INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2, 2517 KJ The Hague, Netherlands
Tel.: +31 (0)70 302 2323 Fax: +31 (0)70 364 9928
Website: www.icj-cij.org
Summary
Not an official document
Summary 2011/6
5 December 2011
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)
Summary of the Judgment of 5 December 2011
I. Factual background of the case (paras. 15-22)
The Court recalls that, on 17 November 2008, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(hereinafter the “Applicant”) filed in the Regi stry of the Court an Application instituting
proceedings against the Hellenic Republic (hereina fter the “Respondent”) in respect of a dispute
concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Interim Accord of 13September1995
(hereinafter the “Interim Accord”).
In particular, the Applicant seeks to establish that, by objecting to the Applicant’s admission
to NATO, the Respondent breached Article11, paragraph1, of the said Accord, which provides
that:
“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part agrees
not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in
international, multilateral a nd regional organizations and institutions of which the
Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the
right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the
Second Part is to be referred to in sucorganization or institution differently than in
paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).”
In paragraph2 of resolution817, the Security Council recommended that the Applicant be
admitted to membership in the United Nations, being “provisionally referred to for all purposes
within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugos lav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of
the difference that has arisen over the name of the State”.
In the period following the adoption of th e Interim Accord, the Applicant was granted
membership in a number of international orga nizations of which the Respondent was already a
member. On the invitation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Applicant in 1995 joined
the organization’s Partnership for Peace (a progr amme that promotes co-operation between NATO
and partner countries) and, in 1999, the organization’s Membership Acti on Plan (which assists
prospective NATO members). The Applicant’s NATO candidacy was considered in a meeting of
NATO member States in Bucharest (hereinafter the “Bucharest Summit”) on 2 and 3April2008
but the Applicant was not invited to begin talks on accession to the organization. The communiqué - 2 -
issued at the end of the Summit stated that an invitation would be extended to the Applicant “as
soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached”.
II. Jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the Application (paras. 23-61)
The Court recalls that the Applicant invoked as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction Article 21,
paragraph 2, of the Interim Accord, under the terms of which any “difference or dispute” as to the
“interpretation or implementation” of the Interim Ac cord falls within the jurisdiction of the Court,
with the exception of the “difference” referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord,
which reads as follows:
“The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council
resolution845(1993) with a view to r eaching agreement on the difference described
in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).”
The Respondent claims that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present case and
that the Application is inadmissible based on the following reasons. Firstly, the Respondent
submits that the dispute concerns the difference over the name of the Applicant referred to in
Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord and that, consequently, it is excluded from the Court’s
jurisdiction by virtue of the exception provided in Article21, paragraph2. Secondly, the
Respondent alleges that the dispute concerns conduc t attributable to NATO and its member States,
which is not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction in the present case. Thirdly, the Respondent claims
that the Court’s Judgment in the present case would be incapable of effective application because it
could not effect the Applicant’s admission to NATO or other international, multilateral and
regional organizations or institutions. Fourthly, the Respondent submits that the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court would interfere with ongoing diplomatic negotia tions mandated by the
Security Council concerning the difference over the name and thus would be incompatible with the
Court’s judicial function.
In respect of the first objection raised by the Respondent, the Court considers it to be clear
from the text of Article 5, paragraph 1, and Article 21, paragraph 2, of the Interim Accord, that the
“difference” referred to therein is the difference over the definitive name of the Applicant and not
disputes regarding the Respondent’s obligation no t to object to the Applicant’s admission to
international organizations, unless the Applicant is to be referred to in the organization in question
differently than in resolution817(1993). Accordingly, the Court decides not to uphold that
objection.
With regard to the second objection, the Court considers that the conduct forming the object
of the Application is the Respondent’s alleged objection to the Applicant’s admission to NATO,
and that, on the merits, the Court will only ha ve to determine whether or not that conduct
demonstrates that the Respondent failed to comply with its obligations under the Interim Accord,
irrespective of NATO’s final decision on the Appli cant’s membership application. Accordingly,
the Court decides not to uphold that objection.
In respect of the third objection, the Court observes that the Applicant is not requesting it to
reverse NATO’s decision in the Bucharest Summit, but to determine whether the Respondent
violated its obligations under the Interim Accord as a re sult of its conduct. It concludes that a
Judgment of the Court would be capable of being applied effectively, because it would affect the
Parties’ existing rights and obligations under the In terim Accord. Accordingly, it decides not to
uphold that objection.
As regards the fourth objection, the Court notes that the Parties included a provision
conferring jurisdiction on the Court (Art.21) in an agreement that also required them to continue - 3 -
negotiations on the dispute between th em over the name of the Applicant (Art. 5, para. 1). It takes
the view that, had the Parties considered that a future ruling by the Court would interfere with
diplomatic negotiations mandated by the Security Council, they would not have agreed to refer to it
disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation of the Interim Accord. Accordingly, it
decides not to uphold that objection.
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over the dispute and that
the Application is admissible.
III. Whether the Respondent failed to comply with the obligation under Article11,
paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord (paras. 62-113)
The Court then considers whether the Respondent objected to the Applicant’s admission to
NATO, within the meaning of the first clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord.
It begins by examining the meaning of that clause and finds in that connection that the
Respondent is under an obligation not to object to “the application by or membership of” the
Applicant in NATO. It notes that the Parties agree that the obligation “not to object”, which is an
obligation of conduct, rather than one of result, does not require the Respondent actively to support
the Applicant’s admission to international organizations. The Court further observes that nothing
in the text of that clause limits the Respondent’s obligation not to object to organizations that use a
voting procedure to decide on the admission of ne w members. It considers that there is no
indication that the Parties intended to exclude from Article11, paragraph1, organizations like
NATO which follow procedures which do not require a vote. Moreover, the Court notes that the
question before it is not whether the decision taken by NATO at the Bucharest Summit with respect
to the Applicant’s candidacy was due exclusively, principally, or marginally to the Respondent’s
objection, but whether the Respondent, by its own conduct, did not comply with the obligation not
to object contained in Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord. The Court also observes that
the Respondent did not take the position that any objection by it at the Bucharest Summit was
based on grounds unrelated to the difference over the name. Therefore, it does not consider it
necessary to decide whether the Respondent retains a right to object to the Applicant’s admission to
international organizations on such other grounds.
The Court then considers whether the Respondent “objected” to the Applicant’s admission to
NATO. To this end, it turns to the evidence submitted to it by the Parties, in order to decide
whether the record supports th e Applicant’s contention that the Respondent objected to the
Applicant’s membership in NATO. The Court notes that, in support of its position, the Applicant
refers to diplomatic correspondence of the Responde nt before and after the Bucharest Summit and
to statements by senior officials of the Responde nt during the same period. The Court observes
that the Respondent does not dispute the authenticity of these statements and it examines them as
evidence of the Respondent’s conduct in connectio n with the Bucharest Summit, in light of its
obligation under Article11, paragraph1, of the In terim Accord. In the view of the Court, the
evidence submitted to it demonstrates that thro ugh formal diplomatic correspondence and through
statements of its senior officials, the Respondent made clear before, during and after the Bucharest
Summit that the resolution of the difference over the name was the “decisive criterion” for the
Respondent to accept the Applicant’s admission to NATO. The Court notes that the Respondent
manifested its objection to the Applicant’s admission to NATO at the Bucharest Summit, citing the
fact that the difference regarding the Applicant’s name remained unresolved. The Court concludes
that the Respondent objected to the Applicant’s admission to NATO, within the meaning of the
first clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord.
The Court then turns to the question whether the Respondent’s objection to the Applicant’s
admission to NATO at the Bucharest Summit fell within the exception contained in the second
clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord. - 4 -
It considers that, in this clause, the Partiesagree that the Respondent “reserves the right to
object to any membership” by the Applicant in an international, multilateral or regional
organization or institution of which the Responde nt is a member “if and to the extent the
[Applicant] is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of
United Nations Security Council resolution817 (1993) ”. The Court recalls that paragraph2 of
resolution817 recommends that the Applicant be admitted to membership in the United Nations,
being “provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the di fference that has arisen over the name of the
State”.
The Court notes that the Parties agree that the Applicant intended to refer to itself within
NATO, once admitted, by its constitutional name, not by the provisional designation set forth in
resolution 817. Thus, it considers whether the second clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, permits the
Respondent to object in that circumstance. The interpretation of that clause in accordance with
Articles31 and32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties leads the Court to conclude
that the Respondent does not have the right to object to the Applicant’s admission to an
organization based on the prospect that the Applicant is to refer to itself in such organization with
its constitutional name. It finds, in effect, that th e Applicant’s intention to refer to itself in an
international organization by its constitutional name did not mean that it was “to be referred to” in
such organization “differently than in” paragraph 2 of resolution 817.
Finally, the Court considers the Respondent’s position that, even assuming that the Court
were to conclude that the Respondent had objected to the Applicant’s admission to NATO, in
contravention of Article11, paragraph1, such objection would not breach the Interim Accord,
because of the effect of Article 22. Article 22 of the Interim Accord provides:
“This Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or entity and it does
not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral or multilateral agreements
already in force that the Parties have concluded with other States or international
organizations.”
The Court observes that the Respondent’s initial in terpretation of Article 22, that its “rights”
under a prior agreement (in addition to its “duti es”) take precedence over its obligation not to
object to admission by the Applicant to an organization within the terms of Article 11, paragraph 1,
would vitiate that obligation, because the Respondent normally can be expected to have a “right”
under prior agreements with third States to expres s a view on membership decisions. The Court,
considering that the Parties did not intend Artic le22 to render meaningless the first clause of
Article11, paragraph1, is therefore unable to accept that interpretation advanced by the
Respondent. The Court then notes that the Res pondent’s narrower interpre tation of Article22,
which it advanced during the oral proceedings, i.e ., that “duties” under a prior treaty would take
precedence over obligations in the Interim Acco rd, would oblige it to determine whether the
Respondent has established that the North Atlantic Treaty imposed a duty on it to object to the
Applicant’s admission to NATO. However, accord ing to the Court, the Respondent offers no
persuasive argument that any provision of the No rth Atlantic Treaty required it to object to the
Applicant’s membership. The Court concludes that the Respondent’s attempt to rely on Article 22
is unsuccessful. Accordingly, it need not decide which of the two Parties’ interpretations is the
correct one.
In the light of the above, the Court concludes that the Respondent failed to comply with its
obligation under Article11, paragraph1, of the Interim Accord by objec ting to the Applicant’s
admission to NATO at the Bucharest Summit. It c onsiders that the prospect that the Applicant
would refer to itself in NATO using its constitu tional name did not render that objection lawful
under the exception contained in the second clause of Ar ticle 11, paragraph 1. It adds that, in the
circumstances of the present case, Article 22 of th e Interim Accord does not provide a basis for the
Respondent to make an objection that is inconsistent with Article 11, paragraph 1. - 5 -
IV. Additional justifications invoked by the Respondent (paras. 114-165)
The Court observes that, as an alternative to its main argument that it complied with its
obligations under the Interim Accord, the Res pondent contends that the wrongfulness of any
objection to the admission of the Applicant to NATO is precluded by the doctrine of exceptio non
adimpleti contractus. The Respondent also suggests that any failure to comply with its obligations
under the Interim Accord could be justified both as a response to a material breach of a treaty and
as a countermeasure under the law of State responsibility.
The Court observes that while the Respondent presents separate arguments relating to the
exceptio, partial suspension under Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, and countermeasures,
it advances certain minimum conditions that are common to all three arguments, namely that the
Applicant breached several provisions of the Interim Accord and that the Respondent’s objection to
the Applicant’s admission to NATO was made in response to those breaches.
A. Alleged breach by the Applicant of the second clause of Article 11, paragraph 1
The Court notes that on its face, the text of the second clause of Article 11, paragraph 1, does
not impose an obligation upon the Applicant not to be referred to in an international organization or
institution by any reference other than the pr ovisional designation (as “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia”). It further notes that, just as other provisions of the Interim Accord
impose obligations only on the Applicant, Article 11, paragraph1, imposes an obligation only on
the Respondent. The second clause contains an important exception to this obligation, but that
does not transform it into an obligation upon the Applicant. Accordingly, the Court finds no breach
by the Applicant of this provision.
B. Alleged breach by the Applicant of Article 5, paragraph 1
At the outset, the Court notes that although Ar ticle 5, paragraph 1, contains no express
requirement that the Parties negotiate in good faith, such obligation is implicit under this provision.
It observes that the failure of the Parties to r each agreement, 16years after the conclusion of the
Interim Accord, does not in itself establish that eith er Party has breached its obligation to negotiate
in good faith. It therefore considers whether th e Parties conducted themselves in such a way that
negotiations may be meaningful. It notes that during the course of the negotiations pursuant to
Article5, paragraph1, the Applicant had resisted suggestions that it depart from its constitutional
name and that the Respondent had opposed the use of “Macedonia” in the name of the Applicant.
It further notes that the political leaders of both Parties at times made public statements that
suggested an inflexible position as to the name di fference, including in the months prior to the
Bucharest Summit. Moreover, it observes that th ere is also evidence that the United Nations
mediator presented the Parties with a range of proposals over the years and, in particular, expressed
the view that, in the time period prior to the Bu charest Summit, the Parties were negotiating in
earnest. Taken as a whole, the Court considers th at the evidence from this period indicates that the
Applicant showed a degree of openness to proposals that differed from either the sole use of its
constitutional name or the “dual formula”, while the Respondent, for its pa rt, apparently changed
its initial position and in September2007 declared that it would agree to the word “Macedonia”
being included in the Applicant’s name as part of a compound formulation. The Court notes in
particular that, in March 2008, the United Nations mediator proposed that the Applicant adopt the
name “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” for all pu rposes. According to the record before the
Court, the Applicant expressed a willingness to put this name to a referendum. The record also
indicates that it was the Respondent who rejected this proposed name. Thus, the Court concludes
that the Respondent has not met its burden of demonstrating that the Applicant breached its
obligation to negotiate in good faith. - 6 -
C. Alleged breach by the Applicant of Article 6, paragraph 2
Article 6, paragraph 2, provides:
“The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its
Constitution, and in particular in Article 49 as amended, can or should be interpreted
as constituting or will ever constitute the basis for the Party of the Second Part to
interfere in the internal affairs of another State in order to protect the status and rights
of any persons in other States who are not citizens of the Party to the Second Part.”
The Court considers that the Respondent has presented no convincing evidence to suggest
that the Applicant has interpreted its Constitution as providing a right to interfere in the
Respondent’s internal affairs on behalf of persons not citizens of the Applicant. The Court
therefore does not find that the Applicant breached Article6, paragraph2, prior to the Bucharest
Summit.
D. Alleged breach by the Applicant of Article 7, paragraph 1
Article 7, paragraph 1, provides:
“Each Party shall promptly take effec tive measures to prohibit hostile activities
or propaganda by State-controlled agencies and to discourage acts by private entities
likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other.”
The Court recalls that, according to the Respondent, the Applicant breached this provision
based on its failure to take effective measures to prohibit hostile activities by State-controlled
agencies, citing, for example, allegations relating to the content of school textbooks, and its failure
to discourage acts by private entities likely to in cite violence, hatred or hostility against the
Respondent, citing, in particular, an incident on 29 March 2008 (in the days prior to the Bucharest
Summit) in which several outdoor billboards in Skopje depicted an altered image of the
Respondent’s flag. The Court observes that the Resp ondent also alleges a consistent failure by the
Applicant to protect the premises and personnel of the Respondent’s Liaison Office in Skopje.
The Court considers that the evidence cannot sustain a finding that the Applicant committed
a breach of Article 7, paragraph 1, prior to the Bucharest Summit. It finds that the textbook content
in question does not provide a basis to conclude that the Applicant has failed to prohibit “hostile
activities or propaganda”. Furthermore, the Respondent has not demonstrated convincingly that the
Applicant failed “to discourage” acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility
towards the Respondent. After recalling the obligati on to protect the premises of the diplomatic
mission and to protect against any disturbance of the peace or impairment of its dignity contained
in Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomat ic Relations, the Court finds that the Applicant
introduced evidence demonstrating its efforts to provide adequate protection to the Respondent’s
diplomatic staff and premises.
E. Alleged breach by the Applicant of Article 7, paragraph 2
Article 7, paragraph 2, provides:
“Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the Second Part shall
cease to use in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag prior
to such entry into force.” - 7 -
The Court finds that the record does support the conclusion that there was at least one
instance in which the Applicant’s army used the symbol prohibited by Article 7, paragraph 2, of the
Interim Accord.
F. Alleged breach by the Applicant of Article 7, paragraph 3
Article 7, paragraph 3, provides:
“If either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or
cultural patrimony is being used by the othe r Party, it shall bring such alleged use to
the attention of the other Party, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective
action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do so.”
The Court notes that, in contrast to Article 7, paragraph 2, the text of Article 7, paragraph 3,
does not expressly prohibit the Applicant from usi ng the symbols that it describes. Rather, it
establishes a procedure for situations in which on e Party believes the other Party to be using its
historical or cultural symbols. Therefore, accord ing to the Court, the question to consider is
whether the Respondent brought its concern “to the attention” of the Applicant before the
Bucharest Summit when the latter renamed the airport of the capital. To that end, it notes that
although it does not appear that the Respondent did so, the Applicant was aware of the
Respondent’s concern, and the Applicant’s Foreign Minister explained the rationale behind the
renaming of the airport in a January2007 intervie w to a Greek newspaper. The Court concludes
that the Respondent has not discharged its burden to demonstrate a breach of Article7,
paragraph 3, by the Applicant.
*
In light of this analysis of the Respondent’s allegations that the Applicant breached several
of its obligations under the Interim Accord, the Court concludes that the Respondent has
established only one such breach. Namely, the Re spondent has demonstrated that the Applicant
used the symbol prohibited by Article7, paragra ph2, of the Interim Accord in 2004. After the
Respondent raised the matter with the Applicant in 2004, the use of the symbol was discontinued
during that same year.
G. Conclusions concerning the Respondent’s additional justifications
1. Conclusion concerning the exceptio non adimpleti contractus
Having reviewed the Respondent’s allegations of breaches by the Applicant, the Court
returns to the Respondent’s contention that the exceptio , as it is defined by the Respondent,
precludes the Court from finding that the Respondent breached its obligation under Article11,
paragraph1, of the Interim Accord. The Court reca lls that in all but one instance (the use of the
symbol prohibited by Article 7, paragraph 2), th e Respondent failed to establish any breach of the
Interim Accord by the A pplicant. In addition, the Responde nt has failed to show a connection
between the Applicant’s use of the symbol in 2004 and the Respondent’s objection in 2008 ⎯ that
is, evidence that when the Respondent raised its objection to the Applicant’s admission to NATO,
it did so in response to the apparent violation of Article7, paragraph2, or, more broadly, on the
basis of any belief that the exceptio precluded the wrongfulness of its objection. The Respondent
has thus failed to establish that the conditions which it has itself asserted would be necessary for - 8 -
the application of the exceptio have been satisfied in this case. It is, therefore, unnecessary for the
Court to determine whether that doctrine forms part of contemporary international law.
2. Conclusion concerning a response to material breach
The Court recalls that the Respondent also s uggested that its objection to the Applicant’s
admission to NATO could have been regarded as a response, within Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention, to material breaches of the Interim Accord allegedly committed by the Applicant.
Article 60, paragraph 3 (b), of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides that a material breach consists
in “the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the
treaty”. The Court further recalls its conclusion that the only breach which has been established is
the display of a symbol in breach of Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Interim Accord, a situation which
ended in 2004. The Court considers that this in cident cannot be regarded as a material breach
within the meaning of Article60 of the 1969Vie nna Convention. Moreover, the Court considers
that the Respondent has failed to establish that the action which it took in 2008 in connection with
the Applicant’s application to NATO was a response to the breach of Article7, paragraph2,
approximately four years earlier. Accordingly, the Court does not accept that the Respondent’s
action was capable of falling within Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
3. Conclusion concerning countermeasures
The Court recalls that the Respondent also argues that its objection to the Applicant’s
admission to NATO could be justified as a proportionate countermeasure in response to breaches of
the Interim Accord by the Appli cant. As the Court has already made clear, the only breach which
has been established by the Respondent is the A pplicant’s use in 2004 of the symbol prohibited by
Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Interim Accord. Having reached that conclusion and in the light of its
analysis concerning the reasons given by the Respondent for its objection to the Applicant’s
admission to NATO, the Court is not persuaded that the Respondent’s objection to the Applicant’s
admission was taken for the purpose of achieving the cessation of the Applicant’s use of the
symbol prohibited by Article7, paragraph2. As the Court noted, the use of the symbol that
supports the finding of a breach of Article 7, paragraph 2, by the Applicant had ceased as of 2004.
Thus, the Court rejects the Respondent’s claim that its objection could be justified as a
countermeasure precluding the wrongfulness of the Respondent’s objection to the Applicant’s
admission to NATO. Accordingly, there is no reason for the Court to consider any of the
additional arguments advanced by the Parties with respect to the law governing countermeasures.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the additional justifications submitted by the
Respondent fail.
*
Lastly, the Court emphasizes that the 1995 Inte rim Accord places the Parties under a duty to
negotiate in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant
to the pertinent Security Council resolutions with a view to reaching agreement on the difference
described in those resolutions.
* - 9 -
V. Remedies (paras. 167-169)
The Court recalls that, in its final submissions pertaining to the merits of the present case, the
Applicant seeks two remedies which it regarded as constituting appropriate redress for claimed
violations of the Interim Accord by the Respondent. First, the Applicant seeks relief in the form of
a declaration of the Court that the Respondent has acted illegally, and secondly, it requests relief in
the form of an order of the Court that the Re spondent henceforth refrain from any action that
violates its obligations under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord.
At the end of its consideration, the Court has found a violation by the Respondent of its
obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord. As to possible remedies for such a
violation, the Court finds that a declaration that the Respondent violated its obligation not to object
to the Applicant’s admission to or membership in NATO is warranted. Moreover, the Court does
not consider it necessary to order the Respondent, as the Applicant requests, to refrain from any
future conduct that violates its obligation under Artic le 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord. As
the Court previously explained, “[a]s a general rule, there is no reason to suppose that a State
whose act or conduct has been declared wrongful by the Court will repeat that act or conduct in the
future, since its good faith must be presumed” (Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 267, para. 150).
The Court accordingly determines that its fi nding that the Respondent has violated its
obligation to the Applicant unde r Article11, paragraph1, of the Interim Accord, constitutes
appropriate satisfaction.
VI. Operative clause (para. 170)
For these reasons,
T HE C OURT ,
(1) By fourteen votes to two,
Finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia on 17 November 2008 and that this Application is admissible;
IN FAVOUR : President Owada; Vice-President Tomka; Judges Koroma, Simma, Abraham,
Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, Skotnikov, CançadoTrindade, Yusuf, Greenw ood,
Donoghue; Judgead hoc Vukas;
AGAINST : JudgeXue; Judgead hoc Roucounas;
(2) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that the Hellenic Republic, by objecting to the admission of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia to NATO, has breached its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the
Interim Accord of 13 September 1995;
IN FAVOUR : President Owada; Vice-President Tomka; Judges Koroma, Simma, Abraham,
Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, Skotnikov, CançadoTrindade, Yusuf, Greenw ood,
Xue, Donoghue; Judgead hoc Vukas;
AGAINST : Judge ad hoc Roucounas; - 10 -
(3) By fifteen votes to one,
Rejects all other submissions made by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
IN FAVOUR : President Owada; Vice-President Tomka; Judges Koroma, Simma, Abraham,
Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Greenw ood,
Xue, Donoghue; Judgead hoc Roucounas;
AGAINST : Judge ad hoc Vukas.
JudgeSimma appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; JudgeBennouna
appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judge Xue appends a dissenting opinion to the
Judgment of the Court; Judge ad hoc Roucounas appends a dissenting opi nion to the Judgment of
the Court; Judge ad hoc Vukas appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court.
___________ Annex to Summary 2011/6
Separate opinion Judge Simma
Judge Simma finds himself in agreement with the findings of the Court as regards both
jurisdiction and the merits of the case. His concern only relates to the way in which the Judgment
treats the so-called exceptio non adimpleti contractus. He begins his analysis by outlining that,
according to the Respondent, were the Court to find ⎯ as it in fact did ⎯ that Greece had violated
the 1995InterimAccord by objecting to the admission of FYROM to NATO in 2008, the
wrongfulness of Greece’s action would still be preclude d. No less than three “defences” are thus
advanced, all based on the allegation of prior breaches of the Accord committed by the FYROM:
in the first instance, Greece pr esents the doctrine of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus ;
secondly, Greece’s objection is explained as a response to material breaches of the Accord by the
FYROM on the basis of the law of treaties; and thirdly, Greece portrays its behaviour as a
countermeasure against the FYROM’s preceding br eaches recognized as justified by the law of
State responsibility.
The Judgment rejects all of these defences, a nd according to JudgeSimma rightly so, even
though in his view the Court took care of the matter in too succinct a way. What JudgeSimma
does take issue with is the treatment by th e Court of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus as a
justification separate, and different, from the other two “defences” just mentioned. On this matter,
the Parties to the case put forward different views. In the face of such conflicting statements about
points of law, an authoritative clarification by the Court of the legal status and interrelationship of
the exceptio vis-à-vis Article60 of the Vienna C onvention on the Law of Treaties (entitled
“Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach”) and the
legal régime of countermeasures as developed by the International Law Commission would have
been helpful.
Judge Simma’s opinion engages in such a clarification. He traces the concept of the exceptio
back to the idea of reciprocity, which in fully developed legal systems has been almost totally
absorbed and supplanted by specific norms and institutions ⎯ “domesticated”, as it were. In
international law, reciprocity still lies closer to the surface, at the root of various methods of
self-help by which States may secure their rights; it has been crystallized into international law’s
sanctioning mechanisms, among them countermeasu res and reciprocal non-performance of an
agreement with its sedes materiae in the law of treaties.
Judge Simma firmly states that the exceptio non adimpleti contractus belongs to the second
category. It gave legal expression, and was conditioned by, the synallagmatic character of most
international agreements ⎯ the rule pacta sunt servanda being linked to the rule do ut des . The
widespread recognition of this functional synallagm a in the law of contracts of the major legal
systems allows to accept it as a general principle of law in the sense of Article38 of the Court’s
Statute, and thus to apply it also in internationa l legal relations. The question then is to what
modifications such a concept developed in foro domestico will have to be subjected at the level of
international law in order to secure it to function in an orderly way and not to become prone to
abuse absent the judicial control of its applicati on regularly available in domestic law. In the
context of responses to treaty breach, unilateral invocation by one and denial of justification by the
other side have been the rule to such an extent that it was difficult to give the exceptio a basis in
customary international law.
Judge Simma’s opinion highlights that it is precisely this circumstance which renders the
codification of this principle in Article60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties so
important. This provision puts reciprocity in treaty relations on the necessary leash ⎯ in particular
by allowing the suspension or termination of a tr eaty only in the case of a material breach by
another party and setting up a numbe r of procedural conditions. Furthermore, as confirmed by
Article42, paragraph2, of the Vienna Convention, Article60 is meant to regulate the legal - 2 -
consequences of treaty breach in an exhaustive way. There is thus no place left for the application
of the exceptio outside the ambit of Article60 and free of any procedural requirements to its
exercise, as Greece wanted the Court to believe . JudgeSimma acknowledges that, according to
Article 73 of the Convention, its provisions do not prejudge questions of State responsibility arising
in regard to treaty breach. The suspension of treaty provisions as a countermeasure undertaken
against prior breaches by another party remains thus untouched by Article60 and permissible
subject to the rather tight régime set up by th e ILC code on the matter. However, JudgeSimma
concludes that since the Respondent drew the necessary distinction in this regard, and the Judgment
treats Greece’s “defences” other than the exceptio in a satisfactory manner, there remains nothing
to be said on the matter.
Declaration of Judge Bennouna
Judge Bennouna concurs in the final conclusi ons of the Court in the present case, yet he
observes that it chose to avoid certain crucial lega l questions raised and discussed at length by the
Parties, notably the exceptio non adimpleti contractus and the countermeasures, by sheltering
behind its assessment of the facts the Parties relied on in support of their arguments. According to
JudgeBennouna, the Court could have analysed and pronounced on these questions, in light of
their temporal and material evolution.
Dissenting opinion of Judge Xue
Judge Xue dissents from the Court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction in the case. She takes
the position that the case falls within the scope of Article5, paragraph1, rather than that of
Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord and the Application is not admissible on the ground
of judicial propriety.
Judge Xue considers that the essential issue for th e Court, in determining its jurisdiction, is
whether the disputed objection of the Respondent to the membership of the Applicant to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the 2008 Bucharest Summit relates to the interpretation or
implementation of Article11, paragraph1, of the Interim Accord or is an issue under Article5,
paragraph1, precluded from the jurisdiction of the C ourt by virtue of Article21, paragraph2, of
that treaty. In her view, any interpretation of the provisions of the Interim Accord in relation to the
name issue should give due consideration to the interim nature of the Accord and the ongoing
negotiation between the Parties for the settlement of the name difference.
Judge Xue is of the view that in establishing its jurisdiction, the Court adopts a rather narrow
interpretation of the term “differe nce” under Article 5, paragraph1. By such interpretation, the
“difference” under that article is reduced to the solution of the final name to be agreed on by the
Parties in the negotiation and Article 11, paragraph 1, and Article 5, paragraph 1, are thus treated as
entirely separate issues without substantive connec tion to each other in the implementation of the
Interim Accord. She questions such treaty interpretation.
In Judge Xue’s view, given the nature of the dispute between the Parties over the name issue
and the object and purpose of the Interim Accord , Article11, paragraph1, and Article5,
paragraph 1, constitute two of the key provisions in the agreement. From the evidence before the
Court, it is clear that the central issue of the di spute between the Parties on Article 11, paragraph 1,
lies in the so-called “dual formula”, as allegedly pursued by the Applicant. The conditional terms
of Article11, paragraph1, have been subject to different interpretations of the Parties; they
particularly disagree as to whether the Applicant could use its constitutional name when referring
to itself or dealing with third States in international organizations. In the subsequent years after the
conclusion of the Interim Accord, the Applicant h as insisted on using its constitutional name when - 3 -
referring to itself and dealing with third States, while the Respondent has formed a general pattern
of protests against such use, alleging it as a breach of resolution 817 and the Interim Accord.
The conclusion of the Interim Accord between the Parties, together with Security Council
resolutions 817 and 845, recognizes the legal interests of both Parti es in connection with the name
issue. The temporary arrangement of the name difference under Article 11, paragraph 1, provides a
means of ending the impasse between the Parties ove r the Applicant’s membership in international
organizations. The ambiguity of the conditional terms in Article11, paragraph1, with regard to
whether, or to what extent, the Applicant’s constitutional name may be used by the Applicant and
third States in international organizations, shows that the Interim Accord, as a temporary measure
for maintaining peace and good-neighbourly relations both in the region and between the Parties,
requires a great deal of good faith and mutual trust from both Parties in its implementation. Such
uncertainty can only be explained and justified by the interim nature of the treaty and the pending
settlement of the name issue. Therefore, the implementation of Article11, paragraph1, is
intrinsically linked with the duty of the two Partie s to settle the name dis pute through negotiations
as required by Article5, paragraph1. Any i ssue relating to the negotiation process should fall
within the scope of Article 5, paragraph 1.
The so-called “dual formula”, as revealed in th e proceedings, refers to the formula whereby,
ultimately, the provisional name will be used only between the Respondent and the Applicant,
while the Applicant’s constitutional name is used wi th all other States. Judge Xue notes that in the
present case, without looking into this so-called “dual formula”, it would be impossible to examine
fully the Respondent’s actions at the Bucharest Summit in light of the object and purpose of the
Interim Accord. If conducted, however, such examination would inevitably have to address the
“difference” under Article 5, paragraph 1, thus going beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
In Judge Xue’s opinion, the Court’s examination of the single act of the Respondent’s
objection to the Applicant’s membership to NATO has isolated Article11, paragraph1, from the
context of the treaty as a whole, and from its object and purpose. Article 11, paragraph 1, cannot
be separated from Article 5, paragraph 1, as long as the settlement of the final name is involved.
On the question of judicial propriety, Judge Xue holds that even if by a strict interpretation
of Article21, paragraph2, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction in the case, there are still good
reasons for the Court to refrain from exercising it, as it bears on the question of judicial propriety.
As the Court pointed out in the North Cameroons case, even if the Court, “when seised, finds that it
has jurisdiction, the Court is not compelled in ev ery case to exercise that jurisdiction. There are
inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function which the Court, as a court of justice,
can never ignore.” (Case concerni ng the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 29.)
She agrees with the Court’s position that the issue before the Court is not whether NATO’s
decision may be attributed to the Respondent bu t rather whether the Respondent has breached its
obligation under the Interim Acco rd as a result of its own conduct. The Court’s decision to
pronounce only on the lawfulness of the single act of the Respondent and to reject all other
submissions of the Applicant, renders the Judgment devoid of any effect on NATO’s decision to
defer the invitation to the Applicant to become a NATO member.
In so far as NATO’s decision remains valid, the Court’s decision will have no practical
effect on the future conduct of the Parties with respect to the Applicant’ s membership in that
organization. In the Northern Cameroons case, the Court pronounced that its decision “must have
some practical consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal rights or obligations of the
parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal relations” (case concerning the Northern
Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Obj ections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1963, p. 34). In Judge Xue’s view, that requirement does not seem to have been met in the present
case. - 4 -
In addition, Judge Xue expresses concerns a bout the potential effect of the Judgment on the
negotiation process, since the Court’s decision is likel y to be used by the Pa rties to harden their
positions in the negotiation, thus not conducive to a speedy settlement of the name issue.
Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Roucounas
After an introduction and brief history, JudgeRoucounas presents the context in which the
two Parties concluded the Interim Accord of 13September1995, which contains a number of
significant “unusual features”, in particular the fact that the Parties are not referred to by name,
owing to the “difference” over the name of the “Party of the Second Part”. That difference is
ubiquitous in this case, and the other claims of the Applicant and reactions of the Respondent
revolve around it. Judge Roucounas notes that the Interim Accord was concluded amid the tumult
of the Balkan crises of the 1990s and describes th e efforts of the European institutions between
1992 and 1994, the policies of the United Nations and the mediation by American envoys which
led to the adoption of resolutions 817 and 845 and to the Interim Accord.
The judge disagrees with the interpretation uphe ld by the Court that the Applicant itself was
not obliged to use the provisional name within international organizations. He points out that that
interpretation is incompatible with the phrase “[is to be] referred to for all purposes”, which is used
in resolutions 817 and 845 and incorporated in the text of the Accord. Furthermore, the phrase “for
all purposes” emphasizes the object of the negotiatio ns, which are intended to achieve agreement
on one name (and one name only). Judge Roucounas observes that the “dual formula” advanced by
the Applicant, who contends that the purpose of the bilateral negotiati ons conducted under the
auspices of the United Nations is simply to r each agreement on the name which will replace the
provisional appellation of FYROM, and which is in tended solely for use by the Respondent, while
the Applicant, for its part, will continue to refe r to itself, and to have itself referred to, as
“Macedonia”, is in breach of the Applicant’s treaty obligations.
The judge points out that, throughout the period from1993 to2008, Greece repeatedly
voiced its opposition, orally and in writing, to the FYROM’s strategy of using its constitutional
name in international organizations, and that the Respondent made its position perfectly clear in the
face of the Applicant’s shift towards a “dual formula”. Moreover, it is not necessary, from a legal
point of view, for those with objections to voice those objections at all times and on every
occasion.
The judge goes on to say that the Interim Acco rd is synallagmatic, in the sense that it is
based on reciprocity. Its provisions are closely inter-connected and the rights and obligations of the
two Parties are legally dependent on one another. He states that it is difficult to see what benefit
the Respondent would derive from the Interim Accord, other than the regularization of its relations
with its northern neighbour, by joint acceptance of a name which would distinguish one from the
other. Therefore, he believes that the Court should strive to make the object and purpose of the
Interim Accord realizable by emphasizing the need for effective negotiations conducted in good
faith, and take care not to prejudice those negotiations directly or indirectly.
The dissenting opinion questions the Court’s juri sdiction to rule on the dispute submitted to
it. The judge is of the view that Article 21, pa ragraph 2, excludes from the Court’s jurisdiction not
only the question of the attribution of a name for the Applicant, but also “the difference referred to
in Article5, paragraph1”, that is to say, it prohibits the Court’s intervention on any question
which, according to the Applicant, relates “directly or indirectly” to the question of the name. He
adds that the exclusion under Article21 is also linked to Article22, which reflects Articles8
and10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Court havi ng no jurisdiction to interpret that instrument.
He finds it regrettable that the Court adopted a r estrictive interpretation of Article5 and, at the
same time, a broad interpretation of the first part of Article 11 and a restrictive interpretation of the
second part of that same Article. He believes that the Court has assumed a position capable of - 5 -
being interpreted as contributing to “faits accomplis”, or which might lead to renewed deterioration
of the negotiations and relations between the two States. He adds that the Court’s lack of
jurisdiction is corroborated by the fact that NAT O’s decision of 3April2008 is an act of that
international organization, and that Greece does not have to answer for the acts of organizations of
which it is a member.
Judge Roucounas then argues that the Applican t’s conduct is incompatible with Article 5 of
the Interim Accord, which sets out the Parties’ obligation to conduct negotiations in good faith. He
believes that resolution 817 was incorporated into Article 5 of the Interim Accord precisely because
it refers to “the difference . . over the name”. Article 5 establishes a balance between the Parties’
rights and obligations. Its first paragraph requires negotiations “with a view to reaching agreement
on the difference”, firstly over what is meant by “name” and secondly over who should use it. The
second paragraph of Article5 reinforces the first, “without prejudice” to the difference over the
name, by stipulating that the Parties must facilitate their relations, in particular their economic and
commercial relations and “shall take practical m easures” to that end. He believes that the
intransigence of the Applicant in respect of the “dual formula” was compromising the negotiations
between the Parties, which he considers is clearl y illustrated by statements of the President and
Prime Minister of the FYROM, which he cites verb atim and which, in his view, have a potentially
destructive character, but on which the Judgment rema ins silent. He recalls that Greece altered its
position and made known that it would be willing to accept a name which included the term
“Macedonia”, on the condition that it was accompanied by a qualifier and that that name should be
used erga omnes. The FYROM, on the other hand, declared that the international use of a name
which differed from its constitutional name was unaccepta ble. He adds that it is permissible to
question whether the Applicant’s actions were in compliance with the generally recognized
conditions for the proper conduct of “meaningful” negotiations, and its good faith in a process
which has been ongoing for 16 years without success.
The judge then examines the question of admission to “closed” or “regional” organizations,
since NATO differs from the other organizations on account of its military and defence-related
nature. He states that the competent organ within the organization can lay down additional
conditions for the admission of a new member. Po litical factors, relating as much to the qualities
of the candidate State as to its relations with the member States, also come into play during the
admissions process, and it is for each member State to determine subjectively whether all the
necessary criteria have been met before giving its assent. To admit a new member to NATO, the
member States — once they have determined whether the European candidate State is in a position
to further the principles of the Treaty and to contri bute to the security of the North Atlantic area —
decide by unanimous agreement to invite that State to accede to the organization (Art.10 of the
North Atlantic Treaty). It follows that all member States, without exception, have the right — the
obligation even— to decide whether the candida te State meets the necessary conditions for its
admission to the organization. And any member State whose relations with the candidate State are
a source of direct concern cannot be prevented from expressing its opinion on the real state of those
relations. Stating that it is not entitled to do so prevents that State
from exercising its rights.
NATO’s decision followed calls by the organization directed towards the Applicant for “mutually
acceptable solutions to outstanding issues”.
The opinion disagrees with the interpretation given by the Court to Article 11 of the Interim
Accord, which not only favours the first part of th e first paragraph of the Article over the second
part of the same paragraph, but also infringes the rights and obligations of the Respondent in
relation to third parties. Thus, excessive weight is attached by the Court to the first part of
Article 11, paragraph 1 — which contains another “unusual feature” in the phrase “the Party of the
First Part agrees not to object”— to the point of rendering it unintelligible . With no decisive
argument, the Court minimizes the scope of the second part of paragraph1, which sets outs the
conditions for the use of the name FYROM. According to the judge, the idea that the second part
of Article 11, paragraph 1, would only apply were the organization to admit the Applicant under a
name other than FYROM is completely misconcei ved, and the distinction between what happens - 6 -
before and what happens after admission to the international organizations is not legally tenable, in
view of the treaty and of the specific nature of NATO. As regards the admission procedure,
JudgeRoucounas notes that the Alliance’s deci sion was taken in accordance with the usual
practice, following consultation within and outside the organization. Since individual views are
absorbed into the organization’s decision, it is impossible to distinguish Greece’s position from that
of the organization. NATO has its own procedures based on the consensus of its member States.
The judge adds that the Court’s reading of the phrase “the Party of the First Part agrees not
to object” (to the admission to international orga nizations) results in depriving the Respondent of
established international competencies. In contr ast, a balanced reading of Article11 would have
enabled the Court to find that the Respondent was not prohibited, legally or politically, from
making public the reasons why, in its view, the A pplicant’s deliberate attitude was in breach of the
Interim Accord and failed to meet the conditions of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, despite
repeated calls from the Alliance’s organs for the Parties to settle the difference over the name.
As regards international protest, he recalls th at this is a legal concept of customary law,
whereby a subject of international law objects to an official act or conduct of another subject which
it considers to be in breach of international law. Protest acquires greater weight when it opposes an
act or conduct which is inconsistent with the in ternational obligations of the other subject of
international law. It has the effect of preserving the rights of the protesting subject and bringing to
the fore the unlawful nature of the official act or conduct at issue. It is further strengthened by and
becomes indisputable through its repetition. J udgeRoucounas observes that the Court has never
relied on the number of protests in order to determine their legal effect; in the present case,
however, the Judgment finds the eight protests by Greece in the period between the adoption of
resolution817 and the conclusion of the Interim A ccord to be insufficient, and contests the many
others (approximately 85) voiced by Greece since th e conclusion of the Interim Accord against the
FYROM’s use of its constitutional name within international organiza tions. JudgeRoucounas
expresses concern that, by using quantitative measures in this way to determine the legal status of
an international act, the Court may undermine the very concept of international protest.
Judge Roucounas stresses the notion of good neighbourliness. The right of neighbourliness
and the right of good neighbourliness are evolving concepts. When good neighbourliness is
embodied in an international treaty, it becomes a le gal principle, to be read in conjunction with the
fundamental principles laid down by the United Na tions Charter, which the commentaries on the
Charter generally regard as legally enshrining the mutual right of neighbouring States to the
protection of their legitimate interests. He a dds that the principle of good neighbourliness is not
binding on States alone but, to the extent that its non-observance may compromise the actions of
the organs of the international community, it is also an obligation incumbent on international
organizations, which must ensure that it is respected. JudgeRoucounas recalls that good
neighbourliness is specifically mentioned in resolutions 817 and 845 and in NATO’s
communiqués, and that the Interim Accord limits the Parties’ freedom of action in seven places, its
object being precisely to regulate peaceful relations between the States. That is why provision was
made in the Accord for the Applicant to be re ferred to provisionally and for all purposes as the
FYROM within international organizations, pe nding the settlement of the difference by
negotiation. According to JudgeRoucounas, the Applicant’s acts of provocation, which are in
breach of those obligations, continue in various forms: irredentist claims concerning the
geographical and ethnic frontiers of the FYROM, which extend beyond its political borders, school
books, maps, official encyclopaedias and inflammatory speeches.
Article22 is a response to the concern expressed by those who study the law of treaties
regarding the problems of interpretation and uncer tainties caused by the silence of international
agreements on the relationship between those agreem ents and other earlier or subsequent treaties.
It is not simply a standard clause, and is aimed at avoiding any potential doubt arising from the
interpretation of Article30, para graph2, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Article22 applies to the whole of the Interim Ac cord and should be read in conjunction with - 7 -
Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which prevents a member State from waiving its rights and
duties towards the Alliance. Moreover, in inco rporating Article22 in the Interim Accord, both
Parties were deemed to be aware of its scope in light of the specific military and defence-related
nature of NATO’s constituent treaty.
With regard to the Respondent’s reliance, in the alternative, on the principle of exceptio non
adimpleti contractus, Judge Roucounas concludes that the exceptio expresses a principle so just and
so equitable that it can be found in one form or anot her in every legal system. It is the corollary of
reciprocity and of synallagmatic agreements and a general principle of law, independently of
Article60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. For, as the Court made clear in the
case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, general international
law and treaty law constantly overlap. Article 60 do es not deprive the injured party of the right to
invoke the exceptio. Greece has responded mildly to the A pplicant’s practices. In the case of the
latter’s application to join NATO, it did not seek a suspension or termination of the Accord as such;
it made its position widely known, but without invoki ng specific articles of the Interim Accord. It
is, however, important not to lose sight of the word ing of Article66, paragraph5, of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that: “[w]ithout prejudice to article 45, the fact
that a State has not previously made the notification prescribed in paragraph 1 shall not prevent it
from making such notification in answer to another party claiming performance of the treaty on
alleging its violation”. Greece has satisfied the substantive conditions of proportionality and
reversibility. In respect of the procedural conditions, flexibility is permitted, the International Law
Commission’s draft Articles being a mix of codification and progressive development.
JudgeRoucounas then examines the Court’s a pproach to countermeasures. He concludes
that, taking into account the full extent of the injury suffered on account of the violations of
Articles5, 6, 7 and11 of the Interim Accord, a nd whatever the current state of international law
relating to countermeasures, the measure adopted by the Respondent satisfies the condition of
proportionality. He believes that the Court’s assessment of those violations fails to address the
substance of the issues.
Declaration of Judge ad hoc Vukas
The author agrees with the conclusion of the Court that it has jurisdiction to entertain the
Application of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and that this Application is admissible.
He also shares the view of the Court that the Hell enic Republic violated Article 11, paragraph 1, of
the Interim Accord signed by the Parties on 13 Se ptember 1995. However, he does not agree with
the conclusion of the Court to reject the Applic ant’s request that the Court orders that the
Respondent has to comply with its obligations under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord
also in the future.
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Summary of the Judgment of 5 December 2011