Summaries of Judgments, AdviNot an official document of the Internationa
l Court of Justice
ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO (NEW
APPLICATION: 2002) (DEMOCRATIC REPIJBLIC OF THE CONGO v. RWANDA)
(PROVISIONAL MEASURES)
Order of 10 July 2002
In an Order in the case concerning Armed Activities on Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby; Judge ad
the Temtory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) hoc Mavungu;
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), the Court AGAINST:Judgead hocDugard."
rejected the request for the indication of provisional
measures submitted by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (hereinafter"the Congo").
In its Order, the Court concludes that "[it] does not in Judges Koroma, Higgins, Buergenthal and Elaraby
the present case have the prima faciejurisdiction necessaryappended declarations to the Order of the Court; Judges ad
to indicate those provisional measures requested by the hoc Dugard and Mavunguappendedseparateopinionsto the
Congo". The decisionwas taken byfourteenvotesto two. Orderof the Coui-t.
The Court also found, by fifteen votes to one, "that it
cannot grant Rwanda's request that the case be removed
fromtheList".
The Court was composed as follows: President
Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh,
Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra- In its Order, the Coui-trecalls that, on 38 May 3002, the
Aranguren,Kooijmans,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal. Congo had institutedproceedingsagainstRwanda inrespect
Elaraby: Judges ad hoc Dugard, Mavungu; Registrar of a dispute concerning "massive, serious and ilagrant
Couvreur. violations of human rightsand of international humanitarian
law" alleged to have been committed "in breach of the
'International Bill of Human Rights', other relevant
iiiternational instruments and mandatoiy resolutions of the
The full text of the operative paragraph of the Order United Nations SecurityCouncil". The Court recalls that, in
reads as follows: the Application the Congo stated that "[the] flagrant and
serious violations [of human rights and of international
"94. For thesereasons, humanitarian law]" of which it complains "result from acts
THE COURT, of armed aggressionperpetrated by Rwandaon the teiritory
(1) By fourteenvotesto two,
of the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo in flagrant breach
Rejects the request for the indication of provisionaof the sovereignty and territorial integrity [of the latter], as
measures submitted by the Democratic Republic of the guaranteedby the UnitedNations and OAU Charters".
Congoon 28 May 2002; The Court stresses that the Coiigo has recalled that it
IN FAVOUR: President Guillaume; Vice-President made a declaration recognizing the coinpulsoiyjurisdiction
Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, of theCOLIIi-n~accordance with Article 36, paragraph 3, of
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, the Statute of the Court; and that it stated that the Rwandati
Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judge ad hoc Gove~nmeni"has madeno suchdeclarationof any sort".
Dugard; The Court adds that referring to Article 36, paragraph 1,
AGAINST:JudgeElaraby;Judge ad hoc Mavungu; of the Statute, the Congo has relied, in order to found the
(2) By fifteenvotesto one, jurisdiction of the Court, on Article 22 of the Inteinational
Convc:ntion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Rejects the submissions by the Rwandese republic
seekingtheremoval ofthe casefromthe Court's List; Discrimination of 7 March 1966 (hereinafter the
IN FAVOUR:President Guillaume; Vice-President "Convention on Racial Discrimination"), Article 29,
Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, paragraph 1, of the Conventio~ion the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Woinen of 18 December
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, 1979 (hereinafter the "Convention on Discrimination Jlwisdiction of the Cotrrt
against Women":), Article IX of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crimeof Genocide of 9 With regardto itsjurisdiction, the Court observesthat, in
December 1948 (hereinafte:rthe "Genocide Convention"), accordancewith Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the
Congo (then Zaire), by means of a declaration dated 8
Article 75 of the Constitutioil of the World Health February 1989, recognized the coinpulsoryjurisdiction of
Organization of 22 July 1946 (hereinafter the "WHO the Court in relation to any State accepting the same
Conslihltion").Article XIV, paragraph 2, of the Constitution obligation; that Rwanda on the other hand has not ~nade
of the United Nations Educational, Scientificand Cultural
Organization of 16 November 1945 (hereinafter the such a declaration;that the Court accordinglywill consider
"UNESCO Constitution") (as well as Article 9 of the itspriina faciejurisdiction solely on the basisof the treaties
Convention on the P1ivil.eges and 1inmuni.ties of the and co~lventionsrelied upon by the Congo pursuant to
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, providing: "Thc
Specialized Agencies of 21 November 1947,which is"also jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the
applicable to UNESCO"), Article30, paragraph 1. of the parties refer toit and all matters speciallyprovided forin the
Convention against Torture: and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Charter of the United Nations or in treatiesand conventions
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984
(hereinafter the"Conventio:nagainst Torture"), andArticle in force."
14, paragraph 1, of the ~&eal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safkty of Civil The Convention against Torture
Aviation of 23 September 1971 (hereinafter tb: "Montreal The Court notes that the Congo has beena party to that
Convention"). The Congo furthermore maintains that the Convention since 1996,butthat Rwanda statedthat it isnot,
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties gives the and has never been, party to the 1984 Convention against
Court jurisdiction to settle disputes arising: from the Torture.The Court findsthat such is indeedthe case.
violation of peremptory no~tns (iuscogens) in the area of
human rights, as those nolrns are reflected ins!number of
inten~ationalinstruments. The Conveiltion on Racial Discrimination
The Court first notes that both the Congoand Rwanda
The Court recalls that on the same day the Congo had
submitted a request for the indication of provisional are parties to the Conventioilon Racial Discrimination; that
measures. however Rwanda's instrument of accession to the
Convention includesa reservation reading as follows:"The
Reasoning of'tke Cozri.1 Rwandese Republic does not consider itself as bouild by
article 22 [the dispute settlementclause] of theConvention."
In its Order, the Court first emphasizes thatit "is deeply It also notes that in the present proceedings the Congohas
concernedby the deplorablehuman tragedy,loss of life, and challenged the validity of that reservation. The Court
enorrrloussuffering in the east of the Democratic Republic
observes that the Convention on Racial Discrimination
of the Co~lgoresulting from the continued fighting there". prohibits reservations incompatible with its object and
Mindful of the purposes and principles of the United purpose; that under Article 20, paragraph 2, of the
Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the Convention, "[a] reservation shall be considered
maintenance of peace and security under the Charter and its incompatible ..if at least two-thirds of the States Parties to
Statute, the Court "finds it necessary toemphasize that all this Conventio~~ob-jectto it"; that such has not beenthe case
partie:;to proceedings before it:must act in conf3nnity with in rcspect of Rwanda's reservation concerning the
their obligations pursuant to the United NationsCharterand jurisdiction of the Court; that that reservation does not
other rules of ii~ternationallaw, including hi~manitarian appear incompatible with the object and purpose of the
law''.The Court co~~sidertshat it "cannot in the present case Conveation; and that the Congo did not object to that
over-en~phasizethe obligation borne by the Congo and reservation when it acceded to the Convention. The Court
Rwanda to respect the provisions of the Geneva concludes that Rwanda's reservation is prima facie
Conventions of 13 August 1949 and of the first Protocol applicable.
additional to those Conventions, of8 June 1977,relating to
the protection ofvictinis of internationalanned conflicts,to
which instrl~nlel~tsothof them areparties". The Genocide Convention
The Court first notes that both the Congo and Rwanda
The Cowt then points out that it "does not auto~~~atically
have jurisdiction over legal disputes between States" and are parties to the Genocide Convention; that however
that "one of the fundamentalprinciples of its Strituteis that Rwanda's instrument of accession to the Convention,
it cannot decide a dispute between States without the includes a resellration worded as follows: "The Rwandese
conse~~tof those States to its jurisdiction". Rloreover it Republic does not consider itself asbound by article IX [the
cannot indicate provisionalnleasureswithout its,jurisdiction dispute settleinelitclause] of the Convention." Italso notes
that in the present proceedings the Congohas challengedthe
inthe case being establishedprima facie (at firstsight). validity of that reservation. The Court observes "that the
rights and obligatioi~senshrined by the Coilvention are
rights and obligations ergo ornne.~" and that, as it alreadyhad occasion to point out, "the ei-gaornrrescharacter of a shows that Article 2 thereof, relied on bythe Congo, places
normand the iule of consenttojurisdiction aretwo different obligationson the Organization,not onthe member States.
things" andthat it does not follow from the mere factthat
rights and obligationserga omnes are at issue in a dispute The UNESCO Constitution
that the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon that
dispute. The Court then takes note of the fact that the The Court notes that in its Application the Congo
Genocide Convention does not prohibit reservations; that invokes Article I of the Constitution and maintains that
"[olwing to the war, the DemocraticRepublicof the Congo
the Congo did not object to Rwanda's reservationwhen it today is unableto fulfil its missions withinUNESCO ..."It
was made; and that thatreservation does not bear on the
substance of the law, but only on the Court's jurisdiction. takes note of the fact thatboth the Congo and Rwandaare
The Court finds that that reservation therefore does not partiesto theUNESCOConstitution.
appearcontraryto the objectand purpose of the Convention. The Court observeshoweverthatArticleXIV,paragraph
2, provides for the referral,under the conditionsestablished
in that provision, of disputes concerning the UNESCO
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Constitution only in respect of the interpretation of that
The Court considers that Article 66 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties must be read in Constitution;thatthat doesnot appearto bethe objectof the
Congo's Application; and that the Application does not
conjunction with Article 65, entitled "Procedure to be thereforeappearto fall withinthe scopeofthat Article.
followedwith respect to invalidity, termination, withdrawal
from or suspensionof the operation of a treaty". It observes The Montreal Convention
that the Congo does not maintain at the present time that
there is a dispute, which could not be resolved under the The Court first notes that both theCongo and Rwanda
procedure prescribed in Article 65 of the Vienna are parties to the Montreal Convention.It considers that the
Convention, between it and Rwanda concerning a conflict Congo has not however asked the Court to indicate any
provirsionalmeasure relating to the preservation of rights
between a treaty and a peremptory norm of international
law; and that theobject of Article66 is not to allow for the which it believes it holds under the Montreal Convention;
substitution of the judicial settlement, arbitration and and that accordingly the Court isnot required, at this stage
conciliationproceduresunderthe Vienna Conventionon the in the:proceedings, to rule, even on a prima facie basis, on
Law of Treaties for the settlement machinery for disputes itsjurisdiction underthat Convention nor on the conditions
relating to the interpretation or application of specific precedent to the Court's jurisdiction containedtherein.
treaties, notablywhen a violation of those treaties hasbeen
alleged.
Conclusions
The Court concludesthat it follows from the preceding
The Convention on Discrimination against considerations taken togetherthat the Court does not in the
Women
present case have the prima facie jurisdiction necessaryto
The Court first notes that both the Congo and Rwanda indimte those provisionalmeasuresrequestedby the Congo.
are parties to the Convention on Discrimination against
Women. It then considers that at this stage in the
proceedings the Congo has not shown that its attempts to
enter into negotiationsor undertake arbitration proceedings However, the findings reached by the Court in the
present proceedingsin no wayprejudge the question of the
with Rwanda concernedthe application of Article29 of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the meritsof the case
Convention on Discrimination against Women; and that or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
neither has the Congo specifiedwhich rights protected by Application, or relating to the merits themselves; andthey
that Convention have allegedly been violated by Rwanda leave unaffected the right of the Governmentsofthe Congo
and shouldbe the object of provisionalmeasures.The Court and of Rwandato submittheir argumentsin respect of those
concludes that the preconditionson the seisin of the Court
set by Article 29 of the Conventiontherefore donot appear questions; in the absence of a manifestlack of jurisdiction,
prima facieto havebeen satisfied. the Court finds that it cannot grant Rwanda's request that
the casebe removedfromtheList.
The Court finally recalls that "there is a fundamental
The WHO Constitution distinctionbetweenthe questionof the acceptanceby a State
of the Court's jurisdiction and the compatibilityof particular
The Court first notes that both the Congo and Rwanda
are parties to the WHO Constitutionand that bothare thus acts with internationallaw; the former requires consent; the
members of that Organization.The Court considershowever latter question can only be reached when the Court deals
that at this stage in the proceedings the Congo has alsonot with the merits after having established its jurisdictionand
shown that the preconditionson the seisin of the Court set havingheardfulllegalargumentsby bothparties".
by Article 75 of the WHO Constitutionhave been satisfied; It underlines that whether or not States accept the
juriscliction of the Court, they remain in any event
andthat moreoveran initial examinationofthat Constitution
responsible for acts attributable to them that violate Judge Koroma concludes by stating that, if ever a
internationallaw; that in particularthey are requiredto fulfil
their obligationsunder the 'UnitedNations Charter; that the dispute warranted the indication of interim measures of
Court cannot but note in this respect that the Security protection, this is it. Bute is of the opinion that, while it
Council has adopted a great number of resolutions was not possible for the Court to grant the request owing to
conct:rning the situation in the region, i11 particular certain missing elements, the Court has, in accordancewith
resoliltions 1234 (1999), 1291 (2000), 1304 (:2000), 1316 its obiter dicta in the cited paragraphs, nevertheless
(2000), 1323 (2000), 1332 (2000), 1341 (2001), 1355 discharged its respoilsibilities in maintaining international
(2001.),1376(2001), 1399(2002) and 1417(2002);that the peace and security and preventing the aggravation of the
SecurityCouncil has demanded on many occasions that "all dispute.The position taken by the Court can only be viewed
the parties to the conflict put an ...end to violations of as constructive, without however prejudging the merits of
human rights and internationalhumanitarian law"; and that the case.It is ajudicial position and it is in the interestof all
it ha:; inter alia reminded "all parties of their obligations concernedto hearkento the call of the Court.
with :respectto the security #ofcivilianpopulationsunder the
Fourth Geneva Conventiori relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949", and Declaratiort ofJudge Higgiits
I do not agree with one of the limbs relied on by the
addetl that "all forces present on the territory of the Court in paragraph 79 of its Order. It is well established in
Democratic Republic of the Congo are responsible for
preventing violations of international humanitarian law in internationalhuman rights case law that it is not necessaiy,
the territory under their control". The Court stresses the for the purpose of establishingjurisdiction over the merits,
necessity for the Parties to these proceedings to use their for an applicant to identifywhich specific provisions of the
influenceto prevent the repeated grave violatio~~sf human treaty saidto foundjurisdiction are alleged to be breached.
rights and international hurnanitarian law whic:hhave been See, for example, the findings of the Human Rights
observedevenrecently. Committee on Stephens v. Jamaica (United Nations,
Oficial Records of the General Asseinbij?, Fifi-jirst
Session,Supplement No.40 (A151140));B.d.B. et al. v. The
Declaration ,ofJudge Koroma
Netherlands(ibid., Forty-fourthSessioil,Sz4pplemeilN t o. 40
Judge Koroma voted infavour of the Order because, in (Al45140));and many other cases. A .fortiori is there no
his view, it has attemptedto addresssome of the.concernsat reason for the International Court of Justice, in establishing
the heart of the request. whether it has prima facie jurisdiction for purposes of the
Referring to the allegations and contention!;of each of indication of provisional measures, to suggest a more
the Parties, he observes that fromthe informatic~nsubmitted stringent test. It should rather be for the Court itself, in
accordance with the usual practice, to see whether the
to the Court it is apparent that real, serious threats do exist
to the population of the region concerned, irlcluding the claims madeby the Congoand the facts allegedcould prima
threatto life. facie constitute violations of any particular clause in the
Judge Koromais aware -thatthe Court has set out certain Convention on the Eliiniilation of All Forms of
criteria to be satisfied befbre granting a request for the Discriminationagainst Women, the instrument relied onby
indication of provisional measures. Among these are that the Congo as providing the Court with jurisdiction over the
merits.
there inust be prima facie or potentialurisdiction, urgency,
and tlherisk of irreparable harm if an order is not granted. However, as I agree with the other elements in
But these criteria, in his view, have to be considered in the paragraph 79, and with the legal consequeilce that flows
context of Article 41, which authorizes the Court to fromthem, I have votedin favourof the Order.
"indicate", ifit considers that the circumstance:;so require,
anyprovisionalmeasure which oughtto be taken topreserve Declaration of Judge Blrergenthal
the respective rights of either party, and of the Court'srole
in maintaining international peace and securit:~,including While agreeing with the Court's decision, Judge
Buergenthal disagrees with the inclusion in the Court's
human securityand the rightto life. Order of the languagefound inits paragraphs 54-56and 93.
In Judge Koroma's view, theCourt,although it has been He does not object to the high-minded propositions they
unable to grant the request for want of prima facie express, but considers that they deal with matters the Court
jurisd.iction, has, in paragraphs 54, 55, 56 and 93 of the
Order, rightly and judiciously expressed its deep concern has no jurisdiction to address once it has ruled that it lacks
over the deplorable human tragedy, loss of life and prima facie jurisdiction to issue the requested provisional
measures.
enornnoussuffering in the east of the Democra1:icRepublic In his view, the Coui-t'sfunction is to pronounce itself
of the Congo resulting frorn the fighting there. It has also on matters within its jurisdiction and not to voice personal
rightly emphasized that whetheror not States accept the sentimentsorto make comments, generalor specific,which,
jurisd.iction of the Court, they remain, in any event,
responsible for acts attributable to them that violate despite their admittedly "feel-good" qualities, have no
international law and that :theyare required to fulfil their legitimateplace in this Order.
obligations under the United NationsCharter and in respect Judge Buergenthal emphasizes that tlie Court's own
"responsibilities in the maintenance of peace and security
of the relevant SecurityCouncilresolutions.under the Charter", which it invokes in paragraph 55, are powers under Article 41 of the Statute. This progressive
not general. They are strictly limitedto the exercise of its shifthas not, inhis view,been reflected inthe Order.
judicial hnctions in cases over which it has jurisdiction.
2. His reading of the two subparagraphs together
Hence, when the Court, without having the requisite convinces him that the Court is vested witha wide scope of
jurisdiction, makes pronouncements such as thosefound in discretion to decide on the circumstances warrantingthe
paragraph 55, for example, which read like preamblesto indication of provisional measures. The reference to the
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council underlines the prominence of the link
SecurityCouncil,it isnot acting likeajudicial body. between the Court and the Council in matters relatedto the
As for paragraph 56, Judge Buergenthal believesthat the maint~:nanceof inteinational peace and security. The Statute
fact that this statement is even-handed in thatit addresses moreover does not attach additional conditions to the
both Parties to the case, does not make it any more authority of the Court to grant provisional measures. In
appropriatethan it would be if it hadbeen addressed to only point of fact, the jurisdiction of the Court need not be
one of them. It is inappropriate, first, because the Court has established at this early stage of the proceedings.
no jurisdiction in this case to call on theSta.tesparties to 3. In his view, the Montreal Convention should have
respect the Geneva Conventions or the other legal
been regarded as a suitable instrumental basisto provide a
instruments and principles mentioned in the paragraph. prima facie jurisdiction for the indication of provisional
Second, since the request for preli~nina~ymeasures by the measures.
Democratic Republic of the Congo soughta cessation by 4. He is of the opinion that the circumstancesof the
Rwanda of activities that might be considered to be case reflect an urgent needto protect the rights and interests
violations of the Geneva Conventions, the Court's of the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo.
pronouncemelitin paragraph56 can bedee~iledto lend some
credence to this claim. The latter conclusion is strengthened
Sepnrczteopiiiion of Judge D~rgard
by the language of paragraph 93, which bears close
resemblance to some of the language the Court would iiiost In his separate opinion Judge Dugard endorses the
likely employ if it had granted the provisional measures Court"s Order that the Congo has failed to show, prima
request. The fact that the paragraph is addressed to both facie, a basis on which thejurisdiction of the Court might be
Pal-tiesis irrelevant, for in comparable circun~stancesthe established and that, as a consequence, its request for
Court has issued provisional measures formulatedin similar provisional measures should be rejected. He disagrees,
language addressed to both Parties although they were
however, with the Court's Order that the case should notbe
requested by only one of them. removedfrom its List.
Judge Buergenthal considers that, whether intendedor Judge Dugard maintains that a case should be removed
not, the Court's pronouncements, particularly those in from the Court's List where there is no reasonable
paragraphs 56 and 93, might be deemedto lend credence to possibility tliat the applicantmight in future be able to
the factual allegations submittedby the party seeking the establish the jurisdiction of the Court in the dispute
provisional measures. In the hture, they niight also submitted to it on the basis of the treaties invoked for
encourage States to file provisional measures requests, jurisdiction, on the ground that in such a case there is a
knowing that, even though they would be unable to sustain inanifest lack of jurisdictio- the test employed by the
the burden of demonstrating the requisite prima facie Court inprevious decisions for movinga case from itsList.
jurisdiction, they would obtain froni the Court some An examination of the treaties invokedby the Congo to
proiiourlcementstliatcouldbe interpretedas supportiiigtheir
claiin against the other party. found jurisdiction in this case leads him to conclude that
they manifestly cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction.
Consequently, he maintains that the case should have been
Declnrntioit of Judge Elul-nby removed from theList.
Judge Dugard wains that, asa result of the finding of the
1. He voted against the rejection of the request for the
indication of provisional measures submitted by the Court in the LnGrand case in 2001 that an Order for
Democratic Republic of the Congo, principally because,in provisional measuresis legally binding, thereis a likelihood
accordance with its Statuteand itspresentjurisprudence, the that the Court will be inundated with requests for
Court should, in principle grant a request for provisional provisional measures. In order to guard against an abuse of
measures once the requirementsof urgency on the one hand this procedure the Court should adopta strict approach to
applications in which the basis forjurisdiction ismanifestly
and likelihood of irreparable damageto the rights of one or unfoundedby removing such cases from the List.
both parties to a dispute, on the other, have been established.
He is of the opinion that the Court has, under Article 41 of Judge Dugard expresses his support for the general
the Statute, a wide-ranging power of discretion to indicate comments made by the Court on the tragic situationin the
provisional measures. eastern Congo. He stresses that these comments deploring
the suffering of people in the eastern Congo resulting froin
The jurisprudence of the Court has progressively, albeit the conflict in that region and calling upon States to act in
gradually, advanced from its earlier strict insistence on
established jurisdiction to acceptance of prima facie confoiinity with inteinational law are addressed to both
jurisdiction as the thresholdfor the exercise of the Court'sRwanda andthe Congo, aridin no way prejudge the issues against Torture. In accordance with the Court's settled
in this case. jurisprudence, itsjurisdiction can be establishedonly on the
basisof States' consent.
Separate opinion ofJudge Mavurzgu On the other hand, he considers that the Court's
Judge Mavungu approves of the general terms of the jurisdiction could be founded prima facie under the
Order of the Court. However,owing to the nature of the compromissoryclauses appearingin the WHOConstitution,
dispute, the Court, in his view, could have prescribed the Montreal Convention of 1971and the 1979Convention
provisionalmeasuresnotwi.thstandingthe narrcwnessof the on Discrimination against Women. The Rwandese
basesof theCourt's jurisdiction. Republic's reservationin respect of thejurisdictional clause
in Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention is, in his
His opinion addresses two main questions: the basis of
the Court's jurisdictionand the requirements governingthe view,contraryto the objectandpurpose ofthat Convention.
indkation of provisional measures. In respect of the first In accordancewith Article 41 of the Statuteand Article
question, he notes that the Democratic Republic of the 73 of the Rules of Court,as well as the Court's well-settled
Congo advanced several legal grounds to establish the jurisprudence, the granting of provisional measures is
dependent on various factors: urgency, preservationof the
Court's jurisdiction: the Congo's February198'3declaration
recognizingthe compulsoryjurisdictionof the Court,certain rights of the parties, non-aggravation of the dispute and
com~)romissory clausesand.norms ofjus cogens. Severalof prima facie jurisdiction. He believes that those conditions
the grounds asserted by the Applicant could not found the have been satisfied in the present case and that this should
jurisdiction of the Court: the Congo's 1989declaration,the have ledthe Courtto indicateseveralprovisionalmeasures.
UNESCO Constitution of 1946 and the 1984 Convention
Summary of the Order of 10 July 2002