lime
of the meeting by going into detail.
Mr. Engholm said that as he understood it there were to be restricted areas
outside 12 miles al1 round the Coast with one or two exceptions where there
would be baseline changes instead. Looking al the outside areas and the
baselines. it could not be said that the new lcelandic proposals represented
much of a change.
Mr. Olafsson said that thechange was more in respect of the duration of the
veriods of restriction: these had been rediiced tu take into account the imoor-
iance of peak periods tu the British indusrry. He went over the areas showing
how the periods of restriction had been reduced in each case, except for the
East coait whcre no ~e~uction was oossible
Sir ~atrick ~eilly said that this &s-a complicated picture which neededto
be examined by experts. It seemed unlikely, however. that this examination
would niake the orooosals seem acceotable
Mr. Engholm émihasized that the'only grounds on which we could enter-
tain restricted areas outside 12iniles were those of conservation. This condi-
tion did not seem tu be satisfied in anv of the areas nientioned bv the Ice-
IaiiJerr. and hecould not. tIiereCire.see ho\v the I<rl;inJic propu%.ils reg~rding
thcse aredi could be .iscept.ihle in spite of the red.iciion in ihr. pcriiids of ilie
restrictions.
Mr. Andersen recalled that in the talks at Reykjavik the United Kingdoni
delegation had said that they might consider sonie areas outside 12 miles.
Sir Patrick Reilly quoted frorn the record of the relevant nieeting tu show
that he had then said on a personal basis that we iiiight possibly consider one
or two such areas if satisfactory agreement could be reached on other points.
The meeting was then adjourned for half an hour for detailed examination
of the lcelandic proposals.
On resumption, Mr. Engholm said that on a broad calculation, taking into account the additional restrictions now proposed both inside and outside the
6-12 mile area, and also the proposed adjustment 10 baselines, the loss in
terms of fish involved in acceptance of the present lcelandic proposals would,
if anything, be slightly more than if we accepted a straight 12-mile fishery
liiiiit OITlceland. Moreover, a settlenient on the proposed basis, would, as a
result of the adjustments of the baselines, result in the permanent loss of
substantial areas.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that the lcelandic proposals had come as a shock to
us. He asked Mr. Andersen to look at the oroblem from Our industrv'~ ~oi. .
of vieu. 'lhc basic position\ <if theIWO sidcs ucre that Iccl;ind claimcd thai a
12-mile fishery lin111iv;ijii;tilirdin internation.%l I;ix \\,hile the United Kina-
dom recognized only a 3-mile limit for territorial waters and fishery limik,
though in practice Our industry had respected the lcelandic 4-mile limit,
claimed unilaterally in 1952.1twas for both sidesto try to find a middle path.
We had oflered a solution which seemed to us to be reasonable, and would
involve <1e/ac10acceptance on Our part of a 12-mile limit after five years-a
painfully short period for readjiistnient.The Icelandic Government had told
us in Reykjavik that they were in principle prepared to accent a transitional
period. We had said we could accept restrictions between 6 and 12 miles.
This seenied to us to be a fair compromise. The present proposals, however,
went much further. The vrooosed chances in baselines went far bevond
anything we thought couldbe~ustified by the 1958Convention; and the areas
outside 12 miles had always been a point of extreme difficulty for us. The
eflect of these proposals was to cancel out any advantage our industry would
obtain from fishing between 6 and 12 miles. He failed to see that there was
anything in the lcelandic proposals which we could present to our industry
as beinc-of advantaee -o them.
In adJitiun. Iceland uas asking for econoiiiic conccrsiuns involving pri1i.i-
~iin fi~r a nil.;\ii,c incrcase of I;clandi:I;i~idinr?\in thiic~i~ntry8hich uould
havenserioiiseiTect on the market for Our own fish sales. ~oreover, as he un-
derstood if,lceland was also asking for a coiiiprehensive rediiction in our
tarifis on fish; this went far beyond even what we had given our EFTA
oartners.
The wording of the proposed lcelandic assurance on extensions beyond 12
miles neededcareful examination by our legal experts. Prima facic. however.
the forni of words now proposed did not give m"ch ground; for confidence
in the future, nor would it enable us to give the industry the security it
required. This added up 10 agloomy and a disappointing picture. It was
distressing that, in spite of the lcelandic Government's careful consideration,
they should have gone so far beyond what we had indicated in Reykjavik we
would be prepared to accept. Even the proposals we tabled on a personal
basis therc were far from acce~table to Our industrv. It would have been verv
diflicult to have got them to agree to any revision of the landings agreemeni;
under the new proposals this would be quite impossible. He thought that ue
were agreed to try to achieve a reasonable compromise with give and take
on both sides. This would have given our industry a reasonable transitional
period for re-equipment-and the lcelanders would have retained their
market in the United Kingdom with the Dossibilitv of im~rovenient for the
future. If agreement could not now be reached thé lcelandic market in the
United Kingdom would not only be impaired but could also be endangered.
Our industry would take matters into their own hands. He was reluctant to
believe that this.was the lcelandic Government's last word. The way things
now stood there was no basis for negotiation. Mr. Andersen said it was no1 a matter of what the lcelanders could
reasonably expect us tu accept, but rather what his Government could get
throuah the Althinc. Thev had consulted their Althinz s-ooo..ers and this
was the result. ~heiFpurpose was not tu say "take it or leave it" but to explore
the possibiliiy of agreement and io seehow hr the United Kingdom could go.
Whën this %,asestablished his Government would wish tu consider whether
any basis which the United Nations could accept would be able tu cornmand
a Parliamentary majority. On the question of what Our industry would gain
or lose through the new proposais, he thought that the proposed new basefines
could not. in so far as they were consistent with the 1958Convention, be said
tu involve out industry in a loss.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that not al1the baselines were in accordance with the
Convention thoukh one or .Iwo might al a pinch be acceptable. On present
instructions he was not authorized tu accept any areas outside 12 miles. He
said that he >vould like tu throw out a sucaestion on a oersonal basis while
emphasizing that it had not been considerid by ~inistek. We might perhaps
go for soniething simpler. naniely an arrangement whereby we would accept
the new restrictions inside 12 niiles and a reduction of the phase-out period
. tu four years. We would not, however. accept any outside areas, nor any
baseline changes, and we should need an assurance in a sütisfactory form that
there would be no extensions by lceland beyond 12miles. There would be no
econo~llic concessions.
Under this arrangenient, lceland would gct:
(a) our defacro acquiescence in the 12-mile limit thus bringing the dispute
to an end;
(b) a very short transitional period:
(c) very considerable restrictions on our fishing within 12miles;
(d) asafe market in the United Kingdom for their fish which could be
expanded by their efforts.
Mr. Andersen said that he could Saystraight away that this kind of agree-
ment would be quite impossible. He repeated the Icelandic difficulties about
the form of assurance and said that, in the Icelandic view, the baselines were
the key tu the whole problenl.
Sir Patrick Reilly asked whether this meant that if we could meet the
lcelanders on baselines they would droD the areas outside 12miles?
Mr. Andersen said they-could not do so coii?pletely. They had presented
the framework of an agreement and would like tu know how far we could go
on each ~oinr
Sir ~atrick Reilly said that there was no possibility of an agreement in su
far as areas outside 12 miles were concerned, and any agreement on baselines
would be very difficult.
Mr. Andersen said that if the United Kingdom delegation could accept no
baseline chairses and no outside areas then he would have tu go away empty
handed and this would be the end of the negotiations.
Mr. Olafsson said that in lceland there was a divergence of view as tu
whether there should be any agreement at al). Soine people thought that
Iceland had already achieved recognition of the 12-mile limit, except by
British trawlers. If the United Kingdoni stuck tu what the British fishing
industry wanted, an agreement would never be achieved. He personally
thought that the current opposition on the part of the British industry tu
landings of Icelandic frozen fish as well as other fish showed that they were
not interested in an agreement. Mr. Engholm said he quite understood that anything the lcelanders gave us
within 12niiles would be looked on in lceland as a concession. The lcelanders
should realize, however, that our industry regarded any restrictions on their
fishing outside 4 miles as a concession. We had to find a rniddle way between
these two extremes. He went on to outline the,legitimate needs and fears of
Our fishing industry and the reasons for their opposition to landings of
lcelandic fish. He emphasized, however, thet they were not opposed in prin-
ciple to a settlement and if a reasonable agreement was in sight he felt sure
they would be prepared to consider a niodification of the landings agreement.
It was agreed to meet again at 3.30 p.m. on the same day.
lrenr IV;;)
Second Series, Second Meeting, 3.30 p.rn.,28 Ocrober 1960
ANGLO-ICELANDLC FLSHERY TALKS
Record of Second Meeting held ar A'o. 12 Carlrotr Horise Terrace al 3.30 p.m.
on 28 Ocroher 1960
Present:
Unired Kingdom Icelai~d
Mr. Hans Andersen
Sir Patrick Reilly
Mr. B. C. Engholm, MAF F Mr. 1. Olafsson
Mr. T. F. S. Hetherington, Scottish
Office
Mr. R. H. Mason, Foreign Office
Miss J. A. Gutteridge. Foreign Office
Mr. M. S. Bethoud, Foreign Office
Mr. A. Savage, MAFF
Sir Patrick Reillysaid that we could not go further on economicconcessions
than we had done with Our EFTA partners. He thought that, if it would help,
Our EFTA partners would probably be glad to agree to our giving the Ice-
landers the same concessions as they themselves received on frozen fish
fillets. On the Landings Agreement it had been difficult enough to get the
industrv to think in terms of acce~ting any modification on the basis of the
sort of agreement which we put forward in~eykjavik on 8October. A forriori
it was out of the question to expect the industry ta agree Io any modification
on the basis of the agreement which the lcelanders were now putting forward.
T-~~industrv would ~ ~~s~ on a minimuni of three thines in order Io contem-
plate any s;ch agreement. Firstly. the restrictions inside 12 iiiiies should be
no creater than those discussed at Reykiavik. Secondly, there should be a
reas%nable phase-out period. Thirdly, oÜr industry would have the greatest
difficulty in agreeing ta any restrictions outside 12 miles. Lastly, they niust
have a satisfactorv assurance regarding the situation after the phase-out
period. On the laiter point, Sir Patrick-~eill~ suggested that the~lcelandic
delegation should consider again the form of assurance which we put forward
in Reykjavik, i.e., that lceland should agree not to extend her limits against
the United Kingdom beyond 12 miles except under: MEMORIAL ON JURISDICTION 203
(a) a bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom, or
(b) an international agreement embodying a generally accepted rule of law
about fishery limits
The Icelanders' present proposal was far less satisfactory. It was vitally
important to find an acceptable wording.
Sir Patrick Reilly then asked whether Mr. Andersen accepted our position
on tarir concessions.
Mr. Olafsson, after discussion with Mr. Andersen, said that the? would like
to seetarilïs abolished on allfish prodocts. This applied especially to fresh fish.
He could not see that an abolition of oiir tariffs could cause any difficulty
with Our EFTA colleagues.
Mr. Engholni said that no reduction on the tariffs of fresh fish was
contemplated under EFTA. Wecould not give such a concession to lceland
withoiit also giving it to al1 oiir EFTA partners and indeed 10 al1 other
nienibers of GATT.
Mr. Olafsson said that in putting forward their suggestion for restricted
areas his Governnient had tried to go as nciir as possible Io meeting our
wishes as expressed in Reykjavik with regard 10 peak periods. He knew that
oilr wishes had not been completely niet, escept in the north. He went
throiigh the various areïs showing IO what entent in each Our requirenients
on peak periods would bemet under the proposed agreenient.
Mr. Engholm said he agreed that although on the whole the lcelandic
suggestions took peak periods into account. ne\-ertheless, some areas were
closed altogether. The total effect of the restrictions \vas Io deprive. Our
triiwlcrs of inore fish than under the proposais ivhich had been worked out
in Reykjavik. Our industry regarded the restrictions mentioned in Reykjavik
as bein~ heavv enoueh. Under the terms of the Dresentsuerested aareement
Our indistry hould Fertainly not be prepared tocontempl~e an? revision of
the Landings Agreement. He asked whether the restrictions bctween.6 and
12niiles were worth more to the lcelanders than whatever chance there was of
soriie niodification of the Landings Agreenient; thc lcelanders could no1have
both.
Mr. Andersen asked whether these were alternatives.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that a modification in the Landings Agreenient was
no1 in Our gift-al1 we could say was that the extra restrictions between 6 and
12miles madeany modification a matter ofextreme difficulty.
Mr. Engholm suggested that different sections of the lcelandic industry
might attach a different importance to a modification in the Landings
Agreenient and to tarif reductions. He thought that if the rest of the agree-
ment was acceptable our industrymight be prepared to agree to some modifi-
cation on the Landings Agreement. including the relationship between the
different species.lt was, however, a matter for the industry and we must know
what "auid" the~l~ ~and~rs were orerine for this~ "~.~o".~~
Mr. Andersen said he hoped this was nitthe last talk. He mus1mull itover.
Mr. Engholm said that the questions of a ~ossible abolition of the 60-40
relationship, the carry-over from one quarter to another andan increasein the
overall quota woiild al1be linked in the industry's mind.
Mr. Olafsson said that when the Landings Agrceriient was iiiade in 1956it
was cleiir that the f 1.8 million ceiling was iiieaningless, as the division by
quarters and by species represented a iiieans which Our side had found for
reducing the total figure. The agreeiiient had been looked on by the Icelandic
industry asunrealistic and involiing them in a heavy sacrifice. Nor was it true that the lcelandic industry were not interested in Our markets during the
sumnier. This summer, for instance, it had been difficult to restrainthem from
comine. In the winter there was verv rarelv -.v daneer-of Lcelandic landinns -
glutting the British market. Indeed, the Lcelandershad an interest in not over-
loading Our i~iarket. Thur if there was either an increase in the absolute
aiiiount of the lcelandic quota or a change in the proportions, there was no
danger of the British market being glutted.
Mr. Engholm agreed that itwould be a help ta the Icelandic industry if
there could be an increase in the quantity of cod they were allowed to land in
the winter nionths. Last winter they had for the first rime reached the ceiling.
The industry would be prepared to sit round a table if the remainder of the
agreenient was reasonable.
To sum up, the industry were prepared to consider some modifications in
the agreement for the winter months provided that the benefits gained were
worthwhile and that they were not being asked ta give too much in return. LI
was a question of balance.
Sir Patrick Reilly reiterated that Our instructions as regards outside areas
were cateeorical. He underlined the imoortance of obtainine a satisfactorv
wording on the assurance. As it stood ai the.moment it wds ïeft open to thé
lcelandic Governnient ta extend unilaterally subject to arbitrationit was no1
clear by whom.
Miss Gutteridge confirmed that from a legal point of view we could not
acquiesce in any formula which iiiiplied a right on the part of the lcelandic
Government to extend unilaterally.
Mr. Andersen said this point could be left until last. If the rest of the agree-
ment was al1 right a formula on the assurance could be found which was
acceptable to bath sides.
Miss Gutteridge agreed with this.
Sir Patrick Reilly recommended the language we had suggestedin Reykjavik
to Mr. Andersen.
Mr. Engholm asked Mr. Andersen to compare the wording we had put
forward in Reykjavik carefully with that contained in the Althing Resolution
and the words used by the,lcelandic Priine Minister iast summer.
Mr. Engholm said that as regards the reles of condricr if had been Our
thought that joint policing should give confidence to both Our fishing
industries.
Mr. Andersen asked whether Mr. Engholm meant policing outside 12.
Mr. Engholm said he meant both outside 12 and also in the 6-12-mile area.
Mr. Andersen raid that his Government had eiven no thought to the auestion
of joint policing in the 6-12-mile area. They had only thought of theseyules as
beingapplied outside 12 miles.
Mr. Engholm suggcsted that the Lcelanders might now like ta give this
matier some thoughf.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that al1 the baselines proposed by the lcelanders
were open to objection in the light of the 1958 Convention. We had, never-
rheless, iridicated chat there were one or 1w.oon which ive could stretch Our
consciences. This depended on the rest of the agreement-especially the
question of the areas outside 12.
Mr. Andersen said that the opinion of the Icelandic Government was that
if there could be no areas outside 12 there was no possibility of getting a
package Ueal through.
Mr. Engholm asked whether that meant that outside areas were more
inlportant to the lcelanders than economic concessions. Mr. Andersen said that they did not want to see anything go. Their
instructions were rigidon this point, they must have some areas outside 12.
Sir Patrick Reilly said itwould help us over the baseline question if the
Icelanders could drop the oiitside areas: also if thes did not press us for both
of the ecoii<iriiic cùricçsjionHe ctiuld not hc morC concreie than ih;s: our
inrtruîtiun\ on outsidç are:is \rere cat~g<~r~cal.
Mr. Andersen asked whether we could not yield an inch on this.
Sir Patrick Reilly said no. There were no conservation reasons which could
justify any of thc outside nreas proposed by the Icelanders. There was,
however, a possibilits of Our being able to move towards the Icelandic
poriiiim <inbasclines if the lcelanrleriuould give up ihelr ouiside arcas.
hlr. AnJersen sÿid they m.ist h:ire their haselincs and some arelisout\id12.
If he h.1118)repijri b3ck ihai\\ç nerr holdins imt for nothinr-oui\ide 12 and
only suggcbting vague concessions un baselines they niight as well go ht~me.
Sir Pïtrich Reilly asked uhish areas outside 12 \rc're esscntial tu the Ice-
landers.
Mr. Olafsson said that the two areas in Area B on the north-west coast,
from 43-1, were essential.
Sir Patrick Reillr asked whether we could take it that this was the absolute
maximum.
Mr. Olafsson said that this was the number 1 priority. Number 2 would be
on the east coast from 16-20.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that bolh sides were obviously tied by very strict
instructions. They would have to reflect very carefully over the weekend. He
suggested that the next meeting sliould be on Monday, 31 October, at 3.30.
Mr. Andersen said that since the British delegation had left Reykjavik the
lcelandic Government had been trying day and night to see how far they
could go to meet the British position. He hoped we appreciated this fact.
/rem (viii)
SecondSeries, Tlrird Meeting, 3.30 p.m., 31 Ocrober1960
ANGLO-ICELANDIC FISHERY TALKS
Recordof Third Mecrin8 ll~eldor No. 12 Carlron HorrseTerrace ar 3.30 p.m.
oiz31 October 1960
Present:
U~riredKingdom Icelaird
Sir Patrick Reilly Mr. Hans Andersen
Mr. B. C. Engholm, M.A.F.F. Mr. D. Olafsson
Mr. A. J. Aglen, Scottish Office.
Mr. R. H. Mason. F.O.
Miss J.A. Gutteridge, F.O.
Mr. A. Savage. M.A.F.F.
Commander R. H. Kennedy, Admiralty
Mr. D. Summerhayes206 FISHERIES lURlSDlCTION
Sir Patrick Reilly said that both sides had now had time to reflect on
Friday's meeting, which had unfortunately showed that the positions of the
two sides were still far apart. If we wanted agreement there must be give and
take. Both Governments were agreed on the importance of reaching a
settlement. Perhaps the best method of proceeding now would be to set out
thecombinations of variables that could make up the basis for an agreement.
Sir Patrick Reilly then listed these variables, which were:
(i)Troizsitio,zal period.What should be the restrictions on British traw-
ling inside 12 miles and what should be the length of the transitional
period?
(ii)Oittside areas. How many "outside areas" should be reserved for Ice-
landic small boats and where should these be?
(iiijBaseli>ze+anges.
(iv) Assriraiice by Icelafidof no further extensions of fishing limits without
mutual agreement.
(v) Ecorrornic co-operation. There were two possibilities here: (a) lowering
of the United Kingdoni tariff on frozen fish, and (b) revision of the
landings agreement.
He suggested going over theground again to see where viewpoints could be
brought closer together on al1 these points.
Taking (v) first Sir Patrick Reilly said it had been hoped from the United
Kinedom side to work in some economic concession to Iceland. both under
was concerned. He asked Mr. Andersen for his views on this point.
Mr. Hans Andersen said that the lcelandic Government had not covered
this point in their brief,but he thought that the tariffconcession was likely Io
be the most important for Iceland. The Landings Agreement was valid for ten
years and would presumably continue after that, but lceland stood to lose
on ihe United Kingdom market when tariff barriers were lowered towards
other countries(e.g., theEFTAc0untries)in the next few years. He could not,
however, voice a definite opinion about this without consulting the Icelandic
industry, who were excluded from these talks.
Sir Patrick Reilly pointedout that the LandingsAgreement had been made
between the two industries and he could not Say what the British fishing
industry might do in regard to it if we could not reach an agreement satis-
factory to them. He also wanted it to be clearly understood that any conces-
sion on the frozen fish tariff would be on the same terms as for other EFTA
countries, namely that it would be subject to there being no subsequent
extension offishing limits against the United Kingdom. Mr. Andersen said
this was generally accepted on the Icelandic side and the point was also
covered by the assurance that the Icelandic Government would be giving
under point (iv).
Sir Patrick Reilly then brought up the question of outside areas. He said
this was still a very difficult matter for the British side. It would be easier for
us to helu over baselines if Iceland would drou its demands for outside areas.
Mr. Êngholm mentioned that if outside areas were granted, the British
trawling industry would at best accept them with bad grace and friction might
continue. It might even be that British trawlers would ignore any areas
reserved to Icelandic small boats outside 12 miles. The agreement must be
one that the British industry could "swallow". Mr. Andersen agreed that this \vas a fact Io be considered but the lcelandic
Government believed that they could not get any agreement through the
Althing without having some outside areas.
Mr. Engholm asked why outside areas were so attractive politically. It was
agreed that there mus1 be benefits to both sides but why must outside areas,
which were of a temporary nature, beadded to the lasting benefits that lceland
would be gaining.
Mr. Olafsson in answer to this Doint said that at ~revious meetines the
Iceland delegation had tried to make it clear that their'people and espccially
the small boat fishermen believed they had already gained 12 miles; therefore
if concessions were granted to ~riiish trawlers inside 12 there mus1 be
compensation for lcelandic fishermen outside.
Mr. Engholm pointed out that cxtended baselines would give an imniediate
additional protection for lcelandic fishermen. The proposed outside areas
would be only transitional, whilst baselines and any economic concession
would be pcrnianent and therefore more important.
Mr. Olafsson said this was not the case. Baselines and outside areas were
regarded by lceland asa separate prohlem from economic concessions.
Mr. Engholm asked whether this meant that economic concessions were
not appreciated? Surely the granting of economic concessions pli!s extended
baselines should together make up a sufficient inducement; why were outside
areas necessary as well?
Mr. Olafsson repeated that some outside areas were quite delinitely
necessary for political reasons.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that froni this it would appear that outside areasand
baselines were the most important factors from the lcelandic point of view.
Could we therefore set aside the economic concession item?
Mr. Andersen was not prepared to say that this was so. He suggested,
however. first taking a look at the baseline question in more detail to see in
the light of that how outside areas could be fitted into the pattern.
Mr. Engholni asked whether lceland was to be divided into sections and
something given to fishermen in cach section.
Mr. Andersen confirmed that in general the lcelandic Government's
intention was to compensate fishermen in every section of the island.
After further discussion on this ooint Mr. En~holni asked whether this
amounted to saying that everyone ;round 1celanüs coast had to have some
concession either in the way of haseline extensions or outside areas? If this
were so ifwould mean thatthe British industrv would be eettinrr soniethina
even less attractive than the straight 12 miles: Mr. ~ndeGen iiterjected at
this point that it might be worthwhile going into the baselines question in
more detail.
Mr. Olafsson asked whether it would be any use to ofier some reduction
of baselines on the north coast in return for larger outside areas in this
region.
Sir Patrick Reilly said it would seem that lceland was asking for a large
number ofadvantages and that these would be mainly permanent. Clearly this
did not oiïer a very rosy orosDecl for aareement.
hlr. Andersen s"ggestid agiin looki& ai the bairline question to secuhere
this could br lied irwith reduiri,sni in oiitsidc arcas.
Sir Patrick Keilly sugpesled takinc the lcclandic coïst in four qunriers and
looking al each area i6dividually.'~or the sake of argument if might be
possible for the United Kingdom to accept one baseline in each area. Wemight for example consider extended baselines between the following points
around the coast:
(i) Between points 1-5.
(ii) Between points 12-16.
(iii) Between points 35-51 (this was a very doubtful one),
(iv) Between points 51-42.
What reduction in outside areas might the lcelandic Government be able
to consider giving in return?
After a short break for consultation Mr. Andersen said that there appeared
Io be hope for advance on this basis. He acknowledged Our reservations on
the extended baselines between areas 35-51 and said that taking this into
account the outside areasproblem could be reduced on the lceland side to the
following points:
(i) The) \iuuld si111necd roriiething on the riorth-nesi coast.
(ail Tlierc codld bc ni<idificatisnr in the ares insi.1~Griiiisey.
(iii) Allother outside areas would be dropped.
Mr. Engholm pointed out that the restrictions on British fishing between
6 and 12 miles as at present foreseen would lose us Iwo-thirds of the catch
that we niight otherwise have expected inside 12.
Sir Patrick Reilly then recapitulated the lcelandic proposals as they now
stood. They amounted to:
(i) Transiiional fishing for British trawlers between 6 and 12 miles. with
the restricted zones, for three years. The precise restrictions againstur
trawlers were still to be discussed.
(ii) Baseline adjustments in three, or possibly four, areas.
(iii)The granting of Iwo small areas outside 12 miles for lcelandic small
boats on the norih-west coast.
(iv) Economic concession no longer necessary.
The main ooint we therefore still had to discuss was the leneth of the
transitional périod. He asked how long it would be possible for Mrr~ndersen
and MI. Olafsson to continue this round of talks in London. Mr. Andersen
said he was ready to stay as long as needed. From the lcelandic Government
point of view the reaching of an agreement on this important mütter had the
highest priority.
After subsequent discussion he agreed to a meeting of experts to take place
on the following morning and for a further meeting of the delegations at
3.30 p.m. the same day (1 November).
Mr. Andersen then mentioned that a strona assurance about further
extension u,ould be a diflicult mïiicr for the lcelandic Guvernment in \,iew of
their public opinion. He also implied thxi ï rïtisF~ctorily norded assurance
would denend on the sort of terms that lceland could cet on other ~oints.
He seemid to infer particularly that lceland must be sassfied on thematter
of baselines.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that Her Majesty's Government quite appreciated
the point but it was also very necessary from the British side to consider the
opinion and the future security of Our industry.
Finally, Mr. Andersen said that he would like, if possible, to avoid the
words "bilateral agreement" in any wording of the assurance. SecondSeries, Foitrth Meeting, 3.30 p.m., I November 1960
ANGLO-ICELANDIC TALKS
Record of Fourth Meeting held ar No. 17 Carlton House Terrace or 3.30 p.m.
on 1 Novernber1960
Present :
United Kingdom Iceland
Sir Patrick Reilly Mr. Hans Andersen
Mr. B. C. Engholm, MAFF Mr. 1.Olafsson
Miss J. A. Gutteridge. FO
Mr. R. D. C. McAlpine, FO
Mr. A. Savage, MAFF
Mr. A. J. Aglen, Scottish Office
Commander R. H. Kennedy, Admiralty
Mr. D. Sunimerhayes
Sir Patrick Reillvsaid that durine the mornine the exoerts had considered
- -
the baseline problem in more detail but they wanted more time for refiection
before reaching any final conclusion. The next points to be dealt with were:
(i) the length of the transitional periodand
(ii) the form ofassurance to be given by the lcelandic Government.
On (i) Mr. Andersen said that the length of the transitional period would
have to depend upon the general terms of the agreement. On a personal basis
he might be able to recommend something better than three years, ex., four
or even five years, but this would have to be approved by his Government.
Sir Patrick Reilly pointed out that ir had originallybeen thought on the
British side that a transitional periodof 10 years would be only fair, but in
view of Iceland's special position as a country heavily dependent on fisheries,
we had cut this to five years. This reduction hadbeen based on Our obtaining
unrestricted fisbing between 6-12 miles. Now, however, there were to be
considerable restrictionswithin 12 miles as well as many other concessions to
Iceland. In the circumstances it would be very helpful in obtaining the agree-
ment of the British industry if a period of not less than five years were
granted. We had understood that the period of three years suggested by
lceland was linked with' the fact that there would be elections in 1963.
Therefore, if four years were coiisidered possible surely it would be just as
easy to go to five.
Mr. Andersen said he would be prepared 10 recommend four years, or
even five years provided the other terms were sufficiently attractive. Sir
Patrick Reillv asked what \vas then the minimum that Iceland could accept
in othcr rerpeit, in order in niake a fite-year transitional perind pt>>\iblc?We
hrid indicatcd our uillingnc% IOconsider ehicnded baselinç\ ai ihree points.
and possibly also in the south-west but this last one presented very great
difficulties for us.
Mr. Andersen said that there were legal arguments to support the new
straight baseline proposed in the south-west and quoted the following from
an article in a legal journal conceriiing the judgment by the International
Court in the Norwegian Fisheriescase: "AS regards the British contention that the Norwegian lines did not
'respect the general direction of the coast',the Court said:
'Ilshould be observed that, however justified the rule in question
may be, it is devoid of any mathematical precision. In order properly
ta apply the rule, regard mus1 be had for the relation between the
deviation comolained of and what. accordinr! ta the terms of the rule.
mus1 be regarded as the geiicrald&ection ofihe coast. Therefore, on;
cannot confine oneself ta exaniining one sector of coast alone. exceut
in a case of manifest abuse: nor c'n one rely on the impression that
may be gathered from a large-scale chart of this sector alone. In the
case in point, the divergence between the baseline and the land
formations is not such ihat il is a distortion of the general direction
of the Norwegian coast'."
He asked whether in the opinion of the British side this was an argunient that
could be applied ta the present case. Miss Gutteridge and Commander
Kennedy both said that in their opinion the argument put forward was no1
applicable Io a baseline between points 35-51.
Sir Patrick Reilly then asked whether a revisecl baseline on the south-west
coast was a necessary accompaninient to an agreement with a five-year
transitional period. Mr. Andersen said that in his opinion this was definiiely
so. In order Io be acceptable to the lcelandic Government an agreement
would have to include bath the new baseline on the south-west and the
granting of an outside area on the north-west coast.
Sir Patrick Reillythen tiirned ta the question of the assurance ta be given
by the lcelandic Government. He asked Miss Gutteridge ta explain the
British position on lhis. Miss Gutteridge said we were &!lad to know that an
assurance was considered possible on the lcelandic side. We could no1 of
course oppose any further extension of limits made by lceland in accordance
wiih int;rnsi!oniil Iaii,. Ai the same tlmc ne held ih; ckiensionq caulil only
be hy agreement and iould noi be unilaieral ewn ifs co.i>ixl Staie i>iTered
arbitration. For this reason we could no1 accept the las1sentence in the tex1
for the assurance proposed by the Icelandic Government. While in Reykjavik
the British Delegation had worked out a formula which seemed Io provide a
possible basis agreeable ta both sides and suggested that this formula should
now be discussed. Miss Gutteridge handed over a copy of the following
proposed text :
"Except in accordance with the terms of any subsequent agreement
between the United Kingdom and Iceland, or any subsequent multi-
lateral agreement which embodies a generally acceoted rule of law in
- -
relation tn fishing Iimits. the Icelandic Governnient x.lll nit1 take any
action Io eïclude \essels registered in ihe territory of the United Kingdom
from fishing in any area outside the 12-niile Iiniii"
After studying the tex1 Mr. Andersen said that itwas necessary for the
purpose of presentation ta public opinion in lceland to leave the Icelandic
Government's hands "untied" in respect of possible further extensions of
fishery jurisdiction. The lcelandic Government would therefore asa minimum
want ta cover in the wording of the assurance the possibility of applying
customary law, as well as international law. Opinion in the world was always
channine and Iceland would want to take advdntaze of that ifil were fa-
vourablè without waiting for changes in internati&al law which always
seemed difficult ta achieve (e.g., the Iwo Geneva Conferences). Miss Gutteridee -aid she realized that customarv law was imnort~-~. but . ~
Her Majesty's Government were also strongly of the opinion that unilateral
extension could not bejustified, even when based on custom. She asked if it
would be sufficient to insert in the assurance a s~ecific "reservation of riehts"
by the lcelandic Government. Mr. Andersen indicated that this would nit do.
Mr. Engholmpointedout that the Allhing resolution of 1959spoke only of
"obtainine recoenition" of Iceland's ri~hti for conservation on the conti-
nental ~helf, whireas the right to extend to 12 miles had been described as
"inalienable". Did this mean that there was sonie distinction between the
two cases?Mr. Andersen confirmed that there was such a distinction and that
in his view further extension beyond 12 miles would only be on a basis of a
change either of international law or of custoniary law. Sir Patrick Reilly
said that this seemed to orovide some basis for advance and surrrested
looking in deiiiil ai the fori"ul<r, ih:it IiaJ hccn put forward on thc i\i,i-bidcs.
Afier dixiii~iùn. II wiis :igrccd thsi referencc to :i"hiliiterîl arreemenl"
between the United Kingdom and lceland was unrealistic since the United
Kingdom was most unlikely to enter into any such agreement in practice.
The words "decisions by the lcelandic Government" were objectionable
from the British ~ ~ide and subseaiient reference to such a decision beine
subject to arbitrÿtion was not regarded as a sufficient safeguard. It was left
that Miss Gutteridge would prepare a fresh draft which so far as possible
would incorporate Ïhe requirements on both sides.
Sir Patrick Reilly suggested that the delegations had now taken matters as
far as possible on the transitional period, and the form of assurance by Ice-
land. It might be useful now to take up the matter of rules of conduct. Was
it the lcelandic view that these rules could only be jointly enforced outside
12 miles? Mr. Andersen confirmed that this was so and said that public
opinion in lceland could no1contemplate CO-operation between the lcelandic
Coast Guards and the Royal Navy inside 12 miles. Mr. Engholm wondered
in that case, if the rules of condtict were really worth pursuing in the case of
the lcelandic fisheries. Mr. Andersen said he thought they were still valuable
but for areas outside 12 miles only. He pointed out that under the 1882 and
1901 agreements the rules had only been applied outside Icekand's territorial
limits. After further discussion it was agreed that the usefulness of rules of
conduct was not entirely excluded but that from the lcelandic side there
could be no question of applying the rules inside 12 miles.
Sir Patrick Reilly then proposed that the next meeting should be held on
Thursday, 3 November. He thought itmight be possible for this 10 be the last
round of the discussions.
Mr. Andersen said that if he had to ao home and reDort that he had not
obtained satisfaction in London on thekain points desired by the lcelandic
Government, then the talks woiild have to be broken ORentirely. What he
would like would be to settle the main points of the agreement here in
London and hc was willing to stay as long as might be necessary to achieve
this.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that he had not meant to imply that the Thursday
meeting should be final in the scnse that Mr. Andersen had implied. It had
been his view lhat a further round of talks would be necessary in Reykjavik
to iron out further differences. But ifMr. Andersen was able to remain for a
longer period in London, it might be possible to consult British Ministers
after the Thursday meeting and theh to resume discussion in London.
It was agreed that the next meeting should be held at 3.30 p.m. on
3 November. (a) Second Series, Filrh Meeting, 10.00 a.m., 4 Novemher 1960:
(6) Annexes 1 and 2
ANGLO-ICELANDIC FlSHERY TALKS
Record ofJ7ijrli meerit~gheld in rhe Foreizn Ofice ar 10 a.m
on Fridoy, 4 Novembrr 1960
Present :
Unifrd Kif~fdom /celand
Sir Patrick Reilly Mr. Flans Andersen
Mr. B. C. Engholm. MAFF Mr. David Olafsson
Mr. A. Savage, MAFF
Mr. A. J. Aglen, Scottish Office
Miss J. C. Gutteridge, FO
Mr. R. D. C. McAlpine, FO
Coinniander Kennedy, Adniiralty
Mr. Andersen beran hv sayina that he woiild still like to know how far the
United Kingdom delegation couid go to meet the lcelandic proposais.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that. as he had made clear earlier, the United King-
dom deleaation's instructions orecluded them from arreeinr to either outside
areas or base~inechanges. Thé Icelandic delegaiion,-for iheir part. had said
that no agreement would be possible without these two conditions. The
problem was Io see if some compromise could be achieved beiuleen these
two positions. If this seemed possible the United Kingdom delepation would
be prepared to refer to Ministers to seeif they would alter their instructions.
We now seemed to be in sight of a position where the United Kingdom
delegation could inforni Ministers of the terms which could he accepted by
the lcelandic Government and ask them to consider wheiher or not the
delegation could be authorized tu agree to them. The essential elenients of
an agreement on the basis which had been discussed so fiir would be:
(i) the 12-mile fishery limit claimed by lceland would no longer be opposed
by the United Kingdom;
(ii) there would be a transitional period during which British vesselswould
be allowed to fish in the 6-12 mile belt in certain areas and at certain
seasonsof the year;
(iii) two areas outside 12 miles on the north-west Coast. as defined in the
lcelandic memorandum, would be reserved for lcelandic small boat
fishermen al certain seasonsduring the transitional period. These would
be tlie minimum areas acceptable to Lceland;
(iv) the United Kingdom would be required tu accept four baselinechanges:
the firstwo in the lcelandic paper, the Iast and the one on the south-
west, i.e., betweenbasepoints 35 and 51, there still being sonie possibility
of compromise on the latter;
(v) there would be an assurance by the lcelandic Government on no exten-
sion of fishery limits beyond 12 miles after the transitional period. It had been recognized by the lcelandic delegation that the rules of conduct
proposed by the United Kingdom delegation would be useful. but the Ice-
l~ndic delc6ÿiion could noi sirce iijoinÏ enfi>rcenieni uithin 12niiles. Itu,a,
313,)~nJcr~t~~)dlnal if ihc a1:rcenicnt rrere to proiide fur an). hxselinc changes
or oiitside areas thcre could be no provision covering the lcelandic proposals
on economic CO-operation.
Mr. Andersen confirmed that the above was also his understanding of the
position.
Sir Patrick Reill. sue-.sted that the followin~ aue-.ions should nnw he ~ ~
rli<:used: 01 e~act Jcfinition uf the inidc arcas: (IIIbaselines; (iiij ternis of
the s$sur;incc Ile thankcd hlr. Olai~>on snd Ur. tneholm for their deisiled
study of the inside areas, but suggested that it wasiot necessary to reach
finality on this point before the United Kingdom delegationreferred to
Ministers.
Mr. Olafsson said that, as he had told Mr. Engholm. the lcelandic delega-
tion might be able to agree tu some changes in favour of the United Kingdom
in the ~eriods for United Kinadom .ishine on th- east coast. The auestion
of having a reseived net arça on the south-west as part of an agreed solution
of the baseline problem there would need fiirther examination. His disciission
with Mr. Engholni had shown. however. that if aareeinen- would be reached
011 tlic uther oiii~t.iriJiiii,\.ies ii sh<i~IJ hc pi~ssible io reach a satiiFa<ii>ry
conipr<>iiiiic oi,cr ihc instde jreai.
Sir P.itrick Kcillv \aid ihat ihefour b~sel.nechances nou, r>rooo\eil irere a11
difficult from the Ünited Kingdoni point of view. 0nly two kight possibly be
accepted. The one proposed on the south-wesr was much the most difficult
from the legal, fishery and defence points ofview.
Miss Gutteridge pointed out that as the coast was not deeply indented in
this region, nor was there a fringe of islands, the two basiccriteria under the
1958 Convention for a straight baseline system were not applicable in the
present case.
Sir Patrick Reilly asked whether Mr. Andersen could consider a line
betiveen basepoints 36 and 38.
Mr. Andersen said he could not justify this line to his Government. The
considerations involvcd on the Icelandic side were frankly political rather
than iuridical. The problem, as he saw it. was to find a suitable western
basepoint; in the lceiandic view this should he point 51. Would a line between
points 36 and 51 be acceptable?
hliss Gutteridge said this would be quite inadmissible from the legal point
of view.
Mr. Engholm said it would also be unacceptable from the fishery point of
view. The basepoint 51 had never previously been used.
hlr. Andersen asked if it \vould help if the proposed baseline changes were
not eiiected until half way through the transitional period.
Sir Patrick Reilly said this would certainly be hclpful, but it would not solve
the issue of principle.
Mr. Andersen said that he might be able to accept 36-38 if the United
Kingdom would drop their demand for the assurance.
Sir Patrick Rcilly said that the assurance was a key point for the United
Kingdom. He did not think it would be fruitful to pursue this line of ap-
proach.
Mr. Enaholm asked whether. in view of the imoortance to lcelandic net
fishermenof the eastern part of the south-wLsÏarea ihe lcclandic Government
would be prepared to forgo their demand for a baseline change in this areaifinsteadtherewereareserved net area between 6 and 12 miles in the eastern
part.
Mr. Olafsson said that there were usually heavy concentrations of nets
throughout the area between points 35 and 38. This whole area. therefore,
would have to be reserved under any such arrangement.
Mr. Engholm said that a reservednet area of this extent, which would cover
almost the entire bay, would greatly reduce or even nullify the value to
United Kinedom fishermen of the orooosed inside area in this reeion.
h?r. 0laf;on comrnented that cven with a new baseline from 3jor 36 to 51
there would be areas outside ihis line where there are heavy net concentra-
tions. In forgoing any reservednet area with a baseline betwéen35 and 51 the
lcelanders would thus be making a sacrifice.
Mr. Andersen said that the furthest hecould go would be to agree Io a new
baseline between either points 35 and 39 or 36and 51. He also confirmed that
the intention would be not to introduce the new baselines until about two-
and-a-half years from the date of the agreement; they would, however, have
to be introduced before the next lcelandic elections.
From the discussion which followed it emerged that:
(i) baselines between either 36 and 38 or between 36 and 39 would be
unacceptable to Iceland;
(ii) baselines between either la) 35 and 39 or (6) 36 and 51 would be
acceptable to Iceland. In thecase of (b) only however, there would have
to be a reservednet area to the Westof the Westmann Islands.
Miss Cutteridge said the alternatives in (ii) above presented serious legal
difficulties. If any baseline changes were accepted as part qf the agreement
Her Majesty's Governrnent would want 10 safeguard their legal position as
far as possible. We should, therefore. want a clause making it clesr that the
United Kingdom was accepting the baseline changes for the purposeonly of
this agreement.
Mr. Andersen said that his Government would prefer there to be no
implication that the baseline changes were a matter on which they had ta
reach agreement with other Governments. He claimed that the Lnterna-
tional Court had ruled that the coastal State is entitled to draw its own
baselines.
Miss Gutteridge reminded Mr. Andersen that this ruling was conditioned
on the baseline changes heing justifiable in international law and that the
Court had expressly drawn attention to the fact that any to alter
baselines had an international aspect.
Mr. Andersen sugaestedthat haselines miaht be covered in an Exchanae of
Notes in which thé' lcelandic ~overnment would inform Her ~ajeity's
Covernment of their intention to extend their baselines and the latter would
take note in whatever form suited them.
Miss Gutteridge said that we would want an explicit reservation of Our
legal position in the United Kingdom Note-Mr. Andersen did not demur.
Mr. Olafsson said that if a baseline change on the south-west were not
introduced for two-and-a-half years this would leave the net areas exposed
for that period. This would create difficulties; since this was the area where
there was the greatest concentration of nets. Fifteen years ago there was a
protected area in the eastern sector extending beyond 12 miles. Jn answer to
a question by Mr. Engholm. he confirmed that lcelandic trawlers are allowed
to fish within 12 miles in the south-west area, but pointed out that this u,as only in the western sector where there were in fact frequent incidents between
trawlers and net fishermen and that there were only about 40 Icelandic
trawlers which fished there while foreign trawlers fishjng in the area would
probably number over 100. He personally thought there would have to be a
reserved net area until after two-and-a-half years under either of the alterna-
tives onèred by Mr. Andersen.
Sir Patrick Reilly, sumniing iip, said that, as he understood the latest
Icelandic position, acceptance of a new baseline between either 35 and 39 or
36 and 51 with a nioratoriuni of two-and-a-half vears would involve a reserved
net area for this period between the existing baseline and the proposed new
one. On the face of it this would much reduce the value of the moratorium
as part of a compromise. To assessthe effect on Our fishing, however, we
would need exact details of the sort of reserved area the lcelandic delegation
had in mind. Mr. Olafsson undertook to supply details later.
Sir Patrick Reilly then asked Miss Gutteridge to explain the United King-
dom position regarding the assurance.
Miss Gutteridge said that the United Kingdom delegation had carefully
considered the points which Mr. Andersen had made at the last meeting and
how they could bc met. They appreciated Mr. Andersen's desire that the
draft should cover the ~ossibility of a further extension of lcelandic fishery
limits in conformity wiih a newrule of customary Iaw, as distinct from a"
international agreement. The difficulty, however, would be how to establish
that such a custoinary rule existed. In the United Kingdom view such a rule
would not only have to reflect the practice of a number of States, but also be
generally accepted, i.e., established by general consent and recognized as
such by the InternationalCourt ofJustice. Miss Gutteridge then handed over
the attached Unite~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ft (Annex 1).
. ~ ~
Mr. Andersen asked whether the reference the draft to the International
Court meant that Her Majesty's Government did not like the arbitration
provision for the settlemeniofdisputes laid down in the 1958Convention on
Conservation.
Miss Gutteridge asked whether, in proposing that a decision by the
Icelandic Government to extend Iceland's fishery limits beyond 12 miles
should be subject to arbitration, the lcelandic Government had been con-
templating arbitration before or after the decision had taken effect.
Mr. Andersen said that this point was covered in the Convention.
Mr. Engholm pointed out the distinction between the nature of arbitration
envisaged in the Conservation convention. where not only leeal, but.also.
admini\trati\,e .ind scientifi~ con\ider.iti.)n,h.iJ tu he taken into acLoiint, and
that envisaged in the prexnt cJ>e where the issue u,oiild be puielv Iegsl. For
th!\ rç~ron the arhitration 5yitein laid down in the Cùnr~ntion would na1 be
appropriate Io the kind of dispute we were now discussing.
Mr. Andersen, after expressing a preference for arbitration, said that the
United Kingdom proposa1 would cause difficulty for his Government. For
one th in- there had~to ~e~ ~case before the Co~-t. W~o would brine it? He
wggeried dcleting the uorrli: ".ind re;ogniled a, suih by the Internaiional
Ca~urtof Ju~tdiç".
hl.<% Giitterid~c \aiJ th31 liel.iiiJ zoiild br.nc a c;isc beiore the Court ifit
wanted. Miss Gitteridge then suggested the redraft at Annex 2.
Mr. Andersen said he could accept this, though he would srill prefer
arbitration.
Sir Patrick Reilly said he thought the point had now been reached where
the United Kingdom delegation must refer to Minisfers. This would taketime, however, and an adjournment of at least a week would be needed.
Summing up, he said that the lcelandic proposais as they now stood were, he
thought, as follows:
(.. Continued fishina -. UnitedKinndom - vesselsbetween 6 and 12 miles in
certain areas and ;IIcçrtdin *casons for 3 transttional periud: the are:,?
and seîsonr IO bc finally defincd aficr the adjournment;
(III 1,) bc nolilicallacceoishle in Iccland an 3areenient of ihis kind uould
. .
have to include as a-minimum the Iwo arias on the north-west Coast.
The lcelandic delegation would not press for others if the rest of the
agreement were satisfactory;
(iii) an undertaking by the United Kingdom no1 to object Io certain baseline
changes, the minimum being the four under discussion, the proposal in
regard Io the one on the south-west, however, being modified so that a
linebetween either points 36 and 51 or 35 and 39 would be acceptable
to Iceland. lmplementation of the changes would be delayed for a
oeriod deoendent on the leneth of the transitional ~eriod. Durinn the
koratoriu.m lceland would want a reserved net area (10 be defined rater)
in the western sector between the existing baseline and the proposed new
one, the efïect of which, as far as he could see, would be considerably
to reduce the value of the moratorium.
There followed some discussion on the length of the transitional period in
which Mr. Andersen made the following points: the assurance was now the
key-on this the United Kingdom delegation were driving him into a corner.
If he accepted this he mus1have a lot on baselines. If the United Kingdom
accepted the baseline change on the south-west originally proposed by him,
namely 35-51 the periodcould be five years; if either of the alternative lines-
36-51 or 35-39 were accepted it would be four years. Of the Iwo, lceland
would prefer 35-39. The baseline changes must take efïect before the next
elections, i.e., on 1June 1963at the latest. The transitional periodmight be a
year longer if the United Kinndom could nrant some economic concessions.
TO this latter point Sir ~atrick Reilly repied that he had only been able Io
pursue the discussions on the present basis becausethe economic concessions
had been dropped.
Sir Patrick Reilly then asked whether he could take it definitely that an
agreement on the basis he had ou:lined with an assurance on the lines of the
United Kingdom draft, as amended at the meeting, would be acceptable to
the lcelandic Government.
Mr. Andersen said that it would.
Sir Patrick Reilly said it could no1 be assumed that such an agreement
would be acceptable Io the United Kingdom. The proposed outside areas
and baseline changes were still a very serious stumbling block.
Mr. Engholm said that although Her Majesty's Government could, of
course, make any agreement they considered to be in the national interest,
an agreement in which the British fishing industry did no1 a1least acquiesce
could be valueless. If the industry were no1 prepared even Io acquiesce in an
agreement including outside areas two dangers would be likely Io arise which
the Government would be able to do nothing to prevent. First Our trawlers
might refuse Io respect the outside areas and there would be incidents;
secondly action might be taken to prevent imports of lcelandic fish. An
agreement which was not, honoured by the industry would not help either
side. Mr. Andersen said he was under the impression that the industry was in
the Government's pocket.
Sir Patrick Reilly denied this. The problem was one which very closely
affected the livelihood of Our fishermen.
Mr. Andersen pointed out that in the United Kingdom a local interest was
at stake; in Iceland it was the national interest.
Sir Patrick Reilly said that if I<er Majesty's Governrnent thought that an
ae-eement on the lines which had been discussed was in the best interests of
the country as a whole they might try to persuade the industry to accept il,
but there would be no euarantee whatever that the industry would accept il.
Mr. Andersen said ihat his Governnient would be taking risks in entering
into any agreement. If il were lessthan satisfactory to the Althing they would
fall. He agreed to an adjournment and said that he would be remaining in
London. Mr. Olafsson would be returningto Reykjavik on the following day.
It was agreedto hold the next meeting in the Foreign Office at 3.30 p.m. on
Monday, 14 November.
Assiiranceby rlteIcelattdicGovernmenfartnoe.rrensions offishery limifsbeyond
12 miles. Uitifed KitrgdomBrafi
The lcelandic Government will not take any action Io exclude vessels
registered in the United Kingdoin from fishing in any area outside the 12-
mile limit except in accordance with the ternis of a subsequent international
agreement enibodvin~ a aenerally acceuted rule of law in relation to fishery
li;~iitor in conCorniit) <rith a r~~c<lfin~ern~t.on~lIJU. c~t:ihli~herlhy gcncril
consent and reci)gnized :is ciicli hy the International Coiirt oi Justice, ivhich
woiild permit such an extension of fishery jurisdiction.
Asstrranceby rheIcelandicGover~imeno rnnoerfensionsoffishery limifsbeyond
12 miles. Reviseddrafr
6. The lcelandic Government will not take any action 10 exclude vessels
registered in the United Kingdom from fishing in any area outside the 12-mile
limit except in accordance with the terms of a subsequent international
agreement embodying a generally accepted rule of law in relation to fishery
limits, or in confor,rnity with a rule of international law, established by
general consent, which would permit such an extension of fishery jurisdiction.
Any dispute as to whether such a rule exists may be referred al the request of
either party to the International Court of Justice. Third Series, First Formol Meeting, 2 p.m., 2 December 1960
Record of Conversationwith Icelandic Foreign Minisrer ar 2 p.m.
on 2 December 1960
Present:
Mr. G. 1. Gudmundsson Her Majesty's Ambassador
Mr. H. Andersen Sir Patrick Reilly
Mr. H. Bjornsson Mr. B. C. Engholm
After thanking the Foreign Minister for receiving Mr. Engholm and
himself al the outset of their visit, Sir Patrick Reillysaid that they on the
United Kingdom side greatly regretted that a misunderstanding should have
arisen over the outcome of the Iast discussions in London. They had thought
these discussions encouraging. The lcelandic representatives were able,
experienced and tough but they had shown a spirit of compromise and
indeed this had been shown by bath sides. The United Kingdom side thotight
that thev had made their oosition entirelv clear. It was that thev had @one
be)ond thcar insiri.cimns and reierencc IO lliniriersrra&ihereiore nccessriry.
It hacl been ihçir iindcr>tanding ihai the position relichcd\vas sciept.ihle Io
ihe Icelandic Go\ern~ilçni and tlritirh >iini\icrrhlid hecn su inrorined. The
latter were naturally very disappointed to learn that this \vas not so. He did
not wish ta take up the Minister's lime by going over the pst. He regretted
very much that Mr. Engholm and he could not stay longer. They had, how-
ever, thought il worthwhile to conie, in order to find out whether there was
still a possible basis for agreement.
2. Sir Patrick Reilly went on to Say that it had always been recognized on
both rides that the agreement must be a "package deai" and al1 the discus-
sions had beenconducted on this basis. An agreement on the basis contem-
plated in the lcelandic paper of 28 October, and even on that rcached at the
end of the London talks, ivould be so very much less favourable to the
United Kingdom than what they had hoped to obtain that Her Majesty's
Government look the view that "economic CO-operation" arrangements on
the lines originally discussed could not now bejustified. This had been made
clear al the outset of the London talks and the whole discussion there had
been on this hasis. Sir Patrick Reillv renretted that he mus1 anain make il
quite clear that this remains Her ~ajesty's Government's posit'ron.
3. There remained a series of variabies in the package.
(a) The extent of the restrictions on the United Kingdom fishing inside the
12-mile limit.
fbJ The extent of such restrictions otitside.
(c, Propo~ed b.iscline changes.
Id, The date on u hich theseihlnges \i,<~uliiilike etTeci.
(z, The length of the transitional periud.
Sir Patrick Reilly did not wish to discuss these points at length now. It was
clear that the vro~osed restrictions inside and oiitside the 12-mile limit
greatly rediiced-the-benefits which the United Kingdom would get from the
agreement, and sa especially did the baseline changes. They had therefore
welcomed the suggestion that the baseline changes should be postponed ~erhaps for two-and-a-half vear.. and.had been much disa~oointed to hear
ihat the lcelandic Government now found this postponemént very difficult.
Naturally the value of the agreement to the United Kingdom would depend
to a great extent on the length of the transitional period. They hadunderstood
that this could be five years, if Her Majesty's Government could meet the
lcelandic Government fully on baselines, and four if they could go a con-
siderable way 10 meeting them.
4. Finally there was the key point of the formula for the assurance about
further extensions outside the 12-mile limit. Her Majesty's Government
considered that siich an assurance must cover three essential points, which
were as follows:
(1) The Icelandic Government will not claim an extension of fishery limits
beyond 12 miles except in accordance with a ritleof international law
which has been clearly established (a) by embodiment in an international
agreement, or (hl accepted hy general consent as a rule of customary
international law.
(2) Any dispute about whether such a rule of international law has been
established shall be subinitted to the International Court of Justice: and
pending the Court's decision, any measure taken to give effect to such a
rule will not apply to British vessels.
(3) The assurance on this ooint will form an essential Dart of the agreeme.t.
If these three points could be met then Her Majesty's Government would do
al1they could to help the lcelandic Government on the form and presentation
of the assurance. In particular, if a reference to the Althing's Resolution of
5 May 1959was important they would have no objection to including one.
5. Sir Patrick Reilly repeated that this was the key problem. He must with
regret make it clear that the latest wordine suanested bv the Icelandic
GOvernment didnot meet the essential points s~tisfactorily and the possibiliry
of concluding the discussions succesrfully turned on the solution of this
orohlem. After al1 the efforts made bv both sides it would be lamentable if
ihey had to conclude that no agreement was possible. He therefore urged that
Icelandic Ministers should authorire Mr. Andersen and his colleagues to
discuss a formula which would cover the three essential pointsand ruggested
that discussions shoold be concentrated on this subject during their present
visit. Naturally if an agreement on the formuJa could be reached in time to
allow discussion of other points, they would be very glad.
6. Mr. Gudmundsson said that the Icelandic Government had very much
regretted that there had been a misunderstanding about the outcome of the
London discussions which thev thought had s-own useful orogress. The . .
po,iiion rc.iclied ihen i:enierl i<i thelit in general <ic;cpi;ible 2% .t h~\i\ for
furilicr diccu,sioii. l'here titre. hoiie~cr, t\ro jr thrce poiiiis ahi;h iiere \cry
iI~ilici.li or e\cn ~nin<~\bihlfcoriticiii. The firu <if 1he.c and the nici,i ditlicult,
was the question or the date of eiitry into force of the new baselines. It was
quite hopeless for the lcelandic Government to consider postponing this for
two-and-a-half years. It was essential that the new baselinesshould enter into
force together &th the agreement.
7. The second difficull point was the formula for the assurance. The text
proposed in London was not acceptable to the Icelandic Government. On the
oiher Iixnil. ihere iliJ n<ii wciiiIO' be ;iny real Jifirenc<ii 0fopini.m beirrr.cn
tlic I\iO .iJes. The Icel:in.ix C;c>ir.rnincnt iiiii\rt:,ic th~i ihcir .ilnia.ti the
Coiitiiiçiit.iShclf. The, 1tr.r~.hi>iic\,er. re~dv io ri..ic iheir iiiicniiii10 b3re
their action on rules ofinternational lah andaiso their willingness to submitanv disoute Io the International Court. He thought, therefore. that it'would
noi he ;mpossible to reach agreement on a mutu~lly acceptable formula.
8. The third difficult peint was the length of the transitional period. Four
vears would be verv difficult for the 1cËlandic Government. but was no1
éntirely excluded. ~;ve years, however, was quite hopeless.
9. Finally there was the question of any economic arrangements. It miist of
course be understood that the landin"s~ban would be withdrawn with the
entr) iniu for~e uf ihe ,igrceiiierii. On the othcr h.tnd. the Icslandic G<>\'ern-
nieni understood Iler hlajc,ty'\ Cici\rrnmcni's pi).~t.on ah,iiit thc rcvirion of
the Landinzs-Agr-ement and about tariff concessions. He did not think that
this point need cause much difficulty. In conclusion Mr. Gudmundsson said
that the Icelandic Government were very anxious to reach agreement. They
were o.eo.red to take a real risk in order to obtain one. but thev were not
prep~rsd IO insur certaiii siii~ide. Their iiiaiii \re:ipan agïinst iheir opponcnis
u3s the basclinc ;h.ingcs. xiid the). niust be ihle tAC thxi ire~poii no\%
10. Mr. Engholm said that the Landin~s Agreement was ofcourse a matter
for the indusrry. He could. however, say with some confidence that if an
agreement was reached which was regarded as acceptable by the industry in
the United Kingdom, the latter would not wish to put obstacles in the way
of a resumption of landings of lcelandic fish within the limits of the existing
Landings Agreement. The question of the date of the entry into force of the
new haselines was of course a very difficult one for the United Kingdom side
but this was one of the various variables which needed to be discussed
together.
II. Mr. Gudmundsson referred to the timing of any further discussions.
He said that the Government would like to be able to suhmit the agreement
Io Parliament before it rose for Christmas. It seemed doubtful however
whether there was really time for this, in view, particularly; of the other
engagements of Mr. Engholm and Sir Patrick Reilly.
12. Mr. Engholm said that Her Majesty's Government were of course very
anxious for an earlv aereement.
.
13. Irkas ogrt,rdth~t there shoiild he2 f.irthsr di*ciic,i.>n <ifthe po,>~hilit)
ofconipletins the necoti:iiions before Chri,tnias and ih:it tlie iirit ,t\r.%io
concenirate on the discussion of the assurance. Mr. Gudmundsson said that
he would arrange for Sir Patrick Reilly and Mr. Engholm to be received by
the Prime Minister and other Ministers assoon as he conveniently could.
Item (xi;)
Third Series, Second Formol Meetitlg, 4 p.m., 2 December 1960
Record of Conversation wirhIcelandicPrime Minisfer, and Ministers of Justice,
Fisheries and Foreign Afairs at 4 p.m. on 2 December 1960
Present :
Mr. Olafur Thors Her Mdjesty's Ambassador
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson Sir Patrick Reilly
Mr. Emil Ionsson Mr. B. C. Engholm
Mr. Gudmunder 1.Gudniundsson
Mr. Hans Andersen
Mr. Hénrik Bjornsson After~oreliminarv courtesies. Sir Patrick Reillv said that. as Mr. Thors
knew, British Ministers and the Prime Minister hiinself were taking a close
interest in the settlement of the fisherv dispute. The Prinie Minister had very
much appreciated the opportiinity for a conversiition with Mr. Thors and
Sir Patrick Reilly knew that they would wish him to convey to the latter his
warm greetings.
2. Sir Patrick Reilly said ihai he niuch regretted that a misunderstanding
had arisen after the las1 discussions in London. These had been useful and
after them British Miitisters had aooroved neiv instructions for the United
Kingdom Delegation which repre&ted a considerable siep forward Io nieet
the lcelandic Government's wishes. They were therefore greatly disappointed
that there appeared to have been a set-back. Mr. Engholm and he had
however been .encouraged by iheir earlier conversation with the Foreign
Minister to think that in fact the two sides werc closer together than they had
believed.
3. Sir Patrick Reilly recalled that the agreement had always been conccived
as a packagedeal andexplained why it was now impossible for Her hlajesty's
Government to agree to measures of "economic co-operation" such as had
been discussed at an early stage. He added that the key problem was the
formula for the assurance and he rehearsed the three essential points which
Her Maiestv's Government considered it should cover. He houed that Ice-
landic ~in&ters Would agree that there should be disciissions with officials
directed at finding a mutiially acceptable formula which covered these three
points.
4. Mr. Olafur Thors made ;i cordial reference to the Prime Minister's
visit. The lcelandic Governiiient had been very grateful for the trouble the
Prirne Minister had taken to respond to Mr. Thors' suggestion tliat they
should meet. He asked Sir Patrick Reilly to convey his greetings to the Prinie
Minister.
5. Mr. Tliors went over the lcelandic Governiiient's oolitical difficulties on
hmiliar lines. He then indicaied that the lcelandic ~overnment undersiood
Her Maiesty's Government's position about economic co-operation and thar
they wo;ld~not press this point. The question of the assurance was, however,
very difficult for them. Finally he said that the q~iestion of baselitte changes
was vital and that ii was quite impossible for the lcelandic Governnient to
contemplate any postponenient of the changes. Mr. Gudnilindsson said that
the most difficult fedture of the problem of the assurance was how to dedl
with the oint to which Her hlajesty's Governnient evidently attached so
much importance that, if there \vis a dispute, no medsure to apply an exten-
sion of fishery limits would be taken pending reference to the International
Court.
6. Mr.~~enediktsson~ ~ ~ed with Mr. Gudmundsson. ~~ He adrnitted that
Her Majesty's Government's attitude on this point was reasonable, but he
said that it was very difficiili to present to Icelandic public opinion. If inight
oerhaos.~e ~os.iblé ~ ~ ~ ~ somë form of words which would imoiv an obii- . .
galion not to apply the extensiori until the Court liad decided, without stüting
ii explicitly in words on which the Opposition woiild lasten.
7. Mr. Benediktsson added that in this connection it was imoortant to
consider ahxi f<irni exsctly thc :issiirdnce ~IioiiIJ idke aiiJ indeeu \rh;ii should
bc rhc form of the uholc ;igreeiiient IIç iiid:c;iicJ th21 Icelsndi~ hlinlsieri had
not yet examined this question. He suggested that one solution might be that
there should be no formül agreement but that the ind der standingrseached
should be embodied in declarations made by each side. If there was io be a formal agreement, what form should it take? It might, for instance, be in the
form of an Exchange of Notes. Anoiher point which needed consideration
was what should be done about other countries. Would they have to be given
the same concessions as the United Kingdom received? A possible way of
avoiding this niiglit be to explain the problem in NATO and ask the other
NATO Governments concerned not to press for the sanie terins as the United
Kingdom.
8. Sir Patrick Reilly and MI. Engholm emphasized that Her Majesty's
Government would consider it very important that the agreement should be
embodied in a formal agreement af one kind or another.
9. In conclusion, Mr. Thors, while agrecing that the assurance formula
should be discussed between oRcials gave a warning that this was not the only
difficult point which remained to be settled. He referred in particular to the
length of the transitional period.He raid that many Governnient siipporters
thought that lhis sliould not extend beyond the election. Le., nor more than
Iwo-and-a-hall years. He emphasized that anything more than three years
would be extremely dificult for the lcelandic Government.
Item (xiii}
Tlzird Series, NoreqfEvents hetwren Sccotid
atrd Tlrird Formal Meeritzgs
RECORD OF EVENTS ON 2 AND 3 DECEMBER 1960
Following on the meeting with the Icelandic Prinie Minister and his
Ministerial colleagues on 2 December a meeting took pluce at 5.00 p.m.
between United Kingdom and lcelandic officiais to discuss the terms of the
. assurance formula. The following were present:
Mr. Hans Andersen Her Majesty's Ambassador
MI. Henrik Bjornsson Sir Patrick Rcilly
MI. B. C. Engholm
Miss 1.A. C. Gutteridge
2. Sir Patrick Reilly and Miss Gutteridge explained why the lcelandic
formula proposed in telegram No. 354 from Reykjavik on 28 November did
not cover the essential United Kingdom points. It was iiiiprecise on what
constituted international law andindeedsuanested atiite wronalv that resolu-
tions of international conferencesand dicta-if international lawbodies might
rank as international Iaw. Moreover it merely said that the Icelündic Govern-
ment would be aiiided bv such matters rather than beinr bound to seek their
objective inaccordance with international law. Finally iïdid not provide that
no action should be taken against United Kingdoni vessels in advance of a
decision of the Court.
3. Mr. Andersen said that they attached importance to such matters as
resolutions of international conferences and the existence of historic rights
and would wish to be able to use these in support of any action that the
Icelandic Governinent might feel justified in taking to ertend its fishery
jurisdiction. But if would still be for the International Court to decide
whether such action was in fact in accordance with Interiiational Law. This was a big concession by the lcelandic Government and should provide the
United Kingdom with adequate safeguards. As regards action pending a
Court decision, his Ministers had explained that they could not commit
themselves generally on this although they would be prepared to consider any
form of words which could be devised which contained such an implication
withoiit openly saying so. Mr. Andersen went on io stress that for psycho-
logical reasons any assurance would have to be in a positive a formas possible
giving the appearance that the lcelandic Government was not going back in
any way on the Althing Resolution of 1959 but was proposing to inake
further progress towards securing ils objective.
4. After a further general discussion the following formula was agreed
between both rides for submission to lcelandic Ministers:
"The lcelandic Governnient will continue to work for the imple-
mentation of the Althing Resolution of 5 May, 1959, but agreesthat any
extension of fisherv iurisdiction around lceland will be in accordance
~ ~ ~ ~, 9~
[with the terms of a subsequent bilateral agreeiiient between the
Government of the United Kingdoni and the Government of Icelandl
or with the terms of any international agreeiiient enibodying a generally
accepted rule of law in relation to fishery limits, or in conformity with a
rule of international law, established by general consent. which would
permit such an extension of fishery jurisdiction. If the lcelandic Govern-
ment intend to apply a mezisureadopted in pursuancc of such ;irule Io
vessels registered in the United Kingdom, any dispute between the
~ontracti&, Parties as to the existen~eora~plicability of the rule shall be
referred, at the request of other 1Contracting Party, to the lnternational
Court of Justice." '
5. On 3 December, alter a morning meeting of the Icelandic Cabinet,
officiais reassembled at 2.00 p.in. for a further meeting. Mr. David Olafsson
attended in addition to those who were present on the previoiis occasion.
At this meeting Mr. Andersen explaincd that his Ministers had considered
the formula drafted the previous evening but could not accept il. They
considered that the furthest whicli they coiild go would be the terms of the
assurance originally proposed by them on 28 November. They did no1
consider.that anything other than this could be go1 through the Althing.
As regards the form of the assurance, Mr. Andersen said thai Ministers were
thinking in terms of a declaration by the lcelandic Government or al the
most, possibly an Exchange of Notes.
6. In reply Sir Patrick Reilly said that, as had already been explained, the
formula suggested by the lcelandic Government was totally unacceptable Io
the United Kingdom and if this was the final position of the lcelandic
Government he thought that further negotiations would be useless.Headded
that the only other idea which the lcelandic Government might wish Io
consider was that instead of agreeing not tu take any action agoinst United
Kinadom vessels in advance of a decision bv the lnternational Court. six
mon-ths' notice of any proposed action shouldbe given so that in thc event of
a dispute the matter could be referred to the International Couri beforc any
measure \vas actually applied. A draft of a suggestedsentence to give eBect to
this was handed to Mr. Andersen. In addition the United Kingdom oliicials
made il clear that a unilateral declaration by the lcelandic Government
1 Sic;?"either" intended: seepara. I of ilem(xi"). would be [some words h0i.e obviortslybeerraccidenrally omirted/rom the
original record ar rhispoi~rrl prepared to consider an Exchange of Notes,
provided that this constituted an agreement between the two Governments.
Mr. Andersen said that he would report the views of the United Kingdom
Delegates to his Ministers.
7. At 7.00 p.m. on 3 December. Mr. Andersen, Mr. Bjornsson and Mr.
Olafsson called to see Sir Patrick Reilly and Mr. Engholm and said that,
since the previous discussion, they had been considering the matter further
in conjunction with their Ministers. As a result they wished to know whether
a formula on the following basis would be niore acceptable to the United
Kingdom Delegates:
The lceland~ ~ ~vernment will continue to work for the imole-
mentation of the Althing ~isolution of 5 May 1959 regarding 'the
extension of fisheriesjurisdiction around Iceland. Six months' notice will
be given of the application of any such extension and in case of dispute
the measures.will be referred to the International Court of Justice.
Sir P~irick Rcilly proiiiiscJ thxi iliis ii,uiild he considercd iiiiniedixiely ~nd
ihe observation^of the Ilnitcd Kingdoiii Delegaie%woulJ betslcphoned IO the
lcelandic representatives that evening. Following further consideration of the
Icclandic formulli. Sir I>atrir.k Keilly rnforniM;. Bjornrwn that thil ftirmula
u,ashelpful in that it provided sonie advancc on ihe previoiis Icelandic pi~ii.
tion. Nevertheless it still didnot cover one of the essential points. namelv that
any further action by the lcelandic Government towards ekending its fishery
jurisdiction should be in accordance with international law. He therefore
proposed a revised formula which read as follows:
The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the imole-
mentation of the Althing Resolution of 5 May 1959 regarding 'the
extension of fisheries jurisdiction around lceland in conformity with
international law. Six months' notice will be e-ven of the ao.l.cation of
any such extension, and any dispute as to whether the measures to be
applied are in accordance with international law will be referred, at the
request of either party, to the International Court of Justice.
Mr. Bjornsson promised that this would be considered by Icelandic
Ministers with a view to a further meeting between officiaisthe following
morning.
(ol Third Series, Tlrird Formol Meering. Noortoii 4 December 1960:
(b) A~incs'es A ond 8
'(0)
Recordof Meeting wirh IcelandicDclegarioi~or rroonon 4 December1960
Present:
Mr. Hans Andersen Her Majesty's Ambassado1
Mr. Henrik Bjornsson Sir Patrick Reilly
Mr. David Olafsson Mr. B. C. Engholm
Miss J. A. C. Gutteridge Mr. Andersen said that the lcelandic Cabinet had considered the amend-
ments to the new lcelandic formula of the assurance which the United
Kingdom Delegation had proposed the previous evening. They had decided
that they could not accept them, with the exception of the words "at the
request of either party". Mr. Andersen explained that the lcelandic blinisters
considered that il would be impossible to justify to Parliament and public
opinion the inclusion of the words "in conformity with international law".
These words contained the implication that lcelandic action hitherto had not
been in conformity with international law and were therefore bound to arouse
severe criticism. The Icelandic Ministers considered that they were quite
unnecessarv. in view of the ~rovision for reference to the Internationiil Court
which wouid of course make its decision on the basis of international Iaw.
2. The United Kingdom representatives said that it was their considered
view that the new formula would no1be acce~tabie to Her Maiest.'s .overn-
iiicnt unless it.uiitaincd ,011icrzfcren~e to inicrnat i)n:ilIdu. fric problcni ai
presentaiion wÿs j.i\t.i>ditfic~lt on the Cnited hingJsiii LISun tlic Icel<iiidi;
side and it had in fact been aagravated bv the history of the Dresent neaotia-
tions. They found it impossible to understand why the words"in confo~mity
with international law" which had been used by the lcelandic Government
themselves, in the first sentenceof the formula put forward in their own paper
on 28 October, were now described as impossible to justify to lcelandic
public opinion.
3. Mr. Andersen replied that he could only say that the matter had been
very carefully considered by the lcelandic Ministers and his instructions were
that the proposed amendments were unacceptable. As regards the use of the
wordine "in conformitv with international law" in the Icelandic formula of
28 0ct:ber he said firsi, that the rest of that formula had of course iiot been
accepted: and secondly, since 28 October the lcelandic Government had been
continuing political consultations and no doubt these had shown that the
phrase in question was not acceptable.
4. After a break for consultation. Sir Patrick Reilly repeated that the
United Kingdom side much regretted that they could not accept the lcelandic
formula without inclusion of any reference to internarional law, since their
considered opinion remained that in its present forni ilwould no1 be accept-
able to United Kingdom Ministers. In a further effort to assis1the lcelandic
Government in the presentation of the formula they had drafted three
alternative formulae. Each of these contained only one reference to inter-
nationallaw. Two were alternative ways of putting il into the second sentence
of the assurance. The third put it into the first sentence and was designed to
use language taken from the Althing Resolution of 5 May 1959. They
thouaht that the first two had better chancesof ap~roval bv United Kingdom
Minzters, but they were prepared to submit the third to (hem if it would be
acceptable to the lcelandic Government.
5. The drafts in question were as follows:
1.(a)
The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the implementation of
the Althing Resolution of 5 May 1959.Six months' notice will be given of the
application of any such extension. and any dispute as to whether there is in
existence a rule of international law which would perniit siich an extension of
fishery jiirisdiction will be referred. at the request of either party to the
International Court of Justice. The lcelandic Government will continue to work for the implementation
of the Al~ ~ ~ Resolution of 5 Mav 1959 reeardine the extension of fisheries
jurisdiction a~oundlceknd. Six mo~ths' notice willlbe given ofthe application
of any such extension and in case of dispute the measures in auestion will be
referred to the International Court of ~ustice, at the request if either Party,
for decision as to whether there is in existence a rule of international law
which would permit such an extension of fishery jurisdiction.
2.
The Icel:aiid c Govcriiiiiciit nill csniiniic io iiork for the rïcognitiaiii iindcr
interrntionsl kiu.of dn exicnsion of the tirheries jiiriidictidr. .rrounJ Icel~nd
in 2ccord~nc.e wiih ihr icrnis of ihc Alihing Rc\oluiton (if 5 >l;iy 1959. Six
n~onihr' notix will br glven of the applicliiion of .iny siich cltcn\ion. and any
dispuIr. in rcrpeci i~fsiich c\ien\i,in \vil1 be referred, ai ihr requsrt of ciihrr
party, 10 the International Court of Justice.
Mr. Andersen said that he would put these drafts to his Ministers. He
commented ihat they were al1 variations on the same theme which the latter
had already declared to be unacceptable.
6. Sir Patrick Reilly asked whether lcelandic Ministers had considered
further the form of the assurance. Mr. Andersen said that thev had not. but
that it was his understanding that they were contemplating its émbodinieni in
an Exchange of Notes. lndeed he thought that it was their idea that the whole
agreement<hould take the form of one or more Exchanges of Notes. Sir
Patrick Reilly said that the United Kingdom side now agreed that il would
be best for the assurance to take the form of an Exchange of Notes, but il was
of course essential that this should state that the Exchanee of Notes consti-
tuted an agreement between the two Governm~nts. He &ve Mr. Andersen
the draft of an Exchange of Notes on the siibiect at Annex A. As regards the
whole agreement. Sir Patrick Reillv said that iheir i~~ ~was that there should
be a sh0rt formal agreement wiih two Exchanges of Notes, the second
dealing with baselines, to which there would, however, be a reference in the
Agreement itself.
7. MI. Andersen, suggested that the meeting should go on to consider
other outstanding points siich as the actual baselines and so on. Sir Patrick
Reillv said that thev thoiieht that it would be Ine~ual to disc~s~-next a ooint
of p;inciple on thé queszon of baselines on which they had categorical
instructions. At his request Miss Gutteridae ex~lained that Her Majesiy's
Government considered it essential that 't should be made clear in ~he
agreement that any baseline changes concerned baselines selected and
accepted for the purpose of delimiting the fishery zone referred to in the
agreement and for that purpose only, i.e.. that they would not relate to the
territorial sea. Mr. Andersen indicated that this was qiiite understood and
would cause no difficulty. Sir Patrick Reilly gave Mr. Andersen the dr;ift.of
an Article and Exchange of Notes on the point omitting any reference to the
üctual new baselines. (See Annex B.)
8. Sir Patrick Reilly said that he thought it would be premature to discuss
the other outstandina oints Mr. Andersen had iust raised ~intil the auestion
of the assurance habbeen settled. He briefly rehéarsedthe five variables and
pointed out that if the lcelandic position on some of these was now in fact
fixed irrevocably, then this would have an effect on the settlement of the
other points. MEMORlALONJURlSDICTlON 227
(b)
ANNEX A
Drafi Exchange of Nores
No. 1
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour to refer to the Fishery Agreement between Iceland and
the United Kingdom signed today, and Io state as follows the position in
regard to any extension of fishery jurisdictibeyond the limits of the 12-mile
zone referred Io in Article1of the Agreement:
The Icelandic Governmcnt will continue to work for the imple-
mentation of the Althing Resolution of 5 May 1959 regarding the
extension of fisheries jurisdiction around lceland in conformity with
international law. Six months' notice will be given of the application of
any such extension, and any dispute as Io whether the measures Io be
applied are in accordance with international lawwill be referred, al the
request of eitherarty, to the International Courtof Justice.
2. 1have the honour to suggest that this Note and Your Excellency's reply
thereto shall be regarded as constituting an Agreement between out two
Governments in regard to the niatters set out in this Note.
No. 2
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of
today's date reading as follows:
[as in No. Il
2. 1have the honour to state that the United Kingdorn Governrnent, whilst
affirming that it cannot recognizc any extension of fisheries jurisdiction which
is not in accordance with internationallaw confirms that Your Excellency's
Note and my present reply thereto shall be regarded as constituting an
Agreement between Our two Governments in regard to matters set out in
Your Note.
ANNEX B
Drafls of an Article irrthAgreenrerrralrdof a?!E.rchanfe of Notes reluring
ro Baselit~es,give~roIcelatrdic Delegorior!on 4 December 1960
(a) DRAFT ARTICLE
The United Kingdom Government shall no1 object Io the exclusion, by the
competent authorities of the Icclandic Government, of vessels registered in
the territory ofthe United Kingdom from fishing within a fishery zone of 12 miles contiguous ta the coast of Iceland and measured from the baselines
specified for the purpose of delimiting that zone.
The baselines referred ta in paragraph (1) of this Article shall be those
described in Article I of the lcelandic Regulation No. 70 of 1 July 1958,
concerning the Fisheries Limits off Iceland, subject ta such modifications as
are set out in Notes exchanged between the Contracting Parties on the date
of signature of this Agreement.
(b) DRAFT EXCHANGE OF NOTES
Originating Icelandic Note
Sir,
I have the honoiir to refer to paragraph (1) of Article I of the Agreement
on Fishery Relations between the United Kingdom and Iceland which was
signed today, and ta state that the lcelandic Government propose Io intro-
duce, no1 earlier than. : . ,the following modification of the baselines
described in Article 1 of the Icelandic Regulation No. 70 of I July 1958,
concerning the Fisheries Limits off Iceland: and to use, for the purposes of
delimitine the fisherv zone referred to in Article 1 of the Aereement. the
blircliiics referrciid .ibo\e JS frimi the d3tc on tihich thçy are introdiiced.
2. I ;tiiii~,iiurest thal ~flrer \li~ic$i)'~Cig>irrnnicni in the Uiiiteil Kiiig-
dom confirm thii they agree that théb&elines specified above shall be used,
as from the date on which they are introduced, for the purposes of the
delimitation of the fishery zone referred ta above, this Note and your
Excellency's reply to that effect shall be regarded as constituting an Agree-
ment between Our two Governments on this matter.
DRAFT UNITED KINGDOM NOTE IN REPLY
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour ta acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's Note of
... which reads as follows:
[as in Originating Note]
2. 1 have the honour ta confirm that Her Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom agree that the baselines specified in your Excellency's Note
shall be used for the Duruose of the delimitation of the fisherv zone con-
tiguous to the coast of-lceland referred ta in Article I of the gréement a,nd
will regard your Excellency's Note and my present reply ta the above effect
as constiiutina an Agreement between Our two Governments on this matter.
3. I ÿin. hoae\'er. tci~nioriii y.>iir ticellcii:ythst in r~ising rio <~hjeitioii.
ior the piirpci'e,.%fihc ,\grecnieni. IO the u5c <iiihc b;i,elincï speziiied t~hcove.
tlcr hlyc.ty'.i <;jvcrnnicni irithe UniteJ KinçJi)m reicr\c tlir'ir p.hiti,tn in
rr's~rd t,,the priniplc; of .nlern:itiun.~lI.$\.~pplis;ihlr181ihe .Ielirilititli~iilof
tlic territorial \c4:iniof fisliery Iitiiiicigenerxl b) the i1.e oi rtrdight hn,e- MEMORIAL ON JURlSDlCTlON
RECORDS OF ANCLO-ICELANDIC DISCUSSIONS,
17 DECEMBER TO 20 DECEMBER, 1960
Firsf Meeting, Paris, 17 December 1960
ANGLO-ICELANDIC FISHERIES DISPUTE
Recordof Conversarion berween the Secretary of Slare and the Icelandic Foreign
Minister oii 17 December in Poris
Present :
The Secretary of State The lcelandic Foreign Minister
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh MI. Hans Andersen
Mr. R. H. Mason
Mr. Ian Samuel
The lcelandic Foreign Minister (Mr. Gudmundsson) began by saying that
his original intention had been not to corne to the NATO Ministerial meeting,
but that his Prinie Minister had asked him to came for the sole purpose of
meeting the Secretary of State in a special effort to solve the dispute.
2. The Secretary of State replied that he was very grateful to Mr.
Gudmundsson for coming al1this way. He was very worried, and so was the
Prime Minister, about the consequences of our failing to reach agreement on
this dispute: it seemed that our positions were so close that we niight hope to
bridge the gap.
3. TheSecretary of State suggested that we might s,tart on the question of
baselines. Our point here was that the revised baseline should be regarded as
solely for the Durpose of delimiting the fishery zone and should not be con-
sidered as applying to Iceland's territorial waters.
4. Mr. Gudinundsson said that that was the position of his Governiiient
also: there had never been any question on their part of regarding these
revised baselines as applying for the purpose of Iceland's territorial waters.
5. The Secretary of State then said that, since the baseline question could
be agreed, we might then go on to the next outstanding point, which was the
form of the aer.ement. He could not understand why the form prouosed ~. by
us seemed objectionable to the Icelandic Government: it was perfectly nornial
and fully in accordance with relations between allies to have formal agree-
ments. If we could settle this point we shoiild be inuch nearer a general
-~~~~eme~t.~
6. Mr. Godniiindsson said that the lcelandic Government's intention was
that the drafi should be subniitted to the Althing and should be approved
before Notes could be exchanged. It was their intention that the aseement
should be fully binding but thcrc was a special rcason why the word "agree-
ment" was objectionable to the lcelandic Government. Hc recalled thal in
1901 the Danich Gove--me~ ~~~~ ~h then exercised soverei~ntv in Iceland.
had concluded an agreement on fishery limits with Her ~ajesty's~overnment
which gave British fisheriiien the right to fish wiihin 3 niiles of the Icelandic
Coast, and niade no provision for baselines. As a result of this agrceiiient, which remained in force for 50years, the fisheries off Iceland had been almost
ruined. The formula which they now proposed was the same as that which had
been proposed in 1958 in NATO and its importance was that the lcelandic
Opposition could not object to it.
7. In reply to a question by the Secretary of State, Mr. Gudmundsson said
that he had hoped to be able to submit the draft exchange of notes to the
Althing within the next few days, but did not think that this would now be
possible.
8. After some discussion as to whether it would be possible to find a form
of words which would be binding as far as the International Court was
concerned, but which would avoid the use of the word "agreement",
Mr. Gudmundsson suggested the following: the second sentence of the
introductory paragraph of the draft note from the lcelandic Government to
Her Majesty's Government handed to the Icelandic Government by
Mr. Stewart in Reykjavik on 14 December should be deleted and replaced
by the following sentence:
"ln view of these discussions my Government is willing to settle the
dispute in the following manner . . ."
The final sentence of this draft should be deleted and replaced by the
following:
"1 have the honour to suesest that Your Excellencv's reolv to this note
will confirm that its contents are acceptable to the unitid Kingdom
Government and that the settlement of the disputehas been accomplished
in the manner stated therein. The settlement will then become a~v..cable
forthwith."
9. The Secretarv of State said that we would consult Our Lee~l -dvi~e~ ~ ~~~--
once as to whethér these suggested amendments would be acceptable to us
from the legal point of view. [Miss Gutteridae confirmed by tele~hone that
the first amendment would be acceptableand the secretGy of'State told
Mr. Gudmundsson.]
10. The Secretary of State then turned to the question of the area outside
12 miles from which our trawlers would be excluded during the transitional
period, and to the related question of the length of the transitional period. ,
He explained that we might be able to agree to a transitional period of three
years but in that case there could be no outside areas.
11. MI. Gudmundsson said that the most diffiçult aspect of this question
was the need to reconcile fishing interests off the south-east coast witb those
off the north-west coast. The présent proposal was that off the north-west
coast there would be no areas outside, under a three-year transitional period,
but equally there would be no areas inside. The people on the south-east
coast, where our trawlers would have rights inside 12 miles, would complain
that they were being made to pay for the agreement that there should be no
fishing outside on the north-west coast. He himself and his party would be
quite content to an arrangement as proposed but the Conservatives (who
together with his party, the Social Democrats make up the Government)
could not accept it.
12. Inreply to a question by the Secretary of State, he said that a five-year
transitional period was out of the question. There would be elections in three
years' time and if British trawlers were still fishing within 12 miles an im-
possible political situation would arise.
13. This led on to a discussion on baselines, the upshot of which was that Mt. Gudmundsson asked whether we could not consider making a further
concession on the south-east Coast, and the Secretary of State asked whether
the Iceliindic Gi>\ernincnr niight ncirconbider the pr<ipos;il.
14. \fr (i~dmiiridsson then ssrd th:it iiirihcr extmirisiiori of the bc~reiar).
of State's message of 13 Deceniber. taking into account a remark made by
representatives if the British fishing indÜstry at the second Geneva con-
ference, had brought him to the tentative conclusion that the most important
points for us both were:
(~. FOYthe Ice1011de-Y ac.ceotance bv the United Kinedom of their 12-mile
fishery jurisdiction;
(ii)For the Utrited Kingdom, an assurance from the Icelandic Government
that they would not extend their fishery limits beyond 12 miles calculated
from present baselines.
15. He thought that if we could reach an agreement on this basis there
would be no need for us to continue with the present very difficult exercise of
trying to adjust the areas inside 12 miles during which our trawlers could fish
during a transitional period. It would be ver? easy to draw up an agreement
on the basis ofthese two points, and the lcelandic Government would be able
Io pive a firm assurance that thev would not attemDt to extend bevond 12miles
caiulated froni present baselines otherwise than with the agreement of the
International Court. He emphasized that he was not authorized to make any
proposal to this effectbut in reply to a question by the Secretary of Statehe
thought that the solution on these lines was "absolutely worth studying".
16. The Secretdry of State said this meant that we should be asked to give
up al1our fishing within 12 miles immediately. Mr. Gudmundsson confirmed
that this would be so if such lin arrangement took effect forthwith. The
Secretary of State went on to say that we niight possibly be able to consider
this but onlv on the condition that we had a watertight agreement with the
lcelandic ~overnment which would stand up in the l;tern&onal Court. He
said that we should prefer to cal1il an agreement, but repeated that whatever
form of words was used it must be binding
17. Ir\,ai dgrcc.111131hoth \ides zhc>iililthiiik wcrtlii1stir.iJeü and tI1.1t
the Sr.:rei3r, si Siüte 2nd \Ir. GiidniiinJ>\i>n sliould nieet ;ig.iin on Sunu.xy.
Irem (ii)
SecondMeeting, Paris, 18 December1960
ANGLO-ICELANDIC FISHERIES DISPUTE
Recordof ConversationbetweentheSecretory of StateandtheIcelondicForeifin
Mifrister-Paris, 18 Decemhrr
Present :
The Secretary of State The lcelandic Foreign Minister
Mr. R. H. Mason MI. Hans Andersen
Mr. Pan Samuel
The Secretary of State referred to his conservation with Mr. Gudmundsson of the previous evening and said that we had now had time to examine the
alternative wording for the last sentence of the first paragraph, and of the
final paragraph of the Draft Exchange of Notes providing for fishing by
British trawlers within 12 miles during the transitional period, which
Mr. Gudmundsson had given to us. We were able to confirm that the first
suggested amendment would be acceptable. We had some amendments to
suggest to the draft for the final paragraph, the most important of which was
that it should contain a sentence to the effect that the Exchange of Notes
should be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance
with Article 102of the United Nations Charter. Our obiect in orooosine this
amendment was to meet the Icelandic Government's objection to'the 'se of
the word "agreement" in the text of the Exchange of Notes. The Secretary of
State handed to Mr. Gudmundsson a boitrde papier (copy attached), giving
the texts of the amendments which we now proposed.
2. The Secretary of State went on to say that in addition to these amend-
rnents, we wished to propose a Confidential Agreed Minute to the effect that
both Governments agreed that the Exchange of Notes would constitute an
agreement between them.
3. Mr. Gudmundsson said that. before reolvin..to the Secretarv of State
on this pdint, he uoiild Iikeitigi\e iis:iJrslt .î<reenient cotering. ('ourç2.
under aliicliHer \lsjekiy'ç C;ovcrnmeni nould aicçpi iiiiriiedilitely Icel.ind's
12-mile fisherv iurisdiction in return for an assurance that thev would not
extend further-itherwise than with the agreement of the lnternacional Court.
(A copy of this is attached.) Mr. Gudmundsson explained that the lcelandic
Government would orobablv be able to acceot such a settlement in the form
of an agreement and that i<would have the'additional advantage, from the
British point of view, of including an undertaking by the lcelandic Govern-
ment to the effect that the existing baselines would not be altered otherwise
than with the agreement of the International Court. MI. Gudmundsson said
that a Course 2 Agreement on these lines would be much easier for the
lcelandic Government to acceot than a Course 1 Aereement.
4. Turning to the ~ecretar; of State's proposal Tor a Confidential Agreed
Minute, Mr. Gudmundsson said that he also had the point in mind, that some
assurance would be required regarding the validityO? an Exchange of Notes
covering Course I. A Confidential Agreed Minute would not be acceptable to
the lcelandic Government and he wished to propose that instead of a
confidential exchanee. the British Ambassador in Revkiavik should address
a Note to the lcelanldic Government to the eiïect that fi& Majesty's Govern-
ment intended to register the Exchange of Notes with the Registrar-General
of the lnternationalCourt, since in the event of a dispute, the terms of the
Exchange would be invoked. The lcelandic Government would return a
simple acknowledgment, thereby implying that they had no objection.
5. The Secretary of State said that Course 2 would he very difficult for us
and we should much prefer Course 1. Could we not now consider the question
of the areas inside 12 miles on the south-east Coast. It would be lielpful if
MI. Gudmundsson could eive us some indication of what additional areas
they had in mind from which our trawlers should be excluded.
6. Mr. Gudmundsson replied that he would be prepared to drop this
requirement and face the political consequences in Iceland. There need be no
alteration in the north-west nor in the south-east. There were some amend-
ments to the areas set out in the Draft Exchange of Notes which he hoped
would he acceptable to us. Otherwise they could accept the Draft for a
Course 1 Agreement as it now stood. These were as follows: (a) Paragraph 1, 2 (D) of the draft:
This should read Point 35 to Point 39.
(b) Paragraph 3 (i):
This should read "Between 63' 37' N. latitude. .."
7. The Secretary of State said that we would consult our Legal Advisers on
the points raised by MI. Gudmundsson and it was agreed that there should
be a further meeting in London on December 20.
Ilem (iii)
Third Meering, London, 19 December 1960
ANGLO-ICELANDIC FlSHERlES DISPUTE
Record of Conversarioribetween the Secrerary of State and the Icelandic Foreign
Minister-3p.m., 19 December 1960
Present:
The Secretary of State The lcelandic Foreign Minister
Sir Patrick Reilly MI. Hans Andersen
Mr. B. C. Engholm
Mr. F. A. Vallat
MI. R. H. Mason
Mr. Gudmundsson began by saying that he did not think it would be
possible for the Althingto agree to a settlement which would give our trawlers
fishing rights within 12 miles (Course 1) before they rose for the Christmas
recess. The Althing would reassemble on 12 or ISJanuary. The lcelandic
Prime Minister was most anxious to have a settlement before the new vear.
A Course 2 agreement (immediate recognition by Her ~ajesty's Government
of Iceland's 12-mile fishery jurisdiction in return for an assurance against
further extension) would be much easier than Course 1 for the lcelandic
Government to accept. The Icelandic Prime Minister was therefore anxious
to have the choice between the two courses.
2. The Secretary of State said that he now understood that Mr.
Gudmundsson was not in favour of including in the text of the Exchange of
Notes covering a Course I agreement a passage about registration of the
Exchange with the Secretariat of the United Nations. We had done what we
could ta meet the lcelandic objection ta the use of the word "agreement" in
the text and we had thought that this would be a good way of doing sa.
Surely the lcelandic Government would be able ta claim credit for registering
the Exchange with the United Nations: he thought that this was a highly
"respectable" method of registering an international agreement.
3. MI. Gudmundsson agreed but said that the word "agreement" had an
unfortunate connotation for the lcelandic people in so far as it wasapplied
to the fisheries off their coasts. He then repeated what he had said in Paris on
17 December about the Anreement which the Danish Government had
entered into with His ~ajescy's Government in 1901.
4. The Secretary of State then asked whether we could not cover the point
by a confidential agreed minute in which the Icelandic Government would234 FlSHERlESlURlSDlCTlON
state that they had no objection to registration of the Exchange of Notes
with the United Nations Secretariat. To this Mr. Gudmundsson replied that
there could be no unpublished agreements as far as his Government was
concerned.
5. The Secretary of State said that we couldaccept Course Ieither with the
word "agreement" in the tex1or with a referelice in the tex1 to registration.
6. Mr. Gudiii~indsson agreed to discuss this further with his Priiiie Minister
and to meet again on 21 December.
Ilem (iv)
ForrrrliMecrNrg,~o;idoir,3.15 p.,".,20 December1960
ANGLO-ICELANDIC FlSHERlES DISPUTE
Rerorrlof Coitrersririo~rerweeizrlzcSecreroryofSrale oirdrhcIcelairdicForeign
Miirisrer-3.15, 20 December1960
Present:
The Secretary of State The lcelandic Foreign Minister
Sir Patrick Rcilly Mr. Hans Andersen
Mr. F. A. Vallat
Mr. B. C. Engholni
Mr. R. H. Mason
The lcelandic Foreign Minister (Mr. Gudmundsson) said that he had been
in touch with his Prime Minister by telephone. Mr. Thors had discussed with
his Cabinet and with the Government's supporters in the Althing whether it
would be possible to accept before the Althing rose for the Christmas recess.
the proposals discussed with LordHome in the Foreign Office on 19 Decem-
ber. for a settlenient which would give British trawlermen fishing rights
within 12 miles for a transitional period. They had reached the conclusion
that il would not be possible. The proposal required further examination and
Mr. Gudm~indsson believed that his best course would be to take the draft
Exchange of Notes back to lceland and explain the proposal 10 his Cabinet
colleagues. He said that the difficulty arose over the requirement to register
the Exchange of Notes with the United Nations: there would be no concealing
the fact that thisconstitutean agreement and, ashe had explained previously,
there woiild be considerable political opposition in lceland to a settlement of
the dispute which look the form of an agreement.
2. Mr. Gudmundsson said that he had not discussed in any detail with his
Prime Minister the vossibilitv of a Course 2 Agreement-i.e. immediate de
facro recognition of lceland's-12-mile fishery jurfsdiction drawn froni present
baselines in return for an assurance that the lcelandic Governnient would
not seek further extensions otherwise than with the agreement of the Inter-
national Court. He knew, however, that this would be much easier for the
Icelandic Government to accept since il would contain no provisions for
fishing rights within I? miles. Mr. Thors had asked him what he thought were
the prospects of a Course 2 agreement and he had replied that he was no1
optimistic. 3. MI. Gudmundsson then said that he did not know whether the lcelandic
Government could agree to Course 1 and asked whether it would be possible
for us to agree to Course 2.
4. The Secretdry of State replied that this would be very difficult for us:
'our fishing industry would not like it and it might lead to further difficulties
for us elsewhere-for example in the Faroes and Greenland.
5. Mr. Gudmundsson said that he could not of course make a definite
proposal, but he was sure that his Government could recommend a Course 2
settlement to the Althing and could also agree to registering it with the
United Nations.
6. Mr. Enaholm said that under a Course 2 agreeme-t there would be a
gr.i\c Jvnper il~;%illie Rriii\h ti\hing ,iidiistry rc\l..c the l'<ris Agrccmcni on
I.tnJ.nghof I:el.tnJ~~ c~~dlit 1i.h in ilie Cniieil Kinedolhlr. <iiidniiii~d~~oii
re~iiarked th31 t.iIk\\\Iii<llhc ~nd the l.eldndi: >I~nt<tcr of JLISII.~, hlr.
Benediktsson, had had in Geneva with representatives of the British Trawler
Federation during the second International Conference on the Law of the
Sea had left him with the impression that the British industry were primarily
interested in an assurance that the lcelandic Government would not seek any
further extensions of iheir 12-mile fishery limit.
7. The Secretary of State asked whether, if we accepted a Course 2
agreement, wecould havea transitional period of oneyear. Mr. Gudmundsson
replied that this would take us back once again to the question of baselines.
8. The Secretarv of State said that he feared that if Mr. Gudmundsson
returned to lceland with no further advance towards an agreement, the whole
question would be back in the melting pot again. How could we avoid slipping
back into that position? It was essential that a settlement should have the
force of an agreement and it must therefore be registered with the United
Nations. Otherwise it would have no binding power if a dispute had to be
referred to the lnternational Court of Justice. He asked whether the lcelandic
Government could not face their opposition on this point. If the lcelandic
Government could agree to register a Course 2 agreement. he could not see
why they would not be prepaied to register a Course 1 agreement. We had
to keep in niind always the possibility that if.there were no agreement Our
trawlers would fish within 12 miles and this would raise the question of naval
protection.
9. Mr. Gudmundsson replied that it would be impossible to register a
Course I agreement and there could be no question of a Confidential
Exchange of Notes to the elîect that the lcelandic Government would not
object to registration. He thought discussion within the lcelandic Cabinet
might help.
10. The Secretary of State asked whether it would be possible to have an
open Exchange of Notes covering the areas inside 12 miles during the
transitional period, and a Confidential Exchange covering the assurance on
further extensions beyond 12.
II. Sir Patrick Reilly siiggested that we might have one Exchange of Notes
on the baselines point, and another on reference of a dispute to the Inter-
national Court.
12. The Secretary of State asked if Mr. Gudmundsson could not telephone
Mr. Thors again and put to him the suggestion to two Exchanges of Notes.
He was apprehensive about relations between Our two countries if the talks
broke down.
13. Mr. Gudmundsson replied that he was sure that Mr. Thors could not
authorire a settlement on this basis without explaining it Sully to both parties236 FISHERIES JURISDICTION
in the Government. He would return to lceland with a draft which he would
discuss in the Cabinet and keep us infirmed of the outcorne. He could initial
nothing at the moment but assured the Secretary of State that the Icelandic
Prime ~inister was anxious for a settlement.
14. Mr. Vallat asked what two Exchanges of Notes in the form now
contemplated would involve. If they were to be considered as an agreement
they would still have to be registered. The Secretary of State said that we
would explore the possibility of a "split" agreement and let Mr. Gudmundsson
know what we were able to suggest. It was essential for us to have a cast-iron
agreement.
Item (v)
Fifrh Meetinp, London, 6.45 p.m., 20 December 1960
Recordof ConversorioirhetweeririteSecrerary of Srare and rhelcelandic Foreign
Miizisrer in the Foreipn Ofiice ar 6.45 p.m. on 20 Decemher 1960
Present :
The Secreiary of State Mr. Gudmundsson
Sir Patrick Reilly
Mr. Valiat
Mr. Engholm
The Secretarv of State said that since his orevious meeting with
Mr. Gudmunds;on he had seen the Prime ~inister.-~e had found h& very
anxious to reach an agreement and was seriously alarmed at the conse-
quences of failurc to do so. At the same time the Prime Minister and his
colleagues considered that they must press the lcelandic Government to
accept a "Course 1" settlement. They were anxious, however, to try to meet
the lcelandic Government if there was anv wav in.whi.h thev could helo
iliein fruni thç pulni oiv,en of prc<entdriuii. Ilc h.iJ ilierefiirc bccn irondrriii~
~hctlier il\roiil.l be p<%iihlc1%)gel ovcr ihr. J.ili:i~lry dhsiil reftsir:tiifnihe
Dresent draft of the Exchanee of Notes was divided U... so that the oart
rcl.iiing i<i the intçri~ii ~rrxiigcniclilof rlie tian\itioii:il period 8,~~1.1he
1rc.irc.l <iiiipl.hrait underiidri.iing hr't\\ecn ihr. 1itd <iiivr.rtiiiient$ 21id tnot
rw~~icce.i ~ ~ ~ihc1 L'nitcci Y.IIIUII< Se:rct;~r.~i. dnJ .ml) rlic nari ~ie~l~nxu~rh
thé Assurance about reference to the International CO& of Justice woild be
registered. There would thus bejust a very brief agreement about the recourse
to the Court. Did Mr. Gundiiiundsson think that this would help?
Mr. Gudinundssonsaid that he thought that this might be al1right. He could
not, however, commit himself before he had had an opportunity to discuss it
with the Prime Minister and his colleagues. He would have to go back to
Reykjavik on 22 December in order to explain the position personally. It was
very difficult to discuss this sort of thinç on the telephone. He must emphasize
again that his Prime Minister was in a very diilicult position. The Govern-
ment's majority was very sniall and they must persuade al1 their supporters
to accept a settlement. The Opposition parties were dead against having any
agreement at all.
2. The Secretary of State said that he mus1again emphasize the very great
dangers which would result from a îailure to get agreement. 3. MI. Gudmundsson asked whether there was any hope for the second
solution. He said that he personally had no douht that Solution No. 1 was
better in everv wav. exceot from the political point of view. The Secretary of
Stliic replicd thst hethouihi ihere \\a; no hop~olihissolution and he thaiught
thai II \vasconiplcicly oiit He poin1r.J out ih.11the ~ug~cstcd5cp:iration of
the tac) naris of the jcitleiiienin faci hroiight us vcry closIO Soluiion No. 2.
4. M;. Gudmundsson explained that he would be leaving London on
21 December hy train for Glasgow in order to make sure of catching the
aeroplane from there to Reykjavik on 22 December. It was therefore agreed
that a redraft of the Exchange of Notes on the lines discussed would be
telephoned to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Reykjavik for communication
to MI. Gudmundsson on his retiirn.
Memorial on Jurisdiction submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland