Summary of the Judgment of 11 June 1998

Summaries of Judgments, AdvNot an official documents of the Internationa
l Court of Justice

CASE CONCERNING LAND AND MARITIME BOUNDARY BETWEEN
CAMEROON AND NIGERIA,(CAMEROON v. NIGERIA) (PRELIMINARY

OBJECTIONS)

Judgment of 11June 1998

In its Judgment on preliminary objections filed by Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Nigeria in the case concerning Land and Maritime Kooijtnans,Rezek;Judgesad hoc Mbaye,Ajibola;Registrar
Bo~~r~darbyetween Camer,oonand Nigeria (Cameroon v. Valencia-Ospina.
Nigeria), the Court foundthat it hasjurisdiction to deal with *
the meritsof the case brought before itby Cameroon.It also
found thatCameroon'sclai~nswereadmissible. X *

In an Application dated 29 March 1994,amended on 6 The complete text of the operative paragraph of the
June 1994, Cameroon ask:ed the Court to determine the Judgmentreads as follows:
ques!:ionof sovereigntyover the Bakassi Peninsulaand over "118. For thesereasons,
islands in Lake Chad, and to specify the course of the land
and inaritime boundary bt:tween itself and Nigeria. As a THE COURT,
basis of the Court's jurisd~~cti, ameroon referred to the (1)(a) by fourteenvotesto three,
declarations made by both States acceptingts jurisdiction Rejectsthe firstpreliminaryobjection;
as cc~mpulsory(Article 36, paragraph2, of the Statuteof the
IN FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Judges Oda,
Court). Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi,
C)n13 December 1995 Nigeria raisedeighi:preliminary Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
objections challenging thejurisdiction of the Clourtand the Kooijmans,Rezek;Judgead hoc Mbaye;
ndlnissibililyof Cameroon's claims. AGAINST: Vice-President Weeramantry; Judge

The Court was composed as follow:;: President Koroma; Judgead hoc Ajibola:
Schv~ebel; Vice-President Weeramcintry; Judges Oda, (b) by sixteenvotesto one,
Bedjaoui, Guillauine.a~~jcvaH, erczegh,Shi, l'leischhauer,

Continued on next page Rejects the secondpreliminary objection; AGAINST: Judges Oda, Koroma, Higgins,
[N FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Vice-President K.ooijmans;Judge adhoc Ajibola;
Weeramantiy; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, (3)by fourteen votes to three,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin,
Findsthat, on the basis of Article36,paragraph 2, of
Higgins. Parra-Aranguren,Kooijmans, Rezek; Judges ad the Statute, it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
hoc Mbaye, Ajibola; dispute;
AGAINST:Judge Koroma; IN FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Judges Oda,
(c) by fifteen votes to two, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi,

Rejects the thirdprelimiilaryobjection; Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
IN FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Vice-President Kooijinans, Rezek; Judge adhoc Mbaye;
Weeramantry; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, AGAINST: Vice-President Weeranlantry; Judge
Railjeva, klcrczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Koroma; Judge ad hoc Ajibola;

Higgins. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Judge ad (4) by fourteen votes to three,
hoc Mbaye; Finds that the Application filed by the Republic of
AGAINST:Judge Koroma; Judge adhoc Ajibola; Cameroon on 29 March 1994, as amended by the
(d) by thirteen votes to four, Additional Application of6 June 1994,is admissible;

,.jects the fourthpreliminary objection; IN FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Judges Oda,
IN FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Vice-President Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi,
Weeratnailtry; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillauine, Ranjeva, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek; Judge ad hoc Mbaye;
AGAINST: Vice-President Weeramantry; Judge
Kooijmans, Rezek; Judgead hoc Mbaye;
AGATNST:Judges Oda, Koroma, Parra-Aranguren; Koroma;Judgead hoc Ajibola."
Judge ad hoc Ajibola;
(e) bythirteenvotes to four,

Rejectsthe fifth preliminary objection;
1N FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Vice-President Judges Oda, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren
Weeramantry; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Rarjeva, and Kooijmans appended separate opinions to the Judgment
Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, of the Court. Vice-President Weeramantry, Judge Koroma
and Judge ad hoc Ajibola appended dissenting opinions to
Kooijmans, Rezek; Judge ad hoc Mbaye: the Judgmentof the Court.
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Koroma, Vereshchetin;
Judge adhoc-4jibola;
Cf )y fifteenvotes to two,

Rejects the sixthpreliminary objection;
TN FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Vice-President Review of tlzeproceedings and Ls~rbrtlissio~~s
Weerainantry; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume. (paras. 1-19)
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin,
The Court begins by recalling that on 29 March 1994
Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Judge ad Cameroon instituted proceedings against Nigeria in respect
hoc Mbaye; of a dispute described as "relat[ing] essentially to the
AGAINST:Judge Koroma; Judge ad hoc Ajibola;
(g)by twelve votesto five, question of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula".
Canleroon further stated in its Application that the
Rejects the seventhprelirninaryobjection; "delimitation [of the maritime boundary between the two
IN FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Vice-President States] has remained a partialone and [that], despite many
Weerainantry; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, attemptsto complete it, the two parties have been unable to
Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Parra- do so". It accordingly requested the Court, "in order to
avoid further incidents between the two countries, ...to
Aranguren, Rezek; Judge ad hoc Mbaye;
AGAINST: Judges Oda, Koroina, Higgins, determine the course of the maritime boundary between the
Kooijmans; Judge adhoc Ajibola; two Statesbeyond the line fixed in1975".In order to found
(2) by twelve votes to five, the jurisdiction of the Court, the Application relied on the
declarations made by the two Parties accepting the
Declc~resthat the eighth preliminary objection does jurisdiction of the Court under Article6, paragraph 2, of
not have, in the circumstancesof the case,an exclusively the Statute of the Court.
preliminaiy character;
IN FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Vice-President On 6 June 1994, Cameroon filed in the Registry an
Additional Application "for the purpose of extending the
Wecramantry; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, subject of the dispute" to a further dispute described as
I-lerczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Parra- ''re1atl:inlssentially to the question of sovereignty over a
Aranguren, Rezek; Judge ad hoc Mbaye;part of the territory of Cameroonin the area of Lake Chad". In this regard, Nigeria notes that it had accepted the
Cam,eroonalso requestedth.eCourt,"to specifydefinitively" Court's compulsoryjurisdiction by a declaration dated 14
the frontier between the two States from Lake Chad to the August 1965, deposited with the Secretary-General of the

sea, and asked it to join the two Applications and "to United Nations on 3 September 1965. Cameroon had also
examine the whole in a single case". Inorder to found the accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction by a
jurisdiction of the Court.the AdditionalApplicationreferred declaration deposited with the Secretary-General on 3
to the "basis of..jurisdiction..already ...indicated" in the March 1994. The Secretary-General transmitted copies of
Applicationinstitutingproceedingsof 29 March 1994. tlie Cameroon Declaration to the Parties to the Statute
At a meeting which the President of the Court held with eleven-and-a-half months later. Nigeria maintains,
accordingly, that it had no way of knowing, and did not
the representativesof the Partieson 14June 1994,tlieAgent
of Nigeria stated thate had no objection to th.eAdditional actuslllyhiow, on the date of the filing of the Application,
Applicatioii being treated,, in accordance with the wish i.e.. 29 March 1994, that Cameroon had deposited a
expr1:ssedby Cameroon, as an amendment to the initial declaration. Cameroon consequently is alleged to have
Application,so that the Court could deal with tliewhole in a "acted prematureIy". By proceeding in this way, the
single case. By an Order dated 16 June 1994, the Court Applicant"is allegedto have violatedits obligationto act in
indicated that it had no objection itself to such a procedure, good faith"? "abused tlie system instituted by Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute" anddisregarded "the condition
and fxed time liinits for the filing of written pleadings. of reciprocity" provided forby that Article and by Nigeria's
C:ameroonduly filed its Memorial.Within the time limit
fixed for the filing of its Counter-Memorial,Nigeria filed Declaration. The Court consequently does not have
preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and jurisdiction to hear the Application.
the itdmissibility of the Application. Accord:ingly,by an In contrast, Cameroon contends that its Application
0rde:r dated 10 January 1996, the President of the Court, fulfils all the conditionsrequiredby the Statute.It notes that
in the case concerning Right of Passage over Irldiart
noting that, under Article '79.paragraph 3, of the Rules of
Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended, fixed Territoiy,the Courtheld that
I5 May 1996 as the time limit within which Cameroon "the Statute does not prescribe any interval between the
might present a written statement of its observations and deposit by a State of its Declaration of Acceptance and
subn~issionson the preliminary objections. Cameroonduly the filing of an Application by that State, and that the
filed such a statement. principle of reciprocity is notaffectcd by any delay in
the receipt of copies of the Declaration by the Parties to
C:ameroonchose Mr. KkbaMbaye,and NigeriaMr. Bola
AjiboIato sit asjudge ad hoc. tlie Statute" (Right of Passage over Indian Territory,
The Court had further, in response to a request made by Pi-elimir~aiyObjections,Jlrdgiizei,t,I.C.J.Reports 1957,
Cameroon and after heari:ngthe Parties, indi2ated certain p. 147).
provisionalmeasuresby anOrder dated 15March 1996. Cameroon indicatesthat there is no reason notto follow
this precedent, at the risk of undermining the system of
Hearings on the preliminary objections were held compulsoryjurisdiction provided by the Optional Clause. It
between2 and 11March 1998.
The requests made by Cameroon in its Application and adds that the CameroonianDeclarationwas in force as early
its Additional Application, as well as the submissions as 3 March 1994, as at that date it was registered in
presented by it in its Menlorial (cf. paras. 16-18 of the accordance with Article 102of the United Nations Charter.
Cameroon states that in any event Nigeria has acted, since
Judgment) have not been rcproduced in this summary for the beginning of these proceedings, in such a way that it
the sakeof brevity. shouldbe regarded as liavingacceptedthejurisdiction of the
The eight objectioils which Nigeria raised in its Court.
Preliminary Objections and at the hearing of 9 March 1998
(cf. paras. 18 and 19 of the Judgment) have neither been Nigeria argues in reply that the "case concerning the
reproduced. The Court's descriptionof the subject of each Right of Prrssage over Iitdiari Territory, was a first
impressioii",that the Judgment givenis outdated,and that it
preliminary objection is to be found in the relevant part of is an isolated one; that international law, especially as it
this summary. Cameroon, in its written state:menton the relates to good - faith. has evolved since and that in
objections and at the hearing of 11 March 19!>8,requested accordance with Article 59 of the Statute, that Judgment
the Court to dismiss the objections or in the .alternativeto only has the forceof resjrldicatcras between the parties and
join them to the merits;anclto declarethat itadjurisdiction
to deal with the case and that the Application was in respect of that case. For these reasons, the solution
admissible. adopted in 1957 should not be adopted here. Nigeria does
not accept the reasoning of Cameroonbased on Article 102
of the Charter. Nigeria also contends that there is no
First Preliritinary Objection question of its liaving consented to tlie jurisdiction of the
(paras. 21-47) Court inthe case and hencethere is no.foruntprorognhlir1.

Nigeria's first objection contends that tlie Court has no Camerooncontestseachof these arguments.
jurisdiction to entertainCa~neroon'sApplication. Quotingthe provisions of Article 36,paragraphs 2 and 4
of its Statute, the Court recalls that in the case concerningRighl of Prrssugeover Indiuil Territory, it concluded. in the enabled the Secretary-General to take the action required of
light of these provisions, that: hirn in relation to Cameroon's Declaration of 3 March
"by the deposit of itsDeclaration of Acceptance with the 1994"'.Compliance with that time period is essential, the
more so because, according to Nigeria, the Court, in its
Secretary-General. the accepting State becomes a Party Judgment of 26 November 1984 in the case concerning
to the system of the Optional Clause in relation to the
other declarant States, with all the rights and obligations Mi1itia:v clrld Purami1itcli:v Acth~ities ir? aild rrgc~iilst
deriving froill Article 36. The contractual relation Nicnragua, required a reasonable time for the withdrawal of
between the Parties and the compulsory jurisdiction of declarationsunder the Optional Clause.
the Court resulting thcre from are established'ipso.fncto The Court considers that its conclusion in respect of the
and without special agreement', by the fact of the withdrawal of declarations under the Optional Clause in the

making oithe Declaration ..For it is on that vely day Judgment of 1984 is not applicable to thc deposit of those
that the coilsensual bond, which is the basis of the declarations. Withdrawal ends existing consensual bonds,
Optional Clause, comes into being between the States while deposit establishes such bonds. The effect of
concerned.". (Right qf Passage over IizdirlirTerritory, withdrawal is therefore purely and simply to deprive other
f. ../Reports 1957,p. 146) Stater;which have already accepted the jurisdiction of the
Courl.of the right they had to bring proceedings before it,
The conclusions thus reached by the Court in 1957 against the withdrawing State. In contrast, the deposit of a
reflect the very essence of the Optional Clause providing for
acceptance of the Court's con~pulsoryjurisdiction. Any declaration does not deprive those States of any accrued
State party to the Statute. in adhering to the jurisdiction of right. Accordingly no time period is rcquired for the
the Court in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, establishment of a consensual bond following such a
accepts jurisdictio~l in its relations with States previously deposit.
having adllercdto that clause. At the saille time, it makes a Nigeria's second argunlent is that Cailleroon oillitled to

standing offer to the other States party to the Statute which infonn it that it intended to accept the jurisdiction of the
have not yet deposited a declaration of acceptance. The day Court, then that it had accepted that jurisdictiotl and. lastly.
one of those States accepts that offer by depositing in its that ii:intended to file an application. Nigeria f~wtherargued
tun1 its declaration of acceptance, the consensual bond is that C:amerooneven continued. during the first three months
established and no li~rthercondition necds to be fulfilled. of 1994, to maintain bilateral col~tactswith it on boundary
Having recalled that its decision in the case concerning questions while preparing itself to address the Court. Such
conduct, Nigeria contends, infringes upon the principle of
Right qj'Pcr.~srlgever Irrrlirrzeri.itoi:has been reaffirmed
in subsequent cases, the Court observes that it is true. as good faith which today plays a larger role in the case-law of
argued by Nigeria, that the Court's judgments, in the Court than before, and should not be accepted.
accordance with Article 59 of the Statute. bind only the Cameroon, for its part, argues that it had no obligation to
partics to and in respect of a particular case. There can be no inform Nigeria in advance of its intentions. or of its
question of holding Nigeria to decisions reached by the decisions. It adds that in any event "Nigeria was notat all
Court inprevious cases. The real question is whether, in this sui-prisedby the filing of Cameroon's Applicatioil and ...

case, there is cause not to follow the reasoning and knew perfectly well what Cameroon's intentions were in
conclusions of earlier cases. that regard several weeks before the filing". The principle of
After examining the legislative history of the provisions good faith was not at all disregarded.
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which The Court observes that the priilciple of good faith is a
Nigeria relies on with regard to its argument that the well-established principle of interi~ational law. It notes.

interpretation given in 1957 to Article 36, paragraph 4, of however, that although that principle is "one of the basic
the Statute should be reconsidered in the light of the principles governing the creation and performance of legal
evolution of the law of treaties which hasoccurred since, the obligations ...it is not in itself a source of obligation where
Court concludes that the general rule reflected in Articles 16 none would otherwise exist". There is no specific obligation
and 24 of the Vienna Convention, which, the Court in intt:rnationallaw for States to infornl other States party to
observes, may only be applied to declarations accepting the the Statute that they intend to subscribe or have subscribcd
Court's jurisdiction as obligatory by analogy, is that: the to the Optional Clause. Consequently, Cameroon was not

deposit of instruments of ratification. acceptance, approval bound to inform Nigeria that it intended to subscribe or had
or accessioi~to a treaty establishes the consent of a State to subscribedto the Optional Clause. Cameroonwas not bound
be bound by a treaty; and that the treaty enters into force as either to ilifornlNigeria of its intention tobring proceedings
regards that State on the day of the deposit. Thus the rules befort:the Court. In the absence of any such obligations and
adopted in this sphere by the Vienna Convention correspond of any infringement of Nigeria's corresponding rights.
to the solution adopted by the Court in the case concerning Nigeria inay not justifiably rely upon the principle of good

Right of' Prrssrrge over Irrdicli~Territory. That solution faith in support of its submissions.
should be maintained. 011 the facts of the matter, to which the Parties devoted
Nigeria maintains however that, in any event, Cameroon considerable attention, and quite apart from legal
could not file an application before the Court without consicleratioas,the Court adds that Nigeria was not unaware
allowing a reasonable period to elapse "as would ...have of Cameroon's intentions. In that connection. the Courtreferis to a comm~micatiorifrom Nigeria to the Security Second Pi-eliinirzuv Objectioiz
Council. dated 4 March 1994;to the infomation contained (paras. 48-60)

in theJ~~~;*;I c?If/'tAeUrzitciintioiis, issued on that same Nigeria raises a secondpreliminaj objection stating that
day; and to statements mstde at tlie extraordinary general
meetingof the Central Organ of the Meclianisn.for Conflict "for a period of at least 24 years priorto the filing of the
Prev~:ntion, lManageineil1 and Resolution of tlie Application the Parties have in tlieir regular dcalings
Organizatioi~of AfricanUnity of 11March 1994. accepted a duty to settle all boundary questions through
Nigeria recalls in the third place that,by its Declaration the existingbilateralmachinery".
According to Nigeria, an implicit agreement is thus said
depositedon 3 September 1965,ithad recogniz1:d to have been reached with aview to resorting exclusively to
"as coii~pulsory ipso jhcto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other State a.cceptingthe such iiiachinery and to refraining from relying on the
satile obligation, that is to say, on the sole condition of jurisdiction of the Intel-nationalCourt of Justice. In the
reciprocity, tlieurisdict:ioiiof the Internatic~l ourt of alternative, Nigeria claiins that by its conduct Cameroon is
estopped from turning to the Court. Finally, Nigeria iiivokes
Justice inconformitywith Article 36, paragraph 2, of the the principle of good faithand the rulepacta szrntservmldt!
Statuteof the Court". in supportof this argument.
Nigeria n~aintainsthat on the date on which Canleroon's
Application was filed, it did not know that Caineroon had Cameroonmaintainstliatthe bilateral bodieswhich dealt
accepted the Court's compnlsoryjurisdiction. Accordinglyit with variousboundary difficultiesthathad emergedbetween
could not have brought an application against Cameroon. the two countries had only been tenlporary and that no
permanent institutional machinery had been set up. It
There was an absence of reciprocity on that date. The contends that no explicit or implicit agreementhad beell
condition col~tained in the Nigerian Declaration was established between the Parties witli a view to vesting
operative; consequently, tlie Court does not have
juristlictioii to hear the Application. Cameroon disputes this exclusive jurisdiction in such bodies. Finally, accordingto
al-,numenitn fact as well as in law. It states that, in the inindsameroon, the coilditionslaid down in the Court's case-law
of the States party to the Optional Clause, the condition of for the application of estoppel to arise were iiot fulfilled
here. Therefore, there was no occasionto apply the principle
reciprocity neverpossessedthe ineaning whichNigeria now of good faithand the rule pnctnszriztsewantin.
ascribes to it. Reviewing the relevant facts the Court notes that the
The Court, noting that ithas on numerous occasionshad
to consider what ineaning it is appropriate to give to the negotiations between the two States concerning the
conditioiiof reciprocity in the implementationof Article 36, delimitation or the demarcation of tlie boundary were
paragraph 2, of the Statute, observes that, in the final carried out in various frameworks and at various levels:
Heads of State, Foreign Ministers, experts. The negotiatioiis
analysis, the notion of reciprocity is concerr~edwith the were active during the period 1970 to 1975 aiid then were
scope aiid substance of the cominitments tmtered into, interrupteduntil 1991.
includiiigreservations,aiidnot with the foimal conditions of
tlieir creation, duration or extinction;and that, consequently, Turning to legal considerations, the Courtthen considers
the principle of reciprocity is not affected by any delay in the first branch of the Nigerian objection. It recalls tliat,
the receipt of copies of the Declarationby the !'artiesto the "negotiationandjudicial settlementare enumeratedtogether
Statute. in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nationsas ineaiis
for the peaceful settlement of disputes". It observes that
The Court considers that Nigeria does not offer evidence neither in the Charier nor otherwise in international law is
in support of its argument that it intendedto insert into its any general ruleto be found to the effectthat the exhaustion
Declaration of 14 August 1965 a condition of reciprocity
with a different meaning ftom the one which he Co~irthad of diplomatic negotiations constitutes a precondition for a
drawn fromsuchclauses in 1957. matter to be referred to the Court and that no such
precondition was eiiibodiedin the Statute of the Pennaneilt
Thc additional phrase of the pertinent serdence in the Court of International Justice, contrary to a proposalby the
Nigerian Declaration, "tliai:is to say, on the sole coiidition Advisory Committee of Juristsin 1920.Nor is it to be found
of reciprocity" must be uilderstood as explanatory and not in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. Neither was a
addiilg any further condition. This interpretation is "in
hanrioiiy witli a natural and reasonable way of reading tlie reservation containing a precondition ofthis type included
text'" and Nigeria's cond.ition of reciprocity cannot be in the Declarations of Nigeria or Caineroonon the datc of
the filingof the Application. Moreover. the fact that the two
treatedas a reservationrattoiletentpoi.is. States have attempted to solve someof the boundary issues
Nigeria's first preliminary objection is accordingly dividing them during bilateral contacts,did not imply that
rejected. The Court observes that it is therefore not called either one had exclllded the possibility of bringing any
upon to examine the reasoning put forward by Cameroon boundary dispute concerning it before other fora, and in
uiide:rArticle 102of the Charter,nor Cameroon's alternative
submissions based onfoi-ml pi-oi-ogatzcinI.n ally event, tlie particular the International Court of Justice.The first branch
of Nigeria's objectionaccordingly isnot accepted.
Court hasjurisdiction topass upon Cameroon's Application. Turning to the second branch of the objection, the Court meaning of Article 52 of the Charter, pointing in particular
then examines whether the conditions laid down in its to the fact that "there has never been any question of
jurisprudence for an estoppelare present in the instantcase. extending this category to international regional
It observes that an estoppel would only arise if by its organizations of a technical nature which, like the
[Co~r~mission]c ,an include a mechanism for the peaceful
acts or declarationsCameroonhad consistentlyinade it fully settlement of disputes or for the promotion of that kind of
clear that it had agreed to settle the boundary dispute
submitted to the Court by bilateral avenues alone. It would settlement".
further be necessary that, by relying on such an attitude, The Court concludes from its analysis of the treaty texts
Nigeria had changed position to its own detriment or had and the practice of Member Statesthat theLake Chad Basin
suffered some prejudice. These conditions are not fulfilled Com~nissionis an international organization exercising its
in this case. Indeed,Cameroondid notattributean exclusive powers within a specific geographical area; that it does not

characterto the negotiationsconducted with Nigeria, nor, as however have as its purpose the settlement at a regional
far as it appears, did Nigeria. Furthermore,Nigeria does not level of matters relating to the maintenance of international
show that it has changed its position to its detriment or that peace:and security and thus does not fall under ChapterVIII
it has sustained prejudice. In bringing proceedings before of the:Charter.
the Court, Cameroondid not disregard the legal rules relied However, even were it otherwise,Nigeria's argumentto
on by Nigeria in support of its second objection.
that effect should nonetheless be set aside, because the
Consequently, Nigeria is not justified in relying on the existence of procedures for regional negotiation whatever
principle of good faith and the rule pactn sunt sei-vandn, their nature, cannot prevent the Court from exercising the
both of which relate only to the fulfilment of existing functions conferred upon it by the Charter and the Statute.
obligations. The second branch of Nigeria's objectionis not The contention of Nigeria that the Commission should be
accepted. seen as a tribunal falling under the provisions of Artic95
The second preliminary objection as a whole is thus of the:UnitedNations Chartermust alsobe set aside.

rejected. The Court further concludes that the Cominission has
never. been given jurisdiction, and N .fortiori exclusive
Third Preliininaty Objection jurisdiction, to rule on the territorial dispute now involving
(paras. 61-73) Cameroon and Nigeria before the Court, a dispute which
moreover did not as yet exist in 1983. It points out in
In its third preliminary objection, Nigeria contends that addition that the conditions laid down in its case-law for an
"the settlement of boundary disputes within the Lake Chad
region is subject to the exclusive competence of the Lake estoppel to arise, as set out above, are not fulfilled in this
case. Indeed, Cameroon has not accepted that the
ChadBasin Comnlission". Commission has jurisdiction to settle the boundary dispute
In support of this argument, Nigeria invokes the treaty now submittedto the Court.
texts governingthe Statuteof the Commissionas well as the In the alternative,Nigeria finally arguesthat, on account
practice of member States.It arguesthat "the procedures for
settlementby the Commissionare binding upon the Parties" of the demarcation under way in the Lake Chad Basin
and that Cameroon was thus barred from raising the matter Commission,the Court "cannot rule out the considerationof
the need for judicial restraint on grounds of judicial
before the Court on the basis of Article 36, paragraph 2, of propriety" and should decline to rule on the merits of
the Statute. Cameroon's Application.
For its part, Cameroon submits to the Court that "no It is not for the Court at this stage to rule upon the
provision of the Statute of the Lake Chad Basin
Commission establishes in favour of that international oppor;ingarguments brought forward by the Parties in this
respect. It need onlynote thatNigeria cannotassertboth that
organization any exclusive competence in relation to the demarcation procedure initiated within the Lake Chad
boundary delimitation". It adds that no such exclusive Comllission was not completed andthat, at the same time,
jurisdiction can be inferred from the conduct of member that procedure rendered Cameroon's submissions moot.
States. There is thus no reason of judicial propriety which should
It is in the light of the treaty texts and the practice that
the Court then considers the positions of the Parties on this make the Court decline to rule on the merits of those
submissions.
matter. For its part, Nigeria first of all contends that "the In the light of the above considerations,the Courtrejects
role andStatute of the Commission" mustbe understood"in Nigeria's thirdpreliminaryobjection.
the framework of regional agencies" referred to in Article
52 of the United Nations Charter. It accordingly concludes
that "the Commission has an exclusive power in relation to Fourtlz PreIinziilniy Objection
issues of security and public order in the region of Lake (paras. 74-83)
Chad and that these issues appropriately encolnpass the
The Court then turns to the fourth preliminary objection
business of boundary demarcation". raised.byNigeria. This objectioncontendsthat:
Cameroonargues, for its part, that theComnlissiondoes "The Court should not in these proceedings determine
not constitute a regional arrangement or agency within the the boundary in Lake Chad to the extent that that bounda~yconstitutes or is constituted by the tripoint in Tlie Court recalls that, in the sense accepted in its
the Lake." jurisprudence and that of its predecessor, a dispute is a
Nigeria holds that the location of the tripoint within disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal
views or interests between parties; and that. in order to
Lake:Chad directly affects a third State. the Republic of
Chad. and that the Court therefore cannot determine this establish the existence of a dispute, it niust be shown tliat
tripoint. the claimof oneparty is positively opposedby the otherand
The Court recalls that it has always acknowledged as further,that whether there existsan internationaldispute isa
one of the fundamental principles of its Statute that no matter for objective determination.
On tlie basis of these criteria, there can be tlo doubt
dispute between Statescan be decided without theirconsent about the existence of disputes with respect to Darak and
to its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court has also
enlp'hasized that it is not necessarily prevented from adjacent islands, the village of Tipsan, as well as the
adjudicating when the judgment it is askcd to give might Peninsula of Bakassi. This latter dispute, as indicated by
affect the legal interestsof a Statewhich is not aparty to the Cameroon, might have a bearing on the maritime boundary
case; and the Courthas onl:ydeclinedto exercisejurisdiction betweenthe twoParties.
when the interests of tlie third State constitute the very All of these disputes concern tlie boundary between
subject matterof thejudgment to be renderedon the merits. Cameroon and Nigeria. However, given the great'lengthof

The Court observesthat the submissions presented to it that boundary, which runs over niore than 1,600 ktn ilom
by C:ameroonrefer to the froiitier between Cameroon and Lake Chadto the sea, it cannotbe said that these disputes in
Nigeria and to that frontier alone. Theydo not relkr to the themselves concern so largea portion of thc bounda~ythat
frontier between Cameroon and the Republic of Chad. they would necessarily constitt~tea dispute coiicerning the
Certainly, the request to "specify definitively the frontier whole of the boundary. Even taken together with the
existing boundary disputes, the incidcnts and incursioiis
between Cameroon and tlie Federal Republic of Nigeria reported by Cameroon do not establish by the~nselvestlie
from Lake Chad to the sea" (para. 17 V) of the Additional
Application) may affect the tripoint,.e., the point wherethe existence of a dispute concerning all of the boundary
frontiersof Cameroon, Chadand Nigeriameet. between CanieroonandNigeria.
However, the request to specify the frontier between However, the Couii notes that Nigeria has co~istantly
Cam~eroonand Nigeria from Lake Chadto the sea does not been reserved in the manner in which it has presented its
own position on the matter. Although Nigeriakncw about
imply that the tripoint couldbe moved away from the line Canleroon's preocc~~pationand concerns, it has repeated,
constituting the Cameroon-Chad boundary. Neither
Cameroon nor Nigeria ccntest the current course of that and has not gone beyond, the statement that there is no
boundary in the centre ofLake Chad as it is describedin the dispute concerning"boundary delimitation as such".Nigeria
"teclnnical document on the demarcation of the ... has shown the same caution in replying to the question
boundaries" mentioned in paragraph 65 of the Judgment. asked by a Member of tlie Court in tlie oral proceedings. as
Incidents betweenNigeria and Chad in the Lak.e.as referred to whether Nigeria's assertionthat therc is no dispute as
to by Nigeria, concern Nigeria and Chad butn.otCameroon regardsthe landboundarybetween the two States(subject to
the existing problems in the Bakassi Peniiisula and the
or its boundary with Chad. Any redefinition of the point
where the frontier between Cameroon and Nigeria meets the Darak region)signifies,
Chad-Cameroon frontier could in the circulr~stancesonly "that, these two sectors apart, there is agreement
lead to a moving of the tripoint along theline of the frontier between Nigeria and Cameroon on the geographical
in tlie Lake between Chad and Cameroon. Thus, the legal coordinates ofthis boundary as they resultfromthe texts
i1itei:estsof Cliadas a third Statenot party to the case do not relied on by Cameroon in its Application and its
constitute the very subject matter of the jtdgnlent to be Memorial".
rendered on the merits of Cameroon's Application; and
Tlie Court notes that, in its reply, Nigeria does not
therefore, the absence of Chad does not prevent the Court indicate whether or not it agrees with Cameroon on the
froni proceeding to a specification of the border between course of the boundary or onits legalbasis, though clearlyit
CameroonandNigeria in the Lake. does differ with Cameroon about Darak and adjacent
'Thefourthprcli~iiinaryobjectionis accordinglyrejected. islands,Tipsan and Bakassi. Nigeria states that the existing
land boundary isnot describedby reference to geographical

FifthPrelimiitnrv Objection coordinates but by reference to physical features. As to the
(paras. 84-94) legal basis on which tlie boundary rests, Nigeria refers to
"relevant instruments" without spccifyiiig which these
Iln its fifth preliminary objection Nigeria. alleges that instrunients are apart from saying tliat they pre-date
there is no dispute conce:rning"boundary delimitation as independence and that, since independence, no bilateral
such" throughout the whole lengthof the boundaryfromthe agreements "exprcssly confiniling or otherwise describing
tripoint in Lake Chad to the sea, subject, within LakeCliad, the pre-independenceboundaiyby referenceto geographical
to the question of tlie title over Darak and adjacent islands,
and withoutprejudiceto the title overthe Bakassi Peninsula. coordinates" have been concluded between the Parties.That
wording seemsto suggest that the existing instrumentsmay
require confirmation. Moreover, Nigeria refers to "well-established practice both before and after independence" as are met in the present instance. The requirements set out in
one of the legal bases of the boundary whose course, it Article 38, paragraph 2, are that the Application shall
states, "has continued to be accepted in practice"; however, "specify the precise nature of the claim, together with a
it does not indicate what thatpractice is. succirlct statement of the facts and grounds on which the
claim is based". The Court notes that "succinct", inthe
The Court points out that Nigeria is entitled not to ordinary meaning to be given to this term, does not mean
advance argumentsthat it considers are for the merits at the
present stage of the proceedings; in the circumstances "coinplete" and neither the context inwhich the term is used
however, the Court finds itself in a situation in which it in Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court nor the
cannot decline to examine the submission of Cameroon object and purpose of that provision indicate that it should
which aims at a definitive determination of its boundary be interpreted in that way. Article 38, paragraph 2, does
with Nigeria from LakeChad to the sea on the ground that therefore not preclude later additions to the statenlentof the
facts and grounds on which a claim is based. Nor does it
there is no dispute between the two States. Because of
Nigeria's position,the exact scope of this dispute cannot be proviclethat the latitude of an applicant State, in developing
deterinined at present; a dispute neverthelessexists between what it has said in its application is strictly limited, as
the two Parties, at least as regards the legal bases of the suggestedby Nigeria.
boundary.It is for the Courtto pass uponthis dispute. As regards the tneaning to be given to the term
The fifth preliminaryobjection raised by Nigeria isthus "succinct", the Court would simply note that Cameroon's
Application contains a sufficiently precise statement of the
rejected.
facts and grounds on which the Applicant bases its claim.
Sixth Prelirnirlury Ol?jection That statementfulfils the conditionslaid down inArticle 38,
(paras. 95-102) paragraph2, and theApplicationis accordinglyadmissible.
Lastly, the Court cannot agree that the lack of sufficient
he Court then turns to Nigeria's sixth preliminary clarity andcompletenessin Cameroon's Applicationand its
objection which is to the effect that there is no basis for a
judicial determination that Nigeria bears international inadecluate character, as perceived by Nigeria, make it
responsibilityfor allegedfrontierincursions. allegations which have been presented or makes itthe

Nigeria contends that the submissions of Cameroon do impossible for the Court ultimately to make a fair and
not meet the standardrequired by Article 38 of the Rules of effective determinationin the light of the argumentsand the
Court and general principles of law regarding the adequate evidence then before it. It is the applicant which must bear
presentation of facts on which Cameroon's request is based, the consequencesof an applicationthat gives an inadequate
including dates, the circumstances and precise locations of rendering of the facts and grounds on which the claim is

the alleged incursions and incidents into and on based.
Cameroonian territory. Nigeria maintains that what The Court consequently rejects the sixth preliminary
Canleroon has presented to the Court does not give Nigeria object-ionraisedby Nigeria.
the knowledge which it needs and to which it is entitled in
order to prepare its reply. Similarly, in Nigeria's view, the
material submitted is so sparse that it does not enable the Seventh Prelirninmy Objection
Court to carry out fair and effective judicial determination (paras. 103-111)

of, or make determination on, the issues of State In its seventh preliminary objection Nigeria contends
responsibility and reparation raised by Cameroon. While that there is no legal dispute concerning delimitation of the
Nigeria acknowledges that a State has some latitude in maritime boundary between the two Parties which is at the
expanding later on what it has said in its Application and in present time appropriateforresolutionby the Court.
its Memorial,Cameroonis saidto be essentiallyrestrictedin Nigeria says that this is so for two reasons: inthe first
its elaborationto the case as presented inits Application. place, no determination of a maritime boundary is possible

Cameroon insists that it stated clearly in its pleadings prior to the determination of title in respect of the Bakassi
that the facts referred to in order to establish Nigeria's Peninsula. Secondly, at the juncture when there is a
responsibility were only of an indicative nature and that it detern~ination of the question of title over the Bakassi
could, where necessary, amplify those facts when it comes Peninsula, the issues of maritime delimitation will not be
to the merits. Cameroon refers to the requirements admissible in the absence of prior sufficient action by the
established in Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules and Parties, on a footing of equality, to effect a delimitation"by

which call for a "succinct" presentation of the facts. It holds agreementonthe basis of internationallaw".
that parties are free to develop the facts of the case The Court initially addresses the first argument
presented in the application or to render them inore precise presented by Nigeria. The Court accepts that it will be
in thecoiuse of theproceedings. difficult if not impossible to determine the delimitation of
The Court observes that the decision on Nigeria's sixth the maritime boundary between the Parties as long as the

preliminary objection hinges upon the question of whether title over the Peninsula of Bakassi has not been determined.
the requirementswhich an applicationmust meet and which Since both questions are before the Court, it becomes a
are set outin Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court matter for the Court to arrange the order in which itaddresses the issues in such a way that it can deal Cameroon's request. The Court recallsthat it has affirmed,
substantivelywith each of them. That is a matter whichlies that one of the fundamentalprinciples of its Statute is that it
within the Court's discretionand which cannot be the basis cannot decide a dispute between States without the consent

of a preli~ninaryobjection. 'Thisargument therefore has to of those Statesto itsjurisdiction. However, it has also stated
be dismissed. that it is not necessarily prevented from adjudicating when
As to the second argument of Nigeria, the Court recalls the judgment it is asked to give inight affect the legal
that, in dealing with the cases brought before it, it must interestsof a Statewhich is nota party to the case.
adhere:to the precise request subiilitted to it. What is in The Court cannot therefore, in the present case, give a
decision on the eighth preliminary objection as a
disput,?betweenthe Parties and what theCourt hiisto decide
now i;swhether the alleged absence of sufficient effort at prelitninarymatter. In order to determinewhere a prolonged
negotiation constitutes an impediment for the Court to maritime boundary beyondpoint G would run, where and to
accept Cameroon's claimas admissible or not. 'Thisinatter what extent it would meet possible claims of other States,
is of a genuinely preliminary character and has to be and howitsjudgment would affecttherights and interestsof
decidedunder Article 79 of the Rules of Court. these States,the Court wouldof necessity have to deal with
the merits of Cameroon's request. At the same time, the
In this connection, Cameroon and Nigeria referto the
United Nations Conventionon the Law of the Se.a,to which Court cannot rule out the possibility that the impact of the
they a-reparties. judgment required by Cameroon on therights and interests
However, the Court notes that, in this case, it has not of the third States could be such that the Court would be
been seized on the basis of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the prevented fromrendering it in the absence of these States,
and that consequently Nigeria's eighth preliminary
Statute,and, in pursuance of it, in accordancewith Part XV objection would have to be upheld at least in part. Whether
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea such third States would choose to exercise their rights to
relating to the settlement of disputes arising between the
parties to tlie Conventionwith respect to its interpretationor intervene in these proceedings pursuant to the Statute
application.It has been seized on the basis of declarations remainsto be seen.
made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, which The Court concludes that therefore the eighth
declarations do not contain any condition relating to prior preliniinary objection of Nigeria does not possess, in the
circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary
negotiations to be conducted within a reasonable time
period..The second argument of Nigeria cannot thereforebe character.
upheld.
ThieCourt finds in addition that, beyond point G (cf.
point (3) of tlie submissions in Cameroon's Memorial), the For the above reasons the Court, in the operative

dispute between the Pai-tieshas been defined with sufficient paragraph of the Judgment, rejects the first preliminary
precision fortlie Courtto be validly seizedof it. objection by fourteen votes to three; the second by sixteen
Itthereforerejects the seventhpreliminaryobjection. votesto one; the third by fifteen votes to two; the fourth and
the fifth by thirteen votes to four; the sixth by fifteen votes
to two; the seventh by twelve votes to five; declares, by
Eighth PI-eliniinuiyObjection twelve votes to five, that the eighth preliminary objection
(paras. 112-117)
does not have, in the circumstances of the case, an
The Court then deals with the eighth and last of the exclusively preliminary character; and finds, by fourteen
preliininary objections presented by Nigeria. With that votes to three, that, on the basis of Article 36, paragraph 2,
object.ion Nigeria contends, in the context of and of the Statute, it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
supplementaryto the seveiitlnpreliminaryobjection,that the dispute;and, by fourteenvotes to three, that the Application
question of maritime delimitation necessarily involves the filed by the Republic of Cameroon on 29 March 1994, as
rights and interests of third States and is to that extent amended by the Additional Application of 6 June 1994, is
inadmissible.
admissible.
The Court notes, as do the Parties, that the problem of
rights and interests of third States arises o~ily for the Sepurute opinion ofJudge Oda
prolongation, as requested by Cameroon, of tlie maritime
boundaryseawardsbcyondpoint G. Judge Oda shares the view of the Court that it has
jurisdiction to adjudicate on certain of the requests
What the Court has :to examine under the eighth presented unilaterallyby Cameroon. In his view, however,
preliminary objection is thereforewhether that prolongation the presentation of Cameroon's March 1994 Application
would iiivolve rights and interests of third States and and June 1994Application, as well as the "submissions" in
whether that would prevetit it from proceeding to such
prolongation. The Court notes that froin the geographical the 1995Memorial(which do not necessarilycorrespondto
location of the territories of the other States bordering the the Applications), is inadequate. This makes the present
Gulf of Guinea, and inparticular EquatorialGui.neaand Sao case extremely complicated and difficult to follow.
However,Judge Oda finds that Cameroon's contentions are
Tonie and Principe, it appears that rights and interests of basically two in number:one being a request to specify the
third States will become in.volvedif the Court accedes to boundary line both on land and at sea and the other beingthe judicial settlement of the matter of the trespass which disinclinationofNigeria to unfold its legal argumentson the
took place in the border areas, namely in the Bakassi merits. True, they may also be viewed as evidence of the
Peninsula, inLake Chad and at certain landborders. probable emergenceof a broader dispute. However, the real
With regard to the indication of a boundary, Judge Oda scope of such a dispute, if any, its parameters and concrete
pointed out that, apartfrom the question of the delimitation consequences can be clarified only at the merits stage when
theCourt has coinpared the maps produced by both Parties
of the offshore areas in the mouth of the Cross River, and and more fi~llyheard and assessed the substance of their
the prolongation of the delimitation of the exclusive
economiczone and the continentalshelf in the ocean area in interpretation of the respective legal instruments. In the
the Gulf of Guinea - issues totally dependent on the view of Judge Vereshclletin, this prompts the conclusion
territoriality of the Bakassi Peninsula- the delimitation of that the fifth objection of Nigeria does not possess an
the nzaritinie ho~mdcli?,cannot be the object of the exclusively preliminary character within the meaning of
adjudication of the Court, unless it is requested jointly by Article79,paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court. and therefore
cannot be dismissedat this stageof the proceedings.
the Parties, as the simple failure of negotiations between
States does not mean that a "legal dispute" has occurred
under Article 36 (2) of the Statute. The simple specification Separclte opir~iorzof Judge Higgiris
of the 1cli.doundary also cannot be deemed as constituting
a "legal dispute" which the Court can entertain, unless Judge Higgins has voted with the majority on all
jointly requestedto do so by the Partiesunder Article 36 (1) elements in the Court's Judgment save for paragraph (1) (g)
of the Statute. of the (/ispositif;
111its seventhpreliminary objection Nigeria claimed that
Judge Oda holds the view that the real "legal dispute" in there "is no legal dispute concerning delimitation of the
the present case involves Cameroon's claim to sovereignty
over the Bakassi Peninsula, the part of Lake Chad and maritime boundary between the two Parties which is at the
certain border areas - which sovereigntyhas, according to present time appropriate for resolution by the Court"
Cameroon, been violatedby incursionsof Nigerian civilians because, first, it was necessary initially totermine title in
respect of the Bakassi Peniiisula and second, there was an
and military personnel - and Nigeria's challengeto such a "absence of sufficient action by the Parties, on a footing of
claim. If the Court is in a position to entertain Cameroon's equality, to effect a delimitationby 'agreement on the basis
Application, it should certainly decide whether or not
Cameroon's claims to sovereignty over the disputed areas of international law"'.
are justified, but this would not be the same as a simple Judge Higgins agrees with the response of the Court in
request to specify the boundary line, over which matter the rejecting each of these claims on inadmissibility. In her
Court does not have jurisdiction. Judge Oda further stated separate opinion she contends, however, that there was
another matter which the Court should have addressed
that, in his view, the larger part of the issues advanced by pr.oprio rirotu, namely that no dispute appears to exist
Nigeria regarding the "legal dispute" on sovereignty over
the boundary areas are matters that should be dealt with at relatingto the maritimeboundary,at least beyond point G as
the merits phase. designated by Cameroon. This emerges both from the way
Cameroonitself formulatesits Application,where it asks for
a delimitation of the maritime boundary "In order to prevent
Separate opinioiz of Jzrdge Vereshcketin any disprite arising ..."(emphasis added) and from the
In his separateopinion,JudgeVereshchetinstates that he absence of any evidence offered in the written or oral

is unable to vote in favour of point 1 (e) of the Judgment, pleadings as to the existence of such a dispute. There have
dealing with the fifth preliminary objection of Nigeria, been no claims beyond point G that have been put by one
because of his belief that the finding on which that part of party and rejected by the other.
the Judgment is based is not duly supported by the evidence The fact that Nigeria and Cameroon have not been able
offered by the Applicant and does not stand the test of to have detailed negotiations on the line beyond point G
objectivedetermination. does not mean that a dispute exists beyond that point on

For the Court to decide on the existence of a dispute Cameroon's proposed line, suggested for the first time in
between the two Parties as to the legal bases of the whole of theseproceedingsbefore the Court.
the boundary, it must previously have been established that Nor can it be the case that the existence of a territorial
the Republic of Nigeria challenges the validity of the legal dispute automatically entitles an applicant State to request
title to the whole of the boundary relied onby the Republic the delimitationof the maritime boundary, without anything
of Cameroon, or relies on a different legal title, or places a
further being required to be shown as to that maritime
different interpretation on a given legal instrument relating frontier.
to the entire boundary. None of those conclusions may be Although it is not normally the task of the Court to
"positively" inferred from the documents or statements suggestadditionalgroundsof inadmissibility beyond those a
presentedto the Court. respondent State chooses to advance, the existence of a
The repeated statements of Nigeria to the effect that
dispute is a requirement of the Court's jurisdiction under
there is no dispute concerning "boundary delimitation as Article 38 of the Statute and the Court should have
such" and the reserved and cautious fornlulations in its reply addressedthe matter proprio mot14.
given to the question of the Court may signify the Separute opiniott of.JudgeParra-Arangttren exclusively preliminary character, it is Judge Kooijmans'
view that in the present case the Court, for reasons of
Judge Parra-Aranguren voted against subpariigraph 1(6) judicial propriety, would have done better to uphold it in the
of the operative part of the Judgment, which rejects the
fourth prelimiiiary objection raised by Nigeria requesting preliminary phase. The most iinportaiit third country
the Court not to detennine in these proceedings the involved is Equatorial Guinea. Both Cai~ieroonand Nigeria
boundary in Lake Chad, to the extent that that boundary agreed in 1993 tliat State's involvementin the deliinitation
of the boundary was essential and that negotiations sliould
constitutes or is determined by the tripoint Nigeria- get started. In view of this recognition by Cameroon of the
Cameroon-Chad in the Lak:e,because its location directly necessityof negotiations itseeins not proper and reasonable
affects a third State, the Republic of Chad. Onthis point the to induce Equatorial Guinea to reveal its legal position by
Court did not follow its decision in the case concerning
Militat?, ai~d Parninilita1:v Activities iiz and against ineans of an intervention under Article 62 of the Statute
Nica~agzta (Nicm-agua v. United States 0)- America), before suchnegotiations have even begun.

Jza.isrlictionand Admissibili~, where it had stz.tedthat the Dissentitrg opinion of Kce-Presideat Weeranzamt~
determination of the third S,tates"affected" by thedecision
is not in itself a jurisdictional problem, but a question Vice-President Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion,
belonging to the merits (I.(?.J.Reports 1984, p. 425, para. expresses disagreement with the Court's findings on
76). This is the applicable plrincipleand in the Judge's view, Nigeria's first objection. The Vice-President expresses the
at this stage of the proceedings tlie Court isnot entitled to
decide, as it has done, that the future determin.3tionon the view that the 1957decision in Right ofPassage over Indian
Ten-itor:is in need of review. That decision implies tliat the
merits of the tripoint Nigeria-Cameroon-Chad will not have State which is sought to be bound by the declaration of
any consequence for the Republic of Chad. 'TheCourt's another State can be so bound without knowing of that
decision unreasonably precludes any subsequent declaration, and thus overlooks the consensual basis of the
intervention by tlieRepublic of Chad under Article 62 of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court. Therefore the fourth preliminary Statute. It also does not give effect to the imperative terms
objection raised by Nigeria sliould not have been rejected
of Article 36, paragraph 4, requiring communication by the
and the Court should have declared that, in the Secretariatof such declarations. The opinion sets out eight
circu~nstances of the case,, tlie objection was not of ail reasons why, in Judge Weerainantry's view, the Right of
exclusivelypreliminarycharacter. Passage decisionneeds to be reviewed.
The opinion also draws in perspectives from
Separate opiniofitof Judge Kooijnzarrs
comparative law regarding the iiotion of consensus and the
In.his separate opinion JudgeKooijmans set:;out why he need for coinmunication of acceptance if a consensual
voted against paragraphs 1 (g) and 2 of the dispositij: He relationshipis to be fornied. Theseperspectives can be used
voted against paragraph 1 (g), as in his opinion the seventh under Article 38, paragraph 1 (c) of the Statute. Referring,
inter alia, to Grotius' endorsement of the need for
preliminary objection shou.ld have been partially upheld, communication of acceptance if a State is to be bound by a
sincethere does not exist a legal dispute between the Parties
as to the continuation of the maritime boundary beyond consensual obligation, the opiiiion also stresses the need for
point G. Although he agrees that the point was not raised ensuring that the party sought to be bound should not be
specifically by Nigeria, he is of tlie opinion that the Court taken by surprise.
should have determined proprio motu whether there is a
dispute in the sense of the Statute. In the present case Disseiztittg opinionof Judge Koronta

Cameroonrequested tlie Courtto determinethe whole ofthe In his dissenting opinion Judge Koroma regretted that he
maritime boundary without ever before having formulateda could not share the opinion of the majority of tlie Court that
specific claim with regard to the inore seaward part of that it has jurisdiction to passpoii Cameroon's Application.In
boundary. It was only in the Memorial that its,submission his view, for a Stateto be entitled to invoke theoiiipdsory
was further substantiated. It therefore cannot be said that
there is a claim of Caineroonwhich, at the date of the filing jurisdiction of the Court, the conditionsstipulated in Article
of the Application, was "positively opposed" by Nigeria as 36, paragraphs 2 and 4. of the Statute must have been met.
In a situation where those conditions have not been
the Court according to its case-lawrequires. satisfied, as in the present case, jurisdiction cannot be said
Since in his view the seventh objectionshould have been to have been conferred on the Court, nor can the Court
upheld as regards the maritime boundary beyond point G impose suchjurisdiction on a Stateagainstits will.
and sincethe issue of the rights and interestsof third parties
(the subject of the eighth preliminary objection) only arises The Judge further stated that this phase of the matter
should have been governedby the provisions of the Statute,
in respect of that part of the boundary, that abjection has rather than the Court allowing its decision to have been
become without object. Judge Kooijmans consequently substantively controlled by the decision in tlie Right of
voted against paragraph 2. But also for other reasons he Passage case.
cannot agree with what the Court said with regard to the
eighth objection. Although in general an objec:condealing
with rights and interests of third States does not possessa11

43 Dissenting opirzionofJirdgeAjibola premised on the fact that Article 36 (4) of the Statute was
In my dissenting opinionI voted against the decisionof wroilgly or inadequately interpreted in 1957and the time
has come for the same to be corrected after 41 years.
the nlajority of the Members of the Courton the first, third, Paragraph 4 of Article 36 provides that declarations under
fourth, fifth, sixth, second partof the seventhand the eighth the Optional Clause "shall" be "depositerP' with the
preliminary objections filed by Nigeria. I, however, voted Secretary-General of the United Nations and the same
with the majority of the Members of the Court with regard
to the decision of the Court on the second preliminary "shall" be"tmr~sr~zittedt"all the StatesMembersand tothe
objection and the first part of the seventh preliminary Registrar of the Court. While the Court rightlyand properly
ob-jectionandI statemy reasons for doing so therein. interpreted the former in the 1957 case it failedto do so in
the case of the latter requirement for themain reason that
The most important aspect of this dissenting opinion such a situationwould bring "uncertainty" intothe operation
deals with my disagreement with the decision of the Court of the declaration vis-a-vis the "accepting State". This
to follow its earlier decisionin the case concerningRight of argument is most unconvillcing and it is anything but a
Pnssnge over Itidimt Territoiy, which I now consider to be
bad case-law. Fundamentally. the reason for so doing is correctinterpretationof Article36 (4) as a whole.