Order of 22 June 1973

Document Number
059-19730622-ORD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

NUCLEAR TESTSCASE
(NEW ZEALAND v.FRANCE)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF INTERIM
MEASURES OF PROTECTION

ORDER OF 22 JUNE 1973

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DES ESSAISNUCLÉAIRES

(NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE c. FRANCE)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 22 JUIN 1973 Officia1cit:tion
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Interim Protection, Order of
22 June 1973,I.C.J. Reports 1973,p. 135.

Mode officielde citation:

Essaisordonnancedu2juin 1973, C.I.J. Recueil 1973,p. 135.nservatoires,

Nodevent:ygo 1
I 22 JUNE 1973

ORDER

NUCLEAR TESTS CASE
(NEWZEALAND vFRANCE)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF INTERIM

MEASURES OF PROTECTION

AFFAIRE DES ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES
(NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE c. FRANCE)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

22 JUIN 1973

ORDONNANCE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1973
22June YEAR 1973
GeneraList
No.59
22June1973

NUCLEARTESTSCASE
(NEW ZEALAND v. FRANCE)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF INTERIM
MEASURES OF PROTECTION

ORDER

Present: Vice-PresidentAMMOUNA, cting President; Judges FORSTER,
GROS, BENGZON,PETRÉN,ONYEAMAI,GNACIO-PINTO DE
CASTROM , OROZOVJ,IMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA S,ir Humphrey
WALDOCK, NAGENDRS AINGHR, UDA;Judgead hoc Sir Garfleld
BARWICK R;egistrarAQUARONE.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court,

Having regard to Articleof the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the Application by New Zealandn the Registry
of the Court on 9 May 1973, instituting proceedings against France in
respect ofdispute as to the legalityof atmospheric nuclear tests in the

SouthPacificregion, and asking the Court to adjudge and declare thatthe conduct by the French Government of nuclear tests in the South
Pacificregion that give rise to radio-active fall-out constitutes a violation
of New Zealand's rights under international law, and that these rights
will be violated by any furthersuch tests,

Makes thefollowing Order:

1. Having regard to the request dated 14 May 1973and filed in the
Registry the same day, whereby the Government of New Zealand,
relying on Article 33 of the General Act ~f 1928for the PacificSettlement
of International Disputes and on Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute and
Article 66 of theRules of Court, asks the Court to indicate, pending the
finaldecision in the case brought before it by the Application of the same
date, the following interim measures of protection:
"The measure which New Zealand requests ... is that France

refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests that give rise to
radio-active fall-out while the Courts seized of the case."

2. Whereas the French Government was notified by telegram the same
day of the filing of the Application instituting proceedings and a copy
thereof was at thesame time transmitted to it by express mail;
3. Whereas, pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute and
Article 37, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, copies of the Application
were transmitted to Members of the United Nations through the Secre-
tary-General and to other States entitled to appear before the Court;

4. Whereas the submissions set out in the request for the indication of
interim measures of protection were on the day of the request commu-
nicated to the French Government, by telegram of 14 May 1973,and a
copy of the request was at thesame time transmitted to it by express mail;

5. Whereas pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the
Government of New Zealand chose the Right Honourable Sir Garfield
Barwick, Chief Justice of Australia, tosit asjudge ad hocin the case;

6. Whereas the Governments of New Zealand and France were
informed by communications of 15May 1973that theCourt would in due
course hold public hearings to afford them the opportunity of presenting
their observations on the request by New Zealand for the indication of
interim measures of protection, and by further communications of 22
May 1973the Parties were informed that such hearings would open on
24 May 1973;
7. Whereas by a letter dated 16 May 1973 from the Ambassador of
France to the Netherlands, handed by him to the Registrar the same day,

the French Government stated that it considered that the Court was
manifestly not competent in the case and that it could not accept the
Court's jurisdiction, and that accordingly the French Government did notintend to appoint an agent, and requested the Court to remove the case
from its list;
8. Whereas at the opening of the public hearings, which were held on

24 and 25 May 1973,there were present in court the Agent, Co-Agent,
counsel and other advisers Ofthe Government of New Zealand;
9. Having heard the observations on the request for interim measures
on behalf of the Government of New Zealand, and the replies on behalf
of that Government to questions put by a Member of the Court, sub-
mitted by Professor R. Q. Quentin-Baxter, Dr. A. M. Finlay, Q.C., and
Mr. R. C. Savage, Q.C.;
10. Having taken note of the final submission of the Government of
New Zealand made at the hearing of 25 May 1973, and filed in the
Registry the same day, which reads as follows:

"... New Zealand's final submissionis:thatthe Court, acting under
Article 33 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes or, alternatively, under Article 41 of its Statute,
should lay down or indicate that France, whilethe Court is seizedof
the case, refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests that give
rise to radio-active fall-out".
11. Having taken note of the written reply given by the Agent of the

Government of New Zealand on 1 June to a question put to him by a
Member of the Court;
12. Noting that the French Government was not represented at the
hearings; and whereas the non-appearance of one of the States concerned
cannot by itself constitute an obstacle to the indication of provisional
measures;
13. Whereas the Governments of New Zealand and France have been
afforded an opportunity of presenting their observations on the request
for the indication of provisional measures;
14. Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not,
before indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it hasisdiction on the
merits of the case, and yet ought not to indicate such measures unless
the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a
basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded;

15. Whereas in its Application and oral observations the Government

of New Zealand claims to found the jurisdiction of the Court on the
following provisons :
(a) Articles 36, paragraph 1, and 37 of the Statute of the Court and
Article 17of the above-mentioned General Act of 1928; and in the
alternative,
(b) Article 36,paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Statute of the Court;

16. Whereas, according to the letter of 16 May 1973 handed to the
Registrar by the French Ambassador to the Netherlands, the French138 NUCLEAR TESTS (ORDER 22 VI 73)

Government considers, inter alia, that the General Act of 1928was an
integral part of the League of Nations system and, sincethe demise of the
League of Nations, has lost its effectivity and fallen into desuetude; that

this view of the matter is confirmed by the conduct of States in regard
to the General Act of 1928 since the collapse of the League of Nations;
that, in consequence, the General Act cannot serve as a basis for the
cornpetence of the Courtto deliberate on the Application of New Zealand
with respect to French nuclear tests; that in any event the General Act of
1928 is not now applicable in the relations between France and New
Zealand and cannot prevail over the will clearly and more recently
expressed in the declaration of 20 May 1966made by the French Govern-
ment under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court; that
paragraph 3 of that declaration excepts from the French Government's
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction "disputes concerning activities
connected with national defence"; and that the present dispute concerning
French nuclear tests in the Pacific incontestably falls within the exception
contained in that paragraph;

17. Whereas in its oral observations the Government of New Zealand
maintains, ilfter alia, that the validity, interpretation and effect in the
present situation of the reservation attached to the French declaration of
20 May 1966are issues which can be the subject of debate, and that it
cannot be baldly asserted that there is a manifest absence of jurisdiction
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute; that the General Act was,
within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute, a treaty or convention in
force on 24 October 1945when New Zealand and France became parties
to the Statute, and that Article 37 of the Statute accordingly conferred
on the Court the jurisdiction provided for in Article 17 of the General
Act;that such evidence as there is of State practice in more recent years is
wholly consistent with the Act's continuity; that since 1946France has
more than once acknowledged that the General Act remains in force;
that so faras the General Act is concerned, not only is there no manifest

lack of jurisdiction to deal with this matter, but the Court's jurisdiction
on the merits on that basis is reasonablv, Lobable. and there exist
weighty arguments in favour of it;
18. Whereas the material submitted to the Court leads it to the con-
clusion, at the present stage of the proceedings, that the provisions
invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which
the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded; and whereas the Court
will accordingly proceed to examine the Applicant's request for the
indication of interim measures of protection;

19. Whereas the request of the Government of New Zealand for the
indication of provisional measures is based on Article 33 of the General
Act of 1928, as well as on Article 41 of the Statute of the Court; and

whereas the Government of New Zealand in its final submission asks theCourt to indicate such measures under Article 33 of the General Act or,

alternatively,under Article 41 of the Statute;
20. Whereas the Court considers that it should not exerciseits power
to indicate provisional measures under Article 33 of the General Act of
1928 until it has reached a final conclusion that the General Act is still in
force; whereas the Court isnot in a position to reach a final conclusion on
this point at the present stage of the proceedings, and will therefore
examine the request for the indication of interim measures only in the
context of Article 41 of the Statute;
21. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate interim measures
under Article 41 of the Statute has as its object to preserve the respective
rights of the Parties pending the decision of the Court, and presupposes
that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the
subject of dispute in judicial proceedings and that the Court's judgment
should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative regarding the

matters in issue before the Court;
22. Whereas it followsthat the Courtin thepresent casecannot exercise
its power to indicate interim measures of protection unless the rights
claimed in the Application, prima facie, appear to faIlwithin the purview
of the Court's jurisdiction;
23. Whereas it is claimed by the Government of New Zealand in its
Application that rules and principles of international law are now
violated by nuclear testing undertaken by the French Government in the
South Pacificregion, and that, inter alia,

(a) it violates the rights of al1members of the international community
including New Zealand, that no nuclear tests that giverise to radio-
active fall-out be conducted;
(b) it violates the rights of al1members of the international community,
'including NewZealand, to the preservation from unjustified artificial
radio-active contamination of the terrestrial, maritime and aerial
environment and, in particular, of the environment of the region in
which the tests are conducted and in which New Zealand, the Cook
Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands are situated;
(c) it violates the right of New Zealand that no radio-active material
enter the territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue or the

Tokelau Islands, including their air space and territorial waters, as
a result of nuclear testing;
(d) it violates the right of New Zealand that no radio-active material,
having entered the territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue
or the Tokelau Islands, including their air space and territorial
waters, as a result of nuclear testing, cause harm, including appre-
hension, anxiety and concern, to the people and Government of New
Zealand and of the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands;

(e) it violates the right of New Zealand to freedom of the high seas,
including freedom of navigation and overflight and the freedom to explore and exploit the resources of the sea and the seabed, without

interference or detriment resulting from nuclear testing;
and whereas New Zealand invokes its moral and legal responsibilities in
relation to the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands;
24. Whereas it cannot be assumed a prior hat such claims fa11com-
pletely outside the purview of the Court's jurisdiction, or that the
Government of New Zealand may not be able to establish a legal interest
in respect of these claims entitling the Court to admit the Application;

25. Whereas by the terms of Article 41 of the Statute the Court may
indicate interim measures of protection only when it considers that
circumstances so require in order to preserve the rights of either party;
26. Whereas the Government of New Zealand alleges, interalia, that
during the period from 1966to 1972the French Government has carried
out a series of atmospheric nuclear tests centred on Mururoa in the
South Pacific; that the French Government has refused to give an
assurance that its programme of atmospheric nuclear testing in the
South Pacific is at an end, and that on 2 May 1973the French Govern-
ment announced that it did not envisage cancelling or modifying the
programme originally planned; that from official pronouncements it is
clear that some further tests are envisaged with the likelihood of de-
ploying a thermonuclear warhead by 1976;that the French Government
has also reserved itsoptions on the development of yet another generation
of nuclear weapons after 1976which would require further tests; that in
previous years the nuclear testing series conducted by France have begun
on dates between 15May and 7 July ;that on the basis of the pronounce-

ments referred to above and the past practice of the French Government,
there are strong grounds for believing that the French Government will
carry out further testing of nuclear devicesand weapons intheatmosphere
at Mururoa Atoll before the Court is able to reach a decision on the
Application of New Zealand;
27. Whereas these allegations give substance to the New Zealand
Government's contention that there is an immediate possibility of a
further atmospheric nuclear test being carried out by France in the
Pacific;
28. Whereas the Government of New Zealand also alleges that each
of the series of French nuclear testst has added to the radio-active fall-out
in New Zealand territory; that the basic principles applied in this field
by international authorities are that any exposure to radiation may have
irreparable. and harmful, somatic and genetic effects and that any
additional exposure to artificial radiation can be justified only by the
benefit which results; that, as the New Zealand Government has repeat-
edly pointed out in its correspondence with the French Government, the
radio-active fall-out which reaches New Zealand as a result of French
nuclear tests is inherently harmful, and that there is no compensating

benefit to justify New Zealand's exposure to such harm; that the uncer- tain physical and genetic effects to which contamination exposes the
people of New Zealand causes them acute apprehension, anxiety and
concern; and that there could be no possibility that the rights eroded by
the holding of further tests could be fully restored in the event of a

judgment in New Zealand's favour in these proceedings;

29. Whereas the French Government, in a diplomatic Note addressed
to the Government of New Zealand and dated 10June 1966.the text of
which was annexed to the Application in this case, emphasized that every
precaution would be taken with a view to ensuring the safety and the
harmlessness of the French nuclear tests, and observed that the French
Government, in taking al1appropriate steps to ensure the protection of
the populations close to the test zone, had sought afortiorito guarantee
the safety of populations considerably further distant, such as New
Zealand or the territories for which it is responsible; and whereas in a
letter dated 19 February 1973 to the Prime Minister of New Zealand
from the French Ambassador to New Zealand, the text of which was also
annexed to the Application in this case, the French Government called

attention to Reports ofthe New Zealand National Radiation Laboratory,
and of the Australian National Radiation Advisory Committee, which
reached the conclusion that the fall-out from the French tests had never
involved anydanger to the health of thepopulations of those two countries,
and observed that the concern which had been expressed as to the long-
term effects of testing could not be based on anything other than con-
jecture ;

30. Whereas for the purpose of the present proceedings it suffices to
observe that the information submitted to the Court, including Reports
of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation between 1958and 1972,does not exclude the possibility that
damage to New Zealand might be shown to be caused by the deposit on
New Zealand territory of radio-active fall-out resulting from such tests
and to be irreparable;
31. Whereas in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court is

satisfied that it should indicate interim measures of protection in order to
preserve the right claimed by New Zealand in the present litigation in
respect of the deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territory of New
Zealand,the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands;
32. Whereas the circumstances of the case do not appear to require
the indication of interim measures of protection in respect of other rights
claimed by New Zealand in the Application;

33. Whereas the foregoing considerations do not permit the Court to
accede at the present stage of the proceedings to the request made by theFrench Government in its letter dated 16 May 1973 that the case be
removed from the list;
34. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way
prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the
merits of the case, or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
Application, or relating to the merits themselves, and leaves unaffected

the right of the French Government to submit arguments in respect of
those questions;
35. Having regard to the position taken by the French Government in
itsletter dated 16May 1973that the Court was manifestly not competent
in the case and to the fact that it was not represented at the hearings held
on 24 and 25 May on the question of the indication of interim measures
of protection;
36. Whereas, in these circumstances, it is necessary to resolve as soon
as possible the questions of the Court's jurisdiction and of the admis-
sibility of the Application;

Accordingly,

Indicates, by 8 votes to 6, pending its final decision in the proceedings
instituted on 9 May 1973by New Zealand against France. the following
provisional measures :

TheGovernments of New Zealand and France should each of them
ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate or
extend the dispute submitted to the Court or prejudice the rights of
the other Party in respect of the carrying out of whatever decision

the Court may render in the case; and, in particular, the French
Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-
active fall-out on the territory of New Zeeland, the Cook Islands,
Niue or the Tokelau Islands;
Decides that the written proceedings shall first be addressed to the
questions of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute, and of
the admissibility of the Application;

Fixes as follows the time-limits for the written proceedings:

21 September 1973 for the Mernorial of the Government of New
Zealand ;
21 December 1973for the Counter-Memorial of the French Govern-
ment;

And reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Done in English and in French, the English text being mthoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-second day of June onethousand nine hundred and seventy-three, in four copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted
respectively to the French Government, to the Government of New

Zealand, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for trans-
mission to the Security Council.

(Signed) F. AMMOUN,
Vice-President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

Judge JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGm Aakes the following declaration:
1have voted in favour of the Order for the reasons stated therein, but
wish to add some brief comments on the relationship between the
question of the Court's jurisdiction and the indication of interim mea-
sures.

1 do not believe the Court should indicate interim measures without
paying due regard to the basic question of itsjurisdiction to entertain the
merits of the Application. A request should not be granted if it is clear,
even on a prima facie appreciation, that there is no possible basis on
which the Court could be competent as to the merits. The question of
jurisdiction is therefore one, and perhaps the most important, among al1
relevant circumstances to be taken into account by a Member of the
Court when voting in favour of or against a request for interim measures.
On the other hand, in view of the urgent character of thedecision on
provisional measures, itis obvious that the Court cannot make its answer
dependent on a previous collectivedetermination by means of ajudgment
of the question of itsjurisdiction on the merits.

This situation places upon each Member of the Court the duty to
make, at this stage, an appreciation of whether-in the light of the
grounds invoked and of the other materials before him-the Court will
possessjurisdiction to entertain the merits of the dispute. From a subjec-

tive point of view, such an appreciation or estimation cannot be fairly
described as a mere preliminary or even cursory examination of the
jurisdictional issue: on the contrary, one must be satisfiedthat this basic
question of the Court's jurisdiction has received the fullest possible
attention which one is able to give to it within the limits of time and of
materials available for the purpose.
When, as in this case, the Court decides in favour of interim measures,
and does not, as requested by the French Government, remove the case
from the list, the parties will have the opportunity at a later stage to
plead more fully on the jurisdictional question. It follows that that

12question cannot be prejudged now; it is not possible to exclude a priori,
that the further pleadings and other relevant information may change
viewsor convictions presently held.

The question described in the Order as that of the existence of "a legal
interest in respect of these claims entitling the Court to admit the Applica-

tion" (para. 24) is characterized in the operative part as one relating to
the admissibility of the Application. The issuehas been raised of whether
New Zealand has a right of its own-as distinct froma general community
interest-or has suffered, or is threatened by, real damage. As far as the
power of the Court to adjudicate on the merits is concerned, the issue is
whether the dispute before the Court is one "with regard to which the
parties are in conflict as to their respective rights" as required by the
jurisdictional clause invoked by New Zealand. The question thus appears
to be a limited one linked to jurisdiction rather than to admissibility.
The distinction between those two categories of questions is indicated
by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in I.C.J. Reports 1963, pages 102-103, as
follows:

"... the realdistinction and test would seem to be whether or not the
objection is based on, or arises from, the jurisdictional clause or
clauses under which the jurisdiction of the tribunal is said to exist.
If so, the objection is basically one ofjurisdiction."
Article 17of the General Act provides that the disputes therein referred
those mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute
to shall include in particular
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Among the classes of
legal disputes there enumerated is that concerning "the existence of any
fact which, ifestablished, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation" (emphasis added). At the preliminary stage it would seem
therefore sufficient to determine whether the parties are in conflict as to
their respective rights.It would notappear ncessary to enter at that stage
into questions which really pertain to the merits and constitute the heart
of the eventualsubstantive decision such as for instance the establishment
of the rights of the parties or the extent of the damage resulting from
radio-active fall-out.

Judge Sir Humphrey WALDOCm Kakes the following declaration:
1 concur in the Order. 1 wish only to add that, in my view, the prin-
ciples set out in Article 67, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court should
guide the Court in givingits decision on the next phase of the proceedings
which is provided for by the present Order. Judge NAGENDR SINGHmakes the following declaration:

While fullysupportingthe reasoning leading to the verdict of theCourt,
and therefore voting with the majority for the grant of interim measures
of protection in this case, 1wish to lend emphasis, by this declaration, to
the requirement that the Court must be satisfied of its own competence,
even though prima facie, before taking action under Article 41 of the
Statute and Rule 61 (New Rule 66) of the Rules of Court.

It is true that neither of the aforesaid provisions spell out the test of
competence ofthe Court or of the admissibility of the Application andthe
request, which nevertheless have to be gone into by each Member of the
Court in order to see that apossiblevalid base for the Court's competence
exists and that the Application is, prima facie, entertainable. 1 am,
therefore, in entire agreement with the Court in laying down a positive
test regarding its own competence, prima facie established, which was
enunciated in the FislzeriesJurisdictioncase and having been reiterated in
this case may be said to lay down not only the latest but also the settled
jurisprudence of the Court on the subject.
It is indeed a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial function that a
court can be moved only if it has competence. If therefore in the exercise

of its inherent powers (as enshrined in Art. 41 of its Statute) the Court
grants interim relief, its solejustification to do sos that if it did not, the
rights of the parties would get so prejudiced that the judgment of the
Court when it came could be rendered meaningless. Thus the possibility
of the Court being ultimately able to give a judgment on merits should
always be present when interim measures are contemplated. If, however,
the Court were to shed its legal base of competence when acting under
Article 41 of its Statute, it would immediately expose itself to the danger
of being accused of discouraging governments from :

". .. undertaking, or continuing to undertake, the obligations of
judicial settlement as the result of any justifiable apprehension that
by accepting them they may become exposed to the embarrassment,
vexation and loss, possibly following upon interim measures, in
cases in which there is no reasonable possibility, prima facie ascer-
tained by the Court, of jurisdiction on the merits. Accordingly, the
Court cannot, in relation to a request for indication of interim
measures, disregard altogether the question of its competence on the

merits. The correct principle which emerges from these apparently
conflicting considerations and which has been uniformly adopted in
international arbitral and judicial practice is as follows: The Court
may properly act under the terms of Article 41 provided that there is
in existence an instrument such as a Declaration of Acceptance of the
Optional Clause, emanatingfrom the Parties to the dispute, which

1 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Unired Kingdomv. Ireland), I.C.J. ReportOrder2of
17August 1972, paras.15to 17,pp. 15to 16.

14 prima facie confers jurisdiction upon the Court and which incor-
porates no reservations obviously excluding its jurisdiction."
(Separate opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in Interhandel case,
I.C.J. Reports 1957,p. 118.)

It needs to be mentioned, therefore, that even at this preliminary stage
of prima facie testing the Court has to examine the reservations and
declarations made to the treaty which is cited by a party to furnish the
base for the jurisdiction of the Court a.ndto consider also the validity of
the treaty if the same ischallenged in relation to the parties to the dispute.
As a result of this prima facie examination the Court could either find:

(a) that there is no possible base for the Court's jurisdiction in which
event no matter what emphasis is placed on Article 41 of its Statute,
the Court cannot proceed to grant interim relief; or
(b) that a possible base exists, but needs further investigation to come
to any definite conclusion in which event the Court is inevitably left
no option but to proceed to the substance of the jurisdiction of the
case to complete its process of adjudication which, in turn, is time
consuming and therefore comes into conflict with the urgency of the
matter coupled with the prospect of irreparable damage to the rights
of the parties. It is this situation which furnishes the "raison d'être"
of interim relief.

If, therefore, the Court, in this case, has granted interim measures of
protection it is without prejudice to the substance whether jurisdictional
or otherwise which cannot be prejudged at this stage and will have to be
gone into further in the next phase.

Judge ad hoc Sir Garfield BARWICm Kakes the following declaration:

1have voted forthe indication of interim measures and the Order of the
Court as to the further procedure in the case because the very thorough
discussions in which the Court has engaged over the past weeks and my
own researches have convinced me that the General Act of 1928and the
French Government's declaration to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court with reservations each provide, prima facie, a basis on which the
Court might havejurisdiction to entertain and decide the claims made by
New Zealand in its Application of 9 May 1973.Further, the exchange of
diplornatic notes between the Governments of New Zealand and France
in 1973afford, in my opinion, at least prima facieevidence ofthe existence
of a dispute between those Governments as to matters of international
law affecting their respective rights.

Lastly, thematerial before the Court, particularly that appearing in the
UNSCEAR reports, provides reasonable grounds for concluding that
further deposit in the New Zealand territorial environment and that ofthe Cook Islands of radio-active particles of matter is likely to do harm
for which no adequate compensatory measures could be provided.

These conclusions are sufficient to warrant the indication of interim
measures.

1 agree with the form of the provisional measures indicated, under-
standing that the action proscribed is action on the part of governments
and that the measures are indicated in respect only of the New Zealand
Government's claim to the inviolability of its territory, and of that of the
Cook Islands.

Judges FORSTER G,ROS, PETRÉN and IGNACIO-PINa Tppend dissenting
opinions to theOrder of the Court.

(Initialled) F.A.
(Initialled) S.A.

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

NUCLEAR TESTSCASE
(NEW ZEALAND v.FRANCE)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF INTERIM
MEASURES OF PROTECTION

ORDER OF 22 JUNE 1973

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DES ESSAISNUCLÉAIRES

(NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE c. FRANCE)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 22 JUIN 1973 Officia1cit:tion
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Interim Protection, Order of
22 June 1973,I.C.J. Reports 1973,p. 135.

Mode officielde citation:

Essaisordonnancedu2juin 1973, C.I.J. Recueil 1973,p. 135.nservatoires,

Nodevent:ygo 1
I 22 JUNE 1973

ORDER

NUCLEAR TESTS CASE
(NEWZEALAND vFRANCE)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF INTERIM

MEASURES OF PROTECTION

AFFAIRE DES ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES
(NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE c. FRANCE)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

22 JUIN 1973

ORDONNANCE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1973
22June YEAR 1973
GeneraList
No.59
22June1973

NUCLEARTESTSCASE
(NEW ZEALAND v. FRANCE)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF INTERIM
MEASURES OF PROTECTION

ORDER

Present: Vice-PresidentAMMOUNA, cting President; Judges FORSTER,
GROS, BENGZON,PETRÉN,ONYEAMAI,GNACIO-PINTO DE
CASTROM , OROZOVJ,IMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA S,ir Humphrey
WALDOCK, NAGENDRS AINGHR, UDA;Judgead hoc Sir Garfleld
BARWICK R;egistrarAQUARONE.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court,

Having regard to Articleof the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the Application by New Zealandn the Registry
of the Court on 9 May 1973, instituting proceedings against France in
respect ofdispute as to the legalityof atmospheric nuclear tests in the

SouthPacificregion, and asking the Court to adjudge and declare that COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1973
Rôlegénéral
no59

22juin1973

AFFAIRE DES ESSAISNUCLÉAIRES

(NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE c. FRANCE)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE

Présents:M. AMMOUNV , ice-Président faisant fonde Président;
MM. FORSTER G,ROS,BENGZON P,ETRÉNO, NYEAMA I, NACIO-
PINTO,DE CASTROM , OROZOVJ,IMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, sir
Humphrey WALDOCK M, M. NAGENDRS AINGH,RUDAj,uges;
sir Garfield BARWIju,ge ad hoc; M. AQUARONGE,refjîer.

La Cour internationale & Justice,

Ainsi composée,
Après délibéren chambre du conseil,

Vu lesarticles41et 48 du Statutde la Cour,
Vu l'articledu Règlementde la Cour,

Vula requêteenregistréeau Greffedela Cour le973,par laquelle
la Nouvelle-Zélandea introduit une instance contre la France au sujet
d'un différendconcernant la légalité des essais nucléainsat-éaliseé
mosphèredans larégiondu PacifiqueSudetie la Cour dire etjuger que

4the conduct by the French Government of nuclear tests in the South
Pacificregion that give rise to radio-active fall-out constitutes a violation
of New Zealand's rights under international law, and that these rights
will be violated by any furthersuch tests,

Makes thefollowing Order:

1. Having regard to the request dated 14 May 1973and filed in the
Registry the same day, whereby the Government of New Zealand,
relying on Article 33 of the General Act ~f 1928for the PacificSettlement
of International Disputes and on Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute and
Article 66 of theRules of Court, asks the Court to indicate, pending the
finaldecision in the case brought before it by the Application of the same
date, the following interim measures of protection:
"The measure which New Zealand requests ... is that France

refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests that give rise to
radio-active fall-out while the Courts seized of the case."

2. Whereas the French Government was notified by telegram the same
day of the filing of the Application instituting proceedings and a copy
thereof was at thesame time transmitted to it by express mail;
3. Whereas, pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute and
Article 37, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, copies of the Application
were transmitted to Members of the United Nations through the Secre-
tary-General and to other States entitled to appear before the Court;

4. Whereas the submissions set out in the request for the indication of
interim measures of protection were on the day of the request commu-
nicated to the French Government, by telegram of 14 May 1973,and a
copy of the request was at thesame time transmitted to it by express mail;

5. Whereas pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the
Government of New Zealand chose the Right Honourable Sir Garfield
Barwick, Chief Justice of Australia, tosit asjudge ad hocin the case;

6. Whereas the Governments of New Zealand and France were
informed by communications of 15May 1973that theCourt would in due
course hold public hearings to afford them the opportunity of presenting
their observations on the request by New Zealand for the indication of
interim measures of protection, and by further communications of 22
May 1973the Parties were informed that such hearings would open on
24 May 1973;
7. Whereas by a letter dated 16 May 1973 from the Ambassador of
France to the Netherlands, handed by him to the Registrar the same day,

the French Government stated that it considered that the Court was
manifestly not competent in the case and that it could not accept the
Court's jurisdiction, and that accordingly the French Government did notles essais nucléairesprovoquant des retombées radioactiveseffectuéspar
le Gouvernement français dans la régiondu PacifiqueSud constituent une
violation des droits de la Nouvelle-Zélandeau regard du droit internatio-
nal et que ces droits seront enfreints par tout nouvel essai,

Rend l'ordonnancesuivante:

1. Vu la demande datéedu 14 mai 1973 et enregistréeau Greffe le
mêmejour, par laquelle le Gouvernement néo-zélandais,invoquant
l'article 33de l'Acte généralde 1928 pour le règlement pacifiquedes
différendsinternationaux, les articles 41 et8 du Statut et l'article 66 du
Règlement, a prié la Cour d'indiquer, en attendant l'arrêtdéfinitifen
l'affairedont la Cour a étésaisiepar la requêteen date du même jour, les
mesures conservatoires suivantes:

«La mesure que la Nouvelle-Zélandedemande à la Cour d'indi-
quer ...est que la France s'abstienne de procéderà tout essai nuclé-
aireprovoquant des retombéesradioactives pendant que la Cour est
saisie de l'affaire.
2. Considérantque:le dépôt dela requête introductive d'instance a été
notifiépar télégrammeau Gouvernement français le jour mêmeet qu'il
lui aétésimultanément transmiscopie de la requêtepar courrier exprès;
3. Considérant que, conformément à l'article 40, paragraphe 3, du

Statut et à l'article 37, paragraphe 2, du Règlement, des copiesde ia
requêteont ététransmises aux Membres des Nations Unies par I'entre-
mise du Secrétaire généraelt aux autres Etats admis à ester devant la
Cour;
4. Considérantque lesconclusions formuléesdans la demande en indi-
cation de mesures conservatoires ont étécommuniquéesau Gouverne-
ment français lejour du dépôt dela demande par télégrammedu 14mai
1973et qu'il luia été simultanément transmis copie de la demande par
courrier exprès;
5. Considérant que, en application de l'article 31, paragraphe 2, du
Statut, le Gouvernement néo-zélandaisa désignéle très honorable sir
Garfield Barwick, Chief Justice d'Australie, pour siégercomme juge
ad hoc en l'affair;
6. Considérant que le Gouvercement néo-zélandaiset le Gouverne-
ment français ont étéaviséspar des communications en date du 15mai
1973que la Cour tiendrait en temps voulu des audiences publiques pour
leur donner la possibilitéde présenter leurs observationssur la demande
en indication de mesures conservatoires déposéepar le Gouvernement
néo-zélandais et que Yesparties ont étinforméespar des communications

ultérieuresdu 22 mai 1973que cesaudiences s'ouvriraient le 24mai 1973;
7. Considérant que,dans une lettre de l'ambassadeur de France aux
Pays-Bas datéedu 16mai 1973,remise par celui-ci au Greffier le même
jour, le Gouvernement français a fait savoir qu'il estime que la Cour n'a
manifestement pas c:ompétenceen l'espèceet qu'il ne peut accepter sa
juridiction, et qu'en conséquencele Gouvernement français n'a pas I'in-intend to appoint an agent, and requested the Court to remove the case
from its list;
8. Whereas at the opening of the public hearings, which were held on

24 and 25 May 1973,there were present in court the Agent, Co-Agent,
counsel and other advisers Ofthe Government of New Zealand;
9. Having heard the observations on the request for interim measures
on behalf of the Government of New Zealand, and the replies on behalf
of that Government to questions put by a Member of the Court, sub-
mitted by Professor R. Q. Quentin-Baxter, Dr. A. M. Finlay, Q.C., and
Mr. R. C. Savage, Q.C.;
10. Having taken note of the final submission of the Government of
New Zealand made at the hearing of 25 May 1973, and filed in the
Registry the same day, which reads as follows:

"... New Zealand's final submissionis:thatthe Court, acting under
Article 33 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes or, alternatively, under Article 41 of its Statute,
should lay down or indicate that France, whilethe Court is seizedof
the case, refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests that give
rise to radio-active fall-out".
11. Having taken note of the written reply given by the Agent of the

Government of New Zealand on 1 June to a question put to him by a
Member of the Court;
12. Noting that the French Government was not represented at the
hearings; and whereas the non-appearance of one of the States concerned
cannot by itself constitute an obstacle to the indication of provisional
measures;
13. Whereas the Governments of New Zealand and France have been
afforded an opportunity of presenting their observations on the request
for the indication of provisional measures;
14. Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not,
before indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it hasisdiction on the
merits of the case, and yet ought not to indicate such measures unless
the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a
basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded;

15. Whereas in its Application and oral observations the Government

of New Zealand claims to found the jurisdiction of the Court on the
following provisons :
(a) Articles 36, paragraph 1, and 37 of the Statute of the Court and
Article 17of the above-mentioned General Act of 1928; and in the
alternative,
(b) Article 36,paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Statute of the Court;

16. Whereas, according to the letter of 16 May 1973 handed to the
Registrar by the French Ambassador to the Netherlands, the Frenchtention de désignerun agent et demande à la Cour d'ordonner que l'af-
faire soit rayéede son rôle;
8. Considérant que, à l'ouverture des audiences publiques, qui ont
eu lieu les 24 et 25 mai 1973,étaient présentsdevant la Cour l'agent, le
coagent, les conseils et conseillers du Gouvernement néo-zélandais;
9. Ayantentendu lesobservations sur lademande enindication demesu-
resconservatoires et lesréponsesaux questions d'un membre de la Cour
présentéesa,u nom du Gouvernement néo-zélandaisp ,ar M.R.Q.Quentin-
Baxter, professeur, M. A. M. Finlay, Q.C., et M. R. C. Savage, Q.C.;

10. Ayant pris note de la conclusion finale du Gouvernement néo-
zélandais, présentéeà l'audience du 25 mai 1973et déposéepar écritau

Greffe le même jour, qui est ainsi conçue:
«La conclusioi~finale de la Nouvelle-Zélandetend à ce que la
Cour, statuant en vertu de I'article 33de l'Actegénéralpour le règle-
ment pacifique des différendsinternationaux ou subsidiairement en
vertu de I'article41 de son Statut, demandeà la Francede s'abstenir
de procéder à tout essai nucléairepouvant provoquer des retombées

radioactives pendant que la Cour est saisiede l'affaire.
11. Ayant pris connaissance de la réponse écrite faitelelerjuin 1973
par l'agentdu Gouvernement néo-zélandais à une question qu'un membre
de la Cour lui avait posée;
12. Constatantque leGouvernementfrançais ne s'estpas fait représen-
ter aux audiences; et considérant que la non-comparution de l'un des
Etats en cause ne saurait en soi constituer un obstacle àl'indication de

mesures conservatoires;
13. Considérant que la possibilitéde faire entendre leurs observations
sur la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires a étéofferte au
Gouvernement néo-zélandaiset au Gouvernement français ;
14. Considérantque, lorsqu'elle est saisied'une demande en indication
de mesures conservatoires, la Cour n'a pas besoin, avant d'indiquer ces
mesures, de s'assurer de façon concluante de sa compétence quant au
fond de l'affaire, mais qu'elle nedoit cependant pas indiquer de telles
mesures si les dispositions invoquéespar le demandeur ne se présentent
pas comme constituant, prima facieu, ne base sur laquelle la compétence
dela Courpourrait êtrefondée;
15. Considérant que, dans sa requêteet ses observations orales, le
Gouvernement néo-zélandaisprétend fonder la compétencede la Cour

sur les dispositions suivante:
a) I'article 36,paragraphe 1, et I'article 37 du Statut de la Cour et I'arti-
cle 17de l'Acte généralde 1928 susmentionné; et subsidiairement,

b) l'article 36, paragraphes 2 et 5, du Statut de la Cour;

16. Considérant que, selon la lettre du 16mai 1973remise au Greffier
par l'ambassadeur de France aux Pays-Bas, le Gouvernement français138 NUCLEAR TESTS (ORDER 22 VI 73)

Government considers, inter alia, that the General Act of 1928was an
integral part of the League of Nations system and, sincethe demise of the
League of Nations, has lost its effectivity and fallen into desuetude; that

this view of the matter is confirmed by the conduct of States in regard
to the General Act of 1928 since the collapse of the League of Nations;
that, in consequence, the General Act cannot serve as a basis for the
cornpetence of the Courtto deliberate on the Application of New Zealand
with respect to French nuclear tests; that in any event the General Act of
1928 is not now applicable in the relations between France and New
Zealand and cannot prevail over the will clearly and more recently
expressed in the declaration of 20 May 1966made by the French Govern-
ment under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court; that
paragraph 3 of that declaration excepts from the French Government's
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction "disputes concerning activities
connected with national defence"; and that the present dispute concerning
French nuclear tests in the Pacific incontestably falls within the exception
contained in that paragraph;

17. Whereas in its oral observations the Government of New Zealand
maintains, ilfter alia, that the validity, interpretation and effect in the
present situation of the reservation attached to the French declaration of
20 May 1966are issues which can be the subject of debate, and that it
cannot be baldly asserted that there is a manifest absence of jurisdiction
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute; that the General Act was,
within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute, a treaty or convention in
force on 24 October 1945when New Zealand and France became parties
to the Statute, and that Article 37 of the Statute accordingly conferred
on the Court the jurisdiction provided for in Article 17 of the General
Act;that such evidence as there is of State practice in more recent years is
wholly consistent with the Act's continuity; that since 1946France has
more than once acknowledged that the General Act remains in force;
that so faras the General Act is concerned, not only is there no manifest

lack of jurisdiction to deal with this matter, but the Court's jurisdiction
on the merits on that basis is reasonablv, Lobable. and there exist
weighty arguments in favour of it;
18. Whereas the material submitted to the Court leads it to the con-
clusion, at the present stage of the proceedings, that the provisions
invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which
the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded; and whereas the Court
will accordingly proceed to examine the Applicant's request for the
indication of interim measures of protection;

19. Whereas the request of the Government of New Zealand for the
indication of provisional measures is based on Article 33 of the General
Act of 1928, as well as on Article 41 of the Statute of the Court; and

whereas the Government of New Zealand in its final submission asks theestime notamment que l'Acte généralde 1928était partie intégrante du

systèmede la Société desNations et que, depuis la disparition de celle-ci,
il manque d'effectivitéet est tombé en désuétude; quece point de vue est
confirmépar la conduite des Etats à l'égardde l'Acte généralde 1928de-
puis l'effondrement du systèmede la Sociétédes Nations; qu'en consé-
quence l'Acte généralne peut servir de fondement à la compétencede la
Cour pour délibérerdu recours de la Nouvelle-Zélande contre les essais
nucléairesfrançais; que detoute manière l'Acte généralde 1928n'est pas
actuellement applicable aux relations entre la France et la Nouvelle-
Zélandeet ne saurait prévaloir sur la volonté clairement et postérieure-
ment expriméedans la déclarationdu 20 mai 1966faite par le Gouverne-
ment français sur la base de l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la
Cour; que le paragraphe 3 de cette déclaration exclut de l'acceptation
de la juridiction obligatoire les ((différendsconcernant des activités se
rapportant Lila défense nationale)); et que cette exclusion s'applique

incontestablement au présent différendconcernant des essais nucléaires
français dans le Pacifique;
17. Considérant que, dans ses observations orales, le Gouvernement
néo-zélandaissoutient notamment que la validité, l'interprétation et
l'effet dans In situation présentede la réserveattachéeà la déclaration
française du 20 mai 1966 sont des questions dont on peut débattre et
que l'on ne saurait affirmer simplement qu'il y a incompétencemanifeste
eu égard à I'article 36,paragraphe 2, du Statut; que l'Acte généralétait
«un traité ou une convention en vigueur)) au sens de I'article 37du Statut,
le 24 octobre 1945,quand la Nouvelle-Zélandeet la Francesont devenues
parties au Statut et qu'en conséquenceI'article 37 du Statut a attribué
la Cour la compétence prévue à I'article 17 de l'Acte général; queles
indications que l'on possèdesur la pratique des Etatsau cours des derniè-
res annéessont parfaitement compatibles avec le maintien en vigueur de

l'Acte; que depuis 1946la France a reconnu à diverses reprises que l'Acte
généralétait toujours en vigueur; qu'en ce qui concerne l'Acte général
non seulement la Cour n'est pas manifestement incompétente pour con-
naître de la question, mais encore sa compétencequant au fond est rai-
sonnablement probable et des arguments trèsforts militent en sa faveur;
18. Considérantque leséléments soumis àla Cour l'amènent àconclure,
au stade actuel de la procédure, que les dispositions invoquéespar le de-
mandeur se présentent comme constituant, primafacie, une base sur
laquelle la compétencede la Cour pourrait être fondée;et qu'en consé-
quence la Cour se propose d'examiner la demande en indication de me-
sures conservatoires présentéepar le demandeur;

19. Considérant que, dans sa demande en indication de mesures con-
servatoires, le Gouvernement néo-zélandaisse fonde sur I'article 33 de
l'Acte généralde 1928 ainsi que sur I'article 41 du Statut de la Cour;
et que, dans sa conclusion finale, il prie la Cour d'indiquer ces mesures en
7Court to indicate such measures under Article 33 of the General Act or,

alternatively,under Article 41 of the Statute;
20. Whereas the Court considers that it should not exerciseits power
to indicate provisional measures under Article 33 of the General Act of
1928 until it has reached a final conclusion that the General Act is still in
force; whereas the Court isnot in a position to reach a final conclusion on
this point at the present stage of the proceedings, and will therefore
examine the request for the indication of interim measures only in the
context of Article 41 of the Statute;
21. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate interim measures
under Article 41 of the Statute has as its object to preserve the respective
rights of the Parties pending the decision of the Court, and presupposes
that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the
subject of dispute in judicial proceedings and that the Court's judgment
should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative regarding the

matters in issue before the Court;
22. Whereas it followsthat the Courtin thepresent casecannot exercise
its power to indicate interim measures of protection unless the rights
claimed in the Application, prima facie, appear to faIlwithin the purview
of the Court's jurisdiction;
23. Whereas it is claimed by the Government of New Zealand in its
Application that rules and principles of international law are now
violated by nuclear testing undertaken by the French Government in the
South Pacificregion, and that, inter alia,

(a) it violates the rights of al1members of the international community
including New Zealand, that no nuclear tests that giverise to radio-
active fall-out be conducted;
(b) it violates the rights of al1members of the international community,
'including NewZealand, to the preservation from unjustified artificial
radio-active contamination of the terrestrial, maritime and aerial
environment and, in particular, of the environment of the region in
which the tests are conducted and in which New Zealand, the Cook
Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands are situated;
(c) it violates the right of New Zealand that no radio-active material
enter the territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue or the

Tokelau Islands, including their air space and territorial waters, as
a result of nuclear testing;
(d) it violates the right of New Zealand that no radio-active material,
having entered the territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue
or the Tokelau Islands, including their air space and territorial
waters, as a result of nuclear testing, cause harm, including appre-
hension, anxiety and concern, to the people and Government of New
Zealand and of the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands;

(e) it violates the right of New Zealand to freedom of the high seas,
including freedom of navigation and overflight and the freedom tovertu de I'article 33 de l'Acte généralou, subsidiairement, en vertu de
l'article 41 du Statut;
20. Considérant que la Cour estime qu'elle nedoit pas exercer le pou-
voir d'indiquer des mesures provisoires conférépar I'article 33 de l'Acte
généralde 1928tant qu'elle n'apas abouti à la conclusion définitiveque
l'Acte généralest en vigueur; que la Cour n'est pas en mesure d'aboutirà
une conclusion définitivesur cepoint, en la phase actuelle de laprocédure,
et en conséquence n'examinera la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires que dans le cadre de I'article 41 du Statut;
21. Considérant que le pouvoir d'indiquer des mesures conservatoires
conféré à la Cour par l'article 41 du Statut a pour objet de sauvegarder
les droits des parties en attendant que la Cour rende sa décision, qu'il
présuppose qu'un préjudiceirréparable ne doit pas êtrecausé auxdroits

en litige devant le juge et qu'aucune initiative concernant les questions
litigieuses ne doit anticiper sur l'arrêtde la Cour;

22. Considérant que par suite la Cour n'exercera en l'espèceson pou-
voir d'indiquer des mesures conservatoires que si les droits invoquésdans
la requête paraissentde prime abord relever de lajuridiction de la Cour;

23. Considérant que le Gouvernement néo-zélandaisprétend dans sa
requêteque des règleset principes du droit internationalsont aujourd'hui
violéspar les essais nidéaires du Gouvernement français dans la région
du Pacifique Sudet en particulier que:

a) ils violent le droit de tous les membres de la communauté internatio-
nale, y compris la Nouvelle-Zélande,à ce qu'aucune expérience nuclé-
aireprovoquant des retombées radioactives n'ait lieu;
b) ils violent le droit de tous les membres de la communauté internatio-
nale, y compris la Nouvelle-Zélande, à ce que le milieu terrestre,
maritime et aérien soit protégécontre une contamination injustifiée
résultant d'une radioactivitéartificielle et notammentce qu'il en soit
ainsi de la régionoù les essais ont lieu et où sont situéesla Nouvelle-

Zélande,les îles Cook, les îles Nioué etTokélaou;
c) ils violent le droit de la Nouvelle-Zélandà ce qu'aucun déchet radio-
actif ne pénètresur son territoire, y compris son espace aérienet ses
eaux territoriales, ciuceux de îles Cook, des îles Nioué etTokélaouà
la suite d'essais nucléaires;
d) ils violent le droit de la Nouvelle-Zélandà ce qu'aucun déchetradio-
actif ayant pénétrésur son territoire, y compris son espace aérien et
seseaux territoriales ou ceuxdes îlesCook, des îlesNiouéet Tokélaou,
àla suited'expérimentations nucléaires, necause un préjudice,notam-
ment des appréhensions, de I'anxiéti:et de l'inquiétude,aux habitants
et aux Gouvernements de la NouveUe-Zélande,des îles Cook, des îles
Nioué etTokélaou;
e) ils violent le droit de la Nouvelle-Zélandà la libertéde la haute mer,
y compris la libertk de navigation et de survol, et la liberté d'explorer explore and exploit the resources of the sea and the seabed, without

interference or detriment resulting from nuclear testing;
and whereas New Zealand invokes its moral and legal responsibilities in
relation to the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands;
24. Whereas it cannot be assumed a prior hat such claims fa11com-
pletely outside the purview of the Court's jurisdiction, or that the
Government of New Zealand may not be able to establish a legal interest
in respect of these claims entitling the Court to admit the Application;

25. Whereas by the terms of Article 41 of the Statute the Court may
indicate interim measures of protection only when it considers that
circumstances so require in order to preserve the rights of either party;
26. Whereas the Government of New Zealand alleges, interalia, that
during the period from 1966to 1972the French Government has carried
out a series of atmospheric nuclear tests centred on Mururoa in the
South Pacific; that the French Government has refused to give an
assurance that its programme of atmospheric nuclear testing in the
South Pacific is at an end, and that on 2 May 1973the French Govern-
ment announced that it did not envisage cancelling or modifying the
programme originally planned; that from official pronouncements it is
clear that some further tests are envisaged with the likelihood of de-
ploying a thermonuclear warhead by 1976;that the French Government
has also reserved itsoptions on the development of yet another generation
of nuclear weapons after 1976which would require further tests; that in
previous years the nuclear testing series conducted by France have begun
on dates between 15May and 7 July ;that on the basis of the pronounce-

ments referred to above and the past practice of the French Government,
there are strong grounds for believing that the French Government will
carry out further testing of nuclear devicesand weapons intheatmosphere
at Mururoa Atoll before the Court is able to reach a decision on the
Application of New Zealand;
27. Whereas these allegations give substance to the New Zealand
Government's contention that there is an immediate possibility of a
further atmospheric nuclear test being carried out by France in the
Pacific;
28. Whereas the Government of New Zealand also alleges that each
of the series of French nuclear testst has added to the radio-active fall-out
in New Zealand territory; that the basic principles applied in this field
by international authorities are that any exposure to radiation may have
irreparable. and harmful, somatic and genetic effects and that any
additional exposure to artificial radiation can be justified only by the
benefit which results; that, as the New Zealand Government has repeat-
edly pointed out in its correspondence with the French Government, the
radio-active fall-out which reaches New Zealand as a result of French
nuclear tests is inherently harmful, and that there is no compensating

benefit to justify New Zealand's exposure to such harm; that the uncer- et d'exploiter les ressources de la mer et du fond des mers, sans subir
de gêneou de préjudiceen raison des essais nucléaires;
considérant que la Nouvelle-Zélande invoque ses responsabilités morales

etjuridiques à l'égard desîles Cook, des îles Nioué etTokélaou;
24. Considérant qii'on ne saurait supposer à priori que de telles de-
mandes échappent complètement à la juridiction de la Cour ou que le
Gouvernement néo-zilandais ne soit pas en mesure d'établir à I'égard
de ces demandes l'existence d'un intérêituridiaue autorisant la Cour à
accueillir la requête;
25. Considérant qu'aux termes de l'article 41 du Statut la Cour ne peut
indiquer des mesures conservatoires que si elle estime que les cirions-
tances l'exigent pour sauvegarder les droits de chacune des parties;
26. Considérant que le Gouvernement néo-zélandais allèguenotam-
ment que, pendant la période 1966-1972, le Gouvernement français a
effectuédes sériesd'expériences nucléairaetsmosphériques avec pour base
Mururoa, dans le Pacifique Sud; que le Gouvernement français a refusé
de donner l'assurance que son programme d'expérimentation nucléaire
en atmosphère dans le Pacifique Sud étaitterminéet qu'il a annoncé le

2 mai 1973qu'il n'envisageait ni d'annuler ni de modifier le programme
initialement prévu; qu'il ressort de déclarations officielles que de nou-
veaux essais sont envisagéset qu'une ogive thermonucléaire sera proba-
blement au point pour 1976; que le Gouvernement français a également
réservé ses décisions quant à la mise au point, après 1976, d'une autre
génération d'armesnucléaires,qui exigerait de nouveaux essais; que, les
années précédentes,les campagnes d'essais nucléaires effectuéspar la
France ont coinmencéentre le 15mai et le 7juillet; quà,enjuger par les
déclarations mentionnées ~lus haut et la ~ratiaue antérieure du Gouver-
nement français, il ya.de sérieusesraisons de croire que le Gouvernement
francais effectuera de nouveaux essais d'e"gins et d'armes nucléairesdans
l'atmosphère, à l'atoll de Mururoa, avant que la Cour puisse statuer sur
la requêtede la Nouvelle-Zélande;
27. Considérantque cesallégationsviennent étayerla thèsedu Gouver-

nement néo-zélandaisselon laquelle il se peut que la France procède
immédiatement à un nouvel essai nucléaireatmosphérique dans la Paci-
fique;
28. Considérant que le Gouvernement néo-zélandaisallègue aussique
chacune dessériesd'essais nucléaires réalisépesr la France a intensifié les
retombées radioactives sur le territoire néo-zélandais;que les principes
de base appliqués dans ce domaine par des autorités internationales sont
que toute exposition aux rayonnements peut entraîner des effets somati-
ques et génétiquesnéfastes etirréparableset que tout surcroît d'exposition
à une irradiation artificielle ne peut sejustifier que par les avantages en
résultant; que, comme le Gouvernement néo-zélandais l'a signalé à
plusieurs reprises dans sa correspondance avec le Gouvernement fran-
çais, la retombée radioactive qui atteint la Nouvelle-Zélandepar suite des
essais nucléairesfrancais est intrinsèquement nuisible et n'apporte aucun tain physical and genetic effects to which contamination exposes the
people of New Zealand causes them acute apprehension, anxiety and
concern; and that there could be no possibility that the rights eroded by
the holding of further tests could be fully restored in the event of a

judgment in New Zealand's favour in these proceedings;

29. Whereas the French Government, in a diplomatic Note addressed
to the Government of New Zealand and dated 10June 1966.the text of
which was annexed to the Application in this case, emphasized that every
precaution would be taken with a view to ensuring the safety and the
harmlessness of the French nuclear tests, and observed that the French
Government, in taking al1appropriate steps to ensure the protection of
the populations close to the test zone, had sought afortiorito guarantee
the safety of populations considerably further distant, such as New
Zealand or the territories for which it is responsible; and whereas in a
letter dated 19 February 1973 to the Prime Minister of New Zealand
from the French Ambassador to New Zealand, the text of which was also
annexed to the Application in this case, the French Government called

attention to Reports ofthe New Zealand National Radiation Laboratory,
and of the Australian National Radiation Advisory Committee, which
reached the conclusion that the fall-out from the French tests had never
involved anydanger to the health of thepopulations of those two countries,
and observed that the concern which had been expressed as to the long-
term effects of testing could not be based on anything other than con-
jecture ;

30. Whereas for the purpose of the present proceedings it suffices to
observe that the information submitted to the Court, including Reports
of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation between 1958and 1972,does not exclude the possibility that
damage to New Zealand might be shown to be caused by the deposit on
New Zealand territory of radio-active fall-out resulting from such tests
and to be irreparable;
31. Whereas in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court is

satisfied that it should indicate interim measures of protection in order to
preserve the right claimed by New Zealand in the present litigation in
respect of the deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territory of New
Zealand,the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands;
32. Whereas the circumstances of the case do not appear to require
the indication of interim measures of protection in respect of other rights
claimed by New Zealand in the Application;

33. Whereas the foregoing considerations do not permit the Court to
accede at the present stage of the proceedings to the request made by theavantage pouvant justifier que la Nouvelle-Zélande y soit exposée; que

l'incertitude quant aux effets physiques et génétiques auxquelsla conta-
mination expose les Néo-zélandaisest pour eux une source d'appréhen-
sion, d'anxiétéet d'inquiétudegraves; qu'il neseraitpas possible de réta-
blir dans leur intégralitéles droits auxquels la reprise des essais aurait
portéatteinte au cas où, en la présente procédure,la Cour se prononce-
rait en faveur de la Nouvelle-Zélande;
29. Considérant que, dans une note diplomatique du 10 juin 1966
adresséeau Gouvernement néo-zélandaiset dont le texte est joint à la
requête déposéeen la présenteaffaire, le Gouvernement français a souli-
gnéque toutes précautions seraient prises en vue d'assurer la sécuritéet
l'inocuité des essais nucléairefrançais, et a fait observer qu'en prenant
toutes dispositions utiles pour assurer la protection des populations voisi-
nes de la zone des tirs le Gouvernement français avait entendu àfortiori

garantir la sécuritédes populations qui en sont bien plus éloignées, telles
que celles de la Nouvelle-Zélande ou des territoires qui sont placéssous
sa responsabilité; et considérant que, dans une lettre du 19février 1973
adressée au premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande par l'ambassadeur
de France en Nouvelle-Zélande, lettre dont le texte est égalementjoint à
la requête déposée en la présente affaire, le Gouvernement français a
appelé l'attention sur des rapports établis par le National Radiation
Laboratory de Nouvelle-Zélande et par le National Radiation Advisory
Cornmittee d'Australie, qui concluaient que les retombées des essais
français n'avaient jamais présentéde dangerpour la santé des populations
des deux pays, et a fait observer que lespréoccupations qui s'étaient expri-
méesquant aux effets à long terme des expériences nepouvaient reposer
que sur des conjectures;
30. Considérant que, aux fins de la présente procédure, il suffit de

noter que les renseignements soumis àla Cour, y compris les rapports du
Comitéscientifiquedes Nations Unies pour l'étudedes effetsdes rayonne-
ments ionisants présentésentre 1958et 1972,n'excluent pas qu'on puisse
démontrer que le dépôt en territoire néo-zélandais de substancesradio-
actives provenant de ces ersais cause un préjudice irréparable à la Nou-
velle-Zélande ;
31. Considérant qu'étantdonné ce qui précèdela Cour estime devoir
indiquer des mesures conservatoires pour sauvegarder le droit invoqué
par la Nouvelle-Zélande dans le présent différend en ce qui concerne
ledépôtde retombées radioactivessur leterritoire de la Nouvelle-Zélande,
des îles Cook, de l'île Niouéou des îles Tokélaou;
32. Considérant que les circonstances de l'affaire ne paraissent pas
exiger l'indication de mesures conservatoires en ce qui concerne d'autres

droits invoquéspar la Nouvelle-Zélandedans la requête;

33. Considérant qu'étant donné ce qui précèdela Cour ne peut faire
droit, au stade actuel de la procédure, à la demande du GouvernementFrench Government in its letter dated 16 May 1973 that the case be
removed from the list;
34. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way
prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the
merits of the case, or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
Application, or relating to the merits themselves, and leaves unaffected

the right of the French Government to submit arguments in respect of
those questions;
35. Having regard to the position taken by the French Government in
itsletter dated 16May 1973that the Court was manifestly not competent
in the case and to the fact that it was not represented at the hearings held
on 24 and 25 May on the question of the indication of interim measures
of protection;
36. Whereas, in these circumstances, it is necessary to resolve as soon
as possible the questions of the Court's jurisdiction and of the admis-
sibility of the Application;

Accordingly,

Indicates, by 8 votes to 6, pending its final decision in the proceedings
instituted on 9 May 1973by New Zealand against France. the following
provisional measures :

TheGovernments of New Zealand and France should each of them
ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate or
extend the dispute submitted to the Court or prejudice the rights of
the other Party in respect of the carrying out of whatever decision

the Court may render in the case; and, in particular, the French
Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-
active fall-out on the territory of New Zeeland, the Cook Islands,
Niue or the Tokelau Islands;
Decides that the written proceedings shall first be addressed to the
questions of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute, and of
the admissibility of the Application;

Fixes as follows the time-limits for the written proceedings:

21 September 1973 for the Mernorial of the Government of New
Zealand ;
21 December 1973for the Counter-Memorial of the French Govern-
ment;

And reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Done in English and in French, the English text being mthoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-second day of June onefrançais dans sa lettre du 16mai 1973tendant à ce que l'affaire soit rayée
du rôle;
34. Considérant qu'une décisionrendue en la présente procédure ne
préjuge en rienla compétencedela Cour pourconnaître du fondde I'affai-
re ni aucune question ,relativeà la recevabilitéde la requêteou au fond
lui-même et qu'elle laisse iràtact le droit du Gouvernement français de
faire valoir ses moyens en cesmatières;

35. Considérant laiposition prise par le Gouvernement francais dans sa
lettre du16mai 1973selop laquelle la Cour n'a manifestement pas compé-
tence en l'espèce,et le faitu'il n'a pas étéreprésenté auxaudiences qui
ont lieu les24 et 25 mai 1973sur la question de l'indication de mesures

conservatoires ;
36. Considérant que, dans ces conditions, il est nécessairede régler
aussi rapidement que possible la question de la compétencede la Cour
et celle de la recevabilitéde la requête;

En conséquence,

Indique à titre provisoire, par huit voix contre six, en attendant son
arrêtdéfinitifdans l'instance introduite le 9 mai 1973 par la Nouvelle-
Zélandecontre la France, les mesures conservatoires suivantes tendant à

ce que:
LeGouvernement néo-zélandais elteGouvernement françaisveillent
l'un et l'autràévitertout acte qui risquerait d'aggraver ou d'étendre
le différenddont la Cour est saisie ou de porter atteinte au droit de
l'autre Partieàobtenir l'exécution de tout arrêt que la Cour pour-
rait rendre en l'affaire; et en particulier le Gouvernement français

s'abstienne de procéder à des essais nucléairesprovoquant le dépôt
de retombées radioactives sur le territoire de la Nouvelle-Zélande,
des îles Cook, d.el'île Niouéou des îles Tokélaou;
Décideque les pièces écrites porteront d'abord sur la question de la
compétence dela Cour pour connaître du différend et sur celle de la rece-

vabilité dela requête:;
Fixecomme suit la date d'expiration des délaispour la procédureécrite:

Pour le dépôt di1 mémoire du Gouvernement néo-zélandais,le 21
septembre 1973,
Pour le dépôtdu contre-mémoiredu Gouvernement français, le 21 dé-
cembre 1973;

Réservela suite de la procédure.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix,à La 'Haye,le vingt-deuxjuin mil neuf centsoixante-treize, en quatrethousand nine hundred and seventy-three, in four copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted
respectively to the French Government, to the Government of New

Zealand, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for trans-
mission to the Security Council.

(Signed) F. AMMOUN,
Vice-President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

Judge JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGm Aakes the following declaration:
1have voted in favour of the Order for the reasons stated therein, but
wish to add some brief comments on the relationship between the
question of the Court's jurisdiction and the indication of interim mea-
sures.

1 do not believe the Court should indicate interim measures without
paying due regard to the basic question of itsjurisdiction to entertain the
merits of the Application. A request should not be granted if it is clear,
even on a prima facie appreciation, that there is no possible basis on
which the Court could be competent as to the merits. The question of
jurisdiction is therefore one, and perhaps the most important, among al1
relevant circumstances to be taken into account by a Member of the
Court when voting in favour of or against a request for interim measures.
On the other hand, in view of the urgent character of thedecision on
provisional measures, itis obvious that the Court cannot make its answer
dependent on a previous collectivedetermination by means of ajudgment
of the question of itsjurisdiction on the merits.

This situation places upon each Member of the Court the duty to
make, at this stage, an appreciation of whether-in the light of the
grounds invoked and of the other materials before him-the Court will
possessjurisdiction to entertain the merits of the dispute. From a subjec-

tive point of view, such an appreciation or estimation cannot be fairly
described as a mere preliminary or even cursory examination of the
jurisdictional issue: on the contrary, one must be satisfiedthat this basic
question of the Court's jurisdiction has received the fullest possible
attention which one is able to give to it within the limits of time and of
materials available for the purpose.
When, as in this case, the Court decides in favour of interim measures,
and does not, as requested by the French Government, remove the case
from the list, the parties will have the opportunity at a later stage to
plead more fully on the jurisdictional question. It follows that that

12exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposé auxarchives de la Cour et dont les

autres seront transmis respectivement au .Gouvernement français, au
Gouvernement néo-zélandaiset au Secrétaire générad le l'organisation
des Nations Unies pour transmission au Conseil de sécurité.

Le Vice-Président,
(SignéF ). AMMOUN.

Le Greffier,
(Signé S. AQUARONE.

M. JIMÉNEZ DE ARECHAGA ju,ge, fait la déclarationsuivante:

J'ai voté en faveurde l'ordonnance et des motifs qui figurent, maisje
voudrais ajouter quelques brèvesobservations au sujet du rapport entre
la compétencede la Cour et l'indication de mesures conservatoires.

Je ne pense pas que la Cour doive indiquer des mesures conservatoires
sans accorder toute l'attention vouluà la question fondamentale de sa
compétencepour connaître au fond de la requêtedont elle est saisie. 11
ne faut pas indiquer de mesures conservatoires s'ilapparaît nettement, et
cela mêmede prime abord, qu'il n'existeaucune base sur laquelle la Cour
puisse éventuellementfonder sa compétenceau fond. La question juridic-
tionnelle est donc l'une des circonstance- et peut-êtrela plus impor-
tante- qu'un membre de la Cour doit prendre enconsidération lorsqu'il
seprononce pour ou contre l'indication de mesures conservatoires.
D'un autre côté,étantdonnél'urgence de la décisionsur les mesures

conservatoires, il est évident que la Cour ne peut pas subordonner sa
réponse à une détermination collective préalable,par voie d'arrêt, desa
compétenceaufond.
Dans ces conditio:ns,il incombeàchaque membre de la Cour d'appré-
cier au stade actuel si, vu les motifs invoquéset les autres élémdont
il dispose, la Cour possède la compétencenécessairepour connaître du
fond du différend.D'un point de vue subjectif, cette appréciation ou es-
timation ne peut êtreconsidérée à proprement parler comme un simple
examen préliminaire ou mêmesommaire de la question juridictionnelle:
au contraire, il fautreparvenu à la conviction que cette question fonda-
mentale de la compétence de la Cour a reçu toute l'attention qu'il est
possible de lui accorder dans les limites de temps et avec les moyens d'in-
formation disponibles.
Lorsque, comme c'est le cas en l'espèce,la Cour décided'indiquer des

mesures conservatoireset ne raye pas l'affairedu rôle, ainsi que le deman-
dait le Gouvernement français, les parties auront plus tard l'occasion de
débattre plusà fond laquestion juridictionnelle. Il s'ensuit qu'on ne sau-
12question cannot be prejudged now; it is not possible to exclude a priori,
that the further pleadings and other relevant information may change
viewsor convictions presently held.

The question described in the Order as that of the existence of "a legal
interest in respect of these claims entitling the Court to admit the Applica-

tion" (para. 24) is characterized in the operative part as one relating to
the admissibility of the Application. The issuehas been raised of whether
New Zealand has a right of its own-as distinct froma general community
interest-or has suffered, or is threatened by, real damage. As far as the
power of the Court to adjudicate on the merits is concerned, the issue is
whether the dispute before the Court is one "with regard to which the
parties are in conflict as to their respective rights" as required by the
jurisdictional clause invoked by New Zealand. The question thus appears
to be a limited one linked to jurisdiction rather than to admissibility.
The distinction between those two categories of questions is indicated
by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in I.C.J. Reports 1963, pages 102-103, as
follows:

"... the realdistinction and test would seem to be whether or not the
objection is based on, or arises from, the jurisdictional clause or
clauses under which the jurisdiction of the tribunal is said to exist.
If so, the objection is basically one ofjurisdiction."
Article 17of the General Act provides that the disputes therein referred
those mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute
to shall include in particular
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Among the classes of
legal disputes there enumerated is that concerning "the existence of any
fact which, ifestablished, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation" (emphasis added). At the preliminary stage it would seem
therefore sufficient to determine whether the parties are in conflict as to
their respective rights.It would notappear ncessary to enter at that stage
into questions which really pertain to the merits and constitute the heart
of the eventualsubstantive decision such as for instance the establishment
of the rights of the parties or the extent of the damage resulting from
radio-active fall-out.

Judge Sir Humphrey WALDOCm Kakes the following declaration:
1 concur in the Order. 1 wish only to add that, in my view, the prin-
ciples set out in Article 67, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court should
guide the Court in givingits decision on the next phase of the proceedings
which is provided for by the present Order.rait la préjugermaintenant: il n'est pas impossible, à priori, que les écri-
tures quiseront présentéeset les autres élémentsd'appréciation pertinents
modifient les opinions ou convictions actuelles.

La question que l'ordonnance présentecomme celle de l'existence, à
l'égard de ces demandes, d'un «intérêtjuridique autorisant la Cour à
accueillir la requête))(paragraphe 24) est caractérisée,dans le dispositif,
comme ayant trait à la recevabilitéde la requête.On s'est demandési la
Nouvelle-Zélande peut se prévaloir d'un droit propre - distinct d'un

intérêctollectif ou gériéra- ou si ellea étéou pourrait êtrevictime d'un
préjudiceréel.Pour ce qui est du pouvoir de la Cour de statuer au fond,
le problème consiste à déterminer si le litige soumis à la Cour est un
((différendau sujet duquel les parties secontesteraient réciproquement un
droit», comme l'exigela clausejuridictionnelle invoquée par la Nouvelle-
Zélande. Il semble donc qu'il s'agisselà d'une question de portéelimitée
concernant la juridiction plutôt que la recevabilité. Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice a indiquécomme suit comment il différenciaitcesdeux catégories
de questions (C.I.J.Recueil 1963,p. 102-103) :

«la distinction,IItest réel,dépendsemble-t-il du point de savoir si
l'exception repose ou est fondéesur la clause ou les clauses juridic-
tionnelles en vertu desquelles on prétendétablirla compétence.Sitel
est le cas, l'exception porte essentiellement sur la compétence.

L'article 17 de l'Acte général stipuleque les différendsvisésdans cet
acte comprennent notamment ceux que mentionne l'article 36 du Statut
de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. Au nombre des catégo-
ries de différendsjuridiques énumérés dans cet article figurela réalitéde
tout fait qui,s'il était établi,onstituerait la violation d'un engagement
international)) (les italiques sont de nous). Au stade préliminaire, il
semblerait donc suffisant de déterminer si les parties se contestent réci-
proquement un droit. IIn'apparaît pas nécessaire à ce staded'aborder des
questions qui relèvent enréalitédu fond et qui constituent le point essen-
tiel de la décisionqui interviendra par la suite sur le fond, comme celle

de l'établissement desdroits des parties ou de l'étenduedu préjudicerésul-
tant des retombées radioactives.

SirHumphrey WAI-DOCK jge, fait la déclarationsuivante:

Je souscris à l'ordonnance. Je voudrais seulement ajouter que, selon
moi, les principes énoncés à l'articl67, paragraphe 7, du Règlement,de-
vraient guider la Cour lorsqu'elle rendra sa décisionen la phase suivante
de la procédure,que prévoitla présenteordonnance. Judge NAGENDR SINGHmakes the following declaration:

While fullysupportingthe reasoning leading to the verdict of theCourt,
and therefore voting with the majority for the grant of interim measures
of protection in this case, 1wish to lend emphasis, by this declaration, to
the requirement that the Court must be satisfied of its own competence,
even though prima facie, before taking action under Article 41 of the
Statute and Rule 61 (New Rule 66) of the Rules of Court.

It is true that neither of the aforesaid provisions spell out the test of
competence ofthe Court or of the admissibility of the Application andthe
request, which nevertheless have to be gone into by each Member of the
Court in order to see that apossiblevalid base for the Court's competence
exists and that the Application is, prima facie, entertainable. 1 am,
therefore, in entire agreement with the Court in laying down a positive
test regarding its own competence, prima facie established, which was
enunciated in the FislzeriesJurisdictioncase and having been reiterated in
this case may be said to lay down not only the latest but also the settled
jurisprudence of the Court on the subject.
It is indeed a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial function that a
court can be moved only if it has competence. If therefore in the exercise

of its inherent powers (as enshrined in Art. 41 of its Statute) the Court
grants interim relief, its solejustification to do sos that if it did not, the
rights of the parties would get so prejudiced that the judgment of the
Court when it came could be rendered meaningless. Thus the possibility
of the Court being ultimately able to give a judgment on merits should
always be present when interim measures are contemplated. If, however,
the Court were to shed its legal base of competence when acting under
Article 41 of its Statute, it would immediately expose itself to the danger
of being accused of discouraging governments from :

". .. undertaking, or continuing to undertake, the obligations of
judicial settlement as the result of any justifiable apprehension that
by accepting them they may become exposed to the embarrassment,
vexation and loss, possibly following upon interim measures, in
cases in which there is no reasonable possibility, prima facie ascer-
tained by the Court, of jurisdiction on the merits. Accordingly, the
Court cannot, in relation to a request for indication of interim
measures, disregard altogether the question of its competence on the

merits. The correct principle which emerges from these apparently
conflicting considerations and which has been uniformly adopted in
international arbitral and judicial practice is as follows: The Court
may properly act under the terms of Article 41 provided that there is
in existence an instrument such as a Declaration of Acceptance of the
Optional Clause, emanatingfrom the Parties to the dispute, which

1 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Unired Kingdomv. Ireland), I.C.J. ReportOrder2of
17August 1972, paras.15to 17,pp. 15to 16.

14 M. NAGENDR SINGHj,uge, fait la déclarationsuivante:
Touten souscrivant pleinement aux motifs de la décisionrendue par la

Cour et en votant donc avec la majorité pour l'indication de mesures
conservatoires en l'espèce,je voudrais bien faire ressortir, dans cette
déclaration, l'obligation faite la Cour de s'assurer de sa compétence,
même primafacie, avant de statuer en vertu de l'article 41 du Statut et de
l'article6 du Règlement.
Certes aucunede cesdispositions ne précisele critèredela compétence
de la Cour ou de la recevabilitéde la requêteet de la demande, critère
que tout membre de la Cour n'en doit pas moins examiner pour s'assurer
qu'il existe un fondement valable possibleà la compétencede la Cour et
que la requêteest de prime abord recevable. J'approuve donc tout à fait

la Courquand elleénonce un critèrepositifquant à sa compétenceprima
facie, critèrequi a éénoncé dans l'affairede la Compétenceenmatièrede
pêcheries1et qui, étantréaffirmé dans la présenteespèce,peut êtrecon-
sidérécomme exprimant, en la matière, non seulement la jurisprudence
la plus récentede la Cour mais aussi sajurisprudence bien établie.
L'exercicede la fonction judiciaire ne peut se concevoir que si le tribu-
nal saisi a compétence.Si par conséquentla Cour indique des mesures
conservatoires dans l'exercicede ses pouvoirs inhérents(tels que l'article
41 de son Statut les consacre), sa seule justification est que, sans ces
mesures, les droits des parties seraient si compromis que l'arrêtde la

Cour, au moment où il serait rendu, serait dépourvude sens. On ne doit
donc jamais oublier, quand on envisage des mesures conservatoires, que
la Cour aura peut-être,en fin de compte, à statuer au fond. Si la Cour
devait écarter le fondement juridique de sa compétencequand elle se
prononce sur !a base tle l'article 41 de son Statut, elle s'exposerait immé-
diatement au reproche de découragerles gouvernements

((d'accepter ou de continuer d'accepter lesobligations du règlement
judiciaire, en raison de la crainte justifiée qu'enles acceptant ils ris-
queraient de s'exposerà la gêne, auxvexations et aux pertes pouvant
résulterde mesures conservatoires dans le cas où il n'existe aucune
possibilitéraisonnable de compétenceau fond vérifiée par la Cour
primafacie. Par c:onséquent,la Cour ne peut,à propos d'une deman-
de en indication de mesures conservatoires, négligercomplètement
la question de sa compétenceau fond. Leprincipe exact qui sedégage

de ces considérations apparemment contradictoires et qui a été
adopté uniformément par la pratique arbitrale et judiciaire inter-
nationale est le suivant: La Cour peut légitimementagir en appli-
cation de l'article 41, pourvu qu'il existeuninstrument, telqu'unedé-
claration d'acceptation de la disposition facultative, émanant des
Parties au différend,conférant la Cour compétenceprimafacie et ne

ordonnance du17 août 1972,par. à517,p.15-16.nic. Islande), C.I.J. Recueil1972,

14 prima facie confers jurisdiction upon the Court and which incor-
porates no reservations obviously excluding its jurisdiction."
(Separate opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in Interhandel case,
I.C.J. Reports 1957,p. 118.)

It needs to be mentioned, therefore, that even at this preliminary stage
of prima facie testing the Court has to examine the reservations and
declarations made to the treaty which is cited by a party to furnish the
base for the jurisdiction of the Court a.ndto consider also the validity of
the treaty if the same ischallenged in relation to the parties to the dispute.
As a result of this prima facie examination the Court could either find:

(a) that there is no possible base for the Court's jurisdiction in which
event no matter what emphasis is placed on Article 41 of its Statute,
the Court cannot proceed to grant interim relief; or
(b) that a possible base exists, but needs further investigation to come
to any definite conclusion in which event the Court is inevitably left
no option but to proceed to the substance of the jurisdiction of the
case to complete its process of adjudication which, in turn, is time
consuming and therefore comes into conflict with the urgency of the
matter coupled with the prospect of irreparable damage to the rights
of the parties. It is this situation which furnishes the "raison d'être"
of interim relief.

If, therefore, the Court, in this case, has granted interim measures of
protection it is without prejudice to the substance whether jurisdictional
or otherwise which cannot be prejudged at this stage and will have to be
gone into further in the next phase.

Judge ad hoc Sir Garfield BARWICm Kakes the following declaration:

1have voted forthe indication of interim measures and the Order of the
Court as to the further procedure in the case because the very thorough
discussions in which the Court has engaged over the past weeks and my
own researches have convinced me that the General Act of 1928and the
French Government's declaration to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court with reservations each provide, prima facie, a basis on which the
Court might havejurisdiction to entertain and decide the claims made by
New Zealand in its Application of 9 May 1973.Further, the exchange of
diplornatic notes between the Governments of New Zealand and France
in 1973afford, in my opinion, at least prima facieevidence ofthe existence
of a dispute between those Governments as to matters of international
law affecting their respective rights.

Lastly, thematerial before the Court, particularly that appearing in the
UNSCEAR reports, provides reasonable grounds for concluding that
further deposit in the New Zealand territorial environment and that of contenantaucune réserveexcluantmanifestement cette compétence. ))

(Opinion individuelle de sir Hersch Lauterpacht dans l'affaire de
l'lnterhandel, C.I.J. Recueil 1957, p. 118-119.)

Il convient par suite de préciserque même àce stade préliminaireoù
elle vérifiesa compétenceprima facie, la Cour doit examiner les réserves
etdéclarationsaffectant letraitéqu'une partie invoquecommefondement
de la juridiction de la Cour, ainsi que la validitéde ce traité si elle est

contestée en ce qui concerne les parties au différend. A l'issue de cet
examenprimafacie, la Court peut conclure:
a) soit qu'il n'existeaucune base possible de compétence de la Cour,
auquel cas, quel que soit le rôle attribuà l'article 41 du Statut, la
Cour ne peut accorder de mesures conservatoires;
b) soit qu'il existeune base possible, mais qu'un examen plus approfondi

s'impose avant de parvenir à une conclusion ferme, auquel cas la
Cour se doit d'examiner à fond sa compétencepour s'acquitter com-
plètement de sa mission judiciaire, ce qui prend du temps, nuit à
l'urgence existant en la matièreet risque de porter un tort irréparable
aux droits des parties. C'est une tellesituation qui justifie l'indication
de mesures conservatoires.

Ainsi, si la Cour a indiqué desmesures conservatoires en l'espèce, elle
l'a fait sans préjudice des problèmes de substance, juridictionnels ou
autres, qui ne peuvent être actuellementpréjugéset devront êtreappro-
fondis au cours de la phase suivante.

Sir Garfield BARWICj:u Kg,e ad hoc,fait la déclaration suivante:

J'ai votéen faveur de l'indication de mesures conservatoires et de l'or-
donnance de la Cour sur la suite de la procédure, convaincupar les dis-
cussions très approfondies auxquelles la Cour a procédéces dernières
semaines et par mes propres recherches que l'Acte général de1928et la
déclarationdu Gouvernement français acceptant, avec réserve,lajuridic-
tion obligatoire de la Cour constituent l'un et l'autre, prima facie, une
base possible de compétencede la Cour pour connaître des demandes
formuléespar la Nouvelle-Zélandedans sa requêtedu 9 mai 1973et se
prononcer àleur sujet.In outre,selonmoi, l'échangedenotes diplomatiques
de 1973entre le Gouvernement néo-zélandaiset le Gouvernement fran-
çais démontre,au moins de prime abord, qu'il existe un différendentre ces
gouvernements sur des questions de droit international affectant leurs
droits respectifs.

Enfin, sur la base de ladocumentation soumise à la Cour, eten particu-
lier des rapports du Clomitéscientifique des Nations Unies pour l'étude
des effetsdes rayonnements ionisants, il est raisonnable de conclure que de
15the Cook Islands of radio-active particles of matter is likely to do harm
for which no adequate compensatory measures could be provided.

These conclusions are sufficient to warrant the indication of interim
measures.

1 agree with the form of the provisional measures indicated, under-
standing that the action proscribed is action on the part of governments
and that the measures are indicated in respect only of the New Zealand
Government's claim to the inviolability of its territory, and of that of the
Cook Islands.

Judges FORSTER G,ROS, PETRÉN and IGNACIO-PINa Tppend dissenting
opinions to theOrder of the Court.

(Initialled) F.A.
(Initialled) S.A.nouveaux dépôts de particules radioactives dans l'environnement territo-
rial de la Nouvelle-Zélandeet desîlesCook causeraientprobablement des
dommages pour lesquelsil ne sauraity avoir de réparation adéquate.
Ces conclusions suffisentà justifier l'indication de mesures conserva-
toires.
J'approuve la formedonnéeaux mesures conservatoires, étantentendu
selon moi que les actes prohibés sont ceux des gouvernementset que les
mesures sont indiquéesuniquement en relation avec la demande néo-
zélandaiseconcernant l'inviolabilitéde son territoire et de celui des îles
Cook.

MM. FORSTER G,ROS,PETRÉN et IGNACIO-PINTjO ug,es, joignenà l'or-
donnance les exposésde leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphé)F.A.

(Paraphé)S.A.

ICJ document subtitle

Request for the indication of measures of protection and fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Order of 22 June 1973

Links