Judgment of 30 June 1995

Document Number
084-19950630-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING EAST TIMOR

(PORTUGAL v. AUSTRALIA)

JUDGMENT OF 30 JUNE 1995

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU TIMOR ORIENTAL

(PORTUGAL c. AUSTRALIE)

ARRÊT DU 30 JUIN 1995 Officia1citation :

East Timor (Portugal v. Australia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90

Mode officielde citation:

Timor oriental (Portugal c. Australie),
arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 90

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 No de vente:

ISBN 92-1-070724-9 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1995 YEAR 1995
30 June
General List
No. 84 30 June1995

CASE CONCERNING EAST TIMOR

(PORTUGAL v. AUSTRALIA)

Treaty of 1989between Australiaand Indonesia concerningthe "Timor Gap".
Objection thattlzereexists in reality no dispute between the -arDis-
agreement between the Parties on the law and on thefac-s Existence of a
legal dispute.
Objection that the Application would require the Court to determine the
rights and obligationsof a third State in the absenceof the consent of that State

- Case concerningMonetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 - Question
whether the Respondent's objective conduct is separablefrom the conduct of a
third State.
Right of peoples to self-determination as righterga omnes and essentialprin-
cipleof contemporary international -awDifference between erga omnes char-
acter of a norm and rule of consent tojurisdiction.
Question whether resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security
Councilconstitute "givens"on the content of which the Court wouldnot have to
decide de novo.
For the two Parties, the Territory of East Timor remains a non-self-govern-
ing territory and its people has the right to self-determination.
Rights and obligationsof a third State constituting theveryt-matter of
thedecision requeste- The Court cannot exercise thejurisdiction conferred

upon it by the declarations made by the Partiesr Article 36, paragraph 2,
of its Statute to adjudicate on the dispute referredto it by the Application.

JUDGMENT

Present: President BEDIAOUIV ; ice-President SCHWEBEL J;dges ODA, Sir
Robert JENNINGS G,UILLAUM SEH,AHABUDDEA EG,UILAR-MAWDSLEY,
WEERAMANTRY, RANJEVA H,ERCZEGH SH, I, FLEISCHHAUK ERR, OMA,
VERESHCHETIN; Judges ad hoc Sir Ninian STEPHEN S,KUBISZEWSKI;
Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA. In the case concerning East Timor,

between
the Portuguese Republic,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Antonio Cascais, Ambassador of the Portuguese Republic to the
Netherlands,

as Agent ;
Mr. José ManuelServulo Correia, Professor in the Faculty of Law of the
University ofLisbon and Member of the Portuguese Bar,
Mr. Miguel Galvao Teles, Member of the Portuguese Bar,
as Co-Agents, Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Pierre-MarieDupuy, Professorat the UniversityPanthéon-Assas(ParisII)
and Director of the Institut des hautes étudesinternationalesof Paris,
Mrs. Rosalyn Higgins, Q.C., Professor of International Law in the Univer-
sity of London,
as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Rui Quartin Santos, Minister Plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Lisbon,
Mr. Francisco Ribeiro Telles, First Embassy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,Lisbon,
as Advisers;

Mr. Richard Meese, Advocate, Partner in Frere Cholmeley,Paris,
Mr. Paulo Canelas de Castro, Assistant in the Faculty of Law of the Uni-
versity ofoïnbra,
Mrs. Luisa Duarte, Assistant in the Faculty of Law of the University of
Lisbon,
Mr. Paulo Otero, Assistantin the Faculty of Law of the Universityof Lisbon,
Mr. Iain Scobbie,Lecturer in Law in the Faculty of Law of the Universityof
Dundee, Scotland,
Miss Sasha Stepan, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Counsellors at Law,
Prague,
as Counsel;

Mr. Fernando Figueirinhas, First Secretary, Portuguese Ernbassy in the
Netherlands,
as Secretary,

and

the Commonwealth of Australia,
represented by
Mr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitor-General of Australia,

as Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. MichaelTate, Ambassador of Australia to the Netherlands, former
Minister of Justice,
Mr. Henry Burmester, Principal International Law Counsel, Officeof Inter-
national Law, Attorney-General's Department,
as Co-Agents and Counsel; Mr. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C., Whewell Professor emeritus, University of
Cambridge,
Mr. James Crawford, WhewellProfessor of International Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris X-
Nanterre and Institute of Political Studies, Paris,
Mr. Christopher Staker, Counsel assisting the Solicitor-General of Australia,

as Counsel ;
Mr. Christopher Lamb, Legal Adviser, Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade,
Ms Cate Steains, Second Secretary,Australian Embassy in the Netherlands,
Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, Head Lecturer, University of Maine and Insti-

tute of Political Studies, Paris,
as Advisers,

THECOURT,

composed as above,
after deliberation,

delivers thefollowing Judgment:
1. On 22 February 1991,the Ambassador to the Netherlands of the Portu-
guese Republic (hereinafter referred to as "Portugal") filed in the Registry of

the Courtan Application instituting proceedingsagainst the Commonwealth of
Australia (hereinafter referred to as "Australia") concerning "certain activities
of Australia with respect to East Timor". According to the Application
Australia had, by its conduct, "failed to observe . . . the obligation to respect
the duties and powers of [Portugal as]the administering Power [ofEast Timor]
. . . and .. the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and the
related rights". In consequence, according to the Application, Australia had
"incurred international responsibility vis-à-vis both the people of East Timor
and Portugal". As the basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, the Application
refers to the declarations by which the two States have accepted the compul-
soryjurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute.

2. In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Applica-
tion was communicated forthwith to the Australian Government by the
Registrar; and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the same Article, al1the
other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified by the Registrar
of the Application.
3. Byan Order dated 3May 1991,the President of the Court fixed18Novem-

ber 1991as the time-limit for filingthe Memorial of Portugal and 1June 1992
as the time-limitfor filingthe Counter-Memorial of Australia, and those plead-
ings were duly filed within the time-limits so fixed.

4. In its Counter-Memorial, Australia raised questions concerning the juris-
diction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application. In the course of a
meeting held by the President of the Court on 1June 1992with the Agents of
the Parties, pursuant to Article 31 ofthe Rules of Court, the Agents agreed that
these questions were inextricably linked to the merits and that they should
therefore be heard and determined within the framework of the merits. 5. By an Order dated 19June 1992,the Court, taking into account the agree-

ment of the Parties in this respect, authorized the filing of a Reply by Portugal
and of a Rejoinder by Australia, and fixed 1 December 1992and 1June 1993
respectively as thetime-limits for the filing of those pleadings. The Reply was
duly filedwithin the time-limit so fixed. By an Order of 19May 1993,the Presi-
dent of the Court, at the request of Australia, extended to 1July 1993the time-
limit for the filing of the Rejoinder. This pleading was filed on 5 July 1993.
Pursuant to Article 44, paragraph 3, of its Rules, having given the other Party
an opportunity to state its views, the Court considered this filing asvalid.

6. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of
either of the Parties, each Party proceeded to exercise the right conferred by
Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the
case; Portugal chose Mr. Antonio de Arruda Ferrer-Correia and Australia Sir
Ninian Martin Stephen. By a letter dated 30 June 1994, Mr. Ferrer-Correia
informed the President of the Court that he was no longer able to sit, and, by

a letter of 14July 1994,the Agent of Portugal informed the Court that its Gov-
ernment had chosen Mr. Krzysztof Jan Skubiszewski to replace him.

7. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court, after
ascertaining the views of the Parties, decided that the pleadings and annexed
documents should be made accessibleto the public from the date of the open-
ing of the oral proceedings.
8. Between30January and 16February 1995,public hearings wereheld in the
course of which the Court heard oral arguments and replies by the following:

For Portugal: H.E. Mr. Antonio Cascais,
Mr. JoséManuel Servulo Correia,
Mr. Miguel Galvao Teles,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
Mrs. Rosalyn Higgins, Q.C.
For Australia: Mr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C.,

H.E. Mr. Michael Tate,
Mr. James Crawford,
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. Henry Burmester,
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C.,
Mr. Christopher Staker.

9. During the oral proceedings, each of the Parties, referring to Article 56,
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, presented documents not previously pro-
duced. Portugal objected to the presentation of one of these by Australia, on
the ground that the document concerned was not "part of a publication readily
available" within the meaning of that provision. Having ascertained Australia's
views, the Court examined the question and informed the Parties that it had
decided not to admit the document to the record in the case.

10. The Parties presented submissions in each of their written pleadings;
in the course of the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were
presented :On behalf of Portugal,
at the hearing on 13 February 1995(afternoon):

"Having regard to the facts and points of law set forth,

Portugal has the honour to
- Ask the Court to dismiss the objections raised by Australia and to
adjudge and declare that it has jurisdiction to deal with the Applica-
tion of Portugal and that that Application is admissible, and
- Request that it may please the Court:

(1) To adjudge and declare that, first, the rights of the people of East
Timor to self-determination, to territorial integrity and unity and to per-
manent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources and, secondly,
the duties, powers and rights of Portugal as the administering Power of the
Territory of East Timor are opposable to Australia, which is under an
obligation not to disregard them, but to respect them.
(2) To adjudge and declare that Australia, inasmuch as in the first place

it has negotiated, concluded and initiated performance of the Agreement
of 11December 1989,has taken interna1legislativemeasures for the appli-
cation thereof, and is continuing to negotiate, with the State party to that
Agreement, the delimitation of the continental shelf in the area of the
Timor Gap; and inasmuch as it has furthermore excluded any negotiation
with the administering Power with respect to the exploration and exploita-
tion of the continental shelf in thatsame area; and, finally, inasmuch as it
contemplates exploring and exploiting the subsoil of the sea in the Timor
Gap on the basis of a plurilateral title to which Portugal is not a party
(each of these facts sufficing on its own):

(a) has infringed and is infringing the right of the people of East Timor
to self-determination, to territorial integrity and unity and its perma-
nent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources, and is in
breach of the obligation not to disregard but to respect that right,
that integrity and that sovereignty ;
(b) has infringed and is infringing the powers of Portugal as the admin-
istering Power of the Territory of East Timor, is impeding the fulfil-
ment of its duties to the people of East Timor and to the international
community, is infringing the right of Portugal to fulfilits responsibili-

ties and is in breach of the obligation not to disregard but to respect
those powers and duties and that right;
(c) is contravening Security Council resolutions 384 and 389 and is in
breach of the obligation to accept and carry out Security Council
resolutions laid down by the Charter of the United Nations, is dis-
regarding the binding character of the resolutions of United Nations
organs that relate to East Timor and, more generally, is in breach of
the obligation incumbent on Member States to CO-operatein good
faith with the United Nations;

(3) To adjudge and declare that, inasmuch as it has excluded and is
excluding any negotiation with Portugal as the administering Power of the
Territory of East Timor, with respect to the exploration and exploitation
of the continental shelf in the area of the Timor Gap, Australia has failed
and is failing in its duty to negotiate inorder to harmonize the respective
rights in the event of a conflict of rights or of claims over maritime areas. (4) To adjudge and declare that, by the breaches indicated in para-
graphs 2 and 3 of the present submissions, Australia has incurred interna-
tional responsibility and has caused damage, for which it owes reparation
to the people of East Timor and to Portugal, in such form and manner as
may beindicated bythe Court, giventhenature of the obligations breached.

(5) To adjudge and declare that Australia is bound, in relation to the
people of East Timor, to Portugal and to the international community, to
cease from al1breaches of the rights and international noms referred to in
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the present submissions and in particular, until
such time as the people of East Timor shall have exercisedits right to self-

determination, under the conditions laid down by the United Nations:
(a) to refrain from any negotiation, signatureor ratification of any agree-
ment with a State other than the administering Power concerning the
delimitation, and the exploration and exploitation, of the continental
shelf, or the exerciseof jurisdiction over that shelf, in the area of the

Timor Gap;
(b) to refrain from any act relating to the exploration and exploitation of
the continental shelf in the area of the Timor Gap or to the exercise
of jurisdiction over that shelf, on the basis of any plurilateral title to
which Portugal, as the administering Power of the Territory of East
Timor, is not a party";

On behaif of Australia,
at the hearing on 16 February 1995(afternoon):

"The Government of Australia submits that, for al1the reasons given by
it in the written and oral pleadings, the Court should:
(a) adjudge and declare that the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the
Portuguese claims or that the Portuguese claims are inadmissible; or
(b) alternatively, adjudge and declare that the actions of Australia

invoked by Portugal do not give rise to any breach by Australia of
rights under international law asserted by Portugal."

11. The Territory of East Timor corresponds to the eastern part of the
island of Timor; it includes the island of Atauro, 25 kilometres to the

north, the islet of Jaco to the east, and the enclave of Oé-Cusse in the
western part of the island of Timor.Its capital is Dili, situated on its north
coast. The south coast of East Timor lies omosiAA the north coast of Aus-
tralia, the distance between them being approximately 430 kilometres.
In the sixteenth century, East Timor became a colony of Portugal;

Portugal remained there until 1975. The western part of the island came
under Dutch rule and later became part of independent Indonesia.

12. In resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960 the United Nations
General Assembly recalled "differences of views ... concerning the status

of certain territories under the administrations of Portugal and Spain and
described by these two States as 'overseas provinces' of the metropolitanState concerned"; and it also stated that it considered that the territories
under the administration of Portugal, which werelistedtherein (including
"Timor and dependencies")werenon-self-governingterritories within the
meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. Portugal, in the wake of its "Car-
nation Revolution", accepted this position in 1974.

13. Following interna1disturbances in East Timor, on 27 August 1975
the Portuguese civiland military authorities withdrew fromthe mainland
of East Timor to the island of Atauro. On 7 December 1975the armed
forces of Indonesia intervened in East Timor. On 8 December 1975the
Portuguese authorities departed from the island of Atauro, and thus left
East Timor altogether. Sincetheir departure, Indonesia has occupied the
Territory, and the Parties acknowledge that the Territory has remained
under the effectivecontrol of that State. Asserting that on 31 May 1976
the people of East Timor had requested Indonesia "to accept East Timor
as an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia?',on 17July 1976Indo-
nesia enacted a law incorporating the Territory aspart of its national ter-
ritory.
14. Following the intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in the
Territory and the withdrawal of the Portuguese authorities, the question of
East Timor became the subject of two resolutions of the Security Council
and of eight resolutions of the General Assembly, namely, Security Coun-
cil resolutions 384(1975) of22 December 1975and 389 (1976) of22 April
1976, and General Assembly resolutions 3485 (XXX) of 12 December

1975, 31/53 of 1 December 1976, 32/34 of 28 November 1977, 33/39 of
13 December 1978,34/40 of 21 November 1979, 35/27 of 11November
1980, 36/50of 24November 1981and 37/30of 23 November 1982.
15. SecurityCouncil resolution 384(1975)of 22 December 1975called
upon "al1States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well
as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination"; called upon
"the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay al1its forces
from the Territory"; and further called upon
"the Government of Portugal as administering Power to CO-operate
fully with the United Nations so as to enable the people of East

Timor to exercise freelytheir right to self-determination".

SecurityCouncil resolution 389(1976)of 22 April 1976adopted the same
terms with regard to the right of the people of East Timor to self-determi-
nation; called upon "the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without
further delayal1its forcesfrom the Territory"; and further calledupon "al1
States and other parties concerned to CO-operatefully with the United
Nations to achievea peaceful solution to the existingsituation .. .".

General Assemblyresolution 3485(XXX)of 12December 1975referred
to Portugal "as the administering Power"; called upon it "to continue to
make every effort to find a solution by peaceful means"; and "strongly
deplore[d] the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia inPortuguese Timor". In resolution 31/53of 1December 1976,and again in
resolution 32134of 28 November 1977,the General Assembly rejected

"the claim that East Timor has been incorporated into Indonesia,
inasmuch as the people of the Territory have not been able to exer-
cise freeiy their right to self-determination and independence".

Security Council resolution 389 (1976)of 22 April 1976and General
Assembly resolutions 31/53 of 1 December 1976, 32/34 of 28 November
1977and 33/39 of 13 December 1978made no reference to Portugal as
the administering Power. Portugal is so described, however, in Security
Council resolution 384(1975)of 22 December 1975and inthe other reso-
lutions of the General Assembly. Also, those resolutions which did not
specificallyrefer to Portugal as the administering Power recalled another
resolution or other resolutions which so referred to it.

16. No further resolutions on the question of East Timor have been
passed by the Security Council since 1976 or by the General Assembly
since 1982.However, the Assembly has maintained the item on its agenda
since 1982,while deciding at each session, on the recommendation of its

General Committee, to defer consideration of it until the following ses-
sion. East Timor also continues to be included in the list of non-self-
governing territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter;
and the SpecialCommittee on the Situation with Regard to the Implemen-
tation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples remains seised of the question of East Timor. The
Secrets-ry-Generalof the United Nations is also engaged in a continuing
effort, in consultation with al1parties directly concerned, to achieve a
comprehensive settlement of the problem.
17. The incorporation of East Timor as part of Indonesia was recog-
nized by Australia de facto on 20 January 1978.On that date the Aus-
tralian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated: "The Government has made
clear publicly its opposition to the Indonesian intervention and has made
this known to the Indonesian Government." He added: "[Indonesia's]
control is effectiveand covers al1major administrative centres of the ter-

ritory."And further :
"This is a reality with which we must come to terms. Accordingly,
the Government has decided that although it remains critical of the

means by which integration was brought about it would be unreal-
istic to continue to refuse to recognize de facto that East Timor is
part of Indonesia."

On 23 February 1978the Minister said: "we recognize the fact that East
Timor is part of Indonesia, but not the means by which this was brought
about". On 15 December 1978 the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
declared that negotiations which were about to begin between Australia
and Indonesia for the delimitation of the continental shelf between Aus-
tralia and East Timor, "when they start, will signifydejure recognition
by Australia of the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor"; he added:
"The acceptance of this situation does not alter the opposition which the
Governmenthas consistently expressedregarding the manner of incorpo-
ration." The negotiations in question began in February 1979.

18. Prior to this, Australia and Indonesia had, in 1971-1972,estab-
lished a delimitation of the continental shelf between their respective
coasts; the delimitation so effected stopped short on either side of the
continental shelf between the south coast of East Timor and the north
coast of Australia. This undelimited part of the continental shelf was
called the "Timor Gap".
The delimitation negotiations which began in February 1979between
Australia and Indonesia related to the Timor Gap; they did not come to
fruition. Australia and Indonesia then turned to the possibility of estab-

lishing a provisional arrangement for the joint exploration and exploita-
tion of the resources of an area of the continental shelf. Treaty to this
effect was eventually concluded between them on 11 December 1989,
whereby a "Zone of Cooperation" was created "in an area between the
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia". Australia
enacted legislation in 1990with a view to implementing the Treaty; this
law came into force in 1991.

19. In these proceedings Portugal maintains that Australia, in nego-
tiating and concluding the 1989Treaty, in initiating performance of the
Treaty, in taking interna1legislativemeasures for its application, and in
continuing to negotiate with Indonesia, has acted unlawfully, in that it

has infringed the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination
and to permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, infringed the
rights of Portugal as the administering Power, and contravened Security
Council resolutions 384 and 389.Australia raised objections to the juris-
diction of the Court and to the admissibility of the Application. It took
the position, however, that these objections were inextricably linked to
the merits and should therefore be determined within the framework of
the merits. The Court heard the Parties both on the objections and on the
merits. WhileAustralia concentrated its main arguments and submissions
on the objections, it also submitted that Portugal's case on the merits
should be dismissed,maintaining, in particular, that its actions did not in
any way disregard the rights of Portugal. 20. According to one of the objections put forward by Australia, there
exists in reality no dispute between itself and Portugal. In another objec-
tion, it argued that Portugal's Application would require the Court to
rule on the rights and obligations of a State which is not a party to the
proceedings, namely Indonesia. According to further objections of Aus-
tralia, Portugal lacks standing to bring the case, the argument being that
it does not have a sufficient interest of its own to institute the proceed-
ings, notwithstandingthe references to it in some of the resolutions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly as the administering Power
of East Timor, and that it cannot, furthermore, claim any right to repre-
sent the people of East Timor; its claims are remote from reality, and the
judgment the Court is asked to give would be without useful effect; and
finally,its claimsconcern matters which are essentiallynot legalin nature

which should be resolved by negotiation within the framework of on-
going procedures before the political organs of the United Nations.
Portugal requested the Court to dismiss al1these objections.

21. The Court will now consider Australia's objection that there is in
reality no dispute between itself and Portugal. Australia contends that
the case as presented by Portugal is artificiallylimited to the question of
the lawfulness of Australia's conduct, and that the true respondent is
Indonesia, not Australia. Australia maintains that it is being sued in
place of Indonesia. In this connection, it points out that Portugal and
Australia have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, but that Indonesia has not.

In support of the objection, Australia contends that it recognizes, and
has always recognized, the right of the people of East Timor to self-
determination,the status of East Timor as a non-self-governingterritory,
and the fact that Portugal has been named by the United Nations as the
administering Power of East Timor; that the arguments of Portugal, as
well as its submissions, demonstrate that Portugal does not challengethe
capacity of Australia to conclude the 1989 Treaty and that it does not
contest the validity of the Treaty;and that consequently there is in reality
no dispute between itself and Portugal.
Portugal, for its part, maintains that its Application defines the real
and only dispute submitted to the Court.
22. The Court recalls that, in the sense accepted in its jurisprudence

and that of its predecessor, a dispute is a disagreement on a point of law
or fact, a conflict of legal viewsor interests between parties (seeMavrom-
matis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C. 1.J., Series A,
No. 2, p. 11 ;Northern Cameroons,Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 27 ;
and Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitvate under Section 21 of the
United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, AdvisoryOpinion, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 27, para. 35). In order to establish the
existence of a dispute, "It must be shown that the claim of one party is

positively opposed by the other" (South West Africa, Preliminary Objec-
tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328); and further, "Whether
there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determina-
tion" (Interpretationof Peace TreatieswithBulgaria,Hungary andRoma-
nia, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950,p. 74).

For the purpose of verifying the existence of a legal dispute in the
present case, it is not relevant whether the "real dispute" is between Por-
tugal and Indonesia rather than Portugal and Australia. Portugal has,
rightly or wrongly, formulated complaints of fact and law against Aus-
tralia which the latter has denied. By virtue of this denial, there is a legal
dispute.
On the record before the Court, it is clear that the Parties are in dis-
agreement,both on the law and on the facts, on the question whether the
conduct of Australia in negotiating, concluding and initiating perfor-
mance of the 1989Treaty was in breach of an obligationdue by Australia
to Portugal under international law.
Indeed, Portugal's Application limits the proceedings to these ques-
tions. There nonetheless exists a legal dispute between Portugal and Aus-

tralia. This objection of Australia must therefore be dismissed.

23. The Court willnow consider Australia's principal objection, to the
effect that Portugal's Application would require the Court to determine
the rights and obligations of Indonesia. The declarations made by the
Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute do not include any
limitation which would exclude Portugal's claims from the jurisdiction
thereby conferred upon the Court. Australia, however, contends that the
jurisdiction so conferred would not enable the Court to act if, in order to
do so, the Court were required to rule on the lawfulness of Indonesia's
entry into and continuing presence in East Timor, on the validity of the
1989Treaty between Australia and Indonesia, or on the rights and obli-
gations of Indonesia under that Treaty, even if the Court did not have to
determineits validity. Portugal agrees that if its Application required the
Court to decide any of these questions, the Court could not entertain it.
The Parties disagree, however, as to whether the Court is required to
decide any of these questions in order to resolve the dispute referred to it.

24. Australia argues that the decision sought from the Court by Por-
tugal would inevitablyrequire the Court to rule on the lawfulness of the
conduct of a third State, namely Indonesia, in the absence of that State's
consent. In support of its argument, it cites the Judgrnent in the casecon-
cerning Monetary GoldRemovedfrom Rome in 1943,in which the Court
ruled that, in the absence of Albania's consent,it could not take any deci-sion on the international responsibility of that State since "Albania's
legal interests would not only be affected by a decision, but would form
the very subject-matter of the decision" (I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32).

25. In reply, Portugal contends, first, that its Applications concerned

exclusively with the objective conduct of Australia, which consists in
having negotiated, concluded and initiated performance of the 1989
Treaty with Indonesia, and that this question is perfectly separable from
any question relating to the lawfulness of the conduct of Indonesia.
According to Portugal, such conduct of Australia in itself constitutes a
breach of its obligation to treat East Timor as a non-self-governing ter-
ritory and Portugal as its administering Power; and that breach could be
passed upon by the Court by itselfand without passing upon the rights of
Indonesia. The objective conduct of Australia, considered as such, con-
stitutes the only violation of international law of which Portugal com-
plains.
26. The Court recalls in this respect that one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of its Statute is that it cannot decidea dispute between States with-
out the consent of those States to its jurisdiction. This principle was
reaffirmed in the Judgment given by the Court in the case concerning
Monetary GoldRemovedfrom Rome in 1943 and confirmed in several of
its subsequent decisions(see Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriyu/
Malta), Applicationfor PermissiontoIntervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

1984,p. 25, para. 40; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 431, para. 88 ; Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 579, para. 49; Land, Island andMaritime Frontier Dispute (El
Salvador/Honduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1990,pp. 114-116,paras. 54-56,and p. 112,para. 73; and Certain Phos-
phate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 259-262,paras. 50-55).
27. The Court notes that Portugal's claim that, in entering into the
1989Treaty with Indonesia, Australia violated the obligation to respect
Portugal's status as administering Power and that of East Timor as a
non-self-governing territory, is based on the assertion that Portugal
alone, in its capacity as administering Power, had the power to enter into
the Treaty on behalf of East Timor; that Australia disregarded this exclu-
sivepower, and, in so doing, violated its obligations to respect the status
of Portugal and that of East Timor.
The Court also observes that Australia, for its part, rejects Portugal's
claimto the exclusivepower to conclude treaties on behalf of East Timor,

and the very fact that it entered into the 1989 Treaty with Indonesia
showsthat it considered that Indonesia had that power. Australia in sub-
stance argues that even if Portugal had retained that power, on whatever
basis, after withdrawing from East Timor, the possibility existed that the
power could later pass to another State under general international law,and that it did so pass to Indonesia; Australia affirms moreover that, if
the power in question did pass to Indonesia, it was acting in conformity
with international law in entering into the 1989Treaty with that State,
and could not have violated any of the obligations Portugal attributes to
it.Thus, for Australia, the fundamental question in the present case is
ultimately whether, in 1989,the power to conclude a treaty on behalf of

East Timor in relation to its continental shelf lay with Portugal or with
Indonesia.

28. The Court has carefully considered the argument advanced by
Portugal which seeks to separate Australia's behaviour from that of
Indonesia. However, in the view of the Court, Australia's behaviour can-
not be assessed without first entering into the question why it is that
Indonesia could not lawfullyhave concluded the 1989Treaty, while Por-
tugal allegedlycould have done so; the very subject-matter of the Court's
decision would necessarily be a determination whether, having regard to
the circumstances in which Indonesia entered and remained in East
Timor, it could or could not have acquired the power to enter into trea-
ties on behalf of East Timor relating to the resources of its continental
shelf. The Court could not make such a determination in the absence of
the consent of Indonesia.
29. However, Portugal puts forward an additional argument aiming
to show that the principle formulated by the Court in the case concern-
ing Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 is not applicable in
the present case. It maintains, in effect, that the rights which Australia

allegedly breached were rights erga omnes and that accordingly Portugal
could require it, individually, to respect them regardless of whether or
not another State had conducted itself in a similarly unlawful manner.
In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to
self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United
Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable. The
principle of self-determination of peoples has been recognized by the
United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court (see
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Coun-
cilResolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,I.C.J. Reports 1971,pp. 31-
32, paras. 52-53 ; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1975, pp. 31-33, paras. 54-59); it is one of the essential principles of con-
temporary international law. However, theCourt considers that the erga
omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two
different things. Whatever the nature of the obligations invoked, the
Court could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its
judgment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of

another State which is not a party to the case. Where this is so, the
Court cannot act, even if the right in question is a right erga omnes. 30. Portugal presents a final argument to challenge the applicability to
the present case of the Court's jurisprudence in the case concerning Mon-
etary GoldRemovedfrom Rome in 1943.It argues that the principal mat-
ters on which its claims are based, namely the status of East Timor as a
non-self-governing territory and its own capacity as the administering

Power of the Territory, have already been decided by the General Assem-
bly and the Security Council, acting within their proper spheres of com-
petence; that in order to decide on Portugal's claims, the Court might
well need to interpret those decisions but would not have to decide de
novo on their content and must accordingly take them as "givens"; and
that consequentlythe Court is not required in this case to pronounce on
the question of the use of force by Indonesia in East Timor or upon the
lawfulness of its presence in the Territory.

Australia objects that the United Nations resolutions regarding East
Timor do not say what Portugal claims they say; that the last resolution
of the Security Council on East Timor goes back to 1976 and the last
resolution of the General Assembly to 1982,and that Portugal takes no
account of the passage of time and the developments that have taken

place since then; and that the Security Council resolutions are not reso-
lutions which are binding under Chapter VI1of the Charter or otherwise
and, moreover, that they are not framed in mandatory terms.

31. The Court notes that the argument of Portugal under considera-
tion rests on the premise that the United Nations resolutions,and in par-
ticularthose of the Security Council, can be read as imposing an obliga-
tion on States not to recognize any authority on the part of Indonesia
over the Territory and, where the latter is concerned, to deal only with
Portugal. The Court is not persuaded, however, that the relevant resolu-
tions went so far.
For the two Parties, the Territory of East Timor remains a non-self-
governing territory and its people has the right to self-determination.
Moreover, the General Assembly, which reserves to itself the right to
determinethe territories which have to be regarded as non-self-governing

for the purposes of the application of Chapter XI of the Charter, has
treated East Timor as such a territory. The competent subsidiary organs
of the General Assembly have continued to treat East Timor as such to
this day. Furthermore, the Security Council, in its resolutions 384 (1975)
and 389 (1976) has expressly called for respect for "the territorialinteg-
rity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-
determination in accordancewith GeneralAssemblyresolution 1514(XV)".

Nor is it at issue between the Parties that the General Assembly has
expressly referred to Portugal as the "administering Power" of East
Timor in a number of the resolutions it adopted on the subject of East
Timor between 1975and 1982,and that the Security Council has done so
in its resolution 384 (1975). The Parties do not agree, however, on thelegal implications that flowfrom the reference to Portugal as the admin-
istering Power in those texts.
32. The Court finds that it cannot be inferred from the sole fact that
the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly and the Secu-
rity Council refer to Portugal as the administering Power of East Timor
that they intended to establish an obligation on third States to treat
exclusivelywith Portugal as regards the continental shelf ofEast Timor.
The Court notes, furthermore, that several States have concluded with

Indonesia treaties capable of application to East Timor but which do not
include any reservation in regard to that Territory. Finally, the Court
observes that, by a letter of 15 December 1989, the Permanent Repre-
sentative of Portugal to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-
Generalthe text of a note ofprotest addressed by the Portuguese Embassy
in Canberra to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
on the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty on 11 December 1989;
that the letter of the Permanent Representative was circulated, at his
request, as an official document of the forty-fifth session of the General
Assembly, under the item entitled "Question of East Timor", and of the
Security Council; and that no responsive action was taken either by the
General Assembly or the Security Council.
Without prejudice to the question whether the resolutions under dis-
cussion could be binding in nature, the Court considers as a result that
they cannot be regarded as "givens" whichconstitute a sufficientbasis for
determining the dispute between the Parties.
33. It follows from this that the Court would necessarily have to rule

upon the lawfulnessof Indonesia's conduct as a prerequisite for deciding
on Portugal's contention that Australia violated its obligation to respect
Portugal's status as administering Power, East Timor's status as a non-
self-governing territory and the right of the people of the Territory to
self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over its wealth and
natural resources.

34. The Court emphasizes that it is not necessarily prevented from
adjudicating when the judgment it is asked to give might affect the legal
interests of a State which is not a party to the case. Thus, in the case
concerning Certain PhosphateLands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), it
stated, inter alia, as follows:
"In the present case, the interests of New Zealand and the United
Kingdom do not constitute the very subject-matter of the judgment
to be rendered on the merits of Nauru's Application . . .In the

present case, the determination of the responsibility of NewZealand
or the United Kingdom isnot a prerequisite for the determination of
the responsibility of Australia, the onlyobject of Nauru's claim . . .
In the present case, a finding by the Court regarding the existenceor
the content of the responsibility attributed to Australia by Nauru might wellhave implications for the legal situation of the two other
States concerned, but no findingin respect of that legal situation will
be needed as a basis for the Court's decision on Nauru's claims
against Australia. Accordingly, the Court cannot decline to exercise

its jurisdiction."I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 261-262,para. 55.)

However, in this case, the effects of the judgment requested by Portu-
gal would amount to a determination that Indonesia's entry into and
continued presence in East Timor are unlawful and that, as a conse-
quence, it does not have the treaty-making power in matters relating to
the continental shelfresources of East Timor. Indonesia's rightsand obli-
gations would thus constitute the very subject-matter of such a judgment

made in the absence of that State's consent. Such a judgment would run
directly counter to the "well-established principle of international law
embodied in the Court's Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise
jurisdiction over a State withits consent" (Monetary GoldRernovedfrom
Rome in 1943, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32).

35. The Court concludes that it cannot, in this case, exercisethe juris-
diction it has by virtue of the declarations made by the Parties under
Article36,paragraph 2, ofits Statute because,in order to decidethe claims
of Portugal, it would have to rule, as a prerequisite, on the lawfulnessof
Indonesia's conduct in the absenceof that State's consent. This conclu-
sion applies to al1the claims of Portugal, for al1of them raise a common
question: whether the power to make treaties concerning the continental
shelf resources of East Timor belongs to Portugal or Indonesia, and,
therefore, whether Indonesia's entry into and continued presence in the
Territory are lawful. In these circumstances, the Court does not deem it

necessary to examine the other arguments derived by Australia from the
non-participation of Indonesia in the case, namely the Court's lack of
jurisdiction todecide on the validity of the 1989Treaty and the effectson
Indonesia's rights under that treaty which would result from a judgment
in favour of Portugal.

36. Having dismissedthe first of the two objections of Australia which
it has examined, but upheld its second, the Court finds that it is not
required to consider Australia's other objections and that it cannot rule
on Portugal's claimson the merits, whatever the importance of the ques-
tions raised by those claims and of the rules of international law which
they bring into play.
37. The Court recallsin any event that it has taken note in the present
Judgment (paragraph 31) that, for the two Parties, the Territory of EastTimor remains a non-self-governing territory and its people has the right

to self-determination.

38. For these reasons,

By fourteen votes to two,

Finds that it cannot in the present case exercise the jurisdiction con-
ferred upon it by the declarations made by the Parties under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of its Statute to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it by
the Application of the Portuguese Republic.
IN FAVOUR :PresidentBedjaoui; Vice-PresidenSchwebel ;Judges Oda, Sir
Robert Jennings,Guillaume,Shahabuddeen,Aguilar-Mawdsley,Ranjeva,
Herczegh, Shi,Fleischhauer, Koroma, VereshchetinJudge ad hoc Sir
Ninian Stephen;

AGAIN~T:Judge Weeramantry ; Judgead hoc Skubiszewski.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this thirtieth day of June, one thousand
nine hundred and ninety-five, in three copies, one of which will be placed
in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to theovern-
ment of the Portuguese Republic and the Government of the Common-
wealth of Australia, respectively.

(Signed) Mohammed BEDJAOUI,

President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.

Judges ODA,SHAHABUDDEER NA, NJEVAand VERESHCHETI append
separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

Judge WEERAMANT anY Judge ad hoc SKUBISZEWS aKpIend dissent-
ing opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled)M.B.
(Initialled)E.V.O.

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING EAST TIMOR

(PORTUGAL v. AUSTRALIA)

JUDGMENT OF 30 JUNE 1995

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU TIMOR ORIENTAL

(PORTUGAL c. AUSTRALIE)

ARRÊT DU 30 JUIN 1995 Officia1citation :

East Timor (Portugal v. Australia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90

Mode officielde citation:

Timor oriental (Portugal c. Australie),
arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 90

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 No de vente:

ISBN 92-1-070724-9 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1995 YEAR 1995
30 June
General List
No. 84 30 June1995

CASE CONCERNING EAST TIMOR

(PORTUGAL v. AUSTRALIA)

Treaty of 1989between Australiaand Indonesia concerningthe "Timor Gap".
Objection thattlzereexists in reality no dispute between the -arDis-
agreement between the Parties on the law and on thefac-s Existence of a
legal dispute.
Objection that the Application would require the Court to determine the
rights and obligationsof a third State in the absenceof the consent of that State

- Case concerningMonetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 - Question
whether the Respondent's objective conduct is separablefrom the conduct of a
third State.
Right of peoples to self-determination as righterga omnes and essentialprin-
cipleof contemporary international -awDifference between erga omnes char-
acter of a norm and rule of consent tojurisdiction.
Question whether resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security
Councilconstitute "givens"on the content of which the Court wouldnot have to
decide de novo.
For the two Parties, the Territory of East Timor remains a non-self-govern-
ing territory and its people has the right to self-determination.
Rights and obligationsof a third State constituting theveryt-matter of
thedecision requeste- The Court cannot exercise thejurisdiction conferred

upon it by the declarations made by the Partiesr Article 36, paragraph 2,
of its Statute to adjudicate on the dispute referredto it by the Application.

JUDGMENT

Present: President BEDIAOUIV ; ice-President SCHWEBEL J;dges ODA, Sir
Robert JENNINGS G,UILLAUM SEH,AHABUDDEA EG,UILAR-MAWDSLEY,
WEERAMANTRY, RANJEVA H,ERCZEGH SH, I, FLEISCHHAUK ERR, OMA,
VERESHCHETIN; Judges ad hoc Sir Ninian STEPHEN S,KUBISZEWSKI;
Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA. COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1995 1995
30juin
Rôle général
30 juin1995 no 84

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU TIMOR ORIENTAL

(PORTUGAL c. AUSTRALIE)

Traitéde 1989 entre l'Australie et l'Indonésieconcernant le ((Timor Gap».
Exception selon laquelle il n'existerait pas véritablementde différend entre
les Parties Désaccordentre les Parties sur le droit et sur le-faExis-
tence d'undiffërend d'ordrejuridique.
Exception selon laquelle la requête obligeraitla Courprononcer surles
droits et les obligations d'un Etat tiers en l'absence du consentement de cet
Etat - Affaire de l'Ormonétaire pràsRome en 1943 - Question de savoirsi
la conduite objective du défendeurest détachabledu comportement d'un Etat
tiers.

Droit despeuples disposerd'eux-mêmescomme droit opposableerga omnes
et principe essentiel du droitinternational contempo-aiDifférence entre
opposabilitérga omnes d'unenorme et règle duconsentemenà lajuridiction.
Question de savoir si desrésolutionsde l'Assembléegénéraleet du Conseil de
sécurité constituentdes «données» sur le contenu desquelles la Cour n'aurait
pas àstatuer de novo.
Pour les deux Parties, le Territoire du Timor oriental demeure un territoire
non autonome et son peuple a le droitisposer de lui-même.
Droits et obligations d'un Etat tiers constituant l'objet mêmede la décision
demandée - La Cour ne saurait exercer ln compétenàeelle conférépar les

déclarationsfaites par les Parties conformément auparagraphe l'article36
du Statut, pour statuer sur le différend porté tlle par larequête.

Présents: M. BEDJAOU PIr,ésident;M. SCHWEBEV Li,ce-Président;M. ODA,sir
Robert JENNINGS M, M. GUILLAUME S,HAHABUDDEEN, AGUILAR-
MAWDSLEW Y, ERAMANT RAY,JEVAH ,ERCZEGS HH, I,FLEISCHHAUER,
KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN,JU sirSi;nian STEPHENM,. SKUBISZEWSKI,

juges ad hoc; M. VALENCIA-OSPIG Nref,fier. In the case concerning East Timor,

between
the Portuguese Republic,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Antonio Cascais, Ambassador of the Portuguese Republic to the
Netherlands,

as Agent ;
Mr. José ManuelServulo Correia, Professor in the Faculty of Law of the
University ofLisbon and Member of the Portuguese Bar,
Mr. Miguel Galvao Teles, Member of the Portuguese Bar,
as Co-Agents, Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Pierre-MarieDupuy, Professorat the UniversityPanthéon-Assas(ParisII)
and Director of the Institut des hautes étudesinternationalesof Paris,
Mrs. Rosalyn Higgins, Q.C., Professor of International Law in the Univer-
sity of London,
as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Rui Quartin Santos, Minister Plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Lisbon,
Mr. Francisco Ribeiro Telles, First Embassy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,Lisbon,
as Advisers;

Mr. Richard Meese, Advocate, Partner in Frere Cholmeley,Paris,
Mr. Paulo Canelas de Castro, Assistant in the Faculty of Law of the Uni-
versity ofoïnbra,
Mrs. Luisa Duarte, Assistant in the Faculty of Law of the University of
Lisbon,
Mr. Paulo Otero, Assistantin the Faculty of Law of the Universityof Lisbon,
Mr. Iain Scobbie,Lecturer in Law in the Faculty of Law of the Universityof
Dundee, Scotland,
Miss Sasha Stepan, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Counsellors at Law,
Prague,
as Counsel;

Mr. Fernando Figueirinhas, First Secretary, Portuguese Ernbassy in the
Netherlands,
as Secretary,

and

the Commonwealth of Australia,
represented by
Mr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitor-General of Australia,

as Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. MichaelTate, Ambassador of Australia to the Netherlands, former
Minister of Justice,
Mr. Henry Burmester, Principal International Law Counsel, Officeof Inter-
national Law, Attorney-General's Department,
as Co-Agents and Counsel; TIMOR ORIENTAL (ARRÊT)

En l'affaire relativeau Timor oriental,

entre

la République portugaise,
représentéepar

S. Exc. M. Antonio Cascais, ambassadeur de la Républiqueportugaise aux
Pays-Bas,
comme agent;
M. JoséManuel Servulo Correia, professeur à la facultéde droit de 1'Uni-
versitéde Lisbonne et avocat au barreau du Portugal,

M. Miguel Galvao Teles, avocat au barreau du Portugal,
comme coagents, conseils et avocats;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur àl'universitéPanthéon-Assas(Paris II)
et directeur de l'Institut des hautes étudesinternationales de Paris,

MmeRosalyn Higgins, Q.C., professeur de droit international à l'université
de Londres,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Rui Quartin Santos, ministre plénipotentiaire, ministère des affaires
étrangères, Lisbonne,
M. Francisco Ribeiro Telles, premier secrétaired'ambassade, ministère des

affaires étrangères,Lisbonne,
comme conseillers ;
M. Richard Meese, avocat, associédu cabinet Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
M. Paulo Canelas de Castro, assistantà la faculté dedroit de l'universitéde
Coïmbre,

MmeLuisa Duarte, assistante à la facultéde droit de l'université de Lis-
bonne,
M. Paulo Otero, assistant à la facultéde droit de l'universitéde Lisbonne,
M. Iain Scobbie, chargéde cours à la faculté dedroit de l'université de
Dundee, Ecosse,
Ml1"Sasha Stepan, cabinet Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, conseillers juri-
diques, Prague,
comme conseils;

M. Fernando Figueirinhas, premier secrétaire à l'ambassade du Portugal aux
Pays-Bas,
comme secrétaire,

le Commonwealth d'Australie,
représentépar
M. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitov-Generald'Australie,

comme agent et conseil;
S. Exc. M. Michael Tate, ambassadeur d'Australie aux Pays-Bas, ancien mi-
nistre de la justice,
M. Henry Burmester, conseiller principal en droit international, bureau du
droit international, services de l'Attorney-General d'Australie,

comme coagents et conseils; Mr. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C., Whewell Professor emeritus, University of
Cambridge,
Mr. James Crawford, WhewellProfessor of International Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris X-
Nanterre and Institute of Political Studies, Paris,
Mr. Christopher Staker, Counsel assisting the Solicitor-General of Australia,

as Counsel ;
Mr. Christopher Lamb, Legal Adviser, Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade,
Ms Cate Steains, Second Secretary,Australian Embassy in the Netherlands,
Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, Head Lecturer, University of Maine and Insti-

tute of Political Studies, Paris,
as Advisers,

THECOURT,

composed as above,
after deliberation,

delivers thefollowing Judgment:
1. On 22 February 1991,the Ambassador to the Netherlands of the Portu-
guese Republic (hereinafter referred to as "Portugal") filed in the Registry of

the Courtan Application instituting proceedingsagainst the Commonwealth of
Australia (hereinafter referred to as "Australia") concerning "certain activities
of Australia with respect to East Timor". According to the Application
Australia had, by its conduct, "failed to observe . . . the obligation to respect
the duties and powers of [Portugal as]the administering Power [ofEast Timor]
. . . and .. the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and the
related rights". In consequence, according to the Application, Australia had
"incurred international responsibility vis-à-vis both the people of East Timor
and Portugal". As the basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, the Application
refers to the declarations by which the two States have accepted the compul-
soryjurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute.

2. In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Applica-
tion was communicated forthwith to the Australian Government by the
Registrar; and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the same Article, al1the
other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified by the Registrar
of the Application.
3. Byan Order dated 3May 1991,the President of the Court fixed18Novem-

ber 1991as the time-limit for filingthe Memorial of Portugal and 1June 1992
as the time-limitfor filingthe Counter-Memorial of Australia, and those plead-
ings were duly filed within the time-limits so fixed.

4. In its Counter-Memorial, Australia raised questions concerning the juris-
diction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application. In the course of a
meeting held by the President of the Court on 1June 1992with the Agents of
the Parties, pursuant to Article 31 ofthe Rules of Court, the Agents agreed that
these questions were inextricably linked to the merits and that they should
therefore be heard and determined within the framework of the merits. TIMOR ORIENTAL (ARRÊT) 92

M. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C., professeur émérite, ancientitulaire de la chaire
Whewell à l'universitéde Cambridge,

M. James Crawford, professeur de droit international, titulaire de la chaire
Whewell à l'universitéde Cambridge,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur de droit internationaà l'université de Paris X-
Nanterre et à l'Institut d'études politiques de Paris,
M. Christopher Staker, conseiller auprès du Solicitor-General d'Australie,
comme conseils;

M. Christopher Lamb, conseillerjuridique au départementdes affaires étran-
gèreset du commerce extérieur d'Australie,
MmeCate Steains,deuxièmesecrétaire à l'ambassade d'Australieaux Pays-Bas,
M. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, maître de conférences à l'université du Maine et
à l'Institut d'études politiquesde Paris,
comme conseillers.

ainsi composée,
après délibéré ecnhambre du conseil,

rend l'arrêtsuivant:

1. Le 22 février 1991,l'ambassadeuraux Pays-Bas de la Républiqueportu-
gaise (dénommée ci-après le((Portugal))) a déposéau Greffe de la Cour une
requêteintroductive d'instance contre le Commonwealthd'Australie (dénommé
ci-après l'«Australie») au sujet de ((certains agissements de l'Australie se
rapportant au Timor oriental)). Selonla requête, l'Australieaurait,par son com-
portement, ((méconnu ..l'obligation de respecterles devoirs et lescompétences
[du Portugal en tant que] ...puissance administrante [du Timor oriental] ...
et ..le droit du peuple du Timor oriental à disposer de lui-mêmeet les droits
y attenants)). En conséquence,d'après larequête, l'Australieaurait ((engagé
sa responsabilitéinternationale, tantàl'égarddu peuple du Timor oriental que
du Portugal)). Pour fonder la compétence de laCour, la requête fait référence
aux déclarationspar lesquellesles deux Etats ont acceptéla juridiction obliga-
toire de la Cour ainsi qu'il est prévuau paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 de son
Statut.
2. Conformémentau paragraphe 2 de l'article 40 du Statut, la requêtea été

immédiatement communiquéeau Gouvernement australien par le Greffier; et,
conformémentau paragraphe 3 du même article,le Greffier a informéde ladite
requêtetous les autres Etats admis à ester devant la Cour.

3. Par ordonnance en date du 3 mai 1991,le Présidentde la Cour a fixéau
18 novembre 1991la date d'expiration du délaipour le dépôtdu mémoiredu
Portugal et au le' juin 1992 la date d'expiration du délaipour le dépôt du
contre-mémoire del'Australie; ces piècesont étédûment déposéesdans les
délais ainsifixés.
4. Dans son contre-mémoire, l'Australiea soulevé desquestions relatives à
la compétence dela Cour et à la recevabilité dela requête.Au cours d'une
réunion quele Président de laCour a tenue le le'juin 1992avec les agents des
Parties en vertu de l'articledu Règlementde la Cour, ceux-ci sont convenus
que ces questions étaient inextricablementliéesau fond et qu'elles devaient en
conséquenceêtretranchéesdans le cadre de l'examen de l'affaireau fond. 5. By an Order dated 19June 1992,the Court, taking into account the agree-

ment of the Parties in this respect, authorized the filing of a Reply by Portugal
and of a Rejoinder by Australia, and fixed 1 December 1992and 1June 1993
respectively as thetime-limits for the filing of those pleadings. The Reply was
duly filedwithin the time-limit so fixed. By an Order of 19May 1993,the Presi-
dent of the Court, at the request of Australia, extended to 1July 1993the time-
limit for the filing of the Rejoinder. This pleading was filed on 5 July 1993.
Pursuant to Article 44, paragraph 3, of its Rules, having given the other Party
an opportunity to state its views, the Court considered this filing asvalid.

6. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of
either of the Parties, each Party proceeded to exercise the right conferred by
Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the
case; Portugal chose Mr. Antonio de Arruda Ferrer-Correia and Australia Sir
Ninian Martin Stephen. By a letter dated 30 June 1994, Mr. Ferrer-Correia
informed the President of the Court that he was no longer able to sit, and, by

a letter of 14July 1994,the Agent of Portugal informed the Court that its Gov-
ernment had chosen Mr. Krzysztof Jan Skubiszewski to replace him.

7. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court, after
ascertaining the views of the Parties, decided that the pleadings and annexed
documents should be made accessibleto the public from the date of the open-
ing of the oral proceedings.
8. Between30January and 16February 1995,public hearings wereheld in the
course of which the Court heard oral arguments and replies by the following:

For Portugal: H.E. Mr. Antonio Cascais,
Mr. JoséManuel Servulo Correia,
Mr. Miguel Galvao Teles,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
Mrs. Rosalyn Higgins, Q.C.
For Australia: Mr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C.,

H.E. Mr. Michael Tate,
Mr. James Crawford,
Mr. Alain Pellet,
Mr. Henry Burmester,
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C.,
Mr. Christopher Staker.

9. During the oral proceedings, each of the Parties, referring to Article 56,
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, presented documents not previously pro-
duced. Portugal objected to the presentation of one of these by Australia, on
the ground that the document concerned was not "part of a publication readily
available" within the meaning of that provision. Having ascertained Australia's
views, the Court examined the question and informed the Parties that it had
decided not to admit the document to the record in the case.

10. The Parties presented submissions in each of their written pleadings;
in the course of the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were
presented : 5. Par ordonnance en date du 19juin 1992,la Cour, compte tenu de l'accord
des Partiesà cet égard,a autorisé la présentation d'une répliquedu Portugal et
d'une duplique de l'Australie, et a fixéau le' décembre1992et au le' juin 1993,
respectivement, les dates d'expiration des délaispour le dépôtde ces pièces.La
réplique a étédûment déposéedans le délai ainsi fixé.Par ordonnance du
19mai 1993,le Président dela Cour, àla demande de l'Australie, a reportéau
1" juillet 1993la date d'expiration du délaipour le dépôtde la duplique. Cette

piècea été déposéle e 5 juillet 1993. En application du paragraphe 3 de l'ar-
ticle 44 du Règlement, la Cour, après avoir offertà l'autre Partie la possibilité
de faire connaître ses vues, a considéréce dSpôt comme valablement effectué.
6. La Cour ne comptant sur le siègeaucun juge de la nationalité des Parties,
chacune d'elles a procédé,dans l'exercice du droit que lui confère le para-
graphe 3 de l'article 31 du Statutà la désignationd'un juge ad hoc pour siéger
en l'affaire: le Portugal a désignéM. Antonio de Arruda Ferrer-Correia et
l'Australie sirNinian Martin Stephen. Par lettre en date du 30 juin 1994,
M. Ferrer-Correia a informéle Président de laCour qu'il n'était plusen mesure
de siéger;et, par lettre du 14juillet 1994,l'agent du Portugal a fait savoir la
Cour que son gouvernement avait désignépour le remplacer M. Krzysztof Jan
Skubiszewski.

7. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 53 du Règlement, la Cour,
après s'être renseignéa euprès des Parties, a décidé derendre accessibles au
public, à l'ouverture de la procédure orale, les pièces de procédure et docu-
ments annexés.
8. Des audiences publiques ont été tenuesentre le 30janvier et le 16février
1995,au cours desquelles ont étéentendus en leurs plaidoiries et réponses:

Pour le Portugal: S. Exc. M. Antonio Cascais,
M. José Manuel ServuloCorreia,
M. Miguel Galvao Teles,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
Mm' Rosalyn Higgins, Q.C.
Pour l'Australie: M. Gavan Griffith, Q.C.,

S. Exc. M. Michael Tate,
M. James Crawford,
M. Alain Pellet,
M. Henry Burmester,
M. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C.,
M. Christopher Staker.

9. Au cours de la procédure orale,chacune des Parties a présenté desdocu-
ments non antérieurement produits, en se référantau paragraphe 4 de l'ar-
ticle 56 du Règlement. Le Portugal a fait objection à la présentation de l'un
d'eux par l'Australie, motif pris de ce que ledit document ne faisait paspartie
d'une publication facilementaccessible))au sens decette disposition. Après avoir
recueilli les vues de l'Australie, la Cour a examiné la question eta informéles
Parties qu'elle avait décidé de ne pas verserce document au dossier de l'affaire.

10. Les Parties ont présenté des conclusionsdans chacune de leurs piècesde
procédureécrite;au cours de la procédure orale,les conclusions finalesci-après
ont été présentées:On behalf of Portugal,
at the hearing on 13 February 1995(afternoon):

"Having regard to the facts and points of law set forth,

Portugal has the honour to
- Ask the Court to dismiss the objections raised by Australia and to
adjudge and declare that it has jurisdiction to deal with the Applica-
tion of Portugal and that that Application is admissible, and
- Request that it may please the Court:

(1) To adjudge and declare that, first, the rights of the people of East
Timor to self-determination, to territorial integrity and unity and to per-
manent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources and, secondly,
the duties, powers and rights of Portugal as the administering Power of the
Territory of East Timor are opposable to Australia, which is under an
obligation not to disregard them, but to respect them.
(2) To adjudge and declare that Australia, inasmuch as in the first place

it has negotiated, concluded and initiated performance of the Agreement
of 11December 1989,has taken interna1legislativemeasures for the appli-
cation thereof, and is continuing to negotiate, with the State party to that
Agreement, the delimitation of the continental shelf in the area of the
Timor Gap; and inasmuch as it has furthermore excluded any negotiation
with the administering Power with respect to the exploration and exploita-
tion of the continental shelf in thatsame area; and, finally, inasmuch as it
contemplates exploring and exploiting the subsoil of the sea in the Timor
Gap on the basis of a plurilateral title to which Portugal is not a party
(each of these facts sufficing on its own):

(a) has infringed and is infringing the right of the people of East Timor
to self-determination, to territorial integrity and unity and its perma-
nent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources, and is in
breach of the obligation not to disregard but to respect that right,
that integrity and that sovereignty ;
(b) has infringed and is infringing the powers of Portugal as the admin-
istering Power of the Territory of East Timor, is impeding the fulfil-
ment of its duties to the people of East Timor and to the international
community, is infringing the right of Portugal to fulfilits responsibili-

ties and is in breach of the obligation not to disregard but to respect
those powers and duties and that right;
(c) is contravening Security Council resolutions 384 and 389 and is in
breach of the obligation to accept and carry out Security Council
resolutions laid down by the Charter of the United Nations, is dis-
regarding the binding character of the resolutions of United Nations
organs that relate to East Timor and, more generally, is in breach of
the obligation incumbent on Member States to CO-operatein good
faith with the United Nations;

(3) To adjudge and declare that, inasmuch as it has excluded and is
excluding any negotiation with Portugal as the administering Power of the
Territory of East Timor, with respect to the exploration and exploitation
of the continental shelf in the area of the Timor Gap, Australia has failed
and is failing in its duty to negotiate inorder to harmonize the respective
rights in the event of a conflict of rights or of claims over maritime areas. TIMOR ORIENTAL (ARRÊT)

Au nom du Portugal,

à l'audience du 13février1995(après-midi) :
«Vu les faits et les points de droit exposés,

le Portugal a l'honneur de:
- prier la Cour de rejeter les exceptions australiennes et dire et juger

qu'elle a juridiction pour se prononcer sur la requêtedu Portugal et
que celle-ciest recevable, et
- demander qu'ilplaise à la Cour de :
1) Dire et juger que, d'une part, les droits du peuple du Timor oriental
à disposer de lui-même, à l'intégrité età l'unitéde son territoire età sa
souverainetépermanente sur sesrichesseset ressourcesnaturelles et,d'autre

part, les devoirs, les compétenceset les droits du Portugal en tant que puis-
sance administrante du Territoire du Timor oriental sont opposables à
l'Australie, laquelle est tenue de ne pas les méconnaîtreet de les respecter.
2) Dire et juger que l'Australie, du fait d'abord d'avoir négocié, conclu
et commencé l'exécution de l'accorddu 11 décembre 1989, ainsi que
d'avoir pris des mesures législatives internes pour son application, et de
négociertoujours avec 1'Etatpartie à cet accord la délimitationdu plateau
continental dans la zone du «Timor Gap», du fait ensuite d'avoir exclu
toute négociation avecla Puissance administrante quant à l'exploration et
à l'exploitation du plateau continental dans la mêmezone, du fait enfin de

se proposer d'explorer et d'exploiter le sous-sol de la mer dans le «Timor
Gap» sur la base d'un titre plurilatéral auquel le Portugal n'est pas partie
(chacun de ces faits étant,à lui seul, suffisant):

a) a portéet porte atteinte au droit du peuple du Timor oriental à dispo-
ser de lui-même, à l'intégritéetà l'unitéde son territoire età sa sou-

verainetépermanente sur ses richesses et ressources naturelles et viole
l'obligation de ne pas méconnaître et de respecter ce droit, cette inté-
grité etcette souveraineté;
b) a porté et porte atteinte aux compétencesdu Portugal comme puis-
sance administrante du Territoire du Timor oriental, fait obstacle à
l'accomplissement de ses devoirs vis-à-vis du peuple du Timor oriental
et de la communauté internationale, porte atteinte au droit du Portu-
gal d'accomplir ses responsabilités, et viole l'obligation de ne pas
méconnaître et de respecter ces compétences,ces devoirs et ce droit;

c) enfreint les résolutions384et 389du Conseil de sécuritév , iole l'obliga-
tion d'acceptation et d'application des résolutions de ce Conseil
imposéepar la Charte des Nations Unies, méconnaît le caractère obli-
gatoire des résolutions des organes des Nations Unies relatives au
Timor oriental et, plus généralement,viole les devoirs de coopération,
de bonne foi, avec les Nations Unies, propres aux Etats Membres.

3) Dire etjuger que, du fait d'avoir excluet d'exclure toute négociation
avec le Portugal en tant que puissance administrante du Territoire du
Timor oriental, quant à l'exploration et à l'exploitation du plateau conti-
nental dans la zone du «Timor Gap», l'Australie a manquéet manque au
devoir de négocierpour harmoniser les droits respectifs en cas de concours
de droits ou de prétentions sur les espaces maritimes. (4) To adjudge and declare that, by the breaches indicated in para-
graphs 2 and 3 of the present submissions, Australia has incurred interna-
tional responsibility and has caused damage, for which it owes reparation
to the people of East Timor and to Portugal, in such form and manner as
may beindicated bythe Court, giventhenature of the obligations breached.

(5) To adjudge and declare that Australia is bound, in relation to the
people of East Timor, to Portugal and to the international community, to
cease from al1breaches of the rights and international noms referred to in
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the present submissions and in particular, until
such time as the people of East Timor shall have exercisedits right to self-

determination, under the conditions laid down by the United Nations:
(a) to refrain from any negotiation, signatureor ratification of any agree-
ment with a State other than the administering Power concerning the
delimitation, and the exploration and exploitation, of the continental
shelf, or the exerciseof jurisdiction over that shelf, in the area of the

Timor Gap;
(b) to refrain from any act relating to the exploration and exploitation of
the continental shelf in the area of the Timor Gap or to the exercise
of jurisdiction over that shelf, on the basis of any plurilateral title to
which Portugal, as the administering Power of the Territory of East
Timor, is not a party";

On behaif of Australia,
at the hearing on 16 February 1995(afternoon):

"The Government of Australia submits that, for al1the reasons given by
it in the written and oral pleadings, the Court should:
(a) adjudge and declare that the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the
Portuguese claims or that the Portuguese claims are inadmissible; or
(b) alternatively, adjudge and declare that the actions of Australia

invoked by Portugal do not give rise to any breach by Australia of
rights under international law asserted by Portugal."

11. The Territory of East Timor corresponds to the eastern part of the
island of Timor; it includes the island of Atauro, 25 kilometres to the

north, the islet of Jaco to the east, and the enclave of Oé-Cusse in the
western part of the island of Timor.Its capital is Dili, situated on its north
coast. The south coast of East Timor lies omosiAA the north coast of Aus-
tralia, the distance between them being approximately 430 kilometres.
In the sixteenth century, East Timor became a colony of Portugal;

Portugal remained there until 1975. The western part of the island came
under Dutch rule and later became part of independent Indonesia.

12. In resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960 the United Nations
General Assembly recalled "differences of views ... concerning the status

of certain territories under the administrations of Portugal and Spain and
described by these two States as 'overseas provinces' of the metropolitan 4) Dire et juger que, de par les violations mentionnées aux para-
graphes 2 et 3 des présentes conclusions, l'Australiea engagé saresponsa-

bilitéinternationale et causépréjudice,dont elle doit réparationau peuple
du Timor oriental et au Portugal, sous les formes et selon les modalités
qu'ilappartient à la Cour d'indiquer, compte tenu de la nature des obliga-
tions violées.
5) Dire etjuger que l'Australiedoit, vis-à-visdu peuple du Timor orien-
tal, du Portugal et de la communauté internationale,cessertoute violation
des droits et des normes internationales visésaux paragraphes 1,2 et 3 des
présentesconclusions, et notamment, jusqu'à ce que le peuple du Timor
oriental ait exercéson droit de disposer de lui-même,dans les conditions
fixéespar les Nations Unies:

a) s'abstenirde toute négociation, signatureou ratification de tout accord
avec un Etat autre que la Puissance administrante concernant la déli-
mitation, ainsi que l'exploration et l'exploitation du plateau continen-
tal, ou l'exercicede la juridiction sur celui-ci,dans la zone du ((Timor
Gap »;
b) s'abstenir detout acte relatifà l'exploration età l'exploitation du pla-
teau continental dans la zone du ((Timor Gap» ou à l'exercicede la
juridiction sur ce plateau, sur la base de tout titre plurilatéral auquelle
Portugal, en tant que puissance administrante du Territoire du Timor
oriental, ne serait pas partie));

Au nom de l'Australie,

à l'audiencedu 16février1995(après-midi) :
«Le Gouvernement de l'Australie conclut que, pour tous lesmotifs qu'il
a exposésdans ses écritureset ses plaidoiries, la Cour devrait:

a) dire et juger qu'ellen'a pas compétencepour statuer sur les demandes
du Portugal, ou que les demandes du Portugal sont irrecevables; ou
b) subsidiairement, dire et juger que les actes de l'Australie viséspar le
Portugal ne donnent lieu à aucune violation par l'Australie de droits
au regard du droit international que fait valoir le Portugal. »

Il. Le Territoire du Timor oriental correspond à la partie est de l'île
de Timor; il comprend l'île d'Atauro, à 25 kilomètres au nord, l'îlot de
Jaco, à l'est, ainsi que l'enclave d'Oé-Cusse, dans la partie occidentale de
l'île de Timor. La capitale en est Dili, située sur la côte nord de l'île. La
côte sud du Timor oriental fait face à la côte nord de l'Australie, la dis-

tance entre elles étant de 430 kilomètres approximativement.
Au XVIe siècle, leTimor oriental est devenu une colonie portugaise; le
Portugal y est demeuré jusqu'en 1975. La partie occidentale de l'île est
passéesous la domination des Pays-Bas et est devenue par la suite partie
de l'Indonésie indépendante.
12. Dans sa résolution 1542 (XV) du 15 décembre 1960, l'Assemblée

générale desNations Unies a rappelé ((des divergences de vues ... au sujet
du statut de certains territoires administrés par l'Espagne et le Portugal et
dénomméspar ces deux Etats ((provinces d'outre-mer)) de 1'Etat métro-State concerned"; and it also stated that it considered that the territories
under the administration of Portugal, which werelistedtherein (including
"Timor and dependencies")werenon-self-governingterritories within the
meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. Portugal, in the wake of its "Car-
nation Revolution", accepted this position in 1974.

13. Following interna1disturbances in East Timor, on 27 August 1975
the Portuguese civiland military authorities withdrew fromthe mainland
of East Timor to the island of Atauro. On 7 December 1975the armed
forces of Indonesia intervened in East Timor. On 8 December 1975the
Portuguese authorities departed from the island of Atauro, and thus left
East Timor altogether. Sincetheir departure, Indonesia has occupied the
Territory, and the Parties acknowledge that the Territory has remained
under the effectivecontrol of that State. Asserting that on 31 May 1976
the people of East Timor had requested Indonesia "to accept East Timor
as an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia?',on 17July 1976Indo-
nesia enacted a law incorporating the Territory aspart of its national ter-
ritory.
14. Following the intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in the
Territory and the withdrawal of the Portuguese authorities, the question of
East Timor became the subject of two resolutions of the Security Council
and of eight resolutions of the General Assembly, namely, Security Coun-
cil resolutions 384(1975) of22 December 1975and 389 (1976) of22 April
1976, and General Assembly resolutions 3485 (XXX) of 12 December

1975, 31/53 of 1 December 1976, 32/34 of 28 November 1977, 33/39 of
13 December 1978,34/40 of 21 November 1979, 35/27 of 11November
1980, 36/50of 24November 1981and 37/30of 23 November 1982.
15. SecurityCouncil resolution 384(1975)of 22 December 1975called
upon "al1States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well
as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination"; called upon
"the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay al1its forces
from the Territory"; and further called upon
"the Government of Portugal as administering Power to CO-operate
fully with the United Nations so as to enable the people of East

Timor to exercise freelytheir right to self-determination".

SecurityCouncil resolution 389(1976)of 22 April 1976adopted the same
terms with regard to the right of the people of East Timor to self-determi-
nation; called upon "the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without
further delayal1its forcesfrom the Territory"; and further calledupon "al1
States and other parties concerned to CO-operatefully with the United
Nations to achievea peaceful solution to the existingsituation .. .".

General Assemblyresolution 3485(XXX)of 12December 1975referred
to Portugal "as the administering Power"; called upon it "to continue to
make every effort to find a solution by peaceful means"; and "strongly
deplore[d] the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in TIMOR ORIENTAL (ARRÊT) 96

politain)), puis déclaré qu'elle considértsterritoires administréspar le
Portugal (((Timor et dépendances)) compris),tels qu'énuméréd sans la
résolution, commeconstituant des territoires non autonomes au sens du
chapitre XI de la Charte. Le Portugal a accepté cette positionen 1974,
dans le sillage de sa ((révolution des Œillets».
13. A la suite de troubles intérieursau Timor oriental, les autorités
civileset militaires portugaises ont quittél'îlede Timor le 27 août 1975et
se sont repliéessur l'îleAtauro. Le 7 décembre1975,les forces armées
indonésiennessont intervenues au Timor oriental. Le 8 décembre,les
autorités portugaises ont quitté l'île'Atauro et se sont ainsi retirées
entièrement du Timor oriental. Depuis ce retrait, c'est l'Indonésie qui

occupe le Territoire et les Parties reconnaissent que celui-ci est demeuré
sous le contrôle effectif de cet Etat. Alléguant que,le 31 mai 1976, le
peuple du Timor oriental l'avait priée ((d'accepterle Timor oriental
comme partie intégrantede la République d'Indonésie», cette dernièra e,
le 17juillet 1976,adoptéune loi qui intègrele Timor oriental à son ter-
ritoire national.
14. Après l'interventiondes forces armées indonésiennesdans le Ter-
ritoire et le retrait des autoritésportugaises, la question du Timor orien-
tal a fait l'objet de deux résolutionsdu Conseil de sécurité et de huit
résolutions del'Assembléegénérale, à savoir lesrésolutionsdu Conseil de
sécurité384(1975)du 22décembre1975et 389(1976)du 22 avril 1976,et
les résolutions de l'Assembléegénérale3485 (XXX) du 12 décembre
1975, 31/53du le' décembre1976,32134du 28 novembre 1977,33/39du
13 décembre1978, 34/40 du 21 novembre 1979, 35/27du 11 novembre

1980, 36/50du 24 novembre 1981et 37/30du 23 novembre 1982.
15. Dans sa résolution384 (1975)du 22 décembre1975,le Conseil de
sécuritéa demandé d'unepart «à tous les Etats de respecter l'intégrité
territoriale du Timor oriental ainsi que le droit inaliénable deson peuple
à l'autodétermination» et d'autre part «au Gouvernement indonésien de
retirer sans délai toutessesforces du Territoire));il a également demandé
«au Gouvernement portugais, en tant que puissance administrante,

de coopérer pleinement avecl'organisation des Nations Unies afin
de permettre au peuple du Timor oriental d'exercer librement son
droità l'autodétermination».
Dans sa résolution389(1976)du 22 avril 1976,le Conseil de sécurités'est
exprimédans les mêmestermes en ce qui concerne le droit du peuple du
Timor oriental à l'autodétermination; il a demandéau ((Gouvernement

indonésien de retirersans plus tarder toutes ses forces du Territoire)) et a
demandé enoutre à ((tous les Etats età toutes les autres parties inté-
resséesde coopérer pleinement avecl'organisation des Nations Unies en
vue d'apporter une solution pacifiqueà la situation existan..»
Dans sa résolution 3485 (XXX) du 12 décembre 1975, l'Assemblée
généralea mentionnéle Portugal comme ((puissance administrante)), a
demandé à celui-ci«de continuer de n'épargneraucun effort pour trou-
ver une solution par des voiespacifiques))et aéplor[év ]ivementl'inter-Portuguese Timor". In resolution 31/53of 1December 1976,and again in
resolution 32134of 28 November 1977,the General Assembly rejected

"the claim that East Timor has been incorporated into Indonesia,
inasmuch as the people of the Territory have not been able to exer-
cise freeiy their right to self-determination and independence".

Security Council resolution 389 (1976)of 22 April 1976and General
Assembly resolutions 31/53 of 1 December 1976, 32/34 of 28 November
1977and 33/39 of 13 December 1978made no reference to Portugal as
the administering Power. Portugal is so described, however, in Security
Council resolution 384(1975)of 22 December 1975and inthe other reso-
lutions of the General Assembly. Also, those resolutions which did not
specificallyrefer to Portugal as the administering Power recalled another
resolution or other resolutions which so referred to it.

16. No further resolutions on the question of East Timor have been
passed by the Security Council since 1976 or by the General Assembly
since 1982.However, the Assembly has maintained the item on its agenda
since 1982,while deciding at each session, on the recommendation of its

General Committee, to defer consideration of it until the following ses-
sion. East Timor also continues to be included in the list of non-self-
governing territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter;
and the SpecialCommittee on the Situation with Regard to the Implemen-
tation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples remains seised of the question of East Timor. The
Secrets-ry-Generalof the United Nations is also engaged in a continuing
effort, in consultation with al1parties directly concerned, to achieve a
comprehensive settlement of the problem.
17. The incorporation of East Timor as part of Indonesia was recog-
nized by Australia de facto on 20 January 1978.On that date the Aus-
tralian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated: "The Government has made
clear publicly its opposition to the Indonesian intervention and has made
this known to the Indonesian Government." He added: "[Indonesia's]
control is effectiveand covers al1major administrative centres of the ter-

ritory."And further :
"This is a reality with which we must come to terms. Accordingly,
the Government has decided that although it remains critical of the

means by which integration was brought about it would be unreal-
istic to continue to refuse to recognize de facto that East Timor is
part of Indonesia."

On 23 February 1978the Minister said: "we recognize the fact that East
Timor is part of Indonesia, but not the means by which this was brought
about".vention militaire des forces armées indonésiennesau Timor portugais)).
Dans sa résolution 31/53 du le' décembre 1976, et à nouveau dans sa
résolution32/34 du 28 novembre 1977,l'Assembléegénéralea rejeté

((l'allégationselon laquelle le Timor oriental a été intégàé]'Indo-
nésie,dans la mesure où la population du Territoire n'a pas été à
même d'exercelribrement son droit àl'autodéterminationet à l'indé-
pendance».

La résolutiondu Conseil de sécurité 389 (1976)du 22 avril 1976et les
résolutionsde l'Assembléegénérale31/53du le' décembre1976, 32/34du
28 novembre 1977et 33/39du 13 décembre1978ne font pas mention du

Portugal comme puissanceadministrante.Toutefois, lePortugal estdésigné
ainsi dans la résolutiondu Conseil de sécurit384 (1975)du 22 décembre
1975, ainsi que dans les autres résolutions del'Assembléegénérale.Par
ailleurs, les résolutions qui nefont pas spécifiquementréférencaeu Portu-
gal comme puissance administrante du Timor oriental rappellent une ou
plusieurs autres résolutionsoù le Portugal est mentionné comme telle.
16. Aucune nouvelle résolutionsur la question du Timor oriental n'a
étéadoptée par le Conseil de sécuritédepuis 1976, ni par l'Assemblée
généraledepuis 1982.Toutefois, l'Assembléegarde ce point à son ordre
du jour depuis 1982,tout en décidant à chaque session, sur la recomman-
dation de son bureau, d'en remettre l'examen à la session suivante. Le
Timor oriental continue par ailleurs de figurer sur la liste des territoires

non autonomes au sens du chapitre XI de la Charte; et le Comitéspécial
chargé d'étudierla situation en ce qui concerne l'application de la décla-
ration sur l'octroi de l'indépendanceaux pays et aux peuples coloniaux
reste saisi de la question du Timor oriental. De son côté,le Secrétaire
général desNations Unies poursuit ses efforts, en consultation avec
toutes les parties directement intéressée,n vue de parvenir à un règle-
ment global du problème.
17. L'incorporation du Timor oriental à l'Indonésie aétéreconnue de
facto par l'Australie le 20janvier 1978.Ce jour-là, le ministre australien
des affaires étrangères adéclaré: «Le gouvernement a manifestépubli-
quement son opposition à l'intervention indonésienneet il en a informéle

Gouvernement indonésien));puis il a ajouté:«[Le]contrôle [de l7Indoné-
sie sur le Timor oriental] est effectif et s'exerce sur tous les principaux
centres administratifs du territoire.)) Le ministre a en outre expliqué:

«Il y a là une réalitédont nous devons prendre notre parti. Aussi
le gouvernement a-t-il décidéque, mêmes'il critique toujours les
moyens par lesquels l'intégration aété effectuéil,serait irréaliste de
persisteràrefuser de reconnaître defacto que le Timor oriental fait
partie de l'Indonésie))

Le 23 février1978,le ministre a affirmé:«nous reconnaissons le fait que
le Timor oriental fait partie de l'Indonésie,mais non les moyens qui ont
permis d'aboutir à ce résultat». On 15 December 1978 the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
declared that negotiations which were about to begin between Australia
and Indonesia for the delimitation of the continental shelf between Aus-
tralia and East Timor, "when they start, will signifydejure recognition
by Australia of the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor"; he added:
"The acceptance of this situation does not alter the opposition which the
Governmenthas consistently expressedregarding the manner of incorpo-
ration." The negotiations in question began in February 1979.

18. Prior to this, Australia and Indonesia had, in 1971-1972,estab-
lished a delimitation of the continental shelf between their respective
coasts; the delimitation so effected stopped short on either side of the
continental shelf between the south coast of East Timor and the north
coast of Australia. This undelimited part of the continental shelf was
called the "Timor Gap".
The delimitation negotiations which began in February 1979between
Australia and Indonesia related to the Timor Gap; they did not come to
fruition. Australia and Indonesia then turned to the possibility of estab-

lishing a provisional arrangement for the joint exploration and exploita-
tion of the resources of an area of the continental shelf. Treaty to this
effect was eventually concluded between them on 11 December 1989,
whereby a "Zone of Cooperation" was created "in an area between the
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia". Australia
enacted legislation in 1990with a view to implementing the Treaty; this
law came into force in 1991.

19. In these proceedings Portugal maintains that Australia, in nego-
tiating and concluding the 1989Treaty, in initiating performance of the
Treaty, in taking interna1legislativemeasures for its application, and in
continuing to negotiate with Indonesia, has acted unlawfully, in that it

has infringed the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination
and to permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, infringed the
rights of Portugal as the administering Power, and contravened Security
Council resolutions 384 and 389.Australia raised objections to the juris-
diction of the Court and to the admissibility of the Application. It took
the position, however, that these objections were inextricably linked to
the merits and should therefore be determined within the framework of
the merits. The Court heard the Parties both on the objections and on the
merits. WhileAustralia concentrated its main arguments and submissions
on the objections, it also submitted that Portugal's case on the merits
should be dismissed,maintaining, in particular, that its actions did not in
any way disregard the rights of Portugal. Le 15 décembre1978, le ministre australien des affaires étrangères a
déclaré, à propos des négociations qui étaient sur le point de s'ouvrir
entre l'Australie et l'Indonésie en vuede la délimitationdu plateau conti-
nental entre l'Australie et le Timor oriental:«lorsqu7elles débuteront,
elles signifieront la reconnaissance dejure par l'Australie de l'intégration
du Timor oriental dans l'Indonésie»;et le ministre a ajouté: ((Accepter
cette situation ne change rien à l'opposition que le gouvernement n'a
cesséd'exprimer quant aux conditions dans lesquelles le Territoire a été
incorporé à l'Indonésie.» Les négociations enquestion ont commencé en

février1979.
18. Antérieurement, l'Australie et l'Indonésieavaient, en 1971-1972,
procédé àune délimitationdu plateau continental s'étendant entre leurs
côtes respectives; la délimitation ainsi opérés'interrompait de part et
d'autre du plateau continental situéentre la côte sud du Timor oriental et
la côte nord de l'Australie. Cette partie non délimitéedu plateau conti-
nental a été désigné par l'expression anglaise«Timor Gap)).
Les négociations relatives à la délimitation qui ont commencé en
février 1979 entre l'Australie et l'Indonésie portaient sur le ((Timor
Gap»; ellesn'ont pas abouti. L'Australie et l'Indonésieont alors envisagé
la possibilitéde conclure un arrangement provisoire en vue de I'explora-
tion et de l'exploitation conjointes des ressources d'un secteur du plateau
continental. A cet effet, elles ont finalement conclu, le 11décembre1989,
un traité auxtermes duquel une ((zone de coopération))est créée«dans

un secteur situé entre la province indonésienne du Timor oriental et
l'Australie septentrionale)). En 1990,l'Australie a adoptéune loi visant
la mise en Œuvredu traité; cette loi est entrée envigueur en 1991.

19. En la présente instance, lePortugal soutient que l'Australie, en
négociantet concluant le traité de 1989,en commençant à l'exécuter, en
prenant des mesures législativesinternes pour son application et en pour-
suivant des négociations avec l'Indonésie,a agi de manière illiciteen ce

qu'ellea porté atteinteaux droits du peuple du Timor orientalà disposer
de lui-mêmeet àla souverainetépermanente sur sesressources naturelles,
portéatteinte aux droits du Portugal comme puissance administrante et
enfreint les résolutions384 et 389 du Conseil de sécurité. L'Australiea
soulevé des exceptions àla compétencede la Cour et à la recevabilitéde
la requête. Ellea toutefois estiméque ces exceptions étaientinextricable-
ment liéesau fond et qu'il devait en conséquenceêtre statué surcelles-ci
dans le cadre de l'examen de l'affaire au fond. La Cour a entendu les
Parties sur les exceptions et sur le fond. Bien qu'ayant fait porter son
argumentation et ses conclusions à titre principal sur lesdites exceptions,
l'Australie a égalementdemandéque lesgriefs du Portugal au fond soient
rejetés, ensoutenant, en particulier, que les actes qu'elle a commis ne
méconnaissenten rien les droits du Portugal. 20. According to one of the objections put forward by Australia, there
exists in reality no dispute between itself and Portugal. In another objec-
tion, it argued that Portugal's Application would require the Court to
rule on the rights and obligations of a State which is not a party to the
proceedings, namely Indonesia. According to further objections of Aus-
tralia, Portugal lacks standing to bring the case, the argument being that
it does not have a sufficient interest of its own to institute the proceed-
ings, notwithstandingthe references to it in some of the resolutions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly as the administering Power
of East Timor, and that it cannot, furthermore, claim any right to repre-
sent the people of East Timor; its claims are remote from reality, and the
judgment the Court is asked to give would be without useful effect; and
finally,its claimsconcern matters which are essentiallynot legalin nature

which should be resolved by negotiation within the framework of on-
going procedures before the political organs of the United Nations.
Portugal requested the Court to dismiss al1these objections.

21. The Court will now consider Australia's objection that there is in
reality no dispute between itself and Portugal. Australia contends that
the case as presented by Portugal is artificiallylimited to the question of
the lawfulness of Australia's conduct, and that the true respondent is
Indonesia, not Australia. Australia maintains that it is being sued in
place of Indonesia. In this connection, it points out that Portugal and
Australia have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, but that Indonesia has not.

In support of the objection, Australia contends that it recognizes, and
has always recognized, the right of the people of East Timor to self-
determination,the status of East Timor as a non-self-governingterritory,
and the fact that Portugal has been named by the United Nations as the
administering Power of East Timor; that the arguments of Portugal, as
well as its submissions, demonstrate that Portugal does not challengethe
capacity of Australia to conclude the 1989 Treaty and that it does not
contest the validity of the Treaty;and that consequently there is in reality
no dispute between itself and Portugal.
Portugal, for its part, maintains that its Application defines the real
and only dispute submitted to the Court.
22. The Court recalls that, in the sense accepted in its jurisprudence

and that of its predecessor, a dispute is a disagreement on a point of law
or fact, a conflict of legal viewsor interests between parties (seeMavrom-
matis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C. 1.J., Series A,
No. 2, p. 11 ;Northern Cameroons,Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 27 ;
and Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitvate under Section 21 of the
United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory TIMOR ORIENTAL (ARRÊT) 99

20. D'aprèsl'une des exceptions présentéep sar l'Australie, il n'existe-
rait pas véritablement de différendentre elle-mêmeet le Portugal; et,
d'aprèsune autre exception, la requêtedu Portugal obligerait la Cour à
statuer sur les droits et les obligations d'un Etat qui n'est pas partià
l'instance,à savoir l'Indonésie. Selond'autres exceptions australiennes
encore, le Portugal n'aurait pas qualité pour agir en l'espèce, car il
n'aurait pas d'intérêptropre suffisant pour introduire l'instance, en dépit
du fait que certaines résolutiorisdu Conseil de sécuritet de l'Assemblée
générale le mentionnent comme puissance administrante du Timor orien-
tal, et il ne pourrait davantage justifier d'un droit de représentation du
peuple du Timor oriental; les demandes du Portugal seraient éloignéed se

la réalité et l'arrêt qu'il ieCour de rendre serait dénué d'effeuttile; et
enfin ses demandes porteraient sur des questions essentiellementnon juri-
diques qui devraient êtrerégléepsar voie de négociationdans le cadre des
procédures encours devant les organes politiques de l'organisation des
Nations Unies. Le Portugal a priéla Cour de rejeter toutes cesexceptions.

21. La Cour commencera par examiner l'exceptionde l'Australie selon
laquelle il n'existerait pas véritablementde différendentre l'Australie et le
Portugal. L'Australie soutient que l'affaire telle que présentéepar le Por-
tugal est artificiellement limitéà la question de la licéitédu comporte-
ment de l'Australie et que le véritable défendeur est l'Indonésiee,t non
l'Australie. Elle expose qu'elle a étéassignée enlieu et place de 1'Indo-

nésie.L'Australie fait observerà ce sujet que le Portugal et elle-mêmont
acceptéla juridiction obligatoire de la Cour conformément au para-
graphe 2 de l'article 36 de son Statut, mais que tel n'est pas le cas de
l'Indonésie.
A l'appui de son exception, l'Australie affirme qu'elle reconnaît, et
qu'ellea toujours reconnu, le droit du peuple du Timor oriental àdispo-
ser de lui-même, lestatut de territoire non autonome du Timor oriental et
le fait que le Portugal a étédésignpar l'Organisation des Nations Unies
comme puissance administrante du Timor oriental; que les moyens
avancéset les conclusions présentéespar le Portugal démontrent que
celui-cine met pas en cause la capacité del'Australie de conclure le traité
de 1989et ne conteste pas la validitéde ce traité;et que, par conséquent,
il n'existe pas véritablementde différendqui l'opposerait au Portugal.
Le Portugal, pour sa part, soutient que sa requêtedéterminel'unique et

véritable différend soumis à la Cour.
22. La Cour rappellera qu'au sens admis dans sajurisprudence et celle
de sa devancièreun différend est un désaccordsur un point dedroit ou de
fait, un conflit, une opposition de thèsesjuridiques ou d'intérêsntre des
parties (voir Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrêt no 2, 1924,
C.P.J.Z. sérieA no 2, p. 11;Cameroun septentrional,arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil
1963, p. 27, et Applicabilité de l'obligation d'arbitraen vertu de la sec-
tion 21 de lhccord du 26juin 1947 relatif ausiège del'Organisation desOpinion, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 27, para. 35). In order to establish the
existence of a dispute, "It must be shown that the claim of one party is

positively opposed by the other" (South West Africa, Preliminary Objec-
tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328); and further, "Whether
there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determina-
tion" (Interpretationof Peace TreatieswithBulgaria,Hungary andRoma-
nia, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950,p. 74).

For the purpose of verifying the existence of a legal dispute in the
present case, it is not relevant whether the "real dispute" is between Por-
tugal and Indonesia rather than Portugal and Australia. Portugal has,
rightly or wrongly, formulated complaints of fact and law against Aus-
tralia which the latter has denied. By virtue of this denial, there is a legal
dispute.
On the record before the Court, it is clear that the Parties are in dis-
agreement,both on the law and on the facts, on the question whether the
conduct of Australia in negotiating, concluding and initiating perfor-
mance of the 1989Treaty was in breach of an obligationdue by Australia
to Portugal under international law.
Indeed, Portugal's Application limits the proceedings to these ques-
tions. There nonetheless exists a legal dispute between Portugal and Aus-

tralia. This objection of Australia must therefore be dismissed.

23. The Court willnow consider Australia's principal objection, to the
effect that Portugal's Application would require the Court to determine
the rights and obligations of Indonesia. The declarations made by the
Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute do not include any
limitation which would exclude Portugal's claims from the jurisdiction
thereby conferred upon the Court. Australia, however, contends that the
jurisdiction so conferred would not enable the Court to act if, in order to
do so, the Court were required to rule on the lawfulness of Indonesia's
entry into and continuing presence in East Timor, on the validity of the
1989Treaty between Australia and Indonesia, or on the rights and obli-
gations of Indonesia under that Treaty, even if the Court did not have to
determineits validity. Portugal agrees that if its Application required the
Court to decide any of these questions, the Court could not entertain it.
The Parties disagree, however, as to whether the Court is required to
decide any of these questions in order to resolve the dispute referred to it.

24. Australia argues that the decision sought from the Court by Por-
tugal would inevitablyrequire the Court to rule on the lawfulness of the
conduct of a third State, namely Indonesia, in the absence of that State's
consent. In support of its argument, it cites the Judgrnent in the casecon-
cerning Monetary GoldRemovedfrom Rome in 1943,in which the Court
ruled that, in the absence of Albania's consent,it could not take any deci-Nations Unies,avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1988,p. 27, par. 35). Pour
établirl'existenced'un différend: «Il faut démontrer que la réclamation
de l'une desparties se heurte à l'opposition manifeste de l'autre)) (Sud-
Ouest africain, exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962,
p. 328); par ailleurs, ((l'existenced'un différendinternational demandà
être établie objectivement))(Interprétation des traitésde paix conclus
avec la Bulgarie, laHongrie et la Roumanie, premièrephase, avis consul-
tatif, C.I.J. Recueil950,p. 74).

Aux fins de vérifier l'existenced'un différend d'ordre juridique en
l'espèce,il est sans importance de déterminer si le ((différendvéritable))
oppose le Portugal à l'Indonésie plutôt qu'à l'Australie. Atort ouà rai-
son, le Portugal a formulé des griefs en fait et en droit l'encontre de
l'Australie et celle-ciles a rejetés.Du fait de ce rejet, il existeun différend
d'ordre juridique.
En effet, au vu du dossier soumis à la Cour, il est clair que les Parties
sont en désaccord, à la fois sur le droit et sur les faits, qàasavoir si
l'Australie,en négociant,concluant et commençant àexécuterle traitéde
1989,a violéune obligation qu'elleavait vis-à-visdu Portugal en vertu du
droit international.

Certes la requêtedu Portugal limite la portée de l'instanceàces ques-
tions.Il n'en existepas moins un différendd'ordrejuridique entre le Por-
tugal et l'Australie.Cette exceptionde l'Australiedoit dèslors êtreécartée.

23. La Cour examinera maintenant l'exceptionprincipale de 1'Austra-
lieselon laquellela requête du Portugal obligeraitlaCour à seprononcer
sur les droits et les obligations de l'Indonésie.Les déclarations faites par
les Parties conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut ne
contiennent aucune restriction qui exclurait les demandes du Portugal du
champ de la compétenceainsi conférée à la Cour. Toutefois, l'Australie

soutient que cette compétencene permettrait pas à la Cour de statuer si,
pour ce faire, la Cour était dans l'obligationde seprononcer sur la licéité
de l'entrée etdu maintien de l'Indonésieau Timor oriental, sur la validité
du traité de1989entre l'Australie et l'Indonésie, ou surles droits et obli-
gations de l'Indonésie auxtermes dudit traité,mêmesi la Cour n'avait
pas à déciderde la validité decelui-ci. LePortugal convient que la Cour
ne pourrait connaître de sa requêtesicelle-cil'obligeaitstatuer sur l'une
de cesquestions. Mais lesParties sont en désaccordsur le point de savoir
si la Cour aà seprononcer sur l'unede cesquestionsaux fins de trancher
le différendqui lui a étésoumis.
24. L'Australie prétend que ladécisionque le Portugal demande àla
Cour de rendre conduirait inévitablement celle-ci à statuer sur la licéité

du comportement d'un Etat tiers, à savoir l'Indonésie,en l'absence du
consentementde cet Etat. A l'appui de sa thèse,elleinvoquel'arrêt rendu
en l'affaire de'Or monétairepris à Rome en 1943,dans lequel la Cour
a jugé qu'en l'absence du consentement de l'Albanie elle ne pouvaitsion on the international responsibility of that State since "Albania's
legal interests would not only be affected by a decision, but would form
the very subject-matter of the decision" (I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32).

25. In reply, Portugal contends, first, that its Applications concerned

exclusively with the objective conduct of Australia, which consists in
having negotiated, concluded and initiated performance of the 1989
Treaty with Indonesia, and that this question is perfectly separable from
any question relating to the lawfulness of the conduct of Indonesia.
According to Portugal, such conduct of Australia in itself constitutes a
breach of its obligation to treat East Timor as a non-self-governing ter-
ritory and Portugal as its administering Power; and that breach could be
passed upon by the Court by itselfand without passing upon the rights of
Indonesia. The objective conduct of Australia, considered as such, con-
stitutes the only violation of international law of which Portugal com-
plains.
26. The Court recalls in this respect that one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of its Statute is that it cannot decidea dispute between States with-
out the consent of those States to its jurisdiction. This principle was
reaffirmed in the Judgment given by the Court in the case concerning
Monetary GoldRemovedfrom Rome in 1943 and confirmed in several of
its subsequent decisions(see Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriyu/
Malta), Applicationfor PermissiontoIntervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

1984,p. 25, para. 40; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 431, para. 88 ; Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 579, para. 49; Land, Island andMaritime Frontier Dispute (El
Salvador/Honduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1990,pp. 114-116,paras. 54-56,and p. 112,para. 73; and Certain Phos-
phate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 259-262,paras. 50-55).
27. The Court notes that Portugal's claim that, in entering into the
1989Treaty with Indonesia, Australia violated the obligation to respect
Portugal's status as administering Power and that of East Timor as a
non-self-governing territory, is based on the assertion that Portugal
alone, in its capacity as administering Power, had the power to enter into
the Treaty on behalf of East Timor; that Australia disregarded this exclu-
sivepower, and, in so doing, violated its obligations to respect the status
of Portugal and that of East Timor.
The Court also observes that Australia, for its part, rejects Portugal's
claimto the exclusivepower to conclude treaties on behalf of East Timor,

and the very fact that it entered into the 1989 Treaty with Indonesia
showsthat it considered that Indonesia had that power. Australia in sub-
stance argues that even if Portugal had retained that power, on whatever
basis, after withdrawing from East Timor, the possibility existed that the
power could later pass to another State under general international law, prendre de décisionsur la responsabilitéinternationale de cet Etat, dès
lors que «les intérêts juridiquesde l'Albanie seraient non seulement

touchés par une décision, mais constitueraient l'objet mêmede ladite
décision))(C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 32).
25. En réponse, le Portugal fait tout d'abord valoir que sa requête
porte exclusivement sur la conduite objective de l'Australie consistantà
avoir négocié,conclu et commencé d'exécuterle traité de 1989 avec
l'Indonésie, et que cette questionest parfaitement détachable de toute
question relativeà la licéitédu comportement de l'Indonésie. Selonle
Portugal, cette conduite de l'Australie constituerait en soi une violation
de l'obligation qu'avait celle-cide traiter le Timor oriental comme un ter-
ritoire non autonome et le Portugal comme sa puissance administrante;
et la Cour pourrait examiner ce manquement de l'Australie en lui-même,
sans se prononcer sur les droits de l'Indonésie.La conduite objective de
l'Australie, considérée commetelle, constituerait la seule violation du

droit international que dénoncele Portugal.
26. La Cour rappellera à cet égardque l'un des principes fondamen-
taux de son Statut est qu'elle ne peut trancher un différendentre des
Etats sans que ceux-ci aient consenti à sa juridiction. Ce principe a été
réaffirmé dans l'arrêtrendu par la Cour en l'affaire de'Ormonétairepris
à Rome en 1943,puis confirmédans plusieurs de ses décisionsultérieures
(voir Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), requêtea
Jin d'intervention, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil 1984, p. 25, par. 40; Activités
militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicara-
gua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), compétence etrecevabilité,arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1984, p. 431, par. 88 ;Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/Répu-
blique du Mali), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil 1986, p. 579, par. 49; Différend
frontalier terrestre,insulaireet maritime (Elalvador/Honduras), requête
afin d'intervention, arrêt, C.IJ.. Recueil 1990, p. 114-116,par. 54-56, et

p. 122,par. 73, et Certaines terreà phosphates a Nauru (Nauru c. Aus-
tralie), exceptions préliminaires,arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil 1992, p. 259-262,
par. 50-55).
27. La Cour constate que si le Portugal soutient que l'Australie, en
concluant avec l'Indonésiele traitéde 1989,a violél'obligation derespec-
ter la qualité de puissance administrante du Portugal et le statut de terri-
toire non autonome du Timor oriental, c'estparce qu'il considère quelui
seul, en sa qualité de puissanceadministrante, avaitle pouvoir de conclure
le traité pour le compte du Timor oriental, que l'Australie a méconnuce
pouvoir exclusifet qu'ellea de ce fait violéles obligations qu'elleavait de
respecter la qualitédu Portugal et le statut du Timor oriental.
La Cour observe aussi que l'Australie, quantà elle,rejette la prétention
du Portugal à l'exclusivitédu pouvoir de conclure des traités pour le

compte du Timor oriental; lefait mêmeque l'Australie ait conclu le traité
de 1989avec l'Indonésiemontre qu'elle a considéréque l'Indonésie déte-
nait ce pouvoir. L'Australie soutient en substance que même si,d'une
façon ou d'une autre, le Portugal avait conservéce pouvoir après s'être
retirédu Timor oriental, il étaitpossible que ledit pouvoir échût ensuiteand that it did so pass to Indonesia; Australia affirms moreover that, if
the power in question did pass to Indonesia, it was acting in conformity
with international law in entering into the 1989Treaty with that State,
and could not have violated any of the obligations Portugal attributes to
it.Thus, for Australia, the fundamental question in the present case is
ultimately whether, in 1989,the power to conclude a treaty on behalf of

East Timor in relation to its continental shelf lay with Portugal or with
Indonesia.

28. The Court has carefully considered the argument advanced by
Portugal which seeks to separate Australia's behaviour from that of
Indonesia. However, in the view of the Court, Australia's behaviour can-
not be assessed without first entering into the question why it is that
Indonesia could not lawfullyhave concluded the 1989Treaty, while Por-
tugal allegedlycould have done so; the very subject-matter of the Court's
decision would necessarily be a determination whether, having regard to
the circumstances in which Indonesia entered and remained in East
Timor, it could or could not have acquired the power to enter into trea-
ties on behalf of East Timor relating to the resources of its continental
shelf. The Court could not make such a determination in the absence of
the consent of Indonesia.
29. However, Portugal puts forward an additional argument aiming
to show that the principle formulated by the Court in the case concern-
ing Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 is not applicable in
the present case. It maintains, in effect, that the rights which Australia

allegedly breached were rights erga omnes and that accordingly Portugal
could require it, individually, to respect them regardless of whether or
not another State had conducted itself in a similarly unlawful manner.
In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to
self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United
Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable. The
principle of self-determination of peoples has been recognized by the
United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court (see
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Coun-
cilResolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,I.C.J. Reports 1971,pp. 31-
32, paras. 52-53 ; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1975, pp. 31-33, paras. 54-59); it is one of the essential principles of con-
temporary international law. However, theCourt considers that the erga
omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two
different things. Whatever the nature of the obligations invoked, the
Court could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its
judgment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of

another State which is not a party to the case. Where this is so, the
Court cannot act, even if the right in question is a right erga omnes. TIMOR ORIENTAL (ARRÊT) 102

un autre Etat en application du droit international général, et qu'ila

effectivementéchu à l'Indonésie; et l'Australieaffirme que si le pouvoir
en question a échu à l'Indonésie, en concluant aveccelle-ci le traitéde
1989, elle a agi conformément au droit international et n'a pu violer
aucune des obligations que le Portugal met à sa charge. En conséquence,
pour l'Australie, la question fondamentale en l'espèceest en définitive
cellede savoir qui, du Portugal ou de l'Indonésie,avait, en 1989,le pou-
voir de conclure pour le compte du Timor oriental un traité concernant
son plateau continental.
28, La Cour a examiné attentivement l'argumentation du Portugal
tendantà dissocierlecomportement de l'Australie de celuide l'Indonésie.
Elle est toutefois d'avis qu'ilne lui est pas possible de porter un jugement
sur le comportement de l'Australie sans examiner d'abord les raisons

pour lesquelles l'Indonésien'aurait pu licitement conclure le traité de
1989 alors que le Portugal aurait pu le faire; l'objet mêmede la décision
de la Cour serait nécessairementde déterminersi, compte tenu des cir-
constances dans lesquelles l'Indonésie est entréeet s'est maintenue au
Timor oriental, elle pouvait ou non acquérirle pouvoir de conclure au
nom de celui-cides traitésportant sur lesressources de son plateau conti-
nental. La Cour ne saurait rendre une telle décision enl'absence du
consentement de l'Indonésie.
29. Le Portugal avance cependant un argument additionnel aux finsde
démontrer que le principe formulé par la Cour dans l'affaire de l'Or
monétairepris à Rome en 1943 ne trouve pas à s'appliquer en l'espèce.Il

soutient en effet que les droits que l'Australie aurait violésétaient oppo-
sables erga omnes et que, par conséquent,le Portugal pouvait exiger de
l'Australie, prise individuellement, le respect de ces droits, qu'un autre
Etat ait ou non adoptéun comportement illicite analogue.
La Cour considère qu'iln'y a rien àredire àl'affirmation du Portugal
selon laquelle le droit des peuples disposer d'eux-mêmes,tel qu'il s'est
développé à partir de la Charte et de la pratique de l'organisation des
Nations Unies, est un droit opposable erga omnes. Le principe du droit
des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmesa été reconnupar la Charte des
Nations Unies et dans la jurisprudence de la Cour (voir Conséquences
juridiques pour les Etats de la présencecontinue de l'Afrique du Sud en
Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du

Conseilde sécuritéa,vis consultatiS,C.I.J. Recueil 1971,p. 31-32,par. 52-
53 ; Sahara occidental, avis consultatiJ; C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 31-33,
par. 54-59); il s'agitlà d'un des principesessentielsdu droit international
contemporain. Toutefois, la Cour estime que l'opposabilité erga omnes
d'une norme et la règledu consentement a la juridiction sont deux choses
différentes. Quelle que soit la nature des obligations invoquées, laCour
ne saurait statuer sur la licéitédu comportement d'un Etat lorsque la
décision à prendre implique une appréciation de la licéitédu comporte-
ment d'un autre Etat qui n'est pas partie à l'instance. En pareil cas, la
Cour ne saurait se prononcer, mêmesi le droit en cause est opposable
erga omnes. 30. Portugal presents a final argument to challenge the applicability to
the present case of the Court's jurisprudence in the case concerning Mon-
etary GoldRemovedfrom Rome in 1943.It argues that the principal mat-
ters on which its claims are based, namely the status of East Timor as a
non-self-governing territory and its own capacity as the administering

Power of the Territory, have already been decided by the General Assem-
bly and the Security Council, acting within their proper spheres of com-
petence; that in order to decide on Portugal's claims, the Court might
well need to interpret those decisions but would not have to decide de
novo on their content and must accordingly take them as "givens"; and
that consequentlythe Court is not required in this case to pronounce on
the question of the use of force by Indonesia in East Timor or upon the
lawfulness of its presence in the Territory.

Australia objects that the United Nations resolutions regarding East
Timor do not say what Portugal claims they say; that the last resolution
of the Security Council on East Timor goes back to 1976 and the last
resolution of the General Assembly to 1982,and that Portugal takes no
account of the passage of time and the developments that have taken

place since then; and that the Security Council resolutions are not reso-
lutions which are binding under Chapter VI1of the Charter or otherwise
and, moreover, that they are not framed in mandatory terms.

31. The Court notes that the argument of Portugal under considera-
tion rests on the premise that the United Nations resolutions,and in par-
ticularthose of the Security Council, can be read as imposing an obliga-
tion on States not to recognize any authority on the part of Indonesia
over the Territory and, where the latter is concerned, to deal only with
Portugal. The Court is not persuaded, however, that the relevant resolu-
tions went so far.
For the two Parties, the Territory of East Timor remains a non-self-
governing territory and its people has the right to self-determination.
Moreover, the General Assembly, which reserves to itself the right to
determinethe territories which have to be regarded as non-self-governing

for the purposes of the application of Chapter XI of the Charter, has
treated East Timor as such a territory. The competent subsidiary organs
of the General Assembly have continued to treat East Timor as such to
this day. Furthermore, the Security Council, in its resolutions 384 (1975)
and 389 (1976) has expressly called for respect for "the territorialinteg-
rity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-
determination in accordancewith GeneralAssemblyresolution 1514(XV)".

Nor is it at issue between the Parties that the General Assembly has
expressly referred to Portugal as the "administering Power" of East
Timor in a number of the resolutions it adopted on the subject of East
Timor between 1975and 1982,and that the Security Council has done so
in its resolution 384 (1975). The Parties do not agree, however, on the 30. Enfin, le Portugal présenteun dernier argument en vue de contes-
ter l'applicabilité enl'espècede lajurisprudence de la Cour en l'affaire de
l'Or monétaire pris à Rome en 1943. Il affirme que les fondements
mêmessur lesquels reposent ses demandes, c'est-à-dire le statut de terri-
toire non autonome du Timor oriental et sa propre qualité de puissance
administrante du Territoire, ont déjàfait l'objet de décisions prisespar
l'Assembléegénérale etle Conseil de sécuritédans le cadre de leurs
compétences respectives; que, pour se prononcer sur les demandes du
Portugal, la Cour pourrait êtreamenée à devoir interpréterces décisions
mais n'aurait pas à statuer de novo sur leur contenu et doit donc les
considérer comme des«données»; et qu'en conséquenceil n'y a pas lieu
pour la Cour, en l'espèce, de se prononcer sur l'emploi de la force
par l'Indonésieau Timor oriental ni sur la licéitde sa présencedans le

Territoire.
L'Australie objecte que les résolutions de l'Organisation desNations
Unies relatives au Timor oriental ne disent pas ce que le Portugal prétend
qu'elles disent; que la dernière résolutiondu Conseil de sécuritésur le
Timor oriental remonte à 1976 et la dernière résolution del'Assemblée
générale à 1982; que le Portugal ne tient pas compte de l'écoulementdu
temps et de l'évolution de lasituation depuis lors; et que les résolutions
du Conseil de sécuriténe sont pas des résolutions revêtant un caractère
obligatoire en vertu du chapitre VI1de la Charte ou à tout autre titre, et
qu'ellesne sont en outre pas rédigéesen termes impératifs.
31. La Cour observe que l'argumentation du Portugal ici examinée
repose sur le postulat que les résolutions del'organisation des Nations
Unies, et en particulier celles du Conseil de sécurité, peuventêtrelues

comme imposant aux Etats l'obligation de ne reconnaître à l'Indonésie
aucune autorité à l'égarddu Territoire et de ne traiter, en ce qui concerne
ce dernier, qu'avec le Portugal. La Cour n'est cependant pas convaincue
que lesdites résolutions soientalléesaussi loin.
Pour les deux Parties, le Territoire du Timor oriental demeure un ter-
ritoire non autonome et son peuple a le droit à disposer de lui-même.
De plus, l'Assembléegénérale,qui s'est réservéle droit de déterminer
les territoires qui doivent êtreconsidérés commenon autonomes aux fins
de l'application du chapitre XI de la Charte, a traité le Timor oriental
comme un territoire ayant ce statut. Les organes subsidiaires compétents
de l'Assembléegénéraleont continuéde traiter le Timor oriental comme
tel jusqu'à ce jour. Par ailleurs, le Conseil de sécurité,dans ses résolu-
tions 384 (1975)et 389 (1976), a expressément demandé que soientres-

pectés ((l'intégrité territorialedu Timor oriental ainsi que le droit
inaliénable de son peupleà l'autodétermination, conformément à la réso-
lution 1514 (XV) de l'Assembléegénérale ».
Il n'est pas non plus contestéentre les Parties que l'Assembléegénérale
a expressémentmentionnéle Portugal comme ((puissance administrante))
du Timor oriental dans certaines des résolutions qu'ellea adoptées surla
question du Timor oriental entre 1975et 1982,et que le Conseil de sécu-
rité l'a faitdans sa résolution384(1975).En revanche, les Parties sont enlegal implications that flowfrom the reference to Portugal as the admin-
istering Power in those texts.
32. The Court finds that it cannot be inferred from the sole fact that
the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly and the Secu-
rity Council refer to Portugal as the administering Power of East Timor
that they intended to establish an obligation on third States to treat
exclusivelywith Portugal as regards the continental shelf ofEast Timor.
The Court notes, furthermore, that several States have concluded with

Indonesia treaties capable of application to East Timor but which do not
include any reservation in regard to that Territory. Finally, the Court
observes that, by a letter of 15 December 1989, the Permanent Repre-
sentative of Portugal to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-
Generalthe text of a note ofprotest addressed by the Portuguese Embassy
in Canberra to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
on the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty on 11 December 1989;
that the letter of the Permanent Representative was circulated, at his
request, as an official document of the forty-fifth session of the General
Assembly, under the item entitled "Question of East Timor", and of the
Security Council; and that no responsive action was taken either by the
General Assembly or the Security Council.
Without prejudice to the question whether the resolutions under dis-
cussion could be binding in nature, the Court considers as a result that
they cannot be regarded as "givens" whichconstitute a sufficientbasis for
determining the dispute between the Parties.
33. It follows from this that the Court would necessarily have to rule

upon the lawfulnessof Indonesia's conduct as a prerequisite for deciding
on Portugal's contention that Australia violated its obligation to respect
Portugal's status as administering Power, East Timor's status as a non-
self-governing territory and the right of the people of the Territory to
self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over its wealth and
natural resources.

34. The Court emphasizes that it is not necessarily prevented from
adjudicating when the judgment it is asked to give might affect the legal
interests of a State which is not a party to the case. Thus, in the case
concerning Certain PhosphateLands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), it
stated, inter alia, as follows:
"In the present case, the interests of New Zealand and the United
Kingdom do not constitute the very subject-matter of the judgment
to be rendered on the merits of Nauru's Application . . .In the

present case, the determination of the responsibility of NewZealand
or the United Kingdom isnot a prerequisite for the determination of
the responsibility of Australia, the onlyobject of Nauru's claim . . .
In the present case, a finding by the Court regarding the existenceor
the content of the responsibility attributed to Australia by Nauru TIMOR ORIENTAL (ARRÊT) 104

désaccordsur les conséquencesjuridiquesqui s'attachent à la mention du
Portugal comme puissance administrante dans ces textes.
32. La Cour constate qu'il ne peut êtredéduit du seul fait qu'elles
mentionnent lePortugal comme puissance administrante du Timor orien-
tal que lesrésolutions sus-indiquéede l'Assemblée générae lt du Conseil
de sécuritéont entendu établir a la charge des Etats tiers une obligation
de traiter exclusivementavec le Portugal pour ce qui est du plateau conti-
nental du Timor oriental. La Cour note par ailleurs que plusieurs Etats
ont conclu avec l'Indonésie destraités susceptibles de s'appliquer au
Timor oriental, mais ne comportant aucune réservequant à ce territoire.
Enfin, la Cour observe que, par une lettre du 15décembre1989,le repré-
sentant permanent du Portugal auprès de l'organisation des ~ations

Unies a fait tenir au Secrétaire généralle texte d'une note de protestation
adresséepar l'ambassade du Portugal a Canberra au département des
affaires étrangèresetdu commerce extérieurd'Australie àl'occasion dela
conclusion du traitéle 11décembre 1989;que la lettre du représentant
permanent a été, a sa demande, distribuéecomme document officielde la
quarante-cinquième session de l'Assembléegénérale,au titre du point
intitulé((Question du Timor oriental)),et du Conseil de sécurité; etque
ni l'Assemblée généralnei le Conseil de sécuritén'ont réagi.
Sans préjudicede la question de savoir si les résolutions à l'examen
pourraient avoir un caractère obligatoire, la Cour estime en conséquence
qu'elles ne sauraient êtreconsidérées comme des((données » constituant

une base suffisante pour trancher le différendqui oppose les Parties.
33. Il découlede ce qui précèdeque la Cour devrait nécessairement
statuer sur la licéitédu comportement de l'Indonésie préalablement à
toute décision sur l'affirmationdu Portugal selon laquelle l'Australie a
violél'obligation qui lui incombait de respecter la qualitéde puissance
administrante du Portugal, le statut de territoire non autonome du Timor
oriental ainsi que le droit du peuple du Territoire'autodéterminationet
à la souveraineté permanente sursesrichesseset sesressources naturelles.

34. La Cour souligne qu'elle n'est pas nécessairement empêché deesta-
tuer lorsque l'arrêtqu'il lui estdemandé de rendreest susceptible d'avoir
des incidences sur les intérêts juridiquesd'un Etat qui n'est pas partie
l'instance. Ainsi,dans l'affaire de Ckrtaines terràphosphates à Nauru
(Nauru c.Australie), elle s'est notamment exprimée commesuit:

«En l'espèce, lesintérêts de laNouvelle-Zélandeet du Royaume-
Uni ne constituent pas l'objet mêmede la décision à rendre sur le
fond de la requêtede Nauru ...Dans la présenteespèce,la détermi-
nation de la responsabilitéde la Nouvelle-Zélandeou du Royaume-
Uni n'est pas une condition préalable à la détermination dela res-
ponsabilité de l'Australie, seul objet de la demande de Nauru ...
Dans la présente affaire,toute décisionde la Cour sur l'existenceou

le contenu de la responsabilitéque Nauru impute à l'Australie pour- might wellhave implications for the legal situation of the two other
States concerned, but no findingin respect of that legal situation will
be needed as a basis for the Court's decision on Nauru's claims
against Australia. Accordingly, the Court cannot decline to exercise

its jurisdiction."I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 261-262,para. 55.)

However, in this case, the effects of the judgment requested by Portu-
gal would amount to a determination that Indonesia's entry into and
continued presence in East Timor are unlawful and that, as a conse-
quence, it does not have the treaty-making power in matters relating to
the continental shelfresources of East Timor. Indonesia's rightsand obli-
gations would thus constitute the very subject-matter of such a judgment

made in the absence of that State's consent. Such a judgment would run
directly counter to the "well-established principle of international law
embodied in the Court's Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise
jurisdiction over a State withits consent" (Monetary GoldRernovedfrom
Rome in 1943, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32).

35. The Court concludes that it cannot, in this case, exercisethe juris-
diction it has by virtue of the declarations made by the Parties under
Article36,paragraph 2, ofits Statute because,in order to decidethe claims
of Portugal, it would have to rule, as a prerequisite, on the lawfulnessof
Indonesia's conduct in the absenceof that State's consent. This conclu-
sion applies to al1the claims of Portugal, for al1of them raise a common
question: whether the power to make treaties concerning the continental
shelf resources of East Timor belongs to Portugal or Indonesia, and,
therefore, whether Indonesia's entry into and continued presence in the
Territory are lawful. In these circumstances, the Court does not deem it

necessary to examine the other arguments derived by Australia from the
non-participation of Indonesia in the case, namely the Court's lack of
jurisdiction todecide on the validity of the 1989Treaty and the effectson
Indonesia's rights under that treaty which would result from a judgment
in favour of Portugal.

36. Having dismissedthe first of the two objections of Australia which
it has examined, but upheld its second, the Court finds that it is not
required to consider Australia's other objections and that it cannot rule
on Portugal's claimson the merits, whatever the importance of the ques-
tions raised by those claims and of the rules of international law which
they bring into play.
37. The Court recallsin any event that it has taken note in the present
Judgment (paragraph 31) that, for the two Parties, the Territory of East rait certes avoir des incidences sur la situation juridique des deux

autres Etats concernés, mais laCour n'aura pas à se prononcer sur
cette situation juridique pour prendre sa décisionsur les griefs for-
muléspar Nauru contre l'Australie. Par voie de conséquence, la
Cour ne peut refuser d'exercer sa juridiction. » (C.I.J. Recueil 1992,
p. 261-262,par. 55.)
Toutefois, en l'espèce,l'arrêtque demande le Portugal aurait des effets
équivalant à ceux d'une décisiondéclarant que l'entrée de l'Indonésie et

son maintien au Timor oriental sont illiciteset qu'en conséquence1'Indo-
nésien'a pas le pouvoir de conclure des traités relativement aux res-
sourcesdu plateau continental du Timor oriental. Les droits et obligations
de l'Indonésie constitueraient dès lors l'objetmêmed'un tel arrêt,rendu
en l'absence du consentement de cet Etat. Un arrêtde cette nature irait
directement à l'encontre du ((principede droit international bien établi et
incorporédans le Statut, à savoir que la Cour ne peut exercer sajuridic-
tion à l'égardd'un Etat si ce n'est avec le consentement de ce dernier»
(Or monétairepris à Rome en 1943, arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 32).

35. La Cour conclut qu'elle ne saurait, en l'espèce, exercerla compé-
tence qu'elle tient des déclarations faitespar les Parties conformémentau
paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 de son Statut car, pour se prononcer sur les
demandes du Portugal, elle devrait statuer à titre préalablesur la licéité
du comportement de l'Indonésie en l'absence du consentement de cet

Etat. Cette conclusion s'applique à toutes les demandes du Portugal; en
effet,ces demandes soulèventtoutes une mêmequestion: cellede savoir si
le pouvoir de conclure des traités concernant les ressources du plateau
continental du Timor oriental appartient au Portugal ou à l'Indonésieet,
partant, si l'entréede l'Indonésie et son maintiendans le Territoire sont
licites. Dans ces conditions, la Cour ne considèrepas nécessaired'exami-
ner les autres arguments que l'Australie tire de la non-participation de
l'Indonésieà l'instance, tels que le défautde compétence de laCour pour
se prononcer sur la validitédu traitéde 1989ou les effets qu'un arrêtfai-
sant droit aux demandes du Portugal aurait sur les droits de l'Indonésie
en vertu de ce traité.

36. Ayant rejetéla première desdeux exceptionsaustraliennes qu'elle a
examinées,mais retenu la seconde, la Cour constate qu'elle n'a pas à se

pencher sur les autres exceptions de l'Australie et qu'elle ne saurait se
prononcer sur les demandes du Portugal au fond, quelle que soit l'impor-
tance des questions que ces demandes soulèvent et des règlesde droit
international qu'ellesmettent en jeu.
37. La Cour rappellera en tout état de cause qu'ellea pris note, dans le
présentarrêt (paragraphe31), du fait que pour les deux Parties le Terri-Timor remains a non-self-governing territory and its people has the right

to self-determination.

38. For these reasons,

By fourteen votes to two,

Finds that it cannot in the present case exercise the jurisdiction con-
ferred upon it by the declarations made by the Parties under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of its Statute to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it by
the Application of the Portuguese Republic.
IN FAVOUR :PresidentBedjaoui; Vice-PresidenSchwebel ;Judges Oda, Sir
Robert Jennings,Guillaume,Shahabuddeen,Aguilar-Mawdsley,Ranjeva,
Herczegh, Shi,Fleischhauer, Koroma, VereshchetinJudge ad hoc Sir
Ninian Stephen;

AGAIN~T:Judge Weeramantry ; Judgead hoc Skubiszewski.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this thirtieth day of June, one thousand
nine hundred and ninety-five, in three copies, one of which will be placed
in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to theovern-
ment of the Portuguese Republic and the Government of the Common-
wealth of Australia, respectively.

(Signed) Mohammed BEDJAOUI,

President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.

Judges ODA,SHAHABUDDEER NA, NJEVAand VERESHCHETI append
separate opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

Judge WEERAMANT anY Judge ad hoc SKUBISZEWS aKpIend dissent-
ing opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled)M.B.
(Initialled)E.V.O.toire du Timor oriental demeure un territoire non autonome et son
peuple a le droitdisposer de lui-même.

38. Par ces motifs,

LACOUR,

Par quatorze voix contre deux,
Dit qu'ellene saurait, en l'espèce, exercerla compétenceconférée
par les déclarationsfaites par les Parties conformément au paragraphe
de l'article 36de son Statut,pour statuer sur le différendportédevant elle
par la requêtede la République portugaise.

POURM : .Bedjaoui,Président;M. Schwebel,Vice-Président; . da, sir
Robert Jennings, MM. Guillaume, Shahabuddeen,Aguilar-Mawdsley,
Ranjeva, Herczegh,Shi, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Vereshchetin,juges; sir
Ninian Stephen,juge adhoc;
CONTRM E:. Weeramantry,juge;. Skubiszewski,jugead hoc.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix,à La Haye, le trente juin mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quinze, en trois
exemplaires, dont'un restera déposéaux archives de la Cour et les autres
seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Républiquepor-
tugaise et au Gouvernement du Commonwealth d'Australie.

Le Président,
(Signé) Mohammed BEDJAOUI.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.

MM. ODA,SHAHABUDDE ENN, JEVt VERESHCHETjIu g,es, joignent
à l'arrêtles exposésde leur opinion individuelle.

M. WEERAMANTR jYg,e, et M. SKUBISZEWSjugI,e ad hoc, joigneàt
l'arrêtles exposésde leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphé) M.B.

(Paraphé) E.V.O.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 30 June 1995

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