OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
OF THE ISLAMICREPUBLICOF LRAN
ON THE PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS
OBSERVATIONSET CONCLUSIONS
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUEISLAMIQUED'IRAN
SUR LESEXCEPTIONSPRÉLIMINAIRESIll
IN THE NAMEOF COD
INTRODUCTION
1. These Observations and Submissionsare submitted
pursuant to the Court'sOrder of9April1991, subsequentlyamended byits
Orders of 18December 1991and 5June 1992,fixing9September 1992as the
time-limitfor the submissionofthe IslarnicRepublic of Iran's observationsand
subrniçsionson the PreliminaryObjectionsfiledbythe United States on 4 March
1991.
2.
In itspleadings,the IslamicRepublic hasinvokedthree
separate, yet complementary,titlesofjurisdictionpursuant to whichthe Court,
under Article 36(1)of itsStatute, isempowered to decide the claimssubmittedby
the lslamicRepublic. Theyare Article 84of the ChicagoConvention,Article
14(1) of the Montreal Conventionand ArtjcleXXI(2)of the Treaty ofAmity
between Iran andthe United States. Each of these Articlescontainsa
compromissoryclausevestingjurisdictionin the Court to decide disputes between
the Parties concerningthe interpretation or applicationof the treaties or
conventionsin question.
3. The United States admitsat page 2 of itsPreliminary
Objectionsthat as a matter of principleeach ofthe provisionsinvokedby the
IsiamicRepublic confersjurisdictionon the Court to decide disputesrelatingto
the interpretation or applicationofthe relevant treaties. However,the United
States goeson to argue that the invocationofthese provisionsissubjectto certain
preconditionswhich,accordingto the United States, have not been satisfiedin
thiscase. Accordingly,the United States requests the Courta address its
PreliminaryObjectionsunder Article 79of the Rules ofCourt, andto uphold284 AERIAL INCIDENT [21
those objections. Significandy,the United States doesnot raise anyobjection as
to the admissibilityofthe IslamicRepublic's Application.
4. In these Observations,the IslamicRepublic willshowthat
disputesclearlyexistbetween itselfand the United States overthe interpretation
or application of each ofthe treaties invoked. Thisisevidenced not onlybythe
positions that the Parties took before the institutthese proceedingsas to the
legalconsequences of,and responsibilityfor, the shootingdom of FlightIR 655,
but alsobytheir submissionsin this caseIn itsPreliminaryObjectionsthe United
States continuesto argue that itsactionswerejustifiedas self-defenseor as
measures designedto protect itsessential securityinterests(both essentially
defenses on the merits). The IslamicRepublic, onthe other tiand,maintains that
the United States breached substantiveprovisionsof al1three treaties byshooting
downan unanned, commercialaircraft flpn g ithinitsownairspace,by otherwise
interferingwiththe IslarnicRepublic's navigationand commercein the Persian
Gulf,and byfailingto accept responsibilityforthe incident or compensate the
victirnsfor the damage provoked.
5. Althoughthe IslamicRepublic reliedon the repeated U.S.
declarations ofneutrality duringthe Irankaq war,and treated the United States
as a nwtral, the IslamicRepublicwasawarethat the actions that the United
States tookagainstit leadingup ta andincludingthe events of 3 July 1988were
part of a deliberate policydesignedto assistIraq initswarefforts and provoke
the IslamicRepublic. Thisviewhasbeen confimed by recent disclosuresbyU.S.
officialsand others,whichevidencethe proioundly ipstile attitude that the
United Statesadopted towards the IslamicRepublicatthe the, in particular with
respect to the activitiesofU.S.forcesin the Persian Gulf. It wasinpart as a
result ofthispolicythat FlightIR 655wasshot downand 290innocent 1ives.were
lost. This evidencewillbe discussedfurther on in this pleading(g, Part Il), andi31 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 285
it willbe seen that disputesexistoverthese facts and their relationto the treaties
invokedby the IslamicRepublic. Thus,byfarthe mostimportant pre-requisite to
the Court's junsdicdon-the existenceofa dispute overthe interpretation or
applicationof each of the treati-sisclearlymet in thiscase. In fact, eventhe
United States doesnot disputethat the Parties take opposingviewswithrespect
tothe treaties concemed.
6. Recognizingthisdifficulty,the United Statesrelies instead
onformalisticobjections. These take the guiseof arguingeither that the Islamic
Republic did not followthe proper procedural nilein raisingitsclairn(inthe
case ofthe IslamicRepubiic'sappeal under the ChicagoConventionfromthe
decisionof the ICA0 Council), orthat the IslamicRepublicdidnot exhaustprior
remediesby seekingto negotiate or arbitrate the disputebefore institutingthese
proceedings(in the caseof itsclaimsarisingunder the Montreal Conventionand
the Treaty ofAmity). Moreover, inwhat isprincipallyan argument on the merits,
in that it concernsthe interpretation or applicationof the treaties concerned,the
United States alsocontendsthat neither the Montreal Convention northe Treaty
ofAmityhave anysubstantive connectionto the shootingdownofFlight IR 655,
and thus cannot be relied on to providea basof jurisdiction. Ifnothingelse, this
argument demonstrates that the freliminaryObjôctionsdo not possessan
exclusivelypreiirninarycharacter.
7. With respect to the ChicagoConvention,the Islamic
Republicwilldemonstrate that the United States' argumentthat the decisionof
the ICA0 Councilfromwhi'chan appeal isbeingsought was not a "decision"
withinthe meaningof Article84 ofthe Convention,and that in consideringthe
matter the Cauncilwasnot actingunder Article 84, isnot correct.Aswillbe seen,
in subrnittingthe disputeto TCAO,the IslamicRepublic didnot refer to any
particular provisionof the ChicagoConvention. Its concernwasto havethe286 AERIAL INCIDENT Pl
matter consideredand ruled on as rapidiyas possible,giventhe gravityofthe
incident and the continued threat to air navigationin the Persian Gulfposed by
the actionsofthe U.S . arships. There are no grounds,therefore, for the United
States' assertionthat the matter wasdealt withunder Article 54(n)of the Chicago
Convention. In fact, that provisionwasnever invokedbythe Councilatany time
duringitsdeliberations.
8. What isclearfrom the record ofthe proceedingsbefore the
ICAO Councilisthat the requirements ofArticle 84of the ChicagoConvention,
which isthe solebasisofthe Court's jurisdiction,weremet. In other words,a
disagreement overthe Convention's applicationor interpretation wassubmitted
to and decidedon bythe Council. In itself,thisissufficientto establishthe
Court's jurisdiction.
9. The IslamicRepublic pursued both legal claims(that the
United States shouldbe held responsible forbreaches ofthe Chicago
Convention) and practical concems (to ensure the safetyoairnavigation)before
the ICAO Council. Being anon-member ofthe Council,the IslamicRepubiic left
it to the Councilto detede the procedures it woulfollow for decidingthe
matter. Thisapproach wasfuliyconsistentwiththe Conventionwhichgivesthe
Councilfullpower to determine the appropriate procedures in anymatter before
it. ln the lightof the urgencyofthe matter, the applicationof ICAO'sRules for
the Settlement ofDifferences ("theRules") couldbe suspended or varied withthe
agreement ofthe Partiesinorder to lead to a more expeditiousor effective
dispositionof the case as effectivelyhappened in this instance. Regrettably,
despiteafullairingof both Parties' positionson the issuesand the commissioning
ofa fact-findinginvestigation,the Councilfailedta respond adequatelyto the
legalaspects of the IslamicRepublic'sclaim. Instead, the Councillimiteditself
mostlyto discussing"technical"aspectsof the matter. Nevcrtheless,there isno151 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBM~ÇSIONS 287
doubt that the Councilrendered a finaldecisionon the dispute subrnittedby the
IslamicRepublic findingthat the shoot-downwasan accident,albeit dueto errors
in identificationof the aircraft, and rejectingthe IslamicRepublic's requestsfor
relief. It isthisdecisionwhichthe IslamicRepublicisappealingpursuant to
Article84ofthe Convention.
10. Whether the Council'sfailure to properly addressthe
IslamicRepublic'sclaimsresulted fromthe factthat itsmembership isheaviiy
weightedin favorof certain powerfulStatesin the fieldofaviation,or from an
inherent reluctanceor inabilityto grapplewithjudicialissues,or evenfrom its
lackof uniformlyapplied procedures, the fact remains that the Council'sdecision
ispreciselythe kindof decisionwhichthe Court shouldconsideron appeal in
exercisingitssupe~sory powersover ICA0 pursuant to Article û4of the Chicago
Convention. The need forthe Court'sreviewiscompellingwhenthere so
evidentlyexisteda disagreement betweenthe IslamicRepublic and the United
States overthe interpretation or application of substantiveprovjsionsof the
ChicagoConventionwhichwas decidedon bythe Council,wherethe
requirements ofArticle 84havebeen met, and where the United States'
objectionsto jurisdictionare ofa purelyformalisticnature. With regardto such
formalisticobjections,itisappropriate to recallthe wordsofthe distinguished
jurist CharleDe Visscher,recentlyreferred to byJudgeShahabuddeen at page
22 ofhjsSeparate Opinionin the j
Nauru:
'The temptation to formalism,and the proneness to generalization
byabstract conceptsand to premature systematization,represent
one of the mostseriousdangersto whichinternational-law doctrine
isstiilexposed..International justiceespeciallymust maintaina288 AERIALINCIDENT FI
proper relatipnshipbetween socialdata and the niles designedto
govem them .
11. Withrespect to the Montreal Convention,the United
States'argument that the IslamicRepublic failedto satisfythe jurisdictional
prerequisites ofArticl14(1b)y noi havingsoughtio resoivethe disputethrough
negotiationor arbitration doesnot stand up to scrutiny. Prior to the filingof the
IslamicRepublic's Application,the United Stateshaan explicitpolicnetto
deal with the Government ofthe IslamicRepublic on the matter, includingon the
issueof compensation. OfficiaU.S S.tateDepartment communicationsconfirm
that the United States insistedon avoiding anylranian "interference"in the
matter. Moreover, the prospect of negotiatingwiththe IslamicRepublic
regardingFlightZR655 was not perceivedby either the executiveor legislative
branches of the U.S.Govemment asaviable alternative. Bearingin mind that
the twoStates didnot then, and stiiido not, maintain diplomaticreiations, the
possibilityof fmitfulnegotiationsleadingeither to settlement or to arbitration
was,in the circumstances,virtuallyniI. For these reasons,it isuntenable for the
United States to allegethat the IslamicRepublic "hasdeliberately avoided normal
diplomaticpractice2". It isthe United Stateswhichwasunwillingto discussthe
matter withthe Government of the IslamicRepublic,
12. In addition,ever sincethe incident occurred,the United
States has made it clear that it refusesto considerthe attack on FlightIR 655as
anythingother than a legitimaactofself-defense. The islamicRepublic has
contested thisviewbefore bothICA0 and the United Nations SecurityCouncil.
The positionsofthe Parties beingsototallyirreconciiable,international lawdoes
not imposean obligationforfurther negotiationsin order to bnng the dispute
De Visscher,C.:Theorv and Realitvin PublicInternational Law,trP.E.
Corbett, 1968,p. 143.
U.S P.reliminaryObjectionsp. 5.171 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 289
before the Court, particularlywhen one of the States (the United States) has not
evenrecognizedthe rightsof the other in the matter and whenparliamentary
formsofdiplomacybefore international organizationshavebeen unable to bridge
their differences. In short,the obligationto negotiate isnot absolutebut rather
depends on the relevant factsand circumstancesof each particular case.
13. Asfor the assertion that the IslamicRepublic'sclaimsfali
outside the scope ofthe Montreal Conventionbecause the Conventiondoes not
applyto the acts of States orState agents (suchas members ofthe amed forces)
againstcivilaircraft, thinosmore than apetitio urincivii. Sucharguments rnay
reflect the United States' position asto the interpretation or applicationofthe
Convention,but thisis aquestionwhichthe Court iscalledupon to decide at the
ments stage of the pmceedings. The United States'thesisthusservesodyto
providefurther evidencethat a dispute eicistsbetween the Parties overthe
interpretation or applicatiof specificprovisionsof theConvention,including
Article 1which plainlyStatesthat the Convention appliestallyperson in the
broadest sense of the tem.
14. With respect to the Treatof Amity,the arguments
presented bythe United States sufferfrom manyof the same defects. Giventhe
divergentpositionsof the Parties on liability,obviouslya dispute existswer the
interpretation or application of the Treaty'sprovisions,particularlyArticle1
(caIlingfor peace and friendship betweenthe countries), ArticleIV(1) (prwiding
that the nationals of the IslamicRepublicbe accorded "fairand equitable
treatment") and ArticleX(1) (providingforfreedorn of commerceand
navigation). The mere fact that the lslamicRepublic onlyinvokedthe Treaty of
Amityin itsMemonal has in no waychangedthe fundamental nature ofthe case
introduced in its Application. That case remains bason the events Ieadingup
to the destruction of FligIR 655and the shoot-downitself. Thus,there are no290 AERIAL INCIDENT 181
grounds for holdingthat the IslamicRepubljc issomehowestopped from invoking
the Treaty at this stageof the proceedings.
15. In addition, contraryto whatthe United States says,the
Treaty ofArnity'scompromissoryclause (ArticleXXI(2)) does not require that
negotiatjonsare a pre-requisitetobringing acase under the Treaty. Al1that is
required, asseveralmembers of the Court confirmedin thejurisdictionalphase of
the Case con ce min^Miiitarvand ParamiIitarvActjvitiesin and aeainst Nicaragua
[Nicaraguav. United States ofAmencal (the "Nicarapuacase"),in connection
withan identicalcompromissoryclausein a treaty between Nicaraguaand the
United States,isthatthe disputebe one 'hot satisfactorilyadjustedby diplornacy".
Such a situation undoubtedlyexistsin the present case. Moreover, evenifan
attemptto negotiate had been required, the United States' categoricalrefusalto
deal with,or to allowany"interference"by, the Government ofthe Islamic
Republic on the matter, or even to recognizethe interests of the IslamicRepublic
relatingto the shoot-down,wouldprecludethe United Statesfrom raisingthe
issuenowas a bar to jurisdiction.
16. Finailyit willbe'necessaryto commenton the United
States' extraordinary accusation thatthe IslamicRepublicisinvokingthe Treaty
ofAmityin bad faith. Foroverten years,the United States has consistentlytaken
the positionthat the IslamicRepublic isbarred fromreuudiating the Treaty. The
United Statesadopted thispositionbecause it was relyingon the Treaty and
wishedto reap itsbenefits inboth theCase ConcerningUnited States Divlomatic
and Consular StaffinTehran (the "Diplomaticand ConsularStaff'case) before
this Court andnurnerous other casesbefore the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. Nowthe United States has reversed its position,insistingthat the
IslamicRepublic isbarred from invokingthe Treaty. Havingsuccessfullyrelied191 OBsERvATIoNs AND SuBMIssIoNs 291
on the Treaty overthe past decade in caseswhere it wasthe claimant,the United
Statesnowseeks topreclude the Treaty'sapplicationwhere it is the respondent.
17. Sucha volte facefindsno support in lawand ismanifestly
unacceptable. If ever there wasan exampleof a State "blowinghot and cold",this
isit. The equal application ofjustice demands thatthe United States be held to
the same standards under the Treaty as havebeen applied againstthe Islamic
Republic inother cases. The fact isthat the Treaty ofArnityprovidesa solidbasis
ofjurisdictionin this cas-a conclusionentirelysupported by the Court's
decisjonsin both the Nicarapuaand the Diplornaticand ConsularStaffcases.
18. Al1of these considerationslead the lslamicRepublicto
submitthat under Article 79(7)ofthe Rules of Court t,e PreliminaryObjections
mustbe rejected withrespect to aUthree bases ofjurisdiction. Subsidiarily,
however,the IslamicRepubIiccallsthe Court's attentionto the fact that manyof
the United States' arguments,especiallythose that relate to the Montreal
Conventionand the Treaty ofAmity,are directed to the ments ofthe case.
Cansequently,if,contraryto the IslamicRepublic's principalsubmission,the
Court concludedthat it couldnot rejectthe United States'PreliminaryObjections
in iimineat thisstageof the proceedings,itwould stillbe open for the Court to
declarethai, inthe circumstancesof the case,the objectionsraiseddo not possess
an exclusivelypreliminarycharacter.
19. In either event, itclearthat thiscase raises important
issuesrelatingto the interpretation or applicationof al1three conventions.
Becauseoftheir importance not onlyto the Parties,but alsoto the safetyof
international air navigationand commercein general and in order to ensure the
payrnentof due compensation,there are compellingreasons forthe Court to '
address these issueson the merits. AERIAL INCIDENT [lo]
20. The Court'sjurisprudencedemonstratesthat the Court has
solidjurisdictional groundsfor tacklingal1of the issuesraised insimilar
circumstancesin the past the Court has not hesitated to exerciseitsjurisdiction.
For States suchas the IslamicRepublicthat are not superpowers,recourse to the
Court remains tbeir besthope forresolvinginternational legaldisputeson the
basisofprocedural due processand respect for the nile of law. WhenStates have
consented to the Court's jurisdictionto resolve disputthe interpretation or
application ofinternational agreements,the Court shouldexercisethat
jurisdiction.
CHAPTER n THE STRUCTUREOF THESEOBSERVATIONS
21. TfieseObservationsare submitted in three volumes.
Volume1containsthe Observationsthemselvesand is dividedinto sevenParts
followingthis introduction.
22. Part 1dealswiththe overalldeficienciesoftU.S.
PreiiminaryObjectionsand explainshowtheydo not riseto the levelof legitimate
preliminaryobjections,stricto sensu,under Arti79ofthe Rules,but rather
constitute defensesto the merits.
23. Parts II and III then take up sorneofthe factual issuesin the
case. It isnot the IslamicRepublic's intentionto plead the merits of the case at
this stage; however,ii isnecessaryto restore somebalance to the veryselective
and one-sided accountofthe "facts"givintheU.S. PreliminaryObjections,
particularlyto the extent that they have abearing on the jurisdictionalissuesand
in the lightof the recent evidencethat has emerged confinningthat the United
Stateswas engaged inapolicydesignedto provoke the IslamicRepublicand that
the Vincennes,and itshclicopter, penetrated Iranian territorial waters to pursue
acts of aggressionagainstthe IslamicRepublic on the day ofthe incident.il1] OBSERVATlONSAND SUBMISSIONS 293
24. After addressingthese matteinPartIIinsofaras they
relate to the events leadingup to and includingthe destruction ofFîightIR 655
on 3July 1988,Part IIIwillthen discussthe relevant factsfollowingthe incident
includingthe question ofnegotiationsbetweenthe Parties, the crystallizationof
the dispute,and the legalprinciplesunderlyingthe questionof negotiations.
25. Thereafter, ParIV , and VIwilladdress the individual
basesofjurisdictionprovidedfor under Article84ofthe ChicagoConvention
(Part IV),Article 14(1)ofthe Montreal Convention(PartV) and ArticleXXI(2)
ofthe Treaty of Amit(PartVI). The Observationsthen end withthe Islamic
Republic'sconclusionsand submissionsin Part VII.
26. Volumes II to IV containadditionaldocurnentaryexhibits
that are referred to in the courseof these Observations. For the convenienceof
the Court,theseincludebothnew documentsand some ofthe more relevant
documents reiatingto thejurisdictionalissuesthat have already been suppliedby
the Parties. PART 1
UNDERARTICLE79 OF THE RULESOF COURT.THE PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS SHOULDEITHER BE RETECTED ORDECLARED NOT TO
POSSESS.ANEXCLUSIVELYPRELLMINARC YHARACTER
1.01 The United Statesas nled itsPreliminaryObjections
pursuant to Article79ofthe Rules of Court. In those Objections,the United
States requests the Court to addressthe issueofjtsdiction before takingup the
meïits ofthe case3.
1.02 This request presents the United States witha diOnmma.
the one hand, the United States isanxiousto introduce itsversion ofthe events
surroundingthe destruction of FIIR655 in order tojustifyitsactions. To this
end, the United States spends some 70pages of itspleadingdiscussingthe facts,
even tothe extent-oftryingtojustifyitsissuanceofwhatwere clearlyillegal
NOTAMSand ofintroducingcopiousmaterials rdating to attacan shippingin
the Persian Gulf,neither ofwhichhaveanyrelevanceto itsjurisdictional
objections.
1.03 On the other hand, the more the United States discussesthe
facts of the case,the more this servesto point up howitsobjectionsare principally
concernedwiththe ments of the case,not withstrictlyjurisdictionalissues.
Consequently,in order to avoid thisdilemma,the United States seeksthe have
best of both worlds:arguinga number of issuthemerits whilemaintaining
that this isnecessaryunder Articfe79(6)ofthe Rules in order to dispose ofthe
jurisdictional issuesat a preliminarystage withoutjoiriingthe objectionsto the
rnents. On thislatter point, the United States goesto greet pains to showthat the
1972revisionof the Rules wasdesignedto encouragethe Court to address al1
U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 75.il31 OBSERVATIONAND SUBMISSIONS 295
legaland factual questionsbeanng onjurisdiction,even ifthey touch on the
merits, at a preliminarystageofthe proceedings. There are severalfiawsinthe
United States'line ofargument whichwillbe discussed below.
CHAPTER1 ARTICLE 79(7OFTHERULESAUTHORTZES THE
COURT TO ORDERFURTHERPROCEEDKNGS TEE
m
EXCLUSZVELP YR1SLiMINARY CEIARACTERSAN
1.04 Under Article 7ofthe Rules,the Court hasthree
avenuesopen to itwhen confrontedwithpreliminaryobjections. The Court may
either (i) uphold the objection; (ii) reject it;or (iii)declare that it doesnot
possess,in the circumstancesof the case,an exclusivelvpreliminarycharacter.
1.05 For the reasonsthatwillbe explainedin the foilowingParts,
the IslamicRepublic believesthat there are overwhelminggroundsforthe Court
to adopt the second ap-torejectthe United States'Preliminary
Objectionsat thisstageof the proceedings. Nevertheless,i£romes not follow
this,as the United Stateswouldhave the Court believe,that simplybecause an
objectionrnightnot be rejected at thisstage it necessarilymust be upheld in a
preliminaq judgment. Asthe Court recognizedin itsjudgment onthe
jurisdictionalissuesin the Nicaragua case,it isperfectlypossible (as indeed
happened in tcasethat particular objectionsrnaybe heldanot to have
"exclusivelypreliminarycharacter"and thusnot to constitute an obstacleforthe
Court to entertain the proceedingsbrought bythe application on the merits4. In
sucha situation,Article79(7)obligesthfixime-limitsforthe further
proceedin(k. t,e merits) in the case.
Militarvand Para iiitarvActivitiesin andaeainstNicaragv. (Nicarawa
v
Renorts 1984,pp. 425-426,para. 76.296 AERIAL INCIDENT Il4]
1.06 Whilethe actuallanguageofArticle 79(7 )fthe Rules may
no longer expresslyrefer to the possibilityofjoiningthe jurisdictionalissuesto the
merits, it isdifficultto seewhat other alternativewouldbe availablefor an
objectionthat isdeclared no1to have an"exclusivelypreliminarycharacter". As
the former President of the Court, JudgeJiménezde Aréchaga,wrote,in such
circumstances"[iltwouidthen befor the Respondent to raise sucha defense at
the stage ofthe merits,ifit sowished5".
1.07 One strikingaspect ofArticle 79(7)isitsprovisionthat the
Court fi xime-limitsfor the further proceedingsifthe Courteither rejects
the preiirninaryobjectionor declaresthat it does not possessan exclusively
preliminarycharacter. The mandatory nature ofthe word "shall"coupledwiththe
use ofthe word "exclusivelysuggeststhat thiscriterion mustbe stnctly
interpreted. Thus, ifthere isanypossibilitythat an objectionwhichisnot rejected
Jiménezde Aréchaga, E:'The Amendments to the Rules ofProcedure of
the International Court ofJustice",67Am. J.Int'L (1973),at p. 17.
Exhibit 1. also,Dissenting OpinionofJudge Schwebelin Militarvand
Paramilitam ActMtiesin and againstNicaragua(Nicarama v.United
States ofAmenca). Jurisdictionand Adrnissibifitv,udment. I.C.J.
Re~orts 1984,p. 613.
In this connection,reference mayalsobe made to the opinionof Professor
Rosenne who notes:
"Thepuzzle that the newversion sets ..iswhether the effectof the new
provisionisto abolishthe option ofjoiningan objectionto the merits,thus
wipingout avirtuallyconstantjuris rudenca itseifcorrespondingto a
circumstances,possessan exclusivelyipreliminarycharacter simplymeanshe
that it isnot admissibleas a reliminaryobjection. lnthat event, sucha
holdingwouldbe the equlvayentofjoining itto the merits,perhaps in the
technicalclassificationofaplea inbar, whilenot requinng the Court to
deal withit specificallyin the operative clauseof thejudgment." Rosenne,
S.:Procedure inthe InternationalCourt, Martinus Nijhoff,The Hague,
1983,p. 165. Exhibit2.1151 OBSERVATIONSAND SuBMIssIoNs 297
at the preliminarystageissointertwinedwiththe rneritsof the casethat it isnot
exclusivelypreliminary,it must be deferred to the "furtherproceedings"6.
1.08 Notwithstandingtheir other deficiencies,a number ofthe
United States' objectionsrun afoul ofthisprovision. Reference maybe made, for
example,to the United States' argumentthat the TreatyofAmityhas nothingto
do withthe shootingdownof Fiight IR 655because it ispurelyacommercial
treaty whichdoes not preclude measures taken bya party to protect itsessential
securiîyinterests. In Part VI,the IslamicRepublicwillshowthat under the
Court'spriorjurisprudence these contentionscannotbe sustained. Yet evenif
there wassome merit to the argument,it wouldstillbe so inextricablyIinkedwith
the rneritsof the ca-ethe interpretation or application ofthe Treaty ofArnity
with respect to the shootingdown ofFEghtIR 655 -that it couldnot be said to
have "an exclusivelypreliminarycharacter". Insuchcircumstances,itwouldfa11
upon the Court toproceed to the merits ofthe case.
1.09 The sametan be said about the United States' contentions
regardingthe scope ofthe Montreal Convention,particularlywhetherit applies
to State actionsor the actsofrnilitaryforces againstcivilaircraft. Even accepting,
areuendo, that sucharguments present a legitimatejurisdictional question,it
cannotbe saidthat theypossess an"exclusivelyprelirninav character"giventhat
the wholequestion conctming the scope ofthe Conventionislinked to issuesthat
the Court must -e--de on the merits:namely,the interpretatioorappiicationof
Sec . go,R.: "Eccezioninon esclusivarnentepreliminari"in 11Processo
&,tealso,Jiménezde Aréchaga,e supraeat.p.17,where the author notes
that:
"i ..the objectionthat has been raised ayparty aspreliminaryisso
intettwined withelements pertainingto the rneritsthat a hearin of those
issueswouldsiphonoffinto the preliminarystagcthe whole oftfe case,
then the Court woulddeclare that, in the circumstances,the objection
raisedaspreliminarydoesnot reallypossesssuch a character".298 AERIAL INCIDENT
the Convention. Accordingly,suchan objectioncannot operateasa bar to
jurisdictionat thisstage, and the Court wouldin anyeventbe obligedto proceed
withthe "further proceedings"inthe case7.
CEL~PTE R ARTICLE79(6)IS NOTRELEVANT TO THE U.S.
0B.IECTIONS
1.10 There isafurther weaknessto the United States' argument
in so far asit isbased on Article79(6)of the Rules. In essence,the United States
relies on this provision as anexcusefor treating factual questionsthat are actually
directed to the merits ofthe dispute. However,thistactic rests on a
misinterpretation ofthe Articlein question. Article79(6)Statesthat:
"ln order to enable the Court to determine itsjurisdiction at the
preliminarystageofthe proceedings,the Court,whenever
necessary,rnayrequest the Parties to argue a11questionsoflawand
fact, andta adduce al1evidence,whichbear on the issue!'
1.11 Asplainlystated, Article 79(6)enables the Court to request
the Parties to argue certain factualor legalquestions bearingon the jurisdictional
issues. In the present case,however,the Court hasmadeno suchrequest, so the
provisionsofArticle 79(6)canhardlyjustifythe United States' detailedtreatment
of the factsinits pleadings. Moreover,there isno need forthe Court ta make
sucha request sinceit isreadilyable to decide thejurisdictional issuesinthe case
on the basisofthe procedural record before it and the compromjssoryclauses
In this connection, itisusefuitobear in mindthe definitionof a
preliminaryobjection offeredyJudges de Visscherand Rostworowskiin
their Joint Separate Opinion inthe Panevezys-SaldutiskisRailwaycase:
"...n objectionisprima facie preliminarywhen,by itsnature or its
purpose, it appears directed againstthe judicialproceedings,that is,
againstthe conditionsgoverningthe institutionofthe proceedingsand not
againstthe Iawon whichtheyrest. In order, however,that it maydefinitely
barguments citedn itssupport. The objectiowiibe treated either as
preliminaryor as a defence of the merits,accordingas these ar dents
rnayor maynot prejudge the justice or injusticeoftheclaim!' !anevem-
SaldutiskisRailwav.Judment. 1939.P.C.I.J.SeriesAiB.No. 76,p. 24.1171 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 299
themselves,without havingto address factualmatters that are inseparable from
the merits of the case.
1.12 The situation issimplythe following:the purely procedural
objectionsto the Court'sjurisdiction raisedbythe United-suchasthat the
IslamicRepublic failedto negotiate the dispute,or that it failedto adhere to the
procedural mles relatingto the bringingofa disputebefore the ICA0 Council
under Article 84of the ChicagoConvention,orthat it isestopped frominvoking
theTreaty of Arnitybecause ofitspast cond-canbe disposedofat this stage
without anyreference to the merits. The other objectionsraisedbythe United
States-relating to whether or not the IslamicRepubIic'sclaimsfailto havemore
thana "rernoteconnection"witheither the Montreal Convention orthe Treaty of
Amity -are neither validnor possessan exclusivelypreIiminarycharacter. Either
way,these objectionscannotbe upheld as genuinepreliminaryobjectionsunder
Article79.
CBAPTER XII JURISDIClïONTHEUNITED STATES ' ONSENT TO
1.13 The United States then shiftsjts argument andassertsthat it
has not consented to the Court'sjurisdictioninthis casewithinthe meaningof
Article36(1) of the statuteB. This allegationalsofallswideof the mark, as a
reviewof the relevant factsreadilyreveals.
1.14 There isno dispute betweenthePartiesthat both ofthem
are partietoal1three treaties invokedbythe IslamicRepubIic,and that these
treaties remain in force between thern. Similarly,itisundisputed that aUthree
treaties contain compromissoryclausesthat vestjurisdictioninthe Court to
decide disputes between the parties asto their interpretation or application. This
U.S.PrelirninaryObjections,pp80-81.300 AERIAL INCIDENT [181
isimportant because it definesthe scope ofwhatthe United States consented to.
By becominga party to the treaties in question,the United States agreed in
principlethat disputes over their interpretation or application couldbe submitted
to the Court for adjudicationeither directly,inthe caseof the Chicago
Convention,on appeal from a decisionof the ICA0 Council.
1.15 Nonetheless,the United States arguesthat it cannot be
presumed to have consented tojunsdictionjust because another State asserts that
a particular dispute arisesunder one of these treaties. Borrowfrom the
Court's wordsin the Ambatjeloscase,the United States assertsthat it isnot
sufficientforthere to be a "zemoteconnection"between the factsofthe Ifamic
Republic'sclaimsand the treaties in question;there mustbe a "reasonable
conne~tion"~.
1.16 Notwithstandingthat the "reasonable connection"testisnot
one that has been speci£icallyendorsed bythe Court, the IslamicRepublicwill
showthat not onlyisthere a "reasonable connection"betweenthe above-
mentioned treatiesand the facts ofthiscase,but that there havebeen express
violationsof these treatiesweU. Inso doing,it mustbe borne in mindthat
these issuesare not matters to be addressed atthe jurisdictionalstagesincethey
do not, strictlyspeaking,passess an exclusivelyprelirninarycharacter. Any
assessrnentof the United States' argumentswouldrequire afullanalysisby the
Court ofthe factsofthe case and an interpretation and application of the treaties
inthe lighof the facts. Suchissuesare preciselythose whichcornewithinthe
jurisdiction ofthe Court pursuant to the terms ofthe compromissoryclauses
invokedbythe IslamicRepublic. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMfSSIONS 301
1.17 The United States'confusion on this point rests on a
fundamental mischaracterization of the findingsof the Court in thethree cases on
whichit relieslO. In the Ambatielos case,for example, the Court found that it had
jurisdiction to decide whether the United Kingdomwas under an obligation to
submit to arbitration a dispute brought by the Royal Hellenic Government on
behalf of Mr. Ambatielos. The compromissoryclausein that case provided that
claimshad to be "based on"the 1886treaty whichformed the basis ofjurisdiction.
The issueon the meritswas thus whether Mr. Ambatielos'claimswere "based on''
the 1886treaty, and whether they couldbe submitted to arbitration. In the
circumstances of the case, the Court found that Greece had to showa "sufficiently
plausible"(not a "reasonable") connectionbetween the claim and the treaty in
order to estabtish that the clairnwas "bbasedon"the treatyl1.
1.18 The differencebetween Ambatielos and the present case is
self-evident. Unliken the1886 treaty at issue in Ambatielos, there isno
requirement in the compromissoryclause of either the Treaty of Amity,the
Montreal Convention orthe Chicago Convention that a prior showingmust be
madethat a daim is"baseo dn"these treatiesTo the contrary, the
compromissoq clauses of al1these treaties coverdisputes over their
interpretation or application, andus the very issue ofwhether a claim falls
within the scope of the treatiea matter withinthe jurisdiction of the Court, not
a matter that has to be estabIishedbefore the Court'sjurisdiction can be upheld.
This being said,the IslamicRepublic willstillshowbat there is much more than a
reasonable connection between its claimsand the treaties involved.
Sec . .S.Preliminary Objections, pp.81-83.
1, atp. 18. AERIAL INCIDENT [201
1.19 The same point appliesto the United States'reference to
the Court'sadvisoryopinionin the Judments of the Administrative Tribunalof
the IL0 mon Com~laintsMade againstUNESCOcase. in that case,the Court
noted that the Administrative Tribunalwasonlycompetent tohear complaintsby
an officia1allegingnon-observanceof the terms or provisionsof certain contracts.
The Court found,however,that giventhe specificterms of the clausegoverning
the competence ofthe Administrative Tribunal,itwasnecessaryto establish asa
prior matter a substantial, not merelyartificial,connection betweenthe
allegationsand the provisionsrelied on. Again,thiscaseisnot applicableto the
present situation where al1suchissuesare withinthe Court'sjurisdiction
inasmuchas the parties have consentedthat al1disputes relatingto the
interpretation or application of the treaties invokedcanbe submitted to the
Court. Moreover, the connection betweenthe islarnicRepubiic'sclaimsand the
treaties at issuewillbe seen to be wellestablished.
1.20 Finally,the United States refers to a third case:the
junsdictional phase ofthe Nicaragua case. This casedidinvolvea treaty very
similarto the Treaty ofAmitywhere the compromissoryclausevestedjurisdiction
in the Court to decide questionsof interpretation or application. The United
States citesa statement in the Court's judgmentto the effect that Nicaragua"must
establishareasonable connection between the treaty and the claimssubmitted tu
the Court",in order to buttress itsdegation thatthe IslamicRepublic mustmake
asimilarshowinghere12.
1.21 Two commentsmaybe made about this citation. Fir het.
reference gjvenisto a part of the Court'sjudgmentwhere the Court was
recapitulating the United States'ownargument, not stating itsindependent view
l2 U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p.83 and fn.1thereto.1211 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 303
as to the extent of the nexusbetweenthe claimsand the Treaty that wasrequired
forjurisdictionalpurposesIn rejectingthe United States' positionon thisissue,
the Court made no suggestionthat a test suasthat advocatedbythe United
States hadtobe satisfied13. Second,there clearlyisin anyevent a "reasonab-e"
indeed, intimat- connectionbetweenthe clairnsofthe IslamicRepublic andthe
treaties invokedhere.As the Court made clearinitsjudgment in the Nicaraeua
case,the question whetherthe use byone State ofarmed force againstthe
territorial sovereigntyofanother State constitutesa breach of substantive
provisionsofa treaty suchas the Treaty of Arnitygivesrise to a queofion
interpretation or application of the treaty in question. Asthe Court-stated
"..or the freedom of commerce and navigation,andthe references
in the Preamble to peace andriendship,there canbe no doubt that
in the circumstancesnwhich[theApplicationwasbrought], and on
the basisofthe factstheresserted, there is a dispute betweenthe
Partiesl&;er alia,asto the 'interpretation or applicofthe'
Treaty .
1.22 The same considerationsapplyto the Montreal Convention.
On itsface, Article 1ofthe'~ontrea1 Conventionappliestan person involved
in the offensesagainstcivilaircraft mentioned therein. No exceptionismade
anywhereinthe Convention forpersons actingonbehalf ofa State, and thus for
State actionsor the acts of armedforces. Prima facie,therefore, the Islamic
Republic'sciaimsrelating to the destruction ofone ofitscivilairlinersbythe crew
ofthe Vincennes haveat least a reasonable connectionto the Convention. The
burden ofproof ison the United States to showotherwise;but thisisa burden to
be satisfiedat the merits stage of the proceedingssinceit relates to the very
l3 See,Militan and ParamilitamActivitiesin and aeainstNicaramia
Nicaraeua v.United States of Arnerica).Jurisdictionand Addssibilitv,
fudement. I.C. Re.ooM 1984,pp. 427-429,paras. 81-83.
l4
M., p. 428,para. 83.304 AERIAL INCIDENT [221
subjectmatter ofthe Court'sjurisdicti-the interpretation or applicationofthe
Montreal Convention.
1.23 It followsthat evenifa "reasonableconnection"test has to
be met, it hasbeen satisfiedby the IslamicRepublicwith respect to itsclaimsin
this case.s such,thereare no groundsfor upholdingthe PrelirninaryObjections
under Article79of the Rules ofCourt. PART n
FACITJALISSUESRELEVANTTOTEE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS
2.01 There are three reasons whythe factsofthis caseshodd be
heard bythe CourtFirs thttrue storofwhat happened on3July 1988has
never beentold bythe United States and thiscase offersperhaps the last chance
fora fulldisclosureof the facts. Second,despite itsjurisdictional objections,the
United States has shownitselfwillingin itsPreliminaryObjectionsto enter into al1
aspects of the rneritsofthe Thir. an.perhaps mostimportant forthe
present stage ofthe proceedings,the Parties have cotathe Court's
jurisdiction overthe merits under the relevant compromissoryclausesafthe
Chicagoand Montreal Conventionsandthe Treaty ofAmity.
2.02 Significantly,the United States' versionofwhathappened
on 3July 1988has changewitheverytelling. Different versionshavebeen
presented at different timesto the public,to the press,to the United States
Congress,to the U.N. SecurityCouncilandto the Councilof ICAO. With every
newversion,the United States has been forcedto reviseitsstory. In an article
published inJulyofthisyear,Newsweekmagazinesummedup the different
"official"versionsofthe incident in its-ea"Seaof ~iesl'".
2.03 Stillanother versionhasbeen presented to the Court inthe
statement offacts set out in1of the United States' pleading.Asthe lslamic
Republicwillshowbelow,thisversioncontainshalf-tniths, misrepresentations
and inaccuraciessimilarto al1the other verInparticular, the United States
misrepresents the role of the U.S.forcesin thePersian Gulf,misrepresents the
l5 Newsweek,13July 1992.Exhibit3.306 AERIAL INCIDENT 1241
actionsof forcesof the IslamicRepublic prior to and on the dayof the incident,
and givesan incompleteand inaccurate versionof the incident itself.
2.04 Moreover, newevidenceabout the incident,some ofwhich
has onlycorneto lightin the lastfewmonths,not onlycontradictsthe offiU.S.
versionof events (insofar assuchexists),but effectivelysubstantiates the factual
presentation that hasbeen made bythe IslamicRepublicsincethe date of the
incident.
2.05 In thisregard, one important event ofwhichthe Court will
be wellaware isthe findingof the Secretary-General of the United Nationsin his
Report of9December 1991that Iraq started and mustbear responsibilityforthe
8-yearwar whichcaused suchterrible sufferingand cost hundredsof thousands of
lives16. Despite thisfinding,the United States seeks to portray the Islamic
Republic as the guiltyparty in the wlttotallyignoresthe fact that Iraq had
started the war, invadinga considerablepart of Iran, a fact that waswell-knownat
the time. lt also ignores Iraq's useofchernical~ea~ons~~,and thatIraq initiated
attacks on neutral shippingin the Persian ~ulfl~. These facts,taken together
withthe Secretary-General'sreport, confirrnthat the United States'presentation
ofthe IslamicRepublic'srole in the warisinaccurate. It isdesignedonlyto color
the case and to distract attention from the main issues.
l6 Further Report ofthe Secretary-General on the Implementation of
Securi CouncilResolution 598(1987),9December 1991, U.N. Doc.
Slud Exhibit4.
l7 A fact confirmed inthe Report ofthe MissionDispatched b the
Scmtary-Gcnerai to InvcstigateAlle ations of the Use of C!hemicai
Weapons in the Confiin between thefslamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, 19
August 1988;U.N.Doc. S/20134,p. 5. Exhibit5.
l8 See .ara. 2.37below. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 307
2.06 The Secretary-General'sReport isalsosignificantbecause it
showsthat the United States'hostilitytowardsthe IslamicRepublic throughout
the irnposedwarwastotallyunjustified. Furtber evidence has recentlycometo
lightrevealingthat U.S . overnment endorseda poiicyof direct rnilitaryand
financialassistanceto Iraq and of miljtaryaction againstthe IslamicRepublic.
Thisevidenceisof direct relevanceto the inof3July 1988inas muchasit
showsthat the United Stateswaspredisposed toadopt an aggressiveposition
againstthe IslamicRepublic anditsshippingand commercialair operations.
2.07 Newevidenceconcerningthe events of3July 1988,muchof
whichwasonlymade publicinJulyof thisyear, alsosuggaverydifferent
versionof the facts than the United States has hitherto soughtto portray. On the
other hand, thisnewevidence substantiallyconfirmsthe presentation ofthe facts
that the IslamicRepublic has made sincethe date of the incidentinthe statement
of Mr. Velayati,the MinisterofForeign Affairsof the IslamicRepublic,before
theU.N. SecurityCouncil,inthe IslamicRepublic'spresentations before the
ICA0 Council,and in itsMernorialbefore the Court. This evidencesh-wsthat
- Statements to the Securi Councilin 1988byVice-
President Bush that8t.Sforceswent to assista neutral
vesse1on 3July 1988were fa-it is nowadmitted that no
neutral vesselswere being "threatened in anywayby
Iranian srnall atrolboats on the dayofthe incident and
none sough8, assitance;
- Statementsby PresidentReagan to Congressthat the U.S.
vesselswere operating in international watersat the time of
the shoot-downwere falset has nowbeen admitted that
U.S orcesintruded into Iranian territorial watersin order
to pursue and harass Jraniansmallpatrol boatsjust prior to
the shoot-down:
- Re eated statements that the U.S.forces acted inself-
deenseare fals-itnûwappearsthat the U.S.forces
launched airect attack on the Iranian smallpatrol boats on
the dayof the incident; AERIAL INCIDENT [261
Despite the admissionin the United States pleadingthat the
Vincennes waswithinthe IslamicRe ublic'sterritorial
waters whenit shot downFLight1R6!5, the United States
has been honest about the positionsf itsvesseb or its
heticopters atarious times ofthe incident-it appears that
thisisbecause each of these vessels wasviolatingthe Islamic
Republic'sterritorialovereignq pior to the incidentitself
and prior to anyengagement withlranian smallpatrol boats.
2.08 AI1ofthese pointswillbe discussedfurther in the following
Chapters. The Court isinvitedto pay particular attention to the Newsweek
article and the transcript of the ABCNiehtlineprogramme included in Exhibit3
and Exhibit6hereto, and the statements of U.S.government andmilitaryofficiais
made therein''. Although these are media reports, the Court willnote that the
writers havehad accessto unique sourcesof information. Tbe Cour wtillalso
note thata verysubstantial part of the United States' factualpresentation inits
pleadingisbased on newspaper articles. Mostimportantly,it appears that the
United States has made no coherent attemptto dispute anyof thisnewevidence.
2.09 The IslamicRepublicunderstands that, in the lightof the
Newsweekand ABCNinhtlinestories,a further investigationofthe incident is
nowunder wayin the United States conductedbythe House Armed Se~ces
Cornmittee. The fact that suchan investigationhas been found necessary,
imilyingthat the Govenunent isnot sure of itsownversionofthe events,
undermin'esthe United States'rejection of responsibiiityfor the incident. It also
makes a mockeryof the United States'protestations that it conducted afull,open
investigationofthe incident,in the forrnof the Defense DepartmentReport,
l9
Asnoted, a copyof the transcript ofthe ABCNiehtlineprogramme is
includedas Exhibit 6. However, avideotape of the full ro amrne has
alsobeen deposited withthe Registrypunuant to Ar& $2) of the
Rules of Court. The IslamicReoublic doesnot of course acceut everv
statement made inExhibits3an'd 6 and onlyrelies on them toihe exient
specificallyindicated in thispleading.[271 OBSERVATIONS AND SuBMIssloNs
whichwaspresented to ICAO~O.
2.10 The United States' failureto tell the wholetruth about this
incidentisnot onlyan abuse of international organizationslikethe Security
Councii,the ICA0 Counciiand the Court itself,to whomthe variousversionsof
the storyhavebeen told, it isalso an abuse ofthe rightsof the 290innocent
victims. The proceedingsbefore the Court are perhaps the last opportunity for
the fullstoryto be tald and forthe victimsand the IslamicRepublic to obtain
proper redress from the United Statestogether witha fullacknowledgmentof
respansibility.
2.11 If the United States genuinelybelievesthat as a matter of
lawit has no responsibilityforthe incident,it shouldhaveno retoprevent a
fullairingof the facts. However,the consideration ofthisnewevidejse
somethingthe United States giveseveryappearance of wantingta avoid. It asks
the Court "toaccept the report of the ICAOinvestigationas an authoritative
findingwith regard to the incident of3July1988~:rguingthat anyissueof fact
"canbe resolvedon the basisof the extensivepublicrecord of the proceedingsof
the ICAO on thisrnatte?2". Thjsargument iswithoiitbasisas a matter of fact
and law.
20
The U.S.Defense Department Report isAppendix E to the ICAO
Re ort. See Exhibit4 to the Mernorialofthe IslamicRepublicSec .lso,
u.J ~rel~~ctions, pp. 52-55. The United States
conclusionswere misleadingand/or quite incorrect and that it has only
been made availableina heavilycensored form.
21 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 66,fn.1.
22 m., p. 83,fn ..Aswillbe seen in Part IVbelow(sec.paras. 4.53to 4.55)
this isan extraordinaar ment because it totallycontradictsthe United
States' positionthat theO Councilonlyconductcdan investigation
into thetechnicalaspects of the incident and didnot make nor was
intended to make legalfindingson the main factualissues.310 AERIAL INCIDENT 1281
2.12 First.it jsnowclear thatICAOwasnot givenan accurate
versionof the facts. Second,the United States'ownpresentation of the factsis
not restrictedto the ICAO Report. A myriadofnewexhibitsisintroduced,
includingpress materials and U.S.policypapers, whichrelate to issues hardly
touched on in thlCAO Report. Third what the United States means bythe
ICAOReport is generallynot the report prepared bythe ICAO investigation
team, but the one-sidedand heavilycensored Report prepared by itsown
Defense Department whichisAppendix E to theICAO Report. In the Iightof
recent evidence,it isnowclear that thisDefense DepartmentReport was
misleadingin itspresentation of the events and incorrectinits conclusions.
2.13 It shouldanywaybe recalled that there isno reason in law
whythe Court shouldnot hear al1ofthe factsrelatingto the incident de novo.
There isthus nojustificationfor the argument that an appeal from an ICAO
decisionshouldbe lirnitedto the factsof the case as presented to ICAO, and the
United States citesn~ne~~.Moreover, where different treaties are under
consideration that were not consideredby tICAO Council (k, the Treaty of
Arnityand the Montreal Convention) andwhere newfacts havebeen discovered
whichmighthavesignificantlyaffected the Council'sdecision,there canbe no
basis for restrictingthe scope of the Court'sreview.
2.14 The approach ofthe United States in this caseis
inappropriate not onlybecause of its inaccurate versionof the facts but also
23
See.L--teroacht. E.: "Asnectsof the Administration ofinternational
Justice"inflersch ~auterbacht Memorial Lectures, Cambridge, Grotius
Publications,991,p. 106.Exhibit 7,Referring to the Court'snilingin
Appeal Relatine to the Jurisdictionofthe ICAOCouncil,Judmnent. I.C.J.
Reuorts 1972,Lauterpacht notes that: "...althoughthere wasno discussion
of whatwasmeant by the idea of 'appeal',the Court proceeded to
determine de novo on itsmerits the cornpetence of the ICA0 Council,
there beingno suggestionthat the concept of 'appeal'meant anything
less."1291 OBSERVATIONS AND suBMIssIoNs 311
because the United States has soughtin itsPreliminaryObjectionsmake a full
presentation ofitsversionof the factswhiatthe same time,it hassought ta
prevent a fullhearing of the case based on purelyformalisticobjections.
2.15 Zn raisingpreliminaryobjectiona,State mayin some cases
have an interest in,-andjustification for,limitingthe Court's powera11the
factsof a case. in this caseno suchjustificationexists. Not onlydid the United
Stateswidelypublicise its versionof the factsprior ta the institutionof these
proceedings,but initspleading it alsomakes a detailedpresentation on al1
relevant issues,includingissuesrelatingto the war imposed on the Islamic
RepublicbyIraq, the role of the United States'forcesin the Persian Gulf,the
problemsof commercialmaritimeand air trafficin the Persian Gulf,andthe
NOTAMsissued bythe United It alsopresents aewversionofthe
shootingdownofFiight IR 655,the pnor engagementwithIranian smallpatrol
boats and the allegedwarningsgivenbythe Vincennes.
2.16 lnmakingsuch a detailed presentation, the United States
takes issuewithvirtuallyal1aspects ofthe statement of factsmade in the Islamic
Republic's Memorialwhichaddressed the merits of the casez5. The United
Statesthus showsthat the Parties continueto have opposing positions concerning
most ofthe main factual issuesand their legalsignificance,andatdispute
continues to existwjthregard to these issues.
2.17 The United States has alsa presented the main aspectsof its
defense on themeritsofthe case. It seekstojustifyitsmilitarypreseinethe
24 Thislatter issueisdiscussedin detail in Annex2to U.S . reIiminary
Objections.
25
The United States'presentation of thefacts,includingAnnex1sand 2 to
its pleading,isevenlongerin terms of number of pages than the Islamic
Republic'spresentation intsMemorial onthe ments.312 AERIAL INCIDENT i301
Persian Gulfand its interference in commercialmaritimeand air trafic on the
groundsthat they constituted "essentialsecuritymeasures"withinthe terms of
ArticleXX(l)(d) of the Treaty ofAmity. Similarly,withrespect to the shoot-
down,the United States presents al1the facts relevantto its self-defense
argument whileat the same time caiiinginto questionthe responsibilityof the
IslamicRepublic in the incident.
2.18 The United States makes no attempt to explainthe
relevance ofthis factualdiscussionto the objectionstojunsdiction raised inother
parts ofits pleading. Althoughthe United States asserts that "manyofthe factual
assertionsmade byIran need not be addressed at thistirnebythe it
neither distinguisheswhichfacts are relevant nor in relation to which
jurisdictional issuetheymightbe relevant, ifat all. This lastisa requirement
implicitin Article 79(5)of the Rules Court w hichprovides that "statements of
fact..in the pleadings ...shallbe confinedto those matters that are relevant to
the objection". Aspointed out in ParIabove,the United States seeksthe best of
both worlds,arguingmerits issues,whileatthe same the attempting torestrict
the Court's considerationof the merits. Moreover,byarguingthe facts at the
same time as it asksthe Court to dismissthe caon jurisdictional grounds,the
United States effectivelyseeks a surnmaryjudgment on the merits,without
allowingiliaCourt, or the IslamicRepublic,to examinefullythe facts and the law,
whichproperlybelong to a later stage ofthe proceedings. ThisitataIly
inappropriate, and in consideringthe United States'jurisdictionalobjectionsthe
Court shouldbear in mind the United States'willingnessto delveinto the merits
ofthe case.
26 U.S. Prelirninq Objections,p. 9. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 313
2.19 A response to the United States'version of the factsisthus
necessaryfor twomain reasons:firs ttcorrect the numerous misrepresentations
of factual issuesbythe United States, shown,not least,bynew evidencewhich
directlysupports the IslamicRepublic'sexplanationofthe factsof thisincident;
and second,because the United States has shown itselfwillingto enter into the
factsofthis casein detail. The IslamicRepublicwillseek to correct the
inaccurate versionof eventsportrayed bythe United States. However,thisisnot
meant to be (nor shouldit be) a detailed rebuttal of al1the factual statements
made bythe United States and, unlikethe United States,the IslamicRepublic
willseek to relate its factualdiscussionto the relevantjurisdictionalissuesin the
case.
2.20 In Chapter 1below,the IslamicRepublic willdiscussthe
relevance of the period priorto the shoot-downofFlightIR 655. In Chapter II
the shoot-downitselfisdiscussed,whileChapter III contaiaconclusion showing
the relevance ofthese factsto the jurisdictionalissues.
CWR 1 THEFACTSRELATINGTOTBE PERIODPRIORTO
THE SROOT-DOW OFFLlGHTIR655
2.21 ThisChapter discussesthe period prior to the incident and
focusseson the United States' allegationsthat the IsIamicRepublic has somehow
expanded itscornplaintbyintroducingfactsrelatingto the background situation
in the Persian Gulf. It willbe shownbelowthat thisallegationisincoaseat
matter offact (SectioA),that factsrelatingto the background situation inthe
Persian Gulf are directlyrelevant to an understanding of the shoot-down (Section
B),and thaf in any event,part ofthe dispute submittedby the IslamicRepublic
tothe Court in itsApplication concerned events thatoccurred prior to the
incident (SectionC).314 AERIALINCIDENT 1321
SEC~ONA. TheIslamicRepublicBas NotEnpandedIts Cornplaintbu
LntroducineBackgroundFactsfromthePenod Priorto the
Shoot-dom
2.22 The United States maintains that the dispute submitted in
the lslamic Republic's Application "arosefrom a singleincident:the destruction
of an Iranian aircraftbya United States warship2'". The United States then
assertsthat, in itsMemorial, the IslamicRepublic "expandsitscomplaint to cover
the effectof U.S.militarydeploymentsin the [Persian]Gulf,and of oU.S.
actions not involvingmilitaryforce, on the commercial relationsof Iran and the
United States over an extended periodof time28". This assertioniswithoutmerit.
2.23 It isuite obviousthat the shoot-downof FlightIR 655
cannotbe fullyunderstood withoutreference to the situation inthe Persian Gulf
prior to the incident. To thisend, the IslamicRepublicintroduced in its
Memorial factsshowingthe clearbreaches ofthe lawsof neutralitybythe United
States dunng the Iran/Iraq war, the hostileattitude shownbyU.S.militaryforces
towards Iranian forces,the continuousinterference bythese forcesin Iranian
commercialtraffic,the United States'issuanceof the illegalNOTAMs,andthe
U.S. rnilitaryforces' lackofcoordinationwith civilaviationauthorities in the
region. These facts are al1directlyrelevant to a fullunderstanding ofthe shoot-
down. TheyexplainwhyU.S.forcesbarged into Iranian territorial waters on 3
July1988,.provokedIranian forcesand were predisposed to treat FIRg655as
hostileand fire on it2'.
27
U.S P.reliminaryObjections,pp. 218-219.
28
used throughout this pleadingin conformitywiththe relevaUniSec;lf'is
retarial Note ~o.~~3li/l GEN (5 March 1971); UN Secretarial
Editorial Directive No. ST/CS/SER, A29 (10 January 1990),
Exhibit 7A.
29 &, paras. 2.48-2.51below. OBSERVATIONA SND SUBMISSIONS
2.24 In total contradictionof itsargument that the Islamic
RepubIicisguiltyof expandingits complaintbyintroducingsuchfacts,the United
States acknowledgestheir relevancein the veryfirstpage of itsown discussionof
the factsby noting that:
occurred in the midstofan armed engagement betweenU.S.andident
Iranian forces,in the contextlpda neries ofattacks on U.S.and
other vesselsin the [Persian]Gulf
WhiIethe IslamicRepublic disputesthe content of this statement, it isa clear
admissionof the relevanceof the background facts. Indeed,the United States
goeson to acknowledgethat"[tlheincident of Iran Air Flight655cannot be
separated from the eventsthat preceded it3'",and citesfromthe ICA0 Report,
whichmade the same conclusion.
2.25 The United States further contradictsitselfby devotingan
entire chapter ofitsStatement ofFactsatdetailed surveyof attacon "neutral"
shippingin the Persian Gulfthroughout the period of the imposed war,and a
reviewof U.S . ilitarypolicyand actionsinthe Persian Gulfregion prior to the
incident.
2.26 Thus, there isno real argument overthe relevanceof the
eventsprior to the shoot-downofFlighiR 655,and the IslamicRepublic has not
expanded its complaintbyreferring to suchevents. However,the United States
has givena versionofthese eventsthat ismisleadingand inaccurate,whichthe
IslamicRepublic willattemptto correct below,whilstat the sametime explaining
the relevance of these eventsto the claimsmade in its Application.
30 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 9.
31 Ibid.316 AERIAL INCIDENT i341
Srno~B. The RelevanceoftheRackeniundFacts tothe Shoot-down
ofFlightIR655
(i) Thenon-neutralmlicy oftheUnitedStatestowardsthe
IslamicRe~ublic
2.27 The United States asserts that the major thrust of itspolicy
in the war imposedbyIraq on the IslarnicRepublic wasto seek a peaceful
settlement of the confliinparticular by the implementation of the Security
Council'sResolution 59~~~I.n fact,whilethe United States repeatedly and as
late a23May1988 prafessed itsneutraIityin the confoncwhichthe Islamic
Republic relied, the United States activelysupported Iraq and adoated
provocativeand hostileattitude towardsthc IslamicRepublic. Thispolicywasa
contributoryfactor to the shoot-dowofFIightIR 655.
2.28 In hisbook Fiphtinefor Peace, the U.S.Secretary of
Defense at the time,Caspar Weinberger,whilenoting that "officialpolicywasto
remain neutral", stated that he "managedto.have officia1United States
statements and actionsconveythat we'tilted'toward ~ra~~~"I.t has nowbecorne
comrnonknowledge,particularlyin the aftermath of the warbetween Iraq and
Kuwait,that this tiltwasfarmore extreme than suggestedbyMr. Weinberger.
The followingfactsgivea better appreciation of the true status of U.S.poiicy
hm 1980to 1988:
-
were reestablished withIraq, one of the belligerents, in
November 1984and remained intactthroughout thewar,
whereas the United States hano diploutatic relations with
the IslamicRepublic;
- Economic sanctionswere imposed onal1goodsof Iranian
originand an almost total restriction ontrade relations of
anykindwiththe IslamicRepublicfrom 1980onwards. No
32 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 14.
33 Weinberger, C.W. :iehtine for Peace, Warner Books,1990,p.358.&g,
Exhibit8 to the Memorial ofthe Islar~icRepublic. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 317
suchsanctionswere imposedon Iraq. Indeed, trade with
Iraq wassubstantjallyincreased duringthisperiotoassist
Iraq'sailingwareconomy;
- The United States put into effe"O eration Staunch"which
wasdesignedto prevent the Islamickzpubüc koomrsceiving
anns fromalrnostanywherein the world. Thiswas
combinedwith a near blockadeof Iranian ports and
coastlinestogether withcomprehensivemonitorin
surveülanceofverselsgoingto and from suchportydNo
suchsteps were taken againstIraq. In fact, the United
Statesexpresslyauthorized trade withIraq to in9%.
equipment that couldbe used for militarypurposes ,
- The United States'poIicyofreflaggingKuwaitishipswas
directlyaimedat assistingIraqAs has become apparent
sincethe Kuwait-Iraqwar,Kuwaitsupported Iraq in itswar
effort,roviding$aq withmassivefinancialsupport and
other assistance ,
- It has alsobeen revealedin U.S.CongressionalWearings
held thisyear that the United Stateswasinvolvedin an
extensiveagreement whereby militaryintelligencewas
providedto Iraq throughoutthe war. Asstated in those
records, thisprogram began in 1984,out offq that Iraq
thisarrangement wasnexpresslyto provide"i~~plligenandf
advicewithrespect to the pursuit of thewar";
- The same CongressionalRecords suggestthat massiveU.S.
Government supported loans of binionsofdollarswere
34 Ibid.,pp.421-424.
35 Sec .oyle,F.A.:"International Cisis and Neutrality:U.S.ForeignPolicy
toward the Iraq-Iran Wss",in Neutrali-Chaneine;Concevts and
Practices,ed.Leonhard, A.T.,UniversityPressofknerica, 1988. Exhibit
-. This article containsa detailed revjewof non-neutral actionsbythe
United States duringthewar. & also,The WashinmonPost. 16
Se tember 1990for araiew oftheUnited States'policytoward Iraq.
&ibit 9.
36 B, Chubin,S. & Tripp, C.:Iran and Iras at War, London, 1988,p. 154.
Exhibit 10.
37
Exhibit 11.alRecord-House of Representatives (March 9,1992),H 1109.
38 -Ibid. AERIAL INCIDENT
purchases .duringthe war and used for militaq
2.29 These actionsviolated the lawsof neutrality and showthat
the United Statesfailed to abide bySecurityCouncilResolution598,which in
paragraph 5calledon "al1other States to exercisethe utmost restraint andto
refrain from anyact whichmaylead ta further escalationand wideningof the
conflict,and thus to facilitate the implementation ofthe present resol~tion~~".
Thispolicywasparticularlyunacceptable giventhe fact,well-knownat the time,
that Iraq had imposed the war onthe IslamicRepublicbyits invasionin 1980.
2.30 Iraq's responsibilityforthe conflicthas nowbeen confirmed
by theSecretary-General of the United Nations. Itwillbe recalled that under
paragraph 6ofResolution 598(39871,the Secretary-Generalwasrequested by
t
the SecurityCouncil-
"..o explore,in consultationwithIran and Iraq, the question of
entrusting an impartial bodywithinquirin into responsibilityfor
possible#f".and to report to the Security$uncil as sasn
2.31 Asa result ofinvestigatiocamed out in implementation of
Resolution 598,the Secretav-General issuedhisReport on 9 December 1991
whichconcludedthat -
"..thewarbetween Iran and Iraq,whichwas goingto be wa ed for
so manyyears,wasstarted incontravention of international aw,
--
39 m., H 1110.
40
20July 1987),U.N. Doc. S/RE-S/598(1987). Mibit 12.l(2750th Meeting,
41 Ibid. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMlSSIONS 319
and viol 'onsof international lawgiverise to responsibilityforthe
conflict!2.
In thisconnection,the Report foundthat the specificconcern of
the international comrnunitywas"theillegaluseof force andisregarfor the
territorial integrityofa Membtat te^ ^he.Report stated that the outstanding
event under these violations-as
"...he attacof22September 1980 against Iran,whichcannot be
justified under the Charter of the United Nations, any recognized
internat'na1rnoraliq and entailsthe responsibilityfor the
conflict ."
TheReport added that Iraq'saggressionagainstIran w"iviolationofthe
prohibitionofthe use of force,whisregardedas oneof the rulesofjus
cogens45".
2.32 NohKithstandingIraq'sresponsibilityforstartingIran-
Iraqwar,the United States continuesto protest that itsactionsin the Persian
Guifwere entirelyjustified. Thus,inAnnex 1to itsPreliminaryObjectionsit
"As aresultofthe United States' effortsto protect itsvesselsin the
that thL nitedStateswasnotea neutral in the Iran-Iraqwar. The)
United States certainlyworked to bringthe war to a negotiated
end, leaWigneither victornor vanquished,but anyconcerted U.S.
pressureon Iran reflected Iran'sintransigenceto negotiate with
42
Further Report ofthe Secretary-Generon the Implementation of
Sl23273.Exhibit4>para. 5. 598(1987),9 December 1991,U.N. Doc.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.,para. 6.
45 -m., para.7.320 AERIAL INCIDENT i381
by XeeJ njted States to intewene in the war on behal8:.f Iraq
In the lightof the factsrecounted in paragraph 2.28above,this statbeent can
seen to be totallyinaccurate. Itwas not the United States'businessto pressure
one side orthe otheror interfere under Resolution 598. Indeed, paragraph 5 of
the Resolution caliedupon al1other States to "exercisethe utmost restraint".
Despite this admonition,the United States stilltook siIraq.AsLawrence
Korb, the Former Assistant Secretaryof Defense, stated in an interviewon CNN
on 2July 1992-
"...hen the United Stateswent into the [Persian]Gulf it wasnot
simplyjust to escort Kuwaititankers. Wewanted to ensure that
ofaIraq~." winthat war. In other words,webecame de facto allies
2.33 In drawingattention to these issues,the lslamicRepublic is
not, as the United States aileges,seekingto expand itscomplaint or to submitnew
disputes concerningviolationof the lawsof neutraliv to the The sole
purpose of thispresentation isto showthat, despite itsrepeated professions of
neutrality,the United States in factadaphostileand provocative attitude
towards the IslamicRepubTic.Thisfonns part of the explanation of the shoot-
dom ofFlight IR 655and the continuedapplicationof the illegalU .S.
NOTAMsin the Persian Gulf.
46 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,Annex 1,pp. 17-18(footnotes ornitted).
47
Sec he interviewswith WilliamColby,Former Director of the CiA, and
Lawrence Korb, Former Assistant Secretaryof DefenseLamn Kin
& 2July 1992,The transcript ofthis programme isjncludedin ~%it
u. in particular, pp. 1W. --.
48 U.S .reliminaryObjections, pp.84-85. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
(ii) Themle ofUS. militawforcesinthePersianGulf
2.34 TheUnited States seekstojuste the presence of its military
forcesinthe Persian Gulfbyreference to the need to protect neutral shipping
and the need to keep open the Strait of ~ormuz~~.Itprovidesa separate Annex
and numerous references to press reports ofallegedattacks on neutral shipping
to support thiscontention. These factshaveno relevanceto thejurisdictional
issuesin the case,and seem designedonlyto color the Court's appreciationof the
case.
2.35 These factsare alsoof limitedrelevance to the ments of the
case. The IslamicRepublic's actionswithrespect to commercialtrafic duringthe
war withIraq were entirely directedat preventingcontraband beingpassed to
Iraq,whicliisa rightof anybelligerentState. This rightwasrecognizedbythe
U.S.Government at the timcas wellasby other third States,in particular the
United Kingdom. The IslamicRepublic hadno quarrel withU.S.for-es~er
and never initiated anyattack againstU.S.militinthe Persian Gulf.
Indeed, it.hasbeen confirmed boU.Sy.overnment and militaiyofficiaisthat
the IslarnicRepublic alwaysaina restrained and professionalmanner in
dealingSwithU.S. forcess0. In suchcircurnstances,claimsthat Iranian actions
were directed against commercialtrafficcan providenojustificationfor'the
vinceniés treating Iranian aircraft,militaryor otherwise,as hostile.
2.36 Most important of al!,it has nowbecome clearfrorn
evidencerecently corneto lightthat on thedayofthe inciwastnoere
"harassment"'ofmeichant vesselsofanykindby lranian forceswhichmighthave
explainedthe involvementU.S orces. Whilethispointwillbe discussed
49 Sec ..S. PreliminaryObjections,ppa-.,, and Annex1 thereto.
50 &, paras. 2.46-2.47below.322 AERIAL INCIDENT 1401
further belod3, it showsthat the United States'presentation of factsconcerning
alleged attacks onneutral shippingcannothelpto excusethe Vincennes' actions.
2.37 Nevertheless,to correctthe impressionwhichthe United
States seeksto givebyitslengthypresentation on this issue,it isnecessaryto draw
attention to factswhichthe United States failsto mention:
-irst:just asraq had started the war and wasthus responsiblefor
it, Iraq alsostarted the attacks on shippingin the Persian Gulf in
1984 attacks whichcontinuedand increased inj ensj for4years
withoutanyresponse framthe IslamicRepubIic 3., ry
Second:Iraq wasprimarilyresponsiblefor suchatta~ks~~;
m: disru tion of shippingin the Persian Gulfwascontraryto
the Islamicf;cpublich interests because the largepan ofits trade
wasconductedthrough the shippinglanes and ports of the Persian
Gulf;
Fourth: Iranian commercia hippingwasone of the heaviest
sufferersfrom suchattacks h4,, '
-ifth:the IslamicRepubiic's actionwere aimed at identifyingand,
in case of doubt, stopping and searchingvesselsconsidered to be
carryingcontraband ofwar,whichisthe recognizedright of any
bPersian Gulf Statesupported Iraq directlyor indirectinitswarr
efforts. Iraq has no usable port on the Persian Gulf and it was
obviousthat shipmentsofwar materials throughports of other
States couldbedestined forIraq. For example,itwasalsoweii-
knownthat both Kuwaitand SaudiArabia had not onlymade
extensiveloansto Iraq but had alsgpened up their ports for the
shipment ofgoods bound for Iraq ,
51 Sec .aras. 2.68-2.71below. -/.
52
includedin Exhibit35to thenU.SnP.reliminaryObjections.ic.is
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
52 Chubin,S. & Tripp,C,,-+ p.154. Exhibit 10. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 323
&&: the Iranian Navyhad made clear ina series of Noticesto
take asaresult oIraqiaggression. The Navycalled onStates using
the Persian Gulfshipping lanes to followprescribed safe routes
outsidethe war zone in the northern part of the Pcrsian &If,
where theycouldbecome involvedin hostilities,and not to set
anchor in the Shatt'alArab. Vessels couldonlycorneinto thiswar
zone ifdestined foIranianports. It alsocalledon neighbouring
Stateswithports on thefersian Gulfnot to giveassistanceto Iraqi
vessels,orto vesselscanying consignmentsofarms to Iraq. so
dojng,the IslarnicRepublicinfaged suchStates of its riasta
belligerenttoenforce suchrules .
2.38 For the same reasons,and contraryto the United States'
allegations,the IslamicRepublicwascommittedto keeping open the Strait of
Hormuz, on whichit depended for asubstantialamount of itstrade. The Notices
to Mariners referred ta abovedid not coverthe Strait ofHormuz and the Islamic
Republic made clear itscornmitmentto keep the Strait open in a letter to the
57
Secretary-Generalof the United Nations .
2.39 The United States acknowledgesthat Iraq initiatedtso-
called"tanker war"by"attackson tankers usingIran'soilterminal at Kharg
lslandS8".The United Stateshas alsorecognizedthatbelligerentshave a
traditional right "toprevent war suppfrom beingshippedto an en en^ F^r^^".
example,when on 12January 1986,a U.S.vesse],the -, was
Copies ofthe Noticesta Mariners issuedbythe IslamicRepublic. Exhibit
-14.
57
Letter dated 21October 1980from the Chargéd'maires ofthe
Permanent Missionof Iran to the United Nationsto the U.N.cretary-
General. U.N. Doc.S/14226,22October 1980. Wîit 15.
58 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p.13.
59 &, NewYork Times,13January 1986. Exhibit9to the Mernorialof the
IslamicRepublic.324 AERIALINCIDENT Pl
boarded and searched byhanian officiais,theDepartment ofState admitted that
'There isa basisin international lawfor shipsearches bybelligerentsaa'.
2.40 in suchcircumstances,the United Stateshad an obligation
to rernainneutral and to restnct itsrole to the protection ofneutral shipping. in
fact, it didno suchthhgThe US. forcesrepeatedly violatedthe territorial
sovereigntyof the IslamicRepublicand repeatedlyinterfered withIranian civil
and rnilitarytrafic6'. In reflaggingKuwaitishipswhenKuwaitwasa de facto aUy
of Iraq, the United States wasalsodirectlyhelplraqin itswar efforts62. The
United States wasengaged in aform of "gunboatdiplomacy"thousands ofmiles
fromitsownshores, aimed at pressurizingthe IslamicRepublicand provokingan
incidentthat wouldfurther the United States'interestsin the ~ar~~.
2.41 These actionswere part of whatthen Vice-PresidentBush
describedas attempts bythe United States to findmeans "tobolster Iraq'sability
and resolveto withstand Iranian attacksob. Despite the fact that Iraq had
imposed the war on the lslamicRepublic and waslargelyresponsiblefor al1
attacks on shipping(makingno attempt to abidby the mles ofvisitand search
governingbeiligerents),the United States exercisednosimilarpressuonIraq.
60 De~artrnent of State Bulletin (March 19861,No. 21p.41. Exhibit9 to
théMernoria1of the IslamicRepubiic.
61
Thisisclearlyevidencedin the IslauiicRepublic'sre eated protests to the
UN! Secretary-Gcneral for distributionasSecurity&uncil documents.
Reuublic'sInterests Sectionat tEmbassv Uofthe Democratic andIslamic
popular Republic ofAigeria. Exhibits19anda to the Memonal ofthe
IslamicRepublic.
62 &, Chubin,S. & Tripp, C., suprap. 154.Exhibit 10.
64 CongressionalRecord-House of Representatives (March 2,1992),H 860.
Exhibit Il.1431 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 325
Eventoday,from the United States' PreliminaryObjections,one wouldnot know
that Iraq had playedany role at alinthe hostilities.
2.42 Asone historianhas noted in reviewingthe role ofthe U.S.
forcesin the Persian Gulf-
"Iran'sactivitinthe [Persian Gulfbefore the U.S.entrywas
almostentirelyin retaliatioior Iraqi attacks on tankers bound for
Iran; theIraniansare the party mostinterested in keepingthe
[Persian]Gulfopen to tankers. It has been Iraq, not Iran,that over
the years has attacked and disruptedy farthe most shi ping,for
thesimplereason that Lrandepsnds mmpletcly on the fiersian]
Gulfand the Strait ofHormuz to export a11itsoil,whileIraq sends
itsiIabroad bypi eline. The United States coulddo far more to
pacifythe [~ersianr~ulf,ifthat iswhatit reallywantsto do,by
persuading Iraq to stop itsattacks on Iranian ship ing,whichar
vhai rtarted and perpetuate the navalwar in the fiersian] ~ul&~!'
Thisstatement represents afar truer picture ofthe role of the U.S.forcesin the
Persian Gulf at the time and substantiallyconfirmsthe lslamicRepublic's
presentation ofthe facts. The Former Assistant Secretaryof Defense, Lawrence
Korb, explainedU.S.policyasfollows:
"Thegreat ironywas [that] Ira was destroyingmanymore shjps
tryingto get out ofthe [Peniaa Gulfthan Iran was st that time.
But when wewentin,wewanted to ensure that Iran didn'twinthat
war from Iraq. That was ourreal objective,and so wewere dowa
lotofthingsto ensure that wecauld teach the iranians a lesson .
(iii) JU.S.forcesces actedin a non-a~wssive mannerîowards
2.43 Inan effortto showthat U.S. forceswere justifiedintreating
the IslamicRepublicas hostile,the United States refers to a numberof alleged
engagementsbetween U.S. and Iranianmilitaryforcesinthe period pnor to the
65 Keddie, N.R.: "Iranian Imbroglios:Who'sIrrational?",World Poli-
Journal, Winter 1987-1988,p. 46. Exhibit 18.
66 Euhibit 13,pp.11-12.326 AERIAL INCIDENT [44]
~hoot-down~~.Again,it mustbe noted that these "facts"relate solelyto the
rneritsof the caseand canhave no relevanceto the United States'jurisdictional
objections. Moreover,there isa certain unrealityinthe United States'argument
that the modest Iranian navaland air forceswouldengage themost powerfulfleet
inthe world. The IslamicRepublic'sforces werefullyengagedin the war
imposedby Iraqand the idea that theywouldhave riskbringinthe United
States into the waraydirect attaonthe U.S . avydefiesbelief.
2.44 The IslamicRepublic never initiated anyattack agU.S.t
miiitaryforcesor US. flagged vessels.Amongthe numerous prereportfiled
bythe United States, onlyone refers to an allegedattack by Iranion forces
U.S.militaryforces. This concernswhatwassaidto be an attack bysmailIranian
boats on aU.S.helicopter on 8 October 1987. However,the IslamicRepublic
immediatelydenied that thboatshad attacked the helicopter and the United
States itselfconcedesthat the outcome ofthe "incident"wasthe sinkingof three
68
Iranian boats and lossof life,wU.S.forces sufferedno damage at al1
2.45 The onlyother incideinwhichU.S. and Iranian forces
were directlyinvolvedarosfrom theU.S .ttack on Iranian forceson 18April
1988,whichthe United States soughttojustifyas an armed reprisal for damage
to a U.S. vesse1 that had hit amine in the Persian Gulf a number of days
U.S.PrclirninaryObjectionpp.16,a sea.
68 M., pp.17-18.i451 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 327
beforefig. Notwithstandingthat suchreprisais are illegalunder international law,
accordingto Mr. Weinberger,theU.S .estroyedhalf of the IslamicRepublic's
navalforces in thisattack70. It issignificantthat this attack coincidedexactlywith
one of the major lraqi offensivesof the war inwhichIraq tookthe Fao peninsula.
Thiswasone ofthe worst blowsto the IslamicRepublic'seffort to make Iraq
abide bythe 1975Frontier Treaty andwithdrawfromthe considerable parts of
Iranianterritory that it had unlawfullyoccupied71. Despite this attack,the
United States wasat painsto stressthat thiswasan isolated incident,that it did
not seek confrontationwiththe IslamicRepublic andthat it remained neu.ral
2.46 The best replyto the contentionsthat the IslamicRepublic
threatened U.S.forceswasgivenby the formeU.S S.ecretary ofDefense, Caspar
Weinberger,whostated that Iranian forceshad demonstrated "adecidedintent to
avoidArnerican~arshi~s~~".This descriptionisconfirmedbythe Commander of
theUSS SidesC.ommander Carlson,who waspresent in the areon 3July 1988
-
69
The United Statesmakes muchof the IslamicRepublic's allegedminin of
thePcrsian GuïP See.inter alia,US. PrelirninaryObjectipp.,18-18.
Wowever,the sole evidenceit points to in thisregard isa statement byan
hadnminedcertain areas "toprotect Iranian coastal installations". The
officialalsopointed outthat use of these mineswasdesignedfor defence
not "toblockfreedom ofnavigation". ne WashingtonPost,21 August
1987,U.S. PrelirninaryOb'ections,Exhi35. &g, also,theIetter from
the Minister ofForeignairs of the IslarnicRcpublic to U.N.
1Secretary-General date26 September 1987. U.N. Doc. Si19161,29
September 1987includedin Eirhibit16.
70 Sec,Weinberger, surir p..25. Exhibit8to the Memorial ofthe Islamic
Republic.
71 m. Sec .lso,ABCNightlinetranscript,p. 6onthe timingof this
incident.Exhibi6.
72
&g, the letter dated 18April 1988from the ActingPermanent
Representative ofheUnited States to the United Nationsto the
President ofthe SecurityCouncil. U.N.c. S/19791, A18ril1988.
Exhibit 19.
73 Weinberger, w, p.401. Exhibit8to the Memoriaofthe Islamic
Republic.328 AER~AL INCIDENT [461
and perhaps best ableto judge the so-called"threat"from Iranian forces. In a
remarkablycandidassessment,he stated that tbese forceswere "pointedlynon-
threatening"in the month precedingthe destruction of FlIR655and that they
were "direct and professionalin their cummunications",consistentlyheeding and
taking stepsto avoiU.S.forces74.
2.47 It shouldbe remembered that the IslarnicRepublic was
engagedin a full-fledgedarmed conflictwithIraq and had been subjected to
hundreds of attacks byIraqi forinthe Persian Gulf. It wasalsosubjected to
almost dailyviolationsofitstemtonai sovereigntyand interference iCM]tand
rniiitaryaviatiby the United tat tes ^espite this situationevery occasion
Iranian aircraft and vesselsmade it apolicytokeep clear of U.S. forces. No
hostileintent wasshown,and no attack wasever made on U.S.warship. As the
U.S. AssistentSecretaryof Defense statedMay 1987,"Iran hasbeen careh1 to
avoidconfrontationswithU.S iagvesselsir6".
(iv) U.S orcesshowed an aegressiveand hostilattitude
2.48 Notwithstandingthe "non-threatening"and "professional"
conductof Iranian forces,the DefenseDepartment Report attached to the ICA0
Report statesthat planes and boas originatingfromthe IslamicRepublic were
74
Sec . arison'sstatement in Proceedinps,Septernber 1989p.87. Exhibit
-3to the Memorial of the IslamicRepublic.
75
Secretary-General concerningthese violations. It canbe seen £romthese
protcsts that therewere hundreds ofillegalwarningsgivento Iranian
aircraft, that aircraftwere intercforas longas 1hour at a tirne,and
thatU.S.forcesrepeatedly intmded into Iranian airspace and Iranian
temtorial waters.
76 U.S. De~ar-tmentofState BulletiJuly 1987,p. 60. Exhibit 29to the
Memorial ofthe IslamicRepublic.i471 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 329
autornaticallyassumedto be hostilebyU.S. forces77. Thisattitude wasreflected
inthe United States'rules of engagementand itsNOTAMsand wasthe direct
result ofthe biascharacterizingU.S.Government policyin the region.
2.49
The postingofthe Vincennesto the Persian Gulfwasa key
part of the U.S.strategy. The Vincenneaswellas the presencof the U.S.fleet
asa whole,constitutedapre-planned showofforce specificallyintended to
intimidatethe IslamicRepubljc. Despitbeing confronted withthiskindof
provocation,the IslamicRepublic exerciseaconsiderablemeasure of restraint.
By wayofcontrast, it can readilybe imaginedthat the United Stateswouldhave
regarded it a seriousthreat to national secuaforeignState amassed its
forcesjust offthe Coastofthe United Statesand acted in a similarlyprovocative
manner.
2.50 The hostileattitude of the Vincenneswasconfirmedbythe
Commander of the the && -the Vincennes' cornpanionship. He attested that
the Vincennes' actions"appeared to be consistentlyaggressive",that "an
atmosphere of restraintwasnot her longsuit",and that her crew"hankefor an
opportunity to showtheir stuff7'". In otherwords,on 3July 1988the Vincennes
wasnot onlypredis~osed as a resultof the U.S.rules of engagementtotrany
aircraft.takingofffromthe IslamicRepublic ashostile,but waslookingfor an
excuseto use itsweapons. As LawrenceKorb, the Former AssistantSecretaryof
77 The Defense Department Report (p.E-52 (emphasisadded)) isteIlingin
this regard.t stated that aslongas hostilitiescontinued in the area,
"Commercialair, articularlvcommercialair £romIran, isat ri...".
Exhibit4to the 'morial ofthe IslamicRepublic. Thur, FLighIR655
wasimmediatel identified as an"unknown-assumedenemy"bythe USS
Vincennes. u.2 PreliminaryObjections p.34 h. 1.
Mernorialof the IslamicRepublic. These descriptionsare vividlyhe
conîïnned in the ABCNiehtline and Newsweekreports attached as
Exhibits6and 3.330 AERIAL INCIDENT 1481
Defense, hasindicated, the United Stateswas"doinalot ofthingsto ensure that
wecouldteach the banians a ess son^^".
2.51 The IslamicRepublic submitsthat the events inthe Persian
Gulf prior to the shoot-downshowthat U.S. militaryforcestreated Iranian forces
as hostile but had nojustification for doingsa.aSconclusionis obviously
relevantto whathappened on 3July 1988,because the Vincennes assumed Flight
IR 655to be hostile,wholy withoutreason. The introduction of suchfacts cannot
therefore be regarded asan expansionof the IslamicRepublic's complaintto the
Court.
SECTIO C. Tbe RelevanceoftheBackgroundFscts Concerningthe
NOTAMs and the Issue ofCiuillMilitarvCoordination
2.52 ln itsMemorial,the IslamicRepublicshowtd that U.S.
forceshad repeatedly interfered withor threatened Iranian commercialtrafic in
the Persian Gulf region in the period prior to the incidentB0.These factsdirectly
related to the contention made in the IslamicRepublic's Application thatthe
United States violatedAnnex 15of the ChicagoConvention and
Recommendation 2.611ofthe Third MiddleEast RegionalAir Navigation
(MIDRAN) meetings1. Inparticular, the United States'issuanceof illegal
NOTAMsand the failureof its forcesto coordinatewithcivilianATS authorities
in the regioncaused interferences incivilaviationand constituted violationsof
the ChicagoConvention. Giventhat these actionswere referred to in the Islamic
Republic'sApplication,there canbe no merit in the United States' argumentthat
the IslamicRepublichas expandeditsoriginalcomplaintbyintroducing
Exhibit 13p. 12.
-ee,Memorial of the lslamicRepublic,pp.33-42.
Sec A.pplicationof the IslamicRepublic,p. 8.i491 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 331
background factsrelatingto suchviolations. In anyeveasshownabove,these
actionsare alsorelevant to an understandingof the shoot-downitself.
2.53 The provisionsenshrinedinAnnex 15of the Chicago
Convention and inthe Recommendation ofthe Third MIDRANMeetingwere
designedto giveeffectto certain fundamental principles setout in the body of the
ChicagoConvention,in particular those principlesfoundin the Preamble and
Articles1,2,3bis,and 44(a) and(h)of the Conventionon whichthe Islamic
Republic specificallyrelied inits Application.
2.54 The United States deployeditsforcesin the Persian Gulf
ignoringsuchfundamental principles. In particular,the United Statesfailed to
takestepçta mardinate itsrnilitary activitieswithcivilianATSauthorities in the
regionand promulgatedillegalNOTAMS*~.There isno doubt asto the factual
basisofthe IslamicRepublic's contentions.The ICAO Report found that:
"Therewasno coordination between UnitedStates warshi s and
thecMIATSunits responsiblefor the provisionofairtra&
serviceswithintheUS flightinformation regionsin the
[Persian]Gulfarea .
Withregard to the NOTAMs,the Report alsofound that -
"...the promu1 ation of the NQTfvl wasnot in conformitywiththe
provisionsofI~AOAmw 15 .
2.55 The United States' forces constantlyinterferedwithlranian
civilaviationtrafficand repeatedlyviolated the IslamicRepublic's sovereignty
82 Sec.Mernorialof the IslamicRepublic,pp. 209-238.
83 ICAOReport, para. 2.8.4. Exhibit4to the Mernorialofthe Islamic
Republic.
84 W., para. 2.2.4.332 AER~ALINCIDENT
over itsownairspace. In sodoing,they also created a grave srisk.The
IslamicRepublic made repeated protests both to the Secretary-General ofthe
United Nations,toICAO and to the United States concerningthese violationsof
85
international law,and the thrtothe safetyof civilaviationthat they posed .
2.56 The actionsof the United States constituted violationsnot
onlyofspecificprovisionsofthe ChicagoConventionbut alsoof the Treaty of
~rnity~~,whichenshrines numerous principles intended to preserve freedom of
commerce and navigationin anyform and tu avoid anyunreasonable or
discriminatingmeasureswhichmightimpede suchfreedorn of commerceand
navigation(s in particular, ArticlesIV,VIIIX).dThese actions were also
violationsof the principlesof customaryinternationallawrelatingto the
prohibition againstthe use of force, principlesof good-neighbourliness,
sovereigntyand freedom ofcommerce enshrinedin both treaties. There isthus
no merit in the United States' argument thatthe IslamicRepubbc has soughtto
expand itscornplaintbymakingreference to variousrules ofcustomary
international lawregardingthe use offorce, sovereigntyand freedom of
85
Protests to the Secretary-General are attached hereto asMibit 16. For
Exhiiits 19anda Ito the Memorial ofthe IslamicRepublic, respectively.
86 In this regard, there isno substance inthe United States'argument that by
introducingthe Trea of Amityin itsMemorialthe Islamic Republic has
soughtto transform disputesubmitted to the Court in itr Ap lication.
The same disputescanbe treatedby the Court under both the 8icago
Conventionand the Treaty ofAmity. The Treaty of Amityaffordsthe
Court an additionalbais ofjurisdictionfor the same dispute. See,
generally,ParVI, below.[SI] OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
87
commerce and navigation .
2.57 Aswillbe shown below,the illegalNOTAMsand the lackof
civil/militarycoordination are also directlyrelated to the sIfthedown.
United States reallydidnot knowthat FlIRh655wasa cornmerciaiflight,this
canmt be used as an excusebecause this ignorance resulteddirect1yfromthe
United States' failureto coordinate itsmilitaryactivitieswithcivilianATS
authorities. Similarly,the allegedUS. warningsto IRi655cannotbe relied
on because these warningsweremade pursuant to the United States'illegal
NOTAMs,and were thus themselvestotallyillegals8.
CaAPTERU THE SHOOT-DOWN OFFLIGHTIR 655
2.58 The United States also sets out inl itsversionoffacts
relatingto the shoot-downitself. Its prirnaryaimisagainto present its defense on
the merit-that it acted in self-defenseand thatthe IslamicRepublipartres
of the burden of responsib-withouteven pretendingthat suchfactshaveany
relevanceto itsjurisdictionalobjections. Aswillbe shownfurther below,the
United States' presentationofthe factsremains misleadingand inaccurate.
87
SecU. .SP.reliminaryObjections,pp.84-85. With regard to the use of
force, Article of the ChicagoConventionhas not been ratified.
isalreadv enshrinedin the ChicaeoConvention. See, the Memonal ofthech
Islamic~e~ublic,~ 147-154.fie United StateG the strongest
supporter ofthis cleand,gwenthat it isalreadyenshrined inthe
Convention, shouldbe esto pedrom violatingthisprincipleevenifnot
ratifie& Significantiy,the Qnited States doesnot take issuewiththe status
of Article in itsPreIirninaryOb'ections Although Article3@ has
notyet been ratifibythe lnlamiRcpu ibm~ediate stepswere taken
to initiate thisprocedure after itssignature.
88
In Annex2 toits Statement ofFacts, the United States seekstothe*
rastual issuerclated to itsjurisdictionalobjections. The United States
once aeainuresents a defense on the meritswhileseekinebvfilins!
preli&ajobjections to prevent the IslamicRepublic fhaviig the
o~nortunitvto nresent itsrebutTakine this into consideration.the
~ilârnic~ebubfic haschosen to restrict itsreply to the U.S.preseitation to
an Annexhereto. AERIAL INCIDENT 152]
2.59 Section A willfocuson the events immediatelypnor to the
shoot-down. It willbe shownthat thiswasa particularlycalmperiod in the
Persian Gulf,that the United States had no reason to expectanyhostilitiesand
that the United States unjustifiablyprovoked hostilitieson the morning of3July
1988,violatingthe IslarnicRepublic'stemtorial sovereigntThe flightofIR655,
and the allegedwarningsaven bythe U.S .orcesto the aircraft aswellas their
failure to identifyjtacivilianflightwillthen be discussedin SectB.n
Smo~ A. EventsImmediaielvPrior tothe Shoot-downof Flieht
IR 655
(i) The week precdine theshoot-dom
2.60 in the United States' Statementof Facts, itisalleged that
duringthe three-day periodprior to the incidentthewas heightened air and
naval activity inthe Persian Gulf, that the IslamicRepublic had inthe preceding
month deployedF-14sto Bandar Abbasairport, and that U.S.forcesin the
Persian Gulfwere alerted to "theprobabilityofsignificantIranian militaryactivity
against..US. militaryvesselsinretaliation for recent Iraqi military successes"
over the Fourth ofJuly holidayweekendg9. The solepurpose of thisdiscussionis
to seek to showthat there waa hostileatmosphere pnor to the incident and to
lend credence to the United States'self-defenseargument. Itistotallywithout
relevance to the United States'jurisdictionalobjections.
2.61 The United States givesno evidencewhatsoeverto support
itscontentionsthat there wassucha hostileatmosphere. Its arguments are simply
drawnfrom statements made in its one-sidedand censoredDefense Department
Report. In fact, objectiveevidenceshowsthat there wasno heightened actjvityin
the Persian ~ulf ;rior to the incident. An article inThe WashinptonPost on 3
July 1988,filedas an Exhibitby the United States,reports that pnor to 3July
89
U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p.22.PI OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 335
there had been "anearlythree-week lu11in the [Persian]gulfs 'tankerwar"',
broken onlybyan lraq aitack an twoIranian tankers 2nJuly 1988~'.
2.62 Speakingon 2July 1988,one daybefore the incident,
LieutenantGeneral George B. Crist,the head ofthU.S.Central Command,
confirmedthis,statingthat "Iran's navalvesselsand gunboatsof itsRevolutionary
Guard have avoided U.S.shipssinceU.S.militaryforcesdestroyedor sanksix
Iranianvessels[on]Aprii18~~".
2.63 The United States alsogivesno evidenceas to the alleged
increased activitofP24s at Bandar Abbas airport in the three priorto the
shoot-down,an allegationwhichthe IslamicRepubliccategoricallydenies. Ln
fact, Iranian F-14swere used for scheduled reconnaissancetrips in an area distant
from wherethe incidentitselfoccurred,their aciivityhad considerablydecreased
inthe period prior to the incident andno F-14swere in operation on 3July 1988.
2.64 ln anyevent,the allegeddeployment ofF-14scanbe of no
significanceAs wasexplainedin theIslamicRepublic'sMemonal, these aircraft
are designedfor air-to-air combnotattacks on surfacevessels,and infact had
neverbeen sousedg2. The United Stateswaswellaware that the IsIamic
Repubiic:hadno capabilityto attack U.S.warships. The U.S. AssistantSecretary
ofDefense stated inMay 1987that "Iranlacksthe sophisticated aircraftand
weaponryused byïraq inthe mistaken attack onthe ~-k~~~~. The United
90
m., Mibit 35. The WashintztonPost, 3July 1988.
91
The WashingtonPost, 2 July 1988.Exhibit20.
92 Memorial of the IslamicRepublicpp. 73,g q.
93 De~artment of State Bulletin,July 1987,p. 60.Exhibit29to the Memorial
of the IslamicRepublic.336 AERIAL INCIDENT 1541
States alsorecognizedthat the hanian air force had been direct and professional
initscommunicationsand non-threatening.
2.65 Finally,whythe United States shouldhave expectedan
attackon 4July inresponse to Iraqi successesin the war isleft unexplaThed.
IslamicRepublicwasat warwithIraq not the United States. Despite the
inflictionofheavydamagesbyIraq an severalpreviousoccasions,thishadnever
resulted inattacks bythe IslamicRepublicon U.S.forces,eventhough, ashas
subsequentlybeen confirmed,the United StateswasassistingIraq. Indeed, as
explainedabove,lranian forcesnever initiated anyattackon U.S.militaryforces
and had alwaystakensteps to avoidsuchconfrontations.
2.66 The onlyspecificincidentto whichthe United States can
point duringthis period involveda Danishvessel,the Karama Maersk, on 2 July
1988~ ~ .is incidentinvolveda routine search byIranian smallpatrol boats of a
vesselcarryinggoods fromSaudiArabia, a nation supportingIraq in itswar
effortg5. This actionwasfullywithinthe rightsof the lslamicRepubasa
belligerent,and vesselstradiin the Persian Gulfwere aware of the Islamic
Republic'sexerciseof thcse rightsgTheKarama Maersk suffered no ham and
the smallpatrol boats retired imrnediatelyafter a U.S.warship,the Elmer
Mont~omery,approachedg7. These factshardlyportray ethreatening or
dangerousattitude bythe lranian forces towardsU.S.forcesinthe period prior to
theincident.
94 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,pp. 22-23.
95 Chubin, S.& Tripp, C., p.154. Exhibit 10.
96
Sec the Noticesto Mariners in Exhibit 14.
97
U.S. PreliminaryObjections,Exhibit35. The WashinetonPost, 3July
1988.[55] OBSERVATIONA SND SUBMISSIONS
(ii) The rnornineof3July 1988
2.67 The eventsof 3July 1988are vividlyportrayed inthe
Newsweekand ABC NightIinereports filedas Exhibits3an6, and to whichthe
Court isurged to givedue attention. The lslamicRepublicwillnot refer to every
statement made in these reports whichcontradictsthe United States'pleading,
but it willbe obviousthat theypaint a verydifferent pictureofwhathappened to
that givenbythe United States. The Court isalsodirected to the statement ofthe
Ministerof Foreign Affairsof the IslamicRepublicof Iran,Dr. Velayati,made
before theU.N. SecurityCouncilon 14July 1988. Itwillbe apparent .fromthis
statement that Dr. Velayati'spresentation of the factswithregard to what
happened on 3July 1988wasaccurate andhas nowbeen substantiallyconfirmed
bythe recent disclosuresinthe United states9'.
2.68 The United States daims that earlyothe morningof3 July
1988there washostileIraniangunboat activityinthe northern portion of the
Strait of Hormuzoutsidethe territorial watersof the IslamicRepublic, andthat it
wasnoted that these boats were approaching a Pakistanivesse19'. No evidenceis
gjvenfor thisstatement, either as to the positionof the Iranianboats or as to their
confrontation ofthe Pakistanivessel. In fact there wasno suchhostile gunboat
activityand no confrontation of the Pakistanivessel,a fact confirmedbyother
U.S.governrnentsources.
2.69 The United Stateshas toldso manydifferent versionsof
whathappened thereafter that it isdifficultto accept anyas accurate. Vice-
President Bush told thU.N. SecurityCouncilthat the Vincenneswentto the
assistanceof a neutral vesse1that wasunder attack by hanian smaUpatrol
98 Exhibit21containsthe fulltextof Dr. Velayati'sstaternent.
99 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,pp.24-25.338 AERIAL INCIDENT [561
boatslOO.AdmiralFogariytold U.S .ongressthat a Pakistanmerchant vessel
had been harassed and had issuaddistresscall,and that a Liberian merchant
ship calledthe StovalwasalsoattackedlOl. Similarallegationswere made before
the ICA0 counci1102. However,the Defense Department Report, prepared by
the same Admira1Fogarty stated that an 3July 1988"Nomerchant vessels
requested assistance103, he United States has never explainedthe mystery
behind these phantom requests for assistance.
2.70 ABC checkedwiththe Captain ofthe Pakistanvessel,the
~irrihodal~~.He confirmedthat he issuedno distresscaiisthat dayand that he
wasnot beingharassedlo5. From the & and Newsweekinvestigations,there is
no record of anyvesselcalledthe Stovalexistinthe Liberian shippingregistq.
Despite the fact that there isnowno evidenceofanyhostileactionbythe small
patrol boats, the Vincenneswasdirected to proceed no(k. t,wards the Coast
ofthe IslamicRepublic) and the Vincennessent a helicopter "OceanLord 25"
ahead to monitor the act~ty.
2.71 It mustbe recalled that in visitingand searchingrnerchant
vessels,especiaiifthese vesselswere in the IslamicRepublic'stemtonal waters
or exclusionzones,the IslamicRepublicwasactingwithinitsrights. On the other
hand, theUnited States had no legalbasisfor dispatchingitsforcesto confront
loO
Exhibit 11to the Memorial of the IslamicRepublic,p. 51.
lol Hearingbefore the Committee on Armed Servicesofthe United States
Senate held on 8September 1988. Exhibit7to the Memorial ofthe
IslamicRepublic,p.9.
1°2 DraftC-Min Extraordinary (1988)/1,13July 198p.8. Exhibit40.
lo3 Defense Department Report, p. E26. Exhibit4to the Mernorialof the
IslamicRepublic.
lo4 Thisvesselhas alsobeen referred to asthe Saramda.1571 OBsERvATloNs AND suBMIssIoNs 339
the Iranian boats, especiallyasno request for assistancehadbeen received.
Accordingto the Secretaiy ofDefense atthe time, U.S.navalrules of
engagementstated that distressassistancewouldonlybe providedto non-U.S.
flaggedmerchant vesselswhen requested, andonlyafter confirmationthat these
vesselswere not carryingwar-related materialslo6. OnJuly1988,U.S.forces
and the Vincennesignoredsuchprocedures. Indeed,itwascommonpractice for
the U.S.forcesto contact the merchant vesselsand askthem iftheywanted
assistance,thus intedering withthe IslamicRepublic'slawfulrightto visitand
searchvesseb and encouragingmerchant vesselsnot to respond to the lslamic
Republic's requests.
2.72 In pursuingthe smallpatrol boats,the Vincennes' helicopter
violatedthe territorial sovereigntyofthe IslamicRepublic. Whilethe United
States denies that thisocc~rred'~~thisstatement iscontradictedby the ICAO
Report itselfwhichStatesthat at 0615on 3July1988the helicopterwas"8to 10
NMnorth of USSMontgomery"whenit wasallegedlyfired upon bythe Iranian
boatslo8. Asthe ICAO Report alsogivesthe positionofthe USS Monteromery
relative to the Vincennes0610, it ispossibleto plot the approximateposition of
Ocean Lord 25 at0615. Thiswasdone in Figure 5facingpage 80of the Islarnic
Republic's Mernorialfrom whichit isclearthatthe helicopterwaswellwithin
1ranian.territorialwaters at that the. Boththe Newsweekand tABC reports
state that the United States has been dishonestabout the actual positionofthe
U.S.PreliminaryObjections,Exhibit35.The WashingtonPost, 3July
1988.
IO7
U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 25fn.3.
ICAOReport, Appendix A,p.A-1. Exhibit4to the Mernorialofthe
Islarnicepublic.340 AERIAL INCIDENT PSI
helicopter and confirmthat it waswithinteritory under the IslamicRepubiic's
sovereigntyin contravention ofArticle2 ofthe Chicagoonv vent ion^^^.
2.73 In anyevent, the helicopter wasalsowithinthe Islamic
Republic'sFlightInformationRegionand under the lslamicRepublic's
jurisdiction. Militaryaircraft haveno rightunder the ChicagoConventionto
enter another State'sFIR without prior notificationand proper coordinationwith
the relevant civilianauthorities. Of course,the United States made noattemptto
abidebyanyof these niles.
2.74 The United States has presented no evidenceforthe
allegationthat the helicopter Ocean Lord wasfiredupon byIranian boats. The
pilot simplyallegedthat he saw"puffsof srnokellO". It shouldbenoted, however,
that these kindsofboats haveno effectivemeans of attack againsta helicopter,
althoughtheywouldhavebeen Eullyjustified infiringwarningshots againsta
foreignrnjlitaa irrraftunlawfullyintniding into the IslamjcRepubliairspace,
and, as past experience had shown,causinga direct threat to the smallboats.
U.S. helicopters had previouslysunkthree smallIranian boats on 8October
1987~~~.What reallyhappened, as Commander Carlson has noted,wasthat the
heficopter was"justtoo damned closeto the boats for itsowngood",and that the
heiicopter was"nothit"l12, Despite this situation,the U.S.warshipsthen
obtained permissionto closeon and engagethe smaBboats considerablylater,
when the boats had retired in the directionof the shore.
ABC Niehtlinetranscriptp. 4. mibit 6.Newsweek, p. 16. Exhibit3.
l0 Newsweek,p. 12. Exhibit3. See, also,Defense Department Report, p. E-
27,para. 2(h).Exhibit4 to the Memorial of the IslamicRepublic.
&, para. 2.44above.
Carlson,Proceedines, Septernber 1989,p. 92. Evhibit23to the Memorial
ofthe IslamicRepublic.I591 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 341
2.75 In itsPreliminaryObjections,the United Statesaliegesthat,
althoughitswarshipshad not previouslyentered Iranianterritorial waters, during
the courseof the attack on the smaUboats these fowerecompelled asa
matter of seu-defense "tomaneuver intowaters claimedbyIran as temtonal
waterç113''.Quite incredibly,givenitsargument that the Treaty ofArnityisnot
applicableto thisdispute,the United States seeks tojustifythisaction by
reference to ArticX,paragraphs 5and 6,of the Treaty ofAmity,pursuant to
whichthe United Statesallegesthat "aU.S.warship indistrisperrnitted to
enter territorial watersclaimedby1ran114".
2.76 The ICA0 Report indicatesthatit wasat least somethirty
minutes aft thr allegedfiringon the helicopter that the U.S.warshipsopened
fireon the Iranian smaliboats, althoughtheIslamicRepublic believesthat itwas
infact afteabout an hour. .y.thisthe, the U.S.vesseiswere alreadywell
withinthe IslamicRepubiic'stemtonal waters. Moreover,the United States
acknowledaesthat at 0643itwasthe U.S.warshiuswho oxienedfie on the
Iranian boats1l5. Thigapintirnecornpletelyundemines the United States'
assertion that the attack on the smallboatanact of self-defense.
2.77 The United States has consjstentlysoughtto concealthe
evidence concerningthe tnie positionsofitswarshipsduringthisincident. The
Defense Department Report wasrecentlyrevjewedin the U.S.press, where it
wasrecognizedthat the "heavilycensored publicversionoftheinvestigationdoes
not showthe position and course of the Vincennes,the Iranian gunboats and the
l3 U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p. 27. The United States has never
questioned in anywaythe IslamicRepublic'srightto itsterritonal sea.
-bid.,fri.3.
U.S .relirninaryObjectionp.27.342 AERIAL INCIDENT t601
airiinerat varioustimesthroughout the fatefulmoming116'Thi sn itselfis
revealing. However,the samereport goeson tostate the following:
'TheVincenneshasthe capabilityto record that information,and
the data were retrievedbut not made public.The Navyrebuffeda
requestunder the Freedom of InformatioAct forthe geographic
track ae of the Vincennes.
Such atirne-distancechart has notbeen made publicbecause the
information itcontainmay not look toogood. It mightweilshow
thatin her fuil-speedpursuitofharassingIranian gunboats,the
Vincennes barged intoIranian temîtorialwatersand wasinthose
waters when hercrewmistakedy blasted the unsuspectingairiiner
out ofthe sky.
The investigationisabsolutelysilenton thisvital issue,buta
videotape ofthe activitieson Vincennes'brid e that morning
'Youractionsare notinaccordancewiththe rightsof passage,
pkase leaveIran's territorial watersimmediately',declavoice
wth a heavyBritishaccentmer the loudspeakeron Vincennes'
bridge.
The warningwasgiven,not once,but twicel"."
2.78 The United States'statement that itswarshipsonlyentered
Iranian temtorial water&g& the engagementwiththe smallpatrol boats is
aIsocontradicted bythe ICAOReport. From the ICAOReport it isapparent
that men at 0610,the Montgomery.the &&s and OceaiiLord 25 were al1within,
or over,the IslamicRepublic's territorialwaters118. While the Vincennesmay
havebeen just outsideterritorial waters at 0610,at 0615the ICAOReport States
that the Vincennesthen proceeded north "athighspeed1l9". In sodoing,the
Vincenneswas headingdirectlyinto the IslamicRepublic'sterritorial waters.
Chicago Tribune,25 October 1991. Exhibit22.
Il7 m.
ICAOReport, AppendmA, p.A-1. Exhiiit 4 to the Mernorialofthe
IslamicRepublic,and Figure5 facing age 80 ofthe Mernorial. The
IslamicRepublicbclievesthat the ~.S!vessels were evenhvlher into
Iredan territorial waters and that Flight 655 was hit at 26434.. and
56033, Exhibit 21, p. 5, rather than what has been reflecteb dy
the ICAO Report. 343
v11 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
the Vincennes was 8 miles into the Iranian territomal waters rather
than the 2 miles that the U.S. Navy recently had to admit. This
intrusion into the Iranianterritorialwaters continued for more than
15 minutes before the firingon Flight 655.
2.79 In other words,it waswellbefany engagementwiththe
smaliboats that the Vincennesbarged into Iranian territorialwaters,at a time
whentwo other warshipsand aU.S .elicopterwere alreadyviolatingIranian
territory. This manoeuvre cannot bejustified asan act ofself-defense.asather,
the Commander of theSidesput it, the Vincennes"'likelyprovokedthe sea battle
withthe Iranian gunboatsthat preceded the shootdown'l2O".
2.80 These factsare further confirmedbythe and
Newsweekreports,both ofwhichsuggestthatthe Vincennesand the
Monteornerr had entered intoIranian temtonal waterswellbefore anyaiieged
incidentwiththe patrol boatThe same reports state thatthe Monteomew had
been posted in Iranianterritorial waters earlyon the morningof the incidentin
order to act as a decoy,sendingout fakedistresssignalswiththe intention of
lunng out the Iranian srnallpatrol boats and givingthe United States an excuseto
attack121.
2.81 It wasduringthe Vincennes'attack on the smaiipaboats
thatthe shoot-downof FlightIR 655occurred. The UnitedStates makesmuchof
the allegeddrama ofthe incident. However,there isno clear evidenceof any
U.S.warships beingdamagedbythe Iranianforcesor indeed of anyaggressive
action at aiibythe Iraniansmallboats againstthe U.S.forces122. As
12' The WashinetonPost,23April 1990. Exhibit64to the Memorialof the
IslamicRepublic.
12' Sec. Mibits 3and 6.
122 m.344 AERIAL INCIDENT 1621
Commander Carlson pointed out,it istotaiiyimplausiblethat sinan patrot boats
woulddare to attack or couldpose anyseriousthreat to a vesse1of the Vincennes
sophisticationand power123. In anyevent,thU.S .orceswere at bestreckiess
in seekingto engagethe Iranian forcesand violatingthe IslamicRepublic's
sovereigntywithoutanyjustification. The United States cannot therefore excuse
the resulting shoot-downon the basisof self-defensewhen as a result ofitsown
illegalactionsitsforces had manoeuvered intoa positionwithinIranian territorial
waters that they considered dangerous.
suc no^ B. U.S.VesseisfTR 655andthe AlIegedWarnings Givenbv the
2.82 Aswasexplainedin the IslamicRepublic's Memorial,Flight
IR 655wason a regularlyscheduledflightwithan experiencedcrewand was
flyi ngthe centre of the international air corridorover the Persian Gitf when
wasshot down. Itwasalsocrossingthe Persian Gulf wellwithin itsffight
schedu~e'~~.
2.83 The United Statesrnakesmuchof the factthat it couldnot
haveknownthat Flight IR 655wasa civilianflightand that it warned the aircraft
ofitsintentions on severaloccasions. Aithoughthe IslamicRepublic in no way
endorses the factual presentation mabythe UnitedStatesitisonlynecessay
at thisstage to make certain general pointsinresponse to these contentions. A
more detailed treatment of the factsismore appropriately leftto subsequent
proceedings.
123 Proceedines,Septernber 1979,p. 92. E.xh&it23to the Memorial ofthe
IslamicRepublic.
124 &, Memorial ofthe IslamicRepublic,pp. 10, ses.i631 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 345
2.84 It isonlypartlya question ofwhether the United States
knewor did not knowthat FlightIR 655 wasa civilianflight. EvenifIR 655had
been a militaryplane, the United States stillhad noreason to shoot itisown.
totallyunreasonable to assumethat anymiIitaryplane flyingwithin itsown
airspace ishostile,especiailywhenIranian militaryplanes had never previously
attacked U.S.forces. Moreover,the factthat itwasthoughttobe an F-14should
have alerted the Vincennesto the tact that it wasunlikelytobe makingan attack.
As wasshownin detail in the IslamicRepublic'sMemonal,the theorythat an F-
14couldattack a U.S.warshipistotallyirnplausible125.
2.85 It was well-knownbythe U.S.militarythat an F-14was
incapable oflaunchingan attack on the Vincennes andthat the lslarnicRepublic
had no forcescapable ofsuchan attackAs waspointed out inAviationWeek Lk
SpaceTechnology"F-14Afighterssoldto Iran bythe U.S . ere equipped to cany
air-to-airmissilesand have limitedsurface attack ~a~abilities"'~~.Referring to
the "hostileF-14"scenano adopted bythe U.S.Government,and pleadingto
"spareusmore fog",Commander Carlson askedwhyan F-14wouldbother to
energize itIFFsysternto squawkMode II (a rnilitarysignal)ifit wastryingto
disguiseitspresencfora sneakattack. He alsopointed out that one ofthe
reasons whythe had classifiedFlight655 asa non-threat wasbecause of
the "lackofanysignificantknownF-14antisurfacewarfare (ASUW)
~a~ability"'~~. he Defense Department'sconclusionofMay 1987confirmsthe
absurdityofthishypothesis,notingtha-
125
m., pp. 69,etseq.
lZ6 AviationWeek & SnaceTechnolo~, 11July 1988, p.16. Exhibit16to the
Memonal ofthe Islamic Republic.
lZ7 &g, Cadson, Proceedings,September 1989. Exhibit23tothe Mernorialof
the Islamic Republic.346 AERIAL INCIDENT 1641
"Iranlacksthe sophisticatedaircra99jd weaponry usedbyIraq in
themistaken attack on U.S.S.Stark .
2.86 In anyevent,the Vincennesshouldhaveknownthat Hight
IR 655was a civiIianflight. The Vincenneshad acivilianflightschedule onboard
and FlightIR 655wasthe onlyflightscheduled to take offEromBandar Abbas
that morning. It should alsohavebeen aware£romits AEGlS system,whichis
able to monitor literallyscores of aircraft up to a range of 250nautical miles,that
FlightIR 655had aiready arrivedat Bandar AbbasfromTehran earlier that day
on the first legof itsregularly-scheduiedflight.
2.87 The United States'failure to coordinate its militaryactivities
with civilianaviationauthorities in the region issignificantin thisconte~t'~~.The
ICAOReport found,that 'There wasno coordination between UnitedStates
warshipsand the civilATSunits responsible forthe provisionof air trafic
serviceswithinthe various flightinformation regionsin the [Persian]Gulf area"
and that "The United Stateswarshipswere not providedwithequipment for VHF
communications ..Thus, theycouldnot monitor civilATC frequtncies for flight
identificationpurposes130'1.
2.88 The ICAOReport's findingon this point wasbased on the
Defense Department Report. However,the DefenseDepartment Report does
not saythat the U.S.vesselsdid not haveVW radios,but onlythat the "lirnited
number" ofsuchradios "degradestheir [& U.S.vessels]abilityto simultaneously
monitor the IADfrequencyand communicatewith civilianair trafficcontrol
12' Department of State Bulletin,July 1987,p. 60. Exhibit29.tothe Memorial
ofthe IslamicRepublic.
12' &, paras. 2.52-2.57,abwe.
130 ICA0 Report, para. 2.8.4. Exhibit4 to the Memorial ofthe Islamic
Republic.[65] OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 347
agencies"131.It simplydefiesbeliefthat the U.S.forcesdidnot havesufi5cient
capacityto listento and communicatewithcivilianaircraft VHF, especiaily
when it had three warshipsinthe immediatearea. The United States admits that
itwasable to givewarningson a WF frequency,and the U.S.NOTAMsrequired
aircraftto maintain contactwith U.S.militaryvesselsVHF frequencies. Atthe
very least,the U.S.helicopters and the U.S.F-14swhicaswillbe shownbelow,
were in the vicinitywouldhave had the capacityto listento these
communications. On the other hand, civiiianaircraft are not required under the
ChicagoConventionto be equipped withequipment forpickingup military
frequencies.
2.89 The recklessdisregard forthe safetyofcivilaviation
revealed in the ICA0 Report'sfindings mustbe regarded as reprehensible. It
wasas a direct result ofthis illegalbehav-and theU.S orces' intrusioninto
Iranian territorial waters coupledwiththeir intent to provoke the Islamic
Republic -that the Vincennes shotdownFlightIR 655. Ifthe United States had
shown€romthe beginningproper respect for the freedom of commercialtrafficin
the Persian Gulf, and of civilaviationin parti-whichare obligationsunder
the ChicagoConvention andthe Treaty ofAmity -it wouldhavetaken steps to
ensure that it couldidentifyFliIRt655,and thisincidentmightnever have
ouurred. In suchcircumstances,the United States cannot useitsalleged
misidentificationofFlighW 655as an excuse when its militaryforcesbarged into
the territorial waters of a distantState and engagedin threatening and
provocative actions.
2.90 With regard tothe U.S.challengessaidto havebeen made
to the aircraft, these were alsototallyiliegalunder the ChicagoConventionand
131
Defense Department Report, p. E-53,para. 6. Exhibit4 to the Mernorial
of the IslamicRepublic.348 AERIAL INCIDENT [661
represented unreasonable and discriminatingmeasures impedingfreedomof
commerceand navigationunder the Treaty ofArnity. The ICAOReport noted
explicitlythat the U.S.NOTAMs,pursuant to whichthe challengeswere made,
were "notin conformitywiththe provisionsof ICAOAnnex 15~~~''I.t wenon to
note that the NOTAMSwere not onlyillegalbut also unclear,and it concluded
that the safetyrisksto civilaviation causedbythe presence U.Sh.orcesin
the Persian Gulfmayhavebeen "~nderestirnatedl~~".
2.91 The ICAOReport found that asa result of these failuresto
abide bythe Chicago Conventionthe "presenceand activitiesofnaval forcesin
the [Persian]Gulfarea have caused numerous problemsto international civil
aviati~nl~~".In particular, itstated-that
"Civilaviation requirements suchairways,tandard a proach
and dcrranure nocedures, and the fued trausecibygelicopters
to oilrigswere-nota considerationinwarshipposition'ing.This
resulted inwarshiuschalleneinecivilaircraft incriticaïnhases
of flight,i.e. durin'gapproack tgland and duringinitialclimbl"."
The resultingchallenges,accordingto tICAO Report, caused "additionai
confusionand danger136'.
2.92 The ICAOReport alsofound thatout ofthe eleven
challengessupposedlymade bythe U.S. vesselsonlyone identifiedFliIRt655
withsufficientclarityforthe pilot,if he had heard the challenge,to realize that his
13* m., para. 2.2.4.
133 m., para. 2.2.5.
134 m., para. 2.3.1.
135 m., para. 2.3.2.
136 Ibid.1671 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
planewasbeing addre~sedl~~.This challengewasmade 39secondsbefore the
planewasdestroyed. During 11 ofthesevital seconds,the pilotwasin routine
communicationswiththe Bandar Abbas tower. Thus, the piIohad no chance to
respond, even ifhe had heard the challenge. Eventhe U.S.Defense Department
Report notes that "Currentverbal warningsand challenges useJTFME [Joint
Task Force MiddleEast] unitsare ambiguousbccause they do not clearlyidentify
to pilotsexactlywhichaircraft the shipisattempting to contact138." Moreover,it
appears that none ofthe challenges allegedlymade byU.S.forcescompiiedwith
the requirements ofiownNOTAM~~~.
2.93 The United States' allegationthat the Vincenneswassubject
to an imminentattack has thus been shownto be withoutfoundation. The
Vincenneshad al1the information availableto knowthat FlightIR 655wasa
civilianaircraft. Itnoareason to fear an attack evithad misidentified
FIightIR655as an F-14.Finally,it hano reason to believeit wassubjectto a
coordinated attack as the U.S.forceshad themselves initiatedthe attack on the
smallpatrol boats.
2.94 In suchcircumstances,it istotallyunacceptforthe
United Statesto cal1into questionthe professionalismofIran Air and itspilots
137 Ibid.,para. 2.10.18.
138 Defense Department Report, p.E-53,para. 5see ,lso,p. E-18,para. 18.
Exhibit4 to the Memonal of the IslamicRepublic.
139 Under the NOTAM that had been issuedbythe United States, aircraft
approachin a U.S .arship wereonlysupposed to beat riof"defensive
measures"ifthq had not been cleand from a regionalairpon and ifthey
came within5 nauticalmilesof a warshipat an altitude of lessthan 2000
feet. In this case,the interception of IR 655took padistanceof 10
nautical miles fromthe Vincennesand at a heightof 12,950feet. Not only.
was this outside the lateral and verticailimitsappearing inthe NOTAM,
but iR 655was alsoa flight"cleared"to depart from a regionalairport to
whichthe NOTAM &~oFed not to apply. For the ten ofthe September
1987NOTAM, a ibtt14to theMernorialof the IslamicRepublicof
Iran.350 AERIAL INCIDENT
withregard to itspracticinlisteniout forsuchwarningsand responding to
them140. The onuswason the United States not to interfere with civiliantraffic,
but to coordinate withcivilaviationauthoritiesand to have equipment capable of
identifyingcivilianaircraft. Moreover,the United States had no authorityto issue
NOTAMs in the Persian Gulfregion nor illegallyto challengeaircraft. Atthe
least,it should havetaken the trouble to ensure that itschallengeswere clearand
foiiowed itsownprocedures.
2.95 The important issue,therefore, isnot, as the United States
wouldhave it,whyFlight IR 655faiIetorespond to thU.S .hailen~es'~~.This
iseasilyunderstood by the fact of the heavypilotworkloadduringthe earlypart
of the fiight,as is even acknowledgedin the U.S.Defense Department
~e~onl~~,and the fact that most ofthe challengeswere sent on a military
frequencywhichthe aircraft could nothear. It isalsoexplainedbythe fact that
out ofal1the numerousvesselsandATS authorities in the area, onlyoneother
Britishvesse1heard these challenges. There isthus no reason to think that Fiight
IR 655,or Bandar Abbasairport tower,or the Iranian P-3,an unarmed
surveillanceplane, couldhave identifîedthe challengesas directed at Flight IR
655. The important issueisthe United States' total disregard forthe safetyof
civilaviationin al1aspectsof thisincident143.
2.96 The finalpart ofthe United States'presentation ofthe facts
involvesan attemptto place someof the responsibilityfor thionethet
IslarnicRepublicThis
leads the United States to make whollynewand utterly
140 Sec . .SPreliminaryObjectionspp. 31-34.
141 Ibid.
142 Defense Department Report, p.E-53,para.3. Exhibit4 to the Memarial
of the Islamc Repubiic.
143 See,Mernorialofthe IslamicRepublic,pp.53,am.[69] OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
baseless allegations. The United States suggeststhat Iranian authorities should
have initiated a "red alert"procedure to notifyair trafficcontrol centresof the
militaryactivityin the Persian Gulfand that the failureto initiatethisprocedure
rnayhavebeen "intentional"or "grosslylackinginj~d~rnentl~~'~T.he implication
that Iranian authorities intentionallyallowedthe innocent passengersand crewof
FlightIR 655to meet their deathsistoo outrageousto warrant comment.
2.97 Asa factualissue,the United States'argument that a "red
alert"procedure should havebeen initiated because Iranian authonties knewthat
a hostile actionwastakingplace,and because Iranianforceswere in anyevent
respansible forhavingattacked U.S.forces,iswrongan al1points. Iranian
authorities had no knowledgeof the hostile action. Moreover, as has beenshown
above,itwasthe U.S.forceswhofirstviolatedIranian territory and then initiated
the attack on the smaflpatrol boats whohad retiredwellwithintheir territorial
waters after performingtheir weli-recognizedrightsofvisitand sear~hl~~.Most
significantly,the United States had interfered withthe communications
equipment of the smallpatrol boats, another commonpractice ofthe U.S.forces
duringthisperiod, thus effectivelypreventingthe boats from makingany
c~rnrnunications~~~.
2.98 In general,it shouldbe noted that a "red alert"procedure
had onlyoccasionallybeen instigatedinthe Bandar Abbas area which,because it
was well awayfrom the warzone,was not normallyan area of hostilities.
Moreover, redalerts wouldnot nomally be adopted asa result ofthepresence of
144
U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p. 36.
145 &, para 2.35,above.
146
IslamicRepublic'sprotest of 10May 1988to the U.N.Secretary-General
on one suchincident. U.N.Doc.S/19874,10 May 1988. Exhibit 16. OBSERVATIONSAND SUEMISSIONS
2.101 Insuchcircumstance- where the United States had
violated the IslamicRepublic'sterritorial sovereignty,attacked Iranian smaU
patrol boats, and flagrantlyignoredinternational treaty provisionsdesignedto
ensure the safetyofinternational civila-the responsibilityfor thisincident
lieswhollywiththe United States whoseactionscannot bejustifiedas a Iegitimate
act of self-defense.
CHAPTER III CONCLUSIONS: TEE RELEVANCE OF THEFACTS
RELATING TO THE SHOOT-DOWNOFFLICIII TR655
TO THEJ m U E
2.102 In the preceding Section,the IslamicRepublc has not
endeavoured to present a fullttal of the versionof eventspresented in the
United States'Statement of Facts. However,itwasessentialto correct some of
the United States'more blatant rnischaracterizationsof the events. The lslamic
Republicwasobligatedto take this positionbythe fact that the United States'
factual presentation isonlyrelevandefense on the merits ofthe case, and in
no waybearson itsPreIimina~ Objections.
2.103 Nonetheless,the facts are relevant because theyshowthat
the actionsof tU.S .orcesinshootingdownFljghtIR 655involvedviolationsof
provisionsof the ChicagoConvention,the Treaty ofAmityand the Montreal
Convention,in addition to the principlesand rules of customaryinternational law
reflected inthose conventions. The use offorce againsta commercialciviiian
flightianexplicitviolatiodlfthree treaties. Boththe infnngement of Iranian
sovereigntyby the U.S.warshipsduringthe shoot-downand the recklessdisregard
shownbythe U.S.forces for commercialcivilianair traffic,whichreached its
nadir in the shootingdownof Fligh655,represent breachofspecific
provisionsof the treaties invAsesuch,the interpretation and application of354 AERIALINCIDENT 1721
al1three treaties is directlyinissue. These are matters that the Court has
jurisdictionto decide.
2.104 Bywayof conclusionto thisPart, a re-examinationof the
United States'companson ofthe shoot-downofFlightIR 655withthat ofKorean
AirLine Fîight007isworthwhile. The United States isquite rightin that a
cornparisonbetween the twoincidents"isnot su~tainable~~~"I.tsjustificationof
thisstatement is,however,asfollows:
"Unlikethe 1983incident,the incidentof 3Juiy 1988involvedthe
rapid ap roach of an unidentified foreign aircrafawarshipthat
was itse$engagepjp amed eonfiictinitiated bythe countryof the
aircraft's registry."
There isnothingin thisstatement whichisother than grosslymisleadingor sirnply
untrue. The elements of thisstatement maybe re-examined asfoliows:
"the rapid approach": eventhe transcripts ofthe Vincennes' challenges
showthat itscrewwasawarethat the plane wassteadilyascendingand
slowing In fact,whenitwas shot down,Flight IR 655wasflying
at an altitudofroughly 13,500feet and cruisingwellwithinitsflight
corridor under whichthe Vincennes had placeditselfinviolationof the
IslamicRepublic'sterritorial sovereignty;
150 U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p. 41.
15' Ibid.
152 &, ICA0 Report, Appendix B,p. B-15. Exhibit4 to the Mernorialofthe
IslamicRepublic.I731 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 355
- "anundentifiedforeignaircraft":eventhe VincennesidentifiedFlightIR
655as a "possibleCOMAER~~~~T ',he United States claimsthat there was
a "perceivedinterception ofan IFF Mode IIsignal1541'a,nd yet it isa fact
that the Vincennes identifiedFlightI655 as squawkingMode III(the
signalof a commercialaircraft) throughout the entire flight155;
"engagedin armed conflictinitiatedby the countryof the aircraft's
registry":there isan obviouscontradictionher-giventhat FlightIR 655
wasreferred to in the Vincennes'warningsas"anunidentified foreign
aircraftjtcouldnot be knownthat there wasanylinkbetween FîightIR
655and the smallpatrol boats allegedlyinvolvedinthe confrontation,
especiallyasmanyother airlinersuse the same air corridor asFliRht
655. Moreover, the armed conflictreferred to wasillusory.There was no
more than alimitedconfrontation initiated and provokedbythe United
States. Moreover, itwasthe United States whichinitiated the eventsof
that daybyintruding intothe IslamicRepublic's territorial waterson the
pretext of comingto the assistanceofneutral shipping.
2.105 The real reasons for the unsustainablenature ofthe
cornparisonbetween the shoot-downsofFlight IR 655and FlightKAL007areas
follows:KAL 007wasflying500kilometresoutsideitsflightpath and in another
country'stemtonal airspace. Bycontrast, in this case,a United States' helicopter
firstunlawfullyentered Iranian airspace under the pretense of assistingneutral
vessels,althoughno suchvesselsrequired assistance. Muchiater, thU.S.
lj3
Defense Department Report, p.E-37. Exhibit4to the Mernorialof the
IslamicRepublic
154
U.S.PreliminaryObjections, p.30.
155 Defense Department Report, p.E-51. Exhibit 4 tothe Mernorialof the
IslamicRepublic.356 AERIAL INCIDENT 1741
warshipsalsounlawfullyentered Iranian temtorial waters and,the United States
admits,opened fire on Iranian smallboats. Meanwhile,FlightIR 655was flying
on course, on schedule, wassignallingitscivilianflightcode, and wasstillwithin
Iranian airspace, withinitsestablisheaircorridor, and on itsscheduled flight
path whenit wasshot down. It wasPresident Reagan whodescribed theSoviet's
shootingdownofKAL007as a"massacre"constitutinganinternational crime.
Thisjudgment applies a fortioriinthiscase.It ia matter ofregret that this far
more seriousincident wastreated differentlybythe ICA0 Council. It isfor this
reason that theIslamicRepublicis now seekingjusticebefore the Court.
2.106 The dispute arisingfromthese events crystallizedin the
subsequent months as stepswere takenbythe IslamicRepublic to seek redress
from the United States both before the United Nationsand before ICAO. This
partof the factswillbe takenupin the next Part. PARTIII
THERELEVANT FACTSCONCEKNlNGNEGOTL9TIONS AND THE
EMEKGENCEOFTHEDISPCTEFOLLOMTN(T ;HE SHOOT-DOW
3.01 One of the United States'mainjurisdictionalobjections
reston thecontention thatbecause theIslamicRepublic made no attempt to
resolvethe disputeby negotiation or arbitisprecluded fromrelyingon
the Treaq ofAmityand the Montreal Conventionas bases ofjurisdictionin this
case. This argument stems fromthe languageinArticle 14(1)of the Montreal
Conventionprovidingthat onlydisputes between twoor more ContractingStates
concerningthe interpretation or application ofthe Convention'kvhichcannotbe
settled through negotiamaybe submitted to the Court and the reference in
ArticleXXJ(2)of the Treaty ofAmityto the submissionof disputesas to the
Treaty'sinterpretation or application "notsatisfactbyidiplomacy".
3.02
In advancingthisthesis,the United Stateshas soughtto
seizethe moral highgroundby arguingthat whileit repeatedly sou-htto offer
erat comapensationfor the familiesof the victimsand to findwaysto avoidsuch
tragedies inthefuture, the IslamicRepubIictook an obstructionistviewby
refusingto negotiate and pressingfor a "politicalconder. uchseif-"S
servingstatements soedivorcedfromthe truth that theywaathorough
rebuttal. In sodoing,it isapprotorecall that the ofanyrequirement
of pnor negotiationsisa functionnot onlyof the specificprovisionsof the
compromissoryclausesin question,but alsoofthe facts and circumstancesof
eachcase.
3.03 As willbe seen herein, the factsshowthat followingthe
shoot-down,irreconcilabledifferencesarose between the Parties as to the legal,
156
U.S .reliminaryObjectiop.42.358 AERIAL INCIDENT [76]
moral and financialresponsibilityfor the incident and the eventsleadingup ta it.
Whilethe IslamicRepublic made it clear that it held the United States
responsiblefor breaches ofitsinternational obligations,the United States refused
to accept responsibiliry,and argued that the IslamicRepublicwasultimatelyto
blame. The Parties' positionsthus evidencedthe existenceof a fundamental
disagreement asto the scope and application of their respective international
obligations.
3.04 These positionswere articulated inthe course of
parliamentary debates that took placebefore a nurnber ofinternational
organizations,includingthe ICA0 Counciland the United NationsSecurity
Council (discussedin Chapter 1below),as wellasindomesticfora,suchas the
United States Congress (discussedin Chapter II). Despite a fullairingof each
side'sviews,it became clear that thedispute couldnot be resolvedby negotiation.
3.05 Inso faras bilateral contactsbeîween the Partieswere
concerned, prior to the filingof the IslamicRepublic's Application,the United
States refused asa matter of policyto negotiate withthe IslamicRepublic over
the shoot-downand thequestion of compensation. Thisattitude, whichistaken
up in Chapter IIbelow,isdocumented bycontemporary Statt Department
records.settingforth officia1U.S. policyon the rnatter, aswellasbystatements
madebythe US. LegalAdviser and leading Congressionalrepresentatives before
the U.S.Congress. Not onlydo these records demonstrate the unwillingnessof
the United States to deal withthe LslarnicRepublic, theyalsoshowthat the
United States refusedtorecognizethat the Government of the IslamicRepublic
evenhad an interest inthe incident. Of course, not onlywasthe IslamicRepubiic
entitled to espouse the rightsofthe persons on board; it wasalsoentitled, in its
ownright,to pursue its owninterests, in particular its claimsforbreaches by the
United States ofvarious internationalagreements to whichit wasa party aswelli771 OBSERVATIONS AND SUEMISSIONS 359
as those of itsnational aircarrier and al1others who sufferedlossas a result of the
incident.
3.06 The policyconstraints under whichthe United Stateswas
operating ensured that whenthe twoParties didfinallymeet to discussthe matter
after the filingofthe IslamicRepublic's Application,these discussionsfailed to
bridge anofthe substantiveissuesthat diÿided (E,mChapterIII).
Moreover, the United States showedabsolutelyno interest in pursuinganyother
kindof arbitration asmighthavebeen envisagedunder Ar14(1)of the
Montreal Convention.
3.07 Consequently, asChapter IV bringsout, anyobligationthat
international lawimposedon the Parties to attempt to resolvetheir disputeby
diplomacybefore havingrecourse to the Cwastfullysatisfiedin the
circumstancesinwhichthe caswasbrought.A deadlock had arisenoverthe
incidentwhichneither "parliamentarynegotiations",inthe form of debates befare
international organizationssuchas ICA0 and the United NationsSecuriq
Council,nor direct meetingswere able ta resoke.
CBAPTER 1 TBE CRYSTALWZATION OFTHE DISPUTE ANDTBE
LRRECONWABLENATUREOF THE PARTIES'
POSITIONS
Smo~ A. Debates&.foretheUnitedNationsSecuritvCouncîl
3.08 The debates before the specialsessionof the United
Nations SecurityCouncilheld on 14July 1988to considerthe destruction of
FlightIR655 demonstrate that, from the beginning,the Parties' positionswereso
divergent asto be "unnegotiable".
3.09 The IslamicRepublic's positionwaspresented byDr. Ali-
Akbar Velayati,the Minister ofForeign Affairs. In discussingthe particular360 AERIAL INCIDENT [78]
circumstancessurroundingthe shoot-down,Dr. Velayatiunderlined the unreality
ofthe United States'claimthat the incidentwasthe result ofa mistEven so,
he added, sucha contention wouldnot "reducethe heavyresponsibilityofthe
United ~tatesl~~".Referring to basic principlesof international law,Dr. Velayati
recalled that al1States must refrain from the threat or use of force "againstthe
territorial integrityand politicalindependence of other States" and that they are
"boundto refrain fromanymeasure whichrnayendanger internationalpeace and
securiSl"".
3.10 Dr. Velayatialso drewattention to Articlefthe Chicago
Convention. He emphasizedthat the objectiveofthe Conventionwas"toprotect
international civilaviation against actsof aggression159t1a,nd noted that
"accordingto well-establishedprinciplesof international law,the United States'
criminalact ofattacking acivilianairliner can neverbejustified under the term
'self-defense'particularlysincethe civilianairlinerdidnot even havethe potential
ofIaunchingan attacklaO". Referring to repeatU.S . iolationsofhanian
sovereignty,Dr. Velayati recalledthat "the IslamicRepublic of Iran has officially
and repeatedly protested againstsuchbreaches of international lawthrough
United States Interests Sectionin Tehran and has circulateditsprotestasotes
documents ofthe Security~ouncil~~l".
157 Sec .tstement ofHisExcellencyDr. Ali-AkbarVelayati,Minister for
ForeignAffairsofthe IslamicRe ublicof Iran, before the Special Session
oftheSecurityCouncil,14July 1888,p.13. Exhibit21.
m., p. 14.
lS9 m., p. 15.
M., pp. 16-17.
l6I Ibid.,p. 20.
-Pl OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 361
3.11 The Foreign Minister concludedbyaddressingthe adverse
legaiconsequencesofthe U.S.presence in the Persian Gulfwhichincluded (i) the
violationofthe principleofneutrality claimedbythe United Stainsthe war; (ii)
the violationofthe sovereigntyofthe IslamicRepublic;and (iii)the prevention of
the exercisebythe IslamicRepublic ofitsswereign rights. In hisfinalremarks,
Dr. Velayati insistedthat the United Nationsand other pertinent international
bodies should"respond adequatelyto the seriousconcernsof the international
public opinionfollowingthistragedylo2".
3.12 In hisaddressto the SecurityCouncil onthe same day
George Bush,whowasthen the U.S . ice-President,refusedto accept any
responsibilityfor the incident. Instead, he attempted to deflectattention fromthe
shoot-downbyarguingthat the criticalissuewasnot the "howand why"of the
destructionofFlightIR 655,but rather "the continuingrefusalof the Gavemment
ofthe IslamicRepublic ofIran to complywithResolution 598,to negotiate an
end tothe war withIraq, and to cease its actsof aggression againstneutral
shippingin the Persian Gulf'. Mr. Bush even insistedthat the IsIamicRepublic
"shoulddeclare its readiness unequivocallyto complywith Resolution-today,
for the firsttime, right here; no. before this body163n.
3.13 Mr. Bush'sargument that the IslamicRepublicwasto blame
for the destruction ofFlightZR655because it had notaccepted Resolut598
wasextraordinaryin severalrespects. In the firstplace,Resolution 598had
nothingto do withthe actionsthat the United States tin thPersian Gulf
againstthe IslamicRepublic.IfResolution 598had anyrelevance,itwaswith
respect to paragraph 5thereto, whichthe United Statesviolatedbystationingits362 AERlAt INCIDENT [801
forces inthe Persian Gulfin the ürst In anyevent, the U.S.actions,
whether inshootingdom Flight IR655,or in issuingunauthorized NOTMs, or
in otherwiseinterferingwithand provokingthe IslamicRepublic, wereplainly
unlawfulin and of themselves. Moreover, in the lightof the Secretary-General's
findingthatIraq wasresponsiblefor initiatingthe hostilitiesagainstthe Islamic
Republicand the well-documentedfact that Iraq wasalsoresponsiblefor
commencingattackson Persian Gulfshipping,detailed in Part II,the attemptto
blame the IslamicRepubiicwasentirelymisplaced. Also incrediblewasthe fact
thatMr. Bush usedthe SecurityCounciIproceedingsto re-state officialU.S.
policythat the United Statesrcmained "steadfastlyneutral in the ~arl~~",when it
has subsequentlybeen admitted byU.S. officiaisthat Washington'spalicywas
specificallydesignedto assistIraqjtswar efforts againstthe IslamicRepublic.
3.14 For present purposes,what issignificantisthat byinsisting
that the.Vincennes had "actedin self-defense"and that the "accidentoccurred
against a back-dropofrepeated, unjustified,unprovoked, and unlawfullranian
attacks againstU.S.merchant shippingand armed forceslo6",Mr.Bush
confirmedthat a fundamental differenceexistedbetween the Parties as to the
legalconsequences arisingout of the destruction of FlightIR 655. Giventhis
situation,there wasno prospect that these differencescouldhavebeen bridged by
further,negotiations. Asthe United States'Preliminary Objectionsrightlypoint
out:'nie responsesofthe UnitedStatesand Iran tothisincidentwere
differentlo7". These differencesarose not because of the IslamicRepublic's
intentioto seek "politicalcondemnation ofthe United Statesat the U.N.
164 Sec,para. 2.29above.
165 m., p. 51.
166 m.
167 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 42.[81] OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 363
Security~ouncil'~~",but because the IslarnicRepublic soughtto hold the United
States accountable under basicprinciplesofinternational law whilethe United
Statesrefused to accept suchresponsibility.
sec no^B. The DebatesBeforetheICAOCouncil
3.15 Immediatelyafter FlightIR 655wasshot down,the Islarnic
Republic notifiedthe President of ICAO that the incident constituted a breach of
generalprinciplesof international law,the ChicagoConvention anditsrelated
Annexes,Standards and Recommended Practices,and the Tokyo,Hague and
Montreal ~onventionsl~~.
3.16 The Minutes of the subsequent proceedingsof the ICAO
Council pointto the factthat the positionsofthe IslamicRepublic andthe United
States were completelyat odds witheach other.Thisdisagreement concerned
factualpoints and legal issues, notablyonthe question of responsibility,rightsof
compensation,and claimsofseH-defensein the lightof the circumstancesofthe
event.
3.37 A comparisonofthe interventionsof the delegates othe
IslamicRepublic andthe United Statesat the sessionsofthe ICA0 Council
demonstrates, in the wordsof the Court, that a"contlictoflegalviews orof
interests"between the Parties existedlclO.At the Extraordinary Sessionofthe
Councilon 13July 1988,for example,the IslarnicRepublic askedfor (i) "explicit
recognitionof a delictofinternational character relatingto the breach of
international lawand legaldutiesof a ContractingState, Member of ICAO";(ii)
169 ICAO WorkingPaper C-WP8644 (8/7/88),p. 5. Evhibit38.
170 MavrommatisPalestine Concessions.Judment No.2.1924. P.C.I.J.,
SeriesA.No. 2,p. 11.364 AERlAL INCIDENT
recognitionof the "internationalresponsibiiity"ofthe United States "forthe
criminalactionsofitsofficials";and (iii) "explicitcondemnation of the use of
weapons againstthe Iran Air passenger aircraft"bythe United statesl7'. lt also
noted that the "useofforce againstcivilaircraft cannotbejustified under any
circumstancesand isa flagrant violationofinternational law1721'.
3.18 In contrast, the United States gavea version ofthe facts
whichsharplyconflictedwiththat of the Islamic~e~ublicl~~,althoughthe U.S.
representative concededthat the incident "canbetconsideredin isolation174".
3.19 Throughout the discussionsbefore the lCAO Council,this
pattern repeated itself. The IslamicRepublic continued topress the Councilto
recognizethe existenceoffundamentalbreaches of internaiional labythe
United Statesas a result ofthe U.S.miiitaq presence in the Persian ~ulfl~~,
whilethe United States denied responsibiiiîyand sought to defiectattefromn
the legalissuesbyfocussingon purely "technical"stepswhichcouldbe taken to
avoidsimilarincidentsin thefuture.
3.20 At the finalICA0 Councilmeetingsin March 1989,the two
Parties continued to stand on opposite sides,each firmlymaintainingthe
divergentviewstheyhad previouslyexpressed. Thus, at the 13March 1989
session,the lslamicRepublic reaffirrnedthe requemade to the Councilin
171 C-Min.baordinary (1988)/1,13July 1988.Exhibit40.
174 B., p.9. Thisviewundermines the United States' contention that the
IslamicReuublic has changedthe nature of the case in its Mernorialbv
discussingme background>acts.
175 g, for exam le, the interventionof the representative of the lslamic
Republic on f~ecember 1988,Draft C-Min. 115/1 Closed). Exhibit43.1831 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 365
December for the legalconsequencesof the incidenttobe recognized, adding
that "thetime isripefor decisiveaction to be taken bythe ICAO Councilto
demonstrate itsmandate enshrined inthe Convention onInternational Civil
Aviationand in the principlesofh~rnanity'~~".The position articulated bythe
United States showedno siofchangefromwhat had previouslybeen advanced.
3.21 If further confirmationthat the Parties' positions were
irreconcilablewere needed, it wasprovidedon the finaldayof the ICAO
Council'sdeliberationswhenan amendment to the draft ICA0 Resolutionwas
proposed condemningthe use of armed force againstcivilaviation,includingthe
actwhichresulted in the destruction of FlightIR 65517'. Even thisproposal,
whichfellwellshort ofthe IslamicRepubiic'srequests, wasstronglyobjected to
bythe United stateslr18. At the closeofthe debate before ICAO, therefore,the
Partieswere no closerto bridgingtheir differencesthan when the incident
occurred. if anything,the proceedingsbefore the ICAO Council had revealed
that a negotiated settlement wasimpossiblegiventhe incompatibilitybetween
eachside'sposition.
CHAPTERII TEiE REFUSAIO ,FTHEUNITEDSTATESTO
NEGOTiATE WiTH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
3.22 The United States makes much of the fact that shortlyafter
the factsof the incident became known,it announced itsintention to compensate
the familiesofthe victimanexeratia basislclg. The United States saysthat to
do thisit needed information about the victims'agesandearning capacityand
thatbecause there were no diplomatic relationsbetween the twoStates at the
176 Sec .raft C-Min. 126/18,13March 19p.7. Exhibit47.
177 a, Draft C-Min. 126120,17March 1989,p. 5. Exhibit49.
178 W.,p. 6.
179 U.S .reliminaryObjections, pp.45m.366 AERIAL INCIDENT IS4]
time ofthe incidentlgO,it soughtto use the Government ofSwitzerlandas an
intermediary.Inparticular, the United States clairnsthat it iried to obtain
informationfrom the Iran Insurance Companyviathe Government of
switzerlandlB1.
3.23 In contras4 the United States accusesthe IslamicRepublic
ofseekinga politicalcondemnation rather than a negotiated settlement.
Accordingto the United States' argument,the IslamicRepublic couldhave
approached the United States to discussthe matter through the U.S. Interests
Sectionat the SwissEmbassyinTehran, the Iranian Interests Sectionatthe
AlgerianEmbassyin Washington,D.C.,the Iran-U.S. ClaimsTribunal or any
willingthird-countryor international organizationls2. Not havingtakenthese
steps,the United States contendsthat the IslamicRepublicisbarred from
invokingeitherthe Montreal Comientionorthe Treatyof Amitywhich,sothe
argument goes,require an attempt at prior negotiationbeadispute canbe
brought to the Court.
3.24 The specificrequirements ofthe Montreal Conventionand
the Treaty oAdty willbe taken up inParts V and VI,respectively. The purpose
Althoughthe United States had formallyreco izedthe newGovemment
had established d!plomatic relations fooneyear thereafter, and had9,
negotiated and signedthe AlgiersDeclarationswith the isRemiublic
on 19January 1981pursuant to whichthe Agentsof the Partiesbe ore the
Iran-U.S. ClaimsTnbunal regularlymet, by 1985the United States had
decided noto extendthat recognitionto subsequent govemments of the
IslamicRe ublic. Conse uently,at the time ofthe incident invobhg
FlighIR &5 the ~nited%atcs didnot evcnrecognizethe Govemment of
the IslamicRepublic. See.AmicusCuriae Brief of the United States in
National Petrochemicalomuanvof Iran v.The Mm Stolt Sheaf. et al
United States Court ofppeals, 2nd. Cir.), No. 87-9022,29Feb. 1p.8
5.Exhibit23.
181 U.S. PreliminatyObjections, pp.47-52.
lg2 m., pp.154-155.[851 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 367
ofthe present Chapter isto showthat based on incontrovertibleevidencebefore
the Court, the United States, as amatter of officialgovernmentpolicy,refused to
deal withthe IslamicRepublicon the issueprior to the institution ofthis case. Ta
the extent that the United Statesmade a concrete offer to compensate some of
the familiesofthe victimswithout admittingIiability,thiswasmade on 12July
1989,two months aft eheIslamicRepublic had already fileditsApplication.
Even then, the U.Spositiowaslackinginthree veryimportant elements: (i) that
there wouldbe no compensation paiddirectlyto the IslamicRepublic forthe
familiesof the victims,for the porfor other related damages sufferedas a
result of thebreach bythe United States of itsinternational obligations;(ii) that
there wouldbe no recognitionofanyinterest of the lslamicRepublic inthe
incident; and (iii)that there wouldbe no admissionofliabilityor responsibility
under international lawand no guarantee of the non-recurrence ofthe incidentor
that steps wouldbe taken to avoidfurther interferace in the IslamicRepublic's
commerceor navigationin the Penian ~ulf]~~.The adoption ofsucha stance
precluded anymeaningfulnegotiations fromtakingplace and rapidlyresulted in a
deadlock. In suchcircumstances,the United States isnot in a position to
cornplainthat the Court lacksjurisdictionbecause of any lackofpnor
negotiations.
S~ON A. ReRisalTo.Dealwitb theIslarnicRepublicon the Matter
3.25 As early as 14July 1988inbis addressto the U.N. SecuriQ
Council,Vice-PresidentBush signaiiedthe ~nikd States' intention notto have
anydealingswiththe Iranian Gwernment on the questionofresponsibifityor
compensation. Mr.Bushstated:
lS3 Althoughthe Idamic Republicwasp~eparedto accept payrnentsmade by
the UnitedStates aspartial compensation pendiagfinaldetermination of
the matter bythe Court, theUnited States showedno interest in sucha
proposal.368 AERIAL INCIDENT [861
"Inthe caseof Iranian victims,we willtakeappropriate measures to
ensure that the moneyflowsdirectlyto the familiesand not to the
government;we 41 providenone ofthese f s to the
Govemment of the lslamicRepublicof Iran81.1,
3.26 The same policydecisionnot to deal withthe Government
ofthe lslamicRepublicwasreflectedintheState Department'scommunications
to the SwissGovernment filedhereas Exhibit24. On 31August 1988,for
example,the State Department cabled the U.S Embassyin Bern as foll~ws~~~:
"Department isinthe process ofinvestigatingthe mechanicsof
rovidingexgratia compensationto the familymembers of those
L~cd on Iran AirFli t 655on July3, 1988. Department has noi
worked outthe deta?s,but pursuant to the President'sdecision,the
Government ofIran willnotreceivethe compensation pavmentson
behalfofits nationals."
The cablewent onto spellout the United States'policyinveryexplicitterms:
"Eventuallythe USG [UnitedStatesGovernment] willalso needto
deal directSvwiththe Government ofIran to accomrilishthis.''
The StateDepartment then added:
'Todisburse Davrnents.the GOS [Government ofSwitzerlandl
&ld have18&tablish a methodLofDavmentdirectlvtothe fâmily
memberswhichhad no nsk ofGovernment ofIran interference."
3.27 Shortlyafterwards,the SwissGovernment askedthe United
States ta reconkn that it wasunwilltodeal withtheGovernment of the
IslamicRepublic withrespect to effectingcompensation. The United States
emphasizedthat thiswasthecase. Asa cabledated 6Septembei 1988from the
U.S .mbassyin Bern to Washingtonrepoited:
lS4 Sec .xhibit26,p. 51.
lg5 Exhibit24(emphasis added). OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 369
"Staehelin[the Chief ofPoliticalDivisi1(Euro e and North
Arnerica)of the SwissDepartment ofForeignAirs] askcd
whether unwillingnessto deal directlywith the Government of Iran
to accomplishany aymentsto su~vors was a sine_sunon forthe
USG. PolOff PaliticaIOfficer]noted that the decisionthat
the Government of Iran wouldnot receivecompensation payments
on behalfofitsnationalshadbeen made byPresident Rea an
Thisshp&d,bepresumed to be an essentialclement of thck~~
inquiry .
3.28 This positionwasfurther underscored bythe State
Department in a cablesignedbySecretaryof State George Shultzsent on 23
September 1988. It stated:
'The USG wishesto make exgratia paymentsto familymernbersof
those killedon Iran Air Fli ht 655,but continuesto be unwillingto
dea\&ectly withthe GO1kwernment of Iran] to accomplish
this ."
3.29 In contrast to the inflexibleattitude of the United States,on
6February 1989the Iran Insurance Companywrote to the U.S.Interests Section
of the SwissEmbassyin Tehran indicatingthat it had been designated asthe
representative ofthe beneficiariesand successorsofthe victandsothers m respect
of their lossesarisingoutof the destruction of FlightIR 655and wasauthorized
to collectcompensation due from the incidentlSZn itsletter, the Company
declared that it wasprepared to nominate itsrepresentative for determining
damagesand the method of collectingcompensationin the matter.
3.30 h the lightof tU.S .olicynot to deal with the Islarnjc
Republicor itsagentsand instnimentalities over the questionofcompensation,
the United Stateswrote back to tIran Insurance Company on 16Apnl1989
askingfor informationas to the company'sstructureand management sothat the
1
lg6 Ibid.
' 187 Ibid. (emphasisadded).
188 Ibid.370 AERIAL INCIDENT [881
United States could"determinewhether it isan entityofthe Government of
~ran'~~.'R~ather than accept the Insurance Company'soffer to name a
representative to discusscompensation,the United States letter simplyrequested
informationto be providedregardingthe victimsand their successors.
3.31 Sucha response wasno more than a prevancation. The
United States knewfullweUat the thne that the Iran lnsurance Companywas
whollyownedand operated bythe Governrnentof Iran and constituted anofficiai
governmentalentitylgO. Not onlydidthe Insurance Company'sletter of 6
February 1989bear the officialseal ofthe IslamicRepublic,it hadbeen
forwarded under coverofa DiplornaticNote from the MinistryofForeignAfïaus
evidencingthat it had the Government'sfullauthonzation and approval.
3.32 Moreover, fromits expenence before the Iran-U.S.Claims
Tribunal, the United Stateswas alsowellaware that the Iran Insurance Company
had been narnedbyU.S.companies as an officialgovernmental entityinseveral
casesbefore that Tribunal. Itwillbe recalled that under the AlgiersDeclarations,
Iran wasdefined as "theGovernment of Iran, anypoliticalsubdivisionof Iran, and
any agency,instrumentality,or entity controlledbythe Government ofhan or any
political subdivisionthereoflgl." Under Article II ofthe ClairnsSettlement
Declaration between the IslamicRepubiic and the United States, claimsbyU.S.
companiescouldonlybe directed againstIranian entities as sodefined.
189 Ibid.
Ig0 The TranInsurance Companywasincorporated asa state-owned
Companyon 6Novernber 1935. Its arnended Articlesof Incorporation
were publishedin the Officia1Gazette of 25February 1974and in the
Iranian LawDigest for the same year. In anyevent, al1Iranian insurance
and credit corn anieswere nationalizedbyan act passedbythe Islamic
Revolutionaryeouncil on l7 November 1979. Exhibit 24.
191
ArticleVIX(3)of the ClaimsSettlement Declaration.~91 OBSERVATIONS AND SuBMIssloNs 371
3.33 In sevencasesbefore the ban-U.S. Tribunal, the Iran
Insurance Companyhadbeen named as a respondent entityof the Government
of Iran.Infact, as eaas27 May 1985,the Tribunal had heldin the case of
Component Builder.Inc.v.the IslamicRe~ublicofIran. et al. that theCompany
fellwithinthe definitionof ''asaset forth in the ClaimsSettlement
~eclarationl~~. Accordingly,the United Stateswasunder no illusionas to the
fact that the Iran Insurance Companywasgovernmental entitywhen it
demanded assurancesto the contraryinitçletter ofApril1989.
3.34 Whatthe United States'letter did underscore, however,was
the continuedrefusal ofthe United States to enter into negotiationswiththe
IslamicRepublic overthe matter. After all,the IslamicRepublic,actingthrough
theIran Insurance Companyhad offeredto name a representative to discussthe
matter. Thisofferwasnot acceptedbythe United States. This sameattitude
endured up to the point whenthe IslamicRepublicfiledits Application on 19
May 1989,and even forseveralmonths afterwards,as the United States hesitated
to name itsAgent inthe case.
3.35 Not only wasthe United States thus unwillingto deal with
the IslamicRepublic overthe question ofcompensation,itwasalsounprepared
Award No.ITMATL51-395-3,27May 1985,re~rinted in 8Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 216,at pp. 220-221.The other casesinvolvedwere as follows:
Fortres-Icas-Continenta' vA he Ilimac Re,ublic of Iran and
Sherkate SahamiBimehIran (Case No.301). Frank B.Hall & Company
Inc...The IslamicRevublicofIran, the Central Insurance Comnanvof
Iran (Bimeh MarkaziI.Insurance Companvof Iran lBimeh Iran),
Teleiommunications Companvof Iran (Tc aseNo. 376) AFIk v.
IslamicRepublic ofIran,Ab& Insurance ~anv,Bimeh Iran(Iran
insurance fZom~anvI.Bi eh Markazi (TheCeniral Insurance Comnanvof372 AERIAL INCIDENT
to recognizethe interests ofthe Government of the IslamicRepublicin the
matter. Thisisevidencedbythe factthat the United States was onlywillingto
discussitsownformulafor exmatia compensation for passengerson the plane
(provided thiswasnot done through the Government ofthe IslamicRepublic),
without addressingthe IslamicRepublic'sowninterestsand damagesarisingout
of the incident.
3.36 it isreadilyapparent, however,that the IslamicRepublic
itselfhad important rightsto espouse inthe matter. Asthe late Judge
Fitzmaurice'sTreatise ofThe Lawand Procedure of the InternationalCourt of
Justice states,referring to Hersch Lauterpacht, there -s an
".important distinctionbetween State rights and interests,and
those of an ind~dual person or entity,even where theyrelate to
the same subject-matter or anse out of the sarneincident.
Althougha State onsuchan occasionspeaks and actsfor its
national,tsownpositionin relation to any wrongit has sufferedin
hisperson isnevercompletelyidentifiedwith his...Thus, ifthere
isa breach of a treaty anindividualmaysuffermage as the result,
buthisGovernment alwayshas an independent groundof
complaintin relation to theongit has itselfsuffered throughthe
breach,~gddition to the nght of complainon behalf of its
national ."
3.37 Equallyapparent wasthe United States'decisionnot to
recognizeor negotiate those interests. As Abraham Sofaer, the LegalAdviserto
theU.S .tateDepartment, stated to members of theUS. Congressin his
testimonyregardingthe incident,to the extent that anycompensation e~atia
wasaccorded -
"..hisis compensationforthe victims'families,and not intended
forthe states mvolved.
lg3 Fitunaunce, G.:The LawandProcedure of the InternationalCourt of
Justice,Vol.iI ,ambridge, Grotius,1986,pp.670-671.Exhibit25.[pl1 OBsERvATtoNs AND suBMlssIoNs 373
The Presidentineffecthas ma t clearthat he does not intend to
compensate Iran for theplanef$i.l
3.38 It isalsostrikingthat the United States'refusal to deal with
the IslamicRepublicwasin stark contrast to itsattitude towardsother States
whichhad nationalskilledon nght IR 655.in a State Department briefingon
the question of compensationheld on 17July 1989(more than ayear after the
incident andaft herIslamicRepublic hadinstituted these proceedings),it was
confirmed that other governments werereceiving moneydirectlyfromthe United
States Government for the shoot-dom whilethe IslamicRepubIicwasnot. The
exchangewiththe State Department's spokesmanwent as follows:
"Q: You Saythat onlythe Government ofIran isbeing askedto
findan intemediary to distributethe paymentsbut that the
other governmentsare gettingthe moneydirectly?
A. That'sthe case,yes195,1'
3.39 These documents showbeyond anydoubt that priorto the
filingofthe IslamicRepublic's Application,negotiations betweenthe twoParties
were impossible,notsimplybecause of the fundamental differencesin each side's
position,but alsobecause of the United States'categoricalrefusalto have any
lg4
Hearingsbefore the Defense PolicyPanel ofthe U.S.House of
Representatives,.A.S.C.No. 100-119,lOOthCong.SecondSess., 1988, p.
59,Exhibit26.Of course,the IslamicRepubiic claimsnot simplyforthe
plane, but fortheariousviolations.bytheUnited States ofitstreaty
obligations,aswellas onbehalf ofthe victims.
lg5 Department of State DailyPress Briehg, 17July 1989.Exhibit27. Atp.
52ofitsPreliminaryObjections,the United States makes certain
allegationsancemingcompensationthat farnilymembers of non-Iranian
victimsare saidto have received. The IslamicRepublic has no
informationregardingthese payments,and thus reservesits positionon
the issue.374 AERIAL INCIDENT ~921
196
dealingswiththe Governent ofthe IslamicRepublicon the keyissues .
SECIIOB N. TheHarings Beforethe DefensePolicyPanelof the U.S.
HouscofRepresentatives
3.40 As aliudedto above,the hearingsbefore the Defense Policy
Panel of the Cornmitteeof Armed SeMces of the U.S.House of Representatives
heldin August,September and October 1988providefurther evidenceofthe
unwillingnessof the U.S.Governrnentto admit legal liabilityor to deal withthe
Government ofthe IslamicRepublic. It isimportant to recallthat the Panel was
aware of the positionpubljclyheld bythe IslamicRepuboncthe incidentsince
in the course ofthe hearingsthe Chaiman ofthe Panel quoted a statement given
bythe Iranian Foreign Ministeron 15Jul1988 at a newsconference at the
United Nationsto the effect that:
"TheU.S.compensationofferwillbe acceptable to Iran onlywithin
thecontextof the United States amting responsibilityfor
shootingdownthe Iranian airliner ."
3.41 With respect to the question of responsibility,the State
Department's Legal Adviser,Mr. Sofaer, advanced the same self-defense
argument previouslyraised byMr. Bush;arguingthat "thedamage caused, in our
judgement, waspursuant to the lawfuluse offorce". He added: "weagree
completely ..that Iran isto blame ultimatelyfor thisaccidentlg8". With respect
196 lncontrastin other casesthe United States has made exeratia payrnents
directlyto the Governments concerned. Thus,the United States ma-e
ratia paymentsto the Government ofJapan for radiation injuriasto
wellasto the Gwemment ofMexicofor injuriesto MexicancitizensiGcas
injured in attempting to crossthe US.-MexicobordeSec . atesG.T.:
"StateRes~onsibilitvfor Nonwealthhiuries to Alieinthe PostwarEra",
in* T - - - (ed. '
Uch, R.), 1983,p.220. Mibit 28.
lg7
See . earines Before the Defense PoliFanel ofthe House of
Re~resentatives. Exhibit26,p. 61.1931 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMlSSlONS 375
to the question whetherthe United Stateswouldbe willingto deal directlywith
the IslamicRepublic,Mr. Sofaer leftno doubt asto the United States' position.
He asserted:
"Weare not goingto work through the GovernrnentofIran. We
are not goingto ermit the Government ofIran to ta%gny of this
moncy,ta the hilest extent of our abilityto prevent it
3.42 Professor Harold Maier,another wimessbeforethe
CongressionalPanel,argued that the lslamicRepublic"wouldliketo use the
incidentasa politicaltool"and that there were "naillusionsabout whether the
Iranian citizensthemsekes wouldactuallyget the rn0ne3~~". Suchremarks
shouldbe beneath comment. Nonetheless, they revealthe extent ofhostilitythat
existedinthe United States atthe time againstanythought ofdealingwith the
Government of the lslamicRepublicon the dispute. '17ieydemonstrate in
additionthat the United States had made up itsmindbeforehand that direct
discussionswiththe IslamicRepubIicwere a practicaland politicalimpossibility.
3.43 In thisconnection,it isimportant to recallthat forfundsto
be appropriated for any campensation mvohlngHight IR 655,congressional
approvalwasrequired. Yettheattitude of the Members of Congresson the
Defense PolicyPanel demonstrates that theywere no mort willingthan the
administrationto deal directlywiththe Governrnentof the IslamicRepublic on
the issue.
3.44 In the coursof the heanngs, forexample,Congressman
Darden told Mr.Sofaer that "theonlywayyou are goingto get anycongressional
approval ofyour intentionsto make these payments isthat the Congressbe
Ig9 m., p.55.376 AERIAL INCIDENT [941
absolutelyand totaliysatisfiedthat theproper people receivethese payments
under terms and conditiowhich wouidcarryout the humanitarian purposes
that yououtline201". The mood of the Panelwassummedup bythe Chairman
who asked Mr.Sofaer:
"1sthere aguarantee that ifwe cannot be absolutelycertain that
thiswillgo to the peo leand not to the governmentthat wewillnot
paythe rnoney? ..IJink that wouldbc somethingifyou are
talkingabout bipartisan coo eration withCongress,1think we
would liketo see someabsoite guarantees. 1am not evensure
that withthat, that itwouldbe somethingthat people would liketo
the issueh ." Congress. There isgoingto be some problem on
Smo~ C. nieIran-U.S.Claims TribunalDid Not Affordan
OpportunityTo Nezotiate
3.45 Notwithstandingthe United States'refusa1to deal withthe
IslamicRepublicon the issue,the United States allegesthat the fora that
the IslamicRepubliccouldhaveused to negotiate itsclaimswasthe Iran-U.S.
ClaimsTribunal in The ~a~ue~~~I.n the lightofthe purpose of the Clairns
Tribunaland U.S.policytowards the IslamicRepublic over questionsof
responsibilityand compensation,the suggestionthat the ClaimsTniunal could
have provideda negotiating forum forthe destruction ofFlightIR 655isentirely
misplaced.
3.46 Inthe firstplace, it has alreadybeen shownthat officialU.S.
policyprecluded anynegotiationsthat wouldhave resulted in an admissionof
202 m., p. 60. Speakinglater, the Chaiman added:
"Weare dealingwith, thina k,erydifficultand sensitiveissuehere that 1
hope youunderstandjust the politicsofthiswholeissueof the kindof
generalvisceralreaction againstthe Iranian Government whichrunsvery,
verydeep".m., p.70.
203 U.S .reliminaryObjectionspp. 155-157.i951 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
liabilivbythe United Statesor the payment of anycompensationto the
Government ofthe lslamicRepublic. The United Stateshas offeredno evidence
to demonstrate whythissame policywouldnot haveapplied to contacts between
the two States at the Iran-U.S.CIaimsTribunal. Indeed, hadthe United States
been genuinelyinterested in deahg withthe IslamicRepublic on the matter, it
couldhaveattempted to raise itwiththe Iranian Agent or other officialsat the
Tribunal insteadofgoingthrough the SwissGovernment inBem. The fact that it
did not do sowasattributable to the decisionthat had been made at the highest
levelsofthe US, Government to avoidwhat wassaid to be Iranian "interference"
in the matter.
3.47 Even ifU.S.policyhad not precluded meaningful
discussions,the Iran-U.S.Qaims Tribunalwouldnot havebeen an appropriate
forum inwhichto negotiate the issuegiventhat anynegotiationsunder the
auspicesofthe Tribunal had been intentionallylimitedbyboth Governmentsto
claimsalreadyfïiedwiththe Tribunal. Due to domesticsensit~ties in each
countryconcerningcontactswiththe other, both Governments ernphasizedthe
limitationsof the forum of the Tribunal notto trespass on areas fallingoutsideof
itsjurisdictionand the need to avoidburdeningthwork undertaken at the
Tribunalwithmatters not faiiingwithinthe Tribunal'smandate. Inshort, the
representatives ofboth governmentsat the Tribunal had no authorizationto
discussanymatters faliingoutside of thejurisdictionalparameters establishedby
the AlgiersDeclarations.
3.48 Moreover,the assertionbythe United States that from3
July 1988to 17May 1989 representatives ofthe twoGovernments heldface-to-
face meetingsno lessthan 16tirncsisgrosslyexaggerated. Highlevelmeetings
between the principallegaladvisersofthe twocountrieswere suspended in late
1986due to the Reagan administration's embarrassrnent overthe so-called378 AERIAL lNCIDENT pfd
"Irangate"affair. Mer that incident,United States officiaiswere extremelywary
of dealingwithIranian representatives at the Tribunal even onofficia1Tniunal
matters. Indeed, kom November 1986untilthe date that the IslamicRepublic's
Applicationwasfiledwiththe Court (May1989) no,highlevelmeetings
between the Parties' principallegaladvisersoccurred. There wasthus na realistic
possibilityof the iran-U.S. CTribunalprovidingan appropriate forum to
negotiate the issuesarisingoutofthe destruction of FîightIR 655.
3.49 The United States suggeststhat negotiationsatthe Tribunal
were possiblebecause the tgwernments were able to reach a settlementin
Case BI1(Claim41,over the amount owedbythe United States to the Islamic
Republicfor various categoriesofmilitaryequipment, and because Iranian and
U.S. arbitrators atthe Tribunalwere alsoable to agree on the appointment of
neutral arbitrators. The United States' suggestionthat suchlimiteddiscussions
couldhave anyrelevanceto possiblesettlement ofthis caseisquite
incomprehensible. The United Statesfailsto mention that the negotiations over
CaseB/1(Claim 4)didnotstart untilSeptember 1989,after the filingofthe
Application. It alsofailsto mention that the appointment ofneutral arbitrators
wasonlyachieved afterrepeated interventions fromthe relevant Appointing
Authority.
CELUTER m DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE FiLJNGOFTHE
AIPPLICATION
3.50 The foregoingdiscussionhas show that there wasno
possibiliofnegotiatinasettlement of the disputebefore the IslarnicRepublic
fileditsApplication. There wassimplyno interest or incentiveforthe United
States to deal directlywith the IslamicRepublic on the matter. It wasonlyafter
the Application hadbeen bled and Agentsappointed that discussionswere
attempted at The Hague. These meetings took plac1September 1989andi971 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 379
12September 1989at the Peace Palace shortlyafterthe United States finally
infonned the Court ofitsappointment of an Agentin the case.
3.51 These inititwo meetingswerefollowedbyfour more
meetings between the legaladvisersof the twoParties in1989duringwhich
the issuesof liabiliîyand methods of compc:isationwere broadlydiscussed.
However, itrapidlybecame apparent that the United States remained unwilling
to accept anyIegalresponsibilityfor the incident. Accordingly,bythe end of 1989
the talksbroke down,and no further meetingswereheld on the matter.
3.52 In tbese circumstances,it cannot be maintained that the
Court lacksjurisdictionbecause the IslamicRepublic failedto attemptto resolve
the dispute through diplomacyor negotiations. Priorto the institutionofthese
proceedings,the United States refused to have anycontactswiththelslamic
Republic regardingthe incident. The limitedtalksthat took placeafter the filing
ofthe Application confirmedthe deadlockthat had previouslyarisen and
demonstrated that because the Parties' positionswere irreconcilabfe,anyhope of
a negotiated settlement wasdoomed to failure. As the followingChapter will
show,in suchcircumstancesinternationallawdoesnot imposean absolute
obligation onthe parties to continuewithnegotiations,particularlywhen the
dispute& shownto be one that cannot be expected tobe settIedor adjusted by
diplomacy.
CHAPTER IV THE LIMITATIONS TOTHE LEGALREOUIREMENT
OFPRTORNEGOTIATIONS
3.53 Whilethissubjectwillbe dealtwith ingreater detail in
connectionwiththe specificprovisionsof the Montreal Convention(PartV) and
the Treaty of Arni(PartVI)where it willbe shownthat the prerequisite that
negotiationsprecede the submissionofthe present dispute to the Court hasbeen380 AERIAL INCIDENT [981
fullymet to the extent that thisisrequired bythe relevant treaty provisions,it is
opportune here to consider,bywayofgeneral introductionto those Parts, the
elementsby whichthe requirement ofprior negotiationsisordinanly
characterized. To this end, the present Chapter willbrieflyreviewthe rationale
and significanceof the relevant international clausesand surveythe relevant case
lawof the Permanent Court and the present Court onthe issue.
3.54 Closescrutinyofthe requirement ofprior negotiations
showsthat:
- The requirement of pnor negotiations presupposesthat
negotiationswillbe camed out in goodfaith. A party that
refuses asa matter of policyto dealwiththe other party on a
dispute betweenthem failsto demonstrate even a minimum
levelofgoodfaith,and thus cannot be heard to cornplain
that the other party did not pursue the negotiations.
- Marewer, the originalrationale behindthis requirement
hasbeen remarkablyplayeddownbythe Court. The Court
has essentiallyconstmed the requirement as a means of
ascertainingwhether alenaldispute has arisenbetween the
contendingStates.
- In addition,the Court has interpreted the requirement of
prior negotiationsto the effectthat it doesnot entai1an
obligationto pursue negotiations when itisclear that the
dispute cannot be expectedta be settledby negotiationsor
when one siderefuses tonegotiate withthe other or is
adamant in itposition. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 381
Smo~ A. TheEmergence inModernInternational Arbitrationof the
PriorNeeotiationsReauirement andIts Ratio
3.55 ClausesrequiringStates to settle their disputesby
negotjations before submittingto arbitration appeared chieflyinwhatwas
considered asthe heydayof arbitration&, towardsthe end ofthe 19thCentury.
In notingonlythe mostimportant texts,whichcontained suchclauses,reference
canbe madeto Article 20of the 1stHague Conventionof29 July1899,Article 38
of the 1stHague Conventionof 18October 1907,and Article 13of the Covenant
ofthe League ofNations.
3.56 Qearly ,the prior negotiations clause had not been regarded
as necessaryin previousarbitrations,whenthe method of submittingdisputesto
arbitration wasalmostexclusivelybymeans of a compromis(which,as isweIl
known,alwaysconcerns adisputethat has alreadyarisen). The clauseat issue
wasinstead regarded asnecessarywhen compromissoryclausesconctrningfuture
disputesbecame widespread.
3.57 Despite the stricinterpretation placed onsuchclausesby
the Permanent Court, whichgreatlylimitedtheir scope (a point whichwillbe
addressed presently),they continuedto be usedinsubsequent treaties204. These
clauseswere motivatedby,andwere indicativeof, the tendencyof States to give
preference to the amicable,out-of-court settlementoftheir differencesas
opposed to international adjudicationor third-partyjudicialsettlement. The
primaq purpose ofsuchclauseswa~to safeguard asmuchas possiblea State's
sovereignty. WheneverStates goto the lengthof agreeingto submitto
arbitration, this submissionisimmediatelyaccompaniedby a significantproviso:
Sufîïceit to mention here some of those of a general purport: Ar1iof
theGeneral Act ofthe PeacefulSettlement of International Dis utes of26
September 1928and Articlé 1ofthe.reviiredtext ofthisAct of d~~ril
1949.382 AERlAL INCIDENT [1001
the prestige and interests ofStates should notbe harmed bya summonsto appear
before an international court whentheState concemed couldeasilyhave acceded
to the demands ofthe cornplainantState before beingmade answerablin court.
3.58 It isthus plain that the clauseswere inteasadsort of
stumblingblockon the road tojudicialsettlement forthe sake of protecting State
sovereignty. Inother words,States, as soon as they agreedto submit to
arbitration,hastened to narrowthe scope oftheir obligation,byprwiding escape
clausesdesignedtorender arbitrationalastresort. AsAnzilottirightlypointed
out in 1915,it issignificantthat mostof the clausesrequiringthe prior exhaustion
of negotiationsalsoexcludedfrom arbitration matters impingingupon the
"independence","honor"or "inte@S1 ofstatesZo5.
SECTI O N The CaseLawofthe PermanentCourt
3.59 Assoonas a standinginternational tniunal, the Permanent
Court of International Justice,wasset up in 1922,itbecame apparent that many
of the clausesthat previouslyqualifiedthe acceptance byStates of their
submissionto arbitrationwere incompatiblewiththe primacyof adjudication.
State sovereigntycouldno longerbe said ta hold swaAs a result, not onlywere
the traditional clausesexcludingfromjurisdictionmatters pertaining to the
"independence","honor",etc. ofStatesjettisoned, but in addition no clause
concerningthe prior exhaustionof negotiationswasplaced inthe Statute of the
Permanent Court.
3.60 It isindeedtrikingthat whilethe AdvisoryCornmitteeof
Jurists entrusted withthe taskofdraftingthe Statute of the Permanent Court
proposed a de (Article 33)concemingthe prior exhaustjonof diplornatic
205 &, AnzilottiD.:Corsodi diritto internazionale,Vol.III,P1,Rome,
1915,pp. 68-69.[iOil OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSlONS
negotiations, thisrule wasnot taken up either bythe League Councilor bythe
Assemblyand, consequently,no suchprovisioncanbe found in the Siatute of the
court206,
3.61 It istherefore onlynaturalthat, once confrontedwith
cornpromissoryclauses that neverthelessincludedthe requirement of prior
negotiations,the Court should have placed a restrictiveinterpretation on these
clausessoas considerablyto reduce their scope.
3.62 Thisthe Court achievedbypropounding twoconcepts: first,
the requirement in questionwasprimanly conceivedofas a means of makingit
possiblefor a legaldispute proper to take shape between the contendingparties.
Sincea legaldisputeis aconflictbetween legalclaims,a disagreement on apoint
of lawor fact, the Court stated that the legalpositionsof the parties shodd clearly
corneto the fore in the course ofthe exchangeofnotes or in diplomatic
negotiations. It isthus apparent that the rationaie ofthe requirement for pnor
negotiationswasno longer founded inthe need to safeguardState sovereigntyas
muchas possiblefrom third-partyadjudication,but rather in the need forthe
Court to be seizedwitha full-fledgedlegaldispute.
3.63 Secondly,it followsfromthe foregoingthat, seen in this
perspective,the requirement ofprior negotiationsdoesnot entail the need for
negotiationsto be prolongedand intense. Assmn as itbecornesapparentthat
one party isunwillingto settlethe matter bybiiateral talksor to compromiseits
positionand that the parameters ofthe dispute havebeen set out, it isno longer
necessaryto waitbefore institutingjudicialproceedings.
*O6 &, Permanent Court ofInternational Justice,AdvisorvCornmitteeof
JuristsProcès-verbauxDf 16June-24
July 1920,at p. 726. AERlAL INCIDENT [1021
3.64 This positionwasclearlyarticuiated bythe Courtinone of
itsfirstcases,the Mawommatis case. Inthat case,the respondent State, Great
Britain,argued that the compramissoryclauseuponwhichGreece relied (Article
26of the Mandate for Palestine) establishedaa precondition for submittinga
dispute to the Court that it be one that "cannotbe settledby negotiation". Great
Britain maintained that because negotiations had not beenexhauste-Greece,
after receivinga Britishnote of 1stApril 1924respondingto a previous Greek
note of 26January 1924,had applied to the Court on 12May 1924withoutfurther
delay -the conditionset out in the compromissoryclause had not been
f~lfilled~~~.
3.65 The Court rejected the Britishobjectionbymakingthree
points. First,it specifiedthat the primarypurpose of pnor negotiationswasto
make it possible fora legal dispute to take shape:
'The Court realises to the full importance ofthe rule laying
shouldbe brought before it.It recognises,in fact,that befare
disputecan be made the subject ofan actionat Jaw,itssubject
matter shouw been clearlydefinedbyrneansofdiplomatic
negotiations ."
3.66 Second,the Court insistedthat in anycase negotiationsmay
be relativelyshort:
"Neeotiationsdo not of necessitvalwavsnresuDDose amore or less
Jenghy seriesof notes and des6atcheGit'maySÙfficethat a
discussionshould havebeen commenced. and thisdiscussion mav
havebeen veryshort; thiswiiibe the caseif a dead lockisreachgd,
or iffinailya point isreached at whichone of the Parties definitely
declares himselfunable, or refuses,to giveway,and there can
207 MavrornmatisPalestine Concessions.JudgrnentNo.2. 1924.P.C.I.J.,
SeriesA No. 2,p. 13.
208 m., p. 15. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
therefore be no doubt!hWlthe dispute cannot be settled
diplomaticnegotiation .
3.67 Third, the Court attached importance to the viewsof the
parties concerned on the question whether the negotiatingprocesswasIikelyto
yieldresultsorwasinstead destined toleadto deadlock. It stated th-t
"...n applyingthisnile [onprior negotiationsj,tCourt cannot
concerned,who are in the best positiontojudge as to political
reasonswhichmay prezfet the settlement of a givendisputeby
diplomatic negotiation ".
3.68 In the Iightof thislast pronouncemenjtwouldseem that
the Court'sviewmust be interpreted to the effect that it isfor the parties
themselvesto assessthe volitica1nature of their relations asbeing (or not being)
conduciveto a possible out-of-courtsettlement. To put it another way,it isnot
for the parties to state whether or not negotjationsmaybe undertaken (each of
them mayhold a differentviewon the matter);rather, it isfor each partyto
appraise the ~eneraluoiiticalcontexoftheir relations forthe purpose of deciding
whether or not negotiations constitute arealisticavenue opento them. It goes
without sayingthat, as the Court explicitlystated, the viewsof the parties are
merelyone ofthe variousfactors tobe taken into accountbythe Court.
3.69 Itisnoteworthythatthe Court'sviewon thispoint has
remained consistentinitssubsequent caselaw. For example,thisviewwaslater
taken up byone ofitsmost distinguishedmembers, ManleyO.Hudson, in1939,
whostated in his DissentingOpinion inthe ElectricitvCom~anvcase:
"The provisionin Article 1ofthe Treatyof Conciliation,
Arbitration and Judicial Settlement,ob31,between Belgivmand
209
m., p.13(emphasisin the original).
M., p.15. AERIAL INCIDENT 11041
Bulgaria],that the dispute must be one whichit maynot havebeen
possibleto settle bydiplomacy,snota meaninglessformality. In
the past the Court hasrawnattention to the importance of nor
negotiations[inthe Mavmmmatiscase,Series A, No.2, p. 14, and
where the requirement isexpresslylaiddownin atreaty it cannot
be disregarded. Whatisessentialisthat pnor to the filin of an
applicationby one party bringingthe dispute More the toourt&
other pa- must havebeen ben the opportunitv to formulate and
to e ress itsiewson the sub'ectofthe dis ute. On1 diplomatjc
nepzationr willhave anorde: suchan op$rtunity. Le precise
point at whichitmayproperlybe saidthatthe negotiations
rnstitutedcannot resulina settlement ofthe disputemayhave to
depend, as the Court has alsorecognize$[SeriesA,No. 2,p. 151,
upon 'theviews ofthe Statesconcemed' ."
3.70 It isapparent hom the abwe that the Court constmed the
clausesonpnor negotiations in sucha way as to deprivethem of their original,
sovereignty-arientedrationale. Indeed, prior negotiationswere no longer
required as a means of impellingStates to settle their disputes outof court. They
were nowconceivedof asa means ofascertainingwhether a disagreement on a
point of lawor fact had emerged betweentwo or more States, and,iso,what the
content ofthisconflictof legal claimswas.
3.71 It followsthat compromissoryclauses callingfor pnor
negotiations havebeen interpreted in a realisticmanner, and even downplayed,
accordingto circumstancesof the case.As wasaptlyernphasizedbythe Iearned
author, N. Kaasik,the interpretation advanced bythe Court actuaiiy"ledto the
21 ElectricitvCompanvofSofiaand Bulaaria.Judment. 1939,P.C.I.J..Series
AB, No. 77,Dissenting Opinion ofJÜdg-Hudson, at pp.132-133
(emphasisadded). - -[1051 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMlSSlONS 387
thwarting,or almost,of the conditionof prior negotiations212.i1
su no^ C. TheDebateset theInstitutdeDroitinternational in 1956
forthe Su~~ressionoftheReauirement ofPrior
3.72
The caselawof the Permanent Court contributedto
convincinga number of distinguishedinternational lawyersthat the clauseon
prior negotiations had become arelicofthe past no longercompatiblewiththe
essenceofmodem adjudication. Therefore, whenin 1952-1956the Institut de
Droit International met to discussa draft mode1clauseon the campulsory
jurisdictionothepresent Court,afeweminentjuristsproposed that the
requirement ofprior negotiations,upheldbythe rapporteur Guggenheim,be
dropped altogether. Arnongthese, mention canbe made ofJessup (American),
Rolin (Belgium),Andrassy(Yugoslav),de la Pradelle (French), Vallindas
(Greek) and Waldock(~ritish)~'~.As a result of these suggestions,the clause
wasdeieted fromthe draft res~liition~~~.
3.73 It isofinterest here to quote the viewsforcefullyset out by
two ofthese eminent lawyers,Jessuand Waldock. The former pointed out that
212 Kaasik,N.:"Laclausedené ociationsdiplomatiquesdans ledroit
international positifet dansfajurisprudence de.la Cour Permanente de
Justice internationale",vue de droit internationalede1égi.slation
corn arée,Vol. 14,1933,p. 81. Exhibit2Sec .lso,p 90-92m., and
Sou&mi, J.: "La nkgociationdiplomatique«&ment kntentiem
international",in Revuede droit international public,Vol.68,1964, pp.
334-335. Exhibit30.
The sentence byKaasik citedabove reads inthe originalFrench version:
"L'interprétatide la Cour aboutit hune annulation oupresque de la
conditionde prioritédesvoiesdiplomatiques".
*13 Sec . nnuaire de l'Institutde Droit International,Vol.46,pp.197-
206.m.
214 W., pp. 217,263-264. For the teofthe resolutiosec lnstitut de Droit
International. Tableaudral des résolutionsf1873-1956JBille,1957,pp.
160-161.Exhibit32.388 AERIAL INCIDENT Il061
"thisformula,whichhasbeen used inverynumerous oldtreaties, seemsto be a
suMval from the period in whichGovernments balkedat submittingtheir
disputesto the Court. This period mustnowbe regarded asgone by,and in any
casethe Institut must not encourage this hesitationof ~overnments~~~".The
latter, after supportingview ofJessup, emphasizedthat the clauseat issue,if
upheld,wouldonlyresult in encouragingthe parties to raise prelirninary
objectionswitha viewto usingdelayingtactics2I6.
3.74 nie debates in the institut de Droit Internationaland the
resolution eventuallyadopted testifyto the sharp declinein the importance of the
clausesat issueBy the same token, those debates were indicativeof the widely
felt need to interpret the existingclauseson prior negotiations asstrictly
possible217.
SECTIOD N. TheCase Law ofthePresentCourtConfirmsthe
Interpretationof the PermanentCourt
3.75 The present Court has not departed bom the interpretation
placed byits predecessor on clausesonptior negotiations. It maysufficehere to
mention brieflythe most important cases.
215
Unofficialtranslation. The originalFrench textreads: "Cette formule ui
seulement une su~vance de la pbriode au cours de Ia ueUelesait$tre
ouvernements &aient hésitanthsoumettre leurs d1ff ren$Ila Cour.
8ette nériodedoit &tremaintenant considércommerévolueet en tout
casl'hstitut se doit dene pas encourager cette hésitationdes
gouvernements",Annuaire de l'Institutde Droit International, pp. 197-
198.
216 "Leseulrésultatqu'aurait l'insertionde la clausetraditionnelle serait
d'inciter les partiesleverdes exceptionspréliminaireseà utiliserdes
moyensdilatoires"., p. 205.
217 These viewsare aisoconsistentwiththe provisionsof Articlof3the
U.N. Charter whichdoesnot providefor anyhierarchybetween solutions
reached by"negotiation,enquis; mediation,nciliat~on,arbitration,
judicial settlement, resortregionalagenciesor managements, or other
peaceful meaais".Thus, undetheU.N. Charter, settlement byjudicial
settlement isaced on anequal footingassettlement bynegotiation.11071 OBSERVATIONS AND SuBMIssIoNs
3.76 In the preliminaryobjectionsphase ofthe SouthWest
Afri case,for example,the Court focusedon the question of the duration of
negotiations,aswellas on the issuewhether itwasadmissible,for procedural
purposes,that suchnegotiations shouldtake place not in a bilateralframework
but withina parliamentaryframeworksuchasthe United Nations.
3.77 On the firstissue,the Court, ifter quotingthe
case,pointed out that inthe casewithwhichitwasdealing''deadlockon the
issuesofthe disputewasreachedand has remained since",and that "no
modificationof the respective contentions[had]takenplace sincethe discussions
and negotiationsin theUnited ~ations~~".
3.78 On the secondissuethe Court stated tha-
"[IJtisnoso muchthe form ofnegotiation that matters as the
attitude and viewsof the Parties on the substantiveissuesof
guestioninvolved. So longasboth sidesremain adamanf and this
1sobvious even£romtheir oral presentations beforethe Court,
there isno reason tohinkthat t%pspute canbe settledbyfurther
negotiationsbetween the Parties ."
It isworth notingthat the viewsexpressedbythe Court on thismatter were
forcehlly taken up, in their Separate OpinibysJudges Bustamanteand
~essup~~'.
3.79 A cornpellingrestatement ofthe Court'sviewcanbe found
in the Separate OpinionofJudge WellingtonKoo inthe Northem Cameroons
218 South WestAfrica.PreliminarvObjections,Judment. I.C.J.Reports 1962,
p. 319,ap. 346.
219 lbid.
220
m., pp. 381-382and 435-436.390 AERIAL INCIDENT [108]
case. In quotingthe previouscase law,he framed the question inthe foUowing,
particularlylucid,terms:
"[Iltisto be recalledthat both the Permanent Court and this Court
have stated to thesame effectthat when the parties to adispute
haveboth defined their positionand haveboth clearlyindicated
that they insistupon their respectiveviews withno possibilityof any
modincation or compromise,and when a deadlockisthus reached,
it canbe reasonablyconcludedthat the dispute cannotbe settledby
negotiation. No particular formor procedure of negotiationis
required,nor is importanc to be attached to the duration of
suchnegotiation ".
3.80 The Court took up thisline of reasoningin twosubsequent
cases. In the Dinlomatic and Consular Staffcase, itheld in 1980that the
requirement of prior negotiationswasmet both because there wasa confict of
viewsbetween the twoparties and because the "refusalofthe banian
Government to enter into any discussionof the matter" had brought about a
deadlock, althoughonly3weekshad passed sincethe incident and the United
States' applicationinstitutingproceedings222.
3.81 In the Nicara~uacase,the Court further developeditsanti-
formalistdoctrine. It held that the failure,byNicaragua,to refer expresslyto a
particular treaty in the courseof its negotiationswiththe United States didnot
debar Nicaraguabarn invokingbefore the Court the compromissoryclauseof
that treaty223. In other words,in the viewof the Court the requirement under
discussionismet even if Inthe course ofnegotiations the parties do not advert to
-- ---
221 Northern Cameroons.Judment. I.C.J.Reports 1963,Separate Opinion of
Judge WellingtonKoo,p. 15,at p.49.
222 United States Didomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. Judgment. I.C.J.
Reports 1980. p.3, at p27, para. 51.
223 Militarvand Paramilitani Activitiesin and aeainst Nicaragua [Nicarama v.
United States of Amen&). Surisdictionand AdmissibilitviJudmnent, I.C.J.
Re~orts 1984,p. 392,at p. 428,para. 83.[log] OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 391
the treatythat the applicantState subsequentlyreliesupon asthe basisfor the
Court'sjurisdiction.
3.82 The long-standingtraditionof the Court on the matter at
issuewas cogentlysumrnedup byJudge Agoin hisSeparate Opinionin the
Nicaragua casewhere heunderlined,in particular,the limitationsto whichthe
prior negotiation requirement issubjected. After quotingthe relevant treaty
provision(whereby"anydispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or
application ofthe present Treaty, not satisfactorilbyddiplomacy"could
be submittedto the Court),Judge Ago went onto Saythe following:
"Itisnot alwaysnecessarilythe caseunder these tems that
diplomatic negotiationsmustbe ascertained to havebeen first
begunand then pursued, andfinallyto have broken down.
reouirements of the textcan evenbe met. under certain
circumstances.without neeotiationsintheictsense ever havinq
prior resort to di~lomaticneeotiations cannot constitute ant
absolute reauirement. to be satisfiewhznnthe ho~eiessnessof
emectine anvnegotiationsto succeedisclearfrom the state of
3.83 A similarclausewasconsideredbythe Court initsAdvisory
Opinion of26April 1988on1
Section21 ofthe United NationsHeadauarters Aareement of 26June 1947.
Under Section21(a) ofthe Headquarters Agreement between the United States
and the United Nations, disputescouldbe submitted to arbitration if theywtre
"notsettiedbynegotiation orother agreed mode of settlement".
3.84 When a dispute arose between the United Statesand the
United Nations overthe status ofPL0 Observer Mission,the United States
224 m., I.C. RJ.ports 1984,app.515-516,para. 4 (emphasisadded).392 AERIAL INCIDENT Il 101
Permanent Representative to the U.N.proposed to the U.N. Secretary-General
that the negotiationsphase ofthe procedure should commence on20January
1988. A series of consultationswereheld untilFebruary 1988;technical
discussions,on an informalbasis,were alsoheld between 28 January and2
February 1988. However,the United States subsequentlystated that it didnot
considerthese contacts and consultations"tobe formallywithinthe frameworkof
Section 21(a)ofthe Headquarters Agreement" and notedthat it couldnot "enter
into the dispute settlementprocedure outlined inSection 21of the Headquarters
Agreement". The Court didnot upholdthis objection. It held that:
'Takinginto accountthe United States'attitude,the [U.N.]
Secretary-General has in the circumstancese ted such
possibilitiesof negotiatjoaswere opento him%QI .
3.85 Once again,the Court took aflexibleand broad viewofthe
prior negotiations clause. It didnot attach valueto the United States' contention
that no negotiations proper had takenplace; it insteadheld that contacts and
consultations,howeverinformal,were sufficientto meet the requirements at
issue. Thisconfirmsthat, whateverthe viewofone of the parties, what realiy
matters for the Court isthat someattempt at contact or negotiation should have
been made, providedof course there was at leastaminimumchanceof
settlement.
3.86 More recently,the matter at hand has been discussedby
Judge BedjaouiinhisDissenthg Opinion in the caseof Questions of
Interprctation and Awriiicationof the 1971Montreal ConventionArising£rom
the Aerialincident at Lockerbie. Foiiowingup on some ofthe themes that Judge
Agohad enuciated in the Nicarae case,Judge Bedjaoui dwelt,inter alia, on
22s
Applicabiliv of the Oblieationto Arbitrate under Section21ofthe United
Nations Headuuarters Ameement of 26June 1947.Order of9March
1988. I.C.JReports 1988,p. 3,at p. 33,para.55.Il111 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
the fact that under certain circumstancesthe requirement ofprior negotiations
need not bemet owingto the adamant positiontaken by thecontendingparties.
He made the followingremarks:
"SinceLibyarefused to extradite itsnationals and proposed
substitute solutionsurrender of the twosusuectsto the United
Nations,to theAra6 League, to thejudicialAthorities of a third
country,orto an international judicialor arbitral bod whereasthe
United Kingdomand the United States anlyoffered&bya the
choicebetween an extraditionthat as a matter ofprinci lewas not
negotiable or the adoption ofsanctionsbythe Security ouncil),it
wasobviousthat the verynot98f a negotiatingprocesswas
meaninglessin sucha context .
3.87 Judge Oda voiceda similarconclusion. He noted that, in
the circumstancesof the case-
".there doesnot seem to existanyconvincingground for asserting
that the Court'sjurisdictionissoobviouslylacking. The
Respondent's argument wherebythe Court'sjurisdictionisdenied
through the non-lapseof the six-month period wodd appear too
legalistic,ifonewere tofindthat no roomremained toneeotiateon
the oreanization of arbitration infie face of a categoricalaenial of
the oossibilityof an arbitration'."
3.88 The Lockerbie caseissignificantin this respect inasmucas
one ofthe main argumentsadvancedby the Respondent States inopposing
jurisdictiowas that the negotiation andtirne-limitrequirements ofArticle 14(1)
ofltheMontreal Conventionbad notbeen satisfiedbythe Applicant. In itsOrder,
the Court didnot accept tMsargument and, infact, didnot even addressthe point
asmight havebeen expectedifit had presented an obstacleto the Court's
jurisdiction. To the contraty, asseveralof the separand dissentingopinions
noted, giventhat the Respondents had effectivelyrefused to negotiate, the
226 Ouestions of Interuretation andApplication ofthe 1971Montreal
Conven 'onArisinefrornthe Aerial lncident at Lockerbie.(LjbvanArab
i
Reliorts 1992,p.145,para. 8.
227 m., Declaration of Judge Oda, p.136,(emphasis added).394 AERIAL lNClDENT II121
provisionsofArticle 14(1)did not present a bar tojurisdiction. Indeed, as Judge
Weeramantry noted, the refusal to negotiate in effectconstituted an anticipatory
breach ofthe provisionsofArticle 14(1)by the Respondetat tes^-a^^iew
that wasshared byJudge ~jibola*~~.
3.89 Once again,therefore, the caselawof the Court on the
practical inapplicabilityof the pnor negotiationsrequirement in casesofclear,
repeated and irreconcilable disagreements betweenthe contendingStates,has
been forcefullyreaffirmed.
SK~ONE. ConcludineObservations
3.90 The authorjtative opinionsof the Judges citedabwe
constitute the logicaldeveloprnentand outcome of a longjudicialprocess
wherebythe pnor negotiations requirement bas been increasinglyrestricted in its
importance and scope. The case iawsurveyedabove provesbeyond any doubt
that:
- The primary purpose of the clauseisto make itpossiblefor
a legaIdisagreement betweentwoStates to take shape in
sucha marner as ta enable the Court to identifythe ternis
ofthis disagreement;
- To the extent that there maybe a requiremofpnor
negotiation, thispresupposes the goodfaith of the parties.
When one party toadispute refuses todeal with the other,
228 m., Dissenting OpinionofJudge Weeramantry, p. 161.
229
m., DissentingOpinionofJudge Ajibola,p.188. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIQNS
itsgoodfaith islackingand it cannot thereafter complain
about any lackofnegotiations;
- By the same token, wheneverit becomes apparent that the
partiesto a dispute haveclearlydefined their legalpositions
and insistupon their respectiveviewswithoutappeanng to
be open to compromise,the resultingdeadlock makes it
superfiuous forthem to try and settlethe matter bybilateral
(or multilateral, for thatmatter) negotiations. In these cases
it isnot strictlynecessaryfor negotiationsevento
commence. To hold the contraryviewwouldresult inthe
requirement at issuebecoming an unacceptablemeans of
delavinarecourse to international adjudicatio- asWaldock
noted in 1956in the Institut de Droit International and Ag0
restated in 1984inthe Court;
- Someallowanceshouldbe made byinternational courtsfor
the viewsthat the parties concernedmay haveexpressed
about the veryfeasibilityofnegotiations,inthelightofthe
general politicacontext of their relations.
3.91 In Parts V and VI below itwillbe shownthat, byinstituting
proceedingsbefore the Court againstthe United States,the IslarnicRepublic has
fullymet the prior negotiations requirement, in sofas itjslaid downinthe
relevant treaties. PART N
THEJURISDICZION OF THE COURTOVERTHEICAOCOUNClL
DECISION OF 17 MARCH 1989PURSUANTTO ARTICLE84OF THE
CHICAGOCONVENTION
4.01 The United States'objectionto the jurisdictionofthe Court
pursuant to Article 84of the ChicagoConventionisbased essentiallyon one
issue:the lslarnicRepublic'sallegedfailureto followthe procedures set out inthe
ICAO Council'sRules for the Settlement of Differences("the~ules")~O. The
United States arguesthat the IslamicRepublic didnot properlysubmit a dispute
under Article 84to the Councilpursuant to the Rules,that the IslamicRepublic's
submissionto the Councilwasnot dealt withunder the Ruleandthat the
Councildid not render a decisionof the kindforeseen in the Rules that can be
appealed to the Court.
4.02 Beforeturning to these arguments,it isimportant to note
what the United States doesnot contest. It doesnot contestthat the Islamic
Republic submitted a disputeto the ICA0 Councilconcerningviolationsofthe
Chicago Conventionbythe United ~tates~~l-a dispute defineby
disagreements arisingfrom (i) the shoot-downof FlIRh655,(ii)the issuance
bythe 7J.Sof illegalNOTAMs,and (iii) the lack of coordinationbyU.S.military
forces.withcivilianATSauthorities. It doesnot contest the fact that the Chicago
Conventionis applicableto thisdispute,nor doesit contest that the ICA0
Councilhadjurisdiction to render a decisionon thisdispute. It doesnot even
contest that thiswasa dispute mer the interpretation and application ofthe
230 Exhibit33.
231
The words"dispute"and "disagreement",whichare the relevant wordsin
Article 84ofthe ChicaOConvention,are used interchangeablinthis
Part. It isthe lslamicBePublic3sview,howeuer,that the use ofthe word
"disa eement" in the relevantpart ofArticle 84of the Convention
cstabyshes a lowerthreshold test than that whichwouldbe requiied to
showa dispute existed.il151 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 397
ChicagoConvention. The argument of the United Statisbased on purely
formalisticrcasoning:that the Ruleswernot applied,and thereforethedispute
didnot fa11withinArticl84. It contends that the failureto applythe Rules
should actas a bar to the Court'sjurisdiction.
4.03 The IslamicRepublicwilladdress thisargumentin detail in
thisPart. InChapter 1,it willbe show that the jurisdictionof the Court over
decisionsof theICA0 Councilisgoverned not bya set ofprocedural hiles
adopted bythe Councilbya simplemajorityvote, but byArticle 84ofthe
Convention. ItisthisArticle to whichStates' partiesto the Conventionhave
consented andthe real question in this casetherefore iswhether the requirements
of Articl84have been fulfilledi.ew h.thera disagreement overthe
interpretation or application ofthe ChicagoConventionwhichcouldnotbe
settled bynegotiationwasconsidered and decided bythe Council. Ifso, then the
IslamicRepublic hasthe right toappealto the Court againstthat decisionand
this rightcannot be limitedbyconsideration ofwhether or not certain purely
procedural ruleswere followedto the letter.
4.04 The satisfactioof the requirements ofArticle84isa matter
that must be determined objectivelyin the lightof the relevant factsand the clear
languageof this provision. The IslamicRepublic willshowin Chapter II that the
requirements ofArticle 84are metinthiscase. In other words,thaa
disagreement overthe interpretation and application of the ChicagoConvention
whichcouldnot be settled bynegotiationwaspresented ta, consideredand
decided onby the Council.
4.05 In Chapter III,the lslamicRepublicwillshowthat the
United States' emphasis onthe Rules ismisplaced,andthat even ifthe Rules398 AERIAL INCIDENT [116]
were not followedbythe Councilinitshandlingof the dispute, this shouldnot act
as abar to the jurisdictionofthe Court,for the followingreasons:
-
The Rules are of ahighlyflexible,ad hocnature, and do not
at alihave the detailed exclusive,comprehensiveand
mandatory character allegedbythe United States. For
example,pursuant to Article 32the Rules canbe 'irariedor
their application suspended"withthe agreement ofthe
parties whenthe Councilconsidersthat "suchactionwould
leadto a more expeditiousor effectivedispositionof the
case"232.This iseffectivelywhathappened in this case;
- The Council'spast practice showsthat it has handled
disputeswith considerablefleiobilityand has in fact
stnctlyfollowedthe Rules. The fact that the Councilhas
chosen to adopt sucha flexible,ad hocapproach, an
approach whichit alsoadopted inthis case, cannobe used
againstthe IslamicRepublic as abar to the Court's
jurisdiction;
- SuchRuleswere adopted bythe Councilto governthe
Council'sownfunctioning.It issolelythe Councilthat
decideshaw it dealswithdisputes anda mernberState of
ICA0 (especiaiiya State Iikethe blamic Republic whois
not a member ofthe Council) cannotbe held accountable,
and thus barred from havingrecourseto the Court, forthe
CounciI'sownfailureto followthe Rules strictly; OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 399
- Even ifthe Rules were not strictlyfollowedby the Councilin
this case,al1of their main proceduralrequirements were
neverthelessmet, and for this reason alsothe Islamic
Republjc should not be barred frommakingan appeal to
the Court.
4.06 The United States alsoarguesthat because the Ruleswere
not followedthis showsthat the Councilwasactingunder Articl54 ofthe
Conventionand nat under Article84. This argument,whichwilIbe addressedin
Chapter IV,introduces afornalistic divisionbetween the Council'sfunctions
under Article 54 and Article84whichisnot justifiedby a correct readingofthe
Convention. The United States itselfacknowledgesthat under Article 54the
Councilmaybe obligedto address questions concerningthe interpretatioor
application of theTreaiy. Thus,evenif the Councilwasactingunder Article 54in
handIingthe dispute overthe shoot-downof FlighIR 655,a decisionrendered by
the Councilon sucha dispute,which clearlyconcemed the interpretation and
application ofthe Convention,wouldstillbe appealable as the objective
requirements ofArticle 84wouldbe met.
4.07 Finally,Chapter Vwilladdress the United States' argument
that:thcre are policyreasonswhytheCourt should not acceptjurisdictiin
relation to this appeal £roma decisionof the CouncilICAO.Itwillbe shownthat
this argument iswithout foundation and that, to the contras., al1relevant policy
considerationssupport a findingofjurisdiction. AERIALINCIDENT
TFlE COURTS JURlSDICIlOK DERIVES FROM
ARTICLE 84OFTBECHICAGOCONVENITON
4.08 ArticleS4providesasfoliows:
"Settlementof disputes
If anydisagreement betweentwo or morecontractingStates
relating to the interpretation or application of thisConvention and
its Annexes cannotbe settled bynegotiation, itshall,on the
application ofanyStateoncerned in the disagreement,be decided
bythe Council. No member of the Councilshallvotein the
considerationbythe Councilof anydis ute to whichit Party.
Anycontracthg State may,subjectto kicle 85,appeal hom the
decisionof the Councilto an ad hocarbitral tribunal agreed upon
Internationalstice.sAny suchappeal shallbe notifiedto theourt of
Council withinsxty daysof receipt ofnotificaofthe decisionof
the Councii."
4.09 The United States submitsa higtilydistorted reading of
Article 84. It seeksto limitthe appeai to the Court onlyto proceedings stipulated
ab initioas beian "Articl84 proceeding"and pursued in strict conformityto
the Rules. The plain meaning ofthe Convention affords nobasisfor sucha
narrowreading. Article84,whichisincorporated inParN of the Convention
entitled "FinalProvisions",and therefore relates to the Conventionas a whole,
allowsappealfrom an vecisionofthe Councilon disagreement regardingthe
Convention'sinterpretatioorapplication.Isaysnothing about procedural
requirements. Aswillbe shownbelow,it isArticle84alonewhichgovernsthe
Court'sjurisdictionand the Rulescannot in anywayderogafrom this
jurisdiction.
4.10 Article û4entmsts the ICA0 Councilwitha rightto resolvc
disputes overtheinterpretatioorapplication of the Conventionsubjectto
appeal to the Court. Essentiallythe same structure isadopted in the Food and
AgricultureOrganization, the WorlHealthOrganization,and the World11191 OBsERvATloNs AND su~M~ss~oNs 401
Meteorological Organization, wherethe plenary organofeach of these
organizationshas the power to decide questionsor disputes concemingthe
relevant constitutiveinstruments, subjectto appeal to the Court or,in the case of
the World Meteorological Organization, anindependent arbitrator appointed by
the President ofthe However,in the ChicagoConventionthe right of
decisionisgivennot to the plenary organof ICAO,the Assembly, butto the
Council,which isof lirnitedrnember~hi~~~~.
4.11 Althoughthe ChicagoConventionwassignedon 7
December 1944,ICA0 existeduntii 1957-for 13year- withoutanyrulesforthe
settlement of disputes under Ar~ 4 ~ ~T.us, signatoriesto the Convention
in 1944consented to thejurisdictionof the Court on the basisofthe provisionsof
Article 84alone without this consent beinglimitedin anywayby anyprocedural
rules.
4.12 Under Article 84,three conditionsare envisagedin order to
establishthejurisdiction of the Court.There mu(ib)disagreementbetween
States over the interpretation or application ofthe Convention;(fi)the
disagreement mustbe one whichcannot be settled bynegotiation; and(iii)the
disagreement mustbe considered and decided onbythe Councilonthe
appIicatian.any State concemed in the disagreement. Other thanthe provision
233
Constitution ofthe Food and AgricultureOrganization,ArticleXVII(1);
Constitution ofthe World Health Organization, Article75;Conventionof
relevantpmvisionsisgiveninb:nization Article29. The textofthe
234 a, alsa,Bowett,D.W. T:h T h (ofndon,
1975J,at p. 134,where thisdistinctionisemphasircd. W%35. Thisisa
sign cant factor in theresent casedue to theparticular characteristics
and compositio~ofthekA0 Council. paras. 4.120-4.129,belov.
235 Both Iranand theUnited States signedthe Convéntion on7Deceniber
1944. Iran ratified the Convenono19April1950,the United States on
9 August1946.402 AERIAL INCIDENT [1201
of Article 84that the application be consideredand decidedbythe Council,no
other forma1prerequisites are set out for the procedure to be followedbythe
~ounci1236.
4.13 The IslamicRepublic soughtto showin itsMernorialthat al1
ofthe conditionsofArticle 84 had been met: asobjectivequestionsof fact and
law,disagreementsbetween the Parties concerningthe interpretation or
application ofthe Convention in connectionwiththe events surroundingthe
destruction of FlighIR655 were submitted to the Council;these disagreements
couldnot be settled bynegotiation; consequently,theywere considered and
decided uponbythe ~ouncil~~~.
4.14 The United States' argumentisessentiallythat the Council
has established specialRules for handling Article84disputes and that the Islamic
Republic'sallegedfailure to followthe Rules should act asa bar to the Court's
jurisdictionThis cannot be correct. ItisArticle 84alonewhichgovernsthe
jurisdictionofthe Court. The Rules cannot havecreated newsubstantive
conditionfor an appeal to the Court that didnot figurein Article 84. In other
words,whatever nile-makingpower the ICA0 Councilpossessescannot be
employedfor thepurpose of introducing new substantive requirements for
bringingan appeal not found in Article84of the Convention.
236 The onlyprocedural requirement isthat no party involvedin the dispute
should havea right to vote Uianydecisionsmade by the Council.&&
para. 4.99below.
237 In this regard, contraryto its ositionwithregard to the Montreal
Convention andthe Treaty of~mit~, the United States does not raise in its
Preliminary Objectionsanyobjectionto the effectthat the Islamic
Republic has failedto showthat the disagreement before the Council
couldnot be settled byne otiation. This in itselfisa recognitionthat the
dis utc overthe Chicago&onvention,whiîh washillyaired before the
I&O Council,couldnot be settlsd byncgotistion. Part III has show
conclusivelythat suchnegotiationswere rendered impossiblebythe
opposingpositionsofthePartiesand the United States'refusalto deal
withthe Idamic Republic on the matter. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
4.15 The subsidiay nature ofthe Rules isconfirmedbytwo
important facts.a the Rules were adopted bythe Councilonlyin 1957
pursuant toArticle 54(c)of the Conventionwhichauthonzes the Councilto
"Determine itsorganizationand niles ofprocedure". It must be stressed that the
Ruleswere therefore adopted not bythe plenaqt organ of ICA0 of whichail
States' partiesto the ChicagoConventionare members,but rather bya simple
vote ofthe Council. Moreover, the languageofArticle54(c)isclear that the
Ruleswere adopted bythe Councilsolelyfor itsbenefit and in order to regulate
itsownprocedures.
4.16 Second,these Rules remain flexibleand subjectto revision.
Article 32of the Rules specifiesthat theymaybe varied or suspendedwiththe
agreement of the contendingparties wheneverthe Councildeems this
appropriate forthe mare expeditiousor effectivedispositionof the case. The
Rules mayalsobe amended by the Councilevenon ad hoc basisunder Article 33.
This contrastssharplywiththe provisionsfor amendingthe ChicagoConvention
itself. Under Articl94(a)of the Convention,anyproposed amendment must be
approved by a two-thirdsvote ofthe Assemblyand then mustbe ratifiedbymore
than two-thirdsofthe total nurnber ofthe contractingStates. It followsthat any
attemptto limitthe scope ofArticle 84of the Conventioncouldonlybe
undertaken in accordancewith this constitutionalprocedure. Itwouldcompletely
undermine the structure and integrityofthe Conventionif,as the United States
seems to contend, substantive provisionsofthe Conventioncouldbe limitedby
subsidiarypravisionsadopted bythe Councii.
4.17 Therelation behVeenthe Rules and the Conventionis
analogousto that between the Court'sRules and itsStatute. For example,the
subsidiarynature of the Rules of Court has been recognizedbythe Court in
considenng the provisionsof the Statute and the Rules withregard to the right of404 AERIAL INCIDENT 11221
intervention. Thus, theCourt has heldthat a State'srightto intervene in a caseis
govemed by Article 62of the Statute and mustbe decided on that basis. The
Rules of Court cannot add anyadditionalrequirements governingthe rightto
intervenebeyond those set out inthe Statute. Even though Article 81of the
Rules of Court provides for the furnishingof certain additionalinformation
relating to an intervention, the Court has noted that anyquestionsconcerning
intervention should "bedecided onthe basis ofthe Statute and in the lightof the
particular circurnstancesof each case238". In the same rnanner, Article 84of the
Conventiontakes precedence over the Rules, and the question ofthe Court's
jurisdictionmust be determined on that basis.
4.18 Al1these points are no doubt familiarto the Court as they
were commented onbyseveraldistinguishedJudges inthe ADDealRelatina to the
Jurisdictionof the ICA0 Councilcase("the Anneal case"). AsJudge JimCnezde
Aréchegaexplainedin hisSeparate Opinion:
"15. The question ofthe cornpetenceof the appeal mustbe
determined on the exclusivebasisofthe treaty provisions
establishingthe Court'sjurisdiction..
The Rules for the Settlement of Differences adopted by the
jurisdiction,it existson the basofethe relevant treaty provisions.
A regulation adopted bythe organ of first instancecannot add tor
detract kom the appellate junsdiction possessedbythe Court
under provisionswhichhavebeen agreed to bythe contracting
States, on whose consentthat jurisdictionffrounded.
16. Inanycase,itwasnot the objectof these Rules to affect or
dirninishthe Court's jurisdiction, butonly%plate the
procedures withinthe ICAO Councilitself .'
238 Continental SheIf(TunisiaiL~bvanArab Jarnahiriva).Aririlicatiofor
Permissionto Intervene. Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1981,p. 16,para.27.
239 ADD~~Relatina to the Jurisdictionof the ICA0 Council.1.C.J.Reports
isR, p. 145. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 405
4.19 The same pointswere made byJudge de Castro in his
Separate Opinion:
"Article4ofthe Conventionmustbe taken as the starting point in
orde1to solvetheproblem ofappeals, and it isstarting that
Articlethat the provisionsof the Rules must be studi."
Judge de Castro alsonoted tha-
"..it cannotbe said ...that the Rules of Procedure are statutory
rules,havingthe same force asthe constituentinstrument of the
Council. TheRules for theSettlement of Differenceswere not
adopted byvote of the Parties to the Convention,f the
members ofthe Assembly;it wasthe Councilwhichapproved them
whichthe Councilitselfhas produced. The Councilreservestomething
itselfpowers overthe procedure (Art.28),and Article33tellsus
that'thegfsent Rules may,at anytime,be amended by the
Council' ."
4.20 The comments of these distinguishedJudgespoint to a fatal
flawinthe United States' argument,whichplaces undue emphasison the Rules
and failsto giveproper signifïcanceto Article 84,whichisthe statutov basisof
the Court'sjurisdiction. It willbe shownin Chapter II that each ofthe conditions
ofArticle 84has been met and that a decisionoftICA0 Councilqppealable to
the Court wasrendered.
CHAPTERIl TEE COUNCiL'SHANDLMC OF THEDISPUTE
m m
-55
4.21 In Chapter 2ofits discussion ofthe ChicagoConvention,the
United States seeksto showthat the disputesubmitted bythe IslamicRepublic406 AERIAL INCIDENT 24~
wasnot dealt withbythe Councilunder the procedural rulesestablished bythe
Councilto deal withArticle 84disputes242. It contends th-t
-
no pro er a plicationwassubmittedbythe Islamic
Article84dispute, asrequired bythe Rules;bmittingan
- no written record ofthe proceedingsexists,aswouldhave
been the case ifthe dispute had been dealth under the
Rules;
- the deliberations ofthe Councilshowthat ifwasnot acting
under the Rules;
- the United States exerciseda rightofvote whichit should
not havedone had the matter been considered under Article
- no decisionofthe kind envisagedunder the Ruleswas
rendered by the Council;and
-
the ICAO'sLegal Bureau Director hasstatedthat the
Councilwas actingunder Article 54(n).
4.22 These arguments are of a purelyformalisticnature and fail
to address the essential issuefor the purposes of determiningwhether the Court
hasjurisdiction-whether or not a disagreement overthe interpretation or
application of the ChicagoConventionwassubmitted to, considered and decided
on bythe Council? Asthe Court obsewed in the Appeal case, thismustbe "an
objectivequestionof law,the answerto whichcannot depend on what occurred
beforc the ~ouncil~~~''A. t best, the United States' arguments,if factually
accurate, wouidonlycauntas evidenceas to whether ornot objectivelysucha
disagreement hadbeen decided, However, in themselves, theycannot answerthe
questionofwhether or not the conditionsofArticle 84ofthe Convention have
been met.
242 S-, U.S .reliminaryObjections, pp. 110Gg..
243 A~~eaiRelatin~to the Jurisdictionof theICA0 Council.Judment. LCJ.
Revorts 1975 p 70. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 407
4.23 The specificfactual contentionsmade by the United States
as to allegedprocedural defectsin the Council'streatment ofthe disputewillbe
addressed in Chapter III. However,itwillbecorneapparent from the following
discussionnot onlythat the Ruleswere followedinessence but also thatto the
extent there wasanydepanure fromthe Rules thiswasdone withthe agreement
of the Partiesand in recognitionofthe urgent nature of the disputeand the need
for itseffectivedisposition,pursuant to Article 32of the Rules.
4.24 Even ifthe Rules were not applied to the letter, it mustbe
asked whether the United States isseriouslyarguingthat the case shouldbe
reheard bythe Councilde novofor a second decisionto be made in cornpliance
withthe Rules. Thiswouldclearlybe an absurd suggestion whenthe Councilhas
dealt sofultywiththe dispute and givenits finaldecisionon the issueItwould
make no sense in terrnsofthe good administrationofjustice andwouldconflict
withone of the established exceptionsto the exhaustionoflocalremedies rule
that:
'There can be no need to resort to the municipalcou9t4;)f the
result mustbe a repetition of acisionalreadygiven .
Preciselyfor these kindsofreasons, in similarcircumstancesthe Court has ruled
244
Panevezvs-SaldutiskisRailway.Judment, 1939,P.C.I.J..SeriesAB. No.
74-p. 18. Sec .lso,the DissentingOpinionsofJudges Hudson and Erich
at pp. 47-48and pp.53-54,respectively.408 AERlAL INCIDENT 11261
that it shouldnot allowitselftobe hampered by mere defects of
4.25 Inthe lightof the abovecomments,this Chapter willshow
that al1the requirements ofArticle 84havebeen met in the present case;that a
disagreement over the interpretation or application of the Conventionwas
submitted to the Council (SectA); that the United States recognizedthat such
a disagreement wasbefore theCouncil(SectionB);and that the Council
considered and made a decisionon this disagreement (SectionC). In such
circumstances,the Court hasjurisdiction, andmere defectsof fonn cannot act as
a bar to that jurisdiction.
Smo~ A. TheIslamic Revublic Subrnitteda Disarreemeat Overthe
htepretation orA~~licationofthe Conventionto the
Council
The Islamic Revublic'scommunicationsof3-4 Julv 1988
i)
4.26 Reflectingthe extrtme urgencyofthe matter, the Islamic
Republic brought the attention of both the U.N. SecurityCounciland ICA0 to
245
sensetorequire Nicaraguanowto institute fresh proceedingsbased on the
Treaty, whichit wouldbe My entitied to do. As the Permanent Court
observed,
'theCourt camot allow itselfto be hampered bya mere defect of
form he rernovalof whichde ends solelyon the Partyconcerned'
$CertainOcman Intereaü in FollrhUo~cr Silesia.lurisdiction,
udement No. 6.1925.P.C.I.J..Senek- No.6,p. 14):'
Militamand ParamilitarvActivitieInand aeainst Nicarama (Nicaraeuav.
United States ofArnerical. Jurisdictionand Admissibilitv;Judment. -1.C.J.
Reports 1984,pp.428-429.[1271 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 409
the incident immediatelyafter it o~curred~~~.To this end, the IslamicRepublic
sent three telexesto the President ofthe ICAOCouncil,two on 3July 1988,and
one on4July 1988. In the firsttelex,the IslamicRepublicreferred to the
"aggressiveand criminalattack"byU.S.forcesand concluded:
"Inthe interestofsafetyand securityofcivilaviationin the region
and forthe benefit of humanityas a whole1kindlyrequest you to
tak5ffective measures in condemningsaid hostile and criminal
acts ."
Inthe second telex,the IslamicRepublic requested the President andother
membersof the Councilto givethe issuetheir persona1attention and invited
thernto visitthe Persian Gulf and studytheincident248. Finally,inthe third telex
the IslamicRepublic requested thatthe issuebe tabled in the Council "asa matter
ofurgency" -
"...withthe viewthat an ExtraordinarySessionof ICAOAssembly
be urgentlyconvenedto conduct a thorough investigationof all
aspects ofthe catastrophe".
The telexadded:
246 In hisletter of 3 Jul 1988to the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations,
Mr. Velayafithe dinirter ofForeign Affairsof the Uamic Republic,was
explicitin statingthat the United States'actionswere a "clearviolationof
al1international rules and rinci les articularlyArtic1eand 2 ofthe
1944Chica O convention'? =bit !& to the Memorial of the Islamic
Republic. Re ais0pointed out theS~~OUS threat to civilaviationin the
region posed bythe presence ofU.S .orces,stressingthat mere verbai
expressionsofregret would notsatistj the requirements of the situation,
andcalledon theSecretary-General toassistin mobilizingpertinent
international bodiesto investigatethetent ofthe U.S.atrocity. It isclear
from thisletter and from the telexesdiscussedhere that the Islarnic
Republic was from the ve firstinstant chargingthe United States with
violationsf the Chicaga gnventian.
247 Exhibit36.
248 Ibid.410 AERIAL INCIDENT [128]
"Wefhly believe prompt and effectiveattn.ICAO isnecessary
if safejfgduct of civilair transportation isto bbyfostered
ICAO ."
4.27 It emergeskom these telexesthat the IslarnicRepublic's
immediate concerns were fourfofir ore.ort the incident as amatter of
urgencyto the highestorgan responsible for internationalcivilaviation;second,to
seek a condemnation ofthe United States'actionsby ICthir tdrequest
ICAOtotake steps to restore the safetyofcivilaviationin the region; andfourth,
to request that a thorough investigationofa11aspects of the catastrophe be
instituted.
4.28 The telexof 4Julycalledfor an Extraordinary Sessionofthe
Assembly. The United States arguesthat this showsthat the IslamicRepublic
was not actingunder Article 84ofthe ChicagoConventionbecause the Assembly
has no role in Article 84disputes250. Even ifrelevant, the President of the
Councilclearlyunderstood that the issueshouldbe heard bythe Council. He
replied to the IslamicRepublic on 4July 1988statingthat hewasconsulting
members of the Council"concerningthe conveningof an Ex-traordinarySessionof
the ~ouncil~~~".However,as al1further proceedingswere before the Council,
and the appropriateness of thiswasnever disputed by the IslamicRepublic, this
argument ishardly relevant. The important point isthat the President recognized
the needio deal withthe JslamicRepubIic'srequest as a matter or urgencyand
wasable to convenethe ExtraordinarySessionofthe Councilwithin9days.
4.29 The IslamicRepublic dinotrefer either expresslyor
impliedlyto anyspecificprovisionofthe ChicagoConventionin makingits
249 Ibid.
250
U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 111.
251 Exhibit36.11291 OBSERVATIONS AND SuBMIssIoNs 41 1
submissionsta the President ofthe Council. Thus,it cannot be argued that the
IslamicRepublic actedunder anyone provisionof the Convention to the
exclusionof others. The IsIamicRepublic reliedon the Conventiongenerally,
and anyand al1provisionsthat were applicable. The IslamicRepublic tookthe
onlyactionopen to it giventhe urgencyof the matter, as there isno provisionfor
callinganurgent meetingof the Councilunder either Article 84of the
Convention or the Rules.
4.30 Moreover,the IslamicRepublic acted asanynon-Council
member of ICAOwouldbe expected to act. The issuewasplaced in the hands of
the Council,whichwasrequested explicitlyand asa matter of urgencytotake
effectivemeasures. The question ofhowthe issueshouldbe dealt with wasleft to
the Council. This approachwas fullyconsistentwiththe Conventionwhich
obligesthe Councilto deal appropriately withailmatters referred toit by
member States and givesthe Council full powerto applyappropriate
procedures252. The IslamicRepublicwasthus entitled to relyon the Council's
obligationstotake al1necessarysteps appropriate to itsrequests.
The IslamicRepublic'sA~dication to theICAOCouncil
(ii)
4.31 The firstExtraordinarySessionof the Councildealingwith
the incidentopened on 13July 1988. The IslamicRepublic's presentation
includeda statement ofthe relevant facts, and drew ona number of factual
252 The Council'sobligationsin this regard are discussedfurther inparas.
4.79-4.87,below.412 AERIAL INCIDENT il301
reports that had been subrnittedto the Councilprior to the It also
included arebuttal of arguments that had appeared in publicstatements byU.S.
4
officiaisabout the inciden- that the Vincennesthoughtit wasbeing attacked by
an F-14,as wellas the self-defenseargument relatingto the alleged attack bythe
srna11patrol boats. The IslamicRepublic's representative concludedwiththe
followingrequests:
"Thedelegation ofthe IslamicRepublicofIran requests that the
attention ofthe Counciland itsdeliberation durinnthis
Extraordinary Sessionbe directed towardsthe folkwing aspects of
thistragic incident:
1. Explicitrecognitionof a delictof international character
relating to the breach of international lawand legalduties of
a ContractingState,Member of ICAO.
2. Recognitionofthe fact that the Contracting State shallbear
an internationalresponsibiIityfor the criminalactionsof its
officiais,regardless whether they haveacted withinthe limits
of their authonty or have exceeded it.
3. Explicitcondemnation ofthe use ofweapons againstthe
Iran air passenger aircraftbya member of ICAO, namely
the United States.
4. Formation of an ad hoccommission to conduct an
investigationofvanous legal,technicaland other aspects of
the shooting dom of the Iran air passenger aircraftto be
reported, through the Council,to an Extraordinary Session
of theAssemblyforthe purpose of taking necessaryaction
as ensuringtheirproper and effectiveimplementation fors well
prevention of similaroccurrence.
5. Demand forthe irnmediatetermination ofpresent
obstacles,restrictions,hreats and use of force againstthe
airspace ofthe IslamicRepublic of Iran and the coastal
253 On 7July 1988the IslarnicRepublichad submitted a report to the
President ofthe Councilabout other incidentswhichhad taken place in
the Persian Gulf since 1987and which "...esulted from the violationsof
international Aviationlawand regulations bythe United States with
respect to safetyofthe International CivilAviation". Exhibit37. The first
report contained adetailed statement ofincidentswhere civilianaircraft
had been endangered byU.S.forces,a re ort on the illegalU.S.
NOTAMs,and a discussionofthe issueofciviI-militarycoordination. It
also contained a record of the IslamiRe ublic'srepeated protests to the
Councilabout thew actions. Exhibit38.I;hÿ report was su lemented by
a further report on 12July 1988,givingdetails,inter alia,of Kght IR 655,
itsroute, itscommunicationsand the number ofvictirns. Exhibit39. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSlONS
States ofthe Persian Gulf,whichendanger the safe
orderlyoperation of civilair transport in the region,1
4.32 These requests revealed that the IslamicRepublic's
application had a dual nature. On the one hand, there were clear requests for a
determination bythe ICAO Councilofthe existenceof a breach of "legalduties of
a ContractingState, ~ember of ICAO",recognition that thatState shodd bear
1
responsibilityfor itsillegalactions,and condemnationof the use of force bythat
State (requests 1,2 and 3).On the otber hand,the IslarnjcRepublicwasalso
concernedwiththe safetyof air navigationin the Persian Gulf (requests4 and 5).
Duringthe courseof the proceedings,the IsiamicRepublic repeatedly
emphasizedthe legalaspectsof itsapplication.
Requests 1,2 and 3clearlypresented to the Councila
4.33
chargeofviolationof the Conventionbythe United States,and thusa dispute
over the interpretation and application ofthe Conventionwithinthe meaning of
Article84. in thisrespect, the test formulated bythe Court in the Auueal caseis
of the greatest relevance:
"Consequentlythe legalissuethat has to be determined bythe
Court reallyamounts to this, namelywhether the dispute ..isone
thatcanbe resolvedwithoy@ly interpretation or application of
the relevant Treaties at al1 .
In the ADD~~ case,the Court held that where there wasa chargeofbreach of
treaties, the Councilwouldinevitablybe involvedin the interpretation and
application of the Convention:
"Iwasessentially a charge ofbreaches of the Treaties,-and in
order to determinethese,theCouncilwouldinevitablybe obliged
254
Draft C-Min.Extraordinary (1988)/1,13July1988,p. 7.Exhibit40.414 AERIAL INCIDENT 11321
to interpret andapplythe Treaties, thus to deal with matters
unquestionablywthin itsjurisdiction.l
The United States has argued thispoint before the Court itselfinthe United
States Diplomatic and Consular StaffinTehran case. There it claimedthat the
mere factthat the United States had charged Iranwithviolatingvarious
provisionsoftheTreaîyofAmity"inevitablyrequires the interpretation and
application of the ~reag'~"The same criteria applyto the IslarnicRepublic's
submissionsto the Council.
(iii) The Islarnic Republicmaintainedits leealclairns beforethe
ICA0 Councilthrougboutthe Council'sdeliberations
4.34 Thenext Councilmeetings dealingwiththe incident
commenced on5December 1988to considerthe fact-findingreport that had
been ordered bythe Council(hereinafter referred to as the "ICAOReport"). The
floorwastaken once more bythe representative ofthe IslarnicRepublic who
expressedthe hope thatthe Council's"deliberationon thisissuewillresult in
decisiveaction againstthe perpetrator as wellas a safeguard for preventing
further occurrencesof suchan In other words,the blamic Republic
fulIymaintained itsrequest that the Councilconsiderboth Iegalclaimsand safety
issues.
4.35 Having expressedhjsGovemment'sviewthat in the lightof
the ICAO Report the United States "shouldbe heldresponsibleand bear the
257
Oral Argumentof Mr.Schwebel,I.C.J.Pleadines.United States
Diplomatic andCansuIarStaffinTehran, (USAv.Iran ,p.285.Sec .lso,
[[onditionsof Admission ofState to MembershivinT hUnited Nations
p.61.This argument isconsideredin greater detail in Part VIbelow.
258 Draft C-Min.125/12(Closed),5December 1988,p. 8. Exhibit43.il331 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
consequencesofthe tragicir~cident~~~t"h,e representative of theIslarnic
Republic repeated hisGovernment's legalrequestsbyseekingthefollowing
action bythe Councii:
"1) Condemnation ofthe shootingdownof IR 655 bythe
United Statesmilitaryforcesin the Persian Gulf.
2) Explicitreco itionof a crimeofinternational character to
the brcach oEntemational lawand legaldutiesof a
ContractingState ofICAO.
Explicitrecognitionofthe responsibilitiesof the United
3) StatesGovernment, and callingfor effectingcompensation
for moral andfinanciaIdamages.
4) Demand for the immediate terminationofpresent
obstacles,restrictions,threats, and the use offorce against
civilianaircraft in the region,includingCouncil'sappeal to
relevant international bodiestoman e withdrawalof
aU foreignforces from the Persian Gulf.9b
These statements are asclear-cuta set ofsubmissionsof a legal claimbased on
violationsof international lawand treaty obligaasanythat couldbe foundin
anyinternationaljudicialor arbitral proceedings,and includechargesof
violationsof the Convention and requests for compensation.There couldthusbe
no questionthat the Councilwasstillfacedwitha seriouslegaldispute concerning
the interpretation and application of the Convention.
4.36 At the nextmeetingtwo dayslater, it wasdecidedthat the
ICAOReport commissionedbythe ICAOCouncilshouldbe submittedta the Air
Navigation Commission(the "ANC').A clear picture of howthe Islamic
Republic understood the proceedingsisgivenin thismeeting. After agreement
wasreached on referenceof theICAO Report to the ANC,the Islamic
Republic'srepresentative stressedthatthe reference toANCe was purelyto
dealwith the technicaland safetyaspects ofthe incident,and that oncethe ANC
259 M., p.11.
260 Ibid.416 AERIALINCIDENT [1341
had issueditsreport there wouidstillbethe legalissueswhichhad to be decided
bythe ~ouncil~~l,
4.37 The IslamicRepublic's representativeaisowent on to
rernindthe Councilof its obligationsunder Article540)of the Convention:
"Wealsowishto drawthe attention of the Councilto paragraphCj)
ofArticle 54ofthe ChicagoConvention,whichclearlystates that
the Councilshouldreport to contractingStates anyinfractionsof
failureg~f?rnoout recommendations or determinations of the
Council ,
The United States allegesthat thisshowsthat the IslamicRepublic was acting
under Article54Cj)not Articl84x3, To the contrary,the use ofthe word "also"
clearlyshowsthat Article541j)wasan additionalmatter for the Councilto
consider. In anyevent, aswillbe shownin Chapter IVbelow,evenifthe Council
acted under Article54(j),this doesnot necessarilypreclude an appeal to the
Court providingthe requirements ofArticle 84are stillmet.
4.38 At the end ofthis meeting,the President of the CounciI
"gaveassurance"that reference ofthe technicalaspectsto tANC "wouldnot
preclude detailed consideration,at a later stage, of the fulltextof the report of
the hvestigation Team"bythe Council(i.e.t.,ICA0 ~e~01-t)~~~H . e also
confirmeddirectlyto the IslamicRepublic that Articles540) and (k) wouldbe
iakenintoconsideration.
261 Draft C-Min 125113(Closed),7December 1988, p.19,para. 20. Exhibit
44.
262 Ibid.
263
US. PreliminaryObjections,p. 118.
264
Draft C-Min.125/13(Closed),7December 1988,pp. 19-20,para. 22.
Exhibit44.il351 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 417
4.39
The finalmeetingsat whichthe incidentwasconsideredby
the Councilwereheldon 13,15and 17March 1989.Asfar asthe Islarnic
Republic was concerned,the purpose of these meetingswastwofold:to consider
the safetyrecommendationsofthe ANC and to deal finallywiththe legalissues.
For thisreason, the hlamic Republic oncemore repeated itsrequests for relief in
alrnostidenticaltems to those set out inparagraph 4.35ab~ve~~. his confirrns
that the IslamicRepublic had reliedon the President's assurancesthat these
issueswtre stillto be decidedbythe Council. Reflectingthe IslamicRepublic's
dual concems, the Council'sfinaldecisionof 17March 1989dealt firstwiththe
incidentitself,fmdingthat the shoot-dom waanaccidentalthough there had
been errors in identificationof the aircraft,and secondwiththe safetyissues,by
approvingthe recommendationsin the ANCreport266.
4.40 It isclear fromthe above that the IslamicRepublic had
appliedto the Councilfora decisionon a disagreement involvingthe
interpretation and application of the ChicagoConvention. To thisextent,
therefore, one ofthe mainrequirements ofArticle84had been met.
SECITO BN. The Reswnse oftheUnited States Beforethe ICA0 Council
Confirms mat a Disagreement Over Tbe Intemretetion and
AvvlicationoftheConventionHadBeenSubrnittedto theCouncil
4.41 The response ofthe United Statesto the IslamicRepublic's
applicationmust be consideredin the lightof the overridingquestionas to
whether a disagreement between the Parties over the interpretation or
applicationofthe ChicagoConventionwithinthe meaningofArdcle 84was
submitted to the Council. InthewordsofJudge Onyeama in hisSeparate
Opinion inthe A~pealcase,sucha disagreement mustexistwhereverthere is"a
265
Draft C-Min. 126/18,13March 1989,p. 7.Exhibit47.
266
C-Dec 126/20,17March 1989, p.3. Exhibit50.418 AERIAL INCIDENT LI361
differenceof opinionas to the meaningofsome provisionofthe Convention,or
as to-howsucha provisionshouldbe applied between contractingStates in the
fieldof civilaviation2671'.
4.42 Judge Onyeama'sviewreflectsthe findingsofboth the
Permanent Court and the present Couras to when a disputecanbe said to exist.
As the Permanent Court indicated initsJudgment of 30August 1924in the
Mavrommatiscase:
"Adispute ia disagreementon a point oflawq6p;t, a cordict of
legalviewsor ofinterestsbetween twopersons .
4.43 Asthe record shows,it immediatelytranspired before the
ICA0 Councilthat sucha disagreement existedbetween the IslamicRepublic
and the United Statesand thathidsisagreement hadbeen submitted ta the
Councilfor decision.
TheUnitedStatesimmediatelvtwk issue withthe Islamic
(i) Re~ublic>srwrsition
4.44 At the firstmeeting ofthe Councilto cansider the incident
on 13July 1988the United States'representative made a detailed presentation of
itsversionof the incidentbefore the ICAOCouncil. Thispresentation was
introduced in the foliowingterms:
"ln mystatement today,1intend to address the following:
commentilon the continukg conflictin the Persian Gulf;t, including
26-' ArmealRelatine to the Jurisdictionofthe ICAO Council,I.C.J.Reports
19h p. 87.
268 MavrornrnatisPalestine Concessions.Judement No.2,1924, P.C.I.J,
SeriesA No. 2,p. 11. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMlSSIONS 419
Second, I wiiidesmie the specificsituation confrontingthe captain
ofthe United States shipVincenneson July3, 1988,as the facts are
knownto usat thistime; and
Third, 1willdiscusspossiblestepsthat the International Civil
AviationOrganizationmightconsiderin order to avoidfuture
incidentssuchas the one we address today. Mygovernmentwants
to incrcasethe safetyof international civilaviationin the Bersian
Gulf,a fundamentalgoal ofthis Organizationand certainlyofthe
United States. Wehope -@raordinary Sessionof the Council
wiilinitiatewark tothat end ."
4.45 The United States'approach mirrored the dualnature of
the IslamicRepublic'sclaims:in essence itwasdividçdinto (i) 1egaUfactual
assertionsand (ii)an aliegedconcernfor safetyissues. Likethe IslamicRepublic,
the United Statesmade no reference to Article54 or anyother Article ofthe
Convention. However,the United States didmake a Iegaland factual
presentation concerningthe background situationinthe PersianGulf prior to the
incident,aswellas the incidentitself,verysimilarin scope to that made in its
PreliminaryObjections. It specificallyrejected the IslamicRepublic'scontention
that the U.S.navalpresence in the Persian Gulfwasto blame for the incident270.
It presenteditsself-defenseargumentin detail: allegingthat the Vincenneshad
gane to assistneutral vesselsthat were being "attackedor threatened" by"Iranian
gunboats";that the VincennesrnisidentifiedFlighIR 655 as an F-14;and that
"thecaptain felt ampelled to take actjon to protect hismen and hisvesse1from
what then appeared to be an air attacinsupport ofthe Iranian surface
Finally,it blamed the IslamicRepublic fora sharofthe
responsibilityfor the incident272.
269 Draft C-Min.Extraordinary (1988)/1, J1l31988,pp. 89. Exhibit 40.
270 m., p. 9.
271 lbid., pp. 10-11.
272 Ibid.,pp. 11-12. AERIAL INCIDENT Il3S]
4.46 In other words,the United States made a detailed rebuttal
of the-IslamicRepublic's contentionas presented to theCouncil. Inand of itself,
the presentation of these arguments showedthat there existeda disagreement as
to the United States' performance of its obligationsunder the Chicago
Convention,and thus asto the interpretation and applicationofthe Convention,
and that these issueswere placed before theCouncil. The United States also
recognizedthe urgencyofthe matter and the need for effectiveand expeditious
treatment bythe Councilof the issuesraised.
4.47 The United States indicatedthat it expected the Councilto
decide these issues. GiWigits agreement to the Idamic Republic'srequest for a
fullfact-hding investigationof the incident,the United States concludedits
opening presentation withthe followingstatement -
"Mr. President, thisCouncilhas a longhistoryof careful
deliberations and of fairness andisdomin itsiudmnents. My
government truststhat itsMembers, asin past incidents,H reach
its conclusionsonlyafter al1the facts havebeen received ."
The wholepresentation by the United States, andin particular the explicituse of
its self-defenseargument, conürmsthejudicialnature ofthe issuesfacingthe
Council,and the judicialnature of the role that the Councilwas expectedto
adopt.
4.48 The Court willappreciate,therefore, that as from the very
outset ofthe ICA0 deliberations there was a disagreement overwhat each State
regarded asthe relevant factual and legalissues. Moreover,both States
rnaintainedtheir positionsin the subsequent proceedingsand the United States
didnot cease to dispute the claimsmade by the IslamicRepublic.
273 m., p.14(emphasis added).il391 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 421
4.49 For example,inthe last deliberationsbefore the Council,at
the meeting on 17March 1989,the United Statessoughtto distinguishthis case
from earlier casesinvolvingthe shootingdownof civilianaircraft. Accordingto
the United States,the caseof FliEtt655was"fardifferent"fromthese other
casesbecause "[ilnnone of the previouscaseshadthere been on-goinghostilities
or anyother circlirnstancesto explainthejustificationofforce"274. In
essence,the United States wasarguingthinpreviouscasesthere had been no
real element ofdispute. The shootingof FliIR655was,according tathe
United States,fundamentallydifferentbecause the use offorce in questionwas
said to be justified,and therefore no violationof the ChicagoConvention had
taken place.
4.50 Giventhe specificrequest ofthe IslamicRepublicaor
findingthat the Unjted Stateshad violated the Convention,it isclear from the
abovethat the United Statesrecognisedthat an Article 84type disagreement
existedand that in dealingwiththis disagreementthe Councilhadjurisdictionto
considerthe United States'arguments on self-defeandother issues. Such
arguments couldnot be consideredwithoutengagingthe Councilin ajudicial
capacityrelating to the interpretation or applicationof the Convention.
SEC~IO CN TheICA0 Council'sAvvroachtothe Shootdowu of Fiinht
m 655
4.51 It has been shownabovethat a disagreementbetween two
States overthe interpretation and application ofthe ChicagoConventionwas
presented to the Counciltisnowappropriateto considerwhether the
remainingrequirements ofArticle84were fulfilled:that thisdisagreewast
considered and decidedby the Council. It shouldbe recalledinthis regard that
once the Councilhas a disagreementbefore it,the obligationison the Council
274 Draft C-Min126/20,17March 1989, p.7. Exhibit49.422 AERIAL INCIDENT il401
under Article84to decide onthat disagreement. Article84providesthat any
suchdisagreement "shall..be decidedbythe Council".
(i) TheICAOCouncil'sconsiderationof thedisamment
4.52 There canbe no doubt that the Council"considered"the
disagreementwith whichit wasfaced. It held severalmeetings,spanninga penod
ofover 9 months,specificallyto deal withthe incident. It heard detailed legaland
factualargumentbyboth the IslamicRepublic and the United States.Italso
initiated afact-findinginvestigationwiththe expresspurpose of determinhg "ail
relevant factsand technical aspectsof the chainof eventsrelatingto the flightand
destruction ofthe air~raft~~~. here isthus a veryfullwritten record ofthese
proceedings.
4.53 From the record of the Council'sdeliberations it isclear that
some Councilmembers soughtto ignore or even excludeconsideration of the
legalissues,notwithstandingrepeated appealsfrom the IslamicRepublic. For
example,the Venezuelan representative stated at the 15March 1989meeting
that legalissueswere "outsideof ICAOs pu~ew276t'. The United Kingdom
representative likewisesuggestedthat the "safetyofinternational civilaviation"
wasthe Council'sconcern,and that the Councilshould"restrictitselfto
consideraiion ofthe technicalissueswithinitsmandatet1277.In the viewof the
two leadingmembers ofthe Council,the United Kingdomand the United States,
ICAOwasmerely"atechnicalbody278",endowedwitha "specifictechnical
275 C-DecExtraordinary (1988)/2,14July 1988,p. 2,para. 6. Exhibit42.
276 Drafi C-Min.126/19,15March 1989,p. 5, para.9. EKhibit48.
277 Draft C-Min1 .2511 (3 iosed),7December 1988,p. 12,para. 11. Exhibit
43-
278
Draft C-Min.126120,17March 1989, p.6, para.8. Exhibit49.II41] OBSERVATIONSAND SUEMISSIONS 423
Thus, inspite oftheIslamicRepublic's remindersthat there were
twoaspectsto itscase,legaland technicalZg0,and itscal1for a ''justand impartial
decision2'l", some Councilmembers seemedmore interested inreaching a
purelypoliticalsolutioninthe "spiritofthe rebirth ofthe Helsinkiaccordof
197528211!
4.54 The United States alsoalleges,that in hissurnmaryof the
openingSessionof 13July1988of the Councilthe President failedto recognise
the elementsofdisagreement that were evidentbetweenthe IslamicRepublic
and theUnited States,focussinginstead on the "technicalaspects2. heT
languageused bythe President wasas foliows:
'The imperativetaskforthe Councilnowisto collectal1vital
informationand to reaca complete technicalunderstandingofthe
chainof eventswhichIed to thistragedy.ehaveto exploreevery
Recommended Practices, guidancegmaterial and procedures which,
couldprevent the repetition of a similartragedy,notonlyinthe
area$&re thistragic incident occurred butanywbereelse in the
world ."
4.55 Ifthe United States iscorrect that the President soughtto
ignore the IslamicRepublic'sIegalrequests, then sstatements,as wellas the
statements of the other Councilmemberswho sougbtto restrict the Council'srole
to technical question,wereclearlyinappropriate where legalissueswere before
the Council. Under the Convention,the Councilbas an obligatitoconsider
279
m., p. 7,para. 9.2.
DraftC-Min. 125/13(Cloçed),7Decernber 1988,p. 19,para. 20. Exhibit
a.
281 Draft C-Min.126/18,13March 1989,p.16,para. 12. W.
282 Ibid.p.19,para. 16.
283 U.S. PreliminaryObjectionspp.117-118.
284 DraftC-Min .xtraordinary (1988)/1,13July1988,p. 4. Exhibit40.424 AERIAL INCIDENT [142]
and deal withsuchlegalissuesand the Councilcannot escape suchobligationsby
pretending that itssoleispurelytechnicaland bydenymgjudicialtreatment to
requests for legaldecisionsof the kindsubmittedbythe IslamicRepublic. Ifthe
Councilsees itsrole in thisway,or findsit difficultto dealwithlegalissues,then
this denial ofjustice isan additional reason forthe Court to exerciseits
supervisoryjurisdictionin thiscase285.
4.56 lnfachit appears uncertain under whichArticlethe Council
itselfthought itwasacting. The United States has argued that the Councilwas
actingunder Article54(n),whichobligesthe Councilto "Consideranymatter
relating to the Conventionwhich anycontractingState refers to it"286. However,
thisprovisionwasnever once referred to in anyof the Councilproceedings
concerningthe incident. Even ifthe Councilthoughtit wasactingunder Article
54(n),in refening to "anymatter relatingto the Conventionwhichanycontracting
State refers to it"(emphasis added), this provisionisclearlybroad enough to
includedisagreements relatingto the interpretation or application of the
Conventionas providedfor under Article 84.
285 See,in general, Chapter Vbelowon this issue.
286
U.S. PreliminaryObjections,P. 129-131.The United States relies-ona
statement byMr. Mildc,the 8xectm ofthe ICA0 Le alBureau, to thk
effect,in Mr, Mildc7rletter to the De utyRegistrar otthe Couriof 26 May
1989. US. PreliminaryObjections,Aibit 24. Mr. Milde'sview were not
onIyinaccurate for threasons explainedbut it wasalsototally
correctly,the Registrar did not put Mr. Milde'sletter in the ofthis
case,and Dr. Kotaite, the President of the ICAO,subsequentlymade ciear
in his oral statement of9June1989tothe Councilin CouncilMeeting
127/10that anywritten observationsof ICAOwili be ro erlysubmitted in
duc course ifrequested and ifappmpriate.&, Exhikt h.
The United States'inclusionofMI. Milde'sletteas an Exhibitto their
PreliminaryObjections hasobligedthe IslamicRepubIicto make this
response, without prejudicea itsview'thMr. Milde'sletter canhave no
statusinthese proceedings.i1431 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 425
4.57 What isclearisthat the IslamicRepublic submitteda legal
dispute tû the Councilfordecision. Thiswasrecognizedbythe United Statesat
the time and,whilesome members ofthe Councilmayhave sought to playdown
the legalaspects of the dispute,thisdisputewasnevertheless consideredand,as
willbe shownbelow,decidedon bythe Council. In suchcircumstances,where the
requirements of Article84ofthe Convention have beeço clearlyfulfilled,a right
of appeal to thCourtelcists.
(ii) TheCouncil'sdecisionof 17March1989 was ofa nature
apwalable to the Court
4.58 The CouncilmeetingsofMarch 1989focussedon both the
legaland the safety aspectsof the incident, reflectingthe dual concerns that had
been expressedduringthe previous proceedingsbefore the Council. In arguing
the legal issues,some members of the Council,suchas the SovietUnion and
Czechoslovakia,supported the IslamicRepublic's request fora condemnation of
the United States and proposed appropriate resoluti~ns~~~.Otherq however,
suchas the United Kingdom,stressed that the tragedywasan accidentand that
no action shouldtherefore be taken againstthe United St-in other words,
that the IslamicRepublic's requests should berejectedB8.
4.59 It itrue that some members of the Councilremained
reluctant to deal withthe legaldispute in the appropriate manner andinstead
concentrated on the safetyand technicalissues. Nevertheless,there isalso no
doubt that the Councilwasaware that the legaldispute had to be dealt with,a
conclusionthatisevidencedby the factthat there were divergviews as to how
the Councilshoulddecide. For example,recagnizingthe legaland fïnaInature of
287 Sec .raft C-Min.126/20,17March 1989,pp. 4-5.Exhibit49.
288 -Ibid.,p. 6,para. 8. In comtothisconclusion,the majorityofthe
Councilwas relyingon the fact-findinginvestigation,the pnmary source of
informationfor whichwasthe U.S.Defense Department Report.426 AERIAL INC1DENT
the decisionto be taken, the Kenyanrepresentative stressedthat it should'be
consistentwith previousdecisions,taken in accordancewith the Council's
mandate and not influencedby politicalconsiderations89.
4.60 The legalnature ofthe decisionexpectedfrom the Council
wasexplicitlybrought to the attention bythe IslamicRepublic:
"Sincethe decisionadopted bythe Counciiat thismeetingwould
remain on ICAO'srecord andwouldmost orobablvbe used as a
recedent in future decision-making,thelegati6n ofthe Islamic
and impartial positionWnst suchviolations,irrespectiveofstron-
political considerations ."
The Council'sdecisionmaynot havemet al1the requirements ofthe Islamic
Republic, but that doesnot alter the fact that it consituteda bindingdecisionthat
dealtwith the issuebefore the Council.
4.61 In the end, the Councildidnot condemnthe United States
as it had been requestta do, and the IslamicRepublic'ssubmissionswere not
upheld. The decisionwas nonethelessa legaldecisionwhichconcludedthe
Council'sconsideration ofthe shoot-downofFlightIR 655. In these
circumstances,the United States' assertionthat the Court isbeing asked to act as
acourt offirstinstance inthepresent caseiswhoIlywithoutf~undation~~'.A
decisionwasreached bythe Councilthat canbe validlysubjected to appeal asit
was ~eached after a comprehensiveconsideraiionofthe positionsofthe Parties
and ofthe facts.
289
-Ibid.pp.7-8,para.10.
290
-Ibid.,p. 4,para5.
291 U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p.142. il451 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 427
4.62 Asforthe United States' argument thatthe decisionof the
Council wasnot an Article84decisionbecause it didnot complywiththe
distinctiveandwell-knownrequirernents forsuahdeci~ion~~-~the short answer
isthat this argumentisirrelevaFir shtcontention ismade in a legalvacuum.
The factisthat there are no "distinctiveand well-knownrequirements for Article
84decisions",as there has never been sucha decisionexceptin the dispute over
the suspensionbyIndia of flightsofPakistaniaircraft over Indian temitoryin 1971
(the "Pakistanflndia"case),which wasnot, ofcouasCouncildecisionon the
merits293.
4.63 Moreover,inthe Pakistanfindiacasethe Ruleswere byno
means strictlyadhered to bythe Counciland the decisionrendered wasnot inthe
"correct"form. In particular,statutoy voting provisionswere ignoredand no
reasons weregivenforthe decisions. However,whenthe Court heard India's
appeal againstthe Council'sdecision,it didnot considerthe allegedprocedural
irregularitiesin anydetaii asit considered thatsuchirregularitieswouldonly
. confirmthe appealabilityof the decisi~n~n~anyevent,as wilibe shownin the
nextChapter, the Rules were followedin essencein the present case in the
Council'srenderina£ a decisionon 17March 1989~~~.
4.64 Second,whatever for mhe decisiowas in-whether termed
a "decision"oa"resolution-the Councilmade a substantive and finaldecision
on the disagreement submitted to it bythe islamicRepublicwithinthe rneaning
293
Sec . ction oftheCouncil,Seventy-fourthSession,27-29July 1971. Doc.
8987-Cf1004,pp. 42-46. Exhibit52.
294 A~~eaiRelatin to the Jurisdictionofthe ICA0 Council,Judment. I.C.J.
Revorts 1972,:p. 69-70.
295 Çee.paras. 4.88-4.101,below.428 AERIAL INCIDENT il461
of Article84. Specifically,the Councilfound that the incident "occurredas a
consequence of events and errors in identificationofthe aircraftwhichinsulted
the accidental destructionof an Iran Airairliner and the lossof290li. s~~~'A
a result of the findingof"accidentaldestruction",there wasno condemnofion
the United Statena findingofviolationsofthe Conventionand no ruiingthat
compensationwasdue297.
4.65 The IslamicRepubIicdoes not accept that this decisionwas
correct in fact or lInthis regard,the mere findingthat there were "errors"in
indentificationof the aircraft should havebeen sufficientto engagethe United
States'responsibilitAsProfessor Lowenfeldhas stated, thisdecisionwas'%ad
international law",evenifirisaccepted that the shoot-downwas an accident,
notingthat there shouldbe 'liabilityregardlessof fault,solong asthe cause is
established,as it clearlywasin the caseof Iran Air 655,as in the case ofKorean
Air Lines 007"~~~.
SECTI ON Conclusion
4.66 Ailthe requirements af Article84 met in the present
case. A disagreement betweentwoStates overthe interpretation or application
ofthe Conventionwassubmitted to the Council,consideredby it and decion.
296
C-Dec 126/20,17March 1989. Exhibit50.
297
separatelyby the Councilitsendorsement of the findingsand safetythquite
recommendations of theANC. No action wastaken bythe Councilon the
NOTAMs. Memberswere informedbythe United Statesthat these
NOTAMs had been cancelled. Sec D.raft C-Min.126/18,13March 1989,
p. 10,para6. Exhibit47. However,they weresubsequentlyreintroduced
bythe United Statesand continue to interfere withand endanger civil
aviation inthe regioSee . ernorialofthe IslamicRepublic,p. 227,
para. 4.28Sec.also,the Annexhereto.
298 Lowenfeld,A.:'ZookingBackand LookingAhead",Agora: Iran AirNght
655,8A 3m. J. Int'l.Law{1989),p. 338. Exhibit53.il471 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 429
4.67 In rendering itsdecision,the IslamicRepublic maintains
that .theCouncilerred on substantivegroundsinnot properiy consideringthe
legalrequests before it, and innot condemningtheUnited States for breaches of
the ChicagoConvention. It js this decisionthat the IslamicRepublicisnow
appealing.
CHAPTERIII TEE UNITEDSTATESE 'MPHASISON THE
SIGNIFICANCO EF1nE RULESIS MISPLACED
4.68 The United States accusesthe IslamicRepublicofignonng
the Rules in its~ernorial~~~.Wie the IslamicRepublic'sMernorialwasnot
principallydevoted to the issueofjurisdiction,it mustbe said that the United
States'discussionofthe ChicagoConventiongivesundue prominence to the
Rules at the expense ofArt84of the Convention. It has already been
explainedabovethat it isArticle84that governsthe Court'sjurisdictionwhich
cannot in anywaybe limitedbyan ad hoc set of procedural rules adopted bythe
~ouncil~~~.Additional reasonswhythe significanceofthe Rules isexaggerated
bythe United StateswiUbe discussedin thisChafirstte,Rules themselves
are clearlynot of the detailed, comprehensive,exclusiveor mandatorynature
suggestedbythe United States. Second,the Rules havenever been stnctly
followedbythe CouncilThir ady.failure to followthe Rules wasa failure ofthe
Councilnot of the IslamicRepublic. Under tge ChicagoConvention,the Council
has thdutyand the power to determine itsownrulesof procedure. Fourth, the
United States'argument isinaccuratebecause the essentialfeatures of the Rules
were followedbythe Councilinitshandlingthedispute and agreement was
reached between the Parties on these procedures in accordancewith hicle 32of
the Rules.
299 U.S .reliminaryObjections,p. 93.
300 Sec .aras4.084.2 a0ove.430 AERIAL INCIDENT [148]
Smo~ A. TheRules Are NeitherDetaiied.Com~rehensive.Exclusive
NorMandatory
4.69 The United States argues that the Rules are "detailed,
comprehensive,exclusiveand mandat~r~~~~"T . hisstaternent issirnplynot true.
Gerald Fitzgerald,former PrincipalLegalOfficerof ICAO,gavea more accurate
descriptionof the Ruleswhen,referring to the "relativelyprimitivedecision-
makingprocedure foUowedbythe ICAOCouncilwhen actingas ajudicialbody",
he noted that there were "inherentweaknessinthe procedures forthe
settlement of disputesarisingunder the Chicu on vent io Ont"^^^.
commentators have stressedthe extrernelyflelobleapproach embodied in the
Rules. Thus,Buergenthal observedthat the Councildoes not act as a "courtof
lawinthe strict senseof the word"and pointed out that it "istherefore freeto
adopt veryflexibleprocedures for dealingwithdisputesthat are referred to
p303
4.70 A brief analysisof the Rules bears out these points304
Article 1oftheRules states that theyshallgove-n
"Anydisagreement betweentwoor more ContractingStates
relating to thete retation or applicationofthe Convention on
Internationalivil%ation ..and itsAnnexes ...".
Wowever,itshouid be noted that the obligationto ensure the Rules are foliowed
rests primarilyon the Council.
301 U.S. PreliminaryObjectionsp.93.
302
Fitzgerald,G.F.: 'The Judgment of the InternationalCourt ofJustice on
the Appeal Relating to the JurisdictionofICAO Council",XII
Canadian Yearbook ofInternational Law(1974 1p. 170-171.Exhibit54.
303 Buergenthal,T.:LawMakingin the International Civil~viation
Organisation (SyracuseUniv.Press, 1969p. 136. Exhibit55.
304 Si, Exhibit33.il491 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 43 1
4.71 The onlysubstantive requirement on a memberState isthat
it shouldsubmit adisagreement to the Councilfor settlement under Article2.
After that initialstep,it isfor the Counciland the Secretav General ofICA0 in
particular to determine the specificRules that shouldbe followedand to ensure
the correct applicationof the Rules.
4.72 Article2of the Rules sets out the procedural requirements
for aState submittinga disagreementto the Council. In particular,the
contractingState should"filean applicationto whichshallbe attached a
memonal". But eventhisobligationissubjectto controlbythe SecretaryGeneral
of ICAO. It ishe,under Article 3of theRules,whoisobligedto verifythat the
application "compliesinform with the requirements ofArticle2"and "if
necessary",he rnay"requirethe applicant tosupplyany deficienciesappearing
thereinSo5.
4.73 The Q& hrther proceedingswhichare obligatoryunder the
Rules are that the respondent State shouldbe invitedbythe SecretaryGeneral to
file a counter-memoriat. However,the Councilhas the optioto take awhole
range ofsteps:
- it mayinvitethe Parties to enter into direct negotiations
under Article6(1);
- it rnaydecide to deal withthe rnatter itselfor appoint a
comrnitteeto do the sameunder Article6(2);
- it mayallowfurther writtenpleadingsunder Article7;
- it mayconduct an investigationunder Articl8whjchshall
be incorporated into a report;
305
In earlier casesthe Counciihasbeen diligentin infqrmingState members
of the requirements of the Rule&, paras. 4.84-4.86below. AERIAL INCIDENT Il501
itmayagree to receive oral testimonyunder Article 9.
After hearing anyargumentsor evidencebythe parties under the procedures
outlined above,the Council"shailrender its decision"pursuant to Ar15ofe
the Rules.
4.74 It can be seen from the above that the Councilhas allowed
itselagreat deal of freedom inits decision-makingprocess. Asnoted byJudge
de Castro, afurther indicationofthe flexibilityof theisthat theyrernain
subjectto amendment bythe Counciland maybe variedor suspended at anytime
withthe agreement ofthe parties to a disagreement whenever thiswouldassist
the expeditiousor effectivedispositionofthe case306.
4.75 Article 32ofthe Rules isofparticular significancein this
case because evenin itsfirst telexesto the Councilthe IslamicRepubPc had
stressed the urgent nature of the caseand the need for effectivemeatobes
taken. The Councilalsorecognizedthe need for suchan approach in convening
an Eiaraordinary Sessionwithin9daysofthe incident. The fact that aUfurther
procedural stepswere taken withthe agreement ofthe Parties showsthat the
Council'sactions remained fullyconsistentwithArtic32.
_-ON B. nie RulcsAreNotWellEstablishedWithinthePrncticeof
theICAOCouncil
4.76 The United States givesthe impressionthat the Rules are
well-establishedwithinthe workingsofthe ICAOCouncil. Infact,the Rules have
never been stnctlyfollowedin practice. The Ruleswere developedduringthe
1950 snthe contextof a dispute raisedby india againstPakistan concerninga
prohibited zone created byPakistin India'sairspace (the "IndiaPakistan"
306 Sec A.~tiealRelating to the Jurisdictionof the ICAO Council,I.C.J.
Re~orii1972, p. 138.Ilsll OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 433
case). Despite the fact that the Rules were not finalizedintime for that case,the
Councildid not considerthisto bean impediment to itsconsiderationof the
dispute. In puttingforwarda proposal for action forthe Councilto take in that
dispute,the representative for Canada stated that "hethought that prepared rules
were unnecessaryat thisstage307". Thisapproach wasadopted bythe Counci1
whichaccepted, inthe wordsofthe representative forMexico,that there "was
nothingunusualin the adoption of ad hoc rules forthe settlement of
Accordingiy,the procedural steps taken bythe Counciland the interested parties
were approved, and theywere invitedto consultwiththe Councilon anyfurther
steps inthe proceedings309.
4.77 Althoughit wasa dispute raised after the adoption ofthe
Rules,the Rules were not followedin the 1971Pakistanflndiacase. As noted
above,improperlyformulatedpropositions werevoted on, statutorymajonty
votingprovisionswere ignored, andno reasons weregivenfor the Council's
deci~ion~'~.These irregularitiesforrnedone ofthe bases for the subsequent
appeal to the Severalcommentators havenoted the validityofthese
criticisms12.
307
CouncilMinutes,SixteenthSession,23May-24June 1952.Doc. 7293 -
C/845,p. 49. Exhibit56.
309 This disputewaseventuallysettled withoutfurther proceedingsbefore the
Council.&, Actionof the Council,SixteenthSession,13May-24June
1952. Doc. 7314 -C/849,pp.26-29. Exhibit57.
310 &, para. 4.63above.
311 See,Ao~ealRelatine to the Jurisdictionof the ICA0 Council.Judment,
I.C.J.Reports 1972,pp. 69-70,The Court foundthat itwasneithef
appropnate nor necessaryforit to gointo these procedura1irregularities,
notingthat itwasfaced with"anobjectivequestionoflaw,the answerto
whichcannot depend on whatoccurredbefore the Council". &, para.
4.22above.
312
B, for exarnple,FitzgeraldG.F.,gxa, Exhibit54.434 AERIAL INCIDENT [1521
4.78 It istherefore misleadingto argue that the Rules providea
comprehensive, well-establishedstnicture for handling disputesknownto al1
States. Onlyone case has everproceeded beyond the initialstageof an
application, and evenin that case (Pakistanflndia)the Rules were not properly
followed.
SECTI ON TheCouncil Bas theObligationToDetermineIts
Procedures.Not theAvpiicant State
4.79 The United States' argumentisalsomisguidedbecause it
ignoresthe fact that under the ChicagoConvention andthe Rules, itisfor the
Councilto determine itown procedures. Asexplainedabove,the dutiesof an
ICA0 member are limitedto submittingto the Councila disagreement overthe
interpretation or application ofthe Convention.
4.80 The basisofthe Council'sdutyinthis regard starts with
Article54(c)ofthe Conventionwhichobligesthe Council todetermine itsniles of
procedure. However,evenunder the Rules themselvesit isfor the Councilto
determine thata member State's applicationisinthe correct form(under Article
3of the Rules) and to decideoanyfurther proceedingsnecessary(under Article
6)when facedwitha disagreement submittedbya member State. The Council
has great fiexibilityin this regard. Under Article 32,the Rules maybe suspended,
varied or even dispensedwith at anystageof the proceedingswiththe agreement
ofthe parties. Article32thus indicatesthe non-mandatorynature ofthe Rules.
Insuchcircumstances,and where, as here, the Parties specificallyagreed to the
procedural steps taken bythe Council, anydeparture from the Rules cannot act
as abar to the Court'sjurisdiction.
4.81 It foilowsthat when thIslamiRepublic, anon-Council
member, submitted itsdisagreementto the Council,it left the question ofil 531 OBSERVATION SND SUEMISSIONS 435
procedure withrespectto these submissions entitothe Councilin
recognitionof the Council'spower and dutyto onvthe mostappropriate
procedure to follow. In dealingwiththis situation,the Councilnever insistedon
the formal applicationofanyset ofniles; instead it relied onthe general
consensusthat a fuIlfact-findinginvestigationwasnecessary(whichhad been
requested bythe lslamicRepublic and wasspecificallyagreed to bythe United
States); that safety andtechnicalquestionsshouldbe consideredbythe ANC
(which wasagainagreed bythe Parties); and that the deliberationsshouldtake
place in forma1Councilmeetings. Thisapproach wassupported by nearlyal1
Councilmembers andwasrefiectedin the Council'svariousprocedural decisions.
4.82 On previous occasions,the Council hastaken a similar
& approach and hasrecognizedthat it hasan obligationto adviseand consult
withthe parties on the procedures to be followed. Thus,inthe 1952
IndialPa ase,Ctuncilmembers consideredthat the formationof the Rules
wasnot a neçessaryprecursor to the commencementofproceedings313. In the
absence of suchRules,the Councilsimplyfollowedthe Assernbly'sresolution
adopted at itsfirstsessionin 1947to the effectthat the "procedureto governthe
arbitral procedures shallbe determined in agreement between the Counciland al1
the interested parties314". in the wordsofthe representative ofCanada,the airn
was 14work out the next steps alonglinesthat wouldbe mutuallysatisfactoryto
[theparties] and to the Council",and to informthe parties "thatthe Council
wishedto consultthem andwouldtake into accounttheirviewson the method of
procedure to be adopted3.5
313 Sec .ara. 4.76above.
314 Doc.4411,Al-P/45,3 June 1947. Exhibit58.
315 CouncilMinutes,SixteenthSession,13May-24June 1952. Doc.72-1
C/845,pp.49 and 52. Exhibit56. AERIAL 1NcIDENT i1541
4.83 Althoughthe Council's discussionin the IndialPakistan case
predated the adoption ofthe Rules,the President of the Councilbelievedthat
consultationas to procedure wasdesirable evenwhere procedural rules were in
force:
'The President thoughtthat evenwhere general rules ofprocedure
werebeing applied,itwas commonpractice andwouldbe useful to
givean opwniîy for objectionsto those niles ta be
considered ."
4.84 On the other hand, the Councilalsorecognizedthat it had
an obligationto informmembers ifit thoughtthat arnemberhad not followedthe
proper procedures. For example,on receipt of a communicationfrom the
Government ofAfghanistan,whichregarded itselfas a party to the IndiaPakistan
a
case,the Council tooksteps to adviseAfghanistanthat it had not submitted an
Article 84 applicationand ofthe steps that were necessaryin order to submit an
application that the Councilwouldregard asvalid3I7. Significantly,no sirnilar
step wastaken bythe Councilin itsconsideration ofthe FlightIR 655incident.
The Councilnever informed the IslamicRepublic that its request for legal
remedies wasnot properly submitted; nor didthe Councilever suggestthat the
IslamicRepublic had not followedthe correct rules.
4.85 Of evengreater relevanceisthe 1958dispute between
Jordan and the United Arab Republic concerning prohibitions againstwerflight
imposed by eachState againstthe other inwhichJordan allegedvi~lationsofthe
Chicago Convention(the "Jordan" case).In response toJordan'sallegations,"the
Secretary General ..sent a communicationto Jordan indicatingthe procedure
that should be followed,as prescribed in the Rules for the Settlement of
317
Action of the Council,SixteenthSession,13May-24June 1952. Doc. 7314
-'21849 , .29. Exhibit57.LIS51 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 437
iff fer en ce As^it^asn.ot clearwhatwasthe appropriate procedure, it was
alsoagreed that "itwasessentialto knowjust what the twoStatesdesired of the
~ounci13'9".
4.86 Byanalogy,if the Council hadthoughtit necessaryinthe
present case,further efforts should havebeen made to ensure that appropnate
procedures werefollowed. No communicationswere ever sent, and the Islamic
Republic'sattention wasnever drawnto the needforapplicationofthe Rules.
Nor wasthere any suggestionfromthe President that he seek from the Parties"a
preciseindicationofthe nature of their requests to the Council"as there had been
inthe Jordan case320. Becauçethe Parties wereso evidentlyin disagreement
overthe interpretation and applicationofthe Convention,the Councilhad the
obligationto ensure that the correct procedure wasfollowedifit deemed this
necessary. In accordancewiththe Council's obligationsunder the Convention
and the Rules, aswellas under itspast practice,the lslamicRepublicwasentitled
to relyon the Councilto adviseit accordingly.
4.87 However,in thiscase, itwasnever oncesuggestedbythe
President or the United States (or anyother Councilmember) that the requests
ofthe IslamicRepublic werein anywayimproper for Council proceedingsor that
the Council couldnot render a decisionthese requests. It wasalsonever
suggestedthat the Councilwasunable to deal withthe Islamic Republic's
requests under the procedures adopted. Instead,the Councilrelied on the
Parties'ownagreementsin this regard-thatafact-findinginvestigation shouldbe
initiated,that the ANCshould rnakesafetyrecornmendationsand thatthe matter
318 Council Minutes,Thirty-fifthSession,25September-17December 1958.
Doc. 7934 -C/912,p. 12. Exhibit59.
319 M.,p. 11.
320 -Ibid.,p. 16.438 AERIAL INCIDENT 11561
shouldbe deliberated in forma1CouncilsessioAs.already explained,sucha
procedure was fullyconsistentwithArticle32of the Ruasit aIlowedthe
expeditious and effectivedispositionof the case,something that the Idamic
Republic had specificallyrequested, andwesadopted withthe agreement of the
Parties.
SECTIO INl. TheRules Were FoIlowedin Essence
4.88 The United States argues that because there wasno proper
legaldeliberation about the incident and no record ofthe proceedings,the Court
wouldessentiallybe hearing the issuesas a court of firstinstance, not as an
appellate courtAs pointed out above,this argument ignoresthe fact that the
Councilconducted extensivedeliberationsconcerningthe disagreement,
produced a fact-findingreport, and rendered a finaldecisionon the matter.
There isan extensiverecord of al1theseproceediascanbe seenfrom the
exhibitsfiledbythe ~arties~~l. There isthus no question of the Court actingasa
court of first instance.
4.89 Tnanyevent,duringthe proceedingsbefore the Council,al1
the main procedural requirements of the Rules, such as there are, were met. In
particular, the lsiamicRepublic's submisto the Councilfulfilledal1the
conditionsof Article 2.ofthe Rules for filingan application:
-
United States (Article2(a));the disagreement existed,the
- it appointed a specialre resentative to act inthe
proceedings(Arti.de2(bY1;
- it made both written and oral statements offactsand
submitted supporting data relatingto those facts (Article
2(c) and (dl);
321 A fullco yof the Hearings ofthe Councilisincluded inExhibits40
thmugh & hersfo. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 439
-
it made a statement of lawsettingout the United States'
violationsofthe Conventionand its Annexesand rebutting
the United States'defensesto these actions(Article2(e));
and
-
it made clearthe reliefthat it sought(Article2(f)).
Whilethe Islamic Republic'ssubmissionsdidnot explicitlycontain a statement as
required under Article 2(g)that negotiationsbetween the parties had taken place
but were not successful,thisrequirement waseffectivelyredundant giventhe state
of relationsbetween the United States and the IslamicRepublic, and giventhe
fact that the United States had alreadymade it clear that it accepted no
responsibilityfor the incidenIn anyevent,ifthe Islamic Republic's application
had been deficientinanyway,itwasfor the SecretaryGeneral under Article3 of
the Rdes to verifj thisand to request the IslamicRepublic to rectifj suchmatters.
Thiswasnever done; nor didthe United States ever make anydemand or
objectionbeforethe Councilto the effectthat the Ruleswere not being followed
correctlyor that the procedures adopted were not appropriate.
4.90 As explainedabove,the onlyother procedural requirement
under the Ruleswasthat the United States shouldbe invitedto reply tothe
IslamicRepublic'sapplication. Again,thiswasan obligationon the Secretary
General under Article3 ofthe Rules. Whilethe SecretaryGeneral maynot
formallyhave done this,the United States effectivelypresented itsdetailed
rebuttalin oral argument before the Counciland in the form ofthe U.S. Defense
DepartmentReport.
4.91 Under the Rules, itwas for the Counciltodwide an the next
stage of the proceedings. Faced withthe mutual agreement ofthe Parties on this
point, the Councilordered a fact-findinginvestigation.Again,thisstep wasfully
consistentboth withArticle 32 and Article 8 of the Rules. AERIAL INCIDENT
4.92 Asfar as the IslamicRepublicwasconcemed, the
investigationwasrelated to the issueof establishingresponsibilityand thus bore
on theIegalaspects of the incident. In askingthe Councilto make itsjudgments
onlyafter al1of the factshad been received,the United States alsoseemed to
have understood that thiswaspart of the role of the investigation322.
4.93 It isclear, however,that Councilmemberssawthe purpose
and nature ofthe investigatiasbeingtwofold. Some memben focussedon the
need to investigatethe technical and safetyaspects. Others took the opposite
Mew arguingthat the investigationshouldbe used to determine responsibilityfor
the incident. The Council'sfinaldecisioncommissioningthe investigationwas
wide enough to deal withbath aspects of the issue. In adopringa flabihoc,
approach to the matter, the Councildirect-d
investigationto determine ailrelevant facts andtechnicalasofcts
the chamyf events relatingto the flightand destructionof the
aircraft ."
Notwithstandingthis,the IslamicRepublicmade clear its understanding thatthe
issueofresponsibilityremained open, to be determined after the investigation,
and that it recognizedthat the Council'sdecisionrepresented a compromiseof
interests determined in part bypolicons ide ration^^^^.
4.94 Significantly,the Councilnever stated on whatbasisit was
ordering the investigation. The United Stnowsassertsthat this investigation
wascarried out under Artic55(e) of theConvention,and that thisproves that
322 Sec .ara. 4.47above.
323 C-Dec Extraordinary (1988)/2,14July 1988.Exhibit42.
324 Draft C-Min .xtraordinary (1988)/2,14July 1988,pp. 12-13. Exhibit41.il591 OBSERVATIONS AND SuBMrssIoNs
the Councilwasnot consideringan Article 84di~agreernent~~~H . owever,the
natufe ofthe investigation calledforwasmuchbroader in itsscope than provided
for by Article55(e). Indeed, itwasmore ofthe nature of an investigationcarried
out under Article8of the Rules,withthe organizationofthe investigationbeing
entrusted to the SecretaryGeneral of 1~~0~~~.
4.95 Under Article55(e) of the Convention,the Council may:
"Investigate,at the requestany contractingState, any situation
whichrnayappear to present avoidable obstaclesto the
development of international air navigation;and, afterch
investigation,issuesuchreports as rnayappear to it desirable."
The investigationordered bythe Councilin thiscasewasnot pnncipally
concernedwith"obstaclesto the development ofinternational air navigation".lt
was an expert fact-findingreport to understand the chainof eventsthat led to the
shoot-downof a civilianaircraft. Assuch,the scope ofthe report wasofexactly
the kindthat mightbe ordered in international arbitral proceedingsin order to
determine the factual and technical issuesrelevantto a dispute.
325 U.S.PreliminaryObjections, p 121-122.The United Statespoints out
that Councilrepresentativesf!;m Spain andCanada stated their belief
that the Council should convenean investigationursuant to Article 55(e).
Of course, whateverthe Canadian and Spanishrepresentatives thought
shouldhappen doesnot necessarilyreflect what didhappen.
326 Article 8reads asfollows:
"Investigationsby&uncil
(1) The Councilrnayat any time, but after hearing the parties, entrust
any individual,body,bureau, commission,or other organizationthat it rnay
select,iththe taskof carryingout an enquiryor givingan expert opinion.
Insuchcasesit shalldefine the subjectofenquiryor expert opinionand
prescribe the procedure to be followed.
(q A report incorporating the resultsof the investigation,together
wth the record ofthe enquiryand anyexpert opinion, shallbe submitted
tothe Councilin suchfom, ifany, asthe Councilrnayhave prescribed,
and shallbe communicatedtothe parties." AERIAL INCIDENT
4.96 After considerationof the fact-findingreport, no other
procedural steps are obligatoryunder the Rules exceptthe rendering ofthe
decisionitself. The United States makes muchof the Councildecision'sfailureto
followthe "distinctiveandweilknownrequirements for Councildecisionsunder
Article ~4~'~".However, asalready pointed out, the onlyCouncildecisionunder
Article 84to date(inthe 3'71 Pakistanflndia case) didnot followthe
requirements ofArticle 15ofthe ~ules~~~,
4.97 In general terms, the decisionreached bythe ICA0 Council
on 17March 1989met the requirements ofArticle 15ofthe Rules:
- the decisionwasmade after hearing arguments,and after
considerationof the fact-findingreport as requirednder
Article 15(1);
the decisionwasinwritingand stated the date on whichit
wasdeliveredas required under Article 15(2)(i);
it isclear from the accompanyingminutes,whichfom part
of the record of the proceedings,whowere the Members of
the Councilparticipating andwhowere the parties to the
disagreement,as required byArticle 15(2)(ii)and (iii);
as noted by the United States,the resolution itself"provides
an excellentsummaryof deliberarionsofthe Co~l
throughout itsdiscussionofthe Iran Air incident ",as
requiredbyArticle 15(2)(iv);and
it Statesthe conclusionofthe Council,that the shoot-down
wasan accident,and the Councii'sreasons for reachingthat
conclusionthat it was"aconsequence ofevents and errors in
identincation"as required byArticle 15(2)(v).
The decisionwasalsotaken at a meeting of the Councilconvenedsolelyfor the
resolution of the proceedingsasrequired byArticle 15(4).
327 U.S.PreliminaryObjectionsp. 126.
328 Sec .ara. 4.63above.
329
U.S. PreliminaryObjections, p. 128. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 443
4.98 The United States ernphasizesthe fact that the Council
decisionof 17March 1989wasgivenin the form ofa resolution andarguesthat
thisshowsthat the Councilwasnot actingunder Article 84330. In fact,the
Conventionmakes no distinction betweendecisions.andresolutions;nor does the
Councilmake anysuchdistinctionin itsordinaryRules of~rocedure~~~,So far
as the Councilisconcerned, it appearsthat the difference betweena decisionand
a resolution ispurelysemantic. In the final sessionsleadingup to the decisionof
17March 1989there are multiplereferences to the need for a "decision"to be
taken332. Due to this practice,and the factthatUS.e vote had no effecton
the final decision,the IslamicRepublic did not makean objection onthispoint.
In anyevent, accardingto one commentator a "decision"wasseen byCouncil
rnembers"aspossessinglessauthonty than a formalre~olution"~~~.
4.99 A finalargument raised bythe United Statesin its effortto
showthat thismatter wasnot dealt with under Article84isthat itwasallowedthe
righttovote in the Council'sde~ision~~. here are three commentsto rnake
about this argumentm, the United States'vote made no differenceto the final
decision,which wassupported by the rnajoriîyofCouncilmembers; secondthe
United States shouldnot have been alloweto voteinthe Councilin thismatter
whether the Councilwasactingunder Article84or.anyother Article ofthe
330 -Ibid.pp.126-128.
331 Althoughthe decisionof 17March 1989wasphrased asa resolution, its
reference becameC-DEC 126120 ,.,a Councildecision. In addition,the
Councilpress release reiating the Council'sfindingin the dispute made
specificreference ao"decision".Exhibit60. The Presidenofthe Council
has repeatedly referred toç a decision. Exhibit51.
332 -See,for example,the statements of the Kenyan,Cuban, Venezuelan and
Panamanian representatives. Draft C-Min.26119,15March 1989,pp. 5-6
Exhibit48.
333 Sochor,E.: The PoliticsofInternational Aviation(London, 1991),140.
Exhibit61.
334
U.S.PreliminaryObjections,pp.123-125.444 AERIAL INCIDENT [162j
Convention -Article53of the Conventionprohibitsa State fromvotingin any
dispute of.anykindinwhichit isinvolved;andthir inpractice,the Council,like
the United NationsSecurityCouncil,which isgovernedbya similarclausein
Article 27(3)of the Charter, seems not to haverequired thisprovisionta be
strictlyenf~rced~~~In the lightof thsractice,and the fact that the U.S.vote
had no effect on the finaldecidon, the IslamicRepublicdidnot make an
objection. In any event,the fact that thisprovisionwasnot foilowedshouldnot
actas abar to jurisdiction,but shouldfurnishthe IslamicRepublicwithadditional
grounds forappeal.
4.100 To the extentthat the decisionwasin anywaydeficientasto
itsforrn,recoursecanalwaysbe had to the record of these proceedinZnthe
A~vealcase, the Court wasnot hindered bya similarfailiinthe Council's
decisionin the 1971PakistanAndiadispute. AsJudge Jiménezde Aréchaga
pointed out in hisSeparate Opinion:
'The Court had nodifficultyin pronouncingon the appeal because
ofthe fonn of the decision. In the verbatim record of the Councii's
discussionsanddecisions,which wasbefore the Court, there wasa
coropletetranscript ofthe reasons and arguments invokedby the
Parties and of the explanationsof vote and other statements made
bythe President and those me rs ofthe Council whochoseto
state the groundsfor their vote.l
While this statement wasmade with'respectto ajurisdictionaldecisionofthe
Council,it appliesequallyin this case.
4.101 On the basisofthe foregoing,the IslamicRepublic submits
that it isclear from the record that the substantive conditionsofArticle 84were
335 With regard to the SecurityCouncil'spractim,, the discussioinCot,
J.P.& Pellet,A.: La Charte des Nations Unies (Pa1985),pp. 508,g
seq.
336 Appeal Relatin~to the Jurisdictionof the ICA0 Council,I.C.J.Reports
1972.p. 155. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
fulfilledandthat al1the essentialrequirements of the Rulesweremet in any
event.
CHAl'TERIl' EVEKIFMADEUNDERARTICLE 54.DECISJOXSOF
THECOUNCLL ONTHEINTERYRETATION OR
APPEALABLE
4.102 The United States seeks to drawa radical distinction
between the Council's functionsunder Articles54and 55ofthe Convention,on
theone hand,and itssuasi-judicialfunction under Article 84,onthe other.
Specifically,the United States arguesthat the Chicago Conv-ntion
"...nvisagestwodistinctand mutuallyexclusjvemethods under
whichthe ICaO Councilmavexaminernattersinvolvingthe
On the basisof thisdistinction,the United States seeksto showthat the dispute
arisirig frornthe shoot-downof FiIRh655wasdealtwithexclusivelyunder
Articles54and 55of the Convention,not under Article84,and that the ICA0
Council'sdecisionistherefore not appealable to the Court.
4.103 For reasons alreadyexplained,thisargument islargely
irrelevant because, byitsverytems, Article 84governsdecisionon
disagreement over the interpretation or application ofthe Convention,whatever
provisionofthe Conventionthe Councilmayhave acted,or thought itwas acting,
under. Quiteapart frorthispoint, itwillbe shownbelowthat there isno clear-
cut distinctionbetweenthe Council'srole under Articles555,on the one
hand, and Article 84,on the other,andthat under Articles555nof the
Convention,the Councilmayalsobe calledupon to decidedisagreementsover
the interpretation or application ofthe Conve-a fact acknowledgedbythe
337
U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 92.446 AERIAL INCIDENT [l641
United States aswillbe shownin SectioC below. Article84ofthe Convention
makes no distinctionas to whysuchdecisionsshouldnotbe appealable.
SECTIOAN. TheStructureoftheChicagoConventionDoesNot Provide
a Clear-CutDistinctionBetweenArtides54and55ofthe
Convention,Onthe OneHand.andArticle 84.On The
Other
4.104 Articles54and 55 of the Convention setout respectivelythe
mandatory and permissivefunctionsof the Council.heyprovide anexhaustive
list whichincludesthe role entrusted to the Councilasarbiter in disputes overthe
interpretation or application ofthe Conventionunder Article84. Pursuant to
Article54(b) t,e Councilisobligedto "dischargethe dutiesand obligationswhich
are laidon it bythis Convention"(which,by definition,includethe Council'srole
under Article.84);pursuant to Article 54(n),the Couisobligedto "Consider
anymatter relating to the Conventionwhich anycontractingState refers to it".
The Council'sdutiesto receive disputes overthe interpretation or application of
the Conventionand to consider and decide on those disputesthus cornewithin
the Council'sobligatoryfunctionsunder Article 54. Far from establishing
rnutuallyexclusivemethods for dealingwithmatters, Articles54and 84are
complementary.
4.105 It followsthat evenwithinthe Conventionitselfthere isno
distinctionofthe kind suggestedbythe United Statesthat decisionsrendered by
the Councilunder one set ofArticlesare appealable to the Court,whiledecisions
under another set ofprovisionsare not. Sucha distinctionispurelyformalistic
and does not reflect the intention of the signatones ofthe ChicagoConvention
whichwasclearlythat disagreement overthe interpretation or application of
the Convention shouldbe capable of beingdecidedbythe Counciland
appealable to the Court. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
4.106 The United States'insistexiceon the importance oform
oversubstance leadsit to drawfurther distinctionsbetween differentkindsof
matters brought under Articles54and 55. At djfferentpoints in itspleading,the
United States argues that the dispute submittedto the Councilin thiscasewas
dealtwithunder Articles54(j),Article 54(k)3387Article ~5(e)~~o~r evenArticle
54(n)340.
4.107 These distinctionsare equallyartificialand rest on the same
confusion. Al1ofthe obligatoryfunctionsofthe Councilare set out in Article54.
These obligationsexistconcurrently. The Council mustaddress anygiven
situationtakinginto accountboth itsobligatoryfunctionsunder Article 54and its
permissivefunctionsunder Article55. For example,the Councilmust considerits
obligationsunder theConventionpursuant to Article 54(b),must alsoreport
infractionsof the Conventionunder Article54(j),must report anyfailureto take
appropriate action afteran infraction ofthe Conventionunder Articl54(k),
consideran investigationunder Article55(e),and soon.
4.108 It isfor the Councilto determine what specificsteps should
be taken inanygiven case, takinginto account the objectivedemands ofthe
situation.A situation presented to the Councilmayrequire the reporting of an
infractionof the Conventionto the Assemblyeven whenno State has specificdly
requested it. Inthis regard,the Council'sdutiesare directed to the safeguarding
ofthe Convention asa whole,and not to anyindividualState. It isforthis reason
that obligatoryfunctionsare imposed on the Council. It bears repeating that
under Articles54(b)and 54(n) ofthe Convention,one ofthese obligatory
338 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 119.448 AERIAL INCIDENT Il661
functionsisto decide on disagreements overthe interpretation or application of
the Conventionwhen suchmatters are presented to it.
SECTI ON Decisionson the Intemretation or Application ofthe
Convention
4.109 It has alreadybeen noted thatthe proceedingsbefore the
ICA0 Council,the IslamicRepubiic made reference to Article54Cj)ofthe
The United States suggeststhat the wholeof the Council's
treatment ofthis casernayhave taken place under this provision342. Far from
thisbeinga reason for the Court to find that there wasno disagreement withinthe
scope ofArticle 84decided uponbythe Council,it in factprovides alternative
grounds for the Court acceptingjurisdiction.
4.110 Under Article 54,the Councilmaybe calledupon to make
decisionson disagreements overthe interpretation or application of the
Convention. The quasi-judicialnature of issuesfacingthe Councilunder Article
540) has been consideredbyProfessor BinCheng,a prominent expertin the
field. Professor Chengwrites:
'The su eMsory functionof the Councilunder the firstpart of
Article 4Cj)of the Convention,whichplaces upon it a dutyto
repart anyinfractionof the Conventionto the contracting States,
includingthe State in default, mustbe regarded asessentialiy
judicial in nature, for what the Councilisto report under Article
54U),aswellas Article54(k),isnot an alle~edinfraction,but an
infraction. Thiseans an infractionthe existenceofwhichhas
been objectivelyscertained bythe Councilwitheffect bindingon
the Organisation andaHitsmembers. Itwould appear that, under
general pnnciples of law,before suchan infractioncanbe stod
exist,the party or arties concemed must havefirstbeen givenan
opportunity to be Aearciand ajudicialor at iesst quasi-judicial
!unction under Article 540) and (k), it wouldappear that both parts
ofArticle 53must be applied.Inother words,the member States
Sec,para. 4.37above.
342 U.S.Preliminary Objectionsp.119.Il67] OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMlSSIONS 449
concerned,whether or not members of the Council,shouldbe
allowedto take partyi~goutvote in the Council'sconsiderationof
the allegedinfraction ."
4.111 It maybe said that any claim lodged withthe ICAOCouncil
under Article 541j)by onICAO member againstanother allegingthat an
infractionof the ChicagoConventionhas been committedis,byitsverynature, a
dispute relatingto the interpretation or application ofthe Convention. it follows
that such a dispute shouldbe settlbythe ICAO Councilin accordancewith
legalpnnciples and in a similarwayto itstreatment of disagreementsunder
Article84.
4.112 This simplyconfirmsthe lackof a clear distinctionbetween
the role ofthe Councilunder Articles 54an55,on the one hand, and Article84,
on the other. The Councilmay make decisionson contentiousissuesinvolvingthe
interpretation or application ofthe Conventionunder either Article540) or
Article84. There are no reasonwhy decisionsmade under Article540) should
be anylessappealable to the Court than those made under Artic84344.
4.113 It itme that in dealingwithArticle54Cj)matters, the
Councilhas not developedanyspecific rules to followin exercisingitsquasi-
judicialfunctions. Thus,the ICAOCouncil can decide legaldisputes relatingto
the interpretation or application of the ChicagoConventionunder Article54
withoutreference to the Rules, althoughit maybe seen asa failingof the Council
thata similarset of niles has not been drafted and applied forsuchdisputes. This
343 Cheng,B.: T h e L a w , (London, 1962),p.100
(footnotes ornitted). Exhibit62.
344
The referenceinArticle 53 recluding ICA0 Counciimembersfrom
votingin disputeiowhich*teyan parties, whichirrepeated alrnart
verbatim in Article84,isalso an indicationthat the Councilmaybe called
u on to considerdisputesbetween member States under Articles54and
5 and that it isobljgedto considersuchdisputesin a quasi-judicial
manner.450 AERIAL INCIDENT Il6s]
issignificantfor tworeasons. &g, itpoints to the relativeunimportance ofthe
Rules generally. Second,tothe extent that the Ruleswere not followedin the
dispute overFîight IR655, thisisnot relevant ifthe ICA0 Councilwasexercising
itsquasi-judicialfunctionsunder Article54.
SECTIO CN. TheUnitedStates Ack~~owledgetshat the Provisions of
Articles54and 55 MayLnvolvethe CouncilMaking
Decisions Over the Intemretation orApplicationofthe
Convention
4.114 In its PreliminaryObjections,the United States
acknowledges"thebreadth and overlappingnature of the functionsset forth in
Articles54and 55" and that "Councilactionstypically engageseveralof its
enumerated powersunder those ~rticles'~~~.Furthemore, the United States
concedesthat there isno reaI distinctionbetweenthe nature of the Council'srole
under Articles54and 55 and itsrole under Article 84,pointingout -
"..hat in carryingout its multitude offunctions undcr Articles54
and 55,the Councilwillbe calledupon to considermanykindsof
contentious issues.Those issueswillfrequentlyinvolvequestions
conceming, among othe@mgs, the interpretation or application of
the Chicago Convention ."
4.115 This iscorrect.As explainedabove,in carryingout its
obligationunder Article546) to "Report to contracthg States anyinfractionof
this Convention..."t isdifficultto see howthe Councilcouldavoidmakinga
decisionbearing on the interpretation or application ofthe Convention.
4.116 Notwithstandingthese features ofthe Convention,the
United States arguesthat because the practice of the Councilallegedlyshowsthat
itroutinelydecidesdisagreements overthe interpretation or application of the
345 U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p. 96.
346 Ibid.[1691 OBsERvATloNs AND SuBMrssroNs 451
ChicagoConventionunder Article 54,it followsthat "abseaspecificinvocation
ofArticle84 procedures byaContractingState",suchdecisionscannotbe
appealable347. Neither the prernisenor the conclusionof this argucanbe
accepted. The Councilisnot routinelyaskedto decideon disagreements overthe
interpretatioor applicationofthe Conventionunder Article 54. Such
applicationsare infactveryrarely dealt with,and the quasi-judicialroleof the
Councilunder Article541j)has rarelybeen in~oked~~~.
4.117 Znanyevent,it cannotbe argued that the Court's
jurisdictionhouiddepend entirelyon the invocationof certain procedural rufes.
Thiswouldmean that twoexactlysimilarcasescouldbe heard and decidedon by
the Council,one pursuant to Article 54,the other pursuant to Article 84,butonly
in the latter casewouldthe decisionbe appealable. Insucha situation,the
Court'sjurisdictionwoulddepend entirelyon the procedures invoked,and not on
whether the conditionsofArticle 84had been met. Thiscannotbe correct. The
Court'sjurisdictionisbased on the expressterms ofArticle84ofthe Convention
alone, and proceduralrules cannot limitthe extent of thisjurisdiction.
4.118 Inthis regard, the United States' referencesta the Council's
decisions ontheKAL 007incidentand on the 1973shootingdownof a Libyan
plane bylsraeli fighter planes,whichthe United Statesargueswere deait with
348 In fact,accordingto the Repertorv Guide to the Conventionon
InternationalCivilAviation,Doc89001 2Second Edition),the Council
had, up to 1977,taken action on no matters under Article 5454(k).
In the lightof the United States'allegationthat the "ICA0 Councilhas
convenedover athousand meetingsand rendered manythousands of
decisionsofvariouskinds"(U.S.PreliminaryObjections,pp.96-97),it
shouldalsobe noted that accordingto the 1977Repertory Guide it has
considered oniyttn matters under Article54 n), under whichthe United
Statesaliegesthe shoot-dom of FlighIR 65$wasconsidered. Exhibit63.452 AERIAL INCIDENT 11701
under Aiticle 54and whichwere not appealed, missthe point349. The fact that
no appeals were made maybe taken asthe relevant parties'accepofthe
Council'sdecisions,but theycannot be evidencethat the decisionswere not
appealable. The questionthus remains open asto whether the requirements of
Article 84were fulfilledinthe Council's discussionsof these Iftheynts.
were, then the Council'sdecisionin each casewouldhavebeen appealable to the
Court.
CHAPTERV POLICYCONSIDERATIONS WEN THE COURT
SHOULDACCEPTJLRISDICIION IN THISCASE
4.119 As a finalelement to its objection,the United States puts
forward certain "policy"considerationswhichit argues shouldlead the Court to
rejectjurisdictionin this case. Reduced to its essentials,the United States
contends that the lslamicRepublic seeksto widenthe scope of Article 84and to
extendthe supervisoryrole of the Court over ICAO in awaythat would
undennine ICAO'sauthorityto deal withdisputesand open the floodgatesto
appealstothe Court from almostanydecisionof the ~ouncil~~~.Aswillbe
show below,this ian unjustifiedfear and an incorrect characterizationofthe
lslamicRepublic's position.It alsofailsto take into account the far more
significantfactors that mitigatein favorofthe Court's acceptingjurisdictionin this
case.
SECTI O N The Limitationsofthe ICAOCouncilJustifkanADW~
4.120 ICAOisbased on a constitution that isfar from being
democratic in severalimportant respects. When ICAOwasnrst conceivedby the
wartirnalliesin tclosinyears ofWorld War II, itwas as a convenient
administrativegroupingof the larger airline Stateswbichcouldbe expected to
349 U.S .reliminaryObjections, pp.sa.
350 Ibid.,pp. 132,seq.[1711 OBSERVATIONS AND SuBMIssIoNs 453
dominate post-war civilpassenger transportation. Thisbias towardsthe principal
air transport States isreflected in the compositionof the Council.
4.121 Notwithstandingsuccessiveconstitutionalamendments
aimed at enlargingthe compositionofthe ICAO Councilboth quantitativelyand
qualitatively,membership inthe Councjlduringthe period fromJuly 1988to
March 1989 wasIimitedto only33States. in an organizationwitha plenary
membership whichstood at 160at the end of 1988, this amounted tojust slightly
more than one-fifthofthe total membership. Evenmore significantly,Article 50
of the ChicagoConventionreserves two-thirdsofthe 33Counciiseats to (i)
"Statesofchiefimportance in air transport"and (ii) Stateswhichotherwise"make
the largest contributionto the provjsionoffacaties for international civilair
navigation". The consideration ofensuring "thatal1the major geographicareas of
the world are represented on the Council"accounts foronlythe remahing one-
third ofthe33 seats available. Furthemore, the Assembly'sRules ofProcedure
allow those States whofaito be elected under the firstcategoryto stand under
the second category,and those whofail to be elected under the second category
to stand under the thir~!~~~.
4.122 The effect of these provisions isthat the ICAO Couna is
domhated by a powerfuland self-perpetuating minorityof States. This is
simcant inthis caseaswillbe apparent from the above discussion,because
States liketheUnited States are ableto wield an enormous influenin Council
proceedings, asin other international organizations,whereasnon-Council
members likethe IsIamicRepublic can have littleinfluence. It alsomeans that
the vast majorityof ICAOmember States, whichperpetually failto be elected
351
StandingRules of Procedure of the Assemblyof the International Civil
AviationOrganization (4thed.,1980). Doc. 760014,Rules 56-57. Exhibit
-4.454 AE.RlALINCIDENT [1721
ont0 the Council,have iittle acquaintance withthe workingsofthe Council,let
alone anypracticaIexpenence. Thismakesit even more difficultfor non-Council
membersto have an effectiverolein proceedings.
4.1U ICA0 alsohas a highlydirigistestructure. It places
practicallyl1the responsibilityfor the functioningof the organkation on the
Council,and leavesthe plenary organ, the ICAO Assembly,ofwhichthe Islamic
Repubiic isa member, so little to do that ithas been decidadconstitutional
amendment that it needs to meet no more than once everythree years.
4.124 The structure ofICAO makes the right of appeal a
particularlyimportant safeguardf;ir thetrght of appeal counter-balances the
weightinginthe Councilinfavourof those nations of chiefimportance in air
transport. Second, as the Director of the LegalBureau ofICAO hasnoted, even
when actingin itsjudicial capacitythe Counciliscomprised ofthe representatives
of the respectivemember States,not of individualsacting asjudges. Thus, M..
Milde,in a paper written in 1980when he wasActingDirector of ICAO'sLegal
Bureau, exarninedthe practice ofthe Councilin dealingwith cases submitted to it
and cited asa"convincingillustrationthat the Representatives of the Council do
not act in 'animpartial and judicial capacitywayhthe Counciimembers acted
in the Pakistannndia dispute before the Councilin 1971~~~.Dr. Mildeconcluded
that "theCouncilcannot be consideredas a true judicialbody",notingthat a
Councilmember's"decisionmaybe based on policyconsiderations ..rather than
on stnctlylegalr~les"~~~.his i,hasbeen argued, is an inherent defeinthe
352 Miide, M.:"Dis ute Settlement in the Framework ofthe international
Cid AviationBrgaiisation (ICAO)"in Setthnent of Soace Law Dis~utes,
(Koln,1980) p.90. Exhibit65. Dr. Mildewas referrinin particular to
the factthat various Councilmembers wanted to defer makingadecision
in this dispute,pendingreceipt of instructions from their governments.
353 Ibid.[173] OBSERVATIONS AND SUEMISSIONS 455
machineryfor dispute settlementunder the ChicagoConventio-a State is
required to actjudiciallyin circurnstanceswhereit ispracticaiiyimpossiblefor the
Stateto divorceitselffromthe political~ontext~~~.
4.125 Asnoted inthe Apeal case,the Councilhas 'limited
experienceon matters of procedure"and is"composedof expertsin other fields
than Thisisaproblem ofmanyinternational organization.As one
author notes-
"...the members afpoliticalor administrativebodydo not
diplomatsor specialsts in the particular svbjectwithwhichthe
organizationisconcerned. Finally,clausesllingfor reference to
sucha bodydo not usuallyincludethe elaborate rules ofprocedure
whichgovern judicialproceedings, and theydo not oftenvide
for the applicationof stated principlesor rules oflaw.
Suchfreedo=tion is not necessarilyconduciveto systematic
jurisprudence .
Where suchorganizations haveto deal withsuchfundamental legal issues,asthe
Councildidin this case,suchfactorsmust argue infavorof a wideinterpretation
of the Court'sjurisdictionand the exerciseofitssupervisoryrole.
4.126 Another feature of ICAO'sstructure isthat certain Council
mernbers have soughtto restrict the Council'sconsiderationoflegalissuesand to
focusinstead on technicalquestions,partly in recognitionofthe Council's
deficiencieasajudicialbodyand partlyfor politicalreasons. The technical
approach to ICAO'srole has been stronglysupported by the United States,and
354 See,FitzgeraldG.F. s,u~r atp. 169. Exhibit54.
355 Declmation ofJudge Lachs,Ameal Relating to the Jurisdictionof the
ICA0 Council.I.C.J.Re~orts iS72 p. 75.
356 Sohn, L.B.:Settlement ofDis~utesRelatin to the Inter retation and
Auolication ofTreaties150R ~ W .456 AERIAL INCIDENT [174]
wasadopted by many Councilmembers duringthe dispute relatingto Fiight IR
655..One of the United States' aimsin the proceedings dealingwiththisincident
wasto divertattention awayfrom the Iegaland factual disputesin favorof having
the Councilconcentrate on lesscontentious "technical"issues.
4.127 Thisattitude wastypicalof the United States'general
approach to the ICAO Councilin the past. Onseveraloccasionsthe United
States has found it expedientto drawattention to the inadequacyof the Council
to deal withissuesof a contentiousor politicalcharacter, and has attempted to
limitthe Council'sconsideration ofpartjcdar issuesto purely technicalmatters.
lnthe 1973dispute concerningthe shootingdownof a Libyancivilaircraft over
Sinai,for example,the United States'representative proposed aseries of
arnendments severelylimitingthe scope ofthe draft resoluti-'hith the object
ofbringingit into closeraccordwiththe proper role of ICAO and of the
~ouncil~~~~T '.hese arnendrnentsweredesignedto dilute the resolution
substantiallysoas not to condemn Israel andtn focusattention instead on the
technicalissues.
4.128 Asnoted above,muchthe same happened in this case
where severalCouncilmembers, includingthe United States, soughtto restrict
the scopeof the Council'smandate to purely technicalissues358. Suchactions
reflected the politicalweightingof the Counciland the fact, as one commentator
has noted, that the United States had"letit be hown that itwouldnot go along
withanytext that would invitecornparisonswiththe KALaffair3591'.On the
357 CouncilMinutes,Seventy-ninthSession,4 June 1973. Doc. 9073 -C/1011,
C-Min.79/4(Closed), p. 27. Exhibit67.
358 paras.4.53-4.54above.
359
Sochor,E.: "ICAOand Armed Attacks againstCivilAviation",XLIV
InternationalJournal (Winter 1988-89),p. 166. Exhibit68.[1751 OBSERVATIONS AND SuBMIssIoNs 457
other hand,intheKAL affair,withthe political weightof the United States
behind it,the Council did nothesitate to make a full-fledgedcondemofthen
Soviet nio on^^^.
4.129 Suchinconsistencyistotallyinappropriate in the lightof the
Council'sobligationto uphold the principlesof international lawenshrined in the
Chicago Conventionand its obligatitoact as a quasi-judicialbodywhen called
upon to do so. To ensure that these obligationsare fulfilled,it isessentialthat the
Court should exercise itssupeMsory role. Accordingto theJudgment inthe
ApueaI case,it isspecificallyfor "thegood functioningofthe Organization"that
the Chicago Convention'ienlist[s]the support of the ~ourt~~'''.
Smo~ B. A i
inthis Case
4.130As the IslamicRepublic has submitted,the Councilwas
clearlyfacedwithdisagreements overthe interpretation or applicationofthe
ChicagoConventionwithinthe meaning ofArticle84withrespect to the
destructionof FligIR 655. Moreover, afullrecord wasestabiished,a detailed
investigativereport wasprepared, and deliberationstook place oversome eight
full Council sessions.The procedures adopted by the Councilremained.within
the essentialrequirement of the Rules,whichare themselvesofa highlyflexjble
nature and subjectto adhocamendment by the Council. In particular,in this
casethe Council relied onthe agreement of the Parties asto procedure in
recognitionof the need for an expeditiousand effective dispositionofthe case,
consistentwith Article32ofthe Rules. The Council alsorendeafinaldecision
findingthat the "tragicinci..occurredas a consequence of eventsand errors
360
Suchinconsisten in approach hasnot goneunnoticed.W., p. 158.Sec.
abo, Luwenfsld,x., p.338. Exhibi53.458 AERIAL INCIDENT 11761
in identificationofthe aircraftwhichresulted in the accidental destructionof an
Iran Air airlinesand the loss290 li~es~~~"W. here there issuchan extensive
record ofthe proceedings anda cleardecisionbythe Council,there isno question
of the Court beingasked to act as a Court offirstinstance.
4.131 In suchcircumstances,to the extent certainprocedural niles
maynot have been exactlyfollowed,this should not actas a bar to the Court's
jurisdiction whichisderivedfrom Article84alone. Thisisespeciallytrue given
the ad hocnature ofthe Rules and the fact that theycan be amended bythe
agreement ofthe
4.132 To the contrary,to the extentthat there were any
procedural defects, this shouldfurther encourage the Court to exerciseits
supe~sory function on appeal. In the Auueal case,the Court held that
procedural irregularitiesdid not need to be consideredprovidedthat they did"not
prejudice in anyfundamental waythe requirements of ajust procedure364".
However,severalJudges thought the Court should have exerciseda greater
degree of itssupervisorycontrol on this issue andgivenguidanceto the Council
preciselybecause of suchirregulantieIn hisDeclaration, forexample,Judge
Lachsregretted that the Court had not gone into the matter, notingthat the
considerationof sucha matter wouldsurelycomewithinthe "supervision bythe
362
C-Dec 126120,17March 1989.Exhibit50.
363
theeRules adonted bvthe Counciland because these Rules have scarcelvf
ever been follbwedh practice, even Councilmembers maybe unfamiliar
with howthe Rules shouldoperate. In the Pakistannndia case there was
great confusionamongCouncilmembers asto votingprocedures partly
because of their lackof famiiiaritywiththe Rules. This problem iseven
greater for non-Council members.
364 Appeal Relatine to the Jurisdictionofthe ICA0 Council.Judment, I.C.J.
Reports 1972,p. 69.[1771 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 459
Court overthose decisions"'referredto inthe Court'sj~d~rnent~~~J.udge Dillard
argued thattothe extent procedural irregularities ledto a miscarriageofjustice,
thiswouidin and of itselfbe sufficienttojusti@an appeal to the
4.133 Equallysignificantisthe factthat ifthere havebeen
procedural irregularities,these are the Councif'sresponsibilityand it isthe Islamic
Republicwhichhas suffered as a result. As alreadyexplainedin Chapter III,the
Councilhas fullcontrol overhowit treata particular matter and the form in
which itrenders a decision. Thisconstitutesan additional reasonwhythe Court
shouldacceptjurisdiction. AsJudge Lachspointed out, "contractingStates have
the right to expectthatthe Councilwillfaithfirllyfollowthese niles, perfoasing
it does,in suchsituations, quasi-judicialfuncti~ns~'.fortiora,State alsohas
the nght to expect that the Councilwiiicorrectlyaddress legalissuesaddressed to
it.
SECTIO C. TheOperation of lCAOWoiildNotBe Hampered bvthe
Cuutt'sAcceptine .lurisdiction Concerninethe Disputeover
Flipht IR 655
4.134 The United States arguesthat allowingan appealin this
casewouldmean that nearlyeverydecisionof the Councilwould.besubjectto
appeal, and it addsthat "Subjectingsuchdecisionsto lengthyjudicialreviewcould
delay crucial aviationsafety-relatedactionsoftheCounciland cnpple the
operation of ICAO~~~."
365 -Ibid.p.75.
366 m., p. 100.
367 m., p.74.
368
U.S.PreIiminaryObjections,p. 140. AERIAL INCIDENT il781
4.135 Thisalarmjstviewhm already been presented to the Court
without successIn the Appeal case, Pakistanargued that Article84specifically
referred to "thedecision"of the Council,not "anydecision",and that itsprovisions
shouldtherefore be construednarrowlylestthe dispute-settlement regimeof the
ICAObe frustrated. This argumentwasrejected bythe Court. It was also
comrnented on byJudge De Castrowho,in hisSeparate Opinion, consideredthat
suchan argument wasbased on a misinterpretation ofArticle 84:
"However,a readingof Article84withoutanypreconceivedview
leadsus to giveit a different meaning. It refersto 'any
disagreement'whichcannot be settled bynegotiation. Itesnot
of courserefer tovervkind of disameement whichcouldbe
resolvedby an Order. -1trefers to disagreementswhich couldbe
settledvneeotiation and whichrelate to the interuretation or
applicationoYtfe Convention. The number of po&ible
disagreements islimited,and decisions onthese do not include any
kind ofOrder whatsaever. Theymus$& !mportant decisions,and
decisionsofa certain generalnterest .
When consent hasbeen givenbythe Conventionitselfto allowan appeal of
Councildecisionon an visagreement -particularla aatteras importantas the
destruction ofFlighIR 655 -it isimpossibleto argue that this consent shouldbe
Iimitedin anywayfor allegedpolicyreasons. The anlyway anylimitation could
be imposedwouldbe byan amendment ofthe compromissoryclausein the
Convention.
4.136 The Court has not been swampedbya mass ofappeals
followingitsdecisionto acceptjurisdictionin the Appeal case and the dispute-
settlement regimeof ICAOhas not been frustratedinany way. The United
States'emotiveargument that acceptingjurisdictionin this casewould"openup
for reviewvirtuaUyaUactionsof the Councilthat mightbe saidto irnplicateor
369 A~~eaiRelating to the Jurisdictionof the ICA0 Council,I.C.J.Reports
-472,pp. 119-120.Il791 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 461
involveone or more provisions ofthe Convention"ignoresthisfa~t~~'.The
vision.ofthe floodgatesopening to appeals has simplynot materiaIized,and there
isno reason why itshouldifthe Court acceptsjurisdiction here. Fortunately,
commercial aircraftflyingwithintheir ownairspace are not destroyedby the
militaryforcesof another State veryfrequently. The largebodyof the CounciI's
work does not involvedisputesbetween individualStates,and to the extent that
there are suchdisagreements,the vastmajority of these willbe settled by
negotiation. However,whensuchincidentsdo occur, and whenthe ICA0
Councilreaches an erroneous decision,the path must be open for appeal to the
Court, whichArticle84provides.
4.137 The United States'argument in thiscontextthat the Court
shouldnot acceptjurisdictionunlessthe Rules are followedto the letter isalso
rnisplaced. The Counciloperated for 13years prior to the adoption ofthe Rules
withouta singleappeal to the Court. Byway ofcornparison,the Food and
Agriculture Organisation,the World Health Organisation,and the World
MeteorologicalOrganisation,the constitutiveinstruments of whichal1contain
clausesbroadlysimilarto Article84,have never formulated rules for the
settlement of disputeas the ICA0 Councilhas done, and yet thishas not led to
the Court's being inundatedby appeals from decisionsmadebythese
organisations relatingto the interpretation or application of their respective
charters. Infact, the Court has not had one suchappeal referred to it. There is
therefore nothingto suggestthat if the Court acceptsjurisdictionin the present
case,it rnightsudden'ybecome subjectto a flood of appeals.
4.138 There is alsono reason why the Council'sworkon safety-
related issuesshouldin anywaybe affectedby an appeal to the Court overa legal
370
U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p. 140.462 AERIAL INCIDENT [lg01
dispute. The Council'swork onsuchissuescan proceed unaffectedbyan appeal
to thecourt, and the Court hasalwaysshownitselfwilIingto deal withthe legal
aspects of disputesthat mayhavea compositecharacter involvingpoliticalor
technicalmatters more appropriately dealtwithin other fora.
4.139 Inthe samevein,the United States has subrnittedthe
further argument that the Court, ifit were to entertain an appeal korn the ICAO
Council'sdecision,wouldbreach the respect due to a coordinatebodyofthe
United Nations. The Court i,itsmodernjurisprudence, has rejectedsimilar
argumentsaimed at prohibitingit hom actingin anydispute simplybecause the
SecurityCouncil,or the General Assembly,has acted or is alsoactingupon it371.
4.140 It istnie that the legalrole of the Council mightgrowin
recognitionofthe fact that it isobligedto deal withdisputesin a more stnctly
judicialway. However, this cannotbe regarded aa negativedevelopment. On
the contrary,whenprovidedfor in their charters, the legalrole of international
organizationsshouldbe camed out in a properlyjudiciatway;thiswouldbe
strengthened byallowingthe righof appeal to the Court.
Smo~ D. The Inteeritv oICAO Would beStrenethenedbvGranting
a RiehtofAiiocalin thisCase
4.141 The disputebefore the Council,whichconcemed the use of
force againsa civilianaircraft,argumentsof self-defense,andissuesof State
responsibility,ciearlyinvolved legalissuesof fundamental importance including
*m.
Sec n this regard, Le al Consesuences for States ofthe Continued
Presence of South in Namibia(SouthWest Africa)notwithstandinq
SecurityCouncilResolution276(19701.AdvisontOriinion.I.C.J.Reoorts
1971, p.16;AeweanSeaContinental Shelf.lnterim Protection. Ordër of 11
September 1976.I.C.J.Reports 1976,P.3;Militarvand Paramilitary
Activitiesin and aeainst Nicarama (Nicarapuv.United Statesof
Amencal, Jurisdictionand Admissibilitv.Judmnent. I.C.J.Re~orts 1984p.
392.Ilgll OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 463
pnnciples enshrinedinthe U.N. Charter. The Court, asthe principaljudicial
organof the United Nations,of whichICA0 isa specializedagency,isunder an
obligationto ensure suchprinciplesare respected throughoutthe United Nations.
Moreover,the Court's roleto ensure respect for internationallawand to ensure
that thislawisapplied universaly and consistentlyboth withinand outsidethe
372
United Nations,make thiscasemostappropriate for treatment bythe Court .
4.142 These considerationswere reflectedby severalJudges in the
Ap~ealcase. For emmple, in hisSeparate Opinion,Judgede Castrostated-
'The questionofthe appeal to thisCourt isofundeniable
importance, bothforhe Court and forinternational organkations.
The Court cannot evade itsresponsibility. For suchorganizations,
it isnecessantthat there shouldbe a su~e~sont bodv.to exercise
supervision;ver complicatedlegaldecisions,aid ovérthe
interpretation an-.application oftheir constitutionalanda1
rules...
It isindetd a fact that the administrativeand technicalnature of
theICAO Councilmakesit a practical necessitythat there should
be thewidestpossibilityof appeal to ajudicialbodysuchas the
Court, withegg% to the interpretation ofthe Conventionand of
the Agreement ."
4.143 Judge de Castro alsoreferred to the Institut de droit
international's studyofthe question of "Recoursjudiciairecontre les décisions
d'organes internationaux"notingthat "itisoofthe desiderata ofthe
international communitythat the possibilityof appeal shouldbe extended to
372 See,in thisregard, the Se arate OpinionsofJudge LachsinthCase
Concemine Questionsoffntemetation and Avvlicationof the 1971
Montreal Conventionarisjnef;om the Aerial hodent at Lockerbie,
Jarnahirivav. United Kingdom).Order of 14Avril 1992.
President oftheCourt'srecent 'addressto the Cfeneral
discussed. Report ofthe lntemational Court ofJustice (4/46pp.,15,s
g.. &, als6, p. 19-20withregard to the Court's role as principal
judicialorgan orthe United Nations.
373 Aorieal Relatine to the Jurisdictionofthe ICAOCouncil.I.C.J.Reports
14' 1.223.464 AERIAL INCIDENT [lx2]
coveral1the decisionsof international ~r~anizations"~~.hisviewiswidely
shared:
"...here isone area of international activi where there isa very
strong caseto be made for the provision somemeasure of appeal
or review. Thisisin relatit9+& exerciseofquasi-judicialpowers
byinternationalorganizations .
4.144 AsJudge Lachspointed out, alsoreferringto the Institut's
work, an extensiveinterpretation of thejurisdictionof the Court maybe
important preciselin order to protect the integnty ofthe lowerforum:
"Indeed,the same reasonswhichunderlie the necessi9 of
interpretingurisdictionalclausesstnctlyimpeloneto adopt an
interpretation of provisionsfor appeal that wouldlendimum
effectto the safeguardsinherent in suchprovisions. For, as
between the 'lowerforum'and 'the courtofappeal',there existsas
itwere a see-sawofjurisdictionalpowers. Henceto applya
powersof the 'courtof appeaf -woul~obvio~l~cntail an extensive
interpretation of theurisdictionalpowersofthe 'courtoffirst
instance'. Thiswouldin fact implymore onerous obligationson the
States concerned: somethingwhich(asindicated above)
international tribunais have continuouslyendeavouredto avoid. To
restnct the rightsofStatetoseek relieffromwhat they deemto be
wronghl decisionswouldto some 5et, at least,defeat the very
object of the institutionof appeals.
There isnothing inthe ChicagoConventionthat impliesthat the signatones
wishedto limitthe nght ofappeal: To the contrary,it mustbe recognisedthat the
breadth ofthe ICAO'sfunctions,and the role it has to playin disagreements
which inevitablyhave politicalaspects notforeseen in 1944,make it essentialthat
the righttoappealinArticle 84shouldnot be restrictivelyconstrued.
374 Ibid..
375
inHersch Lautemack Memonal Lectures, (Cambridge, 1991)tionpp. 112-ce",
113. Exhibit69.
376 A~oeaiRelatine to the Jurisdictionof the ICA0 Council.I.C.J.Reports
rn p.74,il831 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 465
Srnion E. TheUnited States HasReco~nizedthat this Kindof
Incident ShouldBeHead BvtheCourt
4.145 It hasbeen shownabovethat both inthiscase and in
previouscasesthe United States has soughtto restrict the role of ICAOto safety
and technical issues.The United States presumablytakes the Mewthat ICAOis
not an appropriate bodyto hear suchdisputes. However,the United States has
repeatedly stressedthat the Court isan appropriate forum.
4.146 Where the United Stateshas been directlyinvolvedwith
civilaviationincidentsin'thepast it has attempted to refer itsdisputes directlyto
the Court and has not soughtto seekcondemnationfrom the ICAOCouncil.
Thus,innumerous aerialincidents casesin the 19505,the United Statesmade
applications directlyto the Court withoutseekingto bringthe matters before
1~~0~''.
4.147 More significantly,in a dispute broughtbefore the ICA0
CouncilbyCzechoslovakiaconcerningproblems relatedto the flightof
uncontrolledbaIloons,and whichwasconsideredbythe Councilunder Article54
ofthe Convention,the United Statesmade a specificattempt to refer the matter
tothe Court instead ofto the ~ouncil~~~.In that case,the Czechoslovakian
Govemrnent had allegedthat theUnited Stateshad breached Articles1and 8 of
the Chicago Convention. Accordingto the United States, however,"theICA0
Councilwasnot the proper forum for the considerationof suchcontentious
378
C/924,p. 61. Exhibit70. Session,27April-22June 1960. Doc.8078 -charges3791'T. hisisentirelyconsistentwiththe United States'attitude to the
Council,but ofgreater significanceisthe factthat the United States considered
that the Court should havejurisdictionovera matter specificallyconsideredby
the Councilunder Article 54. AstheU.S epresentative stated:
"Asa result ofa careful and thorough investigation,the United
StatesGovemment had found that the chargeswere without
foundation, and ina note dated14May 1958had invitedthe
Government of Czechoslovakiato resort to the international forum
pmvid$k,the International Court ofJustice to determine their
vaiidi .
4.148 Inthe face ofthese precedents, it isinconsistentforthe
United States nowto argue that the Court has nojurisdictionin the present case
where the existenceof a dispute has crystallized,where a Councildecisionhas
been taken andwhere the requirements ofArticle 84havebeen fulfiiied. Given
that the United States consideredthat the CounciIwasnot the correct forum for
its "contentious"matter withCzechoslwakia and that an Article54matter could
and shouldbe referred to the Court for determination,it cannot nowargue that
the present case should notbe deterrninedby the Court, regardlessofwhether it
wasbrought under Article54 or Article84.
SECTIO FN. Conclusions
4.149 In the finalanalysis,the verynature ofthis casejustifiesan
appeal. It involvesfundamental andcomplexprinciplesof international law
whichextendbeyondthe scope ofthe ChicagoConvention andthe expertise of
the ICA0 Council. Inthe interests of the Councilandthe Parties, and in
accordancewiththe Court'srole as guardian ofinternational law,itwouldbe
proper iftheCourt exerciseditsjurisdictionin this case.
379 m, p.63.
380 lbjd., pp. 62-63,il851 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 467
4.150 in conclusion,the IslamicRepublicsubmitsthat the
jurisdictionoftheCourt iestabiishedunder Artide 84of the Chicago
Convention,whichisthe sole basisoftheCourt's jurisdictionand whichisthe
basisofjurisdictionto whichboth Parties haveconsented. There isnothingin the
procedures before the Councilnor in the policyconsiderationsraisedbythe
United States whichcan act asa bar to thatjurisdiction. To the contrary,these
factorssupport a findingofjurisdiction. THEJURISDICï'IONOF THE COURT ON THE BASIS
OF THE MONTREALCONVENTION
5.01 In its Memorial,the IslamicRepublichas already explained
whythe Court hasjurisdictionin the present case under Article 14(1)of the
Montreal Convention,pursuant to whadispute between twoormore
ContractingStates concerningthe interpretation or applicationofthe Convention
canbe submittedto the Court at the request of one ofthe Parties if the dispute is
one "whichcannot be settled through negotiations",and"ifwithinsixmonths from
the date of the request forarbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the
organizationof thearbitration."
5.02 There undoubtedlyexistsa dispute between the Islamic
Republic andthe United States on the question w-as the IslamicRepublic
contends-Articles 1,3 and lO(1)ofthe Conventionare applicableto the actions
of the United States in shooting-downFlightIR 655and infailingtotake
appropriate measures to prevent the xeoccurrenceof similarincidents,or
whether the Montreal Conventionisnot relevant at al1to the incident, asis
asserted bythe United states3&l. AIslamicRepublic hasdemonstrated in
Part III above,thisdispi.ea.dsagreement on a point oflawand fact,arose
between the Parties followingthe shoot-downof FlightIR 655,and took shape in
the discussionsbetween the Partiesbefore the U.N.SecurityCounciland ICAO.
5.03 Withrespect to the formal requirements ofprior
negotiationsand pnor resort to arbitration, the IslamicRepublic hasalready
pointed to the reasonswhyinthis casethey canbe dispensedwith,on amunt of
381 Sec . emorial ofthe IslamicRepublic,pp. 172-178.[1871 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 469
the factthat each contendingParty from the outset stronglyinsisted onitslegal
view,makingany out-of-Courtsettlement practicallyimpossible382.
5.04 In contrast,the United States'objectitathejurisdiction
ofthe Court under Article 14(1)ofthe Montreal Conventionare based onthe
followingarguments:
- The IslamicRepublic cannot relyon the Convention
because it has failedto establishthat the dispute codd not
be settled through negotiations;moreover,the Islamic
Republic disregardedthe additional requirementto seek
arbitration ofthe disputewithaperiod of sk months;
-
The Montreal Convention addressescriminalacts
cornrnittedbyindividualsagainstthe safetyofcivilaircraft
andwasnot intended to addressactionstaken bythe amed
forcesofa State engagedin hostile action;
- The subsequentpractice ofICA0 withrespect to aenal
incidentsconfîrmsthat the Montreal Conventiondoes not
apply toState actionsagainstcivilaircraft;and
- The Montreal Conventioncannot apply tothe downingof
FlightIR 655because jnternational armed conflicts,s@ch
thatinwhichthe United States and the IslamicRepublic
were saidto be engaged on3July 1988,are outsidethe
provinceofthe Convention.
382 See,Part III above.470 AERIALINCIDENT [188]
5.05 These argumentswillbe examinedin three successive
Chapters below:thfir deaihg withthe conditionsofprior negotiation and
arbitration, the secondwiththe relevanceofthe Montreal Conventionto the
destruction ofFliIR655 and the question whether actionstaken byState
agents and,in particubymembers of anned forcesare coverby the
Montreal Convention,and ththi realingwith the question whetherthe
relationship between the United States and the IslamicRepublicwasthat of an
arrned confiictand,ifso,whether sucha conflictexcludesthe application of the
Montreal Convention.
CHAPTERI
ARBITRATiONUNDERARTICLE1411)OFTE[E ANlD
MONTREALCONVENTION
5.06 The United States contendsthat the requirement of pnor
negiitiationand arbitration setforth in Article 14(1)ofthe Montreal Convention
isnot a rnere formality. Sucha requirement represents, in the United States'
opinion,a pre-requisite to the jurisdictionof the Court andisan essentialstep in
definingthe disputein order to fix"thepoints offacts andlawoverwhichthe
parties di~agree~~~.urthemore, ifthe Court were to underestimate the
importance of the conditionsindicatedin Article 14(1)of the Montreal
Convention,the United States argues that thiswoulddiscourageStates from
agreeingiipon compromissoryclausesprovidingfor preliminary"bilateral and
low-profileresolution of disputes".
S~ION A. TheConditionoPPriorNwotiation
5.07 It has alreadybeen emphasizinChapterIV to ParIII
that the requirement ofprior negotiationsentailsthat, before instituting
383 U.S. PrelirninaryObjectioP.151,citingthe Separate Opinion of Judge
Ruda inMilitarvand ParamilitarvActivitiesin and againstNicarama,
[Nicaragua v.United States of Aherica) Jurisdictionand Admissibilitv,
I.c.Reuorts 1984p.453.[1891 OBsERvATloNs AND SuBMlssIoNs 471
internationaljudicialproceedings,the disagreement betweenthe parties ontheir
international obligationsmust have clearlyemerged in direct discussions,public
statements or parliamentary debates.
5.08 Ithas alsobeen stressed that accordingto the case lawof
the Court, oncethe legalpositionsofthe parties haveclearlyshownthe existence
of a legaldispute, diplomaticnegotiations need not necessarilybe conducted, let
alone be protracted and intense. Everythingdepends on the circumstancesof
each particular case.Inanyevenf if one of the parties refuses to discussthe
matter withthe other, or ifthe parties insistupon their respectiveviewswithno
possibilityofanymodificationor compromise,it can be reasonably concluded
that the dispute cannotbe settled bynegotiation. If thisistcase,the
requirement canbe regarded asfulfïiled,evenif no negotiations, orveIylimited
negotiations,havetaken place.
5.09 Inthe lightof these considerationsitisentirelyjustifiedto
concludethat, under the specificcircumstancesof thiscase,the requirement of
prior negotiations,to the extentit exists,has been satisfied.
(i) Prior tothe submissionofthe caseto the Courtthedisvute
hadbeenclearlvdefined
5.10 The steps taken immediatelybythe IslamicRepublic before
the United Nations SecurityCounciland ICA0 showthat the subject-matter of
the dispute raisedbythe IJamic Republic againstthe United States was clearly
articulated at an earlystage. The IslamicRepublic requested the United States
(i)to acknowledgethat the shooting down of FIighIR 655wascontraryto
internationallaw,(ii)tarecognize itsconsequentltgal responsibility,(iii)to
terminate immediatelyjts threats to and interference withcivilaviationin the472 AERIAL INCIDENT [lgo]
Persian Gulf and, (iv)to providecompensation forthe damagesresultingfrom
the shoot-dom.
5.11 The disputewasrapidlyand clearlydefined because of the
radicallyopposed position adoptedbythe United Stateswhen confrontedwith
the precise demandsof the IslamicRepublic. The United States denied that the
attack was inanywaycontraryto international law,whereas the IslamicRepublic
insistecithatit amounted to an internationalwrongand considered thatthe
United States' responsibilwas an essentialelement ofitsclaim.
5.12 The disputewasalsoclearlydefinedwithregard to another
point. Apart £romunspecificgesturesthat compensationmightbe forthcoming,
the United States onlyoffered to compensate some ofthe familiesofthe victims
twomonths after thefihg ofthe Application,and then onlyexmatia. Le.,without
acceptingany responsibilityfor the attack on FIRg655or recognizingthe
legitirnateinterests of the IslamicRepublicin the matter. In fact, prior to the
filingofthe IslamicRepublic's Application,the United States constantlydenied
havinganyobligationto dealwiththeIslamicRepublic concemingthe
incident384. Moreover,in order to avoidanycontactwithIranian suthorities or
agencies,the United States refused to take into considerationanycompensation
forthe lossofthe plane bythe IslamicRepublic,forother damages resulting
from the attack, and refusedto guarantee that simiIarincidentswouldnot
reoccur.
5.13 FinaIy, whilethe United States,byexcludingany
international responsibility,implicitlyruied out not onlythe applicabilityof any
384 paras. 3.25-3.44,above. Aspointed out at par5.38-5. o4the
IslamicRepublic'sMernorial,the amounts offeredbythe United States
aled in comparisonto the amountsdemanded bythe United States from
rraq for itsattack on the U.M.S.11911 OBSERVATIONSAND suBM~ss1oNs 473
general rule on State responsibilitybut alsothe relevant treaties and conventions
on the protection ofcivilaviation,it issignificantthat the report of the Islamic
Republic submittedtothe President of ICAO on 7July 1988specificallyreferred
to violationsbythe United States of "generalprinciplesof international law,the
ChicagoConvention andal1its relative Annexesand Standards and
Recommended Practices,the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal ~onventions~~~".
5.14 The fact that the IsIamicRepubHcinvokedthe Montreal
Convention in itsreport o7July 1988,whileit referred generallyto
"internationallaw"inlatersubmissionsmade before ICAO~~~d,oesnot imply
that the disagreementbetween the Parties didnot relate alsoto the applicability
of the Montreal Convention. Sincethe viewsofthe twoStates were sofarapart
and neither wasreadyto forgoitscontentions,it wasnot necessaryfor the Islamic
Republic to recite in detailal1theinternational pnnciples and conventionsthat in
itsviewwere relevantto the issueand had been breached bythe United States.
As discussedin ChapterIIbelow,ICAO had nojurisdictionto addressthe
interpretation or applicationofthMontreal Conventionin anyevent.
Consequently,the reference made to the Montreal Convention inthe letter of7
July 1988wassufficientto place the United States on noticetaaquestionas to
itsinterpretation or applicationhad ari~en~~~.
5.15 In thisconnection, mentionshouldbe made ofthe Court's
decisioninthejurisdictionphase of the Nicaranua casewhere the Court held that
385 &, Exhibit 38,p.5.
386
Draft C-MinExtraordinary 1988/1,13July 1988,p. 7. Exhibi40. Sec,
also,Draft C-Min125/12,5December 1988,p.8. Eibjtxh 4;nd DraftC-
Min 126/18,13March 1989, p.7,Mibit 47.
387
In fact, prior to the United States'firstconcrete offerof exeratia
compensatito he,IslamicRepublic had also invokedthe Montreal
Conventioninits Application.474 AERIAL INCIDENT [1921
a dispute canbe submittedto it evenif duringthe prior negotiationsriomention is
made.ofthe treaty onwhichthe applicantState reliesto establishthe Court's
jurisdicti~n~~~.In that case,the United States had argued that Nicaragua had
never raised innegotiationsthe applicationof the Treaty ofFriendship of1956to
the factual orlegalallegations madeinits Application. The Court rejected thjs
objectionbynotingthat:
"[Iltdoesnot necessarilyfollowthat, because a State has not
' expresslyreferred in negotiationswithanother Stateto a particular
treaty as havingbeen violatedbyconduct of that other State, it is
debarred frominvokinga compromissoryclausein that treaty. The
conductwasa breach ofinternational obligationsbefore the
present casewasinstituted;and itisnowaware that specificarticles
ofthe 1956 Treaty are allegedto have been violated. It would
make no sense to require Nicaraguanowto institute fresh
prgwdings based on the Treaty,whichitwouldbe fullyentitled to
do .
5.16 Furthermore, the fact that in the present casethe
disagreement betweenthe Parties primarilytook shape duringthe course of
debates in international fora (the U.N.SccuntyCouncilandthe ICA0 Council),
and not inbilateral talks,in no waydetracts from the fact that thepnor
negotiation clausecouldbe regarded as compliedwith tathe extent to whichit
wasapplicable. Asthe Court stated inSouth WestAfnca. Preliminary
Obiections, negotiationscantake place ininternational parliamentary bodies in
theform of"conferenceor parliamentary diplomacy"provided,ofcourse,that the
contending parties set out their viewsclearly,itbecomes apparent that theyare
stronglyconflicting,and "bothsidesremain adamant". In suchsituations direct
negotiations betweenthe parties are not necessaq because "itisnot so rnuchthe
388 Militan and ParamilitarvActivitiesin and againstNicaramia.(Nicarama
v. United States of Amenca) Junsdiction and AdmissibilitI.C.J.Reriorts
1984 at,p. 428,para.83.
389 m., pp. 428-429.[193] OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 475
form ofnegotiation that matters asthe attitude and viewsof the ~artjes~~~. f
course,whenone State refusesto negotiate withthe other, the implicationsfor
tryingto settle thematter are clear.
Prior neeotiatinns did not vrovenecessaw in viewof the
(ii) stmne disamment between theParties
5.17 AsPart III has shown,discussionsregardingthe dispute took
placebetween the Parties, at least to the minimumextentrequired byArticle
14(1) ofthe Montreal Conventionand the relevant international caselaw. What
mustbe stressed isthat, accordingto the Court, the character and qualiiyofthese
djscussionsneeds to be evaluatedby takinginto accountthe politicalrelationship
existingbetween them at the time thedispute arase, aswelastheirviewson the
matte?".
5.18 The United States nowcontendsthat it made attemptsto
negotiate,but these proved unsuccessfulbecaust of the negativeattitude of the
Islamic~e~ublic~~~.Apart from the parliamentary-typedebates before ICA0
and the United Nations,the IslamicRepublic deniesthat the United Statesever
tried to negotiate the disputewithit arisingfrom the the shoot-downof FlightIR
655 priorto the institutionof these proceedings. Anyattempts made by the
United States to deal withthe matter were limitedto seekinginformation
regardingsome of the victimswithouttolerating anyinterventionor "interference"
on the part of the IslamicRepublic. It wasonlyafter the IslamicRepublic filedits
Applicationthat the United States agreed to meet on the matter. Yet eventhen,
and despite the fact that the Unitei!States then knewthat the IslamicRepublic
390
South West Africa.PrelirninarvObjections.Judment, I.C.J.Reports 1962,
p.346, &, in thisrespect, paras, 3.75-3.77,above.
391 MavromrnatisPalestine Concessions.Judment No. 2. 1924,P.C.I.J.Series
A Na. 2.
392 U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p. 159.476 AERIAL INCIDENT il941
wasalleginga breach ofthe Montreal Convention,the discussionsrapidly reached
an impassedueto the radicallydivergingapproaches adopted bythe Parties.
5.19 Accordingly,there isno basis forarguingthat the conditions
laiddownin Article 14(1)of the Montreal Conventionwere notsatisfiedand that
the dispute couldnotbe properlysubmittedto the Court. The attitude ofthe
United States, inrefusingto recognizeor discussthe unlawfulcharacter of the
attack,rendered the fuKient ofthe conditionsset out in Article 14(1)of the
Montreal Convention otiose,ifnot impossible. Inthese circumstances,it is
reasonable to conclude,in the wordsof Article 14(1),that the disputewasone
that "cannotbe settled through negotiation".
5.20 The United Statescannot nowtake advantageof the
requirement of prior negotiations setforth inArticle 14(1)ofthe Montreal
Conventiongiventhat the reason whynegotiations failedwasbecause the United
States refused to deal withthe IslamicRepubIicprior to the bringingof this case
or to accept responsibilityfor theincident393.
5.21 This isnot to Saythat somecharnels, suchasthe U.S.
interests sectionofthe SwissEmbassyin Tehran,were not open between the
farti~ notwithstandingthe absence ofofficialdiplomaticrelations between
However,the IslamicRepublic submitsthat giventhe attitude ofthe
United States,whichwasillustratedbyitsrefusa1to respond positivelyto the Iran
393
Ir tsPreliminaryObjections,the United Statesargues that the Montreal
Conventionisnoi applicable to the case. Undoubtedly,the United States
wouldhave held the sameviewifthe issuehad been raisedinnegotiations,
and a fundamental impassewouldimmediatelyhave therebybeen
reached.
394
U.S.PreliminaryObjections,pp. 154,gt 9.11951 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 477
Insurance Company'soffer on 6Februav 1989to senda representative to discuss
the matter, these channelscouldnot have been usehlly exploited.
5.22 Another possible forumwas,inthe United States'
contention,the Iran-United States ClaimsTribunal. However, asPart III,
Chapter II(C) has explained,the importance of the role of thisTribunal in
providinga possibtenegotiating forum hasbeen greatlyexaggeratedin the U.S.
PreliminaryObjections. Whileit istruethat the Tribunalwasfunctioningat the
time of the incidenasit currentlyis,it isalsotrue that itsjurisdictionwas strictly
limited atthat time, asit isnow,tothe fulfilmentof the tasks entrusted to it bythe
AigiersDeclarations of 19January 1981. The powersof the representatives of
the Partiesto the Tribunalwere accordingly limitedto thematters being dealt
withbythe Tribunal,and didnot encompassmatters suchas the destruction of
FlightIR 655fallingoutsideof the Tribunal'sofficialbusiness.
5.23 Althoughother fora were alsoat the disposalof the Parties
suchas ICA0 and the United Nations,seriousnegotiationswere effectively
impossiblethere because of the conflictingpositionstaken bythe Parties, and
especiallybecause the United States consistentlydeclared itsunwillingnessto
engagein contact, discussionsand negotiationswiththe lslamicRepublicor its
agencies overthe question of compensation.
SECTIO BN. TheCondition ofPriorArbitration
5.24 The United States alsocontends that the second condition
1
laid downin Article 14(1)of the Montreal Convention has notbeen satisfiedby
the IslarnicRepublic:arbitration wasnot officiallyrequested and consequently,
the requirement ofa six-monthperiod fromthedate of the request for arbitration
has not lapsed. AERIAL INCIDENT
5.25 It willbe shownbelowthat:
- The requirement at issueisnotan absolute one:.its
fulfilmentissubjectto the conditionthat bath contending
parties shouldshowa modicumof political wiU to cooperate
and therefore be readyto agree upon not onIythe resort to
arbitration, but abo the practicalmodalitofssuchresort
and, inparticular,theorganizationof the arbitration;
-
In the dispute under consideration,the oppositionbetween
the legalpositionof the Parties wassomarked and
unbridgeable from the outset that theylacked not onay
minimumwillto try andsettle the disagreement by
negotiation,butalso,a fortiori,the willto setin motion the
complexprocess of arbitration;
-
Giventhese circumstances,the terms ofArticle 14(1)of the
Montreal Conventiondo not require that one party to the
dispute shouldperform the mere formalityofgivingnotice
to the other party ofits intention ta resort to ajudicial
settlement ofthe dispute byputtingforward a"preliminary"
request for arbitrationand then waitingfor the six-month
period to elapse;
- Consequently,Article 14(1)ofthe Montreal Convention
does not stand in the wayoftheZslamicRepublic instituting
proceedingsbefore the Court with a viewto askingit to
declare, amongother things,that the respondent State has
breached the Montreal Convention. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 479
5.26 Before dealingwiththe specificcircumstancesof thiscase,it
isfjttingto dwellbrieflyon the purpose and scopeofinternational clauseson
pnor arbitration.A general,ifshort, analysisoftheir role makesit possibleto
graspbetter the reason why, inthe circumstancesofthe present case,Article
14(1)of the Montreal Conventioncanbe regarded ashavingbeen satisfiedbythe
IslarnicRepublic.
(i) Thc DurPoseand scom ofinternationalclausesresuiring
priormurse toarbitratian
5.27 As the United States pointsout,the purpose ofthe pnor
arbitration clauseis"toavoidescalatinga dispute betweenStates to thisforum
[theCourt]before the attempt has been made to resolveit throug..arbiters of
their cho~sin~~~~~A'.cordingto the United States,"[wlerethisCourtto bnish
aside suchexplicitlanguage,the Court wouldultimatelyserveto discourage
Statesfrom crafiingcompromissoryclausesin which theybelievetheyare
fosteringa bilateral, low-profileresolution of
5.28 Clearly,the clausesat issueare designedto enable the
parties to a dispute to avoidresort ta adjudicatiapermanent and
institutionalizedbodysuchasthe Court byinstead optingforathird-party
settlernent that has themeritsof king lessconspicuousandsolernnand more
withinthe controlof the parties (asregardsthe organizationof the procedure and
especiallythe appointment of arbitrators).
5.29 It ishoweverobviousthat resort to arbitration presupposes,
on the part obath contendiriparties,a highdegree ofwillto prefer arbitration
in lieuofadjudication. That bath partiesatdispute musthave a strong
395 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 152.
396 Ibid.480 AERIAL INCIDENT Il981
intention to settle the disputebyarbitration isapparent fromthe fact that, toset
in motion the arbitration procéss,a host ofbilateral stepsmustbe agreed. After
one ofthe parties has requested arbitration and the other has responded
favourably,both partiesmust agree upon the genera1frameworkof arbitration,
that isthe structurofthe arbitral tribunal, the rulesof procedure andwho
establishes them,the compositionof the tribunal,the applicablelaw,etc.,and
then theymust cooperate in order to appoint the arbitrators, as wellas a
chairman ifthere isnot a solearbitrator, and define their terms of reference.
5.30 AI these stepsperforce requirea strong and continuing
desire on thepartofboth parties (ij to eschewforma1adjudication;(ii)to bridge
their differences,hence to corneto some sort ofagreement fortheir settlement;
and (iii)to havethe disputesolvedbyan independent arbitral tribunal.
5.31 The difficultiesinherent inachievingagreement onal1of
these points should notbe underestimated. Article14(1)prowdes absolutelyno
guidelinesforthe procedural or stnictural frameworkofthe arbitration. In this
respect, itfallstar short of eventhe minimumguideries for arbitration provided
for inArticle85of the ChicagoConvention. The latter at least stipulatesthe
number ofarbitrators and, more importantly,the procedures that the appointing
-authority(in:thiscasethe President ofthe ICA0 CounciI)willadopt for naminga
par9 arbitrator ifone ofthe parties failsto name an arbitrator withinthe
stipulated tirnelimif and the Chairman or umpire,ifthe pafry arbitrators are
unable to agree amongst themselves. Article14(1)containsno similarprovisions
designatingan appointing authority,and no procedures forthe namingof
arbitrators.
5.32 Experience has shownthat evenwhenthe arbitration clause
in question designates an appointing authoritydifficultiescan arise. intheil991 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 481
Interuretation ofPeaceTreaties case (Second Phase),the Court held that a
dispute resolutionclausecontainingsucaprovisiondidnot applywhenone of
the partiesfailedfirstto appoint itsownarbitrator. As the Court-noted
"byitsverynature sucha clausemust be strictlyconstrued and can
be applied oniyin the case expresslyprovidedfor therein. The case
envisagedin the Treaties isexclusivelythat of the failure ofthe
parties to agree upon the selectionof a member andbyno
meansthe muchmore seriouscaseof a corn lete refusa1of co-
operation byone aspm, taking the form ofrefushg to appoint its
own Commissioner .
5.33 It followsthat the willofthe contendingpartiesto be ready
and disposedto bridgetheir differencesand have them settledbythirci-party
arbitration, whileagreeingon al1ofthe elements ofthe arbitration, isthe lynchpin
ofthe clausesunder discussionand, indeed,the sQua non conditioofthe
operation of these clauses. Whenever that isproved to be lacking,the clauses
cannot and shouldnot operate, lestthe requirements theylay downbecome mere
formalities,devoid ofanypractical significance.To develop thispoint,thetwo
elements of thispart of Article 14(1)(the request for arbitration andthesix-
month period) willbe considered separately.
5.34 Withrespect to the need to submarequest for arbitration,
clearlya contestingState maylegitimatelybe required to make sucha request
onlyifthere issome chanceof it beingaccepted bythe othparty.Whenever it
isapparent from the outset that one of the parties refusesto deal with the other
or that their disagreementisso fundamentalthat it cannotbe settledby
negotiation but onlyby resort ta an institutionalizedjudicialbodyto whicheither
party canunilaterallyresort, to continue to insistthat one ofthe parties should
perform the fonnalityof makina request for arbitration wouldbe tantamotot
397 Intemretation of Pcace Treaties withRulearia,Hunpan; and Roman.a,
~482 AERIAL INCIDENT [2ooj
introducinginto international proceedings formalitieswhichare absolutely
a~ien~.'~.
5.35 In thisconnection,it shouldbe recalleasearlyas 1925
the Permanent Court stated that it couldnot "alïowitselfto be hampered bya
mere defect of fom, the removalofwhichdepends solelyon the Party
con~erned~~~~T'.hisfundamental rulinghas been recentlyrestated bythe Court
in the Nicara-a caseN?
5.36 The sameholdstrue for the requirement ofthe six-month
period. Again,this provesto be a mere formalitywhichStates are allowedto
dispense within the case of a substantialand werall disagreementbetween them,
and where there isno reasonable prospect that theycanreach agreement onthe
elements of the dispute,muchlessthe organizationofan arbitration.
5.37 Thispoint hasbeen cogentlymade byseveralmembers of
the Court in the opinionstheydeliveredinthe recent Case ConcerningOuestions
ofIntemretation and Applicationofthe 1971Montreal ConventionArisinr!from
the Aesial Incidentat Lockerbie401. Giventheimportance ofthese opinions and
398 Thisisnot tosaythat arbitrations cannatusefulrneansof dispute
resolution. However,whenthere are so manyprocedural obstaclesto
agree to or overcome,and when one of the parties hasnoown
inclinationto discussthe matter in dispute, recourseto theCourt should
be readilyavailablewithouthavingto waitfor a six-monthtime penod to
elapse.
399
Certain Ge an hterests in PolishUooer Sileda. Jurisdiction.Judment
~
1984 p.,429,para. 83.[201] OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 483
their directrelevanceto the issueunder discussion,it isproperto dwellbrieflyon
the casefromwhichtheyoriginate.
5.38 In itstwoOrders on the matter handed downon 14April
1992,the Court did not acceptthe argument raisedbythe respondent States for
denyingthe Court'sjurisdictionunder the Montreal Conventionbasedon the
non-expirationof the six-monthperiod providedforinArticle 14(1)ofthat
Convention. AIthoughthe Court didnot take an expresspositiononthispoint, it
seemsremarkable at anyrate that it did not upholdthe respondent States'
arguments, asit couldhave done. The contention couldtherefore be made that
the Court implicitlyrejected that argument. Bethat as it may,what matters is
that three Judges,the ActingPresident ofthe Court, Judge Oda,Judge Bedjaoui
and Judge Weeramantry,forcefullyrejected in their opinions theaforementioned
argument as put forwardbythe respondent States.
5.39 Inhisdeclaration appended to the Orders,Judge Oda
stated:
"Inthe present case,there doesnotseem to existanyconvincing
ground forassertingthat the Court'sjurisdictionissoobviously
lacking.The Respondent's argument wherebythe Court's
jurisdictionisdeniedthrough the non-lapseof the six-monthperiod
wouldavpear too legalistic.if one wereto find that no room
remainid'to negotiaie on the organizationofarbitration the face
of a categoricaldenialof the possibilityofan arbitration21
5.40 inhisdissentingopinionJudge Bedjaouistatedthat:
'There are severalreasonswhyin the present case thisrequirement
doesnot stand inthe wayof the Court beingseised. It shouldfirst
be noted that inresponse to the request forarbitrationmade by
Libyathe Permanent Representative of the United Kingàomto the
United Nationsstated that that request was'notrelevant',sincethis
rnakes it obviousthat the decisionbythe United Kingdomand the AERIAL INCIDENT i2o21
United states to bringthe matter to the SecurityCouncilsoas to
obtain from it a politicalsolution foreclosed,fromthe outset, any
possibilityof an arbitral solution. request for arbitration
therefore appeared to be fundamentallyinappropriate and
inconsistentwiththe politicalmeasureswhichthe SecurityCouncil
wasexpected to take and were later taken. Accordinglyarbitration
was inherentlyand as a matter of principleruled out, no rnatter
howlongLibyawere to wait. The six-monthtime-limitwas
altogethermeaninglessinasmuchasit was inconsistentwiththe
seeing tiat thcy optaFresubmissionof the matter to the Secunty
CouncillastJanuary ."
5.41 A similarstand wastaken byJudge Weeramantry in his
dissentingopinion. He pointed out, amongother things,the following:
"[Wlhere a party hasin anticipation indicatedthat itwillnot
consideritselfbound bvmediation or neeotiation. the insistencebv
that party onawaitingperiod specified a prerequisite before thé
matter istaken to the International Courtcoulddefeat the
purposes ofsucha rovision[i-e.Article 14(1)of the Montreal
Convention]L...] de question of lawbefore usisthis:if,in a
hypothetical case,a party refuses negotiation,cansuchparty insist
thisCourt?-mSuchinsistencecanweJ88,p roadblock in the path ofa
party seekingrelieffrom this Court .
5.42 After quotingapprovinglythe opinion deliveredbyJudge
Ago in the Nicaraeua case,Judge Weeramantry continued:
"Itcanbe plausiblyargued that there isno purpose in allowina
party whohas repudiated conciliationto argue for the rejection af
an application on groundsof itsnon-cornpliancewithprocedures
whichit hasitselfrejected.A period offreedom from conciliatory
andjudicial rocesseswouldthus be givento the party repudiating,
Iem@ it at gberty to pursve other nonsonciliatory procedures,
whileits opponent isrequired to standbywithouthelp or remedy.
Sucha constructionofthe Article [Article14(1)mentioned above]
fits alsowithintheories ofinterpretation whichemphasize that
403 m., p. 146,para. 9 (Englishtranslation).
404 m., p. 161. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 485
treaty provisions mustbe4~interpreted as not to render nugatory
their objectand purpose ."
5.43 As isapparent fromthe above,the three aforementioned
Judges shared the viewthat to require a party to waitsixmonthsbefore applying
to the Court wouldamount to a meaninglessformalitywheneveritwasclear that
arbitration had no chanceof beinginstituted. In addition,wheneither of the
parties can unilaterallyblockthe arbitration processbyrefusingto agree on
elements necessaryta organizethe arbitration (suchas the compositionof the
arbitral tribunal,the place ofarbitration,the applicable law,the procedure, etc.),
it isinappropriate to require the parties to adhereto the six-monthperiod when it
wouldbe futileta do soand whenthe compromissoryclausein questionexplicitly
leaves open the possibilityof havingultimate recourse to the Court ifthe
elements of arbitration cannotbe agreed onwithinsixrnonths.TO hold othewise
wouldmean deprivingArticle 14ofitsobjectand purpose, contraryto well-
establjshedprinciplesof treaiy interpretation.
5.44 The conclusionis therefore warranted that both
requirements under discussion(the makingof a request for arbitration andthe
lapse ofa six-monthperiod before institutingproceedingsbeforethe Court) can
be legitimatelydispensedwithanytime it becomes apparent that there exist
unbridgeabledifferencesbetween the contending parties and where,
consequently,there isa lackofeven the minimumbasisfor settinginmotion the
arbitration process.
5.45 Internationaljudicialproceedingsare hostileto mere
procedural formalitiesthat uselesslystand inthe way ofthe proper administration
405 m., p. 162.As noted in Part III, severalJudges alsopointed outthat the
actionsof the Respondent States inefusin to negotiate effectivelyacted
as an anticipatorybrçach ofArticl10(1) of the Convention. para.
3.88,above.486 AERIALlNclDENT ~041
ofjustice; at anyrate, suchformalitiesare not suitedto international adjudication,
as the Court has consistentlyheld. It followsthat whenever it canbe shownthat
the fulfilmentofthe requirements under discussionwouldarnountto a mere
formaliq, these requirements canbe dispensedwithwithoutthisamountingto a
breach of the relevant treatyprovisions. Thisisthe caseforthe disputewith
whichthe Court is currentlyseized.
(ii) Theinapdicabilityofthepriorarbitration clauseinthe
case underdiscussion
5.46 On the basisofthe abovediscussion,it iseasyto showwhy
in the instant casethe prior arbitration requirement wasnot applicable as
practical matttr. Indeed, the situationisanalagousto that presented in the
Divlomatic and Consular Staff casewherethe Court referred toone ofthe
parties' refusal to enter into discussions onthe matasa reason whythe other
party couldunderstand suchrefusal as"rulingout, in limine,anyquestion of
arrivingat an agreement to resort to arbitratic~n~~In that case,rnoreover,the
United States had invokedas one of the bases ofjurisdictionthe 1973Convention
on the Frevention of CrimesAgainstInternationally Protected Persons. Article
13ofthat Convention containedthe samekind of temporal arbitration provision
as appears in Article 14(1)of the Montreal Convention. Notwithstandingthis
provision,the United States maintained:
"Thislimitationon the court'siurisdictioncanhaveno application
in circumstancessuchas these; where the party inwhosêfavourthe
made it impossibleas a practical maiter to haGedi~cussionsrelated
to theoreanization of an arbitration. or. indeed.evto
commu&ate adirect forma1request f& arbitration. It issubmitted
406 United States DiriIomaticand Consular StaffinTehran. Judment. I.C.J.
Re orts 1980 .26,para. 49,sec.also,Memorial ofthe IslamicRepublic,
2.67-2kg. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 487
that whensuchan attitude has been manifested, an apphcatio
the Court maybe made without regard to the passageof time %Yl.
This'attitude isin starkcontrast to the United States' positionhere.
5.47 Havingreviewedthe United States' past conduct,the
argument of the United States that the IslamicRepubIicmade no effort to have
the dispute submittedto arbitration, didnot providea representative to negotiate
the issueand never made the request for arbitration providedfor in Article 14(1)
of the Montreal Conventioncanbe placed in context. Soalsocanthe United
States'claimthat, bycontrast, itnever refused to talk withrepresentatives of the
IslamicRepublic about the matter.
5.48 Asexplainedin paragraphs 3.24to 3.44above,the
description ofthe facts offeredbythe United States doesnot correspond to what
actuallyhappened. Prior tothe institution of these proceedings,theUnited
States refused tdeal with the Government ofthe IslamicRepublicand its
agencies asa rnatter of ofncialpolicy. Similarly,the United Statesunwilling
to deal withthe representative that the banian Insurance Companyproposed
naming to discussthe matter withoutreceivingassurances that thiscompany was
not ownedbythe Government ofthe IslamicRepublic. As the US. note to the
Iranian.Insurance Companydated 16April 1989observed (transmitted bythe
U.S. Interests Sectionof the SwissEmbassyin Tehran), the United States
required information onthe structure and managémentofthe companyto
determine "whetherit isan entityofthe Govemment of ~ran~~~'Y '.et this
407
1.C.J.Pleadings.United States Di~lornaticand ConsularStaffin Tehran
(USAv. Iran), Mernorial ofthe United Statesp. 155. Iri'thepresent
occurred to filitApplicationwhereas in the Dinlornaticand Consular
Staffcase,the United States üied itsApplication~ustthree weeksafter the
events thatgiverise to the dispute.488 AERIAL INCIDENT [2061
request wassimplya smokescreen sincethe United States aiready knewthat the
han Insurance Companywas a governmentalentity.
5.49 Moreover, before the institutionof these proceedings,the
United States never accepted the right of the lslamicRepublic to discussthe legai
issuesraised bythe incident involvingFlight IR 655and the question of
compensation arisingtherefrom. It stands to reason hnatrefusa!of the
United States to negotiate withthe Government of the IslarnicRepublic and its
public agencies,coupled withthe United States'viewthat the Montreal
Convention isnot applicable to the incident,rendered it inconceivablethat
agreement could havebeen reachewithinsixmonths on al1ofthe elements
necessaryto put in place an arbitration.
5.50 In the situation descn'bedabove, and keeping in mind the,
diametncally opposed approaches and viewsofthe Parties concerni,gthe
settlement of the dispute, it iswarranted to concludeasinthe Divlomaticand
Consular Staffcase,that no "reasonable probability"existedeven forstarting
seriousnegotiatians and that, consequently,anyrforarbitration would
havebeen pointless.
5.51 Consequently,the dispute beingone which couldnot be
settled bynego'tiation,the IslamicRepublic wasfullyentitled to fileits
Application withthe Court, in conformitywithArticle 14(Montreal
Convention.
CHAPTER n THEMONTREAL CONVENTIONIS RELEVANT TO
TBE FACE3UPON WHICH THE CLAIMSOFTHE
XSL4MIC REPUBLIC REST
5.52 The United States contends that the Montreal Convention
cannot apply to the facts upon whichthe present dispute rests. It assertsthati2071 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 489
"[bloththe terms of the Convention anditshistory,aswellassubsequent practice,
demonstrate that the Conventiondoesnot address the actionsofStates against
civilaircraft, ainparticular clearlydoes not applyto the actianState's
armed forcesengagedin armed con£lictdoA.
5.53 In the opinionofthe United States,sincethe destruction of
FlightIR 655and the killinofits 290passengerswasperpetrated byU.S.armed
forces,it constituted an act attnbutable to the United States. The United States
then argues, however,that, tterm "any person" used inArticle 1of the
Montreal Convention refers toindividualsand not to "abstractand incorporeal
entities"suchas states410.
5.54 The United States alsocontendsthat the inapplicabiiityof
the Montreal Conventionto thiscaseisfurther confirmedbythe conductof
ICAOin condemningepisodesof armed attacks brought againstcivilaviationby
the armed forcesofa State whenICAO has alwaysreferred to the Chicago
Conventionand not to theMontreal Convention.
5.55 In the Sectionsthat follow,the lslamicRepublic wjllshow
that each ofthese arguments ill-founded. Before doinso,it isimportant to
makea preliminaryobservation regardingthe essenceof the United States
objections. Whatisstrikingabout these argumentsisthat they are al1related to
themerits ofthecase -i.e he actual interpretation or application ofthe
Montreal Conventionto the factsofthe case.As a result, theydo not nse to the
levelofgenuine preliminaryobjectionswithinthe meaningofArticle79of the
409 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 365.
410 m., p. 167.490 AERIAL INCIDENT [2081
Rules of Court, and they certainlydo not constitute objectionsthat possessan
exclusivelypreliminarycharacter.
5.56 For example,the United States devotesconsiderable
attention to the phrase "anyperson" appearing in Article 1ofthe Montreal
Conventionin an effort toshowthat these words reallymean "anyprivate
person",not a person engagedin an oficial orState capacity. Suchan argument
directlyrelates to the interpretation or application of the Montreal Conven-ion
an issueforthe merits -and not the preliminaryquestion whetherthe Court has
jurisdictionto hear the case.
5.57 The United States provesthe point byintroducing its
argument withthe well-known maxim enshrined in the Vienna Convention onthe
LawofTreaties that a treaty isto be intemreted in accordancewiththe ordinary
meaningto be givento the termsin their contextandin the lightofitsobject and
purpose411. The IslamicRepublic fullyagrees, but notes that the question ofthe
Montreal Convention'sinterpretation, aswellas itsapplication,isprecisela
questionwhichthe Court hasjurisdictionto address at the next(merits) phase of
these proceedingsunder Article 14(1) of the Convention.
5.58 Inaddition, the United States' argumentsmake it clearthat
a dispute existsbetween the Parties overthe Convention'sinterpretation or
application. While sucha dispute cannot be settled duringthe preliminaryphase
of thecas; itsexistencedemonstrates that the U.S.Preliminary Objectionsin this
respect cannotbe deemed to possess"anexciusivelypreliminarycharacter". It
willtherefore be appropriate, in conforrnitywiththe Rules, for the Court to order
further proceedingsin the case.
41 U.S.Preliminary Objections, p.165.~091 OijsERvATroNs AND SuBMIssloNs 491
5.59 Havingmade these introductory observations,the rest of
this Chapter consistsoftwoSections inwhichthe United States' argumentsare
rebutted on their merits. SectiAnwilldeal withthe interpretation ofthe
expression"any person"contained in Article 1ofthe Montreal Conventionand
the scope ofthe Convention, SectionBwiIlrebut the United States'allegations
concerningICA0 practice in circumstances analogousto the shootingdownof
FlightIR 655.
Smo~ A. The Ex~ression"AnyPerson" Used inArticle1of the
;
PrivateIndividual and aStateAgent
5.60 The United States assertsthat the Montreal Conventionlays
downobligationsto prevent and suppress actsofindividuals;the IslamicRepublic
does notargue anythingto the contrary,but alsomaintainsthat suchindividuals
canbe State agentsand can,when engagedin an o€Eiciaclapacity,thereby engage
the responsibilityofthe StatIfit istrue thatthe Montreal Conventionfocusses
on the prevention and sanctioniof unlawfulindividualconduct,it cannotbe
inferred from thisthat itsscope shouldbe limitedtothe conductofprivate
individuals. Indeed, the Convention,in imposing uponContractingStates
obligationsin connectionwith"unlawfulactsagainstthe safetyof civilaircraft"
doesnot quali*the individual;in particular, it doesnot differentiate between
individuaTactingin their private capacityand those actingq- State agents. The
expression"anyperson"thus includesanyindividualwhether actingin aprivate or
officialcapacity.If suchperson isactinginthelatter capacity,the responsibilityof
the Statewillalso necessarilybe engaged.
5.61 The followingSub-Sectionswill show howsucha broad
meaningofthe expression "anyperson" isconhed byan analysisofthe tex1of
the Montreal Convention (Sub-Section(i)), its preparatory works(Sub-Section
(ii)) and by international practice (Sub-Section (iii)). 492 AERIAL INCIDENT [2101
(i) Tbe textoftheMontreal Convention
5.62 The literalinterpretation of the expression"anyperson"
used in Article 1ofthe Montreal Conventioncannot lead to a restriction ofthe
scope of that provision. Accordingto the rule ofinterpretation of international
treaties laid downinArticle 31of the Vienna Conventionon the LawofTreatks:
"Atreaty shallbe interpreted ingoodfaith in accordance withthe
ordinary meaningto be aven to the terrns ofthedltaty intheir
context andin the lightof itsobject and purpose ."
5.63 The Court itselfhas had occasionto applythese rules of
interpretation ona number of occasions. For instance,in the case ofthe
Com~etence of the General Assemblvfor the Admissionof a State to the United
Nations,AdvisoryOpinion, the Court held that, in the interpretation and
application ofthe provisionsof an international treaty, itisnecessary:
"toendeavour to giveeffect to them in their natural and ordinary
meaningin the context inwhichthey occur. Ifthe relevant wordsin
their natural and ordinaryqygning make sense in their context,
thatisan end of the matter ."
5.64 The plain meaningof the terrn "anyperson"doesnot leave
room foranydistinctionor exclusion:byuse of the qualifyng word "any",the
provisionsof the Montreal Conventionwere purposelykept as broad aspossjble.
i As Judge Bedjaoui indicated inhisDissenting Opinionin the Case Concerning
Questions of Interpretation and Auplication ofthe 1971Montreal Convention
Arisinefromthe Aerial Incident at Lockerbie:
412
It iswellestablishedthat Article31reflects customaryinternational lawon
this point.
413
Com~etence of the General Assemblvfor the Admission of a Stateto the
United Nations. AdvisowOpinion. I.C.J.Reports 1950,p. 8. The Court
reaffirmed thispnnciple-inthe Case con ce min^ the Arbitral Award of 21
Julv 1989(Guinea Bissau v. Seneeall. Judment, I.C.J.Reports 1991,p. 69,
para. 46. OBSERVATlONS AND SUBMISSIONS 493
"lnthe firstplace, Article 1of the 2971Montreal Convention
removesal1doubt on this scoreto the extentthat it refers to 'any
person'committingcertain 'acts'characterized as'offences'. This
meansthat the Convention appliesverybroadlyta 'any' erson,
whether that person acts on hisownaccaunttfan behalf ofany
organization or on the instructionsofa State ".
5.65 The "objectand purpose" of the Montreal Convention,as
wellas al1the other international conventionsin the fieldofcrimes againstthe
peace and secunty ofmankind, isto make anyperson whoperforms acts seriously
irnpairingcertain values accountable. The Conventiontherefore doesnot attach
anyimportance to thequestion whether suchacrsare carritd out byindividuals
actingina private capacityor on behalf ofa State or otherorganizationor entity.
(ii) The preparatory workç
5.66 The above interpretation of the expression"anyperson"
includedinArticle 1isborne out bythe preparatory works.
5.67 At the Montreal Conference of 1971the discussion on
Article 1essentiallyrevolvedaround the classesof offencesto be includedand
the way of mentioningthem (whether bya preciseenumeration or by a general
reference). It istherefore onlynatural that verylittlewassaid as to the categories
ofpersons fallingwithinthepurviewofthat provision.
5.68 However, evena cursorysurveyof the debates makes it
clear that, when referringto the possible authors of offencesagainstthe safetyof
DissentinplOpinion of Judge Bediaoui,I.C.J.494 AERIAL INClDENT PI2]
civilaviation,participants inthe Conference used a broad terminology,whichof
necessityincludedboth private individualsand State agents415.
5.69 That most of the time delegates referred to both categones
of"persons"isborne out bythe factthat onlyin one case did a delegate mention
an examplewhichcouldonlybe Iimitedto acts ofprivate individu al ^tc'^b.e
deduced fromthis,g contrario, that in a11other cases delegatesintended to cover
acts ofboth private individualsand State organs.
5.70 The aboveinterpretation isfurther confirmedbythe only
instance of a discussion,in the Commissionof the Whole, onthe question of
whether the classof"persons"referred to inArticle 1should alsoembrace State
agents.
5.71 The questionwasraised bythe delegate of Czechoslovakia,
who contended that in his.view,sincethe Conventionmust cover actsof public
officiaistoo, it should alsoprovidefor the responsibilityofthe State agency on
whosebehalf the individualhad acted. He stated the following:
415
Sec CAO, International Conference on AirLaw,Montreal, September
1971,Vol.1,Minutes, Doc. 9081-LCf170-1,pp. 21-49. Exhibit71.
416
Dresentdraftinnof Ahcle 1(1)wasnot satisfactorv. There was a risk.
accordhg to th%fonnulatioh,'that actswouldbe hcluded whichhad '
nothine to do withthe safetvof civilaviat-ofor examde. the case where
twopaisengers had a quarréland used a dagger or a knifeIn that caseit
was evidentthat the armed attack had no consequencewith regard to the
safetyof the aircraft fiight: Nevertheless,ifa passenger madan attack
on the lifeofa pilot, evenwithoutthe use of firearm, the safetyof the
aircraftwouldbe certainlyjeo ardiied. He therefore suggesteda
cornpromiresolutionto the e$ect that al1aas ofviolenceagainstthe aew,
byanymeanswhatsoever,shouldbe considered aspunishable offences
under the terms ofthe present convention,and that it wouldbe a
orndeviceson an aircrafinfight".m.,keap.30,para. 27.osivesubstances OBSERVATlONS AND SUBMISSIONS 495
"[Bleforeit proceeded to discussparagraphs (8) and (9) draft
Articlel], the Commissionshoulddecide thescope ofthe
conventionas regardsthe persons committingthe offencedefhed
an employeeof a State or airport authority or,for example,by
sorneoneentrusted withthe regulation oairnavigation safety. In
such a case,hisDelegationbelievedthat the conventionshould
rovidethat the authority concernf~ust alsobear responsibility
fOrthe an or omissionin question .
5.72 This questionwasanswered,rather unsatjsfactonly,bythe
Secretary of the Commission,and then by the President. The Secretay failed to
address the mainpoint raisedbythe Czechoslovakdelegate and onlydealt with
the question of "omissionsHe stated:
"TheSecretanat had intended to drawto theattention ofthe
Drafting Committee the difficultyof interpreting the term 'or
omissions'in thisArticle,and to suggestthat the terminol'an
act or a fail~r~~p~perfoma legalduty'rnightbetter expresswhat
wasintended .
5.73 The President, reacting to this statement, rightlystressed
that it did not provide an answerto the main questionraised by Czechoslovakia.
He pointed out that h-
"[FJeltthat whilethe roposed rewordingwouldmeet one element
of the question raise bythe Czechoslwak Delegate it wouldstill
Ieaveunansweredthe situation of a person fallingwithinthe arnbit
of a State authoriv. That point m@t,perhaps be coveredby
means ofan exclusionin Article4 ,
In the event,it wasdecided not to includeanyfurther exclusionsin Article4.
ThisimpIiesthat personsfallingwithinthe ambit ofa State authoritywere stiü
417 Ibid.,p. 4para. 38.
418 Ibid.
419 M.496 AERIAL INCIDENT Pl41
coveredbyArticle 1. Inshort, therewas"noproposa1foramendment advanced,
and the matter wasnot pursued f~rther"~~~.
5.74 Itsapparent kom this last discussionthat no delegate
challengedthe viewof the Czechoslwak Delegate whereby Article1 also covered
acts or omissionsofState agents, and onthe other hand, no delegate made any
proposa1designedto address the specificpoint raisedby Czechoslovakia,namely
the issueof the additional responsibiütyof the State on whose behalf the agent
wasacting. The conclusionistherefore warranted that this discussionfurther
conEms that Article 1also addresses actsof State organs.
5.75 In consideringthe scope of the Montreal Convention, itis
alsoimportant to recallthe environmentinwhichit wasdrafted. Asthe United
States points out421,the Montreal Convention,together withthe 1970Hague
Convention,wasdrafted in the aftennath of a number of hijackingsand other
terrorist activitiesbyIiberation organizationsand other non-self-goveming
entities that had taken place againstcivilaircraft.
5.76 These incidenthelped sparka debate withinthe
international communiiyasto the definitionof "terronsm" and whether it
comprised Skateactions aswellasthe actionsofindividuals. As the United States
acknowledges initPrelimina~ ybjections,"individualterrorists might,of course,
420 m., para. 39.
421 US. PreliminaryObjections,pp. 168-169.i2151 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
be covertlydirected or supported byStates inparticular incidents422".
5.77 The possibleinvolvementof States or State organsin
terrorist activitieswassubsequentlydiscussedat length,includingat the 1984
meeting of the InternationalLawAssociation. The Amencan scholar,Professor
Alfred Rubin surnmedup the issueat that timeasfollows-
purportedly clothedwiththe authority ofa &ale, jwt as warcrimes
canbe committedby soldiersas such... In our opinion,or at least
inmine,thelegaland politicalfactors underlyingthat solutionto
the problem ofwar cnminaliv applyequallyto 'terrorism'and to
make the co~pt of'State terronsm'both inappropriate and
unnecessary .
5.78 The issueof"Stateterrorism"wasalsoaddressed bythe
Sovietdelegate, ProfessorStaroushenko,whonoted that:
"Stateterrorism opensthe wayto the use ofarmed force and thus
poses a direct threat to worldpeac..Usingthe armed forces
againstanother State'ssovereignty,itsterritorial integrityand
politicalndependence -and beingthe first to do -constitutes an
act of aggression.nnictingany'preventive'blows,withoutthe
SecurityCouncilsanctioningthem, isalsoa crime. State terrorism
istheshortest wayto aggre&ion,an@ry often it is a deliberate
preparation for anactofaggression ."
5.79 When the Montreal Conventionwas drafted in 1971,it was
quite clear that there wasno desire to provoke a lengthydebate overthe scope of
422 m., pp. 166and 172. The U.S. State Department has in fact defined
terroism asprerneditated,politicallymotivatedviolenceperpetrated
againstnoncombatant targets bysubnationalgrays or clandestinestate
agents, usuallyintended to influence an audience,'.Department of
State,Patterns of GlobalTerrorism: 1988,p. (1989),cited in Lambert,
J.J.:Terrorism and Hosta es in International Law,Grotius, Cambridge,
1990-
423 InternationalLawAssociation,Sixty-firstConference, Paris 198p. 167,
citedin McWhinney, E. A:erjal Piracvand International Terrorism, 1987,
p.155.Mibit 73.
424 m., p. 153.498 AERIALINCIDENT l2l61
what mightbe deemed "Stateterrorism". The issuewassimplytoo contentious.
The drafters ofthe Conventiontherefore quite deliberatelyleft the door open for
1
a broad interpretation of Article 1byreferring to offencescommittedby "any
person"withoutlimitingthe reference to "anyprivate person"or "anyperson in
hisindividual~a~acity"~~~ .nsodoing,they werewellaware that suchpersons
could,in the wordsof the United States,be directed or supported byStates, and
thus be actingas State agentscapable of engagingState responsibility.
(iii) The international~racticebearsout theintemretation of
Article1oftheMontres1Conventionset outabove
5.80 To support the interpretation of the expression"anyperson"
advanced above, reference canbe madeto the general practice in the fieldof
crimes againstthe peace and securityofmankind. This practice,followedsince
the end of the First WorldWar,hasnowcrystallizedin aBthe international
instruments, bindingand non-binding,whichdeal withsuchcrimes and has also
foundexpressacceptance in most domesticlegalsystemsincludingthe U.S. legal
system.
5.81 Admittedly,the Montreal Conventiondoes not expressly
mention State agents and uses a term more sweepingand synthetic. However,
other international instrumentswhichrefer to delictaiuris eentium alsouse the
genericterm "person"withoutfurther specification. Thisisso,for instance,with
regard to Resolution 3074mII adopted by the General Assemblyon 3
425 As has been noted byone author -
"... iththe politicaldiscussionof the United Nation(UN) the concept of
international terrorism isused in averybroad sense and as a notion
includingtwo different typesofviolations:not onlycrimes committedby
juridicialor physicalpersons,but international wrongfulacts committedby
States as well."
Konstantinov,E.: "international Terronsm and International Law",
German Yearbook of International Law,Vol.31,Duncker & Humblot,
Berlin, 1988,. 291. Exhibit74.L217] OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
December 1973,concemingthe "PrinciplesofInternational Cooperation inthe
Detection, Arrest, Extraditionand Punjshmentof Persons Guiltyof War Crimes
and Crimes againstHumanity". This Resolution refersin paragraph 4to "persons
suspectedof having committedsuchcnmes"and to "persansagainstwhomthere
isevidencethat they have comrnittedwar crimesand crimes againsthumanity"
(paragraph 5). It iscommon ground thatthe tem "person"referred to in this
Resolution includesbothprivate individualsand State agents.
5.82 Thispractice shows thatthe obligationimposedupan States
to prevent and repress delictabris rrentjumand to exercjsecriminaland possibly
civildomesticjurjsdictionover their individualauthors, existregardlessof the
functionsthat suchindividualsmay cany outwithinthe organisation ofa State.
5.83 The importance that cnmes againstthe peace and security
of mankindhave taken on at the international leveliscloseiybound upwithand
dependent upon the interest that States showfor the protection ofcertain
essentialvalues,suchas life,human dignityand the freedom ofcMlaviation. The
criminalactsthat impairsuchvalues are seen asa threat to international
coexistenceand cooperation. The individualsperpetrating them are regarded as
--stes humani generis.
5.84 Furthermore, there is awidemeasure ofagreement on the
idea that the best deterrent againstsuchcrimesisrepresented bythe possibility
forthe greatest number of States to exerciserepressiauthont-, evenmore so
when the crimehasbeen committedby an individualState agent.
5.85 Manytreaties and other international legalinstruments
providefor the dutyof Statesto search for, arrest and bring to trial or,500 AERIAL INCIDENT [2181
alternatively,extraditeto anotherState concerned al1persons responsiblefor
international crimesincludingwarcrimesand crimes againstpeace and humanity.
5.86 It shouldbe emphasized againthat thisdutyisincurnbent
upon States,regardlessof whether the person accusedofthe crimehas acted in
hispersona1capacityor as a State agent. Wheneverhe has acted as a State agent,
a double res~onsibiiitvhowever arises:the personal resvonsibilit~of theState
agent who has perpetrated the crime andthe resvonsibilitvof theState on whose
behatf the individualhas acted.
5.87 The persona1responsibilityoperates at the levelof domestic
Legalorders: it isinviewofsuchresponsibilitythat States have the dutyto search
for,apprehend and prosecute or extradite persons suspected ofinternational
crimes. The responsibilityofthe State operates at the international level:other
States are entitled to take to taskState onwhose behalfthe individualis
allegedto have perpetrated an international crime426.
426
g, para. 5.70above. The same genericterm isusedbythe four Geneva
Conventionsof 1949, whichdeal withthe cnminal responsibilityof the
members of the armed forcesresponsibiefor "gravebreaches ofthe
Conventions". &, in particular,Articles49 of the First Convention,50of
the SecondConvention,129of the Third Conventionand 146of the
Fourth Convention. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 501
5.88 Clearly,the twoclassesofresponsibilityare not mutually
exclusive,but ratherumulative427. That there eists inthese caaedual,
cumulative responsibility, althoitoperates at different ievels,isbest
illustrated bythe 1977Geneva ProtocolI to the four Geneva Conventions of
1949. Articles 85-89ofthe Protocol proviforthe penal repression of "breaches
and grave breaches" of the Protocol withinthe domestic legalsystemof the High
Contracting Parties. However,Article91then laysdown the principle ofState
responsibilityin the followingterms:
"AParty to the conflictwhichviolatesthe provisionsof the
Conventions or of this Pratocol shall,if the case demands, be liable
bypersons fomiing part of its armed forces."for al1acts committed
It can be seen, therefore, that the Protocol acts on bath the personal (domestic)
leveland State responsibility(international) level.
5.89 Regard may alsobe had, byway ofillustratioto Article 4
of the Convention forthe Prevention and Repression of Genocide of 9December
1948 whichprovides, inter alia,that:
"Persons committinggenocide or anyof other acts enumerated in
Article 3 shallbe punished, whether they are constitutio;ally
responsible rulers, public officiais,or private individuals.
427
On this matter g, Oppenheim,L.and Lauterpacht, H.:International
Law II, 7th ed., London, 1952p.577-58 8 eenspan, M.:The Modern
M.C.and Nanda, V.P.: (eds.), A TreatisonInternational Criminalovni,
Res onsibili ,SpringfïeldIll,1973,Vol.,I,p 103 155 papers by E.G.
'I'oAritisS?. Sinha and F.Miinch), Vol. 65-86(Lap byR.r
Baxter)and 86-96(paper byO. Triffterer); Roling, B.V.A.:"Aspectsof
the Criminal Responsibilityfor Violations of the Lawsof War",in Cassese,
A. (ed.), The NewHumanitarian LawofArmed Co fiict,1,Napoli, 1979,
pp.199-2- Worl Oxford,
1986, p. 274-276,290-293;Brownlie,1.:P-
h, 8h ed.,Oxford, 1990,pp. 561-564. AERIAL INCIDENT
5.90 The same conceptistaken up in the International
Conventionof 30November 1973for the Suppressionand Punishment ofthe
Crime ofApartheid, the purpose ofwhichisthe prevention and punishment of
actsof apartheid forwhich"individuals,members of organizationsand institutions
and representatives of the State"are responsible (Article3,paragraph 1).
5.91 Similarly,the Convention onthe Non-Applicabilityof
StatutoryLimitationsto WarCrimes and Crimes again sutmanityof26
November 1968applies to both "representativesof the State authority"and
"privateindividuals"(Artic2).Attention mustbe drawnto the fact that when
thisprovision specificallyrefers to individualsinctheir private capacity,it
usesthe term 'privateindividualsThi contrastswiththe wordingofArticle 1of
the Montreal Conventionwhichrefers to "anyperson",and underscoresthe
significanceof the fact thatno exclusionwasprovidedfor in Article4 of the
Convention forthe acts of State agents.
5.92 The sameapproach isreflected ina recent international
instrument,the 1988Conventionforthe Suppressionof UnlawfulActs againstthe
Safetyof Maritime Navigation,whichentered into force on 1March1992.This
Convention,which usedasitsmode1the Montreal Convention (indeed, eventhe
titles are ahost identical) issidar to the Montreal Convention,both asto the
content ofthe cnminal acts it bans and asto the obligationson the Contracting
States. In Article3it providesfor offencescommittedby "anyperson", as does
the correspondhg provisioncontainedinArticle 1ofthe Montreal Convention.
5.93 It shouldbe noted that in the courseof the conferencewhich
led to the adoption ofthe Maritime Conventionthere was a certain amount of
discussionasto the inclusiofareference to unlawfulacts committedby
persons actingon behalfof a State. ln the event, a consensuswasreached that12211 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 503
there wasno need to make expressreference to State-sponsored actssincethe
actscoveredbythe Conventionwereexpressedto be acts cornmittedby"any
person",and thisincluded,asa matter of course, actsof persons sponsoredby
~tates428.
5.94 Itmust be noted that thePreamble othe Maritime
Conventionoffersa keyto the interpretation ofthe tem "anyperson"used in
Article3,in that it explicitlymentionU.N. General AssemblyResolution
40161of 9December 1985,notablywherejt "unequivocallycondemns, ascriminal,
al1acts,methods and practicesof terrorismwhereverand bvwhomever
comrnitted,includingthosewhichjeopardise fnendlyrelations amongStatesand
their security"(ernphasisadded).
(iv) Conclusions astoArticle1
5.95 Under internationalaw,referencesto "persons"are by no
meanslimitedto private individuals.For example,in itsRestatement [Thirdl of
the ForeipnRelationsLawofthe United States,theAmericanLawInstitute
States:
'The principalpersons under international Iaw tat tes^'^.''
5.96 There isno doubt that the drafters ofthe Montreal
Conventionwere aware that "persons"assuchcouldincludeStatesand that they
intentionallyusedthe term "anyperson"in Article 1so asnot to Iimitits effect. It
428 Sec .lant, G.:'TheConventionfor the Sup ressionof UnlawfulActs
againstthe SafetyofMaritime Navigation''f,>Clornp.L.Q.,Vol.39
(1990)at p. 33. Exhibit75.
429
Restatement (Third) ofthe Foreim Relations Lawof the United States,
theAmencan Lawinstitute, Washington, D.C. 1986,p. 70(emphasis
added). A copyof thisage isattached in Exhibit76Sec .lso,Brodie,
1.:Princi~ks ofPublic;ternational Law.M-79, p. 436where the
author confirmsthat Statesexistas legal"persons"under international law.504 AERIAL INCIDENT
followsthat absent anyexpressrestriction in Article1indicatingthat itonly
appliesto private individuals,the reference to "anyperson"must alsoinclude
State agentswhenthe acts complainedof are carried out byState officiaisor
agents. This,in turn, givesnse toState responsibility.
5.97 To sumup, it iswamantedto holdthe viewthat
international legalinstruments showthat quite apart from the personal
responsibilityofState agents whocanbe held responsibleat the domesticlevel,
theresponsibilitvof the Stateto whichtheybelonas organsisalso engagedand
operates atthe interstate level.
5.98 In anyevent, ashasbeen pointed out at paragraphs 5.55to
5.58above,the entire question ofthe scope of the term "anyperson"is one for the
Court to address atthe merits stageof the casesinceit involvesthe interpretation
or application of the Mantreal Convention. Thisbeingsaid,the surveyof
international practiceundertaken above,as wellas the interpretation based on
the preparatory works,fullybears out and substantiates the plain and ordinary
meaning ofArticle 1ofthe Montreal Convention.
S~ION B. ThePracticeFollowedbvICAO 1sNotGermaneta the
QuestionWhethertheMontreal Conventio 1sApdicable
tothePresentDis~ute
5.99 The United States contendsthat the non-applicabilityofthe
Montreal Conventionto the present dispute isconfirmedbywhat it calls
"subsequentpractice"in applicationof the Conventionsuchasthe action of
ICA0 innot referring to the Conventionwhen dealingwithanalogous incidents
includingthe 21February 1973shootingdownof a Ljbyancivilianairlinerby
Israelimilitaryaircraft and the I September 1983shoot-downbya Sovietmilitary
airplane of a Korean civilairliner. Accardingto the United States, whenICAO
condemned or deplored thesekindaf attacks, it didsosolelybyinvokingthe12231 OBSERVATIONSAND SUEMISSIONS 505
provisionsof thChicag So on vent io Hna^th^M.ontreal Conventionbeen
relevant,sothe United States contends, itwouldhave been referred to as well.
5.100 Thisinference isdemonstrablyincorrect.isexplained
below,in the incidentsjust named, the injured parties onlytook issuewiththe
applicationofthe ChicagoConvention anditsAnnexesand not withthe
applicationofthe Montreal Convention. Consequently,ICAwas never called
upon to touch upon,muchiessinterpret or apply,the Montreal Convention.
Thelackoflegalrelevanceofthe"subseuueotpracticen
(i) refend tobv theUnitedStates
5.103 The fist flawinthe United States' argumentisthat the
"practice"referred to has no legalrelevance to the interpretation of the Montreal
Convention. The United States citeshicl31(3)(b)of the Vienna Convention
on the LawofTreaties to support itsviewthat anysubsequent practicein the
applicationof the Montreal Conventionwhichestablishesthe agreemofthe
parties regardingitsinterpretation rnaybe taken into ac~ount~~'.However,
reliance on this articleisentirelymisplacedbecause itsapplication depends on
the existenceoftwocriteria: (i) that the "subsequentpractice" bein applicationof
the treaty beinginterpreted, and (ii)that suchpractice establishthe ameement of
the parties regardingitsinterpretation. Withrespect to the "practice"referred to
bythe United States,it neither has anythingto do withthe Montreal Convention,
nor doesitevidencean agreement amongstcontractingparties asto its
interpretation. Sinceboth elements are prerequisitesfor Article ofthe(b)
Vienna Conventionto apply,their absence completelyunderminesthevalidityof
theUnited States' argument.
430 U.S.Prelimhary Objectionspp. 172-181.
431 m., pp. 172-173and note 1tp. 173. AERIAL INCIDENT [2241
5.102 Aswillpresentlybe seen,neither the 1973Israeli shoot-
down.ofthe Libyancivilairliner, nor the subsequent Israelidiversionof a
tebanese civilaircraft,nor the 1983shoot-downofKAL Flight007wasdiscussed
byICAOin the contextof the Montreal Convention SinceICAOhad no power
to address the interpretation or applicationof the Montreal Conventionto those
incidents,it isimpossibleto see howitsdebates caririse to the levelof
"subsequent practicein the application ofthe treaty whichestablishesthe
agreement ofthe partiesregardingitçinterpretation". There wasno effort to
interpret the Montreal Conventioninconnectionwithanyofthe "practice"cited,
and certainlyno agreement onitsinterpretation432.
5.103 Similarly,the debates before the ICAO in 1973on whether
to amend the ChicagoConventionwere not directedat interpreting the Montreal
Convention,whichthe participants hadno authorityto do,but focusedinstead on
modifyingthe Chicago Quite simply,theapplication of the
Montreal Conventionwasnot at issue,and there wasno agreement amongstthe
State parties to it regardingitsinterpretation withinthe meaningof Article
31(3)(b) ofthe Vienna Convention. Indeed, there wasnot evenagreement
amongstthe parties withrespect to amendingthe ChicagoConvention.
5.104 'Itfollowsthat the legalpremise on whichthe United States'
entire argument based on "subsequent practice"rests isfaulty,and the practice
432 There isfurtherlogicaldefectin theU.S.argument. If,as the United
Stateshas maintained, the "subsequentpractice"showsthat theMontreal
Conventiondidnot ariwl to the incidentsin question,how canthis
practice be relied on as Znexampleof subsequent practi&c
aririlicationof the Conventionas Article31(3)(b)of the Vienna
Gnvention requires for it to be taken into account?
433
Unlike Article 94of the ChicagoConvention,whichprovidesfor its
amendment,there isno similarprovisionin the Montreal Convention.
Moreover, the Statesthat metin 1973to consideramendingthe Chicago
Conventionwere not identicalto the State parties to thetreal
Convention.i2251 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
referred to isnot reallypracticewithinthe meaningofthe Vienna Convention
and hasno relevanceat al1to the interpretation of the MontreaI Convention.
Thediscussions inICAO on otber aenalincidents
(ii)
5.105 Notwithstandingthe legalshor-comjngsto the United
States' argument,it tan alsobe shownthat the argument ismisplaced onthe facts.
Whileit istrue that in neither the Libyannor theKorean incidentdidthe
discussionsbefore ICAOfocuson the Montreal Convention,thisisnot because
the Conventionwasnot relevantto suchactions,but because ICAOhad no power
to considerthe application orinterpretation of the Montreal Conventjonto the
eventsin question.
5.106 h this respect, the United States faitsto appreciate that
there is fundamental differencebetweenthe role that ICAOplaysunder the
ChicagoConventionand itsroJeunder the Montreal Convention.
5.107 As explainedinPart IV, under the ChicagoConventionthe
ICAOCounciland itsAssemblypossessa broad spectrumof functionsrelatingto
international cMJaviation. To namejusta few,the Councilhas an obligationto
"considerany rnatter relatingto the ConventionwhichanycontractingSlate
refers to it"(Art.54(n)) and to report anyinfractionofthe Conventionto
contractingStates aswellas anyfailure to cany out recommendationor
determinations ofthe Council(Art.540)). The Councilalsohas the powerto
carryout investigationsof situationswhich mayappear to present obstaclesto the
development ofinternational airnavigation(Art.55(e)) and, particular
relevanceto the present case,to decidedisagreementsbetween two or more
contractingStates as to the interpretation or application ofthe Chicago
Convention (Article84). Asfor the Assernbly,it has the powerto amend the
ChicagoConventionunder Article94,aswellasather powersunder Article 88. AERIAL INCIDENT P6]
5.108 In contrast,under the Montreal ConventionICAOhas a
much-morelirnitedrole. Thisisentirelynatural giventhat the Montreal
Conventionessentiallyprovidesfor a series of State rightsand obligations
whereas the ChicagoConventionisthe constituent instrument creatingthe
International CivilAviationOrgartization,includingthe ICAO Counciland
Assembly,and thus definesICAO'sfunctions.
5.109 Unlike the ChicagoConventionwhichspeilsout in
considerabledetail the functionsof the ICA0 Assemblyand Council,ICAO is
onlymentioned in twoplacesinthe Montreal Convention:Article9 and Article
13. Article 9providesthat contractingStates whichestablishjoint air transport
operating organizationsor agencies,whichoperate aircraft subjectto
international registration,shalldesignatefor each aircraftthe State that willhave
the attributes of the State ofregistration forpurposes of the Montreal
Convention. Under Article 9,States are obligedto notifysuchdesignationsto
ICAO. ICAO'sonlydutiesin this respect are to communicatethese noticesto
State parties to the Montreal Convention.
5.110 Article 13of the Montreal Conventionprovidesthat every
contractingState, in accordancewithitsnational law,shallreport to the ICA0
Conncitanyrelevant information initspossessionconcerningthe circurnstances
of anoffencecornmittedunder the Montreal Notwithstanding
this obligation,the Councilitselfhasno power to investigateor mle on such
matters. Its functionislirnitedto receivingreports. Moreover,neither the
Councilnor the Assemblyhave anypower to decidematters relatingto the
interpretation or applicationofthe Montreal Convention. Failinga negotiated
434
Significantly,the IslamicRepublic did notifyICA0 of the United States'
violationof theMontreal Conventionin shootinndownFlieht IR 655when
irintroduced the matter before ICAO in July1988. &, \xJorkingPaper
C-WPl8644dated 8July1988,p. 3, Exhibit38.~271 OBSERVATlONSAND SUBMlSSlOPJS 509
settlement oranagreement to arbitrate, thtse remainwithinthe exclusive
jurisdictionofthe Court.
5.111 In the lightofthe completelydifferentstructures ofthe
Chicagoand Montreal Conventions,it ishardlysurprisingthat the Montreal
Conventionwasnot invokedinfront ofICAOduringitsdebates over the Libyan
and Korean incidents. Quite simply,ICAOhad no authorityto discussor apply
the Montreal Conventionto the circurnstancesat issue435.
5.112 Bythe same token, whenthe United Statesrefers in its
Preliminary Objectionso the factthat investigationswere commissionby
ICAOinboth the Libyanand Korean incidents,thissimplyhighlightsthe factthat
ICA0 couldonlyact inthis wayunder the Chicago Convention;it had no power
to order suchinvestigationsunder the Montreal Convention. Aswillbe seen in
thenext section,itwaspreciselybecause the ICA0 Councillackedthe power to
deal withmatters fallingunder the Montreal Conventionthat subsequent efforts
were made to amend the Chicago Conventionto incorporate elements from the
former into the latter.
5.113 It followsthat the United States'argument that ifICAOor
the parties to the Montreal Conventionhad construed Article1of the Montreal
Convention"asapplyingio the actio nfStates againsîcivilaircraft, the
resolutions anddebates leadingto their adoption wouldhavestated that the
Montreal Convention, aswellas the Chicago Convention,had been violated"is
cornpletelyrni~~laced~~~T,he Councilhad no authonty to act under the
Montreal Convention,and thus didnot do so. Moreover,ICAOhad no power to
435 Moreover, at the time ofthe Libyanincident,Libyawasnot yet a Partyto
the Montreal Conventionandthus could nothaveinvokedit in any event.
436 U.S.PrelirninaryObjections,pp.179-180.510 AERIAL INCIDENT [2281
rule on the Montreal Convention'sinterpretation or application,orwhether it
had been violated in the circumstancesofthe case.
5.114 For these reasons,it isnot surprisingthat the debates before
the ICAO Councilrelatingto the destructioofFlightIR655alsodidnot refer to
the Montreal Convention. Anyconsiderationby the Councilof the application or
interpretation of the Montreal Convention tothe incidentwouldhave bultra
UA.
5.115 Instead, ICAO dealtwiththe case on thebasisofthe Islamic
Republic'sclaimsset out in differenttelexesto ICAO, qualifymgthe United
States' actionas a directinterference againstthe safetyand regularityof
international airtransport operation. The IslamicRepublicthen requested from
the Councilthe foll~win~~~~:
- Explicitrecognitionthat the downingof FligIR 655was a
breach ofinternational lawand of the legaldutiesof the
United States;
-
Recognitionof the factthat that ContractingStatebore
international responsibilityforthe criminalactionsofits
officiais,especiallywhere it had authorized and ratifiedsuch
actions;
- Explicitcondemnationof the use ofweapons againstFlight
IR 655bytheUnited States, a Member of ICAO;
437 &g, Part IV above,paras. 4.31to 4.33.~291 OBSERVATIONS AND suBMIssIoNs 511
- Commissioningofa detailed fact-findingreport;
- The settingup ofan ad hoccommission(the ANC)charged
withconductingan enquiryintothe variouslegal,technical
and other aspects ofthe shoot-downofFlightIR 655. This
commissionwasto report to the Councilfor the purpose of
takingthe necessaryactionto deviserelevantrules,
regulationsand standards,aswellas to ensure their proper
and effectiveimplementationfor the prevention ofsimilar
occurrences:and
- The immediate temination of obstacles,restrictions,threats
and the use of force againstthe airspace ofthe Islamic
Republic and the coastalStatesof the Persian Gulf,which
endangered the safeand orderlyoperation ofcivilair
transport inthe region.
5.116 As previouslyexplained,in additionto the condemnationof
the United Statesfor the shoot-dowofFlightIR 655,the immediate concernof
the IslamjcRepubiic wasthat ICA0 demand inthe interirnthat the United States
ensure the necessarycoordinationbehveen the militaactivitofitsnavalforces
in the Persian Gulfand foreigncivilaviationin order to prevent similardisasters.
The rest of the debatebefarethe ICAO Councilconcernedthe issuesraised
under the ChicagoConventionsince ICAO had no authoricyto addressthe
interpretation or applicationofthe Montreal Convention. AERIAL INCIDENT [230]
(iii) Theirrelevanceof ICAO'ssuegestionsfornewavreements
9
5.117 In support of its argumentthat the Montreal Convention is
not applicableto the shoot-downofF'lighIR 655,the United States further
contendsthat "theresponse of ICAOto the useofforcebyStates against
international civilaviation hasbeen to considernewinternational
The United Statesadds that ifrecourse to forcebyStates was
alreadydealt withby the Montreal Convention,there wouldhavebeen no need to
propose, as occurred duringthe ExtraordinarySessionsofthe ICAOAssemblyin
1973and 1984,the adoption ofnewconventionalinstruments orthe amendment
of the Chicago Convention.
5.118 As theUnited Statesrightlypoints out, onof the principal
irnpetusesfor the proposa1in 1973to amend the ChicagoConvention came from
the diversionand seizureofa Lebanese civilianaircraft by lsraeli warplanes on 10
August 1973~~'.It doesnot followfkomthis,however,that suchamendments
wouldhavebeen supenluoris had the Montreal Convention already coveredthe
use offorcebyStates againstcivilaircraftAs willbe seen, there were other
compellingreasons whyICA0 debated incorporatingthe Hague and Montreal
Conventionsintothe Chicago Convention.
5.19 What issignificantabout theLebanese incidentisthat it
involvedan action taken againstaCM] aircraft that wasnot alreadycwered by
either the Hague or Montreal Conventions. Thiswas not becausethcse
conventions didnot concern State actions,but ratherbecause neither ofthem
dealt with the samekind ofinterference in civilaviationashad occurred in
connectionwith the diversionofthe Lebanese aircraft.
438
U.S.PreliminaryObjections, p. 181.
439 w.,p.l82 OBSERVATlONSAND SUBMISSIONS
5.120 The Hague Convention,itwillbe recaüed, dealswith
offeneescomrnittedbypersons and their accompliceswho,on board an aircraft in
fli eezetorotherwiseunlawfullytake controlof that aircraft. Consequently,
nothingin theHague Conventionwouldhave coveredan incidentwhere foreign
militaryaircrafthad diverteda civilairliner.
5.121 The Montreal Convention, onthe other hand, doesnot
address "interference"withcivilaircraftin the broad sense ofthe tenu, but rather
dealswiththe actual destructionof,orthe attempt to destroy,an aircrafiin flight
or an act ofviolence agaiasperson on board ifthat act islikelyto endanger the
airplane'ssafety. Thus, nothingin theMontreal Conventionwouldhave covered
the Lebanese aircraft incidenteither sincethe destruction ofthe aircraftwasnot
in question.
5.122 It isclear that one ofthe considerationsin proposing
amendments to the Chicago Conventionin 1973wasto closewhat were perceived
ta be gapsin the Hague or Montreal Conventionsas illustratedby the Lebanese
aircraft incident. There isno basis,therefore, for assertingthat suchamendments
wouldnot havebeen necessaryifthe Montreal Convention already coveredState
actions. For even ifthe Montreal Convention did coverState actions, asthe
IslarnicRepublicsubmitsisthe case,the incidentinvolvingthe diversionand
seizureof the Lebanese aircraftwouldstillhavefallenoutside the sofits
application. Inshort,neither the Hagnor the Montreal Conventiondealt with
sucha situation,and thusamendments were considered necessary inorder to deal
with"interference" incivilaviationin the broader ofthe word.
5.123 There wasan additional,quallyimportant reason why
some delegates consideredthat elementofthe Hague and Montreal
Conventionsshouldbe incorporated into the ChicagoConvention. This514 AERIAL INCIDENT
concernedthe role ofICAO in matters that othenvisewouldfa11withinthe
pu~ew ofthose twoinstruments.
5.124 Asnoted in the previoussection,ICAO'srole under the
Montreal Conventionisrestricted essentiailyto disseminatinginformation and
reports submittedbycontracting States. It has no independent power to examine
questionsunder the Montreal Convention,to decide matters ofinterpretatior
440
application,to provideenforcement measures,ortoamend the Convention .
5.125 In order to broaden ICAO'sjurisdictionovermatters falling
withinthescopeof theHague and Montreal Conventionsto match the powers
provided for inthe ChicagoConvention,itwasnecessaryto incorporate the
provisionsofthe former into the latter. As the United States achowledges, the
proposalsfor the incorporation ofthe Hague and Montreal provisionsinto the
ChicagoConventionwere aimed at subjectingStatesthat violated the obligations
contained in the firsttwo Conventionsto the "enforcementmeasures provided for
in the Chicago~onvention~~l". This argument constitutesthe most cogent
confirmation that the provisionsofthe Montreal Conventionwere not already
subiectto ICA0 enforcement measuresand consesuentlv couldnot be relied
upon before ICAObodies - contraryto what the United States implies,whenit
stressesthe fact that the Montreal Conventionwasnever invokedbefore lCAO in
incidentsconcerningattacks oncM1 aviation.
5.126 That one of the mostimportant purposes behind the
proposals to amend the ChicagoConventionwasto expandthe role of ICAO has
440 The situationwassimilarwithres ect to the Hague Convention,with
ICAO'rrole iimitedto that provid>for in Articl5(correspondingta
Article9of the Montreal Convention)and Article11(correspondingto
Article 13oftheMontreal Convention).
441
U.S .reliminaryObjections,p. 189.12331 OBsERvATloNs AND Su~MIssIoNs 515
been noted byJudge Guillaumein hisseminalworkon Le Terrorisme Aérien.
Judge Guillaumewrites:
"Unetelle incorporation aurait permis auConseilde l'organisation
de procéderà desenquêtes,de formulerdesrecommendations et
de régler d'éventuels différends endeviolationdesdispositions
des Conventionsde La Haye et de Montréalpar lesEtats parties.
Par ailleurs cesats auraient vu &trel'objetdes sanctions
actueilerp@tprévuespar l'article88de l~~onventionde
Chicago .
Under the Mantreal Convention,of course,the Councilhad no suchpower to
cany out investigationsor report infractionsand no power to impose sanctions.
5.127 Clearly,therefore, there wasnothingredundant in
incorporatingthese aspectsofthe Montreal and Hague Conventionsintothe
ChicagoConventionregardlessofwhether theyalready coveredState actions.
The intent wasto provideICAO with powersit did not otherwisehave.
5.128 In the lightof the above,it isclear that the United States'
argumentbasedon the fact that the ICAO Committeereplied affirmativelyto the
followingtwo questions:"Doesthe ExecutiveCommitteewish to includein the
ChicagoConvention,provisions of the Hague and Montreal Conventions?",and
"Doesthe ExecutiveCommitteewishto includein the ChicagoConvention
provisionsconcerningactsof unlawfulinterference comrnittedbyStates?"imis-
directed. Tisnot surprisingthano delegatejudged as "redundant"the
affirmativeanswersgivento both questionssincebyincorporatingprovisionsof
theHague and Montreal Conventionsintothe ChicagoConvention,the role of
ICAO wouldhavebeen considerablyexpanded. All this didnot mean, however,
442
Guillaume,G.: "LeTerrorisme Aérien",I.H.E.I.(1976177)at pp. 48-49.
Exhibit 77.516 AERIAL lNClDENT i2341
that the Montreal Conventiondidnot alreadydealwiththe actionsof the States
as the.United States incorrectly
5.129 Asfor the U.S.argument that the proposal in 1984to adopt
a newArticle 3&s to the ChicagoConventionwouldhave been unnecessaryif the
Montreal Conventionhad already coveredState actionsagainstcivilaircraft,it
too fallsshort ofthe mark. Itiswellknownas the IslamicRepublic pointed out
in itsMemorial,that in adopting Article3 the ICAOAssemblydid not intend
to create a newrule of law,but to reflect a pre-existingonThissimply
confirmsthat the mere fact that there were proposalsto amend the Chicago
Conventiondoes not in itselfsignifythat the amendments suggestedwere not
alreadypart of the corpus of existinglawunder the Convention. Asinthe case of
Article 3bisitwas perfectlypossibleto adopt newprovisionsin the Chicago
Conventionwhichreflected pre-existingrulesof law.
5.130 In conclusion,both the practice foilowedbyICAO after
State attacks against civilaircraft, and the proposals presented duringthe
DiplornaticConferencesin 1973and 19â4 witha viewto insertingin the Chicago
Conventionthe explicitprohibition ofarmed attacks againstcivilaviation
(proposals resultingin the adoption ofArticlbis)a re perfectly compatible
with the IslamicRepublic's contentionthat the Montreal Conventionisapplicable
to unlawfulactscommittedbyState agents againstcivilaviation.
U.S.PreliminaryObjections, pp. 186-187.The kind offlawin theUnited
States'easoning issymptomatic ofa more general methodologicaldefect
in the pleading as a whole. Often the United States triesto draw
inferences based on ayramidof hypotheses astowhat a conferenceor
debate did do,ratherthan focusingonthepointswhere agreement was
actuallyreached. Thisiswhythe IslamicRepublic submitsthat the
"practice"citedbythe United States isirrelevant to the points at issue;
smply does not reflect anyagreement bythe contractingparties asto the
Montreal Convention'sinterpretation.
444 &g, Memorial of the IslamicRepublic, pp. 147-154.12351 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 517
C-R III THE MONTREALCONVENTIONAND
MTERNATIONAL ARMEDCONFllCT
5.131 It has lastlybeen contended bythe United Statesthat "there
isno indicationthat the drafters of the Montreal Conventionintitto apply
to militaryforces actingin [international] arrnedconfiict".Accordingto the
United States, sincethe confrontation betweenU.S. forces,whichhad intruded
into the IslamicRepublic'sterritorial waterson the marningIRnght 655
wasshot dom, constitutedan "international arrnedconflict",the Montreal
Conventionisnot applicableto this case5.
5.132 The Sections belowshalldemonstrate that:
-
The incidentthat led tothe shoot-downofFligIR 655did
not occurwithinthe frameworkofan internationalarmed
conflict;
- Nonetheless, even assumingfor the sake of argumentthat
an international amed confliwas inprogressbetween the
United States and the IslamicRepublic at the time of the
downing,thiswouldbyno means entai1the,inapplicabilityof
the Montreal Conventionto the case at issue.
SECTIO AN. AttheTime ofthe Shoot-downofFlieht IR 655the United
InternationalArmedConflict
(i) Thefactualaspectsof theissue
5.133 A reviewofthe salientfactssurroundingthe destruction of
FlightIR 655revealsthat the.events ofthat daydid notrise to the levelofan
intentionalarmed conflictasthe United Stateswouldhavethe Court believIt
445
U.S.PreliminaryObjections,pp. 200-203.518 AERIAL INCIDENT 12361
hasbeen shownin Part IIthat the entire incident was triggeredbythe unilateral
decisionof the United States to senda militaryhelicopter fromone ofitswarships
into Iranian temtorial waters on the pretext of "assistingneutral shipping when
whatwasactuallyinvolvedwasa missionto harass and provokethe Islarnic
Republic'ssmallpatrol boats,
5.134Havingbeen wamed awaybythe patrol boats,the
helicopter left,onlytobe followedin a separate incident almostan hour later by
the Vincennesitself whichintruded sorneeight nauticalmilesinto the Islamjc
Republic'stefritonal waters. In whatwasvirtuallyan ambush,the Vincennes
then attacked the srnallpatroIboats, firingover 350rounds at them.
5.135 Thiswasnot the firsttime that the United Stateshad
engagedin suchactivities. InOctober 1987and againin April 1988the United
States had attacked anddestioyed severaloffshoreIranian oilplatfoms.
Moreover, bythe admission of itsownofficiais,the United States had also
routinelyharassedthe IslamicRepublic'spatrol boats whichwere engagedin
defensivemeasures necessitatedby the war initiatedbyIraq.
5.136 In contrast to itspresent arguments,never once during 1987
or 1988did the United Statesindicate that it considered itselfto be in an "arrned
conflict"withthe IslamicRepublic. To the contrary,the kind ofincidents
mentioned abovewere viewedbythe United States asisolated incidents,and the
United States repeatedly stressedto itspublicand to the United Nationsthat it
did not seek a confrontationwith the IslamicRepublic and that it wasneutral in12371 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 519
the Iran-Iraq war446. Obviously,the conceptofremainingneutral is
fundamentallyincompatiblewitbthe argument that a statof"armedcon£IictM
egsted.
5.137 The Commander of theVincennes'sistership,the &&, has
alsobelittled the idea that the United Stateswasengageanarmed conflict
withthe IslamicRepublic.As noted in the ~slakc Republic'sMemorial,
Commander Carlsonofthe Side s rote after the downingof FiightIR 655:
"Myexpenence wasthat the conductof Iranian militaryforcesin
themonth preceding theincidentwaspointedlynon-threatening.
They were directand professionalin their communica#yA and in
eachinstancele- no doubt concerningtheir intentions.
These wordsscarcelyconjure upthe imageof a state of armed canflictberween
the twocountries.
5.138 Nor did the United States ever intirnateduringthe debates
before ICA0 or theU.N. Security Councilthat it had been engaginan armed
conflictwiththe IslamicRepublic at the time of the shoot-dom. That argument
has surfacedfor the firsttime purely asan afterthought inthe UnitedStates'
P~elirninary~bjections~~~.
446
PermanentxaRe resentativeofthe United States to the United Nationsto
the ~ecretary-8eneral. Exhibi78.The U.S.Secrctary ofDcfme, Mr.
Weinberger,reiterated this positionby em hasiwi that the United States
wannot scekingfurther hostilitieswiththe elamic kepublic. Financial
Times 21October 1987, Exhibit79.
447 Sec . emorialof the IslamicRepublic,p. 75.
448 Similarly,the United States made no reference to Article 89of the
ChicagoConvention,an alternativethat wasopen to itit genuinely
concludedthatit and the IslamicRepublic werebelligerents.520 AERIAL INCIDENT' i2381
5.139 Havingitselfinstigatedwhatever confrontations occurred on
3July 1988bysending amilitaryhelicopter and, subsequently,twowarshipsinto
the IslamicRepublic's territorial waters,the United States cannot nowseek to
exculpateitselfby arguingthat these actionseffectivelysuspended the operation
of the relevant treatyprovisions.
(ii) Leealconsiderations
5.140 Citingthe Commentarybythe International Cornmittee of
the Red Cross ("ICRC')on the Additional Protocolsof 8June 1977 to the
Geneva Conventionsof 12August 1949,the United States assertsthat "[allthough
it rnaybe difficultto define in the abstral1ofthe circumstancesthat constitute
an armed conflict,there isuniversalagreement that hostile operations carriedout
bymilitaryunitsof one countryagainstthe militaryunitsof another (such aswas
occurringbetweenthe militaryforcesofthe United States and Iran atthe time
that Iran Air Fiight655wasdowned) constitute anarmed confli~t~~~'T ~h. is
argument maybe controvertedbothin lawand in fact,sinceinviewof the facts,it
isapparent that the state of relations betweenthe twoParties didnot then rise to
the levelof an international amed conflict.
5.141 The assertionthat there is"universalagreement" on the
definitionof"anned co~ict" that the United States presents isgrossly
exaggerated. Itistrue that the ICRC Commentary quotedbythe United States
suggests a verybroad concept of suchconflicts. indeed, accordingto the
Commentary, aninternational armed conflictis" anydispute betweentwo States
involvingthe use of their armed forces. Neither the duration ofthe conflict,nor
itsintensity,playa role: the lawmustbe applied to the fullestextentrequired by
449
U.S. PreliminaryObjections, p.202.[239] OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
the situationof the persons and the objectsprotected byit45(h1.It must alsobe
conceded.thatthe lCRC Commentaryon the four Geneva Conventionsof 1949
takes the same~iew~~~.
5.142 However,thisdoesnot mean that the Commentaries set
forth an authoritativeviewon the matter. Nor do theynecessarilyreflect the
officia1positionof States. Infact, the Foreword to the ICRC'sCommentaxyon
each ofthe Geneva ConventionsspecificallyStatesthat:
"Althoughpublishedbythe International Committee,the
Commentary isthe personalwork of itsauthors. The Committee,
moreover, whenevercalledupon for an opinionon a provisionof
an international Convention,alwavstakes care to emphasize that
onlythe participant States are quilified, through coniultation
between themselves.togive an officialand. as.itw.re, authentic
interpretation of ir~te~~overnrnenttrleaty43L."
5.143 On the other hand, the verybroad conceptofamed conflict
the Commentaries advocate isaccounted forbythe need -deeplyand laudably
felt bytheICRC -to tryand expand,as far aspossible,the scope and impactof
the international humanitarian lawof armed conflictin order to extend the
protection accordedto non-combatants. To ascertainwhetherStates uphold the
450 Commentary,bythe International Committeeof the Red Crossonthe
. Additional Protocols of8June 1977to the 1949Geneva Convention,p. 40,
para. 62U.S .reliminaryObjections. Exhibit78.
451 E&, forinstance,PictetJ.S.:
Convention,Geneva, 1958,p.20("Anydifferencearisingbetween two
Statesand leadingto the interventionof membersof the armed forcesis
anarmed conflictwithinthe meaningofArticle 2,evenif one of the
Partiesenies the existenceofa state ofwar. It makesno differencehow
longthe conflictlasts,or howch slaughter takes place".)Exhibit80.
452
For example,sec Commentarybythe lCRC on the Fourth Geneva
Convention. Foreword. Exhibit81.A similarreference to this ointis
made in the Foreword to the 1CRC.sCornmentaryto the 1977ldditional
Protocolswhere the President of the ICRCnotes that "tICRC also
allowedthe authors their academicfreedom, consideringthe Commentary
the viewsofthe ICRC." mibit 81. not as aworkintendeto disseminate522 AERIAL INCIDENT
verybroad notion propounded bythe ICRC, it isnecessaryto undertake an
examinationoftheir officialviews.
5.144 In thisrespect, itisfirstworthpointing outthat the United
Stateshas not evenratified the 1977Geneva Protocols. Withrespect to the
positiontaken bythe United Kingdomafter the adoption of the twoGeneva
Protocolsof 1977,reference canbe madeto the manual 'TheLawofArmed
Conflict"prepared under the Direction ofthe British Chiefof the General Staff
and approved in 1981bythe U.K. MinistryofDefence. In Section2,para. 4of
the Manualit isstated that:
"Becauseofthe consistentfailureof countriesto recognisethe
existenceofa stateofwar, the term 'lawof armed confiict'isstrictly
more accurate than 'thelawofwar'. The aimisto ensure the wider
applicationof the lawof amed conflictwhichappliesifthere is
a. a war; or
b. occupationofthe territory of onestate by another;
or
c. sustained and concerted militay operations akinto war453.11
5.145 It isapparent fromtheabove that in the officia1opinionof
the United Kindom'sauthonties, not every"difference"betweenthe armed forces
oftwo or more States can amount to an "internationalarmed conflict"coming
withinthe puniew of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. Onlythose armed
clashesthat involvesuchlarge-scaleand protracted hostilitiesas to be "akinto
war"canbe classifiedas "armedconflict".
5.146 Anevenmore significantpiece of evidenceas to the opinion
ofStates canbe found inArticle 1,paragraph 2ofthe SecondGeneral Protocol
Additionalto the 1949Geneva Conventions,of 10June 1977. This provision
stipulatesthat:
453
E& The Law of Armed Conflict,Manual pre ared bythe U.K. Chiefof
the General Staff,1981,p. 6 (emphasisaddede. Exhibit82, OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 523
'ThisProtocol [concerningnon-international armed conflict]shall
not applyto situationsof interna1disturbancesand tensions,suchas
riots.isolatedand svoradic actsof 'olandeother actsof a
a
5.147 Aswasrightlypointed out byProfessor K.J.Partsch,this
provisionfurnishesthe answerto the questionof whatisto be meant by"armed
~onflict"~~~I.n this respect, the provisavalue and significancewhichgoes
beyondthe definitionof"non-intemationalarmed conflict".The specific
terminologyused bythe DiplomaticConference ("asnot beingarmed conflicts")
showsthat the draftsrnenintended to clarifywhat in theirviewwasrneantbysuch
a notion-a notion equallyapplicableto "internationalarmed conflicts".In the
lightof these considerations,it followsthat 'fsolatedand sporadic actsofviolence
and other actsof a similarnature"do not reach the threshold required for an
"internationalarmed conflict"inthe same manner as theydo not constitutea
"non-internationalamed confict".
5.148 That the lawof armed conflictdoesnot encompass isolated
and sporadicmilitaryconfrontationsisborne out byclosescrutinyofthe contents
of that law. It embraces suchniles asthose on the proofciviliansin
hospitaland safetyzonesand localities,the so-calledneutralized zones,onthe
treatment of alieinthe territoryaparty to the conflict,the regulationof
occupiedterritaries, the treatment ofinte-to quotejust the major
provisionsofthe Fourth Geneva Conventionof 194-aswellas al1the detailed
regulationof prisoners ofwarthcanbe found inthe Third Geneva Convention
of 1949and the extensivelegalregulationofthe conditionof the sick,wounded
and shipwreckedcontainedinthe First and Second Geneva Conventions.
454 Emphasis added.
455 Partsch, K.J.:"Anned Codict", in Bernhordt, R. ed.): ~ncvclo~ediaof
P- Vol.3,1982,p.25 at p. 6. Exhibjt85. AERIAL INCIDENT
5.149 Ifal1these niles do not applyto an isolated incident
between the armed forcesof twoStates,theobviousreason for thisnon-
application isthat the incident doesnot faIlwithinthe provinceof armed conflicts
proper, althoughof course such incidentscouldremain subjectto those
"elementaryconsiderationsof humanity,even more exacting in peace than in
war",to whichtheCourt has rightlyadverted in the Corfu Channelcase456,
5.150 HavingreviewedinSection (i) above the factual aspectsof
the matter, ifone were to term the eventsof 3 July 1988an "internationalarmed
conflict",then practicallyanyresort to force bya State againstanotherState,
whatever the scaleand duration ofthe use of force,wouldhaveto be definedas
an "internationalarmed conflict"makingoperational al1the detailed and
numerous aforementioned rulesand principlesof the Iawgoverningsuch
conflicts. The absurdityofsuchconsequencesclearlyshowhowunrealisticand
unacceptable it wouldbe to refer to the breaches of international lawperpetrated
by the United States on 3 July 1988asan "internationalarmed conflict"for the
solepurpose of the United States'avoidingliability.
5.151The correct legal descriptionof the position ofthe Parties is
as follows:whilethe IslamicRepublicand Iraq were engagedin an international
armed conflictthat hadtaken onthe proportion and characteristicsofa war
proper, the positionof the United States vis-a-visthiswarwasthat ofa third
party,bound bythe duties -stemmingfromneutralitylaw -ofimpartialitytowards
the belligerents and non-participationin the armed conflict,particularlywhere
the United States had repeatedly professed itsneutrality inthe war.
456
Corfu Channel. Merits.Judmnent, I.C.J.Re~orts 1949,p. 4,at p.22. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBM~SSIONS 525
5.152 At the same time, vis-à-visthe twobelligerent countries,the
United Stateswasalso boundbyal1the rulesand principlesof the lawofpeace -
to the extent that theyhad not been replaced bythe lawsofneutral-tincluding
the U.N. Charter and al1the variousconventionsprotectingthe safetyof civil
aviation,arnongwhich ofcourseisthe Montreal
S~cno~ B. EvenAssuminethatthe UnitedStatesandtheIslsmic
RepublicWereEnaagedinanInternational Armed
5.153 Even assuming, armendo, that the United Statesisrightin
holdingthat at the timef the downingof FiightIR 655the twoStateswere
engagedin an international armed conflict,it wouldby no means follow,as the
United States contends,that the Montreal Conventionwassuspended or
othenvise inapplicableas between the twoStates. In fact,the viewadvocatedby
the United States inits Preliminary Objectiisbased on a misconception:the
United Statesfailsto seethe fundamental difference betweenan international
armed conflictand a state of war. This isa crucialpointon whichit isnecessary
to dwell,if onlybriefly.
5.154 Accordingtothe unanimousviewtaken in the legal
literature, war isonlya classof international armed conflict. More specifically,
war isan armed conflictcharacterizedbythe followingelements:
457 It isnecessaryto add that to the extent the Court deemsit necessaryto
determine whether there wasan "armedcon£lictUsuchasto suspendthe
application of thentreal Convention,this wouldaIsobe an issueto take
up atthe merits stagesinceitwouldrelate not onlyto the factsofthe case,
but alsoto the question of the interpretation, andculariythe
application,fthe Montreal Convention.526 AERIAL INCIDENT [244]
(i) The intention of at ieast one of the belligerentStates to
replace the lawof peace withthe status ofbelligerencyvis-a-
visthe other belligerent (socalledanimusbelliaerandi);
The actualreplacement of the lawofpeace withthelawof
(ii)
war in itsentiretybetween the bclligerents;
(iii) The applicabilityofthe lawofneutrality,in its entirety,to
the reIationsbetween each belligerent and third States;
(iv) The breaking off ofdiplornaticrelationsbetween the
belligerent States;
The tennination ofpoliticaltreaties behveen the
(v)
belligerents,the suspensionof rnultilateraltreaties not
radicaliyincompatiblewiththe status ofwar,in addition to
the specifictreaties on warfare becomingaperationalfor
th en^^^^.
5.155 Internationalarmed conflictsthat are not elevated to the
rank and status of war do not entailthe radical changein legalstatus between the.
belligerents aswellasbetweeneach belligerent and thirdStates as isrendered
necessarybythe state ofwar.
458 &, in particular, Schindier,D.: "Stateof War,Belligerency,Armed
Codict", inCassese,A. (ed.):The New Humanitanan LawofAnned
Confiict,Vol.1,Napoli,1979, pp. 3-20,Exhibit84. Sec .lso,Skubiszewski,
K.:"Peaceand War",in Bernhardt, R. (ed.:En CIOediaof Public
InternationalLaw,Vol.4, 1982,pp. 7W8, &; 8510i2451 OBSERVATIONS AND SuBMlssIoNs 527
5.156 Contrary to what the United Stateargues now,atthe time
ofthe incident it recognizedthat no suchradical change had occurredsuch asto
-
suspend the operation ofitsinternational obligationsunder the Montreal or other
Conventions. Certainly,the United States gaveno notice,whetherunder Article
65 ofthe Vienna Conventionon the LawofTreaties or otherwise,that it
considered anyconventionsto be so suspended. Moreover, as alludedto above,
the United States alsodid not invokeArticle89ofthe ChicagoConvention
regarding suspensionofits obligationsthereunder, and never raised the issuein
the various parliamentary debates before ICA0 or the United Nations inwhich it
participated. Even if thishad not been the case, as onecommentator hasnoted,
"[ajctsdirected againstthe safetyofinternational civilaviation as anile are not
coveredbythe international lawof Stilllesswouldtheybe coveredby
thedoctrine of "armed conûict".
5.157 To the extent that the United States argues that the drafters
of the Montreal Conventionwould havehad to address a rnyriadofissuesrelating
to the acts ofmjlitaryforcesifthey had intended the Conventionto applyto
militaryforces actinginan armed conflict,there isno support for suchan alarmist
position. The United States seeks to buttress its argumentbyreferring to Articles
25-30ofthe First AdditionalProtocoI to the GenevaConvention of 1949~~~.Yet
these articles applyto the activitiesof domestic,militaryor civimedical
aircraft involvein non-scheduled domesticoperations, in un-establjshedair
routes, and used in miiitaor police servicesalthoughexclusivelyassignedto
medical transport. Assuch,medjcaiaircraft are not coveredby the Montreal
Conventionunder Article4, paragraphs 1and 2. Forthat reason, they havebeen
459
See,Hailbronner, K.: "CivilAviation,UnlawfulInterference With",in
Encvclopediaof PublicInternational Law, Vol. 11,1989,p. 57at p. 58.
Exhibit86.
460
U.S.PrelirninaryObjections, pp.203-204.528 AERIAL INCIDENT 12461
given a limited protection in the ProtocThissituation therefore has nothing to
do with civilaircraft involvinregularly-scheduled international commercial
flights in predetermineaircorridors which are covereby the Convention.
5.158 The United States alsocontends that the drafters of the
Montreal Convention would havehadto pay attention to the 1923drafHague
Rules of Aerîal Warfare ifthey had intended the Conventionto apply to the
actions of a State'sarmed forces461. However, this argument fails to take into
consideration that the draft 1923Rules wcre never adopted anlegailybindlng
form62.
5.159 In this respect, the United States' argument exhibits a
remarkable inconsistency. On the one hand, the United States seeks to rely on
the 1923draft Rules to supportitsargument that the Montreal Convention is not
applicable to thicase. On the othcr han4 the United Statesaswell asexperr
authonties in the field,have consistently held that there arerulescovering
aerial warfare. AU.S . ajor W.G. Downey observed in the Proceedings of the
Amercian Society of International Law"asyou are probably aware, there are no
rules &erning aerial warfareY3." Similarly,de Saussur has concluded:
"There is no dearth of opinion that in the matter of air war-
fare there are, in fact, no positive rules. .. 'In so sense but
a rhetorical one' wrote Professor Stone in 1955 leanthere
stiU be said to have emerged a body of intelligible rules of
air warfare comparable to the traditional rules of land and
W., pp.204-205.
462 Sec . ocuments on the Laws of War (Roberts,A. and Guelff,R.;eds.),
mord, 1982, p.121. mfbit 87.
463 Downey, Revision of the Rules of Warfare, Proceedings of the
American Society of International Law, Forty.-third Session, 1949,
p. 102,at p -107. Thisview is erldorsed in the U .S .Depatlnmt of the
Air Force's Pamphlet No. 110131 of 1976 (p .31) which notes that
The Hague draft Rules lof 1923 "do not represent customary inter-
national law as a total codet1 even thoughthey "have some authority
because emminent jurists prepared themt'.i2471 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
sea warfarel" 464 .
5.160 Moreover,the United States'argument also ignoresthe
duties that a State'slitaryforces have to coordinate their activitieswithcivil
aviation authontiesunder Annexes 2,11and 15to the Chicago Convention. As
ICAO has already observed, the United States failedto respect these obligations,
as well asthose under the CnicagoConvention,whichwere inno waysuspended
in connectionwith its activitiesinthe Pers~~18~ ~fcourse, it issignificant
that the Unjted States does not rajasimilarargument withrespect to the
Treaty of Amityfor the periodkom 1980through 1988. Sincethe United States
constantlywas rclyingon the Treaty before thisCourt,thIran-U.S. CIaims
Tribunal, and its own domesticourtsduringthisperiod, the United States
obviouslyhadno interest in arguing that the Trea'ty'seffectwas suspended.
5.161 Asforthe United States'assertion that the IslamicRepublic
never complained to the ICA0 Council that the Montreal Convention had been
violated when it reported thIraq had shot downa civilianaircraft in 1986~~~)
this argument suffersthe same fate as the United States'other references to
previous aenal incidents. The shorr answer isthat the IslamicRepublic requested
ICA0 to condemn iraq'sactions, includingitsissuance oan illegaNOTAM,
under the Chicago Conventionbecause that wasthe Convention under whichthe
ICAOCouncilhad authority to act. As noted above, the CounciIhad no similar
464 De Saussure, The Laws of Air Warfare: Are There Any?
U.S. Naval War Coiiege, International Law Studies, 1947-
1977 Vol. 62 (1980).280, at p. 281 citing J. Stone, Legal
Control of International Conflicts (New York : Rinehart,
1954), p. 609,
465 See, paras. 3.01-3.52 and paras. 4.15-4.32 of the Mernoriai
ofthe Islamic Repubiic.
466 At footnote 1 to page 91 of the U.S.Preiiminary Objections, the
United States only reserves its position as to the application of
the Chicago Convention to surface vessels engagedincombat.
467 U.S. Preiiminary Objections, p. 207.530 AERIAL INCIDENT [2481
power to actwithrespect to the interpretation or application ofthe Montreal
Convention.
5.162 Thus, even assumingthat the United Statesand the Islamic
Republic were engagedin an international amed conflictat the time ofthe
shoot-dom, itwouldnot followthat the Montreal Convention had somehow
become inapplicable. hdeed, the Convention aimsat safeguardingthe safetyof
civilaviation, regardless ofwhether or aninternationalarmed conflictiin
progress. Closescrutinyof the object and purpose ofthe Convention's provisions
shows that they are not incompatiblewith the international principlesand treaty
rules goveminginternational armed conflicts;rather theysu~~lementand
strennhen the protection affordedbytheseprinciplesand rulesThus , hile
general principleson international armed conflicts requirethe belligerent parties
no: to attack civilair~raft~~~t,he MontreaI Convention supplernents this
repulation469,
5.163 Itcan therefore be concludedthat neither the text ofthe
Montreal Convention nor the relevant international rulesgoverninginternational
armed conflictswarrant theviewthat the applicabilityof the Montreal
Convention to the downingof FlightIR 655wasto be excludedon account of the
existenceof an international amed conflictbetween the United Statesand the
IslamicRepublic. On the contrary,the Montreal Conventionusefullyand
convenientlysupplements the principlesand rules regulatingarmed conflicin,
that it restates and strengthens that humanitarian protection againstunlawful
468
As the First Geneva Protocolof 1977has not yetbeen widelyratitied (one
ofthe Statesthat sofar haveailed ta ratifvit beina the United States),
Articles48-60ofthe Protocol, concerningihe genëral protection of tfie
civilianpopulation against effectsofhostilities,are onlybindingon the
contracting States.
469
The same dutyis providedfor in Article 8ofthe First Geneva Protocol,
but of course thisprovisionisonlybindingon contracting States.l2491 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 531
attacks on civilaircraft,whichconstitutesone of thepillarsofboth the lawof
peace and the lawof amed conflict.
5.164 In conciusion,whetheor not the relations behrieenthe
United Statesand the IslamicRepubiic at the time ofthe downingof IRight
655 aretermed an international armed conflict,the applicabilityofthe Montreal
Conventionappears in anycase to be unquestionable. PARTVI
JURISDICTION UNDER THE TREATY OFAMITY
6.01 The compromissoryclausein the Treaty of Amityon which
the IslamicRepublic reliesas a basisofjurisdictioniscontained inArticleXX1(2),
whichprovides:
"Anydisputebetween the High ContractingParties asto the
intemretation or avvlication ofthe uresent Treatv, not
satisfactoriadjusiêdb dipl~mac~~shalb le submitted to the
International Court ofLtice, uniersthe HighCmracting Parties
agreeto settlement bysome other pacificmeans""."
6.02 ln itsPreliminaryObjections,the United States has raised
four reasonswhyjurisdictionshouldbe refused under the ~reaty~~l. The United
States alleges(j) that the IslarnicRepublic is assertingthe Treaty inbad faithand
isthus barred bom invokingitbecause of its past conduct;(ii)that the Islamic
Republjc isseekingto transfom the dispute intadifferent disputefromthat
raised in itsApplication; (iii) that the IslamicRepublicmaynot relyon the
Treaq's compromissoryclausebecause it has made no effortto resolvethe
dispute by diplomacy;and(iv)that the Treaty of Amityispurely a commercial
treaty and isthus irrelevant to the subject-matter ofthe IslamicRepublic's
Application,the shootingdownofFlight IR 655and itsattendant circumstances.
6.03 Aswillbe shownin thisPart, these contentions do not stand
up to scrutiny. For over ten years,the United States has consistentlytaken the
position before this Court and tIran-U.SClaimsTribunal that theTreaty of
Amitymaybe invokedagainstthe IslamicRepublic andthat the IslamicRepubiic
isbarred fromrepudiating it.Inthese circumstances,the argument that the
470
United StatesandEhan,rsignedon 15August 1955,284U.N.T.S.93,Exhibit
3 ta the Memonal ofthe IslamicRepublic.
-
471 See,generally,U.S.Prelimina~yObjections,pp.213-237.i2511 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 533
IslamicRepublic isnowprecluded kom relyingon the Treaty isnot ingood faith.
Havingrepeatedly relied on the Treaty duringthis period, andhavingreaped the
benefitsofjudicial decisionspredicated on itsapplicatioisthe United States
whichshouldbe precluded £rom objectingto the Treatyas a basisofjurisdiction.
Moreover,whilecertain Iranian entitiesmayhave questioned the application of
the Treaty in casesbefore the Iran-U.S.ClaimsTribunal duringthisperiod, the
Govemment of the lslamicRepublic refrained £romtaking a position onthe
issue472, Even ifthe United States had not changeditsposition,therefore, and
even ifthe Court and the Iran-U.S.ClairosTribunal hadnot consistentlyapplied
theTreaty, the IslamicRepublicwouldstillbe entitled to invokethe Treaty here.
6.04 It isalsoclear that the IslamicRepublic has not transformed
thedispute into adifferent one bom that introduced in its Application. It has
simplyadded acomplementarybasisofjurisdictionwithoutchangingthe
underlyingsubject-matter of the case. Quite clearly,the attack and destructionof
a civilaircraft navigatingwithinitçownairspace on a commercialflight,together
withthe issuanceof iilegalNOTAMsand other U.S. actionsintefenng withthe
IslamicRepublic'saviationin the Persian Gulf,involveinsofactoa question
whether there havebeen violationsof the Treaty of Amitywhichprovidesinter
& for peace and hiendship and freedom of commerce and navigationbelween
the twoStates.
6.05 Whilethe lslamicRepublic has, asiscustomary,supplied
greater factual detail in itsMemonal to substantiate these daims, the United
States has itselfacknowledgethe relevance of thismaterial by arguingthat the
472
&, for example,TNA Cornoration v, theGovemment ofthe Islamic
Re ublicof Iran Award No.184-161-1 Lagergren,Chairman 12August
8Iran-US.C.T.R.17 i,alp.318 where the Abunal
notedeernment of the 1slarnic.Repvblicwas not re ared ai
thattime "fopresentjtdefinitivevicwsasto the validityof tEe+reatyll.534 AERIAL INCIDENT
shootingdownof FlightIR 655bythe USSVincennes cannotbe viewedin
isolation,but mustbe examinedagainstthe backdrop ofthe Parties' actionsin the
Persian Gulfleadingup to the incident.As a result, there isno basis forthe
United States' argumentthat simplybecause the Treaty wasnot mentioned in the
IslamicRepublic's Application,orbecause the IslamicRepublic'sMernorial
discussedsome ofthe relevant background eventsin greater detail,the Treaty
cannot be raised as a validbasisofjurisdictionat this stageofthe proceedings.
6.06 With respect to the argument that the Treaty's
compromissoryclause cannotbe invokedbecause the IslamicRepublic made no
effort to resolvethe disputebynegotiation, this claimalsofallsshort ofthe mark.
Quite shply, the Treaty ofAmitydoesnot refer to the word"negotiations"and
doesnot provide that negotiations,or even diplomacy,are a prerequisite to
submitting adispute as to its applicationor interpretation to the Al1
that isrequired isthat the dispute be "notsatisfactody adjustedby diplomacy",a
state of affairswhichthe record showsexistsin the present case.
6.07 Even ifthe Treaty providedotherwise,Part III has
demonstrated that the United States has fundamentally misrepresented the mle
relatingto the need for prior negotiations,and has failedto take into accaunt its
OWJI refusal.to deal withthe lslamicRepublic on the matter. Moreover, the Court
willbe aware that the arguments on this issueadvancedbythe United States in its
PreliminaryObjectionsare in complete contradictionto the position it tookwith
respect to theTreaty in the 1980CaseConcemine United States Di~lomaticand
Consular Staffin Tehran.in the sectionsthat follow,the IslamicRepublic will
citef!romthe United States' pleadingsin that caseto showhowthe Preliminary
Objectionsare manifestlyincompatiblewiththe United States'prior conduct.
473
In thisregard, the'i,eral reference to "diplornacy"does not necessarily
presuppose an exc ange ofviewsor "negotiations".i2531 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 535
6.08 As for the assertion that the Treaty ofAmiisirrelevant to
the disputethat isthe subjectof the IslamicRepublic's Application,this argument
isessentiallyrelated to the merits ofthe disputebecause it concernsthe
applicationor interpretation of the Treaty in the lightof the relevant facts.
Quoting passages fromthe merits hase ofthe Nicaraeua case(whichinitseifis
curioussincethe Court had already foundithadjurisdictionover the dispute),the
United States arguesthat its actionswerejustifiedas self-defensebecause the
U.S.feared an imminentattack from the IslamicRepublicand "perceived the
aircraft ashostile. Sucharguments simplyconfim that adispute e~stsbetween
the IslamicRepublic and the United States overthe interpretation or application
ofthe Treaty. Thisisa disputewhichmust be decidedat the merits phase - a
conclusionreinforcedbythe Court'sdecisionin the Nicaragua case,which
concerned comparable treaty provisionsaswellas analogous actsof armed
aggressionbyone State withinthe territory of an~ther~~~.
6.09 h contrast to the United States' approach, the Islamic
Republic submits that,in examiningthe scope ofthe Court'sjurisdictionunder
the Treaty of Amity,the correct starting point isthe compromissoryclauseitself.
Under Article XXI(2) ofthe Treaty,there are four prerequisitesto the Court's
jurisdiction:
(i) That therebe a "dispute";
(ii) That the dispute relate to the "interpretation or application"
ofthe Treaty;
(iii) That the disputebe one "notsatisfactorilyadjustedby
diplomacy";and
(iv) That there beno agreement between Iran and the United
Statesta settle the disputebsome other pacificmeans.
474
Militarvand Paramilitam Activitiesin and againstNicaraeua [Nicararruav.
United States ofAmerica').Jurisdictionand Adrnissibiiitv,Judmnent. I.C.J.
Reports 1984, p.246. AERIAL INCIDENT [2541
6.10 ln the sectionsthat follow,the IslamicRepublic wiIlshow
that each of these prerequisites issatisfiedin this case. The IslamicRepublic wiil
alsoshowthat prior to the institutionofthese proceedings,the United States had
strenuouslyarguedthat the compromissoryclausein the Treaty of Amityhad
been drafted in a manner that wasintended to be verybroad, and that when the
Treaty wasbeingnegotiated, the United States resisted anyattemnarrow its
jurisdictionalscope475. Thereare thus no irnpedirnentsto the Court'sexercising
jurisdiction overthe dispute under theTreaty.
6.11 Having set outthese introductory comments,Chapter 1will
take up the fact that Treatyremains in force betweenthe Parties and the
reasonswhythe IslamicRepublic isnot barredfrom invokingit. Chapter Il then
dealswiththe United States'assertion that the IslamicRepublic has changedthe
nature of the dispute initsMernorial,and willshowthat this isnot true. Chapter
III setsforth the wayinwhichthe provisionsofthe Treatyare relevant to the
subject-matter of the dispute and alsodemonstrates howthere is unquestionably
a disputebetween the Parties as to itsinterpretation or application. Lastly,
Chapter N wiilindicate howthe dispute hasbeen shownto be one "not
satisfactorilyadjustedby diplomacy",and that the Parties have not agreed to
settle it by some other pacificmeans.
475 =, paras. 6.61to 6.64below.i2551 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
CEIAPTERZ THE UNITED STATES ISPRECLUDED FROM
OBJECîïNG TO THE TREA7T AS A BASISOF
JUrUSDICnON
Smo~ A. The TrestvRemains in ForceBetweentheParties
6.12 It isappropriate to recallat the outset that the Treaty of
Amityremains in force between the Parties. Under the Treaty, termination can
onlyoccurin accordancwith ArticlXXIII,whichprovidesin relevanpartthat:
"2.The present Treaty shallenter into force one month after the
day ofexchangeofratifications. It shallremaininforce for ten
yearsand shaIlcontinue inforce thereafter untilterminated as
providedherein.
3.Either HighContractin Partymay,bygivingone year'swritten
noticeto the other Hi8ontracting Party,teminate the present
Treaty at the end ofthe initialten-year penod ortime
thereafter."
6.13 The importanceofrespectingformal termination provisions
suchas those contained in the Treaty ofhisunderscored byArticle 54of the
Vienna Conventiononthe Lawof Treaties whichprovidesthat termination
shouldtake place "inconformitywiththe provisionsofthe treaty". Significantly,
neither Party has everinvokedthe provisionsofArticleXXIII(3) or suggested
that the one-year period hasbegun to run. To the contrary,the United States has
expresslyacknowledgedin itsPreliminaryObjectionsthat it does natassert that
the Treàkyisnot inforas a reason whyjunsdiction shouldbe ref~sed~~~.Such
an argumentwould,of course,be untenable giventhat the U.S.StateDepartment
bas repeatedly maintained thatthe Tresty remains in force and thatthe State
Department's officialpublication,Treaties inForce, continuesto Iisttas Treaty
validand binding477.
476 U.S.PreüminaryObjections,p.215.
477 & United States Department ofState, Treaties in Force, 1January 1990,
p. 117. A copyof this document is attached in 88.&,it aIsopp.
132-133of the IslamicRepublicPsMernorialand thereto. 6.14 Both this Court and the Iran-United States ClaimsTribunal
have previouslyheld that the Treaty oAmity sunived the fundamental
disruption in relationsthat occurred between the Parties as aresult of the events
of 1979and 1980. In itsjudgment inthe Case Concemina United States
Diulomaticand Consular Staffin Tehran, the Court stated -
Treaty has, no doubt, nowbeen impairedivby reason of diplomatic
relations between thetwocountrieshavingbeen broken off by the
United States, its provisionsremainpart ofhemus of law
applicable between the United States and Iran ,
6.15 Thisholdingwascitedwithapproval bythe Iran-United
States ClaimsTribunal on severaloccasions. In Amoco InternationalFinance
Corporation v.The Govemment of the IslamicRepublic ofIran (Virally,
Chairman),for example,the Tribunal referred to the Court's reasoning inthe
Di~lomaticand Consular Staffcaseto support the conclusionthat the Treaty
remained inforce after the rupture ofrelations between the twoStates in late
1979.The Tribunal added that "theRghtsand obligationsit establishedwere
validand enforceable accordingto itsterm~~~~".
6.16 It istrue that the Court'sruliin the Di~iomaticand
Consular Staffcase onlywent sofar as to hold that the Treaty remained inforce
as of 29November 1979whenthe United States submitted itsdispute to the
Court. Sirnilariy,the decisionsof the Iran-United States ClaimsTribunal have
been limitedto holdingthat the Treaty wasstillin effect asof January 1981,the
date bywhichclaimssubmittedto the Tribunal had to have arisen.
478 Case ConcerninpUnited States Dirilornaticand ConsularStaffin Tehran,
I.C.J.Re~orts 1980,p. 28,para. 54.
479 Award No. 310-56-3,14July1987,re~rinted in 15Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 189,at
p.219.i2571 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISS~ONS 539
6.17 Nonetheless, itisclear that no events havetaken place since
1981whichcouIdbeviewedas terminating the Treaty. As noted above, the
United States continues toviewthe Treaty asremainingin force, and neither
Partyhastaken anyof the forma1steps required under Article XXIII(3)ofthe
Treaq to terminate it even though theycouldhave done soif theyhad so
~hosen~~'.Asnoted bythe Lran-U.S.ClaimsTribunal, al1the most serious
disruptionsin the Parties' relations "tookplacebefore the Court'sfindingthat the
Treatywasstillin force481". Moreover, as recently as 1989,the United States
Federal District Courtheld that the TreAmi9ofwas,as of the date ofthe
opinion,stillinforce and provided a "controllinglegalstandard"withrespect to
certain issuesof compensationin the event ofexpropriation or
nationali~ation~~~.Consequently,the Treaty rernainspart ofthe corpus oflaw
between the twoStates, particularlythe provisionsin itscomprornissaryclause
have denounced the Treaty ifit thought itproper to do so. Sucha decision
couldbe notifïedat anytimc, pursuant to the procedure describedin
ArticleXXIII, paraa h3oftheTreaty, ormade known b anyother
means of ublicity% Pm eonsideredthejudgmentof the nlemational
Court ofirticetobe in error in findingthat the Treaty rernaincd
a plicable,it couldcertainlyhave remedied the error byan expressnotice
oftermination to remwe al1doubt!' ArnocoInternational Finance
Corporationv.IslamicRe~ublicof Iranw, 15Iran-U.S. at p,
218.
482 Forernost McKesson hc..v.IslamicRepublic pfIran, Cjv.action No. 82-
0220 (D.D.C.18April1989), repnnted in Iranian AssetsLitipation
Re orter 28April1989, at p 37177.17178,affirmedon these points by
thknitid States Court of (D.C.Cir.,15lune 1990 re~rinted in
Iranian AssetsLitieationRe~orter, 16Jul40,atpp. 19093,la.. It
shouldbe noted in connectionwiththese twocases that the U.S.courts
disputes ansingnder the Treaty.Exhibit 88A.risdictionalfora for540 AERlAL INCIDENT ~581
providingfor the jurisdictionofthe
Smo~ B. TheIsIamicRepublic 1sNot BarredframXnvokinp . e
nE&
6.18 In itsPreliminaryObjections,the United States asserts that
the IslamicRepublicisinvokingthe compromissoryclauseofthe Treaty of Arnity
inbad faith and that it shouldbe therefore barred from onlthe Treatyas a
basisofjurisdi~tion~~~.Sucha contentionisdernonstrablywithoutmerit in the
lightof the United States'ownconductrelating to the Treaty. For overten years,
the United States has successfuliysoughtto applythe provisionsof the Treaty
againstthe IslamicRepublicin avarietyof different fora, and has argued that the
IslamicRepublic isbarred from repudiating it. Consequently,it isthe United
States'ownargument whichshows alackofgood faith.
6.19 Soinconsistentisthe United States' assertionin this case
withitspreviousposition that it isnot surprishg that the Preliminary Objections
showlessthan fullconfidencein the "estoppel"claim. The sole conclusionwhich
the United States isable to muster is:"[aita min..it isappropriateforthe
Court to be rigorousin determiningwhether Iran'ssudden introduction of this
Treaty as a basis ofjurisdictust tain able^^^".
483
It is quite clearthat the Parties knewhowto terminate bilateral treaties
Revolution,forexample,the Parties terminata1959Treaty ofc
Coo eration between themIncontrast, they took nosuchactionvis-a-vis
theKeaty of Amig. &e, DiplornaticNote No. 191date19Nw. 1979by
the Embassyof the IslamicRepubiic Iranto the U.S.Department of
State concerningtheermination ofthe Agreement of Cooperation
between the im erial Gwernment ofhan and the Government ofthe
U.S.A.dated 5Raich 1959. Exhibit89). &, slso,Reisman, W.M.:
'Tennination of the USSRs$reatyRightof Intervention in IranAm.n
J. IntL..Vol.74 (1980),at p. 153. Exhibit89.
484
U.S Preliminary Objections,pp.213-214.
485 m., pp. 215-216.12591 OBSERVATIONS AND SUEMISSIONS 541
6.20 The essence of the United States' contentionisthat because
certain Iranian entitiesmayhave argued in other proceedings that the Treaq of
Amityterminated foIlowingthe fundamental changesthat accompanied the
lslamicRevolution,the IslamicRepublic isbarred from relyingon the Treaty
here. The United States citesthe IslamicRepublic's conductinthe Divlomatic
and ConsularStaffcase as wellas itspositionbefore the Iran-UniteStates
ClairnsTribunal assupport for thiscontention.
6.21 The reference to the Di~lomaticand ConsularStaffcaseis
misplacedfor severalreasons. First,the lslamicRepubIictook no position asto
the Treaty of Amityinthat case and did not participate except to the extent of
furnishinglimited observationswhichthe Court adverted to in itsjudgmentIn
contrast, the IslamicRepublicis fullyparticipatingin this case and the Court is
thus apprised of iviews. Moreover, asthe Court recognizedin itsjudgment, the
IslamicRepublic's communicationsmade in connectionwiththe Diplomatic and
Consular Staffcasewere directedat the wider aspects ofthe problems between it
and the United Statesand did nat address the status of the ~reaty~~~.
Nonetheless, evenifthe argument hadbeen advanced,it isdoubtfulthat the
Court wouldhave accepted it. Asthe Court stated:
"Itispreciselywhendifficultiesarise that the treaty assumesits
greatest importance, and the wholeobject of ArticleXXI,
paragraph 2,of the 1955Treaty wasto establishmeans for arriving
peacefulemeans. It would,therefore, be incompatiblewiththeyother
wholepu oseof the 1955Treaty ifrecourseto the Court under
Article&, paragraph 2,wcrc nowto bcfound not to be open to
the part&?yreciselyat the moment whensuchrecourse was most
needed .
486 United StatesDi~lomaticand ConsularStaffinTehran, Judment. I.C.J.
Reports 1980,p.39,paras. 35-36. The Court alsoconfmed that Iran had
notmade any suggestionthat the Treaq wasnot in force on 29November
1979when the United States submitted the disputem., p. 28,para. 54.
487 Ibid.542 AERIAL INCIDENT I2aol
6.22 The IslamicRepublic submits that this reasoningisequally
applicable in the present case. Havingalready decided inthe Di~lomaticand
ConsularStaffcasethat the Treaty ofAmitysuMved the deterioration of
relations between the lslamicRepublic and the United Statesin1979so asto
provide avalidbasisofjurisdictionin that case, a similarfindingthatthe Treaty
providesa basisofjurisdictionhere wouldseem to follow. As for theUnited
States, havingpreviouslyinvokedthe Treaty in itsfavorand in favor ofits
nationalsin caseswhere either it or its nationals wereclaimants,and having
prevailed on this point and received positivedecisions£romthe Court, it should
not be ailowedto preclude applicationof the Treaty here simplybecause it isthe
respondent.
6.23 The same commentsmaybe made about the United States'
references to the IsIamicRepublic'sposition before theIran-U.S.Claims
Tribunal. In numerous casesbefore the Tribunal, U.S. claimants,withthe
assistanceofthe State Department, argued that the Treaty of Amityremained in
force after 1981,and that Article IV(2)of theTreaty governedthe standard of
compensation allegedlydue as aresult of expropriationssaidto have taken place
due to the IslarnicRevolution.
6.24 ln some of these cases,Iranian entities questioned whether
the Treaty had sunived the changeof circumstancesthat occurred in 1979and
1980. The United Statesvehementlyopposed thisposition. To buttress itsclaim
that theTreaty remained applicable,the State Department prepared a white
paper in October 1983entitled "Memorandumon the Application ofthe Treaty
ofAmityto Expropriations in Iran". That Memorandum emphasized the
continuingvdidity ofthe Treatybywncluding that: OBSERVATIONSAND SUEMISSIONS 543
"Becauseit has not been terminated in accordance witsermsof
the provisionsof international law,thegyf Amityremains in
force between the United States and Iran,
6.25 Thispositionwasfurther endarsecibytheState Department
whenit issueda secondMemorandum on the Application of International Lawto
IranianForeign ExchangeRegulationsinFebruary 1984. That Memorandum
alsotook the positionthat the Treaty remained inforce andwasapplicable
between the
6.26 Asnoted above,the Iran-US. ClaimsTniunal accepted the
United States' positionthat the Treaty survivedthe binrelations of 1979.
Accordingly,the Tribunal hasrepeatedly applied the provisionsofthe Treaty
againstthe lslamicRepubiic in a nurnber of differentcases490.
6.27 It canbe seen,therefore, that the situationis simplythat
whilethe IslamicRepublic didnot advanceaposition on the Treatybefore the
Court in the Dirilomaticand ConsularStaffcase,certain lranian entitieshave
maintained a positionbefore the Iran-U.S. Tribunalwith respect to the Treaty
which wasnot accepted as a matter of law. The United States advanced an
opposing positionthatprevailed. There is absolutelyno legalprinciple,and the
United States has citednone, indicatingtaParty ,avingadopted a positionon
a matter oflawwhichturns out to be incorrect,shouldbe estopped thereafter
488
Copiesof this Memorandum, together witha secondMemorandum
repared bythe State Department on the "Applicationof International
k1984,have been furnishedwithth%cmorialatofthe lslamicRepublic at
IZxiibit54. For the conveniencoftheCourt both Memoranda are
reproduced herein Exhibit90.
489 &, note to the ForeignEvchangeRegulation Memorandum, m., p.
1185(Exhibit90).
490 See,for exampie,ArnocoInternational F'nanceCornoration v.Islamic
Re~ublicofIran,544 AERIAL INCIDENT [2621
from relyingon a correctstatement ofthe law. Asone commentatorhas recently
noted in a comprehensive studyof the recent lawand procedure of the Court,
such aproposition cannot be accepted:
"Whetherthe idea of acquiescenceor the idea ofpreclusionis
a lied,it isdi6cult to accept that a State isbound in itsown
afairsbya viewof the43~?hich it asserted againstanother State
ona previous occasion .
The same author then added:
"ifthe factsare knowtobath States, each can formits own
assessmentof the legalsituation whichresults from them, and the
assertionyone ofthem that the legal situatisthus andthus-
whichmeans no more than thatisthe opinionof that Statethat
suchisthe legalsituatia-,,cannot be relied on to support an
estoppel tothatffect .
6.28 What ismost extraordinaryabout the United States'
argument isthat in the 1983State Department Memorandum referred to above,
the United States cited exactlythe same opinionof SirRersch Lauterp-tot
the effectthat "aState cannotbe allowedto availitselfofthe advantages of a
treaty whenit suitsit to do soand repudiate it when itsperformance becomes
onerous" -to support the contention that the IslamicRepublicwasbarred from
reuudiatinr!the Trea~ as it citesnowin itsPreliminaryObjectionsfor the
proposition that the IslamicRepublic is estopped frominvokingthe ~rea~~~~.If
ever there was an example oaState "blowinghot and cold, this isit.
6.29 The United States' argumentisreminiscent of the argument
that Pakistan advancedin the 1972A~pealRelatine to the Jurisdiction of the
491
ThirlwayH.: 'The Law and Procedure of the 1.C1960-198 B9i,ish
Yearbook of International Law,989,p.41. Exhibi91.
492 Ibid.,p. 43(footnotes deleted).
493 See .xhibit90. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
ICA0 Councilcase. There Pakistan asserted that India wasprecluded from
affirmingthe cornpetence of the Court because shehad maintained that the
treaties containingthe compromissoryclausesupon whichthe Court'sjurisdiction
wasbased were no longer in force. ThCourtrejected this argument ona
number of groundsincludingthe following:
'The argument based on preclusioncouldalsobeurned against
Pakistan,for sinceit isPakistan not Tndiawhichdeniesthe
jurisdiction ofthe Court, andïrms the force of the Treaties, it
mustbe questionable whether shecanbc heard to utilizefor that
purpose an Indian denial of the force ofthe Tr...".s
The Court went onto observe:
"Thequestionof theCOUR'jSurisdictionon the other hand, is
necessarilyan antecedent and independent o-an objective
question ofaw- whichcannot begovernedbypreclusive
considerations capabofbe'41f4sexpressedasto tell against
either Partyor both Panjes ."
6.30 In viewof these considerations,the United States' argument
cannot be relieupon to avoidthe proper application of the Treaty ofAmityas a
basisofjurisdictionin thiscase.
CEEAPTEi Rl
NATUREOFAMICTHEUBDISPUTEOTCBYNINVOKINGTHE THE
TREATY
6.31 The second argument advancedbythe United States seeks
to make use othe fact that the IslamicRepublic onlyinvokedthe Treaty of
AmityinitsMemoriakrather than in its~~~lication~'~.Whiiethe United States
realizesthat it cannot go sofatoaUegethatthe IslamicRepublic isbarred
frominvokinga supplementarybasisofjunsdiction initsMemoriaInot
494
Reports 1972,p.54,para. 16(c).
495
U.S. PreliminaryObjections,p. 217.546 AERIALINCIDENT 12641
mentioned inits Application,it does claimthat byintroducingthe Treaty the
IslamicRepublic has transformedthe nature ofthe dispute intowith a wholly
differentcharacter frornthat submitted in the ~~~lication~~~,
6.32 Sucha contentionfailsto reflect either the factsor the law.
It rests on the accusationthat whereas the Application onlyconeerned a single
incident-the shootingdownofFlightIR 655 -the Mernorialwent"farbeyond its
initialfactual statement"so as to expand the cornplaint"tocoverthe eU.S.t of
militaiydeployments in the [Persian]Gulf,andofothU.S .ctions not involving
militaryforce...497A.mere glanceat the Application, however,reveals that it
was not Iimitedto the shoot-dom alone. Moreover,the United States'own
pleadingsconfirmthat the "incident"camot be viewedin isolationwithouttaking
accountofthe surrounding events leadingup to the event.
SECTIO A. TheDualNatureofthelslamic Republic'sClaims
Theclaims Iiasedonthe illepauseofforce bvtheUnited
(i) States
6.33 The United States doesnot dispute that the aspect of the
IslamicRepublic's claimsbased onthe use of armed force to shoot-downFlight
IR 655has not changedwiththe submissionofthe IslamicRepublic's Mernorial.
Quite clearly,the iilegalnature ofthe shoot-downremains acentralelemoft
the hlamic Republic's claimsunder ailthree bases ofjurisdictionhvoked.
6.34 With respect to the Treaty of Amity,the shoot-down
involvesthe questionwhether the United States hasviolatednot onlythe whole
purpose ofthe Treaty, but alsothe specincprovisionsof Ar1whichprovides
496 Ibid.,p. 218.
497 m., pp. 219-220.[2651 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 547
that 'There shaiibeEim and enduringpeace and sincere friendshipbetween the
United States ofherica and Iran". In and of itself,the destructiacivil
aircraft operating withinits ownairspacebya foreignwarshipthat had intruded
into the territorial watersofthe State of registrationof the aircraft istaathema
the principlesunderlyingthe Treaty.
(ii) T ï
6.35 Without repeating the points made in Part II, it isimportant
to recallthat the IslamicRepublic's Application notonlyraised the question of
the United Statesillegaluse of armed forcjtalsoreferred to the United States'
"continuousinterference withthe PersiaGuif aviation"asone ofthe groundsfor
itssubmissionthat the United States had breached itsinternational
obligations498,The IslarnicRepublic drewattention to the fact that the United
States had issuedillegNOTAMs and that itsmilitaryforcesoperating in the
Persian Gulf had failed to coordinate their activitieswithlocalair tra6c control
centres in chargingthe United StateswithviolatingAnnex15of the Chicago
Convention,asweIlas Recommendation 2.611of the Third MiddleEast Regional
AirNavigation(MID RAN) meeting of ICAO.
6.36 Both ofthese claimshave a direct bearingon the Islamic
Republic's commerce and navigation.The plain factisthat FiighIR 655was
engagedin a regularlyscheduled commercialflight,navigatingwithinthe
recognizedinternational airroute in itsownairspace,whenit was shotdom by
twomissileslaunchedbythe USSVincenneswhichitselfhad intruded intothe
IslamicRepublic'sterritorial waters. In addition,the continuousUnited States'
interference in the IslamicRepublic's aviationin the Persian Gulfprior to the
498 Application ofthe IçlamicRepubiicp.8.548 AERIAL INCIDENT 12661
incidentalsodirectlyaffectedthe IslamicRepublic's commerceand navigation.
By definition,suchactsrelate to the issueoffreedom of commerceand navigation
guaranteed under ArticleX(l).of the Treaty ofAmity. As such,the United
States'argument that theApplicationwas onlyconcerned withthe shoot-down
and that the IslamicRepublic madeno claimthat the United States had infringed
upon its commerceand navigationcanbe seen to be withoutmerit4".
(iii) Theap~ropriatenessoftheIslamicRepublic'ssubmissions
6.37 Byitsnature, an Application institutingproceedingsbefore
the Court is expected to surnmarizethe main elementsof the dispute submitted.
AsArticle38(2) ofthe Rules ofCourt makes clear,the purpose ofthe
Applicationisto present a succinctstatement ofthe facts and groundson which
the claimisbased. It isthus entirelyappropriate for a party to presamore
fullydevelopedstatement ofthe factsand lawin itsMernorial,partjcularlywhen,
as the lslamicRepublic did,the applicant State reserves itsriinitsApplication
to supplementand amend itssubmissions.
6.38 Both of the IslamicRepublic'spreviouspleadings
conformed to these niles. In discussingelements of the United States'conduct
leadingup to the shoot-downinmore depth in itsMemonal, and in pointingout
that the U.S.actions constituted breachesof the Treaty ofArnity,the Islamic
Republic in no waychangedthe fundamental nature of the dispute submitted to
the Court in itsApplication. The shootingdownofFlightIR 655and the
associatedU.S.interference withthe IslamicRepublic's aviationremain the
subject-matter of the dispute. These matters clearlygiverise to questionsof
interpretation or application of the Treaty generally,aswellas to Article 1
(providingfor peace and friendship),Article IV(1) (providingthat nationals of
499
U.S. ~reliminar~Objections,p.219.i2671 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 549
Iran be accorded "fairand equitable treatment" bythe UnitedStates) and Article
X(l) (providingthat there be fieedom of commerceand navigation),specificaliy.
Thus, there isno basisfor arguingthat the essentialnature ofthe case has
changedfrom that presented in the Application.
Smo~ B. The UnitedStates'Admission as totheRelevance ofthe
BackmoundFaas
6.39 Whatis strikingabout the United States'argumentis that
the relevanceof the background factsto the destructionof FlightIR 655has been
expresslyrecognizedby the United States in itsPreliminaryObjections. There
the United Statesstated:
"Itis,however,important forthe Court to appreciate that this
incidentoccurred in themidstofan arrned engagementbetween
U.S.and lranian forces,inthe contextof a longseriesof attacks on
U.S.and other vesselsin the [Persian]Gulf. The incidentof Iran
Air Flight655cannot be sevarated from the eventsthat ~receded it
and from the hostileenvironment that existedon 3July 198fD$ye
to the actionsof Iran'sownmjlitaryand paramilitaryforces .
6.40 This admissioncouldnot be more explicit. In the lightof the
extensive discussiondevotedto the background factsinthe Preliminary
Objections(whichincludesan entire chapter andtwo annexes devotedto alleged
Iranian attacks onneutral shippinduringthe Iran-Iraq war and the issuanceby
the Uniwd States of NOTAMSfor aircraft in the Persian Gulf),the argument
that the IslamicRepublic istryingto transfom the nature ofthe dispute beyond
the shoot-downisunsustainable. If anything,the United States'selective
discussionofthefacts makes ital1the more important forthe Court to examine
the meritsof the dispute under the jurisdictionconferupon it bythe treaties
invokedbythe Islamic~Republic.The actual shootingdownofFîightW 655is
500 M., p. 9 (ernphasisadded).550 AERIAL INCIDENT 12681
intimatelyrelated to the factual circumstancesthat preceded and contributed to
its occurrenceand mustbe examinedin that context.
6.41 It foDowsfrom the abovethat the United States'attemptto
relyon the Court'sjudgment in thejurisdictional phase of the Case Concerninq
Militamand PararnilitaryActivitiesin and againstNicaraguaismisplaced. In that
case,the Court observedthat Article 38(2)ofthe Rules ofCourt onlyprovides
that an application shouldspecifythe Iegalgrounds uponwhichtheCourt's
jurisdictionisbased "asbr as possible501".An additional groundofjurisdiction
may bebrought to the Court'sattention later provided that "theAppIicantmakes
it clearthat it intends to proceed upon that basis"and that "theresuit isnot to
transform the dispute brought before the Court bythe application intoanother
dispute whichisdifferentin ~haracter~~~".
6.42 The United Stateshas not taken issuewiththe Islamic
Republic's declarationthat it intends to proceed on the basisof the Treaty of
Amityinthis case 503. hdeed, thepoint isindisputable. The IslamicRepublic
hasallegedfiindamentalbreaches oftheTreaty ansing out ofthe same events
and subject-matter that wasmentioned in itsApplication. The IslamicRepublic
fullyintends to proceed withitsclaimsunder the Treaty ofAmityas thus
articulated, aswellasunder the other bases ofjurisdiction ithas invoked. It
501
Militaw and ParamilitarvActivitiesin and aeainst Nicaragua (Nicarama v.
United States ofAmencal, Jurisdictionand AdmissibiIitv.Judment.7.C.J.
wasalsounder a tirne-constraintsince,under Article84ofthe Chicagoblic
Convention, anyappeal £romthe decisionof the ICA0 Councilhad to be
made within 60daysduringwhichtime the IslamicRepublic also hadto
name an Agent. In cantrast, theUnited States took almostthree months
to name its Agentinthe case after the Applicationwasfiledw, para.
3.34,above.
502 Ibid.
503 S& Mernorialof the IslamicRepublic,p.135.[269] OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
followsthat thiselement of the test laiddownin thNicaraeu case ifuUy
satisfied.
6.43 As for the secondcriterionreferredto by the Court,the
sameconclusionreached inNicaragua applies here. In Nicaram, the Court was
dealingwitha Friendship,Commerceand Navigation("FCN) treatythat in al1
material respectswasidenticalto the Treaty of Arnityin this case. The Court was
also dealingwitha factualsituationinvolvingtheuse ofarmed force byone party
againstthe other (the miningofNicaragua'sports and temtorial waters and the
bombingof itsairports bythe United States) that closelyparallels the situatinn
the present case. Despite the fact that Nicaragua had not referredto the treaty in
itsapplication,the Court held:
'Takinginto accountthese Articlesof the Treatyof386,
articularlytheprovisionsin,inter alia,ArticXIX ,for the
Preamble to peace and friendship,therehcanbe no doubt that, in
the circumstances in whichNicaragua broughtitsApplicationto the
Court, and on the basisof the factsthere asserted, there isa dispute
between the Parties, asto the 'interpretation or
application'of the Trea .
6.44 These fmdingsare especiallyrelevantbecause of the
remarkable sirnjlantiesbetween the two cases.The IslamicRepublic has cited
extensively.homthe Court'sdecisionin Nicaraguato underscore the importance
of the factthat the provisionsof the Treaty ofAmitybeinginvokedbythe Islamic
Republic do not cornebefore the Court as a matter of firstimpression. Not only
do both casesinvolvepracticallyidentical treaty provisions(includingtheir
compromissoryclauses),they alsopresent similarfactual questions relatingto the
504
ArticleXIXin theNicaragua/U.S.Treaty isidentical to ArticleX(1) of the
1ranm.S.Treaty ofAmity.
505
Militamand ParamilitarvActivitiesin and apainçtNicaragua (Nicaraguav.552 AERlAL INCIDENT 12701
infringementby one State ofanother State'ssovereigntyand the illegaluse of
armed force.
6.45 For thisreason, the Court'sconclusionin Nicar-that
the mere factthat a State does not expresslyrefer to a particuashavingty
been breached by another State in negotiationswiththat State does not bar the
first State from invokingthe compromissoryclause inthe t-assumes a
çpecialrelevan~e~~. Asthe Courtobsewed:
"TheUnited StateswasweUawarethat Nicaragua allegedthat its
conductwasabreach ofinternational obligationsbefore the
present casewasinstituted; and isnowaware that specificarticles
of the956 Treaty are alle ed to have been violated. It would
pr~pgso senbased on the Treaty, which itwouldbe fullyenttoled
do .
6.46 Thissame reasoningapplies mutatimutandisto the present
case. In itspresentationsbefore ICA0 and the United Nations SecurityCouncil,
as welasin itsApplication,the IslamicRepublic asserted facts relatingto the
destruction of Fiight IR 655aswellastoU.Sep.resenceand interference inthe
PersianGul fenerallyleading up to the shoot-down. Nowthe United States
cornplainsthat the IslaRepublichaswidened itssubmissionsunder the guise
of theTreaty of Amityto cover"the effect of U.S.rnilitarydeployrnentsinthe
[Persian]Gulf,and of other U.S. actionsnot involvingmiiitaryforce...508".
However,theUnited States isfully.aware,ahas been sincethe daythat Hight
IR655 was attacked,that the IslamicRepublic maintainsthat this conduct
constituted a breach of the United States'internatiorial obligations. The United
States'response,articulatedbefore the U.S. Congress,the SecurityCouncil and
506 Ibid.
507 Ibid.,pp. 428-429,para. 83.
508 U.S . reliminaryObjections,pp. 219-220.1271I OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 553
the ICA0 Council, aswellas initsPreliminaryObjections,isthat itsactionswere
justifiedas self-defense. To support thisargument,the United States has feItit
necessaryto addressin considerabledetail the background events inthe Persian
Gulfthat preceded the destruction ofFligIR655. Asthe Preliminary
Objectionsconcede:
"Al1these events are important in understandin wU.S. naval
vesselscame to be offthe CoastoIranin 1988f;ananw]hyon 3luly
of that year the USSVincennesfeared arn inent attack from
Iranianaircraft and reacted accordin... .
6.47 These arguments not onlyillustratethe relevanceof the
wideraspectsof the case, theyare alsodirected to the merits ofthe di-aute
disputethat crystallizedat averyearly stageafter the shoot-down, andthat was
further defined inthe IslamicRepublic's Application.What isevidentisthat the
underlyingnature of thcase has not changedwiththe submissionof the Islamic
Republic'sMernorial. The Mernonal has simplysoughtto addressingreater
detail issueswhichthe United States itselfadmitsare relevant and whichwere
already alludedto in the Application.
6.48 Finally,it isnecessaryto add abrief word aboutthe Court's
recent decisionin the Case Concernin~Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (the
"Phos~hate"case) insofar as it mayhave a beanng on the present proceedings.
In that case,onof Australia'spreliminaryobjectionwasbased onthe assertion
that Nauru had raised a "newclaim"in itsMernorial,not presented in its
Application,whichhad the effect of transformingthe disputebroughtbefore the
Court by the Applicationinto a different dispute5Io.
509 -Ibid.p.12.
510 Certain Phosphate Land in Nauru (Nauru v.Australia).Judment,
Jurisdictionand Admissiblitv,p. 28,para. 63.554 AE.RlAL INCIDENT [2721
6.49 The Court upheld the objectionon the groundsthat ifit had
to entertain the newclaimon the merits-
".the subject ofthe dispute on whichitwouldultimatelyhaveto
pass wouldbe necessarilydistinctfromthe5fgject of the dispute
orginallysubmitted to it in the Application."
Becauseconsiderationof Nauru's"new claim" wouldhaveinvolvedthe Court in
havingto consider anumber offactual questions extraneousto the original
claims,itwasruled inadmissiblebothin form and insubstance512.
6.50 The present situation maybe readilydistinguishedfrom the
situationin the Phosphate case. Unlike Nauru, the IslamicRepublic didnot raise
a "newclaim"in itsMernorialarisingout of a set of factsdistinct frornthose
addressed in its Application. Rather, the IslarnicRepublic introduced a
supplementary basisfor the Court'sjurisdictio-the Treaty ofAmity - which
related to the sameessential facts. Whileit istrue that thisadditional basisof
jurisdiction gaveriseto the submissionthat the United States had breached its
obligationsunder the Treaty, the important point isthat the underlyingsubject-
matter ofthe disputeremained unchanged from that presented in the
Application. The disputebefore the Court continuesto arise out ofthe
destruction of FiightIR 655and the eventsin the Persian Gulf leadingup to that
incident. Bothof these subjectswere raisedinthe Application,and are thus fuiiy
admissibleas claimsunder a supplementarybasisofjurisdiction.
6.51 in short,unlikethe situation inthe Phosuhate case,the
Court here willnotneed to consider any new factual questionsextraneous to the
IslamicRepubIic'soriginal claimin order to rule on the issuesinvolvingthe
511
m., p. 30,para. 68.
512 Ibid.,p. 31, para. 70.12731 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 555
Treaty ofAmity. The underlyingfactsasserted in the Applicationform the
subject-matter ofthe dispute under the Treaty,just astheydidin the Nicaraeua
case. Thisreinforcesthe conclusionthat, unlikeinthe Phosphate case, the
invocationbythe IslamicRepublic ofthe Treaty ofArnityin itsMemorialhas in
nowayservedto transfom the nature of the casebroughtbefore the Court.
CHAPTER III THE TREATYOF AMITY IS DIRECTLYRELEVANT TO
TEE SUB.ECT-MA'ITEROFTHE DISPUTE
S~ON A. The Existeno cfea DisputeoverthTreatv'Iateruretation
orApalication
6.52 Article XXI(2)makes it abundantly clear tanydispute as
to the interpretation or applicationofthe Treaty ofArnity,not satisfactonly
adjustedby diplomacy,maybe submittedtothe Court unlessthe parties agree to
settlement bysome other rneans. The firststep,therefore, isto detemine
whether there asdispute asto the Treaty'sinterpretation or application513.
Thereafter, itwillbe necessaryto examinewhetherthe dispute isone not
satisfactorilyadjustedbydiplomacy(thissubjectbeingtaupnin the next
Chapter).
6.53 ThisCourt hasprovided numerous guidelinesatowhen a
dispute existsover a treaty'sinterpretation or applicatmany of the
Court's pronouncementsinthis respect have been addressedin Part IIl, they
need onlybe brieflyrestated here.
513
United States Di~iomaticand ConsularStaffinTehran, Judgment. 1.C.J.
Re~orts 1980,p.27,para. 52. The Court has already decided inthe
Diplornaticand ConsularStaffcase, andthe United States doesnot
dispute the fact, thatalthough the wordsof Artide XXI(2)do not
one of the partiAs.thesCoun noted,"iisevidenf,asthe 8nited Statesy
contended inits Memorial,that thisiswhatthe parties intended".556 AERIAL INCIDENT 12741
6.54
The classicaldehition of a dispute has,of course,been
givenbythe Permanent Court inthe Mavrommatis casewherethe Court stated:
"Adispute isa disagreement ona point of law~'l$.a;t,a conflictof
legalviews orofinterestsbeween two persons .
Thisdefinitionwasdevdoped hrther bythe Cour n the Int-retation ofPeace
Treaties casewhere the Court stated:
"Whether there existsan international disputaimatter for
objectivedetermination. Themere denial ofthe existenceofa
disputedoes not prwe its non-existenc..There has thus arisen a
situation inwhichthe two sideshold clearlyoppositeviews
concemina the auestion ofthe performance or non-~erformanceof
certain tr&ty obligations. ~onbonted withsucha situation,
Court musrconcludethat international disputes have arisen .
To thismay be added the observationsofthe Permanent Court in the case of
Certain Geman Interests inPolishUpper Silesiato the effecttha-
"... differenceof opiniondoesexistas soon asone of the
Governrnentsconcerned pointsqt&at the attitude adopted bythe
other conflictswithitsownviews .
6.55 Thislineof reasoninghas been fullyadopted by the United
States in itspleadingsin the Divlomaticand ConsularStaff case. One ofthe
juridictional issuespresented there hingedon whether there wasa dispute.
arisingout ofthe interpretation or application of the same Treaty ofAmity. In
the oral hearinginthat case, Counselfor the United States argued veryforcefully
that the mere fact that theUnited States had chargedthe lslamicRepublicwith
514
MavromrnatisPalestineConcessions.Judment No. 2.1924.P.C.I.J.Series
A. No. 2.p. 11.
515
First Phase, Advison.Opinion, I.C.J.Re~orts 1950,p. 74.Romania,
516 C Z
No. 6.P.C.I.J..SerieA.No.6,p. 14.[2751 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 557
violatingvariousprovisionsof the Treaty ofAmity"inevitablyrequires the
interpretation or applicationofthe l+reaSi7".
6.56 The United States'Memonal in the
ConsularStaffcasemade the same point. There the United Statesstated -
"..ifthe Government of Iran had made sornecontentionin this
Courtthat the United Statesinterpretation ofthe Treaty was
incorrector that theTreatydid not applyto Iran'scondua inthe
manner suggestedbythe United States,the Court wouldclearlybe
confrontedwitha dispute atingto the 'interpretatorn
applicationof the Treadd!'
6.57 Similararguments were advancedbythe United States with
respectto the application andinterpretation of the twoVienna Conventionson
Diplomaticand ConsularRelations. The United States claimedthat Iran's
conduct condoningthe seizureofthe U.S .mbassyin 1979violatedseveral
provisionsof these conventions. From this,the United States conclud"IfIran
had disputed these claims,there wouldobviouslybea'dispute' asto the
'interpretation and application'of the two~onventions~~~".
6.58 The IslamicRepubIicsubmitsthat the same reasoning
applieshere. Ashas been dernonstratedin Part III,not simpladispute, but a
fundamental differenceofopinion betweenthe IslamicRepublic and the United
States overthe factsand legalconsequences relatingto the destruction of Flight
IR 655,ernerged shortlyafter the incident occurred. The United States took the
positionthat it bore no responsibilityfor the incidentbecitactionswere
517
Oral argumentof Mr, Schwebel, 1.C.JPleadings,United States
Di~lomaticand ConsularStaffin Tehran (USAv. Iran), p. 285.
518
U.S.Mernorial,W., p. 153.
519 M.,pp.142-143.558 AERlAL INCIDENT 12761
justified asself-defense. The IslamicRepublic contested thisview,and has
asserted that the United Statesismoraiiy,legaiiyand financiallyresponsible.
6.59 The existenceofthisdispute has persisted, andif anything
has become more sharplydefined,withthe submissionofeach Party'sw-rïtten
pleadings. In itsPreliminaryObjectionsthe United Statescontendsthat the
Treaq ofAmityisirrelevant to the casebecause the Treaty isconcernedwith
commercialrelations betweenthe twocountnes, not withthe use of armed
force520. The United Statesalsoargues îhat its actionswejustifiedasself-
defenseand that theyfellwithina categoryofmeasures "necessaryto protect its
essentialsecurityinterests"permitted under ArticleXX(l)(d) ofthe ~rea$~'.
6.60 The IslamicRepublic flatlyrejects these contentionswhich
are supported neither bythe plain meaningof the Treaty, nor bythe Court's
ruling on sÿnilartreaty provisionsin the Nicaragua case,nor bythe fact that the
aircraftwas clearlyinvolvedin "commerceand navigation"withinthe rneaningof
ArticleX(1) of the Treaty whenitwas shot down. We more willbe saidabout
these issueslater, for present purposes it maybe noted that the Parties hold
opposite viewsas to the performance or non-performance of obligationsunder
the Treaty ofAmity. Assuch,it cannot seriouslybe contested that a dispute exists
bepeen the Parties overthe application or interpretation of the Treaty.
6.61 Thisconclusionisreinforced bythe factthat when
negotiatingthe Treaty ofAmity withIran, the United States insistedthat a broad-
520
U.S .reliminaryObjections,p.226.
521
ArticleXX(l)(d) providesthatthe Treaty ofArnity"shallnot preclude the
appIicationof measures ...necessaryto fulfilthe obligationoHigh
Contracting Partyforthe restoration ofinternationalpeace and security,
or necessaryto protect its essentialsecurivinterests".P771 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 559
based compromissoryclausebe included. Asthe United States pointed out in its
Memorialin the -and case:
"Itissignificantthat durin! the negotiationsof the Treaty Iran
soughttodelete the term application' fromthe text and that the
~nzed States successfuiiyréiistedthat suggestion,precisely
y
jurisdictional~rovision~~~."
6.62 The State Department took thisissueveryseriouslyat the
time, Notingthat the matter was"fundamental"and that ifIran persistedin
arguingthat the word"application"shouldbe deleted fromthe compromissory
clausea solutionwouldbe "verydifficult",the SecretaryofState cabU.S.he
ErnbassyinTehran duringthe negotiations statingthat anyrestrictionof the
scope of the clause"mightseriouslycurtailmeans forsettl[oqdisputes
under US.-Iran ~reag~~''.
6.63 The inclusionof a compromissoryclausein the Treatywas
alsoimportant for Iran. The Treaty wasthe firstsuchtreaty to includeabroad-
based compromissoryclausefollowingthe withdrawalbhan of itsdeclaration
acceptingthe Court'sjunsdiction in the aftermath ofthe Ando-Irancase.il
Iranwasthuswellaware ofthe content ofArticXXI(2) and fullyconsented to
the rightof either Partyto submitdisputesunilaterallyto the Court concerning
the Treaty'sinterpretation or application. Had there been an intentionto lirnit
the scope ofthis Article,the Parties wouldnot have agreed tdisputey"
couldbe submittedto the Court in thismanner.
522
I.C.J.Pleadines.United StatesDi~lomaticand ConsularStaffinTehran
(USA v.Iran), p. 153,note14(emphasisadded).
523 Sec A.nnex50to theU.S . emorialm., pp.232-233,reproduced in
Exhibit92hereto.560 AERIAL INCIDENT 12781
6.64 Inthe lightof these considerations,the State Department's
concemswere agreed to byIran, and ArticleXXI(2)ofthe Treaty wasdrafted in
suchawayas to providea broadjurisdictionalmandate. What isimportant isto
appreciate that the position that the United Statestook whenoriginally
negotiatingthe Treatyisfundamentallyinconsistentwiththe stance it isadopting
now. Asthe Court has previouslyheld,the manifesintenti ooanState in
drafting,acceptingand construinga compromissoryclause meritssignificant
That intentionwasthat Article XXI(2)shouldbe as broad-based as
possibleand that disputes overthe interpretation or applicationofthe Treaty
suchas those presented bythe IslarnicRepublic in this casecouldbe submitted to
the Court byeither ofthe Parties.
6.65 Itisweiiestablishedthat the subsequent conductofthe
parties relatingto a treaty bentaken into accounas an indicationof their real
intentions.As McNairnoted in hisworkon The Lawof Treaties:
"....e relevant conductofthe contractingparties after the
has a highprubative valueas to the intention ofthe partiesion")
time ofits conclusion.This isboth goodsenseand goodla$iF .
In thisregard, the United States' positionin the Di~iomaticand ConsularStaff
case is.odirect relevanceto the application andinterpretation of the Treaty here.
6.66 On thebasisof the United States'ownconduct,and the
legalprecedents, jt isapparent that there existsa dispute betweenthe Islamic
Republic and the United States overthe interpretation or application of the
524 Sec for example,the Court'sdecisioninAndo-Iranian Oil Co.. Judgment,
I.C.J.Revorts 1952,p. 93,at pp104-107.
525 McNair, L.:The LawofTreaties, Oxford,Clarendon Press,1961,at p. 424.
Exhibit93.12791 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 561
Treaty ofAmity. To borrow from the Court'swordsin the South WestA£rica
case,the claimsofthe IslamicRepubIicare "positivelyopposed"bythe United
tat tes^ I^^h.se circumstances,andbearing inmind the United States'
previouspositionwithrespect to the jurisdictionalscope ofArticlem(2) ofthe
Treaty, the first twoprerequisites to the Court'sjurisd-that there be a
"dispute"and that the dispute relate to the "interpretation or application ofthe
Treaty" -are clearlysatisfied.
SECTIO BN. TheRelevanceof theTreahi tothe Subject-Matterof the
Disnute
6.67 Instead of focusingon the relevant cnteria under Article
XXl(2)ofthe Treaty, the United Stateshas attempted to divertattention by
allegingthat the Treaty ofAmityas a wholeisirrelevant to the subjectofthe
IslamicRepublic'sApplicationbecause itissolelyconcernedwithcommercial
relations betweenthe twocountries,notwithdamagesresultingfrom an incident
involvingthe use ofarmed forcebetween the Not onlyisthis
contention simplya resurrection of arguments raisedbythe United States inthe
jurisdictionalphase ofthe Nicaragua caseand soundlyrejected bythe Court, it is
alsoflatlycontradicted by the U.S. PreliminaryObjections thernselveswherethe
United Statesseektso justifythe intrusionofitswarshipsinto Iranian territonal
waters on 3July1988on the basjsofArticleX,paragraphs (5) and (6) ofthe
Treaty of Howcan the United States claimthat the Treaty has nothing
to do withthe incident,on the one hand, whileinvokingitsprovisionstojustits
actions,on the other?
526 South WestAfrica.PrelirninaryObiections.Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1962,
p.319,at p.328.
527 U.S.FreliminaryObjections,p. 226.
528 W., note 3to p. 27.562 AERIALlNClDENT [2801
6.68
The United States alsoasserts as an objectiontojurisdiction
that Article XX(l)(d) ofthe Treaty providesthat the Treaty "shallnot preclude
the application ofmeasures..necessaryto fuifillthe obligationsof a High
Contracting Party forthe maintenance or restoration ofinternational peace and
security,or necessaryto motect itsessentialsecurinter est^^*^ Ac',ordingto
the United States,the actionsofthe USSVincennesinshootingdownFlight IR
655 were taken inself-defensebecause the Vincennesthoughtthat itwasbeing
attacked bya hostile aircraft. Suchactions,sothe argument goes,were measures
"necessaryto protect..essential securityinterests"of the United States and, thus,
were permitted under ArticleXX(l)(d) ofthe Treaty. That beingthe case,the
United States argues that the Court cannot entertain the IslamicRepublic's
ciairn~~~O,
6.69 The Court willappreciate that each ofthe United States'
arguments restson factualor legalassertions that fallto be proatthe merits
stage ofthe proceedings. For example,the contention tharthe Treaty of Arnityis
a commercialtreatyhavingnothingto dowithacts ofarmed force reflectsno
more than the United States'position on the interpretation or ap~licationofthe
Treaty. Whilethe IslamicRepublicisconfidentthat this positionisincorrect,the
question ispreciselythe typeof issueoverwhichthe Court hasjurisdictionto
decide on the merits under ArticleXXI(2) ofthe Treaty. It is,in short, aclassical
exampleof a dispute overtwoopposingviewsas to the interpretation or
application of a treaty.
6.70 Similarly,whether the actionsof the Vincenneswere
legitimate actsof self-defense,or whether theyfellwithinthe ambit ofArticle
529 m., p. 227(emphasis suppliedbythe United States).
530 Ibid.[2811 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 563
XX(l)(d) of the Treaty relating to measures necessaryto protect the essential
securityinterests of the United Statesare quintessentiallymerjts questions. It is
sirnplybeggingthe question forthe United Statesto assert that these actionswere
not coveredbythe Treaty, forthat isthe veryissuerelating tothe Treaty's
interpretation or applicationthat the Court mustdecide.
6.71 With respect tothe firstpoint raised bythe United States-
that the Treaty ofAmityis essentiallya "commercial"treaty - it isworthnoting
that thisisexactlythe same argument that Judge Schwebel advanced in his
DissentingOpinionto the Nicaraguajudgment onjurisdiction. He contended:
'TheTreaty as a whole hasnothingto do with the use offorce in
international relations,or righ.~to be freeof suchuse...It is
purely a commercial treaty ... l."
6.72 Byan ovenvhelmingmajority,the Court rejected thisview.
Not only djd the Court rule that it had jurisdictionover the substanceof the
matter, it subsequentlydecided atthe merits stagethat the use ofarmed force by
the United States against Nicaragua's ports,airports and territorial waters
violatedArticle XIX of the Nicaragua-U.S.treatywhichprovided(as Article X(1)
of the Treaty ofAmitydoeshere) that, "Betweenthe temtones of the twoParties
there shallbe freedom ofcommerce and navigation53211 In sodoing,the Court
alsorejected the argument nowbeing advancedbythe United States that the
applicant'sclaimhad to arjse out of a direct commerciallinkbetween the two
parties to the treaty. No suchrequirement existedin the Nicaragua case, and no
suchrequirement existshere.
531
Militarvand PararnilitarvActivitiesin and aeainstNicaragua (Nicarama v.
UnitedStates of Americal, Jurisdictionand Adrnis~ibili~Dis~enting
Opinion ofJudge Schwebel,p. 632.564 AERIAL INCIDENT [2821
6.73 That the Treaty isnot Iirnitedexclusivelyto commercial
rnatters isborne out byits title:'Treaty ofAmity,EconomicRelations,and
ConsularRightsbetween the United States ofAmerica and Iran". The concept of
"amity",not to mention of economic relations andconsularnghts, isfar broader
than mere "commerce"andrefers to a widerange ofactivities. Asone Amencan
specialisthas observed:
"The singlelabel, 'commercial', as appliedto type ofbilateral
treatyunder considerationisperhaps misleading,for the scope of
subject-matter commonlyincluded comprise r more than
provisionsconcerningthe exchangeofgoods 339..
6.74 These viewscoincidewiththose expressedbythe former
U.S. Advisoron CommercialTreaties with the Department ofState, Herman
Walker,whowasinvolvedin the 1950sin drafting variousFCNtreaties. As MI.
WaIkerhas explained:
"An FCN treaty in itsfuiiyreaIizedform isa house ofmany
mansions, concernedwith aiicitizensand their interests, great and
srnaIl,and whether or not of an economicnature; it isimplicitly
concerned also,in amajor way,withthe intangiblesofgoodwill
between nations in their everydayrelations. Aithoughthe United
States maynowin general be motivated rimarilybyinvestment
considerationin seekingsuchtreaties, t!!.@hher sidemayshare
this motivation onlyto a secondaryextsnt ."
6.75 Further evidencethat the United States doesnot viewthe
Trea'y ofAmity as concerned simplywithcommercialrelationsis providedbythe
United States'ownconductwithrespect to the Treaty. It willbe recalled that
532 Militarvand Paramilitarv Activitiesin and againstNicaragua [Nicaraguav.
United States ofArnerical, Merits.Judment. I.C.J.Reports 1986p. 147,
para. 292(7)(dispositif)'
533 Wilson,R.A.:"PostwarCommercialTreaties of the United States",Am.J.
Int'lL.Vol. 43 (1949 1,p.264. Exhibit94.
534 WaIker,H.: "Treaties forthe Encouragement and Protection of Foreign
investment: Present United States Practice"Am. J. Cornu.L.,Vol. 5
(19561,at p.243. Exhibit95.Va31 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 565
whenthe United States instituted praceedingsinthe Diplornaticand Consular
Staffcase,it invokedthe Treaty of Arnitaabasisofjurisdiction. Obviously,
that case dealtwithwhoI1ynon-commercialmatters.
6.76 Inanyevent,the destructionof FIightIR 655and the
interference bythe United States withthe lslamicRepublic's aviationinthe
Persian Gulf doeshave a direct and logicallinkto matters involvingthe lslamic
Republic's freedomof commerce andnavigation. Aspreviouslynoted, FlightIR
655was involved ina commercialfIightandwasnavigatinginthe Islamic
Republic's airspacewhen itwasshot d0w1-1~~~s.a result ofthe incident,
commercialaviationinthe IslamicRepublic,includingthe activitiesofIran Air,
were severelydisrupted and confidenceundermined.Thishad an effectwell
beyondthe immediate consequences relatingto FligIR 655itseif. Asaresult,
evenif the Treaty of Amiîyhad been limitedto "commercialrelations",whichit
wasnot, the IslamicRepublic'sclaimswouldstillbe admissibleunder the
provisionsof ArticleXII) of the Treaty sincethey givroquestionsinvolving
freedom ofboth commerce and navigation.
6.77 As for the second argument advancedbythe United Stat-s
that itsactions cannotbe consideredby the Court "urdessit is firstsatisfiedthat
the conduct complainedofdoes not constitute "measures...necessaryto protect
the essential securityinterests ofthe Untat tes" -thi^too,wasrejected by
535 The United States alsoirnpliesthat the Treaty onlyrelates to "maritime
commerce" (G p. 231of thU.S P.reliminaryObjections). This
argument iscompletelymisplacedinasmuchas the Treaty refers to
freedom of commercein general, notto either maritimeor air commerce.
As the SupremeCourt ofJustice ofthe United Stateshas recognize"...
centuryit has beenudiciallyrecognized thatanbroad sense it embracesa
everyphase of commercial and businessactivityand intercoune". Jordan,
Secretarvof State ofCaliforniav.Tashiro,27U.S.123, 127-128(1928).
536 U.S.PrelirninaryObjectionsp. 227.566 AERIAL INCIDENT 12841
the Court in the Nicaragua case as bartojurisdiction as a defense on the
rnerits. Quite apart from the fact that it isimpossibletosee howthe "essential
securityinterests"ofthe United Statesincludethe need to shoot-downan
unarmed, civilianaircraft thousands ofmilesfrom U.S.temtory, the Court has
made it clear that the wholeissueisoneto be addressed at the merits stageofthe
proceedings. Even under the United States'ownreasoning,howcanthe Court be
firstsatisfiedthat the conduct complainedofis"necessaryto protect essential
secunty interests"ifit doenot examinethe meritsof the issue? Asthe Court
recognizedinthe Nicarama case:
interpreted asemovingthe present dispute asto the scope of the
Treaty from the Court'sjurisdiction. Beingitselfan articleofthe
Treatv, it is cwered bvthe wwision in !ArticleXXl(2'11thatany
dispie about the 'intérpreiarionor ap iication'of the'Treatylies
withinthe Court'siurisdiciion. ~rticleRO((l)(d)l definesthe
instancesinwhichthe Treaty itselfproGdesfor exceptionsto the
generalityofitsother provisions,butitbyno means removesthe
inte retation and applicationof that articfrpfqthe jurisdictionof
the Soun as contcrnplatedin Article [XXi(2)] ."
6.78 In thiscontext,the Court contrasted the wordingthat
appears inArticle XX(l)(d) ofthe Treaty ofArnitywiththe wordingthat is
found,for example, in ArticleXXI of the General Agreement on Tariffsand
Trade. As the Court observed:
'ThisprovisionofGAïT, contemplating exceptionsto the normal
implementation ofthe General Agreement, stipulatesthat the
Agreement isnot tobe construed to prevent anycontracting paq
£romtakinganyactionwhich it'considers necessaryforthe
ytection ofitsessentialxcurity interests',in suchfieldsas nuciear
ssion,anus, etc. The 1956Treaty [aswell as the Treaty of Amity],
537 Militaryand Paramilita? Activitiesin and aeainst Nicaraeua [Nicarama v.
United States ofAmerica). Merits,Judmnent, I.C.J.Revorts 1986, p.116,
para. 222. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 567
consideredby aparty to be such.#fessary' measures,not of those
6.79 These holdingsdisposeofthe United States' argument that
ArtjcleM(l)(d) somehowactsas an impedimentto the Court's accepting
jurisdictionin this case. Moreover, whenthe issuewasultimatelyaddressed at the
merits stageof the Nicarama case, the Court decjdedthat the United States'
attacks on Nicaragua'sports couldnot "possiblybe justitied as 'necessary'to
protect the essential securityinterestsof thetat tes^^W^hiethe Islamic
Repubiicwilldevelop thispoint furtheasubsequent stageof the proceedings,
it submitsnowprima facie,that the destmctioacommercialaircraftflying
withinthe recognizedinternational air comdor and withinits ownairspace cannot
be viewedasnecessaryto protect the essentialsecurityinteaState lying
thousands of milesawayunder anyreading ofthe facts.
6.80 Equallyspeciousisthe United States'claimthatthe Islamic
Republiconlypaid "lipservice"in itsMernorialto the idea that the shootingdown
ofFlightIR655wasa violationofArticlesIV(1) and X(1)the Treaty of
Arnity54 This assertionisbased on nothingmore than the fact that the Islarnic
Republic'seightshbmission,dealingwiththe United States'violationof Article
X(1) ofthe Treaty ofArnityresultingfromthe prior conductofitswarshipsand
th-ejsxance ofillegalNOTAMsin the Persian Gulf,islongerthafourth
submission, dealingwiththe violatofthe Treaty causedbythe shoot-down
itself. Suchan argument ishardlyserious. It merelyservesto introduce yeta
further reasonwhythe PrelirninaryObjections cabeconsidered asgenuine
538 m. On the rneritsofthe issue,the Court wenton to hold that this
provisiondoesnot applyto the exerciseof self-dem.,sepp. 116-117,
para. 223.
539
m., p.141,para. 282.
540 U.S.PreliminaryObjectionsp.222.568 AERIAL lNCIDENT [2g6]
preliminary objectionsin the tnie sense ofthe words: theyare argumentswhich,
inthe finalanalysis,are related to the application or interpretation of the Treaty
to the fact-i&.,Iothe merits of the case. Assuch,theyneither possessan
exclusivelyprelirninarycharacternor divestthe Court ofitslegitimatejurisdiction
over the dispute.
6.81 What issignificantisthat the sametreaty provisions
correspondingto Article IV(1) and X(1)of the Treaty of Amitywere invokedby
Nicaragua in its case againstthe United States. At thejurisdictionalphase of that
case, the Court accepted that the claimsadvancedgaveriseto a dispute overthe
interpretation or application of thetreag41.Accordingly,the Court accepted
jurisdictionon the issue,reservingthe pointsthat the United States had raised for
the merits. In the present case,therefore, it canbe seen that whatever objections
the United States has raiseinitsPreliminaryObjectionswithregard to the
applicabiiityof these Articlesofthe Treaty, theyrelate to their interpretation or
application and are thus properlyreserved for the next phase ofthe case.
6.82 From the foregoingit isclearthat the IslarnicRepublic has
establishedrnuchmore than a "reasonable connection"betweenthe Treaty of
Amityand itclairr~s~~~I.n this respect, it isimportant to recallthat it isnot
incumbent upon the IslamicRepublic to demonstrate at thisstage that its
541 Militamand ParamiiitarvActivitiesin and againstNicarama (Nicaraguav.
United StatesofAmeriia'i.Jurisdictionand Admissibilitv.Judgment,-1.C.J.
Reports 1984, p.428,para. 83.
542 Sec .iso,Riesman, W.M.:'The Other ShoeFalls:The Future ofArticle
36(1) Jurisdictionin the LightofNicaragua"wherethe author finds
significancein the factthat the Court has developed atheory that "there
are certainactivitiesof the United States whichare suchasto undermine
the wholespirit ofabilateralagreement directed to s onsoringfriendship
between the two States paties to it". Am.I. IntL..,ol. 87(1987),atp.
171,citingI.C.J.Rcvorts 1986p. 138,para. 275. Exhibit96.~871 oBsERvAT1oNs AND SuBMIssIoNs
interpretation ofthe Treatyis necessariiythe correct one. It sufficesthat the
connectionbetween itsclaimsand theTreaty isnot remote.
6.83 Surelysuch atest ismet here. As Professor Charneyhas
noted in hiscomprehensivestudyon the subject of "CompromissoryClauses and
the Jurisdictionof the international Court of Justi-e"
"..oncea compromissoryclauseisinvoked andthe substantive
provisionsofthe treaty are relied upon bythe applicant,defenses
on the meritspurporting to limitthescope of the cornpramissory
clausewillbe oflittleor no availto the respondentAt most,the
Court willseek to detemine whether the applicant's allegations,
standingalone, have a reasonable or plausibleconnectionto the
treatycontainingthe compromissoryclause."
Professor Charneywent onto add:
"Thisreviewof the cases suggeststhat the International Couri has
not imposed a heavyburden on the applicant to establishthata
dispute concerningthe 'a plicationor interpretation'oa treatyis
involvedonce it irallegeBthat substantiveprmisions ofthe treaty
would providethe applicantwith arighJ@felief. Norhas a rule of
restrictiveinterpretation been adopted .
6.84 The defenses raisedbythe United States themselvespoint
up the existenceofa dispute between the Parties over theinterpretation and
applicationof the ~rea$~$. In the lightof the plainrneaningofthe relevant
provisionsof the Treaty, and particularlyinviewof the Court's previousdecision
on closelyanalogous issuesin the Nicaramiacase,itwouldhavebeen expected
that the United Stateswould haverefrained fromraisingobjectionswhichhave
543
Charney,J.I.:"CompromissoryClauses andthe Jurisdictionofthe
International Courtof Justice',in Am.J. Int'L.,Vol.81 (1987),at p. 883.
Exhibit97.
544 &, Judge Lachs'Separate Opinioninthe Nicaragua,Meritsjudgrnent,
where he obsewed that "thejurisdictionestablishedbythe bilateral treaty
of 1956[theFCN Treaty] leavesno room for doubt" (Separate Opinionof
Judge Lachs, IIC.J., p. 165.570 AERIAL INCIDENT [2881
aireadybeen sosoundlyrejectedbythe Court. inthe Nicaragua case,most of
the United States arguments concernissuesto be resolved onthe merits,and do
not therefore creatbar to the Court's acceptingjurisdiction.
CHGPTER TV THEDISPUTEHAS BEEN SHOWNTO BE ONE "NOT
SATISFACTORILY ADJUSTED BY DIPLOMA(=I"'
6.85 Under ArticleXXi(2) of the Treaty of Amity,one of the
preconditions for submittinga dispute asto the Treaty'sinterpretation or
application isthat the disputbesatisfactorilyadjustedbydiplomacy". In its
PreliminaryObjections,the United States argues that the IsIamicRepublic
cannot invokethe Treaty as a basisofjurisdictionbecause it made no meaninghil
attempt to settle the disputebynegotiation prior to fdingitsApplication. The
United States adds that there cannotbe saidto be a "dispute"between the Parties
when the IslamicRepublicnever approached the United States andfothed
reliefsoughtfrom thCourtunder the Treaty of
6.86 There are severalbasicflawsunderminingthis lineof
argument. Firsthe.United States misreadsArticleXXI(2)of the Treaty as
requiringpnor diplornaticnegotiations whenthe Articleinfact containsno such
obligation. Second,the United States forgetsthat in the Diulomaticand Consular
-taffcase,it recognizedthat the test under ArticleXXnotwhether the
dispute "cannotbe resolvedbydiplomacy",but whether it has alreadybeen
satisfactonly adjustedby diplomacy,a situation that clearlyhas not occurred
here546,Thir th.United States faiIsto recallthat it endorsed the viewthat
"there isno mle ofinternational lawthat a dispute inthe international legalsense
545 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,p. 234.
546 &, Oral Argument of Mr. SchwebeI.C.JPleadinps.United States
Di~iomaticand ConsularStaffinTehran (USA v. Iran), pp. 284-285.[289] OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
existsonlyifit isreflected in aforrnalexchangeof officialrepresentations5471'.
Finally,evenifArticleXXI(2)did providethat negotiations weraprerequisjte
tobringinga case,whichitdoes not, international lawstiUdoesnot impose a
requirement ofnegotiationwhen the parties' positionsare so evidentlyopposed
to each otber that discussionswouldbe futile.
SECTI ON ArticleXXIB) ofthe TreatvDoesNotReauirePrior
Negotiations
6.87 ArticleXXI(2)oftheTreaty ofArnitysimplyprovidesthat
disputes as to the Treaty'sinterpretation or applicationthat have not already
been satisfactorilyadjustedbydiplomacy, orsubjectto an agreement to settle the
matter by some other pacificmeansmay be submittedto the Court. In
accordancewith normal rules oftreaty interpretation enshrînedinArticle31 of
the Vienna Convention onthe Law ofTreaties, the provisionsofArticleXXI(2)
"shallbe interpreted ingood faithinaccordancewiththe ordinarymeaningto be
givento the terms ofthe treaty intheir contextand in the lightofitsobjectand
purpose".
6.88 In the present case,there isabsolutnothingin the
ordinary meaningofArticle XXI(2) indicatingthat diplornaticnegotiationshave
to havebeen exhausted as a precondition for institutingproceedingsbefore the
Court. The plain languagefoundin ArticlXXI(2) providesno more than that
disputes overthe Treaty'sinterpretation or applicationcanbe submitted to the
Court aslongas they havenotbeen satisfactonlyadjusted bydiplomacyor subject
to some other means of settiement.
6.89 That thisisthe correct meaningof ArticleXXI(2)has been
confirmedbythe Court in the Di~lomaticand ConsularStaffcase, aswellas by
547 m., p.277.572 AERIAL INCIDENT
severalJudges in their separate opinionsto the Nicaraeuajudgment on
jurisdiction.
6.90 In the Diulomaticand Consular Staffcase, the Court did
not suggestthat prior negotiationsweraprecondition tothe institutionof
proceedingsunder Article XXI(2) ofthe Treaty. Instead,the Court stated that:
"ArticleXXI,paragraph 2,ofthe Treaq establishesthejurisdiction
ofthe Court ascompulsoryfor suchdispqttg ."lessthe parties
ame o settlement bysome other rneans
This clearlyimpliesthat the disputeisadmissibunle ishas alreadybeen
settled bysomeother pacificmeans, including diplomacy.However,there isno
requirement that the Parties mustfirstattempt ta do sothraugh negotiations.
6.91 This conclusionfindssupport in the Judgment ofthe Court
and in the Separate Opinions ofseveralJudgesin the Nicarama case. The Court
inthat case noted that the languageemployedinthe compromissoryclauseofthe
treaty didnotrequire the treaty to be invokedin negotiationsbetween the parties
whenthe respondent State wasawarethat the other party wasallegingthat its
conduct constituteda breach of itsinternational obligations549.In commenting
onthis language,fudge Jenningsobserved:
"lnthe present case,the United States claimsthat Nicaragua has
madeno attempt ta settle the matters, the subjectof the
application,bydiplomacy. Butthe qualwg clausein question
merely requires that the dis ute be one 'notsatisfactorilyadjusted
bydiplornacy'.Expressed tIw, in apurelynegativcfq it isnot
an exigentrequirement. It seemsindeed to be cogentlyarguable
that aithat isrequired is,as the clausepreciselyStates,that the
548 United States Diplornaticand Consular StaffinTehran. Judment. I.C.J.
R~Do~~1s980,p. 27,para. 52(emphasissuppliedbythe Court).
54y
Militarvand ParamilitarvActivitieinand aaainst Nicararua (Nicaraeuv.
United States ofArnerjca).Junsdiction andAdmissibilitv;Judment. 1.C.J.
Reports 1984,p.428,para. 83. OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 573
claimshave not infactalready been 'adjusted'bydiplomacy. In
disputes that have alreadybeen adequatelydealtwit to ensure that
diplomacy, should notbe reopened before theCourt 3?8.t
6.92 Judge Ago alsodrew attention to the fact that the language
used in ArticlXXI(2) of the Treatydoes not require pnor negotiationHe
noted that the correspondingprovisionofthe US.-Nicaragua treaty-
",..oesnot make use ofthe wordingto be found in other
instruments whichformallyrequires diplomaticnegotiationsto
havebeen entered into and pursued as a pnor conditionfor the
possibilityof in$$ujing proceedingsbefore an arbitra1tribunalor
court ofjustice .
Judge Ago added that:
"ltisnot alwaysnecessarilythe caseunder these tems that
diplomaticnegotiations mustbe ascertained tohave been first
begun and then pursued, andfinallyto havebroken down.The
requirements of thetextcen evenbe met,under certain
circurnstancf~~withountegotiationsinthe strictsense everhaving
taken place ."
6.93 Judge Singhexpresseda similarview. He noted that the
particular wordingfaund in ArticleXXI(2)of the Treaty of Amitydid notrequire
prior negotiations asa conditionprecedent to bringinga case,and observe-
examined,itowouldappear trfatonegotiationsor representations
affectingthe operation ofthepresent Treaty are not prescnbed as
a conditionprecedent to invokingthe jurisdictionof the Cou....
There is,however, nobindingobligationto negotiate. The above
550
m., Separate OpinionofJudge Jennings,p. 556.
W., Separate Opinionof Judge Ago, p.515(English translation).
552 Ibid.574 AERlAL INCIDENT 12921
conclusion~uld appear to be clearlyjustifiedfromthe wording[of
the article]."
6.94 It isbeyond question that the dispute between the Parties
over the interpretation or application ofthe Treaty ohasnottbeen
satisfactorilyadjustbydiplornacy. The dispute remains outstanding,asthe
Parties' pleadingshavemade abundantly clear. In asmuchasthe Parties have
not agreed to settle the matter bysome other pacificmeans,it followsthat the
Court's jurisdictionisfullyestablishedunder ArticleXXI(2).
SECTIO BN TheParties'PositionsWereSoPositivelvOpposedtoEach
Event thatNegotiationWould NotBeReauiredinany
-
6.95 Even ifArticle XXi(2)ofthe Treaty had been drafted in
sucha manner as to cal1for prior negotiations,sucha requirement wouldnot
havebeen absolute under international lawwhenthe state of relations between
the Parties wassuchthat the pursuit of negotiationsclearlywouldhavebeen
fruitless. Whilethese points havebeen brought outin Part III above,it shouldbe
noted here that it isnot necessary for negotiationsto take place in order forthere
to be a "dispute"behveen two States. Asthe United States itself hasconceded:
"Anysuch nilewouldsuggesta stultifymgformalisminconsistent
withthejurispru ce ofthisCourt and withthe realities of
international life.I
6.96 The IslamicRepublichas shownthat the attitudes of the two
Parties towards the eventssurroundingthe destruction ofFIRg655were
incapable ofbeing reconciled. The IslamicRepublic claimedbefore the ICA0
553 m., Separate Opinion of JudeSingh,p. 445. OnlyJudge Ruda
dissented from th~sviewin h%eparateOpinion;see, ibid.,Separate
Opinion ofJudge Ruda, pp.453-454.
554 Oral Argument of Mr. SchwebelI.C. PJladin~s.United States
Diplornaticand ConsularStafinTehran. (USAv.Iran), p.277.12931 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 575
Counciland the United Nationsthatthe United States had committed
fundamental breachesofinternational law. The IslamjcRepublic sought
recognition through these bodies of the legaland financialresponsibilityofthe
Unjted States.
6.97 The United States refusedto accept suchresponsibility,and
soughtfrom the outset tojustifyits conducton groundsofself-defense. As
documented above,the LegalAdviserto the U.S.State Department repeatedly
argued before theU.S.Congressthatthe destruction ofFlightIR 655had corne
about "pursuanttothe lawfuluse offorce"In these circumstances,he
categoricallyasserted that "Iran isto blame ultimatelyfor this accident555".
6.98 The record alsoshowsthat from the day the incident
occurred to theinstitutionof these proceedings,U.S . overnrnenthad no
intention of dealingwith the Gwernment oftheZslamicRepublic asfar as
discussingthe matter or providingcompensatiowas concerned. hdeed, the
State Department had precise instructions to deal withJranian oficials soas
to avoidwhat wastermed Iranian "inte~ference~~~".na candid assessmentof
the officialUnited States positionat the time,the State Department cabledits
embassyin Ben on 23September 1988that the U.S. Government -
"...continuesto be unwilJijl$;odeal directlywiththe GO1
[Government ofIran] ... .
555 HearingsBefore theDefense PolicyPanel of the U.S.House of
Representatjves, Exhibit'p. 49. Similarl the U.S.letter to the Sccurity
Councilof 6iuiy 1988rougit tojustifythe &ncenner7actions as self-
defense (= Exhibit98).
556
Sec .tate Department telegram dated 31August 1988. Exhibit24.
557 Ibid. AERIAL INCIDENT w4]
6.99 in the lightof thisattitude, it ill-behoovesthe United States
to argue that the IslamicRepublic'sclaimscannot be broughtbecause there have
been no negotiations betweenthe Parties. The Court hasmade itveryclear that
in consideringthe issueofnegotiation,itwilltake into account the views ofthe
States concerned whoare, after al],"inthe best positiontojudge as to political
reasons whichmayprevent the settlement of a givendispuby diplomatic
negotiations55''. In the present case,both Parties have made it evidentthat
reconciliationof their respective positionsbymeans of negotiationisnot a
realisticpossibility,although the refusal of the United Statesto negotiate withthe
IslamicRepublic diposesof the point in any event.
6.100 Thisviewhas been endorsed byJudge Ago in hisSeparate
Opinion in the Nicaraeua case wherehe stated:
"More generallyspeaking,1am infact convincedthat pnor resort
to diplomaticnegotiations cannot constitute anolute
requirement, to be satisfiedevenwhen the hopelessneof
e ectinganynegotiationsto succeedisclearfrom the state of
rztions bctween the parties, and that thcre isno warrant for using
it as a ground fordelayingthe openingof arbitral orju$~?,
proceedings when provisionfor recourseto them exists .
6.101 Mat matters isthat the respective positionsof the Parties
on the essentialissueshave become well-definedon the international plane. As
such,the Court'sreasoninginthe South WestAfricacasesthat "itisnot so much
the form of negotiationsthat matters as the attitude and viewsof the Parties on
558 MavrommatisPalestine Concessions,Judment No.2, 1924,P.C.I.J.,
SeriesA,No. 2,p.15.
559 Militarvand Paramilitam Activitiesin and aeainst Nicaragua(Nicarav.a
v
Retiorts 1984,pp. 515-516(Englishtranslationprovided-bythe Registry).[2951 OBSERVATIONS AND SUEMISSIONS 577
the substantiveissuesofthe question involved"assumesspecialre~evance~~~A . s
the Court went on to note:
"Solongasboth sidesremain adamant, and thisisobviouseven
from their oral presentations before theCourt,there isno reason
tu think that the disggy,yn be settled byfurther negotiations
between the Parties ,
6.102 This reasoningappIieswithequal force to the present
proceedings. Given thatthe Parties had ample opportunity to expresstheir
positionsbefore international organizationssuchas the United Nations and
ICAO,yet these discussionsfaiIedto bridge their differences,nofurther
"negotiations"were required. Asthe Court noted inthe South WestAfricacase -
"...iplomacybyconference or parliamentarydiplomacyhas corne
to be recognizedin the past fourorfivedecades as one ofthe
establishedmodesof international negotiation... If [thedispute]is
one of mutual interest to manyStates, whetherinan organized
bodyor not, there isno reason whyeach of themshould gothrough
the formalityand retence of direct negotiationswiththe comrnon
advenary State afer theyhave alread fullyparticipatedgyhc
coIIe~tivenegotiationswiththe same Aate in opposition !'
6.103 AUof these considerationslead to the conclusionthat the
claimsbrought bythe IslamicRepublic under the Treaty of Amity are fully
admissibleandsubject to the Court'sjurisdiction. The existenceof a dispute over
the Treaty'sinterpretation or application couldnot be clearer. The Parties'
positions,presented publiclyon manyoccasionssincethe shoot-down,have
rernained fundamentaIlyopposed to each other. There issimplyno reason to
impose upon the Partiesa needless charade of goingthrough the motionsof
negotiations whenthe result of suchdiscussions isaforegoneconclusion. In
South WestAfrica.PreliminaryObiections.Judment. I.C.J.Reports 1962,
p.346.578 AERIAL INCIDENT ~961
short, therenosreason to delaybringingcasebefore theCour tnderthe
jurisdictian providedby ArXXI(2) oftheTreatyofAmity. PARTVII
CONCLUSIONSANDSUBMISSIONS
7.01 On the basisof the foregoing,the lslamicRepublic submits
that it has shownthat the Court hasjurisdictionunder al1three agreements cited:
the Chicago Convention,the Montreal Convention, andthe Treaty ofAmity.
7.02 The purely formalisticobjectionsof the United States, such
as that the IslamicRepublic did not satisfythe requirement to negotiate itsclaims
prior to institutingproceedings,or that it didnot followthe correct procedural
rules, or that it isestopped from invokingcertain provisions,havebeen seen to be
based on an incorrect assessrnentof the factsand a misapplicationofthe law.
7.03 Withrespect to the United States'objectionsthat the
treaties inquestion (particularlythe Montreal Conventionandthe Treaty of
Amity)haveno connectionto the claimssubmittedbythe IslarnicRepublic,these
are argumentsthat alsodo not stand up to scrutiny. Prima facie,claimsbased on
the destruction of a civilaircraftflyingwithinitsownairspace on a commercial
fiighthave a direct relationshipttheMontreal Conventionand the Treaty of
Arnity,as wellas to the Chicago Convention. In addition,the IslamicRepublic's
claimsbased onthe United States'interference generallywithitsaviation,
includingitsissuanceof illegalNOTAMs,alsorelatetothe latter two instruments.
7.04 With respect to each ofthe three titlesofjurisdiction,the
IslamicRepublic has shownthat a fundamental disagreement existsbetween the
Parties as to the interpretation or applicationof the treaty in question inthe light
ofthe facts concerningthe attack on FlightIR 655. Thiseistence of sucha
dispute iscriticalin as mucas the United States has consentedto the jurisdiction
of the Court to resolvequestionsrelatingto the interpretation or application of580 AERIAL INCIDENT 12981
these treaties in their compromissoryclauses. The Court isthus fullyempowered
to exerciseitsjunsdiction in thiscasebased on the consent of theParties.
7.05 As has been seen, manyof the United States'arguments are
directed to the merits of the dispute. Theytherefore highlightthe fact that a
disagreement existsbetween the Partiesover the interpretation or application of
the treaties in question. Thisisparticularlythe casewithrespect to the United
States' assertions overthe scope ofthe Montreal Convention andtheTreaq of
Amity. It isfor this reason that the Idamic Republic has maintainedthat in so far
as the PreliminaryObjectionsare not rejected bythe Court ia separate
judgment, they shouldbe declared not to possess,in the circumstancesof the
case, an exclusivelypreliminarycharacter under Article 79(7) of the Rdes of
Court.
7.06 This caseisan important one not onlyfor the Parties to
these proceedings, but forthe familiesof the victimsand the international
communityas awhole. International civilaviationissimplytoo important to be
indiscnminatelysubjectta the kind of attack that the United States launched
against FlightIR 655. States are undea vigorousdutyto ensure that their
rnilitaryforces, particularlywhenoperating far from their owntemtory, do not
endanger, threaten or shoot-downunarmed civilianaircraft.
7.07 In the present case,the arguments for the Court accepting
jurisdictionare even more compellingin the lightof the evidencethat has
surfaced concerningthe policiesthat the United Stateswaspursuingbythe
presence of itsnavaland air forces inthe Persian Gulf. It isnowundisputed that
the United States'officialpolicyofneutralityin the Iran-Iraq warwasa shamand
that the United States activelyassisted Iraq in itswarefforts againstthe Islamic[299] OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS
RepubIic. To this end, the United Statestook increasinglyhostile and
provocativeactions against the IslamicRepublic.
7.08 The eventsof 3July 1988were the culminationof thishighly
antagonisticpolicy -a policywhichresulted on that dayin U.S.warshipsand
aircraft deliberately intruding intoIranian territorial waters to harassand attack
Iranian patrol boats under the pretext of assistingneutral shipping. Asthe
United States itselfhasnowadmitted, there were no requests for assistancebom
neutral shipping onthat day. Thus the wholepretense for the eventsthat
triggeredthe tragic destruction of the aircraft has been seen to have nobasisin
fact. As a result of sucha flawedpolicy,290innocent people met their deathsand
seriousdarnageswere inflictedon the IslamicRepublic. Yetthe United States
doesnot giveup itspresence inthe PersianGulfand the operation of itsillegal
NOTAMs,nor doesit guarantee that sucheventswillnot reoccur.
7.09 The United States has aireadyshownthat it ispredisposed
to argue the merits of the caseby itsextensivetreatrnent ofthfacts inits
PreliminaryObjections. Inviewofthe fact that both States have accepted the
principleof the Court's junsdiction set outin Article 84ofthe Chicago
Convention,Article14(1)of the Montreal Conventionand ArticleXXI(2) of the
Treaty of Arnity,the IsiamicRepublic respectfullyrequests the Court to exercise
itsjurisdiction, aswellaitssupe~sory powers,inthisimportant case. The
principlesand niles ofinternational lawat issueare too cntical to be sidestepped
bythe kindof formalisticpreliminary objections that the United States has raised.
As the klarnic Republichas shown, aU of the requirernentsforjurisdictionto vest
in the Court havebeen met withrespect to each instrument invoked.
Accordingly,the IslamicRepublicseeksjustice forthe violationsofinternational
Lawperpetrated bythe United States.582 AERIAL INCIDENT [300]
7.10 On the basis ofthe foregoing,the IslamicRepublic
respectfullymakes the followingsubrnissions. Havingregard to the requirements ofArticle 84of the Chicago
Convention,Article 14(1)of the Montreal Conventionand ArticleXXI(2)ofthe
Treaty of Amity;
In viewof the facts and arguments adducedbythe ZslamicRepubIic
inthese Observationsand the applicable principlesand rulesof international law,
and reservingits rightsubsequentlyto amend or rnodifythese submissionsinthe
lightof the subsequent proceedings;
Mavit ulease the Court, rejectingal1claimsand submissionsto the
contrary:
To adiudge and declare:
1. That the PreliminaryObjections of the United States are
rejected in their entireiy;
2. That, consequently,the Court hasjurisdictionto entertain
the claimssubrnittedbythe IslamicRepublic inits
Applicationand Memorial asthey relate to (i)an appeal
from the decisionof the ICA0 Councilconcerningthe
interpretation or applicationof the ChicagoConvention
under Article84thereof; (ii) a dispute between the Parties
asto the interpretation or applicationofthe Montreal
Conventionunder Article 14(1) thereof; and (iiia dispute
between the Parties as to the interpretation or applicatioof
theTreaty ofAmityunder ArticleXXI(2)thereof; AERIAL1NclDENT ~3021
3. That, on a subsidiary basis, the Preliminary Objections
of the United States do not possess, in the circumstances
of the case, an exclusively preliminary character within
the meaning of Article 79(7) of the Rules of Court.
The Hague
I
9 September. 1992 &damkad K. Eshraeh
Agent 1sla;ic
Republi ANNEX
THE IUEGAL U.S.NOTAMSANDTHELACKOF
COORDINATIONBYU.SFORCESWITHCIVILUN
ATSAUTBORITIESINTHEPERSLAGULFREGION[Il OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
SECTIO 1.N Introduction
1. The United States'discussionof the NOTAMsin Annex2 ofits
PreliminaryObjectionsisdevoted to presenting a defense on the merits ofthe
case. The United States has made no attempt to relate this issueto its
jurisdictionalobjections.
2. In makingthisdefense on the merits,the United States isfightinga Iost
cause. The one issue onwhichthe ICA0 Report wasabsolutelyclear wasthat
the U.S. NOTAMswere illegaIlypromulgated anddidnot conformto the
standards applicableto NOTAMsunder the ChicagoConventionand its
Annexes. Thisin itseifwas an acknowledgmentbythe Councilthat the United
States had violatedthe ChicagoConvention. However,in addition,in seekingby
means ofthese illegalNOTAMsto create restricted zonesaround its forces
operating inthe Persian Gulf, the United States alsoviolated the temtorial
sovereigntyof the IslamicRepublic,interfered withthe freedom of the Islamic
Republic'scommerce andnavigation,and endangered civilaviation. These are
violationsof fundamental rulesand principlesof customaryinternational law
which are enshrined in boththe ChicagoConventionand the Treaty of Arniîy.
3. The United Statesfailsto mention the onlydirect relevancethe issueof
the NOTAMshas to the jurisdictionalissuesin thiscase: namelythat the illegal
interference byU.S.militaryforcesin Iranian civilaviationwasa clear violationof
provisionsof the Treaty ofAmity designedto guarantee the IslamicRepublic's
freedom ofcommerce andnavigation. The United States'interference with
lranian civilaviation,whichcdminated inthe shoot-downofFlight IR 655 on 3
July 1988,isso obviousb related to provisionsof the Treaty ofAmitythat there
can be no doubt about the applicabilitt ofthis Treatyto the factsof thiscase.588 AERIAL INClDENT L2]
4. Each ofthese issueswillbe explaininmore detail belowafter a brief
statement ofthe relevant facts. Ztisnot the purpose of thispresentation to givea
detailed reviewoaU the relevant issuesrelatingto the NOTAMsbut onlyto
correct the inaccuratepresentation givenbythe United statesl.
SECTI O.N The Facts
5. In January 1984,the United States issueda Noticeto the States
responsiblefor flightinformationservicesin the Persian Gulfregion,inciuding
the IslamicRepublic of Iran. This Noticestated that U.S.vesselsin the region
were taking "defensiveprecautions2",asfollows:
"Aircraftat altitudesless 2000ft AGLwhichare not cleared for
approachldeparture to or from a regionalairport are requested to avoid
that aircraft roachingwithinfiveM nestablish andmaintain radioted
contact withinaval forces on 121.5MHz VHF or 243.0MHz UHF.
Aircraftwhichapproach withinfive NM at altitudeslessthan 2000ft AGL
whoseintentionsare unclear to U.S.naval forcesmaybe held at riskby
U.S. defensivemeasures."
6. The United States describes thisdocument asa "US. SpecialNotice of
Information"and allegesthat it wasprovidedto the relevantStates "sothat they
couldissuean appropriate NOTAM"~. It accusesthe IslamicRepublic,and other
States responsiblefor providing airtransport servicesinthe region, of failingto
complywiththeir obligationsunder the Chicago Convention and its Annexesto
publish thisinformation as a NOTAM.
A detailed expositionof the issueof the NOTAMsand the related issueof
civil/miiitarycoordinationwasgivenin the IslamicRepublic'sMernorial.
paras. 1.28-3.52and ~artfc, pp.2ig23O. paras. 4.15-1.32..157-172,
For the text of this Nos,ceU.S.Preliminary Objections,Exhibit85.
U.S P.reliminaryObjections,Annex2, p. 1and f2.Pl OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS
7. In fact,there isno evidencethat the United States requesteStates
concerned to issuesucha NOTAM. The United States simplyissuedits "U.S.
Special NoticeofInformation". There wasno request, no attempt at discussionor
negotiation-simplya unilateral notificationthat these stepswouldbe taken by
U.S.vessels. Even ifsucha request had been made, the IslamicRepubiic had no
obligationwhatsoeverunder the Chicago Conventionor itsAnnexesto issuethe
informationcontained in the U.S.Noticasa NOTAM. As willbe seen in more
detailbelow,no State has an obligattoissuea NOTAMon behalf of a third
State (unlessthat third State iswjthinitsFIR), especiallywhen the NOTAM
requested ison itsfaceillegalinnature and violativeoffundamental principlesof
international law.
8. The result of these eventswasthatnone ofthe States responsiblefor air
transportse~ces inthe regionpublishedthe ~.~..~oticeas a NOTAM.
Aithoughthe relevant informationmay havebeen relayedto airmen in the region
for safetyreasons, noStateswere prepared to recognizethe U.S.actions aslegai.
9. The IslamicRepubiic iodgeda complaint withICA0 concerningthis
Notice on27February 1984~.This complaint statedinpart asfollows:
"Referenceisherebymade to the Special Notice issuedby
KDCAYNto OIIIYN, dated 2202 O(January 19 4) regarding
restrictionofverflightabovecertain areas of highseasin the
Persian Gulfand the SeaofOman. The Notice is aclear violation
offlyingoverthe highseas. It isindeed a flagrantinfnngement of
principleslaidownby the Chicago Conventionon CivilAviation
aswellasother Conventions regardingtheLaw ofthe Sea.
The Noticewhichpurports to claimsovereigntyaver undefined
areas ofthe highseas inthe Persian Gulf, Sea ofOman and
Exhibit61tothe Mernorialof the IslamicRepublic.590 AERIALINCIDENT 14]
Arabian Sea isbasicallyunfounded and legallyinvalidand
unacceptable.
The IslamicRepublic ofIran considersthe SpecialNotice asa
direct interference intheterna1affairsof the CoastalStates of the
Persian Gulf and theSea ofOman and threat againstthe safetyand
securityofinternational airandsea navigation.
Furthemore, due to specialcircumstancesin the area,the Islamic
Re ublicof Iran declaresthat itwillcontinue to perform itsnghts
anBobligations,for the protection andsafeguard ofitsnational
interests in the (securityperimeter), zone adjacent to itsterritorial
seas.
It is,therefore, requested taapropriate measures be taken for
Mrnediats cancellationof thisJotisc, othenvisethe United States
ofAmericawillbe held responsiblefor al1consequencesresulting
£romsuchviolation."
10. As a result of this prutest,ICA0 MIDRAN meeting, comprisingStates
responsiblefor providingairtransport servicesin the MiddleEast, discussedthe
U.S.Notice at a meeting iMontreal in 1984. Paragraph 2.6.8of the
Recornmendationsofthismeeting calledon States, as a matter of urgency,to
reviewany restrictions"imposedin the airspace overthe highseas withaviewto
elirninatingthem5".
11. NotwithstandingthisICAO RecomrnendationbytheStates exclusively
responsiblefor air transport seMces in the region,and because States in the
regionhad refused to promulgate the Notice asa NOTAM,on 11January 1985
the United Statesreissued the Noticein the form ofwhat it callsa "U.S.
international ciNOTAM~" ("the U.S.NOTAM). Aswillbe shown in Section3
below,there isno basisin international lawfor sucha NOTAM, and consequently
this document,likethe earlier Notice,canhave no legalstatus.
B, ICAO Working Pa er C-WPJ864-4 (8/7/88),Addendum No. 1
(12/7/88)p.1. Exhibit!S. See aiso,lslami Rcepubiic Memorililla paras.
4.29-4.34.
US. PreliminaryObjections,Annex 2,p. 3.[51 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 591
12. The U.S N.OTAMwasupdated in September 1987.The finaltext which
was current on 3 July 1988read in relevant partas follows:
"Aircraft(hed wingand heiicopters) operatingin these areas
shouldmaintain a Iisteningwatchon 121.5MHZVHF or 243.0
MHZUHF. Unidentifiedaircraft,whoseintentionsare unclear or
whoare approaching U.S.naval vessels,willbe contacondthese
frequenciesand requested to identifythemselvesand state their
intentions assoon astheyare detected. Iner to avoid
inadvertentcorbontatjon, aircraft (furedwingand helicopters)
U.S.vessels. Failure to respond to requests for identificationand
intentions,or to warnings,and operating in a threatening
couldplace the aircraft (fixedwingand helicopters)at riskbyU.S.
defensivemeasures. Illuminationof a U.S.navalvesselwitha
weapons fire controlradar wiUbe viewedwith sus icionand could
result in immediate U.S.defensivereaction. ThisKotice is
publishedsolelyto advisethat measuresin self-defenseare being
exercisedbyU.S. navalforcesin thisregion. The measures willbe
implemented ina manner that does undulyinterfere withthe
freedom of navigationand overflig.t
13. This NOTAM also containedthe provisionthat aircraftflyingat altitudes
lessthan 2000feet and with5nauticalmilesofa U.S .essel,and not clearedfor
approachldeparture froma regionalairport, couldbe at riskU.Sm.efensive
measures.
14. The lslamicRepublic immediatelyprotested againstthisNOTAM to
1~~0~.It alsomade repeated protests to both theUnited StaICAO, and the
U.N. Secretary-Generalconcerningthe interferencesU.S .orcesin Iranian
commerce and navigationarisinfrom the applicationof the measures setinut
theNOTAM~.
' Exhibit14to the Mernorialof the IslamicRepublic.
ICAOWorkingPaper C-WP/8644(8/7/88),-Attachent 7. Exhibit38.
&, Exhibits15, and 21 to the Memorialof the IslamicRe ublicfor
rotestsmade to ICAO and the United States,respectivs,y. also,
Ribit 16hereto for protesîs made to the U.N.Secretary-General for
distributionasouncildocuments.592 AERIAL INCIDENT [61
15. The illegalnature ofthe NOTAMswasagainraised by the Islamic
Republic as formingpart ofthe disputebefore the ICAOCouncilconcerningthe
shoot-downofFlight IR 655on 3July1988. However,at the 13March 1989
meeting ofthe Council,the United States announced that it had cancelledits
NOTAM on condition that *e Persian Gulf ProviderStates disseminated the
U.S. NOTAM as "information"l0.
16. Subsequent to the 13March 1989meeting,the United States took steps
for the firsttime makea request for the issuanceof the NOTAM to the ATS
providersin the Persian Gulf regionthrough the propICAO channels, and not
byiilegalunilateral actions. Mile ATSproviders in the regionhave complied
withthis officia1request for safetyreasons, thisdoesnot alter the fact that the
NOTAMremains cornpletelyiilegalin scope and, to the extent it isstillinforce
today, continuesto interfere withand endanger ciand commercial airtraffic.
For thisreason, mostATSprovidersin the regionincludingthe IslamicRepubIic
ofIran have issuedthisinformationwitha clear disclaimerThus,the United
Arab Emirates prefaced their issuanceof thisNOTAMwiththe following
statement:
"Thefollowinginformation originatesfromthe United States of
Americaand ispromulgated in the interesof the safetyofthe
flight:the promulgation does not necessarilyiwly endorsemeof
thisinformationbythe United Arab Emirates ."
A similardisclaimerwasmade by the Islamic~e~ublic'~. Thus, the United
States'conclusionto itsAnnex2,to the effectthat virtuallyal1the Persian Gulf
States (includingthe IslamicRepublic) havenowissuedNOTAMs"pursuant to
Draft C-Min.126118,13March 1989,p.10. Exhibit47.171 OBsERvATloNs AND SuBMIssloNs
the U.S.requests13",iswithout significance.The NOTAM hasnot been
endorsed bythese States and remainsillegalin scope.
SECTIO 3.N The Illepalitvof theU.S+NOTAMs
17. As explainedin the IslamicRepublic's Memorial,under the Chicago
Conventionand itsAnnexesa largepart of theglobeisdividedinto Fiight
InformationRegions("FIRs")whichare the exclusiveresponsibilityof the
relevant AirTransport Service("ATS")providerin that region. No third State,
and leastofal!the militaryforcesofa thirdState, has anyauthorityover civil
aviationwithinanother State'sFIR'~. It willbe shownbelowthat inseekingto
create restrictive zonesaround itsvesselsin another State'sFIR the United States
wasactinginviolationof this principle,aswellasviolatingother fundamental
principlesofinternational lawenshrined in the ChicagoConventionand the
Treaty of Amity.
18. The United States allegesthat in issuingitsNoticeinJanuary 1984it
requested Persian GulfStatesto promulgate a NOTAM containingsuch
informationand that these States failedto meet their obligationunder the
Chicago Conventionto take this action. Asa result,the United States arguesthat
itwas forced on 11January 1985to promulgate itsown"U.S.international civil
NOTAM".
19. It hasbeen seen abovethat the United States has produced no evidence
that it requested these Statesto publisha NOTAM,nor anyevidencethat it
atternpted to discussitscontent in away withsuchStates. However, evenifit
l3 U.S.Preliminary Objections,Annex2,p. 7.
l4 s, Memorial of the islarnicRepublic,pp. 157gtS..594 AERIAL INCIDENT [a]
had, itisappropriate to examinewhyitwouldhavebeen rejected bythe relevant
States.
20. The U.S.Noticewassimplya unilateral warningto aircraft to avoidflying
withina certain range of anyU.S.naval vessel,whether in international waters or
withinthe territorial sea ofanotherState, and stated that anyaircraft flyingwithin
range couldbe at riskfrom U.S.defensivemeasuresfromthese vessels. In effect,
this meant the creation ofa fom offloating danger zone around anyU.S. naval
vesselanywherewithinthe region coveredby the Notice,in other words anywhere
in the Persian Gulf,the Strait of Homuz, the Gulfof Oman and the Arabian Sea
(north of 20degrees north), includingthe territorial watersof States bordering
these areas15.
21. Itisself-evidentthat the issueof sucha Noticecanhave no basis
whatsoever ininternational law:
- No State has the rightto create suchpermanent, floatingdanger
zones over international waters;
- lmplicitlysuchdanger zonescould coverthe territory and airspace
of the States in the area and thusviolatetheir exclusiveand
complete temtorial sovereignty;
- No State has the nght tocreate a danger zone in the Flight
Information Regionforwhichanother State isexclusively
responsible;
l5
&, Mernorialofthe IslamicRepublic,p. 224,para. 4.23. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 595
No State has the rightto challengeor intercept civilaircraft or ask
suchaircraft to change theirroute in the manner foreseen in the
U.S. Notice.
22. Moreover,the U.S.Noticewasnot in a form that could be promulgatedas
a NOTAM. Under the Chicago Convention, aNOTAMmustbe clearand
accurate and issupposed onlyto cover temporary disruptionor hazardsto air
traffic16. The U.S.Noticemet none of these requirements. The principlebehind
the measures set out in the Noticewasthat U.S. vesselscouldgoanywhcrein the
Persian Gulf regionwhilecivilianaircraftwouldhaveto take steps to avoidthem.
Giventhat civilianaircraft are on set flightplanswhichcannot be changed,while
U.S.vesselswere manoeuveringfreelyaround the PersianGulf,the potential for
disruptionisself-eWdent.
23. Ifollowsfrornthe above that the United States' argument ththe Persian
GulfStatesviolatedthe Chicago Conventionin failingto pubIishtheir U.S. Notice
asa NOTAM iswhollywithoutmerit. The U.S.Noticewasillegalon itsface.
24. In anyevent,there isno obligationinthe Chicago Conventionon States
responsiblefor FIRsto issueNOTAMson behalf of third States not withinthat
FIR. One canimaginewhatthe reaction ofthe United Stateswouldhave been if
third Statessoughtto issuerestrictive noticesof the kindproposbythe United
States withinthe United StatesFIR.
25. Asnoted above,on 11January 1985the United States promulgated its
Notice asa "U.S.international civilNOTAM throughjts Washington D.C.
l6 $ee,Memorial ofthe IçlamicRepubiic,pp. 169, gtm..596 AERIAL INCIDENT [Io]
NOTAM office. ThiNOTAM wasupdated in September 1987,and it wasthis
NOTAMwhich wascurrent whenFlightIR 655wasshot dom.
26. The September 1987U.S.NOTAM wasfarwiderin scopethan the 1984
Notice. It providedthat "unidentifiedaircraft,whoseintentionsare unclear or
whoare approachingU.S.navalvessels,willbe contact..and requeçted to
identifythemselves as soon asthevare detected17". This purported to extendthe
dangerzone asfaras the technologyof the vesse1would allow.In the case ofthe
AEGIS system,thiswouldbe 250nautical miles(approximately463 kilometers)
in al1directions from anyU.S.vesse1carryingsucha system.
27. Thus,the same pointsas made abovewithrespect to the U.S. Notice apply
--fortiorito the September 1U.S . OTAM:
m, the United States had no authorityto issuea NOTAMcoveringFIRs
whichare the responsibilityofanother State. nius, the NOTAMultra
and had no legalstatus;
Second,in illegallycreatinganent, floatingdanger zones over
internationalwaters, the NOTAMinterfered withthe freedorn of
navigation;
ThTh, the NOTAMviolated the territorial sovereigntyofthe States
concerned;
Fourth, the procedures envisagedfor challengingand directingaircraft
under the NOTAM were illegaland resultinthe continuous
l7 &, Exhibit 14to the Mernorialof the IslamicRepublic (ernphasisadded).[Ill OBSERVATIONSAND SUEMISSIONS 597
interference withand endangerment of civiIaviationinviolationof
international law;
Fift theU.S. NOTAM didnot meet the standards applicableto
NOTAMsunder the Chicago Conventionand itsAnnexes beingneither
ternporaryinnature, nor "adequate, accurate and timely18".
28. The illegalnature of the September 1987NOTAM has been
confirmedbyICAO.This NOTAM was discussedbyICAOat a meetingin Paris
on 6 October 1988. The findingsof this meetingcodd not be more expliciton this
contraventionofapproved ICAOStandards and Recommended
Practices. The meeting disagreedwith thispractice United
States.Itstressedthat the promulgationof aeronautical
informationisthe responsibilityofthe appropriate ATSauthority
ofthe Stateshichprovideservicesin the FIRs concerned,
includingthe airspacetendingclverthe high seas,in accordance
withrelevantICAOprovisionsand the Air NavigationPlan of
ICAO. Inthe li ht ofthese circurnstances,the meetingrequests the
Counçilof ICA to^rgentlyaddress thismatter, and to iake
~B;".measures to securetl~ewithdrawalof the nferenced
29. Referring to the problems causedto air inathe Persian Gulf,
the meeting-
"..againem hasizedthat the issuanceofthe NOTAM by
the United $ales authorities (FAA NOTAMKDZZNA
056188dated 131429/08Wrnary causeofthe
problems outlinedabove ."
l8 See,Memorial ofthe IslamicRepublic,p. 170,para. 3.50.
l9 Exhibit 40tothe Memorialof the.IslamicRepublic,p. 2,para. 10.
20 m., p. 3, para. 15(ernphasisadded).598 AERIAL INCIDENT [121
30. The meeting alsoaffirmedthat "theresponsibilityfor providingAir Traffic
SeMces rests solelywiththe Statesconcemed, both withintheir national airspace
andthat airspace overthe highseasforwhichthey haveaccepted
responsibility2'."
31. The ICAO Report confirmsthe conclusionsofthis meetingat paragraph
2.2.4. It found that the NOTAMwasillegallyprornulgated:
"AeronauticalnformationseMce authority. In accordancewiththe
provisionsofICAO Annex 15,ICAO ContractingStates providedan
aeronautical informationrviceand publishedaeronauticalinformation
concerningthetemtory ofthe State as wellas areas outsideitsterritory in
whichthe State wasesponsiblefor air traffic services.lnternational
NOTAM officeswere designatedbyStates for the international exchange
of NOTAMsin accordancewiththe ICAOregionalair navi ation plans.
The United States NOTAM concerningthe [Persian] Gul!, trait of
responsibilityof InternationalMOffices AbuDhabi,Baghdad,nthe
Bahrain,Bombay, Karachi, Kuwait,Muscatand Tehran. Therefore. the
romulgationofJbe NOTAM isnot in conformitvwiththe ~rovisionsof
PCA Annex 15LL!'
32. The ICAO Report ais0found that the NOTAMwasundear:
"Thefullimplicationsof the rulesof engagementof the United States
United States. It wasnotecifiedwhatwastconsidered to be 'operatingin
a threateningnanner',what distancewasconsidered'weI1clear of United
Stateswarships', and what wasmeant with 'couldplace the aircraft at risk
byUnited States defensive measures'.Theafetyrisksimposed bythe
presence of naval forcesthe [PersianjGulfarea to civilaviationmay
havebeen underestimated,inparticular as civilaircraftoperated on
~romulgatedtrach incl~~&nsgtandard approach and departure routes
rom airports in the are."
21 ~bid .. 3, para. 12.
22 ICAO Report, para. 2.2.4(emphasisadded). Exhibit4 tothe Mernorialof
the IslamicRepublic
23 m., para. 2.2.5.il31 OBSERVATIONSAND SUBMISSIONS 599
33. It ishighlyrelevant that the U.S.Defense Department itselfhas
condemneditsownwarningsmade pursiiant to the NOTAM as unclear. As
stated in theDefenseDepartment Report:
'The current verbal warningsissuedbyUTFME [CommanderJoint Task
Force MiddleEast] units do?::c c
shipisattemptine to contact .
34. The conclusionsof the ICAO Report further confirmthis. Not onlydid
the Report concludethat "(t)he presenclrand activitiesof navalforcesin the
[Persian]Gulf area have causednumerousproblemsto international civil
aviation25",it alsostated:
"Civilaviationrequirementssuch as ainvays,standard approach and
departure procedures, andthefiiredtracksusedb helicopters ta oilrigs
were not a considerationinarsliippositioning.$hisresulted inwarships
challengingcivilaircraft oftencriticalphases of flight,i.e.during
approach to land and duringinitialclimb. In the absence ofa clear
method of addressing challengedcivilaircraft,suchchallengeswere,on
occasion,rnistakenby ilotsto w'homth?&,alienge wasnot addressed,
cauringadditionalconksion and danger .
SECTION^. The Consequences ofthe IlleealU.SNOTMs
35. The typicalpractice of the United States in the Persian Gulfwasto
challengevirtuallyeveryaircraftthacarne even remotely closeto itswarships.
This resulted in continuous interferencewithand endangerment of civilaviation
traffiinthe region.Many of the resultingincidents havebeen welldocumented,
and repeated protests were made bythr:IslamicRepublicto ICAO,the United
24 Defense Department Re ort, p.E-18(ernphasisadded). Exhibit4 tothe
Mernorialofthe lrlarnicf;epublic.
25
ICAO Report, para. 2.3.1. Wbit 4ta the Mernorialof theIsiamic
Republic.
26 Ibid.,para. 2.3.2.600 AERIAL INCIDENT il41
Statesand the U.N.Secretary-Generalfor distribution as SecurityCouncil
documentson thissubject2'.
36. These interferenceincivilaviationwere violationsofboth the Chicago
Conventionandthe Treaty ofAmity. However,the most seriousconsequence of
the NOTAMsand the measures taken byU.S.forcespursuant to the NOTAMs
wasthe shoot-downofRight IR 655.
37. In consideringthe U.S.forces' applicationof itsNOTAMon 3July 1988
\
one can appreciate whysuchmeasures are prohibited under international law:
Firs th, United States' forces appliedNOTAM againsta civilian
aircraft cleared fortake-offkorn an international airport, whilethat
aircrafwasstillflyingoverthe territory of the lslamicRepublic;
Second,the United States' forces appliedthe NOTAM improperlygivcn
that theywereviolatingthe IslamicRepublic's territorial sovereigntyatthe
time;and
Thir tde.~nited States issuedillegalwarningsand challengesto FlightIR
655pursuant to the NOTAM althoughthere isno basisin international
lawfor challengingcivilianaircraftin sucha manner.
38. The Vincennesfailed evento abide bythe conditionsfor engagementset
outinitsownNOTAM. Under the NOTAMthat had been issuedby the United
27 See,Memorial of the IslamicRepublip, 33 42.See also,Exhibits15
-9and 11 thcreto for proterts made to IC?~ anclthTniteStates and.
Exhibit 1tathese Observations forprotests made to the SecurityCouncil
for distributionSecurityCouncildocuments.1151 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 601
States, aircraftapproachingU.S . arshipwere onlysupposed to be at riskof
"defensivemeasures"(i) ifthey had not been clearedfor take-offfrom a regional
airport, and (ii)ifthey camewithin5 naiiticalmilaswarshipat an altitude of
lessthan 2000feet. In thiscase,the inte:rceptionofIR 655took place ata
distanceof 10nautical milesfromthe Vincennesand at a height of 12,950feet.
Not onlywasthjs outsidethe lateral and verticallimitsappearing in the NOTAM,
but FlightIR 655wasalsoa flight"clearr:to depart froma regionalairport to
whichthe NOTAMpurported not to apply.Thus,under the terms ofthe United
States'own NOTAM,there wasnojustificationfor the attack.
39. Asexplainedinparagraph 16above,this NOTAM (albeit anrevised
form) isstillbeing imposedon the ATS:providersinthe Persian Gulfregionby
the United States. A number ofthese States have refused to endorse the
NOTAMbecause of itsillegalnature and it has onlybeen promulgatedbythese
Statesfor safetyreasons. The IslamicRepublic has continuedto protest the
illegalnature ofthe NOTAh4sincethe incidentof3 July 1988and continuesto
seek itsremoval.
SECTIO 5,N TheU.S.Forces'TotalFailureto Coordinate tbeir Activitieswith
-in the PersianGulfReeioa
40. The United States ends its discussionofthe NOTAMsbyallegingthat the
disruptionof civi1iairtrafficin the Persian Gulfwascausedbythe Iran-Iraq
war and bythe failure ofcountnes suchas the IslamicRepublic "toestablishand
maintain closecooperation with foreignmilitaryauthorities inthe [Persian]Gulf
responsiblefor activitiesthat couldaffectcivilaviation2*". Inthe footnote to this
statement, the United States suggeststfiatunder the ChicagoConventionthe
28 U.S.PreliminaryObjections,Annex 2,p.6.602 AERIAL INCIDENT Il61
burden ison civilianauthoritiesto coordinatetheir activities withmilitary
authorities2'.
41. It iscertainlytme that the war imposedon the IsiarnicRepublic byIraq
together withthe attacks on neutral shippinginitiated byIraq in 1980disrupted
commercial navigationinthe Persian Gulfregion. However, as explainedin Part
II ofthese Observations,the responsibilityfor the consequent disruptionof air
trafficlayentirelywithIraq.
42. In anyevent,stepshad been taken bythe IslamicRepubiic and other ATS
providersinthe regionto controlthissituationand to ensure that civilaviation
kept clear ofthearea ofhostilitiesbetween Iraq and the lslamicRepublic. Itwas
onlythe presence ofthe United States' forcesinthe Persian Gulfand their failure
to coordinatewith the ATSprovidersin the regionwhichdisrupted this situation
and resulted in the interference withand endangerment of civilianatrafic.
43. The United States isentirelywrongwhenit irnpIiesthat the burden was on
countriesin the Persian Gulf to maintain and establishclosecooperation with
militaryforcesin the Persian Gulf.The provisionofthe Chicago Convention to
whichthe United Statesrefers on this pointisrelated to militaryforceswithina
State'sownFIR, not to the militaryforcesof a third State. The militaryforcesof
a third State mustobviouslyhave the obligationto initiate cooperation when
actingwithinanother State'sFIR and must acceptthe authority ofthe ATS
provider in thaFIR.il71 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS 603
44. This pointisconfirmedbythe ICAO Report. It foundconclusivelyth-t
"Therewasno coordinationbetweenUnited Stateswarshi s and
thecivilATS unitsresponsibleforthe provisionofair trafgc
serviceswithinthe CIUS flUhtinformationregionsinthe
[Persian]Gulfarea .
45. The SafetyRecammendations of the ICAO Report clearlyshow
that the burden wason the United States in thisregard,holdin-that
"a) Militaryforces should,initiallythrough theirappropriate
State authorities,liaisewitb States and ATSunitsinthe area
concerned.
b) Militaryforces shouldbei~linformed on the extent of al1
promulgated routestypesgfinirspace,and relevant
regulations and restriction;:
These findingswere confirmedin theMlC's report on the incidentto the
Council,whichitselwas endorsed bythe:Councilinitsfinaldecisionon 17
March 1989~~.
46. The United States made no attenipt whatsoevtotake suchsteps.
It failedto informATSprovidersof the inovementsof itsvesselsand made
no attempt to establisha cornmunicatiorilinkATSh providers. This
failure,combinedwit? the illegalNOTAMs,wasa direct causeof the
shootingdown of FlightIR 655and in itselfconstjtuteda violationofboth
the ChicagoConventionand the Treaty ofAmity.
30
ICAOReport, para. 2.8.4Exhik.it4tothe Memorialof the Islamic
Republic.
31 W., para. 4.1.
32 C-Dec 126/20,17March 1989. Exhibit50.[il
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Procedure of the InternationalrrofJustice",in American
JournalofInternationaLaw .ol. 67,No. 1,January 1973,p. 17.
2 Rosenne, S.: Procedure i~ithe International Court,Martinus
Nijhoff,The Hague, 1983pp.164-165.
3 Bany, J. and CharleR.:"Sea ofLies"in Newsweek,13July 1992.
4 Further Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Implementofion
SecurityCouncilResolution598(1987),9December 1991;U.N.
Doc.Sl23273.
5 Report of the MissionDispatchedbythe Secretary-General to
InvestigateAllegationsof'the Use ofChernicalWeapons in the
Conflictetween the IslainicRepublicof IranaIraq,19August
1988;U.N. Doc.SD0134.
Transcript of ABCNightIine,1July 1992.
7 Laute acht, E.:"Aspectsofthe Administrationof International
Justice in Hersch Lauter~achtMemonal Lectures, Cambridge,
Grotius Publications,9-
7A United Nations SecretariatNote No. AD31111 GEN (5 March
1971) to the Permanecit Mission of Iran;UN Editofial Mrec-
tive No. STICSISEB.dI129 (10 January 1990).
8 Boyle,F.A.:"International Crisisand Neutrality:U.S.Foreign
Policytoward the Iraq-Iran War",inNeutra-Changin
Ameriia, 1988.ractices,cd.Leonhard,A.T.,Universiq ~?essof
9 "AtWar, Ira CourtedU.S.into EconomicEmbrace",
~ashinpton Bort, 16Scpi:ember1990.
10 Chubin,S. and Tripp, C.:Iran and Iras at War,London, 1988,pp.
152-157,272-275.
11 Con essionalRecord -House ofRepresentatives, 2March1992,
H 88.
CongressionalRecord -EiouseofRepresentatives,9March 1992,
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Telegraph to the Embas5:yof the IslamicRepublic at The Hague
14 containingcopies of NoticestoManners issuedtheIslarnic
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Letter dated 21October 1980fromthe Chargéd'Affaires ofthe
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The IslarnicRepublic's roteststo the Secretary-Generalofthe
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S/19016,3August1987;U.N.Doc.5119161.29Lptember 1987;
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S/19335,11December 1987;U.N. Doc.S/19369,22December
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January 1988;U.N.Doc.S/19474,3February 1988;U.N.Dac.
S/19516,18February 1988;U.N.Doc.S119558,lMarch 1988;U.N.
Doc.S/19613,14March 1988;U.N.Doc.5/19687,25March 1988;
U.N.Doc. S/19796,18April1988;U.N.Doc.S/19840,26April
1988;U.N.Doc.S/19863,5May1988;U.N.Doc.S/19871,9May
1988;U.N.Dac. S/19874,10May1988; U.N.Doc.S/19885,16May
3988;U.N.Doc.S/19923,3June 1988;U.N.Doc.S/19%1,24 June
1988;U.N.Doc.5119977,1July1988;U.N.NDac.S/19!279,4Julyne
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United Statecable datedtSeptember 1988from United States
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United States cabledate;!Se tember 1988from Washington,
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