Summaries of Judgments, AdvNot an official documents of the Internationa
l Court of Justice
SOUTH-WEST AFRICACASIES (SECOND PHASE)
Judgmentof18July 1966
The SouthWestAfricacases (Ethiopia v.South Africa; ify the Mandate withoutthe consentof the United Nations
Liberiav.SouthAfrica),whichrelateto thecontinuedexist- GeneralAssembly,which, it was contendedby the Appli-
enceof theMandateforSouLh WestAfrica andthedutiesand cants, had replacedthe Councilof the Leaguefor this and
pedormanceofSouthAfrica.asMandatory :thereundew r,ere otherpurposes.
institutedby Applicationsof the Governm.entsof Ethiopia Beforedealingwiththese questions,however,the Court
andLiberiafiledintheRegistryon4November1960.Byan considered that therewere two questionsof an antecedent
Orderof20May1961theCourtjoined theproceedingisnthe character,appertainitothemeritsofthecase,whichmight
twocases. TheGovernmentof SouthAfricaraisedprelimi- renderanenquiryintoother aspectofthecaseunnecessary.
naryobjectionsto theCount'sproceedingto hearthemerits One was whetherthe Mandatestill subsistedat.alland the
of the case, but these wen: dismissedby the Courton 21 other was the questionof the Applicants'standingin this
December1962,theCourt findingthatit hadjuirisdictionto phase of theproceedings-i.e. their legal rightor interest
adjudicateuponthe meritsdthe dispute. regarding thesubjectmatterof their claims.As the Court
InitsJudgmentonthesecondphaseofthe:casestheCourt, baseditsJudgment ona findingthat the Applicantsdid not
by the Resident's casting vote, theotes being equally possess sucha legalright or interest, it did not pronounce
divided(seven-seven),foundthattheApplicantStatescould uponthe questionof whethertheMandate was stillinforce.
not beconsideredtohaveestablishedanylegalrightorinter- Moreover,theCourtemphasizedthatits 1962decisiononthe
est inthe subject matter of their claimsand accordingly questionof competence was givenwithoutprejudiceto the
decidedtorejectthem. questionof the survivalof the Mandate-a questionapper-
TheResident, SirPercy Spender, has appendeda Decla- taining tohe meritsof the case, and not in issue in 1962
rationtotheJudgment. JudgeMorelliandJudge adhoe van exceptin the sense thatsurvivalhad to be assumedfor the
Wykhave appendedseparalbopinions.Vice-PresidentWel- purpose of determining the purely jurisdictionalsue-
lington Koo, Judges Korc:tsky,Tanaka, Jessup, Padilla which wasall thatwasthen beforetheCourt.
NervoandForsterandJudge ad hoeSorLouisMbanefohave lbrning tothe basisof its decisioninthe preproceed-
appendeddissentingopiniorris. ings, theCourtrecalled that themandatessystemwasinsti-
tutedbyArticle22oftheCovenantoftheLeagueofNations.
Therewere three categoriesof mandates, 'A','B' and 'C'
mandates,whichhad,however, variousfeaturesincommon
as regards their structure.The principalelement of each
instrumentof mandateconsistedof thearticlesdefiningthe
The Applicants, actingin the capacityof States which mandatory'spowers andits obligationsiinrespect of the
were membersofthe formelLeagueofNations,put forward inhabitantsof the territoryand towardsthe Leagueanits
various allegationsof caritraventionsof'the League of organs.TheCourt referredto theseasthe "conduct" provi-
Nations Mandatefor South.WestAfrica bjrthe Republicof sions. In addition, each instrumentof mandatecontained
SouthAfrica. articlesconfemngcertainrightsrelativetothemandatedter-
ThecontentionsoftheRlrtiescovered,interulia, the fol- ritory directlyuponthemembersoftheLeagueasindividual
lowing issues: whetherheMandatefor S13uth WestAfiica States,orinfavourof their nationals. Court referredto
wasstillinforceand,ifso, ywhethetrheMandatory'sobliga- .rightsof this kind as "special interests",embodiedin the
tion tofurnish annualrepcx ts its administrationto the "special interests" provissfthemandates.
Councilof the Leagueof Nationshad become transformed In addition, every mandate contain4 a jurisdictional
intoanobligationsotorep13 totheGenenilAssemblyofthe clause, which, with a single exception,.was in identical
United Nations; whethetrhlr:Respondenthrid,inaccordance terms,providingforareferenceofdisputestothePermanent
withtheMandate, promotedto the utmostthe ]materialand CourtofInternationalJustice, which,theCourtdfoundin
moralwell-being andthesocialprogressoftheinhabitantsof thefirstphaseoftheproceedings,wasnow,byvirtueofArti-
the temtory; whetherthe lvlandatoryhad conlsslvenedthe cle37 oftheCourt'sStatutetobeconstruedasareferenceto
prohibitionin the Mandate:of the "military mining of thethepmsentCourt.
natives" andtheestablishn1,enotf militaryornaval basesor The Courtdrewa distinctionbetweenthe "conduct" and
the erectionoffortificatiarlsin the territory; iind whether "special interests" provisionsof the mandates, the
South Africahadcontraveiledthe provisioninthe Mandate presentdisputerelatingexclusivetotheformer.Theques-
thatit(theMandate)canon:lybemodifiedwiththeconsentof tiontobe decided waswhetheranylegalrightorinterestwas
theCounciloftheLeague ccl ations,byattemptingtomod- vestetiin membersof theLeagueof Nationsindividuallyas
Continued on next pageregards the "conduct" clauses of the mandates-i .e., date,itwasnotstat4 thattheconsentofindividualmembers
whether the variousmandatorieshad any direct obligation oftheLeaguewas i~dditionalltyequired. Individualmembers
towardsthe othermembersof the League individually, as oftheLeaguewen notpartiestothe various instrumentsof
regards the carrying outof the "conduct" provisionsof themandate, thoughtheydid, toa limitedextent,andincertain
mandates.IftheanswerwerethattheApplicantscouldnotbe respectsonly,&riiverights from them. They could draw
regardedas possessingthe legal right or interest claimed,fromthe instrumentsonly suchrightsas theseunequivocally
then evenif the variousallegationsofn~traventionosf the conferred.
Mandatefor SouthWestAfrica wereestablished,theAppli- Had individualmembers of the League poses& the
CantswouldStillnot be entitledto the pro:nOUnCemenasd rightswhichthe Applicantsclaimedth=mto havehad, he
declarationswhich,intheirfinalsubmissiomst,heyaskedthe positionofamanhtory caughtbetweenthedifferentexpres-
Courtto make. sionsof view of sorneor50Stateswouldhave,beenunten-
It was intheir capacity as formermembers ofthe League able. Furthermore,the normal League votinrulewas una-
ofNationsthattheApplicants appearedbeforetheCourt;and nimity,andasthe mandatorywas a memberof theCouncil
therightstheyclaimedwerethose thatthe membersof the onquestionsaffectiingitsmandate, suchquestionscouldnot
Leagueweresaid to havebeeninvestedwithin the timeof be decided againstthe mandatory'scontraryvote.Thissys-
theLeague.Accordingly,inordertodetermlinetherightsand temwasinconsistetitwiththepositionclaimedforindividual
obligationsof thePartiesrelativeto theMiindate,the Court Leaguemembersby the Applicants,and if, as membersof
had toplaceitselfatthepointintimewhenthemandatessys- the League, they did not possess trightscontendedfor,
tem was instituted.Anyenquiry intotherightsand obliga- theydid notposses!;themnow.
tionsof the Partiesmustproceedprincipallyonthe basisof
consideringthetextsofthe instrumentsandprovisionsinthe *
settingoftheirperiod. * *
Similarly,attentionmustbepaidtothejuridical character
andstructureoftheinstitution,theLeagueofNations,within
theframeworkofwhichthemandatessystemwasorganized. It had beenattemptedto derivea legal rightor interestin
A fundamentalelementwas that Article2 of the Covenant principle,ofthe"Sacredtrust". TheSacredtrust,itWassaid,
providedthatthe "actionoftheLeagueundlerthisCovenant Wasa "sacred trustof civilization"and hencedl civilized
andof a Council,witha permanentSecretariat".Individual nationshadaninterestinseeingthat itwascarriedout.Butin
memberStates couldnot themselvesactdi:fferentlyrelative orderthatthis interestmighttakeonaspecificallylegalchar-
to Leaguemattersunlessit wasotherwise;speciallys~pro- acter the sacred tru.stitself must be or becomesomething
videdbysomearticleoftheCovenant. morethanamoral orhumanitarianideal.Inordertogenerate
legalrightsandobligations,itmustbegivenjuridicalexpres-
ItwasspecifiedinArticle22oftheCovenantthatthe"best sion be clothedinlegal Th moralidealmust not
ofgivingpracticaleffectto ithe]principle"thatthe beconfusedwiththelegalrulesintendedtogiveiteffect.The
"well-being and development"of thosepples in former principleof the trust,. hano residualjuridiccon-
formed"a sacre "tustofcivilization"wasthat "the tutelage tent which muld, s*far s anypaRiCular is-
ofsuchpeoples shouldbeentrustedtoadvancednations ... arned, opwte per togiveriseto legalrightsandobliga-
whoarewilling toacceptit" and it specificidly addhatit tions outsidethe systasawhole.
was uon behalfof thehaguew that -this tutelageshouldbe NorcouldtheColurtacceptthesuggestionthatevenifthe
exercisedby thosenationsas ~~&~ri~~*.~ me 'legd positionofthe.Applicantsandofotherindividualmem-
rieswere to be theagentsoftheLeagueandnotofeachand bersofthe LeaguewereastheCourtheldittobe, thiswasso
everymemberofit individually. onlyduringthelifetimeoftheLeague,andthatonthelatter's
Article22 of the Covenant providedthat "securitiesfor dissolutiontherightspreviouslyresidentintheLeagueitself,
thepe*onnance" ofthesacredtrustwere in or in its competentorgans, devolvedupon the individual
this~ovellant". BY~ara&ra~h 7s and9off!Aicle 22*every Stateswhich weremembersofit at thedateofitsdissolution.
mandatorywasto "rendertothe anannual=port in AlthoughtheCourtheldin 1962thatthemembersof a dis-
referencetotheterritory";andaPermanentMandatesCom- solvedinternationalorganizationcanbe deemed,thoughno
mission was to be constituted "to receive and examine" longermembersof it, toretain rightswhich, asmembers,
theseannualreportsand"toadvise theCouncilOn matkrS they individually when the organizationwasin
relatingto theobservanceof the lllandates". In addition,iteing,thiscouldnotextendto ascribingto them, uponand
wasprovided,intheillstlllmentsofmandatethemselves,that members, they nevtl did individuallpossess.iNor could
theannualreportsweretoberendered "tothe satisfactionof anythingthatoccurred to the dissolutioofthe
theCouncil". Leagueoperatetoinvestitsmemberswithrightstheydidnot
IndividualmemberStatesoftheLeague couldtakepartin previously havas membersoftheLeague.TheCourtcould
theadministrativeprocesonly throughtheirparticipationin not read the unilateral declarations,or statementsof inten-
theactivitiesoftheorgansbymeansofwhichtheLeaguewas tion,ma& bythevariousmandatorieson theoccasionofthe
entitledtofunction.Theyhadnorightofdirect intervention dissolutionof the League, expressing theirwillingnessto
relativeto the mandatories:this was theerogativeof the continuetobeguidedbythe mandatesintheiradministration
Leagueorgans. oftheterritoriesconcerned, conferringonthe membersof
The manner in which the mandate inr;mments were theI~agueindividuallyanynewlegalrightsOrinterestsofa
draftedonlylendsemphasisto theviewthatthemembersof kindtheydidnotpreviousl~possess.
the League generallywere not consideredas having any ItmightbesaidthatinsofarastheCourt'sviewledtothe
direct concernwiththe settingup ofthe variousmandates. conclusionthat therewasnownoentity entitledtoclaimthe
Furthermore,whiletheconsentoftheCounciloftheLeague due prformance of .theMandate,it must beunacceptable,
was tequired forany modificationof the termsof thean- butifacorrect legalxeadingofagiven situationshowedcer-
70tain allegedrightsto be nonexistent, the consequencesof The Courtnextdealtwithwhathad beencalledthebroad
this mustbe accepted.To postulate theexistenceof such andunambiguouslanguageof thejurisdictional clause-the
rights in order to avert those consequence:swould be to literal meaningof its reference to"any disputewhatever".
engagein an essentially legislative task,in the serviceof coupledwiththewords "betweentheMandatoryandanother
politicalends. - MemberoftheLeagueofNations" andthephrase "relating
lhrning tothecontentionthattheApplicants' legalrigohrt ... to the provisionsof the Mandate", which,it wassaid,
interesthadbeensettledbythe 1962Judgmentanticouldnot permitted areferencetotheCourtofadisputeaboutany pro-
now bereopened,theCourt:pointedoutthat a decision on a visionof theMandate.TheCourtwasnotofthe opinion that
preliminary objection could nevebre preclusiveof a matter theword"whatever" inArticle7, paragraph2, oftheMan-
appertainingtothe merits,whetherornot itlnadinfactbeen datedid anything morethanlendemphasisto a phrase that
dealt with in connectionwith the preliminary objection. wouldhave meant exactly thesamewithout it.The phrase
When preliminaryobjectionsw ; ereenteredbythe defendant "any dispute" (whatever) didnot meananything intrinsi-
party in a case, the proceedings on the meritswere sus- cally different from"a dispute"; nor did the referencteothe
pended,byvirtueofArticle62, paragraph3, ofthe Court's "provisions"ofthe Mandate,inthe plural, haveanydiffer-
Rules. Thereafter,and untilthe proceedings onthe merits enteffectfromwhat wouldhaveresultedfromsaying"a pro-
wereresumed, therecould benodecisionfina~lldyetermining vision". Aconsiderableproportionoftheacceptancesofthe
orprejudginganyissueofmerits.Ajudgmenton a prelimi- Court's compulsoryjurisdiction underaragirap2ofArticle
nary objectionmighttouch on a pointof merits,but this it 36 ofits Statutewere couchedin languagesimilarly broad
could doonly in a provisionawl ay,to theextentnecessary andunambiguousandeven wider. Itcouldneverbesupposed
fordecidingthequestionraiseb dythepreliminary objection. thaton the basisof this widelanguagethe acceptingState
It couldnot rankas a finaldecisionon the pointof merits wasabsolvedfromestablishinga legal rightorinterest inthe
involved. subjectmatterofitsclaim. TheCourtcouldnotentertainthe
While the 1962 Judgmentdecided thatthe .Applicants propositionthat ajurisdictionacllausebyconferringcompe-
wereentitledto invokethejurisdictionalclauseof theMan- tenceon theCourtthereby andof itselfconferreda substan-
date, it remainedfor them, on the merits, to establishthat tiveright.
they hadsuch arightorinterestinthecarryingoutofthepro- TheCourtnext advertedtothequestionofadmissibility.It
visions which they invokedas to entitle them 110the pro- observedthatthe1962Judgmenthadsimplyfoundthatit had
nouncements and dec1aratio:rrhey were selekingfrom the bbjurisdictioo adjudicateuponthe merits" and thatif any
Court. Therewasno ~ontrat~ictiob netween adecisionthat questionof admissibility were involved it wouldfall to be
the Applicantshad the capacityto invoke the jurisdictional decidednow, as occurred in the merits phase of theNone-
clauseand adecisionthatthe:Applicantshadnotestablished bohmcase; if this wereso the Courtwoulddetermine the
the legal basisoftheirclaimcsnthemerits. questioninexactly thesameway, i.e., lookingat thematter
Inrespectofthecontentionthat thejurisdictionallauseof from the point of view of the capacity of the Applicants
theMandateconferreda substantiverightto claimfromthe to advancetheir Presentclaim, the Court would hold that
Mandatorythecarryingouto.fthe"conductofthe Mandatew theyhadnotgotsuchcapacity,and hence thattheclaimWas
provisions,itwastobeobservedthatit would be remarkable inadmissible.
if so importanta right had ken created illSO casual and Finally,the Court dealt with what had been called the
almost incidental afashion. Therewas nothing aboutthis argumentof "necessityw.Thegistof thiswasthatsincethe
particularjurisdictionalclailse, in fact, to differentiateiCounciloftheLeaguehadnomeansofimposingitsviewson
frommanyothers,anditwasanalmostelementaryprinciple theMandatory,andsincenoadvisoryopinionitmightobtain
ofpnxedural lawthat adistiicictionadtobe madebetween, fromtheCourtwouldbe bindingon the lamr, theMandate
OntheOnehand,therightto2l~tivata eCOUR andtherightofa couldhavebeenfloutedat will. Hence,it wascontended,it
Courtto examinethemeritsOfaclaimand, Ontheother,the was esoential,as an ultimatesafeguardor securityfor the
plaintiffs legal right inrespectof the subjectmatterof its sac& trust, that each Memberof the League should be
claim,whichit wouldhavet,oestablishto thesatisfactionof deemal to havea legalrightor interestinthatmatterandbe
theCourt.Jurisdictionalclaurreswereadjectivalnotsubstan- abletotakedirectactionrelativetoit. Butinthefunctioning
tiveintheirnature andeffect:they didnotdeterminewhether ofthemandatessysteminpractice,muchtroublewastaken
partieshad substantiverights,butonlywhelAer,iftheyhad . to arrive, by argument, discussion, negotiation and co-
them,they couldvindicatethembyrecoursetoa tribunal. operativeeffort,at generallyacceptableconclusionsandto
The Courtthen consideretlthe rightsof imembersof the avoidsituationsinwhichtheMandatorywould beforcedto
LeagueCouncilunderthejurisdictionac llauris ofthe minor- acquiesceintheviewsoftherestoftheCouncilshortofcast-
ities treaties signed after:First WorldWar, and distin- inganadversevote.Inthiscontext,theexistenceofsubstan-
guishedthese clauses fromtlhejurisdictionalclausesof the tive rights for individual memberosfthe Leagueinthe con-
instrumentsof mandate. In the case of the:mandates, the duct of the mandates exercisable indepndently of the
jurisdictionalclause was intendedto give the individual Councilwouldhavebeenoutofplace.Furthermore,leaving
membersof the League the!meansof protectingtheir "spe- asidetheimprobabilitythat,hadtheframersofthe mandates
cialinterests"relativetothernandatedterritories;inthecase system intended thatit shouldbepossible toimpose a given
of theminoritiestreaties,the!rightof actionofthe Members policyon a mandatory, theywouldhaveleft thisto thehap
of the Council under the jurisdictional cllausewas only hazard and uncertainactionof individual membersof the
intendedfortheprotection ofminoritypopu1,ationsF.urther- League, itwas scarcely likely that asystemwhichdeliber-
more, any "difference of opinion" was characterized in atelymadeitpossible for mandatorietso blockCouncildeci-
advance in the minorities treaties as being justiciable, sionsby usingtheir veto (though,so far as the Court was
becauseitwastobe "heldtobeadisputeof aninternational aware, this had never been done) should simultaneously
character". Henceno questionof anylack d legalrightor invest individualmembero sftheLeaguewith a legar lightof
interestcould arise. Thejuirisdictionalclause of the man- complaintif the mandatory madeuse ofthis veto. In the
dates,ontheotherhand,had none ofthespecialcharacteris- internationalfield,theexistenceofobligationsthat could not
ticsoreffectsofthoseofthe minoritiestreaties. be enforcedby any legalprocesshad alwaysbeen the rule
71ratherthantheexception-and thiswasevenmorethecase in pretation. accordillgto which instrumentsmust be given
theirmaximum eflect inorderto ensurethe achievementof
1920thantoday. theirunderlyingpiuposes.Thisprinciplewasa highlycon-
Moreover,the argumentof "necessity" amountedto a troversialoneanditcould,inanyevent,havenoapplication
plea thatthe Court should allowthe equivalentof an actio tocircumstancesinwhiclitheCourtwould havetogobeyond
popularis, orrightresidentin any memberofacommunityto what could reasonablybe regardedas being a processof
takelegalactioninvindicationofapublicinterest.Butsucha interpretationandwould havetoengageinaprocessofrecti-
right was not knownto internationallaw as it stood at ficationor revision.Rights couldnot be presumedto exist
present: and theCourtwasunable toregarditasimportedby merely because itniightseemdesirablethattheyshould.The
"the general principlesof law" referred to in Article 38, Court couldnotretnedya deficiencyif, inorderto do so, it
paragraph 1 (c)of its Statute. hadtoexceedtheboundsofnormaljudicial action.
In the final analysis, the whole "nece:ssity" argument
appearedtobebasedonconsiderationsof ar;extra-legalchar- It mightalsobe :urgedthatthe Courtwouldbeentitled to
acter, theproductof a process of after-knowledge.It was concernedto foreseewhatmighthappenand tohaveregardf those
events subsequentto theperiodof the League,not anything to what it mightbe presumed theframersof the mandate
inherentin the mandates systemas it was originallycon- wouldhavewished,orwouldevenhave madeexpressprovi-
ceived,thatgaveriseto thealleged"necess;ityWw , hich,ifit sion for, had they ihadadvance knowledgeof what was to
existed,layinthepoliticalfield anddidnotconstituteneces- occur. The Court couldnot, however, presume whatthe
sity in the eyesof the law. The Courtwas nota legislative wishesandintentionsofthoseconcernedwouldhavebeenin
body.PartiestoadisputecouldalwaysasktheCourttogivea anticipationofeventsthatwereneitherforeseen norforesee-
decisionexaequoetbono, intermsofparagraph 2 ofArticle able; andevenifitcould,itwouldcertainlynotbepossibleto
38. Failingthat,thedutyoftheCourtwasplain:itsdutywas maketheassumptiaascontendedforbythe Applicantsasto
to applythelaw as it foundit, noto makeit. whatthoseintentionswere.
It mightbe urgedthatthe Courtwasentitledto "fillinthe For the foregoingreasons, the Courdtecided toreject the
gaps", inthe applicationof a teleologicalprincipleof inter- claimsoftheEmpireofEthiopiaand theRepublicofLiberia.
Summary of the Judgment of 18 July 1966