Judgment of 20 December 1988

Document Number
074-19881220-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À DES ACTIONS ARMÉES
FRONTALIÈRES ET TRANSFRONTALIÈRES

(NICARAGUA c. HONDURAS)

COMPÉTENCE DE LA COUR
ET RECEVABILITÉ DE LA REQUÊTE

INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING BORDER AND

TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS
(NICARAGUA v. HONDURAS)

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION

JUDGMENT OF 20 DECEMBER1988 Modeofficieldecitat:on
Actionsarméesfrontalières et transfrontalièreHonduras),u
compétencet recevabilité,Ct.,Z.J.Recueil1988,

Officia1citation:
Borderand TransborderArmed AcsNicaraguav.Honduras),
JurisdictionandAdmissibility, J, .C.J.Reports1988,9.

Nodevent:
Salesnumber 547 1 INTERNATIONAL COURTOFJUSTICE

YEAR 1988 1988
20December
General List
20 December1988 No. 74

CASECONCERNING BORDERAND

TRANSBORDERARMED ACTIONS

(NICARAGUA v. HONDURAS)

JURISDICTIONOF THE COURTAND

ADMISSIBILITYOF THE APPLICATION

Jurisdictionof the Court,burdenofpro-f Intention oftheParties.
Charterof OrganizationfArnericanStates- PactofBogota,ArticleXXXI -
Relationship withArticle 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute and with declarations
made thereunder- ArticleXXXI asanindependentsourceofjurisdicti-nRela-
tionshipbetweenArticlesXXXI andXXXII.
Adrnissibilityof theApplicationPolitical aspe-tsDivisionof general con-
jlict intoseparatebilateraldisp-tResjudicata- Requireddegreeofparticu-
larizationofclai-n Date atwhichadrnissibilitytobedeterrnined:dateoffiling of
Application.
Pactof Bogota,ArticleII SettlernentunderthatArticlebydirectnegotiations
through the usualdiplornaticnnels - Nature of the "Contadoraprocess".

Pactof Bogota, Article IV Questionwhetheranypriorpaczj?cprocedurefor
settlernentof disputewasoncluded"beforeproceedingsinstitut-d Caseof the
"Contadoraprocess"- Goodfaith.

JUDGMENT

Present: President RUDA;Vice-PresidentMBAYEJ;udges LACHSE ,LIASO, DA,
AGO,SCHWEBES Li,r Robert JENNINGSB ,EDJAOUN I,I, EVENSEN,
TARASSO GV,ILLAUM SEA, HABUDDEEN;RegistrarVALENCIA-OSPINA. In the case concerning border and transborder armed actions

between

'he Republic of Nicaragua,
,epresentedby

H.E. Mr. Carlos ArgüelloGomez, Ambassador,
as Agentand Counsel,

Mr. Ian Brownlie,Q.C., F.B.A.,Chichele Professor of Public International
Lawin the Universityof Oxford; Fellow of Al1Souls College, Oxford,

Hon. Abram Chayes, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School; Fellow, American Academyof Arts and Sciences,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professorat the University of Paris-Nord and the Institut
d'étudepsolitiquesde Paris,

as Counsel and Advocates,
Mr. Augusto Zamora Rodriguez, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Ministry of
the Republic of Nicaragua,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotons, Professorof Public International Law in the
UniversidadAutonomade Madrid,

Miss Judith C. Appelbaum, Reichler and Appelbaum, Washington, D.C.,
Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and the State of Califor-
nia,
as Counsel,

and

the Republic of Honduras,
represented by

H.E. Mr. Mario Canas, Ambassador,
as Agent,

H.E. Mr. Jorge Ramon Hemandez Alcerro, Ambassador, Permanent Rep-
resentativeto the United Nations,
as Co-Agent,

Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of
International Lawin the Universityof Cambridge,
Mr. Pierre-MarieDupuy, Professorat the Université dedroit,d'économieed te
sciencessocialesde Paris,
Mr.Julio GonzalesCampos, Professorof International Lawatthe University
of Madrid,

Mr. Arias de Saavedra Muguelar, Ministerat the Embassy of Honduras to
the Netherlands,
Mrs. Salomé Castellanos, Minister-Counselloratthe Embassyof Honduras

to the Netherlands,
as Counsel, composed as above,

delivers thefollowingJudgment:

1. On 28 July 1986,the Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the
Netherlands filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting pro-
ceedings against the Republic of Honduras in respect of a dispute concerning
the alleged activities of armed bands, said to be operating from Honduras, on
the border between Honduras and Nicaragua and in Nicaraguan territory. In
order to foundthe jurisdiction of the Court the Application relied on the provi-
sions of Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, officially
known, according to Article LX thereof, as the "Pact of Bogota", signed on
30April1948, and the declarations made by the two Parties accepting thejuris-
diction of the Court, as provided for in Article 36, paragraphs 1and 2 respec-
tively, of the Statute of the Court.
2. Pursuant to Article 40,paragraph 2, ofthe Statute, the Application was at

once communicated to the Republic of Honduras; in accordance with para-
graph 3 of that Article, al1other Statesentitled to appear before the Court were
notified of the Application.
3. By a letter of 29 August 1986, the Minister for External Relations of
Honduras informed the Court that in his Government's viewthe Courthad no
jurisdiction over the matters raised inthe Application, and expressed the hope
that the Court would confine the firstwritten proceedings to the issues ofjuris-
diction and admissibility. The Parties, consulted pursuant to Article 31 of
the Rules of Court, subsequently agreed that the issues of jurisdiction and
admissibility should be dealt with at a preliminary stage of the proceedings.

4. By an Order dated 22 October 1986,the Court, taking note of the agree-
ment ofthe Parties onthe procedure, decided that the firstpleading should be a
Memorial by the Republic of Honduras dealing exclusively with the issues of
jurisdiction and admissibility; and that in reply the Republic of Nicaragua

should submit a Counter-Memorial confined to those same issues; and fixed
time-limits for those pleadings. The Memorial and Counter-Memorial were
filed within the relevant time-limits.
5. On 3 November 1986the Registrarinformed the States parties to the Pact
of Bogotathat he had been directed, in accordance with Article 43of the Rules
of Court, to draw to their notice the fact that in the Application the Republic of
Nicaragua had invoked, interalia,the Pact of Bogotk,adding however thatthe
notification did not prejudge any decision which the Court might be called
upon to take pursuant to Article 63 ofthe Statute of the Court.
6. Byaletter of 21July 1987the Registrardrew the attention of the Secretary-
General of the Organization of American States to Article 34, paragraph 3, of
the Statute of theCourt andto the Preamble to the Pact of Bogotawhereby that
instrument was stated to be concluded "in fulfillment of Article XXIII of the
Charter of the Organization of American States". The Registrar went on to
inform the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States that
the Court, pursuant to Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, had

instructed him to communicate to that Organization copies of al1the written
proceedings. The Secretary-General of the Organization was atthe same time
informed of the time-limit fixed for any observations the Organization might
wish to submit, pursuant to that Article of the Rules of Court. 7. By a letter of 29 July 1987,the Secretary-General of the Organization
of American States informed the Registrar that in his opinion he would not
as Secretary-General have the authority to submit observations on behalf of

the Organization,and that the convening of the PermanentCouncil of the Or-
ganization would requireeach member Stateto be provided with copies of the
pleadings; he recorded his understanding, however, that the Court had noti-
fied al1parties to the Pact of Bogota of the fact that the proceedings appeared
to raise questions of the construction of that instrument.
8. By a jointletter dated 13August 1987,the Agents of the two Parties in-
formedthe Court of an agreement concluded betweenthe Presidentsof thetwo
countrieson 7 August 1987,whereby both Parties would request the Court "to
acceptthe adjournment,for a period of threemonths, of theopeningof the oral
proceedings on the question of jurisdiction to be heard, inter alia, by the
Court". That agreement provided further that the situation would be reviewed
bythe two Presidentson the occasionof a meetingto beheld 150dayslater.The
Parties were informed by the Registrar the same day that the President of the
Court had decided, in application of Article 54 of the Rules of Court, to
adjoum theopening of theoral proceedingsto a later dateto be fixedaftercon-
sultation with the Agents of the Parties.

9. After the Agent of Honduras had, by a letter dated 1February 1988,in-
formedthe Court of a meetingbetween the Presidents of the Central American
countries held inSanJosé,CostaRica,on 16January 1988,itwasdecided,after
the Partieshad been consulted, to prolong the postponement of the opening of
the oral proceedings.
10. On 21 March 1988the Government of Nicaragua filed in the Registrya
request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Stat-
ute of the Court and Article 73 of the Rules of Court. This request was forth-
with communicated to the Government of Honduras. By letter of 31 March
1988the Agentof Nicaraguainformedthe Courtthat the Government of Nica-
ragua had instructed him to withdraw the request for the indication of provi-
sional measures. By an Order dated the same day the President of the Court
placed on record that withdrawal.
11. Bya letter of 12April 1988,the Agent of Honduras requested that oral
proceedingson the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility should be held
between 23May and 10June 1988.Followinga meetingbetween the President
of the Court and the Agentsof the Partieson 20April 1988,at whichthe Agent
of Nicaragua indicated that his Government had no objection to the dates

suggestedby Honduras,the Presidentdecided that the oral proceedings should
begin on 6June 1988.
12. Atpublichearingsheld between6and 15June 1988,the Court heardoral
argumentsaddressedto it by the following:
ForHonduras: H.E. Mr.Mario Canas,
H.E. Mr.J. R.Hernandez Alcerro,
ProfessorD.W.Bowett,
ProfessorP.-M.Dupuy.

ForNicaragua: H.E. Mr.Carlos ArgüelloGomez,
ProfessorAbramChayes,
ProfessorA.Pellet,
Professor1.Brownlie.
In the course of thehearings,questions wereput to both Partiesby Membersof
the Court. Replies were givento some extent orally during the hearings; addi-tional repliesin writing were filedinthe Registrywithinatime-limitfixedunder
Article 72 of the Rules of Court. Honduras availed itself of the opportunity
afforded bythat Articleto submit to the Court comments on the written replies
of Nicaragua.

13. In the course of the written proceedings, the followingsubmissionswere
presented by the Parties :

Onbehalfof theRepublicof Honduras,
in the Memorial:

"In view of the facts and arguments set forth in the preceding parts of
this Memorial, the Government of Honduras requests that it may please
the Courtto adjudge and declare that :
As toAdmissibility:
The Application of Nicaragua is inadmissible because :

1. It is a politically-inspired, artificial request which the Court should
not entertain consistently with itsjudicial character.
2. The Application is vague and the allegations contained in it are not
properly particularized, sothat the Court cannotentertainthe Application
without substantial prejudice to Honduras.
3. Nicaragua has failed to show that, in the opinion of the Parties, the
dispute cannot be settled by direct negotiations, and thus Nicaragua fails
to satisfyan essentialprecondition to the use ofthe procedures established
by the Pact of Bogota, whichinclude reference of disputes to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
4. Having accepted the Contadora process as a 'special procedure'

within the meaning of Article II of the Pact of Bogotk, Nicaragua is pre-
cluded both by Article IVofthe Pact and by elementary considerations of
good faith from commencing any other procedure for pacific settlement
until such time as the Contadora process has been concluded; and that
time has not arrived.
As toJurisdiction :

The Court is not competent to entertain the Application of Nicaragua
because :
1.The dispute asallegedby Nicaragua isexcluded fromthejurisdiction
ofthe Court bvthe terms oftheHonduran declaration of 22 Mav 1986.and
such declaration applies whether the jurisdiction is alleged to éxiston the
basis of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotaor Article 36,paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the Court.
2. Alternatively,Article XXXI cannot be invoked as a basis ofjurisdic-
tion independently of Article XXXII, and the latter Article precludes any

unilateral application to the Court exceptwhere :

(a) conciliationprocedures havebeen undergone without asolution, and

(b) theparties havenot agreed onan arbitral procedure.

Neither condition is satisfied inthe present case. 3. Jurisdiction cannot be based on Article 36,paragraph 1,of the Stat-
ute of the Court because Statesparties to the Pact of Bogota have agreed
in Article XXXII that a unilateral Application, based on the Pact of
Bogota,can only be made when the two conditionsenumerated in (a)and
(b),paragraph 2 above, have been satisfied,and such is not the case with
the Application of Nicaragua."

Onbehalfof the Republicof Nicaragua,

in the Counter-Memorial :

"A. On the basis of the foregoing facts and arguments the Government
of Nicaragua respectfully asksthe Court to adjudge and declare that :
1. For the reasons set forth in this Counter-Memorial the purported
modifications of the Honduran Declaration dated 20 February 1960,
contained in the 'Declaration' dated 22 May 1986,are invalid and con-
sequently the 'resewations' invoked by Honduras in its Memorial are

without legal effect.
2. Alternatively, in case the Court finds that the modifications of the
Honduran 'Declaration' dated 22 May 1986are valid, such modifications
cannot be invoked as against Nicaragua because on the facts Nicaragua
did not receive reasonablenotice thereof.

3. Without prejudice to the foregoing submissions, the 'resemations'
invoked by Honduras are not applicable in any eventin the circumstances
of the present case:thus -
(a) the dispute to which the Application of Nicaragua relates is not the
subject of any agreementbythe Parties to resort to other means forthe

pacific settlement of disputes; and, in particular, neither the Conta-
dora process nor the provisions of the Pact of Bogota constitute the
'othermeans'to whichthepertinent resemationrefers;

the dispute to which the Application of Nicaragua relates is not a dis-
pute 'relating to facts or situations originating in armed conflicts or
acts of a similar nature which may affect the territory of the Republic
of Honduras, and in which it may find itself involved directly or indi-
rectly', and, in the alternative, the 'resewation' in question does not
possess an exclusivelypreliminary character and therefore the issue
of its application is postponed for determination at the stage of the
Merits.

4. The 'resewations' invokedby Honduras are not applicable in any
event to the provisions of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota, which
provides an independent basis of jurisdiction within the framework of
Article 36,paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Court.
5. The application of the provisions of Article XXXI of the Pact
of Bogota is not subject eitherto the conciliationprocedure referred to in
Article XXXII of the Pact, exhaustion of which isa condition of recourse
to the Court exclusivelywithinthe contextof ArticleXXXII,orto the con-
dition of an agreement upon an arbitral procedure which relates exclu-
sivelyto Article XXXII.
6. The grounds of inadmissibility of the Application alleged to derive from the provisions of Articles II and IV of the Pact of Bogota have no
legalbasis.
7. Al1the other grounds of inadmissibility alleged in the Honduran
Memorial have no legalbasis and must be rejected.
B. Asa consequenceofthese conclusionsthe Government of Nicaragua
respectfully asks the Court to adjudgeand declare that :

1. The Court is competent in respect of the matters raised in the Appli-
cation submitted by the Government of Nicaragua on 28July 1986.

2. Thecompetence oftheCourts exists:byvirtue ofthe Honduran Dec-
laration dated 20 Febniary 1960acceptingthejurisdiction of the Court in
conformitywiththe provisions of Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Statute of
the Court; or(in case the Declaration of 1960has been validly modified)
the Honduran Declaration of 1960as modified by the Declaration dated
22 May 1986,and the Nicaraguan Declarationdated 24 September 1929;
and/or by virtue of the provisions of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota
and Article 36,paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Court.

3. The Application of Nicaragua is admissible.

C. Forthesereasonsthe Government of Nicaragua respectfullyasksthe
Court to declare that it has jurisdiction or, alternatively, to reserve any
question which does not possess an exclusivelypreliminary characterfor
decision at the stage of the merits.
D. In respect of al1questions of fact referred to in the Memorial of
Honduras not expressly considered in the present Counter-Mernorial,the
Government of Nicaragua reservesits position."

14. In the course of the oral proceedings, each Party confirmed its sub-
missionsasmade inthe Memorialand Counter-Memorial respectively,without
modification.

* * *

15. The present phase of the proceedings is devoted, in accordance
with the Order made by theCourt on 22 October 1986,to the issues of the
jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application. Hon-
durashas in its submissions contended, first that "the Application of Nica-
ragua is inadmissible" and, secondly, that "the Court is not competent to
entertain" that Application; the Court will however first examine the
question of jurisdiction before proceeding, if it finds that it is competent,

to examine the issues of admissibility.

16. The Parties have devoted some argument to a question defined by
them as that of the burden of proof: whether it is for Nicaragua to show
the existence ofjurisdiction forthe Court to deal with its claims, or for
Honduras to establish the absenceof such jurisdiction. Each of themhas

cited, in support of its contention, the Court's dictum that "it is the litigantseekingto establish a fact who bears the burden of proving it" (Military
and ParamilitaryActivities inand againstNicaragua(Nicaragua v. United
States ofAmerica),I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 437,para. 101).

Theexistenceofjurisdiction ofthe Court in agivencaseishowevernot

a question of fact, but a question of lawto be resolved in the light of the
relevantfacts.Thedetermination ofthe factsmayraisequestionsofproof.
Howeverthe factsin the present case - the existenceofthe Parties'dec-
larations under Article 36of the Statute,the signature and ratification of
the Pactof Bogota,etc. - arenotindispute;the issueis,what arethe legal
effectsto be attached to them? The question is whether in case of doubt
the Court is to be deemed to havejurisdiction or not. This question has
alreadybeen considered bythe Permanent Court of International Justice
in the case concerning the Factory ut Chorzhw,Jurisdiction,when it
obsemed :

"It has been argued repeatedly in the course of the present pro-
ceedingsthat in case of doubtthe Court should declinejurisdiction.
It istrue thatthe Court's jurisdiction isalwaysa limitedone, existing
onlyinsofarasStateshaveaccepted it; consequently,the Court will,
in the event of an objection - or when it has automatically to con-
sider the question - only affirm itsjurisdiction provided that the
force ofthe argumentsmilitatinginfavour ofit ispreponderant. The

fact that weighty arguments can be advanced to support the con-
tention that it has no jurisdiction cannot of itself create a doubt
calculated to upset itsjurisdiction. When consideringwhetherit has,
jurisdiction or not, the Court's aim is always to ascertain whether
an intention on the part of the Parties exists to confer jurisdiction
upon it." (P.C.I.J.,SeriesA, No.9,p. 32.)

TheCourt willthereforeinthiscasehaveto considerwhetherthe force of
the argumentsmilitatinginfavour ofjurisdiction ispreponderant, andto
"ascertain whether an intention on the part of the Parties existsto confer
jurisdiction upon it".

17. In its Application instituting proceedings in this case, Nicaragua

refers,asbasis ofthejurisdiction ofthe Court, to
"the provisions of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota and to the
Declarations made bythe Republic of Nicaragua and bythe Repub-
lic of Honduras respectively,accepting thejurisdiction ofthe Court

as provided for in Article 36,paragraphs 1and 2,respectivelyofthe
Statute"
of the Court. In the submissionspresented by Nicaragua in the Counter-

Memorial it iscontended more specificallythat "The competence of the Court exists:by virtue of the Honduran
Declarationdated 20 February 1960acceptingthejurisdiction ofthe
Court inconformitywiththeprovisionsofArticle36,paragraph 2,of
the Statuteofthe Court; or(in casethe Declaration of 1960hasbeen
validly modified) the Honduran Declaration of 1960as modified
bythe Declaration dated 22May 1986,and the Nicaraguan Declara-

tion dated 24September 1929;and/or byvirtue ofthe provisions of
Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota and Article 36, paragraph 1,
ofthe Statute ofthe Court."

18. The Pact of Bogota was drafted and adopted at the Bogota Con-
ference in 1948,at the same time as the Charter of the Organization of
American States (OAS).Among the purposes of the OASas proclaimed
in Article 2ofthe Charter wasthe following :

"(b)to prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the
pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Mem-
ber States."

One Chapter of the Charter was devoted to Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes, and consistedoffour Articles,originallynumbered 20to 23,which
read asfollows :
"Article 20

Al1international disputes that mayarise betweenAmericanStates
shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this
Charter, before being referredto the SecurityCouncil ofthe United
Nations.

Article 21
The following are peaceful procedures: direct negotiation, good
offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settle-
ment, arbitration, and those which the parties to the dispute may
especially agreeupon at anytime.

Article22
In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American
Stateswhich,inthe opinion ofone ofthem,cannotbesettledthrough
the usual diplomaticchannels, the parties shallagree on someother
peacefulprocedure that will enable them to reach a solution.

Article23

A specialtreaty willestablish adequate procedures forthe pacific
settlement of disputes and willdeterminethe appropriate means for
their application, so that no dispute between American Statesshall
failof definitivesettlement within a reasonableperiod."The Charter was amended by the Protocol of Buenos Airesin 1967,and
further amended bythe Protocol of Cartagenade Indias in 1988.Nicara-

gua and Honduras are parties to the Charter, as successivelyamended.
19. The "specialtreaty" referred to inArticle23oftheCharter, quoted
above, isthe Pact of Bogota,whichStatesin its Preamblethat it wascon-
cluded "in fulfillment of Article XXIII of the Charter". Nicaragua and
Honduras have since 1950been parties to the Pact, in the case of Hon-
duras without resemation; Nicaragua appended a resemation to its
signature to the Pact, which it maintained at the time of ratification.
The purpose of the resemation wasto reservethe

"position assumed by the Government of Nicaragua with respectto
arbitral decisions the validity of which it has contested on the basis
of the principles of international law, which clearlypermit arbitral
decisions to'be attacked when they are adjudged to be nul1 or
invalidated".
Ithasnotbeencontended thatthat resemation(tobereferred to inanother
context below,paragraph 40)in itself deprives the Court of anyjurisdic-
tion inthis case which it mighthave by virtue ofthe Pact.
20. Article XXXI of the Pact, upon which Nicaragua relies to found

jurisdiction, provides as follows:
"In conformity with Article 36,paragraph 2, ofthe Statute of the
International Court of Justice,the High Contracting Parties declare
that theyrecognize,inrelationto anyother ArnericanState,thejuris-
dictionoftheCourtas compulsory ipsofacto,withoutthe necessityof
any specialagreementsolongas the present Treaty isin force,in al1
disputes of ajuridical nature that arise amongthem concerning :

(a) Theinterpretation ofatreaty ;
(b) Anyquestionofinternational law;
(c) The existenceof any fact which,if established,would constitute
thebreach ofaninternational obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made forthe breach
ofaninternational obligation."

21. Theotherbasis ofjurisdiction relied onbyNicaragua isconstituted
bythedeclarations ofacceptance ofcompulsoryjurisdiction made bythe
Parties under Article36ofthe Statute ofthe Court.
The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its
Statute has been accepted by Honduras, initiallyby a Declaration made
on 2 February 1948,and deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations on 10 Febmary 1948,in the followingterms:

[Translationfrom the Spanish]
"The Executiveofthe Republic of Honduras, with due authoriza-
tion from the National Congressgranted by DecreeNumber Ten of
the nineteenth of December, nineteen hundred and forty-seven,and in conformity with paragraph two of Articlethirty-six ofthe Statute
ofthe International Court ofJustice,

Herebydeclares :
That it recognizes as compulsory ipsofacto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other Stateaccepting the same obliga-
tion, thejurisdiction ofthe International Court ofJustice inal1legal
disputes concerning :

(a) theinterpretation ofatreaty;
(b) anyquestion ofinternational law ;
(c) the existenceofanyfact which,ifestablished,would constitute a
breach ofaninternational obligation;
(d) thenature orextentofthe reparation tobemadeforthebreach of
aninternationalobligation.

This declaration is made on condition of reciprocity and for a
period of six years from the date of the deposit of the declaration
with the Secretary-Generalofthe United Nations.
National Palace,Tegucigalpa,D.C.,the second of February, nine-
teen hundred and forty-eight." (Z.C. Yea.rbook1947-1948,p. 129.)

22. On 24May 1954,the Government of Honduras deposited withthe
Secretary-GeneraloftheUnited Nations a Declaration renewingthe Dec-
laration of 2 February 1948,"for a period of sixyears,renewable bytacit
reconduction".
23. TheHonduran acceptanceofjurisdiction wasfurther renewed,this
time "for an indefinite term", by a Declaration dated 20 February 1960,
and deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on
10March 1960("the 1960Declaration") :

[Translationfrom theSpanish]
"The Government of the Republic of Honduras, duly authorized
by the National Congress, under Decree No. 99 of 29January 1960,
to renewthe Declarationreferred to inArticle36 (2)ofthe Statuteof
the International Court ofJustice,herebydeclares:

1. That it renews the Declaration made by it for a period of six
years on 19April 1954and deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations on 24 May 1954,the term of which will expire
on 24 May 1960;recognizingas compulsory ipsofacto and without
special agreement,in relation to any other Stateacceptingthe same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in
al1legaldisputes concerning :

(a) theinterpretation ofatreaty;
(b) anyquestion ofinternational law ; (c) the existenceofanyfact which,ifestablished,would constitutea

breach ofaninternational obligation ;
(d) the nature and extent ofthe reparation to be made forthe breach
ofaninternational obligation.
2. This new Declaration is made on condition of reciprocity, for
anindefiniteterm,startingfrom thedate onwhichitisdeposited with
the Secretary-Generalofthe United Nations.

National Palace, Tegucigalpa, D.C., 20 February 1960." (Z.C.J.
Yearbook1959-1 960,p. 241.)

24. Asnoted inparagraph 17above, Nicaragua claimsto be entitled to
found jurisdiction on the 1960Declaration. Honduras asserts that that
Declaration has been modified by a subsequent Declaration, made on
22 May 1986("the 1986Declaration"), which it had deposited with the
Secretary-Generalofthe United Nations prior tothe filingoftheApplica-
tion by Nicaragua.The 1986Declaration is worded as follows:

[Translationfrom theSpanish]
"The Government of the Republic of Honduras, duly authorized
by the National Congress under Decree No. 75-86of 21 May 1986
to modify the Declaration made on 20 February 1960concerning
Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice,herebydeclaresthat it modifies the Declaration made by it

on 20February 1960asfollows :
1. It recognizesas compulsory ipsofacto and without specialagree-
ment,inrelation to anyother Stateaccepting the sameobligation,
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in al1legal
disputesconcerning :

(a) the interpretation ofatreaty;
(b) anyquestion ofinternational law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would consti-
tute abreach ofaninternational obligation;
(d) the nature orextentofthereparation tobemade forthe breach
ofaninternational obligation.

2. This Declaration shall not apply, however, to the following dis-
putesto whichthe RepublicofHonduras maybeaparty :

(a) disputes in respect of which the parties have agreed or may
agree to resort to other means for the pacific settlement of
disputes;
(b) disputes concerning matters subject to the domesticjurisdic-
tion ofthe RepublicofHonduras under internationallaw; (c) disputes relating to facts or situations originating in armed
conflictsor acts of a similarnature which mayaffectthe terri-
tory of the Republic of Honduras, and in which it may find
itselfinvolveddirectlyorindirectly;

(d) disputesreferringto :
(i) territorial questions with regard to sovereignty over
islands, shoals and keys; interna1waters,bays, the terri-
torial seaandthe legalstatusand limitsthereof;
(ii)al1rights of sovereignty or jurisdiction concerning the

legalstatus and limits of the contiguouszone, the exclu-
siveeconomiczone andthe continentalshelf;
(iii) the airspace over the territories, waters and zones
referredto inthissubparagraph.
3. The Government of Honduras also reserves the right at any
time to supplement, modify or withdraw this Declaration or the
reservations contained therein by givingnotice to the Secretary-
General ofthe United Nations.

4. This Declaration replaces the Declaration made by the Govern-
mentofHonduras on 20February 1960.
National Palace, Tegucigalpa, D.C., 22 May 1986."(I.C.J. Year-
book1985-1986,pp. 71-72.)

25. In order to be able to show that it isa "State accepting the same
obligation" as Honduras within the meaning of Article 36,paragraph 2,
ofthe Statute,Nicaragua relieson the declaration which,as a Member of
the Leagueof Nations, it made at the time of signature ofthe Protocol of
Signatureof the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
and whichread asfollows :

[Translationfrom theFrench]
"On behalf of the Republic of Nicaragua 1 recognize as com-
pulsory unconditionally the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice.

Geneva, 24September 1929."

Nicaragua relies further on paragraph 5 of Article 36of the Statute of
the present Court, which provides that :
"Declarations made under Article 36of the Statute of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice and which are stillin force shall
bedeemed,asbetween theparties tothepresent Statute,tobeaccept-
ances of the compulsoryjurisdiction of the International Court of

Justice for theperiod whichthey still have to run and in accordance
withtheir terms." ARMEDACTIONS (JUDGMENT) 82

Nicaraguarecallsfinally thattheCourt, initsJudgment inthe casecon-
cerning Military and Paramilitaïy Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. UnitedStates of America), Jurisdictionand Admissibility
(Z.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 441,para. 1IO) found that "the Nicaraguan Dec-
laration of 24September 1929isvalid", and according to Nicaragua, that
Declaration is currentlyin effect.
26. It is, in short, claimed by Nicaragua that there exist two distinct

titlesofjurisdiction. Itassertsthatthe Court could entertainthe caseboth
on the basis ofArticleXXXI ofthe Pact of Bogotaand on the basi~pfthe
declarations of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction made by Nicara-
guaand Honduras under Article36ofthe Statute.
27. Since,inrelationsbetween the Statesparties to the Pact of Bogota,
that Pactisgoverning,the Court willfirstexaminethe questionwhether it
hasjurisdiction under ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact.

28. Honduras maintains in its Memorial that the Pact "does not pro-
vide any basis forthe jurisdiction of th... Court". It does not contend
that the present dispute by its nature falls outside the scope of the provi-
sionsofArticleXXXI itselfbut arguesthatthat Articlenevertheless does
not conferjurisdiction on the Court inthe present case,and puts fonvard
two objectionsto that effect.
29. Honduras firstdrawsattention to the factthat ArticleXXXI begins
withthewords,"In conformity withArticle36,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute
ofthe International Court ofJustice", and that the wording ofthe rest of
the Articleis almostidentical withthat of Article 36,paragraph 2.It con-
tends that the interpretation of Article XXXI which is at once the most
simple,the mostlogicaland the mostconsistentwiththe literalwording of
the Pact is that it "contains a jurisdiction whichan be more precisely
defined by means of a unilateral declaration" under Article 36, para-
graph 2,ofthe Statute,by eachparty to the Pact;and thatthe seisinofthe
Court is "subject to the terms in which the jurisdiction of the Court has

been acknowledged by the parties to the dispute" in such declarations.
Accordingto Honduras,
"Under the mostliteral, and thereforethe most simple,interpreta-
tion ofthetermsofthe Pact,ArticleXXXI,inestablishingthe obliga-
toryjurisdiction oftheCourt, atthe sametimerequirestheadditional
subscription, byeach ofthe Parties, ofa unilateral declaration of-
knowledgement of itsjurisdiction, asprovided for by Article 36.2of
the Statute of the Court, to which Article XXXI of the Pact makes

expressreference.Thereservationsattached to such declarations,as
inthe case ofthe declaration of Honduras of22May 1986[quotedin
paragraph 24 above],thereforeapplyboth in the contextofthe appli-
cation of Article XXXI and on the solebasis of the Honduran dec-
laration itself."In the contention of Honduras, the reservations attached to the 1986
Declaration are such asto excludethe present casefrom the scope ofthe

jurisdiction conferred under Article 36,paragraph 2,by the Declaration.
Accordingly it maintains that the Court has no jurisdiction in the case
under ArticleXXXI either.
30. At this stage, Honduras's interpretation of Article XXXI of the
Pact was thus that it imposed an obligation to make an optional-clause
declaration, and that, inthe absence ofsucha declaration,nojurisdiction
existed under that Article.The interpretation of Article XXXI espoused
by Honduras was, however,elaborated during the oral arguments and in
its replies to questions put by a Member of the Court. First, Honduras
conceded that itwas"arguable that such a declaration wasnot necessary,
and that Article XXXI operated by its own force, on its own terms, and
without need of any companion declaration". Honduras subsequently
contended that Article XXXI is an incorporation into the Pact of the
systemof recognition of the Court's jurisdiction under the régimeof the
"optional clause", i.e.,Article36,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute.

Consequently, Honduras considers that Statesparties to the Pact may
choose either to take no further action,in which caseArticle XXXI itself
operates as a joint acceptance of jurisdiction under Article 36, para-

graph 2,freeofreservationsand conditionsother than the basiccondition
of reciprocity; or to make a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2.
According to Honduras, if that declaration contains no reservations,
while it willoperate in relation to States non-parties to the Pact which
have made declarations under the optional clause, it will not modifythe
situation vis-à-visother Statesparties to the Pact,in relation to whomthe
declarant State is already bound by the joint declaration embodied in
ArticleXXXI. If such a declaration contains reservations, however,

"it willthen bethe terms ofthat declaration whichwillindicate what
is,asfaras those Statesareconcerned,the extentofthejurisdiction of
the Court establishedin Article XXXI ofthe Pact".
31. In short, Honduras has consistently maintained that, for a State
party to the Pact which has made a declaration under Article 36,para-
graph 2, ofthe Statute, the extent of the jurisdiction of the Court under
Article XXXI of the Pact is determined by that declaration, and by any
reservations appended to it. It has also maintained that any modification
or withdrawal ofsuch a declarationwhich isvalidunder Article36,para-

graph 2,ofthe Statuteisequallyeffectiveunder ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact.

Honduras has, however, given two successiveinterpretations of Arti-
cleXXXI,claiminginitiallythat itmustbesupplemented byadeclaration
of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction and subsequentlythat it can be
so supplemented but need not be. 32. The first interpretation advanced by Honduras - that Arti-
cleXXXI must besupplemented by adeclaration - isincompatible with
the actual terms ofthe Article. In that text, the parties "declare that they
recognize"the Court's jurisdiction"as compulsory ipsofacto"inthe cases
there enumerated. Article XXXI does not subject that recognition to the
making of a new declaration to be deposited with the United Nations
Secretary-Generalin accordance with Article 36,paragraphs 2 and 4, of
the Statute. It is drafted in the present indicativetense, and thus of itself
constitutesacceptance ofthe Court's jurisdiction.
33. Turningto the second Honduran interpretation, the Court mayob-
serveat the outset that two possiblereadings ofthe relationship between
Article XXXI and the Statute have been proposed by the Parties. That
Article has been seen either as a treaty provision conferringjurisdiction

uponthe Court in accordance withArticle36,paragraph 1,ofthe Statute,
or as a collective declaration of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction ,
under paragraph 2 ofthat same Article.
Honduras has advanced the latter reading. Nicaragua, after asserting
in 1984,in the case concerning Militaïy and Paramilitaïy Activitiesin
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), that
Article XXXI constituted a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2,
ofthe Statute,hasarguedinthe presentcasethat ArticleXXXI fallsunder
Article 36, paragraph 1,and therefore confersjurisdiction on the Court
on a conventional basis.
34. Thereishowevernoneedto pursue thisargument. Evenifthe Hon-
duran readingofArticleXXXI be adopted,and the Articleberegardedas
a collectivedeclaration ofacceptance ofcompulsoryjurisdiction madein
accordance with Article 36,paragraph 2, it should be observed that that
declaration was incorporated in the Pact of Bogota as Article XXXI.

Accordingly, it can only be modified in accordance with the mles pro-
vided for in the Pact itself. Article XXXI nowhere envisages that the
undertaking entered into by the parties to the Pact mightbe amended by
means of a unilateral declaration made subsequently under the Statute,
and the referenceto Article 36,paragraph 2, ofthe Statute is insufficient
in itselfto havethat effect.
Thefactthat the Pact defines with precision the obligations ofthe par-
ties lends particular significance to the absence of any indication of that
kind. The commitment in Article XXXI applies rationemateriaeto the
disputes enumerated in thattext; it relates rationepersonaeto the Arneri-
can Statesparties to the Pact; it remains valid rationetemporisfor aslong
asthat instrument itselfremainsin force between those States.
35. Moreover, some provisions of the Treaty restrict the scope of the
parties' commitment.Article Vspecifiesthat procedures under the Pact
"may not be applied to matters which, by their nature, are within the

domestic jurisdiction of the State". Article VI provides that they will
likewisenot apply

"to mattersalreadysettled byarrangementbetween the parties, orby arbitral award or by decision of an international court, or which are
governedbyagreementsortreatiesinforceon thedate ofthe conclu-

sion ofthe present Treaty".

Similarly,Article VI1laysdown specificrules relatingto diplomaticpro-
tection.
Finally, Article LVof the Pact of Bogota enables the parties to make
reservationsto that instrument which "shall, withrespectto the Statethat
makes them, apply to al1signatoryStateson the basis of reciprocity". In
the absence of special procedural provisions those reservations may, in
accordance with the rules of general international law on the point as
codifiedby the 1969ViennaConvention on the LawofTreaties,be made
only at the time of signature or ratification of the Pact or at the time of
adhesion to that instrument.

36. These provisions together indicate that the commitment in Ar-
ticleXXXI can onlybe limitedby means of reservationsto the Pact itself.
It is an autonomous commitment, independent of any other which the
parties may have undertaken or may undertake by depositing with the
United Nations Secretary-General a declaration of acceptance of com-
pulsoryjurisdiction under Article 36,paragraphs 2 and 4, of the Statute.

Not only does Article XXXI not require any such declaration, but also
when sucha declarationismade,it has noeffectonthe commitmentresult-
ing fromthat Article.

Neither the first nor the second interpretation of the text advanced by
Honduras is compatible with the actual terms of the Pact.

37. Further confirmation ofthe Court's readingof ArticleXXXI isto
be foundinthe travauxpréparatoiresI.n this casethese must of coursebe
resorted to only with caution, as not al1the stages of the drafting of the
texts at the Bogota Conference werethe subject of detailed records. The
proceedings of the Conference were however published, in accordance
with Article 47 of the Regulations of the Conference, in Spanish, and
certain recorded discussions of Committee III of the Conference throw
light particularly upon the contemporary conception of the relationship
between Article XXXI and declarations under Article 36 ofthe Statute.

Thetext whichwasto becomeArticleXXXI wasdiscussedatthe meet-
ing of Committee III held on 27 April 1948.The representative of the

United States reminded the meeting that his country had previously,
under Article36,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute,madea declarationof accept-
ance of compulsoryjurisdiction that included reservations; he made it
clear that the United States intended to maintain those reservations in
relation to the application of the Pact of Bogota. The representative of
Mexicoreplied that Stateswhich wishedto maintain such reservationsin
their relations with the other parties to the Pact would have toefomu-latethemasreservationsto the Pact,under ArticleLV.Therepresentatives

of Colombiaand Ecuador, members ofthe draftinggroup, confirmedthat
interpretation. The representative of Peru asked whether an additional
Articleshould not be addedto the draftin order to specifythat adhesion
to the treaty would imply, as between the parties to it, the automatic re-
movalofanyresewationsto declarationsofacceptanceofcompulsoryjuris-
diction.The majority ofCommittee III considered,however,that suchan
Article was not necessary and the representative of Peru went onto Say,
afterthe vote,that "weshould place on record whathasbeen said here,to
the effect that it is understood that adhesion is unconditional and that
resewations are automatically removed" ' (translationbytheRegistryl.
38. This solution was not contested in the plenary session, and Ar-
ticle XXXI was adopted by the Conference without any amendments
on that point.
As a consequence the United States, when signing the Pact, made a

resewation to the effectthat :
"The acceptance by the United States of the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice as compulsory ipsofacto and without
specialagreement, as provided in thisTreaty, is limitedby anyjuris-
dictional orotherlimitationscontained inanyDeclarationdeposited
by the United States under Article 36,paragraph 4,of the Statute of
theCourt, and in force at the time ofthe submission of any case."

ItiscommongroundbetweentheParties that iftheHonduran interpre-
tation of Article XXXI of the Pact be correct,this resewation would not
modify the legal situation created by that Article, and therefore would
not be necessary; Honduras argueshoweverthat it wasnot atrue resewa-
tion, but merelyan interpretativedeclaration.

39. That argument is inconsistent with the report, published by the
United States Department of State, of the delegation of that country to
the Conference of Bogota,whichstated that ArticleXXXI
"does not take into account the fact that various Statesin previous
acceptancesofthe Court'sjurisdictionunder Article36,paragraph 2,
of the Statute, have found it necessary to place certain limitations
upon the jurisdiction thus accepted. This was the case in respect to

the United States,and sincethe termsof itsdeclaration had, in addi-
tion, received the previous advice and consent of the Senate, the
delegation found it necessaryto interpose a reservationtothe effect
that the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory

"Pero deben constar en actas las palabras pronunciadas aqui, acerca de que se
entiende que esadhesion incondicional y que quedan removidas, automaticamente, las
rese~as." (NovenaConferenciaInternacional mericana, Actasy Documentos,Vol. IV,
p. 167.) ipsofacto and without special agreement is limited by anyjurisdic-
tional or other limitations contained in any declaration deposited

by the United States under Article 36, paragraph 4, of the Statute
of the Court in force at the time of the submission of any case."
(U.S.Department of State, Report oftheU.S.Delegationto theNinth
International Conferenceof American States, Washington, 1948,
p. 48.)

In the lightofthis report, it isclearthat the United Statesreservationon
thispoint wasintended to achievesomethingwhich,in the opinion ofthe
United Statesdelegation, could not be brought about merelyby applying
ArticleXXXI. It obviouslywas a reservationtothe Pact,the existenceof
which confirms the interpretation of Article XXXI which the Court has
givenabove.
40. That interpretation, moreover, corresponds to the practice of the
parties to the Pactince 1948.
Theyhave not, at any time, linked together ArticleXXXI and the dec-
larations ofacceptanceofcompulsoryjurisdiction madeunder Article36,
paragraphs 2 and 4, of the Statute. Thus no State, when adhering to
or ratifying the Pact, has deposited with the United Nations Secretary-
Generala declaration ofacceptance ofcompulsoryjurisdiction under the

conditions laid down by the Statute. Moreover, no State party to the
Pact(other than Hondurasin 1986)sawanyneed,whenrenewingoramend-
ing itsdeclaration of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction, to notifythe
text to the Secretary-General of the OAS,the depositary of the Pact, for
transmission to the other parties.

Also, in November 1973El Salvador denounced the Pact of Bogota
and modified its declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
withaviewto restrictingitsscope.Ifthe newdeclaration wouldhavebeen
applicable asbetweentheparties to the Pact,no suchdenunciation would
have been required to limit similarlythe jurisdiction of the Courtnder
ArticleXXXI.
Finally, Honduras has drawn attention to the Washington Agreement
of 21July 1957between Honduras and Nicaragua to bring the case con-
cerningtheArbitralAwardMadebytheKingofSpainon23December1906
before the Court, and has argued that the conclusion of that agreement
iinpliesthat Nicaragua's reservation to the Pact (quoted in paragraph 19
above) was regarded as applicable to its declaration of acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction, and that Nicaragua thereby recognized the

existenceofalinkbetweenthe Pactandthe declaration.TheCourt cannot
draw this conclusion from the facts. The conclusion of the Washington
Agreement could be explained much more simply by the parties' desire
to avoid any controversy overjurisdiction, by preventing any objection
being raised before the Court either on the basis of Nicaragua'sreserva-
tion tothe Pact or concerningthe validityofitsdeclaration of acceptance
of compulsory jurisdiction. It follows that that precedent is in no waycontrary to the consistentpractice of the parties in the application ofthe
Pact of Bogota.
41. Under thesecircumstances,theCourt hasto concludethat the com-
mitment in ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact is independent of such declarations
of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction as may havebeen made under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute and deposited with the United
Nations Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 ofthat same Article.
Consequently,it is not necessaryto decide whetherthe 1986Declaration
ofHonduras isopposable to Nicaragua inthiscase; it cannotinany event
restrict the commitment which Honduras entered into by virtue of
ArticleXXXI.The Honduran argument asto the effectofthe reservation
to its 1986Declaration on its commitment under Article XXXI of the
Pactthereforecannot be accepted.

42. The second objection of Honduras to jurisdiction is based on
Article XXXII of the Pact of Bogota,which reads as follows :
"When the conciliation procedure previously established in the
presentTreaty or byagreement oftheparties does not lead to a solu-

tion, and thesaidpartieshavenotagreed upon an arbitralprocedure,
either of them shallbe entitled to have recourse to the International
Court ofJustice in the mannerprescribed in Article40ofthe Statute
thereof.The Court shallhave compulsoryjurisdiction in accordance
with Article 36,paragraph 1,of the said Statute."

43. It is the contention of Honduras that Articles XXXI and XXXII

must be read together.The first is said to define the extent ofthe Court's
jurisdiction andthe second to determinethe conditions under which the
Court may be seised. According to Honduras it follows that the Court
could only be seised under Article XXXI if, in accordance with Arti-
cle XXXII, there had been a prior recourse to conciliation and lack of
agreement to arbitrate, which isnot the situation in the present case.
44. Nicaragua ontheotherhand contends that ArticleXXXI and Arti-
cle XXXII are two autonomous provisions, each of which confersjuris-
diction upon the Court in the cases for which it provides. It claimsthat
ArticleXXXI coversal1juridical disputes which,beforethe conclusionof
the Pact,would havebeensubject to arbitration under the General Treaty
of Inter-AmericanArbitration of 5January 1929;andthat ArticleXXXII
relatestodisputes, whatevertheirnature, previouslyinthe domain ofcon-
ciliationunder the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation
of the same date. It maintains accordinglythat the Court can be seised,

under ArticleXXXI, inthe casescoveredbythat text,withoutthere being
any requirement to ascertain whether the procedural conditions laid
down, in other cases,by Article XXXII have or have not been satisfied. 45. Honduras's interpretation of Article XXXII runs counter to the
termsofthat Article.ArticleXXXII makesno referenceto ArticleXXXI;
under that text the parties have, in general terms, an entitlement to have
recourse to the Court in caseswherethere has been an unsuccessful con-
ciliation.
It is true that one qualification of this observation is required, with
regard to the French text of Article XXXII, which provides that, in the
circumstances there contemplated, the party has "le droit de porter la

questiondevant la Cour". That expression mightbe thought to refer back
to the question whichmight have been the subject ofthe dispute referred
tothe Court under ArticleXXXI. Itshould, however,beobservedthat the
text uses the word "question",which leaves room for uncertainty, rather
than the word "différend(dispute)", used in Article XXXI, which would
havebeenperfectlyclear.Moreover,the Spanish,Englishand Portuguese
versions speak, in general terms, of an entitlement to have recourse
to the Courtand do notjustify the conclusionthat there isa linkbetween
ArticleXXXI and Article XXXII.
Moreover, Article XXXII, unlike Article XXXI, refers expressly to
thejurisdiction whichthe Court has under Article36,paragraph 1,ofthe
Statute. That reference would be difficult to understand if, as Honduras
contends, the sole purpose of Article XXXII were to specify the pro-
cedural conditions forbringing beforethe Court disputes forwhichjuris-
diction had already been conferred upon it by virtue of the declaration
made in Article XXXI, pursuant to Article36,paragraph 2.

46. It is, moreover, quite clear from the Pact that the purpose of the
American Statesin drafting it wasto reinforcetheir mutual commitments

with regard to judicial settlement. This isalso confirmed by the travaux
préparatoires: the discussionat the meeting of Committee III of the
Conference held on 27 April 1948has already been referred to in para-
graph 37 above. At that meeting,furthermore,the delegate of Colombia
explained to the Committee the general lines of the systemproposed by
the Sub-Committee which had prepared the draft; the Sub-Committee
tooktheposition "that theprincipalprocedureforthe peacefulsettlement
of conflicts between the American States had to be judicial procedure
before the International Court of Justice" (translation by the Registry).
Honduras's interpretation would howeverimplythat the commitment,at
firstsightfirmand unconditional, setforth inArticleXXXI would,infact,
be emptied of al1content if,foranyreason,thedispute werenot subjected
to prior conciliation.ucha solutionwouldbeclearlycontrarytoboththe
object and the purpose of the Pact.
47. In short, ArticlesXXXI and XXXII provide for two distinct ways

' "La Subcomision estim6que elprocedimiento principalpara elarreglopacifico de
los conflictos entre los Estados Americanos ha de ser el procedimiento judicial ante la
Corte Internacional de Justic..." (Novena Conferencia Internacional Americana,
Actasy Documentos,Vol.IV,p. 156).bywhichaccessmaybehad totheCourt. Thefirstrelatesto casesinwhich
the Court can be seised directly and the second to those in which the
parties initiallyresort to conciliation.
In thepresent case,Nicaragua hasrelied upon ArticleXXXI,not Arti-
cleXXXII. It is accordinglynot pertinent whether the dispute submitted
to the Court haspreviouslybeen the subjectofan attempted conciliation,
nor whatinterpretation isgivento ArticleXXXII inother respects,inpar-
ticular as regards the nature and the subject-matter of the disputes to
whichthat textapplies. Itissufficientforthe Court tofindthatthe second
objectionput fonvard by Honduras isbased upon an incorrectinterpreta-

tion ofthat Article and,forthat reason, cannot be accepted.
48. ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact of Bogota thus confersjurisdiction upon
the Court to entertain the dispute submitted to it. For that reason, the
Court does not need to consider whether it might havejurisdiction by
virtue of the declarations of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction by
Nicaragua and Honduras set outin paragraphs 23to 25 above.

49. The Court nowturns to the question ofadmissibilityofthe Nicara-
guan Application. Four objectionshavebeen raised by Honduras, two of
which are general in nature and the remaining two presented on the basis
ofthe Pact of Bogoth.
50. Before examining these objections, it will be convenient to recall
briefly the claimsof Nicaragua against Honduras, as stated in the Appli-
cation. Nicaragua allegesthe existenceof armed bands, generally known
asthe contraforces,openlybased in Honduran territory and carryingout
armed attacks on Nicaraguan territory (Application, paras. 11and 13).

It claimsthat these forces operate with the knowledge and assistance of
the Honduran Government (ibid.,para. 14);that the Honduran military
forces not only aid and abet the contrasbut have directly participated
in military attacks on Nicaragua and have given vital intelligence and
logistical support to the contras(ibid.,para. 19);and that the Honduran
Government has used the threat of force against Nicaragua in both
words and facts (ibid.,para. 20). Nicaragua therefore claims that Hon-
duras has incurred legal responsibility for the breach of, inter alia, the
prohibition of the threat or use of force as provided by the Charter of
the United Nations (ibid.,para. 22);the prohibition of interventionin the
interna1or external affairs of other States laid down in the Charter of
the OAS (ibid.,para. 23); and the obligations of customaryinternational
lawnotto intervenein the affairsofanother State,not to useforceagainst
another State, not to violate the sovereignty of another State, and not
to kill,wound or kidnap citizensof other States (ibid.,paras. 26-29).On
this basis, Nicaragua requests the Courtto adjudge and declare that the
actsand omissionsof Honduras constitutebreaches ofinternational law;
thatHonduras is under aduty immediatelyto ceaseandto refrainfrom al1suchacts ;andthatHonduras isunder an obligationto makereparation to

the Republic of Nicaragua.

51. Honduras's firstobjectionto the admissibilityofthe Application is
that "It is a politically-inspired,artificialrequest which the Court should
not entertain consistently with itsjudicial character"; it claimsthat Nica-
ragua is attempting to use the Court, or the threat of litigation before
the Court, as a means of exerting political pressure on the other Central
American States.
52. Asregards the firstaspect ofthisobjection,the Court isawarethat
politicalaspectsmaybepresent in anylegaldisputebroughtbeforeit. The
Court, as a judicial organ, is however only concerned to establish,first,
thatthe disputebefore itisalegaldispute,inthe senseofadisputecapable
ofbeing settledbythe application ofprinciples and mles ofinternational
law,and secondly,thattheCourt hasjurisdiction to deal with it,and that

thatjurisdiction isnotfetteredbyanycircumstancerendering the applica-
tion inadmissible.The purpose of recourse to the Court is the peaceful
settlement of such disputes; the Court's judgment is a legal pronounce-
ment, andit cannot concern itselfwiththe politicalmotivation whichmay
lead a Stateat a particular time, or in particular circumstances,to choose
judicial settlement. So far as the objection of Honduras is based on an
alleged political inspiration of the proceedings, it therefore cannot be
upheld.
53. Thesecondaspect ofthefirstobjectionofHonduras isitsclaimthat
the requestisartificial.In itsMemorial Honduras explainsthat initsview
the overallresult ofNicaragua's actionis"an artificialand arbitrary divid-
ing up of the general conflict existingin Central Arnerica", which "may
have negativeconsequencesfor Honduras asa defendant Statebefore the
Court", because, it is said, certain facts appertaining to the general con-
flict "are inevitablyabsent from the proceedings before the Court", and

otherfactshavealreadybeeninissuebeforethe Court inthe caseconcern-
ing MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainst Nicaragua (Nicara-
gua v. UnitedStatesofAmerica).Honduras contends that no real distinc-
tion can be made between the general situation of tension in the region
and the various bilateral disputes which Nicaragua claims to existthere,
and thatthe "procedural situation" created by Nicaragua'ssplitting-upof
the overallconflictinto separate disputes is contrary to the requirements
ofgood faith and theproper functioning of international justice.

54. The Court cannot uphold this contention. It is not clear why any
factsshould be "inevitably absent" from the proceedings, sinceit isopen
to Honduras to bring to the Court's attention any factswhich in itsview
are relevantto the issuesinthis case.Nor can itbe accepted that oncethe

Court has givenjudgment in a case involvingcertain allegations of fact,and made findings in that respect, no new procedure can be commenced
Inwhichthose, aswellas other,facts might haveto be considered. In any
ievent,it is for the Parties to establish the facts in the present case taking
account of the usual rules of evidence,without it being possible to rely
on considerations of resjudicata in another case not involvingthe same
parties (seeArticle 59of the Statute).

Thereisno doubtthatthe issuesofwhichthe Court hasbeen seisedmay

beregardedas part ofawiderregionalproblem.The Court isnotunaware
of the difficulties that may arise where particular aspects of a complex
generalsituation arebrought beforea Court for separate decision. Never-
theless,asthe Court observedin the caseconcerning UnitedStatesDiplo-
maticand ConsularStaffin Tehran,"no provision of the Statute or Rules
contemplates that the Court should decline to take cognizance of one
aspectofadispute merely becausethat disputehasotheraspects, however
important" (Z.C.J.Reports1980,p. 19,para. 36).

55. Thesecond Honduran objectionto admissibilityisthat "the Appli-
cationisvagueand the allegationscontainedin itarenot properlyparticu-
larized, so that the Court cannot entertain the Application without sub-
stantial prejudiceto Honduras". In support ofthis Honduras asserts that
"a largenumber ofthe mattersput fonvard byNicaragua donotconstitute
concreteacts or omissions,identifiable byreferenceto place and to time",
but concern "indeterminate situations" or "opinions about intentions";
thatanother largegroup of thesemattersarereferredto onlybytheyearin
whichtheytookplace withoutgeographical location; and thatthe Appli-
cation confuses facts of a different nature and attributable to different

causes.

56. Article40,paragraph 1,ofthe Statute requiresthat an Application
indicate "the subject ofthe dispute".Under the RulesofCourt, an Appli-
cation is required to specify"the precisenature ofthe claim", and insup-
port thereof to giveno more than "a succinctstatement of the facts and
grounds on which the claim is based" (Art. 38, para. 2). The Court con-
siders that the Nicaraguan Application in the present case, summarized
in paragraph 50above,meetsthese requirements.
57. Accordingly none ofthese objectionsof a generalnature to admis-
sibilitycan be accepted.

58. The Court now turns to the objections to admissibility which
Honduras bases upon Articles II and IVofthe Pact of Bogoth.
59. Article II of the Pact, upon which Honduras bases itsthird objec-
tion to admissibility,reads as follows:
"The High Contracting Parties recognize the obligation to settle negotiations between Nicaragua and itself prior to April 1983and the
negotiations inthe contextof the Contadora process.

61. Nicaraguahasargued, first,that itdoesnot necessarilyfollowfrom
the text of Article II that recourse to pacificprocedures is available only
when it isthe opinion of the parties that the dispute cannot be settled by
direct negotiations; that it is perfectly logicalto read Article II as setting
forth onecircumstance - but notthe exclusiveone - inwhichtheparties
bind themselvesto use the procedures set forth in the Pact.

62. The Court does not consider that Article II, in the context of the
Pactasawhole, canberead inthissense;that provisionconstitutes,as was
argued by Honduras, a condition precedent to recourse to the pacific
procedures of the Pact in al1cases.The Court has therefore to consider
how that condition applies inthe present case.

63. Nicaragua then rejectsthe interpretation ofArticle II advanced by
Honduras, that both parties to a disputeshould havemanifestedthe opin-
ion that it cannot be settled bynegotiations,contending that itwould give
a recalcitrant party to a dispute a right of veto ofjudicial or otherettle-
mentwhichwouldshatterthe wholecarefullyconstructedscheme ofcom-
pulsoryjurisdiction established by the Pact. It further contends that the
'questionisnot whether one ofthe parties orboth ofthem mustthink that
the dispute cannot be settled by diplomatic means, but whether the dis-
pute can in fact be settledby such means; in itsviewthejurisprudence of
the Court supportsthe principle that whenthere isdisagreementbetween
theparties onthe point,the issueisto beresolvednot so much onthe basis
oftheparticular form ofwordsusedinthe compromissoryinstrument,but
by an objectiveevaluation by the Court of the possibilitiesfor settlement
of the dispute by directnegotiations.

The Court observeshoweverthat that jurisprudence concerns casesin
which the applicable text referred to the possibility of such settlement;
Article II however refersto the opinion ofthe parties as to such possibil-
ity.TheCourt therefore does not haveto makean objectiveassessmentof
suchpossibility,but to considerwhat isthe opinion ofthe Partiesthereon.
64. Before proceeding further, the Court notes that the Parties have
drawnattention to adiscrepancybetweenthefourtexts ofArticleII ofthe
Pact(English,French,Portuguese and Spanish).In the Frenchtext, what
is required is that, "de l'avisde l'une des parties", i.e., "in the opinion of
one ofthe parties", the dispute should not be susceptible ofsettlementby
negotiation. In the English, Portuguese and Spanish texts, the corre-
spondingphrase is"in the opinion ofthe parties", orthe equivalentin the
othertwolanguages.Forreasonswhichwillappear,the Court's reasoning

does not require the resolution of the problem posed by this textual dis-
crepancy, and it will therefore not rehearse al1the arguments that have
been put fonvard bythe Parties to explain it orto justify the preferring of
one versionto another.
65. For the purpose of determiningthe application inthis case ofArti-cleII ofthe Pact,the Court willproceed onthe hypothesisthatthe stricter
interpretation should be used, Le.,that it would be necessaryto consider
whetherthe "opinion" ofboth Parties wasthat itwasnotpossibleto settle
the dispute by negotiation. For this purpose the Court does not consider
that it isbound bythe mere assertion oftheone Party or the other that its
opinion isto aparticular effect :itmust,inthe exerciseofitsjudicial func-

tion,befreetomake its owndetermination ofthat question onthe basisof
such evidenceas is availableto it.This isinfact the viewof Honduras, as
expressedby its Co-Agentat the hearings :
"It is for the Courtto decide for itself whether, by their conduct,
the Partieshaveprovided substantive evidencethat they consider in
good faith that a dispute can or cannot be settled by direct negotia-
tions through the usual diplomaticchannels ...
The Court may disregard what has been saidby one ofthe Parties
if it is clearlyapparentthat the contentions it has putfonvard arein

contradiction with reality.
The Court has to seek for evidence of the Parties' genuine inten-
tions. It cannot substitute its ownopinion for that ofthe Partiesas to
whether the dispute is susceptible to settlement by direct negotia-
tions."
Thisstatementpresupposes that the holding ofopinions canbe subjectto
demonstration, and that the Court may expect "the Parties [to provide]
substantive evidencethat they considerin goodfaith" a certain possibility

of negotiation to exist or not to exist. It even invitesthe Court "to seek
for evidence ofthe Parties' genuineintentions".

66. Thecriticaldate fordeterminingthe admissibilityofan application
isthedate onwhichitisfiled(cf. SouthWestAfrica,PreliminalyObjections,
Z.C.J.Reports1962,p.344).It mayhoweverbenecessary,inorderto deter-
mine withcertaintywhat the situation was at thedate of filingofthe Ap-
plication, to examinethe events, and in particular the relations between
the Parties, overa period prior to that date, and indeed during the subse-
quent period. Furthermore,subsequent eventsmayrender an application
without object,oreventakesuchacourseastopreclude thefilingofalater
application in similarterms. Inthiscase,the date atwhich"the opinion of
the parties" has to be ascertained for the application of Article II of the
Pact is28July 1986,the date of filingofthe Nicaraguan Application.

67. To ascertain the opinion of the Parties, the Court isbound to ana-
lyse the sequence of events in their diplomatic relations. It is common

ground between the Parties that their relations deteriorated seriously
when, from 1980onwards, many active opponents of the Nicaraguan
Government formed themselves into irregular military forces and com-
menced a policy of armed opposition;a substantial group operated from
1981onwards along the Nicaraguan borders with Honduras. According
to Nicaragua, there ensued repeated border incidents, and instances ofmaterial support given to those opponents, which have compelled it to
protest diplomaticallyto Honduras "continuously since 1980".The Presi-
dents ofthe two Statesheldtalkson these matters at ElGuasaule, Nicara-

gua, in May 1981.Bilateral contacts between the Parties continued for
some time after this date; the Parties have however made conflicting
assertions as to their nature and extent.

68. On23March 1982the Honduran ForeignMinisterpresentedto the
Permanent Council ofthe OASa draft "plan to internationalizepeace in
Central America". At a meeting of the two Foreign Ministers in Teguci-
galpaon21 April1982,Nicaraguaresponded withaseven-pointplan call-
ing interaliaforthe signingof abilateral non-aggressionpact, a systemof
joint border patrols and the dismantlingofthe militaryencampments said
to be maintained in Honduras by opponents of the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment. Honduras commentedon this proposal, without committing itself,
twodays later.TheHonduran ForeignMinisterexplainedto the National

Congress that in his reply, a diplomatic Note of 23April 1982,"without
refusing discussion of the bilateral problems" he had reiterated Hon-
duras's position of the prior importance of a solution within a regional
context. In that Note, before commenting on the specific Nicaraguan
proposals, he said the following:

"1understand, as was veryclearlyexplained by Your Excellency,
that your proposa1is of a bilateral nature and is aimed at improving
relationsbetween Ourtwo countries. whiletheHonduran initiativeis
widerinscope,ofa regionalnature and withperhaps moreambitious
objectives.Despite this, my Government considers that the regional
approach should prevail since a major part of the problems con-
fronted bytheCentral Americancountries gobeyond the possibility
of a bilateral solution."

69. Thus, it appearsthat in 1981and 1982,the Parties had engaged in
bilateral exchanges atvarious levelsincluding,at the verybeginning,that
of the Heads of State. Broadly speaking, Nicaragua sought a bilateral
understanding while Honduras increasingly emphasized the regional
dimension ofthe problem and held out for a multilateralapproach, event-
ually producing a plan of internationalization which led to unsuccessful
Nicaraguan counter-proposals.

70. The Foreign Ministers of the countries which were to become
known as the Contadora Group - Colombia, Mexico, Panama and
Venezuela - meton 8and 9January 1983on Contadora Island, Panama,
to consider in what waytheir countries could contribute to the resolution

of the grave and dangerous problems that persisted in Central America. ARMED ACTIONS (JUDGMENT) 97

Theyurgentlycalled upon al1Central Americancountries "to reduceten-
sions and to establish the basis for a lasting climate of friendly relations

and mutual respect ...through dialogue and negotiation". Within three
months they had visited Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador
and Guatemala and had secured the agreement of the Governments of
those countries to engage in a common dialogue. On 17July 1983the
Heads of States of the Contadora countries issued the Cancun Declara-
tion on Peace in Central America, recording the establishment,with the
agreement of al1those Governments, of "an agenda covering the salient
aspects of the problems of the region". Two days later, the President of
Nicaragua made a speech in which he expressed his Government's
acceptance "that the beginning of the negotiation process promoted by
the Contadora Groupbe ofamultilateralcharacter" and proposed imme-
diate discussions with a viewto reaching agreements on certain points;
he added :

"Nicaragua Statesits willingnessto assume, with full responsibil-
ity,al1commitmentsarisingfromthe said agreementsand makesthis
clearbyacceptingthe point ofviewofthe Heads ofStatesofthe Con-
tadora Group totheintentthatthe taskofsettlingspecificdifferences
between countries must be begun initially with the signature of a
memorandum of understanding and the creation of commissions

allowing the parties to carry out combined actions and guarantee
effectivecontrol oftheir territories, especiallyin the frontier zones."

Therefollowedajoint meetingin Panama atthe end ofJuly 1983between

the Contadora Foreign Ministers and those ofthe fiveCentral American
States, at which the Central American Foreign Ministers "made known
their acceptance and gavetheir support to" the Cancun Declaration.

71. On 9 September 1983the Group drew up a "Document of Objec-
tives" covering a vast range of political, military, social, economic,
humanitarianand financialquestions.For thepurpose ofthe instant case,
it should be noted thatthe objectivesincluded the following:

"To promote détenteand put an end to situations of conflict in
the area, refraining from taking any action that might jeopardize
political confidence or prevent the achievement of peace, security
and stabilityinthe region.
.............................
To createpoliticalconditionsintended to ensure the international
security,integrity and sovereigntyofthe Statesofthe region.

Topreventtheuseoftheirownterritory [i.e.,that oftheparticipant States]bypersons,organizations orgroups seekingto destabilizethe
GovernmentsofCentralAmericancountries andto refuseto provide
them with or permit them to receive militaryor logisticalsupport."
(UN doc. S/16041.)

The Group having requested concrete proposals towards an agreement
aimed at the objectives concerned, Nicaragua responded with the sub-
mission of five'proposed treaties, collectively called "Legal Bases for

Guaranteeing Peaceand the International Securityofthe Central Ameri-
can States" on 15October 1983,the date which Honduras identifies as
marking the beginning of Nicaragua's active participation in what has
cometo be called "the Contadora process".

72. On 1May 1984the Contadora Group issued an information bul-
letinnoting interaliathatat ameetingheldinPanamathepreviousday the
Foreign Ministers of the Central American States had reaffirmed their
convictionthatthe Contadora process "represented the genuine regional
alternative and the appropriate forum for the resolution of the conflicts
those countries are currently facing" (UN doc. A/39/226; S/16522). By
then the Group had begunthe drafting ofa "Contadora Actfor Peaceand
Co-operation in Central America", coveringin great detail the samevast
range oftopics ashad been coveredby the Document of Objectives.This
waspublished in July 1984,and a revisedversion ofthe draft Actwas cir-
culated on 7 September 1984.
73. On 21 September 1984the President of Nicaragua informed the
Contadora Group that his Governmenthad decided to acceptthe revised
Contadora Actin itstotality and without modification.The Government

of Honduras took a moreguarded attitude, and invitedthe other Central
American Governments to a meeting in Tegucigalpa for the purpose of
considering further revisions. At this meeting, held on0 October 1984,
but in which Nicaragua did not participate, a different proposed treaty
was provisionally agreed to by Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica.

74. No progressappears to havebeenmadetoward the adoption ofthe
Contadora Act during the next twelve months, although Nicaragua
agreed to negotiate changes in the initial draft;se negotiations lasted
through most of 1985. At a meeting in Cartagena (Colombia) on
24-26August 1985,the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group were
joined by the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Brazil,Peru and Uruguay
(the "Lima Group", later known asthe "Support Group"). Consultations
resulted in the preparation of a further draft Act, presented by the Con-
tadora Group and the Support Group to the Central American States
on 12-13September 1985. None of the Central American States fully
accepted the draft, but negotiations continued, to break down in June

1986. 75. Atthisstagethe Court isnot calledupon to pronounce on the legal
consequences of this breakdown, but merely to determine the nature of
the procedure whichwasfollowed,and toascertainwhether,as Honduras
claims,the negotiations conducted in the context of the Contadora pro-
cesscouldberegardedasdirectnegotiationsthrough theusualdiplomatic
channels,withinthe meaning ofArticle II ofthe Pact of Bogota.
Thisprocess,during the period nowin question,wasa "combination of
consultation,negotiation and mediation", asHonduras has obsemed, and

theGeneral Assemblyofthe OASinResolution702of 17November 1984,
noted withpleasure"theintensiveeffortmade bythe ForeignMinistersof
the Contadora Group in consulting,mediatingbetween, and negotiating
with,the Central Americangovernments ...".

While there were extensive consultations and negotiations between
1983and 1986,in different forms, both among the Central American
States themselves, and between those States and those belonging to the
Contadora Group and the Support Group, these were organized and
carried on within the context of the mediation to whichthey were subor-
dinate. At thistime the Contadora process was primarily a mediation, in
whichthird States,ontheir own initiative,endeavoured to bring together
the viewpoints of the States concerned by making specificproposals to
them.
That processtherefore, which Hondurashad accepted, was, as a result
of the presence and action of third States, markedly different from a
"direct negotiation through the usual diplomatic channels". It thus did
not fa11within the relevant provisions of Article II of the Pact of Bogota.
Furthermore, no other negotiation which would meetthe conditions laid
down in that text was contemplated on 28 July 1986,the date of filingof
the Nicaraguan Application. Consequently Honduras could not plau-
siblymaintain at that datethat the dispute between itselfand Nicaragua,
as defined in the Nicaraguan Application, was at that time capable of
beingsettledbydirectnegotiationthrough the usualdiplomaticchannels.

76. The Court therefore considers that the provisions of Article II of
the Pact of Bogota relied on by Honduras do not constitute a bar to the

admissibilityof Nicaragua's Application.

77. The fourth and last objection of Honduras to the admissibility of
the Nicaraguan Application is that :

"Having accepted the Contadora process as a 'specialprocedure'
within the meaning of Article II of the Pact of Bogota,Nicaragua is
precluded both byArticleIVofthe Pactand byelementaryconsider-
ations of good faith from commencing any other procedure for pacific settlement until such time as the Contadora process has

been concluded; and that time hasnot arrived."

Article IV of the Pact of Bogota, upon which Honduras relies, reads as
follows :

"Onceanypacificprocedure hasbeeninitiated,whether by agree-
ment between the parties or in fulfillment ofthe present Treaty or a
previous pact, no other procedure may be commenced until that
procedure is concluded."

78. It is commonground between the Parties thatthe present proceed-
ings before the Court are a "pacific procedure" as contemplated by the
Pact of Bogota,and that therefore ifany other "pacificprocedure" under
the Pacthasbeen initiated and not concluded,theproceedings wereinsti-

tuted contrary to Article IV and must therefore be found inadmissible.
Thedisagreementbetweenthe PartiesiswhethertheContadora processis
orisnota procedure contemplated byArticleIV.Honduras contends that
the Contadora process is a "special procedure" forthe purposes of Arti-
cleII ofthe Pact, which refersto "such specialprocedures as,intheir [the
parties']opinion,willpermitthem to arriveat asolution" ofthe dispute,as
an alternativeto "the procedures established in the present Treaty". This
specialprocedure has, in the contention of Honduras, been entered into
byagreementbetweenthe Parties,and thus mustberegardedas a "pacific
procedure" forthe purposes of Article IV. Nicaragua onthe other hand
deniesthattheContadora processcan betreated as a "specialprocedure"
for purposes of Articles II and IV of the Pact, because, inter aliai, ts
subject-matterisdistinctfrom thedispute before theCourt.

79. It is clear that the question whether or not the Contadora process

can be regarded as a "special procedure" or a "pacific procedure" within
the meaning of Articles II and IV ofthe Pact would not have to be deter-
mined if such a procedure had to be regarded as "concluded" by
28July 1986,thedate offilingofthe Nicaraguan Application. Thedate of
the institution of proceedings is the date at which the admissibility of
a claim has to be assessed (paragraph 66 above); for the application
of Article IV, the question is specifically whether any initial pacific
procedure which may have been instituted has been "concluded" before
any other procedure, includingjudicial procedure, is "commenced".

80. Forthepurposes ofArticleIVof the Pact,noforma1actisnecessav
before a pacificprocedure can be said to be "concluded". Theprocedure
in question does not have to have failed definitivelybefore a new pro-
cedure can be commenced. It is sufficientif, at the date on which a new

procedure is commenced, the initial procedure has come to a standstill
in such circumstances that there appears to be no prospect of its being
continued or resumed. 81. In order to decide this issue in the present case, the Court will re-
sume itssurvey ofthe Contadora process.Theinitial stages ofthe process

havealready been described in paragraphs 70to 74above. Subsequently,
from 5to7 April1986 ameeting ofthe ForeignMinisters ofthe Contadora
Group and of the Support Group was held in Panama for the purpose
of reviewing progress. On the outcome of this meeting, the Contadora
Group

"invited the five Central American Governments to a meeting on
6 June 1986at Panama City for the purpose of declaring the nego-
tiation of the text of the Contadora Act officially concluded and
proceeding to its forma1adoption" (letter addressed by the Group
tothe Secretary-General ofthe United Nations on 26June 1986(see
paragraph 85below); UN doc. A/40/1136; S/18184, Ann. 1).

The five Governments responded in a communiqué of 18 May 1986
announcing their intention "to gather for the signing of the Act on
6June 1986"and bythe Declaration issued at Esquipulas, Guatemala, on
25May 1986,in whichtheir Presidents stated interalia:

"That they are willing to sign the 'Contadora Act for Peace and
Co-operation in Central America',and agree to complyfullywith al1
the undertakings and procedures contained in the Act. They rec-
ognize that some aspects remain outstanding, such as military
manŒuvres, arms control and the monitoring of compliance with
the agreements.Today, however,in this dialogue among the leaders
of fraternal peoples, they find thearious proposals put forward by
the countries to be sufficientlyproductive and realistic to facilitate
the signing of the Act."

82. Immediately after the meeting of Presidents at Esquipulas, their
plenipotentiaries resumed discussionswith a viewto settling such differ-
encesasremained, but came to the conclusion that itwould be impossible
forthe Acttobesignedon theappointed date; theynevertheless "commu-
nicated the determination of their respectiveGovernments to continue to
promote the diplomatic negotiation process" (letter of 26June 1986to the
Secretary-General cited in the previous paragraph). In that context, al1

Foreign Ministers concerned met at Panama City on 6-7 June 1986for
the forma1 delivery of "that which, in the opinion of the Contadora
Group, constitute[d] the final draft of the Act of Contadora for Peace
and Co-operation in Central America", to quote the letter dated 6 June
1986addressed by the Group tothe Central American Foreign Ministers
on that occasion. The Group explained that the text "incorporates the
essential political commitments related to the substantive aspects", and
went on : "Once this question is resolved, we propose to proceed imme-
diately to another phase of the negotiations, referring to matters of
an operational character and which will refer mainly to the estab-
lishment ofthe Verificationand Control Commission."

83. On 12June 1986,the Governments of Costa Rica and El Salvador
released a joint statement rejecting the draft Act of Contadora. On
13June 1986,the Government of Honduras issued a press communiqué,
stating,in particular:

"1. The last project for an instrument ('acta')proposed by Con-
tadora does not constitute, in the opinion of the Government of
Honduras, a document that establishes reasonable and sufficient
obligationsfor guaranteeingits security.
2. TheContadora Group stated in that meetingthatthe project in

reference exhausted its mediation efforts with relation to the sub-
stantive elements of the 'acta',but that notwithstanding they were
available for collaborating in the negotiation of the operative and
practical elements ofthe 'acta'.
3. TheGovernment ofHonduras reiteratesitswillingnessto conti-
nue exploring new formulas that effectivelyguarantee the legitimate
interests ofal1the States.. ."

On 21June 1986the Government of Honduras addressed a letter to the
Contadora Group, expressing its attitude to the Final Act. In that letter,
inter aliait,quoted paragraph 1ofthe press communiqué,and referredto
paragraph 2; it noted that the Contadora Group "would remain ready to
collaborate in the negotiation of[the]operative and practical aspects" of
the Act,and stated that in itsview

"it would only be possible to systematicallyapproach these matters
insofar as the agreementdealing with the substantiveaspects of the
Act,would havebeen clearlyestablished and accepted".
84. TheForeignMinister ofNicaragua,in aletterof 17June 1986,gave

the forma1response of his Government, to the effect, inter alia,that the
Final Actwasthe onlyinstrument"capable ofproducing a quickand effi-
cient conclusion of the negotiating process", and offered to implement a
number of proposals it contained, in particular on militaryand logistical
matters.
85. On 26 June 1986,the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group
called on the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN doc.
A/40/ 1136; S/18184),and handed to him a letter recounting develop-
ments since September 1985 ;in that letterthe Group stated :

"Now that the substantive issues of the Contadora Act have been
resolved,as the Central American Governments haveunequivocally

37 ARMEDACTIONS(JUDGMENT) 103

stated, and inorder that the Act hay be signed, wepropose that we
should pass on immediately to another phase of the negotiation. In

this phase we will deal jointly and systematically withmatters of a
procedural and operational nature referringprincipally tothe statute
of the Verification and Control Commission for Security Matters
which will be an integral part of the Act and to other regulatory
matters."

The Act, and the proposa1 for negotiation, were not accepted, and the
Contadora process wasthus at a standstill.
86. The situation in the area deteriorated, and on 1October 1986the
ForeignMinisters oftheContadora Group andthe SupportGroup, meet-
ingin NewYork during the United Nations General Assembly,expressed
their concernin a declaration in whichthey said that they had decided to
take a new peace initiative. For thisurpose they visitedthe fiveCentral

American States, and followingthat mission,in a communiquéissued in
MexicoinJanuary 1987,theycould dono morethan reiteratetheir "deter-
mination to maintain dialogue with al1the countries directly or indirectly
involved in the conflict", and "to continue to push ori with diplomatic
negotiations" between the Central American States.

87. Anew stagein the situation in Central Americabegan when Presi-
dent Oscar AriasofCosta Rica,on 15February 1987,presented the Peace
Plan whichbears his name. Thisplan contemplated new approachesand
newmechanismsforthe settlementoftheproblemsfacingthe countries of
the region. The Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group and the Sup-
port Group, meeting in Buenos Aires on 13April 1987,again expressed
their concern at the standstill in the negotiation processnceJune 1986,
emphasized the importance of President Arias's proposa1and noted the

stated intention of the Government of Costa Rica to sponsor, at the pro-
posed meeting ofthe fiveCentral American Presidentsat Esquipulas, an
agreement by the five countries to resume negotiation of the Contadora
Acttogether with the signingof President Arias'sproposal.

88. It wasin these circumstancesthatthe Presidentsofthe fiveCentral
American States adopted on 7 August 1987a "Plan to Establish a Firm
and Lasting Peace in Central America", known as the Esquipulas II
Accord. This agreement comprised a number of commitments,directed
in particular to national reconciliation, an endto hostilities,democratiza-
tion,freeelections,a haltto aidtoirregularforcesorinsurrectionistmove-
ments, and the non-use ofterritory to attack other States.Therole which
was thereafter to be attributed to the Contadora Group and the Support

Group wasdefined in Section7and Section 10(a).Section7provided for
participation ofthe Contadora Group in connection with security, verifi-
cation and control. Section 10(a)provided for an International Verifica-tion and Monitoring Commission whose membership wasto include the
Foreign Ministers of the Contadora and Support Group countries. The
implementation of the agreement was entrusted to an executive commit-
teemade up ofthe Foreign Ministersofthe fiveCentral American States.
Thedetailsofthe negotiationswhichbeganonthis basis do not haveto be
gone into here, Savethat atthe joint meetingbetweenthe Central Ameri-
can Statesand the ContadoraGroup on 10December 1987,itwasdecided
that various provisions of the draft Final Act of Contadora should be
re-examined, and that the necessary proposals would be made by the
Central American countries.

89. From this account it is clear that the Contadora process was at a
standstill at the date on which Nicaragua fileditsApplication. Thissitua-
tion continued until the presentation of the Arias Plan and the adoption
bythe fiveCentral American Statesofthe Esquipulas II Accord,whichin
August 1987set in train the procedure frequently referred to as theCon-
tadora-Esquipulas II process. The questiontherefore arises,for the pur-
poses of Article IV of the Pact, whether this latter procedure should be

regardedas havingensuredthe continuation ofthe initialprocedure with-
out interruption, or whether on 28July 1986that initialprocedureshould
be regardedas having "concluded", and aprocedure ofa differentnature
ashavinggot under waythereafter.Thisquestion isofcrucialimportance,
since on the latter hypothesis, whatever may have been the nature of the
initial Contadora processwithregardto Article IV,that Articlewouldnot
have constituted a bar to the commencement of a procedure before the
Court onthat date.
90. The views ofthe Parties in this respect were givenin particular in
their replies to a question put by a Member of the Court. Nicaraguaindi-
catedthat "the Contadora process has not been abandonedor suspended
at any moment". As for Honduras, it declaredthat "the Contadora pro-
cesshas not been abandoned" andthat, afterthe non-signature ofthe Act
of Contadora, the Contadora Group and the Support Group continued
their efforts up to the time of the approval of the Esquipulas II Accord.
Since that time the process, according to Honduras, continued without
interruption.
91. The Court fullyappreciatesthe importance ofthis concordance of
viewsbetween the Parties onthe subject of regional initiativeswhich are
highlyregarded by them. Butit cannot seeinthis a concordance ofviews

astotheinterpretation oftheterm"concluded" inArticleIVofthe Pactof
Bogota,inrelationtotheposition ofthe Contadora processatthe moment
of the filing of the Nicaraguan Application. In the Court's view, on the
basis of the facts described above the action of the Contadora Group
before June 1986cannot be regarded,for the purposes of the application
of the Pact,as on thesame footing as itssubsequentaction.
Whilethe peacemaking process has continued to bear the name "Con-
tadora", the factisthatthat titlehas becomepracticallya symbolofal1the ARMED ACTIONS (JUDGMENT) 105

stages traversed and al1the multilateral initiatives taken in the last few
yearsto restorepeace to Central America. In fact howeverthe Contadora
process,as it operated in the firstphase, is differentfrom the Contadora-
Esquipulas II process initiated in the second phase. The two differ with
regard both to theirbject andto their nature. The Contadora process, as

has been explained above, initially constituted a mediation in which the
Contadora Group andSupport Group played a decisivepart. IntheCon-
tadora-Esquipulas II process,onthe other hand, theContadora Group of
Statesplayed a fundamentallydifferent role.Thefivecountries ofCentral
Americaset upan independent mechanism ofmultilateralnegotiation,in
which the role of the Contadora Group was confined to the tasks laid
down in Sections 7 and 10(a)of the Esquipulas II Declaration, and has
effectivelyshrunk stillfurther subsequently.

92. The facts show that the Contadora Group regarded its mission as
completed, at least so far as the negotiation of any substantiveaccord is
concerned, with the presentation to the Central American States on
6-7June 1986ofthe final and definitiveAct of Contadora. The signature
of that Act would have crowned the mediation with a success; its non-
signature had the opposite effect.Moreover,it should not be overlooked
that there wasa gap ofseveralmonthsbetweenthe end ofthe initial Con-
tadora process and the beginning of the Contadora-Esquipulas II pro-
cess; and it wasduring thisgapthat Nicaragua filed itsApplication to the

Court.
93. The Court concludes that the procedures employed in the Conta-
dora processup to28July 1986,thedate offilingofthe Nicaraguan Appli-
cation, had been "concluded", within the meaning of Article IV of the
Pact ofBogota,at that date. That being so,the submissions of Honduras
based on Article IVofthe Pact mustbe rejected, and it isunnecessaryfor
the Court to determine whether the Contadora process was a "special
procedure" or a "pacificprocedure" forthe purpose of Articles IIand IV
ofthe Pact,and whetherthat procedure hadthe sameobjectasthat now in
progressbefore the Court.

94. The Court has also to deal with the contention of Honduras that
Nicaragua is precluded not only by Article IVof the Pact of Bogotabut
also "by elementaryconsiderations ofgood faith" from commencingany
other procedure for pacific settlement until such time as the Contadora
process has been concluded. The principle of good faith is, as the Court

has observed,"one ofthe basicprinciplesgoverningthe creation and per-
formance of legalobligations" (NuclearTests,Z.C. Jeports1974,p. 268,
para. 46; p. 473,para. 49); it is not in itself a source of obligation where
none would othenvise exist.In this case howeverthe contention of Hon-
duras isthat, on the basis of successiveacts by Nicaragua culminatinginthe EsquipulasDeclaration of25May 1986(paragraph8 1above),Nicara-
guahas entered into a"commitment tothe Contadora process" ;it argues
that byvirtue ofthat Declaration, "Nicaragua entered intoa commitment
with which its present unilateral Application to the Court is plainly
incompatible". The Court considers that whether or not the conduct of
Nicaragua or the Esquipulas Declaration created any such commitment,
the events of June/July 1986constituted a "conclusion" of the initial
procedure both for purposes of Article IV ofthe Pact and in relation to
any other obligationto exhaust that procedure which might haveexisted
independently of the Pact.

95. The Court concludes from the foregoing that the third and fourth
objections raised by Honduras to the admissibility of the Application
must be dismissed.
96. The Court would add the following.It has to determine the admis-
sibility of an Application brought before it as a matter of law. Accord-
ingly,inthe presentcasethe questionwhether aparticular "procedure" is,
or is not, to be regarded as "concluded" for thepurposes of Article IVof
the Pact of Bogotahas been appreciated in the light ofthe position at the
moment ofthe Nicaraguan Application to theCourt. This does not mean
that theCourt isunaware that, subsequent to that date, efforts to resolve
the difficultiesexistinginCentralAmericatook anew leaseoflifewiththe
agreement known as Esquipulas II. Nor should it be thought that the
Court isunaware that theApplication raisesjuridical questions whichare
only elements of a larger political situation.ose widerissues are how-
ever outside the competence of the Court, which is obliged to confine
itselftothesejuridical questions.

97. The Court alsotakesnote ofthe factthattheContadora Group did
not claim any exclusiverole for the process it set in train. Paragraph34
of the Preambleto the revised draft Contadora Act of 7 September 1984
provided the following :

"The Governments of the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. ..

ReafJimting,without prejudice to the right to resort to competent
international forums,their willingnessto settletheir disputes in the
framework of the negotiation process sponsored by the Contadora
Group.. ."

The similarwording of preambular paragraph 35of the Final Act dated
6 June 1986makes it clear that the dispute settlement procedures to beadopted under that instrument werenot intended to exclude"the right of
recourseto other competent international forums".

98. TheCourt concludesthat ithasjurisdiction to entertainthe present
caseunder ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact of Bogota,and that the Application
filedby Nicaragua on 28July 1986is admissible.

99. For these reasons,

(1) Unanimously,
Endsthat it hasjurisdiction under Article XXXI ofthe Pact of Bogota
to entertain the Application filed by the Government of the Republic of
Nicaragua on 28July 1986;

(2) Unanimously,
Findsthat the Application of Nicaragua is admissible.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twentieth day of December, one
thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight,in three copies, one of which
willbeplaced inthe archivesoftheCourtand the otherstransmitted to the
Government ofthe Republic of Nicaragua and tothe Government ofthe
Republic of Honduras, respectively.

(Signed)José Maria RUDA,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo ~LENCIA-OSPINA,

Registrar.

Judge LACHS appends a declaration to theJudgment ofthe Court.

Judges ODA,SCHWEBE aLd SHAHABUDDE aEpend separate opinions
to the Judgment ofthe Court.

(Initialled)J.M.R.

(Initialled)E.V.O. DÉCLARATION DE M. LACHS

[Traduction]

L'arrêdte la Cour doitnécessairementnetraiteretne résoudreque des
questions de procédure (compétenceetrecevabilité).On peut reprocher
aux arrêtsde cegenre d'être apparemment empreintsdejuridisme.
C'est cependant une des activitésessentiellesde tout tribunal que de
trancher des questions de procédure puisqueces questions déterminent
l'attitudequ'iladoptequantausort àréserveràun différendportédevant
lui.Enprenantune telledécision,laCour peut soitstatuer définitivement
sur cedifférend,soitouvrirlavoie àl'examenau fond. Lorsqu'elle sepro-
nonce,la Cour doit veilleravecleplus grand soin àdécouragertoute ten-

tative de porter devant elle un différenden l'absence de fondement de
juridiction adéquat,sans pour autant nier aux Etats ledroit qui est leleur
de bénéficierde ses décisions lorsqu'il existe un tel fondement.Il suffit
parfois d'ouvrir lavoie l'examenau fond pour qu'un différendtrouvesa
solution.
Dans la présente affaire, la Cour a dû prendre des décisions qui
n'étaientpas sans souleverde délicatesquestions,ainsiqu'ilressort de la
lecture del'arrêt. aresponsabilitédesjuges étaitgrande,qu'il s'agissede
l'examende la situation dans laquelle l'affaire s'inscrivaitou de l'aspect
(juridiquede leur responsabilité.
La Cour n'a pas préjugél'avenir. Les Parties conservent donc leur
libertéd'action ettoutes possibilitésde trouver des solutions.
Toutes ces considérationsm'ont conduit à donner mon appui à cette
décisionde la Cour. Sur les dix-neuf arrêts l'élaboration desquelsj'ai

participé,c'est ledix-huitièmepour lequelj'aivoté affirmativement.

(Signé)Manfred LACHS.

Bilingual Content

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À DES ACTIONS ARMÉES
FRONTALIÈRES ET TRANSFRONTALIÈRES

(NICARAGUA c. HONDURAS)

COMPÉTENCE DE LA COUR
ET RECEVABILITÉ DE LA REQUÊTE

INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING BORDER AND

TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS
(NICARAGUA v. HONDURAS)

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION

JUDGMENT OF 20 DECEMBER1988 Modeofficieldecitat:on
Actionsarméesfrontalières et transfrontalièreHonduras),u
compétencet recevabilité,Ct.,Z.J.Recueil1988,

Officia1citation:
Borderand TransborderArmed AcsNicaraguav.Honduras),
JurisdictionandAdmissibility, J, .C.J.Reports1988,9.

Nodevent:
Salesnumber 547 1 COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE

1988 ANNÉE 1988
20décembre
Rôlegénéral
no74 20 décembre 1988

AFFAIRERELATIVE À DES ACTIONSARMÉES

FRONTALIÈRES ETTRANSFRONTALIÈRES

(NICARAGUA c. HONDURAS)

COMPÉTENCEDE LA COUR
ET RECEVABILITÉDE LA REQUÊTE

Compétence de la Cour,chargede lapreuv- VolontédesParties.
Chartedel'organisationdesEtats américains ArticleXXXZdupacte de Bo-
gota- Ses relationsavecleparagraphe2del'article36duStatut etaveclesdécla-
rationsfaites en application decettedispositionrticleXXXZcommesource
indépendantede compétence- Relations entre l'articleXXXZet l'articleXXXZZ.
Recevabilitéde la requêteAspects politiqu-sFractionnementd'unconfit
général enune sériede différends bilatérauxhosejugée - Degréde préci-
sion exigéde la demande- Date à retenirpour déterminerla recevabide la
requêted:ate du dépôtde la requête.
ArticleI dupacte de Bogot- Règlement enapplicationde cetarticlepar des

négociationdirectessuivantlesvoiesdiplomatiquesordinairesturedu ((pro-
cessusde Contadora».
ArticleIV dupacte de Bogot- Questiondesavoirsi uneprocédurpacifique
antérieurederèglementdesderends était((épuisée))vant l'introductiondeI'ins-
tance- Casdu ((processusde Contador))- Bonnefoi.

Présents:M. RUDA,Président; M. MBAYE,Vice-Président;MM. LACHS,
ELIASO , DA, GO,SCHWEBEL, sir RobertJENNINGM S,M. BEDJAOUI,
NI, EVENSENT , ARASSOV G,UILLAUME S, AHABUDDEE jug,es;
M. VALENCIA-OSPG INrff,ier. INTERNATIONAL COURTOFJUSTICE

YEAR 1988 1988
20December
General List
20 December1988 No. 74

CASECONCERNING BORDERAND

TRANSBORDERARMED ACTIONS

(NICARAGUA v. HONDURAS)

JURISDICTIONOF THE COURTAND

ADMISSIBILITYOF THE APPLICATION

Jurisdictionof the Court,burdenofpro-f Intention oftheParties.
Charterof OrganizationfArnericanStates- PactofBogota,ArticleXXXI -
Relationship withArticle 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute and with declarations
made thereunder- ArticleXXXI asanindependentsourceofjurisdicti-nRela-
tionshipbetweenArticlesXXXI andXXXII.
Adrnissibilityof theApplicationPolitical aspe-tsDivisionof general con-
jlict intoseparatebilateraldisp-tResjudicata- Requireddegreeofparticu-
larizationofclai-n Date atwhichadrnissibilitytobedeterrnined:dateoffiling of
Application.
Pactof Bogota,ArticleII SettlernentunderthatArticlebydirectnegotiations
through the usualdiplornaticnnels - Nature of the "Contadoraprocess".

Pactof Bogota, Article IV Questionwhetheranypriorpaczj?cprocedurefor
settlernentof disputewasoncluded"beforeproceedingsinstitut-d Caseof the
"Contadoraprocess"- Goodfaith.

JUDGMENT

Present: President RUDA;Vice-PresidentMBAYEJ;udges LACHSE ,LIASO, DA,
AGO,SCHWEBES Li,r Robert JENNINGSB ,EDJAOUN I,I, EVENSEN,
TARASSO GV,ILLAUM SEA, HABUDDEEN;RegistrarVALENCIA-OSPINA. En l'affaire relativeà des actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières,

entre
la Républiquedu Nicaragua,

représentéepar
S.Exc. M. Carlos ArgüelloGomez, ambassadeur,

commeagent et conseil;
M. Ian Brownlie, Q.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international public à
l'universitéd'Oxford,titulaire de la chaire Chichele, Fellowde 1'AllSouls
College,Oxford,
M. Abram Chayes,professeuràla facultéde droit de Harvard, titulaire de la
chaire Felix Frankfurter, Fellowde I'American Academy of Arts and

Sciences,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'université de Paris-Nord et à l'Institut
d'étudespolitiques de Paris,
comme conseilset avocats;

M. Augusto Zamora Rodriguez, conseillerjuridique au ministèredes rela-
tions extérieuresde la Républiquedu Nicaragua,
M. Antonio RemiroBrotons,professeurde droit intepationa] public àl'Uni-
versitéautonome de Madrid,
MmeJudith C. Appelbaum, Reichler and Appelbaum, Washington, D.C.,
membre du barreau du district de Columbia et du barreau de 1'Etatde
Californie,
commeconseils,

et

la Républiquedu Honduras,

représentéepar
S. Exc. M. Mario Carias, ambassadeur,
comme agent;

S.Exc.M.Jorge Ramon Hernandez Alcerro,ambassadeur, représentantper-
manent auprèsde l'organisation des Nations Unies,
comme coagent;

M. Derek W. Bowett,C.B.E.,Q.C., LL.D., F.B.A.,professeur de droit inter-
nationalà l'universitéde Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur àl'universitéde droit, d'économie edt e
sciences socialesde Paris,
M. Julio Gonzales Campos, professeur de droit international à l'université
de Madrid,

comme avocats-conseils;
M. Arias de Saavedra Muguelar,ministre de l'ambassadedu Honduras aux
Pays-Bas,
MmeSalomé Castellanos,ministre-conseillerde l'ambassade du Honduras
aux Pays-Bas,

commeconseillers, In the case concerning border and transborder armed actions

between

'he Republic of Nicaragua,
,epresentedby

H.E. Mr. Carlos ArgüelloGomez, Ambassador,
as Agentand Counsel,

Mr. Ian Brownlie,Q.C., F.B.A.,Chichele Professor of Public International
Lawin the Universityof Oxford; Fellow of Al1Souls College, Oxford,

Hon. Abram Chayes, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School; Fellow, American Academyof Arts and Sciences,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professorat the University of Paris-Nord and the Institut
d'étudepsolitiquesde Paris,

as Counsel and Advocates,
Mr. Augusto Zamora Rodriguez, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Ministry of
the Republic of Nicaragua,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotons, Professorof Public International Law in the
UniversidadAutonomade Madrid,

Miss Judith C. Appelbaum, Reichler and Appelbaum, Washington, D.C.,
Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and the State of Califor-
nia,
as Counsel,

and

the Republic of Honduras,
represented by

H.E. Mr. Mario Canas, Ambassador,
as Agent,

H.E. Mr. Jorge Ramon Hemandez Alcerro, Ambassador, Permanent Rep-
resentativeto the United Nations,
as Co-Agent,

Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of
International Lawin the Universityof Cambridge,
Mr. Pierre-MarieDupuy, Professorat the Université dedroit,d'économieed te
sciencessocialesde Paris,
Mr.Julio GonzalesCampos, Professorof International Lawatthe University
of Madrid,

Mr. Arias de Saavedra Muguelar, Ministerat the Embassy of Honduras to
the Netherlands,
Mrs. Salomé Castellanos, Minister-Counselloratthe Embassyof Honduras

to the Netherlands,
as Counsel, ACTIONS ARMÉES(ARRÊT)

ainsi composée,

rendl'arrêstuivant:
1. Le 28 juillet 1986,l'ambassadeur de la République du Nicaragua aux
Pays-Bas a déposéau Greffe de la Cour une requêteintroduisant une instance
contre la Républiquedu Honduras au sujet d'un différendrelatif aux activités
que des bandes armées agissant à partir du Honduras déploieraientà la fron-

tière entre le Honduras et le Nicaragua et sur le territoire nicaraguayen. La
requête indique, commefondement de la compétencede la Cour, les disposi-
tions de l'article XXXI du traitéaméricain de règlement pacifique signéle
30avril 1948,dénomméconformémentàsonarticle LXle ((pacte de Bogota~,
et lesdéclarationspar lesquelles lesdeux Parties ont accepté lajuridiction de la
Cour dans lesconditions prévues respectivementaux paragraphes 1et 2de l'ar-
ticle 36 du Statut de la Cour.
2. Conformémentau paragraphe 2 de l'article 40 du Statut, la requête a été
immédiatementcommuniquée à la Républiquedu Honduras; conformément
au paragraphe 3 du mêmearticle, tous les autres Etats admis à ester devant la
Cour en ont été informés.
3. Par lettre du 29 août 1986,le ministre des relations extérieuresdu Hon-
duras a fait savoir àla Cour que, de l'avisde son gouvernement, celle-ci n'avait
pas compétencepour connaître des questions faisant l'objet de la requêteet a
exprimé le vŒu que la Cour limiterait les premières pièces de la procédure

écriteaux questions de compétence etde recevabilité. LesParties, consultées
conformément à l'article 31 du Règlementde la Cour, sont ensuite convenues
que les questions de compétence etde recevabilitéseraient traitéesà un stade
préliminairede la procédure.
4. Par ordonnance du 22octobre 1986,la Cour,prenant note de l'accord des
Parties sur la procédure, adécidéque la Républiquedu Honduras présenterait,
en tant que première piècede la procédure écrite,un mémoire consacréaux
seulesquestions de compétence etde recevabilité etquela Républiquedu Nica-
ragua présenteraiten réponseun contre-mémoirelimitéaux mêmes questions.
Elle a aussi fixédes délaispour le dépôtde ces pièces.Lemémoire etle contre-
mémoireont été déposé dsans les délais prescrits.
5. Le 3 novembre 1986,le Greffier a informéles Etats parties au pacte de
Bogota qu'ilavait reçu pour instructions, conformémentàl'article43du Règle-
ment de la Cour, d'appeler leur attention sur le fait que, dans sa requête,la
Républiquedu Nicaragua avait invoquénotamment le pacte de Bogota, tout
en ajoutant que cette notification ne préjugeaitaucune décisionque la Cour

pourrait êtreappelée à prendre en application de l'article 63 de son Statut.
6. Par lettre du 21juillet 1987,le Greffier a appelél'attention du Secrétaire
généralde l'organisation des Etats américains sur le paragraphe 3 de l'ar-
ticle 34du Statut de laCour et sur lepréambuledu pacte de Bogota, aux termes
duquel cet instrument a été conclu ((conformémentàl'articleXXIIIde la charte
de l'organisation desEtats américains».LeGreffier a en outre informé le Secré-
taire généralde l'organisation des Etats américains que la Cour lui avait
donnépourinstructions, enapplicationdu paragraphe 3 de l'article69du Règle-
ment de la Cour, de communiquer àl'organisation toutes lespiècesde laprocé-
dure écrite.Le Secrétaire générad le l'organisation des Etats américains a été
informépar la même occasiondu délaifixéconformémentau mêmearticle du
Règlementde laCour pour ledépôtd'éventuelles observationp sar l'organisation. composed as above,

delivers thefollowingJudgment:

1. On 28 July 1986,the Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the
Netherlands filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting pro-
ceedings against the Republic of Honduras in respect of a dispute concerning
the alleged activities of armed bands, said to be operating from Honduras, on
the border between Honduras and Nicaragua and in Nicaraguan territory. In
order to foundthe jurisdiction of the Court the Application relied on the provi-
sions of Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, officially
known, according to Article LX thereof, as the "Pact of Bogota", signed on
30April1948, and the declarations made by the two Parties accepting thejuris-
diction of the Court, as provided for in Article 36, paragraphs 1and 2 respec-
tively, of the Statute of the Court.
2. Pursuant to Article 40,paragraph 2, ofthe Statute, the Application was at

once communicated to the Republic of Honduras; in accordance with para-
graph 3 of that Article, al1other Statesentitled to appear before the Court were
notified of the Application.
3. By a letter of 29 August 1986, the Minister for External Relations of
Honduras informed the Court that in his Government's viewthe Courthad no
jurisdiction over the matters raised inthe Application, and expressed the hope
that the Court would confine the firstwritten proceedings to the issues ofjuris-
diction and admissibility. The Parties, consulted pursuant to Article 31 of
the Rules of Court, subsequently agreed that the issues of jurisdiction and
admissibility should be dealt with at a preliminary stage of the proceedings.

4. By an Order dated 22 October 1986,the Court, taking note of the agree-
ment ofthe Parties onthe procedure, decided that the firstpleading should be a
Memorial by the Republic of Honduras dealing exclusively with the issues of
jurisdiction and admissibility; and that in reply the Republic of Nicaragua

should submit a Counter-Memorial confined to those same issues; and fixed
time-limits for those pleadings. The Memorial and Counter-Memorial were
filed within the relevant time-limits.
5. On 3 November 1986the Registrarinformed the States parties to the Pact
of Bogotathat he had been directed, in accordance with Article 43of the Rules
of Court, to draw to their notice the fact that in the Application the Republic of
Nicaragua had invoked, interalia,the Pact of Bogotk,adding however thatthe
notification did not prejudge any decision which the Court might be called
upon to take pursuant to Article 63 ofthe Statute of the Court.
6. Byaletter of 21July 1987the Registrardrew the attention of the Secretary-
General of the Organization of American States to Article 34, paragraph 3, of
the Statute of theCourt andto the Preamble to the Pact of Bogotawhereby that
instrument was stated to be concluded "in fulfillment of Article XXIII of the
Charter of the Organization of American States". The Registrar went on to
inform the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States that
the Court, pursuant to Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, had

instructed him to communicate to that Organization copies of al1the written
proceedings. The Secretary-General of the Organization was atthe same time
informed of the time-limit fixed for any observations the Organization might
wish to submit, pursuant to that Article of the Rules of Court.72 ACTIONS ARMÉES(ARRÊT)

7. Par lettre du 29juillet 1987,le Secrétaire généradle l'organisation des
Etats américainsa fait savoir au Greffier qu'à son avis ilne serait pas habilité,
en tant que Secrétairegénéral, formuler des observationsau nom de l'organi-
sation et que la convocation du Conseil permanent de I'organisation-nécessite-
rait la remiseàchaqueEtat membrede copiesdespiècesde laprocédureécrite;
il a cependant précisé qu'iclroyait comprendre que la Cour avait avisétoutes
les parties au pacte de Bogota que l'instance semblait soulever des questions
d'interprétationde cet instrument.
8. Par lettre conjointedu 13août 1987,lesagents des deux Parties ont porté
à la connaissance de la Cour un accord conclu entre les présidents des

deuxpays le7août 1987,auxtermesduquel lesdeux Parties demanderaient ala
Cour d'aaccepterl'ajournement,pour une périodedetrois mois,de l'ouverture
de la procédureorale surla question de la compétencedont cettehautejuridic-
tion est notamment saisie». Cet accord prévoyaiten outre que les deux prési-
dents réexamineraient lasituation lors d'une réunion qui auraitlieu cent cin-
quante jours plus tard. Le même jour, le Greffiera informéles Parties que le
Présidentde la Cour avait décidée ,n application de l'article 54du Règlement
de la Cour, de renvoyer l'ouverturede la procédure oraleune date ultérieure
qui serait fixéeaprès consultationdes agents des Parties.
9. L'agentdu Honduras ayant informéla Courpar lettre du lerfévrier1988
que les présidentsdes pays d'Amériquecentrale s'étaientréunisà SanJosé,au
Costa Rica, le 16janvier 1988,ilfut décidéa,prèsconsultation des Parties, de
continuer à différer l'ouverturede la procédureorale.

10. Le21mars 1988,leGouvernement du Nicaragua a déposé au Greffeune

demande en indication de mesures conservatoires,conformémentàl'article41
du Statut etàl'article 73du Règlementde la Cour.Cette demande a été immé-
diatement communiquée au Gouvernement du Honduras. Par lettre du
31mars 1988,l'agentdu Nicaragua a informé laCour queson gouvernement lui
avait donnépour instructions de retirer la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires.Par ordonnance du même jour, le Présidentde laCour a donné
acte à la Républiquedu Nicaragua du retrait de sademande.
11.Par lettre du 12avril 1988,l'agentdu Honduras a demandéquelaprocé-
dure orale sur lesquestions de compétence etde recevabilitésedérouleentrele
23mai etle 10juin 1988.Alasuited'uneréunion, le20avril 1988,entrele Prési-
dent de la Cour et les agents des Parties au cours de laquelle l'agentdu Nica-
ragua a fait savoir que son gouvernement n'avait pas d'objection à formuler
contre les dates suggéréesar le Honduras, le Présidenta décidé quela procé-
dure orale commencerait le6juin 1988.
12. Au cours d'audiences publiques tenues du 6 au 15juin 1988,la Cour a
entendu les exposésoraux qu'ont prononcés devantelle:

Pourla Républiqud eu Honduras: S.Exc.M.Mario Carias,
S.Exc.M.J. R.Hernandez Alcerro,
M.D.W.Bowett,
M.P.-M.Dupuy.

Pourla Républiqud eu Nicaragua: S.Exc.M.CarlosArgüelloGomez,
M.Abram Chayes,
M.A.Pellet,
M.1.Brownlie.
Durant les audiences, des questions ont été poséea sux deux Parties par des
membresde laCouret il a été réponduenpartie oralement àcesquestions; des 7. By a letter of 29 July 1987,the Secretary-General of the Organization
of American States informed the Registrar that in his opinion he would not
as Secretary-General have the authority to submit observations on behalf of

the Organization,and that the convening of the PermanentCouncil of the Or-
ganization would requireeach member Stateto be provided with copies of the
pleadings; he recorded his understanding, however, that the Court had noti-
fied al1parties to the Pact of Bogota of the fact that the proceedings appeared
to raise questions of the construction of that instrument.
8. By a jointletter dated 13August 1987,the Agents of the two Parties in-
formedthe Court of an agreement concluded betweenthe Presidentsof thetwo
countrieson 7 August 1987,whereby both Parties would request the Court "to
acceptthe adjournment,for a period of threemonths, of theopeningof the oral
proceedings on the question of jurisdiction to be heard, inter alia, by the
Court". That agreement provided further that the situation would be reviewed
bythe two Presidentson the occasionof a meetingto beheld 150dayslater.The
Parties were informed by the Registrar the same day that the President of the
Court had decided, in application of Article 54 of the Rules of Court, to
adjoum theopening of theoral proceedingsto a later dateto be fixedaftercon-
sultation with the Agents of the Parties.

9. After the Agent of Honduras had, by a letter dated 1February 1988,in-
formedthe Court of a meetingbetween the Presidents of the Central American
countries held inSanJosé,CostaRica,on 16January 1988,itwasdecided,after
the Partieshad been consulted, to prolong the postponement of the opening of
the oral proceedings.
10. On 21 March 1988the Government of Nicaragua filed in the Registrya
request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Stat-
ute of the Court and Article 73 of the Rules of Court. This request was forth-
with communicated to the Government of Honduras. By letter of 31 March
1988the Agentof Nicaraguainformedthe Courtthat the Government of Nica-
ragua had instructed him to withdraw the request for the indication of provi-
sional measures. By an Order dated the same day the President of the Court
placed on record that withdrawal.
11. Bya letter of 12April 1988,the Agent of Honduras requested that oral
proceedingson the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility should be held
between 23May and 10June 1988.Followinga meetingbetween the President
of the Court and the Agentsof the Partieson 20April 1988,at whichthe Agent
of Nicaragua indicated that his Government had no objection to the dates

suggestedby Honduras,the Presidentdecided that the oral proceedings should
begin on 6June 1988.
12. Atpublichearingsheld between6and 15June 1988,the Court heardoral
argumentsaddressedto it by the following:
ForHonduras: H.E. Mr.Mario Canas,
H.E. Mr.J. R.Hernandez Alcerro,
ProfessorD.W.Bowett,
ProfessorP.-M.Dupuy.

ForNicaragua: H.E. Mr.Carlos ArgüelloGomez,
ProfessorAbramChayes,
ProfessorA.Pellet,
Professor1.Brownlie.
In the course of thehearings,questions wereput to both Partiesby Membersof
the Court. Replies were givento some extent orally during the hearings; addi-réponses complémentaires écriteo snt été déposée au Greffe dans le délai fixé
en application de l'article 72 du Règlementdela Cour. Le Honduras s'estpré-
valu de la possibilitéque lui offrait cet article de présenteàla Cour des obser-
vations sur les réponses écritesdu Nicaragua.

13. Aucours de la procédureécrite,les conclusions ci-aprèsont été présen-
téespar les Parties :

Aunomde la République duHonduras,
dans le mémoire :

((Compte tenu des faits et arguments exposésdans les précédentespar-
ties du présent mémoire, le Gouvernementdu Honduras prie la Cour dire
etjuger :
Encequiconcernelarecevabilité:

Que la requêtedu Nicaragua est irrecevable pour les raisons suivantes :
1. Il s'agit d'une requête artificielle, d'inspiration politique,dont la
Cour ne saurait connaître sans se départirde son caractèrejudiciaire.
2. La requête est vagueet les allégations qu'elle contientne sont pas
bien définies,de sorte que laCour ne sauraitenconnaîtresans que le Hon-
duras en souffre un préjudice sérieux.

3. LeNicaragua n'a pas montré que,de l'avisdes Parties, ledifférend ne
peut pas êtreréglé par voie de négociations directes,de sorte que le Nica-
ragua ne remplit pas un préalable essentielau recours aux procédures
établiespar le pacte de Bogota, parmi lesquelles figure le renvoi des dif-
férendsdevant la Cour internationale de Justice.
4. Le Nicaragua ayant souscrit au processus de négociationde Conta-
dora en tant que «procédurespéciale ))au sens de l'article II du pacte de
Bogoti, il lui est interdit tant par l'article IVdu pacte quepar des considé-
rations élémentairesde bonne foi d'entamer une autre procédurede règle-
ment pacifique, quelle qu'elle soit, tant que le processus deContadora n'a
pas été mené àterme; et ce terme n'est pas échu.

Ence qui concerneljauridiction :
Que laCour n'estpas compétentepour connaître de la requêtedu Nica-
ragua pour les raisons suivantes :

1. Ledifférend telqu'ilestprésentépar le Nicaragua estexclu de lajuri-
diction de la Cour en vertu de la déclaration du Honduras en date du
22 mai 1986,et ladite déclaration est applicable, que la juridiction soit
censée êtrefondée sur l'article XXXI du pacte de Bogota ou sur l'ar-
ticle 36,paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour.
2. Par ailleurs,l'article XXXI ne peut pas non plus être invoqué comme
base de juridiction indépendamment de l'article XXXII, et ce second ar-
ticle interdit de saisir unilatéralement laCour d'une requête introductive
d'instance sauf:

a) sides procéduresde conciliation ont été suivies sansaboutir à une solu-
tion, et
b) silesparties n'ontpas convenu d'une procédurearbitrale.
Ni l'une ni l'autre de ces conditions n'est remplie dans la présente ins-
tance.tional repliesin writing were filedinthe Registrywithinatime-limitfixedunder
Article 72 of the Rules of Court. Honduras availed itself of the opportunity
afforded bythat Articleto submit to the Court comments on the written replies
of Nicaragua.

13. In the course of the written proceedings, the followingsubmissionswere
presented by the Parties :

Onbehalfof theRepublicof Honduras,
in the Memorial:

"In view of the facts and arguments set forth in the preceding parts of
this Memorial, the Government of Honduras requests that it may please
the Courtto adjudge and declare that :
As toAdmissibility:
The Application of Nicaragua is inadmissible because :

1. It is a politically-inspired, artificial request which the Court should
not entertain consistently with itsjudicial character.
2. The Application is vague and the allegations contained in it are not
properly particularized, sothat the Court cannotentertainthe Application
without substantial prejudice to Honduras.
3. Nicaragua has failed to show that, in the opinion of the Parties, the
dispute cannot be settled by direct negotiations, and thus Nicaragua fails
to satisfyan essentialprecondition to the use ofthe procedures established
by the Pact of Bogota, whichinclude reference of disputes to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
4. Having accepted the Contadora process as a 'special procedure'

within the meaning of Article II of the Pact of Bogotk, Nicaragua is pre-
cluded both by Article IVofthe Pact and by elementary considerations of
good faith from commencing any other procedure for pacific settlement
until such time as the Contadora process has been concluded; and that
time has not arrived.
As toJurisdiction :

The Court is not competent to entertain the Application of Nicaragua
because :
1.The dispute asallegedby Nicaragua isexcluded fromthejurisdiction
ofthe Court bvthe terms oftheHonduran declaration of 22 Mav 1986.and
such declaration applies whether the jurisdiction is alleged to éxiston the
basis of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotaor Article 36,paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the Court.
2. Alternatively,Article XXXI cannot be invoked as a basis ofjurisdic-
tion independently of Article XXXII, and the latter Article precludes any

unilateral application to the Court exceptwhere :

(a) conciliationprocedures havebeen undergone without asolution, and

(b) theparties havenot agreed onan arbitral procedure.

Neither condition is satisfied inthe present case. 3. Lajuridiction de la Cour nepeut pas êtrefondésur l'article36,para-
graphe 1,de son Statut parce que les Etats parties au pacte de Bogothont
convenu à l'article XXXII du pacte qu'il n'est possible de saisir la Cour
par voie de requête unilatérale fondéseur le pacte de Bogothque lorsque
lesdeux conditionsénoncéesaux alinéas a)et b)du paragraphe 2ci-dessus

sont remplies et que tel n'est pas le cas en ce qui concerne la requêtedu
Nicaragua.»
Au nom de la Républiqudeu Nicaragua,

dans le contre-mémoire:

«A. Sur la base des faits et moyens qui précèdent,le Gouvernement
du Nicaragua prie respectueusementla Cour de dire etjuger:
1) que, pour les raisons exposéesdans le présent contre-mémoirel,es
prétendues modifications apportéesà la déclaration du Honduras du
20février1960qui figurent dans la ((déclaration»datéedu22mai 1986ne
sont pas valables et qu'en conséquenceles «réserves» invoquéespar le
Honduras dans son mémoiresont sans effetjuridique;
2) subsidiairement,au cas où la Cour conclurait que les modifications
que contient la ((déclaration du Honduras datéedu 22 mai 1986sont
valables, que ces modifications ne peuvent être opposées au Nicaragua
parcequ'ilappert queleNicaraguan'ena pas été avisédans un délai raison-
nable;
3) que,sanspréjudice des conclusionsqui précèdentl,es ((réserve»in-
voquéespar le Honduras ne sont quoi qu'ilen soitpas applicables dans les

circonstances de l'espèce,à savoir:
a) le différend surlequelporte la requêtedu Nicaragua n'apas fait l'objet
d'une décision des Partiesde recourirà un autre moyen ou à d'autres
moyensde règlementpacifiquedesdifférends; en particulier,nilepro-
cessus de Contadora ni les dispositions du pacte de Bogotkne consti-
tuent «un autre moyen ou ..d'autres moyens» viséspar la réserveen
question;
b) le différendsur lequelporte la requêtedu Nicaragua n'estpas un diffé-
rend « ayant trait à des faits ou des situations ayant leur origine dans
des conflitsarmésou desactes de mêmenature qui pourraient affecter
le territoire de la Républiquedu Honduras, et dans lesquelscette der-
nière pourrait se trouver impliquée, directement ou indirectement»;
subsidiairement,la ((réserve»en question n'apas un caractèreexclusi-
vementpréliminaire,sibienquelaréponseàla questionde son applica-
bilitéestreportéeau stadedu fond;

4) aue les «réserves»invoauéesDar le Honduras ne sont en tout cas
pas'a~plicablesaux dispositio& de 15rticleXXXI du pacte de Bogoth,qui
constitue une base de com~étenceindé~endantedans le cadre de l'ar-
ticle36,paragraphe 1,du fatu detla cour;
5) que l'application des dispositions de l'article XXXI du pacte de
Bogota n'estsubordonnéeni à la procédure de conciliationprévueà l'ar-
ticle XXXII du pacte, procédure dont l'épuisement neconstitue une
condition de la saisinede la Cour que dans lescas visésàl'article XXXII,
ni à l'existenced'un accordsur une procédure arbitrale, condition qui ne
concerne que l'article XXXII;
6) que les motifs d'irrecevabilitéde la requêtecensésdécouler des 3. Jurisdiction cannot be based on Article 36,paragraph 1,of the Stat-
ute of the Court because Statesparties to the Pact of Bogota have agreed
in Article XXXII that a unilateral Application, based on the Pact of
Bogota,can only be made when the two conditionsenumerated in (a)and
(b),paragraph 2 above, have been satisfied,and such is not the case with
the Application of Nicaragua."

Onbehalfof the Republicof Nicaragua,

in the Counter-Memorial :

"A. On the basis of the foregoing facts and arguments the Government
of Nicaragua respectfully asksthe Court to adjudge and declare that :
1. For the reasons set forth in this Counter-Memorial the purported
modifications of the Honduran Declaration dated 20 February 1960,
contained in the 'Declaration' dated 22 May 1986,are invalid and con-
sequently the 'resewations' invoked by Honduras in its Memorial are

without legal effect.
2. Alternatively, in case the Court finds that the modifications of the
Honduran 'Declaration' dated 22 May 1986are valid, such modifications
cannot be invoked as against Nicaragua because on the facts Nicaragua
did not receive reasonablenotice thereof.

3. Without prejudice to the foregoing submissions, the 'resemations'
invoked by Honduras are not applicable in any eventin the circumstances
of the present case:thus -
(a) the dispute to which the Application of Nicaragua relates is not the
subject of any agreementbythe Parties to resort to other means forthe

pacific settlement of disputes; and, in particular, neither the Conta-
dora process nor the provisions of the Pact of Bogota constitute the
'othermeans'to whichthepertinent resemationrefers;

the dispute to which the Application of Nicaragua relates is not a dis-
pute 'relating to facts or situations originating in armed conflicts or
acts of a similar nature which may affect the territory of the Republic
of Honduras, and in which it may find itself involved directly or indi-
rectly', and, in the alternative, the 'resewation' in question does not
possess an exclusivelypreliminary character and therefore the issue
of its application is postponed for determination at the stage of the
Merits.

4. The 'resewations' invokedby Honduras are not applicable in any
event to the provisions of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota, which
provides an independent basis of jurisdiction within the framework of
Article 36,paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Court.
5. The application of the provisions of Article XXXI of the Pact
of Bogota is not subject eitherto the conciliationprocedure referred to in
Article XXXII of the Pact, exhaustion of which isa condition of recourse
to the Court exclusivelywithinthe contextof ArticleXXXII,orto the con-
dition of an agreement upon an arbitral procedure which relates exclu-
sivelyto Article XXXII.
6. The grounds of inadmissibility of the Application alleged to derive dispositions des articles II et IV du pacte de Bogota sont sans fondement
juridique;
7)quetous lesautres motifsd'irrecevabilitéalléguédsans lemémoiredu
Honduras sont sansfondementjuridique et doiventêtre rejetés;
B. En conséquencedecesconclusions, le Gouvernementdu Nicaragua
prie respectueusement la Cour de dire etjuger:

1) que la Cour est compétentepour connaître des questions soulevées
dans la requête présentépear le Gouvernement du Nicaragua le 28juillet
1986;
2) que la compétencede la Cour existe: en vertu de la déclarationdu
20février1960par laquelle le Honduras a acceptélajuridiction de la Cour
conformémentaux dispositionsde l'article 36,paragraphe 2, du Statutde
la Cour; ou(au cas où la déclarationde 1960aurait été valablement modi-
fiée), en vertude la déclarationdu Honduras de 1960telle qu'elle a été
modifiéepar la déclarationen date du 22mai 1986,et envertu de la décla-
ration du Nicaragua en date du 24septembre 1929; et/ou en vertu des dis-

positions de l'articXXXI du pacte de Bogoth et de l'article 36, para-
graphe 1,du Statutde la Cour;
3) que la requêtedu Nicaragua est recevable.
C. Par ces motifs, le Gouvernement du Nicaragua prie respectueuse-
ment la Cour de se déclarer compétenteou, subsidiairement,deréserver
pour le stade du fond sa décisionsur toute question qui n'a pas un carac-
tèreexclusivementpréliminaire.
D. En cequi concernetoutes les questionsde fait mentionnéesdans le
mémoire duHonduras qui n'ont pas été expressément examinédeasns le
présent contre-mémoirel,e Gouvernementdu Nicaragua réservesa posi-
tion))

14. Aucours de la procédure orale,les Parties ont confirmé,sans les modi-
fier, les conclusions qu'elles avaient présentéesdans le mémoire etdans le
contre-mémoire.

15. La présente phase de laprocédure est consacrée, conformément à

l'ordonnance rendue par la Cour le 22 octobre 1986,aux questions de la
compétence de la Cour et de la recevabilitéde la requête.Dans ses conclu-
sions, le Honduras a soutenu en premier lieu «que la requêtedu Nica-
ragua est irrecevable » et en second lieu «que la Cour n'est pas compé-
tente pour connaître » de cette requête. LaCour commencera néanmoins
par examiner la question de compétence; si elle se déclare compétente,

elle passera àl'examen de la recevabilité.

16. Les Parties ont évoquédans leur argumentation ce qu'elles ont ap-
peléla question dela charge dela preuve :incombe-t-il au Nicaragua de
démontrer l'existence de la compétence de la Courpour connaître de ses

griefs ou incombe-t-il au Honduras d'établir l'absencede compétence de
la Cour? A l'appui de sa thèse, chacune des Parties a cité le passage de from the provisions of Articles II and IV of the Pact of Bogota have no
legalbasis.
7. Al1the other grounds of inadmissibility alleged in the Honduran
Memorial have no legalbasis and must be rejected.
B. Asa consequenceofthese conclusionsthe Government of Nicaragua
respectfully asks the Court to adjudgeand declare that :

1. The Court is competent in respect of the matters raised in the Appli-
cation submitted by the Government of Nicaragua on 28July 1986.

2. Thecompetence oftheCourts exists:byvirtue ofthe Honduran Dec-
laration dated 20 Febniary 1960acceptingthejurisdiction of the Court in
conformitywiththe provisions of Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Statute of
the Court; or(in case the Declaration of 1960has been validly modified)
the Honduran Declaration of 1960as modified by the Declaration dated
22 May 1986,and the Nicaraguan Declarationdated 24 September 1929;
and/or by virtue of the provisions of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota
and Article 36,paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Court.

3. The Application of Nicaragua is admissible.

C. Forthesereasonsthe Government of Nicaragua respectfullyasksthe
Court to declare that it has jurisdiction or, alternatively, to reserve any
question which does not possess an exclusivelypreliminary characterfor
decision at the stage of the merits.
D. In respect of al1questions of fact referred to in the Memorial of
Honduras not expressly considered in the present Counter-Mernorial,the
Government of Nicaragua reservesits position."

14. In the course of the oral proceedings, each Party confirmed its sub-
missionsasmade inthe Memorialand Counter-Memorial respectively,without
modification.

* * *

15. The present phase of the proceedings is devoted, in accordance
with the Order made by theCourt on 22 October 1986,to the issues of the
jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application. Hon-
durashas in its submissions contended, first that "the Application of Nica-
ragua is inadmissible" and, secondly, that "the Court is not competent to
entertain" that Application; the Court will however first examine the
question of jurisdiction before proceeding, if it finds that it is competent,

to examine the issues of admissibility.

16. The Parties have devoted some argument to a question defined by
them as that of the burden of proof: whether it is for Nicaragua to show
the existence ofjurisdiction forthe Court to deal with its claims, or for
Honduras to establish the absenceof such jurisdiction. Each of themhas

cited, in support of its contention, the Court's dictum that "it is the litigantl'arrêdtelaCour dans lequel celle-cidéclareque «c'est ..au plaideur qui
cherche à établirun faitqu'incombe lachargedelapreuve»(Activitésmili-
tairesetparamilitairesau Nicaraguaet contre celui-ci(Nicaraguac.Etats-
Unis dilmérique),C.Z.JR . ecueil1984,p. 437,par. 101).
L'existencede la compétencede la Cour dans un cas particulier n'est
cependant pas une question de fait, mais une question de droit qui doit
êtretranchée àla lumièredesfaits pertinents. Etablir cesfaitspeut poser
desproblèmesdepreuve. Maisen l'espèce, lesfaits - existencede décla-

rations faites par lesPartiesenapplication del'article36du Statut,signa-
ture etratification du pacte deogota,etc. - ne sontpas contestés;cequi
est en cause, ce sont les effetsjuridiques à attacher àces faits. Somme
toute, la question est de savoir si dans le doute la Cour doit être regardée
comme compétente ou non. Cette question a déjà été examiné pear la
Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans l'affaire de l'Usinede
Chorzow,compétence. Ellea déclaré :

«Il a été allégu àéplusieurs reprises, dans la présente procédure,
que la Cour devrait dans le doute décliner sa compétence. Il est vrai
que la juridiction de la Cour est toujours une juridiction limitée,
n'existant que dans la mesure où les Etats l'ont admise; par con-
séquent, laCour ne l'affirmera en cas de contestation - ou lors-
qu'elledoit l'examiner d'office- qu'à la conditionque la force des
raisons militant en faveur de la compétence soit prépondéranteL . e
fait que des arguments sérieux peuvent être invoquép sour soutenir
la thèse que la compétencen'existe pas, ne saurait déjà créerun
doute qui serait de nature à faire échec à la compétence.C'est

toujours l'existence d'une volonté des Partiesde conférer juridic-
tion àla Cour, qui fait l'objet de l'examen de la question de savoir
s'il a compétenceou non.»(C.P.J.I.sérieA no9,p. 32.)

LaCourvadonc devoirrechercher, dans laprésenteaffaire,silaforcedes
raisonsmilitantenfaveur desacompétenceestprépondéranteets'ilexiste
«une volonté des Partiesde [lui]conférerjuridiction».

17. Dans sa requête introductive d'instance,le Nicaragua se réfère,
commebase de la compétencede la Cour :

«auxdispositions deI'articleXXXI du pacte de Bogotaetauxdécla-
rations par lesquellesla Républiquedu Nicaragua et la République
du Honduras respectivement ont acceptéla juridiction de la Cour
dans lesconditionsprévues àl'article36,paragraphes 1et2respecti-
vement, du Statut de la Cour».

Dans les conclusions de son contre-mémoire,le Nicaragua soutient plus
précisémentseekingto establish a fact who bears the burden of proving it" (Military
and ParamilitaryActivities inand againstNicaragua(Nicaragua v. United
States ofAmerica),I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 437,para. 101).

Theexistenceofjurisdiction ofthe Court in agivencaseishowevernot

a question of fact, but a question of lawto be resolved in the light of the
relevantfacts.Thedetermination ofthe factsmayraisequestionsofproof.
Howeverthe factsin the present case - the existenceofthe Parties'dec-
larations under Article 36of the Statute,the signature and ratification of
the Pactof Bogota,etc. - arenotindispute;the issueis,what arethe legal
effectsto be attached to them? The question is whether in case of doubt
the Court is to be deemed to havejurisdiction or not. This question has
alreadybeen considered bythe Permanent Court of International Justice
in the case concerning the Factory ut Chorzhw,Jurisdiction,when it
obsemed :

"It has been argued repeatedly in the course of the present pro-
ceedingsthat in case of doubtthe Court should declinejurisdiction.
It istrue thatthe Court's jurisdiction isalwaysa limitedone, existing
onlyinsofarasStateshaveaccepted it; consequently,the Court will,
in the event of an objection - or when it has automatically to con-
sider the question - only affirm itsjurisdiction provided that the
force ofthe argumentsmilitatinginfavour ofit ispreponderant. The

fact that weighty arguments can be advanced to support the con-
tention that it has no jurisdiction cannot of itself create a doubt
calculated to upset itsjurisdiction. When consideringwhetherit has,
jurisdiction or not, the Court's aim is always to ascertain whether
an intention on the part of the Parties exists to confer jurisdiction
upon it." (P.C.I.J.,SeriesA, No.9,p. 32.)

TheCourt willthereforeinthiscasehaveto considerwhetherthe force of
the argumentsmilitatinginfavour ofjurisdiction ispreponderant, andto
"ascertain whether an intention on the part of the Parties existsto confer
jurisdiction upon it".

17. In its Application instituting proceedings in this case, Nicaragua

refers,asbasis ofthejurisdiction ofthe Court, to
"the provisions of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota and to the
Declarations made bythe Republic of Nicaragua and bythe Repub-
lic of Honduras respectively,accepting thejurisdiction ofthe Court

as provided for in Article 36,paragraphs 1and 2,respectivelyofthe
Statute"
of the Court. In the submissionspresented by Nicaragua in the Counter-

Memorial it iscontended more specificallythat77 ACTIONS ARM~ES (ARRÊT)

«que la compétencede la Cour existe :en vertu de la déclarationdu
20février1960par laquelleleHonduras a acceptélajuridictionde la
Cour conformément aux dispositionsde l'article 36,paragraphe 2,
du Statut de la Cour; ou(au cas où la déclarationde 1960aurait été
valablement modifiée), en vertude la déclarationdu Honduras de
1960telle qu'ellea été modifiéear la déclaration endate du 22mai
1986,et en vertu de la déclarationdu Nicaragua en date du 24 sep-
tembre 1929; et/ou en vertu des dispositions de l'article XXXI du
pacte de Bogota et de l'article 36, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la

Cour».
18. Le pacte de Bogota a été élaborét adopté àla conférencede Bo-
gota de 1948,en mêmetemps que la charte de l'Organisation des Etats
américains(OEA). L'un des buts de I'OEAproclamés à l'article 2 de la
charte est de

«b) Prévenirles causes possibles de difficultéset assurer la solu-
tion pacifique des différends qui surgissent entre les Etats
membres. »

Un chapitre de la charte est consacréà la solution pacifique des diffé-
rends.Il se compose de quatre articles portaàtl'originelesnuméros20
à 23et ainsi rédigés

Tous les différends internationaux qui surgiront entre les Etats
américains seront soumisauxprocédures pacifiquesindiquées dans
cettecharte avantd'être portésàlaconnaissance du Conseildesécu-
ritéde l'organisation des Nations Unies.

Article 21
Ces procédures pacifiques sont les suivantes: la négociation
directe, les bons offices, la médiation, l'enquête, la conciliation, la
procédure judiciaire, l'arbitrageet celles sur lesquelles les parties
tomberont d'accord spécialement àn'importe quel moment.

Article22

Lorsqueentre deux ou plusieurs Etatsaméricains survientun dif-
férend qui,de l'avisde l'un d'eux, nepeut être résolupar les voies
diplomatiques ordinaires, lesparties devront convenir de n'importe
quelle autre procédure pacifique leur permettant d'arriver à une
solution.
Article23

Un traité spécial établirlaes moyens propres àrésoudreles diffé-
rends et fixera lesprocédures qui conviennentàchacun des moyens
pacifiques, de façon qu'aucun différend surgissant entreles Etats
américainsne reste sans solution définitive au-delà d'une période
raisonnable.» "The competence of the Court exists:by virtue of the Honduran
Declarationdated 20 February 1960acceptingthejurisdiction ofthe
Court inconformitywiththeprovisionsofArticle36,paragraph 2,of
the Statuteofthe Court; or(in casethe Declaration of 1960hasbeen
validly modified) the Honduran Declaration of 1960as modified
bythe Declaration dated 22May 1986,and the Nicaraguan Declara-

tion dated 24September 1929;and/or byvirtue ofthe provisions of
Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota and Article 36, paragraph 1,
ofthe Statute ofthe Court."

18. The Pact of Bogota was drafted and adopted at the Bogota Con-
ference in 1948,at the same time as the Charter of the Organization of
American States (OAS).Among the purposes of the OASas proclaimed
in Article 2ofthe Charter wasthe following :

"(b)to prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the
pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Mem-
ber States."

One Chapter of the Charter was devoted to Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes, and consistedoffour Articles,originallynumbered 20to 23,which
read asfollows :
"Article 20

Al1international disputes that mayarise betweenAmericanStates
shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this
Charter, before being referredto the SecurityCouncil ofthe United
Nations.

Article 21
The following are peaceful procedures: direct negotiation, good
offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settle-
ment, arbitration, and those which the parties to the dispute may
especially agreeupon at anytime.

Article22
In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American
Stateswhich,inthe opinion ofone ofthem,cannotbesettledthrough
the usual diplomaticchannels, the parties shallagree on someother
peacefulprocedure that will enable them to reach a solution.

Article23

A specialtreaty willestablish adequate procedures forthe pacific
settlement of disputes and willdeterminethe appropriate means for
their application, so that no dispute between American Statesshall
failof definitivesettlement within a reasonableperiod."La charte a été modifiée en 1967par le protocole de Buenos Aires puis
en 1988par leprotocole de Cartagena de Indias. LeNicaragua et leHon-
duras sontparties à la charte, telle qu'ainsi modifiée.
19. Le«traitéspécial)) mentionné à l'article 23, cité ci-dessus,de la
charte est le pacte de Bogota qui dans son préambule précisequ'il a été
conclu aconformément à l'article XXIII de la charte ». Depuis 1950le

Nicaragua etle Honduras sontparties au pacte. LeHonduras n'apas for-
muléderéserves.LeNicaragua a assorti sasignature d'uneréservequ'ila
maintenue lors de la ratification. Il a entendu ainsi réserver

«la position qu'il a toujours prise en ce qui concerne les décisions
arbitralesdontla validitéaétécontestéeensebasantsur lesprincipes
du droit international, lequelpermet clairement de contesterdesdé-
cisionsarbitralesjugéesnullesou viciées».

Il n'estpas soutenu qu'en elle-mêmc eetteréserve(qui sera évoquée dans
un autre contexte auparagraphe 40ci-après)prive enl'espècela Cour de
la compétencequ'ellepourrait éventuellementtenirdu pacte.
20. L'article XXXIdu pacte de Bogota,sur lequel le Nicaragua fonde
la compétencede la Cour, selit commesuit:

«Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut de la
Cour internationale deJustice,lesHautes Partiescontractantesen ce
quiconcernetout autre Etat américaindéclarentreconnaître comme
obligatoiredepleindroit,etsansconventionspécialetantque lepré-
sent traité resteraen vigueur, la juridiction de la Cour sur tous les
différends d'ordre juridique surgissant entre elles et ayant pour
objet:

a) L'interprétation d'untraité;
b) Toutequestion dedroitinternational ;
c) L'existencedetout fait qui, s'ilétait établi,constitueraitla viola-
tiond'un engagementinternational ;
d) La nature ou l'étenduede la réparation qui découlede la rupture
d'un engagementinternational. »

21. Le Nicaragua invoque commeautre base de compétencelesdécla-
rations d'acceptation de lajuridiction obligatoirefaites par lesParties en
application de l'article36du Statut de la Cour.
Lacompétencedela Cour sousl'empireduparagraphe 2 del'article36
du Statut a été acceptép eour la première foispar le Honduras par une
déclarationfaitele2février1948etremiseau Secrétairegénéra dlel'Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies le 10février1948,selonlaquelle :

[Traductionde l'espagnol]
«Le Pouvoir exécutifde la Républiquedu Honduras, dûment
autorisé par le Congrès national aux termes du décret no dix, du
dix-neuf décembremil neuf cent quarante-sept, et conformémentThe Charter was amended by the Protocol of Buenos Airesin 1967,and
further amended bythe Protocol of Cartagenade Indias in 1988.Nicara-

gua and Honduras are parties to the Charter, as successivelyamended.
19. The "specialtreaty" referred to inArticle23oftheCharter, quoted
above, isthe Pact of Bogota,whichStatesin its Preamblethat it wascon-
cluded "in fulfillment of Article XXIII of the Charter". Nicaragua and
Honduras have since 1950been parties to the Pact, in the case of Hon-
duras without resemation; Nicaragua appended a resemation to its
signature to the Pact, which it maintained at the time of ratification.
The purpose of the resemation wasto reservethe

"position assumed by the Government of Nicaragua with respectto
arbitral decisions the validity of which it has contested on the basis
of the principles of international law, which clearlypermit arbitral
decisions to'be attacked when they are adjudged to be nul1 or
invalidated".
Ithasnotbeencontended thatthat resemation(tobereferred to inanother
context below,paragraph 40)in itself deprives the Court of anyjurisdic-
tion inthis case which it mighthave by virtue ofthe Pact.
20. Article XXXI of the Pact, upon which Nicaragua relies to found

jurisdiction, provides as follows:
"In conformity with Article 36,paragraph 2, ofthe Statute of the
International Court of Justice,the High Contracting Parties declare
that theyrecognize,inrelationto anyother ArnericanState,thejuris-
dictionoftheCourtas compulsory ipsofacto,withoutthe necessityof
any specialagreementsolongas the present Treaty isin force,in al1
disputes of ajuridical nature that arise amongthem concerning :

(a) Theinterpretation ofatreaty ;
(b) Anyquestionofinternational law;
(c) The existenceof any fact which,if established,would constitute
thebreach ofaninternational obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made forthe breach
ofaninternational obligation."

21. Theotherbasis ofjurisdiction relied onbyNicaragua isconstituted
bythedeclarations ofacceptance ofcompulsoryjurisdiction made bythe
Parties under Article36ofthe Statute ofthe Court.
The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its
Statute has been accepted by Honduras, initiallyby a Declaration made
on 2 February 1948,and deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations on 10 Febmary 1948,in the followingterms:

[Translationfrom the Spanish]
"The Executiveofthe Republic of Honduras, with due authoriza-
tion from the National Congressgranted by DecreeNumber Ten of
the nineteenth of December, nineteen hundred and forty-seven,and79 ACTIONS ARMÉES (ARRÊT)

au paragraphe deux de l'article trente-sixdu Statut de la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice,

Déclarepar la présente
Reconnaître commeobligatoire de plein droit et sans convention
spéciale,àl'égarddetoutautre Etat acceptant la même obligation,la

juridiction de la Coursur tous lesdifférendsd'ordre juridique ayant
pour objet:
a) l'interprétation d'untraité;
b) toutpoint dedroit international;
c) la réalitdetout fait qui, s'ilétait établi,constitueraitla violation
d'unengagementinternational ;
d) la nature ou l'étenduede la réparationdue pour la rupture d'un
engagementinternational.

La présente déclarationest faite sous condition de réciprocité et
pour un délaide six ans à dater du jour de sa remise au Secrétaire
général des NationsUnies.

Fait au Palaisnational, Tegucigalpa, le deux févriermilneuf cent
quarante-huit. »(C.Z.J.Annuaire 1947-1948 ,. 123-124.)
22. Le 24mai 1954,le Gouvernement du Honduras a remis au Secré-
taire généralde l'organisation des Nations Unies une déclaration re-

nouvelant la déclaration du 2 février1948«pour un délaide six ans,
renouvelablepar tacite reconduction ».
23. La déclarationpar laquelle le Hondurasa acceptélajuridiction de
la Cour a étéune nouvellefois renouvelée,cettefois pour «une durée in-
déterminée »,par une déclaration du20février1960remiseau Secrétaire
généralde l'organisation des Nations Unies le 10mars 1960(ci-après
dénommée la «déclarationde 1960»)selonlaquelle :

[Traductionde l'espagnol]
«Par la présente,le Gouvernement de la République du Hon-
duras, dûment autorisépar le Congrès national,en vertu du Décret
no99 du vingt-neufjanvier mil neuf cent soixante, à renouveler la
déclarationviséeau paragraphe 2de l'Article36du Statut delaCour

internationale de Justice, déclare
1. Renouvelerladéclaration qu'il-afaiteledix-neufavril milneuf
centcinquante-quatre pour sixans,déposéeauprèd su Secrétairegé-
néralde l'organisation des Nations Unies levingt-quatre mai de la
mêmeannée,quivient à expirationlevingt-quatre mai milneuf cent
soixanteet par laquelleila reconnu commeobligatoiredeplein droit
et sans conventionspéciale, àl'égarddetout autre Etat acceptant la

même obligation, la juridictionde la Cour sur tous les différends
d'ordre juridique ayantpour objet:
a) L'interprétation d'untraité;
b) Toutpoint dedroitinternational; in conformity with paragraph two of Articlethirty-six ofthe Statute
ofthe International Court ofJustice,

Herebydeclares :
That it recognizes as compulsory ipsofacto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other Stateaccepting the same obliga-
tion, thejurisdiction ofthe International Court ofJustice inal1legal
disputes concerning :

(a) theinterpretation ofatreaty;
(b) anyquestion ofinternational law ;
(c) the existenceofanyfact which,ifestablished,would constitute a
breach ofaninternational obligation;
(d) thenature orextentofthe reparation tobemadeforthebreach of
aninternationalobligation.

This declaration is made on condition of reciprocity and for a
period of six years from the date of the deposit of the declaration
with the Secretary-Generalofthe United Nations.
National Palace,Tegucigalpa,D.C.,the second of February, nine-
teen hundred and forty-eight." (Z.C. Yea.rbook1947-1948,p. 129.)

22. On 24May 1954,the Government of Honduras deposited withthe
Secretary-GeneraloftheUnited Nations a Declaration renewingthe Dec-
laration of 2 February 1948,"for a period of sixyears,renewable bytacit
reconduction".
23. TheHonduran acceptanceofjurisdiction wasfurther renewed,this
time "for an indefinite term", by a Declaration dated 20 February 1960,
and deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on
10March 1960("the 1960Declaration") :

[Translationfrom theSpanish]
"The Government of the Republic of Honduras, duly authorized
by the National Congress, under Decree No. 99 of 29January 1960,
to renewthe Declarationreferred to inArticle36 (2)ofthe Statuteof
the International Court ofJustice,herebydeclares:

1. That it renews the Declaration made by it for a period of six
years on 19April 1954and deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations on 24 May 1954,the term of which will expire
on 24 May 1960;recognizingas compulsory ipsofacto and without
special agreement,in relation to any other Stateacceptingthe same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in
al1legaldisputes concerning :

(a) theinterpretation ofatreaty;
(b) anyquestion ofinternational law ;80 ACTIONS ARM~ES (ARR~T)

c) Laréalité detout faitqui, s'ilétaitétabli,constitueraitlaviolation
d'un engagementinternational;
d) La nature ou l'étenduede la réparationdue pour la rupture d'un
engagementinternational.

2. Cette nouvelle déclarationest faite sous condition de récipro-
cité etpour une durée indéterminée, àpartir de la datà laquelle elle
sera déposée auprèsdu Secrétaire générad le l'organisation des
Nations Unies.
Fait au Palais national, à Tegucigalpa (D.C.), le vingt février
milneuf centsoixante. »(C.I.J.Annuaire1959-1960p ,. 237.)

24. Ainsi qu'il a été noté au paragraphe 17 ci-dessus, le Nicaragua
s'estimeen droit de se réclamerde la déclarationde 1960pour établir la
compétencede la Cour. Le Honduras soutient que cette déclaration a
été modifiép ear une déclaration postérieure, faitele 22 mai 1986(ci-
après dénommée la «déclarationde 1986»),qu'il a remiseau Secrétaire
généralde l'organisation des Nations Unies avant l'introduction de la

requêtedu Nicaragua. La déclarationde 1986estainsi libellée:
[Traductionde l'espagnol]

«Par la présente,le Gouvernement de la Républiquedu Hon-
duras, dûment autorisépar le Congrès national, en vertu du décret
no75-86du 21mai 1986, àmodifier la déclaration faitele 20février
1960concernant leparagraphe 2 de l'article36du Statut de la Cour
internationale de Justice,éclare:

Modifier comme suit la déclaration qu'il a faite le 20 février1960:
1) Reconnaître commeobligatoire de plein droit et sans convention
spéciale,à l'égardde tout autre Etat acceptant la mêmeobliga-
tion, lajuridiction delaCour internationale deJusticesurtous les
différendsd'ordrejuridique ayantpour objet :

a) l'interprétation d'untraité;
b) tout point dedroit international;
c) la réalitde tout fait qui, s'ilétait établi,constituerait laviola-
tion d'un engagementinternational ;
d) lanatureou l'étenduedelaréparationduepour larupture d'un
engagementinternational.
2) La présente déclarationne s'applique pas, toutefois, aux diffé-
rends auxquels la République du Honduras serait partie et qui

appartiennent auxcatégoriessuivantes :
a) les différendspour lesquels les parties ont décidéou pour-
raient déciderde recourir à un autre moyen ou à d'autres
moyensderèglementpacifiquedesdifférends ;
b) lesdifférendsayant traità desquestionsrelevant delajuridic-
tion interne dela Républiquedu Honduras, conformémentau
droitinternational; (c) the existenceofanyfact which,ifestablished,would constitutea

breach ofaninternational obligation ;
(d) the nature and extent ofthe reparation to be made forthe breach
ofaninternational obligation.
2. This new Declaration is made on condition of reciprocity, for
anindefiniteterm,startingfrom thedate onwhichitisdeposited with
the Secretary-Generalofthe United Nations.

National Palace, Tegucigalpa, D.C., 20 February 1960." (Z.C.J.
Yearbook1959-1 960,p. 241.)

24. Asnoted inparagraph 17above, Nicaragua claimsto be entitled to
found jurisdiction on the 1960Declaration. Honduras asserts that that
Declaration has been modified by a subsequent Declaration, made on
22 May 1986("the 1986Declaration"), which it had deposited with the
Secretary-Generalofthe United Nations prior tothe filingoftheApplica-
tion by Nicaragua.The 1986Declaration is worded as follows:

[Translationfrom theSpanish]
"The Government of the Republic of Honduras, duly authorized
by the National Congress under Decree No. 75-86of 21 May 1986
to modify the Declaration made on 20 February 1960concerning
Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice,herebydeclaresthat it modifies the Declaration made by it

on 20February 1960asfollows :
1. It recognizesas compulsory ipsofacto and without specialagree-
ment,inrelation to anyother Stateaccepting the sameobligation,
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in al1legal
disputesconcerning :

(a) the interpretation ofatreaty;
(b) anyquestion ofinternational law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would consti-
tute abreach ofaninternational obligation;
(d) the nature orextentofthereparation tobemade forthe breach
ofaninternational obligation.

2. This Declaration shall not apply, however, to the following dis-
putesto whichthe RepublicofHonduras maybeaparty :

(a) disputes in respect of which the parties have agreed or may
agree to resort to other means for the pacific settlement of
disputes;
(b) disputes concerning matters subject to the domesticjurisdic-
tion ofthe RepublicofHonduras under internationallaw; c) lesdifférendsayanttrait à desfaitsoudessituationsayantleur
origine dans des conflits armés ou des actesde mêmenature
qui pourraient affecter leterritoire de la Républiquedu Hon-

duras, etdans lesquelscettedernièrepourrait setrouverimpli-
quée,directementouindirectement;
d) lesdifférendsayanttrait :
aux questions territoriales concernant la souverainetésur
lesîles,lesbancs etlescayes;leseauxintérieures,lesgolfes
etlamerterritoriale, leurstatut etleurslimites;
, à tous les droits de souverainetéou dejuridiction concer-
nant la zone contiguë,la zone économique exclusiveet le

plateau continental,leursstatutsetleurs limite;
iii)à l'espaceaérien situéau-dessusdesterritoires,deseauxet
deszonesdécritsdansleprésentalinéa d).
3) LeGouvernement de la Républiquedu Honduras seréserve éga-
lement le droit de compléter, modifierou retirer àtout moment
la présente déclaration, oules réserves qu'ellecontient, par noti-
fication adressée au Secrétaire générad l e l'organisation des

Nations Unies.
4) La présente déclaration remplace la déclaration formulép ear le
Gouvernement delaRépubliquedu Hondurasle20février1960.
Fait au palais présidentielà Tegucigalpa(D.C.),le22mai 1986.»
(C.Z.J.Annuaire1985-1986,p. 71-72.)

25. Envued'établir qu'auxfinsdu paragraphe 2de l'article36ilestun
«Etat acceptant la mêmeobligation» que le Honduras, le Nicaragua in-
voque la déclarationqu'il a faite, en tant que membre de la Société des
Nations, à l'époque oùil a signéle Protocole de signature du Statut de la
Cour permanente de Justice internationale, déclarationse lisant comme
suit:

«Au nom de la Républiquedu Nicaragua, je déclare reconnaître
commeobligatoireetsansconditionlajuridiction de laCour perma-
nente de Justiceinternationale.
Genève,le24septembre 1929. »

Le Nicaragua se fonde en outre sur le paragraphe 5 de l'article 36 du
Statut de la présente Cour, lequel disposeque :

«Les déclarations faitesen applicationde l'article36du Statut de
la Cour permanente de Justice internationale pour une durée qui
n'est pas encore expirée seront considéréesd,ans les rapports entre
parties au présent Statut,commecomportant acceptation de lajuri-
diction obligatoire dela Cour internationale deJusticepour la durée
restant à courir d'après ces déclarationset conformément à leurs
ternies.» (c) disputes relating to facts or situations originating in armed
conflictsor acts of a similarnature which mayaffectthe terri-
tory of the Republic of Honduras, and in which it may find
itselfinvolveddirectlyorindirectly;

(d) disputesreferringto :
(i) territorial questions with regard to sovereignty over
islands, shoals and keys; interna1waters,bays, the terri-
torial seaandthe legalstatusand limitsthereof;
(ii)al1rights of sovereignty or jurisdiction concerning the

legalstatus and limits of the contiguouszone, the exclu-
siveeconomiczone andthe continentalshelf;
(iii) the airspace over the territories, waters and zones
referredto inthissubparagraph.
3. The Government of Honduras also reserves the right at any
time to supplement, modify or withdraw this Declaration or the
reservations contained therein by givingnotice to the Secretary-
General ofthe United Nations.

4. This Declaration replaces the Declaration made by the Govern-
mentofHonduras on 20February 1960.
National Palace, Tegucigalpa, D.C., 22 May 1986."(I.C.J. Year-
book1985-1986,pp. 71-72.)

25. In order to be able to show that it isa "State accepting the same
obligation" as Honduras within the meaning of Article 36,paragraph 2,
ofthe Statute,Nicaragua relieson the declaration which,as a Member of
the Leagueof Nations, it made at the time of signature ofthe Protocol of
Signatureof the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
and whichread asfollows :

[Translationfrom theFrench]
"On behalf of the Republic of Nicaragua 1 recognize as com-
pulsory unconditionally the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice.

Geneva, 24September 1929."

Nicaragua relies further on paragraph 5 of Article 36of the Statute of
the present Court, which provides that :
"Declarations made under Article 36of the Statute of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice and which are stillin force shall
bedeemed,asbetween theparties tothepresent Statute,tobeaccept-
ances of the compulsoryjurisdiction of the International Court of

Justice for theperiod whichthey still have to run and in accordance
withtheir terms." Enfin le Nicaragua rappelle que la Cour, dans l'arrêtqu'elle a rendu
dans l'affaire des Activités militairet paramilitairesau Nicaraguaet
contre celui-ciNicaragua c.Etats-Unis d'Amérique),compétence reteva-
bilitéC.I.J.Recueil1984,p. 441,par. 1IO),atenu ((pourvalidela déclara-
tion nicaraguayenne du 24septembre 1929 ».Selonlui, cettedéclaration
estactuellementen vigueur.

26. En définitive,le Nicaragua prétendque la Cour a compétence à
un double titre. Il soutient qu'elle pourrait statuer tant sur la base de
l'articleXXXI du pacte de Bogotaque sur celledesdéclarationsd'accep-
tation de lajuridiction obligatoirefaites par le Nicaragua et le Honduras
conformément àl'article36du Statut.
27. Commelesrelationsentre lesEtatsparties au pacte de Bogotasont
régiespar ceseulpacte, la Cour recherchera d'abord si ellea compétence
sur la base de l'articleXXXI du pacte.

28. Le Honduras expose dans son mémoireque le pacte ne ((fournit
aucune base de compétence àla Cour». Il ne soutient pas que leprésent
différend,de par sa nature, échappe aux dispositionsde l'articleXXXI
lui-même,maisfaitvaloirque cetarticle ne donnecependant pas compé-
tence àla Cour en l'espèce.Il invoque àcet effetdeux exceptions.

29. Le Honduras attire en premier lieu l'attention sur le fait que l'ar-
ticleXXXI commencepar lesmots ((Conformémentauparagraphe 2de
l'article36du Statut de la Cour internationale deJusticeetsur la quasi-

identitédestermesutilisésdans lasuitedel'articleetdans leparagraphe 2
de l'article36.l avanceque l'interprétationde l'articleXXXI qui estàla
foisla plus simple,la plus logique et la plus conforme au libellédu pacte
est celleselon laquelle cetexte ((prévoitunejuridiction qui peut être dé-
finie avecplus de précisionpar une déclaration unilatéralede chacune
desparties au pacte,envertu duparagraphe 2del'article36. Il ajoute que
la saisine de la Cour ((dépend,bien entendu, des conditions dans les-
quelles la juridiction de la Cour a été reconnuepar les parties au diffé-
rend»dans de tellesdéclarations. D'aprèsle Honduras :

Selon l'interprétation la plus littéret par conséquent la plus
simpledes dispositions du pacte,son articleXXXI, en établissantla
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour,imposeen même temps àchacune
desparties desouscrireenoutre une déclarationunilatéraled'accep-
tation de cettejuridiction suivant les dispositions de l'article36,pa-
ragraphe 2,du Statut de la Cour auquel l'article XXXI du pacte fait
expressémentréférence .esréservesjointes àde tellesdéclarations,
commedans lecas de la déclarationdu Hondurasendate du 22mai
1986[citéeauparagraphe 24ci-dessus],s'appliquentpar conséquent
tantdans lecadredelamiseenapplication del'articleXXXI quesur
la base exclusivede la déclarationhondurienne elle-même. » ARMEDACTIONS (JUDGMENT) 82

Nicaraguarecallsfinally thattheCourt, initsJudgment inthe casecon-
cerning Military and Paramilitaïy Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. UnitedStates of America), Jurisdictionand Admissibility
(Z.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 441,para. 1IO) found that "the Nicaraguan Dec-
laration of 24September 1929isvalid", and according to Nicaragua, that
Declaration is currentlyin effect.
26. It is, in short, claimed by Nicaragua that there exist two distinct

titlesofjurisdiction. Itassertsthatthe Court could entertainthe caseboth
on the basis ofArticleXXXI ofthe Pact of Bogotaand on the basi~pfthe
declarations of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction made by Nicara-
guaand Honduras under Article36ofthe Statute.
27. Since,inrelationsbetween the Statesparties to the Pact of Bogota,
that Pactisgoverning,the Court willfirstexaminethe questionwhether it
hasjurisdiction under ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact.

28. Honduras maintains in its Memorial that the Pact "does not pro-
vide any basis forthe jurisdiction of th... Court". It does not contend
that the present dispute by its nature falls outside the scope of the provi-
sionsofArticleXXXI itselfbut arguesthatthat Articlenevertheless does
not conferjurisdiction on the Court inthe present case,and puts fonvard
two objectionsto that effect.
29. Honduras firstdrawsattention to the factthat ArticleXXXI begins
withthewords,"In conformity withArticle36,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute
ofthe International Court ofJustice", and that the wording ofthe rest of
the Articleis almostidentical withthat of Article 36,paragraph 2.It con-
tends that the interpretation of Article XXXI which is at once the most
simple,the mostlogicaland the mostconsistentwiththe literalwording of
the Pact is that it "contains a jurisdiction whichan be more precisely
defined by means of a unilateral declaration" under Article 36, para-
graph 2,ofthe Statute,by eachparty to the Pact;and thatthe seisinofthe
Court is "subject to the terms in which the jurisdiction of the Court has

been acknowledged by the parties to the dispute" in such declarations.
Accordingto Honduras,
"Under the mostliteral, and thereforethe most simple,interpreta-
tion ofthetermsofthe Pact,ArticleXXXI,inestablishingthe obliga-
toryjurisdiction oftheCourt, atthe sametimerequirestheadditional
subscription, byeach ofthe Parties, ofa unilateral declaration of-
knowledgement of itsjurisdiction, asprovided for by Article 36.2of
the Statute of the Court, to which Article XXXI of the Pact makes

expressreference.Thereservationsattached to such declarations,as
inthe case ofthe declaration of Honduras of22May 1986[quotedin
paragraph 24 above],thereforeapplyboth in the contextofthe appli-
cation of Article XXXI and on the solebasis of the Honduran dec-
laration itself."SelonleHonduras, lesréservesformuléesdans ladéclarationde 1986sont
tellesque la présente affairenerelèvepas de la compétenceconférée à la
Cour par cette déclaration sousl'empiredu paragraphe 2 de l'article36.
Dèslorsla Cour n'auraitpas davantagecompétencepour en connaîtreen
vertu de l'articleXXI du pacte.
30. A ce stade, le Honduras interprétaitdonc l'article XXXI comme
imposant aux Partiesl'obligation de faireune déclaration selonlerégime
de la clausefacultativeetalléguaitqu'en l'absence d'une telledéclaration
laCour netirait aucune compétencedecetarticle.L'interprétationdel'ar-
ticleXXXI adoptéeparle Honduras fut cependant précisée au coursdes
audiences et enréponse aux questionsposéespar un membre de IaCour.
Tout d'abord le Honduras a admis qu'«on peut ...soutenir qu'une telle

déclaration n'était pas nécessaireet que l'articleXI étaitopérant de
pleindroit, par sespropres termes,sansqu'ilfûtbesoind'aucune déclara-
tion connexe ».LeHondurasapar lasuitesoutenu que l'articleXXXI est
une inclusiondans lepacte du systèmedereconnaissance delajuridiction
de la Cour selon le régimede la ((clausefacultative»,c'est-à-direselonle
paragraphe 2de l'article36du Statut.
Par voie de conséquence,le Honduras estime qu'après avoir ratifiéle
pacte les Etats devenusparties àcet instrumentpeuvent soit ne rien faire
de plus, auquel cas l'articleXXXI fonctionne comme une acceptation
conjointe dela compétencede laCour conformémentau paragraphe 2de
l'article36,sans réservesni conditions autres que la condition de base de
réciprocité,soitfaireune déclaration par application du paragraphe 2 de
l'article6.Selonle Honduras, si cettedéclaration ne contient pasde ré-
serves,elle nemodifiepas la situation vis-à-visdesEtatsparties au pacte,
aveclesquels 1'Etatauteurde la déclarationestdéjàliépar la déclaration
conjointe incorporée dans l'articleXXXI; ellejoue seulement dans les
relations avec les Etats non parties au pacte ayant fait des déclarations
selon la clausefacultative.En revanche, sila déclaration contient des ré-

serves,
aceserontalorslestermesdecettedéclarationquiindiqueront quelle
est, en ce qui concerne ces Etats, l'étenduede la juridiction de la
Cour, établieà l'articleXXXI du pacte».

31. En résumé, le Hondurasa constammentsoutenu que,pour un Etat
partie au pacte qui a fait une déclarationen application du paragraphe2
del'article36du Statut,l'étendue delacompétencedelaCour envertu de
l'articleXXI du pacte est déterminéepar cette déclaration et,le cas
échéantp ,ar toute réserveyfigurant. Ila aussiavancéquetoute modifica-
tion ou tout retrait d'une telle déclaration, validepour l'application du
paragraphe 2 de l'article36 du Statut, l'estégalementpour l'application
de l'articleXXI.
Cependant le Hondurasa présenté deux interprétations successivesde
l'articleXXI en soutenant d'abord que celui-cidoit être complétp éar
une déclaration d'acceptationde lajuridiction obligatoireet ensuite qu'il
n'apas nécessairement à êtreainsicomplété m,ais qu'ilpeut l'être.In the contention of Honduras, the reservations attached to the 1986
Declaration are such asto excludethe present casefrom the scope ofthe

jurisdiction conferred under Article 36,paragraph 2,by the Declaration.
Accordingly it maintains that the Court has no jurisdiction in the case
under ArticleXXXI either.
30. At this stage, Honduras's interpretation of Article XXXI of the
Pact was thus that it imposed an obligation to make an optional-clause
declaration, and that, inthe absence ofsucha declaration,nojurisdiction
existed under that Article.The interpretation of Article XXXI espoused
by Honduras was, however,elaborated during the oral arguments and in
its replies to questions put by a Member of the Court. First, Honduras
conceded that itwas"arguable that such a declaration wasnot necessary,
and that Article XXXI operated by its own force, on its own terms, and
without need of any companion declaration". Honduras subsequently
contended that Article XXXI is an incorporation into the Pact of the
systemof recognition of the Court's jurisdiction under the régimeof the
"optional clause", i.e.,Article36,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute.

Consequently, Honduras considers that Statesparties to the Pact may
choose either to take no further action,in which caseArticle XXXI itself
operates as a joint acceptance of jurisdiction under Article 36, para-

graph 2,freeofreservationsand conditionsother than the basiccondition
of reciprocity; or to make a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2.
According to Honduras, if that declaration contains no reservations,
while it willoperate in relation to States non-parties to the Pact which
have made declarations under the optional clause, it will not modifythe
situation vis-à-visother Statesparties to the Pact,in relation to whomthe
declarant State is already bound by the joint declaration embodied in
ArticleXXXI. If such a declaration contains reservations, however,

"it willthen bethe terms ofthat declaration whichwillindicate what
is,asfaras those Statesareconcerned,the extentofthejurisdiction of
the Court establishedin Article XXXI ofthe Pact".
31. In short, Honduras has consistently maintained that, for a State
party to the Pact which has made a declaration under Article 36,para-
graph 2, ofthe Statute, the extent of the jurisdiction of the Court under
Article XXXI of the Pact is determined by that declaration, and by any
reservations appended to it. It has also maintained that any modification
or withdrawal ofsuch a declarationwhich isvalidunder Article36,para-

graph 2,ofthe Statuteisequallyeffectiveunder ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact.

Honduras has, however, given two successiveinterpretations of Arti-
cleXXXI,claiminginitiallythat itmustbesupplemented byadeclaration
of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction and subsequentlythat it can be
so supplemented but need not be.84 ACTIONSARMÉES(ARRÊT)

32. Lapremièreinterprétation avancép ear leHonduras, selonlaquelle
l'articleXXI doit être complété par une déclaration,est incompatible
avec les termes mêmesde cet article. En effet, selon ce texte, les parties
((déclarent reconnaître comme obligatoirede plein droit » lajuridiction
de la Cour dans les cas qu'il mentionne. L'articleXI ne subordonne
pas cettereconnaissance à une nouvelledéclaration à remettre au Secré-
taire généradl e l'organisation des Nations Uniesconformémentaux pa-
ragraphes 2 et 4 de l'article 36 du Statut. Rédiàél'indicatif présent,il

comporte par lui-mêmereconnaissancede la compétencede la Cour.
33. Passant à la seconde interprétation proposéepar le Honduras, la
Cour observeradèsl'abordque deuxlecturesde l'article XXXI au regard
du Statut ont été proposéep sar les Parties. Cet article a en effet été re-
gardé soit commeune disposition conventionnelle donnant compétence
à la Cour conformémentau paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 du Statut, soit
comme une déclarationcollectived'acceptation de lajuridiction obliga-
toire effectuéepar application du paragraphe 2 du mêmearticle.
Le Honduras a défendu cette dernière lecture.Le Nicaragua, après
avoiravancéen1984dans l'affaire desActivités militairestparamilitaires
au Nicaraguaet contrecelui-ci(Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique) que
l'articleXXIéquivalait àune déclarationauxtermesduparagraphe 2de
l'article6du Statut,asoutenu dans laprésenteaffairequel'articleXXXI

entrait dans les prévisionsdu paragraphe 1de-l'article36 et donnait par
suitecompétence à la Coursurune base conventionnelle.
34. Il n'est cependantpas nécessaired'entrer dans ce débat. En effet,
même sil'onretientlalecture del'articleXI défenduepar leHonduras
et si l'onregarde cet article comme une déclarationcollectived'accepta-
tion de lajuridiction obligatoirefaite conformémentau paragraphe 2 de
l'article6,il convient de constater que cettedéclarationa étéincorporée
au pacte de Bogota,en tant qu'articleXXI. Dèslors ellene saurait être
modifiéeque selon les règles fixéespar le pacte lui-même. Or l'ar-
ticleXXXIn'envisage à aucun momentquel'engagementpris par lespar-
ties au pacte puisse être amendpar voie de déclaration unilatérale faite
ultérieurementpar application du Statutetlamention du paragraphe 2de
l'article6 du Statut ne suffit pas par elle-mêmeàproduire un tel effet.
Ce silence est d'autant plussignificatifque le pacte fixe avecprécision

les obligations des parties. L'engagementfiguranà l'article XXXI vaut
rationemateriaepour les différends énuméré psar ce texte. Il concerne
rationepersonaeles Etats américains partiesau pacte. Il demeure valide
rationetemporistant que cet instrument reste lui-mêmeen vigueur entre
ces Etats.
35. Certaines dispositions du traité restreignentpar ailleurs la portée
de l'engagementpris. Ainsil'articlepréciseque lesprocédures prévues
aupacte ne«pourront s'appliquer auxquestionsqui,par leurnature, relè-
vent de la compétence nationale des Etats».Ces procédures ne s'appli-
queront pas davantage,selonl'article VI,

(taux questionsdéjàrégléeasu moyend'une ententeentrelesparties, 32. The first interpretation advanced by Honduras - that Arti-
cleXXXI must besupplemented by adeclaration - isincompatible with
the actual terms ofthe Article. In that text, the parties "declare that they
recognize"the Court's jurisdiction"as compulsory ipsofacto"inthe cases
there enumerated. Article XXXI does not subject that recognition to the
making of a new declaration to be deposited with the United Nations
Secretary-Generalin accordance with Article 36,paragraphs 2 and 4, of
the Statute. It is drafted in the present indicativetense, and thus of itself
constitutesacceptance ofthe Court's jurisdiction.
33. Turningto the second Honduran interpretation, the Court mayob-
serveat the outset that two possiblereadings ofthe relationship between
Article XXXI and the Statute have been proposed by the Parties. That
Article has been seen either as a treaty provision conferringjurisdiction

uponthe Court in accordance withArticle36,paragraph 1,ofthe Statute,
or as a collective declaration of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction ,
under paragraph 2 ofthat same Article.
Honduras has advanced the latter reading. Nicaragua, after asserting
in 1984,in the case concerning Militaïy and Paramilitaïy Activitiesin
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), that
Article XXXI constituted a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2,
ofthe Statute,hasarguedinthe presentcasethat ArticleXXXI fallsunder
Article 36, paragraph 1,and therefore confersjurisdiction on the Court
on a conventional basis.
34. Thereishowevernoneedto pursue thisargument. Evenifthe Hon-
duran readingofArticleXXXI be adopted,and the Articleberegardedas
a collectivedeclaration ofacceptance ofcompulsoryjurisdiction madein
accordance with Article 36,paragraph 2, it should be observed that that
declaration was incorporated in the Pact of Bogota as Article XXXI.

Accordingly, it can only be modified in accordance with the mles pro-
vided for in the Pact itself. Article XXXI nowhere envisages that the
undertaking entered into by the parties to the Pact mightbe amended by
means of a unilateral declaration made subsequently under the Statute,
and the referenceto Article 36,paragraph 2, ofthe Statute is insufficient
in itselfto havethat effect.
Thefactthat the Pact defines with precision the obligations ofthe par-
ties lends particular significance to the absence of any indication of that
kind. The commitment in Article XXXI applies rationemateriaeto the
disputes enumerated in thattext; it relates rationepersonaeto the Arneri-
can Statesparties to the Pact; it remains valid rationetemporisfor aslong
asthat instrument itselfremainsin force between those States.
35. Moreover, some provisions of the Treaty restrict the scope of the
parties' commitment.Article Vspecifiesthat procedures under the Pact
"may not be applied to matters which, by their nature, are within the

domestic jurisdiction of the State". Article VI provides that they will
likewisenot apply

"to mattersalreadysettled byarrangementbetween the parties, orby ou d'une décisionarbitrale ou d'une décision d'un tribunal interna-
tional, ni cellesrégiespar desaccordsoutraitésen vigueur àla date
de la signature du présent pacteD.

De mêmel'article VI1pose des règlesparticulièresen matièrede protec-
tion diplomatique.

Enfin,l'article LVdu pacte de Bogota donne aux parties la possibilité
de faire des réservesà cet instrument qui,«à titre de réciprocité,s'appli-
queront à tous les Etats signataires en ce qui concerne 1'Etatqui les a
faites».En l'absence de dispositionsprocédurales spéciales,ces réserves
peuvent, conformément aux règlesdu droit international général appli-
cables en la matière, telles que codifiéespar la convention de Vienne
sur le droit destraitésde 1969,êtreformuléesseulementau moment de la
signature ou de la ratification du pacte ainsi que de l'adhésion cet ins-
trument.
36. Il ressort de l'ensemble de ces dispositions que l'engagement figu-
rant àl'article XXXI ne peut êtrelimitéque par la voie des réservesau
pacte lui-même. Il constitue un engagement autonome indépendant de
tout autre engagement que les parties peuvent par ailleurs avoir pris ou
prendre en remettant au Secrétaire généralde l'organisation des Na-

tions Unies une déclaration d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire
conformémentauxparagraphes 2et4de l'article36du Statut.Non seule-
ment l'article XXXI ne nécessitepas une telle déclaration,mais encore
cettedéclaration,lorsqu'elleestfaite,estsans effetsurl'engagementrésul-
tant de cet article.
La Cour estime en conséquenceque ni la premièreni la secondeinter-
prétationdu texte avancéespar le Honduras ne sont compatiblesavecla
lettre mêmedu pacte.
37. Lalecturequela Cour faitainsi de l'articleXXXI estconfortéepar
les travaux préparatoires. Certes, ceux-ci doiventen l'espèceêtreutilisés
avecprudence, carles différentsstadesdelarédactiondestexteslors dela
conférencede Bogota n'ont pas tous fait l'objet de procès-verbaux dé-
taillés.Lesactes de la conférenceonttoutefoisétépubliés,conformément
à l'article 47de son règlement,en espagnol, et les procès-verbauxde cer-
taines discussions de la commission III de la conférenceéclairentsingu-

lièrement la manière dont ont été conçues à l'époqueles relations entre
l'article XXXI et les déclarations faitesen application de l'article 36 du
Statut.
Letexte qui devaitdevenirl'article XXXI futdiscutélors de la réunion
du 27 avril 1948de la commission III. Le représentant des Etats-Unis
d'Amérique rappela que son pays avait antérieurement fait, par appli-
cation du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36du Statut, une déclaration d'accep-
tation de lajuridiction obligatoirecomportant desréserves; ilprécisaque
les Etats-Unis entendaient maintenir ces réservespour l'application du
pacte de Bogota. Le représentant du Mexique lui répondit que les Etats
qui souhaiteraient maintenir de telles réservesdans leurs relations avec
les autres parties au pacte devraient les reformuler en tant que réserves arbitral award or by decision of an international court, or which are
governedbyagreementsortreatiesinforceon thedate ofthe conclu-

sion ofthe present Treaty".

Similarly,Article VI1laysdown specificrules relatingto diplomaticpro-
tection.
Finally, Article LVof the Pact of Bogota enables the parties to make
reservationsto that instrument which "shall, withrespectto the Statethat
makes them, apply to al1signatoryStateson the basis of reciprocity". In
the absence of special procedural provisions those reservations may, in
accordance with the rules of general international law on the point as
codifiedby the 1969ViennaConvention on the LawofTreaties,be made
only at the time of signature or ratification of the Pact or at the time of
adhesion to that instrument.

36. These provisions together indicate that the commitment in Ar-
ticleXXXI can onlybe limitedby means of reservationsto the Pact itself.
It is an autonomous commitment, independent of any other which the
parties may have undertaken or may undertake by depositing with the
United Nations Secretary-General a declaration of acceptance of com-
pulsoryjurisdiction under Article 36,paragraphs 2 and 4, of the Statute.

Not only does Article XXXI not require any such declaration, but also
when sucha declarationismade,it has noeffectonthe commitmentresult-
ing fromthat Article.

Neither the first nor the second interpretation of the text advanced by
Honduras is compatible with the actual terms of the Pact.

37. Further confirmation ofthe Court's readingof ArticleXXXI isto
be foundinthe travauxpréparatoiresI.n this casethese must of coursebe
resorted to only with caution, as not al1the stages of the drafting of the
texts at the Bogota Conference werethe subject of detailed records. The
proceedings of the Conference were however published, in accordance
with Article 47 of the Regulations of the Conference, in Spanish, and
certain recorded discussions of Committee III of the Conference throw
light particularly upon the contemporary conception of the relationship
between Article XXXI and declarations under Article 36 ofthe Statute.

Thetext whichwasto becomeArticleXXXI wasdiscussedatthe meet-
ing of Committee III held on 27 April 1948.The representative of the

United States reminded the meeting that his country had previously,
under Article36,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute,madea declarationof accept-
ance of compulsoryjurisdiction that included reservations; he made it
clear that the United States intended to maintain those reservations in
relation to the application of the Pact of Bogota. The representative of
Mexicoreplied that Stateswhich wishedto maintain such reservationsin
their relations with the other parties to the Pact would have toefomu-au pacte par application del'articleLV.Lesreprésentantsdela Colombie
et de l'Equateur, membres du comitéde rédaction, confirmèrent cette
interprétation.Lereprésentantdu Pérousedemanda siun articlesupplé-
mentaire ne devrait pas être ajoutéau projet en vue de préciserque
l'adhésionau traité impliqueraitqu'entrelesparties à celui-cilesréserves
à la déclaration d'acceptationde lajuridiction obligatoireseraient auto-

matiquement levées.La majoritéde la commission III estima cependant
qu'un tel article n'étaitpas nécessaireetle représentantdu Pérouajouta
aprèsle vote: «Mais il faut faire consigner ce qui a été ditici, à savoir
qu'il estentendu que l'adhésionest inconditionnelle et que les réserves
sont automatiquement levées.» '(Traductiondu Greffe.)
38. Cette solution n'ayant pas été contestée en séance plénière, l'ar-
ticle XXXI fut adopté parla conférence sans modification surce point.

Par voie de conséquence,les Etats-Unis lors de la signature du pacte
formulèrentune réserveselonlaquelle :

((L'acceptationpar lesEtats-Unisd'Amériquede lajuridiction de
la Cour internationale deJusticecommeobligatoire ipsofacto etsans
accord spécial,telleque cettejuridiction estétablieau présenttraité,
setrouve déterminée par toute limitation dejuridiction etautre caté-
gorie de limitation contenues dans les déclarations faitespar les
Etats-Unisconformément àl'article36,paragraphe 4,du Statutde la
Cour, et qui sont en vigueur au moment de l'étude d'uncas déter-
miné.»

Les Parties sont d'accord pour estimer que, si l'interprétationque le
Honduras donne de l'article XXXIdu pacte était exacte,cetteréserve ne
modifieraitpas lasituation dedroit créépear cetarticle etqu'elle neserait
par conséquentpas nécessaire.Toutefois,le Honduras soutient que cette
réserve n'enétait pas véritablement une,mais qu'elle constituait une
simpledéclaration interprétative.
39. Cetteargumentation estencontradictionaveclerapport de ladélé-
gation des Etats-Unis à la conférencede Bogota,publiépar le départe-
ment d'Etat, et selonlequel l'article XXXI

«ne prend pas en considérationle fait que divers Etats ont jugé né-
cessaired'assortir précédemmentleursdéclarationsd'acceptatiod ne
la juridiction de la Cour en vertu de l'article 36, paragraphe2, du
Statut de certaines restrictions quantà l'étenduede la juridiction
ainsiacceptée.TelestlecasdesEtats-Unis.Comme lestermesdeleur
déclaration avaient en outre été au préalable accueillis favorable-

ment et approuvéspar le Sénat, la délégation a jugénécessairede
formulerune réserveprécisant queson acceptationde la convention

«Pero deben constar en actas las palabras pronunciadas aqui, acerca de que se
entiende que es adhesion incondicioyque quedan removidas, automaticamente,
las reservas.» (Novena Conferencia InternacionalAmericana, Actas y Documentos,
vol. IV,p. 167.)latethemasreservationsto the Pact,under ArticleLV.Therepresentatives

of Colombiaand Ecuador, members ofthe draftinggroup, confirmedthat
interpretation. The representative of Peru asked whether an additional
Articleshould not be addedto the draftin order to specifythat adhesion
to the treaty would imply, as between the parties to it, the automatic re-
movalofanyresewationsto declarationsofacceptanceofcompulsoryjuris-
diction.The majority ofCommittee III considered,however,that suchan
Article was not necessary and the representative of Peru went onto Say,
afterthe vote,that "weshould place on record whathasbeen said here,to
the effect that it is understood that adhesion is unconditional and that
resewations are automatically removed" ' (translationbytheRegistryl.
38. This solution was not contested in the plenary session, and Ar-
ticle XXXI was adopted by the Conference without any amendments
on that point.
As a consequence the United States, when signing the Pact, made a

resewation to the effectthat :
"The acceptance by the United States of the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice as compulsory ipsofacto and without
specialagreement, as provided in thisTreaty, is limitedby anyjuris-
dictional orotherlimitationscontained inanyDeclarationdeposited
by the United States under Article 36,paragraph 4,of the Statute of
theCourt, and in force at the time ofthe submission of any case."

ItiscommongroundbetweentheParties that iftheHonduran interpre-
tation of Article XXXI of the Pact be correct,this resewation would not
modify the legal situation created by that Article, and therefore would
not be necessary; Honduras argueshoweverthat it wasnot atrue resewa-
tion, but merelyan interpretativedeclaration.

39. That argument is inconsistent with the report, published by the
United States Department of State, of the delegation of that country to
the Conference of Bogota,whichstated that ArticleXXXI
"does not take into account the fact that various Statesin previous
acceptancesofthe Court'sjurisdictionunder Article36,paragraph 2,
of the Statute, have found it necessary to place certain limitations
upon the jurisdiction thus accepted. This was the case in respect to

the United States,and sincethe termsof itsdeclaration had, in addi-
tion, received the previous advice and consent of the Senate, the
delegation found it necessaryto interpose a reservationtothe effect
that the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory

"Pero deben constar en actas las palabras pronunciadas aqui, acerca de que se
entiende que esadhesion incondicional y que quedan removidas, automaticamente, las
rese~as." (NovenaConferenciaInternacional mericana, Actasy Documentos,Vol. IV,
p. 167.) spécialeest déterminéepar toute limitation de juridiction ou autre
contenues dans les déclarations faitespar les Etats-Unis confor-
mément à l'article 36, paragraphe 4, du Statut de la Cour, et qui
sont en vigueurau moment de l'étuded'un cas déterminé. »(Dépar-
tement d'Etat des Etats-Unis, Report ofthe U.S.Delegationto the
NinthInternational ConferenceofAmericanStates,Washington, 1948,

p. 48.)

A la lumièrede ce rapport, il est clair que la réserveformuléepar les
Etats-Unis sur ce point avait pour objet d'atteindre un résultat qui,de
l'avisde la délégation américainen ,e pouvait être obtenupar la simple
application del'articleXXI.Al'évidencei,ls'agissaitlàd'uneréserveau
pacte. L'existence de cette dernière confirme l'interprétationde l'ar-
ticleXXXI précédemmentdonnéepar la Cour.
40. Cetteinterprétation correspondenoutre à lapratique suiviepar les
parties au pacte depuis 1948.
Celles-cin'ont àaucunmomentétablidelienentrel'articleXXXIetles
déclarations d'acceptationde la juridiction obligatoire faites conformé-
mentauxparagraphes 2 et4 de l'article36du Statut. C'estainsiqu'aucun
Etat,lors de sonadhésionau pacte ou de saratification de cetinstrument,

n'a remis au Secrétairegénéradle l'organisation des Nations Unies une
déclaration d'acceptationdelajuridiction obligatoire dans lesconditions
fixéespar le Statut.Par ailleurs, aucun Etat partie au pacte (endehors du
Honduras en 1986)n'a cru nécessaire,lorsqu'ila renouveléou lorsqu'ila
amendé sa déclaration d'acceptationde la juridiction obligatoire, d'en
notifierletexteau Secrétairegénéra dlel'OEA,dépositairedupacte, pour
transmissionaux autres parties.
Par ailleurs, en novembre 1973, El Salvador a dénoncéle pacte de
Bogota et a modifié sa déclaration d'acceptationde la juridiction obli-
gatoire en vue d'en restreindre la portée.Or si la nouvelle déclaration
avait étéapplicable entre les parties au pacte une telle dénonciation
n'eûtpas été nécessairpeour apporter une limitationsemblable àlajuri-
diction que la Cour tient de l'articleI.
Enfin, le Honduras a mentionnél'accord qu'ila conclu avec le Nica-
ragua à Washington, le21juillet 1957,envue de soumettre à la Cour l'af-

faire de laSentence arbitralerendue parle roid'Espagnele 23 décembre
1906et il a fait valoir que la conclusion de cet accord implique que la
réservedu Nicaragua au pacte (citéeau paragraphe 19ci-dessus) ait à
l'époque été regardée comme applicabà lela déclaration d'acceptation
par ce pays de la juridiction obligatoire. Selon le Honduras, le Nicara-
gua aurait de ce fait reconnu l'existence d'un lien entre le pacte et la
déclaration.La Cour ne saurait tirer cette conclusion des faits. En effet,
la signature de cet accord peut s'expliquer beaucoup plus simplement
par la volonté des deuxpays de prévenirtout débat sur la compétence
en évitantque soit soulevée devant la Cour une exception tiréede la
réservedu Nicaragua au pacte ou concernant la validitéde sa déclara-
tion d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire. Dès lors ce précédent ipsofacto and without special agreement is limited by anyjurisdic-
tional or other limitations contained in any declaration deposited

by the United States under Article 36, paragraph 4, of the Statute
of the Court in force at the time of the submission of any case."
(U.S.Department of State, Report oftheU.S.Delegationto theNinth
International Conferenceof American States, Washington, 1948,
p. 48.)

In the lightofthis report, it isclearthat the United Statesreservationon
thispoint wasintended to achievesomethingwhich,in the opinion ofthe
United Statesdelegation, could not be brought about merelyby applying
ArticleXXXI. It obviouslywas a reservationtothe Pact,the existenceof
which confirms the interpretation of Article XXXI which the Court has
givenabove.
40. That interpretation, moreover, corresponds to the practice of the
parties to the Pactince 1948.
Theyhave not, at any time, linked together ArticleXXXI and the dec-
larations ofacceptanceofcompulsoryjurisdiction madeunder Article36,
paragraphs 2 and 4, of the Statute. Thus no State, when adhering to
or ratifying the Pact, has deposited with the United Nations Secretary-
Generala declaration ofacceptance ofcompulsoryjurisdiction under the

conditions laid down by the Statute. Moreover, no State party to the
Pact(other than Hondurasin 1986)sawanyneed,whenrenewingoramend-
ing itsdeclaration of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction, to notifythe
text to the Secretary-General of the OAS,the depositary of the Pact, for
transmission to the other parties.

Also, in November 1973El Salvador denounced the Pact of Bogota
and modified its declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
withaviewto restrictingitsscope.Ifthe newdeclaration wouldhavebeen
applicable asbetweentheparties to the Pact,no suchdenunciation would
have been required to limit similarlythe jurisdiction of the Courtnder
ArticleXXXI.
Finally, Honduras has drawn attention to the Washington Agreement
of 21July 1957between Honduras and Nicaragua to bring the case con-
cerningtheArbitralAwardMadebytheKingofSpainon23December1906
before the Court, and has argued that the conclusion of that agreement
iinpliesthat Nicaragua's reservation to the Pact (quoted in paragraph 19
above) was regarded as applicable to its declaration of acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction, and that Nicaragua thereby recognized the

existenceofalinkbetweenthe Pactandthe declaration.TheCourt cannot
draw this conclusion from the facts. The conclusion of the Washington
Agreement could be explained much more simply by the parties' desire
to avoid any controversy overjurisdiction, by preventing any objection
being raised before the Court either on the basis of Nicaragua'sreserva-
tion tothe Pact or concerningthe validityofitsdeclaration of acceptance
of compulsory jurisdiction. It follows that that precedent is in no wayn'est en rien contraire à la pratique constamment suivie par les parties
dans l'application du pacte de Bogoti.
41. Dans ces conditions, la Cour est amenée àconstater que l'engage-

mentfigurant àl'articleXXXI du pacte estindépendantdesdéclarations
d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire effectuéespar application du
paragraphe 2 de l'article36 du Statut et remises au Secrétairegénéradle
l'Organisation des Nations Unies conformémentau paragraphe 4 de cet
article. Par voie de conséquence,il n'est pas nécessairede décidersi la
déclarationde 1986du Honduras peut êtreopposée ou non au Nicaragua
en l'espèce; cette déclarationne saurait en tout étatde cause restreindre
l'engagementprispar cepays en vertu de l'articleXXXI. Dèslors l'argu-
mentation du Honduras concernant l'effet des réservesà sa déclaration
de 1986surl'engagementqu'ilapris àl'articleXXXI du pacte nepeut pas
être accueillie.

42. La seconde exception du Honduras relative à la compétenceest
tiréede l'articleXXII du pacte de Bogota,qui selit comme suit:

((Lorsque la procédure de conciliation établie précédemment,
conformément à cetraité oupar lavolonté desparties, n'aboutitpas
àune solution etquecesditesparties n'ontpasconvenud'une procé-
durearbitrale,l'une quelconqued'entreellesaura ledroitdeporter la
question devant la Cour internationale de Justice de la façon établie
par l'article de son Statut. La compétencede la Cour restera obli-
gatoire, conformémentau paragraphe [l] de l'article 36 du même
Statut.)

43. Le Honduras soutient que l'article XXXI et l'article XXXII sont
indissociables.Lepremierfixeraitl'étendue delacompétencedelaCour;
le second déterminerait les conditions de sa saisine. Dès lors, selon le
Honduras, laCournepourrait êtresaisieenvertudel'articleXXXIquesi,
conformément àl'articleXXXII,ledifférenda été préalablement soumis
à conciliation et s'il n'apas été convenude recourir àl'arbitrage, condi-
tions qui ne sont pas rempliesen l'espèce.
44. Le Nicaragua, pour sa part, estime que l'article XXXI et l'ar-
ticleXXXII constituent deux dispositions autonomes donnant chacune

compétence à la Cour dans les cas qu'ilsprévoient. L'articleXXXI cou-
vrirait les différendsjuridiques soumis, avant l'intervention du pacàe,
arbitrage par application du traité d'arbitrage interaméricaindu 5jan-
vier1929.L'articleXXXIIconcernerait lesdifférends,quellequ'ensoitla
nature, quirelevaient auparavantde laconciliationenvertu dela conven-
tion généralede conciliation interaméricainedu même jour. Par voie de
conséquence,laCour pourrait êtresaisieenapplicationdel'article XXXI
dans les cas prévuspar ce texte sans qu'il y ait lieu de rechercher si les
conditionsprocéduralesfixéespour d'autres caspar l'articleXXXIIsont
ou non remplies.contrary to the consistentpractice of the parties in the application ofthe
Pact of Bogota.
41. Under thesecircumstances,theCourt hasto concludethat the com-
mitment in ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact is independent of such declarations
of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction as may havebeen made under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute and deposited with the United
Nations Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 ofthat same Article.
Consequently,it is not necessaryto decide whetherthe 1986Declaration
ofHonduras isopposable to Nicaragua inthiscase; it cannotinany event
restrict the commitment which Honduras entered into by virtue of
ArticleXXXI.The Honduran argument asto the effectofthe reservation
to its 1986Declaration on its commitment under Article XXXI of the
Pactthereforecannot be accepted.

42. The second objection of Honduras to jurisdiction is based on
Article XXXII of the Pact of Bogota,which reads as follows :
"When the conciliation procedure previously established in the
presentTreaty or byagreement oftheparties does not lead to a solu-

tion, and thesaidpartieshavenotagreed upon an arbitralprocedure,
either of them shallbe entitled to have recourse to the International
Court ofJustice in the mannerprescribed in Article40ofthe Statute
thereof.The Court shallhave compulsoryjurisdiction in accordance
with Article 36,paragraph 1,of the said Statute."

43. It is the contention of Honduras that Articles XXXI and XXXII

must be read together.The first is said to define the extent ofthe Court's
jurisdiction andthe second to determinethe conditions under which the
Court may be seised. According to Honduras it follows that the Court
could only be seised under Article XXXI if, in accordance with Arti-
cle XXXII, there had been a prior recourse to conciliation and lack of
agreement to arbitrate, which isnot the situation in the present case.
44. Nicaragua ontheotherhand contends that ArticleXXXI and Arti-
cle XXXII are two autonomous provisions, each of which confersjuris-
diction upon the Court in the cases for which it provides. It claimsthat
ArticleXXXI coversal1juridical disputes which,beforethe conclusionof
the Pact,would havebeensubject to arbitration under the General Treaty
of Inter-AmericanArbitration of 5January 1929;andthat ArticleXXXII
relatestodisputes, whatevertheirnature, previouslyinthe domain ofcon-
ciliationunder the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation
of the same date. It maintains accordinglythat the Court can be seised,

under ArticleXXXI, inthe casescoveredbythat text,withoutthere being
any requirement to ascertain whether the procedural conditions laid
down, in other cases,by Article XXXII have or have not been satisfied. 45. L'interprétationde l'article XXXII avancéepar le Honduras se
heurte àla lettre de cet article. En effet, celui-ci ne fait pas référànce
l'article XXXI. Les parties tiennent de ce texte, en termes généraux,un
droit derecourir àlaCour encasdetentativeinfructueuse deconciliation.

Cette observation doit, il est vrai, être nuancée ece qui concerne la

versionfrançaise del'articleXXXII. Seloncetteversion,eneffet,chacune
desparties a,dans lescirconstancesprévuesau texte, ledroit deporter la
question devant laCour D.Cetteexpression pourrait êtrecomprise comme
se référantà la question qui constituerait l'objet du différend soumàsla
Cour conformément à l'article XXXI. Mais il convient d'observerque le
texteuse du terme question »,quilaissela place au doute, etnon du mot
((différend»employé à l'articleXXXI,qui eût étéparfaitement clair.Par
ailleurs, les versions espagnole, anglaise et portugaise mentionnent en
termes généraux ledroit de recourir à la Cour et ne permettent pas de
conclure àl'existence d'un lien entre l'article XXXI et l'article XXXII.

En outre, l'article XXXII, contrairement à l'article XXXI, se réfère
expressément à la compétenceque la Cour tient du paragraphe 1 de
l'article 36 du Statut. Cette référence secomprendrait mal si, comme le
Honduras le soutient, l'article XXXII avait pour seul objet de pré-
ciser les conditions procédurales dans lesquelles la Cour doit être saisie
des différendspour lesquels compétence luia déja été attribuéeen vertu
de la déclaration faiteà l'article XXXI conformémentau paragraphe 2
de l'article36.
46. De plus il ressort nettement du pacte que les Etats américains,en
élaborant cetinstrument, ont entendu renforcer leurs engagements mu-
tuels en matièrede règlementjudiciaire. On entrouve aussi confirmation

dans les travaux préparatoires. Au paragraphe 37 ci-dessus, la Cour a
déja mentionné ledébatqui a eu lieu à la séancedu 27 avril 1948de la
commission III de la conférence.La Cour note en outre qu'au coursde
cette séancele représentantde la Colombie a présenté à la commission,
dans sesgrandes lignes,le systèmeque proposaitla sous-commissionqui
avaitélaboréleprojet. Cettesous-commissionestimaitque la principale
procédurede règlement pacifique des différends entreles Etats améri-
cains devait êtrelaprocédurejudiciaire devant la Cour internationale de
Justice))' (traductiondu Greffe).Or l'interprétationdu Honduras impli-
querait que l'obligationde primeabord fermeetsans condition figurant à
l'article XXXIestenfaitvidéedetout contenu si,pourune raison ou pour

une autre, ledifférendn'estpas soumispréalablement à conciliation. Une
telle solution seraitl'évidence contraireà l'objet etau but du pacte.
47. En définitive, l'articleXXXI et l'article XXXII organisent deux

' «LaSubcomisionestimoque elprocedimiento principalpara elarreglopacifico de
Corte Intemacional de Just..)(NovenaConferenciaInternacionalArnerica, ctasicial ante la
y Documentos,vol. IV,p. 156). 45. Honduras's interpretation of Article XXXII runs counter to the
termsofthat Article.ArticleXXXII makesno referenceto ArticleXXXI;
under that text the parties have, in general terms, an entitlement to have
recourse to the Court in caseswherethere has been an unsuccessful con-
ciliation.
It is true that one qualification of this observation is required, with
regard to the French text of Article XXXII, which provides that, in the
circumstances there contemplated, the party has "le droit de porter la

questiondevant la Cour". That expression mightbe thought to refer back
to the question whichmight have been the subject ofthe dispute referred
tothe Court under ArticleXXXI. Itshould, however,beobservedthat the
text uses the word "question",which leaves room for uncertainty, rather
than the word "différend(dispute)", used in Article XXXI, which would
havebeenperfectlyclear.Moreover,the Spanish,Englishand Portuguese
versions speak, in general terms, of an entitlement to have recourse
to the Courtand do notjustify the conclusionthat there isa linkbetween
ArticleXXXI and Article XXXII.
Moreover, Article XXXII, unlike Article XXXI, refers expressly to
thejurisdiction whichthe Court has under Article36,paragraph 1,ofthe
Statute. That reference would be difficult to understand if, as Honduras
contends, the sole purpose of Article XXXII were to specify the pro-
cedural conditions forbringing beforethe Court disputes forwhichjuris-
diction had already been conferred upon it by virtue of the declaration
made in Article XXXI, pursuant to Article36,paragraph 2.

46. It is, moreover, quite clear from the Pact that the purpose of the
American Statesin drafting it wasto reinforcetheir mutual commitments

with regard to judicial settlement. This isalso confirmed by the travaux
préparatoires: the discussionat the meeting of Committee III of the
Conference held on 27 April 1948has already been referred to in para-
graph 37 above. At that meeting,furthermore,the delegate of Colombia
explained to the Committee the general lines of the systemproposed by
the Sub-Committee which had prepared the draft; the Sub-Committee
tooktheposition "that theprincipalprocedureforthe peacefulsettlement
of conflicts between the American States had to be judicial procedure
before the International Court of Justice" (translation by the Registry).
Honduras's interpretation would howeverimplythat the commitment,at
firstsightfirmand unconditional, setforth inArticleXXXI would,infact,
be emptied of al1content if,foranyreason,thedispute werenot subjected
to prior conciliation.ucha solutionwouldbeclearlycontrarytoboththe
object and the purpose of the Pact.
47. In short, ArticlesXXXI and XXXII provide for two distinct ways

' "La Subcomision estim6que elprocedimiento principalpara elarreglopacifico de
los conflictos entre los Estados Americanos ha de ser el procedimiento judicial ante la
Corte Internacional de Justic..." (Novena Conferencia Internacional Americana,
Actasy Documentos,Vol.IV,p. 156).voiesdistinctespermettant d'accéder à la Cour. Lapremièreconcerneles
cas dans lesquels la Cour peut être saisie directement; la secondeceux
dans lesquels lesparties recourent préalablement à la conciliation.
En l'espèce, le Nicaragua a invoqué l'article XXXI et non l'ar-
ticleXXXII. Peuimporte dèslorsque ledifférendsoumisa laCour aitou
non fait l'objetau préalable d'une tentativede conciliation. Peu importe
l'interprétationàdonnersur d'autres points à l'articleXXXII, enparticu-
lier en ce qui concerne la nature et l'objet des différendsrelevant de ce
texte.Ilsuffitpour laCour deconstater quelasecondeexception duHon-
duras repose surune interprétation erronéede cet article et doit par suite

être écartée.
48. L'articleXXXI du pacte de Bogota donne donc compétence à la
Courpour connaître du différendquiluiestsoumis.De cefait,iln'estpas
nécessairepour laCour de s'interrogersurla compétencequ'elle pourrait
éventuellementtenir desdéclarationsd'acceptationde lajuridiction obli-
gatoire faites par le Nicaragua et le Honduras et reproduites aux para-
graphes 23a 25ci-dessus.

49. LaCourvamaintenant examinerlaquestion delarecevabilitédela
requêtedu Nicaragua. Quatre exceptions d'irrecevabilité ontétésoule-
véespar le Honduras :deux d'entre ellesont un caractèregénéraelt deux
sont tiréesdu pacte de Bogota.
50. Avant d'examiner ces exceptions, il convient de résumer briève-

ment les griefs que le Nicaragua, dans sa requête,a formulés contrele
Honduras. Le Nicaragua allègueque desforcesarmées,connuesgénéra-
lementsous lenom de forces contras,sontstationnées ouvertementsur le
territoire du Honduras et se livrent des attaques arméessurleterritoire
du Nicaragua(requête,par. 11et 13).Ilsoutient que cesforcesopèrentau
sudu Gouvernement du Honduras etavecsonaide (ibid.,par. 14),que les
forces militaires honduriennes, outre qu'elles aident et encouragent les
contras,ont participé directementà desattaquesmilitairescontre leNica-
ragua et ont fourni aux contrasdesrenseignements etun appui logistique
d'uneimportance capitale (ibid.,par. 19)etqueleGouvernement du Hon-
duras amenacéd'employerlaforcecontreleNicaraguanon seulementen
parolesmaisaussi dans lesfaits(ibid.,par. 20).Partantde là,leNicaragua
soutient qu'en droit le Honduras a engagésa responsabilité pouravoir
violé,entre autres obligations,l'interdiction de recourira menace ou à

l'emploi de la force telle qu'énoncéedans la Charte des Nations Unies
(ibid.,par. 22),l'interdiction d'intervenirdans les affaires intérieuresou
extérieures d'autres Etats inscritedans la charte de 1'OEA(ibid.,par. 23)
ainsi que lesobligations du droit international coutumier de ne pas inter-
venir dans lesaffairesd'un autre Etat,de ne pas employerla forcecontre
un autre Etat, de ne pas attenter la souverainetéd'un autre Etatetde ne
pas tuer, blesser ou enleverdes citoyensd'autres Etats(ibid.,par. 26-29).
Sefondant sur ce qui précède,le Nicaragua prie la Cour de dire etjugerbywhichaccessmaybehad totheCourt. Thefirstrelatesto casesinwhich
the Court can be seised directly and the second to those in which the
parties initiallyresort to conciliation.
In thepresent case,Nicaragua hasrelied upon ArticleXXXI,not Arti-
cleXXXII. It is accordinglynot pertinent whether the dispute submitted
to the Court haspreviouslybeen the subjectofan attempted conciliation,
nor whatinterpretation isgivento ArticleXXXII inother respects,inpar-
ticular as regards the nature and the subject-matter of the disputes to
whichthat textapplies. Itissufficientforthe Court tofindthatthe second
objectionput fonvard by Honduras isbased upon an incorrectinterpreta-

tion ofthat Article and,forthat reason, cannot be accepted.
48. ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact of Bogota thus confersjurisdiction upon
the Court to entertain the dispute submitted to it. For that reason, the
Court does not need to consider whether it might havejurisdiction by
virtue of the declarations of acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction by
Nicaragua and Honduras set outin paragraphs 23to 25 above.

49. The Court nowturns to the question ofadmissibilityofthe Nicara-
guan Application. Four objectionshavebeen raised by Honduras, two of
which are general in nature and the remaining two presented on the basis
ofthe Pact of Bogoth.
50. Before examining these objections, it will be convenient to recall
briefly the claimsof Nicaragua against Honduras, as stated in the Appli-
cation. Nicaragua allegesthe existenceof armed bands, generally known
asthe contraforces,openlybased in Honduran territory and carryingout
armed attacks on Nicaraguan territory (Application, paras. 11and 13).

It claimsthat these forces operate with the knowledge and assistance of
the Honduran Government (ibid.,para. 14);that the Honduran military
forces not only aid and abet the contrasbut have directly participated
in military attacks on Nicaragua and have given vital intelligence and
logistical support to the contras(ibid.,para. 19);and that the Honduran
Government has used the threat of force against Nicaragua in both
words and facts (ibid.,para. 20). Nicaragua therefore claims that Hon-
duras has incurred legal responsibility for the breach of, inter alia, the
prohibition of the threat or use of force as provided by the Charter of
the United Nations (ibid.,para. 22);the prohibition of interventionin the
interna1or external affairs of other States laid down in the Charter of
the OAS (ibid.,para. 23); and the obligations of customaryinternational
lawnotto intervenein the affairsofanother State,not to useforceagainst
another State, not to violate the sovereignty of another State, and not
to kill,wound or kidnap citizensof other States (ibid.,paras. 26-29).On
this basis, Nicaragua requests the Courtto adjudge and declare that the
actsand omissionsof Honduras constitutebreaches ofinternational law;
thatHonduras is under aduty immediatelyto ceaseandto refrainfrom al1que lesactes etomissions du Honduras constituentdesviolations du droit
international, que le Honduras a l'obligation de mettre immédiatement
fin et de renoncer à tous actes de ce genre et que le Honduras est tenu
enversle Nicaragua d'une obligation de réparer.
51. Aux termes de lapremièreexceptiond'irrecevabilitédu Honduras,
la requêtedu Nicaragua est une requête «artificielle, d'inspiration poli-
tique, dont la Cour ne saurait connaître sans se départirde son caractère
judiciaire». Le Honduras prétend que le Nicaragua cherche à utiliser
la Cour ou la menace d'une procédure devant la Cour comme moyen
d'exercerdespressionspolitiques sur lesautres Etatsd'Amérique centrale.

52. En ce qui concerne le premier aspect de cette exception, la Cour
n'ignore pas quetout différendjuridique portédevant ellepeut présenter
des aspectspolitiques. Mais, en tant qu'organe judiciaire, elle doit seule-
ment s'attacher à déterminer d'unepart si le différendqui lui est soumis
est d'ordre juridique, c'est-à-dire s'ilest susceptibled'êtrerésolupar ap-
plication desprincipes et des règlesdu droit international, et d'autre part
siellea compétencepour enconnaître et sil'exercicede cettecompétence
n'estpas entravépar descirconstancesquirendent la requêteirrecevable.
L'objet de la saisine de la Cour est le règlementpacifique de tels diffé-
rends. La Cour seprononce en droit et n'apas à s'interroger sur les moti-
vations d'ordre politique qui peuvent amener un Etat, à un moment
donnéou dans descirconstancesdéterminées, à choisir lerèglementjudi-
ciaire. L'exception du Honduras, dans la mesure où elle est fondée surla
prétendue inspiration politique de l'instance, nepeut donc être retenue.
53. Le Honduras allèguepar ailleurs, et c'estlà le second aspect de sa

première exception, que la requête présenteun caractère artificiel.Dans
son mémoire, leHonduras explique qu'à son avis le comportement du
Nicaragua aboutit, d'une façongénérale, à «diviser artificiellement et ar-
bitrairement leconflitgénéralquisedéroule enAmériquecentrale,cequi
peut aussi avoir des conséquences fâcheuses pour le Honduras en tant
qu'Etat défendeur devantla Cour »car,selon lui,d'une part certainsfaits
quifont partiedu conflitgénéral«sont inévitablementpasséssoussilence
dans la procédure devant la Cour »et d'autre part d'autres faits ont déjà
été examinép sar la Courdans l'affaire desActivités militairstparamili-
tairesauNicaraguaetcontrecelui-c(iNicaragua c.Etats-Unisdzmérique).
Le Honduras soutient qu'iln'estpas possible de faireréellementune dis-
tinction entre la situation généralede tension dans la région et les divers
différendsbilatérauxqui,selonleNicaragua,existent dans cette région. Il
prétend que la «situation procédurale» crééepar le fractionnement

opéré par leNicaragua du différendglobalenune sériededifférendsbila-
térauxest contraire aux exigences de la bonne foi et du bon fonctionne-
ment de lajustice internationale.
54. La Cour ne peut retenir cette thèse.On voit mal pourquoi desfaits
devraient être «inévitablementpasséssous silence » dans la procédure
dès lorsque le Honduras a tout loisird'appeler l'attention de la Coursur
tous les faits qu'il considère comme pertinents en l'espèce. On ne peut
davantageadmettre l'argument selonlequel, une foisque la Coura rendusuchacts ;andthatHonduras isunder an obligationto makereparation to

the Republic of Nicaragua.

51. Honduras's firstobjectionto the admissibilityofthe Application is
that "It is a politically-inspired,artificialrequest which the Court should
not entertain consistently with itsjudicial character"; it claimsthat Nica-
ragua is attempting to use the Court, or the threat of litigation before
the Court, as a means of exerting political pressure on the other Central
American States.
52. Asregards the firstaspect ofthisobjection,the Court isawarethat
politicalaspectsmaybepresent in anylegaldisputebroughtbeforeit. The
Court, as a judicial organ, is however only concerned to establish,first,
thatthe disputebefore itisalegaldispute,inthe senseofadisputecapable
ofbeing settledbythe application ofprinciples and mles ofinternational
law,and secondly,thattheCourt hasjurisdiction to deal with it,and that

thatjurisdiction isnotfetteredbyanycircumstancerendering the applica-
tion inadmissible.The purpose of recourse to the Court is the peaceful
settlement of such disputes; the Court's judgment is a legal pronounce-
ment, andit cannot concern itselfwiththe politicalmotivation whichmay
lead a Stateat a particular time, or in particular circumstances,to choose
judicial settlement. So far as the objection of Honduras is based on an
alleged political inspiration of the proceedings, it therefore cannot be
upheld.
53. Thesecondaspect ofthefirstobjectionofHonduras isitsclaimthat
the requestisartificial.In itsMemorial Honduras explainsthat initsview
the overallresult ofNicaragua's actionis"an artificialand arbitrary divid-
ing up of the general conflict existingin Central Arnerica", which "may
have negativeconsequencesfor Honduras asa defendant Statebefore the
Court", because, it is said, certain facts appertaining to the general con-
flict "are inevitablyabsent from the proceedings before the Court", and

otherfactshavealreadybeeninissuebeforethe Court inthe caseconcern-
ing MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainst Nicaragua (Nicara-
gua v. UnitedStatesofAmerica).Honduras contends that no real distinc-
tion can be made between the general situation of tension in the region
and the various bilateral disputes which Nicaragua claims to existthere,
and thatthe "procedural situation" created by Nicaragua'ssplitting-upof
the overallconflictinto separate disputes is contrary to the requirements
ofgood faith and theproper functioning of international justice.

54. The Court cannot uphold this contention. It is not clear why any
factsshould be "inevitably absent" from the proceedings, sinceit isopen
to Honduras to bring to the Court's attention any factswhich in itsview
are relevantto the issuesinthis case.Nor can itbe accepted that oncethe

Court has givenjudgment in a case involvingcertain allegations of fact,un arrêtdans une affaire où certains faits ont été avancés eqtu'elles'est
prononcée àleursujet,aucune nouvelleprocéduredans laquelle cesfaits,
commed'autresfaits,seraientsusceptiblesd'être pris en considération ne
saurait êtreengagée.Entout étatde cause,ilappartientaux Partiesd'éta-

blir dans laprésente affairelesfaitscomptetenu des règleshabituelles de
preuvesans quepuisseêtreinvoquéelachosjeugéedansune autre affaire
ne mettant pas en cause les mêmes parties (voirl'article59du Statut).
Ilestincontestable quelesquestionssoumises à laCour pourraient être
considérées commefaisantpartie d'un problème régional pluslarge. La
Cour n'ignore pas les difficultés qui peuvent surgir lorsque des aspects
particuliers d'une situation générale complexesont soumisàun tribunal
pour qu'ilseprononce séparémens tur cesaspects.Néanmoins,commela
Cour l'afaitobserverdans l'affaireduPersonneldiplomatique ectonsulaire
desEtats-Unis à Téhéran ((,aucunedisposition du Statut oudu Règlement
ne luiinterdit de sesaisird'un aspectd'un différendpour la simpleraison
que ce différendcomp~rterait d'autres aspects,si importants soient-ils»

(C.I.J.Recueil1980,p. 19,par. 36).
55. Auxtermesdesadeuxièmeexceptiond'irrecevabilitél,eHonduras
conclut que la requêteest ((vagueet [que]lesallégationsqu'ellecontient
nesontpasbiendéfinies,desorteque laCour nesaurait enconnaîtresans
que le Honduras en souffre un préjudice sérieux)).A l'appui de cette
thèse,le Honduras expose qu'«un grand nombre de cas présentés par le
Nicaragua ne correspondent pas à des omissionsou à des actes concrets
pouvant être replacédsans letemps et dans l'espace»,mais àdes «situa-
tions indéterminéesou à des opinions concernant de prétendues inten-
tionsB. Il ajoute qu'une autre série importantede faits ne sont identifiés
que par l'annéependant laquelle ils se sont produits, sans être localisés
géographiquement. Enfinil affirme que la requête confond des faitsde

nature différenteet qui peuvent êtreattribués des causesdistinctes.
56. Selonleparagraphe 1de l'article40du Statut,une requête doit in-
diquer «l'objetdu différend».Auxtermesdu Règlementde la Cour, une
requêtedoit indiquer ((la nature précisede la demande)) qui y est for-
muléeet contenir «un exposé succinct des faitset moyens sur lesquels
cette demande repose ))(art. 38,par. 2). La Cour estime qu'enl'espèce la
requêtedu Nicaragua, telle qu'elle est résumée au paragraphe 50 ci-
dessus,remplit cesconditions.
57. Aucunedesexceptions decaractèregénéralopposées à larecevabi-
litéde la requêtene peut donc êtreretenue.

58. La Cour va maintenant aborder les exceptions d'irrecevabilité
tiréespar le Honduras des articlesI et IVdu pacte de Bogota.
59. L'article II du pacte, sur lequel le Honduras fonde sa troisième
exception d'irrecevabilité,est ainsi rédigé

«Les Hautes Parties contractantes acceptent l'obligation de ré-and made findings in that respect, no new procedure can be commenced
Inwhichthose, aswellas other,facts might haveto be considered. In any
ievent,it is for the Parties to establish the facts in the present case taking
account of the usual rules of evidence,without it being possible to rely
on considerations of resjudicata in another case not involvingthe same
parties (seeArticle 59of the Statute).

Thereisno doubtthatthe issuesofwhichthe Court hasbeen seisedmay

beregardedas part ofawiderregionalproblem.The Court isnotunaware
of the difficulties that may arise where particular aspects of a complex
generalsituation arebrought beforea Court for separate decision. Never-
theless,asthe Court observedin the caseconcerning UnitedStatesDiplo-
maticand ConsularStaffin Tehran,"no provision of the Statute or Rules
contemplates that the Court should decline to take cognizance of one
aspectofadispute merely becausethat disputehasotheraspects, however
important" (Z.C.J.Reports1980,p. 19,para. 36).

55. Thesecond Honduran objectionto admissibilityisthat "the Appli-
cationisvagueand the allegationscontainedin itarenot properlyparticu-
larized, so that the Court cannot entertain the Application without sub-
stantial prejudiceto Honduras". In support ofthis Honduras asserts that
"a largenumber ofthe mattersput fonvard byNicaragua donotconstitute
concreteacts or omissions,identifiable byreferenceto place and to time",
but concern "indeterminate situations" or "opinions about intentions";
thatanother largegroup of thesemattersarereferredto onlybytheyearin
whichtheytookplace withoutgeographical location; and thatthe Appli-
cation confuses facts of a different nature and attributable to different

causes.

56. Article40,paragraph 1,ofthe Statute requiresthat an Application
indicate "the subject ofthe dispute".Under the RulesofCourt, an Appli-
cation is required to specify"the precisenature ofthe claim", and insup-
port thereof to giveno more than "a succinctstatement of the facts and
grounds on which the claim is based" (Art. 38, para. 2). The Court con-
siders that the Nicaraguan Application in the present case, summarized
in paragraph 50above,meetsthese requirements.
57. Accordingly none ofthese objectionsof a generalnature to admis-
sibilitycan be accepted.

58. The Court now turns to the objections to admissibility which
Honduras bases upon Articles II and IVofthe Pact of Bogoth.
59. Article II of the Pact, upon which Honduras bases itsthird objec-
tion to admissibility,reads as follows:
"The High Contracting Parties recognize the obligation to settle soudre les différends internationauxàl'aide des procédures pacifi-
quesrégionalesavantde recourir au Conseilde sécuritédes Nations
Unies.
Enconséquence,au casoù surgirait,entredeux ou plusieursEtats
signataires,un différend qui,de l'avisde l'une des parties [dans la
version anglaise«in the opinion of the parties »], ne pourrait être
résoluau moyen de négociationsdirectessuivantlesvoiesdiploma-
tiques ordinaires, les parties s'engageàtemployer les procédures

établiesdans ce traité sousla forme et dans les conditions prévues
aux articlessuivants,ou lesprocédures spécialesquià leuravis,leur
permettront d'arriveràune solution.»

60. Lesconclusionsdu Honduras relatives à l'applicationdel'articleII
sont lessuivantes:

«Le Nicaragua n'a pas montré que,de l'avisdes Parties, le diffé-
rend nepeut pas êtreréglépar voiede négociationsdirectes,de sorte
queleNicaragua neremplitpasunpréalableessentielaurecoursaux
procédures établiespar lepacte deBogoti, parmi lesquellesfigure le
renvoi des différendsdevantla Cour internationale de Justice.

Le Honduras soutient que lerecoursaux procédures établies par lepacte
est subordonnénon seulement à la condition que les deux parties soient
de l'avisque le différendn'estpas susceptibled'êtrerésoluau moyen de
négociations,mais aussi a la condition qu'ellesaient «exprimé » un tel
avis.L'avisduHonduras enlamatièreaétéexposé au coursdesaudiences
par le coagent de ce pays. Se référantàla condition posée à l'article II
selonlaquelleledifférend,del'avisdesparties, nedevraitpaspouvoirêtre
réglépar desnégociations,il a déclaré que

«cette première condition du pacte n'a pas été remplie en l'espèce,
carleHonduras n'estpas d'avisquelesparties aientépuisétoutepos-
sibilitéde règlementpar des négociationsdirectes»,

et que,

«au moins del'opinion du Honduras, ledifférendpeut êtrr eéglépar
des négociationsdirectes,par les moyensdiplomatiques ordinaires;
ceciestconfirmépar l'intenseactivitédiplomatique qui sedérouleen
Amérique centrale ..D

L'activitédiplomatiqueen question est celledu processus de Contadora
etdesessuites,quiseradécriteci-après(paragraphes70 a74et8 1à 88).Le
Honduras a soutenu que les négociations conduitesdans le cadre de ce
processusconstituaientdes((négociationsdirectes»au sensdel'articleII
du pacte et que, tout au long de ce processus, il y avait eu des échanges
entre les délégationsdu Honduras et du Nicaragua, des propositions et
des contre-propositions.Il s'estfondé égalemens tur lajurisprudence de
la Cour relativeaux diversesformes de négociationsinternationales,afind'écarter toutedistinctionentrelesnégociationsbilatéralesdirectes qu'ila
menéesavec le Nicaragua avant avril 1983et les négociationsmenées
dans lecadre du processus de Contadora.
61. LeNicaraguasoutientd'abord qu'ilnedécoulepasnécessairement
du libelléde l'article II que le recoursdes procédures pacifiquesn'est
ouvert que silesparties sontd'avisque ledifférendnepeut êtrerésoluau
moyen de négociationsdirectes;il ajoute qu'ilesttout àfaitlogiqued'in-

terpréter l'articleII commeprévoyantun cas - mais non le seul- dans
lequel les parties s'engagent à employer les procédures établiesdans le
pacte.
62. La Cour ne considèrepas que l'article II, dans le cadre de l'en-
sembledu pacte,puisseêtreinterprété dancsesens; comme le Honduras
l'asoutenucetteclauseconstituedanstous lescasune conditionpréalable
du recours aux procédures pacifiquesdu pacte. La Cour doit donc exa-
miner commentcettecondition s'applique en l'espèce.
63. Le Nicaragua rejetteensuitel'interprétationde l'articleII avancée
par le Honduras selon laquelle les deux parties àun différend devraient
avoir exprimél'avisqu'il nepeut êtreréglé par voie de négociations. Il
soutient que cette interprétation donneraità une partie récalcitranteun
droit de veto contre un règlementjudiciaire ou autre, qui provoquerait
l'effondrement de tout le systèmesoigneusement édifiéde juridiction

obligatoire établipar le pacte.Il soutient en outre qu'il ne s'agitpas de
savoir si l'unedes parties ou les deux doivent penser que le différend ne
peut êtrerésolupar la voie diplomatique, mais si, en réalitél,e différend
peut êtreréglépar cemoyen.Ason avis,lajurisprudence de la Cour étaie
leprincipe selonlequel, en casde désaccordentre lesparties sur cepoint,
la question doit êtrerégléesur la base non pas tant du libelléde l'instru-
mentcompromissoirequed'une évaluationobjective parlaCour despos-
sibilitésde règlementdu différendau moyen de négociationsdirectes.
LaCour constatetoutefois que cettejurisprudence concernedescasoù
le texte applicable visait la possibilitéd'un tel règlement.Or l'article II
vise l'avisdesparties surcettepossibilité.EnconséquencelaCour n'apas
àprocéderaune évaluationobjectived'unetellepossibilité,mais à s'inter-
roger sur l'avisdes Partiescet égard.
64. Avant de poursuivre, la Cour relèveque les Parties ont appeléson
attention surune divergenceentre lesquatre textesdel'articleII du pacte

(anglais,espagnol,françaisetportugais). Dansletextefrançais, c'est«de
l'avisdel'une desparties»queledifférenddoitnepas pouvoirêtrerésolu
au moyen de négociations. A ce membre de phrase correspondent les
termes «in the opinion of the parties» (c'est-à-dire«de l'avisdes par-
ties»)dans letexte anglaiset destermeséquivalentsdans lesdeux autres
textes. Pour des raisons qui apparaîtront plus loin, le raisonnement de la
Cour nenécessiterapaslasolutionduproblèmequeposecettedivergence
des textes. La Cour ne va donc pas reprendre tous les argumentsqui ont
été avancépsar les Parties pour expliquercettedivergenceou pour justi-
fier une préférencepour une versionplutôt que pour une autre.
65. Pour se prononcer sur l'application en l'espècede l'article II du negotiations between Nicaragua and itself prior to April 1983and the
negotiations inthe contextof the Contadora process.

61. Nicaraguahasargued, first,that itdoesnot necessarilyfollowfrom
the text of Article II that recourse to pacificprocedures is available only
when it isthe opinion of the parties that the dispute cannot be settled by
direct negotiations; that it is perfectly logicalto read Article II as setting
forth onecircumstance - but notthe exclusiveone - inwhichtheparties
bind themselvesto use the procedures set forth in the Pact.

62. The Court does not consider that Article II, in the context of the
Pactasawhole, canberead inthissense;that provisionconstitutes,as was
argued by Honduras, a condition precedent to recourse to the pacific
procedures of the Pact in al1cases.The Court has therefore to consider
how that condition applies inthe present case.

63. Nicaragua then rejectsthe interpretation ofArticle II advanced by
Honduras, that both parties to a disputeshould havemanifestedthe opin-
ion that it cannot be settled bynegotiations,contending that itwould give
a recalcitrant party to a dispute a right of veto ofjudicial or otherettle-
mentwhichwouldshatterthe wholecarefullyconstructedscheme ofcom-
pulsoryjurisdiction established by the Pact. It further contends that the
'questionisnot whether one ofthe parties orboth ofthem mustthink that
the dispute cannot be settled by diplomatic means, but whether the dis-
pute can in fact be settledby such means; in itsviewthejurisprudence of
the Court supportsthe principle that whenthere isdisagreementbetween
theparties onthe point,the issueisto beresolvednot so much onthe basis
oftheparticular form ofwordsusedinthe compromissoryinstrument,but
by an objectiveevaluation by the Court of the possibilitiesfor settlement
of the dispute by directnegotiations.

The Court observeshoweverthat that jurisprudence concerns casesin
which the applicable text referred to the possibility of such settlement;
Article II however refersto the opinion ofthe parties as to such possibil-
ity.TheCourt therefore does not haveto makean objectiveassessmentof
suchpossibility,but to considerwhat isthe opinion ofthe Partiesthereon.
64. Before proceeding further, the Court notes that the Parties have
drawnattention to adiscrepancybetweenthefourtexts ofArticleII ofthe
Pact(English,French,Portuguese and Spanish).In the Frenchtext, what
is required is that, "de l'avisde l'une des parties", i.e., "in the opinion of
one ofthe parties", the dispute should not be susceptible ofsettlementby
negotiation. In the English, Portuguese and Spanish texts, the corre-
spondingphrase is"in the opinion ofthe parties", orthe equivalentin the
othertwolanguages.Forreasonswhichwillappear,the Court's reasoning

does not require the resolution of the problem posed by this textual dis-
crepancy, and it will therefore not rehearse al1the arguments that have
been put fonvard bythe Parties to explain it orto justify the preferring of
one versionto another.
65. For the purpose of determiningthe application inthis case ofArti-95 ACTIONSARMÉES (ARRÊT)

pacte la Cour va prendre commehypothèse de travail l'interprétation la
plus rigoureuse, celleselonlaquelle il faudrait rechercher siaavis»des
deux Parties étaitqu'il n'était pas possiblede résoudrele différendau
moyen de négociations.Pouropérercetterecherche,la Cour ne s'estime
pastenue par lasimpleaffirmation del'uneou l'autre Partiequ'elle estde
tel ou tel av:la Cour, dans l'exercicede sa fonctionjudiciaire, doit être

libre de porter sa propre appréciationsur cette question, sur la base des
preuves dont elledispose. Tel est d'ailleursle point de vue du Honduras
exprimépar son coagentlors des audiences :
«Ilrevient àlaCourde déciderelle-mêmesip ,ar leurconduite, les
Parties ontdonnélapreuveconcrèteque,debonne foi,ellesconsidè-
rent qu'un différend peut ou nepeut pas êtreréglépar des négocia-
tions directessuivant les moyensdiplomatiqueshabituels ...

Ilappartient àla Courde nepas prendre encompte cequi a été dit
par l'une des Parties,s'ilapparaît de toute évidenceque la réalest
contraire auxpropos qu'elle a tenus.
LaCour doitchercherlapreuvedes vraiesintentionsdesParties. Il
n'estpas possibleà la Cour de substituerson opinion àcelledesPar-
ties sur la question de savoir si le différendest susceptible d'être
réglépar desnégociationsdirectes. »

LaCour note quecettedéclarationsupposeque lesavisexpriméspeuvent
faire l'objetd'une démonstrationetqu'elle peut compterque «les Parties
[donnent]lapreuveconcrèteque,debonne foi, ellesconsidèrent »qu'une
certaine possibilitéde négociationexiste ou n'existe pas. La Cour est
mêmeinvitéedans cette déclaration à((chercherla preuve des vraies in-
tentions des Parties.
66. La date critiqueà retenir pour déterminer la recevabilitéd'une re-
quêteest celle de son dépôt(cf. Sud-Ouest africain, exceptionpsrélimi-
naires,C.I.J.Recueil1962,p. 344). Il peut toutefois êtrenécessaire,pour
déterminer aveccertitude quelle étaitla situationla date du dépôtde la
requête,d'examiner lesévénementse,tenparticulier lesrelationsentre les
parties, pendant une période antérieureà cettedate, voirependant la pé-
riode qui asuivi.Enoutre,ilsepeut quedesévénementsprivent ensuitela
requêtede son objet ou qu'ilsprennent mêmeune tournure telle qu'une

nouvellerequêtenepourrait par lasuiteêtredéposé deans destermesana-
logues. En l'espèce, ladateà laquelle il faut s'assurerde «l'avisdes par-
ties»aux fins de l'application de l'articleII du pacte estle28juillet 1986,
date du dépôtde la requêtedu Nicaragua.
67. Pours'assurerdel'avisdesParties,la Cour doit analyser lesévéne-
ments qui sesont succédé dans leursrelations diplomatiques. LesParties
s'accordent àreconnaître que cesrelations sesont gravementdétériorées
à partir de 1980,annéependantlaquelledenombreuxopposants actifs au
Gouvernement nicaraguayen se constituèrent en forcesmilitairesirrégu-
lièreset inaugurèrent une politique d'opposition armée; ungroupe im-
portant se mit à opérer à partir de 1981le long de la frontière entre le
Nicaragua et le Honduras. Le Nicaragua allèguequ'ils'ensuivitdesinci-cleII ofthe Pact,the Court willproceed onthe hypothesisthatthe stricter
interpretation should be used, Le.,that it would be necessaryto consider
whetherthe "opinion" ofboth Parties wasthat itwasnotpossibleto settle
the dispute by negotiation. For this purpose the Court does not consider
that it isbound bythe mere assertion oftheone Party or the other that its
opinion isto aparticular effect :itmust,inthe exerciseofitsjudicial func-

tion,befreetomake its owndetermination ofthat question onthe basisof
such evidenceas is availableto it.This isinfact the viewof Honduras, as
expressedby its Co-Agentat the hearings :
"It is for the Courtto decide for itself whether, by their conduct,
the Partieshaveprovided substantive evidencethat they consider in
good faith that a dispute can or cannot be settled by direct negotia-
tions through the usual diplomaticchannels ...
The Court may disregard what has been saidby one ofthe Parties
if it is clearlyapparentthat the contentions it has putfonvard arein

contradiction with reality.
The Court has to seek for evidence of the Parties' genuine inten-
tions. It cannot substitute its ownopinion for that ofthe Partiesas to
whether the dispute is susceptible to settlement by direct negotia-
tions."
Thisstatementpresupposes that the holding ofopinions canbe subjectto
demonstration, and that the Court may expect "the Parties [to provide]
substantive evidencethat they considerin goodfaith" a certain possibility

of negotiation to exist or not to exist. It even invitesthe Court "to seek
for evidence ofthe Parties' genuineintentions".

66. Thecriticaldate fordeterminingthe admissibilityofan application
isthedate onwhichitisfiled(cf. SouthWestAfrica,PreliminalyObjections,
Z.C.J.Reports1962,p.344).It mayhoweverbenecessary,inorderto deter-
mine withcertaintywhat the situation was at thedate of filingofthe Ap-
plication, to examinethe events, and in particular the relations between
the Parties, overa period prior to that date, and indeed during the subse-
quent period. Furthermore,subsequent eventsmayrender an application
without object,oreventakesuchacourseastopreclude thefilingofalater
application in similarterms. Inthiscase,the date atwhich"the opinion of
the parties" has to be ascertained for the application of Article II of the
Pact is28July 1986,the date of filingofthe Nicaraguan Application.

67. To ascertain the opinion of the Parties, the Court isbound to ana-
lyse the sequence of events in their diplomatic relations. It is common

ground between the Parties that their relations deteriorated seriously
when, from 1980onwards, many active opponents of the Nicaraguan
Government formed themselves into irregular military forces and com-
menced a policy of armed opposition;a substantial group operated from
1981onwards along the Nicaraguan borders with Honduras. According
to Nicaragua, there ensued repeated border incidents, and instances ofdents de frontière fréquentset qu'un appui matériela été apporté à ces
opposants dans certains cas, ce qui l'a contraintà adresser ((constam-
ment»desprotestations diplomatiques au Honduras((depuis 1980».Les
présidents des deux Etats s'entretinrentde ces questions en mai 1981 à
El Guasaule, au Nicaragua. Les contacts bilatérauxentre les Parties se
poursuivirent pendantun certaintemps aprèscettedate.Surlanature etla
portée deces contactslesassertions des Parties sonttoutefois contradic-
toires.
68. Le 23mars 1982,le ministredesrelations extérieuresdu Honduras

présentaau Conseil permanent de I'OEAun projet de «plan tendant à
internationaliser la paix en Amérique centrale».Lors d'une réunion des
ministresdes relations extérieures des deux pays, qui eut lieu le 21 avril
1982 à Tegucigalpa,leNicaraguaproposa àsontour unplan en septpoints
prévoyant notamment la signature d'un pacte bilatéralde non-agres-
sion, la création d'un systèmede patrouilles frontalières conjointes et le
démantèlement des camps militairesqui, selon lui, avaient été établaiu
Honduras par les opposants au Gouvernement nicaraguayen. Sur cette
proposition le Honduras formula des observations deuxjours plus tard,
sans pour autant s'engager. Le ministre des relations exté~ieuresdu
Honduras expliqua au Congrès national que, «sans refuser de discuter
des problèmes bilatéraux », il avait exposéune nouvelle fois la position
du Honduras dans sa réponse,une note diplomatique du 23 avril 1982,

en soulignant que son pays marquait sa préférencepour une solution
s'inscrivant dans un cadre régional.Dans cette note, avant de formuler
des observations sur les diversespropositions du Nicaragua, il écrivait:
«J'aicompris,commeVotreExcellencel'aclairementexposé,que
votreproposition a un caractèrebilatéral etvise améliorerlesrela-
tions entrenos deuxpaysalors quel'initiativedu Honduras estd'une

portéeplus vaste; elleaun caractèrerégionaletestassortie d'objec-
tifs peut-être plus ambitieux. Quoiqu'ilen soit,mon gouvernement
estd'avisque l'approcherégionale devrait prévaloiér,tantdonnéque,
pour une bonne part, lesproblèmesque connaissentles paysd'Amé-
riquecentrale ne sauraientêtreréglépsar une solutionbilatérale.»
69. Il apparaît ainsiqu'en 1981et 1982les Parties ont eu des échanges
bilatérauxà différentsniveauxetnotamment, autout début,auniveaudes

chefsd'Etat.D'une manièregénérale l, Nicaraguarecherchait un accord
bilatéraltandis que le Honduras mettait de plus en plus l'accent sur la
dimensionrégionaledu problèmeetinsistaitsur une approche multilaté-
rale. Cela le conduisit finalementprésenterun plan d'internationalisa-
tion qui, sontour,amena leNicaragua àformulersans succèsdescontre-
propositions.
70. Lesministresdesrelations extérieuresdespays qui devaientpar la
suite constituer le groupe de Contadora- Colombie,Mexique,Panama
etVenezuela - seréunirentles8et9janvier 1983dans l'îledeContadora,
au Panama, pour examiner de quelle façon leurs pays pourraient contri-
buer à résoudreles graves et dangereux problèmes qui persistaient enmaterial support given to those opponents, which have compelled it to
protest diplomaticallyto Honduras "continuously since 1980".The Presi-
dents ofthe two Statesheldtalkson these matters at ElGuasaule, Nicara-

gua, in May 1981.Bilateral contacts between the Parties continued for
some time after this date; the Parties have however made conflicting
assertions as to their nature and extent.

68. On23March 1982the Honduran ForeignMinisterpresentedto the
Permanent Council ofthe OASa draft "plan to internationalizepeace in
Central America". At a meeting of the two Foreign Ministers in Teguci-
galpaon21 April1982,Nicaraguaresponded withaseven-pointplan call-
ing interaliaforthe signingof abilateral non-aggressionpact, a systemof
joint border patrols and the dismantlingofthe militaryencampments said
to be maintained in Honduras by opponents of the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment. Honduras commentedon this proposal, without committing itself,
twodays later.TheHonduran ForeignMinisterexplainedto the National

Congress that in his reply, a diplomatic Note of 23April 1982,"without
refusing discussion of the bilateral problems" he had reiterated Hon-
duras's position of the prior importance of a solution within a regional
context. In that Note, before commenting on the specific Nicaraguan
proposals, he said the following:

"1understand, as was veryclearlyexplained by Your Excellency,
that your proposa1is of a bilateral nature and is aimed at improving
relationsbetween Ourtwo countries. whiletheHonduran initiativeis
widerinscope,ofa regionalnature and withperhaps moreambitious
objectives.Despite this, my Government considers that the regional
approach should prevail since a major part of the problems con-
fronted bytheCentral Americancountries gobeyond the possibility
of a bilateral solution."

69. Thus, it appearsthat in 1981and 1982,the Parties had engaged in
bilateral exchanges atvarious levelsincluding,at the verybeginning,that
of the Heads of State. Broadly speaking, Nicaragua sought a bilateral
understanding while Honduras increasingly emphasized the regional
dimension ofthe problem and held out for a multilateralapproach, event-
ually producing a plan of internationalization which led to unsuccessful
Nicaraguan counter-proposals.

70. The Foreign Ministers of the countries which were to become
known as the Contadora Group - Colombia, Mexico, Panama and
Venezuela - meton 8and 9January 1983on Contadora Island, Panama,
to consider in what waytheir countries could contribute to the resolution

of the grave and dangerous problems that persisted in Central America.Amérique centrale.Ils appelèrent d'urgence l'attentionde tous les pays
d'Amérique centralesur la nécessité((d'atténuer par le dialogue et la
négociation,les tensions existantes et de prendre des dispositions pour
instaurer de façon définitive un climatde coexistence pacifique et de
respect mutuel ..»En l'espacedetrois mois, cesministresserendirent au

Nicaragua, au Honduras, au Costa Rica, au Salvador et au Guatemala
et obtinrent des gouvernements de ces pays qu'ils acceptent d'engager
un dialogue commun. Le 17juillet 1983,les chefs d'Etat des pays du
groupe de Contadora publièrent la déclarationde Cancun sur la paix en
Amérique centrale, qui prend actede l'élaborationavecl'accord de tous
ces gouvernementsd'un «programme qui comprend les aspects les plus
importants des problèmes de la région ». Deuxjours plus tard, le prési-
dent du Nicaragua prononça un discours dans lequel il déclara que
son gouvernementacceptait .«que le processus de négociationpréconisé
par legroupe de Contadora revêtep , our commencer,un caractèremulti-
latéral» et proposa que les discussions commencent immédiatement en
vue d'aboutir àdes accords sur certains points; il ajouta:

«Le Nicaragua se déclare disposé à prendre, en assumant pleine-
ment sesresponsabilités,touslesengagementsdécoulant desdits ac-
cords.Il manifesteclairement cetteintention en souscrivant à l'avis

deschefs d'Etatdu groupe deContadora selonlequellerèglementde
telouteldifférendentrelespaysdoitnécessairementcommencerpar
la signature d'un mémorandum d'accordet la créationde commis-
sionsqui permettront auxparties de mener desactions conjointes et
de garantir une surveillanceefficacede leursterritoires, notamment
dans leszonesfrontières. »

A la fin de juillet 1983,les ministres des relations extérieures des pays
membres du groupe de Contadora et ceux des cinq Etats d'Amérique
centraletinrent àPanama une réunion conjointeau cours de laquelle les
ministres des relations extérieures despays d'Amérique centrale «indi-
quèrentqu'ilsapprouvaient et appuyaient »la déclarationde Cancun.
71. Le9 septembre 1983,legroupe établitune «listed'objectifs»por-
tant surun grandnombre dequestionspolitiques,militaires,sociales,éco-
nomiques,humanitaires etfinancières.Auxfinsdelaprésente affaire,ily
a lieu de relever certains de cesobjectifs,avoir:

«Promouvoir la détenteetmettrefin àla situation de conflit dans
la région,s'abstenirdetoute mesurequipourrait mettreendanger la
confiance politique ou qui tendrait à faire obstacleà l'objectif de
paix, de sécuritet de stabilitédans larégion.

Créerles conditions politiques nécessairespour garantir la sécu-
ritéinternationale,l'intégrietlasouverainetédesEtatsdelarégion.

Interdire l'utilisation du territoire national [leterritoire des Etats ARMED ACTIONS (JUDGMENT) 97

Theyurgentlycalled upon al1Central Americancountries "to reduceten-
sions and to establish the basis for a lasting climate of friendly relations

and mutual respect ...through dialogue and negotiation". Within three
months they had visited Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador
and Guatemala and had secured the agreement of the Governments of
those countries to engage in a common dialogue. On 17July 1983the
Heads of States of the Contadora countries issued the Cancun Declara-
tion on Peace in Central America, recording the establishment,with the
agreement of al1those Governments, of "an agenda covering the salient
aspects of the problems of the region". Two days later, the President of
Nicaragua made a speech in which he expressed his Government's
acceptance "that the beginning of the negotiation process promoted by
the Contadora Groupbe ofamultilateralcharacter" and proposed imme-
diate discussions with a viewto reaching agreements on certain points;
he added :

"Nicaragua Statesits willingnessto assume, with full responsibil-
ity,al1commitmentsarisingfromthe said agreementsand makesthis
clearbyacceptingthe point ofviewofthe Heads ofStatesofthe Con-
tadora Group totheintentthatthe taskofsettlingspecificdifferences
between countries must be begun initially with the signature of a
memorandum of understanding and the creation of commissions

allowing the parties to carry out combined actions and guarantee
effectivecontrol oftheir territories, especiallyin the frontier zones."

Therefollowedajoint meetingin Panama atthe end ofJuly 1983between

the Contadora Foreign Ministers and those ofthe fiveCentral American
States, at which the Central American Foreign Ministers "made known
their acceptance and gavetheir support to" the Cancun Declaration.

71. On 9 September 1983the Group drew up a "Document of Objec-
tives" covering a vast range of political, military, social, economic,
humanitarianand financialquestions.For thepurpose ofthe instant case,
it should be noted thatthe objectivesincluded the following:

"To promote détenteand put an end to situations of conflict in
the area, refraining from taking any action that might jeopardize
political confidence or prevent the achievement of peace, security
and stabilityinthe region.
.............................
To createpoliticalconditionsintended to ensure the international
security,integrity and sovereigntyofthe Statesofthe region.

Topreventtheuseoftheirownterritory [i.e.,that oftheparticipant participants]et ne prêterni ne permettre que soitpraucun appui
militaireou logistique,espersonnes,organisationsougroupesqui
se proposent de déstabiliserles gouvernements d'Amériquecen-
trale.»(Document des Nations Unies S/16041.)

Le groupe ayant demandé que soient formulées des propositions
concrètespermettant d'aboutir à un accord visant ces objectifs, le Nica-
ragua soumit cinq projets de traités, intitulés collectivement«Fonde-
mentsjuridiques en vue de garantir la paix et la sécurité internationales
des Etats d'Amériquecentrale». Ces projets furent présentésle 15oc-
tobre 1983,dateàlaquelle le Honduras situelecommencementde la par-
ticipation active du Nicaraguaàce qui a été dénommé« leprocessus de
Contadora ».
72. Le lermai 1984,legroupe deContadora publia un bulletin d'infor-
mation indiquant notamment que,lors d'uneréunion tenue laveille àPa-
nama,lesministresdes relations extérieuredes paysd'Amériquecentrale
avaientréaffirméleur convictionque leprocessus deContadora «consti-
tuait la meilleure formule et le moyen le plus approprié pour résoudre
les conflits que connaît actuellement la régiondocument des Nations

Unies A/39/226; S/16522). Le groupe avait alors commencé àélaborer
un «accord deContadorapour lapaixetlacoopérationenAmériquecen-
trale»,quitraitait avecforcedétailslesnombreusesquestionsquiavaient
fait l'objet de la liste d'objectifs. Ce texte fut publiéen juillet 1984et
l'accord, sous forme de projet revisé,fut distribuéle 7 septembre 1984.
73. Le21septembre 1984,leprésidentdu Nicaraguainforma legroupe
deContadora que son gouvernementavaitdécidé d'accepter l'accord re-
visédeContadoradans satotalitéetsansmodification. LeGouvernement
du Honduras adopta une attitude plus réservée eitnvita les gouverne-
mentsdesautres pays d'Amérique centrale àune réunion, àTegucigalpa,
au cours de laquelle devaient être examinéesde nouvelles revisions.A
cette réunion, qui eut lieu sans la participation du Nicaragua le 20 oc-
tobre 1984,un projet de traité différent fut provisoirementaccepar le
Honduras, El Salvador et leCosta Rica.
74. Aucunprogrèsneparaît avoirété réaliséversl'adoption del'accord

de Contadora durant les douze mois suivants,bien que le Nicaragua eût
acceptéquede nouvellesnégociationssoienttenues envuede modifierle
projet initial; ces négociations s'étendirent eneffet sur presque toute
l'année1985.Lors d'une réunion tenue à Cartagena, en Colombie, du 24
au 26août 1985,lesministresdesrelations extérieuresde l'Argentine,du
Brésil,du Pérou etdel'Uruguay(constituantle«groupede Lima»,connu
plus tard sous le nom de«groupe d'appui») sejoignirent aux ministres
desrelations extérieuresdespaysdu groupe deContadora. Lesconsulta-
tionsaboutirentà l'élaboration d'un nouveauprojetd'accord présentéar
le groupe de Contadora et legroupe d'appui aux Etats d'Amérique cen-
trale les 12et 13septembre 1985.Aucun des Etats d'Amérique centrale
n'accepta entièrementle projet, mais les négociationsse poursuivirent
pour échouer enjuin 1986. States]bypersons,organizations orgroups seekingto destabilizethe
GovernmentsofCentralAmericancountries andto refuseto provide
them with or permit them to receive militaryor logisticalsupport."
(UN doc. S/16041.)

The Group having requested concrete proposals towards an agreement
aimed at the objectives concerned, Nicaragua responded with the sub-
mission of five'proposed treaties, collectively called "Legal Bases for

Guaranteeing Peaceand the International Securityofthe Central Ameri-
can States" on 15October 1983,the date which Honduras identifies as
marking the beginning of Nicaragua's active participation in what has
cometo be called "the Contadora process".

72. On 1May 1984the Contadora Group issued an information bul-
letinnoting interaliathatat ameetingheldinPanamathepreviousday the
Foreign Ministers of the Central American States had reaffirmed their
convictionthatthe Contadora process "represented the genuine regional
alternative and the appropriate forum for the resolution of the conflicts
those countries are currently facing" (UN doc. A/39/226; S/16522). By
then the Group had begunthe drafting ofa "Contadora Actfor Peaceand
Co-operation in Central America", coveringin great detail the samevast
range oftopics ashad been coveredby the Document of Objectives.This
waspublished in July 1984,and a revisedversion ofthe draft Actwas cir-
culated on 7 September 1984.
73. On 21 September 1984the President of Nicaragua informed the
Contadora Group that his Governmenthad decided to acceptthe revised
Contadora Actin itstotality and without modification.The Government

of Honduras took a moreguarded attitude, and invitedthe other Central
American Governments to a meeting in Tegucigalpa for the purpose of
considering further revisions. At this meeting, held on0 October 1984,
but in which Nicaragua did not participate, a different proposed treaty
was provisionally agreed to by Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica.

74. No progressappears to havebeenmadetoward the adoption ofthe
Contadora Act during the next twelve months, although Nicaragua
agreed to negotiate changes in the initial draft;se negotiations lasted
through most of 1985. At a meeting in Cartagena (Colombia) on
24-26August 1985,the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group were
joined by the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Brazil,Peru and Uruguay
(the "Lima Group", later known asthe "Support Group"). Consultations
resulted in the preparation of a further draft Act, presented by the Con-
tadora Group and the Support Group to the Central American States
on 12-13September 1985. None of the Central American States fully
accepted the draft, but negotiations continued, to break down in June

1986. 75. A ce stade, la Cour n'estpas amenéeà prendreparti sur lesconsé-
quencesendroit decetéchec,maisseulement à seprononcer surlanature
delaprocéduresuivieet à sedemander si,commeleHonduras leprétend,
les négociationsmenéesdans le cadre du processus de Contadora pou-
vaient être regardéescomme des négociations directes suivantles voies
diplomatiques ordinaires au sens de l'articleII du pacte de Bogota.
Ce processus, au cours de la période en cause,a constitué,comme l'a
notéle Honduras, une combinaison de ((consultations, négociationset

médiation »et l'Assemblée générale de I'OEAs'estfélicitéedans sa réso-
lution 702du 17novembre 1984de «l'intense labeur de consultation, de
médiationet de négociation qu'ont entreprisles ministres des relations
extérieuresdespaysmembresdu groupe de Contadora parmi lesgouver-
nements centraméricains ..»
Si de nombreuses consultations et négociations eurent lieu de 1983
à 1986sousdesformesdiversesd'une part entre Etatscentraméricainset
d'autre part entre ces Etats et ceux appartenant au groupe de Contadora
et au groupe d'appui, ellesfurent organiséeset poursuivies dansle cadre
même dela médiation à laquelleellesétaientsubordonnées.Leprocessus
de Contadora à cette époque constituait avant tout une médiation dans
laquelledes Etatstiers,agissant de leurpropre initiative,tentaient derap-
procher lespoints devuedes Etats concernésenleurfaisant desproposi-
tions précises.
Du fait de laprésenceetde l'actionde cesEtatstiers, ceprocessus,que

le Honduras avait accepté,se différenciaitprofondément des ((négocia-
tions directes suivant les voies diplomatiques ordinaires)).l n'entrait
donc pas dans les prévisions correspondantesde l'article II du pacte de
Bogota.Par ailleurs,aucune autre négociationrépondantaux conditions
fixéespar cetexte n'était envisagée le8juillet 1986,date du dépôtde la
requêtedu Nicaragua. Par suite, le Honduras ne pouvait soutenir de ma-
nière plausibleàcette date que le différend qui l'opposaitau Nicaragua,
tel que définidans la requêtede ce dernier, pouvait alors être résoluau
moyen de négociations directes suivant les voies diplomatiques ordi-
naires.
76. La Cour estimeen conséquenceque les dispositions de l'article II
du pacte de Bogotainvoquéespar leHonduras ne constituentpas un obs-
tacleà la recevabilitéde la requêtedu Nicaragua.

77. La quatrièmeet dernièreexceptiondu Honduras relative àla rece-
vabilitéde la requêtedu Nicaragua estla suivante:

«Le Nicaragua ayant souscrit au processus de négociationde
Contadora en tant que ((procédurespéciale» au sens de l'article II
du pacte de Bogota,illuiestinterdittantpar l'articleIVdu pacte que
par des considérations élémentaires de bonne foi d'entamer une 75. Atthisstagethe Court isnot calledupon to pronounce on the legal
consequences of this breakdown, but merely to determine the nature of
the procedure whichwasfollowed,and toascertainwhether,as Honduras
claims,the negotiations conducted in the context of the Contadora pro-
cesscouldberegardedasdirectnegotiationsthrough theusualdiplomatic
channels,withinthe meaning ofArticle II ofthe Pact of Bogota.
Thisprocess,during the period nowin question,wasa "combination of
consultation,negotiation and mediation", asHonduras has obsemed, and

theGeneral Assemblyofthe OASinResolution702of 17November 1984,
noted withpleasure"theintensiveeffortmade bythe ForeignMinistersof
the Contadora Group in consulting,mediatingbetween, and negotiating
with,the Central Americangovernments ...".

While there were extensive consultations and negotiations between
1983and 1986,in different forms, both among the Central American
States themselves, and between those States and those belonging to the
Contadora Group and the Support Group, these were organized and
carried on within the context of the mediation to whichthey were subor-
dinate. At thistime the Contadora process was primarily a mediation, in
whichthird States,ontheir own initiative,endeavoured to bring together
the viewpoints of the States concerned by making specificproposals to
them.
That processtherefore, which Hondurashad accepted, was, as a result
of the presence and action of third States, markedly different from a
"direct negotiation through the usual diplomatic channels". It thus did
not fa11within the relevant provisions of Article II of the Pact of Bogota.
Furthermore, no other negotiation which would meetthe conditions laid
down in that text was contemplated on 28 July 1986,the date of filingof
the Nicaraguan Application. Consequently Honduras could not plau-
siblymaintain at that datethat the dispute between itselfand Nicaragua,
as defined in the Nicaraguan Application, was at that time capable of
beingsettledbydirectnegotiationthrough the usualdiplomaticchannels.

76. The Court therefore considers that the provisions of Article II of
the Pact of Bogota relied on by Honduras do not constitute a bar to the

admissibilityof Nicaragua's Application.

77. The fourth and last objection of Honduras to the admissibility of
the Nicaraguan Application is that :

"Having accepted the Contadora process as a 'specialprocedure'
within the meaning of Article II of the Pact of Bogota,Nicaragua is
precluded both byArticleIVofthe Pactand byelementaryconsider-
ations of good faith from commencing any other procedure for autre procédurede règlementpacifique, quellequ'ellesoit,tant que
leprocessus de Contadora n'apas étémené à terme; etcetermen'est
pas échu.))

L'article IV du pacte de Bogota, sur lequel le Honduras se fonde, se lit
commesuit :

((Lorsquel'une des procédures pacifiquesaura été entamée, soit
en vertu d'un accord entre les parties, soit en exécutiondu présent
traité,ou d'un pacte antérieur,il ne pourra être recouru aucune
autre avant l'épuisementde celledéjà entamée.»

78. LesPartiess'accordent àreconnaître quelaprésenteprocédure de-
vantla Cour estune «procédure pacifique»au sensdu pacte de Bogotaet
qu'en conséquence,si une autre ((procédure pacifique» prévuepar le
pacte, quelle qu'elle soit,a été entamet n'estpas épuisée,la procédure
devant la Cour a étéengagéecontrairement àl'articleIVet doit de cefait
êtrejugéeirrecevable.La divergencede vues entre les Parties porte sur la
question de savoirsileprocessus deContadora estou nonune procédure
envisagée àl'articleIV. LeHonduras soutient que leprocessus deConta-
dora estune «procédure spéciale »au sensde l'articleII du pacte,lequel
vise «les procédures spéciales quià leur avis[àl'avisdes parties], leur
permettront d'arriverà une solution» de leur différend, procédures qui
s'offrentà leur choix en plus des ((procéduresétabliesdans ce traité».

D'aprèsle Honduras, cetteprocédure spécialea été entamép ear accord
entre les Parties, si bien qu'elle doit être considérée cuene«procé-
dure pacifique» aux fins de l'article IV.Le Nicaragua, pour sa part, nie
que leprocessus de Contadora puisse êtreconsidérécommeune «procé-
dure spéciale» aux fins des articles II et IV du pacte, notamment parce
que ceprocessus n'apaspour objet ledifférendportédevant la Cour.
79. La question de savoirsileprocessus deContadora peut êtreconsi-
dérécomme une((procédurespéciale»ouune((procédurepacifique»au
sensdesarticles II etIVdu pacte n'aurait évidemmentpas à êtretranchée
si une telle procédure devait être considéréc eomme «épuisée» le
28juillet 1986,datedu dépôtde la requêtedu Nicaragua. En effet,c'està
la date de l'introduction d'une instancequ'il faut se placer pour déter-
miner la recevabilitéd'une requête(paragraphe66ci-dessus).Aussibien,
pour l'application de l'articleIV,la question qui sepose estplus particu-

lièrementde savoirsiune procédure pacifiquea étéinitialemene tngagée
et si ellea é((épuisée»avant que toute autre procédure,y compris une
procédurejudiciaire, ne soit((entamée».
80. Aux fins de l'article IV du pacte, aucun acte formel n'est requis
pour qu'on puisse conclurequ'une procédure pacifiquea été ((épuisé»e.
Cette procédurene doit pas nécessairementavoirabouti àun échecdéfi-
nitif pour qu'une nouvelleprocédure puisse être entamée.Il suffit que la
procédure initialese soit trouvéeà un point mort dans des conditions
tellesque ni sacontinuation ni sareprise n'aitétéeffectivemenetnvisagée
àla date ou une nouvelleprocédureest engagée. pacific settlement until such time as the Contadora process has

been concluded; and that time hasnot arrived."

Article IV of the Pact of Bogota, upon which Honduras relies, reads as
follows :

"Onceanypacificprocedure hasbeeninitiated,whether by agree-
ment between the parties or in fulfillment ofthe present Treaty or a
previous pact, no other procedure may be commenced until that
procedure is concluded."

78. It is commonground between the Parties thatthe present proceed-
ings before the Court are a "pacific procedure" as contemplated by the
Pact of Bogota,and that therefore ifany other "pacificprocedure" under
the Pacthasbeen initiated and not concluded,theproceedings wereinsti-

tuted contrary to Article IV and must therefore be found inadmissible.
Thedisagreementbetweenthe PartiesiswhethertheContadora processis
orisnota procedure contemplated byArticleIV.Honduras contends that
the Contadora process is a "special procedure" forthe purposes of Arti-
cleII ofthe Pact, which refersto "such specialprocedures as,intheir [the
parties']opinion,willpermitthem to arriveat asolution" ofthe dispute,as
an alternativeto "the procedures established in the present Treaty". This
specialprocedure has, in the contention of Honduras, been entered into
byagreementbetweenthe Parties,and thus mustberegardedas a "pacific
procedure" forthe purposes of Article IV. Nicaragua onthe other hand
deniesthattheContadora processcan betreated as a "specialprocedure"
for purposes of Articles II and IV of the Pact, because, inter aliai, ts
subject-matterisdistinctfrom thedispute before theCourt.

79. It is clear that the question whether or not the Contadora process

can be regarded as a "special procedure" or a "pacific procedure" within
the meaning of Articles II and IV ofthe Pact would not have to be deter-
mined if such a procedure had to be regarded as "concluded" by
28July 1986,thedate offilingofthe Nicaraguan Application. Thedate of
the institution of proceedings is the date at which the admissibility of
a claim has to be assessed (paragraph 66 above); for the application
of Article IV, the question is specifically whether any initial pacific
procedure which may have been instituted has been "concluded" before
any other procedure, includingjudicial procedure, is "commenced".

80. Forthepurposes ofArticleIVof the Pact,noforma1actisnecessav
before a pacificprocedure can be said to be "concluded". Theprocedure
in question does not have to have failed definitivelybefore a new pro-
cedure can be commenced. It is sufficientif, at the date on which a new

procedure is commenced, the initial procedure has come to a standstill
in such circumstances that there appears to be no prospect of its being
continued or resumed. 81. En vue d'en décider dans la présente affaire,laCour va reprendre
maintenant l'examen du processus de Contadora. Les premières phases
de ce processus ont déjà été exposéesaux paragraphes70 à 74ci-dessus.
Parla suite,du 5au7 avril 1986,lesministresdesrelationsextérieuresdes
Etats membres du groupe de Contadora et des Etats membres du groupe
d'appui se réunirent à Panama afin de faire le point de la situation. A
l'issuede cetteréunion,Iegroupe deContadoraa

«invitéles gouvernementsdes cinq pays d'Amérique centrale à une
réunion quisetiendrait le 6juin 1986 àPanama aux fins de déclarer
officiellementachevéela négociationdu texte de l'accord deConta-
doraet de procéder àsasignature »(lettredu 26juin 1986adresséeau

Secrétairegénérad lel'organisation des Nations Unies par legroupe
de Contadora (voir paragraphe 85 ci-après);document des Nations
Unies A/40/ 1136 ;S/ 18184,annexe 1).

Lescinqgouvernementsrépondirent par uncommuniquédu 18mai 1986,
dans lequel ilétaitditqu'ilfallaitquelespayssignent l'accordle6juin de
l'année en cours»,et par la déclaration publiéeà Esquipulas, au Guate-
mala, le 25mai 1986,dans laquelle lesprésidentsde ces Etats déclaraient
notamment :

«Leur volontéde signer l'aaccord deContadorapour la paix et la
coopération en Amérique centrale », et d'exécuter pleinement tous
les engagements et procédures quiy sont prévus.
Ilsreconnaissent que certainsélémentsn'ont pasencoreété réglés,
tels que lesmanŒuvresmilitaires, le contrôledesarmements et la vé-
rification de l'exécution des accords. Aujourd'hui cependant, dans
ce dialogue entre les mandataires de peuples frères,il a étéjugque
les diverses propositions présentéespar les pays sont suffisamment
constructives et réalistespour faciliterla signature de l'accord.

82. Immédiatement après la réunion des présidents tenue à Esqui-
pulas, lesplénipotentiaires decespays reprirent lesdiscussions envue de
régler lespoints de désaccord qui subsistaient, mais ils parvinrentà la
conclusion qu'ilseraitimpossibleque l'accordsoitsignéàla date fixée ;ils
firent néanmoins ((savoirque leurs gouvernementsrespectifsétaient ré-

solus à poursuivre le processus de négociation diplomatique » (lettre du
26juin 1986adresséeau Secrétairegénéralc,itéedans le précédentpara-
graphe). Sur ces entrefaites, tous les ministres des relations extérieures
concernésseréunirent à Panama les6et 7juin 1986afin de présenteroffi-
ciellement «ce qui, de l'avisdu groupe de Contadora, constitu[ait]la ver-
sion finale de l'accord de Contadora pour la paix et la coopération en
Amériquecentrale »,pour reprendre lestermes de la lettre du 6juin 1986
adressée à cetteoccasionaux ministres desrelations extérieuresdespays
d'Amérique centrale par le groupe de Contadora. Dans cette lettre le
groupe explique que cetexte ((contient lesprincipaux engagementspoli-
tiques relatifsaux aspectsfondamentaux »et ajoute que : 81. In order to decide this issue in the present case, the Court will re-
sume itssurvey ofthe Contadora process.Theinitial stages ofthe process

havealready been described in paragraphs 70to 74above. Subsequently,
from 5to7 April1986 ameeting ofthe ForeignMinisters ofthe Contadora
Group and of the Support Group was held in Panama for the purpose
of reviewing progress. On the outcome of this meeting, the Contadora
Group

"invited the five Central American Governments to a meeting on
6 June 1986at Panama City for the purpose of declaring the nego-
tiation of the text of the Contadora Act officially concluded and
proceeding to its forma1adoption" (letter addressed by the Group
tothe Secretary-General ofthe United Nations on 26June 1986(see
paragraph 85below); UN doc. A/40/1136; S/18184, Ann. 1).

The five Governments responded in a communiqué of 18 May 1986
announcing their intention "to gather for the signing of the Act on
6June 1986"and bythe Declaration issued at Esquipulas, Guatemala, on
25May 1986,in whichtheir Presidents stated interalia:

"That they are willing to sign the 'Contadora Act for Peace and
Co-operation in Central America',and agree to complyfullywith al1
the undertakings and procedures contained in the Act. They rec-
ognize that some aspects remain outstanding, such as military
manŒuvres, arms control and the monitoring of compliance with
the agreements.Today, however,in this dialogue among the leaders
of fraternal peoples, they find thearious proposals put forward by
the countries to be sufficientlyproductive and realistic to facilitate
the signing of the Act."

82. Immediately after the meeting of Presidents at Esquipulas, their
plenipotentiaries resumed discussionswith a viewto settling such differ-
encesasremained, but came to the conclusion that itwould be impossible
forthe Acttobesignedon theappointed date; theynevertheless "commu-
nicated the determination of their respectiveGovernments to continue to
promote the diplomatic negotiation process" (letter of 26June 1986to the
Secretary-General cited in the previous paragraph). In that context, al1

Foreign Ministers concerned met at Panama City on 6-7 June 1986for
the forma1 delivery of "that which, in the opinion of the Contadora
Group, constitute[d] the final draft of the Act of Contadora for Peace
and Co-operation in Central America", to quote the letter dated 6 June
1986addressed by the Group tothe Central American Foreign Ministers
on that occasion. The Group explained that the text "incorporates the
essential political commitments related to the substantive aspects", and
went on : «une fois résolue cette question, nous proposons de passer immé-
diatement à une autre phase de la négociation qui portera sur des
questions pratiques touchant principalement la créationde la com-
mission de vérificationet de contrôle.

83. Le 12juin 1986,lesGouvernements du Costa Rica etd'ElSalvador
publièrentune déclaration conjointepar laquelle ils rejetaient le projet
d'accord de Contadora. Le 13juin 1986,le Gouvernement du Honduras
publia un communiquéde presse dans lequel il étaitnotamment déclaré :

«1. Ledernierprojet d'instrument («acta»)proposépar legroupe
de Contadora ne constitue pas, de l'avisdu Gouvernement du Hon-
duras, un document énonçant des obligations raisonnables et suffi-
santes pour garantir sa sécurité.
2. Legroupe deContadora a déclaréa ,u cours de la réunion,que
ledit projet mettait un termeà ses efforts de médiation ence qui
concerne les élémentsde fond de l'«acta»,mais qu'ilrestait cepen-
dant prêtà collaborer àla négociationconcernant des élémentspra-

tiques et desmodalités d'applicationdel' «cta».
3. Le Gouvernement du Honduras réaffirmesa volontéde conti-
nuer àexplorer de nouvelles formulesqui garantissentefficacement
lesintérêtlségitimesde tous les Etats»

Le 21juin 1986,le Gouvernement du Honduras adressa au groupe de
Contadoraune lettre dans laquelle il exposait son point de vue sur l'acte
final. Dans cette lettre, il cite notamment le paragraphe 1 du commu-
niquéde presse et se réfèreau paragraphe 2. Il note que le groupe de
Contadora ((restenéanmoinsdisposé àparticiper auxnégociationssurles
aspectspratiques et concrets»de l'acteet ajoute qu'à son avis

«il ne sera possible d'aborder systématiquementces questions que
dans la mesureoù lesengagementsconcernant lesquestions de fond
de l'acteauront été clairementdéfiniest acceptés.

84. Dansunelettre du 17juin 1986,leministredesrelationsextérieures
du Nicaragua, s'exprimant au nom de son gouvernement, répondit
notamment que l'acte final constituait le seul instrument qui pouvait
((favoriser l'aboutissement rapide et efficace du processus de négocia-
tion» et offrit de mettre en Œuvreun certain nombre de propositions
qui yfigurent,en particulier dans lesdomainesmilitaire et logistique.
85. Le26juin 1986,lesministresdes relations extérieures despaysdu
groupe deContadora rendirent visiteau Secrétairegénéra dlel7Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies (document des Nations Unies A/40/1136;
S/18134) et lui remirent une lettre relatant l'évolutionde la situation
depuis septembre 1985. Dans cette lettre, le groupe déclarait notam-
ment :

«Les questions de fond concernant l'accord de Contadora étant
résolues,grâceàladéclarationsansambiguïtéfaiteàcetégardpar les "Once this question is resolved, we propose to proceed imme-
diately to another phase of the negotiations, referring to matters of
an operational character and which will refer mainly to the estab-
lishment ofthe Verificationand Control Commission."

83. On 12June 1986,the Governments of Costa Rica and El Salvador
released a joint statement rejecting the draft Act of Contadora. On
13June 1986,the Government of Honduras issued a press communiqué,
stating,in particular:

"1. The last project for an instrument ('acta')proposed by Con-
tadora does not constitute, in the opinion of the Government of
Honduras, a document that establishes reasonable and sufficient
obligationsfor guaranteeingits security.
2. TheContadora Group stated in that meetingthatthe project in

reference exhausted its mediation efforts with relation to the sub-
stantive elements of the 'acta',but that notwithstanding they were
available for collaborating in the negotiation of the operative and
practical elements ofthe 'acta'.
3. TheGovernment ofHonduras reiteratesitswillingnessto conti-
nue exploring new formulas that effectivelyguarantee the legitimate
interests ofal1the States.. ."

On 21June 1986the Government of Honduras addressed a letter to the
Contadora Group, expressing its attitude to the Final Act. In that letter,
inter aliait,quoted paragraph 1ofthe press communiqué,and referredto
paragraph 2; it noted that the Contadora Group "would remain ready to
collaborate in the negotiation of[the]operative and practical aspects" of
the Act,and stated that in itsview

"it would only be possible to systematicallyapproach these matters
insofar as the agreementdealing with the substantiveaspects of the
Act,would havebeen clearlyestablished and accepted".
84. TheForeignMinister ofNicaragua,in aletterof 17June 1986,gave

the forma1response of his Government, to the effect, inter alia,that the
Final Actwasthe onlyinstrument"capable ofproducing a quickand effi-
cient conclusion of the negotiating process", and offered to implement a
number of proposals it contained, in particular on militaryand logistical
matters.
85. On 26 June 1986,the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group
called on the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN doc.
A/40/ 1136; S/18184),and handed to him a letter recounting develop-
ments since September 1985 ;in that letterthe Group stated :

"Now that the substantive issues of the Contadora Act have been
resolved,as the Central American Governments haveunequivocally

37103 ACTIONS ARMÉES (ARRÊT)

gouvernementsd'Amérique centrale,et afin que l'accordpuisse être
signé,nousproposonsdepasserimmédiatement à une autrephase de
la négociation.Dans cettenouvellephase, noustraiterons conjointe-
ment et systématiquementdes questionsde caractère procéduralet

opérationnel touchant principalementle statut de la commission de
vérificationetde contrôleenmatièredesécurité,quiferapartie inté-
grante de l'accord, ainsi que d'autres aspects ayant traitrégle-
mentation.»

L'accordet laproposition de négociationn'ayant pas étéaccepté s,pro-
cessusdeContadora setrouva àun point mort.
86. Lasituationlocales'aggravaet,le le'octobre 1986,lesministresdes
relations extérieures des pays du groupe de Contadora et du groupe
d'appui réunis à New York à l'occasion de l'Assembléegénérale des
Nations Unies exprimèrent leur préoccupation dans une déclaration

dans laquelle ils se disaient décidésrendre une nouvelle initiative de
paix. A cet effet ils se rendirent dans les cinq pays d'Amérique centrale
et,à l'issuede cette mission, ne purent que réaffirmer,dans un commu-
niqué publié àMexico enjanvier 1987,leur adétermination àmaintenir
le dialogue avec tous les pays directement ou indirectement impliqués
dans le conflit)) età promouvoir «les négociations diplomatiques))
entre Etats centraméricains.
87. Une nouvelleétape dans la situationen Amérique centralea com-
mencélorsque le présidentdu Costa Rica, M. Oscar Arias, a présentéle
15février1987le plan de paix qui porte son nom. Ce plan de paix pré-
voyaitde nouvelles approches et de nouveaux mécanismespour le règle-

ment desproblèmesquiseposent auxpays de la région.Lesministresdes
relations extérieures des pays du groupe de Contadora et du groupe
d'appui réunisà BuenosAiresle 13avril 1987exprimèrent alorsunenou-
velle fois leur préoccupation devantl'enlisementdu processus de négo-
ciation depuis juin 1986,soulignèrent l'importancede la proposition du
présidentArias et prirent note de l'intention expriméepar le Gouverne-
ment du Costa Ricadefavoriser, àla réunion quedevaienttenirlesprési-
dents des cinq Etats d'Amérique centrale Esquipulas, un accord entre
lescinqpaysenvuedereprendrelanégociationdel'accorddeContadora,
en même temps que la signature de la proposition du présidentArias.
88. C'estdans cesconditions que lesprésidents des cinq Etatsd7Amé-
rique centrale approuvèrent,le 7août 1987,un «plan pour instaurer une

paix ferme et durable en Amérique centrale)),connu sousle nom d'ac-
cords d'Esquipulas II.Cesaccordscomportaient diversengagementsten-
dant en particulier la réconciliation nationaàela cessationdes hosti-
lités, la démocratisationà des électionslibresà la cessation de l'aide
aux forces irrégulièreset aux mouvements insurrectionnels et au non-
usage du territoire d'un Etat àdes fins d'agression contre d'autres Etats.
Ilsfixaient en leurssections7et 10lerôleattribuédésormaisau groupe
deContadora etaugrouped'appui.Lasection7prévoyaitlaparticipation
du groupe de Contadora en matière de sécurité,de vérificationet de ARMEDACTIONS(JUDGMENT) 103

stated, and inorder that the Act hay be signed, wepropose that we
should pass on immediately to another phase of the negotiation. In

this phase we will deal jointly and systematically withmatters of a
procedural and operational nature referringprincipally tothe statute
of the Verification and Control Commission for Security Matters
which will be an integral part of the Act and to other regulatory
matters."

The Act, and the proposa1 for negotiation, were not accepted, and the
Contadora process wasthus at a standstill.
86. The situation in the area deteriorated, and on 1October 1986the
ForeignMinisters oftheContadora Group andthe SupportGroup, meet-
ingin NewYork during the United Nations General Assembly,expressed
their concernin a declaration in whichthey said that they had decided to
take a new peace initiative. For thisurpose they visitedthe fiveCentral

American States, and followingthat mission,in a communiquéissued in
MexicoinJanuary 1987,theycould dono morethan reiteratetheir "deter-
mination to maintain dialogue with al1the countries directly or indirectly
involved in the conflict", and "to continue to push ori with diplomatic
negotiations" between the Central American States.

87. Anew stagein the situation in Central Americabegan when Presi-
dent Oscar AriasofCosta Rica,on 15February 1987,presented the Peace
Plan whichbears his name. Thisplan contemplated new approachesand
newmechanismsforthe settlementoftheproblemsfacingthe countries of
the region. The Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group and the Sup-
port Group, meeting in Buenos Aires on 13April 1987,again expressed
their concern at the standstill in the negotiation processnceJune 1986,
emphasized the importance of President Arias's proposa1and noted the

stated intention of the Government of Costa Rica to sponsor, at the pro-
posed meeting ofthe fiveCentral American Presidentsat Esquipulas, an
agreement by the five countries to resume negotiation of the Contadora
Acttogether with the signingof President Arias'sproposal.

88. It wasin these circumstancesthatthe Presidentsofthe fiveCentral
American States adopted on 7 August 1987a "Plan to Establish a Firm
and Lasting Peace in Central America", known as the Esquipulas II
Accord. This agreement comprised a number of commitments,directed
in particular to national reconciliation, an endto hostilities,democratiza-
tion,freeelections,a haltto aidtoirregularforcesorinsurrectionistmove-
ments, and the non-use ofterritory to attack other States.Therole which
was thereafter to be attributed to the Contadora Group and the Support

Group wasdefined in Section7and Section 10(a).Section7provided for
participation ofthe Contadora Group in connection with security, verifi-
cation and control. Section 10(a)provided for an International Verifica-contrôle. Lasection 10a)prévoyaitlacréation d'une commissioninterna-
tionale de vérificationet de suividont feraient notamment partie les mi-
nistres des relations extérieures des pays membresdu groupe de Conta-
dora et du groupe d'appui. L'application des accords était confiéene
commission exécutivecomposée des ministres des relations extérieures
descinq Etatsd'Amérique centrale.Surcettebase, desnégociationss'en-
gagèrentdans le détail desquellesil n'ya pas lieu d'entrer ici,sinon pour

signaler que, lors de la réunion conjointeque les pays d'Amérique cen-
trale et legroupe de Contadora tinrent le 10décembre1987,ilfut décidé
de revoirdiversesdispositions du projet d'acte finaldeContadora etpré-
ciséque lespropositions nécessairesàcet effetseraientfaites par lespays
d'Amérique centrale.
89. Il ressort de cet exposéque le processus de Contadora étaitàun
point mort àla dateà laquelle le Nicaragua a déposé sarequêtLe.asitua-
tion est demeuréetellejusqu'àceque leplan Arias aitété présenté eqt ue
les cinq Etats d'Amérique centrale aient approuvé les accordsd'Esqui-
pulas II,lançant en août 1987laprocédure désignéesouven ptar lenomde
processus de Contadora-EsquipulasII. La question se pose dès lors de
savoir,aux fins de l'article IV du pacte, si cette dernière procédure doit
êtreregardéecommeayant assurésanssolutiod ne continuitélapoursuite

de la procédure initiale ousi,le 28juillet 1986,la procédure initialedoit
êtreconsidéré commeayant été «épuisée »,uneprocéduredenature dif-
férenteayant ensuite étéengagée.Cette question est d'une importance
capitale car, dans cette dernière hypothèse,et quelle qu'ait pu être la
nature du processus initial de Contadora au regard de l'article IV, cet
articlen'aurait pas constituéun obstacle'introduction d'une procédure
devant la Cour àcettedate.
90. LesvuesdesParties à cetégardont étépréciséeesnparticulier dans
les réponsesqu'ellesont apportées àune question poséepar un membre
de la Cour. Le Nicaragua a indiqué que «le processus de Contadora n'a
éténa ibandonnénisuspendu àaucun moment».Quant au Honduras, ila
déclaréque «le processus de Contadora n'a pas étéabandonné » et
qu'après la non-signaturede l'accord de Contadora le groupe de Conta-
dora etlegroupe d'appui ontpoursuivileurseffortsjusqu'à l'approbation

desaccords &Esquipulas II. Depuis lors,selon leHonduras, leprocessus
seseraitpoursuivi sansinterruption.
91. La Cour apprécie pleinement l'importancede cette concordance
devuesentrelesPartiesausujetd'initiativesrégionaleshautementprisées
par elles.Mais ellenesaurait yvoirune concordance devuesquant àl'in-
terprétationdu terme «épuisement»,utiliséàl'articleIVdu pacte, au re-
gard dela situation du processus de Contadoraau moment dudépôtdela
requêtedu Nicaragua.Or,del'avisdelaCour,lesfaitsci-dessusdécritsne
permettent pas de placer sur le mêmeplan, pour l'application du pacte,
l'actiondu groupe deContadora antérieure àjuin 1986etson actionulté-
rieure.
Le processus de paix s'estpoursuivi sous le nom de«Contadora »et il
est de fait que ce nom est devenu commele symbole de toutes les étapestion and Monitoring Commission whose membership wasto include the
Foreign Ministers of the Contadora and Support Group countries. The
implementation of the agreement was entrusted to an executive commit-
teemade up ofthe Foreign Ministersofthe fiveCentral American States.
Thedetailsofthe negotiationswhichbeganonthis basis do not haveto be
gone into here, Savethat atthe joint meetingbetweenthe Central Ameri-
can Statesand the ContadoraGroup on 10December 1987,itwasdecided
that various provisions of the draft Final Act of Contadora should be
re-examined, and that the necessary proposals would be made by the
Central American countries.

89. From this account it is clear that the Contadora process was at a
standstill at the date on which Nicaragua fileditsApplication. Thissitua-
tion continued until the presentation of the Arias Plan and the adoption
bythe fiveCentral American Statesofthe Esquipulas II Accord,whichin
August 1987set in train the procedure frequently referred to as theCon-
tadora-Esquipulas II process. The questiontherefore arises,for the pur-
poses of Article IV of the Pact, whether this latter procedure should be

regardedas havingensuredthe continuation ofthe initialprocedure with-
out interruption, or whether on 28July 1986that initialprocedureshould
be regardedas having "concluded", and aprocedure ofa differentnature
ashavinggot under waythereafter.Thisquestion isofcrucialimportance,
since on the latter hypothesis, whatever may have been the nature of the
initial Contadora processwithregardto Article IV,that Articlewouldnot
have constituted a bar to the commencement of a procedure before the
Court onthat date.
90. The views ofthe Parties in this respect were givenin particular in
their replies to a question put by a Member of the Court. Nicaraguaindi-
catedthat "the Contadora process has not been abandonedor suspended
at any moment". As for Honduras, it declaredthat "the Contadora pro-
cesshas not been abandoned" andthat, afterthe non-signature ofthe Act
of Contadora, the Contadora Group and the Support Group continued
their efforts up to the time of the approval of the Esquipulas II Accord.
Since that time the process, according to Honduras, continued without
interruption.
91. The Court fullyappreciatesthe importance ofthis concordance of
viewsbetween the Parties onthe subject of regional initiativeswhich are
highlyregarded by them. Butit cannot seeinthis a concordance ofviews

astotheinterpretation oftheterm"concluded" inArticleIVofthe Pactof
Bogota,inrelationtotheposition ofthe Contadora processatthe moment
of the filing of the Nicaraguan Application. In the Court's view, on the
basis of the facts described above the action of the Contadora Group
before June 1986cannot be regarded,for the purposes of the application
of the Pact,as on thesame footing as itssubsequentaction.
Whilethe peacemaking process has continued to bear the name "Con-
tadora", the factisthatthat titlehas becomepracticallya symbolofal1theparcourues et de toutes les initiativesmultilatérales prises ces dernières
annéesenvuederestaurerlapaixenAmériquecentrale. Maisenréalitél,e
processus deContadora, tel qu'ilavaitfonctionnédans lapremièrephase,
est différentdu processus de Contadora-Esquipulas II mis en place dans
lasecondephase. Il endiffèrepar sonobjet, mais surtoutpar sanature. En
effet, et ainsi qu'il a été expliqué ci-dessusl,e processus de Contadora

constituaitinitialementune médiation dans laquelle le groupe de Conta-
dora etlegrouped'appui jouaient un rôledéterminant.Enrevanche,dans
le processus de Contadora-Esquipulas II, les Etats constituant le groupe
de Contadoraont jouéun rôlefondamentalement différent: lescinqpays
d'Amérique centraleont missurpiedunmécanismedenégociationmulti-
latérale autonome dans lequel l'intervention du groupe de Contadora
est limitéeaux tâches fixéesdans les sections7 et 10a)de la déclaration
d'Esquipulas II et a d'ailleurs depuis lorsété encore réduite.
92. Il ressort des faits que le groupe de Contadora considérait samis-
sion comme achevée,du moins en ce qui concernait la négociation d'un
accord sur lefond,au momentoù a été soumisaux Etatsd'Amérique cen-
trale, les6etjuin 1986,letextefinaletdéfinitifde l'accorddeContadora.
Sicet accord avait étésignéla médiation aurait été couronnéd ee succès,

mais il ne l'a pas été etc'estle contraire qui s'estproduit. Par ailleurs, il
convient desouligner l'existenced'une solution de continuitédeplusieurs
mois entre la fin du processus initial de Contadora et le commencement
du processus de Contadora-Esquipulas II.Or c'estpendant cettepériode
que le Nicaragua a déposé sa requête.
93. LaCour conclut que lesprocéduresemployéesdans leprocessus de
Contadora jusqu'au 28juillet 1986,date du dépôt de la requête du Nica-
ragua, avaientété ((épuisées» àcette dateau sens de l'article IVdu pacte
de Bogota. Dans cesconditions, lesconclusions du Honduras fondéessur
l'article IV du pacte doivent êtrerejetéeset la Cour n'a pasdéterminer,
d'une part, sile processus deContadora constituaitune ((procédurespé-
ciale» ou une ((procédurepacifique » aux fins des articles II et IV du
pacte et, d'autre part, siune telle procédure avaitle mêmeobjetque celle
dont la Coura aujourd'hui à connaître.

94. La Cour doit aussiexaminerl'argument du Honduras selonlequel
non seulementl'article IVdu pacte de Bogota mais aussi «des considéra-
tions élémentairesdebonne foi»interdisent au Nicaragua d'entamer une
autre procédure de règlement pacifique, quelle qu'elle soit, tant que le
processus deContadora n'aura pas étémené à terme. Commela Cour l'a
faitobserver, leprincipe delabonnefoi est((l'undesprincipes debasequi
président à la créationetà l'exécutiond'obligations juridiques »(Essais
nucléaires,C.Z.J. ecueil1974,p.268,par.46; p.473,par. 49);iln'estpasen
soi une source d'obligation quand il n'en existerait pas autrement. Mais,
dans la présente aff-irele Honduras fait valoir qu'à la suite d'une série ARMED ACTIONS (JUDGMENT) 105

stages traversed and al1the multilateral initiatives taken in the last few
yearsto restorepeace to Central America. In fact howeverthe Contadora
process,as it operated in the firstphase, is differentfrom the Contadora-
Esquipulas II process initiated in the second phase. The two differ with
regard both to theirbject andto their nature. The Contadora process, as

has been explained above, initially constituted a mediation in which the
Contadora Group andSupport Group played a decisivepart. IntheCon-
tadora-Esquipulas II process,onthe other hand, theContadora Group of
Statesplayed a fundamentallydifferent role.Thefivecountries ofCentral
Americaset upan independent mechanism ofmultilateralnegotiation,in
which the role of the Contadora Group was confined to the tasks laid
down in Sections 7 and 10(a)of the Esquipulas II Declaration, and has
effectivelyshrunk stillfurther subsequently.

92. The facts show that the Contadora Group regarded its mission as
completed, at least so far as the negotiation of any substantiveaccord is
concerned, with the presentation to the Central American States on
6-7June 1986ofthe final and definitiveAct of Contadora. The signature
of that Act would have crowned the mediation with a success; its non-
signature had the opposite effect.Moreover,it should not be overlooked
that there wasa gap ofseveralmonthsbetweenthe end ofthe initial Con-
tadora process and the beginning of the Contadora-Esquipulas II pro-
cess; and it wasduring thisgapthat Nicaragua filed itsApplication to the

Court.
93. The Court concludes that the procedures employed in the Conta-
dora processup to28July 1986,thedate offilingofthe Nicaraguan Appli-
cation, had been "concluded", within the meaning of Article IV of the
Pact ofBogota,at that date. That being so,the submissions of Honduras
based on Article IVofthe Pact mustbe rejected, and it isunnecessaryfor
the Court to determine whether the Contadora process was a "special
procedure" or a "pacificprocedure" forthe purpose of Articles IIand IV
ofthe Pact,and whetherthat procedure hadthe sameobjectasthat now in
progressbefore the Court.

94. The Court has also to deal with the contention of Honduras that
Nicaragua is precluded not only by Article IVof the Pact of Bogotabut
also "by elementaryconsiderations ofgood faith" from commencingany
other procedure for pacific settlement until such time as the Contadora
process has been concluded. The principle of good faith is, as the Court

has observed,"one ofthe basicprinciplesgoverningthe creation and per-
formance of legalobligations" (NuclearTests,Z.C. Jeports1974,p. 268,
para. 46; p. 473,para. 49); it is not in itself a source of obligation where
none would othenvise exist.In this case howeverthe contention of Hon-
duras isthat, on the basis of successiveacts by Nicaragua culminatingind'actesdu Nicaraguaqui ontdébouché surladéclarationd'Esquipulasdu
25mai 1986(paragraphe 81ci-dessus)cedernier pays apris un ((engage-
ment envers leprocessus de Contadora »; il soutient qu'en vertude cette
déclaration «le Nicaragua a pris un engagement avec lequel la requête
unilatéralequ'ila présentéeàla Cour estincompatible».Que lecompor-
tement adoptépar le Nicaragua à l'égardde la déclarationd'Esquipulas
ait crééou non un tel engagement,laCour estimeque les événements de
juin-juillet 1986((épuisaientla procédure initiale,àla fois aux fins de
l'articleIVdu pacte et au regard de toute autre obligationd'épuiser cette
procédure qui auraitpu existerindépendammentdu pacte.

95. La Cour conclut de ce qui précèdeque lestroisième et quatrième
exceptions opposées par le Honduras à la recevabilitéde la requête
doiventêtrerejetées.
96. La Cour ajoutera que c'estd'unpoint de vuejuridique qu'elledoit
seprononcer surlarecevabilitéd'unerequête.C'estpourquoid , anslapré-
senteaffaire,laquestion desavoirsiune «procédure»particulièredoitou
non êtreconsidéréecomme((épuisée »auxfins del'articleIVdu pacte de
Bogota a été examinée compte tenu de la situation au moment où la re-
quêtea été déposée àla Cour. Cela ne signifie pas que la Cour n'a pas
consciencequ'après cettedate leseffortsenvuederésoudrelesdifficultés
existant en Amérique centraleont pris un nouvel essor avec les accords
connussouslenomd'EsquipulasII. Ilnefaudrait paspensernonplus que
la Cour n'apas conscience que la requête soulèvedespointsde droit qui

ne sont que des éléments d'une situation politique plusvaste. Mais ces
questionsplusgénéralesnesont pas du ressort dela Cour, obligéequ'elle
est de selimiteruxdits points de droit.

97. La Cour relèveau surplus que le groupe de Contadora n'a pas
réclamé un rôle exclusifdans le processus qu'ilavait mis en mouvement.
Le paragraphe 34du préambuledu projet reviséd'accord de Contadora
du 7 septembre 1984estainsirédigé :

«Les Gouvernements des Républiquesdu Costa Rica, d'El Sal-
vador, du Guatemala, du Honduras et du Nicaragua ...
.............................
Réaffirmas an,s préjudicedu droit de recourirà d'autres ins-
tances internationales compétentes,leur volontéde résoudre leurs
différends dans le cadre du processus de négociation établi sous

l'égidedu groupe de Contadora .».
Parailleurs,lelibelléanalogueduparagraphe 35du préambulede laver-
sion finale de l'accorddeContadora du 6 juin 1986fait clairementppa-the EsquipulasDeclaration of25May 1986(paragraph8 1above),Nicara-
guahas entered into a"commitment tothe Contadora process" ;it argues
that byvirtue ofthat Declaration, "Nicaragua entered intoa commitment
with which its present unilateral Application to the Court is plainly
incompatible". The Court considers that whether or not the conduct of
Nicaragua or the Esquipulas Declaration created any such commitment,
the events of June/July 1986constituted a "conclusion" of the initial
procedure both for purposes of Article IV ofthe Pact and in relation to
any other obligationto exhaust that procedure which might haveexisted
independently of the Pact.

95. The Court concludes from the foregoing that the third and fourth
objections raised by Honduras to the admissibility of the Application
must be dismissed.
96. The Court would add the following.It has to determine the admis-
sibility of an Application brought before it as a matter of law. Accord-
ingly,inthe presentcasethe questionwhether aparticular "procedure" is,
or is not, to be regarded as "concluded" for thepurposes of Article IVof
the Pact of Bogotahas been appreciated in the light ofthe position at the
moment ofthe Nicaraguan Application to theCourt. This does not mean
that theCourt isunaware that, subsequent to that date, efforts to resolve
the difficultiesexistinginCentralAmericatook anew leaseoflifewiththe
agreement known as Esquipulas II. Nor should it be thought that the
Court isunaware that theApplication raisesjuridical questions whichare
only elements of a larger political situation.ose widerissues are how-
ever outside the competence of the Court, which is obliged to confine
itselftothesejuridical questions.

97. The Court alsotakesnote ofthe factthattheContadora Group did
not claim any exclusiverole for the process it set in train. Paragraph34
of the Preambleto the revised draft Contadora Act of 7 September 1984
provided the following :

"The Governments of the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. ..

ReafJimting,without prejudice to the right to resort to competent
international forums,their willingnessto settletheir disputes in the
framework of the negotiation process sponsored by the Contadora
Group.. ."

The similarwording of preambular paragraph 35of the Final Act dated
6 June 1986makes it clear that the dispute settlement procedures to beraître que les procédures derèglementdes différendsqui devaient être
adoptéesen application de cet instrument ne devaient pas exclure«le
droit de recouriàd'autres instances internationales compétenD.s

98. La Cour conclut qu'elle est compétente, conformément à l'ar-
ticleXXXI du pacte de Bogoth,pour connaître de la présente affaire et
que la requête déposépear le Nicaragua le 28juillet 1986est recevable.

99. Par cesmotifs,

1) à l'unanimité,

Ditqu'elle a compétence, conformémenà t l'articleXXXI du pacte de
Bogoth,pour connaître de la requête déposépear leGouvernement de la
Républiquedu Nicaragua le 28juillet 1986;

2) à l'unanimité,
Ditque la requêtedu Nicaragua estrecevable.

Fait enfrançais etenanglais,letextefrançais faisant foi,au palais de la
Paix,à LaHaye,levingtdécembremilneufcentquatre-vingt-huit,entrois
exemplaires,dont l'un resteradéposéauxarchivesde la Cour etlesautres
seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Républiquedu
Nicaragua et au Gouvernement de la Républiquedu Honduras.

Le Président,

(Signé)JoséMaria RUDA.
LeGreffier,

(Signé)Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.

M. LACHS j,ge,joint une déclarationl'arrêt.

MM. ODA,SCHWEBE et SHAHABUDDE jENe,s, joignent l'arrêtles
exposésde leur opinion individuelle.

(Paraphé)J.M.R.

(Paraphé)E.V.O.adopted under that instrument werenot intended to exclude"the right of
recourseto other competent international forums".

98. TheCourt concludesthat ithasjurisdiction to entertainthe present
caseunder ArticleXXXI ofthe Pact of Bogota,and that the Application
filedby Nicaragua on 28July 1986is admissible.

99. For these reasons,

(1) Unanimously,
Endsthat it hasjurisdiction under Article XXXI ofthe Pact of Bogota
to entertain the Application filed by the Government of the Republic of
Nicaragua on 28July 1986;

(2) Unanimously,
Findsthat the Application of Nicaragua is admissible.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twentieth day of December, one
thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight,in three copies, one of which
willbeplaced inthe archivesoftheCourtand the otherstransmitted to the
Government ofthe Republic of Nicaragua and tothe Government ofthe
Republic of Honduras, respectively.

(Signed)José Maria RUDA,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo ~LENCIA-OSPINA,

Registrar.

Judge LACHS appends a declaration to theJudgment ofthe Court.

Judges ODA,SCHWEBE aLd SHAHABUDDE aEpend separate opinions
to the Judgment ofthe Court.

(Initialled)J.M.R.

(Initialled)E.V.O. DECLARATION BYJUDGE LACHS

The Court's Judgment has necessarily to dwell on and resolve only
issues of procedure Cjurisdictionand admissibility);judgments of this

type maybe exposed to criticismasbeing apparently legalistic.
Yet solutions of matters of procedure are essential in the activities of
anycourt, astheydetermine itsroleinthe fate ofa disputebroughtbefore
it.Suchdecisionsmayconstitutethe Court's lastwordinsuchadispute,or
theymayopenthe door to substantiveconsideration. Intakingthesedeci-
sions,this Court has to exercisethe utmost careto discourageattempts to
resort to it in any caseacking a proper jurisdictional foundation, but at
the same time not to deny Statestheir right to benefit from its decisions
where such a foundation does exist. Sometimesthe mere opening of the
door maybring about a solution to a dispute.

In the present casethe Court has had to take decisions which - aswill

be clearfrom a mere reading ofthe Judgment - have not been freefrom
complexities,placing onjudges serious responsibilities,both as regards
analysis of the underlying circumstances of the case, and of a juridical
nature.
The Court has not prejudged the future. Thus the Parties retain their
freedom of action, and fullpossibilities of findingsolutions.
Al1 these considerations have prompted me to givemy support to this
decision,votingin favour ofthe Judgment, as 1have in 18ofthe 19Judg-
mentsin the elaboration of which 1have participated.

(Signed) Manfred LACHS. DÉCLARATION DE M. LACHS

[Traduction]

L'arrêdte la Cour doitnécessairementnetraiteretne résoudreque des
questions de procédure (compétenceetrecevabilité).On peut reprocher
aux arrêtsde cegenre d'être apparemment empreintsdejuridisme.
C'est cependant une des activitésessentiellesde tout tribunal que de
trancher des questions de procédure puisqueces questions déterminent
l'attitudequ'iladoptequantausort àréserveràun différendportédevant
lui.Enprenantune telledécision,laCour peut soitstatuer définitivement
sur cedifférend,soitouvrirlavoie àl'examenau fond. Lorsqu'elle sepro-
nonce,la Cour doit veilleravecleplus grand soin àdécouragertoute ten-

tative de porter devant elle un différenden l'absence de fondement de
juridiction adéquat,sans pour autant nier aux Etats ledroit qui est leleur
de bénéficierde ses décisions lorsqu'il existe un tel fondement.Il suffit
parfois d'ouvrir lavoie l'examenau fond pour qu'un différendtrouvesa
solution.
Dans la présente affaire, la Cour a dû prendre des décisions qui
n'étaientpas sans souleverde délicatesquestions,ainsiqu'ilressort de la
lecture del'arrêt. aresponsabilitédesjuges étaitgrande,qu'il s'agissede
l'examende la situation dans laquelle l'affaire s'inscrivaitou de l'aspect
(juridiquede leur responsabilité.
La Cour n'a pas préjugél'avenir. Les Parties conservent donc leur
libertéd'action ettoutes possibilitésde trouver des solutions.
Toutes ces considérationsm'ont conduit à donner mon appui à cette
décisionde la Cour. Sur les dix-neuf arrêts l'élaboration desquelsj'ai

participé,c'est ledix-huitièmepour lequelj'aivoté affirmativement.

(Signé)Manfred LACHS.

ICJ document subtitle

Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 20 December 1988

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