Judgment of 14 February 2002

Document Number
121-20020214-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE REILATIVE AU MANDAT D'ARRÊT
DU II AVRIL 2000

(RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. BELGIQUE)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

IiEPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND OItDERS

CASE CONCE,RNING THE ARRE ST WARRANT
OF 11APRIL 2000

(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v.BELGIUM)

JUDGMENT OF 14 FEBRUARY2002 Mode officielde citation:

Mandut d'urrêtduIl avril 2000 (République dérnocrutique
du Congoc. Belgique), arrêt,
C.IJ. Recueil 2002,3p.

Officia1citat:on
Avrest Warrant ofIApril2000 (Democrutic Republic
of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2002,3p.

ente: 837 1
ISSN 0074-4441 Salesnumber
ISBN 92-1-070940-3 MANDAT D'ARRET DU 11AVRIL 2000

(RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. BELGIQUE)

ARREST WARRANT OF 11APF.IL 2000

(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE COKG0 v.BELGIUM)

14 FEBRUARY 2002

JUDGMENT INTEIRNATIONAL COURT OF .IUSTICE

YEAR 2002 2002
14 February
General List
14 February2002 No. 121

CASE CONCERNING THE ARREST WARRANT

OF 11APRIL 2000

(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v.BELGIUM)

Fuct.7ofthe case - Issue hy a Belgiun investigatiny rnagistrate itf'"an inter-
nutionul arrest ivurrunt in absentia" uguinst the irzcumbentMinister,fir Foreign
A,ffair.sof the Congo, ulleging grave hreaclzes if th? Ceneva convention.^of

1949 und of' the Additional Protocols thereto and cr,mes against lzuwiunitj~ -
Internutionul circzilutiorî of' urrext tvcwrunt through Interpol - Person (.on-
i.crt1c.dslrhsequerzt~ ceusing to hold office us Mini.ste.,for Foreign Afjcairs.

First objection of Belgiurn - Juris~l'ictionof the Court - Statute of' the
Court, Article 36, paragruplî 2 - Euistence (?fa "li~galdispute" betiveen the
Parties crtthe tiine of',filingof'the AppliccltioriN1,stitutingprocerdings - Events
s~lhsrq~retztto the,filing f'the.Apl~lic.utionclonot clep+*ivtehe Court of',juri.stlic-

tion.
Second objection of Belgizirn - i2footrie.s.c-. Fuct thut the person conc,c.rned
had cru.serito holc/ofji'ceus Minister for Foreign Affi irs does rlotput un end to
the dixpute hetii3eetzthe Parties und ciues not cleprlve the Applicutiorî of' ifs
objc7ct.

Third objection of i5elgiuni - Adrnissihility - Facfs underlying the Applica-
tion instituting procet,ding.~rzotchringed in (1 tvay th&/trun.-fi~rrîzedthe dispute
originull~~ hrought h~fire the Court into unother rchic.iis d$rercnt in churuc,ter.

Fourth ohjection of' Belgiuni - Admis.sihility - Ccngo not acting in the corz-

test of'protection of' one c!f'its nationuls - Inupplic~~hilitj,of'rules reluting to
eshc~~rstioto zf'loccilrc-riiedirs.
S~rh.~idiurn ~r.gurîzentof Belginnz - Non ultra peti a rule - Cluim in Appli-
c.cztionirlstituting proceeeling.~that Belgiui?z'.s cluirn to esercisr LIur~ii,~rstjrlris-
diction in i.ssuingthe arrest it.arrunt i.scorztrury to irterncrtionrrl1u1v - Cluim

r~otnicrciciii,fïrzrll.s~~hr~ii.s.sof'zhe Corigo - Court ~rrzahle tu rule on tlîat ques-represented by

H.E. Mr. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza. Ambassldor Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands.
as Agent;

H.E. Mr. Ngele Masudi, Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals,
Maître Kosisaka Kombe, Legal Adviser to the Pr~:sidencyof the Republic,
Mr. François Rigaux, Professor Emeritus at the Catholic University of Lou-
vain,
Ms Monique Chemillier-Gendreau. Professor at the University of Paris VI1
(Denis Diderot),
Mr. Pierre d'Argent, Chargéde cours, Catholic Uiiiversity of Louvain,
Mr. Moka N'Golo, Bâtonnier,
Mr. Djeina Wembou, Professor at the University of Abidjan,
as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Mazyambo Mirkengo, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Justice,
as Counsellor,

the Kingdom of Belgium,
represented by

Mr. Jan Devadder, Director-General, Legal Matters, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
as Agent;

Mr. Eric David, Professor of Public International Law, Université librede
Bruxelles,
Mr. Daniel Bethlehem, Barrister, Bar of England aiid Wales, Fellow of Clare
Hall and Deputy Director of the Lauterpacht Research Centre for Inter-
national Law, Uiniversityof Cambridge,
as Counsel and Advocates;

H.E. Baron Olivier Gillèsde Pélichy.Permanent Rcpresentative of the King-
dom of Belgium to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. responsible for relations with the International Court of Justice,
Mr. Claude Debrulle, Director-General. Criminal Legislation and Human
Rights, Ministry of Justice,
Mr. Pierre Morlet, Advocate-General, Brussels Cour d'Appel,
Mr. Wouter Detavernier, Deputy Counsellor, Cirectorate-General Legal
Matters, Ministr:yof Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Rodney Neufeld, Research Associate, Lauterpacht Research Centre for
International Law. University of Cambridge,
Mr. Tom Vanderhaeghe. Assistant at the Universi é libre de Bruxelles,

THECOUKT.
composed as above,

after deliberation,

tlrlivrrs t,fi)lloiviJudgnient : 1. On 17October 2000 the Democratic Republic c~fthe Congo (hereinafter
referred to as "the Congo") filed in the Registry of !.heCourt an Application
instituting proceedings against theKingdom of Belgi~~m (hereinafter referred to
as "Belgium") in respect of a dispute concerning an 'international arrest war-
rant issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian investigatingjudge . . . against the
Minister for Foreign Affairs in officeof the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi".
In that Application the Congo contended that Iielgium had violated the
"principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another
State", the "principle of sovereign equality among al1Members of the United
Nations, as laid dowii in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United

Nations", as well as "the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of a sovereign State, as recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court
and following from Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention of
18April 1961on Diplomatic Relations".
In order to found the Court's jurisdiction the Coiigo invoked in the afore-
mentioned Application the fact that "Belgium ha[d] a(:ceptedthejurisdiction of
the Court and, in so Faras may be required, the [aforementioned] Application
signifie[d]acceptance of that jurisdiction by the De:nocratic Republic of the
Congo".
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Starute, the Application was
forthwith communicated to the Government of Belgiiimby the Registrar; and,
in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, al1 States entitled to appear
before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. Since the Court included upon the Bench no jiidge of the nationality of
either of the Parties, each Party proceeded to exercise the right conferred by
Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the

case; the Congo chose Mr. Sayeman Bula-Bula, and Belgium Ms Chris-
tine Van den Wyngaert.
4. On 17 October 2000, the day on which the P pplication was filed, the
Government of the Congo also filed in the Registry of the Court a request for
the indication of a provisional measure based on AIticle 41 of the Statute of
the Court. At the hearings on that request, Belgium, l'orits part, asked that the
case be removed froni the List.
By Order of 8 December 2000the Court, on the ont:hand, rejected Belgium's
request that the casebe removed from the List and, c,nthe other, held that the
circumstances, as they then presented themselvesto tl-e Court, were not such as
to require the exercisi: of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate
provisional measures. In the same Order, the Cour. also held that "it [was]
desirable that the issues before the Court should be d':termined as soon as pos-
sible" and that "it [was]therefore appropriate to ensiire that a decision on the
Congo's Application be reached with al1expedition"
5. By Order of 1:3December 2000, the President of the Court, taking
account of the agreement of the Parties as expresse1 at a meeting held with

their Agents on 8 December 2000, fixed time-limits for the filingof a Memorial
by the Congo and of a Counter-Memorial by Belgiun, addressing both issues
of jurisdiction and admissibility and the merits. By Orders of 14 March 2001
and 12April 2001, thi:se time-limits, taking account of the reasons given by the
Congo and the agreement of the Parties, were successively extended. The
Memorial of the Corigo was filed on 16 May 2001 within the time-limit thus
finally prescribed.
6. By Order of 27 .rune 2001, the Court, on the oni hand, rejected a requestby Belgium for authorization, in derogation from th: previous Orders of the
President of the Court, to submit preliminary objectisns involving suspension
of the proceedings on the merits and,on the other, exiended the time-limit pre-
scribed in the Order of 12 April 2001 for the filing by Belgium of a Counter-
Memorial addressing both questions of jurisdiction and admissibility and the
merits. The Counter-Memorial of Belgium was filecl on 28 September 2001
within the time-limit thus extended.
7. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rulcs, the Court, after ascer-
taining the views of the Parties, decided that copies oi'the pleadings and docu-
ments annexed would be made available to the public it the opening of the oral
proceedings.

8. Public hearings vtere held from 15to 19October 2001, at which the Court
heard the oral arguments and replies of:
For tlîe Congo: H.E Mr. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza,
H.E Mr. Ngele Masudi,
Maître Kosisaka Kombe,
Mr. François Rigaux,
Ms IMoniqueChemillier-Gendreau,
Mr. Pierre d'Argent.

For Belgiunî: Mr. Jan Devadder,
Mr. Daniel Bethlehem,
Mr. Eric David.
9. At the hearings, Members of the Court put cuestions to Belgium, to
which replies were given orally or in writing, in accsrdance with Article 61,
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. The Congo provided its written comments

on the reply that was given in writing to one of the:e questions, pursuant to
Article 72 of the Rules of Court.

10. In its Application, the Congo formulated the decision requested in the
following terms :
"The Court is requested to declare that the Kingdom of Belgium shall
annul the international arrest warrant issued on 1I April2000 by a Belgian
investigating jud,ge, Mr. Vandermeersch, of tkie Brussels Tribunal de
première instance against the Minister for Foreign Affairs in office of the
Democratic Repiiblic of the Congo, Mr. Abdu aye Yerodia Ndombasi,
seeking his provisional detention pending a requcst for extradition to Bel-
gium for alleged crimes constituting 'serious vislations of international

humanitarian law', that warrant having been circulated by thejudge to al1
States, including itheDemocratic Republic of the Congo, which received it
on 12July 2000."
11. In the course of the written proceedings, the fo lowing submissions were
presented by the Parties:

On hehalf' of'the Governrnetzt of'tlze Congo.
in the Memorial :

"In light of the facts and arguments set out al)ove, the Government of
the Democratic R.epublicof the Congo requests ihe Court to adjudge and
declare that: 1. by issuing and internationally circulating the rrest warrant of 11April
2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium committed a
violation in regard to the DRC of the rule of customary international
law concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal
process of inciumbentforeign ministers;
2. a forma1 finding by the Court of the unlawfiilness of that act consti-
tutes an appropriate form of satisfaction, providing reparation for the
consequent moral injury to the DRC;
3. the violation o'finternational law underlying tlie issue and international
circulation of the arrest warrant of 11April 2000 precludes any State,
including Belgium, from executing it;
4. Belgium shall be required to recall and cantel the arrest warrant of
11April 2000 and to inform the foreign auth ~ritiesto whom the war-
rant was circulated that, following the Coitrt's Judgment, Belgium
renounces its request for their CO-operation il executing the unlawful

warrant."
On behaif qf the Governnlent of Brlgiurn,

in the Counter-Memorial:
"For the reasons stated in Part II of this Co~~nter-Memorial,Belgium
requests the Couirt. as a preliminarymatter, to iidjudge and declare that
the Court lacks jiirisdiction in this case andlor that the application by the
Democratic Repuiblicof the Congo against Belgium is inadmissible.
If, contrary to the preceding submission, the Court concludes that it
does have jurisdiction in this case and that the application by the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo is admissible, Belgiiimrequests the Court to
reject the submisisionsof the Democratic Repuhlic of the Congo on the
merits of the case and todismiss the application."

12. At theoral proceedings, the following submissiclnswere presented by the
Parties:

On hehcilf of the Governnlent ofthe Congo,
"In light of the facts and arguments set out during the written and oral
proceedings, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:
1. by issuing aiid internationally circulating the arrest warrant of

11April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia IJdombasi, Belgiumcom-
mitted a violaitionin regard to the Democrati: Republic of the Congo
of the rule of customary international law concerning the absolute
inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign
ministers; in so doing, it violated the princi1)leof sovereign equality
among States;
2. a foi-mal finding by the Court of the unlawfiilness of that act consti-
tutes an apprc~priateform of satisfaction, providing reparation for the
consequent moral injury to the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

3. the violations of international law underlyin4 the issue and interna-
tionalcirculatiion of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 preclude any
State, including Belgium. from executing it;
4. Belgium shall be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 and to inform the foreign authorities to whom the war- rant was circ~ilatedthat Belgium renounces its request for their co-
operation in executingthe unlawful warrant."
On hrhulfif'tli~Governnîrnt of'Belgiuni,

"For the reasons statedin the Counter-Memorial of Belgiumand in its
oral submissions,Belgiumrequests theCourt, as a preliminary matter, to
adjudge and declare that the Court lacksjurisdi':tionin this case andlor
that the Application by the Democratic Repubtic of the Congo against
Belgiumis inadmissible.
If, contrary to the submissionsof Belgium wiihregard to the Court's
jurisdiction and tlheadmissibilityof the Applicaton, the Court concludes
that it does have jurisdictionin this caseand that the Application by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is admissib e, Belgium requests the
Court to reject the submissionsof the Democratii Republic of the Congo

on the meritsof the case and to dismissthe Appication."

13. On 11 April 2!000an investigatingjudge 01'the Brussels Tribunal
de première instance issued "an international arrest warrant inabsentiu"
against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, charging him, as perpetrator
or co-perpetrator, with offences constituting grave breaches of theGeneva
Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional Protocols thereto, and with

crimes against humanity.
At the tiine when the arrest warrant was issuecl Mr. Yerodia was the
Minister for Foreign. Affairs of the Congo.
14. The arrest warrant was transmitted to the Congo on 7 June 2000,
being received by the Congolese authorities on l:! July 2000. According
to Belgium, the warrant was at the same time trinsmitted to the Inter-
national Criminal Police Organization (Interl,ol), an organization

whose function is ta'enhance and facilitate cross.border criminal police
co-operation worldwide; through the latter, it \vas circulated interna-
tionally.
15. In the arrest warrant, Mr. Yerodia is accused of having made vari-
ous speeches inciting,racial hatred during the month of August 1998.The

crimes with which Mr. Yerodia was charged were punishable in Belgium
under the Law of 16 June 1993 "concerning the Punishment of Grave
Breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and of Protocols 1 and II of 8 June 1977 A~iditional Thereto", as
amended by the Law of 10 February 1999"concerning the Punishment of
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" (hereinafter

referred to as the "Elelgian Law").
Article 7 of the B,elgian Law provides that "The Belgian courts shall
have jurisdiction in respect of the offences provlded for in the present
Law. wheresoever they may have been cornmittecl". In the present case,
according to Belgium. the cornplaints that initiatcd the proceedings as a
result of which the arrest warrant was issued emanated from 12 indivi-
duals al1resident in Belgium, five of whom were of Belgian nationality.

It is not contested by Belgiun~,however, that th: alleged acts to whichthe arrest warrant relates were committed outside Belgian territory, that
Mr. Yerodia was ncit a Belgian national at the time of those acts, and
that Mr. Yerodia walsnot in Belgian territory at ihe time that the arrest
warrant was issued and circulated. That no Belgian nationals were vic-
tims of the violence that was said to have resultrd from Mr. Yerodia's
alleged offences was also uncontested.
Article 5, paragraph 3, of the Belgian Law further provides that
"[ilmmunity attachirig to the official capacity of ;t person shall not pre-
vent the application of the present Law".
16. At the hearing,~,Belgium further claimed th it it offered "to entrust
the case to the comptent authorities [of the Gong>] for enquiry and pos-

sible prosecution", and referred to a certain nu~nber of steps which it
claimed to have taken in this regard from September 2000, that is, before
the filing of the Application instituting proceedirigs. The Congo for its
part stated the following: "We have scant infornation concerning the
form [of these Belgian proposals]." It added tha "these proposals . ..
appear to have been made very belatedly, namely ujter an arrest warrant
against Mr. Yerodia had been issued".
17. On 17 October 2000, the Congo filed in the Registry an Applica-
tion instituting the present proceedings (see paragi aph 1above), in which
the Court was requested "to declare that the Kingdom of Belgium shall
annul the international arrest warrant issued o~i 11 April 2000". The
Congo relied in its ,4pplication on two separate legal grounds. First, it
claimed that "[tlhe universaljurisdiction that the 13elgianState attributes
to itselfunder Article 7 of the Law in question" constituted a

"[v]iolation of the principle that a State may not exercise its author-
ity on the territory of anothei- State and of the principle of sovereign
equality among al1Members of the United hations, as laid down in
Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations".

Secondly, it claimed that "[tlhe non-recognition, on the basis of
Article 5 . . of the Belgian Law, of the immunit) of a Minister for For-
eign Affairs in officc" constituted a "[v]iolation of the diplomatic immu-
nity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a so~ereign State, as recog-
nized by the jurispriudence of the Court and foll3wing from Article 41,
paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention of 18A~ril 1961on Diplornatic
Relations".
18. On the same day that it filed its Application instituting proceed-
ings, the Congo submitted a request to the Court for the indication of a
provisional measure under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court. During
the hearings devoted to consideration of that request, the Court was
informed that in November 2000 a ministerial rejhuffle had taken place

in the Congo, folloviiingwhich Mr. Yerodia had zeased to hold office as
Minister for Foreigri Affairs and had been entrusted with the portfolio of
Minister of Education. Belgium accordingly cla~medthat the Congo's
Application had become moot and asked the Coiirt, as has already beenrecalled, to remove the case from the List. By Order of 8 December 2000,
the Court rejected both Belgium's submissions to that effect and also the
Congo's request for the indication of provisional measures (see para-
graph 4 above).

19. From mid-April2001, with the formation of a new Government in
the Congo, Mr. Yerodia ceased to hold the post ~f Minister of Educa-
tion. He no longer holds any ministerial office today.

20. On 12 September 2001, the Belgian Natiorial Central Bureau of
Interpol requested the Interpol General Secretariat to issue a Red Notice

in respect of Mr. Yerodia. Such notices concern infiividuals whose arrest
is requested with a view to extradition. On 19October 2001, at the public
sittings held to hear the oral arguments of the Parti-s in the case, Belgium
informed the Court that Interpol had responded on 27 September 2001
with a request for additional information, and that no Red Notice had
yet been circulated.

21. Although the ,4pplication of the Congo ortginally advanced two
separate legal groundls (see paragraph 17 above), Ihe submissions of the
Congo in its Memorial and the final submissions which it presented at the
end of the oral proceedings refer only to a violatio 1"in regard to the . . .
Congo of the rule of customary international law cl~ncerningthe absolute
inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign

ministers" (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above).

22. In their written pleadings, and in oral argument, the Parties

addressed issues of jurisdiction and admissibility as well as the merits (see
paragraphs 5 and 6 above). In this connection, 13elgiumraised certain
objections which the Court will begin by addressiiig.

23. The first objection presented by Belgium reiids as follows:
"That, in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no

longer either Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a min-
ister occupying any other position in the .. . Government [of the
Congo], there iijno longer a 'legal dispute' between the Parties
within the meanung of this term in the Optionil Clause Declarations
of the Parties and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in
this case."

24. Belgium does not deny that such a legal d spute existed between
the Parties at the tin~ewhen the Congo filed its Application instituting
proceedings, and that the Court was properly seised by that Application.

However, it contends that the question is not whether a legal disputeexisted at that time, but whether a legal dispute exijts at the present time.
Belgium refers in this respect inter alia to the Nor,herrzCameroons case,
in which the Court found that it "may pronounce iudgment only in con-
nection with concrete cases where there exists at th: time of the adjudica-
tion an actual controversy involving a conflict of legal interests between
the parties" (I.C.J. Reports 1963, pp. 33-34), as well as to the Nucleur
Tests cases ('Austrulitzv. France)(New Zealurzdv. France), in which the
Court stated the following: "The Court, as a court of law, is called upon
to resolve existing disputes between States .. . The dispute brought

before it must therefore continue to exist at the time when the Court
makes its decision" (1.C.J Reports 1974, pp. 270-271, para. 55; p. 476,
para. 58). Belgium argues that the position of MI. Yerodia as Minister
for Foreign Affairs was central to the Congo's Application instituting
proceedings. and emphasizes that there has now be:n a change of circum-
stances at the very heart of the case, in view of the fact that Mr. Yerodia
was relieved of his position as Minister for Foreign Affairs in Novem-
ber 2000 and that, since 15April2001, he has occupied no position in the
Government of the Congo (see paragraphs 18and 19above). According
to Belgium, while there may still be a difference cf opinion between the
Parties on the scope and content of internatioral law governing the
immunities of a Minister for Foreign Affairs, thai difference of opinion
has now become a matter of abstract, rather than of practical, concern.
The result, in Belgiurn'sview, is that the case has become an attempt by
the Congo to "[seek]an advisory opinion from the Court", and no longer
a "concrete case" involving an "actual controvers) " between the Parties,

and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case.

25. The Congo rej~ectthis objection of Belgium It contends that there
is indeed a legal dispute between the Parties, in ihat the Congo claims
that the arrest warrant was issued in violation of the immunity of its
Minister for Foreign Affairs, that that warrant v/as unlawful ah initio,
and that this legal defect persists despite the sub'equent changes in the
position occupied by the individual concerned, wliile Belgium maintains
that the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant were not contrary to
international law. The Congo adds that the termination of Mr. Yerodia's
officia1duties in no way operated to efface the wrongful act and the
injury that flowed from it, for which the Congo CO ltinues to seek redress.

26. The Court recalls that, according to its settled jurisprudence, its
jurisdiction must be determined at the time that he act instituting pro-
ceedings was filed.Thus, if the Court has jurisdiction on the date the case
is referred to it, it continues to do so regardless of subsequent events.
Such events might lead to a finding that an application has subsequently .ARREST WARRANT (JUDGMENT) 14

of the case it had jurisdiction to deal with it. and that it still has such
jurisdiction. Belgium's first objection must therefore be rejected.

29. The second objection presented by Belgium is the following:

"That in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no
longer either Miriister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a min-
ister occupying any other position in the . . Government [of the

Congo], the case is now without object and the Court should accord-
ingly decline to proceed to judgment on the rrerits of the case."

30. Belgium also ri:lies in support of this objection on the Nortlzern
Cumeroon.~case, in which the Court considered tliat it would not be a
proper discharge of ils duties to proceed further iii a case in which any
judgment that the Court might pronounce would be "without object"
(I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 38), and on the Nucleur Te~tscases, in which the
Court saw "no reasori to allow the continuance of proceedings which it

knows are bound to be fruitless" (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 271, para. 58;
p. 477, para. 61). Belgium maintains that the decllrations requested by
the Congo in its first and second submissions would clearly fall within the
principles enunciated by the Court in those cases, since ajudgment of the
Court on the merits in this case could onlv be dire<ted towards the clari-

fication of the law in this area for the futire, or be designed to reinforce
the position of one or other Party. It relies in support of this argument on
the fact that the Congo does not allege any material injury and is not
seeking compensatory damages. It adds that the issue and transmission
of the arrest warrant were not predicated on the ministerial status of the
person concerned, that he is no longer a minister, and that the case is

accordingly now devoid of object.

31. The Congo contests this argument of Belgium, and emphasizes
that the aim of the Congo - to have the disputed arrest warrant
annulled and to obtain redress for the moral injury suffered - remains

unachieved at the point in time when the Court is called upon to decide
the dispute. According to the Congo, in order for the case to have
become devoid of ob-jectduring the proceedings, the cause of the viola-
tion of the right would have had to disappear, ald the redress sought
would have to have been obtained.

32. The Court has already affirmed on a number csfoccasions that events
occurring subsequent itothe filing of an application rlay render the applica-
tion without object such that the Court is not called lpon to give a decision

thereon (see Qurstiorzco, flnterprrtrition und Applplicutiof tlzc1971 Mont-reul Convention urising,fi.omthe Aeviul Incident ut Lockerbie (Lihyu~ Arub
Jumalziriyu v. United Kingdom), Prelitninury Ohjections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 26, para. 46; and Questions of Inte.pretution und Applica-
tion of the 1971 Montreal Convention urisingfrom the Aeriul Incident ut
Lockerhie (Lihyan Aruh Jumuhiriyu v. United Stute.; ofAmericu), Prelimi-
nu- Objections, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 131,para. 45).

However. it considlers that this is not such a case. The change which
has occurred in the situation of Mr. Yerodia has not in fact put an end to
the dispute between the Parties and has not deprilied the Application of
its object. TheCongo argues that the arrest warrant issued by the Belgian
judicial authorities against Mr. Yerodia was and remains unlawful. It
asks the Court to hold that the warrant is unl,iwful, thus providing

redress for the moral injury which the warrant alleyedly caused to it. The
Congo also continues to seek the cancellation ol' the warrant. For its
part, Belgium contends that it did not act in violation of international
law and it disputes the Congo's submissions. In th: view of the Court. it
follows from the foregoing that the Application of the Congo is not now
without object and that accordingly the case is not moot. Belgium's

second objection must accordingly be rejected.

33. The third Belgian objection is put as follows

"That the case as it now stands is materialiy different to that set
out in the [Congol's Application instituting prlxeedings and that the
Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case andlor that the appli-

cation is inadmissible."
34. According to Belgium, it would be contrarJ1 to legal security and
the sound administration of justice for an applicant State to continue

proceedings in circurnstances in which the factua dimension on which
the Application was based has changed fundamentally, since the respond-
ent State would in those circumstances be uncertain, until the very last
moment, of the substance of the claims against it. Belgium argues that
the prejudice sufferecl by the respondent State in ihis situation is analo-
gous to the situation in which an applicant State lormulates new claims

during the course of the proceedings. It refers to tl-ejurisprudence of the
Court holding inadmissible new claims formulatecl during the course of
the proceedings which, had they been entertained. would have trans-
formed the subject ol'the dispute originally brought before it under the
terms of the Application (see Fislzeric~s J~vi~sdiction(Spciin v. Crinadu),
Jurisclic.tioof' th@Court, Judgm~tzt, I. CIJ. Repo~ts 1998, pp. 447-448,

para. 29). In the circumstances, Belgium contencls that, if the Congo
wishes to maintain its claims, it should be required to initiate proceedings
afresh or,at the very least, apply to the Court for p:rmission to amend its
initial Application. 35. In response, the Congo denies that there has been a substantial
amendment of the terms of its Application, and nsists that it has pre-
sented no new claim, whether of substance or of iorm, that would have
transformed the subject-matter of the dispute. The Congo maintains that
it has done nothing through the various stages i 1 the proceedings but
"condense and refine" its claims, as do most States that appear before the

Court, and that it is simply making use of the riglit of parties to amend
their submissions until the end of the oral proceecings.

36. The Court notes that, in accordance with scttled jurisprudence, it
"cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought befctreit by application to
be transformed by amendments in the submissions into another dispute
which is different in character" (Sociétécommerciale de Belgique, Judg-
ment, 1939, P. C.IJ., Series AIB, No. 78, p. 173 ;4:f.Militury and Para-
military Actiiities in arzciuguinst Nicaragua (Nica,agua v. United States

of' Arnerica), Jurisdiction and Adnzissihility, Jud~ment, 1.C.J. Reports
1984, p. 427, para. 80; see also Certain Phospjzate Lands in Nauru
(Nauru v.Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1. C.J. Reports
1992, pp. 264-267, iniparticular paras. 69 and 70:l.However, the Court
considers that in the present case the facts undeilying the Application
have not changed in a way that produced such a transformation in the
dispute brought before it. The question submitted to the Court for deci-
sion remains whether the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant by
the Belgianjudicial authorities against a person wlhowas at that time the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo were coiîtrary to international

law. The Congo's firial submissions arise "directly out of the question
which is the subject-matter of that Application" (Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Federal Republic qf'Gerrnuny v. Iceland), Me.-its, Judgment, 1.C.J.
Reports 1974, p. 203, para. 72; see also Temple of Preuh Vilzear, Merits,
Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 36).

In these circumst;~nces, the Court considers that Belgium cannot
validly maintain thai; the dispute brought before the Court was trans-
formed in a way that affected its ability to prepare its defence, or that
the requirements of the sound administration of justice were infringed.

Belgium's third objection must accordingly be rejccted.

37. The fourth Bel.gianobjection reads as follo~vs:
"That, in the light of the new circumstances concerning Mr. Yero-
dia Ndombasi, the case has assumed the character of an action of

diplornatic protection but one in which the individual being pro- tected has failed to exhaust local remedies, and that the Court
accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case andlor that the application
is inadmissible."

38. In this respect, Belgium accepts that, when the case was first insti-
tuted, the Congo had a direct legal interest in the niatter, and was assert-
ing a claim in its own name in respect of the allegetl violation by Belgium
of the immunity of the Congo's Foreign Minister. 1-Iowever,according to

Belgium, the case was radically transformed aftei the Application was
filed, iiamely on15 April 2001. when Mr. Yerodia ceased to be a member
of the Congolese Government. Belgium maintains that two of the requests
made of the Court in the Congo's final submissions in practice now con-
Cernthe legal effect of an arrest warrant issued aga nst a private citizen of
the Congo, and that hese issues fa11within the rea m of an action of dip-

lomatic protection. It adds that the individual concerned has not
exhausted al1available remedies under Belgian law a necessary condition
before the Congo can espouse the cause of one 01'its nationals in inter-
national proceedings

39. The Congo, on the other hand, denies that this is an action for

diplomatic protection. It maintains that it is brin:$& these proceedings
in the name of the Congolese State, on account of the violation of the
immunity of its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Congo further denies
the availability of rennediesunder Belgian law. It pints out in this regard
that it is only when the Crown Prosecutor has betome seised of the case
file and makes submissions to the Chambre du conseil that the accused

can defend himself before the Chambre and seek iO have the charge dis-
missed.

40. The Court notes that the Congo has never sought to invoke before
it Mr. Yerodia's persona1 rights. It considers that, despite the change in
professional situation of Mr. Yerodia, the character of the dispute sub-
mitted to the Court by means of the Application has not changed: the

dispute still concerris the lawfulness of the arr:st warrant issued on
11 April 2000 against a person who was at the tine Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Congo, and the question whether the rights of the Congo
have or have not been violated by that warrant. As the Congo is not act-
ing in the context of protection of one of its nationals, Belgium cannot
rely upon the rules relating to the exhaustion of local remedies.

In any event, the Court recalls that an objectior, based on non-exhaus-
tion of local remedies relates to the admissibility of the application (see
Interlzundel, Prelirninary Objections, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1959,
p. 26; Elettrunica Siculu S.p. A. (ELSI), Judgment, 1.C J. Reports 1989,
p. 42, para. 49). Under settled jurisprudence, the critical date for deter-

mining the admissibility of an application is the (late on which it is filed(see Questions of'Interpretation and Applicution of' the 1971 Montreal
Converztion uri.singjkorn the Aeriul Incident ut Lockerbie (Libyun Arub
Jamahirij~uv. United Kingdom), Prelirninary Objections, Judgrnent, 1.C.J.
Reports 1998, pp. 25-26, paras. 43-44; and Questions of Interpretation
und Applicution of the 1971 Montreal Convention clrising.frorn the Aerial

Incident ut Lockerhie (Libyun Arab Jarnuhiriy~ v. United States qf
Anzerica), Prelimincrry Objections, Judgtrzetzt, LC.J. Reports 1998,
pp. 130-131, paras. 4.2-43). Belgium accepts that, on the date on which
the Congo filed the A.pplication instituting proceecings, the Congo had a
direct legal interestin the matter, and was asserting a claim in its own
name. Belgium's fourth objection must accordingly be rejected.

41. As a subsidiary argument, Belgium further contends that "[iln the
event that the Court t-lecidesthat it does have jurisdiction in this case and
that the application iijadmissible, ...the non ultrapetita rule operates to

limit the jurisdiction of the Court to those issues that are the subject of
the [Congol's final isubmissions". Belgium points out that, while the
Congo initially advanced a twofold argument, based, on the one hand,
on the Belgian judge's lack of jurisdiction, and, on the other, on the
immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by its Ministcr for Foreign Affairs,
the Congo no longer claims in its final submissions that Belgium wrongly

conferred upon itself universal jurisdiction in ubse~ltia.According to Bel-
gium, the Congo novi confines itself to arguing that the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 was unlawful because it violated th<.immunity from juris-
diction of its Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the Court conse-
quently cannot rule on the issue of universal juristiiction in any decision
it renders on the merits of the case.
42. The Congo, for its part, states that its intt:rest in bringing these

proceedings is to obtilin a finding by the Court that it has been the victim
of an internationally wrongful act, the question whether this case involves
the "exercise of an excessive universal jurisdiction ' being in this connec-
tion only a secondary consideration. The Congo asserts that any consid-
eration by the Court of the issues of international aw raised by universal
jurisdiction would be undertaken not at the request of the Congo but,

rather, by virtue of the defence strategy adopttd by Belgium, which
appears to maintain 1hat the exercise of such jurisdiction can "represent a
valid counterweight itothe observance of immunities".

43. The Court would recall the well-established principle that "it is the

duty of the Court not only to reply to the questions as stated in the final
submissions of the parties, but also to abstain frc'm deciding points not
included in those submissions" (Asylunz, Judgment. 1. C.J. Reports 1950,p. 402). While the Court is thus not entitled to decide upon questions not
asked of it, the noui ultvu petitu rule nonetheless cannot preclude the
Court from addressing certain legal points in its reasoning. Thus in the
present case the Court may not rule, in the operative part of its Judg-

ment, on the question whether the disputed arrest warrant, issued by the
Belgian investigating judge in exercise of his purported universal jurisdic-
tion, complied in tl-iat regard with the rules anci principles of interna-
tional law governinj; the jurisdiction of national courts. This does not
mean, however, that the Court may not deal with certain aspects of that

question in the reasoning of its Judgment, shoulc it deem this necessary
or desirable.

44. The Court coincludes from the foregoing that it has jurisdiction to

entertain the Congol's Application, that the Application is not without
object and that accordingly the case is not moot and that the Applica-
tion is admissible. T'hus. the Court now turns to the merits of the case.

45. As indicated above (see paragraphs 41 to4: above), in its Applica-
tion instituting these proceedings, the Congo originally challenged the
legality of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 on two separate grounds:
on the one hand, Belgium's claim to exercise a universal jurisdiction and,
on the other, the alleged violation of the immunities of the Minister for

Foreign Affairs of the Congo then in office. However, in its submissions
in its Memorial, ancl in its final submissions at the close of the oral pro-
ceedings, the Congo invokes only the latter grouiid.

46. As a matter alflogic, the second ground should be addressed only
once there has been a determination in respect of the first, since it is only

where a State has jui-isdiction under international law in relation to a par-
ticular matter that there can be any question of immunities in regard to
the exercise of that jurisdiction. However, in the present case, and in view
of the final form of the Congo.a submissions. the Court will address first
the question whether, assuming that it had jurijdiction under interna-
tional law to issue and circulate the arrest warrant of 11 A~rii 2000. Bel-

gium in so doing violated the immunities of the then Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Cong~o.

47. The Congo maintains that, during his or hcr term of office, a Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State is entitled to inviolabilityand to immunity fr'om criminal process being "ibsolute or complete",
that is to say, they are subject to no exception. P~ccordingly,the congo
contends that no criininal prosecution may be brought against a Minister

for Foreign Affairs in a foreign court as long ai he or she remains in
office, and that any finding of criminal responsibility by a domestic court
in a foreign country, or any act of investigation iindertaken with a view
to bringing him or her to court, would contravene the principle of immu-
nity fromjurisdiction. According to the Congo, th? basis of such criminal
immunity is purely hnctional, and immunity is azcorded under custom-

ary international law simply in order to enable the foreign State repre-
sentative enjoying siich immunity to perform his or her functions freely
and without let or tiindrance. The Congo adds that the immunity thus
accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs when i 1 office coverç al1their
acts, including any ccsmmitted before they took of ice, and that it is irrele-
vant whether the act:sdone whilst in office may be characterized or not as

"official acts".

48. The Congo states further that it does not ileny the existence of a
principle of international criminal law, deriving fr2m the decisions of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals, that the accused's

official capacity at the time of the acts cannot, before any court, whether
domestic or international, constitute a "ground 2f exemption from his
criminal responsibiliity or a ground for mitigation of sentence". The
Congo then stresses ithatthe fact that an immunitb might bar prosecution
before a specific court or over a specific period coes not mean that the
same prosecution cannot be brought, if appropriate, before another court

which is not bound by that immunity, or at anothc r time when the immu-
nity need no longer be taken into account. It concludes that immunity
does not mean impunity.

49. Belgium maintains for its part that, while Ministers for Foreign
Affairs in office generally enjoy an immunity from jurisdiction before the

courts of a foreign State, such immunity applies only to acts carried out
in the course of theii- officia1functions, and cannot protect such persons
in respect of private acts or when they are acting otherwise than in the
performance of their officia1functions.

50. Belgium further states that, in the circumstances of the present

case, Mr. Yerodia erijoyed no immunity at the tire when he is alleged to
have committed the acts of which he is accused, and that there is no evi-
dence that he was then acting in any official capacity. It observes that the
arrest warrant was iijsued against Mr. Yerodia personally.

51. The Court would observe at the outset thaf in international law it
is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certainholders of high-ranking office in a State, such as ttle Head of State, Head
of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from
jurisdiction in other States, both civil and crimin;il. For the purposes of
the present case, it is only the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and

the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for ForibignAffairs that faIl for
the Court to consider.
52. A certain numiber of treaty instruments wer: cited by the Parties in
this regard. These included, first, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 18April 1961,which states in its pre imble that the purpose
of diplomatic privileges and immunities is "to e lsure the efficient per-

formance of the func;tions of diplomatic missions as representing States".
It provides in Article 32 that only the sending State may waive such
immunity. On these points, the Vienna Conventicn on Diplomatic Rela-
tions, to which both the Congo and Belgium are parties, reflects custom-
ary international lavi. The same applies to the corresponding provisions
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963. to
which the Congo and Belgium are also parties.

The Congo and I3elgium further cite the Ne- York Convention on
Special Missions of 8 December 1969, to which ~heyare not, however.
parties. They recall ihat under Article 21, paragrilph 2, of that Conven-
tion :

"The Head of the Government, the Minis~er for Foreign Affairs
and otlier persoils of high rank, when they ta1.epart in a special mis-
sion of the sencling State, shall enjoy in the receiving State or in a
third State, in alddition to what is granted by the present Conven-

tion, the facilities, privileges and immunitier, accorded by interna-
tional law."
These conventions, provide useful guidance on certain aspects of the

question of immuniities. They do not, however, contain any provision
specifically defining the immunities enjoyed by Ministers for Foreign
Affairs. It is consequently on the basis of custornary international law
that the Court must decide the questions relatin;: to the immunities of
such Ministers raisecl in the present case.
53. In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Min-

isters for Foreign Afjàirs are not granted for their oersonal benefit, but to
ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their
respective States. In order to determine the exterit of these immunities,
the Court must therefore first consider the nature of the functions exer-
cised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs. He or sh: is in charge of his or
her Government's diplomatic activities and generally acts as its repre-
sentative in internatilonal negotiations and intergovernmental meetings.

Ambassadors and oither diplomatic agents carry out their duties under
his or her authority. His or her acts may bind the State represented, and
there is a presumptioln that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, simply by vir-
tue of that office, has full powers to act on behalf of the State (see, forexample, Article 7, paragraph 2 (u), of the 1969Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties). In the performance of thesr:functions, he or she is
frequently required to travel internationally, and thus must be in a posi-
tion freely to do so whenever the need should arise. He or she must also
be in constant comrnunication with the Government, and with its diplo-
matic missions around the world, and be capable at any time of commu-
nicating with represi:ntatives of other States. The Court further observes

that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for the conduct of his or
her State's relations with al1other States, occupii:~a position such that,
like the Head of State or the Head of Governmt:nt, he or she is recog-
nized under international law as representative of the State solely by vir-
tue of his or her office. He or she does not halle to present letters of
credence: to the contrary, it is generally theMinister who determines the
authority to be conferred upon diplomatic agents and countersigns their
letters of credence. Finally, it is to the Ministerf3r Foreign Affairs that
chargés d'affairesare accredited.

54. The Court accordingly concludes that the 'unctions of a Minister
for Foreign Affairs (aresuch that, throughout the duration of his or her
office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immun ty from criminal juris-
diction and inviolability. That immunity and that lnviolability protect the
individual concernecl against any act of authority of another State which

would hinder him 01-her in the performance of his or her duties.
55. In this respect, no distinction can be drawn between acts per-
formed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official" capacity, and
those claimed to have been performed in a "privat~:capacity", or, for that
matter, between acts performed before the person concerned assumed
office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the
period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreigr~Affairs is arrested in
another State on a ci-iminalcharge, he or she is cli,arly thereby prevented
from exercising the functions of his or her office. The consequences of
such impediment to the exercise of those officia functions are equally
serious, regardless of whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs was, at the
time of arrest, preseilt in the territory of the arre:,ting State on an "offi-
cial" visit or a "private" visit, regardless of whether the arrest relates to
acts allegedly perforined before the person becam: the Minister for For-
eign Affairs or to acts perforrned while in office, and regardless of

whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an "official" capa-
city or a "private" capacity. Furthermore, even the mere risk that, by
travelling to or transiting another State a Minister for Foreign Affairs
might be exposing himself or herself to legal proceedings could deter the
Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the
purposes of the performance of his or her official functions. 56. The Court will now address Belgium's argument that immunities
accorded to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affi~irscan in no case pro-
tect them where the:yare suspected of having coinmitted war crimes or
crimes against humanity. In support of this position, Belgium refers in its
Counter-Memorial 1:ovarious legal instruments creating international
criminal tribunals, to examples from national legislation, and to the juris-
prudence of national and international courts.

Belgium begins by pointing out that certain piovisions of the instru-
ments creating international criminal tribunals state expressly that the
officia1capacity of a person shall not be a bar to the exercise by such
tribunals of their jurisdiction.
Belgium also places emphasis on certain decisions of national courts,
and in particular on the judgments rendered on 24 March 1999 by the
House of Lords in the United Kingdom and on 13 March 2001 by the
Court of Cassation in France in the Pinochet ancl Qudduji cases respec-
tively, in which it cclntends that an exception to the immunity rule was
accepted in the case of serious crimes under inernational law. Thus,
according to Belgiurn, the Pinochet decision recognizes an exception to
the immunity rule when Lord Millett stated that "(ilnternational law can-
not be supposed to have established a crime having the character of a jus
cogens and at the saimetime to have provided an immunity which is co-
extensive with the obligation it seeks to impose", or when Lord Phillips
of Worth Matravers said that "no established rule of international law

requires state immuinity vatione muteriue to be t~ccordedin respect of
prosecution for an international crime". As to the French Court of Cas-
sation, Belgium contends that, in holding that, "under international law
as it currently stands, the crime alleged [acts of terrorism], irrespective of
its gravity,oes not come within the exceptions to the principle of immu-
nity from jurisdiction for incumbent foreign Heacls of State", the Court
explicitly recognized the existence of such exceptions.
57. The Congo, for its part, States that, under international law as it
currently stands, there is no basis for asserting tha there is any exception
to the principle ofabsolute immunity from crimin;tl process of an incum-
bent Minister for Foreign Affairs where he or she is accused of having
committed crimes under international law.
In support of this contention, the Congo refers to State practice, giving
particular consideration in this regard to thePinochet and Qudduji cases,
and concluding that such practice does not correspond to that which Bel-

gium claims but, on the contrary, confirms the ;~bsolutenature of the
immunity from criminal process of Heads of State and Ministers for For-
eign Affairs. Thus, in the Pinoclzet case, the Congo cites Lord Browne-
Wilkinson's statemenitthat "[tlhis immunity enjoycd by a head of state in
power and an ambasisador in post is a complete immunity attached to the
person of the head of state or ambassador and rendering him immune
from al1 actions or prosecutions . . .".Accordil~g to the Congo, theFrench Court of Cassation adopted the same position in its Qudduj judg-
ment, in affirming that "international custom birs the prosecution of
incumbent Heads of State, in the absence of any contrary international
provision binding on the parties concerned, beforc:the criminal courts of
a foreign State".
As regards the instruments creating internaticmal criminal tribunals
and the latter's jurisprudence, these, in the Congo's view, concern only

those tribunals, and no inference can be drawn from them in regard to
criminal proceedingij before national courts against persons enjoying
immunity under international law.

58. TheCourt has carefully examined State practice, including national
legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the
House of Lords or the French Court of Cassation. It has been unable to
deduce from this practice that there exists under clstomary international
law any form of exception to the rule according irilmunity from criminal
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministcrs for Foreign Affairs,
where they are susgected of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity.
The Court has also examined the rules conceining the immunity or

criminal responsibility of persons having an officia1capacity contained in
the legal instruments creating international criminiil tribunals, and which
are specifically applicable to the latter (seeChartlx of the International
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Art. 7; Charter of the International
Military Tribunal of Tokyo, Art. 6; Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para. Z; Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6, para. 2; Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Art. 27). It finds tliat these rules likewise
do not enable it to conclude that any such an exception exists in custom-
ary international law in regard to national courts.
Finally, none of the decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo interna-
tional military tribunals, or of the lnternational Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, cited by Belgium deal with the question of the
immunities of incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs before national
courts where they are accused of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity. The Court accordingly notes tliat those decisions are

in no way at variance with the findings it has reached above.

In view of the foregoing, the Court accordingly cannot accept Bel-
gium's argument in this regard.
59. It should further be noted that the rules go\ erning the jurisdiction
of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing
jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not irriply absence of immu-
nity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus,although various international conventions or the prevention and
punishment of certain serious crimes impose or States obligations of
prosecution or extraclition,thereby requiring them to extend their criminal
jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities
under customary international law, including those of Ministers for
Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before he courts of a foreign
State, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under
these conventions.

60. The Court emphasizes, however, that the i~nmunity from jurisdic-
tion enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean
that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have com-
mitted, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction
and individual crimiinal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While
jurisdictional immuriity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility
is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional i~nmunity may well bar
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannotexoner-
ate the person to whom it applies from al1criminal responsibility.

61. Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under Bnternationallaw by an
incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar
to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.

First,such persoris enjoy no criminal immunity under international

law in their own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries'
courts in accordance with the relevant rules of dcmestic law.

Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity frorn foreignjurisdiction if
the State which they represent or have represente~ldecides to waive that
immunity.
Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the officeof Minister for Foreign
Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy al1of the iinmunities accorded by
international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under
international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for
Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or
subsequent to his oir her period of office, as we 1as in respect of acts
committed during that period of office in a private capacity.

Fourthly, an incurnbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be

subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal
courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples inAude the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant to Security Council
resolutions under Clnapter VI1 of the United Nations Charter, and the
future International Criminal Court created by tl-e 1998 Rome Conven-
tion. The latter's Statute expressly provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2,
that "[i]mmunities or special procedural rules wliich may attach to theofficial capacity of a person, whether under national or international law,
shall not bar the Court from exercising its ju-isdiction over such a
person".

62. Given the conclusions it has reached above concerning the nature
and scope of the rules governing the immunity frcm criminal jurisdiction
enjoyed by incumberit Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Court must now
consider whether in the present case the issue 01' the arrest warrant of

11 April 2000 and ils international circulation violated those rules. The
Court recalls in this regard that the Congo requests it, in its first final
submission, to adjuclge and declare that:
"[Bly issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium
committed a violation in regard to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo of the rule of customary internatior~al law concerning the

absolute inviolability and immunity from crirlinal process of incum-
bent foreign ministers; in so doing, it viclated the principle of
sovereign equaliity among States."
63. In support of this submission, the Congo maintains that the arrest
warrant of II April 2000 as such represents a "ccercive legal act" which
violates the Congo's immunity and sovereign righis, inasmuch as it seeks
to "subject to an organ of domestic criminal juri:diction a member of a

foreign government who is in principle beyond its reach" and is fully
enforceable without special formality in Belgium.
The Congo consiclers that the mere issuance of the warrant thus con-
stituted a coercive measure taken against the persan of Mr. Yerodia, even
if it was not executed.
64. As regards the international circulation of he said arrest warrant,
this, in the Congo's view, not only involved further violations of the rules
referred to above, but also aggravated the moral injury which it suffered
as a result of the opprobrium "thus cast upon one of the most prominent
members of its Government". The Congo further argues that such circu-
lation was a fundaniental infringement of its sokereign rights in that it
significantly restricted the full and free exercise,ty its Minister for For-
eign Affairs, of the international negotiation and representation func-
tions entrusted to him by the Congo's former Prcsident. In the Congo's
view, Belgium "[thus] manifests an intention to h.tve the individual con-
cerned arrested at the place where he is to be fouiid, with a view to pro-

curing his extraditilon". The Congo emphasizej moreover that it is
necessary to avoid any confusion between the arguments concerning the
legal effect of theari-estwarrant abroad and the ciuestion of any respon-
sibility of the foreign authorities giving effect to it.It points out in this
regard that no State has acted on the arrest warrart, and that accordingly ARREST WARRANT (JUDGMENT) 27

"no further consideration need be given to the specific responsibility
which a State executing it might incur, or to tlie way in which that
responsibility should be related" to that of the Belgian State. The Congo
observes that, in such circumstances, "there [woiild bel a direct causal

relationship between the arrest warrant issued in Relgium and any act of
enforcement carried out elsewhere".
65. Belgium rejects the Congo's argument on the ground that "the
character of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 is :;uchthat it has neither
infringed the sovereignty of, nor created any obligation for, the [Congo]".

With regard to the legal effects under Belgian la~vof the arrest warrant
of 11 April 2000, Belgium contends that the clear purpose of the warrant
was to procure that, if found in Belgium, Mr. Yerctdia would be detained
by the relevant Belgian authorities with a view to bis prosecution for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. According to Belgium, the Belgian

investigating judge did, however, draw an explicit distinction in the war-
rant between, on the one hand, inlmunity from j~irisdiction and, on the
other hand, immuniity from enforcement as regards representatives of
foreign States who visit Belgium on the basis of an official invitation,
making it clear that such persons would be immune from enforcement of
an arrest warrant in Belgium. Belgium further coniends that, in its effect,

the disputed arrest warrant is national in charactcr, since it requires the
arrest of Mr. Yerodia if he is found in Belgium b~t it does not have this
effect outside Belgiurn.
66. In respect of thielegal effects of the arrest warrant outside Belgium,
Belgium maintains that the warrant does not creite any obligation for
the authorities of any other State to arrest Mr. Ye*.odiain the absence of

some further step by Belgium completing or validating the arrest warrant
(such as a request for the provisional detention O 'Mr. Yerodia), or the
issuing of an arrest warrant by the appropriate authorities in the State
concerned following a request to do so, or the issuing of an Interpol Red
Notice. Accordingly, outside Belgium, while the Furpose of the warrant

was admittedly "to establish a legal basis for the arvest of Mr. Yerodia . . .
and his subsequent extradition to Belgium", the warrant had no legal
effect unless it was validated or completed by sonie prior act "requiring
the arrest of Mr. Yerodia by the relevant authorities in a third State".
Belgium further argues that "[ilf a State had executed the arrest warrant,
it might infringe Mr. [Yerodia's] criminal immunit q",but that "the Party

directly responsible for that infringement would have been that State and
not Belgium".

67. The Court will first recall that the "international arrest warrant
in cth.serztinissued on 11 April 2000 by an investigating judge of the
Brussels Tribunal de première instance, is directec against Mr. Yerodia, ARREST WARRANT (JUDGMENT) 28

stating that he is "currently Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, having his business ziddressat the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Kinshasa". The warrant statrs that Mr. Yerodia is
charged with being "the perpetrator or CO-perpetritor" of:

"- Crimes under international law constiiuting grave breaches
causing harm by act or omission to perssns and property pro-
tected by the Conventions signed at Geni:va on 12August 1949
and by Additional Protocols 1 and II to those Conventions
(Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Law of 16.lune 1993,as amended
by the Law of 10 February 1999concerning the punishment of
serious violations of international humaiiitarian law)

- Crimes against humanity (Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Law of
16June 1993,as amended by the Law of 10February 1999con-
cerning the punishment of serious violations of international
humanitarian law)."

The warrant refers to "various speeches inciting racial hatred" and to
"particularly virulent remarks" allegedly made b:~ Mr. Yerodia during
"public addresses reported by the media" on 4 August and 27 August
1998. It adds:

"These speeches allegedly had the effect of inciting the population
to attack Tutsi residents of Kinshasa: there were dragnet searches,
manhunts (the Tutsi enemy) and lynchings.

The speeches inciting racial hatred thus arc:said to have resulted
in several hundred deaths, the internment of 7utsis, summary execu-
tions, arbitrary arrests and unfair trials."

68. The warrant fiirther states that "the position of Minister for For-
eign Affairs currently held by the accused does not entai1immunity from
jurisdiction and enfc)rcement". The investigating judge does, however,
observe in the warrant that "the rule concerning the absence of immunity
under humanitarian law would appear . . to reqiiire some qualification
in respect of immuni ty from enforcement" and exAains as follows :

"Pursuant to the general principle of fairnt ss in judicial proceed-
ings, immunity from enforcement must, in Our view, be accorded to
al1State representatives welcomed as such onco the territory of Bel-
gium (on 'officia1 visits'). Welcoming such foreign dignitaries as
official representatives of sovereign States i~ivolvesnot only rela-
tions between individuals but also relations between States. This
implies that suchiwelcome includes an undertaking by the host State
and its various components to refrain froni taking any coercive

measures against its guest and the invitation cannot become a pre-
text for ensnaring the individual concerned in what would then have
to be labelled a trap. In the contrary case, failure to respect this undertaking could give rise to the host State':. international respon-
sibility."

69. The arrest warrant concludes with the following order

"We instruct and order al1bailiffs and ageiits of public authority
who may be so required to execute this arrest warrant and to con-
duct the accused to the detention centre in Forest;

We order the warden of the prison to receive the accused and to
keep him (her) in custody in the detention c:ntre pursuant to this
arrest warrant;
We require al1those exercising public authority to whom this war-
rant shall be shown to lend al1assistance in e~ecuting it."

70. The Court notes that the issuance, as such, of the disputed arrest
warrant represents ari act by the Belgian judicial kuthorities intended to

enable the arrest on Belgian territory of an incuml~ent Minister for For-
eign Affairs on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
fact that the warrant is enforceable is clearly apparent from the order
given to "al1 bailiffs and agents of public authority . . . to execute this
arrest warrant" (see paragraph 69 above) and fron the assertion in the
warrant that "the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs curreritly held

by the accused does not entai1 iminunity from jurisdiction and enforce-
ment". The Court notes that the warrant did admittedly make an excep-
tion for the case of a11officia1visit by Mr. Yerodi;,.to Belgium, and that
Mr. Yerodia never suffered arrest in Belgium. The Court is bound, how-
ever, to find that, given the nature and purpose of'the warrant, its mere
issue violated the imrnunity which Mr. Yerodia eiijoyed as the Congo's

incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court accordingly con-
cludes that the issue csfthe warrant constituted a lriolation of an obliga-
tion of Belgiuin towards the Congo, in that it faileclto respect the immu-
nity of that Minister and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from
criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then eîjoyed by him under
international law.

71. The Court also notes that Belgium admit: that the purpose of
the international circ~ulutionof the disputed arrest ~varrant was "to estab-
lish a legal basis for the arrest of Mr. Yerodia .. .abroad and his subse-
quent extradition to Belgium". The Respondent maintains, however,
that the enforcement of the warrant in third Statr:s was "dependent on
some further prelimiiiary steps having been taken" and that, given the

"inchoate" quality of the warrant as regards thirci States, there was no
"infringe[ment of] thie sovereignty of the [Cong~~]".It further points
out that no Interpol Red Notice was requestetl until 12 September
2001, when Mr. Yeraldia no longer held ministerial office.

The Court cannot subscribe to this view. As ir the case of the war-

rant's issue, its interriational circulation fromJuni: 2000 by the Belgian
authorities, given its nature and purpose, effectively infringed Mr. Yero-dia's immunity as tht: Congo's incumbent Ministcr for Foreign Affairs
and was furthermore liable to affect the Congo's conduct of its interna-
tional relations. Since:Mr. Yerodia was called upon in that capacity to
undertake travel in the performance of his duties, ihe mere international
circulation of the warrant, even in the absence of "further steps" by Bel-

gium, could have resiilted, in particular, in his arrest while abroad. The
Court observes in this respect that Belgium itself cites information to the
effect that Mr. Yerodia, "on applying for a visa tcl go to two countries,
[apparently] learned that he ran the risk of being arrested as a result of
the arrest warrant issued against him by Belgium", adding that "[tlhis,
moreover, is what the [Congo] . . . hints when it writes that the arrest

warrant 'sometimes forced Minister Yerodia to travel by roundabout
routes"'. Accordingly, the Court concludes that ihe circulation of the
warrant, whether or not it significantly interfered with Mr. Yerodia's dip-
lomatic activity, con:;tituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium
towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the inimunity of the incum-
bent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly,
infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability

then enjoyed by him i~nderinternational law.

72. The Court will i~owaddress the issue of the rcmedies sought by the
Congo on account of Belgium's violation of the above-mentioned rules of
international law. In its second, third and fourth submissions, the Congo
requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:

"A formal finding by the Court of the unlawfulness of [the issue
and international circulation of the arrest w;irrant] constitutes an
appropriate form of satisfaction, providing reparation for the con-
sequent moral injury to the Democratic Repu1)lic of the Congo;

The violations of international law underlyirig the issue and inter-
national circulation of the arrest warrant of 1 April 2000 preclude
any State. including Belgium, from executing it;
Belgium shall be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant
of 11 April 2000 and to inform the foreign authorities to whom the
warrant was circiilated that Belgium renouncez its request for their

co-operation in executing the unlawful warrant."
73. In support of tl-iosesubmissions, the Congo :isserts that the termi-
nation of the official duties of Mr. Yerodia in no way operated to efface

the wrongful act and the injury flowing from it, which continue to exist.
It argues that the warrant is unlawful al?initio, that "[ilt is fundamentally
flawed" and that it carinot therefore have any legal i:ffect today. It points ARREST WARRANT (JUDGMENT) 31

out that the purpose of its request is reparation for the injury caused,
requiring the restoration of the situation which would in al1probability

have existed if the said act had not been comnitted. It States that,
inasmuch as the wrongful act consisted in an intr:rnal legal instrument,
only the "withdrawal" and "cancellation" of the latter can provide appro-
priate reparation.
The Congo further emphasizes that in no way is it asking the Court
itself to withdraw or cancel the warrant, nor to determine the means

whereby Belgium is tcscomply wit1.iits decision. It :xplains that the with-
drawal and cancellation of the warrant, by the means that Belgium deems
most suitable. "are riot means of enforcement oi' the judgment of the
Court but the requeijted measure of legal repara ion/restitution itself".
TheCongo maintains that the Court is consequently only being requested

to declare that Belgium, by way of reparation for ihe injury to the rights
of the Congo, be recluired to withdraw and canc~:lthis warrant by the
means of its choice.

74. Belgium for its part maintains that a findinp by the Court that the
immunity enjoyed by Mr. Yerodia as Miriister for Foreign Affairs had

been violated would in no way entai1 an obligaticn to cancel the arrest
warrant. It points out that the arrest warrant is s il1operative and that
"there is no suggestion that it presently infringes the immunity of the
Congo's Minister for Foreign Affairs". Belgium considers that what the
Congo is in reality asking of the Court in its third and fourth final sub-

missions is that the Court should direct Belgium as to the method by
which it should give effect to a judgment of the Court finding that the
warrant had infringecl the immunity of the Congo'; Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

75. The Court has already concluded (see parapraphs 70 and 71) that

the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 by the
Belgian authorities failed to respect the immunity c<fthe incumbent Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly, infringed
the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the involability then en-joyed
by Mr. Yerodia under international law. Those acts engaged Belgium's
international responsibility. The Court considers that the findings so

reached by it constitute a form of satisfaction which will make good the
moral injury complaii~ed of by the Congo.
76. However, as the Permanent Court of Interr ational Justice stated
in its Judgment of 13 September 1928 in the case concerning the Fcrctoi
at C'horzciw :

"[tlhe essential pi-inciple contained in the actuil notion of an illegal
act - a principle which seems to be estab1i;hed by international
practice and in particular by the decisions of 2rbitral tribunals - is

that reparation inust, as far as possible, wipe out al1 the conse- quences of the illegal act and reestablish the :situation which would,
in al1 probabilit:~, have existed if that act hacl not been committed"
(P.C. I.J.,Series A, No. 17, p. 47).

In the present case, "the situation which would, in al1 probability, have
existed if [the illegal act] had not been committed" cannot be re-estab-

lished merely by a fiinding by the Court that the arrest warrant was un-
lawful under international law. The warrant is still extant, and remains
unlawful, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Yersdia has ceased to be
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court accordin:ly considers that Bel-
gium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the warrant in question
and so inform the auithorities to whom it was circulated.

77. The Court seel, no need for any further rerredy: in particular, the
Court cannot, in a judgment ruling on a dispute bitween the Congo and
Belgium, indicate wkiat that judgment's implications might be for third
States, and the Court cannot therefore accept thc Congo's submissions
on this point.

78. For these reasons,

(1) (A) By fifteen votes to one,

Rejects the objections of the Kingdom of Belgi~m relating to jurisdic-
tion, mootness and admissibility;

IN FAVOUR P:residenl Guillaume: Vice-Puesident Shi;Judges Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh. Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans. Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Jucfgrs ad hoc Bula-
Bula. Van den Wyngaert;
AGAINST :Jirdge Oda :,

(B) By fifteen votes to one,

Find.~that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo on 17 October 2000;

IN ~AVOUR Pr:esident Guillaume; Vicc-PresiderztShi Judges Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans, Rezek., Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal Jirdges ad hoc Bula-
Bula, Van den Wyngaert;
AGAINSJ Tt:rdge Oda;

(C) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that the Application of the Democratic Re~ublic of the Congo is

not without object and that accordingly the case i: not moot;

IN FAVOUK Pr:esident Guillaume; Vice-President Shi. Judg~s Ranjeva. Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Hig:ins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc Bula-
Bula, Van den Wyngaert;

AGAINST :Judge Oda ;

(D) By fifteen votes to one,

Fin& that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

is admissible;
IN FAVOUK: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herc-

zegh. Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins. Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans, Rezelc, Al-Khasawneh. Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc Bula-
Bula, Van den Wyngaert;
AGAINST :Jz~rigeOda ;

(2) By thirteen votes to three,

Finds that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the
arrest warrant of 11 ,4pril 2000, and its internatio~ial circulation, consti-
tuted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards
the Democratic Repuiblic of the Congo, in that thvy failed to respect the

immunityfrom crimirial jurisdiction and the inviola Aity which the incum-
bent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo enjoyed under international law;

rN FAVOCR :Presiclent Guillaume; Vice-President Shi, Judges Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans, Rezek, Buergenthal ; Judge ad hoc Biila-Bula ;

AGAIN\T J:irc1gOda, Al-Khasawneh; Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert;

(3) By ten votes to six,

Finds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, t'y means of its own

choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2Ci00and so inform the
authorities to whom lhat warrant was circulated.

FAVOIJR :Presi~i'entGuillaun~e; Vice-Pre.~identShi Judge., Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma. Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek;
Judgb'ad hoc Bula-Bula ;
AGAINST Ju: ~/ge.~Oda, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

Jutlge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert.

Done in French anid in English, the French text I~eingauthoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fourteenth day of February, two thou-

sand and two, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
of the Court and the others transmitted to the Govc:rnment of the Demo-cratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Kingdom of
Belgium, respectively.

(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME,
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,

Registrar.

President GUILLAUMaE ppends a separate opinion to the Judgment of
the Court; Judge ODAappends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of
the Court; Judge RAN.IEVaAppends a declarationIOthe Judgment of the
Court; Judge KOROMA appends a separate opinic~nto the Judgment of

the Court; ~udges HIGGINSK, OOIJMAN and BCERGENTHA aLpend a joint
separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Jiidge REZEKappends a
separate opinion to ithe Judgment of the Court; ludge AL-KHASAWNEH
appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge
ad hoc BULA-BULA appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the
Court; Judge rid hoc VAN DEN WYNGAER Tppends a dissenting opinion

to the Judgment of tlheCourt.

(Znitiulled) G.G.
(Znitiulled) Ph.C.

Bilingual Content

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE REILATIVE AU MANDAT D'ARRÊT
DU II AVRIL 2000

(RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. BELGIQUE)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

IiEPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND OItDERS

CASE CONCE,RNING THE ARRE ST WARRANT
OF 11APRIL 2000

(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v.BELGIUM)

JUDGMENT OF 14 FEBRUARY2002 Mode officielde citation:

Mandut d'urrêtduIl avril 2000 (République dérnocrutique
du Congoc. Belgique), arrêt,
C.IJ. Recueil 2002,3p.

Officia1citat:on
Avrest Warrant ofIApril2000 (Democrutic Republic
of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2002,3p.

ente: 837 1
ISSN 0074-4441 Salesnumber
ISBN 92-1-070940-3 MANDAT D'ARRET DU 11AVRIL 2000

(RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. BELGIQUE)

ARREST WARRANT OF 11APF.IL 2000

(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE COKG0 v.BELGIUM)

14 FEBRUARY 2002

JUDGMENT COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

2002 ANNÉE 2002
14février
Rôle général
no 121 14 février 2002

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU MANDAT D'ARRÊT

DU 11AVRIL 2000

(REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. BELGIQUE)

Circon.statzce.sde I'uffuire - Etnission, pur un juge d'in.~tructionbelge, d'un
((tnanclatcl'arrit internationul par cléfaut» ù l'encontre du trlzinistredes afj'air~.~
étrangères ene.uercice d~rCongo, 1'inr.ulpantd'infractions graves aux conven-
tion.~de Genèvede 1949 et aux protocoles additionnels y relrtifs, ainsi que de
critne.~contre I'lzunzunité - Dij"usiotî ititertzatiotzule(lu matîdat d'clrrit par le

biais d'Interpol - Int~;re.s.scryutzt<.e.s.spur Ici.suite r/'c..rercer/a ,fbtzctiotî c/e
tnitzi.~frciesuffclires étrungère.~.

Première e-uceptionc/e11Belgique - ConzpPtetzcede,lu Cour - Statut de la

Cour, parugruplze 2 de I'crrticle36- Esi.stence d'un (diffrrendjuridique)) entre
les Parties uu tnotnent du dépôt delu rr~quêtientro~/ucti~~(~ l'instance - Evéne-
nlrnts postérieurs au (/&pot(le lu rc.qu6fene privant pus la Cour de su cotiîpé-
tence.
Deu.uiètne e.uception dc, /ILBelgique - Non-lieu - Fuit que I'int4re.s.sé

n'p.uercrplzis la ,fi)nctiotz de ministre (les (if'iiires i'tratzgtres tzetnettant pas un
teune ULI d~ffereticlentre les Purtie.~et ne prii~atitpas la requêtede son objet.

TroisiGtnee.uceptionde lu Belgiclur ----Rc,cevcthilité- Fczit..sur1esquc~lr.sepo-
sait la requite introductiite d'in.sruticrt~z'uj>anptas Gr4trlzod(fié s 'nz.unièretelle

que le difjzrend initialetnent portédei~antla Cour ait PtPtrcrn.sfornié en un uutrc.
u'iffiretztldotzt 1~.ccrrcrcti'rrne sercritpas le metne.
Qucztriètïîee.rc,eptionde la Belgique - RecevubilitP - Action du Congo ne
visant pus ù protéger l'un de ses re.s.sorti.s.sunt s Noti-crpplicahilitédes règles
cwmwuint /'c;puisenzentclesvoies (le recours ititertzes.

Argunzetzt~itionsub.siriirtire(le lu Belgique - RPgIe non ultra petita -
Reqirete inrroductiite d'in.vtriticersl~osunt que Iciprétention dc~lu Belgique ù
exercer une cotrlzpétetîcu rniver.sellcet1ktnettatit le tnunclutd'crrrêetst contraire
au droit internationcil - Question tzoti repri.sctfurzsles conc1u.siotî.Jsltzules du INTEIRNATIONAL COURT OF .IUSTICE

YEAR 2002 2002
14 February
General List
14 February2002 No. 121

CASE CONCERNING THE ARREST WARRANT

OF 11APRIL 2000

(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v.BELGIUM)

Fuct.7ofthe case - Issue hy a Belgiun investigatiny rnagistrate itf'"an inter-
nutionul arrest ivurrunt in absentia" uguinst the irzcumbentMinister,fir Foreign
A,ffair.sof the Congo, ulleging grave hreaclzes if th? Ceneva convention.^of

1949 und of' the Additional Protocols thereto and cr,mes against lzuwiunitj~ -
Internutionul circzilutiorî of' urrext tvcwrunt through Interpol - Person (.on-
i.crt1c.dslrhsequerzt~ ceusing to hold office us Mini.ste.,for Foreign Afjcairs.

First objection of Belgiurn - Juris~l'ictionof the Court - Statute of' the
Court, Article 36, paragruplî 2 - Euistence (?fa "li~galdispute" betiveen the
Parties crtthe tiine of',filingof'the AppliccltioriN1,stitutingprocerdings - Events
s~lhsrq~retztto the,filing f'the.Apl~lic.utionclonot clep+*ivtehe Court of',juri.stlic-

tion.
Second objection of Belgizirn - i2footrie.s.c-. Fuct thut the person conc,c.rned
had cru.serito holc/ofji'ceus Minister for Foreign Affi irs does rlotput un end to
the dixpute hetii3eetzthe Parties und ciues not cleprlve the Applicutiorî of' ifs
objc7ct.

Third objection of i5elgiuni - Adrnissihility - Facfs underlying the Applica-
tion instituting procet,ding.~rzotchringed in (1 tvay th&/trun.-fi~rrîzedthe dispute
originull~~ hrought h~fire the Court into unother rchic.iis d$rercnt in churuc,ter.

Fourth ohjection of' Belgiuni - Admis.sihility - Ccngo not acting in the corz-

test of'protection of' one c!f'its nationuls - Inupplic~~hilitj,of'rules reluting to
eshc~~rstioto zf'loccilrc-riiedirs.
S~rh.~idiurn ~r.gurîzentof Belginnz - Non ultra peti a rule - Cluim in Appli-
c.cztionirlstituting proceeeling.~that Belgiui?z'.s cluirn to esercisr LIur~ii,~rstjrlris-
diction in i.ssuingthe arrest it.arrunt i.scorztrury to irterncrtionrrl1u1v - Cluim

r~otnicrciciii,fïrzrll.s~~hr~ii.s.sof'zhe Corigo - Court ~rrzahle tu rule on tlîat ques-4 MANDAT D'ARRET (ARRET)

Congo - La Cour ne pouvant trancher cette question dans le dispositif de son
arrêt,mais pouvant en aborder certains uspects dans les motgr de cet arrêt.

Immunité de juridiction pénale et inviolabilitéù l'étranger d'un ministredes
affaires étrangères en exercice - Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplo-
matiques du IN avril 1961, préambule eturticle 32 - Convention de Vienne sur
les relations consuluires du 24 avril1963 - Convention de Ne~c,York sur 1e.s
missions spéciu1e.dsu 8 décembre 1969, paragraphe 2 de l'article21 - Règles de

droit international coutumier - Nuture desfinctions e.uercée.p sur un niinistre
des affaires étrungères - Fonctions d'un ministre des affaires étrungèresexi-
geant que, pendant toute la durée de.sucliurge, celui-ci hénéjcie ù I'étrunger
d'une immunitédejuridiction pénaleet d'une inviolabilitétotales - Absence de
distinction dans ce contexte entre les actes uccotnplis2 titre «ofJici~,I»et ceux
qui ~'auruientétéa titre «privé».

Absence d'exception u I'in~rnunitédejuridiction pénuleet 2 l'inviolabilitéd'un
ministre des affuires étrangères en exercice lorsque celui-ci est soupçonné
d'avoir comniis des crimes de guerre ou des crimes contre l'humanité - Distinc-
tion entre compétence destribunaux tiutionuus et imtnunitésjuridictiorznel1e.-
Distinction entre itnniunitéde juridiction et impunité.
Ernission d'un niandut d'arrêtuyunt vocation ù pertnettre I'urrestation, sur le

territoire belge, d'un rninistre des uffuires étrangères en exerc-ceEnlission du
mandat constituurzt en soi une atteinte l'immunité et u l'inviolabilitédu mi-
nistre des aJjruiresétrangères - Diffiusion internationale du mandat d'arrêt
visant ù établirlu buseiuridique d'une arrestation du ministre des ufluires étran-
gères dans un Etut tiers et de son e.wtraditionultérieurevers la Belgique- Dif-
fusion internationale du mandat d'arrêt constituantune atteinte ù I'inimunitéet

cil'inviolabilitédu ministre des uffuires étrangères.

Remèdes detnandéspur le Congo - Con.statation,pur lu Cour, d'une respon-
sabilitéinternationule de lu Belgique, et répurutionde ce seu1,fuit du préjudice

moral invoquépur le Congo - Obligation pour lu Belgique, par les moyens de
son chois, (lemettre a néunt le mandat d'arrêtet d'en infbrnier les autorités
aziprèsdesquelles il a étéd$fu.sé.

Présents: M. GUILLAUME pr,ésident; M. SHI, vice-président; MM. ODA,
RANJEVA,HERCZEGH,FLEISCHHAUER K,OROMA,VERESHCHETIN,
Mme HIGGINSM , M. PARRA-ARANGURK ENO,OIJMANR S,EZEK,AL-
KHASAWNE BHU,ERGENTHAL, juges; M. BULA-BULA M,m" VAN DEN

WYNGAERju T,es ad hoc; M. COUVREUg Rr,~ffïer.

En l'affaire relativeau mandat d'arrêtdu 11 avril 2000,

entre

la République démocratiquedu Congo,représentéepar

S. Exc. M. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plé-
nipotentiaire de la République démocratique du Congo auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent;

S. Exc. M. Ngele Masudi, ministre de la justice et garde des sceaux,
Me Kosisaka Kombe, conseiller juridique à la présidencede la République.
M. François Rigaux, professeur éméritede l'université catholique de Lou-
vain,
Mm' Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, professeur à l'université de Paris VI1
(Denis Diderot),
M. Pierre d'Argent, chargé de cours à l'université catholique de Louvain,
M. Moka N'Golo, bâtonnier,
M. Djeina Wembou, professeur à l'université d'Abidjan,
comme conseils et avocats;

M. Mazyambo Makengo, conseiller juridique au ministère de la justice,
comme conseiller,

le Royaume de Belgique,
représentépar

M. Jan Devadder, directeur général des affaires juridiques du ministère des
affaires étrangères,
comme agent;

M. Eric David, professeur dedroit international publicàl'université libre de
Bruxelles,
M. Daniel Bethlehem, Burrister, membre du barreau d'Angleterre et du pays
de Galles, Felloiv of Clure Hull et directeur adjoint du Lauterpacht
Research Centre for International Law de l'université de Cambridge,
comme conseils et avocats;

S. Exc. le baron Olivier Gillèsde Pélichy,représentantpermanent du Royaume
de Belgique auprès de l'organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chi-
miques, en charge des relations avec la Cour internationale de Justice.
M. Claude Debrulle, directeur généralde la législationpénaleet desdroits de
l'homme du ministère de la justice,
M. Pierre Morlet, avocat généralauprès de la cour d'appel de Bruxelles,
M. Wouter Detavernier, conseiller adjoint àla direction généraledes affaires
juridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Rodney Neufeld, Research Associate au Lauterpacht Research Centre
for International Law de l'université de Cambridge.
M. Tom Vanderhaeghe, assistant à l'université libre de Bruxelles,

ainsi composée,

après délibéréen chambre du conseil.

rend l'arrêtsuii~uizt.represented by

H.E. Mr. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza. Ambassldor Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands.
as Agent;

H.E. Mr. Ngele Masudi, Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals,
Maître Kosisaka Kombe, Legal Adviser to the Pr~:sidencyof the Republic,
Mr. François Rigaux, Professor Emeritus at the Catholic University of Lou-
vain,
Ms Monique Chemillier-Gendreau. Professor at the University of Paris VI1
(Denis Diderot),
Mr. Pierre d'Argent, Chargéde cours, Catholic Uiiiversity of Louvain,
Mr. Moka N'Golo, Bâtonnier,
Mr. Djeina Wembou, Professor at the University of Abidjan,
as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Mazyambo Mirkengo, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Justice,
as Counsellor,

the Kingdom of Belgium,
represented by

Mr. Jan Devadder, Director-General, Legal Matters, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
as Agent;

Mr. Eric David, Professor of Public International Law, Université librede
Bruxelles,
Mr. Daniel Bethlehem, Barrister, Bar of England aiid Wales, Fellow of Clare
Hall and Deputy Director of the Lauterpacht Research Centre for Inter-
national Law, Uiniversityof Cambridge,
as Counsel and Advocates;

H.E. Baron Olivier Gillèsde Pélichy.Permanent Rcpresentative of the King-
dom of Belgium to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. responsible for relations with the International Court of Justice,
Mr. Claude Debrulle, Director-General. Criminal Legislation and Human
Rights, Ministry of Justice,
Mr. Pierre Morlet, Advocate-General, Brussels Cour d'Appel,
Mr. Wouter Detavernier, Deputy Counsellor, Cirectorate-General Legal
Matters, Ministr:yof Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Rodney Neufeld, Research Associate, Lauterpacht Research Centre for
International Law. University of Cambridge,
Mr. Tom Vanderhaeghe. Assistant at the Universi é libre de Bruxelles,

THECOUKT.
composed as above,

after deliberation,

tlrlivrrs t,fi)lloiviJudgnient :6 MANDAT D'ARRÊT (ARRÊT)

1. Le 17 octobre 2000, la République démocratique du Congo (dénommée
ci-après le «Congo») a déposéau Greffe de la Cour une requêteintroduisant
une instance contre le Royaume de Belgique(dénommé ci-après la «Belgique»)
au sujet d'un différendconcernant un «mandat d'arrêtinternational qu'un juge
d'instruction belge... a décernéle II avril 2000 contre le ministre des affaires
étrangèresen exercicede la République démocratiquedu Congo, M. Abdulaye
Yerodia Ndombasi ».
Dans cette requête,le Congo soutenait que la Belgique avait violéle ((prin-
cipe selon lequelun Etat ne peut exercer son pouvoir sur le territoire d'un autre
Etat)), le ((principede l'égalsouveraine entre tous les Membres de l'organi-
sation des Nations Unies, proclamépar l'article 2,paragraphe 1,de la Charte
des Nations Unies)), ainsi que ((l'immunitédiplomatique du ministre des

affaires étrangèresd'un Etat souverain, reconnue par la jurisprudence de la
Cour et découlant de l'article 41, paragraphe 2, de la convention de
Vienne du 18 avril 1961sur les relations diplomatiques».
Pour fonder la compétence de la Cour, le Congo invoquait. dans ladite
requête,le fait que «[l]a Belgique a[vait] acceptéla juridiction de la Cour et,
[qu']entant que de besoin, [ladite] requête[valait] acceptation de cette juridic-
tion par la Républiquedémocratiquedu Congo».

2. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 40du Statut, la requêtea été
immédiatement communiquéeau Gouvernement belgepar legreffier; et,confor-
mémentau paragraphe 3 de cet article, tous les Etats admisester devant la
Cour ont été informéd se la requête.
3. La Cour ne comptant sur le siègeaucun juge de la nationalité des Parties,
chacune d'elles a procédé,dans l'exercice du droit que lui confère le para-
graphe 3 de l'article 31 du Statut, i la désignation d'un juge ad hoc pour
siéger enl'affaire: le Congo a désigné M.Sayeman Bula-Bula, et la Belgique
Mm"Christine Van den Wyngaert.
4. Le 17octobre 2000,jour du dépôtde la requête,le Gouvernement congo-

lais a également déposé au Greffe de la Cour une demande en indication de
mesure conservatoire fondée sur l'article 41 du Statut de la Cour. Au cours des
audiences consacrées a l'examende ladite demande. la Belgiquea présentépour
sa part une demande tendant à ce que l'affaire soit rayéedu rôle.
Par ordonnance du 8 décembre 2000, la Cour, d'une part, a rejetécette
demande tendant a ce que l'affaire soit rayéedu rôle et, d'autre part, a dit que
les circonstances, telles qu'ellesse présentaientalorsa Cour, n'étaientpas de
nature à exiger l'exercicede son pouvoir d'indiquer, en vertu de l'article 41du
Statut, des mesures conservatoires. Dans la mêmeordonnance, la Cour a par
ailleurs déclaréqu'«il [était]souhaitable que les questions soumises la Cour
soient tranchéesaussitôt que possible))et que,«dès lors, il conv[enait] de par-
venir à une décisionsur la requêtedu Congo dans les plus brefs délais)).
5.Par ordonnance du 13 décembre2000, le président de la Cour, compte
tenu de l'accord des Parties tel qu'exprimé lorsd'une réunion tenueavec leurs
agents le 8 décembre2000, a fixédes délaispour le dépôt d'un mémoiredu
Congo et d'un contre-mémoirede la Belgiqueportant à la fois sur les questions
de compétence et de recevabilité et sur le fond. Par ordonnances des
14mars 2001et 12avril 2001,cesdélais,compte tenu des raisons invoquées par

le Congo et de l'accord des Parties, ont été successivementprorogés. Le
mémoiredu Congo a étédéposéle 16mai 2001,dans le délaitel que finalement
prescrit.
6. Par ordonnance du 27 juin 2001, la Cour, d'une part, a rejeté une 1. On 17October 2000 the Democratic Republic c~fthe Congo (hereinafter
referred to as "the Congo") filed in the Registry of !.heCourt an Application
instituting proceedings against theKingdom of Belgi~~m (hereinafter referred to
as "Belgium") in respect of a dispute concerning an 'international arrest war-
rant issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian investigatingjudge . . . against the
Minister for Foreign Affairs in officeof the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi".
In that Application the Congo contended that Iielgium had violated the
"principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another
State", the "principle of sovereign equality among al1Members of the United
Nations, as laid dowii in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United

Nations", as well as "the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of a sovereign State, as recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court
and following from Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention of
18April 1961on Diplomatic Relations".
In order to found the Court's jurisdiction the Coiigo invoked in the afore-
mentioned Application the fact that "Belgium ha[d] a(:ceptedthejurisdiction of
the Court and, in so Faras may be required, the [aforementioned] Application
signifie[d]acceptance of that jurisdiction by the De:nocratic Republic of the
Congo".
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Starute, the Application was
forthwith communicated to the Government of Belgiiimby the Registrar; and,
in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, al1 States entitled to appear
before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. Since the Court included upon the Bench no jiidge of the nationality of
either of the Parties, each Party proceeded to exercise the right conferred by
Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the

case; the Congo chose Mr. Sayeman Bula-Bula, and Belgium Ms Chris-
tine Van den Wyngaert.
4. On 17 October 2000, the day on which the P pplication was filed, the
Government of the Congo also filed in the Registry of the Court a request for
the indication of a provisional measure based on AIticle 41 of the Statute of
the Court. At the hearings on that request, Belgium, l'orits part, asked that the
case be removed froni the List.
By Order of 8 December 2000the Court, on the ont:hand, rejected Belgium's
request that the casebe removed from the List and, c,nthe other, held that the
circumstances, as they then presented themselvesto tl-e Court, were not such as
to require the exercisi: of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate
provisional measures. In the same Order, the Cour. also held that "it [was]
desirable that the issues before the Court should be d':termined as soon as pos-
sible" and that "it [was]therefore appropriate to ensiire that a decision on the
Congo's Application be reached with al1expedition"
5. By Order of 1:3December 2000, the President of the Court, taking
account of the agreement of the Parties as expresse1 at a meeting held with

their Agents on 8 December 2000, fixed time-limits for the filingof a Memorial
by the Congo and of a Counter-Memorial by Belgiun, addressing both issues
of jurisdiction and admissibility and the merits. By Orders of 14 March 2001
and 12April 2001, thi:se time-limits, taking account of the reasons given by the
Congo and the agreement of the Parties, were successively extended. The
Memorial of the Corigo was filed on 16 May 2001 within the time-limit thus
finally prescribed.
6. By Order of 27 .rune 2001, the Court, on the oni hand, rejected a requestdemande de la Belgique tendant à autoriser, en dérogation des ordonnances
déjà rendues par le président de la Cour, la présentation par la Belgique
d'exceptions préliminairesentraînant la suspension de la procédure surle fond
et, d'autre part, a prorogéle délai prescritdans l'ordonnance du 12avril 2001
pour le dépôt par la Belgique d'un contre-mémoireportant a la fois sur les
questions de compétence etde recevabilitéet sur le fond. Le contre-mémoirede
la Belgique a été déposéle 28 septembre 2001, dans le délai ainsiprorogé.

7. Conformémentau paragraphe 2de l'article 53de son Règlement,la Cour,
après s'êtrerenseignéeauprès des Parties, a décidéque des exemplaires des
piècesde procédure et des documerits annexés seraient rendus accessibles au
public à l'ouverture de la procédure orale.
8. Des audiences publiques ont Stétenues du 15 au 19 octobre 2001, au
cours desquelles ont étéentendus en leurs plaidoiries et réponses:
Pour le Congo: S. Exc. M. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza,
S. Exc. M. Ngele Masudi,

Me Kosisaka Kombe,
M. François Rigaux,
M'"' Monique Chemillier-Gendreau,
M. Pierre d'Argent.
Pour la Belgique: M. Jan Devadder,
M. Daniel Bethlehem,
M. Eric David.

9. A l'audience, des membres de la Cour ont poséà la Belgiquedes questions
auxquelles il a étérépondu ou par oral ou par écrit, conformémentau para-
graphe 4 de l'article 61 du Règlement. Le Congo a présentédes observations
écritessur la réponse qui avait étéfournie par écrità l'une de ces questions,
conformément à l'article 72 du Règlement.

*

10. Dans la requête,la décisiondemandéepar le Congo a étéainsi formulée:

((11est demandé à la Cour de dire que le Royaume de Belgique devra
annuler le mandat d'arrêt international qu'un juge d'instruction belge,
M. Vandermeersch, du tribunalde premièreinstance de Bruxelles,a décerné
le 11avril 2000 contre le ministre des affaires étrangèresen exercice de la
Républiquedémocratiquedu Congo, M. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, en
vue de son arrestation provisoire préalablemenà une demande d'extradi-
tion vers la Belgique,pour de prétenduscrimes constituant des ((violations
graves de droit international humanitaire)),mandat d'arrêtque ce juge a
diffuséà tous les Etats, y compris la Républiquedémocratiquedu Congo
elle-même,qui l'a reçu le 12juillet 2000.»

11. Dans la procédureécrite,les conclusions ci-après ont étéprésentéespar
les Parties:
Au non?du Gouvernement du Congo,

dans le mémoire:
«A la lumièredes faits et des arguments exposés ci-dessus, leGouver-
nement de la Républiquedémocratique du Congo prie la Cour de dire et

juger:by Belgium for authorization, in derogation from th: previous Orders of the
President of the Court, to submit preliminary objectisns involving suspension
of the proceedings on the merits and,on the other, exiended the time-limit pre-
scribed in the Order of 12 April 2001 for the filing by Belgium of a Counter-
Memorial addressing both questions of jurisdiction and admissibility and the
merits. The Counter-Memorial of Belgium was filecl on 28 September 2001
within the time-limit thus extended.
7. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rulcs, the Court, after ascer-
taining the views of the Parties, decided that copies oi'the pleadings and docu-
ments annexed would be made available to the public it the opening of the oral
proceedings.

8. Public hearings vtere held from 15to 19October 2001, at which the Court
heard the oral arguments and replies of:
For tlîe Congo: H.E Mr. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza,
H.E Mr. Ngele Masudi,
Maître Kosisaka Kombe,
Mr. François Rigaux,
Ms IMoniqueChemillier-Gendreau,
Mr. Pierre d'Argent.

For Belgiunî: Mr. Jan Devadder,
Mr. Daniel Bethlehem,
Mr. Eric David.
9. At the hearings, Members of the Court put cuestions to Belgium, to
which replies were given orally or in writing, in accsrdance with Article 61,
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. The Congo provided its written comments

on the reply that was given in writing to one of the:e questions, pursuant to
Article 72 of the Rules of Court.

10. In its Application, the Congo formulated the decision requested in the
following terms :
"The Court is requested to declare that the Kingdom of Belgium shall
annul the international arrest warrant issued on 1I April2000 by a Belgian
investigating jud,ge, Mr. Vandermeersch, of tkie Brussels Tribunal de
première instance against the Minister for Foreign Affairs in office of the
Democratic Repiiblic of the Congo, Mr. Abdu aye Yerodia Ndombasi,
seeking his provisional detention pending a requcst for extradition to Bel-
gium for alleged crimes constituting 'serious vislations of international

humanitarian law', that warrant having been circulated by thejudge to al1
States, including itheDemocratic Republic of the Congo, which received it
on 12July 2000."
11. In the course of the written proceedings, the fo lowing submissions were
presented by the Parties:

On hehalf' of'the Governrnetzt of'tlze Congo.
in the Memorial :

"In light of the facts and arguments set out al)ove, the Government of
the Democratic R.epublicof the Congo requests ihe Court to adjudge and
declare that: 1. Que, en émettant et en diffusant internationalement le mandat d'arrêt
du 11avril 2000 délivré à charge de M. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi,
la Belgique a violé,à l'encontre de la RDC, la règlede droit interna-
tional coutumier relativeà l'inviolabilitéet l'immunité pénale absolues
des.ministres des affaires étrangères enfonction;
2. Que la constatation solennelle par la Cour du caractèreillicitede ce fait

constitue une forme adéquate de satisfaction permettant de réparerle
dommage moral qui en découledans le chef de la RDC;
3. Que la violation du droit international dont procèdent l'émissionet la
diffusion internationale du mandat d'arrêtdu 11 avril 2000 interdit a
tout Etat, en ce compris la Belgique, d'y donner suite;
4. Que la Belgique esttenue de retirer et mettreà néantle mandat d'arrêt
dlililavril 2000et de faire savoir auprès des autorités étrangèresaux-
qudh ledit mandat fut diffuséqu'ellerenonce à solliciter leur coopéra-
tion,pour l'exécutionde ce mandat illicite suiteà l'arrêtde la Cour.))

Au norn du Goui~ernementde lu Belgique,
dans le contre-mémoire :

((Pour les motifs développésdans la Partie II du présent contre-
mémoire,la Belgiquedemande àla Cour, a titre préliminaire,de dire et de
juger que la Cour n'est pas compétente etlou que la requêtede la Répu-
blique démocratique du Congo contre la Belgique n'estpas recevable.
Si, contrairement aux conclusions ci-dessus. la Cour devait conclure
qu'elle était compétente etque la requêtede la République démocratique
du Congo était recevable, la Belgiquedemande a la Cour de rejeter les

conclusions finales de la République démocratiquedu Congo sur le fond
de la demande et de rejeter la requête.))
12. Dans la procédure orale, les conclusions ci-aprèsont étéprésentéespar
les Parties:

Au nom du Gouilernernent du Congo,

«A la lumière des faits et des arguments exposésau cours de la procé-
dure écriteet orale, le Gouvernement de la République démocratiquedu
Congo prie la Cour de dire et juger:
1. Que, en émettant et en diffusant internationalement le mandat d'arrêt
du 11avril 2000 délivré à charge de M. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi,
la Belgique a violé, à l'encontre de la République démocratiquedu
Congo, la règlededroit international coutumier relativeà l'inviolabilité
et l'immunité pénale absoluesdes ministres des affaires étrangèresen

fonction; que, ce faisant, elle a porté atteinte au principe de l'égalité
souveraine entre les Etats;
2. Que la constatation solennelle par la Cour du caractèreillicitede ce fait
constitue une forme adéquate de satisfaction permettant de réparerle
dommage moral qui en découledans le chef de la République démo-
cratique du Congo;
3. Que les violations du droit international dont procèdent l'émission et la
diffusion internationale du mandat d'arrêtdu 11avril 2000 interdisent
à tout Etat, en ce compris la Belgique, d'ydonner suite;
4. Que la Belgiqueest tenue de retirer et mettreà néantle mandat d'arrêt
du 11avril 2000 et de faire savoir auprès des autoritésétrangèresaux- 1. by issuing and internationally circulating the rrest warrant of 11April
2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium committed a
violation in regard to the DRC of the rule of customary international
law concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal
process of inciumbentforeign ministers;
2. a forma1 finding by the Court of the unlawfiilness of that act consti-
tutes an appropriate form of satisfaction, providing reparation for the
consequent moral injury to the DRC;
3. the violation o'finternational law underlying tlie issue and international
circulation of the arrest warrant of 11April 2000 precludes any State,
including Belgium, from executing it;
4. Belgium shall be required to recall and cantel the arrest warrant of
11April 2000 and to inform the foreign auth ~ritiesto whom the war-
rant was circulated that, following the Coitrt's Judgment, Belgium
renounces its request for their CO-operation il executing the unlawful

warrant."
On behaif qf the Governnlent of Brlgiurn,

in the Counter-Memorial:
"For the reasons stated in Part II of this Co~~nter-Memorial,Belgium
requests the Couirt. as a preliminarymatter, to iidjudge and declare that
the Court lacks jiirisdiction in this case andlor that the application by the
Democratic Repuiblicof the Congo against Belgium is inadmissible.
If, contrary to the preceding submission, the Court concludes that it
does have jurisdiction in this case and that the application by the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo is admissible, Belgiiimrequests the Court to
reject the submisisionsof the Democratic Repuhlic of the Congo on the
merits of the case and todismiss the application."

12. At theoral proceedings, the following submissiclnswere presented by the
Parties:

On hehcilf of the Governnlent ofthe Congo,
"In light of the facts and arguments set out during the written and oral
proceedings, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:
1. by issuing aiid internationally circulating the arrest warrant of

11April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia IJdombasi, Belgiumcom-
mitted a violaitionin regard to the Democrati: Republic of the Congo
of the rule of customary international law concerning the absolute
inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign
ministers; in so doing, it violated the princi1)leof sovereign equality
among States;
2. a foi-mal finding by the Court of the unlawfiilness of that act consti-
tutes an apprc~priateform of satisfaction, providing reparation for the
consequent moral injury to the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

3. the violations of international law underlyin4 the issue and interna-
tionalcirculatiion of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 preclude any
State, including Belgium. from executing it;
4. Belgium shall be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 and to inform the foreign authorities to whom the war- quelles leditmandat fut diffuséqu'ellerenoncà solliciterleurcoopéra-
tion pour l'exécutionde ce mandat illicite.
Au nom du Goui~ernemerztde la Belgiqicc.,

«Pour les motifs développéd sans le contre-mémoire dela Belgiqueet
dans ses conclusions orales,la Belgiquedemande à la Cour,à titre préli-
minaire, de dire et dejuger que la Cour n'estpas compétenteetlou que la
requête de la Républiquedémocratique du Congo contrela Belgique n'est
pas recevable.
Si,contrairement auxconclusions dela Belgiquesur la compétence etla
recevabilitéde la demande, la Cour devait conclurequ'elleétait compé-
tente etque la requête de la Républiqudémocratiquedu Congoétaitrece-
vable,la Belgiquedemande a la Cour de rejeterlesconclusionsfinales dela
Républiquedémocratique du Congosur le fond de la demande et de reje-
ter la requête»

***

13. Le 11 avril 2000, un juge d'instruction près le tribunal de première
instance de Bruxelles a émisun ((mandat d'arrêt internationalpar défaut))

à l'encontre de M. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, sous l'inculpation, en
tant qu'auteur ou coauteur, de crimes constituant des infractions graves
aux conventions de Genève de 1949 et aux protocoles additionnels à ces
conventions, ainsi que de crimes contre l'humanité.
Au moment de l'émissiondu mandat d'arrêt, M. Yerodia était ministre
des affaires étrangères du Congo.

14. Ce mandat d'arrêta été transmis au Congo le 7juin 2000 et reçu
par les autorités de celui-ci le 12juillet 2000. Selon la Belgique, il a simul-
tanément été transmis a l'organisation internationale de police criminelle
(Interpol), organisation dont la fonction est de renforcer et faciliter la
coopération transfrontière entre les services de police judiciaire sur le
plan universel; le mandat aurait fait l'objet, par l'intermédiaire de cette
dernière, d'une diffusion internationale.

15. Dans le mandat d'arrêt,il est reproché a M. Yerodia d'avoir tenu
certains discours incitant à la haine raciale au cours du mois d'août 1998.
Les crimes dont M. Yerodia étaitainsi accuséétaientpunissables en Bel-
gique au titre de la loi du6juin 1993((relative à la répressiondes infrac-
tions graves aux conventions internationales de Genève du 12 août 1949
et aux protocoles 1et II du 8juin 1977, additionnels a ces conventions)),

telle que modifiéepar la loi du 10 février 1999 ((relative à la répression
des violations graves de droit international humanitaire))(dénommée ci-
après la ((loi belge))).
L'article 7de la loi belge dispose que «les juridictions belges sont com-
pétentespour connaître des infractions prévues à la présenteloi, indépen-
damment du lieu où celles-ci auront été commises)).En l'espèce,selon la
Belgique, les plaintes à l'origine de la procédure dans le cadre de laquelle

a étéémisle mandat d'arrêt émanaient de douzepersonnes, toutes rési-
dant en Belgique, dont cinq de nationalité belge. Il n'est cependant pas
contesté par la Belgique que les faits alléguésauxquels se rapporte le rant was circ~ilatedthat Belgium renounces its request for their co-
operation in executingthe unlawful warrant."
On hrhulfif'tli~Governnîrnt of'Belgiuni,

"For the reasons statedin the Counter-Memorial of Belgiumand in its
oral submissions,Belgiumrequests theCourt, as a preliminary matter, to
adjudge and declare that the Court lacksjurisdi':tionin this case andlor
that the Application by the Democratic Repubtic of the Congo against
Belgiumis inadmissible.
If, contrary to the submissionsof Belgium wiihregard to the Court's
jurisdiction and tlheadmissibilityof the Applicaton, the Court concludes
that it does have jurisdictionin this caseand that the Application by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is admissib e, Belgium requests the
Court to reject the submissionsof the Democratii Republic of the Congo

on the meritsof the case and to dismissthe Appication."

13. On 11 April 2!000an investigatingjudge 01'the Brussels Tribunal
de première instance issued "an international arrest warrant inabsentiu"
against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, charging him, as perpetrator
or co-perpetrator, with offences constituting grave breaches of theGeneva
Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional Protocols thereto, and with

crimes against humanity.
At the tiine when the arrest warrant was issuecl Mr. Yerodia was the
Minister for Foreign. Affairs of the Congo.
14. The arrest warrant was transmitted to the Congo on 7 June 2000,
being received by the Congolese authorities on l:! July 2000. According
to Belgium, the warrant was at the same time trinsmitted to the Inter-
national Criminal Police Organization (Interl,ol), an organization

whose function is ta'enhance and facilitate cross.border criminal police
co-operation worldwide; through the latter, it \vas circulated interna-
tionally.
15. In the arrest warrant, Mr. Yerodia is accused of having made vari-
ous speeches inciting,racial hatred during the month of August 1998.The

crimes with which Mr. Yerodia was charged were punishable in Belgium
under the Law of 16 June 1993 "concerning the Punishment of Grave
Breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and of Protocols 1 and II of 8 June 1977 A~iditional Thereto", as
amended by the Law of 10 February 1999"concerning the Punishment of
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" (hereinafter

referred to as the "Elelgian Law").
Article 7 of the B,elgian Law provides that "The Belgian courts shall
have jurisdiction in respect of the offences provlded for in the present
Law. wheresoever they may have been cornmittecl". In the present case,
according to Belgium. the cornplaints that initiatcd the proceedings as a
result of which the arrest warrant was issued emanated from 12 indivi-
duals al1resident in Belgium, five of whom were of Belgian nationality.

It is not contested by Belgiun~,however, that th: alleged acts to whichmandat d'arrêtont été commishors du territoire belge; que, au moment
des faits,. Yerodia n'étaitpas ressortissant belge; et qu'il ne setrouvait
pas sur le territoire belge lorsque a été émis et diffue mandat d'arrêt.
Il n'est pas davantage contesté qu'aucun ressortissant belge ne figurait
parmi les victimes des violences qui auraient résulté dinfractions impu-
tées à M. Yerodia.
Le paragraphe 3 de I'article 5 de la loi belge dispose en outre que

«[l]'immunitéattachée à la qualité officielle d'une personne n'empêche
pas l'application de la présenteloi)).
16. A l'audience, la Belgique a soutenu par ailleurs avoir offert «de
confier le dossier aux autoritéscompétentes[du Congo] pour enquêteet
poursuite éventuelle))et a fait état d'un certain nombre de démarches
qu'elle aurait entreprisesà cet égard à partir de septembre 2000, soit
avant le dépôtde la requête introductive d'instance.Le Congo a quant à
lui indiquéce qui suit: «On a peu d'informations sur les formes [de ces
propositions belges].))Il a ajouté que «[c]'es... àun moment trèstardif
que ces propositions semblent avoir été faites, c'est-à-dire après qu'un
mandat d'arrêta étélancécontre M. Yerodia)).
17. Le 17 octobre 2000, le Congo a déposéau Greffe une requête
introductive d'instance (voir paragraphe 1ci-dessus), dans laquelle il était

demandé à la Cour «de dire que le Royaume de Belgique devra annuler
le mandat d'arrêtinternational ..décernéle Il avril 2000». Le Congo y
faisait valoir deux moyens de droit distincts.Il soutenait en premier lieu
que <c[l]acompétence universelle que 1'Etatbelge s'attribue par I'article 7
de la loi en cause)) constituait une
c<[v]iolationdu principe selon lequel un Etat ne peut exercer son

pouvoir sur le territoire d'un autre Etat et du principe de l'égalité
souveraine entre tous les Membres de l'organisation des Nations
Unies, proclamé par I'article 2, paragraphe 1, de la Charte des
Nations Unies)).
11 y affirmait en deuxième lieu que «[l]'exclusion, qui découlede l'ar-
ticle5 ..de la loi belge, de l'immunitédu ministre des affaires étrangères
en exercice))constituait une[v]iolationde l'immunité diplomatique dumi-

nistre des affaires étrangères d'unEtat souverain,reconnu[e]par la juris-
prudence de la Cour et découlant de l'article 41, paragraphe 2, de la
convention de Vienne du 18avril 1961sur les relations diplomatiques)).

18. Le jour mêmedu dépôt de sa requête introductive d'instance, le
Congo a présenté à la Cour, en application de I'article 41 du Statut de
cette dernière, une demande en indication de mesure conservatoire. Au
cours des audiences consacrées à l'examen de cette demande, la Cour a
étéinforméequ'en novembre 2000un remaniement ministérielétaitinter-
venu au Congo, à la suite duquel M. Yerodia avait cesséd'exercer les
fonctions de ministre des affaires étrangèreset s'étaitvu confier le porte-
feuille de ministre de l'éducationnationale. La Belgique en a conclu que
la requêtedu Congo était devenue sans objet et a demandé à la Cour,the arrest warrant relates were committed outside Belgian territory, that
Mr. Yerodia was ncit a Belgian national at the time of those acts, and
that Mr. Yerodia walsnot in Belgian territory at ihe time that the arrest
warrant was issued and circulated. That no Belgian nationals were vic-
tims of the violence that was said to have resultrd from Mr. Yerodia's
alleged offences was also uncontested.
Article 5, paragraph 3, of the Belgian Law further provides that
"[ilmmunity attachirig to the official capacity of ;t person shall not pre-
vent the application of the present Law".
16. At the hearing,~,Belgium further claimed th it it offered "to entrust
the case to the comptent authorities [of the Gong>] for enquiry and pos-

sible prosecution", and referred to a certain nu~nber of steps which it
claimed to have taken in this regard from September 2000, that is, before
the filing of the Application instituting proceedirigs. The Congo for its
part stated the following: "We have scant infornation concerning the
form [of these Belgian proposals]." It added tha "these proposals . ..
appear to have been made very belatedly, namely ujter an arrest warrant
against Mr. Yerodia had been issued".
17. On 17 October 2000, the Congo filed in the Registry an Applica-
tion instituting the present proceedings (see paragi aph 1above), in which
the Court was requested "to declare that the Kingdom of Belgium shall
annul the international arrest warrant issued o~i 11 April 2000". The
Congo relied in its ,4pplication on two separate legal grounds. First, it
claimed that "[tlhe universaljurisdiction that the 13elgianState attributes
to itselfunder Article 7 of the Law in question" constituted a

"[v]iolation of the principle that a State may not exercise its author-
ity on the territory of anothei- State and of the principle of sovereign
equality among al1Members of the United hations, as laid down in
Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations".

Secondly, it claimed that "[tlhe non-recognition, on the basis of
Article 5 . . of the Belgian Law, of the immunit) of a Minister for For-
eign Affairs in officc" constituted a "[v]iolation of the diplomatic immu-
nity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a so~ereign State, as recog-
nized by the jurispriudence of the Court and foll3wing from Article 41,
paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention of 18A~ril 1961on Diplornatic
Relations".
18. On the same day that it filed its Application instituting proceed-
ings, the Congo submitted a request to the Court for the indication of a
provisional measure under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court. During
the hearings devoted to consideration of that request, the Court was
informed that in November 2000 a ministerial rejhuffle had taken place

in the Congo, folloviiingwhich Mr. Yerodia had zeased to hold office as
Minister for Foreigri Affairs and had been entrusted with the portfolio of
Minister of Education. Belgium accordingly cla~medthat the Congo's
Application had become moot and asked the Coiirt, as has already beenainsi qu'il a déjétérappelé,de rayer l'affaire du rôle. Par ordonnance en
date du 8 décembre 2000, la Cour a rejeté a la fois les conclusions de la
Belgique en vue d'une telle radiation et la demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires du Congo (voir paragraphe 4 ci-dessus).
19. A partir de la mi-avril 2001, lorsque a été constituéun nouveau
gouvernement au Congo, M. Yerodia a cesséd'occuper le poste de mi-

nistre de l'éducation. Il n'occupe plus aujourd'hui aucun poste ministé-
riel.
20. Le 12septembre 2001, le bureau central national belge d'Interpol a
prié le secrétariat générald'Interpol d'émettre une notice rouge visant
M. Yerodia. De telles notices concernent des individus dont l'arrestation
est demandée en vue de leur extradition. Le 19 octobre 2001, lors des

audiences publiques tenues aux fins d'entendre les Parties en leurs plai-
doiries en l'affaire, la Belgique a informé la Cour qu'en réponse a cette
demande Interpol avait sollicité des inforinations supplémentaires le
27 septembre 2001 et qu'aucune notice rouge n'avait encore été diffusée.
21. Bien que, dans sa requête, le Congo ait initialement fait valoir
deux moyens de droit distincts (voir paragraphe 17ci-dessus), les conclu-
sions que le Congo a formulées dans son mémoire, comme les conclu-

sions finales qu'il a présentéesl'issue de la procédure orale, ne font état
que d'une violation, ((à [son] encontre ..., [de] la règle de droit interna-
tional coutumier relative à l'inviolabilité et l'immunité pénaleabsolues
des ministres des affaires étrangèresen fonction)) (voir paragraphes 11
et 12 ci-dessus).

22. Les Parties, dans leurs écritures et leurs plaidoiries, ont traité des
questions de compétence et de recevabilité ainsi que des questions de
fond (voir paragraphes 5et 6ci-dessus). La Belgique a soulevéà cet égard
un certain nombre d'exceptions que la Cour commencera par examiner.

23. La première exception soulevéepar la Belgique est ainsi formulée:

«Etant donné que M. Yerodia Ndombasi n'est plus ni ministre
des affaires étrangères [du Congo,] ni ministre chargé d'une quel-
conque autre fonction au sein du Gouvernement [du Congo], il n'y
a plus de ((différendjuridique)) entre les Parties au sens des déclara-
tions facultatives d'acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour déposées
par les Parties et la Cour n'est, en conséquence, pas compétente en
l'instance>)

24. La Belgique ne conteste pas qu'un tel différend ait existéentre les
Parties au moment où le Congo a déposésa requête introductive d'ins-

tance, et que la Cour ait étécorrectement saisie par cette requête.Elle
soutient toutefois que la question n'est pas de savoir sun différendjuri-recalled, to remove the case from the List. By Order of 8 December 2000,
the Court rejected both Belgium's submissions to that effect and also the
Congo's request for the indication of provisional measures (see para-
graph 4 above).

19. From mid-April2001, with the formation of a new Government in
the Congo, Mr. Yerodia ceased to hold the post ~f Minister of Educa-
tion. He no longer holds any ministerial office today.

20. On 12 September 2001, the Belgian Natiorial Central Bureau of
Interpol requested the Interpol General Secretariat to issue a Red Notice

in respect of Mr. Yerodia. Such notices concern infiividuals whose arrest
is requested with a view to extradition. On 19October 2001, at the public
sittings held to hear the oral arguments of the Parti-s in the case, Belgium
informed the Court that Interpol had responded on 27 September 2001
with a request for additional information, and that no Red Notice had
yet been circulated.

21. Although the ,4pplication of the Congo ortginally advanced two
separate legal groundls (see paragraph 17 above), Ihe submissions of the
Congo in its Memorial and the final submissions which it presented at the
end of the oral proceedings refer only to a violatio 1"in regard to the . . .
Congo of the rule of customary international law cl~ncerningthe absolute
inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign

ministers" (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above).

22. In their written pleadings, and in oral argument, the Parties

addressed issues of jurisdiction and admissibility as well as the merits (see
paragraphs 5 and 6 above). In this connection, 13elgiumraised certain
objections which the Court will begin by addressiiig.

23. The first objection presented by Belgium reiids as follows:
"That, in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no

longer either Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a min-
ister occupying any other position in the .. . Government [of the
Congo], there iijno longer a 'legal dispute' between the Parties
within the meanung of this term in the Optionil Clause Declarations
of the Parties and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in
this case."

24. Belgium does not deny that such a legal d spute existed between
the Parties at the tin~ewhen the Congo filed its Application instituting
proceedings, and that the Court was properly seised by that Application.

However, it contends that the question is not whether a legal disputedique existait a l'époque, maisde savoir si un différendjuridique existe
présentement. La Belgique se réfèrenotamment a cet égarda l'affaire du
Cameroun septentrional, dans laquelle la Cour avait jugé que «[s]a
fonction ..est de dire le droit, mais [qu']elle ne peut rendre des arrêts
qu'a l'occasion de casconcrets dans lesquelsil existe, au moment du juge-
ment, un litige réelimpliquant un conflit d'intérêts juridiquesentre les
parties» (C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 33-34), ainsi qu'aux affaires des Essais
nucléuires(Au.~tralie c.Frunce) (Nouvellr-Zklunde ccF.rance), dans les-
quelles elle avait précisé cequi suit: «La Cour, comme organe juridic-

tionnel, a pour tâche de résoudre des différendsexistant entre Etats ..Le
différenddont la Cour a été saisidoit donc persister au moment où elle
statue.» (C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 270-271, par. 55; p. 457, par. 58.) La
Belgique soutient que la fonction de ministre des affairesétrangèresexer-
céepar M. Yerodia étaitau centre de la requête introductive d'instance
du Congo. Or, souligne-t-elle, des changements sont intervenus dans les
circonstances qui étaientau cŒur même de l'affaire,uisqu'il a étmis fin
aux fonctions de ministre des affaires étrangères de M. Yerodia au mois
de novembre 2000 et que, depuis le 15 avril 2001, celui-ci n'occupe plus
aucune fonction au sein du Gouvernement du Congo (voir para-
graphes 18 et 19 ci-dessus). Selon la Belgique, bien qu'une différencede
points de vue puisse subsister entre les Parties quant à l'étendueet au
contenu des dispositions de droit international régissantles immunités

d'un ministre des affaires étrangères,celle-ci revêtaujourd'hui davantage
une portée abstraite qu'une portéeconcrète. 11en découle,de l'avis dela
Belgique, que l'instance s'est désormais transforméeen une tentative du
Congo d'«obtenir un avis consultatif de la Cour», qu'il ne s'agit plus
d'un «cas concret »recouvrant ((un litige réel»entre les Parties et que dès
lors la Cour n'a pas compétencepour connaître de l'affaire.
25. Le Congo rejette cette exception de la Belgique. Il soutient qu'il
existe bien un différendjuridique entre les Parties dans la mesure où il
affirme que le mandat d'arrêt a été délivreén violation de l'immunité de
son ministre des affaires étrangères, quece mandat étaitillégalab initioet
que ce vicejuridique persiste malgréles changements intervenus ultérieu-
rement dans les fonctions exercéespar l'intéresséa ,lors que la Belgique
affirme que l'émission etla diffusion du mandat d'arrêt n'étaient pas

contraires au droit international. LeCongoajoute que lefait que M. Yero-
dia n'exerce plus de fonctions officielles n'a nullement eu pour effet
d'effacer le fait illicite et le dommage qui en découle,dommage dont le
Congo continue a demander réparation.

26. La Cour rappelle que, selon une jurisprudence constante, sa com-
pétencedoit s'apprécierau moment du dépôtde l'acte introductif d'ins-
tance. Ainsi, si elle est compétenteà la dateà laquelle une affaire lui est
soumise, elle le demeure quels que soient les événementssurvenus ulté-
rieurement. De tels événements peuvent éventuellemenctonduire a cons-existed at that time, but whether a legal dispute exijts at the present time.
Belgium refers in this respect inter alia to the Nor,herrzCameroons case,
in which the Court found that it "may pronounce iudgment only in con-
nection with concrete cases where there exists at th: time of the adjudica-
tion an actual controversy involving a conflict of legal interests between
the parties" (I.C.J. Reports 1963, pp. 33-34), as well as to the Nucleur
Tests cases ('Austrulitzv. France)(New Zealurzdv. France), in which the
Court stated the following: "The Court, as a court of law, is called upon
to resolve existing disputes between States .. . The dispute brought

before it must therefore continue to exist at the time when the Court
makes its decision" (1.C.J Reports 1974, pp. 270-271, para. 55; p. 476,
para. 58). Belgium argues that the position of MI. Yerodia as Minister
for Foreign Affairs was central to the Congo's Application instituting
proceedings. and emphasizes that there has now be:n a change of circum-
stances at the very heart of the case, in view of the fact that Mr. Yerodia
was relieved of his position as Minister for Foreign Affairs in Novem-
ber 2000 and that, since 15April2001, he has occupied no position in the
Government of the Congo (see paragraphs 18and 19above). According
to Belgium, while there may still be a difference cf opinion between the
Parties on the scope and content of internatioral law governing the
immunities of a Minister for Foreign Affairs, thai difference of opinion
has now become a matter of abstract, rather than of practical, concern.
The result, in Belgiurn'sview, is that the case has become an attempt by
the Congo to "[seek]an advisory opinion from the Court", and no longer
a "concrete case" involving an "actual controvers) " between the Parties,

and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case.

25. The Congo rej~ectthis objection of Belgium It contends that there
is indeed a legal dispute between the Parties, in ihat the Congo claims
that the arrest warrant was issued in violation of the immunity of its
Minister for Foreign Affairs, that that warrant v/as unlawful ah initio,
and that this legal defect persists despite the sub'equent changes in the
position occupied by the individual concerned, wliile Belgium maintains
that the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant were not contrary to
international law. The Congo adds that the termination of Mr. Yerodia's
officia1duties in no way operated to efface the wrongful act and the
injury that flowed from it, for which the Congo CO ltinues to seek redress.

26. The Court recalls that, according to its settled jurisprudence, its
jurisdiction must be determined at the time that he act instituting pro-
ceedings was filed.Thus, if the Court has jurisdiction on the date the case
is referred to it, it continues to do so regardless of subsequent events.
Such events might lead to a finding that an application has subsequentlytater qu'une requête aétépar la suite privéed'objet et à prononcer un
non-lieu à statuer; ils ne sauraient en revanche priver la Cour de sa com-

pétence (voir Nottebolznz, exception prélimilzaire, arrêt,C.1.J. Recueil
1953, p. 122; Droit de passage sur territoire indien, exceptions prélimi-
naires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1957, p. 142; Questions d'interprétation et
d'upplicution de lu convention de Montréal rie1971 ri..sultantde l'incident
uérien[leLockerbie (Janzahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaume- Uni), c2xcep-
tions prélin~inuires,arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 23-24, par. 38 ;et Ques-
tions d'irzterprétationet d'clpplicution d~ lu convention de Montréal de
1971 résultant de l'incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jar?lulziriyu arube
libyenne c. Etats-Uni5d'At?zériyue),exceptions pré lit ni na iarrêt,C. IJ.
Recueil 1998, p. 129, par. 37).

27. Aux termes du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut:
«Les Etats parties au présent Statut pourront, à n'importe quel
moment, déclarer reconnaître comme obligatoire de plein droit et
sans convention spéciale, a l'égardde tout autre Etat acceptant la
mêmeobligation, la juridiction de la Cour sur tous les différends

d'ordre juridique ayant pour objet:
CI) l'interprétation d'un traité;
b) tout point de droit international;
c) la réalitéde tout fait qui, s'il étaitétabli. constituerait la viola-
tion d'un engagement international;
d) la nature ou l'étenduede la réparation due pour la rupture d'un
engagement international. »

Le 17octobre 2000, date à laquelle a été déposé erequêteintroductive
d'instance du Congo, chacune des deux Parties se trouvait liéepar une
déclaration d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour effec-
tuéeconformément à cette disposition: la Belgique par une déclaration
du 17juin 1958 et le Congo par une déclaration du 8 février 1989. Ces
déclarations ne comportaient aucune réserveapplicable au cas d'espèce.

Par ailleurs, il n'est pas contesté par les Parties qu'un différend les
opposait alors quant à la licéitau regard du droit international du man-
dat d'arrêt du11avril 2000 et quant aux conséquences à tirer d'une éven-
tuelle illicéide ce mandat. Un tel différendconstituait bien un différend
juridique au sens de la jurisprudence de la Cour, à savoir ((un désaccord
sur un point de droit ou de fait, une contradiction, une opposition de
thèsesjuridiques ou d'intérêts entrdeeux personnes)),dans lequel «la récla-
mation de l'une des parties se heurte a l'opposition manifeste de l'autre»
(Que.stionsd'interprétationet d'applicutiotî de lu converztionde Molztréul

cie 1971 r~;.sultcrnte I'irzcidentuérien de Lockerhie (Janzulziriya clrube
libyetzne c. Royciume-Uni), exceptions prélitîîinuir~.s,lrrêt,C.1J. Recueil
1998, p. 17, par. 22; et Questions d'interprétatiorzet d'application de lu
convention de Montréal de 1971 résultuntde l'incident uérier~ de Locker-
bie (Jatnalziriya clrahe libj~erznec. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), e.\-cc~ptions
prélinzinuires,arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 122-123, par. 21).
28. La Cour en conclut qu'au moment où elle a été saisiede l'affaireelle avait compétence pour en connaître. Elle est demeurée compétente
pour ce faire. La première exception soulevéepar la Belgique doit par

suite êtrerejetée.

29. La deuxième exception présentéepar la Belgique est la suivante:

«Etant donné que M. Yerodia Ndombasi n'est plus ni ministre
des affaires étrangères [du Congo,] ni ministre chargé d'une quel-
conque autre fonction au sein du Gouvernement [du Congo], la
demande [de ce dernier] n'a plus d'objet et la Cour devrait, en
conséquence, refuserde juger au fond. »

30. La Belgique invoque également, à l'appui de cette exception,
l'affaire du Cuineroun septentrionul, dans laquelle la Cour a estimé
qu'elle ne s'acquitterait pas des devoirs qui sont les siens si elle examinait
plus avant une affaire à l'égardde laquelle tout arrêtqu'ellepourrait pro-
noncer serait «sans objet)) (C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 38), ainsi que les af-
faires desEssais i~ucl6uires,dans lesquellesla Cour n'a vu aucune ((raison
de laisser se poursuivre une procédurequ'elle [savait]condamnéea rester
stérile)(C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 271, par. 58; p. 477, par. 61). La Belgique

soutient que les demandes du Congo contenues dans les première et
deuxièmeconclusions de celui-ci tombent de toute évidence sousle COUD
des principes ainsi énoncéspar la Cour dans ces affaires, dans la mesure
où un arrêtde la Cour sur le fond ne pourrait en l'espèceavoir d'autre
objet que de clarifier le droit en la matière pour les besoins du futur ou de
renforcer la position de l'une ou de l'autre des parties. Elle tireet égard
argument de ce que le Congo ne fait étatd'aucun préjudice matériel etne
demande pas de dommages et intérêts compensatoires.Elle ajoute que
l'émissionet la diffusion du mandat d'arrêtn'étaient aucunementfondées

sur les fonctions ministériellesde l'intéressé, ue ce dernier n'est plus mi-
nistre, et que dèslors l'affaire est désormais dépourvue d'objet.
31. Le Congo conteste l'argumentation ainsi développéepar la Bel-
gique et souligne que l'objectif du Congo - faire annuler le mandat liti-
gieux et obtenir réparation du dommage moral subi - n'est toujours pas
réaliséau moment où la Cour est appelée a trancher le différend. Selonle
Congo, pour que l'affaire soit devenue sans objet au cours de la procé-
dure, il aurait fallu que la cause de la violation du droit ait disparu et que
la réparation demandéesoit intervenue.

32. La Cour a déjà affirmé à plusieurs reprises que des événements
postérieurs à l'introduction d'une requête pouvaientpriver celle-cide son
objet, de telle sorte qu'il n'y avait plus lieu pour la Cour de statuer sur
cette requête (voirQuestionsd'interprétution et d'upplicution de lu conven- .ARREST WARRANT (JUDGMENT) 14

of the case it had jurisdiction to deal with it. and that it still has such
jurisdiction. Belgium's first objection must therefore be rejected.

29. The second objection presented by Belgium is the following:

"That in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no
longer either Miriister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a min-
ister occupying any other position in the . . Government [of the

Congo], the case is now without object and the Court should accord-
ingly decline to proceed to judgment on the rrerits of the case."

30. Belgium also ri:lies in support of this objection on the Nortlzern
Cumeroon.~case, in which the Court considered tliat it would not be a
proper discharge of ils duties to proceed further iii a case in which any
judgment that the Court might pronounce would be "without object"
(I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 38), and on the Nucleur Te~tscases, in which the
Court saw "no reasori to allow the continuance of proceedings which it

knows are bound to be fruitless" (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 271, para. 58;
p. 477, para. 61). Belgium maintains that the decllrations requested by
the Congo in its first and second submissions would clearly fall within the
principles enunciated by the Court in those cases, since ajudgment of the
Court on the merits in this case could onlv be dire<ted towards the clari-

fication of the law in this area for the futire, or be designed to reinforce
the position of one or other Party. It relies in support of this argument on
the fact that the Congo does not allege any material injury and is not
seeking compensatory damages. It adds that the issue and transmission
of the arrest warrant were not predicated on the ministerial status of the
person concerned, that he is no longer a minister, and that the case is

accordingly now devoid of object.

31. The Congo contests this argument of Belgium, and emphasizes
that the aim of the Congo - to have the disputed arrest warrant
annulled and to obtain redress for the moral injury suffered - remains

unachieved at the point in time when the Court is called upon to decide
the dispute. According to the Congo, in order for the case to have
become devoid of ob-jectduring the proceedings, the cause of the viola-
tion of the right would have had to disappear, ald the redress sought
would have to have been obtained.

32. The Court has already affirmed on a number csfoccasions that events
occurring subsequent itothe filing of an application rlay render the applica-
tion without object such that the Court is not called lpon to give a decision

thereon (see Qurstiorzco, flnterprrtrition und Applplicutiof tlzc1971 Mont-tion de Montrkal de 1971 résultant de I'incident aérien de Lockerbie
(Jrrmalziriyu arabe libyenne c. Royaume- Uni), exceptions prélinzinuires,
arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 26, par. 46; et Questions d'interprétation et
d'upplicution (le la convention & Montrécdde 1971 résultant de l'incident

uérien de Lock~>rbie(Jarnuhiri.ya arabe libyenne c. Etats-Utlis d'An~é-
rique), e-uceptionspréli~ninuire.~C,I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 131, par. 45).
Elle estime toutefois que tel n'est pas le cas en l'espèce. En effet, le
changement intervenu dans la situation de M. Yerodia n'a pas mis fin au
différend entre les Parties et n'a pas privéla requête d'objet. Le Congo
maintient sa thèse selon laquelle le mandat d'arrêtdélivrépar les autori-

tés judiciaires belges à l'encontre deM. Yerodia était et demeure illicite.
11demande à la Cour de proclamer cette illicéitéet de réparer ainsi le
préjudice moral que le mandat d'arrêtlui aurait causé.Le Congo conti-
nue par ailleurs de demander la mise à néant dudit mandat. Quant à la
Belgique, elle maintient que ses actions n'étaient pas contraires au droit
international et elle s'oppose aux conclusions du Congo. De l'avis de la

Cour, il résulte de ce qui précèdeque la requêtedu Congo n'est pas
aujourd'hui dépourvue d'objet et que, par suite, il y a lieu pour la Cour
de statuer sur ladite requête.La deuxième exception de la Belgique doit
en conséquence êtrerejetée.

33. La troisième exception de la Belgique est ainsi libellée:
((Etant donné que l'affaire soumise aujourd'hui à la Cour est

substantiellement différente de celle formuléedans la requêteintro-
ductive d'instance [du Congo], la Cour n'est, en conséquence, pas
compétente etlou la requête [duCongo] n'est pas recevable. ))

34. Selon la Belgique, il serait contrairea la sécuritéjuridique et à la
bonne administration de la justice qu'un demandeur poursuive une pro-
cédurejudiciaire lorsque les faits sur lesquels reposait la requêteintro-
ductive d'instance se sont radicalement modifiés,étant donné que, en de
telles circonstances, le défendeur resterait jusqu'au tout dernier moment

dans l'incertitude quant a la teneur des demandes dirigéescontre lui. La
Belgique fait valoir que le préjudice subi par le défendeur serait dans ce
cas du mêmeordre que lorsque 1'Etat demandeur formule de nouvelles
prétentions en cours de Elle se réfèreà la jurisprudence de la
Cour concluant a l'irrecevabilité de demandes nouvelles formulées en
cours d'instance qui, si elles avaient étéaccueillies, auraient transformé

l'objet du différend originellement porté devant elle aux termes de la
requête (voirConzpétcr~ce rn INL~~I~~YPe~~<.I~LII (~~LJsgne c. Ccltzndu),
cot~zpétcncc clr lu Cour, urrêt,C.I.J. Recueil lYY8, p. 447-448, par. 29).
Dans ces conditions, la Belgique soutient que, si le Congo souhaitait
maintenir ses griefs, il conviendrait d'exiger qu'il dépose une nouvelle
requêteou, à tout le moins, qu'il demande à la Cour la permission de

modifier sa requêteinitiale.reul Convention urising,fi.omthe Aeviul Incident ut Lockerbie (Lihyu~ Arub
Jumalziriyu v. United Kingdom), Prelitninury Ohjections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 26, para. 46; and Questions of Inte.pretution und Applica-
tion of the 1971 Montreal Convention urisingfrom the Aeriul Incident ut
Lockerhie (Lihyan Aruh Jumuhiriyu v. United Stute.; ofAmericu), Prelimi-
nu- Objections, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 131,para. 45).

However. it considlers that this is not such a case. The change which
has occurred in the situation of Mr. Yerodia has not in fact put an end to
the dispute between the Parties and has not deprilied the Application of
its object. TheCongo argues that the arrest warrant issued by the Belgian
judicial authorities against Mr. Yerodia was and remains unlawful. It
asks the Court to hold that the warrant is unl,iwful, thus providing

redress for the moral injury which the warrant alleyedly caused to it. The
Congo also continues to seek the cancellation ol' the warrant. For its
part, Belgium contends that it did not act in violation of international
law and it disputes the Congo's submissions. In th: view of the Court. it
follows from the foregoing that the Application of the Congo is not now
without object and that accordingly the case is not moot. Belgium's

second objection must accordingly be rejected.

33. The third Belgian objection is put as follows

"That the case as it now stands is materialiy different to that set
out in the [Congol's Application instituting prlxeedings and that the
Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case andlor that the appli-

cation is inadmissible."
34. According to Belgium, it would be contrarJ1 to legal security and
the sound administration of justice for an applicant State to continue

proceedings in circurnstances in which the factua dimension on which
the Application was based has changed fundamentally, since the respond-
ent State would in those circumstances be uncertain, until the very last
moment, of the substance of the claims against it. Belgium argues that
the prejudice sufferecl by the respondent State in ihis situation is analo-
gous to the situation in which an applicant State lormulates new claims

during the course of the proceedings. It refers to tl-ejurisprudence of the
Court holding inadmissible new claims formulatecl during the course of
the proceedings which, had they been entertained. would have trans-
formed the subject ol'the dispute originally brought before it under the
terms of the Application (see Fislzeric~s J~vi~sdiction(Spciin v. Crinadu),
Jurisclic.tioof' th@Court, Judgm~tzt, I. CIJ. Repo~ts 1998, pp. 447-448,

para. 29). In the circumstances, Belgium contencls that, if the Congo
wishes to maintain its claims, it should be required to initiate proceedings
afresh or,at the very least, apply to the Court for p:rmission to amend its
initial Application.16 MANDAT D'ARRÊT (ARRÊT)

35. En réponse, le Congo conteste que les termes de sa requête aient
étésubstantiellement modifiés, et insiste sur le fait qu'il n'a présenté
aucune demande nouvelle, au plan matériel ou au plan formel, qui aurait
transformé l'objet du différend. Le Congo soutient n'avoir rien fait

d'autre, à travers les différentesétapes de la procédure, que de <<resserrer
et préciser))ses demandes, comme le font la plupart des Etats qui se pré-
sentent devant la Cour, et qu'il aurait simplement fait usage de la faculté
laisséeaux parties de modifier leurs conclusions jusqu'à la fin de la pro-
cédure orale.

36. La Cour rappelle que, selon une jurisprudence constante, elle <<ne
saurait admettre, en principe, qu'un différend porté devant elle par
requêtepuisse être transformé,par voie de modifications apportées aux
conclusions, en un autre différend dont le caractère ne serait pas le

même))(Sociétécommerciale de Belgique, arrêt, 1939,C.P.J.I. skrie AIB
no 78, p. 173; cf. Activités militaires et parainilitaires au Nicaragua et
contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats- Unis d'Amérique), compktence et
recevabilité, arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 427, par. 80; voir aussi Cer-
taines terres ùphosphates ù Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), e'tceptionspréli-

rninuires, arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 264-267, en particulier par. 69 et
70). Toutefois, la Cour estime qu'en l'espèce lesfaits sur lesquels reposait
la requête n'ont pasété modifiéd se manière telle que le différenddont la
Cour était saisie ait subi une transformation de cette nature. En effet, la
question qui est soumise à la Cour pour décision restede savoir si I'émis-

sion et la diffusion, par les autorités judiciaires belges, d'un mandat
d'arrêta l'encontre d'une personne étantalors ministre des affaires étran-
gères du Congo étaient ou non contraires au droit international. Aussi
bien les conclusions finales du Congo découlent-elles ((directementde la
question qui fait l'objet de la requête))(Cornpktence en matiPre de pêclze-
ries (R4puhlique fé&mle d'Allemagne c. Islande), fond, arrêt, CI..J.

Recueil 1974, p. 203, par. 72; voir aussi Temple de Prkalz Viizkur,fond,
arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 36).
Dans ces conditions, la Cour estime que la Belgique ne peut valable-
ment affirmer que le différendportédevant la Cour aurait ététransformé
de manière telle que la capacité de la Belgique à préparer sa défense

aurait été affectée, ouqu'il aurait étéporté atteinte aux exigences d'une
bonne administration de la justice. La troisième exception de la Belgique
doit partant êtrerejetée.

37. La quatrième exception de la Belgique se lit comme suit:

(<Etant donné la situation nouvelle dans laquelle se trouve la per-
sonne de M. Yerodia Ndombasi, la demande a pris la forme d'une
action visant ii recréer la protection diplomatique en faveur de 35. In response, the Congo denies that there has been a substantial
amendment of the terms of its Application, and nsists that it has pre-
sented no new claim, whether of substance or of iorm, that would have
transformed the subject-matter of the dispute. The Congo maintains that
it has done nothing through the various stages i 1 the proceedings but
"condense and refine" its claims, as do most States that appear before the

Court, and that it is simply making use of the riglit of parties to amend
their submissions until the end of the oral proceecings.

36. The Court notes that, in accordance with scttled jurisprudence, it
"cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought befctreit by application to
be transformed by amendments in the submissions into another dispute
which is different in character" (Sociétécommerciale de Belgique, Judg-
ment, 1939, P. C.IJ., Series AIB, No. 78, p. 173 ;4:f.Militury and Para-
military Actiiities in arzciuguinst Nicaragua (Nica,agua v. United States

of' Arnerica), Jurisdiction and Adnzissihility, Jud~ment, 1.C.J. Reports
1984, p. 427, para. 80; see also Certain Phospjzate Lands in Nauru
(Nauru v.Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1. C.J. Reports
1992, pp. 264-267, iniparticular paras. 69 and 70:l.However, the Court
considers that in the present case the facts undeilying the Application
have not changed in a way that produced such a transformation in the
dispute brought before it. The question submitted to the Court for deci-
sion remains whether the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant by
the Belgianjudicial authorities against a person wlhowas at that time the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo were coiîtrary to international

law. The Congo's firial submissions arise "directly out of the question
which is the subject-matter of that Application" (Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Federal Republic qf'Gerrnuny v. Iceland), Me.-its, Judgment, 1.C.J.
Reports 1974, p. 203, para. 72; see also Temple of Preuh Vilzear, Merits,
Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 36).

In these circumst;~nces, the Court considers that Belgium cannot
validly maintain thai; the dispute brought before the Court was trans-
formed in a way that affected its ability to prepare its defence, or that
the requirements of the sound administration of justice were infringed.

Belgium's third objection must accordingly be rejccted.

37. The fourth Bel.gianobjection reads as follo~vs:
"That, in the light of the new circumstances concerning Mr. Yero-
dia Ndombasi, the case has assumed the character of an action of

diplornatic protection but one in which the individual being pro-17 MANDAT D'ARRÊT (ARRET)

M. Yerodia Ndombasi alors que ce dernier n'a pas épuisétoutes les
voies de recours internes; la Cour n'est, en conséquence, pas com-
pétenteetlou la requête[du Congo] n'est pas recevable. »

38. La Belgique reconnaît à cet égard que, lorsque l'instance a été
introduite, un intérêt juridiquedirect du Congo était effectivement en
cause et que cet Etat faisait alors valoir une demande en son nom propre
a raison de la prétendue violation, par la Belgique, de l'immunité de son
ministre des affaires étrangères. Toutefois, selon la Belgique, l'instance
aurait étéradicalement transformée après le dépôt de la requête,à savoir

le 15 avril 2001, lorsque M. Yerodia a cesséde faire partie du Gouver-
nement congolais. La Belgique affirme que deux des demandes faites à la
Cour par le Congo dans ses conclusions finales concernent en pratique les
effets juridiques d'un mandat d'arrêtdélivréà l'encontre d'une personne
privéeayant la nationalité congolaise, et que ces questions relèvent d'une

action en protection diplomatique. Elle ajoute que l'intéressé n'apas
épuisétoutes les voies de recours ouvertes en droit belge, condition néces-
saire pour que le Congo puisse prendre fait et cause, dans une procédure
internationale. Dour son ressortissant.
39. Le Congo, en revanche, nie qu'il s'agisse en l'espèced'une action
en protection diplomatique. Il soutient que son action a été présentéaeu

nom de I'Etat congolais, à raison de la violation de I'immunité de son
ministre des affaires étrangères. Le Congo nie égalementque des voies de
recours aient été disponiblesen droit belge. Il fait observer à cet égard
que ce n'est que lorsque le procureur du Roi est saisi du dossier et prend
des réquisitions devant la chambre du conseil que l'inculpépeut se dé-
fendre devant cette dernière et demander une ordonnance de non-lieu.

40. La Cour note que le Congo n'ajamais entendu se prévaloirdevant
elle de droits individuels dM. Yerodia. Elle estime que, malgréles chan-
gements intervenus dans la situation professionnelle de celui-ci, le carac-
tèredu différenddont elle a étésaisie par la requêtedemeure inchangé: ce

différend concerne toujours la licéitédu mandat d'arrêt délivréle
11 avril 2000 à l'encontre d'une personne qui était alors ministre des
affaires étrangèresdu Congo, ainsi que la question de savoir si les droits
du Congo ont ou non étévioléspar ce mandat d'arrêt. Le Congo n'agis-
sant pas dans le cadre de la protection d'un de ses ressortissants, la Bel-
gique ne saurait exciper des règles concernant l'épuisement desvoies de

recours internes.
En tout état de cause, la Cour rappelle que l'exception tiréedu non-
épuisement des voies de recours internes a trait à la recevabilité de la
requête (voir Interlzundel, excc.ptions pr6liminaires, arrêt,C.J. Recueil
1959, p. 26; Elettronicu Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), urrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1989,
p. 42, par. 49). Or, selon une jurisprudence constante, la date pertinente

aux fins d'apprécier la recevabilité d'une requête estcella laquelle cette tected has failed to exhaust local remedies, and that the Court
accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case andlor that the application
is inadmissible."

38. In this respect, Belgium accepts that, when the case was first insti-
tuted, the Congo had a direct legal interest in the niatter, and was assert-
ing a claim in its own name in respect of the allegetl violation by Belgium
of the immunity of the Congo's Foreign Minister. 1-Iowever,according to

Belgium, the case was radically transformed aftei the Application was
filed, iiamely on15 April 2001. when Mr. Yerodia ceased to be a member
of the Congolese Government. Belgium maintains that two of the requests
made of the Court in the Congo's final submissions in practice now con-
Cernthe legal effect of an arrest warrant issued aga nst a private citizen of
the Congo, and that hese issues fa11within the rea m of an action of dip-

lomatic protection. It adds that the individual concerned has not
exhausted al1available remedies under Belgian law a necessary condition
before the Congo can espouse the cause of one 01'its nationals in inter-
national proceedings

39. The Congo, on the other hand, denies that this is an action for

diplomatic protection. It maintains that it is brin:$& these proceedings
in the name of the Congolese State, on account of the violation of the
immunity of its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Congo further denies
the availability of rennediesunder Belgian law. It pints out in this regard
that it is only when the Crown Prosecutor has betome seised of the case
file and makes submissions to the Chambre du conseil that the accused

can defend himself before the Chambre and seek iO have the charge dis-
missed.

40. The Court notes that the Congo has never sought to invoke before
it Mr. Yerodia's persona1 rights. It considers that, despite the change in
professional situation of Mr. Yerodia, the character of the dispute sub-
mitted to the Court by means of the Application has not changed: the

dispute still concerris the lawfulness of the arr:st warrant issued on
11 April 2000 against a person who was at the tine Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Congo, and the question whether the rights of the Congo
have or have not been violated by that warrant. As the Congo is not act-
ing in the context of protection of one of its nationals, Belgium cannot
rely upon the rules relating to the exhaustion of local remedies.

In any event, the Court recalls that an objectior, based on non-exhaus-
tion of local remedies relates to the admissibility of the application (see
Interlzundel, Prelirninary Objections, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1959,
p. 26; Elettrunica Siculu S.p. A. (ELSI), Judgment, 1.C J. Reports 1989,
p. 42, para. 49). Under settled jurisprudence, the critical date for deter-

mining the admissibility of an application is the (late on which it is filed18 MANDAT D'ARRET (ARRET)

dernière a été déposé (eoir Questions d'interprétution et d'application de
lu convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l'incident aérien de
Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libj~ennec. Roj~uun~cU - ni), exceptions préli-
minaires, arrêt, C I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 25-26, par. 43-44; et Questions
d'interprétatiot~et d'application de lu conver~tionde Montréal de 1971
résultant de l'incident aériende Lockerbie (Junzahiriju uruhe libyenne

c. Etuts- Unis d'iltnérique) ; exceptions prÉlirwinuire.r, arrêt, C.I. J.
Recueil 1998, p. 130-131, par. 42-43). La Belgique reconnaît que, au
moment du dépôt de la requête introductive d'instancepar le Congo, ce
dernier avait un intérêt juridique directementen cause et faisait valoir
une demande en son nom propre. La quatrième exception de la Belgique
doit par suite êtrerejetée.

41. A titre subsidiaire, la Belgique fait encore valoir que, «au cas ou la
Cour [déciderait]qu'elle estcompétenteet que la requêteétaitrecevable, ...

la règlenon ultra petita limite[rait] [sa]compétence ...aux questions qui
font l'objet desconclusions finales [du Congo])). La Belgiqueexpose que,
si le Congo avait initialement avancéun double argument fondé, d'une
part, sur l'incompétencedu juge belgeet, d'autre part, sur l'immunitéde
iuridiction dont bénéficiait son ministre des affaires étranuères d.ans ses
conclusions finales, le Congo ne prétendait plus que la Belgique s'était
arrogé à tort une compétenceuniverselle par défaut. Selon la Belgique, le
Congo se limite désormais à soutenir que le mandat d'arrêt du
11 avril 2000 étaitillicite parce qu'il violait l'immunitéde juridiction de
son ministre des affaires étrangères;en conséquence,la cour ne saurait
se prononcer sur la questio~~de la compétenceuniverselledanstoute déci-

sion qu'elle rendrait sur le fond de l'affaire.

42. Le Congo précisepour sa part que ce qui l'intéresseen l'espèce est
de faire constater par la Cour qu'il a été victimed'un fait internationa-
lement illicite, la question de savoir s'il y a eu en l'occurrence ((exercice
d'une compétenceuniverselle excessive))ne revêtant à cet égard qu'une
importance secondaire. Le Congo expose que, si la Cour devait examiner
les problèmes soulevés endroit international par la question de la com-
pétence universelle,elle le ferait, non pas à la demande du Congo, mais
en conséquencedu systèmede défenseadopté par la Belgique,qui semble
affirmer que l'exercice d'une telle compétence pourrait ((valablement
contrebalancer le respect des immunités)).

43. La Cour rappellera le principe bien établiselon lequel elle a «le
devoir de répondre aux demandes des parties telles qu'elles s'expriment
dans leursconclusions finales, mais aussi celui de s'abstenir de statuer sur
des points non compris dans lesdites demandes ainsi exprimées)) (Droit(see Questions of'Interpretation and Applicution of' the 1971 Montreal
Converztion uri.singjkorn the Aeriul Incident ut Lockerbie (Libyun Arub
Jamahirij~uv. United Kingdom), Prelirninary Objections, Judgrnent, 1.C.J.
Reports 1998, pp. 25-26, paras. 43-44; and Questions of Interpretation
und Applicution of the 1971 Montreal Convention clrising.frorn the Aerial

Incident ut Lockerhie (Libyun Arab Jarnuhiriy~ v. United States qf
Anzerica), Prelimincrry Objections, Judgtrzetzt, LC.J. Reports 1998,
pp. 130-131, paras. 4.2-43). Belgium accepts that, on the date on which
the Congo filed the A.pplication instituting proceecings, the Congo had a
direct legal interestin the matter, and was asserting a claim in its own
name. Belgium's fourth objection must accordingly be rejected.

41. As a subsidiary argument, Belgium further contends that "[iln the
event that the Court t-lecidesthat it does have jurisdiction in this case and
that the application iijadmissible, ...the non ultrapetita rule operates to

limit the jurisdiction of the Court to those issues that are the subject of
the [Congol's final isubmissions". Belgium points out that, while the
Congo initially advanced a twofold argument, based, on the one hand,
on the Belgian judge's lack of jurisdiction, and, on the other, on the
immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by its Ministcr for Foreign Affairs,
the Congo no longer claims in its final submissions that Belgium wrongly

conferred upon itself universal jurisdiction in ubse~ltia.According to Bel-
gium, the Congo novi confines itself to arguing that the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 was unlawful because it violated th<.immunity from juris-
diction of its Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the Court conse-
quently cannot rule on the issue of universal juristiiction in any decision
it renders on the merits of the case.
42. The Congo, for its part, states that its intt:rest in bringing these

proceedings is to obtilin a finding by the Court that it has been the victim
of an internationally wrongful act, the question whether this case involves
the "exercise of an excessive universal jurisdiction ' being in this connec-
tion only a secondary consideration. The Congo asserts that any consid-
eration by the Court of the issues of international aw raised by universal
jurisdiction would be undertaken not at the request of the Congo but,

rather, by virtue of the defence strategy adopttd by Belgium, which
appears to maintain 1hat the exercise of such jurisdiction can "represent a
valid counterweight itothe observance of immunities".

43. The Court would recall the well-established principle that "it is the

duty of the Court not only to reply to the questions as stated in the final
submissions of the parties, but also to abstain frc'm deciding points not
included in those submissions" (Asylunz, Judgment. 1. C.J. Reports 1950,19 MANDAT D'ARRÊT (ARRET)

d'asile, arrêt,C.I.J.Recueil 1950, p. 402). Si la Cour ne peut donc pas
trancher des questions qui ne lui ont pas été soumises,en revanche la
règle non ultra petita ne saurait l'empêcherd'aborder certains points de
droit dans sa motivation. Aussi la Cour ne saurait-elle en l'espèce sepro-
noncer, dans le dispositif de son arrêt,sur la question de savoir si leman-

dat d'arrêtlitigieux, émis par le juge d'instruction belge en vertu de la
compétence universelle dont il se réclame, estconforme sur ce point aux
règleset principes du droit international gouvernant les compétences des
juridictions nationales. Toutefois, il ne s'ensuit pas que la Cour ne puisse
aborder, si elle l'estime nécessaire ou souhaitable, tel ou tel aspect de
cette question dans les motifs de son arrêt.

44. La Cour conclut de ce qui précède qu'ellea compétence pour
connaître de la requêtedu Congo, que cette requête n'est pas dépourvue
d'objet et que, par suite, il y a lieu de statuer sur celle-ci, et que ladite
requêteest recevable. La Cour se penchera donc maintenant sur le fond
de l'affaire.

45. Comme il a déjàétéindiquéci-dessus (voir paragraphes 41 a 43), le
Congo, dans sa requête introductive d'instance, a initialement contestéla
licéitédu mandat d'arrêt du 11 avril2000 en s'appuyant sur deux moyens

distincts: d'une part, la prétention de la Belgique à exercer une compé-
tence universelle et, d'autre part, la violation alléguée desimmunités du
ministre congolais des affaires étrangères alors en fonction. Toutefois,
dans les conclusions figurant dans son mémoire, ainsi que dans les
conclusions finales présentéesau terme de la procédure orale, le Congo
n'invoque que le second de ces moyens.
46. D'un point de vue logique, le second moyen ne devrait pouvoir

être invoquéqu'après un examen du premier, dans la mesure où ce n'est
que lorsqu'un Etat dispose, en droit international, d'une compétence a
l'égard d'une question particulière qu'un problème d'immunité peut se
poser au regard de l'exercice d'une telle compétence. Cependant, en
l'espèce, et compte tenu du dernier état des conclusions du Congo, la
Cour examinera d'embléela question de savoir si, a supposer que la Bel-

gique ait étécompétente, au plan du droit international, pour émettre et
diffuser le mandat d'arrêt du 11 avril 2000, elle a violé cefaisant les
immunités du ministre des affaires étrangèresdu Congo alors en fonc-
tion.

47. Le Congo soutient que, pendant toute la durée de ses fonctions, le
ministre des affaires étrangères d'unEtat souverain bénéficied'une invio-p. 402). While the Court is thus not entitled to decide upon questions not
asked of it, the noui ultvu petitu rule nonetheless cannot preclude the
Court from addressing certain legal points in its reasoning. Thus in the
present case the Court may not rule, in the operative part of its Judg-

ment, on the question whether the disputed arrest warrant, issued by the
Belgian investigating judge in exercise of his purported universal jurisdic-
tion, complied in tl-iat regard with the rules anci principles of interna-
tional law governinj; the jurisdiction of national courts. This does not
mean, however, that the Court may not deal with certain aspects of that

question in the reasoning of its Judgment, shoulc it deem this necessary
or desirable.

44. The Court coincludes from the foregoing that it has jurisdiction to

entertain the Congol's Application, that the Application is not without
object and that accordingly the case is not moot and that the Applica-
tion is admissible. T'hus. the Court now turns to the merits of the case.

45. As indicated above (see paragraphs 41 to4: above), in its Applica-
tion instituting these proceedings, the Congo originally challenged the
legality of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 on two separate grounds:
on the one hand, Belgium's claim to exercise a universal jurisdiction and,
on the other, the alleged violation of the immunities of the Minister for

Foreign Affairs of the Congo then in office. However, in its submissions
in its Memorial, ancl in its final submissions at the close of the oral pro-
ceedings, the Congo invokes only the latter grouiid.

46. As a matter alflogic, the second ground should be addressed only
once there has been a determination in respect of the first, since it is only

where a State has jui-isdiction under international law in relation to a par-
ticular matter that there can be any question of immunities in regard to
the exercise of that jurisdiction. However, in the present case, and in view
of the final form of the Congo.a submissions. the Court will address first
the question whether, assuming that it had jurijdiction under interna-
tional law to issue and circulate the arrest warrant of 11 A~rii 2000. Bel-

gium in so doing violated the immunities of the then Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Cong~o.

47. The Congo maintains that, during his or hcr term of office, a Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State is entitled to inviolabilitylabilitéet d'une immunité de juridiction pénale qui sont ((absolues ou
intégrales)),en ce sens qu'elles ne souffrent aucune exception. Le Congo
affirme en conséquencequ'aucune poursuite pénalene peut êtreengagée
a l'encontre d'un ministre des affaires étrangères devant une juridiction
étrangèreaussi longtemps qu'il exerce sesfonctions, et que toute consta-
tation de sa responsabilité pénalepar une juridiction interne étrangère,
ou tout acte d'instruction ou d'enquêtevisant àle traduire en justice, est

contraire au principe de l'immunitédejuridiction. Selon le Congo, le fon-
dement de cette immunitépénaleest purement fonctionnel, celle-cin'étant
accordée par le droit international coutumier que pour permettre au
représentant de I'Etat étranger qui en bénéficiede remplir librement et
sans entrave les fonctions dont il a la charge. Le Congo ajoute que
l'immunitéainsi reconnue aux ministres des affaires étrangèresen exer-
cicecouvre tousleursactes, y compris ceux qui auraient étécommisavant
leur entréeen fonctions, et qu'il importe peu que les actes commis durant
l'exercice de leurs fonctions puissent êtreou non qualifiésd'«actes de la
fonction D.
48. Le Congo précisepar ailleurs qu'il ne conteste pas l'existenced'un
principe de droit international pénal,qui trouverait son origine dans la
jurisprudence des tribunaux militaires internationaux de Nuremberg et de

Tokyo, selon lequel la qualitéofficiellede l'accuséau moment des faits ne
pourrait constituer une ((cause d'exonération de sa responsabilitépénale
ou un motif de réduction de sapeine)) devant quelque juridiction que ce
soit, interne ou internationale.Et le Congode souligner que lefait qu'une
immunité fasse obstacle à l'exercicede poursuites devant un juge déter-
miné,ou durant une période déterminée,n'empêchepas que les mêmes
poursuites pourront êtreexercées,le cas échéant,devant un autre juge
non liépar l'immunité,ou à un moment où il n'y aura plus lieu de tenir
compte d'une telle immunité. Il conclut qu'immunité ne signifie pas
impunité.
49. La Belgique soutient quant à elle que, alors que les ministres des
affaires étrangèresen exercice jouissent en générald'une immunité de
juridiction devant les tribunaux d'un Etat étranger, cette immunité ne

s'applique qu'aux actes accomplis dans le cadre de leurs fonctions offi-
cielles, et qu'une telle immunité ne saurait protéger ces personnes dans
leurs actions privées ou lorsqu'elles agissent autrement en dehors de
I'exercicede leurs fonctions officielles.
50. La Belgique fait par ailleurs valoir qu'en l'espèceM. Yerodia ne
bénéficiaitd'aucune immunité à la date a laquelle il aurait commis les
actes qui lui sont reprochés, etque rien n'indique qu'il ait alors agiitre
officiel. Ellefait remarquer que le mandat d'arrêta étéémis à l'encontre
de M. Yerodia à titre personnel.

51. La Cour observera tout d'abord qu'il estclairement établi en droit
international que, de mêmeque les agents diplomatiques et consulaires,and to immunity fr'om criminal process being "ibsolute or complete",
that is to say, they are subject to no exception. P~ccordingly,the congo
contends that no criininal prosecution may be brought against a Minister

for Foreign Affairs in a foreign court as long ai he or she remains in
office, and that any finding of criminal responsibility by a domestic court
in a foreign country, or any act of investigation iindertaken with a view
to bringing him or her to court, would contravene the principle of immu-
nity fromjurisdiction. According to the Congo, th? basis of such criminal
immunity is purely hnctional, and immunity is azcorded under custom-

ary international law simply in order to enable the foreign State repre-
sentative enjoying siich immunity to perform his or her functions freely
and without let or tiindrance. The Congo adds that the immunity thus
accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs when i 1 office coverç al1their
acts, including any ccsmmitted before they took of ice, and that it is irrele-
vant whether the act:sdone whilst in office may be characterized or not as

"official acts".

48. The Congo states further that it does not ileny the existence of a
principle of international criminal law, deriving fr2m the decisions of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals, that the accused's

official capacity at the time of the acts cannot, before any court, whether
domestic or international, constitute a "ground 2f exemption from his
criminal responsibiliity or a ground for mitigation of sentence". The
Congo then stresses ithatthe fact that an immunitb might bar prosecution
before a specific court or over a specific period coes not mean that the
same prosecution cannot be brought, if appropriate, before another court

which is not bound by that immunity, or at anothc r time when the immu-
nity need no longer be taken into account. It concludes that immunity
does not mean impunity.

49. Belgium maintains for its part that, while Ministers for Foreign
Affairs in office generally enjoy an immunity from jurisdiction before the

courts of a foreign State, such immunity applies only to acts carried out
in the course of theii- officia1functions, and cannot protect such persons
in respect of private acts or when they are acting otherwise than in the
performance of their officia1functions.

50. Belgium further states that, in the circumstances of the present

case, Mr. Yerodia erijoyed no immunity at the tire when he is alleged to
have committed the acts of which he is accused, and that there is no evi-
dence that he was then acting in any official capacity. It observes that the
arrest warrant was iijsued against Mr. Yerodia personally.

51. The Court would observe at the outset thaf in international law it
is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certaincertaines personnes occupant un rang élevédans l'Etat, telles que le chef
de I'Etat, le chef du gouvernement ou le ministre des affaires étrangères,
jouissent dans les autres Etats d'immunitésde juridiction, tant civiles que
pénales. Aux fins de la présente affaire, seules l'immunitéde juridiction

pénale et l'inviolabilité d'un ministre des affaires étrangères en exercice
doivent être examinéespar la Cour.
52. Un certain nombre de textes conventionnels ont étéévoquéspar
les Parties à cet égard. Il en a ététout d'abord ainsi de la convention de
Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques du 18avril 1961.Dans son préam-
bule, celle-ci préciseque le but des privilègeset immunités diplomatiques

est «d'assurer l'accomplissement efficace des fonctions des missions diplo-
matiques en tant que représentants des Etats)). Elle dispose en son ar-
ticle 32 que seul1'Etataccréditant peut renoncer à cette immunité. Sur ces
points, la convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques, à laquelle
tant le Congo que la Belgique sont parties, reflète le droit international

coutumier. Il en est de mêmedes dispositions correspondantes de la
convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires du 24 avril 1963, à
laquelle le Congo et la Belgique sont également parties.
Le Congo et la Belgique se réfèrent en outre à la convention de
New York du 8 décembre 1969 sur les missions spécialesà laquelle ils ne
sont cependant pas parties. Ils rappellent que, selon le paragraphe 2 de

l'article 1 de cette convention:
«Le chef de gouvernement, le ministre des affairesétrangères et les
autres personnalités de rang élevé,quand ils prennent part à une

mission spécialede 1'Etat d'envoi, jouissent dans 1'Etat de réception
ou dans un Etat tiers, en plus de ce qui est accordé par la présente
convention, des facilités, privilèges et immunités reconnus par le
droit international.))

Des enseignements utiles peuvent êtretirésde ces conventions sur tel
ou tel aspect de la question des immunités. Elles ne contiennent toutefois
aucune disposition fixant de manière précise lesimmunitésdont jouissent
les ministres des affaires étrangères. C'est par conséquent sur la base du

droit international coutumier que la Cour devra trancher les questions
relatives aux immunités de ces ministres soulevées en l'espèce.
53. En droit international coutumier, les immunités reconnues au mi-
nistre des affaires étrangères ne lui sont pas accordées pour son avantage
personnel, mais pour lui permettre de s'acquitter librement de ses fonc-
tions pour le compte de 1'Etat qu'il représente.Afin de déterminer I'éten-

duede ces immunités, la Cour devra donc d'abord examiner la nature des
fonctions exercéespar un ministre des affaires étrangères.Celui-ci assure
la direction de l'action diplomatique de son gouvernement et le repré-
sente généralementdans les négociations internationales et les réunions
intergouvernementales. Les ambassadeurs et autres agents diplomatiques
sont appelés a exercer leurs fonctions sous son autorité. Ses actes sont

susceptibles de lier 1'Etat qu'il représente, et un ministre des affaires
étrangères est considéré,au titre des fonctions qui sont les siennes,holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as ttle Head of State, Head
of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from
jurisdiction in other States, both civil and crimin;il. For the purposes of
the present case, it is only the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and

the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for ForibignAffairs that faIl for
the Court to consider.
52. A certain numiber of treaty instruments wer: cited by the Parties in
this regard. These included, first, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 18April 1961,which states in its pre imble that the purpose
of diplomatic privileges and immunities is "to e lsure the efficient per-

formance of the func;tions of diplomatic missions as representing States".
It provides in Article 32 that only the sending State may waive such
immunity. On these points, the Vienna Conventicn on Diplomatic Rela-
tions, to which both the Congo and Belgium are parties, reflects custom-
ary international lavi. The same applies to the corresponding provisions
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963. to
which the Congo and Belgium are also parties.

The Congo and I3elgium further cite the Ne- York Convention on
Special Missions of 8 December 1969, to which ~heyare not, however.
parties. They recall ihat under Article 21, paragrilph 2, of that Conven-
tion :

"The Head of the Government, the Minis~er for Foreign Affairs
and otlier persoils of high rank, when they ta1.epart in a special mis-
sion of the sencling State, shall enjoy in the receiving State or in a
third State, in alddition to what is granted by the present Conven-

tion, the facilities, privileges and immunitier, accorded by interna-
tional law."
These conventions, provide useful guidance on certain aspects of the

question of immuniities. They do not, however, contain any provision
specifically defining the immunities enjoyed by Ministers for Foreign
Affairs. It is consequently on the basis of custornary international law
that the Court must decide the questions relatin;: to the immunities of
such Ministers raisecl in the present case.
53. In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Min-

isters for Foreign Afjàirs are not granted for their oersonal benefit, but to
ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their
respective States. In order to determine the exterit of these immunities,
the Court must therefore first consider the nature of the functions exer-
cised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs. He or sh: is in charge of his or
her Government's diplomatic activities and generally acts as its repre-
sentative in internatilonal negotiations and intergovernmental meetings.

Ambassadors and oither diplomatic agents carry out their duties under
his or her authority. His or her acts may bind the State represented, and
there is a presumptioln that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, simply by vir-
tue of that office, has full powers to act on behalf of the State (see, forcomme doté des pleins pouvoirs pour agir au nom de 1'Etat (voir par
exemple l'alinéa a) du paragraphe 2 de l'article 7 de la convention de
Vienne de 1969sur le droit des traités).Dans l'exercicede ses fonctions,
il est fréquemment appelé a sedéplacer à l'étranger etdoit dèslors êtreen
mesure de le faire librement dès que la nécessité s'en faistentir.Il doit
également demeurer en liaison constante avec son gouvernement ainsi
qu'avec les missions diplomatiques que celui-ci entretient dans le monde
entier, et pouvoir a tout moment communiquer avec les représentants
d'autres Etats. La Cour fait en outre observer qu'un ministre des affaires

étrangères,responsable de la conduite des relations de son Etat avec tous
les autres Etats, occupe une position qui fait qu'à l'instar du chef de
1'Etatet du chef du gouvernement il se voit reconnaître par le droit inter-
national la qualitéde représenterson Etat du seul fait de I'exercicede sa
fonction. Il n'a pas à présenterde lettres de créance: tout au contraire,
c'est généralement luiqui décide des pouvoirs à conférer aux agents
diplomatiques et qui contresigne leurs lettres de créance. Enfin, c'est
auprès du ministère desaffaires étrangèresque les chargésd'affaires sont
accrédités.
54. La Cour en conclut que les fonctions d'un ministre des affaires
étrangèressont telles que, pour toute la duréede sa charge, il bénéficie
d'une immunité de juridiction pénale et d'une inviolabilité totales a
I'étranger.Cette immunitéet cette inviolabilitéprotègentl'intéresscontre
tout acte d'autoritéde la part d'un autre Etat qui ferait obstacle l'exer-
cice de ses fonctions.
55. A cet égard,il n'est pas possible d'opérer de distinction entre les

actes accomplis par un ministre des affaires étrangéreà titre «officiel» et
ceux qui l'auraient étéà titre «privé», pas plus qu'entre les actes accom-
plis par l'intéresséavant qu'il n'occupeles fonctions de ministre des af-
faires étrangéreset ceux accomplis durant I'exercicede cesfonctions. C'est
ainsi que, si un ministre des affaires étrangèresest arrêté dansun autre
Etat a la suite d'une quelconque inculpation, il se trouvera à l'évidence
empêchéde s'acquitter des tâches inhérentes à ses fonctions. Les ob-
staclesainsi apportésa l'exercicede tellesfonctions officiellesont desconsé-
quences aussi graves, que le ministre des affaires étrangères,au moment
de son arrestation, ait été présent titre officiel ou privésur le territoire
de 1'Etatayant procédé a cette arrestation, que celle-ciconcerne des actes
qu'il aurait accomplis avant d'occuper le poste de ministre des affaires
étrangèresou des actes accomplis dans le cadre de ses fonctions, ou
encore qu'elle concerne des actes qu'ilaurait accomplis a titre «officiel»
ou des actes qu'il aurait accomplisa titre «privé».En outre, le simple fait
qu'en se rendant dans un autre Etat ou qu'en traversant celui-ci un mi-

nistre des affairesétrangèrespuisse êtreexposé a une procédurejudiciaire
peut le dissuader de se déplacerà I'étrangerlorsqu'il est dans l'obligation
de le faire pour s'acquitter de ses fonctions.example, Article 7, paragraph 2 (u), of the 1969Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties). In the performance of thesr:functions, he or she is
frequently required to travel internationally, and thus must be in a posi-
tion freely to do so whenever the need should arise. He or she must also
be in constant comrnunication with the Government, and with its diplo-
matic missions around the world, and be capable at any time of commu-
nicating with represi:ntatives of other States. The Court further observes

that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for the conduct of his or
her State's relations with al1other States, occupii:~a position such that,
like the Head of State or the Head of Governmt:nt, he or she is recog-
nized under international law as representative of the State solely by vir-
tue of his or her office. He or she does not halle to present letters of
credence: to the contrary, it is generally theMinister who determines the
authority to be conferred upon diplomatic agents and countersigns their
letters of credence. Finally, it is to the Ministerf3r Foreign Affairs that
chargés d'affairesare accredited.

54. The Court accordingly concludes that the 'unctions of a Minister
for Foreign Affairs (aresuch that, throughout the duration of his or her
office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immun ty from criminal juris-
diction and inviolability. That immunity and that lnviolability protect the
individual concernecl against any act of authority of another State which

would hinder him 01-her in the performance of his or her duties.
55. In this respect, no distinction can be drawn between acts per-
formed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official" capacity, and
those claimed to have been performed in a "privat~:capacity", or, for that
matter, between acts performed before the person concerned assumed
office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the
period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreigr~Affairs is arrested in
another State on a ci-iminalcharge, he or she is cli,arly thereby prevented
from exercising the functions of his or her office. The consequences of
such impediment to the exercise of those officia functions are equally
serious, regardless of whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs was, at the
time of arrest, preseilt in the territory of the arre:,ting State on an "offi-
cial" visit or a "private" visit, regardless of whether the arrest relates to
acts allegedly perforined before the person becam: the Minister for For-
eign Affairs or to acts perforrned while in office, and regardless of

whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an "official" capa-
city or a "private" capacity. Furthermore, even the mere risk that, by
travelling to or transiting another State a Minister for Foreign Affairs
might be exposing himself or herself to legal proceedings could deter the
Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the
purposes of the performance of his or her official functions. 56. La Cour passera maintenant à l'examen de l'argumentation de la
Belgique selon laquelle les immunités reconnues aux ministres des affaires
étrangèresen exercice ne peuvent en aucun cas protéger ceux-cilorsqu'ils
sont soupçonnés d'avoir commis des crimes de guerre ou des crimes
contre l'humanité. Aux fins d'étayer cette position, la Belgique se réfère
dans son contre-mémoire a divers instruments juridiques créant des

juridictions pénales internationales, à des exemples tirés de législations
nationales, ainsi qu'à la jurisprudence de juridictions internes et inter-
nationales.
La Belgique précise tout d'abord que des dispositions des instruments
créant des juridictions pénales internationales prévoient expressément
que la qualité officielle d'une personne n'est pas un obstaclea l'exercice
de leur compétence par ces juridictions.

Elle insiste également sur certaines décisions rendues par des juridic-
tions nationales et tout particulièrement sur les décisions rendues le
24 mars 1999 par la Chambre des lords du Royaume-Uni et le
13 mars 2001 par la Cour de cassation française, respectivement dans les
affaires Pinoclzetet Kudlzafi,dans lesquelles une exception à la règle de
I'immunitéaurait étéadmise en cas de crimes graves de droit internatio-
nal. Ainsi, selon la Belgique, la décisiPinochet reconnaît une exception
à la règlede I'immunitélorsque lord Millet dit qu'«on ne peut supposer

que le droit international aiinstituéun crime relevant du jus cogens tout
en prévoyant une immunité ayant la mêmeportée que l'obligation qu'il
cherche à imposer)), ou que lord Phillips of Worth Matravers expose
qu'<(aucune règle établie de droit international n'exige que I'immunité
d'un Etat ratione muteriae soit accordéedans le cadre de poursuites pour
crime international)). Quant a la Cour de cassation française, en décidant
que, «en l'état du droit international, le crime dénoncé[faits de terro-

risme], quelle qu'en soit la gravité, ne relèvepas des exceptions au prin-
cipe de I'immunitéde juridiction des chefs d'Etat étrangers en exercice)),
elle aurait reconnu explicitement, selon la Belgique, l'existence de telles
exceptions.
57. Le Congo soutient pour sa part que, en l'étatactuel du droit inter-
national, rien ne permet de soutenir qu'il existerait une quelconque
exception au principe de I'immunité pénaleabsolue du ministre des

affaires étrangères en exercice dans le cas où il serait accusé d'avoir
commis des crimes de droit international.
A l'appui de cette affirmation, le Congo se réfèreà la pratique des
Etats, examinant notamment A ce titre les affairePinoclzetet Kudhufi,
pour constater que cette pratique ne correspond pas à ce que la Belgique
prétend, mais consacre au contraire le caractère absolu de I'immunité
pénale des chefs d'Etat et des ministres des affaires étrangères. Ainsi,
s'agissant de la décisionPir~oclzetle Congo cite lord Browne-Wilkinson,

selon lequel l'«immunité dont jouit un chef d'Etat en fonction ou un
ambassadeur en exercice est une immunité totale liée a la personne du
chef d'Etat ou de l'ambassadeur et qui exclut toute action ou poursuite
judiciaire à son encontre...)). Selon le Congo, la Cour de cassation fran- 56. The Court will now address Belgium's argument that immunities
accorded to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affi~irscan in no case pro-
tect them where the:yare suspected of having coinmitted war crimes or
crimes against humanity. In support of this position, Belgium refers in its
Counter-Memorial 1:ovarious legal instruments creating international
criminal tribunals, to examples from national legislation, and to the juris-
prudence of national and international courts.

Belgium begins by pointing out that certain piovisions of the instru-
ments creating international criminal tribunals state expressly that the
officia1capacity of a person shall not be a bar to the exercise by such
tribunals of their jurisdiction.
Belgium also places emphasis on certain decisions of national courts,
and in particular on the judgments rendered on 24 March 1999 by the
House of Lords in the United Kingdom and on 13 March 2001 by the
Court of Cassation in France in the Pinochet ancl Qudduji cases respec-
tively, in which it cclntends that an exception to the immunity rule was
accepted in the case of serious crimes under inernational law. Thus,
according to Belgiurn, the Pinochet decision recognizes an exception to
the immunity rule when Lord Millett stated that "(ilnternational law can-
not be supposed to have established a crime having the character of a jus
cogens and at the saimetime to have provided an immunity which is co-
extensive with the obligation it seeks to impose", or when Lord Phillips
of Worth Matravers said that "no established rule of international law

requires state immuinity vatione muteriue to be t~ccordedin respect of
prosecution for an international crime". As to the French Court of Cas-
sation, Belgium contends that, in holding that, "under international law
as it currently stands, the crime alleged [acts of terrorism], irrespective of
its gravity,oes not come within the exceptions to the principle of immu-
nity from jurisdiction for incumbent foreign Heacls of State", the Court
explicitly recognized the existence of such exceptions.
57. The Congo, for its part, States that, under international law as it
currently stands, there is no basis for asserting tha there is any exception
to the principle ofabsolute immunity from crimin;tl process of an incum-
bent Minister for Foreign Affairs where he or she is accused of having
committed crimes under international law.
In support of this contention, the Congo refers to State practice, giving
particular consideration in this regard to thePinochet and Qudduji cases,
and concluding that such practice does not correspond to that which Bel-

gium claims but, on the contrary, confirms the ;~bsolutenature of the
immunity from criminal process of Heads of State and Ministers for For-
eign Affairs. Thus, in the Pinoclzet case, the Congo cites Lord Browne-
Wilkinson's statemenitthat "[tlhis immunity enjoycd by a head of state in
power and an ambasisador in post is a complete immunity attached to the
person of the head of state or ambassador and rendering him immune
from al1 actions or prosecutions . . .".Accordil~g to the Congo, the24 MANDAT D'ARRÊT (ARRÊT)

çaise aurait adoptéla même positiondans son arrêtKadhafien affirmant
que «la coutumeinternationale s'oppose àce que leschefs d'Etat en exer-
cice puissent, en l'absence de dispositions internationales contraires
s'imposant aux parties concernées,faire l'objet de poursuites devant les
juridictions pénalesd'un Etat étranger)).
Quant aux instruments créant des juridictions pénalesinternationales

et à la jurisprudence de ces dernières, ils ne concernent, selon le Congo.
que ces seulesjuridictions internationales et rien ne saurait en êtretiré en
ce qui concerne les actions pénalesdevant des juridictions nationales ii
l'encontre des personnes jouissant d'une immunité en vertu du droit
international.

58. La Cour a examiné avec soin lapratique des Etats, y compris les
législationsnationales et les quelques décisionsrendues par de hautes
juridictions nationales, telle la Chambre des lords ou la Cour de cassation
française. Elle n'est pas parvenueà déduire de cette pratique l'existence,
en droit international coutumier, d'une exception quelconque à la règle

consacrant l'immunité dejuridiction pénale et l'inviolabilité des ministres
des affaires étrangères en exercice, lorsqu'ils sont soupçonnés d'avoir
commis des crimes de guerre ou des crimes contre I'humanité.
La Cour a par ailleurs examinéles règlesafférentes à l'immunitéou à
la responsabilité pénale des personnes possédant une qualitéofficielle
contenues dans les instruments juridiques créant des juridictions pénales
internationales et applicables spécifiquement à celles-ci (voir statut du
Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg, art. 7; statut du Tribunal
militaire international de Tokyo, art.6; statut du Tribunal pénalinter-
national pour l'ex-Yougoslavie, art. 7, par. 2; statut du Tribunal pénal
international pour le Rwanda, art. 6,par. 2; statut de la Cour pénale
internationale, art. 27). Elle a constatéque ces règlesne lui permettaient
pas davantage de conclure à l'existence,en droit international coutumier,

d'une telle exception en ce qui concerne lesjuridictions nationales.
Enfin, aucune des décisions destribunaux militaires internationaux de
Nuremberg et de Tokyo, ainsi que du Tribunal pénalinternational pour
l'ex-Yougoslavie, que cite la Belgique ne traite de la question des immu-
nités des ministres des affairesétrangèresen exercice devant lesjuridic-
tions nationales lorsqu'ils sont accusésd'avoir commis des crimes de
guerre ou des crimes contre I'humanité. LaCour note, par conséquent,
que ces décisionsne contredisent en rien les constatations auxquelles elle
a procédéci-dessus.
Au vu de ce qui précède, laCour ne saurait donc accueillir I'argumen-
tation présentéepar la Belgique àcet égard.
59. Il convient en outre de relever que les règlesgouvernant la compé-
tence des tribunaux nationaux et celles régissantles immunités juridic-

tionnelles doivent êtresoigneusement distinguées: la compétence n'im-
plique pas l'absence d'immunitéet l'absence d'immunitén'implique pasFrench Court of Cassation adopted the same position in its Qudduj judg-
ment, in affirming that "international custom birs the prosecution of
incumbent Heads of State, in the absence of any contrary international
provision binding on the parties concerned, beforc:the criminal courts of
a foreign State".
As regards the instruments creating internaticmal criminal tribunals
and the latter's jurisprudence, these, in the Congo's view, concern only

those tribunals, and no inference can be drawn from them in regard to
criminal proceedingij before national courts against persons enjoying
immunity under international law.

58. TheCourt has carefully examined State practice, including national
legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the
House of Lords or the French Court of Cassation. It has been unable to
deduce from this practice that there exists under clstomary international
law any form of exception to the rule according irilmunity from criminal
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministcrs for Foreign Affairs,
where they are susgected of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity.
The Court has also examined the rules conceining the immunity or

criminal responsibility of persons having an officia1capacity contained in
the legal instruments creating international criminiil tribunals, and which
are specifically applicable to the latter (seeChartlx of the International
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Art. 7; Charter of the International
Military Tribunal of Tokyo, Art. 6; Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para. Z; Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6, para. 2; Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Art. 27). It finds tliat these rules likewise
do not enable it to conclude that any such an exception exists in custom-
ary international law in regard to national courts.
Finally, none of the decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo interna-
tional military tribunals, or of the lnternational Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, cited by Belgium deal with the question of the
immunities of incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs before national
courts where they are accused of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity. The Court accordingly notes tliat those decisions are

in no way at variance with the findings it has reached above.

In view of the foregoing, the Court accordingly cannot accept Bel-
gium's argument in this regard.
59. It should further be noted that the rules go\ erning the jurisdiction
of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing
jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not irriply absence of immu-
nity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus,la compétence.C'est ainsi que, si diverses conventions internationales ten-
dant à la préventionet à la répressionde certains crimes graves ont mis à
la charge des Etats des obligations de poursuite ou d'extradition, et leur
ont fait par suite obligation d'étendre leur compétence juridictionnelle,
cette extension de compétence ne porte en rien atteinte aux immunités
résultant du droit international coutumier, et notamment aux immunités
des ministres des affaires étrangères. Celles-ci demeurent opposables
devant les tribunaux d'un Etat étranger, mêmelorsque ces tribunaux
exercent une telle compétencesur la base de ces conventions.
60. La Cour souligne toutefois que l'immunitéde juridiction dont

bénéficieun ministre des affaires étrangèresen exercice ne signifie pas
qu'il bénéficied'une impuniti. au titre de crimes qu'il aurait pu com-
mettre, quelle que soit leur gravité.Immunitédejuridiction pénale etres-
ponsabilitépénale individuellesont des concepts nettement distincts. Alors
que I'immunitéde juridiction revêt uncaractère procédural, la responsa-
bilité pénale touche au fond du droit. L'immunité de juridiction peut
certes faire obstacle aux poursuites pendant un certain temps ou a l'égard
de certaines infractions; ellene saurait exonérerla personne qui en bénéficie
de toute responsabilité pénale.
61. Les immunitésdont bénéficie en droit international un ministre ou
un ancien ministre des affaires étrangèresne font en effet pas obstacle à
ce que leur responsabilité pénale soit recherchéedans certaines circons-
tances.
Ils ne bénéficient,en premier lieu, en vertu du droit international
d'aucune immunitédejuridiction pénaledans leur propre pays et peuvent
par suite êtretraduits devant les juridictions de ce pays conformément

aux règlesfixéesen droit interne.
En deuxièmelieu, ils ne bénéficientplus de I'immunitéde juridiction a
l'étranger si 1'Etat qu'ils représentent ou ont représenté décide delever
cette immunité.
En troisième lieu, des lors qu'une personne a cesséd'occuper la fonc-
tion de ministre des affaires étrangères,elle ne bénéficie plde la totalité
des immunitésde juridiction que lui accordait le droit international dans
les autres Etats. A condition d'êtrecompétentselon ledroit international,
un tribunal d'un Etat peut juger un ancien ministre des affaires étran-
gèresd'un autre Etat au titre d'actes accomplis avant ou après la période
pendant laquelle il a occupéces fonctions, ainsi qu'au titre d'actes qui,
bien qu'accomplis durant cette période, l'ont étéa titre privé.
En quatrième lieu, un ministre des affaires étrangèresou un ancien mi-
nistre des affaires étrangères peut faire l'objet de poursuites pénales
devant certaines juridictions pénalesinternationales dèslors que celles-ci
sont compétentes.Le Tribunal pénalinternational pour l'ex-Yougoslavie

et le Tribunal pénalinternational pour le Rwanda, établispar des réso-
lutions du Conseil de sécuritéadoptéesen application du chapitre VI1de
la Charte des Nations Unies, ainsi que la future Cour pénaleinternatio-
nale instituéepar la convention de Rome de 1998,en sont des exemples.
Le statut de cette dernière prévoit expressément,au paragraphe 2 dg sonalthough various international conventions or the prevention and
punishment of certain serious crimes impose or States obligations of
prosecution or extraclition,thereby requiring them to extend their criminal
jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities
under customary international law, including those of Ministers for
Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before he courts of a foreign
State, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under
these conventions.

60. The Court emphasizes, however, that the i~nmunity from jurisdic-
tion enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean
that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have com-
mitted, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction
and individual crimiinal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While
jurisdictional immuriity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility
is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional i~nmunity may well bar
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannotexoner-
ate the person to whom it applies from al1criminal responsibility.

61. Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under Bnternationallaw by an
incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar
to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.

First,such persoris enjoy no criminal immunity under international

law in their own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries'
courts in accordance with the relevant rules of dcmestic law.

Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity frorn foreignjurisdiction if
the State which they represent or have represente~ldecides to waive that
immunity.
Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the officeof Minister for Foreign
Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy al1of the iinmunities accorded by
international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under
international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for
Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or
subsequent to his oir her period of office, as we 1as in respect of acts
committed during that period of office in a private capacity.

Fourthly, an incurnbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be

subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal
courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples inAude the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant to Security Council
resolutions under Clnapter VI1 of the United Nations Charter, and the
future International Criminal Court created by tl-e 1998 Rome Conven-
tion. The latter's Statute expressly provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2,
that "[i]mmunities or special procedural rules wliich may attach to the26 MANDAT D'ARRET (ARRÊT)

article 27, que «les immunités ou règles de procédure spéciales qui
peuvent s'attacher à la qualité officielle d'une personne, en vertu du
droit interne ou du droit international, n'empêchent pasla Cour d'exercer
sa compétence à l'égard de cettepersonnep.

62. Compte tenu des conclusions auxquelles la Cour est parvenue ci-
dessus quant à la nature età la portéedes règlesafférentes àl'immunité
de juridiction pénale des ministres des affairesétrangèresen exercice, il
lui fautà présent examinersi, dans le cas d'espèce, l'émissidu mandat
d'arrêtdu 11avril 2000et la diffusion de celui-ci sur le plan international
ont contrevenu à ces règles.La Cour rappelle en effet qu'aux termes de sa
première conclusion finalele Congo la prie de dire et juger:

«Que, en émettant et en diffusant internationalement le mandat
d'arrêt du 11 avril 2000 délivréà charge de M. Abdulaye Yerodia
Ndombasi, la Belgique a violé,à l'encontre de la Républiquedémo-
cratique du Congo, la règlede droit international coutumier relative
à l'inviolabilité et l'immunité pénalaebsolues des ministres des af-
faires étrangèresen fonction; que, ce faisant, elle a porté atteinte au
principe de l'égalitsouveraine entre les Etats.

63. A l'appui de cette conclusion, le Congo affirme que le mandat
d'arrêt du 11avril 2000 constitue comme tel un «acte iuridiaue coercitifii
portant atteinteà l'immunitéet aux droits souverains du Congo, dans la
mesure où il vise à ((soumettre à un pouvoir juridictionnel répressif
interne un gouvernant étranger qui lui échappeen principe)) et est exé-
cutoire de plein droit et sans formalitéparticulière en Belgique.
Le Congo considère que la simple émission dece mandat constituait
ainsi un acte de contrainte dirigécontre la personne de M. Yerodia,
mêmeen l'absence d'exécution.
64. Quant à la diffusion internationale dudit mandat d'arrêt,ellea non

seulement, selon le Congo, emporté de nouvelles violations des règlessus-
mentionnées,mais a en outre aggravéle préjudicemoral qu'il a subi, en
raison de l'opprobre «ainsi jetésur'un des membres les plus éminentsde
son gouvernement)). Le Congo fait valoir de surcroît qu'une telle diffu-
sion a fondamentalement porté atteinte à ses droits souverains en ce
qu'elle a considérablement limitéle libre et plein exercice, par son mi-
nistre des affaires étrangères,des fonctions de négociationinternationale
et de représentationdont il s'étaitvu confierla charge par l'ancienprésident
du Congo. Selon lui, la Belgique «exprime[rait] [ainsi]l'intention de voir
la personne concernéearrêtéelà où elle se trouve, en vue d'obtenir son
extradition)). Le Congo souligne par ailleurs qu'il convient d'évitertoute
confusion entre lesarguments relatifs l'effet juridiquedu mandat d'arrêt
à l'étranger et laquestion de la responsabilité desEtats tiers lui donnant

effet.Iexpose àce sujet qu'aucun Etat n'a donnésuite au mandat d'arrêt
et qu'il ne convient dèslors pas de ((s'interroger plus avant sur lan-official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law,
shall not bar the Court from exercising its ju-isdiction over such a
person".

62. Given the conclusions it has reached above concerning the nature
and scope of the rules governing the immunity frcm criminal jurisdiction
enjoyed by incumberit Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Court must now
consider whether in the present case the issue 01' the arrest warrant of

11 April 2000 and ils international circulation violated those rules. The
Court recalls in this regard that the Congo requests it, in its first final
submission, to adjuclge and declare that:
"[Bly issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium
committed a violation in regard to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo of the rule of customary internatior~al law concerning the

absolute inviolability and immunity from crirlinal process of incum-
bent foreign ministers; in so doing, it viclated the principle of
sovereign equaliity among States."
63. In support of this submission, the Congo maintains that the arrest
warrant of II April 2000 as such represents a "ccercive legal act" which
violates the Congo's immunity and sovereign righis, inasmuch as it seeks
to "subject to an organ of domestic criminal juri:diction a member of a

foreign government who is in principle beyond its reach" and is fully
enforceable without special formality in Belgium.
The Congo consiclers that the mere issuance of the warrant thus con-
stituted a coercive measure taken against the persan of Mr. Yerodia, even
if it was not executed.
64. As regards the international circulation of he said arrest warrant,
this, in the Congo's view, not only involved further violations of the rules
referred to above, but also aggravated the moral injury which it suffered
as a result of the opprobrium "thus cast upon one of the most prominent
members of its Government". The Congo further argues that such circu-
lation was a fundaniental infringement of its sokereign rights in that it
significantly restricted the full and free exercise,ty its Minister for For-
eign Affairs, of the international negotiation and representation func-
tions entrusted to him by the Congo's former Prcsident. In the Congo's
view, Belgium "[thus] manifests an intention to h.tve the individual con-
cerned arrested at the place where he is to be fouiid, with a view to pro-

curing his extraditilon". The Congo emphasizej moreover that it is
necessary to avoid any confusion between the arguments concerning the
legal effect of theari-estwarrant abroad and the ciuestion of any respon-
sibility of the foreign authorities giving effect to it.It points out in this
regard that no State has acted on the arrest warrart, and that accordinglysabilité spécifiquequi pourrait en résulter dans le chef de 1'Etatqui I'exé-
cute, ni sur la manière dont celle-ci devrait s'articuler)) avec celle de I'Etat
belge. Le Congo observe que, dans une telle hypothèse, «il y [aurait] une
relation causale immédiate entre le mandat d'arrêtdélivréen Belgique et
l'acte d'exécutionqui serait [opéré]ailleurs)).

65. La Belgique rejette l'argumentation du Congo au motif que «la
nature du mandat d'arrêtdu 11 avril 2000 [serait] telle [que celui-ci] n'a ni
violé lasouveraineté [du Congo] ni crééaucune obligation pour [ce der-
nier]».
S'agissant des effets juridiques du mandat d'arrêtdu 11 avril 2000 en
droit belge, la Belgique expose que l'objet manifeste du mandat était

d'obtenir que, dans le cas ou M. Yerodia serait trouvé en Belgique, I'inté-
ressésoit détenupar les autorités belges compétentes, aux fins de le pour-
suivre Dour crimes de euL-re et crimes contre l'humanité. Selon elle. le
juge d'instruction belge aurait toutefois clairement distingué dans le man-
dat entre, d'une part, immunité de juridiction et, d'autre part, immunité
d'exécutionpour les représentants d'Etats étrangersvisitant la Belgique à
la suite d'une invitation officielle, en précisant que ces personnes seraient

à l'abri de l'exécutiond'un mandat d'arrêt en Belgique. La Belgique pré-
tend également que, par ses effets, le mandat d'arrêt en cause revêtun
caractère national puisqu'il exige I'arrestation deM. Yerodia, si celui-ci
devait se trouver en Belgique, mais qu'il n'a pas un tel effet à l'étranger.

66. Pour ce qui a trait aux effets juridiques du mandat d'arrêthors de

la Belgique, celle-cisoutient que lemandat n'impose aux autorités d'aucun
autre Etat une quelconque obligation d'arrêter M. Yerodia en l'absence
d'une démarche supplémentaire de la Belgique consistant à compléter ou
valider le mandat d'arrêt(sous la forme par exemple d'une demande de
mise en détention provisoire de M. Yerodia),ou de l'émission d'unman-
dat d'arrêt par les autorités compétentes de 1'Etat concerné à la suite
d'une demande en ce sens, ou encore de la diffusion d'une notice rouge

d'Interpol. Dès lors, en dehors de la Belgique, l'objet du mandat aurait
certes été((d'établirune base juridique pour I'arrestation dM. Yerodia ...
ainsi que [pour] son extradition ultérieure vers la Belgique)),mais le man-
dat n'aurait eu d'effet juridique que s'il avait étéassorti d'un acte préa-
lable ((exigeant I'arrestation deM. Yerodia ... par les autorités compé-
tentes dans un Etat tiers)).La Belgique fait valoir par ailleurs que, «si un

Etat avait exécutéle mandat d'arrêt,il aurait, peut-être,porté atteinte à
l'immunitépénalede M. Yerodia)), mais que (tl'auteur direct de l'atteinte
aurait été cetEtat [et] non la Belgique)).

67. La Cour rappellera tout d'abord que le «mandat d'arrêtinterna-
tional par défaut)),délivréle11 avril 2000 par un juge d'instruction prèsle
tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, vise M. Yerodia en précisant ARREST WARRANT (JUDGMENT) 27

"no further consideration need be given to the specific responsibility
which a State executing it might incur, or to tlie way in which that
responsibility should be related" to that of the Belgian State. The Congo
observes that, in such circumstances, "there [woiild bel a direct causal

relationship between the arrest warrant issued in Relgium and any act of
enforcement carried out elsewhere".
65. Belgium rejects the Congo's argument on the ground that "the
character of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 is :;uchthat it has neither
infringed the sovereignty of, nor created any obligation for, the [Congo]".

With regard to the legal effects under Belgian la~vof the arrest warrant
of 11 April 2000, Belgium contends that the clear purpose of the warrant
was to procure that, if found in Belgium, Mr. Yerctdia would be detained
by the relevant Belgian authorities with a view to bis prosecution for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. According to Belgium, the Belgian

investigating judge did, however, draw an explicit distinction in the war-
rant between, on the one hand, inlmunity from j~irisdiction and, on the
other hand, immuniity from enforcement as regards representatives of
foreign States who visit Belgium on the basis of an official invitation,
making it clear that such persons would be immune from enforcement of
an arrest warrant in Belgium. Belgium further coniends that, in its effect,

the disputed arrest warrant is national in charactcr, since it requires the
arrest of Mr. Yerodia if he is found in Belgium b~t it does not have this
effect outside Belgiurn.
66. In respect of thielegal effects of the arrest warrant outside Belgium,
Belgium maintains that the warrant does not creite any obligation for
the authorities of any other State to arrest Mr. Ye*.odiain the absence of

some further step by Belgium completing or validating the arrest warrant
(such as a request for the provisional detention O 'Mr. Yerodia), or the
issuing of an arrest warrant by the appropriate authorities in the State
concerned following a request to do so, or the issuing of an Interpol Red
Notice. Accordingly, outside Belgium, while the Furpose of the warrant

was admittedly "to establish a legal basis for the arvest of Mr. Yerodia . . .
and his subsequent extradition to Belgium", the warrant had no legal
effect unless it was validated or completed by sonie prior act "requiring
the arrest of Mr. Yerodia by the relevant authorities in a third State".
Belgium further argues that "[ilf a State had executed the arrest warrant,
it might infringe Mr. [Yerodia's] criminal immunit q",but that "the Party

directly responsible for that infringement would have been that State and
not Belgium".

67. The Court will first recall that the "international arrest warrant
in cth.serztinissued on 11 April 2000 by an investigating judge of the
Brussels Tribunal de première instance, is directec against Mr. Yerodia,que celui-ciest ((actuellement ministre des affairesétrangères dela Répu-
blique démocratique du Congo, ayant sa résidence professionnelle au
ministère des affaires étrangères à Kinshasa)). Le mandat indique que
M. Yerodia est inculpé,«comme auteur ou coauteur)), de:

((- Crimes de droit international constituant des infractions graves
portant atteinte par action ou omission aux personnes et aux
biens protégés par les conventions signées à Genève le
12 août 1949 et par les protocoles 1 et II additionnels à ces
conventions (article 1, paragraphe 3, de la loi du 16juin 1993
modifiéepar la loi du 10février1999relative à la répression des
violations graves de droit international humanitaire)
- Crimes contre l'humanité (article 1, paragraphe 2, de la loi du

16juin 1993modifiéepar la loi du 10février1999relative à la
répression desviolations graves de droit international humani-
taire).
Le mandat fait étatde ((différentsdiscours incitant à la haine raciale)) et

de ((propos particulièrement virulents))que M. Yerodia aurait tenus lors
d'«interventions publiques relayéespar les médias))en date des 4 août et
27 août 1998.Il y est ajoutéce qui suit:
Ces discours auraient eu pour effet d'inciter lapopulationà s'en

prendre aux résidents tutsi de Kinshasa: il fut question d'opérations
de ratissage, de chasseà l'homme (l'ennemi tutsi), de scènesde lyn-
chage.
Les discours incitant à la haine raciale auraient ainsi eu pour
résultatla mort de plusieurs centaines de personnes et l'internement
de Tutsi, des exécutionssommaires, des arrestations arbitraires et
des procès injustes.)

68. Il est dit en outre dans le mandat que «la qualité deministre des
affaires étrangères quepossède à l'heure actuelle l'inculpén'entraîne pas
d'immunité de juridiction et d'exécution>).Le juge d'instruction observe
toutefois dans le mandat que ((la réglede l'absence d'immunitéen droit
humanitaire ...paraît devoir connaître un tempérament sur le plan de
l'immunité d'exécution)e )t explique ce qui suit:

((En vertu du principe généralde loyauté del'action de la justice,
une immunitéd'exécutiondoit être, à notre sens, reconnue à tout
représentant d'un Etat qui est accueilli sur le territoire belge en tant
que tel (en ((visite officielle))). L'accueil d'une telle personnalité
étrangèreen tant que représentant officiel d'un Etat souverain met
en jeu non seulement des relations entre individus mais également
des relations entre Etats. Dans cet ordre d'idées,il inclutI'engage-
ment de 1'Etat accueillant et de ses différentescomposantes de ne

prendre aucune mesure coercitive à l'égard deson hôte et cette invi-
tation ne pourrait devenir le prétexte pour faire tomber l'intéressé
dans ce qui devrait alors êtrequalifié deguet-apens. Dans I'hypo- ARREST WARRANT (JUDGMENT) 28

stating that he is "currently Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, having his business ziddressat the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Kinshasa". The warrant statrs that Mr. Yerodia is
charged with being "the perpetrator or CO-perpetritor" of:

"- Crimes under international law constiiuting grave breaches
causing harm by act or omission to perssns and property pro-
tected by the Conventions signed at Geni:va on 12August 1949
and by Additional Protocols 1 and II to those Conventions
(Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Law of 16.lune 1993,as amended
by the Law of 10 February 1999concerning the punishment of
serious violations of international humaiiitarian law)

- Crimes against humanity (Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Law of
16June 1993,as amended by the Law of 10February 1999con-
cerning the punishment of serious violations of international
humanitarian law)."

The warrant refers to "various speeches inciting racial hatred" and to
"particularly virulent remarks" allegedly made b:~ Mr. Yerodia during
"public addresses reported by the media" on 4 August and 27 August
1998. It adds:

"These speeches allegedly had the effect of inciting the population
to attack Tutsi residents of Kinshasa: there were dragnet searches,
manhunts (the Tutsi enemy) and lynchings.

The speeches inciting racial hatred thus arc:said to have resulted
in several hundred deaths, the internment of 7utsis, summary execu-
tions, arbitrary arrests and unfair trials."

68. The warrant fiirther states that "the position of Minister for For-
eign Affairs currently held by the accused does not entai1immunity from
jurisdiction and enfc)rcement". The investigating judge does, however,
observe in the warrant that "the rule concerning the absence of immunity
under humanitarian law would appear . . to reqiiire some qualification
in respect of immuni ty from enforcement" and exAains as follows :

"Pursuant to the general principle of fairnt ss in judicial proceed-
ings, immunity from enforcement must, in Our view, be accorded to
al1State representatives welcomed as such onco the territory of Bel-
gium (on 'officia1 visits'). Welcoming such foreign dignitaries as
official representatives of sovereign States i~ivolvesnot only rela-
tions between individuals but also relations between States. This
implies that suchiwelcome includes an undertaking by the host State
and its various components to refrain froni taking any coercive

measures against its guest and the invitation cannot become a pre-
text for ensnaring the individual concerned in what would then have
to be labelled a trap. In the contrary case, failure to respect this thèse contraire, le non-respect de cet engagement pourrait entraîner
la responsabilité de 1'Etat hôte sur le plan international. »

69. Le mandat d'arrêts'achèvesur l'injonction suivante:
((Mandons et ordonnons à tous huissiers de justice et agents de la

force publique à ce requis de mettre le présentmandat d'arrêtà exé-
cution et de conduire l'inculpéà la maison d'arrêtde Forest;
Enjoignons au directeur de la prison de recevoir I'inculpé(e)et de
le (la) garder dans la maison d'arrêten vertu du présent mandat
d'arrêt;
Requérons tous dépositaires de la force publique, auxquels le pré-

sent mandat sera exhibé,de prêter main-forte à son exécution.»
70. La Cour note que l'&missiondu mandat d'arrêtlitigieux, comme

telle, constitue un acte de l'autoritéjudiciaire belge ayant vocation à per-
mettre l'arrestation, sur le territoire belge, d'un ministre des affaires étran-
gèresen exercice inculpéde crimes de guerre et de crimes contre I'huma-
nité.Le caractére exécutoiredu mandat ressort clairement de l'injonction
adressée <(àtous huissiers de justice et agents de la force publique ..de
mettre le présent mandat d'arrêtà exécution)) (voir paragraphe 69 ci-
dessus), ainsi que de l'affirmation, faite dans le mandat, quela qualité de

ministre des affaires étrangèresque possède à l'heure actuelle l'inculpé
n'entraîne pas d'immunité dejuridiction et d'exécution)). LaCour observe
certes que le cas de visite officielle de M. Yerodia en Belgique a été
réservédans le cadre dudit mandat, et que M. Yerodia n'a fait l'objet
d'aucune arrestation en Belgique. Elledoit toutefois constaterque,compte
tenu de la nature et de l'objet du mandat, la seule émission de celui-ci
portait atteinte à l'immunitéde M. Yerodia en sa qualité de ministre des

affaires étrangèresen exercice du Congo. La Cour en conclut que I'émis-
sion dudit mandat a constitué une violation d'une obligation de la Bel-
gique a l'égard du Congo, en ce qu'elle a méconnu l'immunité de ce
ministre et, plus particulièrement, violél'immunité dejuridiction pénaleet
l'inviolabilitédont il jouissait alors en vertu du droit international.
71. La Cour constate égalementque la Belgique reconnaît que la diffu-
sion sur le plan international du mandat d'arrêtlitigieux avait pour objet

((d'établir une base juridique pour l'arrestation de M. Yerodia ... a
l'étranger ainsique [pour] son extradition ultérieure versla Belgique)). La
Partie défenderessesoutient toutefois que l'exécutiondudit mandat dans
des Etats tiers aurait«dépend[u] de l'existence d'autres démarches préli-
minaires)) et que, étant donné le caractère c<incomplet>> du mandat à
l'égard desEtats tiers, iln'y aurait pas eu «violation de la souveraineté
[du Congo])). Elle souligne en outre qu'une notice rouge n'a étédeman-
déea Interpol que le 12 septembre 2001, à un moment où M. Yerodia

n'était plus ministre.
La Cour ne saurait partager ce point de vue. Comme dans le cas de
l'émissiondu mandat, la diffusion de celui-ci dès juin 2000 par les auto-
ritésbelges sur le plan international, compte tenu de sa nature et de son undertaking could give rise to the host State':. international respon-
sibility."

69. The arrest warrant concludes with the following order

"We instruct and order al1bailiffs and ageiits of public authority
who may be so required to execute this arrest warrant and to con-
duct the accused to the detention centre in Forest;

We order the warden of the prison to receive the accused and to
keep him (her) in custody in the detention c:ntre pursuant to this
arrest warrant;
We require al1those exercising public authority to whom this war-
rant shall be shown to lend al1assistance in e~ecuting it."

70. The Court notes that the issuance, as such, of the disputed arrest
warrant represents ari act by the Belgian judicial kuthorities intended to

enable the arrest on Belgian territory of an incuml~ent Minister for For-
eign Affairs on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
fact that the warrant is enforceable is clearly apparent from the order
given to "al1 bailiffs and agents of public authority . . . to execute this
arrest warrant" (see paragraph 69 above) and fron the assertion in the
warrant that "the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs curreritly held

by the accused does not entai1 iminunity from jurisdiction and enforce-
ment". The Court notes that the warrant did admittedly make an excep-
tion for the case of a11officia1visit by Mr. Yerodi;,.to Belgium, and that
Mr. Yerodia never suffered arrest in Belgium. The Court is bound, how-
ever, to find that, given the nature and purpose of'the warrant, its mere
issue violated the imrnunity which Mr. Yerodia eiijoyed as the Congo's

incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court accordingly con-
cludes that the issue csfthe warrant constituted a lriolation of an obliga-
tion of Belgiuin towards the Congo, in that it faileclto respect the immu-
nity of that Minister and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from
criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then eîjoyed by him under
international law.

71. The Court also notes that Belgium admit: that the purpose of
the international circ~ulutionof the disputed arrest ~varrant was "to estab-
lish a legal basis for the arrest of Mr. Yerodia .. .abroad and his subse-
quent extradition to Belgium". The Respondent maintains, however,
that the enforcement of the warrant in third Statr:s was "dependent on
some further prelimiiiary steps having been taken" and that, given the

"inchoate" quality of the warrant as regards thirci States, there was no
"infringe[ment of] thie sovereignty of the [Cong~~]".It further points
out that no Interpol Red Notice was requestetl until 12 September
2001, when Mr. Yeraldia no longer held ministerial office.

The Court cannot subscribe to this view. As ir the case of the war-

rant's issue, its interriational circulation fromJuni: 2000 by the Belgian
authorities, given its nature and purpose, effectively infringed Mr. Yero-30 MANDAT D'ARRÊT (ARRET)

objet, portait en effet atteinte à l'immunitédont M. Yerodia jouissait en
tant que ministre des affaires étrangèresen exercice du Congo et étaitde
surcroît susceptible d'affecter la conduite par le Congo de ses relations
internationales. L'intéresseétant appelé,en cette qualité, à entreprendre

des voyages dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, la seule diffusion du mandat
sur le plan international, en l'absence même((d'autres démarches))de la
part de la Belgique, aurait pu en particulier conduire i son arrestation
lors d'un déplacement à l'étranger. La Cour observe à cet égard que la
Belgique elle-mêmefait état d'une information selon laquelle M. Yerodia
((aurait appris, lors d'une demande de visa pour se rendre dans deux

pays, qu'il risquait d'êtrearrêtéen raison du mandat d'arrêt lancécontre
lui par la Belgique)) et qu'elle a ajouté que «[c]'est d'ailleurs ce que [le
Congo] ..laisse entendre lorsqu'[il] écritque le mandat d'arrêt a obligé
<(leministre Yerodia ... à emprunter des voies parfois moins directes pour
voyager)). Par voie de conséquence, la Cour conclut que la diffusion
dudit mandat, qu'elle ait ou non entravé en fait l'activitédiplomatique de

M. Yerodia, a constitué une violation d'une obligation de la Belgique à
l'égarddu Congo, en ce qu'elle a méconnu l'immunitédu ministre des
affaires étrangèresen exercice du Congo et, plus particulièrement, violé
l'immunitéde juridiction pénale et l'inviolabilitédont iljouissait alors en
vertu du droit international.

72. La Cour se penchera maintenant sur la question de la réparation
demandée par le Congo en raison de la violation, par la Belgique, des
règles de droit international susvisées. Aux termes des deuxième, troi-

sième et quatrième conclusions du Congo, la Cour est priéede dire et
juger :
«Que la constatation solennelle par la Cour du caractère illicite

[de l'émission et de la diffusion internationale du mandat d'arrêt]
constitue une forme adéquate de satisfaction permettant de réparer
le dommage moral qui en découle dans le chef de la République
démocratique du Congo;
Que les violations du droit international dont procèdent l'émission
et la diffusion internationale du mandat d'arrêt du 11 avril 2000

interdisent à tout Etat, en ce compris la Belgique, d'y donner suite;
Que la Belgique est tenue de retirer et mettre à néant le mandat
d'arrêt du 11 avril 2000 et de faire savoir auprès des autorités étran-
gères auxquelles ledit mandat fut diffusé qu'elle renonce à solliciter
leur coopération pour l'exécutionde ce mandat illicite. >)

73. A l'appui desdites conclusions, le Congo fait valoir que le fait qu'il
ait été misfin aux fonctions officielles de M. Yerodia n'a nullement eu
pour conséquence d'effacer le fait illicite et le dommage qui en découle,

lesquels demeurent. Il expose que le mandat est illicite uh initio que
«[s]on vice est radical)), et qu'il ne saurait dès lors produire aujourd'huidia's immunity as tht: Congo's incumbent Ministcr for Foreign Affairs
and was furthermore liable to affect the Congo's conduct of its interna-
tional relations. Since:Mr. Yerodia was called upon in that capacity to
undertake travel in the performance of his duties, ihe mere international
circulation of the warrant, even in the absence of "further steps" by Bel-

gium, could have resiilted, in particular, in his arrest while abroad. The
Court observes in this respect that Belgium itself cites information to the
effect that Mr. Yerodia, "on applying for a visa tcl go to two countries,
[apparently] learned that he ran the risk of being arrested as a result of
the arrest warrant issued against him by Belgium", adding that "[tlhis,
moreover, is what the [Congo] . . . hints when it writes that the arrest

warrant 'sometimes forced Minister Yerodia to travel by roundabout
routes"'. Accordingly, the Court concludes that ihe circulation of the
warrant, whether or not it significantly interfered with Mr. Yerodia's dip-
lomatic activity, con:;tituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium
towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the inimunity of the incum-
bent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly,
infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability

then enjoyed by him i~nderinternational law.

72. The Court will i~owaddress the issue of the rcmedies sought by the
Congo on account of Belgium's violation of the above-mentioned rules of
international law. In its second, third and fourth submissions, the Congo
requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:

"A formal finding by the Court of the unlawfulness of [the issue
and international circulation of the arrest w;irrant] constitutes an
appropriate form of satisfaction, providing reparation for the con-
sequent moral injury to the Democratic Repu1)lic of the Congo;

The violations of international law underlyirig the issue and inter-
national circulation of the arrest warrant of 1 April 2000 preclude
any State. including Belgium, from executing it;
Belgium shall be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant
of 11 April 2000 and to inform the foreign authorities to whom the
warrant was circiilated that Belgium renouncez its request for their

co-operation in executing the unlawful warrant."
73. In support of tl-iosesubmissions, the Congo :isserts that the termi-
nation of the official duties of Mr. Yerodia in no way operated to efface

the wrongful act and the injury flowing from it, which continue to exist.
It argues that the warrant is unlawful al?initio, that "[ilt is fundamentally
flawed" and that it carinot therefore have any legal i:ffect today. It points31 MANDAT D'ARRÊT (ARRÊT)

aucun effet de droit. Le Congo observe que sa demande a pour objet la
réparation du dommage causé, réparation qui imposerait que soit res-
tauré l'étatqui aurait selon toute probabilité existési ce fait n'avait pas
étécommis. Il préciseque, dans la mesure où le fait illicite consistait en

un actejuridique interne, seul le «retrait» et la((miseà néant» de celui-ci
pourraient dès lors constituer une réparation appropriée.
Le Congo souligne par ailleurs qu'il ne demande nullement à la Cour
de procéder elle-mêmeau retrait ou à la mise à néant du mandat, ni de
déterminer le moyen par lequel la Belgique devrait se conformer à son
arrêt.Il explique qu'un tel retrait et qu'une telle mise à néantdu mandat,

par les moyens que la Belgique estimera les plus appropriés, «ne consti-
tue[raient] pas des moyens d'exécution de l'arrêtde la Cour mais la
mesure mêmede réparation-restitution juridique en nature sollicitée)).Le
Congo soutient que, par voie de conséquence, la Cour est seulement priée
de dire que la Belgique, au titre de la réparation du dommage causé aux
droits du Congo, est tenue de procéder, par le moyen de son choix, au

retrait et à la mise à néant dece mandat d'arrêt.
74. La Belgique estime quant à elle que l'éventuelleconstatation, par
la Cour. d'une violation de l'immunité dont bénéficiait M. Yerodia en
tant que ministre des affaires étrangèresn'implique aucunement qu'il y
ait lieu d'annuler le mandat d'arrêt.Elle expose que ce dernier continue à
produire ses effets et que «[r]ien n'indique qu'il porte aujourd'hui atteinte

à l'immunitédu ministre des affaires étrangères))du Congo. La Belgique
considère que ce que sollicite en réalitéle Congo par ses troisième et qua-
trième conclusions c'est que la Cour dicte à la Belgique la manière dont
celle-ci devrait donner effet à un arrêt dela Cour constatant que le man-
dat d'arrêt a violé l'immunité du ministre des affaires étrangères du
Congo.

75. La Cour a déjà conclu ci-dessus (voir paragraphes 70 et 71) que
l'émissionet la diffusion, par les autorités belges, du mandat d'arrêtdu
11 avril 2000 avaient méconnu l'immunitédu ministre des affaires étran-
gèresen exercice du Congo et, plus particulièrement, violél'immunitéde
juridiction pénale et l'inviolabilité dont jouissait alors M. Yerodia en
vertu du droit international. Ces actes ont engagé la responsabilité inter-

nationale de la Belgique. La Cour estime que les conclusions auxquelles
elle est ainsi parvenue constituerit une forme de satisfaction permettant
de réparer le dommage moral dont se plaint le Congo.
76. Cependant, ainsi que la Cour permanente de Justice internationale
l'a dit dans son arrêtdu 13 septembre 1928 en l'affaire relative à l'Usine
de Cltorz(j~t,

«[l]e principe essentiel, qui découlede la notion mêmed'acte illicite
et qui semble se dégagerde la pratique internationale, notamment de
la jurisprudence des tribunaux arbitraux, est que la réparation doit,

autant que possible, effacer toutes les conséquences de l'acte illicite ARREST WARRANT (JUDGMENT) 31

out that the purpose of its request is reparation for the injury caused,
requiring the restoration of the situation which would in al1probability

have existed if the said act had not been comnitted. It States that,
inasmuch as the wrongful act consisted in an intr:rnal legal instrument,
only the "withdrawal" and "cancellation" of the latter can provide appro-
priate reparation.
The Congo further emphasizes that in no way is it asking the Court
itself to withdraw or cancel the warrant, nor to determine the means

whereby Belgium is tcscomply wit1.iits decision. It :xplains that the with-
drawal and cancellation of the warrant, by the means that Belgium deems
most suitable. "are riot means of enforcement oi' the judgment of the
Court but the requeijted measure of legal repara ion/restitution itself".
TheCongo maintains that the Court is consequently only being requested

to declare that Belgium, by way of reparation for ihe injury to the rights
of the Congo, be recluired to withdraw and canc~:lthis warrant by the
means of its choice.

74. Belgium for its part maintains that a findinp by the Court that the
immunity enjoyed by Mr. Yerodia as Miriister for Foreign Affairs had

been violated would in no way entai1 an obligaticn to cancel the arrest
warrant. It points out that the arrest warrant is s il1operative and that
"there is no suggestion that it presently infringes the immunity of the
Congo's Minister for Foreign Affairs". Belgium considers that what the
Congo is in reality asking of the Court in its third and fourth final sub-

missions is that the Court should direct Belgium as to the method by
which it should give effect to a judgment of the Court finding that the
warrant had infringecl the immunity of the Congo'; Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

75. The Court has already concluded (see parapraphs 70 and 71) that

the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 by the
Belgian authorities failed to respect the immunity c<fthe incumbent Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly, infringed
the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the involability then en-joyed
by Mr. Yerodia under international law. Those acts engaged Belgium's
international responsibility. The Court considers that the findings so

reached by it constitute a form of satisfaction which will make good the
moral injury complaii~ed of by the Congo.
76. However, as the Permanent Court of Interr ational Justice stated
in its Judgment of 13 September 1928 in the case concerning the Fcrctoi
at C'horzciw :

"[tlhe essential pi-inciple contained in the actuil notion of an illegal
act - a principle which seems to be estab1i;hed by international
practice and in particular by the decisions of 2rbitral tribunals - is

that reparation inust, as far as possible, wipe out al1 the conse- et rétablir l'état qui aurait vraisemblablement existé si ledit acte
n'avait pas été commis)) (C.P.J.I. sérieA no 17, p.47).

Or, dans le cas d'espèce, le rétablissement de ((l'étatqui aurait vraisem-
blablement existé si [l'acte illicite] n'avait pas étécommis» ne saurait
résulter simplement de la constatation par la Cour du caractère illicite du
mandat d'arrêtau regard du droit international. Le mandat subsiste et

demeure illicite nonobstant le fait queM. Yerodia a cesséd'êtreministre
des affaires étrangères. Dès lors la Cour estime que la Belgique doit, par
les moyens de son choix, mettre à néant le mandat en question et en
informer les autorités auprès desquelles ce mandat a étédiffusé.
77. La Cour ne voit aucune autre mesure de réparation a prescrire:
elle ne saurait en particulier indiquerdans un arrêtstatuant sur un dif-

férend entre le Congo et la Belgique, quelles en seraient les implications
éventuelles pour des Etats tiers, et ne saurait par suite accueillir sur ce
point les conclusions du Congo.

78. Par ces motifs,

1) A) Par quinze voix contre une,

Rejette les exceptions d'incompétence, de non-lieu et d'irrecevabilité
soulevéespar le Royaume de Belgique;
POURM : . Guillaume, pré.sirient;M. Shi, vice-président;MM. Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mn" Higgins, MM. Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek. Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, juges;

M. Bula-Bula, Mt"'Van den Wyngaert.juges ad hoc:
CONTRE: M. Oda, juge;

B) Par quinze voix contre une,
Dit qu'elle a compétence pour connaître de la requête introduite le
17octobre 2000 par la République démocratique du Congo;

POURM : . Guillaume, prksir/ent: M. Shi, vice-président;MM. Ranjeva. Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer. Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mn" Higgins. MM. Parra-
Aranguren. Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal. juges;
M. Bula-Bula, Mn" Van den Wyngaert, j~1gr.ad hoc:
COILTKL: M. Oda, ,juge;

C) Par quinze voix contre une,

Dit que la requête de la République démocratique du Congo n'est pas
dépourvue d'objet et que, par suite, il y a lieu de statuer sur ladite
requête;

POUR :M. Guillaume, pré.tir/ent;M. Shi, vice-prksident ;MM. Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer. Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mn" Higgins, MM. Parra- quences of the illegal act and reestablish the :situation which would,
in al1 probabilit:~, have existed if that act hacl not been committed"
(P.C. I.J.,Series A, No. 17, p. 47).

In the present case, "the situation which would, in al1 probability, have
existed if [the illegal act] had not been committed" cannot be re-estab-

lished merely by a fiinding by the Court that the arrest warrant was un-
lawful under international law. The warrant is still extant, and remains
unlawful, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Yersdia has ceased to be
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court accordin:ly considers that Bel-
gium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the warrant in question
and so inform the auithorities to whom it was circulated.

77. The Court seel, no need for any further rerredy: in particular, the
Court cannot, in a judgment ruling on a dispute bitween the Congo and
Belgium, indicate wkiat that judgment's implications might be for third
States, and the Court cannot therefore accept thc Congo's submissions
on this point.

78. For these reasons,

(1) (A) By fifteen votes to one,

Rejects the objections of the Kingdom of Belgi~m relating to jurisdic-
tion, mootness and admissibility;

IN FAVOUR P:residenl Guillaume: Vice-Puesident Shi;Judges Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh. Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans. Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Jucfgrs ad hoc Bula-
Bula. Van den Wyngaert;
AGAINST :Jirdge Oda :,

(B) By fifteen votes to one,

Find.~that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo on 17 October 2000;

IN ~AVOUR Pr:esident Guillaume; Vicc-PresiderztShi Judges Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans, Rezek., Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal Jirdges ad hoc Bula-
Bula, Van den Wyngaert;
AGAINSJ Tt:rdge Oda;

(C) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that the Application of the Democratic Re~ublic of the Congo is

not without object and that accordingly the case i: not moot;

IN FAVOUK Pr:esident Guillaume; Vice-President Shi. Judg~s Ranjeva. Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Hig:ins, Parra-Aranguren, Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Kliasawneh, Buergenthal, juge.^;
M. Bula-Bula, Mm"Van den Wyngaert, juges ad hoc;
CONTRF M: . Oda,juge;

D) Par quinze voix contre une,

Dit que la requête de la République démocratique du Congo est rece-

vable ;
POUR :M. Guillaume,prksident;M. Shi, vice-président;MM. Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mm' Higgins, MM. Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, ,juges;
M. Bula-Bula, Mm' Van den Wyngaert,juges ad hoc;

CONTRE: M. Oda,juge;

2) Par treize voix contre trois,

Dit que l'émission, à l'encontre de M. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi,
du mandat d'arrêt du 11 avril 2000, et sa diffusion sur le plan inter-
national ont constitué des violations d'une obligation juridique du

Royaume de Belgique à l'égard de la République démocratique du
Congo, en ce qu'elles ont méconnu l'immunité de juridiction pénale
et l'inviolabilité dont le ministre des affaires étrangères en exercice
de la République démocratique du Congo jouissait en vertu du droit
international;

POUR :M. Guillaume, prksiden;M. Shi, vice-prkside;MM. Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mm' Higgins, MM. Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Buergenthal, juges; M. Bula-Bula, juge
ad hoc;

CONTRE: MM. Oda, Al-Khasawneh, juges; M'"' Van den Wyngaert, juge
ad hoc;

3) Par dix voix contre six,

Dit que le Royaume de Belgique doit, par les moyens de son choix,
mettre à néant le mandat d'arrêtdu 11 avril 2000 et en informer les auto-
ritésauprès desquelles ce mandat a étédiffusé.

POUR: M. Guillaume, président;M. Shi, vice-prksiu'ent;MM. Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin. Parra-Aranguren, Rezek.
,juges; M. Bula-Bula,juge ad hoc;
CONTRE M:. Oda, MIn'Higgins, MM. Kooijmans, AI-Khasawneh, Buergen-
thal, juges; Mn" Van den Wyngaert, juge ad hoc.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisafoi, au Palais
de la Paix, à La Haye, le quatorze février deux mille deux, en trois
exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposéaux archives de la Cour et les
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Répu- Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc Bula-
Bula, Van den Wyngaert;

AGAINST :Judge Oda ;

(D) By fifteen votes to one,

Fin& that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

is admissible;
IN FAVOUK: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herc-

zegh. Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins. Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans, Rezelc, Al-Khasawneh. Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc Bula-
Bula, Van den Wyngaert;
AGAINST :Jz~rigeOda ;

(2) By thirteen votes to three,

Finds that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the
arrest warrant of 11 ,4pril 2000, and its internatio~ial circulation, consti-
tuted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards
the Democratic Repuiblic of the Congo, in that thvy failed to respect the

immunityfrom crimirial jurisdiction and the inviola Aity which the incum-
bent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo enjoyed under international law;

rN FAVOCR :Presiclent Guillaume; Vice-President Shi, Judges Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans, Rezek, Buergenthal ; Judge ad hoc Biila-Bula ;

AGAIN\T J:irc1gOda, Al-Khasawneh; Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert;

(3) By ten votes to six,

Finds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, t'y means of its own

choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2Ci00and so inform the
authorities to whom lhat warrant was circulated.

FAVOIJR :Presi~i'entGuillaun~e; Vice-Pre.~identShi Judge., Ranjeva, Herc-
zegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma. Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek;
Judgb'ad hoc Bula-Bula ;
AGAINST Ju: ~/ge.~Oda, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

Jutlge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert.

Done in French anid in English, the French text I~eingauthoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fourteenth day of February, two thou-

sand and two, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
of the Court and the others transmitted to the Govc:rnment of the Demo-34 MANDAT D'ARRET (ARRÊT)

blique démocratique du Congo et au Gouvernement du Royaume de
Belgique.

Le président,

(Signé) Gilbert GUILLAUME.
Le greffier,

(Signé) Philippe COUVREUR.

M. GUILLAUMp Er,ésident, joànI'arrêtI'exposéde son opinion indi-

viduelle;M. ODA,juge, jointà I'arrêtI'exposéde son opinion dissidente;
M. RANJEVA ju,ge, joint une déclaratàI'arrêt;M. KOROMA ju,ge, joint
à l'arrêtl'exposéde son opinion individuelle; Mm'HICIet MM. KOOIJ-
MANS et BUERGENTHA jug,es, joigneàtl'arrêtI'exposéde leur opinion
individuelle commune; M. REZEK,juge, joint à I'arrêtI'exposéde son
opinion individuelle;. AL-KHASAWNE jg,e, joinà l'arrêtI'exposéde
son opinion dissidente;. BULA-BULA ju,ge udl?oc,joiàtl'arrêtI'exposé
de son opinion individuelle;n' VAN DEN WYNGAERjT u,ge adIlocjoint
à I'arrêt l'exposé don opinion dissidente.

(Paraphé) G.G.
(Parc~pl7P)Ph.C.cratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Kingdom of
Belgium, respectively.

(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME,
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,

Registrar.

President GUILLAUMaE ppends a separate opinion to the Judgment of
the Court; Judge ODAappends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of
the Court; Judge RAN.IEVaAppends a declarationIOthe Judgment of the
Court; Judge KOROMA appends a separate opinic~nto the Judgment of

the Court; ~udges HIGGINSK, OOIJMAN and BCERGENTHA aLpend a joint
separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Jiidge REZEKappends a
separate opinion to ithe Judgment of the Court; ludge AL-KHASAWNEH
appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge
ad hoc BULA-BULA appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the
Court; Judge rid hoc VAN DEN WYNGAER Tppends a dissenting opinion

to the Judgment of tlheCourt.

(Znitiulled) G.G.
(Znitiulled) Ph.C.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 14 February 2002

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