Judgment of 2 February 1973

Document Number
055-19730202-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

COUR.INTERNDJUSTICE

RECUEILDES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS

ET ORDONNANCES

INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,

ADVlSORY OPINIONS
AND ORDERS INTElRNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

R.EPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

FISHEKIES JURISDICTION CASE

(UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND v. ICELAND)

JUliTSDICTION OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT OF 2 FEBRUARY 1973

COPIR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CC)NSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE LA COMPÉTENCE
EN MATIÈRE DE PÊCHERIES

(ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET
D'1RI;ANDE DU NORD c. ISLANDE)

C:OMPI?TENCEDE LA COUR

.ARRETDU 2 FEVRIER 1973 Officialcit:tion
FisheriesJurisdiction (United Kingdomv. Iceland),
Jurisdiction of theCourt, Judgment,I.C.J. Reports 1973,

Mode officielde citation:
Compétenceen matièredepêcheries(Royaume-Uni
c. IslanC.I.J. Recueilp.93.,rêt,

Salesnumber
I No devent: 374 1 2 FEBRUARY 1973

JUDGMENT

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE

(UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND v. ICELAND)
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

AFFAIRE DE LA COMPÉTENCE

EN MATIÈRE DE PÊCHERIES
(ROYAUIME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET

D'IRLANDE DU NORD c.ISLANDE)
ICOMPÉTENCEDE LA COUR INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1973 YEAR 1973
2 February
GeneralList
No. 55 2February 1973

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE

(UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAINAND

NORTHERN IRELAND v.ICELAND)

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Jurisdiction of the Court-Applicability of a compromissory clauseproviding

for reference to the Court on the o-A.rrenceof as~ecifiedevent-Failureof one
party-to appear-Examinatof question of jurisdiction by the Courtproprio
motu-Statute,Article 53-Compromissorclause in Exchange of Notes-
Statute, Article 36,paragraph 1-Determination of scopeandpurpose of agree-
ment-Relevanceof preparatory work-Inivalidityof clause-Question of
duress-Duratioof clause-Implementatiof clause subject to condition-
Changed circumstancesoffact and lawasground of termination of agreement-
Conditionsfor application of doctrine offundamental changeof circumstances-
Efict of changed circumstances in relationto compromissory clause.

JUDGMENT

Present: PresidenSir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN; Vice-President
AMMOUN; Judges Sir Gerald FITZMAURICP E, DILLANERVO,
FORSTER G,ROS,BENGZON,PETRÉNL , ACHS,ONYEAMA D,ILLARD,
IGNACIO-PINT OE, CASTROM, OROZOV J,M~NEZ DE ARÉCHAGA;
Registrar AQUARONE. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case,
between

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

represented by
Mr. H. Steel, OBE, Legal Counsellor in the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office,
as Agent,

assisted by
the Rt. Hon. Sir Peter Rawlinson, QC, MP, Attorney-General,
Dr. D. W. Bowett, President of Queens' College, Cambridge, Member of
the English Bar,
Professor D. H. N. Johnson, Professor of International and Air Law in
the University of London, Member of the English Bar,
Mr. J. L. Simpson, CMG,TD, Member of the English Bar,

Mr. G. Slynn, Member of the English Bar,
Mr. P. Langdon-Davies, Member of the English Bar,
as Counsel,
and by

Mr. M. G. de Winton, CBE, MC, Assistant Solicitor, Law Officers'
Department,
Mr. P. Pooley, Assistant Secretary, Ministryof Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food,
Mr. G. W. P. Hart, Second Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

as Advisers,
and

the Republic of Iceland,

composed as above,

delivers thefollowing Judgment:

1. By a letter of 14Aprill972, received in the Registry of the Court the
same day, the Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy in the Netherlands
transmitted to the Registrar an Application instituting proceedings against
the Republic of Iceland in respect of a dispute concerning the then proposed
extension by the Government of Iceland of its fisheries jurisdiction. In order
to found the jurisdiction of the Court, the Application relied on Article 36,
paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on an Exchange of Notes
between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
Iceland dated 11 March 1961.
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
at once communicated to the Government of Iceland. In accordance with
paragraph 3 of that Article, al1 other States entitled to appear before the
Court were notified of the Application. 3. By a letter dated 29 May 1972from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Iceland, received in the Registry on 31 May 1972, the Court was informed
(inter alia) that the Government of Iceland was not willing to confer juris-
diction on the Court and would not appoint an Agent.
4. On 19July 1972,the Agent of the United Kingdom fled in the Registry
of the Court a request for the indication of interim measures of protection
under Article 41 of the Statute and Article 61 of the Rules of Court adopted
on 6 May 1946. By an Order dated 17 August 1972, the Court indicated
certain interim measures of protection in the case.
5. By an Order dated 18 August 1972, the Court, considering that it was
necessary to resolve first of al1 the question of its jurisdiction in the case,
decided that the first pleadings should be addressed to the question of the
jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute, and fued time-limits for
the filing of a Memorial by the Government of the United Kingdom and a
Counter-Memorial by the Government of Iceland. The Memorial of the
Government of the United Kingdom was filed within the time-limit pre-
scribed, and was communicated to the Government of Iceland. No Counter-

Memorial was filed by the Government of Iceland and, the written pro-
ceedings being thus closed, the case was ready for hearing on 9 December
1972, the day following the expiration of the time-limit fixed for the
Counter-Memorial of the Government of Iceland.
6. The Governments of Ecuador, the Federal Republic of Germany and
Senegal requested that the pleadings and annexed documents in this case
should be made available to them in accordance with Article 44, paragraph 2,
of the Rules of Court. The Partieshavingindicated that they had no objection,
it was decided to accede to these requests. Pursuant to Article 44, paragraph
3, of the Rules of Court, the pleadings and annexeddocuments were, with the
consent of the Parties, made accessible to the public as from the date of the
opening of the oral proceedings.
7. On 5 January 1973,after due notice to the Parties, a public hearing was
held in the course of which the Court heard the oral argument on the question
of the Court's jurisdiction advanced by Sir Peter Rawlinson on behalf of the
Government of the United Kingdom. The Government of Iceland was not

represented at the hearing.
8. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom:
in the Application :

"The United Kingdom asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
(a) That there is no foundation in international law for the claim by
Iceland to be entitled to extend its fisheries jurisdiction by estab-
lishing a zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction extending to 50
nautical miles from the baselines hereinbeforereferred to; and that
its claim is therefore invalid; and
(b) that questions concerning the conservation of fish stocks in the
waters around Iceland are not susceptible in international law to

regulation by the unilateral extension by Iceland of its exclusive
fisheriesjurisdiction to 50 nautical milesfromtheaforesaid baselines
but are matters that may be regulated, as between Iceland and the
United Kingdom, by arrangements agreed between those two
countries, whether or not together with other interested countries
and whether in the form of arrangements reached in accordance with the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 24 January
1959, or in the form of arrangements for collaboration in accor-

dance with the Resolution on Special Situations relating to Coastal
Fisheries of 26 April 1958, or otherwise in theform of arrangements
agreed between them that give effect to the continuing rights and
interests of both of them in the fisheries of the waters in question."

in the Memorial :

"The Government of the United Kingdom submit to the Court that
they are entitled to a declaration and judgment that the Court has full
jurisdiction to proceed to entertain the Application by the United King-
dom on the merits of the dispute."

9. At the close of the oral proceedings, the following written submissions
were filed in the Registry of the Court on behalf of the Government of the
United Kingdom:
"The Government of the United Kingdom contend

(a) that the Exchange of Notes of 11 March, 1961,always has been and
remains now a valid agreement;
(6) that, for the purposes of Article 36 (1) of the Statute of the Court,
the Exchange of Notes of 11 March, 1961, constitutes a treaty or
convention in force, and a submission by both parties to the juris-
diction of the Court in case of a dispute in relation to a claim by
Iceland to extend its fisheries jurisdiction beyond the limits agreed
in thatExchange of Notes;
(c) that, given the refusal by the United Kingdom to accept the validity
of unilateral action by Iceland purporting to extend its fisheries
limits (as manifested in the Aides-Memoires of the Government of
Iceland of 31 August, 1971, and 24 February, 1972, the Resolution

of theAlthing of 15 February, 1972,andthe Regulations of 14July,
1972, issued pursuant to that Resolution), a dispute exists between
Iceland and the United Kingdom which constitutes a dispute
within the terms of the compromissory clause of the Exchange of
Notes of 11 March, 1961;
(d) that the purported termination by Iceland of the Exchange of Notes
of 11 March, 1961, so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Court is
without legal effect; and
(e) that, by virtue of the Application Instituting Proceedings that was
filed with the Court on 14 April, 1972, the Court is now seised of
jurisdiction in relation to the said dispute.
Accordingly, the Government of the United Kingdom submit to the

Court that they are entitled to a declaration and judgment that the
Court has fulljurisdiction to proceed to entertain the Application by the
United Kingdom on the merits of the dispute."
10. No pleadings were filed by the Government of Iceland, which was also
not represented at the oral proceedings, and no submissions were theiefore
presented on its behalf. The attitude of that Government with regard to the
question of the Court's jurisdiction was however defined in the above-
mentioned letter of 29 May 1972 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Iceland. After calling attention to certain documents that letter stated:

7 "Those documents deal with the background and termination of the
agreement recorded in the Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961, and
with the changedcircumstancesresultingfromtheever-increasingexploi-
tation ofthe fisheryresourcesin the seassurrounding Iceland."

The letter concluded by saying:
"After the termination of the Agreementrecorded in the Exchangeof
Notes of 1961,there was on 14 April 1972 no basis under the Statute
for the Court to exercisejurisdiction in the case to which the United
Kingdomrefers.
The Government of Iceland, consideringthat the vital interestsof the
people of Iceland are involved, respectfullyinforms the Court that it is
not willingto conferjurisdiction on the Court in any case involvingthe
extent of the fisherylimits of Iceland, and specificallyin the case sought
to be instituted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland on 14 April 1972.
Having regard to the foregoing, an Agent will not be appointed to
represent the Government of Iceland."
In a telegram to the Court dated 4 December 1972, the Minister for Foreign
Affairsof Iceland stated that the position of the Governmentof Icelandwas
unchanged.

11. The present caseconcerns a dispute between the Government of the
United Kingdom and the Government of Iceland occasioned by the
claim of thelatter to extend its exclusivefisheriesjurisdiction to a zone of
50 nautical miles around Iceland. In the present phase it concerns the
competence of the Court to hear and pronounce upon this dispute. The
issue being thus limited, the Court will avoid not only al1expressions of
opinion on matters of substance, but also any pronouncement which
might prejudge or appearto prejudge any eventual decision on the merits.

12. It is to be regretted that the Government of Iceland has failed to
appear in order to plead the objections to the Court's jurisdiction which
it is understood to entertain. Nevertheless the Court, in accordance with
itsStatute and its settled jurisprudence, must examine proprio motu the
question of its own jurisdiction toconsider the Application of the United

Kingdom. Furthermore, in the present case the duty of the Court to
make this examination on its own initiative is reinforced by the terms of
Article 53 of the Statute of the Court. According to this provision,
whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to
defend its case, the Court, before finding upon the merits, must satisfy
itself that it has jurisdiction. It follows from the failure of Iceland to
appear in this phase of the case that it has not observed the terms of
Article 62, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, which requires inter aliathat a State objecting to the jurisdiction should "set oiit the facts and
the law on which the objection is based", its submissions on the matter,
and any evidence which it may wish to adduce. Nevertheless the Court,
in examining its own jurisdiction, will consider those objections which
might, in its view, be raised against itsjurisdiction.

13. To found the jurisdiction of the Court in the proceedings, the
Applicant relies on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's Statute,
which provides that: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises ... al1
matters speciallyprovided for ... in treaties and conventions in force";
and on the penultimate paragraph (the "compromissory clause7')of the
Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom and
the Government of Iceland of 11 March 1961(the "1961 Exchange of
Notes"), which provides :
"The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the im-
plementation of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding
the extension of fisheriesjurisdiction around Iceland, but shall give

to the United Kingdom Government six months' notice of such
extension, and, in case of a dispute in relation to such extension, the
matter shall, at the request of either party, be referred to the Inter-
national Court of Justice."
In its resolution of 5 May 1959the Althing (the Parliament of Iceland)
had declared:

". .. that it considers tlzat Iceland has an indisputable right to
fishery limits of 12 miles, tlzat recognition should be obtained of
Iceland's right to the entire continental shelf area in conformity
with the policy adopted by the Law of 1948,concerning the Scientific
Conservation of the Continental Shelf Fisheries and that fishery
limits of lessthan 12 milesfrom base-linesaround thecountry areout
of the question".

14. The meaning of the expression "extension of fisheriesjurisdiction"
in the compromissory clause must be sought in the context of this Althing
resolution and of the complete text of the 1961 Exchange of Notes, in
which the two contracting parties, referring to the discussions which had
taken place concerning a fisheriesdispute between them, stated that they
were willing to settle that dispute on the following basis: The United
Kingdom, for its part, agreed that it "will no longer object to a twelve-
mile fishery zone around Iceland" (paragraph 1 of the Notes), measured
from certain designated baselines relating to the delimitation of that zone
(paragraph 2). It futher agreed to a three-year transitional periodduring
which vessels registered in the United Kingdom might fish within the
outer six miles of the 12-milezone, subject to certain specifiedtimes and
exclusions with respect to designated areas (paragraphs 3 and 4). It also9 FISHERIESJURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)

recognized (in the compromissory clause) that the Icelandic Government

"will continue to work for the implementation of the Althing Resolution
of May 5, 1959" regarding its extension of fisheries jurisdiction. The
Icelandic Government, for its part, agreed in that clause to give six
months' notice of such extension and also agreed therein that "in case of
a dispute in relation tosuch extension, the matter shall, at the request of
eitherParty, be referred to the International Court of Justice".

15. In an aide-mémoire of31August 1971the Government of Iceland
gave notice to the United Kingdom Government that it "now finds it
essential to extend further the zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction
around its coasts to include the areas of sea covering the continental
shelf", adding that: "It is contemplated that the new limits, the precise
boundaries of which willbe furnished at a later date, willenter into force
not later than 1 September, 1972." In answer to this notice, the United
Kingdom Government advised the Government of Iceland on 27 Sep-

tember 1971 of its view "that such an extension of the fishery zone
around Iceland would have no basis in international law". It also reserved
its rights under the 1961Exchange of Notes, "including the right to refer
disputes to the International Court of Justice".

16. There is no doubt in the present case as to the fulfilment by the
United Kingdom of its part of the agreement embodied in the 1961
Exchange of Notes concerning the recognition of a 12-milefishery zone
around Iceland, and the phasing-out during a period of three years of
fishingby British vesselswithin that zone. There is no doubt either that a
dispute has arisen between the parties andthat it has persisteddespite the
negotiations which took place in 1971 and 1972. This dispute clearly
relates to the extension by Iceland of its fisheriesjurisdiction beyond the
12-milelimit in the waters above its continental shelf, as contemplated
in the Althing resolution of 5 May 1959.

17. Equally, there is no question but that Iceland gave the United
Kingdom the required notice of extension. In consequence, the United
Kingdom having disputed the validity, not of the notice but of the
extension, theonly question now before theCourt iswhether the resulting
dispute falls within the compromissory clause of the 1961 Exchange of
Notes as being one for determination by the Court. Since, on the face of
it, the dispute thus brought to the Court upon the Application of the
United Kingdom falls exactly within the terms of this clause, the Court
would normally apply the principle it reaffirmed in its 1950 Advisory
Opinion concerning the Competence of the General Assembly for the
Admission of a State to the UnitedNations,according to which there is no
occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a convention is10 FISHERIESJURISDICTION(JUDGMENT)

sufficientlyclear in itself. However, having regard to the peculiar circum-

stances of the present proceedings, as set forth inparagraph 12above, and
in order fully to ascertain the scope and purpose of the 1961Exchange of
Notes, the Court will undertake a brief review of the negotiations that
led up to that exchange.

18. The records of these negotiations which weredrawn up byand have
been brought to the Court's attention by the Applicant, as well as certain
documents exchanged between the two Governments, show that, as early
as 5 October 1960, it had become apparent that the United Kingdom
would accept in principle Iceland's right to exclusivefisheriesjurisdiction
within the 12-mile limit following the end of a transitional period.
However, the Government of the United Kingdom sought an assurance
that therewouldbe no further extensions of Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction

excluding Britsh vessels, in implementation of the Althing resolution,
except in conformity with international law. In the course of the discus-
sions concerning this point both parties accepted the notion that disputes
arising from such further extensions should be submitted to third-party
decision. The Government of Iceland preferred recourse to arbitration,
a position consistent with the proposals it had put forward and the
attitudeit had adopted at both Conferences on the Law of the Seain 1958
and 1960. Its representatives are recorded in the documents brought to
the Court's attention as having proposed in the bilateral negotiations on
28 October 1960the following :

"The Icelandic Government reserves its right to extend fisheries
jurisdiction in Icelandic waters in conformity with international law.
Such extension would, however, be based either on an agreement
(bilateral ormiiltilateral) or decisions of the TcelandicGovernment
which would be subject to arbitration at the request of appropriate
parties."

For its part, the Governn~ent of the United Kingdom preferred that
disputes be referred to the Tnternational Court of Justice. Equally, the
representatives of Iceland, while having indicated their preference for
arbitration, expressed in later meetings, and specifically on 4 November
1960,their willingness to accept the International Court of Justice as the
appropriateforum. Subsequent exchanges of drafts consistentlycontained
a specific reference to the Court, which was finally included in the 1961
Exchange of Notes. In placing the terms of the proposed Exchange of
Notes before the Althing on 28 February 1961,the Government of Iceland
presented a memorandum which included the followifig statement con-
cerning this point : "The Government declares that it will continue to work for the
implementation of the Althing resolution of 5 May, 1959,regarding
the extensions of the fisheriesjurisdiction around Iceland. Such an
extension would, however, be notified to the British Government six
months in advance, and ifa dispute arises in connection with these
measures, this shall be referred to the International Court of Justice,
should either one of the parties request it." (Emphasis added.)

19. The representatives of Iceland having accepted the proposal for
reference to the International Court of Justice, discussioncontinued as to
the precise formulation of the compromissory clause, including, in par-
ticular, the method whereby the agreement to have recourse to the Court
would be effected. On 3 December 1960 the Icelandic delegation is
recorded as having proposed the following text:

"The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the imple-
mentation of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding the
extension of fisheriesjurisdiction around Iceland. Six months notice
will be given of the application of anysuch extension and in case of
dispute the measures will be referred to the International Court of
Justice." (Emphasis added.)

The delegation of the United Kingdom proposed to insert in the last
phrase of this text the words "at the request of either party" in order to
makeit clearthat thejurisdiction of the Court could be invoked by means
of a unilateral application and need not require a joint submission by
both parties. This howeverwasnot immediately agreedto by the Icelandic
delegation. In a draftexchange of Notes put forward by the Government
of Iceland on 10 December 1960 it was proposed that the assurance
sought by the Government of the United Kingdom should be couched in
the following terms:

"Icelandic Government willcontinue to work for implementation
of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding extension of
fisheriesjurisdiction around Iceland. Six months' notice will begiven
of application of any such extension and in case of dispute the
measures will, at the requestof the severalparties, be referred to the
International Court of Justice." (Emphasis added.)

This proposa1 was not accepted by the Government of the United King-
dom, which on 16December 1960submitted a new text of the assurance
insisting on the words "at the request of either party". This text was
finally agreed to by Iceland on 13 February 1961and the words "at the
request of either party" thus appear in the compromissory clause of the
Exchange of Notes.

20. A further point of differenceconcerned the form to be givento theassurance contained in that clause. The proposa1 for a draft exchange of
Notes put forward by the Government of Iceland on 10 December 1960

was unacceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom for a
number of reasons set out in a Message by the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs delivered on 14 December 1960. Included among the
objections was the failure to frame theexchange as an agreement binding
on the parties. As stated in the Message:
". .. the assurance should be set out in an Exchange of Notes
expressly stated to constitute an Agreement which would, in Her
Majesty's Government's view, be the only way of binding both
parties to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in the event of any dispute arising over extensions of fishery
jurisdiction. We regard this as essential if we are going to achieve
stability inurfuture fishery relations as weearnestly desire."

In a letter addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the
United Kingdom to the Foreign Minister of Iceland on 21 December
1960it was also considered-

". . essential that the terms of the Assurance that any dispute on
future extensions of fishery jurisdiction beyond 12 miles would be
referred to the International Court of Justice, should be embodied
in a form which is an Agreement registered with the Secretariat of
the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
Article 102 of the Charter specifically provides that unless so
registered the Agreement cannot be invoked before any organ of
the United Nations.'

This proposa1 was finally accepted by the TcelandicGovernment, and the
last sentence of the Note of 11 March 1961 addressed by the Foreign
Minister of Tcelandto the British Ambassador reads as follows:

"1 have the honour to suggest that this Note and Your Excel-
lency's reply thereto, confirming that its contents are acceptable to
the United Kingdom Government, shall be registered with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with Article
102of the United Nations Charter ..."

This was agreed to in the Note sent on the same date by the British
Ambassador in Reykjavik to the Foreign Minister of Iceland. In its
memorandum to the Althing of 28 February 1961 the Government of
Iceland stated :
"Finally it is provided in the Note that it, together with the reply
of the British Government, where the British Government confirms
its contents, be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In Article 102 of the United Nations Charter it is stated

that only agreements that are so registered can be handled by the
International Court of Justice, should a dispute arise concerning
their implementation. This provision is a direct consequence of what
ha: been said about reference of the matter to the International
Court of Justice."

The Exchange of Notes was registered by the Government of Iceland
with the Secretariat of the United Nations on 8June 1961.
21. The history of the negotiations not only shows theintentions of the
parties but also explains the significance of the six months' notice
required to be given by the Government of Iceland to the United King-
dom Government, for on 2 December 1960the United Kingdom repre-
sentatives stated that the assurance they were seeking should provide,
inter alia,that, "pending the Court's decision, any measure taken to give
effect to such a rule will not apply to British vessels". The Foreign
Minister of Iceland is recorded as having replied on the same date that

the most difficult feature of the problem of the assurance was how to
deal with the point that "if there was a dispute, no measure to apply an
extension on fishery limits would be taken pending reference to the Inter-
national Court".

22. The idea of a six months' notice to be given by Iceland was first
discussed on 3 December 1960and was embodied in the formula advanced
by the Icelandic delegation on that same date, which is transcribed in
paragraph 19 above. This requirement of notice was agreed to by the
parties,It may be assumed that they considered that such a period would
allow sufficient time to settle the question through negotiations or, if no
settlement were reached, to submit the whole issue to the Court, in-
cluding, in accordance with the statutory powers possessed by the Court,
the applicability of the measures of exclusion to British vesselspendenre
lite.Furthermore, the interpretation advanced in the letter of 29 May
1972from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland to the Registrar of

the Court, intimating that the requirement of notice limited the right of
recourse to the Court to the eventuality that the Icelandic Government
should "without warning further extend the limits" (emphasis added),
does not correspond to the text of the compromissory clause, which
clearly relates to the extension of the limits and not to the notice of
extension. Such an interpretation is also to be discounted in the light of
the history of the negotiations.
23. This history reinforces the view that the Court has jurisdiction in
this case, and adds emphasis to the point that the real intention of the
parties was to give the United Kingdom Government an effectiveassur-
ance which constituted a sine qua non and not merely a severable condi-
tion of the whole agreement: namely, the right to challenge before the
Court the validity of any further extension of Icelandic fisheries juris-
diction in the waters above its continental shelf beyond the 12-milelimit.In consequence, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court to entertain the
present Application would fa11within the terms of the compromissory
clause and correspond exactly to the intentions and expectations of both
Parties when they discussedand consented to that clause. It thus appears
from the text ofthe compromissory clause,read in the context of the 1961
Exchange of Notes and in the light of the history of the negotiations, that
the Court hasjurisdiction. It has however been contended that the agree-
ment either was initially void or hassince ceased to operate. The Court
willnow consider these contentions.

24. The letter of 29 May 1972 addressed to the Registrar by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Icelandcontains the following statement:

"The 1961 Exchange of Notes took place under extremely difficult
circumstances, when the British Royal Navy had been using force
to oppose the 12-mile fishery limit established by the Icelandic
Government in 1958."

This statement could be interpreted as a veiled charge of duress pur-
portedly rendering the Exchange of Notes void ab initi ao,d it was dealt
with as such by the United Kingdom in its Memorial. There can be little
doubt, as is implied in the Charter of the United Nations and recognized
in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that
under contemporary international law an agreement concluded under
the threat or use of force is void. It is equally clear that a court cannot
consider an accusation of this serous nature on the basis of a vague
general charge unfortified by evidencein its support. The history of the
negotiations which led up to the 1961 Exchange of Notes reveals that
these instruments were freely negotiated by the interested parties on the
basis of perfect equality and freedom of decision on both sides. No fact
has been brought to the attention of the Court from any quarter sug-

gesting the slightest doubt on this matter.

25. In his letter of 29 May 1972 to the Registrar of the Court, the
Minister for Foreign Affairsof Iceland observed that the 1961agreement
"was not of a permanent nature" and added that:
"In particular, an undertaking for judicial settlement cannot be

considered to be of a permanent nature. There is nothing in that
situation, or in any generaluleofcontemporary international law, to
justify any other view."
This observation, directed against the Court's jurisdiction, appears to 15 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)

rest on the following chain of reasoning: (1) inasmuch as the com-
promissory clause contains no provision for termination, it could be
deemed to be of a permanent nature; but (2) a compromissory clause

cannot be of a permanent nature; therefore (3) it must be subject to
termination by givingadequate notice. Thisreasoning appears to underlie
the observation of the Government of Iceland in its aide-mémoire of
31August 1971to the effectthat:
"In the opinion of the Icelandic Government ... the object and
purpose of the provision for recourse to judicial settlement of
certain matters envisaged in the passage quoted above [i.e., the
compromissory clause] have been fully achieved."

26. It appears to the Court that, although the compromissory clause
in the 1961 Exchange of Notes contains no express provision regarding
duration, the obligation it embraces involves an inherent time-factor
conditioning its potential application. It cannot, therefore, be described
accurately as being of a permanent nature or as one binding the parties
in perpetuity. This becomes evident from a consideration of the object
of the clause when read in the context of theExchange of Notes.

27. The 1961 Exchange of Notes did not set up a definite time-limit
within which the Government of Iceland might make a claim in im-
plementation of the Althing's resolution. It follows that there could be
no specification of a time-limit for the corresponding right of the United
Kingdom to challenge such an extension and, if no agreement were
reached and the dispute persisted, to invoke the Court's jurisdiction. The
right of the United Kingdom thus to act would last so long as Iceland
might seek to implement the Althing's resolution. This was, of course,
within the control of the Government of Iceland which in 1971,ten years
after theExchange of Notes, made a claim to exclusivefisheryrights over
the entire continental shelf area surrounding its territory and thus
automatically brought into play the right of the United Kingdom to have
recourse to the Court.

28. That being so, the compromissory clause in the 1961Exchange of
Notes may be described as an agreement to submit to the Court, at the

unilateral request of either party, a particular type of dispute which was
envisaged and anticipated by the parties. The right to invoke the Court's
jurisdiction was thus deferred until the occurrence of well-definedfuture
events and was therefore subject to a suspensive condition. In other
words, it was subject to a condition which could, at any time, materialize
if Iceland made a claim to extend her fishery limits, and the right of
recourse to theCourt could be invoked only in that event.

29. The above observations sufice to dispose of a possible objection
based on viewsexpressed by certain authorities to the effectthat treaties
of judicial settlement or declarations of acceptance of the compulsory16 FISHERlES JURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)

jurisdiction of the Court are among those treaty provisions which, by
their very nature, may be subject to unilateral denunciation in the absence
of express provisions regarding their duration or termination. Since those
views cannot apply to a case such as the present one, the Court does not
need to examine or pronounce upon the point of principle involved. It is
sufficient to remark thatsuch viewshave reference only to instruments in
which the parties had assumed a general obligation to submit to judicial
settlement al1or certain categories of disputes which might arise between
them in the unpredictable future. The 1961 Exchange of Notes does not
embody an agreement of this type. It contains a definite compromissory
clause establishing the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with a concrete
kind of dispute which was foreseen and specifically anticipated by the
parties. In consequence, when a dispute arises of precisely the sort
contemplated, and is referred to the Court, the contention that the com-
promissory clause has lapsed, or is terminable, cannot be accepted.

30. In his statement to the Althing on 9 November 1971,the Prime
Minister of Iceland alluded not only to an alleged change of circum-
stances with respect to fisheries and fishing techniques (which will be
considered later in this Judgment), but also to changes regarding "legal
opinion on fisheries jurisdiction". However, the relevance to the com-
promissory clause of this allusion is not apparent, since if there is a
dispute as to such changes it would be embraced in the compromissory
clause and might be considered as an issue going to the merits. On the
other hand, it could be considered as relevant to the compromissory
clause on an hypothesis familiar in the law of certain States under the
guise of "failure of consideration". Assuch, it is linked with the assertion
th~t, the object and purpose of the agreement having been fulfilled, it no
longer has a binding effect for Iceland.
31. It should be observed at the outset that the compromissory clause

has a bilateral character, each of the parties being entitled to invoke the
Court's jurisdiction; it is clear that in certain circumstances it could be
to Iceland's advantage to apply to the Court. The argument of Iceland
appears, however, to be that, because of the general trend of development
of international law on the subject of fishery limits during the last ten
years, the right of exclusivefisheriesjurisdiction to a distance of2miles
from the baselines of the territorial sea has been increasingly recognized
and claimed by States, including the applicant State itself. It would then
appear to be contended that the compromissory clause was the price
paid by Iceland for the recognition at that time of the 12-mile fishery
limit by the other Party. It is consequently asserted that if today the 12-
mile fishery limit is generally recognized, there would be a failure of
consideration relieving Iceland of itscommitment because of the changed
legal circumstances. Ttis on this basis that is is possible to interpret thePrime Minister's statement to the Althing on 9 November 1971, to the
effect that it was unlikely that the agreement would have been made if
the Government of Iceland had known how these matters would evolve.

32. While changes in the law may under certain conditions constitute
valid grounds for invoking a change of circumstances affecting the

duration of a treaty, the lcelandic contention is not relevant to the
present case. The motive which induced Iceland to enter into the
1961 Exchange of Notes may well have been the interest of obtaining
an immediate recognition of an exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a
distance of 12 miles in the waters around its territory. It may also be that
this interest has in the meantime disappeared, since a 12-mile fishery
zone is now asserted by the other contracting party in respect of its own
fisheries jurisdiction. But in the present case, the object andpurpose of
the 1961 Exchange of Notes, and therefore the circumstances which
constituted an essential basis of the consent of both parties to be bound
by the agreement embodied therein, had a much wider scope. That object
and purpose was not merely to decide upon the Icelandic claim to
fisheriesjurisdiction up to12miles, but also to provide a means whereby
the parties might resolve the question of the validity of anyfurther claims.
This follows not only from the text of the agreement but also from the
history of the negotiations, thatis to Say,from the whole set of circum-
stances which must be taken into account in determining what induced
both parties to agree to the 1961Exchange of Notes.

33. According to the memorandum submitted by the Government of
Iceland to the Althing on 28 February 1961,together with the proposed
Exchange of Notes, the agreement comprised :

"... four main points:
(1) Britain recognises immediately the 12 mile fishery zone of Ice-
land.
(2) Britain recognises important changes in the baselines in four
places around the country, which extends the fishery zone by
5065 square kilometres.
(3) British ships will be permitted to fish within specified areas
between the 6 and 12 mile limits for a limited period each year
during the next three years.

(4) The Government of Iceland declares that it will continue to
work for the implementation of the parliamentary resolution
of 5 May, 1959, regarding the extension of the fisheries juris-
diction around Iceland and that any dispute on actions that may
be taken, will be referred to the International Court of Justice."

Undoubtedly certain of these provisions, such as those concerning
fishing in designatedareas during a period of three years, had a transitorycharacter and may be considered to have become executed. But in
contrast there are other provisions which do not possess that same tran-
sitory character. The compromissory clause is an instance.
34. It is possible that today lceland may find that some of the motives

which induced it to enter into the 1961 Exchange of Notes have become
less compelling or have disappeared altogether. But this is not a ground
justifying the repudiation of those parts of the agreement the object and
purpose of which have remained unchanged. lceland has derived benefits
from the executed provisions of the agreement, such as the recognition
by the United Kingdom since 1961 ofa 12-mileexclusive fisheriesjuris-
diction, the acceptance by the United Kingdom of the baselines estab-
lished by lceland and the relinquishment in a period of three years of the
pre-existing traditional fishing by vessels registered in the United King-
dom. Clearly it then becomes incumbent on Iceland to comply with its
side of the bargain, which is to accept the testing before the Court of the
validity of its further claims to extended jurisdiction. Moreover, in the
case of a treaty which is in part executed and in part executory, in which
one of the parties has already benefited from the executed provisions of
the treaty, it would be particularly inadmissible tollow that party to put
an end to obligations which were accepted under the treaty by way of
quidpro quofor the provisions which the other party has already executed.

35. In his letter of 29 May 1972 to the Registrar, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of lceland refers to "the changed circumstances resulting
from the ever-increasing exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas
surrounding Iceland". Judicial notice should also be taken of other
statements made on the subject in documents which Iceland has brought
to the Court's attention. Thus, the resolution adopted by the Althing on
15 February 1972 contains the statement that "owing to changed cir-
cumstances the Notes concerning fishery limits exchanged in 1961are no
longer applicable".
36. In these statements the Government of Iceland is basing itself on
the principle of termination of a treaty by reason of change of circum-
stances. International law admits that a fundamental change in the
circumstances which determined the parties to accept a treaty, if it has
resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations
imposed by it, may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected a
ground for invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty. This
principle, and the conditions and exceptions to which it is subject, have
been embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which may in many respects be considered as a codification of
existing customary law on the subject of the termination of a treaty
relationship on account of change of circumstances.

37. One of the basic requirements embodied in that Article is that thechange of circumstances must have been a fundamental one. In this
respect the Government of lceland has, with regard to developments in

fishing techniques, referred in an official publication on Fisheries Juvis-
Clicfi i0I7celane dnclosed with the Foreign Minister's letter of 29 May
1972 to the Registrar, to the increased exploitation of the fishery re-
sources in the seas surrounding lceland and to the danger of still further
exploitation because of an increase in the catching capacity of fishing
fleets.The Icelandic statements recall the exceptional dependence of that
country on its fishing for its existence and economic development. In his
letter of 29 May 1972the Minister stated:

"The Government of Iceland, considering that the vital interests
of the people of Iceland are involved, respectfully informs the Court
that it is notwilling to confer jurisdiction on the Court in any case
involving the extent of the fishery limits of Iceland..."

In this same connection, the resolution adopted by the Althing on 15
February 1972had contained a paragraph in these terms:

"That the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic of Germany be again informed that because of the vital
interests of the nation and owing to changed circumstances the
Notes concerning fishery limits exchanged in 1961 are no longer
applicable and that their provisions do not constitute an obligation
for Iceland."

38. The invocation by Iceland of its "vital interests", which were not
made the subject of an express reservation to the acceptance of the juris-
dictional obligation under the 1961 Exchange of Notes, must be inter-
preted, in the context of the assertion of changed circumstances, as an
indication by Iceland of the reason why it regards as fundamental the
changes which in its view have taken place in previously existing fishing
techniques. This interpretation would correspond to the traditional view
that the changes of circumstances which must be regarded as fundamental
or vital arethose which imperil the existence or vital development of one

of the parties.
39. The Applicant, for its part, contends that the alterations and
progress in fishing techniques have not produced in the waters around
Iceland the consequences apprehended by Iceland and therefore that the
changes are not of a fundamental or vital character. In its Mernorial, it
points out that, as regards the capacity of fishing fleets, increases in the
efficiency of individual trawlers have been counter-balanced by the
reduction in total numbers of vessels in national fleets fishing in the
waters around Iceland, and that the statistics show that the total annual
catch of demersal species has varied to no great extent since 1960.

40. The Court, at the present stage of the proceedings, does not need to pronounce on this question of fact, as to which there appears to be
a serious divergence of views between the two Governments. If, as con-
tended by Iceland, there have been any fundamental changes in fishing

techniques in the waters around Iceland, those changes might be relevant
forthe decision on the merits of the dispute, and the Court might need to
examine the contention at that stage, together with any other arguments
that Iceland might advance in support of the validity of the extension of
its fisheriesjurisdiction beyond what was agreed to in the 1961Exchange
of Notes. But the alleged changes could not affect in the least the obliga-
tion to submit to the Court's jurisdiction,which is the only issue at the
present stage of the proceedings.It follows that the apprehended dangers
for the vital interests of Iceland, resulting from changes in fishing tech-
niques, cannot constitute a fundamental change with respect to the
lapse or subsistence of the compromissory clause establishing the
Court's jurisdiction.

41. lt should be observed in this connection that the exceptional
dependence of Iceland on its fisheries for its subsistence and economic
development is expressly recognized in the 1961 Exchange of Notes, and
the Court, in itsrder of 17August 1972,stated that "it isalso necessary

to bear in mind the exceptional dependence of the Icelandic nation upon
coastal fisheries for its livelihood and economjc development as ex-
pressly recognized by the United Kingdom in its Note addressed to the
Foreign Minister of Iceland dated 11 March 1961". The Court further
stated that "from this point of view account must be taken of the need
for the conservation of fish stocks in the Iceland area" (I.C.J.Reports
1972, pp. 16and 17).This point is not disputed.

42. Account must also be taken of the fact that the Applicant has
contended before the Court that to the extent that Iceland may, as a
coastal State specially dependent on coastal fisheries for its livelihood or
economic development, assert a need to procure the establishment of a
special fisheries conservation régime (including such a régime under
which it enjoys preferential rights) in the waters adjacent to its Coastbut
beyond the exclusive fisherieszone provided for by the 1961 Exchange of
Notes, it can legitimately pursue that objective by collaboration and
agreement with the other countries concerned, but not by the unilateral

arrogation of exclusive rights within those waters. The exceptional
dependence of Iceland on its fisheries and the principle of conservation
of fish stocks having been recognized, the question remains as to whether
lceland is or is not competent unilaterally to assert an exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction extending beyond the 12-mile limit. The isue before the
Court in the present phase of the proceedings concerns solely its juris-
diction to determine the latter point.21 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)

43. Moreover, in order that a change of circumstances may give rise
to a ground for invoking the termination of a treaty it is also necessary
that it should have resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of
the obligations still to be performed. The change must have increased the
burden of the obligations to be executed to the extent of rendering the
performance something. essentially different from that originally under-
taken. In respect of the obligation with which the Court is here concerned,
this condition is wholly unsatisfied; the change of circumstances alleged
by Iceland cannot be said to have transformed radically the extent of the
jurisdictional obligation which is imposed in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.
The compromissory clause enabled either of the parties to submit to the
Court any dispute between them relating to an extension of Icelandic
fisheriesjurisdiction in the waters above its continental shelf beyond the
12-milelimit. The present dispute is exactly of the character anticipated
in the compromissory clause of the Exchange of Notes. Not only has the

jurisdictional obligation not been radically transformed in its extent; it
has remained precisely what it was in 1961.

44. In the United Kingdom Memorial it is asserted that there is a flaw
in the Icelandic contention of change of circumstances: that the doctrine
never operates so as to extinguish a treaty automatically or to allow an
unchallengeable unilateral denunciation by one Party; it only operates
to confer a right to call for termination and, if that call is disputed, to
submit the dispute to someorgan or body withpower to determine whether
the conditions for the operation of the doctrine are present. In this
connection the Applicant alludes to Articles 65 and 66 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Those Articles provide that where
the parties to a treaty have failed within 12 months to achieve a settle-

ment of a dispute by the means indicated in Article 33 of the United
Nations Charter (which means include reference to judicial settlement)
any one of the parties may submit the dispute to the procedure for con-
ciliation provided in the Annex to the Convention.

45. In the present case, the procedural complement to the doctrine of
changed circumstances is already provided for in the 1961 Exchange of
Notes, which specifically calls upon the parties to have recourse to the
Court in the event of a dispute relating to Iceland's extension of fisheries
jurisdiction. Furthermore, any question as to the jurisdiction of the
Court, deriving from an alleged lapse through changed circumstances,
is resolvable through the accepted judicial principle enshrined in Article
36, paragraph 6, of the Court's Statute, which provides that "in the event
of a dispute as to whether the Court hasjurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by thedecision of the Court". In this case such a dispute obviously
exists, ascan be seen from Iceland's communications to the Court, andto the other Party, even if Iceland has chosen not to appoint an Agent,
file a Counter-Memorial or submit preliminary objections to the Court's
jurisdiction; and Article 53 of theStatute both entitles the Court and, in

the present proceedings, requires it to pronounce upon the question of its
jurisdiction. This it has now done with binding force.

46. For these reasons,

by fourteen votes to one,

finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland on 14April 1972and to deal with the merits of the dispute.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague,this second day of February, one thou-
sand nine hundred and seventy-three, in three copies, of which one will
be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland and to the Government of the Republic of Iceland, respectively.

(Signeci) ZAFRULLA KHAN,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

President Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHANmakes the following dec-
laration:

1am in entire agreement with the Judgment of the Court. 1consider it
needful, however, to append the following brief declaration.
The sole question before the Court in this phase of these proceedings
is whether, in viewof the compromissory clause in the Exchange of Notes
of II March 1961between the Government of the United Kingdom and
the Government of Iceland, read with Article 36 (1) of its Statute, theCourt is competent to pronounce upon the validity of the unilateral ex-
tension by Iceland of its exclusive fisheriesjurisdiction from to 50
nautical miles from the baselines agreed to by the parties in 1961. Al1
considerations tending to support or to discount the validity of Iceland's

action are, at this stage, utterly irrelevant. Toy such consideration
into aid for the purpose of determining the scope of the Court's jurisdic-
tion, would not only beg the question but would put the proverbial cart
before the horse with a vengeance and is to be strongly deprecated.

Judge Sir Gerald FITZMAURIa Cppends a separate opinion to the
Judgment of the Court.

Judge PADILLN AERVO appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of
the Court.

(Initialled) Z.K.
(Initialled) S.A.

Bilingual Content

COUR.INTERNDJUSTICE

RECUEILDES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS

ET ORDONNANCES

INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,

ADVlSORY OPINIONS
AND ORDERS INTElRNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

R.EPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

FISHEKIES JURISDICTION CASE

(UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND v. ICELAND)

JUliTSDICTION OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT OF 2 FEBRUARY 1973

COPIR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CC)NSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE LA COMPÉTENCE
EN MATIÈRE DE PÊCHERIES

(ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET
D'1RI;ANDE DU NORD c. ISLANDE)

C:OMPI?TENCEDE LA COUR

.ARRETDU 2 FEVRIER 1973 Officialcit:tion
FisheriesJurisdiction (United Kingdomv. Iceland),
Jurisdiction of theCourt, Judgment,I.C.J. Reports 1973,

Mode officielde citation:
Compétenceen matièredepêcheries(Royaume-Uni
c. IslanC.I.J. Recueilp.93.,rêt,

Salesnumber
I No devent: 374 1 2 FEBRUARY 1973

JUDGMENT

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE

(UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND v. ICELAND)
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

AFFAIRE DE LA COMPÉTENCE

EN MATIÈRE DE PÊCHERIES
(ROYAUIME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET

D'IRLANDE DU NORD c.ISLANDE)
ICOMPÉTENCEDE LA COUR INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1973 YEAR 1973
2 February
GeneralList
No. 55 2February 1973

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE

(UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAINAND

NORTHERN IRELAND v.ICELAND)

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Jurisdiction of the Court-Applicability of a compromissory clauseproviding

for reference to the Court on the o-A.rrenceof as~ecifiedevent-Failureof one
party-to appear-Examinatof question of jurisdiction by the Courtproprio
motu-Statute,Article 53-Compromissorclause in Exchange of Notes-
Statute, Article 36,paragraph 1-Determination of scopeandpurpose of agree-
ment-Relevanceof preparatory work-Inivalidityof clause-Question of
duress-Duratioof clause-Implementatiof clause subject to condition-
Changed circumstancesoffact and lawasground of termination of agreement-
Conditionsfor application of doctrine offundamental changeof circumstances-
Efict of changed circumstances in relationto compromissory clause.

JUDGMENT

Present: PresidenSir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN; Vice-President
AMMOUN; Judges Sir Gerald FITZMAURICP E, DILLANERVO,
FORSTER G,ROS,BENGZON,PETRÉNL , ACHS,ONYEAMA D,ILLARD,
IGNACIO-PINT OE, CASTROM, OROZOV J,M~NEZ DE ARÉCHAGA;
Registrar AQUARONE. COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE

1973
2 fbvrier
Rôle général
no 55

AFFAYRE DE LACOMPÉTENCE

EN NIATIÈREDE PÊCHERIES

(ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNEET

D'IRLANDE DU NORD c. ISLANDE)

CC)MPI?TENCE DE LA COUR

Compétencedela Cou- Applicabilitéd'uneclausecompromissoireprévoyant
lapossibilitédesaisir la Coursi un événementdéeproduit- Défaut de
comparutiond'une desparti-sExamen d'officepar la Cour de la question de
sa compétenc- Article 53 du Sta-utClause compromissoirede l'échange
de notes- Article 30, paragraphe 1, du St-tDétermination dela por-
téeet du but de l'acco-d Pertinence destravauxpréparato-reValidité
initiale de la cl-uQuestion de la contra-ntDuréed'application de la
clause- La mise enjeu de la clause étaitsoàune conditio- Change-
ment de circonstancefait et en droit invoquécomme cause d'extinction de
l'accor- Conditionsd'applicationdela théoriedu changementfondamental de
circonstance- Effet du changement de circonstances en ce qui concerne la
clause compromissoire.

Présents:Sir MuhammadZAFRULLK AHAN,Président;M. AMMOUNV , ice-
Prksident; sirGeraldFITZMAURICME, .PADILLNAERVO F,ORSTER,
GROS,BENGZON, PET~N, LACHSO , NYEAMA D,ILLARDI,GNACIO-
PINTO, DE (CASTRO M, OROZOV J,IMBNEZDE ARBCHAGA ju,ges;
M. AQUAROI~ GEr,effier. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case,
between

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

represented by
Mr. H. Steel, OBE, Legal Counsellor in the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office,
as Agent,

assisted by
the Rt. Hon. Sir Peter Rawlinson, QC, MP, Attorney-General,
Dr. D. W. Bowett, President of Queens' College, Cambridge, Member of
the English Bar,
Professor D. H. N. Johnson, Professor of International and Air Law in
the University of London, Member of the English Bar,
Mr. J. L. Simpson, CMG,TD, Member of the English Bar,

Mr. G. Slynn, Member of the English Bar,
Mr. P. Langdon-Davies, Member of the English Bar,
as Counsel,
and by

Mr. M. G. de Winton, CBE, MC, Assistant Solicitor, Law Officers'
Department,
Mr. P. Pooley, Assistant Secretary, Ministryof Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food,
Mr. G. W. P. Hart, Second Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

as Advisers,
and

the Republic of Iceland,

composed as above,

delivers thefollowing Judgment:

1. By a letter of 14Aprill972, received in the Registry of the Court the
same day, the Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy in the Netherlands
transmitted to the Registrar an Application instituting proceedings against
the Republic of Iceland in respect of a dispute concerning the then proposed
extension by the Government of Iceland of its fisheries jurisdiction. In order
to found the jurisdiction of the Court, the Application relied on Article 36,
paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on an Exchange of Notes
between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
Iceland dated 11 March 1961.
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
at once communicated to the Government of Iceland. In accordance with
paragraph 3 of that Article, al1 other States entitled to appear before the
Court were notified of the Application. En l'affaire de la compétenceen matièrede pêcheries,

entre
le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande duNord,

représentépar
M. H. Steel, OBE, jurisconsulte au ministère des Affaires étrangèreset du
Commonwealth,

comme agent,
assistépar
letrèshonorable sir IPeterRawlinson, QC, MP, Attorney-General,
M. D. W. Bowett, présidentdu Queens' College de Cambridge, membre du
barreau d'Angleterre,
M. D. H. N. Johnson, professeur de droit international et aérieàlyUniver-

sitéde Londres, membre du barreau d'Angleterre,
M. J. L. Simpson, CIMG,TD, membre du barreau d'Angleterre,
M. G. Slynn, membre du barreau d'Angleterre,
M. P. Langdon-Davies, membre du barreau d'Angleterre,
comme conseils,

et par
M. M. G. de Wintoti, CBE, MC, solicitor adjoint au Law Oficers' Depart-
ment,
M. P. Pooley, secrétaireadjoint au ministèrede l'agriculture, de la pêcheet
de l'alimentation,
M. G. W. P. Hart, deuxième secrétaireau ministère desAffaires étrangères
et du Commonwealth,

comme conseillers,

la RépubliquedYIsland,e,

ainsi composée,

rendl'arrêtsuivant:

1. Par lettre du 14 a.vri11972 reçue au Greffe de la Cour le mêmejour, le
chargéd'affairesde I'arnbassade du Royaume-Uni aux Pays-Bas a transmis au
Greffier une requêteintroduisantune instance contrela République d'Islande
au sujet d'un différendportant sur l'extension de la compétenceislandaise en
matière de pêcheries 8.laquelle le Gouvernement islandais se proposait de
proceder. Pour établirla compétence de la Cour, la requête invoquel'article
36, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour et un échangede notes entre le Gou-
vernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement islandaisen date du 11mars
1961.
2. Conformément à l'article 40, paragraphe 2, du Statut, la requêtea été

immédiatement communiquée au Gouvernement islandais. Conformément
au paragraphe 3du mêmearticle, les autres Etats admis à ester devant la Cour
ont étéinformésde la requête. 3. By a letter dated 29 May 1972from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Iceland, received in the Registry on 31 May 1972, the Court was informed
(inter alia) that the Government of Iceland was not willing to confer juris-
diction on the Court and would not appoint an Agent.
4. On 19July 1972,the Agent of the United Kingdom fled in the Registry
of the Court a request for the indication of interim measures of protection
under Article 41 of the Statute and Article 61 of the Rules of Court adopted
on 6 May 1946. By an Order dated 17 August 1972, the Court indicated
certain interim measures of protection in the case.
5. By an Order dated 18 August 1972, the Court, considering that it was
necessary to resolve first of al1 the question of its jurisdiction in the case,
decided that the first pleadings should be addressed to the question of the
jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute, and fued time-limits for
the filing of a Memorial by the Government of the United Kingdom and a
Counter-Memorial by the Government of Iceland. The Memorial of the
Government of the United Kingdom was filed within the time-limit pre-
scribed, and was communicated to the Government of Iceland. No Counter-

Memorial was filed by the Government of Iceland and, the written pro-
ceedings being thus closed, the case was ready for hearing on 9 December
1972, the day following the expiration of the time-limit fixed for the
Counter-Memorial of the Government of Iceland.
6. The Governments of Ecuador, the Federal Republic of Germany and
Senegal requested that the pleadings and annexed documents in this case
should be made available to them in accordance with Article 44, paragraph 2,
of the Rules of Court. The Partieshavingindicated that they had no objection,
it was decided to accede to these requests. Pursuant to Article 44, paragraph
3, of the Rules of Court, the pleadings and annexeddocuments were, with the
consent of the Parties, made accessible to the public as from the date of the
opening of the oral proceedings.
7. On 5 January 1973,after due notice to the Parties, a public hearing was
held in the course of which the Court heard the oral argument on the question
of the Court's jurisdiction advanced by Sir Peter Rawlinson on behalf of the
Government of the United Kingdom. The Government of Iceland was not

represented at the hearing.
8. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom:
in the Application :

"The United Kingdom asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
(a) That there is no foundation in international law for the claim by
Iceland to be entitled to extend its fisheries jurisdiction by estab-
lishing a zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction extending to 50
nautical miles from the baselines hereinbeforereferred to; and that
its claim is therefore invalid; and
(b) that questions concerning the conservation of fish stocks in the
waters around Iceland are not susceptible in international law to

regulation by the unilateral extension by Iceland of its exclusive
fisheriesjurisdiction to 50 nautical milesfromtheaforesaid baselines
but are matters that may be regulated, as between Iceland and the
United Kingdom, by arrangements agreed between those two
countries, whether or not together with other interested countries
and whether in the form of arrangements reached in accordance 3. Par lettre du 29 mai 1972reçue au Greffe le 31 mai 1972, le ministre des
Affaires étrangères d'Islandea fait notamment savoir a la Cour que le Gou-
vernementislandais n'btait pas disposé à lui attribuer cornpetence et ne dési-
gnerait pas d'agent.
4. Le 19 juillet 19712,l'agent du Royaume-Uni a déposéau Greffe une
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires en vertu de l'article 41 du
Statut et de l'article 61 du Règlement de la Cour adopté le 6 mai 1946. Par
ordonnance du 17 août 1972, la Cour a indiqué certaines mesures conserva-
toires en l'affaire.-
5. Par ordonnance du 18 août 1972 la Cour, considérant qu'il étaitnéces-
saire de régler en premier lieu la question de sa compétence en l'affaire, a
décidéque les premières piècesécrites porteraient sur la question de la com-
pétence de la Cour pour connaître du différendet a fixéla date d'expiration
des délais pour le dép8t du mémoiredu Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et
du contre-mémoire du Gouvernement islandais. Le mémoire du Gouverne-
ment du Royaume-Uni a été déposé danlse délai prescrit et il a été commu-

niqué au Gouvernement islandais. Le Gouvernement islandais n'a pas dé-
poséde contre-mémoi.reet, la procédure écriteétant ainsi terminée, l'affaire
s'est trouvéeen étatle 9 décembre1972, c'est-à-dire le lendemain du jour où
expirait le délaifixépour le dépôt du contre-mémoire du Gouvernement is-
landais.
6. Les Gouverneme:nts de l'Equateur, de la République fédéraled'Alle-
magne et du Sénégalont demandé que les pièces de la procédure écriteen
l'affaire soient tenuesà leur disposition conformément à l'article 44, para-
graphe 2, du Règlement. Les Parties ayant indiqué qu'elles ne s'y opposaient
pas, il a étédécidéde faire droit àces demandes. En application del'article 44,
paragraphe 3, du Règlement, les piècesde la procédure écriteont, avec l'as-
sentiment des Parties, été renduesaccessibles au public à dater de l'ouverture
de la procédure orale.
7. Les Parties ayant été dûment averties, une audiencepublique a été tenue
le 5 janvier 1973, durant laquelle la Cour a entendu sir Peter Rawlinson
plaider pour le Gouvlernement du Royaume-Uni sur la question dela com-
pétence de la Cour. Le Gouvernement islandais n'était pas représenté a
l'audience.
8. Dans la procédu.reécrite,les conclusions ci-après ont étédéposéesau
nom du Gouvernemeritdu Royaume-Uni :

dans la requête:

«LeRoyaume-Uni demandequ'il plaise à la Cour dire etjuger:
a) que la prétention de l'Islande qui se dit en droit d'élargirsa compé-
tence en matikre de pêcheries enétablissant une zone de compétence
exclusivesur les pêcheries jusqu'a50 milles marins à partir des lignes
de base mentionnéesplus haut n'est pas fondéeen droit international
et n'est donc ]pasvalable;
6) que les questions relatives à la conservation des stocksdepoisson
dans les eaux qui entourent l'Islande ne sauraient êtrerégléesen
droit internat:ional par la décisionque l'Islande a prise unilatérale-
ment d'étendre sa compétenceexclusive sur les pêcheriesjusqu'à 50
milles marins à partir desdites lignes de base mais que ces questions
peuvent êtrerégléesentre l'Islande et le Royaume-Uni par des arran-
gements conclus entre ces deux pays, avec ou sans la participation des
autres pays iintéressés,et soit sous forme d'arrangements réalisés

6 with the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 24 January
1959, or in the form of arrangements for collaboration in accor-

dance with the Resolution on Special Situations relating to Coastal
Fisheries of 26 April 1958, or otherwise in theform of arrangements
agreed between them that give effect to the continuing rights and
interests of both of them in the fisheries of the waters in question."

in the Memorial :

"The Government of the United Kingdom submit to the Court that
they are entitled to a declaration and judgment that the Court has full
jurisdiction to proceed to entertain the Application by the United King-
dom on the merits of the dispute."

9. At the close of the oral proceedings, the following written submissions
were filed in the Registry of the Court on behalf of the Government of the
United Kingdom:
"The Government of the United Kingdom contend

(a) that the Exchange of Notes of 11 March, 1961,always has been and
remains now a valid agreement;
(6) that, for the purposes of Article 36 (1) of the Statute of the Court,
the Exchange of Notes of 11 March, 1961, constitutes a treaty or
convention in force, and a submission by both parties to the juris-
diction of the Court in case of a dispute in relation to a claim by
Iceland to extend its fisheries jurisdiction beyond the limits agreed
in thatExchange of Notes;
(c) that, given the refusal by the United Kingdom to accept the validity
of unilateral action by Iceland purporting to extend its fisheries
limits (as manifested in the Aides-Memoires of the Government of
Iceland of 31 August, 1971, and 24 February, 1972, the Resolution

of theAlthing of 15 February, 1972,andthe Regulations of 14July,
1972, issued pursuant to that Resolution), a dispute exists between
Iceland and the United Kingdom which constitutes a dispute
within the terms of the compromissory clause of the Exchange of
Notes of 11 March, 1961;
(d) that the purported termination by Iceland of the Exchange of Notes
of 11 March, 1961, so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Court is
without legal effect; and
(e) that, by virtue of the Application Instituting Proceedings that was
filed with the Court on 14 April, 1972, the Court is now seised of
jurisdiction in relation to the said dispute.
Accordingly, the Government of the United Kingdom submit to the

Court that they are entitled to a declaration and judgment that the
Court has fulljurisdiction to proceed to entertain the Application by the
United Kingdom on the merits of the dispute."
10. No pleadings were filed by the Government of Iceland, which was also
not represented at the oral proceedings, and no submissions were theiefore
presented on its behalf. The attitude of that Government with regard to the
question of the Court's jurisdiction was however defined in the above-
mentioned letter of 29 May 1972 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Iceland. After calling attention to certain documents that letter stated:

7 conformément a la convention du 24janvier 1959sur les pêcheriesde
l'Atlantique du nord-est, soit sous forme d'arrangements organisant
leur collaboration conformément a la résolution du 26 avril 1958
sur les situations spécialestouchant les pêcheriescôtières, soit encore
sous forme d''arrangements qui seraient convenus entre eux et qui
donneraient effet aux droits et intérêtsconstants des deux pays dans
les pêcheriesdieseaux en question.))

dans le mémoire :

«Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni prie la Cour de dire et juger
qu'elle a pleine compétence pour connaître de la requêtedu Royaume-
Uni sur le fond dlu différend.»

9. A l'issue de la procédure orale, les conclusions écrites ci-après ont été
déposéesau Greffe aunom du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni:

«Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni conclut:

a) que I'échange.de notes du 11 mars 1961 n'a cesséd'êtreun accord
valable et le demeure;
h) que, aux fins de l'article 36, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour,
I'échangede notes du 11 mars 1961 constitue un traité ou une con-
vention en vigueur et une acceptation par les deux parties de se sou-
mettre à la juridiction de la Cour au cas où surgirait un différend
tenant à ce que l'Islande prétend élargirsa compétence sur les pêche-
ries au-delà des limites convenues dans I'échangede notes;

C) que,étant donnéle refus du Royaume-Uni de considérercomme vala-
ble l'action unilatéralepar laquellel'Islande prétendétendreleslimites
de sa zone de pêche (tellequ'elle résulte desaide-mémoire du Gouver-
nement islandais du 31 août 1971 et du 24 février 1972,de la résolu-
tion de 1'Althingdu 15 février 1972et du règlement du 14juillet 1972
pris conformi5ment a cette résolution), il existe entre l'Islande et le
Royaume-Uni un différendqui constitue un différendaux termes de
la clausecomlpromissoire contenue dans I'échangede notes du 11mars
1961;
d) que la prétendue dénonciation par l'Islande de l'échangede notes du
11 mars 19611,qui visait a éliminer la compétence de la Cour, est
dépourvue d''effetjuridique;
e) et que, en vertu de la requête introductive d'instance déposéea la

Cour le 14avril 1972,la Cour a compétence à l'égardde ce différend.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni prie la Cour de
dire et juger qu'c:llea pleine compétence pour connaître de la requêtedu
Royaume-Uni sur le fond du différend.))

10. Aucune pièceécriten'a étédéposéepar le Gouvernement islandais, qui
n'était pasnon plus représenté à la procédure orale, et aucune conclusion n'a
donc étéprise en son nom. Toutefoisl'attitude du Gouvernement islandais en
ce qui concerne la question de la compétence de la Cour a étédéfiniedansla
lettre précitéedu ministre des Affaires étrangèresd'Islande en date du 29 mai
1972.Aprèsavoir appelél'attention sur certains documents, la lettre déclarait: "Those documents deal with the background and termination of the
agreement recorded in the Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961, and
with the changedcircumstancesresultingfromtheever-increasingexploi-
tation ofthe fisheryresourcesin the seassurrounding Iceland."

The letter concluded by saying:
"After the termination of the Agreementrecorded in the Exchangeof
Notes of 1961,there was on 14 April 1972 no basis under the Statute
for the Court to exercisejurisdiction in the case to which the United
Kingdomrefers.
The Government of Iceland, consideringthat the vital interestsof the
people of Iceland are involved, respectfullyinforms the Court that it is
not willingto conferjurisdiction on the Court in any case involvingthe
extent of the fisherylimits of Iceland, and specificallyin the case sought
to be instituted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland on 14 April 1972.
Having regard to the foregoing, an Agent will not be appointed to
represent the Government of Iceland."
In a telegram to the Court dated 4 December 1972, the Minister for Foreign
Affairsof Iceland stated that the position of the Governmentof Icelandwas
unchanged.

11. The present caseconcerns a dispute between the Government of the
United Kingdom and the Government of Iceland occasioned by the
claim of thelatter to extend its exclusivefisheriesjurisdiction to a zone of
50 nautical miles around Iceland. In the present phase it concerns the
competence of the Court to hear and pronounce upon this dispute. The
issue being thus limited, the Court will avoid not only al1expressions of
opinion on matters of substance, but also any pronouncement which
might prejudge or appearto prejudge any eventual decision on the merits.

12. It is to be regretted that the Government of Iceland has failed to
appear in order to plead the objections to the Court's jurisdiction which
it is understood to entertain. Nevertheless the Court, in accordance with
itsStatute and its settled jurisprudence, must examine proprio motu the
question of its own jurisdiction toconsider the Application of the United

Kingdom. Furthermore, in the present case the duty of the Court to
make this examination on its own initiative is reinforced by the terms of
Article 53 of the Statute of the Court. According to this provision,
whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to
defend its case, the Court, before finding upon the merits, must satisfy
itself that it has jurisdiction. It follows from the failure of Iceland to
appear in this phase of the case that it has not observed the terms of
Article 62, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, which requires inter alia «Ces documents concernent l'historique de l'accord consignédans
l'échangede notes du 11 mars 1961, la caducitéde cet accord et le chan-
desressources dela pêchedans les mersentourant l'Islande.»s croissante

La lettreconcluaitdans lestermessuivants:

((L'accordconsignédans l'échange de notes de 1961ayant pris fin, la
compétencedans l'affaireviséepar leRoyaume-Uni.il1972 pour exercersa

Considérant queles intérêtvsitaux du peuple islandaissont enjeu, le
Gouvernement idandais porte respectueusementa la connaissancede la
Cour qu'iln'est pas disposéà lui attribuer compétencedans une affaire
qui concernerait l'étenduedes pêcheriesislandaises,en particulier dans
l'instance que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne
et d'Irlande du Nord a voulu introduire 14 avril1972.
Etant donnéce qui précèdei,l ne sera pas désignd'agent pour repré-
senterle Gouvernementislandais.))

Dans un télégramme adressé à la Cour le 4 décembre 1972,le ministre des
Affairesétrangèresd'Islandea déclaréque l'attitude du Gouvernement islan-
daisrestait inchangée.

11. La présenteaffaire porte sur un différendsurvenu entre le Gouver-
nement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement islandais à propos de la
prétention élevée par celui-ci d'étendre jusqu'à 50 milles marins sa
zone de compétence:exclusive sur les pêcheriesautour de l'Islande.
En la phase actuelle, elle concerne la compétence de la Cour pour
trancher le différend.La question étantainsi limitée,la Cour s'abstiendra
non seulement d'exprimer une opinion sur des points de fond, mais aussi
de se prononcer d'une manière qui pourrait préjugerou paraître préjuger
toute décision qu'ellt:pourrait rendre sur le fond.
12.Il est regrettable que le Gouvernement islandais ne se soit pas

présentépour exposer les objections que lui inspirerait, d'après ce que
l'on sait, la compétence de la Cour. Celle-ci n'en doit pas moins, con-
formément à son Statut et à sa jurisprudence constante, examiner
d'officela question de sa propre compétencepour connaître de la requête
du Royaume-Uni. En outre, dans la présente affaire, le devoir qu'a la
Cour de procéder à cet examen de sa propre initiative est confirmé par
l'article53 du Statut. Aux termes de cette disposition, lorsqu'une des
parties ne se présente pas ou s'abstient de faire valoir ses moyens, la
Cour doit s'assurer qu'elle a compétence avant de statuer sur le fond.
Il résultede la non-iromparution de 1'Islande dans la présente phase de
l'affaire qu'elle ne s'est pas conforméeà l'article 62, paragraphe 2, du
Règlement, lequel exige notamment que 1'Etatqui soulèveune exceptionthat a State objecting to the jurisdiction should "set oiit the facts and
the law on which the objection is based", its submissions on the matter,
and any evidence which it may wish to adduce. Nevertheless the Court,
in examining its own jurisdiction, will consider those objections which
might, in its view, be raised against itsjurisdiction.

13. To found the jurisdiction of the Court in the proceedings, the
Applicant relies on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's Statute,
which provides that: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises ... al1
matters speciallyprovided for ... in treaties and conventions in force";
and on the penultimate paragraph (the "compromissory clause7')of the
Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom and
the Government of Iceland of 11 March 1961(the "1961 Exchange of
Notes"), which provides :
"The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the im-
plementation of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding
the extension of fisheriesjurisdiction around Iceland, but shall give

to the United Kingdom Government six months' notice of such
extension, and, in case of a dispute in relation to such extension, the
matter shall, at the request of either party, be referred to the Inter-
national Court of Justice."
In its resolution of 5 May 1959the Althing (the Parliament of Iceland)
had declared:

". .. that it considers tlzat Iceland has an indisputable right to
fishery limits of 12 miles, tlzat recognition should be obtained of
Iceland's right to the entire continental shelf area in conformity
with the policy adopted by the Law of 1948,concerning the Scientific
Conservation of the Continental Shelf Fisheries and that fishery
limits of lessthan 12 milesfrom base-linesaround thecountry areout
of the question".

14. The meaning of the expression "extension of fisheriesjurisdiction"
in the compromissory clause must be sought in the context of this Althing
resolution and of the complete text of the 1961 Exchange of Notes, in
which the two contracting parties, referring to the discussions which had
taken place concerning a fisheriesdispute between them, stated that they
were willing to settle that dispute on the following basis: The United
Kingdom, for its part, agreed that it "will no longer object to a twelve-
mile fishery zone around Iceland" (paragraph 1 of the Notes), measured
from certain designated baselines relating to the delimitation of that zone
(paragraph 2). It futher agreed to a three-year transitional periodduring
which vessels registered in the United Kingdom might fish within the
outer six miles of the 12-milezone, subject to certain specifiedtimes and
exclusions with respect to designated areas (paragraphs 3 and 4). It alsod'incompétence présente((l'exposéde faitet de droit sur lequel l'exception
est fondée)),ses conclusions à ce sujet et les moyens de preuve qu'il
désire éventuellemenitemployer. Néanmoins la Cour, en examinant sa
propre compétence, considérerales objections qui peuvent, à son avis,
êtresoulevéescontre celle-ci.

13. Pour établirla compétence dela Cour dans l'affaire, le demandeur
se fonde sur I'articbr 36, paragraphe 1, du Statut qui dispose: ((La
compétence de la Cour s'étend ..à tous les cas spécialement prévus ...
dans les traités et conventions en vigueur)),ainsi que sur l'avant-dernier
alinéa (ci-après dénommé laclause compromissoire) de l'échange de
notes entre le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement
islandais en date du I1 mars 1961(ci-aprèsdénommél'échange de notes
de 1961),qui stipule:

((Le Gouvernement islandais continuera de s'employer à mettre
en Œuvre la résolution de 1'Althing en date du 5 mai 1959 relative
àl'élargissementde lajuridiction sur lespêcheriesautour de l'Islande
mais notifiera six moisà l'avance au Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni toute mesure en ce sens; au cas où surgirait un différenden la
matière, laquestion sera portée, à la demande de l'une ou l'autre
partie, devant la Cour internationale de Justice.))

Dans sa résolution ,du 5 mai 1959, 1'Althing (Parlement islandais) a
proclamé qu'il considérait:

((que l'Islande a incontestablement le droit de fixer les limites des
pêcheries à une distance de 12 milles, que le droit de l'Islande sur
toute la zone du plateau continental doit êtrereconnu conformément
àla politique consacréepar la loi de 1948concernant la conservation
scientifique des pêcheriesdu plateau continental et qu'il n'est pas
question de fixer les limites des pêcheries une distance de moins
de 12milles des lignes de base tracéesautour de l'Islande».

14. Le sens des termes ((élargissementde la juridiction sur les pêche-
ries» qui figurent dans la clause compromissoire doit être recherché
dans le contexte de cette résolution de 1'Althing et du libellécomplet
de l'échangede notes de 1961 où les deux parties contractantes, après
s'être référée aux c:onversations qu'elles avaient eues au sujet d'un
différend relatif aux pêcheriessurvenu entre elles, se sont déclarées
disposées à accepter que ce différend soit réglédans les conditions ci-
après: Le Royaume-TJni pour sa part ((n'élèvera plusd'objection contre
la zone de pêches'étendant autour de l'Islande sur une largeur de 12
milles)) (paragraphe 1 des notes échangées) à partir de certaines lignes
de base définiespour la délimitation de ladite zone (paragraphe 2). Il a
également accepté une période transitoire de trois ans pendant laquelle
les navires immatriculés au Royaume-Uni pourraient se livrer à la pêche9 FISHERIESJURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)

recognized (in the compromissory clause) that the Icelandic Government

"will continue to work for the implementation of the Althing Resolution
of May 5, 1959" regarding its extension of fisheries jurisdiction. The
Icelandic Government, for its part, agreed in that clause to give six
months' notice of such extension and also agreed therein that "in case of
a dispute in relation tosuch extension, the matter shall, at the request of
eitherParty, be referred to the International Court of Justice".

15. In an aide-mémoire of31August 1971the Government of Iceland
gave notice to the United Kingdom Government that it "now finds it
essential to extend further the zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction
around its coasts to include the areas of sea covering the continental
shelf", adding that: "It is contemplated that the new limits, the precise
boundaries of which willbe furnished at a later date, willenter into force
not later than 1 September, 1972." In answer to this notice, the United
Kingdom Government advised the Government of Iceland on 27 Sep-

tember 1971 of its view "that such an extension of the fishery zone
around Iceland would have no basis in international law". It also reserved
its rights under the 1961Exchange of Notes, "including the right to refer
disputes to the International Court of Justice".

16. There is no doubt in the present case as to the fulfilment by the
United Kingdom of its part of the agreement embodied in the 1961
Exchange of Notes concerning the recognition of a 12-milefishery zone
around Iceland, and the phasing-out during a period of three years of
fishingby British vesselswithin that zone. There is no doubt either that a
dispute has arisen between the parties andthat it has persisteddespite the
negotiations which took place in 1971 and 1972. This dispute clearly
relates to the extension by Iceland of its fisheriesjurisdiction beyond the
12-milelimit in the waters above its continental shelf, as contemplated
in the Althing resolution of 5 May 1959.

17. Equally, there is no question but that Iceland gave the United
Kingdom the required notice of extension. In consequence, the United
Kingdom having disputed the validity, not of the notice but of the
extension, theonly question now before theCourt iswhether the resulting
dispute falls within the compromissory clause of the 1961 Exchange of
Notes as being one for determination by the Court. Since, on the face of
it, the dispute thus brought to the Court upon the Application of the
United Kingdom falls exactly within the terms of this clause, the Court
would normally apply the principle it reaffirmed in its 1950 Advisory
Opinion concerning the Competence of the General Assembly for the
Admission of a State to the UnitedNations,according to which there is no
occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a convention isdans les 6 milles extérieursde la zone de 12 milles, sauf à certaines
époques déterminéee st dans certaines zones définies(paragrapheset4).
Il a en outre admis dans la clause compromissoire que le Gouvernement
islandais ((continuera de s'employerà mettre en Œuvrela résolutionde
1'Althingen datedu 5mai 1959))relative à l'élargissementde lajuridiction
sur les pêcheries.Le Gouvernement islandais de son côté a acceptédans
cette clause de notifier six mois l'avance toute mesure en ce sens et il
a admis qu'ccaucas où surgirait un différend enla matière, la question
sera portée, à la dernande de l'une ou l'autre partie, devant la Cour

internationale de Justice.))
15. Dans un aide-niémoiredu 31août 1971,leGouvernement islandais
a fait savoir au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni qu'il considérait
((maintenant comme essentiel d'étendre sazone de compétenceexclusive
sur les pêcheries auitour descôtes de manière à inclure les espaces
maritimes recouvrant le plateau continental)) et qu'il envisagaitue la
nouvelle délimitation, dont le tracé exact sera précisé à une date ul-
térieure, entreen vigueur llerseptembre 1972auplus tard)). En réponse
à cette communication, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a prié le
27 septembre 1971 Ir: Gouvernement islandais de noter qu'à son avis
((un tel élargissementde la zone de pêcheentourant l'Islande n'aurait
aucun fondement en droit international)). Il a également réssesdroits
en vertu de l'échangede notes de 1961, ccycompris celui de porter les

différendsdevant la Cour internationale de Justice)).
16.Il ne fait pas de doute en l'espèceque le Royaume-Uni a exécuté
les obligations que l'accord consacrépar l'échangede notes de 1961
mettait à sa charge eince qui concerne la reconnaissance d'une zone de
pêches'étendantautour de l'Islande sur une largeur de 12 milles et le
retrait, échelonnésur trois ans, des navires britanniques pratiquant la
pêchedans cette zone. Il n'est pas douteux non plus qu'un différend
s'est élevéentre les parties et qu'il persiste malgré lesnégociationsqui
ont eu lieu en 1971 et en 1972. Ce différenda manifestement trait à
l'élargissementpar l'Mande de sa compétenceen matière de pêcheries
au-delà de la limitede 12 milles dans les eaux recouvrant son plateau
continental,élargisseinentqui était envisagédans la résolution de l'Al-
thing du 5 mai 1959.

17. De mêmeil est hors de doute que l'Islande a donnéau Royaume-
Uni le préavisqui étaitprévuen cas de nouvel élargissement.En con-
séquence,le Royaum~r-Uniayant contesté lavalidité,non pas du préavis
mais de 17élargisseme:nl, seule question dont la Cour soit à présent
saisie consiste déterminersi le différendqui en est résulté estde ceux
que la Cour est appelléeà trancher en vertu de la clause compromissoire
figurant dans l'échangede notes de 1961. Puisque à première vue le
différend ainsioumi:; àlaCour sur requêtedu Royaume-Uni correspond
exactement aux termes de la clause, il serait normal que la Cour applique
le principe qu'elle a réaffirmédans son avis consultatif de 1950 sur la
Compétencede 1'As:remblée généralepour l'admission d'un Etat aux
Nations Unies selon lequel il n'y a pas lieu de recourir aux travaux10 FISHERIESJURISDICTION(JUDGMENT)

sufficientlyclear in itself. However, having regard to the peculiar circum-

stances of the present proceedings, as set forth inparagraph 12above, and
in order fully to ascertain the scope and purpose of the 1961Exchange of
Notes, the Court will undertake a brief review of the negotiations that
led up to that exchange.

18. The records of these negotiations which weredrawn up byand have
been brought to the Court's attention by the Applicant, as well as certain
documents exchanged between the two Governments, show that, as early
as 5 October 1960, it had become apparent that the United Kingdom
would accept in principle Iceland's right to exclusivefisheriesjurisdiction
within the 12-mile limit following the end of a transitional period.
However, the Government of the United Kingdom sought an assurance
that therewouldbe no further extensions of Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction

excluding Britsh vessels, in implementation of the Althing resolution,
except in conformity with international law. In the course of the discus-
sions concerning this point both parties accepted the notion that disputes
arising from such further extensions should be submitted to third-party
decision. The Government of Iceland preferred recourse to arbitration,
a position consistent with the proposals it had put forward and the
attitudeit had adopted at both Conferences on the Law of the Seain 1958
and 1960. Its representatives are recorded in the documents brought to
the Court's attention as having proposed in the bilateral negotiations on
28 October 1960the following :

"The Icelandic Government reserves its right to extend fisheries
jurisdiction in Icelandic waters in conformity with international law.
Such extension would, however, be based either on an agreement
(bilateral ormiiltilateral) or decisions of the TcelandicGovernment
which would be subject to arbitration at the request of appropriate
parties."

For its part, the Governn~ent of the United Kingdom preferred that
disputes be referred to the Tnternational Court of Justice. Equally, the
representatives of Iceland, while having indicated their preference for
arbitration, expressed in later meetings, and specifically on 4 November
1960,their willingness to accept the International Court of Justice as the
appropriateforum. Subsequent exchanges of drafts consistentlycontained
a specific reference to the Court, which was finally included in the 1961
Exchange of Notes. In placing the terms of the proposed Exchange of
Notes before the Althing on 28 February 1961,the Government of Iceland
presented a memorandum which included the followifig statement con-
cerning this point :préparatoires si le te~cted'une convention est en lui-même suffisamment
clair. Toutefois, eu(Sgardaux particularités de la présente procédure,
signaléesau paragraphe 12 ci-dessus, et afin de bien préciserla portée
et le but de l'échangede notes de 1961, la Cour se propose à présent
d'examiner brièvement ledéroulement des négociations qui ont abouti
à cet échange de notes.

18.Il ressort des comptes rendus de ces négociations qui ont été
établiset portés à la connaissance de la Cour par le demandeur ainsi
que de certains documents échangésentre les deux gouvernements que,
dès le 5 octobre 1960, il apparaissait clairement que le Royaume-Uni
accepterait en principe le droit de'lslande d'étendresa zone de compé-
tence exclusive sur les pêcheriesjusqu'à 12 milles à l'expiration d'une
périodetransitoire.T'outefoisle Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni désirait
êtreassuré qu'il ne serait procédé,après cela, en application de la
résolution de I'Althiiigà aucune nouvelle extension de la compétence
de I'lslande en matière depêcheriesayant pour effet d'exclure les navires
britanniques, à moins qu'une telle extension ne soit faite en conformité
avec le droit international. Au cours des pourparlers qui se sont déroulés

sur ce point, les deux parties ont admis que les différends suscpar de
nouvelles extensions devraient être tranchéspar un tiers. Le Gouverne-
ment islandais penchait pour l'arbitrage, ce qui était conforme aux
propositions qu'il avait faitesàel'attitude qu'il avait adoptéeaux deux
conférencesde 1958 et de 1960 sur le droit de la mer. Il ressort des
documents soumis à la Cour que, dans les négociations bilatérales,les
représentantsde l'Islande ont proposéle texte suivant le 28 octobre 1960:

((Le Gouvernement islandais se réserve le droit d'étendre sa
compétenceen matière de pêcheriesdans les eaux islandaises con-
formément au droit international. Cette extension serait néanmoins
fondée soit sur un accord (bilatéral ou multilatéral), soit sur des
décisionsdu Gouvernement islandais qui seraient soumises à un
arbitrageà la demande des parties intéressées.))

Pour sa part le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni préférait que les
différendsqui pourraient surgir soient soumis à la Cour internationale
de Justice. Les représentants del'Islande, qui avaient d'abord manifesté
leur préférencepour l'arbitrage, ont indiquéeux aussi, lors de réunions
ultérieureset en particulier le 4 novembre 1960,qu'ils étaientdisposés
accepter la Cour internationale de Justice commejuridiction compétente.
Les projets échangéspar la suite mentionnaient tous expressémentla
Cour et c'est cette formule qui, pour finir, a étéreprise dans l'échange
de notes de 1961. Ide 28 février 1961, lorsqu'ila soumis à I'Althing
l'échangede notes proposé, le Gouvernement islandais a présentéun
mémorandum qui contenait sur ce point le passage suivant: "The Government declares that it will continue to work for the
implementation of the Althing resolution of 5 May, 1959,regarding
the extensions of the fisheriesjurisdiction around Iceland. Such an
extension would, however, be notified to the British Government six
months in advance, and ifa dispute arises in connection with these
measures, this shall be referred to the International Court of Justice,
should either one of the parties request it." (Emphasis added.)

19. The representatives of Iceland having accepted the proposal for
reference to the International Court of Justice, discussioncontinued as to
the precise formulation of the compromissory clause, including, in par-
ticular, the method whereby the agreement to have recourse to the Court
would be effected. On 3 December 1960 the Icelandic delegation is
recorded as having proposed the following text:

"The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the imple-
mentation of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding the
extension of fisheriesjurisdiction around Iceland. Six months notice
will be given of the application of anysuch extension and in case of
dispute the measures will be referred to the International Court of
Justice." (Emphasis added.)

The delegation of the United Kingdom proposed to insert in the last
phrase of this text the words "at the request of either party" in order to
makeit clearthat thejurisdiction of the Court could be invoked by means
of a unilateral application and need not require a joint submission by
both parties. This howeverwasnot immediately agreedto by the Icelandic
delegation. In a draftexchange of Notes put forward by the Government
of Iceland on 10 December 1960 it was proposed that the assurance
sought by the Government of the United Kingdom should be couched in
the following terms:

"Icelandic Government willcontinue to work for implementation
of the Althing Resolution of May 5, 1959,regarding extension of
fisheriesjurisdiction around Iceland. Six months' notice will begiven
of application of any such extension and in case of dispute the
measures will, at the requestof the severalparties, be referred to the
International Court of Justice." (Emphasis added.)

This proposa1 was not accepted by the Government of the United King-
dom, which on 16December 1960submitted a new text of the assurance
insisting on the words "at the request of either party". This text was
finally agreed to by Iceland on 13 February 1961and the words "at the
request of either party" thus appear in the compromissory clause of the
Exchange of Notes.

20. A further point of differenceconcerned the form to be givento the ((Le Gouvernement déclare qu'il continuera de s'employer à
mettre en Œuvrela résolution de 1'Althingen date du 5 mai 1959
relativeà I'élargiissement e la juridiction sur les pêcheriesautour
de l'Islande. Cet élargissementserait cependant notifié six mois
à l'avance au Gouvernement britannique et, si un différend surgit
àpropos de ces nresures,la Cour internationalede Justice sera saisie
à la demande de l'une ou l'autre des parties.)) (Les italiques sont
de la Cour.)

19. Les représentants de l'Islande ayant accepté la proposition de
saisine de la Cour internationale de Justice, les négociations se sont
poursuivies sur la rédaction exacte de la clause comprornissoire, et en
particulier sur laméthodeselon laquelle l'accord concernant la saisine
de la Cour serait mis en pratique. Le 3 décembre 1960, suivant les

documents fournis, la,délégation islandaisea proposéle texte suivant:
«Le Gouverne:ment islandais continuera de s'employer à mettre
en Œuvre la résolutionde 1'Althingen date du 5 mai 1959 relative
à l'élargissementde la juridiction sur les pêcheriesautour de 1'1s-
lande. Les mesures d'application d'un tel élargissement seront

notifiéessix mois à l'avance et, en cas de différend,elles seront
soumises à la Cour internationale de Justice.)) (Les italiques sont
de la Cour.)
La délégationdu Rcoyaume-Uni a suggéré d'inséred rans la dernière
phrase du texte précitles mots ((àla demande de l'une ou l'autre partie))

pour bien faireressortir que la juridiction de la Cour pourrait êtremise
en Œuvre au moyen d'une requêteunilatérale et n'exigerait pas une
démarche conlmune des deux parties. La délégation islandaisen'a pas
immédiatement accepté.Dans un projet d'échangede notes présentéle
10 décembre 1960 par le Gouvernement islandais, il était proposéde
rédiger commesuit la formule concernant les assurances recherchéespar
le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni :

((Le Gouverni:ment islandais continuera de s'employer à mettre
en Œuvrela résolutionde 1'AIthingen date du 5 mai 1959relative
àl'élargissement delajuridictionsur lespêcherieautour del'Islande.
Les mesures d'application d'un tel élargissementseront notifiées
sixmois àl'avanceet, encasdedifférend,cesmesures seront soumises
àla Cour internationale de Justicà la demandedes diversesparties.»
(Les italiques sont de la Cour.)

Cette proposition n'aipas étéagréée par le Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni qui, le 16 décembre1960,a présentéune nouvelle formule d'assu-
rances où les termes ((àla demande de l'une ou l'autre partie))étaient
maintenus. L'Islande a finalement accepté ce texte le 13 février 1961
et les mots ((àla de:mandede l'une ou l'autre partie)) figurent dans la
clause compromissoire de l'échange de notes.
20. Une autre divergence a concerné la forme que revêtiraient lesassurance contained in that clause. The proposa1 for a draft exchange of
Notes put forward by the Government of Iceland on 10 December 1960

was unacceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom for a
number of reasons set out in a Message by the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs delivered on 14 December 1960. Included among the
objections was the failure to frame theexchange as an agreement binding
on the parties. As stated in the Message:
". .. the assurance should be set out in an Exchange of Notes
expressly stated to constitute an Agreement which would, in Her
Majesty's Government's view, be the only way of binding both
parties to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in the event of any dispute arising over extensions of fishery
jurisdiction. We regard this as essential if we are going to achieve
stability inurfuture fishery relations as weearnestly desire."

In a letter addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the
United Kingdom to the Foreign Minister of Iceland on 21 December
1960it was also considered-

". . essential that the terms of the Assurance that any dispute on
future extensions of fishery jurisdiction beyond 12 miles would be
referred to the International Court of Justice, should be embodied
in a form which is an Agreement registered with the Secretariat of
the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
Article 102 of the Charter specifically provides that unless so
registered the Agreement cannot be invoked before any organ of
the United Nations.'

This proposa1 was finally accepted by the TcelandicGovernment, and the
last sentence of the Note of 11 March 1961 addressed by the Foreign
Minister of Tcelandto the British Ambassador reads as follows:

"1 have the honour to suggest that this Note and Your Excel-
lency's reply thereto, confirming that its contents are acceptable to
the United Kingdom Government, shall be registered with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with Article
102of the United Nations Charter ..."

This was agreed to in the Note sent on the same date by the British
Ambassador in Reykjavik to the Foreign Minister of Iceland. In its
memorandum to the Althing of 28 February 1961 the Government of
Iceland stated :
"Finally it is provided in the Note that it, together with the reply
of the British Government, where the British Government confirms
its contents, be registered with the Secretary-General of the Unitedassurances consignéesdans cette clause. Pour diverses raisons qui sont
exposéesdans un message du secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères
du Royaume-Uni transmis le 14 décembre 1960, le Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni ne pouvait accepter le projet d'échange denotes que le
Gouvernement islanclais avait présentéle 10 décembre 1960. Une des
objections était que cet échangene se présentait pas comme un accord
liant les parties. Aux termes du message:

((lesassurances devraient figurer dans un échangede notes indiquant
expressémentqu'il constitue un accord ce qui, de l'avisdu Gouverne-
ment de Sa Majesté, seraitla seule façon d'obliger les deux parties
àaccepter la compétence dela Cour internationale de Justice au cas
où un différendsurviendrait au sujet de l'élargissementde la juri-
diction sur les ]pêcheries. e point nous paraît essentiel si nous
voulons aboutir àla stabilitéqui nous semble hautement souhaitable
dans nos relations futures en matière de pêche.))

Par ailleurs, dans une lettre du 21 décembre1960au ministre des Affaires
étrangères d'Islande, le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères du
Royaume-Uni consid.éraitcomme

((indispensable qlueles assurances d'après lesquelles tout différend
relatif aux élargissementsfuturs de la juridiction sur les pêcheries
au-delà de 12 rn.illesserait porté devant la Cour internationale de
Justice revêtentla forme d'un accord enregistré au Secrétariat de
l'organisationdes Nations Unies conformémentaux dispositions de
la Charte. L'article 102de la Charte prévoit expressémentqu'à moins
d'êtreenregistré dans ces conditions l'accord ne peut pas être
invoqué devant un organe des Nations Unies.))

Cette proposition a obtenu finalement l'accord du Gouvernement islan-
dais et la dernière phrase de la note adresséele 11 mars 1961 par le
ministre des Affaires étrangèresd'Islandeà l'ambassadeur du Royaume-
Uni se lit ainsi:

((J'ai l'honneur de suggérerque la présente note et la réponse
de Votre Excellence confirmant que les dispositions de ladite note
rencontrent l'agrément du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni soient
enregistrées auprès du Secrétaire général del'organisation des
Nations Unies conformément àl'article 102de la Charte des Nations
Unies...))

Cette suggestion a étéacceptée dans la note de l'ambassadeur du
Royaume-Uni à Reykjavik au ministre des Affairesétrangèresd'Islande
datée du mêmejour. Dans le mémorandum soumis à I'Althing le 28
février1961,le Gouvernement islandais s'estexpriméen ces termes :

((Pour finir il est prévudans la note que celle-ci, avec la réponse
du Gouvernement britannique en confirmant la teneur, sera enregis-
trée auprès du Secrétaire généralde l'organisation des Nations Nations. In Article 102 of the United Nations Charter it is stated

that only agreements that are so registered can be handled by the
International Court of Justice, should a dispute arise concerning
their implementation. This provision is a direct consequence of what
ha: been said about reference of the matter to the International
Court of Justice."

The Exchange of Notes was registered by the Government of Iceland
with the Secretariat of the United Nations on 8June 1961.
21. The history of the negotiations not only shows theintentions of the
parties but also explains the significance of the six months' notice
required to be given by the Government of Iceland to the United King-
dom Government, for on 2 December 1960the United Kingdom repre-
sentatives stated that the assurance they were seeking should provide,
inter alia,that, "pending the Court's decision, any measure taken to give
effect to such a rule will not apply to British vessels". The Foreign
Minister of Iceland is recorded as having replied on the same date that

the most difficult feature of the problem of the assurance was how to
deal with the point that "if there was a dispute, no measure to apply an
extension on fishery limits would be taken pending reference to the Inter-
national Court".

22. The idea of a six months' notice to be given by Iceland was first
discussed on 3 December 1960and was embodied in the formula advanced
by the Icelandic delegation on that same date, which is transcribed in
paragraph 19 above. This requirement of notice was agreed to by the
parties,It may be assumed that they considered that such a period would
allow sufficient time to settle the question through negotiations or, if no
settlement were reached, to submit the whole issue to the Court, in-
cluding, in accordance with the statutory powers possessed by the Court,
the applicability of the measures of exclusion to British vesselspendenre
lite.Furthermore, the interpretation advanced in the letter of 29 May
1972from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland to the Registrar of

the Court, intimating that the requirement of notice limited the right of
recourse to the Court to the eventuality that the Icelandic Government
should "without warning further extend the limits" (emphasis added),
does not correspond to the text of the compromissory clause, which
clearly relates to the extension of the limits and not to the notice of
extension. Such an interpretation is also to be discounted in the light of
the history of the negotiations.
23. This history reinforces the view that the Court has jurisdiction in
this case, and adds emphasis to the point that the real intention of the
parties was to give the United Kingdom Government an effectiveassur-
ance which constituted a sine qua non and not merely a severable condi-
tion of the whole agreement: namely, the right to challenge before the
Court the validity of any further extension of Icelandic fisheries juris-
diction in the waters above its continental shelf beyond the 12-milelimit. Unies. A l'article 102de la Charte des Nations Unies, il est spécifié
que la Cour internationale de Justice ne peut connaître que des
accords enregistrés de cette manière au cas où leur application
soulèveraitun litige. Cette clause est une conséquencedirecte de ce
qui a étédit ausujet de la possibilitéde saisir la Cour internationale
de Justice.)

L'échange de notes a.été enregistré par le Gouvernement islandais au
Secrétariat de l'orgariisation des Nations Unies le 8juin 1961.
21. Le déroulement des négociations révèledonc les intentions des

parties et explique en outre pourquoi il étaitprévu quele Gouvernement
islandais devrait donrier au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni un préavis
de six mois: en effet,.e2 décembre1960,les représentantsdu Royaume-
Uni ont déclaréqueles assurances qu'ilscherchaient à obtenir devraient
notamment sptcifier que, ((dans l'attente de la décision de la Cour,
toute mesure prise pour donner effet à une telle règlene s'appliquera
pas aux navires britainniques)).Le ministre des Affaires étrangèresd'Is-
lande a répondu le mêmejour, suivant les documents fournis, que
l'aspect le plus difficile du problème des assurances concernait les
dispositions à prévoir pour garantir ((qu'en cas de différend aucune
mesure tendant à élargirles limites de pêchene serait prise sans que la
Cour internationale en soit saisie)).
22. L'idéed'un préavisde sixmois à donner par l'Islande a étdiscutée

pour la première foiisle 3 décembre 1960 et reprise dans la formule
proposéele mêmejour par la délégation islandaise(voir ci-dessus para-
graphe 19). Les parties ont acceptécette obligation de préavis.On peut
supposer que, dans leur esprit, ce délaidevait suffire pour permettre
de réglerla question par voie de négociationsou, à défaut,pour saisir
la Cour de l'ensemble du problème, y compris, conformément aux
pouvoirs que lui reconnaît le Statut, le problème de l'applicabilité aux
navires britanniques des mesures d'exclusion pendente lite. En outre
l'interprétation avancéepar le ministre des Affaires étrangèresd'Islande
dans sa lettre du 29 mai 1972au Greffier, selon laquelle l'obligation de
préavisavait pour effet de limiter le droit de saisir la Cour àl'éventualité
où le Gouvernement islandais ((reculeraitde nouveau sans préavisles

limites de pêche))(lesiitaliques sont de la Cour), ne correspond pas au
texte de la clause comprornissoire, qui vise nettement l'extension des
limites et non le préavis d'extension.Au surplus l'historique des négocia-
tions conduit à écarter cette interprétation.

23. Cet historique renforce la thèse selonlaquelle la Cour est compé-
tente en l'espèceet fait ressortir que l'intention véritable des parties
était de donner au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni des assurances
réellesqui constituaient une condition sine qua non et non pas simple-
ment une condition dissociable de l'ensemblede l'accord, et consistaient
dans le droit de contester devant la Cour la validité de tout nouvel
élargissement de la compétence de l'Islande en matière de pêcheriesIn consequence, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court to entertain the
present Application would fa11within the terms of the compromissory
clause and correspond exactly to the intentions and expectations of both
Parties when they discussedand consented to that clause. It thus appears
from the text ofthe compromissory clause,read in the context of the 1961
Exchange of Notes and in the light of the history of the negotiations, that
the Court hasjurisdiction. It has however been contended that the agree-
ment either was initially void or hassince ceased to operate. The Court
willnow consider these contentions.

24. The letter of 29 May 1972 addressed to the Registrar by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Icelandcontains the following statement:

"The 1961 Exchange of Notes took place under extremely difficult
circumstances, when the British Royal Navy had been using force
to oppose the 12-mile fishery limit established by the Icelandic
Government in 1958."

This statement could be interpreted as a veiled charge of duress pur-
portedly rendering the Exchange of Notes void ab initi ao,d it was dealt
with as such by the United Kingdom in its Memorial. There can be little
doubt, as is implied in the Charter of the United Nations and recognized
in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that
under contemporary international law an agreement concluded under
the threat or use of force is void. It is equally clear that a court cannot
consider an accusation of this serous nature on the basis of a vague
general charge unfortified by evidencein its support. The history of the
negotiations which led up to the 1961 Exchange of Notes reveals that
these instruments were freely negotiated by the interested parties on the
basis of perfect equality and freedom of decision on both sides. No fact
has been brought to the attention of the Court from any quarter sug-

gesting the slightest doubt on this matter.

25. In his letter of 29 May 1972 to the Registrar of the Court, the
Minister for Foreign Affairsof Iceland observed that the 1961agreement
"was not of a permanent nature" and added that:
"In particular, an undertaking for judicial settlement cannot be

considered to be of a permanent nature. There is nothing in that
situation, or in any generaluleofcontemporary international law, to
justify any other view."
This observation, directed against the Court's jurisdiction, appears todans les eaux recouvrant son plateau continental au-delà de la limite de
12milles. En conséqiiencel'exercicepar la Cour de sa compétencepour
connaître de la présente requêteentrerait dans le cadre de la clause
compromissoire et répondrait exactement à ce qu'étaientles intentions
et l'attente des deux: parties lorsqu'elles ont discuté et accepté cette
clause. 11ressort ainsi du libelléde la clause compromissoire, replacé
dans le contexte de l'lichangede notes de 1961et interprété comptetenu
de l'historique des négociations, que la Cour est compétente. On a
cependant soutenu que l'accord était nul dès l'origine ou qu'il a cessé
d'êtreapplicable depiuislors. La Cour va examiner ces thèses.

24. La lettre adresséele 29 mai 1972au Greffier par le ministre des
Affaires étrangères d"1slandecontient l'affirmation suivante:
((L'échangede notes de 1961est intervenu dans des circonstances
extrêmement difificilàsun moment où la flotte britannique em-
ployait la force pour s'opposerà l'application de la limite de pêche

de 12millesque IleGouvernement islandais avait établie en 1958.))
Cette affirmation peut êtreinterprétée commeune allégationdéguisée
de contrainte qui aurait prétendument rendu l'échangede notes nul
dèsl'origine et le Royaume-Uni l'a considéréecomme telle dans son
mémoire. Il n'y a gu2:rede doute que, comme cela ressort implicitement
de la Charte des Nations Unies et comme le reconnaît l'article 52 de la

convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, un accord dont la con-
clusion a étéobtenue par la menace ou l'emploi de la force est nul en
droit international contemporain. Il est non moins clair qu'un tribunal
ne peut pas prendre en considération une accusation aussi grave sur la
base d'une allégation générale et vague qu'aucune preuve ne vient
étayer. Le déroulement des négociationsqui ont abouti à l'échangede
notes de 1961montre que les instruments ont été librementnégociés par
les parties intéresséessur la base d'une parfaite égalitéet d'une pleine
libertéde décision. Il n'a étésignaléà l'attention de la Cour aucun fait
qui laisserait planer le moindre doute sur ce point.

25. Dans sa lettre du 29 mai 1972au Greffier, le ministre des Affaires
étrangèresd'Islande ;ifait valoir que l'accord de 1961 ((n'avait pas un
caractère permanent):^et il a ajouté:
((En particulier on ne saurait considérer comme permanent un
engagement de si: $oumettre au règlement judiciaire. Riendans cette
situation ni dans une règle générale de droit international contem-
porain ne justifietraitune autre manière de voir.»

Cette observation, dont l'objet est de nier la compétence de la Cour, 15 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)

rest on the following chain of reasoning: (1) inasmuch as the com-
promissory clause contains no provision for termination, it could be
deemed to be of a permanent nature; but (2) a compromissory clause

cannot be of a permanent nature; therefore (3) it must be subject to
termination by givingadequate notice. Thisreasoning appears to underlie
the observation of the Government of Iceland in its aide-mémoire of
31August 1971to the effectthat:
"In the opinion of the Icelandic Government ... the object and
purpose of the provision for recourse to judicial settlement of
certain matters envisaged in the passage quoted above [i.e., the
compromissory clause] have been fully achieved."

26. It appears to the Court that, although the compromissory clause
in the 1961 Exchange of Notes contains no express provision regarding
duration, the obligation it embraces involves an inherent time-factor
conditioning its potential application. It cannot, therefore, be described
accurately as being of a permanent nature or as one binding the parties
in perpetuity. This becomes evident from a consideration of the object
of the clause when read in the context of theExchange of Notes.

27. The 1961 Exchange of Notes did not set up a definite time-limit
within which the Government of Iceland might make a claim in im-
plementation of the Althing's resolution. It follows that there could be
no specification of a time-limit for the corresponding right of the United
Kingdom to challenge such an extension and, if no agreement were
reached and the dispute persisted, to invoke the Court's jurisdiction. The
right of the United Kingdom thus to act would last so long as Iceland
might seek to implement the Althing's resolution. This was, of course,
within the control of the Government of Iceland which in 1971,ten years
after theExchange of Notes, made a claim to exclusivefisheryrights over
the entire continental shelf area surrounding its territory and thus
automatically brought into play the right of the United Kingdom to have
recourse to the Court.

28. That being so, the compromissory clause in the 1961Exchange of
Notes may be described as an agreement to submit to the Court, at the

unilateral request of either party, a particular type of dispute which was
envisaged and anticipated by the parties. The right to invoke the Court's
jurisdiction was thus deferred until the occurrence of well-definedfuture
events and was therefore subject to a suspensive condition. In other
words, it was subject to a condition which could, at any time, materialize
if Iceland made a claim to extend her fishery limits, and the right of
recourse to theCourt could be invoked only in that event.

29. The above observations sufice to dispose of a possible objection
based on viewsexpressed by certain authorities to the effectthat treaties
of judicial settlement or declarations of acceptance of the compulsorysemble sefonder sur le raisonnement suivant: 1)la clausecompromissoire
ne contenant aucune disposition relative à son extinction, on pourrait

lui attribuer un caractère permanent; 2) mais une clause compromissoire
ne saurait avoir un caractère permanent; 3) il doit donc êtrepossible
d'y mettre finmoyenniant un préavisadéquat. C'est ceraisonnement qui
parait être à la base de l'observation figurant dans l'aide-mémoire du
Gouvernement islandais du 31 août 1971selon laquelle:
«De l'avis du Gouvernement islandais ...la disposition sur le
recours au règlement judiciaire en certaines matières envisagédans
le passage cité [isavoir la clause compromissoire] a entièrement

atteint son but et son objet.))
26. LaCour estime que, bien que la clause compromissoire de l'échange
de notes de 1961 ne contienne aucune disposition expresse concernant
sa durée, l'obligation qu'elle prévoit comporte un facteur temporel
intrinsèque qui en conditionne l'application. Ilserait donc inexact de
dire qu'elle possède Lincaractère permanent ou qu'elle lie les parties à
perpétuité. Celarésulte à l'évidenced'un examen de l'objet de cette

clause replacéedans le contexte de l'échangede notes.
27. L'échange de notes de 1961 ne fixait pas de délai précisdans
lequel le Gouvernement islandais pourrait prétendre mettre en Œuvre
la résolution de 1'Althing. Il s'ensuit qu'aucune limite de temps ne
pouvait êtrespécifiéepour le droit correspondant du Royaume-Uni de
contester toute prétention de l'Islande à un élargissement de la zone
de pêcheet d'itivoqui:r la juridiction de la Cour dans le cas où, aucun
accord n'étant concl~i,le différendpersisterait. Ce droit du Royaume-
Uni devait durer aussi longtemps que l'lslande pourrait chercherà mettre
en Œuvre la résolution de I'Althing. Cela ne dépendait évidemment que
du Gouvernement islandais qui, en 1971, soit dix ans après l'échange
de notes, a revendiqué des droits exclusifs en matière de pêcheriessur
toute la zone du plateau continental entourant son territoire, faisant
ainsi automatiquement jouer le droit du Royaume-Uni de saisir la
Cour.

28. Dans ces conditions, la clause comprornissoire formulée dans
l'échange de notes de 1961 pourrait êtredéfinie comme un accord
prévoyant de soumettre à la Cour, sur requête unilatéralede l'une ou
l'autre des parties, un genre particulier de différend envisagéet prévu
par celles-ci. Le droit d'invoquer la compétence de la Cour ne devait
donc être mis en Œuvrequ'au moment où surviendraient certains événe-
ments futurs et bien définiset, partant, était soumis à une condition
suspensive. Autrement dit, ilétait subordonnéà une conditionquipouvait
à tout moment se réaliser - l'affirmation par l'Islande d'une prétention
à un élargissementde sa zone de pêche - et le droit d'agir devant la Cour
ne pouvait être invoquéque dans cette éventualité.
29. Ces observations suffisentàfaire justice d'une objection éventuelle
s'appuyant sur l'opinion de certaines autorités d'après lesquelles les
traités de règlementjudiciaire ou les déclarationsd'acceptation delajuri-16 FISHERlES JURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)

jurisdiction of the Court are among those treaty provisions which, by
their very nature, may be subject to unilateral denunciation in the absence
of express provisions regarding their duration or termination. Since those
views cannot apply to a case such as the present one, the Court does not
need to examine or pronounce upon the point of principle involved. It is
sufficient to remark thatsuch viewshave reference only to instruments in
which the parties had assumed a general obligation to submit to judicial
settlement al1or certain categories of disputes which might arise between
them in the unpredictable future. The 1961 Exchange of Notes does not
embody an agreement of this type. It contains a definite compromissory
clause establishing the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with a concrete
kind of dispute which was foreseen and specifically anticipated by the
parties. In consequence, when a dispute arises of precisely the sort
contemplated, and is referred to the Court, the contention that the com-
promissory clause has lapsed, or is terminable, cannot be accepted.

30. In his statement to the Althing on 9 November 1971,the Prime
Minister of Iceland alluded not only to an alleged change of circum-
stances with respect to fisheries and fishing techniques (which will be
considered later in this Judgment), but also to changes regarding "legal
opinion on fisheries jurisdiction". However, the relevance to the com-
promissory clause of this allusion is not apparent, since if there is a
dispute as to such changes it would be embraced in the compromissory
clause and might be considered as an issue going to the merits. On the
other hand, it could be considered as relevant to the compromissory
clause on an hypothesis familiar in the law of certain States under the
guise of "failure of consideration". Assuch, it is linked with the assertion
th~t, the object and purpose of the agreement having been fulfilled, it no
longer has a binding effect for Iceland.
31. It should be observed at the outset that the compromissory clause

has a bilateral character, each of the parties being entitled to invoke the
Court's jurisdiction; it is clear that in certain circumstances it could be
to Iceland's advantage to apply to the Court. The argument of Iceland
appears, however, to be that, because of the general trend of development
of international law on the subject of fishery limits during the last ten
years, the right of exclusivefisheriesjurisdiction to a distance of2miles
from the baselines of the territorial sea has been increasingly recognized
and claimed by States, including the applicant State itself. It would then
appear to be contended that the compromissory clause was the price
paid by Iceland for the recognition at that time of the 12-mile fishery
limit by the other Party. It is consequently asserted that if today the 12-
mile fishery limit is generally recognized, there would be a failure of
consideration relieving Iceland of itscommitment because of the changed
legal circumstances. Ttis on this basis that is is possible to interpret thediction obligatoire de la Cour sont au nombre des dispositions conven-
tionnelles qui, par nature, peuvent être dénoncéesunilatéralemelotrsque
aucune disposition expresse ne régitleur duréeou leur extinction. Etant
donnéque cette thèsen'est pas applicable en l'espèce,la Cour n'a pas à
examiner le principe en question nià se prononcer à ce sujet. Il suffitde
souligner que cette conception ne vise que les instruments par lesquels les
parties acceptent l'obligation générale desoumettre au règlementjudi-
ciaire tous les différends,ou certaines catégories dedifférends,pouvant
survenir entre elles clans un avenir imprévisible. L'échangee notes de
1961ne contient pas un accord de cette nature. II comporte une clause
compromissoire préciseétablissantla compétencede la Cour pour con-
naître d'une catégorie déterminée dd eifférends,prévueet spécialement

envisagéepar les parties. En conséquence,lorsque surgit un différend
qui entre précisémentdans la catégorieenvisagéeet qui est portédevant
laCour,on ne sauraii:admettre quela clausecompromissoire soitcaduque
ou qu'il puissey êtremis fin.

30. Dans la déclaration qu'il a faite le 9 novembre 1971 devant
I'Althing, le premier ministre d'Islande a évoquénon seulement un pré-
tendu changement d:ecirconstances en ce qui concerne la pêcheet les
techniques de pêche (voirci-après)mais encore des changements inter-
venus dans ((l'opiniondes juristes sur la compétenceen matière de pê-
cheries)). On ne voit pas l'intérêdte cette observation à l'égardde la
clause compromissoire car tout différend éventuerlelatifà de tels chan-
gements relèveraitde cette clause et pourrait être considércomme une

question touchant au fond. On pourrait en revanche tenir cette obser-
vation pour pertinente si l'on acceptait une notion bien connue dans le
droit de certains Etats, celle d'absence de contrepartie. A ce titre, elle
se rattacheà l'affirmation selon laquellel'accord, ayant atteint son objet
et son but, ne lie plus l'Islande.
31. Il convient de noter, pour commencer, que la clause compromis-
soire a un caractère bilatéral,chacune des parties étant en droit d'in-
voquer la compétence dela Cour; il est clair que, dans certaines hypo-
thèses, l'Islande aurait intérêt agir devant la Cour. L'argument de
l'Islande paraît néanmoinscelui-ci: vu lesens général ans lequel le droit
international a évoluéces dix dernières annéesen ce qui concerne les
limites des pêcheries,un nombre toujours plus grand d7Etats, y compris
1'Etatdemandeur, ont reconnu et réclamé ledroit àune compétenceexclu-
sive en matière de pêchejusqu'à une distance de 12 milles à partir des

lignes de base de la mer territoriale. On soutientdonc, semble-t-il,que la
clause compromissoire est le prix que l'Islande a payépour que son
cocontractant admette à l'époquela limite de 12 milles en matière de
pêcheries.On allègueen conséquence que,la zone de pêchede 12milles
étant génkralementreconnue aujourd'hui, on se trouverait dans un cas
où la contrepartieailrait disparu, et que ce changement de circonstances

17Prime Minister's statement to the Althing on 9 November 1971, to the
effect that it was unlikely that the agreement would have been made if
the Government of Iceland had known how these matters would evolve.

32. While changes in the law may under certain conditions constitute
valid grounds for invoking a change of circumstances affecting the

duration of a treaty, the lcelandic contention is not relevant to the
present case. The motive which induced Iceland to enter into the
1961 Exchange of Notes may well have been the interest of obtaining
an immediate recognition of an exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a
distance of 12 miles in the waters around its territory. It may also be that
this interest has in the meantime disappeared, since a 12-mile fishery
zone is now asserted by the other contracting party in respect of its own
fisheries jurisdiction. But in the present case, the object andpurpose of
the 1961 Exchange of Notes, and therefore the circumstances which
constituted an essential basis of the consent of both parties to be bound
by the agreement embodied therein, had a much wider scope. That object
and purpose was not merely to decide upon the Icelandic claim to
fisheriesjurisdiction up to12miles, but also to provide a means whereby
the parties might resolve the question of the validity of anyfurther claims.
This follows not only from the text of the agreement but also from the
history of the negotiations, thatis to Say,from the whole set of circum-
stances which must be taken into account in determining what induced
both parties to agree to the 1961Exchange of Notes.

33. According to the memorandum submitted by the Government of
Iceland to the Althing on 28 February 1961,together with the proposed
Exchange of Notes, the agreement comprised :

"... four main points:
(1) Britain recognises immediately the 12 mile fishery zone of Ice-
land.
(2) Britain recognises important changes in the baselines in four
places around the country, which extends the fishery zone by
5065 square kilometres.
(3) British ships will be permitted to fish within specified areas
between the 6 and 12 mile limits for a limited period each year
during the next three years.

(4) The Government of Iceland declares that it will continue to
work for the implementation of the parliamentary resolution
of 5 May, 1959, regarding the extension of the fisheries juris-
diction around Iceland and that any dispute on actions that may
be taken, will be referred to the International Court of Justice."

Undoubtedly certain of these provisions, such as those concerning
fishing in designatedareas during a period of three years, had a transitoryd'ordre juridique libérerait l'Islande de son engagement. C'est ainsi
qu'il est possible d'interpréter la déclarationfaite par le premier ministre
devant 1'Althing le 9 novembre 1971 et selon laquelle l'accord n'aurait
probablement pas été conclusi le Gouvernement islandais avait su
comment leschoses allaient évoluer.
32. Certes des changements survenus dans le droit peuvent, dans cer-
taines conditions, juistifier que soit invoqué un changement de circons-
tances influant sur la durée d'un traité,mais la thèse islandaise n'est

pas pertinente en l'occurrence. II se peut que le motif ayant amené
l'Islandeà conclure l'échangede notes de 1961tienne à ce qu'elle avait
intérêtà obtenir la reconnaissance immédiate de sa com~étenceexclusive
en matière de pêcheries jusqu'à une distance de 12 milles dans les eaux
entourant son territoire.Il se peut aussi que cet intértit disparu depuis
lors, puisque son cocontractant affirme a présent que sa pr6pre compé-
tente sur les pêcheries s'exercedans une zone de 12 milles. Mais en
l'espècel'objet et le but de I'échangede notes de 1961, et par suite les
circonstances qui constituaient une base essentielle du consentement des
parties àêtreliéespar l'accord qu'il contenait, avaient une portée beau-
coup plus large. Il s'agissait non seulement de trancher la prétention du
Gouvernement islanclaisd'étendre sacomvétenceen matière de vêcheries
à une distance de 12milles mais encore de fournir un moyen permettant

aux parties de réglerentre elles la question de la validité detoute préten-
tion ultérieure.Cela résultenon seulement du texte de l'accord mais aussi
de l'historique desnkgociations, autrement dit de I'ensembIedescircons-
tances que l'on doit prendre en considération pour déterminer ce qui
a amenéles deux parties àconclure I'échangede notes de 1961.
33. D'aprèsle mémorandum que le Gouvernement islandais a soumis à
1'Althing le 28 février 1961 avec le projet d'échange de notes, l'accord
comportait :

((quatre aspects principaux:
1) La Grande-Elretagne reconnaît immédiatement la zone de pêche
islandaise de 12 milles.
2) La Grande-Biretagne accepte d'importants changements deslignes
de base en quatre endroits autour du pays, qui augmentent de
5065 kilomètres carrés l'étendue dela zone de pêche.
3) Au cours des trois prochaines années, les navires britanniques
pourront pêcherdans certaines zones situéesentre 6 et 12 milles
pendant un laps de temps limitéchaque année.
4) Le Gouvernement islandais déclare qu'il continuera de s'em-

ployer à mettre en Œuvre la résolution parlementaire du 5 mai
1959 relativeà l'élargissementde la juridiction sur les pêcheries
autour de l'Islande et que tout différend sur les mesures qui
pourraient être prises sera porté devant la Cour internationale
de Justice.))
II est hors de doute que certaines de ces dispositions comme celles qui
concernaientla pêch'deans des zones déterminéesau cours d'une périodecharacter and may be considered to have become executed. But in
contrast there are other provisions which do not possess that same tran-
sitory character. The compromissory clause is an instance.
34. It is possible that today lceland may find that some of the motives

which induced it to enter into the 1961 Exchange of Notes have become
less compelling or have disappeared altogether. But this is not a ground
justifying the repudiation of those parts of the agreement the object and
purpose of which have remained unchanged. lceland has derived benefits
from the executed provisions of the agreement, such as the recognition
by the United Kingdom since 1961 ofa 12-mileexclusive fisheriesjuris-
diction, the acceptance by the United Kingdom of the baselines estab-
lished by lceland and the relinquishment in a period of three years of the
pre-existing traditional fishing by vessels registered in the United King-
dom. Clearly it then becomes incumbent on Iceland to comply with its
side of the bargain, which is to accept the testing before the Court of the
validity of its further claims to extended jurisdiction. Moreover, in the
case of a treaty which is in part executed and in part executory, in which
one of the parties has already benefited from the executed provisions of
the treaty, it would be particularly inadmissible tollow that party to put
an end to obligations which were accepted under the treaty by way of
quidpro quofor the provisions which the other party has already executed.

35. In his letter of 29 May 1972 to the Registrar, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of lceland refers to "the changed circumstances resulting
from the ever-increasing exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas
surrounding Iceland". Judicial notice should also be taken of other
statements made on the subject in documents which Iceland has brought
to the Court's attention. Thus, the resolution adopted by the Althing on
15 February 1972 contains the statement that "owing to changed cir-
cumstances the Notes concerning fishery limits exchanged in 1961are no
longer applicable".
36. In these statements the Government of Iceland is basing itself on
the principle of termination of a treaty by reason of change of circum-
stances. International law admits that a fundamental change in the
circumstances which determined the parties to accept a treaty, if it has
resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations
imposed by it, may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected a
ground for invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty. This
principle, and the conditions and exceptions to which it is subject, have
been embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which may in many respects be considered as a codification of
existing customary law on the subject of the termination of a treaty
relationship on account of change of circumstances.

37. One of the basic requirements embodied in that Article is that thede trois ans avaient un caractère transitoire et peuvent être considérées
comme ayant étéexécutées.D'autres dispositions en revanche n'avaient
pas le mêmecaractère transitoire; la clause compromissoire en est une.
34. 11se peut que I'lslande estime actuellement que certains des motifs
qui l'ont poussée à accepter l'échangede notes de 1961n'ont plus autant
de force ou qu'ils ont entièrement disparu. Mais ce n'est pas une raison
pour en exclure les dispositions dont le but et l'objeterrieurent inchan-
gés. L'Islande a retiré certains avantages des dispositions de l'accord
qui ont étéexécutées,par exemple, la reconnaissance par le Royaume-
Uni depuis 1961de s;acompétenceexclusive sur une zone de pêchede 12
milles, l'acceptation]parle Royaume-Uni des lignes de base définiespar
l'Islande et la renonciation après une période de trois ans à la pêche
traditionnellement pratiquée par des navires immatric'ilésau Royaume-
Uni. II est donc évidentque l'Islande doit à son tour remplir les obliga-

tions qui luiincombmt en contrepartie et qui consistent à accepter l'exa-
men par la Cour de la validitéde ses nouvelles prétentions concernant
l'extension de sajuri,diction. Au surplus dans le cas où un traitéest par-
tiellement exécutéet partiellement exécutoireet où l'une des parties a déjà
bénéficié des dispositions exécutées,il serait particulièrement inadmis-
sible d'autoriser cette partie à mettre fin à des obligations qu'elle a
acceptées envertu dii traité et qui constituent la contrepartie des dispo-
sitions que l'autre a déjàexécutées.

35. Dans sa lettre du 29 mai 1972au Greffier, le ministre des Affaires
étrangères d'Islande a mentionné «le changement de circonstances résul-
tant de l'exploitation toujours croissante des ressources de la pêchedans

les mers entourant l'Islande». Il convient aussi de prendrenote desautres
déclarations faitesà ce sujet dans les documents que l'Islande a portés
à l'attention de la Ccour.Ainsi, dans la résolutionadoptéepar I'Althingle
15février1972,il étai.tdit qu'en raison ((duchangement des circonstances,
les notes échangées en1961 sur les limites des pêcheries nesont plus
applicables)).
36. Dans ces déclarations, le Gouvernement islandais se fonde sur
le principe selon lequel un changement de circonstances entraînerait la
caducitéd'un traité. Le droit international admet que, si un changement
fondamental des circonstances qui ont incitéles parties à accepter un
traité transforme radicalement la portée des obligations imposées par
celui-ci, la partieéséede ce fait peut,à certaines conditions, en prendre
argument pour invoquer la caducitéou la suspension du traité. Ce prin-
cipe et lesconditionset exceptionsauxquelles ilestsoumis ont été énoncés
à l'article 62 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités quipeut,

à bien des égards,êtreconsidéré commeune codification du droit coutu-
mier existant en ce aui concerne la cessation des relations convention-
nelles en raisond'un changement de circonstances.
37. L'une des coniditions essentielles requises par cet article est que lechange of circumstances must have been a fundamental one. In this
respect the Government of lceland has, with regard to developments in

fishing techniques, referred in an official publication on Fisheries Juvis-
Clicfi i0I7celane dnclosed with the Foreign Minister's letter of 29 May
1972 to the Registrar, to the increased exploitation of the fishery re-
sources in the seas surrounding lceland and to the danger of still further
exploitation because of an increase in the catching capacity of fishing
fleets.The Icelandic statements recall the exceptional dependence of that
country on its fishing for its existence and economic development. In his
letter of 29 May 1972the Minister stated:

"The Government of Iceland, considering that the vital interests
of the people of Iceland are involved, respectfully informs the Court
that it is notwilling to confer jurisdiction on the Court in any case
involving the extent of the fishery limits of Iceland..."

In this same connection, the resolution adopted by the Althing on 15
February 1972had contained a paragraph in these terms:

"That the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic of Germany be again informed that because of the vital
interests of the nation and owing to changed circumstances the
Notes concerning fishery limits exchanged in 1961 are no longer
applicable and that their provisions do not constitute an obligation
for Iceland."

38. The invocation by Iceland of its "vital interests", which were not
made the subject of an express reservation to the acceptance of the juris-
dictional obligation under the 1961 Exchange of Notes, must be inter-
preted, in the context of the assertion of changed circumstances, as an
indication by Iceland of the reason why it regards as fundamental the
changes which in its view have taken place in previously existing fishing
techniques. This interpretation would correspond to the traditional view
that the changes of circumstances which must be regarded as fundamental
or vital arethose which imperil the existence or vital development of one

of the parties.
39. The Applicant, for its part, contends that the alterations and
progress in fishing techniques have not produced in the waters around
Iceland the consequences apprehended by Iceland and therefore that the
changes are not of a fundamental or vital character. In its Mernorial, it
points out that, as regards the capacity of fishing fleets, increases in the
efficiency of individual trawlers have been counter-balanced by the
reduction in total numbers of vessels in national fleets fishing in the
waters around Iceland, and that the statistics show that the total annual
catch of demersal species has varied to no great extent since 1960.

40. The Court, at the present stage of the proceedings, does not needchangement de circon:stancesait étéfondamental. A ce sujet, le Gouver-
nement islandais, dans une publication officielle intitulée Fisheries
Jurisdiction in Iceland,jointeà la lettre du ministre des Affaires étrangères
du 29 mai 1972, a fait état, en ce qui concerne les progrès intervenus
dans les techniques di: pêche,de l'exploitation croissante des ressources

de la pêchedans les mers entourant l'Islande et du danger d'une exploi-
tation encore plus poussée enraison de l'accroissement de la capacité
de capture des flottilles de pêche.Dans ses déclarations, l'Islande a
rappelé qu'elle étaitexceptionnellement tributaire de la pêchepour son
existence et son développement économique. Le ministre a indiqué
dans sa lettre du 29 mai 1972 :

((Considérantque les intérêts vitauxdu peuple islandais sont en
jeu, le Gouvernernent islandais porte respectueusement à la connais-
sance de la Cour qu'il n'est pas disposé à lui attribuer compétence
dans une affaire qui concernerait l'étendue des pêcheriesislandai-
ses..))

Sur le mêmesujet, on trouve dans la résolution de1'Althingdu 15février
1972le paragraphe suivant :
((Les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de la République
fédérale d'Allemalgneseront de nouveau informés que, en raison des
intérêtsvitaux de la nation et du changement des circonstances, les

notes échangéesen 1961 sur les limites des pêcheriesne sont plus
applicables et que leurs dispositions ne sont pas obligatoires pour
l'Islande.1)
38. Le fait que l'Islande invoque ses ((intérêtsvitaux)) - alors qu'ils
n'étaientpas l'objet d'luneréserve expresse àl'acceptation de l'obligation

juridictionnelle prévuedans l'échangede notes de 1961 - doit êtreinter-
prété, euégard au chlangement de circonstances allégué,comme l'indi-
cation par l'Islande di1motif pour lequel elleconsidèrecommefondamen-
taux les changements intervenus à son avis par rapport aux techniques
depêcheantérieures. Cetteinterprétation correspondrait àl'idéetradition-
nelle que les changernents de circonstances qui doivent êtreconsidérés
commefondamentaux ou vitaux sont ceux qui mettent en péril l'existence
présenteou l'avenir de l'unedes parties.
39. Pour sa part Ir:demandeur soutient que les modifications et les
progrès intervenus dans les techniques de pêchen'ont pas entraîné,dans
les eaux entourant l'l:slande, les conséquences redoutéespar ce pays et

que les changements n'ont donc pas un caractère fondamental ou vital.
Il souligne dans son mémoireque, en ce qui concerne la capacité decap-
ture des flottilles de pêche,l'augmentation du rendement des chalutiers
a été contrebalancéepar une diminution du nombre total des navires
des différentspays qui pêchentdans les eaux entourant l'Islande et que,
d'après les statistiques, le total des prises annuelles des espèces démer-
sales a peu varié depuis 1960.
40. Au stade actuel dela procédure,laCour n'a pas à se prononcer sur to pronounce on this question of fact, as to which there appears to be
a serious divergence of views between the two Governments. If, as con-
tended by Iceland, there have been any fundamental changes in fishing

techniques in the waters around Iceland, those changes might be relevant
forthe decision on the merits of the dispute, and the Court might need to
examine the contention at that stage, together with any other arguments
that Iceland might advance in support of the validity of the extension of
its fisheriesjurisdiction beyond what was agreed to in the 1961Exchange
of Notes. But the alleged changes could not affect in the least the obliga-
tion to submit to the Court's jurisdiction,which is the only issue at the
present stage of the proceedings.It follows that the apprehended dangers
for the vital interests of Iceland, resulting from changes in fishing tech-
niques, cannot constitute a fundamental change with respect to the
lapse or subsistence of the compromissory clause establishing the
Court's jurisdiction.

41. lt should be observed in this connection that the exceptional
dependence of Iceland on its fisheries for its subsistence and economic
development is expressly recognized in the 1961 Exchange of Notes, and
the Court, in itsrder of 17August 1972,stated that "it isalso necessary

to bear in mind the exceptional dependence of the Icelandic nation upon
coastal fisheries for its livelihood and economjc development as ex-
pressly recognized by the United Kingdom in its Note addressed to the
Foreign Minister of Iceland dated 11 March 1961". The Court further
stated that "from this point of view account must be taken of the need
for the conservation of fish stocks in the Iceland area" (I.C.J.Reports
1972, pp. 16and 17).This point is not disputed.

42. Account must also be taken of the fact that the Applicant has
contended before the Court that to the extent that Iceland may, as a
coastal State specially dependent on coastal fisheries for its livelihood or
economic development, assert a need to procure the establishment of a
special fisheries conservation régime (including such a régime under
which it enjoys preferential rights) in the waters adjacent to its Coastbut
beyond the exclusive fisherieszone provided for by the 1961 Exchange of
Notes, it can legitimately pursue that objective by collaboration and
agreement with the other countries concerned, but not by the unilateral

arrogation of exclusive rights within those waters. The exceptional
dependence of Iceland on its fisheries and the principle of conservation
of fish stocks having been recognized, the question remains as to whether
lceland is or is not competent unilaterally to assert an exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction extending beyond the 12-mile limit. The isue before the
Court in the present phase of the proceedings concerns solely its juris-
diction to determine the latter point.cette question de fait à propos de laquelle une grave divergence de
vues paraît exister entre les deux gouvernements. Si, comme l'Islande
le soutient, des changements fondamentaux sont intervenus en ce qui
concerne les techniqu~csde pêchedans les eaux entourant l'Islande, ces
changements ne pourraient avoir d'intérêtqu'aux fins de la décision
relative au fond du différend et c'est au stade du fond que la Cour
pourrait avoir à examiner cette thèse, comme tous autres arguments que
l'Islande pourrait invoquer à l'appui de la légitimitéde l'extension de

sajuridiction en matière depêcheriesau-delà des dispositions de l'échange
de notes de 1961. Mais de tels changements ne sauraient modifier en
quoi que ce soit l'obligation d'accepter la compétence de la Cour, seule
question qui se pose en la présente phasede l'instance. II s'ensuit que les
dangers que les transformations des techniques de pêcheferaient courir
aux intérêtsvitaux de l'Islande ne sauraient constituer un changement
fondamental pour ce qui est du maintien en vigueur ou de la caducitéde
la clause compromissoire établissant la compétencede la Cour.
41. 11convient de releverà ce propos que l'exceptionnelle dépendance
de l'Islandeà l'égardde ses pêcheriespour sa subsistance et son dévelop-
pement économique est expressémentreconnue dans l'échangede notes
de 1961 et, dans son ordonnance du 17 août 1972, la Cour a dit: ((il
faut également ne pals oublier que la nation islandaise est exception-
nellement tributaire de ses pêcheriescôtières pour sa subsistance et
son développement économique,ainsi que le Royaume-Uni l'a reconnu

dans la note adresséele 11mars 1961au ministre des Affaires étrangères
d'Islande)). La Cour a ajouté que «de ce point de vue, il faut tenir
compte de la nécessitCde la conservation des stocks de poisson dans la
région de l'Islande» (C.I.J. Recueil 1972, p. 16 et 17). Ce point est
acauis.
42. 11faut également tenir compte de ce que le demandeur a soutenu
devant la Cour que, dans la mesure où l'Islande peut, en tant qu'Etat
riverain essentiellement tributaire des pêcheriescôtières pour sa sub-
sistance ou son développement économique, faire valoir la nécessité
d'un régime spécialde conservation des pêcheries(notamment un régime
lui conférant des droits prioritaires) dans les eaux adjacentesses côtes
mais situéesau-delà diela zone exclusive de pêcheprévuedans l'échange
de notes de 1961, elle peut légitimement poursuivre cet objectif par
voie de collaboration et d'entente avec les autres pays intéresséset non

pas en s'arrogeant unilatéralement des droits exclusifs dans lesdites
eaux. Le fait que l''Islande est exceptionnellement tributaire de ses
pêcherieset le principe de la conservation des stocks de poisson ayant
été reconnus,il resteIfepoint de savoir si l'Islande a la compétence voulue
pour s'attribuer unila.téralementune juridiction exclusive en matière de
pêcheriesau-delà de 12milles. En la présentephase de l'instance la Cour
n'a à se prononcer que sur sa compétencepour trancher ce point.21 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)

43. Moreover, in order that a change of circumstances may give rise
to a ground for invoking the termination of a treaty it is also necessary
that it should have resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of
the obligations still to be performed. The change must have increased the
burden of the obligations to be executed to the extent of rendering the
performance something. essentially different from that originally under-
taken. In respect of the obligation with which the Court is here concerned,
this condition is wholly unsatisfied; the change of circumstances alleged
by Iceland cannot be said to have transformed radically the extent of the
jurisdictional obligation which is imposed in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.
The compromissory clause enabled either of the parties to submit to the
Court any dispute between them relating to an extension of Icelandic
fisheriesjurisdiction in the waters above its continental shelf beyond the
12-milelimit. The present dispute is exactly of the character anticipated
in the compromissory clause of the Exchange of Notes. Not only has the

jurisdictional obligation not been radically transformed in its extent; it
has remained precisely what it was in 1961.

44. In the United Kingdom Memorial it is asserted that there is a flaw
in the Icelandic contention of change of circumstances: that the doctrine
never operates so as to extinguish a treaty automatically or to allow an
unchallengeable unilateral denunciation by one Party; it only operates
to confer a right to call for termination and, if that call is disputed, to
submit the dispute to someorgan or body withpower to determine whether
the conditions for the operation of the doctrine are present. In this
connection the Applicant alludes to Articles 65 and 66 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Those Articles provide that where
the parties to a treaty have failed within 12 months to achieve a settle-

ment of a dispute by the means indicated in Article 33 of the United
Nations Charter (which means include reference to judicial settlement)
any one of the parties may submit the dispute to the procedure for con-
ciliation provided in the Annex to the Convention.

45. In the present case, the procedural complement to the doctrine of
changed circumstances is already provided for in the 1961 Exchange of
Notes, which specifically calls upon the parties to have recourse to the
Court in the event of a dispute relating to Iceland's extension of fisheries
jurisdiction. Furthermore, any question as to the jurisdiction of the
Court, deriving from an alleged lapse through changed circumstances,
is resolvable through the accepted judicial principle enshrined in Article
36, paragraph 6, of the Court's Statute, which provides that "in the event
of a dispute as to whether the Court hasjurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by thedecision of the Court". In this case such a dispute obviously
exists, ascan be seen from Iceland's communications to the Court, and 43. Au surplus, pour que l'on puisse invoquer un changement de
circonstances en vue dir mettre finà un traité, ce changement doit avoir
entraîné une transfornnation radicale de la portée des obligations qui
restent à exécuter. II doit avoir rendu plus lourdes ces obligations,
de sorte que leur exécution devienne essentiellement différentede celle
à laquelle on s'étaitengagéprimitivement. En ce qui concerne l'obligation
dont la Cour s'occupe ,àprésent, cettecondition n'est nullement remplie;
on ne saurait dire que le changement de circonstances alléguépar
l'Islande ait transformé:radicalement la portée de l'obligation juridiction-
nelle qu'impose l'échangede notes de 1961. La clause compromissoire
autorisait l'une ouI'acitrepartieà porter devant la Cour tout différend
qui surviendrait entre elles au sujet d'un élargissementde la juridiction

de l'Islande sur les pêcheriesdans les eaux recouvrant son plateau
continental au-delà de la limite de 12 milles. Le différend actuel est
exactement du genre de ceux que la clause compromissoire de l'échange
de notes envisageait.Non seulement l'obligation juridictionnelle ne s'est
pas radicalement transformée dans sa portée mais encore elle est restée
précisémentce qu'elle étaiten 1961.

44. Le Royaume-Uni déclare, dans son mémoire, que la thèse islan-
daise relativeà un changement de circonstances présente une faille: la
théorieen question n'aurait jamais pour effetd'abroger automatiquement
un traité ou d'autoriser une des parties dénoncer un traité unilatérale-

ment et sans contestatiion possible; elle aurait pour seul effetde conférer
le droit de demander l'abrogation et, si cette demande est contestée,
de renvoyer le différend devant un organe ou un organisme habilité
à dire si les conditions requises pour sa mise en jeu sont réunies. A cet
égard le demandeur m.entionne les articles 65 et 66 de la convention de
Vienne sur le droit des traités. Ces articles disposent que, si les parties
à un traité n'ont pu parvenirà réglerleur différenddans les douze mois
par les moyens énumérés à l'article 33 de la Charte des Nations Unies,
moyens parmi lesquelisfigure le règlement judiciaire, toute partie peut
mettre en Œuvre la procédure de conciliation indiquée à l'annexe à la
convention.
45. 11se trouve qu'en l'espècela disposition procédurale complétant
la théoriedu changemrmt de circonstances est déjàprévuedans l'échange

de notes de 1961 qui stipule que les parties porteront devant la Cour
tout différend relatifà l'élargissement par l'Islande de sa juridiction
en matière de pêcheries.En outre, s'il se posait une question quant
à la compétence dela Cour, en raison d'une prétendue caducité résultant
d'un changement de circonstances, on pourrait la résoudrepar application
du principejudiciairerleconnuqui est consacréà l'article 36,paragraphe 6,
du Statut, lequel dispose: ((Encas de contestation sur le point de savoir
si la Cour est compétente, la Cour décide)).En l'espèceune contestation
de cegenre existe manifestement, comme le montrent les communications

22to the other Party, even if Iceland has chosen not to appoint an Agent,
file a Counter-Memorial or submit preliminary objections to the Court's
jurisdiction; and Article 53 of theStatute both entitles the Court and, in

the present proceedings, requires it to pronounce upon the question of its
jurisdiction. This it has now done with binding force.

46. For these reasons,

by fourteen votes to one,

finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland on 14April 1972and to deal with the merits of the dispute.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague,this second day of February, one thou-
sand nine hundred and seventy-three, in three copies, of which one will
be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland and to the Government of the Republic of Iceland, respectively.

(Signeci) ZAFRULLA KHAN,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

President Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHANmakes the following dec-
laration:

1am in entire agreement with the Judgment of the Court. 1consider it
needful, however, to append the following brief declaration.
The sole question before the Court in this phase of these proceedings
is whether, in viewof the compromissory clause in the Exchange of Notes
of II March 1961between the Government of the United Kingdom and
the Government of Iceland, read with Article 36 (1) of its Statute, theadresséespar I'Island~à la Cour età la Partie adverse, mêmesi l'Islande
a choisi de ne pas désignerd'agent, de ne pas déposer de contre-mémoire
et de ne pas présenter d'exceptions préliminaires la compétencede la
Cour; l'article53du Statut donne à la Cour le droit et, dans la présente
affaire, lui impose l'obligation de se prononcer sur le problème de sa
compétence. C'est ce qu'elle fait par une décisionayant l'autorité de la
chose jugée.

46. Par ces motifs,

par quatorze voix contre une,
dit qu'ellea compét'encepour connaître de la requête déposée par le

Gouvernement du R.oyaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du
Nord le 14avril 1972et statuer sur le fond du différend.

Fait en français e.t en anglais, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais
de la Paix,à La Haye, ledeuxfévriermilneuf centsoixante-treize, en trois
exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposé auxarchives de la Cour et dont
lesautresseront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et au Gouvernement de
la République d'Islande.

Le Président,

(Signé) ZAFRULL KAHAN.
Le Greffier,

(Signé) S. AQUARONE.

Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLK AHAN, Président, fait la déclaration
suivante:

Je souscris entièrementà l'arrêtde la Cour. J'estime cependant néces-
saire de lui adjoindre la brèvedéclaration qui suit.
La seule question dont la Cour soit saisie dans la phase actuelle de la
présente instance est celle de savoir si, vu la clause compromissoire de
l'échangede notes du 11mars 1961entre le Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni et le Gouvernernent islandais et compte tenu de l'article6, para-Court is competent to pronounce upon the validity of the unilateral ex-
tension by Iceland of its exclusive fisheriesjurisdiction from to 50
nautical miles from the baselines agreed to by the parties in 1961. Al1
considerations tending to support or to discount the validity of Iceland's

action are, at this stage, utterly irrelevant. Toy such consideration
into aid for the purpose of determining the scope of the Court's jurisdic-
tion, would not only beg the question but would put the proverbial cart
before the horse with a vengeance and is to be strongly deprecated.

Judge Sir Gerald FITZMAURIa Cppends a separate opinion to the
Judgment of the Court.

Judge PADILLN AERVO appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of
the Court.

(Initialled) Z.K.
(Initialled) S.A.graphe 1, de son Statut, la Cour cht conipéterite pour se prononcer sur

la validitéde l'acte ~inilatéralpar leqiiel I'lslande a étendu sa juridiction
exclusive en matière de pêcheriesde 12 milles à 50 niilles ~narins à partir
des lignes de base coiîveniies par les parties en 1961. Toutes les con-
sidérations militant pour OLI contrc I:1validiti. de cet acte de l'Islande
sont, ail stade actuel, entièreineiit dépourvues de pertinence. Invoq~ier
quelque considérationi de ce genre pour déterniiner l'étendue de la

compétence de la Cour, ce ne serait pas seulement préjuger la question
mais bel et bien mettre la charrue devant les bŒufset une telle façon de
faire doit être:t~ormellementdésapprouvée.

Sir Gerald FITZMAURI ugE,, joint à l'arrêtun exposéde son opinion

individuelle.

M. PADILLA NERVO j,ge, joint à l'arrêt un exposé de son opinion
dissidente.

(ParaphéZ j.K.

(Purupf~é) S.A.

ICJ document subtitle

Jurisdiction of the Court

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 2 February 1973

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