1NTERNATlONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
CASE CONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER
MEXICAN NATIONALS
(MEXICOv.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
JUDGMENTOF 31 MARCH 2004
COUR INTERNATlONALE DE JUSTICE
AVISCONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE AVENA ET AUTRES
RESSORTISSANTS MEXICATNS
ARRETDU 31 MARS 2004 Officialcitation
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexicov. United Slates of America),
Judgment,.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 12
Mode oflicielde cit:tion
Avenaet autres ressortissants mexicains
(Mexique c. Etats-Unisd'Amtrique),
urrt?t, CRecueil2004p.12
"k "U"b€X 880 1
ISSN 0074-4441 Nodevente:
ISBN 92-1-070989-6 31 MARCH2004
JUDGMENT
AVENA AND OTHER MEXlCAN NATIONALS
(MEXICO v.UNlTED STATESOF AMERICA)
AVENA ETAUTRESRESSORTISSANTSMEXICAFNS
(MEXIQUE c.ETATS-UNISD'AMERIQUE)
31 MARS 2004
ARRET INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE
20U4 YEAR 2004
31 March
GencralList
No. 128 31 March2004
CASECONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER
MEXICAN NATIONALS
(MEXICO v.UNlTED STATESOF AMERICA)
Facts of fhrCUSP - Article 36 offhe Vienna Convention nlaCunsulur Rela-
tions($24 April 1963.
Mexico's nhjci,tion to the United Staler objeufiuns tojnri.~dicfionund admis-
sibilid- United Srates objections no! pruscntud a.r preliminary objec~ions
-Arficle 79of Rules of Court not pertinent ipprsent case.
Jurisdictionuj' [hCourt.
First United States ohjeuriontojurisdicti-n Confeniiun that Mexico's sub-
missrons invite the Court to ru(In ihoperation ofthe ClnifeclStutes crirnlnal
justice system- Jurisdicfion of Gourdfo determine fhe nature urid extent of
obligations arlslng undcr Vtsnna Convenfion - Enquiry into theuc~nductof
criminal proceedings inUni~ed Slates courts a tnutier belonging to the merits.
Second Ut~itedStutus objecfion to jurisiiiutiu- Contention !hut thp jifirst
.~uhtniaionuf Mexi~o'~~Memcjrirlii~excluded from rhe Court'sjurisdiutic~-
Mexico wending an inrexprerafiunof tlre finnu Convention wherebynot only
the absence ofcmn~ulrinorijcation bu~ulso the arrest, &tention, triul and con-
victionofit6~CII~UW weIIunlawful,failingsuch not$carion - lnterpretalion
ofVienna Cunvention a nlafter within the Court'sjurisdiction.
Third Uniled S~ule~ubjection 10jurisdicrion- Conr~ntdnn$hot Mexico's
submissions on rernedic~gu beyond IheCourt'sjirrisdirtio- Jzcrisdicfion of
Court to consider fhey~esti~)Cl femedies - Question whether or howfar [he
Court rrrayorder tho requestedremedies a matter belonginglu tfie rnerits. Fourth United Staler objection tojurisdiction - Contention that the Court
lacksjurisdiction to determine whether or not con,~ulurnutificalion is a hr~man
right - Queslion of inlerpretation of Vienna Convenfion.
Admissibility of Mexico's claims.
Firs1 United States objection to udmissihility - Cofitentiun that Mexico's
submissions on remedies seek IU have he Courtfunction us a court of criminal
appeal - Question belonging to the merits.
Second Unifed States objection Io uilmissibiIi~y- Conlencion #hut Mexico's
cluims tu exercise its right oj diplamutic protection are irsadmissibleon ground7
that local remedim have nut been exhausted - Inferdependence in the presen f
case oJ rights of the Stute and of individual rights - Mexico r~questing che
Courr do rule on the violation of rights which il suffered both directly und
through the vinlufion of individual rights oy its nationals - Duty to exhaust
loca! remedies does not apply to such a reque.5 t.
Third United Stutes objec fion lo admissibility - Contention thut cerluin
Mexlcan nurionalsalso have Uniled States nufionality - Questjon belunging fu
the merits.
Fourth United States ohjecrion fa admissibility - C(~ntcntiunrkat Mexico
had actual knowledge ofu breuuhburfailed to bring.wchbreach to the altention
of the United States or did su only after considerahie delay - No conlention in
the present mse oj'any prejudice causedby such delay - No implied tlruiverby
Me-~icoof its rights.
Fjfth United States ohjecrir~nlo admissibilify - Conren~ionthat Mexico
invokes standards that irdoe3nutfollow in i1.r own practice - Nature oJ Vicnnn
Convenliun preclurles such an uvgiimenr.
Article 36, paragruph I - Mexican nationality nJ42 individuals concerned
- United States has no6 proved i1.7contention tltat .r(me were also United
Sfales nacionuis.
Article 36, purrrgruphI (b) - Consular irafimnotion - Duty to provide cun-
sular information 0ssoon as arresdingauthoriries rculize fhat arrested person is
a foreign naliunal, or have ground7for so believing - Pro vision of consular
information in parallel wi6hreading of "Miranda righrs" - ond dent inn that
seven individuals srated ut rhe dime of arrert rhat they were United Slates
nationals - Inturpretution of phrase "wi6houtdelay" - Violalion by United
Stales oJ the obligation lo provide consulur information in $1 cslses.
Consular nod~J?caliu n Violation by Uniled Stutes of the obligalinn uj' con-
sular not$cation in 49 ciases.
Article 36 parugruph I (a)and (c) - lnrerrrlured nature oJ the three sub-
purugraphx of paragraph I - Violation by United States of the obligation fo
enable Mexican cunsularofficers to communicu~~with, have access to and visit
their nationcrlsin 49 cases - Violation by United States of I~E obligation toenable Mexicun cunmlar ofjccrs to arrange fur legal represendationof their
nationals in34 cases.
Article 36, paragraph 2- "Procedural d+uIt" rule - Possibilify ofjudicial
runedies still open in 49 msec - Violation by United S~ate.~of iY obligations
under Article 36, paragraph 2, in three cases.
Legal consequences of tlaebreuch.
Question of ndequa~erepuratiunfor violations oj Article 36 - Review and
reconsiderrrtionby United States cowls of convictions and sentences of the
Mexicun nationals - Choice of means Igt to United Slates - Review and
reconsideration to he curried out by taking account of violatiof Vienna Con-
vention rights- "Pmcedumi default" rule.
Judiciat process suile dofhctusk of review and reconsidewiiun - Clemency
process, as currently pruciiscd withithe United States criminaljuslice sysrem,
nodrufjcient in dzsevroserve as appropriat~means nj "review and reconsidera-
tion" - Appropriure clrm~ncyprocedures can.~upplementjudicial review and
reconsiderution.
Mexico revuesling cessationofwrongj'ul uci und guarantees and assurunLes
clnj'n-repetition- No evidence to e.~tablish"regular and continulng"pol tern
oJ breuchcs by United Stam of Article 36 uf Vienna Convention - Mcusures
luken by United S6ale.Tto comply witif its obligations ut~durAriiule 36, para-
graph 1 - Commitrvientundertaken by Uniled S~afes to ensure impIementalinn
of ilsobli~ations under that provirion.
No a contrario argument can be madc in respect of the Court'AJ/indingin thc
present Judgn~en concerning Mexican nalionol.r.
United Sdares ohligafions declared i~ Judgmmr replace those arislng jrom
Prr>visionaMl easures Order (45 February2003 - In the fhree cases where the
United Sfatcs violated its oh1igurion.sunder ArlicI~36, purograph 2, il must find
an appropriutc renledj having henulure of review and recnnsiderulion uccord-
ing to the criteria indicatedin ihe Judgrnenl.
JUDGMENT
Present: President SHI ; Vice-Presidenl RANJEVJA u;dges GUILLAUME K,OROMA,
VERESHCHFI'IN H,ICGINS,PARRA-ARANGUK KWNI,JMANS, REZEK,
A].-KIIASAWWEB HU,ERGE~HAI.E , LAKAUY O, ADA,TOMKA ; Judge ad
h0c SEPULVE ;RAegistrrzrCOUVKEUR.
Inthe case concerning Avena and othcr Mexican nationals,the Un~tedMexican States,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Juan Manuel Gbrnez-Robledo, Ambassador, former Legal Adviser,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MexicoCity,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Santiago Oriate, Ambassador of Mexico to the Kingdom of thc
Netherlands,
as Agent (until 12February 2004);
Mr. Arturo A. Dager, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico
City,
Ms Maria dei Refugio Gonzalez Domingucz, Chief, Legal Co-ordination
Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mcxico City,
as Agents (from2 March 2004);
H.E. Ms Sandra Fuentes Berain, Ambassador-Designate of Mexico to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent (from 17 March 2004);
Mr. Pierre-Maric Dupuy, Professor of Public lnternational Law at the
University of Paris II (Pantheon-Assas) and at the European University
Institute, Florence,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan, Attorney at Law, D~bcvoise & Plimpton,
New York,
Ms Sandra L. Babcock, Attorney at Law, Diractor of the Mexican Capital
Legal AssistanceProgramme,
Mr. Carlos Bernal, dttorncy at Law, Noriega y Escobedo,and Chairman of
the Commission on International Lawat the Mcxican Bar Association,
Mexico City,
Ms Katherine Birmingham Wilmore, Attorney at Law, Dekvoise &
Plimpton, London,
Mr. Dietmar W. Prager, Attorney at Law, Debevoise & Plimpton, New
York,
Ms Socori-oFlores Liera,Chiefof Staff, Under-Secretariatfor Global Amairs:
andHuman Rights, Ministry of Foreign AfFdirs,Mcxico City,
MI- . ictor Manuel UribeAvida, Head of the International Litigation Scc-
tion, Legal Adviser'sOffice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MexicoCity,
as Counsellors and Advocates;
Mr. Erasmo A.Lira Cabrera, Head of the International Law Section, Legal
Adviser's Office,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City,
Ms Natalie Klein, Attorney at Law, Dehvoise & Plimpton, Ncw York,
Ms Catherine Amirfar, Attorney at Law, DebevoiseBrPlimpton, New York,
Mr.Thomas Bollyky,Attorney atLaw, Debevoise& Plimpton, Ncw York,
Ms Cristina Hoss, Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute fCom-
parativc Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg,
Mr. Mark Warren, InternationaLaw Researcher, Ottawa,
as Advisers; Mr. Michel L'Enfant, Dcbevoise & Plitnpton, Paris,
as Assistant,
und
the United States of America,
represented by
The Honourable Wtlliam H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, United Statcs Dcpart-
ment of State,
as Agent ;
Mr. JamesH. Thessin, PrincipalDeputy LegalAdviser, United StatesDepart-
ment of State,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Catherine W. Brown, Assisranl Legal Adviscr For Consular Affairs,
United States Department of State,
Mr. D. StephenMalhias, Assistant LcgalAdviscrfor Un~tedNations Affairs,
United Slates Department of Statc,
Mr. Patrick F. Philbin, Associate Dcputy Attorney General, United Slates
Department of Justice,
Mr. John Byron Sandage, Attorney-Adviser for United Nations AtTairs,
United States Department of Slate,
Mr. Thomas Weigcnd,Professor of Law and Director of the institute of For-
eign and International CriminalLaw, University of Cologne,
Ms Elisabeth Zoller, Professor of PublicLaw, Univcrsity of Paris I1 (Pan-
thkon-Assas),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Jacob Katz Cogan, Attorney-Adviser forUnited Nations AM'airsU, nited
States Department of Slate,
Ms Sara Criscitelli, Member of the Bar of thStatcof New York,
Mr. Robert J. Erickson, Principal Deputy Chief, Criminal Appcllatc Section,
Uniied States Dcpartmcnt of Justtce,
Mr. Noel J. Francisco, Ocputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Unlted States Department of Justice,
Mr. StevcnHill,Attorney-Adviser for Economicand BusinessAffairs, United
States Department of Spate,
Mr. Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, Thc
Hague,
Mr. David A. Kaye, Deputy Legal Counsellor, Unitcd States Embassy, The
Hague,
Mr. Petcr W. Mason, Attorney-Adviser for Consular AfFdirs,United States
Department of State,
as Counsel;
Ms Barbara Barrett-Spencer, United StatesDepartment of Statc,
Ms Mariannc Hata, United States Departmen1 of Stale,
Ms Cecile Jouglet, United States Embassy, Paris,
Ms Joanne Nell~gan,Untted Statcs Departmentof State,
Ms Laura Rornains, United States Embassy, The Hague,
as Administrative Staff, composed as above,
after deliberation,
delivers thefollowing Judgment:
t.On 9 January 2003 the United Mexican States (hereinafter referred to as
"Mexico") filedin the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceed-
ings against the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the
"United States") Tor"violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions" of 24 April 1963{hereinafter referred to as the "Vienna Convention")
allegedlycommitted by the United Slates.
In its Application, Mexicobased the jurisdiction of the Court OnArticle 36,
paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Court and on Article 1 of the Optional Pro-
tocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which accompanies
the Vienna Convention (hereinafter referred to as the "Optional Protocol").
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
forthwith communicated to the Government of the United States; and, in
accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, allStates entitled to appear before
the Court were notifiedof the Application.
3. On 9 January 2003,the day onwhich the Application was filed,the Mexi-
can Government also fled in the Registry of the Court a request for ihe indica-
tion of provisional measures basedon Article41 ofthe Statute and Articles 73,
74 and 75 of the Rules of Court.
By an Order of 5 February 2003, the Court indicated the following provi-
sional measures :
"(a) The United States of America shall,take all mcasures necessary to
ensurc that Mr. CCsarRoberto Ficrro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno
Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera arc not executed pending
fin-a1judgment in these proceedings;
(b) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the
Court of all measures taken in implcm~ntationof this Order."
It further decided that, "untilhe Court has rendered its finaljudgment, it shall
remain seisedofthe matters" which formed the subject of that Order.
In a letter of 2 November 2003, the Agcnt of the United Statcs advised the
Court that the United States had "informed the relevant state authorities of
Mexico's application"; that, sincc the Order of 5 February 2003, the United
Slatcs had "obtained from them information about the status or the fifty-four
cases, including the three cases identified in paragraph 59 (I)(a) of that
Order"; and that the United States could "confirm that none of the named
individuals [had]been executed".
4. In accordance with Article43of the Rules ofCourt, the Registrar sentthe
notification referred to in Article 63, paragraph1, of the Statute to all States
parties to the Vienna Convention or to that Convention and the Optional Pro-
tocol.
5. By an Order of 5 February 2003,the Court, taking account of thc vicwsof
thc Parties,fixed 6 June 2903 and 6 October 2003, respectively, as the time-
limits for the filingof a Memorial by Mexico and of a Counfer-Memorial by
the United States. 6. By an Order of 22 May 2003, the President of the Court, on the joint
requcst of the Agents of the two Parties, exiendcd to 20 June 2003 the timc-
limit for the filing ofthe Memorial; the time-limit for the filingof the Countcr-
Mcmorial was extended, by he same Order, to 3 November 2003.
By a letter dated 20June 2003and received inthe Regi~tryon the sameday,
the Agent of Mcxicoinformed the Court that Mexicowas unablc for techn~cal
reasons to file the original of its Memorial on time and accordingly asked the
Court to dec~de,under Articlc 44, paragraph 3, of thc Rules ofCourt, that thc
filingof the Memoriakaftcr the expiration of lhe time-Iimitfixedtherefor would
be considered as valid; that letter wasaccompanied by two eleckroniccopies of
the Memorial and its annexes. Mexicohaving filedthe original of thc Memor~al
on 23 June 2003 and the United Slatcs having informed the Court, by a letter
of 24 June 2003, that ~thad no commcnt to make on the matter, the Court
decided on 25 June 2003 that the filingwould be considered as valid.
7. In a lettcr of 14October 2003, the Agent of Mexico expressedh~sGov-
ernment's wish to amend its submissions in order to include therein the cases
of two Mexican nationals, Mr. Victor Miranda Guerrcro and Mr. Tonatihu
Aguilar Saucedo, who had been sentenced to death, aftcr the filinof Mexico's
Memorial, as a result of criminal proceedings in which, according to Mexico,
thc United States had failed to comply wilh its obligations under Articlc 36of
the Vienna Convention.
In a lerterof2 November 2003, under cover of which the Unitcd States tiled
its Countcr-Memorial within the limc-limit prescribed, rhe Agent of the United
States informed the Court that his Government objected to the amendment of
Mexico's submissions, on the grounds that the requcst was late, that Mexico
had submitted no evidenceconcerning the alleged facts and that there was not
enough time for the United States to inves~igatethcrn.
In a letter receivedin the Registry on 28 Navcmber 2003, Mexico responded
to the United States objection and at the same time amcnded its submissions so
as to withdraw its request for relief in the cases of two Mexican nationals men-
tioned in the Memorial, Mr. Enrique Zambrano Garibi and Mr. Pcdro Hernin-
dcz Alberto, having comc to the conclusion that the former had dual Mexican
and United States nationality and that the latter had been Informed of his right
of consular notification prior to interrogation.
On 9 December 2903,the Rcgistrar informed Mexicoand the United Statcs
that, in order to ensure thc pruccdural equality of thc Parties, the Court had
decidcd not to authorize the amendment of Mcxico's submissions so as to
include the two additional Mexican nationals mentioned above. He also
informed the Parties that the Court had taken note thar the United States had
made no objection to the withdrawal by Mexico ofi~srequest for relief in the
casesof Mr. Zarnbrano and Mr. Wernkndez.
8. On 28 November 2903and 2 December 2903, Mexicofiled various docu-
ments which it wishedto produce in accordance with Article 56of thc Rules of
Court. By letters dated 2 December 2003 and 5 December 2003, the Agent of
the United Stales informed the Court that his Government did not object to the
production ofthese new documents and that ~tlntendcd to exercise~ts rightto
comment upon these documents and to submit documents in support of its
comments, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article. By letters dated 9 Dccem-
ber 2003,the Registrar infonned the Parties that the Court had takcn note thatthe United Slates had no objection to the production of these documents and
that accordingly counsel would be free to refer to them in the course of the
hearings. On 10Deccmber 2003, the Agent of the United States filedthe com-
ments of hisGovernment on the newdocuments produced by Mexico,together
with a number of documents in support of those comments.
9. Since the Court included upon thc Bench no judge of Mexican national-
ity, Mexico availed itselfof itright under Article 31, paragraph 2, of the
Slatutc to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: it chose Mr. Bernardo
Scp6lveda.
LO.Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph2,of its Rules, the Court, hiving con-
sulted the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed
would be made accessibleta the public on the opening of the oral proceedings.
1I. Public sitt~ngswere heldbctween 15and14 December2003, at which the
Court hcard the oral arguments and replies of:
For Mexico: H.E. Mr. Juan Manuel Cbmez-Robledo,
Ms Sandra L. Babcock,
Mr. Victor Manuel Uribc Avifia,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan,
Ms Katherine Birmingham Wilmore,
H.E. Mr. Santiago Okate,
Ms Socorro Florcs Liera,
Mr. Carlos Bcrnal,
Mr. Dietmar W. Prager,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.
Fur!he United Sdales: The Honourable William H. Taft, IV,
Ms Elisibcth Zoller,
Mr. Patrick F. Philbln,
Mr. John Byron Sandage,
Ms Catherine W. Brown,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias,
Mr. James H. Thessin,
Mr. Thomas Weigend.
12. In its Application, Mexico formulated the decision requested in the fol-
lowing terms:
"The Government of the United Mexican States therefore asks the
Court to adjudge and declare:
(1) that the United Stales, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and
sentencing the54 Mcxican nationats on death row described in this
Application, violated itsinternational legal obligations lo Mexico, in
its own right and in the exerciseor its right of consular protection of
its nationals, as provided by Article5 and 36, respectivelyofthe
Vienna Convention;
(2) that Mexico is therefore entitled to restitutio in integrum;
(3) that the Un~tedStatcs isunder an international legal obligation not to apply the doctrine of procedural default, or any other doctrine of
its municipal law, tn precludc the exercise or thc rights afforded by
Article36 of the Vienna Convention;
(4) that the United States is undcr an internatianal lcgal obltgation to
carry out in conformity with thc foregoing international legal obIiga-
tions any future detention of or criminal proceedings against the 54
Mexican nationals on death row or any other Mcxican national in its
territory, whether by a constituent, legi~lative,executive, judicial or
other power, whether that power holds a superlor or a subordinate
position in thc organization of thc United States, and whether that
power's functionsare international or internal in character;
(5) that the right to consular notificationunder the Vienna Convention IS
a human righl;
and that, pursuant to the foregoing international lcgal obligations,
(I) the United States must restore the s!atu.squu anle, that is, re-es~ablish
the situation that ex~sredbeforc the detentian of, proceed~ngsagainst,
and convictions and sentences of, Mexico's nationalsin violatioo of
the Unitcd States international legal obligations;
(2) thc United States must take the steps necessary and suficicnt to
ensure that the provisions of its municipal law enable full cffect to be
given to the purposcs for which the rights afforded by Article 36 are
intended ;
(3) the United States must take he stcps necessaryand suficien~to esrab-
I~sha rnean~ngful rcmcdy at law Forviolationsorthe nghts afforded to
Mexico and its nationals by Article 36 of thc V~ennaConvention,
including by bamng the imposition, as a matter of rn~tn~cipallaw, of
any procedural penalty for the failure timely to raisc a claim or -
dcfcncebased on thc V~ennaConvention where competent authorities -;..
of thc Un~ted Slates havc breached their obligation to advisc the
national of his or her rights under the Convention; and
(4) the United States, in light of the pattcrn and practice oviolations set
forth in this Application,musl provide Mexico a hll guarantee of Ihe
non-repetition of the illegal acts."
13. In the course of the written procecdings, the following submissions werc
presented by the Parties:
On buhalfofthe GovernmentofM~rdcu,
in the Memorial
"For these reasons, . . . the Governmcnt of Mexico rcspcctfullyrequests
thc Court to adjudgc and declare
(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and
sentencing the fifty-four Mexican nationals on death row described in Mexico's Application and this Memorial, violatcd its international
legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise
of ~ts right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, as provided by
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention;
(2) that the obligation in Article 36(1)of the Vienna Convention requircs
notification before the competent authorities of the rece~vingStatc
interrogate thc foreign national or take any other action potentially
detrimental to his or her rights;
(3) that the United States, in applying the doctrinc of procedural default,
or any other doctrine of its municipal law, to preclude kheexerciseand
rcview of the rights afforded by Articlc 36 of the Vienna Convention,
violated its international iegal obligations to Mexico, in its own right
and in the excrciseof its righrof diplomatic,protection of its nationals,
as provided by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention; and
(4) that thc United States is under an international legal obligation to
carry out in conformity with the Foregoinginternational legal obliga-
tions any future detention of or criminal procccdings against thc fifty-
four Mexican nationals on dcath row and any other Mexican national
in irsterritory, whether by a constituent, legislative,executivc,judic~al
or other power, whether that power holds a superior or a subordinate
position in the organization ofthe United States, and whcther that
powcr's functions are intcrnational or intcrnal In character;
and that, pursuant lo the foregoing international legal obligations,
(1) Mcx~cois entitled to reslidufirin inlegrumand the United States thcre-
fore is under an obligation to restore the starus quo ante, that is, re-
establish the situation that cxisted al the tirnc afthe detention and
prior to the intcrrogation of, proceedingsagainst, and convichons and
sentences of, Mexico's nationals in violation of the United Statcs'
intcrnatianal legal obiigations, specificatlyby, among other things,
(a] vacating the convictions of the fifty-four Mexican nationals;
(A) vacating the sentences of the fifty-four Mexicannationals;
(c) excludingany subsequent proceedings againstthcfifty-four Mexi-
can nationals any statements and confessionsobtained from them
prior to notification of their rights to consular notification and
acccss;
(dl preventing thc application of any procedural penalty for a Mcxi-
can national's failuretimcly to raise a claim or defencxbased on
the ViennaConvention wherecompetent authorities of theUnited
States have breached their obligation to advise the national of his
rights under the Convention; (e) preventing the application of any municipal law doctrine or
judicial holding that prevents a court in the United States from
providing a remedy, ~ncluding thc rehef to which this Court
holds that Mcxico 1sentitled hcre, to a Mexican national whose
Article 36 rights have been violated; and
(f) preventing thc application of any nlunlcipal law doctrine or judi-
cial holding ahat requires an individualized showing of prejudice
as a prercyuisitc to relief for the violations of Articlc 36;
(2) the United States, in light of the regular and continuous violations set
forth in Mexico'sAppIication and Memorial, is under an obligation to
lake all leg~slative,executive, and judicial steps necessary to:
(u] ensure that the regular and continuing violations of the Article 36
consular notification, access, and assistance rightsofMexicoand
its nationals ceasc;
(h) guarantee that its competent authoritics, of federal, state, and
localjurisdiction, maintain regular and rout~necornpliancc with
thcir Article 36 obligations;
(c) cnsure that itsjudicial authorities cease applying, and guarantee
that in the rururc they will not apply:
(i) any pruccdural penalty for a Mexican national's failure
timelyto raise a claim Ordefcncebased on the Vienna Con-
vention where competent authorities of thc United States
have breached the~robligation to advise the national of his
or her rights under thc Convention;
(ii) any mun~cipal law doctrine or judicial holdingthat prcvents
a court in the United States from providing a rcmedy,
including the reliefto which th~sCourt holds that Mexico is
entttled here, to a Mexican national whose Article36 rights
have beenviulatcd; and
(111)any municipal law doclrine or judicial holding that requires
an individualized showing of prejudice as a prerequisite to
relief for the ViennaConvention violations shown here."
On hehulf of the Gov~rnrnen! ofthe Uni~odStates,
in the Counter-Memorial :
"On the basisof thc facts and arguments set out above, the Government
of the Unitcd States of Amcrica requests that the Court adjudge and
declare that the claims of the United Mexican States are dismisscd."
14. At the oraI proceedings, the followingsubmissionswere presented by the
Parties:On behalfof the GovernmentofMexico,
"The Government of Mexico respectfully requests the Court to adjudge
and declare
(1) that the United Skates ofAmerica, Inarresting, detaining, trying, con-
victing, and sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death row
described in Mexico's Memorial, violated its international legal
obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its
right to diplomatic proteclion of its nationals, by failing to inform,
without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their
right to consular nolification and access under Article 36 (1) (h)
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving
Mexico of iu right to provide consular protection and the 52
nationals' right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide
under Article 36 (I) (a)and (c) of the Convention;
(2) that the obligation in Articlc (1) of the Vienna Convention requires
notification of consular rightand a reasonable opportunity for con-
sular access before the competent authorities of the receiving State
take any action potentially detrimental to Iheforeign national's rights;
(3) that the United States of America violated its obligations under
Article35 (2) of the Vienna Convention by failing to provide mean-
ingful and effective reviewand reconsideration of convictions and
sentences impaired by a violation of Article 36 (I); by substituting
for such review and reconsideration clemency procccd~ngs; and by
applying the 'procedural dcfault' doctrine and other municipal law
doctrines that fail to attach legal significanceto an Article 36 (1) vio-
lation on its own tcrrns;
(4) that pursuant to the injuries suffered by Mexico in its own right and
in the exercise of diplomatic protection of its nationals, Mexico is
entitled to Fullreparation for those injuries in thform of restitutio
in intugrum;
(5) that this restitution consists of the obligation ro restorestocusquo
ante by annulling or otherwise deprivingof full forceor effectthcon-
victions and sentencesof all52 Mexican nationals:
(6) that this restitutioalso includes the obligation to take all measures
necessary toensure that a prior violation of Article 36shall not affect
the subsequent proceedings;
(7) that to the extent thatany of the 52 convictions or sentences are not
annulled, the United States shall provide, by means of its own choos-
ing, meaningfuland effectivereviewand reconsideration of the convic-
tions and sentencesof the52 nationals, and that this obligation cannot
be satisfiedby means of clemencyproceedings or if any municipal law
ruleor doctrinc inconsistent with paragraph (3) above is applied;and (8) that the United States of America shall ccasc its violations of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention with regard to Mexico and its
52 nationals and shall provideappropriate guarantees and assurances
that it shall take measures sufficientachleveincreased compliance
with Article 36 (1j and to ensure compliancew~tArticle36 (21."
On behuIf of the Governnwntofthe United States,
"On thc basis of the facts and arguments made by the United Statetn
its Counter-Memorial and in these proceedings,the Government of the
United Statesof Amerlcarequeststhat the Court, taking info account that
the United States hasconformed its conducllothis Court's Judgrncntin
thc LaCrclndCase (Germany v. Unite States ofdmericu), not only with
respect to German nationals but, consistent with the Declaralion of the
President or the Court in that case, lo all detained fore~gnnationals,
adjudge and declare that the claims of the Unitcd Mexican States are dis-
missed."
15.The present proceedings have been brought by Mexico against the
United States on the basis of the Vienna Convention, and of theOptional
Protocol providing for thcjurisdiction ofthc Court over "disputes arising
out of the interpretation or application"of the Convention. Mexico and
the United States are, and were at all relevant times, parlies to the Vienna
Convention and to the Optional Protocol. Mexico claims that the United
States has committed breaches of the Vienna Convention in relation lo
the treatment of a number of Mexican nationals who have been tried,
convicted and sentenced to death in criminal proceedings in the United
States. The original claim related to 54 such persons, but as a resultof
subscqucnt adjustments to its claimmade by Mexico (see paragraph 7
above), only 52 individual cascsare involved, These criminal proceedings
have been taking place in nine different Statcs of the United States,
namely California (28 cases), Texas (15 cases), Illinois (three cases),
Arizona (one case), Arkansas (one case), Nevada (one case), Ohio
(one case), Oklahoma (one case) and Oregon (one case), between 1979
and the present.
16. For convcniencc, thc namcs ofthe 52 individuals, and thenumbers
by which their cases will be referreto, areset out below:
1. Carlos Avena Guillen
2. Hkctor Juan Ayah
3. Vicente Benavides Figueroa
4, Constantino Carrera Montenegro
5. Jorge Contreras Lbpez25 AVENA AND OTI~ERs(JUDGMENT)
6. Daniel CovarrubiasSinchez
7. MarcosEsquivelBarrera
8. Rubin Gbmez Pkrez
9. JaimeArmandoHoyos
10. drturo JuhrezSuhrez
11. Juan ManuelLopez
12.JosiLupercioCasares
13. LuisAlbertoMacielHernandez
14. AbelinoManriquezJaquez
15. OmarFuentes Martinez(a.k.a. LuisAvilesde la Cruz)
16. MiguelAngel MartinezSinchez
17. MartinMendoza Garcia
18.SergioOchoaTamayo
19. EnriqueParraDuefias
20. Juande Dios RarnirezVilla
21, MagdalenoSalazar
22. Ram6nSalcidoBojhrquez
23. JuanRamonSAnchezRamirez
24. Ignacio'FafoyaArriola
25. AlfredoValdezReyes
26. Eduardo David Vargas
27. Tomis Verano Cruz
28. [Casewithdrawn]
29. SamuelZamudio JirnCnez
30. JuanCarlosAlvarezBanda
31. CSsarRobertoFierroReyna
32. HCctor Garcia Torres
33. TgnacioGSmez
34. RamiroHernandezLlanas
35.RamiroRubl lbarra
36. HumbertoLealGarcia
37. VirgilioMaldonado
38. JoseEmcsto MedcllinRojas
39. RobertoMorenoRamos
40. Daniel AngelPlataEstrada
41. RubCnRamirezCrirdenas
42. FClixRocha Diaz
43. OswaldoRegaladoSoriano
44. EdgarAriasTamayo
45. JuanCaballeroHernindez
46. MarioFloresUrbin
47. GabrielSolacheRomero
48. MartinRaul Fong Soto
49. RafaelCamargoOjeda
50. [Casewithdrawn]
51. Carlos RenkPkrezGutikrrez
52. Josi:TrinidadLoza 53. Osvaldo Netzahualctiyotl Torres Aguilera
54. Horacio Alberto Reyes Carnarena
17. The provisions of the Vienna Convention of which Mexicoallegcs
violations are contained InArticle 36. Paragraphs 1and 2 of this Article
arc set out respectively in paragraphs 50 and 108 below. Article 36
relates, according to its title, to "Communication and contact with
nationals of the sending State". Paragraph I (b) of that Article provides
that if a nationalof that Stale "is arrested or committed to prison or to
custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner", and he so
requests, the localconsular post of the sending State is to be notified. The
Articlegoeson to providethat the "competent authorities of the receiving
State" shall "inform the person concerned without delayof his rights" in
this respect. Mexico claimsthat in the present case these provisions were
not complied with by the United Statcs authorities in respcct of the 52
Mexican nationals the subject of its claims. As a result, the United States
has according lo Mcxicocommitted breaches of paragraph I (h) ;more-
over, Mexico claims,for reasons to beexplained below(seeparagraphs 98
et seq.j, that the United States is also in breach of paragraph 1 (a) and
(c) and of paragraph 2 of Article 36, in view of the relationship of
these provisions with paragraph 1 (b).
18. As regards the terminology cmployed to designate thc obligations
incumbent upon the receiving State under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b),
the Court notes that thc Parlies have: used the terms "inform" and
"notify" in differing senses. For the sake of clarity, the Court, when
speaking in its own name in the present Judgment, will use the word
"inform" when referring to an individual being made aware of his rights
under that subparagraph and the word "notify" when referring to the
giving of notice to the consular post.
19. The underlying factsallegedby Mexicomay be briefy described as
foilows :some are conceded by the United States, and some disputed.
Mexico states that all the individuals the subjectof its claims were Mexi-
can nationals at the time of their arrest. It further contends that the
United Statesauthorities that arrested and interrogated these individuals
had sufficient information at their disposal to be aware of the foreign
nationality of those individuals. According to Mexico'saccount, in 50 of
the specified cases,Mexican nationals were never informed by the com-
petent United States authorities of their rights under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention and, in the two remaining cases,
such information was not provided "without delay", as required by that
provision. Mexico has indicated that in 29 or the 52 cases its consular
authorities learned of the detention of the Mexican nationals only after
death sentences had been handed down. In the 23 remaining cases,
Mexico contends that it Iearned of the cases through means other than
notification to the consular post by the competent United States authori-
tics under Article 36, paragraph 1 (bj. It explains that in five cases thiswas too late to affect the trials, that in 15 cases the defendants had
already made incriminating statements, and that it became aware of the
other three cases only after considerable delay.
20. OF the 52 cases referredto in Mexico'sfinal submissions,49 are
currently at different stagesof the proceedings before UnitedStatesjudi-
cial authorities at state or federal level, and in three cases, thosof
Mr. Fierro (caseNo. 31), Mr. Moreno (caseNo. 39)and Mr. Torres(case
No. 531 judicial remedies withinthe United States have already been
exhausted. The Court has been informed of the variety of types of pro-
ceedingsand forms of relief available in the criminal justice systems of
the United States, which can differ from state to state. In very general
terms, and according to the description offered by both Parties in their
pleadings, itappears that the52casesmay be classifiedinto three catego-
ries: 24 cases which are currently in direct appeal; 25 cases in which
means of direct appeal have been exhausted, but post-conviction relief
(habeas corpus), either at slate or at federal level,is still available; and
three cases in which nojudicial remedies remain.The Court also notes
that, in at least 33 cases, the alleged breach of the Vienna Convention
was raised by the defendant either during pre-trial, at tronlappeal or
in haheas corpus proceedings, and that some of these claims weredis-
missedon proceduralor substantivegrounds and othersare still pending.
To date, in none of the 52 cases havethe defendants had recourseto the
clemency process.
2 1. On 9 January 2003,the day on which Mexicofiledits Application
and a requesl for the indicatioof provisional measures, all52 individ-
uals the subject of the claims wereon death row. However,two days later
the Governor of the State of Illinois, exercisinghis power of clemcncy
review, commuted the sentences of a11convicted individuals awaiting
execution in that State, including those of three individuals named in
Mexico's Application(Mr. Caballero (case No. 45), Mr. Flores (case
No. 46) and Mr. Solache (case No. 47)). By a letter dated 20 January
2003, Mexicoinformed the Court that, further to that decision, it with-
drew its requestfor the indicationof provisional measureson behalf of
these three individuals,but that itspplication remained unchanged.In
the Order of 5 February 2003, mentioned in paragraph 3 above, on the
request by Mexicofor the indication ofprovisional measures,the Court
considered that it was apparent from the information before ilthat the
three Mexicannationals named in the Application who had exhausted all
judicial remediesin the United States (see paragraph 20 above)wereat
risk of execution in the followingmonths, or even weeks.Consequently,
it ordered by way oC provisional measurethat the United States take all
measures necessary to ensurethat these individuals wouldnotbe executedpending find judgment in these proceedings.The Court notes that, at the
date of the present Judgment, thcse three individuals have not been
executed, but further notes with great concern that, by an Order dated
1 March 2004, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has sct an
execution dateof 18May 2004 for Mr. Torres.
THEMEXICAO NR~ECTI OONTHE UNITED STATE OSWECT~O f0 S
JUKISDICT INDNA~MTSS~BILITY
22. As noted above, the present disputhas been brought bel'orcthe
Court by Mexico on thebasisof'theVienna Convention and the Optional
Protocol tothat Convention. Articl1of the Optional Protocol provides:
"Disputes arising outf the interpretation or application of the
[Vienna] Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice and may accordinglbcbrought
before theCourl by a written application made by any party to the
dispute being a Party to the present Protocol."
23. The United Statcshas presented a number of objections to the
jurisdiction of the Court, as well asa number of objections to thc
admissibility of the claims advancbyMexico. It is however thcontcn-
lion of Mexico that all the objections raised by the United Statare
inadmissible as having bccn raised after the expiratofthe time-timit
laid down by the Rules of Court. Mexico draws attention to the text of
Article 79,paragraph 1,of the Rules of Courl as amended in 2000,which
provides that
"Any objectionby the respondent to the jurisdiction of the Court
or to the admissibility of the application, or other objection the deci-
sion upon which is requested before any furlhcr proceedings on the
merits, shall be made in writing as sooas possible, and not later
than threc months after the delivery of the Memorial."
Thc previous text of this paragraph rcquired objections to be made
"within the time-limitxedfor deliveryof the Counter-Memorial". In thc
prcscnl case the Memorial of Mexico was filed on 23 June 2003; the
objections of the Unitcd States to jurisdiction and admissibility were
presented in its Counter-Memorial, filed on 3 November 2003, more
than four months later.
24. The United States has observed that, during the proceedings on
the request made by McxicoForthe indicationofprovisional measures in
this case, it specifically reservedits right to makejurisdictional arguments
at the appropriate stage, and that subsequently the Parties agreed that
there shouldbe a single round of pleadings. The Court would however
emphasize that parties to casesbefore il cannot, by purporting to "reserve
their rights" to take someprocedural action, exempt themselvesfrom the
applicationto such action of the provisioof the Statute and Rules ofCourt (cf. Application of the Convenlion on he Prevention and Punish-
ment r$ the Crime ofGenocide (Bosaio and Fierzegovinav. Yugosluviu),
Order of13 Seplember1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 338,para. 28).
Thc Court notes, however, that Articlc 79of the Rules applies only to
preliminary objections,as isindicated by the title of the subsection of the
Rules which it constitutes. As the Court observed in the Lockcrbie cases,
"if it is to be covered by Article 79, an objection mu. ..possess a 'pre-
liminary' characlcr", and "Paragraph 1 of Articlc 79 of the Rules of
Court characterizes as 'preliminary' an objection 'the decision upon
which is requested beforeany further proceedings"' (Quwlions c$ Infer-
pretalion andApplicalion of the 1'971 Montreal Conv~nliun urising ji-om
the Acrid Incident at LockerBic (Libyan Aroh Jarnahiriya v. United
Kingdom) (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Uniled Stufes of America), Pre-
liminaryObjeclions,I.C.J.Repurls 1998,p. 26, para. 47; p. 131,para46) ;
and the effectof thetimely presentation of such an objection is that the
proceedings on the merits are suspended (paragraph 5or Article 79).An
objection that is not presented as a preliminary objection in accordance
with paragraph 1 of Article 79 does not thereby become inadmissible.
There are of course circumstances in which the party failing to put for-
ward an objection to jurisdiction might be held to have acquiesced in
jurisdiction (Appeui Relaling to the Jurisdictionuf the ICAO Council,
Judgment, I.C. J. Reporls 1972, p. 52, para. 13). However, apart from
such circumstances, a party failing to avail itself of the Article 79
procedure may forfeit the right to bring about a suspension of the pro-
ceedings on the merits, but can still argue the objection along with the
mcrits. That isindeed what the Unitcd Stateshas done in thiscase;and,
for reasons tobe indicated below, many of its objections are of such a
nature that they wouldin any event probably have had to be heard along
with the merits. Thc Court concludes that it shodd not exclude from
consideration the objections of the United States to jurisdiction and
admissibility by reason of the fact that they were not presented within
three months from the date of fiEingof the Memorial.
25. The United Stateshas submitted four objections to thejurisdiction
of the Court, and five to the admissibility of the claims of Mexico. As
noted above, these have not been submitted as preliminary objections
under Article 74of the Rules of Court; and they are not ofsuch a nature
that the Court would be required to examine and dispose of all of them in
limine, before dealing with any aspect of the mcrits of the case. Some arc
expressed tobe only addressed to certain claims; some are addressed to
questions of the remedies to be indicated if the Courtfind that breaches
of the Vienna Convention have beencommitted; and some are of such a
nature that they would have to be dealt with along with the merits. The
Court will however now examineeach of them in turn. 26. The United States contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction to
decide many of Mexico's claims, inasmuch as Mexico's submissions in
the Memorial asked theCourt to decide questions which do not arise out
of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention, and which
thc Uniled Slates has never agreed to submit to the Court.
27. By its first jurisdictional objection, the United States suggested
that the Memorial is fundamentally addressed to the treatment of Mexi-
can nationals in the federal and state criminal justice systems of the
United States, and the operation of the United States criminal justicesys-
tem as a whole. It suggested that Mexico's invitation to the Court lo
make what the United States regards as "hr-reaching aiid unsustainable
findingsconcerning the United States criminaljustice systems" would be
an abuse of thc Court's jurisdiction. At the hearings, the United States
contended that Mexico is asking the Court to interpret and apply the
treaty as if it were intended principally to govcrn the operation of a
State's criminal justicc system as it affects foreign nationals.
28. The Court would recallthat itsjurisdiction in the present case has
been invoked under the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol to
determine the nature and extent or the obligations undertaken by the
United Statcs towards Mexicoby becoming party to that Convention. If
and so Taras the Court may find that the obligations accepted by the
parties to the Vicnna Convention included commitments as to the con-
duct of their municipat courtsin relation to the nationals of other parties,
then in order to ascertain whether there have been breaches of the Con-
vention, Ihc Court must be able to examine the actions of those courts in
the lightof international law. The Court is unable to uphold the conten-
tion of the United States that, as a matter of jurisdiction, it is debarred
from enquiring into the conduct of criminal proceedings in United States
courts. How far it may do so in the present case isamaller for the merits.
The first objection ofthe United Statcstojurisdiction cannot therefore be
upheld.
29. The second jurisdictional objection presented by the United States
was addressed to the first of the submissions presented by Mexico in its
Memorial (see paragraph 13above). The United States pointed out that
Article 36of the Vienna Convention "creates no obligations constraining
the rights of the United States to arrest a foreign national"; and thatsirniiarlythe "detaining, trying, convicting and scnlencing" of Mexican
nationals could not constitute breaches of Article 36, which merelylays
down obligations of notification, The United States deduced from this
that the matters raised inMcxico'sfirst submission are outside the juris-
diction of the Court under the Vienna Convention and the Optional Pro-
tocol, and it maintains this objection in response to the revised submis-
sion, presented by Mexico at the hearings, whereby it asks the Court to
adjudgeand declare:
"That the United States of America, in arresting, detaining, try-
ing, convicting, and sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death
row described in Mexico'sMemorial, violated its international legal
obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exerciseof its right
to diplomatic protection of its nationals,by failingto inform, with-
out dclay, the 52Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right lo
consular notification and access under Article 36 (I) (b) of the
ViennaConvention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Mexico
of its right to provide consular protection and ~hc52 nationals'
right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide under
Article 36 (1) (u) and (c) of the Convention."
30. This issueisa question of interpretation of the obligationsimposed
by the Vienna Convention. It is true lhat the only obligation of the
receivingState toward a foreign national that is specificallyenunciatedby
Article 36, paragraph 1(b), of heVienna Convention is to inform such
foreign national of his rights, when he is "arrcsted or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner";
the text does not restrain the receiving Slate from "arresting, detaining,
trying, convicting, and sentencing" the foreign national, or limit its
power to do so. I-lowever,as regards the detention, trial, conviction and
sentence of its nationals, Mexico argues that depriving a foreign national
facingcriminal proceedings ofconsular notification and assistancerenders
those proceedings fundamentally unfair.Mexico explains in this respect
that :
"Consular notification constitutes a basic cornponcnt of due pro-
cess byensuring both the procedural equality of a foreign national
in the criminal process and the enforcement of other fundamental
due process guarantees to which that national is entitled",and that "Itis therefore:an essenlial requirement for fair criminal pro-
ceedings against fbreign nalionals." In Mexico's contention, "consular
notification has been widely recognized as a fundamental due process
right, and indeed, a hutwanright". On this basis itargues that the rights
of the detained Mexicannationals have been violated by the authorities
of thc Unitcd Slales, and that those nationals have been "subjectedto
criminal proceedingswithout the fairnessand dignity to whicheach per-
son iscntillcd". Conscquenlty,in the contention of Mexico, "the integrity
of these proceedingshas been hopelessly undermined, their outcomes
rendered irrevocably unjust".For Mexico to contend, on this basis,that
not mcrcly the faiiurc to noliry, but the arrest, detention, trial and con-
viction ofitsnationals were unlawfulis to argue in favour of a particular
it~terpretationof the ViennaConvention. Such an interpretation may or
may not be confirmed on the merits,but is not excluded from the juris-
diction conferred on the Court by the Optional Protocol lo thc Vicnna
Convention. The second objection of the United Slales Lo jurisdiction
cannot therefore be upheld.
71. The third objection by the United Statcs lo the jurisdiction ofthe
Court refersto the first of the submissionsin the MexicanMemorialcon-
cerning remedies.By that submission,whichwas confirmedin substance
in the final submissions. Mexico claimed that
"Mexicois cntitled to restiluiiin integrum,and the United States
lhercfore isunder an obligation lo restore the sralus quo ante, that
is, rc-establishthc situation that existedat thetime of the detention
and prior to the interrogation of, proceedings against, and convic-
tions and sentences of, Mexico's nationals in violationof the United
States'international legal obligations . . ."
On that basis, Mexicowent on in its first submissionto invite the Court
to declarethatIheUnitcd States was bound to vacatethe convictionsand
sentences of the Mexicannationals concerned, to excludefrom any sub-
sequent proceedingsany statementsand confessionsobtained rrom them,
to prevent the application of any procedural penalty for failureto raise a
timely defenceon the basis ofthe Convention, and to prevent the appli-
cation of any municipal law rule preventing courts in the United States
from providing a rcmedy for the violation of Article 36 rights.
32. The United States objects that so to require specificacts by the
United States in its municipal criminal justice systems would intrude
deeply into the independence of its courts; and that for the Court todeclare that the United States is undera specificobligation to vacate con-
victions and sentences would be beyond its jurisdiction. The Court, the
United States claims, has no jurisdiction to review approprialeness of
sentences in criminal cases,and even lessto determine guiltor innocence,
matters which only a court of criminal appeal could go into.
33. For its part, Mexicopoints out that the United States accepts that
the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Vienna Convention and to
determine the appropriate form of reparation under international law. In
Mexico'sview,these two considerations are sufficient to deltat the third
objection to jurisdiction of the United Statcs.
34. For the same reason as in respect of the second jurisdiclional
objection, the Court is unable to uphold the contention of the United
States that, even if thc Court were to find that breaches of the Vienna
Convention have been committed by the United States of the kind
alleged by Mexico, itwould still be without jurisdiction to orderresridutitl
in integrum as requested by Mexico. The Court would recall in this
regard, as it did in theLuGrundcase, that, wherejurisdiction cxists over
a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is
required by the Court in order to consider the remedies a party has
requested for the breach of thc obligation (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 485,
para. 48).Whether or how far the Court may order the remedy requested
by Mexico are matters to be determincd as part of the merits of the dis-
pute. The third objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot
therefore be upheld.
35. Thc Fourthand last jurisdictional objection of the United States is
that "the Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether or not consular
notification is a 'human right', or to declare fundamental requirements of
substantive or procedural due process". Asnoted abovc, itis on the basis
of Mexico's contention that the right to consular notification has been
widely recognized as a fundamental due process right, and indeed a
human right, that it argues that the rights of the detained Mexican
nationals have been violated by the authorities of the United States, and
that they have been "subjected to criminal proceedingswithout the fair-
ness and dignity to which each person is entitled". The Court observes
that Mexico has presented this argument as being a matter of inter-
pretation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), and therefore belonging to
the merits. The Court considers that this is indeed a question of inter-
pretation OFthe Vienna Convention, Torwhich it has jurisdiction ; the
fourth objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot therefore be
upheld. 36. In its Countcr-Memorial, the United States has advanced a number
of arguments presented as objections to the admissibility of Mexico's
claims. 1t argues that
"Before proceeding, the Court should weigh whether characteris-
tics of the case before it today, or special circumstances related to
particular claims, render either the entire case, or particular claims,
inappropriate for furtherconsideration and decision by the Court."
37. The first abjection under this head is that "Mexico's submissions
should be found inadmissible because they seekto have this CourtFunc-
tion as a court of criminal-appealv; there is, in the view of the United
States, "no other apt characterization of Mexico's two submissions in
respect of remedies". The Court notes that this contention is addressed
solelyto the question of remedies.The United States does not contend on
this ground that the Court should declinejurisdiction to enquire into thc
question of breaches of the VicnnaConvention at all, but simply that, if
such breaches are shown, the Court should do no more than decide that
thc United States must provide "sevicw and reconsideration" along the
linesindicated in the Judgment in.the LaGmndcase (I.C. J. Reports 2001,
pp. 513-514,para. 125).The Court notes that this is amatter of merits.
The first objectionof the United States to admissibility cannot therefore
be upheld.
38. The Court now turns to the objection of the Unitcd States
based on the rule of exhaustion of local remedies. The Uniled Slatcs
contends that the Court "should find inadmissible Mexico's claim lo
exercise its right of diplomatic protcction on behaIf of any Mexican
national who has failed to meet the customary legal requirement of
exhaustion of municipal remedies". It asserts that in a number of the
cases the subject of Mexico's claims, the detained Mexican national,
even with the benefit of the provision of Mexican consular assistance,
failed to raise the alleged non-compliance with Article 35,paragraph 1,
of the Vienna Convention at the trial. Furthermore, it contends that
all of the claims relating tocascs referred to in the Mexican Memorial
are inadmissible bccause local remedies remain available in every case.
It has drawn attention to the fact that litigation is pending bcforc
courts in the United States in a largenumber of the cases the subject
of Mexico's claims and that, m those cases whcrc judicial remedies
have been exhausted, the defendants have not had recourse to the
clemency process available to them; from this it concludes that noneof the cases "is in an appropriate posture for rcviewby an international
tribunal".
39. Mexico respondsthat the rule of exhaustion of local remedies can-
not preclude the admissibilityof its claims. It first states that a majority
of the Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 16above have sought
judicial remediesin the United States based on the Vienna Convention
and that their claims havebeen barred, notably on the basis of thepro-
ceduraldefault doctrine. In this regard, itquotesthe Court's statementin
the LaCrandcase that
"the United States may not. . rely before this Court on this fact in
order to preclude the admissibilityof Germany's [claim] . .., as it
was the United States itselfwhich had failed to carry out its obliga-
tion underthe Convention to inform the LrtGrand brothers" (I. C.J.
Reports 2201, p. 488, pard. 60).
Further, in respcct of the other Mexican nationals, Mexico asserts that
"the courts of the United States have never granted a judicial
remedy to any foreign national for a violation of Article 36. The
United States courts hold either that Article 36 does not create an
individual right,or that a foreign national who has been denied his
Article 36 rights but given hisconstitutional and statutory rights,
cannot establish prejudiceand therefore cannot get relief."
It concludes that the available judicial remedies are thus ineffective.As
for clemency procedures, Mexicocontends that they cannot count for
purposes of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies,becausethey are not
a judicial remedy.
40. In its final submissions Mexicoasks the Court to adjudge and
declare that the United States,in failingto comply with Article 36, para-
graph 1, of thc Vienna Convention, has "violaled its international lcgal
obligations to Mexico,in its own Tight and in the exerciseof its right of
diplomatic protection ofits nationals".
The Court would first observethat the individual rights of Mexican
nationals under paragrapIh(b) of Article 36or the ViennaConvention
are rights which are to be asserted, at any rate in the first place, within
the domestic legal systemof the United States. Only whenthat processis
completed and local remediesare exhausted would Mexico be entitledto
espouse the individual claimsof its nationals through the procedure of
diplomatic protection.
In thepresent case Mexico doesnot, howcver,claimto bcacting solely
on that basis. It also asserts its own claims, basingthem on the injury
which it contends that ir has its+$ suffered, directly and ~hro~igh irsnulionul.~,as a result of the violation by the United States of the obliga-
tions incumbent upon il under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a), (B) and (uj.
The Court would recallthat, in the LaCrurzdcase, it recognizedthat
"Articlc 36, paragraph 1 [of the Vienna Convention], creaks indi-
vidual rights [forthe national concerned], which . . may be invoked
in this Court by the national State or the detained person" (I.C.J.
Reports2001, p. 494, para. 77).
It would further observe that violations of ~hc rights of the individual
under Article 36 may entail a violation of the rights of the sending State,
and that violations of the rights of the latter may cntail a violatioof'the
rights ofthe individual. In these specialcircumslances of interdependence
of the rights of the State:and of individuai rights, Mexico may, in sub-
mitling a claim in its own name, requcst the Court to rule on the viola-
tion of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and through
the violation of individual rights conferred on Mcxican nationals undcr
Article 36,paragraph 1(b). Thc duty to exhausl local remedies does not
apply to such a request. Further, for reasons just explained, the Court
does not find it necessaryto deal with Mexico's claims of violationunder
a distinc~ heading af diplomatic protection. Withoul needing to pro-
nounce at this juncture on the issues raised by the procedural default
rule, as explained by Mexico in paragraph 39 above, the Court accord-
inglyfinds that the second objection by lhc United States lo adnlissibility
cannot be upheld.
41. The Court now turns to the question of lhc alleged dual national-
ity of certain of the Mexican nationals the subjcct of Mexico's claims.
This question is raised by the United States by way of an objection lo the
admissibility of those claims: the United States contends that in its
Memorial Mexico had failed 10establish that it may cxercisediplomatic
protection based on breaches of Mexico's rightsundcr the Vienna Con-
vention with respect to those of its nationals who are also nationals of the
United States. The United States regards it as an acccpted principle that,
when a person arrested or detained in the receivingState is a national of
that State,then even if he is alsoa national of another State party to the
Vienna Convention, Article 36 has no application, and the authorities
or the receiving Slate are not required to procced as laid down in that
Article; and Mexico has indicated that, Torthe purposes of the present
case it docs not contest that dual nationals have no right to be advised
of rheir rights undcr Article 36.
42. It has howeverto be recalledthat Mexico, in addition to seekingto
exercise diplomatic protection of its nationals, is making a claim in itsown right on the basis of the alleged breaches by the United States of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Seen from this standpoint, the
qucstion of dual nationality is not one of admissibility, but of merits. A
claim maybe made by Mexicoof breach of Article 36of the Vienna Con-
vention in relation to any of its nationals, and the United States is therc-
upon free to show that, because the person concerned was also a United
Statesnational, Article 36 had no application to that person,so that no
breach of treaty obligations could have occurred. Furthermore, as regards
the claim to exercisediplomatic protection, the question whether Mexico
is entitled to protecta person having dual Mexican and United States
nationality is subordinatedto the question whcther,in relation to such a
person, the United States was under any obligation interns of Article 36
of the Vienna Convention. It is thus in the courseof its examination of
the merits that the Court will have lo consider whcther the individuals
concerned, or some of them, were dual nationals in law. Without preju-
dice to the outcome of such examination, the third objection of the
UnitedStates to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld.
43. The Court now turns to the fourth objection advanced by the
United Slates to the admissibility of Mexico'sclaims: the contention that
"The Court should not permit Mexico to pursue a claim against
theUnited States with respect to any individual case where Mexico
had actual knowledge of a breach of the Vienna Convention] but
failedto bring such breach to the attention of the United States or
did so only after considerable delay."
In the Counter-Memorial, the United States advances two considerations
in support of this contention: that if the cases had been mentioned
promptly, corrective action might have been possible; and that by
inaction Mexico created an impression that it considered that the
United States was meeting its obligations under the Convention, as
Mexico understood them. At the hearings, the United States suggested
that Mexico had in effectwaivedits right to claimin respect of the alleged
breaches of the Convention, and to seek reparation.
44. As the Court observed in the case of Certai Phosphate land.^in
Nauru(Nouru v. Austrulia), "delay on the part of aclaimant Statemay
render an application inadmissible", but "international law does not lay
down any specifictime-limitin that regard" (1.C.J. Reports1992,pp. 253-
254, para. 32). In that casethe Court recognized that delay might preju-
dice the respondent State "with regard to both theestablishment of the
facts and the determination of the content of the applicable Iaw" (ihid,
p. 255,para. 36),but it has not been suggestedthat there isany such risk
of prejudice in the present case. Sfar as inadmissibility mightbe based
on an impIied waiver of rights, the Court considers that only a muchmore prolonged and consistent inaclion on the par1 of Mexico than any
that the United Slatcs has alleged might be interpreted as implying such
a waiver. Furthermore, Mexico indicated a number of ways in which it
brought to the altcntion of the United States the breaches which itper-
ceived of the Vienna Convenlion. The fourth objection of the United
States to admissibility cannot thereforebe upheld.
45. The Court has now to examine the objection of the United States
that the claim of Mcxico is inadmissible inthat Mexico should not bc
allowed to invoke against the United States standards that Mexico does
not follow in its own practice. The United States contends that, in
accordance wilh basic principles of administration of justice and the
equality of States, both litigants are to be hcld accountable to the same
rules of international law. The objection in this regarwas presented in
terms of the interpretation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, in the
sense that, according to the Unikcd States, a treaty may not be inter-
preted so as to impose a significantlygreater burden on any one party
than the other (DiversionoJ Water from lizeMeuse, Judgment, 1937,
P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 70, p. 20).
46. The Court would recall that thc United Statcs had already raiscd
an objection of a similar nature before it in the LaGrundcase; there, the
Court held that it need not decide "whether this argument of the United
States, if true, would resull in the inadmissibility of Germany's submis-
sions", sincethe United States had failed to prove that Germany's own
praciie did not conrorm to the standards it was demanding from the
United States (I. J. Reports 2001, p. 489, para. 63).
47. The Court would recall that is in any event essentialto have in
mind the nature of the Vienna Convention. It lays down certain stand-
ards to bc observed by all States parties, with a view lo the "unimpeded
conduct of consular relations", which,as the Court observed in 1979,is
important in present-day international law "in promoti~lgthe develop-
ment of lkicndlyrelations among nations, and ensuring protection and
assistance for aliens resident in the territories of other States" (Unired
Srutes Diplomutic und Consulur Slug in Tehran (Unilud Stures of
Amerku v. Iran}, Prtlvisional Measures, Order of 15 Dccember 1979,
I.C.J. Reports 1979, pp. 19-20,,para. 40). Even if it were shown, there-
fore, that Mexico'spractice as regards the application of Article36 was
not beyond reproach, this would not constitutc aground of objection to
the admissibility of Mexico's claim. The fifth objection of the United
States to admissibility cannot thereforebe upheld. 48. Having established that it has jurisdiction to entertain Mexico's
claimsand that they are admissible,the Court willnow turn to the merits
of those claims.
44. In its final submissions Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and
declare that,
"the United States of America, in arresting, detaining, trying, con-
victing, and sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death row
described in Mexico'sMemorial,violated itsinternational legalobli-
gations toMexico,in its own right and in the exerciseof its right to
diplomatic protection of its nationals, by failingto inform, without
delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right to
consular notification and access under Article 36 (1) (h) of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,andbydepriving Mexico
of its right to provide consular protection and the 52 nationals'
right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide under
Article36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention".
50. The Court has already in its Judgment in the LaGrund case
describedArticle 36, paragraph 1, as "an interrelated regime designed to
facilitatehe implementationof the system ofconsularprotection" (I.C.J.
Reporis 2001, p. 492, para. 74). It is thus convenient to set out the
entirety of that paragraph.
"With a viewtoward facilitating theexerciseof consular functions
relatingto nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officersshall be free to communicatewith nationals of
the sendingState and to have accessto them. Nationals of the
sendingState shall have the same freedom withrespectto com-
munication with and accessto consular officersof the sending
State;
(h) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, withoutdelay, inform the consular post of the send-
ing Stateif,within its consular district, a nationoi that State:
is arrested or committed to prison or tocustody pendingtrial
or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested,inprison,
custodyor detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities
3140 AVENA AND OTI"IBRS (JUUGMLNT)
without delay.Thc said authorities shall inform the person con-
cerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officersshall have thc right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to con-
verse and correspond with himand to arrange for his legalrep-
resentation. They shall also have the right to visit any national
of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in
their district inrsuance of ajudgment. Nevertheless,consular
officcrsshall refrain from taking action on behallofa national
who it;in prison, custody or detention ir he expressly opposes
such action."
51.The United States as the receiving State does not deny its duty
to perform thesc obligations. However, it claims that the obligations
apply only to individuals shown to be of Mexican nationality alotie, and
not to those of dual MexicanlUnilcd States nationality. The United
States further contends irzteralia that it has not committed any brcach
of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), upon the proper interpretation of
"without delay" as used in that subparagraph.
52. Thus two major issues under Article 36,paragraph 1 (b), that are
in dispute between the Parties are, first,e question of the riationality of
the individuals concerned;and second, the question of the meaning to be
givcn to the expression "without delay". Thc Court will examine each ui'
these in turn.
53. The Parties have advanced thcir contentions as to nationalily in
three different legalcontexts. The United Stateshas begun by making an
objection to admissibility, which the Court has already dealt wilh (see:
paragraphs 41 and 42 above). The United States has further contended
that a substantial number of the 52 persons listed in paragraph 16
above were United States nationals and that it thus had no obligation
to these individuals undcr Article 36, paragraph 1 (h). The Court will
address this aspect of the matter in the followingparagraphs. Finally, the
Parties disagree as to whether the requirement under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (h), for the information to be given "without delay" becomes
operalive upon arrest or upon ascertainment of nationality. The Court
will address this issue latersccparagraph 63 below).
54. The Parties disagree as to what each of them must show as regards
nationality in connection withthe applicability of thterns of Article 36,
paragraph 1,and as to how the principles of cvidencehave been met on
the facts of the cases. 55. Both Parties recognize the well-sellled principle in international
law that a litigant seeking to establish the existence of a fact bears the
burden of proving it (cf. Military und Pararniliiary Activilies in and
uguinst Niuarragncc(Nicaragua v. Uniied Slates ofAmericu), Jurisiliction
and Adwissisibility J,udgnzenl,I. C.J.Rpporls 1984, p. 437, para. 101).
Mexico acknowledges that it has the burden of proor to show that the
52persons listedin paragraph 16above were Mexicannationals to whom
Ihc provisions of Article36,paragraph 1(b), in principle apply.It claims
it hasmet this burden by providing to the Court I~C birth certificates of
these nationals, and declarations from 42 of them that they have not
acquired United States nationality. Mexico further contends that the
burden of proof lieson the United States should it wish lo contend that
particular arrested persons of Mexican nationality were, at the relevant
time, also United States nationals.
56. The United States accepts that in such cases it hasthe burden of
proof to demonstrate United States nationality, but ont tendsthat none-
thelessthe "burden of evidcnce" as to this remains with Mexico.This dis-
tinction is explained by the United States as arising out of the f:dctthat
persons of Mexican nationality may also havc acquired United States
citizenship by operation of law, depending on their parents' dates and
places or birth, places of residency, marital status at time of their birth
and so forth. I1the viewof the United States "virtually all such informa-
tion is in the hands of Mexico through the now 52 individuals it repre-
sents". The United Slates contends that it was the responsibility of'
Mexico lo produce such information, which responsibility ithas not dis-
charged.
57. Thc Court finds that it ISfor Mexicoto show that the 52 persons
listed inparagraph 16above held Mexicannationality at the time of their
arrest. Thc Court notes that to this end Mexico has produced birth
certificates and declarations of nationality, whose contents have not
been challenged by the United States,
The Court observes further that the United States has, however, ques-
tioned whether some of these individuals were not also United States
nationals. Thus, the United States has informed the Court that, "in the
case of defendant Ayala (case No. 2)we are close to certain that Ayala is
a United States citizen", and that this could be confirmed withabsolute
certainty if Mexico produced facts about this mattes. Similarly Mr.
Avena (case No. 1)was said to be "likely'90 be a United States citizen,
and there was "some possibility" that some 16 othcr defendants were
United States citizens.Asto six others, the United States said it "cannot
rule out the possibility" of United States nationality. The Courlakes the
viewthat it was for the United States to demonstrate that thiswas so and
to furnish the Court with all information on the matter in its possession.
In so far as relevant data on that matter are said by the United States to
lie within the knowledge of Mexico, itwas for the United States to have42 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
sought that information from the Mexican authorities. The Court cannot
acceptthat, because suchinrormation may have bccn in part in the hands
of Mexico, it was for Mexicoto produce suchinformation. It was for the
United States to seek such information, with sufficient specificity,and to
demonstrate both that this was done and that the Mexican authorities
declined or failed to respond to such specific requests. At no stage,
however, has the United States shown the Court that it made specific
enquiries of those authorities about particular cascs and that rcsponses
were not forthcoming. The Court accordingly concludes that the United
Statcs has not mct its burden of proof in its attempt to show that persons
of Mexican nationality were also United States nationals.
The Court therefore finds that, as regards the 52 persons listed in
paragraph 16 above, the Unitcd Statcs had obligations under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b).
58. Mexico asks the Court to find that
"the obligationin Article 36,paragraph I, of the Vienna Convention
requires notification ofconsular rights anda reasonable opportunity
for consular access before the competent authorities or the receiv-
ing State take any action potentially detrimental to the foreign
national's rights".
59. Mexicocontends that, i11each of the 52cases beforethe Court, the
United States failed to provide the arrested persons with information as
to their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), "without delay". It
alleges that in one case, Mr. Esquivel(case No. 7), the arresled person
was informed, but only some 18months after the arrest, whilein another,
that of Mr. Juirez (case No. lo), information was given to the arrested
person of his rights some 40 hours after arrest. Mexicocontends that this
still constituted violation, because "without delay" is to be understood
as meaning "immediately", and in any event before any interrogation
occurs. Mexico further draws the Court's attention to tlze fact that in
this case a United States court found that there had been a violation of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), and claims that the United States cannot
disavow such a determinatioil by its own courts. In an Annex to its
Memorial, Mexicomentions that, in a third case (Mr. Ayala, case No. 2),
the accused was informed of his rights upon his arrival on dcath row,
some four years after arrest. Mexico contends that in the remaining
cases the Mexicans concerned were in fact never so informed by the
United States authorities.
60. The United States disputes both the facts as presented by Mexico
and the legalanalysis of Article36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Con-
vention offered by Mexico. The United States claims that Mr. Solache
(case No. 47) was informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention43 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
some sevenmonths after his arrest.The United States further claimsthat
many of the persons concernedwereof United States nationalityand that
at leastsevenof these individuals"appear to have affimativcly claimedto
be United Statescitizensat the timeof their arrest". Thesecases were said
to be those of'Avena (case No. l), Ayala (case No. 21,Benavides (case
No. 3), Ochoa (caseNo. 18),Salcido(caseNo. 22),Tafoya (caseNo. 241,
and Alvarez(case No. 30).In the viewof the United States no duty of
consular information arose in these cases.Further, in the contention of
the United States, in the casesofr*Ayala (caseNo. 2)and Mr. Salcido
(caseNo. 22)there wasno reasonto believethat the arrested personswere
Mexicannationals at any stage; the informationin the caseof Mr. Juirez
(cascNo. 10)was given"without delay",
51. The Court thus nowturns to the interpretation of Article 36,para-
graph 1 (b), having found in paragraph 57above that it isapplicable to
the 52persons listedin paragraph 16.It beginsby noting that Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), contains three separate but interrelated elements: the
right of thc individual concerned lo be informed without delay of his
rights under Article36,paragraph 1 (b);the right of theconsular post to
be notifiedwithout delayof the individual'sdetention, if he so requests;
and the obligation of the receivingState to forward without delay any
communication addressed to the consular post by the detained person.
62. The third element of Articlc 36, paragraph 1 (b), has not been
raisedon the facts beforethe Court. The Court thus begins withthe right
of an arrested or detained individualto information.
63. The Court finds that the duty upon the detaining authoritiesto
givethe Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), information to the individualarises
once it is realizedthattheperson is a foreignnational, or once there are
grounds to think chatthe pcrsonis probably a forcignnational. Precisely
when this may occur will vary with circumstances.The United States
Department of Statebooklet, Consular Not$cation and Access - Instruc-
lionsfor Federa l,ale und Local Law Enfircement and Other Qfjcials
Regmiling Foreign Nationals inthe United States and the Righis ofCon-
sular OfficiulsEQAssisf Them,issued to Federal,state and local authori-
ties in orderto promote compliance with Article 36of the Vienna Con-
vention points out in such cases that: "most, but not all, persons born
outside the United States are not [citizens].Unfamiliarity with English
may also indicate foreign nationality." The Court notes that when an
arrested person himself claims to be of United States nationality, the
realization by the authorities that he is not in fact a United States
national, or groundsfor that realization,is likelyto come somewhatlater
in time. 64. The United Stateshas told the Court that millionsof aliens reside,
either legallyor illegally,on its territory, and moreover that its lawscon-
cerning citizenship are generous. The United States has also pointed out
that itis a mullicuItura1society, wilh citizenshipbeing heldby pcrsons of
diverse appearance, speaking many languages. The Courl appreciates
that in the United States the language that a person speaks, or his
appearance, does not ncccssarily indicate that hc is a foreign national.
Nevertheless, and particularly in view of the large numbers of foreign
nationals living in the United States, lhcse very circumstances suggest
that it would be desirable for enquiry routinely to be made of the indi-
vidual as to his nationality upon his detention, so that the obligations of
the Vienna Convention may be complied with. The United Stales has
informed the Court that some of'its law enforcement authorities do
routinely ask persons lakcn into detention whether they are United States
citizens. Indccd, were each individual to be told at that time that, should
hc be a foreign national, hc is entitled to ask for his consular post to be
contacted, compliance with this requirement under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (h), would be greatly enhanwd. The provision of such informa-
tion could parallel the readingof'those rights of which any person taken
into custody in connection with a criminal offcnce must be informed
prior to interrogation by virtue of what in thc United States is known as
the "Miranda rule"; these rights include, inleraliu, the righl to remain
silent, theright to have an attorney present during questioning, and the
right tohave an attorney appointed at government expense if the person
cannot afford one. The Court notes that, according to the United States,
such a practice in respect of the Vienna Convention rights is already
being followed in some local jurisdictions.
65. Bearing in mind the complexities explained by the United States,
the Court now begins by examining the application of Article 36,
paragraph I (b), of the Vienna Convention to the 52 cases. In 45 of
these cases, the Court has no cvidence that the arreslcd persons claimed
United SVdtesnationality, or wercreasonably thought to bc United States
nationals, with specific enquiriesbeing made in timely fashion to verify
such dual nalionality. The Court has explained in paragraph 57 above
what enquiries it would have expectedto have been made, within a short
time period, and what information should have been provided to the
Court.
66. Seven pcrsons, however, are asserted by the United States to
have stated at the timc of arrest that they were United States citizens.
Only in the casc of Mr. Salcido (casc No. 22) has the Court been pro-
vided by the United States with cvidenceof such a statement. This has
been acknowledged by Mexico. Further, there has been no cvidence
before thc Court to suggest that there were in this case at the same time
also indications of Mexican nationality, which should have caused
~apidenquiry by the arresting authorities and the providing of consular
information "without delay". Mexico has accordingly not shown that ininlbrmed that the Tmmigrationand Naturalization Service was holding
investigations to determine whether, because of a previous conviction,
Mr. Alvarez was subjcctto deportation as a foreign national. The Court
has not been presented with evidencethat rapid resolution was sought as
to the question of Mr. Alvarez'snationality.
74. The Court concludes that Mexico has failed to prove the violation
by the United States of its obligationsundcr Article 36,paragraph 1 (b),
in the caseor Mr. Salcido (case No. 22),and his casewill not be further
cornmenlcd upon. On the other hand, as regards the other individuals
who are alleged to have claimed United States nationality on arrest,
whose cases have beenconsidered in paragraphs 67 to 73 above, the
argument or lhc UnitcdStates cannot be upheld.
75. The question noncthcless remains as to whether, in each of the 45
cases referredto in paragraph 65 and of the sixcases mentioned in para-
graphs 67 to 73, the United States did provide the required information
to the arrested persons "without delay". Itis to that qucstion that the
Court now turns.
76. Thc Court has been provided with declarations from a number of
the Mexican nationals concerned that attest to their never beinginformed
of their rights under Article6,paragraph 1 (b). The Court at the outset
notes that, in 47 such cases, the United States nowhere challenges
this fact of information not being given. Nevertheless, in the case of
Mr. Hernindez (case No. 34),the United States observes that
"Although the [arresting] officerdid not ask Hernindez Llanas
whether he wanted them to inform the Mexican Consulate of his
arrest, it was certainly not unreasonable for him to assume that an
escaped convict would not want the Consulate of the country from
which he escaped notifiedof his arresl."
Thc Court notes that the clear duty to provide consular information
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (B), does not invite assumptions as to
what the arrested person might prefer, as a ground For not informing
him. It rather givesthe arrested pcrson, once informed, the righto sayhe
nonetheless does not wish his consular post to be notified.It necessarily
rollowsthat in each of these 41 cases, the duty to inform "wilhout delay"
has been violated.
77. In four cases, namely Ayala (caseNo. 2), Esquivel (caseNo. 7),
Juirez (caseNo. 10)and Solache (caseNo. 471, some doubtsremainas to
whether the information that was givenwas providcd without delay. For
these, some examination of the tern isthus necessary.
78. This is a matter on which the Parties have very different views.According to Mexico, the timing of the notice to the detained person "is
critical to the exercise of the rights provided by Article 36"andthe
phrase "without delay" in paragraph 1 (hj requires "unqualified imme-
diacy". MexicoI'urthercontcnds that, in viewof the object and purpose
of Article 36which is to enable "meaningful consular assistance" and the
safeguarding of the vulnerability of foreign nationals in custody,
"consuiar notification. . .must occur immediately upon detention
and prior to any interrogation of the foreign detainee, so that the
consul may offcr useful advice about the foreign legal system and
pravide assistance inobtaining counsel before the foreign national
makes any ill-informeddecisionsor the State takes any action poten-
tially prejudicial to his rights".
79. Thus, in Mexico'sview,it would followthat in any case in which a
foreign national was interrogated before being informed of his rights
under Article 36, there would @so facto be a breach of that Article, how-
everrapidly after the interrogation the informationwas given to the for-
eign national. Mexicoaccordingly includes the case of Mr. Juirez among
those where it claims violation of Article6, paragraph 1 (b), as he was
interrogated before beinginformed of his consular rights, some40 hours
after arrest.
80. Mexico has also invoked the dravnnxpr6purutoires or the Vienna
Convention in support of its interpretation of thcrequirement that the
arrested person be informed "without delay" of the right to ask that the
consular post be notified. In particulaMexico rccallcd that the phrase
proposed to the Conferenceby the International Law Commission, "with-
out undue delay", was replaced by thc United Kingdom proposal to
delete the word "undue". The United Kingdom representative had
explained that this would avoid the implication that "some delay was
permissible" and no delegate had expressed dissent with the USSR and
Japanese statements that the result of the amendment would be Eo
require information "immediately".
81. The United States disputed this interpretation of the phrase "with-
out delay". In its viewit did not mean "immedialely, and before interro-
gation" and such an understanding was supported neither by the termi-
nology, nor by thc object and purpose of the Vienna Convention, nor by
its travaux pr&paruloires.In the booklet referred to in paragraph 63
above, the State Department explains that "without delay" means "there
should be no deliberate delay" and that the required action should be
taken "as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances". It was
normally to be expected that "notification to consular officers" would
have been made "within 24 to 72 hours ofthe arrest or detention". The
United States further contended that such an interpretation of the words
"without delay" would be reasonable in itself and also allow a consistent48 AVENA AND OTHERS (IUDGMENT)
interpretation of the phrase as it occurs in each of three different occa-
sions in Article 36, paragraph 1 (h). As fbr the truvous prkparrrtoires,
they showed only that unduc or dclibcratc dclay had been rcjcctcd as
unacceptable.
82. According to the United States, the purpose of Article 36 was to
facilitate the exerciseof consular functions by a consular officer:
"The significanceof'giving consular inlbrmalion to a national is
thus limited .. . It is a procedural device that allows the foreign
national to trigger the related process of notificatio. . [It] cannot
possibly befundamental to the criminal justice process."
83. The Court now addresses the question of the proper interpretation
of the expression "without dclay" in thelight of arguments put to it by
the Parties. The Court begins by noting that the precise meaning of
"without delay", as it is to be understood in Articl35, paragraph 1 (b),
is not defined in the Convention. This phrase therefore requires interpre-
tation according to the customary rules of treaty interpretation refleclcd
in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ot'Treaties.
84. Article I of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which
defines certain of the terms used in the Convention, offers no definition
of the phrase "without delay". Moreover, in the different language ver-
sions of the Convention various terms are e~nployedto render the phrases
"without delay" in Article 36and "irnmedialely" in Article 14.The Court
observes that dictionary definitions, in thc various languages of the
Vienna Convention, ok'f'eriverse meanings of the tcrm "without dclay"
(and also of "immediately"). It is therefore necessary lo look elsewhere
for an understanding of this term.
85. As for the object and purpose of the Convention, the Court
observes lhalArticle 36 provides for consular officers to be free to com-
municate with nationals of thc scnding State, to have access to them, to
visit and speak with them and to arrange for their legal representation. It
is not envisaged, either in Article 36, paragraph 1, or elsewhcrc in the
Convention, that consular functions entail a consukar officer himselfor
herself acting as the legal representative or more directly engaging in
the criminal justice process. indeed, this is confirmed by the wording of
Artide 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention. Thus, neithcr thc lcms
of the Convention as normally understood, nor its object and purpose,
suggest that "without delay" is to be understood as "immediately upon
arrest and before interrogation".
86. The Court further notes that, notwilhslanding the uncertainties in
the travuzrxprkpuraloires, they too do nor support such an interpreta- tion. During the diplomatic conf'crence,the conference's expert, former
Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, explained to
the delegatcs that the words "without undue delay" had bcen introduced
by the Commission, after long discussion in both the plenary and draft-
ing committee, to allow for special circumslanccs which might permit
information as to consular notification notlo be givenat once. Germany,
the only one of two States to present an amendment, proposed adding
"but at latest withinone month". There was an extended discussion by
many different delegates as to what such outer time-limit would be
amptable. During that debate no delegate proposed "immediately". The
shortest specific period suggested was by the United Kingdom, namely
"promptly" and no later than "48 hours" afterwards. Eventually, in the
absence of agreement on a precise time period, the United Kingdom's
other proposal to delete the word "undue" was accepted as the position
around which delegatescould converge. It isalso of interest that there is
no suggestion in the travaux that the phrase "without delay7'mighthave
different meanings in each of the three sets of circumstancesin which itis
used in Article 36, paragraph 1 (bJ.
87. The Court thus finds that "wizhout delay" is not necessarily tobe
intcrprcted as "immediately" upon arrest. It further observes that during
the Conference debates on this term, no delegate made any connection
with the issue of interrogation.hc Court considers that the provision in
Article 36, paragraph I (b), that the receiving Stale authorities "shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights" cannot be intcr-
. preted to signifythat the provision of such information must necessarily
precede any interrogation, so chat the commencement of interrogation
before the information is given would be a breach of Article 36.
88. Although, by application of the usual rulesofin~erpre~ation,"with-
out delay" as regards the duty to inform an individual under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), is not to be understood as necessarilymeaning "irnrnc-
diately upon arrest", there is nonetheless a duty upon the arresting
authorities.to give that information to an arrested person as soon as it is
realized that the personisa foreign national, or once therare grounds to
think that the person is probablya foreign national.
89. With one exception, no information as to entitlement to consular
notification was given in any of the casescited in paragraph 77 within
any ofthe various time periods suggested by the delegatesto the Confer-
ence on the Vienna Convention, or by the United States itself (see para-
graphs 81and 86above). Indeed, the information was giveneither not at
allor at periods very significantlyremoved from the time of arrest. the
case of Mr. 9uBrez (case No. lo), the defendant was informed of his50 AVENA AND 0TE.IERS(JUDGMEN'I')
consular rights 40 hours after his arrest. The Court notes, however, that
Mr. Juirez? arrest report statedthathe had been born in Mexico; more-
over, therehad been indicationsof his Mexicannationality from thc time
of his initial interrogationy agents of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) Lbllowinghis arrest. It EoIlowsthat Mr. Juiirez'sMexican
nationality was apparent from the outset of his detention by the United
Statesauthorities. In these circumstances, in accordance with its interpre-
tation of the expression "without delay" (see paragraph 88 above), the
Court concludes that theUnited States violated the obligation incumbcnt
upon it under Article36, paragraph 1 (BJ,to inform Mr. Juarez without
delay of his consular rights. The Court notcs that the same finding was
reached by a California Superior Court, albeit on different grounds.
90. The Court accordingly concludes that, with respect to each of the
individualslistedin paragraph 16,with the exception of Mr. Salcido (case
No. 22; see paragraph 74 above),the United Stateshas violaled its obli-
gation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention to
provide information to the arrested person.
91. As noted above, Article 36, paragraph I (b), contains three
elements. Thus far, the Court has bccn dealing with the right of an
arrested person tobe informed that he may ask for his consular post lo
be notified. The Court now turns to another aspect of Article 36,
paragraph 1 (h), The Court finds the United States is correct in observ-
ing that the fact that a Mexican consular post was not notified under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (151does not of necessityshow that the arrested
person was not inlbm~edof his rights under that provision. He may
have been informed and declined to have hisconsular post notified.Thc
givingof the information is relevant, however, for satisfying the clement
in Article36, paragraph 1 (A) ,n which the other two elements thcrcin
depend.
92. In only two caseshas the United States claimed that the arrested
person was informed or hisconsular rights but asked for the consular
post not to be notified. These arMr. luirez (case No. 10)and Mr. So-
lache (case No. 47).
93. The Court is satisfied that whcn Mr. Juirez (case No. 10)was
informed of his consular rights 40 hours after his arrest (see para-
graph 89) he chose not to have his consular post notified. As regards
Mr. Solache(caseNo. 471,however, itis not sufficientlyclcar to the Court,
on the evidencebefore it, that he requested that hisconsular post should
not be notified.Indeed, the Court has not been provided withany reasons
as to why, if a request of non-notification was made, the consular post
was then notifiedsome three months latcr.
94. In a further three cases, the United States alleges that the con-
sular post was formally notifiedof the detention of one of its Mexican51 AYENA AND OTI4ERS(JUDGMENT)
nationals without prior information to the individual as to his consular
rights.These are Mr. Covarrubias (case No. 6), Mr. Hernandez (case
No. 34) and Mr. Reyes (case No. 543.The United States further con-
tends that the Mexicanauthorities were contacted regarding the case of
Mr. Loza (caseNo. 52).
45. The Court notes that, in the case of Mr. Covarrubia(caseNo. 61,
the consular authorities learned from third parties of his arrest shortly
after it occurred.Some 16 months later, a court-appointed interpreter
requested that the consulate intervene in the case prior to trial. It would
appear doubtrul whether an interpreter can be considered a competent
authority for triggering theinterrelated provisions of Article, para-
graph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention. In the caseofMr. Reyes (case
No. 54), the United States has simply told the Court that an Oregon
Department of Justice attorney had advised United States authorities
that both the District Attorney and the arresting detective advisedhe
Mexicanconsular authorities of his arrest. No information is givenas to
when this occurred, in relation to theate of his arrest. Mr. Reyes did
receiveassistance beforehis triaIn these two cases,the Court considers
that, evenon thehypothesisthat the conduct of the United Stateshad no
serious consequencesfor the individuals concerned, it did nonetheless
constitutea violation of the obligations incumbent upon the United
States under Article36, paragraph I (h).
96. In the case of Mr. Loza (case No. 523,a United States Congress-
man from Ohio contacted the Mexican Embassy on behalf of Ohio
prosecutors, some four months after the accused's arrest, "to enquire
about the procedures for obtaininga certified copyof Loza's birth cer-
tificate". The Court hasot been provided witha copy of the Congress-
man's letter and is therefounable to ascertain whether itexplained that
Mr. Loza had been arrested. The response from the Embassy (which
is also not included in the documentation provided to the Court) was
passed by the Congressman to the prosecuting attorney, who then asked
the Civil Registry of Guadalajara for a copy of the birth certificate.
This request made no specificmention ofMr. Loza'sarrest. Mexicocon-
tends that its consulate was neverformally notifiof Mr. Loza'sarrest,
of which it only became aware after he had been convicted and
sentenced to death. Mexico includesthe case of Mr. Lord among those
in which the United States was in breach of its obligation of consular
notification. Taking amount of all these elements, and in particular
o€ the fact that the Embassy was contacted four months after the
arrest, and that the consular post became aware of the defendant's
detention only after hc had been canvicted and sentenced, the Court
concludes that in the caseof Mr. Loza the United States violated the
obligation ol' consular notification without delay incumbent upon it
under Article36, paragraph 1(b). 97. Mr. Hcrniindez (case No. 34)was arrested in Texas on Wednesday
15 Octobcr 1997.The United States authorities had no reason to believe
he might have American citizenship.The consular post was notified the
followingMonday, that isfivedays (corresponding to only threc working
days) thereafter.The Court finds that, in the circumstances, lhc United
Statcs did notify the consular post without delay, in accordanw with its
obligation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (h).
88. In the first of its final submissions, Mexico also asks the Court
to find that the violations it ascribes to the United States in rcspect of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), have also deprived "Mexico of its right to
provide consular protection and the 52 nationaldright to receive such
protection as Mexico would provide under Article 36 (1) (a) and (c)
of thc Convention".
99. The relationship between the three subparagraphs of Article 36,
paragraph 1, has been described by the Court in its Judgment in
the LaCrund case (I.C.J. Reporr~ 2001, p. 492, para. 74) as "an
interrelated r6gime". Thc legal conclusions to bc drawn from that
interrelationship necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. In the
LaGrund case, the Court found that the failure for 16 years lo inform
the brothers of their right to havc their consul notified effcclively pre-
vented the exercise of other rights that Germany might have chosen to
exerciseunder subparagraphs (a) and (cj.
100. Ilisnecessaryto revisitthe interrelationship of the three subpara-
grnphs of Article 36, paragraph 1,in the lighl of the particular facts and
circumstances of the prcsentcase.
101. The Court would first recall that, in the case of Mr.Juhrez (case
No. 10) (seeparagraph 93 above), whcn the defendant was ialbrmcd af
his rights, he declinedto have hisconsular posznotilicd. Thus in this case
lhere was no violation of either subparagraph la)or subparagraph (c)
of Article 36,paragraph 1.
102. In the remaining cases,because of the failure of the United States
to acl in conformity with Article 36, paragraph I (b), Mexico was in
effect prccluded (in some cases totally,and in some cases for prolonged
periods of time) from exercisingits right under paragraph 1 (a) to com-
municate with its nationals and have accessto them. As the Court has
already had occasion to explain, il is immaterial whether Mexico would
have offered consular assistance, "or whether a different verdict would
have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred these
rights" (I.CX Reporrs2001, p, 492, para. 74),which might havc been
acted upon.
103. The same is true, pari pcr.rsu,of ccrtain rights identified in sub-
paragraph (c): "consular officers shall havethe right to visit a national
or the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, and to con-
verse and correspond with him . ..".53 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
104.On the other hand, and on the particular facts of this case, no
such generalized answer can he given as regards a further entitlement
mentioncd in subparagraph (c), namely, the right ofconsular officers"to
arrangc for [the]legalrepresentation" of the foreign national. Mexico has
laid muchemphasis in this litigation upon the importance of consular
officersbeing able lo arrange for such representation before and during
trial, and especiallyt sentencing, in cases in which a severepenalty may
be imposed. Mexicohas further indicated thc importance of any financial
or other assistance that consular officersmay provide to defcncecounsel,
intcr aliu for investigationof the defendant's familybackground and
mcntal condition, when such information is relevant to the casc. The
Court observes that the exerciseof the rights or the sending State under
Article36, paragraph 1 (c), depends upon notification by the authorities
of the receiving State.t may be, however, that information drawn to the
attention of the sending State by other means maystill enable itsconsular
officers to assist in arranging legal representation Tor its national. In
the following cases, the Mexican consular authorities learned of their
national's detention in time to provide such assistance, eithcr through
notification by United States authorities (albeit belatedly in terms of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (h)) or through other channels: Renavides
(case No. 3);Covarrubias (case No. 6); EsquiveI (case No. 7); Hoyos
(case No. 9); Mendoza(case No. 17); Ramirez (case No. 20); Sanchez
(case No. 23); Verano (case No. 27); Zamudjo (case No. 29); Gomez
(case No. 33); Hernindez (case No. 34); Ramires (case No. 41); Rocha
(case No. 42); Solache (caseNo. 47); Carnargo [case No. 49) and Rcyes
(case No. 54).
105. In relation to Mr. Manriquez (case No. 14), the Court lacks pre-
cise information as to when his consular post was notified. It is merely
given to understand that it was two years prior to conviction, and that
Mr. Manriquez himself had never been informed of his consular rights.
There is also divergence between the Parries in regard to the case of
Mr. Fuentes (caseNo. 15), where Mexico claims it became aware of his
detention during trial and the United States says this occurred during
jury selection, prior to the actual commencement of the trial. In thc
case of Mr. Arias (case No. 44, the Mexican authorities became aware
of his detention less than one week before the commencement of the
trial. Inthose three cases, the Court concludes that the United States
violated its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1(c).
106. On this aspect of the case, the Court thus concludes:
(1) that the United States committed breaches of the obligation incum-
bent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Con-
vention to inform detained Mexican nationals or their rights under55 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
Flores (case No. 46),Fong (caseNo. 48), Perez (caseNo. Sl), Loza
(case No. 52)and Torres (caseNo. 53).
107. In its third final submission Mexicoasks the Court to adjudge
and declarethat
"the United Statesviolated its obligationsunder Article 36 (2)of the
Vienna Convention by failing to provide meaningful andeffective
reviewand reconsideration ofconvictionsand sentences impairedby
a violation of Article 36 (I)".
108. Article 36, paragraph 2, provides :
"The rights referred to in paragraph 1of this article shallbe exer-
cised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso, however,that the said lawsand regu-
lations must enable full effectlo be given to the purposes for which
thc rightsaccorded under this articleare intended."
109. In thisconnection, Mexico has argued that the United States
"Byapplyingprovisionsof itsmunicipal lawto defeat or foreclose
remedies forthe violation of rights conferred by Article 36 - thus
failingto provide meaningful review and reconsideration of severe
sentencesimposed in proceedings that violated Article 36- ... has
violated, and continues to violate, the Vienna Convention."
More specifically,Mexicocontends that:
"The United States uses several municipallegal doctrines to pre-
vent finding any legal effect from the violations of Article 36.First,
despitethis Court'sclear analysisin LuGrand,US courts, at both the
state and federal level,continue to invoke default doctrines to bar
any review of Article 36 violations - even when the national had
been unaware of his rights to consular notification and communica-
tion and thus his abilityto raise their vioIation as an issue at trial,
due to the competent authorities' failureto comply with Article36."
110. Againstthis contention by Mexico,the United States arguesthat:
"the criminal justice systems of the United States address all errors
47 in process through both judicial and executive clemencyproceed-
ings, relyingupon the latter when rulesof default haveclosedout the
possibility of the former. That is, the 'laws and regulations' of the
United States provide for the correction of mistakes that may bc
relevant to a criminal defendant to occur through a combination
of judicial review and demcncy. These processes together, working
with other competent authorities, give fulleffst to the purposes for
which Article 36 (1) is intended, in conformity with Article 36 (2).
And, insofar as a brcach of Article 36 (1) has occurred, these pro-
cedures satisfy the remedial function of Article 38 (2) by allowing
the United States to provide review and reconsideration of convic-
tionsand sentences consistent with La Grrrrzd."
111. The "procedural default" rulc in United States law has already
bccn brought to the attention of the Court in the LaCrundcase. The fol-
lowing brief definitionof the rulewas provided by Mexico in its Mcmo-
rial in this case and has not been challenged by Ihc United States: "a
defendant who could have raised, but failsto raise,a legal issueat trial
willgenerally not be permitted to raise it in future proceedings,on appeal
or in a petition for writ of huheas (:orpus".The rule requires exhaustion
of remedies, inter ulirral lhc statc level and before a Izuheascorpus
motion call be filed with federal courts. In the LaGrandcase, the rule in
question was applied by United Stales federal courts; in the present case,
Mexico also complains of the application of the rulc in certain state
courts of criminal appeal.
112. The Court has alrcady considered the application of the "pro-
cedural default" rule, alleged by Mcxico to be a hindrance to the full
implementation of the international obligations of the United States
under Article 36,in the LaGrandcase, when the Court addressed the issue
of its implicationsfor the application of Article 36,paragraph 2, of the
Vienna Convention. The Court emphasized that "a distinction must be
drawn between that rulc as such and its specificapplication in the present
case". The Court stated:
"In itself, the rule does not violate Articl36of the Vienna Con-
vention. The problem arises when the procedural default rule does
no1allow the detained individual to challenge a conviclion and sen-
tence by claiming,in reliance on Article36,paragraph 1,of the Con-
vention, that the competent national authorities failed to comply
with their obligation to provide the requisite consular information
'without delay',thus preventing the person from seekingand obtain-
ing consular assistance from the sending State." (I.CJ. Reports
2001, p. 497, para. 90.)57 AVENA AND OTI.IERS(JUDGMENT)
On this basis, the Court concluded that "the procedural default rule
prevented counsel Forthe LaGrands to effectivelychallenge their convic-
tions and sentences other than on United States constitutional grounds"
(I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 493, para. 91).This statement of the Court seems
equally valid inrclation lo the present case, where a number of Mexican
nationals have been placed exactlyin such a situation.
113. The Court willreturn to this aspect below, in the context of Mexi-
co'sclaims as to remedies. For the moment, the Court simply notes that
the procedural default rule has not been revised, nor has any provision
been made to prevent its application in cases where it has beenIhe failure
of the United States itself to inform that may have precluded counsel
from being in aposition to have raised the question of a violation of the
Vienna Convention in the initial trial. It thus remains the casc that the
procedural default rule may continue to prevent courts from attaching
legal significancetothe fact, inter uliu, that the violationthe rights set
forth in Article 36, paragraph 1, prevented Mexico, in a timely fashion,
from relaining privatccounsel for certain nationals and otherwise assist-
ing in their defence. In such cases, application of the proceduraldefault
rule would havethe effect of preventing "full effect[from being] givento
the purposes Forwhich the rightsaccorded under thisarticleare intended",
and thus violate paragraph 2 of Article 36.Thc Court notes moreover
that in several of the cases cited in Mexico's final submissions the pro-
cedural default rule has already been applied, and that in others it could
be applied at subsequent stages in the proceedings. However, in none of
the cases, savefor the three mentioned inparagraph 114 below, have the
criminal proceedings against the Mexican nationals concerned already
reached a stage at wh~chthere is no further posnbility of judicial re-
examination of those cases;that isto say, all possibilityisnot yet excluded
of "review and reconsideration" of conviction and sentence, as called for
in the LaCrandcase, and as explained further in paragrslphs 128 and fol-
lowing below. It would therefore be premature Forthe Court to concludc
at this stage that,inthose cases, there is alreadya violation of thc obli-
gations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention.
114. By contrast,the Court notes that in the case of three Mexican
nationals, Mr. Fierro (case No. 311,Mr. Moreno (mse No. 391,and
Mr. Torres (case No. 53),conviction and scntence have become final.
Moreover, in the case of Mr. Torres the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals has set an execution date (see paragraph 21 above, in Jne).
Thc Courtmust therefore conclude that, in relation to these three indi-
viduals, the United States is in breach of the obligations incumbent
upon it under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention.58 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
115. Having concluded that in most of the cases brought before the
Court by Mexico in the 52 instances, there has been a failure to observe
the obligations prescribed by Article 36, paragraph I (b], of thc Vienna
Convention, the Court now proceeds to the examination of the legal
consequences or such a breach and of what legal remedies should be con-
sidered for the breach.
116. Mexico in its fourth, fifth and sixth submissionsasks theCourt lo
adjudge and dcclare:
"(4) that pursuant to the injuries sufl'eredby Mexico in its own right
and in the exercise of diplomatic protection of its nationals,
Mexico is cntitled to Full reparation for these injuries in the
form of resriiutio i~?inlegrum;
(5)that this restitution consists of the obligation to restore the
status guu unlr by annulling or otherwise depriving of full
force orcfSectthe conviction and sentences of all 52 Mexican
nationals; [and]
(6) that this restitution also includes the obligation to take
all measures necessary to ensure that a prior violation of
Article 35 shall not aKcctthe subsequent proceedings."
117. In support of its fourth and fifth submissions,Mexicoargues that
"lt is wdl-established that the primary form of reparation available to a
State injured by an internationally wrongful act is rrstirutiin intrgrum",
and that "Thc United States is therefore obliged to take the necessary
actlon to restore the srarus quo ante in respect of Mexico's nationals
detained, tried, convicted and sentenced in violation of their intcrnalion-
ally recognized rights." To restore thestatus quo ante, Mexico contends
that "restitution hcrcmust take the form of annulment OFthe conv~ctions
and sentences lhat resulted from the proceedings tainted by the Article 36
violations", and that "It follows from the very nature of rrstilutiothat,
when a violation of an international obligation is manifested in a judicial
act, that act must be annulled and thereby deprived of any force or effect
in the national legal system." Mexico therefore asks in its submissions
that the convictions and sentences of the 52 Mexican nationals be
annulled, and that, in any Suturc criminal proceedings against these 52
Mexican nationals, evidence obtained in breach of Article 36 of the
Yicnna Convention be excluded.
118. The United States on the other hand argues:
"LaCrmrds holding calls for the United States to provide, in each
case, 'review and reconsideration' that 'takes account of the viola- tion, not 'reviewand reversal', not across-the-board exclusions of
evidence or nullification of convictions simply becausea breach of
Article36 (1)occurredand without regard to its effcctupon the con-
viction and sentence and, not .. .'a precise,concrete, stated result:
to re-establish theslutusquo ante"'.
119. The general principleon the legal consequencesof thecommis-
sion of an inlcrnationally wrongful act was stated by the Permanent
Court of International Justicein theFactory ut Chorrbwcaseas follows:
"It is a principle ofinternational law that the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form." [FCLC-
tory at Chorzdw, Jurisdiction, 19.27,P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9,p. 21 .)
What constitutes"reparation in an adequate form" clearly variesdepend-
ing upon the concrete circurnstanws surrounding each case and the pre-
cisenature and scope of the injury, sincethe question has to beexamined
from the viewpoint of whatis the "reparation in an adequate form" that
corresponds to the injury. Pna subsequent phase of the same case, the
Permanent Court went on lo elaborate on this point as follows:
"The essential principlecontained in Iheactual notion of an illegal
act - a principle which seems to be established by international
practice and in particularby the decisionsof arbilral tribunals - is
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipeout all the conse-
quences ofthe illegalact and reestablish the situation whichwould,
in all probability, have existedif that act had not been committed."
(Factory al Chorzdw, Meriis, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17,
p. 47.)
120. In the LaGrand case the Court made a general statement on the
principle involvedas follows :
"The Court considersin this respectthat ifthe United States, not-
withstanding its comrnitrncnt [to ensure implementation of the
specific measuresadopted in performalice of its obligations under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b)], should fail in its obligation of consular
notificationto the detrimentof German nationals, an apology would
not sufficein cases wherethe individuals concerned have been sub-
jected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe
penalties.In the case of such a conviction and sentence, itwould be
incumbcnt upon the United Slates to allow the reviewand reconsid-
eration of the conviction and sentenceby taking account of the vio-
lation of the rights set forth in the Convention. This obligation can
be carried out in various ways.The choice of n-reansmust be left lo
the United States." (LC J. Reporis 2001, pp. 513-514,para. 125.)
121. Similarly. in the present case:the Court's task is to determine
what would be adequate reparation for the violations of Article 36. It
should be clear from what has been observedabove that the internation-
ally wrongful acts committed by the United Stales were the failure of its50 AVENA AND OTlIERS (JUDGMENT)
competent authorities to inform the Mexican nationals concerned, to
notify Mexican consular posts and to enable Mexico to provide consuIar
assistance. It follows that the rerncdy to make good lhese violations
should consist in an obligation on thc United States to permit reviewand
reconsideration of these nationals' cases by the Uniled States courts, as
the Court will explain further in paragraphs. 128 ta 134below, with a
view lo ascertaining whether in each case the violation of Article 36com-
mitted by thecompetent authorities causedactual prejudice to the defend-
ant in the process of administration of criminal justice.
122. The Court reaffirms,that the case before it concerns Article 36of
the Vicnna Convention and not the correctness as such of any conviction
or sentencing. The question of whether thc violations of Article 36, para-
graph 1, are to bc regarded as having, in the causal sequence of events,
ultimately led to convictions and scvere penalties is an integral part of
criminal proceedings before the courts of the United States and is lor
them to dctcrmine in the process of review and reconsideration. In so
doing, il is for the courts of the United States to examine the facts, and in
particular the prejudice and its causes, taking account of the violation of
the rights set forth in the Convention.
123. 11 isnot to be presumed, as Mexico asserts, that partial or total
annulment of conviction or sentence providcs the necessary and sole
remedy. In this regard, Mexico cites the recent Judgment of this Court
in the caseconcerning the Arrest Wurranrof II April 2000 (Drmour~rtic
R~public ofthe Congo v. Belgium), in which the "Court ordcred the
cancellation of an arrest warrant issued by a Bclgianjudiciab oKicial in
violation of thc international immunity of the Congo Minister for Foreign
Affairs". However, the present case has clearly to be distinguished from
thc Arrest Wurrant case. In that case,the question of thc legality under
international law of the act of issuing thc arrest warrant against the
Congolese Minister for Forcign Affairs by the Belgianjudicial authori-
ties was itsclfthe subject-rnatlcr of the disputc. Since the Court found
that act to be in violationof intcrnational law rclating to immunity, the
proper legal consequence was Lbrthe Court to order the cancellation of
the arrest warrant in question (1.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 33). By contrast,
in the present case itis not the convictions and senlcnces of the Mexican
nationals which are to be regarded as a violation of international law,
but solely certain breaches of treaty obligations which preceded them.
124. Mexico has further contended that the right to consular notifica-
tion and consular communication under the Vienna Convention is a fun-
damental human right that constitutes part of due process in criminal
proceedings and should be guaranteed inthe territory of each of the Con-
tracting Parties to the Vienna Convention ; according to Mexico, this6 1 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUWMEN'I')
right, as such, is so fundamentalthat its [email protected] pro-
duce the effect of vitiating theentire processf Ihc criminal proceedings
conducted in violation of this fundamental right. Whether or not the
Vienna Convention rights are human rights is not a matter that this
Court need dccide. The Court would, howevcr, observe that neither the
text nor the object and purpose ofthe Convention, nor any indicationin
the travaux prkpnraloires, support the conclusion that Mcxico draws
from its contention in that regard.
125. For these reasons, Mexico'sfourth and fifth submissionscannot
bc upheld.
126.The reasoning of the Court on the fifth submission of Mexicois
equallyvalidinrelation to the sixth submissionof Mexico.In elaboration
of its sixth submission, Mcxicocontends that,
"As an aspcct ofreslitutioin inlegrum, Mcxico is also entitled to
an order that in any subsequent criminal proceedingsagainst the
nationals, statements and confessionsobtained prior to notification
to the national of his right to consular assistance be excluded."
Mexico argues that "The cxclusionaryrule appliesin both common law
and civillawjurisdictions and requires the exclusion of evidencethat is
obtained in a manner that violatesdue proecssobligations", and on this
basis concludesthat
"Thc status of the exclusionaryrulc asa general principle of law
permits the Court to order that the United States is obligated to
apply this principlein respectof statements and confessions givento
United Stateslaw enforcementofficialsprior to thcaccused Mexican
nationals being advised or their consular rights in any subsequent
criminal proceedingsagainst thcm."
127. The Court does not consider that it is necessaryto enter into an
examination of thc merits of thecontention advanced by Mexicothat the
"exclusionary rule"is "a general principle oflawunder Article38 (1) (cJ
of the ... Statute" of the Court. The issue raisedby Mexico in itssixth
submission relatesto the qucstion of what legalconscquencesflow from
the breach of the obligations under Article36,paragraph 1 - a question
whichthe Court has already sufficientlydiscussedabovein relation to the
fourth and the firth submissonsof Mexico.The Court is of the view that
this qucstion is one whichhas to beexamined under the concretccircum-
stances ofeach caseby the United States courts concernedin the process
of their reviewand reconsideration.For this reason, the sixth submission
of Mexicocannot be upheld.
128. While the Court has rejected the fourth, fifth and sixth submis-
sions of Mexicorelating to the remediesfor the breaches by the UnitedSlalehof its international obligationsunder Article 36of the Vienna Con-
vention, the Factremains that such breachcs have been committed, as the
Court has found, and it isthus incumbent upon the Court to specifywhat
remediesare required in order to redress the injury done to Mexico and
to its nationals bythe Unitcd States through non-compliance with those
international obligations. As has already been observed in paragraph 120,
the Court in the LaGrandJudgment stated the gencral principle to be
applied in such cases by way of a remedy to redress an injury of this kind
(I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 513-514, para. 125).
129. In this regard, Mexico'sseventh submission also asks ~hcCourt
to adjudge and declare:
"That to thc extent thatany of the 52convictions or senlcncesare
nol annulled, the United States shall provide, by means of its own
choosing, meaningful and effectivereviewand reconsideration of the
convictions and sentences of thc 52 nationals, and that this obliga-
tion cannot be satisfiedby means of clemency proceedings or iFany
municipal law rule or doctrine [that fails to attach legalsignihcance
to an Article 36 (I) violation] is applied."
130. On this question of "review and reconsideralion", the United
Statcs lakes the position that it has indeed conformed its conduct to the
Lacrand Judgment. In a further elaboration of this point, the United
States argues that "[tlhe Court said in LaCrtrndthat lhe choice of means
for allowing the reviewand reconsideration il called For'must be left'to
the United States", but that "Mexico would not leave this choice to the
United States hut have the Court undertake the review instcad and
decide at once thal thebreach rcquircs the conviction and sentence to bc
set aside ineach case".
131. In stating in its Judgment in the LcrGrand case that "the United
States 01'Arncrica, by trnerms ofils own choosing, shall allow the review
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence" (I.C..J. Reports '
2001, p. 516, para. 128 (7); emphasis added), the Court acknowledged
that the concrete modalities for such reviewand reconsideration should
be left primarily to the United States. It should be underlined, howcvcr,
that this freedom in the choice of means for such reviewand reconsidcra-
tion is not without qualification: as he passage of the Judgrncnt quoted
above rnakcs abundantly clear, such reviewand reconsideration has to be
carried out "by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in
the Convention" (I.C.J. Rcporls ZOUJ,p. 514, para. 125);including, in
particular, the question of lhe lcgal consequences of the violation upon
the criminal procccdings that have followed the violation.
132. Thc United Statesargues (1)"that the Court'sdecisioninLclGrand
in calling for reviewand reconsideration called for a process to re-exam-
ine a conviction and sentencein light of a breach of Article 36"; (2) that,
"in calling for a processof rcview,the Court necessarily impliedthat one
legitimate result of that process might bea conclusion that the conviction
and scntcnce should stand"; and (3)"that the relief Mexico seeksin thiscase is flatly inconsistentwith thc Judgment in LaGrand: it seeks pre-
cisely the award of a substantive outcome that the Lacrand Court
declined to provide".
133. However, the Court wishesto point out that the current situation
in the United States criminal procedure, as explained by the Agent at thc
hearings, is that
"If lhc derendant allegedat trial that af;uilureof consular informa-
tionresulted in harm to u pclrtiouhr right essen~iul[(Ia fairfrial,an
appeals court can review how rhelower courl handledthat claim of
prejudice",
but that
"Ij theforeign nalional did not raise his Arlrcle36 clcriruttriul,
he mayface proceduraI constraints [i.e., the application of the pro-
cedural default rule]on raising that particular claim in direct or col-
lateral judicial appeals" (emphasis added).
As a result,adaim based on the violation of Article 36, paragraph I, of
the Vienna Convention, however meritorious in itself,could be barred in
the courts of the United States by the operation or the procedural default
rule (see paragraph 111 above).
134. It isnot sufficientfor the United States to argue that "[wlhatever
label [the Mexicandefendant] places on his claim, his right ... must and
will he vindicated if il is raisedin someform at trial" (emphasis added),
and that
"Inthat way, even though a failure to label the cornpIaint as a
breach of the Vienna Convention may mean that he has lechnically
speaking forfeited his right to raise this issue as a Vienna Conven-
tion claim,on appeal that failure would not bar him from independ-
ently assertinga claim tl?ahe wasprejudiced becuusr he lucked his
critical protection neededfor u fair trial." (Emphasis added.)
The crucial point in this situation is that, by the operation of the
procedural default rule as it isapplied at present, the defendant is
cffcclively barred from raising the issue of the violation of his rights
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and is limited to seeking the
vindication of his rights under thc Unilcd States Constitution.
135. Mexico, in the latter part of its seventh submission, has stated
that "this obligation [of providing review and reconsideration] cannot bcsatisfied by means of clemency proceedings". Mexico elaborates this
point by arguing first orall Ihat "the United States's reliancon clemency
proceedings is wholly inconsistent with its obligation to provide a
rcmedy,as that obligation was found by this Court in LaCratnf'. More
specifically, Mexico contends :
"Firs t s clear that the Court's direction toIhc United Statcs in
LuGrund clearly conteinplated that 'review and reconsideration'
would be carried out by judicial procedures . . . .
Secmrsrlt,heCourt was fully aware that the LaGrand brothers had
received a clemency hearing, during which the Arizona Pardons
Board took into account the violation of their consular righls.
Accordingly, the Court determined in LuGrundthat clcmcncy review
alonc did not conslitutc thcrcquired 'reviewand reconsideration' . . .
Finully,the Court specified that the United States must 'allow the
review and reconsideration of the conviction lrnd sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convcnlion'. ..
it is a basic matter of U.S. criminal procedural law that courts
rcvicw convictions; clemency panels do not. With the rare exception
of pardons based on actual innocence, the focus of capital clemency
review is on the propriety of the sentence and not on he underlying
conviction."
Furthermore, Mexico argues that the clemcncy process is in itself an
ineffective remedy to satisfy the international obligations of thc Unitcd
States. It concludes: "clemency review is standardless, secretive, and
immune from judicial oversight".
Finally, in support of its contention, Mexico argues that
"the failureof state clemency authorities to pay heed to the interven-
tion of the US Department of State in cases of death-sentenced
Mexican nationals refutes the [United States] contention that clem-
ency review willprovide meaningful consideration of the violations
of---ghts conferred under Article 36".
136. Against this contention of Mexico, the United Statcs claims that
it "gives 'full effect'to the 'purposes for which the rights accorded under
[Article 36, paragraph l,] arc intended' through executive clemency". It
argucs that "[tlhe clemency process . . is well suitedto the task or pro-
viding review and reconsideration". The United States explains that
"Clemency . . . more than a matter of grace; it is part or the overall
scheme for ensuring justice and fairness in the legal process" and that"Clemencyprocedures are an integral part of the existing 'lawsand regu-
lations' ofthe United States through which errors are addressed".
137. Specificallyin Ihc context of the present case, the United States
contends that the followingtwo points are particularly noteworthy:
"First, these clemencyprocedures allowfor broad participation by
advocates of clemency,including an inmate'sattorney and the send-
ing state's consular officer.. Second, these clemency officialsare
not bound by principles of procedural default, finality, p~ejudice
standards, or any other limitations on judicial review.They may
consider any facts and circumstances that they deem appropriate
and relevant, including specifically ViennaConvention claims."
138. The Court would emphasize that the "review and reconsidera-
tion" prescribed by it in the LaGraiadcase should be effective.Thus it
should "tak[e]account ol'thcviolation of the rights set forth in [Ihc]Con-
vention" (I.C.J. Reporrs 2001, p. 516, para. 128 (7))and guarantee that
the violation and the possible prejudice caused by that violation will be
fully examined and taken into account in the reviewand reconsideration
process. Lastly, review and reconsideration should be both of the sen-
tence and of Ihe conviction.
139. Accordingly, in a situation of the violation of rights under
Article 36, paragraph I, of the Vienna Convention, the defendant raises
his claim in this respcct not as a caof "harm to a particular right essen-
tialto a fair trial- a concept relevant to the enjoyment of due process
rights under the United States Conslitution - but as a case involving the
infringement ofhis rightsunder Article 36, paragraph 1.The rights guar-
anteed undcr the Vienna Convention are treaty rights which the United
States has undcrtaken to comply with in relation to the individual con-
cerned, irrespectiveOF the due process rights under United States consti-
tutional law. In this rcgard, the Court would point out that what is
crucial in the reviewand reconsideration processis the existenceof a pro-
cedure which guaranlccs that full weight is given to thc violation of the
rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual
outcome of such review and reconsideration.
140. As has been explained in paragraphs 128 to 134above, the Court
isof the viewthat, in cases where the breach of the individual rights of
Mexican nationals undcr Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), of the Convention
has rcsultcd, in the sequenceof judicial proccedings that has followed, in
the individuals concerned being subjected to prolonged detention or con-
victed and sentenced to severe penalties, the legal consequences of this
breach have to be examined and taken into account in the course ofreview and reconsideration. The .Court considers that it is thejudicial
process that is suiled to this task.
141. The Court in the LaCrcrnA case Ieft to the United States the
choice of mcans as to how reviewand reconsiderationshould beachieved,
especially in Ihe light of the procedural defaull rule. Nevertheless, the
prcmisc on which the Court proceeded in that case was that the process
of review and reconsideration should occur within the overall judicial
proceedings relating to the individual defendant concerned,
142. As regards the clemencyprocedure, thc Court notes that this per-
forms an important function in thc administration of criminal justice in
the United States and is "thc historic remedy for preventing miscarriages
ofjustice whcrcjudicial process has been exhausled" (I-lerrerv. Collins,
506US 390 (1443) at pp. 41 1-412). The Court accepts that executive
cIcmency,while not judicial, is an integral part of the overall scheme for
ensuringjustice and fairness in thc legal process withinthe United Slales
criminaljustice system. It must, however, point out that what is at issue
in the present caseis not whcther executive clemencyas an institution it;
or is not an integral part of the "existing laws and regulations of the
United States", but whether the clemencyprocess as practised within the
crirnina!justice systemsof different stalesinthe United States can, in and
of itself, qualify as an appropriate means for undertaking the effective
"review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set Sorlinthe Convention", as the
Court prescribed in the LaGrrrndJudgment (I.C.J. Rr.porl.52001, p.514,
para. 125).
143. It may be true, as the United Stalcs argues, that in a number of
cases "clemency in fact results in pardons of convictions as well as com-
mutations of senlences". In that sense and to that extent, it might be
argued that the facts demonstrated by the United Stalcs testify to a
degree of effectivenessof thc clemencyprocedures as a means of relieving
defendants on death row rrom cxccution. The Court notes, howcvcr, that
the clemency process, as currently practised within the Unitcd States
criminal justice system, does not appear to meet the requirerncnts
described in paragraph 138 above and that it is therefore not sufficientin
itsclf'to serveas an appropriate means of "reviewand reconsideration" as
envisaged bythe Court in the LaGrandcase. The Court considers never-
theless that appropriate clemency procedures call supplement judicial
review and reconsideration, in particular where the judicial systemhas
failed to take duc account of the violation of thc rights set forth in the
Vienna Convention, as has occurred in the case of the three Mcxtcan
nationals referred to in paragraph 114 above. 144. Finally, the Court willconsider the cighth submission of Mexico,
in whichit asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
"That the [United States] shall ceaseils violations of Article 36 of
the ViennaConvention with regard to Mexico and its 52 nationals
and shall provide appropriate guarantees and assuranecs that it
shalltake measures sufficientto achieve increased compliance with
Article36 (I) and to ensure compliancewith Article 36 (21.'"
145. In this respect,Mexicorecognizesthe effortsby the United Stares
to raise awarenessof consular assistance rights,through the distribution
of pamphlets and pocket cards and by the conduct of'training pro-
grammes, and that the measures adopted by the United Slates to that
end were noted by the Court in its decision in the LuGrundcase (I. C.J.
Reports 2001, pp. 511-51 3,paras. 121, 123-1241,Mcxico,however,nolcs
with regret that
"the United States programme, whatever its components, has
proven ineffective to prevent the regular and continuing violation
by itscompetent authorities of consular notification and assistance
rights guaranteed by Article 36".
146. In particular, Mexico claims in relation to thc violation of thc
obligations under Article 36, paragraph I, of the Vienna Convention:
"First,competent authoritiesof the United States regularly failto
provide the timely notification required by Article 36 (1) (h) and
thereby lo [sic] frustrate the cornrnun~cationand access conlem-
plated by Article 36 (1) (u)and the assistance contemplated by
Article 36 (1) (u) .These violalions continue nolwithstanding the
Court's judgment in LaCrundand the programme described there.
................... ..........
Mexico has dernonstratcd, moreover, that the pattern or regular
non-compliance continues.During the firsthalf of 2003,Mexicohas
identified at least one hundrcd cases in which Mexicannationals
havebeen arrested by competent authoritiesof the United Statesfor
serious feloniesbut not timely notifiedof their consular notification
rights."
Furthermore, in relation to the violation of the obligations under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention, Mexico claims:
"Second,courts in the United States continue to apply doctrines
of procedural default and non-retroactivity that prevent thosccourts
from rcaching the merits of Vienna Convention claims, and those
courts that have addressed the merits of those claims (becauseno
procedural bar applies)have repeatedlyheIdthat no remedyis avait- able for a breach of the obligations of Article 36 . .. Likewise, the
United States' reliance on clemency procccdings to meel LaGrirnds
requirement of review and reconsideration represents a deliberate
decision to allow these lcgal rules and doctrines to continue to have
theirincvitable effect. Hcnce, the Unitcd States continues to breach
Article 36 (2) by failing to give full effect to the purposes for which
thc rights accorded under Article 36 are intended."
147. The Unilcd States contradicts this contention of Mexicoby claim-
ing that "its en'ortsto improve the conveyanceof information about con-
sular notification are continuing unabated and are achieving tangible
results".Ttcontends that Mexico "Failsto establish a 'regular and con-
tinuing' pattern of breaches ofArticle 36 in the wake of LuGrand'.
148. Mexico emphasizesthe necessity of requiring the cessation ofthe
wrongful acts because, italleges,the violation of Article36 with regard to
Mexico and its 52 nationals still continucs, The Court considers, how-
ever, that Mexico has not establisheda continuing violation ofArlicle 36
of the YiunnaConvention with respcct to the 52 individuals rekrred toin
its final submissions; it cannot therefore uphold Mexico's claim seeking
cessation. TheCourt would moreover point out that, iwasmuch as these
52 individual cases are at various stages of criminal proceedings before
the United Statcs courts, they are i11the slate of pcndente lire; and thc
Cvurt has already indicated in respect of them what it regards as the
appropriate remedy, namely review and reconsideration by reference to
the breach of the Vienna Convention.
149. The Mexican request for guarantees of non-regctilion isbased on
its contention that beyond these 52 cases there is a "regular and continu-
ing" pattern of breaches by the United States of Article 36. In this
respect, the Court observes that thero:is no evidcnce properly before it
that would establish a gcneral pattern. While it is a matter of concern
thal, even in the wake of theLaCrcrndJudgment, there remain a substan-
tialnumbcr of casesof f'ailureto carry out the obligation to f~~rnishcon-
sular information to Mexican nationals, the Court notes that the United
States has been making considerable efforts to ensure that itslaw enforce-
ment authorities provide consular information to every arrcsted person
they know or havc reason to bclieve is a foreign national. Especially at
the stage of pre-trial consular information, it is noteworthy that the
United States has been making good faith efforts to implement the obli-
gations incumbent upon it undcr Article 36, paragraph 1,of the Vienna
Convention, through such measures as a new outreach programme
launched in 1998,including the dissemination to fcdcral, state and local
authorities of the State Department booklet mentioned ahovc in para-graph 63. The Court wishes to recall in this context what it has said in
paragraph 84 about efforts in somejurisdictions to provide the informa-
tion under Article 36,paragraph l (bJ, in parallel with thc reading of the
"Miranda rights".
150. The Court would further note in this regard that in the LaGrand
case Germany sought, interalia, "a straightforward assurance that the
United States will not repeat its unlawfuI acts" (I.C.J. Rtports 2001,
p. 511, para. 120).With regard to this gcneral demand for an assurance
of non-repetition, the Court stated:
"lf a State, in proceedings before this Court, repeatedly refersto
substantial activities whicitiscarrying out in order to achievecom-
pliance with certain obligations under a treaty, then this expresses a
commitment to follow through with the efforts in this regard. Thc
programme in question ce~tainlycannot provide an assurance that
there willnever againbe a failure by the United Slates to observe the
obligations of notification undcr Article 36 ol'the Vienna Conven-
tion. But no State could give such a guarantee and Gcrmany does
not seek it. The Court considers that the commitment expressed by
the United States to ensure implementation of the specificmeasures
adopted in performance of its obligations under Articlc 36, para-
graph 1 (b),must be regarded as meeting Germany's request for a
general assurance of non-repetition." (IC.J. Reports 2001, pp. 512-
513, pard. 124.)
The Court believes that as Car as the request of Mexico for guarantees
and assurances of non-repetition isconcerned, what the Court stated in
this passage ofthc LaGrandJudgment remains applicable, and therefore
meets that request.
151. The Court would now re-emphasize a point of importance. In the
present case,it has had occasion toexamine theobligations of the United
States under Article 36of the ViennaConvention in relation to Mexican
nationals sentenced to death in the United States. Its findings as to the
duty of review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences have
been directed to the circurnstancc of severe penalties being imposed on
foreign nationals who happen lo be of Mexican nationality. To avoid any
ambiguity, it should bemade clear that, whilewhat the Court has stated
concerns the Mexican nationals whose cases have bcen broughl bcfore it
by Mcxico, the Court has been addressing the issuesof principle raisedin70 AVENA AND UTHERS (~UDGMENT)
the course of the present proceedings from thc viewpoint or the general
applicalion of the Vienna Convention, and there can bc no question of
making an a corz!rurioargument in respect of any of the Court's findings
in the present Judgment. In other words, the fact that in this case the
Court's ruling has concerned only Mexicannationals cannot be taken to
imply,that the conclusions reached by it in the present Judgment do not
apply to other foreignnationals finding themselvesin similar situations in
the United Slates.
152. By its Order OF5February 2003the Court, acting on a request by
Mexico, indicated by way ofprovisional measure that
"The United States of America shall take a41measures neccssary
to ensurethat Mr. CksarRoberto Fierro Rcyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno
Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilcra are not exccuted pending
finaljudgment in these proceedings" (I.C.J.Reports 2003, pp. 91-92,
para. 59 (1))(see paragraph 21 above).
The Order of 5February 2003,according to its terms and to Article 4 1or
the Statute,was effectivepending finaljudgment, and the obligations of
the United States in that respect are, with effect from the date of the
present Judgment, replaced by those declared in this Judgment. The
Court has rcjccted Mexico'ssubmission thal, by way of re.stirutiininrp-
gruwa, the United States is obliged to annul the convictio~snd sentences
of all of the Mexican nationals the subject of its claims (see above, para-
graphs 115-125).The Court has found that, in relationtothesc three per-
sons (among ~thcrs), the United States has committed breaches of its
obligations under Article 36,paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention
and Arlicle 36,paragraphs I (a) and (c), of that Convention; moreover,
in respect of those three persons alone, the United States has also
committed breaches of Article 36, paragraph 2, of thesaid Convention.
The review and reconsideration ofconviction and sentencc required by
Article 36, paragraph 2, which is the appropriate remedy tbr breaches of
Article 36, paragraph 1, has not been carried out. Thc Court considcrs
that in these three Casesit is for the United Statcs to find an appropriate
remedy having the nature of reviewand reconsideration according to the
critcria indicated in paragraphs 138ei seq. of the present Judgment.
153. For these reasons,
TIE COURT,
(I) By thirteen votes to two, Rejects the objection by the United Mexican States lo the admissibility
of the objections presented by the United States of America to the juris-
diction of the Court and the admissibility of Ihe Mexican claims;
IN FAVOUR : President Shi; V~ce-President Ranjcva ; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Wiggins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren; Judge ad hoc Sepulvcda;
(2) Unanimously,
REJ~L'I t.e four obj~tions~by the United States of America to the
jurisdiction of the Court;
(3) Unanimously,
Rejects the five objections by the United States of America to the
admissibility of the claims of the United Mexican States ;
(4) Byfourteen votes to one,
Fin& that, by not informing, without dclay upon their detention, the
51 Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 106 (1) above of their
rights under Article36, paragraph 1 (h), of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations of 24 April 1463, the United Stales of America
breached the obligations incumbent upon it under that subparagraph;
IN FAVOUR : Presidenl Shi ; Vice-Presidenl Ranjeva ; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vcrcshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawnch,
Buergenthal,Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sepulveda;
AGAINST :Judge Parra-Aranguren :
(5) By fourteen voles lo one,
Finds that, by not notifying the appropriate Mexican consular post
without delay of the detention of the 49 Mexican nationals referred to in
paragraph 106 (2) abovc and thereby depriving the United Mexican
States of the right, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided
for by the Vienna Convention to the individuals concerned, the United
States of America breached the obligations incumbent upon it under
Article 36, paragraph1 (b) ;
IN FAVOUR : President Shi ; Vice-President Ranjeva ; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vcreshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buergenthal,Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judgoad hoc Sep6lvcda;
AcArNsr :Judge Parra-Aranguren ;
(6) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that, in relation to the 49Mexican nationals referred to in para-
graph 106(3) above, the United States of America deprived the United
Mexican States ofthe right, in a timely fashion, to communicate with and
have access to those nationals and to visit them in detention, and therebybreached the obligations incurnbenl upoil itui~der Article 36, para-
graph 1 (u) and (c), of the Convention ;
IN FAVOUR : Prcsicitat Shi ; Vice-PresicierisKanjcva ; Jurl'gpsCuiElaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Bucrgenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judge ad hoc.Seplilveda;
AGAINST: Judgc Parra-Aranguren ;
(7) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that, in relacion to lhc 34 Mexican nationals referred to in para-
graph 106 (4) above, the United States of America deprived the United
Mexican States of the right, in rttimely fashion, to arrange for legal rep-
resentation of those nationals, and thereby breached the obligations
incumbenl upon it under Article 36,paragraph I (c), of the Convcntion ;
FN FAVOIJR: Prusidcn~ Shi ; Vice-I'rcsident Ranjeva ; Judges Cuillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchelin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rczek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buzrgenlhal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sep~ilveda;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(8) By fourteen voles to one,
Fi~idsthat, by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in the
light or Ihc rights set forth in the Convention, of the conviction and sen-
tences of Mr. Cesar Roberto Fierro Keyna, Mr. Roberlo Morcno Ramos
and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, after the violations referred to in sub-
paragraph (4) above had been established in respect of those individuals,
the United Slales or America brcached the obligations incumbent upon it
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Conve~~tion;
IN I.AVOUK : PrexiIEnt Shl ; Vice-Preridenr Ranjeva; Judges Cuillaume,
Koroma, Vcreshchctin, IZiggins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, To~nka; Judge ad hoc Sep~ilveda;
AGAINST : JudgeParw-Arangurcn ;
(9) By fourteen votes to one:
Finds that the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obliga-
tion of theUnited StatesofAmerica to provide, bymeans of its ownchoos-
ing, review and reconsideration of the: conviclions and sentences of the
Mexican nationals referred to in subparagraphs (41,(51,(6) and (75above,
by taking account both of the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36
ot'thc Convention and of paragraphs 138to 141of this Judgment;
IN FAVOUR: Pre~idel~tShi; Vice-Pre.~iden~Ranjeva; Judges Guillaumc,
Koroma, Vereshchetit~, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka ; Jn.dg~ad hoc Sepulveda ;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren ;73 AVENA AND OTIdERS(JUDGMENT)
(10) Unanimously,
Takes note of the commitment undertaken by the United States of
America to ensure implementation or the specificmeasures adopted in
performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragr1p(b), orthc
Vienna Convention; and,find.sthat this commitment must be regarded as
meeting the request by the United Mexican Statesfor guarantees and
assurances of non-repetition;
(I1) Unanimously,
Finds that, should Mexican nationals nonetheless be sentenced to
severe penalties, without their rightscr Article36, paragraph 1 (h),
of the Convention having been respected,thc United Slates of America
shall provide, by meansof its ow11choosing, reviewand reconsideration
of the conviction and sentence, so as to allow full weightto be giton
the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention, taking account of
paragraphs 138to 141of this Judgment.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, Thc Hague, this thirty-first day of March, two
thousand and four, in three copies, one of which will be placed in thc
archives of the Court and the others transmitteto the Government of
the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of
America, respectively.
(Signed) SHI Jiuyong,
President.
($ignell)Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.
PresidentSr.~rnd Vicc-PresidentRANIEVA append declarations to the
Judgment of the Court; Judges VERESHCHEP TINR,RA-ARANGU anEN
TOMKA and Judge ad hoc SEPL'LVEaU ppend separate opinions to the
Judgment of the Court.
(lniriallcd) J.Y.S.
(Inirialled) Ph.C.
1NTERNATlONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
CASE CONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER
MEXICAN NATIONALS
(MEXICOv.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
JUDGMENTOF 31 MARCH 2004
COUR INTERNATlONALE DE JUSTICE
AVISCONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE AVENA ET AUTRES
RESSORTISSANTS MEXICATNS
ARRETDU 31 MARS 2004 Officialcitation
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexicov. United Slates of America),
Judgment,.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 12
Mode oflicielde cit:tion
Avenaet autres ressortissants mexicains
(Mexique c. Etats-Unisd'Amtrique),
urrt?t, CRecueil2004p.12
"k "U"b€X 880 1
ISSN 0074-4441 Nodevente:
ISBN 92-1-070989-6 31 MARCH2004
JUDGMENT
AVENA AND OTHER MEXlCAN NATIONALS
(MEXICO v.UNlTED STATESOF AMERICA)
AVENA ETAUTRESRESSORTISSANTSMEXICAFNS
(MEXIQUE c.ETATS-UNISD'AMERIQUE)
31 MARS 2004
ARRET INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE
20U4 YEAR 2004
31 March
GencralList
No. 128 31 March2004
CASECONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER
MEXICAN NATIONALS
(MEXICO v.UNlTED STATESOF AMERICA)
Facts of fhrCUSP - Article 36 offhe Vienna Convention nlaCunsulur Rela-
tions($24 April 1963.
Mexico's nhjci,tion to the United Staler objeufiuns tojnri.~dicfionund admis-
sibilid- United Srates objections no! pruscntud a.r preliminary objec~ions
-Arficle 79of Rules of Court not pertinent ipprsent case.
Jurisdictionuj' [hCourt.
First United States ohjeuriontojurisdicti-n Confeniiun that Mexico's sub-
missrons invite the Court to ru(In ihoperation ofthe ClnifeclStutes crirnlnal
justice system- Jurisdicfion of Gourdfo determine fhe nature urid extent of
obligations arlslng undcr Vtsnna Convenfion - Enquiry into theuc~nductof
criminal proceedings inUni~ed Slates courts a tnutier belonging to the merits.
Second Ut~itedStutus objecfion to jurisiiiutiu- Contention !hut thp jifirst
.~uhtniaionuf Mexi~o'~~Memcjrirlii~excluded from rhe Court'sjurisdiutic~-
Mexico wending an inrexprerafiunof tlre finnu Convention wherebynot only
the absence ofcmn~ulrinorijcation bu~ulso the arrest, &tention, triul and con-
victionofit6~CII~UW weIIunlawful,failingsuch not$carion - lnterpretalion
ofVienna Cunvention a nlafter within the Court'sjurisdiction.
Third Uniled S~ule~ubjection 10jurisdicrion- Conr~ntdnn$hot Mexico's
submissions on rernedic~gu beyond IheCourt'sjirrisdirtio- Jzcrisdicfion of
Court to consider fhey~esti~)Cl femedies - Question whether or howfar [he
Court rrrayorder tho requestedremedies a matter belonginglu tfie rnerits. CUUR INTERNATTONALEDE JUSTICE
ANNBE 2004 2004
3k mars
RBlegtntral
31 mars 2004 no128
AFFAFREAVENA ET AUTRES
RESSORTISSANTSMEXTCAINS
(MEXIQUE c. ETATS-UNISD'AMERIQUE)
Frritsu I'originerfeI'uffii-e Articlc 36 cle11icunvanriondr.Vlenne sur IPS
relations cunruluirosdu 24 avril 1963.
Excepdion opposke par iuMuxiqlre nux exceplions d'incomp&lenceet d'irre-
ccllubilir6soul~v&espar les Eiuts- Uni- Escepr 1on.des Erars-Unis non pri-
,senfbr.u fitre ifexceptions prilin~inui-e~Nan-pertinence de rartick 7Pdu
Reglement clt.Iu Cour en I'esj~Pce.
Cr,mpPrcncc dcInCour.
PrerniGre exception d'incornpbtence PA E~uts-Unis - AlI@tion selon
luquelle les conclusionsduMexique invlterrl/uCaur L?stprunonrer sur lefonc-
tionnement du systi.m~ de justice pknaluux Etatr-Unis - CompPtenre dela
Cour pour dirertnlner Iu nature et la pur~du de.~obligcltions decoulant rle lu
(,onvunrmnde Vienrze - E,wnicn du diruuletnent d~sprockdures pinale devunr
i?lrurld~ctionsrles Etars-Unis re.soirsant aufond.
Deuxikmu cxcepfion d'incntnpetence des Elals-Unb - Allkgation selon
laquellc Iu prumii.re concluszondu mk~noiredu Mexique tchappe rila conrpb-
tencc dt iuCour - Mexirjue diJenclunrune inrerprerat~ond~ la convention de
Vienneselon luquelie lunt le difaur de notificariun cunsul~que I'arr~station,
b dilentbn, Iejugetnent et lacund~imnutinnde sesressortissunts cn I'ubsencede
telle notijcrrrinnserclientiili-ibInterpriturion de llradconvention rentrunt
crlansla compitenue de/laCour.
Troisikme exception d'inaotnpi.tence des Eluis- Unis- Ailkgation selon
luyuel~cles conclusionsduMsxique concernant Iesremides depcraenrIP.TI~mires
& /.acopnlrtrenrede la Cour - CutnpCiencede la Courpour exan~ilacr iuyues-
rion des rt.mi.de-7 Question de ssaoir silu Cour peur oriionner Irs rerur.2rlE.r
demandis, et duns q~clleslimites, rcssortis.~nutfond. Fourth United Staler objection tojurisdiction - Contention that the Court
lacksjurisdiction to determine whether or not con,~ulurnutificalion is a hr~man
right - Queslion of inlerpretation of Vienna Convenfion.
Admissibility of Mexico's claims.
Firs1 United States objection to udmissihility - Cofitentiun that Mexico's
submissions on remedies seek IU have he Courtfunction us a court of criminal
appeal - Question belonging to the merits.
Second Unifed States objection Io uilmissibiIi~y- Conlencion #hut Mexico's
cluims tu exercise its right oj diplamutic protection are irsadmissibleon ground7
that local remedim have nut been exhausted - Inferdependence in the presen f
case oJ rights of the Stute and of individual rights - Mexico r~questing che
Courr do rule on the violation of rights which il suffered both directly und
through the vinlufion of individual rights oy its nationals - Duty to exhaust
loca! remedies does not apply to such a reque.5 t.
Third United Stutes objec fion lo admissibility - Contention thut cerluin
Mexlcan nurionalsalso have Uniled States nufionality - Questjon belunging fu
the merits.
Fourth United States ohjecrion fa admissibility - C(~ntcntiunrkat Mexico
had actual knowledge ofu breuuhburfailed to bring.wchbreach to the altention
of the United States or did su only after considerahie delay - No conlention in
the present mse oj'any prejudice causedby such delay - No implied tlruiverby
Me-~icoof its rights.
Fjfth United States ohjecrir~nlo admissibilify - Conren~ionthat Mexico
invokes standards that irdoe3nutfollow in i1.r own practice - Nature oJ Vicnnn
Convenliun preclurles such an uvgiimenr.
Article 36, paragruph I - Mexican nationality nJ42 individuals concerned
- United States has no6 proved i1.7contention tltat .r(me were also United
Sfales nacionuis.
Article 36, purrrgruphI (b) - Consular irafimnotion - Duty to provide cun-
sular information 0ssoon as arresdingauthoriries rculize fhat arrested person is
a foreign naliunal, or have ground7for so believing - Pro vision of consular
information in parallel wi6hreading of "Miranda righrs" - ond dent inn that
seven individuals srated ut rhe dime of arrert rhat they were United Slates
nationals - Inturpretution of phrase "wi6houtdelay" - Violalion by United
Stales oJ the obligation lo provide consulur information in $1 cslses.
Consular nod~J?caliu n Violation by Uniled Stutes of the obligalinn uj' con-
sular not$cation in 49 ciases.
Article 36 parugruph I (a)and (c) - lnrerrrlured nature oJ the three sub-
purugraphx of paragraph I - Violation by United States of the obligation fo
enable Mexican cunsularofficers to communicu~~with, have access to and visit
their nationcrlsin 49 cases - Violation by United States of I~E obligation to Quatrikrne exception dincumpttcnce des ECULT U-nis - Allkga fion selon
Iuquellela Cour n'apas cornpi.tencepour dire si Iu nnl$cation consulaireest un
droit de l'homine - Question rel~wnt de 1'1nterprttationde la convention de
Vicnne.
Recevohili~Cdexdemandes du Mexique.
I'rmi2re exceplmn d'irrecevabilili.des Efufs-Unis - AlIEgntionscion Irrqu~il~
Iesconclusionsdu Mexiqup concernan( les reinides viseni Ljuire de la Cour une
juridiclion d'uppel en rnarlkreptnale - Question relevant dufind.
Deuxicme exception d'irret,evahilit t des Edals-Unis - Alltgaation selun
luquelle les demand~s Ilu Mexiyuu dun^E'exercicede son droil de prorecdion
diplumratiquesont irrecevables au motif que Irs vuics dc rccnur.vinlernes n'ont
pas i.lCkpuiskes - Inlerde'pendancede.~droifs de I'Etul et des ilroit~individuelr
en I'espice- Mexiyur: invilanrla Cour a slatuer sur la violationdes drvits don!
il a ttt victime u lafois directumen~ut u rruvers la vloErtliondes droirs indivi-
ducls de SES re~~~rtissants - Obligation d'ipuiser IES voiez de recours internes
ne s'uppliyuun~pas a une telle demande.
Troisikme uxceprion d'irrecevabiiift des Efals- Unis - Ailtgufion selon
Iuquelle cerlains re~smr6issanfs mexicains on[ kgulemen f la nutiunulitt umdri-
cuine - Qeter.tiunrelevant dujond.
Quutrii.me exception d'irrecevubililt des Etats-Unis - Ailkgution sebn
laquelle le n/lcxique u eu connaissance des violations et ne les a pas purrkus d
I'attention des Eluls- Unis,mu I'ufail avec un relard considkrable - Prejudice
dtcnulant d'un tel retard n'ayunt pus kt6 ralltguk en I'espkce - Absence de
rennnciation tacite du Mexique d wedroits.
Cinquakme exception d'irreccvahiliii des Ems- Unis - itIlkgation seIon
IoquclieIe Mexique invogue dm norrnesqu'ilne suit pus duns sa propre pratique
- Nature dc lu convention de Viennene permelfant pas dc beprivuioir fun re1
argument.
Paragruphe I de I'crlrick 36 - NulronalitC muxicuinc des cinquante-deux
personncs concerntes - Etats-Unix n'uyunr pas prouvC leur a//kg~lion selon
luquelle cerluines de ces per3onne.vklaienl aussi des ressortissants am&ricoins.
Alinka b) du parugruphe I d~ I'urticle36 - Information consuluire - Obli-
galion ikfi~urnir !'injbrmarionronsulaircau ntornentoti ks aulorilCsnyant pro-
ckdk u I'urrestation constatenl que la pursonne e.5.iun ressortissclnt&anger ou
Ir~rsqu'ilxiste des raisonsde ie penser - information consulairefournie parul-
Idement d la lecture des ({droirsMirandaw - Al1t;gationselon luquellc sept
personnes auraient diclurk, uut?~Rl?IEP delE/e#r arrestafimn, Etre des rt's.~outis-
sanasamCricains - Inlerpri~ation de I'expression Nsans retard)) - Violutiun
par les Etuts- Unisde I'obligationd'informarion consirlairedans cinquanle el un
cas.
Notification cunsulrrire- Violationpar les Etats- Unisrlr I'obligutionilennori-
ficatinn consulaire dansquarantu-neuf cas.
Alin&as a) elc) du paragraphe I de I'urricie35 - Interdipendance des trois
aiinbas duparugruphe I - Jfi~l~fionpar Ics Etats-Unis dc I'obAgationde per-
mettre alrxfoncf iunnairesconsuiairesmexicains de commu~liqucravec Ieurs re.y-
sortissants et de se rendre auprh d'eux dans yuarante-neuf cus - I/iolarionparenable Mexicun cunmlar ofjccrs to arrange fur legal represendationof their
nationals in34 cases.
Article 36, paragraph 2- "Procedural d+uIt" rule - Possibilify ofjudicial
runedies still open in 49 msec - Violation by United S~ate.~of iY obligations
under Article 36, paragraph 2, in three cases.
Legal consequences of tlaebreuch.
Question of ndequa~erepuratiunfor violations oj Article 36 - Review and
reconsiderrrtionby United States cowls of convictions and sentences of the
Mexicun nationals - Choice of means Igt to United Slates - Review and
reconsideration to he curried out by taking account of violatiof Vienna Con-
vention rights- "Pmcedumi default" rule.
Judiciat process suile dofhctusk of review and reconsidewiiun - Clemency
process, as currently pruciiscd withithe United States criminaljuslice sysrem,
nodrufjcient in dzsevroserve as appropriat~means nj "review and reconsidera-
tion" - Appropriure clrm~ncyprocedures can.~upplementjudicial review and
reconsiderution.
Mexico revuesling cessationofwrongj'ul uci und guarantees and assurunLes
clnj'n-repetition- No evidence to e.~tablish"regular and continulng"pol tern
oJ breuchcs by United Stam of Article 36 uf Vienna Convention - Mcusures
luken by United S6ale.Tto comply witif its obligations ut~durAriiule 36, para-
graph 1 - Commitrvientundertaken by Uniled S~afes to ensure impIementalinn
of ilsobli~ations under that provirion.
No a contrario argument can be madc in respect of the Court'AJ/indingin thc
present Judgn~en concerning Mexican nalionol.r.
United Sdares ohligafions declared i~ Judgmmr replace those arislng jrom
Prr>visionaMl easures Order (45 February2003 - In the fhree cases where the
United Sfatcs violated its oh1igurion.sunder ArlicI~36, purograph 2, il must find
an appropriutc renledj having henulure of review and recnnsiderulion uccord-
ing to the criteria indicatedin ihe Judgrnenl.
JUDGMENT
Present: President SHI ; Vice-Presidenl RANJEVJA u;dges GUILLAUME K,OROMA,
VERESHCHFI'IN H,ICGINS,PARRA-ARANGUK KWNI,JMANS, REZEK,
A].-KIIASAWWEB HU,ERGE~HAI.E , LAKAUY O, ADA,TOMKA ; Judge ad
h0c SEPULVE ;RAegistrrzrCOUVKEUR.
Inthe case concerning Avena and othcr Mexican nationals,1.eEtats-Unis de I'obligutiundepermettre uuxfoncrionncliresconsuIairesmexi-
cains de pourvuir lu reprkxenturionm jusric~ de ieurs ressortissants dons
trrnte-yuutrecus.
Parugraphe 2 dc I'urrick 35- RkgIe de la crcarenceprockduruleu - Pu~si-
hilitb de rerours judiciuirus encore ouvertes dans quarante-neuf cas - Vio-
lation par les Ltuts-Unis de Irurs rnhligalinn~en uertu du paragraphe 2 de
I'uriicle36 duns Irois cus.
Conskquencesjuridii~ucsdr:Iu vio!uiion.
Question de Iuriparation udiquure des violutinns de /'articl- 3Rtexanlen
el revision, par les fribunaux aintricuins, des verdi~~sde cuIpaAilitt renrduset
dcs prine.~pmnonde.r u I'encontre cks ressurtissrints rncxicui-s Choh des
moyens uppurrennnl aux Etats-Unis - Riexumcn ct revision dcvunr lenir
cuinpte ri/u viuirilionde.~droit~prkvus par la convenlion ck Vien-e &-ie de
la {carenceprockduriiltw.
Prockdurejudiciaire allaprku Iu icichedu rPexamen et de la revisio- Pro-
cCdurr:de recours en grrice, ;elk que prutiqutr uctueilt.mcni rhns le cordred~
systemc dcjusiicc pinula dcs Etats-Unis, ne pouvant suffire uclle se-culc uuns-
titurr nmmuyen uppropit da rte-yamen elde revision- ProcPduresupprupriies
de recuurs-en grZi~epouvan; complCterie reexamen E? fa revisionjudiciuirc~
Cessation Cf L'llici~eel garanties et assurances de nun-ripitition de~nundkes
par Ic Mexique - Prm~iquerkcurrente et continue de violalion par ley Erors-
Unis tie I'urticle 36 dc p on vent ide Vipnnen'ayan~pus ttt ktublie - Me-
suresprim pur Irs EI~~YU -nisenvue des'acquitferdes obligationsl~urincombnnl
en vertu didparu~ruphe I de I'arrlcle36- Engagement pris par les Etats- Unis
d'assurer la misr en wilwc de Ieurs obligations nu titre de cetdedisposilion.
Argurnenda contrario nun susuep.pribide'trre rippliqut aux conclusionde la
Cour concernant dm ressortissants mexi~uirlsfurrnu1i.e~dun9 le prt~ent arre^t.
Obiigufion.rde.rEsaas-UnisCnoncPesduns IbrrCt renlplupzi celles dt~oulunr
de I'ordonnance de rnesures conserllatoircsd~ 5 @vrier 200.3 - Etais-Unzs
dewnr drouverun reme& opprupriilqui coif de ICI nalure du rtexamen elde la
revisionconforinbncni uux crir&rmincliyub duns I'arr&tdans les trois cus ou ils
ont violi luurs clhligu~bnsen vertu du paragruphc 2 dc I'ur~icle36.
Prisen~s: M. SHI,president ; M. RANJEVA vi,cu-prisider; MM. GUILLAUME,
KOROMA V,ERE~HCHETIN, HIGGINS , M. PARRA-ARANGUREN,
KOOIJMANS R,EZEK, AL-KHASAWNEII,BUEKGEN'I'I,IAL E,LARABY,
OWADA, TOMKA ,ges; M. SEPUI.VETj)uAg,ead hoc; M. Couv~tuu,
xrujfier.
En l'affairAvena et autres ressortissants mexicains,the Un~tedMexican States,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Juan Manuel Gbrnez-Robledo, Ambassador, former Legal Adviser,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MexicoCity,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Santiago Oriate, Ambassador of Mexico to the Kingdom of thc
Netherlands,
as Agent (until 12February 2004);
Mr. Arturo A. Dager, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico
City,
Ms Maria dei Refugio Gonzalez Domingucz, Chief, Legal Co-ordination
Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mcxico City,
as Agents (from2 March 2004);
H.E. Ms Sandra Fuentes Berain, Ambassador-Designate of Mexico to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent (from 17 March 2004);
Mr. Pierre-Maric Dupuy, Professor of Public lnternational Law at the
University of Paris II (Pantheon-Assas) and at the European University
Institute, Florence,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan, Attorney at Law, D~bcvoise & Plimpton,
New York,
Ms Sandra L. Babcock, Attorney at Law, Diractor of the Mexican Capital
Legal AssistanceProgramme,
Mr. Carlos Bernal, dttorncy at Law, Noriega y Escobedo,and Chairman of
the Commission on International Lawat the Mcxican Bar Association,
Mexico City,
Ms Katherine Birmingham Wilmore, Attorney at Law, Dekvoise &
Plimpton, London,
Mr. Dietmar W. Prager, Attorney at Law, Debevoise & Plimpton, New
York,
Ms Socori-oFlores Liera,Chiefof Staff, Under-Secretariatfor Global Amairs:
andHuman Rights, Ministry of Foreign AfFdirs,Mcxico City,
MI- . ictor Manuel UribeAvida, Head of the International Litigation Scc-
tion, Legal Adviser'sOffice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MexicoCity,
as Counsellors and Advocates;
Mr. Erasmo A.Lira Cabrera, Head of the International Law Section, Legal
Adviser's Office,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City,
Ms Natalie Klein, Attorney at Law, Dehvoise & Plimpton, Ncw York,
Ms Catherine Amirfar, Attorney at Law, DebevoiseBrPlimpton, New York,
Mr.Thomas Bollyky,Attorney atLaw, Debevoise& Plimpton, Ncw York,
Ms Cristina Hoss, Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute fCom-
parativc Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg,
Mr. Mark Warren, InternationaLaw Researcher, Ottawa,
as Advisers; Mr. Michel L'Enfant, Dcbevoise & Plitnpton, Paris,
as Assistant,
und
the United States of America,
represented by
The Honourable Wtlliam H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, United Statcs Dcpart-
ment of State,
as Agent ;
Mr. JamesH. Thessin, PrincipalDeputy LegalAdviser, United StatesDepart-
ment of State,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Catherine W. Brown, Assisranl Legal Adviscr For Consular Affairs,
United States Department of State,
Mr. D. StephenMalhias, Assistant LcgalAdviscrfor Un~tedNations Affairs,
United Slates Department of Statc,
Mr. Patrick F. Philbin, Associate Dcputy Attorney General, United Slates
Department of Justice,
Mr. John Byron Sandage, Attorney-Adviser for United Nations AtTairs,
United States Department of Slate,
Mr. Thomas Weigcnd,Professor of Law and Director of the institute of For-
eign and International CriminalLaw, University of Cologne,
Ms Elisabeth Zoller, Professor of PublicLaw, Univcrsity of Paris I1 (Pan-
thkon-Assas),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Jacob Katz Cogan, Attorney-Adviser forUnited Nations AM'airsU, nited
States Department of Slate,
Ms Sara Criscitelli, Member of the Bar of thStatcof New York,
Mr. Robert J. Erickson, Principal Deputy Chief, Criminal Appcllatc Section,
Uniied States Dcpartmcnt of Justtce,
Mr. Noel J. Francisco, Ocputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Unlted States Department of Justice,
Mr. StevcnHill,Attorney-Adviser for Economicand BusinessAffairs, United
States Department of Spate,
Mr. Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, Thc
Hague,
Mr. David A. Kaye, Deputy Legal Counsellor, Unitcd States Embassy, The
Hague,
Mr. Petcr W. Mason, Attorney-Adviser for Consular AfFdirs,United States
Department of State,
as Counsel;
Ms Barbara Barrett-Spencer, United StatesDepartment of Statc,
Ms Mariannc Hata, United States Departmen1 of Stale,
Ms Cecile Jouglet, United States Embassy, Paris,
Ms Joanne Nell~gan,Untted Statcs Departmentof State,
Ms Laura Rornains, United States Embassy, The Hague,
as Administrative Staff, AVENA ET AUTRES (ARR~T)
M. Michcl L'Enfant, cabinet Debevoise & Plimpton, Paris,
comme assistant,
~CSEtats-Unis d'AmCrique,
reprCsentCspar
I'honorable Will~amH. Taft, IV, conseillerjuridique du dkpartcment d'Etat
des Etats-Unls,
cornmc agent;
M. James 1-1Thcssin, conseillerjutidique adjoint principal du dkpartement
d'Etat des Etats-U nis,
comrne coagcnt ;
MIneCatherine W. Brown, consciller juridique adjoint chargb dcs affaires
consulaires au departement d'Etat dcs Etats-Unis,
M. D. Stephen Mathias, conseillcr juridique adjoint charge des questions
concernant les Nations Unies au dcpartcmeni d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
M. Patrick F. Philbin, vice-At~urneyGeneraladjoint, dkpartement de la jus-
tice des Etats-Unis,
M. John Byron Sandage, avocat-conseiller pour les questions concernant Ics
Nations Unies au departement d'Etat dcs Elats-Unis,
M. Thomas Weigend, professeur de droit ctdirecteur de I'lnstitut de droit
penal Ctrangcrel internatlonal iiI'Univcrsitkde Cologne,
M"" Elisabcth Zoller, professeur de droit public h I'LJniversitide Paris I1
(Panthkon-Assas),
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Jacob Katz Cogan, avocat-conseiIler pour lcs questions concernant les
Nations Unies au dkpariement d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
Mm"Sara Criscitelli, membrc du barreau de I'Etat de Ncw York,
M. Robert J. Erickson, chcf principal adjointa la section des I-XQU~Sen
matiire pinale du dkparternent de lajustice des Etats-Unis,
M. Noel J. Francisco, conseillerjuridique adjoint auprZdt I'Aflorney Gene-
ral, bureaudu conseillerjurldique du dlpartement de lajustice dcs Etats-
Unis,
M. Steven Hill,avocat-conseillerpour lesquestions konomiques et comrner-
ciales au dkpartement J'Etat des Etats-Unis,
M. Clifton M. Johnson, conselllerjuridique i l'ambassade des Etats-Unis a
La Haye,
M. David A. Kaye, conscillerjuridique adjojnr a l'ambassadcdes Etats-Unis
iLa Haye,
M, Peter W. Mason, avocat-conseiller pour Ics questions consulaires au
dbpartement d'Etar des Etats-Unis,
comme conseils;
Mm"Barbara Barrett-Spencer, departement d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
M"" Mariannc Hala, dipartement d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
MmcCecileJouglct, arnbassade des Etats-Unis h Paris,
M"'" Joanne Nelligan, dkpartement d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
M"'" Laura Rornains, alnbassade des E~ats-Unis i La Haye,
comme personnel administratif, composed as above,
after deliberation,
delivers thefollowing Judgment:
t.On 9 January 2003 the United Mexican States (hereinafter referred to as
"Mexico") filedin the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceed-
ings against the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the
"United States") Tor"violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions" of 24 April 1963{hereinafter referred to as the "Vienna Convention")
allegedlycommitted by the United Slates.
In its Application, Mexicobased the jurisdiction of the Court OnArticle 36,
paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Court and on Article 1 of the Optional Pro-
tocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which accompanies
the Vienna Convention (hereinafter referred to as the "Optional Protocol").
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
forthwith communicated to the Government of the United States; and, in
accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, allStates entitled to appear before
the Court were notifiedof the Application.
3. On 9 January 2003,the day onwhich the Application was filed,the Mexi-
can Government also fled in the Registry of the Court a request for ihe indica-
tion of provisional measures basedon Article41 ofthe Statute and Articles 73,
74 and 75 of the Rules of Court.
By an Order of 5 February 2003, the Court indicated the following provi-
sional measures :
"(a) The United States of America shall,take all mcasures necessary to
ensurc that Mr. CCsarRoberto Ficrro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno
Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera arc not executed pending
fin-a1judgment in these proceedings;
(b) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the
Court of all measures taken in implcm~ntationof this Order."
It further decided that, "untilhe Court has rendered its finaljudgment, it shall
remain seisedofthe matters" which formed the subject of that Order.
In a letter of 2 November 2003, the Agcnt of the United Statcs advised the
Court that the United States had "informed the relevant state authorities of
Mexico's application"; that, sincc the Order of 5 February 2003, the United
Slatcs had "obtained from them information about the status or the fifty-four
cases, including the three cases identified in paragraph 59 (I)(a) of that
Order"; and that the United States could "confirm that none of the named
individuals [had]been executed".
4. In accordance with Article43of the Rules ofCourt, the Registrar sentthe
notification referred to in Article 63, paragraph1, of the Statute to all States
parties to the Vienna Convention or to that Convention and the Optional Pro-
tocol.
5. By an Order of 5 February 2003,the Court, taking account of thc vicwsof
thc Parties,fixed 6 June 2903 and 6 October 2003, respectively, as the time-
limits for the filingof a Memorial by Mexico and of a Counfer-Memorial by
the United States. ainsicompode,
apris defibereen charnbre du conseil,
rend I'arrit suivunt:
1.LC 9 janvier 2003, les Etals-Unis du Mexique (dtnommts ci-aprks le
((Mexique>))ont depos6 au Greffe de la Cour une requEteintruduisant une ins-
tance contre les Etats-Unis dYAmerique(denommks ci-apris les tErats-Unisn)
en raison de ccviolationsde la convention de Vienne sur les relations consu-
laires)) du24 avril 1963(dknommee ci-aprits la <<conventionde Viennen) qui
auraient Ctkcommises par les Etats-Unis.
Dans sa requEte,3eMexique fonde la competence dc la Cour sur le para-
graphe 1de I'article 36 du Statut de la Cour et !'articlepremier du protmole
dc signature facultative concernant le reglement obligatoire des diffirends qui
accompagne la convention de Vienne (dinomrne ci-aprb le <cprotocolede
signature Facultative>)).
2. Conformimenl au paragraphe 2 de I'articIe40 du Statut, la requEtea ttk
immediatcment communiqukeau Gouvernement des Etats-Unis; et, conforme-
ment au paragraphe 3 de cet article, tous les Etats admBsester devant la Cour
ont Cteinformis de la requite.
3. Le 9janvier 2003,jour du depBt de la requete, le Gouvernement mexicain
a Cgalementdeposk au Greffe de la Cour une demande en indication de me-
sures conservataircs fond& sur l'artide 41 du Statut et les articles 73,et75
du Riglement.
Par ordonnance du 5 fkvricr 2003, la Cour a indique les mcsures conserva-
toires suivantes:
cta) ICS Etats-Unis d3AmCrique prcndront toute mesure pour quc
MM. CksarRoberto Fierro Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos etOsval-
do Torres Aguilera ne soient pas executkstantque I'arrit dkfinitif'n
la prksentc instance n'aura pas CtCrendu;
6) le Gouvernemcnt des Etats-Unis d'Ameriquc portera a la connais-
sance de la Courtoute mesure prise en application de la prksente
ordonnance)).
Elle a tgalement dkidk que, ({jusqu'hce que la Cour rende son arret definitlf,
elledemeurera[it]saisiedes questions))qui faisaicnt l'objetde cette ordonnance.
Par lettre du2 novembre 2003, l'agent des Etats-Unis a fait savoir ila Cour
que Ics Etats-Unis avalent ({informede la requgte du Mexiquc les autoritis
fkdtrkes compktentesn; qu'ils avaient, depuis le prononcC de l'ordonnance du
5 fevrier 2003,ctobtenu d'ellescertaines informations sur I'itat d'avancernent
des cinquante-quatre affaires, y compris lestrois visausparagraphe 59I a) de
ette ordonnancen; et qu'ils etaient cten mesure de confirmer qu'aucune des
pcrsonnes citks n5a[vait]ktecxicutk)).
4. Confomiment a I'article43 du Riglement, le grefier a adresst la notifi-
cation privue au paragraphe 1 de l'articlc63 du Statua tous les Etats parties
soit i la convention de Vienne, soita ladite convention etiison protocule de
signature facultative.
5. Par ordonnance du 5 fkvner 2003, la Cour, compte tenu des vues des
Parties, a fix6au 6 juin 2003 et au 6 octobre 2003, rcspectivement, les dates
d'expirittiondes dela~spour ledepotd'un mkmoiredu Mexique et d'un contre-
mkrnoiredes Etars-Unis. 6. By an Order of 22 May 2003, the President of the Court, on the joint
requcst of the Agents of the two Parties, exiendcd to 20 June 2003 the timc-
limit for the filing ofthe Memorial; the time-limit for the filingof the Countcr-
Mcmorial was extended, by he same Order, to 3 November 2003.
By a letter dated 20June 2003and received inthe Regi~tryon the sameday,
the Agent of Mcxicoinformed the Court that Mexicowas unablc for techn~cal
reasons to file the original of its Memorial on time and accordingly asked the
Court to dec~de,under Articlc 44, paragraph 3, of thc Rules ofCourt, that thc
filingof the Memoriakaftcr the expiration of lhe time-Iimitfixedtherefor would
be considered as valid; that letter wasaccompanied by two eleckroniccopies of
the Memorial and its annexes. Mexicohaving filedthe original of thc Memor~al
on 23 June 2003 and the United Slatcs having informed the Court, by a letter
of 24 June 2003, that ~thad no commcnt to make on the matter, the Court
decided on 25 June 2003 that the filingwould be considered as valid.
7. In a lettcr of 14October 2003, the Agent of Mexico expressedh~sGov-
ernment's wish to amend its submissions in order to include therein the cases
of two Mexican nationals, Mr. Victor Miranda Guerrcro and Mr. Tonatihu
Aguilar Saucedo, who had been sentenced to death, aftcr the filinof Mexico's
Memorial, as a result of criminal proceedings in which, according to Mexico,
thc United States had failed to comply wilh its obligations under Articlc 36of
the Vienna Convention.
In a lerterof2 November 2003, under cover of which the Unitcd States tiled
its Countcr-Memorial within the limc-limit prescribed, rhe Agent of the United
States informed the Court that his Government objected to the amendment of
Mexico's submissions, on the grounds that the requcst was late, that Mexico
had submitted no evidenceconcerning the alleged facts and that there was not
enough time for the United States to inves~igatethcrn.
In a letter receivedin the Registry on 28 Navcmber 2003, Mexico responded
to the United States objection and at the same time amcnded its submissions so
as to withdraw its request for relief in the cases of two Mexican nationals men-
tioned in the Memorial, Mr. Enrique Zambrano Garibi and Mr. Pcdro Hernin-
dcz Alberto, having comc to the conclusion that the former had dual Mexican
and United States nationality and that the latter had been Informed of his right
of consular notification prior to interrogation.
On 9 December 2903,the Rcgistrar informed Mexicoand the United Statcs
that, in order to ensure thc pruccdural equality of thc Parties, the Court had
decidcd not to authorize the amendment of Mcxico's submissions so as to
include the two additional Mexican nationals mentioned above. He also
informed the Parties that the Court had taken note thar the United States had
made no objection to the withdrawal by Mexico ofi~srequest for relief in the
casesof Mr. Zarnbrano and Mr. Wernkndez.
8. On 28 November 2903and 2 December 2903, Mexicofiled various docu-
ments which it wishedto produce in accordance with Article 56of thc Rules of
Court. By letters dated 2 December 2003 and 5 December 2003, the Agent of
the United Stales informed the Court that his Government did not object to the
production ofthese new documents and that ~tlntendcd to exercise~ts rightto
comment upon these documents and to submit documents in support of its
comments, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article. By letters dated 9 Dccem-
ber 2003,the Registrar infonned the Parties that the Court had takcn note that AVENA ET AUTRES (AKKI?~) 18
6. Par ordonnance du 22 mai 2003, le president de la Cour, sur demande
conjointe des agents dcs dcux Pdrhes,a report&au 20 juin 2003 la date d'expi-
ration du dklai pour ledCp8tdu memaire; la date d'expiration du dC1apour le
depbt du contre-memoire a Ctereportee, par la mime ordonnance, au 3 no-
vembre 2003.
Par lettrc datce du 20juin 2003et requc lc mime jour au Greffe, I'agent du
Mexlque a inform& laCour que, pour dcs raisons d'ordre technique, le Mc-
xtque n'etait pasen mesure de dkposer A temps I'originalde son mkmolre, et a
demande cn consCquenceque la Cour, conformkment au paragraphe 3 de l'ar-
ticle 44 du Rkglcment, dkide de cons~dkrercolnmc valable le dCpBtdudit
mkmoire aprks I'cxpirabon Ju d&laitixk a cet effct; cette leltre ktait accornpa-
gnee de deux copies Clcctroniques du mkmolre et de scs annexes. Le Mexique
ayanl dkposi:I'originalde son memoire le 23juin 2003 et les Etats-Unisayant
informi:la Cour, par lettre datke du 24 juin 2003,qu'ils n'avaientpas d'obser-
vation riformuler hce sujet, la Cour a decidcIc25 juin 2003,de considerer cc
dCpdtcomme valable.
7. Par lettre du 14octobrz 2003,l'agentdu Mexiquc a cxprimkle vau de son
gouvernement d'amendcr scs conclusions, aux tins d'y inclurc Icscas de deux
rcssorlissants mex~cains,MM. Victor Miranda Guerrero ct Tonatihu Aguilar
Sau~rdo, condamnks iila pcine capitale aprks le dCpbt par Ic Mcxique de son
rnkmoire, al'issuede procedurcs pknaiesau cours desquellcs,sclon le Mexique,
lcsEtals-Unis n'ava~entpas rcspcctkleurs obligations en vertu dc l'article36de
la convention de Vienne.
Pilr lettre du 2 novembrc 2003, sous le couvert de laquellcIcsEtats-Unis ont
dtpost, dans ledkla~prescrit, ]curcontre-mkmoire,I'agent desEtats-Unisa fait
savoiriikaCour que son gouvcrilcmcnt s'opposait a lamodification dcs conclu-
sions du Mexique, aux motifs quc la demande etait tardtve, que Ic Mexique
n'avait fourni aucuil dement de preuve en cc yui concerne les fa~tsallegucs ct
que les Etats-Unis nc disposaient pas de suffisammcntde temps pour enquetcr
h leur propos.
Par leltre reque au Greffc lc 28 novembre 2003, le Mexiquc a rkpondu a
l'objcctiondes Etats-Unis. I1a cn outre modifiesesconclusions aux fins dereti-
rcr sa demande de rkparation conccrnant deux ressortlssants mcxicains men-
tionnks dans son mkmoire, MM. Enrique Zambrano Caribi et Pedro Heman-
dez Albcrto, apris avoir constate quc lc premier possida~tla doublc nat~onaliti:
mcximine et america~neet quc Icsecond avait bkneticlede I'informationconsu-
laire avant son interrogatoire.
Le 9 dkcembrc 2003, le greffier a informe Ic Mexique elesEtats-Unis que,
dans le souci de veillarI'Cgal~tkcs Partiesau cours de la prockdurc, la Cour
avait dccidi de ne pas autoriser la modification par le Mexiquc de ses conclu-
sionsaux finsd'yinclure les dcux ressortissants mexicainsadditionnels susmen-
tionnts. 11a egalement inform6 les Parties que la Cour avail pris note du fait
quc les Etats-Unisne s'opposaient pas au retrait par IcMcxiquede sa demande
dc rcpamtion concernant MM. Earnbrano et Hernindez.
8. Le 28 novembre 2903et le 2 dkccrnbre2903, le Mexique a deposi divers
documents qu'il souhaitait produire conformkmcnt ri I'arkicle56du Regletncnt
de la Cour. Par des lcttrcs datkes du 2 dkembre 2003 ct du 5 dkembre 2003,
l'agcnt des Etats-Un~sa inform6 la Cour que son gouvcrncmenl ne s'opposait
pas 1 la production de ces documents nouveaux et entendait exeruer son droit
de prkscntcr des observations au sujct dcsdits documents et de sournettre des
documents 1 l'appui decer;observations, conformkment au paragraphe 3 de
I'art~cleprecite. Par lettres du 9 dkcembre2003, le greffiera inform&les Partiesthe United Slates had no objection to the production of these documents and
that accordingly counsel would be free to refer to them in the course of the
hearings. On 10Deccmber 2003, the Agent of the United States filedthe com-
ments of hisGovernment on the newdocuments produced by Mexico,together
with a number of documents in support of those comments.
9. Since the Court included upon thc Bench no judge of Mexican national-
ity, Mexico availed itselfof itright under Article 31, paragraph 2, of the
Slatutc to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: it chose Mr. Bernardo
Scp6lveda.
LO.Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph2,of its Rules, the Court, hiving con-
sulted the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed
would be made accessibleta the public on the opening of the oral proceedings.
1I. Public sitt~ngswere heldbctween 15and14 December2003, at which the
Court hcard the oral arguments and replies of:
For Mexico: H.E. Mr. Juan Manuel Cbmez-Robledo,
Ms Sandra L. Babcock,
Mr. Victor Manuel Uribc Avifia,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan,
Ms Katherine Birmingham Wilmore,
H.E. Mr. Santiago Okate,
Ms Socorro Florcs Liera,
Mr. Carlos Bcrnal,
Mr. Dietmar W. Prager,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.
Fur!he United Sdales: The Honourable William H. Taft, IV,
Ms Elisibcth Zoller,
Mr. Patrick F. Philbln,
Mr. John Byron Sandage,
Ms Catherine W. Brown,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias,
Mr. James H. Thessin,
Mr. Thomas Weigend.
12. In its Application, Mexico formulated the decision requested in the fol-
lowing terms:
"The Government of the United Mexican States therefore asks the
Court to adjudge and declare:
(1) that the United Stales, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and
sentencing the54 Mcxican nationats on death row described in this
Application, violated itsinternational legal obligations lo Mexico, in
its own right and in the exerciseor its right of consular protection of
its nationals, as provided by Article5 and 36, respectivelyofthe
Vienna Convention;
(2) that Mexico is therefore entitled to restitutio in integrum;
(3) that the Un~tedStatcs isunder an international legal obligation not toyue la Cour avait pris note du fait que 1csEtats-Unis ne s'opposaicnt pisla
production de ces documents et qu'en constyuence les conseils des Parties
pourraient lesmenlionner au cours dcs audiences. Le 10dkcernbre2903,I'agent
des Etats-Unis a dtpose les observations de son gouvernement au sujet des
documents nouveaux produits par Ic Mexique, ainsi qu'un ccrtain nombre de
documents sournis a I'appui des observations en question.
9. La Cour ne cornptant pas sur 1csiegede juge de nationalitti mexicaine, le
Mexiques'cstprkvalu du droit que lui confire leparagraphe 2 dc l'article31du
Statutde procider h la dksignation d'un jugead hoc pour siegcrcn l'ardire: iE
a deslgne M. Bcrnardo Sep~lveda.
10. Conformkment au paragraphe 2 de I'article 53 de son Rbglement, la
Cour, aprks s'ttrc renseignie aupres des Partiea,dkcide que des cxcmplaires
despitces de proddure et des documents annexts seraient rendus accessiblcsau
public h l'ouverture de la prockdure orale.
1I. DESaudiences publiques ont Ctt tenues du 15 au 19dkcrnbre 2003,au
cours desquellesont ett entendus en leurs plaidoiries et repon:es
Pour le Mexique: S. Exc.M. Juan Manuel Gbmcz-Robledo,
Mm"Sandra L. Babcock,
M. Victor Manuel Uribe Aviiia,
M. Donald Francis Donovan,
MmcKatherine Birmingham Wilmorc,
S. Exc. M. Santiago OAate,
Mm"Socorro Flores Liera,
M. Carlos Bernal,
M. Dietrnar W. Prager,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.
Rour les Etats- Unis: i'honorablc William H. Taft, IY,
Mm"Elisabeth Zoller,
M. Patrick F. Philbin,
M. John Byron Sandage,
Mm" Catherine W. Brown,
M. D. Stephen Mathias,
M. James H. Thessin,
M. Thomas Weigend.
12.Dans la requite, la decisiondemandee par le Mcxique a ete ainsformu-
1Cc:
cEn consequencc, le Gouvernement dcs Etats-Unis du Mexiquc prie la
Cour de dire ct juger que:
1) en aretant, detcnant, jugeant, dkclarant coupables et condamnant les
cinquante-quatre ressortissants mexicains se trouvant dans le couloir
de la mort, dont lescas sont dkrits dins la prksente requite, les Etats-
Unis d3AmCriqueont violi leurs obligationsjuridiques internationales
cnvers le Mexique, en son nom propre et dans l'exercicedu droit qu'a
cet Etal d'nssurer la protection eonsulaire de scs ressortissants, ainsi
qu'il estprkvu aux articl5set 36, respectlvement,dc la convention de
Vienne ;
2) le Mexique a en conskquencedroit kla restdlutio in inregrum;
3) les Rats-Unis d'amtrique ont I'obligationjuridique internationade apply the doctrine of procedural default, or any other doctrine of
its municipal law, tn precludc the exercise or thc rights afforded by
Article36 of the Vienna Convention;
(4) that the United States is undcr an internatianal lcgal obltgation to
carry out in conformity with thc foregoing international legal obIiga-
tions any future detention of or criminal proceedings against the 54
Mexican nationals on death row or any other Mcxican national in its
territory, whether by a constituent, legi~lative,executive, judicial or
other power, whether that power holds a superlor or a subordinate
position in thc organization of thc United States, and whether that
power's functionsare international or internal in character;
(5) that the right to consular notificationunder the Vienna Convention IS
a human righl;
and that, pursuant to the foregoing international lcgal obligations,
(I) the United States must restore the s!atu.squu anle, that is, re-es~ablish
the situation that ex~sredbeforc the detentian of, proceed~ngsagainst,
and convictions and sentences of, Mexico's nationalsin violatioo of
the Unitcd States international legal obligations;
(2) thc United States must take the steps necessary and suficicnt to
ensure that the provisions of its municipal law enable full cffect to be
given to the purposcs for which the rights afforded by Article 36 are
intended ;
(3) the United States must take he stcps necessaryand suficien~to esrab-
I~sha rnean~ngful rcmcdy at law Forviolationsorthe nghts afforded to
Mexico and its nationals by Article 36 of thc V~ennaConvention,
including by bamng the imposition, as a matter of rn~tn~cipallaw, of
any procedural penalty for the failure timely to raisc a claim or -
dcfcncebased on thc V~ennaConvention where competent authorities -;..
of thc Un~ted Slates havc breached their obligation to advisc the
national of his or her rights under the Convention; and
(4) the United States, in light of the pattcrn and practice oviolations set
forth in this Application,musl provide Mexico a hll guarantee of Ihe
non-repetition of the illegal acts."
13. In the course of the written procecdings, the following submissions werc
presented by the Parties:
On buhalfofthe GovernmentofM~rdcu,
in the Memorial
"For these reasons, . . . the Governmcnt of Mexico rcspcctfullyrequests
thc Court to adjudgc and declare
(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and
sentencing the fifty-four Mexican nationals on death row described in ne pas appliquer la doctrine dc la oarence proceduralc (proccrlrrral
dejuult), ni aucune autre doctrinc de leur droit Interne, cf'unemaniere
qui fassc obstacle Q I'exerciccdes droits confer& par I'arlicle 36 de la
convention de Vienne ;
4) les Etats-Unis d'ArnCr~que sont tenus, au regard du droit international,
d'agir coilformCrnentaux obligations juridiques intcrnationales sus-
rnentionnkcs dans le cas ou, riI'avenir,ils placeraient cn detention les
cinquantc-quatre ressortissants mexicains se trouvant dans le couloir
de la tnort ou lout autre ~~ssQI"E~ss~~~mexicain sur leur tcrriloire, ou
engageraicnt une action penalck lcur encontre, que cct itcte soit accom-
pli par un pouvoir constitue, qu'il soil Itgislatlf, exkcutif,judiciaire ou
autre, et quc ce pouvoir occupc uiie place supkrieurc ou subordonnee
dans I'organisation des Etats-Unis ou que les fonctions dc ce pouvoir
prisentent un caractere international ou interne;
5) Icdroit de notification consulaire garanti par la convention de Vicnne
hit partie des droits dc l'homme;
et quc, conformkrnent aux obligations juridiqucs internationales susmcn-
tionnkcs :
1) les Etats-Unis dYAmeriquedoivent restaurcr Ic stalu quo unte, c'est-k-
dirc rttablir la situation qui existait avant Ics actes de detention, dc
poursuite, de dkclaration de culpabilite et de condamnation des ressor-
tlssants mexicainscommis cn violation des obligationsjuridiques intcr-
nationales des Etats-Unis d'Amerique;
2) les Etats-Unis d'Arnkriquc doivent prendre Ics mesures nkcessairesct
suffisantes pour garantir que les di~pos~t~ond sc leur droit interne pcr-
mettent la pleine rkalisation des fins pour lesquclles sont prevus Ies
droits conferis par I'article36;
3) les Etats-Un~sd'AmCr~quedoivent prendre les mesures necessaires ct
suffisantcspour ttablir en droit une voie de recours cficace contre les
violations dcs droits confkres au Mexique et i ses rcssorlissants par
I'article36 dc la convention de Vicnne, notamment en empechant que
nc soit,en droit intcrne, pinalise sur le plan prockdural un ressortissant
n'ayant pa, en tctnps voulu, Fdilvaloir unc rklamation au titrc dc la
conventLonde Vienneni exup6 de uelle-cidans Ic cadre de sa dkfense,
lorsquc desautoritks comperenresdes Etats-Unls d'ArnCriqueont viole
I'obligation qul est la lcur d'informer cc ressortissant desdro~tsqu'il
tire de wtte convention,
4) les Etats-Unis dYArnCriqud eoivent, au vu du caractcre ricurrent et sys-
tkmatiquc des violations dkrites dans la prkscnte requite, donncr au
Mcxique une pleine garantie que de tels actcs illicites ne se rcprodui-
rant pas. >)
13. Dans la prockdure Ccrite,les conclusions ci-aprirsont cte prtsentkes par
les Partics:
dans le memoire:
{<Parccs motifs, leGouverncment du Mexiquc prie respectueuscmcnt lid
Cour dc direet juger que:
1) en arrgtant, detenant, jugcant, diclaranr coupables et condamnant Ics
cinquante-qualre rcssort~ssantsmexicainsse trouvanl dans le couloir de Mexico's Application and this Memorial, violatcd its international
legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise
of ~ts right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, as provided by
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention;
(2) that the obligation in Article 36(1)of the Vienna Convention requircs
notification before the competent authorities of the rece~vingStatc
interrogate thc foreign national or take any other action potentially
detrimental to his or her rights;
(3) that the United States, in applying the doctrinc of procedural default,
or any other doctrine of its municipal law, to preclude kheexerciseand
rcview of the rights afforded by Articlc 36 of the Vienna Convention,
violated its international iegal obligations to Mexico, in its own right
and in the excrciseof its righrof diplomatic,protection of its nationals,
as provided by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention; and
(4) that thc United States is under an international legal obligation to
carry out in conformity with the Foregoinginternational legal obliga-
tions any future detention of or criminal procccdings against thc fifty-
four Mexican nationals on dcath row and any other Mexican national
in irsterritory, whether by a constituent, legislative,executivc,judic~al
or other power, whether that power holds a superior or a subordinate
position in the organization ofthe United States, and whcther that
powcr's functions are intcrnational or intcrnal In character;
and that, pursuant lo the foregoing international legal obligations,
(1) Mcx~cois entitled to reslidufirin inlegrumand the United States thcre-
fore is under an obligation to restore the starus quo ante, that is, re-
establish the situation that cxisted al the tirnc afthe detention and
prior to the intcrrogation of, proceedingsagainst, and convichons and
sentences of, Mexico's nationals in violation of the United Statcs'
intcrnatianal legal obiigations, specificatlyby, among other things,
(a] vacating the convictions of the fifty-four Mexican nationals;
(A) vacating the sentences of the fifty-four Mexicannationals;
(c) excludingany subsequent proceedings againstthcfifty-four Mexi-
can nationals any statements and confessionsobtained from them
prior to notification of their rights to consular notification and
acccss;
(dl preventing thc application of any procedural penalty for a Mcxi-
can national's failuretimcly to raise a claim or defencxbased on
the ViennaConvention wherecompetent authorities of theUnited
States have breached their obligation to advise the national of his
rights under the Convention; (e) preventing the application of any municipal law doctrine or
judicial holding that prevents a court in the United States from
providing a remedy, ~ncluding thc rehef to which this Court
holds that Mcxico 1sentitled hcre, to a Mexican national whose
Article 36 rights have been violated; and
(f) preventing thc application of any nlunlcipal law doctrine or judi-
cial holding ahat requires an individualized showing of prejudice
as a prercyuisitc to relief for the violations of Articlc 36;
(2) the United States, in light of the regular and continuous violations set
forth in Mexico'sAppIication and Memorial, is under an obligation to
lake all leg~slative,executive, and judicial steps necessary to:
(u] ensure that the regular and continuing violations of the Article 36
consular notification, access, and assistance rightsofMexicoand
its nationals ceasc;
(h) guarantee that its competent authoritics, of federal, state, and
localjurisdiction, maintain regular and rout~necornpliancc with
thcir Article 36 obligations;
(c) cnsure that itsjudicial authorities cease applying, and guarantee
that in the rururc they will not apply:
(i) any pruccdural penalty for a Mexican national's failure
timelyto raise a claim Ordefcncebased on the Vienna Con-
vention where competent authorities of thc United States
have breached the~robligation to advise the national of his
or her rights under thc Convention;
(ii) any mun~cipal law doctrine or judicial holdingthat prcvents
a court in the United States from providing a rcmedy,
including the reliefto which th~sCourt holds that Mexico is
entttled here, to a Mexican national whose Article36 rights
have beenviulatcd; and
(111)any municipal law doclrine or judicial holding that requires
an individualized showing of prejudice as a prerequisite to
relief for the ViennaConvention violations shown here."
On hehulf of the Gov~rnrnen! ofthe Uni~odStates,
in the Counter-Memorial :
"On the basisof thc facts and arguments set out above, the Government
of the Unitcd States of Amcrica requests that the Court adjudge and
declare that the claims of the United Mexican States are dismisscd."
14. At the oraI proceedings, the followingsubmissionswere presented by the
Parties: el empecher que nc soit appliquie toute doctrine juridlquc ou juris-
prudence interne qui privc une juridiction des Etats-Unis d'AmC-
riquede la possibilitt d'accorder reparation - notamment la repa-
ration a laquelle, sclon lejugcment de la Cour, le Mexiquc a droit
ici- i un ressortissant mcxicaln dont les dro~tsau titre de l'ar-
licle 36 ontCte violes; et
f) empkcher que ne soit appliquec toutc doctrine juridique ou juris-
prudence interne qui exige d'etablir dans chaque cas individuel
I'existcnce d'un prkjudice comme condition prialable A I'octroi
d'unc riparation pour lesviolations de I'articlc36;
2) Ics Etats-Unis dYArniriquedolvent, au vu du caractkre rkcurrenr et
continu des violations decritesdans la rcqutte et lepresent rnkrna~redu
Mcxiquc, prenclre touter; mesures nkessaircs sur les plans ICgislatif,
executifct ludiciaire pour :
u) faire en sortcquc cessent les violations recurrentes ct continues des
droits que I'article36 confire au Mexique et a ses ressortissants en
matiere de notification consulaire, de communication cntrc les
uonsulats et les ressortissants ct d'assistance consulaire;
h) garantir que leurs autoritb compktcntcs aux niveaux TedCral,eta-
tlque et local se conrormeront systkmatiquemcnt aux obligations
qut sont les leurs au titre de l'article36;
c) faire en sorte quc leurs autoritks judlciaires essent d'appliquer, et
garantir qu'ellcss'abstiendront i I'avenird'appliqucr:
i) toute rkgle pknalisanl sur le plan procedural un ressortissanl
mexicain qui n'a pas, en temps voulu, fait valoir une riclarna-
tion au titre de la convention de Vienne ni excipCdc celle-ci
dans le cadre dc sa dcfense, Eorsquedes autoritbs comp&tentes
des Etats-Unis d'Arnhique ont viol&I'obligationqui cst la leur
d'informer ce ressortissant des droits qu'il tire de ccttc conven-
tion;
ii) toule doctrine juridiquc ou jurisprudence internequi empiche
unc juridiction des Etats-Unis d'AmCrique d'accarder ripara-
tion - notammcnt la riparation a laquelle, selon lc juge-
ment dc la Cour, le Mexique a drolt ici - I un ressortissant
mexicain dont les drolts ail titre de l'arhcle 36 ont Cti!violks;
--
iii) toute doctr~ne juridiquc ou jurisprudence internc qui exige
d'etabllr dans chaque cas lndividuel I'existenccd'un prkjudice
commc condition prkalable a I'octroid'unc rkparation pour les
violations de la convention de Vienne demontrees ici. b}
Au nom du Gouvernanent ~CS Erals-Unis,
dans lc contre-memoire:
ctSur la base des fa~tset moycns cxposes precidemment, le Couvcrnc-
ment des Etats-Unis d'Amerique prie la Cour de dire et juger que les
demandes des Etats-Unis du Mexique sont rejetkes. >)
14. Dans la proddur~ orale, les conclusions ci-aprcs ont &tiprisentks par
les Parties:On behalfof the GovernmentofMexico,
"The Government of Mexico respectfully requests the Court to adjudge
and declare
(1) that the United Skates ofAmerica, Inarresting, detaining, trying, con-
victing, and sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death row
described in Mexico's Memorial, violated its international legal
obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its
right to diplomatic proteclion of its nationals, by failing to inform,
without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their
right to consular nolification and access under Article 36 (1) (h)
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving
Mexico of iu right to provide consular protection and the 52
nationals' right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide
under Article 36 (I) (a)and (c) of the Convention;
(2) that the obligation in Articlc (1) of the Vienna Convention requires
notification of consular rightand a reasonable opportunity for con-
sular access before the competent authorities of the receiving State
take any action potentially detrimental to Iheforeign national's rights;
(3) that the United States of America violated its obligations under
Article35 (2) of the Vienna Convention by failing to provide mean-
ingful and effective reviewand reconsideration of convictions and
sentences impaired by a violation of Article 36 (I); by substituting
for such review and reconsideration clemency procccd~ngs; and by
applying the 'procedural dcfault' doctrine and other municipal law
doctrines that fail to attach legal significanceto an Article 36 (1) vio-
lation on its own tcrrns;
(4) that pursuant to the injuries suffered by Mexico in its own right and
in the exercise of diplomatic protection of its nationals, Mexico is
entitled to Fullreparation for those injuries in thform of restitutio
in intugrum;
(5) that this restitution consists of the obligation ro restorestocusquo
ante by annulling or otherwise deprivingof full forceor effectthcon-
victions and sentencesof all52 Mexican nationals:
(6) that this restitutioalso includes the obligation to take all measures
necessary toensure that a prior violation of Article 36shall not affect
the subsequent proceedings;
(7) that to the extent thatany of the 52 convictions or sentences are not
annulled, the United States shall provide, by means of its own choos-
ing, meaningfuland effectivereviewand reconsideration of the convic-
tions and sentencesof the52 nationals, and that this obligation cannot
be satisfiedby means of clemencyproceedings or if any municipal law
ruleor doctrinc inconsistent with paragraph (3) above is applied;and AVENA ET AUTRES (ARRET)
Au nom $U Go~vernemenzdu Mexiqere,
cLe Gouvernement du Mexique prie la Cour de dire eeljuge~ que:
1) en arcgtant, dktenant, jugeant, dklarant coupables ct condamnant les
cinquante-deux ressortissants rnexicainsse trouvant dans le couloir de
la mort dont lescas sont dkcritsdans lememoire dwMexique, lesEtats-
Un~sd'Amenque ont vide leurs obligations juridiques internationales
envers le Mexique agissant en son norn propre et dans I'exercicedu
droit qu'a cet Etat d'assurer la protection diplomatique de ses ressor-
tjssants par le fait qu'ils n'opas infomi, sans retard, les cinquante-
deuxressortissants mexicains apris leur arrestation du hit ;ila noti-
ficationct1 1'accCsaux autoritcs consulairesqui etait leleur en vertu de
I'alinta h) du paragraphe Idc I'article36 de la convention de Vienne
sur Ics relations consulaires, qu'ils ont privk le Mexique de son droit
d'accorder sa protection consulaire et prive les cinquante-deux ressor-
tissants mexicains de leur droit de benificier de la protection quc lc
Mexique lcur aurait accordkc conformCment aux alinkas a) et c) du
paragraphe I de I'artiele36 de la convention;
2) I'obligationinonk au paragraphe f de I'article36de la convention de
Vienneexigequ'une no~ificationdes droits mnsulaires ait lieu et qu'unc
possibilite raisonnable d'awes aux autoritis consulaircs soit donntc
avant quc les autoriles cornp&lcniesde I'Etat dc rksidcnccnc prennent
aucune mesure susceptible dcportcr atteinte aux droits du ressortissant
etranger;
3) les Etats-Unis d'Amerique ont viole les obligations qui leur incornbent
en vertu du paragraphe 2 de I'article36 de la convention de Vienne en
ne permettant pas un rkexamenet une revision veritableset effectirsdes
verdicts de culpabirite et des peines entachkes d'une violation du para-
graphe 1 de I'article36, en substituant i ce riexamen et ceite revision
des prucidures dr.grke ainsi qu'en appliquant la doctrine de la carence
prockdurale (procedurcrldefault) ou d'autres doctrines de droit interne
qm n'attachent pas de pottee juridlque ala violation du paragraphe I
dc I'articl36 cn rant quc tclle;
4) en considkration des domrnages qu'a subis le Mexique agissant en son
nom propre et dans I'exercioede la protection diplomatique de sesres-
sortissants, le Mexique a droit a une reparation integralede aes dom-
magcs sous la formc dc la resrilulioin uttegrurn;
5) ceite restitution consiste dans I'obligationde rebablilestatu quo ante
en annulant ou en privant d'autre facon de tout effet ou valeur les ver-
dicts de culpabilitk rendus et les peines prononcees a l'encontre des
cinquantc-dcux ressortissants mcxicains ;
6) cette restitution comprend k~alementI'obligation de prendre toutes les
mesures nkcessairespour qu'une violation passbe de l'article 36 n'ait
pas d'incidencesur les prockdures ulterieures;
7) dans la mesure ou les cinquante-deux verdicts de culpabilitf:ou peines
nc seraicnrpas annulis, IcsEtals-Unis d'Arnirique devrant assurcr, par
lesmoyensde leurchoix, un rkexarnenet une revisionvkritables eteffec-
tifs de cesverdicts et peines,et cette obligation ne pourra &tresatisfaite
par des proddures de grgce ni par I'application d'aucune rkgle ou
doctrinc dc droit intcrnc incompatible avec le paragraphc 3 cj-dcssus;
ct (8) that the United States of America shall ccasc its violations of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention with regard to Mexico and its
52 nationals and shall provideappropriate guarantees and assurances
that it shall take measures sufficientachleveincreased compliance
with Article 36 (1j and to ensure compliancew~tArticle36 (21."
On behuIf of the Governnwntofthe United States,
"On thc basis of the facts and arguments made by the United Statetn
its Counter-Memorial and in these proceedings,the Government of the
United Statesof Amerlcarequeststhat the Court, taking info account that
the United States hasconformed its conducllothis Court's Judgrncntin
thc LaCrclndCase (Germany v. Unite States ofdmericu), not only with
respect to German nationals but, consistent with the Declaralion of the
President or the Court in that case, lo all detained fore~gnnationals,
adjudge and declare that the claims of the Unitcd Mexican States are dis-
missed."
15.The present proceedings have been brought by Mexico against the
United States on the basis of the Vienna Convention, and of theOptional
Protocol providing for thcjurisdiction ofthc Court over "disputes arising
out of the interpretation or application"of the Convention. Mexico and
the United States are, and were at all relevant times, parlies to the Vienna
Convention and to the Optional Protocol. Mexico claims that the United
States has committed breaches of the Vienna Convention in relation lo
the treatment of a number of Mexican nationals who have been tried,
convicted and sentenced to death in criminal proceedings in the United
States. The original claim related to 54 such persons, but as a resultof
subscqucnt adjustments to its claimmade by Mexico (see paragraph 7
above), only 52 individual cascsare involved, These criminal proceedings
have been taking place in nine different Statcs of the United States,
namely California (28 cases), Texas (15 cases), Illinois (three cases),
Arizona (one case), Arkansas (one case), Nevada (one case), Ohio
(one case), Oklahoma (one case) and Oregon (one case), between 1979
and the present.
16. For convcniencc, thc namcs ofthe 52 individuals, and thenumbers
by which their cases will be referreto, areset out below:
1. Carlos Avena Guillen
2. Hkctor Juan Ayah
3. Vicente Benavides Figueroa
4, Constantino Carrera Montenegro
5. Jorge Contreras Lbpez AVENA E.TAUTRES (ARRET) 24
8) lesEtats-Unis d'Amtrique dcvront cesscr leurs v~olationsde I'article 36
de la convention de Vienne AI'kgarddu Mcxiquc ct de ses cinquante-
deux ressortissants devront fournis des garanties et assurancesappro-
prikes qu'lls prendront des mesures suffisantespour faire plus largc-
ment respecter le paragraphe1 de I'article 36 et assurer le rcspcct du
paragraphe 2.>>
{(Surla base desfaitset desmoyensexposespar les Etats-Unisdans lcur
conlre-memoire elau cours dela prksenteprockdurc,le Couvernement des
Etats-Unis dYAm&riqup cric la Cour, cn tenant compte du fait que les
Etats-Unis sc sont comport&s dc fagon conforme a I'arrEt qu'a rendla
Cour dans I'affrlircLaGrund (Allemagne c. Em1.r U-ni.d'dtntriyuc),non
sculcn~cntcn ce qui concerne des ressortissants allemands maistgalernent,
dans la Iigne de la dkclaration faite par le prksident de la Cour en cette
affairc, cn ce qui concerne tous les ressortlssants Ctrangers dCtenus, de dire
ct jugcr que les demandes des Etats-Un~s duMexique sont releties.)>
15. LA presente instance a kteintroduite par lc Mcxique contre les
Etats-Unis au titrcdc la convenlion de Vienne et du protocole de signa-
ture fstcultative qui disposeque la Cour est compkente pour connailre
des ((diflkrends relatifi I'interprktationou h I'applicatio)> de cette
convention. Le Mexique et les Etats-Unis sont, et Ctaient a tous les
moments pertinents, partics k la convention de Vienne et auprotocole de
signature ~acultativc.Le Mexique prktend que les Etats-Unis ont viole la
co~~ventionde Vienne en ce qui concerne tetraitement-applique $ un cer-
lain nombre de ressortissants mexicains qui ont it6 jugb, dkclarks cou-
pables et condamnks B mort a la suite de procedures pknales qui se sont
dlroulees aux Etats-Unis. La requ6te iniliale vistcinquante-quatre ressor-
tissantsmexicains sc trouvant dans cc cas, mais le:Mexique a rnodifieul-
tkrieurement ses demandes (voir Ic paragraphc 7 ci-dessus), et cinquante-
deux pcrsonncs sculcmcnl sonl maintcnant concernkes. Les procedures
pinales en question se son1 dkroulkes entrc 1979 et aujourd'hui dans neuf
Etats des Etats-Unis, i savoir la Californie (vingt-huit affaires), le Texas
(quinze affaircs), 1'Tllinois(trois affaires), I'Arizona (une affaire), 1'Arkan-
bas (une ahire), le Nevada (une affaire), ]'Ohio (une affaire), 1'Okla-
hama (unc affairc) ct I'Orcgon(unc affaire).
16. Par sauci de commoditC, le nom de ces cinquante-deux personnes
ainsi que le numkro attribuk a leur cas sont indiquks ci-apris:
1. Carlos AvenaGuillen
2. Hector Juan Ayala
3. Yicente Benavides Figueroa
4. Constantino Carrcra Montcncgro
5. Jorge Contreras Lopez25 AVENA AND OTI~ERs(JUDGMENT)
6. Daniel CovarrubiasSinchez
7. MarcosEsquivelBarrera
8. Rubin Gbmez Pkrez
9. JaimeArmandoHoyos
10. drturo JuhrezSuhrez
11. Juan ManuelLopez
12.JosiLupercioCasares
13. LuisAlbertoMacielHernandez
14. AbelinoManriquezJaquez
15. OmarFuentes Martinez(a.k.a. LuisAvilesde la Cruz)
16. MiguelAngel MartinezSinchez
17. MartinMendoza Garcia
18.SergioOchoaTamayo
19. EnriqueParraDuefias
20. Juande Dios RarnirezVilla
21, MagdalenoSalazar
22. Ram6nSalcidoBojhrquez
23. JuanRamonSAnchezRamirez
24. Ignacio'FafoyaArriola
25. AlfredoValdezReyes
26. Eduardo David Vargas
27. Tomis Verano Cruz
28. [Casewithdrawn]
29. SamuelZamudio JirnCnez
30. JuanCarlosAlvarezBanda
31. CSsarRobertoFierroReyna
32. HCctor Garcia Torres
33. TgnacioGSmez
34. RamiroHernandezLlanas
35.RamiroRubl lbarra
36. HumbertoLealGarcia
37. VirgilioMaldonado
38. JoseEmcsto MedcllinRojas
39. RobertoMorenoRamos
40. Daniel AngelPlataEstrada
41. RubCnRamirezCrirdenas
42. FClixRocha Diaz
43. OswaldoRegaladoSoriano
44. EdgarAriasTamayo
45. JuanCaballeroHernindez
46. MarioFloresUrbin
47. GabrielSolacheRomero
48. MartinRaul Fong Soto
49. RafaelCamargoOjeda
50. [Casewithdrawn]
51. Carlos RenkPkrezGutikrrez
52. Josi:TrinidadLoza 5. DanieECovarrubiasSanchez
7. Marcos Esquivel Barrera
8. Ruben Gbmez Pkrez
9. Jaime Armando Hoyos
10. Arturo Juirez Suarez
11. Juan Manuel L6pez
12. JosCLupercio Casares
13. Luis Alberto Maciel Hernkndez
14. Abelino Manriquez Jaquez
15. Omar Fuentes Martinez (alias Luis Avilesdela Cruz)
16. Miguel Angel Martinez Sinchez
17.'Martin Mendoza Garcia
18. SergioOchoa Tamayo
19. Enrique Parra Duegas
20. Juan de Dios Ramirez Villa
21. MagdalenoSalazar
22. Ramon SalcidoBojbrquez
23. Juan Rarnbn Sinchez Ramirez
24. Ignacio Tafoya Arriola
25. Alfredo Valdez Reyes
26. Eduardo David Vargas
27. TomiisVerano Cruz
28. [Demande retirke]
29. Samuel Zamudio JimCnez
30. Juan Carlos Alvarez Banda
31. CCsarRoberto Fierro Reyna
32. Htctor Garcia Torres
33. Ignacio Gbmez
34. Ramiro HernindezLlanas
35.Ramiro Rubi Ibarra
36. Humb~rto kal Garcia
37. VirgilioMaldonado
38. Jose Ernesto Medellin Rojas
39. Roberto MorenoRamos
40. Daniel Angel Plata Estrada
41. Ruben Rarnirez Cardenas
42. FklixRocha Diaz
43. Oswaldo Regalado Soriano
44. Edgar Arias Tamayo
45. JuanCaballero Hernindez
46. Mario Flores Urban
47. Gabriel Solache Romero
48. Martin RaLl Fong Soto
49. Rafael Camargo Ojeda
50.[Demande retirke]
51. Carlos RenCPerez Gutierrez
52. Jose Trinidad Loza 53. Osvaldo Netzahualctiyotl Torres Aguilera
54. Horacio Alberto Reyes Carnarena
17. The provisions of the Vienna Convention of which Mexicoallegcs
violations are contained InArticle 36. Paragraphs 1and 2 of this Article
arc set out respectively in paragraphs 50 and 108 below. Article 36
relates, according to its title, to "Communication and contact with
nationals of the sending State". Paragraph I (b) of that Article provides
that if a nationalof that Stale "is arrested or committed to prison or to
custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner", and he so
requests, the localconsular post of the sending State is to be notified. The
Articlegoeson to providethat the "competent authorities of the receiving
State" shall "inform the person concerned without delayof his rights" in
this respect. Mexico claimsthat in the present case these provisions were
not complied with by the United Statcs authorities in respcct of the 52
Mexican nationals the subject of its claims. As a result, the United States
has according lo Mcxicocommitted breaches of paragraph I (h) ;more-
over, Mexico claims,for reasons to beexplained below(seeparagraphs 98
et seq.j, that the United States is also in breach of paragraph 1 (a) and
(c) and of paragraph 2 of Article 36, in view of the relationship of
these provisions with paragraph 1 (b).
18. As regards the terminology cmployed to designate thc obligations
incumbent upon the receiving State under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b),
the Court notes that thc Parlies have: used the terms "inform" and
"notify" in differing senses. For the sake of clarity, the Court, when
speaking in its own name in the present Judgment, will use the word
"inform" when referring to an individual being made aware of his rights
under that subparagraph and the word "notify" when referring to the
giving of notice to the consular post.
19. The underlying factsallegedby Mexicomay be briefy described as
foilows :some are conceded by the United States, and some disputed.
Mexico states that all the individuals the subjectof its claims were Mexi-
can nationals at the time of their arrest. It further contends that the
United Statesauthorities that arrested and interrogated these individuals
had sufficient information at their disposal to be aware of the foreign
nationality of those individuals. According to Mexico'saccount, in 50 of
the specified cases,Mexican nationals were never informed by the com-
petent United States authorities of their rights under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention and, in the two remaining cases,
such information was not provided "without delay", as required by that
provision. Mexico has indicated that in 29 or the 52 cases its consular
authorities learned of the detention of the Mexican nationals only after
death sentences had been handed down. In the 23 remaining cases,
Mexico contends that it Iearned of the cases through means other than
notification to the consular post by the competent United States authori-
tics under Article 36, paragraph 1 (bj. It explains that in five cases this 53. Osvaldo Netzahualcbyotl Torres Aguilera
54. Horacio Alberto Rcy~sCamarena
17. Lesdispositions de la convention de Viennc qui, selon le Mexique,
auraient kle violccssont contenues A l'article 36. Les paragraphes1et 2
de cet article sont reproduits rcspectivement aux paragraphes 50 et 108
ci-aprcs. L'article36, comme son intituli I'indique, concerne la cr[c]om-
munication aveclesressorlissants de 1'Etatd'envoi>).L'alinia b) du para-
graphe 1 de ccl article dispose que si un ressortissant de E'Etd'envoi
I {cestarrEtC incarckre ou mis en etat dc delcnlion nrkventive ou toute
autre forine de dktention)etqu'il enfait la demande, notification doien
Ctrc hitc au poste consulaire concerne de 1'Etal d'cnvoi. L'article 36
ajoute que les crautorites compktentes de 1'Etat de rbidencen doivent
({sansretard informer l'intkressede ses droils)a cetCgard.Le Mexique
affirrne qu'en I'espCccles autoritks des Etats-Unis n'ont pas respecces
dispositions ri1'Cgarddes cinquantc-deux ressortissants mexicains qui
Ibnt I'ohjet de ses demandes. A son avis, les Etats-Unis ont donc viol&
I'alineaB) du paragraphe 1; en outre, le Mexique soutient que les Etats-
Unis, pour les motifs exposksplus loin (paragraphes 98 et suivants), ont
egalement violCles alineas u) et c) du paragraphe I ainsi quc le para-
graphe 2 de I'article36,compte tenudu lienexistant entre cesdispositions
et I'alinPab) du paragraphe 1.
18. S'agissant de la terminologie ernployke pour designer les obliga-
tions qui incombeiltk 1'Elatde rksidenceen vertu de l'alinkab) du para-
graphe 1 de I'article 36, la Cour relevera quelesParties on1 utilisk les
termes ({informerset ctnoliiicrn dans des sens diffkrents. Pour plus de
clartk, la Cour, lorsqu'elles'cxprimeraen son nom propre dans 1epresent
arrzt, utilisera le verbecrinformernpour serkfkreil'inforrnatian fournie
k l'individude ses droits aux termes dudit alin6a et le vcrbe ctnolifier))
pour dCsignerI'avertissemenldonnCau poste consulaire.
19. Les hits allegukssur lesquclssfbnde leMexique peuvenl &trebrie-
vementdecrits commesuil: cerrainssont admispar lesEtats-Unis, d'autres
sont contestes.Le Mexique afirme que toutes les personnes faisant I'objet
de ses demandes etaient dcs ressortissants mexicainsau moment de leur
arrestation. 11expose Cgalementque les autoritCsdes Etats-Unis qui ont
arr2tCet interroge ces personncs disposaient d'assezd'informations pour
savoir qu'ellesavaient afl-airdes trrangcrs. Selonle Mexique, cinquante
des ressortissants mexicains coilccrnks n'ont jamais eti: informks par les
autoritkscornpltentesdesEtals-Unisdes droits qu'ils tenaientde I'alinEa6)
du paragraphe 1de l'article36de la conventionde Vienne;quant aux deux
derniers,ilsen ont ite informis maisnon {(sansretards cornmeI'exigecette
dispositioo.Le Mexiquc aindiqukque, dans vingt-neufdes cinquante-dcux
cas, lesressortissantsexicainsavaient dijaetC condamnis iimort lorsquc
ses fonctionnairesconsulairesont apprisque lesintiressks se trouvaient en
detention.Le Mexiqueaffirmeque, dans lesvingt-trois autres cas, il Cte
infomi. de la situatiodes dCtenuspar d'autresmoycns qu'unenolifica~ion
aJrzssCeau poste cor~sulairepar fes autoritis cornpiientes des Etats-Unis
Iwas too late to affect the trials, that in 15 cases the defendants had
already made incriminating statements, and that it became aware of the
other three cases only after considerable delay.
20. OF the 52 cases referredto in Mexico'sfinal submissions,49 are
currently at different stagesof the proceedings before UnitedStatesjudi-
cial authorities at state or federal level, and in three cases, thosof
Mr. Fierro (caseNo. 31), Mr. Moreno (caseNo. 39)and Mr. Torres(case
No. 531 judicial remedies withinthe United States have already been
exhausted. The Court has been informed of the variety of types of pro-
ceedingsand forms of relief available in the criminal justice systems of
the United States, which can differ from state to state. In very general
terms, and according to the description offered by both Parties in their
pleadings, itappears that the52casesmay be classifiedinto three catego-
ries: 24 cases which are currently in direct appeal; 25 cases in which
means of direct appeal have been exhausted, but post-conviction relief
(habeas corpus), either at slate or at federal level,is still available; and
three cases in which nojudicial remedies remain.The Court also notes
that, in at least 33 cases, the alleged breach of the Vienna Convention
was raised by the defendant either during pre-trial, at tronlappeal or
in haheas corpus proceedings, and that some of these claims weredis-
missedon proceduralor substantivegrounds and othersare still pending.
To date, in none of the 52 cases havethe defendants had recourseto the
clemency process.
2 1. On 9 January 2003,the day on which Mexicofiledits Application
and a requesl for the indicatioof provisional measures, all52 individ-
uals the subject of the claims wereon death row. However,two days later
the Governor of the State of Illinois, exercisinghis power of clemcncy
review, commuted the sentences of a11convicted individuals awaiting
execution in that State, including those of three individuals named in
Mexico's Application(Mr. Caballero (case No. 45), Mr. Flores (case
No. 46) and Mr. Solache (case No. 47)). By a letter dated 20 January
2003, Mexicoinformed the Court that, further to that decision, it with-
drew its requestfor the indicationof provisional measureson behalf of
these three individuals,but that itspplication remained unchanged.In
the Order of 5 February 2003, mentioned in paragraph 3 above, on the
request by Mexicofor the indication ofprovisional measures,the Court
considered that it was apparent from the information before ilthat the
three Mexicannationals named in the Application who had exhausted all
judicial remediesin the United States (see paragraph 20 above)wereat
risk of execution in the followingmonths, or even weeks.Consequently,
it ordered by way oC provisional measurethat the United States take all
measures necessary to ensurethat these individuals wouldnotbe executed AVENAFT AUTRES (ARR~T) 27
conformEment a I'alineab) du paragrapheEde I'article36. I1prrkiiccel
Cgardque dans cinq cas il etait aloss trop tard pque l'issuedu procis
puisscen&treaffectee,quedans quinzecasI'accusC avaitdeji faitdedMa-
rations suscepliblesd'&treretenuescontre lui,et que dans trois cas I'infor-
mation avait Cterecueavec tnnretard considerable.
20. Des cinquante-deux affsliresviseesdans lesconclusions finalesdu
Mexique, quarantc-neuf en sont actuellement diffkrents stades de la
prockdure devant les autorites judiciaires des Elals-Unis, auiniveau
des Etats, soit au niveau fkdkral.Dans les trois affaires restantes (celles
concernant M. Fierro (cas no 31),M. Moreno (cas no 39)et M. Torres
(casno 53))'Icsvoiesde recoursjudiciairesdans cepays ont dkji ete epui-
sCes.La Cour a Cte inform& dcs dirererites procedures et voies de
recours qui existentdans les systirnes dejustice pCnaledes Etats-Unis et
qui peuventvarier d'un ElalA I'autre.En termestris gknkrauxet d'aprh
la description fourniepar les deux Parties dans leurs kritures, il semble
que Eescinquante-deux affairespuissent Etrerkparticscn lrois categories:
dans vingl-quatre d'entre elles, la procidure se trouve actuellement au
stade de l'appeldirect; dans vingt-cinqautres, lemoyen de I'appeldirect
a dkja Cti:CpuisC,mais d'autres recoursa engagcr apres condarnnation
(hoheas corpus) sont encore possiblesau niveau de 1'Etatou au niveau
federal; et dans lestrois affaircsrestantes, toutes lesvoiesde recoursjudi-
ciairesontCtk CpuisCesL. a Cour relevepar aiHeursque, dans trente-trois
ias au moins, l'accuska invoqut la violation allkgdede la convention
de Vienne, soit avantIc prods, soit en premiire instance, soit en appel
ou dans le cadre d'une prockdure d'hubeusc:urpus; certaines de ces de-
mandesont CtCrejetkespour des motifs de forme ou de fond, lcs aulres
son1encorependantes. Dans aucundescinquante-deux cas,1~accusCs n'onl
itI'heureactuellcutilisela prockdurede recours en grice.
21. Au 9janvier 2003,dale a laquellele Mexiquea introduitsa requgte
ainsi qu'une dernande en indication dc mesures conservatoires, les
cinquantc-dcux personnes visCesdans sesdemandes se trouvaient toutes
dans le couloirdela mort. Deuxjours plus tard, legouverneur de 1'Etat
dc l'Illinois,exerqant son droit de grice, a commuC1a.condamnationde
tous lesdktenusen instanced'exkcutiondans cet Etat, dont lrois tlaient
des personnes citees dans la requete du Mexique (M. Caballero (cas
no 45)'M. Flores (casno46)et M. Solache(cas no47)).Par une lettrc en
date du 20janvier 2003,le Mexiquea inform6la Cour que, k la suiledc
cette dkision, il retirait sa demande en indication de mesuresconserva-
toires encequi concernecestrois personnes,mais que sa requgtedemeu-
rait inchangee,Dans son ordonnance du 5 fkvrier2003sur la demande en
indication de mesuresconserwsltoiredu Mcxique,citee au paragraphe 3,
la Cour a estimkqu'il ressortait des informatioisa disposition que les
trois ressortissantsmexicainsvisCsdans la requCtequi avaient tpuist tous
lesrecoursjudiciaires(voirparagraphe 20 ci-dessus)risquaient d'CtreexC-
cutis dans les mois suivants, voire dans les semainessuivantes. Par voie
de consCquence,la Cour a ordonne, Btitre de mesureconservatoire, que
les Etats-Unis prennent toute mesurepour que ces personnes nesoientpending find judgment in these proceedings.The Court notes that, at the
date of the present Judgment, thcse three individuals have not been
executed, but further notes with great concern that, by an Order dated
1 March 2004, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has sct an
execution dateof 18May 2004 for Mr. Torres.
THEMEXICAO NR~ECTI OONTHE UNITED STATE OSWECT~O f0 S
JUKISDICT INDNA~MTSS~BILITY
22. As noted above, the present disputhas been brought bel'orcthe
Court by Mexico on thebasisof'theVienna Convention and the Optional
Protocol tothat Convention. Articl1of the Optional Protocol provides:
"Disputes arising outf the interpretation or application of the
[Vienna] Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice and may accordinglbcbrought
before theCourl by a written application made by any party to the
dispute being a Party to the present Protocol."
23. The United Statcshas presented a number of objections to the
jurisdiction of the Court, as well asa number of objections to thc
admissibility of the claims advancbyMexico. It is however thcontcn-
lion of Mexico that all the objections raised by the United Statare
inadmissible as having bccn raised after the expiratofthe time-timit
laid down by the Rules of Court. Mexico draws attention to the text of
Article 79,paragraph 1,of the Rules of Courl as amended in 2000,which
provides that
"Any objectionby the respondent to the jurisdiction of the Court
or to the admissibility of the application, or other objection the deci-
sion upon which is requested before any furlhcr proceedings on the
merits, shall be made in writing as sooas possible, and not later
than threc months after the delivery of the Memorial."
Thc previous text of this paragraph rcquired objections to be made
"within the time-limitxedfor deliveryof the Counter-Memorial". In thc
prcscnl case the Memorial of Mexico was filed on 23 June 2003; the
objections of the Unitcd States to jurisdiction and admissibility were
presented in its Counter-Memorial, filed on 3 November 2003, more
than four months later.
24. The United States has observed that, during the proceedings on
the request made by McxicoForthe indicationofprovisional measures in
this case, it specifically reservedits right to makejurisdictional arguments
at the appropriate stage, and that subsequently the Parties agreed that
there shouldbe a single round of pleadings. The Court would however
emphasize that parties to casesbefore il cannot, by purporting to "reserve
their rights" to take someprocedural action, exempt themselvesfrom the
applicationto such action of the provisioof the Statute and Rules ofpas exkutks tant que I'arretdefiniliren la prkscnle instance n'aurait pas
eterendu. La Cour constate quc, ftladate du present arr&t,ces trois per-
sonnes n'ont pas kt&executees, mais note ri grand regret que la cour
d'appel pknale de I'Oklahoma, par une ordonnance du Ie%mars2004,a
fix&la date d'exkcutionde M. Torres au 18mai 2004.
EXCEPTIO OPPOS~EPAR I,E MEXIQU AEUX EXCEMIPNS D'INCOMI'~I.ENCEET
D'IKKECEVABI SOI.LE~VEESPAR LES ETATS-UNIS
22. Comrne indiquk plus haut, le Mexique a saisi la Cour du present
differend au titre de la convention de Vienneet du protocolc dcsignature
facultativeAcette convention. L'article premierdu protocole dispose que
cc[l]esdiffirends relatiisI'interprctation oa I'application de la
convention [de Vienne]relivent de la compktence obligatoire de la
Cour internationale de Justice, quA,ce titre, pourra ktre saisie par
une requite de toute parrie au differend qui sera elle-m&mepartie au
prksent protocole>).
23. LesEtats-Unis ont soulev6plusieurs exceptionsa la compktencede
la Cour ainsi qu'a la recevabilitk des demandes du Mexique. Ce dernier
plaide cependant que les exccplions des Etats-Unis sont toutes irrece-
vablcs aumotif qu'ellesont Cteprbentees aprks I'expirationdu dklaipre-
vu dans le Rkglement de la Cour. Le Mexique rappelle en effet qu'aux
termes du paragraphe I de I'article 79 du Rkglerncnt, tcl que rnodifik
en 2000,
ct[t]outeexceptiorila compktencedc la Cour ou Bla recevabilitkde
larequeteou toute autre exception sur laquelle ledkfendeurdcmande
unc dCcisionavant que Ya prockdure sur le fond se poursuive doit
ktre prCsentCpar hit des que possible, et au plus tard trois mois
aprb le dkpat du memoire)).
Dans sa precedente version, ce paragraphe disposail que les exceptions
dcvaienl Etre prksentkes ((clans le dClafix6pour le depcil du contre-
memoire,>.En l'espice,lemkmoiredu Mexiquea cti:dCpos@le 23juin2003;
Icscxceptionsa la competence et ,i la recevabiliteont ttCsoulevkespar les
Etals-Unis dans leur contre-mCmoire qui a etC d6posC Ic 3 novembre
2003,soit plus de quatre mois plus tard.
24. Les Etats-Unis ont quant a eux rappele que, lors de la phase dc
I'affairerelativrla demande en indication de mesures conservatoires du
Mexique, ils s'ktaient expresskmentresew6 le droit de contester la com-
pilence de la Cour au stade opportun de laprocedure, et que les Parties
Ctaient ensuite convenucs qu'il neserait procedk qu'ii un seul tour de
pieces&rites. La Cour soulignera ccpcndant que les parties aux affaires
dont elleest srtisi~ne sausaient, sous prktexte{{rkserveleur droith)de
prendre telle ou telle decision de prockdure, soustraire ces dkcisioksCourt (cf. Application of the Convenlion on he Prevention and Punish-
ment r$ the Crime ofGenocide (Bosaio and Fierzegovinav. Yugosluviu),
Order of13 Seplember1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 338,para. 28).
Thc Court notes, however, that Articlc 79of the Rules applies only to
preliminary objections,as isindicated by the title of the subsection of the
Rules which it constitutes. As the Court observed in the Lockcrbie cases,
"if it is to be covered by Article 79, an objection mu. ..possess a 'pre-
liminary' characlcr", and "Paragraph 1 of Articlc 79 of the Rules of
Court characterizes as 'preliminary' an objection 'the decision upon
which is requested beforeany further proceedings"' (Quwlions c$ Infer-
pretalion andApplicalion of the 1'971 Montreal Conv~nliun urising ji-om
the Acrid Incident at LockerBic (Libyan Aroh Jarnahiriya v. United
Kingdom) (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Uniled Stufes of America), Pre-
liminaryObjeclions,I.C.J.Repurls 1998,p. 26, para. 47; p. 131,para46) ;
and the effectof thetimely presentation of such an objection is that the
proceedings on the merits are suspended (paragraph 5or Article 79).An
objection that is not presented as a preliminary objection in accordance
with paragraph 1 of Article 79 does not thereby become inadmissible.
There are of course circumstances in which the party failing to put for-
ward an objection to jurisdiction might be held to have acquiesced in
jurisdiction (Appeui Relaling to the Jurisdictionuf the ICAO Council,
Judgment, I.C. J. Reporls 1972, p. 52, para. 13). However, apart from
such circumstances, a party failing to avail itself of the Article 79
procedure may forfeit the right to bring about a suspension of the pro-
ceedings on the merits, but can still argue the objection along with the
mcrits. That isindeed what the Unitcd Stateshas done in thiscase;and,
for reasons tobe indicated below, many of its objections are of such a
nature that they wouldin any event probably have had to be heard along
with the merits. Thc Court concludes that it shodd not exclude from
consideration the objections of the United States to jurisdiction and
admissibility by reason of the fact that they were not presented within
three months from the date of fiEingof the Memorial.
25. The United Stateshas submitted four objections to thejurisdiction
of the Court, and five to the admissibility of the claims of Mexico. As
noted above, these have not been submitted as preliminary objections
under Article 74of the Rules of Court; and they are not ofsuch a nature
that the Court would be required to examine and dispose of all of them in
limine, before dealing with any aspect of the mcrits of the case. Some arc
expressed tobe only addressed to certain claims; some are addressed to
questions of the remedies to be indicated if the Courtfind that breaches
of the Vienna Convention have beencommitted; and some are of such a
nature that they would have to be dealt with along with the merits. The
Court will however now examineeach of them in turn. I'applicationdes dispositionsdu Statut et du Rkglementde la Cour (voir
Applicurir~ndeIa conventionpour Iuprkvenlionet Iur8pressioncf urimede
gknocide (Bosnie-Herzt'govine c. Yougoslavie), mesurcs cunservatoircs,
ordonnunct. du 13 septembre1993, C.I.J.R~cueil1993,p. 338,par. 28).
La Cour rclkvcraloutel'oisque l'article79 du Rkglement concerneseu-
ternent les exceptions prkliminaires,cornme l'indique I'intitulede la sous-
section du Reglement qu'il constitue. La Cour a fait observer dans les
affairesLockerbie que, ((pour &trecouverte par l'article79, une exception
doit ... revctir un caractere apreliminaircjct quc{<[l]e aragraphe 1de
l'article 79 du Rkglement qualifie de crpriliminaireu une exception ccsur
laquellele dkfendeur dcmandc une decisionavant que la procedure sur le
fond se poursuive~>)(Questions d'inierprklalion et d'application de la
cunventzun de Montrtul de I971 rbullnnl de I'incideficue'riende Lockerbie
(JumuhiriyuuruheIihyennec. Royuume-Uni)(Jumuhiriyuurubelibyenne
c. Etats-Undsd'Amtrique), excepiiona prt2liminaire.~ Z.J.Rccueil 1998,
p. 26, par. 47p. 131,par. 46); une telleexception, lorsqu'elleest soulevke
dans le dklai imparti, a pour effet de suspendre la prockdure sur le fond
(art.79,par. 5). Une exception qui n'estpas soulevkesous la forme d'une
exception prkliminaircconibrmtrnent au paragraphc 1 dc I'article 79 ne
devient paspour autant irrecevable.11estccrtesdes circonstancesdans les-
quelles la partie qui s'abstient de soulever une exception d'incompbtence
I pourrail Etrcconsidiree cornme ayant accept6 cette compttence (Appel
concernan!la coinp&.lencdeu Conseildc I'OA CI,arrtt, C.I.J. Recucil197.2,
p. 52,par. 13).Maishors de cette hypothise, une partie qui n'upasde la
proddure prkvue i I'article79perd sansdoute ledroit d'obtenir [asuspen-
sionde la procidure sur le fond, mais n'enpeut pas moins fairevaloircette
exceptionen mkmetemps que sesarguments au fond. C'estprkciskmentce
que les Etats-Unis ont fait en I'espice; aussi bien est-il possibleque, pour
les motifsexposis plus loin, bon nombre des exceptions qu'ilson1soule-
veesdevaient,en raison de leur nature, Etreexaminies enmEme temps que
I lesargumentssur le fond. La Cour en conclur qu'ellene doit pas serefuser
I i examiner lesexceptions d'jncompktence et d'irrecevabilitksoulev6espar
lesEtats-Unis au motif que celles-cin'ont pas ktkprksenties dans lestrois
mois A cornpter de Iadate du dCpdtdu rnkmoire,
25. LesEtats-Unis ont soulevequatre exceptions ila cornpitence de la
Cour et cinq exceptions ri la recevabiliti: dcs dcmandes du Mexique.
Cornmeindiquk ptus haut, ces exceptions n'ont pas CtCpresentees ititre
d'exceptions prkliminaires relevant de I'article 79 du Rkglement de la
Cour; et leur nature n'exigepas quela Cour lesexamine toutes et statue;i
leur sujetinliming,avant d'abosder le moindre aspect du fond de l'affaite.
Certaines exceptions sont censies ne viser qu'une partie des demandes;
d'autres portent sur des questions likes anx remkdes que la Cour devra
indiquer si elleconstate que la convention de Vienna ete violke;d'autres
encore, par leur nature,demandent ii Etre traitles au stade du fond. La
Cour les examinera cependant dis maintenant une par une. 26. The United States contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction to
decide many of Mexico's claims, inasmuch as Mexico's submissions in
the Memorial asked theCourt to decide questions which do not arise out
of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention, and which
thc Uniled Slates has never agreed to submit to the Court.
27. By its first jurisdictional objection, the United States suggested
that the Memorial is fundamentally addressed to the treatment of Mexi-
can nationals in the federal and state criminal justice systems of the
United States, and the operation of the United States criminal justicesys-
tem as a whole. It suggested that Mexico's invitation to the Court lo
make what the United States regards as "hr-reaching aiid unsustainable
findingsconcerning the United States criminaljustice systems" would be
an abuse of thc Court's jurisdiction. At the hearings, the United States
contended that Mexico is asking the Court to interpret and apply the
treaty as if it were intended principally to govcrn the operation of a
State's criminal justicc system as it affects foreign nationals.
28. The Court would recallthat itsjurisdiction in the present case has
been invoked under the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol to
determine the nature and extent or the obligations undertaken by the
United Statcs towards Mexicoby becoming party to that Convention. If
and so Taras the Court may find that the obligations accepted by the
parties to the Vicnna Convention included commitments as to the con-
duct of their municipat courtsin relation to the nationals of other parties,
then in order to ascertain whether there have been breaches of the Con-
vention, Ihc Court must be able to examine the actions of those courts in
the lightof international law. The Court is unable to uphold the conten-
tion of the United States that, as a matter of jurisdiction, it is debarred
from enquiring into the conduct of criminal proceedings in United States
courts. How far it may do so in the present case isamaller for the merits.
The first objection ofthe United Statcstojurisdiction cannot therefore be
upheld.
29. The second jurisdictional objection presented by the United States
was addressed to the first of the submissions presented by Mexico in its
Memorial (see paragraph 13above). The United States pointed out that
Article 36of the Vienna Convention "creates no obligations constraining
the rights of the United States to arrest a foreign national"; and that EXC~P~ION USINCQMP~~TENCE SOU[-EV~ES PAR I.ES ~TATS-UNIS
26. LesEtats-Unis affirment que la Cour n'a pas compitence pour sta-
tuer sur bon nornbre des demand~sdu Mexique du Caitque celui-ci,dans
les conclusions formulkes dans son memoire, a prie la Cour de se pro-
noncer sur des questions qui ne relkvent pas de l'interprktation ou de
l'application de la convention de Vienne et que les Etats-Unis n'ont
jamais accept&de soumettre a la Cour.
27. Par leur prerniire exception d'incompktence, les Etats-Unis
donnenl iientendre que lememoireconcerne essentiellementle traitement
des ressortissantsmexicainsdans Icssyslimcs dcjustice penale ambicaine,
tant ri1'Cchelonfederal qu'h celui des Etats, et, plus largement, le fonc-
tionnement de ces systimes dans leur ensemble. Pour les Etats-Unis, le
Mcxiquc inviterail la Cour a formuler ce qu'ilsconsidkent comme udes
conclusions indkfendablcs et lourdes de consiquences sur les systemesde
justicepenale des Etats-Unis})ct a abuser de la compctcncc de la Cour.
Lors de la prockdure orale, les Etats-Unis ont soutenu que le Mexique
demandait i la Cour d'interprkter et d'appliques la convention comme si
die-ci visait principalemcnt i~rCgirle fonctionnement du systime dejus-
ticepinale d'un Etat quand celui-cis'applique ;ides Ctrangers.
28. La Cour rappelle que sa competence en l'espkcea CtCinvoquke au
titre de la convention de Vicnnc etdu protocole de signature facultative
en vue de diterminer la nature et la portke des obligationsque les Etats-
Unisont contractkes enversle Mexique endevenant partie i cette conven-
tion. Si, et dans la mesure oh la Cour aboutirait Bla conclusion qu'en
acceptant Icsobligations prescritespar la conventionde Viennelesparties
Bcet instrument ont pris des engagcrncnlscn cc qui conccrnc la conduite
de leursjuridictions interneiil'egarddes ressortissants des autres parties,
la Cour devra, pour etablir s'ily a eu violation de la convention, CtreB
m2med'examiner les actes de cesjuridictions au regard du drnit interna-
tional. La Cour ne peut retenir I'argument des Elats-Unis selon lequcl
elle n'est pas compktente pour examiner le dCroulcmenrdcs procedures
penales engagkes devant les juridictions amkricaines. La question de
savoir jusqu'ou elle peut proceder a cet exarncn cn l'espkceressorlit au
fond. La premiPreexception d'incompktencesoulev6cpar IcsEtats-Unis
ne saurait donc Etreaccueillie.
29. La deuxiPme exception d'incompktence des Etats-Unis visail la
prernikc dcs conclusions presentees par le Mexique dans son memoire
(voir paragraphe 13ci-dessus).LesElats-Unis faisaient valoir en I'occur-
rence que l'articl35 de la convention de Vienne crnYinstitu[,ait.aucunc
obligation ltmitant lcdroitdesEtats-Unis d'arreter un ressortissant ktran-sirniiarlythe "detaining, trying, convicting and scnlencing" of Mexican
nationals could not constitute breaches of Article 36, which merelylays
down obligations of notification, The United States deduced from this
that the matters raised inMcxico'sfirst submission are outside the juris-
diction of the Court under the Vienna Convention and the Optional Pro-
tocol, and it maintains this objection in response to the revised submis-
sion, presented by Mexico at the hearings, whereby it asks the Court to
adjudgeand declare:
"That the United States of America, in arresting, detaining, try-
ing, convicting, and sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death
row described in Mexico'sMemorial, violated its international legal
obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exerciseof its right
to diplomatic protection of its nationals,by failingto inform, with-
out dclay, the 52Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right lo
consular notification and access under Article 36 (I) (b) of the
ViennaConvention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Mexico
of its right to provide consular protection and ~hc52 nationals'
right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide under
Article 36 (1) (u) and (c) of the Convention."
30. This issueisa question of interpretation of the obligationsimposed
by the Vienna Convention. It is true lhat the only obligation of the
receivingState toward a foreign national that is specificallyenunciatedby
Article 36, paragraph 1(b), of heVienna Convention is to inform such
foreign national of his rights, when he is "arrcsted or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner";
the text does not restrain the receiving Slate from "arresting, detaining,
trying, convicting, and sentencing" the foreign national, or limit its
power to do so. I-lowever,as regards the detention, trial, conviction and
sentence of its nationals, Mexico argues that depriving a foreign national
facingcriminal proceedings ofconsular notification and assistancerenders
those proceedings fundamentally unfair.Mexico explains in this respect
that :
"Consular notification constitutes a basic cornponcnt of due pro-
cess byensuring both the procedural equality of a foreign national
in the criminal process and the enforcement of other fundamental
due process guarantees to which that national is entitled", AVENA ET AUTRES (ARKE'I') 31
1 gem; et que les mesures consistant a ctdeten[ir],juge[r], dkla[rcr] cou-
pables et condamn[erJndesressortissantsmexicainsne pouvaiencdavantage
constituer desviolations de I'article36, lequel enonce seulement des obli-
gations en matiere de notification. Les Etats-Unis en dkduisaient que les
questions souleveesdans la premikreconclusion du Mexique Cchappaient
Bla compktenceconfkrkea la Cour par la convention de Vienneet par le
protocole de signature facultative. Les Etats-Unis continuent d'opposer
celte cxccplion a la conclusion modifike que le Mexique a prCsentCeB
I l'audience, aux termes de laquelle celui-ci prie la Cour de dire ecjuger
que :
I
({enarrelant, detenant, jugeant, dkclarant coupables et condamnant
lescinquante-deux ressortissants mexicains se trauvant dans le cou-
loir de la mort dont lescas sont dCcritsdans lememoire du Mexique,
Ics Etats-Unis d3Amcriquc: ont viol6 leurs obligations juridiques
internationales envers le Mexique agissant en son nom propre et
dans l'exercicedu droit qu'a cet Etat d'assurer la protection diplo-
matique de sesressortissants par le fait qu'ilsn'ont pas infomC, sans
retard, Ies cinquante-deux ressortissanls mexicains aprh leur arres-
tation du droit a la notification ct riI'accaux autoritb consulaires
qui etait le leur en vertu de I'alib)adu paragraphe 1de l'article36
de la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires, qu'ilson1
privCle Mexique de son droit d'accorder sa protection consulaire et
prive les cinquante-deux ressortissants mexicains de leur droit de
Enkficier de la protection que le Mexique leur aurait accordee
conformement aux alinkasa)et c) du paragraphe I de I'article36 de
la convention D.
39. 11s'agitla d'unequestion d'interprktation des obligations imposkes
par la convention de Vienne. Certes, aux termes de l'alinkabJ du para-
graphe I de I'articl36 de cette convention, la seule obligation explicite
de 13Etatde rksidence a l'egard d'un ressorlissanl Ctranger consiste ii
informer cedernier de ses droits lorsqu'il estarrEte,incarceri.ou mis en
Ctat de dktention prkventive ou toute autre forme de detention)); tcllc
qu'elle est libellke, cette disposition n'empkche pas 1'Etat de residence
d'<(rr?t[er],dCten[ir],juge[r],declar[er]coupabl[eetcondamn[er] D le res-
sortissant Ctranger, et ne limite pas davantage sa capaciti: de le faire.
S'agissantde la dktention, dujugernent, de la dklaration de culpabilitket
de la condamnation de ses ressortissants, le Mexique soutient cependant
que le fait de priver un Ctranger,lorsqu'une prockdure penale estengagk
son encontre, de la notification et de l'assistanceconsulaires rend cette
prokdure fondamentalement inkquitable. Le Mexique explique i cet
Cgardque
<t[ljanotificationconsulairc cst un klkrnentessentiel des droits de la
dkfense ence qu'elledonne aux ressortissants Ctrangersl'kgalitedans
une prockdure penale et qu'elleperrnet le respect des autres garanties
judiciaires essentiellesauxquelles ils ont dro)),and that "Itis therefore:an essenlial requirement for fair criminal pro-
ceedings against fbreign nalionals." In Mexico's contention, "consular
notification has been widely recognized as a fundamental due process
right, and indeed, a hutwanright". On this basis itargues that the rights
of the detained Mexicannationals have been violated by the authorities
of thc Unitcd Slales, and that those nationals have been "subjectedto
criminal proceedingswithout the fairnessand dignity to whicheach per-
son iscntillcd". Conscquenlty,in the contention of Mexico, "the integrity
of these proceedingshas been hopelessly undermined, their outcomes
rendered irrevocably unjust".For Mexico to contend, on this basis,that
not mcrcly the faiiurc to noliry, but the arrest, detention, trial and con-
viction ofitsnationals were unlawfulis to argue in favour of a particular
it~terpretationof the ViennaConvention. Such an interpretation may or
may not be confirmed on the merits,but is not excluded from the juris-
diction conferred on the Court by the Optional Protocol lo thc Vicnna
Convention. The second objection of the United Slales Lo jurisdiction
cannot therefore be upheld.
71. The third objection by the United Statcs lo the jurisdiction ofthe
Court refersto the first of the submissionsin the MexicanMemorialcon-
cerning remedies.By that submission,whichwas confirmedin substance
in the final submissions. Mexico claimed that
"Mexicois cntitled to restiluiiin integrum,and the United States
lhercfore isunder an obligation lo restore the sralus quo ante, that
is, rc-establishthc situation that existedat thetime of the detention
and prior to the interrogation of, proceedings against, and convic-
tions and sentences of, Mexico's nationals in violationof the United
States'international legal obligations . . ."
On that basis, Mexicowent on in its first submissionto invite the Court
to declarethatIheUnitcd States was bound to vacatethe convictionsand
sentences of the Mexicannationals concerned, to excludefrom any sub-
sequent proceedingsany statementsand confessionsobtained rrom them,
to prevent the application of any procedural penalty for failureto raise a
timely defenceon the basis ofthe Convention, and to prevent the appli-
cation of any municipal law rule preventing courts in the United States
from providing a rcmedy for the violation of Article 36 rights.
32. The United States objects that so to require specificacts by the
United States in its municipal criminal justice systems would intrude
deeply into the independence of its courts; and that for the Court to AVENA ET AUTRES (ARR~~T) 32
et qu'il ccs'agitdonc d'une condition essentiellepour I'CquitCdes prod-
dures penales cngageescontre les ressortissants etrangers)). Selle Me-
xiquc,cr[l]anotification consulaireest largementreconnuc cornmeun droit
fondamental dc Fadkfense, et m2me comme un droit de lYhornme>)L .C
Mexique s'appuic:sur cet argument pour soutenir que les autoritb des
Etats-Unis ont viol6 les droits des ressortissants mexicains.qui Ctaient
dikenus et que ces derniers onCtt,({dansIccadre de prockdures penales,
privksde l'equiteet de la dignite auxquelles toutc pcrsonne a droitu. Pour
leMexique, il s'ensuitque ((l'integritedcesprockdures cst irrcrnidiable-
ment compromise cl lcur issue irrkvocablement injusten. En affirmant
pour ces motifs que non seulement le dkfaut denotification est illicite,
mais quc I'arrcstation, la detention, le jugement et la condamnalionde
ses ressortissants le son1 toul autant, le Mexique dkfend une certaine
interprktation de laconvention de Vienne.Celtc inlerpretation seraconfir-
rni eu in6rmce lors de l'examen au fond, mais elle ne se situe pas hors
des lirnitesde la compefenccconferee a la Cour par le protocole de signrt-
ture facultative i la convention de Yicnnc. La deuxihme exception
d'incompktencesoulevkepar lesEtats-Unit;ne saurail donc &treaccueillie.
*
31. La troisihe exception d'inctlmpClenccdes Etats-Unis a trait a la
prcmicre conclusion knoncke dans le memoire du Mcxiquc en ce qlri
concerne lesremkdcs.Aux termes de cette conclusion, qui a ktereaffirmkc
en substance dans lesconclusions finalesrnexicaines,le Mexiquea affirmi.
qu'ilavait droit
ccrilaresrirurioin intregrurnles Etats-Unis d'Amkrique devant en
consequence restaurer le,xtraquo mnte, c'cst-a-dire rktablir la situa-
tionquiexistait au moment oi ontett:dClcnuset avantque ne soient
interrogb, poursuivisdCclarCscoupables el condamnes lesressortis-
sants mexicains en violation des obligations juridiques intcrnatio-
nales des Etals-Unis d'AmCrique ..)).
En se fondant sur cet argument, le Mexiquea poursuivi, dans sa premiire
conclusion, en priant la Cour de dire quc Ics Elats-Unis kaient tenus
d'annuler les verdicts de culpabilitk sendus et les peines prononckesi
I'cncontre des ressortissants mexicains conccrnCs,d'exclurede toute pro-
cCdure penale toute dCclaration et tous aveux obtenus de leur part,
d'empkher que ne soit pinalise sur le plan procedural un ressortissant
mexicain qui n'aurait pas, cn temps voulu, excipe de la convention de
Viennc dans le cadre de sa dkfense,et d'ernpecherque ne soit appliquke
toute doctrine juridique ou jurisprudence interne privant une juridiction
des Etats-Unis de la possibilitk de porter remede i une violation dcs
droits dtcoulant de l'article 35.
32. Les Etats-Unis retorquent qu'exigerde teur part des mcsures pri-
cisesdans lecadre dc teurssystimes internes dejustice penale constituerail
unc atteinte gravei l'indkpendance de lcursjuridictions; et qu'endecla-
24declare that the United States is undera specificobligation to vacate con-
victions and sentences would be beyond its jurisdiction. The Court, the
United States claims, has no jurisdiction to review approprialeness of
sentences in criminal cases,and even lessto determine guiltor innocence,
matters which only a court of criminal appeal could go into.
33. For its part, Mexicopoints out that the United States accepts that
the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Vienna Convention and to
determine the appropriate form of reparation under international law. In
Mexico'sview,these two considerations are sufficient to deltat the third
objection to jurisdiction of the United Statcs.
34. For the same reason as in respect of the second jurisdiclional
objection, the Court is unable to uphold the contention of the United
States that, even if thc Court were to find that breaches of the Vienna
Convention have been committed by the United States of the kind
alleged by Mexico, itwould still be without jurisdiction to orderresridutitl
in integrum as requested by Mexico. The Court would recall in this
regard, as it did in theLuGrundcase, that, wherejurisdiction cxists over
a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is
required by the Court in order to consider the remedies a party has
requested for the breach of thc obligation (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 485,
para. 48).Whether or how far the Court may order the remedy requested
by Mexico are matters to be determincd as part of the merits of the dis-
pute. The third objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot
therefore be upheld.
35. Thc Fourthand last jurisdictional objection of the United States is
that "the Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether or not consular
notification is a 'human right', or to declare fundamental requirements of
substantive or procedural due process". Asnoted abovc, itis on the basis
of Mexico's contention that the right to consular notification has been
widely recognized as a fundamental due process right, and indeed a
human right, that it argues that the rights of the detained Mexican
nationals have been violated by the authorities of the United States, and
that they have been "subjected to criminal proceedingswithout the fair-
ness and dignity to which each person is entitled". The Court observes
that Mexico has presented this argument as being a matter of inter-
pretation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), and therefore belonging to
the merits. The Court considers that this is indeed a question of inter-
pretation OFthe Vienna Convention, Torwhich it has jurisdiction ; the
fourth objection of the United States to jurisdiction cannot therefore be
upheld. AVENA ET AUTRES (AKKET) 33
rant que les Etats-Unis ant l'abligation particulikre en l'espke d'annuler
lesverdictsde culpabilitket lespeines,la Cour dkpasserait leslimitesde sa
competence. Selon les Etats-Unis, la Cour n'est pas cornpktente pour
apprkcier la pertinenced'une condamnation penale, et encoremoins pour
juger de la culpabilite ou de l'innocenced'un accud, questions que seulc
une juridictiond7appelen matiere pinale pourrait examiner.
33. Le Mexique, pour sapart, expose que lesEtats-Unis reconnaissent
la compktence de la Cour pour interprkter la convention de Vienne et
pour dire quelle est lareparation requise en droit international. Selon 1e
Mexique, ces deux Climents suffisent pour rejeter latroisierne exception
d'incompetence desEtats-Unis.
34. Pour le motif dkji exposi lors de I'examende la deuxikmeexcep-
tion d'incornpetence,la Cour ne saurait retenir l'argument des Etats-Unis
selon lequel,mEmesi la Cour devait conclure que ces derniers ontcom-
mis les violations de la convention de Vienne allkguCespar le Mexique,
elle n'en serait pas moins incompktente pour ordonner la restitntioin
integrurndemand& par celui-ci.A cetegard, la Cour rappellera, comme
ellel'afait dans I'affaireLaGrand,que, s'ilest Ctabliqu'ellea compktence
pour connaitre d'un diffkrend portant sur une question dCterminCe,elle
n'a pas besoin d'une base de compktence distincte pour examiner les
remkdes demand& par une partie pour la violation en cause (C.I.J.
Recueil 2001, p. 485, par. 481. La question de savoir si la Cour peut
ordonner le remede demandkpar le Mexique, et dans quelles limites, res-
sortit au fond du diffirend. La troisikme exception d'incompetence sou-
lev& par IesEtats-Unis ne saurait donc Etre accueillie.
*
35. Aux termes de la quatrikrne et derniere exception d'incompktence
des Etats-Unis, cclaCour n'a pas compktence pour dire si la notification
consulaire constitue ou non un {(droit de I'hommejr, ni quellcs son1les
exigencesfondamentales des droits de la defense sur le plan du fond ou
de la proddure>). Comme il a Ctkindiqut plus haul, c'est precisement
parce que le droit h la notification consulaire serait largement reconnu
cornmeun droit fondamental dc ladefense, et mEmecomme un droit de
l'homme, que le Mexique estime que les autorites des Etats-Unis ont
violk les droits des ressostissants mexicains dktenus et que ces derniers
ont CtC,{(danslecadre de procedures pknales, privksde l'kquiteet de la
digniti auxquelles toute personne a droit)). La Cour fait observer que le
Mexique a prksentk cet argument comme une question qui relkve:de
l'interpretatjon del'alinia b)du paragraphe 1de lyarticle36 et qui, par
conskquent, ressortit au fond. La Cour considere qu'il s'agit 18effective-
ment d'une question relevant de l'interpretation de la convention de
Vienne, qu'ellea compktencepour traiter; dkslors la quatrikme exception
d'incompktencesoulevCepar les Etats-Unis ne saurait &re accueillie.
* * 36. In its Countcr-Memorial, the United States has advanced a number
of arguments presented as objections to the admissibility of Mexico's
claims. 1t argues that
"Before proceeding, the Court should weigh whether characteris-
tics of the case before it today, or special circumstances related to
particular claims, render either the entire case, or particular claims,
inappropriate for furtherconsideration and decision by the Court."
37. The first abjection under this head is that "Mexico's submissions
should be found inadmissible because they seekto have this CourtFunc-
tion as a court of criminal-appealv; there is, in the view of the United
States, "no other apt characterization of Mexico's two submissions in
respect of remedies". The Court notes that this contention is addressed
solelyto the question of remedies.The United States does not contend on
this ground that the Court should declinejurisdiction to enquire into thc
question of breaches of the VicnnaConvention at all, but simply that, if
such breaches are shown, the Court should do no more than decide that
thc United States must provide "sevicw and reconsideration" along the
linesindicated in the Judgment in.the LaGmndcase (I.C. J. Reports 2001,
pp. 513-514,para. 125).The Court notes that this is amatter of merits.
The first objectionof the United States to admissibility cannot therefore
be upheld.
38. The Court now turns to the objection of the Unitcd States
based on the rule of exhaustion of local remedies. The Uniled Slatcs
contends that the Court "should find inadmissible Mexico's claim lo
exercise its right of diplomatic protcction on behaIf of any Mexican
national who has failed to meet the customary legal requirement of
exhaustion of municipal remedies". It asserts that in a number of the
cases the subject of Mexico's claims, the detained Mexican national,
even with the benefit of the provision of Mexican consular assistance,
failed to raise the alleged non-compliance with Article 35,paragraph 1,
of the Vienna Convention at the trial. Furthermore, it contends that
all of the claims relating tocascs referred to in the Mexican Memorial
are inadmissible bccause local remedies remain available in every case.
It has drawn attention to the fact that litigation is pending bcforc
courts in the United States in a largenumber of the cases the subject
of Mexico's claims and that, m those cases whcrc judicial remedies
have been exhausted, the defendants have not had recourse to the
clemency process available to them; from this it concludes that none 36. Dans leur conlre-memoire, les Etats-Unis ont prksente un certain
nombre d'arguments en tan1 qu'exceptionslila recevabiliti:des demandes
du Mcxique. 11ssoutiennent que,
c<[a]vantde poursuivre, la Cour doit se demander si les caractiris-
tiques de la prksente aff.direou lescirconstances prtrticuli6resentou-
rant cerlaines demandes ne rendent pas inapproprit I'cxamen de
cette affaire dans sa totalite ou dc ccrtaines de ces demandes, et s'il
convient de slaluer sur ellen.
37. Selon la premiere dc ccs cxceptions, <(lesconclusions du Mexjque
doivent Ctre jugkes irrecevables parce qu'elles visentrifaire de la Cour
unejuridiction d'appclen matiere pknalen ;deI'avisdes Etats-Unis, cr[o]n
ne saurait interprkter autremcnt lesdeux conclusions du Mexiqueconcer-
nant les remcdcs>).La Cour constatc que les Etacs-Unisvisentici unique-
ment la question des remkdes. 11sne prttendent pas, au titre de cette
exception, que la Cour dcvrait decliner d'exerccrsa compitence pour exa-
rnincr les violations all6guces de la convention dc Vienne, rnais consi-
derenl simplement que, si parcilles violations ktaicnt Ctablies, la Cour
devrait seborncr A dkciderque lesEtats-Unis doivent organiser le(trkexa-
men et la revision)}des jugements intcrvcnus, comrne elle I'a hit dans
I'arrEt rendu en I'amaire LuGrand (C.I.J. RecueiI 2001, p. 5I3-514,
par. 125).La Cour constate qu'ils'agitla d'une question de fond. Lapre-
miere exccption d'irsecevabilitk soulevke par les Etals-Unis ne saurait
donc Ctreaccueillie,
38. La Cour en vient maintenant a l'exception dcs Etats-Unis fondee
sur la rigle de I'Cpuisernenldes voies de recours inlernes. Les E'tats-Unis
soutiennent que la Cour ctdoitjuger irrecevablela prktention du Mexique
d'exercerson droil dc protectioti diplomatique en faveur de tout ressor-
tissant rnexicainqui n'a pas Cpuiseles voiesde recours internes ainsi que
I'exigele droil coutumier)>.11s affirment que, dans plusieurs des cas qui
font I'objetdes demandes du Mcxique, le ressortissant mcxicain detenu,
mEme Inrsqu'ila bCnCficidee I'assistanceconsulairedu Mexique, n'a pas
excipk du nianquement alICgucau paragraphe 1 dc {'article 36 de la
convention de Vienne lors de son procCs.Les Etats-Unis soutiennent en
outre que les demandes relatives aux cas visCsdans le rnkmojre du Mc-
xiquesont toutes irrccevablesparce que, dans chaque affaire,des voiesde
recours internes restent disponibles. 11sattirenl I'attention sur le queiz
l'instance demcure pendante devant lesjuridictions americaines dans un
grand nombre des casqui motivent lesdemandes rnexicaincstt que, dans
les cas oh les recours judiciaires ont Cte CpuisQ,les accusis n'ont pas
engag6 la proccdure de recours en grace qui leur est ouverte; d'ou ilsof the cases "is in an appropriate posture for rcviewby an international
tribunal".
39. Mexico respondsthat the rule of exhaustion of local remedies can-
not preclude the admissibilityof its claims. It first states that a majority
of the Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 16above have sought
judicial remediesin the United States based on the Vienna Convention
and that their claims havebeen barred, notably on the basis of thepro-
ceduraldefault doctrine. In this regard, itquotesthe Court's statementin
the LaCrandcase that
"the United States may not. . rely before this Court on this fact in
order to preclude the admissibilityof Germany's [claim] . .., as it
was the United States itselfwhich had failed to carry out its obliga-
tion underthe Convention to inform the LrtGrand brothers" (I. C.J.
Reports 2201, p. 488, pard. 60).
Further, in respcct of the other Mexican nationals, Mexico asserts that
"the courts of the United States have never granted a judicial
remedy to any foreign national for a violation of Article 36. The
United States courts hold either that Article 36 does not create an
individual right,or that a foreign national who has been denied his
Article 36 rights but given hisconstitutional and statutory rights,
cannot establish prejudiceand therefore cannot get relief."
It concludes that the available judicial remedies are thus ineffective.As
for clemency procedures, Mexicocontends that they cannot count for
purposes of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies,becausethey are not
a judicial remedy.
40. In its final submissions Mexicoasks the Court to adjudge and
declare that the United States,in failingto comply with Article 36, para-
graph 1, of thc Vienna Convention, has "violaled its international lcgal
obligations to Mexico,in its own Tight and in the exerciseof its right of
diplomatic protection ofits nationals".
The Court would first observethat the individual rights of Mexican
nationals under paragrapIh(b) of Article 36or the ViennaConvention
are rights which are to be asserted, at any rate in the first place, within
the domestic legal systemof the United States. Only whenthat processis
completed and local remediesare exhausted would Mexico be entitledto
espouse the individual claimsof its nationals through the procedure of
diplomatic protection.
In thepresent case Mexico doesnot, howcver,claimto bcacting solely
on that basis. It also asserts its own claims, basingthem on the injury
which it contends that ir has its+$ suffered, directly and ~hro~igh irsconcluent qu'aucune des affaires crnese trouv[ej en l'etat voulu pour Etre
rkexaminee par une juridiction internationale )>.
39. Le Mexique retorque que la reglc de I'Cpuisementdes voies de re-
cours internes ne saurait faire obstacle;ila recevabilite de ses demandes.
I1indique, en premier lieu, que la majoriti: des ressortissants mexicains
visksau paragraphe 16ci-dessus ont form6 des recours judiciaires fondts
sur la convcnlion de Vienne aux Etats-Unis et ont kkt dCboutks,notam-
ment en raison de la doctrine de la carence prockduralc. A cet egard,
il invoque le prononck de la Cour en l'affaire LnGrand, selon lequel
(les Etats-Unis ne [pouvaient] seprkvaloir ...devant la Cour dc cette
circonstance pour fairc obstacle h la recevabilitk [de la demande
allemande] ...d2s lors qu'ils avaient eux-mhes failli a l'exkcution
de leur obligation, en vertu de la convention, d'informer les frires
LaGrand~ (C.1.J. Recueil2001, p. 488, par. 60).
En outre, s'agissant des autres ressortissants mexicains, le Mexique in-
dique ce qui suit:
ales juridictions des Etats-Unis n'ont jarnais fait droit au moindrc
recours judiciaire intenti. par un ressortissant Clranger pour une vio-
lation de l'article36.Cesjuridictions dkclarent soit que I'article3ne
crke pas dc droit individuel, soit qu'un ressortissant Ctranger qui a
Cti:privkdes droits qu'il tenait de I'article36,mais qua en revanche
btnCfici6de ceuxprtvus par la Constitution et leslois americaincs, ne
peut Ctablir l'existenced'un prijudice et donc obtenir ri.paralian.)>
Le Mexique conclut que les recours judiciaires disponibles sont dis lors
incfficaces. Quant itla prockdure de recours en grice, ellc ne saurait,
selon le Mexique, entrer en ligne de compte aux finsde la rigle de I'epui-
sement des voies de recours internes, puisqu'il ne s'agit pas d'un recours
judiciaire.
40. Le Mexique, dans ses conclusioils finales, grie la Cour de dire et
jugr que les Etats-Unis, en ne se conformant pas au paragraghe 1 de
l'article 36 de la convention de Yienne, ant crviolCleurs obligations juri-
diques internationales envers le Mexique agissant en son nom propre et
dans I'exercicedu droit qu'acet Etat d'assurer la protection diplomatique
de ses ressortissants>).
La Cour fera d'abord observer que les droits individuels que les res-
sortissants mexicains tirent de 1'alinCabJ du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36
de la convenlion de Vienne sont des droits don1 la rkalisation doit, en
tout cas en premier lieu, etre recherchk ddan le cadre du systkmejuri-
dique intemc des Etats-Unis. Ce n'est qu'une fois ce processus mentB
son terme et les voies de recours internes Cpuisies que le Mexique pour-
rait faire siennes des demandes individuelles de ses ressortissanls par le
mkanisme de la protection diplomatique.
En I'espkcele Mcxique ne prktend cepcndant pas agir seulementpar ce
mkcanismc. I1prksente en outre des demandes qui lui sont propres en se
fondant sur Itprkjudice qu'il declare avoirsubihi-meme, directemenl etnulionul.~,as a result of the violation by the United States of the obliga-
tions incumbent upon il under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a), (B) and (uj.
The Court would recallthat, in the LaCrurzdcase, it recognizedthat
"Articlc 36, paragraph 1 [of the Vienna Convention], creaks indi-
vidual rights [forthe national concerned], which . . may be invoked
in this Court by the national State or the detained person" (I.C.J.
Reports2001, p. 494, para. 77).
It would further observe that violations of ~hc rights of the individual
under Article 36 may entail a violation of the rights of the sending State,
and that violations of the rights of the latter may cntail a violatioof'the
rights ofthe individual. In these specialcircumslances of interdependence
of the rights of the State:and of individuai rights, Mexico may, in sub-
mitling a claim in its own name, requcst the Court to rule on the viola-
tion of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and through
the violation of individual rights conferred on Mcxican nationals undcr
Article 36,paragraph 1(b). Thc duty to exhausl local remedies does not
apply to such a request. Further, for reasons just explained, the Court
does not find it necessaryto deal with Mexico's claims of violationunder
a distinc~ heading af diplomatic protection. Withoul needing to pro-
nounce at this juncture on the issues raised by the procedural default
rule, as explained by Mexico in paragraph 39 above, the Court accord-
inglyfinds that the second objection by lhc United States lo adnlissibility
cannot be upheld.
41. The Court now turns to the question of lhc alleged dual national-
ity of certain of the Mexican nationals the subjcct of Mexico's claims.
This question is raised by the United States by way of an objection lo the
admissibility of those claims: the United States contends that in its
Memorial Mexico had failed 10establish that it may cxercisediplomatic
protection based on breaches of Mexico's rightsundcr the Vienna Con-
vention with respect to those of its nationals who are also nationals of the
United States. The United States regards it as an acccpted principle that,
when a person arrested or detained in the receivingState is a national of
that State,then even if he is alsoa national of another State party to the
Vienna Convention, Article 36 has no application, and the authorities
or the receiving Slate are not required to procced as laid down in that
Article; and Mexico has indicated that, Torthe purposes of the present
case it docs not contest that dual nationals have no right to be advised
of rheir rights undcr Article 36.
42. It has howeverto be recalledthat Mexico, in addition to seekingto
exercise diplomatic protection of its nationals, is making a claim in its AVENA ET AUTRES (ARK&T) 36
u Iruvers se.~rtr.ssortissadusfait de la violation par les Etats-Unjs des
obligations qui leur incornbenta son igard en vertu des alinkas a), h) et
cJ du paragraphe 1de I'articlc36.
La Cour rappellera que, dans l'affaire LuGrunrl,elle a reconnu que
ctleparagraphc 1 de l'article 36 crke [pour le ressorlissant concernk]
des droits individuels qui ... peuvent @treinvoquks devant la Cour
par I'Etat dont la personne dktenue a la nationalitk})(C.I.J. Recueil
2001, p. 494, par. 77).
Elle observ~raen outre queloute violation dcsdroits que l'individu tient
de l'article36 risque d'entrainer une violation des droits de 1'Etatd'envoi
et que toute violation des droits de cc dernier risque de conduiri une
violation des droitsde l'individu. Dans ces circonstances loutes particu-
liires d'interdkpendance des droits de 1'Etatetdcs droits individucls, le
Mexique peut, en sournettant une demande en son non7propre, inviter la
Cour istatuer sur la violation des droits dont il soutient avoir elk victime
Bla fois dircctement eti travcrs la violation des droits individuets confk-
rks rises ressortissants par I'alinea b) du paragraphe 1 de l'arlicl36.
L'obligation d'tpuiser les voies de recours interncs ne s'appliquepas a
une telle dernandc. Au demeurant, pour les motifs qui viennent d'Ctre
exposks, la Cour n'esdme pas necessaire de traiter des demandes mexi-
I cainesconcernant lesditesviolations sous \'angledistinct de la protection
diplomatiquc. Sans qu'ily aitlieu a ce stadc d'aborder lesquestions sou-
levies par la rigle de la carence proc6durale, tdles qu'exposkes par le
Mexique au paragraphe 39 ci-dessus, la Cour conclut que la deuxieme
exceptiondYirrecevabili~sCoulevkepar IcsEtats-Unis ne saurait donc Etre
accueillie.
41. La Caur en vient rnainlcnant a la question de la double nationalite
qu'auraient cerrains des ressortissants mexicains raisant l'objet des de-
mandes du Mexique. Les Etats-Unis soulkventcette question en opposant
une exception a la recevabilitkdesdites den~andes:ils soutiennent que le
Mexique n'avait pas Ctabliclansson memoircqu'ilpouvait, au titre de la
violation desdroits qu'il tire de la convention de Viennc, exercerla pro-
tcction diplomatique en faveur de ccux de ses ressortissants qui sont tga-
lemcnt ressortissants des Etats-Unis. Les Etats-Unis tiennent pour un
principe ginkralement admis que, lorsqu'une personnc arrCtk ou placCe
en dkl~ntion dans 1'Elatde risidencc est ressortissanlc de cet Etat, I'ar-
ticle 36n'estpas applicable, meme si cette personne est kgalemcntressor-
tissante d'un autre Etat partik la convention de Vicnne, et les autoritis
de 1'Etalde rksidencenc sont pas teiiucs de procider comme prCvudans
cct article; eIc Mexique a indiqui que, aux fins de la prksenle affajre,
il ne conteste pas que les ressortissants ayant la double nationalit6 ne
peuvent prktcndre a un droil d'ttre inforrnksen vertu de l'article 36.
42. 11hut toutefois rappeler que le Mexique, outre qu'il cherche i
exercerla protection diplomatique ;iI'Cgardde scs rcssortissants. prkscnteown right on the basis of the alleged breaches by the United States of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Seen from this standpoint, the
qucstion of dual nationality is not one of admissibility, but of merits. A
claim maybe made by Mexicoof breach of Article 36of the Vienna Con-
vention in relation to any of its nationals, and the United States is therc-
upon free to show that, because the person concerned was also a United
Statesnational, Article 36 had no application to that person,so that no
breach of treaty obligations could have occurred. Furthermore, as regards
the claim to exercisediplomatic protection, the question whether Mexico
is entitled to protecta person having dual Mexican and United States
nationality is subordinatedto the question whcther,in relation to such a
person, the United States was under any obligation interns of Article 36
of the Vienna Convention. It is thus in the courseof its examination of
the merits that the Court will have lo consider whcther the individuals
concerned, or some of them, were dual nationals in law. Without preju-
dice to the outcome of such examination, the third objection of the
UnitedStates to admissibility cannot therefore be upheld.
43. The Court now turns to the fourth objection advanced by the
United Slates to the admissibility of Mexico'sclaims: the contention that
"The Court should not permit Mexico to pursue a claim against
theUnited States with respect to any individual case where Mexico
had actual knowledge of a breach of the Vienna Convention] but
failedto bring such breach to the attention of the United States or
did so only after considerable delay."
In the Counter-Memorial, the United States advances two considerations
in support of this contention: that if the cases had been mentioned
promptly, corrective action might have been possible; and that by
inaction Mexico created an impression that it considered that the
United States was meeting its obligations under the Convention, as
Mexico understood them. At the hearings, the United States suggested
that Mexico had in effectwaivedits right to claimin respect of the alleged
breaches of the Convention, and to seek reparation.
44. As the Court observed in the case of Certai Phosphate land.^in
Nauru(Nouru v. Austrulia), "delay on the part of aclaimant Statemay
render an application inadmissible", but "international law does not lay
down any specifictime-limitin that regard" (1.C.J. Reports1992,pp. 253-
254, para. 32). In that casethe Court recognized that delay might preju-
dice the respondent State "with regard to both theestablishment of the
facts and the determination of the content of the applicable Iaw" (ihid,
p. 255,para. 36),but it has not been suggestedthat there isany such risk
of prejudice in the present case. Sfar as inadmissibility mightbe based
on an impIied waiver of rights, the Court considers that only a much une demande en son nom propre a raison des violations a1lCgui.e~ de
I'article 36 de la convention de Vienne cornmises par Ics Etats-Unis. De
ce point de vue, la question de la double nationaliti: n'est pas une ques-
lion de recevabilitk,mais de fond.Le Mexiquepeut fair valoir une viola-
I lion de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne a l'kgard de n'importe
lequel de ses ressortissants, aprk quoi il est loisible aux Etats-Unis de
dkmontrer que, I'inlbessk etant egalement ressortissant des Etats-Unis,
I'article6 ne s'appliquait pas son endroit, de sorte qu'aucune obliga-
tion conventionnelle ne pouvait &treviolCe. Qui plus est, pour cc qui
concernela prktention d'exercerla protection diplomatique,la question de
savoir si le Mcxique a le droit de protiger une personnc ayant la double
nationalit6 - mexicaine et amkricainc - est subordonnke a celle de
savoir si les Etats-Unis Ctaienttenus d'une obligation ri1'Cgard de cette
personne aux termes de I'article 36 de la convention de Vienne. C'est
donc lors de I'examende l'affaire au fond que la Cour devra apprecier si
lesintkresds, ou du moins certains d'entre eux,avaient en droit la double
nationalitk. Sans prejudice de I'issuedecet examen, la troisikme excep-
I tiond'irrecevabilitedes Etats-Unis ne saurait donc Ctreaccueillie.
*
43. La Cour passera maintenant BI'examende la quatrikrne exccption
d'irrecevabililt!opposke par les Etats-Unis aux demandes du Mexique, h
savoir que:
t{[l]aCour ne doitpas permettre au Mexique de faire valoir une prk-
lcntion a l'encontredes Etats-Unis pour les cas oh le Mexique avait
effectjvernent connaissancc d'une violation dc la [convention dc
Yienne] mais n'a pas porti: cettc violation ;i l'attention des Etats-
Unis ou I'a fait avec un retard considkrable~.
Dans le contre-mkmoire, les Etnts-Unis font valoir deux considCrationsa
l'appuide cet argument: la premiere estque, sices casnvaient Cti:signalks
promptement, il aurait kte possible d'agirpour corriger la situation; la
seconde est que le Mexique, par son inaction, aurait donne I'irnpression
qu'il considerait que Ics Etats-Unis rcrnplissaient les csbtigations leur
incombant en verlu de la convention, telles que le Mexique les interprk-
tait. Lorsdes audiences, les Etats-Unis ont avancCque le Mexique avait,
de fait, renonck a se prkvaloir de son droit ri contester les violations alle-
gueesde la convention et sidemander rkparation.
44. Comme la Cour I'afait observer dans I'affairede Certaines terres
ciphospkares d Nauru (Nauru e. Australie), si ctle retard d'un Etat
demandeur peut rendre une requkte irrccevable~>c,rledroit international
n'imposepas h cet kgard une limicede temps dkterminke >>(C.I.J. Recueil
1992, p. 253-254,par. 32). Dans cette affaire, la Cour a reconnu qu'un
i retard pouvait porter prkjudice a 1'Etat dkicndeur {ten ce qui concerne
lant l'etablissement des faits que la dktermination du contenu du droit
applicable>>(ibid.,p. 255,par. 36),mais un tel risque de prejudicen'a pas
Ctkevoque dans Pa prksente espece. Pour autant qu'une irrecevabilitk
puisse Stre fondCesur la renonciation tacite rdes droits, la Cour consi-more prolonged and consistent inaclion on the par1 of Mexico than any
that the United Slatcs has alleged might be interpreted as implying such
a waiver. Furthermore, Mexico indicated a number of ways in which it
brought to the altcntion of the United States the breaches which itper-
ceived of the Vienna Convenlion. The fourth objection of the United
States to admissibility cannot thereforebe upheld.
45. The Court has now to examine the objection of the United States
that the claim of Mcxico is inadmissible inthat Mexico should not bc
allowed to invoke against the United States standards that Mexico does
not follow in its own practice. The United States contends that, in
accordance wilh basic principles of administration of justice and the
equality of States, both litigants are to be hcld accountable to the same
rules of international law. The objection in this regarwas presented in
terms of the interpretation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, in the
sense that, according to the Unikcd States, a treaty may not be inter-
preted so as to impose a significantlygreater burden on any one party
than the other (DiversionoJ Water from lizeMeuse, Judgment, 1937,
P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 70, p. 20).
46. The Court would recall that thc United Statcs had already raiscd
an objection of a similar nature before it in the LaGrundcase; there, the
Court held that it need not decide "whether this argument of the United
States, if true, would resull in the inadmissibility of Germany's submis-
sions", sincethe United States had failed to prove that Germany's own
praciie did not conrorm to the standards it was demanding from the
United States (I. J. Reports 2001, p. 489, para. 63).
47. The Court would recall that is in any event essentialto have in
mind the nature of the Vienna Convention. It lays down certain stand-
ards to bc observed by all States parties, with a view lo the "unimpeded
conduct of consular relations", which,as the Court observed in 1979,is
important in present-day international law "in promoti~lgthe develop-
ment of lkicndlyrelations among nations, and ensuring protection and
assistance for aliens resident in the territories of other States" (Unired
Srutes Diplomutic und Consulur Slug in Tehran (Unilud Stures of
Amerku v. Iran}, Prtlvisional Measures, Order of 15 Dccember 1979,
I.C.J. Reports 1979, pp. 19-20,,para. 40). Even if it were shown, there-
fore, that Mexico'spractice as regards the application of Article36 was
not beyond reproach, this would not constitutc aground of objection to
the admissibility of Mexico's claim. The fifth objection of the United
States to admissibility cannot thereforebe upheld. dere que seulc une inaction bien plus longue et systkmatique quc celle
qu'ont alleguee les Etats-Unis en ce qui concerne le Mexique pourrait
6tre interprktke comme impliquan tune telle renonciation. D'ailleurs, le
Mexique a signale plusieurs voies qu'il avait utiliskes pour portcr ft
I'attention des Etats-Unis cequ'il tenstitpour des violations de la convcn-
tion de Vienne. La quatriime exception d'irrecevabilitksoulevee par les
Etats-Unis ne saurait donc ktre accueillie.
45.La Cour doit maintenant examiner l'exception des Etats-Unis
selon laquelle la demande mexicaine est irrecevable en ce sens qilc le
Mexique nedevrait pas etre autorid i invoquer conlre les Etats-Unis des
nomcs qu'il ne suitpas dans sa propre pratique. Selon 1esEtats-Unis, les
principes de la bonne administration dc la justice et l'egalite des Ems
exigent que les deux Parties soient tenues de respecter les mCrnesrkgles
de droit international. CC~ igard, l'exceptiona Ct6prtsentke commeayant
traita l'interprktation de I'arlicle 36 de la conventiode Vienne, en ce
sellsque, selon les Etats-Unis, un mite doit Ctreilzterprkti:dc rnaniire a
ne pas imposcr une charge plus irnpostanie B l'une desparties qu'h I'autre
(Priscs d'eau ri laMtuse, arrel, 1937, C,P.J.I. ,&ic AIB no70, p. 20).
I 46. La Cour rappellcra que les Etats-Unis avaient dkj8souleve devant
elle une exception de mtme nature en I'affairc LuGrarrd; dans cette
affaire, la Cour a conclu qu'ellen'avait pas besoin de dkcider crsil'argu-
ment en question dcs Etats-Unis, ;i supposer qu'il fCtexact, rendrait les
conclusionsde 1'Allemagneirrecevables)>,etant donnCque les Etats-Unis
n'ktaientpas parvenus Bprouvcr que la pratique de I'Allernagnes'kcartait
des normes don1 elle demandait I'application par les Etats-Unis (C.I.J.
Recuezl2001, p. 489, par. 63).
47. La Cour ajoutera qu'ilcsten tout Ctatde cause essentiel de garder
a l'espritla nature de la convention de Vienne. Celle-cienoncc certaines
normes que tous les Etats parties doivcnt observer aux findu rcderoule-
~nentsans entrave des relations consulaires>)qui, coinme la Cour I'a fait
obscrver en 1979,est important dans le droit international contemporain
{tence [sens]qu'il favorisele developperncnt des relatioris amicales cntre
Icsnations et assure protection et assista~~caux Ctrangersrksidanl sur le
tcrritoire d'autresats})(Personneldiplornutiyarc e! ronsulaire$ex Ems-
Unisu Tehgra (Elmts-Unis d'rlmkrique c.Iran), mesures conservatoires,
orcionnunc~ du 15 dicembre 1979, C.I.J. R~ecuei l979,p. 20, par.40).Par
consequent, m6me s'iletait dcmontre que la pratiquc du Mexique en ce
qui concerne l'applicalion de l'article 36 n'Ctaitpas exernpte clecritique,
lesEtats-Unis ne pourraient s'en prkvaloir comme exception Bla receva-
bilitk de la demande mexicaine. La cinquikme exception d'irrecevabilitk
dcs Etats-Unis ne sausait donc ktre accueillic. 48. Having established that it has jurisdiction to entertain Mexico's
claimsand that they are admissible,the Court willnow turn to the merits
of those claims.
44. In its final submissions Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and
declare that,
"the United States of America, in arresting, detaining, trying, con-
victing, and sentencing the 52 Mexican nationals on death row
described in Mexico'sMemorial,violated itsinternational legalobli-
gations toMexico,in its own right and in the exerciseof its right to
diplomatic protection of its nationals, by failingto inform, without
delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right to
consular notification and access under Article 36 (1) (h) of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,andbydepriving Mexico
of its right to provide consular protection and the 52 nationals'
right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide under
Article36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention".
50. The Court has already in its Judgment in the LaGrund case
describedArticle 36, paragraph 1, as "an interrelated regime designed to
facilitatehe implementationof the system ofconsularprotection" (I.C.J.
Reporis 2001, p. 492, para. 74). It is thus convenient to set out the
entirety of that paragraph.
"With a viewtoward facilitating theexerciseof consular functions
relatingto nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officersshall be free to communicatewith nationals of
the sendingState and to have accessto them. Nationals of the
sendingState shall have the same freedom withrespectto com-
munication with and accessto consular officersof the sending
State;
(h) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, withoutdelay, inform the consular post of the send-
ing Stateif,within its consular district, a nationoi that State:
is arrested or committed to prison or tocustody pendingtrial
or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested,inprison,
custodyor detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities
31 AVENA ET AUTRES (ARR~~T) 39
48. Ayant etabli qu'elle avait compktence pour connaitre des de-
mandes du Mexiqueet que celles-ci Ctaicnt recevables, la Cour exami-
nera maintenant ces demandes au fond.
I
48. Dans ses conclusions finales, le Mexique dernande ;ila Cour de
dire et juger que
ccenarrEtant, dktenant, jugeant, declarant coupables et condamnant
les cinquantc-deux rcssortissants mexicains se trouvant dans le cou-
loir de la mort dont lescas sont dkcrilsdans lemimoire duMexique,
les Etats-Unis d3AmCriqueont violk leurs obligations juridiques
internationales envers le Mexique agissant en son nom propre et
dans l'exercicedu droit qu'a cet Etat d'assurer la protection diplo-
matique dc sesrcssortissants par le fait qu'ils n'ontpas informe, sans
retard, lescinquante-deuxrcssortissanls mexicains apres leur arres-
tation du droit ;Ila notification c;iI'accCsaux autorilks consulaires
qui Ctaitle leur en vertu de I'alincab) du paragraphe 1de l'article 36
de la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires, qu'ils on1
privi:le Mexique de son droit d'accorder sa protection consulaire et
privi: les cinquantc-deux ressortissanzs mexicains de leur droit de
bCnCficierde la protection que le Mcxique leur aurait accordke
conformiment aux alinCasa) et cJ du paragraphe1de I'article36de
la convention 1).
50. Dans son arrCtrendu en I'affaireLaGrand,la Cour a dkji prksente
le paragraphe I de I'article 36 comme definissant ciun regime dont les
divers ClCmentssont intcrdipendants et qui est conqu pour faciliter la
mise en Eeuvredu systltnc dc protection consulairen (C.I.J.Recueil2001,
p. 492, par. 74). I1convient donc de citc~ cc paragraphe dans son inti-
gralitk.
t(Afin que l'exercicedes fonctions consulaircs relatives aux rcssor-
tissants de 1'Etatd'envoi soit facilite:
a) les fonctionnaires consulaires doivent avoir la liberti:de cornmu-
niquer avec Ics rcssortissants de 1'Etat d'envoi et de se rendre
aupres d'eux. Lesressortissants de 1'Etatd'envoidoivent avoir la
mEme liberte de communiquer avec les ronctionnaires consu-
laireset de se rendre aupres d'eux;
b) si I'intCresseen fait la demandc, les autoritks cornpktentes de
1'Etatde rksidencedoivent avertir sans retard le poste consulaire
dc 1'Etatd'envoi lorsque, dans sa circonscription consulaire, un
ressortissanl de cet Etat est add, incarckri. ou mis en Ctat de
dktention prhentive ou toute autre fome de dltention. Toute
communication adresske au poste consulaire par la personne
arretCe,incarckree ou mix en Ctat de detention prkventive ou40 AVENA AND OTI"IBRS (JUUGMLNT)
without delay.Thc said authorities shall inform the person con-
cerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officersshall have thc right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to con-
verse and correspond with himand to arrange for his legalrep-
resentation. They shall also have the right to visit any national
of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in
their district inrsuance of ajudgment. Nevertheless,consular
officcrsshall refrain from taking action on behallofa national
who it;in prison, custody or detention ir he expressly opposes
such action."
51.The United States as the receiving State does not deny its duty
to perform thesc obligations. However, it claims that the obligations
apply only to individuals shown to be of Mexican nationality alotie, and
not to those of dual MexicanlUnilcd States nationality. The United
States further contends irzteralia that it has not committed any brcach
of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), upon the proper interpretation of
"without delay" as used in that subparagraph.
52. Thus two major issues under Article 36,paragraph 1 (b), that are
in dispute between the Parties are, first,e question of the riationality of
the individuals concerned;and second, the question of the meaning to be
givcn to the expression "without delay". Thc Court will examine each ui'
these in turn.
53. The Parties have advanced thcir contentions as to nationalily in
three different legalcontexts. The United Stateshas begun by making an
objection to admissibility, which the Court has already dealt wilh (see:
paragraphs 41 and 42 above). The United States has further contended
that a substantial number of the 52 persons listed in paragraph 16
above were United States nationals and that it thus had no obligation
to these individuals undcr Article 36, paragraph 1 (h). The Court will
address this aspect of the matter in the followingparagraphs. Finally, the
Parties disagree as to whether the requirement under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (h), for the information to be given "without delay" becomes
operalive upon arrest or upon ascertainment of nationality. The Court
will address this issue latersccparagraph 63 below).
54. The Parties disagree as to what each of them must show as regards
nationality in connection withthe applicability of thterns of Article 36,
paragraph 1,and as to how the principles of cvidencehave been met on
the facts of the cases. AVENA ET AUTRES (ARRET) 40
toute autre forme de dktention doit egalement ktre transmise
sans retard par lesdites autoritb. Celles-ci doivent sans retard
informer I'intCresdde ses droits aux termes du present alinia;
les fonctionnaires consulaires ont le droit de se rendre auprh
d'un ressortissant de I'Etat d'envoi qui est inearckre, en etat de
dktention preventive nu toute autse forrne de detention, de
s'cntrclenict dc corrcspondrc avcc lui cl de pourvoir a sarepre-
sentationen justicc. 11sont kgalementledroit de se rendre aupres
d'un ressortissant de 1'Etat d'envoi qui, dam leur circonscrip-
tion, est incarckrkou detenu en exkcution d'un jugement. Nkan-
moins, Ics Ibnclionnaircs consulaircs doivent s'abstenir d'intcr-
venir en faveur d'un ressortissant incarkrk ou mis en Ctat de
ditention prkventive ou toute autre forme de dktention lorsque
I'interesse'yoppose expressernent.)j
51. Les Etats-Unis, en tant qu'Etat de residence,ne contesterlt pas leur
devoir de s'acquitter de ces obligations. 11saffirment cependant que les
obligations ne s'appliquent qu'aux personnes dont il a kt6 etabli qu'elles
etaient uniquement de nationalite mexicaineet non Bcellesposskdant i la
foisla nationalite des Etats-Unis et celledu Mexique. Les Etats-Unis font
en outre vaioir, entre autres, qu'ils n'ont en aucune faqon enfreint I'ali-
nCab) du paragraphc I dc I'articlc36,comptctcnu dc I'inlcrprktationqu'il
convient de donner de I'expression({sansretard)) utiliskedans cet alinia.
52. Par condquent, en ce qui concerne 1'alinCahJ du paragraphe 1de
I'arrjcle75,deux points majeurs sur lesquels les Parties s'opposent sont,
prernihement, la question de la nationalite des personnes concernkes,
deuxiimement, la question de la significationqu'il canvient de donner i
l'expressionrcsans retard>).La Cour examinera successivementchacun de
ccspoints.
53. Les Parties ont situt leursarguments rclatifs la nationalitt dans
trois conlexlesjuridiyues differents. LesEtats-Unis en ont en premier lieu
tire une exception d'irrecevabiliteque la Cour a dejjkexaminee (voir para-
graphes 41 et 42 ci-dessus).Par ailleursles Etats-Unis soutiennent qu'un
grand nombre des cinquante-deux personnes viskes au paragraphe IS ci-
dessus Ctaient des rcssortissants amkricains cl quc, par conskqucnt, lcs
Elals-Unis n'klaicnt lenus d'aucune obligation envers ces personnes en
vcrtu dc I'alinta hJ du paragraphe 1 de l'articl36. La Cour traitera de
cet aspccl dc la queslion dans les paragraphes qui suivent. EnGn, les
Parties divergent sur la qucstion dc savoir si l'information quidoit etre
donnie ({sansretard)), comme le prescrit l'alinia b) du paragraphe 1de
I'article 38, doic I'elrdts I'arrestation d'une pcrsonne ou a partir du
moment ou sa nationalit6 est etablie.La Cour se penchera sur cette ques-
tion plus loin (voirparagraphe 63 d-apres).
54. Les Parties ne sont d'accord ni sur ce que chacune d'elles doit
prouver en ce qui concerne la nationalilk aux tins de I'application du
paragraphe I de l'article35, ni sur la maniere dont lesprincipes regissant
la preuve ont 6tSrespectksdans chaque cas en ce qui concerne les faits. 55. Both Parties recognize the well-sellled principle in international
law that a litigant seeking to establish the existence of a fact bears the
burden of proving it (cf. Military und Pararniliiary Activilies in and
uguinst Niuarragncc(Nicaragua v. Uniied Slates ofAmericu), Jurisiliction
and Adwissisibility J,udgnzenl,I. C.J.Rpporls 1984, p. 437, para. 101).
Mexico acknowledges that it has the burden of proor to show that the
52persons listedin paragraph 16above were Mexicannationals to whom
Ihc provisions of Article36,paragraph 1(b), in principle apply.It claims
it hasmet this burden by providing to the Court I~C birth certificates of
these nationals, and declarations from 42 of them that they have not
acquired United States nationality. Mexico further contends that the
burden of proof lieson the United States should it wish lo contend that
particular arrested persons of Mexican nationality were, at the relevant
time, also United States nationals.
56. The United States accepts that in such cases it hasthe burden of
proof to demonstrate United States nationality, but ont tendsthat none-
thelessthe "burden of evidcnce" as to this remains with Mexico.This dis-
tinction is explained by the United States as arising out of the f:dctthat
persons of Mexican nationality may also havc acquired United States
citizenship by operation of law, depending on their parents' dates and
places or birth, places of residency, marital status at time of their birth
and so forth. I1the viewof the United States "virtually all such informa-
tion is in the hands of Mexico through the now 52 individuals it repre-
sents". The United Slates contends that it was the responsibility of'
Mexico lo produce such information, which responsibility ithas not dis-
charged.
57. Thc Court finds that it ISfor Mexicoto show that the 52 persons
listed inparagraph 16above held Mexicannationality at the time of their
arrest. Thc Court notes that to this end Mexico has produced birth
certificates and declarations of nationality, whose contents have not
been challenged by the United States,
The Court observes further that the United States has, however, ques-
tioned whether some of these individuals were not also United States
nationals. Thus, the United States has informed the Court that, "in the
case of defendant Ayala (case No. 2)we are close to certain that Ayala is
a United States citizen", and that this could be confirmed withabsolute
certainty if Mexico produced facts about this mattes. Similarly Mr.
Avena (case No. 1)was said to be "likely'90 be a United States citizen,
and there was "some possibility" that some 16 othcr defendants were
United States citizens.Asto six others, the United States said it "cannot
rule out the possibility" of United States nationality. The Courlakes the
viewthat it was for the United States to demonstrate that thiswas so and
to furnish the Court with all information on the matter in its possession.
In so far as relevant data on that matter are said by the United States to
lie within the knowledge of Mexico, itwas for the United States to have 1
AVENA ET AUTRES (AKR~T) 41
55.LesdeuxParties reconnaisscntle principebien etabli en droit inter-
national selonlequeljlincombeau plaideurqui cherchea ktablirl'existence
d'unFaitd'enapporter laprcuvc (cfAclivdtiami/itaireelpararnililaircau
Nicaragua:et contre celui-ci(Nicaragua c. Elals-Urtid'dmtrique), corn-
pifence el recevabflitkarr&I,C.I.J. Recueil 1584, p. 437, par. 191).LC
Mexique reconnaitqu'il lui appartient de prouver queles cinquante-deux
personnesCnumerkesau paragraphe 16ci-dessusCtaientdes ressortissants
mexicainsauxquelslesdispositionsde l'alinea b) du paragraphe 1de l'ar-
ticle36s'appliquent enprincipe.11affirrnes'Etreacquittidecetlechargeen
fournissantiila Cour Icsexlraitsd'actede naissancede ces ressortissants,
ainsi que des declarationsde quarante-deux d'entre eux,attestant qu'ils
n'ont pas acquisla nationalitkamiricaineLe Mexiqueaffirmeaussi que,si
lesEtats-Unis souhaitenthire valoir que, parmi les personnesde nationa-
litkmexicainearrgtkes,certainesCtaientCgalement i I'kpoquedes ressortis-
sants des Etats-Unis,c'esa eux d'enapporter la preuve.
56. Les Etats-Unis reconnaissent que,dans ces cas, la charge de la
preuve leur incombe en ce qui concerne l'kablissement de la nationalit6
amkricaine,majssoutiennent que,nianmoins, ilappartient au Mexiquede
produire lescrklkmentsde preuve)}pcrtinents. Selon les Erats-Unis, cette
distinction s'expliquepar lefait que des personnesde nationaliti mexi-
caine peuvent aussi avoir acquis deplein droit la nationalitk amkricaine,
du fait notamment de la date edu lieudc naissance,dulieude residence
ou de la situation matrimonialede leursparents au moment de leur nais-
sance.SelonlesEtats-Unis {[plratiquementtoutescesinformationssont en
possessiondu Mexique,par I'intermkdiairedescinquante-deux personnes
qu'il reprksente disormais n.Les Etats-Unis soutiennent qu'il apparte-
nait au Mexique de produire cesinforrnrtdons,ce qu'iln'a pas fait.
57. La Cour estime qu'ilappartient au Mexjque de dkmontrer que les
cinquante-deux personnes identifikesau paragraphe 16 ci-dessusCtaient
de nationalitkmexicaineau moment de leur arrestation. Elleconstate que
I le Mcxique a produit i cet effetdes extraits d'actc dc naissance et des
dkctarations de nationalitk, dont le contenu n'a pas Ctecontestk par les
Etats-Unis.
La Cour relive que les Etats-Unisontcependantsoulevi:la questionde
savojr si certainesde ces personnes n'ktaientpas aussi des ressortissants
amkricains.Les Etats-Unjsont ainsi informela Cour que, adans lecas de
I'accusCno2, M. Ayala, [ilsktaient]quasiment certains quel'intiresskest
citoyen des Etats-Unis)),et que cela pourrait Etreconfirmi.avecune certi-
tude absolue sileMexiqueavaitfourni lesinformationsrequises.Demtrne,
selon les Etats-Unis,M. Avena (cas no 1)doit Pt~econsidhe comrneCtant
crvraisernblabIement)c)itoyendes Etats-Unis,et on ccpouvait)penser que
quelqueseizeautres accusis l'itaient aussi. Ece qui concernesix autres
personnes, les Etats-Unis ont declareque lZCventualitde la nationalitk
arntricainene (([pouvait]Gtrekcartken.La Cour est d'avis qu'ilappartenait
aux Etats-Unisdeprower qu'ilen itait ainsi etde fourniri la Courtoutes
informationsen leurpossession cesujet.Dans la mesureou desinforma-
l tions pertinentessur la matiire Ctaient,selon les Etats-Unis,en la posses-
3342 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
sought that information from the Mexican authorities. The Court cannot
acceptthat, because suchinrormation may have bccn in part in the hands
of Mexico, it was for Mexicoto produce suchinformation. It was for the
United States to seek such information, with sufficient specificity,and to
demonstrate both that this was done and that the Mexican authorities
declined or failed to respond to such specific requests. At no stage,
however, has the United States shown the Court that it made specific
enquiries of those authorities about particular cascs and that rcsponses
were not forthcoming. The Court accordingly concludes that the United
Statcs has not mct its burden of proof in its attempt to show that persons
of Mexican nationality were also United States nationals.
The Court therefore finds that, as regards the 52 persons listed in
paragraph 16 above, the Unitcd Statcs had obligations under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b).
58. Mexico asks the Court to find that
"the obligationin Article 36,paragraph I, of the Vienna Convention
requires notification ofconsular rights anda reasonable opportunity
for consular access before the competent authorities or the receiv-
ing State take any action potentially detrimental to the foreign
national's rights".
59. Mexicocontends that, i11each of the 52cases beforethe Court, the
United States failed to provide the arrested persons with information as
to their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), "without delay". It
alleges that in one case, Mr. Esquivel(case No. 7), the arresled person
was informed, but only some 18months after the arrest, whilein another,
that of Mr. Juirez (case No. lo), information was given to the arrested
person of his rights some 40 hours after arrest. Mexicocontends that this
still constituted violation, because "without delay" is to be understood
as meaning "immediately", and in any event before any interrogation
occurs. Mexico further draws the Court's attention to tlze fact that in
this case a United States court found that there had been a violation of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), and claims that the United States cannot
disavow such a determinatioil by its own courts. In an Annex to its
Memorial, Mexicomentions that, in a third case (Mr. Ayala, case No. 2),
the accused was informed of his rights upon his arrival on dcath row,
some four years after arrest. Mexico contends that in the remaining
cases the Mexicans concerned were in fact never so informed by the
United States authorities.
60. The United States disputes both the facts as presented by Mexico
and the legalanalysis of Article36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Con-
vention offered by Mexico. The United States claims that Mr. Solache
(case No. 47) was informed of his rights under the Vienna Conventionsiondu Mexique,lesEtats-Unis dcvaicnts'enenquerir aupris des autorites
mexicaines.La Cour nepeut pas acceplcrI'argument selon lequeillrevenait
au Mexique de produire ces informations au motif qu'ellesse trouvaient
peut-etre en parlic cn sa possession. C'est auxEtats-Unis qu'ilappartenait
de chercher iiobte~lirlesdilesinrormations, avecun degrede precisionsuf-
fisant,et dedkmonzrer rila foisqu'ils I'avaientfait et que lesautorites mexi-
caines avaienl rcfusk ou n'avaient pas ete en rncsurc de rkpondre a leurs
demandes precises.A aucun stade pourtant, les Etats-Unis n'onl itabli
devant la Cour qu'ilsavaienl adresskdes demandesde renseignementspre-
ciscsaux autoritks mexicainessur dcs cas particuliers, mais n'avaient pas
obnenudc rkponse.La Cour en conclutquc IcsE~ats-Unisne sesont pas ac-
quittes dc la charge qui leur incombait deprouver quc certaines persannes
de nationaliti mexicaiileetaient azlssides ressortissants dcs Elals-Unis.
La Cour considere donc qu'cn ce qui concerne lescinquante-deux per-
sonnes idcntifikesau paragraphe 16ci-dcssus 1csEtats-Unis avaient des
obligations en vcrtu de I'alineah) du paragraphe 1de I'arlicle36.
58.Le Mexique demandc iilaCour de dkclarer que:
({l'obligation@noncCe au paragraphe 1 de I'articlc36 de la conven-
tion de Vienne exige qu'une notification des droits consulaires ail
lieuel qu'une possibiliti raisonnable d'ads aux autoritks consu-
laires soil donnke avant que lesautoritis comptlentes de 1'Etatde rk-
sidence neprcnnenl aucune mesure susceptibledc porter atteinte aux
droits du ressortissant Clranger>>.
59. I1soutient que, dans chacun des cinquante-deux cas dont est saisie
la Cour, ICSElals-Unis ont omis d'informcr asins retard)) les personnes
arrCtCesdcs droits qu'ils tenaient de I'alinta du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle 36. Dans un cas (celuide M. Esquivel, no 71,la personne arrktee en
aurait ktCinform&, maisseulernentdix-huit mois environ apres I'arresta-
lion. Dans un autre cas, celuide M.Juarez (cas no10),la personne arrEtie
a Cti iilformkede ses droitsquelque quarante heures aprk I'arrestation.
LeMexiqueaffirmequ'ils'agitla encored'uneviolation Farceque I'expres-
sion ({sansretard)) doitEtrecomprise dans le sens de crirnrnEdiatcment)>,
et, en tout cas, avant Ic moindre interrogatoire. Le Mexiquc attire egale-
rnent l'attention de la Cour sur le fait que, dans cette affairc, unejuridic-
tion des Etats-Unis avaitjug& qu'ily avajt eu violation de l'alinea 6) du
paragraphc I dc I'article36, et affirrnequelesEtats-Unis ne peuvent pas
desavouer ri cet egard leurs propres juridictions. Dans une annexe i
son memoire, le Mexique indique que, dans un troisihe cas (celui dc
M. Ayala, no 21, l'accuska ete inform6 dc scs droits lors de son arrivee
dans le couloirde la mort, soit quelque quatre ans aprcs son arrestation.
LC Mexique soutient que, dans les autres cas, les intkressksn'onen fait
jamais Ctkinformes de leurs dsoits par les autoritedes Etats-Unis.
60. Les Etats-Unis contestenta la fois lesfaits tels qu'ilssont prksentks
par le Mexiqueet I'analysejuridique que fait 1cMexiquede l'alineabJ du
paragraphe 1de l'article36 de la conventionde Vienne.Ils soutiennent que
M.Solache(cas no47)a CtCinform6 deses droits au titrde la convention43 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
some sevenmonths after his arrest.The United States further claimsthat
many of the persons concernedwereof United States nationalityand that
at leastsevenof these individuals"appear to have affimativcly claimedto
be United Statescitizensat the timeof their arrest". Thesecases were said
to be those of'Avena (case No. l), Ayala (case No. 21,Benavides (case
No. 3), Ochoa (caseNo. 18),Salcido(caseNo. 22),Tafoya (caseNo. 241,
and Alvarez(case No. 30).In the viewof the United States no duty of
consular information arose in these cases.Further, in the contention of
the United States, in the casesofr*Ayala (caseNo. 2)and Mr. Salcido
(caseNo. 22)there wasno reasonto believethat the arrested personswere
Mexicannationals at any stage; the informationin the caseof Mr. Juirez
(cascNo. 10)was given"without delay",
51. The Court thus nowturns to the interpretation of Article 36,para-
graph 1 (b), having found in paragraph 57above that it isapplicable to
the 52persons listedin paragraph 16.It beginsby noting that Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), contains three separate but interrelated elements: the
right of thc individual concerned lo be informed without delay of his
rights under Article36,paragraph 1 (b);the right of theconsular post to
be notifiedwithout delayof the individual'sdetention, if he so requests;
and the obligation of the receivingState to forward without delay any
communication addressed to the consular post by the detained person.
62. The third element of Articlc 36, paragraph 1 (b), has not been
raisedon the facts beforethe Court. The Court thus begins withthe right
of an arrested or detained individualto information.
63. The Court finds that the duty upon the detaining authoritiesto
givethe Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), information to the individualarises
once it is realizedthattheperson is a foreignnational, or once there are
grounds to think chatthe pcrsonis probably a forcignnational. Precisely
when this may occur will vary with circumstances.The United States
Department of Statebooklet, Consular Not$cation and Access - Instruc-
lionsfor Federa l,ale und Local Law Enfircement and Other Qfjcials
Regmiling Foreign Nationals inthe United States and the Righis ofCon-
sular OfficiulsEQAssisf Them,issued to Federal,state and local authori-
ties in orderto promote compliance with Article 36of the Vienna Con-
vention points out in such cases that: "most, but not all, persons born
outside the United States are not [citizens].Unfamiliarity with English
may also indicate foreign nationality." The Court notes that when an
arrested person himself claims to be of United States nationality, the
realization by the authorities that he is not in fact a United States
national, or groundsfor that realization,is likelyto come somewhatlater
in time.de Vicnne environ sept mois apres son arrestation. Les Etats-Unis al-
leguenlenoutre qu'ungrand nombredespersonnes encausepossCdaientla
nationaliteamericaineet qu'aurnoinsseptdeces personnescrontapparcrn-
ment affirme, au moment de leur arrestation, elre citoyens des Etats-
Unis)). Ces cas auraient CtCceux de MM. Avena (cas n" I), Ayala @as
no I), Benavides(cas no 3),Ochoa (casnu18),Salcido(cas no22)'Tafoya
(cas n" 24)cl Alvarez(cas no30). Les Etats-Unis estimentqu'ilsn'ktaient
pas tenus de proceder h l'informationconsulairedans ces cas. En outre,
sclonles Etats-Unis,dans les casdc MM. Ayala (cas no2) et Salcido (cas
no 221, rien ne portait Bcroire que les personnes arrcdes eussent CtC, it
un moment quelconque,des ressortissants rnexicains;et dans le cas de
M. Julirez (casno 101,l'informationavait CtCdonntc ({sansretard)).
61. La Cour en vient maintenant i l'interprktation de I'alinia hJ du
paragraphe 1 de I'article 36, ayant conclwau paragraphe 57 ci-dessus
qu'il estapplicable aux cinquante-deux personnes identifiies au para-
graphe 16.Ellerelkvctout d'abord que cet alineacontienttroiselementsdis-
tinctsmais liksentre eux: ledroitde l'intkresd d'Ctreinformi?sans retard
des droits qui lui sont reconnus par ledit alinea; le droit du poste consu-
lairede recevoirsans repardnotificationde la miseen dktention de l'intk-
ressk,si cc dcrnier en fait la demandc; ct I'obligationde I'Etatde rksi-
dencede transrnettre sans retard toute communication adresskeau poste
consulairepar la personne ditenue.
62. LC troisiime Climentde Iyalinkab) du paragraphe 1de I'article:36
n'a pas kt$ soulevea propos des faits soumis a la Cour. Cette derniere
examinera donc en premier lieu le droit ri I'information d'une personne
arretee ou ditenue.
63. La Cour estirneque lesautoritks qui interviennentdans les pro&
dures de dktention ont I'obligationde donner l'information requise par
I'alineab) du paragraphe I deI'article36 au moment ou elks conslalent
que la personne arrctke est un ressortissanl &anger ou lorsqu'il existe
des raisons de pcnscr qu'ils'agit probablement d'un ressortissantCtran-
ger. LC moment prkcisvarie selon lescirconskances.Lemanuel du d6par-
temenkd'Etat des Etats-Unis, diffuse auprks des autorites fiderales, tta-
tiques et locales afin de promouvoir le respect de I'article 36 de la
convenlion de Vienne(intitulk Nmtificutionconsuluirc efcummunicutic~ns
entre be.ourrsulutsct les ressorfissrrns6trungcrs: Direcfives & rinlention
des respc>nsahles de l'appiicutimndes iuis erautres fonct ionnuiresftd6-
rraux, iratiques el locaux concernand IEJ rcssorfis~ant~ klrang~rs uux
Erats-Unis efle droittiesfonctionncrires consulairesde Ieurprtter assis-
tunce),indiquedans ces cas que: ((laplupart, mais non la totalite des per-
sonncs nCesen dehors des Etals-Unis, n'ont pas [la citoyenneti amCri-
caine].La rneconnaissancede la langue anglaise peut aussi constituer un
indice rCvClateurd'une nationalit& Ctrangere. )> La Cour note que,
lorsqu'une personnearrkde dkclareelle-meme&trede nationalite amtri-
caine,il peut s'kouler un certain tempsavant que lesrtutoritksconstatent
qu'enrealitkellen'est pas un ressortissant des Etats-Unis ou qu'il existe
des raisons de le pcnser. 64. The United Stateshas told the Court that millionsof aliens reside,
either legallyor illegally,on its territory, and moreover that its lawscon-
cerning citizenship are generous. The United States has also pointed out
that itis a mullicuItura1society, wilh citizenshipbeing heldby pcrsons of
diverse appearance, speaking many languages. The Courl appreciates
that in the United States the language that a person speaks, or his
appearance, does not ncccssarily indicate that hc is a foreign national.
Nevertheless, and particularly in view of the large numbers of foreign
nationals living in the United States, lhcse very circumstances suggest
that it would be desirable for enquiry routinely to be made of the indi-
vidual as to his nationality upon his detention, so that the obligations of
the Vienna Convention may be complied with. The United Stales has
informed the Court that some of'its law enforcement authorities do
routinely ask persons lakcn into detention whether they are United States
citizens. Indccd, were each individual to be told at that time that, should
hc be a foreign national, hc is entitled to ask for his consular post to be
contacted, compliance with this requirement under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (h), would be greatly enhanwd. The provision of such informa-
tion could parallel the readingof'those rights of which any person taken
into custody in connection with a criminal offcnce must be informed
prior to interrogation by virtue of what in thc United States is known as
the "Miranda rule"; these rights include, inleraliu, the righl to remain
silent, theright to have an attorney present during questioning, and the
right tohave an attorney appointed at government expense if the person
cannot afford one. The Court notes that, according to the United States,
such a practice in respect of the Vienna Convention rights is already
being followed in some local jurisdictions.
65. Bearing in mind the complexities explained by the United States,
the Court now begins by examining the application of Article 36,
paragraph I (b), of the Vienna Convention to the 52 cases. In 45 of
these cases, the Court has no cvidence that the arreslcd persons claimed
United SVdtesnationality, or wercreasonably thought to bc United States
nationals, with specific enquiriesbeing made in timely fashion to verify
such dual nalionality. The Court has explained in paragraph 57 above
what enquiries it would have expectedto have been made, within a short
time period, and what information should have been provided to the
Court.
66. Seven pcrsons, however, are asserted by the United States to
have stated at the timc of arrest that they were United States citizens.
Only in the casc of Mr. Salcido (casc No. 22) has the Court been pro-
vided by the United States with cvidenceof such a statement. This has
been acknowledged by Mexico. Further, there has been no cvidence
before thc Court to suggest that there were in this case at the same time
also indications of Mexican nationality, which should have caused
~apidenquiry by the arresting authorities and the providing of consular
information "without delay". Mexico has accordingly not shown that in1 Mexiquc n'a donc pas dcmonlrt que les Etats-Unis aient viol&les obli-
gations leur incombant en vertu de I'alinkabJdu paragraphe I de l'ar-
ticle35.
67. Dans lecasde M. Ayala (cas no21,bien que celui-ciait etkqualifik
dans une pike de procidure soumise en 1989(trois ans apres son arresta-
tion)de citoyen desEtats-Unis, il n'existcaucun CtCmentelablissant aux
yeux de la Cour que I'accuseait effectivementafftrrnelors de son arresta-
tion Ztre un citoyen des Etats-Unis. La Cour n'a pas i:tCinformke de
recherches qu'auraient rnenies les Etats-Unis pour corroborer ces Cven-
tuellesaffirmations de nationaliti:amkricaine.
68. Dans cinq autres cas considCrCspar Ics Etats-Unis comme Ctant
dcs affaires dans lcsquclleIcsintkrcsds crontapparemment affirme, au
moment de leur arrestation, Etrecitoyens desEtats-Unis~, aucun k1Cment
de preuve attestant I'existenced'une telle dkclaration au moment de
l'arrestation n'atCpresentk.
69. Dans le cas dc M. Avcna (casno I), le procks-verbald'arrestation
indique commelieu de naissancela Californie. L'intCresdfiguredans les
dossiersde la prison commeressortissanl mcxicain. Les Etats-Unis n'ont
pas etabli devant la Cour qu'ils avaient entrepris des recherchesfin de
confirmer la nationalite amkricaine.
70. Au moment de son arrestation en 1991, M. Benavides (cas no 3)
Claitportcur d'wnccarlc d'immigrationdClivrkcpar le servicede I'immi-
gration et des naturalisarions. La Cour n'a pas Cti:informked'une guel-
conque raison pour laquelle les autoritks ayant prockdi:a l'arrestation
auraient nkanmoinsdii croire, au moment deladite arrestation, qu'ilCtait
ressortissant des Etats-Unis.LesClementsattestant que son avocat avait
informi:le tribunal en juin 1943que M. BenavidesCtaitdevenu citoyen
des Etats-Unis son1sans pertinence s'agissantde savoir ce qui aurail pu
Etresupposi quant h sa nationaliti au moment de son arrestation.
71. En ce qui concerne M. Ochoa (cas no1S),la Cour fail remarquer
que leprods-verbal d'arrestation dc 1990indique que celui-ciCtaitne au
Mexique,une affirmation que l'on retrouve dans un second rapport de
police.Environ deux ans plus lard, des piecesde son dossier ledksignent
comme uncitoyenamkricainnt au Mcxique.La Cour nedisposed'aucune
aulre precision. Les Ebals-Unis n'onl pas dkmontrk ;ila Cour que, h
l'ipoque de son arrestation, ilsetaient informksd'uneprktenduc nationa-
lit6 ambicaine, ni qu'ils aiententrepris activement des recherches a ce
sujet.
I 72. En ce qui concerne M. Tafoya (casno24),lelieude naissanceindi-
quk sur le registre d'kcrou de la police est le Mexique. Les Etats-Unis
n'ont pas expliquk pourquoi cette mention a etC faite ni quelles re-
cherche~ont, le cas khCant, CtCeffectukesau sujet de la nationalit&de
l'intkresst,
73. Enfin, la derniere des sept personnes de ce group citks par lex
Etats-Unis estM. Alvarez (casno30),qui a ttCarrttC au Texasle 20juin
1998. Les registresdu Texas le designentcomme citoyen desEtats-Unis.
i Dans les trois jours qui ont suivison arrestation, les autoritks du Texasinlbrmed that the Tmmigrationand Naturalization Service was holding
investigations to determine whether, because of a previous conviction,
Mr. Alvarez was subjcctto deportation as a foreign national. The Court
has not been presented with evidencethat rapid resolution was sought as
to the question of Mr. Alvarez'snationality.
74. The Court concludes that Mexico has failed to prove the violation
by the United States of its obligationsundcr Article 36,paragraph 1 (b),
in the caseor Mr. Salcido (case No. 22),and his casewill not be further
cornmenlcd upon. On the other hand, as regards the other individuals
who are alleged to have claimed United States nationality on arrest,
whose cases have beenconsidered in paragraphs 67 to 73 above, the
argument or lhc UnitcdStates cannot be upheld.
75. The question noncthcless remains as to whether, in each of the 45
cases referredto in paragraph 65 and of the sixcases mentioned in para-
graphs 67 to 73, the United States did provide the required information
to the arrested persons "without delay". Itis to that qucstion that the
Court now turns.
76. Thc Court has been provided with declarations from a number of
the Mexican nationals concerned that attest to their never beinginformed
of their rights under Article6,paragraph 1 (b). The Court at the outset
notes that, in 47 such cases, the United States nowhere challenges
this fact of information not being given. Nevertheless, in the case of
Mr. Hernindez (case No. 34),the United States observes that
"Although the [arresting] officerdid not ask Hernindez Llanas
whether he wanted them to inform the Mexican Consulate of his
arrest, it was certainly not unreasonable for him to assume that an
escaped convict would not want the Consulate of the country from
which he escaped notifiedof his arresl."
Thc Court notes that the clear duty to provide consular information
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (B), does not invite assumptions as to
what the arrested person might prefer, as a ground For not informing
him. It rather givesthe arrested pcrson, once informed, the righto sayhe
nonetheless does not wish his consular post to be notified.It necessarily
rollowsthat in each of these 41 cases, the duty to inform "wilhout delay"
has been violated.
77. In four cases, namely Ayala (caseNo. 2), Esquivel (caseNo. 7),
Juirez (caseNo. 10)and Solache (caseNo. 471, some doubtsremainas to
whether the information that was givenwas providcd without delay. For
these, some examination of the tern isthus necessary.
78. This is a matter on which the Parties have very different views.avaient cependant Ctkinformkes des recherches du servicede l'immigra-
tion et des naturalisations qui ktaient en cours afin de dkterminer si, en
raison d'une condamnation antkrieure, M. Alvarez etait susceptible
d'expulsion en tant que ressortissant Ctranger.Aucun e1Cmentn'a CtCpre-
senti:;ila Cour indiquant qu'un rkglement rapide de la question de la
nationalitk deM. Alvarez ajt Iterecherche.
74. La Cour conclut que le Mexique n'a pasdkmontri que les Etats-
Unis aient violCles obligations leur incombant en vertu de I'alinCah} du
paragraphe 1 de I'article36 dans le cas de M. Salcido(cas no 22), etelle
ne formulera pas d'autres observations concernant ce cas. En revanche,
en cequi concerne les autres personnes qui auraient affirme Ctredes res-
sortissantsamkricains Iors de leur arrestation, et don1escas ont kt6exa-
minks aux paragraphes 67 a 73ci-dessus, I'argumentation des Etats-Unis
ne saurait itre accueillie.
75. I1rcslc cepcndant a dttcrminer si, dans chacun des quarante-cinq
cas mentionnks au paragraphe 65 et des six cas Cvoquks aux para-
graphes 67 a 73, les Etats-Unis ont fournj ({sansretard)) les informations
requisesaux personnes arrgt6cs. La Cour passcra 51prcscnt h I'examende
cette question.
76. Des dkclarations d'un certain nornbre de ressortissants rnexicains
coneernes, altcslant n'avoirjamaiskte infonnks de leurs droits dkcoulant
de l'alinkabJ du paragraphe I de I'article36, ont Ptkfournies ;ila COUF.
La Cour notera tout d'abord que, dans quarante-sept de ces cas, les
Etats-Unis ne contestent nullement cedCfaut d'information. Toutefois,
dans le cas de M. Hernandez (cas no 341,les Etats-Unis font remarquer
clue
a[l]e policier [quiI'aarrEln'a certes pas dcmandk i M. Hcrnhndcr
Llanas s'il souhaitait que les forccs de police infoment le consulat
mexicain de son arrestation, mais il n'y avait certainement rien de
diraisonnable a ce que ce policierpresume qu'un condamnk fugitif
ne souhaiterait pas qu'on fitconnaitre son arrestation au consulat
du pays duquel il s'itait Cchappi,).
La Cour souligneque l'obligationsans equivoque de fournir I'informa-
tion consulaire en vertu de I'alinea b) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 35
n'appellcpas dc conjccturcs sur Eesprkrerencesde la personne arretke, qui
pourraientjustifier de ne pas l'informer. Elle donne plutbt a la personne
arretee ledroit, une fois infornee, de dire qu'elle nesouhaite nkanmoins
pas que son poste consulaire reqoiveune notification. 11s'ensuitnecessai-
remen1quc, dans chacunde cesquarante-sept cas, l'obligation d'informer
({sansretard)) aetC violee.
77. Dans quatre cas, en l'occurrence ceuxde M. Ayala (cas no 2), de
M. Esquivcl (cas no 7)'de M. Juhrez (cas no 10)et de M. Solache (cas
no 47), des doutes subsistent quant a la question de savoir si l'informa-
tion donneel'a it6 sans retard. A cette finlconvientdonc de preciser le
sens de cette expression.
78. I1s'agitd'uncqucstion surlaquelle lesParties ont des vues trksdif-According to Mexico, the timing of the notice to the detained person "is
critical to the exercise of the rights provided by Article 36"andthe
phrase "without delay" in paragraph 1 (hj requires "unqualified imme-
diacy". MexicoI'urthercontcnds that, in viewof the object and purpose
of Article 36which is to enable "meaningful consular assistance" and the
safeguarding of the vulnerability of foreign nationals in custody,
"consuiar notification. . .must occur immediately upon detention
and prior to any interrogation of the foreign detainee, so that the
consul may offcr useful advice about the foreign legal system and
pravide assistance inobtaining counsel before the foreign national
makes any ill-informeddecisionsor the State takes any action poten-
tially prejudicial to his rights".
79. Thus, in Mexico'sview,it would followthat in any case in which a
foreign national was interrogated before being informed of his rights
under Article 36, there would @so facto be a breach of that Article, how-
everrapidly after the interrogation the informationwas given to the for-
eign national. Mexicoaccordingly includes the case of Mr. Juirez among
those where it claims violation of Article6, paragraph 1 (b), as he was
interrogated before beinginformed of his consular rights, some40 hours
after arrest.
80. Mexico has also invoked the dravnnxpr6purutoires or the Vienna
Convention in support of its interpretation of thcrequirement that the
arrested person be informed "without delay" of the right to ask that the
consular post be notified. In particulaMexico rccallcd that the phrase
proposed to the Conferenceby the International Law Commission, "with-
out undue delay", was replaced by thc United Kingdom proposal to
delete the word "undue". The United Kingdom representative had
explained that this would avoid the implication that "some delay was
permissible" and no delegate had expressed dissent with the USSR and
Japanese statements that the result of the amendment would be Eo
require information "immediately".
81. The United States disputed this interpretation of the phrase "with-
out delay". In its viewit did not mean "immedialely, and before interro-
gation" and such an understanding was supported neither by the termi-
nology, nor by thc object and purpose of the Vienna Convention, nor by
its travaux pr&paruloires.In the booklet referred to in paragraph 63
above, the State Department explains that "without delay" means "there
should be no deliberate delay" and that the required action should be
taken "as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances". It was
normally to be expected that "notification to consular officers" would
have been made "within 24 to 72 hours ofthe arrest or detention". The
United States further contended that such an interpretation of the words
"without delay" would be reasonable in itself and also allow a consistent AVENA ET AUTRES (ARR~T) 47
fkrentes. Selon le Mcxique, le moment oh la personne detenue reqoit
l'infomation acst dkterminant pour I'exercice des droits prkvus par
l'article36,) et I'cxprcssion ({sans retard)) visee B l'alinea6) du para-
graphe 1requiert une {immkdiatetkabsolue )>.Le Mexique soutient que,
l'article 36ayant pour objet et pour but dercndrc possible une ((vkritable
assistance consulaire})et de protkger les ressortissants etrdngers detenus
quison1cn situation dc vulnPrabilitC,
(<lanotification consulaire ...[doit] avoir lieu dts la dktenlion ct
avant tout interrogatoire pour que leconsul puisw fournir au res-
sortissant des informations uliles sur lc systcmejuridique etranger et
l'aidera trouver un avucat avant qu'il ne prenne des decisions ma1
avisks ou que 1'Etal ne prcnne des mesures risquant de porter
atteinterises droits}).
79. En conskquence, selon le Mexique, iichaquc fois qu'un ressortis-
sant etranger scrait interrogt avant d'ktre inform&de ses droits en vertu
de I'article36, il y aurait ipsofactoviolation de cet article, m&mes'il nc
s'estCcoulCque peu de temps entre lemoment ou le rcssortissant Ctranger
a Cti:inform6 et celuioh ilest interrogi. C'estpourquoi le Mexique inciut
le cas de M. Jurirez parmi ceux oi, seion ce pays, il y a eu violation de
l'alinea bJ du paragraphe 1 de l'article36, puisqu'il a kte intcrrogk avant
d9&treinform6 de ses droits consulaires, cnviron quarante heures aprb
son arrestation.
80. Le Mexique invoquc kgalcment les travaux prkparatoires de la
convention de Vienne ii I'appui de son interprktation de la condition
selon laquelleI'intkressedoit Ctreinformi:rcsansretard}}de son droit iice
que le poste consulaire reqoive une notification. En particulier, le Me-
xiquerappelleque l'expressionproposke a la confkrenccpar la Commission
du droit inlcmational - (sans retard injustifie~- fut amendie sur pro-
position du Rayaume-Uni tendant $ supprimer le teme <tinjustifi~>>.
Ainsi, commeI'expliqua Ierepresentant de ce pays, =la ne laisserait pas
supposer qu'un ccccrtainrctard scrait acceptabIe)), et aucun reprksentant
nc se dkclara en dtsaccord avec les dkclarations de I'URSSet du Japon
selon lesquellesI'amendernentaurail pour cffct d'exigerune information
crimmkdiate~.
81. LesEtats-Unis contestent cette interprktation de I'expression((sans
retard)). Selon eux,ellene veut pas dire ccimmkdiatement,et avant I'inter-
rogatoiren, et une telle interprktation ne trouverait appui ni dans le
libelle, ni dans I'objet et le but de la convention de Vienne, ni dans ses
travaux prkparatoires. Dans le manuel mentionnk au paragraphe 63 ci-
dessus, Ic dcpartcrncnt d'Etat dcs Etats-Unis explique que I'expression
ccsansretard)) signifiercqu'ilne devrait pas y avoir de retard dClibkrC>e>t
que la mesure requiscdevra 5treprise crdes que cela est raisonnabiement
possible compte tenu des circonstances)>.11est escomptk gue normale-
ment la {(notificationaux fonctionnaises consulaires)} se ferait <{dam Ies
vingt-quatre li soixante-douze heures aprks I'arrestation ou la mise en
detention)). Les Etats-Unis soutiennent Cgalernentque cette interprkta-48 AVENA AND OTHERS (IUDGMENT)
interpretation of the phrase as it occurs in each of three different occa-
sions in Article 36, paragraph 1 (h). As fbr the truvous prkparrrtoires,
they showed only that unduc or dclibcratc dclay had been rcjcctcd as
unacceptable.
82. According to the United States, the purpose of Article 36 was to
facilitate the exerciseof consular functions by a consular officer:
"The significanceof'giving consular inlbrmalion to a national is
thus limited .. . It is a procedural device that allows the foreign
national to trigger the related process of notificatio. . [It] cannot
possibly befundamental to the criminal justice process."
83. The Court now addresses the question of the proper interpretation
of the expression "without dclay" in thelight of arguments put to it by
the Parties. The Court begins by noting that the precise meaning of
"without delay", as it is to be understood in Articl35, paragraph 1 (b),
is not defined in the Convention. This phrase therefore requires interpre-
tation according to the customary rules of treaty interpretation refleclcd
in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ot'Treaties.
84. Article I of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which
defines certain of the terms used in the Convention, offers no definition
of the phrase "without delay". Moreover, in the different language ver-
sions of the Convention various terms are e~nployedto render the phrases
"without delay" in Article 36and "irnmedialely" in Article 14.The Court
observes that dictionary definitions, in thc various languages of the
Vienna Convention, ok'f'eriverse meanings of the tcrm "without dclay"
(and also of "immediately"). It is therefore necessary lo look elsewhere
for an understanding of this term.
85. As for the object and purpose of the Convention, the Court
observes lhalArticle 36 provides for consular officers to be free to com-
municate with nationals of thc scnding State, to have access to them, to
visit and speak with them and to arrange for their legal representation. It
is not envisaged, either in Article 36, paragraph 1, or elsewhcrc in the
Convention, that consular functions entail a consukar officer himselfor
herself acting as the legal representative or more directly engaging in
the criminal justice process. indeed, this is confirmed by the wording of
Artide 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention. Thus, neithcr thc lcms
of the Convention as normally understood, nor its object and purpose,
suggest that "without delay" is to be understood as "immediately upon
arrest and before interrogation".
86. The Court further notes that, notwilhslanding the uncertainties in
the travuzrxprkpuraloires, they too do nor support such an interpreta-tion de I'expression({sansretard )>est en elle-mime raisonnable et perrnet
en outre une interpretation homogkne de l'expressiondans trois passages
differents de I'alinka b) du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36 oG elle est
employke. Quant aux travaux preparatoires, ils montreraienl seulement
qu'un retard injustifieou dClibCreavait Cte exclu car inacceptable.
82. Pour 1csElals-Unis, le but de l'article 36 est de faciliter l'exercice
par un fonctionnaire consulaire de scs fonctions:
cl'importance de I'information consulairedonnkc aux rcssortissants
Ctrangersest donc limitee. 1I s'agit d'un rnkcanisme prockdural qui
permet aux ressortissants Ctrangersde rnettre en euvrc Ic proccssus
connexe de notification ..[ellejne saurait avoir de caractkre fonda-
mental dans le cadre d'une procidure pknale.~
83. La Cour se penchera k prkscnl sur la qucstion de I'interprktation
qu'il convient de donner riI'expression({sans retard)) i la IumiPredes
argumcilts avances devant elle par les Parties. La Cour constate tout
d'abord que lesens prkcis de cclk cxprcssion, lelqu'il faut I'entendre i
l'alinka b) du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36, n'est pas indiqui: dans la
convcnlion. Celte expression doit donc itre interprktee au regard des
rkgles coutumikres d'interprttation des traites, telles qu'elles ont trouvC
leur expression aux articles 31 et 32 dc la convcnlion de Vienne sur le
droit des traitks.
84. L'article premier de la convention de Vienne sur les relations
consulaircs, qui definitcertains des termes utilisesdans celle-ci,ne donne
aucune definition dc l'cxpressionctsansretard)). En outre, dans lesdiffe-
rentes versionslinguisliqucs de la convention, des terrnes divers sont uti-
IisCspour rendre les mots {{sansrelard )>ettrimmtdiatcmcnt)>,employks
respectivementaux articles 36 et 14de ladite convention. La Cour relCvc
que les diclionnaircs, dans les diff-erenteslangues de la convention de
Vienne,donnent des definitions divergentesde I'exprcssinnrcsansreiard >)
(et aussi dc I'adverbe ccirnmediatement)>) .1est donc nkcessairede cher-
cher aillcurs pour comprendre le sens de cette expression.
85. S'agissantde I'objet etdu but de la convention, la Cour rcltvc quc
l'article36 prkvoit que les fonctionnaires consulaires doivcnl avoir la
liberte de communiquer avec les ressortissants de 1'Etal d'envoi, de se
rendre auprks d'eux,de leur rendrc visitcel de s'entretenir avec euxet de
pourvoir a leur reprksentation enjusticc.I1n'cst pas prkvu, que ce soit au
paragraphe 1de I'article36 ou ailleurs dans la convention, que les fonc-
tions consulai~espermettent iileurstitulaires de faire officeeux-rn6mesde
reprksentants en justice, ni d'intervcnir plus direclement dans le systime
dejuslicc pcnale. C'estce que confirmeen effet le libelledu paragraphe 2
de l'article 36 de la convention. Par consequent, ni les temes de la
conventiondans leur sensordinaire, ni son objet et son but ne permettent
de penser que {(sansretard)) doit s'cntcndrc par {timmediatementaprks
I'arrestation et avant l'interrogatoireb.
86.La Cour rclkve en outre que, quellesque soient lesincertitudes dcs
travaux prepara~oires, ceux-ei ne viennent pas davantagc ktayer cette tion. During the diplomatic conf'crence,the conference's expert, former
Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, explained to
the delegatcs that the words "without undue delay" had bcen introduced
by the Commission, after long discussion in both the plenary and draft-
ing committee, to allow for special circumslanccs which might permit
information as to consular notification notlo be givenat once. Germany,
the only one of two States to present an amendment, proposed adding
"but at latest withinone month". There was an extended discussion by
many different delegates as to what such outer time-limit would be
amptable. During that debate no delegate proposed "immediately". The
shortest specific period suggested was by the United Kingdom, namely
"promptly" and no later than "48 hours" afterwards. Eventually, in the
absence of agreement on a precise time period, the United Kingdom's
other proposal to delete the word "undue" was accepted as the position
around which delegatescould converge. It isalso of interest that there is
no suggestion in the travaux that the phrase "without delay7'mighthave
different meanings in each of the three sets of circumstancesin which itis
used in Article 36, paragraph 1 (bJ.
87. The Court thus finds that "wizhout delay" is not necessarily tobe
intcrprcted as "immediately" upon arrest. It further observes that during
the Conference debates on this term, no delegate made any connection
with the issue of interrogation.hc Court considers that the provision in
Article 36, paragraph I (b), that the receiving Stale authorities "shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights" cannot be intcr-
. preted to signifythat the provision of such information must necessarily
precede any interrogation, so chat the commencement of interrogation
before the information is given would be a breach of Article 36.
88. Although, by application of the usual rulesofin~erpre~ation,"with-
out delay" as regards the duty to inform an individual under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), is not to be understood as necessarilymeaning "irnrnc-
diately upon arrest", there is nonetheless a duty upon the arresting
authorities.to give that information to an arrested person as soon as it is
realized that the personisa foreign national, or once therare grounds to
think that the person is probablya foreign national.
89. With one exception, no information as to entitlement to consular
notification was given in any of the casescited in paragraph 77 within
any ofthe various time periods suggested by the delegatesto the Confer-
ence on the Vienna Convention, or by the United States itself (see para-
graphs 81and 86above). Indeed, the information was giveneither not at
allor at periods very significantlyremoved from the time of arrest. the
case of Mr. 9uBrez (case No. lo), the defendant was informed of his AVENA ET AUTRES(ARR~T) 49
interpretation. Au cours de la confkrence diplomatique, l'expert de la
conference, ancienrapporteur spkcialde la Commissiondu droit intema-
tional, expliqua aux dklkguksque l'expression{(sansretard injustifik~
avait Ctepresentee par la Commissionaprks une longue discussion,tant
en dance plkniire qu'au sein du comite de rtdaclion, pour tenir cornpte
de circonstances spkciales enraison desquellesl'information relativeitla
notification consulairepourrait ne pas ktre donnke tout de suite. L'AHe-
magne, I'un des deux Etats qui prksentkrent un amendement, proposa
pour sa part d'ajouterrcetau plus tard dans le dClaid'un mois)).De nom-
breux representantss'exprimkent longuernentsur lepoint de savoir si un
dClaimaximal commecelui-liiserait acceptable. Lors de ce dkbal, aucun
representant ne proposa d'employer le mot crirnrnkdiatementn.Le dC-
lai precisle plus court fut celuiproposCpar le Royaume-Uni, en I'occur-
rencecrpromptement ecpas plustard que crquarante-huitheures))aprk
Finalement, faute d'accord sur un dklai precis, I'autre proposition du
Royaurne-Uni, qui Ctait de supprimer le mot crinjustifik)),fut retenue
cornrneEaposition la plus gCnCralementacceptable.11est kgalementintC-
ressant de constater que rien dans les lravaux preparatoires n'indique
que l'expressionrtsans retard)) pourrait avoir des sens differents dans
chacun destrois contextes particlrliersoh elleest employeea I'alinCabJ
du paragraphe 1 de I'article36.
87. La Cour conclut de ce qui prtckde que l'expressioncrsansretard))
ne doit pas nkcessairementEtreinterprktte cornme signifiant ({irnmkdia-
tement})aprb l'arrestation. Elle observe en outre que, au cours des
debats de la confkrenceBce sujet, aucun reprisentant ne fit le rnoindre
lien enlre cetle expression et la question de I'inzerrogatoire.La Cour
considere que la disposition figurant i I'alinkab) du paragraphe I de
I'article6, qui impose aux autoritis de 1'Etatde rttsidenced'informer
ccsansretard ,..l'intkresskde ses droitsn, ne saurait Ctre interpretee
commesignifiant qu'il Caulnicessairementfournircetteinformation avant
lout interrogatoire, si bienque commencer un interrogaloire avant que
I'inrormationne soit donnke constituerait une violation de I'article36.
88. MEme si, en application des rkgles habituelles d'intcrpritatian,
l'expression ({sans retard)) visant l'obligation d'informer un individu
conformkment a t'alinea b) du paragsaphe 1 de l'articl36 ne doit pas
nCcessairernentEtre comprisc comme signifiant crimmkdiaternentnaprh
I'arrestation,lesautoriles ayant procCdCa l'arrestationn'enont pas rnoins
I'obligationde donner cette information a toute personnearr2tCeaussit8t
que sa nationalitt:Ctrangereest etablie, ou des qu'il existedes raisons de
croireque cette personneest probablementun ressortjssantitranger.
89. Dans aucun des cas mentionnks au paragraphe 77 ci-dessus, sauf
un seul,I'infornlarionrelativeau droitA la notification consulairen'a etC
donnkedans l'unou l'autredes diffkrentsdklaisavanckspar lesreprben-
tants h la confkrencede Vienneou les Etats-Unis eux-mkmes(voir para-
, graphes 81et 86 ci-dessus).En effet, soit il naycu aucune information,
soit celle-ai6tt5effectuketrh longtemps apres l'arrestation. Dans lecas
de M. Juiirez(cas nolo), l'ac~usi a Ctiinformi:de sesdroits consulaires50 AVENA AND 0TE.IERS(JUDGMEN'I')
consular rights 40 hours after his arrest. The Court notes, however, that
Mr. Juirez? arrest report statedthathe had been born in Mexico; more-
over, therehad been indicationsof his Mexicannationality from thc time
of his initial interrogationy agents of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) Lbllowinghis arrest. It EoIlowsthat Mr. Juiirez'sMexican
nationality was apparent from the outset of his detention by the United
Statesauthorities. In these circumstances, in accordance with its interpre-
tation of the expression "without delay" (see paragraph 88 above), the
Court concludes that theUnited States violated the obligation incumbcnt
upon it under Article36, paragraph 1 (BJ,to inform Mr. Juarez without
delay of his consular rights. The Court notcs that the same finding was
reached by a California Superior Court, albeit on different grounds.
90. The Court accordingly concludes that, with respect to each of the
individualslistedin paragraph 16,with the exception of Mr. Salcido (case
No. 22; see paragraph 74 above),the United Stateshas violaled its obli-
gation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention to
provide information to the arrested person.
91. As noted above, Article 36, paragraph I (b), contains three
elements. Thus far, the Court has bccn dealing with the right of an
arrested person tobe informed that he may ask for his consular post lo
be notified. The Court now turns to another aspect of Article 36,
paragraph 1 (h), The Court finds the United States is correct in observ-
ing that the fact that a Mexican consular post was not notified under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (151does not of necessityshow that the arrested
person was not inlbm~edof his rights under that provision. He may
have been informed and declined to have hisconsular post notified.Thc
givingof the information is relevant, however, for satisfying the clement
in Article36, paragraph 1 (A) ,n which the other two elements thcrcin
depend.
92. In only two caseshas the United States claimed that the arrested
person was informed or hisconsular rights but asked for the consular
post not to be notified. These arMr. luirez (case No. 10)and Mr. So-
lache (case No. 47).
93. The Court is satisfied that whcn Mr. Juirez (case No. 10)was
informed of his consular rights 40 hours after his arrest (see para-
graph 89) he chose not to have his consular post notified. As regards
Mr. Solache(caseNo. 471,however, itis not sufficientlyclcar to the Court,
on the evidencebefore it, that he requested that hisconsular post should
not be notified.Indeed, the Court has not been provided withany reasons
as to why, if a request of non-notification was made, the consular post
was then notifiedsome three months latcr.
94. In a further three cases, the United States alleges that the con-
sular post was formally notifiedof the detention of one of its Mexican51 AYENA AND OTI4ERS(JUDGMENT)
nationals without prior information to the individual as to his consular
rights.These are Mr. Covarrubias (case No. 6), Mr. Hernandez (case
No. 34) and Mr. Reyes (case No. 543.The United States further con-
tends that the Mexicanauthorities were contacted regarding the case of
Mr. Loza (caseNo. 52).
45. The Court notes that, in the case of Mr. Covarrubia(caseNo. 61,
the consular authorities learned from third parties of his arrest shortly
after it occurred.Some 16 months later, a court-appointed interpreter
requested that the consulate intervene in the case prior to trial. It would
appear doubtrul whether an interpreter can be considered a competent
authority for triggering theinterrelated provisions of Article, para-
graph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention. In the caseofMr. Reyes (case
No. 54), the United States has simply told the Court that an Oregon
Department of Justice attorney had advised United States authorities
that both the District Attorney and the arresting detective advisedhe
Mexicanconsular authorities of his arrest. No information is givenas to
when this occurred, in relation to theate of his arrest. Mr. Reyes did
receiveassistance beforehis triaIn these two cases,the Court considers
that, evenon thehypothesisthat the conduct of the United Stateshad no
serious consequencesfor the individuals concerned, it did nonetheless
constitutea violation of the obligations incumbent upon the United
States under Article36, paragraph I (h).
96. In the case of Mr. Loza (case No. 523,a United States Congress-
man from Ohio contacted the Mexican Embassy on behalf of Ohio
prosecutors, some four months after the accused's arrest, "to enquire
about the procedures for obtaininga certified copyof Loza's birth cer-
tificate". The Court hasot been provided witha copy of the Congress-
man's letter and is therefounable to ascertain whether itexplained that
Mr. Loza had been arrested. The response from the Embassy (which
is also not included in the documentation provided to the Court) was
passed by the Congressman to the prosecuting attorney, who then asked
the Civil Registry of Guadalajara for a copy of the birth certificate.
This request made no specificmention ofMr. Loza'sarrest. Mexicocon-
tends that its consulate was neverformally notifiof Mr. Loza'sarrest,
of which it only became aware after he had been convicted and
sentenced to death. Mexico includesthe case of Mr. Lord among those
in which the United States was in breach of its obligation of consular
notification. Taking amount of all these elements, and in particular
o€ the fact that the Embassy was contacted four months after the
arrest, and that the consular post became aware of the defendant's
detention only after hc had been canvicted and sentenced, the Court
concludes that in the caseof Mr. Loza the United States violated the
obligation ol' consular notification without delay incumbent upon it
under Article36, paragraph 1(b). AVENA ET AU't'KES (ARR~T) 51
ressortissant de ce pays, sansque cette personne ait ktk prealablement
Enformkede ses droifs consulaires. I1s'agit des cas de M. Covarrubias
(cas no 6)'de M, Hernandez (cas nu 34)et de M. Reyes (cis n" 54). Les
Etats-Unis affirment en outre gue lesautoritks mexicainesont ktecontac-
tkes au sujet du cas de M. Loza (casno 52).
95. La Cour note que, dans le cas de M. Covarrubias @asnu6), les
autoritks consulaires ont Cteverties de son arrcstation par des tiers peu
de temps apris celle-ciUn interprite disigne par lejuge a demand6 envi-
ran seizemois plus tard que leconsulat intervienne dans l'affaire avant le
procks. 11parail douteux qu'un interprite puisse Ctreconsidere cornme
une autoritk competenle pour hire appliquer lesdispositions interdkpen-
dantes de l'alinkab) du paragraphe 1dc I'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne. Dans le cas de M. Reyes (cas nu 541, les Etats-Unis se sont
contentks de dire 2ila Cour qu'un procureur du dkpartement de lajustice
de ]'Oregonavait fait savoir aux auloritks des Etats-Unis que le District
Attorraey etI'inspecteur ayant procSdC itI'arrestation de cette personne
avaient tous deux prevenu Ics autoritks consulaires mexioaincs de cette
arrestation. Aucun ClkrnentdYnForrnationn'estdonne quant au moment
oh cela s'est produit, par rapport 6 la date d'strrestation. M. Reyes a
effcctivementreCuune aide avant son proch. Dans ces deux cas, la Cour
considkre que le comportement des Etats-Unis, i supposer mCme qu'il
n'ait pas entrain6 de graves consequences pour les interessks, n'en cons-
titue pas rnoinsune violalion desobligations qui leur incornbent en vertu
de l'alinea Bj du paragraphc 1 de I'article36.
96. Dans Ic cas de M. Loza (cas no521,un membre du Congrks des
Etats-Unis pour 1'Ohioavait priscontact avec I'ambassade du Mexique
au nom des procureurs de I'Ohio,quatre mois environ apr&sl'arrestation
de I'llccus@,ccen vue de se renseigner sur les prouidures permettant
d'obtenir une copie certifiee conforme de I'actcde naissance dc Coza~.
La Cour n'a pasrecu copie de la lettredu membre du C0ngri.s et est par
suitedans I'impossibilitkde determiner selleprecisait que M. Loza avait
ttt arrete.La riponse de l'ambassade (quine figure pas davantage dans
la documentation fournie la Cour) ful transmise par lemembre du
CongrZs au procureur chargi de la poursuite qui demanda alors au
bureau de 1'Ctatcivil de Guadalajara une copie de I'acte de naissance.
Cettc demande nE fait pas specifiquement mention de l'arrestation de
M. Loza. Le Mexique soutient que son consulat n'a jamais requ formel-
lementnotificationde l'arrestation de M. Loza, dont iln'aeuconnaissance
qu'aprh quc l'interesseeut CtC dkclark coupable et condarnnk a la peine
capitale. Le Mexiqueinclut le cas de M. Loza parmi ceux dans Icsquels
lesEtats-Unis ont violeleur obligation de notification consulaire. Compte
tenu de tous ces eltments et en particulier du fait que l'ambassade a Ctb
contactke quatre mois apri-s l'arrestation et que Ie poste consulaire n'a
appris la dktention de l'interesst qu'apris le verdict de culpabilitk et la
condamnation, la Cour conclut que, dans le cas de M. Loza, les Etats-
Unisont violCI'obligation denotification consulaire sans retard qui Ieur
incornbeen vertu de I'alinkab) du paragraphc 1de I'article 36. 97. Mr. Hcrniindez (case No. 34)was arrested in Texas on Wednesday
15 Octobcr 1997.The United States authorities had no reason to believe
he might have American citizenship.The consular post was notified the
followingMonday, that isfivedays (corresponding to only threc working
days) thereafter.The Court finds that, in the circumstances, lhc United
Statcs did notify the consular post without delay, in accordanw with its
obligation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (h).
88. In the first of its final submissions, Mexico also asks the Court
to find that the violations it ascribes to the United States in rcspect of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), have also deprived "Mexico of its right to
provide consular protection and the 52 nationaldright to receive such
protection as Mexico would provide under Article 36 (1) (a) and (c)
of thc Convention".
99. The relationship between the three subparagraphs of Article 36,
paragraph 1, has been described by the Court in its Judgment in
the LaCrund case (I.C.J. Reporr~ 2001, p. 492, para. 74) as "an
interrelated r6gime". Thc legal conclusions to bc drawn from that
interrelationship necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. In the
LaGrund case, the Court found that the failure for 16 years lo inform
the brothers of their right to havc their consul notified effcclively pre-
vented the exercise of other rights that Germany might have chosen to
exerciseunder subparagraphs (a) and (cj.
100. Ilisnecessaryto revisitthe interrelationship of the three subpara-
grnphs of Article 36, paragraph 1,in the lighl of the particular facts and
circumstances of the prcsentcase.
101. The Court would first recall that, in the case of Mr.Juhrez (case
No. 10) (seeparagraph 93 above), whcn the defendant was ialbrmcd af
his rights, he declinedto have hisconsular posznotilicd. Thus in this case
lhere was no violation of either subparagraph la)or subparagraph (c)
of Article 36,paragraph 1.
102. In the remaining cases,because of the failure of the United States
to acl in conformity with Article 36, paragraph I (b), Mexico was in
effect prccluded (in some cases totally,and in some cases for prolonged
periods of time) from exercisingits right under paragraph 1 (a) to com-
municate with its nationals and have accessto them. As the Court has
already had occasion to explain, il is immaterial whether Mexico would
have offered consular assistance, "or whether a different verdict would
have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred these
rights" (I.CX Reporrs2001, p, 492, para. 74),which might havc been
acted upon.
103. The same is true, pari pcr.rsu,of ccrtain rights identified in sub-
paragraph (c): "consular officers shall havethe right to visit a national
or the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, and to con-
verse and correspond with him . ..". 97. M. Hernilndez (cas no 34) a ite arrete au Texas le tnercredi
15octobre 1997. Lesautorites des Etats-Unis n'avaient aucune raison dc
penser qu'ilaurait pu avoir la ciloyennetkamkricaine. Le poste consulaire
a @tCaverti de son arrestation le lundi suivant, soit cinq jours aprks,
I
dont trois seulement ktaicnt ouvrables. La Cour estirne que, dans ces cir-
constanas, les Etats-Unis ont averti sans retard le poste consulaire,
conformkmcnt i l'obligation qui est la leur cn vertu de 1'aiini.ah) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article 36.
98. Dans la premike de ses conclusions finales, le Mexique prie kgale-
ment la Cour de dtre que lesviolations de l'alinea b) du paragraphe 1dc
I'article36 qu'il attribue aux Etats-Unis ont aussi privi: ctleMexique de
son droit d'accorder sa protection consvlairc et prive lescinquante-deux
ressortissantsmexicainsdc leur droit de beneficierde la protection que le
Mexiquelcur aurait accordccconformkment aux alinkasa) et c) du para-
graphe 1de I'article36 de la convcnlionn.
99. Le lien entre les trois alinCasdu paragraphe I de I'arlicle36 a ete
qualifiC par la Cour, dans I'arr2t rendu en I'affaire LaGranrl (C.I.J.
Recueil 2001, p. 492, par. 74)' de aregime dont Ics divers dements sont
interdependantsa. Les conclusions a tirer en droit dc cette interdkpen-
dance dkpendent necessairement des faits de I'espi-m.Dans l'affairc
LuGrund, la Cour a estime que le fait de ne pas avoir informi. pendant
seize ans les freres de lcur droit B la notification consulairc a effective-
ment fait obstacle iI'excrcicedes autres droits que 1'Allemagncaurait pu
decidcr d'exercer en application des alin6as a) et c).
100. I1 y a lieu de rkcxaminer E'interdtpcndance des trois alinkas du
paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 h la lumike des faits et circonstrtncesparti-
culiers de la prescnte espece.
101. La Cour rappellera tout d'abord que M. Jurirez (cas no 10 ;voir
paragraphe 93 ci-dessus), lorsqu'ila Cti.informe de ses droits, a refusk
qu'une notification soit adresske h son poste consulaire. I1n'y a dkslors
dans ce cas v~olationni de I'alinkaa) ni de I'alineac) du paragraphe 1 de
I'article36.
102. Dans les autres cas, puisque les Elals-Unis n'ont pas agi confor-
rnkment a I'alineabj du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36, le Mexique a CtC
cffectivement emp2che (totalement dans certains cas, el pendant long-
temps dans d'aulres) d'exercerson droit, en application de l'alinka u) du
paragraphe 1, de cornmuniquer avec ses rcssortissants et dc se rendre
auprks d'cux. Comme la Cour a dejh eu l'occasion de I'cxpliquer, peu
importe de savoir si le Mexique aurait apporik l'assistanceconsulaire {(et
si un verdict diffkrcntaurait alors CtCprononck. I1suffitde constaler que
la convention confkrait ccs droits)>(C.1.J.Recueil2001, p. 402, par. 74),
qui auraient pu &treutilids.
103. I1en va tout autant pour certains droits enoncks l'alineac):
t[liesfonctionnaires consulaires ont le droit dcse:rendre auprks d'un res-
sorlissant de 1'Etatd'euvoiqui est incar&&, en Ctatde detention preven-
tive ou toute autre forme dc detention, de s'entretenir et de corrcspondre
avec lui..)).53 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
104.On the other hand, and on the particular facts of this case, no
such generalized answer can he given as regards a further entitlement
mentioncd in subparagraph (c), namely, the right ofconsular officers"to
arrangc for [the]legalrepresentation" of the foreign national. Mexico has
laid muchemphasis in this litigation upon the importance of consular
officersbeing able lo arrange for such representation before and during
trial, and especiallyt sentencing, in cases in which a severepenalty may
be imposed. Mexicohas further indicated thc importance of any financial
or other assistance that consular officersmay provide to defcncecounsel,
intcr aliu for investigationof the defendant's familybackground and
mcntal condition, when such information is relevant to the casc. The
Court observes that the exerciseof the rights or the sending State under
Article36, paragraph 1 (c), depends upon notification by the authorities
of the receiving State.t may be, however, that information drawn to the
attention of the sending State by other means maystill enable itsconsular
officers to assist in arranging legal representation Tor its national. In
the following cases, the Mexican consular authorities learned of their
national's detention in time to provide such assistance, eithcr through
notification by United States authorities (albeit belatedly in terms of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (h)) or through other channels: Renavides
(case No. 3);Covarrubias (case No. 6); EsquiveI (case No. 7); Hoyos
(case No. 9); Mendoza(case No. 17); Ramirez (case No. 20); Sanchez
(case No. 23); Verano (case No. 27); Zamudjo (case No. 29); Gomez
(case No. 33); Hernindez (case No. 34); Ramires (case No. 41); Rocha
(case No. 42); Solache (caseNo. 47); Carnargo [case No. 49) and Rcyes
(case No. 54).
105. In relation to Mr. Manriquez (case No. 14), the Court lacks pre-
cise information as to when his consular post was notified. It is merely
given to understand that it was two years prior to conviction, and that
Mr. Manriquez himself had never been informed of his consular rights.
There is also divergence between the Parries in regard to the case of
Mr. Fuentes (caseNo. 15), where Mexico claims it became aware of his
detention during trial and the United States says this occurred during
jury selection, prior to the actual commencement of the trial. In thc
case of Mr. Arias (case No. 44, the Mexican authorities became aware
of his detention less than one week before the commencement of the
trial. Inthose three cases, the Court concludes that the United States
violated its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1(c).
106. On this aspect of the case, the Court thus concludes:
(1) that the United States committed breaches of the obligation incum-
bent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Con-
vention to inform detained Mexican nationals or their rights under AVENA ET AUTRES (ARRET) 54
cel alinea, dans le cas des cinquante etune personnes suivantcs:
M. Avena (cas nu I), M. Ayala (casno 21, M. Benavides (cas n" 31,
M. Carrcra (cas no41,M. Conlreras (casn" 51, M. Covarrubias (cas
no 6$,M. Esyuivel (cas no 7), M. Gomez (cas nu8), M. Hoyos (cas
no 9), M. Juarez (cas nu 101,M. L6pez (cas no 1I), M. Lupercio (cas
nu 123,M. Maciel (casnu 131,M. Manriquez (cas no 14),M. Fuentes
(cas nu 151, M. Martinez (cas no 161, M. Mendoza (cas no 17),
M. Ochoa (cas no 18),M. Parra (cas no19), M. Rarnirez (cas no 201,
M. Sala2ar (casnu211,M. SGnchez(cas no 23),M. Tafoya (cas no24),
M. Valdcz (casn" 25), M. Vargas (casno 26), M. Verano (cis no 271,
M. Zamudio (cas no 29),M. Alvarez(cas n"30), M. Fierro (cas no 3I),
M. Garcia (cds no 321, M. Gbrnez (cas no 33, M. Hernandez (cas
no 34),M. Ibarra (casnu 351,M. Leal (cas no36),M. Maldonado (cas
no 371,M. Medellin(cas no38), M. Moreno (cas no 39), M. Plata (cas
no 40), M. Rarnirez (cas no 411,M. Rocha (casn" 423, M. Regalado
(cas no43), M. Arias (cas n" 44j, M. Caballero (cas no451,M. Flores
(casno46),M. Solache (casno47), M. Eong (cas no 48)'M. Camargo
(cas no491, M. Perez (cslsno 51j, M. Loza (cas no 52M. Torres (cas
no 53) ctM. Reyes (cas no 54);
2) que les Etats-Unis ont manque sileur obligation, en vertu de I'ali-
nea b) du paragraphe 1de I'article36:de notifier au poste consulaire
du Mexique la dklenlion des ressortissants dccc pays enumkrQ$ l'ali-
nka 1)ci-dessus,sauf dans lescas de M. Juarez (cas nu 103et M. Her-
n6ndez (cas no 34);
3) que, du hit des violations par les Etats-Unis de I'alinCah) du para-
graph~1de l'article36 visEesiiI'alinea23ci-dessus,lesEtals-Unis ont
egalemcntviol6l'obligation qui leurincornbeen vertu de l'alinuJ du
paragraphe 1 de I'article36 de la convention de Vienne de permettrc
aux fonctionnaires consulaires mexicains de communiquer avec leurs
ressortissantet de se rendre auprisdkux, ainsi que l'abligation qui
leur ~ncornbeen vcrlu de I'alinCac) du paragraphe1de ce m&mear-
ticleconcernant le droit des fonctionnaires consulaires de se rendre
auprks de leurs ressortissants qui sont dktenus;
4) que, du hit de:ces violatiorls de l'alihj du paragraphe 1 de I'ar-
ticlc36commisespar lesEtats-Unis, ceux-ciont egalement violel'obli-
gation qui leur iaicornbeen vcrlu de l'alic)du paragraphe 1de cet
arliclc de permettre aux fonctionnaires consulaires mexicains de pour-
voir a la reprksentation en justice de leurs ressortissants, dans les cas
suivants: M. Avena (casno 11 , . Ayala (cas no 21, M. Carpera (cas
n" 4), M. Contreras (casno 51,M. Gbmez (cas no 81,M. Lopez (cas
no II), M. Lupcrcio (cas no 12),M. Maciel(cas no 13)M. Manriquez
(cas 11" 14), M. Fuelltes (cas no 151, M. Martinez (cas no 16),
M. Ochoa (casno I$), M. Parra (casno 19),M. Salazar (cas no21),
M. TaCoya(cas no 24)' M. Valdez (cas no25),M. Vargas (cas no261,
M. Alvarez (cas nu 301,M. Fierro (cas nQ31), M. Garcia (cas no32),
M. Ibarra (casno 351,M. Leal (cas no 36),M. Maldonado (cas no 37),
M. Medellin (cas nQ381,M. Moreno (cas nu391,M. Plata [cas no401,55 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
Flores (case No. 46),Fong (caseNo. 48), Perez (caseNo. Sl), Loza
(case No. 52)and Torres (caseNo. 53).
107. In its third final submission Mexicoasks the Court to adjudge
and declarethat
"the United Statesviolated its obligationsunder Article 36 (2)of the
Vienna Convention by failing to provide meaningful andeffective
reviewand reconsideration ofconvictionsand sentences impairedby
a violation of Article 36 (I)".
108. Article 36, paragraph 2, provides :
"The rights referred to in paragraph 1of this article shallbe exer-
cised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso, however,that the said lawsand regu-
lations must enable full effectlo be given to the purposes for which
thc rightsaccorded under this articleare intended."
109. In thisconnection, Mexico has argued that the United States
"Byapplyingprovisionsof itsmunicipal lawto defeat or foreclose
remedies forthe violation of rights conferred by Article 36 - thus
failingto provide meaningful review and reconsideration of severe
sentencesimposed in proceedings that violated Article 36- ... has
violated, and continues to violate, the Vienna Convention."
More specifically,Mexicocontends that:
"The United States uses several municipallegal doctrines to pre-
vent finding any legal effect from the violations of Article 36.First,
despitethis Court'sclear analysisin LuGrand,US courts, at both the
state and federal level,continue to invoke default doctrines to bar
any review of Article 36 violations - even when the national had
been unaware of his rights to consular notification and communica-
tion and thus his abilityto raise their vioIation as an issue at trial,
due to the competent authorities' failureto comply with Article36."
110. Againstthis contention by Mexico,the United States arguesthat:
"the criminal justice systems of the United States address all errors
47 AVENA ET AU.1-KES(ARKST) 55
M.Regalado (casno431,M.Arias(casno44),M. Caballero(cas nn 451,
M. Flores (cas no 461, M. Fong (cas no 48), M. PCrez(cas no 511,
M. Loza(cas no52) ct M. Torres (cas n"57).
107. Dans sa troisiime conclusion finale,le Mexique priela Cour de
dire et juger que
({lesEtats-Unis ont violelesobligations qui leur incornbent en vertu
du paragraphe 2 de I'articlc36de la convcnlion dc Vienneen ne per-
mettant pas un rkexamenet une revision vkritables et effectifsdes
verdictsdeculpabilitCcl dcs pcinesentachksd'uneviolation du para-
graphe 1de l'article36 )).
108. Le paragraphe 2 de l'article36 stipule que
{{Lcsdroits visks au paragraphe 1 du prksent article doivent
s'exercerdans le cadre dcs lois ct riglcmentsdc I'Etat de residence,
ktant entendu, toutefois, quecesloiset reglementsdoivent pennettre
la pleinerkalisation des fins pour lesquellesles droits sont accordes
cn vertudu present articleH
109. Lc Mcxique a soutenu i cetCgardque les Etats-Unis,
cr[e]nappliquant lesdispositionsde leur droit interne pour rejeterour
empicher les recours au titrede la violadon des droils confkrespar
l'article6- et en ne perrnettant pas, de ce fait, un rkexamenet une
revisioneffectifsdes peinessbveresimpostcs au tcrme dc prockdures
entachkes dc violationsde I'articl36 - ..ont violeet continuent de
violer lconvention de Vieme)).
En particulier, le Mexique fait valoir que:
(LesEtats-Unis s'appuientsur plusieursdoctrinesde droit interne
pour empecherque soientattachkesdesconsbquencesjuridiques aux
violationsde l'articl36.En premier lieu,malgrk la claireanalyse qui
a CtCfaite par la Cour dans I'affaireLuGraad, lesjuridictions amC-
ricaines,tant etatiques que fkdtralcs, continuenh invoquer la regle
de la carenceprocCdurakpour hire obstacle a toutexamendes vio-
lations de l'article- mCmesi Icressorlissantn'etait pas conscient
de sesdroits h la notification et a la communication consulaires et,
partant, du fait qu'ilpouvait invoquerleurviolation lorsde son pro-
cis,prtciskment parce que les autorites compktentes n'avaient pas
respecte l'article36))
110. A cela, les Etals-Unis repondent que:
<<les systemesde justice penaie des Etats-Unis permettent l'exarnen in process through both judicial and executive clemencyproceed-
ings, relyingupon the latter when rulesof default haveclosedout the
possibility of the former. That is, the 'laws and regulations' of the
United States provide for the correction of mistakes that may bc
relevant to a criminal defendant to occur through a combination
of judicial review and demcncy. These processes together, working
with other competent authorities, give fulleffst to the purposes for
which Article 36 (1) is intended, in conformity with Article 36 (2).
And, insofar as a brcach of Article 36 (1) has occurred, these pro-
cedures satisfy the remedial function of Article 38 (2) by allowing
the United States to provide review and reconsideration of convic-
tionsand sentences consistent with La Grrrrzd."
111. The "procedural default" rulc in United States law has already
bccn brought to the attention of the Court in the LaCrundcase. The fol-
lowing brief definitionof the rulewas provided by Mexico in its Mcmo-
rial in this case and has not been challenged by Ihc United States: "a
defendant who could have raised, but failsto raise,a legal issueat trial
willgenerally not be permitted to raise it in future proceedings,on appeal
or in a petition for writ of huheas (:orpus".The rule requires exhaustion
of remedies, inter ulirral lhc statc level and before a Izuheascorpus
motion call be filed with federal courts. In the LaGrandcase, the rule in
question was applied by United Stales federal courts; in the present case,
Mexico also complains of the application of the rulc in certain state
courts of criminal appeal.
112. The Court has alrcady considered the application of the "pro-
cedural default" rule, alleged by Mcxico to be a hindrance to the full
implementation of the international obligations of the United States
under Article 36,in the LaGrandcase, when the Court addressed the issue
of its implicationsfor the application of Article 36,paragraph 2, of the
Vienna Convention. The Court emphasized that "a distinction must be
drawn between that rulc as such and its specificapplication in the present
case". The Court stated:
"In itself, the rule does not violate Articl36of the Vienna Con-
vention. The problem arises when the procedural default rule does
no1allow the detained individual to challenge a conviclion and sen-
tence by claiming,in reliance on Article36,paragraph 1,of the Con-
vention, that the competent national authorities failed to comply
with their obligation to provide the requisite consular information
'without delay',thus preventing the person from seekingand obtain-
ing consular assistance from the sending State." (I.CJ. Reports
2001, p. 497, para. 90.) dc toules leserreurs commises, i la fois dans lecadrc dc la procidure
judiciaire et du recours en griiceaupres dc l'exicutif, s'en remettant
;ce dernier lorsque la rigle de la carence procklurale ne permet pas
de recourir h la premiere. Celasignifieque Ees{(loiset rkglemcnts)>
dcs Elals-Unis permettent de corriger leserreurs dont un accuse peut
Etre victime, correction qui s'opkre conjoinlcment par les recours
juridictionnels et le recours cn grice. L'ensemblede ces prockdures,
avcc la collaboratio~~d'autres autoritis compitentes, assure la pleinc
realisation des finsdu paragraphe 1de l'article 36,conformCmcntau
paragraphe 2 de l'article 36. Et en cas dc violation du paragraphe 1
de l'article 36, ces ptockdures rcnlplissent la fonction de remlde du
paragraphc 2 dc I'articlc36 en permettan1 aux Etats-Unis d'assurer
un riexarnen et une revision des verdictsde culpabilitk ct des peines,
conformkment BI'arrst LuGrund. )>
111. La regle de la cccarenceprockdurale}) (procedural dejuult) en
vigueur aux Etats-Unis a dejh Cle porttc ril'attention de la Cour dans
I'affaireLrrGrund, Dans la presente affaire, la brkve dkfinition que Ic
Mexique a fournie de cette rigle dans son memoirc, ct que lesEtats-Unis
n'ont pas contestke, estla suivante: cdlcdki'cndeurqui aurait pu soulever
une question de droit lors d'un procb, mais ne I'apas fait, n'est gCnCra-
lemenl pas autorisk itIcfairedans lesCtapessuivantes de la procedure, en
appcl ou au stade de la requkte en habeascorpus>).Cette regle CX~~E que
soient CpuisCesles voies de recours, enlre autres au niveau de I'Etat,
avant qu'un recours enhuhem ccorpwp suisse Etreintroduit devant lesjuri-
diclions fedirales, Dans I'affaireLuCralzd,la rkgleen question Claitcelle
qu'avaient appliquee lesjuridictions fkdCralesamkricaincs; dans la pre-
sente espkce,le Mexique se plaint aussi dc I'application de cette rkglepar
certaines cours d'appcl phales au niveau des Etats.
112. La Cour s'est dija penchkedans I'affaire LaGrundsur l'applica-
tion de Ia rkgle dc la {(carcnceprocedurale>), qui selon le Mexique fait
obstacle i la pleine execution par les Etats-Unis des obligations interna-
tionales lcur incombant en vertu de I'article 36 de la convenlion dc
Vienne, lorsqu'ellc a cxamink quelles en ktaient les conskquences pour
l'applicationdu paragraphe 2 de cet article. La Cour a souligne qu'ail y
a lieu d'etablir une distinction enlre cctte rkgle en tant que telle et son
application en l'espice>),dkclaranl :
crEn elle-meme, cette regle ne viole pas I'articlc36 du la conven-
tion de Vienne. Le problkme se pose lorsque la rkgle de la earcnce
procidurale ne permet pas i une personnc delenuc de Fdirerecours
contrc sa condamnation et sa peine en pretendant, sur la base du
paragraphe 1de l'article36de la convention, quelesauloriies natio-
nales cornpdtentes nc sc scraient pas acquittkes de leur obligation
d'informer ({sans retard )> les autoritks consulaires compklentes,
empkhant par la mSme cette personne de solliciter et d'obtenir
I'assislanceconsulaire:de I'Etatd'envoi.)[C. 1J. RecueiI2001, p. 497,
par. 90.)57 AVENA AND OTI.IERS(JUDGMENT)
On this basis, the Court concluded that "the procedural default rule
prevented counsel Forthe LaGrands to effectivelychallenge their convic-
tions and sentences other than on United States constitutional grounds"
(I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 493, para. 91).This statement of the Court seems
equally valid inrclation lo the present case, where a number of Mexican
nationals have been placed exactlyin such a situation.
113. The Court willreturn to this aspect below, in the context of Mexi-
co'sclaims as to remedies. For the moment, the Court simply notes that
the procedural default rule has not been revised, nor has any provision
been made to prevent its application in cases where it has beenIhe failure
of the United States itself to inform that may have precluded counsel
from being in aposition to have raised the question of a violation of the
Vienna Convention in the initial trial. It thus remains the casc that the
procedural default rule may continue to prevent courts from attaching
legal significancetothe fact, inter uliu, that the violationthe rights set
forth in Article 36, paragraph 1, prevented Mexico, in a timely fashion,
from relaining privatccounsel for certain nationals and otherwise assist-
ing in their defence. In such cases, application of the proceduraldefault
rule would havethe effect of preventing "full effect[from being] givento
the purposes Forwhich the rightsaccorded under thisarticleare intended",
and thus violate paragraph 2 of Article 36.Thc Court notes moreover
that in several of the cases cited in Mexico's final submissions the pro-
cedural default rule has already been applied, and that in others it could
be applied at subsequent stages in the proceedings. However, in none of
the cases, savefor the three mentioned inparagraph 114 below, have the
criminal proceedings against the Mexican nationals concerned already
reached a stage at wh~chthere is no further posnbility of judicial re-
examination of those cases;that isto say, all possibilityisnot yet excluded
of "review and reconsideration" of conviction and sentence, as called for
in the LaCrandcase, and as explained further in paragrslphs 128 and fol-
lowing below. It would therefore be premature Forthe Court to concludc
at this stage that,inthose cases, there is alreadya violation of thc obli-
gations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention.
114. By contrast,the Court notes that in the case of three Mexican
nationals, Mr. Fierro (case No. 311,Mr. Moreno (mse No. 391,and
Mr. Torres (case No. 53),conviction and scntence have become final.
Moreover, in the case of Mr. Torres the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals has set an execution date (see paragraph 21 above, in Jne).
Thc Courtmust therefore conclude that, in relation to these three indi-
viduals, the United States is in breach of the obligations incumbent
upon it under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention. Sur cettebase,la Cour a concluque ((lareglede lacarence prockdurale
a empEchkles avocats des LaGrand de remettre en cause de fa~on efi-
cace,si ce n'est sur la base du droit constitutionnel des Etats-Unis, leurs
condarnnations et leurs peinesn (C.I.J. Reuueil 2001, p, 497, par. 91).
Cette conclusion de la Cour parait Ctreaussi vatable dans la prksente
affaire,oh un certain nombre de ressortissantsmexicains sesont retrou-
vCsexactementdans la mdmesituation qu'elle1'Ctaita propos de l'affaire
LaGrand.
113. La Cour reviendra plus loinsur cet aspect, a propos des remedes
demand& par le Mexique. Pour le moment, la Cour se contentera de
noter que la rigle de la carenceprocedurale n'apas CtCreviskeet qu'iln'a
pas davantage Cte pris de dispositions pour ernp&cherson application
dans les cas ou le d6faut d'information imputable aux Etats-Unis eux-
rn2mesn'aurait pas permis aux avocats de souleveren premikreinstance
la question de laviolation de laconvention deVienne.11sepeut ainsjque
la regle de la carence proctdurale continue i ernpEcherIes tribunavx
d'attacher une port& juridique notamment au fait que la violation des
droits knoncksau paragraphe 1 de l'article36 a ernpEchCle Mexique de
retenir en temps utile les services'avocats privkspour assurer la reprC-
sentation de certains de ses ressortissantset de les assister d'autre faqon
dans leur difense. Dans ces hypothkses, I'application de la regle de la
carence prockdurale aurait pour effet d'ernpkher {{lapFeinerkalisation
des finspour lesquelles[djesdroits sont accordksen vertu [dudit]article))
etvioleraitpar conskquentleparagraphe 2 de l'article36.La Cour notera
d'ailleursque dans plusieurs des cas visksdans lesconclusions finalesdu
Mexique la rkglede la carence prockdurale a dija trouvi application et
que dans d'autres elle pourrait Etre appliquke dans la suite de la prod-
dure. Toutefois, les prockdurespknalesengagkescontre les ressortissants
mexicainsn'en sont pas encorearrivks, sauf dans les trois casquiseronr
mentionnes ci-aprb au paragraphe 114, au stade ou il n'existerait plus
aucune possibililkde recoursjudiciaire;autrement dit, iln'estpas encore
exclu que les verdicts de culpabilitk et les peines soient rcrkexaminket
revidsa, commele demandail la Cour dans I'affaireLaCrand, et comme
il seraexpliqukplus avant aux paragraphes 128et suivants. I1serait donc
prkrnaturkde la part de la Cour de conclurea cc stade qu'ily a diji, dans
ces cas, violation des obligations dkcoulant du paragraphe 2 de I'ar-
ticle 36 dela convention de Vienne.
114. En revanche,la Cour releveque trois ressortissants mexicainsont
dkja fait t'objet d'une condamnation dkfinitive;il s'agit de MM. Fierro
(casno 31)'Moreno (casno39)et Torres (cas no 53). Dc plus, dans lecas
de M. Torres, la cour d'nppelpenale de I'Oklahomaa fie une date d'exk-
cution (voirparagraphe 21 injine ci-dessus).La Cour doitdonc conclure
que, a l'kgardde ces trois personnes, lesEtats-Unis ont viol6les obliga-
tions leur incombant en vertu du paragraphe 2 de I'article 36 de la
convention de Vienne.58 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUDGMENT)
115. Having concluded that in most of the cases brought before the
Court by Mexico in the 52 instances, there has been a failure to observe
the obligations prescribed by Article 36, paragraph I (b], of thc Vienna
Convention, the Court now proceeds to the examination of the legal
consequences or such a breach and of what legal remedies should be con-
sidered for the breach.
116. Mexico in its fourth, fifth and sixth submissionsasks theCourt lo
adjudge and dcclare:
"(4) that pursuant to the injuries sufl'eredby Mexico in its own right
and in the exercise of diplomatic protection of its nationals,
Mexico is cntitled to Full reparation for these injuries in the
form of resriiutio i~?inlegrum;
(5)that this restitution consists of the obligation to restore the
status guu unlr by annulling or otherwise depriving of full
force orcfSectthe conviction and sentences of all 52 Mexican
nationals; [and]
(6) that this restitution also includes the obligation to take
all measures necessary to ensure that a prior violation of
Article 35 shall not aKcctthe subsequent proceedings."
117. In support of its fourth and fifth submissions,Mexicoargues that
"lt is wdl-established that the primary form of reparation available to a
State injured by an internationally wrongful act is rrstirutiin intrgrum",
and that "Thc United States is therefore obliged to take the necessary
actlon to restore the srarus quo ante in respect of Mexico's nationals
detained, tried, convicted and sentenced in violation of their intcrnalion-
ally recognized rights." To restore thestatus quo ante, Mexico contends
that "restitution hcrcmust take the form of annulment OFthe conv~ctions
and sentences lhat resulted from the proceedings tainted by the Article 36
violations", and that "It follows from the very nature of rrstilutiothat,
when a violation of an international obligation is manifested in a judicial
act, that act must be annulled and thereby deprived of any force or effect
in the national legal system." Mexico therefore asks in its submissions
that the convictions and sentences of the 52 Mexican nationals be
annulled, and that, in any Suturc criminal proceedings against these 52
Mexican nationals, evidence obtained in breach of Article 36 of the
Yicnna Convention be excluded.
118. The United States on the other hand argues:
"LaCrmrds holding calls for the United States to provide, in each
case, 'review and reconsideration' that 'takes account of the viola- tion, not 'reviewand reversal', not across-the-board exclusions of
evidence or nullification of convictions simply becausea breach of
Article36 (1)occurredand without regard to its effcctupon the con-
viction and sentence and, not .. .'a precise,concrete, stated result:
to re-establish theslutusquo ante"'.
119. The general principleon the legal consequencesof thecommis-
sion of an inlcrnationally wrongful act was stated by the Permanent
Court of International Justicein theFactory ut Chorrbwcaseas follows:
"It is a principle ofinternational law that the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form." [FCLC-
tory at Chorzdw, Jurisdiction, 19.27,P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9,p. 21 .)
What constitutes"reparation in an adequate form" clearly variesdepend-
ing upon the concrete circurnstanws surrounding each case and the pre-
cisenature and scope of the injury, sincethe question has to beexamined
from the viewpoint of whatis the "reparation in an adequate form" that
corresponds to the injury. Pna subsequent phase of the same case, the
Permanent Court went on lo elaborate on this point as follows:
"The essential principlecontained in Iheactual notion of an illegal
act - a principle which seems to be established by international
practice and in particularby the decisionsof arbilral tribunals - is
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipeout all the conse-
quences ofthe illegalact and reestablish the situation whichwould,
in all probability, have existedif that act had not been committed."
(Factory al Chorzdw, Meriis, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17,
p. 47.)
120. In the LaGrand case the Court made a general statement on the
principle involvedas follows :
"The Court considersin this respectthat ifthe United States, not-
withstanding its comrnitrncnt [to ensure implementation of the
specific measuresadopted in performalice of its obligations under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b)], should fail in its obligation of consular
notificationto the detrimentof German nationals, an apology would
not sufficein cases wherethe individuals concerned have been sub-
jected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe
penalties.In the case of such a conviction and sentence, itwould be
incumbcnt upon the United Slates to allow the reviewand reconsid-
eration of the conviction and sentenceby taking account of the vio-
lation of the rights set forth in the Convention. This obligation can
be carried out in various ways.The choice of n-reansmust be left lo
the United States." (LC J. Reporis 2001, pp. 513-514,para. 125.)
121. Similarly. in the present case:the Court's task is to determine
what would be adequate reparation for the violations of Article 36. It
should be clear from what has been observedabove that the internation-
ally wrongful acts committed by the United Stales were the failure of its violation,et non pas ccunrkexamen et une infirntationn, ni une ex-
clusion gknkraledes dements de preuveouI'annulation de la condam-
nation, au seulmotif qu'ilya euviolationdu paragraphe 1del'article36
et sans se demander si cette violation a influk sur la declaration de
culpabilitC et la condamnation, ni ...(tun resultat prkeis, concret,
determine: retablir le statuquo ante)>>>.
119. Le principe gCnCralapplicable aux conskquences juridiques d'un
fait internationalcment illicite a kt6 CnoncCpar la Cour permanente
de Justice internationale, dans l'affaire de I'Usine de Chorzciw, en ces
terrncs: {(C'estun principe dc droit international que la violation d'un en-
gagement enlraine l'obligationde rtparer dans une formeadequate.i}(Usine
de Chorzdw, compttenuc: 1927, C.P.J.I. sErieA nu 9, p. 21.) Quant a
savoir ce qui constitue une ctrkparation dans une forme adkquaten, cela
dkpend, rnanifestement, des circonstances concrkces de chaque affaire
ainsi que de la naturc exacte et de l'importance du prejudice, puisqu'il
s'agit de determiner quelleest la crrkparation dans une forme adequate))
qui correspond riceprkjudice. Dans une phase ultkrieure de la mEme
affaire, la Cour perrnanente a dkveloppe ce point comme suit:
c{Le principe essentiel, qui decoule dela notion rnZrne d'actc illi-
cite et qui semble se dkgager de la pralique internationale, notam-
menede la jurisprudence des tribunaux arbitraux, est que la repara-
tion doit, autant que possible, effacer toutes les conskquences de
I'acte illicite et rktablir 1'Ctatqui aurait vraisemblablemcnt existi si
ledit acte n'avait pasetk commis. )>(U.sinede Chorzdw,fond, 1928,
C.P.J.I. strie A a" 17, p. 47.)
120. Dans l'affaire LaGrand,la Cour a fait la declaration gCnCralesui-
vante au sujet du principe en jeu :
ciLa Cour cstime a cet egard que, si Ics Etats-Unis, en dCpit de
[leur] engagement [d'assurer la mise en &uvre des mesures spkci-
iiques adoptkes en cxtculion de leurs obligations en vertu de I'ali-
nea h) du paragraphe I de l'article361,manquaient a leur obligation
de notification consulaire au dktriment de ressortissants allernands,
des excuses ne sumraient pas dans les cas oh les intkressks auraient
fait I'objetd'une dktention prolongte ou Cte condamnks ides peines
skvkres. Dans le cas d'une telle condamnation. les Etats-Unis
devraient pennettre le rkexarnenet la revision duverdict de culpabi-
lite et de la peine en tenant complcde la violation des droits prkus
par la convention. Celte obligation peut 6tre mise en oeuvrede di-
verses fa~ons. Le choix des moyens doit revenir aux Etats-Unis.))
(C.I.J. Recueil2001',p. 513-514,par. 125.)
121. De la m2me maniire, dans la prksente esptce, il s'agit de deter-
miner quelle serait la riparation adkquate des violationsde l'article 36. I1
ressort clairernent des observations qui preddent que les faits interna-
tionalement illicites des Etats-Unis consistent en ce que leurs autoritks50 AVENA AND OTlIERS (JUDGMENT)
competent authorities to inform the Mexican nationals concerned, to
notify Mexican consular posts and to enable Mexico to provide consuIar
assistance. It follows that the rerncdy to make good lhese violations
should consist in an obligation on thc United States to permit reviewand
reconsideration of these nationals' cases by the Uniled States courts, as
the Court will explain further in paragraphs. 128 ta 134below, with a
view lo ascertaining whether in each case the violation of Article 36com-
mitted by thecompetent authorities causedactual prejudice to the defend-
ant in the process of administration of criminal justice.
122. The Court reaffirms,that the case before it concerns Article 36of
the Vicnna Convention and not the correctness as such of any conviction
or sentencing. The question of whether thc violations of Article 36, para-
graph 1, are to bc regarded as having, in the causal sequence of events,
ultimately led to convictions and scvere penalties is an integral part of
criminal proceedings before the courts of the United States and is lor
them to dctcrmine in the process of review and reconsideration. In so
doing, il is for the courts of the United States to examine the facts, and in
particular the prejudice and its causes, taking account of the violation of
the rights set forth in the Convention.
123. 11 isnot to be presumed, as Mexico asserts, that partial or total
annulment of conviction or sentence providcs the necessary and sole
remedy. In this regard, Mexico cites the recent Judgment of this Court
in the caseconcerning the Arrest Wurranrof II April 2000 (Drmour~rtic
R~public ofthe Congo v. Belgium), in which the "Court ordcred the
cancellation of an arrest warrant issued by a Bclgianjudiciab oKicial in
violation of thc international immunity of the Congo Minister for Foreign
Affairs". However, the present case has clearly to be distinguished from
thc Arrest Wurrant case. In that case,the question of thc legality under
international law of the act of issuing thc arrest warrant against the
Congolese Minister for Forcign Affairs by the Belgianjudicial authori-
ties was itsclfthe subject-rnatlcr of the disputc. Since the Court found
that act to be in violationof intcrnational law rclating to immunity, the
proper legal consequence was Lbrthe Court to order the cancellation of
the arrest warrant in question (1.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 33). By contrast,
in the present case itis not the convictions and senlcnces of the Mexican
nationals which are to be regarded as a violation of international law,
but solely certain breaches of treaty obligations which preceded them.
124. Mexico has further contended that the right to consular notifica-
tion and consular communication under the Vienna Convention is a fun-
damental human right that constitutes part of due process in criminal
proceedings and should be guaranteed inthe territory of each of the Con-
tracting Parties to the Vienna Convention ; according to Mexico, this6 1 AVENA AND OTHERS (JUWMEN'I')
right, as such, is so fundamentalthat its [email protected] pro-
duce the effect of vitiating theentire processf Ihc criminal proceedings
conducted in violation of this fundamental right. Whether or not the
Vienna Convention rights are human rights is not a matter that this
Court need dccide. The Court would, howevcr, observe that neither the
text nor the object and purpose ofthe Convention, nor any indicationin
the travaux prkpnraloires, support the conclusion that Mcxico draws
from its contention in that regard.
125. For these reasons, Mexico'sfourth and fifth submissionscannot
bc upheld.
126.The reasoning of the Court on the fifth submission of Mexicois
equallyvalidinrelation to the sixth submissionof Mexico.In elaboration
of its sixth submission, Mcxicocontends that,
"As an aspcct ofreslitutioin inlegrum, Mcxico is also entitled to
an order that in any subsequent criminal proceedingsagainst the
nationals, statements and confessionsobtained prior to notification
to the national of his right to consular assistance be excluded."
Mexico argues that "The cxclusionaryrule appliesin both common law
and civillawjurisdictions and requires the exclusion of evidencethat is
obtained in a manner that violatesdue proecssobligations", and on this
basis concludesthat
"Thc status of the exclusionaryrulc asa general principle of law
permits the Court to order that the United States is obligated to
apply this principlein respectof statements and confessions givento
United Stateslaw enforcementofficialsprior to thcaccused Mexican
nationals being advised or their consular rights in any subsequent
criminal proceedingsagainst thcm."
127. The Court does not consider that it is necessaryto enter into an
examination of thc merits of thecontention advanced by Mexicothat the
"exclusionary rule"is "a general principle oflawunder Article38 (1) (cJ
of the ... Statute" of the Court. The issue raisedby Mexico in itssixth
submission relatesto the qucstion of what legalconscquencesflow from
the breach of the obligations under Article36,paragraph 1 - a question
whichthe Court has already sufficientlydiscussedabovein relation to the
fourth and the firth submissonsof Mexico.The Court is of the view that
this qucstion is one whichhas to beexamined under the concretccircum-
stances ofeach caseby the United States courts concernedin the process
of their reviewand reconsideration.For this reason, the sixth submission
of Mexicocannot be upheld.
128. While the Court has rejected the fourth, fifth and sixth submis-
sions of Mexicorelating to the remediesfor the breaches by the UnitedMcxiquc, ce droit, en tan1 que tel, est si fondamental quesa violation a
ipsofacto pour cfTeldc vicierl'ensemblede la prockdure penale conduite
cn contravention dudit droit. Sans qu'il lui soit necessaire de se pronon-
cer sur la question de savoir si le droit cn cause est ou non un droit de
l'homrne, la Cour fera observer que ni le tcxtcni I'objel et le but de la
convention, ni aucune indication qui figurerail dans les lravaux pripara-
toires, ne permettent d'arrivek la conclusion que lc Mexique lire de cet
argument.
125. Pour ces motifs, les quatrilme et cinquieme conclusions du Me-
xique nc sauraient &Ireaccueillies.
126. Le raisonncmcnt suivi par la Cour a propos de la cinquikme
conclusion du Mexique vaut egalemcnt pour la sixieme. Dans ses deve-
loppements concernant cette sixiemeconclusion, le Mexique,
c<Ea]titre de son droita la restitutdo iinlegrum, ...demande Cga-
lement Bla Cour d'ordonner que lesdkclarations et les aveux obte-
nus avant que I'intkressCaitCte informi: de son droit a I'assistance
consulaire ne soicnt pas admis dans toute procedure pCnale qui
pourrait Etreengagee ulterieurcmcnt contre scs ressortissants)>.
Le Mexique soutient que rc[l]aregle de l'inadmissibiliti:s'applique tant
dans lcs systkmesde common law que dans les systkmesde droit civil et
impose d'exclurc 1csklkmentsde preuve qui sont obtenus d'une manikre
contraire aux exigenccs d'une proskclure regulii.re)>et, sur cette base,
conclut :
{Puisque la rkglede l'inadmissibilitea le statut de principe genCral
de droir, la Cour peut dkdarer que les Etats-Unis sont tenus d'appli-
quer ce principesiI'Cgarddes dkpositions el dcs aveux recueillispar
les fonctionnairesde police amkricains avant quc Ics ressortissants
mexicains accusks n5aient CtC informes de leurs droits consulaires,
dans toute prockducc pinale qui pourrait &tre engagbe ultkrieure-
ment A leur encontre.)>
127. La Cour n'estime pas nkcessairc d'cxarniner lc bien-fondCde la
thbe du Mexiquc sulon laquelle lacrkgle de I'inadmissibilit>>estccun
desprincipes gkniraux de droit visCsil'alinkac) du paragraphe I de I'ar-
tick 38 du Statut de la Courn. Le point souleve par le Mexique dans sa
sixikmeconclusion est lii: la question de savoir quelles sont lecome-
qucnwsjuridiques qui dkcoulent de la violation desobligations enoncees
auparagraphe i de l'article36de la convention de Vienne, question dont
la Cour a dkji sumsarnment trait6 a propos des quatrikme et cinquieme
conclusions du Mexique. La Cour estime qu'il appartiendra aux tribu-
naux amkricains concernks par le processus de reexamen et de revision
d'examiner cette question 6 la lumibe des circonstances concrktes
propres a chaque eas. Pour ce motif, la sixiemeconclusion du Mexique
ne sauraitEtreaccueillie.
128. Si la Cour n'a pas donne suite aux qwatrikme, cinquieme et
six~emeconclusions du Mexique concernant les mesures a prendre pourSlalehof its international obligationsunder Article 36of the Vienna Con-
vention, the Factremains that such breachcs have been committed, as the
Court has found, and it isthus incumbent upon the Court to specifywhat
remediesare required in order to redress the injury done to Mexico and
to its nationals bythe Unitcd States through non-compliance with those
international obligations. As has already been observed in paragraph 120,
the Court in the LaGrandJudgment stated the gencral principle to be
applied in such cases by way of a remedy to redress an injury of this kind
(I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 513-514, para. 125).
129. In this regard, Mexico'sseventh submission also asks ~hcCourt
to adjudge and declare:
"That to thc extent thatany of the 52convictions or senlcncesare
nol annulled, the United States shall provide, by means of its own
choosing, meaningful and effectivereviewand reconsideration of the
convictions and sentences of thc 52 nationals, and that this obliga-
tion cannot be satisfiedby means of clemency proceedings or iFany
municipal law rule or doctrine [that fails to attach legalsignihcance
to an Article 36 (I) violation] is applied."
130. On this question of "review and reconsideralion", the United
Statcs lakes the position that it has indeed conformed its conduct to the
Lacrand Judgment. In a further elaboration of this point, the United
States argues that "[tlhe Court said in LaCrtrndthat lhe choice of means
for allowing the reviewand reconsideration il called For'must be left'to
the United States", but that "Mexico would not leave this choice to the
United States hut have the Court undertake the review instcad and
decide at once thal thebreach rcquircs the conviction and sentence to bc
set aside ineach case".
131. In stating in its Judgment in the LcrGrand case that "the United
States 01'Arncrica, by trnerms ofils own choosing, shall allow the review
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence" (I.C..J. Reports '
2001, p. 516, para. 128 (7); emphasis added), the Court acknowledged
that the concrete modalities for such reviewand reconsideration should
be left primarily to the United States. It should be underlined, howcvcr,
that this freedom in the choice of means for such reviewand reconsidcra-
tion is not without qualification: as he passage of the Judgrncnt quoted
above rnakcs abundantly clear, such reviewand reconsideration has to be
carried out "by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in
the Convention" (I.C.J. Rcporls ZOUJ,p. 514, para. 125);including, in
particular, the question of lhe lcgal consequences of the violation upon
the criminal procccdings that have followed the violation.
132. Thc United Statesargues (1)"that the Court'sdecisioninLclGrand
in calling for reviewand reconsideration called for a process to re-exam-
ine a conviction and sentencein light of a breach of Article 36"; (2) that,
"in calling for a processof rcview,the Court necessarily impliedthat one
legitimate result of that process might bea conclusion that the conviction
and scntcnce should stand"; and (3)"that the relief Mexico seeksin thiscase is flatly inconsistentwith thc Judgment in LaGrand: it seeks pre-
cisely the award of a substantive outcome that the Lacrand Court
declined to provide".
133. However, the Court wishesto point out that the current situation
in the United States criminal procedure, as explained by the Agent at thc
hearings, is that
"If lhc derendant allegedat trial that af;uilureof consular informa-
tionresulted in harm to u pclrtiouhr right essen~iul[(Ia fairfrial,an
appeals court can review how rhelower courl handledthat claim of
prejudice",
but that
"Ij theforeign nalional did not raise his Arlrcle36 clcriruttriul,
he mayface proceduraI constraints [i.e., the application of the pro-
cedural default rule]on raising that particular claim in direct or col-
lateral judicial appeals" (emphasis added).
As a result,adaim based on the violation of Article 36, paragraph I, of
the Vienna Convention, however meritorious in itself,could be barred in
the courts of the United States by the operation or the procedural default
rule (see paragraph 111 above).
134. It isnot sufficientfor the United States to argue that "[wlhatever
label [the Mexicandefendant] places on his claim, his right ... must and
will he vindicated if il is raisedin someform at trial" (emphasis added),
and that
"Inthat way, even though a failure to label the cornpIaint as a
breach of the Vienna Convention may mean that he has lechnically
speaking forfeited his right to raise this issue as a Vienna Conven-
tion claim,on appeal that failure would not bar him from independ-
ently assertinga claim tl?ahe wasprejudiced becuusr he lucked his
critical protection neededfor u fair trial." (Emphasis added.)
The crucial point in this situation is that, by the operation of the
procedural default rule as it isapplied at present, the defendant is
cffcclively barred from raising the issue of the violation of his rights
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and is limited to seeking the
vindication of his rights under thc Unilcd States Constitution.
135. Mexico, in the latter part of its seventh submission, has stated
that "this obligation [of providing review and reconsideration] cannot bcculpabilitk et de la peine)},et 3) que {(leremede dernandi: par le Mexique
dans la prbente afFaireest absolument incompatibleavec1'arrEt LaCrcrnd:
il vise prkistmcnt un rbullal quant au fond que la Cour a refug
d'accorder dans IZarr5tLaGrandj).
133. La Cour fera toutefois observer que la situation actuelleest, selon
les rkgles de la procidure pknale des Etats-Unis, et comme l'a expliqui.
leur agent lors des audiences, que
cc[l]orsqu'unaccusk a fait valoir en premiere instance que Ie dkfaut
d'inf~rmation con.suluirt.u port4 afleinte d un droiifparliculier qui
revin un uarcruttretr.ssenbit1our I'iyuitt du ppmc2s,unejuridiclion
d'appel peut examinercomment lajuridiction infirieura fruit&celle
rkclamationn,
'%
mais que
ic/s]ile ressorlissant Ptrangcr n'u pas soulevk dc!grief fond& Asup
l'urticbtr36 en premi.@rtriastunce,ispmurruit se trvuver devanl dm
obsracle~.d'ordre prvckdural [a savoir I'application de la regle de la
carence procCdurale]s'il invoque ce grief particulier lors de recours
judiciaires directs ou incidents))1esitaliques sont de la Cour).
En consequence, un recours s'appuyant sur la violation du paragraphe 1
de l'article 36 de la convention de Yienne, si fond&fiit-il en soi, pourrait
Eiredcclart irrccevablcpar lesjuridiclions dcs Elats-Unis, par I'efrede la
rkglede la carence prokdurale (voir paragraphe 111ci-dessus),
134. I1ne suffit pas de faire valoir, cornme le font les Etats-Unis, que
cc[q]ueIleque soit I'appeIlation sous laquelle sa dernande est prksentee,
le ..droit [du defendeur mexicain]sera considkrc cornmejuslifie s'ilcsl
invoqui: sous quelque fbrme gue ce soiten premiere instance)) (les ita-
liques sont de la Cour) et que:
crDe celte maniere, mime siavoir ornis de formuler legrieCcomrnc
une violation de la convention de Vienne peut signifierque [ledBFen-
deur] a, sur un plan technique, perdu son droit dc soulever cette
qucslion au litrcdc la convcnlion de Vienne, cn appel celtc omission
nefcra pas obstacle h cc qu'ilpuisse souteniryu'il a suhiunprkjudiue
purce yu'i!a tf.4privkde ccelteprolection m~entidle, nicessuire pour
I'CquitPd'un proces.)) (Les italiques sont de la Cour.)
Le point crucial, en pareille situation, este, par l'effetde la rkglede la
carence prockdt~raletelle qu'elleest actuellement appliqde, l'interesd xe
voil en failinterdirede soulever la questionde la violation dcs droits que
lui reconnait l'article 36de la convention de Vienne et ne peut que cher-
cher 6 hire valoir ses droits au tilrc de la Constitution des Etats-Unis.
135. Dans la seconde partie de sa septikmeconclusion, le Mexique dit
que crcetteobligation [consistant a assurer le rCexamenet la revision] nesatisfied by means of clemency proceedings". Mexico elaborates this
point by arguing first orall Ihat "the United States's reliancon clemency
proceedings is wholly inconsistent with its obligation to provide a
rcmedy,as that obligation was found by this Court in LaCratnf'. More
specifically, Mexico contends :
"Firs t s clear that the Court's direction toIhc United Statcs in
LuGrund clearly conteinplated that 'review and reconsideration'
would be carried out by judicial procedures . . . .
Secmrsrlt,heCourt was fully aware that the LaGrand brothers had
received a clemency hearing, during which the Arizona Pardons
Board took into account the violation of their consular righls.
Accordingly, the Court determined in LuGrundthat clcmcncy review
alonc did not conslitutc thcrcquired 'reviewand reconsideration' . . .
Finully,the Court specified that the United States must 'allow the
review and reconsideration of the conviction lrnd sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convcnlion'. ..
it is a basic matter of U.S. criminal procedural law that courts
rcvicw convictions; clemency panels do not. With the rare exception
of pardons based on actual innocence, the focus of capital clemency
review is on the propriety of the sentence and not on he underlying
conviction."
Furthermore, Mexico argues that the clemcncy process is in itself an
ineffective remedy to satisfy the international obligations of thc Unitcd
States. It concludes: "clemency review is standardless, secretive, and
immune from judicial oversight".
Finally, in support of its contention, Mexico argues that
"the failureof state clemency authorities to pay heed to the interven-
tion of the US Department of State in cases of death-sentenced
Mexican nationals refutes the [United States] contention that clem-
ency review willprovide meaningful consideration of the violations
of---ghts conferred under Article 36".
136. Against this contention of Mexico, the United Statcs claims that
it "gives 'full effect'to the 'purposes for which the rights accorded under
[Article 36, paragraph l,] arc intended' through executive clemency". It
argucs that "[tlhe clemency process . . is well suitedto the task or pro-
viding review and reconsideration". The United States explains that
"Clemency . . . more than a matter of grace; it is part or the overall
scheme for ensuring justice and fairness in the legal process" and thatpourra etre satisfaite par des prockdurcs de grricen.Le Mexique dive-
loppe cet argument en soutenant avant tout que ccs'cnrcrncltrc aux pro-
ckdures de recours en grice ne saurait pcrmctlre aux Etats-Unis de
s'acquitter de I'obligation qui est la leur de remkdieraux violations, telle
que cette obligation a Cti:definiepar la Cour dans I'arrtt LuGrund,).Plus
prkciskrnent,le Mexique dit ceci:
aPrerrrikren~nar, il est clair que, dans les prescriptions qu'ellc a
adresskes aux Etats-Unis dans l'affaireLaCrund, la Cour envisageait
manifestemenl que ctlereexamen et la revision))s'effectueraientdans
le cadre de proctdures judiciaires..
Deuxii.mcmcnt,la Cour savait parrailcmcnt que le cas des frkres
LaGrand avait ktk examink par la commission des grPocs dc 1'Ari-
zona qui avait pris en considkration la violation de leurs droits
consulaires. C'estpourquoi la Cour a estime,dans I'afTaire LaCrwd,
que l'examendu recours en grice ne constituait pas en soi ctlcreexa-
men el la revision)>reyuis ...
kvinulernr.nil,a Cour a prkcisk que les Etats-Unis devaient <<per-
mettre le reexamen et la rcvisian du vver~fiu te uulpahilitt et& Iu
pcinc en tenant co~npte de la violation dcs droits prevus par la
convention )> ...[dux Etats-Unis], selon un prineipe klementaire de
leur code de prockdure penale, cesont les juridictions qui rccxa-
rnincnt 1cscondamnations et non les commissions de recours cn
grice. A I'cxccption des rares cas ou la grice est accord& en
raison de I'innoccncedu condamni., c'est la justesse de la peine et
non du verdict de culpabilitk qui csl cxaminkc lors des recours en
grice contre les condamnations k rnort.n
En outre, le Mexique souticn~quc la prockdure des recours en gri est
en soi un rerni.desans efficacitkqui ne saurait rcpondre aux obligations
inlernationales ~ES Etats-Unis. Et le Mexique de conclure: {(l'examen des
recours en grice nYob6t li aucune norme, se deroule dans le secret et
Cchappeh tout ccmtrtilcjudiciaire>).
En dernicr licu, au soutien de sa these, le Mexique dit encore yue
ctlerefus par les autorites chargCes[,aux Etats-Unis,] au nivcau des
Etats de l'examen des recours en grim dc tci~ircomptc des mlerven-
tions du departement d'Etat des Etats-Unis dans les affaires de res-
sortissants mexicains condamnks B mort dCment que l'examen des
recours en grice puisse donncr licu a un examen vbitable des viola-
tions des droitsconfirks par ]'article36,).
136. Pour faire echec i~cette thCscdu Mcxique, les Etats-Unis sou-
tiennent qu'ils{(permettent ...(une pleine realisation)>des cfinspour les-
quelleslesdroits son1accordks [envertu du paragraphe 1de l'article361~
par la prockdurede recoursen grice aupresdc l'cxccutil'~L . eursarguments
sont que cccette procedure ...est parhitement adaptee a la tgche consis-
Pant Bassurer reexamen et revision)>.Les Etazs-Unis expliyuenl que {{Ie
recours en grice est plus qu'unc si~nplequestion de grdce; il fait partie de"Clemencyprocedures are an integral part of the existing 'lawsand regu-
lations' ofthe United States through which errors are addressed".
137. Specificallyin Ihc context of the present case, the United States
contends that the followingtwo points are particularly noteworthy:
"First, these clemencyprocedures allowfor broad participation by
advocates of clemency,including an inmate'sattorney and the send-
ing state's consular officer.. Second, these clemency officialsare
not bound by principles of procedural default, finality, p~ejudice
standards, or any other limitations on judicial review.They may
consider any facts and circumstances that they deem appropriate
and relevant, including specifically ViennaConvention claims."
138. The Court would emphasize that the "review and reconsidera-
tion" prescribed by it in the LaGraiadcase should be effective.Thus it
should "tak[e]account ol'thcviolation of the rights set forth in [Ihc]Con-
vention" (I.C.J. Reporrs 2001, p. 516, para. 128 (7))and guarantee that
the violation and the possible prejudice caused by that violation will be
fully examined and taken into account in the reviewand reconsideration
process. Lastly, review and reconsideration should be both of the sen-
tence and of Ihe conviction.
139. Accordingly, in a situation of the violation of rights under
Article 36, paragraph I, of the Vienna Convention, the defendant raises
his claim in this respcct not as a caof "harm to a particular right essen-
tialto a fair trial- a concept relevant to the enjoyment of due process
rights under the United States Conslitution - but as a case involving the
infringement ofhis rightsunder Article 36, paragraph 1.The rights guar-
anteed undcr the Vienna Convention are treaty rights which the United
States has undcrtaken to comply with in relation to the individual con-
cerned, irrespectiveOF the due process rights under United States consti-
tutional law. In this rcgard, the Court would point out that what is
crucial in the reviewand reconsideration processis the existenceof a pro-
cedure which guaranlccs that full weight is given to thc violation of the
rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual
outcome of such review and reconsideration.
140. As has been explained in paragraphs 128 to 134above, the Court
isof the viewthat, in cases where the breach of the individual rights of
Mexican nationals undcr Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), of the Convention
has rcsultcd, in the sequenceof judicial proccedings that has followed, in
the individuals concerned being subjected to prolonged detention or con-
victed and sentenced to severe penalties, the legal consequences of this
breach have to be examined and taken into account in the course of- --
AVENA ET AUTRES (ARR~T) 65
la structure d'ensemble visantBassurer justice et Cquiti.dans le fonction-
nement s du systeme judiciaire, et que cc[l]esprockdures de recaurs en
grim font partie intkgrante des (<loiset reglements)) existantsdes Etats-
Unis, par tcsquclsEeserreurs font l'objet dhn examen)).
137. Concretcmcnt, dans les circonstances de l'espkce,les Etats-Unis
affirrnent que deux points mkritent d'Etre relevks tout particulierement:
(<Enpremier lieu, CES prockdures de recours en grhce permettent
une large participation dcs avocats de la difense, y compris un
conseil de I'acud et le fonctionnaire consulaire de 1'Etatd'envoi ...
En second lieu, les fonc~ionnaires chargb dcs rccours en gr8ce ne
sont pas ligspar les principesde carence procCduralc,du caractere de-
finitif dcs decisions de justice rendues en dernjer ressort, de normes
en matikre de prejudice ni par toute autre limitation pesant sur
la revisionjudiciaire. 11speuvent examiner tous iaits el circonstances
qui leur sernblent appropriis et pertinents, y compris notamment Ics
moyens fond& sur la convention de Vienne.),
138. La Cour soulignera que le crrCexamcc nt [la] revisionn qu'elle a
prescrits dans l'affaire LaCrand doivent etre effcctifs. 11sdoivent donc
({ten[ir]compte de la violation des droits prkvus par la convention>)
(C .J. Reuueil2001, p. 516,par. 128,point 7))et garantir que ladite vio-
lationet le prfjudice en rksultant seront pleinement CtudiCset pris en
considkration dans le proccssus de reexamen et de revision. Enfin, ledit
riexamen et ladite revision doivent porter a la fois sur la wine prononcie
ct sur le verdict de culpabiliti: rendu.
139. 11s'ensuilque, dans une situation ou ily a eu violation dcs droits
dkcoulant du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne,
l'accuskprisente sa demande y relative non pas a raison du ~prijudice
causC a un droit essentiel B une prockdure equitable>> - notion qui
concerne lajouissance des droits dc la dkfense (dueprocess) garantis par
la Constitution amiricaine -, mais i raison de l'atleintc portee aux
droits qu'il peuttirer du paragraphe 1 del'article 36. Les droits garantis
par la convention de Vicnnc sont des droits conventionnels que les Etats-
Unis se sont engages k rcspccter a 1'Cgardde l'individu interesse, quels
que soient les droils de la defense tels que prevus par le droit constitu-
tionnel ambicain. A cet kgard, la Cour signalera que ce qui estcrucial
dans tcprocessus de reexamen et de revision, c'est l'existcnced'une pro-
cedure garantissant qu'il sera accord6 toutle poids voulu a la violation
dcsdroits definisdans la convention de Vienne. quclle que soit finalement
l'issuee ce rkexamcn ct de cette revision.
149. Comrne la Cour l'explique aux paragraphes 128 a 134ci-dessus,
chaque fois que la vioIation des droits individuels conferks rides ressor-
tissants mexicains par l'alinea b) du paragraphe 1 de l'artjcle 36 de la
convention SE traduit, dans le dkroulement des prockdures judiciaircs qui
suivent, par une detention prolongke dcsindividus en question ou par un
verdict de culpabiliti. et par une condamnation a des peines skdres,
il faut cxarninerles conskquences juridiques de laditc violation et les
57review and reconsideration. The .Court considers that it is thejudicial
process that is suiled to this task.
141. The Court in the LaCrcrnA case Ieft to the United States the
choice of mcans as to how reviewand reconsiderationshould beachieved,
especially in Ihe light of the procedural defaull rule. Nevertheless, the
prcmisc on which the Court proceeded in that case was that the process
of review and reconsideration should occur within the overall judicial
proceedings relating to the individual defendant concerned,
142. As regards the clemencyprocedure, thc Court notes that this per-
forms an important function in thc administration of criminal justice in
the United States and is "thc historic remedy for preventing miscarriages
ofjustice whcrcjudicial process has been exhausled" (I-lerrerv. Collins,
506US 390 (1443) at pp. 41 1-412). The Court accepts that executive
cIcmency,while not judicial, is an integral part of the overall scheme for
ensuringjustice and fairness in thc legal process withinthe United Slales
criminaljustice system. It must, however, point out that what is at issue
in the present caseis not whcther executive clemencyas an institution it;
or is not an integral part of the "existing laws and regulations of the
United States", but whether the clemencyprocess as practised within the
crirnina!justice systemsof different stalesinthe United States can, in and
of itself, qualify as an appropriate means for undertaking the effective
"review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set Sorlinthe Convention", as the
Court prescribed in the LaGrrrndJudgment (I.C.J. Rr.porl.52001, p.514,
para. 125).
143. It may be true, as the United Stalcs argues, that in a number of
cases "clemency in fact results in pardons of convictions as well as com-
mutations of senlences". In that sense and to that extent, it might be
argued that the facts demonstrated by the United Stalcs testify to a
degree of effectivenessof thc clemencyprocedures as a means of relieving
defendants on death row rrom cxccution. The Court notes, howcvcr, that
the clemency process, as currently practised within the Unitcd States
criminal justice system, does not appear to meet the requirerncnts
described in paragraph 138 above and that it is therefore not sufficientin
itsclf'to serveas an appropriate means of "reviewand reconsideration" as
envisaged bythe Court in the LaGrandcase. The Court considers never-
theless that appropriate clemency procedures call supplement judicial
review and reconsideration, in particular where the judicial systemhas
failed to take duc account of the violation of thc rights set forth in the
Vienna Convention, as has occurred in the case of the three Mcxtcan
nationals referred to in paragraph 114 above. 144. Finally, the Court willconsider the cighth submission of Mexico,
in whichit asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
"That the [United States] shall ceaseils violations of Article 36 of
the ViennaConvention with regard to Mexico and its 52 nationals
and shall provide appropriate guarantees and assuranecs that it
shalltake measures sufficientto achieve increased compliance with
Article36 (I) and to ensure compliancewith Article 36 (21.'"
145. In this respect,Mexicorecognizesthe effortsby the United Stares
to raise awarenessof consular assistance rights,through the distribution
of pamphlets and pocket cards and by the conduct of'training pro-
grammes, and that the measures adopted by the United Slates to that
end were noted by the Court in its decision in the LuGrundcase (I. C.J.
Reports 2001, pp. 511-51 3,paras. 121, 123-1241,Mcxico,however,nolcs
with regret that
"the United States programme, whatever its components, has
proven ineffective to prevent the regular and continuing violation
by itscompetent authorities of consular notification and assistance
rights guaranteed by Article 36".
146. In particular, Mexico claims in relation to thc violation of thc
obligations under Article 36, paragraph I, of the Vienna Convention:
"First,competent authoritiesof the United States regularly failto
provide the timely notification required by Article 36 (1) (h) and
thereby lo [sic] frustrate the cornrnun~cationand access conlem-
plated by Article 36 (1) (u)and the assistance contemplated by
Article 36 (1) (u) .These violalions continue nolwithstanding the
Court's judgment in LaCrundand the programme described there.
................... ..........
Mexico has dernonstratcd, moreover, that the pattern or regular
non-compliance continues.During the firsthalf of 2003,Mexicohas
identified at least one hundrcd cases in which Mexicannationals
havebeen arrested by competent authoritiesof the United Statesfor
serious feloniesbut not timely notifiedof their consular notification
rights."
Furthermore, in relation to the violation of the obligations under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention, Mexico claims:
"Second,courts in the United States continue to apply doctrines
of procedural default and non-retroactivity that prevent thosccourts
from rcaching the merits of Vienna Convention claims, and those
courts that have addressed the merits of those claims (becauseno
procedural bar applies)have repeatedlyheIdthat no remedyis avait- 144.En dernier lieu, la Cour examinera la huitikme conclusion du
Mexique dans laquelle cedernier la prie de direl juger que:
r{Les Etats-Unis d'Arnerique devront cesser leurs violations de
1'~1rti~3I6de la conventionde Vienne al'kgarddu Mexiqueet de ses
cinquantc-deux ressortissants et devront Cournir des garanties et
assurances approprikes qu'ilsprendront des mcsures suffisantespour
faire plus largcment respecter le paragraphe 1 dc I'article36 et assu-
rer le respect du paragraphe 2.>>
145.A cct kgard, le Mexique reconnait quc les Etats-Unis rnenent une
action pour hire rnieuxprendrc consciencedu droit l'assistanccconsu-
hire en assurant la diffusion de brochures et de fichcs et en organisant
des programmes de formation; la Cour a quant elle pris acte des me-
sures adoptkcs par les Etals-Unis a cette tin dans la decision qu'elle a
rendue dans I'afiaireLaCrand (C .J. Rccueil2001, p. 511-513, par. 12 1,
I 123-124). Le Mexique constate toutefois avec regret quc
ctleprogramme arnkricain, quelle qu'en soit la nature, [s'est]revkle
incfficace pour empicher les autoritks compktentcs de violer de
maniire rkcurrentc et continue les droits de notification et d'assis-
tance consulaires garantis par I'article36n.
146. En particulier, au sujet de la violation dcs obligations dkoulant
du paragraphe 1 de I'article36 de la convention de Vienne, le Mexique
formulc les griefs suivants:
crTout d'abnrd les autoritts compktentes dcs Etats-Unis omcttent
syslkmatiquement d'inforrner sans retard les intkcsses, ainsi que le
requiert I'alinCab) du paragraphe 1de I'article36, faisant ainsi ob-
stacle non seulcrnenta la communication et h I'acds prkvuspar I'ali-
nea a), mais aussi siI'assistanceenvisagie a l'alinkaCJ dudit para-
graphe. Ces violations continuent nonobstant I'arrEt rcndu par la
Cour en l'affaire LuGrand et le programme decrit alors.
.............................
Le Mexique a en outrc dkrnontre que cette pratique de violation
systematique continue. Au cours du prcmier semestre de I'annee
2003, Ic Mexique a rccensi:au moins cent cas oi les autoritks com-
petentes des Etats-Unis ont arrCti:des ressortissants mexicains prC-
sum& criminels sans les informcr en temps voulu de leurs droits en
matiere de notification consulaire.)>
En outre, en ce qui concerne la violation des obligations decoulant du
paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne, le Mexique for-
muje les griefsci-apres:
crEnsudtul,es juridictions des Etats-Unis continuent d'appliquer
Icsdoctrines de la carence procedurale et de la non-rktroactivile qui
les empgchent d'examiner au fond les rklamations presentkes au
titre de la convention de Vienne; quant aux juridiclions qui ont
examine de telles demandes au fond (parce qu'aucune resuiction able for a breach of the obligations of Article 36 . .. Likewise, the
United States' reliance on clemency procccdings to meel LaGrirnds
requirement of review and reconsideration represents a deliberate
decision to allow these lcgal rules and doctrines to continue to have
theirincvitable effect. Hcnce, the Unitcd States continues to breach
Article 36 (2) by failing to give full effect to the purposes for which
thc rights accorded under Article 36 are intended."
147. The Unilcd States contradicts this contention of Mexicoby claim-
ing that "its en'ortsto improve the conveyanceof information about con-
sular notification are continuing unabated and are achieving tangible
results".Ttcontends that Mexico "Failsto establish a 'regular and con-
tinuing' pattern of breaches ofArticle 36 in the wake of LuGrand'.
148. Mexico emphasizesthe necessity of requiring the cessation ofthe
wrongful acts because, italleges,the violation of Article36 with regard to
Mexico and its 52 nationals still continucs, The Court considers, how-
ever, that Mexico has not establisheda continuing violation ofArlicle 36
of the YiunnaConvention with respcct to the 52 individuals rekrred toin
its final submissions; it cannot therefore uphold Mexico's claim seeking
cessation. TheCourt would moreover point out that, iwasmuch as these
52 individual cases are at various stages of criminal proceedings before
the United Statcs courts, they are i11the slate of pcndente lire; and thc
Cvurt has already indicated in respect of them what it regards as the
appropriate remedy, namely review and reconsideration by reference to
the breach of the Vienna Convention.
149. The Mexican request for guarantees of non-regctilion isbased on
its contention that beyond these 52 cases there is a "regular and continu-
ing" pattern of breaches by the United States of Article 36. In this
respect, the Court observes that thero:is no evidcnce properly before it
that would establish a gcneral pattern. While it is a matter of concern
thal, even in the wake of theLaCrcrndJudgment, there remain a substan-
tialnumbcr of casesof f'ailureto carry out the obligation to f~~rnishcon-
sular information to Mexican nationals, the Court notes that the United
States has been making considerable efforts to ensure that itslaw enforce-
ment authorities provide consular information to every arrcsted person
they know or havc reason to bclieve is a foreign national. Especially at
the stage of pre-trial consular information, it is noteworthy that the
United States has been making good faith efforts to implement the obli-
gations incumbent upon it undcr Article 36, paragraph 1,of the Vienna
Convention, through such measures as a new outreach programme
launched in 1998,including the dissemination to fcdcral, state and local
authorities of the State Department booklet mentioned ahovc in para- prockdurale n'y Ffaisaitobstacle), cllcs ont invariablemcnt decla-
ri.qu'aucune forrne de reparation n'htail dispanible pour remkdiera
une violation des obligations prkvucspar l'article36...De mGme,en
se rcposant sur les mecanismes de recours en grim pour satisfaire i~
E'obligationde reexamenci de revisionque lcur a imposeela Cour en
I'affaire LuGrund,llesEtats-Unis ont delibkrtmcnt choisi de laisscr
ces rkglescl doctrines continuer a produirc Icur effet ineluctable.
Dans ces conditions, les Elats-Unis continucnl de violer le para-
graphe 2de I'article36en ne perrnettant pas la pleinc realisation des
fins pour lesquellesIcsdroits sont accordis en vertu de Y'article36.))
147. Les Etals-Unis s'opposcnt a cette thkse du Mexique en soutenant
qu'crilspoursuiv[enl] sans reliche lcurs efforts pour nqicuxtransmettre
l'information sur la notification consulaire et que ces initiatives pro-
duisfent]desrcsultatsconcrets>}.Ilsexposent yuele Mexique ([nedkmontre]
nullement ...que des violations dc I'article 36 se soicnt pourstlivies c<dc
manikre recurrente et continue>) aprks le prononce de I'arrEtLuCi.and)>.
148. Le Mexique insiste sur la niccssite de demander la cessation de
I'illicitc parce que, psitend-il, la violalion de I'article 36 a l'kgard
du Mexique et de ses cinquante-deux rcssortissants persiste. La Cour
considere c~pendant que le Mexique n'a pas Ctabli l'existcnce d'une
violation coiltinue de I'article36 de la convention deVienne i I'egarddes
cinquante-deux pcrsonnes visCes dans ses conclusic~nsfinales ; elie ne
saurait des lor: accueillir la demande mexicaine visant a obtenir la
cessation. Elle fera ctl outre observcr que, comme ws ctnquante-deux
cas individuels se trouvent actuellement itdilrerents stades de la prock-
dure pinale devanl les juridictions amkricaines, ils sent pendants; et la
Cour a deja indiqd, en ce qui les conccme, ce qu'elleconsidkre cornme
le rerni.de approprii., c'est-A-direle reexamcn et la revision i raison
de la violationde la cotlventionde Vienne.
149. La demande de garantie de non-repetition Sormulkepar le Me-
xiquc sc base sur I'alltgation que, au-dcla des cinquante-deux cas consi-
dCrb, il existerait unc pratique de violation ccrkcurrentcelcontinue,, dc
I'article36 par les Etats-Unis. A cet egard, la Cour fait observer qu'cllc
n'a pas ete dhrnent saisie dlklCmentsde preuvc de nature ri fairc appa-
raitre unc pratique habituelle revktant un caractgre genkral. S'il y a des
raisons de sYinquiCtedru fail que, mime h la suite du prononcc de 1'arrCt
en l'affaircLuCrund,il subsisteun grand nombre de cas oh I'obligationde
fournir I'information consrllaire a des ressortissants mexicains n'est pas
rcspecde, la Cour prend acte de ce que les Etals-Unis ont men6 une
action intcnsive pour f-aircen sorte que lcs servicesde la force publique
fournissent l'information consulairerequise rilout individu arrCiCdont ils
savenl ou ont tout licude croire qu'il s'agit d'un ktranger. Tout particu-
likrement en cc qui coticernc l'information consulaire iicornmuniquer
prkalablement au proces, il convient de relever que les Etats-Unis ont
cherchi de bonne foi ris'acquitter dcs obligations lcur incombant en
vertu du paragraphe 1de I'ariicle36 de laconvcntion de Vienneen adop-graph 63. The Court wishes to recall in this context what it has said in
paragraph 84 about efforts in somejurisdictions to provide the informa-
tion under Article 36,paragraph l (bJ, in parallel with thc reading of the
"Miranda rights".
150. The Court would further note in this regard that in the LaGrand
case Germany sought, interalia, "a straightforward assurance that the
United States will not repeat its unlawfuI acts" (I.C.J. Rtports 2001,
p. 511, para. 120).With regard to this gcneral demand for an assurance
of non-repetition, the Court stated:
"lf a State, in proceedings before this Court, repeatedly refersto
substantial activities whicitiscarrying out in order to achievecom-
pliance with certain obligations under a treaty, then this expresses a
commitment to follow through with the efforts in this regard. Thc
programme in question ce~tainlycannot provide an assurance that
there willnever againbe a failure by the United Slates to observe the
obligations of notification undcr Article 36 ol'the Vienna Conven-
tion. But no State could give such a guarantee and Gcrmany does
not seek it. The Court considers that the commitment expressed by
the United States to ensure implementation of the specificmeasures
adopted in performance of its obligations under Articlc 36, para-
graph 1 (b),must be regarded as meeting Germany's request for a
general assurance of non-repetition." (IC.J. Reports 2001, pp. 512-
513, pard. 124.)
The Court believes that as Car as the request of Mexico for guarantees
and assurances of non-repetition isconcerned, what the Court stated in
this passage ofthc LaGrandJudgment remains applicable, and therefore
meets that request.
151. The Court would now re-emphasize a point of importance. In the
present case,it has had occasion toexamine theobligations of the United
States under Article 36of the ViennaConvention in relation to Mexican
nationals sentenced to death in the United States. Its findings as to the
duty of review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences have
been directed to the circurnstancc of severe penalties being imposed on
foreign nationals who happen lo be of Mexican nationality. To avoid any
ambiguity, it should bemade clear that, whilewhat the Court has stated
concerns the Mexican nationals whose cases have bcen broughl bcfore it
by Mcxico, the Court has been addressing the issuesof principle raisedintant certaines mesures, qui ont consisti par exempleA lancer en 1998un
nouveau programme de sensibilisation, lequel s'est traduit notamment
par la diffusion aupris des autorites Ekdkrales,etatiqucs et locales, du
manuel du dkpartemenl d'Etat mentionne ci-dessusau paragraphe63.La
Cour souhaite riidrer dans ce contexte les observations qu'ellea formu-
lCesau paragraphe &I concernant certajns efforts bits sur le plan local
afin de fournjr, parallclementiila lecture des c<droitsMirunda,), I'infor-
mation prkvue h I'alinta h) du paragraphe I de I'article 36.
150. La Cour entend par ailleurs rappeler;ice sujet que, dans l'affaire
Lacrand, 1'Allemagnea notamment voulu obtenir crdesEtats-Unis une
assurance pure et simple qu'ils ne rkpctcront pas leurs actcs illicites,,
(C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 511, par. 120). Conccrnant cette demande de
caractkre genkral visant l'obtention d'une assurance denon-ripetition, la
Cour a dit ceci:
cc[S]i,dansle cadre d'une instance, un Etat fdit reL%rencde ma-
nikrc repetCedevant la Cour aux activites substantielles auxquelles
il se livre aux fins de mettre en muvre certaines obligations decou-
lantd'un trait&,cela traduit un engagement de sapart de poursuivre
les effortsntrepris a cet effet. Ccrtes, le programme cn cause ne
peut fournir I'assurance qu'il n'y aura plus jamais de rnanquement
des autorites des Etats-Unisa l'obligation de notification prkvue ri
I'article36 de la convention de Vicnne. Mais aucun Elatne pourrait
fournir une tellearantie et I'Allemagnenc cherche pas k l'obtenir.
La Cour estimeque l'engagemcntpris par lesEtats-Unis d'assurer la
miscen oeuvredes mcsuresspkcifiquesadoptkes en exkution dc leurs
obligations autitre de I'alinta h) du paragraphe 1de l'article36 doit
&tre consider6 comme satisfaisant i la demande de I'hllemagne
visant a obtenir une assurance gknkrale de nun-ripetition. >(C ..J.
Recueil2001, p. 512-513,par. 124.)
La Cour estime que, s'agissantde la dcmande du Mexique visant a abte-
nir des garanties et assurances de non-rkpttition, ce qu'elle a dit dans
I'extraici-dessus dc 1'arrEtLuCrand dcmeure applicable ct satisfait ladite
demande.
151. La Cour souhaite cncore rkaffirmer un point important. En
I'espPce,ellca eu l'occasion d'examiner les obligations incombant aux
Etats-Unis en vertu de I'article36de la convention de Vienne a 1'Cgardde
ressortissants rnexicains condamnks ri mort aux Etats-Unis. Elle a fait
porter les conclusions qu'elle a consacrkes au devoir de rkexamen et de
revision desverdicts de culpabilite et des peinessur cet elemedespeines
sevires prononcees a I'encontred'ktrangers qui selrouvent avoir la natio-
nalitk mexicaine. Pour tviter toute ambiguitk, il y a lide prkciser que,
bien que les observationsde la Cour intkrcssent lescasdesressortissants
mexicains qui lui ont etk sournis par le Mexique, elle s'est r~l'krkea:ux70 AVENA AND UTHERS (~UDGMENT)
the course of the present proceedings from thc viewpoint or the general
applicalion of the Vienna Convention, and there can bc no question of
making an a corz!rurioargument in respect of any of the Court's findings
in the present Judgment. In other words, the fact that in this case the
Court's ruling has concerned only Mexicannationals cannot be taken to
imply,that the conclusions reached by it in the present Judgment do not
apply to other foreignnationals finding themselvesin similar situations in
the United Slates.
152. By its Order OF5February 2003the Court, acting on a request by
Mexico, indicated by way ofprovisional measure that
"The United States of America shall take a41measures neccssary
to ensurethat Mr. CksarRoberto Fierro Rcyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno
Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilcra are not exccuted pending
finaljudgment in these proceedings" (I.C.J.Reports 2003, pp. 91-92,
para. 59 (1))(see paragraph 21 above).
The Order of 5February 2003,according to its terms and to Article 4 1or
the Statute,was effectivepending finaljudgment, and the obligations of
the United States in that respect are, with effect from the date of the
present Judgment, replaced by those declared in this Judgment. The
Court has rcjccted Mexico'ssubmission thal, by way of re.stirutiininrp-
gruwa, the United States is obliged to annul the convictio~snd sentences
of all of the Mexican nationals the subject of its claims (see above, para-
graphs 115-125).The Court has found that, in relationtothesc three per-
sons (among ~thcrs), the United States has committed breaches of its
obligations under Article 36,paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention
and Arlicle 36,paragraphs I (a) and (c), of that Convention; moreover,
in respect of those three persons alone, the United States has also
committed breaches of Article 36, paragraph 2, of thesaid Convention.
The review and reconsideration ofconviction and sentencc required by
Article 36, paragraph 2, which is the appropriate remedy tbr breaches of
Article 36, paragraph 1, has not been carried out. Thc Court considcrs
that in these three Casesit is for the United Statcs to find an appropriate
remedy having the nature of reviewand reconsideration according to the
critcria indicated in paragraphs 138ei seq. of the present Judgment.
153. For these reasons,
TIE COURT,
(I) By thirteen votes to two,questions de principe souleveesau cours de la prtscntc instance du point
de vue de l'application generale dela convcnlion de Vienne, et qu'il ne
saurait 6tre question d'appliquer un argument a con!rario & la rnoindrc
dcs conclusions que la Cour for~nuledans lc prksent arr2t. En d'autres
terrnes, on nc saurait dkduire du hit que la Cour a cu A se prononcer
uniquement sur Iccas de ressortissants mexicainsdans lecadre de la pre-
sente affaire que lesconclusions de cet arr6sont inapplicables ri d'autres
ressortissants Ctrangersse trouvant dans lesmzmesconditions aux Etats-
Unis.
152. Par son ordonnancc du 5 fkvrier 2003, la Cour, donnant suite h
une demande du Mexique, a indiqui:a titre de mesure consewatoire que
ales Etats-Unis dlAmerique prcndronl ioute mesure pour que
MM. CEsar Roberto Fierso Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos et Os-
valdo Torrcs Aguilera ne soientpas executestant yue I'arrEtdefinitif
en la prksente inslancc n'aura pas Cterendu)) (C.I.J. Recueil 2003,
p. 91-92,par. 59, paint 1))(voir paragraphe 21 ci-dessus).
L'ordonnance du 5 fevrier 2003ne produisant scscfits, cornme le pre-
voient sesterines el I'arlicle41du Statut de la Cour, quepour autant que
I'arrel definitif n'pas CtCrendu, Ics obligations des Etats-Unis k cet
egard sont, li comptcr dc la date du present arrit, remplackes par celles
CnoncCesdans celui-ci.La Cour a Ccartela conclusion du Mexique selon
laquelle, par voic dc restilulio inintegrutn,les Etals-Unis sont tenus
d'annuler lesverdicts de culpabilitk rendus et les peines prononcees a
l'encontre de chacun des ressortissants mexicainsvisCsdans lesdemandcs
du Mexique (voir ci-dessus, paragraphes 115a 125).Elle a estirne que, i
I'Cgard(entre autres) des trois porsoilnes susmentionnkes, les Etats-Unis
avaient viole l'alinea b) du paragraphe 1 dc I'arlicl36 de la convention
de Vienne, ainsi que Icsalinkasa) et r) de ce rnZrneparagraphe; etque,
en outre, ri 1'Cgardde ces trois seules personnes,Ics Erals-Unis avaient
viol&le paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 de ladite convention. Le reexamen et
la revision du verdict de culpabiliti et de la pcinc rcquis par le para-
graph~ 2 dc I'article36, qui constituent 1crcmkdeapproprie en cas devio-
lation du paragraphe lde l'article 35, n'onl pas Cteeffectub. La Cour
considkre quc, s'agissant des cas de ces trois personnes, il revient aux
Etats-Unis dc lrouver un remede approprik qui soil dc la nature du rkexa-
men et de la revision conformi.ment aux critkrcs indiquks aux para-
graphes 138et suivants du present arrkt.
153. Pas ces motifs,
1) Par treize voix contre dcux, Rejects the objection by the United Mexican States lo the admissibility
of the objections presented by the United States of America to the juris-
diction of the Court and the admissibility of Ihe Mexican claims;
IN FAVOUR : President Shi; V~ce-President Ranjcva ; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Wiggins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren; Judge ad hoc Sepulvcda;
(2) Unanimously,
REJ~L'I t.e four obj~tions~by the United States of America to the
jurisdiction of the Court;
(3) Unanimously,
Rejects the five objections by the United States of America to the
admissibility of the claims of the United Mexican States ;
(4) Byfourteen votes to one,
Fin& that, by not informing, without dclay upon their detention, the
51 Mexican nationals referred to in paragraph 106 (1) above of their
rights under Article36, paragraph 1 (h), of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations of 24 April 1463, the United Stales of America
breached the obligations incumbent upon it under that subparagraph;
IN FAVOUR : Presidenl Shi ; Vice-Presidenl Ranjeva ; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vcrcshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawnch,
Buergenthal,Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sepulveda;
AGAINST :Judge Parra-Aranguren :
(5) By fourteen voles lo one,
Finds that, by not notifying the appropriate Mexican consular post
without delay of the detention of the 49 Mexican nationals referred to in
paragraph 106 (2) abovc and thereby depriving the United Mexican
States of the right, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided
for by the Vienna Convention to the individuals concerned, the United
States of America breached the obligations incumbent upon it under
Article 36, paragraph1 (b) ;
IN FAVOUR : President Shi ; Vice-President Ranjeva ; Judges Guillaume,
Koroma, Vcreshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buergenthal,Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judgoad hoc Sep6lvcda;
AcArNsr :Judge Parra-Aranguren ;
(6) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that, in relation to the 49Mexican nationals referred to in para-
graph 106(3) above, the United States of America deprived the United
Mexican States ofthe right, in a timely fashion, to communicate with and
have access to those nationals and to visit them in detention, and thereby Rejette I'exceptiooppostc par lcs Elats-Unis du Mcxiquc i la rcccvabi-
litdes exceptions soulevkcspar lcs Etals-Unis dyAmcriqueala compClcnce
de laCour eta la recevabilitdes demandes des Etats-Unis du Mexique;
POUR :M. Shi, pri.si&n[;M. Ranjeva, vice-prisid ;enM, Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, MmCHiggins, MM. Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-
Khasawneh,Ruergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka, ji~~us;
CON'I'KEM. Parra-Aranguren,jugc; M. Sepulveda,juge ad hoc:
2) A I'unanirnitk,
R~jeite les quatre exceptionsala cornpktence de la Cour sowlevies par
les Etats-Unisd'Amtrique ;
3) A I'unanirnite,
Rejett~ les cing exceptionsa la recevabilitdes demandes des Etats-
Unis du Mcxiquc soulcvCes par les Etats-Unis d'Amtrique ;
4) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Dit que, en n'informant pas sans retard, lorde leur dktention, les cin-
quanle et un ressortissants mexicains visau point 1)du paragraphe 106
ci-dcssus dcs droitsqui sont Ics leursen vertu de I'alintah) du para-
graphe 1 de I'article36 de la convention de Vienne sur les relations
consulaires du 24 avril1963, les Etats-Unis d'Amkrique ont violC les
obligations leurincombant cn vcrlu dudit alinka ;
rorra:M. Shi, prisid~nl M;. Ranjeva, vice-prksident;MM. Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin,Mmc Higgins, MM. Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-
Khasawnch,Bucrgcnthal,Elaraby, Owada, Tomka, juges; M. Sepirlveda,
jugaad hoe;
CONTRE :M. Parra-Arangurcn,juge;
5) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Dit que, en ne notifiant pas sans rctard au postc consulairc mexicain
approprik la dktention des quarante-neuf ressortissants mexicains visb
au point 2)du paragraphe 106ci-dessus et en privant ainsilesEtats-Unis
du Mexique du droit de rendre en temps utile aux inttrcssks l'assistancc
prCvue par la convention, les Etats-Unis dZAm@riqu ont viol&les obli-
gations leur incombant en vertu de I'aliniahJ du paragraphe 1 deI'ar-
ticle36;
WUK :M. Shi, prhidonl; M. Ranjeva, vice-prksidc nM;. Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, MmCHiggins, MM. Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-
Khasawneh, Ruergenthal,Elaraby,Owada, Tomka,juger; M. Seplilveda,
jugead hoc;
CONTRE: M. Parra-Arangurcn juge;
6) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Dir que, en ce qui concerne lesquarante-neuf ressortissants mexicains
visesau point 3) du paragraphe 106ci-dessus, les Etats-Unis d'AmCrique
ont prive les Etats-Unis du Mexique du droit,en temps utile, de commu-
niquer avec ces ressortissantetdc sc rendre auprts d'eux lorsqu'ilssontbreached the obligations incurnbenl upoil itui~der Article 36, para-
graph 1 (u) and (c), of the Convention ;
IN FAVOUR : Prcsicitat Shi ; Vice-PresicierisKanjcva ; Jurl'gpsCuiElaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Bucrgenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judge ad hoc.Seplilveda;
AGAINST: Judgc Parra-Aranguren ;
(7) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that, in relacion to lhc 34 Mexican nationals referred to in para-
graph 106 (4) above, the United States of America deprived the United
Mexican States of the right, in rttimely fashion, to arrange for legal rep-
resentation of those nationals, and thereby breached the obligations
incumbenl upon it under Article 36,paragraph I (c), of the Convcntion ;
FN FAVOIJR: Prusidcn~ Shi ; Vice-I'rcsident Ranjeva ; Judges Cuillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchelin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rczek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buzrgenlhal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judge ad hoc Sep~ilveda;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(8) By fourteen voles to one,
Fi~idsthat, by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in the
light or Ihc rights set forth in the Convention, of the conviction and sen-
tences of Mr. Cesar Roberto Fierro Keyna, Mr. Roberlo Morcno Ramos
and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, after the violations referred to in sub-
paragraph (4) above had been established in respect of those individuals,
the United Slales or America brcached the obligations incumbent upon it
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Conve~~tion;
IN I.AVOUK : PrexiIEnt Shl ; Vice-Preridenr Ranjeva; Judges Cuillaume,
Koroma, Vcreshchctin, IZiggins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, To~nka; Judge ad hoc Sep~ilveda;
AGAINST : JudgeParw-Arangurcn ;
(9) By fourteen votes to one:
Finds that the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obliga-
tion of theUnited StatesofAmerica to provide, bymeans of its ownchoos-
ing, review and reconsideration of the: conviclions and sentences of the
Mexican nationals referred to in subparagraphs (41,(51,(6) and (75above,
by taking account both of the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36
ot'thc Convention and of paragraphs 138to 141of this Judgment;
IN FAVOUR: Pre~idel~tShi; Vice-Pre.~iden~Ranjeva; Judges Guillaumc,
Koroma, Vereshchetit~, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh,
Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka ; Jn.dg~ad hoc Sepulveda ;
AGAINST: Judge Parra-Aranguren ; en dilenlion,ct ont d~ce fait vide les obligations leur incombant cvcrtu
dcs aliileas a) et cj du paragraphe1 de l'article 36 dc la convention;
WUR : M. Shi, prGsidcnr; M. Ranjeva, vice-prisider~tMM. Guillaume,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mm" Higgins. MM. Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-
Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka.luges; M. Sephlveda,
jug^ ad hoc;
CONTRE: M. Parra-Ardnguren j,ge;
I 7) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Dit yue, cn ce qui concerne les trente-quatre ressortissanls mexicains
visesau point 4) du paragraphe 106ci-dcsbus, Ics Etats-Unis dlArnerique
ont privi:lesEtats-Unis du Mcxiquc du droit de pourvoir en temps utile
A la represenlalionen justice desdits ressortissants, et odecc f'aiviol6
les obligations leur incombanten vertu de l'alinea c)du paragraphe 1 de
I'article6 Je la convention;
POUR: M. Shi,prbident; M. Ranjeva, vice-prkside 1~6;. Guillaumc,
Koroma, Vereshchctin, Mm" I-Iiggins,MM. Kooijnlans, Kezek, Al-
Khasawneh,Bucrgcnthal,Elaraby,Owada, Tomka, jugt's:M. Septilvcda,
juge ad hoc;
CONTKE: M. Parra-Arangurenj,uge;
I 8) Par qualorxc voix contre une,
Dit que, en ne permettant pas Ic rcexamen et la revision,au regard des
droits definis danslaconvention, du verdictde culpabilitc rcndu et dela
peine prononcie A l'encontrede M. Ccsar Roberto Fierro Keyna, M. Ro-
berto Moreno Rarnos ct M. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, une fois qu'il
avait it6etabliquc Ics interessks etaient victimes des violativisCcsnu
poinl 4) ci-dessus, les Etats-Unis d'AmCrique ont viole les obligations
lcus incombant en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 de convention;
POUR: M. Shi,prt,si~ienrM.*Ranjeva, viu-prckidcrrt;MM. Guillaume,
Koroma, Vercslichetin, Mm' Higgins, M M. Kooijmans; Rezck, Al-
Khasawneh, Buergcnthal, ElarilbyOwada: Tomka, jecge.;M. Sepblveda,
juge ad hoc;
CONTRE: M. Parra-Aranguren j,ge;
I 9) Par quatorzc voix contre une,
Dirque, pour fournir lareparatioti approprike en I'espkce,les Etats-Unis
d'Amcriquc sont tenus d'assurer, par les moyens de leuchoix,Ic rkexamcn
ct Larcvision des verdicts de culpabilitk rendus edes peincs prononctes
contre lesressortissants rnexicains visaux points41,51,6)et 7) ci-dessus,
en tenant compte i lafois delaviolation des droitsprevus par E'articl36
de la convcnlion ct dcs paragraphes 138 i 141du prksent arr&t;
POUR: M. Shi, prksidenl; M. Ranjeva. vice-prisidunr; MM. Guillaume,
Koroma, Vcrcshchctin, MIn" Higgins, MM. Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-
Khasawnch.Bucrgcnthal, Elaraby,Owada, Tomka,juges, M. Sep~ilveda,
jug^;~dhoc;
CONTKE: M. Parra-Arangurenj,uge;73 AVENA AND OTIdERS(JUDGMENT)
(10) Unanimously,
Takes note of the commitment undertaken by the United States of
America to ensure implementation or the specificmeasures adopted in
performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragr1p(b), orthc
Vienna Convention; and,find.sthat this commitment must be regarded as
meeting the request by the United Mexican Statesfor guarantees and
assurances of non-repetition;
(I1) Unanimously,
Finds that, should Mexican nationals nonetheless be sentenced to
severe penalties, without their rightscr Article36, paragraph 1 (h),
of the Convention having been respected,thc United Slates of America
shall provide, by meansof its ow11choosing, reviewand reconsideration
of the conviction and sentence, so as to allow full weightto be giton
the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention, taking account of
paragraphs 138to 141of this Judgment.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, Thc Hague, this thirty-first day of March, two
thousand and four, in three copies, one of which will be placed in thc
archives of the Court and the others transmitteto the Government of
the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of
America, respectively.
(Signed) SHI Jiuyong,
President.
($ignell)Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.
PresidentSr.~rnd Vicc-PresidentRANIEVA append declarations to the
Judgment of the Court; Judges VERESHCHEP TINR,RA-ARANGU anEN
TOMKA and Judge ad hoc SEPL'LVEaU ppend separate opinions to the
Judgment of the Court.
(lniriallcd) J.Y.S.
(Inirialled) Ph.C. 110A l'unanimitk,
Prend ucrede l'engagementpris par lcs Etats-Unis d'AmCriqued'assu-
rer la rnise en oeuvredes mesures spkifiques adoptees en execution de
leursobligations en vertu de l'alineah) du paragraphe 1de I'article36de
la convention de Vienne; et lldtque cet engagement doit etre considirk
comme satisfaisant rila demande des Etats-Unis du Mexique visanl a
obtcnir des garanties et assurances de non-repktiti;n
11)A l'unanimitk,
Dit que, si des ressortissants mexicains devaient nkanmoins Gtre
condamnes ii une peine sCvi.resans que les droils qu'ils tiennent de l'ali-
nea b) du paragraphe 1de I'article:36 de la convention aient Cti:respec-
tes, les Etats-Unis d'Amkriquedevront, en rnettant en oeuvreles moyens
de leur choix,assurcr le reexamen et la revision duverdict de culpabiIilC
et de la peinc, dhqon h accorder tout le poids voulua la violation des
droits prCvuspar laconvention, en tenant compce des paragraphes 138
ii141du present arrCt.
Fait en anglais et en fran~aIctexteanglaisfaisant foi, au Palajs de la
Paix, i La Hayc, Ictrente et un mars deux millequatre, en troisexern-
plaires, dont l'un restera deposi aux archivesde la COUF et les autres
seront transmis respectivementau Gouvernement des Etats-Unis du Me-
xique et au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique.
Le prksident,
(Signt) SHI Jiuyong.
Le grefier,
(Sign&) PhilippeCOUYREUK.
M. Ic juge Sbri,president, et M. 1e juge RANJEVA, vice-prksidenl,
joignajt des dkclarations ;i1'arrEt; MM. les juges VERESHCHETIN,
PARRA-ARANGUR etT~MKA et M. le juge ad hoc SEPULVED joignenr
riI'arrEtlesexposes de leur opinion individuelle.
(Parphk) J.Y.S.
(ParuphCJPh.C.
Merits
Judgment of 31 March 2004